2/8/2016 10:02:32 AM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 8997496 By: Euniecy Gentry Filed: 2/8/2016 10:02:32 AM 2015-69353 § § § § § § § § § § Plaintiff v. ANNISE D. PARKER, MAYOR, and THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Defendants IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ist ric t C ler k PHILLIP PAUL BRYANT, 333rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT nie l D Defendants’ Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction Da Defendants the City of Houston (“City”), and Annise D. Parker (“Parker”), in hr is her official capacity as former Mayor of the City of Houston, file their Special C Appearance and, subject thereto, Plea to the Jurisdiction, and request that the ffic Introduction and Summary O I. e of Court dismiss all claims against them. op y The City and former Mayor Parker are entitled to dismissal of all claims in C this case for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. As of this date, ial plaintiff has failed to serve the City or Parker. By statute, the citations expired, Un of fic service cannot be effected now, and the Court never obtained jurisdiction of this case or the Defendants. The case must be dismissed. II. Proper Service is Essential to Invoke the Court’s Jurisdiction Plaintiff is challenging the adoption of new term limits for City elected officials, approved by an overwhelming majority of Houston voters on November 3, 2015. The Election Code imposes strict mandatory burdens on a plaintiff who seeks to set aside ballot measures approved by a majority of citizen voters, as in this case. An essential requirement of any election challenge is timeliness, including the deadlines to file suit and to properly serve the contestees. See Wooley v. Sterrett, 387 ist ric t C ler k S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1965, no writ) (holding that in an election contest, “time is of the essence.”) In this case, plaintiff has yet to serve the former Mayor or the City with citation, therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Landrum v. Centennial Rural High Sch. Dist. No.2, 134 S.W.2d 353, (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin, nie l D 1939, writ dism., judg. cor.) (holding that service in the time and manner prescribed Da by the Election Code is jurisdictional and is not subject to waiver). Proper timely is service was required in order to give the Court jurisdiction. The case must be Timeliness, Diligence and Jurisdiction of III. C hr dismissed. ffic e The Election Code mandates that a person must contest a ballot measure O within a short period of time – “not later than the 30th day after the date the official op y result of the contested election is determined.” Tex. Elect. Code. § 233.006. The ial C Election Code further mandates that the plaintiff must serve the defendants fic within 20 days of the date of the citation. Tex. Elect. Code § 233.008. (“The citation Un of issued in an election contest must direct the officer receiving the citation to return it unserved if it is not served within 20 days after the date of issuance”). A citation that is not served within 20 days must be returned to the court unserved. There is no statutory provision for re-issuance of the citation. Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 2 In this case, the citations were issued on November 25, 2015 and delivered to plaintiff’s counsel for service.1 (Ex. A, copy of Court record of issuance date of citation). Under the Texas Election Code, Plaintiff was required to serve the ist ric t C ler k citations on both defendants by no later than December 15, 2015, or return the citations to the Court unserved. Tex. Elect. Code § 233.008. Plaintiff did neither. Nor did the citations include the required instructions to return the citation. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to “see that service is properly accomplished.” Aguilar v. nie l D Stone, 901 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.—Houston 1995, reh’g overruled). The citations Da were invalid. As a result, this Court never obtained jurisdiction and the case must is be dismissed. No Service C hr IV. of Plaintiff cannot proceed because plaintiff never served the City or former ffic e Mayor Parker and because the attempted service was untimely. Plaintiff’s O attempted service is void because the citation expired before service was attempted, op y neither Defendant was actually served and plaintiff was not diligent in attempting ial C service. fic First, plaintiff’s only attempt at service was by certified mail and it was Un of untimely – plaintiff did not accomplish service within 20 days as required by the Texas Election Code. Tex. Elect. Code § 233.008. The green cards were signed (not by the Defendants) on December 16, 2015. By law, the citations were void because they had expired by the time the certified mail was delivered. See Lewis v. Lewis, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the court record of the docket, pleadings and citations for this case. 1 Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 3 667 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. App.—Waco 1984, no writ.) In Lewis, the Court held that a “citation becomes functus officio,” that is, it is “of no further force or authority” if not served within the stated deadline after issuance. Id. The Lewis court analyzed ist ric t C ler k the language of former Rule 101 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which directed that citations shall be returned unserved if not served within 90 days. Courts uniformly applied the language in former Rule 101 to deny jurisdiction when a defendant was served with a citation older than 90 days. See also Kem v. Krueger, nie l D 626 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 1981, no writ). (“Service [of citation Da 123 days after issuance] was void on its face; the trial court did not acquire is jurisdiction of [defendant] …”). The language of former Rule 101 parallels that of C hr the Texas Election Code citation requirement that the citation shall be returned of unserved if not served within 20 days. Only the deadline differs. Thus, because ffic e service was not accomplished timely under the Election Code, the Court has not O obtained jurisdiction. op y Second, the certified mail receipt was signed by Charles Hicks, who is neither ial C a party, nor an agent for a party for service of process. (Ex. B, Affidavit of Charles fic Hicks). It is immediately clear on the face of the green cards that the signatures are Un of of someone named “Charles,” not “Annise D. Parker.” Plaintiff was aware that service was ineffective based on the green cards, yet did nothing to effect service in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. It is too late now. Third, plaintiff did not exercise any diligence in attempting service. On January 26, 2016, plaintiff provided copies of the green cards to the undersigned, Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 4 contending that the Defendants had been served. In response, the undersigned sent an email that same day to plaintiff’s counsel with a copy of relevant authority—the case, Southwestern Security Servs., Inc. v. Gamboa, 172 S.W.3d 90 (Tex. App.—El ist ric t C ler k Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding that service by certified mail must be signed by the addressee or its agent for service in order to be valid service). (Ex. C, email from undersigned to plaintiff’s counsel). Immediately after receiving the undersigned’s email correspondence, plaintiff chose to file the invalid returns of service with the nie l D Court on January 27, 2016, and decided to give the City Secretary a courtesy copy of Da the citations on January 27, 2016. If the courtesy copy of each citation was an is attempt at service, it was not valid because the returns for those citations had C hr already been returned to the Court with invalid service, and because the citations of had long ago expired. Neither the original citations served on the wrong person, nor ffic e the courtesy copies given to the City Secretary are validly served citations. O Finally, service on former Mayor Parker cannot be accomplished by serving op y “the Mayor Clerk Secretary or Treasurer” as stated on the citation. The citation ial C requested by plaintiff for Mayor Parker was invalid ab initio because it instructed fic Mayor Parker to be served “by serving the Mayor Clerk Secretary or Treasurer.” Un of (Ex. D, copy of citation). Section 17.024 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides that citation may be served on the mayor, clerk, secretary or treasurer, “in a suit against an incorporated city, town, or village.” It does not provide that the clerk, secretary or treasurer is an agent for service on the Mayor. Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 5 There is no excuse for Plaintiff’s indifference and delay in regard to service under the Election Code. Plaintiff is represented by five attorneys from four different law firms, none of whom is a stranger to the courthouse or legal ist ric t C ler k proceedings. In addition, neither the Mayor nor the City of Houston is difficult to locate for service of process. The office of the City Secretary was open during normal business hours during the twenty days after the citations were issued -- just blocks away from the District Clerk’s office where the lawsuit was filed. Even a single nie l D attempt to serve Defendants in person at the City Secretary’s office before Da December 15, 2015, would have accomplished timely service. The Election Code is requires due diligence for service of process. Under the circumstances, the delay in C hr service conclusively demonstrates a striking and unreasonable lack of diligence. The of Court has no jurisdiction. See Bell v. Harrison, 550 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. App.— ffic e Dallas 1977, no writ) (holding that case was properly dismissed because contestant O did not use reasonable diligence when he attempted personal service one time, op y unsuccessfully, and failed to make any further attempt to serve the mayor). ial C Plaintiff did not comply with the Texas Election Code. The citations were void fic after December 15, 2015, and were not properly served. The statute mandated that Un of the citations had to be served within 20 days or returned to the Court unserved. “[N]o other service than that specified [by the Election Code] will suffice to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the contest or suit.” Landrum v. Centennial Rural High Sch. Dist. No. 2, 134 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1939, writ dism., judg. cor.). Plaintiff cannot avoid the dismissal of this case by filing the Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 6 untimely returns of citation with the Court. This Court does not have jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. V. No Personal or Subject Matter Jurisdiction ist ric t C ler k This case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2009). “In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, a court may not weigh the claims’ merits but must consider only the plaintiffs’ pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry.” County of nie l D Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). In this case, the citations show Da on their face that they were not served within 20 days, affirmatively negating the is Court’s jurisdiction. No amendment would cure the defect. See Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d C hr at 621-622. of “[I]f a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, ffic e we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve O the jurisdictional issues raised, even where those facts may implicate the merits of op y the cause of action.” Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 621. (internal quotations omitted). “If ial C that evidence creates a fact issue as to the jurisdictional issue, then it is for the fact- fic finder to decide. However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a Un of fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. The Court has no jurisdiction except as provided by the Texas Election Code. In other words, jurisdiction is determined by the mandatory provisions of Chapter 233 of the Texas Election Code, entitled “Contest on Measure.” Tex. Elect. Code § Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 7 233.001. “The action being a special proceeding, it is necessary that the record affirmatively show the prescribed requisites by which the district court becomes vested with active jurisdiction thereof.” ist ric t C ler k Prior to 1986, the Election Code required that the defendants receive written notice within 30 days. In 1996, the statute was amended, including changing from the “notice” requirement to a service of citation requirement. The current mandatory requirement of the Election Code is that the citation shall be served nie l D within 20 days of its issuance or it shall be returned unserved. Tex. Elect. Code § Da 233.008. Thus, the legislature mandated a short time period for service and is prohibited service of the citation more than 20 days after its issuance. Just as the C hr earlier “notice” requirement was long recognized to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, of so too is service necessary to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. “In the absence of ffic e notice, it has been repeatedly held that the District Court acquired no jurisdiction of (citations omitted). Personal Jurisdiction Cannot be Waived. ial C VI. op y O such contest.” Maddox v. Comm. Ct of Palo Pinto Cnty., 222 S.W.2d 475, 476 (1949) fic This motion serves to resolve the case by dismissal rather than have the case Un of continue to linger on the docket when there has been, and can be, no service. The Special Appearance procedure and jurisdictional challenge is founded in the mandatory provisions of the Election Code that (1) voids a citation after 20 days and (2) precludes the entry of default judgments. Tex. Elect. Code §§ 233.008 and 221.004 (“A default judgment may not be rendered in an election contest.”). Thus Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 8 one way to resolve the case when the plaintiff served the wrong person (in this case, Mr. Hicks), is for the defendants to point out the defect by way of a special appearance to obtain dismissal. ist ric t C ler k Under the Election Code requirements prior to 1986, instead of service of a citation within 20 days of its issuance, the plaintiff was required to give written notice of the his intention to contest the election within 30 days. Landrum v. Centennial Rural High Sch. Dist. No. 2, 134 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.— nie l D Austin 1939, writ dism., judg. cor.). Defendants were entitled to challenge the Da untimely notice without submitting to jurisdiction. Id. “The contestees in a is statutory election contest have no authority to waive such notice and/or service, and C hr hence an appearance by answer does not imply such waiver nor authorize a of presumption of the requisite notice and service. Adamson v. Connally, 112 S.W.2d ffic e 287, 289-90 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland, 1937, reh. denied). (citations omitted). O Similarly, Defendants do not waive the absence of service of process in this case. op y The Court must apply the time limits imposed by the Election Code. It has ial C long been recognized that “[a]n election contest does not partake of the usual fic characteristics of the ordinary case in law or in equity.” Wooley v. Sterrett, 387 Un of S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1965, no writ). As the Wooley court noted: All courts are in accord in holding that an election contest is a statutory proceeding in which statutory requirements must be met and the contest can only be maintained when all of such statutory requirements have been completely satisfied. Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 9 Id. (citations omitted). Without strict adherence to the requirements of the Texas Election Code, an election contest, such as the one brought by plaintiff here, simply cannot succeed. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims ist ric t C ler k VII. Because plaintiff did not follow the statutory requirements of the Election Code, the Court does not have either personal or subject matter jurisdiction over defendants. There is no waiver of governmental immunity under the circumstances. nie l D WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants the City of Houston Da and Annise D. Parker, in her official capacity as former Mayor of the City of is Houston, respectfully request that the Court grant this special appearance and, C hr subject thereto, plea to the jurisdiction to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims and causes of of action in their entirety, and that the Court grant Defendants such other and ffic e further relief to which they may be justly entitled. Un of fic ial C op y O Respectfully submitted, DONNA EDMUNDSON CITY ATTORNEY JUDITH L. RAMSEY CHIEF, GENERAL LITIGATION CENTER /s/ Patricia L. Casey ___ PATRICIA L. CASEY Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No.: 03959075 Tel: 832.393.6302 Fax: 832.393.6259 E-mail: pat.casey@houstontx.gov MARY LUCILLE ANDERSON Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No.: 00793260 Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 10 Tel: 832.393. Fax: 832.393.6259 E-mail: mlucilleanderson@houstontx.gov CITY OF HOUSTON LEGAL DEPARTMENT 900 Bagby, 4th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 ist ric t C ler k Attorneys for Defendants Annise D. Parker, Mayor, and The City of Houston l D CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Da nie I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above referenced pleading was served in compliance with Tex. R. Civ. P. 21 and 21a, on February 8, 2015, upon counsel of record for Plaintiff: Rogelio Garcia 1317 Telephone Road Houston, TX 77021 e of C hr is Eric B. Dick Joe Synoradzki 3701 Brookwoods Dr. Houston, TX 77092 eric@dicklawfirm.com Kevin Fulton 2855 Mangum Rd, Ste 413 Houston, TX 77092 /s/ Patricia L. Casey ___ Patricia L. Casey Un of fic ial C op y O ffic Chris Carmona PO Box 7137 Houston, TX 77248 Defendants’ Special Appearance & Plea to the Jurisdiction Page 11