Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 83 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT LOUISVILLE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. PLAINTIFF CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:15CR-99-DJH CHRISTOPHER MATTINGLY DEFENDANT MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE WIRETAP EVIDENCE AND ALL EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM ELECTRONICALLY FILED Comes the defendant, Christopher Mattingly, by counsel Brian Butler and Alex Dathorne, and hereby moves this Court to Order the United States to suppress the wiretap evidence and all evidence derived therefrom as said wiretap was not properly authorized and said wiretap was not necessary as it was issued prior to attempting and exhausting normal investigative procedures. In support of the motion, Mr. Mattingly states as follows: Chris Mattingly was indicted on September 1, 2015 for conspiring to knowingly and intentionally distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana between May 1, 2014 and June 1, 2015. The investigative agency assisting the United States is the Bullitt County Drug Task Force. BACKGROUND The United States tendered discovery stemming from a Riverside, California state wiretap. According to USA Today Riverside County, California judge assigned to review wiretaps issued “almost five times as many wiretaps as any other judge in the United States” and “three times more taps than all of the federal judges in California combined last year.” Exhibit 1. USA Today further reported that Riverside County, a Los Angeles suburb, “approved almost one Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 84 of every five United States wiretaps last year.” Exhibit 2. All of the applications for wiretaps associated with this matter were signed by assistant district attorneys in Riverside, California, not by the elected Riverside County District Attorney. Assistant District Attorney Jeffery Van Wagenen, Jr. applied for a state wiretap connected to four separate telephone numbers on March 11, 2014. Exhibit 3. The wiretap application affidavit was submitted under penalty of perjury by Detective Christopher Carnahan of the Riverside Police Department. The wiretap application included a required section entitled “Necessity and Exhaustion.” The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section uses boilerplate language to outline the goals of the wiretap investigation. Exhibit 3, pgs 25-26. Then, the ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section delineates investigative techniques “which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation.” Exhibit 3, pgs 26-39. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Interviews’ entirely uses boilerplate language. In sum, the section details not one attempt at interviewing anybody. Exhibit 3, pgs 2627. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Confidential Informants’ also uses only boilerplate language. In sum, the section does not detail a single attempt at trying to recruit an informant. Exhibit 3, pg 27. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section addressing ‘Undercover Officers / Agents’ uses only boilerplate language. Again, no attempt is made to introduce an undercover officer or agent. Exhibit 3, pgs 27-28. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section relating to ‘Controlled Purchases’ again regurgitates boilerplate language and makes no attempt to conduct a controlled purchase. Exhibit 3, pgs 28-29. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Surveillance’ delineates five surveillance attempts between November 2013 and March 2014 including two successful Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 3 of 19 PageID #: 85 attempts in seizing narcotics on December 12, 2013 and March 3, 2014. However, the affidavit is silent as to what less intrusive methods were utilized to follow up on these significant drug seizures. Exhibit 3, pgs 29-33. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section relating to ‘Search Warrants’ once again relies primarily on boilerplate language to attempt to explain why law enforcement did not do anything. Exhibit 3, pgs 33-35. The only specific acts listed were applying for a search warrant on January 22, 2014 concerning a target telephone and applying for search warrants on target telephones on February 25, 2014. Exhibit 3, pg 33. As is characteristic of this affidavit, the affiant does not indicate what information was gleamed from these search warrants nor if any attempt was made to follow up on the information obtained. The affiant simply relies upon boilerplate language. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Pen Registers and Telephone Tolls’ indicates that they have been used in the investigation. Exhibit 3, pg 35. However, no specific details have been outlined and the entire section is boilerplate.1 The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section relating to ‘Closed Circuit Television Monitoring’ uses boilerplate language to once again attempt to explain why law enforcement did not try this investigative technique. Exhibit 3, pgs 35-36. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Trash Searches of Target Locations’ uses boilerplate language to further attempt to explain why law enforcement did not try this investigative technique. Exhibit 3, pgs 36-39. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section discussing ‘Financial Investigation’ also uses boilerplate language to attempt to explain why law enforcement did not do any financial investigation. Exhibit 3, pg 28. Finally, the ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section discussing the 1 In fact, the section references “use of pagers” which are nearly non-existent and a relic of the past which likely indicates that the boilerplate language has been in use for many years and the affiant did not even bother to read it. Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 4 of 19 PageID #: 86 “Grand Jury’ again uses standard boilerplate language to attempt to explain why there has not been any attempt at a Grand Jury investigation. Exhibit 3, pgs 38-39. Based almost entirely upon boilerplate language, a state court judge in Riverside, California authorized wire intercepts. On April 8, 2014, Assistant District Attorney Jeffery Van Wagenen, Jr. applied for a spinoff wiretap from the aforementioned wiretap. Exhibit 4. This application sought to intercept wire communications from (502) 609-5937. The United States has identified (502) 609-5937 as Chris Mattingly’s phone number. The affidavit in support of April 8th application indicates that narcotics related conversations were captured from the March 11th wiretap between the target phone and Chris LNU (last name unknown) at (502) 609-5937. Exhibit 4, pgs 17-19. The wiretap application included a required section entitled “Necessity and Exhaustion.” The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section uses boilerplate language to outline the goals of the wiretap investigation. Exhibit 4, pgs 26-27. In fact, the goals of the wiretap investigation verbiage is identical to the verbiage used in the goals of the wiretap investigation affidavit from the March 11, 2014 application. See Exhibit 3, pgs 25-26 and Exhibit 4, pgs 26-27. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Interviews’ entirely uses boilerplate language. This section does not detail one attempt at interviewing anybody. Exhibit 4, pg 27. Again, the boilerplate language attempting to justify not attempting to do any interviews is identical to the language in the March 11, 2014 application. See Exhibit 3, pgs 26-27 and Exhibit 4, pg 27. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Confidential Informants’ also uses only boilerplate language. Again, the section does not detail a single attempt at trying to recruit an informant. Exhibit 4, pgs 27-28. Once again, the boilerplate language attempting to justify not attempting to recruit any informants is identical to the language in the March 11, 2014 Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 5 of 19 PageID #: 87 application. See Exhibit 3, pg 27 and Exhibit 4, pgs 27-28. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section addressing ‘Undercover Officers / Agents’ uses only boilerplate language. Again, no attempt is made to introduce an undercover officer or agent. Exhibit 4, pgs 28-29. The boilerplate language attempting to justify not attempting to use undercover officers /agents is identical to the language in the March 11, 2014 application. See Exhibit 3, pgs 27-28 and Exhibit 4, pgs 28-29. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section relating to ‘Controlled Purchases’ again regurgitates boilerplate language and makes no attempt to conduct a controlled purchase. Exhibit 4, pg 29. Again, the boilerplate language attempting to justify not attempting any controlled purchases is identical to the language in the March 11, 2014 application. See Exhibit 3, pgs 2829 and Exhibit 4, pg 29. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Surveillance’ delineates the same five surveillance attempts between November 2013 and March 2014 including two successful attempts in seizing narcotics on December 12, 2013 and March 3, 2014. See Exhibit 3, pgs 29-31 and Exhibit 4, pgs 29-31. During the time between applications, the affidavit documents only two additional surveillance attempts which both occurred in California, not Kentucky. Once again, the affidavit is utterly silent as to what less intrusive methods than a wiretap were utilized to follow up on the few documented surveillance attempts. Exhibit 4, pgs 29-33. Once again, the exact same boilerplate language is utilized to attempt to justify not doing more surveillance before requesting another wiretap. Exhibit 3, pgs 31-33 and Exhibit 4, pgs 31-33. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section relating to ‘Search Warrants’ once again relies primarily on boilerplate language to attempt to explain why law enforcement did very little. Exhibit 3, pgs 33-35. Once again, the boilerplate language in the March 11, 2014 application is Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 6 of 19 PageID #: 88 the same language used in the April 8, 2014 application. Exhibit 3, pgs 33-35 and Exhibit pgs 34-35. The April 11th application documents four additional search warrants concerning “target telephones”. Exhibit 4, pg 34. Once again, the affiant does not indicate what information was gleamed from these search warrants nor if any attempt was made to follow up on the information obtained. Once again, no search warrants were sought for any physical locations. The affiant simply relies upon boilerplate language. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Pen Registers and Telephone Tolls’ indicates that they have been used in the investigation. Exhibit 4, pgs 35-36. However, no specific details have been outlined and the entire section is the exact same boilerplate use in the March 11th application.2 Exhibit 3, pg 35 and Exhibit 4, pgs 35-36. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section relating to ‘Closed Circuit Television Monitoring’ uses the same boilerplate language as utilized in the March 11th application but further states they have used “this type of monitoring for Rey LNU.” Exhibit 4, pg 36. The affidavit is silent regarding what attempts they have made to follow up on any information they may have gathered from watching Rey LNU. The affidavit is silent as to any attempt to use this type of investigative tool to investigate Chris Mattingly. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section concerning ‘Trash Searches of Target Locations’ uses the exact same boilerplate language to further attempt to explain why law enforcement did not try this investigative technique. Exhibit 3, pgs 36-39 and Exhibit 4, pgs 37-39. The ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section discussing ‘Financial Investigation’ also uses boilerplate language. Exhibit 4, pgs 38-39. The affidavit indicates that they learned some bank account 2 Again, the section references “use of pagers” which are nearly non-existent and a relic of the past which likely indicates that the boilerplate language has been in use for many years and the affiant did not even bother to read it. Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 7 of 19 PageID #: 89 information relating to Rey LNU but is silent as to any follow up information derived from the prior interception. The affidavit is silent as to any attempt to locate or obtain financial information about Chris Mattingly. Finally, the ‘Necessity and Exhaustion’ section discussing the “Grand Jury’ again uses standard boilerplate language to attempt to explain why there has not been any attempt to use the Grand Jury as a less intrusive investigative technique. Exhibit 4, pg 39. Once again, the boilerplate language attempting to explain why nothing was done is identical to the verbiage used in the prior application. Exhibit 3, pgs 38-39 and Exhibit 4, pg 39. Again, however, a state court judge rubber stamped a wiretap application from Assistant District Attorney Jeffery Van Wagenen, Jr. based almost entirely upon boilerplate language. On October 27, 2014, Assistant District Attorney Creg Datig applied for a spinoff wiretap from the aforementioned wiretap based upon information procured from the previous wiretaps. Exhibit 5. On February 19, 2015, Assistant District Attorney John Aki applied for yet another spinoff wiretap again based upon information procured from the previous wiretaps. Exhibit 6. The United States supplied an affidavit, with attachments, from Deputy District Attorney Deena Bennett. Exhibit 7. In her affidavit, Ms. Bennett acknowledges that “wiretap paperwork, all wiretap affidavits and applications were submitted directly to the Assistant District Attorney” during District Attorney Paul Zellerbach’s tenure. Exhibit 7, pg. 4, paragraph 16. Mr. Zellerbach was the District Attorney at the time of original application on March 11, 2014 and the spin-off applications on April 8, 2014 and October 27, 2014.3 Ms. Bennett further states, “Mr. Zellerbach did not keep records or a calendar that consistently, regularly, or accurately, reflected his day-to-day business.” Exhibit 7, pg. 4, paragraph 17. 3 Mr. Zellerbach lost his reelection bid to Michael Hestrin and was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for vandalizing Mr. Hestrin’s election signs. Exhibit 7. Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 8 of 19 PageID #: 90 According to USA Today, Mr. Zellerbach acknowledged in two interviews ... that he could not recall having reviewed or personally authorized any of the county’s wiretap applications and said he was unaware of the details of the requests. Exhibit 2. Mr. Zellerbach was quoted as saying, “I didn’t have time to review all of those, No way.” Exhibit 2. Mike Ramos, District Attorney of San Bernardino, California, stated that he warned Mr. Zellerbach about the implications of not personally signing the wiretaps and Mr. Zellerbach said it would be impossible for him to sign them all. Exhibit 2. ARGUMENT A. The wiretaps in question were not properly authorized. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 prescribes the procedure for securing judicial authority to intercept wire communications and who has the statutory authority to request said authorization. 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 2516 (2) states: The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire, oral or electronic communications having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made ... Wire interceptions are extremely intrusive and violate the subject’s privacy rights. Because of the significant privacy intrusion, Congress narrowly confined who may apply for a wiretap. Congress wanted the application process “limited to those responsive to the political process.” United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 520 (1974). For example, even a Presidentially Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 9 of 19 PageID #: 91 appointed United States Attorney does not have the authority to apply for a wiretap. On the state level, only the “principal prosecuting attorney of any State” (i.e. the State Attorney General) or the “principal prosecuting attorney of a political subdivision” (i.e. the elected District Attorney) may apply for a wiretap. 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 2516 (2) is quite clear on its face that an assistant district attorney in Riverside County, California does not have the authority to apply for a wiretap. In Giordano, the United States Attorney General’s Executive Assistant authorized submission of the wiretap application. 416 U.S. at 512. The United States Supreme Court noted that pursuant to the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1) only the “Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application for intercept authority.” 416 U.S. at 513. The Supreme Court further stated, “The mature judgment of a particular, responsible Department of Justice official is interposed as a critical precondition to any judicial order.” {emphasis added} Giordano, 416 U.S. at 516. The United States Supreme Court further noted that the authority to apply for wiretaps is limited to “those responsive to the political process.” Giordano, 416 U.S. at 520. The United States Supreme Court specifically held that the Executive Assistant to the United States Attorney General did not have the authority to apply for a wiretap. Id. The remedy for ignoring the statutory requirements is suppression. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 528. In the matter before the Court, the district attorney did not apply for any of the wiretaps in question. All of the applicable wiretaps were authorized by an assistant district attorney. Assistant district attorneys do not have the statutory authority in California to apply for a wiretap except under very limited circumstances. California Penal Code § 629.50 states that “a district attorney, or the person designated to Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 10 of 19 PageID #: 92 act as district attorney in the district attorney’s absence,” may apply to the court “for an order authorizing the interception of a wire or electronic communication.” In United States v. PerezValencia, the Ninth Circuit addressed the application of California Penal Code § 629.50 to a motion to suppress a wiretap based upon an assistant district attorney, not the district attorney, applying for the wiretap. 727 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2013) and 744 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2014). In Perez-Valencia, an assistant district attorney applied for the challenged wiretap. The assistant district attorney was ‘designated’ pursuant to California Penal Code § 629.50 to apply for the wiretap in the district attorney’s absence. 727 F.3d at 853-854. The district attorney was out of the office attending to an ill family member who had undergone surgery for a serious health issue. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the wiretap on the basis of said wiretap not having been signed by the district attorney. The Ninth Circuit held that an assistant district attorney can apply for a wiretap pursuant to California Penal Code § 629.50 if, and only if, the designated assistant district attorney is “acting in the district attorney’s absence not just as an assistant district attorney designated with the limited authority to apply for a wiretap order, but as an assistant district attorney duly designated to act for all purposes as the district attorney of the political subdivision in question.” Perez-Valenzia, 727 F.3d at 855.4 The Ninth Circuit returned the case to the trial court for a factual inquiry. The case went back to the trial court for a fact finding hearing and was subsequently appealed again to the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Perez-Valencia, 744 F.3d 600 (9Th Cir. 4 See also State v. Daniels, 389 So.2d 631 (Fla.SCt. 1980) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2516 and United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), the Florida Supreme Court held that an assistant district attorney may only apply for a wiretap when the district attorney delegates his authority “to allow for the continuity of administration when the state attorney is absent for an extended period of time” but concluding that Florida law did not permit any delegation of authority to an assistant district attorney. Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 11 of 19 PageID #: 93 2014). The Ninth Circuit found that the wiretap was properly applied for by an assistant district attorney based upon California Penal Code § 629.50. The Ninth Circuit upheld the wiretap because the Court made two critical and necessary findings. First, the assistant district attorney’s authority to act in the district attorney’s absence was not limited to only applying for wiretap orders. The designated assistant attorney assumed all the powers, duties and responsibilities of the district attorney. Perez-Valencia, 744 F.3d at 602. Second, the Ninth Circuit found the district attorney was truly absent and unavailable. The district attorney’s wife underwent surgery during the time of the wiretap application. The district attorney was completely devoted to caring for his wife in the hospital and moving her back home when she was discharged. The district attorney was not in communication with anyone from the office during work hours. Based upon these extreme circumstances, the Court found the district attorney “absent from and unavailable to” the district attorney’s office. Perez-Valencia, 744 F.3d at 603. Applying the aforementioned authority to the facts concerning the alleged delegation of authority by Paul Zellerbach and, subsequently, Michael Hestrin, the Court should suppress the wiretaps and all evidence derived therefrom. Mr. Zellerbach acknowledged in two interviews ... that he could not recall having reviewed or personally authorized any of the county’s wiretap applications and said he was unaware of the details of the requests. Exhibit 2. Mr. Zellerbach is quoted as saying, “I didn’t have time to review all of those, No way.” Exhibit 2. Mr. Zellerbach’s comments acknowledge what is apparent when you look at the evidence; Mr. Zellerbach abdicated his legal responsibility to oversee the applications for wiretaps in Riverside, California. Mr. Zellerbach was district attorney when three of four wiretaps associated with this case Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 12 of 19 PageID #: 94 were applied for. On none of the occasions5, did Mr. Zellerbach personally apply for the wiretap. The United States’s supplied Deena Bennett’s affidavit in an attempt to justify Mr. Zellerbach’s abdication of his statutory responsibilities. Exhibit 7. Ms. Bennett certifies that “Mr. Zellerbach did not keep records or a calendar that consistently, regularly, or accurately, reflected his day-today business.” Exhibit 7. It defies common sense to assume that it is merely coincidence that Mr. Zellerbach just so happened to be absent and unavailable on the dates these wiretaps were authorized. What happened is what Mr. Zellerbach told USA Today; he did not review any wiretaps and he delegated his legal responsibility to an assistant in violation of federal law and California law. The United States Supreme Court made it crystal clear in Giordano that authorizing a wiretap is limited to those that are responsive to the political process. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 520. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a district attorney can designate an assistant district attorney to act if they are absent and unavailable such as when the district attorney is attending to his wife during and immediately after surgery. Perez-Valencia, 744 F.3d at 603. What cannot happen is what happened here; in this case District Attorney Zellerbach was so neglectful of his statutory duties that he pawned off his responsibility to an assistant in perpetuity. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 strictly limited who can apply for a wiretap because Congress was rightfully concerned with insuring that individual privacy was protected and that wiretaps would be used judiciously and only when necessary. What they feared is what Paul Zellerbach created by his dereliction of duty; a rogue district attorney’s office that applied for 20% of the wiretaps in the United States with no oversight by an 5 March 11, 2014 April 8, 2014 October 27, 2014 Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 13 of 19 PageID #: 95 elected official and no concern for privacy rights. Exhibit 2. Paul Zellerbach did not want to trouble himself with the statutory duties associated with the office he chose to run for and the people of Riverside, California elected him to do. Paul Zellerbach was not absent and unavailable pursuant to California law. As such, all of the wiretaps associated with this case and the evidence derived therefrom should be suppressed. B. The wiretaps were premature and not necessary. The use of a wiretap should be the last step in an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) states in relevant part: Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order ... authorizing the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communication ... if the judge determines on the basis of facts submitted by the applicant that *** (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. Title III requires that an application for a wiretap contain “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2002). The purpose of this ‘necessity’ requirement is “to ensure that a wiretap is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.” United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 (1974). The necessity component prohibits the impermissible use of a wiretap as the “initial step in a criminal investigation.” Giordano, 416 U.S. at 515. The government must overcome the statutory presumption against an intrusive wiretap by proving necessity. United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000). The United Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 14 of 19 PageID #: 96 States is not required to prove that every conceivable method of investigation has been tried and failed before seeking a wiretap. United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1988). But, other reasonable investigative means must not be viable alternatives. United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1237 (1st Cir. 1995). A purely conclusory affidavit unrelated to the instant case and not showing any factual relations to the circumstances at hand does not satisfy the necessity component of the statute. United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 710 (6th Cir. 2007) citing United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir. 1977). In Rice, the Sixth Circuit in upholding the suppression of the wiretap held that specific information that the cooperating source was not able to make contact with Rice, and therefore, would not be of use and that the pen registers and telephone tolls revealed possible connections to other people with histories of drug-related arrests was not sufficient to establish necessity. 478 F.3d at 711. “Generalized and uncorroborated information about why grand jury subpoenas, witness interviewing and search warrants, and trash pulls would not be useful” was not sufficient to establish necessity. Id. In United States v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit upheld the suppression of a wiretap. The Court concluded that sufficient normal investigative techniques had not been utilized. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 1112-1113. The Court stated that use of pen registers alone is insufficient to establish necessity for a wiretap. Id. citing United States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court also noted that very limited physical surveillance is not sufficient. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 1113. The Court further noted that one attempt to infiltrate the organization was insufficient. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 1113. The Ninth Circuit, as the Sixth Circuit did in Rice, held that the wiretap application could not be saved by boilerplate language about why law enforcement had not done anything such as Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 15 of 19 PageID #: 97 the affidavit’s terse rejection of the possible productive use of grand jury subpoenas or search warrants. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 1114. The Court stated that the affidavit’s rejection of tools such as grand jury subpoenas and search warrants by claiming they would likely reveal the investigation to its targets does not reasonably explain why traditional investigative tools are unlikely to succeed in a particular investigation. Id. Rather, they are “boilerplate conclusions that merely describe inherent limitations of normal investigative procedures,” which the Court found insufficient to establish necessity. Id. In Blackmon, the Ninth Circuit addressed a spin-off wiretap where the government did not conduct any investigation specifically targeted at Blackmon. 273 F.3d at 1208. The necessity sections of the prior wiretap and the spin-off were nearly identical with the exception of trap and trace devices and pen registers. Id. The Court suppressed the wiretap finding that material omissions and misstatements were made as it relates to Blackmon because nothing had been done to investigate Blackmon and generalized statements that would be true of any narcotics investigation fail to contain sufficiently specific facts to satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518. Blackmon, 273 F.3d at 1211. Applying the aforementioned authority to this matter, the Court should find that the necessity component was not satisfied and suppress the wiretaps. The initial March 11, 2014 was issued almost entirely based upon boilerplate language. The affidavit indicates that they made only five surveillance attempts and two were successful in seizing drugs. The affidavit is silent, other than boilerplate language, as to what follow up investigation, if any, was conducted based upon the seizure of drugs. The affidavit indicates that two search warrants were sought concerning target telephones but no information, other than boilerplate language, is provided concerning what information, if any, resulted and what follow up, if any, was conducted. No Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 16 of 19 PageID #: 98 interviews were attempted. No attempts were made to recruit a confidential source. No attempts were made to introduce an undercover officer or agent. No attempts were made to do a controlled purchase. No closed circuit television monitoring was attempted. No trash pulls or trash searches were conducted. No financial investigation was attempted. The Grand Jury was not utilized. Despite the investigation having success with two drug seizures, the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office sought a wiretap without doing any further investigation and without even trying most forms of less intrusive investigation. The wiretap was used as an initial step in the investigation not as a last option as mandated by Giordano. 416 U.S. at 515. The April 8, 2014 spinoff wiretap sought to intercept Chris Mattingly’s phone number. The wiretap application is nearly identical to the March 11th application. The application is almost entirely boilerplate language attempting to justify extremely limited investigation before seeking a wiretap. Critically, the government did not try any less intrusive investigation techniques in their investigation of Chris Mattingly. Their initial and only step in the investigation of Chris Mattingly was to seek a wiretap. This is not permissible. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 515 and Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2000). The wiretaps in question are representative of a systematic problem in Riverside County. As previously stated, they issued 20% of the wiretaps in the United States. Exhibit 2. They could not have possibly investigated their cases thoroughly prior to seeking a wiretap as a last resort. In fact, Mr. Zellerbach was quoted as saying, “I didn’t have time to review all of those, No way.” Exhibit 2. There were so many wiretaps being issued the District Attorney, the statutory obligation to review them, acknowledged there were so many he could not have possibly even read them all. His statement speaks volumes as to how little investigation was being done before seeking approval for a wiretap. While the undersigned is only concerned with Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 17 of 19 PageID #: 99 the wiretaps before the Court, it is very likely that most, if not all, of the wiretaps approved during Mr. Zellerbach’s tenure were sought as an initial step in the investigation based upon cut and paste affidavits with boilerplate language utilized in all narcotics investigations. In sum, Riverside County made a mockery of individual privacy rights, ignored federal requirements limiting the use of wiretaps and permitted law enforcement to intercept telephone calls at their whim and caprice. C. Suppression is the appropriate remedy 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10) provides, Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, ... of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval. ... If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter. ...” In Giordano, the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression must follow” when it is shown that the wiretap application was improperly authorized. 416 U.S. at 528. In Rice, the Sixth Circuit stated, “Because the necessity requirement is a component of Title III, and because suppression is the appropriate remedy for a violation under Title III, where a warrant application does not meet the necessity requirement, the fruits of any evidence obtained through that warrant must be suppressed.” 478 F.3d at 710 citing Giordano, 416 U.S. at 524-525. Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 18 of 19 PageID #: 100 The Sixth Circuit in Rice also held that the good-exception to the usual rule that courts should exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to improperly issued wiretaps. 478 F.3d at 712. Given the reckless pervasiveness of wire interceptions stemming from the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office, it is difficult to imagine a credible argument that law enforcement relied upon their wiretap applications in goodfaith. In fact, it is much more probable that law enforcement sought to use Riverside County to obtain wiretaps because they knew their applications would never survive federal scrutiny. Nonetheless, Sixth Circuit precedent does not recognize a good-faith exception in the context of wiretap interceptions. Id. D. Conclusion “Congress legislated in considerable detail in providing for applications and orders authorizing wiretapping and evinced the clear intent to make doubly sure that the statutory authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications.” Giordano, 416 U.S. at 515. The Riverside County District Attorney’s Office made a mockery of Congressional intent and issued illegal wiretaps with astounding frequency including the wiretaps in question in this case. The wiretap evidence obtained against Chris Mattingly and all evidence derived from it was illegally obtained and, therefore, is inadmissible. Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27 Filed 02/16/16 Page 19 of 19 PageID #: 101 WHEREFORE, the undersigned requests that the Court enter the attached Order suppressing the wiretaps and any and all evidence derived therefrom or, in the alternative, to schedule this matter for a Franks hearing in order for the Court to be more fully advised. Respectfully submitted, /S/ Brian Butler BRIAN BUTLER Dathorne & Butler, LLC 600 West Main Street, Suite 500 Louisville, Kentucky 40202 (502) 594-1802 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 17, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the Hon. Larry Fentress. Respectfully submitted, /S/Brian Butler BRIAN BUTLER Jusrice.or?tasie Page 1 of 247 PagelD Mirage 1 of? Justice officials fear nation's biggest wiretap operation may not be legal Brad Heath and Brett Keiman. USA TODAY 5:40 pm ESTNm'embcr 1 . 2015 RIVERSIDE, Calif. Federal drug agents have built a massive wiretapping operation in the Los Angeles suburbs. secretly intercepting tens of thousands of Americans' phone calls and text messages to monitor drug traf?ckers across the United States despite objections from Justice Department lawyers who fear the practice may not be legai. Nearly all of that surveillance was authorized by a single state courtjudge in Riverside County. who last year signed off on almost ?ve times as many wiretaps as any otherjudge in the United States. The judge's orders (Photo: Virginia State Police) allowed investigators usuaily from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to intercept more than 2 million conversations involving 44,000 people, federal court records show. The eavesdropping is aimed at dismantling the drug rings that have turned Los Angeles' eastern suburbs into what the DEA says is the nation's busiest shipping corridor (istorvinewsicrime courtsi2015i1 til for heroin and methamphetamine. Riverside wiretaps are supposed to be tied to crime within the county, but investigators have relied on them to make arrests and seize shipments of cash and drugs as far away as New York and Virginia, sometimes concealing the surveillance in the process. The surveillance has raised concerns among Justice Department lawyers in Los Angeies, who have mostly refused to use the results in federal court because they have concluded the state courts eavesdropping orders are unlikely to withstand a legal chailenge, current and former Justice officials said. "It was made very clear to the agents that if you're going to go the state route, then best wishes. good luck and all that, but that case isn?t coming to federal court," a former Justice Department lawyer said. The lawyer and other of?cials described the situation on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the department's internal deliberations. Federal agents often prefer to seek permission to tap phones from state courts, instead of federal courts, because the process is generally faster and less demanding than seeking approval through the" Justice Department. In addition, California law allows them to better conceal the identities of con?dentiai informants they rely on to heip investigate drug rings. Over the past decade, drug agents have more than tripled their use of wiretaps iistorvinewsizm mostly by using state court orders. DESERT SUN i-low Riverside County become America?s drug pipeline courtsf20 i 5/1 1 liriverside-countv- Wiretaps which allow the police to secretly monitor Americans' communications are among the most intrusive types of searches the police can conduct, and federal law imposes strict limits on when and how they can be used. The law requires that police use wiretaps only after they have run out of other tools to build a case. In Riverside, the authorities' use of that last-ditch tool quadrupled over the past four years. Last year alone, Riverside County prosecutors and a local judge approved 624 wiretaps, far more than any otherjurisdiction in the United States, according to records compiled by the federal court system. Nearly all were tied to drug investigations. 11/19/2015 Justice shame Page 2 of 247 PagelD lQQge 2 of? hthREmt?S wrasraa charter. A county court in Riverside. Caiif. authorized far more police eavesdropping than any other court in the USA. tviuch of it was sought by federai drug agents. Shown beiow are the 30 iurisdictions with the most wiretaps in the USA. i-iover or tap for detaiis Source: Administrative Office of the t5 8 Courts Credit: Brad Heath Mitch-sit ?thereon use. TODAY "Those numbers the totals, and just the size of some of those wiretaps are huge red fiags for us." said Dave Maass, an investigative researcher for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "When there?s this amount of secrecy it starts to raise serious concerns about accountability for electronic interceptions." Because wiretap orders are sealed, there is no way to know precisely how many of them were sought by the DEA and the local of?cers it deputized to work on a drug task force. Some of the taps were sought by locai police of?cers and of?cers in neighboring counties. Prosecutors acknowledged, however, that the drug agency plays a leading rote in the wiretapping. The county?s former district attorney, Paui Zellerbach, who presided over the rapid rise in wiretapping there before he left of?ce in January, said the drug agency was "a significant player." Riverside County's new district attorney. Mike Hestrin. said he found out about the county's wiretap numbers not long after taking office after other prosecutors approached him to suggest he look into the matter. He was concerned by what he found. Hestrin said in an interview that he made a "series of reforms" to how wiretaps are handled, which he said will lead to fewer taps in the future. He said he personally evaluates new wiretap requests and insists that each one now must "have a strong investigative nexus" to the county. Asked if that had been the case in previous years, Hestrin replied: "You?re going to have to extrapolate that." Hestrin said prosecutors "follow the law to the letter" when seeking wiretaps, but he would not discuss the detaiis. "This is an area of our law. an area of our iaw enforcement. where we can't be totally transparent, in the same way that the federal government can't be totaliy transparent about the massive intelligence operations they run," he said. DEA officials said it shouid not come as a surprise that so much of their surveillance work happens in the area around Riverside a vast expanse of suburbs and desert east of Los Angeles. crisscrossed by freeways that have become key shipping routes for drugs moving from Mexico to the United States and for cash making the return journey. "There are organizations here and we're working these organizations and we're trying to stay abreast of the technoiogy and all the different ways these organizations are operating." said Stephen Azzarn. the associate special agent in charge of Los Angeles division. On paper. agents? choice of state court over federal should not matter: Federal law sets a minimum standard for police to obtain a wiretap. even when they are seeking one from a state-courtjudge. And California courts have Riverside County District Attorney repeatedly said the state?s wiretaps are suf?cient. Mike Hestrin said he made a "series of reforms" to how county prosecutors handle wiretaps after he took of?ce in January. (Photo: .fnv Caldamnn'hn Quin! 1/1 1 1/19/2015 justice ott?a?e 1/1 Hvrraspunesmaraayeudeegee/m Page 3 of 247 PageID 1%ge 3 of? out current and tonner Justice Department orricials said prosecutors in Los Angeles repeatedly told the drug agency that they would not accept cases based on state-court wiretaps and those from Riverside County in particular? because they believed the appiications being approved by state judges feil short of what the federal law requires. Prosecutors were particularly concerned that the DEA was seeking state-court wiretap orders without adequately showing that it had first tried other, iess intrusive, investigative techniques. "They?d want to bring these cases into the US. Attorney's Of?ce, and the feds would tell them no (expietive) way," a former Justice Department official said. The result was that even seemingly significant drug cases stayed out of federai court. In December, for example, court records show DEA agents and local detectives in South Gate, Calif. near Los Angeles, used a state~court wiretap to target a man named Omar Salazar, who the DEA suspected was tied to a Mexican drug traf?cking group. Between searches of Salazar?s car and his house, officers seized $76,869.94, a gun and a cache of iilegal drugs, including 36 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. investigators found some of the drugs in a safe in Salazar?s garage, atong with a box of ammunition and probation papenivork from one of his previous arrests. That should have been enough to build a signi?cant federal case with a long mandatory prison sentence, but that was not what happened. Court records show the Justice Department prosecuted the $76,869.94 in a civil asset seizure case But it did not prosecute Saiazar. Instead, Salazar was booked into jail and reteased the same day; his lawyer, John Passanante, said he has not been charged as a result of the search. Neither the DEA nor prosecutors would expiain why. WIRETAPPING Perhaps the only outward sign that Riverside has become America's most wiretapped place can be found on a deserted ?oor of the city?s courthouse. On a recent Friday afternoon, a handful of officers in scruffy jeans and baseball caps waited there with sealed maniia enveIOpes in their hands. After a few minutes. they disappeared inside Judge Helios Hernandez?s iocked courtroom for hearings that are closed to the public. Nojudge in the United States has been so prolific in authorizing eavesdropping. Riverside County Superior Court Judge Heiios Hernandez approved nearly ?ve times as many wiretaps last year as any otherjudge in the United States. (Photo: Brett Keiman, The Desert Sun) Records compiied by the federal courts' administrative of?ce show Hernandez authorized 624 wiretaps that ended last year, and another 339 that ended the year before. Hernandez approved three times more taps than sit of the federal judges in California combined last year, and once received more wiretap applications in a day, 17, than most courts do in a year. (The court of?ce counts wires based on when they end. rather than when they begin, to avoid revealing ongoing investigations.) The next-ciosest court was in Las Vegas, where judges approved wiretaps that ended last year. California law generally requires that each county court appoint one judge to handle wiretaps. For the past three years, that job fail to Hernandez, who was Riverside's chief narcotics prosecutor before he became a judge. The records do not indicate how many wiretaps, if any, Hernandez turned down. 11/19/2015 Justlce o-u?aae 16 Page 4 Of 247 PagelD #1 1%go 4 of 7 Hernandez to comment through a spokesman. Riverside County?s presiding judge, Harold Hepp, said judges do not decide how many eavesdropping applications are submitted to them; "they have to consider each one on its merits." The county's wiretap numbers are so high that even investigators who helped supervise eavesdropping there were taken aback. "This can?t be right," said Anthony Valente, who, until 2012, commanded the Iniand Crackdown Allied Task Force, which uses wiretaps to investigate drug traf?cking and gangs in Southern California. Neariy all of Riverside's wiretaps about 95% were related to drug investigations. Federal records show the taps that ended in 2014 cost more than $18 million. The records do not indicate who paid for them. Tine ?gures are based on reports that judges and prosecutors are required to submit each year to the federal courts' administrative office. The reports inciude the number of wiretaps judges authorize. and the number of communications including telephone calls, text messages and other electronic conversations that investigators intercepted. Those reports show the overwhelming majority of the more than 2 million communications investigators intercepted last year as a result of Riverside wiretaps had nothing to do with crime. Poiice are not supposed to record conversations that are not reievant to their investigations. DEA officials said that the agency conducts its wiretaps wherever their investigations lead them. Its Riverside ?eld of?ce, which covers Riverside and neighboring San Bernardino counties. was responsible for a large share of the agency's methamphetamine and heroin seizures last year; therefore, it's only natural that investigators would focus there. "We don't pick a jurisdiction. We take the enforcement action where it's warranted and where we can do it effectiveiy." DEA spokesman Timothy Massino said. Nonetheless. Hernandez approved 20 times as many wiretaps as his counterparts in San Bernardino County. DEA of?cials said they could not explain that difference. Zelierbach said Riverside's wiretaps multiplied during his tenure because prosecutors and the county?s court became more "efficient and effective" in handiing surveiliance applications and word spread throughout the law enforcement community, bringing stili more applications. Eventually, Zellerbach said. he learned the county was among the nation's wiretap ieaders. thought we were doing a hell of a iob." he said. 1/1 1 1H 9/2015 Justice oe Page 5 of 247 PagelD wage 5 of? Zellerbach said the taps yielded signi?cant arrests and seizures. And they paid other dividends. "We liked it because in these dif?cult economic times. my budget was being cut, and that was a way to somewhat supplement funding for my of?ce," he said in an interview. Prosecutors wouid not say how much money they received. Zellerbach said the operation grew under the leadership of an aggressive new lawyer, Deena Bennett, who still heads the wiretap unit today. Bennett. a one-time contestant on the reality show Survivor, rebuffed attempts to contact her, a reporter that "the fact that you have my cellphone number is really harassment, and I?m going to report it." Former Riverside County District Attorney Paul Zellerbach presided over a rapid increase in wiretaps. (Photo: Richard Lori, The Desert Sun) WIDESPREAD ARRESTS AND SEIZURES investigators have used 2014.htmlitdocumenngZia2604221 wiretaps in Riverside to seize hundreds of pounds of drugs and millions of dollars in cash. The taps have helped agents pinpoint smuggling tunnels dug beneath the Mexican border and map the inner workings of South American traf?cking groups. But if the taps also produce arrests, they are dif?cuit to ?nd. Prosecutors seidom make use of state-court wiretaps in the federal courts around Los Angeles. And defense lawyers in Riverside said they only rarely encounter cases with disclosed wiretaps in state court. The county's pubiic defenders handle 40.000 criminai cases a year; no more than ?ve involve disclosed wiretaps, said Steve Harmon, the head of that office. Instead, court records and interviews with DEA officials and prosecutors show the drug agency has used the fruits of its Riverside wiretaps to help stOp and seize shipments of drugs and cash elsewhere in the United States. In some of those cases, agents used wiretaps to identify drug couriers. then tipped off other investigators, who were told to find their own independent evidence to conduct a search. That practice. known within the agency as "parallel construction." is now the subject of an investigation by the Justice Department?s inspector general. "That approach ends up insulating dubious police practices from any kind ofjudicial review. That's what so pernicious about it." American Civii Liberties union lawyer Nathan Wessler said. Riverside's District Attorney's Office reported approximately one arrest for every three wiretaps that concluded last year. among the iowest rates of any jurisdiction that conducted more than a handful of taps. That's a sign, Hestrin acknowiedged. that many of the wiretaps may be ieading to prosecutions in other jurisdictions. 1/1 1 1/19/2015 Page 6 of 247 PageID wage 6 of7 mam WLM 31' (RON: 93? meme? it Warn of wipe-?ed int/min {ma ?idm?i Police seized heroin and cocaine from this truck after it was stopped in rural Virginia in 2013. The stop was based on a wiretap from Riverside, Calif. (Photo: Unites States District Court) One surfaced last year after a state trooper stopped a tractor traiier on a remote stretch of interstate highway outside Harrisonburg, Va. ostensibly because some of the tiny LED bulbs around its cab had burned out. The trooper. Keith Miller. summoned a drug-sniffing dog. and within minutes, of?cers had pulled 32 kilograms of heroin and cocaine from compartments in the truck's cap. Federal prosecutors indicted the driver, George Covarrubaiz. on drug possession charges. Miller testi?ed during a court hearing - tater described by a prosecutor as "a high-wire act? that he had been tipped off by the DEA that the truck might be carrying drugs, but that the burnt-out iights were his "sole reason" for stopping the truck. The problem for prosecutors was that driving without those lights is not illegal in Virginia. The judge hearing the case warned that he was inciined to bar prosecutors from using the seized drugs as evidence because, if driving without the lights was legal. Miller had no valid reason to stop the truck. So seven months after Covarrubaiz was stopped and sent to jail, the Justice Department returned to court acknowledged there was more to its investigation 0859-th-52? wiretap-disclosure.htrni1. Covarrubaiz, a government iawyer wrote. had been picked up in a "wiretap investigation of a signi?cant California-based drug trafficking organization." investigators had been monitoring his calls using a tap approved by Hernandez in Riverside County. and agents from the DEA's secretive Special Operations Division had been tracking his truck across the United States. During a 4 am. meeting at a nearby hotei. the agents directed Miller to ?nd a reason to stop the truck and search it. The agents' reports referred to the episode merely as a traffic stop because "that way they didn't have to provide the information for the directed stop later," agent Gregg Mervis later testi?ed Officers found 32 kilograms of "Win and ?Wine in a truck Justice Department lawyers later said they had intended to reveal the wire all along but had not done so sooner Geor Covarrubaiz had been . . . . because police had not yet locked up some of the investigation 3 key targets. in particular, Asmstant U.S. driving through rural Virginia. The search was captured on cameras Attorney Grayson Hoffman pointed to the truck's owner, Everardo Amador Sn, who he described as "a grave mum" in One ?the threat to the safety and welt-being of the people of the United States." car. (Photo: Virginia State Poii'ce) That's hardly how California police treated Amador, though. Agents arrested him iast year on charges that he had iilegally possessed drug money a far less serious charge than the federal narcotics case his driver faced in Virginia. Ajudge freed him the next day on $5,000 baii, at the prosecutor's request. Amador's lawyer, Niicoias Estrada. calied the Justice Department's 1/ 1 1 1/19f2015 Justice. OWE IBaESIaItdhm?gngle1ra??loma??7 BEE 1/1 4! Everardo Amador Sr. right, leaves court in Riverside, Calif. on Oct. 21, 2015. The Justice Department said it could not reveal a state- court wiretap because Amador posed a "grave threat," but when he was arrested, he was immediately freed on bail. (Photo: Brett Keiman. The Desert Sun) dam/16 Page 7 of 247 PagelD 1%ge 7 of? Characterization "an exaggeration." Covarrubaiz?s lawyer, Randy Cargili. accused the Justice Department in a court ?ling of an "extraordinary strategy of doling out truth as it sees fit." in the end, US District Court Judge Michael Urbanski declared himself 0895-ohc?1 t4? "singularly unhappy with the way the government has conducted this case." And in March, the Justice Department abandoned it altogether, dismissing the charges hc-126-motion? against Covarrubaiz. Assistant US. Attorney Heather Carltontold Urbanski that prosecutors had "re? evaluated the evidence" and conciuded that "it would be best to terminate the investigation." The rest of her explanation is sealed Keiman also reports for The (Palm Springs, Calif.) Desert Sun. Contributing: Mark Harman in McLean, Va. Follow Brad Heath on Twitter at @bradheath and Brett Kelman at Read or Share this story: 11/190015 Police dsegapg?e??ycl?g?wngta?s @eement?at o?th?sQZ/ 16/16 Page 8 Of 247 PagelD lqgage 1 of 5 Police used apparently illegal wiretaps to make hundreds of arrests Brad Heath and Brett Kclman, USA TODAY 5:03 am. 20. 20:5 RIVERSIDE, Calif. -- Prosecutors in the Los Angeles suburb responsible for a huge share of the nation?s wiretaps almost certainly violated federal law when they authorized widespread eavesdropping that police used to make more than 300 arrests and seize millions of dollars in cash and drugs throughout the USA. The violations could undermine the legality of as many as 7'38 wiretaps approved in Riverside County, Calif.. since the middle of 2013, an investigation by USA TODAY and The Desert Sun, based on interviews and court records, has found. Prosecutors reported that those taps, often conducted by federal drug investigators. intercepted phone calls and text messages by more than 52,000 people. Federal law bars the government from seeking court approval for a wiretap unless a top prosecutor has personally authorized the request. Congress added that restriction in the 19605, when the FBI had secretly monitored civil rights leaders, to ensure that such intrusive surveillance would not be conducted (Photo: Unites States District Court) in Riverside County a Los Angeles suburb whose court and prosecutors approved almost one of every ?ve US. wiretaps last year the district attorney turned the job of reviewing the applications over to lower-level lawyers, interviews and court records show. That practice almost certainly violated the federal wiretapping law and could jeopardize prosecutors' ability to use the surveillance in court. district attorney is playing with gunpowder if he ignores the potential implications of letting somebody else handle the entire process. That?s potentially said Clifford Fishman, a Catholic University of America law professor who studies wiretapping. That also creates a iegal problem for Riverside's massive wiretapping operation. which had come under scrutiny from Justice Department lawyers. Last week, USA TODAY and The Desert Sun reported that the US. Drug Enforcement Administration had secretlv helped turn the county into the nation?s wiretap capith ll?l even though federal prosecutors repeatedly warned that the surveillance orders violated a separate part of the wiretapping law and would not withstand a legal challenge. Federal drug agents used information from Riverside wiretaps to make arrests as far away as Kentucky and Virginia. sometimes concealing the surveillance from judges and defense lawyers. Buy Photo Riverside County District Attorney Paul Zellerbach at a press conference on metal theft on February 18. 2014. Wiretaps in the county quadrupled under his administration. (Photo: Chatham/ The Desert Sun} 1/ 1 1 1/20/2015 Police o?ieesQZ/ 16/16 Page 9 Of 247 PagelD #3 ?liege 2 of 5 Wiretaps in Hiversme more than quadrupled under the county?s former district attorney. Paul Lelleroacn. who left omce in January. Despite a federal court ruling that only the district attorney himself should usually approve wiretaps. Zellerbach said in two interviews over the past month that he could not recall having reviewed or personally authorized any of the county?s wiretap applications and said he was unaware of the details of the requests. Instead. he said. he delegated that job to one of his assistants. didn?t have time to review ali of those." Zellerbach said. ?No way." Because wiretap applications are secret. it is dif?cult to gauge how often they were approved by other lawyers. .B JEFF A A A report based on information Zellerbach's office submitted to federal court administrators lists an assistant. SISTWRI Jeffrey Van Wagenen. as the person who authorized hearty all of the county?s wiretap applications. Van Wagenen's signature appears on a sealed wiretap application approved iast year by a Riverside County judge and obtained by USA TODAY. Van Wagenen. who ieft the of?ce last year. said it would be inappropriate for him PAUL 5? ZELLERBA to comment. . RICT AWORNEY Delegating that job poses a legal problem because federal law which regulates wiretap appiications even in state courts -- carefully restricts who must approve a surveillance request. The US. Supreme Court ruled in 1974 case?case=t 3882476521514079594&l that those restrictions were serious enough that it threw out wiretap evidence in a drug case because the surveillance had been approved by A Riverside County wiretap the wrong senior of?cial at the US. Justice Department. application, approved by Assistant District Attorney Jeffrey . . . . . Van Wager.? (Photo: Obtained by The federal 9th Circmt Court of Appeals reiterated that point in 2013 USA room) 6883-1 after federal prosecutors sought to use evidence from a wiretap police obtained from a state court in San Bernardino County. just north of Riverside. The prosecutor who signed off on the wiretap was not the county's district attorney, Mike Ramos, but one of his deputies. That, the appeals court ruled. wasn?t good enough: Wiretaps had to be signed by the district attorney himself unless he had turned over ail of his powers to someone else while he was away from the office. country or RIVERSIDE Since this decision, Ramos has begun signing all wiretap apptications himself and urged other district attorneys to do the same. "This is our responsibility. We are talking about people's rights. the Fourth Amendment, cadets. drugs. gangs. it shouid be handled by the eiected he said. Riverside County?s new district attorney. Mike Hestrin, who replaced Zelierbach in January. instituted a simiiar policy. Hestrin said the 9th Circuit ruiing makes clear that district attorneys have a "legal obligation" to approve wiretaps themselves. but his of?ce will defend his predecessor?s wires if they are challenged in court. 5/ 1 1 1/20/2015 Police usa??t?tjili-IWQW?bS BQ?bllEBQ?i?ihach-s o'fia?ii?g/ 16/ 16 Page 10 Of 247 PagelD #3 l?idge 3 of 5 Ramos said in mtervrews that he warned zerlerbach about the Impticatrons or the 9th Circurt?s decreron. "We had a conversation about wiretaps. and he said that he had so many that it would be impossible for him to sign them all," Ramos said. 9 Records and interviews show no evidence that Zelierbach changed his approach. Records from the federal court administrative office show Riverside prosecutors obtained at least 1738 wiretaps in the years after the appeals court's decision. They identify Van Wagenen as the person who authorized neariy all of the surveillance applications. The scope of those apparent violations is "staggering," said defense lawyer Michael Garey, and the rami?cations are "endiess." Riverside County District Attorney "And what i mean by endless is, if you have a wiretap authorization that is invalid, all of the material that is t?nsmade a obtained as a result of that wiretap [5 subject to suppressron.? he said. and anything derived from that material rs ?series of reforms" to how county prosecutors handle wiretaps after also 5Uble?3t to suppress'on- he took of?ce in January. (Photo: Jay caldemmhe Desert American Civil Liberties Union lawyer Nathan Wessier said Riverside prosecutors should warn agencies that made use of the wires that the surveillance may have been illegal and notify the people whose conversations were recorded, even if they were never arrested as a result. ?They should know that these were illegally obtained." he said. ?h?ERiQ?tig ?gs-Ni?? A county court in Riverside. authorized far more poiice eavesdropping than any other court in the USA. Much of it was sought by tederai drug agents. Shown beiow are the 30 jurisdictions with the most wiretaps in the USA. Hover or tap for detaiis SourcarAdminisirative Office of the t} 3 (loans Credit: Brad Heath. twitcheii Tho-race USA TODAY The 9th Circuit's decision left one exception: Lower-level of?cials can authorize wiretaps if the district attorney is "absent" and authorizes another lawyer in the office to act in his piece. Zellerbach said he ?often was absent" because his job required him to travel across a county that stretches from the Los Angeles suburbs to the Arizona border. Still, records show Riverside prosecutors routinely requested wiretaps on days when he was working. Federal court records show prosecutors appiied for five wiretaps Feb. 18. 2014, for example, when Zellerbach appeared at a news conference to talk about metai thefts. The next week. prosecutors applied for nine more wiretaps on a day when Zellerbach's of?ce posted a photo on Twitter of him meeting with a delegation of Chinese of?ciais in his office conference room. in each case, reports by the federai court administrative of?ce list Van Wagenen. not Zellerbach. as the person who approved the surveiliance. 1 1/20/2015 Police {?qsqu?t?ta/eas oEiJedsQQ/ 16/ 16 Page 11 Of 247 Page' #1 legge 4 of5 DA Zellerbach speaks w/of?ciais from the People's Procuratorate of Sichuan Provinci; in China who visited Riverside. Riverside DA Of?ce Februam 27. 2014 Zeilerbach declined to answer questions about his office?s approval of wiretap applications. did nothing wrong other than have my office assist law enforcement in their effort to obtain a wiretap." he said Thursday. San Bernardino County District Attorney Mike Ramos, pictured at a press conference. said he cautioned his counterparts in Riverside County about the need to personally approve wiretap requests. (Photo: James Qur'gg. It is impossible to know how often prosecutors in otherjurisdictions improperly turned the job of approving wiretaps over to lower-levei attorneys because those orders almost always remain secret. ln submissions to the federal courts' administrative office. Los Angeles prosecutors reported that hundreds ofwiretaps had been approved by the head of the of?ce?s drug crimes unit, not the district attorney. A spokesman said the information in those reports was incorrect. Ramos. the president?elect of the National District Attorneys Association, said he planned to raise the issue with other top prosecutors at a meeting this week. Kefman also reports for The (Palm Springs, Desert Sun. Contributing: Mark Harman in McLean, Va. Read or Share this story: OBQOPR MORE STORIES Halloween scared up hotel biz in Oct. occupancv-coachella- Us ow/news/ZOW NOV. 20, 5? 29am valEev/76074 1 281$?g Blackhawks Thanksol iving lunch for ?rst (/storv/news/ed?WlS/l 1/20/13}: re - thanksgiving- Lem responders/76077? 14/1 grog-tilanksgiving-lunch??rst- MW Nov. 20, 2015. 7:38 am. 6 Reasons You Mav Be Forgetting Your Kevs {istorv/sponsor?storv/desert? storv/descrt- We: Lessee;- . Nov. 14 2015. 9:31 p.m. med1cal- center/201 5/1 1/1 S/desert- regional? 5/ 1 1/ 1 1 1/20/2015 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 12 of 247 PageID 113 1 PAUL E. ZELLERBACH 2 DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 955?9673 6 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 3 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or RIVERSIDE 9 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 14-120 10 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE - COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER 1 1 AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF APPLICATION WIRE, PAGE-ER AND ELECTRONIC 12 Target Telephone 13 Target Telephone #10, 562-492-1461 - Target Telephone #11, 951-570-0461 14 Target Telephone #12, 951-322-5805 15 16 APPLICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. 17 18 I, Jeffery A. Van Wagenen In, Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, 19 declare: 20 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Paul E. Zellerbach. 21 I am the RiVerside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code 22 section 23 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order 24 Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Police 25 Department, Detective Chris Carnahan, and relying thereon, I approve making this Application 26 and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to intercept Wire, 27 pager and electronic communications to and from the communication devices (the "Target 28 1 Application Wiretap #14420 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 13 of 247 PageID 114 described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 3. Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her substitute, to physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic reports required by Penal Code section 629.60. 4. Detective Carnahan, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Riverside District Of?ce, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section He is certi?ed by the California State Attorney General's Of?ce in wiretaps, as set forth in the Af?davit. 5. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce Los Angeles Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal Code Section Riverside Police Department Lt. Cook, reviewed the Af?davit and approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led herewith). 6. Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to conclude the Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and will continue to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, Transportation and Sales of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11351, 11352, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code with reSpect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, andfor ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in proceeds from narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and conSpiracy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the meaning of Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted conversation of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, will provide additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said offenses. 2 Application Wiretap #14?120 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 14 of 247 PageID 115 There is probable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes listed herein and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. 7. Pursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular descriptions of the device(s) from which the communications are to be intercepted and their locations: A. Target Telephone is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation. Subscriber information is unknown at this time. TT #9 is being utilized by B. Target Telephone #10: (502) 492-1461 (TT #10) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by There is no subscriber information due to the account being a ?prepaid customer?. The user address is 17330 Preston Rd. Dallas, TX 75252. TT #10 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). C. Target Telephone #11: (951) 570-0461 11) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of Eudelia Gonzalez, with an address 1135 W. 7th St. Peri-is, CA 92570. TT #11 is being utilized by an mndenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). D. Target Telephone #12: Target Telephone #12: (951) 322-5805 12) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of HITE3CH BOOST069, with an address PO Box 54988 Irvine, CA 92619. TT #12 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). 8. The actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. 9. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic communications between the Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates and/or co-conspirators concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section .3 Application Wiretap #14-120 Case 2 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 15 of 247 PageID 116 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have been attempted Without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if attempted, as set forth in the Affidavit. 11. Due to the ongoing nature of the conspiracy related to the above offenses, and because there is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those offenses will occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to maintain this intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be deemed to automatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin Mobile U.S.A., Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, Wireless, California Products and Services, T-Mobile USA Inc., Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc, Cingular Wireless, Nextel Communications, Metro PCS, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint? Nextel, Metrocall, PageNet, Tuyo Mobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, T-Mobile, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other affected telecommunications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecommunications Companies?) or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request of law enforcement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be I compensated by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of fumishing the facilities and technical assistance. 13. I request this Court to order the Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. 4 Application Wiretap #14-120 Case 3 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 16 of 247 PageID 117 14. Applicant requests this Application, Review, Af?davit, Order and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, andXor exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney?s Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Renal Code Section 629.66) 15. I are unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the Af?davit within the meaning of Penal Code Section 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice certi?ed person(s), selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement of?cer/agency, to provide linguistic interpretation for interception of Wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular telephone communications, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief, which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in Riverside, California. DATED: By: JEFF YA. AN AGEN IR. ASSIST TDIST For: PAUL E. ZELLERBACH DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 5 Application Wiretap #14-120 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 17 of 247 PageID 118 .SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY INTERCEPT ORDER OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN 14-133 ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ELECTRONIC REVIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE DESIGNEE INSTALLATION OF A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE, AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE OBTAINING OF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING ANDIOR CELLULAR SITE DATA REVIEW OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER Assistant Chief Christopher Vicino of the Riverside Police Department, states: 1. The Chief Executive Officer for the Riverside Police Department is Sergio Diaz. 2. I am the Assistant Chief of Police in charge of the Riverside Police Department. 3. I am the Chief Executive Officer's designee for intercept orders, within the meaning of California Penal Code section 4. Christopher Carnahan is a Detective with the Riverside Police Department and is currently assigned to the Special Investigations Bureau DEA TFG2. 5. have reviewed the Affidavit of Christopher 'Carnahan, which sets forth the circumstances in support of the application and which requests authority to install a pen register trap and trace device, to obtain global positioning system (GPS) tracking and/or cellular site data of and to intercept wire or electronic communications to and from Target Telephone #9 arget Telephone #10, 502-492-1461, Target Telephone #11, 951-570-0461, and Target Telephone #12, 951-322-5805. CEO REVIEW Page 1 of2 Casp Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 18 of 247 PageID 119 I APPROVE THE APPLICATION. Dated: g?b?-?br W0 Riverside Police Department com-\tmanz-osm .(J1 ~15- 00 CEO REVJEW Page 2 of 2 Flee Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 19 of 247 PageID 120 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION 0F WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TE OMMUNICATION Target Telephone #9 WIRETAP N0.: 14-120 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF INTERCEPT ORDER (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 (951) 322-5805 Target Telephone #10 Target Telephone #11 Target Telephone #12 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE AND AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE INTRODUCTIONIAND EXPERTISE I, Christopher Carnahan, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 1. Pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.50 I am a Detective for the Riverside Police Department assigned to the Special Investigations Bureau, and I am currently assigned as a Task Force Of?cer (TFO) with the Riverside District Of?ce of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 1 am the of?cer who is seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic cellular telephone communications. I am an investigator, or law enforcement of?cer of the United States, Within the meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 18 of the United States Code. I are empowered to conduct investigations of, and to make arrests for, the drug offenses enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, and Section 2516. Additionally, I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical, and legal aspects of court ordered Wiretaps. (Penal Code Section 629.50 et seq.) Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 Flee Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 20 of 247 PageID 121 2. I have worked as a police of?cer with the City of Riverside Police Department for the past ten years. I have held the rank of detective and am currently assigned to the DEA Task Force. Prior to working for the Riverside Police Department, I worked for the Oceanside Police Department for approximately eight years. Prior to working for the Oceanside Police Department, I worked for the Los Angeles Police Department for approximately nine years. While employed by the Oceanside Police I held the rank of Detective. I worked for a year as a gang detective and three years as a narcotic detective. The gang unit Specializes in gathering intelligence information of gang-related crimes and investigating crimes involving gang members. While working as a narcotic detective, I was selected and assigned to the DEA MET Team. While assigned to the DEA MET Team, we targeted Los Angeles and Oceanside gang members who sold cocaine on North Coast Highway in the City of Oceanside. While employed by the Los Angeles Police Department, I worked approximately two and a half years with the South Bureau C.R.A.S.H. (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) Search Warrant Team. During my employment with Oceanside Police Department and the Los Angeles Police Department, I have participated in numerous narcotics investigations as well as physical and wire surveillance, executed search warrants, and arrested numerous drug traf?ckers. I havc also spoken, on numerous occasions, to informants and suspects concerning the methods and practices of drug traf?ckers. I have received in excess of 360 hours of specialized training I involving the use, possession, packaging, manufacturing, sales, concealment, and transportation of various controlled substances, and conSpiracy investigations regarding violations of California State narcotics laws. I currently investigate domestic and foreign large scale, multiple pound/kilo, poly-drug dealers, traf?ckers and organizations. I have conducted investigations regarding the unlawful importation, possession, and distribution of controlled substances, as Well as conspiracies associated with criminal narcotics, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, 84l(a)(l), 843(b), 846, 952(a) and 963, and Title 18, United States Code, 2, 1952, 1956 and 1957. 3. Currently, I am assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration- Task Force Group 2, which is a large scale narcotic investigation group. I am an investigative or law Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14- 120 2 122 rise Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 21 of 247 PageID enforcement of?cer of the United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2510(7), who is empowered to conduct investigations of, and to make arrests for, the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. 4. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein. This Af?davit is based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge I have derived from my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training and experience; (3) my conversations with other law enforcement investigators with whom I have discussed this case; (4) and what I believe to be reliable information obtained from the following sources: oral and written reports about this investigation and other investigations which I have received ?om law enforcement of?cers; (5) law enforcement databases; (6) telephone records - toll records and subscriber information; (.7) public records; and (8) physical surveillances conducted by law enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 5. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a'statement was made, the information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my interpretation, derived ?om my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics investigations. 6. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones #10, #11, and #12 as described below: A. Target Telephone (TT is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation. The subscriber information is still pending. TT #9 is B. Target Telephone #10: (502) 492-1461 (IT #10) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by There is no subscriber information due to the account being a ?prepaid customer?. The user address is I Dallas, TX 75252. The Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14- 120 3 CI ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 22 of 247 PageID 12: Name Unknown (LNU). Electronic Serial Number 355697052043860, the Mobile Station Identi?cation Number 310410649733251. TT #11 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last C. Target Telephone #11: (951) 570?0461 11) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of Eudelia Gonzalez, with an address t. Penis, CA 92570. The Electronic Serial Number 268435459707826755, the Mobile Station Identi?cation Number 000002564064260. TT #12 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). D. Target Telephone #12: (951) 322-5805 12) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of BOOSTO69, with an address PO Box 54988 Irvine, CA 92619. The Electronic Serial Number 268435462502699737, the Mobile Station Identi?cation Number 000009122485578. TT #13 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). 7. 1 request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 8. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, transportation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11351, 11352,11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code, with respect to a substance containing cocaine andfor methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 4 :ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 23 of 247 PageID 12? II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, AN DIOR ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 9. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty-day order to intercept the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push?to?talk voice communications, to and from TT TT #10: (502) 492- 1461 (951) 570?0461 and (951) 322-5805 between the herein named target suspect(s) and any additional known and unlmown and shall include any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) commimications and push-to-talk voice communications and any background conversations while the telephone instrument is otherwise in use. B. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING ANDIOR CELLULAR 10. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace feature on TT if? TT #10: (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 ., and (951) 322-5805. I also request the authorization to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GP S) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations, related to TT TT #10: (502) 492?1461 (951) 570? 0461 and (951) 322?5805. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular A??davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 5 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 24 of 247 PageID 12ft telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GP S) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers would be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the user of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant requests an order to obtain and receive cell site data andfor Global Positioning System (GP S) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone. a. Your af?ant has learned through conversations with other law enforcement of?cers and by personal knowledge that illegal narcotic traffickers have the potential to disable the GPS function in their telephones if they are aware law enforcement can monitor their real time movements. Your affiant does not solely rely on GPS locations because your affiant knows, often times GPS requests can fail or revert to cell towers with a 5000 meter locate. I also know there are many ?dead spots? in Southern California as related to cellular service for Verizon. Ihave been told by Verizon employees if cellular telephones do not receive a signal, I will receive a failed response when requesting GPS locations. b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify. TT TT #19: (502) 492-1461, (951) 570-0461, and (951) 322-5805. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of mobile electronic tracking devices, law enforcement agents can Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 6 alone. 1) 2) 3) telephone. is being utilized by Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 25 of 247 PageID 12(? identify the location of a cellular telephone to a much ?ner detail than through cellular site data DURATION OF INTERCEPTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 11. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance of the Order, whichever comes ?rst, pursuant to California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the full scope, membership and methods of operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the interception not terminate when the communications described herein are ?rst intercepted, but may continue to the full extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or until the full scope of the enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in . furtherance of the enterprise, whichever comes ?rst. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. Therefore, your af?ant believes that additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the ?rst communication to and horn the target telephone(s). IV. TARGET TELEPHONES) (Penal Code section 12. The Target Telephones are described as follows: Target Telephone TT is a Sprint wireless Target Telephone #10: (502) 492-1461 is an telephone. is being utilized by (TS 7). Target Telephone #11: (951) 570-0461 is a Sprint Wireless telephone. is being utilized by (T 7). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 7 4) Target Telephone #12: (951) 322?5805 (T is a Sprint Wireless telephone. is being utilized by 7). A. The term ?Target Telephone ?Target Telephone ?Target Telephone and ?Target Telephone #12? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address and/or Push?to?talk (PTT) number, andfor Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT andfor DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), and/or any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone numbe?s) and/or ESN and/or JFMI, ii), PTT and/or DC whether the changes occur simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as the target telephone(s) B. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names when obtaining Pre~Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement ?om immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. V. TARGET SUBJECTS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13. The known Target Subj ect(s) of this investigation are: REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 8 ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 26 of 247 PageID 12' \l se Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 27 of 247 PageID 18 REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14420 9 use Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 28 of 247 PageID 12 [Remorse - 1 I: g. (Target Subject 7) is a Hispanic male identi?ed only as utilizing (502) 492-1461, and (951) 570?0461, with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of residence. There are no other known identifying characteristics about REY Last Name Unknown (LNU) and as a result a records check into the California Department of Motor Vehicles cannot be completed. VI. JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMJVIUNICATION INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 14. Colyromz'o Penal Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 US. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was impr0perly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located in New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held ?for the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the taped telephone is located, but Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 29 of 247 PageID 13? also Where the contents of the redirected are ?rst to be heard.? (Hard, at page 136) In United States v. Bertram, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the original listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction have authority under Title to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodrigtez noted, this interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge to supervise an investigation that spans more than one judicial district.? (Ibid, at pages 403?404) Also see United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 15. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use cellular telephone(s), use ?ctitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by law enforcement. By using other persons? names and creating a ?ctitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 1 lse Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 30 of 247 PageID 13: certain degree of anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the popularity of pre-paid cellular telephones among those engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to ?ee the area of the crime. seminar) 3- 18.rgeTlne #10: 4141 is an telephone. is subscribed to a prepaid customer located at Dallas, TX 7 5252 and is being utilized by 7). 19. Target Telephone #11: (951) 570?0461 is a Sprint wireless telephone. is subscribed to I I sable crap St Perris, CA 92570 and is being utilized by Sit). 20. Target Telephone #12: (951) 322?5805 is a Sprint wireless telephone. is subscribed to HITE3 CH BOOST069 located at PO Box 54988 Irvine, CA 92619 and is being utilized by 7). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 3. 2 CK) -J (.21. Based on GPS pings of TT #11 and TT #12, investigators have identi?ed multiple residences within Riverside County associated to REY to include the subscriber address of TT #12. 22. Lastly, based on extensive toll analysis of all three target telephones utilized by REY, investigators determined that there are multiple connections to ongoing narcotics cases across the continental United States to include Missouri, Georgia, Texas and Kentucky. REY, Operating in, around and/or through Riverside County which stretches from Orange County to the Colorado River and forms the state border with Arizona. Riverside County lies inland of Los Angeles County and is bordered by Orange County to the west, San Bernardino County to the north and San Diego County and Imperial County to the south. Major Highways that operate thru Riverside County include Interstates 10, 15, 215 and State Routes 60, 91 and 111. The above referenced highways will lead to the other, major counties of California previously mentioned as well as across state lines into Nevada. 23. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. VII. PRIOR APPLICATIONS (Penal Code section 629.5061) 24. On March 4, 2014, a review of the California Electronic Intercept Court Order System and electronic surveillance indices was conducted for Target Telephone #10 (TT Target Telephone #11 11) and Target Telephone 12 12). Id nsnacr?c .1;I;d 26. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 3 ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 31 of 247 PageID 13 IV) se Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 32 of 247 PageID 13 1 intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places speci?ed in thi Application, within the meaning of Penal Code section - .REDACTED Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 4 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 33 of 247 PageID 13: OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 27. Your af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target Telephones #9-12 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this investigation which include discovering: a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subj ect(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subjectt?s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 1X. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE (Penal Code section 28. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate drug traf?cking. 29. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I assert that: Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 5 El; ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 34 of 247 PageID 13, a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, have committed, or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11351, 11352, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and Conspiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, with respect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning the above-named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Pencl Code section 30. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities ?orn which, or the places where, the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above~narned offenses or are leased to, listed in the name of or commonly used by the Target Subjects whose communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 6295203)) 31. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more fully explained below. (Penal Code section 32. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I ?irther assert that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in furtherance of the narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places involved in the manufacturing and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 6 woodman??2?me will be obtained through the interception of Wire communications over the ?Target Telephones?. 33. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived ?om participation in this investigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: a. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that have received ?om the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; b. Physical surveillance conducted by the West County Narcotic Task Force Riverside Sheriff Department (RSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; 0. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other documentary evidence in this and other investigations and, d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. f. Evidence obtained through court-authorized intercept orders. A IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET ELEPHO #9 REDACTED Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 7 Fee Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 35 of 247 PageID 13? se Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 36 of 247 PageID 137 NH HO madam-me - 8594:1513 REDA c750 to 00 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 8 00 ?4 43? DJ se Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 37 of 247 PageID 1 8 B. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #10 38. The following intercepted communications made to or from (502) 492-1461 #10) as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14-79 are indicative of the types of narcotics activates associated with REY and indicate that REY is a narcotics broker for various distributors, and that REY utilizes target telephones to facilitate the transfer of narcotics to further his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with REY and the target telephone which he utilizes. 3 a. On Mondav, Februarv 3, 2014, at 4:24 pm, utilizing ?mm (502) 492-1461 called . REY what was going on. REY said the phone didn?t have a good signal. fighters Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 9 (Ease Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 38 of 247 PageID 13 REY said he had to get a small phone, but was struggling with it aid ?okay?. REY said ?yes? but it further said that it would be $200 more, but called utilizing TT #10 (502) 492?1461. asked what was going on. that the (narcotics) was ready, but the other guy would be calling soon and let him know when he would be able to bring the (narcotics) either today or tomorrow. REY said it would be better the next morning. said it would depend on when ?they? (other dealer) could bring it. REY said it ?they? could do it within the next hour of so then it would be okay. said he would let REY know when ?they? call him. REY then told let him know if possible an hour before it would happen and he (REY) would make arrangements. C. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #11 39. On January 14, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios .T. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14-11, authorizing the interception of the electronic cellular telephone communications to and ?om Target Telephone and used by The following intercepted communications made to or from (951) 570-0461 (TT 40. #11) as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14-11 are indicative of the types of narcotics activates associated with REY and indicate that REY is a narcotics broker for various Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 20 G3 ,ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 39 of 247 PageID 14IO distributors, and that REY utilizes target telephones to facilitate the transfer of narcotics to further his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with REY and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. 011 Sunday. January 19. 2014. at 1:37 called utilizing (951) 570-0461. asked for Rey. REY said hello. greeted. asked what the message was about. i :i said he was running out but he was setting some away for him (REY). REY said everything was calm (possibly slow), so he would have to see, but he (RE-Y) did have enough to pay for one part (one unit of narcotics). REY said he had been up and down, and had not been around. said he only had six left. but they (REY and others) had gotten a call horn those guys (third parties/with the "ventilator"), since they (REY and others) had worked with those other guys (third party) before. REY said he had told them (third parties) they (REY and others) were not working. REY said they (third parties) would be a good opportunity for "if: was getting them for three~sornething them (possibly narcotics) for only three, when Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 2 p?i CD Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 40 of 247 PageID 14. REY said he would take one (possibly narcotics), for Wednesday or Thursday. aid okay, he would pre-pay it. REY said okay. b. On Sundav anuarv 19. 2014. utilizing Target Telephone #4 identi?ed himself a alled utilizing (951) 570?0461. and told REY that there was a guy who had it (possibly narcotics) at that moment, but he (guy) was giving it (possibly narcotics) three points higher (possibly higher price). REY said they (third party and others) had already seen somebody yesterday. REY said he told them (third party and others) to better wait for the one that belonged to (possibly narcotics), adding that he (REY) would wait for it (possibly same thing" "nd REY he the same thing that belonged to so he gave it to them 0461. asked REY what he was doing. REY said nothing and asked who was calling. cursed and identi?ed himself as ?Pollo?. REY said he was having a hard time said these ones (REY) was most interested in getting something that was good. (possibly narcotics) were also good. REY said he would need to talk to his buddy because the other guys have not said anything because the lady had not arrived yet. REY said he was far right now; he was about two hours away. said to call him back and let him know how many he (REY) needed. REY asked if he should jot down this number or should he keep the other one (phone number). told REY to jot this one (phone number) down since this one was the good one. REY asked if this was the one for business or Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 22 :ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 41 of 247 PageID 142 home (phone). said this one was his business (phone). REY said okay, he would jot it down and would call from another one. D. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHO 42. The following intercepted made to or ?'orn (951) 322-5805 (IT #12) as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14?11 are indicative of the types of narcotics activates associated with REY and indicate that REY is a narcotics broker for various distributors, and that REY utilizes target telephones to facilitate the transfer of narcotics to ?thher his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with REY and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On Thursday January 16. 2014 utilizing Target Telephone TT - received an incoming call ?om utilizing Target Telephone (951) 322-5805, told REY he called a dude (possibly was going to check. REY asked in how many days did not know. said they (third parties) to give him a call on the other one (phone) because where he (REY) was going to be at, he (REY) was not going to get (any reception). REY said to to try this one (phone number) ?rst. said he was going to give the number to the guy (possibly so they (REY and could meet. REY asked Where he was going to see him (possibly said close by to REY's Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 2 3 \Dooqoxmewwi?a 0 ml Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 42 of 247 PageID 143 narcotics). REY told the money on hand. REY said okay. b. Telephone (951)622-5895. said they (third parties) told him on 3 5" CD A did not know, there was a problem before crossing (possibly border). REY said okay. REY asked aid yes, and told REY he had two (phone numbers for REY). REY said for to give him a call on the other one (phone) because where he (REY) was going to be at, he (REY) was not going to get (any reception). REY said for to try this one (phone number) ?rst. i) so they (REY and said he was going to give the could meet. REY asked where number to the guy (possibly was going to let him know if there was one (possiny narcotics). REY told to give him (REY) around 20, 30 minutes to get ready and have the money on hand. said he would give REY a call when everything was ready. REY said okay. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 2 4 C2 188 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 43 of 247 PageID 14: 43. The above listed calls and parenthetical explanations are based on my training, experience, and intelligence gained during this investigation and is related to narcotics distribution. XI. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SEIZURES 44. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may not be directly connected to the Target Subject(s) of this Affidavit, unless othemise noted, all seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the Target Subj ect(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, sophistication, and ability of these organizations. a. On 12?12-13, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop at Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol unit alerted to the rear of the vehicle. Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine (approximately 5 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his ??ont pants pocket. b. On 01-02-14, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle impounded on 12-12-43 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. was impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators recovered approximately 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine from vehicle truck area. X. NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 45. Interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14? 120 25 4a Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 44 of 247 PageID 14! evidence against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed; appear reasonably likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation to obtain direct evidence that will convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of: a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subj ect(s)? illegal narcotics trafficking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; I c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; ti. The stash where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 46. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in identifying and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 47. Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or his/their known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conSpiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 26 ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 45 of 247 PageID 14 location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subj ect(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruthful statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conSpiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 48. It appears that this organization is a close-knit organization whose members are either blood rel"tives, mutual ?iends andfor very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large-scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would-be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain ?om potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, and/or its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 49. Since it appears that no single informant or informants are available or eXpected to become available, your af?ant is currently unable to determine the scepe of this criminal enterprise, the identity of other co-conspirators, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their methods of operation. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS AGENTS 50. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. If the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 2 7' O) :ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 46 of 247 PageID 14 directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 51. Due to the close-knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique fraught with failure and would most likely jeopardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore, the leaders of drug traf?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. 52. As previously noted, it is a conunon ?rartice for indi?iduals involved in large scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suspicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouch? for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned compartmentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any ?n?ther than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 53. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subj ect(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 28 \l ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 47 of 247 PageID 148 54. If 3. Con?dential Source (CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy from the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight?knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the organization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upon my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. 55. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 56. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone is often unlmown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 57. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. 58. Surveillance has been conducted of subject(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 2 9 use Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 48 of 247 PageID 149 identi?cation. The subject was unable to produce any identi?cation, but verbally identi?ed himself as with a date of birth of and address of Where the Cl had previously picked up Heroin with lso provided a cellular phone number 0 Deputy Wicker took a picture of with his consent, for identi?cation, and subsequently released him. TFO Layos conducted ember investigation .. . .. identity. Via Riverside County Sheriffs Departrnents data base, revealed contacts for Wildomar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed the person Deputy Wicker stopped was in fact b. On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside Sheriffs Department (RSD) South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted surveillance of I. I I. I Wildomar. During the surveillance, a black Jaguar with paper plates was observed leaving residence and ultimately stopped by CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TFG2 and seized approximately 51bs of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, was arrested by CHP Of?cer Mendenhall for state felony Violations of 11378 HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Herein and 2 of Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. 0. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the city of Temecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside Investigators identi?ed .. .. d. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 3 tuse Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 49 of 247 PageID 150 text message conversations as authorized by Riverside County Wire hich indicated that was to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed Carson, California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. e. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 W. 7th Street, Perris, California on two houses associated with REY. Investigators followed two Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. One of the subjects was identi?ed as DOB: is REY and the user of Investigators are still working on determining if TT #10?12. Note: I I II as been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. 59. Surveillance operations have been successful to the extent they have established persons and/or vehicles arriving at, and/or departing ?orn principal locations; and extended the scope of the investigation to additional locations and co-conspirators. However, surveillance operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of Operation and the manner in which their Operation is conducted. 60. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co-conspirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suspected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an investigative technique that is used to con?rm meetings and other suSpected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 61. Your affiant knows from training and experience, and horn Speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14? 120 3 ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 50 of 247 PageID 15 64. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the opportunities for detection by the Target Subject(s). If surveillance were to be detected, I believe the traf?ckers? perpetual suspicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations would in their minds be con?rmed. The subjects would not only likely ?ee the area, they would also engage in wholesale abandonrnent of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking place. This selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help maintain the integrity of the investigation. 65. Based on the above-stated facts and on my training and experience, your affiant does net believe that surveillance of the above~referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target Telephone, will enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation. SEARCH WARRAN TS 66. On 01-22? 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #01221417 for a target telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. 67. On 2?25?14, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge Irma Poole Asberry. 68. There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. That danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search warrants after carefully weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall investigation. Generally, it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 69. DEA investigators will prepare af?davits to search the principal locations involved in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on-going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 3 3 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 51 of 247 PageID 15: intermediate quantity of narcotics and/or controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances andtor illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large-scale narcotic traf?ckers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics and/or controlled substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 70. Your af?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total scope of the illegal Operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug traf?cking organization, the organizational structure, the full scope of the narcotics conSpiracy, the locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware that higher-level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics andfor controlled substances at their residences. Although surveillance has identi?ed residence(s), your affiant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their home(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stash? locations, without intercepted wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized, those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amounts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far less probative value by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conspirators, which give full meaning Af?davit Wiretap Order No. l4?120 3 4 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 52 of 247 PageID 15 to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 71. The analysis of data derived from the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been helpful in determining patterns, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls between telephores, suspects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your af?ant knows from experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation ?om law enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived from the pen register and telephone tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for successful prosecution, eSpecially in light of the familial structuring of this organization. Speci?cally, the details of the involvement of the participants, and the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before successful surveillance operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. I 72. Based on the above, your af?ant believes? that pen registers, toll analysis, and subscriber information, without the aid of a wire intercept, will not help your af?ant achieve the objectives of the investigation. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 73. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that people who are entering or leaving the location. It is your af?ant?s opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14? 120 3 5 {\JiCase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 53 of 247 PageID 154 conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuals entering and exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement within the organization, if any. TRASH SEARCHES OF TARGET LOCATIONS 74. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subject(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high-level narcotics traf?ckers and their associates go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to dispose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me narcotic traffickers will often carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it would be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in front of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the search would draw susPicion on the law enforcement of?cers. A trash search would surely draw the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subject(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the government?s objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor, without identifying themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash search. Even if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained from the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full scope of the conspiracy. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 3 6 ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 54 of 247 PageID 15. 75. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul- de?sacs. They would be conspicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be spotted. At this time, your af?ant feels that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. 76. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects we to observe and disclose to the Targrt Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already suspicious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co-conSpirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 77'. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traf?ckers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and frequently will not use their residential trash containers to dispose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. 78. I ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would be suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co? conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 3 7 ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 55 of 247 PageID 15 narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 79. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 80. Even if investigators are able to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers frequently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail. GRAND JURY 81. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal suSpects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would c00perate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the targets of this investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 38 U) ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 56 of 247 PageID 15 . 82. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be successful in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his ?fth amendment privilege; (2) it would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conspirators, when they are identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. XI. CONCLUSION 83. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I believe that the Target Subjects have are committing and are about to commit the aforementioned crimes and that particular communications of the Target Subj ect(s) over the target telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied for herein. 84. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. However, it is your af?ant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electronic communications over the Target Telephone and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your af?ant to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 85. For reasons set out in this af?davit, it is your af?ant?s Opinion that the only reasonable and effective way to develop the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the person(s) involved in this conSpiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested herein. 86. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 3 9 :ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 57 of 247 PageID 15 listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinaiter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order: a. Authorize the installation andfor use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, all wireless digital functions, wireless analog functions, direct connect/digital dispatch/direct diSpatch functions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California Where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in the Riverside Comty ?ea. (See United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5111 Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and [hatred States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation andfor use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. 0. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace Direct Connect/Dispatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. (1. Authorize the installation and/ or use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller and any calling features such as ?call forwarding? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services said company provides the peeple whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 40 CD Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 58 of 247 PageID 159 subscribers and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through this intercept/pen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not limited to past telephone bills and records. 87. Your af?ant requests the Court order Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereina?er referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order, within 48 hours (including a?er-business hours, we ?kends, and holidays), and without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging device(s), cellular/wireless telephone(s), calling card(s), and other communication device(s) contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary number/account, billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone numbeds), and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identified in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 4 3. ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 59 of 247 PageID 16 c. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, and/or GPS location information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703(1)). d. Provide any and all cell site data, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of any and all cellular telephones, which called each Target Telephone, whiCh was called by each Target Telephone, which was identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or which was otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, without geogcrhicrl limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703 (D). e. Provide access and the access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. f. Provide all information related to pre-paid cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identified in the investigation, including historical, past, present, current, and on- going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre-paid telephone account. 88. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) to continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, your af?ant requests that if the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, the Telecommunication Companies be ordered to not disclose to the Target Subj ect(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid the balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 42 ase Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 60 of 247 PageID 16 for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the court?s order. 89. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the order has authorized this Wire interception, or of its existence. 90. Your af?ant requests the Court to authorize law enforcement of?cers use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify the target telephone(s). 91. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to execute such intercept order. 92. Your af?ant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Appiication, its af?davit, and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 93. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Riverside, California. . (LA etective ChristoPher Carnahan Riverside Police Department Dated: March ,2014 Sworn to and subscribed before me on March 201 HONORABLE ELIOS J. HERNANDEZ COUNTY RIVERSIDE Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 4 3 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 61 of 247 PageID 162 1 PAUL E. ZE LERBACH 2 DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, Galifornia 92501 5 Telephone: (9551) 955?5400 6 Fax: (951) 95[5?9673 7 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 9 IN THE MA ER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 14-483 10 OF THE RICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OP RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER 1 1 AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF APPLICATION WIRE, PAGER AND ELECTRONIC - 12 COM ICATIONS Target Tele hone #13: 502?609-5937 13 Target Telephone #14: 702-885-3486 Target ele hone #15: 14 Target Tele hone #16: 951?322-0063 15 16 AP ICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. 7 18 I, ery A. Van Wagenen Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, 1 9 declare: 20 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Paul E. Zellerbach. 21 I am the Ri erside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code 22 section 23 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order 24 Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Drug 25 Enforcement Administration, Special Agent Emilio Baca, and relying thereon, I approve making 26 this Application and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to 27 intercept wire, pager and electronic communications to and ?om the devices 28 1 Application Wiretap #14-183 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 62 of 247 PageID 163 WOOQONUIDWMH 1431- UJ l? (the "Target described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 3. substitute, to reports requir 4. Administratic authorization I-l forth in the A 5. Los Angeles Code Sectio: Af?davit ant herewith). 6. conclude the will continue of Controlled and 11379 of Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic ed by Penal Code section 629.60. Special Agent Baca, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement sn (DEA) Riverside District Of?ce, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section to is certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s O?ice in wiretaps, as set f?davit. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal 1 Special Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, reviewed the 1 approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, Transportation and Sales Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11351, 11352, 11378 'the Health and Safety Code with respect to a substance containing cocaine andfor methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, andfor ten (1 proceeds fror and conspira meaning of conversation will provide 0) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, cy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said offenses. 2 Application Wiretap #14?183 Case 3:1 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 63 of 247 PageID 164 There is probable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes listed herein and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. 7. Pursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular descriptions of the device(s) horn which the communications are to be intercepted and their locations: A. Target Telephone #13 (502) 609-5937 (TT #13) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). B. Target Telephone #14 (702) 885-7486 (IT #14) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). Target "feiephone #15 1T #15) is a T-Mobiie wireless telephone. Records Pending. TT #15 is being utilized by UM8364. D. Target Telephone #16 (931) 322-0063 (TT #16) is a Sprint Wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU. 8. The actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. 9. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic communications between the Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates andfor co-conspirators concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have been attempted without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if attempted, as set forth in the Af?davit. 11. Due to the ongoing nature of the conspiracy related to the above offenses, and because there is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those offenses will occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to maintain this intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be 3 Application Wiretap #14-183 Case deemed to a1 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 64 of 247 PageID 165 Jtomatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. Mobile Wire Partnership (1 Wireless, N: Nextel, Metr Google, affected tele Companies?) of law enforc I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin L, Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, less, California Products and Services, T-Mobile USA Inc, Cellco oing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc., Cingular :xtel Communications, Metro PCS, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint? ocall, PageNet, Tuyo Mobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, T-Mobile, L, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other communications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecormnunications or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request ement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be compensated facilities and 13. by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of furnishing the technical assistance. I request this Court to order the Teleconununications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. l4. incorporated Applicant requests this Application, Review, Af?davit, Order and any/all documents, attachments, and/or exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of 15. good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) I am unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the Af?davit within the meaning of Penal Code Section 4 Application Wiretap #144 83 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 65 of 247 PageID E166 1 . 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice cerh?ed person(s), 2 selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement of?cer/agency, to provide 3 linguistic interpretation for interception of wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular 4 5 telephone communications, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. 6 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief, 7 which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in Riverside, 8 California. 9 10 DATED: '4-8 4% ix? By: JEFF A. JR. ASSIST NT DIS elm EY 12 COUN RSIDE 13 For: PAUL E. ZELLERBACH 14 DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Application Wiretap #14-1 83 Cass Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 66 Of 247 PageID 167 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO.: 14-183 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 4 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER INTERCEPT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF 5 WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR 6 TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS (502) 609-5937 Target Telephone #13 7 (702) 885-7486 Target Telephone #14 Target Telephone #15 8 (951) 322-0063 Target Telephone #16 9 10 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC 1 1 CELLULAR TELEPHONE AND 12 AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA 1 3 AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE 14 .. I. 13 INTRODUCTION AND EXPERTISE 16 I, Emilio J. Baca, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 17 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration 18 (DEA), and I am an investigative or law enforcement Of?cer of the United States within the 19 meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 20 2. I am empowered by law to conduct investigations and to make arrests for felony 21 offenses as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. Ihave been so employed since February 2010 and I am 22 currently assigned to the Riverside District Of?ce Task Force Group 2. I primarily investigate 23 narcotic traf?cking and distribution organizations Operating in and around Riverside County in 24 California 25 3. I have received approximately 19 weeks of training at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia and was trained in all aspects of conducting narcotics investigations as well as the methods and techniques commonly used by major narcotics traf?ckers. I have attended special training in wire and electronic interceptions, toll analysis, and the use of wire and electronic Af?davit Wiretap Order NO. 14-183 Page 1 Cas pap?.Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 67 of 247 PageID 168 interception equipment. I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical and legal aspects of court ordered wiretaps per Penal Code Section 629 et seq. 4. During my employment with the DEA, I have participated in narcotics investigations through the surveillance, execution of search warrants, and arrests of drug traf?ckers. In addition, I have spoken to informants and suspects regarding the methods and means of drug traf?ckers. I have debriefed persons arrested for controlled substance traf?cking and have debriefed informants on the methods for gathering controlled substance intelligence. I have Spoken with experienced narcotics investigators concerning the methods and practices of narcotics traf?ckers. Through my training, experience and interaction with other Special Agents, Task Force Of?cers, and other narcotics investigators, I have become familiar with narcotic traf?ckers? methods of operation, including the distribution, tranSportation, collection of proceeds and methods of laundering used in an attempt to conceal the nature of narcotic related proceeds. Through these interactions I have become familiar with and developed an understanding for the manner in which controlled substances are imported, manufactured, distributed, and sold, to include the methods of avoiding detection and apprehension by law enforcement of?cers. I am familiar with the manner in which narcotics traf?ckers use wireless communication equipment such as cellular telephone technology, pagers, coded communications, false identities, and counter surveillance to determine the presence of law enforcement and other means to facilitate their illegal activities and avoid detection or mislead a narcotics investigation. 5. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein and make this af?davit based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge I have gained from my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training, experience, and conversations with other law enforcement investigators with whom I have discussed this case; (3) and what I believe to be reliable information obtained ?om the following sources: oral and written reports about this investigation, received from law enforcement of?cers; (4) law enforcement databases; (5) Pen register and trap and trace information as well as telephone records - toll records and subscriber information; (6) public records; and (7) physical surveillances conducted by DEA, West County Narcotics Task Force - Riverside County Sheriff?s Department, and other law Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 2 Cas ~153Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 68 of 247 PageID 169 . enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 6. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a statement was made, the information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my interpretation, derived from my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics investigations. 7. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones as described below: A. Target Telephone #13 (592} 609-5937 (TT #13) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). B. Target Telephone #14 (702) 885-7486 (TT #14) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). C. Target Telephone #15 (TT #15) is a T?Mobile wireless telephone. Records Pending. TT #15 is being utilized by UM8364Target Telephone #16 (951) 322-0063 (TT #16) is a Sprint wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU. 8. Probable cause exists to believe that CHRIS LNU (user of TT #13 and TT UM8364 (user of TT #15) and REY LNU (user of and other identi?ed and unidenti?ed co- conspirators, have committed, are committing, or are about to commit, the crimes as discussed below, and that their communications relate to those and other ongoing crimes. 9. I request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 10. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, transportation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11351, 11352,11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 3 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 69 of 247 PageID 170 1 . with respect to a substance containing cocame and/or methamphetamine where the substance 2 exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, 3 possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a 4 conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. 5 6 II. 7 PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT A. 8 WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, OR ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER 9 (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 10 11. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty~ 11 day order to intercept the wire, electronic pager, andfor electronic cellular telephone 12 communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to 13 include, but not limited to: voice text messages, digital photographic images, 14 digital video images, electronic mail (?e?mail?) and push?to-talk voice 15 communications, to and from TT #13: 502?609?5937, TT #14: 762-885?7486#16: 951?322-0063 between the herein named target suspect(s) and any additional 17 co-conspirators known and unknown and shall include any and all communications to the cellular 18 telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, 19 digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to-talk voice communications and any background conversations while the telephone 20 21 instrument is otherwise in use. 22 B. 23 PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACIQNG CELLULAR SITE DATA 24 (18 SC. Sections 3121 through 3126) 25 12. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace 26 feature on TT #13: 502?609?5937, TT #14: 702?885-7486, TT #15 .j and TT #16: 27 951?322-0063. I also request the authorization to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global 28 Af?davit? Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 4 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 70 of 247 PageID 171 b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use 2 mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify TT #13: 502?609-5937, TT #14: 702-885? 7486, TT #15 and TT #16: 951-322-0053. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile 5 cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of 6 the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of mobile 7 electronic tracking devices, law enforcement agents can identify the location of a cellular telephone 8 to a much ?ner detail than through cellular site data alone. 9 10 DURATION OF INTERCEPTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 11 13. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic 12 communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial 13 intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance of the Order, Whichever comes first, pursuant to 11} California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the hill scope, 13 membership and methods of operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the 16 int?tc ?ption not ternrirrate when?tilt: described herein are first intercepted, but may 17 continue to the full extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or until the full scope of the enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of 20 operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in ?irtherance of the enterprise, 21 whichever comes ?rst. 22 14. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively 23 use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. Therefore, your af?ant believes that 24 additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the first 25 communication to and from the target telephone(s). 26 27 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 6 Cas t?lP?ll-wll-wll??l?Al?t 3 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 71 of 247 PageID 172 IV. TARGET (Penal Code section 15. The Target Telephones are described as follows: a. Target Telephone #13 (502) 609-5937 (TT #13) is a Cingular Wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). b. Target Telephone #14 (702) 885-7486 (TT #14) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). (TT #15) is a T-Mobile wireless I. .- I. I. . 0. Target Telephone #15 telephone. Records Pending. TT #15 is being utilized by UM83 64. (1. Target Telephone #16 (951) 322-0063 (TT #16) is a Sprint wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU. l. The term ?Target Telephone #13-16? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation (IMSI) number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address andfor Push-to-talk (PTT) number, and/or Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), and/or mqam?hmeowmq any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, l'P, PTT and/or DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone number(s) andfor ESN and/or IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC Whether the changes occur simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as the target telephone(s) 2. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names when obtaining Pro-Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement ?om immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suSpects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page '7 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 72 of 247 PageID 173 V. TARGET SUBJECTS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) The known Target Subject(s) of this investigation are: p-i CD amass REDACTED I Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 8 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 73 of 247 PageID 174 REY LNU (Last Nam Unknown-Target Subject 7 is a iSpanic male 14 identi?ed only as with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of 15 residence. There are no other known identifying characteristics about REY LNU and as a result a 16 records check into the California Department of Motor Vehicles cannot be completed. Investigators 17 are working on the identi?cation of REY LNU through various surveillances both physical and 1 8 electronic. 19 h. CHRIS LNU (Las Name Unknown Target Subject 8) is a Hispanic male 20 identi?ed only as CHRIS with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of 21 residence. Investigators believe CHRIS is a coordinator for the and possible cell 22 head with connections to Kentucky. Investigators are working to identify CHRIS LNU and are 23 communicating with Kentucky DEA case agents. 24 i. UM8364 (Target Subject 9) is a Hispanic male identi?ed only as UM8364 with 25 an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of residence. In March of 2014, 26 investigators intercepted UM8364 as a narcotics source of supply that provided approximately 10 27 pounds of suspected herein to i 28 j. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 9 Cas i?Ap?Ii?tp?Ai?lr?tt?t osm-pumec: F- Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 74 of 247 PageID 175 VI. JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 17. California Penal Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 US. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was improperly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located in New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held ?for the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the tapped telephone is located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are ?rst to be heard.? (Ibid, at page 136) In United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the original listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 10 n. Cas OOMOLII-D-UJNH Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 75 of 247 PageID 176 have authority under Title to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodriguez court noted, this interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge to supervise an investigation that Spans more than one judicial district.? (Ibid, at pages 403-404) Also see United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 18. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use cellular telephone(s), use ?ctitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining cellular phones as a means of nreventing detection by law enforcement. By using other personsnames and creating a fictitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a certain degree of anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the pepularity of pre-paid cellular telephones among those engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to ?ee the area of the crime. 19. Target Telephone #13 and #14 used by CHRIS LNU (TS are Cingular Wireless telephones. Subscriber information pending. TT #13 and #14 are being utilized by CHRIS LNU (TS Since March 2014, investigators began to monitor wire communications of REY LNU (TS as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-120. During these intercepted communications, investigators determined that CHRIS LNU was a principle member of the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14v 1 83 Page 11 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 76 of 247 PageID 177 5- i amines 5 speci?cally a segment operated by REY LNU, and that CHRIS operates as a load driver coordinator and possible cell head in the state of Kentucky. During this period of interception, CHRIS LNU coordinated between REY LNU, cell head in the county of Riverside, and an unidenti?ed subject delivery proceeds ?orn an unknown origin into Riverside County, speci?cally, Perris, California. Investigators have initiated contact with DEA Kentucky to determine if the user of TT #13, identi?ed as Chris LEONARD in Kentucky is in fact TS Although CHRIS LNU may operate a cell in Kentucky, the framework if his illegal narcotics activity originates in Riverside County through REY LNU who operates as a source of supply. Additionally, proceeds acquired through sales of narcotics in Kentucky are eventually transported back into Riverside County. 20. Target Telephone #15 used by UM8364 (TS is a T~Mobile telephone. Subscriber information pending. #15 is being utilized by UMS364. Since December of 2013 investigators have been monitoring multiple phones utilized by I . In March of 2014, investigators and UM8364 (TS who was identi?ed as a narcotics source of supply for the Based on these intercepted communicationsinvestigators initiated GPS pings of TT #15 as authorized by Riverside County Search Warrant 03191403. Investigators identi?ed a possible address for TS #9 in the city of South Gate, California. Although TS #9 possibly resides in Los Angel es County, it should be noted that the narcotics TS #9 distributed were destined to i - samurai: 3' ff? in Riverside County. Additionally, on March 20, 2014, investigators identi?ed a vehicle operated by a courier for UIVIS364 (TS who met with I off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in Riverside County. 21. Target Telephone #16 used by REY LNU (TS is a Sprint telephone. Subscriber information pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU (TS Since March 2014, investigators have been monitoring communications on multiple target telephones utilized by TS #7 as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-120. REY has been identi?ed as a cell head for the visa-as - if," reSponsible for acquiring and distributing narcotics to various points in the domestic US. REY resides at 1135 W. 7til Street, Penis, California and has multiple properties Af?davit w? Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 12 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 77 of 247 PageID 178 1 Within Riverside County. REY acquires narcotics from various sources, to include a 2 subsequently distributes them from Riverside County. 3 22. Lastly, the narcotics distributed and tranSported by CHRIS LNU (TS UM8364 (IS 4 and REY LNU (TS and the DTO members they work for, to include 5 distributed in, around and/or through Riverside County, in example CHRIS LNU (TS has ,6 coordinated a proceeds courier into Riverside County. UMBSM (TS provided narcotics to 7 and coordinated the delivery into Riverside County. Lastly, REY LNU (TS resides in 8 Riverside County and distributes therefrom. 9 23. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. 10 1 VII. PRIOR APPLICATIONS 12 (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13 24. On April 1, 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the California Department of I 14 Justice reference the Electronic Intercept Court Order System for TT #13?16. 15 25. On April 1, 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the United States Department of 16 Justice wiretap database to determine if any Federal applications had been made to initiate a Title 17 wiretap intercept ofTT #13?16. 18 26. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other 19 applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to intercept 20 wire, oral, or electronic involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places 21 Speci?ed in this Application, within thetmeaning of Penal Code section 629.5003). 23 24 Ramon-:Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 13 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 78 of 247 PageID 179 I I - REDA CTED f. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120: On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios .T. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court, State of California granted and issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14?120, which authorized the TT #10: (502) 492-1461 interception of the communication to and from TT (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 14 a: Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 79 of 247 PageID 180 1 2 . 4 OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 5 27. Your af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target 6 Telephone #13?16 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this 7 investigation which include discovering: 8 a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? 9 illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; 10 b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; 11 c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed 12 a conspirators; 13 d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are 14 stored prior to its distribution; 15 e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s 16 illegal narcotics trafficking; 17 f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics 18 traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal 23 narcotics to various states; and 21 g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a 22 conviction) against the Target Subj ect(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set 23 forth herein. IX. 24 STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE 25 (Penal Code section 26 28. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement 27 of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate 28 drug traf?cking. Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 15 Gas 9 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 80 of 247 PageID 181 1 29. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, 1 assert that: 2 a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, if have committed, or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, 5 Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11351, 6 11352, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code 7 Section 11370.6, and Conspiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, 8 with reSpect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of 9 solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section 10 b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning 11 the above?named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, 12 and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Penal Code section 629.52(b) 13 30. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the places where, 14 the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted 15 are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above?named offenses 16' or me leased to, listed in the ?1?1?1?18 of or commonly used by the Target Suujects whose 17 communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 18 31. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably 19 appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more fully explained 20 below. (Penal Code section 21 32. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I further assert 22 that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence 23 regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in 2: furtherance of the narcotics trafficking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of 27 distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places 28 involved in the manufacturing and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, will be obtained Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 16 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 81 of 247 PageID 182 1 through the interception of wire communications over the Target Telephones. 2 33. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived ?om participation in A: this investigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: 5 a. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that I have 6 received from the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; 7 b. Physical surveillance conducted by the West County Narcotic Task Force 8 Riverside Sheriff Department (BSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, 9 which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; 10 0. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other 11 documentar evidence in this end other hivestigations and, 12 d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. 13 e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. 14 f. Evidence obtained through court-authorized intercept orders. 1 5 16 A. 17 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #13 34. On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside 1: County Superior Court issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14-120, authorizing the interception 20 of the electronic cellular telephone communications to and from TT TT #10: 21 (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. 22 35. Based on intercepted communications between REY (TS and CHRIS (TS 23 investigators determined that TS #8 was the user of TT #13. 24 36. The following intercepted made to or from 502-609-5937 Target 25 Telephone #13 as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14-120 are indicative of the types of 26 narcotics activities associated with TT #13 and indicate that CHRIS LNU (1?8 will use TT #13 27 to facilitate his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the 28 following pertinent aSpects of intercepted. communications and parenthetical explanations of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 17 Cas p?At?II?tt?th?t I-PUJNHO s?at?l GNU Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 82 of 247 PageID 183 language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with CHRIS (TS and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On March 17, 2014, CHRIS LNU (IS was intercepted communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At approximately 10:53 during session number 582, CHRIS received an incoming call on #13 ?orn REY who was using 951-570?0461 (TT #ll-Riverside County Wire 14-120). REY and CHRIS greeted. CHRIS said he had been working. REY asked if CHRIS went to Ripley (Possibly Kentucky). CHRIS said yes, he won three and lost his fourth one (referring to rooster ?ghts). CHRIS told REY about the rooster ?ght he lost. REY asked if CHRIS was ?ghting a Mexican one (possibly rooster). CHRIS said yes. CHRIS and REY talked about the blades and boots CHRIS used for the ?ghts. CHRIS said he used the ones (blades/knife) Richard sent him. REY asked where CHRIS was. CHRIS said he was not around and would be back later tonight, then asked if he could call REY later tonight. REY said okay. CHRIS said he did not have his bill (referring to U.S. Currency) with him. REY asked if that meant that buddy (proceeds courier) was going to come (to area-Penis, California) tomorrow. CHRIS said yes, and mumm-p-ri?iowooq reminded REY that he told CHRIS he (REY) needed him (courier) to be there this weekend. REY said yes, he wanted him there (REY's location) as soon as possible, they needed. REY interrupted himself and asked CHRIS to call him (Voices overlapped). CHRIS said he would call REY back tonight. REY said all right. b. On March 21, 2014, CHRIS LNU (TS was intercepted communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At approximately 10:49 am, during session number 970, CHRIS received an incoming call on TT #13 ?oni REY who was using 951?570-0461 (TT till-Riverside County Wire 14-120). CHRIS said everything was going good, there was no problem. REY asked if CHRIS knew when he (REY) was going to see him (referring to proceeds courier). CHRIS said probably the day they were planning on. REY said okay. REY asked CHRIS to just let him know if he (courier- UM0441) did leave. CHRIS said that was no problem. CHRIS told REY not to get riled up. REY Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 18 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 83' of 247 PageID 184 1 said they (REY and others) just wanted to know (Thought un?nished). CHRIS said REY had 2 already told him what day it (currency) needed to be there. REY said that was good. c. On March 22, 2014, CHRIS LNU (TS was intercepted 5 communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At 6 approximately 3:04 pm, during session number 1085, CHRIS received an incoming call on 7 #13 hour REY who was using 951?570-0461 (TT #ll-Riverside County Wire 14-120). CHRIS 8 said he got an ass whooping at the rooster ?ghts. CHRIS and REY talked about losing at the 9 rooster ?ghts. REY said they (REY and others) had not done well either. REY asked what was 10 going on. CHRIS said he (CHRIS) talked to the guy (proceeds courier), and he (possibly 11 UMO441) only had 600 dollars left to spend (referring to miles to cover). REY said he was going to 12 be earlier that he thought then. REY said that was about REY said he would be there, and was 13 only going about an hour away because (Thought left un?nished). CHRIS said it was no 14 problem. REY said he would have somebody there though (to receive the courier). CHRIS said 15 alright. REY said he would talk to CHRIS tomorrow. 16 d. The above listed calls and parenthetical explanations are based on my 17 training, experience, and intelligence gained during this investigation and are related to narcotics 1 8 distribution. I 19 20 IDENTIFICATION OF TELEPHONE #14 21 37. On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside 22 County Superior Court issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14?120, authorizing the interception 23 of the electronic cellular telephone communications to and from TT '3 TT #10: 24 (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. 25 38. Based on intercepted communications between REY (TS and CHRIS (TS 26 investigators determined that TS #8 was the user of TT #14. 27 39. The following intercepted communications made to or from 702?885-7486 Target 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 19 Cas \omqmm-hnwma?n Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 84 of 247 PageID 185 Telephone #14 as intercepted over Riverside Courrty Wire 14?120 are indicative of the types of narcotics activities associated with TT #14 and indicate that CHRIS LNU (TS will use TT #14 to facilitate his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with CHRIS (TS and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On March 22, 2014, CHRIS LNU (TS was intercepted communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At approximately 3:04 p.n1., during session number 1085, CHRIS received an incoming call on #13 from REY who was using 951-570-0461 #ll?Riverside County Wire 14420). CHRIS asked what was REY needing. REY asked how much did CHRIS have of their?s (REY's and possible third party) then said (how much did he have) of his (REY's). CHRIS said he had the one that he (third party-courier) had brought and whenever REY was ready, they (CHRIS and others) could send whatever REY needed. CHRIS said they could send 2, but since he (REY) had not been ready to send it, he (CHRIS) had been using it, giving it to them, but there was no problem. REY said he did not need it all, but did want the 195 9referinf to narcotics proceeds). CHRIS said okay, and then asked if they could send it the beginning of next week. REY said it would be best on the weekend. CHRIS said they (courier) had to go out there (unspeci?ed location) to visit family, so it would be perfect and cool. REY asked if it was the same one (courier) that was coming. CHRIS said yes. REY asked CHRIS to tell him (third party/possible driver) to go around where he had told CHRIS and cut through another ?eeway and come down through New Mexico. CHRIS said he told him. REY said a few guys had gone down there and everybody was getting stepped (referring to Law Enforcement). REY said it did not matter, but he had wanted to see him (courier) this weekend so it could leave this Monday and that was what he needed the money. CHRIS said they (courier) could not leave until Monday. REY said alright, and then they would wait until next Monday. REY said he would talk to his brother in law, because he (brother in law) wanted to send a little bit (referring currency). CHRIS said he had two (possible money) with that (unspeci?ed). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 20 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 85 of 247 PageID 186 1 . . REY said he (brother in law) would not want to send two, adding he (REY) needed the 195. REY 2 then asked if CHRIS was going to send 20. CHRIS said right. REY said he did not want to send that much; he needed around two, but would wait a little bit. CHRIS said he would send REY 195, 5 adding that was close to two. REY said that was ?ne. REY said his 195 and (unintelligible) would 6 be perfect. CHRIS said 195 and asked REY for a repeat. REY said (195) and 20. REY 7 said the 20 for the shipping. CHRIS said okay. REY said that way he (CHRIS) would get his and 8 REY would pay his. CHRIS said he understood. REY said he would be talking to him (brother in 9 law) this weekend and let CHRIS know. CHRIS said okay. REY asked if CHRIS had two for 10 him. CHRIS said yes and if they (possibly brother in law) wanted to send Lasador (ph Possible 11 Lazaro) it would be no problem. REY said okay and told CHRIS that he had not talked to him 12 (brother in law) for a while, since they had gone over there. 13 b. Based on my training, experience and knowledge about this ongoing 14 wiretap investigation, the calls made by/or to CHRIS collectively between TT #13 and TI #14 15 indicate that he coordinated with a courier the transportation of proceeds into Riverside County. 16 Additionally, based on information obtained from multiple wiretaps on and REY LNU, 17 investigators know that REY acquires multi?pound quantities of narcotics from various sources and 18 that he operates a cell in the state of Kentucky. 1 9 20 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #15 22 23 - Remorse 24 25 26 41. Based on intercepted communications between UM8364 (IS and Remus; 27 I neonate-p- i investigators determined that TS #9 was the user of TT #15. 28 Af?davit? Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 21 Ca 9 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 86 of 247 PageID 187 42. The following intercepted communications made to or from Target Telephone #15 as intercepted over Riverside County Wire (to include Extension 1) are indicative of the types of narcotics activities associated with TT #15 and indicate that UM8364 (T8 will use TT #15 to facilitate his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with UMSSM (TS and the target telephone which he utilizes. REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 22 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 87 of 247 PageID 188 I - . HM HQ U.) REDACTED D. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #16 REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 23 Cas- Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 88 of 247 PageID 189 I) skewered 7 44. Based on intercepted communications between REY (TS and if: investigators detenuined that TS #7 was the user of TT #16. On March 18, 2014, REY (T8 was intercepted communicating with egarding a narcotics related activity. At approximately 4:07 pm, during session number 2673, REY placed an outgoing call on TT #16 to who was using Hl??k?lI?dl?lI??H l?J back SO he can call the buddy- 00 On March 19, 2014, REY (TS was intercepted communicating with OKD cl regarding a narcotics related activity. At approximately 5:20 pm, during session number 2763, REY placed an outgoing call on TT #16 to supposed to call had not called yet. REY said for U.) and REY) would not li?ssbacisp -i his nephew and they might give him a few (narcotics units) so they struggle. REY asked when. said he did not know but he (nephew) told him there might Ch be some (narcotics) around and he would let him have them (narcotics). he would let REY know. REY said he needed to ?nd out about it because he had been dry for a 00 few days and if not, then he would look elsewhere (secondary source) because he was in need of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 24 Cassr Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 89 of 247 PageID 190 something (narcotics). said that was right, but he would have an answer for REY by 2 tomorrow. REY asked if anything would get done with the guy (courier). said he would i call REY back if he called him. 5 On March 21, 2014, REY (TS was intercepted communicating with 6 egarding a narcotics related activity. At approximately 9:04 am, during session 7 number 2838, REY received an incoming text message on TT #16 from who was using 8 . . The following is the direct text: ?Hay on vato 9 ke tiene por hay pero las da un poko mas caras wey es que todo Abajo subio way? or ?There is a 10 guy (secondary source of narcotics) who has it somewhere around, but he gives it a little more 11 expensive dude. The thing is that everything went up down there, dude. 12 XI. 13 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS I SEIZURES 14 45. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or 15 actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may 16 not be directly connected to the Target Subject(s) of this Af?davit, unless otherwise noted, all 17 seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the 18 Target Subject(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, 19 sephistication, and ability of these organizations. 20 a. On 12?12-13, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop at 21 Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol unit alerted to the rear of the vehicle. 22 Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine (approximately 5 23 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his front pants pocket. 24 b. On 01-02-14, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle 25 impounded on 12-12-13 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of 26 heroin. 27 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 25 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 90 of 247 PageID 191 2 (620V570) at the 91 Fwy and Green River Rd in Corona. Vehicle was I impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators seized approximately 9.8 pounds of 5 methamphetamine from vehicle truck area. 6 d. On 03-14?2014, California Highway Patrol stepped 7 vehicle in Riverside County. Investigators seized approximately 10 pounds of 8 methamphetamine from the vehicle. 9 X. 10 NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 11 46. interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager 12 communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather evidence 13 against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed, appear reasonably 14 likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the 15 government to achieve the objectives of this investigation -- to obtain direct evidence that will 16 convince a in? beyond a reasonauie donut of: 17 a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? 18 illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; 19 b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; 20 c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed I 21 conspirators; 22 d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are 23 stored prior to its distribution; 24 e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s - 25 illegal narcotics traf?cking; 26 f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics 27 traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal 28 narcotics to various states; and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 26 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 91 of 247 PageID 192 Hi?Ih-ai?th-AI?Ii?t g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 47. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 48. A Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or hisftheir known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conSpiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subject(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruthful statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conspiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMAN TS 49. It appears that this organization is a close?knit organization whose members are either blood relatives, mutual friends and/or very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large?scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would~be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain from potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, and/or its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 27 Cas wooumm?hwwi-a r?I i .12- 03 3?4 C.) i?ir-w-A GNU Er Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 92 of 247 PageID 193 and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 50. Since it appears that no single informant or informants are available or expected to become available, your af?ant is currently unable to determine the scepe of this criminal enterprise, the identity of other co?conspirators, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their methods of operation. See Con?dential ?ghbg section. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS AGENTS 51. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. If the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 52. Due to the close?knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique fraught with failure and would most likely jeopardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore. the leaders of drug OOHONMLUJNHOKDOONJ tra?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. 53. As previously noted, it is a common practice for individuals involved in large scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suSpicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouc for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned compartmentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any further than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 28 Cas OOHJCRUI-PUJNH Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 93 of 247 PageID 194 informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 54. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subj ect(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. 55. If 3. Con?dential Source (CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy from the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight?knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the orgmization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upcn my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. 56. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an attempt to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 57. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GP S) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 58. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-133 Page 29 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 94 of 247 PageID 195 59. Surveillance has been conducted of subj ect(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?'eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his identi?cation. The subject - 3 -. Reagent: with a date 0 and address of Wildornar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed that the person Deputv Wicker stooped was in fact .. . .. .. . Sheriffs Department (RSD) - South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside surveillance of 1mm 11 i - anon -. esidence, located at i'Wildomar. During the surveillance, a black Jaguar with paper plates ,was observed leaving esidenoe and ultimately stopped by CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TF G2 and seized approximately of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, 3' i i: 1' ?ram 1 I I i i was arrested by CHP Of?cer Mendenhall for state felony violations of 11378 HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case -532-801-l3. A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Heroin and 2 of Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 30 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 95 of 247 PageID 196 c. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance 2 in the city of Ternecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside County Wire 3 I i identi?the user 0f 4 d. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on 5 I in the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted text 6 message conversations as authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-79 which indicated that 7 GUSMAN was to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed Carson, 8 California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators 9 seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. 10 e. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 1 1 W. 7th Street, Pe.-is, Cali..ornia on two houses associaed with REY. Investigators fo lowed two 12 Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. 13 One Ofthe subjects was identi?ed as Investigators 14 are still working on detennining if artisans; 's REY and the user of TI #10-12. Note: 15 has been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. 16 f. On March 19. 2014. investigators conducted surveillance eon UMR364 17 pursuant to GPS pings of TT #15. Investigators identi?ed a possible residence for UM8364 and an 18 associated vehicle (silver Honda Civic bearing California plate 7ADV247). Additionally, on the 19 same date, investigators located the user of TT #15 (UM8364) at a shOpping plaza located off 20 Atlantic and Clara. Surveillance units observed UM8364 and an unidenti?ed Hispanic male conduct 21 . counter techniques such as squaring the block and looking into parked vehicle to identify possible 22 surveillance by law enforcement. 23 g. On March 20, 2014, investigators conducted a brief surveillance on 24 in the county of Riverside off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order 2 5 to identify the vehicle Operated by the narcotics courier working for UMS3 64. On the same date, 26 investigators acquired the vehicle information. 27 60. Surveillance Operations have been successful to the extent they have established 28 persons and/or vehicles arriving at, and/or departing from principal locations; and extended the Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 31 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 96 of 247 PageID 197 scope of the investigation to additional locations and co~con3pirators. However, surveillance operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of operation and the manner in which their operation is conducted. 61. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co- conSpirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suSpected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an inves.igative technioue is used to con?rm meetings and other suspected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 62. Your affiant knows from training and experience, and from speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic traf?cking organizations is limited to placing individuals together without knowing the signi?cance of their meeting or the role of each traf?cker. Fmthermore, based on my training and experience, surveillance of major narcotics traf?ckers is often dif?cult without detection. Physical surveillance is often limited to watching suspects ?'orn a distance, which as an investigative technique, can be problematic. Your af?ant believes that excess random surveillance of a location without knowledge when a narcotics transaction will be taking place, could expose the identity of the of?cers and thereby compromise the investigation. Even if blanket, twenty-four hour surveillance were feasible, it would still be limited to providing information only on the movements and whereabouts of the Target Subject(s). If the Target Subject(s) suSpected he was being watched by law enforcement personnel, he could abandon his phone and move his activities to a different location, thus effectively ending the current on?going investigation until he was located again. A wire intercept would greatly assist the agents because they could be deployed more effectively knowing about a future narcotics transaction. This would allow surveillance to be set up on strategic locations, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-133 Page 32 Cas mummh,mN??Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 97 of 247 PageID 198 thereby lessening the risk of compromising the investigation. 63. Furthermore, your af?ant knows ??om past investigations that narcotics traf?ckers use various counter-surveillance driving techniques. These techniques include ?requent u?tums, stepping in parking lots to observe traf?c, waiting at traf?c lights to allow traf?c to pass, speed variations, and taking circuitous routes through residential neighborhoods. All of these methods are used for the sole purpose of determining the presence of law enforcement personnel. These methods are frequently successful, as it is extremely dif?cult tofollow suSpects who employ these methods without being detected. Once detected, these suSpects usually abandon their activities, which mean they may shut down their cellular phones, pagers, and other phones, and ?ee the jurisdiction or area only to resurface at another unknown location at a later date. 64. When physical surveillance is combined with interception of wi.e communications, the purpose of meetings can he revealed and may constitute admissible evidence if the meetings relate to an intercepted conversation of criminal behavior. 65. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the opportunities for detection by the Target Subject(s). If surveillance were to be detected. I believe the traf?ckers? perpetual suspicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations would in their minds be con?rmed. The subjects would not only likely ?ee the area, they would also engage in wholesale abandonment of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking place. This Selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help maintain the integrity of the investigation. 66. Based on the above-stated facts and on my training and experience, your af?ant does not believe that surveillance of the above-referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target Telephone, will enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation. SEARCH WARRAN TS 67. On 61?22? 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #0122141? for a target telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-133 Page 33 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 98 of 247 PageID 199 1 68. On 2?25-14, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target 2 telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge Irma Poole Asberry. 3 69. On (32?27-214, SA Baca acquired search warrant #02271412 for a target telephone 4 utilized by members of th 5 70. On 03-11-214, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03111409 for multiple target 6 telephone utilized by members of the 7 71. On 03?19-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03191403 for multiple target 8 telephone utilized by members of the 9 72. On 03?26- 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #03261411 for a target 10 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation. 11 73.. There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. 12 danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own 13 investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause 14 for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search warrants after 15 care?illy weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall 16 investigation. Generally. it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has 17 been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 18 74. DEA investigators will prepare affidavits to search the principal locations involved 19 in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations 20 involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on- 21 going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an intermediate quantity of narcotics 22 andfor controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful 23 conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all 24 members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances 25 andtor illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant 26 would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large- 27 scale narcotic traf?ckers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law 28 enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics andfor controlled Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 34 Cas i?ar?Awi?lr?AMl?I a Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 99 of 247 PageID 200 substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 75. Your af?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total scepe of the illegal operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug traf?cking organization, the organizational structure, the full scoPe of the narcotics conspiracy, the locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware that higher-level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics and/0r controlled substances at their residences. Although sunreillance has ide rti?ed residence{s), your af?ant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their home(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stas locations, without intercepted wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized. those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amounts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far less probative value by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conSpirators, which give full meaning to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 76. The analysis of data derived from the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 35 Case h?ar?dI?di?tl?Ab?ti-M Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 100 of 247 PageID 201 one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been helpful in determining patterns, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls between telephones, suspects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your af?ant knows ?om experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation ?'om law enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived ?om the pen register and telephone tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for successful prosecution, especially in light of the familial structuring of this organiza-ion. Speci?cally, the details of the involvment of the participants, and the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before successful surveillance Operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. 77. Based on the above, your af?ant believes that pen registers, toll analysis, and subscriber information, without the aid of a wire intercept, will not help your af?ant achieve the obiectives of the investigation. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 78. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that people who are entering or leaving the location. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuals entering and exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement within the organization, if any. However, investigators have incorporated this type of monitoring for REY LNU in order to gather vehicle information entering and exiting the This, in conjunction with wire information can lead to the identi?cation of narcotics and/or proceeds load drivers working for REY LNU. TRASH SEARCHES OF TARGET LOCATIONS 79. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 36 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 101 of 247 PageID 202 identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subject(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high?level narcotics traf?ckers and their associates go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to di3pose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me that narcotic traf?ckers will often carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it would be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in ?oat of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the search would draw suSpicion on the law enforcement of?cers. A trash search would surely dra the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subj ect(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the government?s objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor. without identift'mg themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash searchEven if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained ?om the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full scope of the consPiracy. 80. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul-de-sacs. They would be conspicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be spotted. At this time, your af?ant feels that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. 81. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects were to observe Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 3 7 Case 43?.?th? DORIQUI Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 102 of 247 PageID 203 and disclose to the Target Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already suspicious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co?conspirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 82. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traf?ckers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and frequently will not use their residential trash containers to dispose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. 83. I ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co~conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 84. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 85. Even if investigators are able to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 38 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 103 of 247 PageID 204 often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers frequently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail. It should be noted that investigator shave acquired some back account information over intercepted communications for REY LNU. Investigators have begun an inquiry into these accounts to determine the extent of monetary transactions, however, it should be noted that based on intercepted communications, your af?ant is aware that REY LNU operates and tranSports proceeds in bulk cash. GRAND JURY 86. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal suspects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would cooperate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the targets of this investigation. 87. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be successful in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his ?fth amendment privilege; (2) it would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conSpirators, when they are identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 39 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 104 of 247 PageID 205 1 2 X1. 3 CONCLUSION 4 88. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I 5 believe that the Target Subjects have committed, are committing and are about to commit the 6 aforementioned crimes and that particular commur?cations of the Target Subject(s) over the target 7 telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied 8 for herein. 9 89. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. 10 However, it is your af?ant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to 11 obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described 12 Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electromc communications over the Target Telephone 13 and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your af?ant to achieve the objectives of this 1 4 investigation. 15 90. For reasons set out in this af?davit, it is your af?ant?s opinion that the only 16 reasonable and effective way to develop the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the 17 person(s) involved in this conspiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested 1 8 herein. 19 91. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and 20 all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission 21 to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing 22 basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet 23 Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers 24 (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law 25 enforcement agency executing the intercept order: 26 a. Authorize the installation and/or use of all facilities to enable the interception 27 and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, 28 I A?idavit Wiretap Order No. 14-483 Page 40 Case 42-0310 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 105 of 247 PageID 206 all wireless digital functions, wireless analog functions, direct connect/digital dispatch/direct dispatch functions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are first heard or accessed in the Riverside County area. (See United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 U.S. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th C112, 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. c. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace Direct ConnecttDispatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. d. Authorize the installation and/or use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller and any calling features such as ?call forwarding? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel and Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services said company provides the people whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying subscribers and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through this intercept/pen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not limited to past telephone bills and records. 92. Your af?ant requests the Court order Sprinthextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 41 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 106 of 247 PageID 207 provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order, Within 48 hours (including after-business hours, weekends, and holidays), and without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging device(s), cellular/wireless telephone(s), calling card(s), and other communication device(s) contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed. in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary numberfaccount, billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone number(s), and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation. 0. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, andfor GPS location information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703 (D). d. Provide any and all cell site data, including, but not limited to, cell site Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 42 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 107 of 247 PageID 208 i?ll?AMI?nMi?at?I location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of any and all cellular telephones, which called each Target Telephone, which was called by each Target Telephone, Which was identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or which was otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703 (D). e. Provide access and the access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. f. Provide all information related to pre?paid cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, including historical, past, present, current, and on?going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre?paid telephone account. 93. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) to continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, your af?ant requests that if the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target elephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, the Telecommunication Companies be ordered to not disclose to the Target Subj ect(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, the Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the court?s order. 94. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprinth extel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the order has authorized this wire interception, or of its existence. 95. Your affiant requests the Court to authorize law enforcement of?cers use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify the target telephone(s). 96. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 43 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 108 of 247 PageID 209 Case I of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to 2 execute such intercept order. 97. Your affiant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Application, its af?davit, 5 and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the 6 Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 7 98. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this 8 Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug 9 Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a 10 showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. 11 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at 12 Riverside, California. 1 3 14 Dated: Apati, 2014 15 Special Agent Emilio J. Baca 16 Drug Enforcement Administration 1 7 18 Sworn to and subscribed before me on April 2014. 9 20 (Q 21 HO ORABL HELIOS J. HERNANDEZ 22 CO I TY RIVERSIDE STA OF CALIFORNIA 23 24 25 26 27 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 44 Case I Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 109 of 247 PageID 210 1 PAUL E. ZELLERBACH 2 DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 6 Fax: (951) 955-9673 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or RIVERSIDE 9 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 14-558 10 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER 1 1 AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF APPLICATION WIRE, PAGER AND ELECTRONIC 12 Target Telephone #31: 13 Target Telephone #32: 909-994-2290 Target Telephone #33: . i . I 14 Target Telephone #34: - 15 Tar at Telehone #35: 16 APPLICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. 17 I, CREG G. DATIG, Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, declare: 18 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Paul E. Zellerbach. 19 I am the Riverside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code 20 section 21 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order 22 Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Drug 23 Enforcement Administration, Special Agent Emilio Baca, and relying thereon, I approve making 24 this Application and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to 25 intercept wire, pager and electronic communications to and from the communication devices 26 (the "Target described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated 27 herein by this reference. 28 1 Application Wiretap #14?558 Case I PM h?a in- innDocument 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 110 of 247 PageID 211 3. Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her substitute, to physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic reports required by Penal Code section 629.60. 4. Special Agent Baca, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Riverside District Of?ce, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section He is certi?ed by the California State Attorney General's Of?ce in wiretaps, as set forth in the Af?davit. 5. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce Los Angeles Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal Code Section Special Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, reviewed the Af?davit and approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led herewith). 6. Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to conclude the Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and will continue to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, TranSportation and Sales of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11351, 11352, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code with respect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in proceeds from narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and conSpiracy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the meaning of Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted conversation of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, will provide additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said offenses. There is probable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes listed herein and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. 2 Application Wiretap #14-55 8 Case I Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 111 of 247 PageID 212 IxPursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular descriptions of the device(s) from which the conununications are to be intercepted and their locations: b. Target Telephone #32: (909) 994-2290 (IT #32) is a SPRINT cellular phone being utilized by Raymundo CARILLO (TS and subseribed to Ferris QVIS at PO Box 54988, Perris, California. REDACTED 8. The actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. 9. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic conuntmications between the Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates and/or co?conspirators concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have been attempted without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if attempted, as set forth in the Af?davit. 11. Due to the ongoing nature of the conSpiracy related to the above offenses, and because there is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those offenses will occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to Application Wiretap #14-558 Case 5 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 112 of 247 PageID 213 t?a i?I Irr.12- 03 maintain this intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be deemed to automatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin Mobile U.S.A., Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, Wireless, California Products and Services, T?Mobile USA Inc., Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc., Cingular Wireless, Nextel Communications, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint?Nextel, Metrocall, PageNet, Tuyo Mobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, T- Mobile, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other affected telecommunications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecommunications Companies?) or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request of law enforcement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimmn of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of furnishing the facilities and technical assistance. 13. I request this Court to order the Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. 14. Applicant requests this Application, Review, Af?davit, Order and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, and/or exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attomey's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) 15. I am unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the Af?davit Within the meaning of Penal Code Section 4 Application Wiretap #14-558 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 113 of 247 PageID 214 \ocoqoxmemmw I?l r?a in! ItL11 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice certi?ed person(s), selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement of?cer/agency, to provide linguistic interpretation for interception of Wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular telephone pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief, which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in RiversideICT ATTORNEY UNTYO ERSIDE For: PAUL E. ZELLERBACH DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE California. DATED: m/z 24 5 Application Wiretap #14-55 8 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 114 of 247 PageID 215 PAUL E. ZELLERBACH DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 Fax: (951) 955-9673 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER WIRETAP N0.: 14~558 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF INTERCEPT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS amen Target Telephone #31 (909) 994-2290 Target Telephone #32 Target Telephone #33 - - - . - Target Telephone #34 Target Telephone #35 I AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE OF ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COM.MUNICATIONS AND AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE I. INTRODUCTION AND EXPERTISE I, Emilio J. Baca, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and I am an investigative or law enforcement of?cer of the United States within the meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 2. I am empowered by law to conduct investigations and to make arrests for felony offenses as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. I have been so employed since February 2010 and I am currently assigned to the Riverside District Of?ce Task Force Group 2. I primarily investigate Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 1 Casr Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 115 of 247 PageID 216 narcotic traf?cking and distribution organizations operating in and around Riverside County in California 3. I have received approximately 19 weeks of training at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia and was trained in all aspects of conducting narcotics investigations as well as the methods and techniques commonly used by major narcotics traf?ckers. I have attended special training in wire and electronic interceptions, toll analysis, and the use of wire and electronic interception equipment. I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical and legal aSpects of court ordered wiretaps per Penal Code Section 629 et seq. 4. During my employment with the DEA, I have participated in narcotics investigations through the surveillance, execution of search warrants, and arrests of drug traf?ckers. In addition, I have spoken to informants and suSpects regarding the methods and means of drug traffickers. I have debriefed persons arrested for controlled substance traf?cking and have debriefed informants on the methods for gathering controlled substance intelligence. I have Spoken with experienced narcotics investigators concerning the methods and practices of narcotics traf?ckers. Through my training, experience and interaction with other Special Agents, Task Force Officers, and other narcotics investigators, I have become familiar with narcotic traf?ckers? methods of operation, including the distribution, transportation, collection of proceeds and methods of laundering used in an attempt to conceal the nature of narcotic related proceeds. Through these interactions 1 have become familiar with and developed an understanding for the manner in which controlled substances are imported, manufactured, distributed, and sold, to include the methods of avoiding detection and apprehension by law enforcement of?cers. I am familiar with the manner in which narcotics traffickers use wireless communication equipment such as cellular telephone technology, pagers, coded communications, false identities, and counter surveillance to determine the presence of law enforcement and other means to facilitate their illegal activities and avoid detection or mislead a narcotics investigation. 5. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein and make this af?davit based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge 1 have gained from my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training, experience, and conversations with other law enforcement investigators with Whom I have discussed this case; (3) Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 2 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 116 of 247 PageID 217 1 and what I believe to be reliable information obtained ?om the following sources: oral and written 2 reports about this investigation, received from law enforcement of?cers; (4) law enforcement 3 databases; (5) Pen register and trap and trace information as well as telephone records - toll records 4 and subscriber information; (6) public records; and (7) physical surveillances conducted by DEA, 5 West County Narcotics Task Force - Riverside County Sheriff?s Department, and other law 6 enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 7 6. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a statement was made, the 8 information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information 9 with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical 10 explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my 11 interpretation, derived from my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics 12 investigations. 13 7. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to 1?4 intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones 15 as described belowTarget Telephone #32: (909) 994-2290 (PT #32) is a SPRINT cellular 21 phone being utilized by Raymundo CARILLO and subscribed to Penis QVIS at PO Box 22 54988, Penis, Californiam;an 27 I 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 3 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 117 of 247 PageID 218 "Remorse - 8- Pr 01331316 cause eXiStS t0 bane?? that CARILLO (T #7 user of TT and other identi?ed and unidenti?ed co-conspirators, have committed, are committing, or are about to commit, the crimes as discussed below, and that their communications relate to those and other ongoing crimes. 9. I request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 10. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, transPoxtation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11351, 11352, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code, with respect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, AN DIOR ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMNIUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 11. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty- day order to intercept the Wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to-talk voice E: I . cornrnunications, to and ?our TT #31: TT #32: 909-994-2290, TT #33: TT #34: ii} between the herein named target 7' and TT #35: suspect(s) and any additional co-conspirators known and unknown and shall include any and all Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 4 Cast a?t p?t a?t i?L p?I run(11 luv-?I CD Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 118 of 247 PageID 219 communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to?tallc voice communications and any background conversations while the telephone instrument is otherwise in use. B. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA (18 .S.C. Sections 3121 through 3126) 12. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace TT #32: 909-994-2290, TT #33: feature on TT #31: REDACTED 35345759. 1 and TT #35: I also request the authorization to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations, if: TT #32: 909-994?2290, TT #33 TT #34: related to TT #31: j: The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular I .'REoAc'r?o and TT #35: "amass .3 telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers would be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the user of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant requests an order to obtain and receive cell site data andior Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 5 Cass Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 119 of 247 PageID 220 geographical limitations related to the target telephone. a. Your af?ant has learned through conversations with other law enforcement of?cers and by personal knowledge that illegal narcotic traf?ckers have the potential to disable the GPS function in their telephones if they are aware law enforcement can monitor their real time movements. Your af?ant does not solely rely on GPS locations because your af?ant knows, often times GPS requests can fail or revert to cell towers with a 5000 meter locate. I also know there are many ?dead spots? in Southern California as related to cellular service for Sprinthextel. I have been told by Sprinthextel employees if cellular telephones do not receive a signal, I will receive a failed reSponse when requesting GPS locations. b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify TT #31: #32: 909-994- and TT #35: Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is o?en unknown. However with the assistance of mobile electronic tracking devices, law enforcement agents can identify the location of a cellular telephone to a much ?ner'detail than through cellular site data alone. DURATION OF INTERCEPTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance of the Order, whichever comes first, pursuant to California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the full scope, membership and methods of operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the interception not terminate when the communications described herein are ?rst intercepted, but may continue to the full extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or until the full scope of the enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in furtherance of the enterprise, whichever comes ?rst. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 6 Cast 10 punDocument 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 120 of 247 PageID 221 16_ use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. 15. The Target Telephones are described as follows: b. phone being utilized by Raymundo CARILLO (TS and subscribed to Penis QVIS at PO Box 1. 14. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively Therefore, your af?ant believes that additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the ?rst communication to and from the target telephone(s). IV. TARGET TELEPHONEIS) (Penal Code section Rana cram Target Telephone #32: (909) 994-2290 (TT #32) is a SPRINT cellular S4988, Penis, California. EEDACTED The term ?Target Telephone #31-35? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation (IMSI) number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address and/or Push-to-talk (PTI) number, and/or Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, andfor DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), andfor Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 7 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 121 of 247 PageID 222 1 any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IF, PTT andfor DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with 2 the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone 3 number(s) and/or ESN and/or IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC Whether the changes occni~ 4 simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as 5 the target telephone(s). 6 2. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names 7 when obtaining Pre?Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. 8 This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that 9 their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement from immediately knowing their true 10 identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy 11 or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. 12 1 3 V. TARGET SUBJECTS 14 (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 15 16. The known Target Subject(s) of this investigation areesters ?etap Order No. 14?558 Page 8 Ca Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 122 of 247 PageID 223 REDACTED g. Raymundo CARILLO aka CEJAS (Target Subject 7) previously listed as Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ. Investigators previously had identi?ed the target subject known as as CHAVEZ based on information obtained from GPS pings, secondary narcotics investigation indicating CHAVEZ was associated with 1135 W. 7th Street, Ferris, California, the residence identi?ed from GPS pings on phones utilized by and physical surveillances. It should be noted that CHAVEZ has a listed address of 1111 W. ?7th Street, Penis, California 92570. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-5 5 8 Page 9 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 123 of 247 PageID 224 However, further investigative analysis indicated the subject known as was actually CARILLO. On October 23, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in Perris, California pursuant to GPS pings of TT #32, used by CARILLO. On the same date, investigators positively identi?ed as CARILLO from a state of California booking photo. It should be noted that surveillance observations on movements were also concurrent to GPS pings of TT #32. CARILLO is a HiSpanic male with a Date of Birth of and has been the subject of Riverside County Wire Intercepts 14-120, 14?183 and criminal history includes arrests for HS 11377 from 2001 and records indicate police contacts for CARILLO at 23802 Lake Drive, Perris, California. Investigators have obtained vehicle plates observed at this regidence which come back to a member Of this DTO- h. CHRIS LNU (Las Name Unknown Target Subject 8) is a HiSpanic male identi?ed only as CHRIS with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of i' Ragnar, residence. Investigators believe CHRIS is a coordinator for the and possible cell head with connections to Kentucky. Investigators are working to identify CHRIS LNU and are communicating with Kentucky DEA case agents. Remorse I j. Ronald Ashley SHEWMAKER (Target Subject 10): is described as a White male, with a date of birth of REL-taste Hair: Red, Eyes: Brown, Weight: 2201bs., Height: 5, According to Department of Motor Vehicles, SHEWMAKER is issued Kentucky Driver?s License Lebanon Jct, Kentucky 40150. Your with an address of l' REDACIED af?ant found no documented criminal history for SHEWMAKER. REDAC TED ?3 davit Wiretap Order No. 14-65 8 Page 10 Ca Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 124 of 247 PageID 225 - REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 11 Ca Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 125 of 247 PageID 226 . REDACTED REDA CYED Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 126 of 247 PageID 227 JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 17. California Penal Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was improperly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held ?for Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 13 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 127 of 247 PageID 228 2 tapped telephone is located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are ?rst to 3 be hear (Ibid, at page 136) In United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. 4 denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap 5 was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in 6 which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the 7 Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were 8 located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s 9 contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We 10 agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the original listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction 12 have authority under Title to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodriguez court noted, this 13 interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge 14 the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the to supervise an investigation that spans more than one judicial distric (that, at pages 403?404) 15 Also see United States v. Rama/ea, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 16 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived 17 and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular 18 telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular 19 telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being 20 investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. 21 In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 22 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order 23 to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because 24 the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 25 18. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use 26 cellular telephone(s), use fictitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining 27 cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by law enforcement. By using other persons? 23 names and creating a ?ctitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a certain degree of Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 14 anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the p0pula1ity of pre-paid cellular telephones among those Caste Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 128 of 247 PageID 229 1 engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate 2 with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from 3 immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suSpects often allows 4 them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to 5 ?ee the area of the crime. 6 19. This investigation into the 7 (3mm (TS and encompasses the dimbu?on of narcotics to multiple 8 states across the continental United States to include, but not limited to, Missouri, Texas, Georgia 9 and Kentucky. There are several narcotics investigations involving multiple segments/cells for this 10 DTO currently being investigated by DEA (St. Louis and Lexington) as well as by Local Narcotics 11 Teams (Louisville, KY area). Although the primary jurisdiction for TT #31-35 is based on the 12 listening post, as outlined above, key members of this DTO operate Within the Penis area of 13 Riverside County wherefrom narcotics and proceeds originate andjor are destined for. This af?davit 14 is made in ?irtherance of multiple members of the DTO Operating across the US whose narcotics 15 activities filter back to Riverside and surrounding counties. - - REDA CTED 13 32 used CARILLO (TS was identi?ed over wire 19 communications for BETO (TS #20, as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-508. A 20 Riverside County Search Warrant, R1102020149, requesting GPS pings of TT #32 was granted on 21 October 20, 2014. GPS pings place TT #32 in Perris, California. In May of 2014, investigators 22 seized approximately $420,000 US Currency in Penis, California which was destined to be received 23 by CARILLO. REDA CTED Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 129 of 247 PageID 230 25. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. This is suf?cient in and of itself to confer jurisdiction to this court. VII. PRIOR APPLICATIONS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 26. On October 24, 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the California Department of Justice reference the Electronic Intercept Court Order System for 11? #31-35. 27. On October 24 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the United States Department of Justice wiretap database to determine if any Federal applications had been made to initiate a Title wiretap intercept of TT #3165. 28. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places Speci?ed in this Application, within the meaning of Pena! Code section 62 9.5 REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 16 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 130 of 247 PageID 231 I 'am CTED Remorse f. I verside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120: On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court, State of California granted and issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14?120, which authorized the interception of the communication to and from TT j" 35545755 1.. TT #10: (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. . hem crap Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?558 Page 17 Ca Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 131 of 247 PageID 232 h. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-183: on April 7, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14?183, authorizing the initiation of State wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone #13 502?609-5967, Target Telephone #14 702-885-7486, Target Telephone #1 and Target Telephone #16 951-322-0063. i. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14?120 Extension 1: On April 8, 2014, Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-120 Ext 1, authorizing the initiation of State Wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone #11 951-570-0461. I REDA CTED REDA GTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 18 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 132 of 247 PageID 233 OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 29. Year af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target Telephone #31-35 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this investigation which include discovering: a. The ?ll scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 19 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 133 of 247 PageID 234 g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. IX. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE (Penal Code section 30. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate drug traf?cking. 31. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I assert that: a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, have committed, or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11351, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and Conspiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, with respect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning the above-named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Penal Code section 629.52Cb) 32. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the places where, the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above-named offenses or are leased to, listed in the name of or commonly used by the Target Subjects whose communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 33. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more fully explained below. (Penal Code section 34. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I further assert that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence A?idavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 20 Cas rDocument 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 134 of 247 PageID 235 regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in furtherance of the narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places involved in the manufactming and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, will be obtained through the interception of wire communications over the Target Telephones. 35. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived from participation in this investigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: a. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that I have received from the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; b. Physical surveillance conducted by the Riverside Sheriff Department (RSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; c. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other documentary evidence in this and other investigations and, d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. f. Evidence obtained through court-authorized intercept orders. A IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #31 REDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 21 Ca Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 135 of 247 PageID 236 . REDACTED Investigators Note: In October of 2014, your af?ant learned that HIDTA 51 of the DEA Los Angeles Field Division is working a source of information (SOI) into this segment of the DTO. Your af?ant learned that on October 19, 2014, investigators seized approximately 250,000 US Currency which, based on SOI information, originated ?om the Kentucky cell operated by Chris MATTINGLY at the direction of ?ttest? -f and CARILLO (TS The currency was seized in in Barstow, California. Based on this information, your af?ant asserts that the above listed call coincides with SCI information and that UM4265 coordinated the Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 22 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 136 of 247 PageID 237 1 bulk cash smuggling. 2 40. The above listed calls and parenthetical explanations are based on my training, 3 experience, and intelligence gained during this investigation and are related to narcotics distribution. 4 B. 5 DENTIFICATION 0F TARGET TELEPHONE #32 7 8 10 CARILLO aka CEJAS (TS investigators determined that TS #7 is the user of TT #32. 11 43. The foiiowing intercepted made to or from 909~?94~2299 (T #32) 12 as intercepted over 678-542-7349 and authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-508, are indicative 13 of the scepe of narcotics related activities associated with the use of the target telephone used by 14 CARILLO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted 15 communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and 16 indicative of the narcotics related activities associated with CARILLO and the target telephone 17 which he utilizes. 18 44. On October 18, 2014, at approximately 4:04 Target Telephone #32, used by 19 CARILLO (TS received an incoming call from telephone number 20 number used I I I seahorse 23 referring to the ones (possibly narcotics) that were sent over there. yes. CARILLO said supposedly they went (sold) for nine because the dude complained about them (narcotics) being 24 25 bad and ugly (quality). CARILLO said he met with the other guy and gave him (third party) the 26 same ones (narcotics) and he (guy) said they were pretty (referring to quality). CARILLO said they 27 might have gotten messed up in the thought by CARILLO). CARILLO said the 28 other guys said they (narcotics) were pretty (referring to quality) but '?szria?i??f (phonetic) were ugly (referring to quality). asked if itinerary: was given some (narcotics). CARILLO said no, Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-5 58 Page 23 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 137 of 247 PageID 238 kin-Ensues they gave (phonetic) eight, and mentioned that he (CARILLO) had not seen his ?Compadre? (pal) ho was not given anything either. CARILLO told 0 charge that dude because he kept ?ve (narcotic units). said okay. CARILLO said to tell him to take the money from there and for 0 ask 1 peso (referring to 1 thousand) for them. CARILLO said he asked that son of bitch what number (price) they had given him, and he said he did not know. CARILLO said he told him the deal was done and mentioned they (CARILLO and others) were not going to make any pro?t. CARILLO said he knew how they were (quality) because he (CARILLO) was the one that sent (coordinated tranSport) them (narcotics) but he (CARILLO) was not going to argue about it. said what happened was they (narcotics) were closed up for several days and it was too hot. CARILLO said he believed so. aid they (narcotics) fucken stink up. CARILLO said they were brownish. said that was why, because of the heat. CARILLO said the dude had not said anything to him (CARILLO) about the money; supposedly he (third party) was going to get the asking price. CARILLO said he would give them (CARILLO) nine and he would keep 100. cursed and said it was not enough for sodas. CARILLO said all those peeple over there were dif?cult to work with, CARILLO said he was afraid to go over there (possibly Kentucky). said he was told to put (possibly send) some in Tene, about eight or 10 (narcotics units). said he would look into it later. CARILLO said alright, that dude had not said anything to him (CARILLO), he just asked if they (CARILLO and others) needed the money but he (CARILLO) was embarrassed. CARILLO mentioned that dude had to leave and he (CARJLLO) was afraid that maybe he (dude) did not sell it (narcotics) after all. asked who CARILLO was referring to. CARILLO said (phonetic) buddy. CTED asked if he (dude) sold it. CARILLO said supposedly he (dude) had already sold it but he (dude) had an emergency and CARILLO was not sure if he (dude) ended up selling it. told CARILLO they should ask for the paper (currency). CARILLO said that other dude offered it (possibly money) to him (CARILLO) but he (CARILLO) told him (other dude) to wait. CARILLO said they would see what happens. a?qh?r?n' said alright. C. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #33 2 I REDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 24 Ca - Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 138 of 247 PageID 239 CTED REDA C750 REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 25 Ca Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 139 of 247 PageID 240 D. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #34 REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?5 5 8 Page 26 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 140 of 247 PageID 241 I REDA CTED r?4 REDACTED E. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #35 IREDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 27 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 141 of 247 PageID 242 I 1 REDA CTED REDA CTED Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 142 of 247 PageID 243 - REDA CTED XI. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SEIZURES 61. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may not be directly connected to the Target Subjeet(s) of this Af?davit, unless otherwise noted, all seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the Target Subject(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, sophistication, and ability of these organizations. a. On December 12, 2013, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop at Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol K-9 unit alerted to the rear of the vehicle. Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine (approxirnately 5 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his front pants pocket. b. On January 1, 2014, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle impounded on 12?12-43 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14~558 Page 29 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 143 of 247 PageID 244 1 c. On March 3, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped ff 2 ehicle (GZOV570) at the 91 Fwy and Green River Rd in Corona. Vehicle was I 3 impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators seized approximately 9.8 pounds of 4 methamphetamine ?'om vehicle truck area. 5 d. On March 14, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped 6 in Riverside Ceeney- seized approximately 10 pounds of 7 methamphetamine from the vehicle. 8 e. On May 4, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Department stopped Ronald 9 SHEWMAKER in Penis, California pursuant to information develoPed from wire communications 10 on Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ (TS which indicated that proceeds were to be delivered. 11 On the same date, investigators seized approximately $420,000 US. Currency concealed within the 12 nehicle operated by SHEWMAKER. In addition to the currency, investigator seized the transport 13 vehicle. 14 f. On June 18, 2014, pursuant to information developed through this 15 investigation, a search warrant was executed at the residence located at 27680 Irma Street, Perris, California. The search produced approximately 1 pound of 1 7 methamphetamine. 18 g. On July 2, 2014, pursuant to information deve10ped through this 19 investigation into a Search warrant was executed at three locatiOnS 20 identi?ed as narcotics, proceeds and processing locations for The search produced 21 approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine and small amounts of heroin and marijuana. Addition 22 to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. 23 h. On July 15, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of 422 24 Devener, Riverside, California on .. Surveillance units observed '3 3 25 i a follow vehicle in tandem with a secondary vehicle believe to be a load 26 car. On the same date, investigators seized approximately 40 pounds of marijuana and arrested one 27 target subject. 23 i. On July 18, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of Whittier Blvd, and Gerhart in the city of Los Angeles, California pursuant to intercepted Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 30 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 144 of 247 PageID 245 1 communications on ifiji-"i Riverside County Wire Intercept which indicated that 2 was to receive a narcotics shipment. On the same date, investigators conduct a vehicle st0p 3 of a white BMW and executed a Los Angeles County search warrant at the primary residence of 4 33?: identi?ed as 757 Hendricks Avenue, los Angeles, California. At the residence, investigators seized approximately $30,000.00 US Currency, 3 guns, and small amounts of methamphetamine 6 and arrested PACAS identi?ed as On July 21, 2014, a search of the vehicle 7 produced approximately 45 pounds of methamphetamine concealed Within the ?oorboard of the 8 vehicle and accessed through aftermarket trap compartment from the driver and passenger side 9 ?oorboards. 10 11 X- NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION 12 (Penal Code section 6.2950(3) 13 62. Interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager 14 communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather evidence 15 against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed, appear reasonably 16 likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the 17 government to achieve the objectives of this investigation -- to obtain direct evidence that will 18 convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of: 19 a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? 20 illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; 21 b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; 22 c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed 23 conspirators; 24 d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are 25 stored prior to its distribution; 26 e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s 27 illegal narcotics traf?cking; 28 f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14?558 Page 31 traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 145 of 247 PageID 246 narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 63. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in identifying and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 64. Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or his/their known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conspiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subject(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruth?il statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conspiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMAN TS 65. It appears that this organization is a close-knit organization whose members are either blood relatives, mutual friends and/or very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large?scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would?be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain from potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, andfor its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 32 Cas; Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 146 of 247 PageID 247 and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 66. In October of 2014, your af?ant became aware that 3. Con?dential Source has information on members of this DTO and was capable of providing information on members of this DTO. Your af?ant has been communicating with respective Law Enforcement Of?cers directing the CS to gather Intel on members of this DTO. Based on my communications with CS controlling investigators it appears that the CS will be unable to determine the scope of this criminal enterprise, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their full methods of operation. The and is a compartmentalized DTO that layers its distribution network between oizationl members across various states. At this time, it appears the CS can af?rm the identity of key members of the DTO, however, investigators cannot obtain enough information on the modus Operandi for the importation, distribution, acquisition of narcotics proceeds, and the identity of cell heads operating on their behalf in California, Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, Missouri etc. A wire intercept on key members of this DTO, coupled with CS information can provide the best result for obtaining the goals of this investigation. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS I AGENTS 67. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. If the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 68. Due to the close-knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique fraught with failure and would most likely jeepardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore, the leaders of drug traf?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. 69. As previously noted, it is a common practice for individuals involved in large Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 33 Cas. til-th OOHJON Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 147 of 247 PageID 248 scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suspicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouch? for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned compartmentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any further than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 70. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subject(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. 71. If a Con?dential Source CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy ?om the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight-knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the organization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upon my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. 72. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an attempt to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 73. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 34 Cass (mm?boom Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 148 of 247 PageID 249 is o?en unknown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 74. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. 75. Surveillance has been conducted of subject(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?'eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his identi?cation. The subject was unable to produce any identi?cation, but verbally identi?ed himself as Victor Arredondo, with a date of birth of Reoncreo _f 23-599mm? Isa; . up Heroin with with his consent, for "3 "Remorse Target Telephone Deputy Wicker took a picture of identi?cation, and subsequently released him. TFO Layos conducted ftuther investigation of I identity. Via Riverside County Sheriff's Departments data base, . [magma II with a date birth of I mama: and revealed contacts for . . . .- Wildornar. TFO Layos also found DMV records Index number - - with a date of and address of address of X8725114 for REDA cram - Remorse I Wildomar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed that the person . CTED Deputy Wicker stopped was in fact b. On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside Sheriffs Department (RSD) - South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted surveillance of amass f: esidence, located at Wildornar. During the surveillance, a black I- Jaguar with paper plates was observed leaving Remorse residence and ultimately stopped by CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TFGZ and seized approximately 5le of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 35 CasDocument 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 149 of 247 PageID 250 occupant of the vehicle, was arrested by CHP Of?cer Mendenhall for state felony violations of 11378 HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case F-532-801- 13. A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Heroin and 2 of Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. c. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the city of Temecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside County Wire Intercept Investigators identi?ed d. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on I in the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted text message converations as authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-79 which indicated that as to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed to Carson, California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. c. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 W. 7th Street, Perris, California on two houses associated with REY. Investigators followed two Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. DOB: Investigators One of the subjects was identi?ed as I I Still working on damming if is REY and the user of TT #10-12. Note: REDA CTED REDAC TED has been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. f. On March 19, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance eon UM8364 pursuant to GPS pings of TT #15. Investigators identi?ed a possible residence for UM8364 and an associated vehicle (silver Honda Civic bearing California plate 7ADV247). Additionally, on the same date, investigators located the user of TT #15 (UM8364) at a shopping plaza located off Atlantic and Clara. Surveillance units observed UM8364 and an unidenti?ed Hispanic male conduct counter techniques such as squaring the block and looking into parked vehicle to identify possible surveillance by law enforcement. g. On March 20, 2014, investigators conducted a brief surveillance on I Ranacrso . in the county of Riverside oif the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-5 5 8 Page 36 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 150 of 247 PageID 251 I to identify the vehicle operated by the narcotics courier working for UM8364. On the same date, 2 investigators acquired the vehicle information. 3 h. On June 25, 2014, investigators conducted a follow up with Motel 6 off the 4 210 and the 215 freeways pursuant to information obtained from Wire communications which 5 indicated that was to acquire narcotics at that location. Investigators identi?ed 6 ough information provided to Motel 6 staff and subsequently conducted a drive 7 by of the listed address to acquire additional information. 8 i. In June and July of 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on 9 ref-03365 in the county of Riverside off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order to refresh 10 information used in furtherance of a Riverside County search warrant for his residence and 11 associated locations. On July 1, 2014, investigators observed a vehicle ente residence, 12 and deliver two 5 gallon bails. On the same date, intercepted communication indicated that 13 as in possession of narcotics. l4 j. On July 2, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on 15 the vicinity of Randy Canyon between the 15 and 215 freeways pursuant to information obtained was to acquire narcotics from an 16 from wire communications which indicated that 17 unidenti?ed third party. On the same date, investigators observed a Hispanic male operating a red 13 Mercedes enter the If residence. Shortly thereafter, investigators executed a Riverside 19 County search warrant on three locations associated with .. ewe 20 k. On July 15, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the vicinity of 21 Riverside, California on 7 7 Remorse Investigators ultimately seiZed 22 approximately 40 pounds of marijuana. 23 1. On July 17, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of 5?46?? 24 ammo" Los Angeles, California, the primary residential location of ammo as identified by Global Positioning System (GPS) pings of Target Telephone #23, authorized 25 by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-369, as well as in the vicinity of the K-Inart/ Dearden?s 27 parking lot located off Whittier Blvd, and S. Gerhart Avenue, Los Angeles, California. At the 23 residence was a black lifted Yukon consistent with intercepted communications during which tates that he drives a ?black lift Yukon?. At approximately 4:15 pm, surveillance units of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 37 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 151 of 247 PageID 252 7CPL313 leave the target residence and proceed west on 4th street. Investigators followed the vehicle to a Subway restaurant located off 411] Street and Wilkerson Ave, Ferris, California. Investigators G. Rohn of conducted foot surveillance and observed CARILLO (TS inside the Subway restaurant, consistent with GPS results on #32. At that point surveillance was terminated. 76. Surveillance operations have been successful to the extent they have established persons andfor vehicles arriving at, and/or departing from principal locations; and extended the scope of the investigation to additional locations and co-conspirators. However, surveillance Operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of Operation and the manner in which their operation is conducted. 77. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co- conspirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suspected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an investigative technique that is used to con?rm meetings and other suspected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 78. Your af?ant knows from training and experience, and from speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic traf?cking organizations is limited to placing individuals together without knowing the signi?cance of their meeting or the role of each traf?cker. Furthermore, based on my training and experience, surveillance of major narcotics traf?ckers is often dif?cult without detection. Physical surveillance is often limited to watching suspects ?orn a distance, which as an investigative technique, can be problematic. Your af?ant believes that excess random surveillance of a location without knowledge when a narcotics transaction will be taking place, could expose the identity of the of?cers and thereby compromise the investigation. Even if blanket, twenty-four hour surveillance were feasible, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 39 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 152 of 247 PageID 253 2 Target Subject(s). If the Target Subject(s) su3pected he was being watched by law enforcement 3 personnel, he could abandon his phone and move his activities to a different location, thus 4 effectively ending the current on?going investigation until he was located again. A wire intercept 5 would greatly assist the agents because they could be deployed more effectively knowing about a 6 future narcotics transaction. This would allow surveillance to be set up on strategic locations, 7 thereby lessening the risk of compromising the investigation. 8 79. Furthermore, your af?ant knows from past investigations that narcotics traf?ckers 9 use various counter-surveillance driving techniques. These techniques include frequent u-turns, 10 stopping in parking lots to observe traf?c, waiting at traf?c lights to allow traf?c to pass, speed 11 variations, and taking circuitous routes through residential neighborhoods. Ali of these methods are 12 used for the sole purpose of determining the presence of law enforcement personnel. These methods 13 it would still be limited to providing information only on the movements and whereabouts of the are frequently successful, as it is extremely dif?cult to follow susPects who employ these methods 14 without being detected. Once detected, these suSpects usually abandon their activities, which mean 15 they may shut down their cellular phones, pagers, and other phones, and ?ee the jurisdiction or area 15 only to resurface at another unknown location at a later date. 17 80. When physical surveillance is combined with interception of wire communications, 13 the purpose of meetings can be revealed and may constitute admissible evidence if the meetings 19 relate to an intercepted conversation of criminal behavior. 20 81. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the 22 opportunities for detection by the Target Subject(s). If surveillance were to be detected, I believe 23 the traf?ckers? perpetual suspicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations 24 would in their minds be continued. The subjects would not only liker flee the area, they would 25 also engage in wholesale abandonment of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, 25 agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking 27 place. This selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help 28 maintain the integrity of the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 40 82. Based on the above?stated facts and on my training and experience, your af?ant Cass Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 153 of 247 PageID 254 does not believe that surveillance of the above?referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target Telephone, will enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation. SEARCH WARRAN TS 83. On 01~22- 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #0122141? for a target telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. 84. On (32-25-2014, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge Irma Poole Asben'y. 85. On 02-27?2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #02271412 for a target telephone utilized by members 03-11-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03111409 for multiple target telephone utilized by members of the Resorts. 87. On 03-19-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03191403 for multiple target telephone utilized numbers of?le 88. On 03-26- 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant #03261411 for a target telephone associated with this ongoing investigation. 89. On July 1, 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant for two target telephones associated with this ongoing investigation. 90. On July 2, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Of?ce, Southwest Corridor Narcotics Task Force, investigators acquired a Riverside County Search warrant of for 5 Wildomar, California. Investigators REDA CTED Wildornar, California and neoncrso seized approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine, small amounts of heroin and 4 pounds of marijuana. In addition to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. 91. On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca write and signed search warrant for Target Telephone #25 utilized by . . . 92. On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Ios Angeles County search warrant located at REDA CTED for the primary residence of later identi?ed as I . REDACTED Los Angeles, California. insoncran 93. On August 13, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Los Angeles County search warrant for the primary residence of .. i' located L05 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14658 Page 41 steamed 1' Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 154 of 247 PagelD 255 Angeles, California. This search was a follow up search based on information that developed through intercepted communications. 94. There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. That danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search warrants after carefully weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall investigation. Generally, it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 95. DEA investigators will prepare af?davits to search the principal locations involved in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on- going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an intermediate quantity of narcotics and/or controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances and/or illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large- scale narcotic traffickers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics and/or controlled substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 96. Your af?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total sc0pe of the illegal operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug traf?cking organization, the organizational structure, the full scope of the narcotics compiracy, the locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 42 Ca: ALI-5N ROGUE-JOEDocument 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 155 of 247 PageID 256 that higher?level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics and/or controlled substances at their residences. Although surveillance has identi?ed residence(s), your af?ant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their horne(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stash? locations, without intercepted Wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized, those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amormts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far iess probative vaiue by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conspirators, which give full meaning to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants?were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 97. The analysis of data derived from the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been helpful in determining pattems, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls between telephones, suspects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your af?ant knows from experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation from law enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived from the pen register and telephone tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for successful prosecution, especially in light of the familial Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 43 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 156 of 247 PageID 257 structuring of this organization. Speci?cally, the details of the involvement of the participants, and the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before successful surveillance operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. 98. Based on the above, your af?ant believes that pen registers, toll analysis, and subscriber information, without the aid of a Wire intercept, will not help your affront achieve the objectives of the investigation. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 99. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that pe0ple who are entering or leaving the location. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuais entering and exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement within the organization, if any. TRASH SEARCHES OF TARGET LOCATIONS 100. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subject(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high-level narcotics traffickers and their associates go to geat to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to dispose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me that narcotic traf?ckers will often carry trash aWay from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it would be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in front of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the search would draw suspicion on the law enforcement of?cers. A trash search would surely draw the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subject(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the government?s Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 44 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 157 of 247 PageID 258 objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor, without identifying themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash search. Even if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained from the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full scepe of the conspiracy. 101. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul-de-sacs. They would be conspicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be spotted. At this time, your af?ant feeis that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. 102. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects were to observe and disclose to the Target Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already suspicious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co-conSpirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 103. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traffickers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and ?equently will not use their residential trash containers to dispose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 45 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 158 of 247 PageID 259 104. 1 ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would be suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co~conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 105. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 106. Even if investigators me abie to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers ?equently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail and that the majority of the proceeds is transported in bulk via passenger vehicles. GRAND JURY 107. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal SUSpects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would cooperate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 46 Cas Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 159 of 247 PageID 260 targets of this investigation. 103. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be successful in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his ?fth amendment privilege; (2) it would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conspirators, when they are identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. XI. CONCLUSION 109. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I believe that the Target Subjects have committed, are committing and are about to commit the aforementioned crimes and that particular communications of the Target Subject(s) over the target telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied for herein. 110. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. However, it is your af?ant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electronic communications over the Target Telephone and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your af?ant to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 111. For reasons set out in this affidavit, it is your af?ant?s Opinion that the only reasonable and effective way to deveIOp the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the person(s) involved in this conSpiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested herein. 112. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Sprinthextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 47 woo-damnase 3:15-cr-0 - 0099 DJH Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 160 of 247 PageID 261 Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecormnunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order: Authorize the installation andlor use of all facilities to enable the interception a. and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, all wireless digital functions, wireless analog functions, direct connectfdigital dispatch/direct dispatch functions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California where the contents of the Riverside County area. (See United redirected communications are first heard or accessed in the .3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 States v. Denman, 100 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation andf or use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. I and trace Direct c. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap Connect/Dispatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. d. Authorize the installation andfor use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller I and any calling features such as ?call forward'ng? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel and Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception said company provides the unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services people whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying subscribers Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-5 58 Page 48 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 161 of 247 PageID 262 1 and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through 2 this intercethpen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not 3 limited to past telephone bills and records. 4 113. Your affiant requests the Court order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all 5 provide telecommunications servrces the Unrted States of America, as listed on an ongomg 7 8 Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers 9 (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law 10 enforcement agency executing the intercept order, within 48 hours (including after?business hours, 11 weekends, and holidays), and without delay: 12 a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text 13 telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Commission to basis on FCC Form (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet messaging device(s), cellular/wireless telephone(s), calling card(s), and other communication 14 device(s) contacting 01? being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted 15 conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such 15 conununication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and 17 accounts associated with the primary number/account, billing information (billed and unbilled), 13 activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone 19 and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial 20 number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment 21 identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. 22 b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all 23 historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit 24 extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones called or being called by each 25 Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the 25 investigation. 27 0. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, and/or GPS location 23 information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 49 termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use Cas; Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 162 of 247 PageID 263 117. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to execute such intercept order. 118. Your af?ant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 119. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. I deciare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and currect. Executed at Special Agent Emilio J. Baca Drug Enforcement Administration Riverside, California. F, Dated: November 5 ,2014 r" 5 Sworn to and subscribed before me on November COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE HONORABL HELIOS .T. HERNANDEZ STATE OF ALIFORNIA Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 51 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 163 of 247 PageID 264 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 955-9673 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRETAP NO. 15-108 . 2 WIRE, PAGER AND ELECTRONIC 1 APPLICATION Target Telephone #38: ammo -. Target Telephone #39: Tamet Telephone #40: 502-609?593 APPLICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. I, John Aki., Chief Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, declare: 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Michael A. Hestrin. I am the Riverside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code section 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Drug Enforcement Administration, Special Agent Emilio Base, and relying thereon, I approve making this Application and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to intercept wire, pager and electronic communications to and from the communication devices (the "Target described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 3. Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her substitute, to physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic reports required by Penal Code section 629.60. 1 . Application Wiretap 15-10 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 164 of 247 PageID 265 m?Jam-?hWNHO?omQQM-bwmma 4. Special Agent Baca, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Riverside District Office, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section He is certified by the California State Attorney IGeneral's Of?ce in wiretaps, as set forth in the Af?davit. 5. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce, Los Angeles Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal Code Section Special Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, reviewed the Af?davit and approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led herewith). 6. Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to conclude the Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and will continue to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, Transportation and Sales of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code with respect to a substance containing cocaine andfor methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in proceeds from narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and conspiracy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the meaning of Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted conversation of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, will provide additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said o??enses. There is probable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes listed herein and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. 7. Pursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular descriptions of the device(s) from which the communications are to be intercepted and their locations: REDA CTED Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 165 of 247 PageID 266 neoncren - c. Target Telephone #40: (502) 609-5937 (TT #40) is an cellular phone being utilized by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS and subscribed to Christopher MATTINGLY at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being utilized by MATTINGLY. 8. The actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. 9. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic communications between the Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates andfor co-conspirators concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have been attempted without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if attempted, as set forth in the Af?davit. 11. Due to the ongoing nature of the conspiracy related to the above offenses, and because there is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those o??enses will occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to maintain this intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be deemed to automatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin - Mobile U.S.A., Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, Wireless, California Products and Services, T-Mobile USA Inc., Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc., Cingular Wireless, Nextel Communications, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint-Nextel, Metrocall, PageNet, Tuyo higobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 166 of 247 PageID 267 Mobile, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other affected telecommunications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecommunications Companies?) or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request of law enforcement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of furnishing the facilities and technical assistance. 13. I request this Court to order the Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. 14. Applicant requests this Application, Review, Affidavit, Order and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, andfor exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Office and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) 15. Af?davit within the meaning of Penal Code Section I am unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the 4 Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 167 of 247 PageID 268 1 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice certi?ed person(s), 2 selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement officer/agency, to provide linguistic interpretation for interception of Wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular 4 telephone communications, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. 5 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 6 foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief 7 which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in Riverside, 3 California. 9 10 DATED01-11 ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 12 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 13 For: MICHAEL A. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 14 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 168 of 247 PageID 269 1 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 Fax: (951) 955?9673 6 7 8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 10 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO.: 15-108 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 1 1 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER INTERCEPT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF 12 WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS Target Telephone #39 (502) 609?5937 Target Telephone #40 I 15 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION 15 FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC 17 CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS . AND AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING 13 CELLULAR SITE DATA AND 19 AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE 20 I 21 INTRODUCTION AND EXPERTISE 22 I, Emilio J. Baca, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 23 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration 24 (DEA), and I am an investigative or law enforcement of?cer of the United States within the 25 meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 26 2. I am empowered by law to conduct investigations and to make arrests for felony 27 offenses as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. I have been so employed since February 2010 and I am 28 currently assigned to the Riverside District Of?ce Task Force Group 2. I primarily investigate Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 1 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 169 of 247 PageID 270 narcotic traf?cking and distribution organizations Operating in and around Riverside County in California 3. I have received approximately 19 weeks of training at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia and was trained in all aspects of conducting narcotics investigations as well as the methods and techniques commonly used by major narcotics traf?ckers. I have attended special training in wire and electronic interceptions, toll analysis, and the use of wire and electronic interception equipment. I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical and legal aspects of court ordered wiretaps per Penal Code Section 629 et seq. 4. During my employment with the DEA, I have participated in narcotics investigations through the surveillance, execution of search warrants, and arrests of drug traf?ckers. In addition, I have spoken to informants and suspects regarding the methods and means of drug traf?ckers. I have debriefed persons arrested for controlled substance traf?cking and have debriefed informants on the methods for gathering controlled substance intelligence. I have Spoken with experienced narcotics investigators concerning the methods and practices of narcotics traf?ckers. Through my training, experience and interaction with other Special Agents, Task Force Of?cers, and other narcotics investigators, I have become familiar with narcotic traf?ckers? methods of operation, including the distribution, transportation, collection of proceeds and methods of laundering used in an attempt to conceal the nature of narcotic related proceeds. Through these interactions I have become familiar with and developed an understanding for the manner in which controlled substances are imported, manufactured, distributed, and sold, to include the methods of avoiding detection and apprehension by law enforcement of?cers. I am familiar with the manner in which narcotics traf?ckers use wireless communication equipment such as cellular telephone technology, pagers, coded communications, false identities, and counter surveillance to determine the presence of law enforcement and other means to facilitate their illegal activities and avoid detection or mislead a narcotics investigation. 5. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein and make this af?davit based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge I have gained ?om my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training, experience, and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 2 Case Document 27?1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 170 of 247 PageID 271 conversations with other law enforcement investigators with whom I have discussed this case; (3) and what I believe to be reliable information obtained from the following sources: oral and written reports about this investigation, received from law enforcement of?cers; (4) law enforcement databases; (5) Pen register and trap and trace information as well as telephone records toll records and subscriber infonnation; (6) public records; and (7) physical surveillances conducted by DEA, West County Narcotics Task Force - Riverside County Sherist Department, and other law enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 6. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a statement was made, the information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my interpretation, derived ?om my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics investigations. 7. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones as described below: REDA CTED 0. Target Telephone #40: (502) 609-5937 (TT #40) is an cellular phone being utilized by Christopher MATTINGLY (1?8 and subscribed to Christopher MATTINGLY at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being utilized by MATTINGLY. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15- 108 ?age 3 Case I 00 10 Inn-J. gunDocument 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 171 of 247 PageID 272 8. Probable cause exists to believe that BETO LNU #20 user of TT #38 and TT Chris MATTINGLY (TS #8 user of TT #40) and other identi?ed and unidenti?ed co- conspirators, have committed, are committing, or are about to commit, the crimes as discussed below, and that their communications relate to those and other ongoing crimes. 9. I request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 10. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, tramportation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11350, 11351, 11373 and 11379 or the Health and Safety Code, with resPect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, possession of narcotics proceeds in Violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT . A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 11. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty- day order to intercept the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to?talk voice REDAC TED communications, to and from TT #38: 7 hematite I 7' and TT #48: 502- 609-5937 between the herein named target suspect(s) and any additional co-conspirators known and unknown and shall include any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to-talk voice Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 4 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 172 of 247 PageID 273 communications and any background conversations while the telephone instrument is otherwise in use. B. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA (IS .S.C. Sections 3121 through 3126) 12. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace TT #39: and TT #40: 502-609-5937 I also feature on TT #38: .aenacrsn I I request the authorization to obtain. and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations, related to TT #38: REDACTED and TT #40: 502-609-5937. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile TT #39: cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unlmown. However with the assistance of cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) 'of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers would be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the user of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant requests an order to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone. a. Your af?ant has learned through conversations with other law enforcement of?cers and by personal knowledge that illegal narcotic traf?ckers have the potential to disable the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15- 108 Page 5 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 173 of 247 PageID 274 GPS function in their telephones if they are aware law enforcement can monitor their real time 2 movements. Your af?ant does not solely rely on GPS locations because your af?ant knows, often 3 times GPS requests can fail or revert to cell towers with a 5000 meter locate. I also know there are 4 many ?dead spots? in Southern California as related to cellular service for Sprint/Nextel. I have 5 been told by Sprint/Nextel employees if cellular telephones do not receive a siglal, I will receive a 6 failed reSponse when requesting GPS locations. 7 b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use 8 mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify TT #38: TT #39: 9 and TT #40: 502-609-5937. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular telephone(s), 10 which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the 11 target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of mobile electronic tracking 12 devices, law enforcement agents can identify the location of a cellular telephone to a much ?ner 13 detail than through cellular site data alone. 14 DURATION OF INTERCEPTION 15 (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 15 13. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic 17 communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial 18 intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance. of the Order, whichever comes first, pursuant to 19 California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the full 20 membership and methods of Operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the 21 interception not terminate when the communications described herein are ?rst intercepted, but may 22 continue to the hill extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or .until the full scope of the 23 enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in furtherance of the enterprise, 24 25 whichever comes ?rst. 26 14. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively 27 use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. Therefore, your af?ant believes that 28 additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the ?rst Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 6 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 174 of 247 PageID 275 communication to and from the target telephone(s). IV. TARGET (Penal Code section 15. The Target Telephones are described as follows: - REDACTED c. Target Telephone #40: (502) 609-5937 (TT #40) is an cellular phone being utilized by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS and subscribed to Christopher at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being utilized by MATTINGLY. l. The term ?Target Telephone #38-40? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation (IMSI) number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address and/or Push-to-talk number, and/or Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), and/or any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, and/or DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone number(s) and/or ESN and/or UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC whether the changes occur simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as the target telephone(s). 2. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names when obtaining Pre-Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 7 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 175 of 247 PageID 276 1 their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement from immediater knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these su3pects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. V. (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 16. The known Target subject(s) of this investigation are: REDA CTED REDAC TED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 8 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 176 of 247 PageID 277 NEDA CTED REDA GTED Raymundo CARILLO aka CEJAS (Target Subject 7) previously listed as Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ. Investigators previously had identi?ed the target subject known as as CHAVEZ based on information obtained from GPS pings, secondary narcotics investigation indicating CHAVEZ was associated with 1135 W. 7th Street, Penis, California, the residence identi?ed from GPS pings on phones utilized by and physical surveillances. It should be noted that CHAVEZ has a listed address of 1111 W. 7th Street, Penis, California 92570. However, further investigative analysis indicated the subject known as was actually CARILLO. On October 23, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in Perris, California pursuant to GPS pings of TT #32, used by CARILLO. On the same date, investigators positively identi?ed as CARILLO from a state of California booking photo. It should be noted that surveillance observations on movements were also concurrent to GPS pings of TT #32. ?amers-n CARILLO is a Hispanic male with a Date of Birth of and has been the subject of Riverside County Wire Intercepts 14-120, 14-183 and .aeeagee; criminal history Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 9 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 177 of 247 PageID 278 includes arrests for HS 11377 from 2001 and records indicate police contacts for CARILLO at 23802 Lake Drive, Perris, California. Investigators have obtained vehicle plates observed at this a member of this DTO. residence which come back to h. Chris MATTINGLY (Target Subject 8) is a described as a White male with a Date of Birth air: Blonde, Eyes: Blue, Weight: 250, Height: 6?3, and listed residence of 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, KY. REDACTED j. Ronaid Ashley SHEWMAIER (Target Subject 16): is described as a White male, with a date of birth 0 easel air: Red, Eyes: Brown, Weight: 2201bs., Height: 5, According to Department of Motor Vehicles, SHEWMAKER is issued Kentucky Driver?s License with an address of I af?ant found no documented criminal history for SHEWMAKER. ?1 Lebanon Jct, Kentucky 40150. Your REDA crEo REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 10 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 178 of 247 PageID 279 REDA CTED REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 11 1 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 179 of 247 PageID 280 REDAC TED REDR Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 12 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 180 of 247 PageID 281 samurai: VI. JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, AN ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 17. Calyfomia PenaZ' Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 US. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d_ 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was improperly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located in New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held ?for Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 13 Case 3 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 181 of 247 PageID 282 the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the tapped telephone is located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are ?rst to be hear (Ibid, at page 136) In United States v. Denmon, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the originai listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction have authority under Title to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodriguez court noted, this interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge to supervise an investigation that spans more than one judicial district.? (Ibid, at pages 403-404) Also see United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 18. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use cellular telephone(s), use ?ctitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by law enforcement. By using other persons? names and creating a ?ctitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a certain degree of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15?408 Page 14 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 182 of 247 PageID 283 1 anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the popularity of pre?paid cellular telephones among those 2 engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate 3 with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from 4 immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these su3pects often allows 5 them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to 6 ?ee the area of the crime. 7 19, This investigation into the speci?cally the segment operated by 8 CARILLO (TS encompasses the distribution of narcotics to multiple states across the 9 continental United States to include, but not limited to, Missouri, Texas, Georgia and Kentucky. 10 There are several narcotics investigations involving multiple segments/cells for this DTO currently 11 being investigated by DEA (St. Louis and Lexington) as weii as by Local Narcotics Teams 12 (Louisville, KY area21. Target Telephone #40 used by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS identi?ed as 18 Kentucky cell head for the 'i?sanc'rs'n' working with CARILLO (TS Although 19 MATTINGLY is physically in Kentucky, he routine coordinates with DTO members Operating out 20 of Riverside County and which transport narcotics from Riverside County to Kentucky. 21 Additionally, the proceeds from the sale of narcotics ?lters back to Riverside County via proceeds 22 couriers operating passenger vehicles. In May of 2014, investigators seized approximately $420,000 23 which was sent by MATTINGLY. 24 22. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. This is suf?cient in 25 and of itself to confer jurisdiction to this court. 26 VII. 27 PRIOR APPLICATIONS 28 (Penal Code section 629.5002) Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 15 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 183 of 247 PageID 284 23. On February 13, 2015, your af?ant requested checks of the California Department of Justice reference the Electronic Intercept Court Order System for TT #38-40. 24. On February 13, 2015, your af?ant requested checks of the United States Department of Justice wiretap database to determine if any Federal applications had been made to initiate a Title wiretap intercept of TT #3840. 25. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places speci?ed in this Application, within the meaning of Penal Code section REDACTED REDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No: 15-108 Page 16 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 184 of 247 PageID 285 Remorse f. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120: On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court, State of California granted and issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14-120, which authorized the interception of the communication to and horn TT TT #10: (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. Remorse 11. Riverside County Win: Intercept Order 14-183: on April 7, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-183, authorizing the initiation of State wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone [sweeten .. #13 502-609-5967, Target Telephone #14 702?885?7486, Target Telephone #15 I and Target Telephone #16 951-322?0063. i. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120 Extension 1: On April 8, 2014, Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-120 Ext 1, authorizing the initiation of State wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone #11 951-570-0461. REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 17 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 185 of 247 PageID 286 REDACTED REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 18 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 186 of 247 PageID 287 Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-558: On November 5, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-558; authorizing the initiation of State Wire intercept for 30 days for TT #31: REDA CTED OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 26. Your af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target Telephone #38-40 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this investigation which include discovering: a. The full and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 19 Case inan Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 187 of 247 PageID 288 traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. IX. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE (Penal Code section 27. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate drug traf?cking. 28. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I assert that: a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, have or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11350, 11351, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and ConSpiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, with respect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning the above?named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Penal Code section 629.52Cb) 29. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the places where, the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above?named offenses or are leased to, listed in the name of or commonly used by the Target Subjects whose communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 30. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more ?illy explained Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 20 Case ummew Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 188 of 247 PageID 289 below. (Penal Code section 31. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I further assert that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in furtherance of the narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places involved in the manufacturing and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, will be obtained through the interception of wire communications over the Target Telephones. 32. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived from participation in this invatigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: a. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that I have received from the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; b. Physical surveillance conducted by the Riverside Sheriff Departrnent (RSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; 0. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other documentary evidence in this and other investigations and, d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. f. Evidence obtained through court?authorized intercept orders. A. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #38 and #39 REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 21 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 189 of 247 PageID 290 REDA CTED REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 22 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 190 of 247 PageID 291 REDA CTED REDACTED REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 23 Case . Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 191 of 247 PageID 292 h?Lp-md HO Nr??r??h??Hr?lh?lr?il?n? exam-?ammth REDACTED 42:- UJ REDACTED 00 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 24 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 192 of 247 PageID 293 REDACTED REDAC TED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 25 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 193 of 247 PageID 294 REDACTED REDA CYED A. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #40 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 ?age 26 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 194 of 247 PageID 295 39. On April 7, 2014 the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez signed Riverside County Wire Intercept 14?183 for #13 (502-609~5937-now TT #40) used by Christopher IVIATTINGLY. Investigators monitored the communications for MATTINGLY while using TT #40 (marked Tl? #13 for Wire Intercept 14-183) for a 30 day period. During that interception period, investigators seized approximately $420,000 US Currency from a narcotics proceeds courier identi?ed as Ronald SHEWMAKER. The proceeds transport was coordinated between CARILLO (TS and MATTINGLY (TS Since the last interception period on MATTINGLY, investigators have been coordinating with DEA Louisville and Lexington in an effort to dismantle these cells working under the if and at the direction of CARILLO. Investigators determined that TT #40 is still active and is being utilized by MATTINGLY based on GPS pings initiated by a local Narcotics Task Force investigating MATTENGLY. "?ne ?oeiow reference calls are outlined to demonstrate historical narcotics communications on TT #40. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics related activities associated with MATTINGLY and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On April 9, 2014, at approximately 10:33 am, Target Telephone #40, used by ChristoPher MATTINGLY (TS received an incoming call from telephone number 27 0- 547?9757, session number 223 used by UM9757. UM9757 asked where MATTINGLY was. MATTINGLY said he was at his house, and then asked where UM9757 was. UM9757 said he was at the of?ce. MATTINGLY asked UM9757 to go up there (to location) because he (MATTINGLY) had gotten some nicer shit (narcotics) for UM9757. UM9757 said he had some deals and some cash, then asked where MATTINGLY wanted him to put it. MATTINGLY said to give it to Leslie, because she would be back here and that she (Leslie) should be there (at UM9757's location) in a second because she was walking back there (to UM9757's location) from the house. UM9757 said alright. b. On April 19, 2014, at approximately 7:46 am, Target Telephone #40, used by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS received an incoming call from telephone number 27 0- 859-0111, session number 665 used by UM0111 said he (third party) had made him Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 1 5?108 Page 27 Case 43m Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 195 of 247 PageID 296 (UM0111) a shot. MATTINGLY asked what he (third party) said. UM0111 said he (third party) wanted one of those Hardinsburg Specials, and laughed. UM0111 said 1,590, 100 of them MATTINGLY said 1,700 for 100 of them. UMOI 11 said MATTINGLY said they would not be MATTINGLY said 1,700 and if he did not want them, it was alright. UM0111 said okay. 0. On May 4, 2014, at approximately 10:42 am, MATTINGLY placed and outgoing call to Raymundo CARILLO (TS The following highlights the pertinent aspects of the conversation which, based on my training and experience relates to narcotics activity. REY asked what was happening. said not a whole lot. MATTINGLY said he meant to call REY last night, but he had gotten busy. REY said he went to a party. MATTINGLY asked if REY had gotten wild. REY asked if MATTINGLY knew how (thought not ?nished by REY). REY asked if MATTINGLY knew where RONNIE (proceeds courier) was at that moment. MATTINGLY said not exactly and he (RONNIE) probably would not tell him exactly. REY said alright. MATTINGLY said he (RONNIE) would be there (at REY's area) later this afternoon for sure. REY said that was what he was thinking. REY said something right now, but would try to be there (at REY's location) MATTINGLY said there was no problem. REY said he would call MATTINGLY back when he (Ronnie) was there (REY's location). MATTINGLY said alright 1) approximately 420,000 US Currency from Ronald in Perris, California. This Investigators Note: On May 4, 2014, investigators seized currency was coordinated between CARILLO and MATTINGLY. 40. Although, the aforementioned intercepted communications are dated, recent investigative information and seizures indicate that MATTINGLY continues to operate as a cell head in Kentucky. In November of 2014, inveStigators were monitoring intercepted communications for Raymundo CARILLO as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14?558. On or about NOVember 11, 2014, investigators began to intercept communications between CARILLO and a proceeds courier for the DTO. The courier was provided the following address: 521 Old Highway 60, Hardinsburg, Kentucky. On the same date, your af?ant, working with agents in Kentucky, learned that the aforementioned address was a property owned by MATTINGLY. investigators in Kentucky Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 28 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 196 of 247 PageID 297 1 initiated surveillance and ultimately conducted a vehicle st0p which contained approximately 60,000 2 US Currency. Based on intercepted communications, surveillance and proceeds seizure, your af?ant 3 believes that MATTINGLY continues to distribute narcotics for the DTO. 4 Toll Analysis of TT #40: 5 41. On January 29, 2015, your af?ant conducted a telephone toll analysis of Target 6 Telephone #40. TT #40 placed or received 24 calls between 01?07-201 5 and 01-26-2014 to 502-921- 7 0299, which is associated to I a multi-pound methamphetamine traf?cker in 8 Louisville, Kentucky. 9 XI. 10 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SEIZURES ll 42. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or 12 actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may 13 not be directly connected to the Target Subject(s) of this Af?davit, unless otherwise noted, all 14 seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the 15 Target Subject(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, 15 sophistication, and ability of these organizations. 17 a. On December 12, 2013, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop 18 at Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol unit alerted to the rear of the 19 vehicle. Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine 20 (approximately 5 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his front pants 21 pocket. 22 b. On January 1, 2014, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle 23 impounded on 12?12-13 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of 25 c. On March 3, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped 7 ehicle (6ZOV570) at the 91 Fwy and Green River Rd in Corona. Vehicle was I I I II I 27 impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators seized approximately 9.8 pounds of 28 methamphetamine from vehicle truck area. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 29 Case p?l 10 Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 197 of 247 PageID 298 d. On March 14, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped ehicle in Riverside County. Investigators seized approximately 10 pounds of methamphetamine from the vehicle. e. On May 4, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff 3 Department stopped Ronald SHEWMAKER in Penis, California pursuant to information develoPed from wire communications on Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ (T8 which indicated that proceeds were to be delivered. On the same date, investigators seized approximately $420,000 US. Currency concealed within the vehicle operated by SHEWMAKER. In addition to the currency, investigator seized the transport vehicle. f. On June 18, 2014, pursuant to information developed through this .. . 359497.59. investigation, a search warrant was executed at the residence of Perris, California. The search produced approximately 1 pound of located a I. methamphetamine. On July 2, 2014, pursuant to information developed through this g. investigation into {if a search warrant was executed at three locations identi?ed as narcotics, proceeds and processing locations for The search produced approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine and small amounts of heroin and marijuana. Addition to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. h. On July 15, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of senate genera ammo Surveillance units observed 'verside, California on - ?amenco operating a follow vehicle in tandem with a secondary vehicle believe to be a load car. On the same date, investigators seized approximately 40 pounds of marijuana and arrested one target subject. i. On July 18, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of Whittier Blvd, and Gerhart in the city of Los Angeles, California pursuant to intercepted sumac ran [amass communications on Riverside County Wire Intercept Rena step if was to receive a narcotics shipment. On the same date, investigators conduct a vehicle stop of a white BMW and executed a Los Angeles County search warrant at the primary residence of Af?davit a Wiretap Order No. 154 as Page 30 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 198 of 247 PageID 299 if identi?ed as if": I 'a?oact?o I: .5 los Angeles, California At the residence, investigators seized approximately $30,000.00 US Currency, 3 guns, and small amounts of methamphetamine and arrested On July 21, 2014, a search of the vehicle produced approximately 45 pounds of methamphetamine concealed Within the ?oorboard of the vehicle and accessed through aftermarket trap compartment ?om the driver and passenger side ?oorboards. In November of 2014, investigators of DEA Louisville, Kentucky DEA seized approximately 60,000 US Currency ?orn proceeds runner directed by CARILLO. The information was developed by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14?558, Target Telephone #32, used by CARIILO. k. 011 December 3, 2014, investigators seized approximater 60 pounds marijuana 5 grams of methamphetamine, 5 ?rearms and arrest 3 subjects, to include 1. On February 11, 2015, investigators executed a Riverside County Warrant at on the Same dateI investigators seized one (1) pound of methamphetamine and 1 ?rearm. X. NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 43. Interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather evidence against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed, appear reasonably likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation to obtain direct evidence that will convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of: a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 31 Case .4me Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 199 of 247 PageID 300 c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and diSposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 44. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in identifying and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 45. Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or his/their known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conspiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subject(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruthful statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conSpiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15~108 Page 32 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 200 of 247 PageID 301 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 46. It appears that this organization is a close~knit organization whose members are either blood relatives, mutual ?iends and/or very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large-scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would-be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain from potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, and/or its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 47. In October of 2014, your afiiant became aware that 3. Con?dential Source has information on members of this DTO and was capable of providing information on members of this DTO. Your af?ant has been communicating with reSpective Law Enforcement Of?cers directing the CS to gather Intel on members of this DTO. Based on my communications with CS controlling investigators it appears that the CS will be unable to determine the scope of this criminal enterprise, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their full methods of operation. and is a compartmentalized DTO that layers its distribution network between organizational members across various states. At this time, it appears the CS can af?rm the identity of key members of the DTO, however, investigators cannot obtain enough information on the modus operandi for the importation, distribution, acquisition of narcotics proceeds, and the identity of cell heads Operating on their behalf in California, Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, Missouri etc. A wire intercept on key members of this DTO, coupled with CS information can provide the best result for obtaining the goals of this investigation. As of today, the aforementioned CS has become unavailable to provide information on this DTO. Your af?ant has learned that the CS has been held account for seized proceeds is currently not in a position to provide investigators with investigative or enforcement information. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS AGENTS 48. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 33 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 201 of 247 PageID 302 narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. If the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 49. Due to the close?knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique ?aught with failure and would most likely jeopardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore, the leaders of drug traf?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. 50. As previously noted, it is a common practice for individuals involved in large scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suspicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouch? for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned comparunentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any further than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 51. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subj ect(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-408 Page 34 Case 1 1 1:2 1:3 111 1:5 1:5 1?7 15; 1E) 32() :21 22:2 :23; :24; 22:5 22:5 22'? :25; Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 202 of 247 PageID 303 52. If a Con?dential Source (CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy ?om the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight?knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the organization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upon my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. ?53. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very . unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an attempt to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 54. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone is o?en unknown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to? the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 55. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. 56. Surveillance has been conducted of subject(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his identi?cation. The subject :neogcrgo was unable to produce any identi?cation, but verbally identi?ed himself as a date of birth of and address of I where the CI had previously picked Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 35 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 203 of 247 PageID 304 up Heroin with [Emcee also provided a cellular phone number of if: 2 i .I i in. Deputy Wicker took a picture of his consent, for 3 identi?cation, and subsequently released him. TFO Layos conducted further investigation of 5 6 7 X3725114 for 8 ildomar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed that the person 9 Deputy Wicker Stopped was in fact 10 b. On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside Sheriffs 11 Department (RSD) - South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted 12 esidence, located at I. During the surveillance, a black 13 Jaguar with paper plates was observed leaving esidence and ultimately stopped by 1?4 CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TF G2 and seized approximately 15 of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole 17 Mendenhall for state felony violations of 1137s HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case 13 13. A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Heroin and 2 of 19 Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. 20 c. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the 21 city of Ternecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside County Wire Intercept 1- as the user of 22 79. Investigators identi?ed I 23 d. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on 24 amoral: in the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted text 25 message conversations as authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-79 which indicated that 26 as to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed steamy": Carson, 27 California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators 28 seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 36 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 204 of 247 PageID 305 e. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 W. 2 7th Street, Pen-is, California on two houses associated with REY. Investigators followed two 3 Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. 4 One of the subjects was identi?ed as Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ, DOB: Investigators 5 are still working on determining if CHAVEZ is REY and the user of IT #10-12. Note: CHAVEZ 6 has been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. 7 f. On March 19, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance eon UM8364 8 pursuant to GPS pings of TT #15. Investigators identi?ed a possible residence for UM8364 and an 9 associated vehicle (silver Honda Civic bearing California plate 7ADV247). Additionally, on the 10 same date, investigators located the user of TT #15 (UM8364) at a shopping plaza located off 11 Atiantic and Clara. Surveiilance units observed UM3364 and an unidenti?ed Hispanic male conduct 12 counter techniques such as squaring the block and looking into parked vehicle to identify possible 13 surveillance by law enforcement. 14 g. On March 20, 2014, investigators conducted a brief surveillance on 15 the county ofRiverside off the Is interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order 16 to identify the vehicle operated by the narcotics courier working for UM8364. On the same date, 17 investigators acquired the vehicle information. 18 h. On June 25, 2014, investigators conducted a follow up with Motel 6 off the 19 210 and the 215 freeways pursuant to information obtained from wire communications which 20 indicated that #5545?? was to acquire narcotics at that location. Investigators identi?ed 21 ewe-?Tee. through information provided to Motel 6 staff and subsequently conducted a drive 22 by of the listed address to acquire additional information. 23 i. In June and July of 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on 24 ans..- ii'n the county of Riverside off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order to refresh 25 information used in furtherance of a Riverside County search warrant for his residence and 26 associated locations. On July 1, 2014, investigators observed a vehicle enter ram?? .1 residence, 27 and deliver two 5 gallon bails. On the same date, intercepted communication indicated that 28 was in possession of narcotics. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15 -1 08 Page 37 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 205 of 247 PageID 306 j. On July 2, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on in 2 the vicinity of Bundy Canyon between the 15 and 215 ?eeways pursuant to information obtained 3 from wire communications which indicated that was to acquire narcotics from an 4 unidenti?ed third party. On the same date, investigators observed a Hispanic male operating a red 5 Mercedes enter the residence. Shortly thereafter, investigators executed a Riverside 6 County search warrant on three locations associated with 7 k. On July 15, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the vicinity of 8 Riverside, California on Investigators ultimately seized 9 approximately 40 pounds of marijuana. 10 1. On July 17, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of j?gaq? 1 1 12 as identi?ed by Global Positioning System (GPS) pings of Target "alibi-Z"- authorized 13 by Riverside County Wire Intercept as well as in the vicinity of the K?mart/ Dearden?s 1?4 parking lot located off Whittier Blvd., and S. Gerhart Avenue, Los Angeles, California. At the 15 residence was a black lifted Yukon consistent with intercepted communications during which 15 PACAS states that he drives a ?black lift Yukon?. At approximately 4:15 pm, surveillance units of 17 CAL-MET observed a black Expedition in the K?Mart/Dearden?s lot bearing California plate 18 4EUG401 (Target Vehicle 1) operated by an unidenti?ed Hispanic male in the vicinity. 19 Surveillance units maintained constant surveillance of Shortly thereafter, surveillance units 20 observed an unidenti?ed Hispanic male arrive in a pedal bicycle approach the vehicle, meet 21 with Open the trunk space of and look into the rear trunk space of Shortly 22 thereafter, entered the driver seat ?of and leaves the K?Mart/Dearden?s lot. Surveillance 23 units maintained observations on and followed Wit] to issue's Los Angeles, 24 California, the primal-y residence of armed consistent with intercepted 25 which indicated that game's? '3 was to take possession of HIRE-Dachau- 'f vehicle to load it with narcotics. 25 Shortly thereafter, surveillance units observed an unidenti?ed Hispanic male move a work vehicle 27 form the driveway and place into the garage of Los Angeles, 23 Galifomia. Surveillance units lost the primary load vehicle. Af?davit W'iretap Order No. 15-108 Page 38 - Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 206 of 247 PageID 307 1 m. On July 18, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in Los Angeles, 2 California pursuant to intercepted communications that was to receive a 3 narcotics shipment. On the same date, investigators seized approximately 30 pounds of 4 5 6 On the same date, 7 investigators followed a HiSpanic male driver and female passenger (identi?ed as west 8 on 4th Street from the residence in a silver Nissan Path?nder to a school. Shortly thereafter, 9 investigators continued surveillance as the vehicle continued west on 4th Street and began 10 conducting counter surveillance driving techniques. The operator of the vehicle conducted multiple 1?1 U?turns and drove into and through desolate streets to identify any follow vehicles. At that point 12 investigators pulled surveillance. Shortly thereafter, your af?ant observed and the 13 Hispanic male operator walks back to the residence ?om 7th street. Your af?ant believes that 14 and unidenti?ed male subject ditched the vehicle to avoid law enforcement. 15 o. On October 14, 2014, South West Corridor Narcotics Taskforce and DEA 16 Taskforce Group 2, conducted surveillance at the address. Your af?ant observed 17 the White Nissan Altima license plate 5UUN878 driver up to the residence and park on the street. 13 A male Hispanic exited the driver?s door and walked into the house. Your af?ant identi?ed this 19 subject as the same person who was observed at .I j. .?iresidence on 20 October 9, 2014. During the surveillance, team member utilized current electronic technology to 21 obtain the driver of the white Nissan Altima?s phone number, authorized by Riverside County 22 Superior Judge, on October 10, 2014, SW R1101020147 23 p. On October 23, 2014, investigators conduct surveillance in the vicinity of 24 Ellis and Burton Road, pursuant to GPS pings of TT #32 in order to con?rm the user of TT #32 as 25 CARILLO (TS On the same date, investigators observed an Arcadia bearing California plate 26 7CPL313 leave the target residence and proceed west on 4th street. Investigators followed the 27 vehicle to a Subway restaurant located off 4th Street and Wilkerson Ave, Penis, California. 23 Investigators G. Rohn of conducted foot surveillance and observed CARILLO (TS Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 39 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 207 of 247 PageID 308 inside the Subway restaurant, consistent with GPS results on TT #32. At that point surveillance was terminated. q. On February 10, 2105, investigators conducted surveillance in Ferris, California in an attempt to identify the user of nvestigators have GPS surveillance on the aforementioned phone and are working to identify the user. Surveillance was terminated after an extended period of time and the phone could not be located. 57. Surveillance operations have been successful to the extent they have established persons and/or vehicles arriving at, and/or departing from principal locations; and extended the scepe of the investigation to additional locations and co-conspirators. However, surveillance operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of operation and the manner in which their operation is conducted. 58. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co- conspirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suspected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an investigative technique that is used to con?rm meetings and other suspected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 59. Your af?ant knows from training and experience, and from speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic traf?cking organizations is limited to placing individuals together without knowing the signi?cance of their meeting or the role of each traf?cker. Furthermore, based on my training and experience, surveillance of major narcotics traf?ckers is often dif?cult without detection. Physical surveillance is often limited to watching suspects from a distance, which as an investigative technique, can be problematic. Your af?ant believes that excess random surveillance of a location without knowledge Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 40 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 208 of 247 PageID 309 when a narcotics transaction will be taking place, could expose the identity of the of?cers and thereby compromise the investigation. Even if blanket, twenty-four hour surveillance were feasible, it would still be limited to providing information only on the movements and whereabouts of the Target Subject(s). If the Target Subject(s) suSpected he was being watched by law enforcement personnel, he could abandon his phone and move his activities to a different location, thus effectively ending the current on-going investigation until he was located again. A wire intercept would greatly assist the agents because they could be deployed more effectively knowing about a future narcotics transaction. This would allow surveillance to be set up on strategic locations, thereby lessening the risk of compromising the investigation. 60. Furthermore, your af?ant knows from past investigations that narcotics traf?ckers use various counter-surveillance driving techniques. ?nese techniques include frequent u-turns, stOpping in parking lots to observe traf?c, waiting at traf?c lights to allow traf?c to pass, Speed variations, and taking circuitous routes through residential neighborhoods. All of these methods are used for the sole purpose of determining the presence of law enforcement personnel. These methods are frequently successful, as it is extremely dif?cult to follow suspects who employ these methods without being detected. Once detected, these suspects usually abandon their activities, which mean they may shut down their cellular phones, pagers, and other phones, and ?ee the jurisdiction or area only to resurface at another unknown location at a later date. 61. When physical surveillance is combined with interception of wire communications, the purpose of meetings can be revealed and may constitute admissible evidence if the meetings relate to an intercepted conversation of criminal behavior. 62. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the opportunities for detection by the Target Subj ect(s). If surveillance were to be detected, I believe the traf?ckers? perpetual suSpicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations would in their minds be con?rmed. The subjects would not only likely ?ee the area, they would also engage in wholesale abandonment of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-408 Page 41 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 209 of 247 PageID 310 1 place. This selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help 2 maintain the integrity of the investigation. 3 63. Based on the above-stated facts and on my training and experience, your af?ant 4 does not believe that surveillance of the above-referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target 5 Telephone, will enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 6 7 SEARCH WARRAN TS 8 64. On 01-22- 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #0122141? for a target 9 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. 10 65. On 02-25-2014, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target 11 telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge irma Poole Asberry. 12 66. On (12-27?2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #02271412 for a target telephone 13 utilized by members of the 14 67. On 03414014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03111409 for multiple target 15 telephone utilized by members of the 3i:- 16 68. On 03-19-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03191403 for multiple target 17 telephone utilized by members of the 3 13 69. On 03-26- 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant #03261411 for a target 19 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation. 20 '70. On July 1, 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant for two 21 target telephones associated with this ongoing investigation. 22 71. On July 2, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Of?ce, Southwest Corridor Narcotics 23 Task Force, investigators acquired a Riverside County Search warrant of for 24 Wildomar, California and "heaven Wildomar, California. Investigators 25 seized approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine, small amounts of heroin and 4 pounds of 25 marijuana. In addition to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. 27 72. On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca write and signed search warrant 23 for Target Telephone #25 utilized by i ij_ 5- g: Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15?108 Page 42 Case Ln.th Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 210 of 247 PageID 311 73. On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Los Angeles County search warrant -I.- . -. for the primary residence of later identi?ed as - i- hematite - 51-} Los Angeles, California. 1: 74. On August 13, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Los Angeles County search warrant for the Primary residence Angeles, California. This search was a follow up search based on information that developed through intercepted communications. 75. On December 3, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Of?ce, Southwest Corridor Narcotics Task Force, investigators acquired a Riverside County Search warrant for Ferris, California. Investigators seized 1.5.5. . 3509497543 . . Nuevo, California and approximately 60 pounds of marijuana, 5 grams of methamphetamine and 5 firearms. 76. On February 11, 2015, Riverside County Sheriff's Of?ce, Southwest Corridor Narcotics Task Force investigators acquired a Riverside County Search Warrant for Penis, California. Investigators seized approximately 1 pound of methamphetamine, one (1) ?rearm and arrested one subject. 77. There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. That danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search Warrants after carefully weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall investigation. Generally, it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 78. DEA investigators will prepare af?davits to search the principal locations involved in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on- going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an intermediate quantity of narcotics and/or controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 43 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 211 of 247 PageID 312 members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances andXor illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large- scale narcotic traf?ckers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics andfor controlled substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 79. Your ai?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total scope of the illegal operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug traf?cking organization, the organizational structure, the full scepe of the narcotics conspiracy, the locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware that higher-level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics and/or controlled substances at their residences. Although surveillance has identi?ed residence(s), your af?ant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their horne(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stash? locations, without intercepted wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized, those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amounts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far less probative value by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conspirators, which g've full meaning to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 44 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 212 of 247 PageID 313 existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 80. The analysis of data derived ?'orn the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been help?il in determining patterns, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls between telephones, su3pects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your affiant knows from experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation ?om law enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived from the pen register and telephone tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for success?rl prosecution, especially in light of the familial structuring of this organization. Speci?cally, the details of the involvement of the participants, and the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before successful surveillance operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. 81. Based on the above, your af?ant believes that pen registers, toll analysis, and subscriber information, without the aid of a wire intercept, will not help your af?ant achieve the objectives of the investigation. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 82. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that people who are entering or leaving the location. It is your af?ant?s opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuals entering and exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement within the organization, if any. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 45 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 213 of 247 PageID 314 TRASH SEARCHES 0F TARGET LOCATIONS 83. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subj ect(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high-level narcotics traf?ckers and their associates go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to dispose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me that narcotic traf?ckers will often carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it wouid be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in ?-ont of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the search would draw suspicion on the law enforcement of?cers. A trash search would surely draw the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subject(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the government?s objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor, without identifying themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash search. Even if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained from the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full sc0pe of the conspiracy. 84. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul-de-sacs. They would be conSpicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be spotted. At this time, your af?ant feels that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. 85. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15408 Page 46 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 214 of 247 PageID 315 conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects were to observe and disclose to the Target Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already su3picious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co-conspirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 86. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traf?ckers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and frequently will not use their residential trash containers to disPose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. 87. I ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would be suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co-conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 88. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCML INVESTIGATION 89. Even if investigators are able to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-4 08 Page 47 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 215 of 247 PageID 316 members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and, often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers ??equently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail and that the majority of the proceeds is transported in bulk via passenger vehicles. During the course of this investigation, investigators have seized bulk currency transported din passenger vehicles. Additionally, DEA HIDTA of Los Angeles, seized buik currency from passenger vehicie that can be attributed to his DTO. it should be noted, that the DTO has been using traditional banking methods to deposit US Currency below the currency transaction report threshold. In this coordinated effort, DEA Kentucky is working on Grand Jury subpoenas on the accounts identi?ed during the course of their investigation. Additionally, DEA Riverside has identi?ed 10 accounts used by CARILLO to structure proceeds. Investigators intend on submitting Grand Jury subpoenas for these accounts to determine if any assets can be seized. GRAND JURY 90. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal suspects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would c00perate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the targets of this investigation. 91. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be success?il in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 48 Case pDocument 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 216 of 247 PageID 317 other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his amendment privilege; (2) it would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conspirators, when they are identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. XI. CONCLUSION 92. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I believe that the Target Subjects have committed, are committing and are about to commit the aforementioned crimes and that particular communications of the Target Subj ect(s) over the target telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied for herein. 93. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. However, it is your affrant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electronic communications over the Target Telephone and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your affrant to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 94. For reasons set out in this af?davit, it is your af?ant?s opinion that the only reasonable and effective way to deveIOp the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the person(s) involved in this conspiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested herein. 95. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15~108 Page 49 Case .tsmto Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 217 of 247 PageID 318 (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order: a. Authorize the installation and/or use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, all wireless digital ?inctions, wireless analog functions, direct connectfdigital diSpatch/direct dispatch ?mctions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in the Riverside County area. (See United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 U.S. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and abetted States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. c. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace Direct Connect/DisPatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. d. Authorize the installation and/or use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller and any calling features such as ?call forwarding? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel and Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services said company provides the people whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying subscribers and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through this intercept/pen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 50 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 218 of 247 PageID 319 limited to past telephone bills and records. 96. Your af?ant requests the Court order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order, within 48 hours (including after-business hours, weekends, and holidays), and without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging device(s), teiephone(s), caliing card(s), and other communication device(s) contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary number/account, billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co?signer information, contact address(es) and telephone number(s), and all information identifying the communication deviee(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits ?'om any and all telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation. c. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, and/or GPS location information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 51 Case thb?b.) @00le Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 219 of 247 PageID 320 2703 (D). d. Provide any and all cell site data, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of any and all cellular telephones, which called each Target Telephone, which was called by each Target Telephone, which was identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or which was otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703 (D). e. Provide access and the access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. f. Provide all information related to pre?paid cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, including historicai, past, present, current, and on?going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre-paid telephone account. 97. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) to continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, your a?iant requests that if the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, the Telecommunication Companies be ordered to not disclose to the Target Subj ect(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, the Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the court?s order. 98. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the order has authorized this Wire interception, or of its existence. 99. Your af?ant requests the Court to authorize law enforcement of?cers use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify the target telephone(s). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 52 Case U142:Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 220 of 247 PageID 321 100. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to execute such intercept order. 101. Your af?ant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Application, its affidavit, and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 102. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at We? Special Agent Emilio J. Baca Drug Enforcement Administration Riverside, California. Dated: February ,2015 Sworn to and subscribed before me on February I 2015. We HONORABLE HELIOS .HERNANDEZ COUNTY OF RIVER DE STATE OF CALIFO 1A Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 53 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 221 of 247 PageID 322 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 Fax: (951) 955-9673 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP No. 15?108 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION 0F ORDER (SEALED) Target Telephone #38 Target Telephone #39 502-609-5937 Target Telephone #40 Ream-?750 3 TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AS PROVIDED IN PENAL CODE SECTIONS 629.50 et seq. and ORDER AUTHORIZING THE OF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA Michael A. Hestrin, the District Attorney for the County of Riverside, State of California, has made application to this court pursuant to Penal Code Sections 629.50 et seq. requesting authorization to intercept communications to and from certain telephones described below (hereinafter the Target Telephone(s). The Application was accompanied by the A?davit of Special Agent Emilio Baca of the Riverside Drug Enforcement Administration, and the review of Special Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, who is the designee Chief Executive O?iccr of the Drug Enforcement Administration. This Court has read and considered each of those documents, referred to hereinafter as the "Application." IT APPEARING TO THIS COURT: (1) There is probable cause to believe that the individuals identi?ed and/or referred to in 1 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 222 of 247 PageID 323 the Application as Target Subject and their associates, and other co-conspirators (the ?Target Subjects?) have committed, are committing and are about to commit offenses involving importation, possession for sale, transportation, sale of a controlled substance and possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11378, 11379, 11370.6 and a Conspiracy to commit said crimes in violation of Penal Code section 182, with respect to a substance 00nt cocaine Where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten gallons by liquid volume. (Penal Code Section (2) crimes (the illegal activities) will be obtained through this interception. (Penal Code Section There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning said (3) the communications are to be intercepted, are being used, or are about to be used, in connection There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the place where with the commission of said offenses, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the persons whose communications are about to be intercepted, and is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. (Penal Code Section (4) unlikely to succeed if tried and/or are too dangerous. (Penal Code Section Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed and appear to be IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1) communication devices described below (the ?Target Telephones?), including the installation and Interception of the wire, pager and electronic communications to and from the use of pen registers, dialed number recorders, text messages, digital photographic images, electronic mail ?e-mail?) communications, push-to talk communications, and trap-and-trace devices on the Target Telephones, is hereby authorized. (2) Authorization to intercept communications occurring outside of Riverside County is hereby The actual interception and listening post shall be in Riverside County. granted. This authorization extends to communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in Riverside County. (See 2 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-103 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 223 of 247 PageID 324 1 United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992)) 2 (3) Properly trained investigators and monitors working with the Riverside County 3 Sheriff?s Department Drug Enforcement Administration Southwest Narcotics Corridor Task 4 Force are authorized to intercept the of the Target Subjects concerning the above- 5 described offenses to and ?our the Target Telephone(s) for a period of thirty days (Penal Code Sections 629.54(a) and The Target Telephone(s) are described as followsTelep 4: 52) 609-590 40 lular be ing 16 utilized by ChristOpher MATTINGLY (TS and subscribed to ChristOpher 17 MATTINGLY at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being ?3 utilized by MATTINGLY. 19 (4) The term ?Target Telephone? also refers to any changed telephone number 20 assigned to the same IMSI or SIN or MIN or ESN, or UFMI or MSID with the same subscriber 21 information, and/or any changed IMSI or SIN or MIN or ESN, or UFMI or MSID assigned to 22 the same telephone number with the same subscriber information, and/or any changed subscriber 23 information with the same IMSI or SIN or MIN or ESN, or UFMI or M313) and the same 24 telephone number. 25 (5) That the particular types of communications authorized to be intercepted are Wire 26 and electronic communications concerning the commission of said offenses. (Penal Code Section 27 28 3 Court Order? Wiretap Order No. 15-108 1 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 224 of 247 PageID 325 (6) to intercept the communications. (Penal Code Section (7) for this interception. (Penal Code Section (8) the described communication has been ?rst obtained because the Af?davit describes the ongoing That the United States Drug Enforcement Administration is the agency authorized That the District Attorney of Riverside County, State of California, is the applicant That this Order is valid for thirty days and shall not automatically terminate when nature of the illegal activities. (Penal Code Section (9) as to minimize the interception of not otherwise subject to interception, and shall The intercept shall be executed as soon as practical, shall be executed in such a way terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event, no longer than 30 days from the date of this Order, unless an extension is granted. (Penal Code Section 629.58) In the event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization may be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception. (10) Wireless, Virgin Mobile, Wireless Services, Broadband, Conexone That Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Mobile USA, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless, Nextel, Nextel Communications, Sprint-Nextel, Sprint PCS, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Sprint Long Distance, U.S. Sprint, Paci?c Bell Telephone Company, Paci?c Telesis Group, Paci?c Bell Wireless, Cingular Wireless, Cingular Wireless West Coast, SBC, General Telephone Company, Allegiance Telecom, Verizon California Inc, Verizon New York, Verizon West Coast Inc, Verizon, Verizon Wireless, Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, Qwest, Qwest Wireless, Qwest Corporation, US. West, WorldCom, WorldCom Wireless, MCI, MCI WorldCom, In Touch Communications, Cellular One, U.S. Telepaci?c Communications, MPower Communications, Time Warner Telecom, Optel Telecom, GST Telecom Inc, X0, X0 California Inc, PacWest Telecomm, Inc, d.b.a. Connect Communications Corporation, BellSouth, Cox, Cox Communications Inc, d.b.a. Cox California Telecom Inc, Citizens Communications, Continental Cablevision, Northwestern Bell, Evans 4 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 225 of 247 PageID 326 {Jr-th KDOOMON Telephone Company, Central Wireless Partnership, Arch Wireless, TSR Wireless, Airstar Paging, Winstar Telecommunications, Network Services LLC, Tri State Radio Paging Inc, PageNet, PageMart, Southwest Paging, AirTouch Paging, Metrocall, Weblink Wireless, Mobile, Boost Mobile, and any other telephone, long distance, calling card, paging, cellular, wireless or other telecommunication service providers (hereinafter referred to as the Telecommunication Companies) shall, upon oral or written request of law enforcement, provide technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services which said companies are providing to the people whose communications are to be intercepted and shall provide caller identi?cation where possible. (11) enforcement under this Order, which complies with Section 2703 of Title 18 of the United States That the Telecommunications Companies, upon oral or written request of law Code, shall, within 48 hours (including after-business hours, weekends, and holidays), without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging devices, cellular/wireless telephones, calling cards, and other communication devices contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s) and, the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary number/account, service and billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone number(s), call identi?cation information whether published or non-published, Global Positioning System (GPS) data and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number, universal ?eet mobile identi?er (UF MI), and any and all keys/codes or other identi?er. b. Provide toll information, including any and all historical data for any period requested by law enforcement within 48 hours of the request, call detail, including Direct Connect Push-to-Talk information, call records, originating and tenninating call detail, Global Positioning 5 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 226 of 247 PageID 327 System (GPS) information, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones calling to or being called by each Target Telephone number. c. Provide cell site data including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, Global Positioning System (GPS) data, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone number and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, pursuant to Title 18 USC Section d. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment known as dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to each Target Telephone number. e. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of caller identi?cation feature, ?caller any calling features such as ?call-forwarding? and "speed dialing? currently assigned to the primary telephone numbers, and that the tracing operation: and the use of the caller ID service be without geographical limits. f. Provide access and access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. g. Authorize the installation and/or use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), and that law enforcement be provided all access necessary to install the necessary equipment required to implement such interception, including but not limited to, all Wireless digital functions, Wireless analog functions, push-to-talk/direct connect/digital dispatch functions, voice over IP communications, automatic mode svvitching functions, ?short message service,? text messages, packet data services, and instant messages. This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in Riverside County. (See United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992)) 6 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 227 of 247 PageID 328 h. Provide all information related to pre-paid cellular telephones including historical, past, present, current, and on?going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre-paid telephone account. i. Provide pass codes, user ID, passwords, access codes, user names and identify any other features speci?c to the Target Telephone(s) with GPS capabilities. j. Upon request of law enforcement, provide any and all geographic location information at call origination (for outbound calls), call termination (for incoming calls), and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking andfor pinging data during the progress of a call, on an ongoing andXor real time basis, for the Target Telephone(s) as well as any and all telephones calling into or being called by each Target Telephone number. k. Provide all published and non?published subscriber information, including Buddy List information and subscriber information pertaining to the Buddy List, as well as pass codes, user ID, passwords, access codes, and usernames, and identify any other features speci?c to any and all telephones calling into or being called by each Target Telephone number, within two business days of each request submitted during the term of this Order, pursuant to Title 18, use Sections 2703 (C) and 1. Provide an itemized bill to the law enforcement agency for services . rendered for the implementation of this Order. rn. Upon oral or written request of a law enforcement of?cer acting under . this Order, provide within 24 hours, orally, by facsimile, or by electronic mail, the most recent unbilled call traf?c (including date, time and duration) and the latest ISMI transaction for the Target Telephone and! or any telephone in contact with the Target Telephone. n. Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin Mobile, T-Mobile, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) shall continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, the Telecommunication Companies shall continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid 7 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Am Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 228 of 247 PageID 329 balances. The Telecommunication Companies are ordered to not disclose to the Target Subject(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, the Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the Court Order for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the Court?s Order. (12) States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is authorized to assist with the delivery of call Where applicable, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and/or the United content and data between the Telecommunications Companies and the listening post in Riverside County. (13) interception showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective, That there shall be written reports to this court for every ten?day period during the or a satisfactory explanation for a lack thereof and the need for continued interception; each ten-day report is to be completed and presented to this Court at the earliest possible time from the end of each ten-day period, or as this Court ?lrther directs. (Penal Code Section 629.60) (14) That the Telecommunications Companies shall not disclose to the subscriber or any other unauthorized person any information regarding this interception, or the fact that it exists, unless audiorized by further written Order of this Court or of another court of competent jurisdiction. (15) This Application, Review, Af?davit, Order(s) and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, and/or exhibits shall be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (1 6) Pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.64, the Court Copy of the analog tape recordings shall be sealed on a daily basis and presented to this Court upon expiration of this Order or any extensions thereof. If, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.64, the recordings are made on a 8 Court Order -- Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case 4b. Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 229 of 247 PageID 330 digital Optical disk or other digital recording media, that recording media shall be presented to this Court upon expiration of this Order or any extensions thereof. (17) pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.68 can be prepared. Such an inventory shall be sent to the The agency executing this Order shall maintain records so that an inventory following classes of individuals: (1) persons named in the Order or the Application; (2) known parties to intercepted communications; (3) persons for whom telephone subscriber information has been obtained as the result of the telephone being used in an intercepted conversation; (4) persons identi?ed as the result of surveillance based on intercepted conversations; (5) persons arrested as a result of intercepted conversations. (13) previous paragraph who are identi?ed during this wiretap and provide the Asset Forfeiture Division The agency executing this Order shall maintain a list of all persons described in the of the District Attorney?s Of?ce with said list upon the conclusion of the wiretap. (19) including the arrest of any individuals, whenever information derived ?om the wiretap is The agency executing this Order shall determine the result of an investigation, communicated to another law enforcement agency or to another investigative team. (20) The agency executing this Order shall maintain a list of all persons arrested during this wiretap and provide the Asset Forfeiture Division of the District Attomey?s Of?ce with said list upon the conclusion of this wiretap. (21) for authorization to use the contents of intercepted communications and evidence derived there The agency executing this Order may make an application in the Six-day Reports from, for crimes not speci?ed in the wiretap interception Order, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.82. 9 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 230 Of 247 PageID 331 (22) Pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.61, the agency executing this Order shall report 2 to the Attorney General, within 10 days after the Order was issued, the persons, facilities, and 3 places that are to be intercepted pursuant to this Order. 4 (23) This Application, Review, Af?davit, Order(s) and any/all incorporated 5 documents, attachments, and/or exhibits shall be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency 6 executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a 7 . 8 showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) 9 IT IS SO ORDEREDDALE: rebruary ,2013 12 13 TIME: i 34PM. HONORABLE HELIOS J. HERNANDEZ 14 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 10 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Document 27?1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 231 of 247 PageID 332 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN District Attorney County of Riverside Deena Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange Street Riverside, CA 92501 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 95 5-9673 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 15-108 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE SEALING OF DOCUMENTS AND OPTICAL DISK ACQUIRED DURING THE THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE COMMUNICATIONS 1. On February 19, 2015, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 et.seq., this Court SEALING ORDER \vavv signed Riverside County Wiretap Order No. 15-108, authorizing the interception of wire and REDACTED electronic communications to and from cellular telephone number TT #38: #39: and TT #40: 502-609-5937, for a period of 30 (thirty) days. Interception was terminated for TT #38-40 on March 20, 2015. 2. On March 27, 2015, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Taskforce Of?cer (T F0) Amado Layos presented the original signed Wiretap Application Packet (to include the Application, Af?davit, CEO Letter, Minimizations, Court Order(s), and 10 Day Reports, Sealing Order) contained in one book for Riverside County Wiretap Order No. 15?108 and associated compact discs containing audio calls and SMS text messages. 3. TFO Layos shall place the original Wiretap Application Packet for the above named Target Telephones, the compact discs and the original signed Sealing Order into one (1) large evidence envelope. 4. The envelope shall be sealed in the presence of the Honorable Judge Becky L. Dugan. TFO Layos shall place the envelope into evidence with the Drug Enforcement Administration Non?Drug Evidence Custodian. Case I p-a CD Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 232 of 247 PageID 333 5. The Drug Enforcement Administration shall maintain custody of the envelope in a sealed condition for a period of 10 years, pursuant to Penal Code sections 629.64 and 629.66. 8. Total number of calls recorded for the authorized interception periods covering the Original Application for Target Telephone #Total number of calls recorded for the authorized interception periods covering the Original Application for Target Telephone #39 is: REDACTED 10. Total number of calls recorded for the authorized interception periods covering the Original Application for Target Telephone #40 is: A. Total number of calls: 3,393 B. Total number of voice calls: 2,721 C. Total number of pertinent calls: 225 Case I Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 233 of 247 PageID 334 1 D. Total number of minimized calls: 248 2 E. Total number of privileged calls: 1 1 3 F. Total number of SMS Text messages: 670 4 G. Total number of pertinent SMS Text Messages: 227 5 H. Total number of minimized SMS Text messages: 0 6 7 11. I certify, under penalty of perjury and the laws of the State of California, that the 8 above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed in Riverside County, California. 9 10 Dated: 3,27,1?8 Taskfo Of?c ado Layos 12 Drug forcem Administration Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 234 of 247 PageID 335 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. TFO Layos shall place the original Wiretap 15-108 audio recordings into one (1) envelope, along with the original Wiretap 15-108 Af?davit, Application, CEO Letter, Minimizations, Court Order(s), 10 Day Reports and signed Sealing Order, for sealing. 2. The enve10pe(s) shall be sealed in the presence of the Honorable Judge Becky L. Dugan. 3. TFO Layos shall cause the envelope(s) to be booked into evidence at the evidence room. 4. The Law Enforcement Agency shall maintain custody of the envelope(s) in a sealed condition for a period of 10 years pursuant to Penal Code Sections 629.64 and 629.66. Honorable Judge Becky L. Dugan Riverside County Superior Court DATED: March lb ,2015 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 235 of 247 PageID 336 NM MICHAEL A. HESTRIN District Attorney County of Riverside Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange Street Riverside, CA 92501 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 955-9673 State Bar No. 165447 SUPERIOR COURT DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNLA FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF WIRETAPS DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF UNSEALING WIRETAP #14-120, UNAVAILABILITY BY THE #14-120 EXTENSION 1, #14-183, #14?558, DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND #15-08 AUTHORIZATION OF DESIGNEE H, DECLARATION OF DEENA M. BENNETT, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY: I, DEENA BENNETT do hereby declare: 1. I am licensed to practice law in the State of California and am employed by the Riverside County District Attorney?s Of?ce. I have been with this of?ce since September 1993. I am currently assigned to the Asset Forfeiture Unit and I am the Deputy District Attorney assigned to handle all wiretaps within the County of Riverside. I have held this assignment since February 2011. My of?ce location is the Western Division which is located in the City of Riverside. 2. Paul E. Zellerbach was sworn in as the District Attorney of the County of Riverside in January 2011. He was the elected of?cial for four years through December 2014. Mr. Zellerbach lost his bid for a second term to Michael A. Hestrin, and Mr. Hestrin was sworn in as the District Attorney on January 5, 2015. 3. During his tenure in of?ce, and pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section District Attorney Paul E. Zellerbach named his second in command as his primary designee. On February 16, 2011, Mr. Zellerbach issued an of?ce memorandum indicating that Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 236 of 247 PageID 337 Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Jeffrey A. Van Wagenen would be the primary designee. (See Attachment A.) 5. On January 2, 2014, District Attorney Paul E. Zellerbach issued a new designation memorandum in accordance with current case law. The designation memorandum authorized ADA Jeffrey A. Van Wagenen ?to make all decisions necessary to the administration of the District Attorney?s Office.? (See Attachment B.) 6. Following the 2014 election and prior to the sweating in of District Attorney-Elect Michael A. Hesuin, ADA Van Wagenen left employment at the District Attorney?s Of?ce. Upon ADA Van Wagenen?s departure in October 2014, and pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 629.50, District Attorney Zellerbach issued a designation letter, addressed to the Riverside County Superior Court, authorizing Assistant District Attorney Creg G. Datig, his second in command, to act as his primary designee. (See Attachment C.) 7. At all time, all involved judicial of?cers who reviewed and authorized the wiretap applications were personally informed of all designees and any changes to the Penal Code section 629.50 designation by the District Attorney. 8. On January 5, 2015, Michael A. Hestrin was sworn in as the Riverside County District Attorney. Following a change in personnel, Michael A. Hestrin issued a designation letter, addressed to the Riverside County Superior Court, indicating that pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 629.50, Chief Assistant District Attorney (CADA) John Aki, his second in command, would be the primary designee. (See Attachment D.) 9. The Riverside County District Attorney?s Of?ce received a request ?'om Assistant United States Attorney ?'om the Western District of Kentucky regarding the following wiretap applications: 14?120 Signed by ef?'ey A. Van Wagenen on 03/1 1/2014 14-120 Ext. 1 Signed by Jef?'ey A. Van Wagenen on 04/08/2014 14?183 Signed by ef?'ey A. Van Wagenen on 04/08/2014 14-658 Signed by Greg Datig on 10/27/2014 15-108 Signed by John Aki on 02/19/2015 10. All of these wiretap af?davits were reviewed by the authorized designee of the District Attorney. The applications were subsequently signed by the designee and the af?davits Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 237 of 247 PageID 338 Mmmn?Ai?sa?an?Ir?uu?IHMI?IH were presented to the court. 1 1. District Attorney Hestrin took of?ce on January 2015. District Attorney Hestrin immediately changed a number of the policies, practices and procedures in the administration of the of?ce, including wiretaps. 12. On February 19, 2015, when Chief Assistant District Attorney John Aki reviewed and signed wiretap #154 08, District Attorney Hestrin was unavailable. His calendar indicates that he was in the Eastern Division of the County and not physically present in the Western end of the county. 13. Riverside County is the 3rd largest county in the state of California and 10th largest in the nation. Riverside County extends from its Western end, which begins at the borders of Orange and San Bernardino Counties, to its Eastern end at the Arizona border. Riverside County?s southern border reaches to San Diego County. The District Attorney?s Of?ce is divided into three divisions: Western, Seuthwest/Mid?County, and Eastern. 14. Geographically, the Eastern Division?s main of?ce in the City of Indie is located approximately 146 miles ?'orn the Western Division?s main of?ce in the City of Riverside. The designated judicial of?cer who authorizes and signs wiretap orders is physically located in the Western end of the county, in the City of Riverside. 15. Pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 629.50, Chief Assistant District Attorney John Aki reviewed wiretap #15-108 because District Attorney Hestrin was not available to review and sign the wiretap. District Attorney Hestrin was not physically present in the Western Division?s main of?ce in Riverside for the entire day, nor was he in the Western end of the County. District Attorney Hestrin?s calendar re?ects that he was in the Indie of?ce in the morning hours for scheduled meetings. In the afternoon, he was outside the Indie of?ce but remained in the Eastern end of the County to attend a meeting with another County agency. Given that District Attorney Hestrin was not present in the Western end of the County where wiretap applications are processed and signed, and was instead over two hours away in Indie, District Attorney Hestrin was unavailable to personally review the af?davit and sign the application. Given this unavailability, the Chief Assistant District Attorney reviewed the af?davit Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 238 of 247 PageID 339 1 and signed the application. 2 16. In 2014, regarding wiretaps #14?120, #14420 Extension 1, #14?183, and #14-558, 3 pursuant to the protocol created by District Attorney Paul E. Zellerbach, following the preparation 4 of the wiretap paperwork, all wiretap af?davits and applications were submitted directly to the 5 Assistant District Attorney of the Administrative Division Jeffery A. Van Wagenen. After 5 Assistant District Attorney Van Wagenen left the of?ce in October of 2014, all wiretap af?davits 7 and applications were submitted directly to ADA Creg G. Datig. In his letter dated October 14, 3 2014, Paul E. Zellerbach designated Assistant District Attorney Creg G. Datig as the designee 9 pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 (See Attachment C.) 10 17. Mr. Zellerbach, Mr. Van Wagenen and Mr. Datig have since departed the of?ce. This 1 1 declaration is based on my own recollection of the events. Mr. Zellerbach did not keep records or 12 a calendar that consistently, regularly, or accurately, re?ected his day~to~day business. 13 I certify under penalty of peljury and the laws of the State of California, that the above is 14 true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed in Riverside County, California. 15 Dated: January 2016 Depu istn Atto Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 239 of 247 PageID 340 ATTACHMENT A Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 240 of 247 PageID 341 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PAUL E. ZELLERBACH ATTORNEY DISTRICT ATTORNEY DESIGNEE (RC. Section 629.50) February 16, 201 1 TO: Asset Forfeiture.? Wiretap Staff FROM: Paul E. Zellerbach, District Attorney SUBJECT: District Attorney Designee authorized to Sign wiretap applications pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50. Effective February 16, 2011, Assistant District Attorney Jeffrey A. Van Wagenen Jr. is my Designee pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.50. In his absence, Assistant District Attorney Cregor Datig will be my designee. My designee is authon?zed to act in my place pursuant to the provisions outlined in Penal Code Section 629.50 and Sign all applications relating to wiretaps. 3960 ORANGE STREET ORNERSIDE. CA 92501 951-955-5400 Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 241 of 247 PageID 342 ATTACHMENT Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 242 of 247 PageID 343 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE MEMORANDUM PAUL E. DISTRICT January 2, 2014 TO: Wiretap Stal?l? FROM: Paul Zeilcrbach SUBJECT: Designation Pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 In my absence, Assistant District Attorney .lel?l?rey A. Van is in}: designee and is authorized to make all decisions necessary to the administration ol'the District Attorney?s Of?ce. Ifhe is unavailable, Assistant District Attorney C?reg G. Datig is authorized to act on behaifof the District Attorney?s Of?ce. The above authorization was ?rst made on February 16, 201 l, and shall continue until amended, altered, or revoked, in writing by me. If any questions or concerns arise with respect to wiretap authorization and/or protocol, please feel free to contact me. Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 243 of 247 PageID 344 ATTACHME Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 244 of 247 PageID 345 DE STR 1 Tl? ATTO RN- EY r" Kiln". 3-53. it?: n" October E4. 2014 Honorable Mark Cope Riverside ounty Superior Court 4050 Main Street Riverside. CA 92501 Dear Judge Cope: Subject: Designation Pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 In my absence. Assistant District Attorney Creg Datig is in}! dcsignee and is authorized to make all decisions necessary to the administratitm ol?the District Attorney's Of?ce. Who is unavailable. Assistant District Attorney Sean is authorized to act on behali'ot? the District Attorney's Of?ce. This authorization shall continue until amended. altered. or revoked. in writing by the District Attorney. Ii?any questions or concerns arise with respect to wiretap authorization andz?or protocol. please contact Deputy District Attorney Deena Bennett. . .- Very yours. x- 7 ?3 r" give tact; PAUL E. District Attorney cc: Judge Michele Levine Judge Helios J. I~Iernandez Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 245 of 247 PageID 346 ATTACHMENT Case Document 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 246 of 247 PageID 347 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3960 ORANGE smear RIVERSIDE. CAIJFORNIA 92501 35.13 DISTRECT PCTORNEY January 5. 2015 Presiding Judge I-Iarelcl W. llopp Riverside County Superior Court 4050 Main Street Riverside. CA 9250] Dear Presiding Judge Re: Designation Pursuant to Penal Code section {329.50 In in): absence. C'ltiel' Assistant District Attorney .leltn 2in is my designee and is authorized to make all necessary to the admmistratmn el?the District Attorney?s Ol'?ee. This authorization shall enntinue until amended. altered. or revoked. in \x'riting by the District Attornex'. It'any questions or concerns arise with respect In wiretap authorization antlr'or protocol. please contact Deputy District Attorney Deena Bennett. Sinecrel)?. . . l/ll W. I tam-K: t?vlichael A. l-iestrin Distrtet cc: Judge Beck): Dugan Judge Helios lernandez 27-1 Filed 02/16/16 Page 247 of 247 PageID 342%?) 1 OI 1 Zellerbach pleads no contest to sign tampering Colin Am i, The Desert Sun P-m- 8' 20? Former Riverside County District Attorney Paul Zellerbach pleaded no contest to vandalism charges involving election signs that beionged to his opponent in last year's district attorney campaign. Zellerbach entered his plea Wednesday in Riverside County Superior Court in Riverside. He was sentenced to one year probation and 60 hours of community service. according to the California Attorney General?s of?ce. He also must pay an $800 fine and $200 in restitution. On April 23, a security camera ?lmed Zeilerbach at an Arco gas station at 42-334 Jefferson Street in Indio. Footage showed him getting out of a county Ford Escape and planting a campaign sign before removing one that belonged to his election opponent. Mike Hestrin. (Photo: The Desert Sun) lndio police, whose Police Of?cer's Association backed Hestrin in the election. investigated the incident and requested the state attorney general's of?ce ?le charges against Zellerbach recommending two felonies and three misdemeanors. Zeilerbach pleaded no contest to one misdemeanor. "l'm proud of our staff that maintained the integrity of this investigation and followed the law. The detail of their facts and ?ndings presented a complete and comprehensive complaint ?ling to the California Attorney General?s Of?ce," said indio Police Chief Richard Twiss. in a statement. "The California Attorney General's Of?ce's determination to ?le a charge and a subsequent plea of no contest to misdemeanor vandalism validates the integrity of our criminal investigation." Zellerbach cut the county 3 $203 personal check on April 25 as reimbursement for the miles he logged in the Ford, which was used to carry around campaign signs during hours that were for of?cial business. Hestrin. a Riverside County deputy district attorney, won the November election. He was sworn in last week. Read or Share this story: 01/ 0 5779/ 2/12/2016 Case 3:15-cr-00099-DJH Document 27-2 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 349 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT LOUISVILLE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:15CR-99-DJH CHRISTOPHER MATTINGLY DEFENDANT ***** ORDER Defendant Christopher Mattingly, by counsel, having moved to suppress the wiretaps and all derived therefrom, and the Court being sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Suppress is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the wiretap evidence and any and all derived therefrom is inadmissible in the trial of this action. nailed mam Page 1 of 7 PagelD 43?age 1 of? Justice officials fear nation's biggest wiretap operation may not be legal Brad Heath and Brett Keiman. USA TODAY 5:40 pm. ES 1" November 1 1 . 2015 RIVERSIDE, Calif. Federal drug agents have built a massive wiretapping operation in the Los Angeles suburbs. secretly intercepting tens of thousands of Americans' phone calls and text messages to monitor drug traf?ckers across the United States despite objections from Justice Department lawyers who fear the practice may not be legai. Nearly all of that surveillance was authorized by a single state courtjudge in Riverside County. who last year signed off on almost ?ve times as many wiretaps as any otherjudge in the United States. The judge's orders (Photo: Virginia State Police) allowed investigators usuaily from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to intercept more than 2 million conversations involving 44,000 people, federal court records show. The eavesdropping is aimed at dismantling the drug rings that have turned Los Angeles' eastern suburbs into what the DEA says is the nation's busiest shipping corridor (istorvinewsicrime courtsi2015i1 til for heroin and methamphetamine. Riverside wiretaps are supposed to be tied to crime within the county, but investigators have relied on them to make arrests and seize shipments of cash and drugs as far away as New York and Virginia, sometimes concealing the surveillance in the process. The surveillance has raised concerns among Justice Department lawyers in Los Angeies, who have mostly refused to use the results in federal court because they have concluded the state courts eavesdropping orders are unlikely to withstand a legal chailenge, current and former Justice officials said. "It was made very clear to the agents that if you're going to go the state route, then best wishes. good luck and all that, but that case isn?t coming to federal court," a former Justice Department lawyer said. The lawyer and other of?cials described the situation on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the department's internal deliberations. Federal agents often prefer to seek permission to tap phones from state courts, instead of federal courts, because the process is generally faster and less demanding than seeking approval through the" Justice Department. In addition, California law allows them to better conceal the identities of con?dentiai informants they rely on to heip investigate drug rings. Over the past decade, drug agents have more than tripled their use of wiretaps iistorvinewsizm mostly by using state court orders. DESERT SUN i-low Riverside County become America?s drug pipeline courtsf20 i 5/1 1 liriversidc-countv- Wiretaps which allow the police to secretly monitor Americans' communications are among the most intrusive types of searches the police can conduct, and federal law imposes strict limits on when and how they can be used. The law requires that police use wiretaps only after they have run out of other tools to build a case. In Riverside, the authorities' use of that last-ditch tool quadrupled over the past four years. Last year alone, Riverside County prosecutors and a local judge approved 624 wiretaps, far more than any otherjurisdiction in the United States, according to records compiled by the federal court system. Nearly all were tied to drug investigations. 11/19/2015 Justice onteaseermmaggeemreepmmaw rlBiled [@4316/16 Page 2 of 7 PagelD 43133ge 2 0167 hthREmt?S shatter. A county court in Riverside. Caiif. authorized far more police eavesdropping than any other court in the USA. tviuch of it was sought by federai drug agents. Shown beiow are the 30 iurisdictions with the most wiretaps in the USA. i-iover or tap for detaiis Source: Administrative Office of the t5 8 Courts Credit: Brad Heath Mitch-sit Thorson use. TODAY "Those numbers the totals, and just the size of some of those wiretaps are huge red fiags for us." said Dave Maass, an investigative researcher for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "When there?s this amount of secrecy it starts to raise serious concerns about accountability for electronic interceptions." Because wiretap orders are sealed, there is no way to know precisely how many of them were sought by the DEA and the local of?cers it deputized to work on a drug task force. Some of the taps were sought by locai police of?cers and of?cers in neighboring counties. Prosecutors acknowledged, however, that the drug agency plays a leading rote in the wiretapping. The county?s former district attorney, Paui Zellerbach, who presided over the rapid rise in wiretapping there before he left of?ce in January, said the drug agency was "a significant player." Riverside County's new district attorney. Mike Hestrin. said he found out about the county's wiretap numbers not long after taking office after other prosecutors approached him to suggest he look into the matter. He was concerned by what he found. Hestrin said in an interview that he made a "series of reforms" to how wiretaps are handled, which he said will lead to fewer taps in the future. He said he personally evaluates new wiretap requests and insists that each one now must "have a strong investigative nexus" to the county. Asked if that had been the case in previous years, Hestrin replied: "You?re going to have to extrapolate that." Hestrin said prosecutors "follow the law to the letter" when seeking wiretaps, but he would not discuss the detaiis. "This is an area of our law. an area of our iaw enforcement. where we can't be totally transparent, in the same way that the federal government can't be totaliy transparent about the massive intelligence operations they run," he said. DEA officials said it shouid not come as a surprise that so much of their surveillance work happens in the area around Riverside a vast expanse of suburbs and desert east of Los Angeles. crisscrossed by freeways that have become key shipping routes for drugs moving from Mexico to the United States and for cash making the return journey. "There are organizations here and we're working these organizations and we're trying to stay abreast of the technoiogy and all the different ways these organizations are operating." said Stephen Azzarn. the associate special agent in charge of Los Angeles division. On paper. agents? choice of state court over federal should not matter: Federal law sets a minimum standard for police to obtain a wiretap. even when they are seeking one from a state-courtjudge. And California courts have Riverside County District Attorney repeatedly said the state?s wiretaps are suf?cient. Mike Hestrin said he made a "series of reforms" to how county prosecutors handle wiretaps after he took of?ce in January. (Photo: .fnv Caldamnn'hn Quin! 1/1 1 1/19/2015 Justice dotted ages/16 Page 3 0f 7 PagelD 432mg: 3 of 7 . . tsut current and tonner Justice Department ortioials said prosecutors in Los Angeles repeatedly told the drug agency that they would not accept cases based on state-court wiretaps and those from Riverside County in particular? because they believed the appiications being approved by state judges feil short of what the federal law requires. Prosecutors were particularly concerned that the DEA was seeking state-court wiretap orders without adequately showing that it had first tried other, iess intrusive, investigative techniques. "They?d want to bring these cases into the US. Attorney's Of?ce, and the feds would tell them no (expietive) way," a former Justice Department official said. The result was that even seemingly significant drug cases stayed out of federai court. In December, for example, court records show DEA agents and local detectives in South Gate, Calif. near Los Angeles, used a state~court wiretap to target a man named Omar Salazar, who the DEA suspected was tied to a Mexican drug traf?cking group. Between searches of Salazar?s car and his house, officers seized $76,869.94, a gun and a cache of iilegal drugs, including 36 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. investigators found some of the drugs in a safe in Salazar?s garage, atong with a box of ammunition and probation paperwork from one of his previous arrests. That should have been enough to build a signi?cant federal case with a long mandatory prison sentence, but that was not what happened. Court records show the Justice Department prosecuted the $76,869.94 in a civil asset seizure case But it did not prosecute Saiazar. Instead, Salazar was booked into jail and reteased the same day; his lawyer, John Passanante, said he has not been charged as a result of the search. Neither the DEA nor prosecutors would expiain why. WIRETAPPING Perhaps the only outward sign that Riverside has become America's most wiretapped place can be found on a deserted ?oor of the city?s courthouse. On a recent Friday afternoon, a handful of officers in scruffy jeans and baseball caps waited there with sealed maniia enveIOpes in their hands. After a few minutes. they disappeared inside Judge Helios Hernandez?s iocked courtroom for hearings that are closed to the public. Nojudge in the United States has been so prolific in authorizing eavesdropping. Riverside County Superior Court Judge Heiios Hernandez approved nearly ?ve times as many wiretaps last year as any otherjudge in the United States. (Photo: Brett Keiman, The Desert Sun) Records compiied by the federal courts' administrative of?ce show Hernandez authorized 624 wiretaps that ended last year, and another 339 that ended the year before. Hernandez approved three times more taps than at! of the federal judges in California combined last year, and once received more wiretap applications in a day, 17, than most courts do in a year. (The court of?ce counts wires based on when they end. rather than when they begin, to avoid revealing ongoing investigations.) The next-ciosest court was in Las Vegas, where judges approved wiretaps that ended last year. California law generally requires that each county court appoint one judge to handle wiretaps. For the past three years, that job feii to Hernandez, who was Riverside's chief narcotics prosecutor before he became a judge. The records do not indicate how many wiretaps, if any, Hernandez turned down. 1/1 1 1/19/2015 Justlce Hailed dam/16 Page 4 0f 7 PagelD #1 43?age 4 of 7 Hernandez to comment through a spokesman. Riverside County?s presiding judge, Harold Hepp, said judges do not decide how many eavesdropping applications are submitted to them; "they have to consider each one on its merits." The county's wiretap numbers are so high that even investigators who helped supervise eavesdropping there were taken aback. "This can?t be right," said Anthony Valente, who, until 2012, commanded the Iniand Crackdown Allied Task Force, which uses wiretaps to investigate drug traf?cking and gangs in Southern California. Neariy all of Riverside's wiretaps about 95% were related to drug investigations. Federal records show the taps that ended in 2014 cost more than $18 million. The records do not indicate who paid for them. Tine ?gures are based on reports that judges and prosecutors are required to submit each year to the federal courts' administrative office. The reports inciude the number of wiretaps judges authorize. and the number of communications including telephone calls, text messages and other electronic conversations that investigators intercepted. Those reports show the overwhelming majority of the more than 2 million communications investigators intercepted last year as a result of Riverside wiretaps had nothing to do with crime. Poiice are not supposed to record conversations that are not reievant to their investigations. DEA officials said that the agency conducts its wiretaps wherever their investigations lead them. Its Riverside ?eld of?ce, which covers Riverside and neighboring San Bernardino counties. was responsible for a large share of the agency's methamphetamine and heroin seizures last year; therefore, it's only natural that investigators would focus there. "We don't pick a jurisdiction. We take the enforcement action where it's warranted and where we can do it effectiveiy." DEA spokesman Timothy Massino said. Nonetheless. Hernandez approved 20 times as many wiretaps as his counterparts in San Bernardino County. DEA of?cials said they could not explain that difference. Zelierbach said Riverside's wiretaps multiplied during his tenure because prosecutors and the county?s court became more "efficient and effective" in handiing surveiliance applications and word spread throughout the law enforcement community, bringing stili more applications. Eventually, Zellerbach said. he learned the county was among the nation's wiretap ieaders. thought we were doing a hell of a iob." he said. 1/1 1 1H 9/2015 Justice dialled [mam/16 Page 5 of 7 PagelD 434)age 5 of? Zellerbach said the taps yielded signi?cant arrests and seizures. And they paid other dividends. "We liked it because in these dif?cult economic times. my budget was being cut, and that was a way to somewhat supplement funding for my of?ce," he said in an interview. Prosecutors wouid not say how much money they received. Zellerbach said the operation grew under the leadership of an aggressive new lawyer, Deena Bennett, who still heads the wiretap unit today. Bennett. a one-time contestant on the reality show Survivor, rebuffed attempts to contact her, a reporter that "the fact that you have my cellphone number is really harassment, and I?m going to report it." Former Riverside County District Attorney Paul Zellerbach presided over a rapid increase in wiretaps. (Photo: Richard Lori, The Desert Sun) WIDESPREAD ARRESTS AND SEIZURES investigators have used 2014.htmlitdocumenngZia2604221 wiretaps in Riverside to seize hundreds of pounds of drugs and millions of dollars in cash. The taps have helped agents pinpoint smuggling tunnels dug beneath the Mexican border and map the inner workings of South American traf?cking groups. But if the taps also produce arrests, they are dif?cuit to ?nd. Prosecutors seidom make use of state-court wiretaps in the federal courts around Los Angeles. And defense lawyers in Riverside said they only rarely encounter cases with disclosed wiretaps in state court. The county's pubiic defenders handle 40.000 criminai cases a year; no more than ?ve involve disclosed wiretaps, said Steve Harmon, the head of that office. Instead, court records and interviews with DEA officials and prosecutors show the drug agency has used the fruits of its Riverside wiretaps to help stOp and seize shipments of drugs and cash elsewhere in the United States. In some of those cases, agents used wiretaps to identify drug couriers. then tipped off other investigators, who were told to find their own independent evidence to conduct a search. That practice. known within the agency as "parallel construction." is now the subject of an investigation by the Justice Department?s inspector general. "That approach ends up insulating dubious police practices from any kind ofjudicial review. That's what so pernicious about it." American Civii Liberties union lawyer Nathan Wessler said. Riverside's District Attorney's Office reported approximately one arrest for every three wiretaps that concluded last year. among the iowest rates of any jurisdiction that conducted more than a handful of taps. That's a sign, Hestrin acknowiedged. that many of the wiretaps may be ieading to prosecutions in other jurisdictions. 1/1 1 1/19/2015 @hlB/ 16 Page 6 Of 7 PagelD 435page 6 of 7 mam WLM 31' (RON: 93? meme? it Warn 3! amps-?ed int/min {ma ?mum; Police seized heroin and cocaine from this truck after it was stopped in rural Virginia in 2013. The stop was based on a wiretap from Riverside, Calif. (Photo: Unites States District Court) One surfaced last year after a state trooper stopped a tractor traiier on a remote stretch of interstate highway outside Harrisonburg, Va.. ostensibly because some of the tiny LED bulbs around its cab had burned out. The trooper. Keith Miller. summoned a drug-sniffing dog. and within minutes, of?cers had pulled 32 kilograms of heroin and cocaine from compartments in the truck's cap. Federal prosecutors indicted the driver, George Covarrubaiz. on drug possession charges. Miller testi?ed during a court hearing - iater described by a prosecutor as "a high-wire act? that he had been tipped off by the DEA that the truck might be carrying drugs, but that the burnt-out tights were his "sole reason" for stopping the truck. The problem for prosecutors was that driving without those lights is not illegal in Virginia. The judge hearing the case warned that he was inciined to bar prosecutors from using the seized drugs as evidence because, if driving without the lights was legal. Milier had no valid reason to stop the truck. So seven months after Covarrubaiz was stopped and sent to jail, the Justice Department returned to court acknowledged there was more to its investigation 0859-th-52? wiretap-disclosure.htrni1. Covarrubaiz. a government iawyer wrote. had been picked up in a "wiretap investigation of a signi?cant California-based drug traf?cking organization." investigators had been monitoring his calls using a tap approved by Hernandez in Riverside County. and agents from the DEA's secretive Special Operations Division had been tracking his truck across the United States. During a 4 am. meeting at a nearby hotei. the agents directed Miller to ?nd a reason to stop the truck and search it. The agents' reports referred to the episode merely as a traffic stop because "that way they didn't have to provide the information for the directed stop later," agent Gregg Mervis later testi?ed 1321 -th-wiretap-testiomonv. html#documentip41 ia2604?l 9). Officers found 32 kilograms of "Win and ?Wine in a truck Justice Department lawyers later said they had intended to reveal the wire all along but had not done so sooner Gear Covarrubaiz had been . . . . because police had not yet locked up some of the investigation 3 key targets. in particular, Asmstant U.S. driving through rural Virginia. The search was captured on cameras Attorney Grayson Hoffman pointed to the truck's owner, Everardo Amador Sn, who he described as "a grave mum" in One ?the threat to the safety and welt-being of the people of the United States." car. (Photo: Virginia State Poiice) That's hardiy how California poiice treated Amador, though. Agents arrested him iast year on charges that he had iilegally possessed drug money a far less serious charge than the federal narcotics case his driver faced in Virginia. Ajudge freed him the next day on $5,000 baii, at the prosecutor's request. Amador's lawyer, Niicoias Estrada. calied the Justice Department's 1/1 1 1/19f2015 116B 1/1 4! Everardo Amador Sr. right, leaves court in Riverside, Calif. on Oct. 21, 2015. The Justice Department said it could not reveal a state- court wiretap because Amador posed a "grave threat," but when he was arrested, he was immediately freed on bail. (Photo: Brett Keiman. The Desert Sun) ed @516/16 Page 7 of 7 PagelD 43@age 7 of? Characterization "an exaggeration." Covarrubaiz?s lawyer, Randy Cargili. accused the Justice Department in a court ?lino of an "extraordinary strategy of doling out truth as it sees fit." in the end, US District Court Judge Michael Urbanski declared himself 0895-ohc?1 t4? "singularly unhappy with the way the government has conducted this case." And in March, the Justice Department abandoned it altogether, dismissing the charges hc-126-motion? against Covarrubaiz. Assistant US. Attorney Heather Caritontold Urbanski that prosecutors had "re? evaluated the evidence" and conctuded that "it would be best to terminate the investigation." The rest of her explanation is sealed Keiman also reports for The (Palm Springs, Calif.) Desert Sun. Contributing: Mark Harman in McLean, Va. Follow Brad Heath on Twitter at @bradheath and Brett Kelman at Read or Share this story: 11/190015 Police WWreaslbf 16/16 Page 1 0f 4 PagelD #3 437Fage of 5 Police used apparently illegal wiretaps to make hundreds of arrests Brad Heath and Brett Kclman, USA TODAY 5:03 am. 20. 20:5 RIVERSIDE, Calif. -- Prosecutors in the Los Angeles suburb responsible for a huge share of the nation?s wiretaps almost certainly violated federal law when they authorized widespread eavesdropping that police used to make more than 300 arrests and seize millions of dollars in cash and drugs throughout the USA. The violations could undermine the legality of as many as 7'38 wiretaps approved in Riverside County, Calif.. since the middle of 2013, an investigation by USA TODAY and The Desert Sun, based on interviews and court records, has found. Prosecutors reported that those taps, often conducted by federal drug investigators. intercepted phone calls and text messages by more than 52,000 people. Federal law bars the government from seeking court approval for a wiretap unless a top prosecutor has personally authorized the request. Congress added that restriction in the 19605, when the FBI had secretly monitored civil rights leaders, to ensure that such intrusive surveillance would not be conducted (Photo: Unites States District Court) in Riverside County a Los Angeles suburb whose court and prosecutors approved almost one of every ?ve US. wiretaps last year the district attorney turned the job of reviewing the applications over to lower-level lawyers, interviews and court records show. That practice almost certainly violated the federal wiretapping law and could jeopardize prosecutors' ability to use the surveillance in court. district attorney is playing with gunpowder if he ignores the potential implications of letting somebody else handle the entire process. That?s potentially said Clifford Fishman, a Catholic University of America law professor who studies wiretapping. That also creates a iegal problem for Riverside's massive wiretapping operation. which had come under scrutiny from Justice Department lawyers. Last week, USA TODAY and The Desert Sun reported that the US. Drug Enforcement Administration had secretlv helped turn the county into the nation?s wiretap capith ll?l even though federal prosecutors repeatedly warned that the surveillance orders violated a separate part of the wiretapping law and would not withstand a legal challenge. Federal drug agents used information from Riverside wiretaps to make arrests as far away as Kentucky and Virginia. sometimes concealing the surveillance from judges and defense lawyers. Buy Photo Riverside County District Attorney Paul Zellerbach at a press conference on metal theft on February 18. 2014. Wiretaps in the county quadrupled under his administration. (Photo: Chatham/ The Desert Sun} 1/ 1 1 1/20/2015 Police B??dm?i?rgasef @502/16/16 Page 2 0f 4 PagelD #3 43?Jage 2 of 5 Wiretaps in Hiversme more than quadrupled under the county?s former district attorney. Paul Lelleroacn. who left omce in January. Despite a federal court ruling that only the district attorney himself should usually approve wiretaps. Zellerbach said in two interviews over the past month that he could not recall having reviewed or personally authorized any of the county?s wiretap applications and said he was unaware of the details of the requests. Instead. he said. he delegated that job to one of his assistants. didn?t have time to review ali of those." Zellerbach said. ?No way." Because wiretap applications are secret. it is dif?cult to gauge how often they were approved by other lawyers. .B JEFF A A A report based on information Zellerbach's office submitted to federal court administrators lists an assistant. SISTWRI Jeffrey Van Wagenen. as the person who authorized hearty all of the county?s wiretap applications. Van Wagenen's signature appears on a sealed wiretap application approved iast year by a Riverside County judge and obtained by USA TODAY. Van Wagenen. who ieft the of?ce last year. said it would be inappropriate for him PAUL 5? ZELLERBA to comment. . RICT AWORNEY Delegating that job poses a legal problem because federal law which regulates wiretap appiications even in state courts -- carefully restricts who must approve a surveillance request. The US. Supreme Court ruled in 1974 case?case=t 3882476521514079594&l that those restrictions were serious enough that it threw out wiretap evidence in a drug case because the surveillance had been approved by A Riverside County wiretap the wrong senior of?cial at the US. Justice Department. application, approved by Assistant District Attorney Jeffrey . . . . . Van Wager.? (Photo: Obtained by The federal 9th Circmt Court of Appeals reiterated that point in 2013 USA room) 6883-1 after federal prosecutors sought to use evidence from a wiretap police obtained from a state court in San Bernardino County. just north of Riverside. The prosecutor who signed off on the wiretap was not the county's district attorney, Mike Ramos, but one of his deputies. That, the appeals court ruled. wasn?t good enough: Wiretaps had to be signed by the district attorney himself unless he had turned over ail of his powers to someone else while he was away from the office. country or RIVERSIDE Since this decision, Ramos has begun signing all wiretap apptications himself and urged other district attorneys to do the same. "This is our responsibility. We are talking about people's rights. the Fourth Amendment, cadets. drugs. gangs. it shouid be handled by the eiected he said. Riverside County?s new district attorney. Mike Hestrin, who replaced Zelierbach in January. instituted a simiiar policy. Hestrin said the 9th Circuit ruiing makes clear that district attorneys have a "legal obligation" to approve wiretaps themselves. but his of?ce will defend his predecessor?s wires if they are challenged in court. 5/ 1 1 1/20/2015 Police usd?paai?l??meg?me?pblto 16/16 Page 3 0f 4 PagelD #3 433?age 3 of 5 Ramos said in mtervrews that he warned zerlerbach about the Impticatrons or the 9th Circurt?s decreron. "We had a conversation about wiretaps. and he said that he had so many that it would be impossible for him to sign them all," Ramos said. 9 Records and interviews show no evidence that Zelierbach changed his approach. Records from the federal court administrative office show Riverside prosecutors obtained at least 1738 wiretaps in the years after the appeals court's decision. They identify Van Wagenen as the person who authorized neariy all of the surveillance applications. The scope of those apparent violations is "staggering," said defense lawyer Michael Garey, and the rami?cations are "endiess." Riverside County District Attorney "And what i mean by endless is, if you have a wiretap authorization that is invalid, all of the material that is t?nsmade a obtained as a result of that wiretap [5 subject to suppressron.? he said. and anything derived from that material rs ?series of reforms" to how county prosecutors handle wiretaps after also 5Uble?3t to suppress'on- he took of?ce in January. (Photo: Jay caldemmhe Desert American Civil Liberties Union lawyer Nathan Wessier said Riverside prosecutors should warn agencies that made use of the wires that the surveillance may have been illegal and notify the people whose conversations were recorded, even if they were never arrested as a result. ?They should know that these were illegally obtained." he said. ?h?ERiQ?tig ?gs-Ni?? A county court in Riverside. authorized far more poiice eavesdropping than any other court in the USA. Much of it was sought by tederai drug agents. Shown beiow are the 30 jurisdictions with the most wiretaps in the USA. Hover or tap for detaiis SourcarAdminisirative Office of the t} 3 (loans Credit: Brad Heath. twitcheii Tho-race USA TODAY The 9th Circuit's decision left one exception: Lower-level of?cials can authorize wiretaps if the district attorney is "absent" and authorizes another lawyer in the office to act in his piece. Zellerbach said he ?often was absent" because his job required him to travel across a county that stretches from the Los Angeles suburbs to the Arizona border. Still, records show Riverside prosecutors routinely requested wiretaps on days when he was working. Federal court records show prosecutors appiied for five wiretaps Feb. 18. 2014, for example, when Zellerbach appeared at a news conference to talk about metai thefts. The next week. prosecutors applied for nine more wiretaps on a day when Zellerbach's of?ce posted a photo on Twitter of him meeting with a delegation of Chinese of?ciais in his office conference room. in each case, reports by the federai court administrative of?ce list Van Wagenen. not Zellerbach. as the person who approved the surveiliance. 1 1/20/2015 Police 511%1302/16/16 Page 4 0f 4 PagelD 44(13age 4 of 5 DA Zellerbach speaks w/of?ciais from the People's Procuratorate of Sichuan Provinci; in China who visited Riverside. Riverside DA Of?ce Februam 27. 2014 Zeilerbach declined to answer questions about his office?s approval of wiretap applications. did nothing wrong other than have my office assist law enforcement in their effort to obtain a wiretap." he said Thursday. San Bernardino County District Attorney Mike Ramos, pictured at a press conference. said he cautioned his counterparts in Riverside County about the need to personally approve wiretap requests. (Photo: James Qur'gg. It is impossible to know how often prosecutors in otherjurisdictions improperly turned the job of approving wiretaps over to lower-levei attorneys because those orders almost always remain secret. ln submissions to the federal courts' administrative office. Los Angeles prosecutors reported that hundreds ofwiretaps had been approved by the head of the of?ce?s drug crimes unit, not the district attorney. A spokesman said the information in those reports was incorrect. Ramos. the president?elect of the National District Attorneys Association, said he planned to raise the issue with other top prosecutors at a meeting this week. Kefman also reports for The (Palm Springs, Desert Sun. Contributing: Mark Harman in McLean, Va. Read or Share this story: OBQOPR MORE STORIES Halloween scared up hotel biz in Oct. occupancv-coachella- Us ow/news/ZOW NOV. 20, 5? 29am valEev/76074 1 281$?g Blackhawks Thanksol iving lunch for ?rst (/storv/news/ed?WlS/l 1/20/13}: re - thanksgiving- Lem responders/76077? 14/1 grog-tilanksgiving-lunch??rst- MW Nov. 20, 2015. 7:38 am. 6 Reasons You Mav Be Forgetting Your Kevs {istorv/sponsor?storv/desert? storv/descrt- We: Lessee;- . Nov. 14 2015. 9:31 p.m. med1cal- center/201 5/1 1/1 S/desert- regional? 5/ 1 1/ 1 1 1/20/2015 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 49 PageID 441 PAUL E. ZELLERBACH DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 955?9673 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 14-120 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF PAGE-ER AND ELECTRONIC Target Telephone Target Telephone #10, 562-492-1461 Target Telephone #11, 951-570-0461 Target Telephone #12, 951-322-5805 APPLICATION APPLICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. I, Jeffery A. Van Wagenen In, Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, declare: 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Paul E. Zellerbach. I am the RiVerside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code section 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Police Department, Detective Chris Carnahan, and relying thereon, I approve making this Application and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to intercept Wire, pager and electronic communications to and from the communication devices (the "Target 1 Application Wiretap #14420 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 2 of 49 PageID 442 described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 3. Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her substitute, to physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic reports required by Penal Code section 629.60. 4. Detective Carnahan, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Riverside District Of?ce, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section He is certi?ed by the California State Attorney General's Of?ce in wiretaps, as set forth in the Af?davit. 5. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce Los Angeles Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal Code Section Riverside Police Department Lt. Cook, reviewed the Af?davit and approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led herewith). 6. Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to conclude the Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and will continue to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, Transportation and Sales of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11351, 11352, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code with reSpect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, andfor ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in proceeds from narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and conSpiracy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the meaning of Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted conversation of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, will provide additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said offenses. 2 Application Wiretap #14?120 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 3 of 49 PageID 443 There is probable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes listed herein and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. 7. Pursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular descriptions of the device(s) from which the communications are to be intercepted and their locations: A. Target Telephone is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation. Subscriber information is unknown at this time. TT #9 is being utilized by B. Target Telephone #10: (502) 492-1461 (TT #10) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by There is no subscriber information due to the account being a ?prepaid customer?. The user address is 17330 Preston Rd. Dallas, TX 75252. TT #10 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). C. Target Telephone #11: (951) 570-0461 11) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of Eudelia Gonzalez, with an address 1135 W. 7th St. Peri-is, CA 92570. TT #11 is being utilized by an mndenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). D. Target Telephone #12: Target Telephone #12: (951) 322-5805 12) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of HITE3CH BOOST069, with an address PO Box 54988 Irvine, CA 92619. TT #12 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). 8. The actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. 9. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic communications between the Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates and/or co-conspirators concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section .3 Application Wiretap #14-120 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 4 of 49 PageID 444 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have been attempted Without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if attempted, as set forth in the Affidavit. 11. Due to the ongoing nature of the conspiracy related to the above offenses, and because there is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those offenses will occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to maintain this intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be deemed to automatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin Mobile U.S.A., Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, Wireless, California Products and Services, T-Mobile USA Inc., Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc, Cingular Wireless, Nextel Communications, Metro PCS, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint? Nextel, Metrocall, PageNet, Tuyo Mobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, T-Mobile, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other affected telecommunications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecommunications Companies?) or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request of law enforcement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be I compensated by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of fumishing the facilities and technical assistance. 13. I request this Court to order the Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. 4 Application Wiretap #14-120 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 5 of 49 PageID 445 14. Applicant requests this Application, Review, Af?davit, Order and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, andXor exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney?s Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Renal Code Section 629.66) 15. I are unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the Af?davit within the meaning of Penal Code Section 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice certi?ed person(s), selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement of?cer/agency, to provide linguistic interpretation for interception of Wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular telephone communications, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief, which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in Riverside, California. DATED: By: JEFF YA. AN AGEN IR. ASSIST TDIST For: PAUL E. ZELLERBACH DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 5 Application Wiretap #14-120 Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 6 of 49 PageID 446 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY INTERCEPT ORDER OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN 14-133 ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ELECTRONIC REVIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE DESIGNEE INSTALLATION OF A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE, AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE OBTAINING OF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING ANDIOR CELLULAR SITE DATA REVIEW OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER Assistant Chief Christopher Vicino of the Riverside Police Department, states: 1. The Chief Executive Of?cer for the Riverside Police Department is Sergio Diaz. 2. I am the Assistant Chief of Police in charge of the Riverside Police Department. 3. I am the Chief Executive Officer's designee for intercept orders, within the meaning of California Penal Code section 4. Christopher Carnahan is a Detective with the Riverside Police Department and is currently assigned to the Special Investigations Bureau DEA TFG2. 5. have reviewed the Affidavit of Christopher 'Carnahan, which sets forth the circumstances in support of the application and which requests authority to install a pen register trap and trace device, to obtain global positioning system (GPS) tracking and/or cellular site data of and to intercept wire or electronic communications to and from Target Telephone #9 arget Telephone #10, 502-492-1461, Target Telephone #11, 951 -570-04s1, and Target Telephone #12, 951-322-5305. CEO REVIEW Page 1 of 2 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 7 of 49 PageID 447 I APPROVE THE APPLICATION. Dated: g?b?-?br W0 Riverside Police Department com-\tmanz-osm .(J1 ~15- 00 CEO REVJEW Page 2 of 2 pase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 8 of 49 PageID 448 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION 0F WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TE OMMUNICATION Target Telephone #9 Target Telephone #10 Target Telephone #11 Target Telephone #12 WIRETAP NO: 14-120 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF INTERCEPT ORDER (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 (951) 322-5805 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE AND AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE I. INTRODUCTION AND EXPERTISE I, Christopher Carnahan, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 1. Pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.50 I am a Detective for the Riverside Police Department assigned to the Special Investigations Bureau, and I am currently assigned as a Task Force Of?cer (TFO) with the Riverside District Of?ce of the Drug Enforcement Administration. I am the of?cer who is seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic cellular telephone communications. I am an investigator, or law enforcement of?cer of the United States, Within the meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 18 of the United States Code. I are empowered to conduct investigations of, and to make arrests for, the drug offenses enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, and Section 2516. Additionally, I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical, and legal aspects of court ordered Wiretaps. (Penal Code Section 629.50 et seq.) Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 A Itase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 9 of 49 PageID 449 2. I have worked as a police of?cer with the City of Riverside Police Department for the past ten years. I have held the rank of detective and am currently assigned to the DEA Task Force. Prior to working for the Riverside Police Department, I worked for the Oceanside Police Department for approximately eight years. Prior to working for the Oceanside Police Department, I worked for the Los Angeles Police Department for approximately nine years. While employed by the Oceanside Police I held the rank of Detective. I worked for a year as a gang detective and three years as a narcotic detective. The gang unit Specializes in gathering intelligence information of gang-related crimes and investigating crimes involving gang members. While working as a narcotic detective, I was selected and assigned to the DEA MET Team. While assigned to the DEA MET Team, we targeted Los Angeles and Oceanside gang members who sold cocaine on North Coast Highway in the City of Oceanside. While employed by the Los Angeles Police Department, I worked approximately two and a half years with the South Bureau C.R.A.S.H. (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) Search Warrant Team. During my employment with Oceanside Police Department and the Los Angeles Police Department, I have participated in numerous narcotics investigations as well as physical and wire surveillance, executed search warrants, and arrested numerous drug traf?ckers. I havc also spoken, on numerous occasions, to informants and suspects concerning the methods and practices of drug traf?ckers. I have received in excess of 360 hours of specialized training I involving the use, possession, packaging, manufacturing, sales, concealment, and transportation of various controlled substances, and conSpiracy investigations regarding violations of California State narcotics laws. I currently investigate domestic and foreign large scale, multiple pound/kilo, poly-drug dealers, traf?ckers and organizations. I have conducted investigations regarding the unlawful importation, possession, and distribution of controlled substances, as Well as conspiracies associated with criminal narcotics, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, 84l(a)(l), 843(b), 846, 952(a) and 963, and Title 18, United States Code, 2, 1952, 1956 and 1957. 3. Currently, I am assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration- Task Force Group 2, which is a large scale narcotic investigation group. I am an investigative or law Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14- 120 2 {use Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 10 of 49 PageID 450 enforcement of?cer of the United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2510(7), who is empowered to conduct investigations of, and to make arrests for, the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. 4. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein. This Af?davit is based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge I have derived from my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training and experience; (3) my conversations with other law enforcement investigators with whom I have discussed this case; (4) and what I believe to be reliable information obtained from the following sources: oral and written reports about this investigation and other investigations which I have received ?om law enforcement of?cers; (5) law enforcement databases; (6) telephone records - toll records and subscriber information; (.7) public records; and (8) physical surveillances conducted by law enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 5. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a'statement was made, the information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my interpretation, derived ?om my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics investigations. 6. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones #10, #11, and #12 as described below: A. Target Telephone (TT is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation. The subscriber information is still pending. TT #9 is B. Target Telephone #10: (502) 492-1461 (IT #10) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by There is no subscriber information due to the account being a ?prepaid customer?. The user address is I Dallas, TX 75252. The Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14- 120 3 (Ease Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 11 of 49 PageID 451 Electronic Serial Number 355697052043860, the Mobile Station Identi?cation Number 310410649733251. TT #11 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). C. Target Telephone #11: (951) 570?0461 11) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of Eudelia Gonzalez, with an address t. Perris, CA 92570. The Electronic Serial Number 268435459707826755, the Mobile Station Identi?cation Number 000002564064260. TT #12 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). D. Target Telephone #12: (951) 322-5805 (T 12) is an electronic cellular telephone issued by Sprint Corporation with a subscriber name of BOOSTO69, with an address PO Box 54988 Irvine, CA 92619. The Electronic Serial Number 268435462502699737, the Mobile Station Identi?cation Number 000009122485578. TT #13 is being utilized by an unidenti?ed male known as REY Last Name Unknown (LNU). 7. i request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 8. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, transportation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11351, 11352,11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code, with respect to a substance containing cocaine andfor methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 4 A Iiase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 12 of 49 PageID 452 II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, AN DIOR ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 9. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty-day order to intercept the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push?to?talk voice communications, to and from TT TT #10: (502) 492- 1461 (951) 570?0461 and (951) 322-5805 between the herein named target suspect(s) and any additional co?conspirators known and unlmown and shall include any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) commimications and push-to-talk voice communications and any background conversations while the telephone instrument is otherwise in use. B. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING ANDIOR CELLULAR 10. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace feature on TT i5 TT #10: (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. I also request the authorization to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GP S) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations, related to TT TT #10: (502) 492?1461 (951) 570? 0461 and (951) 322?5805. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 5 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 13 of 49 PageID 453 telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GP S) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers would be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the user of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant requests an order to obtain and receive cell site data andfor Global Positioning System (GP S) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounti.-g Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone. a. Your af?ant has learned through conversations with other law enforcement of?cers and by personal knowledge that illegal narcotic traffickers have the potential to disable the GPS function in their telephones if they are aware law enforcement can monitor their real time movements. Your affiant does not solely rely on GPS locations because your affiant knows, often times GPS requests can fail or revert to cell towers with a 5000 meter locate. I also know there are many ?dead spots? in Southern California as related to cellular service for Verizon. Ihave been told by Verizon employees if cellular telephones do not receive a signal, I will receive a failed response when requesting GPS locations. b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify. TT TT #19: (502) 492-1461, (951) 570-0461, and (951) 322-5805. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of mobile electronic tracking devices, law enforcement agents can Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 6 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 14 of 49 PageID 454 identify the location of a cellular telephone to a much ?ner detail than through cellular site data alone. DURATION OF INTERCEPTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 11. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance of the Order, whichever comes ?rst, pursuant to California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the full scope, membership and methods of operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the interception not terminate when the communications described herein are ?rst intercepted, but may continue to the full extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or until the full scope of the enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in . furtherance of the enterprise, whichever comes ?rst. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. Therefore, your af?ant believes that additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the ?rst communication to and ?om the target telephone(s). IV. TARGET TELEPHONES) (Penal Code section 12. The Target Telephones are described as follows: 1) telephone. is being utilized by Target Telephone TT is a Sprint wireless 2) Target Telephone #10: (502) 492-1461 is an telephone. is being utilized by (TS 7). 3) telephone. is being utilized by (T 7). Target Telephone #11: (951) 570-0461 is a Sprint Wireless Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 7 A Ease Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 15 of 49 PageID 455 4) Target Telephone #12: (951) 322?5805 (T is a Sprint Wireless telephone. is being utilized by 7). A. The term ?Target Telephone ?Target Telephone ?Target Telephone and ?Target Telephone #12? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation (IMSI) number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address and/or Push?to?talk (PTT) number, andfor Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, UFMI, IP, PTT andfor DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), and/or any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone numbe?s) and/or ESN and/or lMSi, JFMI, ii), PTT and/or DC whether the changes occur simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as the target telephone(s) B. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names when obtaining Pre~Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement ?om immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. V. TARGET SUBJECTS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13. The known Target Subj ect(s) of this investigation are: REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 8 _ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 16 of 49 PageID 45 . REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14420 9 ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 17 of 49 PageID 457 [Remorse - 1 I: g. (Target Subject 7) is a Hispanic male identi?ed only as utilizing (502) 492-1461, and (951) 570?0461, with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of residence. There are no other known identifying characteristics about REY Last Name Unknown (LNU) and as a result a records check into the California Department of Motor Vehicles cannot be completed. VI. JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COIVIIVIUNICATION INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 14. Colyromio Penal Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 US. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was impr0perly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located in New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held ?for the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the taped telephone is located, but Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 ?ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 18 of 49 PageID 458 also Where the contents of the redirected are ?rst to be heard.? (Hard, at page 136) In United States v. Bertram, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the original listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction have authority under Title 111 to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodrigtez noted, this interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge to supervise an investigation that spans more than one judicial district.? (Ibid, at pages 403?404) Also see United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 15. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use cellular telephone(s), use ?ctitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by law enforcement. By using other persons? names and creating a ?ctitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 1 v-v ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 19 of 49 PageID 459 certain degree of anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the popularity of pre-paid cellular telephones among those engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to ?ee the area of the crime. seesaw) 3- 18. rgeTlne #10: 4141 is an telephone. TT10 is subscribed to a prepaid customer located at I I. utilized by 7). 19. Target Telephone #11: (951) 570?0461 is a Sprint wireless telephone. is subscribed to I I sable ergo St Perris, CA 92570 and is being utilized by Sit). 20. Target Telephone #12: (951) 322?5805 is a Sprint wireless telephone. is subscribed to HITE3 CH BOOST069 located at PO Box 54988 Irvine, CA 92619 and is being utilized by 7). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 3. 2 CK) -J (.tase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 20 of 49 PageID 46C 21. Based on GPS pings of TT #11 and TT #12, investigators have identi?ed multiple residences within Riverside County associated to REY to include the subscriber address of TT #12. 22. Lastly, based on extensive toll analysis of all three target telephones utilized by REY, investigators determined that there are multiple connections to ongoing narcotics cases across the continental United States to include Missouri, Georgia, Texas and Kentucky. REY, Operating in, around and/or through Riverside County which stretches from Orange County to the Colorado River and forms the state border with Arizona. Riverside County lies inland of Los Angeles County and is bordered by Orange County to the west, San Bernardino County to the north and San Diego County and Imperial County to the south. Major Highways that operate thru Riverside County include Interstates 10, 15, 215 and State Routes 60, 91 and 111. The above referenced highways will lead to the other, major counties of California previously mentioned as well as across state lines into Nevada. 23. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. VII. PRIOR APPLICATIONS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 24. On March 4, 2014, a review of the California Electronic Intercept Court Order System and electronic surveillance indices was conducted for Target Telephone #10 (TT Target Telephone #11 11) and Target Telephone 12 12). REDACTED '3 i 26. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 3 ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 21 of 49 PageID 46 1 intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places speci?ed in this Application, within the meaning of Penal Code section - .REDACTED Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 4 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 22 of 49 PageID 462 OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 27. Your af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target Telephones #9-12 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this investigation which include discovering: a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subj ect(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subjectt?s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 1X. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE (Penal Code section 28. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate drug traf?cking. 29. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I assert that: Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 5 A Zase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 23 of 49 PageID 463 a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, have committed, or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11351, 11352, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and Conspiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, with respect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning the above-named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Pencl Code section 30. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities ?orn which, or the places where, the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above~narned offenses or are leased to, listed in the name of or commonly used by the Target Subjects whose communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 6295203)) 31. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more fully explained below. (Penal Code section 32. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I ?irther assert that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in furtherance of the narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places involved in the manufacturing and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 6 woodman?t2?me A Zase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 24 of 49 PageID 464 will be obtained through the interception of Wire communications over the ?Target Telephones?. 33. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived ?om participation in this investigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: a. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that have received ?om the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; b. Physical surveillance conducted by the West County Narcotic Task Force Riverside Sheriff Department (RSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; 0. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other documentary evidence in this and other investigations and, d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. f. Evidence obtained through court-authorized intercept orders. A IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET ELEPHO #9 REDACTED Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 1 7 se Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 25 of 49 PageID 46 . HO madam-me - 8594:1513 REDA c750 to 00 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 8 00 ?4 43? DJ ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 26 of 49 PageID 46 B. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #10 38. The following intercepted communications made to or from (502) 492-1461 #10) as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14-79 are indicative of the types of narcotics activates associated with REY and indicate that REY is a narcotics broker for various distributors, and that REY utilizes target telephones to facilitate the transfer of narcotics to further his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with REY and the target telephone which he utilizes. 3 a. On Mondav, Februarv 3, 2014, at 4:24 pm, utilizing ?mm (502) 492-1461 called . REY what was going on. REY said the phone didn?t have a good signal. fighters Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 1 9 ?iase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 27 of 49 PageID 467 REY said he had to get a small phone, but was struggling with it aid ?okay?. REY said ?yes? but it further said that it would be $200 more, but called utilizing TT #10 (502) 492?1461. asked what was going on. that the (narcotics) was ready, but the other guy would be calling soon and let him know when he would be able to bring the (narcotics) either today or tomorrow. REY said it would be better the next morning. said it would depend on when ?they? (other dealer) could bring it. REY said it ?they? could do it within the next hour of so then it would be okay. said he would let REY know when ?they? call him. REY then told let him know if possible an hour before it would happen and he (REY) would make arrangements. C. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #11 39. On January 14, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios .T. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14-11, authorizing the interception of the electronic cellular telephone communications to and ?om Target Telephone and used by The following intercepted communications made to or from (951) 570-0461 (TT 40. #11) as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14-11 are indicative of the types of narcotics activates associated with REY and indicate that REY is a narcotics broker for various Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 7 20 A Iiase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 28 of 49 PageID 468 distributors, and that REY utilizes target telephones to facilitate the transfer of narcotics to further his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with REY and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. 011 Sunday. January 19. 2014. at 1:37 pm, called utilizing asked for Rey. REY said hello. (951) 570?0461. greeted. asked what the message was about. i :i said he was running out but he was setting some away for him (REY). REY said everything was calm (possibly slow), so he would have to see, but he did have enough to pay for one part (one unit of narcotics). REY said he had been up and down, and had not been around. said he only had six left. but they (REY and others) had gotten a call ?om those guys (third parties/with the "ventilator"), since they (REY and others) had worked with those other guys (third party) before. REY said he had told them (third parties) they (REY and others) were not working. REY said they (third parties) would be a good opportunity for "if: was getting them for three~something them (possibly narcotics) for only three, when Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 2 p?t CD ?ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 29 of 49 PageID 469 REY said he would take one (possibly narcotics), for Wednesday or Thursday. if aid okay, he would pre-pay it. REY said okay. b. On Sundav anuarv 19. 2014. utilizing Target Telephone #4 identi?ed himself a alled utilizing (951) 570?0461. and told REY that there was a guy who had it (possibly narcotics) at that moment, but he (guy) was giving it (possibly narcotics) three points higher (possibly higher price). REY said they (third party and others) had already seen somebody yesterday. REY said he told them (third party and others) to better wait for the one that belonged to (possibly narcotics), adding that he (REY) would wait for it (possibly same thing" "ad REY ha the same thing that belonged to so he gave it to them 0461. asked REY what he was doing. REY said nothing and asked who was calling. cursed and identi?ed himself as ?Pollo?. REY said he was having a hard time said these ones (REY) was most interested in getting something that was good. (possibly narcotics) were also good. REY said he would need to talk to his buddy because the other guys have not said anything because the lady had not arrived yet. REY said he was far said to call him back and let him right now; he was about two hours away. know how many he (REY) needed. REY asked if he should jot down this number or should he keep the other one (phone number). told REY to jot this one (phone number) down since this one was the good one. REY asked if this was the one for business or Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 22 Ziase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 30 of 49 PageID 470 home (phone). said this one was his business (phone). REY said okay, he would jot it down and would call from another one. D. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHO 42. The following intercepted made to or ?'orn (951) 322-5805 (IT #12) as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14?11 are indicative of the types of narcotics activates associated with REY and indicate that REY is a narcotics broker for various distributors, and that REY utilizes target telephones to facilitate the transfer of narcotics to ?thher his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with REY and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On Thursday January 16. 2014 utilizing Target Telephone TT - received an incoming call ?orn utilizing Target Telephone (951) 322-5805, told REY he called a dude (possibly was going to cheek. REY asked in how many days did not know. said they (third parties) to give him a call on the other one (phone) because where he (REY) was going to be at, he (REY) was not going to get (any reception). REY said to to try this one (phone number) ?rst. said he was going to give the number to the guy (possibly so they (REY and could meet. REY asked Where he was going to see him (possibly said close by to REY's Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 2 3 wooqmmewwp?a Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 31 of 49 PageID 471 narcotics). REY told the money on hand. REY said okay. b. Telephone (951)622-5895. said they (third parties) told him on 3 5" CD A did not know, there was a problem before crossing (possibly border). REY said okay. REY asked aid yes, and told REY he had two (phone numbers for REY). REY said for to give him a call on the other one (phone) because where he (REY) was going to be at, he (REY) was not going to get (any reception). REY said for to try this one (phone number) ?rst. i) so they (REY and said he was going to give the could meet. REY asked where number to the guy (possibly was going to let him know if there was one (possiny narcotics). REY told to give him (REY) around 20, 30 minutes to get ready and have the money on hand. said he would give REY a call when everything was ready. REY said okay. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-1520 2 4 :ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 32 of 49 PageID 472 43. The above listed calls and parenthetical explanations are based on my training, experience, and intelligence gained during this investigation and is related to narcotics distribution. XI. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SEIZURES 44. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may not be directly connected to the Target Subject(s) of this Affidavit, unless otherwise noted, all seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the Target Subj ect(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, sophistication, and ability of these organizations. a. On 12?12-13, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop at Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol unit alerted to the rear of the vehicle. Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine (approximately 5 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his ??ont pants pocket. b. On 01-02-14, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle impounded on 12-12-43 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. was impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators recovered approximately 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine from vehicle truck area. X. NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 45. Interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14? 120 25 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 33 of 49 PageID 473 evidence against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed; appear reasonably likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation to obtain direct evidence that will convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of: a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subj ect(s)? illegal narcotics trafficking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; I c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 46. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in identifying and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 47. Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or his/their known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conSpiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 2 6 a?I PM l?l In? i-uI'm" 00 Zase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 34 of 49 PageID 474 location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subj ect(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruthful statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conSpiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 48. It appears that this organization is a close-knit organization whose members are either blood rel"tives, mutual ?iends andz?or very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large-scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would-be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain ?om potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, and/or its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 49. Since it appears that no single informant or informants are available or eXpected to become available, your af?ant is currently unable to determine the scepe of this criminal enterprise, the identity of other co-conspirators, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their methods of operation. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS AGENTS 50. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. If the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 2 7' 2:.ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 35 of 49 PageID 47E directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 51. Due to the close-knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique fraught with failure and would most likely jeopardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore, the leaders of drug traf?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. ?ractice for indi?iduals in large 52. As previously noted, it is a scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suspicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouch? for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned compartmentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any iin?ther than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 53. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subj ect(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 28 CZ ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 36 of 49 PageID 476 54. If 3. Con?dential Source (CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy from the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight?knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the organization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upon my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. 55. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 56. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone is often ur?mown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 5 7. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. 58. Surveillance has been conducted of subject(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 2 9 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 37 of 49 PageID 477 identi?cation. The subject was unable to produce any identi?cation, but verbally identi?ed himself as with a date of birth of and address of lso where the Cl had previously picked up Heroin with provided a cellular phone number 0 Deputy Wicker took a picture of with his consent, for identi?cation, and subsequently released him. TFO Layos conducted further investigation .. . .. identity. Via Riverside County Sheriffs Departrnents data base, revealed contacts for Wildomar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed that the person Deputy Wicker stopped was in fact b. On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside Sheriffs Department (RSD) South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted surveillance of I. I Wildomar. During the surveillance, a black Jaguar with paper plates was observed leaving residence and ultimately stopped by CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TFG2 and seized approximately 51bs of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, was arrested by CHP Of?cer Mendenhall for state felony violations of 11378 HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Heroin and 2 of Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. 0. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the city of Temecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside Investigators identi?ed .. .. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 3 am?ai?II?lt?k bowl??ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 38 of 49 PageID 478 text message conversations as authorized by Riverside County Wire hich indicated that was to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed Carson, California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. e. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 W. 7th Street, Perris, California on two houses associated with REY. Investigators followed two Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. One of the subjects was identi?ed as DOB: is REY and the user of Investigators are still working on determining if TT #10?12. Note: I I II as been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. 59. Surveillance operations have been successful to the extent they have established persons and/or vehicles arriving at, and/or departing ?orn principal locations; and extended the scope of the investigation to additional locations and co-conspirators. However, surveillance operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of Operation and the manner in which their Operation is conducted. 60. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co-conspirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suspected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an investigative technique that is used to con?rm meetings and other suSpected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 61. Your affiant knows from training and experience, and horn Speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14? 120 31 A Zase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 39 of 49 PageID 47S 64. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the opportunities for detection by the Target Subject(s). If surveillance were to be detected, I believe the traf?ckers? perpetual suspicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations would in their minds be con?rmed. The subjects would not only likely ?ee the area, they would also engage in wholesale abandonment of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking place. This selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help maintain the integrity of the investigation. 65. Based on the above-stated facts and on my training and experience, your affiant does net believe that surveillance of the above~referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target Telephone, will enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation. SEARCH WARRAN TS 66. On 01-22? 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #01221417 for a target telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. 67. On 2?25?14, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge Irma Poole Asberry. 68. There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. That danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search warrants after carefully weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall investigation. Generally, it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 69. DEA investigators will prepare af?davits to search the principal locations involved in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on-going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 3 3 ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 40 of 49 PageID 480 intermediate quantity of narcotics and/or controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances andtor illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large-scale narcotic traf?ckers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics and/or controlled substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 70. Your af?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total scope of the illegal Operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug traf?cking organization, the organizational structure, the full scope of the narcotics conSpiracy, the locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware that higher-level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics andfor controlled substances at their residences. Although surveillance has identi?ed residence(s), your affiant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their home(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stash? locations, without intercepted wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized, those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amounts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far less probative value by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conspirators, which give full meaning Af?davit Wiretap Order No. l4?120 3 4 (Ease Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 41 of 49 PageID 48] to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 71. The analysis of data derived from the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been helpful in determining patterns, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls between telephores, suspects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your af?ant knows from experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation ?oin law enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived from the pen register and telephone tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for successful prosecution, eSpecially in light of the familial structuring of this organization. Speci?cally, the details of the involvement of the participants, and the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before successful surveillance operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. I 72. Based on the above, your af?ant believes? that pen registers, toll analysis, and subscriber information, without the aid of a wire intercept, will not help your af?ant achieve the objectives of the investigation. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 73. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that people who are entering or leaving the location. It is your af?ant?s opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14? 120 3 5 {\Ji?ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 42 of 49 PageID 482 conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuals entering and exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement within the organization, if any. TRASH SEARCHES OF TARGET LOCATIONS 74. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subject(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high-level narcotics traf?ckers and their associates go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to dispose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me narcotic traffickers will often carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it would be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in front of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the search would draw susPicion on the law enforcement of?cers. A trash search would surely draw the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subject(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the government?s objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor, without identifying themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash search. Even if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained from the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full scope of the conspiracy. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 36 Iase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 43 of 49 PageID 483 75. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul- de?sacs. They would be conspicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be spotted. At this time, your af?ant feels that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. 76. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects we to observe and disclose to the Targrt Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already suspicious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co-conSpirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 77'. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traf?ckers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and frequently will not use their residential trash containers to dispose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. 78. I ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would be suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co? conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 3 7 A .4 ?ase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 44 of 49 PageID 484- narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 79. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 80. Even if investigators are able to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers frequently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail. GRAND JURY 81. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal suSpects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would c00perate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the targets of this investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 38 Zase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 45 of 49 PageID 485 . 82. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be successful in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his ?fth amendment privilege; (2) it would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conspirators, when they are identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. XI. CONCLUSION 83. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I believe that the Target Subjects have are committing and are about to commit the aforementioned crimes and that particular communications of the Target Subj ect(s) over the target telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied for herein. 84. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. However, it is your af?ant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electronic communications over the Target Telephone and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your af?ant to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 85. For reasons set out in this af?davit, it is your af?ant?s Opinion that the only reasonable and effective way to develop the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the person(s) involved in this conSpiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested herein. 86. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 3 9 A Jase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 46 of 49 PageID 4865 listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinaiter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order: a. Authorize the installation andfor use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, all wireless digital functions, wireless analog functions, direct connect/digital dispatch/direct diSpatch functions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California Where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in the Riverside Comty ?ea. (See United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5111 Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and [hatred States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation andfor use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. 0. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace Direct Connect/Dispatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. d. Authorize the installation and/ or use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller and any calling features such as ?call forwarding? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services said company provides the peeple whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 40 Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 47 of 49 PageID 487 subscribers and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through this intercept/pen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not limited to past telephone bills and records. 87. Your af?ant requests the Court order Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereina?er referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order, within 48 hours (including a?er-business hours, we ?kends, and holidays), and without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging device(s), cellular/wireless telephone(s), calling card(s), and other communication device(s) contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary number/account, billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone numbeds), and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identified in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 4 3. A Case Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 48 of 49 PageID 488 c. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, and/or GPS location information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703(1)). d. Provide any and all cell site data, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of any and all cellular telephones, which called each Target Telephone, whiCh was called by each Target Telephone, which was identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or which was otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, without geogcrhicrl limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703 (D). e. Provide access and the access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. f. Provide all information related to pre-paid cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identified in the investigation, including historical, past, present, current, and on- going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre-paid telephone account. 88. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) to continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, your af?ant requests that if the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, the Telecommunication Companies be ordered to not disclose to the Target Subj ect(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, the Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?120 42 Zase Document 27-5 Filed 02/16/16 Page 49 of 49 PageID 489 for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the court?s order. 89. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the order has authorized this Wire interception, or of its existence. 90. Your af?ant requests the Court to authorize law enforcement of?cers use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify the target telephone(s). 91. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to execute such intercept order. 92. Your af?ant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Appiication, af?davit, and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 93. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Riverside, California. . (LA etective ChristoPher Carnahan Riverside Police Department Dated: March ,2014 Sworn to and subscribed before me on March 201 HONORABLE ELIOS J. HERNANDEZ COUNTY RIVERSIDE Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-120 4 3 Case 3 15-cr-00099-lpJH Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 48 PageID 490 1 PAUL E. ZE LERBACH 2 DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, Galifornia 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 6 Fax: (951) 95[5?9673 7 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 9 IN THE MA ER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 14-483 10 OF THE RICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OP RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER 1 1 AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF APPLICATION WIRE, PAGER AND ELECTRONIC - 12 COM ICATIONS Target Tele hone #13: 502?609-5937 13 Target Telephone #14: 702-885-3486 Target ele hone #15: 14 Target Tele hone #16: 951?322-0063 15 16 AP ICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. 7 18 I, ery A. Van Wagenen Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, 1 9 declare: 20 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Paul E. Zellerbach. 21 I am the Ri erside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code 22 section 23 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order 24 Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Drug 25 Enforcement Administration, Special Agent Emilio Baca, and relying thereon, I approve making 26 this Application and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to 27 intercept wire, pager and electronic communications to and ?om the devices 28 1 Application Wiretap #14-183 Case 3 WOOQONUIDWMH 1431- UJ l? DJH Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 2 of 48 PageID 491 (the "Target described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 3. Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her substitute, to reports requir 4. Administratic authorization physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic ed by Penal Code section 629.60. Special Agent Baca, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement in (DEA) Riverside District Of?ce, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section I-lle is certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s O?rce in wiretaps, as set forth in the A S. Los Angeles f?davit. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal Code Section Special Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, reviewed the Af?davit and approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led herewith). 6. conclude the will continue of Controlled Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, Transportation and Sales Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11351, 11352, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code with respect to a substance containing cocaine andfor methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, andfor ten (1 proceeds fror and conspire meaning of conversation will provide 0) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, cy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said offenses. 2 Application Wiretap #14?183 Case 3 There is prol listed herein 7. descriptions locations: Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 3 of 48 PageID 492 Jable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. Pursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular of the device(s) horn which the communications are to be intercepted and their A. Target Telephone #13 (502) 609-5937 (TT #13) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). B. Target Telephone #14 (702) 885-7486 (IT #14) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). Target Teiephone #15 1T #15) is a T-Mobiie wireless telephone. Records Pending. TT #15 is being utilized by UM8364. D. Target Telephone #16 (931) 322-0063 (TT #16) is a Sprint Wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU. 8. 9. between the The actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic communications Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates andfor co-conspirators concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have been attempted without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if attempted, as 11. because there offenses will maintain this set forth in the Af?davit. Due to the ongoing nature of the conspiracy related to the above offenses, and is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be 3 Application Wiretap #14-183 Case 3: deemed to a1 Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 4 of 48 PageID 493 Jtomatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. Mobile Wire Partnership (1 Wireless, N: Nextel, Metr Google, affected tele Companies?) of law enforc I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin L, Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, less, California Products and Services, T-Mobile USA Inc, Cellco oing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc, Cingular :xtel Communications, Metro PCS, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint? ocall, PageNet, Tuyo Mobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, T-Mobile, L, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other communications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecormnunications or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request ement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. compensated facilities and 13. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of ?irnishing the technical assistance. I request this Court to order the Teleconununications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unaumorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. l4. incorporated Applicant requests this Application, Review, Af?davit, Order and any/all documents, attachments, and/or exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of 15. good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) I am unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the Af?davit within the meaning of Penal Code Section 4 Application Wiretap #14-i 83 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 5 of 48 PageID 494 1 . . 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice cerh?ed person(s), 2 selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement of?cer/agency, to provide 3 linguistic interpretation for interception of wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular 4 5 telephone communications, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. 6 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief, 7 which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in Riverside, 8 California. 9 10 DATED: ?1-8 41% ix? - By: JEFF A. JR. ASSIST NT DIS elm EY 12 COUN RSIDE 13 For: PAUL E. ZELLERBACH 14 DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Application Wiretap #14-1 83 1-4 r?I i?t I?t 1?4 1 42:. U) r?Ar?I GNU fe Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 6 of 48 PageID 495 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE TERCEPTION OF WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS (502) 609-5937 Target Telephone #13 (702) 885-7486 Target Telephone #14 Target Telephone #15 Target Telephone #16 WIRETAP NO.: 14-183 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF INTERCEPT ORDER 322-0063 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMIVIUNICATIONS ANT) AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM CELLULAR SITE DATA AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE (GPS) TRACKING I. INTRODUCTION AND EXPERTISE I, Emilio I. Baca, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and I am an investigative or law enforcement of?cer of the United States within the meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 2. I am empowered by law to conduct investigations and to make arrests for felony offenses as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. Ihave been so employed since February 2010 and I am currently assigned to the Riverside District Of?ce Task Force Group 2. I primarily investigate narcotic traf?cking and distribution organizations operating in and around Riverside County in California 3. I have received approximately 19 weeks of training at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia and was trained in all aspects of conducting narcotics investigations as well as the methods and techniques commonly used by major narcotics traf?ckers. I have attended special training in wire and electronic interceptions, toll analysis, and the use of wire and electronic Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 1 Ca pap?.Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 7 of 48 PageID 496 interception equipment. I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical and legal aspects of court ordered wiretaps per Penal Code Section 629 et seq. 4. During my employment with the DEA, I have participated in narcotics investigations through the surveillance, execution of search warrants, and arrests of drug traf?ckers. In addition, I have spoken to informants and suspects regarding the methods and means of drug traf?ckers. I have debriefed persons arrested for controlled substance traf?cking and have debriefed informants on the methods for gathering controlled substance intelligence. I have Spoken with experienced narcotics investigators concerning the methods and practices of narcotics traf?ckers. Through my training, experience and interaction with other Special Agents, Task Force Of?cers, and other narcotics investigators, I have become familiar with narcotic traf?ckers? methods of operation, including the distribution, tranSportation, collection of proceeds and methods of launder-in an attempt to conceal the nature of narcotic related proceeds. Through these interactions I have become familiar with and developed an understanding for the manner in which controlled substances are imported, manufactured, distributed, and sold, to include the methods of avoiding detection and apprehension by law enforcement of?cers. I am familiar with the manner in which narcotics traf?ckers use wireless communication equipment such as cellular telephone technology, pagers, coded communications, false identities, and counter surveillance to determine the presence of law enforcement and other means to facilitate their illegal activities and avoid detection or mislead a narcotics investigation. 5. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein and make this af?davit based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge I have gained from my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training, experience, and conversations with other law enforcement investigators with whom I have discussed this case; (3) and what I believe to be reliable information obtained ?om the following sources: oral and written reports about this investigation, received from law enforcement of?cers; (4) law enforcement databases; (5) Pen register and trap and trace information as well as telephone records - toll records and subscriber information; (6) public records; and (7) physical surveillances conducted by DEA, West County Narcotics Task Force - Riverside County Sheriff?s Department, and other law Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 2 ~153Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 8 of 48 PageID 497 . enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 6. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a statement was made, the information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my interpretation, derived from my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics investigations. 7. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones as described below: A. Target Telephone #13 (592} 609-5937 (TT #13) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). B. Target Telephone #14 (702) 885-7486 (TT #14) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). C. Target Telephone #15 (TT #15) is a T?Mobile wireless telephone. Records Pending. TT #15 is being utilized by UM8364Target Telephone #16 (951) 322-0063 (TT #16) is a Sprint wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU. 8. Probable cause exists to believe that CHRIS LNU (user of TT #13 and TT UM8364 (user of TT #15) and REY LNU (user of and other identi?ed and unidenti?ed co- conspirators, have committed, are committing, or are about to commit, the crimes as discussed below, and that their communications relate to those and other ongoing crimes. 9. I request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 10. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, transportation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11351, 11352,11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 3 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 9 of 48 PageID 498 1 with respect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance 2 exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, 3 possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a 4 conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. 5 6 II. 7 PURPOSE 0: AFFIDAVIT 8 WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, OR ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER 9 (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 10 11. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty~ 11 day order to intercept the wire, electronic pager, andfor electronic cellular telephone 12 communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to 13 include, but not limited to: voice text messages, digital photographic images, 14 digital video images, electronic mail (?e?mail?) communications and push?to-talk voice 15 communications, to and from TT #13: 502?609?5937, TT #14: 762-885?7486#16: 951?322-0063 between the herein named target suspect(s) and any additional 17 co-conspirators known and unknown and shall include any and all communications to the cellular 18 telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, 19 digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and 20 push-to-talk voice communications and any background conversations while the telephone 21 instrument is otherwise in use. 22 B. 23 PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACIGNG CELLULAR SITE DATA 24 (18 SC. Sections 3121 through 3126) 25 12. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace 26 feature on TT #13: 502?609?5937, TT #14: 702?885-7486, TT #15 and TT #16: 27 951?322-0063. I also request the authorization to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 4 Cass twat?II?Ap?Ai?t l?ll?? Gnu Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 10 of 48 PageID 499 b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify TT #13: 502?609-5937, TT #14: 702-885? 7486, TT #15 and TT #16: 951-322-0063. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of mobile electronic tracking devices, law enforcement agents can identify the location of a cellular telephone to a much ?ner detail than through cellular site data alone. 111. DURATION OF INTERCEPTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance of the Order, Whichever comes first, pursuant to California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the scope, membership and methods of operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the intnc ption not wheat?tilt: cormnuuications described herein are first intercepted, but may continue to the full extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or until the full scope of the enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in ?irtherance of the enterprise, whichever comes ?rst. 14. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. Therefore, your af?ant believes that additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the ?rst communication to and from the target telephone(s). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 6 secoqmmeer?ng? t?lF?IH?lh?l??Hl?t In Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 11 of 48 PageID 500 IV. TARGET (Penal Code section 15. The Target Telephones are described as follows: a. Target Telephone #13 (502) 609-5937 (TT #13) is a Cingular Wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). b. Target Telephone #14 (702) 885-7486 (TT #14) is a Cingular wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #13 is being utilized by CHRIS Last Name Unknown (LNU). (TT #15) is a T-Mobile wireless I. .- I. I. . 0. Target Telephone #15 telephone. Records Pending. TT #15 is being utilized by UM83 64. (1. Target Telephone #16 (951) 322-0063 (TT #16) is a Sprint wireless telephone. Records pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU. 1. The term ?Target Telephone #13-16? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation (IMSI) number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address andfor Push-to-talk (PTT) number, and/or Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), and/or mqam?hmeowmq any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, l'P, PTT and/or DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone number(s) andfor ESN and/or IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC Whether the changes occur simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as the target telephone(s) 2. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names when obtaining Pro-Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement ?om immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suSpects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page '7 Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 12 of 48 PageID 501 9: V. TARGET SUBJECTS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) The known Target Subject(s) of this investigation are: p?l CD amass REDACTED I Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 8 Cass cameo.)wa Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 13 of 48 PageID 502 I g. REY LNU (Last Name Unknown-Target Subject 7) is a HiSpanic male identi?ed only as with an unknovm Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of residence. There are no other known identifying characteristics about REY LNU and as a result a records check into the California Department of Motor Vehicles cannot be completed. Investigators are working on the identi?cation of REY LNU through various surveillances both physical and electronic. h. CHRIS LNU (Las Name Unknown Target Subject 8) is a Hispanic male identi?ed only as CHRIS with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of residence. Investigators believe CHRIS is a coordinator for the ji and possible cell head with connections to Kentucky. Investigators are working to identify CHRIS LNU and are communicating with Kentucky DEA case agents. i. UM8364 (Target Subject 9) is a Hispanic male identi?ed only as UM8364 with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of residence. In March of 2014, investigators intercepted UM8364 as a narcotics source of supply that provided approximately 10 pounds of suspected herein to i scanner: j. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 9 Cast t?Ar?Ir?tp?Ar?lr?tl?t osm-pumec: Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 14 of 48 PageID 503 VI. JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 17. California Penal Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 US. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was improperly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located in New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held ?for the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the tapped telephone is located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are ?rst to be heard.? (Ibid, at page 136) In United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the original listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 10 Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 15 of 48 PageID 504 have authority under Title to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodriguez court noted, this interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge to supervise an investigation that Spans more than one judicial district.? (Ibid, at pages 403-404) Also see United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 18. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use cellular telephone(s), use ?ctitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining cellular phones as a means of nreventing detection by law enforcement. By using other personsnames and creating a fictitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a certain degree of anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the pepularity of pre-paid cellular telephones among those engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to ?ee the area of the crime. 19. Target Telephone #13 and #14 used by CHRIS LNU (TS are Cingular Wireless telephones. Subscriber information pending. TT #13 and #14 are being utilized by CHRIS LNU (TS Since March 2014, investigators began to monitor wire communications of REY LNU (TS as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-120. During these intercepted communications, investigators determined that CHRIS LNU was a principle member of the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14v 1 83 Page 11 Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 16 of 48 PageID 505 5- i stature 5 speci?cally a segment operated by REY LNU, and that CHRIS operates as a load driver coordinator and possible cell head in the state of Kentucky. During this period of interception, CHRIS LNU coordinated between REY LNU, cell head in the county of Riverside, and an unidenti?ed subject delivery proceeds ?orn an unknown origin into Riverside County, speci?cally, Perris, California. Investigators have initiated contact with DEA Kentucky to determine if the user of TT #13, identi?ed as Chris LEONARD in Kentucky is in fact TS Although CHRIS LNU may operate a cell in Kentucky, the framework if his illegal narcotics activity originates in Riverside County through REY LNU who operates as a source of supply. Additionally, proceeds acquired through sales of narcotics in Kentucky are eventually transported back into Riverside County. 20. Target Telephone #15 used by UM8364 (TS is a T~Mobile telephone. Subscriber information pending. #15 is being utilized by UMS364. Since December of 2013 investigators have been monitoring multiple phones utilized by I . In March of 2014, investigators and UM8364 (TS who was identi?ed as a narcotics source of supply for the Based on these intercepted communicationsinvestigators initiated GPS pings of TT #15 as authorized by Riverside County Search Warrant 03191403. Investigators identi?ed a possible address for TS #9 in the city of South Gate, California. Although TS #9 possibly resides in Los Angel es County, it should be noted that the narcotics TS #9 distributed were destined to - emf-torso 3' ff? in Riverside County. Additionally, on March 20, 2014, investigators identi?ed a vehicle operated by a courier for UIVIS364 (TS who met with Off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in Riverside County. 21. Target Telephone #16 used by REY LNU (TS is a Sprint telephone. Subscriber information pending. TT #16 is being utilized by REY LNU (TS Since March 2014, investigators have been monitoring communications on multiple target telephones utilized by TS #7 as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-120. REY has been identi?ed as a cell head for the teas-as reSponsible for acquiring and distributing narcotics to various points in the domestic US. REY resides at 1135 W. 7til Street, Penis, California and has multiple properties Af?davit w? Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 12 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 17 of 48 PageID 506 Within Riverside County. REY acquires narcotics from various sources, to include 2 subsequently distributes them from Riverside County. 3 22. Lastly, the narcotics distributed and tranSported by CHRIS LNU (TS UM8364 (IS 4 and REY LNU (TS and the DTO members they work for, to include 5 distributed in, around and/or through Riverside County, in example CHRIS LNU (TS has ,6 coordinated a proceeds courier into Riverside County. UMBSM (TS provided narcotics to 7 and coordinated the delivery into Riverside County. Lastly, REY LNU (TS resides in 8 Riverside County and distributes therefrom. 9 23. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. 10 1 VII. PRIOR APPLICATIONS 12 (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13 24. On April 1, 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the California Department of I 14 Justice reference the Electronic Intercept Court Order System for TT #13?16. 15 25. On April 1, 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the United States Department of 16 Justice wiretap database to determine if any Federal applications had been made to initiate a Title 17 wiretap intercept ofTT #13?16. 18 26. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other 19 applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to intercept 20 wire, oral, or electronic involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places 21 Speci?ed in this Application, within thetmeaning of Penal Code section 629.5003). 23 24 Remorse 25 . . 26 27 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 13 Ca - Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 18 of 48 PageID 507 I I - REDA CTED f. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120: On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios .T. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court, State of California granted and issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14?120, which authorized the TT #10: (502) 492-1461 interception of the communication to and from TT (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 14 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 19 of 48 PageID 508 1 2 23w . 4 OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 5 27. Your af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target 6 Telephone #13?16 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this 7 investigation which include discovering: 8 a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? 9 illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; 10 b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; 11 c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed 1? conspirators; 13 d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are 14 stored prior to its distribution; 15 e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s 16 illegal narcotics trafficking; 17 f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics 18 traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal 23 narcotics to various states; and 21 g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a 22 conviction) against the Target Subj ect(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set 23 forth herein. IX. 24 STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE 25 (Penal Code section 26 28. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement 27 of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate 28 drug traf?cking. Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 15 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 20 of 48 PageID 509 1 29. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, 1 assert that: 2 a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, if have committed, or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, 5 Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11351, 6 11352, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code 7 Section 11370.6, and Conspiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, 8 with reSpect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of 9 solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section 10 b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning 11 the above?named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, 12 and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Penal Code section 629.52(b) 13 30. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the places where, 14 the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted 15 are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above?named offenses 16' or me leased to, listed in the ?nine of or used by the Target Suujects whose 17 communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 18 31. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably 19 appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more fully explained 20 below. (Penal Code section 21 32. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I further assert 22 that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence 23 regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics trafficking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in 2: furtherance of the narcotics trafficking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of 27 distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places 28 involved in the manufacturing and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, will be obtained Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 16 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 21 of 48 PageID 510 1 through the interception of wire communications over the Target Telephones. 2 33. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived ?om participation in A: this investigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: 5 a. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that I have 6 received from the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; 7 b. Physical surveillance conducted by the West County Narcotic Task Force 8 Riverside Sheriff Department (RSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, 9 which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; 10 0. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other 11 documentar evidence in this end other investigations and, 12 d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. 13 e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. 14 f. Evidence obtained through court-authorized intercept orders. 1 5 16 A. 17 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #13 34. On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside 1: County Superior Court issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14-120, authorizing the interception 20 of the electronic cellular telephone communications to and from TT TT #10: 21 (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. 22 35. Based on intercepted communications between REY (TS and CHRIS (TS 23 investigators determined that TS #8 was the user of TT #13. 24 36. The following intercepted made to or from 502-609-5937 Target 25 Telephone #13 as intercepted over Riverside County Wire 14-120 are indicative of the types of 26 narcotics activities associated with TT #13 and indicate that CHRIS LNU (1?8 will use TT #13 27 to facilitate his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the 28 following pertinent aSpects of intercepted. communications and parenthetical explanations of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 17 9: r?dt?Ip?ti?tp?t I-PUJNHO s?at?l GNU Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 22 of 48 PageID 511 language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with CHRIS (TS and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On March 17, 2014, CHRIS LNU (IS was intercepted communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At approximately 10:53 during session number 582, CHRIS received an incoming call on #13 ?om REY who was using 951-570?0461 (TT #ll-Riverside County Wire 14-120). REY and CHRIS greeted. CHRIS said he had been working. REY asked if CHRIS went to Ripley (Possibly Kentucky). CHRIS said yes, he won three and lost his fourth one (referring to rooster ?ghts). CHRIS told REY about the rooster ?ght he lost. REY asked if CHRIS was ?ghting a Mexican one (possibly rooster). CHRIS said yes. CHRIS and REY talked about the blades and boots CHRIS used for the ?ghts. CHRIS said he used the ones (blades/knife) Richard sent him. REY asked where CHRIS was. CHRIS said he was not around and would be back later tonight, then asked if he could call REY later tonight. REY said okay. CHRIS said he did not have his bill (referring to US. Currency) with him. REY asked if that meant that buddy (proceeds courier) was going to come (to area-Penis, California) tomorrow. CHRIS said yes, and mumm-p-ri?iowooq reminded REY that he told CHRIS he (REY) needed him (courier) to be there this weekend. REY said yes, he wanted him there (REY's location) as soon as possible, they needed. REY interrupted himself and asked CHRIS to call him (Voices overlapped). CHRIS said he would call REY back tonight. REY said all right. b. On March 21, 2014, CHRIS LNU (TS was intercepted communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At approximately 10:49 am, during session number 970, CHRIS received an incoming call on TT #13 ?om REY who was using 951?570-0461 (TT till-Riverside County Wire 14-120). CHRIS said everything was going good, there was no problem. REY asked if CHRIS knew when he (REY) was going to see him (referring to proceeds courier). CHRIS said probably the day they were planning on. REY said okay. REY asked CHRIS to just let him know if he (courier- UM0441) did leave. CHRIS said that was no problem. CHRIS told REY not to get riled up. REY Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 18 KO 00 43- g? In t?Ar-Ai?lI-mt?tr?at?a Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 23 of 48 PageID 512 said they (REY and others) just wanted to know (Thought un?nished). CHRIS said REY had already told him what day it (currency) needed to be there. REY said that was good. 0. On March 22, 2014, CHRIS LNU (TS was intercepted communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At approximately 3:04 pm, during session number 1085, CHRIS received an incoming call on #13 ?om REY who was using 951?570-0461 (TT #ll-Riverside County Wire 14-120). CHRIS said he got an ass whooping at the rooster ?ghts. CHRIS and REY talked about losing at the rooster ?ghts. REY said they (REY and others) had not done well either. REY asked what was going on. CHRIS said he (CHRIS) talked to the guy (proceeds courier), and he (possibly UMO441) only had 600 dollars left to spend (referring to miles to cover). REY said he was going to be earlier that he thought then. REY said that was about REY said he would be there, and was only going about an hour away because (Thought left un?nished). CHRIS said it was no problem. REY said he would have somebody there though (to receive the courier). CHRIS said alright. REY said he would talk to CHRIS tomorrow. d. The above listed calls and parenthetical explanations are based on my training, experience, and intelligence gained during this investigation and are related to narcotics distribution. B. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #14 37. On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14?120, authorizing the interception Catamaran of the electronic cellular telephone communications to and from TT TT #10: (502) 492-1461 (951) 570?0461 and (951) 322-5805. 38. Based on intercepted communications between REY (TS and CHRIS (TS investigators determined that TS #8 was the user of TT #14. 39. The following intercepted communications made to or from 702?885-7486 Target Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 19 Ca: \omqmm-hnwma?n Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 24 of 48 PageID 513 Telephone #14 as intercepted over Riverside Courity Wire 14?120 are indicative of the types of narcotics activities associated with TT #14 and indicate that CHRIS LNU (TS will use TT #14 to facilitate his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with CHRIS (TS and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On March 22, 2014, CHRIS LNU (TS was intercepted communicating with REY LNU (TS regarding a narcotics proceeds related activity. At approximately 3:04 p.n1., during session number 1085, CHRIS received an incoming call on #13 from REY who was using 951-570-0461 till?Riverside County Wire 14420). CHRIS asked what was REY needing. REY asked how much did CHRIS have of their?s (REY's and possible third party) then said (how much did he have) of his (REY's). CHRIS said he had the one that he (third party-courier) had brought and whenever REY was ready, they (CHRIS and others) could send whatever REY needed. CHRIS said they could send 2, but since he (REY) had not been ready to send it, he (CHRIS) had been using it, giving it to them, but there was no problem. REY said he did not need it all, but did want the 195 9referinf to narcotics proceeds). CHRIS said okay, and then asked if they could send it the beginning of next week. REY said it would be best on the weekend. CHRIS said they (courier) had to go out there (unspeci?ed location) to visit family, so it would be perfect and cool. REY asked if it was the same one (courier) that was coming. CHRIS said yes. REY asked CHRIS to tell him (third party/possible driver) to go around where he had told CHRIS and cut through another ?eeway and come down through New Mexico. CHRIS said he told him. REY said a few guys had gone down there and everybody was getting stepped (referring to Law Enforcement). REY said it did not matter, but he had wanted to see him (courier) this weekend so it could leave this Monday and that was what he needed the money. CHRIS said they (courier) could not leave until Monday. REY said alright, and then they would wait until next Monday. REY said he would talk to his brother in law, because he (brother in law) wanted to send a little bit (referring currency). CHRIS said he had two (possible money) with that (unspeci?ed). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 20 Cass HHl??l?ll?AHt?A Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 25 of 48 PageID 514 REY said he (brother in law) would not want to send two, adding he (REY) needed the 195. REY then asked if CHRIS was going to send 20. CHRIS said right. REY said he did not want to send that much; he needed around two, but would wait a little bit. CHRIS said he would send REY 195, adding that was close to two. REY said that was ?ne. REY said his 195 and (unintelligible) would be perfect. CHRIS said 195 and asked REY for a repeat. REY said (195) and 20. REY said the 20 for the shipping. CHRIS said okay. REY said that way he (CHRIS) would get his and REY would pay his. CHRIS said he understood. REY said he would be talking to him (brother in law) this weekend and let CHRIS know. CHRIS said okay. REY asked if CHRIS had two for him. CHRIS said yes and if they (possibly brother in law) wanted to send Lasador (ph Possible Lazaro) it would be no problem. REY said okay and told CHRIS that he had not talked to him (brother in law) for a while, since they had gone over there. b. Based on my training, experience and knowledge about this ongoing wiretap investigation, the calls made by/or to CHRIS collectively between TT #13 and TI #14 indicate that he coordinated with a courier the transportation of proceeds into Riverside County. Additionally, based on information obtained from multiple wiretaps on and REY LNU, investigators know that REY acquires multi?pound quantities of narcotics from various sources and that he operates a cell in the state of Kentucky. C. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #15 A neonatal) 41. Based on intercepted communications between UM8364 (IS and I investigators determined that TS #9 was the user of TT #15. 'j REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 21 Ca: Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 26 of 48 PageID 515 42. The following intercepted communications made to or from Target Telephone #15 as intercepted over Riverside County Wire (to include Extension 1) are indicative of the types of narcotics activities associated with TT #15 and indicate that UM8364 (T8 will use TT #15 to facilitate his narcotics related activities for the DTO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics activities associated with UMSSM (TS and the target telephone which he utilizes. REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 22 Ca - Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 27 of 48 PageID 516 I - . HM HQ U.) REDACTED D. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #16 REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 23 g? Hl??P?lt?dl?ll??H Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 28 of 48 PageID 517 skewered 7 44. Based on intercepted communications between REY (TS and if: investigators detennined that TS #7 was the user of TT #16. On March 18, 2014, REY (T8 was intercepted communicating with egarding a narcotics related activity. At approximately 4:07 pm, during session number 2673, REY placed an outgoing call on TT #16 to who was using back SO he can call the buddy- b. On March 19, 2014, REY (TS was intercepted communicating with regarding a narcotics related activity. At approximately 5:20 pm, during session number 2763, REY placed an outgoing call on TT #16 to supposed to call had not called yet. REY said for and REY) would not his nephew and they might give him a few (narcotics units) so they struggle. REY asked when. said he did not know but he (nephew) told him there might be some (narcotics) around and he would let him have them (narcotics). he would let REY know. REY said he needed to ?nd out about it because he had been dry for a few days and if not, then he would look elsewhere (secondary source) because he was in need of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 24 Cas; t?At?Ii?AH?Ai?nwi?A Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 29 of 48 PageID 518 something (narcotics). said that was right, but he would have an answer for REY by tomorrow. REY asked if anything would get done with the guy (courier). said he would call REY back if he called him. On March 21, 2014, REY (TS was intercepted communicating with egarding a narcotics related activity. At approximately 9:04 am, during session number 2838, REY received an incoming text message on TT #16 from who was using The following is the direct text: ?Hay un vato ke tiene por hay pero las da un poko mas caras wey es que todo Abajo subio wey? or ?There is a guy (secondary source of narcotics) who has it somewhere around, but he gives it a little more expensive dude. The thing is that everything went up down there, dude. XI. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS I SEIZURES 45. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may not be directly connected to the Target Subject(s) of this Af?davit, unless otherwise noted, all seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the Target Subject(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, SOphistication, and ability of these organizations. a. On 12?12-13, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop at Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol unit alerted to the rear of the vehicle. Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine (approximately 5 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his front pants pocket. b. On 01-02-14, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle impounded on 12-12-13 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 25 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 30 of 48 PageID 519 c- On 63-03-14: Califomia Highway Patrol stopped i 2 vehicle (620V570) at the 91 Fwy and Green River Rd in Corona. Vehicle was impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators seized approximately 9.8 pounds of 5 methamphetamine from vehicle truck area. 6 d. On 03-14?2014, California Highway Patrol stepped 7 vehicle in Riverside County. Investigators seized approximately 10 pounds of 8 methamphetamine from the vehicle. 9 X. 10 NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 11 46. Interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager 12 communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather evidence 13 against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed, appear reasonably 14 likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the 15 government to achieve the objectives of this investigation -- to obtain direct evidence that will 16 committee a reasonauie donut of: 17 a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? 18 illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; 19 b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; 20 c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed I 21 conspirators; 22 d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are 23 stored prior to its distribution; 24 e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s - 25 illegal narcotics traf?cking; 26 f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics 27 traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal 28 narcotics to various states; and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 26 -. o: Hi?Ih-ai?th-AI?Ii?t Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 31 of 48 PageID 520 g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 47. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 48. A Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or hisftheir known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conSpiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subject(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruthful statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conspiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMAN TS 49. It appears that this organization is a close?knit organization whose members are either blood relatives, mutual friends and/or very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large?scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would~be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain from potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, and/or its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 27 Cas wooumm?hwwi-a r?I i .12- 03 3?4 C.) i?ir-w-A GNU Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 32 of 48 PageID 521 and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 50. Since it appears that no single informant or informants are available or expected to become available, your af?ant is currently unable to determine the scepe of this criminal enterprise, the identity of other co?conspirators, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their methods of operation. See Con?dential ?ghbg section. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS AGENTS 51. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. if the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 52. Due to the close?knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique fraught with failure and would most likely jeopardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore. the leaders of drug OOHONMLUJNHOKDOONJ tra?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. 53. As previously noted, it is a common practice for individuals involved in large scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suSpicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouc for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned compartmentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any further than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 28 Cass OOHJCRUI-IAUJNH Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 33 of 48 PageID 522 informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 54. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subj ect(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. 55. If 3. Con?dential Source (CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy from the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight?knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the orgmization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upcn my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. 56. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an attempt to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 57. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GP S) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 58. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-133 Page 29 Cass Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 34 of 48 PageID 523 59. Surveillance has been conducted of subj ect(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?'eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his identi?cation. The subject - 3 -. Remorse with a date 0 and address of Wildomar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed that the person Deputv Wicker stooped was in fact .. . .. .. . Sheriffs Department (RSD) - South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside surveillance of 1mm 11 i - senses -. esidence, located at I'Wildomar. During the surveillance, a black Jaguar with paper plates ,was observed leaving esidence and ultimately stopped by CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TF G2 and seized approximately of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, 3' i I: 1' ?esta I I I I I was arrested by CHP Of?cer Mendenhall for state felony violations of 11378 HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case -532-801-13. A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Herein and 2 of Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 30 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 35 of 48 PageID 524 c. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance 2 in the city of Ternecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside County Wire 3 identi?the user 0f 4 d. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on 5 I in the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted text 6 message conversations as authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-79 which indicated that 7 GUSMAN was to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed Carson, 8 California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators 9 seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. 10 e. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 1 1 W. 7th Street, Penis, Cali..ornia on taro houses associaed with REY. Investigators fo lowed two 12 Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. 13 One Ofthe subjects was identi?ed as Investigators 14 are still working on detennining if near-?res; 's REY and the user of TI #10-12. Note: 15 has been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. 16 f. On March 19. 2014. investigators conducted surveillance eon UMR364 17 pursuant to GPS pings of TT #15. Investigators identi?ed a possible residence for UM8364 and an 18 associated vehicle (silver Honda Civic bearing California plate 7ADV247). Additionally, on the 19 same date, investigators located the user of TT #15 (UM8364) at a shepping plaza located off 20 Atlantic and Clara. Surveillance units observed UM8364 and an unidenti?ed Hispanic male conduct 21 . counter techniques such as squaring the block and looking into parked vehicle to identify possible 22 surveillance by law enforcement. 23 g. On March 20, 2014, investigators conducted a brief surveillance on 24 in the county of Riverside off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order 2 5 to identify the vehicle Operated by the narcotics courier working for UMS3 64. On the same date, 26 investigators acquired the vehicle information. 27 60. Surveillance Operations have been successful to the extent they have established 28 persons and/or vehicles arriving at, and/or departing from principal locations; and extended the Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 31 a: ?e Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 36 of 48 PageID 525 scope of the investigation to additional locations and co~con3pirators. However, surveillance operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of operation and the manner in which their operation is conducted. 61. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co- conSpirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suSpected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an inves.igative technique the. is used to con?rm meetings and other suspected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 62. Your af?ant knows from training and experience, and from speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic traf?cking organizations is limited to placing individuals together without knowing the signi?cance of their meeting or the role of each traf?cker. Furthermore, based on my training and experience, surveillance of major narcotics traf?ckers is often dif?cult without detection. Physical surveillance is often limited to watching suspects ?'orn a distance, which as an investigative technique, can be problematic. Your af?ant believes that excess random surveillance of a location without knowledge when a narcotics transaction will be taking place, could expose the identity of the of?cers and thereby compromise the investigation. Even if blanket, twenty-four hour surveillance were feasible, it would still be limited to providing information only on the movements and whereabouts of the Target Subject(s). If the Target Subject(s) suSpected he was being watched by law enforcement personnel, he could abandon his phone and move his activities to a different location, thus effectively ending the current on?going investigation until he was located again. A wire intercept would greatly assist the agents because they could be deployed more effectively knowing about a future narcotics transaction. This would allow surveillance to be set up on strategic locations, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-133 Page 32 o: In mummL,WNrDocument 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 37 of 48 PageID 526 thereby lessening the risk of compromising the investigation. 63. Furthermore, your af?ant knows ??om past investigations that narcotics traf?ckers use various counter-surveillance driving techniques. These techniques include ?requent u?tums, stepping in parking lots to observe traf?c, waiting at traf?c lights to allow traf?c to pass, speed variations, and taking circuitous routes through residential neighborhoods. All of these methods are used for the sole purpose of determining the presence of law enforcement personnel. These methods are frequently successful, as it is extremely dif?cult tofollow suSpects who employ these methods without being detected. Once detected, these suSpects usually abandon their activities, which mean they may shut down their cellular phones, pagers, and other phones, and ?ee the jurisdiction or area only to resurface at another unknown location at a later date. 64. When physical surveillance is combined with interception of wLe communications, the purpose of meetings can be revealed and may constitute admissible evidence if the meetings relate to an intercepted conversation of criminal behavior. 65. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the opportunities for detection by the Target Subject(s). If surveillance were to be detected. I believe the traf?ckers? perpetual suspicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations would in their minds be con?rmed. The subjects would not only likely ?ee the area, they would also engage in wholesale abandonment of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking place. This Selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help maintain the integrity of the investigation. 66. Based on the above-stated facts and on my training and experience, your af?ant does not believe that surveillance of the above-referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target Telephone, will enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation. SEARCH WARRAN TS 67. On 61?22? 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #0122141? for a target telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-133 Page 33 Case Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 38 of 48 PageID 527 1 68. On 2-25-14, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target 2 telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge Irma Poole Asberry. 3 69. On (32?27-214, SA Baca acquired search warrant #02271412 for a target telephone 4 utilized by members of th 5 70. On 03-11-214, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03111409 for multiple target 6 telephone utilized by members of the 7 71. On 03?19-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03191403 for multiple target 8 telephone utilized by members of the 9 72. On 03?26- 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #03261411 for a target 10 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation. 11 73.. There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. 12 danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own 13 investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause 14 for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search warrants after 15 care?illy weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall 16 investigation. Generally. it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has 17 been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 18 74. DEA investigators will prepare affidavits to search the principal locations involved 19 in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations 20 involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on- 21 going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an intermediate quantity of narcotics 22 andfor controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful 23 conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all 24 members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances 25 andXor illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant 26 would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large- 27 scale narcotic traf?ckers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law 28 enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics andfor controlled Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 34 Cass i?ar?Awi?lr?AMl?I Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 39 of 48 PageID 528 substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 75. Your af?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total scepe of the illegal operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug traf?cking organization, the organizational structure, the full scoPe of the narcotics conspiracy, the locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware that higher-level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics and/or controlled substances at their residences. Although sunreillance has ide rti?ed residence{s), your af?ant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their home(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stas locations, without intercepted wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized. those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amounts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far less probative value by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conSpirators, which give full meaning to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 76. The analysis of data derived from the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 35 \omqmmeri?lg? h?ar?dl?di?tl?Ab?ti-M Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 40 of 48 PageID 529 one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been helpful in determining patterns, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls between telephones, suspects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your af?ant knows ?om experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation ?'om law enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived ?om the pen register and telephone tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for successful prosecution, especially in light of the familial structuring of this organiza-ion. Speci?cally, the details of the involvment of the participants, and the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before successful surveillance Operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. 77. Based on the above, your af?ant believes that pen registers, toll analysis, and subscriber information, without the aid of a wire intercept, will not help your af?ant achieve the obiectives of the investigation. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 78. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that people who are entering or leaving the location. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuals entering and exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement within the organization, if any. However, investigators have incorporated this type of monitoring for REY LNU in order to gather vehicle information entering and exiting the This, in conjunction with wire information can lead to the identi?cation of narcotics and/or proceeds load drivers working for REY LNU. TRASH SEARCHES OF TARGET LOCATIONS 79. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 36 Cast Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 41 of 48 PageID 530 identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subject(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high?level narcotics traf?ckers and their associates go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to di3pose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me that narcotic traf?ckers will often carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it would be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in ?ont of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the A search would draw suSpicion on the law enforcement of?cers. trash search would surely dra the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subj ect(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the government?s objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor. without identift'mg themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash searchEven if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained ?om the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full scope of the consPiracy. 80. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul-de-sacs. They would be conspicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be spotted. At this time, your af?ant feels that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. 81. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects were to observe Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 3 7 Cass 43?.?th? DORIQUI Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 42 of 48 PageID 531 and disclose to the Target Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already suspicious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co?conspirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 82. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traf?ckers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and frequently will not use their residential trash containers to dispose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. 83. I ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co~conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 84. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 85. Even if investigators are able to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?183 Page 38 Cane Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 43 of 48 PageID 532 often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers frequently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail. It should be noted that investigator shave acquired some back account information over intercepted communications for REY LNU. Investigators have begun an inquiry into these accounts to determine the extent of monetary transactions, however, it should be noted that based on intercepted communications, your af?ant is aware that REY LNU operates and tranSports proceeds in bulk cash. GRAND JURY 86. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal suspects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would cooperate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the targets of this investigation. 87. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be successful in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his ?fth amendment privilege; (2) it would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conSpirators, when they are identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 39 CaDocument 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 44 of 48 PageID 533 XI. CONCLUSION 88. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I believe that the Target Subjects have committed, are committing and are about to commit the aforementioned crimes and that particular commur?cations of the Target Subject(s) over the target telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied for herein. 89. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. However, it is your af?ant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electromc communications over the Target Telephone and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your af?ant to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 90. For reasons set out in this af?davit, it is your af?ant?s opinion that the only reasonable and effective way to develop the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the person(s) involved in this conspiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested herein. 91. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order: a. Authorize the installation and/or use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. l4~1 83 Page 40 Cas; 42-0310 Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 45 of 48 PageID 534 all wireless digital functions, wireless analog functions, direct connect/digital dispatch/direct dispatch functions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in the Riverside County area. (See United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 U.S. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. c. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace Direct ConnecttDispatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. d. Authorize the installation and/or use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller and any calling features such as ?call forwarding? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel and Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services said company provides the people whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying subscribers and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through this intercept/pen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not limited to past telephone bills and records. 92. Your af?ant requests the Court order Sprinthextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 41 Ee Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 46 of 48 PageID 535 provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order, Within 48 hours (including after-business hours, weekends, and holidays), and without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging device(s), cellular/wireless telephone(s), calling card(s), and other communication device(s) contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed. in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary numberfaccount, billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone number(s), and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation. 0. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, andfor GPS location information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 270303). d. Provide any and all cell site data, including, but not limited to, cell site Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 42 Ca. i?ll?AMI?nMi?at?I A 3e Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 47 of 48 PageID 536 location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of any and all cellular telephones, which called each Target Telephone, which was called by each Target Telephone, Which was identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or which was otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703 (D). e. Provide access and the access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. f. Provide all information related to pre?paid cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, including historical, past, present, current, and on?going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre?paid telephone account. 93. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) to continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, your af?ant requests that if the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target elephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, the Telecommunication Companies be ordered to not disclose to the Target Subj ect(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, the Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the court?s order. 94. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprinth extel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the order has authorized this wire interception, or of its existence. 95. Your affiant requests the Court to authorize law enforcement of?cers use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify the target telephone(s). 96. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 43 Document 27-6 Filed 02/16/16 Page 48 of 48 PageID 537 Case 1 of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to 2 execute such intercept order. 97. Your affiant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Application, its af?davit, 5 and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the 6 Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 7 98. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this 8 Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug 9 Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a 10 showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. 11 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at 12 Riverside, California. 1 3 14 Dated: Apnti, 2014 15 Special Agent Emilio J. Base 16 Drug Enforcement Administration 1 7 18 Sworn to and subscribed before me on April 2014. 9 20 (Q 21 HO ORABL HELIOS J. HERNANDEZ 22 CO TY RIVERSIDE STA OF CALIFORNIA 23 24 25 26 27 28 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-183 Page 44 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 54 PageID 538 1 PAUL E. ZELLERBACH 2 DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 6 Fax: (951) 955-9673 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 9 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 14-558 10 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER 1 1 AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF APPLICATION WIRE, PAGER AND ELECTRONIC 12 Target Telephone #31: 13 Target Telephone #32: 909-994-2290 Target Telephone #33: . i . I 14 Target Telephone #34: - 15 Tar at Telehone #35: 16 APPLICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. 17 I, CREG G. DATIG, Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, declare: 18 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Paul E. Zellerbach. 19 I am the Riverside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code 20 section 21 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order 22 Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Drug 23 Enforcement Administration, Special Agent Emilio Baca, and relying thereon, I approve making 24 this Application and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to 25 intercept wire, pager and electronic communications to and from the communication devices 26 (the "Target described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated 27 herein by this reference. 28 1 Application Wiretap #14?558 Case PM h?a innup- Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 2 of 54 PageID 539 3. Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her substitute, to physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic reports required by Penal Code section 629.60. 4. Special Agent Baca, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Riverside District Of?ce, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section He is certi?ed by the California State Attorney General's Of?ce in wiretaps, as set forth in the Af?davit. 5. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce Los Angeles Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal Code Section Special Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, reviewed the Af?davit and approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led herewith). 6. Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to conclude the Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and will continue to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, TranSportation and Sales of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11351, 11352, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code with respect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in proceeds from narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and conSpiracy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the meaning of Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted conversation of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, will provide additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said offenses. There is probable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes listed herein and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. 2 Application Wiretap #14-55 8 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 3 of 54 PageID 540 1 7. Pursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular 2 descriptions of the device(s) from which the communications are to be intercepted and their 3 locationsTarget Telephone #32: (909) 994?2290 #32) is a SPRINT cellular 9 phone being utilized by Raymundo CARILLO (IS and subscribed to Perris QVIS at P0 10 Box 54988, Perris, CaliforniaThe actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. 21 9. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic conuntmications 22 between the Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates and/or co?conspirators 23 concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section 24 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have 25 been attempted without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if 26 attempted, as set forth in the Af?davit. 27 11. Due to the ongoing nature of the conSpiracy related to the above offenses, and 28 because there is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those offenses will occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to Application Wiretap #14-558 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 4 of 54 PageID 541 t?a r?I Irr.12- 03 maintain this intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be deemed to automatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin Mobile U.S.A., Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, Wireless, California Products and Services, T?Mobile USA Inc., Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc., Cingular Wireless, Nextel Communications, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint?Nextel, Metrocall, PageNet, Tuyo Mobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, T- Mobile, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other affected telecommunications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecommunications Companies?) or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request of law enforcement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of furnishing the facilities and technical assistance. 13. I request this Court to order the Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. 14. Applicant requests this Application, Review, Af?davit, Order and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, and/or exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attomey's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) 15. I am unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the Af?davit Within the meaning of Penal Code Section 4 Application Wiretap #14-558 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 5 of 54 PageID 542 \ocoqoxmemmw I?l r?a in! ItL11 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice certi?ed person(s), selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement of?cer/agency, to provide linguistic interpretation for interception of Wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular telephone pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief, which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in RiversideICT ATTORNEY UNTYO ERSIDE For: PAUL E. ZELLERBACH DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE California. DATED: m/z 24 5 Application Wiretap #14-55 8 ase Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 6 of 54 PageID 543 1 PAUL E. ZELLERBACH DISTRICT ATTORNEY 2 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 6 Fax: (951) 955-9673 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 8 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO.: 14?558 9 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 10 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER INTERCEPT ORDER THE OF 1 1 WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS 12 Target Telephone #31 (909) 994-2290 Target Telephone #32 13 Target Telephone #33 14 - . Emerge. . . Target Telephone #34 Target Telephone #35 I 15 16 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE OF ELECTRONIC 17 CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS AND 18 AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA 1'9 AND AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE 20 21 INTRODUCTIOIN AND EXPERTISE 22 I, Emilio J. Baca, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 23 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration 24 (DEA), and I am an investigative or law enforcement of?cer of the United States within the 25 meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 13 of the United States Code. 26 2. I am empowered by law to conduct investigations and to make arrests for felony 27 offenses as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. I have been so employed since February 2010 and I am 28 currently assigned to the Riverside District Of?ce Task Force Group 2. I primarily investigate Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 1 ELSE Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 7 of 54 PageID 544 narcotic traf?cking and distribution organizations operating in and around Riverside County in California 3. I have received approximately 19 weeks of training at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia and was trained in all aspects of conducting narcotics investigations as well as the methods and techniques commonly used by major narcotics traf?ckers. I have attended special training in wire and electronic interceptions, toll analysis, and the use of wire and electronic interception equipment. I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical and legal aSpects of court ordered wiretaps per Penal Code Section 629 et seq. 4. During my employment with the DEA, I have participated in narcotics investigations through the surveillance, execution of search warrants, and arrests of drug traf?ckers. In addition, I have spoken to informants and suSpects regarding the methods and means of drug traffickers. I have debriefed persons arrested for controlled substance traf?cking and have debriefed informants on the methods for gathering controlled substance intelligence. I have Spoken with experienced narcotics investigators concerning the methods and practices of narcotics traf?ckers. Through my training, experience and interaction with other Special Agents, Task Force Officers, and other narcotics investigators, I have become familiar with narcotic traf?ckers? methods of operation, including the distribution, transportation, collection of proceeds and methods of laundering used in an attempt to conceal the nature of narcotic related proceeds. Through these interactions 1 have become familiar with and developed an understanding for the manner in which controlled substances are imported, manufactured, distributed, and sold, to include the methods of avoiding detection and apprehension by law enforcement of?cers. I am familiar with the manner in which narcotics traffickers use wireless communication equipment such as cellular telephone technology, pagers, coded communications, false identities, and counter surveillance to determine the presence of law enforcement and other means to facilitate their illegal activities and avoid detection or mislead a narcotics investigation. 5. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein and make this af?davit based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge 1 have gained from my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training, experience, and conversations with other law enforcement investigators with whom I have discussed this case; (3) Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 2 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 8 of 54 PageID 545 and what I believe to be reliable information obtained ?om the following sources: oral and written reports about this investigation, received from law enforcement officers; (4) law enforcement databases; (5) Pen register and trap and trace information as well as telephone records - toll records and subscriber information; (6) public records; and (7) physical surveillances conducted by DEA, West County Narcotics Task Force - Riverside County Sheriff?s Department, and other law enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 6. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a statement was made, the information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my interpretation, derived from my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics investigations. 7. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones as described below: neonates b. Target Telephone #32: (909) 994-2290 (IT #32) is a SPRINT cellular phone being utilized by Raymundo CARILLO and subscribed to Penis QVIS at PO Box 54988, Pen-is, California. REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 3 a Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 9 of 54 PageID 546 - 8' Pr 01331316 cause ?ms to believe that CARILLO (T #7 user of TT and other identi?ed and unidenti?ed co-conspirators, have committed, are committing, or are about to commit, the crimes as discussed below, and that their communications relate to those and other ongoing crimes. 9. I request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 10. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, transPOItation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11351, 11352, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code, with respect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, AN DIOR ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMNIUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 11. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty- day order to intercept the Wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to-talk voice E: I . cornrnunications, to and ?our TT #31: TT #32: 909-994-2290, TT #33: TT #34: i} between the herein named target 7' and TT #35: suspect(s) and any additional co-conspirators known and unknown and shall include any and all Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 4 9 a?t p?t a?t i?L p?I run(11 luv-?I CD se Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 10 of 54 PageID 547 communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to?tallc voice communications and any background conversations while the telephone instrument is otherwise in use. B. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA (18 SC. Sections 3121 through 3126) 12. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace feature on TT #31: TT #32: 909-994-2290, TT #33: REDACTED 35345759. 1 and TT #35: I also request the authorization to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations, if: TT #32: 909-994?2290, TT #33 TT #34: related to IT #31: j: The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular I .'REoAc'r?o and TT #35: "harass .3 telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers would be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the user of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant requests an order to obtain and receive cell site data andior Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 5 CaDocument 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 11 of 54 PageID 548 geographical limitations related to the target telephone. a. Your af?ant has learned through conversations with other law enforcement of?cers and by personal knowledge that illegal narcotic traf?ckers have the potential to disable the GPS function in their telephones if they are aware law enforcement can monitor their real time movements. Your af?ant does not solely rely on GPS locations because your af?ant knows, often times GPS requests can fail or revert to cell towers with a 5000 meter locate. I also know there are many ?dead spots? in Southern California as related to cellular service for Sprinthextel. I have been told by Sprinthextel employees if cellular telephones do not receive a signal, I will receive a failed reSponse when requesting GPS locations. b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify TT #31: #32: 909-994- and TT #35: Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is o?en unknown. However with the assistance of mobile electronic tracking devices, law enforcement agents can identify the location of a cellular telephone to a much ?ner'detail than through cellular site data alone. DURATION OF INTERCEPTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance of the Order, whichever comes ?rst, pursuant to California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the full scope, membership and methods of operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the interception not terminate when the communications described herein are ?rst intercepted, but may continue to the full extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or until the full scope of the enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in furtherance of the enterprise, whichever comes ?rst. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 6 AWN 3e Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 12 of 54 PageID 549 14. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. Therefore, your af?ant believes that additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the ?rst communication to and from the target telephone(s). IV. TARGET TELEPHONEIS) (Penal Code section 15. 10 pun-I p?l 12 13 14 15 The Target Telephones are described as follows: neon cram b. Target Telephone #32: (909) 994-2290 (TT #32) is a SPRINT cellular phone being utilized by Raymundo CARILLO (TS and subscribed to Penis QVIS at PO Box 54988, Penis, CaliforniaEEDACTED 1. The term ?Target Telephone #31-35? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation (IMSI) number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address and/or Push-to-talk (PTI) number, and/or Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, andfor DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), andfor Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 7 se Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 13 of 54 PageID 550 any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IF, PTT andfor DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone number(s) and/or ESN and/or IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC Whether the changes occni~ simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as the target telephone(s). 2. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names when obtaining Pre?Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement from immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suspects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. V. TARGET SUBJECTS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 16. The known Target Subject(s) of this investigation are: - REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?558 Page 8 . Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 14 of 54 PageID 551 REDACTED g. Raymundo CARILLO aka CEJAS (Target Subject 7) previously listed as Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ. Investigators previously had identi?ed the target subject known as as CHAVEZ based on information obtained from GPS pings, secondary narcotics investigation indicating CHAVEZ was associated with 1135 W. 7th Street, Ferris, California, the residence identi?ed from GPS pings on phones utilized by and physical surveillances. It should be noted that CHAVEZ has a listed address of 1111 W. ?7th Street, Penis, California 92570. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-5 5 8 Page 9 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 15 of 54 PageID 552 However, further investigative analysis indicated the subject known as was actually CARILLO. On October 23, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in Perris, California pursuant to GPS pings of TT #32, used by CARILLO. On the same date, investigators positively identi?ed as CARILLO from a state of California booking photo. It should be noted that surveillance observations on movements were also concurrent to GPS pings of TT #32. CARILLO is a HiSpanic male with a Date of Birth of .. and has been the subject of Riverside County Wire Intercepts 14-120, 14?183 and criminal history includes arrests for HS 11377 from 2001 and records indicate police contacts for CARILLO at 23802 Lake Drive, Perris, California. Investigators have obtained vehicle plates observed at this residence which come back to a member of this DTO. h. CHRIS LNU (Las Name Unknown Target Subject 8) is a HiSpanic male identi?ed only as CHRIS with an unknown Date of Birth, Hair, Eyes, Weight, Height, or place of i' Rania, residence. Investigators believe CHRIS is a coordinator for the and possible cell head with connections to Kentucky. Investigators are working to identify CHRIS LNU and are communicating with Kentucky DEA case agents. Remorse I j. Ronald Ashley SHEWMAKER (Target Subject 10): is described as a White male, with a date of birth of REL-365750 Hair: Red, Eyes: Brown, Weight: 2201bs., Height: 5, According to Department of Motor Vehicles, SHEWMAKER is issued Kentucky Driver?s License with an address of II I Lebanon Jot, Kentucky 40150. Your REDACIED af?ant found no documented criminal history for SHEWMAKER. REDAC TED ?3 davit Wiretap Order No. 14-65 8 Page 10 Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 16 of 54 PageID 553 - REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 11 a Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 17 of 54 PageID 554 . REDACTED REDA CYED Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 18 of 54 PageID 555 JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 17. California Penal Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was improperly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The coun: held ?for Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 13 Ca 3e Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 19 of 54 PageID 556 the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the tapped telephone is located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are ?rst to be hear (Ibid, at page 136) In United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the original listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction have authority under Title to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodriguez court noted, this interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge to supervise an investigation that spans more than one judicial distric (livid, at pages 403?404) Also see United States v. Ramirea, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 18. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use cellular telephone(s), use ?ctitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by law enforcement. By using other persons? names and creating a ?ctitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a certain degree of anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the p0pula1ity of pro-paid cellular telephones among those Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 14 Cane Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 20 of 54 PageID 557 engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these suSpects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to ?ee the area of the crime. 19. This investigation into the CARILLO (TS and encompasses the distribution of narcotics to multiple states across the continental United States to include, but not limited to, Missouri, Texas, Georgia and Kentucky. There are several narcotics investigations involving multiple segments/cells for this DTO currently being investigated by DEA (St. Louis and Lexington) as well as by Local Narcotics Teams (Louisville, KY area). Although the primary jurisdiction for TT #31-35 is based on the listening post, as outlined above, key members of this DTO operate Within the Penis area of Riverside County wherefrom narcotics and proceeds originate andjor are destined for. This af?davit is made in ?irtherance of multiple members of the DTO Operating across the US whose narcotics activities filter back to Riverside and surrounding counties. - - REDA CTED 32 used I. CARILLO (TS was identi?ed over wire communications for BETO (TS #20, as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-508. A Riverside County Search Warrant, R1102020149, requesting GPS pings of TT #32 was granted on October 20, 2014. GPS pings place TT #32 in Penis, California. In May of 2014, investigators seized approximately $420,000 US Currency in Penis, California which was destined to be received by CARILLO. REDA CTED Ca Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 21 of 54 PageID 558 25. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. This is suf?cient in and of itself to confer jurisdiction to this court. VII. PRIOR APPLICATIONS (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 26. On October 24, 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the California Department of Justice reference the Electronic Intercept Court Order System for 11? #31-35. 27. On October 24 2014, your af?ant requested checks of the United States Department of Justice wiretap database to determine if any Federal applications had been made to initiate a Title wiretap intercept of TT #3165. 28. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places Speci?ed in this Application, within the meaning of Pena! Code section 62 9.5 REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 16 . . Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 22 of 54 PageID 559 I IREDA CTED Remorse f. I verside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120: On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court, State of California granted and issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14?120, which authorized the interception of the communication to and from TT j" 35545755 1.. TT #10: (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. . hem crap Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?558 Page 17 a Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 23 of 54 PageID 560 h. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-183: on April 7, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14?183, authorizing the initiation of State wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone #13 502?609-5967, Target Telephone #14 702-885-7486, Target Telephone #1 and Target Telephone #16 951-322-0063. i. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14?120 Extension 1: On April 8, 2014, Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-120 Ext 1, authorizing the initiation of State Wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone #11 951-570-0461. I REDA CTED REDA GTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 18 Telephone #31-35 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 24 of 54 PagelD 561 OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 29. Year af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target investigation which include discovering: a. The ?ll scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 19 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 25 of 54 PageID 562 g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support A conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. IX. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE (Penal Code section 30. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate drug traf?cking. 31. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I assert that: a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, have committed, or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11351, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and Conspiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, with respect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning the above-named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Penal Code section 629.52Cb) 32. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the places where, the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above-named offenses or are leased to, listed in the name of or commonly used by the Target Subjects whose communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 33. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more fully explained below. (Penal Code section 34. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I further assert that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence A?idavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 20 rDocument 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 26 of 54 PageID 563 regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in furtherance of the narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places involved in the manufactming and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, will be obtained through the interception of wire communications over the Target Telephones. 35. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived from participation in this investigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: 3. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that I have received from the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; b. Physical surveillance conducted by the Riverside Sheriff Department (RSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; c. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other documentary evidence in this and other investigations and, d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. f. Evidence obtained through court-authorized intercept orders. A IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #31 REDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 21 Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 27 of 54 PageID 564 . REDACTED a. . Investigators Note: In October of 2014, your af?ant learned that HIDTA 51 of the DEA Los Angeles Field Division is working a source of information (SOI) into this segment of the DTO. Your af?ant learned that on October 19, 2014, investigators seized approximately 250,000 US Currency which, based on SOI information, originated ?orn the Kentucky cell operated by Chris MATTINGLY at the direction of awe -f and CARILLO (TS The currency was seized in in Barstow, California. Based on this information, your af?ant asserts that the above listed call coincides with SCI information and that UM4265 coordinated the Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 22 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 28 of 54 PageID 565 bulk cash smuggling. 40. The above listed calls and parenthetical explanations are based on my training, experience, and intelligence gained during this investigation and are related to narcotics distribution. B. DENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #32 CARILLO aka CEJAS (TS investigators determined that TS #7 is the user of TT #32. 43. The foiiowing intercepted conununications made to or from 909~?94~2299 (T #32) as intercepted over 678-542-7349 and authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-508, are indicative of the scepe of narcotics related activities associated with the use of the target telephone used by CARILLO. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics related activities associated with CARILLO and the target telephone which he utilizes. 44. On October 18, 2014, at approximately 4:04 Target Telephone #32, used by CARILLO (TS received an incoming call from telephone number REDACTED number 530, used by referring to the ones (possibly narcotics) that were sent over there. "thirteen"; yes. CARILLO said supposedly they went (sold) for nine because the dude complained about them (narcotics) being bad and ugly (quality). CARILLO said he met with the other guy and gave him (third party) the same ones (narcotics) and he (guy) said they were pretty (referring to quality). CARILLO said they might have gotten messed up in the thought by CARILLO). CARILLO said the other guys said they (narcotics) were pretty (referring to quality) but (phonetic) were ugly was given some (narcotics). CARILLO said no, (referring to quality). asked if retire: Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-5 58 Page 23 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 29 of 54 PageID 566 they gave (phonetic) eight, and mentioned that he (CARILLO) had not seen his ?Compadre? (pal) ho was not given anything either. CARILLO told 0 charge that dude because he kept ?ve (narcotic units). said okay. CARILLO said to tell him to take the money from there and for 0 ask 1 peso (referring to 1 thousand) for them. CARILLO said he asked that son of bitch what number (price) they had given him, and he said he did not know. CARILLO said he told him the deal was done and mentioned they (CARILLO and others) were not going to make any pro?t. CARILLO said he knew how they were (quality) because he (CARILLO) was the one that sent (coordinated tranSport) them (narcotics) but he (CARILLO) was not going to argue about it. said what happened was they (narcotics) were closed up for several days and it was too hot. CARILLO said he believed so. aid they (narcotics) fucken stink up. CARILLO said they were brownish. said that was why, because of the heat. CARILLO said the dude had not said anything to him (CARILLO) about the money; supposedly he (third party) was going to get the asking price. CARILLO said he would give them (CARILLO) nine and he would keep 100. cursed and said it was not enough for sodas. CARILLO said all those peeple over there were dif?cult to work with, CARILLO said he was afraid to go over there (possibly Kentucky). said he was told to put (possibly send) some in Tene, about eight or 10 (narcotics units). said he would look into it later. CARILLO said alright, that dude had not said anything to him (CARILLO), he just asked if they (CARILLO and others) needed the money but he (CARILLO) was embarrassed. CARILLO mentioned that dude had to leave and he (CARJLLO) was afraid that maybe he (dude) did not sell it (narcotics) after all. asked who CARILLO was referring to. CARILLO said (phonetic) buddy. asked if he (dude) sold it. CARILLO said supposedly he (dude) had already sold it but he (dude) CTED had an emergency and CARILLO was not sure if he (dude) ended up selling it. emcee told CARILLO they should ask for the paper (currency). CARILLO said that other dude offered it (possibly money) to him (CARILLO) but he (CARILLO) told him (other dude) to wait. CARILLO said they would see what happens. a?qh?r?n' said alright. C. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #33 2 I REDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 24 . Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 30 of 54 PageID 567 CTED REDA C750 REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 25 a Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 31 of 54 PageID 568 D. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #34 REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14?5 5 8 Page 26 . -. Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 32 of 54 PageID 569 I REDA CTED r?4 REDACTED E. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #35 IREDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 27 Cae Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 33 of 54 PageID 570 I 1 REDA CTED REDA CTED Ca i. Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 34 of 54 PageID 571 - REDA CTED XI. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SEIZURES 61. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may not be directly connected to the Target Subject(s) of this Af?davit, unless otherwise noted, all seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the Target Subject(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, sophistication, and ability of these organizations. a. On December 12, 2013, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop at Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol K-9 unit alerted to the rear of the vehicle. Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine (approxirnately 5 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his front pants pocket. b. On January 1, 2014, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle impounded on 12?12-43 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-658 Page 29 Ca. MAD-1M WOO-Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 35 of 54 PageID 572 c. On March 3, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped ff ehicle (GZOV570) at the 91 Fwy and Green River Rd in Corona. Vehicle was 3_ .I . pagans}: .I3 .132} .: impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators seized approximately 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine ?'om vehicle truck area. d. On March 14, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped vehicle in Riverside County. Investigators seized approximately 10 pounds of methamphetamine from the vehicle. e. On May 4, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Department stopped Ronald SHEWMAKER in Penis, California pursuant to information deveIOped from wire communications on Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ (TS which indicated that proceeds were to be delivered. On the same date, investigators seized approximately $420,000 US. Currency concealed within the vehicle operated by SHEWMAKER. In addition to the currency, investigator seized the transport vehicle. f. On June 18, 2014, pursuant to information developed through this investigation, a search warrant was executed at the residence located at 27680 Irma Street, Perris, California. The search produced approximately 1 pound of methamphetamine. g. On July 2, 2014, pursuant to information deve10ped through this investigation into a search warrant was executed at three locations "imam identi?ed as narcotics, proceeds and processing locations for The search produced approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine and small amounts of heroin and marijuana. Addition to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. h. On July 15, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of 422 Surveillance units observed ?shnets-e- Devener, Riverside, California on a follow vehicle in tandem with a secondary vehicle believe to be a load '3 3 car. On the same date, investigators seized approximately 40 pounds of marijuana and arrested one target subject. i. On July 18, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of Whittier Blvd, and Gerhart in the city of Los Angeles, California pursuant to intercepted Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 30 ase Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 36 of 54 PageID 573 communications on 32.9.2513'22' Riverside County Wire Intercept which indicated that was to receive a narcotics shipment. On the same date, investigators conduct a vehicle step of a white BMW and executed a Los Angeles County search warrant at the primary residence of 33?; identi?ed as 757 Hendricks Avenue, los Angeles, California. At the residence, investigators seized approximately $30,000.00 US Currency, 3 guns, and small amounts of methamphetamine and arrested PACAS identi?ed as On July 21, 2014, a search of the vehicle produced approximately 45 pounds of methamphetamine concealed Within the ?oorboard of the vehicle and accessed through aftermarket trap compartment from the driver and passenger side ?oorboards. X. NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 62. Interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather evidence against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed, appear reasonably likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation -- to obtain direct evidence that will convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of: a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; I f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 14?558 Page 31 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 37 of 54 PageID 574 narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 63. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in identifying and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 64. Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or his/their known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conspiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subject(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruth?il statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conspiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMAN TS 65. It appears that this organization is a close-knit organization whose members are either blood relatives, mutual friends and/or very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large?scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would?be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain from potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, andfor its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 32 El se Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 38 of 54 PageID 575 and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 66. In October of 2014, your af?ant became aware that 3. Con?dential Source has information on members of this DTO and was capable of providing information on members of this DTO. Your af?ant has been communicating with respective Law Enforcement Of?cers directing the CS to gather Intel on members of this DTO. Based on my communications with CS controlling investigators it appears that the CS will be unable to determine the scope of this criminal enterprise, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their full methods of operation. The and is a compartmentalized DTO that layers its distribution network between oizationl members across various states. At this time, it appears the CS can af?rm the identity of key members of the DTO, however, investigators cannot obtain enough information on the modus Operandi for the importation, distribution, acquisition of narcotics proceeds, and the identity of cell heads operating on their behalf in California, Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, Missouri etc. A wire intercept on key members of this DTO, coupled with CS information can provide the best result for obtaining the goals of this investigation. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS I AGENTS 67. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. If the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 68. Due to the close-knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique fraught with failure and would most likely jeepardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore, the leaders of drug traf?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. 69. As previously noted, it is a common practice for individuals involved in large Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 33 PM til-th OOHJON Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 39 of 54 PageID 576 scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suspicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouch? for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned compartmentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any further than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 70. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subject(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. 71. If a Con?dential Source CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy ?om the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight-knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the organization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upon my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. 72. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an attempt to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 73. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 34 El (mm?123mm se Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 40 of 54 PageID 577 is o?en unknown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 74. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. 75. Surveillance has been conducted of subject(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?'eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his identi?cation. The subject was unable to produce any identi?cation, but verbally identi?ed himself as Victor Arredondo, with a date of birth of Reoncrso _f 23-599mm? Isa; . up Heroin with with his consent, for "3 Target Telephone Deputy Wicker took a picture of identi?cation, and subsequently released him. TFO Layos conducted ?uther investigation of I identity. Via Riverside County Sheriff's Departments data base, . [ashram with a date birth of I mamas and revealed contacts for . . . .- Wildornar. TFO Layos also found DMV records Index number - - with a date of and address of address of REDA cram X8725114 for - Remorse I Wildornar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed that the person . CTED Deputy Wicker stopped was in fact b. On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside Sheriffs Department (RSD) - South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted surveillance of mamas f: esidence, located at Wildornar. During the surveillance, a black I- Jaguar with paper plates was observed leaving Remorse residence and ultimately stopped by CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TFGZ and seized approximately 5le of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 35 tse Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 41 of 54 PageID 578 occupant of the vehicle, was arrested by CHP Of?cer Mendenhall for state felony violations of 11378 HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case F-532-801- 13. A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Heroin and 2 of Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. c. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the city of Temecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside County Wire Intercept Investigators identi?ed d. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on I I I in the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted text message converations as authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-79 which indicated that as to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed to Carson, California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. c. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 W. 7th Street, Perris, California on two houses associated with REY. Investigators followed two Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. DOB: Investigators One of the subjects was identi?ed as I I Still working on damming if is REY and the user of TT #10-12. Note: REDA CTED REDAC TED has been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. f. On March 19, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance eon UM8364 pursuant to GPS pings of TT #15. Investigators identi?ed a possible residence for UM8364 and an associated vehicle (silver Honda Civic bearing California plate 7ADV247). Additionally, on the same date, investigators located the user of TT #15 (UM8364) at a shopping plaza located off Atlantic and Clara. Surveillance units observed UM8364 and an unidenti?ed Hispanic male conduct counter techniques such as squaring the block and looking into parked vehicle to identify possible surveillance by law enforcement. g. On March 20, 2014, investigators conducted a brief surveillance on I Renderso . in the county of Riverside oif the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-5 5 8 Page 36 El R-JONUI 3e Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 42 of 54 PageID 579 to identify the vehicle operated by the narcotics courier working for UM8364. On the same date, investigators acquired the vehicle information. h. On June 25, 2014, investigators conducted a follow up with Motel 6 off the 210 and the 215 freeways pursuant to information obtained from Wire communications which indicated that was to acquire narcotics at that location. Investigators identi?ed ough information provided to Motel 6 staff and subsequently conducted a drive by of the listed address to acquire additional information. IIREPACTED In June and July of 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on i. in the county of Riverside off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order to refresh information used in furtherance of a Riverside County search warrant for his residence and associated iocations. On July 1, 2014, investigators observed a vehicle ente residence, and deliver two 5 gallon bails. On the same date, intercepted communication indicated that as in possession of narcotics. . HUREDACTED. . Remorse j? on July 2: 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on the vicinity of Bundy Canyon between the 15 and 215 freeways pursuant to information obtained was to acquire narcotics from an from wire which indicated that unidenti?ed third party. On the same date, investigators observed a Hispanic male operating a red Mercedes enter the If residence. Shortly thereafter, investigators executed a Riverside County search warrant on three locations associated with .. k. Riverside, California on On July 15, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the vicinity of I g: Investigators ultimately seiZed REDACTED I approximately 40 pounds of marijuana. 1. On July 17, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of We? ?ammo Remorse "ff: Los Angeles, California, the primary residential location of assume as identified by Global Positioning System (GPS) pings of Target Telephone #23, authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14-369, as well as in the vicinity of the K-Inart/ Dearden?s parking lot located off Whittier Blvd, and S. Gerhart Avenue, Los Angeles, California. At the residence was a black lifted Yukon consistent with intercepted communications during which tates that he drives a ?black lift Yukon?. At approximately 4:15 p.1n., surveillance units of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 37 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 43 of 54 PageID 580 7CPL313 leave the target residence and proceed west on 4th street. Investigators followed the vehicle to a Subway restaurant located off 411] Street and Wilkerson Ave, Ferris, California. Investigators G. Rohn of conducted foot surveillance and observed CARILLO (TS inside the Subway restaurant, consistent with GPS results on #32. At that point surveillance was terminated. 76. Surveillance operations have been successful to the extent they have established persons andfor vehicles arriving at, and/or departing from principal locations; and extended the scope of the investigation to additional locations and co-conspirators. However, surveillance Operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of Operation and the manner in which their operation is conducted. 77. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co- conspirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suspected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an investigative technique that is used to con?rm meetings and other suspected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 78. Your af?ant knows from training and experience, and from speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic traf?cking organizations is limited to placing individuals together without knowing the signi?cance of their meeting or the role of each traf?cker. Furthermore, based on my training and experience, surveillance of major narcotics traf?ckers is often dif?cult without detection. Physical surveillance is often limited to watching suspects ?orn a distance, which as an investigative technique, can be problematic. Your af?ant believes that excess random surveillance of a location without knowledge when a narcotics transaction will be taking place, could expose the identity of the of?cers and thereby compromise the investigation. Even if blanket, twenty-four hour surveillance were feasible, Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 39 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 44 of 54 PageID 581 would still be limited to providing information only on the movements and whereabouts of the Target Subject(s). If the Target Subject(s) su3pected he was being watched by law enforcement personnel, he could abandon his phone and move his activities to a different location, thus effectively ending the current on?going investigation until he was located again. A wire intercept would greatly assist the agents because they could be deployed more effectively knowing about a future narcotics transaction. This would allow surveillance to be set up on strategic locations, thereby lessening the risk of compromising the investigation. 79. Furthermore, your af?ant knows from past investigations that narcotics traf?ckers use various counter-surveillance driving techniques. These techniques include frequent u-turns, stopping in parking lots to observe traf?c, waiting at traf?c lights to allow traf?c to pass, speed variations, and taking circuitous routes through residential neighborhoods. All of these methods are used for the sole purpose of determining the presence of law enforcement personnel. These methods are frequently successful, as it is extremely dif?cult to follow susPects who employ these methods without being detected. Once detected, these suSpects usually abandon their activities, which mean they may shut down their cellular phones, pagers, and other phones, and ?ee the jurisdiction or area only to resurface at another unknown location at a later date. 80. When physical surveillance is combined with interception of wire communications, the purpose of meetings can be revealed and may constitute admissible evidence if the meetings relate to an intercepted conversation of criminal behavior. 81. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the opportunities for detection by the Target Subject(s). If surveillance were to be detected, I believe the traf?ckers? perpetual suspicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations would in their minds be con?rmed. The subjects would not only liker flee the area, they would also engage in wholesale abandonment of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking place. This selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help maintain the integrity of the investigation. 82. Based on the above?stated facts and on my training and experience, your af?ant Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 40 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 45 of 54 PageID 582 1 does not believe that surveillance of the above?referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target 2 Telephone, will enable the government to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 3 SEARCH WARRANTS 4 83. On 01~22- 2014, Detective Carnelian wrote search warrant #0122141? for a target 5 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. 6 84. On (32-25-2014, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target 7 telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge Irma Poole Asben'y. 8 85. On 02-27?2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #02271412 for a target telephone 9 utilized by mmbers ofthe 10 86. On 03-11-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03111409 for multiple target 1 1 telephone utilized by members of the Beretta. 12 87. On 03-19-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03191403 for multiple target 13 telephone utilized by mmbers ofthe 14 88. On 03-26? 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant #03261411 for a target 15 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation. 16 89. On July 1, 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant #1210701201413 for two 17 target telephones associated with this ongoing investigation. 13 90. On July 2, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Of?ce, Southwest Corridor Narcotics 19 Task Force, investigators acquired a Riverside County Search warrant of for treatise" Wildoznar, California and I i Wildomar, California. Investigators 21 seized approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine, small amounts of heroin and 4 pounds of 22 marijuana. In addition to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. 23 91. On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca write and signed search warrant 24 for Target Telephone #25 utilized by 'rroro'rro 2 5 92. On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Ios Angeles County search warrant 25 for the primary residence of am. later identi?ed as located at 27 Los Angeles. California. 23 93. On August 13, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Los Angeles County search warrant for the primary residence of imam? if:- located Los Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 41 Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 46 of 54 PageID 583 Angeles, California. This search was a follow up search based on information that developed through intercepted communications. 94. There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. That danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search warrants after carefully weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall investigation. Generally, it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 95. DEA investigators will prepare af?davits to search the principal locations involved in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on- going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an intermediate quantity of narcotics and/or controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances and/or illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large- scale narcotic traffickers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics and/or controlled substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 96. Your af?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total sc0pe of the illegal operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug traf?cking organization, the organizational structure, the full scope of the narcotics conSpiracy, the locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 42 ALI-5N ROGUE-JOECape Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 47 of 54 PageID 584 that higher?level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics and/or controlled substances at their residences. Although surveillance has identi?ed residence(s), your af?ant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their horne(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stash? locations, without intercepted Wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized, those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amormts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far iess probative vaiue by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conspirators, which give full meaning to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants?were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 97. The analysis of data derived from the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been helpful in determining pattems, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls between telephones, suspects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your af?ant knows from experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation from law enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived from the pen register and telephone tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for successful prosecution, especially in light of the familial Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 43 Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 48 of 54 PageID 585 structuring of this organization. Speci?cally, the details of the involvement of the participants, and the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before successful surveillance operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. 98. Based on the above, your af?ant believes that pen registers, toll analysis, and subscriber information, without the aid of a Wire intercept, will not help your affrant achieve the objectives of the investigation. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 99. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that pe0ple who are entering or leaving the location. It is your af?ant?s Opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuais entering and exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement within the organization, if any. TRASH SEARCHES OF TARGET LOCATIONS 100. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subject(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high-level narcotics traffickers and their associates go to geat to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to dispose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me that narcotic traf?ckers will often carry trash aWay from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it would be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in front of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the search would draw suspicion on the law enforcement of?cers. A trash search would surely draw the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subject(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the govermnent?s Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 44 CaDocument 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 49 of 54 PageID 586 objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor, without identifying themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash search. Even if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained from the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full scepe of the conspiracy. 101. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul-de-sacs. They would be conspicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be .1 spotteu. At 102. this time, your af?ant feeis that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects were to observe and disclose to the Target Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already suspicious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co-conSpirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 103. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traffickers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and ?equently will not use their residential trash containers to dispose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 45 Ca 3e Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 50 of 54 PageID 587 104. I ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would be suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co~conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 105. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 106. Even if investigators we able to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers ?equently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail and that the majority of the proceeds is transported in bulk via passenger vehicles. GRAND JURY 107. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal suSpects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would cooperate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 46 Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 51 of 54 PageID 588 targets of this investigation. 103. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be successful in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his ?fth amendment privilege; (2) it would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conspirators, when they are identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. XI. CONCLUSION 109. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I believe that the Target Subjects have committed, are committing and are about to commit the aforementioned crimes and that particular communications of the Target Subject(s) over the target telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied for herein. 110. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. However, it is your af?ant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electronic communications over the Target Telephone and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your af?ant to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 111. For reasons set out in this affidavit, it is your af?ant?s Opinion that the only reasonable and effective way to deveIOp the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the person(s) involved in this conSpiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested herein. 112. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Sprinthextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 47 woo-damaCase 3:15-c - - 00099 DJH Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 52 of 54 PageID 589 Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecormnunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as 181?), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order: a. Authorize the installation andlor use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, all wireless digital functions, wireless analog functions, direct connectfdigital dispatch/direct dispatch functions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are fest heard or accessed in the Riverside County area. (See United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation andf or use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. I 0. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace Direct Connect/Dispatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. (1. Authorize the installation andfor use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller I and any calling features such as ?call forward'ng? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel and Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception said company provides the unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services people whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying subscribers Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-5 58 Page 48 Case Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 53 of 54 PageID 590 and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through this intercethpen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not limited to past telephone bills and records. 113. Your af?ant requests the Court order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all providers subject to regulation by the Federal Commission to provide telecomunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order, within 48 hours (including after?business hours, weekends, and holidays), and without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging device(s), cellular/wireless telephone(s), calling card(s), and other communication device(s) contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary number/account, billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone numbeds), and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation. 0. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, and/or GPS location information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 49 Ca se Document 27-7 Filed 02/16/16 Page 54 of 54 PageID 591 117. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to execute such intercept order. 118. Your af?ant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 119. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. I deciare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and currect. Executed at Special Agent Emilio J. Baca Drug Enforcement Administration Riverside, California. F, Dated: November 5 ,2014 r" 5 Sworn to and subscribed before me on November COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE HONORABL HELIOS .T. HERNANDEZ STATE OF ALIFORNIA Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 14-558 Page 51 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 72 PageID 592 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 955-9673 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRETAP NO. 15-108 . 2 WIRE, PAGER AND ELECTRONIC 1 APPLICATION Target Telephone #38: ammo -. Target Telephone #39: Tamet Telephone #40: 502-609?593 APPLICATION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 629.50, Et Seq. I, John Aki., Chief Assistant District Attorney for the County of Riverside, declare: 1. Applicant is the District Attorney of the County of Riverside, Michael A. Hestrin. I am the Riverside County District Attorney?s designee, as de?ned in California Penal Code section 2. After reviewing the Af?davit In Support Of Application For An Order Authorizing The Interception Of Wire And Electronic Communications of Riverside Drug Enforcement Administration, Special Agent Emilio Base, and relying thereon, I approve making this Application and hereby apply to the Riverside County Superior Court for authorization to intercept wire, pager and electronic communications to and from the communication devices (the "Target described below. The Af?davit is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 3. Applicant hereby assigns Deputy District Attorney Deena M. Bennett, or her substitute, to physically present this Application to the Court and to make the required periodic reports required by Penal Code section 629.60. 1 . Application Wiretap 15-10 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 2 of 72 PageID 593 Woo-4thme 4. Special Agent Baca, assigned to the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Riverside District Office, is the law enforcement of?cer seeking authorization to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to Penal Code Section He is certified by the California State Attorney IGeneral's Of?ce in wiretaps, as set forth in the Af?davit. 5. Pursuant to Penal Code Section the DEA Riverside District Of?ce, Los Angeles Field Division, is the agency that will execute this Order and, pursuant to Penal Code Section Special Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, reviewed the Af?davit and approves this Application (see Review of the Chief Executive Of?cer ?led herewith). 6. Based on my review of the Af?davit, I believe there is probable cause to conclude the Target Subjects as set forth in the Af?davit have committed, are committing, and will continue to commit the crimes of Importation, Possession for Sale, Transportation and Sales of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections, 11378 and 11379 of the Health and Safety Code with respect to a substance containing cocaine andfor methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight, and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, as well as the possession of over $100,000 in proceeds from narcotics transactions in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and conspiracy to commit said offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, within the meaning of Penal Code Sections and and that intercepted conversation of these persons, along with any additional known and unknown co-conspirators, will provide additional evidence regarding the Target Subjects? involvement in said o??enses. There is probable cause to believe the Target Subjects possess information about the crimes listed herein and will discuss these matters over the Target Telephone. 7. Pursuant to Penal Code Section following are particular descriptions of the device(s) from which the communications are to be intercepted and their locations: REDA CTED Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 3 of 72 PageID 594 l-Ineoncren - c. Target Telephone #40: (502) 609-5937 (TT #40) is an cellular phone being utilized by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS and subscribed to Christopher MATTINGLY at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being utilized by MATTINGLY. 8. The actual interception and monitoring post will be in Riverside County. 9. The communications to be intercepted are wire and electronic communications between the Target Subjects and other known and unknown associates andfor co-conspirators concerning the offenses set forth above, as set forth in Penal Code Section 10. I have been informed and believe that conventional investigation techniques have been attempted without success or reasonably appear too dangerous or unlikely to succeed if attempted, as set forth in the Af?davit. 11. Due to the ongoing nature of the conspiracy related to the above offenses, and because there is probable cause to believe that multiple communications related to those o??enses will occur during the course of interception and monitoring, I request that authority to maintain this intercept be granted for thirty (30) days and request that the authority not be deemed to automatically terminate upon interception of the ?rst communication of the type described above. 12. I request that this Court order Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin - Mobile U.S.A., Paci?c Bell Company, Virgin Mobile, SBC, Verizon Communications, Wireless, California Products and Services, T-Mobile USA Inc., Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, T-Page Plus Communications, Inc., Cingular Wireless, Nextel Communications, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless, Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint PCS, Sprint-Nextel, Metrocall, PageNet, Tuyo higobile (an IDT Company), Weblink Wireless, Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 4 of 72 PageID 595 Mobile, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, HotPop, Apple Inc., Microsoft, and any other affected telecommunications companies, subsidiaries, or entities (the ?Telecommunications Companies?) or electronic mail service providers (the ?Email Service Providers?) upon request of law enforcement, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference of the services being provided the Target Subjects. The Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the reasonable costs of furnishing the facilities and technical assistance. 13. I request this Court to order the Telecommunications Companies or the Email Service Providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the court has authorized this wiretap. 14. Applicant requests this Application, Review, Affidavit, Order and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, andfor exhibits be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Office and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) 15. I am unaware of any previous relevant wiretaps other than those set forth in the Af?davit within the meaning of Penal Code Section 4 Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 5 of 72 PageID 596 1 16. Applicant designates any California Department of Justice certi?ed person(s), 2 selected and supervised by the investigative or law enforcement officer/agency, to provide linguistic interpretation for interception of Wire, electronic digital pager and electronic cellular 4 telephone communications, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.94. 5 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 6 foregoing is true and correct, except as to those matters declared on information and belief 7 which matters I believe to be true, and that this Application was executed in Riverside, 3 California. 9 10 DATED01-11 ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 12 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 13 For: MICHAEL A. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 14 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Application Wiretap #15408 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 6 of 72 PageID 597 1 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 Fax: (951) 955?9673 6 7 8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 10 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO.: 15-108 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 1 1 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER INTERCEPT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF 12 WIRE ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS Target Telephone #39 (502) 609?5937 Target Telephone #40 I 15 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION 15 FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC 17 CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS . AND AN ORDER OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING 13 CELLULAR SITE DATA AND 19 AN ORDER AUTHORIZING A PEN REGISTER TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE 20 I 21 INTRODUCTION AND EXPERTISE 22 I, Emilio J. Baca, being duly sworn do hereby declare and state: 23 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration 24 (DEA), and I am an investigative or law enforcement of?cer of the United States within the 25 meaning of Section 2510 (7) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 26 2. I am empowered by law to conduct investigations and to make arrests for felony 27 offenses as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 2516. I have been so employed since February 2010 and I am 28 currently assigned to the Riverside District Of?ce Task Force Group 2. I primarily investigate Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 1 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 7 of 72 PageID 598 narcotic traf?cking and distribution organizations Operating in and around Riverside County in California 3. I have received approximately 19 weeks of training at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia and was trained in all aspects of conducting narcotics investigations as well as the methods and techniques commonly used by major narcotics traf?ckers. I have attended special training in wire and electronic interceptions, toll analysis, and the use of wire and electronic interception equipment. I am certi?ed by the California State Attorney General?s Of?ce in the practical, technical and legal aspects of court ordered wiretaps per Penal Code Section 629 et seq. 4. During my employment with the DEA, I have participated in narcotics investigations through the surveillance, execution of search warrants, and arrests of drug traf?ckers. In addition, I have spoken to informants and suspects regarding the methods and means of drug traf?ckers. I have debriefed persons arrested for controlled substance traf?cking and have debriefed informants on the methods for gathering controlled substance intelligence. I have Spoken with experienced narcotics investigators concerning the methods and practices of narcotics traf?ckers. Through my training, experience and interaction with other Special Agents, Task Force Of?cers, and other narcotics investigators, I have become familiar with narcotic traf?ckers? methods of operation, including the distribution, transportation, collection of proceeds and methods of laundering used in an attempt to conceal the nature of narcotic related proceeds. Through these interactions I have become familiar with and developed an understanding for the manner in which controlled substances are imported, manufactured, distributed, and sold, to include the methods of avoiding detection and apprehension by law enforcement of?cers. I am familiar with the manner in which narcotics traf?ckers use wireless communication equipment such as cellular telephone technology, pagers, coded communications, false identities, and counter surveillance to determine the presence of law enforcement and other means to facilitate their illegal activities and avoid detection or mislead a narcotics investigation. 5. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances described herein and make this af?davit based upon the following: (1) personal knowledge I have gained ?om my participation in this investigation; (2) conclusions I have reached based upon my training, experience, and Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 2 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 8 of 72 PageID 599 conversations with other law enforcement investigators with whom I have discussed this case; (3) and what I believe to be reliable information obtained from the following sources: oral and written reports about this investigation, received from law enforcement of?cers; (4) law enforcement databases; (5) Pen register and trap and trace information as well as telephone records toll records and subscriber infonnation; (6) public records; and (7) physical surveillances conducted by DEA, West County Narcotics Task Force - Riverside County Sherith Department, and other law enforcement of?cers, which have been reported to me directly. 6. Unless otherwise noted in this Af?davit, when I assert that a statement was made, the information was provided to me by another law enforcement of?cer, or other source of information with whom I have spoken or whose reports or statements I have reviewed. Parenthetical explanations of coded or vague communications throughout this Af?davit are based on my interpretation, derived ?om my training, experience and familiarity with this and previous narcotics investigations. 7. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make an application to intercept the wire, pager, and electronic cellular telephone communications for Target Telephones as described below: REDA CTED 0. Target Telephone #40: (502) 609-5937 (TT #40) is an cellular phone being utilized by Christopher MATTINGLY (1?8 and subscribed to Christopher MATTINGLY at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being utilized by MATTINGLY. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15- 108 ?age 3 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 9 of 72 PageID 600 00 10 Inn-J. gunProbable cause exists to believe that BETO LNU #20 user of TT #38 and TT Chris MATTINGLY (TS #8 user of TT #40) and other identi?ed and unidenti?ed co- conspirators, have committed, are committing, or are about to commit, the crimes as discussed below, and that their communications relate to those and other ongoing crimes. 9. I request that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be authorized to execute such wire intercept order. The listening post will be in the County of Riverside, California. 10. Based on this investigation, set forth in detail below, I assert that there is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects (as de?ned below) have committed, are committing, and are about to commit the crimes of possession for sale, tramportation, and sale of a controlled substance in violation of sections 11350, 11351, 11373 and 11379 or the Health and Safety Code, with resPect to a substance containing cocaine and/or methamphetamine where the substance exceeds three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten (10) gallons of liquid by volume, possession of narcotics proceeds in Violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6, and a conspiracy to commit said offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 182. II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT . A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code sections 629.50(a) and 629.50(a) 11. Based upon the information contained herein, I hereby make application for a thirty- day order to intercept the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications, including any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to?talk voice I and TT #49: 502- REDAC TED communications, to and from TT #38: 7 ease 609-5937 between the herein named target suspect(s) and any additional co-conspirators known and unknown and shall include any and all communications to the cellular telephone handset device, to include, but not limited to: voice communications, text messages, digital photographic images, digital video images, electronic mail (?e-mail?) communications and push-to-talk voice Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 4 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 10 of 72 PageID 601 communications and any background conversations while the telephone instrument is otherwise in use. B. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE AND OBTAINING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA (IS .S.C. Sections 3121 through 3126) 12. I also request the authorization for the installation of a pen register and trap and trace TT #39: and TT #40: 502-609-5937 I also feature on TT #38: .aenacree I I request the authorization to obtain. and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations, related to TT #38: REDACTED and TT #40: 502-609-5937. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile TT #39: cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unlmown. However with the assistance of cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) 'of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers would be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the user of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant requests an order to obtain and receive cell site data and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) location information including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each target telephone and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each target number without geographical limitations related to the target telephone. a. Your af?ant has learned through conversations with other law enforcement of?cers and by personal knowledge that illegal narcotic traf?ckers have the potential to disable the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15- 108 Page 5 Case ?our-Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 11 of 72 PageID 602 GPS function in their telephones if they are aware law enforcement can monitor their real time movements. Your af?ant does not solely rely on GPS locations because your af?ant knows, often times GPS requests can fail or revert to cell towers with a 5000 meter locate. I also know there are many ?dead spots? in Southern California as related to cellular service for Sprint/Nextel. I have been told by Sprint/Nextel employees if cellular telephones do not receive a sigml, I will receive a failed reSponse when requesting GPS locations. b. I also request that law enforcement of?cers be given the authorization to use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify TT #38: TT #39: and TT #40: 502-609-5937. The Target Telephone(s) is/are a mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the target telephone is often unknown. However with the assistance of mobile eiectronic tracking devices, law enforcement agents can identify the location of a cellular telephone to a much ?ner detail than through cellular site data alone. DURATION OF INTERCEPTION (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 13. This Af?davit is in support of an Application to intercept wire and electronic communications for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days commencing on the day of the initial intercept or ten (10) days after the issuance. of the Order, whichever comes first, pursuant to California Penal Code section 629.58. The goal of this investigation is to prove the full membership and methods of Operation of the conspiracy. I request that the Court order that the interception not tenninate when the communications described herein are ?rst intercepted, but may continue to the ?ll extent of California Penal Code section 629.58 or .until the full scope of the enterprise is developed, including the identities of all participants, their places and methods of operation and the various activities in which they are engaged in furtherance of the enterprise, whichever comes ?rst. 14. Based upon your af?ant?s training and experience, narcotic traf?ckers extensively use their telephones to conduct their illegal activities. Therefore, your af?ant believes that additional communications of the same type will occur after the interception of the ?rst Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 6 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 12 of 72 PageID 603 communication to and from the target telephone(s). IV. TARGET (Penal Code section 15. The Target Telephones are described as follows: - REDACTED c. Target Telephone #40: (502) 609-5937 (TT #40) is an cellular phone being utilized by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS and subscribed to Christopher at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being utilized by MATTINGLY. l. The term ?Target Telephone #38-40? also refers to any changed telephone number assigned to the same Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and/or International Mobile Subscriber Identi?cation (IMSI) number, Urban Fleet Mobile Identi?er (UFMI) number, Internet Protocol (IP) Address and/or Push-to-talk number, and/or Direct-Connect (DC), ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s), and/or any changed ESN, IMSI, UFMI, IP, and/or DC assigned to the same telephone number(s) with the same subscriber information as the target telephone(s) or any additional changed telephone number(s) and/or ESN and/or IMSI, UFMI, IP, PTT and/or DC whether the changes occur simultaneously or consecutively, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account(s) as the target telephone(s). 2. Based on my training and experience, persons often use ?ctitious names when obtaining Pie-Paid cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by Law Enforcement. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 7 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 13 of 72 PageID 604 their ?ctitious information will keep Law Enforcement from immediater knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these su3pects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also buys them time to ?ee the area of the crime. V. (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 16. The known Target subject(s) of this investigation are: REDA CTED REDAC TED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 8 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 14 of 72 PageID 605 NEDA CTED REDA GTED Raymundo CARILLO aka CEJAS (Target Subject 7) previously listed as Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ. Investigators previously had identi?ed the target subject known as as CHAVEZ based on information obtained from GPS pings, secondary narcotics investigation indicating CHAVEZ was associated with 1135 W. 7th Street, Penis, California, the residence identi?ed from GPS pings on phones utilized by and physical surveillances. It should be noted that CHAVEZ has a listed address of 1111 W. 7th Street, Penis, California 92570. However, further investigative analysis indicated the subject known as was actually CARILLO. On October 23, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in Perris, California pursuant to GPS pings of TT #32, used by CARILLO. On the same date, investigators positively identi?ed as CARILLO from a state of California booking photo. It should be noted that surveillance observations on movements were also concurrent to GPS pings of TT #32. mama CARILLO is a Hispanic male with a Date of Birth of and has been the subject of Riverside County Wire Intercepts 14-120, 14-183 and criminal history Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 9 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 15 of 72 PageID 606 includes arrests for HS 11377 from 2001 and records indicate police contacts for CARILLO at 23802 Lake Drive, Perris, California. Investigators have obtained vehicle plates observed at this a member of this DTO. residence which come back to h. Chris MATTINGLY (Target Subject 8) is a described as a White male with a of 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, KY. air: Blonde, Eyes: Blue, Weight: 250, Height: 6?3, and listed residence REDACTED Ronaid Ashley SHEWMAIER (Target Subject 16): is described as a White 3 male, with a date of birth 0 Iii-re?t? air: Red, Eyes: Brown, Weight: 2201bs., Height: 5, According to Department of Motor Vehicles, SHEWMAKER is issued Kentucky Driver?s License with an address of I af?ant found no documented criminal history for SHEWMAKER. ?1 Lebanon ct, Kentucky 40150. Your REDA crEo REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 10 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 16 of 72 PageID 607 REDA CTED REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 11 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 17 of 72 PageID 608 REDACTED REDAC TED REDR Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 12 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 18 of 72 PageID 609 hammer: VI. JURISDICTION A. WIRE, ELECTRONIC PAGER, AN ELECTRONIC CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT ORDER (Penal Code section 629.52) 17. Calyfomia PenaZ' Code section 629.52, in part, states ?The judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing interception of wire, electronic page, or electronic cellular telephone communications initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is Section 629.52 does not de?ne the phrase ?initially intercepted.? However, federal courts have ruled on similar language found in 18 USC 2518(3), which, at the time of the rulings, stated, ?the judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is In United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 US. 847, 113 140, 1212 L.Ed.2d_ 92, a federal magistrate of Southern District of New York issued an intercept order for the telephones of a cafe located in New Jersey. The defendants contended that the intercept order was improperly issued and argued that only a New Jersey magistrate could issue an intercept order for a telephone located in New Jersey. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held ?for Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 13 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 19 of 72 PageID 610 the purposes of [the] jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the tapped telephone is located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are ?rst to be hear (Ibid, at page 136) In United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 US. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, the defendants contended that the wiretap was jurisdictionally defective because it was authorized by a judge outside the judicial district in which the defendants? telephones were located. The wiretap order was issued by a judge in the Eastern District of Texas where the calls were monitored and recorded; the tapped telephones were located in Houston within the Southern District of Texas. The court rejected the defendant?s contention and explained the jurisdiction issue as it pertains to intercept orders. The court held, ?We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and now hold that the interception included both the location of a tapped telephone and the originai listening post, and that judges in either jurisdiction have authority under Title to issue wiretap orders. As the Rodriguez court noted, this interpretation aids an important goal of Title to protect privacy interests, by enabling one judge to supervise an investigation that spans more than one judicial district.? (Hard, at pages 403-404) Also see United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 US. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, which held a judge, sitting in the district where the target subject lived and where the criminal conduct was being investigated, could issue a wiretap order for a cellular telephone which was thought to be used by the target subject regardless of where the cellular telephone or the listening post was located, even though the criminal conduct which being investigated was occurring in another district and the listening post was located in another district. In United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 US. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531, the Court of Appeals held that a judge sitting in one district could issue an order to intercept cellular telephones which were assigned area codes located in another district, because the listening post was located in the same district as the judge who issued the order. 18. Based upon my training and experience, persons engaged in criminal conduct use cellular telephone(s), use ?ctitious names, facilitators or facilitating agencies when obtaining cellular phones as a means of preventing detection by law enforcement. By using other persons? names and creating a ?ctitious prepaid account, a target subject acquires a certain degree of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15?408 Page 14 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 20 of 72 PageID 611 anonymity, and is one of the reasons for the popularity of pre?paid cellular telephones among those engaged in narcotics traf?cking. This enables persons involved with criminal activity to operate with a level of comfort knowing that their ?ctitious information will keep law enforcement from immediately knowing their true identities. This delay in identifying these su3pects often allows them enough time to either destroy or hide evidence of their crimes and also provides them time to ?ee the area of the crime. 2 19. CARILLO (TS encompasses the distribution of narcotics to multiple states across the This investigation into the speci?cally the segment operated by continental United States to include, but not limited to, Missouri, Texas, Georgia and Kentucky. There are several narcotics investigations involving multiple segments/cells for this DTO currently being investigated by DEA (St. Louis and Lexington) as weii as by Local Narcotics Teams (Louisville, KY area). REDACTED 21. Target Telephone #40 used by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS identi?ed as Kentucky cell head for the l' working with CARILLO (TS Although . REDA CTED MATTINGLY is physically in Kentucky, he routine coordinates with DTO members Operating out of Riverside County and which transport narcotics from Riverside County to Kentucky. Additionally, the proceeds from the sale of narcotics ?lters back to Riverside County via proceeds couriers operating passenger vehicles. In May of 2014, investigators seized approximately $420,000 which was sent by MATTINGLY. 22. The interception and listening post will be in Riverside County. This is suf?cient in and of itself to confer jurisdiction to this court. VII. PRIOR APPLICATIONS (Penal Code section 629.5002) Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 15 I) Cas. Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 21 of 72 PageID 612 23. On February 13, 2015, your af?ant requested checks of the California Department of Justice reference the Electronic Intercept Court Order System for TT #38-40. 24. On February 13, 2015, your af?ant requested checks of the United States Department of Justice wiretap database to determine if any Federal applications had been made to initiate a Title wiretap intercept of TT #3840. 25. Other than those Applications described herein, your af?ant is not aware of any other applications that have been made to any court in the United States for authorization to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places speci?ed in this Application, within the meaning of Penal Code section 11 12 13 14 15 16 REDACTED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No: 15-108 Page 16 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 22 of 72 PageID 613 hamster: f. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120: On March 11, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Riverside County Superior Court, State of California granted and issued Riverside County Intercept Order 14-120, which authorized the interception of the communication to and horn TT TT #10: (502) 492-1461 (951) 570-0461 and (951) 322-5805. Remorse 11. Riverside County Wiro Intercept Order 14-183: on April 7, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-183, authorizing the initiation of State wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone [tween .. #13 502-609-5967, Target Telephone #14 702?885?7486, Target Telephone #15 I and Target Telephone #16 951-322?0063. i. Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-120 Extension 1: On April 8, 2014, Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County Of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-120 Ext 1, authorizing the initiation of State wire intercept for 30 days for Target Telephone #11 951-570-0461. REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 17 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 23 of 72 PageID 614 REDACTED REDACTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 18 a Gas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 24 of 72 PageID 615 Riverside County Wire Intercept Order 14-558: On November 5, 2014, the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez of the Superior Court, County of Riverside, signed wire Order 14-558; authorizing the initiation of State Wire intercept for 30 days for TT #31: REDA CTED OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION 26. Your af?ant believes interception of wire communications to and from Target Telephone #38-40 is necessary for the government to fully achieve the objectives of this investigation which include discovering: a. The full and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 19 Case inan Document 27?8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 25 of 72 PageID 616 traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. IX. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE (Penal Code section 27. The following statement of facts and circumstances detail the historical involvement of the Target Subjects in drug traf?cking and their current use of the Target Telephones to facilitate drug traf?cking. 28. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I assert that: a. There is probable cause to believe that the Target Subjects are committing, have or are about to commit particular offenses. Those offenses are Possession for Sale, Sale and Transportation of Controlled Substances in violation of Health and Safety Code 11350, 11351, 11378, 11379, possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11370.6, and ConSpiracy to commit those offenses in violation of Penal Code Section 182, with respect to a substance containing methamphetamine in an amount exceeding three pounds of solid substance by weight or ten gallons of liquid by volume. (Penal Code section b. There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning the above?named offenses will be obtained through the interception of the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications. (Penal Code section 629.52Cb) 29. There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the places where, the wire, electronic pager, and/or electronic cellular telephone communications are to be intercepted are being used, or about to be used, in connection with the commission of the above?named offenses or are leased to, listed in the name of or commonly used by the Target Subjects whose communications are to be intercepted. (Penal Code section 30. That normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, as more ?illy explained Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 20 Case. ummew Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 26 of 72 PageID 617 below. (Penal Code section 31. Based upon the investigation in this case, set forth in detail below, I further assert that there is probable cause to believe evidence of the aforementioned offenses including evidence regarding (1) the identities and roles of participants in the illegal narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (2) the sources of supply of the narcotics; (3) the locations utilized in furtherance of the narcotics traf?cking and money laundering activities; (4) the methods of distribution of contraband and money laundering and the identities of the persons and places involved in the manufacturing and distribution of narcotics and money laundering, will be obtained through the interception of wire communications over the Target Telephones. 32. I make this Af?davit, in part, on personal knowledge derived from participation in this invatigation and, in part, upon the information from the following sources: a. Oral and written reports about this and other investigations that I have received from the DEA and other law enforcement of?cers; b. Physical surveillance conducted by the Riverside Sheriff Departrnent (RSD), and DEA RDO in this and other investigations, which has been reported to me either directly or indirectly; 0. Pen register and trap and trace information, telephone tolls and other documentary evidence in this and other investigations and, d. Evidence gathered through other law enforcement investigations. e. Communications intercepted pursuant to court-authorized intercept orders. f. Evidence obtained through court?authorized intercept orders. A. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #38 and #39 REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 21 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 27 of 72 PageID 618 REDA CTED REDA CTED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 22 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 28 of 72 PageID 619 REDA CTED REDACTED REDAC TED Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 23 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 29 of 72 PageID 620 h?Lp-md HO Nr??r??h??Hr?lh?lr?il?n? exam-?ammth REDACTED 42:- UJ REDACTED 00 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 24 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 30 of 72 PageID 621 REDACTED REDAC TED Af?davit - Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 25 Cas Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 31 of 72 PageID 622 REDACTED REDA CYED A. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET TELEPHONE #40 Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 ?age 26 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 32 of 72 PageID 623 39. Wire Intercept 14?183 for TT #13 (502-609~5937-now TT #40) used by Christopher On April 7, 2014 the Honorable Judge Helios J. Hernandez signed Riverside County NIATTINGLY. Investigators monitored the communications for MATTINGLY while using TT #40 (marked Tl? #13 for Wire Intercept 14-183) for a 30 day period. During that interception period, investigators seized approximately $420,000 US Currency from a narcotics proceeds courier identi?ed as Ronald SHEWMAKER. The proceeds transport was coordinated between CARILLO (TS and MATTINGLY (TS Since the last interception period on MATTINGLY, investigators have been coordinating with DEA Louisville and Lexington in an effort to dismantle these cells working under the if and at the direction of CARILLO. Investigators determined that TT #40 is still active and is being utilized by MATTINGLY based on GPS pings initiated by a local Narcotics Task Force investigating MATTENGLY. "?ne below reference calls are outlined to demonstrate historical narcotics communications on TT #40. Based on my training an experience, the following pertinent aspects of intercepted communications and parenthetical explanations of language contained therein, are related to and indicative of the narcotics related activities associated with MATTINGLY and the target telephone which he utilizes. a. On April 9, 2014, at approximately 10:33 am, Target Telephone #40, used by ChristoPher MATTINGLY (TS received an incoming call from telephone number 27 0- 547?9757, session number 223 used by UM9757. UM9757 asked where MATTINGLY was. MATTINGLY said he was at his house, and then asked where UM9757 was. UM9757 said he was at the of?ce. MATTINGLY asked UM9757 to go up there (to location) because he (MATTINGLY) had gotten some nicer shit (narcotics) for UM9757. UM9757 said he had some deals and some cash, then asked where MATTINGLY wanted him to put it. MATTINGLY said to give it to Leslie, because she would be back here and that she (Leslie) should be there (at UM9757's location) in a second because she was walking back there (to UM9757's location) from the house. UM9757 said alright. b. On April 19, 2014, at approximately 7:46 am, Target Telephone #40, used by Christopher MATTINGLY (TS received an incoming call from telephone number 27 0- 859-0111, session number 665 used by UM0111 said he (third party) had made him Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 1 5?108 Page 27 CaseDocument 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 33 of 72 PageID 624 (UM0111) a shot. MATTINGLY asked what he (third party) said. UM0111 said he (third party) wanted one of those Hardinsburg Specials, and laughed. UM0111 said 1,590, 100 of them MATTINGLY said 1,700 for 100 of them. UMOI 11 said MATTINGLY said they would not be MATTINGLY said 1,700 and if he did not want them, it was alright. UM0111 said okay. 0. On May 4, 2014, at approximately 10:42 am, MATTINGLY placed and outgoing call to Raymundo CARILLO (TS The following highlights the pertinent aspects of the conversation which, based on my training and experience relates to narcotics activity. REY asked what was happening. said not a whole lot. MATTINGLY said he meant to call REY last night, but he had gotten busy. REY said he went to a party. MATTINGLY asked if REY had gotten wild. REY asked if MATTINGLY knew how (thought not ?nished by REY). REY asked if MATTINGLY knew where RONNIE (proceeds courier) was at that moment. MATTINGLY said not exactly and he (RONNIE) probably would not tell him exactly. REY said alright. MATTINGLY said he (RONNIE) would be there (at REY's area) later this afternoon for sure. REY said that was what he was thinking. REY said something right now, but would try to be there (at REY's location) MATTINGLY said there was no problem. REY said he would call MATTINGLY back when he (Ronnie) was there (REY's location). MATTINGLY said alright 1) approximately 420,000 US Currency from Ronald in Perris, California. This Investigators Note: On May 4, 2014, investigators seized currency was coordinated between CARILLO and MATTINGLY. 40. Although, the aforementioned intercepted communications are dated, recent investigative information and seizures indicate that MATTINGLY continues to operate as a cell head in Kentucky. In November of 2014, inveStigators were monitoring intercepted communications for Raymundo CARILLO as authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14?558. On or about NOVember 11, 2014, investigators began to intercept communications between CARILLO and a proceeds courier for the DTO. The courier was provided the following address: 521 Old Highway 60, Hardinsburg, Kentucky. On the same date, your af?ant, working with agents in Kentucky, learned that the aforementioned address was a property owned by MATTINGLY. Investigators in Kentucky Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 28 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 34 of 72 PageID 625 initiated surveillance and ultimately conducted a vehicle st0p which contained approximately 60,000 US Currency. Based on intercepted communications, surveillance and proceeds seizure, your af?ant believes that MATTINGLY continues to distribute narcotics for the DTO. Toll Analysis of TT #40: 41. On January 29, 2015, your af?ant conducted a telephone toll analysis of Target Telephone #40. TT #40 placed or received 24 calls between 01?07-201 5 and 01-26-2014 to 502-921- 0299, which is associated to I a multi-pound methamphetamine traf?cker in Louisville, Kentucky. XI. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SEIZURES 42. The information described in this section exhibits law enforcement?s activity and/or actions taken while investigating drug traf?cking organizations. While the described events may not be directly connected to the Target Subject(s) of this Af?davit, unless otherwise noted, all seizures described herein are associated with these drug traf?cking organizations to which the Target Subject(s) are related. Investigators believe the following events demonstrate the activity, sophistication, and ability of these organizations. a. On December 12, 2013, California Highway Patrol conducted a vehicle stop at Highway 15 in Lake Elsinore. California Highway Patrol unit alerted to the rear of the vehicle. Investigators recovered 5 individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine (approximately 5 pounds). Investigators also recovered $8,553.00 from arrestee in his front pants pocket. b. On January 1, 2014, investigators made a subsequent search of the vehicle impounded on 12?12-13 and recovered an additional 2 pounds of methamphetamine and 5 pounds of heroin. c. On March 3, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped - II ehicle (620V570) at the 91 Fwy and Green River Rd in Corona. Vehicle was impounded for 30 days and driver released. Investigators seized approximately 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine from vehicle truck area. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 29 Case p?l 10 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 35 of 72 PageID 626 d. On March 14, 2014, California Highway Patrol stopped inset-terse ehicle in Riverside County. Investigators seized approximately 10 pounds of methamphetamine from the vehicle. c. On May 4, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff Department stopped Ronald SHEWMAKER in Penis, California pursuant to information develoPed from wire communications on Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ (T8 which indicated that proceeds were to be delivered. On the same date, investigators seized approximately $420,000 US. Currency concealed within the vehicle operated by SHEWMAKER. In addition to the currency, investigator seized the transport vehicle. f. On June 18, 2014, pursuant to information developed through this .. . 359497.59. investigation, a search warrant was executed at the residence of Perris, California. The search produced approximately 1 pound of located a I. methamphetamine. On July 2, 2014, pursuant to information developed through this g. investigation into {if a search warrant was executed at three locations identi?ed as narcotics, proceeds and processing locations for The search produced approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine and small amounts of heroin and marijuana. Addition to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. h. On July 15, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of assets raises ammo Surveillance units observed 'verside, California on - ?amenco operating a follow vehicle in tandem with a secondary vehicle believe to be a load car. On the same date, investigators seized approximately 40 pounds of marijuana and arrested one target subject. i. On July 18, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of Whittier Blvd, and Gerhart in the city of Los Angeles, California pursuant to intercepted atone ran [semen on Riverside County Wire Intercept Rena crap if was to receive a narcotics shipment. On the same date, investigators conduct a vehicle stop of a white BMW and executed a Los Angeles County search warrant at the primary residence of Af?davit a Wiretap Order No. 154 as Page 30 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 36 of 72 PageID 627 1 Jervis? if identi?ed as "if: los Angeles, California At the residence, investigators 2 seized approximately $30,000.00 US Currency, 3 guns, and small amounts of methamphetamine 3 and arrested I On July 21, 2014, a search of the vehicle 4 produced approximately 45 pounds of methamphetamine concealed Within the ?oorboard of the 5 vehicle and accessed through aftermarket trap compartment ?om the driver and passenger side 6 ?oorboards. 7 In November of 2014, investigators of DEA Louisville, Kentucky DEA 8 seized approximately 60,000 US Currency ?om proceeds runner directed by CARILLO. The 9 information was developed by Riverside County Wire Intercept 14?558, Target Telephone #32, used 10 by CARIILO. 11 it. On December 3, 2014, investigators seized approximater 60 pounds 12 marijuana, 5 grams of methamphetamine, 5 ?rearms and arrest 3 subjects, to include 14 1. On February 11, 2015, investigators executed a Riverside County Warrant at 15 On the same date, investigators 16 seized one (1) pound of methamphetamine and 1 ?rearm. 17 18 X. NECESSITY AND EXHAUSTION 19 (Penal Code section 629.50(a) 20 43. Interception of the electronic cellular telephone and electronic digital pager 21 communications over the Target Devices is the only reasonable, viable means to gather evidence 22 against the Target Subjects because normal investigative techniques have failed, appear reasonably likely to fail if tried, or are too dangerous. Such information is therefore necessary to enable the 23 24 government to achieve the objectives of this investigation to obtain direct evidence that will 25 convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of: 26 a. The full scope and identi?cation of key personnel of the Target Subject(s)? 27 illegal narcotics traf?cking organization; 28 b. The identity and role of all of Target Subject(s)? suppliers of illegal narcotics; Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 31 Case .4me Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 37 of 72 PageID 628 c. The identity of the Target subject(s)? customers and the other unidenti?ed conspirators; d. The stash locations where Target Subject(s)? supplies of illegal narcotics are stored prior to its distribution; e. The management and diSposition of proceeds generated by the organization?s illegal narcotics traf?cking; f. The methods and routes used by the Target subject(s)? illegal narcotics traf?cking organization to import illegal narcotics into the United States, to deliver the illegal narcotics to various states; and g. Providing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that will support a conviction) against the Target Subject(s), and any later identi?ed targets for the alleged violations set forth herein. 44. The following is a list of the investigative techniques which have been used or which I have considered using in this investigation and an explanation of why these techniques are not reasonably likely to succeed in identifying and allowing the government to accomplish its investigative objectives. INTERVIEWS 45. Your af?ant believes that interviews of the target subject(s) or his/their known associates would produce insuf?cient information as to the identities of all of the persons involved in the conspiracy, the source of the narcotics, the proceeds and ?nancing, the location of records and drugs and other pertinent information regarding the named crimes. Your af?ant also believes that if the target subject(s) was/were interviewed, he/she/they would provide agents with a signi?cant number of untruthful statements, diverting the investigation with false leads or otherwise frustrating the investigation. Additionally, any such interviews would also have the effect of alerting the members of the conSpiracy, thereby compromising the investigation and resulting in the possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence, and the possibility of harm to con?dential sources whose identity may become known or whose existence may otherwise be compromised. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15~108 Page 32 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 38 of 72 PageID 629 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 46. It appears that this organization is a close~knit organization whose members are either blood relatives, mutual ?iends and/or very familiar with one another. Your af?ant is aware that it is a common concern of large-scale narcotic organizations that neither customers, would-be thieves, nor the police learn the identity of all members of the organization, or the locations where they store large amounts of narcotics or illicit proceeds. Therefore, lower echelon members shield those members higher up on the distribution chain from potential customers, and multiple locations are used to store lesser amounts of narcotics, and/or its proceeds, and additional locations are used to meet with customers. This method of operation allows suspects to minimize the risk of discovery and loss to the organization in the event the customer is an informant. 47. In October of 2014, your afiiant became aware that 3. Con?dential Source has information on members of this DTO and was capable of providing information on members of this DTO. Your af?ant has been communicating with reSpective Law Enforcement Of?cers directing the CS to gather Intel on members of this DTO. Based on my communications with CS controlling investigators it appears that the CS will be unable to determine the scope of this criminal enterprise, the sources and location of the narcotics, and their full methods of operation. and is a compartmentalized DTO that layers its distribution network between organizational members across various states. At this time, it appears the CS can af?rm the identity of key members of the DTO, however, investigators cannot obtain enough information on the modus operandi for the importation, distribution, acquisition of narcotics proceeds, and the identity of cell heads Operating on their behalf in California, Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, Missouri etc. A wire intercept on key members of this DTO, coupled with CS information can provide the best result for obtaining the goals of this investigation. As of today, the aforementioned CS has become unavailable to provide information on this DTO. Your af?ant has learned that the CS has been held account for seized proceeds is currently not in a position to provide investigators with investigative or enforcement information. UNDERCOVER OFFICERS AGENTS 48. Because the seller of narcotics usually receives a fee for brokering the sale of Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 33 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 39 of 72 PageID 630 narcotics, the seller will rarely permit a customer to meet or deal directly with the supplier. If the seller were to introduce the customer to the supplier and the customer were able to deal directly with the supplier, the seller would be cut out of any future purchases by the buyer, who would seek to deal directly with the supplier. 49. Due to the close?knit structure of this organization, in?ltration by an undercover police of?cer appears to be an investigative technique ?aught with failure and would most likely jeopardize both the safety of the of?cer and the progress of this investigation. Drug traf?cking organizations are aware of law enforcement efforts to in?ltrate drug traf?cking organizations through the introduction of undercover of?cers by informants. Therefore, the leaders of drug traf?cking organization routinely refuse to deal directly with any person who they do not personally know. Subsequently, informants are rarely able to introduce undercover of?cers to drug traf?cking organizations. 50. As previously noted, it is a common practice for individuals involved in large scale illegal money laundering, drug smuggling, and drug distribution to remain highly suspicious of strangers, new acquaintances, and individuals with whom they have conducted illegal drug transactions. If an informant introduced an undercover of?cer to a member of the drug traf?cking organization, the informant would have to ?vouch? for the undercover of?cer. Because of the previously mentioned compartmentalization of drug traf?cking organizations, if an informant were able to introduce an undercover of?cer to a drug traf?cking organization, it is unlikely that the undercover of?cer would be able in?ltrate the organization any further than the informant. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that the introduction of an undercover agent by an informant to the drug traf?cking organization would be either successful or accomplish the goals of this investigation. CONTROLLED PURCHASES 51. Your af?ant has considered the bene?ts and risks associated with a controlled purchase. It is your af?ant?s opinion that a controlled purchase could result in the arrest and conviction of one or more of the target subj ect(s), a controlled purchase would not accomplish the previously stated goals of the investigation. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-408 Page 34 Case 1 1 1:2 1:3 111 1:5 1:5 1?7 15; 1S) :21 22:2 :23; :24; 22:5 22:5 22'? :25; Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 40 of 72 PageID 631 52. If a Con?dential Source (CS) or an undercover of?cer were to make a controlled buy ?om the target subject that would limit the investigation to the target subject and not his source of supply because the leaders of the organization are a tight?knit group whom only has contact with certain members of the organization to help avoid detection by law enforcement. Based upon my training and experience, if a CS or an undercover of?cer attempted to ?nd out the target subject?s source of supply it would be met with negative results. ?53. Law enforcement would be required to make several smaller purchases over a period of time to work up to the level at which the target subject(s) deals narcotics and it is very . unlikely that anyone within the law enforcement community would receive approval from their management to allow tens of thousands of dollars to be handed over to a target subject in an attempt to facilitate a larger transaction. SURVEILLANCE 54. The target telephone(s) is/are mobile cellular telephone(s), which makes surveillance dif?cult if not impossible because the location of the person using the Target Telephone is o?en unknown. However with the assistance of real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to? the target telephone(s), law enforcement of?cers will be able to locate and conduct surveillance of the users of the target telephone(s). Therefore, your af?ant has requested an order to obtain and receive real precision location, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates tracking and/or pinging data related to the target telephone(s). 55. As described herein, physical surveillance has been used and will continue to be used during this investigation. 56. Surveillance has been conducted of subject(s) and at address(es) identi?ed during this investigation, the results of which are reported below: a. On November 18, 2013, about 1452 hours, Deputy Wicker, conducted a vehicle stop of the vehicle for a minor vehicle violation, located at the 15 ?eeway and Cajalco Exit. Wicker contacted the driver and sole occupant, and asked for his identi?cation. The subject :neogcrgo was unable to produce any identi?cation, but verbally identi?ed himself as a date of birth of and address of where the CI had previously picked Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 35 Caseidenti?cation, and subsequently released him. TFO Layos conducted further investigation of Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 41 of 72 PageID 632 REDACTEQ 5: ssnacren up Heroin with also provided a cellular phone number of with his consent, for sweeten . .3 Deputy Wicker took a picture of .. . X8725114 for ildomar. Based on the above information, Investigators identi?ed that the person b. On December 12, 2013 members of the DEA and Riverside Sheriffs Department (RSD) - South West Corridor Narcotics Task Force conducted surveillance During the surveillance, a black i. I. 1'2 I Ranach ?f esidence, located at Jaguar with paper plates was observed leaving esidence and ultimately stopped by CHP interdiction unit. During this operation, DEA TFG2 and seized approximately of Methamphetamine, $8,553 in US Currency, and a black 2010 Jaguar. The driver and sole was arrested by CHP Of?cer occupant of the vehicle, -. Mendenhall for state felony violations of 11378 HS and 11379 HS, CHP agency case 13. A secondary search of the vehicle revealed additional 5 of Heroin and 2 of Methamphetamine, during asset forfeiture proceeding. c. On February 27, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the city of Temecula, California to identify a male intercepted over Riverside County Wire Intercept 1- as the user of 79. Investigators identi?ed I d. On March 3, 2014, DEA and conducted surveillance on in the city of Riverside, California pursuant to intercepted text I message conversations as authorized by Riverside County Wire 14-79 which indicated that as to acquire narcotics. On the same date, investigators followed . Rm crzo Carson, California and back to Riverside County where an interdiction unit made contact and investigators seized 9.8 pounds of methamphetamine. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 36 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 42 of 72 PageID 633 e. On March 5, 2014, conducted surveillance at 1135 and 1111 W. 2 7th Street, Pen-is, California on two houses associated with REY. Investigators followed two 3 Hispanic adult males to a home depot consistent with GPS pings on multiple phones used by REY. 4 One of the subjects was identi?ed as Daniel Navarro CHAVEZ, DOB: Investigators 5 are still working on determining if CHAVEZ is REY and the user of IT #10-12. Note: CHAVEZ 6 has been the subject of investigation on secondary DEA narcotics investigations. 7 f. On March 19, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance eon UM8364 8 pursuant to GPS pings of TT #15. Investigators identi?ed a possible residence for UM8364 and an 9 associated vehicle (silver Honda Civic bearing California plate 7ADV247). Additionally, on the 10 same date, investigators located the user of TT #15 (UM8364) at a shopping plaza located off 11 Atiantic and Clara. Surveiilance units observed UM3364 and an unidenti?ed Hispanic male conduct 12 counter techniques such as squaring the block and looking into parked vehicle to identify possible 13 surveillance by law enforcement. 14 g. On March 20, 2014, investigators conducted a brief surveillance on 15 the county ofRiverside off the Is interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order 16 to identify the vehicle operated by the narcotics courier working for UM8364. On the same date, 17 investigators acquired the vehicle information. 18 h. On June 25, 2014, investigators conducted a follow up with Motel 6 off the 19 210 and the 215 freeways pursuant to information obtained from wire communications which 20 indicated that #5545?? was to acquire narcotics at that location. Investigators identi?ed 21 ewe-?Tee. through information provided to Motel 6 staff and subsequently conducted a drive 22 by of the listed address to acquire additional information. 23 i. In June and July of 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on amt. 24 ans..- ii'n the county of Riverside off the 15 interstate and Bundy Canyon Road in order to refresh 25 information used in furtherance of a Riverside County search warrant for his residence and 26 associated locations. On July 1, 2014, investigators observed a vehicle enter 585%?? i: residence, 27 and deliver two 5 gallon bails. On the same date, intercepted communication indicated that 28 was in possession of narcotics. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15 -1 08 Page 37 C6181 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 43 of 72 PageID 634 j. On July 2, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance on Cff' the vicinity of Bundy Canyon between the 15 and 215 ?eeways pursuant to information obtained from wire communications which indicated that was to acquire narcotics from an unidenti?ed third party. On the same date, investigators observed a Hispanic male operating a red Mercedes enter the residence. Shortly thereafter, investigators executed a Riverside County search warrant on three locations associated with k. On July 15, 2014, investigators conducted surveillance in the vicinity of Riverside, California on Investigators ultimately seized approximately 40 pounds of marijuana. l. On July 17, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in the vicinity of ?9395, as identi?ed by Global Positioning System (GPS) pings of Target "alibi-Z"- authorized by Riverside County Wire Intercept as well as in the vicinity of the K?mart/ Dearden?s parking lot located off Whittier Blvd., and S. Gerhart Avenue, Los Angeles, California. At the residence was a black lifted Yukon consistent with intercepted communications during which PACAS states that he drives a ?black li? Yukon?. At approximately 4:15 pm, surveillance units of CAL-MET observed a black Expedition in the K?Mart/Dearden?s lot bearing California plate 4EUG401 (Target Vehicle 1) Operated by an unidenti?ed Hispanic male in the vicinity. Surveillance units maintained constant surveillance of Shortly thereafter, surveillance units observed an unidenti?ed Hispanic male arrive in a pedal bicycle approach the vehicle, meet with open the trunk space of and look into the rear trunk space of Shortly thereafter, entered the driver seat ?of and leaves the K?Mart/Dearden?s lot. Surveillance units maintained observations on and followed Wit] to 7 - REDA crap I Los Angeles, REDACTED consistent with intercepted communications California, the primary residence of which indicated that resume was to take possession of 'f vehicle to load it with narcotics. . REDACTED Shortly thereafter, surveillance units observed an unidenti?ed Hispanic male move a work vehicle form the driveway and place into the garage of if} Los Angeles, California. Surveillance units lost the primary load vehicle. Af?davit W'iretap Order No. 15-108 Page 38 - C6181 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 44 of 72 PageID 635 111. On July 18, 2014, investigators initiated surveillance in Los Angeles, California pursuant to intercepted communications that was to receive a .- ?1,453.55 I. narcotics shipment. On the same date, investigators seized approximately 30 pounds of - -- -- On the same date, investigators followed a HisPanic male driver and female passenger (identi?ed as west on 4th Street from the residence in a silver Nissan Path?nder to a school. Shortly thereafter, investigators continued surveillance as the vehicle continued west on 4th Street and began conducting counter surveillance driving techniques. The operator of the vehicle conducted multiple U?turns and drove into and through desolate streets to identify any follow vehicles. At that point .. and the "niacin" - -- investigators pulled surveillance. Shortly thereafter, your af?ant observed Hispanic male operator walks back to the residence ?om 7th street. Your af?ant believes that and unidenti?ed male subject ditched the vehicle to avoid law enforcement. o. On October 14, 2014, South West Corridor Narcotics Taskforce and DEA address_ Your af?ant observed granite - Taskforce Group 2, conducted surveillance at the the White Nissan Altima license plate 5UUN878 driver up to the residence and park on the street. A male Hispanic exited the driver?s door and walked into the house. Your ai?ant identi?ed this I It residence on subject as the same person who was observed at .I .I October 9, 2014. During the surveillance, team member utilized current electronic technology to obtain the driver of the white Nissan Altima?s phone number, authorized by Riverside County Superior Judge, on October 10, 2014, SW R1101020147 p. On October 23, 2014, investigators conduct surveillance in the vicinity of Ellis and Burton Road, pursuant to GPS pings of TT #32 in order to con?rm the user of TT #32 as CARILLO (TS On the same date, investigators observed an Arcadia bearing California plate 7CPL313 leave the target residence and proceed west on 4th street. Investigators followed the vehicle to a Subway restaurant located off 4th Street and Wilkerson Ave, Ferris, California. Investigators G. Rohn of conducted foot surveillance and observed CARILLO (TS Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 39 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 45 of 72 PageID 636 inside the Subway restaurant, consistent with GPS results on TT #32. At that point surveillance was terminated. q. On February 10, 2105, investigators conducted surveillance in Ferris, California in an attempt to identify the user of nvestigators have GPS surveillance on the aforementioned phone and are working to identify the user. Surveillance was terminated after an extended period of time and the phone could not be located. 57. Surveillance operations have been successful to the extent they have established persons and/or vehicles arriving at, and/or departing from principal locations; and extended the scepe of the investigation to additional locations and co-conspirators. However, surveillance operations cannot establish the purpose of any observed meetings, nor identify other conspirators who do not make personal appearances. Therefore, surveillance appears unlikely to yield the sources of the supply of narcotics, fully identify each of the conspirators, their places of operation and the manner in which their operation is conducted. 58. Surveillance of the targets subjects and their associates will not enable the government to achieve its objectives in this investigation. To date, surveillance has failed to allow law enforcement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity and roles of all of all the co- conspirators. While surveillance may show subjects of this investigation with packages suspected to be drugs, it will not identify the contents of these packages or what is being said as packages are exchanged. Surveillance is an investigative technique that is used to con?rm meetings and other suspected activities between alleged participants, but often leaves the investigators with insuf?cient evidence to prove the purpose of the meetings and activities. 59. Your af?ant knows from training and experience, and from speaking with other experienced agents and of?cers, that physical surveillance of high-level members of narcotic traf?cking organizations is limited to placing individuals together without knowing the signi?cance of their meeting or the role of each traf?cker. Furthermore, based on my training and experience, surveillance of major narcotics traf?ckers is often dif?cult without detection. Physical surveillance is often limited to watching suspects from a distance, which as an investigative technique, can be problematic. Your af?ant believes that excess random surveillance of a location without knowledge Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 40 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 46 of 72 PageID 637 when a narcotics transaction will be taking place, could expose the identity of the of?cers and thereby compromise the investigation. Even if blanket, twenty-four hour surveillance were feasible, it would still be limited to providing information only on the movements and whereabouts of the Target Subject(s). If the Target Subject(s) suSpected he was being watched by law enforcement personnel, he could abandon his phone and move his activities to a different location, thus effectively ending the current on-going investigation until he was located again. A wire intercept would greatly assist the agents because they could be deployed more effectively knowing about a future narcotics transaction. This would allow surveillance to be set up on strategic locations, thereby lessening the risk of compromising the investigation. 60. Furthermore, your af?ant knows from past investigations that narcotics traf?ckers use various counter-surveillance driving techniques. ?nese techniques include frequent u-turns, stepping in parking lots to observe traf?c, waiting at traf?c lights to allow traf?c to pass, Speed variations, and taking circuitous routes through residential neighborhoods. All of these methods are used for the sole purpose of determining the presence of law enforcement personnel. These methods are frequently successful, as it is extremely dif?cult to follow suspects who employ these methods without being detected. Once detected, these suspects usually abandon their activities, which mean they may shut down their cellular phones, pagers, and other phones, and ?ee the jurisdiction or area only to resurface at another unknown location at a later date. 61. When physical surveillance is combined with interception of wire communications, the purpose of meetings can be revealed and may constitute admissible evidence if the meetings relate to an intercepted conversation of criminal behavior. 62. Your af?ant believes that without the aid of wire intercepts, regular surveillance will compromise the investigation because prolonged, regular surveillance increases the opportunities for detection by the Target Subj ect(s). If surveillance were to be detected, I believe the traf?ckers? perpetual suSpicions that they are the subjects of law enforcement investigations would in their minds be con?rmed. The subjects would not only likely ?ee the area, they would also engage in wholesale abandonment of their communication facilities. By using the wiretap, agents will be able to initiate selective surveillance when it appears that criminal activity is taking Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-408 Page 41 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 47 of 72 PageID 638 1 place. This selectivity will reduce the chances of having surveillance compromised and will help 2 maintain the integrity of the investigation. 3 63. Based on the above-stated facts and on my training and experience, your af?ant 4 does not believe that surveillance of the above-referenced locations, absent a wiretap on the Target 5 Telephone, will enable the govelrnnent to achieve the objectives of this investigation. 6 7 SEARCH WARRAN TS 8 64. On 01-22- 2014, Detective Carnahan wrote search warrant #0122141? for a target 9 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge David Gunn. 10 65. On 02-25-2014, SA Baca wrote search warrant #02251403 for multiple target 11 telephones associated with this ongoing investigation, signed by Judge irma Poole Asberry. 12 66. On 02-27?2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #02271412 for a target telephone 13 utilized by members of the 14 67. On 03414014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03111409 for multiple target 15 telephone utilized by members of the 3i:- i'I-febaeu 16 68. On 03-19-2014, SA Baca acquired search warrant #03191403 for multiple target 17 telephone utilized by members of the 3 13 69. On 03-26- 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant #03261411 for a target 19 telephone associated with this ongoing investigation. 20 '70. On July 1, 2014, TFO Carnahan wrote search warrant #R107012014l3 for two 21 target telephones associated with this ongoing investigation. 22 71. On July 2, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Of?ce, Southwest Corridor Narcotics 23 Task Force, investigators acquired a Riverside County Search warrant of for 24 Wildomar, California and "heaven Wildomar, California. Investigators 25 seized approximately 5 pounds of methamphetamine, small amounts of heroin and 4 pounds of 25 marijuana. In addition to the narcotics, investigators seized three vehicles. 27 72. On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca write and signed search warrant 23 for Target Telephone #25 utilized by i ij_ 5- g: Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15?108 Page 42 Case Ln.th 1.5.5. Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 48 of 72 PageID 639 '73. for the primary residence of 74. sandman . -. Los Angeles, California. 1: warrant for the Primary residence Angeles, California. This Search was a follow up search based on information that developed through intercepted communications. 75. Narcotics Task Force, investigators acquired a Riverside County Search warrant for . 3509497543 . . Nuevo, California and later identi?ed as - 2- hematite. - 51-} On July 18, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Los Angeles County search warrant On August 13, 2014, SA Emilio Baca acquired a Los Angeles County search On December 3, 2014, Riverside County Sheriff?s Of?ce, Southwest Corridor Ferris, California. Investigators seized approximately 60 pounds of marijuana, 5 grams of methamphetamine and 5 ?rearms. 76. Narcotics Task Force investigators acquired a Riverside County Search Warrant for Perris, California. Investigators seized approximately 1 pound of methamphetamine, one (1) ?rearm and arrested one subject. 77. danger is that the service of search warrants causes the target subject(s) to conduct their own investigation in an effort to determine how law enforcement was able to develop the probable cause for the search warrant. Your af?ant will continue to consider the use of search Warrants after carefully weighing the potential danger the service of search warrant can have to the overall investigation. Generally, it is more effective to serve search warrants when the investigation has been completed and the targets subjects are being arrested. 78. in this investigation. However, execution of a search warrant at any one of the multiple locations involved would only serve to alert members of this organization that they are the subject of an on- going law enforcement investigation. Although a seizure of an intermediate quantity of narcotics and/or controlled substances might result, such action would not likely lead to a successful conclusion of this investigation since the primary objective of this investigation is to identify all Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 43 On February 11, 2015, Riverside County Sheliff's Of?ce, Southwest Corridor There is always a danger associated with the service of search warrants. DEA investigators will prepare af?davits to search the principal locations involved That Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 49 of 72 PageID 640 members of this organization, all locations used to store narcotics and/or controlled substances andXor illicit proceeds, and the organization?s source of supply. The execution of a search warrant would in all probability terminate the present investigation. Experience has demonstrated that large- scale narcotic traf?ckers adapt their routines to investigative procedures utilized by law enforcement. This includes utilizing multiple locations to store narcotics andfor controlled substances and money, and the use of other locations to conduct business. Execution of a search warrant at one or more locations would in all probability terminate the present investigation and preclude identi?cation of other associates, additional locations, and the organization?s sources of supply. 79. Your af?ant believes that the execution of search warrants at this stage of the investigation would unlikely reveal the total scope of the illegal operation and produce evidence which would identify the members of drug trafficking organization, the organizational structure, the full scepe of the narcotics conspiracy, the locations used to store narcotics andfor controlled substances, the sources of supply, and the customers or the money launderers. Your af?ant is aware that higher-level members of narcotics organizations usually do not store narcotics and/or controlled substances at their residences. Although surveillance has identi?ed residence(s), your af?ant does not know at this time whether or not the target subject(s) store narcotics and/or controlled substances and proceeds from the sale thereof at his/their horne(s). Moreover, assuming investigators do locate one or more ?stash? locations, without intercepted wire communications, the investigators will be unable to determine when a given location will contain contraband. Even if identi?able locations were searched and narcotics records were seized, those records are often in code and rarely contain information beyond that necessary for the maintenance of the particular location to which they relate. Moreover, even if items such as large amounts of currency, documents listing addresses and telephone numbers and other papers are seized, they generally have far less probative value by themselves than when they are introduced in conjunction with conversations between the conspirators, which g've full meaning to the documents and currency. Additionally, if locations were targeted for the execution of search warrants and the warrants were served, the members of the targeted organization would likely be placed on notice regarding the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 44 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 50 of 72 PageID 641 1 existence of the investigation. At this time, it would be counterproductive to make the existence of 2 the investigation public. Rather, it would be more productive to execute search warrants at the end 3 of the investigation, once the goals of the investigation are met. 4 PEN REGISTERS AND TELEPHONE TOLLS 5 80. The analysis of data derived ?'orn the use of a pen register and telephone tolls are 6 one of the techniques that have been utilized during this investigation. It has been help?il in 7 determining patterns, if any, of telephone activity and con?rming the volume of telephone calls 8 between telephones, su3pects and locations already identi?ed in this investigation through 9 surveillance, as well as new locations. Your af?ant has also learned that members of this 10 organization communicate primarily through the use of pagers and cellular telephones. Although 11 the review of those records does reveal the names of subscribers to the number called, your affiant 12 knows from experience that drug traf?ckers often list their residential telephones, cellular 13 telephones, and pagers in the names of other persons in an attempt to avoid identi?cation ?om law 14 enforcement personnel. In addition, the information derived from the pen register and telephone 15 tolls are insuf?cient as a basis for success?rl prosecution, especially in light of the familial 16 structuring of this organization. Speci?cally, the details of the involvement of the participants, and 17 the dates, times, and places that narcotics transactions are to occur must be revealed before 13 success?il surveillance operations, prosecutions or both may be initiated. 19 81. Based on the above, your af?ant believes that pen registers, toll analysis, and 20 subscriber information, without the aid of a wire intercept, will not help your af?ant achieve the 21 objectives of the investigation. 22 CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITORING 23 82. Exterior closed circuit monitoring shows that people who are entering or leaving the 24 location. It is your af?ant?s opinion that this type of monitoring does not gather evidence as to 25 conversations, agreements, and other arrangements necessary for this investigation. Additionally, 25 this type of monitoring will not provide identifying information on the individuals entering and 27 exiting the location, making it dif?cult if not impossible to determine the level of involvement 28 within the organization, if any. Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 45 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 51 of 72 PageID 642 TRASH SEARCHES 0F TARGET LOCATIONS 83. Your af?ant believes that a trash search could be conducted at some of the locations identi?ed thus far as being associated with the targets subj ect(s), however, it would risk the detection of law enforcement. Your af?ant is aware that high-level narcotics traf?ckers and their associates go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and are unlikely to use their residence trash containers to dispose of such information. Your af?ant has conferred with other experienced agents and of?cers who told me that narcotic traf?ckers will often carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. Furthermore, investigators have considered conducting trash searches of identi?ed residences of known Targets of the investigation and believe that, in considering each location, it wouid be dif?cult to conduct a trash search because the neighborhoods are situated where trash cans are placed at the curb in ?-ont of the residence for dumping or are located in a rural area where the search would draw suspicion on the law enforcement of?cers. A trash search would surely draw the attention of neighbors, who would possibly report this to police, and/or notify the target subject(s) or his/their associates. Such discovery would likely alert target subjects and his/their associates to the existence of this investigation and risk having it prematurely terminated before the government?s objectives have been achieved. It is dif?cult for law enforcement of?cers to justify their presence to any neighbor, without identifying themselves and their purpose for conducting the trash search. Even if trash searches were conducted and evidence of narcotics traf?cking was obtained from the trash at this location, the evidence would probably not establish (1) the roles of all participants; (2) the suppliers of the narcotics; (3) the customers; and (4) the full sc0pe of the conspiracy. 84. Regular trash pick?ups at the principal locations identi?ed in this af?davit would be dif?cult, if not impossible, based upon the physical placement of the locations on cul-de-sacs. They would be conSpicuous to the residents of the location and/or persons living in the area. Further, it is a limited investigative tool, which is unlikely to result in the recovery of evidence suf?cient for conviction. Additionally, any time a trash search is conducted; it is possible that of?cers will be spotted. At this time, your af?ant feels that the potential returns to be gained do not justify the risks. 85. Based on my training and experience, there are great risks associated with Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15408 Page 46 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 52 of 72 PageID 643 conducting trash searches, usually for very minimal possible gain. For example, if one of the Target Subjects were to observe (or a neighbor of or associate of one of the Target Subjects were to observe and disclose to the Target Subject) law enforcement rummaging through his trash, that Target Subject, already su3picious of law enforcement, could likely conclude that he was being investigated. This could lead to the adverse consequences discussed above, including the Target Subject ?eeing, warning co-conspirators, destroying evidence, etc. Based on my training and experience, it is highly unlikely that rummaging through someone?s garbage is going to yield evidence suf?cient to achieve the goals of this investigation. Further, the risks of such action in this investigation far outweigh any potential rewards. 86. In addition, I have found that not only are trash searches risky, they are also usually worthless. I have learned that narcotics traf?ckers go to great to destroy possible incriminating evidence and frequently will not use their residential trash containers to disPose of valuable information. I know that it is not uncommon for the traf?ckers to carry trash away from their residences and place it in commercial dumpsters to avoid having it examined by law enforcement. I know it is common for traf?ckers to burn items that contain evidence and they utilize shredders to completely destroy any evidence of substantial value to a law enforcement investigation. 87. I ?nd it extremely unlikely that evidence obtained from a trash search would be suf?cient, by itself, to prosecute the Target Subjects, let alone identify their co-conspirators. For instance, a trash search might help identify the wrappings used to transport narcotics, but it will not provide us with information as to who is transporting the narcotics, who is distributing the narcotics and where the narcotics are being stashed. 88. At this time, I do not believe that trash searches, even in conjunction with conventional methods of investigation, will achieve the goals of this investigation. If conversations are intercepted concerning certain locations, agents will be able to evaluate their signi?cance, and trash searches may be conducted at that time if the risk is outweighed by the potential reward. FINANCML INVESTIGATION 89. Even if investigators are able to locate accounts and ?nancial records for the Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-4 08 Page 47 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 53 of 72 PageID 644 members of this Drug Traf?cking Organization and its associates at some later date; based on my experience, I know that those involved in drug traf?cking conduct business on a cash basis and, often do not use traditional banking methods. I also know that drug traf?ckers ??equently either do not ?le income tax returns or ?le false income tax returns. I know that drug traf?ckers do not usually maintain records of their illicit earnings. At best, a ?nancial investigation of a drug traf?cker can serve to con?rm the existence of unexplained wealth or unusual ?nancial transactions. However, I know from my training and experience that traf?ckers go to great to avoid creating and leaving a ?nancial paper trail and that the majority of the proceeds is transported in bulk via passenger vehicles. During the course of this investigation, investigators have seized bulk currency transported din passenger vehicles. Additionally, DEA HIDTA of Los Angeles, seized buik currency from passenger vehicie that can be attributed to his DTO. it should be noted, that the DTO has been using traditional banking methods to deposit US Currency below the currency transaction report threshold. In this coordinated effort, DEA Kentucky is working on Grand Jury subpoenas on the accounts identi?ed during the course of their investigation. Additionally, DEA Riverside has identi?ed 10 accounts used by CARILLO to structure proceeds. Investigators intend on submitting Grand Jury subpoenas for these accounts to determine if any assets can be seized. GRAND JURY 90. The last technique, which could be employed in the investigation of narcotics offenses, is the initiation of grand jury proceedings. It is noted that the use of the grand jury to investigate narcotics offenses is not a technique normally employed in the State of California by state prosecutors. In addition, even if this investigation met existing criteria for submission to a grand jury, there is no reason to believe that any of the principal suspects in this investigation or their co-conspirators would coOperate with the grand jury, with or without grants of immunity. In fact, the mere initiation of a grand jury investigative proceeding would render continued investigation dif?cult by revealing the existence of the investigation by law enforcement to the targets of this investigation. 91. I believe the issuance of grand jury subpoenas would not be success?il in achieving the goals of this investigation for the following reasons: (1) the Target Subject, and any Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 48 Cass Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 54 of 72 PageID 645 1 other associates when they are identi?ed, would likely invoke his amendment privilege; (2) it 2 would be unwise to seek grand jury immunity for any of the co-conspirators, when they are 3 identi?ed, as that would likely foreclose prosecution of the most culpable individuals; (3) the 4 issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lower level members of the organization, if they are identi?ed, 5 would likely alert the other members to the existence of the investigation, thereby severely 6 hampering, if not entirely impeding the investigation. 7 8 XI. CONCLUSION 9 92. Based on the facts related above and my experience as a law enforcement of?cer, I 10 believe that the Target Subjects have committed, are committing and are about to commit the 11 aforementioned crimes and that particular communications of the Target Subj ect(s) over the target 12 telephone(s) concerning those offenses will be obtained through the requested interception applied 13 for herein. 14 93. Normal investigative techniques have been and will continue to be used. 15 However, it is your af?ant?s opinion that these techniques alone will not allow investigators to 16 obtain the critical information, which your af?ant believes will be discussed over the described 17 Target Telephone. Interception of wire and electronic communications over the Target Telephone 18 and Target Pagers are necessary in this matter to enable your af?ant to achieve the objectives of this 19 investigation. 20 94. For reasons set out in this af?davit, it is your af?ant?s opinion that the only 2] reasonable and effective way to deveIOp the necessary evidence to discover and prosecute the 22 person(s) involved in this conspiracy is to obtain authorization for the interceptions requested 23 herein. 2?4 95. Your af?ant requests that the Court order that Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and 25 all teleconununications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission 26 to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing 27 basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecomrnunications Companies?), Internet 23 Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15?108 Page 49 Case .ptmto Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 55 of 72 PageID 646 (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order: a. Authorize the installation and/or use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), including but not limited to, all wireless digital functions, wireless analog functions, direct connectfdigital diSpatch/direct dispatch ?mctions, automatic mode switching functions, and ?short message service.? This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in the Riverside County area. (See United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996, cert. denied 520 U.S. 1121, 117 1256, 137 L.Ed.2d 336, United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 892, 118 232, 139 L.Ed.2d 163, and bhitea' States v. Luong, 471 F36 1107 (9th Cir., 2006) cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 169 L.Ed.2d 371, 128 531). b. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment known as pen registers or dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to the targeted numbers. c. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace Direct Connect/DisPatch Service and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the target telephone numbers. d. Authorize the installation and/or use of trap equipment to trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of ?caller and any calling features such as ?call forwarding? and ?speed dialing? currently assigned to the Target Telephone numbers. e. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel and Verizon upon request of the applicant, to provide the technical assistance necessary to accomplish this interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services said company provides the people whose communications are to be intercepted, and to provide records identifying subscribers and providing subscriber information on any and all telephone and pager numbers identi?ed through this intercept/pen register, and any changed numbers whether published or not, including, but not Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 50 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 56 of 72 PageID 647 limited to past telephone bills and records. 96. Your af?ant requests the Court order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission to provide telecommunications services within the United States of America, as listed on an ongoing basis on FCC Form 499-A (hereinafter referred to as ?Telecommunications Companies?), Internet Service Providers (hereinafter referred to as ISP), or Voice Over Internet Protocol Providers (hereinafter referred to as VOIP) and any other service providers shall, upon request of the law enforcement agency executing the intercept order, within 48 hours (including after-business hours, weekends, and holidays), and without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging device(s), teiephone(s), caliing card(s), and other communication device(s) contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s), identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in this investigation and the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary number/account, billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co?signer information, contact address(es) and telephone number(s), and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number or other identi?er. b. Provide Call Data Records (CDR) information, including any and all historical data, originating and terminating call detail, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits ?'om any and all telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation. c. Provide any and all cell site data, pinging data, and/or GPS location information, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 51 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 57 of 72 PageID 648 thb?b.) @00le 2703 (D). d. Provide any and all cell site data, including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of any and all cellular telephones, which called each Target Telephone, which was called by each Target Telephone, which was identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or which was otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, without geographical limitations, pursuant to Title 18 USC section 2703 (D). e. Provide access and the access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. f. Provide all information related to pre?paid cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, identi?ed in an intercepted conversation, or otherwise identi?ed in the investigation, including historicai, past, present, current, and on?going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre-paid telephone account. 97. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) to continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, your a?iant requests that if the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, the Telecommunication Companies be ordered to not disclose to the Target Subj ect(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, the Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the court order for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the court?s order. 98. Your af?ant requests the Court to order Sprint/Nextel, Verizon and any and all telecommunications providers not to disclose to the subscriber or any unauthorized person the fact that the order has authorized this Wire interception, or of its existence. 99. Your af?ant requests the Court to authorize law enforcement of?cers use mobile electronic tracking devices to locate and identify the target telephone(s). Af?davit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 52 Case U142:Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 58 of 72 PageID 649 100. Your af?ant requests, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50(a) (2) that peace of?cers of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other assisting peace of?cers be ordered to execute such intercept order. 101. Your af?ant requests that, prior to the sealing of this Application, its affidavit, and the Court Order pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 102. Your af?ant requests that, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.66, this Application, its af?davit, and the Court Order be ordered sealed and kept in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the agency executing this Court?s Order, and be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at We? Special Agent Emilio J. Baca Drug Enforcement Administration Riverside, California. Dated: February ,2015 Sworn to and subscribed before me on February I 2015. HONORABLE HELIOS .HERNANDEZ COUNTY OF RIVER DE STATE OF CALIFO IA Affidavit Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Page 53 Case 3: Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 59 of 72 PageID 650 1 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY 2 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3 Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 4 3960 Orange St. Riverside, California 92501 5 Telephone: (951) 955?5400 Fax: (951) 955-9673 6 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 15?108 9 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE 10 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION 0F ORDER 1 1 TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS (SEALED) 12 -- - mm? Target Telephone #38 Target Telephone #39 13 502-609-5937 Target Telephone #40 14 ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 15 AS PROVIDED IN PENAL CODE SECTIONS 629.50 et seq. and 16 ORDER AUTHORIZING THE OF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING CELLULAR SITE DATA 13 Michael A. Hestrin, the District Attorney for the County of Riverside, State of California, 19 has made application to this court pursuant to Penal Code Sections 629.50 et seq. requesting 20 authorization to intercept communications to and from certain telephones described below 21 (hereinafter the Target Telephone(s). The Application was accompanied by the A?davit of Special 22 Agent Emilio Baca of the Riverside Drug Enforcement Administration, and the review of Special 23 Agent in Charge Anthony D. Williams, who is the designee Chief Executive O?icer of the Drug 24 Enforcement Administration. This Court has read and considered each of those documents, 25 referred to hereinafter as the "Application." 26 IT APPEARING TO THIS COURT: 27 (1) There is probable cause to believe that the individuals identi?ed and/or referred to in 1 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 60 of 72 PageID 651 the Application as Target Subject and their associates, and other co-conspirators (the ?Target Subjects?) have committed, are committing and are about to commit offenses involving importation, possession for sale, transportation, sale of a controlled substance and possession of narcotics proceeds in violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 11378, 11379, 11370.6 and a Conspiracy to commit said crimes in violation of Penal Code section 182, with respect to a substance 00nt cocaine Where the substance exceeds three pounds of solid substance by weight and/or ten gallons by liquid volume. (Penal Code Section (2) crimes (the illegal activities) will be obtained through this interception. (Penal Code Section There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning said (3) the communications are to be intercepted, are being used, or are about to be used, in connection There is probable cause to believe that the facilities from which, or the place where with the commission of said offenses, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the persons whose communications are about to be intercepted, and is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. (Penal Code Section (4) unlikely to succeed if tried and/or are too dangerous. (Penal Code Section Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed and appear to be IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1) communication devices described below (the ?Target Telephones?), including the installation and Interception of the wire, pager and electronic communications to and from the use of pen registers, dialed number recorders, text messages, digital photographic images, electronic mail ?e-mail?) communications, push-to talk communications, and trap-and-trace devices on the Target Telephones, is hereby authorized. (2) Authorization to intercept communications occurring outside of Riverside County is hereby The actual interception and listening post shall be in Riverside County. granted. This authorization extends to communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in Riverside County. (See 2 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-103 Case 3 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 61 of 72 PageID 652 1 United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992)) 2 (3) Properly trained investigators and monitors working with the Riverside County 3 Sheriff?s Department Drug Enforcement Administration Southwest Narcotics Corridor Task 4 Force are authorized to intercept the of the Target Subjects concerning the above- 5 described offenses to and ?our the Target Telephone(s) for a period of thirty days (Penal Code Sections 629.54(a) and The Target Telephone(s) are described as followsTelep 4: 52) 609-590 40 lular be ing 16 utilized by ChristOpher MATTINGLY (TS and subscribed to ChristOpher 17 MATTINGLY at 661 Old Highway 245, Shepherdsville, Kentucky. TT #40 is being ?3 utilized by MATTINGLY. 19 (4) The term ?Target Telephone? also refers to any changed telephone number 20 assigned to the same IMSI or SIN or MIN or ESN, or UFMI or MSID with the same subscriber 21 information, and/or any changed IMSI or SIN or MIN or ESN, or UFMI or MSID assigned to 22 the same telephone number with the same subscriber information, and/or any changed subscriber 23 information with the same IMSI or SIN or MIN or ESN, or UFMI or M313) and the same 24 telephone number. 25 (5) That the particular types of communications authorized to be intercepted are Wire 26 and electronic communications concerning the commission of said offenses. (Penal Code Section 27 28 3 Court Order? Wiretap Order No. 15-108 1 Case 3 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 62 of 72 PageID 653 (6) to intercept the communications. (Penal Code Section (7) for this interception. (Penal Code Section (8) the described communication has been ?rst obtained because the Af?davit describes the ongoing That the United States Drug Enforcement Administration is the agency authorized That the District Attorney of Riverside County, State of California, is the applicant That this Order is valid for thirty days and shall not automatically terminate when nature of the illegal activities. (Penal Code Section (9) as to minimize the interception of not otherwise subject to interception, and shall The intercept shall be executed as soon as practical, shall be executed in such a way terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event, no longer than 30 days from the date of this Order, unless an extension is granted. (Penal Code Section 629.58) In the event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization may be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception. (10) Wireless, Virgin Mobile, Wireless Services, Broadband, Conexone That Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Mobile USA, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless, Nextel, Nextel Communications, Sprint-Nextel, Sprint PCS, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Sprint Long Distance, U.S. Sprint, Paci?c Bell Telephone Company, Paci?c Telesis Group, Paci?c Bell Wireless, Cingular Wireless, Cingular Wireless West Coast, SBC, General Telephone Company, Allegiance Telecom, Verizon California Inc, Verizon New York, Verizon West Coast Inc, Verizon, Verizon Wireless, Cellco Partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless, Qwest, Qwest Wireless, Qwest Corporation, US. West, WorldCom, WorldCom Wireless, MCI, MCI WorldCom, In Touch Communications, Cellular One, U.S. Telepaci?c Communications, MPower Communications, Time Warner Telecom, Optel Telecom, GST Telecom Inc, X0, X0 California Inc, PacWest Telecomm, Inc, d.b.a. Connect Communications Corporation, BellSouth, Cox, Cox Communications Inc, d.b.a. Cox California Telecom Inc, Citizens Communications, Continental Cablevision, Northwestern Bell, Evans 4 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case 3 {Jr-th KDOOMON Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 63 of 72 PageID 654 Telephone Company, Central Wireless Partnership, Arch Wireless, TSR Wireless, Airstar Paging, Winstar Telecommunications, Network Services LLC, Tri State Radio Paging Inc, PageNet, PageMart, Southwest Paging, AirTouch Paging, Metrocall, Weblink Wireless, Mobile, Boost Mobile, and any other telephone, long distance, calling card, paging, cellular, wireless or other telecommunication service providers (hereinafter referred to as the Telecommunication Companies) shall, upon oral or written request of law enforcement, provide technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services which said companies are providing to the people whose communications are to be intercepted and shall provide caller identi?cation where possible. (11) enforcement under this Order, which complies with Section 2703 of Title 18 of the United States That the Telecommunications Companies, upon oral or written request of law Code, shall, within 48 hours (including after-business hours, weekends, and holidays), without delay: a. Provide any and all information related to any telephone(s), pager(s), text messaging devices, cellular/wireless telephones, calling cards, and other communication devices contacting or being contacted by the Target Devices(s) and, the subscriber(s) of any such communication devices(s). Such information shall include, but not be limited to, all numbers and accounts associated with the primary number/account, service and billing information (billed and unbilled), activation date, credit information, co-signer information, contact address(es) and telephone number(s), call identi?cation information whether published or non-published, Global Positioning System (GPS) data and all information identifying the communication device(s) such as electronic serial number (ESN) international mobile subscriber identi?er (IMSI), international mobile equipment identi?er (IMEI), subscriber identity module (SIM) number, universal ?eet mobile identi?er (UF MI), and any and all keys/codes or other identi?er. b. Provide toll infonnation, including any and all historical data for any period requested by law enforcement within 48 hours of the request, call detail, including Direct Connect Push-to-Talk information, call records, originating and tenninating call detail, Global Positioning 5 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case 3: Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 64 of 72 PageID 655 System (GPS) information, extended dialed digit information, dialed digit extraction, and/or post cut-through digits from any and all telephones calling to or being called by each Target Telephone number. c. Provide cell site data including, but not limited to, cell site location (physical address) of call initiation, Global Positioning System (GPS) data, call termination, and call progress locations (Automated Message Accounting Data) connected to the use of each Target Telephone number and any and all cellular telephones called or being called by each Target Telephone number, pursuant to Title 18 USC Section d. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment known as dialed number recorders to detect and record all numbers dialed or pulsed by the telephones connected to each Target Telephone number. e. Authorize the installation and/or use of equipment to trap and trace and identify the telephone numbers of persons placing calls to and from the Target Telephone numbers to include the activation of caller identi?cation feature, ?caller any calling features such as ?call-forwarding? and "speed dialing? currently assigned to the primary telephone numbers, and that the tracing operation: and the use of the caller ID service be without geographical limits. f. Provide access and access codes to voice mail and voice mail features. g. Authorize the installation and/or use of all facilities to enable the interception and monitoring of all functions and capabilities of the Target Device(s), and that law enforcement be provided all access necessary to install the necessary equipment required to implement such interception, including but not limited to, all Wireless digital functions, Wireless analog functions, push-to-talk/direct connect/digital dispatch functions, voice over IP communications, automatic mode svvitching functions, ?short message service,? text messages, packet data services, and instant messages. This includes interception of cellular communications occurring outside California where the contents of the redirected communications are ?rst heard or accessed in Riverside County. (See United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992)) 6 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case 3 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 65 of 72 PageID 656 h. Provide all information related to pre-paid cellular telephones including historical, past, present, current, and on?going activity related to hours, minutes, and money left on the pre-paid telephone account. i. Provide pass codes, user ID, passwords, access codes, user names and identify any other features speci?c to the Target Telephone(s) with GPS capabilities. j. Upon request of law enforcement, provide any and all geographic location information at call origination (for outbound calls), call termination (for incoming calls), and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking andfor pinging data during the progress of a call, on an ongoing andXor real time basis, for the Target Telephone(s) as well as any and all telephones calling into or being called by each Target Telephone number. k. Provide all published and non?published subscriber information, including Buddy List information and subscriber information pertaining to the Buddy List, as well as pass codes, user ID, passwords, access codes, and usernames, and identify any other features speci?c to any and all telephones calling into or being called by each Target Telephone number, within two business days of each request submitted during the term of this Order, pursuant to Title 18, use Sections 2703 (C) and 1. Provide an itemized bill to the law enforcement agency for services . rendered for the implementation of this Order. rn. Upon oral or written request of a law enforcement of?cer acting under . this Order, provide within 24 hours, orally, by facsimile, or by electronic mail, the most recent unbilled call traf?c (including date, time and duration) and the latest ISMI transaction for the Target Telephone and! or any telephone in contact with the Target Telephone. n. Sprint Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Virgin Mobile, T-Mobile, Metro PCS, Cricket Wireless and any and all telecommunications providers providing service to the Target Telephone(s) shall continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) for the duration of the intercept, regardless of unpaid balances. Additionally, the Telecommunication Companies shall continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid 7 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case 3 Am Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 66 of 72 PageID 657 balances. The Telecommunication Companies are ordered to not disclose to the Target Subject(s) the fact that the service was continued in spite of unpaid balances. In the event the Telecommunication Companies continue to provide service to the Target Telephone(s) regardless of unpaid balances, and the Target Subject(s) do not pay for the continued service, the Telecommunication Companies shall be compensated by the agency executing the Court Order for the cost of the service that was continued regardless of unpaid balances, pursuant to the Court?s Order. (12) States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is authorized to assist with the delivery of call Where applicable, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and/or the United content and data between the Telecommunications Companies and the listening post in Riverside County. (13) interception showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective, That there shall be written reports to this court for every ten?day period during the or a satisfactory explanation for a lack thereof and the need for continued interception; each ten-day report is to be completed and presented to this Court at the earliest possible time from the end of each ten-day period, or as this Court ?lrther directs. (Penal Code Section 629.60) (14) That the Telecommunications Companies shall not disclose to the subscriber or any other unauthorized person any information regarding this interception, or the fact that it exists, unless audiorized by further written Order of this Court or of another court of competent jurisdiction. (15) This Application, Review, Af?davit, Order(s) and any/all incorporated documents, attachments, and/or exhibits shall be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (1 6) Pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.64, the Court Copy of the analog tape recordings shall be sealed on a daily basis and presented to this Court upon expiration of this Order or any extensions thereof. If, pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.64, the recordings are made on a 8 Court Order -- Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case 3 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 67 of 72 PageID 658 4b. digital Optical disk or other digital recording media, that recording media shall be presented to this Court upon expiration of this Order or any extensions thereof. (17) pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.68 can be prepared. Such an inventory shall be sent to the The agency executing this Order shall maintain records so that an inventory following classes of individuals: (1) persons named in the Order or the Application; (2) known parties to intercepted communications; (3) persons for whom telephone subscriber information has been obtained as the result of the telephone being used in an intercepted conversation; (4) persons identi?ed as the result of surveillance based on intercepted conversations; (5) persons arrested as a result of intercepted conversations. (13) previous paragraph who are identi?ed during this wiretap and provide the Asset Forfeiture Division The agency executing this Order shall maintain a list of all persons described in the of the District Attorney?s Of?ce with said list upon the conclusion of the wiretap. (19) including the arrest of any individuals, whenever information derived ?om the wiretap is The agency executing this Order shall determine the result of an investigation, communicated to another law enforcement agency or to another investigative team. (20) The agency executing this Order shall maintain a list of all persons arrested during this wiretap and provide the Asset Forfeiture Division of the District Attomey?s Of?ce with said list upon the conclusion of this wiretap. (21) for authorization to use the contents of intercepted communications and evidence derived there The agency executing this Order may make an application in the Six-day Reports from, for crimes not speci?ed in the wiretap interception Order, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.82. 9 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 Case 3 Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 68 Of 72 PageID 659 (22) Pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.61, the agency executing this Order shall report 2 to the Attorney General, within 10 days after the Order was issued, the persons, facilities, and 3 places that are to be intercepted pursuant to this Order. 4 (23) This Application, Review, Af?davit, Order(s) and any/all incorporated 5 documents, attachments, and/or exhibits shall be sealed and kept in the custody of the agency 6 executing the Court Order or the District Attorney's Of?ce and to be disclosed only upon a 7 . 8 showing of good cause before a Judge of competent jurisdiction. (Penal Code Section 629.66) 9 IT IS SO ORDEREDDALE: reoruary ,2013 12 13 TIME: HONORABLE HELIOS J. HERNANDEZ 14 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 10 Court Order Wiretap Order No. 15-108 'Case Document 27?8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 69 of 72 PageID 660 MICHAEL A. HESTRIN District Attorney County of Riverside Deena Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange Street Riverside, CA 92501 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 95 5-9673 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION WIRETAP NO. 15-108 OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE SEALING OF DOCUMENTS AND OPTICAL DISK ACQUIRED DURING THE THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE COMMUNICATIONS 1. On February 19, 2015, pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 et.seq., this Court SEALING ORDER \vavv signed Riverside County Wiretap Order No. 15-108, authorizing the interception of wire and Remorse electronic communications to and from cellular telephone number TT #38: #39: pagan and TT #40: 502-609-5937, for a period of 30 (thirty) days. Interception was terminated for TT #38-40 on March 20, 2015. 2. On March 27, 2015, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Taskforce Of?cer (T FO) Amado Layos presented the original signed Wiretap Application Packet (to include the Application, Af?davit, CEO Letter, Minimizations, Court Order(s), and 10 Day Reports, Sealing Order) contained in one book for Riverside County Wiretap Order No. 15?108 and associated compact discs containing audio calls and SMS text messages. 3. TFO Layos shall place the original Wiretap Application Packet for the above named Target Telephones, the compact discs and the original signed Sealing Order into one (1) large evidence envelope. 4. The envelope shall be sealed in the presence of the Honorable Judge Becky L. Dugan. TFO Layos shall place the envelope into evidence with the Drug Enforcement Administration Non?Drug Evidence Custodian. Case p-a CD Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 70 of 72 PageID 661 5. The Drug Enforcement Administration shall maintain custody of the envelope in a sealed condition for a period of 10 years, pursuant to Penal Code sections 629.64 and 629.66. 8. Total number of calls recorded for the authorized interception periods covering the Original Application for Target Telephone #Total number of calls recorded for the authorized interception periods covering the Original Application for Target Telephone #39 is: REDACTED 10. Total number of calls recorded for the authorized interception periods covering the Original Application for Target Telephone #40 is: A. Total number of calls: 3,393 B. Total number of voice calls: 2,721 C. Total number of pertinent calls: 225 Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 71 of 72 PageID 662 D. Total number of minimized calls: 248 2 E. Total number of privileged calls: 1 1 3 F. Total number of SMS Text messages: 670 4 G. Total number of pertinent SMS Text Messages: 227 5 H. Total number of minimized SMS Text messages: 0 6 7 11. I certify, under penalty of perjury and the laws of the State of California, that the 8 above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed in Riverside County, California. 9 10 Dated: 3,27,1?8 Taskfo Of?c ado Layos 12 Drug forcem Administration Case Document 27-8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 72 of 72 PageID 663 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. TFO Layos shall place the original Wiretap 15-108 audio recordings into one (1) envelope, along with the original Wiretap 15-108 Af?davit, Application, CEO Letter, Minimizations, Court Order(s), 10 Day Reports and signed Sealing Order, for sealing. 2. The enve10pe(s) shall be sealed in the presence of the Honorable Judge Becky L. Dugan. 3. TFO Layos shall cause the envelope(s) to be booked into evidence at the evidence room. 4. The Law Enforcement Agency shall maintain custody of the envelope(s) in a sealed condition for a period of 10 years pursuant to Penal Code Sections 629.64 and 629.66. Honorable Judge Becky L. Dugan Riverside County Superior Court DATED: March lb ,2015 Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 12 PageID 664 NM MICHAEL A. HESTRIN District Attorney County of Riverside Deena M. Bennett Deputy District Attorney 3960 Orange Street Riverside, CA 92501 Telephone: (951) 955-5400 Fax: (951) 955-9673 State Bar No. 165447 SUPERIOR COURT DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNLA FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE IN THE MATTER OF WIRETAPS DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF UNSEALING WIRETAP #14420, UNAVAILABILITY BY THE #14-120 EXTENSION 1, #14-183, #14?558, DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND #15-08 AUTHORIZATION OF DESIGNEE H, DECLARATION OF DEENA M. BENNETT, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY: I, DEENA BENNETT do hereby declare: 1. I am licensed to practice law in the State of California and am employed by the Riverside County District Attorney?s Of?ce. I have been with this of?ce since September 1993. I am currently assigned to the Asset Forfeiture Unit and I am the Deputy District Attorney assigned to handle all wiretaps within the County of Riverside. I have held this assignment since February 2011. My of?ce location is the Western Division which is located in the City of Riverside. 2. Paul E. Zellerbach was sworn in as the District Attorney of the County of Riverside in January 2011. He was the elected of?cial for four years through December 2014. Mr. Zellerbach lost his bid for a second term to Michael A. Hestrin, and Mr. Hestrin was sworn in as the District Attorney on January 5, 2015. 3. During his tenure in of?ce, and pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section District Attorney Paul E. Zellerbach named his second in command as his primary designee. On February 16, 2011, Mr. Zellerbach issued an of?ce memorandum indicating that Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 2 of 12 PageID 665 Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Jeffrey A. Van Wagenen would be the primary designee. (See Attachment A.) 5. On January 2, 2014, District Attorney Paul E. Zellerbach issued a new designation memorandum in accordance with current case law. The designation memorandum authorized ADA Jeffrey A. Van Wagenen ?to make all decisions necessary to the administration of the District Attorney?s Office.? (See Attachment B.) 6. Following the 2014 election and prior to the sweating in of District Attorney-Elect Michael A. Hesuin, ADA Van Wagenen left employment at the District Attorney?s Of?ce. Upon ADA Van Wagenen?s departure in October 2014, and pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 629.50, District Attorney Zellerbach issued a designation letter, addressed to the Riverside County Superior Court, authorizing Assistant District Attorney Creg G. Datig, his second in command, to act as his primary designee. (See Attachment C.) 7. At all time, all involved judicial of?cers who reviewed and authorized the wiretap applications were personally informed of all designees and any changes to the Penal Code section 629.50 designation by the District Attorney. 8. On January 5, 2015, Michael A. Hestrin was sworn in as the Riverside County District Attorney. Following a change in personnel, Michael A. Hestrin issued a designation letter, addressed to the Riverside County Superior Court, indicating that pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 629.50, Chief Assistant District Attorney (CADA) John Aki, his second in command, would be the primary designee. (See Attachment D.) 9. The Riverside County District Attorney?s Of?ce received a request ?'om Assistant United States Attorney ?'om the Western District of Kentucky regarding the following wiretap applications: 14?120 Signed by ef?'ey A. Van Wagenen on 03/1 1/2014 14-120 Ext. 1 Signed by Jef?'ey A. Van Wagenen on 04/08/2014 14?183 Signed by ef?'ey A. Van Wagenen on 04/08/2014 14-658 Signed by Greg Datig on 10/27/2014 15-108 Signed by John Aki on 02/19/2015 10. All of these wiretap af?davits were reviewed by the authorized designee of the District Attorney. The applications were subsequently signed by the designee and the af?davits Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 3 of 12 PageID 666 Mmmn?Ai?sa?an?Ir?uu?IHMI?IH were presented to the court. 1 1. District Attorney Hestrin took of?ce on January 2015. District Attorney Hestrin immediately changed a number of the policies, practices and procedures in the administration of the of?ce, including wiretaps. 12. On February 19, 2015, when Chief Assistant District Attorney John Aki reviewed and signed wiretap #154 08, District Attorney Hestxin was unavailable. His calendar indicates that he was in the Eastern Division of the County and not physically present in the Western end of the county. 13. Riverside County is the 3rd largest county in the state of California and 10th largest in the nation. Riverside County extends from its Western end, which begins at the borders of Orange and San Bernardino Counties, to its Eastern end at the Arizona border. Riverside County?s southern border reaches to San Diego County. The District Attorney?s Of?ce is divided into three divisions: Western, Southwest/Mid?County, and Eastern. 14. Geographically, the Eastern Division?s main of?ce in the City of Indio is located approximately 146 miles ?'orn the Western Division?s main of?ce in the City of Riverside. The designated judicial of?cer who authorizes and signs wiretap orders is physically located in the Western end of the county, in the City of Riverside. 15. Pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 629.50, Chief Assistant District Attorney John Aki reviewed wiretap #15-108 because District Attorney Hestrin was not available to review and sign the wiretap. District Attorney Hestrin was not physically present in the Western Division?s main of?ce in Riverside for the entire day, nor was he in the Western end of the County. District Attorney Hestrin?s calendar re?ects that he was in the Indie of?ce in the morning hours for scheduled meetings. In the afternoon, he was outside the Indio of?ce but remained in the Eastern end of the County to attend a meeting with another County agency. Given that District Attorney Hestrin was not present in the Western end of the County where wiretap applications are processed and signed, and was instead over two hours away in Indie, District Attorney Hestrin was unavailable to personally review the af?davit and sign the application. Given this unavailability, the Chief Assistant District Attorney reviewed the af?davit Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 4 of 12 PageID 667 1 and signed the application. 2 16. In 2014, regarding wiretaps #14?120, #14420 Extension 1, #14?183, and #14-558, 3 pursuant to the protocol created by District Attorney Paul E. Zellerbach, following the preparation 4 of the wiretap paperwork, all wiretap af?davits and applications were submitted directly to the 5 Assistant District Attorney of the Administrative Division Jeffery A. Van Wagenen. After 5 Assistant District Attorney Van Wagenen left the of?ce in October of 2014, all wiretap af?davits 7 and applications were submitted directly to ADA Creg G. Datig. In his letter dated October 14, 3 2014, Paul E. Zellerbach designated Assistant District Attorney Creg G. Datig as the designee 9 pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 (See Attachment C.) 10 17. Mr. Zellerbach, Mr. Van Wagenen and Mr. Datig have since departed the of?ce. This 1 1 declaration is based on my own recollection of the events. Mr. Zellerbach did not keep records or 12 a calendar that consistently, regularly, or accurately, re?ected his day~to~day business. 13 I certify under penalty of peljury and the laws of the State of California, that the above is 14 true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed in Riverside County, California. 15 Dated: January 2016 Depu istn Atto Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 5 of 12 PageID 668 ATTACHMENT A Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 6 of 12 PageID 669 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PAUL E. ZELLERBACH ATTORNEY DISTRICT ATTORNEY DESIGNEE (RC. Section 629.50) February 16, 201 1 TO: Asset Forfeiture.? Wiretap Staff FROM: Paul E. Zellerbach, District Attorney SUBJECT: District Attorney Designee authorized to Sign wiretap applications pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50. Effective February 16, 2011, Assistant District Attorney Jeffrey A. Van Wagenen Jr. is my Designee pursuant to Penal Code Section 629.50. In his absence, Assistant District Attorney Cregor Datig will be my designee. My designee is authon?zed to act in my place pursuant to the provisions outlined in Penal Code Section 629.50 and Sign all applications relating to wiretaps. 3960 ORANGE STREET ORNERSIDE. CA 92501 951-955-5400 Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 7 of 12 PageID 670 ATTACHMENT Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 8 of 12 PageID 671 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE MEMORANDUM PAUL E. DISTRICT January 2, 2014 TO: Wiretap Stal?l? FROM: Paul Zeilcrbach SUBJECT: Designation Pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 In my absence, Assistant District Attorney .lel?l?rey A. Van Wagencm is in}: designee and is authorized to make all decisions necessary to the administration ol'the District Attorney?s Of?ce. Ifhe is unavailable, Assistant District Attorney C?reg G. Datig is authorized to act on behaifof the District Attorney?s Of?ce. The above authorization was ?rst made on February 16, 201 l, and shall continue until amended, altered, or revoked, in writing by me. If any questions or concerns arise with respect to wiretap authorization and/or protocol, please feel free to contact me. Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 9 of 12 PageID 672 ATTACHME Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 10 of 12 PageID 673 DE STR 1 Tl? ATTO RN- EY r" Kiln". 3-53. it?: n" October E4. 2014 Honorable Mark Cope Riverside ounty Superior Court 4050 Main Street Riverside. CA 92501 Dear Judge Cope: Subject: Designation Pursuant to Penal Code section 629.50 In my absence. Assistant District Attorney Creg Datig is in}! designer: and is authorized to make all decisions necessary to the administratitm ol?the District Attorney's Of?ce. Who is unavailable. Assistant District Attorney Sean is authorized to act on behali'ot? the District Attorney's Of?ce. This authorization shall continue until amended. altered. or revoked. in writing by the District Attorney. Ii?any questions or concerns arise with respect to wiretap authorization andz?or protocol. please contact Deputy District Attorney Deena Bennett. . .- Very yours. x- 7 ?3 r" give tact; PAUL E. District Attorney cc: Judge Michele Levine Judge Helios J. I~Iernandcz Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 11 of 12 PageID 674 ATTACHMENT Case Document 27-9 Filed 02/16/16 Page 12 of 12 PageID 675 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 3960 ORANGE smear RIVERSIDE. CAIJFORNIA 92501 35.13 DISTRECT PCTORNEY January 5. 2015 Presiding Judge I-Iarelcl W. llopp Riverside County Superior Court 4050 Main Street Riverside. CA 9250] Dear Presiding Judge Re: Designation Pursuant to Penal Code section {329.50 In in): absence. C'ltiel' Assistant District Attorney .leltn 2in is my designee and is authorized to make all necessary to the admmistratmn el?the District Attorney?s Ol'?ee. This authorization shall enntinue until amended. altered. or revoked. in \x'riting by the District Attornex'. It'any questions or concerns arise with respect In wiretap authorization antlr'or protocol. please contact Deputy District Attorney Deena Bennett. Sineerel)?. . . l/ll W. I tam-K: t?vlichael A. l-iestrin Distrtet cc: Judge Beck): Dugan Judge Helios lernandez 27-10 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 1 PageID 676age 1 GI 1 Zellerbach pleads no contest to sign tampering Colin Am i, The Desert Sun P-m- 8' 20? Former Riverside County District Attorney Paul Zelierbach pleaded no contest to vandalism charges involving election signs that beionged to his opponent in last year's district attorney campaign. Zellerbach entered his plea Wednesday in Riverside County Superior Court in Riverside. He was sentenced to one year probation and 60 hours of community service. according to the California Attorney General?s of?ce. He also must pay an $800 fine and $200 in restitution. On April 23, a security camera ?lmed Zellerbach at an Arco gas station at 42-334 Jefferson Street in Indio. Footage showed him getting out of a county Ford Escape and planting a campaign sign before removing one that belonged to his election opponent. Mike Hestrin. (Photo: The Desert Sun) lndio police, whose Police Of?cer's Association backed Hestrin in the election. investigated the incident and requested the state attorney general's of?ce ?le charges against Zellerbach recommending two felonies and three misdemeanors. Zellerbach pleaded no contest to one misdemeanor. "l'm proud of our staff that maintained the integrity of this investigation and followed the law. The detail of their facts and ?ndings presented a complete and comprehensive complaint ?ling to the California Attorney General?s Of?ce," said indio Police Chief Richard Twiss. in a statement. "The California Attorney General's Of?ce's determination to ?le a charge and a subsequent plea of no contest to misdemeanor vandalism validates the integrity of our criminal investigation." Zellerbach cut the county a $203 personal check on April 25 as reimbursement for the miles he logged in the Ford, which was used to carry around campaign signs during hours that were for of?cial business. Hestrin. a Riverside County deputy district attorney, won the November election. He was sworn in last week. Read or Share this story: 01/ 0 5779/ 2/ 12/2016