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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
(ORDER XXXVIII, S.C.R, 2013)
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No.

OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF:
Shayara Bano
116, R.T.S. Depot,
Hempur Daya, Kashipur,
Udhamsingh Nagar,
Uttarakhand 244713

… Petitioner

VERSUS
1. Union of India,
Represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Women and Child Development,
Shastri Bhawan, ‘A’ Wing,
Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,
New Delhi - 110 001
… Respondent No. 1
2. Ministry of Law and Justice,
Represented by the Secretary,
Department of Legal Affairs,
Shastri Bhawan, ‘A’ Wing,
Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,
New Delhi - 110 001

… Respondent No. 2

3. Ministry of Minority Affairs,
Represented by the Secretary,
11th Floor, Paryavaran Bhawan,
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110 001

… Respondent No. 3

4. National Commission for Women,
Represented by the Chairperson,
Plot 21, Jasola Institutional Area,
New Delhi - 110025

… Respondent No. 4

5. Shri Rizwan Ahmad,
S/o Iqbal Ahmad,
37-F/15P/1 V.I.P. Colony,
Gausnagar, P.S. Karaili,
Dist. Allahabad,
Uttar Pradesh

… Respondent No. 5

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WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA SEEKING A WRIT OR ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE
NATURE OF MANDAMUS DECLARING THE PRACTICES OF
TALAQ-E-BIDAT,

NIKAH-HALALA

AND

POLYGAMY

UNDER

MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS AS ILLEGAL, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14, 15, 21 AND 25 OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND TO PASS SUCH FURTHER ORDERS AS
THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE TO PROVIDE
A LIFE OF DIGNITY UNMARRED BY ANY DISCRIMINATION TO
MUSLIM WOMEN
TO,
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA AND HIS
COMPANION JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. This is a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India praying for a direction against the Union of India and
others seeking a writ or order or direction in the nature of
mandamus declaring the practices of talaq-e-bidat, nikah
halala and polygamy under Muslim personal laws as illegal,
unconstitutional for being violative of Articles 14, 15, 21 and
25 of the Constitution, and to pass such further orders as this
Hon’ble Court may deem appropriate to provide a life of
dignity to Muslim women. This petition is filed by the
Petitioner in her individual capacity.

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2. The Petitioner has not approached any other court for the
reliefs claimed in the present Writ Petition. No representation
has been filed with any authority since the constitutional
validity of a statute is under challenge and the reliefs claimed
can only be granted by this Hon’ble Court.
3. The Petitioner is a female citizen of India, a Muslim by
religion, and hails from Kashipur (Uttarkhand). She is sick,
unemployed, and the daughter of a government employee
who has meagre income. The Petitioner was married to
Respondent No. 5 on 11.04.2002 at Allahabad (Uttar
Pradesh) as per Muslim Shariyat law rites and customs and
has two children from the wedlock. Her parents had been
compelled to give dowry before the marriage. Her husband
and his family not only subjected her to cruelty after the
marriage (including physical abuse and administration of
drugs that caused her memory to fade, kept her unconscious,
and eventually made her critically ill), but also demanded
additional dowry in the form of a car and cash which her
family was unable to provide. Due to the unreasonable
demands, the torturous behaviour of her husband and his
eventual decision to abandon her, the Petitioner has been
forced to stay with her parents since April 2015. As a
consequence of the drugs administered to the Petitioner-wife
by her husband, she is ill, requires the constant care and
support of doctors and medicines, and requires to be

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financially supported by her father. The Petitioner-wife was
divorced by triple-talaq, which was confirmed by a divorce
deed dated 10.10.2015 issued by Respondent No. 5.
A true translated copy of the divorce deed dated 10.10.2015
issued to the Petitioner-wife by Respondent No. 5 is attached
as Annexure P-1 (Pages 40 to 42).
BACKGROUND
4. This Hon’ble Court has not only observed that gender
discrimination against Muslim women needs to be examined,
but has also been pleased to direct that a public interest
litigation be separately registered for which notices were
directed to be issued to the Ld. Attorney General and the
National Legal Services Authority, New Delhi. Referring to
John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611, it
was observed in Prakash and Others v. Phulavati and
Others, Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013 decided on
16.10.2015, that laws dealing with marriage and succession
are not a part of religion, the law has to change with time, and
international covenants and treaties could be referred to
examine

validity and

reasonableness

of

a

provision.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Court directed that the issue of
gender discrimination against Muslim women under Muslim
personal laws, specifically the lack of safeguards against
arbitrary divorce and second marriage by a Muslim husband
during the currency of first marriage notwithstanding the

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guarantees of the Constitution, may be registered as a public
interest litigation and heard separately.
5. A perusal of the decisions of this Hon’ble Court in Prakash v.
Phulavati (supra), Javed and Others v. State of Haryana
and Others, (2003) 8 SCC 369, and Smt. Sarla Mudgal,
President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of India and
Others, (1995) 3 SCC 635 illustrates that the practice of
polygamy has been recognised as injurious to public morals
and it can be superseded by the State just as it can prohibit
human sacrifice or the practice of sati. In fact, in Khursheed
Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2015)
8 SCC 439, this Hon’ble Court has also taken the view that
practices permitted or not prohibited by a religion do not
become a religious practice or a positive tenet of the religion,
since a practice does not acquire the sanction of religion
merely because it is permitted.
6. It is accordingly submitted that a ban on polygamy has long
been the need of the hour in the interest of public order and
health. It is further submitted that this Hon’ble Court has
already expressed the view that polygamy is not an integral
part of religion and Article 25 merely protects religious faith,
but not practices which may run counter to public order,
morality or health.
7. The Muslim personal laws of India permit the practice of
talaq-e-bidat or talaq-i-badai, which includes a Muslim man

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divorcing his wife by pronouncing more than one talaq in a
single tuhr (the period between two menstruations), or in a
tuhr after coitus, or pronouncing an irrevocable instantaneous
divorce at one go. This practice of talaq-e-bidat (unilateral
triple-talaq) which practically treats women like chattel is
neither harmonious with the modern principles of human
rights and gender equality, nor an integral part of Islamic
faith, according to various noted scholars. Many Islamic
nations, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iraq, have
banned or restricted such practice, while it continues to vex
the Indian society in general and Indian Muslim women like
the Petitioner in particular. It is submitted that the practice
also wreaks havoc to the lives of many divorced women and
their children, especially those belonging to the weaker
economic sections of the society.
8. The practice of talaq-e-bidat and divorce of a woman without
proper attempt at reconciliation violates the basic right to live
with dignity of every Muslim woman. Muslim women have
been given talaq over Skype, Facebook and even text
messages. There is no protection against such arbitrary
divorce. Muslim women have their hands tied while the
guillotine of divorce dangles, perpetually ready to drop at the
whims of their husbands who enjoy undisputed power. Such
discrimination and inequality hoarsely expressed in the form
of unilateral triple-talaq is abominable when seen in light of

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the progressive times of the 21st century. Further, once a
woman has been divorced, her husband is not permitted take
her back as his wife even if he had pronounced talaq under
influence of any intoxicant, unless the woman undergoes
nikah halala which involves her marriage with another man
who subsequently divorces her so that her previous husband
can re-marry her. This unfortunate practice was highlighted
by the media in the case of Nagma Bibi of Orissa whose
husband divorced her in the spur of the moment in a drunken
state and wanted her back the next morning when he realized
he had committed a terrible mistake. Unfortunately, she was
prevented by her community’s leaders who forcibly sent her
with her three children to her father’s house suggesting she
will have to undergo nikah halala before she can re-unite with
her husband.
9. According to many scholars, talaq-e-bidat is not a form of
divorce recognised in the Holy Quran as the Holy Book
provides

for

reconsideration

and

reconciliation

before

recognising divorce as irrevocable. Noted Islamic scholars
like Asghar Ali Engineer have opined that talaq-e-ehsan, in
which a married Muslim couple is given three months to
separate if they wish, and also offers an opportunity to
reconcile their differences, is the only acceptable and valid
form

of

talaq.

In

any event,

the

social,

economic,

humanitarian and moral significance of making attempts over

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a period of time to reconcile marital disputes is widely
prevalent and very well recognised. According to Prof. Tahir
Mahmood (former Dean of Faculty of Law at the University of
Delhi, former Chairman of the National Commission for
Minorities, author and editor of numerous commentaries on
Muslim law, and an internationally recognised expert on
Muslim law), talaq-e-bidat is not recognised by the Holy
Quran which, to the contrary, provides that a person cannot
divorce his wife unless there is an arbitration or reconciliation
process. He has also expressed the view that maulvis have
thwarted reforms in the Muslim community in India and it is
imperative for the judiciary to step in.
A true copy of an interview dated 05.05.2015 reported on
Scroll.in, where the views of Prof. Tahir Mahmood on talaq-ebidat have been reported, is attached as Annexure P-2
(Pages 43 to 53).
10.

Maulana Mohammad Ali in his commentary on the Holy

Quran has stated that not only must there be a good cause
for divorce, but all means to effect reconciliation must also
have been exhausted, since the impression that a Muslim
husband may put away his wife at his mere caprice is a grave
distortion of the Islamic institution of divorce. This view was
referred to in Dagdu s/o Chotu Pathan, Latur v. Rahimbi
Dagdu Pathan, 2002 (3) Mh LJ 602, wherein a three judge
bench of the Bombay High Court observed that talaq must be

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for reasonable cause, must be preceded by attempts at
reconciliation, and the husband must satisfy the preconditions
of arbitration for reconciliation and the reasons for talaq,
since mere pronouncement of talaq by the husband or merely
declaring his intentions or his act of having pronounced talaq
is not sufficient and does not meet the requirements of law. In
the words of the judgment, every exercise of right to talaq by
the husband is required to satisfy the preconditions of
arbitration for reconciliation and the reasons for talaq.
11.

In Sri Jiauddin Ahmed v. Mrs. Anwara Begum, (1981)

1 GLR 358, Baharul Islam, J. as a judge of the High Court of
Gauhati (as His Lordship then was), quoted several Quranic
verses and commentaries

thereon

by well-recognized

scholars of great eminence like Mahammad Ali and Yusuf Ali
as well as the pronouncements of great jurists like Ameer Ali
and Fyzee and expressed disapproval of the notion that the
whimsical and capricious divorce by a husband is “good in
law though bad in theology” and even observed that such a
statement is based on the concept that women were chattel
belonging to men, which the Holy Quran does not brook.
Similarly, in Must. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar,
(1981) 1 GLR 375 (DB), Baharul Islam, J. stated that the
correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that
talaq must be for a reasonable cause and it must be
preceded by an attempt of reconciliation between the

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husband and the wife by two arbiters, one chosen by the wife
from her family and the other by the husband from his. It is
submitted that this view was referred to with approval by this
Hon’ble Court in Shamim Ara versus State of Uttar
Pradesh & Another, (2002) 7 SCC 518, wherein this Hon’ble
Court considered valid talaq in Islamic law and, referring to
these decisions as “illuminating and weighty judicial opinion
available in two decisions of Gauhati High Court recorded by
Baharul Islam, J”, observed that talaq must be for a
reasonable

cause

and

be

preceded

by attempts

at

reconciliation between the husband and the wife.
12.

In A. Yusuf Rawther v. Sowramma, AIR 1971 Ker 261,

V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then was), observed
that it is a popular fallacy that Muslim men enjoy unbridled
authority to liquidate their marriage under Quranic law and
the view that Muslim men enjoy an arbitrary unilateral power
to inflict instant divorce does not accord with Islamic
injunctions. It was also observed in this case that
commentators on the Holy Quran have rightly observed that
the husband must satisfy the Court about the reasons for
divorce, which view tallied with the law administered even at
that time (almost five decades ago) in some Muslim countries
like Iraq, although Muslim law as applied in India has taken a
course contrary to the spirit of what the Prophet or the Holy

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Quran propounds and the same misconception also vitiates
the law dealing with a wife’s right to divorce.
13.

Polygamy is another practice that has been recognised

as an evil plague similar to sati and has also been banned by
law in India for all but Muslim citizens. Unfortunately, even in
the 21st century, it continues to vex Muslim women
notwithstanding that such practice poses extremely serious
health, social, economic, moral and emotional risks. It is
submitted that religious officers and priests like imams,
maulvis, etc. who propagate, support and authorise practices
like talaq-e-bidat, nikah halala, and polygamy are grossly
misusing their position, influence and power to subject
Muslim women to such gross practices which treats them as
chattel, thereby violating their fundamental rights enshrined in
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.
14.

It has been noted in Smt. Sarla Mudgal (supra) that

bigamous marriage has been made punishable amongst
Christians by the Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (No. XV of
1872), amongst Parsis by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce
Act, 1936 (No. III of 1936), and amongst Hindus, Buddhists,
Sikhs and Jains by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (No. XXV of
1955). However, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act,
1939 does not secure for Indian Muslim women the
protection from bigamy which has been statutorily secured for
Indian women belonging to all other religion. It is submitted

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that the citizens of India who followed religions other than
Islam also traditionally practiced polygamy, but the same was
prohibited not only because laws dealing with marriage are
not a part of religion, but also because the law has to change
with time and ensure a life of dignity unmarred by
discrimination on the basis of gender. It is further submitted
that the failure to secure the same equal rights and life of
dignity for Muslim women violates their most basic human
and fundamental right to a life of dignity unmarred by gender
discrimination, which in turn have a critical impact on their
social and economic rights to say the least.
15.

In State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952

Bom 84, wherein the constitutional validity of the Bombay
Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946 was
challenged on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 15 and
25 of the Constitution, a Division Bench consisting of Chief
Justice Chagla and Justice Gajendragadkar (as His Lordship
then was), held that a sharp distinction must be drawn
between religious faith and belief and religious practices,
since the State only protects religious faith and belief while
religious practices that run counter to public order, morality or
health or a policy of social welfare must give way to the good
of the people of the State. It is submitted that this view has
been referred to with approval by this Hon’ble Court in
Khursheed Ahmad Khan (supra).

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16.

The observations of the Constitution Bench in Danial

Latifi & Another v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740, are of
utmost relevance. This Hon’ble Court stated that when
interpreting provisions where matrimonial relationship was
involved it has to consider the social conditions prevalent in
our society, where a great disparity exists in the matter of
economic resourcefulness between a man and a woman
whether they belong to the majority or the minority group,
since our society is male dominated both economically and
socially and women are invariably assigned a dependent role
irrespective of the class of society to which they belong. This
Hon’ble Court further observed that solutions to societal
problems of universal magnitude pertaining to horizons of
basic human rights, culture, dignity, decency of life, and
dictates of necessity in the pursuit of social justice should be
invariably left to be decided on considerations other than
religion or religious faith or beliefs or sectarian, racial or
communal constraints.
17.

Reform to prohibit talaq-e-bidat has already been sought

by many citizens from the Muslim community of India. The All
India Muslim Women Personal Law Board has expressed the
view that talaq-e-bidat is against the light of Islam and the
Holy Quran does not endorse divorce by such a simplistic
procedure that lacks any attempt at reconciliation.
A true copy of an electronic news article titled “Talaq, Talaq,
Talaq: The Islamic Legality Behind the Cliche” dated

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04.09.2015, where the views of the All India Muslim Women
Personal Law Board on talaq-e-bidat have been reported, is
attached as Annexure P-3 (Pages 54 to 56).
18.

The Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan has written to the

Prime Minister seeking codification of Muslim personal law as
per a draft based on Quranic tenets prepared by them and
has sought that certain prevalent practices be declared
illegal, including the practice of talaq-e-bidat and polygamy.
A true copy of a news article dated 28.11.2015 in the DNA
titled “Muslim women write to PM Modi to make triple talaq,
polygamy illegal”, where the letter to the Prime Minister from
the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan seeking ban of tripletalaq and polygamy has been reported, is attached as
Annexure P-4 (Pages 57 to 58).
19.

A high-level committee set up by the Union Government,

in its report to the Ministry of Women and Child Development
in 2015 titled “Women and the law: An assessment of family
laws with focus on laws relating to marriage, divorce, custody,
inheritance and succession”, has recommended a ban on
various practices that are purportedly Islamic but require
reform, including the practice of talaq-e-bidat and polygamy.
According to a news article in the Hindustan Times titled
“High-level panel seeks overhaul of family laws”, the report of
the high-level committee not only recommends a complete
ban on triple-talaq as it renders Muslim wives extremely
insecure and vulnerable, but also recognises that equality

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should be the basis of all personal law since the Constitution
envisages equality, justice and dignity for women. The news
article also reports that it is the view of the high-level
committee that the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939
must be amended to introduce specific provisions to render
triple-talaq and polygamy void and to provide for statutory
interim maintenance to Muslim women.
A true copy of the news article dated 23.08.2014 in the
Hindustan Times titled “High-level panel seeks overhaul of
family

laws”,

in

which

the

high-level

committee’s

recommendations on personal laws were reported, is
attached as Annexure P-5 (Pages 59 to 61).
20.

It is submitted that Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)

Application Act, 1937, by providing for the application of
Muslim personal law in matters relating to marriage where the
parties are Muslims, conveys a wrong impression that the law
sanctions the sinful form of talaq and the practice of halala
and polygamy, which is grossly injurious to the fundamental
rights of the married Muslim women and offends Articles 14,
15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution. The assumptions and
beliefs upon which the talaq-e-bidat form of divorce is
recognised are factually false, scientifically untenable and
contrary to the spirit and provisions of the Constitution. This
form of divorce has been declared to be a spiritual offence in
the Holy Quran and giving recognition to that form interferes
with the Muslim women’s right to profess and practice her

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religion, inasmuch as it unleashes a spiritual offence on her
to say the least and is, thus, violative of Articles 14, 15, 21
and 25 of the Constitution. It is, accordingly, submitted that
the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937,
which is subject to the Constitution, is invalid in so far as it
seeks to recognise and validate the practices of talaq-e-bidat,
nikah halala and polygamy.
21.

Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)

Application Act, 1937 reads:
“Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in
all questions (save questions relating to agricultural
land) regarding intestate succession, special property of
females,

including

personal

properly

inherited

or

obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of
Personal

Law.

marriage,

dissolution

of

marriage,

including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat,
maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust
properties,

and

wakfs

(other

than

charities

and

charitable institutions and charitable and religious
endowments) the rule of decision in cases where the
parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat).”
It is submitted that this provision, in so far as it seeks to
recognise and validate talaq-e-bidat as a valid form of divorce
and the practices of nikah halala and polygamy, is void and

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unconstitutional as such practices are not only repugnant to
the basic dignity of a woman as an individual but also
violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.
A true copy of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application
Act, 1937 is attached as Annexure P-6 (Pages 62 to 65).
22.

The Constitution neither grants any absolute protection

to the personal law of any community that is arbitrary or
unjust, nor exempts personal laws from the jurisdiction of the
Legislature or the Judiciary. To the contrary, Entry 5 of List III
in the Seventh Schedule confers power on the Legislature to
amend and repeal existing laws or pass new laws in all such
matters (including marriage and divorce) which were on
August 15, 1947, governed by personal laws.
23.

The freedom of conscience and free profession, practice

and propagation of religion guaranteed by Article 25 of the
Constitution is not absolute and, in terms of Article 25(1),
“subject to public order, morality and health and to the other
provisions of this Part”. It is submitted that a harmonious
reading of Part III of the Constitution clarifies that the freedom
of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation
of religion guaranteed by Article 25 is subject to the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 21. In
fact, Article 25 clearly recognises this interpretation by
making the right guaranteed by it subject not only to other

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provisions of Part III of the Constitution but also to public
order, morality and health.
24.

It is submitted that the Legislature has failed to ensure

the dignity and equality of women in general and Muslim
women in particular especially when it concerns matters of
marriage, divorce and succession. Despite the observations
of this Hon’ble Court for the past few decades, Uniform Civil
Code remains an elusive Constitutional goal that the Courts
have fairly refrained from enforcing through directions and the
Legislature has dispassionately ignored except by way of
paying some lip service. However, it is submitted that laws
dealing with marriage and succession are not part of religion
and the law has to change with time, which finds support from
the views expressed by this Hon’ble Court in John
Vallamattom (supra) and Prakash v. Phulavati (supra). It is
further submitted that this Hon’ble Court has already held that
the issue of gender discrimination against Muslim women
under Muslim personal laws, specifically the lack of
safeguards against arbitrary divorce and second marriage by
a Muslim husband during currency of first marriage
notwithstanding the guarantees of the Constitution, needs to
be examined by this Hon’ble Court.
25.

In the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in terms of Section 7

of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, various
safeguards have been introduced to protect the dignity of

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women including the requirement that notice of talaq must be
in writing, prescribing punishment for contravention of such
requirement of notice, prescribing a mandatory period of
separation and reconciliation for divorce to be effective,
prohibiting divorce during pregnancy of wife, introducing an
arbitration council for facilitating reconciliation process
between husband and wife who seek to divorce, and
empowering women to remarry their husband after divorce
without the need for an intervening marriage with a third
person. Similarly, in terms of Section 6 of the Muslim Family
Laws Ordinance, 1961, polygamy has been severely
restricted by prescribing that a married man may not enter
into another marriage without just reasons for the proposed
marriage, seeking the consent of existing wife or wives, and
obtaining the approval of an Arbitration Council established
by the law, which Arbitration Council must necessarily consult
the existing wife or wives to consider whether the proposed
marriage is necessary and just. Violation of this law has also
been declared a punishable offence. It is submitted that the
same law of divorce and polygamy is also followed by
Bangladesh.
A true copy of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961
followed by Pakistan and Bangladesh, as available on the
electronic legal portal vakilno1.com, is attached as Annexure
P-7 (Pages 66 to 73).

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26.

It is submitted that in view of the changes in the laws in

various Islamic countries that either ban or restrict triple-talaq,
as well as the views of scholars of Muslim law which clearly
establish that such form of talaq is neither a part of the
Muslim religion nor the Holy Quran, this Hon’ble Court is the
sole hope not only for Muslim women but also for the Muslim
community which has been suffering on account of personal
laws that are being presently enforced without any foundation
in Muslim law and in violation of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
A true copy of a news article dated 09.09.2015 in The Wire
titled “The Muslim Law Board’s Decision on Triple Talaq is
Irrational and Wrong”, which criticizes the practice of tripletalaq and its approval by the All India Muslim Personal Law
Board is attached as Annexure P-8 (Pages 74 to 80).
27.

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

provides that everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person while Article 7 provides that everyone is
equal before the law and is entitled without any discrimination
to equal protection of the law. Since the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the universality and
indivisibility of human rights have been emphasised and it
has been specifically recognised that women’s human rights
are part of universal human rights. In the year 2000, on the
grounds that it violates the dignity of women, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee considered polygamy a

 21

destruction

of

the

internationally

binding

International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which India
acceded on 10.04.1979) and recommended that it be made
illegal in all States. It is accordingly submitted that it is well
recognised in international law that polygamy critically
undermines the dignity and worth of women. On the same
lines, it is also submitted that the practices of talaq-e-bidat
and nikah halala also critically undermine the dignity and
worth of women.
A true copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
attached as Annexure P-9 (Pages 81 to 89).
28.

Non-discrimination and equality between women and

men are central principles of human rights law. Both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (to both of which India acceded on 10.04.1979)
prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender and guarantee
women and men equality in the enjoyment of the rights
covered by the Covenants. Article 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for equality
before the law and equal protection of the law, while Article
2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights requires States to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the Covenant can be exercised without any
discrimination of any kind including on the lines of gender or
religion. It is submitted that discrimination and inequality can

 22

occur in different ways, including through laws or policies that
restrict, prefer or distinguish between various groups of
individuals. It is further submitted that to achieve actual
equality, the underlying causes of women’s inequality must
be addressed since it is not enough to guarantee identical
treatment with men.
A true copy of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is attached as Annexure P-10 (Pages 90 to
120).
A true copy of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights is attached as Annexure P-11
(Pages 121 to 137).
29.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council’s

Committee

on Economic,

Social

and Cultural Rights

explained in its General Comment No. 16 of 2005 that the
parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights are obliged to eliminate not only direct
discrimination, but also indirect discrimination, by refraining
from engaging in discriminatory practices, ensuring that third
parties do not discriminate in a forbidden manner directly or
indirectly, and taking positive action to guarantee women’s
equality. It is submitted that failure to eliminate de jure
(formal) and de facto (substantive) discrimination constitutes
a violation of the rights of women envisaged in such
international treaties and covenants. It is further submitted
that not only must the practices of polygamy, talaq-e-bidat
and nikah halala be declared illegal and unconstitutional, but

 23

the actions of religious groups, bodies and leaders that permit
and propagate such practices must also be declared illegal
and unconstitutional.
A true copy of General Comment No. 16 of 2005 of the
United Nations Economic and Social Council’s Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is attached as
Annexure P-12 (Pages 138 to 157).
30.

The Petitioner has not filed any similar Writ Petition

either before this Hon’ble Court or any High Court praying for
the same reliefs as are claimed in the present Writ Petition.
31.

The present Writ Petition is filed bona fide and in the

interest of justice.
32.

The Petitioner has no adequate or equally efficacious

remedy but to approach this Hon’ble Court by way of the
present Writ Petition.
GROUNDS
33.

The importance of ensuring protection of Muslim women

from arbitrary talaq-e-bidat, nikah halala, and polygamy has
profound consequences on the quality of justice rendered in
the country as well as ensuring a life of dignity for the citizens
as guaranteed by Part III the Constitution.
34.

Various eminent Muslim scholars, judgments of eminent

judges, and Muslim citizens’ groups have expressed
disapproval of the notion that the whimsical and capricious
divorce by a husband is “good in law though bad in theology”

 24

as well as observed that such view is not only an affront to
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but is
also based on the concept that women are chattel belonging
to men, which the Holy Quran does not brook.
35.

A life of dignity and equality is undisputedly the most

sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution
and it prevails above all other rights available under the laws
of India. It is therefore submitted that the solutions to societal
problems of universal magnitude pertaining to horizons of
basic human rights, culture, dignity, decency of life, and
dictates of necessity in the pursuit of social justice should be
decided on considerations other than religion or religious faith
or beliefs, or sectarian, racial or communal constraints.
36.

The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act,

1937, by providing for the application of Muslim personal law
in matters relating to marriage where the parties are Muslims,
conveys a wrong impression that the law sanctions the sinful
form of talaq, nikah halala, and polygamy which is grossly
injurious to the fundamental rights of married Muslim women
and offends Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.
37.

The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 fails to

secure for Indian Muslim women the protection from bigamy,
which protection has been statutorily secured for Indian
women belonging to all other religions, and is to that extent
violative of Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.

 25

38.

The assumptions and beliefs upon which talaq-e-bidat is

recognised are factually false, scientifically untenable and
contrary to the spirit and provisions of the Constitution and, in
any event, this form of divorce has been declared to be a
spiritual offence in the Holy Quran itself.
39.

Giving recognition to nikah halala and to talaq-e-bidat as

a valid form of divorce interferes with the Muslim women’s
right to profess and practice her religion, inasmuch as it
unleashes a spiritual offence on her to say the least and is,
thus, violative of Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the
Constitution.
40.

The Constitution neither grants any absolute protection

to the personal law of any community that is unjust, nor
exempts personal laws from the jurisdiction of the Legislature
or the Judiciary.
41.

Entry 5 of List III in the Seventh Schedule confers power

on the Legislature to amend and repeal existing laws or pass
new laws in all such matters (including marriage and divorce)
which were on August 15, 1947, governed by personal laws,
and the Legislature has practically abdicated its duties and
permitted the basic fundamental rights of Muslim women to
be widely violated which also affects the entire country as a
matter of public order, morality and health.
42.

The freedom of conscience and free profession, practice

and propagation of religion guaranteed by Article 25 of the

 26

Constitution is, in terms of Article 25(1), “subject to public
order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this
Part”. It is submitted that the Constitution does not preclude
the State from introducing social reforms and enacting laws
on subjects traditionally associated with religion, especially
when such laws aim to secure public order, morality, health
and the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
43.

The Constitution only protects religious faith and belief

while the religious practices under challenge run counter to
public order, morality, and health and must therefore yield to
the basic human and fundamental right of Muslim women to
live with dignity, under equal protection of laws, without any
discrimination on the basis of gender or religion.
44.

The Legislature has failed to ensure the basic dignity

and equality of women in general and Muslim women in
particular when it concerns matters of marriage and divorce
and succession.
45.

A complete ban on polygamy, nikah halala and unilateral

triple-talaq has long been the need of the hour as it renders
Muslim wives extremely insecure, vulnerable and infringes
their fundamental rights.
46.

Equality should be the basis of all personal law since the

Constitution envisages equality, justice and dignity for
women.

 27

47.

Several Islamic nations have banned or restricted the

practice of talaq-e-bidat while Indian Muslims are still being
compelled to follow such practice which neither has any basis
in the Holy Quran nor is associated with the practice of Islam
as a religion. Thus, the fundamental rights of Indian Muslims
are being violated continuously, without any basis in Islam or
the Holy Quran, despite reforms introduced by Islamic
nations to secure a life of dignity unmarred by gender
discrimination.
48.

Failure to eliminate de jure (formal) and de facto

(substantive) discrimination against women including by nonState actors, either directly or indirectly, violates not only the
most basic human rights of women but also violates their
civil, economic, social and cultural rights as envisaged in
international treaties and covenants. It is submitted that not
only must the practices of polygamy, talaq-e-bidat and nikah
halala be declared illegal and unconstitutional, but the actions
of religious groups, bodies and leaders that permit and
propagate such practices must also be declared illegal,
unconstitutional, and violative of Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of
the Constitution.
PRAYER
It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to:
A. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to all Respondents declaring the divorce

 28

deed dated 10.10.2015 issued by Respondent No. 5
void ab initio for being illegal, unconstitutional, and
violative of Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the
Constitution;

B. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring Section 2 of
the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act,
1937 unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15, 21
and 25 of the Constitution in so far as it seeks to
recognise and validate talaq-e-bidat (triple-talaq) as a
valid form of divorce;

C. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring Section 2 of
the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act,
1937 unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15, 21
and 25 of the Constitution in so far as it seeks to
recognise and validate the practice of nikah halala;

D. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring Section 2 of
the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act,
1937 unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15, 21
and 25 of the Constitution in so far as it seeks to
recognise and validate the practice of polygamy;

E. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring the
Dissolution

of

Muslim

Marriages

Act,

1939

unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15, 21 and
25 of the Constitution in so far as it fails to secure for

 29

Indian Muslim women the protection from bigamy which
has been statutorily secured for

Indian women

belonging to other religions;

F. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring the practice
of

talaq-e-bidat

(triple-talaq)

as

illegal

and

unconstitutional as it violates the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, including Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25;

G. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring the practice
of nikah halala as illegal and unconstitutional as it
violates the rights guaranteed by the Constitution
including Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25;

H. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring the practice
of polygamy as illegal and unconstitutional as it violates
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution including
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25;

I. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring that a Muslim
wife whose marriage has been terminated by a valid
and legally recognised form of talaq by her husband
may remarry her husband without an intervening halala
marriage with another man;

 30

J. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of
mandamus to the Union of India declaring any form of
divorce under Muslim personal laws as illegal and
unconstitutional if the divorce is not preceded by
attempts

to

reconcile

the

marriage

over

three

successive tuhrs, or ninety days, or any other period of
time this Hon’ble Court deems appropriate;

K. Pass any other or future order(s) as this Hon’ble Court
deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the present
case.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS IN
DUTY BOUND SHALL ALWAYS PRAY.

DRAWN BY:

FILED BY:

ARUNAVA MUKHERJEE

BALAJI SRINIVASAN

Advocate

Advocate for Petitioner

Drawn on:

.02.2016

Filed on:

.02.2016