INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OCCL
JUN 1 9 2007

Mr. Nick Schwellenbach
Investigator
Project On Government Oversight
666 11 th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Dear Mr. Schwellenbach:
This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated
June 18, 2007. You requested, "the 2002 MPRI Department of Defense Inspector
General Study."
I have carefully reviewed the document responsive to your FOIA request and
determined that the enclosed document that originated with the Office of the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense may be released to you with redactions. The
redactions are in accordance with the FOIA under the following exemptions:
(b)(6): The disclosure of information would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy of individuals.
You have the right to appeal the decision to withhold information from you that is
responsive to your FOIA request. If you should appeal, your appeal must be in writing to
the Appellate Authority:
Mr. John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Office of Communications and Congressional Liaison
400 Army Navy Drive, Room 1034
Arlington, VA 22202-4704
To be considered your appeal should be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days
from the date of this letter. Please give your reasons for the appeal and write "Freedom
of Information Act Appeal" printed clearly on the envelope and the letter. Also,
reference your FOIA request number 07-0211 in your appeal letter, and include a copy of
this letter.

 2
I am the official responsible for this determination and have waived all processing
fees. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Ms. Melanie
Tenorio at (703) 604-9779.

Da 1 R. Aaron
Chief
FOIA Requester Service Center/
Privacy Act Office
Enclosures:
As stated

  

 nciosu re

Executive Summary of the Assessment of the Office of The Inspector General
of the Department of Defense
Objective:
An independent Assessment Team from Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) was
assembled and tasked by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD) in
response to interest by DoD leadership and the Congress. The MPRI Assessment Team was
assigned the objective of conducting "an independent review to assess the overall effectiveness
of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (OIG DoD)".
General:
The Assessment Team was composed of eight people: four general officers (USA Ret.), one
colonel (USA Ret.), two attorneys, and an office manager. Four of these officers have extensive
Inspector General experience and two are former Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense, These
seasoned officers and civilians were hand picked for this assessment because of their experience,
competence, and integrity. The team commenced the assessment on 21 April 2002. The
assessment followed the time tested method of examining organizations and commands. By
design, the assessment started at the bottom and worked its way to the top.
Background:
The tasking to make an assessment of the Department of Defense Inspector General (IG DoD)
organization originated at the time that the current IG DoD was being considered for
confirmation by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mr. Joseph E. Schmitz concluded that
if his nomination was approved he would ask for an independent assessment by an outside team
and that he would provide the results to the Committee.
It would appear to be particularly appropriate to conduct such an assessment at this time when
one considers that the Inspector General Act of 1978 was passed 24 years ago and the IG DoD
organization was included under the act as an amendment in 1982; since that time no outside
independent assessment has been made. Further, for nearly half of its existence over the last 20
years there has been no confirmed IG DoD in charge.
Whatever the circumstance, this has resulted in a vacuum of leadership in an organization where
the requirement for leadership is the primary concern. The findings enumerated as part of this
document more than bear this out. There is no question that the intent of the law was directed
toward the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse. The orientation of the services inspectors
general by law was directed toward "determining and reporting on the economy, efficiency,
morale, discipline, and esprit de corps of each of the services". The law provides for an
Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and an Assistant Inspector General for Investigation.
While the Secretary of Defense and the IG DoD are not precluded from establishing whatever
other accounting they believe are necessary to accomplish the IG mission, the fact remains that
the principal vector of the IG DoD is the prevention, and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse.
D (AWSWO1-99-D-0026, DO 0080, Para 4.1

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DoD IG FOIA 1

 This dichotomy in the mission of the 1G DoD and the services inspectors general causes
complications that may only be solved by revised legislation.
The 1G system has its foundation in the organization created by Major General Frederic Wilhelm
the Baron von Steuben in 1775 at the instance of the Continental Congress and George
Washington. There is a monument to General von Steuben in Lafayette Park opposite the White
House in Washington and on this monument is inscribed a tribute to von Steuben that has
actually provided the beacon for the inspectors general of the services ever since. This
inscription states ".. .he gave military training and discipline to the citizen soldiers who achieved
the independence of the United States". For two centuries the armed forces have seized upon
this tribute as the doctrinal basis for the activities of the service inspectors general. It is difficult
to reconcile the thrust of the civilian inspector general to the service inspectors general although
they should be focused on the same goals . . .a better Army, a better Navy, a better Air Force,
and a better Joint Staff.
Overall Assessment

The assessment has revealed four major areas of paramount concern.
The first and overriding issue in OIG DoD is the quality of leadership, particularly at the Senior
Executive Service (SES) and senior GS 15 level. No member of the team has seen an
organization, civil or military, manned by so many talented people, so ill served by its senior
leadership. This level of management displays all of the malignant attributes attributed to
entrenched bureaucracy. Much of this assessment and the supporting findings is a direct result of
deficient leadership.
The second area of concern is organization and grade structure of the OIG DoD. The present
organization is top heavy with SESs. The 1G DoD organization consists of 1257 people and has
15 assigned members of the Senior Executive Service. This over structure in grade causes
serious problems in command, leadership, and management. OIG DoD has no clear staff
organization responsive to a chief of staff. Critical and sensitive responsibilities such as ethics
and integrity, education and training, security, public relations, the general counsel, and resource
management (comptroller) are buried in the organization beyond the tight control of the IG DoD.
The third area of concern is the lack of an inspection capability in OIG DoD. The IG DoD has
legal responsibility for the oversight of at least 40 DoD components. If he is to fulfill his legal
responsibility for oversight, and if he is to meet the expectation of the senior DoD leadership that
the IG DoD should be the eyes, ears, and conscience of the Department, the OIG DoD needs an
inspection capability.
The fourth area of concern is promotion of civil service employees, particularly in OAIG
Auditing. There is no more sensitive subject amongst the rank and file of OIG DoD people. They
demand that the promotion process be fair and visible; the current process in OIG Auditing is
neither.
Overall the assessment indicates that the leadership of the OIG DoD will have a full time job in
creating an atmosphere that will lead to the implementation of command policies and procedures

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DoD IG FOIA 2

 that are necessary for the health of this vital organization. It will not be easy. The assessment
carries with it descriptions in detail of matters requiring instant correction and implementation.

Summaries of Major Task Assessments
Task 1: Statute Compliance Summary
The OIG DoD is, literally speaking, a "creature of statute", and is often referred to as a "statutory
IG". The Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended) created offices of Inspector General
throughout the federal government, including the DoD. The stated purpose of the Act was to
create "independent and objective units" within various departments and agencies ("such
establishments"). 5 USC App 3, Section 2. The independence and objectivity of the OIG DoD
are qualities that are hard to measure.
Task 2: Organization, Doctrine, Policies, and Personnel Management Summary
Task 2a: The Organization of the OIG DoD The current organization of the OIG DoD
reflects past attempts to accommodate mandated manpower reductions and changing
missions of the OIG over a period of years. It also reflects the compromises that were
recognized at the time as being less than desirable but necessary. It appears that the new
Inspector General has a window of opportunity to rework the organizational structure to
cure some of the past problems and prevent future ones. With that in mind, two
alternative organizational structures are offered for consideration. Neither structure is
"correct" or "incorrect". They are simply efficient starting points for any reorganization
to be undertaken, and it is probable that any reorganization will differ somewhat from the
basic model selected.
Task 2b: Doctrine and Policy of the OIG DoD There is a comprehensive body of
doctrine and implementing policies guiding the OIG DoD to the proper accomplishment
of its mission. Policies however are modified at lower levels within the OIG DoD
components, both orally and in writing. This is a source of confusion and frustration to
some members of the staff, and is fundamentally inefficient.
Task 2c: Personal Management in OIG DoD: The Administration and Information
Management Directorate, OIG DoD provides personnel and human resource advice,
assistance, and services. However, some components of personnel management and
development are under control of the managers and supervisors in other components and
are ineffective or perceived to be unfairly administered.
Task 3: Audit Procedures and Policies Summary: The OAIG Auditing is a major component
of the OIG DoD. Its past accomplishments have been laudable but substantial improvements are
needed. The process for issuing audit reports, as well as the reports themselves have suffered in
recent years. Self-imposed metrics concerning productivity have emphasized quantity over
quality and form over substance. A performance metric on concurrence rates for audit findings
and recommendations should be eliminated. Efforts to improve internal quality controls have

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DoD IG FOIA 3

 resulted in multiple layers of review and paperwork. Reforms have been confusing and have
increased editing time. Compliance with Government Auditing Standards and OIG DoD audit
policies and procedures remains a problem. Credible evidence indicates audit findings and
recommendations were diluted or eliminated. The professional staff needs to be overhauled. A
pervasive system of cronyism drives promotions, work assignments, and performance awards.
Potential whistleblowers are deterred with reprisal and the message is ignored. Training of
auditors lacks a systematic plan. Junior auditors are rotated too early and often. These
circumstances erode morale and contribute to the attrition of skilled auditors when its aging work
force is already exhibiting a shortage of critical GS-13 employees.
Task 4: Education and Training Summary. Education and training in OIG DoD is in some
disarray. There is no articulated professional ethic for IGs. There is no one senior staff
responsible for the function. There is no overall system to plan, program, budget, and manage the
function. There is no Training Model for OIG DoD. Technical training in the components is
being attended to. The two most serious deficiencies are:
•

The lack of a program for progressive leadership education specifically for OIG DoD, and

▪

Training for employees at appropriate levels on how the DoD, OSD, and the Services run.
This causes a serious handicap for OIG DoD people who will be auditing, investigating, and
Inspecting the complex organization that is DoD. (See Task 4 assessment)

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DoD IG FOIA 4

 Special Subject Areas Summaries
Leadership
Feedback to compile this report was obtained from one-on-one personal interviews, from
numerous seminars and also from the Assessment Team's Survey of the OIG DoD employees.
As a general observation, senior OIG DoD leaders have displayed by their actions an arrogance
of leadership and have placed their personal aspirations and goals above OIG DoD's mission
accomplishments. A buddy system or "who you know" permeates the agency in both facts and
in perception. OIG DoD personnel view senior managers, with few exceptions, as being
entrenched and intractable. It is believed that reprisal or retaliation could result if the party line
is not followed. As a first corrective step, leaders (SESs and GS-15s) should be required to
attend leadership, sensitivity, and interpersonal relations training.
Ethics and Integrity
Ethics and Integrity in the OIG DoD are imperatives; they brook no priorities. The Agency's
reputation for ethics and integrity is fragile, and trust once damaged is hard to repair. The
unsavory events of the past few years involving OIG DoD have eroded that trust both in the
Department and in the Congress. IG DoD has announced that ethics is his highest priority. A
high standard of ethics is embedded in the Agency's Strategic Plan and in the Annual
Performance Plan. There is mandatory annual ethics training for all covering the details of the
application of the many ethics regulations, directives, and policies. There is an aggressive Ethics
Review in progress in OIG. What is missing, so far, is the obvious and visible presence of the
senior leadership who report to the IG DoD, setting the example, reinforcing truth as the bottom
line, and nurturing ethics as the basis for professionalism.
Command Climate
The Assessment Team has conducted numerous desk side interviews and small seminars with
010 DoD personnel of all GS grade levels. These face-to-face discussions coupled with on-site
observations have provided the Assessment Team with an insight as to the command climate of
the OIG DoD. The OIG DoD Employee Survey supports these insights. The inspection of
numerous OIG DoD field offices and the Office of the Director for Administration and
Information Management (AIM) revealed a very positive command climate while the inspection
of the Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations and the Office of the Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing revealed a poor and unhealthy command climate. The primary
causes of this poor command climate can be directly attributed to micro-management and poor
senior leadership. The 10 DoD has already initiated several highly effective initiatives which are
improving employee morale and esprit.
The Inspection Process
Since its inception in 1983 the OIG DoD had an inspections/evaluation capability in OAIG
Inspections. In 1995 the OIG DoD was directed to eliminate 477 positions by 2001. As a result,
OAIG Inspections was eliminated and the majority of its personnel were transferred to OAIG
Auditing. Since a need exists for an inspections/evaluations capability, OAIG Inspections should
be established with an initial strength of 50 employees (25 civilian and 25 military). Civilians to
be transferred from OAIG Auditing and military personal from within OIG DoD. The

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DoD IG FOIA 5

 organization is to be austere with only operations, planning and follow-up, and administration
(with management info management) capabilities.
Quality of Life
People live where they work. The quality of life in their office is the sum of many different
programs, processes and conditions such as: cohesiveness, awards and recognition, meaningful
work, working conditions, office pride, employee empowerment, training and education,
grievance system, promotion opportunity, flexible working hours, dress code, office furnishings,
leadership and command environment. The quality of life areas of training and education,
leadership, promotion opportunity and command environment are so important that they have
been addressed in detail elsewhere in this report. OIG DoD needs to finish the enhancement of
office spaces. The Telework Program is popular, useful, and should be fairly applied. Changes
to the Cash Award Guidance should reflect an attempt to broaden the distribution of monetary
rewards for performance.
Funding of the OIG DoD: The inadequacy of the OIG DoD budget is apparent throughout the
organization and is the result of a flat budget and increasing mission requirements. Based upon
interviews with 316 employees and the results of 34 seminars attended by 327 employees of the
OIG DoD, and the results of the OIG Employee Survey, it is clearly a source of employee
frustration with their jobs, it impacts morale, and it affects their view of the efficiency of senior
management.
Promotion Process in OAIG Auditing
There is no more sensitive subject among the rank and file of OIG DoD people. They rightfully
demand that the promotion process be fair and visible; the process in OAIG Auditing is
perceived as neither. Promotion interview panels in OAIG Auditing produce an order of merit of
all those eligible for promotion to GS-13 and 14. The OIG Auditing leadership then selects from
the order of merit list those to promote to fill the vacancies. At this point the selection process
becomes opaque. The results do not necessarily reflect the order of merit. Deep selects are
common, and those higher on the list are passed over. Either the announced process should be
officially changed, or the OAIG Auditing leadership must be disciplined to follow the merit
selection.
Attitude Towards Whistleblowers
The culture of the OIG DoD has been, and continues to be, hostile to internal whistleblowers.
All too often, OIG employees who have endeavored to identify mismanagement or violations of
law have been punished by their chain of command. At the same time, the underlying issue has
gone ignored. These incidents have had a chilling effect on good faith dissent that continues to
impair free and open discussions between the staff and management. This result is both ironic
and lamentable for an agency created to cultivate and safeguard whistleblowers. The
Assessment Team also found minimal evidence that the OIG DoD has played a substantial role
in protecting external whistleblowers in civilian DoD jobs, in uniform, or in the employ of
military contractors. As a result, festering waste, fraud and abuse within civilian and military
DoD components may be placing lives and taxpayer dollars at risk.

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DoD IG FOIA 6

 Deputy General Counsel's Office
Members of the Assessment Team conducted interviews with all seven lawyers in the Deputy
General Counsel's Office (DGC) of the OIG DoD. Additional interviews were conducted of
other personnel in the agency that elicited comments regarding the DGC.
While the attorneys in the Deputy General Counsel's Office expressed a high degree of
satisfaction with their particular jobs and their role in the larger organization, there was a
startling "disconnect" between how they felt and how their office was regarded by others in the
OIG DoD. While this disparity may be more apparent than real, the resulting antagonism
towards the DGC's Office, particularly within DCIS, represents both a real challenge and a
unique opportunity for systemic change for the OIG DoD and the DGC's Office.
The OIG DoD Employee Survey. In the course of the assessment, the team contacted
approximately 643 of the 1257 employees in OIG DoD. In order to extend our reach to a broader
sample and to determine the degree of support for the initial findings and assessments, the team
developed a 28-question survey of the OIG DoD employees. The survey was administered via
the OIG DoD INTRANET with as much protection of anonymity for the respondents as possible.
The survey effort was strongly supported by the 1G DoD. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed
responded, 527 made voluntary written responses. The vast majority of responses to the survey
corroborate and support the Team's assessment, which was primarily based on face-to-face
interviews, seminars, and observations.

Summary of Major Recommendations
1. Start leadership sensitivity and inter-personal relations education for senior leaders.
2. Reorganize OIG DoD.
3. Reestablish OIG DoD Inspections.
4. Appoint a Director of Training.
5. Develop a comprehensive OIG DoD Training Model.
6. Establish an OIG DoD Academy
7. Develop a realistic OIG DoD POM.
8. Streamline the audit process.
9. Control and discipline the GS-13/GS-14 promotion process in OAIG Auditing.
10. Improve communications within OIG DoD.

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DoD IG FOIA 7

 An Assessment of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense
Objective:
On 21 April 2002, an independent Assessment Team was assembled and tasked by the Inspector
Genera1 of the Department of Defense (IG DoD) in response to interest by DoD 1eadership and
the Congress. The MPRI Assessment Team was assigned the objective of conducting "an
independent review to assess the overall effectiveness of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense (OIG DoD). The review will:
a. Identify problem areas, including those related to organization, policy, and personnel.
b. Provide recommendations to reconcile the statutory duties of the IG DoD with the
traditional military IG role as "an extension of the eyes, ears, and conscience", of the
commanders.
c. Outline recommendations aimed at restoring full faith and confidence in the integrity
of the OIG DoD."
General:
The MPRI Assessment Team was composed of eight people: four general officers (USA Ret.),
one colonel (USA Ret.), two attorneys, and an office manager. Four of these officers have
extensive Inspector General experience and two are former Deputy Assistant Secretaries. of
Defense. The military members of the team have leadership experience extending over three
wars and every level of command from squad to division and major installation. The team
followed a normal Inspector General process for a systemic inspection. The process included the
following steps:
•

Review and Assignment of Tasks. The team was assigned four major assessment tasks
and ten special subject areas (SSA). The team did a task analysis and assigned selected
team members to each task and SSA.

•

Gathering Information: The team received formal briefings from each component of OIG
DoD, and reviewed organization charts and function manuals. The team paid particular
attention to the 1atest comprehensive report on the OIG DoD, dated 1 May 1980 on the
Audit, Inspection and Investigative Components of the Department of Defense. (The
Boutte Report).

•

Developing the Problem. The team made an initial determination of the major systemic
problems that appeared to affect mission accomplishment. This analysis was expanded
and refined as the assessment progressed.

•

Assessment, Evaluation, and Inspection. The team approached the assessment from
bottom to top, component by component, using a combination of one-on-one interviews
with key personnel, seminars, open door sessions, document review, and field visits. This
methodology generated numerous voluntary contacts, often from anonymous sources.
The inspection results are a matter of record in Findings and Assessments. Factual data

(AWSW01-99-D-0026, DO 0080, Para 4.1

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DoD IG FOIA 8

 was coordinated with sources. In the course of its 90 day assessment the team conducted
316 one-on-one interviews of key employees and conducted 34 free flowing seminars
with junior, middle, and senior grade employees, reaching 327 employees. Primarily as a
result of the interviews and seminars, many employees, past and present, made voluntary
contacts with the team on a myriad of issues. These contacts generated leads to several
critica1 inspection areas. As a supplement to the seminars, interviews, and voluntary
contacts, the team conducted a survey of all OIG DoD employees garnering 657
responses (a 52% return). The team members visited 26 field locations.

o Conducting In-Progress Reviews, Preparing Reports and a Final Briefing. The team
conducted one MPRI internal progress briefing and made two presentations to an
independent Senior Advisory Group. This report is accompanied by a formal briefing for
the IG DoD. Written 30 and 60 day progress reports as well as several informal inprocess reports were made to the IG DoD. Issues of critica1 importance requiring quick
action were taken directly to the IG DoD.
The Overall Assessment
There has been no comprehensive assessment of Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense since its inception in 1982. For ten of the 20 years of its existence
there has been no confirmed IG DoD; it is apparent to the team that this assessment is long
overdue. In reviewing this assessment, it is important that the IG DoD not be confused with
the Armed Services' Inspectors General. The service IGs report on economy, efficiency,
morale, discipline, and esprit de corps. Only the Air Force charges their IG with a police
function. On the other hand, it is clear that the intent of the Congress is that the 1G DoD's
primary interest is to be fraud, waste, and abuse. This dichotomy has been a source of
misunderstanding about and between the service IGs and the Office of the IG DoD since its
inception. For example, the 1aw does not expressly require an inspection or evaluation
capability; DoD Directive 5106.1 does. The OIG DoD maintained an inspection capability
from its founding in 1982; this had been deactivated by 1996. The principle reason for its
demise was caused by a DoD mandated cut of 477 personnel.
This comprehensive assessment has revealed four areas of paramount concern:
The first and overriding concern in OIG DoD is the quality of leadership, particularly at
the Senior Executive Service (SES) and senior GS 15 level. No member of the team has seen
an organization, civil or military, manned by so many talented people, so ill served by its
senior leadership. This 1evel of management displays all of the malignant attributes attributed
to entrenched bureaucracy. With few exceptions, these civil servants have demonstrated
questionable loyalty to their subordinates and to the 1G DoD. They are self-serving, resistant
to change, short on initiative and averse to taking risks. They may be passable managers, but
they are unsatisfactory leaders. This has created an impenetrable culture of ineffectiveness.
Much of this assessment and the supporting findings is a direct result of deficient leadership.
The second area of concern is organization. The present organization is top heavy with
SESs (15), and has no clear staff organization responsive to a chief of staff. Critical and
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DoD IG FOIA 9

 sensitive responsibilities such as ethics and integrity, education and training, security, public
relations, the general counsel, and resource management (comptroller) are buried beyond the
tight control of the IG DoD. The clear chain of responsibility for line functions in OIG DoD
is diluted by stovepipes, some necessary, some not. These stovepipes provide an escape for
the leader from some of the essential functions of leadership, which should rest
unequivocally on their shoulders. The IG DoD must organize OIG DoD to accomplish the
mission, and that organization must reflect the IG DoD's vision and 1eadership style.
The third area of concern is the lack of an inspection capability in OIG DoD. The IG DoD
has legal responsibility for the oversight of at least 40 DoD components. If he is to fulfill his
legal responsibility for oversight, and if he is to meet the expectation of the senior DoD
leadership that the IG DoD should be the eyes, ears, and conscience of the Department, the
OIG DoD needs an inspection capability. Both of those responsibilities expand the present
mission functions of OIG DoD beyond the relatively narrow confines of audit and
investigation, beyond fraud, waste and abuse. Inspection entails the evaluation and analysis
of the effectiveness of the programs, operations, productivity, and efficiency of DoD
agencies. With a quick response capability at the call of Agency leadership, the IG DoD can
return to being a teacher and trainer for DoD. With an inspection capability the IG DoD can
truly be the guarantor of DoD's stewardship.
The fourth area of concern is promotion of civil service employees, particularly in OAIG
Auditing. There is no more sensitive subject amongst the rank and file of OIG DoD people.
They demand that the promotion process be fair and visible; the process in OIG Auditing is
perceived as neither. Promotion interview panels in OIG Auditing produce an order of merit
of all those eligible for promotion to GS-13 and 14. The OIG Auditing leadership then selects
from the order of merit list those to promote to fill the vacancies. At this point the selection
process becomes opaque. The results do not necessarily reflect the order of merit. Deep
selects are common, and those higher on the list are passed over. Either the announced
process should be officially changed, or the OIG Auditing leadership must be disciplined to
follow the merit selection process.
The team's assessments of the specific tasks and the special subject areas follow. There may
be some redundancies among assessments, particularly in the more globa1 subjects such as
1eadership, ethics, and command climate.

Major Task Assessments
Task 1: Statute Compliance in the OIG DoD.
Summary
The OIG DoD is, literally speaking, a "creature of statute", and is often referred to as a "statutory
IG". The Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended) created offices of Inspector General
throughout the federal government, including the DoD. The stated purpose of the Act was to
create "independent and objective units" within various departments and agencies ("such
establishments"). 5 USC App 3, Section 2. The independence and objectivity of the OIG DoD

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DoD IG FOIA 10

 are qualities that are hard to measure. Perhaps the best way to analyze this issue is to look at
each component of the OIG in the context of their statutorily defined functions.
Discussion
The first such function, set out in Section 2 (1) of the Act, was to conduct and supervise audits
and investigations of the establishments involved. This is reiterated in Section 8 (c) (2) of the
Act, dealing specifically with the OIG DoD, which require the IG to "initiate, conduct, and
supervise such audits and investigations in the Department of Defense (including the military
departments) as the Inspector General considers appropriate". These tasks are embodied in the
missions of the two 1argest components of the OIG DoD: OAIG Auditing and OAIG
Investigations.
The second role assigned to OIG DoD by the 1G Act, Section 2 (2) is leading, coordinating, and
recommending policies designed "to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" and "to
prevent and detect fraud" in the administration of DoD programs and operations. These are in
accord with Section 8 (c) (1) and (c) (4) of the IG Act, which requires the OIG DoD to be the
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense relating to the prevention and detection of fraud,
waste and abuse in DoD programs and operations. This is also spelled out in DoD Directive
5106.1 (Section 5.1.5), which requires the OIG DoD to investigate fraud, waste and abuse in
DoD programs and operations. (Although not statutes, DoD Directives have the force of law and
supplement and reinforce statutes like the Inspector General Act of 1978.)
These are two sides of the same statutory coin; i.e. to encourage the good and discourage the bad
in terms of how the DoD operates.
The third statutorily assigned mission is that of keeping the Secretary of Defense and the
Congress "fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for progress of corrective
actions". Section 5 of the 1G Act imposes a detailed and specific semi-annual reporting
requirement on the IG DoD. Within the OIG DoD, compiling these reports is the responsibility
of the IG's "front office" and AIM (Office of Administration and Information Management),
with the assistance of the Office of Congressional Liaison.
During the course of this assessment, the IG DoD discovered that the semi-annual reports
furnished to the Secretary of Defense were not being forwarded to Congress as required by
Section 5 (b). Since then, the 1G DoD has taken steps to correct this deficiency. The timeliness
of the report from GIG DoD to the Secretary of Defense (which is forwarded in turn to the
appropriate committees and subcommittees of Congress) is the subject of a Sec. Def. Info Memo
dated July 3, 2002. The memo also makes note of the requirement that the Secretary of
Defense, as the "head of the establishment", prepare a report responsive to the semi-annual
report from the OIG DoD, and forward that to the appropriate congressional committees within
thirty days and commits to correcting any further deficiencies in the future.
Sections (8) (c) (3), (5), and (7) of the IG Act set out additional statutory duties and
responsibilities for the OIG DoD. These may be summarized as providing policy direction,
guidance, monitoring, and evaluating program performance for Audits and Investigations. CIPO
(Criminal Investigative Policy and Oversight) sets the policies and monitors compliance with

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DoD IG FOIA 11

 DoD standards and procedures on criminal investigations. APO (Audit Policy and Oversight)
sets the policies to be followed by DoD audit organizations and monitors and evaluates their
adherence to auditing standards, policies and procedures. CIPO and APO thus perform functions
that meet two of the remaining prongs of the IG's statutory duties under the IG Act.
Other important responsibilities and functions set forth in DoD Directive 5106.1 include
reviewing "existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to DoD programs and
operations and (to) make recommendations thereon". Section 5.1.11. These functions are
performed by the 010 Deputy Counsel's Office, which reviews and comments on proposed
1egislation; and the Office of Congressional Liaison, which is tasked with monitoring legislative
actions taken by Congress and, through liaison with OSD Legislative Affairs and other 1G
offices, commenting on legislation. See OIG Front Office (FO) Performance Plan for
Management Year 2002, FO-1.A.1
There is an additiona1 reporting requirement besides the OIG DoD Semi-Annual Report, i.e. that
the IG DoD keeps the Congress otherwise fully and currently informed concerning fraud and
other serious problems in the administration of DoD programs. DoD Directive 5106.1.14.
Within the OIG DoD, this is another responsibility of the Office of Congressional Liaison, which
is charged with tracking congressionally mandated reports and correspondence. OIG FO
Performance Plan, F0-1.c.1 and FO 1.c.2.
In the area of intelligence, the 010 DoD is required to receive and evaluate complaints and
concerns from the various DoD intelligence agencies (i.e. NSA, DIA, NIMA & NRO). In this
area, the 010 DoD is also given the job of evaluating, monitoring, and receiving programs,
policies, and procedures of the DoD Intelligence Community. See Sections 5.1.16 and 5.1.19,
DoD Directive 5106.1. In both instances, the Office of Intelligence Review of the OIG DoD is
given oversight responsibility for those functions.
The final three specific responsibilities of the IG DoD created by law are also set forth in DoD
Directive 5106.1. These are protecting whistleblowers (Section 5.1.17); investigating improper
mental health evaluations of members of the Armed Forces (Section 5.5.18); and investigating
allegations of serious misconduct made against senior DoD officials (Section 5.5.19). The
departmental inquiries directorate of OIG DoD has two components that carry out these tasks:
Special Inquiries fulfills two of them, protecting whistleblowers and investigating improper
menta1 health referrals; Program Integrity handles the investigation of allegations of serious
misconduct lodged against senior officials of the DoD.
Recommendation
The different statutorily defined roles each have a different component of the DIG DoD assigned
to perform their functions. No significant function, whether set forth in the IG Act or DoD
Directive 5106.1, appears to have been overlooked.
In visiting DCIS field offices, however, one statutory duty appears to have been slighted.
Section 8 (c) (8) and 8 (c) (9) require the 1G DoD to request assistance from other audit,
inspections, and investigative units of the Department of Defense (giving particular regard to the

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DoD IG FOIA 12

 units of military departments); with a view toward avoiding duplication and insuring effective
coordination and cooperation between them.
The fierce and continued turf wars between DCIS and the MCIOs, mitigated only by a temporary
truce in the form of an "Interim Agreement", shows this particular function is carried out more in
the breach then in the observance. Serious thought needs to be given to naming someone in the
upper ranks of CIPO or DCIS as Agency "Cooperation" or "Coordination" Officer in order to
stop this internecine feuding which is both distracting and wasteful.
Task 2: Organization, Doctrine, Policies, and Personnel Management in OIG DoD.
Task 2a: Organization of the OIG DoD.
Summary
In its 20+ years of existence the OIG has undergone numerous ad hoc organizational changes.
These changes were driven primarily by manpower reductions, particularly the large 1995
strength cut and subsequent reorganization. Over time, the resulting organization of the OIG has
proven dysfunctional in several respects. The following assessment discusses those dysfunctional
affects, and are accompanied by suggested organizational changes to correct them.
Discussion
Chief of Staff
The major functiona1 components (AIG Audit and AIG Investigations) are focused on narrow,
specific professional tasks. The remaining components are much smaller in size and focus upon
broader organizationa1 support. There is no integrator of the staff functions throughout the OIG,
a job typically performed by a Chief of Staff. A Chief of Staff is sometimes described as the
Chief Executive Officer's (read IG's) "trusted agent" who converts general guidance into
specific staff activity, across horizonta1 lines as well as vertical ones in the organization. In the
process he/she performs strategic planning, organizes and directs the solution of institutional
problems, assures the agency is staffed to satisfy the needs of the CEO, and that effective
agency-wide policies are in place and followed. The list of functions can be virtually limitless,
but an integrator is essential if the organization is to be anything other than a collection of
narrowly focused stovepipes.
Inspections (Special Assessment)
Within the current OIG DoD organization structure, there does not exist an inspection capability
to conduct overall organizational assessment or quick-look inspections as the Inspector General
may require. The OAIG Inspection was disestablished in early 1996 due primarily to mandated
personnel reductions, but due also to non-functional considerations. Of the 14 Departmental
Inspector Genera1 offices, eight have an inspections capability. Recommend that an OAIG
Inspections capability be established with the transfer of 50 in-house OIG DoD personnel assets
(25 civilians; 25 military).

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DoD IG FOIA 13

 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
Providing prompt, fair, and impartial consideration of complaints relating to issues of
discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, sex, national origin, physical or mental disability,
and reprisal is of instant importance to the Inspector General. Consequently, it is recommended
that the Equal Employment Opportunity officer be made a member of the IG DoD Special Staff,
reporting directly to the Inspector General.
General Counsel
The DoD General Counsel provides the OIG with a Deputy Genera1 Counsel as a service. This
arrangement is formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding that attempts to establish a basis
for the Deputy Genera1 Counsel to maintain both independence and objectivity. This attempt to
"serve two masters" is a model that was commonly used by various federal department
Inspectors General shortly after they were organized. It has since been rejected by most if not all,
except the DoD Inspector General, due to the obvious appearance if not fact, of an inherent
conflict of interest. This apparent conflict of interest should be corrected and the Inspector
General needs to have a singularly dedicated General Counsel.
Ethics Office (Finding 1-001)
The Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official (DDAEO) and the Ethics Counselor and
Program Manager (EC/PM) are assigned to two different offices. In essence, the EC/PM has two
superiors to whom he reports. It is important to recognize that the EC/PM is doing an excellent
job and that this unusual arrangement has not created any observable problems. Nonetheless, it
has the potential to do so, and conveys the impression that the EC/PM is submerged in the
organization and the issues connected with ethics are being handled in a non-traditional manner.
In view of the central role ethics plays in the daily operation of the OIG, this organizational
artifact should be corrected. The most direct manner in which to do so is for the Inspector
General DoD to designate himself as the Designated Agency Ethics Officer, assign the Ethics
Counselor and Program Manager to his Special Staff, reporting to him directly.
Public Affairs
The OIG DoD is a large organization, distributed in almost 60 geographical locations where they
conduct operations that are often highly visible and potentially controversial. Any of these could
erupt in a flurry of publicity and requests for information. The OIG is unusua1 in that there is no
identifiable single spokesman representing the official position of the Inspector General or the
organization. As a result, responses to requests for information could go to a person in the OIG
who does not have the authority to act upon it, but does. That has happened and raises the
possibility that a one of the persons not trained to identify releasable information could release
information that is classified, protected by the Privacy Act, or incorrect. There is a clear need for
a public affairs officer on the staff to be the single point of contact for gathering and clearing
releasable information. That person would also assess potential public affairs implications of
ongoing and proposed audits and investigations, to frame and coordinate responses to outside
queries, to develop and assist in the implementation of a proactive public affairs plan, and to
assist the leadership of the DIG to communicate within the organization. Tentatively, the Public
Affairs office is placed in the Congressional Liaison Office since they have substantia1
experience in gathering information, checking facts, and responding in a timely manner to
requests from outside the OIG. This placement is subject to validation.

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DoD IG FOIA 14

 Education and Training (Findings 4-002, 4-003, 4-004, 4-005)
Training is fragmented, mostly unresourced, and generally disorganized. There is no single place
within the OIG where one can go to find a clear statement of the training needs of the
components in terms of the names of people to be trained, the courses, funds available, and
programmed attendance date. Most of those elements do not exist anywhere within the OIG. The
OIG clearly needs a Director of Education and Training. This individual would be the proponent
for planning, programming, budgeting, and supervision of education and training within the OIG
DoD. In so doing, the Director of Education and Training would work closely with the AIGs to
fulfill their needs and to develop essential training models.
Policy and Oversight
Both the audit and investigation functions (as will the inspection function, if established) require
policy guidance and performance oversight. At the present time, the policy and oversight
functions reside in the organizations of the Assistant Inspectors General for Auditing and for
Investigations/Defense Criminal Investigative Service; both organizations perform oversight
upon themselves. The oversight is an attempt to enforce adherence to policy and standards and to
assure quality. Numerous comments made in interviews, the seminars, and in response to the
OIG Survey indicate that this self-regulation has not been effective in preventing watered-down
reports and ethical conflicts.
- Audit Policy and Oversight. This function can be reassigned from the AIG Audit
organization in its entirety without affecting its overall mission.
Criminal Investigative Policy and Oversight. This function can be divided into two
classes of activities. Operational activities (administration of the Voluntary
Disclosure Program, referrals under the Program Fraud Civi1 Remedies Act,
processing MCIO requests for subpoenas, the National Incident Based Reporting
System, liaison with other law enforcement and prosecutive agencies, etc.) should
remain in the AIG Investigations/Defense Criminal Investigative Service. Policy and
self-regulation and oversight functions should be removed.
Internal Affairs (Assessment A-013)
The 010 has a requirement for an 010 internal affairs investigative capability to police its
contested or suspect investigations, EEO, sexual harassment, and whistleblower complaints and
to investigate alleged employee misconduct. In the absence of any current OIG DoD element
performing this critical function. The internal affairs function should be performed by a small
group of carefully selected personnel; the best and the brightest. These personnel should be
members of the special staff and report directly to the 1G DoD, and be groomed for future
leadership positions.
Hotline
The hotline function is buried in too low in the OIG and there is profound employee suspicion of
it. To ensure its integrity and restore the confidence of both employees and others who may use
it, it should be elevated to a more central location with senior management oversight.

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DoD IG FOIA 15

 Comptroller
The great funding shortfalls that have affected training, furnishings, travel, equipment, and
almost everything else in the OIG must be addressed in the POM and budget process. Beyond
that, the person in charge of the financial plans and management of the organization must have
greater visibility, authority, and be a participant in every decision and action affecting the OIG
budget and funds expenditure. This points out the need for a comptroller, rather than a
subordinate element of OAIM.
The Organization of the Inspector General
The current organization of the OIG reflects past attempts to accommodate mandated manpower
reductions and changing missions of the OIG over a period of years. It also reflects the
compromises that were recognized at the time as being less than desirable but necessary. It
appears that the new Inspector General has a window of opportunity to rework the organizational
structure to cure some of the past problems and prevent future ones. With that in mind two
alternative organizational structures are offered for consideration. Neither structure is "correct"
nor "incorrect". They are simply efficient starting points for any reorganization to be undertaken,
and it is probable that any reorganization will differ somewhat from the basic model selected.
The organization displayed at Figure 1, Single Deputy Model, reflects the adjustments to the
present organization that are discussed above. The intent of the reorganization is to provide
greater control by the Inspector General, eliminate real and perceived conflicts of interest,
improve organizational efficiency and responsiveness, ensure better integration of OIG plans and
programs, and to remove obstacles to efficiency in accomplishing the mission. The green-tinted
blocks in Figure 1 are those elements of the current organization that currently exist but which
would be moved to a new subordination. Those that are yellow-tinted are elements that do not
exist today but are composed of sub elements moved from an existing location and combined to
form a new element. For example, the Comptroller is created from the Financial Management
Directorate of the Administration and Information Management Directorate. The organization in
Figure 1 will be the easier organization to form. This model could result in a net savings of four
Senior Executive Service positions that could be redirected to higher priority management, if
necessary.
Figure 2, Staff and Line Deputy Model accomplishes the same end result but separates the staff
functions of establishing and maintaining internal standards, policy and oversight from the
operational functions of audits, inspections, and investigations. This is reflected in the
establishment of a Deputy Inspector General for Standards, Policy, and Oversight, separate from
the operational components of the OIG. This provides stronger, dedicated, and more focused
management and 1eadership for both the operational functions and the standards, policy, and
oversight function. Reorganizations provide an opportunity to "make a statement" regarding the
nature and character of an organization, and the Staff and Line Deputy Model better reinforces
the ethical character of the 01G. A Deputy Inspector General Operations and Support controls
the operational components, to include the recreated AIG Inspections.
Senior Executive Service
Two issues raise the question whether the OIG is over-structured in SES classified positions.
First there are 17 SES positions in an organization of fewer than 1,300 persons. Within the DoD,

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DoD IG FOIA 16

 this is an extraordinary density. It is recognized, however, that SES positions are established on
the basis of the need for exceptional technical, 1eadership, and management skills and the OIG
DoD has numerous such requirements. The second issue is the layering of SESers, particularly in
OAIG for Auditing. Auditing has three layers of SES classified positions and eight of the 17
such positions in the OIG.
In earlier years the Office of Personnel Management conducted periodic reviews or audits of
SES positions in the departments and agencies of the Federal government. During the process the
rationale for establishing the position was evaluated and was tested against the reality of what
grade was justified by the position description and duties at the time of the OPM review. The
OPM no longer conducts the SES position reviews; the field teams that did this work were
eliminated as the agency downsized. An internal review should be conducted by the OIG DoD to
determine the requirement for and best utilization of the SES personnel and positions. This
internal review team can be formed from a trusted and knowledgeable persons within the OIG
DoD or, if necessary, requested from another Federal Agency. This review can be conducted as a
part of the OIG reorganization.
Field Organizational Issues
During the course of field visits to both audit and investigation offices of the OIG DoD it became
clear that the lack of administrative help was a burden upon efficient operation of the offices that
had no administrative assistant. As an example of the problem, highly skilled and well-paid
investigators are burdened by routine filing, photocopying, collating, typing and similar support
functions. This is a waste of both time and money and a major irritant to skilled employees.
Every effort should be made to provide a support assistant to those offices that do not have one.
Innovative organizational solutions such as authorizing the hire of part time support assistants
would be useful. This, coupled with a reduction of the administrative burden imposed by the
OIG and OAIG headquarters would greatly facilitate more and better audit reports and
investigations.
As DCIS field offices were eliminated the remaining offices were forced to cover wider
geographica1 areas. In view of the events subsequent to 11 September 2001, the distribution of
field offices as well as numbers of investigators should be reevaluated. As an example of the
problem, one of the largest Islamic populations in the U.S. resides in the Detroit-Dearborn
Michigan area. This is also the location of a number of major defense contractors. There is no
DCIS office or representation there and any OIG investigative work required there must come
from hundreds of miles away. Again there may be an innovative solution to establishing a
minimal presence in such locations. For example an agent could possibly work out of his house
rather than have to have a full-up office.
Recommendations
1) Establish the position of Chief of Staff working directly for the 1G DoD.
2) Establish an OAIG Inspections capability.
3) Move the Equal Employment Opportunity officer to the IG DoD Special Staff, reporting
directly to the Inspector General
4) Establish a singularly dedicated General Counsel working for the Inspector General.

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DoD IG FOIA 17

 5) The Inspector General DoD designate himself as the Designated Agency Ethics Officer,
and assign the Ethics Counselor and Program Manager to his Special Staff, reporting to
him directly.
6) Establish a Public Affairs office
7) Establish a Director of Education and Training
8) Policy, self-regulation and oversight functions should be removed from AIG Audit and
AIG Investigations.
9) Establish an Internal Affairs Office
10) Conduct an internal review to determine the requirement for and best utilization of the
SES personnel and positions.
11) Provide more attention to the personne1 and organizational needs of the field offices.
12) SES classified positions below the AIG level should be evaluated to determine whether
they properly justify the assignment of an SES.
13) Move the OIG Hotline to the Special Staff
14) Move the Financial Management Directorate to a position reporting to the Chief
of Staff and convert it to an Office of the Comptroller

Task 2b DOCTRINE AND POLICY
Summary
There is a comprehensive body of doctrine and implementing policies guiding the OIG DoD to
the proper accomplishment of its mission. Policies however are modified at 1ower levels within
the OIG DoD components, both orally and in writing. This is a source of confusion and
frustration to some members of the staff, and is fundamentally inefficient.
Availability of Doctrine and Policy
There is a comprehensive and very useful body of doctrine to guide the OIG DoD.
The doctrinal base of the OIG DoD is established by the 1G Act of 1978 (as amended), DoD
Directive 5106.1 (mission and responsibilities), IG Guide 5106.1 (organization and functions),
The Strategic Plan (2001-2005) (principles, goals, and objectives), and the Annua1 Performance
Plan (performance goals and objectives). These are augmented by IG Instructions, IG Plans, and
values and standards instilled through training, education and formal procedures. Together, they
form a framework for professional performance of the OIG DoD and are the basis of policies
intended to implement the doctrine and body of guidance.
Changing Doctrine and Policy (Finding 2-002)
The agency-wide policies are formulated at the OIG level, primarily within the Directorate for
Administration and Information Management. If necessary, they are then refined by the
components to more specifically apply to the component's mission. These implementing policies
are coordinated with the originator of the basic policy. This process works well but problems
occur within the components when numerous additional uncoordinated policies, written and oral
instructions, guidance, standard operating procedures, and similar instructions either elaborate on
elements of OIG DoD doctrine and policy cited above, or alter it. There is no apparent control.

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DoD IG FOIA 18

 The changing of policy at low levels within the components was cited repeatedly as a source of
confusion and frustration.
The uncoordinated modification, selective enforcing, or ignoring of policies or regulations
imposed by agencies other than the DoD creates a second type of problem. Examples cited to the
Assessment Team include claims by multiple auditors that audit policies do not conform to the
Yellow Book requirements. Other auditors desiring to Telework pointed out that there is little or
no ability to do so and that the government-wide (established in Sec. 359 of Public Law 106346) and OIG DoD (IG Reg. 1400.620) 25% Telework target will never be achieved since only
12 people in OAIG Auditing are considered to be eligible. (See Finding 2-003)
As a result, OIG DoD doctrine and policy are not applied universally and the leadership has no
means of knowing whether all components of the organization are following the guidance or
selectively ignoring it.
Potential New Doctrinal and Policy Requirements
The Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended) established, among other requirements, the
purpose of the Inspector General of the DoD to be to "... develop policy, monitor and evaluate
program performance and provide guidance with respect to all Department activities relating to
criminal investigation programs." For many years, these investigations have focused on fraud
and similar white-collar crime. Since the attack on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 there has
been increasing focus on other crimina1 activity and counterterrorism. This activity is clearly
within the authority of the IG DoD, but there is a belief among many field investigators that this
new line of investigative activity is not fully supported by the OAIG Investigations leadership.
Cited as evidence of that fact is the continuing lack of personnel and funding resources to
support the expanded investigative requirements to include participation in Joint Task Forces,
and the lack of policies to assist agents in the field to cope with their expanded role. The U.S.
was attacked and the Commander-in-Chief stated that we are at war. Clearly, these requirements
are not going to go away. As a result, it is important that appropriate policies be developed and
that resources to carry them out be provided to the field investigators.
Recommendations
1. Supplementing the OIG DoD directives and policies should be discouraged except in cases
specifically approved at the component 1eadership level.
2. If it is appropriate to supplement an OIG DoD directive or policy, the proposed supplement
should be reviewed by senior leadership at the component level to ensure that its content is
both known and that it supports the OIG DoD leadership's intent.
3. Policies and their reason for being should be clearly communicated to and understood by the
component staffs.
4. Policies to provide guidance to the OIG DoD regarding waging the war against terrorism
should be developed. In particular, policies are required regarding the war's execution,
particularly by investigators in the field.

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DoD IG FOIA 19

 Task 2c PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Summary
The Administration and Information Management Directorate, OIG DoD provides personnel and
human resource advice, assistance, and services. However, some components of personnel
management and development are under control of the managers and supervisors in other
components and are ineffective or perceived to be unfairly administered.
Discussion
Where Personnel Management Occurs
The Administration and Information Management Directorate (AIM) performs centralized
civilian personnel management for the OIG DoD. This consists of typical human resource
actions such as providing advice, assistance, and services, and personnel policy. These actions
include classification and management, recruiting, merit promotions, administration of health
and insurance benefits, and the handling of records being sent to the Washington Headquarters
Services for maintenance. AIM services are well organized, responsibly managed, and effective.
Personnel and human resource management internally within other components of the OIG DoD
is limited but is critical to the development and maintenance of the workforce. It consists mainly
of recruiting (in some cases), managing the development of assigned personnel, selecting them
for education or training, preparing them for increased responsibilities and eventual promotion,
developing with the employee the Performance Plan and performing performance appraisals,
making or recommending promotions and reassignments, and recognizing employee
achievements. These are more than elements of personnel and human resource management;
they are elements that reflect both effective (or ineffective) management and leadership that will
"build the bench" (or prevent the building of a bench) of future high grade General Schedule and
Senior Executive Service employees.
Interviews, seminar responses, and the OIG DoD Employee Survey ("The Survey") (Annex I,
OIG Employee Survey) all revealed widespread dissatisfaction with many elements of personnel
and human resource management handled by components other than AIM. Examples are:
Training
Most OIG DoD employees know what training they need to progress in their career but do not
believe that they will receive it when the time comes due to lack of funds, a coherent training
program, favoritism in selecting attendees, or a supervisor who will not release them to attend
the training. This is supported by the responses to questions 5 and 6 to The Survey. The
responses indicate that 48% of the persons expressing an opinion are not confident that they will
receive the needed training. There were numerous narrative responses on this subject as well. It
is essential that the current education and training situation be corrected, both for the benefit of
OIG DoD personnel and the future professionalism of the agency. See Findings: 4-004
Education and Training; 4-001 Improvements In The Assignment And Schooling Of OIG DoD
Military Personnel Are Needed; and Specia1 Assessment Funding of the OIG DoD

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DoD IG FOIA 20

 Assignments
Staff development rotational assignments are represented as fostering professional development
and growth. It is far from clear that that they do either. In fact, they are a source of significant
employee dissatisfaction. In seminars, interviews, and in the narrative responses to the OIG DoD
Employee Survey, it was made clear to the Assessment Team that rotational assignments are
often seen as rotating junior auditors who possess limited auditing experience and little or no
technical or functional expertise from one directorate to another directorate where they possess
limited auditing experience and little or no technical or functional expertise. Assessment A-005
Junior Auditor Rotational Assignments. The rationale and methodology of rotational assignments
should be re-evaluated. For some personnel, they may not make sense. For others they may make
sense but the rotational cycle should be lengthened.
Recruiting
Some OIG DoD personnel management processes are adversely impacted by the organization's
"flatline budget" The budget limitations affect everything from employee Performance Cash
Awards and training to the quality of individual workspaces and savings should be sought from
all logical sources. It is possible that the Recruitment Bonus paid to new auditors may no longer
be necessary in view of the successful non-bonus recruiting by OIG's from other federal
agencies in 2001. The logic of this bonus should be reexamined.
Promotion
Identifying and selecting individuals for promotion are among the most important
responsibilities of good managers and leaders. A good promotion choice made under a fair
selection process rewards performance, recognizes the selectee's potential for added
responsibility and authority, and sends a positive message throughout the activity. Choices that
are poor or unfair, or are perceived to be so, send a demoralizing message. Based on the seminars
and interviews and reinforced by the results of both The Survey question responses and narrative
responses, there is a widespread belief that the OIG DoD promotion processes are unfair and
frequently the wrong people are being promoted. Assessment of Special Subject Area:
Promotions in OAIG Auditing. That applies to selection of SESs, supervisors and intermediate
leaders and managers, and lower graded personnel. For example, 56% of the respondents to
question 7 of The Survey stated that they believed that their supervisors and intermediate leaders
are selected based upon whom they know rather than what they know.
It is impossible to determine whether the widespread concern regarding unfair promotion
practices are justified or are erroneous perceptions. As a practica1 matter it makes little
difference. The perception of unfairness or poor choices is as damaging as fact in areas (such as
this) that adversely affect employee value judgments regarding the honesty, and ethics of an
organization and its leadership. This must be corrected.
Performance Plan and Performance Appraisals
Inspector General Regulation 1400.430 Performance Management requires the preparation of
Performance Plans. Information developed by the Team indicates that this is not universally done
and where it is, the prescribed schedule is not always followed. This is a source of concern to
many employees who state that they either do not know what is expected of them, or do not see

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DoD IG FOIA 21

 how they can receive an objective Performance Appraisa1 rating without a measurable goal for
them to attain.
Mentoring

Mentoring is a successful form of employee personnel development, and since it includes career
development advice and assistance, it is an informal form of personnel management as well.
There is a formal mentoring requirement in the OIG DoD but only 70 people are actually being
mentored. The underutilization of mentoring amounts to a missed opportunity to more rapidly
and effectively develop knowledgeable, effective, and dedicated employees who are better
prepared for promotion and assignment to positions of greater responsibility. Finding: 4-006
Mentoring Program in GIG DoD Auditing

Attitude Towards Employees
Within the Federal bureaucracy the attitude of managers towards their employees is generally not
considered to be an issue of personnel management. However, as a practical matter, it should be
considered so since it affects the personal and career development of employees. It is even a
determinant of whether the employee wil1 remain with and progress within the agency or leave
for a different and more fulfilling job. The Team encountered numerous OIG DoD employee
comments in seminars, one-on-one interviews and in The Survey regarding supervisor "handsoff' attitudes toward employees. This approach to management inhibits employee productivity
and ambition. Among these, the most corrosive attitudes from the point of view of the employees
were that managers and supervisors:
• do not trust employees
■ do not help employees to be successfu1
■ do not give employees enough responsibility, challenges, responsibilities
■ do not discuss with employees their goals, tasks or responsibilities
Clearly, it is far better for the OIG DoD to have employees who know that they and their work
efforts are both valued and will be rewarded, who desire to continue in and progress in their jobs,
and who will learn from their supervisors and mentors how an effective leader and manager
deals with peers and subordinates. This approach will prepare them for future supervisory
positions and success.
Recommendations

1) Evaluate training needs, and plan for and program the funds necessary to conduct it.
2) Re-examine the junior auditor rotational assignment policy to determine if it is as counterproductive as believed by many audit employees.
3) Re-examine the need for the Recruitment Bonus for new auditors.
4) Reform the promotion process to remove every possibility or appearance of unfair selection.
5) Enforce the requirement to prepare Performance Plans.
6) Expand the mentoring program to benefit more employees.
7) Improve supervisor "people skills" through education and training, leader-subordinate
mentoring, and counseling. This can be made a factor in the annual Performance and
Appraisal rating.

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 Task 3: AUDIT PROCEDURES and POLICIES in OIG DoD
SummaryThe OAIG Auditing is a major component of the GIG DoD. Its past accomplishments have been
laudable but substantial improvements are needed. The process for issuing audit reports, as well
as the reports themselves have suffered in recent years. Self-imposed metrics concerning
productivity have emphasized quantity over quality and form over substance. A performance
metric on client concurrence rates for audit findings and recommendations should be eliminated.
Efforts to improve internal quality controls have resulted in multiple layers of review and
paperwork. Reforms have been confusing and have increased editing time. Compliance with
Government Auditing Standards and OIG DoD audit policies and procedures remains a problem.
Credible evidence indicates audit findings and recommendations were diluted or eliminated. The
professional staff needs to be overhauled. A pervasive system of cronyism drives promotions,
work assignments, and performance awards. Potential whistleblowers are deterred with reprisal
and the message is ignored. Training of auditors lacks a systematic plan. Junior auditors are
rotated too early and often. These circumstances erode morale and contribute to the attrition of
skilled auditors when its aging work force is already exhibiting a shortage of critical GS-13
employees.
Discussion
As of June 29, 2002 OAIG Auditing had an assigned strength of almost 700 personnel (including
15 military). This represents better than 50% of the OIG DoD strength. This manpower is
primarily a sign to four operating directorates and a fifth directorate, the internal quality control,
audit follow-up, GAO Affairs, and support. Of these OAIG Auditing personnel, over 500 are
auditors, over 100 at some geographical locations other than the Arlington, Virginia
headquarters. Succinctly stated, this is a robust organization that has many of the mission
responsibilities as delineated by the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended). As required by
The Act, OAIG Auditing submits the majority of annual and semi-annual required reports and
also provides Congress a copy of all final audit reports within a relatively short time of their
completion. It performs the primary internal audit function within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments and other widely
dispersed and specialized defense components. The senior leadership within OAIG Auditing
includes 8 of the 15 assigned OIG DoD SESs and 30 of the 56 OIG DoD assigned GS-15s.
Clearly, the majority of the senior OIG DoD leaders reside within this organization.
Methodology
Considering the OAIG Auditing personnel assets, the geographical dispersion of some elements,
and the assigned multiple missions, the Assessment Team had to be certain that our evaluation
methodology was complete and all-encompassing. As stated earlier in the report, our process
started with organizational briefings by key OAIG Auditing personnel, interviews, seminars and
on-site visits to the headquarters and to some field locations. This process was supplemented
with anonymous information received by telephone, email, letters (both mailed and slipped under
the door), and the OIG Employee Survey. The Assessment Team is satisfied that the evaluation
was complete, thorough and impartial.

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 Areas of Concern
The Assessment Team found problems within the operational side of OAIG Auditing as well as
within its management of personnel. These areas of concern resulted in substantial erosion in the
morale of the organization. Employees felt dispirited about how they and their work were
treated by management.
Work Product Issues
The current process for issuing audit reports is subject to several questionable metrics. Although
any organization needs to measure its own performance, several tools of measurement now in
use at OAIG Auditing have resulted in unintended and undesirable effects. These are selfimposed and not required by law. First, managers issue a given number of draft and final audit
reports for a specified period. Annual performance plans typically contain these goals. During
the course of the year, managers base decisions on whether they will satisfy their performance
numbers. The Assessment Team learned that managers would slow down work once it became
apparent that they would meet their goals. The notion was that work in the pipeline should be
saved and applied toward the goals for the next year. Conversely, auditors shared examples of
managers dividing the scope of an ongoing audit in order to spawn two separate audit reports.
This enabled a manager to meet his goal in half the time. The overall effect of this metric was to
emphasize quantity over quality or form over substance.
A second troublesome metric requires a 90% client concurrence rate by DoD management with
OAIG Auditing recommendations (or agreement to take an acceptable course of action). It is
contained in OAIG-Performance Metric 1.B.3 "Recommendation Concurrence Rate." During
the initial briefing for the Assessment Team, management for OAIG Auditing was proud that it
had achieved a 97% rate for MY 2001. The risk inherent to any concurrence metric, much less
one with a 90% rate, is that the contents of audit reports may be watered down in order to obtain
agreement from the audited DoD agency.
Other OIG officials within the federal government expressed surprise to members of the
Assessment Team that an auditing organization like the OIG DoD would even use such a metric.
They suggested a better approach of measuring the results of the recommendations rather than
mere agreement with the recommendations.
The process for generating audit reports also bears the scars of severa1 external peer reviews that
have tracked problems with the design and implementation of quality controls within OAIG
Auditing. Beginning with a qualified opinion received from the OIG EPA in 1997, and
continuing up through another qualified opinion from the OIG HHS in 2001, OAIG Auditing has
attempted to take remedial actions to address those peer review criticisms. These responses have
taken the form of new or revised quality control measures such as the imposition of numerous
checklists regarding working papers and revised Style Tips for Audit Report ("STAR")
requirements. The effect has been to 1eave auditors confused and frustrated over an ever
changing and burdensome system of quality control. In their words, "checklists have been
created for checklists." Staff auditors fee1 that no one in management is tracking the cumulative
effect of the new quality control measures. In an ironic twist, notably in the troubled Finance
and Accounting Audit Directorate, many auditors end up going through the motions of
completing the checklists with the result that their working papers do not always comply with

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DoD IG FOIA 24

 governing standards. They take the position that diligent adherence to the checklists will result
in cut corners on quality elsewhere.
The foregoing attempts at reform also have helped make the editing process for draft reports
more onerous and time consuming. Assessment No. A-009 provides a detailed description of
how almost half of the time to complete an audit report is now spent in the editing stage, a
process that does not always improve the product. A draft audit report may repeatedly bounce
several times between up to six layers of review at two different junctures in the performance
audit process. As one auditor put it, each level of management feels compelled to leave their
"scent on the report."
A final concern about work product voiced by OAIG Auditing employees is that audit report
findings and recommendations are sometimes diluted or killed all together for questionable
reasons. Credible examples were provided to the Assessment Team. This practice not only
compromises the work product of the OIG DoD but also takes a toll on employee morale.
Auditors are naturally upset to see documented findings left out of an important audit report.
Personnel Related Issues
Our Assessment Team sensed early on, particularly through seminar sessions and personal
interviews, that a significant morale problem existed within OAIG Auditing. Personnel appeared
"beaten down," junior auditors reported that they were not productively employed, and there
were numerous complaints about a "good old boy" system of favoritism that was often linked to
participation on an OAIG Auditing softbal1 team. Many rank and file employees felt that
cronyism impacted jobs and promotions, team assignments, and bonus awards. The complaints
were frequent and varied. Subsequent inquiries by the Assessment Team validated many of
these unsolicited comments.
One of the issues often raised by employees related to the quality of senior leadership in OAIG
Auditing. The managers in question were viewed as members of a "good old boy network"
which was often cited as having created a climate of favoritism and cliques. They typically react
to suggestions and warnings with a defensive posture that often results in reprisal for employees
who expose waste or mismanagement. The survey conducted by the Assessment Team further
confirmed these perceptions. Senior leadership was viewed as part of the problem rather than
part of the solution. Employees often noted that many of these managers were technocrats as
opposed to 1eaders with vision. The "Leadership" assessment addresses this issue in greater
detail.
Many employees within OAIG Auditing believe that promotions are not based on merit or
awarded with impartiality. Although OAIG Auditing has written procedures that govern the
promotion selection process, employees noted that top rated candidates are sometimes passed
over for someone else further down on the list who is below the "best qualified" category. The
rank and file view the promotion process as a tool which management exploits to reward its
friends, particularly those who play on an OIG DoD softball team. The Special Assessment
"Promotions in OAIG Auditing" provides a telling case study of two promotion panels for GS-14
positions that were held within the past year. In both instances, less qualified applicants were
selected at the expense of much higher rated applicants. Several members of the interview

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DoD IG FOIA 25

 panels were disgusted with the unfairness of the final selections made by the current Acting AlG
Auditing.
Employees view the assignment of personne1 to individual jobs and teams within OAIG Auditing
with suspicion. Assignments based on reasons other than merit or need can adversely affect
morale, particularly in large organizations with multiple directorates, divisions, and teams.
Although any large organization will exhibit lateral employee mobility, such moves in OAIG
Auditing are often viewed as rewards to management "pets" or punishments to disfavored
employees who are not part of the ruling clique. Some components are overloaded with talented
auditors and given plum assignments while other elements are understaffed with as little as two
auditors and assigned inconsequential projects or "cookie cutter" audits. Plum assignments stand
to greatly affect an employee's resume and chances for future promotion. In other cases,
employees who are at odds with management are assigned to Program Directors known to have
abrasive styles of management in the hope that such a hostile working environment will drive the
employees to resign from the OIG DoD. Senior officials even admitted to once having had
"Turkey Farms" which grouped disliked employees onto the same teams. In short, the
perception that employee assignments by senior management are tainted by favoritism (e.g.,
based on softball teams and car pools) only serves to undercut confidence in the leadership of the
organization. The Assessment Team uncovered enough evidence to conclude that this
perception has a strong grounding in reality.
Although the issue of employee training is discussed in the "Education and Training"
assessment, additional comments specific to auditors are in order. When college graduates join
OAIG Auditing, they not only must be exposed to the mission and agencies of DoD, but they
must frequently make the transition from accountant to auditor. This process requires an initial
orientation to the government auditing process. This limited training is normally accomplished
in a timely manner. The minimum continuing professional education requirement of 80 hours
(to include 24 core hours) over two years with at least 20 hours in one year is also being attained.
Training beyond these requirements, however, is fragmentary at best. This concern is
exacerbated by the premature rotation of junior auditors between directorates. They are not left
in place long enough to sufficiently learn the mission of the directorate and the DoD agencies
they audit. Assessment No. A-005 provides the details and adverse affects from this misguided
OAIG Auditing policy. The last external peer review by OIG HHS also detected record keeping
deficiencies in the area of training. OAIG Auditing officials blamed the problem on OAIM's
administration of the records.
Finally, a growing personnel issue for OAIG Auditing is the aging of its workforce. When the
top three grades (i.e., SES, GS-I5, and GS-14) are grouped together, approximately 64% are
over 50 years old. When broken down, all of the SES employees are over 50 and 72% of the
GS-15 mangers past that age. Since FY 1998, over 400 audit personnel have left OAIG
Auditing, including 131 critical GS-13s. About 50% of the GS-13 positions turn over every
three years. This is a significant talent drain, especially for the pool of auditors who do actual
audit work and who wil1 later become managers with an institutional expertise. Some of these
auditors depart for other higher paying positions (e.g., OIG U.S. Postal Service), but others
depart due to dissatisfaction with current OAIG Auditing 1eadership. Current plans to recruit do
not appear to explain where replacements with a strong background in government auditing

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DoD IG FOIA 26

 standards and DoD agencies will be found. Raiding other agencies for their GS-13 auditors
ignores the fact that the issue of an aging workforce affects all agencies within the federal
government. This situation has long term training implications.

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DoD IG FOIA 27

 11. Revise the Junior Audit Rotation Policy to allow a new auditor time to sufficiently learn the
functional and technical aspects of their job prior to rotating to another directorate.
12. Ensure that each audit directorate has a sufficient number of qualified functional/technical
auditors to assist the audit teams in conducting complex audits.
Task 4: Education and Training in the OIG DoD
Sum mary
Education and training in OIG DoD is in some disarray. There is no articulated professiona1 ethic
for IGs. There is no one senior staff responsible for the function. There is no overall system to
plan, program, budget, and manage the function. Technical training in the components is being
attended to. The most serious deficiency is a lack of a program for progressive leadership
education specifically for OIG DoD. Introductory training for new employees is planned, but
sporadically delivered. This causes a serious handicap for OIG DoD people who will be auditing,
investigating, and inspecting the complex organization that is DoD.
Why Education and Training?
Education is defined as learning why we do things; training is learning how we do things.
An ethic of professionalism for IGs is the essentia1 capstone for education and training. The OIG
DoD is more than an organization; it closely resembles a profession and has most of the
attributes of a profession*, i.e. ;
• Authority delegated by Congress,
• Unique expertise,
• Limited autonomy, and
• A culture distinct from the rest of DoD, with a code of ethics, cohesive and self-policing.
Education and training develop and sustain a profession's unique expertise. More importantly,
education develops and sustains leadership, fosters cohesion, and generates pride.
The Assessment Team has made an examination of education and training in the OIG DoD. This
part of the assessment is a result of our task to identify deficiencies in (education and) training
programs and provide recommendations for improvement. The results of this assessment follow.
Education and Training in OIG DoD As It Is.
Responsibility for Education and Training. There is no one in charge of the OIG DoD education
and training effort. The "unique expertise" of professionalism is not being nurtured. As a result,
the pride born of confidence in demonstrated ability is neither strong nor widespread. (See
Finding # 4-005)
Education and Training Model. A model would establish the education and training goals keyed
to the career development for each career field in the OIG DoD. There is no overall education

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DoD IG FOIA 28

 and training model for the Office, though each component has the elements of a training model
attentive to the technical requirements of their dominant career fields. As a result, the leadership
and management education that generates professionalism is not given high priority for
resources. (See Finding #4-003 and OIG Employee Survey)
Resources for Education and Training. The management of resources (money, time, people and
technology) in OIG DoD to support education and training reflects the decentralized
management of the function. There is no proponent for education and training in the Senior
Management Group where resource priorities are established. Each of the components has
education and training models of varying degrees of sophistication and utility. They follow those
models as current resources permit. (See Finding # 4-002)
A "Bubble Up" System. Overall the ambitious mid-grade civil servant in OIG DoD is left to seek
leadership and management education on his own. This is not universal, but too often the
essential responsibility of leadership to develop subordinates is forgotten in the pressure of
deadlines and routines. Mentoring of junior grades is not common. The efficiency of "training
the trainer" is neglected. (See OIG Employee Survey)
Bright Spots. There are bright spots in the OIG DoD education and training assessment.
Technical training, particularly in Auditing and Investigations, is being attended to. Employees
are seeking the training they need to stay abreast of their career fields; Program Directors and
Program Managers are, in some cases, encouraging employees to do this. It is not surprising that
the prevalence of this essential function of 1eadership is in direct proportion to the overall
effectiveness of individual leaders. (See Assessment Number 4, Education and Training and OIG
Employee Survey)
New Mission. The Assessment Team will recommend that the OIG DoD develop an inspections
capability. This capability will require significant education and training support, particularly for
employees transferred from other DoD functional areas. One training source for inspectors is the
Army Inspector General School at Ft. Belvoir. All Army officers detailed to OIG DoD attend
that school as do a number of other service officers. A mature education and training system for
OIG DoD must include provision for this new mission.
IG Training in DoD. The Assessment Team was tasked to review DoD training practices for
auditors, evaluators, investigators, and inspectors within the overall policy oversight of the IG
DoD. This is a desirable effort, particularly as DoD's thrust to transformation impacts on DoD's
personnel and money resources. However, in our judgment, unti1 the OIG DoD's education and
training function is overhauled, OIG DoD cannot exercise that Department-wide responsibility.
Such a review should be included in a follow-up effort.
Areas Requiring Senior Management Attention and Action.
Leadership Support. Senior Management, especially at the SES level, should be visible and vocal
in their support of education and training within OIG DoD. This support should be manifest in
the allocation of the resources of money, time and people. This emphasis should reach every
level of every component. All leaders are teachers!

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DoD IG FOIA 29

 A Training Manager. Appoint a senior officer in the OIG DoD, reporting to the Deputy IG DoD
responsible for education and training. This official should be responsible for:
•
•
•
•

Developing a training model 1inking education and training for each level of
responsibility in each career field in the OIG DoD. The model must serve both managers
and individual employees.
Being the proponent for education and training planning, programming, and budget for
the Office,
Developing, promulgating, and exercising staff supervision over, education and training
policy for all components of the OIG DoD. Maintaining all training records, both
individual and organizational.
Planning and executing the transition of the current OIG DoD education and training
arrangement to a coherent system outlined in these recommendations.

A Training Model. Develop and execute an education and training model for OIG DoD. This is
the essential tool to plan, program, budget and manage all education and training in the OIG
DoD. The steps in the development of such a model are as follows:
•

Develop a Mission Essential Skill List (MESL). For each grade level from GS-4 through
GS-15 in each career field in OIG DoD, identify the mission essential skills necessary to
accomplish the OIG DoD mission. This will require a bottom up development process
possibly taking an 18-month period.

•

Identify Training Sources. Inventory al1 possible sources of education and training that
can efficiently satisfy the MESL. Consider OJT and mentoring, OIG DoD in-house,
governmental, and non-governmental sources. Cost each source in time, people, and
dollars.

•

Enhance DAMIS. Use the DAMIS system, developed in OAIG Auditing, as a basis for
developing the OIG DoD training model. With continued aggressive enhancement,
"DAMIS-PLUS" can become the education and training model for OIG DoD, and it
could be the key instrument in managing the transition from the present fragmented
system to a model driven system. Examples of the rudiments of a training model can be
seen on the IGnet, PCIE/ECIE Quality Standards, Quality Standards for Investigations
(1987), Annex B, and Appendix A, Quality Standards for Inspections (1993). Web Site:
http://www. ignet.gov/pande/standards.html

•

Plan, Program, and Budget. Education and training funding has remained relatively flat
and inadequate for the past three fiscal years. Once a training model is put in place, OIG
DoD will be able to express aggressive training funds requests in terms of mission
essential skills, and will be able support requests to DoD and the Congress to sustain
those skills.
o Long Range. Forecast for a rolling five fiscal years the education and training
requirements for the Agency as a basis for budget submission.
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 o Short Range. Develop and allocate the OIG DoD education and training resources
six months before the fisca1 year begins.
o Near Term. Based upon quarterly reprogramming, support unfunded education
and training requirements at least one quarter before the training is available.
•

Make Program Assessments. Make periodic assessments of the effectiveness of training
by post-course reports of OIG DoD students, their supervisors and by visits to training
sources. Modify planning based on assessment results. In fact, an inventory of al1 training
sources available to OIG should begin now with the purpose of insuring that these
sources meet current OIG education and training needs in the most cost – effective way.
Such an inventory would ease transition to a model driven system.

As an OIG DoD training model matures it will become apparent that a possible alternative to the
use of out-of-house training resources is the establishment of an OIG DoD Academy. Such a
facility could offer tightly focused courses, specifically tailored to the assessed needs of OIG
DoD as identified in the MESL. The cost-effectiveness of this approach should be determined
based on a ten-year comparison and on the use of contractors or some selected OIG DoD
managers as instructors.
A matter of concern, particularly among program directors and program managers, is the
mediocre quality of expository writing and prerequisite analytical thinking of their subordinates.
Since OIG DoD's reputation for excellence rests on the accuracy and clarity of its written
communication, this deficiency is serious. Again, education and training, along with leader-led
mentoring, is the remedy. (See Assessment A-003)
In the team's many seminars, one-on-one interviews, and the Assessment Team's employee
survey results there was much discomfort with the quality of leadership in the components. This
discomfort is so widespread as to be a matter of serious concern and examination by the
assessment team. In the main, DIG DoD senior leadership, particularly at the SES level, is
viewed by the assessment team and the rank and file as self-centered, self-serving, defensive, and
resistant to change. In addition to draconian personnel measures, the solution to leadership
ineptitude and inexperience is education and leader-led mentoring. The senior leadership must
make this their first education and training priority, whatever the final shape of education and
training in OIG DoD. (See Special Assessment on Leadership, OIG Employee Survey)
Recommendations
1. Senior leadership must be visible and vocal in their support of education and training.
2. Appoint a senior staff officer as Director of Training reporting to the Chief of Staff. This
staff officer to be responsible for the policy development, planning, programming,
budgeting, and staff supervision for education and training in OIG DoD.
3. Develop a comprehensive training model for OIG DoD.

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DoD IG FOIA 31

 4. Develop a Mission Essential Skill List (MESL) for every career field, for every grade
level in 010 DoD.
5. Plan, program and budget for education and training on a long, short, and near term basis.
Make a continuing program assessment.
6. Consider the establishment of an IG DoD academy.
7. Make leadership education the top priority.
8. Embed an ethic of professionalism, as defined above, in the OIG DoD Strategic Plan, in
the OIG DoD doctrine, and in the education and training of every employee.

Special Subject Areas
Subject: An Assessment of Leadership in the Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense
Summary
Feedback to compile this report was obtained from one-on-one personal interviews, from
numerous seminars and also from the Assessment Teams Survey of the DIG DoD employees.
As a general observation, senior OIG DoD leaders have displayed by their actions an arrogance
of leadership and have placed their personal aspirations and goals above DIG DoD's mission
accomplishments. A buddy system or "who you know" permeates the agency in both facts and
in perception. OIG DoD personnel view senior managers, with few exceptions, as being
entrenched and intractable. It is believed that reprisal or retaliation could result if the party line
is not followed. As a first corrective step, leaders (SESs and GS-15s) should be required to
attend leadership, sensitivity, and interpersonal relations training.
Overview
Within the OIG DoD organization there is a plethora of leaders. These positions vary from the
Inspector General and the Deputy Inspector General down to Team Chiefs. Regardless of their
position, leaders should possess the ability to supervise, to communicate, to teach, to analyze, to
be a role model, and to evaluate and meet challenges. Since leaders progress through a
succession of promotions and resulting concomitant increase in responsibilities, future leaders
must also be exposed to an increasing level of training focused specifically to increase their
requisite skills.
One of the intrinsic aspects of leadership is the individual's ability to influence positively other
personnel to accomplish valid goals and tasks. Admittedly, leadership is a very subjective area
with the answer being in the eyes of the beholder. However, there are some traits and principles
that every successful 1eader must follow. For a leader to be effective, he must be a trusted and
wise counselor and teacher. A leader must mentor subordinates as a logical progression in the
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DoD IG FOIA 32

 maturation process. He must be honest, possess integrity, be trustworthy, and above all, lead by
example. While some people believe that these traits can be taught, there is unanimity that the
mores of a culture will determine an individual's ethos. In this regard, recent college graduates,
who are assigned to the OIG DoD, may have a personal challenge meeting the ethics, honesty
and integrity standards. This is especially true when considering the new employee's mores and
their recent learning environment.
Regardless of the traits of a perfect leader, training is the core element to the schooling of future
supervisors. Failure to provide the requisite training will sometimes doom our up-and-coming
personnel to only an on-the-job learning curve.
General Baron Friedrich Von Steuben, the first Army Inspector General, recognized the
importance of discipline and reasoned that partiality and prejudice may be the ruin of discipline.
He further believed a misuse of authority was an anathema for an effective organization. Von
Steuben believed strongly that leaders above all must display a sense of responsibility.
Current Leadership Culture
Feedback from subordinates was received from numerous seminars and personal one-on-one
interviews – many were unsolicited and conducted with past and present OIG DoD personnel.
The Assessment Team's OIG Employee Survey also provided invaluable feedback on the senior
leadership issue. The survey results and an analysis are reported as a separate assessment.
As a general observation, OIG DoD senior leaders displayed by their past actions a complete
disregard of what is correct and proper for the OIG DoD. Their own personal aspirations and
goals are paramount and an attitude prevails that they will survive the new IG DoD. They have
demonstrated an arrogance of leadership and this culture exists within the agency. Leaders have
established valid rules, policies, and internal regulations for the efficient operation of their
offices, but they often circumvent these rules for personal reasons. Subordinates frequently
relate stories that it's a "who-you-know" feeling that permeates OIG DoD. Although some
stories are perpetuated by the rumor-mill, the perceptions exist because of past actions and
possible unethical conduct. Many stories relate personnel actions involving intra-office moves,
promotions, rewards, and bonuses.
A senior leadership culture exists that we can-do-no-wrong and the status quo is a good standard.
There is a climate that resists change. Leaders were heard to state, "can't believe that you are
listening to complaining subordinates" and "I don't believe in mentoring because I didn't get a
bonus when I first came here". Unfortunately, the content of one's character is revealed by how
you think and what you do – not by the policies and procedures that are promulgated. Personnel
view senior managers as being entrenched and intractable – often refusing to discuss issues
without explanation. It is also feared that reprisal or retaliation could result if the party line is
not followed. Some employees have been advised to "not make waves". This working
environment is totally unacceptable in any organization and must not continue to flourish in the
OIG DoD.
Numerous feedback was received that OIG DoD leaders do not foster a climate to that accepts
honest mistakes. The prevailing leadership attitude is that the written fina1 reports go to

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DoD IG FOIA 33

 Congress and they must be perfect. While the final report high-standards are valid and
attainable, there should be a participative management and positive learning atmosphere.
Subordinates should be exposed to a clear, concise writing style that is consistent throughout
OIG DoD. The style could be explained in an SOP and by correspondence writing courses
taught in-house by college professors. Then leaders must hold to these standards without
imposing their own prose style. Subordinates must subsequently be nurtured to meet the
established standards.
The OIG DoD requires improvement in the middle management people skills and in the training
area. As addressed in a separate Special Assessment of task number 4, there is a void in training
within the OIG DoD. The program is fragmented without a central training agency and point of
contact. Succinctly stated, no one is in charge. Senior OIG DoD leaders were doing very little
mentoring. What was being accomplished was more by accident than a planned program. To
illustrate the diversity of possible mentoring approaches, another OIG organization identified
five highly talented employees per year to develop as future leaders. A combination of both
mentoring and professional schooling would then follow. OIG DoD requires a program that
provides the wise counsel while selecting talented future supervisors.
Underlying the above discussion is, as stated by the President's Commission on Integrity and
Ethics, that the Inspector General must be impartial with their opinions, conclusions, judgments,
and recommendations. In the described leadership atmosphere, it is difficult to visualize how the
OIG DoD can be perceived as impartial, straightforward, and above- board.
Recommendations
1. Senior managers (i.e., SESs, GS-1 5s and GS-14s) should be required to attend leadership,
sensitivity, and interpersonal relations training. This training could be given in-house with
adjunct college professors.
2. If not already accomplished, each AIG DoD should be required to conduct an office goal
setting conference.
3. An improved OIG DoD mentoring program should be developed.
Subject: An Assessment of Ethics and Integrity in the Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense
Summary
Ethics and Integrity in the OIG DoD are imperatives; they brook no priorities. The Agency's
reputation for ethics and integrity is fragile, and trust once lost is hard to repair. The unsavory
events of the past few years involving OIG DoD have eroded that trust both in the Department
and in the Congress. IG DoD has announced that ethics is his highest priority. A high standard of
ethics is embedded in the Agency's Strategic Plan and in the Annual Performance Plan. There is
mandatory annual ethics training for all covering the details of the application of the many ethics
regulations, directives, and policies. There is an aggressive Ethics Review in progress in 01G.
What is missing, so far, is the obvious and visible presence of the senior leadership who report to

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DoD IG FOIA 34

 the IG DoD, setting the example, reinforcing truth as the bottom line, and nurturing ethics as the
basis for professionalism.
The Assessment Approach
The Assessment Team has made a review of ethics and integrity in the OIG DoD. This part of
the assessment results from the avowed intent of the 1G DoD to restore confidence in the
integrity (ethics) of the OIG DoD.
Ethics are the rules or standards of conduct governing the members of a profession. Integrity is
the firm adherence to a code or standard of values. Ethics are organizational; integrity is
personal.
Ethics and integrity in the OIG DoD are imperatives. They brook no priorities. They must be
pervasive at every level of leadership and in every component of the OIG DoD. Ethics and
integrity are vital and fragile elements of the culture and reputation of any organization, and
every member shares in, and contributes to, that culture and reputation. Trust in the ethics and
integrity of an organization, once lost, is hard to regain.
Integrity is imbedded in the character of each individual; therefore the results of our assessment
reflect employees' personal perceptions and opinions. Ethical rules of conduct are more visible.
They are in place OIG DoD. The results of this assessment follow.
The Erosion of Ethics and the Results
Congressional Concerns. Congress has a proprietary interest in the OIG DoD. Between 60% and
70% of the work done in the Office is generated by Congress. Congress's enthusiasm for IGs is
rooted in their trust in the ethical standards and integrity of an institution they have created.
When there is a breach or a perception of a breach of that trust, the effects are corrosive and long
term. Unsavory events of the past few years in the OIG DoD have had that effect, and have
increased the tensions normally part of the OIG DoD's relations with Congress.
Ethical Climate in OIG DoD
e Perceptions of the ethical climate vary at various levels of maturity, length of service, and
responsibility. All levels in the OIG DoD agree that the great majority of employees in
the OIG DoD have integrity and want to do the right thing. The Assessment Team
concurs. (Survey results)
• No closure to the Working Paper issue. Face to face interviews of middle and senior
employees reveal a mixture of impatience for the issue to go away, chagrin over the
degradation of professional reputation (collectively and individually), confusion over the
facts of the incident, and dissatisfaction with the sanctions imposed as a result. Some
have transferred these frustrations to blame certain members of Congress or their staffs
for their overreaction.

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 •

Various incidents of the past three years such as the Mancuso nomination, the
Hollingsworth affair, and the working papers scandal received attention in the press.
These had impact inside OIG DoD, in the Congress, and with the public.

Outside/Inside Culture. Adherence to OIG ethical standards varies with age, grade, and time in
OIG DoD.
•

Many employees coming to OIG DoD from high school or college arrive with a different
standard of integrity than that which must exist in OIG DOD. It is naive to assume that
such a transition to a more demanding standard of integrity will occur automatically.

•

Internally, adherence to OIG DoD's code of ethics is driven by procedures, but the
measures of effectiveness do not necessarily present a true picture of the ethical culture.
Annually, close to all OIG DoD employees certified that they had completed annual
ethics training, yet at least 12 employees were involved in the working papers incident.

•

There is a perception among junior employees that the higher the grade, the less the rules
apply. Whether or not this perception matches reality is immaterial; the perception must
be changed by the official actions and personal conduct of senior leaders. (AssessmentLeadership, Survey results).

Integrity of the Audit Processes. OAIG Auditing has established measures of effectiveness that
provide incentives to water down the accuracy and thoroughness of OIG DoD audits. Emphasis
on the quantity rather than quality and candor (telling it all, and telling it as it is) is an affront to
the integrity of individual auditors and the ethics of OIG DoD. Left unchanged, this situation
makes a mockery of the of the high standards and the priority of ethics current in OIG DoD.
Junior employees perceive that there is a "zero defects" atmosphere abroad in OAIG Auditing.
This situation is corrosive; it must be changed. ( See Assessment A-006).
The "Working Papers" Issue. The working papers issue will be presented in detail elsewhere in
the assessment. Interviews with many involved at various levels reveal a case study in
rationalization and quibbling. The Assessment Team's investigation shows how a group of
normally honest people can be induced to dishonesty by the push of events, ambitious leadership,
and an overriding desire to excel. The result of the reconstruction of spurious working papers
was a collapse of the ethical structure among those involved. (See Working Papers Issue Report.)
Areas Requiring Senior Management Attention or Action.
The solution to ethics and integrity problems in OIG DoD is not one of more regulations or
directives; there is a plenitude at every level of the executive branch and in the OIG DoD. The
challenge is to embed ethics and integrity in the ethos of OIG DoD.
Responsibility for Ethics and Integrity in OIG DoD). Line responsibility for ethics and integrity
must rest clearly and unequivocally on the shoulders of the OIG chain of command. Staff
responsibility for administering the OIG ethics program rests with the Ethics Coordinator and is
being well done. The danger is that the 1ine managers lose touch with the true ethos of integrity

36
DoD IG FOIA 36

 in their components, and the rank and file wil1 relegate ethics to the level of just another
requirement to fulfill. Whatever reorganization of OIG DoD that may result from the Assessment
Team's recommendations, the clear line of ethics responsibility must be visible to all.
Set the Example. Responsibility for ethics and integrity demands that every manager set the
example by:
• Reinforcing truthfulness as the bottom line in every official and unofficial act. Just
meeting the requirements of law and regulations is not enough; that leads to legalism and
quibbling.
•

Set clear ethical standards. Once standards are practical and clear, they must be enforced
impartially and fairly.

•

Tolerating honest mistakes and inexperience. The danger of renewed emphasis on ethics
and integrity in OIG DoD is overemphasis. Single-minded emphasis, or the appearance of
an "enforcer system", will kill initiative in the new or inexperienced employee. Managers
must be tolerant of honest mistakes and inexperience. The indispensable mentoring by
every level of leadership is one solution.

Enforce Discipline. Adherence to standards of excellence in the OIG DoD must be based on a
foundation of discipline; standards of excellence are no exception.
•

Evaluate ethics and integrity in annual performance evaluations. One powerful method of
reinforcing high ethica1 standards is to include evaluation of employees' performance in
adhering to the standards appropriate for their grade and position.

•

Impose tough, fair sanctions. Within the intent of law and regulation, responsible officials
must impose sanctions on those who cannot or will not meet the OIG DoD ethical
standards. Managers must take care to ensure that the right of the individual to his
reputation is protected. Sanctions should be imposed as quickly as law and regulation
permit. The essential facts of a given case, including any punishment imposed, should be
made public and rumors countered.

Assess the ethica1 "climate" of the OIG DoD. The Ethics Task Force (ETF), chartered by the IG
DOD before the assessment team began work, has proposed a three-tiered assessment of the state
of ethics and integrity in the OIG DoD. A member of the Assessment Team has attended two
meetings of the task force and has been privy to their deliberations. The proposa1 is
commendable; it is an essential first step. The Ethics Task Force proposal was presented to the
IG DoD on 5 June 2002. It deserves approval and should be supported with the necessary
resources.
Education and training. Leaders in OIG DoD have the obligation to set the example, to mentor,
and to be confident in dealing with ethics and integrity matters in the general or the specific. The
recommendations of the assessment team in the areas of education and training address this
issue.

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DoD IG FOIA 37

 •

Leadership education. The object of education in ethics and integrity is to prepare and
encourage leaders at every level to discharge their ethics 1eadership responsibility. The
program of instruction for such education should be OIG DoD specific, practical, and
keyed to the level of responsibility of the students.

•

Pride. OIG DoD is not proud. And there is no quick fix. Pride is manifest in an attitude
that a good outfit tries to do everything well. Pride begets cohesion; cohesion provides
mora1 support for people to adhere to the ethical standards of the group. Developing the
pride born of demonstrated ability is the challenge. The patient encouragement of
excellence by senior leadership, and recognition of that excellence are the answer.

Recommendations
1. Place the responsibility for ethics and integrity in OIG DoD squarely on the line
management at each level of responsibility
2. Reinforce truthfulness in every official and unofficial act at every level.
Set clear standards. Enforce them fairly.
4. Tolerate honest mistakes and inexperience.
5. Enforce discipline. Evaluate ethics and integrity in annual reports.
6. Support the excellent work of the Ethics Task Force. Approve their recommendations,
and provide the necessary resources.
7. Educate the OIG DoD leadership in ethics and integrity as recommended in the
assessment of OIG DoD education and training.
8. On the premise that bad news, unlike wine, does not improve with age, The IG DoD
should have a full time Public Affairs Officer on his staff.
Subject: An Assessment of the Command Climate in the Office of the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense
Summary
The Assessment Team has conducted numerous desk side interviews and small seminars with
OIG DoD personne1 of all GS grade levels. These face-to-face discussions coupled with on-site
observations have provided the Assessment Team with an insight as to the command climate of
the 016 DoD. The OIG DoD Employee Survey supports these insights. The inspection of
numerous OIG DoD field offices and the office of the Director for Administration and
Information Management (AIM) revealed a very positive command climate while the inspection
of the Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations and the Office of the Assistant

38
DoD IG FOIA 38

 Inspector General for Auditing revealed a poor and unhealthy command climate. The primary
causes of this poor command climate can be directly attributed to micro-management and poor
senior leadership. The IG DoD, has already initiated several highly effective initiatives which
are improving employee morale and esprit.
Discussion
No command climate assessment can be completely inclusive of all offices, branches and
divisions; however, the Assessment Team was able to gain considerable insight as to the
employee's attitude towards their subordinates, peers and superiors and their workplace.
The most positive command environment was found in the Office of the Director for
Administration and Information Management (OAIM). The employees and managers of this
directorate were a cohesive team who displayed a noteworthy positive attitude towards their
duties and responsibilities. Interviews with many of the OAIM leaders revealed a healthy
respect for their supervisors and subordinates alike and a loyalty towards their leadership.
Comments such as, "Out of all the offices I've worked in this is the best" were not uncommon.
The frankness and openness with the Assessment Team members was commendable and reflects
the positive environment in which they work. They are proud of their work and receptive to new
thoughts and ideas. The Assessment Team attributed this excellent working environment
directly to a talented and dedicated group of middle level OAIM managers and inspired
employees.
On the other hand, the two major OIG DoD organizations, OAIG Investigations and the OAIG
Auditing reflected a far different command environment. Many employees and middle managers
alike viewed these organizations as micro-managed and over controlled. The working
environment inhibited creativity and initiative. There was a general perception of unethical or
self serving conduct on the part of supervisors and senior managers, especially in the audit arena.
Many auditors witnessed "watered down" audit reports and changed audit findings that could not
be supported. These unwarranted audit report changes not only caused anxiety and frustration
but also resulted in resentment and a lack of trust, faith and confidence in the audit leadership. In
OAIG Investigations political considerations resulted in several instances where the results of
investigations against major defense contractors were watered down.
Both of these organizations suffer from a lack of top-level leadership. Many employees felt
unappreciated and noted that the words "thank you", "good job", and "wonderfu1 work" are
rarely spoken. The fear of reprisals or retaliation is pervasive. This unhealthy command
environment has had a demoralizing effect upon many talented auditors and investigators.
There were noteworthy exceptions to the previously described poor command climate in these
two organizations. The Acquisition Management Audit Directorate, OAIG Auditing is generally
viewed as a good place to work. For the most part, employees in this directorate are cheerful,
competent, and proud of their accomplishments. This positive working environment can be in
part attributed to the Director, Mary Ugone, who has an ability to relate to and direct effectively
the efforts of her subordinates in a positive, caring manner. Most employees hold the director in
high esteem. The Deputy Director, Contract Management, Keith West, is consistently described
as a bright, knowledgeable, people oriented person who exhibits excellent 1eadership qualities.

39
DoD IG FOIA 39

 He too is held in high esteem. Another breath of fresh air in the audit community is
a project manager in the Contract Management Directorate who leads and mentors his
auditors in an exceptiona1 fashion. There were numerous other OIG DoD employees who
exhibit good leadership, management and personnel skills including DCIS
OAIG Auditing;
Special Inquiries;
DCIS;
OAIG Auditing.
OAIM; and
OAIM;
Assessment Team visits to numerous field offices found a positive command environment.
Interviews with field leaders and subordinates alike revealed a dedicated, competent, responsive
and well motivated workforce. The DCIS field offices concerns centered on an inordinate
administrative workload and a lack of much needed modern furniture and law enforcement
equipment. Weak leadership and a lack of guidance and direction from the DCIS headquarters
are frustrating and have a detrimental effect upon the effectiveness of the field offices. Within
OAIG Auditing, two directorates have some subordinate divisions whose personnel are split
between the headquarters and field locations. In some cases, the Program Director is not with
the majority of his/her personnel. This situation requires a careful review. (See Assessment #A004)
The command climate and working atmosphere in the Office of Departmental Inquiries is of
deep concern. The vast majority of investigators within this office view their organization as
micro-managed and over controlled by their leadership. The employees are frustrated with what
they perceive as a lack of trust, faith and confidence in their ability to perform their investigative
duties and write their reports in an acceptable manner. This is particularly applicable to
management in the Special Inquiries Directorate. Numerous examples of endless editing and
rewriting of reports were cited as a primary cause of their discontent. The investigators are
equally concerned about the lengthy report processing times (see Assessment A-003).
Leadership and human relations skills training for the Office of Departmental Inquiries
leadership is required. The investigators would be well served by attending a comprehensive
analytical writing course.
The challenge of fixing the command environment within the OIG DoD will be difficult but is
clearly obtainable. The fix is already underway as the new IG DoD has started several simple
but highly effective initiatives. First, the command presence initiative where the IG DoD walks
through the headquarters complex and meets employees at their worksite is achieving excellent
results. Seminars and employee interviews clearly indicate that the boss's "walk-throughs" are
deeply appreciated. The timing of these "walk-throughs" should be scheduled to ensure
maximum employee presence. The periodic emails from the new IG DoD are the "talk of the
town" and are a highly effective means to communicate with OIG DoD workers. These emails
are not only informative but also are by-pass surgery that ensures a non-filtered message gets
directly to the employees. Some type of OPEN DOOR policy is needed where employees have
the opportunity to talk directly to the boss. Since an old fashioned Open Door policy is very
time consuming it would probably be more efficient to establish an Open-Door-Email Box that
employees can use to email the IG DoD directly. A periodic Navy "All Hands" employee
meeting should be considered where the IG DoD personally briefs employees on selected topics.
It is imperative that the IG DoD continues with his person-to-person approach to the his
employees. Team building initiatives such as off site meetings with senior leaders as well as

40
b(6)
DoD IG FOIA 40

 teleconferencing with field leaders would be extremely beneficial. Personal IG DoD instruction
in leadership, ethics and core OIG DoD values should be undertaken immediately.
Recommendations
1. Continue the highly effective "walk-throughs" and IG DoD personal emails to
employees.
2. Establish some type of Open Door Policy such as an Open-Door-Email Box.
3. Conduct personal leadership, ethics and core OIG DoD value instruction for all senior
leaders.
4. Conduct team building initiatives such as off site meetings with senior leaders and
teleconferencing with field leaders.
Subject: An Assessment of the Inspection Process in the Office of the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense
Summary
Since its inception in 1983 the OIG DoD had an inspections/evaluation capability in OAIG
Inspections. In 1995 the OIG DoD was directed to eliminate 477 positions by 2001. As a result,
OAIG Inspections was eliminated and the majority of its personnel were transferred to OAIG
Auditing. Since a need exists for an inspections/evaluations capability, OAIG Inspections should
be established with an initial strength of 50 employees (25 civilian and 25 military). Civilians to
be transferred from OAIG Auditing and military personal from within OIG DoD. The
organization is to be austere with only operations, planning and follow-up, and administration
(with management info management) capabilities.
Discussion
Historical Lay Down of the IG DoD
The "Inspector General Act of 1978", (as amended in 1982) created the Office of the Inspector
General, Department of Defense. The purpose was to establish an independent and objective
office: (1) to conduct and supervise audits and investigations; (2) to provide leadership and
coordination and recommended policies to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the
administration of; and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse; and (3) to provide a means for
keeping the Secretary of Defense and the Congress fully and currently informed about problems
and deficiencies.
DoD Directive 5106.1, dated January 4, 2001 delineated the responsibilities, functions,
authorities, and relationships of the IG DoD as contained in the Inspector General Act of 1978
(as amended). The directive stated that one of the missions of the 1G DoD was to "conduct,
supervise, monitor, and initiate audits, evaluations, and investigations relating to programs and
operations of the Department of Defense." The directive also authorized, along with other
organizational entities, an Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and an Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations. This directive further authorized "such other offices and employees
as may be necessary to carry out the mission, functions, responsibilities and authorities

41
DoD IG FOIA 41

 assigned." It is interesting to note, that the Act is devoid of any reference to inspections or
evaluations entities within the OIG DoD. On the other hand, the current DoD directive 5106.1
does list "evaluations" in the mission and responsibilities and functions of the OIG DoD.
Background Information on OAIG Inspections
Beginning in 1983, the OIG DoD had an Assistant IG for Inspections along with other Assistant
IG's (e.g., Audit, Investigations, etc.). The AIG Inspections performed program and operation
compliance inspections and non-crimina1 specia1 inquiries. Over time, this inspections element
varied in size from 130 to 166 personnel. Creating the OAIG Inspections gave the OIG DoD the
capability to inspect Defense Agencies and other non-service DoD components that had never
before been subject to inspections. At one time over 165 entities had been identified for
inspection. From its inception, the inspections element instituted a functional approach to
evaluate agency management and compliance with DoD regulations and to highlight systemic
problems.
In 1995, the OIG DoD was directed to eliminate 477 positions by 2001. This included the
requirement to reduce high grades (GS 14 and above), and numbers of supervisors and
administrative positions. As a result of these mandated reductions, the OAIG Inspections, and
some other 010 DoD elements were eliminated. To a large degree, the functions of the OAIG
Inspections were assumed by the OAIG Auditing. These reductions were accomplished without
the need to separate involuntarily any employees by reduction-in-force (RIF) procedures.
However, grade reductions were part of the reorganization process. Approximately 60% of the
OAIG Inspections staff was transferred to OAIG Auditing and many employees were
downgraded but were afforded the grade and pay retention features according to Title 5, United
States Code.
It is a matter of conjecture as to why OAIG Inspections was absorbed by OAIG Auditing. Some
reasons for this reorganization, gleaned from personal interviews with various employees, and
historical research are:
1. The 477-space reduction was the driving force.
2. The reports from OAIG Inspections were not timely (i.e., 12-18 months to complete).
3. There existed an unhealthy competition between OAIG Inspections and OAIG
Auditing as to which office would be assigned specific audits.
4. An adversarial relationship existed between the different AIG's.
5. The OAIG Inspections had morale and leadership problems that affected the
efficiency and direction of the office.
6. Although OAIG Inspections did initially conduct an overall assessment (sometimes
called a general inspection) of inspected agencies, it gradually drifted towards
functional or specific inspections that were narrow in scope. The methodology of
OAIG Inspections was approaching that of OAIG Auditing but without the
requirement for extensive confirming back up data. As one senior OIG DoD
executive stated, " we did not have the luxury to conduct general inspections" and [It
is] "Bureaucracy at [its] worst to create an Inspections Division".

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DoD IG FOIA 42

 7. OAIG Inspections lacked the dollar or high value impact as is often displayed in
OAIG Auditing reports. Or simply stated, OIG DoD did not get sufficient "bang-forthe-buck". Leadership was more concerned with a dollar assessment than the overall
efficiency of a specific command or agency.
New OAIG Inspections
As stated earlier, the OAIG Inspections was terminated for a variety of reasons. Unfortunately,
the rationale, in some cases, was personality driven and devoid of organizational logic.
Numerous one-on-one interviews were conducted with former OAIG Inspections personnel and
extensive research was conducted on the former inspections process. In addition, the current
OIG DoD mission and organization were analyzed and other federal department OIG
organizations were researched and some visited. Considering the above, the Assessment Team
recommends that the OAIG Inspections be reestablished. Except for a general overall
inspection of relatively small DoD agencies, the OAIG Inspections could conduct functional or
special assessments, and could provide the nucleus of the OIG DoD's rapid response team for
urgent situations. The team could also provide an "eyes and ears" overall assessment of some
DoD agencies. Some of these assessments could be done on a confidential basis to assist the
requesting agency supervisor. A framework for the organization is explained below.
When activated, OAIG Inspections could be staffed with approximately 50 personnel. Twentyfive spaces could be military officers who would be transferred from within the current OIG
DoD organization. These officers will provide the necessary functional area expertise required
when inspecting or evaluating a specific agency. If required, these military subject area experts
could augment the OAIG Auditing for a specific audit. On the civilian side, 25 spaces could be
transferred from OAIG Auditing with the majority of these personnel being Management and
Program Analyst Series, GS-343. They will analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of
government programs and operations, management's productivity, and efficiency of DoD
agencies.
Since some evaluators/inspectors must possess specialized subject matter knowledge and skills,
those positions could be under the Miscellaneous Administration and Program Series, GS-301.
Additional specialized personnel could be Computer Specialist Series, GS-334, Industrial
Engineering Series, GS-896, and Operations Research Series, GS-1515.
The above listed personnel actions are only an initial lay down of some required civilian skills.
As an OAIG Inspections experience curve is acquired, then additional civilian skills may be
added. Regardless of the initia1 and ultimate organizational size of the OAIG Inspections, the
required civilian personnel assets should be transferred from OAIG Auditing.
Quality Standards for Inspections
In March 1993, the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) published "Quality
Standards for Inspections". These standards were published because many Departmental
Inspectors General were utilizing inspections to effectively review and improve Department or

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DoD IG FOIA 43

 Agency operations. At present, 8 of the 14 Departments have an inspections organizational
entity. Although the PCIE standards were advisory, application of the standards was
encouraged.
The publication defines an "inspection process as other than an audit or an investigation, that is
aimed at evaluating, reviewing, studying, and/or analyzing the programs and activities of a
Department or Agency for the purposes of providing information to managers for decision
making, for making recommendations for improvement to programs, policies or procedures, and
for administrative actions." In a climate of reduced personnel resources, it is incumbent upon the
IG DoD to provide greater coverage with fewer resources. A viable inspections capability will
provide the OIG DoD with the quick response inspections/evaluations capability that is
sometimes required.
Following are highlights of the PCIE standards for inspections:
-Inspectors must be free from impairments (i.e., personal and external).
-Inspectors must exercise due care in conducting and writing inspections reports.
-Proper supervision must be exercised from start of inspection to report finalization.
-Personnel must coordinate, research, and design inspections to achieve objectives.
-Information and data obtained should be consistent with inspection objectives.
-Evidence supporting inspection conclusions should be competent and relevant.
-Relevant and supporting information must be retained.
-Significant information must be delivered to appropriate personne1 in a timely manner.
-Illegal acts must be promptly reported to appropriate authorities.
-Personnel must conduct appropriate follow-up actions.
The above listed standards are excellent guiding principles for the OAIG Inspections and will
provide the foundation for a reestablished inspections capability.
Inspections Organization — Past and Present
Upon the demise of the OIG DoD inspections capability in 1995, the organizational structure
was as indicated on the following page:

44
DoD IG FOIA 44

 Inspector
Gran era]

Deputy
inspector

forInspecti

M

Genral

Assistant Inspector
G en.

anagram en t System s
Office

0 aerations

Inspection
Plans, Policy &
Analysis

Inspections

Program
Evaluation

This was a robust office of over 150 personnel with a full range of individual organizational
entities. For a new startup OAIG Inspections, there should be a minimal administrative support
staff. The preponderance of personnel should be devoted to assisting, teaching, evaluating and
inspecting. There should also be some small planning and follow-up capabilities. Consistent
with this rationale, indicated below is a proposed OAIG Inspections Organization:
Assistant Inspector General
For Inspections
Administration

Planning and
Follow-up

Operations

Management Information Systems
(MIS)

All personnel assigned to this reestablished OAIG Inspections should be required to attend an IG
school if the personnel haven't previously done so. At a minimum, they should all be given
some inspections refresher training.
Inspection Methodology

The newly formed OAIG Inspections should use the functional/systemic approach to address
causes rather than symptoms, refine or correct policy guidance, and detect fraud, waste and MIS
management. The emphasis should be placed on correcting the problems. Initially a
functional/systemic inspection concept must be developed to determine how OAIG Inspections
will conduct their business. Their concept should include the initial survey phase, pre-site
survey, finalization of inspection plan, site visits, and report writing. The development of this
inspections concept could be either fleshed out with a small OAIG Inspections task force or be
assigned as a task to the follow-on Assessment Team.
Recommendations

I. Reestablish the OAIG Inspections.

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DoD IG FOIA 45

 2. Organize initially with 50 personnel from current OIG DoD assets. Transfer 25 civilians
from OAIG Auditing and 25 military from throughout the OIG DoD.
3. Organize with minimal administrative staff with MIS and follow-up capabilities.
4. Develop an inspection methodology.
5. Send OAIG Inspections personnel to an appropriate service IG school.
Subject: Quality of Life in OIG DOD
Summary
People live where they work. The quality of life in their office is the sum of many different
programs, processes and conditions such as: cohesiveness, awards and recognition, meaningfu1
work, working conditions, office pride, employee empowerment, training and education,
grievance system, promotion opportunity, flexible working hours, dress code, office furnishings,
leadership and command environment. The quality of life areas of training and education,
leadership, promotion opportunity and command environment are so important that they have
been addressed in detail elsewhere in this report. OIG DoD needs to finish the enhancement of
office spaces. The Telework Program is popular, useful, and should be fairly applied. Changes
to the Cash Award Guidance should reflect an attempt to broaden the distribution of monetary
rewards for performance.
Commendable Quality of Life Programs
Interviews with numerous OIG DoD employees revealed that the Voluntary Leave Transfer
Program, Business Casual Attire Program and the Alternative Work Schedules Program were
greatly appreciated by the workforce. The implementation of these programs significantly
enhanced the quality of life of the OIG DoD employees. (See Finding 5-008)
The Voluntary Leave Transfer Program permits an employee to transfer unused, accrued leave to
another employee who needs such leave because of a medical emergency. This program is
extremely helpful to an employee whose medical condition may result in a prolonged absence
from the workforce, which could result in a substantia1 loss of income because of the
unavailability of paid leave.
The Business Casual Attire Program is a morale booster for many OIG DoD employees. This
program permits employees to wear casual clothing to work when the employee's schedule does
not require customary professional attire.
The Alternative Work Schedules Program is a widely acclaimed program, which not only allows
employees more flexibility in scheduling their personal activities but also allows them more
control in balancing work and family responsibilities.
Telework Program
The Telework Program is another exceptional employee oriented program in which an employee
performs official assigned duties at an alternative worksite on either a regular and recurring
basis, or on an ad-hoc basis. Ad-hoc telework refers to telework performed less than one day per
bi-weekly pay period or on an occasional, one-time, or irregular basis. Regular and recurring

46
DoD IG FOIA 46

 telework refers to an approved work schedule where eligible employees regularly work at 1east
one day per biweekly pay period at an alternative worksite. The OIG DoD recognizes
circumstances where it is mutually beneficial for employees to perform work at sites other than
the traditional office or at 1ocations other than where typical field or headquarters work is
performed. Employees and their supervisors may make telework arrangements for purposes of
promoting the efficiency of the Government and fostering a family-friendly OIG DoD. Section
359 of Public Law No. 106-346 requires executive agencies to establish policies under which
eligible employees may participate in teleworking to the maximum extent possible, without
diminished employee performance. The law also requires agencies to allow 25% of their eligible
workforce to telework in FY 2001, and an additional 25% in each of the three subsequent fiscal
years. Through the commendable efforts of Mr. Napoleon Walker, the Assistant OIG DoD
Telework Program Coordinator, the OIG DoD has met the public Iaw requirements. Inspection
revealed that 188 OIG DoD employees are currently eligible to telework. Of this number 108
and 80 employees were eligible for ad-hoc and regular and recurring telework respectively.
Only twelve OAIG Auditing employees have been identified as eligible for the Telework
Program. This represents 6.3% of the total number of eligible teleworkers. The OAIG Auditing
has not complied with the spirit and intent of the Inspector General Regulation 1400.620
pertaining to the OIG DoD Telework Program. The leadership did not actively promote the
program. Discussions with responsible personnel indicate that the audit leadership had stated that
auditors would be considered only for ad-hoc teleworking. Employees in other job series are
considered for both ad-hoc and a regular and recurring telework. This approach to the
teleworking program will not reach the Telework Program goals. (See Finding 2-003)
Working Conditions
The recently conducted OIG DoD Employee Survey indicated employee concern about their
working conditions. The following comments were taken from the survey:
1. "My work area/space is not quiet and conducive to efficiently and effectively perform my
duties,"
2. "Need for high speed internet connections between field duties and headquarters."
3. "Getting new furniture – modular – would improve morale."
4. "Shower facilities would greatly enhance the workplace."
5. "Our office space is open and distracting."
6. "Some work areas are crowded, cluttered and sometimes noisy."
7. "We have been constantly behind in providing adequate work space, information
technology equipment and furniture to employees."
Personal interviews and numerous seminars with OIG DoD employees also revealed
considerable concern with the headquarters facilities and in some cases field offices working
conditions. Inspection of the Office of Departmental Inquiries revealed that the investigators
lacked the required privacy to carry out their sensitive investigative duties. Similar working
conditions existed in other headquarters working areas.
The Space Management Branch, Office of the Director of Administration and Information
Management developed an upscale Systems Furniture Project. This innovative project was
researched, developed and implemented by the OIG DoD's Space Management Planning Group

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DoD IG FOIA 47

 The planning group developed the concept, researched
headed by 
furniture options and configurations and planned for the systems furniture implementation. The
Systems Furniture Project was developed not only for the OIG DoD headquarters building but
also for all OIG DoD field offices. The project involved renovations, construction and office
space reconfiguration to a space-efficient modular concept. The new individual modular office
space design is outstanding as it features a flexible workspace configuration, storage tower for
personal items and clothing and a one-touch storage bin for each employee. The project also
featured teaming areas (conference space) to facilitate collective work projects. (See Finding 5001)
A review of the OIG DoD's efforts in implementing a facilities and furniture improvement
program revealed that throughout the 1990's there was little command support for this facilities
improvement project because leadership was reluctant to request required funding. As a result
OIG DoD is eight to ten years behind other local governmental agencies in developing and
implementing a facilities and furniture improvement program. Recent command attention
resulted in the Senior Management Group's (SMG) approval of a Systems Furniture Project in
the Fall of 2000. Five systems furniture projects in the OIG DoD headquarters have been
completed; a sixth project is due to start in the June/July 2002. The latter project is not fully
funded. As of 8 May 2002, $2,247,524 has been spent on the OIG DoD headquarters for this
project. The project is 25% complete. The estimated cost to complete the Systems Furniture
Project is $7,452,524. In the past, the Systems Furniture Project has not received upfrontprogrammed monies and is not being funded in the core FY04-FY09 Program Budget. This
project has been an unfinanced requirement from the start and has been funded with
reprogrammed dollars made available from excess Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds.
The continued use of reprogrammed monies for the Systems Furniture Project inhibits the
efficient implementation of the project and affects other claimants for scarce funds. This
Systems Furniture Project should be funded in the core OIG DoD program budget.
Employee Empowerment
The 1G DoD has established an Employee Council to provide a forum where all employee issues
and concerns can be raised and addressed. "The primary purpose of the Employee Council is to
help provide a working environment where employees freely contribute their ideas, concerns,
and professional advice in support of the OIG community." There are thirteen council members
selected for a one-year term from all OIG DoD components including field offices. The council
meets on a monthly basis. Council minutes are prepared and forwarded to the IG DoD or his
representative. These minutes are also distributed to all OIG DoD components. Discussions with
council members including the council Chairperson reveal that the Employee Council has made
significant contributions to the quality of life of OIG DoD employees. Specifically, the council
was a driving force for the adoption of the Telework Program and the Business Casual Attire
Program. The council also established the Annua1 Employee Week Program that features
instruction and seminars on topics of interest to all employees. It is imperative that the 1G DoD
not only review the councils issues and recommendations but also provide his personal guidance,
direction and thoughts to the council members.
The OAIG Auditing has established several internal employee councils including a Joint
Council, GS 5-12 Employee Council, GS-13 Employee Council and a GM-14 Advisory Council.

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DoD IG FOIA 48

 The Joint Council's primary purpose is to address concerns and issues that may affect all OAIG
Auditing employees. One of the purposes of the Joint Council is to "enhance the employee's
working conditions and environment." The GS-5 through GS-12 and GS-13 Employee Councils
provide employees "the opportunity to participate in the management of the OAIG Auditing."
The GM-14 Advisory Counci1 mission is to "provide advice to the AIG-Auditing concerning the
establishment, implementation, and revision of OAIG-Auditing policies, procedures, and
practices." All of these councils provide members of the OAIG Auditing with the opportunity to
present issues, ideas and concern to the OAIG Auditing leadership.
Awards and Recognition
The OIG DoD had devoted considerable time and effort in developing a comprehensive awards
and recognition program. The OIG DoD awards include Performance Awards, Quality Step
Increases (QSI) within grade increases, Time Off Awards and Honorary Awards. A QSI consists
of an additional within grade pay increase for an employee, given in recognition of "outstanding"
performance. Only employees with a current "outstanding" rating are eligible for a QSI. An
employee may receive only one QSI within a 52-week period. QSI within each OAIG shall be
limited to no more than five percent of the total non-SES work force on board as of October 1 of
the current fiscal year. Since a QSI can be given to only five percent of the non-SES workforce
each year, extreme care must be taken in the selection of QSI recipients. The Office of the
Director for Administration and Information Management for example, may grant QSI's to only
five employees during the fiscal year based upon a non-SES end strength of 101 personnel. With
such a limited number of QSI recipients it behooves the OIG DoD leadership to select only
outstanding employees whose performance clearly indicates a higher quality performance than is
normally found in the job position. Yearly repetitive QSI rewards for the same employee are not
in the best interest of the OIG. To permit more deserving people to receive this scarce award, the
"OIG Cash Awards Guidance" memorandum should be amended to reflect that an employee
may receive only one QSI within a 104-week period. In addition the memorandum should state
that employees promoted or appointed during the appraisal period are not eligible for a QSI.
These amendments are not only in the best interest of the OIG DoD but also will enable
additional high performing employees to receive this much sought after recognition. (See
Finding 5-005)
A performance award consists of a monetary award, given in recognition of high-level
performance during the performance approval period. Inspections revealed that additional
funding for performance cash awards could significantly enhance the ability of the OIG DoD
leadership to reward deserving employees (See Finding 5-004). IG DoD Memorandum entitled
"OIG Cash Awards Guidance" dated 17 March 1994, states that total cash awards (including
special act or service awards) dollars within each OAIG for non-SES employees shall not exceed
1.25 percent of the aggregate base salaries of those employees on board as of October 1 of the
current fiscal year. Reflecting this guidance, $864,000 for 1,193 GS personnel was targeted for
FY 2001 GS awards. This represents a potentia1 cash award of $724.22 per GS employee
assuming all are rated at least "fully successful". Subordinate OIG DoD organizations have their
own formulas to provide cash awards for deserving GS personnel. For example, the
Administration and Logistics Services Directorate, OAIM had elected to provide their
supervisory personne1 I.5% of their $389,184 base salary target and to provide their nonsupervisory personnel 1.1% of their $389,184 salary base. This represents an average cash

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DoD IG FOIA 49

 award of $972.96 for supervisory employees and only $194.60 for the larger number of nonsupervisory employees. Interviews with the responsible OAIM personnel reveal that there are
insufficient award funds to reward many deserving employees. Alternate methods to award
employees for performance such as Time Off Awards and Honorary Awards are used to
complement cash performance awards. There is a need to revise "OIG Cash Awards Guidance"
to reflect that total cash dollars for non-SES employees shall not exceed 2.5% of the aggregate
base salaries of those employees on board as of October 1 of the current fiscal year, and to
separate targets for supervisory and non-supervisory personnel (that cannot be intermingled).
Further, only one type of monetary recognition should be approved for performance during an
appraisal period. These changes will allow a greater number of deserving GS employees to
receive monetary recognition for their work. (See Finding 5-004)
The OIG DoD has established an Honorary Awards Program to supplement cash performance
awards, Time Off Awards and QSI programs. The Honorary Awards program is designed to
"recognize and reward GIG DoD employees individually or in groups, appropriately, promptly,
and on the basis of merit for their contributions or other personal efforts that exceed normal
expectations or standards that result in improved productivity and efficiency of operations". OIG
DoD Honorary Awards include:
1. Distinguished Civilian Service Award
2. Superior Civilian Service Award
3. Meritorious Civilian Service Award
4. Inspector General, DoD Award
S. Annual Inspector General, DoD Specia1 Achievement Award for Management
Excellence
6. Annual Inspector General, DoD Creative Achievements Award
In addition to OIG DoD Honorary Awards, there are numerous component unique awards given
to deserving employees in OAIG Auditing, OAIG Investigations, Administration and
Information Management Directorate, Departmental Inquiries and Intelligence Review. OAIG
Auditing in particular has a comprehensive awards program that awards deserving personnel on
a quarterly and yearly basis as well as team oriented awards.
The recently conducted GIG DoD Employee Survey reflected the positive attitude the OIG DoD
employees have towards their awards and recognition programs. When asked the question
"when awards and recognition are given in my workgroup they go to the people who earned
them", 66% of the employees who expressed an opinion agreed with this statement.

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DoD IG FOIA 50

 Recommendations
1. OIG DoD should provide funds for the Systems Furniture Project in the core OIG
DoD budget program.
OAIG Auditing should review immediately their Telework Program and adhere to the
clear guidelines set forth in the Inspector General Regulation 1400.620.
3. The IG DoD participate actively and interact with the OIG DoD Employee Council.
4. The "OIG Cash Awards Guidance" be amended to reflect that an employee may
receive only one QSI within a 104-week period.
5. Employees promoted or appointed during the approval period should not be eligible
for a QSI.
6. "OIG Cash Awards Guidance" should be revised to reflect that total cash dollars for
non-SES employees shall not exceed 2.5% of the aggregate base salaries.

Subject: Funding of the OIG DoD
Summary
The inadequacy of the OIG DoD budget is apparent throughout the organization and is the result
of a flat budget and increasing mission requirements. Based upon interviews with 316 employees
and the results of 34 seminars attended by 327 employees of the OIG DoD, and the results of the
OIG Employee Survey, it is clearly a source of employee frustration with their jobs, it impacts
morale, and it affects their view of the efficiency of senior management.
Discussion
Personnel full-time equivalent (FTE) workyears were reduced 25% over 5 years beginning in FY
I 995,and the budget was reduced about 12%. Since FY 1999, the agency budget has essentially
been flat with a small 5% increase (presumably for inflation) in FY 2001 (Source: OIG DoD
Senior Officials Briefing).
The severe workyear reductions were not allocated evenly among the OIG DoD components.
The OAIG Inspections capability was totally eliminated and its residual personnel were
incorporated into the OAIG Audit. At the same time the OAIG Audit budget to support its
reduced manyears was reduced by approximately 33% expressed in terms of constant dollars.
While those reductions were taking place, additional unprogrammed workloads were imposed.
These included many new audit requirements, such as Y2K, imposed by the Congress. Many of
these are recurring, to include Export Controls, Chief Financial Officers Act, Payment of D. C.
Water and Sewer Bills, Compliance With Federa1 Voting Assistance Act, Undefinitized
Contractual Actions, and others. In addition, as this assessment is being written, there are more
than 15 additional one-time reporting requirements imposed by Senators and Congressmen.
These are inevitable as the Congress pursues its responsibilities and the OIG DoD should be in a

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DoD IG FOIA 51

 proactive budget mode to ensure adequate funding for the increasing number of mandatory
audits.
The OAIG Investigations workyears were reduced approximately 10%. That initially left
adequate workyears to accomplish the statutory mission with some adjustment, but left
insufficient funds for timely replacement and upgrade of equipment and software. In particular,
keeping up with new advances in technology that would make an agent's job easier and save
time for both the agent and the headquarters is essential. Computer connectivity between the
field agents and the OAIG Investigations is an example of how productivity is hampered by the
lack of budget support. Presently, agents transmit their Investigative Data System updates and
reports by modem. As an aside, telecommuters of every OIG DoD component will face the same
connectivity problem if this is not solved. A similar problem exists for the Oracle Discover data
that agents must save in Excel spreadsheets in the field. That conversion must be made because
Oracle Discover is not on agent computers in the field. Funds to license additional copies of
Discover would solve part of the problem and, again, funds for broadband connections would
solve much of the rest of the problem. Broadband connections are also essentia1 for timely
backup of files to secure offsite locations to ensure continuity of operations in the event of a
natural or other disaster. OAIG Investigations now has manpower issues as well. As previously
mentioned, the initial 10% reduction in workyears was accommodated with minor adjustments.
Since that time there has been a large growth in OIG DoD participation on Joint Task Forces and
other investigative activities. Computer intrusion investigations and the requirements to recover
evidence from computers have greatly increased since 1995 and is likely to increase in the future.
Additionally, as a result of the 11 September 2001, OAIG Investigations is participating in
approximately 40 counterterrorism task forces with an unresourced investment of approximately
32 FTE workyears.
Budget reductions in other OIG DoD activities amounted to approximately 33%. This caused a
number of essential services to be combined, reduced, or eliminated. Slices of capability in terms
of funded manpower positions were removed from the Administration and Information
Management Directorate, while its discretionary requirements for funds for maintenance,
training, replacement equipment, etc. were reduced or removed from the budgets. This led to
large unfunded requirements (e.g. the renovation and furniture program, criminal investigation
operational travel and permanent change of station fund shortfalls, shortfalls of funds for
technical equipment, shortfall in information technology support, and a shortfall in training
funds).
An additional effect of the shortage of funds is its impact upon the ability of the OIG DoD
leadership to reward deserving employees by means of its Performance/Cash Awards Program.
Additional funds for this recognition and incentive program would be useful.
From the above discussion one must conclude that, while the OIG was able to initially absorb the
mandated 25% reduction of personnel workyears and still accomplish its mission, it did so by
eliminating and combining functions, and removing the flexibility to rapidly respond to new
taskings and unforeseen events. Equally disruptive to the organization, the reductions caused it to
mortgage its future by deferring essential expenditures for maintenance of personnel (training),

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DoD IG FOIA 52

 equipment (technical equipment and information technology support), and working conditions
(the renovation and furniture program). (Finding: 5-002)
The flat budget will no longer permit the OIG to continue to perform its statutory mission with
the degree of responsiveness and professionalism that the IG, SECDEF, and Congress have come
to expect and rely upon. An increased budget request and justification are essential. For the
remainder of FY 2002, other, separate, sources of funds should be pursued. For example,
counterterrorism funds may be available to pay an offset for the number of agents dedicated to
Joint Counterterrorism Task Forces. They may also be a source of appropriate travel and
temporary duty funds.
Budget solutions should be sought promptly. It is essential to both the OIG and the people within
it.
Recommendations
1) Develop a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission that realistically reflects the
OIG DoD requirements.
2) Develop a solid rationale for funding requirements e.g. ; counterterrorism, congressional
tasking, facility modernization/quality of 1ife, etc..
3) Seek alternative sources of funds; counterterrorism, other.
4) Examine programs for opportunity to save money; training reorganization, possible
elimination of the auditor recruitment bonus, deferral of unneeded software upgrades to help
pay for essential upgrades, etc..

Subject: Promotions in OAIG Auditing
Summary
There is no more sensitive subject among the rank and file of OIG DoD people. They rightfully
demand that the promotion process be fair and visible; the process in OAIG Auditing is
perceived as neither. Promotion interview panels in OAIG Auditing produce an order of merit of
all those eligible for promotion to GS-13 and 14. The OIG Auditing leadership then selects from
the order of merit list those to promote to fill the vacancies. At this point the selection process
becomes opaque. The results do not necessarily reflect the order of merit. Deep selects are
common, and those higher on the list are passed over. Either the announced process should be
officially changed, or the OAIG Auditing leadership must be disciplined to follow the merit
selection.
Discussion
Inspector General Regulation 1404.I, Merit Placement and Promotion Plan establishes policies,
practices, procedures and responsibilities for accomplishing promotion and placement actions in
accordance with merit system principles. This regulation states: "Promotions and placement
actions wil1 be based strictly on merit factors and not on personal relationships, favoritism or
patronage." Managers and supervisors are tasked to assure that employees referred for
promotion or placement receive ful1 and impartial consideration. Promotion candidates must

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DoD IG FOIA 53

 meet the "basic qualification determination". This determination is based primarily upon timein-grade considerations and the applicant's current performance appraisal.
The OAIG Auditing promotion process for GS-13 and GS-14 candidates commences when the
certificate of eligibles and associated resumes are forwarded to the auditing selection official, the
AIG Auditing. OAIG Auditing has appointed an Interview Panel to interview and evaluate all
candidates for promotion. The Interview Panel membership normally includes four or more
personnel from OAIG Auditing. These personnel include the deputies from the four audit
directorates (Acquisition Management, Contract Management, Readiness and Logistical Support
and Finance and Accounting) and one GS-15 member from Audit Follow-up and Technical
Support Directorate and ODAIG for Audit Policy and Oversight. The policies and procedures
for the Interview Panel are set forth in the Interview Panel Guidance document. This
comprehensive document clearly establishes guidelines for candidate interviews, questioning,
confidentiality and candidate ratings. The Interview Panel Guidance specifically states: "Each
candidate will be given a single rating based upon the Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA's)
demonstrated during the interview."
At the completion of each individual's interview, the selection panel discusses the overall
interview performance of the candidate and his/her qualifications for the job. The panel then
rates the candidate on a five level scale:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Superior (A)
Very Good (A-)
Above Average (B)
Average (C)
Minimal (C-)

It should be pointed out that the Interview Panel uses various versions from this scale especially
when larger numbers of candidates are involved.
The Interview Panel has information such as the last annual appraisal, rotational assignments,
certifications and awards information to assist them in their evaluations. Inspection revealed that
the Interview Panel process is done to an acceptable standard and provides the OAIG Auditing
leadership with a ranking of the best-qualified candidates for promotion. The weak link in the
OAIG Auditing GS-13 and GS-14 promotion process occurs when the auditing leadership selects
the candidates to be promoted from the Interview Panel recommended list.
A review of the OAIG Auditing Interview Panel for promotion to GS-14 conducted during
January 2002 revealed that 44 candidates were interviewed. The 44 candidates were rated in 7
categories, A-5, A-4, A-3, A-2, A-I, A and B with A-5 being the top rating and B the lowest
rating. The candidate-rating and selection breakdown is as follows:
Candidate Ratings 
A-5 Rating —1 
A-4 Rating — 5 
A-3 Rating — 3 

Selected for promotion to GS-14
1
2
2

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DoD IG FOIA 54

 A-2 Rating – 5
A-I Rating – 4
A Rating – 4

2
1
0

B Rating — 22

0

Totals 

8

44

The OAIG Auditing Interview Panel recommended GS-14 promotion list was forwarded to the
selecting official, the AIG Auditing, for selection action. The AIG Auditing promoted the top
rated A-5 candidate and two of the five A-4 rated candidates, two of the A-3 rated candidates,
two of the A-2 rated candidates and one A-I rated candidate. It should be noted that three of the
top six Interview Panel recommended candidates were not selected. These three outstanding
candidates had ten, fifteen and sixteen years of OIG DoD experience respectively. At least eight
higher rated candidates were bypassed to promote the one A-I rated candidate who had only five
years of OIG DoD experience. Several interview pane1 members were discouraged by the nonselection of so many highly qualified candidates. One interview panel member viewed the
selection of less qualified candidates for promotion to be "outrageous" and a disservice to the
OIG DoD.
A review of the OAIG Auditing Interview Panel for promotions to GS-14 conducted during June
2001 also indicated a questionable selection process by the AIG Auditing. There were thirtynine candidates evaluated by the Interview Panel. These candidates were rated A+, A-, A, and B
with A+ being the top rating and B the lowest rating. The candidates rating and selection
breakdown is as follows:
Candidate Ratings 
A+ Rating – 4 
A Rating –12 
A- Rating – 10 
B Rating – 13 

Selected for promotion to GS-14
3
0
1
0

The AIG Auditing promoted three out of the four top rated (A+) candidates, none of the next
most qualified (A) rated candidates and one (A-) rated candidate. It should be noted that one
(A+) rated candidate departed the OIG DoD organization prior to the GS-14 selection
announcement. At least twelve higher rated candidates were bypassed to promote one of the ten
rated (A-) candidates. Some of the more qualified candidates who were bypassed on this
promotion list were also bypassed on the January 2002 GS-14 promotion list. The promotion of
less qualified and deserving auditors who were ranked far down the Interview Panel's
recommended 1ist has fueled the fires of favoritism and cronyism in the selection process and
brings discredit upon the auditing leadership.
Personal interviews, employee seminars and the OIG Employee Survey clearly indicates a wide
spread dissatisfaction with the OIG DoD promotion system. There is a strong perception that
promotions are based upon favoritism, personal relationships and the "old boy network"
especially in the OAIG Auditing area. 287 out of 504 employees (56.9%) who expressed a
survey opinion responded that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement,
"Supervisors and intermediate 1eaders are selected based on WHAT they know rather than

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DoD IG FOIA 55

 WHOM they know". Many employees believed that numerous deserving candidates had been
passed over for promotion. The perception of favoritism in the promotion process is a major
contributor to the lack of trust and respect many employees have for their 1eaders and managers,
especially in OAIG Auditing.
Inspection of the OAIG Auditing promotions process clearly indicates that promotions are not
always accomplished in accordance with merit system principles. There is merit to the generally
held perception that some audit promotions are based on favoritism and personal relationships.
Although Inspector General Regulation 1404.I gives the selecting officer the right to select any
candidate referred on OIG DoD Form 5, it does not imply that the selecting official should
disregard the recommendation of the Interview Panel and the merit systems principles, and select
obviously less qualified candidates for promotion. The GS-13 and GS-14 promotion process in
the OAIG Auditing is questionable and has caused numerous deserving auditors to be denied
their rightful promotions. Immediate steps should be taken to correct this situation.
Recommendations
1. Temporarily withdraw GS-13 and GS-14 promotion selection authority from the AIG
Auditing until the IG DoD is assured that all future promotions are based solely on merit factors.
2. Update Inspector General Regulation 1404.I, Merit Placement and Promotion Plan to reflect
definitive guidance on the use of the Interview Panels/Selection Panels by subordinate OIG DoD
organizations.
3. Give special consideration to the three passed over highly rated (A-4) candidates on the
January 2002 Interview Panel Competitive List when the next OAIG Auditing GS-14 Interview
Panel convenes.

Subject: Attitude Towards Whistleblowers
Summary
The culture of the OIG DoD has been, and continues to be, hostile to internal whistleblowers.
All too often, OIG employees who have endeavored to identify mismanagement or violations of
law have been punished by their chain of command. At the same time, the underlying issue has
gone ignored. These incidents have had a chilling effect on good faith dissent that continues to
impair free and open discussions between the staff and management. This result is both ironic
and lamentable for an agency created to cultivate and safeguard whistleblowers. The
Assessment Team also found minimal evidence that the OIG DoD has played a substantial role
in protecting external whistleblowers in civilian DoD jobs, in uniform, or in the employ of
military contractors. As a result, festering waste, fraud and abuse within civilian and military
DoD components may be placing lives and taxpayer dollars at risk.
Discussion
A variety of federal statutes and DoD Directives provide legal protection for civilian and military
whistleblowers. Civil service employees within the DoD, including the 0IG, who make
protected disclosures are protected under the terms of 5 U.S.C. Section 2302(b)(8) and may seek
legal relief using procedures involving the Office of Special Counsel and Merit Systems

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DoD IG FOIA 56

 Protection Board. See 5 U.S.C. Sections 1213, 1214, and 1221. Members of the uniformed
services are protected under the terms of 10 U.S.C. Section 1034, DoD Directive 7050.6,
"Military Whistleblower Protection," (June 23, 2000), and DoD Directive 6490.I, "Menta1
Health Evaluations of Members of the Armed Forces," (October I, 1997). Non-appropriated
fund employees within DoD are protected pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 1587 and DoD
Directive 1401.3. Defense contractor employees are protected from reprisals at 10 U.S.C. 2409.
See also Chapter 7.4 of Inspector General Guide 5106.1 (March 12, 2001). Finally, Section
Seven of the IG Act provides that the OIG DoD may receive and investigate whistleblower
complaints, and further protects such whistleblowers from reprisal. 5 U.S.C. App. III, Section 7.
The OIG DoD has been a poor example for an organization whose mission includes the
facilitating of whistleblowing on DoD-related issues involving waste, fraud and abuse. The
spring 2000 audit work paper scandal went unchecked because of a common employee
perception that it was not safe to report improper managerial conduct outside the immediate
chain of command. As one senior audit official put it, "people were not that comfortable coming
to management." Management's past practice has been to silence the messenger and ignore the
message. Past alleged reprisals included the planting of evidence designed to jeopardize security
clearances, poor performance appraisals, forgone promotions, and distasteful assignments.
The Assessment Team was struck by the substantial fear of speaking out that was prevalent
among current rank and file employees, particularly in the OAIG Auditing and the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service ("DCIS"). It became clear early on in the assessment process that
interviews could not take place at employee workstations. Instead, a secure conference room
within the HQ building and off-site meeting locations were established in order to promote a
feeling of privacy and safety for employee interviews. In many instances, employees had to be
encouraged to provide details for their concerns. They feared that those details would enable
management to identify them as the source of the allegations.
The Assessment Team also became aware of credible accounts that some managers either
encouraged their staffs not to cooperate with the Assessment Team or insisted that individual
employees debrief management on what questions were posed by the Assessment Team. Even
more disturbing were acts of retaliation by OIG DoD management against individual employees
who were perceived to be whistleblowers or otherwise assisting the Assessment Team. During
the assessment process, the Assessment Team became aware of several cases where managers
threatened individual employees with negative repercussions based on the their suspected
cooperation with the Assessment Team. Such conduct violates the letter and spirit of federa1
whistleblower protection statutes. Worse, the underlying issues pertaining to highly sensitive
security matters had been ignored for some time. Only direct intervention by the IG DoD or his
immediate staff prevented the threatened reprisal from becoming a reality.
The IG DoD should use his office as a "bully pulpit" to eradicate the culture of fear and
retaliation within the 010 DoD. The IG DoD could issue an "all hands" email or memorandum
that would establish a "zero tolerance" for whistleblower reprisal. The social good served by
whistleblowers could be set forth in terms of saved lives and taxpayer dollars. SES, GS-15, and
GS-14 managers also should be given a memorandum to sign that would acknowledge their

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DoD IG FOIA 57

 awareness of the newly stated 010 DoD policy. Violations of this policy should be grounds for
severe adverse personnel actions initiated by the IG DoD.
The OIG DoD also should develop an administrative model for resolving whistleblower reprisal
complaints on an informal basis. An informal binding arbitration process would avoid the
adverse publicity, cost and delay inherent to litigation. This approach also would provide OIG
DoD employees with an alternative to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") and
the Office of Special Counsel ("OSC"). These forums have become increasingly discredited as a
viable source of legal relief for aggrieved whistleblowers. Few whistleblowers now prevail
before the MSPB because the governing statute, the Whistleblower Protection Act, has been
steadily eroded by restrictive interpretations that make it most difficult to sustain a winning case.
The statute has been so riddled with judicial exceptions that major amendments to cure these
interpretations are currently pending in the Congress. The bills are S. Bill 995 and H.R. Bill
2588. Senators Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Carl Levin (D-Michigan) are among the lead
sponsors to the Senate version. The arbitration model could be initially tried within the OIG
DoD and then expanded for use on a DoD-wide basis.
The OIG DoD does not appear to devote significant resources towards the protection of civilian
DoD whistleblowers outside of the OIG. Although the OIG DoD Hotline takes in whistleblower
complaints regarding waste, fraud, or abuse, no policy or procedures exist for following up to
ensure that ensuing retaliation is documented, much 1ess prevented or stopped in progress. This
approach detaches the message from the messenger, and thereby discourages whistleblowing by
leaving the employee at risk after making the protected disclosure. When asked what recourse
was available to civilian DoD employees who were punished for reporting waste, fraud and
abuse, OIG DoD officials would often shrug and respond that lega1 remedies could be sought
through the MSPB and the OSC. No acknowledgement was made of the aforementioned legal
obstacles facing whistleblowers who use those forums to seek legal redress for injuries caused by
management retaliation. In short, the OIG DoD is not encouraging the intake of a valuable
source of information, whistleblower complaints, which it is authorized to investigate under
Section 7 of the IG Act of 1978 (as amended).
The Special Inquires Directorate ("SI") within the Office of Departmental Inquiries ("DI") for
the OIG DoD should assign resources to investigate allegations of civilian whistleblower
retaliation within all DoD agencies, including the OIG. The ensuing reports of investigation
could assist employees attempting to vindicate their legal rights before the MSPB and
would support personnel actions against managers who engaged in retaliation. This function
would parallel the work performed currently by DI regarding military whistleblower reprisal
cases.
The Assessment Team also found minimal evidence that the 010 DoD has successfully
protected military and DoD contractor whistleblowers or followed up to ensure that those who
engage in proscribed retaliation were held accountable. Eight OIG DoD Semiannua1 Reports to
the Congress dating back to 1996 were reviewed. Each report contained a standard section,
entitled "Administrative Investigations," that described the fact patterns underlying substantiated
whistleblower reprisal cases worked or monitored by SI. In the older reports, no mention was
made of what happened to rehabilitate the whistleblower's career or whether the perpetrator was

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DoD IG FOIA 58

 held accountable. Instead, the self-described "results of investigations" were limited to reciting
statistics pertaining to the number of opened and closed cases as well as the percent of
substantiated reprisal allegations. The text provided anecdotal accounts of select cases, but
actually had the counterproductive effect of presenting an intimidating picture of the many kinds
of retaliation used against whistleblowers. A casual reader could easily take away the lesson that
the seemingly endless list of tools of retaliation (e.g., denied promotions, letters of
admonishment and reprimand, removals from supervisory positions, improper mental health
evaluations, suspension from flight duty, downgraded evaluations, termination, and threats
thereof) described in the report make blowing the whistle an endeavor that is not worth the risk
and effort. In short, none of these older cases had a "happy ending." More recent reports have
started to include some mention of redress and accountability imposed on the retaliators. Based
on the SI briefing provided to the Assessment Team and the OIG DoD Semiannual Reports to
the Congress, the emphasis appears to remain on raw numbers rather than substantive results.
The OIG DoD Semiannual Report to the Congress should devote far more coverage to
recommendations and actions taken by the OIG DoD to protect all types of whistleblowers and
hold those who retaliate accountable for their actions. These accounts should be as detailed as
possible, consistent with constraints of privacy law. Recommended steps to rehabilitate the
whistleblower and punish the officials responsible for reprisal should be articulated.
The SI sponsored seminar that trains employees of the military service IG's to investigate
whistleblower reprisa1 cases also needs reform in its curriculum and presentation. (See
Assessment A-015)
Finally, the "bully pulpit" approach regarding "zero tolerance" for whistleblower reprisal should
then be taken outside of the OIG DoD and extended to the civilian DoD agencies and military
services using a "teach and train" methodology. The IG DoD should start by sending memoranda
to these audiences in his capacity as "an extension of the eyes, ears, and conscience of the
Commander" and his role as teacher and trainer. The purpose would be to underscore how
important this issue is to the current IG DoD, based on Constitutional rights (i.e. First
Amendment right of free speech) and governing federal statutes.
Recommendations
1.
The IG DoD should issue "all hands" communications to the OIG DoD, all DoD
agencies, and military services that set forth a "zero tolerance" policy for
whistleblower retaliation.
2.

SES, GS-15, and GS-14 managers within the OIG DoD should be required to sign a
form indicating receipt and understanding of an IG communication setting forth a
"zero tolerance" policy toward whistleblower retaliation.

3.

The OIG DoD should review whether other federal agencies, including OIG's
formally recognize and reward employees who report waste, fraud and abuse.

4.

The OIG DoD should design and implement a binding arbitration process for
resolving internal whistleblower reprisal complaints.

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DoD IG FOIA 59

 5.

The OIG DoD should expand SI jurisdiction to investigate and document allegations
of reprisal against civilian DoD employees.

6.

The OIG DoD Semiannual Report to the Congress should contain detailed
descriptions of how substantiated reprisa1 cases were resolved.

Subject: Deputy General Counsel's Office
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times." Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities

Summary
Members of the Assessment Team conducted interviews with all seven lawyers in tile Deputy
General Counsel's Office (DGC) of the OIG DoD. Additional interviews were conducted of
other personnel in the agency that elicited comments regarding the DGC.
While the attorneys in the Deputy General Counsel's Office expressed a high degree of
satisfaction with their particular jobs and their role in the larger organization, there was a
startling "disconnect" between how they felt and how their office was regarded by others in the
OIG DoD. While this disparity may be more apparent than real, the resulting antagonism
towards the DGC's Office, particularly within DCIS, represents both a rea1 challenge and a
unique opportunity for systemic change for the OIG DoD and the DGC's Office.
Discussion
The first impression made by the DGC's Office on the Assessment Team members was very
favorable. Five of the lawyers in the office were there to explain what they did at the initial
(April 22) briefing. The DGC (IG) led the briefing and handed out a 1999 job description of his
position, which does a good job of defining the office's responsibilities. In addition, an outline
of the work performed by the office (captioned "Program Review"), which captured the points
made in the briefing, was handed out to the Assessment Team.
The Team came away from the initial briefing with two strong impressions. One was the clearcut division of labor within the DGC's Office between OAIG Auditing and OAIG Investigations.
The other was the degree of comfort expressed by DGC (IG) with the current arrangement
whereby the DGC's Office is part of the DoD General Counsel's Office, while giving
independent and objective legal advise to the IG DoD. He handed out an August 16, 1985
Memorandum of Understanding between the OIG DoD and the DoD General Counsel's Office
which defines their relationship. These sentiments were reinforced by follow-up interviews with
the individua1 lawyers (Associate Deputy General Counsels). The individual lawyers confirmed
the impression of specialization that had been conveyed at the briefing.
Two Associate Deputy General Counsels work almost exclusively with the Audit/APO side of
OIG, primarily in reviewing the three hundred draft audit reports that are generated yearly. Two
other Associate Deputy General Counsels work extensively with DCIS and CIPO. Their work
consists in large part of reviewing requests for subpoenas and consensual monitoring.

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 Two additiona1 Associate Deputy General Counsels work closely with the Departmental
Inquiries Directorate; handling such matters as whistleblower protection cases, senior official
misconduct investigations, and special investigations handled by the OIG DoD.
The Associate Deputy General Counsels all echoed the DGC (IG)'s comments on the desirability
of continuing with the present dual-hatted arrangement for the DGC's Office. They shared his
view that being part of the larger DoD General Counsel's Office had a number of advantages,
not the least of which was the ability to draw on specialized knowledge in the latter office. One
area that was repeatedly pointed out to us as one that the DGC's Office had no interest in getting
up to speed on on its own was personne1 matters, which they were content to leave to "The
Building". The lawyers also repeated the DGC (IG)'s argument that being part of the DoD
General Counsel's Office gave you more clout in dealing with the service counsels.
By the same token, the DGC lawyers felt very strongly that being part of the DoD General
Counsel's Office did not affect their independence and objectivity as far as representing the IG
DoD's interests. They cited instances where they staked out positions at odds with the DoD
General Counsel's Office. They feel that the Memorandum of Understanding (which requires
them to get the IG's okay before they can make disclosures to the DoD, among other things)
serves as an adequate framework to safeguard their independence.
Along with the comfort leve1 that comes with the certainty as to what one's job duties are, the
lawyers in the DGC's Office also felt good about their workloads and their collective levels of
experience. Although the workload tends to cycle (peaking during the Tailhook scandal, for
example), they felt they had adequate staffing. Most of the lawyers seemed to have twenty years
experience or more in the legal profession and all but one had military service in various Judge
Advocate Corps, (and that individual had worked as a civilian attorney for the Army).
Outwardly, at least, the DGC's Office seemed to have good morale; to be competent,
experienced lawyers; and to have clearly defined areas of responsibility within the office.
It came as a shock then, when Assessment Team members heard comments about the OIG DoD
Deputy General Counsel's Office such as; "they're worthless", "they fight us rather than help
us", "Once it goes up to Headquarters, you're screwed!" These comments come
disproportionately from DCIS agents in the field. They expressed extreme frustration at the turn
around time on subpoenas and requests for consensual monitoring. While a certain natura1
tension between police and prosecuting attorneys may be at work in this relationship, the agents'
complaints do seem to have merit.
They complain not just of delay in terms of subpoenas and requests for consensual monitoring,
but also a hostile, questioning attitude on the part of the DGCs; e.g., "Why do you need these
particular documents?" They also gave examples of instances where the DGC's Office refused
to arrange for legal representation of a DCIS agent in critical legal proceedings like depositions.
In another instance, a DCIS agent was sued by a pro se litigant in what was clearly a claim
arising in the course and scope of his employment and yet no defense was afforded him.

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 Regarding its independence from the DoD General Counsel's Office and "The Building", the
issue with the DGC's Office is not so much whether it ever takes positions at odds with the
former but whether the former ever colors or clouds its objectivity.
Witnesses have provided us with several significant examples where the positions taken by the
DGC's Office have arguably been influenced by organizational or personal ties to "The
Building". Furthermore, the DGC's Office is an anomaly due to its hybrid nature (working for
the DoD General Counsel but reporting to the IG DoD). (All the other agencies and departments
have stand alone General Counsel offices).
Recommendations
The role of liaison between the DCIS agents in the field and the DGC's Office (to ensure the
latter's responsiveness) could be given to CIPO in its role as maker of criminal investigative
policy and performer of oversight. This could go a long way to ensuring that such breakdowns
of communications and misunderstandings do not occur.
For a variety of reasons, the Gordian Knot should be severed between the DGC (IG) and "The
Building". Creating a truly independent General Counsel's Office for the OIG DoD would
remove the perception of the former serving two masters.
Subject: OIG Employee Survey
In the course of the assessment, the team contacted approximately 643 of the 1257 employees in
OIG DoD. In order to extend our reach to a broader sample and to determine the degree of
support for the initial findings and assessments, the team developed a 28-question survey of the
OIG DoD employees. The survey was administered via the OIG DoD INTRANET with as much
protection of anonymity for the respondents as possible. The survey effort was strongly
supported by the IG DoD. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed responded, 527 made voluntary
written responses. The vast majority of responses to the survey corroborate and support the
Team's assessment, which was primarily based on face-to-face interviews, seminars, and
observations. (See Annex 1)

Minor Assessments
A-001
Subject: Security of Firearms
Although the Assessment Team avoids commenting on compliance issues, sometimes an issue
illustrates a climate within an organization that requires further amplification. The security of
government issued firearms is such a case. Department of Defense Directorate 5210.56 with
change one dated January 24, 2002 "Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DoD
Personne1 Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties" governs the carrying of firearms
by DoD personnel assigned to various DoD organizational entities. This regulation includes the
provisions that agents must follow when carrying of firearms to an agent's residence.

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 During visits to DoD Defense Criminal Investigative Services (DCIS) field elements it was
revealed that special agents were authorized to retain firearms at their home because "there is a
reasonable expectation that all agents may be called back to duty at any time." DoD Directive
5210.56 states that safety lock devices and instructions for their proper use shall be provided
with all firearms issued to DCIS special agents. However, most agents were issued a 1ock case
for home security. Some agents also had their own safe or upgraded 1ock box. When this
dichotomy of proper gun safety procedure was presented to DCIS management, one response
was that the DoD directive was "dumb" and another response was that the Assessment Team was
not reading the DoD regulation correctly. Further checking with the DoD's Directive proponent
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence) revealed that an agent's government issued firearm that was taken home was to be
secured by a 1ocking devise installed on the gun. It was further stated that no DoD component
had recommended a directive change.
The above issue reveals the climate with an organization that prides itself and is vocal about
being "the best". Visits to DCIS field elements revealed a talented, professional, and devoted
force of special agents. However, some headquarters personne1 display an attitude of being
above reproach. The issue on the firearm security could have been defused with the headquarters
personnel stating that the conflict between the DoD Directive and the DCIS would be pursued
and resolved. However, the DCIS position was clearly one of they knew the best manner of how
to secure the firearms regardless of the DoD directive. This feeling of elitism, especially in a law
enforcement agency, inherently reveals a climate that could be detrimental to an office charged
to evaluate the DoD law enforcement community.
Recommendation
OAIG Investigations should contact immediately the Office of ASD (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence) to resolve the DCIS non-compliance with DoD Directive
5210.56 as it relates to a government issued firearms security in a home.

A-002
Assessment deleted
A-003
Subject: Timely Reports
One of the central problems that surfaced during the conduct of numerous seminars and one-onone interviews is the inordinate time it takes to finalize reports — whether they are audit,
inquiries, or other types of fina1 written product. The Secretary of Defense has also questioned
why the OIG DoD reports are late.
At the auditor/investigator/team member level (i.e., those that write the reports and hereafter
referred to as writers) there is almost unanimous agreement that there are excessive word
changes for no apparent substantive reason. They complain that sometimes months will elapse
with the reports being sent back between the writer and the first supervisor level. It is not
unusual to hear writers complain that sometimes reports would be returned ten times for non-

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DoD IG FOIA 63

 substantive word changes. They see a report as a "moving target" with frequent rule changes.
Although some offices may have a correspondence book as a guide, writers complain that the
supervisors violate the standard operating procedures. Writers will admit that some supervisors
are excellent critics whose comments are readily accepted and do contribute to a more accurate
and defensible report. However, as a group, writers are frustrated that reports are not timely and
"often gather dust" as they move ponderously through the writer to signature approval process.
In some cases, writers complain that supervisors totally rewrite a report and, may at times, soften
some report conclusions to achieve a 90% concurrence metric goal.
On the other hand, supervisors complain that many writers do not possess the most rudimentary
of writing skills and it is not unusual that reports must be totally rewritten. Supervisors state that
sometimes the evidence does not justify conclusions and major rewriting/restructuring of the
report is required. A level of frustration is also apparent at the supervisory level.
Obviously, the entire report writing process requires improvement for the efficiency of OIG DoD
and job satisfaction of all employees. Quality control must remain the benchmark. In this
regard, the quality control standards are succinctly stated in a January 14, 1986 Presidents
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) report titled "Quality Standards for Federal Offices
of the Inspector General". Quoted below is an excerpt from this report:
"Each OIG should establish procedures to ensure that its appropriate units and activities maintain
adequate quality control over their work. This is an inherent responsibility of the supervisors of
the OIG component. As noted in the Maintaining Quality Assurance Standard, quality contro1
and quality assurance are not synonymous. The latter is a formal and distinct effort intended to
ensure the entire OIG, organization wide, is adhering to professional standards and the dictates of
sound management. Quality control is the process by which supervisors ensure that the work of
their immediate staff meets professional standards."
A visit to another Departmental Inspector General Office revealed an innovative approach to
improve report timeliness. Following the preparation of a readable draft report, the key
personnel in the report approval process (e.g., team chief, program directors, program managers,
and deputy IG) are assembled in a room. If required, some participants are present via
speakerphone. The report is thoroughly discussed, changes made, and the report finalized for the
IG's signature. Depending on the report complexity, this process can take from four hours to
three days. This process is formalized with key participants blocking specific hours each week
to conduct such reviews. An ancillary benefit of the review is that subordinates view this as a
participatory and 1earning process.
In order to improve report timeliness, a writing training course must be developed. The OIG
Health and Human Services has a combination of in-house instructors and academic professors
present the specific, tailored instruction. Sometimes leadership training is given concurrently.
The courses are presented throughout the year depending upon the number of new professional
employees and the need for refresher training. Another laudatory program is the Analytical
Writing Course designed by The Department of Agriculture.

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 Some federal agencies are using computer technology to do electronic report writing, publication
and distribution. OIG DoD must explore this area not only to improve report timeliness but also
to maximize monetary savings.
The efficiency of the OIG DoD is determined not only by the quality and thoroughness of its
audits, investigations, and evaluations, but also primarily by the quality and timeliness of its final
reports. Unfortunately, the final report is the most visible yardstick that is used by Congress and
other report recipients. The report must be accurate and timely.
Recommendations
I_ Since some OAIG DoD components have their own peculiar organizational setup with some
having field agencies, the AIG's should be required to develop a streamlined reports approval
process. Business as usual should not prevail. The new process should be required to improve
primarily timeliness of reports but also to permit subordinates participation.
2. A writing course should be developed (either with in-house or academic instructors) with
required attendance for new personne1 and refresher training.
3. AIG-AIM should be tasked to maximize electronic support to report writing, publication,
and distribution.

A-004
Subject: Geographical Locations of OAIG Auditing Personnel
OAIG Auditing is an integra1 part of OIG DoD. Its functions and mission are clearly defined in
the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended in 1982) and in DoD Directive 5106.1, dated
January 4, 2001. To perform its assigned mission, OAIG Auditing is organized into five major
directorates. Two of the five are Finance and Accounting Audit Directorate and Readiness and
Logistics Support Directorate. To effectively perform their assigned missions, these two
directorates have some subordinate divisions whose assigned personnel are split between the
OAIG Auditing Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia and field 1ocations. In some cases, the
Program Director (PD) is not with the majority of his personnel. In one instance the PD's
secretary is not located with her boss.
It appears that the current geographical locations of OAIG personnel are the result of the two
Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) actions, and the OIG DoD 477 space reduction in the
1996-2001 timeframe. Also impacting on this issue is the high expense to PCS OIG DoD
personnel. At present, the average PCS cost per OIG DoD employee is $45,000.
There exists solid rationale for the current locations of the OAIG Auditing field locations.
However, the personnel maiming at the field offices of the above stated directorates are
questionable. If PD's are not with the majority of his personnel, then an organization may have
increased travel costs and other attendant coordination issues. Although the electronic age has
streamlined internal office functioning and made them less cumbersome, managers need to be
with the majority of his personnel. Past organizational actions are valid reasons for explaining

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DoD IG FOIA 65

 the current structure and personne1 arrangements, but a visionary and optimum organization with
required personnel assets should be established. This study should focus on where these two
directorate's personnel should be located with particular emphasis on the Program Directors.
Once the manning decisions are made, then future personnel recruiting actions should be
conducted so that new employees are hired at the proper locations. These personnel actions
should be accomplished through the attrition process.
Recommendation
That OAIG Auditing develop an optimum organizationa1 location for personnel assigned to the
Finance and Accounting Audit Directorate and the Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate.
Future personnel recruiting actions should be conducted consistent with this document.

A-005
Subject: Junior Auditor Rotational Assignments
Chapter 7-3, Staff Development Rotational Assignments in the OAIG-AUD handbook outlines
the policies and procedures for staff development and rotational assignments for auditors. The
general policy states that:
"within the auditing profession, the skills and knowledge stressed are those of the audit method,
rather than a claim of superior knowledge of a particular technical specialty. However, applying
the audit method to diverse functional areas can pose special challenges. Therefore, it is the
policy of the OAIG-AUD that staff auditors will be given substantially diverse audit
assignments, working in a variety of environments, to foster their professional growth as
auditors."
To accomplish the objective of this policy, career auditors should have had experience in at least
two directorates before they apply for GS-13 positions." The policy goes on to state that
"Individual auditors (GS 5-12) should plan their careers so that they wil1 transfer to a different
directorate after they have been with the OAIG-AUD for at least two years, and preferably no
more than three years." This rotation policy appears to be directed solely toward making the
junior inexperienced auditor more competitive towards promotions to GS-13 and may not be in
the best interest of the junior GS-12 auditor or the OAIG-Auditing. In addition the premise that
"the skills and knowledge stressed are those of the audit method, rather than a claim of superior
knowledge of a particular technical specialty" may be fatally flawed. What this policy
encourages is the rotation of junior auditors, who have limited audit experience and little if any
technical or functional expertise to rotate to another directorate where they have no functional or
technical expertise. This premature rotation is not in the best interest of conducting timely and
efficient audits of DoD agencies. The only benefit from this premature rotation of inexperienced
junior auditors is that the junior auditor will gain experience form working with and learning
from a new Project Manager and Program Director. The premise that an auditor can effectively
and efficiently audit any functional/technical area is in question. In the Contract Management
Directorate for example, few auditors have had any hands-on contracting experience yet we
require the auditor to efficiently audit the complex contracting and procurement function.
Having contracting experts within the Contract Management Directorate would save auditor's

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DoD IG FOIA 66

 valuable time and money and would improve the quality of audit reports. This lack of
contracting expertise is magnified when after two years the junior GS-12 auditor who is just
learning how to conduct contracting audits is transferred to another directorate. Interviews with
numerous members of the auditing community reveal that program directors have to train-up
auditors to be somewhat proficient and knowledgeable in the functional area to be audited. A
need exists to have a sprinkling of qualified functional/technical expertise (e.g., engineers,
contracting and procurement, logistics, etc.) in all OAIG directorates. A need also exists to
revise the junior auditor rotation policy to allow the new auditor time to sufficiently learn one
aspect of auditing before he/she is transferred to a new directorate that requires new
functional/technical skills. This revision is not only best for the training and development of the
junior auditors but also better serves the accomplishment of DoD Auditing mission. The current
rotation policy promulgates a questionable career auditing development process at the expense of
the efficiency of the OIG DoD.
Recommendations
1. Revise the Junior Audit Rotation Policy to allow a new auditor time to sufficiently learn the
functional and technical aspects of their job prior to rotating the auditor to another directorate.
2. Ensure that each audit directorate has a sufficient number of qualified functional/technical
auditors to assist the audit teams in conducting complex audits.
A-006
Subject: Use of Metrics
Senior leaders have always used objectives to measure an organizations effectiveness. The
current measurement term is called "metrics". Unfortunately, within OIG DoD there are some
metrics used by senior leaders that have a negative connotation. For example, the OAIG
Auditing Performance Metric 1.B.3 "Recommendation Concurrence Rate" states, "Success will
be measured by management acceptance of at least 90 percent of recommendations or
management agreement to take an acceptable alternative course of action." This metric argues
against the centra1 covenant that an Inspector General must be impartial and completely
objective in their conclusions and recommendations.
Another metric centers on report or case completion time as expressed in elapsed days from
project start to final report. Employees view this metric with suspicion because it can easily be
manipulated by a "rush to the finish 1ine" by end management year. Often uncomplicated reports
are completed quickly at year's end to meet metric goals. Further impacting this issue is the
administrative actions taken within some organizations to put some artificial management
controls on project start time.
Metrics are valid management tools as an indication of an organization's effectiveness — and they
should be used. However, a close examination should be made to determine which OIG DoD
metrics are counter productive to the overal1 mission of OIG DoD. The Inspector General
standards of honesty, integrity and impartiality should be maintained and protected and should
not be compromised by some measurement of managerial success.

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 Recommendation

A thorough review should be conducted of all OIG DoD metrics to determine which are valid
and measure realistically the agencies stated objectives.
A-007
Subject: Information Release to the News Media
The OIG DoD has no assigned Public Affairs Officer at this time but does have a policy
regarding the release of OIG information of significant concern to the public. The policy requires
a review by OIG component heads as well as by the OIG Front Office before release. This policy
is being selectively ignored and releases are being made without the required review.
Department of Defense Directive Number 5230.9 dated April 1996 Subject: Clearance of DoD
Information for Public Release establishes the DoD policy for the accurate and timely release of
information being made available to the public. It also establishes the policy that all information
that applies to military matters, nationa1 security issues, or subjects of significant concern shall
be reviewed for clearance by appropriate security and public affair offices prior to release.
Paragraph 4.5 of DoD Directive 5230.9 specifically exempts the DoD IG, as an independent and
objective office, from the DoD policy review cited above. Recognizing that the DoD policy is
sound, the Inspector General has established a similar news media contact policy. Paragraphs C.
D. and F. of Inspector General Instruction 5230.1 dated 6 Dec 2001 Subject: Contact With the
News Media establishes those policies and procedures, and assigns responsibilities within the
OIG.
The OIG DoD is a large organization, distributed in almost 60 geographical locations where they
conduct operations that are often highly visible and potentially controversial. Any of these could
erupt in a flurry of publicity and requests for information. Without an identifiable single
spokesman representing the official position of the Inspector Genera1 or the organization
responses to requests for information could continue to be released, without leadership
knowledge, by any number of people in the organization who do not have complete and up-todate information. There is also a possibility that a person not trained to identify releasable
information could release information that is classified or protected by the Privacy Act. There is
a clear need for a public affairs officer on the staff to be the single point of contact for gathering
and clearing releasable information. That person would also assess potential public affairs
implications of ongoing and proposed audits and investigations, to frame and coordinate
responses to outside queries, to develop and assist in the implementation of a proactive public
affairs plan, and to assist the leadership of the OIG to communicate within the organization.

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 Recommendations
1. The 010 should obtain a Public Affairs Officer to assist the IG in the review and release
process as well as to execute the other traditional public affairs functions.
2. Modify Inspector Genera1 Instruction 5230.1 dated 6 Dec 2001 to incorporate the role of
the Public Affairs Officer in advising, assisting, and reviewing processes associated with
information release to the news media
A-008
Subject: Drug Testing Program
The current OIG DoD Drug Testing Program appears to comply with governing law. It
randomly selects employees for periodic testing. The selection methodology was recently
overhauled to ensure randomness. Employee files created pursuant to this program are
segregated and secured. Based on the program's results, employee drug use does not appear to
be a problem within the OIG DoD.
The DoD OIG drug-testing program is governed by an internal set of guidelines entitled, "Plan
For a Drug-Free Workplace." The Plan will be reissued sometime soon as it was last revised on
September 3, 1996. It implements Executive Order No. 12564 and tracks the "Mandatory
Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs" issued by HHS. The Program
Administrator also maintains a standard operating procedure for selecting OIG DoD employees
and applicants for their drug tests.
OIG DoD employees are tested for illegal drugs (amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana, opiates, and
PCP) based on the following events:
• Random Testing
The 010 DoD is obligated by DoD policy memorandum to randomly test 30% of its 1198 test
designated positions each fiscal year. Approximately 60 names are randomly selected every two
months. The procedure involves subjecting a floppy disk containing the current payroll of testdesignated positions to a random selection software program developed by the IT staff. The disk
is updated every two months to ensure accuracy. The software program has been approved by
OIG DoD auditors in the Quantitative Methods Division for its mathematical randomness.
e Reasonable Suspicion Testing
The Plan contains the standard for defining reasonable suspicion. The Program Administrator
has had only one request for a drug test from an employee's supervisor during her tenure at the
OIG DoD. The request was denied because the facts did not satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standard.

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 •

Accident and Unsafe Practice Testing

The Program Administrator has had only one such request during her tenure at the OIG DoD. It
involved a hospitalized employee who had been injured in an accident.
® Voluntary Testing
This is not an amnesty program. The Program Administrator has not had any cases of voluntary
testing.
o Follow Up Testing
This circumstance is triggered by prior positive test results.
During the Program Administrator's tenure, she has experienced several complaints from OIG
employees who were selected for multiple drug tests, sometimes on consecutive months. They
felt that the selection process was less than random. As a result of these complaints, the software
selection program was revised in Apri1 of 2002. The Program Administrator is optimistic that
the new program will sharply reduce the number of employee complaints.
A file is maintained for each employee who is selected for a random drug test. These files are
secured and are subject to a 3-year retention cycle. None of the drug test information makes its
way into official personnel files unless the employee is fired for flunking the tests.
The OIG DoD works with the Department of the Interior in contracting out the drug test sample
collection and processing. Contractors include PharmChem and NWT. The Program
Administrator also uses a temp agency that provides an administrative assistant on a three quarter
full time basis. This individual handles telephone calls and paperwork tasks.
The post-test program involves the following steps. If a drug test is positive, a medical review
officer contacts the employee for an explanation. For example, a 1egal prescription may produce
a positive result. If there is no valid explanation, then the medical review officer notifies the
Program Administrator of the positive test result. Thereafter, the Program Administrator refers
the employee to an Employee Assistance Program, notifies the employee's supervisor, contacts
OIG Security (to pull the employee's security clearance), and initiates the remova1 process.
The OIG DoD drug-testing program has produced only one positive result (out of 241 random
tests) for fisca1 year 2002.
The Employee Relations office maintains multiple sets of employee files for different subject
categories. As a result, there are stand alone filing systems for employee training records, drug
testing results, disciplinary actions, performance ratings, and official personnel files.
Recommendation

The Drug Testing Program should be reviewed in six months in order to verify that employee
complaints about randomness have subsided.

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 A-009
Subject: The Performance Audit Process
The OAIG Auditing handbook establishes the performance audit process. Section 2 describes in
detail the audit project announcement, survey and programs, the preparation and review of
working papers, and the important project verification/field work phase (commonly called the
audit phase).
The audit process begins with issuance of the announcement letter sent to the audited
organization 30 days prior to the commencement of auditing activities. This announcement letter
provides the audit objectives, initia1 locations to be visited, OIG DoD points of contacts and
audit start dates. The performance audit starts with the survey phase, which is the process for
quickly gathering information on the most significant and material areas, without detailed
verification needed to reach a decision on whether the audit should continue to the audit phase.
The survey debrief marks the end of the survey phase. The purpose of the survey debrief is to
provide sufficient information to reach a decision on whether the audit should proceed to the
audit phase and to determine the resource requirements. The survey debrief is normally
presented to the directorate head and AIG Auditing. If the leadership decides to proceed with the
audit, the audit team headed by the GS-14 Project Manager, begins the audit phase to collect,
analyze, interpret, and document the information necessary to accomplish the objectives and to
support the audit results. The OIAG-AUD Handbook states; "The information developed must
form a sound basis for the findings and recommendations and, therefore must be sufficient,
competent, and relevant." This is in keeping with the Government Auditing Standards (GAS).
The audit phase ends when the audit team presents the completion debrief (audit debrief) to the
auditing leadership. The audit debrief seeks agreement upon the audits conclusions, findings and
recommendations and the thrust and presentation of the draft report. The OAIG-AUD Handbook
directs that the audit team should use the working draft report as the primary vehicle for
presenting the audit report.
Although a working draft audit report is used for audit debrief, the audit team may make changes
in the working draft based upon instructions received during the audit debrief. Once the working
draft has been updated, the draft goes to the audit organization for verbal comment. This is
commonly called a discussion draft. Once verbal comments are received, the audit team makes
changes in the audit report if necessary. Generally, the draft report is then provided to the editor.
The editor is charged with providing advisory assistance to the audit team on matters of
grammar, sentence structure, punctuation, format clarity, convincingness and conciseness. The
draft audit report can go through the editing process numerous times until the editor certifies the
draft report in writing.
Once the draft report is edit certified, the audit team commences in earnest to complete the cross
referencing process. Chapter 3-6, OAIG-AUD Handbook "Report Referencing of Factual Data"
describes the cross-referencing process. Chapter 3-6 states; "All statements of facts must be
referenced to the supporting evidence in the working papers." Statements of fact include all
report references to physical evidence, documenting evidence, and analytical evidence.

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DoD IG FOIA 71

 Throughout the performance audit process working papers are developed and reviewed
continuously. The OAIG-AUD Handbook describes working papers as "documents, papers,
computer diskettes, and computer tapes prepared or collected by the auditor or evaluator to
document the objectives, scope, methodology and work performed to support findings, opinions,
conclusions and judgments." These working papers are essential to a viable performance
auditing process.
Once the audit team cross-references the draft report to the working papers, the cross-referenced
draft audit report with associated working papers or Team Mate access is provided to the
Independent Reference Reviewer (IRR). The IRR is tasked to compare reported factual data
with working paper supporting documents. The IRR must verify the following:
1. The statements of fact contained in the report are adequately supported by the working
papers.
2.. An approved auditing plan exists and has been cross-referenced to the working papers.
3. The working papers have evidence of supervisory review.
The IRR is also tasked to provide a list of deficiencies to the audit team. The audit team must
reconcile the deficiencies with the IRR prior to the audit report going to final approval. The IRR
must certify in writing that the audit report is factually correct. Should any significant changes
be made to an audit report after the IRR process has been completed, the program director must
insure that the IRR reviews the significant changes.
Once the IRR process has been completed, the draft audit report is signed and forwarded to the
audited organization for comments. When the comments are received from the audited
command, the comments are added to the final audit report, changes made in the audit report if
necessary and the audit teams response to the audited organization comments are added to the
audit report. The audit report changes caused by the audited organizations comments, the audit
teams response to these comments and any changes made to the audit report must then go
through the edit and Independent Reference Review process again. Once these actions are
complete the audit report is finalized and distributed as necessary.
Throughout the audit report writing process there are numerous certifications for the auditing
team to complete and have approved by various officials. The certifications are as follows:
I Edit
2. Quantitative Methods
3. The Independent Reference Review
4. Technical Quality Review (Includes Checklist)
All of these certifications are conducted on two occasions, once at the draft report stage and
again at the final report stage. In addition to these required certifications there are four optional
checklists that are normally required in the audit package submitted to management. These
checklists include:

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DoD IG FOIA 72

 I . Draft Report Start Checklist
2. Issue Draft Report Checklist
3. Final Report Start Checklist
4. Issue Final Report Checklist
The audit performance metrics are shown below:
Audit Performance Metrics:
Survey Phase
Audit Phase
Draft Report Phase
Draft Comment Phase
Final Report Phase

60 Days
100 Day
27 Days
60 Days
23 Days
270 Days

Discussions with numerous project managers, program directors, senior auditors, team leaders
and auditors reveal widespread dissatisfaction with the performance audit process, as it exists
today. The overall auditing process is seen as slow, laborious, extremely cumbersome and
highly frustrating. The initial phase of the performance audit process, planning, arranging and
conducting site visits, data collection, interviewing responsible officials, writing working papers,
analyzing data and collecting facts, forming conclusions and writing the initial version of the
draft report appear to go very well. When the auditing team, normally headed by a GS-14,
submits the initial audit report draft the process deteriorates. The problems begin with the
management review of the initial draft audit report. As the draft audit report is reviewed be each
level of management, i.e., project managers, program director, deputy director, director and on
occasion the DAIG-Auditing and AIG-Auditing, the draft audit report is subjected to numerous
and repetitive changes and revisions. This management review process often results in numerous
rewrites and sometimes results in substantive changes. Many middle level managers and
auditors reported that their audit reports were toned down, watered down, and softened up to
insure that the audited entity concurs with the findings and recommendations. These managers
and auditors cited OAIG Performance Metric 1.B.3 "Recommended Concurrence Rate" as the
major influence on adversely affecting impartial audit reporting. This metric "OAIG-AUD will
work with DoD management to help assure that audit and evaluation recommendations are
practical and will bring about positive improvements in DoD operations" and that "Success will
be measured by management acceptance of at least 90 percent of recommendations or
management agreement to take an acceptable alternative course of action". In addition, many
auditors perceived that their reports were significantly altered without supporting justification.
This initial management draft audit review process is not only a source of deep concern and
frustration but also results in significant 1oss of auditor and manager's time.
The audit debrief process can also result in major changes to the findings and recommendations.
Examples were given where findings were deleted and in some cases management requested
additional findings. It is the commonly held perception that many of these audit debriefs
changes are unwarranted and resulted in additional loss of auditor and manager time.

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 The editing process is a mixed bag. Some auditors have editors they are comfortable with while
many others cite endless editing, unnecessary editing, and in some cases editors recommending
factual changes to findings. In some cases the editor ends up editing their own work after several
editing reviews. The Style Tips for Audit Reports (STAR) manual is not only an overwhelming
document but also another source of confusion and frustration. The STAR manual is viewed as
an elusive moving target that is constantly updated and changed. The constant changing and
revising of this manua1 contributes significantly to delays in the editing process. Many auditors
questioned the need to verify in writing that the edit process had been accomplished. Some
auditors perceived this to be an example of an unnecessary administrative requirement that
reflected management's lack of trust in the editor and auditors.
Although the cross referencing process is tedious in nature it was seen by most interviewed
auditors as a necessary procedure to insure that the audit report was factually correct and
supported by evidence contained in the working papers.
The Independent Reference Review process was another source of considerable frustration and
concern to the audit team. Often the IRR had little if any knowledge of the technical/functional
area they were reviewing. This lack of expertise was seen as a detriment to the Independent
Reference Review process. On occasion, the IRR would stray from his/her primary function of
insuring that the statements of fact in the audit report were clearly supported by the working
papers and became involved with critiquing the style and format of the audit report and the report
conclusions. There was also considerable pressure placed upon the IRR to complete the process
quickly and efficiently and sign the Quality Control Certification. The necessity of requiring
written certification that the Independent Reference Review had been conducted was questioned
and viewed as another example of management not having trust, faith and confidence in the IRR
and the audit team.
The entire performance audit review process was severely encumbered by senior management's
constant and continuous emphasis on the quantity of audit reports, rather than the quality or
value added of the audit reports. It was a widely held perception that senior management judged
the success of the OIG DoD audit program by the number of audit reports it generated each year.
This resulted in many repetitive, smaller in scope and less complicated audits being conducted.
The Information Assurance Audits are primary examples of small scope, less complicated audits
that can be quickly processed. Towards the end of the management year there is considerable
pressure placed upon the auditing community to reach the audit quantity goals. It is a commonly
held view that the audit leadership stresses form and numbers over substance.
The recent "working papers" scandal has caused the audit management to implement new
procedures and reforms to the performance audit process that has contributed significantly to the
"zero defects - you can not fail" mentality. This in turn has resulted in undue paranoia among
auditors and a paralysis to the system. There is an immediate need to streamline the performance
audit process and focus the audit community upon attaining high quality, value added audits
which would significantly benefit the Department of Defense. More importantly however, there
is an urgent need to reestablish management's trust, faith, and confidence in the abilities of their
highly educated and talented audit staff

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DoD IG FOIA 74

 Recommendations
1. Convene a Performance Audit Task Force with the mission to streamline the performance
audit process by:
a. Minimizing the levels of audit report management review.
b. Eliminating audit directorate unique quality assurance processes that supplement and
augment existing OAIG-Audit Quality Assurance Policies and procedures.
c. Rewriting and simplifying the STAR and reducing interim changes to the STAR.
d. Reducing the number of auditing report checklists.
2. Take immediate measures to eliminate the "zero defects-you will not fail" mentality that
currently exits in the auditing community.
3. Insure organization wide emphasis on high quality, value added audit reports which benefit
DoD.
4. Eliminate the current focus upon the quantity of audit reports as a key performance measure.
5. Immediately eliminate the OAIG Performance Metric 1.B.3 "Recommended Concurrence
Rate-Success will be measured by management acceptance of at least 90 percent of
recommendations or management agreement."
6. Reestablish managements trust in their auditors.
A-010
Subject: Effective use of OAIG Auditing Branch Personnel
In order to effectively cover the entire family of DoD Components that require auditing
oversight, OAIG Auditing is organized into Directorates, Divisions, Branches and Teams. Some
of these elements are co-located in the same geographical area as the inspected unit. This is
particularly true for oversight of the financial centers of the military departments.
The Assessment Team has found that due to the highly structured branch arrangements, led by a
Project Manager at the GS-14 1evel, some teams may be underutilized. They sometimes are idle
while waiting for the next audit project. On the other hand, there are some divisions that will
task organize their teams as required by the audit complexity and the requisite skills required.
This appears to be a prudent use of valuable professional assets.
Recommendation
To the maximum extent possible, considering geographical dispersions of some divisions and
requisite skil1 requirements, recommend that the structured branch alignment be penetrated to
keep audit teams productively employed.

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DoD IG FOIA 75

 A-011
Subject: Evaluation of the OIG DoD Senior Executive Structure
The OIG DoD has a very large number of SES positions for an organization of its size. In view
of the critical comments regarding organizational layering and the leadership and management
capability of the OIG DoD SESers in general, the need for 17 SESers in an organization of fewer
than 1,300 people should be reexamined.
Two issues raise the question whether the OIG DoD is over-structured in SES classified
positions. First there are 17 SES positions in an organization of fewer than 1,300 persons. Within
the DoD, this is an extraordinary density. It is recognized, however, that SES positions are
established on the basis of the need for exceptional technical, 1eadership, and management skills
and the OIG DoD has numerous such requirements. The second issue is the layering of SESers,
particularly in OAIG for Auditing. This office has three layers of SES classified positions and
eight of the 17 such positions in the OIG.
The size and layering of the OIG DoD SES force indicates that there is a need to review the
justification for each of these positions below the deputy IG and AIG levels.
There is no standardized format specified to justify the classification of SES positions. Those
justified by the OIG DoD were prepared in severa1 formats, to include one format generally
structured around the Office of Personne1 Management's five Executive Core Qualifications
(ECQ). The ECQ specifies the qualifications expected of persons selected to become SESers.
®
•
•
■
■

ECQ 1 Leading Change
ECQ 2 Leading People
ECQ 3 Results Driven
ECQ 4 Business Acumen
ECQ 5 Building Coalitions/Communications

Under each of the five ECQs there are a number of characteristics that are expected of an SES.
For example, the characteristics listed under ECQ I, Leading Change are:
1. Providing leadership in setting the work force's expected performance 1evels
commensurate with the organization's strategic objectives; inspiring, motivating, and
guiding others toward goal accomplishment; empowering people by sharing power and
authority.
2. Promoting quality through effective use of the organization's performance management
system (e.g., establishing performance standards, appraising staff accomplishments using
the developed standards, and taking action to reward, counsel, and remove employees, as
appropriate).
3. Valuing cultural diversity and other differences; fostering an environment in which
people who are culturally diverse can work together cooperatively and effectively in
achieving organizational goals.

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DoD IG FOIA 76

 4. Assessing employees' unique developmental needs and providing developmental
opportunities that maximize employees' capabilities and contribute to the achievement of
organizational goals; developing leadership in others through coaching and mentoring.
5. Fostering commitment, team spirit, pride, trust, and group identity; taking steps to
prevent situations that could result in unpleasant confrontations.
6. Resolving conflicts in a positive and constructive manner. This includes promoting
labor/management partnerships and dealing effectively with employee relations matters,
attending to morale and organizational climate issues, handling administrative, labor
management, and EEO issues, and taking disciplinary actions when other means have not
been successful.
The ECQ is a reasonable standard against which the need for an SES as well as the suitability of
a candidate SES to fill the position can be measured. It is clear that the criteria established by the
ECQ could be applied to high-grade GS employees as well as SESers and this clouds the answer
to the question of whether any given position is properly classified as an SES position. This
"matter of degree" is a judgment matter that can be resolved by analysis. Thus, examining SES
position classifications in the context of the ECQ requirements presents a sound and justifiable
approach for determining if any SES positions are over-graded.
In earlier years the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducted periodic reviews or
audits of SES positions in the departments and agencies of the Federal government. During the
process the rationale for establishing the position was evaluated and was tested against the reality
of what grade was justified by the position description and duties at the time of the OPM review.
The OPM no longer conducts the SES position reviews; the field teams that did this work were
eliminated as the agency downsized.
Recommendation
All SES classified positions below the AIG level should be evaluated to determine whether they
properly justify the assignment of an SES. It may be necessary for the OIG to form a team of
trusted and knowledgeable agents from within the OIG DoD to examine the SES classified
positions for validity, or request assistance from another Federal agency IG.

A-012
Subject: Retrieval of OIG DoD Employee Emails
Managers within the OIG DoD have historically conducted searches of computer systems for
purposes of seeking evidence to support employee disciplinary actions. For example, stored
emails or common files on the network are retrieved in order to ascertain whether employees are
conducting private business using government computers during their official work hours.
Pursuant to current protocol, the search requests are sent to the Director for the Information
Systems Directorate (ISD). The Director, ISD then assigns a given request to a member of his
Information Technology staff. The back up tapes recycle on a rolling 90-day period. As a result,

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DoD IG FOIA 77

 a search can reach back up to 90 days in time. This window of time was formerly 30 days, The
Director, ISD recalled receiving search requests "once in a while."
The Director, ISD requires that a written search request before performing the search. Email
requests are deemed to be in writing. The Office of the Deputy General Counsel does not
become involved; search warrants are not required. The Director, ISD could not recall any
instance where a search request was rejected.
The Assessment Team encountered a far different environment when it requested a search of
emails in connection with its investigation of the audit work paper scandal. A search request
seeking emails going back two years was made to the Director AIM. He reacted with a high
degree of concern about employee privacy and referred to the Privacy Act and further insisted on
a written request from the IG DoD which ultimately was furnished to the Director AIM. The
Director, ISD later reported that the back up tapes could be searched only for the last 90 days.
By contrast, the Acting AIG Auditing told the Assessment Team that he made an email search
request to AIM in 2001 in connection with his disciplinary investigation of the managers
responsible for the audit work paper scandal. This request went back almost one year.
The IG DoD request for emails in support of the Assessment Team investigation also instructed
the Director AIM to develop a written policy to establish procedures for future email retrieval.
The request specifically stated that all future retrievals would have to be personally approved by
the IG DoD. This requirement was added in recognition of the potential for abuse of employees
(e.g., reprisal activity against suspected whistleblowers). To date, the Director AIM does not
appear to have developed and issued such a policy.
Recommendation
The IG DoD should demand that Director AIM comply with his instructions and develop a
written policy and a set of procedures governing employee computer searches which contain
controls designed to prevent the abuse of this investigative tool. The policy should clarify just
how far back in time a search can encompass.

A-013
Subject: Internal Affairs Capability
The OIG DoD has a requirement for an OIG DoD internal affairs investigative capability to
police its contested or suspect investigations, EEO, sexual harassment, and whistleblower
complaints.
The OIG DoD has numerous investigative, audit, and human resource oversight
responsibilities. Under the current organization, there are circumstances in which persons in a
unit subordinate to the person or element being investigated could be called upon to exercise that
oversight responsibility. This would place the individuals in a position of investigating the
actions of their superior. At best, this practice would create the appearance of a conflict of
interest and jeopardize claims of investigative independence. Examples of such elements of the
OIG DoD in which this could occur are the Criminal Investigation and Oversight in the DCIS

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DoD IG FOIA 78

 and the DoD Hotline. Additionally, there are OIG DoD offices with special responsibilities (e.g.
EEO) that require immediate attention whenever accusations are made of their misconduct.
There is a need to make clear that the answer to the question "who investigates the accused?" is
not "themselves." Such apparent conflicts can be avoided by establishing a small Internal Affairs
Office, independent of OAIG Investigations and other components responsible for investigating
complaints alleging OIG DoD employee misconduct or other inappropriate behavior.
There are two types of internal investigations that an OIG DoD Internal Affairs Office would
conduct; those dealing with possible criminal activity by OIG DoD employees, and those dealing
with non-criminal actions or complaints. While this would be a small office, it needs personnel
of the highest quality. Investigation of possible criminal activity by an employee requires skilled
and experienced 1811s. The internal affairs function should be performed by a small group of
carefully selected personnel; the best and the brightest. These personnel should be members of
the special staff and report directly to the IG DoD, and be groomed for future leadership
positions.
Recommendation
Establish a small OIG DoD Internal Affairs Office as part of the IG DoD Special Staff reporting
directly to the Inspector General.
A-014
Subject: Joint Service Credit for OIG DoD Military Personnel
The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense should be staffed with quality
and dedicated personnel considering the IG DoD's vision of being an independent and objective
broker for DoD. The assigned OIG DoD's mission requires them to "conduct, supervise,
monitor, and initiate audits, evaluations, and investigations relating to programs and operations
of the Department of Defense." This mission entails an oversight of all DoD Components which
includes the Military Departments, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant
Commands, the Defense Agencies and DoD field activities. Many of these DoD Components
are considered to be jointly manned activities (per JCS Admin Publication 1.2 dated 30 June
1989).
Normally the military personnel assigned to these jointly manned activities are considered to be
in joint billets or commonly called "purple suit" positions. These are highly sought positions
since they will enhance an officer's resume and impact positively on a person's promotion
potential.
In 1998, the OIG DoD submitted justification that 17 of 37 billets warranted joint credit.
However, only one position within OAIG Auditing was validated by The Joint Validation Board
as being a joint billet. This is an unacceptable situation if the OIG DoD is to attract talented
officers who can contribute to the OIG DoD's mission and, hopefully, enhance his future value
to DoD.

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DoD IG FOIA 79

 Recommendation
Subsequent to all OIG DoD organizational changes that affect military officer assignments, the
Director, AIM should resubmit a complete justification packet for joint billet validation. The
packet should include a strong IG DoD's endorsement for the proposal.

A-015
Subject: OIG DoD Military Whistleblower Reprisal Workshop
The OIG DoD periodically offers a "Military Whistleblower Reprisal Workshop." The day-long
course is offered by the Special Inquiries Directorate (SI), Office of Departmental Inquiries.
Attendees come from the military 1G offices. The course is intended to educate the audience on
the nuts and bolts of investigating allegations that a member of the armed forces was retaliated
against for making a protected communication. These kinds of investigations are conducted by
the military IG's and the OIG DoD pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 1034, DoD Directive 7050.6
"Military Whistleblower Protection", (June 23, 2000) and DoD Directive 6490.1 "Mental Health
attended the workshop
Evaluations of the Armed Forces" (October 1, 1997). 
when it was offered on May 14, 2002.
The program contains a review of governing statutes and DoD directives, provides a detailed
step by step analysis of the requisite elements for a reprisal investigation, analyzes mental health
evaluations, and offers legal input from an attorney in the Office of Deputy Counsel. After
listening to the entire program, the author believes that several changes would improve the
program. For example:
The Director, Office of Departmental Inquiries accomplished little in his welcoming comments.
It was a valuable opportunity to improve relations with other agencies that have had a
contentious working relationship with the OIG DoD. He could have made comments about
forging a new positive team effort in this area.
There were repeated and tiresome references to how difficult or complicated whistleblower
reprisal cases can be. This encourages the audience to disconnect, lose interest, and excuse their
inattention. One speaker's numerous references to "long faces" in the audience were selffulfilling. The self-proclaimed "pep rally" became a bust.
The SI Director constantly fields audience questions and effectively shuts down her speakers.
The slumping body 1anguage of her staff tells all. They appeared sufficiently well trained to
handle the questions on their own.
Military IG members should be asked whether their work with whistleblower reprisal cases
actually makes a difference. This is a valuable opportunity to 1earn what is working and what is
broken within the system of OIG DoD oversight of reprisal investigations by the military IG's.
It was not until late in day when a speaker from the Office of the Deputy General Counsel
provided examples of the good that military whistleblowers do. Prior to that, there was only one
nd overpriced weapons parts. In the interim, the SI
historical reference to civilian 

80 

b(6)
DoD IG FOIA 80

 Director constantly spoke about how the complainants are difficult personalities. As she
explained it, the "American system" requires a reprisal investigation in deference to the statutory
scheme and their first amendment rights. Legitimate whistleblowers are better viewed as a
resource, not an inconvenience. Their messages can save lives and tax dollars. This module also
should discuss how difficult it is to blow the whistle. Famous whistleblowers could be
highlighted as case studies.
The subject workshop represents a laudable training function but needs improvement in the
following areas. First, legitimate whistleblowers need to be cast in a far more favorable light.
They are currently portrayed as malcontents or difficult employees who rarely provide a public
service. Second, whistleblower cases should be presented as interesting work that stands to save
lives and dollars. Third, individual speakers need to be allowed to teach their portion of the
program without constant interruptions by their supervisor in response to questions from the
audience.
Recommendations
I . 
Add a separate module on the importance of whistleblowers.
2.

Provide a more upbeat presentation.

3.

Change the "Welcoming Comments" to a more cooperative note.

4.

The SI Director should not constantly disrupt the program.

5.

Poll the audience for useful information.

Findings
Finding 1-001
Subject: Organizational Location and Supervision of the Ethics Function
The OIG DoD Ethics Counselor and Program Manager's supervisory and reporting chain has the
potential for conflict between two supervisors who have differing supervisory roles over him.
The organizational 1ocation of the ethics function has the appearance of being buried in the
organization.
Discussion
The OIG DoD Ethics Counselor and Program Manager is supervised by the Director,
Congressiona1 Liaison Office, but reports to the Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official
(DDAEO) who is dual-hatted as the Director, Office of Departmental Inquiries. The OIG DoD
Ethics Counselor and Program Manager is also dual-hatted as the head of the Strategic Planning
Unit. While this arrangement works due to the good cooperation and personalities of the people
involved, the potential for conflict exists. Equally important, its organizational location in the
Congressional Liaison Office is unrelated to the ethics functional area, and the split supervisory
and reporting responsibilities together incorrectly conveys to observers that the ethics function is

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DoD IG FOIA 81

 buried in the organization and is a low priority. The reputation and credibility of the OIG DoD
rests upon its core ethics and this is a subject that can never be far from the attention of the IG
DoD. This suggests that the OIG DoD Ethics Counselor and Program Manager should be
assigned close to the 10 DoD in the chain-of-command, and should have a single supervisory
and reporting chain reaching to him. To accomplish this would require reassignment of the OIG
DoD Ethics Counselor and Program Manager, reassignment of the 010 DoD Ethics Counselor
and Program Manager supervisory and reporting functions, or both. This is a reorganization issue
and should be considered as part of a larger OIG DoD reorganization.
Recommendation
The OIG DoD Ethics Counselor and Program Manager should be reassigned to an organizational
entity in a direct line of the chain-of-command to the IG DoD. Specific organizational location
will be addressed as a part of the 010 DoD reorganization recommendations.
Finding 2-001
Subject: Manpower Management
Existing controls, checks and balances that form the OIG DoD manpower management system
are highly effective.
Discussion
There are no authorization documents establishing the number, grade structure, and job series of
civilian personnel. Instead, these data are initially established by means of a civilian manpower
survey and position classification, and established position descriptions. The planning tools for
establishing the program year's manpower levels are full-time manpower equivalents (FTE) and
the fund request necessary to support them. The resulting manpower baseline is annually
included as part of the requested budget of each OIG component and "rolled-up" at the Office of
Administration and Information Management as a part of the planning, programming and
budgeting-POM-PBD process.
After the OIG DoD budget is approved, civilian manpower is managed to the budget throughout
the year. This requires a rigorous accounting process to prevent an Anti-Deficiency Act
violation. This accounting process has been performed in an exemplary manner and, coupled
with senior management oversight exercised at Quarterly Budget Review meetings has been
highly effective in managing civilian manpower.
Finding: 2-002
Subject: OIG DoD Doctrine and Policies
There is a comprehensive body of doctrine and implementing policies guiding the OIG DoD to
the proper accomplishment of its mission. Policies however are modified at lower levels within
the 010 components, both orally and in writing. This is a source of confusion and frustration to
some members of the staff, and is fundamentally inefficient.
Discussion
There is a comprehensive and very useful body of doctrine to guide the OIG DoD.

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DoD IG FOIA 82

 The doctrinal base of the IG DoD is established by the IG Act of 1978 (as amended), DoD
Directive 5106.1 (mission and responsibilities), IG Guide 5106.I (organization and functions),
The Strategic Plan (2001-2005) (principles, goals, and objectives), and the Annual Performance
Plan (performance goals and objectives). These are augmented by IG Instructions, IG Plans, and
values and standards instilled through training, education and formal procedures. Together, they
form a framework for professional performance of the OIG DoD and are the basis of policies
intended to implement the doctrine and body of guidance.
The agency-wide policies are formulated at the OIG DoD level, primarily within the Directorate
of Administration and Information Management. If necessary, they are then refined by the
components to more specifically apply to the component's mission. These implementing policies
are coordinated with the originator of the basic policy. This process works well but problems
occur within the components when numerous additional uncoordinated policies, written and oral
instructions, guidance, standard operating procedures, and similar instructions either elaborate on
elements of OIG DoD doctrine and policy cited above, or alter it. There is no apparent control.
The changing of policy at low levels within the components was cited repeatedly as a source of
confusion.
The uncoordinated modification, selective enforcing, or ignoring of policies or regulations
imposed by agencies other than the DoD creates a second type of problem. Examples cited to the
Assessment Team include claims by multiple auditors that audit policies do not conform to the
Yellow Book requirements. Other auditors desiring to telework pointed out that there is little or
no ability to do so and that the government-wide (established in Sec. 359 of Public Law 106346) and OIG DoD (IG Reg. 1400.620) 25% telework target will never be achieved since only
12 people in Auditing are considered to be eligible.
As a result, OIG DoD doctrine is not universally applied and the leadership has no means of
knowing whether all components of the organization are following the guidance or selectively
ignoring it.
Recommendations
1) Supplementing the OIG DoD directives and policies should be discouraged except in cases
specifically approved at the senior leadership level.
2) If it is appropriate to supplement a directive or policy, the proposed supplement should be
reviewed at the AIG level to ensure that its content is both known and that it supports the
OIG DoD 1eadership's intent.
3) Policies and their reason for being should be clearly communicated to and understood by the
component staffs.
4) Develop appropriate policies to provide guidance to the OIG DoD regarding waging the war
against terrorism should be developed. In particular, policies are required regarding the war's
execution, particularly by investigators in the field.

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DoD IG FOIA 83

 Finding: 2-003
Subject: Implementation of Telework Program
Full compliance by all OIG DoD component heads with the spirit and intent of the GIG DoD
Telework regulation would significantly enhance the Telework Program.
Discussion
Telework is defined as "Any arrangement in which an employee performs official assigned
duties at an alternative worksite on either a regular and recurring basis, or on an ad-hoc basis (not
including official travel duty stations or locations where typical field or headquarters work is
performed)". Ad-hoc telework refers to telework performed less than one day per bi-weekly pay
period or on an occasional, one-time, or irregular basis. Regular and recurring telework refers to
an approved work schedule where eligible employees regularly work at least one day per
biweekly pay period at an alternative worksite. Section 359 of Public Law No. 106-346 requires
executive agencies to establish policies under which eligible employees may participate in
teleworking to the maximum extent possible, without diminished employee performance. The
law also requires agencies to allow 25% of their eligible workforce to telework in FY 2001, and
an additional 25% in each of the three subsequent fiscal years. Through the commendable
efforts of Mr. Napoleon Walker, the Assistant OIG DoD Telework Program Coordinator, the
OIG DoD has met the public law requirements. Inspector Genera1 Regulation 1400.620 sets
forth the policies, procedures and responsibilities of the OIG DoD Telework Program. This
regulation states "The OIG, DoD, recognizes circumstances where it is mutually beneficial for
employees to perform work at sites other than the traditional office or at locations other than
where typical field or headquarters work is performed. Such circumstances include, but are not
1imited to, accommodation of special needs or disabilities, energy or environmental conservation,
savings in commuting costs, the need for an uninterrupted work environment, cost or space
savings, or better geographic coverage for the agency mission. Employees and their supervisors
may make telework arrangements for purposes of promoting the efficiency of the Government
and fostering a family-friendly OIG DoD". This regulation requires OIG Component heads to
actively promote an increase in the number of teleworkers by encouraging and supporting
participation in the GIG DoD Telework Program to the maximum extent possible. This
regulation also requires GIG DoD component heads to maintain records of determinations of
eligibility for telework, offers and responses to offers to telework, telework agreements, etc.
Inspection revealed that 188 OIG DoD employees are currently eligible to telework. Of this
number, 108 and 80 employees were eligible for ad-hoc and regular and recurring telework
respectively. Only twelve audit employees have been identified as eligible for the Telework
Program. This represents 6.3% of the total number of eligible teleworkers. A review of the audit
telework programs revealed that the OAIG Auditing has not complied with the spirit and intent
of the Inspector Genera1 Regulation 1400.620 pertaining to the GIG DoD Telework Program in
that the 1eadership did not actively promote the program, ensure that no less than 25% of
employees eligible to telework on a regular and recurring basis are offered telework in FY 2001
and maintain records of determinations of eligibility for telework. Discussions with responsible
personnel indicate that the audit leadership had stated that auditors would be considered for adhoc teleworking only. Employees in other job series are considered for both ad-hoc and a
regular and recurring telework. This approach to the teleworking program will not achieve the
Telework Program goals as outlined in the GIG DoD regulation.

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 Recommendation
OAIG Auditing should review immediately their Telework Program and adhere to the clear
guidelines set forth in the Inspector General Regulation 1400.620.

Findings: Series 3 Findings have been deleted
Finding: 4-001
Subject: Assignment/Training of Military Personne1
Improvements in the assignment and schooling of OIG DoD military personnel are needed.
Discussion
As of 30 April 2002, 32 military officers were assigned to the Office of the Inspector General,
Department of Defense. The break down is Army-10, Navy-5, Air Force-15 and Marine Corps2. Their professional career fields are in al1 disciplines to include military police, medical
services, lawyers, transportation, intelligence, engineers, contracting and security. Accordingly,
they are assigned to a variety of OIG DoD positions to include evaluations, readiness, logistics,
acquisitions, administration and policy and programs. With few exceptions, they are assigned to
positions consistent with their professional expertise and years of military service (6 to over 20
years).
The assignment policy for these officers to the OIG DoD varies among the different services.
The Army officers are nominative through the Army Inspector General to the OIG DoD. On the
other hand, the other services assign personnel directly to the OIG DoD without going through
an individual service IG nominative process. Resulting therefrom is a wide variance of technical
expertise, years of service and quality of officers. Although the majority of military officers are
talented and of exceptional quality, in some cases, the officer is on a terminal assignment and
may be disgruntled or ineffective. The OIG DoD should be staffed with professional,
productive, technically qualified officers who are carefully selected to enhance and contribute to
the overall Inspector General mission.
The Army personnel assigned to the OIG DoD are required to attend the Department of the
Army's Inspector General (DAIG) School at Ft. Belvoir. The course length is three weeks and
other services can attend the school on a space available basis providing the class capacity of 64
is not exceeded. The Navy and the Air Force also have similar IG schools.
Recommendations
That all 010 DoD military personnel:
1. Be processed through their service nominative process prior to a name submission to OIG
DoD,
2. Be required to attend the DAIG school (or a similar school).

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 Finding: 4-002
Subject: Education and Training
Resources (money, people, time) for education and training do not match requirements.
Discussion

There is no effective system to identify and verify the education and training needs in the OIG
DoD. Responsible senior management and staff cannot make meaningful decisions on priorities
and requests for education and training resources. Without validated requirements (in accord
with a training model) the system cannot be managed. Therefore resources for education and
training do not match the demand for education and training that bubbles up from among the
rank and file.
Money. Education and training funds come from two sources. The first is from the annual
Agency budget; this was $I.239 mil. for FY 02. The second source is the quarterly
reprogramming actions by the OIG DoD Senior Management Group. Unfunded requirements
compete for these funds in that arena, and there is no education and training proponent directly
involved in the reprogramming decision.
People. There are no senior or middle managers with a sole duty of developing and promulgating
education and training policy. The education and training function is starved for people. Without
a current assessment of education and training requirements, or a training model, rational staffing
of this functional area is not possible.
Time. The allocation of work force time to education and training is as important as the
allocation of other resources, and is a responsibility of the managers concerned. Clear Agency
doctrine must underlay education and training resource allocation.
Recommendation

As part of a comprehensive restructuring of the education and training function in the OIG DoD,
base the allocation of resources upon an annual assessment of the Agency's education and
training needs, in accord with the training doctrine and the education and training model. (See
Education and Training Assessment)
Finding: 4-003
Subject: Education and Training
There is no education and training mode1 for the OIG DoD.
Discussion

The essential management tool to plan, program, budget, and manage education and training is a
comprehensive training model. A training model identifies the education and training required
for each level of each career field in OIG DoD. It is a management tool that assists in allocating
scarce resources, presents a current education and training status for managers and sets usable
training goals for managers and individuals. No such model exists in the OIG DoD. The OIG
DoD components each have the elements of a training model that satisfies their particular skil1

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 training needs. These fragments of an OIG DoD model are the remnants of a once robust and
useful education and training strategy in the Agency, and are the results of initiatives by the
component leadership.
An example of a partial training model exists in OIG DoD Audit. That component has developed
a computer-based system called DAMIS. It contains sufficient data to serve as the basis of a fullblown OIG DoD training model. DAMIS contains all the courses used by Audit employees. It
contains the training records of each employee and can track employee progress in meeting the
required (Yellow Book) training. Individual training requests can be submitted through this
system when Audit employees begin to access DAMIS. The system is still under development.
Recommendations
1. As part of a comprehensive restructuring of OIG DoD's education and training, develop
and activate a comprehensive training model for OIG DoD.
2. OIG DoD should support and exploit the capabilities of Audit's DAMIS project. The
results of an 010 DoD education and training assessment will rationalize the
requirements; the addition of costing data will rationalize the planning and programming
process.
Finding: 4-004
Subject: Education and Training
There is no one senior officer responsible all education and training in the OIG DoD.
Discussion
The education and training function in the OIG DoD is, in practice delegated to the components.
This is justified in part, by the difference in mission and essentia1 skills between the audit
function and the investigation function. For technical skills at the GS 5 thru GS 11, this
decentralization appears to work to the satisfaction of the responsible AIG's. When it comes to
non-technical subjects such as initial entry orientation, leadership, and career development,
decentralized education is insufficient and ineffective.
Because there is no central responsibility; there is no training model; there are no central existing
training records, and a limited central training database. There are none of the normal tools
available to plan, program, budget, and manage education and training. The most glaring
deficiency, expressed mainly by those being led, is in leadership and management education.
The sources of education and training (mostly external to OIG DoD) are available.
Recommendations
Appoint a senior official, reporting to the IG DoD, responsible and accountable for planning,
programming, budgeting and management of al1 agency education and training.

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 Finding: 4-005
Subject: DoD-Specific Education and Training
Leadership and management. The education of the middle grades (GS 12 throughI4's) is not
matching the needs of the organization.
Discussion
Repeatedly in seminars and individual interviews, subordinates and incumbents point out the
need for leadership and management education. It is not clear whether this is a result of an
incomplete knowledge of what education is available, or what education the individual needs, or
a lack of resources. In any case, it is a responsibility of management to develop the leadership
capability of their subordinates. Either in truth, or in perception, such education is not being used
to improve the professionalism and effectiveness of the OIG DoD workforce.
Education resources are available at the Federal Executive Institute, The Eastern Establishment
Development Center, The Office of Personnel Management courses, and the USDA Graduate
School. It is possible that a number of these institutes could tailor programs of instruction for
OIG DoD middle and senior leaders. An alternative, deserving serious consideration, is the
establishment of an IG DoD Academy
Recommendations
1. In the process of a comprehensive overhaul, particular care and high priority should be given
to progressive leadership development and education in OIG DoD.
2. Consider the establishment of an IG DoD Academy with three courses: a Basic Course (for all
new employees), an Advanced Course (for all employees between their third and sixth year of
service), and a Management and Staff Course (for those with demonstrated potential for
Division, Directorate, or OAIG leadership or staff). Such an academy could replace many of the
non-technical education and training resources now in use.
Finding: 4-006
Subject: Mentoring Program in OIG DoD Auditing
The mentoring program in OIG DoD Auditing has had mixed results.
Discussion:
The Assessment Team convened a discussion group of a sample (12 of 70) of the Mentoring
Program participants. Attendees were all grades from GS 7 to GS 15 and all levels of
experiences from 6 months to 22 years. Eleven of the 12 at this meeting found the program to be
useful, particularly in enhancing their understanding of the command climate, corporate cultures
of OIG DoD Auditing. A smaller portion used the program to enhance their knowledge of their
specific job. Some of the group identified an informal mentoring process carried on by their
supervisors; all were enthusiastic about this approach.

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 Repeatedly, attendees at the meeting group talked about leadership, 1eadership training, and
communication. Some were critical of the lack of sensitivity of supervisors, and their reluctance
to do informal mentoring and counseling. Some indicated that their supervisors had been
sensitive and supportive.
Leadership education and training were brought up constantly in this discussion. For example,
one auditor who was not designated as a team chief, but in fact had been sent out as a team chief
did not feel that he was adequately prepared to lead a team, or in the technical sense to prepare a
draft report of the audit.
Recommendations
1. OAIG Auditing should make an assessment of the mentoring program to measure its
effectiveness.
2. Encourage supervisors to act as mentors in both the one-on-one mode and the group mode. It
is not now part of the Audit Mentoring Program. Mentoring is an intrinsic part of leadership.
Finding: 5-001
Subject: OIG DoD Systems Furniture Project
The development of the OIG DoD Systems Furniture Project was commendable.
Discussion
The Space Management Branch, Office of the Director of Administration and Information
Management developed an upscale Systems Furniture Project. This innovative project was
researched, developed and im lemented by the OIG DoD's Space Management Planning Group
headed by The planning group developed the concept, researched
furniture options and configurations and planned for the systems furniture implementation. The
Systems Furniture Project was developed not only for the OIG DoD headquarters building but
also for all OIG DoD field offices. The Space Management Planning Group is a mode1 for other
DoD agencies to emulate. The project involved renovations, construction and office space
reconfiguration to a space-efficient modular concept. The new individual modular office space
design is outstanding as it features a flexible workspace configuration, storage tower for personal
items and clothing and a one-touch storage bin for each employee. The project also featured
teaming areas (conference space) to facilitate collective work projects. Instruction was given to
employees as to how to adjust chairs and keyboards to the correct 1evel so as to avoid Carpel
Tunnel Syndrome injuries and eyestrain. The Systems Furniture Project research, planning and
implementation was highly commendable and reflects great credit upon
and the
Space Management Planning Group.

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 Finding: 5-002
Subject: Funding of the OIG DoD Systems Furniture Project
The efficient implementation of the OIG DoD Systems Furniture Project would be significantly
enhanced by the allocation of programmed dollars over time.
Discussion
and the OIG DoD
Finding 5-001 described the commendable effort by [redacted]
Space Management Planning Group in the recent planning and implementation of the Systems
Furniture Project. A review of the OIG DoD efforts in implementing a facilities and furniture
improvement program revealed that throughout the 1990's there was little command support for
this much needed facilities improvement project and that leadership was reluctant to request
required funding. Due to this command inactivity during the 1990's the 010 DoD is eight to ten
years behind other local governmental agencies in developing and implementing a facilities and
furniture improvement program. Recent command attention to this project resulted in the Senior
Management Group (SMG) approval of a Systems Furniture Project as part of the OIG DoD
Quality of Life Improvement Plan in the Fall of 2000. This enabled the 01G DoD Space
Management Branch to plan and develop a Systems Furniture Project featuring new modular
furniture, building renovations and remodeling. Five systems furniture projects in the OIG DoD
headquarters have been completed; a sixth project is due to start in the June/July 2002. The latter
project is not fully funded. As of 8 May 2002, $2,247,524 has been spent on the OIG DoD
headquarters for this project. The project is 25% complete. The estimated cost to complete the
Systems Furniture Project is $7,452,524. In the past the Systems Furniture Project has not
received upfront-programmed monies and is not being funded in the core FY04-FY09 Program
Budget. This project has been an unfinanced requirement from the start and has been funded
with reprogrammed dollars made available from excess Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
funds. In res onse to recent senior leadership directives to fund the Systems Furniture Project,
Director of Financial Management, Administration and Information
Management has done a commendable job in obtaining funds for this much needed Quality of
Life Project. For example, during the 3 rd Quarter FY 2001 Budget Review she was able to take
excess funds from the O&M budget in the areas of pay and compensation, transit subsidy, travel,
audit and investigations permanent change of station accounts and the reserve account to provide
$1,604,600 toward needed unfinanced requirements including the System Furniture Project. The
continued use of reprogrammed monies for the Systems Furniture Project inhibits the efficient
implementation of the project and affects other claimants for scarce funds. This Systems
Furniture Project should be funded in the core OIG DoD program budget.
Recommendation

OIG DoD should provide funds for the Systems Furniture Project in the core OIG DoD budget
program.

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 Finding: 5-003
Subject: Listing of DoD Components
A complete and accurate listing of all DoD Components is required.
Discussion
In order for the IG DoD to comply with the duties and responsibilities in the Inspector General
Act of 1978 (as amended) and Department of Defense Directorate 5106.I, "Inspector General of
the Department of Defense (IG DoD)," dated January 4, 2001, the OIG DoD requires an accurate
listing of all DoD components. Collectively the term "DoD components" includes the Military
Departments, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities.
Initially the OAIG Administration and Information Management provided the assessment team a
list of 14-16 DoD Components. Later, through a combination of the time consuming effort and a
subsequent list (30 agencies) provided by OAIG Auditing on 16 May 2002, this list increased to
35. In a June 2, 1981 summary report signed by Mr. Joseph H. Sherick, a former IG DoD, he
stated there were "over 165 entities identified for inspection". Some of these 165 DoD entities
have since been disestablished and the correct number of components could be somewhere in the
35-70 range. An accurate component listing is essential to the primary purpose of the OIG DoD
to provide oversight of these entities. A preliminary survey revealed that most of these
components, except for the intelligence agencies, have no inspector general or internal review
capabilities.
Recommendations
That the 010 DoD compile and update annually an accurate listing of all DoD Components that
require audit, investigative or evaluation oversight.
Finding: 5-004
Subject: Performance/Incentive Cash Awards
Additional funding for performance/incentive cash awards would significantly enhance the
ability of the OIG DoD 1eadership to reward deserving employees.
Discussion
1G DoD Memorandum entitled "OIG Cash Awards Guidance" dated 17 March 1994, states that
total cash awards (including special act or service awards) dollars within each OAIG for nonSES employees shall not exceed 1.25 percent of the aggregate base salaries of those employees
on board as of October 1 of the current fiscal year. Reflecting this guidance, $864,000 for 1,193
GS personnel was targeted for FY 2001 GS awards. This represents a potential cash award of
$724.22 per GS employee assuming all are rated at least "fully successful". SES employees on
the other hand are budgeted for 10% of their aggregate base pay for awards as of October 1 of
the current fisca1 year. SES employees may receive between 5 and 20 percent of base pay. For
the rating period ending June 2001, eleven of the fourteen assigned IG DoD SES employees
received cash awards totaling $137,140. This amount represents 8.04% of the total SES payroll
and an average cash award of $12,467.27 per SES award recipient. Although the award monies
for SES and GS employees come from different accounts, it appears that insufficient award

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DoD IG FOIA 91

 funds are allocated for GS employees. 1.25% of the aggregate base salary does not provide
sufficient award funds for GS5 to GS 15 employees whose base salary range from $22,737. to
$107,357. In keeping with DIG Cash Awards Guidance subordinate DIG DoD organizations
have their own formulas to provide cash awards for deserving GS personnel. For example, the
Administration and Logistics Services Directorate had elected to provide their supervisory
personnel 1.5% of their $389,184 base salary target and to provide their non-supervisory
personnel I.I% of their $389,184 salary base. This represents an average cash award of $972.96
and $194.60 for supervisory and non-supervisory employees respectively. Interviews with the
responsible AIM personnel reveal that there are insufficient award funds to reward many
deserving employees. Alternate methods to award employees for performance such as Time Off
Awards and Honorary Awards are used to complement cash performance awards. There is a
need to revise "OIG Cash Awards Guidance" to reflect that total cash dollars for non-SES
employees shall not exceed 2.5% of the aggregate base salaries of those employees on board as
of October 1 of the current fiscal year, and to separate targets for supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel (that cannot be inter-mingled). Further, only one type of monetary
recognition should be approved for performance during an appraisal period. These changes will
allow a greater number of deserving GS employees to receive monetary recognition for their
work.
Recommendations
1. "DIG Cash Awards Guidance" should be revised to reflect that total cash dollars for non-SES
employees shall not exceed 2.5% of the aggregate base salaries.
2. Separate cash award targets for supervisory and non-supervisory personnel (that cannot be
intermingled).
3. Allow only one type of monetary recognition for performance during an appraisal period.
Finding: 5-005
Subject: Quality Step Increases (QSI)
Amendments to the "OIG Cash Awards Guidance" memorandum pertaining to QSI awards
would benefit the IG DoD GS employee.
Discussion
IG DoD Memorandum entitled "OIG Cash Awards Guidance" dated 17 March 1994, outlines the
parameters for awarding Quality Step Increases within the OIG DoD. This memorandum states
that; "Quality Step Increases within each OAIG shall be limited to no more than five percent of
the total non-SES work force on board as of October I of the current fiscal year". A QSI
consists of an additional within grade pay increase for an employee, given in recognition of
"outstanding" performance. Only employees with a current "outstanding" rating are eligible for
a QSI. An employee may receive only one QSI within a 52-week period. Since a QSI can be
given to only five percent of the non-SES workforce each year, extreme care must be taken in the
selection of QSI recipients. The Office of the Director for Administration and 1nformation
Management for example, may grant QSI's to only five employees during the fisca1 year based

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DoD IG FOIA 92

 upon a non-SES end strength of 101 personnel. With such a limited number of QSI recipients it
behooves the OIG DoD leadership to select only outstanding employees whose performance
clearly indicates a higher quality performance than is normally found in the job position. Yearly
repetitive QSI rewards for the same employee are not in the best interest of the OIG. To permit
more deserving people to receive this scarce award, the "OIG Cash Awards Guidance"
memorandum should be amended to reflect that an employee may receive only one QSI within a
I04-week period. In addition the memorandum should state that employees promoted or
appointed during the appraisa1 period are not eligible for a QSI. These amendments are not only
in the best interest of the OIG but also will enable additional high performing employees to
receive this much sought after recognition.
Recommendations
1. The "OIG Cash Awards Guidance" be amended to reflect that an employee may receive only
one QSI within a 104-week period.
2. Employees promoted or appointed during the approval period should not be eligible for a
QSI.
Finding: 5-006
Subject: DoD Hotline
The operation of the DoD Hotline Program is laudatory but some areas require improvement.
Discussion
The DoD hotline is guided by DoD Directive Number 7050.1 — "Defense Hotline Program",
dated January 4, 1999 and DoD Instruction Number 7050.7 "Defense Hotline Procedures", dated
December 14, 1998. The purpose of Directive 7050.1 is to clarify Defense Hotline Program
responsibilities and the purpose of Instruction 7050.7 is to implement policy, assign
responsibilities and prescribe procedures for the operation of the program. Collectively, the
documents assign responsibility for operation of the DoD Hotline to the OIG DoD and, also for
oversight, assurance reviews and the issuance of implementing instructions to the same agency.
A review of the DoD Hotline Program revealed that directives addressing the program,
procedures and the quality assurance review are current and provide the necessary guidance to
DoD components. Further, that the internal controls of the administrative processing of the DoD
Hotline information are excellent. Without exception, the Hotline personnel are honest, talented,
professionally qualified, well trained and know the intricacies of their sensitive positions. They
understand fully that the above-reproach, highest standards must be attained and sustained for the
DoD Hotline to be the primary vehicle for reporting fraud, waste and mismanagement in DoD.
In the training area, new personnel are placed with experienced GS-13 Hotline investigators for
approximately 30 days before being permitted to answer Hotline calls. New personnel are also
required to attend the Department of the Army IG course and the one-week Hotline Operators
Training Course, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center as soon as practical subsequent to
their arrival.

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DoD IG FOIA 93

 Confidentiality and anonymity are the bedrock of this program. A violation to a single
complainant of the confidential or the anonymous pledge will render the program ineffective and
untrustworthy. As an aside, historically over the past few years, the valid cases are split evenly
among the confidential and anonymous categories. It is known by some personnel in the OIG
DoD community that the current DoD Hotline telephone system displays the telephone number
of the incoming call. Although there is no indication that Hotline investigators have violated the
confidential or anonymous pledge, there does exist a perception that the telephone feature could
invalidate a sacrosanct system. Additionally, any telephone system can identify an incoming call
by dialing 69, then the pound sign. A system should be devised to eliminate this negative
erce tion label. Per OAIG Investigations personnel, coordination has been effected with [redacted].
OAIM, to have the telephone company determine the feasibility of securing a nontelephone number display phone for the Hotline operations.
More importantly, the current physical setup of the Hotline Office is totally unacceptable for the
storage of closed and open sensitive case files. The Hotline Office is located between two OIG
DoD elements, which very easily could have access to all files especially during non-working
hours. This physical arrangement also permits other OIG DoD personnel and cleaning crews
unrestricted access during non-duty hours. With a very small investment of two cipher lock
doors, the files could be secured. OAIG Investigations attempted previously to resolve the
Hotline files issue but without success. This is a potentially embarrassing problem that must be
addressed expeditiously.
Recommendations
1. Secure a telephone system that will not display the telephone number of the complainant.
2. Provide a secure facility, which allows only Hotline personnel access to sensitive files.
Finding: 5-007
Subject: Commendable Quality of Life Programs
The implementation of the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program, Business Casual Attire Program
and Alternative Work Schedules Program was commendable.
Discussion
Interviews with numerous OIG DoD employees revealed that the Voluntary Leave Transfer
Program, Business Casual Attire Program and the Alternative Work Schedules Program were
greatly appreciated by the workforce. The implementation of these programs significantly
enhanced the quality of life of the OIG DoD employees. The Voluntary Leave Transfer Program
permits an employee to transfer unused, accrued leave to another employee who needs such
leave because of a medical emergency. This program is extremely beneficial to an employee
whose medical condition may result in a prolonged absence from the workforce, which could
result in a substantial.loss of income because of the unavailability of paid leave. The Business
Casual Attire Program is a significant morale booster for many OIG DoD employees. This
program permits employees to wear casual clothing to work when the employee's schedules does
not require customary professional attire. The Alternative Work Schedules Program is a widely

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DoD IG FOIA 94

 acclaimed program, which not only allows employees more flexibility in scheduling their
persona1 activities but also allows them more control in balancing work and family
responsibilities. The OIG DoD Alternative Work Schedules Program consists of a Flexible
Work Schedules (FWS) and a Compressed Work Schedules (CWS). The FWS consists of a
flexitour Schedules which allows an employee to select his/her starting and stopping times
within flexible hours and a gliding Schedules which allows an employee to select a range
wherein his/her duty day will start and end, within the established flexible hours. The CWS
program allows full time employees 80 hours of work to be completed each biweekly pay period
in nine workdays. These CWS program employees work a fixed Schedules of eight 9-hour
workdays and one 8-hour workday in each biweekly pay period. In addition to these alternative
work Schedules the OIG DoD is currently staffing a new 4 by 10 work Schedules which would
permit employees to work 10 hour days for 4 days each week. The implementation of these
quality of 1ife programs, Voluntary Leave Transfer Program, Business Casual Attire Program
and Alternative Work Schedules Program is commendable and reflects management's interest in
the welfare of their employees.

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DoD IG FOIA 95

 ANNEX 2. REPORT OF SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP, 16 MAY 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD
FROM: MPRI INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP (SAG)
DATE: 6/26/2002
As directed by Delivery Order Execution Plan 0080, dated 22 April 2002, a Senior Advisory
Group was convened on 16 May 2002 to review the progress of the MPRI 1ndependent
Assessment Team. The SAG membership was composed of senior officials with experience in
audits, inspections, and investigations in a variety of government settings.
SAG Membership:
General Ron Griffith USA (Ret), former Vice Chief, US Army. Former Inspector General, US
Army.
LTG Ross Thompson USA (Ret), former Inspector General, US Army.
Mr. Hal Stugart, Former Auditor General, US Army. Former division chief, GAO.
The Assessment Team gave the SAG a comprehensive briefing on the progress of the work to
date.
The IG DoD took the opportunity to express his vision of what the OIG DoD should be. He
emphasized that he wanted to move the agency toward the "Von Steuben model". He elaborated
on his expectations for the Assessment Team's product.
Items discussed and guidance offered:
• Discussion of the difference between investigations and inspections.
• Raised the issue of having professional IGs with a professional ethic.
• Possibility of an AIG for Integrity.
• Explored the desirability of an OIG DoD Academy.
• Recruiting auditors

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DoD IG FOIA 96

 Annex 3. Report of Senior Advisory Group, 26 June 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
FROM: 

MPRI INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM

SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP (SAG)
DATE: 

18 JULY 2002

As directed by Delivery Order Execution Plan 0080, dated 22 April 2002, a Senior Advisory
Group was convened on 26 June 2002 to review the progress of the MPRI Independent
Assessment Team. The SAG membership was composed of senior officials with experience in
audits, inspections, and investigations in a variety of government settings.
SAG Membership:
General Ron Griffith USA (Ret), former Vice Chief, US Army. Former Inspector General, US
Army.
Mrs. Carol Schuster, Deputy Director, Defense Directorate, General Accounting Office (GAO).
Judge Eugene Sullivan, former Chief Judge, U.S. Military Court of Appeals.
LTG Ross Thompson USA (Ret), former Inspector General, US Army.
Mr. Hal Stu• art Former Auditor General, US Army, Former Division chief, GAO
White House Liaison Officer to the Department of State
Air Force Reserve, Judge Advocate Genera1 Corps.
The IG DoD was also in attendance.
The Assessment Team gave the SAG a comprehensive briefing on the progress of the work to
date. The briefing covered the four assigned Tasks and 10 Special Subject Areas. In the ensuing
discussion the following comments and issues were raised:
• Standards of Excellence. The level of professionalism in OIG DoD should be so
respected that there is where the best civil servants should seek to serve.
• Loyalty. Any member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) brought into the OIG DoD
should demonstrate loyalty to the IG DoD to the rank and file.
• DCIS Issue. Is the DCIS by law to be part of the OIG DoD? (Answer is yes).
• GAO Revitalization. Mrs. Shuster described the leadership techniques used to revitalize
the GAO several years ago. She followed up her remarks with a memo to the MPRI
Program Director.
• Mobility of SESs. The IG DoD requested that we consider whether SESs be rotated every
three years and that their positions be recompeted.
• Quick Reaction Inspection Capability. The SAG suggested that IG DoD have a
Commanders' Quick Reaction Inspection Program.
The SAG was satisfied with the Assessment Team's progress to date.

97

b(6)
DoD IG FOIA 97