Journal of African Studies and Development Vol. 3(9), pp. 176-186, September, 2011
Available online http://www.academicjournlas.org/JASD
ISSN – 2141 -2189 ©2011 Academic Journals

Full Length Research Paper

Intelligence operations as terrorism: Emerging state
terrorism in Botswana
Tshepo T. Gwatiwa
Program in International Cooperation, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, South Korea. E-mail:
gwtsjd@gmail.com.
Accepted 24 September, 2011

Botswana is considered one of Africa’s credible democracies. Its economic performance and good
governance over the years distinguished its statehood from its African counterparts. The stable
political landscape backdating to independence also made it a regional security exception. However,
the security landscape has changed over the last three years. Using a historical procedure, the article
illustrates how the changing political landscape resulted in the creation of a securitized state controlled
by intelligence agencies. It also employs a survey procedure—using interviews and other qualitative
sources—to illustrate how incidents of incidents of intellectual repression, communication surveillance,
extra judicial killings and politicized covert operations have changed the country. The article
interrogates the magnitude of security threats as well as the competence of the intelligence security
outfits. Having proven the existence of common denominators of state terrorism in Botswana, which
point to emerging state terrorism, the study proceeds to make recommendations for structural and
operational reform.
Key words:Botswana, Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS), state-terrorism, extrajudicial killings,
surveillance.
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the Directorate of Intelligence and
Security (DIS) in 2008 became the key variable that
redefined Botswana’s political and security landscape.
The DIS accounts for an unprecedented record of state
terrorism. These events were until then, uncommon in
Botswana, which was regarded Africa’s miracle.
Botswana’s democratic credentials originate from the
traditional Tswana culture, which predates the colonial
era. Thus, by maintaining a free society characterized by
principles of free speech, freedom of expression and
freedom of association, Botswana became one of Africa’s
thriving democracies (Maundeni, 2005). These were
preserved without blemish until the reign of Lieutenant
General Seretse Khama Ian Khama from 2008.
The Ian Khama regime managed to reverse the
democratic profile of Botswana through the DIS. The DIS
turned itself on the civilian population with a legacy of
terror. Public extra-judicial killings by state security
agents, particularly in operations overseen and
coordinated by the DIS, became a commonality.
Communication surveillance is instigated towards

politicians who seem to be a threat to the presidency:
whether from the ruling party or opposition. It mattered
less whether this perceived threat was of national
security or towards the Khama personality cult, a man
whose leadership aptitude is considered wanting (Good,
2010). Black operations were instigated against certain
members of the public on political grounds or in order to
defeat the ends of justice. Select members of the society,
including tertiary students, became victims of renditions
during which security agents issued death threats. These
not only cause terror but undermined a democratic legacy
enshrined in civil freedoms, political freedom, judicial
independence, and a proper use of security institutions.
Thus terror escalated in the public realm.
The purpose of this article is to provide a narrative of
emerging state terrorism from a security point of view.
The focus is on misplaced intelligence activities,
particularly covert operations that undermine democracy,
hence raising the level of insecurity within society. The
primary thesis is that the arbitrary use of force and
violence, including structural violence, amounts to

 Gwatiwa

terrorism. These operations erode the freedoms in a
democratic entrenching a culture of fear and terror. This
terrorism paralyzes the functions of government. The
power of one arm of government is inflated while its
counterparts are rendered useless and ceremonial. The
drift of this paper is informed by the murder of unarmed
civilians; communication surveillance; renditions and
other acts meant to create a culture of fear and terror.
Objectives
The objective of this paper is to provide a scientific and
systematic analysis of politico-security events in
Botswana. It seeks to prove that there is evidence of
emerging state terrorism. This form of terrorism started
recently at the hands of the newly created DIS. The
paper seeks to show the gap between a tranquil and
accountable democratic state in 2008, to a less
democratic, rogue and terror state within three years;
instigated and the local populace. The method of analysis
hinges on the constriction of democratic credentials.
ANALYTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This paper does not present a rigorous emphasis of
theoretical framework. It is primarily based on a
systematic analysis of politico-security events occurring
in Botswana. Below is delineation of this systematic as
well as the conceptual basis of the argument.
This paper analyses the events that occurred under the
aegis and auspices of security organs in Botswana. This
analysis hinges on the activities that occurred at the
hands of intelligence agencies. Although the text seeks to
exclusively chronicle events at the hands DIS, the
clandestineness
behind
intelligence
operations
encroaches on this precision. In some of the cases it is
not clear whether the operations are DIS, instigated or
they were inter-agency operations. The analysis exploits
several factors in order to underscore the terrorist nature
of the activities. Democratic rights and freedoms, as
reflected in the constitution, form the basis for analysis.
There is also conformity to the legality and judicial
correctness of the operations, whether they [dis]regard
the foundations of political stability as enshrined in the
laws of Botswana. This also qualifies the element of fear,
which is the end objective of inflicting terror in human
beings. In other cases there is a leaning on the subject of
human and civil rights. The conceptual basis of the study
invokes a controversial and sometimes ambiguous
concept of state terrorism. This study adopts the following
definition of state terrorism, as captured in Gareau (2004:
14).
State terrorism consists of deliberate acts of physical
and/or psychological nature perpetrated on select groups
of victims. Its intent is to mould the thinking and

177

behaviour not only of these target groups, but more
importantly, of larger sections of society that identify or
share the views and aspirations of the targeted groups or
who might easily be led to do so.
This aptly captures the scenario in Botswana. What
follows is a discussion of events of both physical and
psychological harm intended to protect a personality cult.
Whether the personality figure is the engineer of this
process or this is a result of a few zealots is beyond the
scope of this discussion. However, it is in the interest of
this study to discuss these events.
State terrorism varies from the legitimate right of the
state to use reasonable force. Norbert Elias (as cited in
Schlesinger, 1991: 9) argues that areasonable use of
forceis usually inclined to protect the civilian population.
This requires either separate or collaborative operations
of state security apparatuses such as the army, police
and civil intelligence community: these are monopolized
by the state (Poggi, 1990). The objective is to
depersonalize the use of force so that it is not abused as
various arms of the state, through a system of checksand-balances,
“[provides]
a
legal
framework
which...[seeks] to limit its (the state’s) arbitrariness”
(Schlesinger, 1991: 9). The supremacy of just laws
ensures that the state does not become a terror to its
citizens.
State terrorism is engineered by an arbitrary use of
force and violence by the state. Historical examples of
state terrorism include apartheid South Africa. This
example captures the refinement of this concept. P.W.
Botha characterized Mandela and the ANC as terrorists,
yet the apartheid state was responsible for physical and
psychological terror. This means that an analysis of state
terrorism should be impact-based. The apartheid
government passed an anti-terrorism law in 1967. By the
late 1980s South Africa had a plethora of secret
committees, teams and squadrons which exacerbated
terror throughout the country (Perdue, 1989: 92-94).
Other cases, in South East-Asia, exhibited a direct
terrorism from the state against specific groups
(Heryanto, 2006). These include military crackdowns,
torture, suppression of opinion through black
propaganda, andextra judicial killing of civilians (Simons,
2000). This extreme and unjustifiable use of force or
violence is meant to create fear in the public. Use of
violence objective of these mechanisms is to create and
sustain terror among civilians.
Autocratic laws have often preceded state terrorism. In
such cases, despots can often retort that security
institutions are fulfilling their mandate in law-enforcement.
The former Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismarck,
once dissolved parliament after they rejected a battery of
laws which parliament deemed autocratic. He invoked
executive privilege and thus unilaterally enacted laws that
paved way for state terrorism (Miller, 1995: 39-41). The
aforementioned case of apartheid South Africa is also a
case in point. Therefore, a law in itself is not a basis for

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J. Afr. Stud. Dev.

adjudging whether a system is justified or not. The law in
question should be just, coming short of encroaching on
civil liberties that guarantee a free society.
The above framework forms the basis of what
happened in Botswana since 1998. The following
sections will discuss the legality of the phenomenon as
well as case studies of incidents of state terrorism, at the
hands of security services. It is also imperative to note
that the perceived state terrorism is strictly ascribed to
security institutions. It does not extend to other arms of
the state. However, this parochial framework does not
annul the fact that fragments of state terrorism are
starting to emerge in Botswana, and are gaining
momentum.

METHODOLOGY
This study follows a qualitative approach. As fitting for a qualitative
approach, there is heavy reliance on a descriptive representation of
the phenomenon in question (Weber, 1949). There is no use of
statistical data or evidence, in which case it annuls the relevance of
quantitative approach or a combined methodology (combining
both). Thus, the research follows two procedures.
The study makes use of two research procedures: historical and
survey procedures. The historical procedure makes use of literature
preceding this study. This includes texts dealing with Botswana’s
changing political landscape. Some also point to the shift in security
policy. The paper makes use of such revisionist texts as those of
Professor Kenneth Good. It also makes use of texts by leading
political scientists on Botswana such as Ian Taylor. There has been
very little written about intelligence related activities in Botswana,
hence the paper leapfrogs local texts in favour of those published
elsewhere. This includes conceptual subjects such as state
terrorism and ethics of intelligence operations. There is reliance on
credible media reports regarding the activities of intelligence
organizations. The paper prefers the Sunday Standard for its
credible practice of investigative journalism. In case of Mmegi,
articles are selected sensitively, seeking to decipher between cases
of speculation and veracity. It will emerge that cases cited from
Mmegi are mostly court cases.
The survey procedure makes use of the interviews and
communications with select individuals. This forms a smaller part of
the study. The objective is to cover subjects outside the scope of
media reportage. In such cases the author used direct interviews
(when in Botswana: March-May, 2011) and electronic
communication [in the early part of the compilation of evidence,
while in Japan]. Names are disclosed in the case of public figures
and deceased, and concealed in case of living sources. Some
cases were left out due lack of apparent evidence as well as their
capacity to undermine diplomatic relations with other countries.

State terrorism in Africa
State terrorism is conspicuous in many African countries. The
difference between what happened in most African countries and
Botswana is that the former were not democracies. The number of
democracies in Africa has increased since the end of the Cold War.
However, a number of countries that emerged from conflicts still
grapple with abuse of the security forces. The abuse of intelligence
agencies is rife. Those opposed to these bogus governments are
killed or die under mysterious circumstances (Ayittey, 1992). The

lack of democracy in this countries means that the deaths of such
victims cannot be probed. Even in the new democracies,
accountability is still a challenge. Although African state may be
impervious to democratic accountability, they are not behind in the
use of security forces. This includes use within and without the
country. In both cases, circumstances often dictate that the state
use covert operations. However, in standard international practice
covet operations should mostly be an extension of foreign policy
where overt diplomacy comes short (Cater, 2000; Volkman, 1994).
In this dispensation plausible deniability is necessary as required by
the nature of these activities, which include propaganda and
assassinations (Lowenthal, 2000; Holt, 1995). However, African
states have not hesistated to use this system against its own
populaces. In some cases the use of grotesque methods during
liberation struggles have often translated into the postindependence governments, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa
(Smith and Tromp, 2009). Thus most countries are more
experienced in the grotesque use of security institutions and much
less experienced in democratic accountability of these institutions.
It is also imperative to note the high politicization of security forces
in Africa. First, such as in the Southern African case, leaders sought
to reward one another for their efforts during the liberation struggle.
For example, in South Africa and Zimbabwe, former leaders of the
armed wings of the ANC and ZIPRA and ZANLA, respectively were
grafted into the new military (Ibid. Smith and Tromp, 2009; Sibanda,
2005: 244; Alao, 1994: 82-88). This comradeship grew to blur the
lines between the politicians and civil servants. Second, this system
sometimes evolves out of gradual mutual endearment as elitism of
comprador grows within a state. For example, in the process of
Africanising the Tanzanian civil service (which took considerably
longer than other countries such as the Congo), politicians replaced
British senior civil servants with native civil servants whom they
later endeared with quasi detrimental effects (Pratt, 1971: 105-106).
The prospect of politicized security institutions also stems from such
scenarios.
The antecedent of the emerging state terrorism in Botswana
arises from similar arrangements: a buddy system that results in a
clique consisting of an amalgam of technocrats and autocrats
working in concert to reverse a democracy built over two centuries
(although the actual state was incepted forty-four years ago).

Creation of the DIS
Botswana’s democracy encountered a major shift during towards
the end of President Masire’s rule. He invoked executive privilege
and incepted what came to be known as automatic succession. It
ensures that the vice president of the Republic of Botswana
automatically assumes the presidency when the term of the
incumbent expires (Good, 2006: 53). It was also designed such that
term of the new benefactor commences a year before the general
elections. This is the process that ushered Lt. General Ian Khamathe creator of the DIS-into the presidency.
Khama joined politics as Vice President in 1998. Prior to this
Khama was the commander of the armed forces, the Botswana
Defence Force. Khama was not new to joining institutions at senior
levels. He started his military career at age 24, as the world’s
youngest brigadier general (Henk, 2004). During his ten years as
Vice President, Khama was controversial. He abolished the national
service1, took unjustified sabbatical leave, flew military helicopters
1

The national service was popularly known as TireloSechaba. Under this
programme, high school graduates served in areas culturally different from
their place of origin and schooling. Khama abolished this programme only to
bring it back under his term in the form of a post-graduate internship for
university and college graduates.

 Gwatiwa

and had a propensity of attacking fellow legislators whenever he
chose to attend parliament. During this era, dictatorial tendencies
started to surface (Good, 2010). Key among his initiatives was to
suggest the creation of the DIS. Legislator and fierce critic of
Khama, Honourable Akanyang Magama, stated that the pretext for
the proposed intelligence agency was to help Khama “execute his
job [as president] more effectively” (Magama, 2008). The idea was
brought before parliament for debate.
The bill was met with mixed feelings from the political
establishment and civil society. A number of legislators from the
ruling party and opposition were not convinced by the bill. Magama
constantly expressed misgivings over the correlation between
Khama’s dictatorial tendencies and the use of the intelligence
community. Another fierce Khama critic, HonourableDumelang
Saleshando, was not entirely dismissive of the bill but pointing to
certain aspects of the bill, such as oversight, that would
compromise its credibility. Academics were expressly sceptical.
During a symposium, Dr. Elmon Tafa predicted that the directorate
would be used for political suppression. The then Minister of
Defence, Security and Justice, Honourable Phandu Skelemani, who
was tasked with campaigning for acceptance of the bill, remarked
during the same symposium that “whether you like it or not, we will
pass this bill” 2. The bill was finally passed as an act of law in March
2008, a month before Ian Khama’s presidential inauguration.
The Act gave state agents arbitrary powers to use [unreasonable]
force andviolence. Among these were powers to use firearms-a
luxury that even CIA agents did not enjoy during the Cold War
(Devlin, 2007). Prior to this Act, the right to use arms was limited to
police paramilitary units, and the army. The Act also empowered
agents arrest without a warrant. Section 24 of the Act proffers
immunity for all agents and auxiliary operatives (Intelligence Act,
2008). This meant that agents could operate with absolute impunity,
regardless of the nature and legality of their actions.
The DIS came into being without credibleoversight. The director
of the DIS reports directly to the president (Khama Inaugural
Speech, 2008) 3. Although Section 31(3) of the Act mandates the
creation of an Appeals Tribunal, there was none until the directorate
degenerated into a political mess, at which point Khama appointed
his party colleagues and chums to that tribunal. The Leader of
opposition was never consulted during this process as required by
law. The then leader of opposition, Otsweletse Moupo, was
consulted when Khama had commissioned his allies to the tribunal
(Lute, 2008). The oversight mechanism remains politically skewed
towards Khama’s trustees and party loyalists.

INCIDENTS OF STATE TERRORISM
Tertiary students harassment
The inception of the DIS, in 2008, coincided with student
demonstrations at the University of Botswana (UB). Mass
demonstrations and class boycotts occur frequently at the
national university, often headed by the Student
Representative Council (SRC). The most popular UBincited strike ever in Botswana was that following the
murder of a 14-year old SegametsiMogomotsi of
2
The symposium was organized by the then Fourth Estate Club, a student
movement housed within the Department of Media Studies, at the University.
The panelists of the symposium included Hon. Phandu Skelemani, Hon.
DumelangSaleshando, Attorney TshiamoRantao and key members of the
Socialist movement of Botswana.
3
Ian Khama’s inaugural speech of April 1st, 2008 is available in video (English)
at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5748864085901803362

179

Mochudi. The strike spread from the main university
campus in Gaborone to Mochudi village (Good, 1996). All
major political parties have microcosms within the UB
campus. These include GS-26, part of the BDP; MASSBNF, part of the BNF; BCP and BPP. All but the GS-26
always express hostility towards the government. In
2008, MASS-BNF was in control of the SRC. They
instigated class boycotts over a number of issues
including book allowance, stipend disbursements,
accommodation and poor university management. These
strikes always enjoy massive coverage from the media.
As elsewhere, the intelligence communityis always
present to appraise the impact of the strike on national
security (Johnson, 2007: 177). During the 1990s
university students fermented a national strike that spilt
4
as far as Mochudi , escalating into a case of national
security (Masire, 2008). Thus this presence was justified
over the years. However, in 2008 there was the DIS
which not only appraised the situation but was eager to
terrorize the students.
The president of the UB Student Representative
Council (SRC) became the victim of an intelligence
5
rendition . The agents issued death threats and
abandoned him the forest (Madibana, 2009). Key student
activists were increasingly abducted by unknown and
armed security agents over the next days. There was no
violence on the part of the students, such as to warrant
these intimidations. They were warned over their key role
in the strike. Some were intimidated for their
outspokenness or ‘tarnishing the name of the president’.
The irony of these claims by security agents is that the
Penal Code provides for the prosecution for sedition and
insulting the head of state (Penal Code, Sections 50-51).
The DIS agentscould not charge these students because
they (the agents) were blatantly abusing their authority.
The publicity wing of the DIS later denied these claims
following a public outcry over these abuses (Motlogelwa,
2009). During this strike, uniformed police also whipped
students who were on a peaceful march to present a
petition to the Minister of Education. This marked the first
rigorous charges by state security units against members
of the public.
This episode marked two important elements of state
terrorism. First, it emerged that for the first time state
security agents (primarily DIS) could apply an arbitrary
use of force with impunity. Second, it marked the
beginning of the desire to instil fear in members of the
public. The beating of students by police was also
unlawful. The Penal Code authorizes the use of
reasonable force in case of public disorder and
disturbance (Penal Code, Section 42). There was no
4

Mochudi is the headquarters of Kgatleng District. It is located some 37
kilometers north-east of Gaborone. It is one of the largest villages in Botswana.
5
A rendition is an intelligence term referring to a process wherein agents abduct
a subject and move him/her to another place for questioning or torture. See
Weissman, 2010

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J. Afr. Stud. Dev.

public disorder and disturbance during this incident. This
does not imply that students never riot, yet the march
was peaceful and the action could not also be deemed
pre-emptive. It was the undisciplined behaviour of DIS
agents that could ferment a student uprising. However,
the students proved more disciplined and never rioted.
Intellectual repression
The DIS subsequently moved its harassment from
students to university lecturers and academics. It is
common for university lecturers to publish opinion pieces
in the media. Key commenters are mainly proffer
analyses of political and social issues. In most cases they
appear critical of government policies, and certain social
trends. This is something that Khama does not take
kindly to criticism. The DIS did not hesitate to intimidate
these academics. This does imply that Khama directly
authorized any of these harassments: it could have been
his zealots. Nevertheless, intimidating professors was not
easy as intimidating students and foreign professors (who
were deported for their views). Some of the academics
proved difficult to deal with. One of them suggested to the
agents that they could exercise their civil right and
counter his writings in the media.Others received death
threats but continued writing to this day.
Repression of intellectual freedom is a key indicator of
state terrorism. Despots have a propensity to limit
intellectual freedom in order to exert more control of the
society. Freedoms and rights predate what the world
knows to be Botswana’s democracy. There are old age
adages that have often guided these freedoms in political
and social forums: “Mmualebeoabo a bua la gagwe” (a
speaker is simply expressing his/her opinion) and
“Mafoko a kgotla a mantle otlhe” (all statements are worth
listening to). These embody the philosophy that guided
judicial and political proceedings in traditional Tswana
society. These also define the free society that the DIS
and is bent to curtail. However, the limits of these
freedoms [relating to sedition] are clearly defined in the
Penal Code (the locus classicus of law enforcement in
Botswana) and due punishment is prescribed (Penal
Code, Sections 50-51). Sections 74 and 98 also define
the boundaries for expressing dissatisfaction with the
government. Thus the Penal Code outlines what
constitutes national security threats, a buzzword the DIS
has often abuse. What the DIS and sister institutions
embarked on was a clear violation of both the law and
order of society by abusing their powers and mandate.

intelligence (IMINT) and electronic signals intelligence
(ELINT). The objective of communications intelligence is
to monitor perceived security threats. This involves the
tapping of telecommunication devices, including
unconventional electronic gadgets. Idealistically, the
scope and frequency of surveillance should match the
perceived threat (Todd and Bloch, 2003: 35-37).
However, this practice varies from one agency to
another.
Communication surveillance in Botswana includes
eavesdropping into telephone calls, and email
communication. It is yet to be clear whether this is a
blanket operation or select few individuals pending court
authorization. Although most people believe that the
surveillance process is erratic, the Registrar and Master
of High Court attested to the fact that courts were
inundated with court applications to intercept private
phone calls (Morewagae, 2010). The veracity of these
claims remains suspect. However, the process which
preceded the surveillance incited this paranoia and
cynicism.
In 2008 the government of Botswana mandated the
registration of mobile communication gadgets, and
proceeded to tap other forms of communication. For
example, surveillance cameras were installed at the
University of Botswana. Thus government became privy
to all communication. The position of government was
that this initiative was part of an anti-cybercrime strategy
(Koontse, 2008). They denied any connection between
mobile-phone
registration
and
communication
surveillance. The DIS later acquired antelephone-call
eavesdropping machine. It eventually became clear that
the police service had also acquired its own
eavesdropping machine. DIS director, Isaac Kgosi,
denied that the directorate possessed such equipment
(Ngakane, 2010). Ironically, Kgosi later admitted that the
DIS had used such equipment to monitor a serial killer in
Kanye6 (discussed thus).
The DIS also began to target several opinion makers
using the newly acquired surveillance material. In 2009, a
young radical
returned from Germany with
unprecedented political zeal. (Mokwena*, personal
communication, April, 2010). The following week
Mokwena* died in a mysterious car accident. There
continues to be a common view that the DIS is complicit
in his death.
The DIS also instigated cyber-warfare on journalists
and lawyers who handles high profile cases, particular
those in which security agents were complicit. For
instance, following the extra-judicial killing of John
Kalafatis, journalists reporting on the issue were
constantly harassed by security agents over their interest

Communication surveillance and monitoring
Communication surveillance falls within an area called
communication intelligence (COMINT). It is further
divided into signals intelligence (SINGIT), image

6

Kanye is one of the main villages in Botswana, and the administrative center
of the Southern District. It is also the capital of the Bangkwetsi tribe. It is
located south west of Gaborone.

 Gwatiwa

in the matter. An investigative journalist7indicates that the
DIS would send a text message with a warning to these
journalists. The message would appear for as long as it
optimally takes to read then disappear. The journalist
also disclosed that Duma Boko, who was then handling
the Kalafatis case, received such a text message. This
was an attempt to silence the last remaining vanguard of
freedom of expression. Had they been successful, they
would have managed to intensify the fear that already
existed.
A propensity to propagate fear indicates that a stateis
gravitating towards terror. This sort of campaign starts
with open or clandestine threats. In the event that these
campaigns fail, the perpetrators resort to killing or
eliminating the subject. These sorts of death are
conspicuous throughout most of Africa (Ayittey, 1992). In
reality, there was little that the security agents could do
because the extrajudicial killing of Kalafatis had already
raised alarms outside Botswana. However, the security
agency was adamant to escalate the fear and it did work.
Most Botswana within the country were not aware that
the new developments were closely watched in the
region and abroad, hence the fear-spreading campaign
worked. Moreover, the main concern for security organs
covers urban areas, which are very few in number. Thus
this operation could be easily executed in Gaborone and
few key towns. Within a short time most people feared
the DIS as though it was a terror squad.
It is imperative to question the transparency of
communication surveillance in Botswana. The may hem
that surrounds this process is suspect. Government
claimed that mobile-phone registration was aimed at
fighting cyber-crime. Where is that evidence?
Government launched the Financial Intelligence Agency
(FIA), but still cannot afford to make it fully operational
(Pitse, 2011). Is it because there is nothing for them to
do? Could it be that there is negligible cybercrime in
Botswana? The number of misplaced use of
communication surveillance of politicians also leaves a lot
to be desired. The intent is not to demonize
communication surveillance, but impropriety surrounding
its application. The fact that the surveillance is bent on
terror is what is particularly disturbing.

Extra judicial killings and torture
Incidents of public shootings stood at twelve by 2010. In
prior years such incidents were rare and occasionally
carried out against armed suspects following extensive
intelligence exercises. This changed with the advent of
the DIS. Shooting suspects and wanted criminals in
public became conspicuous. Two of the cases were
mistaken identities. A man suspected of stealing a mobile
7

Identity of the journalist and name of the newspaper withheld for security
reasons, and sworn anonymity

181

phone was shot in front of his family in Maun (Mooketsi,
2010). The deceased turned out to have been preparing
to leave for another city the next day. Another man on the
police’s wanted list was shot in front of his father in
Molepolole. A Zimbabwean national suspected of armed
robbery and also on police wanted list was shot by
security agents and left for dead (Pitse, 2009c). Not only
was this a rapid pace of killings, but never before had
suspects been shot in public in this manner.
The most virulent of these acts was the extra-judicial
killing of one John Kalafatis on the night of 12 March,
2009. The shooting occurredat the Extension 12 Mall, in
Gaborone. Until then Kalafatis was an unpopular petty
criminal. Days before the shooting, John Kalafatis was
implicated in a robbery at Phakalane Estates (the
plushest suburb of Gaborone). The victim was a friend of
President Khama’s. Following a joint manhunt by agents
of the directorate, police and a commando unit of the
BDF8, Kalafatis was shot in public view at the
aforementioned venue which is a well frequented pub.
Posthumous ballistic analysis confirmed that he was shot
using armour-piercing bullets. Current judicial testimony
point exonerates the police from the killings, thus liability
falls on the soldiers and intelligence agents (who did not
and cannot appear before court). Only one military
intelligence official appeared before court. The four were
convicted and sentenced to 11 years imprisonment and
the military intelligence officer sentenced to four
(Morewagae, 2011). (They are currently appealing their
sentences)9. Other DIS agents who had allegedly been
involved in the manhunt were never prosecuted. They
were shielded by the law.
Another court case involves police intelligence officers
are facing criminal charges following a drive and shoot
along the A1 Highway10. The security agents claimed that
the suspects were implicated in an attempted robbery.
Court proceedings would later reveal that some white
residents around Ruretse (a farm owned by the Khama
family) had reported a suspicious vehicle moving in their
neighbourhood. The state agents chased and shot at the
suspects in broad daylight. This was not a clandestine
operation. There was not even an attempt to follow these
suspects to a less populated area. The agents rather
jeopardized the lives of civilians by shooting at unarmed
suspects. They explicitly disturbed public order. These
activities may be clandestine, their increasing statistics
before the courts of laws have drawn the attention of the
public.
Incidents of torture at the hands of the DIS became
were increasingly reported in the media. The Serious
8

Botswana Defence Force
The latest information in the media denotes that the convicts intend to appeal
their sentences. Ref. Morewagae (2011) Kalafatis killers to appeal, Mmegi, 28
(119)
10
This is an international route that starts from Ramatlabama border [with
South Africa], passes through Gaborone, Mahalapye and Francistown and
proceeds to the Ramokgwebana border [with Zimbabwe].
9

 182

J. Afr. Stud. Dev.

Crimes Unit (police intelligence) is also implicated on
increased used of torture. One of the cases before the
courts, features tortured female suspects who were not
subsequently taken to hospital (“Five CID officers
charged”, 2009). In another case the DIS tortured
soldiers over a missing gun which was later found in the
armoury.
Disregard for human life is a key indicator of state
terrorism. It is paradoxical that Ian Khama became
president he promised that one of the pillars of
government would be dignity. Alas his key security
project, the DIS, has done everything to frustrate dignity.
Where is dignity of suspects when they are shot to death
in public? Where is the dignity [of the public] when public
order is disturbed by trigger-happy security agents? In
the pre-Khama years, public shootings were unheard of.
Paramilitary units used force when necessary. In some
cases the Special Support Group (SSG)-a police
paramilitary unit-used arms in order to incapacitate
violent and/or armed criminals11. This use of force was
never deliberately lethal. The society was engulfed in fear
following the public execution of John Kalafatis. The
public now fears both the DIS and criminals. Moreover,
this trend is likely to incite even the pettiest of criminals to
start arm themselves. This boomerang will make
Botswana unliveable, perhaps proving too difficult for the
state to control security.
The relationship between these shootings and elitism is
a source of concern. It is the duty of the state to provide
security details for sitting and retired presidents.
President Ian Khama is still a bachelor as a
sexagenarian. It becomes more difficult to determine who
qualifies for the presidential security detail. This could
end up being extended to his relatives and friends. This is
evinced by shootings that occurred near Ruretse, and
that the killing of Kalafatis followed complaints by a
Caucasian friend of Ian’s. This is particularly disturbing in
that anyone with an irrational agenda who befriend might
have DIS services at their command. The DIS, its
legitimacy notwithstanding, is a public institution
sustained by public funds hence it should be accountable
and serve the good of the public, not elites.
Covert operations: Defeating the ends of justice
According to Carter (2000) covert operations are carried
out in utmost secrecy which should not be traced back to
the state. Covert operations are sometimes illegal
activities but are an extension of government policy
especially in cases where overt operations prove difficult
or impossible. Lochrie (1999) also discusses the
relationship between power and covert operations,
implying that elites and regimes generally depend on
11

This does not imply that police do not carry guns. They do not carry them
regularly but only in cases where there are reports of armed criminal activity.

covert action to maintain power. Covert action has been a
key asset for defeating the ends of justice in Botswana
during a spate of high-profile court cases involving
members of the elites.
The first incidence of abuse of covert action among in
favour of elites involved the Masitara rape case. Robert
Masitara, a local business tycoon and philanthropist was
accused of rape by one of his employees. The evidence
involved a towel that Masitara had allegedly used after
forcing himself on his employee. The towel contained
samples of semen from the rape scene. During his trial,
some of the evidence disappeared from a police station
in Gaborone through covert means [which were never
investigated] (Mooketsi, 2004). Masitara is a close friend
of the former president and his vice, Festus Mogae and
Ian Khama respectively. The mysterious loss of evidence
undermined the case and Masitara was finally acquitted.
He is currently serving as a specially elected member of
parliament in the Khama administration.
In another case covert action was instigated against the
chief prosecutor of former Managing Director of
Debswana, Louis Nchindo. Debswana is joint merger of
DeBeers and the Botswana government. Nchindo was
charged with corruption andeconomic crimes committed
during and after his official tenure. This was the highest
profile case of its nature. At the peak of the case there
was an unusually skilful break into the house of the chief
prosecutor, Ngakayagae. Only his laptop was stolen
(Gaotlhobogwe, 2010). This was not a case of turning the
case in favour of Nchindo. Nchindo had earlier remarked
that the DIS was after him. His court case had implicated
many members of Botswana’s political elite and thus
increasingly became a menace to political careers of
many. The stolen laptop contained crucial information
about the case which appeared to implicate many
political figures. Nchindo ultimately died from an alleged
suicide that police investigations kept in utter secrecy
(Morula, 2010; Modise, 2010). Members of the public
rarely believe this story. Nonetheless, with Nchindo out of
the picture, the political careers of many elites were more
secure. A similar case of covert action featured in the
Kalafatis case. The court case was a high profile case
from the onset. There were allegations of abuse of office
on the part of the presidency. This was never proven.
However, the case involved security agents as well as
members of the intelligence community. A laptop
computer belonging to Duma Boko, who was
representing the Kalafatis family, disappeared during a
burglary. In a manner similar to the burglary at
Ngakaagae’s house, the ‘burglars’ only stole the
computer
and
its
accessories,
leaving
other
valuables.The stolen laptop contained crucial information
on the case launched by the Kalafatis family against the
state. The case was finally taken over by the Directorate
of Public Prosecution, who prosecuted the accused in
their private capacity.
Gomolemo Motswaledi became the first person to

 Gwatiwa

challenge the state president in a landmark application at
the high court. Motswaledi was the then secretary
general of the ruling party and had challenged Khama’s
non-democratic tendencies. The case drew increasing
political and civil interest from across the country
because there is no clear separation of partisan politics
and governance in Botswana (Tutwane, 2011). Following
this application, which he lost on grounds of presidential
immunity, he was dismissed from the ruling party. A
splinter party was formed around the increasing outcry
over Khama’s tendencies. The party was named
Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD). Within a
year the party had become widely popular among the
working class and youth. At the zest of the party’s
maturity there was a burglary at Motswaledi’s house. The
perpetrators appropriated three laptops and two
Blackberry mobile phones, ignoring more valuable assets
(Nkala, 2010). There was a stark similarity between this
burglary and those involving Boko, Ntwayagae and
Professor Good. The electronic gadgets contained crucial
information about the dealings of the party as well as
those of his personal life. The similarities of these events
draw curiosity. The plausibility of these covert operations
being carried out bythe DIS was very apparent. The state
has not so far given any statement to counter such claims
in the media. Even if they were to deny, it is nature of
covert operations—plausible deniability.
In this regard the quest for power by elites undermined
justice. This occurred in cases which featured state
terrorism-the Kalafatis case; and whenever elites had
done wrong or felt their future was threatened. It is not
difficult to relate this type of burglaries to black
operations. This is what is to be expected in the case of a
national intelligence agency that does not account to a
legislative body. Thus the elites, mostly from the ruling
party, are able to use the intelligence agency for petty
projects and personal vendettas. The prospects of terror
are heightened among members of society who guard
democracy: lawyers, judges, journalists, civil activists and
members of opposition parties. In further development,
this tendency may even work against the members of the
elite groups as they grapple for more power and control.
Thus the DIS finds itself in a channel of abuse. What is
the future of Botswana’s democracy if the state sows
a culture of terror among the sentinels of democracy? It is
fitting to submit that this sort of activities jeopardizes the
mandate and future democratic institutions and their
occupational candidates.
Where is the threat?
There are probably a number of operations that the
directorate may have cracked. Given the secrecy of such
activities, the public does not have access to such cases
of success. That notwithstanding, the DIS chose to leak
some of their operations to the media. These were

183

essentially public warnings, in which they sought the
cooperation of the public. However, these issued light
into the prime cases of the directorate. In one of the
cases the head of the DIS, Isaac Kgosi, claimed that AlQaeda had operations within Botswana, which sought to
target the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. The
suspects, mainly of Pakistani and Egyptian descent were
later deported (Pitse, 2009d). Another case involved a
Jamaican radical Islamist who was also declared a
persona non grata and deported. The other case was the
discovery of an international human trafficking syndicate
with operations in Botswana. These were credible
operations befitting an intelligence organization.
The preceding cases do not exhibit a sense of
exceptional ingenuity. These are rudimentary intelligence
duties which can be handled by the police intelligence.
Tracking of trafficking syndicates and terrorist networks
continue to be part of the mandate of Interpol (Fooner,
1989). By virtue of its name and structure, Interpol
exhibitsa
transnational
operation
which
brings
international criminal syndicates under its ambit. This
brings the necessity of Botswana bringing the
aforementioned crimes under the operational mandate of
the DIS. This would stand in contrast with, perhaps the
CIA, having direct interest in fighting Al Qaeda. In the
case of the CIA there is direct cause (linked to domestic
security policy) to pursue terrorist networks. It is yet to be
established and justified whether Botswana has interests
in terrorism, when South Africa [by far having the politicoeconomic raison d’être to fight terrorism] has not shown
such interest. What terrorist threats face Botswana?
What is the DIS doing that the Botswana Police Service’s
Serious Crimes unit cannot do?
Real security threats ignored
Although the intelligence Act of 2008 mandates the DIS
to quell external and internal threats, it has failed the
latter at its embryonic stage. Events that brought the
nation to a standstill occurred during the same period that
the DIS was making media headlines for impropriety.
This brought the efficacy and mandate of the DIS
(outside instigating terror) into question.
The capability and credibility of the DIS first became
suspect during a series of serial murders in Kanye and
the surrounding villages. A certain Oreeditse Mokoti killed
about eight female victims between September 2008 and
July 2009. The alleged killer would call police and notify
them of his impending moves. The police failed to
apprehend the suspect. On one occasion the suspect
posed for a picture with his arm around President Khama
during a BDP political rally in Kanye. The suspect
laterallegedly committed suicide in police custody. This
happened before there could be a positive DNA
confirmation of his criminal liability. This raised scepticism
over whether Mokoti was criminally liable. Kgosi would

 184

J. Afr. Stud. Dev.

later claim that the DIS had monitored Mokoti’s calls and
were aware of his identity his final “Kodak moments” with
President Khama at a BDP rally held in Kanye (Pitse,
2009a, b). This presented dire failure on the part of the
DIS. It appears that their concern was the security of the
president rather than the general public. It betrays the
generic mandate of the DIS issued by law. This
somewhat inflates the suspicion that the DIS is a pet
project meant for Khama and his fan club. This brings the
credibility of this organization into question.
It is beyond the scope of this article to deliberate the
criminal liability of Mokoti, but the failure of the DIS hardly
escapes notice. They failed to ensure “national security”
when needed most. Kgosi’s statements reflect a public
relations makeover for professional incompetence. If the
DIS seeks to qualify its legitimacy, it should gain the
confidence of the public. They should contribute
meaningfully to the security of the nation. It is the
mandate of the state security mechanisms, of which the
DIS is part. If national security is a top priority for the DIS,
they would not allow such killings that threaten human
security. Director Kgosi’s statements regarding Mokoti’s
calls prompt a lot of questions. Does this mean that the
DIS was aware of the calls made to the police? Even if
the DIS came late into the picture in order to support the
shortcomings of the police, what is the communications
surveillance for? Does the controversial surveillance
system not allow the DIS to pre-empt threats? What is
the duty of the more than 5000 people they have enlisted
across the country? The DIS and police have technical
equipment (for COMMINT) enabling them to trace and
locate calls (Mokone, 2006; Nkala, 2010).This dramatic
outcome and the mystery thereof justify the scepticism as
to whether the deceased suspect was really liable. Could
this have been an operation to derail the public’s
attention from the Kalafatis saga, which had dragged for
months? Nevertheless, the paramount argument here is
that the DIS failed to live up to its mandate.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding argument posits that Botswana is
experiencing a new surge of state terrorism. The
intelligence community, through the aegis of the DIS is
the main source of terror. This stands in contrast to the
existence of similar establishment in the ‘disciplined
forces’, vis-à-vis Botswana Defence Force and the
Botswana Police Service. This stands in contrast to four
decades of peace and tranquillity in the democratic state.
In this new era the DIS has instigated various acts of
terror against members of the public. These include extra
judicial killings, most of which are public; torture of
suspects in order extract confessions, even for minor
crimes; communication surveillance against people with
dissenting views; and open intimidation in a bid of
intellectual repression. These acts of terror by the state

are intended to instil fear in the public. It is a misfire to
assume that the DIS acts in isolation. It is part of the state
and their actions are not reprimanded by other arms of
government. This terror is not in the interest of the public,
but against the public.
This emerging state terrorism sees Botswana
gravitating towards the grotesque legacies such
witnessed elsewhere. State terrorism has been
sufficiently practiced and the horrors thereof documented
in Congo, Uganda, Libya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe (De
Witte, 2002; Sullivan, 2009; Kyemba, 1977). This is the
direction in which Botswana is headed. It matters less
whether this has happened elsewhere in Africa.
Botswana has managed to differentiate itself as a model
state in Africa over the years.
This paper proffers several suggestions on how
intelligence unit can be utilized in Botswana. First, the
DIS should make itself useful economically. In the postcold war era most intelligence agencies have turned their
efforts to economic espionage (Volkman, 1994). The
world of international relations is a place where each
nature strives for influence and power. It is not an easy
world. The DIS should indulge in economic espionage in
order to improve economic development.
Second, they should seek to counter espionage within
the border. Pateman (1992) discusses the extent to
which Western intelligence communities, as well as
Israel’s Mossad, and Chinese intelligence are loosely
infiltrating Africa. There is hardly an African country
without a clique of agents infiltrating and frustrating the
plans of the sitting government. As much as the current
President [Ian Khama] departed from the noninterference foreign policy, he is set on antagonizing
fellow African states; the DIS must be ready to tackle the
concomitant ramifications.
Finally, the state (through arms not complicit in the acts
of terror) should gravitate towards entrenching a purely
democratic and non-partisan oversight of the DIS. The
DIS, in an apolitical context, might be useful to Botswana.
However, in order to make it a sustainable organization
there should be credible oversight that survives the
Khama presidency. What if Khama’s successor becomes
tyrannical? What if the current (Kgosi) leadership of the
DIS is eventually assumed [years later] by eccentric,
paranoid half-brained quarks? This oversight must also
be entrenched in law. Most importantly this oversight
mechanism should make the DIS accountable to a wide
range of policymakers, including those that do not have a
sentimental attachment to the presidency.
In the event that the above recommendations fail, it is
sufficient to invoke a pre-emptory and dismissive
suggestion made in the run-up to the legalization of the
intelligence act. During a public debate Minister Phandu
Skelemani asked,“What country can exist for forty years
without an intelligence agency?” Dr. Elmon Tafa
responded by stating that Botswana has effectively
survived for forty years without a “civil” intelligence

 Gwatiwa

agency. If oversight of the DIS fails, Botswana is better
off without the DIS. If the DIS does not desist from its
terrorist acts, with other arms of the state unwilling to
placate this state terrorism, then it should be dismantled
and redirect the billions of dollars spent on the DIS to
infrastructural development, urbanization and economic
diversification.
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