Case 2:13-cr-00082-KJM Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 1 of 12
1 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
2 MATTHEW D. SEGAL
PAUL HEMESATH
3 Assistant United States Attorneys
501 I Street, Suite 10-100
4 Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 554-2700
5 Facsimile: (916) 554-2900
6 LESLIE R. CALDWELL
Assistant Attorney General
7 United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division
JAMES SILVER
8 Deputy Chief for Litigation
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
9 Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 514-1026
10
Attorneys for Plaintiff
11 United States of America
12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

13

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

14
15

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

16

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM OF THE
UNITED STATES - CORRECTED

v.

17
18

CASE NO. 2:13-CR-82 KJM

MATTHEW KEYS,
Defendant.

19

DATE: March 23, 2016
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
COURT: Hon. Kimberly J. Mueller

20
21

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States recommends that the Court impose a sentence of sixty months imprisonment.

22

23 The Probation Department’s recommendation of eighty-seven months is reasonable and the best way to
24 promote sentencing uniformity. But this prosecutor has been with this case since its inception in 2010
25 and submits that a five-year sentence as sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
26 purposes of sentencing. A sentence of five years imprisonment reflects Keys’s culpability and places his
27 case appropriately among those of other white collar criminals who do not accept responsibility for their
28 crimes.
SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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II.

1

FACTS

2

A.

The Offense Conduct

3

Matthew Keys was the site administrator for Fox 40 on Tribune Company’s content management

4 system (“CMS”). Tribune terminated Keys’s known CMS credentials on the day he was dismissed from
5 the newsroom. But for two months after that, Keys remained bitter, angry, and in control of login
6 credentials that he had secretly created while at the company. He also had his administrator’s
7 knowledge of the CMS’s architecture and vulnerabilities.
8

At first, Keys used what skills and knowledge he had to steal the list of the email addresses of

9 Fox 40’s viewers who had signed up for an affinity program, and, in many cases, given over their credit
10 card numbers. Through a proxy server, Keys sent anonymous, harassing emails to his former viewers
11 and colleagues.
12

That Keys intended to harm Fox 40 is obvious. Keys confessed that he wanted for there to be

13 consequences for his being hurt by Fox 40. (Dkt. 23-5 at 54.) He reveled in his power over Fox 40. As
14 “Cancer Man,” he bragged to Brandon Mercer, “you guys make it incredibly easy to gain access to your
15 subscriber list,” and, then, later, copied text about how easily a corporation’s security technology could
16 be undermined by “a determined insider” who decides to “go rogue.” (GX 108, 109.) In an email to
17 Fox 40’s most interested viewers, he suggested that Fox 40 was “spying on you, turning your credit card
18 statement into advertising GOLD[.]” (GX 107.)
19

Confident in his anonymity behind a foreign proxy server, (GX 103), Keys was also entirely

20 willing to inflict substantial collateral harm in the offline world. On December 3, 2010, when told about
21 the “crying senior citizen” who was worried about her account during her husband’s kidney failure,
22 Keys ridiculed Fox 40 for “report[ing] to the old folks home,” and suggested that the woman’s response
23 indicated her “priorities [were] in the wrong place.” (GX 1004.) Later the same day, Keys taunted Fox
24 40 with more stolen emails and asked, “think any of these guys are elderly?” (GX 108.)
25

On December 6, 2010, Keys sent an email to viewers excoriating a Fox 40 reporter for making a

26 woman cry. (GX 111.) He also started an eight-day campaign of accessing the CMS to lock his
27 replacement out of the CMS. (GX 112.) Keys knew what effect he was having. He later said, “I
28 believe that Brandon [Mercer] was terrified.” (Dkt. 23-5 at 56.)
SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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Then Keys found Anonymous, whom he called “A group of individuals who could do significant

1

2 damage . . . and not get[] caught.” (Dkt. 23-5 at 33.) Keys called Anonymous “malicious without a
3 cause,” and “the people who were doing the most damage.” (Id.) He was amazed by “the skill that was
4 in that chat room and blatant disregard for any kind of consequence.” (Id.) What did he do? On
5 December 8, 2010, Keys created and gave Anonymous backdoor access to the Tribune Company CMS
6 and told them what Tribune Company properties to target. (GX611.) Nothing obvious immediately
7 happened, so he spent days repeatedly urging Anonymous to “demolish” a major American newspaper
8 because of what it had published. On December 9, 2010, he posted a link to a Los Angeles Times piece
9 critical of Wikileaks and wrote, “Yet another reason the Times must be demolished.” (GX 607.) On
10 December 10, 2010, when a member of Anonymous stated opposition to attacking media, Keys
11 responded, “FOX News is not media, it’s ‘infotainment’ for inbreds. I say we target them.” (GX 60812 609.)
13

Keys thus had good reason to expect Anonymous would carry out his instructions and do what

14 he had suggested to the Los Angeles Times. So, Keys, ever eager to promote his own career interests as
15 a digital journalist, pitched a scoop on Anonymous. On December 12, 2010, Keys emailed Brandon
16 Mercer, “your ex-web producer infiltrated a group of hackers within the ‘Anonymous’ organization,”
17 and he predicted future operations against, among other entities, the Los Angeles Times. (GX 124.) He
18 repeated this prediction in a conversation with that Mercer recorded at FBI direction. (GX 201.) But
19 nothing happened. Perhaps growing frustrated, on December 14, 2010, Keys posted in an IRC channel
20 used by Anonymous members, “Anyone interested in defacing FOX, LA Times?” (GX 610.)
21

One of the hackers finally did deface a Los Angeles Times story. The responsible editor at the

22 Los Angeles Times regarded this as the most serious content-related security incident in his thirty-three
23 years at the paper. (R.T. 297.) Keys finally got closer to getting what he had wanted out of his co24 conspirators. The result at Tribune Company headquarters in Chicago was “panic,” the personal
25 involvement of the Chief Technology Officer, and a report to the Chief Executive Officer. (R.T. 50626 507.) A large team of IT personnel spent that night locating loose super-user accounts and shutting
27 down any other such back-door access points to Tribune Company’s network. (R.T. 513-515.) Tribune
28 Company’s damage assessment had to be intensive because of the nature of the super-user credentials
SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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1 that Keys had given Anonymous:
2

It should be noted that there was trial testimony from Tribune Company
employees responsible for running and/or repairing the Tribune’s
computer systems including Tom Comings, Tim Rodriguez, Jason
Jedlinksi, Dylan Kuleza, and Armando Caro. These witnesses were
assisted by multiple other Information Technology (IT) employees who
worked on the response but did not testify. The witnesses discussed the
difficulty of ensuring that all rogue accounts had been deleted, closing the
“back doors” Keys had installed, and assessing whether the cyber attack
had affected other parts of the Tribune’s network including news archives,
payment systems, and the systems that controlled the print editions of
newspapers.

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7

8 PSR ¶ 14. Keys denies and minimizes the evidence by denying creating “back doors” and characterizes
9 his conduct as merely “an innocuous and short-lived edit to an LA Times story on tax cuts.” (Def. Objs.
10 at 8.) What was visible to the public is only a small part of the loss to Tribune Company. The
11 guidelines and the CFAA itself anticipate this situation, and instruct that damage assessment and
12 restoring the integrity of the system is “loss.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, application note 3(A)(v)(III); 18 U.S.C.
13 § 1030(e)(11). Foreseeability is not even a factor for sentencing, but, of course, Keys as a former
14 Tribune Company site administrator must have foreseen a vigorous response. Indeed, he warned
15 Anonymous that Tribune Company deletes created super-user accounts. (GX 205-4.)
16

Apparently, Keys believed that the Los Angeles Times story defacement was not sufficient for his

17 objective to “destroy” the newspaper or its parent company. On December 15, 2010, the next day, Keys
18 tried to help sharpie get back in. Sharpie had a whole front page layout ready and had figured out how
19 to “do a bunch of different layouts on different papers,” and “have them all go live at the same time.”
20 (GX 506.) Keys’s response was “hang on,” and then an unhappy emoticon when he realized that his
21 credentials had been deactivated. (Id.)
22

B.

23

Matthew Keys was the initial suspect in this case and succeeded in deflecting suspicion away

The Investigation

24 from himself. On December 12, 2010, two days before the Los Angeles Times defacement, the FBI
25 requested that Brandon Mercer record his telephone conversation with Keys. (GX 201.)

In June 2011,

26 the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office had a discussion about whether Keys had wittingly or
27 unwittingly assisted Anonymous in the Los Angeles Times hack. The agent wrote that Keys had seemed
28 “genuinely baffled by allegations he perpetrated the intrusion” in this case, and “was otherwise candid
SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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1 about his involvement with Anonymous.” (6/6/2011 FBI Memorandum at MKP-0035802.) The FBI
2 and the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed on three things that closed the Keys investigation: Keys was
3 unwilling to provide information related to Anonymous hacking; Department of Justice regulations
4 made it very difficult to get authorization to compel records from Keys; and without Keys, the proper
5 venue for the case lay in Los Angeles. As a result, the case was transferred and its title was changed to
6 delete Keys’s name as a subject. (Id. at MKP-0035798, 35801.)
7

Six months later, on December 16, 2011, the Sacramento case agent reviewed chat logs seized in

8 another one of the agent’s investigations, which also involved Anonymous. (1/09/2012 FBI
9 Memorandum at MKP-0035841.) The logs showed that Keys had had ample reason not to talk about
10 Anonymous and the Los Angeles Times defacement. The reason was that Keys had instigated it. In the
11 logs, members of Anonymous discussed among one another that Keys was AESCracked and had been
12 the one who had given them the passwords for the Los Angeles Times and Fox 40. (Id. at MKP13 0035841-43.) The agent then found AESCracked in the logs from the Ohio computer admitted at trial.
14 (Id. at MKP-0035845.) This broke the case. Keys was again made the main subject and the case was
15 returned to the Eastern District of California. (Id. at MKP-0035846.)
16

Keys was not targeted because he was a journalist. His employment and apparently sincere

17 denials were together the reason Keys was at one point deleted as a subject.
18

C.

19

Matthew Keys was eventually indicted. Keys received all the process that he was due under the

The Motion to Suppress and the Trial

20 Constitution, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Rules of Evidence. He had excellent
21 attorneys who brought credit to the legal profession through their hard work and agreement to accept
22 this case pro bono. Keys litigated a motion to suppress the FBI’s search and their two redundant
23 recordings of the Mirandized confession. 1 Keys received discovery that included even the handwritten
24 witness interview notes of the prosecutors. Finally, Keys, as was his right, received an eight-day trial
25 before a jury of his peers, who were instructed not to convict unless they unanimously agreed that there
26 was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Keys confronted witnesses, put on what evidence he thought
27 helped, and litigated various theories about the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
28

1

Keys’s motion relied, in part, on the FBI’s decision to close the case against him in June 2011.

SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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The jury evaluated eight days of trial evidence. There were logs from the CMS, files seized from

2 Keys’s own computer, logs from Overplay, logs from the chat room, the Cancer Man emails, a recording
3 of Keys’s conversation with Mercer, Keys’s handwritten confession, and audio-recorded proof of Keys’s
4 oral statements to the FBI. (The complete transcript was filed by Keys at Dkt. 23-5.)
5

The evidence was overwhelming. The jury convicted Keys on all three counts.

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D.

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After the trial and without risking cross-examination under oath, Keys communicated

Keys Lies and Promotes Cyncism about the Justice System

8 extensively to the public in notable ways:
9

•

verdict, he tweeted, “That was bullshit.”

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He expressed contempt for the jury’s verdict. On October 7, 2015, minutes after the

•

He made false, self-serving statements about his conduct, his motives, and the

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investigation. He tried to cast himself as a reporter protecting sources and cast shame on

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the victim company for “being complicit” in what Keys cast as the justice system’s

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outrage. On the day of the verdict, the Los Angeles Times reported:

15

In an interview with The Times following his conviction, Keys used an
expletive to describe the government’s case against him and tweeted the
same sentiment. He said prosecutors only went after him after he
published information in 2011 that he gleaned from unnamed online
sources, and refused to cooperate with federal investigators in a separate
probe.

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...
“It’s wrong to call it a confession,” he said. “Armed FBI agents who just
pointed a gun at my face were telling me what to write.”
“They would love it if journalists who get background or go into dark
places would play ball in criminal investigations,” Keys said of
prosecutors. “But we’re under no obligation to do that. That’s how we get
out our stories – by protecting our sources.”
He drew similarities between the case against him and the government
seizure of Associated Press phone records and the prosecution of a New
York Times reporter for refusing to divulge a source, as examples. He had
no part in the hacking of The Times site, in which the headline of an
article was defaced, he said.
...
“Are you guys really that offended?” Keys asked a Times reporter.

SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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“Shame on the Tribune Co. for being complicit in this.” 2

1
•

2

On October 8, 2015, the following quote was observed in the Sacramento News and

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Review blog, “I did not commit the crime alleged,” Keys wrote in an email. “I worked as

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a journalist observing a hacker group, and when I refused to comply with an FBI request

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to have my computer scanned for their investigation into Anonymous, I became a

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criminal suspect.”
•

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On October 12, 2015, he tweeted, “There’s no question I was targeted and falsely
charged because of my work as a journalist.”

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III.

9

ARGUMENT

10

A.

The Offense was Serious Enough to Require a Substantial Prison Sentence.

11

Matthew Keys should be sentenced to reflect the seriousness of the crimes he committed. See

12 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Keys used credentials and knowledge he obtained as a trusted network
13 administrator to carry out, instigate, and guide attacks on journalists’ ability to communicate with their
14 viewers and readers. Keys created backdoor access points to the publishing system of a major American
15 newspaper and then he persistently urged his co-conspirators to use the credentials to “target” and
16 “destroy” that paper. To motivate his confederates, Keys told them about what the paper had published
17 that they would not like. This was an online version of urging a mob to smash the presses for publishing
18 an unpopular story. And Keys did it with an administrator’s knowledge of the network and a journalist’s
19 understanding of what the profession is supposed to mean. To accomplish his angry, vengeful ends,
20 Keys employed means that challenge core values of American democracy.
21

Brandon Mercer, former news director of Fox 40, was asked about his own personal interest in

22 the outcome of this case and clearly stated:
The reason . . . is because of the First Amendment. I feel if someone can
hijack the means of publication, the means of communicating with the
public, the means of doing our job as the press, if someone can hijack that
and do what they will with it, the First Amendment is in jeopardy and the
freedom of the press is in jeopardy, and that cannot be done with
impunity.

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http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-matthew-keys-convicted-hacking-la-times20151007-story.html. The article was updated to include the undersigned prosecutor’s post-verdict
28 statements made in direct response to Defendant’s lies.
27

SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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 Case 2:13-cr-00082-KJM Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 8 of 12
1 (R.T. at 206.) The pecuniary harm in this case is accurately calculated in the PSR. But it is only part of
2 the story. Keys’s attack on Tribune Company’s network caused pecuniary harm, albeit not as much as
3 Keys had hoped. But more important was something not reflected in the guidelines. This was not just
4 an attack on an online merchant for profit. It was an attack on a newspaper for what it printed.
5

B.

6

In a way, one can at least understand Keys’s desire to harm Tribune Company. Plenty of people

Keys’s Personal Character Does not Favor a Lenient Sentence.

7 have workplace incidents that lead them to hate their employer. But it is much harder to understand how
8 indifferent Keys was toward the collateral damage he caused in the homes of total strangers. Keys knew
9 that a lot of Fox 40 Rewards participants had uploaded their credit card information to the channel, and
10 he intentionally wrote messages to frighten them about misuse of that information. (GX 107.) It
11 worked. Viewers called the station worried about the security of their bank accounts and credit cards.
12 (R.T. 197-198.)
13

“Worried” would be an understatement for the emotions of at least one Fox 40 viewer. The

14 Court will recall that Mercer told “Cancer Man” that Mercer had just talked down a tearful elderly
15 woman who had been having a “panic attack” over the emails while her husband was in kidney failure.
16 The Court ordered this and Keys’s reaction redacted before it went to the jury. The Rule 403 exclusion
17 meant that the Court thought the unredacted email would have created a substantial risk that the jury
18 might read it and return a verdict based on something other than the elements of the offense. The
19 Government respects the Court’s ruling. The way Keys reacted shows he is a different and worse kind
20 of person. Keys ridiculed the station for “reporting to the old folks home” and casually passed judgment
21 on the poor woman for having her priorities “in the wrong place there.” (GX 1001.) Keys’s haughty,
22 cold reaction to that woman’s suffering was the other reason that Mercer said he came to take a personal
23 interest in the outcome of this case. (R.T. at 189-190.) The Court should sentence to reflect the
24 characteristics of the Defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Keys’s characteristics include narcissism
25 and an arrogant indifference to the suffering of innocent and vulnerable people.
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C.

Keys’s Public Statements to Undermine Confidence in the Jury’s Verdict Favor a
Stronger Sentence to Promote Respect for Law.

Keys’s sentence must also be sufficient to promote respect for law. See 18 U.S.C.
SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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1 § 3553(a)(2)(A). It is exceptionally rare to see a defendant engage in an after-verdict press campaign to
2 undermine public confidence in the jury’s verdict. It is a direct attack on the work of the jury and the
3 validity of the verdicts. It undermines respect for law at a time when the public seems more willing to
4 credit strongly worded criticism of traditional institutions. But there was a trial and there was evidence.
5 The Court should send a strong message regarding what happened in this trial and what the Court thinks
6 of Keys’s statements. In this context, there is no substitute for the Court’s pronouncement of a strong
7 sentence and clear reasons. The criminal jury trial, like the free press, is one of the most important
8 institutions of our democratic system. After the verdict, Keys showed himself perfectly willing to
9 undermine yet another institution of democracy because he does not want people to think that he did
10 what the evidence overwhelmingly proved he did.
11

D.

12

A network administrator’s attack on a network requires an adequately deterrent sentence. See 18

Network Administrator Misconduct Must be Answered with a Deterrent Sentence.

13 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). This kind of insider misconduct is a serious threat to computer security. All
14 over the economy, network administrators are trusted to safeguard sensitive information and maintain
15 essential systems. Some of them probably hate their bosses and the CFAA functions in part to deter
16 insiders from damaging systems. Matthew Keys knew all about the insider threat. His “Going Rogue”
17 email helps demonstrate how deterrent interests weigh strongly against a sentence too far off the
18 guidelines range:
19

There is a new urgency to addressing information security inside
corporations and a reminder of its limits when confronted with a
determined insider.

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At risk are companies’ secrets – e-mails, documents, databases, and
internal websites that are thought to be locked to the outside world.
Companies create records of every decision they make.

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Although it is easy, technologically, to limit who in a company sees
specific types of information, many companies leave access too open.
Despite the best of intentions, mistakes happen and settings can become
inadvertently broad, especially as networks grow more complex with
reorganizations and acquisitions.

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Even when security technology is doing its job, it is a poor match if
someone with legitimate access decides to go rogue.

27
28 (GX109.)

SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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1

E.

Sentencing Uniformity Favors a Sentence at or Close to the Guidelines Range.

2

Keys has already complained that the PSR recommends a sentence longer than that received by

3 another hacking defendant who pleaded guilty in another district. The Ninth Circuit has an answer for
4 this kind of argument:
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8

The mere fact that [Keys] can point to a defendant convicted at a different
time of a different [computer crime] and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment shorter than [Keys’s] does not create an ‘unwarranted’
sentencing disparity. For one thing, we aren’t presented with the records
in the cases on which [Keys] relies when he argues that other [computer
crime] defendants got off better than him. Moreover, sentencing disparity
is only one factor a court considers in crafting an individualized sentence
under § 3553(a).

9
10 United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). A broader survey of computer crime
11 cases is of no more value. “A district court need not, and, as a practical matter, cannot compare a
12 proposed sentence to the sentence of every criminal defendant who has ever been sentenced before. Too
13 many factors dictate the exercise of sound sentencing discretion in a particular case to make the inquiry
14 Treadwell urges helpful or even feasible.” Id. The way to promote uniformity is to correctly calculate
15 and give due weight to the guidelines. That is their purpose. Id.
16

Keys may be able to point to computer crime cases where defendants pleaded guilty and received

17 sentences lower than the one recommended in this case. These cases are extremely expensive and time18 consuming to prosecute, and it would not be surprising if a raft of computer crime defendants have
19 received lenient sentencing recommendations in return for saving the Government’s resources for use in
20 other cases. Those defendants are not similarly situated and that is not an unwarranted disparity. See
21 United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (defendants who cooperate are not
22 similarly situated), and United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant who
23 went to trial was not similarly situated with defendant who had participated in same conduct but had a
24 plea agreement to lesser charges). The Supreme Court recognizes that plea agreements necessarily flow
25 from “the mutuality of advantage” between prosecutors and defendants. See United States v. Goodwin,
26 457 U.S. 368, 379 (1982). The Ninth Circuit knows how important that system is and teaches,
27
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When a defendant voluntarily chooses to reject or withdraw from a plea
bargain, he retains no right to the rejected sentence. Having rejected the
offer of a lesser sentence, he assumes the risk of receiving a harsher
SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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sentence. If defendants could demand the same sentence after standing
trial that was offered in exchange for a guilty plea, all incentives to plead
guilty would disappear. Defendants would lose nothing by going to trial.
The reality of plea bargaining is that once the defendant elects to go to
trial, all bets are off.

1
2
3

4 United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 508, 513-514 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations and quotations
5 omitted), see also United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 805 (9th Cir. 2008).
6

If the Court is to compare this case to others, it should consider network crimes in the broadest

7 sense. This kind of crime exploits any kind of vulnerability in a network that people rely on to convey
8 information and assets among one another. Network criminals harm individuals without facing them
9 and harm the economy generally by threatening the linking infrastructure upon which modern activity
10 relies. Postal theft has been a network crime for a very long time. There is a whole chapter of Title 18
11 dedicated to protecting the postal system. Each theft of mail matter is is a five-year felony. See 18
12 U.S.C. § 1708. The purpose of these theft statutes is to protect “the mails” by extending federal
13 protection to the matter deposited in the system. Thompson v. United States, 202 F. 401, 405 (9th Cir.
14 1913); McCowan v. United States, 376 F.2d 122, 124 (9th Cir. 1967).
15

Today’s defendants convicted of yesterday’s network crime generally commit the offense out of

16 drug-addicted desperation. They find vulnerable mail boxes, harm customers, and impose costs on the
17 network. But few mail thieves manage to affect as many people for as much pecuniary harm as did
18 Matthew Keys. Such defendants are routinely sentenced to imprisonment and it is completely
19 unremarkable.
20

What is remarkable is Keys’s insistence that his crime does not merit a years-denominated prison

21 sentence. Keys’s network crime caused far more damage than even a very large-scale postal theft. The
22 fact that Keys carried this out as a formerly trusted insider, digitally, while covering his tracks through a
23 foreign proxy server, makes him more culpable, not less. The Defendant’s articulateness and his out24 sized, narcissistic sense of specialness should not sway the Court into treating him more favorably.
IV.

25
26

CONCLUSION

Matthew Keys committed a serious crime that requires strong deterrence. In his crime, he

27 targeted an institution that our Democracy has a special interest in protecting. In his post-verdict
28 defiance, he targeted the justice system itself. All of this conduct merits strict punishment and indicates
SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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1 a character that warrants the same. The United States requests a sentence of five years imprisonment.
2
3

Respectfully submitted,

4 Dated: March 9, 2016

BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney

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By: /s/ MATTHEW D. SEGAL
MATTHEW D. SEGAL
Assistant United States Attorney

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SENT. MEM. OF THE U.S.

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