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ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 24, 2016

Nos. 12-7139 & 12-7140

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ACT NOW TO STOP WAR AND END RACISM, et al.,
APPELLEES & CROSS-APPELLANTS,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
APPELLANT & CROSS-APPELLEE.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Cross-Appellants' Responsive Supplemental Brief Addressing the Impact of
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015)

CARL L. MESSINEO
MARA VERHEYDEN-HILLIARD
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE FUND
617 Florida Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
T. (202) 232-1180; F. (202) 747-7747
cm@justiceonline.org
mvh@justiceonline.org

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. The District’s Sign Regulation is Content-Based and Expressly Makes
Distinctions Based on the Content or Message of a Sign ..........................................1
II.

The District Mischaracterizes the Reed Opinion and Oral Argument .............2

A. Justice Alito’s Concurrence Regarding One-Time Events Should Not Be
Read to Encompass Signs Conveying a Political Message of Continuing
Relevancy ...............................................................................................................2
B. At Oral Argument Justice Alito Disputed the Contention, Advanced by the
District, that an Event Distinction Was Not Content-Based ..................................4
C.

The District Misrepresents its Own Regulations in the Context of Reed .....4

D. The Event-Based Regulation Can Be Wielded to Prematurely Truncate
Political Speech of Continuing Relevancy .............................................................5
III. The Court Should Reject the District’s Efforts to Reiterate Arguments and
Reasoning Rejected by the Supreme Court in Reed ..................................................6
IV. The District’s Belated Attempt to Relitigate its Case When it Failed to Meet
its Burden of Proof, Despite Being on Notice, Should Be Denied ............................7

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1
Cases
*ANSWER Coal. v. D.C., 798 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2011) .............................7, 8
*ANSWER Coal. v. D.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 317 (D.D.C. 2012) .................................8
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) ......................................................................6
Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................3
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2556,
183 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2012)........................................................................................3
*Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236,
2015 U.S. LEXIS 4061 (June 18, 2015)........................................ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) .................................................6, 7
Regulations
24 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 108 .....................................................................................1
24 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 108.5 ..................................................................................1
Law Review Articles
Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart To Be a Part: The Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 2083 (1995)................4

1

Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks.
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GLOSSARY
ANSWER

plaintiff Act Now to Stop War and End Racism

MASF

plaintiff Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation

NOVs

Notices of Violation

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I.

The District’s Sign Regulation is Content-Based and Expressly
Makes Distinctions Based on the Content or Message of a Sign
The District’s regulations at 24 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 108 et seq. regulate
signs based on what the signs say. This is content-based regulation.
District inspectors read the content of signs to decide based on that content,
and applying unfettered discretion to interpret that content, whether to issue a fine
and/or require that a sign containing political speech be removed from public view.
The only signs at issue here are noncommercial signs. The District’s
challenged regulations already prohibit signs the content of which relates “to the
sale of goods or services” id. § 108.5.
The signs precipitating this litigation called to stop a war and for a march at
the White House. (JA298.) MASF and ANSWER affixed the signs to lampposts
until, unprecedented in the District’s history and sparked by a politically hostile
television report, an approximately 300 baseless NOVs issued, which chilled
MASF from further postering. (JA31.)
The relevancy of political advocacy to stop a war, and the discussion it
engenders, does not, as the District argues, “expire” upon the occurrence of a
related march. See District’s Supplemental Br. 6 (insisting regulatory restrictions
apply “only long after the communicative content of the sign has expired”).

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The District admits “a law that ‘on its face draws distinctions based on the
message a speaker conveys’ meets th[e] test” to be deemed content-based.
District’s Supplemental Br. 3-4 (citing Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227).
The District refuses to concede the obvious, that its regulations meet this test
and are, therefore, content-based and subject to strict scrutiny.
The District conflates viewpoint and content-based discrimination in its
effort to gloss over its regulations’ evident content-based constitutional infirmity.
The District contends that the regulations do not distinguish within the topic of
event-related signs and should therefore be saved. District’s Supplemental Br. 5, 7.
If the regulations distinguished between types of events, they might be viewpoint
based. The fact that regulations facially restrict all noncommercial signs if the
content relates to an event renders it a content-based distinction.
II.

The District Mischaracterizes the Reed Opinion and Oral
Argument

A. Justice Alito’s Concurrence Regarding One-Time Events Should Not
Be Read to Encompass Signs Conveying a Political Message of
Continuing Relevancy
Justice Alito, joined by two Justices, joined in the opinion of the Court (i.e.,
thereby assented to both outcome and rationale of the majority opinion) and wrote
separately to identify certain factual circumstances, not then present before the
Court, which the Justices believe would not be deemed content-based.

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Justice Alito identified “[r]ules imposing time restrictions on signs
advertising a one-time event.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2223.
At oral argument, Justice Alito asked petitioner’s counsel “What if it’s
commercial and it related to a one-time event. For example, for a yard sale.” (Tr. 8
(attached)) (omitted from the District’s transcript presentation). Justice Alito’s
inquiry highlighted the different constitutional protections between the one-day
commercial yard sale and constitutionally protected political speech. Ibid. (“If [the
government] allow[s] election-related signs to be put up in the right-of-way, then
anybody who has a yard sale has an equal right?”); See also MASF Principal Br.
51-52; ECF No. 64 3 - 6, 16 – 18 (distinguishing political speech from one-day
yard sale). Justice Alito’s reference to a one-day commercial yard sale is readily
distinguishable from signage containing protected political expression.
The District’s argument regarding the “narrowest grounds” is inapplicable,
pertaining solely to the treatment of a plurality opinion, i.e., when at least five
Justices agree on the result but no single opinion garners five votes. District’s
Supplemental Br. 9 (citing Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138,
176 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) discussing application of National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2556, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2012)
(plurality opinion)). There is no clearly established rule for affording such a simple
concurrence precedential value or to treat it as a limitation on the Court’s majority
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opinion. See Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart To Be a Part: The Precedential
Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 2083 (1995).
B. At Oral Argument Justice Alito Disputed the Contention, Advanced
by the District, that an Event Distinction Was Not Content-Based
The District argues its event-based distinction is not content-based,
identifying selective portions of the argument transcript in Reed. Contrary to the
District’s presentation, Justice Alito challenged the argument that an event-based
distinction was not content-based, and pointed to the fact that one would have to
read the content of the sign. The District cuts off its transcript presented to the
Court as this discussion continues onto page 18. (Tr. 17-18.)
C. The District Misrepresents its Own Regulations in the Context of
Reed
The District further miscasts the import of the oral argument on the
regulations at issue, promoting the Reed Petitioner’s ostensible reference to the
D.C. regulations. The Reed Petitioner misstated the District’s regulations to the
Court, evidently unfamiliar with their details. The Petitioner showed confusion
over whether inspectors regulated based on the date of the event that was part of
the content of the sign or by the date the sign was posted. (Tr. 18.)
The Petitioner further confused the District’s regulations as similarly
governing lawn signs as in Reed. The District does not regulate lawn signs in
public space which proliferate to such a blighted extreme that the current Attorney
General, who signed the District’s brief, himself used thousands of lawn signs
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staked in public space, including dozens per block near polling stations, during his
electoral campaign to win the office he now holds (further belying aesthetic
interest arguments as underinclusive, see Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231).
D. The Event-Based Regulation Can Be Wielded to Prematurely
Truncate Political Speech of Continuing Relevancy
The District argues that “the [event-based] regulation applies only long after
the communicative content of the sign has expired. The District’s regulation thus
poses no danger that the government may ‘wield [it] to suppress disfavored
speech.’” District’s Supplemental Br. 6. This premise, while perhaps applicable to
a one-day commercial yard sale, does not hold true when applied to a sign with
political relevancy or messaging.
Justice Kennedy at oral argument in Reed noted the distinction between a
political event and a sports game. (Tr. 15.) (“a political campaign is a dynamic that
goes on for some weeks that the signs initiate a discussion.”)
The potential for the challenged event-based distinction to be wielded
arbitrarily or to enhance favored speech or suppress disfavored speech is patent,
and was evidenced in depositions by the District’s inspectors. See, e.g. MASF
Principal Brief 19 – 22.
The challenged regulations present all the risks of political abuse and
abridgment of political speech against which the First Amendment establishes a
clear and firm rule in the definition of content-based distinctions.
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III.

The Court Should Reject the District’s Efforts to Reiterate
Arguments and Reasoning Rejected by the Supreme Court in
Reed
The District argues that Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), which

allowed restriction of expressive activities similar to picketing or demonstrating in
a buffer zone, applies to permit the District’s regulatory distinctions, which are
drawn based on content.
The Supreme Court expressly reversed the underlying Ninth Circuit ruling in
Reed, which erroneously relied on Hill as informing its definition of “contentneutral” distinctions. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
The District re-argues that which has been squarely addressed and resolved
with finality by the Supreme Court in Reed.
The District re-argues that Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986),
permits the District’s regulation to evade strict scrutiny.
The dissent in Reed explicitly referenced Renton. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at
2238. Informed by that dissent, the opinion of the Court reflects that a “clear and
firm rule regarding content-neutrality is an essential means of protecting the
freedom of speech,” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231. While the District derides the
Supreme Court as “formalistic,” its majority opinion in Reed is the law.
Renton is a zoning case regarding where adult theaters may be located. This
case at bar is not about zoning authority nor does not it challenge the District’s

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restriction of certain signs, placards and posters to the location of lampposts and
appurtenances. Renton is not, as the District contends, directly applicable to the
sign and speech regulations under consideration. To the extent there is any conflict
or tension between the cases, the Reed majority opinion governs.
IV.

The District’s Belated Attempt to Relitigate its Case When it
Failed to Meet its Burden of Proof, Despite Being on Notice,
Should Be Denied
To the extent the District claims Reed establishes a “new” standard of strict

scrutiny, MASF has always presented strict scrutiny as the established standard,
relying on cases ultimately relied upon by the Reed Court. See e.g., ECF No 64 at
23 – 30.
The District was obligated and had every opportunity to submit evidence to
meet a strict scrutiny standard and at no point in this litigation has ever proffered
any evidence to support, or even claimed, a compelling interest. See also ANSWER
Coal. v. D.C., 798 F. Supp. 2d 134, 145 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (Court observes “the
District does not suggest it can” meet the strict scrutiny standard applicable to
content-based regulations); (See also JA 317) (uncontroverted material fact that the
District disclaims or fails to claim any compelling interest). It may not manufacture
such a claim now.
The District Court found that the District failed to meet even the lesser
intermediate scrutiny standard it claimed was applicable.

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The District was afforded full opportunity in discovery to submit evidence
of its interests and how the regulations advanced said interests or avoided
purported harms. ANSWER Coal. v. D.C., 798 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (discovery for
such purposes).
The District rested on its position that “the government need not produce
affirmative evidence. . .”. ECF No. 59 at 11. See MASF’s Opening Br. 45 – 49.
The District refused to respond to discovery seeking disclosure of its
asserted interests and any evidence of how challenged regulations advanced
interests, presumably because it was incapable of doing so. ANSWER Coal. v.
D.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d at 344 n.8. MASF Opening Br. 48.
The Reed opinion changes nothing to justify the failure and inability to
present evidence, and if such existed it was incumbent on the District to so present.
Post-Reed, the submission of no record evidence is still nothing. See Ibid. at 341
(“After a half-year discovery period, and sufficient time to prepare complete
summary judgment motions” the District rested its case relying solely on counsel’s
argument).
After more than eight years of proceedings, given multiple constitutional
bases which invalidate the challenged law, and the refusal of the District to issue
across-the-board regulations that apply regardless of viewpoint or content, the
District’s futile request for delay in final resolution must be rejected.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Carl Messineo
Carl Messineo (#450033)
cm@justiceonline.org
Mara Verheyden-Hilliard (#450031)
mvh@justiceonline.org
PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE FUND
617 Florida Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
T. (202) 232-1180; F. (202) 747-7747
Attorneys for Appellees and CrossAppellants

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of January 2016, an electronic copy of
the foregoing brief was served through the Court’s CM/ECF system to:
Carl J. Schifferle
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
441 4th Street, NW, Suite 600S
Washington, D.C. 20001
carl.schifferle@dc.gov
Todd S. Kim
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
One Judiciary Square
441 4th Street, NW, Suite 600S
Washington, D.C. 20001
todd.kim@dc.gov
Loren L. AliKhan
Deputy Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
One Judiciary Square
441 4th Street, NW, Suite 600S
Washington, D.C. 20001
Loren.AliKhan@dc.gov

/s/ Carl Messineo
Carl Messineo
Attorney for Appellees and Cross-Appellants

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation in the
Court's October 30, 2015, Order because the brief contains 1,816 words, excluding
the parts of the brief exempted. This brief complies with the typeface and style
requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft
Word 2007 in Times New Roman 14-point.
January 7, 2016

/s/ Carl Messineo
Carl Messineo
Attorney for Appellees and Cross-Appellants

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ATTACHMENT

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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x

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CLYDE REED, ET AL.,               :

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5

 Petitioners 
 v. 

         :

                       :  No. 13­502.

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TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA,         :

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ET AL.                            :

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­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x

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 Washington, D.C.

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 Monday, January 12, 2015

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 The above­entitled matter came on for oral

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argument before the Supreme Court of the United States

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at 10:04 a.m.

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APPEARANCES:

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DAVID A. CORTMAN, ESQ., Lawrenceville, Ga.; on behalf of

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 Petitioners.
ERIC J. FEIGIN, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor

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 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for

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 United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither

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 party.

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PHILIP W. SAVRIN, ESQ., Atlanta, Ga.; on behalf of
 Respondents

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 C O N T E N T S


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ORAL ARGUMENT OF                                  PAGE

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DAVID A. CORTMAN, ESQ.

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On behalf of the Petitioners 


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ORAL ARGUMENT OF

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ERIC J. FEIGIN, ESQ.

                   3

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 On behalf of United States, as amicus curiae,

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 supporting neither party 

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ORAL ARGUMENT OF
PHILIP W. SAVRIN, ESQ.
 On behalf of the Respondents 

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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF

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DAVID A. CORTMAN, ESQ.

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 On behalf of the Petitioners 

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                   53

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 P R O C E E D I N G S

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 (10:04 a.m.)
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: 

We will hear

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argument first this morning in Case 13­502, Reed v. Town

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of Gilbert.

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 Mr. Cortman.

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 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID CORTMAN

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 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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 MR. CORTMAN: 

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

please the Court:

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 The town's code discriminates on its face by

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treating certain signs differently based solely on what

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they say.  For example, political signs may be 32 square

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feet, may be unlimited in number, and may be placed in

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the right­of­way of the entire town for five months

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before the election; but the church's signs can only be

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one­fifth of that side ­­ size, only placed in the dark

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of night, the night before the church service.

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 While the church's signs with directional

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content are only allowed up for 14 hours, other signs

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with directional content are allowed up for much longer.

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For example, builders' directional signs to home sales

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events are allowed up to be the entire ­­ are allowed up

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the entire weekend, and homeowners' association event

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signs are allowed to be up for 30 days.

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residential signs except for ­­ in fact, it was the

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reverse.  It banned for sale signs and allowed some

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residential signs that were exceptions.

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 But this Court said exactly that, that the

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town shouldn't value different types of speech,

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especially on private property when you have homeowners'

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rights that also comes in play in addition to speech

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rights.

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 JUSTICE ALITO: 

What if it's commercial and

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it relates to a one­time event.  For example, for a yard

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sale.

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 MR. CORTMAN: 

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 JUSTICE ALITO: 

Right.
If the State and the city

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allow election­related signs to be put up in the

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right­of­way, then anybody who has a yard sale has an

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equal right?

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 MR. CORTMAN: 

Well, I think ­­ I think

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commercial speech, under this Court's jurisprudence, can

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be treated differently, and that's one of the important

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things.  The category here is narrow because government

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speech ­­ government can put up whatever signs that it

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would like.  It doesn't trigger any problem under the

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First Amendment.

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 We hear a lot in the other briefs about
warning signs and other types of signs.  The government

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signs to be up for one single event for five months,

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certainly there should be some way to say, well, if we

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have a recurring event as we do here, certainly the sign

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should be allowed up at least equal to the same time,

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and ­­

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 JUSTICE KENNEDY: 

Well, I mean, to say that

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an election is a single event in the same way as a

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football game, a cookout, a basketball championship,

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it's ­­ it seems to me is a very difficult thing for

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this Court to have to decide.  It's just not ­­ a

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political campaign is a dynamic that goes on for some

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weeks that the signs initiate a discussion.  I can see

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where you can say the religious sign does or at least

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should initiate the same discussion of ­­ on issues that

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are certainly of the same importance, if not more.

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 MR. CORTMAN: 

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 JUSTICE KENNEDY: 

Certainly ­­
But it seems to me you are

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forcing us into making a very wooden distinction that

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could result in a proliferation of signs for birthday

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parties or for every conceivable event that could be up

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for five months.

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 MR. CORTMAN: 

But I think the problem is

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there ­­ there already is that here, because we have an

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unlimited number of political signs.  And so if the

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streets are already littered in an unlimited number of

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 And what it says is all temporary signs

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should be treated the same, period.  You can put ­­ you

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have to put your date on the sign for when you put it

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up.  Every temporary sign can be up for 180 days.  If

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it's tied to an event, after the event is over, it needs

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to be down 30 days after the event.

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 I think ­­ our opinion is the reason that is

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content­neutral is whenever something is over, if your

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store is closed, the event is done, then the sign can be

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removed.  But the important part is every sign can be up

11

for the same amount of time, even if it is that event

12

that's over now.  And I think that's the way you

13

deal with these ­­ these single event ­­

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 JUSTICE ALITO: 

I thought you said the way

15

you distinguish between temporary signs and permanent

16

signs is based on the ­­ the nature of the sign, not

17

what it says.

18

 MR. CORTMAN: 

19

 JUSTICE ALITO: 

Right.
So that gets you over the

20

problem Justice Sotomayor mentioned about having to read

21

the sign.

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 MR. CORTMAN: 

23

 JUSTICE ALITO: 

Right.
But if this ­­ if there's a

24

rule that says the sign has to be down within a certain

25

period of time after the date of the event, which is on

Alderson Reporting Company

 USCA Case #12-7139

Document #1592401

Filed: 01/07/2016

Official ­ Subject to Final Review

Page 23 of 23
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1

the sign, I don't see how you get around to reading the

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sign.

3

 MR. CORTMAN: 

Well, what you would be

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reading is the date, and ­­ and the code requires the

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date to be placed on the sign both for when the sign is

6

placed and ­­ and for ­­ you know, for what the event

7

is.  But I think that ­­

8
9

 JUSTICE ALITO: 

So if somebody puts up a

sign for a yard sale two days before the yard sale, then

10

they can ­­ that can stay up for 48 days after the yard

11

sale?  It has 50 days or whatever the period of time is?

12

 MR. CORTMAN: 

Yes, according to ­­ according

13

to the code.  But what is interesting, that time period

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can be anything the town desires.  It ­­ it doesn't need

15

to be ­­ and we're not looking for signs all year long.

16

 The town can say, for example, temporary

17

signs can be up for seven days, they can be a certain

18

size.  Like Washington, D.C., does, you can only have

19

three signs per block, have to be spaced out.  And ­­

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and that's part of our point.

21

 And I think one of the things to take a ­­

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to take look at is the amici brief that's been filed on

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behalf of the town by the National League of Cities, and

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the reason that brief is important, for example, on

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page 10 and 13, it lists dozens and ­­

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