Flint Water Advisory Task Force March  21,  2016   Governor  Rick  Snyder   Office  of  Governor     P.O.  Box  30013     Lansing,  Michigan  48909       Dear  Governor  Snyder:   We,  the  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  (FWATF),  offer  in  this  report  our  findings  and  recommendations   regarding  the  Flint  water  crisis.  We  have  come  to  our  conclusions  largely  through  interviews  of   individuals  involved  and  review  of  related  documents  now  available  in  the  public  record.  Our  report   includes  36  findings  and  44  recommendations,  offered  to  fulfill  our  charge  of  determining  the  causes  of   the  Flint  water  crisis,  identifying  remedial  measures  for  the  Flint  community,  and  safeguarding  Michigan   residents.     We  hope  that  our  report  serves  three  fundamental  purposes:   1. Clarify  and  simplify  the  narrative  regarding  the  roles  of  the  parties  involved,  and  assign   accountability  clearly  and  unambiguously.   2. Highlight  the  causes  for  the  failures  of  government  that  precipitated  the  crisis  and  suggest   measures  to  prevent  such  failures  in  the  future.   3. Prescribe  recommendations  to  care  for  the  Flint  community  and  to  use  the  lessons  of  Flint’s   experience  to  better  safeguard  Michigan  residents.   We  are  encouraged  by  your  focus  and  expressed  commitment  to  address  the  Flint  community’s  needs,   and  to  learn  from  the  failures  that  have  transpired.  This  commitment  is  appropriate  because,  though  it   may  be  technically  true  that  all  levels  of  government  failed,  the  state’s  responsibilities  should  not  be   deflected.  The  causes  of  the  crisis  lie  primarily  at  the  feet  of  the  state  by  virtue  of  its  agencies’  failures   and  its  appointed  emergency  managers’  misjudgments.         Given  the  extensive  investigative  reporting  on  the  Flint  water  crisis  (from  which  we  have  benefited   greatly),  we  have  limited  our  explanatory  narrative.  Rather,  our  report  builds  on  the  ample  public  record   and  information  yielded  through  over  60  interviews  and  discussions  to  prescribe  recommendations  that,   we  hope,  will  ultimately  safeguard  and  benefit  Michigan  residents  for  years  to  come.  We  have   approached  our  work  with  a  solemn  commitment  to  the  charge  you  invested  in  us:  to  place  Michigan   residents’  well-­‐being  first.     Respectfully,                 Matthew  M.  Davis,  MD,  MAPP                Chris  Kolb           Eric  Rothstein,  CPA                                        Ken  Sikkema   Lawrence  Reynolds,  MD   2 1       March     2016                 Flint    Water  Advisory  Task  Force     FINAL  REPORT               C o m m i s s i o n e d   b y   t h e   O f f i c e   o f   G o v e r n o r   R i c k   S n y d e r   S t a t e   o f   M i c h i g a n     FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Table  of  Contents     Executive  Summary  ...........................................................................................................................  1   Summary  Statement  ...............................................................................................................................  1   A  Series  of  Government  Failures  .............................................................................................................  1   FWATF  Membership,  Charge  and  Scope  of  Review  ................................................................................  2   Acknowledgements  .................................................................................................................................  5   Findings  of  the  Task  Force  ......................................................................................................................  6   Recommendations  of  the  Task  Force  ....................................................................................................  10   Background  .....................................................................................................................................  15   Flint,  Michigan  ......................................................................................................................................  15   Water  Crisis  ..........................................................................................................................................  15   Summary  Timeline  of  Key  Events  ..........................................................................................................  16   Regulatory  Context  ...............................................................................................................................  22   Public  Health  Context  ...........................................................................................................................  23   Roles  of  Government  Entities  in  the  Flint  Water  Crisis  .....................................................................  26        Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality  (MDEQ)  ..............................................................  26   Defined  Role  ..........................................................................................................................................  26   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  27   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  28   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  29        Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (MDHHS)  ....................................................  30   Defined  Role  ..........................................................................................................................................  30   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  31   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  33   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  34        Michigan  Governor’s  Office  ...........................................................................................................  35   Defined  Role  ..........................................................................................................................................  35   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  36   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  38   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  38        State-­‐Appointed  Emergency  Managers  .........................................................................................  39   Defined  Role  ..........................................................................................................................................  39   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  39   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  40   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  41        City  of  Flint  ...................................................................................................................................  42   Defined  Role  ..........................................................................................................................................  42   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  43   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  44   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  45        Genesee  County  Health  Department  (GCHD)  ................................................................................  46   Defined  Role  ..........................................................................................................................................  46   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  46   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  48   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  48        U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  Oversight  and  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  .................  48   Defined  Role  ..........................................................................................................................................  48   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  50         FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  52   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  52   Issues  Presented  by  the  Flint  Water  Crisis  ........................................................................................  53        The  Reality  of  Environmental  Injustice  ..........................................................................................  54   Discussion  .............................................................................................................................................  54   Findings  .................................................................................................................................................  55   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  55        Perspectives  from  Flint  .................................................................................................................  55        Flint  Recovery  /  Remediation  ........................................................................................................  56   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  57        State-­‐Wide  Initiatives  ...................................................................................................................  58   Recommendations  ................................................................................................................................  58   Conclusions  .....................................................................................................................................  62   APPENDIX  I:  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  (FWATF)   APPENDIX  II:  FWATF  Letters   APPENDIX  III:  Interviewee  Listing   APPENDIX  IV:  Questions  of  Lockwood,  Andrews,  &  Newnam   APPENDIX  V:  Detailed  Timeline   APPENDIX  VI:  Abbreviations  and  Acronyms         Executive Summary Summary  Statement   The  Flint  water  crisis  is  a  story  of  government  failure,  intransigence,  unpreparedness,  delay,   inaction,  and  environmental  injustice.  The  Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality   (MDEQ)  failed  in  its  fundamental  responsibility  to  effectively  enforce  drinking  water  regulations.   The  Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (MDHHS)  failed  to  adequately  and   promptly  act  to  protect  public  health.  Both  agencies,  but  principally  the  MDEQ,  stubbornly   worked  to  discredit  and  dismiss  others’  attempts  to  bring  the  issues  of  unsafe  water,  lead   contamination,  and  increased  cases  of  Legionellosis  (Legionnaires’  disease)  to  light.  With  the  City   of  Flint  under  emergency  management,  the  Flint  Water  Department  rushed  unprepared  into  full-­‐ time  operation  of  the  Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant,  drawing  water  from  a  highly  corrosive  source   without  the  use  of  corrosion  control.  Though  MDEQ  was  delegated  primacy  (authority  to  enforce   federal  law),  the  United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  delayed  enforcement  of   the  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act  (SDWA)  and  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR),  thereby  prolonging  the   calamity.  Neither  the  Governor  nor  the  Governor’s  office  took  steps  to  reverse  poor  decisions  by   MDEQ  and  state-­‐appointed  emergency  managers  until  October  2015,  in  spite  of  mounting   problems  and  suggestions  to  do  so  by  senior  staff  members  in  the  Governor’s  office,  in  part   because  of  continued  reassurances  from  MDEQ  that  the  water  was  safe.  The  significant   consequences  of  these  failures  for  Flint  will  be  long-­‐lasting.  They  have  deeply  affected  Flint’s   public  health,  its  economic  future,1  and  residents’  trust  in  government.     The  Flint  water  crisis  occurred  when  state-­‐appointed  emergency  managers  replaced  local   representative  decision-­‐making  in  Flint,  removing  the  checks  and  balances  and  public   accountability  that  come  with  public  decision-­‐making.  Emergency  managers  made  key  decisions   that  contributed  to  the  crisis,  from  the  use  of  the  Flint  River  to  delays  in  reconnecting  to  DWSD   once  water  quality  problems  were  encountered.  Given  the  demographics  of  Flint,2  the   implications  for  environmental  injustice  cannot  be  ignored  or  dismissed.       The  Flint  water  crisis  is  also  a  story,  however,  of  something  that  did  work:  the  critical  role  played   by  engaged  Flint  citizens,  by  individuals  both  inside  and  outside  of  government  who  had  the   expertise  and  willingness  to  question  and  challenge  government  leadership,  and  by  members  of  a   free  press  who  used  the  tools  that  enable  investigative  journalism.  Without  their  courage  and   persistence,  this  crisis  likely  never  would  have  been  brought  to  light  and  mitigation  efforts  never   begun.     A  Series  of  Government  Failures   Flint  water  customers  were  needlessly  and  tragically  exposed  to  toxic  levels  of  lead  and  other   hazards  through  the  mismanagement  of  their  drinking  water  supply.  The  specific  events  that  led   to  the  water  quality  debacle,  lead  exposure,  heightened  Legionella  susceptibility,  and                                                                                                               1  Direct  and  indirect  economic  impacts  of  the  Flint  water  crisis  include,  for  example,  financial  consequences  to   individuals  and  homeowners;  impacts  on  economic  development  opportunities  and  on  the  revenue  base  for  public   services;  and  the  costs  of  exacerbated  requirements  for  water  infrastructure  repair  and  rehabilitation  as  well  as  long-­‐ term  public  health  and  social  services.       FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   infrastructure  damage  are  a  litany  of  questionable  decisions  and  failures  related  to  several  issues   and  events,  including,  but  not  limited  to:   • • • • • • Decisions  related  to  the  use  of  the  Flint  River  as  an  interim  water  supply  source.   Inadequate  preparation  (for  example,  staffing,  training  and  plant  upgrades)  for  the  switch   to  full-­‐time  use  of  the  Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant  using  the  Flint  River  as  the  primary   water  supply  source.   Inadequate  and  improper  sampling  of  distribution  system  water  quality,  potentially  in   violation  of  the  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act.   Intransigent  disregard  of  compelling  evidence  of  water  quality  problems  and  associated   health  effects.   Callous  and  dismissive  responses  to  citizens’  expressed  concerns.   Persistent  delays  in  coordinating  appropriate  responses  to  the  resultant  public  health   crises  once  irrefutable  evidence  of  exposure  and  poisoning  was  presented.   We  cannot  begin  to  explain  and  learn  from  these  events—our  charge—without  also  highlighting   that  the  framework  for  this  decision-­‐making  was  Michigan’s  Emergency  Manager  Law.  This  law   replaces  the  decision-­‐making  authority  of  locally  elected  officials  with  that  of  a  state-­‐appointed   emergency  manager.  While  one  must  acknowledge  that  emergency  management  is  a  mechanism   to  address  severe  financial  distress,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  the  role  of  the  emergency   manager  in  Flint  places  accountability  for  what  happened  with  state  government.     Our  complete  findings  and  recommendations  are  provided  throughout  this  report  and  also  are   summarized  at  the  close  of  this  Executive  Summary.  They  are  formulated  to  offer  specific   measures  to  better  safeguard  public  health,  enhance  critical  water  system  infrastructure,   improve  governmental  decision-­‐making  and  regulatory  oversight,  and  mitigate  the  many  negative   health  and  economic  effects  facing  the  people  of  Flint.  We  hope  that  our  findings  and   recommendations  serve  as  a  guide  and  template  for  remediation  and  recovery  in  Flint,  and  for   safeguarding  the  health  and  well-­‐being  of  residents  across  our  state.   FWATF  Membership,  Charge  and  Scope  of  Review   The  FWATF—composed  of  five  members  with  experience  and  backgrounds  in  public  policy,  public   utilities,  environmental  protection,  public  health,  and  health  care—was  appointed  by  Governor   Rick  Snyder  on  October  21,  2015.3  We  were  charged  with  conducting  an  independent  review  of   the  contamination  of  the  Flint  water  supply:  what  happened,  why  it  occurred,  and  what  is   needed  to  prevent  a  reoccurrence  in  Flint  or  elsewhere  in  the  state.  We  assessed  ongoing   mitigation  efforts  to  help  assure  that  short  and  long-­‐term  public  health  issues  and  water   management  concerns  will  be  properly  addressed  to  safeguard  the  health  and  well-­‐being  of  the   Flint  community.  We  have  developed  findings  and  offer  recommendations  on  the  following:   • Roles  of  Government  Entities  in  the  Flint  Water  Crisis   o State  of  Michigan   § Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality  (MDEQ)   § Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (MDHHS)   § Michigan  Governor’s  Office   § State-­‐Appointed  Emergency  Managers                                                                                                               3  Paragraph  summaries  of  the  FWATF  members’  backgrounds  and  experience  are  provided  as  Appendix  I.         2   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   • o City  of  Flint   o Genesee  County  Health  Department  (GCHD)   o United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency  and  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule   Issues  Presented  by  the  Flint  Water  Crisis   o The  Reality  of  Environmental  Injustice   o Perspectives  from  Flint   o Flint  Recovery   o State-­‐Wide  Recommendations   Before  completing  this  report,  the  Task  Force  issued  three  interim  letters  to  Governor  Snyder   offering  findings  and  recommendations  requiring  immediate  response,  as  follows:4     1. The  first  letter,  issued  December  4,  2015,  identified  our  concerns  about  coordination  of   response  measures  and  the  need  for  a  framework  to  measure  results  and  clearly   delineate  responsibilities  for  continuing  actions  to  protect  public  health.   2. The  second  letter,  issued  December  29,  2015,  addressed  the  critical  and  urgent  need  to   establish  responsibility  and  ensure  accountability  for  what  happened  in  Flint.     3. Our  third  letter,  issued  January  21,  2016,  addressed  the  need  for  the  state  to  engage  the   scientific  experts  who  overcame  state  and  federal  agency  intransigence  to  expose  the  lead   poisoning,  and  similarly  to  engage  trusted,  scientific  experts  drawn  from  independent   institutions  to  address  the  implications  of  the  Legionellosis  outbreak.   In  conducting  our  interviews,  we  have  had  complete  independence  and  largely5  unfettered   access  to  local,  state  and  federal  government  personnel.  Interview  subjects  were  not  compelled   to  participate  in  our  review,  and  the  FWATF  held  no  subpoena  or  judicial  enforcement  powers.   We  are  grateful  to  the  parties  involved  for  their  forthright  willingness  to  discuss  the  events  that   transpired  and  their  perspectives.   We  acknowledge  that  other  reviews  and  investigations  are  taking  place,  some  with  tools  that  the   FWATF  did  not  have,  such  as  the  subpoena  and  judicial  enforcement  powers  mentioned  above.   We  appreciate  and  support  these  reviews  because  the  magnitude  of  this  tragedy  warrants  deep   and  detailed  investigation.  It  is  our  hope  that  these  or  other  reviews  examine  certain  issues  we   had  neither  the  time  nor  investigative  tools  to  fully  explore,  and  that  fell  outside  our  immediate   scope  given  the  accelerated  timeframe  for  our  information  gathering  and  rendering  of   judgments.  These  issues  include,  but  are  not  limited  to:   • State  approval  and  permitting  of  the  Karegnondi  Water  Authority  (KWA)  in  a  region  that   had  ample  water  supply  and  treatment  capacity,  yet  faced  economic  distress  sufficient  to   warrant  emergency  management  in  its  two  largest  urban  centers.     • The  appropriate  role  of  regulatory  agencies  and  the  water  utility  industry  in  addressing   the  dangers  presented  by  widespread  use  of  lead  in  public  and  private  plumbing  systems.                                                                                                               4  The  FWATF’s  interim  letters  to  Governor  Snyder  are  provided  as  Appendix  II.   5  The  FWATF  was  not  successful  in  scheduling  an  interview  with  representatives  of  the  firm  Lockwood,  Andrews,  &   Newnam  (LAN)  despite  several  requests.  LAN  requested  that  questions  be  submitted  to  them  in  writing,  and  the   questions  we  submitted  are  included  in  Appendix  IV.  As  of  the  time  of  publication,  the  FWATF  has  not  received   responses  to  these  questions.         3   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Historically,  regulatory  agencies  and  the  water  utility  industry  at  large  have  been   reluctant  to  address  these  dangers  beyond  use  of  corrosion  control  treatment.6  Though   the  industry  now  endorses  strengthening  of  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  and  ultimate   replacement  of  lead  service  lines  (LSLs),7  the  industry  has  not  (with  notable  exceptions)   been  proactive  in  reducing  risk  through  full  LSL  replacement  programs  and  has   highlighted  utility  customers’  obligations  to  manage  lead  risks  on  private  property.  While   the  recommendations  of  the  National  Drinking  Water  Advisory  Council  (NDWAC)  advance   objectives  of  full  LSL  replacements,  enhanced  monitoring,  and  improved  public   education,  concerns  persist  about  accountability,  oversight  and  enforcement.8,  9     • Protocols  for  environmental  compliance  enforcement  when  EPA  has  delegated  primacy   (authority  to  enforce  federal  law)  to  state  agencies,  yet  retains  ultimate  responsibility  for   protection  of  public  health  and  management  of  environmental  risks.       • Budgets  for  public  health  activities  at  federal,  state,  and  local  levels  to  ensure  that  highly   skilled  personnel  and  adequate  resources  are  available.  The  consequences  of  under-­‐ funding  include  insufficient  and  inefficient  responses  to  public  health  concerns,  which   have  been  evident  in  the  Flint  water  crisis.     The  need  for  greater  clarity  on  local  and  state  processes  and  procedures  for  declaring   emergencies  in  response  to  man-­‐made  catastrophes  (in  contrast  to  natural  disasters).  The   efforts  of  local,  state,  and  federal  emergency  operations  teams  in  Flint  beginning  in                                                                                                               • 6  Historically,  water  industry  groups  have  maintained  that  removing  lead  from  water  and  plumbing  systems  is  not   necessary  and  would  involve  significant  difficulty  and  expense  (see,  for  example,  “Controlling  Lead  in  Drinking   Water,”  Water  Research  Foundation,  2015).  Notably,  when  EPA’s  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR)  was  published  in  1991,   it  required  replacement  of  entire  LSLs,  and  in  1994  the  water  industry  sought  in  court  to  limit  this  requirement  to   only  the  publicly  owned  portions  of  service  lines  (40  F.3d  1266,  AWWA  vs.  EPA,  1994).  In  response,  EPA  revised  the   LCR  in  2000  to  allow  for  partial  service  line  replacement—a  practice  the  CDC  later  maintained  was  associated  with   increases  in  blood  lead  levels  (“Important  Update:  Lead-­‐Based  Water  Lines,”  Howard  Frumkin,  MD;  CDC,  May  2010).     The  water  industry  historically  has  focused  on  controlling  lead  exposure  risks  through  use  of  chemical  corrosion   control  methods  and  has  offered  a  number  of  related  studies  (as  compiled  in  “Lead  and  Copper  Corrosion:  An   Overview  of  WRF  Research,”  Jonathan  Cuppett,  Water  Research  Foundation,  updated  January  2016).  The  American   Water  Works  Association  (AWWA)  also  has  published  communications  guides  on  lead-­‐in-­‐water  issues  (see,  for   example,  “Communicating  About  Lead  Service  Lines:  A  Guide  for  Water  Systems  Addressing  Service  Line  Repair  and   Replacement,”  AWWA,  2014;  and  “Strategies  to  Obtain  Customer  Acceptance  of  Complete  Lead  Service  Line   Replacement,”  AWWA,  2005).  Yet  industry  guidance  has  taken  the  position  that  managing  lead-­‐related  risks   associated  with  LSLs  and  plumbing  fixtures  on  private  property  is  largely  the  utility  customers’  responsibility.  Many   water  utilities  have  not  informed  customers  proactively  (if  at  all)  about  the  presence  of  LSLs.  As  a  result,  customers   generally  have  limited  awareness  of  the  potential  need  to  take  action  to  protect  themselves  from  lead  in  drinking   water.   7  See,  for  example,  AWWA  press  release:  “AWWA  Board  supports  recommendation  for  complete  removal  of  lead   service  lines,”  March  8,  2016. 8  For  example,  there  are  concerns  that  the  voluntary,  customer-­‐initiated  sampling  approach  recommended  by  the   NDWAC  will  substantially  decrease  public  water  systems’  ability  to  track  presence  of  lead  over  time,  identify   emerging  public  health  threats,  and  inform  LSL  replacement  programs.  For  more  information  on  additional  concerns,   see,  for  example,  “Strength  of  New  EPA  Lead  Rule  Depends  on  Accountability,”  by  Brett  Walton,  Circle  of  Blue,   February  10,  2016,  www.circleofblue.org/2016/world/strength-­‐of-­‐new-­‐epa-­‐lead-­‐rule-­‐depends-­‐on-­‐accountability/.       9  NDWAC  and  water  utility  industry  representatives  have  highlighted  concerns  about  the  significant  financial   resources  and  time  required  to  effect  full  LSL  replacement,  suggesting  the  need  to  support  reasonable  yet  aggressive   scheduling  of  LSL  replacement  through  both  enforcement  measures  (within  the  LCR)  and  resource  commitments  of   local,  state  and  federal  entities.           4   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   January  201610  have  demonstrated  that  emergency  operations  can  be  deployed   appropriately  and  with  multi-­‐level  coordination.  However,  delays  in  Flint  occurred  due  to   reluctance  to  elevate  concerns,  confusion  and  disagreement  among  authorities  about   how  and  what  levels  of  emergency  status  were  appropriate,  and  extensive  application   requirements.     We  also  note  and  acknowledge  that  additional  information  will  continue  to  be  revealed  as  other   investigations  and  reviews  of  the  crisis  are  conducted.  The  narrative,  findings  and   recommendations  in  this  report  are  based  on  our  interviews  and  the  public  record  available   through  February  2016.  We  believe  this  information  alone  warrants  urgent  and  thorough   response  and  supports  our  recommendations.   We  hope  that  our  earlier  letters  and  this  report  contribute  to  the  collective  understanding  of   what  transpired,  evoke  thoughtful  consideration  of  our  recommendations,  and—most   importantly—further  motivate  sustained  response  and  support  for  the  Flint  community  and  more   earnest  and  effective  protection  of  all  Michigan  residents.     Acknowledgements     The  FWATF  would  not  have  been  able  to  complete  its  work  without  the  support  of  many   individuals  and  organizations  that  dedicated  their  time,  resources  and  passion  to  facilitate  our   review.  We  are  indebted  to  the  Michigan  State  University’s  Center  for  Local  Government  Finance   and  Policy  for  their  administrative  support  and  insights,  particularly  with  regard  to  Michigan’s   emergency  manager  laws;  and  to  Chris  DeWitt  of  DeWitt  Communications  for  keeping  the  task   force  informed  regarding  media  coverage.  We  have  been  aided  by  technical  insights  from   individuals  in  the  water  utility  and  public  health  communities,  too  numerous  to  name  individually   here,  who  have  educated  us  on  a  broad  range  of  issues.  Where  we  have  accurately  stated  the   technical  attributes  of  specific  issues,  it  reflects  on  their  guidance.  We  are  responsible  for  any   technical  inaccuracies  or  unintentional  misstatements  of  fact.   Perhaps  most  notably,  we  are  deeply  indebted  to  the  members  of  the  Flint  community  and  safe   drinking  water  and  public  health  advocates  who  ultimately  entrusted  us  with  profound   expressions  of  their  frustrations,  concerns,  perspectives  and  hopes  for  the  future.  We  are   especially  thankful  to  Flint  residents  for  giving  voice  to  the  searing  personal  costs  that  are  too   often  muted  in  the  discourses  about  public  policy  implications.  We  are  acutely  aware  that  as  we   are  a  task  force  commissioned  by  the  State  of  Michigan,  their  forthrightness  was  a  leap  of  faith   given  what  happened  in  Flint.  We  hope  that  our  report  honors  their  trust,  advances  their  hopes   for  the  future,  and  helps  ensure  that  Michigan  communities  are  safer.                                                                                                                     10  The  FWATF  recommended  to  the  Governor’s  office  that  an  emergency  be  declared  as  early  as  November  2015  and   issued  its  first  letter  to  the  Governor  on  December  4,  2015  noting  the  acute  need  for  more  effective  coordination  of   activities.         5   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Findings  of  the  Task  Force   Note:  Footnotes  and  text  supporting  these  findings  and  recommendations  are  provided  in  the   individual  sections  of  the  report.  The  footnotes  and  text  provide  substantive  detail  and  important   context  for  our  findings  and  recommendations.  Also  please  note  that  the  findings  and   recommendations  are  independent  lists;  the  findings  do  not  correlate  one-­‐to-­‐one  to  the   recommendations.     Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality  (MDEQ):   F-­‐1. MDEQ  bears  primary  responsibility  for  the  water  contamination  in  Flint.   F-­‐2. MDEQ,  specifically  its  Office  of  Drinking  Water  and  Municipal  Assistance  (ODWMA),   suffers  from  cultural  shortcomings  that  prevent  it  from  adequately  serving  and  protecting   the  public  health  of  Michigan  residents.         F-­‐3. MDEQ  misinterpreted  the  LCR  and  misapplied  its  requirements.  As  a  result,  lead-­‐in-­‐water   levels  were  under-­‐reported  and  many  residents’  exposure  to  high  lead  levels  was   prolonged  for  months.     F-­‐4. MDEQ  waited  months  before  accepting  EPA’s  offer  to  engage  its  lead  (Pb)  experts  to  help   address  the  Flint  water  situation  and,  at  times,  MDEQ  staff  were  dismissive  and   unresponsive.   F-­‐5. MDEQ  failed  to  move  swiftly  to  investigate,  either  on  its  own  or  in  tandem  with  MDHHS,   the  possibility  that  Flint  River  water  was  contributing  to  an  unusually  high  number  of   Legionellosis  cases  in  Flint.     Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (MDHHS):   F-­‐6. MDHHS’s  lack  of  timely  analysis  and  understanding  of  its  own  data  on  childhood  blood   lead  levels,  along  with  its  reliance  on  MDEQ  and  reluctance  to  share  state  data  with  Dr.   Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha  and  Professor  Marc  Edwards,  prolonged  the  Flint  water  crisis.   F-­‐7. MDHHS  bears  ultimate  responsibility  for  leadership  and  coordination  of  timely  follow-­‐up   efforts  in  Flint  and  across  the  state  regarding  childhood  lead  poisoning.  While  local   entities  (for  example,  healthcare  professionals,  GCHD,  health  insurance  plans)  are   partners  in  efforts  to  protect  children  from  lead  poisoning,  MDHHS  has  the  lead  role  and   failed  to  exercise  its  responsibility.   F-­‐8. The  consequences  of  lead  exposure  for  Flint  residents  are  expected  to  be  long-­‐term  and   will  necessitate  sustained  investments  in  education,  public  and  mental  health,  juvenile   justice,  and  nutrition  needs  over  the  next  10  to  20  years.         F-­‐9. Too  few  children  in  Michigan  are  screened  for  lead  through  routine  blood  tests  as   recommended  for  children  ages  1  and  2.  Statewide  screening  goals  for  children  enrolled  in   Medicaid  are  met  in  very  few  instances  at  the  county  level  or  within  Medicaid  health   plans.  This  lack  of  information  leaves  parents,  healthcare  professionals,  and  local  and   state  public  health  authorities  uninformed  about  the  possibility  of  lead  poisoning  for   thousands  of  Michigan  children.   F-­‐10. Coordination  between  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  was  inadequate  to  properly  address  the  public   health  issues  related  to  water  quality  in  Flint.  Communication  was  infrequent,  and  when  it   did  occur,  the  default  position  was  to  conclude  that  the  health  problems  were  not  related         6   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   to  the  water  supply  switch  –  rather  than  to  assume  that  the  problems  might  be  related  to   the  switch.     F-­‐11. Communication  and  coordination  among  local  and  state  public  health  staff  and  leadership   regarding  Legionellosis  cases  in  2014-­‐2015  was  inadequate  to  address  the  grave  nature  of   this  outbreak.  The  fact  that  these  cases  occurred  while  there  were  several  simultaneous   concerns  about  quality  and  safety  of  water  in  Flint  should  have  caused  public  health  staff   and  leadership  at  local  and  state  levels  to  coordinate  their  actions  to  ensure  a  prompt  and   thorough  investigation.   Michigan  Governor’s  Office:   F-­‐12. Ultimate  accountability  for  Michigan  executive  branch  decisions  rests  with  the  Governor.   F-­‐13. The  Governor’s  knowledge,  and  that  of  Governor’s  office  staff,  of  various  aspects  of  the   Flint  water  crisis  was  compromised  by  the  information—much  of  it  wrong—provided  by   MDEQ  and  MDHHS.     F-­‐14. The  Governor’s  office  continued  to  rely  on  incorrect  information  provided  by  these   departments  despite  mounting  evidence  from  outside  experts  and  months  of  citizens’   complaints  throughout  the  Flint  water  crisis,  only  changing  course  in  early  October  2015   when  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  finally  acknowledged  the  extent  of  the  problem  of  lead  in  the   public  water  supply.   F-­‐15. The  suggestion  made  by  members  of  the  Governor’s  executive  staff  in  October  2014  to   switch  back  to  DWSD  should  have  resulted,  at  a  minimum,  in  a  full  and  comprehensive   review  of  the  water  situation  in  Flint,  similar  to  that  which  accompanied  the  earlier   decision  to  switch  to  KWA.  It  was  disregarded,  however,  because  of  cost  considerations   and  repeated  assurances  that  the  water  was  safe.  The  need  to  switch  back  to  DWSD   became  even  more  apparent  as  water  quality  and  safety  issued  continued  and  lead  issues   began  to  surface  in  2015,  notwithstanding  reassurances  by  MDEQ.   F-­‐16. The  Flint  water  crisis  highlights  the  risks  of  over-­‐reliance—in  fact,  almost  exclusive   reliance—on  a  few  staff  in  one  or  two  departments  for  information  on  which  key   decisions  are  based.   F-­‐17. Official  state  public  statements  and  communications  about  the  Flint  water  situation  have   at  times  been  inappropriate  and  unacceptable.     State-­‐Appointed  Emergency  Managers:   F-­‐18. Emergency  managers,  not  locally  elected  officials,  made  the  decision  to  switch  to  the  Flint   River  as  Flint’s  primary  water  supply  source.   F-­‐19. Treasury  officials,  through  the  terms  of  the  local  emergency  financial  assistance  loan   executed  by  the  Flint  emergency  manager  on  April  29,  2015,  effectively  precluded  a   return  to  DWSD  water,  as  Flint  citizens  and  local  officials  were  demanding,  without  prior   state  approval.   F-­‐20. The  role  of  the  emergency  managers  in  Flint  (in  combination  with  MDEQ’s  failures)  places   primary  accountability  for  what  happened  with  state  government.             7   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   F-­‐21. Emergency  managers  charged  with  financial  reform  often  do  not  have,  nor  are  they   supported  by,  the  necessary  expertise  to  manage  non-­‐financial  aspects  of  municipal   government.   F-­‐22. Michigan’s  Emergency  Manager  Law  and  related  practices  can  be  improved  to  better   ensure  that  protection  of  public  health  and  safety  is  not  compromised  in  the  name  of   financial  urgency.   City  of  Flint:   F-­‐23. Flint  Public  Works  personnel  were  ill-­‐prepared  to  assume  responsibility  for  full-­‐time   operation  of  the  Flint  WTP  and  distribution  system.     F-­‐24. The  Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant  (WTP)  and  installed  treatment  technologies  were  not   adequate  to  produce  safe,  clean  drinking  water  at  startup  of  full-­‐time  operations.  Flint’s   lack  of  reinvestment  in  its  water  distribution  system  contributed  to  the  drinking  water   crisis  and  ability  to  respond  to  water  quality  problems.     F-­‐25. Flint  Public  Works  personnel  failed  to  comply  with  LCR  requirements,  including  the  use  of   optimized  corrosion  control  treatment  and  monitoring  for  lead.  Flint  personnel  did  not   identify  residences  with  LSLs,  secure  an  adequate  number  of  tap  water  samples  from   high-­‐risk  homes,  or  use  prescribed  sampling  practices  (for  example,  line  and  tap  flushing   methods  and  sample  bottle  sizes).   F-­‐26. Flint  Public  Works  acted  on  inaccurate  and  improper  guidance  from  MDEQ.       F-­‐27. Many  communities  similarly  rely  on  MDEQ  to  provide  technical  assistance  and  guidance   on  how  to  meet  regulatory  requirements.  In  the  case  of  Flint,  MDEQ  assistance  was   deeply  flawed  and  lax,  which  led  to  myopic  enforcement  of  regulations  designed  to   protect  public  health.         F-­‐28. The  emergency  manager  structure  made  it  extremely  difficult  for  Flint  citizens  to  alter  or   check  decision-­‐making  on  preparations  for  use  of  Flint  River  water,  or  to  receive   responses  to  concerns  about  subsequent  water  quality  issues.   Genesee  County  Health  Department  (GCHD):   F-­‐29. Communication,  coordination  and  cooperation  between  GCHD,  the  City  of  Flint  and   MDHHS  were  inadequate  to  protect  Flint  residents  from  public  health  threats  resulting   from  inadequately  treated  Flint  River  water.   F-­‐30. The  rate  of  follow-­‐up  on  children  with  elevated  blood  lead  levels  through  January  2016   was  unacceptable,  illustrating  a  low  level  of  coordination  between  GCHD  and  MDHHS  and   insufficient  resources  devoted  to  this  task.   F-­‐31. Management  of  the  Flint  River-­‐sourced  water  supply  may  have  contributed  to  the   outbreaks  of  Legionellosis  in  2014  and  2015  in  Genesee  County.  Although  the  definitive   cause  of  the  outbreaks  is  uncertain  at  the  time  of  publication,  GCHD  and  MDHHS  did  not   notify  the  public  of  the  outbreaks  in  a  timely  fashion  in  order  to  urge  caution.     United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA):   F-­‐32. EPA  failed  to  properly  exercise  its  authority  prior  to  January  2016.  EPA’s  conduct  casts   doubt  on  its  willingness  to  aggressively  pursue  enforcement  (in  the  absence  of         8   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   widespread  public  outrage).  EPA  could  have  exercised  its  powers  under  Section  1414  and   Section  1431  of  the  SDWA  or  under  the  LCR,  40  CFR  141.82(i).   F-­‐33. Despite  the  clear  intent  of  the  LCR,  EPA  has  accepted  differing  compliance  strategies  that   have  served  to  mute  its  effectiveness  in  detection  and  mitigation  of  lead  contamination   risks.  These  strategies  have  been  adopted  at  water  systems  and  primacy  agencies  across   the  country.  Though  there  may  be  some  ambiguity  in  LCR  rule,  none  of  it  relates  to  what   MDEQ  should  have  done  in  Flint.  There  was  and  remains  no  justification  for  MDEQ  not   requiring  corrosion  control  treatment  for  the  switch  of  water  source  to  the  Flint  River.   F-­‐34. EPA  was  hesitant  and  slow  to  insist  on  proper  corrosion  control  measures  in  Flint.  MDEQ   misinformation  notwithstanding,  EPA’s  deference  to  MDEQ,  the  state  primacy  agency,   delayed  appropriate  intervention  and  remedial  measures.   F-­‐35. EPA  tolerated  MDEQ’s  intransigence  and  issued,  on  November  3,  2015,  a  clarification   memo  on  the  LCR  when  no  such  clarification  was  needed.    Issues  Presented  by  the  Flint  Water  Crisis:   F-­‐36. The  Flint  water  crisis  is  a  clear  case  of  environmental  injustice.                 9   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Recommendations  of  the  Task  Force   Note:  Footnotes  and  text  supporting  these  findings  and  recommendations  are  provided  in  the   individual  sections  of  the  report.  The  footnotes  and  text  provide  substantive  detail  and  important   context  for  our  findings  and  recommendations.  Also  please  note  that  the  findings  and   recommendations  are  independent  lists;  the  findings  do  not  correlate  one-­‐to-­‐one  to  the   recommendations.   Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality  (MDEQ):   R-­‐1. Implement  a  proactive,  comprehensive  cultural  change  program  within  MDEQ,  specifically   its  ODWMA,  to  refocus  the  department  on  its  primary  mission  to  protect  human  health   and  the  environment.  MDEQ  should  aspire  to  become  a  national  leader  through  a   proactive  program  designed  to  detect  and  address  contaminants  in  public  water  supplies   in  a  timely  manner.   R-­‐2. Establish  an  apprenticeship/certification  program  for  MDEQ  ODWMA  employees  that   requires  direct,  hands-­‐on  experience  with  public  water  system  operations.  MDEQ   ODWMA  employees  responsible  for  water  system  regulation  and  SDWA  enforcement   should  be,  or  have  access  to,  certified  operators  and  subject  matter  experts  (including,  for   example,  those  at  EPA).   R-­‐3. Strengthen  SDWA  enforcement,  most  notably  for  the  LCR.  The  state  has  the  ability  to   strengthen  its  own  enforcement  of  the  SDWA  and  not  wait  for  action  to  occur  at  the   federal  level.   R-­‐4. Participate  in  the  Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Committee’s  (FWICC’s)  work   team  established  to  oversee  conversion  from  DWSD-­‐supplied  to  KWA-­‐delivered  water.   MDEQ  should  draw  from  that  work  to  revise  its  policies  and  procedures  for  approval  of   water  treatment  and  distribution  system  operating  regimens,  particularly  when  source   water  changes  are  contemplated.     R-­‐5. Participate  in  EPA’s  ongoing  review  and  revision  of  the  LCR,  conveying  lessons  learned   from  the  Flint  water  crisis.     Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (MDHHS):   R-­‐6. Establish  policies  and  procedures  at  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  to  ensure  input  by  health  experts   and  scientists  when  permit  decisions  may  have  a  direct  impact  on  human  health.   R-­‐7. Establish  and  maintain  a  Flint  Toxic  Exposure  Registry  to  include  all  the  children  and  adults   residing  in  Flint  from  April  2014  to  present.   R-­‐8. Re-­‐establish  the  Michigan  Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  and  Control  Commission.     R-­‐9. Ensure  that  MDHHS  is  transparent  and  timely  in  reporting  and  analysis  of  aggregate  data   regarding  children’s  blood  lead  levels.  MDHHS  data  regarding  lead  levels  shall  be  provided   to  individuals  and  organizations,  based  on  their  expertise,  upon  request  and  in  cases   when  the  interpretation  of  data  by  MDHHS  is  questioned.   R-­‐10. Establish  a  more  aggressive  approach  to  timely  clinical  and  public  health  follow-­‐up  for  all   children  known  to  have  elevated  blood  lead  levels,  statewide.  MDHHS  should  expand  its   local  efforts  and  partnerships  to  accomplish  this  goal.  Whenever  possible,  routine         10   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   screening  for  lead  and  appropriate  follow-­‐up  should  occur  in  children’s  primary  care   medical  homes.   R-­‐11. Strive  to  be  a  national  leader  in  monitoring  and  responding  to  exposure  of  children  to  lead   by  converting  the  Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  Program  (CLPPP)  from  passive   collection  of  test  results  into  an  active  surveillance  and  outreach  program.     R-­‐12. Improve  screening  rates  for  lead  among  young  children  through  partnerships  with  county   health  departments,  health  insurers,  hospitals,  and  healthcare  professionals.   R-­‐13. As  the  state  authority  on  public  health,  and  as  the  organization  that  conducted  the   epidemiologic  study  of  Legionellosis  cases  in  Genesee  County  in  2014-­‐15,  take   responsibility  for  coordinating  with  GCHD  and  CDC  to  protect  Michigan  residents  from   further  outbreaks  of  Legionellosis.     R-­‐14. In  cases  of  switches  in  drinking  water  supplies  in  the  future,  assume  that  outbreaks  of   Legionellosis  cases  may  be  related  to  changes  in  water  source  and  communicate  the   potential  risk  to  the  public,  rather  than  assuming  and  communicating  the  opposite.   Michigan  Governor’s  Office:   R-­‐15. Expand  information  flow  to  the  Governor  so  that  information  providing  the  foundation  for   key  decisions  comes  from  more  than  one  trusted  source—and  is  verified.       R-­‐16. Create  a  culture  in  state  government  that  is  not  defensive  about  concerns  and  evidence   that  contradicts  official  positions,  but  rather  is  receptive  and  open-­‐minded  toward  that   information.  View  informed  opinions—even  if  critical  of  state  government—as  an   opportunity  for  re-­‐assessing  state  positions,  rather  than  as  a  threat.   R-­‐17. Ensure  that  communications  from  all  state  agencies  are  respectful,  even  in  the  face  of   criticism,  and  sensitive  to  the  concerns  of  diverse  populations.     R-­‐18. The  Governor  must  assume  the  leadership  of,  and  hold  state  departments  accountable   for,  long-­‐term  implementation  of  the  recommendations  in  this  report,  including  but  not   limited  to  the  need  for  cultural  changes  across  multiple  state  agencies,  the  need  for   health  mitigation  and  LSL  replacement  in  Flint,  and  the  need  for  a  funding  strategy  to   address  replacement  of  LSLs  statewide.     R-­‐19. Review  budget  requests  for  MDEQ  to  ensure  adequate  funding  is  provided  to  the   ODWMA.  EPA  audit  and  interviews  indicate  that  Michigan’s  drinking  water  program  might   have  one  of  the  lowest  levels  of  financial  support  within  EPA  Region  V  while  having  one  of   the  largest,  if  not  the  largest,  number  of  community  water  systems  to  regulate.   State-­‐Appointed  Emergency  Managers:   R-­‐20. Review  Michigan’s  Emergency  Manager  Law  (PA  436)  and  its  implementation,  and  identify   measures  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  the  checks  and  balances  that  are  provided  by   representative  government.   R-­‐21. Consider  alternatives  to  the  current  emergency  manager  approach—for  example,  a   structured  way  to  engage  locally  elected  officials  on  key  decisions;  an  Ombudsman   function  in  state  government  to  ensure  that  local  concerns  are  a  factor  in  decisions  made   by  the  emergency  manager;  and/or  a  means  of  appealing  emergency  manager  decisions   to  another  body.           11   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   R-­‐22. Ensure  proper  support  and  expertise  for  emergency  managers  to  effectively  manage  the   many  governmental  functions  of  a  city.  Decisions  on  matters  potentially  affecting  public   health  and  safety,  for  example,  should  be  informed  by  subject  matter  experts  identified   and/or  provided  by  the  state.   City  of  Flint:   R-­‐23. Establish  and  fund  a  team  of  subject  matter  experts  in  water  system  operations   (treatment  and  distribution  system  management)  to  support  and  train  water  system   personnel,  guide  safe  system  operation  under  current  conditions,  and  prepare  for   successful  conversion  to  KWA.   R-­‐24. Implement  a  programmatic  approach  to  Flint  WTP  and  distribution  system  operations,   maintenance,  asset  management,  water  quality,  capital  improvements  and  public   engagement  (including  risk  communication)  to  ensure  that  the  disparate  ongoing  efforts   to  address  Flint  water  system  infrastructure  needs  are  coordinated,  fully  documented,   and  structured  to  sustain  high-­‐quality  potable  water  service  over  the  long  term.   R-­‐25. Implement  a  robust  public  engagement  and  involvement  program  in  conjunction  with  the   anticipated  conversion  to  KWA-­‐delivered  water  and  provide  for  regular  reporting  to  the   Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Committee  (FWICC).   Genesee  County  Health  Department  (GCHD):   R-­‐26. Improve  follow-­‐up  on  public  health  concerns  between  GCHD,  MDHHS  and  the  City  of  Flint   now  and  in  the  future,  to  effect  timely,  comprehensive,  and  coordinated  activity  and   ensure  the  best  health  outcomes  for  children  and  adults  affected.   R-­‐27. Presume  that  the  risk  of  Legionella  may  remain  elevated  in  the  Flint  water  distribution   system  and  must  take  appropriate  steps  with  public  and  private  partners  to  monitor  and   mitigate  that  risk  as  concerns  about  water  quality  continue  in  the  City  of  Flint.   R-­‐28. Coordinate  with  state  officials  (MDHHS)  and  with  local  healthcare  professionals  and   healthcare  institutions  in  Genesee  County  and  the  City  of  Flint  to  mitigate  the  risk  of   Legionellosis  in  2016  and  beyond.     United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA):   R-­‐29. Exercise  more  vigor,  and  act  more  promptly,  in  addressing  compliance  violations  that   endanger  public  health.     R-­‐30. In  collaboration  with  the  NDWAC  and  other  interested  partners,  clarify  and  strengthen   the  LCR  through  increased  specificity  and  constraints,  particularly  requirements  related  to   LCR  sampling  pools,  sample  draw  protocols,  and  LSL  replacements—and,  more  generally,   strengthen  enforcement  protocols  with  agencies  delegated  primacy.     R-­‐31. Engage  Michigan  representatives  in  ongoing  LCR  revisions  and  development  of   enforcement  protocols  at  EPA  and  MDEQ.             12   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Issues  Presented  by  the  Flint  Water  Crisis        Environmental  Injustice:   R-­‐32. Issue  an  Executive  Order  mandating  guidance  and  training  on  Environmental  Justice   across  all  state  agencies  in  Michigan,  highlighting  the  Flint  water  crisis  as  an  example  of   environmental  injustice.  The  state  should  reinvigorate  and  update  implementation  of  an   Environmental  Justice  Plan  for  the  State  of  Michigan.     Flint  Recovery  and  Remediation:   R-­‐33. Sustainably  fund  the  Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Committee  (FWICC)  to  provide   adequate  resources  to  engage  supporting  sub-­‐committees  for  delivery  of  public  health   and  water  system  services.     R-­‐34. Clarify  and  effectively  communicate  the  roles,  work  and  expected  outcomes  of  the  City  of   Flint,  FWICC  and  Mission  Flint.   R-­‐35. Through  collaboration  among  MDHHS,  GCHD,  local  healthcare  professionals,  and  health   insurance  plans,  ensure  100  percent  clinical  and  environmental  follow-­‐up  with  Flint   families  whose  children  have  been  found  to  have  elevated  blood  lead  levels  since  April   2014,  and  work  together  to  ensure  that  follow-­‐up  occurs  in  children’s  medical  homes.       R-­‐36. Offer  all  children  listed  in  the  recommended  Flint  Toxic  Exposure  Registry  timely  access  to   age-­‐appropriate  screening  and  clinically  indicated  follow-­‐up  for  developmental  and   behavioral  concerns  by  licensed  healthcare  professionals,  as  well  as  access  to  early   childhood  education  and  nutrition  services.     R-­‐37. Consider  establishing  a  dedicated  subsidiary  fund  in  the  Michigan  Health  Endowment   Fund  to  facilitate  funding  of  health-­‐related  services  for  Flint.   R-­‐38. Establish  a  comprehensive  Flint  public  health  program,  coordinated  with  county  and   state-­‐level  public  health  initiatives,  that  can  serve  as  a  model  for  population  health  across   the  state.  This  program  should  provide  assessment,  interventions,  and  support  not  only   regarding  the  health  effects  of  water  contamination  but  also  more  broadly  regarding  the   health  effects  of  chronic  economic  hardship  and  other  social  determinants  of  poor  health.   State-­‐wide  Recommendations:   R-­‐39. Conduct  an  investigative  review  of  the  development  and  approval  of  the  Karegnondi   Water  Authority  and  of  the  City  of  Flint’s  commitments  to  KWA  water  purchases.     R-­‐40. Institute  a  school  and  daycare  water  quality  testing  program  (which  could  serve  as  a   model  for  the  U.S.),  administered  collaboratively  by  MDEQ  and  MDHHS,  that  includes   appropriate  sampling  and  testing  for  lead  contamination  for  all  schools  and  childcare   centers  in  the  state  and  effective  reporting  of  test  results.   R-­‐41. Develop  a  model  LSL  replacement  program  and  funding  mechanisms  for  financing  work   on  private  property.   R-­‐42. Revise  and  enhance  information  distributed  by  public  water  systems  on  the  implications   of  widespread  use  of  lead  in  public  and  private  plumbing.         13   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   R-­‐43. Use  the  occasion  of  the  Flint  water  crisis  to  prompt  local  and  state  re-­‐investment  in   critical  water  infrastructure,  while  providing  mechanisms  to  advance  affordability  and   universal  access  to  water  services.   R-­‐44. Prioritize  health  matters  across  all  state  agencies  with  establishment  of  a  new  Cabinet-­‐ level  post  focused  on  public  health.           14   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Background11   Flint,  Michigan   The  beleaguered  history  of  Flint,  Michigan  over  the  last  several  decades  is  well  known,12  yet  some   facts  are  particularly  important  to  provide  context  for  our  findings  and  recommendations.       The  City  of  Flint  has  suffered  dramatic  declines  in  population.  From  a  peak  of  more  than  200,000   in  1960,  Flint’s  population  had  fallen  below  100,000  residents  by  2014.  Since  2000,  Flint  has  lost   over  20  percent  of  its  population.13  Of  the  remaining  residents,  approximately  57  percent  are   Black  or  African  American.  14   Poverty  is  endemic  in  Flint,  with  41.6  percent  of  the  population  living  below  federal  poverty   thresholds—2.8  times  the  national  poverty  rate.  The  median  value  of  owner-­‐occupied  housing  is   $36,700,  roughly  one-­‐fifth  of  the  national  average.  15  Crime  plagues  the  community;  for  2013,   Flint’s  crime  index  was  811  as  compared  to  a  national  average  of  295.16   Even  before  the  Flint  water  crisis,  Genesee  County  (in  which  Flint  is  the  largest  population  center)   exhibited  poor  health  statistics.  In  a  2015  study,  the  county  ranked  81st  out  of  82  Michigan   counties  in  health  outcomes.  It  ranked  78th  in  length  of  life,  81st  in  quality  of  life,  77th  in  health   behaviors,  78th  in  social  and  economics  factors,  and  75th  in  physical  environment  measures.  Only   the  quality  of  clinical  care,  for  which  the  county  ranked  22nd,  is  not  a  cause  of  acute  community   concern.17   Water  Crisis   The  Flint  Water  System  was  first  organized  in  1883  under  private  ownership,  and  the  City   purchased  the  water  system  in  1903.  Before  1967,  Flint  treated  Flint  River  water  at  its  Water   Treatment  Plant  (WTP).  To  ensure  adequacy  and  reliability  of  water  supplies,  in  1967  Flint  signed   a  long-­‐term  water  supply  contract  with  the  Detroit  Water  and  Sewerage  Department  (DWSD).     From  1967  through  2014,  the  Flint  WTP  served  as  an  emergency  backup  to  DWSD-­‐supplied   water.  As  such,  the  Flint  WTP  was  not  operated  on  an  ongoing  day-­‐to-­‐day  basis,  but  rather  four   times  per  year  to  maintain  readiness  as  an  emergency  backup.  The  WTP  was  also  upgraded   periodically  to  keep  it  ready  for  use  as  an  emergency  backup.                                                                                                               11  The  series  of  events  and  decisions  that  led  to  the  Flint  water  crisis  are  (now)  well  documented,  thanks  to  the   tireless  efforts  of  local  activists  and  journalists.  In  addition,  the  public  record  has  been  supplemented  by  the  release   of  e-­‐mails  and  other  documents  by  the  Governor’s  office  and  key  state  agencies.  We  are  indebted  to  this   construction  of  a  substantial  public  record.  We  believe  that  this  public  record,  in  combination  with  insights  obtained   through  our  interview  process,  provides  more  than  ample  basis  for  our  findings  and  recommendations.   12  For  extensive  information  on  Flint’s  economic  decline  and  troubled  circumstances,  see  the  report  and  endnotes   provided  in  “Long-­‐Term  Crisis  and  Systemic  Failure:  Taking  the  Fiscal  Stress  of  America’s  Older  Cities  Seriously:  Case   Study,  Flint  Michigan,”  by  Eric  Scorsone,  Ph.D.  and  Nicolette  Bateson,  Michigan  State  University  Extension,   September  2011.   13  BiggestUSCities.com,  www.biggestuscities.com/city/flint-­‐michigan       14  U.S.  Census,  Quickfacts  for  Flint,  Michigan  and  the  United  States,   www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00       15  Ibid   16  City-­‐Data.com,  www.city-­‐data.com/crime/crime-­‐Flint-­‐Michigan.html     17   County  Health  Rankings,   www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/michigan/2015/rankings/genesee/county/outcomes/overall/snapshot               15   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   DWSD  provided  water  to  Flint  under  a  35-­‐year  contract  signed  on  December  20,  1965.  The  initial   contract  term  expired  in  2000  and  renewed  each  year  unless  it  was  terminated  by  either  party.   As  one  of  DWSD’s  wholesale  customers,  Flint  was  subject  to  the  terms  and  rate-­‐setting  practices   applicable  to  all  of  DWSD’s  wholesale  customer  communities.    During  the  final  10  years  that  Flint   received  contractual  service  from  DWSD,  the  average  annual  increase  in  water  charges  to  Flint   was  6.2  percent.  DWSD’s  water  supply  has  been  treated  for  corrosion  control  for  over  20  years   and  is  deemed  optimized  for  corrosion  control  treatment.   On  April  16,  2013,  after  a  symbolic  Flint  City  Council  vote  that  accompanied  the  Flint  emergency   manager’s  decision,  the  City  joined  the  Karegnondi  Water  Authority  (KWA),  which  had  been   established  to  develop  a  raw  water  supply  pipeline  from  Lake  Huron.  After  being  advised  of  the   City  of  Flint’s  intent,  DWSD  notified  the  City  of  the  termination  of  its  then-­‐current  water  supply   contract  terms,  effective  April  2014.  DWSD  and  the  City  of  Flint,  both  under  emergency   management,  continued  unsuccessfully  to  negotiate  alternative  water  supply  terms.  Although   the  State  of  Michigan  was  in  control  of  both  cities  at  the  time,  efforts  to  arrive  at  an  agreement   between  the  parties  during  the  final  year  of  service  to  the  City  of  Flint  ultimately  failed.   In  April  2014,  the  City  of  Flint  began  treating  Flint  River  water  at  the  Flint  WTP  on  a  full-­‐time  basis   and  distributing  the  treated  water  to  its  customers.  A  critical  element  of  that  treatment— corrosion  control,  as  required  under  EPA’s  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR)—was  (incorrectly)   determined  by  MDEQ  not  to  be  required  immediately;  instead,  Flint  could  complete  two  6-­‐month   monitoring  periods  and  MDEQ  would  then  determine  whether  corrosion  control  was  necessary.     Soon  after  the  City  began  distributing  treated  water  from  the  Flint  WTP,  Flint  residents  began  to   complain  about  its  odor,  taste  and  appearance.  Numerous  water  quality  problems  and   operational  challenges  resulted  in  water  quality  violations  related  to  E  coli  contamination  and   disinfection  by-­‐products  (total  trihalomethanes  or  TTHMs).  Ultimately,  the  corrosiveness  of  the   drinking  water  leached  lead  from  pipes  and  plumbing  fixtures,  and  it  may  have  increased  the   likelihood  of  water  contamination  with  Legionella.  18   Summary  Timeline  of  Key  Events   In  this  economically  disadvantaged  and  ethnically  diverse  Michigan  community,  a  series  of   disastrous  decisions  and  events  occurred.  Following  are  the  events  most  critical  to  development   of  our  findings  and  recommendations:19     1. 1967:  City  of  Flint  enters  into  long-­‐term  water  supply  contract  with  the  Detroit  Water  and   Sewerage  Department  (DWSD).       2. 1991:  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  issues  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  to   ensure  routine  local  testing  of  drinking  water  and  assurance  of  safe  levels  of  lead  and   copper.   3. January  23,  2013:    Mike  Prysby/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  colleague  Liane  Shekter  Smith  and  others   about  feasibility  of  Flint  switching  to  the  Flint  River,  highlighting  water  quality  concerns.                                                                                                                 18  Bouffard  K.  Hospital  ties  Legionellosis  to  Flint  water.  Detroit  News,  January  23,  2016,   www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/22/legionnaires-­‐bacteria-­‐found-­‐tests-­‐mclaren-­‐medical-­‐centers-­‐ water/79183428/.     19  Appendix  V  provides  a  further,  more  detailed  timeline  that  attempts  to  synthesize  numerous  timelines  developed   by  other  sources,  including  local  media  and  government  agencies.           16   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   4. March  26,  2013:  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  MDEQ  Director  Dan  Wyant  with  Liane   Shekter  Smith  and  other  MDEQ  staff  copied,  with  warnings  about  public  health  risks   associated  with  Flint  River  water.   5. March  28,  2013:  State  Treasurer  Andy  Dillon  e-­‐mails  Governor  Snyder  notifying  him  of  his   approval  of  Flint  joining  Karegnondi  Water  Authority  (KWA)  and  MDEQ  concurrence.     6. April  16,  2013:  Flint  Emergency  Manager  (EM)  Ed  Kurtz  signs  agreement  with  KWA  and   informs  the  State  Treasurer  that  the  City  will  join  KWA  (decision  officially  announced  May   1,  2013).   7. April  17,  2013:  DWSD  issues  letter  to  Flint  notifying  termination  of  contract  to  provide   water  service.  Negotiations  continue  to  establish  alternative  contractual  arrangements  for   DWSD  service  to  Flint.     8. June  26,  2013:  Flint  EM  Ed  Kurtz  authorizes  a  sole-­‐source  contract  with  the  firm  of   Lockwood,  Andrews,  &  Newnam  (LAN)  for  professional  engineering  services  to  place  the   Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant  (WTP)  into  operation  using  the  Flint  River  as  a  primary   drinking  water  source.       9. March  26,  2014:  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Liane  Shekter  Smith  and  Richard   Benzie/MDEQ  on  clarifying  what  Flint  will  be  required  to  do  before  beginning  full-­‐time   Flint  WTP  operation.   10. April  16-­‐17,  2014:  Michael  Glasgow/Flint  Utilities  Department  e-­‐mails  MDEQ,  noting   unpreparedness  of  Flint  WTP  and  apparent  political  pressure  to  start  distributing  water.     11. April  29,  2014:  Flint  EM  Darnell  Earley  notifies  Detroit  EM  that  Flint  has  switched  water   supply  sources  to  the  Flint  River.  Genesee  County  Drain  Commission  remains  as  a  non-­‐ contract  customer  of  DWSD.     12. July  1,  2014:  Flint  begins  first  6-­‐month  monitoring  period  for  lead  and  copper  in  drinking   water.       13. August  15,  2014:  E.  coli  bacteria  violation  in  water  sampled  from  the  Flint  distribution   system  leads  to  local  boil  water  advisory.   14. September  10,  2014:  MDEQ  requests  pre-­‐emptive  operational  evaluation  for  disinfection   byproducts  called  trihalomethanes  (THMs).   15. October  1,  2014:  MDEQ  submits  briefing  paper  to  Governor's  office  re:  City  of  Flint   drinking  water  situation  (boil  water  notices).  Genesee  County  Health  Department  (GCHD)   expresses  concern  to  Flint  Public  Works  regarding  increased  incidence  of  cases  of   Legionellosis  since  April  2014,  and  the  possible  relationship  to  use  of  the  Flint  River  as  the   water  supply.  MDHHS  epidemiology  staff  expresses  concern  but  there  is  no  further  state-­‐ level  evaluation.   16. October  13,  2014:  General  Motors  (GM)  announces  that  it  will  cease  to  use  Flint  WTP-­‐ sourced  water  for  its  Flint  Engine  Operations  facility  until  the  KWA  connection  is   completed,  due  to  corrosion  concerns  related  to  the  chloride  levels  in  water  from  the  Flint   WTP.  MDEQ  notes  chloride  in  Flint  WTP-­‐treated  water  is  within  public  health  guidelines.     17. October  14,  2014:  Valerie  Brader,  State  Deputy  Legal  Counsel  and  Senior  Policy  Advisor,  e-­‐ mails  Governor’s  Chief  of  Staff  Dennis  Muchmore  and  other  top  aides  arguing  for  a  return   to  DWSD  because  of  water  quality  problems.  Michael  Gadola,  then  the  Governor’s  Legal   Counsel,  responds  by  agreeing  with  Brader.  Brader  and  Rich  Baird,  another  senior  aide  to         17   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   the  Governor,  then  discuss  the  idea  with  Emergency  Manager  Darnell  Earley,  who   maintains  the  water  quality  problems  can  be  solved  and  it  would  be  cost-­‐prohibitive  to   return  to  DWSD.   18. December  16,  2014:  MDEQ  notifies  Flint  of  initial  quarterly  violation  of  SDWA  Disinfection   Byproducts  (total  trihalomethane,  or  TTHM)  requirements.   19. December  31,  2014:  First  6-­‐month  round  of  LCR  monitoring  ends.  Using  100  samples  not   necessarily  drawn  from  highest  risk  homes  (as  the  LCR  intends),  the  90th  percentile  lead   level  result  is  6  parts  per  billion  with  2  samples  above  action  levels  for  lead  (15  parts  per   billion). Given  the  6  ppb  result,  Flint  is  disqualified  from  being  exempted  and  will  have  to   implement  corrosion  control  treatment  under  the  LCR,  irrespective  of  subsequent  6-­‐ month  monitoring  results.  MDEQ  fails  to  properly  advise  Flint  WTP  of  this  regulation.     20. January  12,  2015:  In  response  to  water  quality  concerns,  the  state  installs  water  coolers  in   state  offices  in  Flint,  and  state  employees  are  given  the  option  in  their  offices  to  use   bottled  water  and  provide  bottled  water  to  visitors.     21. January  27,  2015:  MDHHS  epidemiology  staff  member  contacts  Genesee  County  Health   Department  (GCHD)  to  recommend  that  they  construct  a  map  of  Legionellosis  cases  and   correlate  them  to  the  City’s  water  service  area.   22. January  2015  (date  unclear):  Staff  from  Genesee  County  hospitals,  MDHHS,  MDEQ  and   GCHD  meet,  and  MDHHS  Director  Nick  Lyon  directs  GCHD  to  conduct  and  complete  its   evaluation  of  the  causes  of  the  increased  Legionellosis  cases  that  had  begun  to  occur  in   2014.   23. January  27,  2015:  FOIA  request  sent  by  GCHD  environmental  hygienist  James  Henry  to   Flint  DPW  and  Flint  Mayor  for  information  on  water  treatment  to  support  the  county’s   investigation  of  Legionellosis  cases.     24. January  30,  2015:  Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Dave  Murray,  Governor  Snyder’s  deputy   press  secretary,  re:  Legionella,  saying  said  he  didn’t  want  MDEQ  Director  Wyant  “to  say   publicly  that  the  water  in  Flint  is  safe  until  we  get  the  results  of  some  county  health   department  traceback  work  on  42  cases  of  Legionellosis  in  Genesee  County  since  last   May.”   25. February  25,  2015:  LeeAnne  Walters  contacts  EPA  Region  V  regarding  high  levels  of  lead   (104  ppb)  found  in  drinking  water  at  her  home.   26. February  26,  2015:  Initial  EPA-­‐MDEQ  correspondence  regarding  elevated  lead  in  sample   collected  from  LeeAnne  Walters's  house.  Jennifer  Crooks/EPA  speculates  Flint  River  water   chemistry  is  leaching  contaminants  from  pipes;  this  prompts  the  EPA’s  initial  query  of   MDEQ  about  whether  optimized  corrosion  control  treatment  (OCCT)  is  in  place  at  the  Flint   WTP.       27. February  26,  2015:  Mike  Prysby/MDEQ  emails  Jennifer  Crooks/EPA  indicating  that  all   other  samples  in  the  monitoring  period  for  July  1,  2014  through  December  31,  2014  are   below  the  EPA  action  level  of  15  ppb.   28. February  27,  2015:  Miguel  Del  Toral/EPA,  in  e-­‐mails  to  MDEQ  and  EPA  staff,  mentions   possibility  of  biasing  lead  results  low  by  collecting  samples  after  flushing  water  through   the  taps;  asks  again  about  Flint  OCCT,  saying  "they  are  required  to  have  OCCT  in  place."           18   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   29. February  27,  2015:  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Jennifer  Crooks  and  Miguel  Del   Toral/EPA  saying  that  the  90thpercentile  is  6  ppb  for  the  monitoring  period  7/1/14-­‐ 12/31/14  and  that  Flint  has  an  optimized  corrosion  control  program,  and  talks  about  EPA   regulations  requiring  targeted  sample  pool  to  focus  on  highest  risk  homes.   30. March  3,  2015:  In  response  to  local  complaints  regarding  drinking  water  quality  and   related  health  effects,  Flint  EM  Ambrose  cites  $12  million  in  costs  associated  with   returning  to  DWSD.   31. March  12,  2015:  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  colleagues  stating  that  there  is  no   confirmation  of  Legionella  in  the  water  supply.  No  test  data  are  provided  to  substantiate   this  statement.   32. March  13,  2015:  Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Harvey  Hollins/Governor’s  office  and  Dan   Wyant/MDEQ  noting  uptick  in  Legionellosis  cases,  placing  responsibility  for  follow-­‐up  on   GCHD,  and  discounting  GCHD  environmental  hygienist  Jim  Henry’s  concerns  about  a   possible  relationship  between  uptick  in  Legionellosis  and  change  in  water  source.   33. March  13,  2015:  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Jim  Henry/GCHD  stating  there  is  unlikely   to  be  Legionella  at  the  Flint  WTP,  but  that  water  main  breaks  and  leaks  may  permit  entry   of  Legionella  into  the  water  supply.  Busch  advises  contacting  MDHHS,  but  does  not   himself  contact  MDHHS.   34. March  30,  2015:  MDEQ  notifies  Flint  of  results  of  first  6-­‐month  lead  and  copper   monitoring  period  (July-­‐December  2014)  showing  6  ppb  result.     35. March  31,  2015:  Jennifer  Crooks/EPA  corresponds  with  MDEQ  regarding  a  conference  call   that  focused  on  increased  cases  of  Legionellosis.   36. April  25,  2015:  Miguel  del  Toral/EPA  e-­‐mails  Pat  Cook/MDEQ,  questions  how  a  large  water   system  can  be  deemed  to  have  optimal  corrosion  control  without  treatment,  cites  federal   regulations  that  provide  the  only  two  scenarios  for  large  systems  to  be  deemed  to  have   optimized  corrosion  control,  and  shows  that  Flint  does  not  meet  either  of  the  two   scenarios.   37. April  27,  2015:  Miguel  Del  Toral/EPA  e-­‐mails  Tom  Poy/EPA  and  other  colleagues  stating   that  Pat  Cook/MDEQ  has  confirmed  the  Flint  WTP  has  no  corrosion  control  treatment   (CCT),  which  is  “very  concerning  given  the  likelihood  of  lead  service  lines  in  the  city.”       38. April  27,  2015:  Laurel  Garrison/CDC  e-­‐mails  GCHD  stating  that  the  Legionellosis  outbreak   in  Genesee  County  is  “very  large,  one  of  the  largest  in  the  past  decade.”   39. April  27,  2015:  Miguel  Del  Toral/EPA  visits  LeeAnne  Walters’s  house  to  inspect  plumbing   and  deliver  sampling  bottles.   40. April  27,  2015:  Pat  Cook  and  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ  exchange  e-­‐mails  complaining  about   Del  Toral/EPA's  questions  on  corrosion  control  treatment.     41. May  29,  2015:  MDHHS’s  Surveillance  of  Infectious  Diseases  and  Epidemiology  team   produces  a  report  regarding  Legionellosis  cases  in  Genesee  County  in  2014-­‐2015;  the   conclusion  of  the  report  is  that  “the  outbreak  is  over.”20                                                                                                                 20  Of  the  Legionellosis  cases  in  2014-­‐2015,  42  percent  had  healthcare  (hospital)  contact;  47  percent  had  contact   with  the  Flint  water  supply.  The  report  indicates  that  the  lack  of  clinical  specimens  from  patients  prohibited         19   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   42. June  24,  2015:  Miguel  Del  Toral  (EPA)  provides  Tom  Poy/EPA  his  “Interim  Report:  High   Lead  Levels  in  Flint,  Michigan,”  summarizing  information  and  concerns  about  lead  levels  in   drinking  water  in  Flint.       43. June  10,  2015:    EPA/MDEQ  conference  call  includes  discussion  of  the  fact  that  Flint  does   not  have  CCT  in  place.   44. June  25,  2015:  Adam  Rosenthal/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Mike  Glasgow  and  Brent  Wright/Flint   Utilities  Department  (copying  Mike  Prysby  and  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ)  reminding  them   that  61  more  lead  and  copper  samples  need  to  be  collected  and  sent  to  the  lab  by  June   30,  2015,  “and  that  they  are  will  be  [sic]  below  the  AL  [action  level]  for  lead.  As  of  now   with  39  results,  Flint’s  90th  percentile  is  over  the  AL  for  lead.”   45. July  7,  2015:  MDEQ  is  contacted  by  the  American  Civil  Liberties  Union  regarding  a  draft   letter  from  Miguel  Del  Toral/EPA  to  LeeAnne  Walters  that  raises  concerns  about  possible   leaching  of  lead  from  service  lines  without  appropriate  corrosion  control.   46. July  10,  2015:  Susan  Hedman/EPA  Region  5  (based  in  Chicago)  writes  to  Flint  Mayor   Walling  to  say  that  EPA  will  work  with  MDEQ  on  issues  related  to  lead  in  water.   47. July  22,  2015:  Governor  Snyder’s  chief  of  staff  Dennis  Muchmore  e-­‐mails  director  of   MDHHS  expressing  that  many  members  of  the  Flint  community  are  raising  concerns  about   water  but  feel  they  are  not  being  heard.   48. July  23,  2015:  Linda  Dykema/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  Deputy  Director  of  Population  Health  and   Community  Services  Susan  Moran  and  others  at  MDHHS  (though  not  Director  Lyon)   stating  that  she  has  corresponded  with  MDEQ  and  that  there  has  been  no  change  in   compliance  regarding  Flint  water  quality  and  appropriate  state  and  federal  law,  and  that   Miguel  Del  Toral/EPA  “acted  outside  of  his  authority”  (these  are  MDEQ  talking  points).   49. July  24,  2015:  In  response  to  Muchmore  e-­‐mail,  Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  writes,  “The  bottom   line  is  that  the  residents  of  Flint  do  not  need  to  worry  about  lead  in  the  water  supply,  and   MDEQ  recent  sampling  does  not  indicate  eminent  [sic]  health  threat  from  lead.”   Muchmore  responds,  “Thanks.”   50. July  28,  2015:  MDHHS  epidemiologist  Cristin  Larder  finds  that  children’s  blood  lead  tests   conducted  in  summer  2014  “lie  outside  the  control  limit”  compared  with  prior  years  and   that  this  finding  “does  warrant  further  investigation.”  On  the  same  day,  CLPPP  data   manager  Robert  Scott  analyzes  the  data  over  a  5-­‐year  period  and  concludes  that  “water   was  not  a  major  factor.”  Later  that  day,  CLPPP  manager  Nancy  Peeler  concludes  that  the   lack  of  persistently  elevated  blood  lead  levels  in  children  in  Flint  beyond  the  summer   months  indicates  no  connection  to  the  change  in  water  in  Flint  in  2014.  Larder  then   receives  email  communication  from  Peeler:  Peeler  has  concluded  from  CLPPP  data  and   communicated  with  MDHHS  leadership  that  there  is  no  problem  with  children's  lead   levels  in  Flint.   51. August  27,  2015:  Virginia  Tech  professor  Marc  Edwards  releases  his  first  set  of  findings   regarding  tests  of  water  in  Flint.  Over  half  of  48  samples  have  lead  levels  of  more  than  5   parts  per  billion  (ppb)  and  30  percent  of  samples  have  lead  levels  greater  than  15  ppb.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       testing  that  could  have  made  a  definitive  link  to  the  water  supply  as  a  source  of  Legionella.  It  indicates  that  there   should  be  vigilance  in  2015  regarding  possible  new  cases  of  Legionellosis,  including  collection  of  clinical   specimens.         20   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   52. August  31,  2015:  EPA/MDEQ  conference  call:  second  6-­‐month  monitioring  test  results  for   January  1-­‐July  31,  2015  indicate  90th  percentile  at  11  ppb.  It  is  determined  that  CCT  is   needed  and  implementation  steps  are  delineated.   53. August  31,  2015:  Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  raises  concerns  about  Professor  Edwards’s  tests  and   accompanying  media  coverage  to  MDEQ,  Muchmore,  Harvey  Hollins,  Dave  Murray  and   Sara  Wurfel  of  Governor’s  office.  There  is  no  apparent  communication  with  MDHHS   regarding  this  issue.   54. September  8,  2015:  Virginia  Tech  posts  to  FlintWaterStudy.org  sample  testing  results  on   252  samples  of  300  sample  kits  provided.  The  Virginia  Tech  researchers  concluded  that:   “mathematically,  even  if  the  remaining  48  samples  returned  have  non-­‐detectable  lead...   FLINT  HAS  A  VERY  SERIOUS  LEAD  IN  WATER  PROBLEM.”  Of  the  252  water  samples,  101   have  lead  in  excess  of  5  ppb.  Flint’s  90th  percentile  in  Edwards’  survey  was  25  ppb.   Several  samples  were  over  100  ppb  and  one  of  the  samples  as  over  1,000  ppb.     55. September  9-­‐12,  2015:  MDHHS  begins  to  develop  educational  program  materials  for  the   public  regarding  reducing  the  risk  of  lead  exposure  for  children,  in  response  to  media   coverage  of  Professor  Edwards’s  water  testing  results.   56. September  22,  2015:  Dr.  Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha,  director  of  the  pediatric  residency  program   at  Hurley  Medical  Center,  contacts  Robert  Scott/MDHHS  to  request  access  to  the  state’s   childhood  lead  testing  records.  This  is  a  similar  request  to  one  filed  by  Professor  Edwards   several  weeks  before,  to  which  the  state  had  yet  to  respond.  No  data  are  shared.   57. September  23,  2015:  Nancy  Peeler/MDHHS,  director  of  the  state’s  Childhood  Lead   Poisoning  Prevention  Program  (CLPPP),  e-­‐mails  Robert  Scott/MDHHS  to  consider  re-­‐ running  the  analysis  that  had  been  conducted  in  July,  and  asks  for  formal  epidemiologic   help.  Later  that  day,  Mikelle  Robinson/MDHHS  writes  to  colleagues  that  the  Governor’s   office  briefing  maintains  that  Flint  water  does  not  represent  an  “imminent  public  health   problem.”   58. September  24,  2015:  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  presents  her  findings  about  children  tested  for   lead  in  a  press  conference  at  Hurley  Medical  Center,  reporting  that  the  proportion  of   children  with  elevated  blood  lead  levels  has  increased  since  the  switch  to  the  Flint  River   water  source  in  April  2014.  MDHHS  issues  comments  emphasizing  differences  between   the  Hurley  analysis  and  preceding  internal  analyses  by  MDHHS  that  were  not  shared   publicly.  That  same  day,  Robert  Scott/MDHHS  writes  in  an  internal  memo  that  he  sees   patterns  in  blood  lead  levels  similar  to  what  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  has  reported.   59. September  28,  2015:  MDHHS  Director  Nick  Lyon  calls  for  analysis  of  the  blood  lead  levels   in  order  to  “make  a  strong  statement  with  a  demonstration  of  proof  that  the  blood  lead   levels  seen  are  not  out  of  the  ordinary.”  No  such  analysis  is  ever  provided.  Later  that  day,   Governor  Snyder  is  briefed  by  staff  that  the  Flint  water  system  is  in  compliance.   60. September  29,  2015:  The  Detroit  Free  Press  publishes  an  analysis  of  Flint  blood  lead  tests,   concluding  that  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha’s  analysis  is  correct.  GCHD  issues  a  health  advisory   regarding  the  water  quality.  Governor  Snyder’s  office  contacts  Director  Wyant  and   Director  Lyon  to  consider  emergency  responses.   61. October  1,  2015:  MDHHS  issues  a  statement  confirming  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha’s  analysis.   62. October  16,  2015:  Flint  switches  back  to  DWSD  as  source  of  drinking  water  for  the  city.         21   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Regulatory  Context   The  federal  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act21  (SWDA)  was  enacted  in  1974  and  governs  regulation  of   drinking  water  throughout  the  United  States.  It  has  been  amended  multiple  times  since  its   enactment,  most  recently  in  2015.  From  the  United  States  Environment  Protection  Agency  (EPA)   website:    “The  Act  authorizes  EPA  to  establish  minimum  standards  to  protect  tap  water   and  requires  all  owners  or  operators  of  public  water  systems  to  comply  with   these  primary  (health-­‐related)  standards.  The  1996  amendments  to  SDWA   require  that  EPA  consider  a  detailed  risk  and  cost  assessment,  and  best  available   peer-­‐reviewed  science,  when  developing  these  standards.  State  governments,   which  can  be  approved  to  implement  these  rules  for  EPA,  also  encourage   attainment  of  secondary  standards  (nuisance-­‐related).”22   Michigan  enacted  the  state  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act  (PA  399)  in  1976.  It  establishes  state   authority  for  regulating  drinking  water  supplies  in  Michigan.  It  also  provides  the  statutory  basis   for  the  EPA’s  delegation  to  the  Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality  (MDEQ)  to   implement  the  federal  SWDA,  including  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR).     Lead and Copper Rule The  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR),  promulgated  in  1991,23  falls  under  the  SDWA.  Short-­‐term   revisions,  prompted  following  the  incidence  of  elevated  lead  levels  in  the  District  of  Columbia’s   water  distribution  system,  were  published  in  the  Federal  Register  in  2007.24  From  the  guidance  to   the  states  on  the  rule:   The  goal  of  the  LCR  is  to  provide  maximum  human  health  protection  by  reducing   lead  and  copper  levels  at  consumers'  taps  to  as  close  to  the  [Maximum   Contaminant  Level  Goals]  MCLGs  as  is  feasible.  To  accomplish  this  goal,  the  LCR   establishes  requirements  for  community  water  systems  (CWSs)  and  non-­‐transient   non-­‐community  water  systems  (NTNCWSs)  to  optimize  corrosion  control  and   conduct  periodic  monitoring.  Systems  are  required  to  perform  public  education   when  there  are  lead  action  level  exceedances  at  more  than  10  percent  of  the  taps   that  are  sampled,  treat  source  water  if  it  contributes  significantly  to  lead  and   copper  levels  at  the  tap,  and  replace  lead  service  lines  in  the  distribution  system  if   the  lead  level  at  the  tap  continues  to  exceed  the  action  level  after  optimal   corrosion  control  and/  or  source  water  treatment  has  been  installed.25   The  MCLG  for  lead  in  water  is  0  milligrams  per  liter  (mg/L);  the  action  level  requiring  public   notification  of  exceedance  is  0.15  mg/l  (also  expressed  as  15  parts  per  billion).     Large  water  systems,  defined  as  those  serving  over  50,000  people,  were  required  to  have  optimal   corrosion  control  treatment  (OCCT)  by  1997.  The  rule  requires  large  water  systems  that  have  met                                                                                                               21  42  U.S.C.  §300f  et  seq.,  1974    www.epa.gov/laws-­‐regulations/summary-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐act   23  56  FR  26460,  June  7,  1991   24  72  FR  57782,  October  2007   22 25  LCR  Short-­‐Term  Revisions  State  Implementation  Guidance-­‐Final  June  2008         22   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   the  OCCT  requirements  through  the  installation  of  corrosion  control  treatment  to  continue  to   operate  and  maintain  that  treatment.26       Currently,  EPA  is  in  the  process  of  reviewing  and  revising  the  LCR  through  its  established   rulemaking  procedures.   Public  Health  Context       Flint  is  now  confronted  by  public  health  challenges:  mitigating  the  effects  of  toxic  lead  exposure   and  ensuring  an  appropriate  case-­‐tracking  and  containment  response  to  the  outbreak  of   Legionellosis  in  Flint.    Several  attributes  of  these  public  health  challenges  are  particularly   noteworthy  and  informed  our  findings  and  recommendations:   Lead Exposure Lead  is  a  potent  neurotoxin.  For  any  given  exposure,  lead  has  more  profound  health  effects  in   children  because  the  exposure  is  distributed  throughout  the  body’s  volume.  Children’s  smaller   body  volumes  convey  larger  risks  from  lead  exposure;  these  effects  are  concentrated  in  brain   cells.     One  of  the  most  concerning  aspects  of  lead  exposure  is  that  once  it  has  been  deposited  in  the   nervous  system,  lead  cannot  be  removed.  The  impact  of  lead  poisoning  on  neurological   development  is  permanent.  Recent  research  has  indicated  that,  with  each  1  microgram  per   deciliter  increase  in  blood  lead  level,  children  demonstrate  decreasing  performance  on   intelligence  tests.27     Given  the  neurotoxicity  of  lead,  for  many  decades  medicine  and  public  health  experts  have   focused  on  how  to  reduce  lead  exposure,  particularly  for  children.  Known  historical  sources  of   lead  include  lead  in  paint,  lead  in  gasoline,  and  lead  in  water  sources.28  Major  federal  laws  have   addressed  these  sources  by  prohibiting  lead  in  paint,  prohibiting  lead  in  gasoline,  and  requiring   corrosion  control  and  testing  of  public  drinking  water  sources  to  identify  lead  contamination  in   water  (via  the  LCR,  above).     In  Michigan,  prior  to  the  Flint  water  crisis,  trends  in  lead  test  results  for  children  had  told  a  story   of  public  health  progress.  As  recently  as  the  late  1990s,  almost  50  percent  of  young  children  (ages   1  to  2)  in  Michigan  had  blood  lead  levels  of  5  micrograms  per  deciliter  or  above.  By  2013,  fewer   than  5  percent  of  young  children  in  Michigan  had  levels  of  5  micrograms  per  deciliter  or  above.29   This  downward  trend  mirrors  similar  improvements  in  communities  across  the  United  States.                                                                                                               26  40  CFR  141.82  (g)  Continued  operation  and  monitoring.  All  systems  optimizing  corrosion  control  shall  continue  to   operate  and  maintain  optimal  corrosion  control  treatment,  including  maintaining  water  quality  parameters  at  or   above  minimum  values  or  within  ranges  designated  by  the  State  under  paragraph  (f)  of  this  section,  in  accordance   with  this  paragraph  for  all  samples  collected  under  §141.87(d)  through  (f).   27  Citations  offered  in  “Elevated  Blood  Lead  Levels  in  Children  Associated  With  the  Flint  Drinking  Water  Crisis:  A   Spatial  Analysis  of  Risk  and  Public  Health  Response,”  by  Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha,  MD,  MPH;  Jenny  LaChance,  MS;   Richard  Casey  Sadler,  PhD;  and  Allison  Champney  Schnepp,  MD,  American  Journal  of  Public  Health,  November  2015.   28  For  a  discussion  of  the  prevalent  use  of  lead  in  the  United  States  and  the  lead  industry’s  conduct  in  light  of  the   determination  of  its  toxicity,  see  Lead  Wars:  The  Politics  of  Science  and  the  Fate  of  America's  Children  (2013),  by   Gerald  Markowitz  and  David  Rosner,  who  are  interviewed  on  National  Public  Radio’s  Fresh  Air  in  a  March  3,  2016   episode  titled,  “America's  'Lead  Wars'  Go  Beyond  Flint,  Mich.:  ‘It's  Now  Really  Everywhere.’”      Known  as  the  “reference  level”  as  stated  by  the  federal  Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention.   29       23   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   These  improvements  have  largely  been  attributed  to  reductions  in  lead  paint  in  households   rather  than  reductions  in  lead  exposure  through  drinking  water.       In  Michigan,  routine  blood  lead  level  checks  are  recommended  for  children  1  to  2  years  old  who   live  in  communities  that  are  known  to  have  historically  high  proportions  of  children  with  levels  at   the  reference  level  or  higher,  and  for  all  children  with  Medicaid  health  coverage.  For  the  past   decade,  Flint  has  been  one  of  14  Michigan  communities  that  have  been  identified  by  MDHHS  as   “focus  communities”  because  of  historically  high  levels  of  children  with  elevated  blood  lead   levels.  Local  and  state  health  agencies  are  responsible,  in  coordination  with  children’s  healthcare   providers  (physicians,  nurse  practitioners,  etc.),  for  following  up  on  elevated  blood  lead  levels.     Appropriate  follow-­‐up  includes:     o Providing  advice  to  families  regarding  increasing  the  nutritional  quality  of  the  child’s  diet   to  increase  the  amount  of  foods  with  high  levels  of  iron,  calcium,  and  vitamin  C;   o Rechecking  blood  lead  levels  within  3  to  6  months  to  see  whether  the  level  has  decreased   below  5  micrograms  per  deciliter,  and  continuing  interventions  and  re-­‐testing  at  this   interval  to  assure  progress;  and     o Performing  in-­‐home  assessments  for  environmental  sources  of  lead  (for  example,  lead   paint,  lead  in  dust)  for  children  with  blood  lead  levels  of  10  micrograms  per  deciliter  or   more.30     Of  note,  before  the  Flint  water  crisis,  in-­‐home  assessments  did  not  routinely  include  testing  of   drinking  water  as  a  potential  source  of  lead  exposure.   Legionella Infections  caused  by  Legionella  bacteria  can  cause  relatively  mild  illness  in  generally  healthy   adults  but  can  cause  life-­‐threatening  illness  and  even  death  in  elderly  and  immune-­‐compromised   patients.  Such  infections  almost  never  occur  in  children.  Legionellosis,  the  name  given  to   infections  caused  by  Legionella  bacteria,  has  been  recognized  since  the  1970s  as  often  occurring   in  environments  with  self-­‐contained  air  supply  systems  (such  as  healthcare  facilities)  during  non-­‐ winter  months  when  cooling  towers  for  air  conditioning  can  serve  as  breeding  grounds  for  the   bacteria.  Historically,  Legionellosis  is  fatal  in  approximately  10  percent  of  cases.   Legionellosis  is  a  reportable  disease,  meaning  that  infections  with  Legionella  must  be  reported  to   local  and  state  public  health  authorities.  Public  health  specialists  known  as  epidemiologists   conduct  analyses  of  cases,  especially  when  the  pattern  of  cases  exceeds  historical  levels  in  a  given   jurisdiction.       Prior  to  the  switch  to  the  Flint  River  as  a  source  of  drinking  water  in  2014,  the  number  of  cases  of   Legionellosis  in  Genesee  County  had  not  exceeded  10  cases  per  year  for  several  years.  From  June   2014  to  March  2015,  there  were  45  cases  of  Legionellosis  in  Genesee  County,  with  5  deaths.  This   was  described  by  an  expert  from  the  CDC  in  2015  as  “one  of  the  largest  [outbreaks  of   Legionellosis]  in  the  past  decade.”    About  40  percent  of  the  cases  had  known  exposure  to                                                                                                               30  Prior  to  the  Flint  water  crisis,  environmental  assessments  were  not  performed  for  children  with  blood  lead  levels   of  5  to  9  micrograms  per  deciliter,  but  only  for  children  with  blood  lead  levels  of  10  micrograms  per  deciliter  or   higher.               24   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   possible  healthcare  sources  of  Legionella;  almost  50  percent  of  cases  had  known  exposure  to   Flint  River-­‐sourced  water  supply.31       According  to  the  MDHHS  report  issued  on  May  29,  2015,  it  was  not  possible  for  the  state   epidemiologists  to  draw  definitive  conclusions  that  the  change  in  water  supply  was  related  to  the   outbreak  of  disease,  given  the  lack  of  clinical  specimens  of  Legionella  from  patients  diagnosed   with  the  disease  in  2014-­‐15.  It  is  speculated  that  clinical  respiratory  specimens  (sputum)  were  not   available  because  antibiotic  treatment  was  started  presumptively  after  a  positive  urine  test  for   Legionella,  rendering  any  subsequent  specimens  indeterminate.  Although  urine  specimens  can   confirm  a  diagnosis  of  Legionellosis,  urine  specimens  cannot  be  used  for  determining  the  source   of  Legionella.   Subsequent  data  reported  publicly  by  MDHHS  on  January  21,  2016,  indicated  that  there  were  42   additional  cases  of  Legionellosis  from  May  2015  through  October  2015,  with  4  deaths.32  Taking   the  2014-­‐15  data  together  with  additional  2015  data,  MDHHS  reported  that  36  percent  of  cases   likely  were  exposed  to  Flint  River-­‐sourced  drinking  water,  and  that  again  there  were  too  few   clinical  specimens  to  draw  definitive  conclusions  about  contaminated  water  as  the  source  of   infection  in  these  cases.       At  the  time  of  this  report,  the  pattern  of  an  abrupt  increase  in  cases  of  Legionellosis  in  Genesee   County  in  2014-­‐15  that  occurred  after  a  shift  to  the  Flint  River  strongly  implicates  the  water   source  and  treatment  of  the  water  as  a  potential  cause  of  higher  Legionellosis  case  incidence.     EPA  experts  Del  Toral  and  Lytle  have  suggested  that  the  treated  water  from  Flint  WTP  has   disrupted  the  previously  stable  lining  and  “biofilm”  of  water  lines  to  such  an  extent  that  chlorine   in  the  water  supply  has  been  excessively  depleted.  Del  Toral  also  suggested  that  the  flushing  of   fire  hydrants  may  have  stripped  the  biofilm  and  released  bacteria  (Legionella)  that  the  biofilm   had  contained.    If  true,  this  may  have  led  to  a  situation  where  Legionella  may  grow  more   abundantly  than  in  a  distribution  system  conveying  properly  treated  drinking  water.       Unfortunately,  these  are  hypotheses.  Definitive  data  for  the  analysis  of  cases  in  2014  and  2015   are  not  available,  so  it  is  not  possible  to  be  conclusive  about  the  cause.  Nonetheless,  great   concern  should  remain  about  the  clustering  of  cases  among  patients  potentially  exposed  in   healthcare  facilities  in  the  City  of  Flint  and  cases  among  individuals  whose  homes  receive  water   from  the  Flint  WTP.   MDHHS  and  GCHD  have  indicated  that  they  will  have  a  high  level  of  vigilance  in  monitoring  for   cases  of  Legionellosis  in  2016.  They  have  reminded  healthcare  professionals  treating  patients  in   Genesee  County  to  obtain  appropriate  clinical  (respiratory)  specimens  in  suspected  cases  of   Legionellosis  before  initiating  treatment.  This  cooperation  between  public  health  and  medical   professionals  will  be  crucial  to  identifying  the  cause  of  future  Legionellosis  cases  in  Genesee   County  and  controlling  outbreaks  in  the  future.  In  addition,  a  team  of  scientists  from  multiple                                                                                                               31  Some  of  these  cases  had  exposure  to  both  Flint  River  water  and  to  healthcare  facilities.   32  Twenty-­‐two  of  the  42  cases  reported  from  May-­‐October  2015  had  known  healthcare-­‐related  exposures  in  the  two   weeks  prior  to  development  of  symptoms,  and  21  of  these  were  from  the  same  healthcare  facility.  Sixteen  of  the  42   cases  of  Legionellosis  in  Genesee  County  from  May-­‐October  2015  were  in  individuals  who  had  neither  exposure  to  a   healthcare  facility  nor  exposure  to  Flint  River-­‐sourced  water.           25   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Michigan  universities  is  expected  to  test  Flint  drinking  water  in  2016  to  assess  whether  conditions   in  the  system  created  an  environment  that  heightened  the  likelihood  of  Legionella   contamination.   Roles of Government Entities in the Flint Water Crisis Many  individuals,  agencies  and  groups  participated  in  the  events  leading  to  the  Flint  water  crisis   and  the  subsequent  response.  Their  various  roles  and  responsibilities  have  been  subjects  of   considerable  discussion  and  debate.  In  the  subsequent  sections,  we  describe  the  defined  (or   statutory)  roles  of  many  of  these  parties,  as  well  as  the  nature  of  their  involvement  in  the  Flint   water  crisis.  Findings  and  recommendations  are  also  provided.   The  water  crisis  in  Flint  is  effectively  elevating  public  awareness  of  the  latent  dangers  associated   with  lead  in  water  systems,  which  regulators  and  many  water  utilities  historically  have  been   reluctant  to  address  beyond  the  addition  of  corrosion  control  treatment.  As  it  responds  to  the   acute  crisis  in  Flint,  the  State  of  Michigan  is  in  a  position  to  set  important  precedents  that  may   have  application  well  beyond  the  state,  as  more  utilities  and  regulatory  agencies  prepare  for   more  aggressive  approaches  to  address  the  problem  of  lead  in  water.  This  opportunity  is  noted  in   several  of  the  recommendations  provided  below.   Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) Defined  Role   MDEQ  is  responsible  for  enforcement  of  the  SDWA  (including  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR)),   the  Clean  Water  Act  (CWA)  and  other  environmental  regulations  in  the  State  of  Michigan.  With   respect  to  drinking  water,  MDEQ’s  stated  goal  is  that  “Michigan’s  water  resources  are  clean  and   safe”  and  a  measure  of  success  towards  that  goal  is  that  “100  percent  of  the  population  has  safe   drinking  water  with  no  reported  violations  of  health  based  standards.”33  The  agency’s   responsibility  for  SDWA  compliance  enforcement  derives  from  it,  like  all  other  states  except   Wyoming,  being  delegated  “primacy”  by  the  EPA.       Within  the  MDEQ,  the  Office  of  Drinking  Water  and  Municipal  Assistance  (ODWMA)  has   responsibility  for  SDWA  enforcement  and  lending  assistance  to  public  water  suppliers.  The   ODWMA  Community  Water  Supply  Program’s  “primary  function  is  regulatory  oversight  of   approximately  1,425  community  public  water  supplies  in  Michigan.”34  The  Community  Water   Supply  Program  provides  capacity  development  and  operator  training  and  certification,  operates   certified  laboratories,  and  monitors  and  reports  on  public  water  system  violations.  ODWMA  staff   who  regulate  compliance  with  the  SDWA  are  not  required  to  be  licensed  operators  or  have   experience  with  drinking  water  treatment  plant  or  distribution  system  operations.       For  many  communities,  ODWMA  has  been  and  continues  to  be  relied  upon  to  provide  technical   assistance  and  guidance  on  water  treatment  processes,  approaches  to  managing  distribution                                                                                                               33  “Sustaining  Michigan’s  Water  Heritage:  A  Strategy  for  the  Next  Generation,  Draft  for  Public  Review,”  June  4,  2015.     Prepared  by  the  Michigan  Office  of  the  Great  Lakes,  in  collaboration  with  Michigan  Department  of  Environmental   Quality,  Michigan  Department  of  Natural  Resources,  Michigan  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development,   and  Michigan  Economic  Development  Corporation,  p.  6.   34    www.michigan.gov/deq/0,1607,7-­‐135-­‐3313_3675_3691-­‐-­‐-­‐,00.html         26   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   system  water  quality,  and  overall  utility  management.  ODWMA  historically  has  taken  a   collaborative  approach  with  public  water  suppliers,  offering  guidance  on  technical  requirements   for  compliance  with  environmental  regulations.   Discussion     MDEQ  is  responsible  for  ensuring  that  community  water  systems  comply  with  the  SDWA.   According  to  EPA  Region  V,  ODWMA,  which  was  originally  within  the  state  Department  of   Community  Health,  has  more  community  water  systems  to  regulate  than  other  Region  V  states.     Additionally,  while  all  states’  water  system  regulators  in  Region  V  are  stretched  financially,   Michigan  is  particularly  challenged  because  fees  to  operate  the  program  are  generally  lower  than   fees  charged  by  other  states,  requiring  the  state  to  rely  more  heavily  on  general  funds  and   federal  revenue.     For  a  variety  of  reasons,  MDEQ  discounted  use  of  the  Flint  River  as  a  permanent  water  source  in   2013.  However,  it  did  agree  to  use  of  the  river  as  a  temporary  source,  conditioned  upon   completion  of  identified  improvements  to  the  Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant  (WTP).  Flint  was   granted  two  permit  modifications  in  April  2014  that  allowed  the  treatment  plant  to  operate  full-­‐ time  with  the  Flint  River  as  the  water  source.   In  advance  of  the  City  of  Flint’s  conversion  from  DWSD  water  supply  to  use  of  Flint  River  water,   MDEQ  had  multiple  communications  and  meetings  with  Flint  Utilities  Department  staff  and  their   consultants.  A  plan  of  treatment  of  Flint  River  water  was  discussed  and  covered  numerous  issues   including  dosing  of  chemicals,  use  of  polymers,  and  unit  process  performance.  When  asked  by   Flint  water  plant  personnel  about  adding  phosphate  in  the  treatment  process,  as  DWSD  does  for   corrosion  control,  MDEQ  said  that  a  corrosion  control  treatment  decision  would  be  made  after   two  6-­‐month  monitoring  periods  were  conducted  to  see  if  corrosion  control  treatment  was   needed.  Similarly,  distribution  system  operations  requirements  were  outlined,  including  sampling   and  testing  for  compliance  with  the  LCR  that  involved  obtaining  tap  water  samples  from  high-­‐risk   residences.  ODWMA  anticipated  that  use  of  Flint  River  water  would  be  problematic35  but   deferred  to  state  emergency  manager  decisions  to  proceed.36  Subsequently:   o MDEQ  advised  Flint  WTP  staff,  in  contradiction  to  longstanding  federal  policy  under  the   LCR,  that  corrosion  control  treatment  was  not  required.       o MDEQ  did  not  require  appropriate  sampling  of  tap  water  quality  as  mandated  by  the  LCR.     o MDEQ  obstinately  used  water  quality  test  results  based  on  flawed  sampling  and  insisted   on  the  accuracy  of  the  erroneous  data.   o MDEQ  dismissed  expressed  concerns  of  Flint  residents,  elected  officials,  and  external   subject  matter  experts  (as  well  as  EPA).                                                                                                               35  Internal  March  26,  2013  MDEQ  e-­‐mail  (Busch  to  Wyant,  Shekter  Smith,  and  others)  noting,  among  other  points:   “Continuous  use  of  the  Flint  River  at  such  demand  rates  would:  Pose  an  increased  microbial  risk  to  public  health   (Flint  River  vs.  Lake  Huron  source  water),  Pose  an  increased  risk  of  disinfection  by-­‐product  (carcinogen)  exposure  to   public  health  (Flint  River  vs.  Lake  Huron  source  water),  Trigger  additional  regulatory  requirements  under  the   Michigan  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act.”     36 Internal  March  27,  2013  MDEQ  e-­‐mail  (Sygo  to  Busch)  noting,  among  other  points:    “As  you  might  guess  we  are  in  a   situation  with  Emergency  Financial  Managers  so  it’s  entirely  possible  that  they  will  be  making  decisions  relative  to   cost.  The  concern  in  either  situation  is  that  a  compliant  supply  of  source  water  and  drinking  water  can  be  supplied.”         27   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   o MDEQ  inaccurately  reported  information  about  Flint’s  corrosion  control  to  EPA,  stating   that  Flint  had  an  optimized  corrosion  control  program  when,  in  fact,  it  was  not  employing   corrosion  control  treatment.   o MDEQ  deferred  requiring  Flint  to  implement  CCT  until  after  the  second  6-­‐month   monitoring  period  was  completed  and  showed  lead  levels  of  11  ppb,  though  EPA  advised   MDEQ  to  require  Flint  to  have  CCT  as  early  as  April  2015.   o MDEQ  waited  on  legal  opinions  about  SDWA  compliance  requirements  and  delayed   admission  of  its  incorrect  interpretation  of  SDWA  compliance  requirements  for  (at  least)  2   months.   o MDEQ  insisted,  even  after  compelling  evidence  of  lead  poisoning  of  children  was   presented,  that  Flint  water  quality  met  applicable  SDWA  standards.   o MDEQ  failed  (for  more  than  a  year)  to  work  with  MDHHS  leadership  and  staff  to  ensure   an  appropriate  and  comprehensive  public  health  response  to  repeated  requests  to   address  health  concerns  related  to  drinking  water.  MDEQ  continued  to  insist  the  water   was  safe  and  met  all  federal  requirements,  and  discouraged  any  statements  that  would   imply  that  the  water  was  not  safe.   The  obvious  question  that  MDEQ,  along  with  the  City  and  its  consultants,  should  have  asked  was:   “What  will  happen  without  corrosion  control  treatment?”  Similarly,  they  could  have  asked  why  a   less  corrosive  source  of  water  (Lake  Huron  water)  would  be  required  to  have  corrosion  control   treatment,  but  not  the  more  corrosive  Flint  River  source.  In  Flint,  the  more  corrosive  water   source  ultimately  destroyed  the  protective  scaling  on  pipes  and  plumbing  that  orthophosphate   addition  had  provided  through  the  water  supplied  by  DWSD.       Findings   The  FWATF,  as  stated  in  our  second  letter  to  Governor  Snyder,37  places  primary  responsibility  for   the  Flint  water  crisis  on  the  MDEQ,  and  specifically  its  ODWMA.  This  finding  is  based  on   numerous  interviews  and  reviews  of  publicly  available  documents.  Nothing  in  our  subsequent   interviews  or  our  review  of  thousands  of  pages  of  related  documents  has  dissuaded  us  from  this   fundamental  conclusion.  We  found  that:   F-­‐1. MDEQ  bears  primary  responsibility  for  the  water  contamination  in  Flint.   F-­‐2. MDEQ,  specifically  its  ODWMA,  suffers  from  cultural  shortcomings  that  prevent  it  from   adequately  serving  and  protecting  the  public  health  of  Michigan  residents.         F-­‐3. MDEQ  misinterpreted  the  LCR  and  misapplied  its  requirements.  As  a  result,  lead-­‐in-­‐water   levels  were  under-­‐reported  and  many  residents’  exposure  to  high  lead  levels  was   prolonged  for  months.  Specifically:   o MDEQ’s  misinterpretation  of  the  LCR  and  lack  of  due  caution  resulted  in  the   decision  not  to  require  corrosion  control  upon  the  switch  to  the  Flint  River  but,   rather,  to  begin  two  consecutive  6-­‐month  water  quality  monitoring  periods.         o MDEQ  failed  to  promptly  require  corrosion  control  even  after  the  initial  6-­‐month   monitoring  period  results  were  received  and  90th  percentile  lead  sampling  results   were  at  6  ppb,  which  would  have  disqualified  Flint  from  being  exempted  from                                                                                                                See  Appendix  II  for  copies  of  the  FWATF’s  letters  to  Governor  Rick  Snyder.   37       28   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   having  to  have  corrosion  control  treatment—even  under  MDEQ’s  flawed   interpretation.   o MDEQ’s  guidance  to  Flint  on  LCR  compliance  sampling  techniques  (calling  for  pre-­‐ flushing,  use  of  small  mouthed  bottles,  etc.),  while  possibly  technically  permissible,   was  not  designed  to  detect  risks  to  public  health.  MDEQ  failed  to  take  adequate   steps  to  correct  Flint  water  operations  staff’s  inaccurate  LCR  sampling.   o MDEQ  ODWMA  advised  Flint  Utilities  Department  personnel  to  make  sure  the  rest   of  the  water  samples  in  the  second  6-­‐month  monitoring  period  were  clean,  since   the  samples  they  had  already  submitted  exceeded  EPA’s  action  level  for  lead.   o MDEQ  conveniently,  and  without  adequate  investigation,  excluded  LeeAnne   Walters’s  water  quality  test  results  for  purposes  of  determining  whether  Flint   sampling  results  exceeded  EPA’s  action  level.     F-­‐4. MDEQ  waited  months  before  accepting  EPA’s  offer  to  engage  its  lead  (Pb)  experts  to  help   address  the  Flint  water  situation  and,  at  times,  MDEQ  staff  were  dismissive  and   unresponsive.   F-­‐5. MDEQ  failed  to  move  swiftly  to  investigate,  either  on  its  own  or  in  tandem  with  MDHHS,   the  possibility  that  the  Flint  water  system  was  contributing  to  an  unusually  high  number   of  Legionellosis  cases  in  Flint.     MDEQ  caused  this  crisis  to  happen.  Moreover,  when  confronted  with  evidence  of  its  failures,   MDEQ  responded  publicly  through  formal  communications  with  a  degree  of  intransigence  and   belligerence  that  has  no  place  in  government.  These  failures  are  not  diminished,  nor  should  focus   on  them  be  deflected,  by  the  fact  that  other  parties  contributed  to  the  disastrous  decisions  or  the   prolonging  of  their  consequences.   Recommendations       R-­‐1. Implement  a  proactive,  comprehensive  cultural  change  program  within  MDEQ,  specifically   its  ODWMA,  to  refocus  the  department  on  its  primary  mission  to  protect  human  health   and  the  environment.  MDEQ  should  aspire  to  become  a  national  leader  through  a   proactive  program  designed  to  detect  and  address  contaminants  in  public  water  supplies   in  a  timely  manner.38   o ODWMA  should  heighten  its  focus  on  protection  of  public  health  and  provide   technical  assistance  to  advance  public  water  system  performance.       o Technical  assistance  should  not  be  oriented  toward  defining  minimum  requirements   to  achieve  technical  compliance  with  regulatory  requirements.       o In  the  event  that  regulatory  requirements  are  ambiguous,  ODWMA  should  default  to   public  health  protection.                                                                                                                   38  For  example,  in  the  case  of  lead  detection,  ODWMA’s  program  should  have  adopted  water  quality  sampling   procedures  that  maximized  the  potential  for  detection  by  identifying  high-­‐risk  homes,  prohibiting  pre-­‐flushing  of   service  lines,  and  improving  sample  draw  procedures.         29   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   o MDEQ’s  program  restructuring  should  address  the  findings  of  this  and  other  program   and  incident  reviews,  and  commit  to  transparent,  accessible  reporting  on   implementation  of  associated  recommendations.   R-­‐2. Establish  an  apprenticeship/certification  program  for  MDEQ  ODWMA  employees  that   requires  direct,  hands-­‐on  experience  with  public  water  system  operations.  MDEQ   ODWMA  employees  responsible  for  water  system  regulation  and  SDWA  enforcement   should  be,  or  have  access  to,  certified  operators  and  subject  matter  experts  (including,  for   example,  those  at  EPA).   R-­‐3. Strengthen  SDWA  enforcement,  most  notably  for  the  LCR.  The  state  has  the  ability  to   strengthen  its  own  enforcement  of  the  SDWA  and  not  wait  for  action  to  occur  at  the   federal  level:   o Reiterate  (and  clarify  where  necessary)  appropriate  sampling  procedures,  and   establish  them  in  rule  revisions  or  guidelines  such  that  they  are  clear  for  all  to   understand.    Provide  resources  for  public  water  systems  to  obtain  authoritative   guidance  in  the  event  of  questions  or  concerns.   o Make  water  sample  test  results  required  under  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  available  to   the  public  while  protecting  personally  identifiable  information.   R-­‐4. Participate  in  the  Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Committee’s  (FWICC’s)  work   team  established  to  oversee  conversion  from  DWSD-­‐supplied  to  KWA-­‐delivered  water.     MDEQ  should  draw  from  that  work  to  revise  its  policies  and  procedures  for  approval  of   water  treatment  and  distribution  system  operating  regimens,  particularly  when  source   water  changes  are  contemplated.     R-­‐5. Participate  in  EPA’s  ongoing  review  and  revision  of  the  LCR,  conveying  lessons  learned   from  the  Flint  water  crisis.39         Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) Defined  Role   The  Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (MDHHS)40  is  responsible  for  addressing   all  matters  of  public  health  for  the  population  of  the  state.    MDHHS  works  to  achieve  this  goal   through  a  combination  of  primary  prevention—preventing  illnesses  before  they  occur41—and   secondary  prevention—reducing  the  burden  of  disease  once  it  has  occurred.42     Meeting  the  responsibilities  of  MDHHS  requires  constant  attention  through  surveillance   programs  and  effective  communication  and  coordination  with  public  health  partners  at  multiple   levels  of  government  (city,  county,  federal).  MDHHS  conducts  surveillance  for  dozens  of  diseases                                                                                                                Also  applicable  for  recommendations  related  to  the  LCR  offered  in  the  report  section  on  the  EPA  and  LCR.   39 40  Created  from  the  combination  of  the  Department  of  Community  Health  and  Department  of  Human  Services  in   2015.   41  For  example,  promoting  and  facilitating  childhood  vaccination  against  diseases  such  as  measles  and  influenza.   42  For  example,  conducting  screening  programs  to  identify  individuals  who  have  developed  cancer  so  that  they  can   receive  appropriate  medical  care.           30   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   and  health  conditions  through  a  wide  variety  of  efforts.  For  instance,  MDHHS  is  recognized  for  a   high-­‐quality  system  of  tracking  childhood  vaccination  through  the  Michigan  Care  Improvement   Registry  (MCIR).  MCIR  allows  state  officials  to  assess  children’s  vaccination  levels  on  a  regular   (weekly)  basis,  and  to  identify  neighborhoods  and  schools  where  vaccination  levels  may  be  so  low   that  outbreaks  of  vaccine-­‐preventable  diseases  are  possible.  As  a  result,  MDHHS  can  then   communicate  with  healthcare  professionals  who  administer  vaccines,  and  with  parents  of   children  who  are  not  up-­‐to-­‐date  on  their  vaccinations,  to  encourage  them  to  protect  their   children  against  disease.   MCIR  is  a  very  positive  example  of  the  public  health  function  of  MDHHS.  In  the  case  of  Flint,   however,  MDHHS’s  response  to  two  public  health  concerns,  related  to  lead  exposure  and  cases  of   Legionella  infection,  did  not  meet  the  agency’s  own  standard  of  performance.     Discussion   Children’s Exposure to Lead in Drinking Water MDHHS  includes  the  Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  Program  (CLPPP),  which  is  responsible   for  tracking  the  results  of  all  children’s  blood  lead  tests,  and  the  Healthy  Homes  program,  which   is  responsible  for  coordinating  remediation  of  homes  when  high  levels  of  environmental  lead   exposure  are  found  for  a  child  with  an  elevated  blood  lead  level.  All  blood  lead  tests  conducted  in   the  state  must  be  reported  to  CLPPP,  under  state  law.  For  many  years,  CLPPP  has  functioned  as  a   registry  of  blood  lead  tests,  comparing  aggregate  results  at  the  state  level  in  the  most  recent  year   to  levels  in  prior  years—typically  in  annual  reports  released  in  the  summer  following  the  end  of  a   given  calendar  year.  The  primary  outcomes  reported  have  been  the  proportions  of  children  with   blood  lead  levels  ≥10  micrograms  per  deciliter  and  proportions  with  blood  lead  levels  ≥5   micrograms  per  deciliter.  For  more  than  a  decade,  CLPPP  has  also  specifically  tracked  local  lead   testing  results  in  14  “focus  communities”  known  to  have  higher  proportions  of  children  with   elevated  blood  lead  levels  than  in  other  communities  in  Michigan.  Flint  is  one  such  focus   community.   The  CLPPP  operated  under  the  assumption  that  children  with  elevated  blood  lead  levels  were   being  managed  by  their  respective  healthcare  professionals.  Therefore,  no  urgency  was  given  to   performing  the  comparisons  that  they  published  in  annual  reports,  which  were  posted  online   without  any  public  announcements.  For  this  reason,  there  is  no  evidence  that  MDHHS  conducted   an  analysis  of  blood  lead  levels  in  2014  prior  to  late  July  2015,  after  Governor  Snyder’s  chief  of   staff  Dennis  Muchmore  wrote  to  MDHHS  officials  expressing  concern  about  many  complaints   from  Flint  residents  about  water  quality  in  Flint.       On  July  28,  2015,  a  MDHHS  epidemiologist  (Larder)  performed  a  classic  epidemiologic  analysis  of   2014  blood  lead  test  data  versus  prior  years  and  found  a  concerning  pattern  of  elevated  levels  in   Flint.  On  the  same  day,  the  CLPPP  data  manager  (Scott)  compared  data  over  the  preceding  5   years  and  concluded  that  the  2014  data  were  not  substantially  different  than  several  preceding   years.  Scott’s  analysis  was  fundamentally  flawed  because  he  failed  to  consider  that  the   proportions  of  children  with  high  blood  lead  were  declining  over  the  years  2011-­‐2013,  and   therefore  2014  levels  represented  a  clear  deviation  from  the  improving  trend  in  previous  years.     For  unclear  reasons,  these  conflicting  conclusions  of  Scott  and  Larder  were  not  elevated  to  higher   levels  of  authority  within  MDHHS.  Rather,  the  explanation  that  there  was  no  difference  (from  a   data  manager  rather  than  an  epidemiologist)  was  allowed  to  persist  for  another  2  months.     Messages  from  other  MDHHS  officials  over  that  subsequent  time  period  indicated  that  they  were         31   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   aware  of  the  MDEQ  narrative  that  the  water  in  Flint  was  “safe”  and  did  not  present  “an  imminent   public  health  problem.”   By  September  2015,  Dr.  Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha  released  her  analysis  of  blood  lead  tests  performed   at  Hurley  Medical  Center,  showing  that  children’s  blood  lead  levels  were  clearly  abnormal  at  a   higher  rate  than  in  prior  years.  Of  note,  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  and  Professor  Marc  Edwards  of  Virginia   Tech  had  formally  requested  release  of  CLPPP  data  from  MDHHS  (Scott)  in  previous  weeks  and   months,  but  had  never  received  such  data,  leading  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  to  analyze  data  from  Hurley   Medical  Center  only.  When  the  Hurley  data  were  released,  MDHHS  issued  statements  indicating   that  the  Hurley  data  were  analyzed  using  different  methodology  than  the  state  would  employ,   and  MDHHS  did  not  endorse  the  Hurley  findings.    A  few  days  later,  MDHHS  Director  Lyon  sent  a   memo  to  MDHHS  staff  asking  them  to  “make  a  strong  statement  with  a  demonstration  of  proof   that  the  blood  lead  levels  seen  are  not  out  of  the  ordinary.”  Within  a  few  days,  MDHHS   epidemiologists  had  re-­‐analyzed  the  data  and  reversed  course,  agreeing  publicly  with  the  Hurley-­‐ based  analysis  by  October  1,  2015.   Subsequently,  MDHHS  changed  its  approach  and  began  to  analyze  blood  lead  level  data  in  the   CLPPP  database  on  a  basis  closer  to  “real  time.”  In  a  series  of  reports  released  approximately   every  2  weeks  since  November  2015,  MDHHS  has  communicated  with  the  public  regarding  the   proportion  of  children  in  Flint  with  blood  lead  tests  ≥5  micrograms/deciliter.  This  is  a  promising   step  in  transparency  and  timeliness.   However,  excessive  and  likely  harmful  lead  exposure  already  has  occurred  for  hundreds  and   perhaps  thousands  of  children  in  Flint,  and  it  is  now  MDHHS’s  responsibility  to  follow  up  with   comprehensive  secondary  prevention.  MDHHS  reports  that  about  200  children  in  Flint  are  known   to  have  had  childhood  lead  levels  ≥5  micrograms/deciliter  when  they  were  tested  since  April   2014  (the  month  of  the  water  switch  to  the  Flint  River).  This  number  of  children  is  likely  a   profound  underestimate  of  the  number  of  children  exposed;  based  on  Census  estimates  and   Medicaid  records,  the  number  of  children  under  6  years  old  living  in  the  City  of  Flint  is   approximately  10,900.  Given  the  known  risks  of  lead  neurotoxicity  for  young  children,   appropriate  near-­‐term,  middle-­‐term,  and  long-­‐term  follow-­‐up  for  children  exposed  to  lead  in   Flint  will  include:     Neurodevelopmental  assessments,   Timely  access  to  early  childhood  education,   Behavioral  assessments  and  interventions  in  preschool  years,     Educational  assessments  in  preschool  and  school  years  accompanied  by  appropriate   learning  support,  and     o Appropriate  counseling  and  medical  therapy  to  address  attentional  and  behavioral   concerns  at  school  age  and  into  adolescence.       Such  comprehensive  approaches  to  secondary  prevention  for  children  in  Flint  are  consistent  with   a  model  framework  for  medical  and  public  health  response  proposed  by  Dr.  Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha   at  Hurley  Medical  Center.   o o o o Despite  the  unmistakable  connection  between  the  quality  of  drinking  water  and  public  health,   there  is  no  liaison  between  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  to  ensure  that  complaints  or  concerns  about   water  are  brought  to  the  attention  of  MDHHS  staff  in  a  timely  fashion  to  prompt  investigative   action.    The  lack  of  a  liaison  function  within  state  government  also  adversely  affected  the   response  to  cases  of  Legionellosis,  as  described  below.         32   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Cases of Legionella Infection Legionellosis  is  an  infection  with  species  of  bacteria  called  Legionella,  so  called  because  it  came  to   prominence  when  many  attendees  at  an  American  Legion  conference  fell  ill  in  1976.     Legionellosis  has  a  broad  spectrum  of  severity,  causing  relatively  mild  illness  in  some  individuals   who  are  generally  healthy  and  causing  much  more  severe  illness  in  seniors  and  patients  whose   immune  systems  are  weakened.  It  is  generally  fatal  in  about  10  percent  of  cases.   Legionella  bacteria  live  in  water  supplies  and  flourish  in  warmer  temperatures  and  standing   water,  present  in  locations  such  as  cooling  towers  for  air  conditioning  systems.  It  is  a  reportable   disease,  meaning  that  any  healthcare  professional  who  makes  the  diagnosis  must  report  the  case   to  the  local  health  department.  In  turn,  the  local  health  department  reports  cases  to  the  state   health  department.  Fewer  than  10  cases  of  Legionellosis  per  year  were  reported  by  GCHD  in   years  immediately  preceding  the  switch  of  water  source  to  the  Flint  River.   MDHHS  assisted  GCHD  with  evaluation  of  the  Legionellosis  outbreak  that  began  in  2014  and   extended  into  early  2015,  at  GCHD’s  request.    When  the  initial  evaluation  report  was  issued  by   MDHHS  epidemiology  team  in  May  2015,  it  is  unclear  why  they  asserted  the  “the  outbreak  is   over”;  subsequent  reports  released  in  January  2016  indicated  that  additional  cases  occurred   beginning  in  May  2015.43  MDHHS  indicated  in  its  May  2015  report  that  data  were  inconclusive   regarding  a  community  source  such  as  the  water  supply  because  of  a  lack  of  clinical  specimens.       While  MDHHS’s  statement  regarding  the  absence  of  conclusive  evidence  of  a  community  source   has  scientific  merit,  it  is  evident  that  MDHHS  was  not  calibrating  its  evaluation  for  the  unusual   circumstance  of  the  switch  to  the  Flint  River  in  April  2014.  In  fact,  although  the  report  mentions  it   as  a  possible  source,  there  is  no  explicit  mention  of  the  switch  to  a  new  raw  water  source  in  Flint,   and  new  water  treatment  protocols,  as  possible  causal  factors.  Although  there  was  a  January   2015  meeting  that  included  MDHHS,  MDEQ  and  GCHD  regarding  cases  of  Legionellosis  in   Genesee  County,  subsequent  discussions  of  Legionellosis  appear  to  have  occurred  within  the  silos   of  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  until  late  2015,  and  remained  uncoordinated  until  the  Governor’s   announcement  about  ongoing  Legionella  investigations  in  January  2016.   Findings   F-­‐6. MDHHS’s  lack  of  timely  analysis  and  understanding  of  its  own  data  on  childhood  blood   lead  levels,  along  with  its  reliance  on  MDEQ  and  reluctance  to  share  state  data  with  Dr.   Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha  and  Professor  Marc  Edwards,  prolonged  the  Flint  water  crisis.   F-­‐7. MDHHS  bears  ultimate  responsibility  for  leadership  and  coordination  of  timely  follow-­‐up   efforts  in  Flint  and  across  the  state  regarding  childhood  lead  poisoning.  While  local   entities  (for  example,  healthcare  professionals,  GCHD,  health  insurance  plans)  are   partners  in  efforts  to  protect  children  from  lead  poisoning,  MDHHS  has  the  lead  role  and   failed  to  exercise  its  responsibility.   F-­‐8. The  consequences  of  lead  exposure  for  Flint  residents  are  expected  to  be  long-­‐term  and   will  necessitate  sustained  investments  in  education,  public  and  mental  health,  juvenile   justice,  and  nutrition  needs  over  the  next  10  to  20  years.                                                                                                                  This  may  have  been  related  to  delays  in  reporting  between  local  healthcare  professionals,  GCHD,  and  MDHHS.       43       33   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   F-­‐9. Too  few  children  in  Michigan  are  screened  for  lead  through  routine  blood  tests  as   recommended  for  children  ages  1  and  2.  Statewide  screening  goals  for  children  enrolled  in   Medicaid  are  met  in  very  few  instances  at  the  county  level  or  within  Medicaid  health   plans.  This  lack  of  information  leaves  parents,  healthcare  professionals,  and  local  and   state  public  health  authorities  uninformed  about  the  possibility  of  lead  poisoning  for   thousands  of  Michigan  children.   F-­‐10. Coordination  between  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  was  inadequate  to  properly  address  the  public   health  issues  related  to  water  quality  in  Flint.  Communication  was  infrequent,  and  when  it   did  occur,  the  default  position  was  to  conclude  that  the  health  problems  were  not  related   to  the  water  supply  switch  –  rather  than  to  assume  that  the  problems  might  be  related  to   the  switch.     F-­‐11. Communication  and  coordination  among  local  and  state  public  health  staff  and  leadership   regarding  Legionellosis  cases  in  2014-­‐2015  was  inadequate  to  address  the  grave  nature  of   this  outbreak.  The  fact  that  these  cases  occurred  while  there  were  several  simultaneous   concerns  about  quality  and  safety  of  water  in  Flint  should  have  caused  public  health  staff   and  leadership  at  local  and  state  levels  to  coordinate  their  actions  to  ensure  a  prompt  and   thorough  investigation.   Recommendations   R-­‐6. Establish  policies  and  procedures  at  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  to  ensure  input  by  health  experts   and  scientists  when  permit  decisions  may  have  a  direct  impact  on  human  health.   R-­‐7. Establish  and  maintain  a  Flint  Toxic  Exposure  Registry  to  include  all  the  children  and   adults  residing  in  Flint  from  April  2014  to  present.   The  Flint  Toxic  Exposure  Registry  will  serve  as  an  authoritative  reference  source  of   information  (including  contact  details  [for  example,  primary  contact  information,  back-­‐up   contact  information,  and  preferred  mode  of  contact])  for  purposes  of  timely  health   assessments  in  the  short-­‐term  and  long-­‐term,  as  well  as  subsequent  communication   regarding  policies  and  scientific  findings.    Timely  assessments  will  include  clinical   evaluations  and  re-­‐evaluations  in  healthcare  settings,  appropriate  follow-­‐up  conducted  by   public  health  professionals,  and  longitudinal  assessments  of  the  impact  of  environmental   exposure  on  children’s  and  adults’  health  (including  among  pregnant  women).     R-­‐8. Re-­‐establish  the  Michigan  Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  and  Control  Commission.   The  Commission  would  perform  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  state’s  lead  poisoning   prevention  program;  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  the  program,  including  its  ability  to   satisfy  federal  law  requiring  that  100  percent  of  all  young  children  enrolled  in  Medicaid  be   screened  with  a  blood  lead  test;  and  make  recommendations  for  the  program’s   improvement.  The  Commission  would  also  conduct  public  hearings,  review  information   from  other  sources,  and  study  other  states’  experiences.  The  Commission  must  also   develop  short-­‐  and  long-­‐range  strategic  recommendations  for  childhood  lead  poisoning   prevention  and  control  in  Michigan.     R-­‐9. Ensure  that  MDHHS  is  transparent  and  timely  in  reporting  and  analysis  of  aggregate  data   regarding  children’s  blood  lead  levels.  MDHHS  data  regarding  lead  levels  shall  be  provided         34   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   to  individuals  and  organizations,  based  on  their  expertise,  upon  request  and  in  cases   when  the  interpretation  of  data  by  MDHHS  is  questioned.   R-­‐10. Establish  a  more  aggressive  approach  to  timely  clinical  and  public  health  follow-­‐up  for  all   children  known  to  have  elevated  blood  lead  levels,  statewide.  MDHHS  should  expand  its   local  efforts  and  partnerships  to  accomplish  this  goal.  Whenever  possible,  routine   screening  for  lead  and  appropriate  follow-­‐up  should  occur  in  children’s  primary  care   medical  homes.   R-­‐11. Strive  to  be  a  national  leader  in  monitoring  and  responding  to  exposure  of  children  to   lead  by  converting  the  Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  Program  (CLPPP)  from   passive  collection  of  test  results  into  an  active  surveillance  and  outreach  program.     Performance  of  the  surveillance  program  should  be  reported  to  the  public.  MDHHS   should  be  prepared  to  amplify  its  efforts  if  performance  targets  are  not  met.   R-­‐12. Improve  screening  rates  for  lead  among  young  children  through  partnerships  with  county   health  departments,  health  insurers,  hospitals,  and  healthcare  professionals.     R-­‐13. As  the  state  authority  on  public  health,  and  as  the  organization  that  conducted  the   epidemiologic  study  of  Legionellosis  cases  in  Genesee  County  in  2014-­‐15,  take   responsibility  for  coordinating  with  GCHD  and  CDC  to  protect  Michigan  residents  from   further  outbreaks  of  Legionellosis.44       R-­‐14. In  cases  of  switches  in  drinking  water  supplies  in  the  future,  the  state  must  assume  that   outbreaks  of  cases  of  Legionellosis  may  be  related  to  changes  in  water  source  and  should   communicate  the  potential  risk  to  the  public,  rather  than  assuming  and  communicating   the  opposite.   Michigan Governor’s Office Defined  Role   The  Governor  of  Michigan  heads  the  executive  branch  of  Michigan  state  government  and  has  the   power  to  reorganize  state  departments  and  appoint  department  heads.  All  executive  branch   departments  of  state  government  report  to  the  Governor,  including  the  three  key  departments   involved  in  the  Flint  water  crisis:  MDEQ,  MDHHS,  and  Treasury.  The  Governor  also  appoints   personal  staff  to  keep  him  informed  of  issues  and  events.  Among  other  responsibilities,  the   Governor  (through  the  Michigan  Department  of  Technology,  Management  and  Budget)  submits   an  annual  budget  and  has  a  line-­‐item  veto  for  appropriations  bills.     Rick  Snyder,  Michigan’s  48th  Governor,  took  office  in  January  2011.  He  began  his  second  term  in   January  2015.                                                                                                                 44  Specific  steps  should  include:  (a)  anticipate  the  risks  of  Legionellosis  infections  going  forward;  (b)  take  timely  steps   to  minimize  those  risks  in  Flint  drinking  water  by  working  with  EPA,  MDEQ  and  Flint  WTP;  (c)  coordinate  with   healthcare  facilities  to  minimize  risks  of  healthcare  facility-­‐acquired  Legionellosis;  (d)  communicate  with  the  public   about  steps  being  taken  and  cases  of  Legionellosis  that  occur.           35   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Discussion   The  Flint  water  crisis  occurred  during  Governor  Snyder’s  tenure.  The  Governor  and  his  office   were  directly  involved  in  some  aspects  of  the  crisis  and  briefed  on  some  of  the  major  decisions   surrounding  Flint  drinking  water.  Emergency  managers  that  he  appointed  made  key  decisions   that  led  to  and  prolonged  the  crisis.  He  appointed  the  directors  of  the  three  state  departments— MDEQ,  MDHHS,  and  Treasury—that  bear  differing  degrees  of  responsibility  for  what  happened.     The  Governor  and  the  Governor’s  office  must  rely  heavily  on  information  from  state  departments   to  make  decisions,  set  directions,  and  take  action.  In  this  case,  the  individuals  and  departments   on  which  the  Governor  relied  for  guidance  provided  wrong  information,  particularly  on  the  issues   related  to  lead  in  the  drinking  water  and  elevated  blood  lead  levels  in  children.  In  particular,  two   state  agencies  attempted  to  dismiss  and  discredit  credible  evidence  of  threats  to  public  health.   MDEQ  did  not  acknowledge  the  true  extent  of  the  Flint  water  problems  until  late  September   2015.  Likewise,  MDHHS,  which  misread  its  own  data  on  children’s  blood  lead  levels  in  Flint,  did   not  inform  the  Governor  of  lead  poisoning  related  to  use  of  the  Flint  River  as  a  water  source  until   late  September  2015.       However,  Governor  Snyder  and  certain  executive  staff  members  were  aware  before  late   September  2015  of  several  issues  that  are  noteworthy  and  relevant.  For  example:   o The  Department  of  Treasury  approved  the  Flint  emergency  manager’s  decisions   (supported  by  Flint  City  Council)  to  switch  to  KWA  after  negotiations  across  two  entities   under  emergency  management  failed.  Members  of  the  Governor’s  staff—and  the   Governor  himself—participated  in  some  of  those  discussions.   o The  Governor’s  office  received  citizen  complaints  and  was  well  aware  of  numerous  press   stories  about  water  quality  problems  as  early  as  May  2014  and  continuing  throughout   2015.45,46       o The  decision  by  General  Motors  (GM)  in  October  of  2014  to  use  Flint  Township  water   instead  of  Flint  WTP-­‐sourced  water  for  its  Flint  Engine  Operations  facility  was  not  only   known  to  executive  staff  members  of  the  Governor,  but  was  also  cited  as  a  reason  to   switch  back  to  DWSD  (see  below).     o In  late  January  2015,  at  least  one  member  of  the  Governor’s  office  was  informed  that   concerns  were  being  raised  in  the  MDEQ  about  the  Legionellosis  outbreak  in  Genesee   County  and  possible  connection  to  the  Flint  water  supply.47   o In  March  2015,  at  least  one  of  the  Governor’s  office  staff  members  was  advised  of  the   Legionellosis  outbreak  in  Flint  and  local  health  department  concerns  of  a  potential  link  to   the  Flint  water  conversion.48                                                                                                               45  This  was  subsequent  to  Department  of  Treasury’s  approval  of  the  Flint  emergency  manager’s  decision  to  contract   with  LAN  to  upgrade  the  Flint  WTP  to  treat  water  from  the  Flint  River  as  the  primary  drinking  water  supply,  instead   of  purchasing  water  from  DWSD.   46  The  October  1,  2014  MDEQ  briefing  paper  to  Governor's  office  regarding  City  of  Flint  drinking  water  situation  (boil   water  notices)  ascribes  problems  to  aged,  inadequately  maintained,  cast  iron  pipe  in  the  distribution  system.     47  See  January  30,  2015  e-­‐mail  from  Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  to  Dave  Murray,  Governor  Snyder’s  deputy  press  secretary,   re:  Legionella.         36   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   o In  March  2015,  the  Governor’s  chief  of  staff  proposed  buying  and  distributing  bottled   water  in  Flint  because  of  citizen  concerns  about  water  quality.   o In  mid-­‐summer  2015,  an  aide  to  Governor  Snyder  arranged  for  the  donations  of  water   filters  to  be  distributed  in  Flint  to  address  concerns  about  water  quality.     o In  mid-­‐summer  2015,  the  Governor  and  senior  staff  discussed  Flint  water  issues;  lead  was   apparently  part  of  those  discussions.   The  switch  to  the  Flint  River  as  the  primary  source  of  drinking  water  for  the  City  of  Flint  occurred   in  late  April  2014.  On  October  14,  2014,  after  citizen  complaints  about  the  water’s  odor,  color   and  taste49  and  the  decision  by  GM  to  leave  the  Flint  water  system,  two  key  executive  staff   members  traded  emails  suggesting  that,  given  these  problems,  it  was  time  to  switch  back  to   DWSD  for  Flint’s  drinking  water.  Other  executive  staff  members  received  these  emails,  and— according  the  Governor’s  chief  of  staff  at  the  time—the  Governor  was  informed  of  the  concern   and  the  suggestion.  A  phone  conversation  occurred  between  key  staff  members  Valerie  Brader   and  Rich  Baird  and  the  Flint  emergency  manager  about  the  suggestion.  The  emergency  manager   assured  these  Governor’s  office  staff  members  that  the  water  quality  problems  were  not  of  a   permanent  nature  and  asserted  that  it  would  be  too  costly  to  switch  back  to  DWSD.  That   conversation  ended  any  serious  discussion  about  switching  back  to  DWSD  at  that  time.   The  suggestion  to  switch  back  to  DWSD  was  revisited  in  mid-­‐summer  2015.  However,  MDEQ   continued  to  provide  reassurances  that  the  treated  water  reaching  homes  in  Flint  was  both  safe   and  in  compliance  with  SDWA  requirements.  These  continuing  reassurances,  as  well  as  the  cost   issue,  apparently  prevented  any  systemic  or  comprehensive  review  of  the  water  situation  in  Flint.   According  to  Governor  Snyder,  it  was  not  until  after  September  28,  2015,  that  he  was  personally   advised  that  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  had  been  wrong  for  months  about  the  reality  of  lead  in  the   water  and  children’s  blood  lead  levels.   Discussions  about  the  Flint  water  situation  were  also  conducted  in  the  context  of  overarching   discussions  about  financially  distressed  cities  served  by  emergency  managers,  and  Flint  in   particular.  Flint  water  issues  were  a  focal  point  for  senior  staff  and  were  discussed  with  the   Governor.  Considerable  frustration  was  apparent  due  to  new  issues  arising  just  as  immediate   problems  seemed  on  the  road  to  improvement.  Continued  reliance  on  MDEQ  drove  poor   decisions—or  the  lack  of  decisions.       As  the  Flint  water  crisis  unfolded,  certain  state  agencies’  perceived  need  to  defend  the  original   decision  to  switch  to  the  Flint  River  and  resist  a  return  to  DWSD  resulted  in  public  relations  and   communications  efforts  that  have,  at  times,  been  inappropriate.  In  the  spring  and  summer  of   2015,  for  example,  this  perceived  need  to  defend  a  flawed  decision  manifested  itself  in  attempts   by  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  to  discredit  accurate  information  on  lead  in  drinking  water  and  elevated   blood  lead  levels  provided  by  outside  experts.  Citizen  concerns  were  at  times  derided  and   dismissed,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  various  members  of  the  Governor’s  staff  had  expressed—and   were  expressing—concerns  about  the  water  situation  in  Flint  at  the  same  time.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     48  See  March  13,  2015  E-­‐mail  from  Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  to  Harvey  Hollins/Governor’s  office.      Though  not,  at  that  time,  related  to  lead  or  TTHMs.   49       37   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   To  some  extent,  inappropriate  official  public  relations  efforts  continue  to  this  day.  Even  as  the   state  is  aggressively  engaged  in  mitigation  efforts  in  Flint,  the  statement  that  the  Flint  water  crisis   was  a  local,  state,  and  federal  failure  implies  that  blame  is  attributable  equally  to  all  three  levels   of  government.  Primary  responsibility  for  the  water  contamination  in  Flint  lies  with  MDEQ.  In   addition,  at  the  time  of  the  water  crisis,  Flint  was  under  the  control  of  state-­‐appointed   emergency  managers,  who  made  key  decisions  that  contributed  to  the  crisis.  Because  of  these   two  facts,  the  state  is  fundamentally  accountable  for  what  happened  in  Flint.   Though  delayed,  we  acknowledge  and  support  the  many  steps  the  Governor  has  taken  to  date  to   address  the  implications  of  lead  in  the  Flint  water  supply—the  state  declaration  of  emergency,   the  establishment  of  both  the  Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Council  and  Mission  Flint,   additional  funding  for  addressing  the  health  issues  faced  by  lead-­‐poisoned  children  in  Flint,   partial  reimbursement  for  water  bills  paid  during  the  time  of  lead  contamination,  and  progress  on   a  plan  to  replace  LSLs.   Findings   F-­‐12. Ultimate  accountability  for  Michigan  executive  branch  decisions  rests  with  the  Governor.   F-­‐13. The  Governor’s  knowledge,  and  that  of  Governor’s  office  staff,  of  various  aspects  of  the   Flint  water  crisis  was  compromised  by  the  information—much  of  it  wrong—provided  by   MDEQ  and  MDHHS.     F-­‐14. The  Governor’s  office  continued  to  rely  on  incorrect  information  provided  by  these   departments  despite  mounting  evidence  from  outside  experts  and  months  of  citizens’   complaints  throughout  the  Flint  water  crisis,  only  changing  course  in  early  October  2015   when  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  finally  acknowledged  the  extent  of  the  problem  of  lead  in  the   public  water  supply.   F-­‐15. The  suggestion  made  by  members  of  the  Governor’s  executive  staff  in  October  2014  to   switch  back  to  DWSD  should  have  resulted,  at  a  minimum,  in  a  full  and  comprehensive   review  of  the  water  situation  in  Flint,  similar  to  that  which  accompanied  the  earlier   decision  to  switch  to  KWA.  It  was  disregarded,  however,  because  of  cost  considerations   and  repeated  assurances  that  the  water  was  safe.  The  need  to  switch  back  to  DWSD   became  even  more  apparent  as  water  quality  and  safety  issued  continued  and  lead  issues   began  to  surface  in  2015,  notwithstanding  reassurances  by  MDEQ.   F-­‐16. The  Flint  water  crisis  highlights  the  risks  of  over-­‐reliance—in  fact,  almost  exclusive   reliance—on  a  few  staff  in  one  or  two  departments  for  information  on  which  key   decisions  are  based.   F-­‐17. Official  state  public  statements  and  communications  about  the  Flint  water  situation  have   at  times  been  inappropriate  and  unacceptable.   Recommendations   R-­‐15. Expand  information  flow  to  the  Governor  so  that  information  providing  the  foundation   for  key  decisions  comes  from  more  than  one  trusted  source—and  is  verified.       R-­‐16. Create  a  culture  in  state  government  that  is  not  defensive  about  concerns  and  evidence   that  contradicts  official  positions,  but  rather  is  receptive  and  open-­‐minded  toward  that         38   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   information.  View  informed  opinions—even  if  critical  of  state  government—as  an   opportunity  for  re-­‐assessing  state  positions,  rather  than  as  a  threat.   R-­‐17. Ensure  that  communications  from  all  state  agencies  are  respectful,  even  in  the  face  of   criticism,  and  sensitive  to  the  concerns  of  diverse  populations.     R-­‐18. The  Governor  must  assume  the  leadership  of,  and  hold  state  departments  accountable   for,  long-­‐term  implementation  of  the  recommendations  in  this  report,  including  but  not   limited  to  the  need  for  cultural  changes  across  multiple  state  agencies,  the  need  for   health  mitigation  and  LSL  replacement  in  Flint,  and  the  need  for  a  funding  strategy  to   address  replacement  of  LSLs  statewide.     R-­‐19. Review  budget  requests  for  MDEQ  to  ensure  adequate  funding  is  provided  to  the   ODWMA.  EPA  audit  and  interviews  indicate  that  Michigan’s  drinking  water  program  might   have  one  of  the  lowest  levels  of  financial  support  within  EPA  Region  V  while  having  one  of   the  largest,  if  not  the  largest,  number  of  community  water  systems  to  regulate.   State-Appointed Emergency Managers Defined  Role   The  role  of  the  emergency  manager  (EM)  under  the  Emergency  Manager  Law,  PA  436,  is  clear   and  unambiguous.  Though  they  report  directly  to  the  Department  of  Treasury,  EMs  have   complete  authority  and  control  over  municipal  decisions.  In  that  context,  the  EMs  had  the   responsibility  to  ensure  that  Flint  water  system  operations  were  adequately  resourced  and   supported  by  personnel  and  consultants  with  adequate  training  and  expertise.   Discussion   Owing  to  significant  declines  in  economic  vitality  and  substantial  outmigration  since  (at  least)  the   1990s,  Flint  was  first  placed  in  financial  receivership  under  an  emergency  “financial”  manager   between  2002  and  2004.50  Since  2011,  the  City  has  been  under  some  form  of  state-­‐ordered  and   controlled  emergency  financial  management.51  During  this  time,  four  different  EMs  have  served   for  varying  lengths  of  time,  one  serving  twice.52   Our  interviews  confirmed  the  EMs  reported  to  and  interacted  regularly  with  Treasury  officials.     They  discussed  issues  such  as  public  safety,  staffing  requirements,  and  financial  matters.  The   EMs,  working  through  Treasury,  also  would  contact  other  state  agencies  for  assistance  on  a   regular  basis,  such  as  the  State  Police  on  law  enforcement  matters.                                                                                                               50  Imposed  under  PA  72  of  1990.   51  In  2011,  PA  72  was  replaced  by  PA  4,  which  amplified  the  powers  of  an  appointed  EM.  The  voters  repealed  PA  4  in   November  2012,  but  a  subsequent  statute  was  passed  by  the  legislature  in  December  2012:  PA  436  of  2012.  That   statute  is  not  subject  to  a  voter  referendum  and  has  been  in  effect  since  March  2013.   52  Ed  Kurtz  served  as  Flint’s  emergency  financial  manager  under  PA  72  of  1990  from  May  2002  to  2004;  Michael   Brown  was  appointed  in  December  2011  under  PA  4;  Ed  Kurtz  became  EM  again  in  August  2012;  Michael  Brown  was   reappointed  again  in  June  2013;  Darnell  Earley  replaced  Brown  In  October  2013;  Jerry  Ambrose  replaced  Earley  in   January  2015;  and  Ambrose  left  in  April  2015  when  control  over  the  city’s  finances  was  assigned  to  a  city   administrator  under  the  supervision  of  a  Receivership  Transition  Advisory  Board.           39   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Numerous  decisions  were  made  between  December  2011  and  April  2015  that  had  some  impact   on  the  decision  to  use  the  Flint  River  as  the  primary  source  of  drinking  water  for  the  City  of  Flint.   Various  state-­‐appointed  EMs  served  during  this  timeframe  and  it  was  these  EMs  who  made  these   decisions,  not  locally  elected  officials.  Although  it  is  true  that  some  locally  elected  officials   supported,  acknowledged,  embraced,  and  even  celebrated  some  of  the  decisions,  the  decisions   were  not  theirs  to  make.  The  state-­‐appointed  EMs  made  the  decisions.   Specifically,  Flint  EM  Ed  Kurtz  authorized  use  of  the  Flint  River  as  a  water  source  for  Flint,  as   clearly  indicated  by  his  approval  of  a  sole-­‐source  contract  for  the  engineering  firm  Lockwood,   Andrews,  &  Newnam  (LAN)  to  prepare  the  Flint  WTP  for  full-­‐time  treatment  of  Flint  River  water.     Darnell  Earley  was  the  incumbent  Flint  EM  and  presided  over  the  switch  of  water  sources  in  April   2014.  He  and  later  EM  Jerry  Ambrose  were  in  place  during  periods  when  citizens  requested  a   return  to  DWSD  because  of  health  problems  they  were  experiencing.  Neither  Darnell  Earley  nor   Jerry  Ambrose  seriously  considered  a  return  to  DWSD  in  part  because  MDEQ,  local  staff  and  their   consultants  assured  the  EMs  that  the  water  quality  problems  were  manageable  and  that  there   was  nothing  seriously  wrong  with  the  water.53  In  March  2015,  nearly  one  year  after  the  source   water  conversion,  Jerry  Ambrose  stated  that  a  reconnection  to  DWSD  would  cost  the  City  $10.1   million  per  year  and  that  water  purchases  could  be  as  high  as  $1  million  per  month—essentially   asserting  that  it  was  unaffordable.54   In  any  event,  the  facts  in  this  case  point  to  the  reality  that  state  government,  as  the  entity  in   charge  of  Flint  decision-­‐making,  failed  to  protect  the  health  of  the  city’s  residents.  Regardless  of   any  successes  of  the  EM  process  in  other  Michigan  cities,  this  failure  must  force  us  to  review  the   EM  law  and  the  general  approach  to  financial  problems.  Government  approaches  to  cities  in  fiscal   distress  must  balance  fiscal  responsibility  with  the  equally  important  need  to  address  quality  of   life,  economic  development,  and  infrastructure  maintenance  and  provision.   Findings   F-­‐18. Emergency  managers,  not  locally  elected  officials,  made  the  decision  to  switch  to  the  Flint   River  as  Flint’s  primary  water  supply  source.     F-­‐19. Treasury  officials,  through  the  terms  of  the  local  emergency  financial  assistance  loan   executed  by  the  Flint  emergency  manager  on  April  29,  2015,  effectively  precluded  a   return  to  DWSD  water,  as  Flint  citizens  and  local  officials  were  demanding,  without  prior   state  approval.   The  Emergency  Manager  Law  is  predicated  on  the  provision  that  any  ongoing   accumulated  local  government  deficit  is  resolved  prior  to  the  termination  of  receivership   (P.A.  436  of  2012).  As  the  city  of  Flint  neared  the  end  of  its  Emergency  Manager  status  in   March  2015,  the  city  still  retained  an  $8  million  accumulated  deficit  in  the  General  Fund.     To  resolve  this  accumulated  deficit,  the  state  and  the  Flint  EM,  with  the  concurrence  of   Flint’s  City  Council,  signed  an  emergency  loan  agreement  between  the  City  of  Flint  and                                                                                                               53  See,  for  example,  "City  of  Flint  Water  System  Update  with  Questions  and  Answers,"  February  16,  2015,  posted  to   City  of  Flint  website  at  www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/Water-­‐Sysytem-­‐FAQ-­‐Update-­‐2-­‐16-­‐151.pdf,  as   confirmed  in  FWATF  interviews  of  Flint’s  former  EMs.       54  Memorandum  dated  March  3,  2015,  to  Deputy  State  Treasurer  Wayne  Workman.         40   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Michigan’s  Local  Emergency  Financial  Assistance  Loan  Board  for  nearly  $8  million.55  This   emergency  loan  included  a  provision  that  the  City  of  Flint  could  not,  without  prior  state   approval,  return  to  DWSD  or  lower  water  rates.   F-­‐20. The  role  of  the  EMs  in  Flint  (in  combination  with  MDEQ’s  failures)  places  primary   accountability  for  what  happened  with  state  government.       Trying  to  assign  responsibility  to  an  individual  EM  for  the  decision  to  use  the  Flint  River  is   pointless—and  the  answer  ambiguous.  One  EM  set  it  in  motion,  another  presided  over   the  actual  event,  and  two  EMs  did  not  seriously  entertain  reversing  the  decision  in  the   face  of  public  protest.  The  latter  refusals  were  for  simple  reasons:  they  received  “expert”   advice  that  the  water  was  safe  to  drink,  and  they  concluded  that  switching  back  to  DWSD   would  be  too  costly.   We  believe  the  larger  issue  is  one  of  accountability.  Who  is  accountable  for  the  decisions   made  by  the  EMs  in  Flint?  We  believe  the  state  must  assume  that  accountability.  If  the   state  does  not  assume  that  responsibility,  given  the  role  the  state  has  in  both  the   appointment  of  EMs  and  the  line  of  accountability  to  the  Department  of  Treasury,  then  no   accountability  exists  at  all.     F-­‐21. EMs  charged  with  financial  reform  often  do  not  have,  nor  are  they  supported  by,  the   necessary  expertise  to  manage  non-­‐financial  aspects  of  municipal  government.   F-­‐22. Michigan’s  Emergency  Manager  Law  and  related  practices  can  be  improved  to  better   ensure  that  protection  of  public  health  and  safety  is  not  compromised  in  the  name  of   financial  urgency.   The  EM  Law  is  predicated  on  the  concept  that  a  local  financial  crisis—such  as  that  which   occurred  in  Flint  in  2011—is  due  to  the  inability  of  local  officials  to  address  the  problem.     The  EM  is  supposed  to  be  able  to  better  handle  the  situation,  make  better  and  faster   decisions,  and  resolve  the  crisis.  The  EM  law  states  “[t]hat  the  fiscal  stability  of  local   governments  is  necessary  to  the  health,  safety,  and  welfare  of  the  citizens  of  this  state   and  it  is  a  valid  public  purpose  for  this  state  to  assist  a  local  government  in  a  condition  of   financial  emergency.”56  The  EM  is  deemed  necessary  not  only  to  resolve  the  fiscal   problem  but  also  to  protect  the  public  health  and  safety.         Yet  in  the  case  of  Flint,  while  other  state  and  local  officials  were  involved,  EMs  were  at  the   heart  of  decision-­‐making  processes  that  prolonged  lead  exposure  occasioned  by  MDEQ’s   failure  to  prescribe  appropriate  treatment  for  the  Flint  water  system.     Recommendations   R-­‐20. Review  Michigan’s  Emergency  Manager  Law  (PA  436)  and  its  implementation,  and   identify  measures  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  the  checks  and  balances  that  are   provided  by  representative  government.                                                                                                               55  Note  that  the  Resolution  presented  to  Flint  City  Council  by  the  Flint  EM,  Resolution  150302.1,  contained  no   information  regarding  the  DWSD  and  water  rates  conditions  contained  in  the  emergency  loan.   56  Michigan  Public  Act  436  of  2012,  Section  3  (c).         41   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Although  we  acknowledge  that  controversy  will  always  accompany  state  receivership  in   whatever  form,  we  recommend  a  review  of  PA  436.  While  some  of  the  checks  and   balances  inherent  in  democratic  decision-­‐making  are  necessarily  and  by  definition  absent   under  emergency  management—as  is  also  true  under  bankruptcy—proper  and  efficient   checks  and  balances  per  se  should  not  be  a  casualty  of  state  receivership.  Neither  should   avenues  for  citizens  to  voice  their  concerns,  particularly  regarding  matters  of  public  health   and  safety.   R-­‐21. Consider  alternatives  to  the  current  EM  approach—for  example,  a  structured  way  to   engage  locally  elected  officials  on  key  decisions;  an  Ombudsman  function  in  state   government  to  ensure  that  local  concerns  are  a  factor  in  decisions  made  by  the  EM;   and/or  a  means  of  appealing  EM  decisions  to  another  body.     R-­‐22. Ensure  proper  support  and  expertise  for  EMs  to  effectively  manage  the  many   governmental  functions  of  a  city.  Decisions  on  matters  potentially  affecting  public  health   and  safety,  for  example,  should  be  informed  by  subject  matter  experts  identified  and/or   provided  by  the  state.   EMs  are  asked  to  ensure  the  protection  of  the  public  health  and  safety  and  yet  are  not   provided  adequate  tools  and  resources  to  achieve  this  objective.  EMs  are  empowered  to   effect  cost-­‐cutting  measures  such  as  the  ability  to  terminate  contracts  and  restructure   budgets.  However,  they  are  given  little  or  no  priority  access  to  state  or  federal  resources   or  assistance  in  undertaking  the  complex  activities  of  running  a  municipality.  Other  states   take  different  approaches  that  may  do  a  better  job  of  balancing  the  need  for  fiscal   discipline  with  the  need  to  provide  basic  public  services,  especially  when  scientific,  health,   and/or  engineering  expertise  is  involved.       City of Flint Defined  Role   As  the  owner  of  its  public  water  system,  the  City  of  Flint  has  responsibility  for  compliance  with   the  SDWA  under  Act  399.  These  responsibilities  include  “ensuring  proper  design,  construction,   operations  and  maintenance,  so  that  contaminants  in  tap  water  do  not  exceed  the  standards   established  by  law.”  The  City  is  “required  to  employ  properly  certified  water  operators  that  are   trained  and  experienced  to  operate  the  treatment  and  distribution  system.”     The  City  must  “test  its  water  routinely  for  specified  contaminants  and  report  the  results  to   MDEQ.”  If  a  water  system  is  not  meeting  these  standards,  it  is  the  water  supplier’s  responsibility   to  notify  its  customers  when  there  is  a  problem  with  water  quality.57    With  a  planned  change  in   water  source,  it  is  the  City’s  responsibility  to  carefully  plan  and  test  water  treatment  techniques,   ensure  staff  is  knowledgeable  about  treatment  protocols,  and  monitor  distribution  system  water   quality.  We  note  that  decisions  affecting  these  responsibilities,  particularly  those  that  had   financial  implications,  were  ceded  to  Flint’s  EMs  throughout  the  course  of  the  Flint  water  crisis.                                                                                                               57    Quotes  are  from  the  MDEQ’s  “Outline  of  Flint  Drinking  Water  Issues  for  Flint  Water  Task  Force,”  p.3.       42   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Discussion   City  of  Flint  Public  Works  executive  leadership  and  staff  were  immediately  responsible  for   treating  Flint  River  water  and  for  monitoring  water  quality  in  the  distribution  system.  SDWA   compliance  is  the  obligation  of  the  public  water  supplier,  and  it  is  their  hands  that  public  trust  is   placed.  Flint  was  responsible  for  ensuring  that  its  WTP  was  adequately  upgraded  and  tested  to   perform  full-­‐time  operations,  that  operations  staff  members  were  adequately  trained  and   familiar  with  treatment  processes,  that  the  treatment  technologies  used  were  adequate  to   produce  safe  drinking  water,  and  that  the  water  quality  throughout  the  distribution  system  (all   the  way  to  consumers’  taps,  in  the  case  of  the  LCR)  was  in  compliance  with  regulatory   requirements,  as  confirmed  using  appropriate  sampling  procedures.  These  standards  of  practice   were  not  met  in  Flint.         The  City  relied  on  Flint  Utilities  Department  staff’s  limited  experience,  consultant  advice,  and   most  substantially  MDEQ  for  technical  support.  In  this  respect,  Flint  was  similar  to  many   communities  in  Michigan  that  rely  on  MDEQ  for  technical  assistance  and  advice  on  regulatory   compliance  requirements.  However,  in  Flint,  that  reliance  was  tragically  misplaced.   Our  interviews  underscored  several  troubling  aspects  of  the  inexorable  drive  to  leave  the  DWSD   system  and  use  the  Flint  River  as  an  interim  supply  source  for  drinking  water.  Most  obviously,  the   parties  simply  failed  to  adequately  appreciate  (or  signal)  the  complexities  involved  in  treating   Flint  River  water,  or  the  potential  implications  of  water  chemistry  changes  to  the  city’s  water   distribution  network.  We  note  that  Flint  endured  a  series  of  water  quality  threats—from  E  coli   contamination  to  high  total  trihalomethane  (TTHM)  levels—that  could  have  been  prevented.   Increased  lead  exposure  and  increased  incidences  of  Legionellosis  likely  are  the  most  serious   health  consequences  of  a  sustained  period  of  water  quality  problems  that  clearly  overwhelmed   Flint  staff.  At  best,  consultant  support  for  Flint  River  water  treatment,  and  later  for  redress  of   distribution  system  water  quality  problems,  focused  on  specific  issues  without  adequate   consideration  for  latent  public  health  dangers.   The  Flint  Utilities  Department  personnel  were  under-­‐trained,  inexperienced  with  full-­‐time  plant   operations,  and  ill-­‐prepared  to  manage  complex  water  chemistry  issues.  We  note  that  selected   staff  members  conveyed  concerns  as  events  unfolded,  only  to  have  those  concerns  discounted.     Several  aspects  of  the  situation  are  particularly  troubling.     o Less  than  one  month  before  startup  of  full-­‐time  Flint  WTP  operation,  MDEQ  was  uncertain   about  its  requirements  for  the  transition.  MDEQ  staff  noted  internally  that  Flint  would   face  complexities  in  treating  Flint  River  water  and  challenges  with  full-­‐time  operation  of   the  dated  WTP.58     o It  is  not  clear  that  Flint’s  resident  consulting  engineers,  LAN,  had  adequate  expertise  and   experience  with  river  water  treatment,  yet  the  firm  was  engaged  through  a  sole-­‐source   contract.59                                                                                                                 58  See,  for  example,  Stephen  Busch  e-­‐mail  of  March  26,  2014  –  and  his  e-­‐mail  of  exactly  one  year  earlier.   59  LAN  representatives  were  not  made  available  for  interview.    Questions  were  provided  in  writing  and  sent  to  LAN   (and  are  included  in  Appendix  IV);  responses  were  not  received  prior  to  publication  of  this  report.         43   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   o Flint  WTP  operators  were  hired  too  late  in  plant  ramp-­‐up  efforts  to  enable  full-­‐time   staffing,  which  precluded  adequate  training  on  plant  operations.         o MDEQ  misinterpreted  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR)  in  determining  that  corrosion   control  treatment  was  not  necessary  with  commencement  of  full-­‐time  WTP  operation.     Neither  Flint  Utilities  Department  staff  nor  their  consulting  engineers  were  given  either  to   question  this  misinterpretation,  or  to  institute  rigorous  distribution  system  water  quality   monitoring  to  safeguard  against  corrosion-­‐causing  water  quality  issues.   We  note  that  Flint  WTP  supervisory  personnel’s  expressed  concerns  regarding  readiness  to  begin   full  time  operations—including  appropriate  LCR-­‐mandated  sampling—and  these  concerns  went   unheeded.60  However,  it  seems  clear  that  these  concerns  were  voiced  in  an  environment  that   was  unreceptive  to  reconsideration  of  the  City’s  chosen  course,  mandated  by  its  EMs.61   We  also  are  dismayed  by  the  inadequate  and  technically  flawed  efforts  Flint  Utilities  Department   personnel  undertook,  based  on  MDEQ’s  instructions,  to  assess  distribution  system  water  quality.   As  a  result,  Flint’s  water  quality  sampling  was  fundamentally  flawed,  giving  false  assurances  and   an  untenable  basis  for  MDEQ’s  claims  that  Flint’s  system  was  delivering  safe  water.  The  series  of   missteps  and  outright  errors  is  well  documented,62  including  sampling  of  pre-­‐flushed  lines,  use  of   narrow-­‐mouthed  bottles,  and  perhaps  most  egregiously  failure  to  select  high-­‐risk  homes  for   testing,  as  required  by  the  LCR.  It  is  hard  not  to  attribute  this  conduct  to  a  misguided  objective  of   securing  nominal  LCR  compliance  irrespective  of  what  conditions  might  actually  exist  in  the   homes  of  Flint  residents.       Also  troubling,  though  not  altogether  uncommon  among  U.S.  water  systems,  is  Flint’s  admission   that  it  had  not  conducted  a  census  of  LSLs  as  required  by  the  LCR.  Without  this  information,  Flint   was  not  in  a  position  to  identify  high-­‐risk  homes  to  properly  monitor  lead  levels  and  comply  with   the  LCR.   In  summary,  while  we  cannot  begin  to  explain  or  excuse  MDEQ’s  transgressions  in  its  oversight  of   the  conversion  to  the  Flint  River  water  supply,  the  Flint  Public  Works  role  in  the  crisis  appears   attributable  to  an  inexperienced  and  poorly  resourced  organization  struggling  to  take  on   enormous,  untenable  responsibilities.  Flint’s  EM,  relying  on  sole-­‐sourced  consultant  support,  held   responsibility  for  ensuring  adequate  staffing,  training,  and  preparation  for  conversion  of  Flint’s   drinking  water  source.  Those  responsibilities  were  not  met.   Findings   F-­‐23. Flint  Public  Works  personnel  were  ill-­‐prepared  to  assume  responsibility  for  full-­‐time   operation  of  the  Flint  WTP  and  distribution  system.                                                                                                                 60  April  17,  2014  e-­‐mail  from  Flint  Utilities  Department’s  Michael  Glasgow  to  Adam  Rosenthal,  Mike  Prysby,  and   Stephen  Busch  at  MDEQ.   61  See,  for  example,  April  24,  2014  e-­‐mail  from  Daugherty  Johnson,  City  of  Flint  Utilities  Administrator,  and  Mike   Prysby  and  Stephen  Busch/MDEQ,  including  Flint  Public  Works  Director  Howard  Croft.   62  See,  for  example,  “COMMENTARY:  MDEQ  Mistakes  and  Deception  Created  the  Flint  Water  Crisis,”  September  30,   2015,  Siddhartha  Roy,  Flintwaterstudy.org,  and  February  27,  2015  e-­‐mail  from  Miguel  Del  Toral/EPA  to  MDEQ:  “If   systems  are  pre-­‐flushing  the  tap  the  night  before  collection  of  LCR  compliance  samples  (MDEQ  still  provides  these   instructions  to  public  water  systems)  this  clears  particulate  lead  out  of  the  plumbing  and  biases  the  results  low  by   eliminating  the  highest  lead  values.”         44   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   F-­‐24. The  Flint  WTP  and  installed  treatment  technologies  were  not  adequate  to  produce  safe,   clean  drinking  water  at  startup  of  full-­‐time  operations.  Flint’s  lack  of  reinvestment  in  its   water  distribution  system  contributed  to  the  drinking  water  crisis  and  ability  to  respond   to  water  quality  problems.     F-­‐25. Flint  Public  Works  personnel  failed  to  comply  with  LCR  requirements,  including  the  use  of   optimized  corrosion  control  treatment  and  monitoring  for  lead.  Flint  personnel  did  not   identify  residences  with  LSLs,  secure  an  adequate  number  of  tap  water  samples  from   high-­‐risk  homes,  or  use  prescribed  sampling  practices  (for  example,  line  and  tap  flushing   methods  and  sample  bottle  sizes).   F-­‐26. Flint  Public  Works  acted  on  inaccurate  and  improper  guidance  from  MDEQ.       F-­‐27. Many  communities  similarly  rely  on  MDEQ  to  provide  technical  assistance  and  guidance   on  how  to  meet  regulatory  requirements.  In  the  case  of  Flint,  MDEQ  assistance  was   deeply  flawed  and  lax,  which  led  to  myopic  enforcement  of  regulations  designed  to   protect  public  health.         F-­‐28. The  EM  structure  made  it  extremely  difficult  for  Flint  citizens  to  alter  or  check  decision-­‐ making  on  preparations  for  use  of  Flint  River  water,  or  to  receive  responses  to  concerns   about  subsequent  water  quality  issues.   Recommendations   R-­‐23. Establish  and  fund  a  team  of  subject  matter  experts  in  water  system  operations   (treatment  and  distribution  system  management)  to  support  and  train  water  system   personnel,  guide  safe  system  operation  under  current  conditions,  and  prepare  for   successful  conversion  to  KWA.   In  addition  to  creating  water  quality  problems,  the  switch  to  the  Flint  River  may  have   precipitated  conditions  in  Flint’s  water  system  that  increase  the  potential  for  Legionella  to   occur.  With  warmer  temperatures  in  2016,  there  is  a  heightened  need  for  multi-­‐agency   coordination  on  testing  of  the  Flint  water  system  for  the  presence  of  Legionella,  and  on   public  health  monitoring  for  the  incidence  of  Legionellosis  and  determinations  of  sources.     R-­‐24. Implement  a  programmatic  approach  to  Flint  WTP  and  distribution  system  operations,   maintenance,  asset  management,  water  quality,  capital  improvements  and  public   engagement  (including  risk  communication)  to  ensure  that  the  disparate  ongoing  efforts   to  address  Flint  water  system  infrastructure  needs  are  coordinated,  fully  documented,   and  structured  to  sustain  high-­‐quality  potable  water  service  over  the  long  term.   Though  not  the  subject  of  the  FWATF’s  review,  it  is  apparent  that  the  Flint  water  utility   faces  acute  financial  challenges  due  to  earlier  financial  management  practices,  as  well  as   successful  challenges  to  EM-­‐ordered  rate  increases.  These  circumstances  impose  an   unprecedented  context  for  establishing  defensible  water  rates  and  collection  practices  in   a  community  that  was  already  facing  difficult  water  affordability  challenges.  Careful   financial  planning  and  management  will  be  required  to  secure  and  effectively  deploy   external  funding  assistance,  and  to  gradually  stabilize  water  system  revenues  to  sustain   water  utility  operations  over  the  long  term.  This  must  be  complemented  by  an  effective   public  education  and  engagement  program,  and  innovative  water  affordability  strategies   to  advance  universal  access  to  potable  water  service.         45   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   R-­‐25. Implement  a  robust  public  engagement  and  involvement  program  in  conjunction  with  the   anticipated  conversion  to  KWA-­‐delivered  water  and  provide  for  regular  reporting  to  the   Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Committee  (FWICC).   Genesee County Health Department (GCHD) Defined  Role     As  a  local  health  department,  the  Genesee  County  Health  Department  (GCHD)  is  responsible  for   all  government  public  health  functions  for  residents  in  their  jurisdiction,  including  the  City  of   Flint.  Like  the  vast  majority  of  cities  in  Michigan,  Flint  does  not  have  its  own  public  health  officials   and  instead  relies  on  its  county  health  department  (GCHD)  to  perform  public  health  functions.   GCHD  must  coordinate  and  communicate  effectively  with  city  officials  and  the  public.  Specific  to   the  Flint  water  crisis,  GCHD  responsibilities  include  investigating  outbreaks  of  reportable  diseases   such  as  Legionellosis  and  conducting  timely  in-­‐home  assessments  of  potential  sources  of  lead   exposure  for  children  found  to  have  elevated  blood  lead  levels.   Importantly,  the  functions  of  local  health  departments  also  include  cooperative  coordination  with   state  public  health  authorities  (MDHHS),  and  in  turn  with  federal  public  health  authorities  (for   example,  Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention  [CDC])  as  needed.  The  expectation  is  that   local  health  departments  manage  issues  that  arise  in  their  jurisdictions.  State  public  health   authorities  become  involved  at  the  request  of  local  authorities  and/or  when  events  such  as  an   outbreak  involve  more  than  one  jurisdiction  (that  is,  more  than  one  local  health  department).  In   turn,  MDHHS  requests  help  from  the  CDC  as  needed.  This  local-­‐to-­‐state-­‐to-­‐federal  sequence  is   designed  to  facilitate  communication,  coordination,  and  follow-­‐up  among  officials  at  multiple   levels  of  authority,  and  it  requires  mutual  trust,  collaboration  and  effective  communications   across  agencies.     Discussion     In  summer  2014,  after  the  change  of  water  source  for  the  City  of  Flint,  there  were  two  public   health  problems  that  arose  within  the  jurisdiction  of  GCHD:  exposure  to  lead  and  exposure  to   Legionella.       Exposure  to  Lead   In  contrast  to  Legionellosis,  which  has  involved  GCHD  as  a  front-­‐line  responder,  GCHD  was  not   extensively  involved  in  responding  to  exposure  of  children  to  lead  from  the  Flint  water  supply.   Elevated  blood  lead  level  records  are  maintained  as  part  of  a  regularly  updated  listing  of  test   results  by  MDHHS  in  the  statewide  Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  Program  (CLPPP).  GCHD   was  involved  as  a  coordinating  organization  for  conducting  tests  and  relaying  test  results  to  the   state.   Clinicians  are  responsible  for  testing  children’s  blood  for  lead  in  early  childhood  on  a  routine   basis.  Health  insurance  plans  (especially  those  that  contract  with  state  Medicaid)  are  responsible   for  encouraging  families  and  clinicians  to  have  children  screened  at  the  appropriate  ages  and   then  following  up  with  children  whose  blood  lead  levels  are  elevated.  GCHD  would  get  involved   for  children  with  elevated  lead  levels  that  prompted  in-­‐home  assessments  of  possible  sources  of   environmental  lead  exposure.           46   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Since  the  switch  to  the  Flint  River,  a  higher  proportion  of  children  in  Flint  have  had  elevated  lead   levels  that  would  prompt  in-­‐home  assessments.  Several  aspects  of  the  GCHD-­‐MDHHS  response   are  noteworthy:   o GCHD  was  overwhelmed  with  the  need  for  in-­‐home  assessments,  and  MDHHS   supported  training  and  placement  of  outreach  nurses  in  GCHD  to  supplement  its   workforce.       o GCHD  had  been  asked  only  to  reach  out  to  pregnant  women  who  might  have  had  lead   exposure,  rather  than  performing  their  usual  in-­‐home  assessment  duties.  MDHHS   tasked  an  outside  firm  with  performing  the  in-­‐home  assessments.       o As  of  late  January  2016,  only  about  one-­‐fifth  of  children  known  to  have  had  elevated   blood  lead  levels  in  Flint  since  April  2014  had  received  in-­‐home  environmental   assessments  (including  water  testing).     Legionella   After  the  switch  to  the  Flint  River  in  2014,  the  Flint  Utilities  Department  began  flushing  water   mains  citywide  to  address  brown-­‐colored  water  resulting  from  corrosion  of  pipes  in  the   distribution  system.  Many  fire  hydrants  ran  for  days,  which  may  have  disrupted  the  “biofilm,”  a   slime  coating  (which  is  distinct  from  the  scaling  provided  by  corrosion  control  treatment)  on  the   inside  surface  of  the  water  mains  and  water  service  lines.  When  the  biofilm  was  disrupted,   Legionella  and  other  bacteria  may  have  been  released.  In  addition,  EPA  experts  Del  Toral  and   Lytle  believe  that  corroding  pipes  likely  absorbed  chlorine  in  the  water,  leading  to  extremely  low   chlorine  levels  that  were  insufficient  to  kill  Legionella  in  the  water.  Also,  given  the  small   population  in  Flint  compared  to  the  large  water  distribution  system  developed  to  serve  the  city’s   larger  population  in  decades  past,  water  likely  pooled  in  the  system  for  excessively  long  periods,   providing  an  ideal  environment  for  bacterial  growth.   As  noted  above,  several  cases  of  Legionellosis  occurred  in  patients  who  likely  were  exposed  to   Legionella  in  healthcare  facilities.  McLaren  Medical  Center  in  Flint  responded  to  the  incident  by   hiring  a  Legionella  expert,  spending  $300,000  for  systems  to  eliminate  the  bacteria,  and  changing   practices  on  their  wards  to  instruct  patients  not  to  take  showers  (because  aerosols  can  spread   Legionella).   During  this  timeframe,  the  City  of  Flint  (Mayor  Dayne  Walling,  EM  Jerry  Ambrose  and  others)   asserted  the  water  was  safe.  Even  while  outbreak  investigations  were  ongoing,  GCHD  and   MDHHS  did  not  issue  a  bulletin  to  the  medical  community  or  the  public.  The  Legionella  expert   hired  by  the  hospital  and  other  water  quality  experts  cannot  dismiss  the  possibility  of  a  link   between  the  Legionellosis  outbreaks  and  lack  of  proper  corrosion  control  and  disinfection  in  the   City’s  water  system.   In  Flint,  neither  the  Flint  EM  nor  his  appointed  City  Administrator,  GCHD,  or  MDHHS  fully   disclosed  the  Legionellosis  outbreak  to  local  medical  professionals  or  the  general  public.     Moreover,  this  outbreak,  which  is  always  associated  with  water  supplies,  was  not  communicated   by  MDEQ  with  sufficient  urgency  to  the  Governor’s  office.       In  contrast,  New  York  City  experienced  an  outbreak  of  Legionellosis  attributed  to  several  hospital   cooling  systems  in  different  parts  of  the  city  in  summer  2015.  Public  health  officials  made         47   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   announcements  to  City  residents  about  the  cases  and  the  outbreak  was  reported  in  the  media,   along  with  health  advice  for  the  public.       Findings   F-­‐29. Communication,  coordination  and  cooperation  between  GCHD,  the  City  of  Flint  and   MDHHS  were  inadequate  to  protect  Flint  residents  from  public  health  threats  resulting   from  inadequately  treated  Flint  River  water.   F-­‐30. The  rate  of  follow-­‐up  on  children  with  elevated  blood  lead  levels  through  January  2016   was  unacceptable,  illustrating  a  low  level  of  coordination  between  GCHD  and  MDHHS  and   insufficient  resources  devoted  to  this  task.   F-­‐31. Management  of  the  Flint  River-­‐sourced  water  supply  may  have  contributed  to  the   outbreaks  of  Legionellosis  cases  in  2014  and  2015  in  Genesee  County.  Although  the   definitive  cause  of  the  outbreaks  is  uncertain  at  the  time  of  publication,  GCHD  and   MDHHS  did  not  notify  the  public  of  the  outbreaks  in  a  timely  fashion  in  order  to  urge   caution.      Recommendations   R-­‐26. Improve  follow-­‐up  on  public  health  concerns  between  GCHD,  MDHHS  and  the  City  of  Flint   now  and  in  the  future,  to  effect  timely,  comprehensive,  and  coordinated  activity  and   ensure  the  best  health  outcomes  for  children  and  adults  affected.   R-­‐27. Presume  that  the  risk  of  Legionella  may  remain  elevated  in  the  Flint  water  distribution   system  and  must  take  appropriate  steps  with  public  and  private  partners  to  monitor  and   mitigate  that  risk  as  concerns  about  water  quality  continue  in  the  City  of  Flint.   R-­‐28. Coordinate  with  state  officials  (MDHHS)  and  with  local  healthcare  professionals  and   healthcare  institutions  in  Genesee  County  and  the  City  of  Flint  to  mitigate  the  risk  of   Legionellosis  in  2016  and  beyond.     It  is  not  clear  whether  the  switch  back  to  DWSD  in  October  2015  and  subsequent  addition   of  corrosion  control  will  change  the  conditions  for  Legionella  growth  in  the  Flint  water   distribution  system.  In  addition,  the  strong  predominance  of  cases  linked  to  healthcare   exposure  at  one  particular  hospital  in  Flint  underscores  the  critical  importance  of   appropriate  and  timely  antiseptic  use  by  healthcare  facilities  to  reduce  the  risk  of   Legionellosis.   To  facilitate  appropriate  collection  of  Legionella  specimens  that  will  permit  tracing  of   Legionella  species  in  the  setting  of  any  further  outbreaks,  healthcare  professionals  in   Genesee  County  should  be  vigilant  and  err  on  the  side  of  collecting  respiratory  specimens   before  initiating  therapy  in  cases  of  presumed  Legionellosis.   U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Oversight and the Lead and Copper Rule Defined  Role   EPA  has  responsibility  under  the  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act  to  set  and  enforce  health-­‐based   drinking  water  quality  standards.  EPA  establishes  National  Primary  Drinking  Water  Regulations   that  set  enforceable  maximum  contaminant  levels  in  drinking  water  and  prescribe  treatment         48   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   requirements.  Each  standard  also  includes  requirements  for  water  systems  to  test  for   contaminants  in  the  water  to  make  sure  standards  are  achieved.   EPA  regulates  public  water  systems  through  its  Public  Water  System  Supervision  (PWSS)  program.     From  the  description  of  that  program:   EPA’s  and  states’  primary  means  of  monitoring  public  water  system  compliance  with  the   SDWA  and  its  implementing  regulations  is  the  review  and  evaluation  of  analytical  results   of  water  samples  collected  by  public  water  systems.  These  reports  provide  the  water   systems  and  regulators  with  the  data  they  need  to  ensure  that  drinking  water  monitoring   is  ongoing  and  that  the  drinking  water  standards  are  being  met.  When  results  indicate   that  a  contaminant  is  present  at  a  level  that  exceeds  standards,  states  and  EPA  work  with   public  water  systems  to  take  steps  to  prevent  or  remove  the  contaminants,  and  notify   consumers  so  that  they  can  make  informed  choices.63   EPA  is  required  to  oversee  the  regulatory  actions  of  state  and  local  agencies  and  ensure  that  local   public  water  suppliers  adhere  to  the  standards  set  under  the  SDWA.64  The  SDWA  authorizes  the   EPA  to  delegate  primary  enforcement  responsibilities  to  the  states.  Forty-­‐nine  states,  including   Michigan,  have  this  delegated  authority.         While  the  states  are  delegated  regulatory  primacy,  there  are  two  sections  of  the  SDWA  that  give   EPA  authorization  to  act:   a. Sec.  1414  of  the  Act  says  that  when  the  agency  finds  a  public  water  system  out  of   compliance,  the  EPA  must  notify  the  state  and  public  water  system  of  the  violation.  If   after  30  days  the  state  has  not  commenced  enforcement  action,  then  the  EPA  must  issue   an  order  to  comply.  In  the  case  of  Flint,  EPA  did  not  use  this  authority  as  required  by  the   SDWA.   b. Sec.  1431  of  the  Act  grants  emergency  powers  to  the  EPA  when  the  Administrator  is   aware  of  a  contaminant  or  threat  “which  may  present  an  imminent  and  substantial   endangerment  to  the  health  of  persons,  and  that  appropriate  state  and  local  authorities   have  not  acted  to  protect  the  health  of  such  persons,  the  EPA  Administrator  may  take   such  actions  as  he  or  she  may  deem  necessary  in  order  to  protect  the  health  of  such   persons.”  The  EPA  used  this  authority  when  it  issued  its  emergency  order  on  January  21,   2016.   Lead  and  Copper  Rule:   The  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR)  is  intended  to  protect  public  health  by  reducing  lead  and  copper   in  drinking  water  at  customers’  taps.  For  the  rule  to  be  effective,  and  for  lead  and  copper   contamination  to  be  detected,  water  sampling  practices  must  be  rigorous.  Ample  industry   guidance65  emphasizes  the  requirements  for  this  rigor,  which  include  selecting  residences  at  high                                                                                                               63 64  www.epa.gov/compliance/safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐act-­‐sdwa-­‐compliance-­‐monitoring      Before  the  federal  EPA  was  established,  states  regulated  drinking  water.  The  SDWA  kept  that  regulatory  structure   in  place  and  assigned  EPA  oversight  responsibility  for  state  regulatory  activities.       65  See,  for  example,  “A  Field  Comparison  of  Sampling  Protocols  for  Measuring  Lead  in  Drinking  Water,”  Porter,  A.,  M.   Del  Toral,  and  M.  Schock.  In  Proceedings,  Water  Quality  Technology  Conference,  Long  Beach,  CA,  November  3-­‐7,   2013,  American  Water  Works  Association,  Denver,  CO  (2013).         49   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   risk  for  lead  exposure,  prohibiting  pre-­‐flushing  and  aerator  removal,  and  observing  minimum   stagnation  times.  More  fundamentally,  public  water  systems  must  identify  the  LSLs  in  their   service  areas,  advise  customers  of  their  presence  and  potential  implications,  and  facilitate  full   service  line  replacements  in  the  event  of  action  level  exceedances.  The  LCR  also  requires  public   water  systems  to  minimize  lead  and  copper  levels  in  drinking  water  by  controlling  corrosion  in   the  distribution  system,  which  is  achieved  by  implementing  corrosion  control  treatment  (CCT).   Unfortunately,  despite  the  clarity  of  its  intent,  the  LCR’s  language  has  been  subject  to  various   interpretations  from  one  state,  and  one  water  system,  to  another.  Though  MDEQ’s   misinterpretations  may  be  among  the  most  egregious  examples  of  lax  and  myopic  compliance   practices,  there  are  pronounced  concerns  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  rule  has  been   compromised.66  EPA  is  in  the  process  of  reviewing  and  revising  the  LCR  through  its  established   rulemaking  procedures.   While  the  states  are  delegated  regulatory  primacy,  40  CFR  141.82(i)  gives  the  EPA  Regional   Administrator  authority  to  review  treatment  decisions  made  by  a  state  and  issue  federal   treatment  determinations  consistent  with  the  LCR.   Discussion   Prior  to  Flint’s  water  supply  conversion,  EPA’s  delegation  of  primacy  for  enforcement  of  the   SDWA  in  Michigan  had  been  challenged  by  a  series  of  disagreements  and  concerns  over   compliance  requirements  and  sampling  practices.67  These  were  heightened  with  the  series  of   events  that  precipitated  the  water  crisis.  EPA  Region  V  was  first  notified  of  a  potential  problem  in   Flint  by  resident  LeeAnne  Walters,  who  called  to  inform  them  of  the  high  lead  level  (104  ppb)   found  in  her  drinking  water.  In  early  2015,  EPA’s  Miguel  Del  Toral  worked  with  Walters  to   diagnose  water  quality  problems  at  her  residence.  During  this  time,  EPA  inquired  (repeatedly)   about  CCT  at  the  Flint  WTP,  advised  MDEQ  that  the  LCR  unambiguously  requires  CCT,  and  were   told  incorrectly  that  Flint  had  an  optimized  corrosion  control  program.   In  this  timeframe,  EPA  was  trying  to  determine  whether  the  high  lead  levels  at  LeeAnne  Walters’s   house  represented  an  isolated  or  system-­‐wide  problem.  Ultimately,  it  required  LeeAnne   Walters’s  inquiry  of  Flint  Utiliites  Department  personnel  for  EPA  to  learn  that  Flint  did  not  have   CCT  in  place.  It  took  2  months  from  EPA’s  first  inquiry  for  MDEQ  to  acknowledge  that  Flint  was   not  implementing  CCT.   Given  this  information,  EPA  tried  to  convince  MDEQ  by  persuasion  and  forthright  referencing  to   the  LCR  that  Flint  needed  to  add  CCT  (as  DWSD  had  been  doing  for  decades)  However,  MDEQ  was   entrenched  in  its  (incorrect)  position  that  two  6-­‐month  monitoring  periods  are  allowed  before  a   decision  on  CCT  is  required.  MDEQ  forestalled  imposing  the  requirement  for  CCT  pending   issuance  of  a  legal  opinion.                                                                                                                   66  See,  for  example,  Dr.  Yanna  Lambrinidou’s  dissenting  opinion  on  long-­‐term  revisions  for  the  LCR,  submitted  to  the   EPA  National  Drinking  Water  Advisory  Council  in  October  2015  (“EPA  NDWAC  LCR  WG,  Dissenting  Opinion,  Oct.   2015”),  www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-­‐11/documents/ndwaclcrstatementofdissent.pdf;  and  the   Northeast-­‐Midwest  Institute’s  Elin  Betanzo’s  article,  “Clarifications  Needed  to  Strengthen  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule   Working  Group’s  Recommendations  for  Long  Term  Revisions  to  the  Federal  Lead  and  Copper  Rule,”  November  17,   2015,  www.nemw.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/11/NEMWI-­‐LCR-­‐recommendations.pdf.   67  FWATF  interviews  with  Miguel  Del  Toral.  Also  see  April  27,  2015,  e-­‐mail  exchanges  among  MDEQ’s  Cook,  Busch   and  Prysby  regarding  Del  Toral’s  question  on  corrosion  control  treatment.           50   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   EPA  was  similarly  hampered  by  poor  information  derived  from  Flint’s  flawed  water  quality   sampling  for  LCR  compliance.  Not  only  did  MDEQ  persist  in  prescribing  sampling  methods  that   limited  opportunities  for  detection  of  lead  contamination,  it  did  not  ensure  that  a  proper  sample   pool  was  obtained  from  the  Flint  system.  The  first  6-­‐month  monitoring  period  results  showed  the   90th  percentile  lead  level  results  to  be  6  ppb,  and  the  second  6-­‐month  monitoring  period  results   showed  the  90th  percentile  to  be  11  ppb.  Both  of  these  outcomes  fell  beneath  the  lead  action   level  of  15  ppb.  Unfortunately,  because  of  the  flawed  sampling  pool  and  sampling  techniques,  the   extent  of  the  lead  problem  was  under-­‐reported.  It  came  to  light  in  September  2015  with  the   results  of  Dr.  Marc  Edwards’s  lead  sampling  program.  After  testing  252  water  samples  taken  in   Flint,  the  90th  percentile68  of  Dr.  Edward’s  samples  was  found  to  be  25  ppb,  and  more  than  100   samples  had  lead  over  5  ppb.   Even  given  the  City’s  flawed  sampling  program,  EPA  staff  did  become  aware  of  the  potential  risks   in  April  2015  when  MDEQ’s  failure  to  require  CCT  was  revealed,  and  EPA  leadership  was  advised   of  acute  concerns  in  an  interim  report  by  Miguel  del  Toral  in  June  2015:   “In  effect,  the  City  of  Flint  stopped  providing  treatment  used  to  mitigate  lead  and  copper   levels  in  the  water.  In  accordance  with  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR),  all  large  systems   (serving  greater  than  50,000  persons)  are  required  to  install  and  maintain  corrosion   control  treatment  for  lead  and  copper.  In  the  absence  of  any  corrosion  control  treatment,   lead  levels  in  drinking  water  can  be  expected  to  increase.     The  lack  of  mitigating  treatment  is  especially  concerning  as  the  high  lead  levels  will  likely   not  be  reflected  in  the  City  of  Flint's  compliance  samples  due  to  the  sampling  procedures   used  by  the  City  of  Flint  for  collecting  compliance  samples.”69     However,  with  the  exception  of  the  strident  e-­‐mails  and  interim  report  by  Del  Toral,70  EPA   refrained  from  elevating  concerns  or  taking  action.  EPA  did  not  insist  on  implementation  of  CCT   between  the  end  of  April  2015,  when  it  learned  CCT  was  not  in  place,  and  July  21,  2015,  when  the   second  round  of  LCR  monitoring  results  ended  MDEQ’s  misinformed  interpretaton  of  the  LCR.   Only  after  broad  public  revelation  of  the  magnitude  of  the  crisis  and  of  MDEQ’s  multiple   failures—and,  not  coincidentally,  the  opportunity  to  garner  positive  recognition—did  EPA   exercise  its  authority  under  the  SDWA  and  issue  its  Emergency  Order  on  January  21,  2016.   EPA  did  not  cause  the  problem  in  Flint,  and  it  was  EPA  employees  (in  particular  Del  Toral)  who   asserted  the  need  for  Flint  to  have  CCT  in  place.  Unfortunately,  EPA  was  not  insistent  or  forceful   enough  to  prompt  MDEQ  to  require  Flint  to  add  CCT  for  almost  3  months  after  EPA  was  aware  of   its  absence.  This  needlessly  extended  the  time  during  which  Flint  residents  were  exposed  to   corrosive  drinking  water  with  potentially  high  levels  of  lead.     Finally,  EPA  entertained  and  acquiesced  to  MDEQ’s  request  for  a  legal  opinion  regarding  the  long-­‐ standing  and  well-­‐understood  requirement  for  corrosion  control,  ultimately  issuing  a  clarification   memo  on  LCR  compliance  requirements  that  suggested  ambiguities.                                                                                                                     68 th  For  a  discussion  of  the  arithmetic  related  to  calculation  of  the  90  percentile,  see  the  YouTube  video:  ”How  to   calculate  Flint's  90th  percentile  lead  level  with  EMU  math  professor  Chris  Gardiner,”   www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pql00zr700&feature=em-­‐share_video_user.   69  “Interim  Report:  High  Lead  Levels  in  Flint,  Michigan,”  by  Miguel  del  Toral,  transmitted  to  Thomas  Poy,  Chief,   Ground  Water  and  Drinking  Water  Branch,  on  June  24,  2015;  p.  2.     70  See,  for  example,  Miguel  Del  Toral’s  e-­‐mail  to  Jennifer  Crooks  MDEQ  dated  April  25,  2015.         51   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Findings   F-­‐32. EPA  failed  to  properly  exercise  its  authority  prior  to  January  2016.  The  agency’s  conduct   casts  doubt  on  its  willingness  to  aggressively  pursue  enforcement  (in  the  absence  of   widespread  public  outrage).  EPA  could  have  exercised  its  powers  under  Section  1414  and   Section  1431  of  the  SDWA  or  under  the  LCR,  40  CFR  141.82(i).   F-­‐33. Despite  the  clear  intent  of  the  LCR,  EPA  has  accepted  differing  compliance  strategies  that   have  served  to  mute  its  effectiveness  in  detection  and  mitigation  of  lead  contamination   risks.  These  strategies  have  been  adopted  at  water  systems  and  primacy  agencies  across   the  country.  Though  there  may  be  some  ambiguity  in  LCR  rule,  none  of  it  relates  to  what   MDEQ  should  have  done  in  Flint.  There  was  and  remains  no  justification  for  MDEQ  not   requiring  corrosion  control  treatment  for  the  switch  of  water  source  to  the  Flint  River.   F-­‐34. EPA  was  hesitant  and  slow  to  insist  on  proper  corrosion  control  measures  in  Flint.  MDEQ   misinformation  notwithstanding,  EPA’s  deference  to  MDEQ,  the  state  primacy  agency,   delayed  appropriate  intervention  and  remedial  measures.   F-­‐35. EPA  tolerated  MDEQ’s  intransigence  and  issued,  on  November  3,  2015,  a  clarification   memo  on  the  LCR  when  no  such  clarification  was  needed.   Recommendations   R-­‐29. Exercise  more  vigor,  and  act  more  promptly,  in  addressing  compliance  violations  that   endanger  public  health.     R-­‐30. In  collaboration  with  the  NDWAC  and  other  interested  partners,  clarify  and  strengthen   the  LCR  through  increased  specificity  and  constraints,  particularly  requirements  related  to   LCR  sampling  pools,  sample  draw  protocols,  and  LSL  replacements—and,  more  generally,   strengthen  enforcement  protocols  with  agencies  delegated  primacy.71     The  LCR  should  be  modified  to  address  a  host  of  issues  that  have  been  the  subject  of   ongoing  debate  and  were  tragically  exemplified  by  the  Flint  water  crisis.  In  particular,  the   LCR  should  be  revised  to:   o Unambiguously  require  optimized  corrosion  control  treatment  as  a  default  practice  for   all  large  public  works  systems,  and  consider  extending  this  requirement  to  small  and   medium-­‐sized  public  water  systems.72  EPA  should  remove  any  loopholes  or  flexible   provisions  that  could  be  misinterpreted  as  allowing  utilities  to  defer  or  avoid  corrosion   control,  as  was  done  in  Flint.  Optimized  corrosion  control  will  continue  to  be   important  in  the  long  term,  even  after  LSLs  are  replaced,  due  to  other  sources  of  lead   in  the  distribution  system  such  as  lead  solder  and  brass  fixtures.                                                                                                               71  For  a  further  discussion  of  opportunities  to  strengthen  the  LCR,  see  Dr.  Yanna  Lambrinidou’s  dissenting  opinion  on   long-­‐term  revisions  for  the  LCR,  submitted  to  the  EPA  National  Drinking  Water  Advisory  Council  in  October  2015   (“EPA  NDWAC  LCR  WG,  Dissenting  Opinion,  Oct.  2015”),  www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-­‐ 11/documents/ndwaclcrstatementofdissent.pdf.   72  The  current  LCR  language  requires  corrosion  control  for  small  and  medium-­‐sized  systems  only  if  water  testing   indicates  action  level  exceedances,  and  it  allows  cessation  of  treatment  if  subsequent  testing  is  below  action  levels.   EPA  should  define  procedures  for  small  and  medium-­‐sized  systems  to  safeguard  public  health  and  water  quality   through  evaluation  of  corrosion  control  treatment  requirements.         52   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   o Reiterate  (and  clarify)  lead-­‐in-­‐water  tap  monitoring  and  sampling  protocols  to  ensure   that  lead  sampling  will  capture  the  worst-­‐case  lead  levels  in  the  highest  risk  homes,  as   the  LCR  intends.   o Clarify  requirements  for  full  LSL  replacement,  avoiding  or  eliminating  language  that   allows  utilities  to  count  a  LSL  as  “replaced”  if  water  from  a  service  line  tests  under  the   lead  action  limit  in  a  one-­‐time  sample.   o Ban  partial  LSL  replacements,  which  have  been  found  by  the  CDC  to  increase  risks  of   elevated  blood  lead  levels.   In  addition,  the  15  ppb  lead  action  level  in  the  LCR  should  be  revisited  given  that  It  is   widely  acknowledged  that  no  lead  is  safe,  and  that  the  CDC  recently  lowered  its  10   micrograms/deciliter  “blood  lead  level  of  concern”  to  a  5  micrograms/deciliter  “reference   level.”     Also,  the  LCR  should  call  for  frequent  and  accessible  public  outreach  and  education  on   lead-­‐in-­‐water  risks,  including  instructions  on  steps  consumers  can  take  to  protect   themselves.  The  LCR  should  require  utilities  to  provide  customers  with  explicit  and  urgent   public  notification  of  lead  risks  associated  with  activities  that  may  cause  physical   disturbance  of  LSLs;  inform  customers  when  a  LSL  is  present  at  their  home;  and  provide   customers  clear  information  on  how  to  request  testing  of  lead-­‐in-­‐water  levels  in  their   homes.   Perhaps  most  fundamentally,  the  LCR  should  mandate  proactive,  full  replacement  of   LSLs73  in  a  manner  that  appropriately  balances  risks  and  financial  impacts.  The  LCR  should   require  LSL  replacements  to  be  explicitly  incorporated  into  water  utilities’  renewal  and   replacement  programs  with  required  (and  monitored)  timelines  that  preclude  undue   (multi-­‐decade)  delays  in  replacements.   R-­‐31. Engage  Michigan  representatives  in  ongoing  LCR  revisions  and  development  of   enforcement  protocols  at  EPA  and  MDEQ.   EPA  is  conducting  a  process  to  define  revisions  to  the  LCR,  which  provides  an  opportunity   to  clarify  ambiguities  in  requirements  and  to  strengthen  measures  to  protect  public  health   and  safety.  State  and  local  representatives,  chastened  by  Flint’s  experience,  should   participate  in  this  revision  process  and  ensure  lessons  learned  are  clearly  and  effectively   communicated  to  decision-­‐makers,  including  the  National  Drinking  Water  Advisory   Council  and  EPA.   Issues Presented by the Flint Water Crisis While  our  review  has  enabled  us  to  draw  a  number  of  findings  and  conclusions  about  respective   roles,  it  also  occasions  us  to  speak  to  issues  and  consequences  that  transcend  the  accountabilities   assigned  to  individual  agencies  or  entities.    These  issues  convey  many  of  the  lessons  learned  from                                                                                                               73  This  recommendation  is  consistent  with  recommendations  of  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  Working  Group:  Report  of   the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  Working  Group  To  the  National  Drinking  Water  Advisory  Council,  August  24,  2015.   https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-­‐01/documents/ndwaclcrwgfinalreportaug2015.pdf         53   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   the  Flint  water  crisis,  evoke  collective  empathy  for  the  Flint  community,  and  speak  to  the   opportunties  for  the  crisis  to  improve  the  conduct  and  performance  of  government.   The Reality of Environmental Injustice Discussion   Environmental  justice  embraces  two  fundamental  principles:  (1)  the  fair,  non-­‐discriminatory   treatment  of  all  people;  and  (2)  the  provision  for  meaningful  public  involvement  of  all  people—   regardless  of  race,  color,  national  origin  or  income—in  government  decision-­‐making  regarding   environmental  laws,  regulations  and  polices.74  Environmental  justice  or  injustice,  therefore,  is  not   about  intent.  Rather,  it  is  about  process  and  results—fair  treatment,  equal  protection,  and   meaningful  participation  in  neutral  forums  that  honor  human  dignity.     Environmental  injustice  is  not  about  malevolent  intent  or  deliberate  attacks  on  specific   populations,  nor  does  it  come  in  measures  that  overtly  violate  civil  rights.  Environmental   injustices  as  often  occur  when  parties  charged  with  the  responsibility  to  protect  public  health  fail   to  do  so  in  the  context  of  environmental  considerations.   The  facts  of  the  Flint  water  crisis  lead  us  to  the  inescapable  conclusion  that  this  is  a  case  of   environmental  injustice.  Flint  residents,  who  are  majority  Black  or  African  American  and  among   the  most  impoverished  of  any  metropolitan  area  in  the  United  States,  did  not  enjoy  the  same   degree  of  protection  from  environmental  and  health  hazards  as  that  provided  to  other   communities.  Moreover,  by  virtue  of  their  being  subject  to  emergency  management,  Flint   residents  were  not  provided  equal  access  to,  and  meaningful  involvement  in,  the  government   decision-­‐making  process.   The  occurrence  of  environmental  injustice  in  the  Flint  water  crisis  does  not  indict  or  diminish   other  public  and  private  efforts  to  address  Flint’s  many  challenging  circumstances.  However,   irrespective  of  the  intent  of  the  parties  involved,  the  simple  reality  is  that  the  Flint  water  crisis  is  a   case  of  environmental  injustice.75                                                                                                                   74  From  the  Environmental  Justice  Plan  for  the  State  of  Michigan  and  Department  of  Natural  Resources  and   Environment,  December  17,  2010:       “The  term  "environmental  justice"  is  defined  in  Executive  Directive  No.  2007-­‐23  as  follows:   Environmental  justice  means  the  fair,  non-­‐discriminatory  treatment  and  meaningful  involvement  of   Michigan  residents  regarding  the  development,  implementation,  and  enforcement  of  environmental   laws,  regulations,  and  policies  by  this  state.  The  two  "pillars"  of  environmental  justice,  thus,  are  the   fair  treatment  of  all  people  and  providing  for  meaningful  public  involvement  in  government  decision-­‐ making.”   From  the  U.S.  EPA  (www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice):    “Environmental  Justice  is  the  fair  treatment  and  meaningful  involvement  of  all  people  regardless  of   race,  color,  national  origin,  or  income  with  respect  to  the  development,  implementation,  and   enforcement  of  environmental  laws,  regulations,  and  policies.  EPA  has  this  goal  for  all  communities   and  persons  across  this  Nation.  It  will  be  achieved  when  everyone  enjoys  the  same  degree  of   protection  from  environmental  and  health  hazards  and  equal  access  to  the  decision-­‐making  process   to  have  a  healthy  environment  in  which  to  live,  learn,  and  work.”   75  There  is  ample  evidence  that  the  lead  poisoning  crisis  is  one  in  a  series  environmental  injustices  visited  on  the   citizens  of  Flint.  See,  for  example,  “The  Racist  Roots  of  Flint’s  Water  Crisis,”  by  Julia  Craven  and  Tyler  Tynes,         54   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Findings   F-­‐36. The  Flint  water  crisis  is  a  clear  case  of  environmental  injustice.       Recommendations   R-­‐32. Issue  an  Executive  Order  mandating  guidance  and  training  on  Environmental  Justice   across  all  state  agencies  in  Michigan,  highlighting  the  Flint  water  crisis  as  an  example  of   environmental  injustice.  The  state  should  reinvigorate  and  update  implementation  of  an   Environmental  Justice  Plan  for  the  State  of  Michigan.     Perspectives from Flint The  FWATF  believes  that  by  characterizing  some  of  the  prevailing  perspectives  of  Flint  residents,   its  members  can  provide  valuable  context  for  effectively  implementing  the  recommendations   herein.   From  the  viewpoint  of  medical  services  providers  charged  with  responsibility  to  mitigate  heath   consequences,  there  is  both  depression  and  anxiety  associated  with  understanding  what  is   occurring  in  Flint.  The  Flint  water  crisis  is  a  chronic  toxic  exposure  of  an  entire  population  in  a   sharply  demarcated  geographic  area.  Several  key  aspects  point  to  the  long-­‐term  health  and  social   consequences:   a. The  manifestations  of  this  toxic  exposure  depend  on  where  along  the  life  course  a  person   may  be.  At  different  ages,  critical  structures  and  functions  are  injured  or  altered  to   different  degrees.  These  changes  may  not  manifest  in  functional  derangements  for   months  or  years  after  exposure.  The  science  of  epigenetics  addresses  the  interaction   between  genes  and  the  environment,  suggesting  that  some  of  these  changes  can  be   passed  on  from  one  generation  to  the  next.     b. Blood  lead  levels  do  not  indicate  peak  lead  exposures  beyond  a  30-­‐  to  35-­‐day  window.   The  damage  from  lead  toxicity  may  be  done  months  before  the  first  blood  lead  level  is   taken  or  after  the  last  is  drawn,  especially  for  newborns  and  children  younger  than  6  years   of  age.  This  suggests  that  the  findings  related  to  elevated  lead  levels  measured  in  Flint   children  are  merely  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  of  actual  exposure  across  children  living  in  Flint.   c. Documented  risks  of  learning,  behavioral,  and  cognitive  problems  are  present  for  all   potentially  exposed  children  in  Flint.  Aggressive  and  impulsive  behaviors  that  can  emerge   in  adolescence  related  to  lead  exposure  put  children  in  the  crosshairs  of  the  criminal   justice  system,  unemployment  and  underachievement.     d. The  risk  of  kidney  problems,  hypertension,  gout  and  stillbirths  may  affect  exposed  adults   in  Flint  over  the  coming  years  and  decades.     For  those  serving  in  Flint’s  already  distressed  schools  and  mental  health  agencies,  new  and   unprecedented  challenges  derive  from  balancing  the  need  to  track  children  and  adults  in  a  toxic   exposure  registry  for  preventative  and  supportive  services,  while  being  mindful  of  the  stigma  of   low  expectations  for  those  listed  in  the  registry.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Huffington  Post,  February  3,  2016,  www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/racist-­‐roots-­‐of-­‐flints-­‐water-­‐ crisis_us_56b12953e4b04f9b57d7b118.         55   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   For  well-­‐intentioned  parents,  there  is  a  need  for  significant  sensitivity  and  expertise  as  they   struggle  to  address  and  understand  the  guilt  and  depression  that  derive  from  unknowingly   exposing  their  children,  based  on  the  hollow  reassurances  of  those  appointed  and  elected  at  city   and  state  levels  that  the  water  was  safe.     For  non-­‐English-­‐speaking  Flint  residents,  equally  subject  to  the  toxic  effects  of  lead  and  related   psychological  trauma,  communications  and  instructions  regarding  water  use  were  not  available,   especially  for  those  not  literate  in  their  native  language.  The  sight  of  uniformed  state  troopers   and  National  Guardsmen  entering  neighborhoods  in  convoys  with  flashing  lights  frightened  many   who  did  not  open  their  doors  to  accept  filter  or  water  distributions.  Initial  requirements  for   identification  scared  many  families  away  from  distribution  sites.  There  has  been  no  provision  for   necessary  medical  and  behavioral  services  for  undocumented  residents,  regardless  of  age.  There   is  fear  that  those  presenting  for  extensive  medical  services  will  be  deported,  potentially  dividing   families.  While  there  are  several  organizations  that  provide  services  regardless  of  status,  it  is   essential  that  trusted  members  of  the  community  can  vouch  for  those  organizations  and  help   with  appropriate  documents  which  are  unfamiliar  to  local  service  providers.   Among  African  American  seniors,  the  protracted  Flint  water  crisis  echoes  the  tragic  Tuskegee   syphilis  study  and  the  decision  not  to  treat  smallpox  among  freedmen  in  the  aftermath  of  the   American  Civil  War.  From  this  perspective,  it  is  noted  that  measuring  blood  lead  levels  without   removing  the  sources  of  lead  from  the  environment—in  this  case,  lead-­‐tainted  water—appears   the  equivalent  of  using  Flint’s  children  (and  adults)  as  human  bioassays.       From  the  perspective  of  Flint  community  leaders,  these  consequences  are  traumatic  and   contribute  to  a  dynamic  that  requires  care  and  interventions  as  for  any  survivors  of  a  traumatic   event.  These  interventions  must  occur  for  individuals,  neighborhoods  and  the  community.   Leaders  must  work  to  counter  the  doubtful  views  of  many  residents  that  public  health  and   political  systems  do  not  have  the  will  to  sustain  primary  prevention  but,  rather,  are  willing  to   consign  some  people  by  virtue  of  their  home  address  to  the  long-­‐lasting  neurodevelopmental  and   health  impacts  of  lead  exposure.  Flint  will  have  to  engage  in  self-­‐care  and  healing  as  it  dissects   the  implications  of  what  has  occurred  and  is  reminded  of  how  much  further  we  must  go  to   become  a  just  society.   Flint Recovery / Remediation In  light  of  the  damage  done,  and  the  long-­‐term  health,  economic,  and  social  consequences  for   the  Flint  population,  the  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  endorses  the  visions  of  responsive   model  public  health  and  infrastructure  renewal  programs  outlined  by  Dr.  Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha,   Professor  Marc  Edwards  and  Miguel  Del  Toral.  Flint’s  population,  exposed  to  toxic  levels  of  lead,   must  be  provided  mitigating  health  services,  public  health  infrastructure  and  skilled  personnel.   Flint’s  water  system,  damaged  by  corrosive  water,  must  be  renewed  and  rehabilitated  with  high-­‐ risk  LSL  replacements  prioritized.  The  State  of  Michigan  must  bear  the  primary  responsibility  for   funding  and  securing  federal  funding  for  mitigation  efforts  in  light  of  the  responsibilities  of  state   agencies,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  state-­‐appointed  emergency  managers  governed  Flint  as  key   decisions  were  made  that  led  to  the  water  crisis.     As  our  initial  letter  to  Governor  Snyder  called  for  a  coordinated  response  to  the  Flint  water  crisis,   we  are  gratified  to  see  the  efforts,  now  coordinated  through  emergency  management  personnel,   to  the  immediate  problems  imposed  by  uncertainty  regarding  the  safety  of  Flint’s  tap  water.           56   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   Recommendations   Our  final  recommendations  look  beyond  the  most  immediate  challenges  of  the  unsustainable  and   expensive  bottled  water  and  filter  distribution  program  that  was  needed,  but  clearly  must  serve   as  an  interim  emergency  response.  We  offer  the  following  mid-­‐term  and  long-­‐term  Flint-­‐specific   recommendations:         R-­‐33. Sustainably  fund  the  Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Committee  (FWICC)  to   provide  adequate  resources  to  engage  supporting  sub-­‐committees  for  delivery  of  public   health  and  water  system  services.     The  FWICC  has  been  charged  with  developing  an  incident  action  plan;  reviewing  our   recommendations;  establishing  routine  protocols  for  communications  at  the  local,   executive  and  legislative  levels;  making  recommendations  regarding  the  health  impacts  of   the  affected  population;  and  assessing  the  status  of  infrastructure  and  determining   feasible  actions  for  upgrading  Flint’s  water  system.76  The  FWICC  also  should  ensure   transparent,  public  reporting  of  the  status  of  various  Flint-­‐related  measures,  including  the   sources  and  uses  of  local,  state  and  federal  funds.  Charitable  organizations  should  be   asked  to  provide  accounting  of  their  Flint-­‐related  activities  to  facilitate  comprehensive   reporting  and  information  dissemination  on  available  services.   R-­‐34. Clarify  and  effectively  communicate  the  roles  and  work  of  the  City  of  Flint,  Flint  Water   Inter-­‐Agency  Coordinating  Council  and  Mission  Flint.   While  many  of  the  current  efforts  and  investigations  are  critically  important  to  safeguard   Flint  residents,  address  immediate  challenges,  and  further  establish  accountability,  the   FWICC  and  Mission  Flint  are  now  in  place  to  work  with  the  City  of  Flint  in  coordinating   sustained  service  delivery  and  remediation  measures.  These  entities,  and  accompanying   committees  and  work  teams,  have  complementary  roles  and  responsibilities  that  should   be  clearly  delineated  and  communicated  to  all  Flint  residents.  Communication  must   include  efforts  to  reach  Flint  residents  for  whom  English  is  not  the  primary  language,  and   residents  whose  literacy  in  any  language  is  limited.  The  status  of  the  projects  and   programs  that  these  entities  are  shepherding  should  be  clearly  communicated  and   measured  against  aspirational  goals  and  objectives.   R-­‐35. Through  collaboration  among  MDHHS,  GCHD,  local  healthcare  professionals,  and  health   insurance  plans,  ensure  100  percent  clinical  and  environmental  follow-­‐up  with  Flint   families  whose  children  have  been  found  to  have  elevated  blood  lead  levels  since  April   2014,  and  work  together  to  ensure  that  such  follow-­‐up  occurs  in  children’s  medical   homes.       For  the  majority  of  >200  children  residing  in  Flint  and  known  to  have  elevated  blood  lead   levels  (≥5  micrograms  per  deciliter)  from  April  2014  to  present,  appropriate  clinical  and   public  health  follow-­‐up  has  not  been  timely.  Such  limitations  in  follow-­‐up  reflect  a  lack  of   coordination  among  state  and  county  public  health  authorities,  health  insurance  plans,   local  healthcare  professionals,  and  parents.  These  children,  and  others  who  have  elevated                                                                                                               76  Drawn  from  January  11,  2016  Press  Release:  “Gov.  Rick  Snyder:  Flint  Water  Interagency  Coordinating  Committee   will  support  long-­‐term  needs  in  Flint.”         57   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   blood  levels  on  testing  after  this  report  is  issued,  will  need  long-­‐term  monitoring  and   access  to  a  support  services  that  include  focused  public  health,  nutrition  and  educational   services.   R-­‐36. Offer  all  children  listed  in  the  recommended  Flint  Toxic  Exposure  Registry  timely  access  to   age-­‐appropriate  screening  and  clinically  indicated  follow-­‐up  for  developmental  and   behavioral  concerns  by  licensed  healthcare  professionals,  as  well  as  access  to  early   childhood  education  and  nutrition  services.     Importantly,  all  children  in  the  recommended  Flint  Toxic  Exposure  Registry  are  at  risk  for   toxic  lead  exposure,  even  if  they  were  not  screened  for  blood  lead  levels  during  the  time   period  of  April  2014  to  present.  Therefore,  all  children  listed  should  have  access  to  the   same  screening  and  appropriate  follow-­‐up  services  as  children  who  were  found  to  have   elevated  blood  lead  levels.     R-­‐37. Consider  establishing  a  dedicated  subsidiary  fund  in  the  Michigan  Health  Endowment   Fund  to  facilitate  funding  of  health-­‐related  services  for  Flint.   The  Michigan  Health  Endowment  Fund  (MHEF)  statute  created  eight  areas  of  focus  for  the   fund,  including  several  that  are  pertinent  to  the  Flint  water  crisis.  The  MHEF  focuses  on   access  to  healthy  food  (known  to  offset  children’s  absorption  of  environmental  lead),   wellness  programs  (such  as  those  known  to  encourage  primary  and  secondary   prevention),  access  to  mental  health  services  (such  as  behavioral  therapy  for  children   adversely  affected  by  lead  exposure),  and  foodborne  illness  prevention  (such  as  averting   exposure  to  lead  in  food  prepared  with  lead-­‐contaminated  drinking  water).  Given  the   substantial  overlap  between  the  focus  areas  of  the  fund  and  the  areas  of  short-­‐  and  long-­‐ term  activity  for  the  people  of  Flint,  it  is  appropriate  to  establish  a  subsidiary  fund  that   would  be  administered  to  facilitate  funding  of  health-­‐related  services  for  children  and   adults  in  the  Flint  Toxic  Exposure  Registry.  Because  Michigan  has  been  successful  in   securing  federal  funds  to  expand  Medicaid  coverage  for  persons  under  age  21  years  in   Flint,  the  subsidiary  MHEF  Fund  would  be  designed  to  focus  on  facilitating  and  supporting   services  not  explicitly  covered  by  Medicaid.  The  Fund  should  also  provide  funding  to   support  timely  and  transparent  evaluation  of  the  health  impact  of  these  supplementary   services  for  the  people  of  Flint.   R-­‐38. Establish  a  comprehensive  Flint  public  health  program,  coordinated  with  county  and   state-­‐level  public  health  initiatives,  that  can  serve  as  a  model  for  population  health  across   the  state.  This  program  should  provide  assessment,  interventions,  and  support  not  only   regarding  the  health  effects  of  water  contamination  but  also  more  broadly  regarding  the   health  effects  of  chronic  economic  hardship  and  other  social  determinants  of  poor  health.   State-Wide Initiatives Beyond  remediation  of  the  impacts  inflicted  upon  Flint,  outstanding  issues  and  lessons  learned   from  the  Flint  water  crisis  provide  an  opportunity  to  improve  public  water  supplies  and   coordination  of  institutions  charged  with  safeguarding  public  health.       Recommendations   Our  recommendations  include:         58   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   R-­‐39. Conduct  an  investigative  review  of  the  development  and  approval  of  the  Karegnondi   Water  Authority  and  of  the  City  of  Flint’s  commitments  to  KWA  water  purchases.     The  development  of  the  KWA  and  the  decision  by  the  City  of  Flint  to  join  it  is  complicated   by  an  array  of  factors  related  to  regional  water  system  capacities,  utility  capital  project   contracting  and  financing,  and  local  control  over  the  implementation  of  facilities  to   promote  economic  development.  As  noted,  issues  related  to  state  approval  and   permitting  of  the  KWA  are  beyond  the  scope  of  our  review.77  However,  the  specific   attributes  of  the  decisions  related  to  KWA  warrant  investigative  review.  We  note:   o State  and  local  officials  repeatedly  characterized  Genesee  County  and  Flint  leadership,   including  Flint’s  emergency  managers,  as  adamant  in  their  promotion  of  KWA  and   desire  for  independence  from  DWSD.   o Several  firms,  each  with  ties  to  the  respective  and  effectively  competing  parties,   issued  conflicting  studies  as  to  the  merit  of  KWA.  Independent  review  was  requested   of  MDEQ,  an  agency  ill-­‐equipped  to  render  judgments  regarding  economic  feasibility.   o Contracting  related  to  Flint’s  water  purchase  commitments  and  to  use  of  the  Flint   WTP  on  an  interim  basis  were  effected  through  action  of  Flint’s  emergency  managers.   An  entity  with  proper  tools  and  resources,  such  as  the  Michigan  Attorney  General  or  the   U.S.  Attorney’s  office,  should  do  a  complete  and  thorough  review  of  the  development  and   approval  of  KWA  and  of  the  City  of  Flint’s  commitments  to  KWA  water  purchases.   R-­‐40. Institute  a  school  and  daycare  water  quality  testing  program  (which  could  serve  as  a   model  for  the  U.S.),  administered  collaboratively  by  MDEQ  and  MDHHS,  that  includes   appropriate  sampling  and  testing  for  lead  contamination  for  all  schools  and  childcare   centers  in  the  state  and  effective  reporting  of  test  results.   Drinking  water  and  water  available  for  food  preparation  in  schools  and  may  be  sources  of   lead  and  other  hazards  for  school  children.  Currently,  federal  and  state  regulations  do  not   require  city,  county  or  state  authorities  to  routinely  test  water  in  school  buildings.     Furthermore,  there  is  no  state  law,  guidance  or  regulation  regarding  testing  of  drinking   water  in  various  childcare  and  pre-­‐school  settings  (children  below  kindergarten-­‐age).     Michigan  should  institute  a  school  and  day  care  water  quality  testing  program,   administered  collaboratively  by  MDEQ  and  MDHHS,  that  includes  appropriate  sampling   and  testing  for  lead  contamination  in  all  schools  and  childcare  centers  in  the  state.   Findings  from  such  testing  should  be  made  available  to  all  parents  of  children  enrolled  in   the  facilities  where  testing  is  performed.  If  lead  is  discovered  through  this  testing,   immediate  remediation  of  the  situation  (for  example,  replacement  of  LSLs  and  lead-­‐ containing  fixtures)  must  be  required.       School  testing  requirements  also  should  be  applied  to  licensed  day  care  settings  across   the  state,  given  that  young  children  are  at  the  highest  risk  of  profound  health  effects  from   lead  exposure.                                                                                                               77  These  issues  may  (and  perhaps  should)  prompt  general  inquiry  into  how  utility  regulation  may  better  promote   regional  optimization  of  infrastructure  investments.         59   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   A  “Safe  Water  in  Schools  for  Health  (SWISH)  program”78  would  include  regular  testing   (and  re-­‐testing)  of  tap  water  at  school  and  licensed  day-­‐care  facility  faucets  and  water   fountains  for  regulated  contaminants  and  for  bacteria  growth  (like  Legionella)  known  to   be  contained  in  plumbing  systems.  For  schools  found  to  have  unsafe  water,  the  program   would  provide  funding  and  implementation  support  for  either  lead  pipe  replacements  or   installation  of  filters  capable  of  treating  the  water  to  federal  standards.  The  program   could  establish  goals  to  install  high-­‐quality  water  fountains  that  facilitate  effective  water   quality  monitoring  (as  well  as  student  use  with  refillable  bottles).  For  some  schools,  this   program  could  include  the  participation  of  science  programs  and  students,  working  with   independent  testing  laboratories.  In  any  event,  all  water  quality  testing  results  should  be   posted  both  at  the  facilities  and  online,  and  communicated  to  parents.   R-­‐41. Develop  a  model  LSL  replacement  program  and  funding  mechanisms  for  financing  work   on  private  property.   Notwithstanding  the  water  industry’s  historical  reluctance  to  advocate  for  full  LSL   replacements,  the  state  should  develop  a  funding  mechanism  and  program  to  evaluate   and  replace  LSLs  statewide,  recognizing  that  some  communities  already  have  replaced   their  LSLs.79  The  state  should  develop  a  model  statewide  LSL  replacement  program  that   could  serve  as  a  national  model,  in  collaboration  with  EPA,  with  the  following  attributes:   • • • • • • Requirement  for  developing  censuses  of  LSLs  in  utility  service  areas  that  are  accessible   on  utility  systems’  computerized  Geographical  Information  Systems  (GIS)  and  asset   management  systems.  Censuses  should  be  comprehensive,  covering  full  lengths  of   service  lines  and  ownership  status,  and  be  made  publicly  available  to  facilitate   satisfaction  of  customer  queries.   Evaluation  of  lead  line  conditions  and  associated  risks  (placing  high  priority  on   replacements  of  lines  to  high-­‐risk  properties  (for  example,  schools,  childcare  centers,   hospitals,  older  neighborhoods  and  residences  of  vulnerable  populations).     Programming  of  full  LSL  replacements  in  federal-­‐  and  state-­‐sponsored  public  housing.   Provision  of  health  risk  information  to  customers  with  LSLs  when  homeowners  are   presented  with  the  option  to  pay  for  the  private  part  of  their  LSL  replacement.   Explicit  incorporation  of  LSL  risk  considerations  in  utility  renewal  and  replacement   programs  to  enable  orderly,  yet  expeditious,  full  LSL  replacement  (including   replacement  of  LSLs  on  private  property).   Establishment  or  enhancement  of  funding  mechanisms  to  facilitate  full  LSL   replacements  by:   o Reviewing  strategies  used  by  other  communities  and  approaches  to  addressing   funding  of  improvements  on  private  property;                                                                                                               78  These  recommendations  are  drawn  from  (and  reflect  our  substantive  concurrence  with)  recommendations  offered   by  Peter  Gleick,  president  of  the  Pacific  Institute,  and  Professor  Marc  Edwards,  Virginia  Tech.  See  “One  step  to  help   restore  trust  in  Flint,”  Detroit  Free  Press,  March  6,  2016.   79  Information  on  industry  experience  and  perspectives  is  provided  in  “Strategies  to  Obtain  Customer  Acceptance  of   Complete  Lead  Service  Line  Replacement,”  American  Water  Works  Association,  2005.         60   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   o Facilitating  public  water  systems’  access  to  LSL  replacement  funding,  including   through  provisions  in  drinking  water  state  revolving  loan  fund  program   administration;   o Facilitation  of  public  water  system  customer  funding  for  replacement  of  LSLs  and   lead-­‐containing  fixtures  on  private  property;     o Review  of  LCR-­‐established  authority  to  require  full  service  line  replacements;  and       o Mitigation  of  low-­‐income  water  affordability  challenges  through  financial   assistance  and  innovative  financing  mechanisms.   The  program  should  provide  for  MDEQ  to  require  annual  reporting  and  tracking  of  the   census  of  LSLs  as  part  of  regular  reporting  requirements.  MDEQ  should  compile,  analyze   and  publicly  report  on  the  submitted  data,  enabling  state  legislature  and  the  general   public  to  readily  access  information  on  progress  of  LSL  replacements  throughout  the  state   while  protecting  personal  information.   R-­‐42. Revise  and  enhance  information  distributed  by  public  water  systems  on  the  implications   of  widespread  use  of  lead  in  public  and  private  plumbing.   Independently,  or  in  conjunction  with  the  model  LSL  replacement  program  recommended   above,  the  state  should  improve  dissemination  of  accurate  information  on  the  dangers   presented  by  lead  in  water  systems  and  plumbing.  Readily  accessible  information  should   be  broadly  provided  about  potential  sources  of  high  levels  of  lead  in  water,  including,  for   example,  the  potential  for  the  release  of  lead  particulates  from  piping  disturbed  by   construction  activities,  as  well  as  lead  solder,  galvanized  plumbing,  and  brass  fixtures.     Consider  and  model  successful  public  engagement  (and,  more  generally,  LSL  replacement)   programs  used  in  countries  such  as  the  Netherlands  that  have  more  successfully  managed   lead  risks.80   R-­‐43. Use  the  occasion  of  the  Flint  water  crisis  to  prompt  local  and  state  re-­‐investment  in   critical  water  infrastructure,  while  providing  mechanisms  to  advance  affordability  and   universal  access  to  water  services.   Nationally,  water  system  infrastructure  renewal  and  rehabilitation  requirements  are   expected  to  exceed  $1  trillion  over  the  next  generation.81  Michigan  is  no  exception  in   facing  a  significant  infrastructure  funding  gap,  even  without  prospective  funding  of  full  LSL   replacements.  State  and  local  decision-­‐makers,  water  utility  representatives,  and   community  groups  should  partner  to  garner  support  for  water  system  re-­‐investment   (through  local  service  rates  and  state  funding  mechanisms),  while  balancing  potential                                                                                                               80  Refer  to  “Water  production  and  distribution  in  the  Netherlands,”  Andr.  Struker,  Waternet,  Jan  Vreeburg,  KWR,  Jan   Peter  van  der  Hoek,  Delft  University,  Waternet,  February  2016  –  presentation  to  Flint  Water  Inter-­‐Agency   Coordinating  Committee.   81  See,  for  example:   • “Report  Card  for  America’s  Infrastructure,”  American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers  (ASCE),  2013,   www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/grade-­‐sheet/americas-­‐infrastructure-­‐investment-­‐needs       • Buried  No  Longer:  Confronting  America’s  Water  Infrastructure  Challenge,  AWWA,  2012,   www.awwa.org/Portals/0/files/legreg/documents/BuriedNoLonger.pdf       • Drinking  Water  Infrastructure  Needs  Survey  and  Assessment,  Fifth  Report  to  Congress,  U.S.  EPA,  2011,     www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-­‐07/documents/epa816r13006.pdf           61   FLINT  WATER  ADVISORY  TASK  FORCE—FINAL  REPORT   MARCH  2016   impacts  on  low-­‐income  populations.  Stakeholders  should  work  to  define  new  and   innovative  water  service  pricing  and  funding  approaches82  to  advance  water  affordability   and  universal  access  to  service.   R-­‐44. Prioritize  health  matters  across  all  state  agencies  with  establishment  of  a  new  Cabinet-­‐ level  post  focused  on  public  health.   The  Flint  water  crisis  illustrates  that  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  failed  to  coordinate  and   collaborate  in  responding  to  multiple  health-­‐related  concerns  raised  by  members  of  the   Flint  community  and  by  public  health  partners  such  as  GCHD.  Governor  Snyder  indicated   that  there  is  no  liaison  function  at  the  Cabinet  level  in  Michigan  state  government  to   connect  inter-­‐agency  actions  regarding  health  matters.  Although  the  FWICC  is  designed  to   function  in  an  inter-­‐agency  manner,  its  purpose  is  Flint-­‐centric.  There  is  a  strong  argument   that  such  inter-­‐agency  functionality  for  health  should  be  instituted  at  the  state  level,  to   help  safeguard  the  health  of  all  Michigan  residents.     The  sheer  size  of  the  current  MDHHS  potentially  dilutes  the  role  of  the  state  in  important   public  health  matters.  The  Task  Force  recommends  that  a  physician  or  nurse  with  public   health  and/or  health  policy  credentials  serve  on  the  Governor's  Cabinet,  and  be   supported  by  a  staff  and  budget  appropriate  for  the  activities  of  this  role.  This  person   would  serve  an  overall  supervisory  and  inter-­‐agency  liaison  role  for  all  activities  that  have   a  bearing  on  health  for  Michiganders.  Given  the  suboptimal  health  status  of  the  Michigan   public  on  a  wide  array  of  matters  (for  example,  infant  mortality,  obesity,  life  expectancy,   smoking),  not  to  mention  the  health  concerns  that  are  now  paramount  in  Flint,  this   person  would  have  a  broad  mandate.     Conclusions The  conclusion  we  made  in  December  2015  that  primary  responsibility  for  causing  the  Flint  water   crisis  rests  with  the  MDEQ  has  only  been  substantiated  by  our  subsequent  interviews  and   research.  This  final  report,  however,  documents  the  failings,  shortcomings  and  problems  in  other   agencies  and  entities  as  well,  such  as  MDHHS,  GCHD,  the  local  water  treatment  plant,  the  EM   structure,  the  Governor’s  office,  and  the  U.S.  EPA.  These  failures  reflect  the  discounting  of   profound  public  health  concerns  and  indifference  to  Flint  residents’  plight.   The  value  in  documenting  what  went  wrong  is  not  to  ascribe  blame  for  blame’s  sake,  but  to   establish  the  foundation  for  moving  forward,  both  in  Flint  and  throughout  the  state.  The  state   clearly  must  respond  with  dedicated  and  systematic  attention  to  health  concerns  for  people  of   Flint.  But  it  also  has  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  that  lessons  have  been  learned  from  the   Flint  experience—as  traumatic  as  it  has  been  and  will  continue  to  be—and  develop  model   infrastructure  renewal  and  public  health  programs  that  will  serve  all  Michigan  residents  for   generations  to  come.   Flint  residents  and  their  fellow  Michigan  citizens  deserve  no  less.                                                                                                                 82  See,  for  example,  “Blue  Ribbon  Panel  on  Affordability  Final  Report,”  City  of  Detroit,  2016,   www.detroitmi.gov/brpa.           62   APPENDIX  I:  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  (FWATF)             Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  (FWATF)   Matthew  Davis,  MD,  MAPP,  is  professor  of  pediatrics  and  internal  medicine  at  the  University  of   Michigan  Health  System  and  professor  of  public  policy  at  the  Gerald  R.  Ford  School  at  the   University  of  Michigan,  having  joined  the  faculty  in  2000.  Davis  also  is  a  professor  of  health   management  and  policy  at  the  School  of  Public  Health.  He  previously  served  as  the  chief  medical   executive  of  the  Michigan  Department  of  Community  Health/Department  of  Health  and  Human   Services.   Chris  Kolb  (Co-­‐Chair)  is  president  of  the  Michigan  Environmental  Council,  a  statewide  coalition  of   70  environmental,  public  health  and  faith-­‐based  nonprofit  groups.  Before  joining  the  MEC,  Kolb   represented  Ann  Arbor  in  the  state  House  for  six  years  and  served  six  years  on  the  Ann  Arbor  City   Council.  He  has  been  president  of  the  MEC  for  seven  years  and  has  more  than  12  years  of   experience  in  the  environmental  management  field.   Lawrence  Reynolds,  MD,  is  a  pediatrician  in  Flint  who  serves  as  president  of  the  Mott  Children’s   Health  Center.  He  received  his  medical  degree  from  Howard  University  College  of  Medicine  and   has  been  in  practice  for  36  years.  He  has  served  as  president  of  the  Genesee  County  Medical   Society  and  the  Michigan  Chapter  of  the  American  Academy  of  Pediatrics.  He  has  been  honored   for  his  humanitarian  and  advocacy  efforts  on  behalf  of  children  from  the  Community  Foundation   of  Greater  Flint.   Eric  Rothstein  is  a  national  water  issues  consultant  and  principal  at  the  Galardi  Rothstein  Group.   He  served  as  an  independent  advisor  on  the  creation  of  the  Great  Lakes  Water  Authority.   Rothstein  also  has  served  as  Jefferson  County,  Alabama’s  rate  consultant  and  municipal  adviser   for  litigation  related  to  the  county’s  bankruptcy  and  issuance  of  $1.7  billion  in  sewer  warrants   and  led  strategic  financial  planning  for  the  City  of  Atlanta’s  Department  of  Watershed   Management.  He  has  more  than  30  years  of  experience  in  water,  wastewater  and  stormwater   utility  finance  and  rate-­‐making  assessments.   Ken  Sikkema  (Co-­‐Chair)  is  a  senior  policy  fellow  at  Public  Sector  Consultants,  where  he  specializes   in  public  finance,  environment,  and  energy  policy.  Prior  to  joining  the  firm,  Sikkema  served  in   both  the  Michigan  House  and  Senate,  culminating  with  four  years  as  Senate  majority  leader.  He   has  also  served  as  both  an  adjunct  and  visiting  professor  at  Grand  Valley  State  University.                 APPENDIX ll: FWATF Letters December 7, 2015 Dear Governor Snyder: On Wednesday, November 18, 2015, the Flint Water Advisory Task Force met with representatives of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) to discuss elements of the 10-point Action Plan designed to address various issues related to the ongoing public health protection challenges precipitated by lead in the Flint water supply. These discussions were held at our request as part of our task to make recommendations to prevent a similar occurrence in Flint or elsewhere, and also to monitor ongoing mitigation efforts. Subsequent to those meetings, on Tuesday, November 24, 2015, members of the Task Force participated in a conference call with yourself, members of the Administration, and representatives of these agencies to discuss the progress to date on the 10-point Action Plan, as well as several other related issues. We want to acknowledge the steps that have already been taken to implement the action plan, specifically in the areas of outreach efforts to facilitate blood lead testing for children, communication with health care providers in the Flint community about the importance of testing children for lead, and the training of additional public health nurses in the Genesee County Health Department. We do believe, however, that additional steps need to be taken to reach additional children for blood lead testing, assure proper follow-up with children found to have elevated blood lead levels, and to continue water testing. We will continue to assess state and local efforts and make recommendations regarding specific steps that we believe are warranted. One primary concern we have at this point is that the current efforts appear to be taking place in the absence of a larger project coordination framework that measures results and clearly delineates responsibilities for continuing actions to protect public health. We believe the state is best positioned to facilitate this larger framework, which should address the following: 1. The need for MDHHS and MDEQ—and, possibly, other state agencies--to set goals for actions in collaboration with local and federal agencies and organizations. 2. The need for a set of corresponding timelines for the goals. 3. The need to establish responsibility for meeting the goals in a timely fashion and for contingency plans for the state if the goals are not being met. 4. The need for clear, regular communication with the Flint community and stakeholder groups regarding action steps and updates. We also believe it important that a single person or entity—potentially independent of any one particular state agency and mutually agreeable to this Task Force and you, Governor—be established to provide effective coordination of ongoing activities and reporting on the status of mitigation measures. For this, we also believe a readily understood “dashboard” should be developed that reports on the goals, timelines and assignments. This will enable members of the Flint community, public health providers, and state agencies to know about the status of the Flint water crisis mitigation program, as well as promote coordination and accountability. The Task Force is prepared to assist in the development of that dashboard. We believe it is vitally important that trusted members of the Flint community be engaged in communication on this issue, as well as the distribution of information conveyed by our suggested dashboard reporting. Accordingly, in advance of our final report, we would like to ensure the independent coordinator suggested above engage trusted community groups to begin rebuilding community trust in state actions. We appreciate your personal interest in this issue, commitment to assisting the Task Force in our review, and—most importantly—commitment to ensuring that the full measure of state resources are brought forward to protect the public health in Flint and throughout the state. Respectfully yours, Flint Water Advisory Task Force: Dr. Matt Davis Chris Kolb Dr. Larry Reynolds Eric Rothstein Ken Sikkema December  29,  2015     Dear  Governor  Snyder:   The  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force,  which  you  appointed  on  October  21,  2015,  has  devoted   considerable  effort  and  countless  hours  to  our  review  of  the  contamination  of  the  Flint  water  supply:   what  happened,  why  it  occurred,  and  what  is  needed  to  prevent  a  recurrence  in  Flint  or  elsewhere  in   the  state.  We  have  also  been  assessing  ongoing  mitigation  efforts  to  help  assure  that  short-­‐  and  long-­‐ term  public  health  issues  and  water  management  concerns  will  be  properly  addressed  to  safeguard  the   health  and  well  being  of  the  Flint  community.     Shortly  after  we  began  our  work,  we  recognized  the  immediate  need  for  better  coordination  of  the   state’s  response  to  the  ongoing  public  health  issues  in  Flint,  and  for  assignment  of  a  single  person  to   provide  this  coordination.  We  addressed  these  concerns  in  a  letter  to  you  on  December  7,  2015,  and  you   responded  with  immediate  adoption  of  these  recommendations.  We  thank  you  for  the  commitment   your  response  demonstrates.   In  our  continuing  efforts,  we  have  now  interviewed  numerous  individuals  at  state  and  local  levels;   reviewed  many  documents,  articles,  and  emails;  and  deliberated  repeatedly  as  a  group.  Both  individually   and  as  a  group,  we  have  visited  Flint  several  times  during  the  past  several  weeks  to  meet  with  citizens,   public  health  officials  and  healthcare  providers,  individuals  who  have  water  management   responsibilities  at  the  city  and  county  levels,  and  other  public  officials.   It  is  clear  to  us,  particularly  as  we  listen  to  the  people  of  Flint,  that  it  is  both  critical  and  urgent  to   establish  responsibility  for  what  happened  in  their  community  and  to  ensure  accountability.  This  is  a   first  step  in  a  long  process  to  re-­‐establish  the  trust  they  no  longer  have  in  their  government  and  the   agencies  whose  responsibility  it  is  to  protect  their  health.  It  is  urgent  because  this  deep  distrust  of   government  continues  to  compromise  the  effective  delivery  of  protective  services  designed  to  address   ongoing  public  health  issues.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  we  are  sending  this  letter  at  this  time.   We  believe  the  primary  responsibility  for  what  happened  in  Flint  rests  with  the  Michigan  Department   of  Environmental  Quality  (MDEQ).  Although  many  individuals  and  entities  at  state  and  local  levels   contributed  to  creating  and  prolonging  the  problem,  MDEQ  is  the  government  agency  that  has   responsibility  to  ensure  safe  drinking  water  in  Michigan.  It  failed  in  that  responsibility  and  must  be   held  accountable  for  that  failure.   The  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act  (SDWA)  places  responsibility  for  compliance  with  its  requirements  on  the   public  water  system.  In  this  instance,  the  City  of  Flint  had  the  responsibility  to  operate  its  water  system   within  SDWA  requirements,  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  MDEQ.  The  role  of  the  MDEQ  is  to  ensure   compliance  with  the  SDWA  through  its  regulatory  oversight  as  the  primary  agency  having  enforcement   responsibility  for  the  Flint  water  system.     The  MDEQ  failed  in  three  fundamental  ways.   Regulatory  Failure   We  believe  that  in  the  Office  of  Drinking  Water  and  Municipal  Assistance  (ODWMA)  at  MDEQ,  a  culture   exists  in  which  “technical  compliance”  is  considered  sufficient  to  ensure  safe  drinking  water  in  Michigan.   This  minimalist  approach  to  regulatory  and  oversight  responsibility  is  unacceptable  and  simply   insufficient  to  the  task  of  public  protection.  It  led  to  MDEQ’s  failure  to  recognize  a  number  of  indications   that  switching  the  water  source  in  Flint  would—and  did—compromise  both  water  safety  and  water   quality.  The  MDEQ  made  a  number  of  decisions  that  were,  and  continue  to  be,  justified  on  the  basis  that   federal  rules  “allowed”  those  decisions  to  be  made.  ODWMA  must  adopt  a  posture  that  is  driven  not  by   this  minimalist  technical  compliance  approach,  but  rather  by  one  that  is  founded  on  what  needs  to  be   done  to  assure  drinking  water  safety.   A  culture  change  must  occur  within  ODWMA.  It  must  be  driven  by  a  mission  that  is  aspirational   regarding  the  role  of  the  MDEQ  in  ensuring  the  safety  and  the  quality  of  Michigan’s  drinking  water.  We   believe,  and  have  expressed  to  MDEQ  Director  Dan  Wyant,  that  as  a  Great  Lakes  State,  Michigan  should   aspire  to  have  the  safest  drinking  water  in  the  nation,  rather  than  merely  aiming  for  technical   compliance  with  regulatory  requirements.   Failure  in  Substance  and  Tone  of  MDEQ  Response  to  the  Public   Throughout  2015,  as  the  public  raised  concerns  and  as  independent  studies  and  testing  were  conducted   and  brought  to  the  attention  of  MDEQ,  the  agency’s  response  was  often  one  of  aggressive  dismissal,   belittlement,  and  attempts  to  discredit  these  efforts  and  the  individuals  involved.  We  find  both  the  tone   and  substance  of  many  MDEQ  public  statements  to  be  completely  unacceptable.  In  a  real  way,  the   MDEQ  represents  the  public,  including  the  very  individuals  it  treated  dismissively  and  disrespectfully  in   public  statements.  We  recognize  that  the  agency  might  disagree  with  the  opinions  of  others  on  a  variety   of  issues,  including  testing  protocol,  interpretation  of  testing  results,  the  requirements  of  federal  law   and  rules,  and  other  matters.  What  is  disturbing  about  MDEQ’s  responses,  however,  is  their  persistent   tone  of  scorn  and  derision.  In  fact,  the  MDEQ  seems  to  have  been  more  determined  to  discredit  the   work  of  others—who  ultimately  proved  to  be  right—than  to  pursue  its  own  oversight  responsibility.   Failure  in  MDEQ  Interpretation  of  the  Lead  and  Copper  Rule   The  federal  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR)  is  central  to  what  happened  in  Flint,  because  that  rule,  at  least   theoretically,  is  designed  to  prevent  lead  and  copper  contamination  of  drinking  water.  The  federal  LCR   calls  for  “optimized  corrosion  control  treatment,”  which  the  MDEQ  did  not  require  in  the  switch  to  the   Flint  River.  Prior  to  the  switch,  MDEQ  staff  instructed  City  of  Flint  water  treatment  staff  that  corrosion   control  treatment  (CCT)  was  not  necessary  until  two  six-­‐month  monitoring  periods  had  been  conducted.   The  need  for  CCT  would  be  evaluated  after  the  results  from  those  two  monitoring  periods  were   reviewed.  The  decision  not  to  require  CCT,  made  at  the  direction  of  the  MDEQ,  led  directly  to  the   contamination  of  the  Flint  water  system.     The  MDEQ  seems  to  have  taken  different  positions  on  whether  it  faithfully  followed  the  LCR  in  the  Flint   situation.  It  first  maintained  that  it  followed  the  LCR,  then  stated  that  it  did  not  follow  the  rule  properly,   and  most  recently  claimed  that  a  federal  memorandum  issued  by  the  US  EPA  in  early  November  2015   suggests  that  the  original  MDEQ  interpretation  was  possibly  correct.   We  are  not  convinced.  Even  the  MDEQ’s  latest  interpretation  of  the  US  EPA’s  November  memorandum   is  overly  legalistic  and  misunderstands  the  intent  of  the  LCR,  which  is  to  minimize  risks  of  lead  and   copper  exposure  for  human  health.   We  believe  ODWMA’s  single-­‐minded  legalistic  focus  is  the  heart  of  the  problem,  and  it  is  part  of  the   “technical  compliance”  culture  described  above.  ODWMA  should  not  be  basing  its  actions  solely  on  a     2   legally  possible  interpretation  of  the  LCR.  It  should  be  focusing  on  how  to  protect  Michigan’s  citizens   from  lead  in  drinking  water.   We  met  with  MDEQ  Director  Wyant  on  December  16,  2015,  to  discuss  these  issues,  as  well  as  many   others.  We  note  his  substantial  agreement  with  many  of  our  conclusions,  particularly  as  it  relates  to  the   regulatory  failure  and  the  abysmal  public  response  of  his  agency.  It  is  our  understanding  that  he  has   drawn  similar  conclusions  in  his  own  evaluation  of  the  MDEQ’s  role  in  the  Flint  water  crisis.  At  the  same   time,  it  was  disappointing  to  hear  his  weak  defense  of  the  CCT  decision  based  on  the  EPA’s  November   2015  memorandum.     We  are  not  finished  with  our  work.  Other  individuals  and  entities  made  poor  decisions,  contributing  to   and  prolonging  the  contamination  of  the  drinking  water  supply  in  Flint.  As  an  example,  we  are   particularly  concerned  by  recent  revelations  of  MDHHS’s  apparent  early  knowledge  of,  yet  silence   about,  elevated  blood  lead  levels  detected  among  Flint’s  children.  We  also  feel  it  important  to  further   review  local  government  decision  processes  under  emergency  management.  Our  final  report  will   highlight  and  discuss  those  concerns,  among  many  others,  to  provide  some  context  to  a  comprehensive   series  of  recommendations.  As  stated  earlier  in  this  letter,  however,  we  believe  that  establishing   responsibility  is  a  critical  and  urgent  need,  and  one  that  should  not  wait  for  our  final  report  in  2016.   Individuals  and  agencies  responsible  must  be  held  accountable  in  a  timely  fashion.   It  is  our  hope  that  the  heightened  awareness  of  the  dangers  of  lead  poisoning  can  be  an  opportunity  to   make  Michigan  safer,  particularly  for  its  children.  Drinking  water  must  be  recognized  as  a  potential   source  of  health  risk  exposure  when  water  lines  and  fixtures  containing  lead  are  disturbed  or   compromised.  Proper  testing,  not  only  in  high-­‐risk  areas  but  also  in  facilities  serving  children  (e.g.,   schools),  must  be  considered.  Facilitating  long-­‐term  financing  of  a  model  public  health  program,  and   also  replacement  of  lead-­‐containing  water  service  lines  and  fixtures,  would  enable  Michigan  to  realize  a   positive  lasting  legacy  from  the  tragedy  of  the  Flint  water  crisis.  Our  final  report  will  address  some  of   these  issues.   The  City  of  Flint’s  water  customers—fellow  Michigan  citizens—were  needlessly  and  tragically  exposed  to   toxic  levels  of  lead  through  their  drinking  water  supply.  They  deserve  a  commitment  to  properly  assess   responsibility  and  ensure  accountability.  They  also  deserve  a  commitment  to  needed  mitigation  in  both   the  short  and  long  term.  The  Flint  water  crisis  never  should  have  happened.  Having  failed  to  prevent  it,   state  government  should  coordinate  a  sustained,  public-­‐health-­‐focused  response  to  remedy,  to  the   fullest  extent  possible,  the  impacts  on  the  Flint  community.     Respectfully  yours,     Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force:   Matt  Davis   Chris  Kolb   Larry  Reynolds     Eric  Rothstein   Ken  Sikkema       3   Flint Water Advisory Task Force January 22, 2016 Governor Rick Snyder Office of Governor P.O. Box 30013 Lansing, Michigan 48909 Dear Governor Snyder: The Flint Water Advisory Task Force (FWATF) appreciates your recent efforts to secure federal and mobilize state emergency response resources to address the immediate water supply issues in Flint. This letter is to encourage a similarly robust response to the challenges of re-establishing a reliable, trusted potable water distribution system in Flint. This is required as soon as possible to replace the unsustainable and expensive bottled water and filter distribution program that has been necessitated, but which clearly must serve as an interim, emergency response. Consistent with the priorities identified in the Safe Drinking Water Emergency Order issued by the EPA on January 21, 2016, we recommend the following actions to address scientifically grounded concerns that the water system in Flint remains unsafe because of lead contamination and Legionella. Public trust in the safety of the water supply may only begin to be re-established through the state’s forthright engagement of the scientific experts who overcame state and federal agency intransigence to expose the lead poisoning. Our recommendations are:  Engage US EPA staff experts versed in Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) requirements – specifically Miguel del Toral, Darren Lytle and Michael Shock. These individuals should be empowered to guide implementation of a comprehensive LCR sampling program in Flint that will monitor lead levels now and throughout the conversion to raw water supply by the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA) and full-time use of the Flint Water Treatment Plant.  Establish an inter-disciplinary work group comprising subject matter experts drawn from respected public utility associations and institutions of higher learning in Michigan and elsewhere (including Marc Edwards of Virginia Tech), to oversee the conversion to KWAsupplied raw water.  Commission and/or contract with an unbiased third-party organization or consortium (hereafter: Flint water safety scientific assessment team [FWSSAT]) that will be responsible for assessing the quality and safety of drinking water in residences, schools and child care settings in Flint, and hospitals and other healthcare facilities served by the Flint Water Advisory Task Force Flint water system. The explicit focus of FWSSAT activities will be lead and Legionella; however, the FWSSAT may include other considerations in its work. The FWSSAT will be invested with the responsibility of declaring when the public water supply in Flint is safe for routine consumption. The FWSSAT will employ the most rigorous scientific standards, using a sampling strategy that is designed to optimize detection of water contamination in home, school, and child-care settings, and healthcare environments. All schools and healthcare facilities must be included in the sampling approach. Rigorous sampling of residences and child-care settings (whether centers or in-home) will also be implemented, using any and all available information about lead water service lines. In addition, if a homeowner or renter whose dwelling has not been included in sampling wishes to have the dwelling included, they will also be sampled. The sampling efforts and reporting process of the FWSSAT will be fully transparent to the public; results of testing should be published on local, state, and federal (EPA) websites.  To assure the re-building of community trust and assure sufficient expertise for future water quality and safety, the FWSSAT should partner with local (Flint Water Treatment) and state (MDEQ) personnel in its activities. The FWSSAT should have an interdisciplinary advisory committee that includes local community leaders, local and state officials, national scientific authorities regarding water quality and safety and public health, and the leader of the interagency state effort regarding the Flint water crisis. When the FWSSAT advisory committee is satisfied that the FWSSAT scientific procedures have thoroughly assessed water quality and safety in Flint residences, schools and child care settings, and healthcare facilities and found the water to be sufficiently free of contamination, then the committee will advise the public of the findings. The FWSSAT will then organize the transfer of responsibility to local and state authorities to sustain the sampling and reporting methods thereafter, including the conversion to KWA raw water in the future. We also believe that a forthright response to the Legionella outbreak must similarly engage trusted, scientific experts drawn from independent institutions. Accordingly, we recommend:  The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MHHS) should make a formal request to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for assistance in assessing the outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease in Flint, if they have not already done so. MHHS, working with CDC, should develop a strategy for improving prevention, rapid detection, and timely treatment of cases of Legionellosis in Michigan in 2016 and beyond. While the MDHHS evaluation of the dozens of cases of Legionellosis in 2014 and 2015 has strongly suggested a link to the shift to drinking water from the Flint River in 2014, further and more intensive evaluation of clinical isolates (i.e., samples from infected patients) is necessary to understand the route(s) of transmission from contaminated water to humans. The unique set of outbreak circumstances in the setting of a change in water source strongly indicates that support from federal public Flint Water Advisory Task Force health authorities would be a welcome way to amplify the public’s collective understanding of risk of contracting Legionella in residences served by the Flint water system, and in Flint healthcare facilities.  The state should specifically request federal support from the CDC – and, as appropriate, additional federal experts and agencies – to advise and assess Flint healthcare facilities and Flint-based healthcare providers regarding: (a) appropriate application and timely re-application of biocides to air treatment systems and cooling towers in all healthcare facilities in Flint, in order to prevent colonization with Legionella; and (b) proper assessment and timely diagnosis of Legionella among patients in Flint who present with characteristic signs and symptoms and have a history of potential exposure to contaminated water. Of note, the risk of resurgent Legionellosis in Spring 2016 is on the horizon; the first cases of Legionellosis in the 2014 and 2015 outbreaks were diagnosed in June and May, respectively, and Legionella is known to be much more common in the spring, summer, and fall than in the winter months. Time is of the essence.  MDHHS should work with its federal partners to assure that investigative efforts related to Legionella regarding quality and safety of water are conducted in coordination with the FWSSAT described above. Furthermore, MDHHS should regularly communicate its findings to the Flint community regarding its efforts to prevent, detect, and treat cases of Legionella until case levels return to pre-2014 levels. We expect that these measures will provide members of the Flint community with assurance that the quality of their tap water is being appropriately monitored and that forthcoming announcements that Flint’s tap water is safe to drink are well-founded. Notwithstanding earnest state agency actions, we believe that the engagement of independent subject matter experts, whether to assess drinking water quality or public health concerns, is critical to overcome, over time, the understandable skepticisms that prevail in the Flint community. We hope that you will receive these recommendations in the same spirit with which they are offered – to advance the recovery and reinvigoration of the Flint community. Respectfully, Matthew Davis, M.D. Chris Kolb Lawrence Reynolds, M.D. Eric Rothstein, CPA Ken Sikkema APPENDIX Ill: lnterviewee Listing Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Interviews  and  Discussions  Listing No. Last  Name 1 2 Kildee Ananich 3 4 5 6 Snyder Muchmore Baird Hollins 7 8 9 10 11 Dillon Workman Saxton Byrne Sampson 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Ambrose Earley Kurtz Brown Weaver Walling Henderson Freeman 20 21 22 23 24 25 Lundquist Brown Croft Johnson Wright Glasgow 26 27 28 Mays Overton Shariff 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 Wyant Sygo Creagh Krisztian Anderson Shekter  Smith Rosenthal First  Name Organization Federal  and  State  Office  Holders  /  Key  Officials Daniel  T. U.S.  House  of  Representatives James Michigan  State  Senate Michigan  Governor's  Office Rick Michigan  Governor's  Office Dennis Michigan  Governor's  Office Rich Michigan  Governor's  Office Harvey Michigan  Governor's  Office Michigan  Department  of  Treasury Andy Treasury  Department Wayne Treasury  Department Thomas Treasury  Department Randall Treasury  Department Jeremy Treasury  Department  Flint  Emergency  Managers  -­‐  Office  Holders Jerry City  of  Flint Darnell City  of  Flint Ed City  of  Flint Michael City  of  Flint Karen City  of  Flint Dayne City  of  Flint Natasha City  of  Flint Josh City  of  Flint City  of  Flint  Staff  and  Consultants Jody City  of  Flint Inez City  of  Flint Howard City  of  Flint Daugherty City  of  Flint Brent City  of  Flint Mike City  of  Flint  Flint  Community Melissa Flint  Citizen Allan Flint  Citizen Nayyirah   Flint  Citizen Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality Dan MDEQ Jim MDEQ Keith MDEQ George MDEQ Madhu MDEQ Liane MDEQ Adam MDEQ Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Interviews  and  Discussions  Listing No. 36 37 Last  Name Busch Prysby   38 39 40 41 42 43 Lyon Becker Wells Larder Lasher Moran 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 Hyde Crooks Hedman Kaplan Del  Toral Porter Blair Poy 51 52 53 54 Betanzo Edwards Sullivan McElmurry 54 55 56 57 Hanna-­‐Attisha Valacak Doerr Henry 58 59 Guyette Fonger 59 60 61 62 63 Wright O'Brien Jansen Wolfson Koesters First  Name Organization Stephen MDEQ Mike   MDEQ Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services Nick MDHHS Tim MDHHS Eden MDHHS Cristin MDHHS Geralyn MDHHS Susan MDHHS US  EPA Tinka EPA Jennifer EPA Susan EPA Bob EPA Miguel EPA Andrea EPA Rita EPA Tom EPA Technical  Experts  -­‐  WQ  and  Lead Elin Northeast-­‐Midwest  Institute Marc Virginia  Tech Laura Kettering  University Shawn Wayne  State  University Public  Health  Community Mona Hurley  Medical  Center Mark Genesee  County  Health  Dept. Kay Genesee  County  Health  Dept.  -­‐  Board  of  Health James Genesee  County  Health  Dept. Media Curt ACLU Ron MLive KWA  -­‐  DWSD Jeff GCDC John GCDC Dave GCDC William GLWA  /  DWSD Laurie GLWA  /  DWSD APPENDIX  IV:  Questions  of  Lockwood,  Andrews,  &  Newnam           Flint Water Advisory Task Force   Lockwood,  Andrews  and  Newnam   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  Questions   February  22,  2016     1. Please  describe  your  firm’s  experience  with  drinking  water  treatment  facilities,   specifically  related  to  drinking  water  quality,  treatment  of  river  water  supply,   disinfection  and  disinfection  byproduct  management,  corrosion  control,  and  startup  for   full-­‐time  operation.   2. Please  describe  your  firm’s  experience  with  distribution  system  management,  including   corrosion  control,  disinfection  and  DBP  management,  and  Legionella  management.   3. Please  provide  the  scope  of  work  for  your  engagements  related  to  preparing  the  Flint   Water  Treatment  Plant  for  full-­‐time  operation,  as  well  as  any  subsequent  engagements.   4. Please  describe  the  procurement  processes  used  for  contracting  these  scopes  of  service.   Please  provide  copies  of  relevant  proposals  and  contracts.   5. Please  provide  a  narrative  describing  LAN’s  involvement  with  City  of  Flint  and  MDEQ   staff  throughout  your  engagement  with  the  City  related  to  full-­‐time  operation  of  the   Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant.     6. Please  provide  a  list  of  your  findings  and  recommendations  to  address  the  various  water   quality  problems  that  occurred  following  startup  of  full-­‐time  operation  of  the  Flint   Water  Treatment  Plant.   7. Please  provide  your  subjective  assessment  of  the  condition  and  technologies  at  the  Flint   Water  Treatment  Plant  and  distribution  system  prior  to  full-­‐time  operation  of  the  plant.   8. Please  identify  all  team  members  (including  LAN  staff  and  any  subconsultants)  who   worked  on  the  project  to  prepare  the  Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant  for  full-­‐time   operation.  Describe  their  respective  roles  on  the  project  and  their  experience.  If  any   other  staff  or  consultants  were  engaged  for  guidance  or  review,  please  include  those   individuals  as  well.   9. Please  describe  the  reporting  structure  (both  LAN’s  project  team  reporting  structure   and  its  reporting  relationship  to  City  of  Flint  staff  and  Emergency  Manager)  for  LAN’s   work  on  the  Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant,  specifically  for  preparations  for  full-­‐time   operation  of  the  plant.   10. Please  provide  a  copy  of  any  deliverables  prepared  to  support  full-­‐time  operation  of  the   Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant,  including  the  plan  of  treatment  that  was  reviewed  with   MDEQ.   11. Please  review  your  discussions  with  the  City  of  Flint  utility  staff  and  MDEQ  regarding   Flint  River  water  chemistry  and  treatment  requirements,  specifically  relating  to:   a. Anticipated  treatment  challenges  related  to  use  of  Flint  River   b. Prospective  disinfection  requirements  and  options  for  management  of  DBPs   c. Corrosion  control   12. Please  describe  the  decision-­‐making  processes  related  to  treatment  requirements,   specifically  with  regard  to  corrosion  control  treatment.   Flint Water Advisory Task Force   13. What  was  the  nature  of  the  discussions  regarding  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  compliance   requirements?       14. Did  LAN  identify  requirements  for  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  compliance  in  advance  of   discussions  with  MDEQ?   15. Did  LAN  express  any  concerns  or  cautions  with  respect  to  MDEQ’s  interpretation  of  Lead   and  Copper  Rule  requirements  for  water  treatment?   16. What  were  the  outcomes  of  discussions  with  MDEQ  regarding  treatment  requirements,   specifically  regarding  compliance  with  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  requirements?   17. Please  outline  your  interactions  with  other  consultants  and  suppliers  working  on  the   Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant,  both  during  preparation  for  and  after  startup  of  full-­‐time   operation,  including  Rowe  Professional  Consultants,  Veolia  and  any  others.   18. Please  describe  LAN’s  involvement  with  the  City  of  Flint’s  Technical  Advisory  Committee.   Please  provide  copies  of  any  presentations  or  handouts  offered  in  the  context  of  the   Technical  Advisory  Committee  discussions.   19. Please  offer  any  key  points  or  information  not  already  provided  that  you  think  would  be   of  value  in  addressing  the  causes  of  the  Flint  water  crisis  and  avoiding  similar  situations   in  the  future.  Please  provide  any  recommendations  to  address  prospective  Flint  water   system  needs.     20. Please  offer  any  key  points  or  information  not  already  provided  that  you  think  would  be   of  value  in  addressing  the  causes  of  the  Flint  water  crisis  and  avoiding  similar  situations   in  the  future.  Please  provide  any  recommendations  to  address  prospective  Flint  water   system  needs.   APPENDIX V: Detailed Timeline Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Integrated  Event  Timeline March  21,  2016 Note:  This  timeline  was  compiled  by  the  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  to  support  its  investigation  of  the  Flint  water  crisis.  It  includes  selected  events  that  occurred  before  and  during  the  crisis.  The  timeline  ends  February  29,  2016.   Date Event Flint's  water  system  is  organized  and  built  under  private  ownership  as  the  Flint   Water  Works  Company,  pumping  raw  water  from  the  Flint  River  to  customers City  of  Flint  purchases  water  utility  ($262,500)  and  converts  it  to  a  Municipally   1903 Owned  Corporation 1883 1911 City  of  Flint  adds  water  filtration  to  Flint's  water  system   1947  -­‐  1955 1967 1991 2000 Sources Brochure  provided  to  FWATF  by  City  of  Flint "The  Water  Supply  of  Flint,  Michigan"  (brochure) Brochure  provided  to  FWATF  by  City  of  Flint "The  Water  Supply  of  Flint,  Michigan"  (brochure) Brochure  provided  to  FWATF  by  City  of  Flint City  of  Flint  invests  in  capital  improvements  to  the  water  utility  ($12.5M)  including   improved  water  storage,  treatment  and  pumping.  "Polyphosphate  is  added  in  small   "The  Water  Supply  of  Flint,  Michigan"  (brochure) Brochure  provided  to  FWATF  by  City  of  Flint amounts  to  lessen  the  corrosion  of  water  pipe  when  in  contact  with  the  cold  water,"   p.  11 City  of  Flint  executes  long-­‐term  water  supply  contract  with  Detroit  Water  and   Contract  referenced  in  "Detroit  Water  and  Sewerage  Department  -­‐   dwsd.org/downloads_n/about_dwsd/history/complete_history.p Sewerage  Department  (DWSD)  and  begins  receiving  water  from  DWSD.  Flint  Water   The  First  300  Years,"  posted  to  DWSD  website df Treatment  Plant  (WTP)  subsequently  is  converted  to  a  backup  supply  source EPA  issues  Lead  and  Copper  Rule  (LCR)  to  control  lead  and  copper  in  drinking  water LCR  history  and  current  rule  posted  to  EPA's  website www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/lead-­‐and-­‐copper-­‐rule Timeline/Analysis/Recommendations  (July  15,  2010),  prepared  by   Flint  water  supply  contract  with  DWSD  expires Information  provided  to  FWATF   DWSD  Wholesale  Customer  Outreach  Team 2001 DWSD  and  Flint  enter  into  contract  negotiations  -­‐  subsequently  suspended July  2002 Reference  Document "The  Water  Supply  of  Flint,  Michigan"  (brochure) “Source  Water  Assessment  Report  for  the  City  of  Flint  Water   Supply  –  Flint  River  Emergency  Intake,"  prepared  by  U.S.   Technical  assessment  of  Flint  River  raises  concerns  about  its  use  for  drinking  water,   February  2004 Geological  Survey,  MDEQ  and  Flint  Water  Utilities  Department.  As   noting  the  source's  susceptibility  to  contamination reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by  Day:   A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Genesee  County  Drain  Commission  (GCDC)  commissions  feasibility  study  on   "Preliminary  Report  -­‐  Long-­‐Term  Water  Supply  for  Genesee   alternatives  to  provide  water  service  to  existing  and  new  customers.  Report   January  2006 County,"  prepared  by  Rowe,  Jones  &  Henry,  Gannett  Fleming. indicates  Flint  River  water  can  be  safely  treated  but  does  not  have  adequate   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) capacity  for  permanent  use DWSD  (Mercado/Foster)  discusses  water  contract  options  with  Genesee  County   Drain  Commission  (GCDC) DWSD  brings  forward  pipeline  loop  in  its  capital  plan  to  address  concerns  of  City  of   September  2007 Flint,  Genesee  County,  and  Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality  (MDEQ)   3/12/16 3/12/16 Timeline/Analysis/Recommendations  (July  15,  2010),  prepared  by   DWSD  Wholesale  Customer  Outreach  Team Under  Michigan's  Public  Act  72  of  1990,  Flint  is  placed  under  an  Emergency  Financial   MLive  (Nov.  10,  2011):  "What  happened  last  time?  A  look  back  at   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2011/11/what_happened_l Manager  (EFM)  until  2004.  Ed  Kurtz  is  appointed  Flint  EFM Flint's  2002  state  takeover"  (Mostafavi) ast_time_a_look.html January  2007 Accessed 3/12/16 bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 Report  provided  to  FWATF  by  MDEQ.   Gov.  Snyder's  timeline:   mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. pdf 3/20/16 Timeline/Analysis/Recommendations  (July  15,  2010),  prepared  by   Information  provided  to  FWATF   DWSD  Wholesale  Customer  Outreach  Team Timeline/Analysis/Recommendations  (July  15,  2010),  prepared  by   Information  provided  to  FWATF   DWSD  Wholesale  Customer  Outreach  Team 2008 June  3,  2008 June  12,  2008 July  16,  2008 September  3,  2008 GCDC  requests  negotiation  with  DWSD  for  water  supply  contract;  requests  short-­‐ term  contract  due  to  ongoing  evaluation  of  long-­‐term  needs DWSD  issues  response  to  GCDC  negotiation  request  (referenced  in  July  16,  2008   letter) Flint  advises  DWSD  that  GCDC  will  represent  its  interests  in  negotiations GCDC  and  DWSD  meet  on  water  supply  contracting Letter  from  O'Brien/GCDC    to  Mercado/DWSD   Information  provided  to  FWATF   Mercado/DWSD  letter Information  provided  to  FWATF   Letter  from  Williamson  &  Wright  to  Detroit  Deputy  Mayor  Adams Information  provided  to  FWATF   Meeting  Summary  -­‐  Project  Innovations Information  provided  to  FWATF   2009 February  11,  2009 March  10,  2009 GCDC  submits  permit  application  for  85-­‐mgd  surface  water  withdrawal  from  Lake   Huron Permit  application  and  supporting  data  posted  to  MDEQ  website DWSD  offers  partnership  arrangement:  GCDC  fund  Flint  loop  north  of  Oakland   border  ($200  million)  and  obtain  40%  reduction  on  service  rates Timeline/Analysis/Recommendations  (July  15,  2010),  prepared  by   Information  provided  to  FWATF. DWSD  Wholesale  Customer  Outreach  Team. www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2009/03/halfprice_water_o MLive  (March  11,  2009):  "Half  Price  Water  Offer  from  Detroit  Not   ffer_from_det.html Exactly  What  it  Seems"  (Fonger) Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/deq-­‐wb-­‐dwehs-­‐wateruse-­‐ gcdcwwpermitapp_280312_7.pdf 3/12/16 3/19/16 1 Date Event June  2009 DWSD  and  SOCWA  file  comments  opposing  GCDC  withdrawal  permit  application June  25,  2009 GCDC  announces  plans  to  build  $600  million  water  system June  25,  2009 "Lake  Huron  Water  Supply  Study  -­‐  Karegnondi  Water  Authority  (KWA)  Executive   Summary"  issued July  10,  2009 DWSD  Interim  Director  Pamela  Turner  publishes  Letter  to  Editor  in  MLive August  13,  2009 Foster  Group  provides  observations  on  GCDC  cost  analysis  re:  KWA August  28,  2009 MDEQ  issues  permit  to  GCDC    for  85-­‐mgd  Lake  Huron  withdrawal  for  KWA September  2009 "Lake  Huron  Water  Supply  -­‐  KWA  Preliminary  Engineering  Report"  issued Reference  Document Sources Timeline/Analysis/Recommendations  (July  15,  2010),  prepared  by   Information  provided  to  FWATF   DWSD  Wholesale  Customer  Outreach  Team Referenced  in  July  25th  letter  -­‐  DWSD  Director  Pam  Turner Information  provided  to  FWATF   "Lake  Huron  Water  Supply  Study  -­‐  Karegnondi  Water  Authority   Attachment  3  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.  6,   Executive  Summary,"  prepared  by  AECOM,  Jones  &  Henry,  LAN,   2015 O'Malia,  Rowe  and  Wade  Trim MLive  (July  10,  2009):  "Another  View:  Genesee  County  Water   www.MLive.com/opinion/flint/index.ssf/2009/07/another_viewg Venture  is  Risky  Business:  Think  AutoWorld"  (Hughes) enesee_county_wat.html Foster  Group  memo:  "Observations  on  Cost  Analysis  from  the  Lake   Huron  Water  Supply  Karegnondi  Water  Authority  Preliminary   Information  provided  to  FWATF   Engineering  Report" MDEQ  Large  Quantity  Water  Withdrawal  Permit  posted  to  MDEQ   www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/deq-­‐wb-­‐dwehs-­‐wwciu-­‐ website gcdclqwwpermit_290342_7.pdf "Lake  Huron  Water  Supply  Study  -­‐  Karegnondi  Water  Authority   www.scribd.com/doc/52254829/Karegnondi-­‐Water-­‐Authority-­‐ Preliminary  Engineering  Report,"  prepared  by  AECOM,  Jones  &   Preliminary-­‐Engineering-­‐Report-­‐Sept-­‐2009 Henry,  LAN,  O'Malia,  Rowe  and  Wade  Trim Accessed 3/20/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 2010 MLive  (Feb.  25,  2010):  "Another  View:  Detroit  Water  and   Sewerage  wants  to  work  with  leaders  in  Genesee  and  Lapeer   counties"  (Letter  from  Pamela  Turner/DWSD) www.MLive.com/opinion/flint/index.ssf/2010/02/another_view_ detroit_water_and.html 3/12/16 April  13,  2010 Genesee  County  approves  KWA  Articles  of  Incorporation MLive  (April  13,  2010):  "Genesee  County  starts  regional  water   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2010/04/genesee_county_ authority,  potential  partners  plan  votes  in  coming  weeks"  (Fonger) starts_regional.html 3/12/16 May  14,  2010 MLive  reports  on  GCDC  contract  with  political  consultant  Sam  Riddle   MLive  (May  14,  2010):  "Drain  commissioner  paid  Sam  Riddle   $2,000  a  month  to  work  on  Genesee  county  water  pipeline"   (Longley) 3/12/16 February  22,  2010 DWSD  posts  letter  to  potential  KWA  partners  (Flint,  Genesee,  Lapeer) DWSD  and  GCDC  meet  to  negotiate  water  supply  contract.  Notes  re:  contract   June  17,  2010 termination:  "Does  not  mean  DWSD  will  not  continue  to  provide  water  but  rates  will   Meeting  summary  -­‐  Project  Innovations reflect  stranded  cost  charge  to  protect  the  system" "2013  Consumer  Confidence  Report"  posted  to  GCDC  website. MLive  (July  10,  2010):  "Genesee  County  drain  commissioner's  new   July  10,  2010 GCDC  issues  Consumer  Confidence  Report  supporting  KWA  pipeline water  quality  report  focuses  on  benefits  of  building  new  water   pipeline"  (Fonger) www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2010/05/drain_commission er_paid_sam_ri.html Information  provided  to  FWATF   www.gcdcwws.com/images/contentImages/file/2014%20Water% 20Color-­‐WE.pdf www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2010/07/genesee_county_ drain_commissio_10.html 3/12/16 Report:   www.scribd.com/doc/64381765/Analysis-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Flint-­‐River-­‐as-­‐a-­‐ Permanent-­‐Water-­‐Supply-­‐for-­‐the-­‐City-­‐of-­‐Flint-­‐July-­‐2011 Appendices:   www.scribd.com/doc/64382181/Analysis-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Flint-­‐River-­‐as-­‐a-­‐ Permanent-­‐Water-­‐Supply-­‐for-­‐the-­‐City-­‐of-­‐Flint-­‐July-­‐2011-­‐ Appendices-­‐1-­‐to-­‐8 3/12/16 www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-­‐ GovernorsDetermination-­‐11-­‐8-­‐11_417435_7.pdf 1/31/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2011/08/flint_water_sewer _rates_increa.html 3/12/16 2011 Report  is  completed  for  City  of  Flint  on  feasibility  of  using  Flint  WTP  and  Flint  River   as  primary  water  supply.  Notes  Flint  River  water  will  require  more  treatment  than   "Analysis  of  the  Flint  River  as  a  Permanent  Water  Supply  for  the   July  1,  2011 Lake  Huron  water;  recommends  capital  improvements  and  projects  capital  and   City  of  Flint,"  prepared  by  Rowe  and  LAN operating  costs  (including  phosphate  addition) August  29,  2011 September  16,  2011 September  30,  2011 November  11,  2011 November  29,  2011 Michigan  Department  of  Treasury  conducts  preliminary  review  of  City  of  Flint   finances  and  recommends  appointment  of  a  Financial  Review  Team.  Noting  the   Letter  posted  to  State  of  Michigan  website city's  accumulated  deficits  of  $25.7  million,  it  concludes  "probable  financial  distress"   exists  in  the  city City  of  Flint  increases  water  and  sewer  rates  by  35  percent,  following  a  water  and   MLive  (Aug.  16,  2011):  "Flint  water,  sewer  rates  increasing  35   sewer  rate  increase  of  25  and  22  percent,  respectively,  that  took  effect  in  January   percent"  (Longley) 2011 Gov.  Snyder  appoints  8-­‐member  Financial  Review  Team,  which  convenes  in  October-­‐ Letter  posted  to  State  of  Michigan  website November  and  recommends  appointment  of  Emergency  Manager  in  Flint   Gov.  Snyder  notifies  Flint  Mayor  Dayne  Walling  via  letter  of  intent  to  appoint   Letter  posted  to  State  of  Michigan  website Emergency  Manager Detroit  Free  Press  (February  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis   Gov.  Snyder  places  City  of  Flint  in  receivership  under  PA  4 Unfolded"  (Dixon) Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-­‐ GovernorsDetermination-­‐11-­‐8-­‐11_417435_7.pdf www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-­‐ GovernorsDetermination-­‐11-­‐8-­‐11_417435_7.pdf www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ 1/31/16 1/31/16 3/12/16 2 Date Event Michael  Brown  replaces  Ed  Kurtz  as  City  of  Flint  EFM.  Brown  lays  off  high-­‐ranking   December  1,  2011 City  Hall  appointees  and  eliminates  pay  for  mayor  and  city  council  (which  he  later   partially  restored) Reference  Document Sources Detroit  Free  Press  (November  30,  2011):  "Governor  names  Flint   native  city's  emergency  financial  manager" www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/06/hes_back_a_timel MLive  (June  30,  2013):  "He's  back:  A  timeline  of  Michael  Brown's   ine_of_michael.html moves  as  Flint's  emergency  manager"  (Adams) Accessed 3/12/16 2012 Gov.  Snyder  delivers  statewide  public  safety  message  from  Flint  City  Hall  to   March  7,  2012 announce  plan  including  reopening  Flint  lockup  and  boosting  state  police  patrols  in   Flint Judge  grants  temporary  restraining  order  against  any  action  by  EM  Brown  pending   March  15,  2012 lawsuit  filed  by  city  employee  Sam  Mum  (head  of  AFSCME  Local  1600)  alleging  state   violated  Open  Meetings  Act  in  appointing  him Ingham  County  Circuit  Court  Judge  Rosemarie  Aquilina  rules  in  favor  of  Muma,   March  20,  2012 removing  Brown  from  office  and  restoring  power  to  the  mayor  and  city  council March  26,  2012 Michigan  Court  of  Appeals  reinstates  Brown  as  Flint  EM April  24,  2012 City  of  Flint’s  Fiscal  Year  2013  budget  passed  by  an  “executive  order” Flint  Department  of  Public  Works  (DPW)  Director  Howard  Croft  sends  letter  to   District  Engineer  Mike  Prysby,  MDEQ  Office  of  Drinking  Water  and  Municipal   Assistance  (ODWMA),  stating  KWA  "has  the  potential  to  be  a  major  factor  in  our   May  9,  2012 region’s  economic  development...  The  City  of  Flint  is  pleased  to  be  a  partner  in  the   process  and  we  pledge  to  offer  our  assets  to  support  the  development.  We   appreciate  your  technical  support  as  we  develop  our  components  of  the  project.” Flint  City  Council  President  Scott  Kincaid  files  lawsuit  against  City  seeking  to  repeal   May  24,  2012 recent  (Sep.  2011  and  May  2012)  increases  in  water  and  sewer  rates May  30,  2012 June  26,  2012 July  2,  2012 August  8,  2012 September  10,  2012 September  20,  2012 October  31,  2012 November  2013 November  6,  2012 November  6,  2012 December  27,  2012 MLive  (March  7,  2012):"Gov.  Snyder  unveils  public  safety  proposal   in  Flint  calling  for  more  state  police,  forensic  techs  in  high-­‐crime   cities"  (Longley) MLive  (March  15,  2012):  "Restraining  order  against  Flint   emergency  manager  leaves  city  without  clear  chain  of  command"   (Longley) MLive  (June  30,  2013):  "He's  back:  A  timeline  of  Michael  Brown's   moves  as  Flint's  emergency  manager"  (Adams) MLive  (March  26,  2012):  "Flint  emergency  manager  reinstated  as   battle  over  Public  Act  4  continues"  (Longley) "City  of  Flint  Financial  and  Operating  Plan  -­‐  Fiscal  Year  2013,"   posted  final  to  City  of  Flint  website  Sep.  25,  2012 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/03/gov_snyder_unvei ls_public_safe.html 3/12/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/03/emergency_mana ger_restraining.html 3/12/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/06/hes_back_a_timel ine_of_michael.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/03/flint_emergency_ manager_reinst.html www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐ content/uploads/Reports/FinPlanFY13pdf.pdf 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 MLive  (May  24,  2012):  "Lawsuit  filed  against  Flint  by  council   president  over  water  rate  increases"  (Ridley) www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/05/lawsuit_filed_agai nst_flint_by.html 3/12/16 Emergency  Manager  Brown  further  increases  water  rates  by  12.5  percent  and  sewer   Emergency  Manager  Order  No.  31  -­‐  Water  and  Sewer  Rate   rates  45  percent,  and  ratifies  Sep.  2011  increases.    (Appeals  court  subsequently   Increases,  posted  to  City  of  Flint  website 3/12/16 www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/CityPDF/031.pdf invalidates.)  With  this  increase,  Flint  water  customers  had  seen  a  "110  percent   Referenced  in  MLive  (June  19,  2015):  "Flint  council  members  want   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/flint_council_me increase  in  their  average  water  and  sewer  rates  since  January  2011" water  customers  refunded,  lawsuit  settled"  (Fonger) mbers_say_city.html Flint  EM  Brown  sends  letter  to  DWSD  for  permission  to  begin  blending  Flint  River   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p water  with  treated  water  from  DWSD.  Letter  indicates  MDEQ  is  supporting  this   3/12/16 Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df option,  which  would  save  City  $2  million  to  $3  million  annually State  appeals  court  dismisses  Kincaid  lawsuit  challenging  recent  Flint  water  and   MLive  (July  2,  2012):  "State  appeals  court  dismisses  Flint  water   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/07/appeals_court_dis 3/12/16 sewer  rate  increases rate  lawsuit"  (Longley) misses_flint.html Ed  Kurtz  (who  served  as  Flint  EFM  from  2002  to  2004)  replaces  Brown  as  Flint  EFM,   after  Brown  has  to  exit  because  the  state's  EM  law,  Public  Act  4,  is  officially   NBC25  News  (Aug.  8,  2012):  "Ed  Kurtz  returns  to  Flint  as   nbc25news.com/news/local/ed-­‐kurtz-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐flint-­‐as-­‐ 3/12/16 suspended  due  to  referendum  to  repeal  it.  Kurtz  appoints  Brown  as  Flint  City   emergency  manager" emergency-­‐manager?id=785990 Administrator MLive  (Sep.  10,  2012):  "Flint  City  Council  members  sue  emergency   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/09/flint_city_council_ Flint  City  Council  files  suit  against  Kurtz's  appointment  as  EFM 3/12/16 financial  manager  Ed  Kurtz"  (Longley) members_sue.html Flint  EFM  Ed  Kurtz  sends  letter  to  DWSD  requesting  written  permission  to   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p 3/12/16 implement  the  blending  option.  Approval  is  requested  by  October  1,  2012 Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df Analysis  by  Flint  Finance  Director  suggests  annual  cost  to  purchase  water  from   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p 3/12/16 DWSD  will  steadily  increase  to  $23M  per  year  by  fiscal  year  2020 Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df Department  of  Treasury  retains  Tucker,  Young,  Jackson  and  Tull  (TYJT)  to  evaluate   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p 3/12/16 KWA  proposal  to  the  City  of  Flint Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df Michigan  voters  overturn  state's  EM  Law  (Public  Act  4)  in  referendum.  Kurtz  remains   MLive  (Nov.  7,  2012):  "Flint  gains  public  safety  millage,  loses   3/12/16 as  Flint's  EFM  under  Public  Act  72 emergency  manager  law"  (Longley) www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/11/flint_gains_public_safety_mill.html Flint  EFM  Kurtz  sends  letter  to  State  Treasurer  Andy  Dillon  indicating  that  a  proposal   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p from  DWSD  is  expected,  but  that  the  initial  assessment  shows  switching  to  KWA  is  in   3/12/16 Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df the  best  interest  of  the  City  of  Flint MLive  (Dec.  12,  2012):  "Michigan  House  approves  new  emergency   Michigan  legislature  approves  new  EM  law 3/12/16 manager  legislation"  (Eggert) www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2012/12/michigan_house_approves_new_em.html Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3 Date Event Reference  Document Sources Accessed 2013 January  23,  2013 February  6,  2013 March  2013 March  25,  2013 March  26,  2013 March  26,  2013 March  27,  2013 March  28,  2013 March  28,  2013 March  29,  2013 March  29,  2013 April  1,  2013 April  11,  2013 April  15,  2013 April  15,  2013 April  16,  2013 April  16,  2013 April  17,  2013 Prysby/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Liane  Shekter  Smith,  head  of  ODWMA,  and  other  colleagues   re:  feasibility  of  Flint  switching  to  Flint  River.  “I  agree  that  the  city  should  have   concerns  of  fully  utilizing  the  Flint  River  (100%)  for  the  following:  the  need  to  soften,   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ the  potential  for  more  advanced  treatment  after  next  round  of  crypto  monitoring,   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" available  capacity  in  Flint  River  at  100-­‐year  low  flow,  residuals  management   (disposal  of  lime  sludge).” TYJT  issues  final  report  to  Department  of  Treasury  on  comparison  between  KWA   www.scribd.com/doc/131442949/City-­‐of-­‐Flint-­‐Water-­‐Supply-­‐ "City  of  Flint  Water  Supply  Assessment,"  prepared  by  TYJT   and  DWSD,  raising  concerns  about  KWA  cost  estimates  and  system  governance Assessment-­‐Final-­‐Report-­‐February-­‐6-­‐2013 DWSD  contacts  City  of  Flint  to  begin  direct  negotiations  on  contract  extension.   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p Multiple  options  are  provided  to  Flint  EFM  Kurtz Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df Flint  City  Council  approves  resolution  to  buy  water  from  KWA  and  contract  with   "Amended  Resolution  to  Purchase  Capacity  from  Karegnondi   KWA  to  build  a  pipeline  from  Lake  Huron  to  Genesee  County.  Council  votes  7-­‐1  to   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p Water  Authority"  included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.   leave  DWSD  and  go  to  KWA  for  water  supply.  Council's  vote  is  not  binding;  final   df 20,  2016  (pp.  142-­‐3/274) decision  to  switch  from  DWSD  to  KWA  is  Treasurer  Dillon's Genesee  County  Drain  Commissioner  Jeffrey  Wright  issues  statement  praising  Flint   media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_474a2f7e6f0902948ba9327284c796 Press  release  posted  online City  Council  for  approving  resolution  to  join  KWA 01.pdf Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  MDEQ  Director  Wyant  with  Shekter  Smith  and  other  MDEQ   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ staff  copied,  warning  about  Flint  River  water  quality  and  microbial/DBP  risks Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Sygo/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Busch  re:  Flint  River  water  source  switch.  “As  you  might  guess   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   we  are  in  a  situation  with  Emergency  Financial  Managers  so  it’s  entirely  possible   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" that  they  will  be  making  decisions  relative  to  cost." Treasurer  Dillon  e-­‐mails  Gov.  Snyder  recommending  support  for  Flint's  decision  to   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ join  KWA Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" MLive  (March  27,  2013):  "Ed  Kurtz  expected  to  remain  Flint's   State  of  Michigan's  new  EM  law,  Public  Act  436,  takes  effect;  Kurtz  remains  in  place   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/03/ed_kurtz_expecte emergency  manager  through  June  30  as  new  state  law  takes  effect   as  Flint  EM d_to_stay_be_f.html Thursday,  March  28"  (Adams) City  of  Flint  enacts  resolution  signed  by  EM  Kurtz,  City  Attorney  and  Finance  Director   "By  the  Emergency  Manager:  Resolution  to  Purchase  Capacity   Attachment  5  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.  6,   to  purchase  capacity  from  KWA from  Karegnondi  Water  Authority" 2015 Letter  from  EM  Kurtz  to  Treasury  referenced  in  letter  of  approval   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p Flint  EM  Kurtz  requests  state  approval  of  Flint  purchasing  capacity  from  KWA from  Treasurer  Dillon,  included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released   df Jan.  20,  2016  (p.  140/274) Detroit  Free  Press  (February  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis   DWSD  issues  statement  that  Flint's  water  supply  plan  will  not  save  money www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ Unfolded"  (Dixon) State  Treasurer  Andy  Dillon  authorizes  Flint  EM  Kurtz,  pursuant  to  Section  12(3)  of   Letter  of  approval  from  Treasurer  Dillon  included  in  Gov.  Snyder's   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p PA  436  of  2012,  to  enter  into  a  contract  with  KWA  if  a  final  offer  from  DWSD  is   e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.  140/274) df either  not  received  or  rejected  in  good  faith  based  upon  specific  objections DWSD  (McCormick)  letter  to  Flint  EM  Kurtz  and  KWA. reason.com/assets/db/14537555551018.pdf DWSD  provides  a  best  and  final  offer  to  the  City  of  Flint,  representing  20%  savings   ThinkProgress  (Jan.  25,  2016):  "Leaked  Documents  Undermine   thinkprogress.org/health/2016/01/25/3742625/documents-­‐ compared  to  KWA  proposal Official  Story  Of  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (Israel) michigan-­‐contradict-­‐flint-­‐narrative-­‐snyder/ Analyses  by  Flint  EM  Kurtz,  MDEQ  and  Treasury’s  Office  of  Fiscal  Responsibility   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p independently  conclude  that  the  KWA  option  is  cheaper  for  the  City  of  Flint Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df GCDC  Commissioner  Wright  and  Flint  EM  Kurtz  issue  joint  statement  re:  why  KWA  is   www.gcdcwws.com/images/contentImages/file/Press%20Release Press  release  posted  to  GCDC  website preferable  to  DWSD's  final  offer .Official.Final%20Decision%20on%20KWA.pdf Flint  EM  Kurtz  signs  agreement  with  KWA  and  informs  State  Treasurer  Dillon  that   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p the  City  will  join  KWA  (decision  officially  announced  May  1,  2013) Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df DWSD  transmits  letter  to  Flint  EM  Kurtz  terminating  service  to  the City  of  Flint  effective  April  17,  2014 Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Press  Release:  DWSD  Director  Makes  Statement  on  Flint's   Decision,  provided  by  MDEQ. Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  11,  2015):  “Chemical  testing  could  have   predicted  Flint's  water  crisis”  (Wisely,  Erb). The  Detroit  News  (Jan.  6,  2016):  "Ex-­‐Detroit  official  reignites  Flint   water  switch  tiff"  (Lynch) Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Attachment  6  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.  6,   2015. www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/10/missed-­‐ opportunities-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/73688428/ www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/01/26/ex-­‐detroit-­‐official-­‐reignites-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐switch-­‐ tiff/79379770/ 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 4 Date Event May  1,  2013 GCDC  announces  rejection  of  DWSD's  final  offer  and  partnership  with  KWA May  29,  2013 Kurtz  sends  Gov.  Snyder  resignation  letter  indicating  July  3,  2013  will  be  his  last  day June  1,  2013 KWA  begins  construction  on  pipeline  project City  of  Flint  decides  to  use  the  Flint  River  as  a  water  source,  per  Gov.  Snyder   June  2013 timeline Flint  EM  Kurtz  signs  resolution  that  allows  Flint  to  hire  the  engineering  firm   June  26,  2013 Lockwood,  Andrews,  and  Newnam  (LAN)  to  prepare  Flint  WTP  for  full-­‐time   operation  using  Flint  River  as  primary  drinking  water  supply  source June  2013 Flint  notifies  MDEQ  of  intent  to  operate  Flint  Water  Treatment  Plant  full  time  using   Flint  River  for  drinking  water June  26,  2013 Michael  Brown  is  again  appointed  by  Gov.  Snyder  as  Flint  EM Groundbreaking  for  KWA  begins.  City  of  Flint  also  requests  DEQ  approval  for  full-­‐ June  26,  2013 time  use  of  the  Flint  WTP  with  Flint  River  water  as  source June  28,  2013 KWA  hosts  Pipeline  Groundbreaking  Ceremony Financing  Contract  between  City  of  Flint  and  KWA  is  approved,  effective  August  1,   2013  (document  is  signed  by  EM  Michael  Brown) City  of  Flint,  Genesee  County,  MDEQ  and  LAN  representatives  meet  at  Flint  WTP  to   discuss  feasibility  of  using  Flint  River  as  a  temporary  water  supply  source  while   June  29,  2013 waiting  for  KWA  to  come  online.  Flint  DPW  and  Finance  Department  recommend   using  the  Flint  River  as  a  temporary  water  source. June  28,  2013 June  30,  2013 Flint  EM  Kurtz  submits  "City  of  Flint  Financial  &  Operating  Plan,  Third  Update"  (and   EM  Kurtz's  closing  memorandum)  to  MI  Treasury  Dept. Reference  Document Sources Announcement  and  attachments  from  Kevin  Sylvester,  GCDC   www.gcdcwws.com/images/contentImages/file/Final%20KWA%2 Communications  Director,  posted  to  GCDC  website 0Decision.05.01.13.pdf MLive  (May  30,  2013):  "Flint  emergency  manager  Ed  Kurtz  submits   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/05/flint_4.html resignation  notice  to  the  state"  (Adams) Detroit  Free  Press  (February  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ Unfolded"  (Dixon) Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016);  no  other   mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. documentation  located pdf Resolution:   Resolution  posted  online. mediad.publicbroadcasting.net/p/michigan/files/201512/water_p Detroit  Free  Press  (February  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis   lan_resolution.pdf?_ga=1.129405580.1036207224.1446746452 Unfolded"  (Dixon). www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ Referenced  in  MLive  (Oct.  26,  2015):  "Ex-­‐emergency  manager  says   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/ex-­‐ local  leaders  made  decision  to  use  Flint  River  water"  (Fonger)  and   emergency_manager_says_loca.html in  Detroit  Free  Press  (Nov.  22,  2015):  "Flint  water  mystery:  How   www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/21/snyders-­‐top-­‐ was  decision  made?"  (Egan) aide-­‐talked-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐supply-­‐alternatives/76037130/ Attachment  7  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.  6,   Flint  WTP  Facility  Meeting  Agenda 2015 MLive  (June  30,  2015):  "He's  back:  A  timeline  of  Michael  Brown's   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/06/hes_back_a_timel moves  as  Flint's  emergency  manager"  (Adams) ine_of_michael.html Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sept.  28,  2015),  included   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df Brochure:  "KWA  Pipeline  Groundbreaking  Ceremony  -­‐  Dawn  of  a   Attachment  8  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.  6,   New  Era" 2015 Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sept.  28,  2015),  included   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df "City  of  Flint  Water  System  Questions  and  Answers,"  dated   www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/CoF-­‐Water-­‐System-­‐ January  13,  2015. QA.pdf Detroit  Free  Press  (February  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ Unfolded"  (Dixon) www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐ "City  of  Flint  Financial  &  Operating  Plan  -­‐  Third  Update"  posted  to   content/uploads/Reports/City%20of%20Flint%20Update%203%20 City  of  Flint  website Financial%20&%20Operating%20Plan%20062813.pdf Accessed 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 July  2013 City  of  Flint  begins  testing  Flint  River  water  treatment  at  Flint  WTP  "to  see  if  the   river  could  adequately  supply  drinking  water  during  KWA  pipeline  construction" MLive  (July  23,  2015):  "Flint  River  now  an  option  for  drinking  water   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/07/city_readying_wat following  Detroit's  termination  of  contract"  (Adams) er_plant_to_t.html 3/12/16 July  8,  2013 City  of  Flint  retains  Lockwood  Andrews  &  Newnam  (LAN)  engineering  firm  to  get the  City’s  WTP  up  and  running  while  KWA  pipeline  is  built Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sept.  28,  2015),  included   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df 3/12/16 Rowe  Professional  Services  Company  completes  an  engineering  proposal  for   From  October  2014  MDEQ  briefing  to  the  Snyder  Administration  -­‐   August  2013 improvements  to  the  Flint  WTP  that  would  allow  continuous  operation  of  the  WTP   as  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ utilizing  the  Flint  River  in  lieu  of  continuing  service  from  DWSD Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Michael  Brown  resigns  as  Flint  EM,  effective  October  31,  2013,  and  Darnell  Earley  is   MLive  (Sept.  11,  2013):  "New  Flint  emergency  manager  Darnell   appointed  as  replacement Earley  to  take  over  after  Michael  Brown  resigns"  (Adams) City  of  Flint  Water  Timeline:  “City  receives  engineered  estimates   October  3,  2013 City  of  Flint  publishes  engineering  costs  for  Flint  WTP  upgrade on  the  ability  to  upgrade  the  Flint  Water  Plant  along  with  costs   estimates” September  2013 3/12/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/09/michael_brown_r esigns_as_flint.html 3/12/16 www.flintneighborhoodsunited.org/wp-­‐ content/uploads/2015/03/COf-­‐TTHM-­‐Data.pdf 3/12/16 2014 KWA  Board  of  Directors  adopts  Resolution  2014-­‐01,  authorizing  KWA  to  bond  for   February  19,  2014 water  line  construction  on  behalf  of  City  of  Flint Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_86bc474fd0d94f019332018dcba332 February  27,  2014 MDEQ  approves  KWA  permit  for  Lake  Huron  Pump  Station MDEQ  Permit  142004 9a.pdf Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sept.  28,  2015),  included   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p March  1,  2014 City  of  Flint  enters  consent  agreement  with  MDEQ  re:  Flint  WTP's  lime  sludge  facility in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016    (p.  39/274) df Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/12/16 1/31/16 3/12/16 5 Date March  7,  2014 March  26,  2014 April  9,  2014 April  16,  2014 April  17,  2014 April  17,  2014 April  21,  2014 Event Reference  Document Sources Flint  EM  Earley  sends  letter  to  Sue  McCormick/DWSD  explaining  that  the  City  of   Attached  as  Ex.  10  to  ACLU  Michigan's  November  16,  2015  letter   www.aclumich.org/article/flint-­‐residents-­‐sue-­‐city-­‐state-­‐over-­‐lead-­‐ Flint  has  "actively  pursued  using  the  Flint  River  as  a  temporary  water  source"   announcing  federal  lawsuit drinking-­‐water instead  of  accepting  DWSD's  offer  to  provide  water  to  the  City Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Shekter  Smith  and  Benzie/MDEQ  re:  uncertainty  on  startup   requirements  for  Flint  WTP.  “...  I  would  like  to  make  sure  everyone  is  on  the  same   page  on...  what  Flint  will  be  required  to  do  in  order  to  start  using  their  plant  full   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ time...  starting  up  for  continuous  operation  will  carry  significant  changes  in   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" regulatory  requirements  so  there  is  a  very  gray  area  as  to  what  we  consider  for   startup.” MDEQ  issues  Flint  WTP  construction  permits  for  full  time  operation  enhancements Attachment  9  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.  6,   MDEQ  Construction  Permits  W141025  and  W141026 W141025  and  W141026 2015 Flint  laboratory  and  water  quality  supervisor  Michael  Glasgow  e-­‐mails  Adam   Rosenthal/MDEQ  requesting  information.  ""I  am  expecting  changes  to  our  Water   Quality  Monitoring  parameters,  and  possibly  our  DBP  on  lead  &  copper  monitoring   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ plan…  Any  information  would  be  appreciated,  because  it  looks  as  if  we  will  be   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" starting  the  plant  up  tomorrow  and  are  being  pushed  to  start  distributing  water  as   soon  as  possible" Glasgow/Flint  e-­‐mails  Rosenthal,  Prysby  and  Busch/MDEQ.  “If  water  is  distributed   from  this  plant  in  the  next  couple  of  weeks,  it  will  be  against  my  direction.  I  need   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (February  13,  2016):  "E-­‐mails:  Flint  water  plant   time  to  adequately  train  additional  staff  and  to  update  our  monitoring  plans  before  I   crisis/2016/02/12/e-­‐mails-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐plant-­‐rushed-­‐into-­‐ was  rushed  into  operation"  (Egan,  Spangler,  Shamus) will  feel  we  are  ready.  I  will  reiterate  this  to  management  above  me,  but  they  seem   operation/80300220/ to  have  their  own  agenda." Water  service  from  DWSD  officially  ends.  City  of  Flint  also  conducts  two  separate   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p public  forums  regarding  the  use  of  Flint  River  water,  upgrades  to  City’s  water  system   Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df and  overall  cost  of  switch  to  KWA media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_7126cbc7d5cb453f94d0549a370298 MDEQ  approves  KWA  permit  for  Intermediate  Pump  Station MDEQ  Permit  142023 d9.pdf Accessed 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  re:  proposed  talking  points  for  the  water   switch  ceremony  to  be  held  in  two  days.  Suggests:  “While  the  Department  is   satisfied  with  the  City’s  ability  to  treat  water  from  the  Flint  River,  the  Department   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   April  23,  2014 looks  forward  to  the  long  term  solution  of  continued  operation  of  the  City  of  Flint   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Water  Treatment  Plant  using  water  from  the  KWA  as  a  more  consistent  and  higher   quality  source  water.” bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 Daugherty  Johnson,  Flint  Utilities  Administrator,  e-­‐mails  Flint  colleague  Howard   April  24,  2014 Croft  and  Prysby  and  Busch/MDEQ  requesting  concurrence  that  there  is  no   regulatory  requirement  for  Flint  to  sign  up  a  back-­‐up  agreement  with  DWSD As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 City  of  Flint  officially  switches  its  water  source  to  the  Flint  River,  using  Flint  WTP  for   treatment,  and  hosts  “changeover  ceremony,"  public  event  marking  the  transition   April  25,  2014 to  use  of  Flint  River  water.  MDEQ  information  shows  that  transition  complete  by   May  2015 MDEQ  e-­‐mail  dated  April  28,  2014  describing  Flint  WTP  startup   ceremony  on  April  25. MLive  (April  25,  2014):  "Closing  the  valve  on  history:  Flint  cuts   water  flow  from  Detroit  after  nearly  50  years"  (Adams). City  of  Flint  press  release  included  in  Snyder  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.   20,  2016  (p.  15) Attachment  10  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015. www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/04/closing_the_valve _on_history_f.html somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df 3/12/16 MLive  (May  13,  2014):  "Kincaid,  Flint  residents  take  water  rate   lawsuit  to  federal  court"  (Fonger) www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/05/kincaid_flint_resid ents_take_w.html 3/12/16 As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 Flint  EM  Earley  notifies  Detroit  EM  that  Flint  has  switched  water  supply  sources  to   the  Flint  River.  GCDC  remains  as  a  non-­‐contract  customer  of  DWSD City  Council  President  Scott  Kincaid  and  two  other  Flint  residents  file  suit  re:  City  of   May  4,  2014 Flint  water  rates  in  federal  court Jennifer  Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mails  colleagues  Mindy  Eisenberg,  Thomas  Poy  and  Tinka   Hyde/EPA  re:  concerns  about  Flint  drinking  water  expressed  by  resident  Lathan   Jefferson.  "Flint  River  quality  is  not  great,  but  there  is  a  surface  water  treatment   May  15,  2014 plan  producing  water  that  is  currently  meeting  SDWA  standards...  his  doctor  says   the  rash  is  from  the  new  drinking  water...  He  has  no  interest  in  speaking  with  Mike   Prysby;  he  doesn’t  trust  anyone  in  MI  government." April  29,  2014 Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Information  provided  to  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 6 Date Event Resident  complaints  intensify  re:  water  quality;  Flint  WTP  operators  boost  use  of   lime  to  address  hardness  concerns Adam  Rosenthal/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Mike  Glasgow/Flint  confirming  no  orthophosphate   June  17,  2014 monitoring  is  necessary  at  Flint  WTP,  since  no  orthophosphate  is  being  added June  2014 July  1,  2014 Flint  begins  first  6-­‐month  monitoring  period  for  lead  and  copper  in  drinking  water Reference  Document Sources MLive  (June  12,  2014):  "City  adding  more  lime  to  Flint  River  water   as  resident  complaints  pour  in"  (Fonger) MLive  (Feb.  17,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis  unfolds  in  key  officials'   emails  through  the  years" www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/06/treated_flint_river _water_meet.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/see_flint_water_c risis_unfold.html#4 mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. pdf www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/10/missed-­‐ opportunities-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/73688428/ media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_cc139234530f4fca8bbfb8768ef25d4 a.pdf media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_d1b6e185aadc4cb4adbaf737e9421a 96.pdf Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  11,  2015):  "Chemical  testing  could  have   prevented  Flint's  water  crisis" July  16,  2014 MDEQ  approves  KWA  permit  for  pipeline MDEQ  Permit  142044 July  29,  2014 MDEQ  approves  KWA  permit  for  12-­‐mile  transmission  main MDEQ  Permit  142049 City  of  Flint  issues  boil  water  advisory  due  to  E.  coli  bacteria  violation  (Localized   August  15,  2014 System  Boil  Water  Advisory);  City  increases  flushing  of  water  mains  and  boosts   chlorine  disinfectant  use.  Advisory  lifted  Aug.  20,  2014 Second  boil  water  advisory  is  issued  due  to  coliform  bacteria  detected  in  drinking   September  5,  2014 water  (expanded  on  Sept.  7,  2015);  City  boosts  chlorine  use  again.  Advisory  lifted   Sep.  9,  2014 September  10,  2014 October  2014 October  1,  2014 October  13,  2014 October  13,  2014 October  14,  2014 October  17,  2014 October  21,  2014 November  1,  2014 November  1,  2014 November  7,  2014 E-­‐mail  correspondence  and  public  notifications  from  MDEQ Attachment  11  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 MDEQ  e-­‐mail  dated  September  25,  2014;  expansion  referenced  in   MLive  (Sep.  7,  2014):  "Flint  expands  boil  water  advisory  area  after   more  positive  tests  for  total  coliform  bacteria"  (Fonger) Detroit  Free  Press  (February  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis   Unfolded"  (Dixon) MDEQ  Memo:  "Compliance  Communication  -­‐  TTHM  Operational   Evaluation  Requested" MLive  (Jan.  16,  2016):  "Public  never  told,  but  investigators   suspected  Flint  River  tie  to  Legionnaires'  in  2014"  (Fonger) Attachments  12  &  13  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF   Nov.  6,  2015. www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/09/flint_expands_boil _water.html www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ Attachment  12  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/01/documents_show _agencies_knew_o.html MDEQ  requests  preemptive  Operational  Evaluation  for  Disinfection  Byproducts  -­‐   total  trihalomethanes  (TTHMs) Genesee  County  Health  Department  initially  expresses  concern  to  Flint  Water  re:   increased  incidence  of  Legionellosis  and  possible  connection  to  water  supply Snyder  requests  and  receives  a  briefing  paper  from  MDEQ  re:  Flint  water  issues.  The   Attachment  13  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   paper  blames  Sep.  2014  boil  water  advisories  on  variety  of  factors,  mostly  aging  cast   Governor's  Office  Briefing  Paper  -­‐  City  of  Flint  Drinking  Water 6,  2015 iron  pipes.  No  mention  of  lead  issues GM  announces  it  is  switching  from  City  of  Flint  water  system  to  Flint  Township  (Lake   Huron)  water  for  its  Flint  Engine  Operations  facility  until  KWA  connection  is   MLive  (Oct.  13,  2014):  "General  Motors  shutting  off  Flint  River   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/10/general_motors_ complete,  citing  corrosion  concerns.  Prysby/MDEQ  notes  Flint  water  chloride  levels   water  at  engine  plant  over  corrosion  worries"    (Fonger) wont_use_flint.html are  "easily  within"  public  health  guidelines.    Annual  revenue  loss  of  $400,000 Prysby/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Busch,  Shekter  Smith  and  others  at  MDEQ  re:  inquiry  from   E-­‐mail  from  Mike  Prysby/MDEQ  dated  October  13,  2014  discussing   Attachment  14  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   Ron  Fonger/MLive  concerning  GM's  switch  to  Lake  Huron  water.  Notes  Flint  water   interview  with  Fonger 6,  2015 has  elevated  chlorides  but  "although  not  optimal,"  it  is  "satisfactory." Valerie  Brader,  State  Deputy  Legal  Counsel  and  Sr.  Policy  Advisor,  sends  e-­‐mail  to   Governor’s  Chief  of  Staff  Dennis  Muchmore  and  other  top  aides  arguing  for  a  return   to  DWSD  because  of  water  quality  problems.  Michael  Gadola,  then  Gov.  Snyder’s   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  26,  2016):  "Top  Snyder  aides  urged  going   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Legal  Counsel,  responds  agreeing  with  Brader.  Brader  and  Rich  Baird,  senior  aide  to   back  to  Detroit  water"  (Dolan,  Egan) crisis/2016/02/26/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐snyder-­‐detroit/80926138/ Gov.  Snyder,  discuss  the  idea  with  EM  Earley,  who  maintains  water  quality  problems   can  be  solved  and  it  would  be  cost-­‐prohibitive  to  return  to  DWSD Genesee  Co.  Health  Department  (GCHD)  representatives  hold  conference  call  with   MLive  (Feb.  17,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis  unfolds  in  key  officials'   Glasgow  and  Wright/Flint  DPW  re:  county's  concerns  about  Legionellosis  outbreak   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/see_flint_water_c emails  through  the  years"  -­‐  provides  screen  capture  of  e-­‐mail   and  possible  connection  to  city's  water  system.  DPW  "acknowledges  that  the   risis_unfold.html#4 describing  conference  call distribution  system  has  areas  of  concern" Susan  Bohm/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  GCHD  officials  re:  Shekter  Smith's  concern  that  Flint   Detroit  Free  Press  (February  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ water  would  be  publicly  linked  to  Legionellosis  outbreak  in  Flint.  "I  told  her  the  Flint   concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ water  was  at  this  point  just  a  hypothesis" Wisely) info/80028820/ "Operational  Evaluation  Report,  City  of  Flint,  Trihalomethane   LAN  issues  Operational  Evaluation  Report  to  City  of  Flint,  assessing  factors   Formation  Concern,"  Nov.  2014,  prepared  by  LAN,  posted  to  City   www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/Operational-­‐Evaluation-­‐ contributing  to  TTHM  levels  in  Flint  drinking  water of  Flint  website.  Referenced  in  EPA's  Interim  Report  dated  June  24,   Report.pdf 2015 Flint  DPW  increases  hydrant  flushing  to  reduce  the  residence  time  of  water  in  the   Flint  Water  System  Timeline,  posted  on  City  of  Flint  website www.cityofflint.com/public-­‐works/city-­‐water-­‐system-­‐timeline/ distribution  system City  of  Flint  staff  and  engineering  team  meet  with  MDEQ  to  discuss  quarterly  TTHM   Flint  Water  System  Timeline,  posted  on  City  of  Flint  website www.cityofflint.com/public-­‐works/city-­‐water-­‐system-­‐timeline/ results Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Accessed 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 1/31/16 1/31/16 7 Date Event Reference  Document MLive  (Jan.  8,  2015):  "Flint  report  says  getting  water  from  Detroit   is  possible  but  would  cost  $4  million  just  to  reconnect"  (Fonger) City  of  Flint  begins  hydraulic  modeling  to  "help  identify  locations  of  bad  valves" Flint  Water  System  Timeline,  posted  on  City  of  Flint  website MDEQ  notifies  Flint  of  initial  quarterly  violation  of  SDWA  Disinfection  Byproducts   MDEQ  Letter:  Violation  Notice  -­‐  MCL  for  TTHM  Operational   (TTHM)  requirements Evaluation  -­‐  TTHM,  4th  Quarter  2014  Monitoring  Period Flint’s  GM  engine  plant  switches  off  its  water  supply  from  Flint's  water  system,   Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  11,  2015):  "Chemical  testing  could  have   drawing  water  instead  from  neighboring  Flint  Township predicted  Flint's  water  crisis"  (Wisely,  Erb) First  6-­‐month  round  of  lead  and  copper  monitoring  (per  MDEQ's  interpretation  of   MDEQ  Letter:  City  of  Flint  -­‐  Lead  and  Copper  Monitoring  of   LCR)  ends.  Results  due  from  City  of  Flint  to  MDEQ  on  January  10,  2015.  100  samples   Drinking  Water  Taps,  dated  March  30,  2015;  MDEQ  e-­‐mail  dated   within  90th  percentile  lead  level,  6  ppb;  2  samples  above  lead  action  level Feb  27,  2015 November  26,  2014 LAN  issues  report  on  cost  of  reconnection  to  DWSD December  1,  2014 December  16,  2014 December  27,  2014 December  31,  2014 Sources www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_report_says_ going_back_t.html www.cityofflint.com/public-­‐works/city-­‐water-­‐system-­‐timeline/ www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/City-­‐of-­‐Flint-­‐Violation-­‐ Notice-­‐MCL-­‐TTHM-­‐12_16_14.pdf www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/10/missed-­‐ opportunities-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/73688428/ Accessed 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 Attachment  16  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 2015 January  2015 January  1,  2015 January  2,  2015 January  7,  2015 January  7,  2015 January  9,  2015 January  12,  2015 January  12,  2015 January  13,  2015 January  13,  2015 January  21,  2015 January  21,  2015 January  23,  2015 January  27,  2015 Officials  from  Genesee  County  hospitals,  MDHHS,  MDEQ,  GCHD  meet  re:   Legionellosis  outbreak  in  Flint.  MDHHS  Director  Nick  Lyon  directs  GCHD  to  conduct   Information  provided  by  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force and  complete  its  evaluation  of  causes  of  the  increased  cases   City  of  Flint  begins  second  6-­‐month  monitoring  period  for  lead  and  copper  in   mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) drinking  water pdf City  of  Flint  issues  press  release  and  mails  notice  to  water  customers  stating  the  City   Department  of  Treasury  timeline  (dated  Sep.  28,  2015),  included  in   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p water  system  exceeds  maximum  contaminant  level  (MCL)  for  total  trihalomethanes   Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  93-­‐94/274) df (TTHMs),  which  are  disinfection  byproducts Michigan  Department  of  Technology,  Management  and  Budget  announces   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (January  29,  2016):  "Amid  denials,  state  workers   installation  of  water  coolers  in  Flint's  State  Office  Building.  "The  coolers…  will  be   crisis/2016/01/28/amid-­‐denials-­‐state-­‐workers-­‐flint-­‐got-­‐clean-­‐ in  Flint  got  clean  water"  (Egan) provided  as  long  as  the  public  water  does  not  meet  treatment  requirements." water/79470650/ Richard  Benzie/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  colleagues  re:  discussion  of  Flint  water  issues  with   State  Representative  Sheldon  Neely  (D-­‐Flint)  and  others.  "...there  appears  to  be  a   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ significant  (I  think  they  used  the  word  complete)  loss  of  public  confidence  in  the   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" drinking  water  quality  in  Flint" University  of  Michigan-­‐Flint  alerted  city  officials  that  it  found  elevated  lead  levels  in   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   two  locations  on  campus,  prompting  the  school  to  shut  off  some  drinking  fountains   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ (Dixon) and  add  water  filters  to  others mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. DWSD  offers  to  reconnect  to  Flint  and  waive  $4  million  connection  fee Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) pdf MDEQ  staff  (Prysby,  Shekter  Smith,  Benzie,  numerous  others)  communicate  via  e-­‐ mail  re:  decision  to  provide  water  coolers  at  Flint's  State  Office  building.  Some   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ discussion  re:  how  this  decision  will  affect  Flint  residents'  perceptions  of  drinking   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" water  safety,  and  how  the  decision  will  "make  it  more  difficult...  for  ODWMA  staff" Gov.  Snyder  announces  that  Jerry  Ambrose,  who  previously  served  as  Flint's  finance   MLive  (Jan.  13,  2015):  "Jerry  Ambrose  named  Flint's  fourth   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/jerry_ambrose_ta and  administration  director,  will  replace  Earley  as  Flint  EM emergency  manager  as  Darnell  Earley  heads  to  Detroit"  (Adams) pped_as_next_e.html Flint  DPW  posts  water  system  FAQs  re:  bacteria  and  TTHM  issues  in  Flint  water,  and   "City  of  Flint  Water  System  Questions  and  Answers,"  dated   www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/CoF-­‐Water-­‐System-­‐ decision  to  switch  to  Flint  River  as  temporary  water  supply January  13,  2015 QA.pdf City  of  Flint  holds  public  meeting  re:  disinfection  byproducts  and  bacteria;  residents   Attachment  17  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   City  of  Flint  -­‐  Public  Forum  Agenda attend,  bringing  containers  of  water  from  their  taps.  LeeAnne  Walters  shows   6,  2015. MLive  (Jan.  21,  2015):  "Officials  say  Flint  water  is  getting  better,   samples  of  discolored  water  taken  from  her  taps  on  Jan.  15  and  Jan.  21,  2015,  to  EM   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/state_water_offici but  many  residents  unsatisfied"  (Fonger) Ambrose als_tell_fli.html Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  colleagues  re:  Flint  water  supply  .  "...when  Flint   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   decided  to  leave  Detroit  and  operate  using  the  River,  our  role  wasn’t  to  tell  them   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" our  opinion;  only  what  steps  would  be  necessary  to  make  the  switch” Walling  says  decision  to  use  Flint  River  water  was  made  by  former  EM  Earley  [who   MLive  (Jan.  23,  2015):  "Flint  water  problems:  Switch  aimed  to  save   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flints_dilemma_h later  disputes  this  statement] $5  million  -­‐-­‐  but  at  what  cost"  (Fonger) ow_much_to_spe.html GCHD  environmental  health  supervisor  James  Henry  e-­‐mails  colleagues  re:  inability   to  obtain  information  from  local  and  state  officials  needed  to  investigate  connection   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ of  Flint  water  system  to  Legionellosis  outbreak.  "Initially  the  water  plant  was   concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ cooperative,  but  since  the  beginning  of  November  they  have  not  responded  to   Wisely) info/80028820/ multiple  written  and  verbal  requests" Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 8 Date Event Reference  Document Shannon  Johnson,  MDHHS  epidemiologist,  emails  GCHD  re:  Legionellosis  outbreak   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   and  investigating  possible  connection  to  the  Flint  water  system.  "A  current  map  of   January  27,  2015 concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   the  municipal  water  system  needs  to  be  obtained  and  cases’  residences  mapped  in   Wisely) relation  to  the  water  system” January  29,  2015 Flint  EM  Ambrose  declines  DWSD  offer  to  reconnect  Flint  to  Detroit  water  supply Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) MLive  (Jan.  29,  2015):  "Flint  emergency  manager  says  there  are   two  big  reasons  not  to  reconnect  Detroit  water"  (Fonger) Sygo  and  Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  e-­‐mail  re:  Flint  water  quality  problems.  Shekter   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   January  29,  2015 Smith  identifies  the  problem  as  corrosion  across  the  distribution  system  rather  than   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" a  "premise  plumbing"  issue Brad  Wurfel/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Dave  Murray,  Governor  Snyder’s  deputy  press  secretary,   re:  Legionella,  saying  said  he  didn’t  want  MDEQ  Director  Wyant  “to  say  publicly  that   Detroit  News  (Feb.  26,  2016):  "Legionnaires’  fear  led  staffer  to   January  30,  2015 the  water  in  Flint  is  safe  until  we  get  the  results  of  some  county  health  department   warn  against  calling  water  safe"  (Oosting) traceback  work  on  42  cases  of  Legionnaires  disease  in  Genesee  County  since  last   May” February  1,  2015 February  2,  2015 February  3,  2015 February  4,  2015 February  6,  2015 February  6,  2015 February  10,  2015 February  10,  2015 February  16,  2015 February  18,  2015 February  25,  2015 February  26,  2015 February  26,  2015 Sources www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ info/80028820/ mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. pdf www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_extends.html Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/12/16 3/12/16 bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/26/flint-­‐legionnaires-­‐safe-­‐water-­‐wyant-­‐ snyder/80966744/ 3/19/16 Briefing  memo  is  prepared  for  Gov.  Snyder  on  Flint  water  situation,  including  info  on   residents'  complaints  about  water  quality,  Mayor  Walling's  call  for  assistance,  and   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  54-­‐62/274) MDEQ  "backgrounder"  downplaying  health  risks.  Wurfel:  "It's  not  like  an  imminent   df threat  to  public  health" City  of  Flint  DPW  issues  letter  to  customers  offering  testing  for  discoloration,  taste   www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015_02_02-­‐Water-­‐ Letter  posted  to  City  of  Flint  website and  odor Test-­‐Letter.pdf Gov.  Snyder  awards  Flint  $2  million  to  find  leaks  in  city  water  lines  and  replace  a   MLive  (Feb.  3,  2015):  “Governor  Awards  Flint  $2  million  for   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/02/governor_awards wastewater  incinerator,  part  of  state's  $8  million  Distressed  Cities  program Troubled  Water  System:  Mayor  Says  More  is  Needed”  (Fonger) _flint_2_millio.html Flint  resident  LeeAnne  Walters  shows  Flint  City  Council  a  video  documenting  rashes   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ on  her  son's  skin,  attributed  to  drinking  water (Dixon) Liz  Murphy,  assistant  to  Flint  EM,  and  Prysby/MDEQ  exchange  e-­‐mails  re:  other   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Michigan  systems  that  treat  river  water,  and  a  source  water  assessment  for  Flint   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" River Flint  ABC  affiliate  (ABC12)  posts  report  on  independent  testing  showing  water   www.abc12.com/flintwaterworries/headlines/ABC12-­‐Investigates-­‐ ABC12  (Feb.  6,  2015):  "What's  in  your  water?"  (Elliott) quality  is  within  EPA  limits  for  TTHMs Whats-­‐in-­‐your-­‐water-­‐291074071.html www.cityofflint.com/2015/02/10/flint-­‐hires-­‐international-­‐urban-­‐ City  of  Flint  retains  Veolia  sole-­‐source  to  provide  additional  review  and   Press  release  posted  to  City  of  Flint  website water-­‐experts-­‐of-­‐veolia-­‐north-­‐america-­‐to-­‐assess-­‐citys-­‐water-­‐ recommendations  on  water  system issues/ GCDC  epidemiologist  Shurooq  Hasan  e-­‐mails  outside  expert  about  47  Legionellosis     Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ cases  diagnosed  in  Flint  in  2014,  almost  four  times  the  number  in  2013.  "We…  have   concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ expanded  our  investigation  to  include  the  city  water  supply" Wisely) info/80028820/ City  of  Flint  posts  second  Flint  Water  FAQ  document,  stating  that  Flint  water  is  safe   "City  of  Flint  Water  System  Update  with  Questions  and  Answers,"   www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/Water-­‐Sysytem-­‐FAQ-­‐ to  drink dated  February  16,  2015 Update-­‐2-­‐16-­‐151.pdf Referenced  in  EPA-­‐MDEQ  e-­‐mail  correspondence  dated  February   Attachment  18  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   EPA  collects  additional  samples  at  LeeAnne  Walters's  home 26,  2015 6,  2015 Mike  Glasgow/Flint  DPW  tests  water  in  LeeAnne  Walters's  home  and  finds  high  lead   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ levels  (104  ppb).  She  contacts  Chicago  offices  of  EPA  to  discuss (Dixon) EPA/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  included  in  chronological  compilation  of  e-­‐ Initial  e-­‐mail  correspondence  between  EPA  (Crooks,  Del  Toral,  Poy)  and  MDEQ   mails  from  FOIA  requests,  created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ (Busch,  Prysby)  re:  elevated  lead  in  sample  collected  February  18,  2015  at  LeeAnne   Flint  Water  Study  website. Final.pdf Walters's  home.  Initial  inquiry  made  re:  corrosion  control  treatment  (OCCT)  at  Flint   E-­‐mail  correspondence  between  Mrs.  Walters  and  City  of  Flint   Attachment  18  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   WTP.  Crooks:  "WOW!!!  Did  he  find  LEAD!  104  parts  per  bilion" dated  Feb.  19-­‐26,  2015;  Consumer  Notice  of  Results;  Official   6,  2015 Laboratory  Report. Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  colleagues  Shekter  Smith  and  Benzie  in  response  to  Crooks’   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   email.  “As  indicated  by  Mike  and  Adam  the  city  is  meeting  90th  percentile.  Not  sure   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" why  region  5  [EPA]  sees  this  one  sample  as  such  a  big  deal” Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Accessed 3/12/16 1/31/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 9 Date Event Reference  Document Sources flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ In  continued  e-­‐mail  correspondence,  Del  Toral/EPA  voices  concern  re:  possibility   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests,   Final.pdf February  27,  2015 that  City  of  Flint's  lead  sampling  protocol  (pre-­‐flushing)  is  biasing  lead  results  toward   created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website   Attachment  19  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   the  low  side.  Asks  again  about  OCCT  at  Flint  WTP 6,  2015 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Busch/MDEQ  responds  to  Del  Toral/EPA  saying  that  the  City  of  Flint  "Has  an   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests,   Final.pdf February  27,  2015 Optimized  Corrosion  Control  Program,"  LeeAnne  Walters's  house  is  "not  part  of  the   created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website   Attachment  20  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   City's  established  sample  site  pool"  and  the  residence  has  PVC  plumbing 6,  2015 Accessed 3/12/16 3/12/16 March  3,  2015 In  response  to  complaints  re:  drinking  water  quality  and  related  health  effects,  Flint   EM  Ambrose  claims  costs  will  increase  $12  million  with  return  to  DWSD  service.  He   MLive  (June  5,  2015):  "Lawsuit  seeks  end  to  Flint  River  drinking   provides  memo  to  Deputy  State  Treasurer  Wayne  Workman  stating  reconnection  to   water,  return  to  Detroit"  (Fonger) DWSD  will  cost  the  City  $10.1M/year  and  water  could  be  as  high  as  $1M/month www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/lawsuit_seeks_en d_to_flint_riv.html 3/12/16 March  4,  2015 City  of  Flint/Veolia  Technical  Advisory  Committee  holds  its  first  meeting;  17   members  from  City,  County,  State,  USEPA,  hospitals  &  universities List  of  members  posted  to  City  of  Flint  timeline www.cityofflint.com/public-­‐works/water-­‐advisory-­‐committees/ 3/12/16 MDEQ  Letter:  Violation  Notice  -­‐  MCL  for  TTHM  Operational   Evaluation  -­‐  TTHM,  1st  Quarter  2015  Monitoring  Period MLive  (Feb.  17,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis  unfolds  in  key  officials'   emails  through  the  years"  -­‐  provides  screen  capture  of  partial  e-­‐ mail   Attachment  21  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/see_flint_water_c risis_unfold.html#4 3/12/16 March  5,  2015 MDEQ  issues  second  Disinfection  Byproducts  quarterly  violation  notice March  5,  2015 Officials  in  Governor's  Office  and  MDEQ  begin  discussing  providing  water  filters  to   Flint  citizens March  5,  2015 Citizens  Advisory  Committee  (CAC),  hosted  by  City  of  Flint,  holds  its  first  meeting;   includes  58  members  representing  various  interests List  of  members  posted  to  City  of  Flint  timeline www.cityofflint.com/public-­‐works/water-­‐advisory-­‐committees/ 3/12/16 Harvey  Hollins/Governor's  Office  meets  with  Flint  EM  and  DEQ  officials  to  discuss   possible  solutions  to  Flint  water  issues MLive  (Feb.  17,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis  unfolds  in  key  officials'   emails  through  the  years"  -­‐  provides  screen  capture  of  e-­‐mail   referring  to  meeting   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/see_flint_water_c risis_unfold.html#4 3/12/16 Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mails  Busch,  Prysby  and  Benzie/MDEQ  saying  she  has  been   March  10,  2015 “inundated”  with  citizen  e-­‐mails  referred  to  her  from  the  White  House  about  Flint   water  quality  problems As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 James  Henry/GCHD  e-­‐mails  Howard  Croft/Flint  DPW,  Prysby/MDEQ,  Mayor  Walling   and  others  citing  the  city's  and  state's  lack  of  cooperation  and  failure  to  respond  to   his  requests  for  information  -­‐-­‐  and  a  Jan.  2015  FOIA  -­‐-­‐  to  support  county's   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   March  10,  2015 investigation  of  potential  causes  of  Legionellosis  outbreak  in  Flint.  "This  is  rather   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" glaring  information  and  it  needs  to  be  looked  into  now,  prior  to  the  warmer  summer   months  when  Legionella  is  at  its  peak  and  we  are  potentially  faced  with  a  crisis." bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 Benzie/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  colleagues  Shekter  Smith,  Busch  and  Prysby  re:  thoughts  for  a   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   plan  of  action  on  Legionellosis  response Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  colleagues  Shekter  Smith,  Prysby  and  Benzie  re:  Legionella.  “…   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   March  12,  2015 there  is  no  evidence  or  confirmation  of  Legionella  coming  directly  from  the  Water   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Treatment  Plant  or  in  the  community  water  supply  distribution  system  at  this  time.” bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 March  9,  2015 March  11,  2015 Veolia  issues  Water  Quality  Report  to  City  of  Flint/EM  Ambrose,  an  evaluation   "Flint,  Michigan  Water  Quality  Report,"  prepared  by  Veolia,  posted   Report:  www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/Veolia-­‐REPORT-­‐ providing  advice  primarily  on  TTHM  control  and  other  operational  issues  in  the   to  City  of  Flint  website. Flint-­‐Water-­‐Quality-­‐20150312.pdf March  12,  2015 City's  water  system.  Report  states  that  Flint's  water  meets  state  and  federal   Report  and  accompanying  Veolia  presentation  included  in  Gov.   E-­‐mails:   standards  for  TTHM  control,  but  does  not  address  lead.  Also  recommends  corrosion   Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  151-­‐186/274). somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p control  at  Flint  WTP  to  address  iron  leaching  from  pipes  -­‐  estimated  cost  $50,000 Referenced  in  EPA's  Interim  Report  dated  June  24,  2015. df Wurfel/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Harvey  Hollins/Governor’s  office  and  Wyant/MDEQ  noting   APNewsBreak  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Officials  warned  of  water,   bigstory.ap.org/500a2ef5b57d423d876ef25709af1973 uptick  in  Legionellosis  cases,  placing  responsibility  for  follow-­‐up  on  GCHD,  and   Legionnaires'  link"  (Eggert,  White) www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ March  13,  2015 discounting  Henry/GCHD’s  concerns  about  a  possible  relationship  between  uptick  in   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "E-­‐mails:  Snyder  aide  was  told  of   crisis/2016/02/04/apnewsbreak-­‐officials-­‐warned-­‐of-­‐water-­‐ Legionellosis  and  change  in  water  source Legionnaires'  in  March"  (Egan)  -­‐  includes  link  to  e-­‐mails legionnaires-­‐link/79828466/#read Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Henry/GCHD  re:  Legionellosis  investigation.  Implies  DEQ  has   no  responsibilities  re:  Legionella  since  it  isn't  regulated  by  SDWA;  says  it  isn't  coming   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   March  13,  2015 from  the  WTP  but  could  be  associated  with  main  breaks,  leaks  or  repairs  to   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" distribution  system;  reminds  Henry  that  epidemiological  investigation  is  GCHD's  job   and  directs  him  to  MDCH  (MDHHS)  if  they  need  support Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 10 Date Event Busch/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Croft/Flint  with  instructions  to  conduct  monitoring  for   Legionella  at  the  WTP  tap  and  in  the  distribution  system Water  in  LeeAnne  Walters's  home  is  re-­‐tested  for  lead  following  thorough  flushing;   March  18,  2015 results  are  extremely  high  (397  ppb).  Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mails  Busch,  Prysby  and   Benzie/MDEQ  re:  those  test  results EPA  Region  5  calls  MDEQ  to  express  concerns  about  high  lead  levels  found  in   March  19,  2015 LeeAnne  Walters's  home,  noting  that  they  suspect  lead  is  coming  from  service  line March  17,  2015 March  19,  2015 City  of  Flint  responds  to  61  questions  posed  by  CAC  in  March  5  meeting Henry/GCHD  e-­‐mails  Busch/MDEQ  re:  investigation  of  Legionellosis  outbreak  in   March  19,  2015 Flint,  again  requesting  MDEQ  collaboration  and  providing  documentation  of   previous  requests Flint  City  Council  votes  7-­‐1  to  end  Flint  River  service  and  return  to  Detroit  water   service;  the  vote  is  non-­‐binding  since  Flint  is  under  EM  control.  Flint  EM  Ambrose:   "It  is  incomprehensible  to  me  that...  Flint  City  Council  would  want  to  send  more   March  23,  2015 than  $12  million  a  year  to  the  system  serving  Southeast  Michigan,  even  if  Flint  rate   payers  could  afford  it.  (Lake  Huron)  water  from  Detroit  is  no  safer  than  water  from   Flint." EPA  learns  that  Genesee  County  Health  Department  is  investigating  uptick  in     March  26,  2015 Legionellosis  in  the  county,  including  Flint;  an  EPA  official  questions  whether  it  is   related  to  switch  to  Flint  River  water March  27,  2015 LeeAnne  Walters's  son  is  tested  for  blood  lead  levels;  results  are  above  CDC's  5   ug/dl  "threshold  of  concern" Reference  Document 3/12/16 As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 Detroit  Free  Press,  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"  (Dixon) www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ 3/12/16 "Water  Advisory  Committee  Questions  &  Answers,"  posted  to  City   www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015_03_19-­‐Water-­‐ of  Flint  website Advisory-­‐Comittee-­‐Questions-­‐Answers.pdf 3/12/16 As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" 3/12/16 bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ MLive  (March  24,  2015):  "Emergency  manager  calls  City  Council's   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/03/flint_emergency_ Flint  River  vote  'incomprehensible'"  (Fonger) manager_calls.html 3/12/16 Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ (Dixon) 3/12/16 Flint  Water  Study  website  (Sep.  30,  2015):  "COMMENTARY:  MDEQ   flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-­‐mdeq-­‐mistakes-­‐ Mistakes  and  Deception  Created  the  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (Roy) deception-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/ 3/12/16 MDEQ  notifies  Flint  of  results  of  first  6-­‐month  lead  and  copper  monitoring  period   Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) (July-­‐December  2014)  showing  6  ppb  result Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mails  Busch,  Prysby  and  Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  re:  EPA  conference  call   on  Legionella  in  Flint.  Cites  Del  Toral's  statement  that  the  city's  aggressive  pre-­‐ As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (March  1,  2016):  "Flint  crisis   March  31,  2015 flushing  before  lead  testing  may  be  contributing  to  favorable  conditions  for   timeline:  Part  2" Legionella  in  disribution  system MDEQ  sends  Flint  LT2  Surface  Water  Treatment  Rule  Letter  re:  monitoring   requirements  for  Cryptosporidium,  E.  Coli  and  turbidity Flint  proposes  installation  of  Granular  Activated  Carbon  filter  media  to  reduce   April  6,  2015 disinfection  byproducts MDHHS  hosts  conference  call  regarding  Legionella,  but  the  subject  matter  and   April  7,  2015 participants  are  not  clear.  It  was  suggested  that  there  was  a  communication  plan  in   preparation,  but  no  indication  that  public  communication  happened  as  a  result MDEQ  Letter:  LT2  ESWTR  Rule  -­‐  2nd  Round  of  Monitoring   Requirements E-­‐mail  from  LAN  to  Busch/MDEQ,  cc  Croft,  dated  April  6,  2015 As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (March  1,  2016):  "Flint  crisis   timeline:  Part  2" Del  Toral/EPA  e-­‐mails  Cook/MDEQ  again  to  ask  re:  Flint  corrosion  control  treatment.   April  23,  2015 Cook/MDEQ,  in  follow-­‐up  message  to  Busch  &  Prysby/MDEQ:  "Other  than  sampling   EPA-­‐MDEQ  e-­‐mail  correspondence  dated  April  23-­‐24,  2015 for  Pb/Cu,  I  don't  think  Flint  is  doing  anything  regarding  corrosion  control" mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. pdf 3/12/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐2/ 3/12/16 Attachment  22  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 Attachment  23  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐2/ Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/12/16 Attachment  24  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests,   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website   Final.pdf April  24,  2015 MDEQ  staff  indicates  to  EPA  no  corrosion  control  treatment  in  place  in  Flint  system Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   pdf (Dixon) www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ Del  Toral/EPA  e-­‐mails  Cook/MDEQ  to  express  concern  re:  Flint's  lack  of  corrosion   Attachment  25  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   April  25,  2015 control  treatment,  pre-­‐flushing  and  high  lead  levels.  Says  Flint  does  not  appear  to   E-­‐mail  from  Del  Toral/EPA  to  Cook/MDEQ  dated  April  25,  2015 6,  2015 meet  requirements  for  OCCT  without  treatment Del  Toral/EPA  e-­‐mails  Poy/EPA  and  other  colleagues  stating  that  Cook/MDEQ  has   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2,  2016):  "EPA  too  slow  to  respond  to  Flint   April  27,  2015 confirmed  the  Flint  WTP  has  no  corrosion  control  treatment  (CCT),  which  is  “very   crisis/2016/02/02/epa-­‐too-­‐slow-­‐respond-­‐flint-­‐crisis-­‐critics-­‐ crisis,  critics  say"  (Spangler) concerning  given  the  likelihood  of  lead  service  lines  in  the  city”     say/79652928/ Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Accessed bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ March  30,  2015 April  3,  2015 Sources As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" 3/12/16 3/20/16 11 Date Event Reference  Document Sources Del  Toral/EPA  visits  LeeAnne  Walters's  house,  inspects  plumbing  and  finds  it  is  lead-­‐ Flint  Water  Study  website  (Sep.  30,  2015):  "COMMENTARY:  MDEQ   flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-­‐mdeq-­‐mistakes-­‐ April  27,  2015 free;  leaves  sample  bottles  and  provides  Marc  Edwards/Virginia  Tech's  contact  info Mistakes  and  Deception  Created  the  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (Roy) deception-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/ April  27,  2015 April  27,  2015 April  28,  2015 April  29,  2015 April  29,  2015 Cook,  Busch  and  Prysby/MDEQ  exchange  e-­‐mails  re:  Del  Toral/EPA's  question  on   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  14,  2016):  "State  MDEQ  didn't  take  Flint   corrosion  control  treatment.  Busch:  "If  he  continues  to  persist,  we  may  need  Liane   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/02/13/state-­‐ water  concerns  seriously"  (Shamus) or  Director  Wyant  to  make  a  call  to  EPA  to  help  address  his  over-­‐reaches.”  Cook:  "I   deq-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐concerns/80332954/ Also  as  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day   agree,  the  constant  second  guessing  of  how  we  interpret  and  implement  our  rules  is   bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-­‐water-­‐disaster-­‐timeline/ by  Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" getting  tiresome." Laurel  Garrison/CDC  e-­‐mails  GCHD  officials  re:  concern  over  Legionellosis  outbreak   in  Flint.  Indicates  that  city  and  state  officials  allegedly  were  not  supplying  needed   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ information  for  the  county’s  investigation.  "“We  are  very  concerned  about  this   concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ Legionnaires’  disease  outbreak…  It’s  very  large,  one  of  the  largest  we  know  of  in  the   Wisely) info/80028820/ past  decade,  and  community-­‐wide,  and  in  our  opinion  and  experience  it  needs  a   comprehensive  investigation.”   Michigan  Office  of  the  Auditor  General  announces  planned  performance  audit  of   Office  of  Auditor  General  letter  to  MDEQ  Director  Wyant,  dated   audgen.michigan.gov/wip/wip761032015.html MDEQ-­‐Office  of  Drinking  Water  and  Municipal  Assistance April  28,  2015.  Notice  of  audit  posted  to  OAG  website To  resolve  an  $8  million  accumulated  deficit  in  Flint's  General  Fund,  the  State   Treasurer  and  Flint  EM,  with  the  concurrence  of  Flint  City  Council,  sign  an   emergency  loan  agreement  between  the  City  and  Michigan's  Local  Financial   Emergency  Loan  Agreement,  signed  by  EM  Ambrose  and  Treasurer   Document  provided  to  FWATF Assistance  Loan  Board  for  nearly  $8  million.  The    loan  agreement  includes  a   Khouri,  dated  April  29,  2015 provision  that  the  city  of  Flint  cannot,  without  prior  state  approval,  return  to  DWSD   or  lower  water  rates. Press  release:  "Gov.  Rick  Snyder:  City  of  Flint  ready  to  move   Gov.  Snyder  announces  control  of  City  of  Flint's  finances  has  been  returned  to   www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐57577_57657-­‐353433-­‐-­‐ forward  as  financial  emergency  resolved"  posted  to  State  of  MI   Mayor  and  City  Council  under  supervision  of  Receivership  Transition  Advisory  Board ,00.html website LeeAnne  Walters’s  water  samples  are  sent  to  Virginia  Tech  for  analysis.  Average  lead   Flint  Water  Study  website  (Aug.  24,  2015):  "Hazardous  Waste-­‐ May  2015 level  is  “2,429  ppb  lead,  the  high  was  13,200  ppb,  and  even  after  25  minutes   levels  of  Lead  found  in  a  Flint  household’s  water"  (Roy) flushing  the  water  never  dropped  below  200  ppb” Cook/MDEQ  responds  to  Del  Toral/EPA  re:  inquiries  about  Flint  corrosion  control,   indicating  MDEQ  is  delaying  decision  pending  completion  of  second  6-­‐month   E-­‐mail  from  Cook/MDEQ  to  Del  Toral/EPA  dated  May  1,  2015,   May  1,  2015 monitoring  period  in  June  2015.  Says  that  since  Flint  will  be  switching  water  source   included  in  chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA   in  another  year,  "requiring  a  [corrosion  control]  study  at  the  current  time  will  be  of   requests  (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website little  to  no  value" May  6,  2015 City  replaces  service  line  at  212  Browning  with  EPA  onsite May  7,  2015 Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mails  MDEQ  re:  EPA  visit  to  LeeAnne  Walters's  home  to  deliver   sampling  bottles  for  lead/copper  analyses  and  observe  plumbing  systems May  14,  2015 MDEQ  approves  GCDC  permit  for  surface  water  impoundment  to  feed  KWA  WTP Second  meeting  of  City  of  Flint/Veolia  Technical  Advisory  Committee.  Meeting   May  20,  2015 notes:  ""Some  attention  has  shifted  to  lead  and  copper  concerns"  -­‐  no  further   mention  of  lead  issue EPA/MDEQ  e-­‐mail  correspondence  continues  re:  results  of  additional  sampling  at   May  26,  2015 Walters's  home  and  at  2  additional  homes  connected  to  same  water  service  line May  28,  2015 New  samples  show  improved  water  quality  at  LeeAnne  Walters's  residence EPA  e-­‐mail  to  MDEQ  dated  May  7,  2015 J.  Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mail  to  MDEQ  dated  May  7,  2015 MDEQ  Permit  151036 Meeting  summary  posted  to  City  of  Flint  website Coalition  for  Clean  Water  in  Flint  and  others  file  lawsuit  in  Genesee  County  Circuit   Court  seeking  order  for  Flint  to  return  to  DWSD  service Jim  Collins/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  GCHD  officials  saying  he  spoke  with  officials  at  federal   June  8,  2015 Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention  that  morning  about  the  Legionellosis   issue.  He  then  chastises  county  officials  for  talking  to  CDC  without  state  approval June  5,  2015 Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   MLive  (June  5,  2015):  "Lawsuit  seeks  end  to  Flint  River  drinking   water,  return  to  Detroit"  (Ridley) Detroit  Free  Press  (February  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   Wisely) Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/17/16 3/12/16 flintwaterstudy.org/2015/08/hazardous-­‐waste-­‐levels-­‐of-­‐lead-­‐ found-­‐in-­‐a-­‐flint-­‐households-­‐water/ 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 Attachments  26  &  27  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF   Nov.  6,  2015 Attachments  26  &  27  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF   Nov.  6,  2015 media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_830d3b5098294e78825c8f720f155e ca.pdf www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015-­‐05-­‐20-­‐TAC-­‐ Meeting-­‐Summary.pdf EPA  e-­‐mail  correspondence  dated  May  26-­‐27,  May  28  and  June  2,   Attachment  28  &  29  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF   2015;  laboratory  reports  attached Nov.  6,  2015 As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐2/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" MDHHS  produces  a  report  regarding  Legionellosis  cases  in  Genesee  County  in  2014-­‐ "Summary  of  Legionellosis  Outbreak  —  Genesee  County,  June   May  29,  2015 15;  the  conclusion  is  that  “the  outbreak  is  over.”  42%  of  the  cases  had  healthcare   2014–March  2015,"  posted  to  state  website (hospital)  contact;  47%  had  contact  with  the  Flint  water  supply Accessed www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/Genesee_Co_Legionnaires _Disease_Investigation_Ex_Summary_FINAL_510722_7.pdf www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/lawsuit_seeks_en d_to_flint_riv.html www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ info/80028820/ 1/31/16 1/31/16 3/12/16 3/17/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 12 Date Event June  9,  2015 MDEQ  issues  third  Disinfection  Byproducts  quarterly  violation  notice Michigan  Semi-­‐Annual  Conference  Call  is  held  with  EPA,  DNR  and  MDEQ.  EPA   June  10,  2015 recommends  that  MDEQ  offer  technical  assistance  to  Flint  on  managing  water   quality  issues,  including  lead Michigan  Court  of  Appeals  reverses  Genesee  County  Circuit  Court  dismissal  of   June  12,  2015 Kincaid  rate  lawsuit,  claiming  City  didn't  follow  the  proper  process  for  raising  rates   and  improperly  spent  the  funds  collected Press  conference  held  at  UAW  Region  1D  post  with  Councilman  Kincaid  and   June  15,  2015 attorney  Val  Washington  urging  City  to  negotiate  on  water  and  sewer  rates U.S.  District  Judge  Stephen  J.  Murphy  III  denies  Coalition  for  Clean  Water  in  Flint's   June  23,  2015 motion  for  the  preliminary  injunction  without  prejudice Del  Toral/EPA  provides  his  "Interim  Report:  High  Lead  Levels  in  Flint,  Michigan"  to   June  24,  2015 his  supervisor,  Poy/EPA.  Report  expresses  numerous  concerns  re:  lead  levels,   sampling  methodology,  and  lack  of  corrosion  control  treatment  at  Flint  WTP Reference  Document Sources MDEQ  Letter:  Violation  Notice  -­‐  MCL  for  TTHMs,  2nd  Quarter  2015   Attachment  30  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   Monitoring  Period 6,  2015 J.  Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mail  dated  July  1,  2015,  with  notes  from  June  10   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ conference  call;  notes  posted  final  July  28,  2015.  E-­‐mail  and  notes   Final.pdf are  included  in  chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from   Attachment  31  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   FOIA  requests  (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website 6,  2015 MLive  (June  12,  2015):  "Appeals  Court  breathes  new  life  into  Flint   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/appeals_court_sid water  rebate  lawsuit"  (Fonger) es_with_flint.html MLive  (June  15,  2015):  "Flint  councilman  urges  city  to  negotiate   end  to  water  rate  lawsuit"  (Fonger) MLive  (June  23,  2015):  "Judge  won't  force  Flint  to  return  to  buying   Detroit  water"  (Fonger) "Memorandum:  High  Lead  Levels  in  Flint,  Michigan  -­‐  Interim   Report,"  prepared  by  M.  Del  Toral  and  transmitted  to  T.  Poy. Per  Curt  Guyette/ACLU  (interview  with  FWATF  Dec.  10,  2015),  Del   Toral  provided  report  to  Walters  and  she  provided  it  to  Guyette.   Interim  report  is  available  on  Flint  Water  Study  website.  Final   report  issued  Nov.  2015  is  also  posted  to  ACLU-­‐MI  website www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/flint_councilman_ urges_city_to.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/judge_says_flint_ doesnt_have_t_1.html flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/11/Miguels-­‐ Memo.pdf Accessed 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/17/16 June  25,  2016 Rosenthal/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Glasgow  and  Wright/Flint  DPW  reminding  them  that  61   more  lead  and  copper  samples  need  to  be  collected  and  sent  to  the  lab  by  June  30,   Detroit  Free  Press  (Dec.  24,  2015):  "State's  handling  of  Flint  water   www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/12/23/states-­‐handling-­‐ 2015,  “and  that  they  are  will  be  [sic]  below  the  AL  [action  level]  for  lead.  As  of  now   samples  delayed  action"  (Egan) flint-­‐water-­‐samples-­‐delayed-­‐action/77367872/ with  39  results,  Flint’s  90th  percentile  is  over  the  AL  for  lead.” June  30,  2015 EPA  e-­‐mails  MDEQ  as  preface  to  conference  call  scheduled  for  July  21,  2015,  re:   elevated  lead  and  corrosion  control;  mentions  Del  Toral  report E-­‐mail  from  T.  Hyde/EPA  to  L.  Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  dated  June  30,   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ 2015,  included  in  chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from   Final.pdf FOIA  requests  (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website 3/13/16 June  30,  2015 Second  6-­‐month  round  of  lead  and  copper  monitoring  ends.    Results  due  from  Flint   Included  in  chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ to  MDEQ  July  10,  2015 requests  (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf 3/13/16 July  1,  2015 July  2,  2015 July  2,  2015 July  7,  2015 July  9,  2015 July  9,  2015 July  10,  2015 Gov.  Snyder  asks  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  about  Flint;  both  report  nothing  unusual  or   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ widespread  occurring,  Flint  complying  with  LCR,  elevated  blood  levels  are  seasonal (Dixon) EPA  Region  5  Water  Division  Director  Tinka  Hyde  tells  MDEQ  that  Region  5  is   Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. "concerned  about  the  lead  situation"  but  acknowledges  second  round  of  monitoring   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   pdf is  under  way (Dixon) www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ EPA  Region  5  Administrator  Susan  Hedman  writes  Mayor  Walling  to  say  that  EPA   "Highlights  of  Marc  Edwards  FOIA,"  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/Virginia-­‐Tech-­‐ will  work  with  MDEQ  on  issues  related  to  lead  in  water.  "it  would  be  premature  to   website FOIA-­‐EPA.pdf draw  any  conclusions"  based  on  draft  EPA  memo  regarding  lead Included  in  chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA   ACLU  reporter  Curt  Guyette  contacts  MDEQ  regarding  Del  Toral's  draft  Interim   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ requests,  created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study   Report Final.pdf website flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   MDEQ  Public  Information  Officer  Karen  Tommasulo  emails  Wurfel/MDEQ  as   Final.pdf (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Michigan  Public  Radio  begins  picking  up  on  the  ACLU  reports  concerning  Flint  lead-­‐ www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  22,  2015):  "MDEQ  e-­‐mails  show  stunning   in-­‐water  issue.  "“Apparently,  it  is  going  to  be  a  thing  now.” kaffer/2015/10/21/indifference-­‐characterized-­‐state-­‐approach-­‐ indifference  to  Flint  peril"  (Kaffer) flint-­‐water/74289430/ The  Nation  (July  16,  2015):  "In  Flint,  Michigan,  Overpriced  Water  is   www.thenation.com/article/in-­‐flint-­‐michigan-­‐overpriced-­‐water-­‐is-­‐ ACLU-­‐Michigan  reporter  Curt  Guyette  breaks  story  of  concerns  about  lead  in  Flint’s   Causing  People's  Skin  to  Erupt  in  Rashes  and  Hair  to  Fall  Out"   causing-­‐peoples-­‐skin-­‐to-­‐erupt-­‐and-­‐hair-­‐to-­‐fall-­‐out/ drinking  water  by  detailing  the  June  24  EPA-­‐Del  Toral  memo,  reporting  the  high  lead   (Guyette) Attachment  33  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   levels  in  LeeAnne  Walters’s  water,  and  exposing  the  lack  of  corrosion  control  in  Flint   E-­‐mail  from  B.  Wurfel/MDEQ  dated  July  9,  2015  is  included  in   6,  2015. drinking  water  treatment chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf Susan  Hedman/EPA  Region  5  (based  in  Chicago)  writes  to  Flint  Mayor  Walling  to  say   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ that  EPA  will  work  with  MDEQ  on  issues  related  to  lead  in  water Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/20/16 3/12/16 1/31/16 3/13/16 3/20/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/20/16 13 Date July  13,  2015 July  14,  2015 July  21,  2015 July  22,  2015 July  23,  2015 July  24,  2015 July  27,  2015 July  27,  2015 July  28,  2015 July  28,  2015 August  4,  2015 August  4,  2015 August  7,  2015 August  10,  2015 August  17,  2015 Event Reference  Document Sources Michigan  Radio  quotes  Wurfel's  reassurances  in  story  on  EPA  memo.  "Let  me  start   here  –  anyone  who  is  concerned  about  lead  in  the  drinking  water  in  Flint  can  relax…   Michigan  Radio  (July  13,  2015):  “Leaked  internal  memo  shows   michiganradio.org/post/leaked-­‐internal-­‐memo-­‐shows-­‐federal-­‐ It  does  not  look  like  there  is  any  broad  problem  with  the  water  supply  freeing  up   federal  regulator’s  concerns  about  lead  in  Flint’s  water"  (Smith) regulator-­‐s-­‐concerns-­‐about-­‐lead-­‐flint-­‐s-­‐water#stream/0 lead  as  it  goes  to  homes." MDEQ  issues  construction  permit  to  Flint  for  Granular  Activated  Carbon  filter  media Attachment  34  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   MDEQ  Construction  Permit  W151055 W151055 6,  2015 EPA  and  MDEQ  hold  conference  call  re:  LCR  implementation  and  Flint;  EPA  informs   "Notes  on  Call  with  MDEQ  on  July  21,  2015  -­‐  MDEQ   MDEQ  of  its  interpretation  of  LCR.  EPA  wants  corrosion  control  implemented  in   Implementation  of  LCR  Rule  and  Flint  Issues,"  included  in   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Flint,  but  MDEQ  believes  this  is  premature,  per  e-­‐mail  from  Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  to   chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests,   Final.pdf Hyde/EPA  later  the  same  day  requesting  EPA  concurrence  on  MDEQ  approach created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Gov.  Snyder's  Chief  of  Staff  Dennis  Muchmore  e-­‐mails  MDHHS  director  Lyon  re:     community  concerns  about  lead  in  the  water.  "These  folks  are  scared  and  worried   mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) about  the  health  impacts  and  they  are  basically  getting  blown  off  by  us  (as  a  state   pdf we're  just  not  sympathizing  with  their  plight)" Linda  Dykema,  director  of  MDHHS  Division  of  Environmental  Health,  provides   detailed  response  to  the  Muchmore  inquiry  via  email  to  MDHHS  managers.  "DEQ   has  not  seen  a  change  in  the  city’s  compliance  with  the  lead  rule  since  switching  to   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests,   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ the  Flint  River  source…  Regarding  the  EPA  drinking  water  official  quoted  in  the  press   created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf articles,  the  report  that  he  issued  was  a  result  of  his  own  research  and  was  not   reviewed  or  approved  by  EPA  management.  He  has  essentially  acted  outside  his   authority" Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests,   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ In  response  to  Muchmore's  July  22  e-­‐mail,  Wurfel/MDEQ  writes,  “The  bottom  line  is   created  by  Roy/Edwards  and  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf that  the  residents  of  Flint  do  not  need  to  worry  about  lead  in  their  water  supply,  and   Detroit  News  (Jan.  7,  2016):  "Flint  crisis  response  delayed  for   www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/07/flint-­‐ DEQ's  recent  sampling  does  not  indicate  an  eminent  [sic]  health  threat" months"  (Lynch) emails/78410314/ MDEQ  prepares  e-­‐mail  and  draft  letter  re:  Flint  90th  percentile  lead  determination   MDEQ  e-­‐mail  correspondence  dated  July  20-­‐21,  2015;  MDEQ  letter   Attachment  36  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   at  11  ppb  and  City  of  Flint  requirement  to  add  corrosion  control  treatment to  Flint  re:  Lead  and  Copper  Monitoring  dated  July  27,  2015 6,  2015 City  provides  MDEQ  its  original  LCR  report  documenting  lead  levels  measured  in   FOIA'd  information  on  Flint  Water  Study  website,  including  original   flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-­‐MDEQ-­‐mistakes-­‐ sampling  from  1/1/15  to  6/30/15.  LCR  report  is  later  "scrubbed"  after  Flint  meets   and  "scrubbed"  LCR  reports deception-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/ with  MDEQ  and  is  released  on  August  20,  with  two  high  lead  results  excluded Flint  Water  Study  website:  "Chronology  of  MDHHS  E-­‐mails   Cristin  Larder/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  other  MDHHS  staff  indicating  blood  lead  levels  were   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2016/01/MDHHS-­‐FOIA-­‐II-­‐ pertaining  to  blood  lead  levels  of  kids  in  Michigan,  primarily  in   unusually  elevated  in  summer  2014 FINAL-­‐For-­‐Web.pdf Flint  -­‐  Part  II"  (Roy/Edwards) Nancy  Peeler/MDDHS  sends  e-­‐mail  confirming  analysis  shows  lead  levels  spiked  in   Attachment  37  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   E-­‐mail  correspondence  -­‐  MDHHS  and  MDEQ,  dated  July  22-­‐28,   July-­‐September  2014,  but  "that  pattern  was  not  terribly  different  from  what  we  saw   6,  2015. 2015 in  the  previous  three  years" flintwaterstudy.org MDEQ  representatives  meet  with  City  of  Flint  representatives,  community  activists   MDEQ  e-­‐mail  dated  August  10,  2014  documenting  meeting  notes and  pastors,  and  LeeAnne  Walters  at  Gov.  Snyder’s  office LeeAnne  Walters  and  Melissa  Mays  meet  with  MDEQ  officials  Shekter  Smith,  Busch   and  Wurfel  to  discuss  lead  in  water  problems.  Walters  and  Mays  report  Shekter   Flint  Water  Study  website  (Sep.  30,  2015):  "COMMENTARY:  MDEQ   Smith  said  “Mr.  Del  Toral  has  been  handled”  and  Flint  residents  would  not  be   Mistakes  and  Deception  Created  the  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (Roy) hearing  from  him  again Genesee  County  Circuit  Court  Judge  Hayman  issues  emergency  injunction  on  earlier   Flint  water  rate  increase  and  orders  City  to  roll  back  water  and  sewer  rates  by  35   MLive  (Aug.  7,  2015):  "Judge  orders  Flint  to  cut  water  rates  35   percent,  repay  its  water  and  sewer  fund  $15.7  million  transferred  in  2007  to  settle  a   percent  in  sweeping  injunction"  (Fonger) sewer  overflow  claim,  and  immediately  stop  water  disconnections  and  liens  for  past-­‐ due  bills Poy/EPA  e-­‐mails  Shekter  Smith  and  Busch/MDEQ  inquiring  re:  action  on  corrosion   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   control  in  Flint (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website MDEQ  notifies  Flint  of  lead/copper  monitoring  results  from  Jan-­‐June  2015   Letter  to  Wright/Flint  from  Rosenthal/MDEQ  included  in   monitoring  period,  and  requires  City  to  install  corrosion  control  for  LCR  compliance.   chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   Indicates  Flint  has  6  months  to  fully  optimize  corrosion  control,  but  recommends   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website starting  phosphate  treatment  as  soon  as  possible   Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Accessed 3/13/16 3/13/16 1/31/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 Attachment  38  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-­‐mdeq-­‐mistakes-­‐ deception-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/ 3/13/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/flint_ordered_to_ cut_water_rat.html 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 14 Date Event Reference  Document Genesee  County  Circuit  Court  places  preliminary  injunction  on  prior  Flint  water  rate   MLive  (Aug.  17,  2015):  "Judge  signs  order  for  lower  Flint  water   August  17,  2015 increase rates,  $15.7  million  payback"  (Fonger) August  20,  2015 August  23,  2015 August  25,  2015 August  27,  2015 August  27,  2015 August  28,  2015 "Scrubbed"  LCR  report  for  City  of  Flint  is  provided  to  ACLU-­‐MI  in  reponse  to  FOIA   request E-­‐mail  from  M.  Edwards  to  MDEQ/Flint  dated  August  23,  2015  is   included  in  chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA   requests  (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Ms.  Walters  updating  her  on  findings  related  to   E-­‐mail  from  Shekter  Smith  to  Ms.  Walters  is  included  in   questions  at  the  community  meeting  and  summarizing  lead  sampling  /  results  at  212   chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   Browning (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Edwards/VT  reports  findings  of  elevated  lead  levels  in  its  Flint  water  study;  EPA   Region  5  reports  to  MDEQ  that  VT  study  is  finding  elevated  lead  levels.  52%  of  first   Flint  Water  Study  website  (Aug.  27,  2015):  "Analysis  of  water   48  samples  analyzed  were  at  or  above  5  ppb  "which  suggests  a  serious  lead  in  water   samples  from  48  Flint  homes  to  date  for  lead  are  worrisome"  (Roy) problem" Mike  Brown,  Gov.  Snyder's  senior  federal  policy  representative,  e-­‐mails   Wurfel/MDEQ  to  inquire  about  discrepancy  in  lead  levels  measured  in  water  in   LeeAnne  Walters's  home.  Wurfel  replies:  "This  person  is  the  one  who  had  EPA  lead   specialist  come  to  her  home  and  do  tests,  then  released  an  unvetted  draft  of  his   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   report  (that  EPA  apologized  to  us  profusely  for)  to  the  resident,  who  shared  it  with   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website ACLU,  who  promptly  used  it  to  continue  raising  hell  with  the  locals...  (I)t’s  been   rough  sledding  with  a  steady  parade  of  community  groups  keeping  everyone   hopped-­‐up  and  misinformed" Poy/EPA  e-­‐mails  Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  re:  VT  lead  testing  results  in  Flint:  "...they  are   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   finding  lead  at  levels  above  five  parts  per  billion  and  some  above  15  parts  per   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website billion" EPA  and  MDEQ  hold  conference  call:  second  6-­‐month  monitioring  test  results  for   August  31,  2015 January-­‐July  2015  indicate  90th  percentile  at  11  ppb.  It  is  determined  that  CCT  is   needed  and  implementation  steps  are  delineated Wurfel/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Busch,  Shekter  Smith,  Prysby  and  Director  Wyant/MDEQ,   August  31,  2015 copying  Gov.  Snyder  aides  Muchmore,  Hollins,  Murray  and  Sara  Wurfel.  Raises   concerns  about  Edwards/VT's  tests  and  accompanying  media  coverage Genesee  County  Circuit  Court  certifies  class  in  class  action  lawsuit  on  Sept.  2011   August  31,  2015 water  rate  increase Mayor  accepts  petition  calling  for  return  to  DWSD  service.  Administration   August  31,  2015 statements  cite  TTHM  compliance.  "Water  from  the  treatment  plant  is  significantly   better  now  and  comparable  with  Detroit's"  -­‐  Henderson August  31,  2015 Edwards/VT  reports  on  corrosive  lead  levels City  of  Flint  announces  projected  loss  from  disconnect  moratorium  and  new  water   September  1,  2015 rates  incompliance  with  Court  order;  begins  sending  bills  with  reduced  rates  as   mandated  by  Judge  Hayman VT  researchers  report  elevated  lead  levels  in  Flint  water,  communicating  that  the   corrosiveness  of  Flint  water  is  causing  lead  to  leach  into  residents'  water  through   September  2,  2015 pipes.  "...the  current  Flint  River  water  leaches  12X  more  lead  to  the  water  than   Detroit  water" Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/judge_certifies_cl ass_action_l.html Flint  Water  Study  website  (Sep.  30,  2015):  "COMMENTARY:  MDEQ   flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-­‐mdeq-­‐mistakes-­‐ Mistakes  and  Deception  Created  the  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (Roy) deception-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/ Marc  Edwards/Virginia  Tech  notifies  City  of  Flint  and  MDEQ  that  VT  has  begun   collecting  samples  for  a  water  quality  study  in  Flint August  28,  2015 Concerned  Pastors  announce  water  giveaway  in  Flint Sources Accessed 3/13/16 3/12/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/2015/08/analysis-­‐of-­‐water-­‐samples-­‐from-­‐48-­‐ flint-­‐homes-­‐to-­‐date-­‐for-­‐lead-­‐are-­‐worrisome/ 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. pdf 1/31/16 Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/12/16 MLive  (Aug.  31,  2015):  "Judge  OKs  class  action  lawsuit  for  Flint   water  customers  against  city"  (Fonger) www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/judge_certifies_cl ass_action_i.html 3/13/16 MLive  (Aug.  31,  2015):  "Flint  mayor  accepts  petitions  but  not  call   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/flint_mayor_acce to  end  use  of  Flint  River"  (Fonger) pts_petitions.html 3/13/16 MLive  (Sep.  2,  2015):  "Lead  leaches  into  'very  corrosive'  Flint   drinking  water,  researchers  say"  (Fonger) www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/new_testing_sho ws_flint_water.html 3/13/16 MLive  (Sep.  1,  2015):  "Unpaid  Flint  water  bills  creating  $500,000   budget  hole,  officials  say"  (Fonger)  /  "Typical  Flint  water  bill   dropping  $18  after  ruling  on  improper  rates" www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/post_436.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/typical_flint_wate r_bill_will.html 3/13/16 Flint  Water  Study  website  (Sep.  2,  2015):  "Flint  River  water  is  very   flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/flint-­‐rivers-­‐water-­‐is-­‐very-­‐corrosive-­‐ corrosive  to  lead,  and  causing  lead  contamination  in  homes"  (Roy)   to-­‐lead-­‐and-­‐causing-­‐lead-­‐contamination-­‐in-­‐homes/ Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/13/16 15 Date Event Reference  Document Wurfel/MDEQ  issues  press  release  disputing  Edwards/VT's  test  results  and   conclusions  about  corrosion  and  lead  leaching.  "(W)e  want  to  be  very  clear  that  the   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   September  2,  2015 lead  levels  being  detected  in  Flint  drinking  water  are  not  coming  from  the  treatment   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website plant  or  the  city’s  transmission  lines…  The  issue  is  how,  or  whether,  and  to  what   extent  the  drinking  water  is  interacting  with  lead  plumbing  in  people’s  homes." Sources flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf September  2,  2015 Anonymous  company  donates  1,500  kitchen  water  filters  to  Concerned  Pastors  for   Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  (released  Jan.  20,  2016) distribution  to  Flint  residents,  as  documented  in  Hollins  e-­‐mail  to  Gov.  Snyder Attachment  43  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df September  3,  2015 Prysby/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Benzie/MDEQ  stating  that  City  administration  said  there  will   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   be  no  funding  restrictions  for  installing  corrosion  control (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf September  2,  2015 MDEQ  notifies  Flint  of  return  to  compliance  on  Disinfection  Byproducts  (TTHM)   September  3,  2015 September  3,  2015 September  8,  2015 September  8,  2015 September  9,  2015 September  9,  2015 September  10,  2015 September  10,  2015 September  10,  2015 September  11,  2015 September  11,  2015 September  11,  2015 Letter  to  B.  Wright  (Flint)  from  Rosenthal  &  Prysby  (MDEQ) Croft/Flint  DPW  e-­‐mails  state  and  local  officials  announcing  that  Flint  is  in   compliance  with  MI  SDWA  /  report  160+  lead  samples  since  switch,  remain  within   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ EPA  standards.    Note  expect  optimization  plan  within  4  months  by  1/1/2016  (faster   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf than  other  cities) MLive  (Sep.  3,  2015):  "Lower  TTHM  levels  put  Flint  in  compliance   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/lower_tthm_level MLive  reports  on  compliance  with  TTHM  issues  but  also  notes  lead  concerns with  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act"  (Fonger) s_moves_flint.html Edwards/VT  publishes  full  results  to  date  of  his  Flint  water  testing.  “FLINT  HAS  A   Flint  Water  Study  website:  "Lead  testing  results  for  water  sampled   VERY  SERIOUS  LEAD  IN  WATER  PROBLEM.  Forty  percent  of  the  first  draw  samples   flintwaterstudy.org/information-­‐for-­‐flint-­‐residents/results-­‐for-­‐ by  residents"  (Edwards,  Roy,  Rhoads).  Includes  link  to  lead  data  for   are  over  five  parts  per  billion…  Several  samples  exceeded  100  ppb  and  one  sample   citizen-­‐testing-­‐for-­‐lead-­‐300-­‐kits/ all  271  residences  sampled  at  that  point collected  after  45  seconds  of  flushing  exceeded  1000  ppb." Edwards/VT  e-­‐mails  Mayor  Walling  re:  lead  in  water  issue.  "I  have  no  idea  what   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   MDEQ’s  agenda  is,  but  based  on  their  press  releases  and  actions  to  date,  protecting   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" the  public  and  following  Federal  laws,  does  not  seem  to  be  a  priority." MDHHS  begins  to  develop  educational  program  regarding  reducing  the  risk  of  lead   From  MDHHS  e-­‐mails  posted  online somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf exposure  for  children,  in  response  to  media  coverage  of  Edwards/VT’s  test  results Wurfel/MDEQ  e-­‐mails  Fonger/MLive  re:  Edwards's  test  results.  Virginia  Tech   researchers  “only  just  arrived  in  town  and  (have)  quickly  proven  the  theory  they  set   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   out  to  prove...  offering  broad,  dire  public  health  advice  based  on  some  quick  testing   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website could  be  seen  as  fanning  political  flames  irresponsibly” Michelle  Bruneau/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  Kory  Gretsch/MDHHS:  "if  we're  going  to  take   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   action  it  needs  to  be  soon  before  the  Virginia  Tech  University  folks  scandalize  us  all" Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Crooks/EPA  e-­‐mails  Shekter  Smith/MDEQ  with  notes  from  Aug.  31,  2015  conference   call  re:  lead  in  water;  includes  action  plan.  "EPA  acknowledged  that  to  delay   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   installation  of  corrosion  control  treatment  in  Flint  would  likely  cause  even  higher   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website levels  of  lead  over  time  as  Flint’s  many  lead  service  lines  are  continuously  in  contact   with  corrosive  water" State  Senator  Ananich  and  Representatives  Neeley  and  Phelps  send  questions  re:   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   Flint  lead-­‐in-­‐water  issue  to  Wyant/MDEQ (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Dr.  Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha  contacts  Dr.  Lawrence  Reynolds  with  concerns  re:   children’s  blood  lead  levels  in  light  of  Edwards/VT's  findings.  She  convenes  Hurley   Medical  Center  (HMC)  Research  Team.  Dr.  Reynolds  contacts  MDHHS  Childhood   Information  provided  by  Dr.  Lawrence  Reynolds Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  Program  (CLPPP)  with  data  request  for  Flint  EBLLs,  and   contacts  MDEQ  staffer  who  states  MDEQ  is  awaiting  a  letter  from  MDHHS  regarding   health  issues  and  action Robert  Scott/MDHHS  obtains  Edwards/VT's  grant  proposal  to  the  National  Science   Foundation  for  funding  for  his  Virginia  Tech  /  Flint  Water  Study  and  forwards  it  to   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   MDHHS  colleagues  Peeler,  Lishinski  and  Priem.  "Sounds  like  there  might  be  more  to   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" this  than  what  we  learned  previously.  Yikes!” Crooks/EPA  sends  e-­‐mail  to  MDEQ  confirming  that  EPA  did  not  directly  transmit  the   E-­‐mail  from  J.  Crooks  to  MDEQ draft  June  24,  2015  Interim  Report  memo  to  MDEQ Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Accessed 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/19/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/12/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf 3/13/16 Dr.  Lawrence  Reynolds's  timeline bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/12/16 Attachment  44  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 16 Date September  11,  2015 September  11,  2015 September  15,  2015 September  15,  2015 September  17,  2016 September  20,  2015 September  21,  2015 September  21,  2015 September  22,  2015 September  22,  2015 September  22,  2015 September  23,  2015 September  23,  2015 Event Reference  Document Sources Busch/MDEQ,  in  reply  to  request  from  Fonger/MLive  (forwarded  by  Wurfel/MDEQ),   e-­‐mails  that  City  has  until  end  of  2015  to  make  a  recommendation  for  corrosion   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ control  treatment  and  are  planning  to  have  it  in  place  by  January  2016.  Shekter   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf Smith  replies  that  the  City  has  not  yet  applied  for  a  construction  permit  to  install   corrosion  control  treatment  and  "the  ball's  in  their  court" Poy/EPA  sends  MDEQ  a  draft  response  to  Congressman  Kildee's  Sep.  9  letter  posing   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ questions  about  drinking  water  quality  in  Flint.  Says  EPA  is  evaluating  Flint's   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf compliance  with  LCR   MLive  reports  on  Edwards/VT's  statement  that  results  of  Flint's  lead  tests  cannot  be   trusted  -­‐  that  the  City's  results  amount  to  "smoke  and  mirrors"  due  to  flawed  testing   procedures.  "Flint  is  the  only  city  in  American  that  I'm  aware  of  that  does  not  have  a   MLive  (Sep.  15,  2015):  "Virginia  Tech  professor  says  Flint's  tests  for   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/virginia_tech_rese corrosion-­‐control  plan  in  place  to  stop  this  kind  of  problem."  Wurfel's  response,   lead  in  water  can't  be  trusted"  (Fonger) archer_says.html quoted  in  the  article:  "The  problem  isn't  new.  It's  just  news  (now,  and)  a  knee-­‐jerk   reaction  would  be  an  irresponsible  response." Dr.  Reynolds  discusses  MDHHS  graph  for  0-­‐16  yoa  children  with  Flint  mailing   addresses  and  ELLs  with  two  GCHD  Board  of  Health  (GCBOH)  members  (chair  Kay   Doer  and  member  Dr.  Laura  Carravallah)  and  management  staff  –  Mark  Valacak,   Director;  Dr.  Gary  Johnson,  Medical  Director;  and  John  Henry,  Environmental   Information  provided  by  Dr.  Lawrence  Reynolds Hygiene  –  in  an  informal  meeting.  GCBOH  chair  reads  GCHD  mission  aloud.  GCHD   Director’s  response:  staff  and  resources  to  access  MCIR  data  registry  for  lead  levels   are  not  available;  also  says  it  is  Flint  DPW’s  responsibility  to  issue  a  health  advisory,   not  GCHD's Wyant/MDEQ  responds  to  state  lawmakers'questions  (September  10,  2015)  stating   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ that  MDEQ  "does  not  receive  or  review  draft  memos"  from  EPA (Dixon) Edwards/VT  alleges  in  e-­‐mail  to  EPA  officials  that  Flint’s  lead  sampling  techniques   are  seriously  flawed.  "They  do  not  have  an  approved  lead  sampling  pool.  Only  13  of   Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ the  lowest  lead  sampled  homes  from  2014  were  resampled  in  2015.  The  homes   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website Final.pdf sampling  high  in  2014  were  not  asked  to  be  resampled.  At  best,  their  program  is   sending  out  sampling  bottles  at  random  across  the  city" Meeting  with  Congressional  representatives,  legislators,  EPA  and  MDEQ  to  discuss   Attachment  45  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   MDEQ  and  EPA  Briefing  on  Flint  Water  -­‐  meeting  agenda issues  with  water  quality  in  Flint 6,  2015 Greater  Flint  Health  Coalition  (GFHC)  views  presentation  by  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  and   passes  resolution  requesting  health  advisory  for  City  of  Flint.  At  noon,  members  of   GFHC  meet  with  then-­‐mayor  Walling,  administrator  Henderson  and  DPW  director   Information  provided  by  Dr.  Lawrence  Reynolds Crump  requesting  action  on  the  resolutions,  HMC  research  and  VA  Tech  research.   Administrator's  response:  Flint  cannot  change  water  sources  because  of  cost,  and   the  water  leaving  the  plant  meets  MDEQ  standards Meeting/conference  call  is  held  with  MDHHS,  GCHD,  and  MDEQ  to  discuss  lead   Attachment  46  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   E-­‐mail  summarizing  call  discussion,  dated  September  24,  2015 education/outreach 6,  2015 Genesee  County  Medical  Society  (GCMS)  passes  resolution  requesting  health   Information  provided  by  Dr.  Lawrence  Reynolds advisory  for  City  of  Flint Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  contacts  Robert  Scott/MDHHS  to  request  access  to  the  state's   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ childhood  blood  lead  level  testing  data   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Mayor  Walling  indicates  he  will  issue  "an  advisory  and  promote  ways  to  minimize   MLive  (Sep.  24,  2015):  "Elevated  lead  found  in  more  Flint  kids  after   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/study_shows_twic residents'  exposure  to  lead"  ...  He  and  others  in  Flint  Admin  advise  Dr.  Hanna-­‐ water  switch,  study  finds"  (Fonger) e_as_many_flin.html Attisha  &  Dr.  Reynolds  "that  a  return  to  purchasing  water  from  Detroit  would   Detroit  News  (Sep.  24,  2015):  "Doctors  warn  Flint  of  high  lead   www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/09/24/fli bankrupt  the  city" levels  in  tap  water"  (AP) nt-­‐plans-­‐advisory-­‐curbing-­‐exposure-­‐lead/72725736/ Nancy  Peeler/MDHHS,  director  of  state's  Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention   Program  (CLPPP),  corresponds  with  Scott/MDHHS  to  consider  re-­‐running  the   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   analysis  conducted  in  July,  and  asking  for  formal  epidemiologic  help.  Later  that  day,   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" MDHHS  official  Mikelle  Robinson  reports  that  the  Governor’s  Office  briefing   maintains  that  Flint  water  does  not  represent  an  “imminent  public  health  problem” Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Accessed 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 17 Date September  24,  2015 September  24,  2015 September  24,  2015 September  24,  2015 September  25,  2015 September  25,  2015 September  25,  2015 September  25,  2015 September  25,  2015 September  26,  2015 September  28,  2015 Event Reference  Document Sources In  the  absence  of  a  response  by  Flint  City  Administration  or  Genesee  County  Health   Department,  a  press  conference  is  called  by  HMC  and  GFHC  members  to  advise  the   "Pediatric  Lead  Exposure  in  Flint,  MI:  Concerns  from  the  Medical   community  of  a  health  emergency.  In  press  conference,  Dr.  Mona  Hanna-­‐Attisha   flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/09/Pediatric-­‐Lead-­‐ Community,"  presentation  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website presents  HMC's  findings  of  elevated  blood  levels  in  Flint  children,  followed  by   Exposure-­‐Flint-­‐Water-­‐092415.pdf US  News  &  World  Report  (Sep.  25,  2015):  "Did  This  Michigan  Town   remarks  by  the  GCHD  Director  Mark  Valacak.  The  city  administrator  attends.   www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/25/flint-­‐michigan-­‐ Poison  Its  Children?"  (AP) Wurfel/MDEQ  calls  Hurley  findings  "unfortunate"  and  says  water  controversy  is   children-­‐show-­‐high-­‐levels-­‐of-­‐lead-­‐in-­‐blood Additional  information  provided  by  Dr.  Lawrence  Reynolds becoming  "near-­‐hysteria";  "Flint's  drinking  water  is  safe  in  that  it's  meeting  federal   and  state  standards" Robert  Scott/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  colleague  Nancy  Peeler  saying  he  has  attempted  to   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   “recreate  Hurley’s  numbers”  and  sees  “difference  between  the  two  years...  but  not   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" as  much  difference  as  (Hurley)  did.”  "“I’m  sure  this  one  is  not  for  the  public" Debbie  Baltazar/EPA,  chief  of  Region  5  Water  Division’s  State  and  Tribal  Programs   Branch,  e-­‐mails  colleagues  re:  use  of  Drinking  Water  State  Revolving  Fund  funding   Vox  (Mar.  15,  2016):  EPA  email:  "I'm  not  so  sure  Flint  is  the   for  water  filters  in  Flint.  "Perhaps  she  [Hedman]  knows  all  this,  but  I'm  not  so  sure   www.vox.com/2016/3/15/11239438/flint-­‐epa community  we  want  to  go  out  on  a  limb  for"  (Nelson) Flint  is  the  community  we  want  to  go  out  on  a  limb  for.  At  least  without  a  better   understanding  of  where  all  that  money  went" Edwards/VT  e-­‐mails  Scott/MDHHS  re:  difficulty  in  obtaining  state  blood-­‐lead   records.  “Can  you  tell  me  why  it  is  so  difficult  to  get  this  data,  and  why  your  agency   is  raising  so  many  obstacles  to  sharing  it  with  everyone  who  asks?…I  have  been   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ asking  to  see  your  data  since  MDEQ  first  sent  it  to  reporters  back  in  August,  and  I   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" count  10  email  that  I  sent  responding  to  all  your  questions.  As  of  yet,  you  have  given   me  nothing  in  response” Scott/MDHHS  drafts  response  to  Edwards/VT  but  does  not  send  to  him;  sends  to   Peeler/MDHHS  for  review  who  recommends  changes.  Scott:  “I  agree  that  his   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ statements  are  inappropriate;  there  are  plenty  of  things  I’d  LIKE  to  say  in  response,   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" but  won’t” Lead  Advisory  press  release;  MDEQ  e-­‐mails;  City  of  Flint  -­‐  DPW   Attachment  48  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   GCHD  and  City  of  Flint  issue  lead  advisory  for  residents  to  be  aware  of  lead  levels  in   Public  Information  Plan 6,  2015. drinking  water;  City  of  Flint  holds  press  conference  at  City  Hall  regarding  drinking   MLive  (Sep.  25,  2015):  "Flint  makes  lead  advisory  official,  suggests   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/flint_makes_lead_ water water  filters  and  flushing"  (Fonger) advisory_offi.html G.  Lasher/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  Governor's  Office  and  MDEQ  with  update  on  Flint   drinking  water  issue  minimizing  findings  from  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha's  "data";  attaches   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.  74,  e-­‐ somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p MDHHS  talking  points  to  support  claim  that  elevated  blood  lead  levels  in  Flint  in   mail;  pp.  79-­‐82,  MDHHS  study  results  and  talking  points) df 2014  are  consistent  with  seasonal  changes Scott/MDHHS  responds  to  email  from  colleagues  about  Kristi  Tanner/Detroit  Free   Press's  interest  in  lead  issue.  Tanner  has  looked  at  DHS  blood  lead  data  between   2013-­‐2014  and  concludes  the  increase  “is  statistically  significant.”  Scott:  “While  the   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   trend  for  Michigan  as  a  whole  has  shown  a  steady  decrease  in  lead  poisoning  year   bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" by  year,  smaller  areas  such  as  the  city  of  Flint  have  their  bumps  from  year  to  year   while  still  trending  downward  overall."  Peeler:  “My  secret  hope  is  that  we  can  work   in  the  fact  that  this  pattern  is  similar  to  the  recent  past.” Chief  of  Staff  Dennis  Muchmore  e-­‐mails  Gov.  Snyder  an  update  on  Flint  water   issues.  "I  can't  figure  out  why  the  state  is  responsible  except  that  Dillon  did  make   the  ultimate  decision  so  we're  not  able  to  avoid  the  subject.  The  real  responsibility   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p rests  with  the  County,  city  and  KWA,  but  since  the  issue  is  the  health  of  citizens  and   71/274) df their  children  we're  taking  a  proactive  approach  putting  MDHHS  out  there  as  an   educator" Chief  of  Staff  Dennis  Muchmore  e-­‐mails  Gov.  Snyder  an  update  on  Flint  water   issues.  "Now  we  have  the  anti  everything  group  turning  to  the  lead  content…  We   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p can't  tolerate  increased  lead  levels  in  any  event,  but  it's  really  the  city's  water   73/274) df system  that  needs  to  deal  with  it" MDEQ  and  MDHHS  directors  brief  Gov.  Snyder  on  potential  scope  and  magnitude  of   Briefing  documents  included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p the  issue.  MDHHS  continues  to  review  blood  lead  data.  Briefing  documents  support   20,  2016  (pp.  87-­‐91) df claim  that  blood  lead  levels  are  consistent  with  seasonal  changes Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Accessed 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/15/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 18 Date September  28,  2015 September  28,  2015 September  28,  2015 September  28,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  29,  2015 September  30,  2015 Event Reference  Document Sen.  Ananich  sends  letter  to  Gov.  Snyder  requesting  assistance  in  Flint  -­‐  transition  to   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   safe  water  supply,  corrosion  control  treatment,  filters,  infrastructure 85/274) MDHHS  Director  Nick  Lyon  e-­‐mails  staff  in  his  department  for  help  refuting  VT/HMC   blood  lead  level  data.  “I  need  an  analysis  of  the  Virginia  Tech/Hurley  data  and  their   conclusions.  I  would  like  to  make  a  strong  statement  with  a  demonstration  of  proof   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   that  the  lead  blood  levels  seen  are  not  out  of  the  ordinary  and  are  attributable  to   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" seasonal  fluctuations.  Geralyn  (Lasher)  is  working  on  this  for  me  but  she  needs   someone  in  public  health  who  can  work  directly  with  her  on  immediate   concerns/questions.” Valacek/GCHD  e-­‐mails  Rashmi  and  Travis/MDHHS  requesting  confirmation  that   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   blood  lead  levels  have  not  shown  significant  increase  since  switch  to  Flint  River   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" water  supply  -­‐-­‐  asks  again  the  following  day Gov.  Snyder  is  copied  on  a  briefing  re:  Flint  lead  issue  that  states  the  water  system  is   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   in  compliance.  Briefing  document  under-­‐states  lead  sampling  results,  downplays   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" problems  and  emphasizes  the  high  cost  of  replacing  lead  service  lines Wurfel/MDEQ  states  in  National  Public  Radio  interview  that  Del  Toral's  draft  report   NPR  (Sep.  29,  2015):  "High  Lead  Levels  In  Michigan  Kids  After  City   was  the  work  of  a  "rogue  employee" Switches  Water  Source"  (Hulett) Detroit  Free  Press  publishes  their  own  analysis  of  state's  blood  lead  level  data,   Detroit  Free  Press  (Sep.  29,  2015):  "State  data  confirms  higher   saying  the  state's  data  actually  support  the  HMC  findings blood-­‐lead  levels  in  Flint  kids"  (Tanner,  Kaffer) Executive  Director  to  the  Governor  Allison  Scott  e-­‐mails  Snyder  aides  Muchmore,   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Agen,  Clement,  Wyant/MDEQ  and  Lyon/MDHHS  re:  meeting  to  discuss  emergency   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" management  approach  for  Flint  situation Lasher/MDHHS  circulates  to  colleagues  an  advisory  from  Genesee  County  that   demands  fresh  analysis  of  state  blood  level  data  and  threatens  to  seek  third-­‐party   analysis  of  the  state  data  MDHHS  has  consistently  used  to  suggest  no  elevated   From  MDHHS  e-­‐mails  posted  online blood  lead  levels  due  to  the  Flint  water.  "“I  understand  that  we  are  still  reviewing   the  data  –  but  the  county  has  basically  issued  a  ransom  date  that  they  want  this   information  by  tomorrow" Lasher/MDHHS  e-­‐mails  Peeler,  Eden  Wells  (state  CMO),  Scott/MDHHS  requesting   blood  lead  data  for  children  under  age  6,  to  compare  with  other  evaluations.   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   Response  from  Linda  Dykema  to  Corinne  Miller,  Sara  LyonCallo  and  Eden  Wells   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" discourages  "data  war" Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  e-­‐mails  Wells/MDHHS  with  updated  findings  on  blood  lead  levels   correlated  to  water  supply  switch;  Wells  asks  when  Hanna-­‐Attisha  is  going  public   with  the  results.  Hanna-­‐Attisha:  "...when  we  noticed  our  findings  and  the  glaring   correlation  to  elevated  water  lead  levels  in  the  same  locations  and  learned  that   corrosion  control  as  never  added  to  the  water  treatment,  we  ethically  could  not  stay   From  MDHHS  e-­‐mails  posted  online silent.  In  addition,  your  annual  elevated  blood  level  percentage  supports  our   findings  –  annual  decrease  (as  seen  nationally)  and  then  an  increase  post-­‐water   switch.  We  also  knew  that  releasing  our  data  would  only  incite  a  data  war;  however,   the  more  we  dig,  the  more  alarming  the  results." Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   Gov.  Snyder  receives  a  detailed  timeline  for  Flint  water  issues  prepared  by  Treasury 102/274) Genesee  County  issues  its  own  public  health  advisory  for  people  using  water   MLive  (Sep.  29,  2015):  "Genesee  County  joins  city  in  issuing  health   supplied  by  Flint  system advisory  on  lead  in  Flint  water"  (Fonger) Mayor  Walling  forwards  Wyant/MDEQ  an  e-­‐mail  from  Fr.  Phil  Schmitter  that  states:   “You  delayed  your  action  on  this  issue  for  an  inordinate  amount  of  time.  People   were  told  over  and  over  that  it  was  all  fine…  I  no  longer  trust  the  city  on  this  issue.   As  reported  in  Bridge  Magazine  (Feb.  4,  2016):  "Disaster  Day  by   And  that  we  have  now  a  lead  problem  for  babies  and  children  is  unconscionable.”   Day:  A  detailed  Flint  crisis  timeline" Walling:  "I  don’t  know  what  more  I  could  have  done  given  the  guidance  coming   from  EPA  and  DEQ  and  subsequently  city  staff  but  this  major  health  issue  did  come   up  anyway  and  our  community  is  paying  a  huge  price." October  2015 City  of  Flint  issues  Quarterly  Water  Quality  Report Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Posted  to  City  of  Flint  website Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Sources Accessed somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df 3/12/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/13/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/13/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/13/16 www.npr.org/2015/09/29/444497051/high-­‐lead-­‐levels-­‐in-­‐ michigan-­‐kids-­‐after-­‐city-­‐switches-­‐water-­‐source www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-­‐ kaffer/2015/09/26/state-­‐data-­‐flint-­‐lead/72820798/ 3/13/16 3/13/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/13/16 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf 3/13/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/13/16 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf 3/13/16 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/genesee_county_ also_issues_pub.html 3/12/16 3/13/16 bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-­‐crisis-­‐timeline-­‐part-­‐3/ 3/13/16 www.cityofflint.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/Quarterly-­‐Water-­‐ Quality-­‐Report_Oct-­‐15.pdf 3/13/16 19 Date Event October  2015 Michigan  Office  of  the  Auditor  General  begins  formal  review  of  MDEQ  ODWMA October  1,  2015 October  1,  2015 October  1,  2015 October  1,  2015 October  1,  2015 October  1,  2015 October  2,  2015 October  2,  2015 State  CMO  Wells  confirms  HMC  blood  lead  level  data  (showing  greatly  increased   blood  lead  levels  in  some  Flint  neighborhoods).  “After  a  comprehensive  and  detailed   "Blood  Lead  Levels  in  Flint  Talking  Points,"  dated  Oct.  5,  2015,   review  down  to  the  zip  code  level,  we  have  found  that  the  state  analysis  is   from  MDHHS  e-­‐mails  posted  online consistent  with  that  presented  by  Hurley.” Genesee  County  Board  of  Commissioners  and  GCHD  issue  “Do  Not  Drink”  Advisory   Public  Health  Emergency  Declaration  for  People  Using  the  Flint   for  Flint  water  using  the  Flint  River  as  a  source;  news  conference.  GCHD  declares   City  Water  Supply  with  the  Flint  River  as  the  Source Public  Health  Emergency.  Flint  Mayor  Walling  issues  statement  on  advisory  saying   MLive  (Oct.  1,  2015):  "Don't  drink  Flint's  water,  Genesee  County   Flint  Water  customers  should  filter  their  water  before  drinking  it leaders  warn"  (Johnson) Private  and  public  sources  donate  $105,000  to  fund  5,000  water  filters  for  Flint   MLive  (Oct.  1,  2015):  "More  than  5,000  in  Flint  to  get  lead  water   residences;  to  be  distributed  to  "highest  risk  populations  first" filters  following  donation"  (Adams) MLive  reports  that  Flint  Water  stores  service  line  records  on  index  cards,  making  it   MLive  (Oct.  1,  2015):  "Flint  data  on  lead  water  lines  stored  on   difficult  to  identify  highest-­‐risk  locations  for  lead  pollution 45,000  index  cards"  (Fonger) Greater  Flint  chapter  ACLU  joins  petition  urging  EPA  to  order  Flint  to  reconnect  to   MLive  (Oct.  2,  2015):  "Petition  launched  for  EPA  intervention  in   DWSD  system Flint  water  crisis"  (Emery) Referenced  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   DWSD  provides  proposal  for  reconnecting  Flint  to  DWSD  system 97/274) Governor's  Office,  EPA  Region  5,  City  of  Flint,  MDEQ  and  MDHHS  hold  press   conference  announcing  Governor’s  Flint  10-­‐point  Action  Plan  to  address  water   Press  release  -­‐  "Gov.  Rick  Snyder:  Comprehensive  action  plan  will   system,  $1  million  for  water  filters,  and  anti-­‐corrosion  treatment.  Governor's  press   help  Flint  residents  address  water  concerns";  press  conference   release  also  says  the  water  leaving  Flint's  system  is  safe  to  drink  but  families  with   announcement lead  plumbing  in  their  homes  could  have  higher  lead  levels Gov.  Snyder  requests  "clear  side  by  side  comparison  of  health  benefits  and  cost  of   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   GLWA  vs.  a  more  optimized  Flint  system"  in  e-­‐mail  to  Muchmore 102/274) October  2,  2015 GCHD  school  screening  water  samples  are  collected  for  lead  analysis October  6,  2015 October  7,  2015 October  8,  2015 October  8,  2015 October  8,  2015 Reference  Document E-­‐mails  indicate  Wyant/MDEQ  Director  will  update  Gov.  Snyder  daily  on  Flint  water   action  plan  announced  Oct.  2 State  Budget  Director  John  Roberts  outlines  $10.4  million  in  state  aid  to  implement   the  action  plan  of  October  2 Gov.  Snyder  holds  press  conference:    Flint  to  reconnect  to  Great  Lakes  Water   Authority/Detroit  Water  and  Sewerage  Department City  of  Flint  develops  its  plan  to  reconnect  to  Detroit  Water  and  Sewerage   Department Wyant/MDEQ  briefs  Gov.  Snyder  on  Flint  water  issues;  affirms  elevated  test  results   for  lead  in  water  at  Flint  schools October  8,  2015 Detroit  paper  publishes  editorial  criticizing  causes  of/response  to  Flint  water  crisis Sources audgen.michigan.gov/wip/wip761032015.html Michigan  Radio  (Oct.  20,  2015):  "Auditor  general  looking  into  state   michiganradio.org/post/auditor-­‐general-­‐looking-­‐state-­‐agency-­‐ agency  responsible  for  monitoring  Flint  water"  (Carmody) responsible-­‐monitoring-­‐flint-­‐water#stream/0 Flint  Community  Schools  Testing  Results  -­‐  Initial  Screening Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   102/274) Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (p.   102/274) Press  release  -­‐  "Gov.  Rick  Snyder:  Move  back  to  Detroit  water   provides  best  protection  for  public  health  in  Flint" As  reported  in  a  timeline  produced  by  the  Michigan  Auditor   General  in  December  2015 Briefing  materials  included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.   20,  2016  (p.  116-­‐121) Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  8,  2015):  "Flint  water  crisis:  An  obscene   failure  of  government"  (Editorial  Board) somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf Attachment  49  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015. www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/genesee_county_l eaders_warn_do.html#incart_river_mobile www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/more_than_5000 _in_flint_to_get.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/flint_official_says _data_on_lo.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/greater_flint_aclu _holds_meeti.html somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-­‐192-­‐29701-­‐366287-­‐-­‐,00.html Attachment  50  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df Attachment  51  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df Attachment  52  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   6,  2015 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df www.freep.com/story/opinion/editorials/2015/10/08/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis-­‐obscene-­‐failure-­‐government/73578640/ Accessed 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 Detroit  Free  Press  publishes  article  with  details  on  corrosivity  of  Flint  River  water,   based  on  VT's  study.  "The  tests  showed  Flint  Water  without  added  phosphates   October  11,  2015 corroded  the  lead  at  19  times  the  rate  of  Detroit  water.  Even  when  phosphates   were  added,  it  corroded  at  16  times  the  rate  of  the  Detroit  water."  (DFP  10-­‐11-­‐15) Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  11,  2015):  "Chemical  testing  could  have   predicted  Flint's  water  crisis"  (Wisely,  Erb) www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/10/missed-­‐ opportunities-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/73688428/ 3/13/16 October  13,  2015 MDEQ  announces  plans  for  statewide  lead  education  campaign  focused  on  schools Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  13,  2015):  "Michigan  to  launch  lead   education  effort  statewide"  (Higgins) www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/13/lead-­‐ water-­‐flint-­‐michigan-­‐testing/73871480/ 3/13/16 State  Legislature  authorizes  $9.35  million  to  help  City  of  Flint  pay  for  return  to   DWSD  water  system,  water  filters,  and  staff  at  schools  to  gauge  lead  exposure   October  14,  2015 (signed  by  Gov.  Snyder  Oct.  15).  C.S.  Mott  Foundation  pledges  another  $4  million   and  City  of  Flint  will  provide  additional  $2  million Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  14,  2015):  "Michigan  House  OKs  $9.35M  to   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/14/michiga aid  in  Flint  water  crisis"  (Gray) n-­‐house-­‐oks-­‐915m-­‐aid-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/73932980/ October  16,  2015 DWSD  and  City  of  Flint  execute  water  supply  contract,  and  City  of  Flint  is   reconnected  to  DWSD  system October  16,  2015 First  weekly  coordination  meeting  held  between  City  of  Flint  and  state  agencies Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   3/13/16 LAN01-­‐#394270-­‐v1-­‐Executed  Flint  Water  Agreement  DWSD.PDF,   MDEQ  info:  Attachment  53  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to   Letter  to  B.  Wright  (Flint)  from  Rosenthal  &  Prysby  (MDEQ),  e-­‐mail   FWATF  Nov.  6,  2015 from  MDEQ  confirming  disinfection  testing  of  transmission  main Information  provided  by  MDEQ  to  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 20 Date Event MDEQ  meets  with  Flint  Schools  Superintendent  and  Genesee  County  Health   Department EPA  announces  formation  of  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  to  provide   October  16,  2015 technical  expertise  to  MDEQ  and  City  of  Flint Edwards/VT  e-­‐mails  Wyant/DEQ,  state  legislators  and  Flint  residents  Walters  and   October  16,  2015 Mays  citing  inaccuracies  in  lead  sampling  and  communication October  16,  2015 October  16,  2015 October  18,  2015 October  21,  2015 October  21,  2015 October  21,  2015 October  22,  2015 October  23,  2015 October  26,  2015 October  28,  2015 October  30,  2015 October  30,  2015 October  31,  2015 Reference  Document Sources yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/A92DE629DB86E6668525 7EE000579593 flintwaterstudy.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-­‐USEPA-­‐ Final.pdf media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_dc3d45b23fd5418fbb6ec65d0ad974 MDEQ  approves  GCDC  Water  Supply  System  permit  for  new  30-­‐mgd  WTP   MDEQ  Permit  W151099 13.pdf Detroit  News  (Oct.  19,  2015):  "Michigan  DEQ  vows  changes  in  Flint   www.detroitnews.com/story/news/environment/2015/10/18/de MDEQ  Director  Dan  Wyant  issues  statement  saying  his  office  was  mistaken  in  how  it   water  crisis"  (Lynch) q-­‐mistakes/74198882/ interpreted  federal  rules  governing  corrosion  control  for  water  systems  the  size  of   MLive  (Oct.  19,  2015):  "DEQ  chief  says  state  used  wrong  federal   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/state_deq_flint_s Flint;  also  says  ODWMA  chief  Shekter  Smith  is  being  reassigned  to  help  with  FOIA   water  rules  in  Flint  for  17  months"  (Fonger) hould_have_be.html requests,  and  is  being  replaced  by  interim  chief  Jim  Sygo MLive  (Oct.  19,  2015):  "DEQ  replaces  water  official  after  state   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/top_state_water_ acknowledges  'mistake'  in  Flint"  (Fonger) official_repla.html U.S.  Rep.  Dan  Kildee,  D-­‐Flint,  and  state  Senate  Minority  Leader  Jim  Ananich,  D-­‐Flint,   MLive  (Oct.  21,  2015):  "Kildee,  Ananich  call  for  federal   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/kildee_ananich_ca issue  separate  letters  to  Gina  McCarthy,  EPA  Administrator,  requesting  federal   investigation  into  Flint  water  crisis"  (Fonger) ll_for_federa.html review  of  MDEQ's  oversight  of  water  treatment EPA's  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  provides  MDEQ  with  technical  comments   Posted  to  EPA  website www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐activities on  Draft  School  Sampling  Protocol Press  release  -­‐  "Gov.  Rick  Snyder  announces  Flint  Water  Task  Force   to  review  state,  federal  and  municipal  actions,  offer   michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐-­‐367761-­‐-­‐,00.html Gov.  Snyder  announces  formation  of  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force  to  complete  an   recommendations" www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/10/21/task-­‐force-­‐ After-­‐Action  Review Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  21,  2015):  "Task  force  appointed  to   appointed-­‐examine-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐controversy/74342628/ examine  Flint  water  controversy"  (Gray) Detroit  Free  Press  (Oct.  21,  2015):  "MDEQ  e-­‐mails  show  stunning   www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-­‐ Detroit  paper  publishes  column  on  MDEQ's  "stunning  indifference"  to  Flint  water   indifference  to  Flint  peril"  (Kaffer) kaffer/2015/10/21/indifference-­‐characterized-­‐state-­‐approach-­‐ crisis FOIA'd  information  is  also  provided  on  Flint  Water  Study  website flint-­‐water/74289430/ EPA's  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  provides  MDEQ  technical  comments  on   Included  on  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  list  of  activities,   www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐activities Flint  Corrosion  Control  Plan posted  to  EPA  website Former  Flint  EM  Earley  issues  statement  to  MLive  claiming  decision  to  switch  to  Flint   MLive  (Oct.  26,  2015):  "Ex-­‐emergency  manager  says  local  leaders   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/ex-­‐ River  as  supply  source  was  "a  local  decision  made  by  local  civic  leaders" made  decision  to  use  Flint  River  water"  (Fonger) emergency_manager_says_loca.html MDEQ  issues  construction  permit  for  additional  corrosion  control  treatment Attachment  54  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   MDEQ  Construction  Permit  W151104 W151104 6,  2015 Attachment  55  -­‐  MDEQ  documentation  provided  to  FWATF  Nov.   MDEQ  notifies  Flint  regarding  corrosion  control  treatment  operation Letter  from  Prysby/MDEQ  to  Glasgow/Flint 6,  2015 EPA's  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  provides  MDEQ  technical  comments  on   Included  on  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  list  of  activities,   www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐activities Flint  Corrosion  Control  Permit  and  cover  letter posted  to  EPA  website MLive  (Oct.  31,  2015):  "Letters  to  be  sent  to  Flint  parents  with   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/letters_to_be_sen Flint  sends  letters  to  parents  providing  recommendations  of  GCHD  and  MDHHS information  on  lead  testing"    (Emery) t_to_flint_pa.html EPA  press  release  -­‐  "EPA  Establishes  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task   Force  to  Provide  Technical  Expertise  to  MDEQ  and  City  of  Flint" Chronological  compilation  of  MDEQ  e-­‐mails  from  FOIA  requests   (Roy/Edwards)  posted  to  Flint  Water  Study  website MI  National  Action  Network  (NAN)  calls  for  special  court  for  offenders  who   November  2,  2015 consumed  water  contaminated  by  lead  poisoning  in  Flint.  Governor's  Office  notes   work  of  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force MLive  (Nov.  2,  2015):  "Al  Sharpton  group  wants  new  Flint  court  for   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/al_sharpton_grou possible  lead  poison  victims"  (Fonger) p_wants_specia.html EPA  to  conduct  "full  review  of  actions  taken  to  address  drinking  water  quality  issues   in  Flint,"  with  results  by  end  of  week  of  Nov.  2nd  (MLive).  EPA  also  will  audit   November  3,  2015 MDEQ's  drinking  water  program,  which  "will  take  several  months"  (EPA  press   release) EPA  Region  5  press  release:  "EPA  Region  5  to  Audit  State  of   Michigan's  Drinking  Water  Program" MLive  (Nov.  3,  2015):  "U.S.  EPA  will  conduct  'full  review'  of  Flint   water  crisis"    (Fonger) EPA  releases  memo  indicating  differing  possible  interpretations  of  the  LCR  with   November  3,  2015 respect  to  how  OCCT  procedures  apply  to  this  situation  (new  water  source/new   water  treatment) Karen  Weaver  defeats  incumbent  Dayne  Walling  in  Flint  mayoral  election;  takes   November  3,  2015 office  November  9,  2015 "Lead  and  Copper  Rule  Requirements  for  Optimal  Corrosion   Control  Treatment  for  Large  Drinking  Water  Systems,"  posted  to   EPA  website MLive  (Nov.  3,  2015):  "Karen  Weaver  unseats  Dayne  Walling  to   win  Flint  mayor"  (Fonger) Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Accessed Information  provided  by  MDEQ  to  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a5792a626c8dac098525735 900400c2d/9e26559c4478e1cb85257ef900617183!OpenDocume nt www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/us_epa_tells_kild ee_it_will_ca.html www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-­‐ 11/documents/occt_req_memo_signed_pg_2015-­‐11-­‐03-­‐ 155158_508.pdf www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/karen_weaver_m akes_history_ele.html 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/1/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 21 Date Event Reference  Document Sources "Final  Report:  High  Lead  at  Three  Residences  in  Flint,  Michigan";   EPA  issues  "Final  Report:  High  Lead  at  Three  Residences  in  Flint,  Michigan";  includes   www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/Redacted%20EPA%20mem November  4,  2015 transmittal  from  T.  Hyde/EPA  to  J.  Sygo/MDEQ,  posted  to  ACLU-­‐MI   information  June  24  Interim  Report,  with  personal  ID/health  info  redacted o.110415.pdf website MLive  (Feb.  17,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis  unfolds  in  key  officials'   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/see_flint_water_c November  4,  2015 DEQ  authorizes  a  permit  for  installation  of  corrosion  control  at  Flint  WTP emails  through  the  years"  -­‐  provides  screen  capture  of  e-­‐mail   risis_unfold.html#4 referring  to  permit  authorization MDEQ  releases  water  testing  data  from  nearly  400  homes  and  businesses  as  well  as   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  200-­‐ somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p November  9,  2015 schools;  press  release  says  tests  indicate  lead  problem  is  related  to  individual   206/274) df buildings  or  faucets,  not  system-­‐wide yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a5792a626c8dac098525735 EPA  Region  5  press  release:  "EPA  Region  5  to  Audit  State  of   EPA  announces  intent  to  audit  State  of  Michigan's  drinking  water  program;  will   900400c2d/9e26559c4478e1cb85257ef900617183!OpenDocume Michigan's  Drinking  Water  Program" November  10,  2015 examine  MDEQ's  implementation  of  SDWA  and  related  rules  on  lead  and  copper,   nt MLive  (Nov.  10,  2015):  "EPA  to  audit  Michigan  drinking  water   total  coliform,  nitrates  and  ground  water www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/epa_says_it_will_ program  following  Flint  lead  crisis"  (Fonger) audit_michiga.html#incart_story_package EPA's  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  meets  in  Flint  with  Rep.  Kildee  and  City  of   Included  on  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  list  of  activities,   November  10,  2015 www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐activities Flint  officials  to  discuss  technical  issues  with  optimization  of  corrosion  control posted  to  EPA  website MLive  publishes  article  indicating  City  of  Flint  certified  that  most  water  samples   came  from  homes  at  high  risk  for  lead,  but  other  records  indicate  most  did  not  -­‐   MLive  (Nov.  12,  2015):  "Documents  show  Flint  filed  false  reports   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/documents_show November  12,  2015 potentially  leading  the  city  and  state  to  underestimate  for  months  the  extent  of  lead   about  testing  for  lead  in  water"  (Fonger) _city_filed_fals.html#incart_story_package pollution  in  tap  water Flint  families  file  federal  lawsuit  accusing  14  state  and  local  officials  of  intentional   Detroit  Free  Press  (Nov.  13,  2015):  "After  Flint  Water  Crisis,   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/11/13/after-­‐ November  13,  2015 negligence Families  File  Lawsuit"  (Bethencourt) flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐families-­‐file-­‐lawsuit/75744376/ Genesee  Co.  Dept.  of  Health  and  Michigan  MDHHS  announce  they  are  providing   MLive  (Nov.  13,  2015):  "County  Health  Department,  state  partner   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/county_health_de November  13,  2015 resources  to  educate  Flint  residents  and  primary  care  providers  about  lead  and  what   to  educate  Flint  area  on  lead"  (Johnson) partment_state.html#incart_story_package people  should  do  to  protect  themselves www.MLive.com/lansing-­‐ MI  Board  of  Canvassers  rejects  petition  filed  by  Angelo  Scott  Brown  of  Detroit  to   MLive  (Nov.  13,  2015):  "Board  rejects  petition  seeking  to  recall   November  13,  2015 news/index.ssf/2015/11/board_rejects_petition_to_reca.html#inc recall  Gov.  Snyder,  alleging  he  is  responsible  for  Flint  water  crisis Michigan  Gov.  Rick  Snyder"  (Oosting) art_river_index Class  action  lawsuit  is  filed  against  Gov.  Snyder,  State  of  MIchigan  and  various  city   November  13,  2015 Case  is  filed  in  U.S.  District  Court,  Eastern  District  of  Michigan flintwaterclassaction.com and  state  employees  on  behalf  of  Melissa  Mays  and  other  Flint  residents www.aclumich.org/article/flint-­‐residents-­‐sue-­‐city-­‐state-­‐over-­‐lead-­‐ Press  release  and  notice  posted  to  ACLU-­‐MI  website. ACLU  Michigan,  NRDC  and  Concerned  Pastors  for  Social  Action  announce  intended   drinking-­‐water November  16,  2015 MLive  (Nov.  16,  2015):  "ACLU,  national  activists  intend  to  sue  Gov.   federal  lawsuit  against  City  and  State  officials  over  the  Flint  water  crisis www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/nrdc_aclu_file_no Snyder,  Flint  over  lead  in  water"  (Fonger) tice_to_sue_s.html#incart_river_index MLive  (Nov.  16,  2015):  "Howard  Croft,  Flint  official  responsible  for   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/howard_croft_flin November  16,  2015 Howard  Croft  resigns  as  Flint  DPW  director water  oversight,  resigns"  (Fonger) t_official_re.html#incart_river_index Q&A  document  dated  Nov.  16,  2015  included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐ somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p November  17,  2015 MDEQ  provides  Flint  drinking  water  Q&A  to  Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  217-­‐235/274) df Elected  officials  and  activists  testify  before  USEPA  National  Drinking  Water  Advisory   MLive  (Nov.  18,  2015):  "Story  of  Flint  water  crisis,  'failure  of   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/story_of_flint_wat November  18,  2015 Council  regarding  Flint  water  crisis government,'  unfolds  in  Washington"  (Fonger) er_crisis_fa.html#incart_story_package E-­‐mail  from  MDHHS  to  Governor's  Office,  press  release  and  talking   MDHHS  releases  data  on  October  2015  blood  lead  levels;  24  of  963  adults  and   somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p November  19,  2015 points  included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.   children  tested  had  elevated  blood  lead  levels  in  October df 207-­‐216/274) Detroit  Free  Press  (Nov.  22,  2015):  "Flint  water  mystery:  How  was   www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/21/snyders-­‐top-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  reports  on  Governor's  office's  involvement  in  decisions  to   decision  made?"  (Egan) aide-­‐talked-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐supply-­‐alternatives/76037130/ November  22,  2015 approve  KWA  and  to  use  Flint  River  water  for  City  of  Flint  water  supply Detroit  Free  Press  (Nov.  21,  2015):  "Answers  prompt  more   www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-­‐ questions  in  Flint  water  crisis"  (Kaffer) kaffer/2015/11/21/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/76060708/ Flint  City  Council  approves  $907,650  contract  extension  for  engineering  company   MLive  (Nov.  23,  2015):  "Engineer  gets  $907,000  contract  add-­‐on  to   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/engineer_gets_90 November  23,  2015 LAN  to  prepare  Flint  WTP  for  treating  Lake  Huron  water  from  KWA  pipeline prepare  Flint  for  KWA  water"  (Fonger) 7000_contract.html EPA's  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  releases  comments  on  Flint's  residential   www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐comments-­‐ November  23,  2015 lead  and  copper  sampling  instructions;  agrees  with  Del  Toral  that  pre-­‐flushing   Comments  posted  to  EPA  website flints-­‐residential-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐lead-­‐copper should  be  removed EPA's  Flint  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  releases  Preliminary  Assessment,  with   "Lead  in  Drinking  Water  -­‐  Preliminary  Assessment,"  posted  to  EPA   www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐draft-­‐lead-­‐ November  25,  2016 recommendations  on  sampling  protocol,  operating  procedures,  corrosion  control   website drinking-­‐water-­‐preliminary-­‐assessment and  outreach  during  transition  to  KWA  pipeline Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Accessed 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 22 Date Event Hearing  held  on  whether  City  has  violated  Genesee  County  Circuit  Court  order  to   reduce  water  and  sewer  rates Reference  Document MLive  (Nov.  25,  2015):  "Flint  water  customers  say  no  change  in   bills,  despite  court  order"  (Ridley) Sources Accessed www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/flint_residents_te stify_on_wat.html 3/13/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_in_talks_wit h_regulators.html#incart_story_package 3/13/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/lead_levels_in_fli nts_water_st.html 3/13/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/03/election s-­‐board-­‐rejects-­‐latest-­‐snyder-­‐recall-­‐petition/76712410/ 3/13/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/03/flint-­‐kids-­‐ lead-­‐levels/76746474/ 3/13/16 www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-­‐01/documents/ftf-­‐ 4_task_force_comments_on_mdhhs_residential_sampling_protoc ol_12-­‐4-­‐15.pdf 3/13/16 James  Henry/GCHD  recapped  events  over  several  months  in  an  e-­‐mail  to  other   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   December  4,  2015 county  health  officials  and  singled  out  a  specific  state  health  department  official  he   concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   said  had  sabotaged  their  Legionella  investigation Wisely) www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ info/80028820/ 3/13/16 Tamara  Brickey,  GCHD  public  health  division  director,  e-­‐mails  other  county  health   officials  that  “the  state  is  making  clear  they  are  not  practicing  ethical  public  health   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  9,  2016):  "Flint  e-­‐mails:  CDC  voiced   December  5,  2015 practice”  re:  Legionella  outbreak.  “Now  evidence  is  clearly  pointing  to  a  deliberate   concerns  over  Legionnaires'  actions"  (Dolan,  Anderson,  Egan,   cover-­‐up…  In  my  opinion,  if  we  don’t  act  soon,  we  are  going  to  become  guilty  by   Wisely) association.” www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐e-­‐mails-­‐state-­‐city-­‐appear-­‐unable-­‐share-­‐ info/80028820/ 3/13/16 FWATF  sends  letter  to  Gov.  Snyder  recommending  project  coordination  framework   December  7,  2015 for  Flint  water  crisis  mitigation,  with  single-­‐point  management,  goals,  timeline,   Letter  posted  online  by  MLive responsibility  assignments,  contingency  planngin  and  communication media.MLive.com/newsnow_impact/other/FWATF%20letter%20t o%20Governor%20Snyder.pdf 1/31/16 November  25,  2015 City  of  Flint  in  talks  with  state  and  federal  regulators  to  determine  how  long  Flint   MLive  (Dec.  11,  2015):  "Flint  in  talks  with  regulators  over  length  of   December  2015 will  be  required  to  practice  treating  water  from  a  new  pipeline  before  selling  it  to   test  run  with  KWA  water"  (Fonger) customers Dr.  Edwards  makes  presentation  at  Hurley  Medical  Center  stating  that  Flint's  water   MLive  (Dec.  2,  2015):  "Flint  water  still  unsafe  without  lead  filters,   December  2,  2015 is  still  not  safe  to  drink  without  filtration  in  some  areas;  Mayor  Weaver  presents  him   professor  says"  (Fonger) with  a  Certificate  of  Appreciation MI  Board  of  Canvassers  again  rejects  petition  filed  by  Angelo  Scott  Brown  of  Detroit   Detroit  Free  Press  (Dec.  3,  2015):  "Push  to  recall  Snyder  over  Flint   December  3,  2015 to  recall  Gov.  Snyder;  Brown  says  he  will  try  again water  crisis  stalls"  (Egan) State  reports  that  blood  lead  levels  in  Flint  children  have  dropped,  with  the  rate   falling  to  3%  of  children  under  6,  based  on  results  from  1,361  children.  Dr.  Hanna-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (Dec.  4,  2015):  "State  says  blood-­‐lead  levels  in   December  4,  2015 Attisha:  the  most  recent  data  does  not  capture  past  exposure,  so  it  provides  limited   Flint  kids  have  dropped"  (Erb) information  on  the  population's  real  exposure December  4,  2015 December  8,  2015 December  8,  2015 December  9,  2015 December  10,  2015 December  11,  2015 December  11,  2015 December  14,  2015 EPA's  Flint  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  releases  comments  on  MDHHS  residential   drinking  water  sampling  protocol   Posted  to  EPA  website Testimony  continues  in  hearing  on  whether  City  has  violated  Genesee  County  Circuit   MLive  (Dec.  8.  2015):  "Daughter's  piggy  bank  makes  appearance  in   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/daughters_piggy_ Court  order  to  reduce  water  and  sewer  rates Flint  water  rate  hearing"  (Ridley) bank_makes_app.html MLive  (Dec.  9,  2015):  "Flint  administrator  says  city  plans  to  add   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_administrato Mayor  Weaver  holds  first  Town  Hall  meeting;  Flint  City  Administrator  Henderson   third-­‐party  water  testing"  (Fonger) r_says_city_1.html#incart_river_index announces  plan  to  start  independent  testing  for  lead  in  City  of  Flint  water  supply MLive  (Dec.  10,  2015):  "Flint  will  pay  for  independent  water  tests,   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_will_pay_for added  phosphate  treatment"  (Fonger) _independent.html City  of  Flint  starts  adding  supplemental  phosphates  to  water  purchased  from  City  of   MLive  (Dec.  9,  2015):  "Flint  officials  say  they've  boosted  corrosion   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_officials_say Detroit  in  an  effort  to  rebuild  protective  coating  in  transmission  lines control  agents  in  water"  (Fonger) _theyre_boo.html#incart_river_index MDEQ  issues  report  finding  lead  in  plumbing  system  at  Brownell  STEM  Academy  -­‐   one  of  three  school  buildings  that  tested  above  federal  limits  for  lead.  Includes   MLive  (Dec.  10,  2015):  "More  lead  in  plumbing  found  at  Flint's   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/state_report_iden quotes  from  Wurfel  attributing  high  lead  levels  to  "old  faucets  and  drinking  water   Brownell  school,  state  report  says"  (Fonger) tifies_more_l.html#incart_river_index fountains" MDHHS  releases  latest  results  from  blood  lead  testing  conducted  in  Flint  since  Oct.   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  246-­‐ michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐-­‐367761-­‐-­‐,00.html 1.  39  of  1,386  adults  and  children  had  elevated  blood  lead  levels  since  Oct.  1,  2015 247/274) Former  Flint  Mayor  James  Sharp  calls  for  federal  investigations  into  Flint  water   Detroit  Free  Press  (Dec.  11,  2015):  "Former  Flint  mayor  wants  feds   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/10/former-­‐ controversy to  probe  lead  in  water"  (Egan) flint-­‐mayor-­‐wants-­‐feds-­‐probe-­‐lead-­‐water/77088024/ Flint  Mayor  Weaver  declares  state  of  emergency  in  Flint  -­‐-­‐  the  first  step  in  pursuing   MLive  (Dec.  15,  2015):  "Read  Flint  mayor's  state  of  emergency   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/read_flint_mayor a  federal  disaster  declaration.  Declaration  says  the  damage  done  to  Flint  children  by   declaration  on  water  crisis" _karen_weavers.html#incart_river_index lead  exposure  is  irreversible,  creating  need  for  increased  spending  on  special   The  Guardian  (Dec.  15,  2015):  "Flint  mayor  declares  'manmade   www.theguardian.com/us-­‐news/2015/dec/15/michigan-­‐mayor-­‐ education,  mental  health  and  juvenile  justice disaster'  over  lead-­‐tainted  water  supply" declares-­‐manmade-­‐disaster-­‐lead-­‐tainted-­‐water-­‐supply Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/12/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 23 Date December  14,  2015 December  15,  2015 December  16,  2015 December  17,  2015 December  17,  2015 December  17,  2015 December  17,  2015 December  21,  2015 December  22,  2015 December  22,  2015 December  23,  2015 December  29,  2015 December  29,  2015 December  29,  2015 Event Reference  Document Sources Accessed FEMA  sends  28,000  liters  of  water  to  Food  Bank  of  Eastern  Michigan,  for   distribution  to  partner  agencies  to  serve  Flint  residents MLive  (Dec.  14,  2015):  "FEMA  sends  28,000  liters  of  bottled  water   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/fema_sends_thou 3/13/16 to  Flint  amid  lead  troubles" sands_of_cases.html media.MLive.com/newsnow_impact/other/15.12.15%20Flint%20 Gov.  Snyder  issues  response  to  FWATF's  Dec.  7  letter,  naming  Harvey  Hollins,   Letter  dated  Dec.  15,  2015  posted  online  by  MLive Task%20Force%20Letter.pdf director  of  Office  of  Urban  Initiatives,  to  lead  Flint  water  crisis  response,  with  Chris   MLive  (Dec.  17,  2015):  "Read  letters  from  governor,  task  force  on   3/13/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/read_letters_from DeWitt  supporting  communications Flint  water  crisis"  (Fonger) _governor_tas.html#incart_river_index EPA's  Flint  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  releases  recommendations  on  Flint  drinking   www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐ 3/13/16 water  treatment  prior  to  switching  to  KWA  source recommendations-­‐regarding-­‐flint-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐treatment Press  release  described  in  MLive  (Dec.  17,  2015):  "Governor's  task   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/state_task_force_ FWATF  issues  press  release  re:  letter  to  Gov.  Snyder  and  response force  on  Flint  water  crisis  releases  early  recommendations"   3/13/16 on_flint_wate.html#incart_river_index (Fonger) National  media  coverage  of  Flint  water  crisis  -­‐  e.g.:  MSNBC's  Rachel  Maddow  Show   MSNBC  -­‐  Rachel  Maddow  Show  (Dec.  19,  2015):  "Flint  toxic  water   www.msnbc.com/rachel-­‐maddow-­‐show/watch/toxic-­‐water-­‐ report  on  Flint  water  crisis  places  blame  on  Governor's  Office  and  "radical,  anti-­‐ tragedy  points  directly  to  Michigan  Gov.  Snyder" tragedy-­‐points-­‐directly-­‐to-­‐snyder-­‐588635715518 3/13/16 democratic  policies";  The  Guardian  (US  edition)  article  describes  interview  with  Dr.   The  Guardian  (Dec.  17,  2015):  "Flint's  'toxic  soup'  polluted  water   www.theguardian.com/us-­‐news/2015/dec/17/flint-­‐polluted-­‐ Hanna-­‐Attisha worse  for  children  than  thought,  doctor  says" water-­‐toxic-­‐lead-­‐children-­‐at-­‐risk Genesee  County  Board  of  Commissioners  Chairman  Jamie  Curtis  sends  letter  to   MLive  (Dec.  18,  2015):  "Genesee  County  chairman  says  he  can   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/genesee_county_ Mayor  Weaver  saying  he  is  authorized  to  forward  Flint's  request  for  disaster   3/13/16 send  Flint  disaster  request  to  governor"  (Fonger) board_chair_say.html#incart_story_package declaration  to  the  Governor's  Office   City  of  Flint’s  Emergency  Operations  Center  (EOC)  is  activated  to  begin  to  coordinate   www.cityofflint.com/2015/12/17/emergency-­‐operations-­‐center-­‐ Announced  on  City  of  Flint  website 3/13/16 relief  efforts activated/ "Elevated  Blood  Lead  Levels  in  Children  Associated  With  the  Flint   American  Journal  of  Public  Health  publishes  results  of  further  study  of  blood  lead   Drinking  Water  Crisis:  A  Spatial  Analysis  of  Risk  and  Public  Health   ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2015.303003 levels  by  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha  et  al.  New  research  further  details  the  rise  in  elevated   Response,"  available  via  AJPH  website. www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/health_journal_pu 3/13/16 blood  levels  that  was  documented  in  the  initial  study  released  Sep.  24 Described  in  MLive  (Dec.  21,  2015):  "Newly  published  study  gives   blishes_blood.html#incart_story_package more  evidence  of  elevated  lead  in  Flint  kids"  (Fonger) Genesee  County  Circuit  Court  Judge  Hayman  rules  city  can  continue  shutting  off   water  to  customers  who  haven't  paid  their  water  bill  since  September  2015  -­‐  not   MLive  (Dec.  22,  2015):  "Questions  over  emergency  manager  law   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/questions_arise_r 3/13/16 others.  Also  says  City  must  apply  35%  rate  rollback  to  service  charges  as  well  as   arise  in  Flint  water  rates  lawsuit"  (Emery) egarding_publ.html#incart_story_package water  commodity  rates Continued  national  media  coverage  of  Flint  water  crisis  -­‐  e.g.,  Rachel  Maddow  show   CBS  News  (Dec.  22,  2015):  "New  study  links  tainted  water,  high   www.cbsnews.com/news/tainted-­‐water-­‐high-­‐lead-­‐levels-­‐kids-­‐flint-­‐ reports  on  Flint  water  crisis;  CBS  News  reports  on  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha's  refined  study   3/13/16 lead  levels  in  kids  in  Flint,  Mich." michigan/ of  blood  lead  levels Auditor  General  issues  responses  to  questions  from  Sen.  Ananich  re:  Flint  water   crisis.  Notes  no  "major  infractions"  committed  by  MDEQ  but  also  notes  mistakes  -­‐   Included  in  Gov.  Snyder's  e-­‐mails  released  Jan.  20,  2016  (pp.  250-­‐ michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐-­‐367761-­‐-­‐,00.html 3/13/16 corrosion  control  treatment  should  have  been  initiated  with  switch  to  Flint  River  as   264/274) primary  water  supply,  Tier  1  sample  sites  not  verified,  etc. FWATF  issues  letter  to  Gov.  Snyder  and  press  release  re:  initial  findings  from  its   www.scribd.com/doc/294248389/Flint-­‐Water-­‐Advisory-­‐Task-­‐ work;  puts  primary  blame  for  Flint  water  crisis  on  MDEQ  but  indicates  more  to  come   Link  to  letter  posted  in  Free  Press  article  (see  below) 3/13/16 Force-­‐letter-­‐to-­‐Snyder in  final  report Gov.  Snyder  issues  apology  for  Flint  water  crisis  via  press  release Press  release  posted  on  michigan.gov www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐57577_57657-­‐372335-­‐-­‐,00.html 3/13/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/29/deq-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (Dec.  29,  2015):  "Snyder  apologizes,  Wyant   director-­‐wyant-­‐resigns-­‐over-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/78027052/ resigns  in  Flint  water  crisis"  (Egan). www.MLive.com/lansing-­‐ MDEQ  Director  Wyant  and  Director  of  Communication  Brad  Wurfel  submit  their   MLive  (Dec  29-­‐30,  2015):  "Director  Dan  Wyant  resigns  after  task   news/index.ssf/2015/12/deq_director_dan_wyant_resigns.html#i 3/13/16 resignations force  blasts  MDEQ  over  Flint  water  crisis"  (Lawler);  "MDEQ   ncart_river_index spokesman  also  resigns  over  Flint  water  crisis,  says  city  'didn't  feel   www.MLive.com/lansing-­‐ like  we  cared'"  (Lawler) news/index.ssf/2015/12/deq_spokesman_also_resigns_ove.html# incart_river_index Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 24 Date Event December  29,  2015 Continued  national  media  coverage  of  Flint  water  crisis Mayor  Weaver  meets  with  Genesee  County  Board  of  Commissioners  Chairman   December  30,  2015 Curtis  and  others  involved  in  emergency  planning  to  discuss  the  City's  Incident   Action  Plan Gov.  Snyder  reassigns  Michigan  DNR  Director  Keith  Creagh  as  interim  MDEQ   December  30,  2015 Director,  effective  January  4,  2016 Reference  Document Sources Accessed MSNBC  Rachel  Maddow  (Dec.  29,  2015):  "Michigan  governor   apologizes  for  Flint  water"  (Kildee  interview). The  Guardian  (Dec.  30,  2015):  "Governor  Rick  Snyder  'very  sorry'   about  Flint  water  lead  levels  debacle"  (Felton). Reuters/Huffington  Post  (Dec.  29,  2015):  "Michigan  Gov.  Rick   Snyder  Apologizes  For  Flint's  Water  Crisis"  (Klayman). AP/Wall  Street  Journal  (Dec.  29,  2015):  "Michigan’s  Top   Environmental  Regulator  Resigns  Over  Flint  Water  Crisis" www.msnbc.com/rachel-­‐maddow-­‐show/watch/michigan-­‐ governor-­‐apologizes-­‐for-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐593269827585 www.theguardian.com/us-­‐news/2015/dec/30/michigan-­‐governer-­‐ rick-­‐snyder-­‐very-­‐sorry-­‐about-­‐water-­‐supply-­‐debacle www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rick-­‐snyder-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐lead-­‐ poisoning_56830314e4b014efe0d9814f www.wsj.com/articles/michigans-­‐top-­‐environmental-­‐regulator-­‐ resigns-­‐over-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐1451432226 3/13/16 Press  release  posted  to  City  of  Flint  website www.cityofflint.com/2015/12/30/mayor-­‐meets-­‐with-­‐county-­‐chair-­‐ over-­‐incident-­‐action-­‐plan/ 3/19/16 Press  release  posted  on  State  of  Michigan  website www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐57577_57657-­‐372399-­‐-­‐ ,00.html 3/13/16 2016 Newsweek  puts  Flint  water  crisis  atop  list  of  "nastiest  cases  of  toxic  discharge"  in   January  1,  2016 2015 Newsweek  (Jan.  1,  2016):  "The  Year  in  Pollution"  (Schlanger) January  4,  2016 Genesee  County  Commission  declares  state  of  emergency Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  January  2016) January  5,  2016 Gov.  Snyder  declares  state  of  emergency  for  Genesee  County,  activating  the  State   Emergency  Operations  Center Press  release  and  proclamation  on  State  of  Michigan  website www.newsweek.com/year-­‐pollution-­‐here-­‐are-­‐nastiest-­‐cases-­‐toxic-­‐ discharge-­‐2015-­‐410766 mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. pdf www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-­‐135-­‐3313_3675_73946-­‐372653-­‐-­‐ ,00.html www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/2016-­‐01-­‐ 05_Flint_Water_Governors_Declaration_Final_509966_7.pdf?201 60105162343 Gina  Balaya,  spokeswoman  for  the  U.S.  Attorney's  Office  in  Detroit,  said  Tuesday  her   Detroit  Free  Press  (Jan.  15,  2016):  "Snyder  declares  emergency  as   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/01/05/us-­‐ January  5,  2016 office  is  working  with  the  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency  on  an  investigation   feds  probe  Flint  water"  (Egan) attorneys-­‐office-­‐investigating-­‐lead-­‐flint-­‐water/78303960/ of  the  Flint  water  situation State  of  Michigan  launches  Joint  Information  Center  (JIC)  to  coordinate  public   Press  release  -­‐  "State  of  Michigan  Joint  Information  Center  Now   www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-­‐135-­‐3313_3675_73946-­‐372766-­‐-­‐ January  6,  2016 information  from  the  State  Emergency  Operations  Center,  set  up  to  help  with  health   Operational" ,00.html and  safety  issues  caused  by  lead  in  the  city  of  Flint’s  drinking  water NBC  News  (Jan.  6,  2015):  "Drinking  water  crisis  in  Flint,  Michigan   www.nbcnews.com/nightly-­‐news/video/drinking-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐in-­‐ prompts  federal  investigation" flint-­‐-­‐michigan-­‐-­‐prompts-­‐federal-­‐investigation-­‐597142595942 January  6,  2016 Continued  national  media  coverage:  NBC  News,  MSNBC MSNBC  Rachel  Maddow  (Jan.  6,  2015):  "Flint  toxic  water  draws   www.msnbc.com/rachel-­‐maddow/watch/flint-­‐toxic-­‐water-­‐draws-­‐ federal  scrutiny";  "State  dismissed  Flint  bad  water  test  concerns";   www.msnbc.com/rachel-­‐maddow/watch/state-­‐dismissed-­‐flint-­‐ Guyette  interview bad-­‐water-­‐test-­‐concerns-­‐597320259868 Michigan's  chief  medical  executive,  Dr.  Eden  Wells,  says  Flint  residents  should  either   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   January  7,  2016 www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ use  lead  filters  or  drink  bottled  water  until  further  notice (Dixon) Genesee  County  Sheriff  Robert  Pickell  deploys  work  detail  and  staff  to  deliver  water   MLive  (Jan.  7,  2016):  "Genesee  County  Sheriff  uses  work  detail  to   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/01/work_detail_used January  7,  2016 and  filters  to  homes distribute  filters  in  Flint"  (Acosta) _by_genesee_co.html Continued  national  media  coverage  criticizing  state's  failure  to  provide  bottled   MSNBC  Rachel  Maddow  (Jan.  7,  2016):  "Water  donations  run  dry   www.msnbc.com/rachel-­‐maddow/watch/flint-­‐water-­‐donations-­‐ January  7,  2016 water  and  water  filters in  Flint,  no  action  from  Governor  Snyder" run-­‐dry-­‐-­‐no-­‐state-­‐plan-­‐598134339963 Gov.  Snyder  and  Mayor  Weaver  announce  formation  of  an  inter-­‐agency  group  to   MLive  (Jan.  7,  2016):  "Flint  Mayor,  Gov.  Rick  Snyder  to  provide  city   www.MLive.com/lansing-­‐ January  7,  2016 work  with  State  Emergency  Operations  Center  on  taking  action  to  improve  the   with  'suite  of  services'  following  water  crisis"  (Lawler) news/index.ssf/2016/01/flint_mayor_gov_rick_snyder_to.html situation mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. January  8,  2016 Gov.  Snyder  and  Mayor  Weaver  meet  to  discuss  collaboration Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) pdf MSP  Emergency  Management  Division  announces  water  resource  sites  established   mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. January  9,  2016 Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) in  Flint  with  bottled  water,  filters  and  testing  kits pdf Gov.  Snyder  signs  Executive  Order  to  create  Flint  Water  Interagency  Coordinating   mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. January  11,  2016 Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) Committee  to  work  on  long-­‐term  solutions  to  the  Flint  water  situation pdf Gov.  Snyder  requests  FEMA's  assistance  in  coordinating  an  inter-­‐agency  plan  and   mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. January  12,  2016 Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) activates  Michigan  National  Guard  to  help  with  water  resources  distribution pdf Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/13/16 1/31/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 1/31/16 1/31/16 1/31/16 1/31/16 25 Date January  13,  2016 January  14,  2016 January  15,  2016 January  16,  2016 January  16,  2016 January  19,  2016 Event Gov.  Snyder  and  MDHHS  announce  a  spike  in  Legionellosis  in  Flint  between  June   2014  and  Mar  2015,  which  may  be  linked  to  switch  to  Flint  River.  Spike  included  87   cases,  with  10  deaths,  in  18  months.  This  is  the  first  public  notification,  10  months   after  MDEQ  notified  Hollins  the  outbreak  coincided  with  switch  to  Flint  River  water Gov.  Snyder  requests  Presidential  declaration  of  major  disaster  and  emergency  and   requests  federal  aid Michigan  Attorney  General  Bill  Schuette  announces  he  has  opened  an  investigation   of  Flint  water  crisis President  Obama  approves  declaration  of  emergency  and  request  for  federal  aid,   and  declines  request  for  declaration  of  major  disaster MLive  reports  that  Genesee  County  Health  Dept.  officials  expressed  concern  re:   increase  in  Legionellosis  in  Oct.  2014  in  meeting  with  Flint  Water Gov.  Snyder  delivers  State  of  the  State  address;  apologizes  for  Flint  water  crisis,   announces  release  of  his  own  e-­‐mails  regarding  Flint  water,  and  commits  another   $28  million  in  short-­‐term  for  more  filters,  bottled  water,  school  nurses,  intervention   specialists,  testing  and  monitoring January  19,  2016 Flint  Mayor  Weaver  meets  with  President  Obama  in  Washington,  DC Reference  Document Sources Accessed MLive  (Jan.  13,  2016):  "87  cases,  10  fatal,  of  Legionella  bacteria   found  in  Flint  area;  connection  to  water  crisis  unclear"  (Al  Hajal);   also  reported  nationally  on  CNN,  ABC,  Washington  Post www.MLive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2016/01/legionaires_dis ease_spike_disc.html 3/13/16 Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. pdf 1/31/16 Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2016):  "How  Flint's  Water  Crisis  Unfolded"   www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐timeline/ (Dixon) mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7. Gov.  Snyder's  Flint  Water  timeline  (released  Jan.  2016) pdf MLive  (Jan.  16,  2016):  "Public  never  told,  but  investigators   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/01/documents_show suspected  Flint  River  tie  to  Legionnaires'  in  2014"  (Fonger) _agencies_knew_o.html 3/13/16 1/31/16 3/13/16 New  York  Times  (Jan.  20,  2016):  "Gov.  Rick  Snyder  of  Michigan   Apologizes  in  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (Bosman,  Smith) www.nytimes.com/2016/01/20/us/obama-­‐set-­‐to-­‐meet-­‐with-­‐ mayor-­‐of-­‐flint-­‐about-­‐water-­‐crisis.html?_r=0 3/13/16 Detroit  Free  Press  (Jan.  19,  2016):  "Obama  meets  Flint  mayor,   responds  to  lead  crisis"  (Spangler) www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/01/19/flint-­‐mayor-­‐meet-­‐white-­‐house-­‐ officials/79001256/ 3/13/16 somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p df 3/12/16 www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2016-­‐01-­‐20/michigan-­‐ governor-­‐on-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐i-­‐let-­‐you-­‐down 3/13/16 Class  action  lawsuit  is  filed  against  City  of  Flint  and  various  city  and  state  employees   Case  filed  in  Genesee  County  Circuit  Court on  behalf  of  Melissa  Mays  and  other  Flint  residents Gov.  Snyder  voluntarily  posts  his  e-­‐mails  regarding  Flint  water  to  his  website   January  20,  2016 (Governor's  office  is  exempt  from  Michigan  FOIA) Posted  to  Gov.  Snyder's  webpage  at  www.michigan.gov/snyder US  News  &  World  Report  (Jan.  20,  2016):  "Michigan  Gov.  Rick   Snyder  is  asking  President  Barack  Obama  to  reconsider  his  denial   Gov.  Snyder  asks  President  Obama  to  reconsider  denial  of  federal  disaster   January  20,  2016 of  a  federal  disaster  declaration  to  address  the  drinking  water   declaration crisis  in  Flint,  saying  its  severity  poses  an  'imminent  and  long-­‐term   threat'  to  residents"  (Eggert/AP) State  budget  office  asks  legislature  for  $28  million  to  aid  in  Flint  water  crisis;  House   MLive  (Jan.  20,  2016):  "Michigan  House  approves  $28M  in   January  20,  2016 approves;  heads  next  week  to  Senate immediate  assistance  for  Flint"  (Lawler) EPA's  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  provides  recommendation  that  all     January  20,  2016 Documented  posted  to  EPA  website samples  for  lead  analysis  be  collected  using  wide-­‐mouth  sample  bottles CBS  News  (Jan.  20,  2016):  "Michigan  gov.:  We  don't  want  people   January  20,  2016 CBS  Evening  News  interviews  Gov.  Snyder to  assume  Flint  water  is  safe" Detroit  News  (Jan.  21,  2016):  "Obama  gives  $80  million  to   President  Obama  announces  $80  million  in  financial  aid  for  water  infrastructure   Michigan  for  Flint"  (Burke) January  21,  2016 projects  in  Michigan,  including  Flint.  Money  is  being  provided  for  state's  revolving   MLive  (Jan.  23,  2016):  "$80  million  announced  in  connection  with   loan  fund,  not  as  an  appropriation Flint  water  is  revolving  loan  fund" NBC  News  (Jan.  21,  2016):  "EPA  Administrator  quits  over  Flint   January  21,  2016 EPA  Region  5  Director  Susan  Hedman  resigns,  effective  Feb.  1,  2016 water  crisis"  (Seville/Helsel) EPA  issues  SDWA  Emergency  Order  saying  authorities  in  Michigan  failed  to  properly   respond  to  Flint  water  crisis  and  prescribing  various  actions  for  the  City  and  MDEQ.   PA  will  begin  testing  the  city’s  water;  order  a  range  of  data  collection,  plans  and   January  21,  2016 reports  from  the  City  and  MDEQ;  and  form  an  Independent  Advisory  Panel  of   Order  posted  to  EPA  website drinking  water  /  treatment  experts  and  community  members  to  recommend  next   steps.  EPA  Administrator  Gina  McCarthy  also  asks  EPA  inspector  general  to  conduct   independent  review  of  Region  5's  oversight  of  public  water  systems MDEQ  Director  Creagh  responds  to  EPA  by  saying  they  will  comply,  but  questioning   Detroit  News  (Jan.  22,  2016):  "Michigan  questions  legality  of  EPA   January  22,  2016 McCarthy/EPA's  legal  authority  to  direct  MDEQ  in  Flint  response,  and  stating  MDEQ   directive  on  Flint"  (Oosting)  (includes  letter  response) has  complied  with  all  EPA's  recent  demands January  19,  2016 January  22,  2016 MDHHS  releases  data  showing  70%  of  people  who  contracted  Legionellosis  in  the   Flint  outbreak  were  exposed  to  Flint  water  2  weeks  before  their  symptoms  began Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Detroit  Free  Press  (Jan.  22,  2016):  "Legionnaires’  expert  blames   spike  in  cases  on  Flint  water"  (Tanner,  Anderson) Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/01/michigan_house_appr oves_28m_in.html https://www.epa.gov/mi/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐ recommendations-­‐regarding-­‐wide-­‐mouth-­‐sampling-­‐bottles www.cbsnews.com/news/michigan-­‐gov-­‐at-­‐least-­‐100-­‐kids-­‐affected-­‐ by-­‐lead-­‐in-­‐flint-­‐water/ www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/21/stabeno w-­‐obama-­‐gives-­‐million-­‐flint/79134306/ www.MLive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2016/01/80_million_ announced_in_connec.html www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/epa-­‐administrator-­‐ quits-­‐amid-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐n501561 3/13/16 3/18/15 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-­‐ 01/documents/1_21_sdwa_1431_emergency_admin_order_0121 16.pdf 3/13/16 www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/22/michigan-­‐ questions-­‐legality-­‐epa-­‐directive-­‐flint/79202618/ 3/13/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/01/22/legionnaires-­‐expert-­‐blames-­‐spike-­‐cases-­‐flint-­‐ water/79203614/ 3/13/16 26 Date Event FWATF  sends  letter  to  Gov.  Snyder  calling  for  him  to  engage  experts  versed  in  LCR   January  22,  2016 requirements,  including  Del  Toral/EPA,  and  a  work  group  including  Edwards/VT;   various  other  recommendations  re:  lead  sampling  and  control Two  MDEQ  staffers  are  suspended  without  pay  pending  an  investigation.  The   January  22,  2016 employees  are  not  named  in  the  press  release  but  soon  are  identified  as  Stephen   Busch  and  Liane  Shekter  Smith Gov.  Snyder  returns  additional  executive  powers  to  Flint's  mayor.  “Mayor  Weaver   January  22,  2016 will  now  have  the  authority  to  appoint  the  city  administrator  and  all  department   heads.  Today’s  action  is  the  next  step  in  transitioning  to  full,  local  control  in  Flint”   January  22,  2016 Detroit  Free  Press  reports  that  hacker  group  Anonymous  has  launched  a  Flint   operation  and  is  calling  for  Gov.  Snyder  to  be  charged  with  manslaughter Michigan  AG  Schuette  names  Todd  Flood  (defense  attorney  and  former  Wayne   County  assistant  prosecutor)  and  former  Detroit  FBI  bureau  chief  Andy  Arena  to   January  25,  2016 lead    investigation  into  potential  misconduct  in  office  concerning  Flint  water  crisis.   State  Rep.  LaTanya  Garrett  (D-­‐Detroit)  files  petition  with  U.S.  AG  Loretta  Lynch  to   remove  Schuette’s  office  from  Flint  water  investigation  citing  conflicts  of  interest ACLU  Michigan,  NRDC  and  Concerned  Pastors  for  Social  Action  file  federal  lawsuit   January  27,  2016 against  city  and  state  officials  seeking  to  force  owners  and  operators  of  Flint's  water   system  to  comply  with  SDWA Pastor  Edwin  Anderson,  Aline  Anderson  and  Beatrice  Boler  file  federal  lawsuit   January  31,  2016 against  city  and  state  officials  seeking  compensatory  and  punitive  damages  over   Flint  water  crisis February  1,  2016 Michigan  Attorney  General  Schuette  says  his  office  "likely"  can't  defend  the  seven   MDEQ  workers  being  sued  over  Flint  water  crisis;  asked  federal  judge  to  decide FBI  joins  federal  investigation  of  Flint  water  crisis,  which  also  involves  U.S.   February  2,  2016 Attorney's  office,  US  Postal  Inspection  Service  and  EPA  Criminal  Investigation   Division February  2,  2016 $100  million  lawsuit  is  filed  against  McLaren  Flint  Hospital  and  State  of  Michigan   over  Flint  Legionellosis  cases,  on  behalf  of  four  who  contracted  the  disease Reference  Document 1/31/16 Press  release  posted  to  Gov.  Snyder's  webpage www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐57577-­‐374565-­‐-­‐,00.html 3/13/16 Press  release  posted  to  Gov.  Snyder's  webpage www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐57577_57657-­‐374556-­‐-­‐ ,00.html 3/13/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (Jan.  22,  2016):  "State  on  high  cyber  alert  after   crisis/2016/01/22/activist-­‐hacker-­‐group-­‐anonymous-­‐starts-­‐flint-­‐ Anonymous  threat"  (Egan) campaign/79157780/ 3/13/16 The  State  (Jan.  26,  2016):  "Ex-­‐prosecutor  to  spearhead   investigation  into  Flint  water  crisis"  (Eggert,  Householder) www.thestate.com/news/nation-­‐ world/national/article56583968.html 3/13/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/01/31/deq-­‐workers-­‐need-­‐find-­‐own-­‐lawyer-­‐flint-­‐ lawsuit/79608504/ 3/13/16 Filed  in  U.S.  District  Court,  Eastern  District  of  Michigan Filed  in  U.S.  District  Court,  Eastern  District  of  Michigan Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  1,  2016):  "State  might  not  defend  MDEQ   workers  in  Flint  water  suit"  (Baldas) NBC  News  (Feb.  2,  2016):  "FBI  Investigating  Flint's  Poisoned  Water   www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/fbi-­‐investigating-­‐ Crisis"  (Connor) flint-­‐s-­‐poisoned-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐n509686 Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  2,  2016):  "Fieger  files  $100-­‐million  suit   over  Flint  Legionnaires'  disease  cases"  (Wisely,  Dixon) Press  release  posted  to  Gov.  Snyder's  webpage U.S.  Small  Business  Admnistration  approves  Gov.  Snyder's  request  to  aid  businesses   MLive  (Feb.  5,  2016):  "Businesses  affected  by  Flint  water  crisis  can   February  5,  2016 in  Flint  and  Genesee  County  affected  by  Flint  water  crisis.  SBA  will  provide  access  to   seek  disaster  loans  from  SBA"  (Emery) federal  Economic  Injury  Disaster  Loans  for  small  businesses   EPA's  Flint  Safe  Drinking  Water  Task  Force  provides  recommendations  on  MDEQ's   February  5,  2016 Documented  posted  to  EPA  website Draft  Sentinel  Site  Selection Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  7,  2016):  "Hillary  Clinton:  What  happened   February  7,  2016 Democratic  presidential  candidate  Hillary  Clinton  visits  Flint in  Flint  is  immoral"  (Gray,  Stafford) Luke  Waid  and  Michelle  Rodriguez  file  federal  lawsuit  over  2-­‐year-­‐old  daughter's   February  8,  2016 Filed  in  U.S.  District  Court,  Eastern  District  of  Michigan lead  poisoning Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  9,  2016):  "Flint  issues  boil  advisory  after   water  main  break"  (Bethencourt) Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/13/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/02/fieger-­‐flint-­‐lawsuit-­‐mclaren-­‐water-­‐ crisis/79704852/ 3/13/16 www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/03/flint-­‐water-­‐congressional-­‐hearing/79728072/ www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/house-­‐panel-­‐chair-­‐ vows-­‐hunt-­‐down-­‐official-­‐behind-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐n510411 3/13/16 www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/03/snyder-­‐water-­‐bills/79753564/ www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-­‐277-­‐57577_57657-­‐376028-­‐-­‐ ,00.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/businesses_affect ed_by_flint_w.html www.epa.gov/flint/flint-­‐safe-­‐drinking-­‐water-­‐task-­‐force-­‐ recommendations-­‐mdeqs-­‐draft-­‐sentinel-­‐site-­‐selection www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/07/hillary-­‐clinton-­‐flint-­‐campaign-­‐stop/79902530/ www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/09/flint-­‐residents-­‐asked-­‐boil-­‐their-­‐filtered-­‐ water/80086916/ Gov.  Snyder  proposes  state  budget  for  FY  2017  that  includes  $195  million  to  address   MLive  (Feb.  10,  2016):  "Gov.  Rick  Snyder  proposes  $195M  for  Flint   www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/02/gov_rick_snyder_prop February  10,  2016 Flint  water  crisis water  as  protesters  call  for  his  removal"  (Lawler) oses_195m.html February  9,  2016 Flint  issues  boil  water  advisory  due  to  broken  water  main Accessed www.gongwer.com/public/fwatf-­‐letter.pdf House  Committee  on  Oversight  and  Government  Reform  holds  hearing  where   Detroit  News  (Feb.  5,  2016):  "Lawmakers  spar  on  state's  blame  for   Beauvais/EPA,  Creagh/MDEQ,  Edwards/VT  and  Flint  resident  Walters  testify  re:  Flint   Flint  water"  (Burke,  Lynch) February  3,  2016 water  crisis;  former  Flint  EM  Earley  declines  to  appear.  Edwards:  "I  am  personally   NBC  News  (Feb.  3,  2016):  "House  Panel  Accuses  Officials  of   shamed  that  the  profession  I  belong  to,  the  drinking  water  industry  in  this  country,   Covering  Up  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (Schuppe) has  allowed  this  to  occur." Snyder  proposes  $30  million  in  state  funds  to  offset  a  portion  of  Flint  residents'   Detroit  News  (Feb.  3,  2016):  "Snyder  pitches  $30  million  for  Flint   February  3,  2016 water  bills.  Approved  by  Michigan  Senate  Feb.  4,  by  House  Feb.  17 water  bill  refunds"  (Livengood,  Carah,  Oosting) February  5,  2016 Gov.  Snyder  announces  that  Shekter  Smith/MDEQ,  head  of  ODWMA,  is  fired   Sources 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/13/16 3/18/16 3/13/16 3/18/16 3/18/16 27 Date February  10,  2016 February  10,  2016 February  10,  2016 February  11,  2016 February  11,  2016 February  12,  2016 February  12,  2016 February  12,  2016 February  12,  2016 February  14,  2016 February  15,  2016 February  15,  2016 February  16,  2016 February  16,  2016 February  16,  2016 February  16,  2016 February  17,  2016 Event Reference  Document Mayor  Weaver,  Dr.  Hanna-­‐Attisha,  Yanna  Lambrinidou  and  others  address  House   MLive  (Feb.  10,  2016):  "Flint  mayor,  superintendent  ask  for  short   Democratic  Steering  and  Policy  Committee  in  D.C.  Gov.  Snyder  was  invited  but   and  long-­‐term  water  crisis  help"  (Acosta) declined  due  to  concurrent  state  budget  proposal U.S.  House  of  Representatives  passes  H.R.  4470,  which  specifies  notification   Act  posted  to  congress.gov  website requirements  for  lead  action  level  exceedances  in  public  water  systems U.S.  Small  Business  Administration  opens  Flint  Business  Recovery  Center  to  aid   MLive  (Feb.  10,  2016):  "Help  center  opens  for  small  businesses   entrepreneurs  and  business  owners  affected  by  Flint  water  crisis impacted  by  Flint's  water  crisis"  (Adams) U.S.  District  Judge  John  Corbett  O'Meara  grants  request  by  state  attorneys  to   withdraw  from  representing  7  MDEQ  employees  who  are  being  sued  over  Flint   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  11,  2016):  "AG's  office  freed  from  MDEQ   water  crisis,  due  to  conflict  of  interest.  State  lawyers  noted  the  MDEQ  employees   workers  in  Flint  water  case"  (Baldas) will  still  get  lawyers  paid  for  by  the  state Obama  administration  officials  tell  Democratic  members  of  Congress  they  anticipate   providing  a  Medicaid  expansion  that  will  cover  lead  blood-­‐level  monitoring,   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  12,  2016):  "Obama  administration  to  offer   behavioral  health  services  and  nutritional  support  for  children  and  pregnant  women   more  benefits  in  Flint"  (Spangler) in  Flint  as  a  result  of  water  crisis   Gov.  Snyder  calls  U.S.  House  Oversight  and  Government  Reform  Committee  chair   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  27,  2016):  "Snyder  to  testify  before   Chaffetz  to  offer  his  testimony  on  Flint  water  crisis Congress  on  Flint  crisis"  (Spangler,  Dolan) MDEQ  announces  plan  to  regularly  test  water  from  400  Flint  addresses  for  lead  over   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  12,  2016):  "Flint  water  tests  to  track   next  8  weeks;  public  should  be  able  to  track  the  results  through  a  map  of  the  sites   change  in  lead  levels"  (Allen) on  www.michigan.gov/flintwater Department  of  Environmental  Quality:Part  1  (381MB  PDF)    Part  2   (206MB  PDF)    Part  3  (185MB  PDF)    Part  4  (227MB  PDF) Department  of  Technology,  Management  and  Budget  (2.38MB   State  of  Michigan  activates  website  containing  numerous  e-­‐mails  related  to  Flint   PDF) water  crisis Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (6.51MB  PDF) Department  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (33KB  PDF) Department  of  Treasury  (12.5MB  PDF) Lawsuit  is  filed  against  LAN,  alleging  professional  negligence  in  preparing  Flint  WTP   NBC25  News  (Feb.  12,  2016):  "Engineering  firm  hired  to  fix  Flint   for  full-­‐time  operation water  plant  now  facing  multi-­‐million  dollar  lawsuit"  (Moore) Sources 3/18/16 www.congress.gov/bill/114th-­‐congress/house-­‐bill/4470/text 3/18/16 www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/help_center_open s_for_small_bu.html 3/19/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/11/ags-­‐office-­‐freed-­‐deq-­‐workers-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐ case/80257552/ 3/19/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/12/obama-­‐administration-­‐offer-­‐more-­‐benefits-­‐ flint/80298130/ 3/19/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/12/snyder-­‐wants-­‐testify-­‐congress-­‐flint/80290232/ 3/19/16 www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/02/12/flint-­‐ water-­‐tests-­‐track-­‐lead-­‐levels/80282428/ 3/19/16 Links  published  in  Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  12,  2016):  "State   releases  trove  of  e-­‐mails  related  to  Flint  water"  (Egan):   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/12/flint-­‐water-­‐crisis-­‐emails/80278914/ 3/19/16 nbc25news.com/news/local/engineering-­‐firm-­‐hired-­‐to-­‐fix-­‐flint-­‐ water-­‐plant-­‐now-­‐facing-­‐multi-­‐million-­‐dollar-­‐lawsuit www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Gov.  Snyder  asks  for  expanded  Medicaid  support  for  about  15,000  Flint  residents  in   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  14,  2016):  "Snyder  asks  for  more  Medicaid   crisis/2016/02/14/snyder-­‐asks-­‐more-­‐medicaid-­‐support-­‐ the  wake  of  Flint  water  crisis support  for  Flint"  (Bethencourt) flint/80382696/ U.S.  Surgeon  General  Vivek  Murthy  visits  Flint  and  meets  with  150  local  doctors,   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  15,  2016):  "U.S.  surgeon  general  to  Flint's   social  workers  and  students;  says  "trusted  voices"  need  to  impart  critical  nutrition   crisis/2016/02/15/us-­‐surgeon-­‐general-­‐flint-­‐crisis-­‐dr-­‐vivek-­‐ trusted  voices:  Speak  up"  (Allen) and  education  to  Flint  residents murthy/80431666/ NAACP  announces  it  will  invite  "disruptive  civil  disobedience"  in  Flint  if  Gov.  Snyder   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  15,  2016):  "NAACP  threatens  civil   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ does  not  produce  a  plan  within  30  days  for  replacing  the  city's  water  pipes disobedience  over  Flint  pipes"  (Allen) crisis/2016/02/15/naacp-­‐president-­‐flint-­‐outrage/80416032/ www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/lessons-­‐flint-­‐and-­‐price-­‐water-­‐ Food  &  Water  Watch  releases  report  showing  Flint  residents  were  being  charged   Report  posted  to  Food  &  Water  Watch  website privatization more  for  water  than  any  other  customers  in  the  nation's  500  largest  community   MLive  (Feb.  16,  2016):  "Flint  water  rates  highest  in  country,  study   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/flints_water_rates water  systems claims"  (Ridley) _highest_in.html Detroit  Free  Press  publishes  Google  map  of  Flint  homes  that  have  tested  with   dangerously  high  lead  levels.  "666  addresses  with  levels  of  more  than  15  parts  per   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  16,  2016):  "Flint  map:  See  666  homes   www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ billion  of  lead  found  the  water.  That's  out  of  9,940  tests  taken  from  September   where  lead  levels  too  high"  (Allen) crisis/2016/02/16/flint-­‐lead-­‐water-­‐map/80445272/ through  Feb.  13" 2-­‐page  report  posted  online www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10446.pdf Congressional  Research  Service  issues  report  stating  EPA  did  not  respond  to  Flint's   MLive  (Feb.  18,  2016):  "EPA  didn't  respond  to  Flint's  water  crisis  as   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/epa_didnt_respon water  crisis  as  soon  as  it  could  have soon  as  it  could  have,  report  says"  (Emery) d_to_flints_wa.html Governor's  Office  announces  it  has  contracted  with  Rowe  Professional  Services  to   MLive  (Feb.  16,  2016):  "Effort  to  replace  lead  water  pipes   www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ update  a  recent  analysis  of  Flint's  water  pipes,  beginning  the  work  required  to   underway  in  Flint"  (Williams) crisis/2016/02/16/lead-­‐water-­‐pipe-­‐replacement-­‐flint/80478866/ replace  lead  service  lines.   Federal  class  action  lawsuit  is  filed  on  behalf  of  Angela  McIntosh  and  other  Flint   PR  Newswire  (Feb.  17,  2016):  "Class  action  law  firm  and  personal   www.prnewswire.com/news-­‐releases/class-­‐action-­‐law-­‐firm-­‐and-­‐ water  crisis  victims.  While  other  lawsuits  have  been  filed,  no  case  has  yet  been   injury  Super  Lawyer  filed  lawsuit  on  behalf  of  thousands  of  Flint   personal-­‐injury-­‐super-­‐lawyer-­‐filed-­‐lawsuit-­‐on-­‐behalf-­‐of-­‐thousands-­‐ granted  class  action  status  by  any  state  or  federal  court victims"   of-­‐flint-­‐victims-­‐300221443.html Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force Accessed www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/flint_mayor_super intendent_ask.html 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 28 Date Event Reference  Document RT.com  (Feb.  18,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis:  Mayor,  governor  spar   over  timeline  to  replace  lead  pipes"   Mayor  Weaver  counters  state  lead  replacement  plan  with  Flint  Fast  Start  Plan,   Detroit  Free  Press  (Feb.  17,  2016):  "State  signs  agreement  for  Flint   February  18,  2016 working  with  Lansing  employees;  Gov.  Snyder  announces  grant  of  $2M  to  help  with   pipe  testing"  (Dolan) pipeline  replacement   MLive  (Feb.  18,  2016):  "Flint  gets  $2  million  from  state  to  start   lead  service  water  replacements"  (Fonger) U.S.  DHHS  Secretary  Sylvia  Burwell  visits  Flint;  announces  her  agency  will  provide  an   MLive  (Feb.  18,  2016):  "Additional  $500,000  in  federal  money  to   February  18,  2016 additional  $500,000  to  help  mitigate  potential  lead  damage  in  Flint  children fight  lead  damage  in  Flint  children"  (Johnson) Rev.  Jesse  Jackson's  Rainbow  PUSH  Coalition  and  Concerned  Pastors  for  Social   MLive  (Feb.  19,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis  march  with  Jesse  Jackson   February  19,  2016 Action  organize  a  march  from  Metropolitan  Baptist  Tabernacle  to  Flint  WTP draws  thousands"  (Acosta) February  20,  2016 Mark  Pollins/EPA  sends  letter  to  MDEQ  and  Flint  officials  saying  they  are  not  doing   Letter  posted  to  EPA  website enough  to  comply  with  SDWA  emergency  order  on  lead  contamination Board  of  State  Canvassers  approves  petition  to  recall  Gov.  Snyder  over  Flint  water   crisis,  submitted  by  David  Bullock Dr.  Marty  Kaufman/University  of  Michigan-­‐Flint  says  in  press  conference  that  it  is   still  unknown  what  types  of  pipes  are  running  to  13,000  properties  in  Flint.  Thus  far,   February  22,  2016 4,376  locations  with  lead  pipes  have  been  identified;  records  do  not  exist  for  more   than  10,000  properties February  22,  2016 MLive  (Feb.  22,  2016):  "Petition  to  recall  Gov.  Rick  Snyder  over   Flint  water  crisis  clears  Michigan  panel"  (Lawler) Sources www.rt.com/usa/332817-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐pipe-­‐replacement-­‐pfcs/ www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ crisis/2016/02/17/state-­‐agreement-­‐flint-­‐pipe-­‐testing/80470524/ www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/governor_says_2-­‐ million_grant.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/us_department_o f_health_announ.html www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/flint_water_crisis_ march_with.html www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-­‐ 02/documents/epa_letter_to_mdeq_and_city_of_flint_w_attach ments_2.19.16.pdf www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/02/petition_to_recall_gov _rick_sn.html#incart_river_index_topics MLive  (Feb.  22,  2016):  "Work  still  needed  to  identify  service  lines   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/work_still_needed to  13,000  Flint  properties"  (Acosta) _to_identify.html#incart_river_index_topics MLive  (Feb.  22,  2016):  "Latest  Flint  water  tests  show  1  in  10  sites   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/latest_flint_water still  exceed  federal  lead  limit"  (Fonger) _testing_sho.html#incart_river_index_topics www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-­‐water-­‐ Gov.  Snyder  announces  his  office  will  release  e-­‐mails  his  staff  sent  or  received  dating   Detroit  News  (Feb.  22,  2016):  "Snyder:  Office  will  release  staff   crisis/2016/02/22/snyder-­‐office-­‐release-­‐staff-­‐emails-­‐flint-­‐ back  to  2011  re:  Flint  water  supply  switch  and  subsequent  contamination   emails  on  Flint  water"  (Livengood) water/80771952/ MLive  (Feb.  22,  2016):  "Six  takeaways  on  Flint  water  crisis  from   www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/six_takeaways_on Congressional  delegation  led  by  U.S.  Rep.  Dan  Kildee,  D-­‐Flint  Township,  visits  Flint Congressional  delegation"  (Acosta) _flint_water_c.html#incart_river_index_topics Michigan  CMO  Wells  announces  MDHHS  has  requested  Assessment  of  Chemical   CBS  Detroit  (Feb.  23,  2016):  "Federal  Officials  To  Probe  Rashes   detroit.cbslocal.com/2016/02/23/federal-­‐officials-­‐to-­‐probe-­‐rashes-­‐ Exposure  from  U.S.  DHHS  to  assess  skin  rashes  reported  during  Flint  water  crisis Amid  Flint  Water  Crisis"  (AP) amid-­‐flint-­‐water-­‐crisis/ State  lawmakers  announce  they  have  created  a  joint  committee  to  begin  formally   MLive  (Feb.  23,  2016):  "Flint  water  crisis  to  get  fresh  probe  by   www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/state_lawmakers_ reviewing  Flint's  ongoing  water  crisis   state  lawmakers"  (Ridley) form_committee.html#incart_story_package Ruth  Mott  Foundation  dedicates  $1  million  to  go  toward  short-­‐  and  long-­‐term  needs   MLive  (Feb.  24,  2016):  "Ruth  Mott  Foundation  gives  $1M  to  aid  in   www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/ruth_mott_founda of  Flint  residents  exposed  to  lead Flint  water  crisis"  (Adams) tion_gives_1m.html#incart_river_index_topics MLive  (Feb.  26,  2016):  "Gov.  Snyder  signs  $30  million  water  relief   www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/snyder_signs_30_ Gov.  Snyder  signs  $30  million  bill  to  provide  water  bill  relief  for  Flint  residents bill  for  Flint"  (Johnson) million_water.html #JUSTICEFORFLINT  benefit  show  is  held  at  The  Whiting  in  Flint,  raising  more  than   MLive  (Mar.  1,  2016):  "Justice  for  Flint  benefit  show  raises   www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/03/justice_for_flint_b $150,000  to  benefit  Flint  residents $156,000  for  water  crisis  relief"  (Acosta) enefit_show.html Accessed 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 February  22,  2016 MLive  reports  some  test  sites  still  exceed  federal  limit  for  lead  in  water 3/19/16 February  22,  2016 3/19/16 February  22,  2016 February  23,  2016 February  23,  2016 February  24,  2016 February  26,  2016 February  28,  2016 Flint  Water  Crisis  Timeline   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 3/19/16 29 APPENDIX VI: Abbreviations and Acronyms   Abbreviation   ACLU   AG   AJPH   AWWA   CAC   CCT   CDC   CLPPP   Cu   DBPs   DEQ   DHHS   DNR   DPW   DWSD   EBLL   EFM   ELL   EM   EPA   FAQs   FOIA   FWATF   FWICC   GCBOH   GCDC   GCHD   GCMS   GFHC   GM   HMC   KWA   LAN   LCR   LSL   MCIR   MCL   MDCH   MDEQ   MDHHS   mgd   NAN     Definition   American  Civil  Liberties  Union   Attorney  General   American  Journal  of  Public  Health   American  Water  Works  Association   Citizens  Advisory  Committee   Corrosion  control  treatment   Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention   Childhood  Lead  Poisoning  Prevention  Program   Copper   Disinfection  byproducts   Department  of  Environmental  Quality   Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services     Department  of  Natural  Resources   City  of  Flint  Department  of  Public  Works   Detroit  Water  and  Sewerage  Department   Elevated  blood  lead  level   Emergency  financial  manager   Elevated  lead  level   Emergency  manager   U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency   Frequently  Asked  Questions   Freedom  of  Information  Act   Flint  Water  Advisory  Task  Force   Flint  Water  Interagency  Coordinating  Committee   GCHD  Board  of  Health   Genesee  County  Drain  Commission   Genesee  County  Health  Department   Genesee  County  Medical  Society   Greater  Flint  Health  Coalition   General  Motors   Hurley  Medical  Center   Karegnondi  Water  Authority   Lockwood,  Andrews,  &  Newnam,  Inc.   Lead  Contaminant  Rule   Lead  service  line   Michigan  Care  Improvement  Registry   Maximum  Contaminant  Level   Michigan  Department  of  Community  Health   Michigan  Department  of  Environmental  Quality   Michigan  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services   Million  gallons  per  day   National  Action  Network       NDWAC   NRDC   OAG   OCCT   ODMWA   O&M   Pb   ppb   SDWA   TAC   TTHMs   TYJT   UAW   µg/l   VT   WTP   National  Drinking  Water  Advisory  Council   National  Resources  Defense  Council   Office  of  the  Auditor  General   Optimal  Corrosion  Control  Treatment   Office  of  Drinking  Water  and  Municipal  Assistance   Operations  and  maintenance   Lead   Parts  per  billion   Safe  Drinking  Water  Act   City  of  Flint/Veolia  Technical  Advisory  Committee   Total  trihalomethanes   Tucker,  Young,  Jackson,  Tull  Inc.   United  Auto  Workers  Union   Micrograms  per  liter   Virginia  Tech  (Virginia  Polytechnic  Institute  and  State  University   Water  Treatment  Plant