03 JUN 2013 05:07 pm A. WARREN ____________________________________ CARMELO SANTIAGO Plaintiff v. POLICE OFFICER RICHARD NICOLETTI, et al. Defendants ____________________________________ : : : : : : : : : : COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY JURY TRIAL DEMAND August Term 2011 No. 2034 January Term 2013 No. 1297 ORDER AND NOW, this day of , 2013, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Police Officer Richard Nicoletti and Police Officer Matthew McCarthy, is GRANTED, and it is ORDERED that all claims are dismissed with prejudice. BY THE COURT: _________________________________ J. Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT CRAIG M. STRAW CHIEF DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR AMANDA C. SHOFFEL DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR IDENTIFICATION N O. 306956 1515 ARCH STREET,14TH FLOOR PHILADELPHIA , PA 19102-1595 TEL (215) 683-5443 AND FAX (215) 683-5397 amanda.shoffel@phila.gov ____________________________________ : : CARMELO SANTIAGO : Plaintiff : : v. : : POLICE OFFICER : RICHARD NICOLETTI, et al. : Defendants : ____________________________________ COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY JURY TRIAL DEMAND August Term 2011 No. 2034 January Term 2013 No. 1297 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF OFFICER RICHARD NICOLETTI AND OFFICER MATTHEW McCARTHY Defendants, Police Officer Richard Nicoletti and Police Officer Matthew McCarthy, by and through undersigned counsel, file the following Motion for Summary Judgment. The City of Philadelphia respectfully requests that this Honorable Court dismiss Plaintiff‟s claims, for the following reasons, also set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Law, which is incorporated herein by reference: 1. On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff Carmelo Santiago filed a Complaint against Philadelphia Police Officer Richard Nicoletti. See Plaintiff‟s Complaint. 2. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Officer Nicoletti on December 21, 2011, alleging intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2 See Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 Exhibit A. Officer Nicoletti was the only named defendant in the instant action for approximately two years. 3. On January 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against his partner, Officer McCarthy. The only allegations against Officer McCarthy is intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4. The parties agreed due to common issues of law and fact, as well as to not waste the Court‟s resources, the actions should be consolidated for discovery and trial. 5. The Court granted the Motion to Consolidate on February 20, 2013. 6. Plaintiff‟s claims must be dismissed because they fail as a matter of law. 7. First, the City of Philadelphia and its employees acting within their official capacities are immune from liability for claims of negligence unless the injury complained of was caused by an act falling within one of eight narrowly construed exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541-§ 8542; Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118. There is no exception for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the officers are immune from suit. 8. Second, it is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the actor's alleged conduct can reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173 (1996), appeal denied, 681 A.2d 178 (1996); Reimer v. Tien, 514 A.2d 566 (1986). 9. Here, the officers were privileged to use deadly force because they were confronted with deadly force. See generally, 18 Pa.C.S. § 508. 10. Title 18 Section 508(d) expressly authorizes the use of force by police officers to prevent another person from committing suicide. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public 3 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 Welfare, Farview State Hosp. v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (1990), appeal dismissed by 615 A.2d 730 (1992). 11. Accordingly, the Officers‟ conduct does not rise to a level of outrageous behavior. WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons and for all of the reasons more fully set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Law, Police Officer Nicoletti and Police Officer McCarthy move this Honorable Court to grant their motion for summary judgment and dismiss Plaintiff‟s claims with prejudice. Respectfully submitted, AMANDA C. SHOFFEL DEputy City Solicitor City of Philadelphia Law Department 1515 Arch Street, 14th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102-5397 DATED: June 3, 2013 4 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT CRAIG M. STRAW CHIEF DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR ATTORNEYS FOR D EFENDANT POLICE OFFICER RICHARD NICOLETTI AMANDA C. SHOFFEL DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR IDENTIFICATION N O. 306956 1515 ARCH STREET,14TH FLOOR PHILADELPHIA , PA 19102-1595 TEL (215) 683-5443 AND FAX (215) 683-5397 amanda.shoffel@phila.gov ____________________________________ : : CARMELO SANTIAGO : Plaintiff : : v. : : POLICE OFFICER : RICHARD NICOLETTI, et al. : Defendants : ____________________________________ COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY JURY TRIAL DEMAND August Term 2011 No. 2034 January Term 2013 No. 1297 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 and Philadelphia Civil Rule *210, the Defendants, Police Officer Nicoletti and Police Officer McCarthy, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby file this Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. I. MATTER BEFORE THE COURT The Defendants hereby submit this Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting this Honorable Court to dismiss the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. 5 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 II. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED A. Are the Defendants entitled to summary judgment on all the Plaintiff's claims against them, because the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8541 et. seq., limits the tort liability for municipal employees to certain instances of negligence, none of which are applicable to this case? Suggested Answer: Yes. B. Are the Defendants entitled to summary judgment because there was no outrageous conduct where the 18 Pa.C.S. § 508. Title 18 Section 508(d) expressly authorizes the use of deadly force by police officers to prevent another person from committing suicide? Suggested Answer: Yes. III. OPERATIVE FACTS On March 13, 2011, Plaintiff noticed his son, Carmelo Winans, was exhibiting strange behavior. See, Exhibit B, DEPOSITION OF CARMELO SANTIAGO at 50:21-51:10. Carmelo was acting erratically, appeared paranoid, and speaking in broken phrases about God. Id. at 63:2-6. Plaintiff watched his son go into the kitchen, grab a steak knife, and put the knife to his throat. Id. at 59:5; 62:14-16. He observed his son pressing the knife to his throat. Id. At that point, he believed his son was going to commit suicide. Id. at 63:710. Plaintiff and his father (Carmelo‟s grandfather) repeatedly told Carmelo to put the knife down. Id. at 61:14-62:13. At no time did Carmelo listen to his family members and put the knife down. Id. Plaintiff left the room to call the police. Id. at 63:4-10. Plaintiff testified left the room because he was concerned that if his son saw him calling the police, he may kill or hurt himself. Id. Officer Nicoletti and Officer McCarthy arrived on scene at Plaintiff‟s home. Id. at 70. Plaintiff let them in the house and pointed them towards the kitchen. Id. at 70:8-21. 6 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 Officer Nicoletti began to talk to Carmelo, who still had the knife at his throat. Id. at 72:24. The officers both had their firearms drawn, but pointed towards the ground. Id. at 74-16. At some point, Carmelo began to put the knife down and Officer Nicoletti lunged towards him. Id. at 77:1-10. A struggle ensued between Carmelo and Officer Nicoletti. During the struggle, Officer Nicoletti was shot. Id. at 77:12-20. He fell backwards. Id. Officer McCarthy, also observing the incident, fired two times after he observed deadly force used on his partner. Id. 78:2-10. Plaintiff‟s claims must be dismissed because they fail as a matter of law. First, the City of Philadelphia and its employees acting within their official capacities are immune from liability for claims of negligence unless the injury complained of was caused by an act falling within one of eight narrowly construed exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541-§ 8542; Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118. There is no exception for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the officers are immune from suit. Second, it is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the actor's alleged conduct can reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173 (1996), appeal denied, 681 A.2d 178 (1996); Reimer v. Tien, 514 A.2d 566 (1986). Here, the officers were privileged to use deadly force because they were confronted with deadly force. See generally, 18 Pa.C.S. § 508. Title 18 Section 505(d) expressly authorizes the use of deadly force by police officers to prevent another person from committing suicide. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Welfare, Farview State Hosp. v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 7 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 887 (1990), appeal dismissed by 615 A.2d 730 (1992). Accordingly, the Officers‟ conduct does not rise to a level of outrageous behavior. A. Are the Defendants entitled to summary judgment on all the Plaintiff's claims against them, because the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8541 et. seq., limits the tort liability for municipal employees to certain instances of negligence, none of which are applicable to this case? Suggested Answer: Yes. Plaintiff brings a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against Officer Nicoletti. See Amended Complaint, Count II, Exhibit A. This claim must fail as a matter of law. The City of Philadelphia and its employees acting within their official capacities are immune from liability for claims of negligence unless the injury complained of was caused by an act falling within one of eight narrowly construed exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541-§ 8542; Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987) (exceptions to the tort claims act must be narrowly construed). The eight (8) negligence exceptions to immunity enumerated in Section 8542(b) of the Act are: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) operation of motor vehicles; care, custody, and control of personal property; care, custody, and control of real property; dangerous conditions of trees, traffic controls & street lighting; dangerous conditions of utility service facilities; dangerous conditions of streets; dangerous conditions of sidewalks; and care, custody and control of animals. Here, Plaintiff‟s claims do not fall under one of the eight enumerated exceptions. As such, Officer Nicoletti is immune from a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress and from all allegations of negligence in Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint. See, Amended Complaint at ¶ 13 (e) (stating, “In the alternative, [Nicoletti] negligently 8 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 discharged his gun.”). City employees may only be held liable if their conduct amounts to actual fraud, crime, actual malice or willful misconduct. See id. at §§ 8545 & 8550. To state an actionable claim, plaintiff must allege more than mere negligence on the part of Officer Nicoletti. Therefore, all claims in Count II based in negligence must be dismissed with prejudice. A. Are the defendants entitled to summary judgment because there was no outrageous conduct where the 18 Pa.C.S. § 508. Title 18 Section 508(d) expressly authorizes the use of deadly force by police officers to prevent another person from committing suicide? Suggested Answer: Yes. Plaintiff brings claims against both Officers for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress. See Exhibits A and B. These claims fail as a matter of law. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the actor's alleged conduct can reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173 (1996), appeal denied, 681 A.2d 178 (1996); Reimer v. Tien, 514 A.2d 566 (1986). The tort of outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress on a third party is outlined in § 46(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows: (1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. (2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm 9 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized the cause of action and has held that, “in order for a plaintiff to prevail on such a claim, he or she must, at the least, demonstrate intentional outrageous or extreme conduct by the defendant, which causes severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.” Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1230 (2005). Liability on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim “has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2010) citing Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 388 Pa. Super. 400, 565 A.2d 1170, 1184 (1989). It requires an emotional injury result due to the tortfeasor‟s outrageous conduct. Ford v. Isdaner, 374 Pa. Super. 40, 44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) It is required that a defendants acted intentionally in causing plaintiff emotional distress. McNeal v. Easton, 143 Pa. Commw. 151, 156-157 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). Legitimate police conduct does not qualify as “extreme and outrageous” behavior as required by the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Robinson v. Cook, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1532 (1st Cir. 2013); Cann v. Wanner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44406, 27-28 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2006). To permit a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed, the court, “must be satisfied that the defendant‟s alleged misconduct is so extreme and outrageous that it „go[es] beyond all possible bounds of decency, and . . . [is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.‟” Wilkes v. State Farm Ins. Cos., No. 1:05-CV-586, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36434, 2005 WL 1667396, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 15, 2005). 10 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 For example, conduct that Pennsylvania courts have deemed sufficiently outrageous to constitute claims include: (1) killing the plaintiff's son with an automobile and then burying the body, rather than reporting the incident to the police; (2) intentionally fabricating documents that led to the plaintiff's arrest for murder; and (3) knowingly releasing to the press false medical records diagnosing the plaintiff with a fatal disease. Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998); cited from Dull v. W. Manchester Twp. Police Dep't, 604 F. Supp. 2d 739, 755-756 (M.D. Pa. 2009). Here, Plaintiff cannot show the officers acted outrageously or unreasonably. The officers used deadly force because they were confronted with deadly force. See generally, 18 Pa.C.S. § 508. In fact, Title 18 Section 508(d) expressly authorizes the use of deadly force by police officers to prevent another person from committing suicide. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Welfare, Farview State Hosp. v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (1990), appeal dismissed by 615 A.2d 730 (1992). The statute states: Use of force to prevent suicide or the commission of crime. (1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to prevent such other person from committing suicide, inflicting serious bodily injury upon himself, committing or consummating the commission of a crime involving or threatening bodily injury, damage to or loss of property or a breach of the peace, except that: (i) Any limitations imposed by the other provisions of this chapter on the justifiable use of force in self-protection, for the protection of others, the protection of property, the effectuation of an arrest or the prevention of an escape from custody shall apply notwithstanding the criminality of the conduct against which such force is used. (ii) The use of deadly force is not in any event justifiable under this subsection unless: (A) the actor believes that there is a substantial risk that the person whom he seeks to prevent from committing a crime will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless the commission or the consummation of the crime is prevented and that the use of such force presents no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; 11 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 Pursuant to the statute, the use of deadly force is justified where the actor believes that there is a substantial risk that the person will cause death or serious bodily harm to another. As a matter of law, deadly force is justified in response to deadly force. It is undisputed in this case that the officers were confronted with deadly force. Only looking at Plaintiff‟s version of the events, the use of deadly force was justified. Plaintiff testified his son Carmelo was high on drugs at the time of the incident. See, Exhibit B, DEPOSITION OF CARMELO SANTIAGO at 50:21-51:10. Carmelo was acting erratically and appeared paranoid. Id. at 63:2-6. Plaintiff observed his son go into the kitchen, grab a steak knife, and put the knife to his throat in the kitchen. Id. at 59:5; 62:14-16. He observed him pressing the knife to his throat. Id. He believed his son was going to commit suicide. Id. at 63:7-10. Plaintiff and his father repeatedly told Carmelo to put the knife down. Id. at 61:14-62:13. At no time did Carmelo put the knife down. Id. Plaintiff left the room to call the police. Id. at 63:4-10. He left the room because he was concerned that if his son saw him calling the police, he may kill or hurt himself. Id. This is the second time Plaintiff expressed concern that his con was violent, and would use the knife in an act of deadly force. Officer Nicoletti and Officer McCarthy arrived. Plaintiff let them in the house and pointed them towards the kitchen. Id. at 70:8-21. Officer Nicoletti began to talk to Carmelo, who still had the knife at his throat. Id. at 72:24. The officers both had their firearms drawn, but pointed towards the ground. Id. at 74-16. At some point, Carmelo began to put the knife down and Officer Nicoletti lunged towards him. Id. at 77:1-10. A struggle ensued between Carmelo and Officer Nicoletti. During the struggle, Officer 12 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 Nicoletti was shot. Id. at 77:12-20. He fell backwards. Id. Officer McCarthy, also observing the incident, fired two times after he observed deadly force used on his partner. Id. 78:2-10. Under Pennsylvania law, a police officer is justified in using deadly force when there is a belief that such force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or others. Wargo v. Municipality of Monroeville, 646 F.Supp.2d 777 (W.D. Pa.2009). Courts have found officers‟ use of deadly force reasonable in various circumstances where they have been confronted with deadly weapons. Nash v. U.S., 897 F.Supp. 180 (E.D. Pa.1994) (Under Pennsylvania law, officers were entitled to use deadly force when they observed plaintiff coming toward them carrying a loaded and cocked revolver; moreover, although plaintiff contended that he was repeatedly shot while trying to hand over his pistol to officers, as long as officers perceived plaintiff to be pointing or aiming in their direction, they were entitled to continue using deadly force); Dolan v. Golla, 481 F.Supp. 475, (M.D. Pa.1979) affirmed 633 F.2d 209; see also, Belcher v. U. S., 511 F.Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa.1981). In Belcher v. United States, Plaintiff brought tort claims under Pennsylvania law against an officer who shot him. Belcher, 511 F.Supp. 476. The Defendant, Officer Dowling, claimed he was justified in using deadly force against Plaintiff in defense of his fellow officer under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 508. Officer Dowling and Officer Jenkins attempted to question Plaintiff in his home. Plaintiff became uncooperative, and a struggle broke out between he and Officer Jenkins. Officer Dowling observed the struggle, and observed Plaintiff reach for Officer Jenkins‟ firearm. Officer Jenkins screamed, “My gun!” and Officer Dowling shot the Plaintiff. Plaintiff survived, and sued the Officers for various 13 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 intentional torts, including assault and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The Court found that under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 508, Officer Dowling was justified in using deadly force against Plaintiff because he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to defend Officer Jenkins‟ life. Id. at 485, citing Redding v. Medica, 411 F.Supp. 272, 276 (W.D.Pa.1976). The Court stated that based on the record evidence, “[Officer] Dowling reasonably believed that plaintiff was gaining control of Jenkins‟ gun and that deadly force was required to prevent plaintiff from killing or seriously injuring [Officer] Jenkins.” Id. at 485. Accordingly, he was privileged under § 508. Id. Based on the record evidence, and only taking Plaintiff‟s version into account, there is no colorable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the officers acted explicitly within the boundaries of Section 508(d). First, even Plaintiff testified he believed his son was dangerous and would do something violent to himself or others. Based on this testimony, it is objectively reasonable that the officers believed Plaintiff‟s son would use deadly force to harm himself. Second, there can be no legitimate dispute that McCarthy not only believed there was a substantial risk to his partner‟s life, he knew for certain there was a substantial risk because he witnessed deadly force used on his partner prior to his use of deadly force. Officer McCarthy did not discharge his weapon first. He waited until deadly force was used before resorting to that measure himself. In this circumstance, the use of deadly force is not only justified but explicitly permitted by Section 508. The record evidence does not rise to the level of outrageous conduct required for an intentional tort. Based on the case law, as well as Section 508, this case must be dismissed on summary judgment. 14 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons, the City of Philadelphia moves this Honorable Court to grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Respectfully submitted, AMANDA C. SHOFFEL Deputy City Solicitor City of Philadelphia Law Department 1515 Arch Street, 14th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102-5397 DATED: June 3, 2013 15 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT CRAIG M. STRAW CHIEF DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR ATTORNEYS FOR D EFENDANTS AMANDA C. SHOFFEL DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR IDENTIFICATION N O. 306956 1515 ARCH STREET,14TH FLOOR PHILADELPHIA , PA 19102-1595 TEL (215) 683-5443 AND FAX (215) 683-5397 amanda.shoffel@phila.gov ____________________________________ : : CARMELO SANTIAGO : Plaintiff : : v. : : POLICE OFFICER : RICHARD NICOLETTI, et al. : Defendants : ____________________________________ COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY JURY TRIAL DEMAND August Term 2011 No. 2034 January Term 2013 No. 1297 VERIFICATION I, Amanda C. Shoffel, state that I am a Deputy City Solicitor for the City of Philadelphia, and counsel for the Defendants. On behalf of the Defendants, I have conducted an investigation in this matter and state that the facts set forth in the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I am authorized to sign the verification on behalf of Defendants in this case. I understand that my statements are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: June 3, 2013 AMANDA C. SHOFFEL Deputy City Solicitor 1515 Arch Street,14th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595 16 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT CRAIG M. STRAW CHIEF DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR ATTORNEYS FOR D EFENDANTS AMANDA C. SHOFFEL DEPUTY CITY SOLICITOR IDENTIFICATION N O. 306956 1515 ARCH STREET,14TH FLOOR PHILADELPHIA , PA 19102-1595 TEL (215) 683-5443 AND FAX (215) 683-5397 amanda.shoffel@phila.gov ____________________________________ : : CARMELO SANTIAGO : Plaintiff : : v. : : POLICE OFFICER : RICHARD NICOLETTI, et al. : Defendants : ____________________________________ COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY JURY TRIAL DEMAND August Term 2011 No. 2034 January Term 2013 No. 1297 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Amanda C. Shoffel, hereby certify that on this date I caused the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment and Verification to be served upon counsel for Plaintiff via the electronic filing system. Respectfully Submitted, Date: June 3, 2013 AMANDA C. SHOFFEL Deputy City Solicitor 1515 Arch Street,14th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595 17 Case ID: 110802034 Control No.: 13060429