Case: 1:15-cv-01433 Document #: 61 Filed: 03/29/16 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:457

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ALSTORY SIMON,
Plaintiff,
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
DAVID PROTESS, PAUL J. CIOLINO,
and JACK P. RIMLAND,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-1433
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Alstory Simon alleges that Defendants’ unethical journalistic and investigative
practices led to his wrongful conviction and 15-year incarceration for a double murder that he
did not commit. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly falsified evidence
and disseminated that evidence to the prosecuting authorities to frame Plaintiff for the murders.
Before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by each Defendant [34, 42, 43, 46] as well
as Defendants’ joint motion to stay discovery [48] pending resolution of those motions to
dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss [34, 42, 43, 46] are
granted in part and denied in part. Defendants’ motion to stay [48] is denied as moot. This case is
set for further status on 4/19/2016 at 9:30 a.m. to discuss scheduling and case management.
I.

Background1
A.

David Protess, Paul Ciolino, and the Medill School of Journalism

Defendant David Protess joined the faculty of Northwestern University’s Medill School
of Journalism in 1981. In 1990, Protess teamed up with investigative journalist Rob Warden
(who specialized in wrongful conviction cases) to investigate the case of David Dowaliby, who
                                                        
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The Court accepts as true the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint and makes all reasonable inferences
in his favor. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2012).

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had been convicted of murdering his seven-year-old adopted daughter. Protess and Warden,
along with several of Protess’s journalism students, undertook an investigation that ultimately
contributed in large part to Dowaliby’s exoneration.
Protess’s success on the Dowaliby case was highly publicized. In July 1990, the Chicago
Tribune published a two-part series written by Protess about the investigation and
Northwestern’s role in Dowaliby’s exoneration. Protess and Warden wrote a book about their
investigation called “Gone in the Night,” which inspired a two-part, made-for-TV movie that
aired on CBS in 1996. Protess’s accomplishments also reflected positively on Northwestern’s
Medill School of Journalism, and because of this rise in prestige and popularity, Northwestern
encouraged Protess to continue focusing his investigative journalism class on wrongful
conviction cases.
Protess’s next success came in 1996, when he and his journalism students began
investigating the case known as the “Ford Heights Four,” which involved four men convicted for
a double murder that occurred in 1978. To assist in the investigation, Northwestern hired a
private investigator, Defendant Paul Ciolino. By July 1996, with the help of the Northwestern
investigative team, the Ford Heights Four were exonerated. By August 1996, Protess had signed
another book deal (“A Promise of Justice”), which was published in 1998.
Plaintiff alleges that Protess and Ciolino used ethically-questionable investigatory tactics
in working on the Ford Heights Four case, some of which Protess wrote about in “A Promise of
Justice.” For example, Protess allegedly wrote a letter to a key eyewitness on Medill School of
Journalism letterhead advising the witness that his monetary rights to his story were contingent
on his story aligning with Northwestern’s view of the case. In another instance, Ciolino allegedly
posed as Hollywood producer Jerry Bruckheimer in a witness interview to add gravitas to

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Protess’s promise to the witness that he could reap huge financial rewards for his story.
Defendants also allegedly used female students to sexually flirt with witnesses in order to
manipulate their testimony, and Protess allegedly told one eyewitness “that he could have sex
with either of two Northwestern Medill students if he would change his testimony.” [1, ¶ 32–35.]
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Northwestern became aware of Protess’s and Ciolino’s
unethical behavior as early as 1997, but, motivated by the “prestige, recognition and monetary
benefits” that came from Protess’s work, continued to endorse his program anyway. More
specifically, in 1997, the Dean of the Medill School of Journalism (Michael Janeway) expressed
concerns to Northwestern over the lack of oversight and supervision of Protess and Ciolino and
his desire to cancel Protess’s investigative journalism classes. In response, Northwestern
replaced Dean Janeway with Ken Bode, “a Dean that would support and/or ignore Protess’[s]
and Ciolino’s unethical, deceitful and/or illegal conduct.” [1, ¶ 42.] Despite the publicity
surrounding these questionable investigative tactics as presented in the “massive publicity
surrounding the Ford Heights Four case, and the publishing of ‘A Promise of Justice,’” Dean
Bode continued to support Protess’s investigative journalism program. [1, ¶ 39.] And in August
1998, on the heels of the publication of Protess’s second book, the Robert R. McCormick
Tribune Foundation announced a $20,000,000 grant to the Medill School of Journalism.
B.

The Anthony Porter Case

Riding high on the acclaim from two successful exoneration projects (coupled with two
book publications, vast media exposure, and a sizeable grant), Defendants set out to continue
their streak of journalistic accomplishment. In late 1998, Protess, Ciolino, and several Medill
journalism students began investigating the 1983 double-murder conviction of Anthony Porter.
On the morning of August 15, 1982, Jerry Hillard and Marilyn Green were shot and killed in the

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bleachers of the Washington Park swimming pool on Chicago’s southeast side. Upon arriving at
the scene of the crime, the Chicago police identified two witnesses, Henry Williams and William
Taylor. Williams told police that, as he was exiting the Washington Park swimming pool that
morning, Anthony Porter tried to rob him at gunpoint. After that exchange ended, Williams
watched Porter walk into the bleachers where Hillard and Green were sitting, at which point
Williams heard several gunshots. The other witness, Taylor, was in the swimming pool at the
time of the murders. He did not identify the shooter initially, but later told police that he saw
Anthony Porter shoot the two victims. Later that day, a Cook County State’s Attorney and a
Chicago Police Officer located two more witnesses, one of whom (Kenneth Edwards) said that
he saw Anthony Porter shoot both victims in the bleachers.
Police apprehended Porter several days later and charged him with the murders of Hillard
and Green. At Porter’s trial, Williams and Taylor testified consistently with what they told the
police on the day of the shootings. Porter did not testify, but his friend Kenneth Doyle falsely
testified that he and Porter were somewhere else at the time of the shootings. A jury found Porter
guilty of the murders, and on September 21, 1983, Porter was sentenced to death.
Shifting back to 1998, with Porter’s execution date on the horizon, Defendants Protess
and Ciolino and their team of journalism students began an expeditious investigation into
Porter’s conviction. The team first focused on Porter’s mental competence to be executed “but,
shortly thereafter, Defendants Protess and Ciolino formulated a plan to fabricate evidence that
would exonerate Porter for the murders.” [1, ¶ 80.] Defendants’ primary tactic quickly
materialized: they would develop an alternate suspect, and that person was Plaintiff, Alstory
Simon. As Plaintiff puts it, “[al]though [Plaintiff’s] name was never mentioned by a single
person to police or at Porter’s criminal trial, Defendant Protess found references to [Plaintiff] in

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old affidavits submitted during Porter’s original post-conviction proceedings and promptly
announced, in early November 1998, before any investigation was undertaken or any evidence
developed, that he was almost certain [Plaintiff] committed the murders.” [1, ¶ 81.]
Plaintiff alleges that over the next seven weeks, “Defendants Protess and Ciolino, with
the participation of Protess’[s] students, knowingly manufactured and fabricated four pieces of
false evidence which they contended dismantled the case against Porter and proved that Simon
committed the murders.” [1, ¶ 84.] First, Defendants coerced eyewitness William Taylor into
signing two affidavits (one prepared by Ciolino, the other by Protess) essentially recanting his
prior incriminating statements against Porter. Defendants sent Taylor’s statements to CBS
television, pitching Taylor as the only eyewitness to the crime, and claiming that in light of this
change in testimony, there was now no evidence tying Porter to the murders. But according to
Plaintiff, Defendants “never made any effort to interview any of several other witnesses who had
identified Porter as either the shooter or being present at the murder location.” [1, ¶ 85.]
The second and third pieces of false evidence were coerced statements from Illinois
inmate Walter Jackson and his aunt (and Plaintiff’s estranged wife), Inez Jackson Simon. Protess
contacted Walter Jackson first, promising him money and freedom to get him to sign a false
affidavit claiming that Plaintiff had confessed his guilt to him 17 years earlier. Protess then had
Walter Jackson call his aunt, Inez Jackson Simon, to convince her to provide a false statement of
her own regarding the murders. Defendants Protess and Ciolino, along with two Medill students,
visited Inez Jackson Simon in Milwaukee, where they “coaxed and induced” her into signing a
witness statement by promising her money and the release of her nephew and son from prison. In
the statement, Inez Jackson Simon said that she was with Plaintiff when he shot Hillard and
Green in Washington Park—a statement that Plaintiff says “was blatantly inconsistent with

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several key known facts.” [1, ¶ 89.] Protess nonetheless sent Inez Jackson Simon’s statement to
CBS television, and he appeared with her on television to announce Plaintiff’s guilt for the
murders.
The fourth piece of falsified evidence was Plaintiff’s false confession for the murders.
According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ “campaign to compel a false confession” from Plaintiff
began in December 1998, when Protess sent two of his female students to interview Plaintiff at
his home. Protess then confronted Plaintiff directly and accused him of the murders, but Plaintiff
did not confess. Protess then sent in Ciolino to extract the confession. In the early morning of
February 3, 1999, Ciolino—while impersonating a police officer—“bull rushed” Plaintiff’s home
with another investigator, guns drawn. Ciolino illegally detained Plaintiff, and “through the use
of threats, fabricated evidence, false statements, promises, money, and other illegal tactics,”
obtained the false confession. [1, ¶ 93.] For example, Ciolino showed Plaintiff a videotape of a
man (who is now known to be an actor) falsely claiming that he saw Plaintiff commit the
murders. He also showed Plaintiff the television clip with Protess and Inez Jackson Simon
identifying Plaintiff as the murderer. Ciolino told Plaintiff that he was facing the death penalty
and that the Chicago police were on their way to arrest him, but that he could avoid the death
penalty (and make large sums of money) if he confessed to the murders. Ciolino wrote out a
confession stating that Plaintiff shot Hillard in self-defense and Green by accident, he had
Plaintiff rehearse the statement “so that it appeared legitimate,” and then he videotaped
Plaintiff’s statement.
Defendants’ release of Plaintiff’s taped confession to CBS television started what
Plaintiff refers to as a “national media ‘frenzy.’” Ciolino arranged for his friend, attorney (and
Defendant in this lawsuit) Jack Rimland to provide legal representation to Plaintiff free of

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charge, but according to Plaintiff, Defendant Rimland was in on the conspiracy, and he ensured
that Plaintiff did not change his story by instilling fear in him that any change in testimony could
lead to the death penalty. Within a matter of days, Anthony Porter was released from prison, and
Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the double murder.
C.

Plaintiff’s Prosecution, Conviction, and Exoneration

In February and March 1999, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office conducted a
grand jury investigation of the murders. Defendants Protess and Ciolino and several Medill
students testified before the grand jury, advancing their fabricated evidence to incriminate
Plaintiff. “[F]our other independent and unbiased witnesses” also testified, three of whom
identified Anthony Porter at the scene of the crime (one stating affirmatively that “it was
Anthony Porter who shot the victims”), and none of whom identified or implicated Plaintiff.
[1, ¶¶ 103–05.] These four witnesses were prominently referenced in the police reports from the
original 1982 murder investigation, but Protess’s team made no effort to locate and/or interview
any of them. Ultimately, “[t]he grand jury was disbanded without being asked to return an
indictment against [Plaintiff].” [1, ¶ 109.] However, [i]n March of 1999, a new grand jury was
empaneled and on March 24, 1999, based solely on the false evidence manufactured by the
Northwestern Team, [Plaintiff] was indicted for the murders.” [1, ¶ 110.] On September 7, 1999,
at Defendant Rimland’s insistence, Plaintiff pled guilty to the murder of Green and the voluntary
manslaughter of Hillard, and was sentenced to 52 years in prison.
In 2001, Plaintiff finally spoke up, arguing in a pro se post-conviction petition that he had
been coerced into pleading guilty, and that evidence of Porter’s guilt had been hidden from him.
Plaintiff’s post-conviction motion was denied, but it set in motion a years-long investigation that
eventually led to Plaintiff’s exoneration. In late 2005/early 2006, both Walter Jackson and Inez

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Jackson Simon recanted their statements, explaining that they provided false testimony based on
promises made by Defendant Protess. Based on this evidence and years of legal work by
Plaintiff’s attorneys, in October 2013, the State’s Attorney’s Office announced that it would reinvestigate the Hillard and Green murders. The investigation took one year, and involved
interviews of over 100 witnesses. On October 30, 2014, at the suggestion of the Cook County
State’s Attorney’s Office, the Circuit Court vacated all charges against Plaintiff and released him
from custody later that day. Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez issued a press release
explaining, “At the end of the day and in the best interests of justice, we could reach no other
conclusion but that the investigation of this case has been so deeply corroded and corrupted that
we can no longer maintain the legitimacy of this conviction,” adding that “this investigation by
David Protess and his team involved a series of alarming tactics that were not only coercive and
absolutely unacceptable by law enforcement standards, they were potentially in violation of
Mr. Simon’s constitutionally protected rights.” [1, ¶¶ 125–26.] On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff
filed this civil lawsuit against Protess, Ciolino, Rimland, and Northwestern University, seeking
damages for their roles in his wrongful conviction and 15-year imprisonment.
II.

Legal Standard
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all well-plead

facts as true and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Agnew v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 2012). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require only that a complaint provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the * * *
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The Supreme Court has
described this notice-pleading standard as requiring a complaint to “contain sufficient factual

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matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). While factual allegations must be
accepted as true, legal conclusions may not be considered. Id.
III.

Analysis
A.

Time-Barred Claims

Plaintiff concedes that Counts IV through VIII of his complaint (negligent supervision
and negligent retention claims against Defendant Northwestern, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims against all Defendants) are time barred, and he has agreed to dismiss
those claims. [See 55, at 17–18.] Accordingly, Counts IV through VIII are dismissed with
prejudice. Plaintiff has also agreed to dismiss “all claims against Defendant Rimland” as time
barred. [See 55, at 17.] Accordingly, all claims against Defendant Rimland are dismissed with
prejudice. The remaining claims include a malicious prosecution claim against all Defendants
(Count I), two respondeat superior claims against Defendant Northwestern (Counts II and III),
and a conspiracy claim against all Defendants (Count IX).
B.

Malicious Prosecution

To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution under Illinois law, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial
proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff;
(3) the absence of probable cause; (4) malice; and (5) damages.” Szczesniak v. CJC Auto Parts,
Inc., 21 N.E.3d 486, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
The first element—the only one at issue here—requires Plaintiff to show that Defendants
“commenced” or “continued” the criminal proceeding. Id. A criminal proceeding is formally
“commenced” when a complaint, an information, or an indictment is filed. 725 ILCS 5/111–1.

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Individuals (read: non-prosecutors and non-officers) can also be held liable for commencing a
criminal proceeding if they “knowingly give[] false information to a police officer, who then
swears out a complaint” based on that false information.2 Randall v. Lemke, 726 N.E.2d 183, 185
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000). However, even if an individual knowingly provides false information to a
prosecuting authority, he or she is not liable for commencing a criminal proceeding if the
prosecution is “based upon” separate or independently developed information. Id.
1.

Knowingly Presenting False Evidence

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants knowingly presented
false evidence to the prosecuting authorities. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff explains in detail how
Defendants Protess and Ciolino—with Defendant Northwestern’s knowledge and approval—
fabricated four pieces of evidence, and how they presented this evidence to the Cook County
State’s Attorney both indirectly through public dissemination (a “media blitz”) and directly
through the grand jury process. [See, e.g., 1, ¶ 86 (“Protess’[s] media blitz publication of
Taylor’s coerced affidavit, along with the misrepresentations and fabrications by omissions made
by Protess, was an intentional effort to create a public sentiment, built on falsehoods of Porter’s
innocence, in order to influence the prosecuting authorities to free Porter.”); id., ¶ 97
(“Defendants Northwestern, Protess and Ciolino knowingly provided the false evidence
purporting to exonerate Porter to the State’s Attorney’s Office.”); id., ¶ 103 (“In February and
March, 1999, several witnesses including Defendants Protess and Ciolino, and several Medill
students, testified before a grand jury about their investigation into Porter’s case, and the
evidence that the Northwestern Team manufactured against Simon.”); id., ¶ 110 (“In March of
                                                        
2

Alternatively, a private citizen may be held liable for “continuing” a criminal proceeding “by actively
encouraging the prosecution despite knowing that no probable cause existed.” Szczesniak, 21 N.E.3d at
491. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s own conduct (i.e., voluntarily confessing to the murders)
“continued” his prosecution. [See 59, at 10–11.] Because Plaintiff has adequately pled that Defendants
“commenced” his prosecution, the Court need not assess this alternative basis for liability.

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1999, a new grand jury was empaneled and on March 24, 1999, based solely on the false
evidence manufactured by the Northwestern Team, [Plaintiff] was indicted for the murders.”).]
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s confession and the other incriminating statements were
given voluntarily, and so even if they ended up being false, that does not mean that Defendants
knowingly presented false statements. Instead, Defendants claim that they knowingly presented
voluntary statements that they learned, after the fact, were false. But this argument is belied by
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants coerced these statements using intimidation, financial
incentives, sexual advances, and other unethical practices for the sole purpose of manufacturing
false evidence so as to pin the murders on Plaintiff as a means of securing Porter’s exoneration.
[See, e.g., 1, ¶ 84 (“Defendants Protess and Ciolino, with the participation of Protess’[s]
students, knowingly manufactured and fabricated four pieces of false evidence which they
contended dismantled the case against Porter and proved that Simon committed the murders.”).]
This is sufficient to allege that Defendants knowingly presented false evidence to the prosecuting
authorities.
2.

Independent Investigation

Defendants also argue that even if Plaintiff successfully pled that they knowingly
presented false evidence to the prosecuting authorities, any tainted evidence was “superseded
and rendered immaterial” by the State’s Attorney’s independent investigation. [57, at 4 (quoting
Szczesniak v. CJC Auto Parts, Inc., 21 N.E.3d 486, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)).] The rule is that
even if an individual knowingly provides false information to a prosecuting authority, he or she
is not liable for commencing a criminal proceeding if the prosecution is based upon separate or
independently developed information. Randall, 726 N.E.2d at 185. In other words, a prosecutor’s
independent investigation only absolves the provider of false information from liability if the

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prosecutor’s ultimate decision to proceed with the prosecution is “based upon” the new, nonfalsified evidence.
Defendants, relying on Randall v. Lemke, 726 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), argue that
“a private party may be liable for maliciously commencing a prosecution only where the private
party knowingly provides false information to the public authorities, the authorities conduct no
independent investigation, and the authorities bring charges relying solely upon the false
information reported to them by the private party.” [57, at 3 (first emphasis added).] Defendants
stretch Randall too far. In that case, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of a
malicious prosecution claim, noting that even if the police would not have investigated the
plaintiff absent the defendant’s presentation of false evidence, this did not mean that the
prosecution was “based on” the false evidence. Randall, 726 N.E.2d at 185–86. While this is a
fair generalization of the law, it does not support Defendants’ broad assertion that prosecutors
must rely solely on false information in order to sustain a malicious prosecution claim. The
standard, as the Randall court says, is that the prosecution must be “based upon” the false
evidence. Id. at 186 (“If the officer relies upon the informer’s report, the informer interferes with
the officer’s intelligent exercise of discretion, and the informer may be subject to liability.”).
To close the door on Defendants’ reliance on Randall, the operative pleading deficiency
that led to dismissal in that case stemmed from the plaintiff’s concession in his reply brief that “a
fair reading of his complaint establishes that the charges filed against him had nothing to do with
the information that defendant allegedly reported to the police.” Randall, 726 N.E.2d at 186.
This makes sense: if the falsified evidence is irrelevant to the ultimate charge, it is unreasonable
to say that the charge was “based upon” the falsified evidence. But that’s not the case here. Much
to the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that the only evidence supporting the prosecution of Plaintiff is

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what came from Defendants, whereas all of the independently discovered evidence pointed
towards Anthony Porter as the guilty party. [See 1, ¶ 110 (“In March of 1999, a new grand jury
was empaneled and on March 24, 1999, based solely on the false evidence manufactured by the
Northwestern Team, [Plaintiff] was indicted for the murders.”).] More specifically, Plaintiff lays
out the evidence presented to the grand jury that led to his prosecution, 3 which includes
(a) testimony from the Northwestern team, including Defendants Protess and Ciolino, advancing
Defendants’ falsified evidence, and (b) the testimony of “four other independent and unbiased
witnesses,” three of whom identified Anthony Porter at the scene of the crime (one stating
affirmatively that “it was Anthony Porter who shot the victims”), and none of whom identified or
implicated Plaintiff. [1, ¶¶ 103–05.] Based on these allegations, the only evidence supporting
Plaintiff’s prosecution is Defendants’ falsified evidence, and the independently discovered
evidence in no way advanced the prosecutor’s case against Plaintiff. This distinguishes this case
from Randall, and is sufficient to show, at the pleading stage, that Defendants “interfere[d] with
the [prosecutor’s] intelligent exercise of discretion.” Randall, 726 N.E.2d at 186.
Defendants argue that the Cook County State’s Attorney’s investigation and the scope of
the grand jury investigation were broader that Plaintiff alleges. But even if the Court were to take
judicial notice of the grand jury proceedings, this evidence would, at most, establish a disputed
issue of fact as to what the State’s Attorney’s decision to prosecute was “based upon”; it would
not impact the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim of malicious
prosecution, and it certainly would not establish as a matter of law that the State’s Attorney’s
prosecution was based upon independently developed evidence. While Defendants’ arguments
                                                        
3

Plaintiff explains that there were two separate grand juries empaneled for this investigation—which
Defendants refer to as the “investigating grand jury” and the “charging grand jury”—where certain
witnesses testified before only one of the two panels. [See 57, at 4.] The significance of this fact, if any, is
unclear. For purposes of this order, both panels are considered part of the State’s Attorney’s investigation.

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may bear fruit at the summary judgment stage, they do little to challenge the sufficiency of the
pleadings. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422–23 (7th Cir. 2013)
(discussing the pleading standard as applied to a malicious prosecution claim).
3.

Defendant Northwestern

In Count I, Plaintiff seeks to hold Northwestern vicariously liable for malicious
prosecution based on the actions of its “employees and/or agents Protess and Ciolino.”
[1, ¶¶ 141–57.] The only argument that Defendant Northwestern raises in response to Plaintiff’s
agency/employer–employee theory of liability—as opposed to its many arguments against
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim as it applies to its purported agents, Protess and Ciolino—
is that Plaintiff “does not and cannot allege facts demonstrating that Northwestern had
knowledge in 1998 and 1999 that Protess was supposedly knowingly providing false information
to the authorities implicating Simon in the Hillard and Green murders.” [57, at 2.] Northwestern
does not tie this argument to any case law explaining the legal relevance, if any, of
Northwestern’s “knowledge” of the specific acts of its purported agents/employees.
But regardless, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Northwestern was aware of Protess’s and
Ciolino’s ethically questionable investigative tactics since at least 1997, based on the concerns
expressed by the Dean of the journalism school regarding the lack of oversight and supervision
of Protess and Ciolino, as well as the massive publicity surrounding the Ford Heights Four case,
including the recounting of Protess’s “deceitful and unethical investigatory techniques” as
discussed in his 1998 book, “A Promise of Justice.” [1, ¶¶ 28–50.] According to Plaintiff,
motivated by the “prestige, recognition and monetary benefits” that came from Protess’s work,
Northwestern continued to facilitate this ethically-questionable investigative journalism by
turning a blind eye to the negative publicity and by replacing the Dean with someone who

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“would support and/or ignore Protess’[s] and Ciolino’s unethical, deceitful and/or illegal
conduct.” [1, ¶¶ 41–42.] Based on these allegations, Northwestern’s argument is unavailing.
Plaintiff may proceed on his malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Northwestern based
on the agency-based and employer–employee theories of liability as outlined in his complaint.
4.

Plausibility

Plaintiff’s allegations are also plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). Anthony Porter was convicted of the double
murder of Jerry Hillard and Marilyn Green in 1983. Defendants Protess and Ciolino began
investigating Porter’s conviction in late 1998—15 years later. Just months after that investigation
began, Porter was released from prison and Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the murders.
Plaintiff says that in the several months that Defendants were “investigating” the case, they
fabricated four pieces of evidence and then disseminated that evidence to the public in order to
frame Plaintiff and exonerate Porter. It is reasonable to think that Defendants, who had garnered
tremendous prestige (e.g., book deals, a made-for-TV movie, sizable donations, etc.) from their
involvement in two high-profile wrongful conviction cases, would be eager to continue their
streak of successes. It is also reasonable to think that Defendants, who allegedly used ethicallyquestionable tactics in their previous investigation, would continue down that path in securing
their third in a string of successful exonerations. And finally, it is plausible that the State’s
Attorney prosecuted Plaintiff because of the falsified evidence, which consisted of a recanted
eyewitness account, a new eyewitness account, and a corroborated confession. Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claim therefore is plausible on its face, and is far from “a “[t]hreadbare
recital[] of the elements of [his] cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id.

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Because Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants knowingly provided false information to
the Cook County State’s Attorney that prompted Plaintiff’s prosecution, and because it is not
clear, as a matter of law, that the Cook County State’s Attorney’s prosecution of Plaintiff was
based upon independently discovered evidence, dismissal of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution
claim is not appropriate. Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim of malicious prosecution against
Defendants Protess and Ciolino, and thus Defendants’ motion as to this claim is denied.
C.

Respondeat Superior

Similar to its vicarious-liability allegations in Count I, Plaintiff alleges in Counts II and
III that Defendant Northwestern is liable under a respondeat superior theory of liability for the
torts of its employees, Protess and Ciolino. Northwestern properly notes that respondeat superior
is not an independent cause of action, and must be predicated on an underlying tortious act by the
accused’s employee or agent, such as Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against the
individual Defendants. Because the Court has denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claim against Protess and Ciolino, Northwestern’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claims is also denied, and Plaintiff may proceed against
Defendant Northwestern on his respondeat superior theory of liability as well.
D.

Conspiracy

In Count IX of its complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired against him by
fabricating evidence that they used to frame Plaintiff for the murders of Jerry Hillard and
Marilyn Green, thereby securing exoneration of the real killer, Anthony Porter.
1.

Statute of Limitations

Defendants’ primary argument is that Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim is time barred.
Conspiracy, standing alone, is not a separate and distinct tort in Illinois. See Weber v. Cueto, 624

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N.E.2d 442, 449 (Ill. 1993). Instead, “[a] cause of action for civil conspiracy exists only if one of
the parties to the agreement commits some act in furtherance of the agreement, which is itself a
tort.” Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ill. 1994); see also Mauvais-Jarvis v.
Wong, 987 N.E.2d 864, 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (“Because it is the underlying tortious acts
performed pursuant to the agreement that give rise to a claim for civil conspiracy, it is logical
that a conspiracy claim itself be governed by the statute of limitations for the underlying tort.”);
15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 26, at 1043 (2013) (unless a jurisdiction provides an independent statute
of limitations for civil conspiracy, “[t]he statute of limitations for a civil-conspiracy claim is
determined by the nature of the underlying conduct on which the claim of conspiracy is based.
* * * A claim alleging civil conspiracy is thus time-barred if the substantive tort underlying it
was time-barred.”).
Here, the tort underlying Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim is malicious prosecution.
Under Illinois law, “[a] cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the
criminal proceeding on which it is based has been terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Ferguson
v. City of Chicago, 820 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Ill. 2004). Plaintiff’s conviction was vacated on
October 30, 2014. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 17, 2015—less than one year after his
criminal proceeding was terminated in his favor. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim,
which is predicated on his malicious prosecution claim, is not time barred. See, e.g., Starks v.
City of Waukegan, 946 F. Supp. 2d 780, 795–98 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
2.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants’ also argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy. Illinois
law defines civil conspiracy as “a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of
accomplishing by concerted action either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful

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means.” McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 720 N.E.2d 242, 258 (Ill. 1999) (quoting
Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Ill. 1998)). To state a claim
for conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an agreement between two or more persons for the
purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means;
and (2) at least one tortious act by one of the co-conspirators in furtherance of the agreement that
caused an injury to the plaintiff.” Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 509 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citing McClure, 720 N.E.2d 242, 258 (Ill. 1999)); see also Boothe v. Sherman, 66 F.
Supp. 3d 1069, 1078 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (same). “A cause of action for civil conspiracy exists only
if one of the parties to the agreement commits some act in furtherance of the agreement, which is
itself a tort.” Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ill. 1994); see also Indep. Trust
Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 2012). “A defendant who
innocently performs an act which happens to fortuitously further the tortious purpose of another
is not liable under the theory of civil conspiracy.” Borsellino, 477 F.3d at 509 (quoting Adcock,
645 N.E.2d at 894).
a.

Agreement

As to the agreement, Plaintiff alleges that in late 1998, “Defendants Protess and Ciolino
formulated a plan to fabricate evidence that would exonerate Porter for the murders” by pinning
the murders on Plaintiff. [1, ¶ 80.] This allegation is plausible in light of the many supporting
details alleged in the complaint, including Defendants Protess’s and Ciolino’s prior work on
exoneration cases and their desire to perpetuate their streak of successful investigations. This
allegation is not vague, conclusory, or a mere recitation of an element of civil conspiracy.
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an agreement between Defendants Protess and Ciolino.

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b.

Tortious Act

As to the tortious act, Plaintiff only needs to allege that “the parties to the agreement
commit[ted] some act in furtherance of the agreement, which is itself a tort.” Adcock, 645 N.E.2d
at 894. Plaintiff accomplished this by alleging that Defendants Protess and Ciolino maliciously
prosecuted Plaintiff by “knowingly manufactur[ing] and fabricat[ing] four pieces of false
evidence which they contended dismantled the case against Porter and proved that Simon
committed the murders,” and then by presenting that evidence to the prosecuting authorities both
indirectly through public dissemination (a “media blitz”) and directly through the grand jury
process. [1, ¶¶ 84, 86.]. Malicious prosecution is an acceptable tort on which a conspiracy claim
can be predicated, and the Court already concluded that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims
are not subject to dismissal at this stage in the litigation. See, e.g., Boothe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1078
(dismissing a conspiracy claim where the plaintiff agreed to drop her malicious prosecution
claim, thereby removing the underlying intentional tort that the defendants could have conspired
to perform (citing Farwell v. Senior Servs. Assocs., Inc., 970 N.E.2d 49, 58 (Ill. 2012))). And
Plaintiff’s allegations are plausible for the same reasons that his malicious prosecution claim is
plausible, as discussed in detail above. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants
committed a tortious act in furtherance of their conspiratorial agreement.
c.

Defendant Northwestern

While Plaintiff only seeks to hold Defendant Northwestern indirectly liable for malicious
prosecution (under its agency-based and employer–employee theories of liability in Count I, and
its respondeat superior theory of liability in Counts II and III), Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant
Northwestern directly liable for civil conspiracy, at least according to the plain language in
Count IX of its complaint. [See 1, ¶¶ 267–71.] Defendant Northwestern argues that Plaintiff

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failed to allege that Northwestern entered into any agreements with Defendants Protess and/or
Ciolino, and so the Court should dismiss Northwestern from Count IX. But Plaintiff says that he
“does not allege that Northwestern conspired with its employees, Protess and Ciolino, to
maliciously prosecute [Plaintiff]. To the contrary, as it is clearly pled in the Complaint,
Northwestern is liable for Protess and Ciolino’s conspiracy to maliciously prosecute [Plaintiff]
based on respondeat superior liability.” [55, at 24 (emphasis added).]
Regardless of what Plaintiff did or did not allege in his complaint, Plaintiff may not
proceed against Defendant Northwestern directly on his claim of civil conspiracy. However,
because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff may proceed against Defendants Protess and
Ciolino directly on his civil conspiracy claim, Plaintiff also may seek to hold Defendant
Northwestern vicariously liable for civil conspiracy under a respondeat superior theory of
liability, as alleged in Counts II and III of the complaint.
E.

Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery

Also before the Court is Defendants’ motion to stay discovery [48] pending the Court’s
ruling on the various pending motions to dismiss. Defendants’ motion [48] is denied as moot.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss [34, 42, 43, 46] are granted in

part and denied in part. More specifically, Defendant Jack P. Rimland is dismissed as a
Defendant in this case with prejudice as the claims against him admittedly are time-barred.
Counts IV through VIII of Plaintiff’s complaint also are dismissed with prejudice as time barred.
Plaintiff may proceed against Defendants Protess and Ciolino on Count I (malicious prosecution)
and Count IX (conspiracy). Plaintiff may proceed against Defendant Northwestern on his
vicarious liability theories only, as articulated in Counts I, II, and III. Defendants’ motion to stay

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[48] is denied as moot. This case is set for further status on 4/19/2016 at 9:30 a.m. to discuss
scheduling and case management.

Date: March 29, 2016
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge

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