

## INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

March 2, 2016  
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**TO:** The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

**FROM:** Chief of Police

**SUBJECT:** OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID NO. 038-15

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 038-15. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on February 8, 2016. I have adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

### SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS<sup>1</sup>

On May 5, 2015, at approximately 2327 hours, Officers [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED], Pacific Patrol Division, were in full uniform, driving a marked black and white police vehicle. The officers responded to a radio call for service for a *415 Man* at the Bank of Venice Restaurant at 80 Windward Avenue, Venice. The comments of the call described the suspect as a *Male Black transient, wearing a black shirt and grey sweatpants and his dog black Labrador/Pit Bull mix, no weapons.*

Upon arrival, the officers observed a male who matched the description of the suspect, later identified as B. Glenn, 29 years of age, holding a leash with a dog standing on the south sidewalk of Windward Avenue, just west of the Bank of Venice. Officer [REDACTED] parked their vehicle in the street parallel with the sidewalk. The officers then exited the vehicle and began to approach Glenn on foot (Additional Debrief Topic – Tactical Vehicle Deployment).

**Note:** Prior to exiting the vehicle, Officer [REDACTED] activated [REDACTED] personal Body Worn Video (BWV) camera which captured the officer's initial contact with Glenn (Additional Debrief Topic – Personal Body Worn Video Camera).

[REDACTED]

According to Officer [REDACTED], Glenn appeared *very irate* and *threatened to release the dog* in their direction. Glenn continued walking toward them with the dog. Concerned that Glenn was going to release his dog on them, Officer [REDACTED] told Glenn, "*Don't bring your fucking dog here. Don't come over here with your dog. I will shoot your dog*" (Additional Debrief Topic – Tactical Language/Agitated Delirium).

According to Officer [REDACTED], Glenn exhibited signs of intoxication, including *slurred speech* and *staggering* as he was walking over toward us with his leashed dog. Officer [REDACTED], said [REDACTED] did not feel threatened by the dog's presence.

Glenn stepped back onto the sidewalk and handed the leash to the unidentified female, who was sitting in the middle of the sidewalk. Glenn then began to walk back towards the direction of the officers. According to Officer [REDACTED], as Glenn was walking towards them he started *throwing up his hands and calling me [Officer [REDACTED]] nigger*.

**Note:** Video obtained from Officer [REDACTED] BWV captures Glenn approaching the officers while raising his hands in the air and stating, *what's up boy* and *hands up nigger*.

Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] continued to direct Glenn to leave, until he finally complied and began to walk west. According to the officers, they decided not to arrest Glenn for being drunk in public, due to his compliance and their belief that he was not intoxicated to a level where he was unable to care for himself.

Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] continued to observe Glenn as he walked west on the sidewalk toward the Townhouse Bar, located at 52 Windward Avenue.

According to the Officer [REDACTED], [REDACTED] observed Glenn still talking to someone in front of the Townhouse Bar whom he appeared to know and started to *walk over [REDACTED] direction to remind him that he needs to leave the area because the radio call was that he was harassing customers*. As they began to walk over toward Glenn, [REDACTED] heard [REDACTED] partner broadcasting an additional unit request.

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Glenn hug a man and then walk towards the *bouncer* who was standing in front of the Townhouse Bar. Glenn then began to yell *racial epithets* at patrons who were going inside the bar. Officer [REDACTED] continued to watch Glenn and observed *he [Glenn] and the bouncer were pushing each other back and forth*. Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] began to walk over toward Glenn with the intention of *taking him into custody*. As they began walking toward Glenn, Officer [REDACTED] broadcast a request for an additional unit.

According to both officers, as they made their approach they observed Glenn involved in a physical altercation with a male, Black, later identified as [REDACTED], a doorman at the Townhouse Bar.

Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not wait for the additional unit to arrive and made contact with Glenn, after observing [REDACTED] push Glenn to the ground. According to Officer [REDACTED]

asked [REDACTED] to step back and advised him that they would handle the situation with Glenn. Officer [REDACTED] grabbed Glenn's right arm with both hands and ordered him to turn around (Non-Lethal Use of Force).

According to Officer [REDACTED], Glenn refused to comply, tensed his right arm and attempted to break free from [REDACTED] hold. According to Officer [REDACTED] ordered Glenn to *turn around and place his hands behind his back* two times. Glenn refused to comply and then stated, *fuck you nigger*.

According to Officer [REDACTED], as Glenn started to pull away from Officer [REDACTED], they decided to take him to the ground, using the ground as a controlling agent. According to Officer [REDACTED], [REDACTED] grabbed Glenn's shirt while [REDACTED] partner had Glenn's right arm and then they took Glenn down to the ground (Non-Lethal Use of Force – Debriefing Point No. 1).

**Note:** According to Officer [REDACTED], they *walked Glen down to the ground*. The officers' takedown was captured on an exterior Townhouse Bar surveillance camera. A review of the video footage reflects that [REDACTED] also grabbed Glenn's hair during the takedown. During a subsequent interview with FID, Officer [REDACTED] was shown the video footage and stated that [REDACTED] was unaware that [REDACTED] had grabbed Glenn's hair and indicated that *was not a technique that I would normally use*.

According to Officer [REDACTED] continued to hold onto Glenn's right arm, as both officers took Glenn down to the ground. Once on the ground, Officer [REDACTED] assumed a position on Glenn's right side with [REDACTED] left knee on Glenn's lower back as Officer [REDACTED] assumed a position on Glenn's left side and placed [REDACTED] right knee *in the small* of Glenn's back in an attempt to hold Glenn down and gain control of his left arm. Officer [REDACTED] then attempted to pull Glenn's right arm behind his back so [REDACTED] could handcuff him (Non-Lethal Use of Force).

According to both officers, Glenn continued to resist and pushed himself upward in an attempt to stand. According to Officer [REDACTED], Glenn stood up into a crouching position with his left hand, as he used his right hand underneath his body to *grab the right side* of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] holster with his right hand. According to Officer [REDACTED] pushed [REDACTED] *off and away from Glenn for a while and then got back into holding him [Glenn] in control*.

**Note:** According to Officer [REDACTED] felt a *brief tug* on [REDACTED] holster but never observed Glenn's hand on [REDACTED] holster. Video footage obtained from the Townhouse Bar camera captured the struggle between Glenn and the officers and at no time during the struggle can Glenn's hand be observed on or near any portion of Officer [REDACTED] holster.

According to Officer [REDACTED] Glenn was able to *pull away from us again and then get up in a crouching position and turn his body approximately 180 degrees*. Officer [REDACTED] continued to try to *fight him off* and place Glenn's right arm behind his back. According to Officer [REDACTED], [REDACTED] then heard Officer [REDACTED] *say oh shit* and observed Glenn reach across and behind his own body and grab the top of Officer [REDACTED] holster with his left hand.

According to Officer [REDACTED] then observed Officer [REDACTED] trying to push Glenn's hand away from [REDACTED] holster. Believing that Glenn was trying to take Officer [REDACTED] gun, [REDACTED] drew [REDACTED] service pistol and fired one round at Glenn to stop his actions (Drawing/Exhibiting – Lethal Use of Force).

**Note:** Video footage from the Townhouse Bar camera captured the struggle between Officer [REDACTED] and Glenn. At no time during incident can Glenn's hand be observed on or near any portion of Officer [REDACTED] holster, or capture any actions by Officer [REDACTED] that would suggest the [REDACTED] was attempting to push Glenn's hand away from [REDACTED] holster.

According to Officer [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] fired [REDACTED] first shot, Glenn did not appear to be effected. He believed Glenn was still trying to take possession of Officer [REDACTED] gun and fired a second round at Glenn to stop his actions (Lethal Use of Force – Debriefing Point No. 2).

According to Officer [REDACTED], Glenn's right arm was extended with his palm planted on the sidewalk, as [REDACTED] was attempting to pull Glenn's right arm behind his back. Officer [REDACTED] then heard two gunshots in rapid succession and observed Glenn fall onto his back.

**Note:** Video footage from the Townhouse Bar camera depicted Glenn's right arm, wrapped around Officer [REDACTED] right rear thigh and his left arm extended downward toward the sidewalk. According to Officer [REDACTED] *didn't feel any jerking movements and didn't see Glenn's right hand near [REDACTED] gun.* Officer [REDACTED] holster was attached to the left side of [REDACTED] duty belt.

Following the OIS, Officer [REDACTED] utilized [REDACTED] handheld radio to initiate a *help call* and request a rescue ambulance (RA) for Glenn. Officer [REDACTED] holstered [REDACTED] service pistol and began administering CPR to Glenn (Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Blood Borne Pathogens).

**Note:** According to Officer [REDACTED], an officer who responded to the scene advised [REDACTED] that Glenn still needed to be handcuffed. Officer [REDACTED] then handcuffed Glenn, placing the handcuffs in front of his body (Debriefing Point No 3).

Sergeant [REDACTED] Serial No. [REDACTED] Pacific Patrol Division, responded and assumed the role of the Incident Commander (IC). Sergeant [REDACTED] also ensured that a Public Safety Statement was taken from Officer [REDACTED] and the involved officers were appropriately separated and monitored (Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Preservation of Evidence).

Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel responded to the scene and transported Glenn to Ronald Reagan University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center. Glenn failed to respond to treatment and was pronounced dead on May 6, 2015 at 0016 hours.

#### **Debriefing Point No. 1 Tactical Communication/Planning (Substantial Deviation)**

*"Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency,*

*overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack” (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).*

Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not discuss tactics prior to making contact with Glenn and did not communicate with each other before attempting to take Glenn into custody.

Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively plan and approach each incident in a safe manner, keeping officer safety in mind at all time. Officers when faced with an ongoing tactical situation must remain alert to improve their overall safety, by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution.

In this case, Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] knew they were responding to a radio call for a 415 man with a dog and did not discuss tactics prior to their arrival including who would be the contact or cover officer. Upon making contact, the officers noted that Glenn appeared agitated and displayed signs of intoxication.

After observing Glenn walk over to the Townhouse Bar and get into an physical altercation with [REDACTED], the officers made the decision to arrest Glenn for being drunk in public without having any communication or tactical plan, or waiting for an additional unit prior to engaging Glenn, which would have afforded them a greater tactical advantage.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the officer’s decision not to communicate with one another or develop a tactical plan prior to making contact with Glenn was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief

**Debriefing Point No. 2 Crossfire (Substantial Deviation – Officer [REDACTED])**

*Does the surrounding area provide a clear background/foreground? Officers must be aware of where the bullet will go and where it may stop. Officers should not fire under conditions that would subject bystanders to death or possible injury, except in Imminent Defense of Life or to prevent serious bodily injury (Standardized Roll Call Training Program, Deployment Period No. 8/2007).*

Officer [REDACTED] fired two rounds at Glenn while [REDACTED] partner, Officer [REDACTED], was standing in [REDACTED] line of fire.

Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. The ability to adjust to a tactical situation ensures minimal exposure to the officers.

In this case, Officer [REDACTED] fired two rounds at Glenn while Officer [REDACTED] was standing directly in [REDACTED] line of fire on Glenn's right side attempting to hold him down.

The UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer [REDACTED] decision to fire [REDACTED] weapon was not reasonable and also compromised the safety of [REDACTED] partner, Officer [REDACTED], who was in [REDACTED] line of fire at the time Officer [REDACTED] fired [REDACTED] weapon. As a result, Officer [REDACTED] actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief

### **Debriefing Point No. 3 Handcuffing / Searching a Suspect**

*USE OF HANDCUFFS. The primary purpose in handcuffing an arrestee is to maintain control of the arrestee and to minimize the possibility of escalating the situation to a point that would necessitate more drastic means of restraint (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 217.30).*

*The purpose of a pat down search is a quick search of the outer clothing for weapons and is to protect officers from the possibility of a surprise attack from a suspect who is possibly armed or may constitute a danger to the officer or others. The facts that lead an officer to conduct a search vary with each incident. A pat down would be justified if the suspect is linked to a crime that might involve a weapon, such as a violent crime, narcotics offense, burglary, car theft or a vehicle pursuit.*

*The pat down search is a vital tool for ensuring the safety of officers in the field. However, this search should not be done as a matter of routine for general officer safety reasons. Justification for a pat down search must be based on specific facts, which cause the officer, under the totality of the circumstances, to reasonably suspect the lawfully detained individual might be armed or dangerous (Training Bulletin, Volume XXXVI, Issue 1 February 2004).*

Following the OIS, Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not handcuff or search Glenn for the possible possession of weapons.

Officers are trained to handcuff and conduct a search of an arrestees to ensure they are not armed with weapons and do not possess items of contraband on their person. This practice is necessary for the safety of not only the officers, but also for responding medical personnel and the public.

In this case, Officer [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had to be reminded to handcuff the suspect and neither officer conducted a search of Glenn after he was handcuffed.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the officers were focused on rendering aid to the suspect. As such, their actions did not represent a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

### ADDITIONAL TACTICAL DEBRIEF TOPICS

**Personal Body Worn Video Camera** – The FID investigation revealed that Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], both had personally owned BWV cameras attached to their persons but had not submitted a request or received approval from their commanding officers to wear them in the field as required by Department policy. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Tactical Language** – The BWV camera worn by Officer [REDACTED] recorded [REDACTED] interacting with Glenn, who was clearly intoxicated. The camera captured Glenn as he approached Officer [REDACTED] with his dog. According to Officer [REDACTED] heightened [REDACTED] voice and used profanity as tactical language in order *to get him [Glenn] to obey my instructions*. However, in this case the statement likely escalated the situation. In an effort to bring further awareness in regards to interacting with members of the public who may be under the influence of a controlled substance or alcohol, officers should consider these factors when determining the best tactical response. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Blood Borne Pathogens** – The FID investigation revealed that Glenn's blood was transferred onto Officer [REDACTED] pant leg, as [REDACTED] performed chest compressions on Glenn. Officer [REDACTED] was not wearing personal protective gear as [REDACTED] rendered aid. Officers are to be mindful of the hazards and potential exposure to diseases that stem from not donning personal protective gear. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

### FINDINGS

**Tactics:** Administrative Disapproval, Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

**Drawing/Exhibiting:** Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval, Officer [REDACTED].

**Non-Lethal Use of Force:** In Policy, No Further Action, Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

**Lethal Use of Force:** Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval, Officer [REDACTED].

### TACTICS

*Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: "A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and that the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

In conducting an objective assessment of this case in the evaluation of tactics, I find that the tactics utilized by Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] substantially and unjustifiably deviated from approved Department tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made individually and collectively, and a Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss the incident and individual actions that took place.

Therefore, I will direct Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics are discussed.

**Note:** Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code-Six);
- Tactical Planning;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

### DRAWING/EXHIBITING

*Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: "An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80).*

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Officer [REDACTED] trying to push Glenn's hand away from [REDACTED] holster. Officer [REDACTED] believed that Glenn was trying to take possession of Officer [REDACTED] gun and drew [REDACTED] service pistol.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*"... his left hand was on my partner's holster, so I was trying to grab the suspect... everything was happening so fast and everybody's hands were flailing around. I can't tell you where I was grabbing... I was trying to grab the suspect... when I realized I didn't have control... proper control because he had spun us around and I saw my... it's my... his hand on my partner's holster... top of the holster, that's when I drew my fire... my firearm. [REDACTED]"*

[REDACTED]



**Note:** Video footage obtained from the Townhouse Bar camera captured the struggle between Glenn and the officers and at no time during the struggle can Glenn's hand be observed on or near any portion of Officer [REDACTED] holster. Officer [REDACTED] holster was attached to the left side of his duty belt.

Based on the totality of the circumstances and supporting evidence, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer [REDACTED], while faced with similar circumstances would not reasonably believe, there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officer [REDACTED] Drawing/Exhibiting to be Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval.

**Note:** In addition to the above listed employees, there were additional personnel who responded and also drew or exhibited firearms. Their drawing/exhibiting was appropriate and requires no specific findings or action in regard to these officers.

### NON-LETHAL USE OF FORCE

*It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:*

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance. (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force – Tactics Directive, Use of Force Policy – Revised, July 2009)*

**Officer [REDACTED]** – Firm Grip, Takedown, Bodyweight

**Officer [REDACTED]** – Firm Grip, Physical Force, Takedown, Bodyweight

Officer [REDACTED] applied a firm grip on Glenn's right arm with both hands. Officer [REDACTED] then grabbed onto Glenn's shirt with [REDACTED] left hand while simultaneously grabbing the back of Glenn's hair, stepped backed and then pushed Glenn down to the ground as Officer [REDACTED] maintained a firm grip of Glenn's right arm.

After taking Glenn down to the ground, Officer [REDACTED] placed [REDACTED] left knee on Glenn's lower back and applied bodyweight in an attempt to prevent Glenn from getting up and place him into handcuffs. Officer [REDACTED] held onto Glenn's shirt with is right hand, then pushed Glenn's upper body down toward the ground with [REDACTED] left hand. Officer [REDACTED] then placed [REDACTED] right knee on Glenn's back and applied bodyweight in an attempt to prevent Glenn from getting up and place him into custody.

Officer [REDACTED] pushed away from Glenn as Glenn continued to resist the officer's efforts to take him into custody. Officer [REDACTED] continued to hold onto Glenn as he pushed himself up to his knees and began to stand up.

**Note:** The entire struggle and non-lethal force utilized by Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was captured on the video that was obtained from the Townhouse Bar.

After a review of the incident and the non-lethal force used by these officers, I have determined an officer with similar training and experience as Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would believe this same application of force would be reasonable to overcome Glenn's resistance, prevent his escape and effect an arrest.

Therefore, I find Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Non-Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

### LETHAL USE OF FORCE

*Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:*

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).*

Officer [REDACTED] – .40 caliber, two rounds in a downward direction from a distance of approximately one foot, six inches.

#### First Round Fired

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Glenn's hand on top of Officer [REDACTED] holster. Believing that Glenn was trying to take possession of [REDACTED] partner's weapon, Officer [REDACTED] drew [REDACTED] service weapon and fired one round at Glenn to stop his actions.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*"When I fired the first shot, I remember, to the best of my recollection, his hand was on my partner's...the top of my partner's holster...left hand... I was aiming at the back area."*

[REDACTED]

### Second Round Fired

According to Officer [REDACTED], after firing [REDACTED] first round at Glenn, it appeared to have no effect because Glen continued to struggle with [REDACTED] partner so [REDACTED] fired an additional round at Glenn to stop his actions.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*"I fired the first shot and it seemed as though he didn't react. He was still there. I mean, I couldn't see properly now, but he was still there because my... my... my sights I became a little tunnel vision... and I fired my second shot. I don't really know where his hands were, but he is still holding on to... [REDACTED] was still fighting with him. What was going through my mind when I fired the second shot was I honestly believed that this guy was on something strong, like some kind of drug. And the first round did absolutely nothing to affect him. He didn't move. He was just there... But you could still see they were fighting... well, struggling. [REDACTED]"*

The perception of officers using deadly force must be based on objectively reasonable belief that an imminent threat exists.

Based on the totality of the circumstances and after reviewing all the evidence in its entirety, including the video footage of Officer [REDACTED] use of lethal force and statements of [REDACTED] partner, Officer [REDACTED], who said that [REDACTED] never felt *any jerking movements* or saw Glenn's *hand* near [REDACTED] handgun at anytime during the incident, coupled with the fact that at no time during the incident did Officer [REDACTED] make any statements or actions that would have suggested that Glenn was trying to remove [REDACTED] service pistol from [REDACTED] holster, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer [REDACTED] would not have reasonably believed that Glenn's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Additionally, I believe that the evidence does not independently support Officer [REDACTED] perception that a deadly threat was present.

Therefore, I find Officer [REDACTED] Use of Lethal Force was not objectively reasonable and Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval.

### AUDIO/VIDEO RECORDINGS

Pacific Division officers and vehicles were not equipped with the Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) or Body Worn Video (BWV) at the time of incident; however, both involved officers were equipped with their own personal BWV cameras. Officer [REDACTED] personally owned BWV camera captured the officer's initial contact with Glenn.

Force Investigation Division investigators recovered video footage from an exterior camera affixed to the Townhouse Bar that captures the officer's physical struggle and subsequent OIS

[REDACTED]

with Glenn. Video footage from an exterior camera affixed to Menotti's Coffee Shop, located at [REDACTED] captures a portion of the officer's struggle with Glenn, but did not capture the OIS.

Video footage was recovered from the exterior of a business located at [REDACTED] however, the camera focused sharply downward, covering the north sidewalk of Windward Avenue and did not capture any images of the OIS.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Sergeant [REDACTED] responded and assumed the role Incident Commander (IC). Sergeant [REDACTED] assured that the involved officers were separated, monitored and that Public Safety Statements were obtained. Sergeant [REDACTED] actions were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of a field supervisor during a critical incident.

**GENERAL TRAINING UPDATE (GTU)**

On July 14, 2015, Officer [REDACTED] attended the GTU. Officer [REDACTED] has not attended a GTU.

Respectfully,



CHARLIE BECK  
Chief of Police

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

3-2-16