ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM Attorney General FREDERICK M. BOSS Deputy Attorney General DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION MEMORANDUM DATE: November 25, 2015 FROM: Darin Tweedt, Chief Counsel Criminal Justice Division SUBJECT: Criminal Justice Division Overview This memorandum is to assist outside counsel with the HR investigation into the use of the ?Digital Stakeout? computer program by Special Agent (SA) ?The memorandum provides an overview of the Criminal Justice Division?s reSponsibilities and organization. Overview of Responsibilities The Criminal Justice Division provides investigative, trial and training support to Oregon?s District Attorney?s and law enforcement agencies. The Division also acts as a safety net for District Attorneys? Offices in crisis. The Division?s prosecutors are often called upon to act as the District Attorney and perform all local prosecution functions in times of need. Finally, the Division leads or participates in several important criminal and anti?terrorism related information Sharing and analysis programs. The Criminal Justice Division conducts specialized criminal investigations and prosecutions and provides highly trained and experienced Special agents, prosecutors and to fight crime across Oregon. The Division also provides outreach and training to communities, victim service providers, and members of the law enforcement community to help ensure that Oregonians receive the highest level of service from the criminal justice system. Program Description The Division is divided into three sections: The Special Investigations and Prosecutions Section, the Organized Crime Section and the Criminal Intelligence Unit. Members of these units perform a variety of investigation, prosecution and analytical roles, some of which are detailed below. - Special Investigations and Prosecution Section The Special Investigations and Prosecution Section is composed of three specialty units: the District Attorney/Law Enforcement Assist Unit, the Child EXploitation Unit and the Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit. EXHIBIT A 2250 McGilchrist St SE, Suite 100, Salem, OR 97302?1147 Page 1 0f 3 Telephone: (503) 378-6347 Fax: (503) 373?1936 TTY: (800) 735?2900 November 25, 2015 Page 2 - District Attorney/Law Enforcement Assistance Unit: The District Attorney/ Law Enforcement Assistance Unit supports law enforcement agencies and District Attorneys by investigating and prosecuting highly complex criminal cases," cases requiring specialty expertise, and cases in which the investigating agency or District Attorney has a con?ict. This unit has experts in the investigation and prosecution of homicide, child exploitation, Driving Under the In?uence of Intoxicants, and domestic violence. In addition, this unit is primarily responsible for providing important training to law enforcement of?cers and prosecutors throughout Oregon at low or no cost. The unit is composed of ?ve attorneys, one Special Agent and one Operations and Policy Analyst assigned as Program Coordinator to the Oregon District Attorneys Association. Child Exploitation Unit: The Child Exploitation Unit focuses on identifying, investigating, prosecuting and preventing crimes relating to the sexual exploitation of children. The Child Exploitation unit is comprised of an anti?human traf?cking initiative and the Oregon Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC). The human traf?cking initiative focuses on the commercial sexual exploitation of children outside of the Portland metropolitan area. The Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force focuses on investigating, prosecuting and preventing the sexual exploitation of children on the internet. In addition to case work, members of the Child Exploitation Unit conduct statewide trainings for law enforcement of?cers, prosecutors, schools and parents. The unit is composed of an attorney, ?ve Special Agents and a Research Analyst. I - Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit: This unit is part of a multi?agency task force that investigates suspicious social security disability claims. The unit?s mission is to obtain evidence that can resolve questions of fraud before bene?ts are ever paid. The Criminal Justice Division component is three Special Agents and an Administrative Specialist. Organized Crime Section The Criminal Justice Division is charged by statute with investigating and prosecuting organized crime and allegations of public of?cials involved in corruption or malfeasance. ORS 180.610. The Organized Crime Section has criminal investigators, prosecutors, and who specialize in identifying and combating such crimes. It is composed of three attorneys and five Special Agents. Section members often team with from the Criminal Intelligence unit. In addition, the Division has specialized equipment and trained personnel to conduct wiretap investigations against organized crime groups. These investigations are highly effective at disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations. Page 2 of 3 November 25, 2015 Page 3 Criminal Intelligence Unit The ability to gather and analyze information about criminals and their organizations is invaluable to law enforcement agencies.1 The Criminal Intelligence Unit, aka Criminal Intelligence Center, facilitates the gathering, analysis and sharing of criminal information with local, state and national law enforcement agencies. The Unit is composed of the Oregon TITAN 6 Fusion Center, the Oregon HIDTA Investigation Support Center, and the Oregon HIDT A Watch Center. - Oregon TITAN Fusion Center: The Fusion Center is Oregon?s focal point for receiving, analyzing, gathering, and sharing threat?related information in order to better detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. The Fusion Center is composed primarily of staff from the Criminal Justice Division.2 This staff works in conjunction with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The Fusion Center produces threat assessments3, officer safety bulletins, general crime bulletins and terrorism related bulletins. In addition, the Fusion Center is an essential component of the state?s critical infrastructure review process. The Fusion Center also provides criminal to assist federal, state and local law enforcement agencies with criminal investigations. Finally, the Center provides important training to law enforcement agencies, businesses and first responders about active shooters and the latest terrorist trends, techniques and procedures. - High Intensity Drug Traf?cking Area (HIDTA) Investigation Support Center: The Investigation Support Center is a co-located multi-agency program. Its mission is to promote, facilitate, and coordinate the exchange of criminal intelligence information, and provide 1 The bene?ts of gathering and analyzing criminal information was recognized by the Oregon legislature in 1977 when it directed the Department of Justice to: Establish a coordinated system of collecting, storing and disseminating information relating to organized crime. (3) Develop and maintain a liaison between local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in Oregon, assisting them in the investigation and suppression of organized criminal activity and encouraging cooperation among those agencies. (4) Conduct comprehensive factual studies of organized criminal activity in Oregon, outlining existing state and local policies and procedures with respect to organized crime, and formulating and proposing such changes in those policies and procedures as the department may deem appropriate.? ORS 180.610 (3) and (4). . 2 The Criminal Justice Division component is one attorney, one Special Agent, five Research and an IS Specialist. 3 A threat assessment is the ?[p]rocess of identifying or evaluating entities or events for indications of potential harm to life, property, operations or information. These assessments involve investigative research which results in a Written product identifying possible threats to a specific person or incident. Examples include Pendleton Round?up, Hillsboro Air Show or Governor?s Inauguration. Threat assessments may be conducted by an individual or team of based on the complexity of the assessment.? Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Procedure, Threat Assessments/Risk Vulnerability Assessments, September 18, 2015. EXHIBIT A Page 3 of 3 Oregon TI TAN Fusion Center I PRIVACY POLICY 1.0 Purpose The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center (the Center) was initiated in response to the increased need for timely information sharing and exchange of terrorism and crime-related information among members of the Oregon law enforcement community. The purpose of the Center is to protect the citizens of the State of Oregon ?rom terrorism providing an all-crimes information clearinghouse for federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. The Center is a collaborative effort of state'and federal law enforcement agencies to provide resources, expertise, and information to the law enforcement cemmunity with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, disrupt, prevent, and respond to terrorism, organized crime, and gang-related criminal activity. One component Of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center focuses on the development and exchange of information, including criminal intelligence. This component focuses on the process where information collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed and disseminatw. The Oregon law enforcement community recognizes that combining intelligence resources will allow greater dissemination of intelligence products and will greatly enhance the ability to predict, prevent, and respond to terrorist threats and related criminal activity within the state. .Law enforcement agencies-also recognize the'role of intelligence sharing in avoiding con?icting operational activities that may endanger of?cers and civilians. The information received and maintained by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center is provided on a voluntary basis by ?participating agencies,? or is information obtained by the Center from other sources such as other law enforcement agencies, ?open? media sources, commercial databases, public records and unclassi?ed government material. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will keep a record of the source of all information sought and collected by the Center. ?Participating agencies? are those which have assigned personnel to work at the Center and have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center?s products and services will be made available to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies operating in Oregon and to other entities as permitted by this Privacy Policy (Policy). The purpose of this privacy, civil rights, and civil! liberties protection policy is to promote Oregon TITAN and user conduct that complies with applicable federal, state, local, and tribal law (see Appendix A, Terms and Definitions, of this policy)] and assists the Center and its users in: 1. Increasing public safety and improving national security. 2. Minimizing the threat and risk of injury to specific individuals. . - 3. Minimizing the threat and risk of physical or ?nancial injury to law enforcement and others responsible for public protection, safety, or health. EXHIBIT Page 1 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 1 . -. Minimizing the threat and risk of damage to real or personal property. Protecting individual privacy, civil rights, civilliberties, and other protected interests. . Protecting the integrity of the criminal investigatory, criminal intelligence, and justice system processes and information. 7. Minimizing reluctance of individuals or grailps to use or cooperate with the justice system. own? 2.0 Compliance with Laws Regarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties All participating agency personnel, personnel providing information technology services to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center, private contractors, and users (including Information Sharing Environment participating centers and agencies) will comply with the . provisions contained in this Policy and with all applicable laws protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in the collection, use, analysis, retention, destruction, sharing, and disclosure of information as stated below and herein. 4 The internal operating policies .goveming the operation of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center comply with 28 CFR Part 23, ORS 181.575, the Oregon Department of Justice Administrative Rules 137-090- 0000?0225, ORS Chapter. 192 relating to public records, the US. and Oregon constitutions, and state and federal law pertaining to con?dential records and records containing personally identi?able information. - The Center?s Executive Advisory Committee has approved this Policy and oversees its implementation in various ways including: liaising with the community to ensure that privacy and civil rights are protected as provided in this policy and by the Center?s information? gathering and collection, retentiOn, and dissemination processes and procedures; and conducting an annual review and recommendation for updates to the policy, with the assistance of the Privacy Of?cer, in response to changes in law and implementation experience, including the results of audits and inspections. The Director for the Center is responsible for insuring that all participating agency personnel, personnel providing information'technology services to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center, private contractors, and users will comply with the terms of this Policy. Section 9 ofthis Policy contains specific provisions relating to the review, implementation and enforcement of this Policy. The Privacy Officer, who is the attorney for the Center and who is appointed by the I Chief Counsel of the Oregon Department of Justice Criminal Division, receives reports regarding alleged errors and violations of the provisions of this policy, receives and coordinates complaint resolution under the Center?s redress policy, and serves as the liaison for the Information Sharing Environment, ensuring that privacy protectiOns are implemented through efforts such as training, business process changes, and system designs that incorporate privacy?enhancing technologies. The Privacy Of?cercan be contacted at the following address: 610 Hawthorne Ave, SE, Suite 210, Salem, Oregon, 97301, The Director of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center ensures that enforcement procedures and sanctions outlined in Section 9.3 are adequate and enforced. EXHIBIT 3 Page 2 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 2 - 3.0- Definitions . Appendix A provides de?nitions for words or phrases regularly used in this Policy to explain their meaning in the context of this Policy. 4.0 Seeking, Collecting, andRetainingInformation and Criminal Intelligence Each participating agency will determine which database(s) it will provide, and access to such- database(s) will be governed by the laws that govern the particular agency respecting such data, as well as by applicable federal laws. Because the laws governing information that can be sought, collected or released on private individuals will vary from agency to agency, limitations on the collection of data concerning individuals is the responsibility of the collector of the original source data. Each contributor of information will abide by the collection limitations applicable to it by reason of law. Information contributed to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center should be that which has been collected in conformance with those limitations. - The following provisions set out the policies that will guide the operation of the Oregon . TITAN Fusion Center in four areas: 1) the types of information that may be sought and the types of information that may be collected or retained; 2) information that may not be sought, collected, or retained; 3) permissible methods of seeking information, including the receipt of information from third parties in the form of unsolicited tips; and 4) assessing information with respect to its validity, reliability, and aCcess or disclosure. . 4.1 Information That May Be Sought or Retained l. The Oregon TITAN 'Fusion Center will seek or retain information only under the - following circumstances: a. The source of the information is reliable and veri?able or limitations on the quality of the information are identi?ed; and b. The information was collected in a fair and lawful manner, with the knowledge and consent of the individual, if appropriate, and c. The information is based on a possible threat 'to public safety or the enforcement of the criminal law; or d. Where there is reasonable suspicion that a specific individual or organization has cemmitted acriminal offense or is involved in or is planning criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, or the nation, and the informatiOn is relevant to the criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity; or e. The information is relevant to the investigation and prosecution of suspected (including terrorist) incidents; the resulting justice system response; the enforcement of sanctions, orders, or sentences; or the prevention of crime, or . f. The mformation is useful in crime analysis or in the administration of criminal justice and public safety (including topical searches). EXHIBIT Page 3 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 3 2. Collection, retention and storage of criminal intelligence will comply with applicable state and federal law. The Center may retain protectexiinformation that is based on a level of suspicion that is less than ?reasonable suspicion,? such as tips and leads or suspicious activity report (SAR) information, subject to the policies and procedures speci?ed in this policy. 3. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will not seek or retain information about an individual or organization solely on the basis of their religious, political, racial, or social views or activities, their participation in a particular non-criminal organization or lawful event; or their race, ethnicity, citizenship, place'of origin, age, disability, gender, or sexual orientation. 4. The, Oregon TITAN Fusion Center shall apply labels to center?originated information (or ensures that the originating agency has applied labels) to indicate to the accessing authorized user that: a. The information is ?protected information? to include ?personal da on any individual (see De?nitions), and, to the extent expressly provided in this policy, includes organizational entities. 5. The information is subject to ORS 181.575, ORS 192.41 0?192.505, OAR 137?090- 0000, et seq., 28 CFR Part 23, the United States Constitution and the Oregon Constitution restricting access, use or dis closure.- 6. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center personnel will, upon receipt of information, assess the information to determine or review its nature, us ability, and quality. Personnel will assign categories to the information (or ensure that the originating agency has assigned categories, to the information) to re?ect the assessment, such as: . . - a. Whether the information Consists of tips and leads data, suspicious activity reports, criminal history, intelligence information, case records, conditions of Supervision, case progress, or other information category. b. The nature of the source as it affects veracity (for example, anonymous tip, trained interviewer or investigator, public record, private sector). 0. The reliability of the source (for example, reliable, usually reliable, unreliable, unknown). d. The validity of the conteht (for'example, con?rmed, probable, doubtful, cannot be judged). 7. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will keep a record of the source of all-retained information. A EXHIBIT Page 4 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 4 8. Tips and Leads Information or Data The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center may seek or retain information of uncorrcborated information or reports generated from inside or outside the agency that alleges or indicates some form of possible criminal activity. Tips and leads may include suspicious Incidents Reports (SIR) information, suspicious activity report (SAR) information, and/or ?eld interview reports (F IRS). Tips and leads informatiOn does not include incidents that do not have an offense attached, criminal history records, or CAD data. Tips and leads information should be - maintained in a secure system, similar to data that rises to the level of reasonabl suspicion. A tip or lead can come from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, the public, ?eld interview reports, and anonymous or confidential sources. This information raises some suspicion but may be based on a level of suspicion that is less than ?reasonable suspicion? and, without further inquiry or analysis; it is unknown whether the information is accurate or useful. Tips and leads information falls between being of no use to law enforcement and being extremely valuable depending on the availability of time and resources to determine its meaning. Center personnel are required to adhere to the following practices and procedures for the receipt, collection, assessment, storage, access, dissemination, retention, and security of tips and leads and suspicious activity report (SAR) information. Center personnel will: - a. Prior to allowing access to or dissemination of the information, ensure that attempts to validate or refute the information have taken place and that the information has been assessed for sensitivity and con?dence by subjecting it to an evaluation or screening process to determine its credibility and value and categorize the information as unsubstantiated or uncorrob orated if attempts to validate or the eligibility of the information have been unsuccess?il. The Center will use a standard reporting format and standard collection codes for SAR information. b. Store the information using the same storage method used for data which rises to the level of reasonable suspicion and which includes an audit and inspection process, supporting docurnentation, and labeling of the data to delineate it from other information. c. Allow access to or disseminate the information using the same (or a more restrictive) access or dissemination standard that is used for data that rises to the level of reasonable suspicion (for example, ?need-to?know? and ?right?to? know? access or dissemination for personally identi?ableinformation). d. Regularly provide access to or disseminate the information in response to an interagency inquiry for law enforcement, homeland security, or public safety and analytical purposes or provide an assessment of the information to any agency, entity, individual, or the public when credible information indicate3 potential imminent danger to life or property. EXHIBIT Page'5 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy I . Page 5 9. 10. ll. Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy c. Retain information for one hundred and eighty (180) days in order?to work an unvalidated tip, lead, or SAR information to determine its credibility and value or assign a ?disposition? label (for example, undetermined or unresolved, cleared unfounded, veri?ed, or under active investigation) so that a subsequently authorized user knows the status and purpose for the retention and will retain the information based on the retention period associated with the disposition label. An additional one hundred and eighty (180) day retention may be authorized by the. Director of the Center, after consultation with Privacy Of?cer, if after the ?rst one hundred and eighty (180) days, it appears likely that based upon investigation during the ?rst one hundred and eighty (180) days the unvalidated tip, lead, or SAR information may be credible. f. Adhere to and follow the Center?s physical, administrative, and technical security measwres to ensure the protection and security of tips, leads, and SAR information. Tips, leads, and SAR information will be secured in a system that is the same as or similar to the system that secures data that rises to the level of reasonable suspicion. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center incorporates the gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of terrorism-related suspicious activities and?incidents (SAR process) into existing processes and systems used to manage other crime-related information and criminal intelligence, thus leveraging existing policies and protocols utilized to protect'the information, as well as information privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will identify and review protected information that may be accessed ?om or disseminated by the Center prior to sharing that information through the Information Sharing Environment. Further, the Center will provide notice mechanisms, including but not limited to 'metadata or data ?eld labels . that will enable ISE authorized users to determine the nature of the protected information and how to handle the information in accordance with applicable legal requirements. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center requires certain basic descriptive information (metadata tags or labels) to be entered and electronically associated with data (or content) for which there are special laws, rules, or policies regarding access, use, and disclosure, including terrorism?relatedinformation shared through the ISE. The types of information include: - - I a. Ihenarne of the originating Center, departr'nent or agency, component, and subcomponent, - b. The name of the Center?s justice infermation system from which the information is disseminated. c. The date the information was collected and, where feasible, the date its accuracy was last veri?ed; . d. The title and contact information'for the person to whom questions regarding the information should be directed. I EXHIBIT Page 6 of 32 Page 6 12. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will attach (or ensure that the originating agency has attached) speci?c labels and descriptive metadata to information'that will be used, accessed, or disseminated to clearly indicate any legal restrictions on information sharing based on information sensitivity or classi?cation. 4.2 Methods of Seeking or Receiving Information 1. Information gathering and investigative techniques used by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will comply with all applicable laws, including but not limited to ORS 1.81.575, OAR 137-090?0000, et seq., 28 CFR Part 23, the United States Constitution and the Oregon Constitution. - 2. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center?s SAR process provides for human review and- vetting to ensure that information is both legally gathered and, Where applicable, determined to have a potential terrorism nexus. Law enforcement of?cers and appropriate center and participating agency staff will be trained to recognize those behaviors and incidents that are indicative of criminal activity related to terrorism. . 3. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center?s SAR process includes safeguards to ensure, to the greatest degree possible, that only information regarding individuals involved in activities that have been determined to be. consistent with criminal activities or associated with terrorism will be documented and shared through the ISE. These safeguards are intended to ensure that information that could violate civil rights (race, religion, national origin, ethnicity, etc.) and civil liberties (speech, assembly, religious exercise, etc.) will not be intentionally or inadvertently gathered, documented, processed, and shared. 4. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will not directly or indirectly seek,receive or retain information ?rOm: a. An individual or nongovernmental information provider, who may or may not receive a fee or bene?t for providing the information, except as expressly authorized by law or Oregon TITAN Fusion Center policy. b. An individual or information provider who is legally prohibited ?om ob the speci?c information sought or disclosing it to the Center. A c. An individual or information provider who used methods for collecting the information that the Center itself could not legally use, except Where: The information was provided through an anonymous tip, in which case the Center may use the information as a basis to'investigate . further, but shall not retain the information unless it meets the requirements set out in Section 4.1 or . ii. The information was provided by a cooperating defendant or criminal informant and the person was not acting at the direction or under the control of the Center; and . . The commercial database entities provide a written assurance that their methods for gathering personally identi?able informwion comply with applicable local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal laws, statutes, and regulations and that these methods are not based On misleading information?gathering practices. EXHIBIT Page 7 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center? Privacy Policy 7 Page 7 . .1 d. The Center could not itself legally collect the speci?c information sought from the individual or information prOvider, except that the Centermay receive aggregated information Where: . i. The indiVidual or information provider has lawfully obtained such information; and . ii. The Center could lawfully collect the speci?c pieces of information that comprise the aggregate. . e. The Center has not taken the steps necessary, such as obtaining a search warrant or subpoena, to be authorized to seek and receive theinformation. 5. Information gathering and investigative techniques used by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will be no more intrusive than is necessary in the particular circumstance to gather information it is authorized to seek'or retain under'applicable statues and rules. 6. External agencies that access the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center?s information or share information with the Center are governed by the laws and rules governing those individual agencies, including applicable federal and state laws. 4.3 Classi?cation Regarding Validity and Reliability of Information I 1. At the time of retention in a system maintained by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center, the information will be categorized regarding its: a. Content validity; . b. Nature of the source (anonymous tip, con?dential source, trained interviewer or investigator, written statement (victim, Witness, other), private sector, or other source); and 0. Source reliability. 4.4 Classi?cation of Information according to limits on access and disclosure 1. At the time a decision is made to retain information, it will be classi?ed pursuant to the" applicable limitations on access and sensitivity of disclosure in order to: a. Protect an individual?s right of privacy and civil rights; b. Protect con?dential sources and police undercover techniques and methods; . 0. Not interfere with or compromise pending criminal investigations; and d. Provide legally required protection based on the status of an- individual (such as a child, sexual abuse victim, resident 'of a substance abuse treatr'nent program, resident of a mental health treatrnent program, or resident of a domestic abuse shelter, a domestic violence crime victim or as a Witness). 2. At the time a decision is made to retain, or store, criminal intelligence, it will be classified pursuant to the applicable limitations on access and disclosure contained in OAR intelligence information is classi?ed according to'the following system: Sensitive, Con?dential and Restricted. See, loo/OAR 137/137 090.html . - EXHIBIT Page 8 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 8 3. The classi?cation of stored information will be reevaluated whenever: a; New information is added that has an impact on access Ernitations or the sensitivity of disclosure of the information; or b. There is a change in the use of the information affecting access or disclosure limitations; for example, the information becomes part of court proceedings for which, there are different public access laws. 4. Classifications regarding access will be used to control: a. The information to which a particular group or class of users can have access based on the group or class; b. What information a class of users may add, change, delete or print; and c. To whom the information may be disclosed and under what circumstances. 5. C-redentialed, role-based access criteria will be used by'the Center, as appropriate, to control: a. The information to which a particular group or class of users can have access based on the group or class. b. The information a class of users can add, change, delete, or print. c. To whom, individually, the information can be disclosed and under what circumstances. 6. Access to or disclosure of records retained by the Center will be provided only to personswr?thz'n the center or in other governmental agencies who are authorized to have access and only for legitimate law enforcement, public protection, public prosecution, public health, or justice purposes and only for the performance of official duties in accordance with law and procedures applicable to the agency for which the person is working. An audit trail suf?cient to allow the identi?cation of each individual who accessed information retained by the Center and the nature of the information accessed will be kept by the Center. - 7. The labeling of retained information will be reevaluated by the Center or the originating agency when new information is gathered that has an imp act on con?dence (source reliability and content validity) in previously retained information. 5.0 Information Quality The agencies participating in the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center remain the owners of the data they contribute. a Inaccurate personal information can have a damaging impact on the person concerned and on the integrity and functional value of the Center. In order to maintain the integrity of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center, any agency that obtains information through the Center must independently verify the information with the agency that originally provided it before taking any of?cial action warrant or arrest) based on the information. - User agencies and individual users are responsible for complying with applicable laws governing the use, further dissemination, purging, and updating of information obtained ?om i the Center. EXHIBIT . Page 9 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 9 i a 5.1 5.2. 5.3 5.4 5.5 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will make every reasonable effort to ensure that information sought or retained is: . 1. Derived from reliable and trustworthy sources of information; 2. Accurate, current; and' 3. Complete, including the relevant context in which it was sought or received and other related information; and mergedwith other information about the same. individual or organization only when the applicable standard has been met. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will make every reasonable effort to ensure that only authorized users are allowed to add, change, or delete information ?om . criminal intelligence storage systems. The Oregon TITAN I Fusion Center will make every reasonable effort to ensure that information will be deleted from criminal intelligence storage systems When the Center learns that: 1 . The information is invalid, inaccurate, unveri?able, no longer use?il, no longer.- relevant, or otherwise unreliable; 2. The information does not support a reasonable suSpicion of criminal activity; 3. The source of the information did not have authority to gather the information or to provide the information to the Center; or 4. The source of the information used prohibited means to gather the information, except where: a. The information was provided through an anonymous tip, in which case the Center may use the informationas a basis to investigate ?arther,_but shall not retain the information unless it meets the requirements set out in Section 4.1; or b. The information was provided by a cooperating defendant or criminal . inferrnant and the person was not acting at the direction or under the control of the Center. . . I The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will inVestigate, in a timely manner, alleged errors and deficiencies (or refer them to the originating agency) and correct, delete, or refrain from using protected information found to'be erroneous or deficient. The Center will conduct periodic data quality reviews of information it originates and make every reasonable effort to ensure that the information will be corrected, deleted from the system, or not used when the Center identifies information that is erroneous, misleading, obsolete, or otherwise unreliable; the Center did not have authority to gather the information or to provide the information to another agency; or the Center used prohibited means to gather the information (except when the Center?s information source did not act as the agent of the Center in gathering the information). EXHIBIT Page 10 of 372 Page 10 --. i I. 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 analyzed or combined in a manner or for a purpose that violates Section 4.1.4. . Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy information.- . - Information sought or received by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center or from other sources will only be analyzed: Originating agencies external to the Center are responsible for reviewing the quality and accuracy of the data provided tothe Center. The Center will review the quality of information it has received from an originating agency and advise the appropriate contact person in the originating agency, in writing or electronically, if its data is alleged, suspected, or found to be inaccurate, incomplete, out of date, or .unverifiable, At the time of retention in the system, the information will be labeled regarding its level of quality (accUracy, completeness, currency, and confidence [verifiability and reliability]). The labeling of retained information will be reevaluated by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center or the originating agency when new information is gathered that has an impact on confidence (source reliability and content validity) in previously retained The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will use written or electronic notification to inform recipient agencies when information previously provided to the recipient agency is deleted or changed by the Center because the information is determined to be erroneous, includes incorrectly merged information, is out of date, cannot be veri?ed, or lacks adequate context such that the rights of the individual may be affected. Collation' and Analysis of Information Collation and Analysis 1. By quali?ed individuals approved'and employed by the Oregon Department of Justice, or by a participating agency, who have successfully completed a background check and appropriate security clearance, if applicable, and have been selected, approved and trained accordingly; and 2. To provide tactical and/or strategic criminal intelligence on the existence, identi?cation, and capability of individuals and organizations suspected of having engaged in or engaging in criminal activities generally, including terrorism; or 3. To further crime prevention (including terrorism), law enforcement, public safety, force deployment, or prosecution objectives and priorities established by the Center. Information sought or'received by the agency or from other sources will not be i EXHIBIT Page 11 of 32 Page 11 6.2 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center requires that all analytical products be reviewed and approved by the Privacy Of?cer to ensure that they provide appropriate privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections prior to dissemination or sharing by the Center. Analytical products may be reviewed and approved for dissemination or sharing by the Director of the TITAN Fusion Center, the Oregon Department of Justice Criminal Justice Division?s Special Agent in Charge, Deputy Chief Counsel or the Chief Ceunsel when: - 1. Immediate dissemination or sharing is reasonably necessary to protect life or prevent physical injury where the risk of injury or death is imminent, and 2. The Privacy Of?cer cannot be contacted or contact with the Privacy Of?cer would delay dissemination or sharing and delay would reasonably increase the risk of injury or death of a person. - - 6.3_ I Information subject to collation and analysis is information as de?ned and identi?ed in Section 4.1 l. of this policy. 6.4 Records ab out an individual or organization from two or more sources will not be merged by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center unless there is suf?cient identifying information to reasonably conclude that the information is about the same individual or organization. The set of identi?ers sufficient to allow merging will consist of all available attributes that can contribute to a higher accuracy of match. 6.5 If the matching requirements are not fully met but there is an identi?ed partial match, a the information may be associated by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center if accompanied by a clear statement that it has not been adequately established that the inform ation relate to the same individual or organization. I 7.0 Sharing and disclosure of Information/criminal Intelligence This section addresses to whom and under what the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center may dis close information/ criminal intelligence. Disclosure may be passive, by . allowing authorized law enforcement personnel access to databases via direct queries, or active, as when the Center disseminates or publishes information in bulletins, notices, or reports. Informationobtained from or through the ,Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those speci?ed in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by each participating agency. Information cannot be (1) sold, published, exchanged, or disclosed for commercial purposes; (2) disclosed or published without prior approval 'of the contributing agency; or (3) disseminated to unauthorized persons. Agencies external to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center may not disseminate information accessed or disseminated from the Center without approval from the Center or other originator of the information. . - EXHIBIT Page 12 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy I Page. 12 The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center adheres to the cturent version of the Functional Standard for its suspicious activity reporting (SAR) process, includingthe use of a . standard reporting format and commonly accepted data Collection codes and a sharing-process that complies with the Functional Standard for suspicious activity potentially related to terrorism. . 7.1 Sharing Information within the Oregon TITAN Fusion Centenand with Other Law Enforcement Agencies - 1. Access to information retained by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will only be provided to personnel assigned to the Center or in other governmental agencies who are authorized by law to have access; who will use it only for legitimate law' enforcement, public protection, public prosecution, or public health purposes (?right to know?); and who will use it only in the performance of their of?cial duties (?need to know?). 2. The Center will maintain an audit trail to document access by or dissemination of information to such persons. 7.2 Sharing-criminal Intelligence Within the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center and - with Criminal Law Enforcement Agencies Criminal intelligence can only be used for lavaul purposes. A lawful purpose means that - the request for information is directly linked to a law enforcement agency?s active criminal investigation or is a response to a con?rmed lead that requires follow?up to prevent a criminal act. 1. Access to criminal intelligence will be provided according to OAR 137-090?0000 et.seq. and other applicable laws; 2. The Center shall not con?rm the existence or nonexistence of intelligence to any person or agency that would not be eligible to receive the information itself. 7.3 Sharing Information with those Responsible for Public Protection, Safety, or Public Health - 1. Information retained by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center'may be disseminated to individuals in public or private entities only for public protection, safety, or public health purposes (?right to know?) and only in the performance of of?cial duties in accordance with applicable laws and procedures (?need to know? 2. An audit trail will be kept of the access by or dissemination of information to such persons. - - 3. Nothing in this policy shall limit the dissemination, including unsolicited, of an assessment of criminal intelligence information to a government o?icial or to any other individual, when necessary to avoid imminent danger or certain danger to lif or ro . . party EXHIBIT Page 13 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 13 4. The Center shall not con?rm the existence or nonexistence of information to any person or agency that would not be eligible to receive the information itself. 7.4 Sharing Information for Speci?c Purposes I 1? . Information gathered'and retained by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center may be disseminated for speci?c purposes upon request by persons authorized by law to have such access (?right to know?) and only for those uses or purposes speci?ed in the law (?need to The Center shall not con?rm the existence or nonexistence of information to any person or agency that would not be eligible to receive the information itself. An audit trail suf?cient to allow the identi?cation of each individual who requested, accessed, or received information retained by the Center; the nature of the information requested, accessed, or received; and the speci?c purpose will be kept for a minimum 'of 20 years by the Center. - 7.5 Disclosing Information to the Public Information gathered and retained by the Oregon Fusion Centermay be disclosed to a member of the public only if the information is a public record as de?ned in ORS 192,410?192,505 and is not exempt from disclosure. The Center may collect a fee ?om those requesting information, as authorized in I ORS 192.440, for costs associated with providing the information. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will follow OAR 137?090?0040 in responding to I requests for stored criminal intelligence. The Center shall not con?rm the existence or nonexistence of information to any person or agency that would not be eligible to receive the information itself. The Center will maintain an audit trail of all requests and of the. information disclosed. 7 Disclosing Information to the Individual about Whom Information has been Gathered 1.. Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Upon satisfactory veri?cation of his or her identityand subject to the conditions speci?ed in Section 7.63, an individual is entitled to know the existence of and to review the information about himself or herselfthat has been gathered and retained by the Center. The individual may obtain a copy of the information for the purpose of challenging the accuracy or completeness of the information (correction). The Center?s response to the request for information will be made within a reasonable time and'in a form that is readily intelligible to the individual._ EXHIBITB Page 14 of 32 Page 14 .- - 2. Upon receiving 'such a request, the Center will direct the individual to contact the agency that originally submitted the information. The submitting agency will determine what information may be released under the laws governing that agency. 1 3. The existence, content, and source of the information will not be made available to an individual when:' a. Disclosure would interfere with, compromise, or delay an ongoing . investigation or prosecution (ORS 192.501 b. Disclosure would endanger the health or safety of an individual, organization, or community (ORS 19250108) and (23The information is stored in a crirninal intelligence system, such as the Oregon State Intelligence Network (28 CFR Part 23 and ORS 137?,090? - 0150-? 137?090?0170); or d. Disclosure is otherwise limited or prohibited by law.- 4. If the information does not originate with the Center, the request will be referred to the originating agency, if appropriate or required, or the Center will notify the source agency of the request and its determination that disclosure by the Center or referral of the requestor to the source agency was neither required nor appropriate under applicable law. 5. If an individual challenges the accuracy or completeness of information retained at and the Center and for Which the Center is the original source, the Center Will inform the individual of the procedure for requesting a review of any challenges and for making corrections. . . a. If a request for correction is denied, the Center will advise the individual of the reason(s) for the denial. - b. The Center will also inform the individual of the procedure for appealwhen I the Center has declined to correct challenged information to the degree requested by the individual. I . c. A record will be kept of all requests for corrections and the resulting action, if any. 7 6. The agency may collect a fee from those requesting information, as- authorized in ORS 192.440, for costs associated with providing the information. 7. The Center will maintain a record of all requests and of the information disclosed to an individual. 8. Information gathered or collected and records retained by the Center will not be: a. Sold, published, exchanged, or disclosed for commercial purposes. b. Disclosed or published without prior notice to the originating agency that such information is subject to disclosure or publication, unless disclosure is agreed to as part of the normal operations of the agency. c. Disseminated to persons not authoriZed to access or use the information. EXHIBIT 'Page 1-5-of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 15 9. 10. .11. If an individual has a complaint with regard to the accuracy or completeness of terrorism-related protected information that: a a. Is exempt from disclosure, A b. Has been or may be shared through the ISE, i. Is held by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center and ii. Allegedly has resulted in demonstrable harmto the complainant. - The Center will inform the individual of the procedure for submitting (if needed) and resolving such complaints. Complaints will be received by the Center?s Privacy Officer at the following address: 610 HawthomeAve, SE, Suite 210, Salem, Oregon, 97301, The Privacy Of?cer will acknowledge the complaint and state that it will be reviewed but will not con?rm the existence or nonexistenceof the information to the complainant unless otherwise required by law. If the information did not originate with the Center, the Privacy Officer will notify the originating agency in writing or electronically within 10 days and, upon request, assist such agency to correct any identi?ed data/record de?ciencies, purge the information, or verify that the record is accurate. All information held by the Center that is the subject of a complaint will be reviewed within 30 days and confirmed or I corrected/purged if determined to be inaccurate, incomplete, to include incorrectly merged information, or to be out of date. If there is no resolution within 30 days, the Center will not share the information until such time as'the complaint has been resolved. A record will be kept by the Center of all complaints and the resulting action taken in response to the complaint. To delineate protected informatiOn shared through the ISE from other data, the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center maintains records of agencies sharing terrorism? related information and employs system mechanisms to identify? the originating - agency when the information is shared. . . Records that will ordinarily not be provided to the public 1. Oregon TITAN Fusion Center PriVacy Policy Records required to be kept con?dential by law are exempted ?om disclosure requirements under ORS 192.410?192505. Information that meets the definition 0 ?classified information? as that term is de?ned in the NatiOnal' Security .Act, Public Law 235, Section 606 and in accord With Executive Order 13 549, Classi?ed National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities, August 18, 2010. Investigatory records of law enforcement agencies that are exempted ?om disclosure requirements under ORS 192.4104 92.505. EXHIBIT Page 16 of 32 Page 16 4. A record or part of a record the public disclosure of which would have a reasonable likelihood of threatening public safety by exposing a vulnerability to terrorist attack is exempted from disclosure requirements ORS 192.410- 192.505. This includes arecord assembled, prepared, or maintained to prevent, mitigate, or reSpond to-an act of terrorism or an act of agricultural terrorism, vulnerability assessments, risk planning documents, needs assessments, and threat assessments. 5. Protected federal, state, local, or tribal records, which may include records originated and controlled by another agency that cannot, under 28 CFR Part 23 or OAR 137?090-0150 137?090-0170 be shared without permission. 6. A violation of an authorized nondisclosure agreement entered into between participating agencies as authorized by Oregon Public Records laws. 8.0 Retention, Review, Purge, and Destruction of Information/Stored Criminal Intelligence 8.1 Retention and, Review of Information 1. When'information retained at the Center has no further value or meets the criteria for removal Under ORS Chapter 192, OAR 137-090?0000 to 137?090?0225, i28 CFR - Part 23, and Center policy, it will be returned to the submitting agency or purged and destroyed according to the above stated law 0r Center policy. 2. The Director of the ODOJ Criminal Justice Division?s Criminal Intelligence Unit or a designee will review information prior to its removal from a record or information storage system. 8.2 Destruction of Records Containing Information 1. Records centaining information will be destroyed, or returned to the submitting (originating) agency, according'to the requirements of OAR 166?300-0015. 2. The Center will provide noti?cation of proposed destruction or return of records to the submitting agency. 3. The Center will maintain a record-of the information that has been purged or returned. EXHIBIT Page.17 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 17 8.3 - Review, Purge, and Destruction of Stored Criminal Intelligence The Center will follow 28 CFR Part 23 and OAR 137?090?0150 137?090?0170 in reviewing, purging, and destroying stored-criminal intelligence. The maximum retention period is ?ve (5) years, and a criminal intelligence ?le must be purged after ?ve years unless the information in that criminal intelligence ?le has been updated consistent with these Standards and Procedures. - - The procedure contained in Part 23 Section will be followed by'Oregon TITAN Fusion Center fornoti?cation of appropriate parties, including the originating. agency, before information is deleted or returned in accordance with this policy or as otherwise agreed upon with the originating agency in a participation or membership agreement. 1. The Center will maintain a record that information has been purged and destroyed, which will contain at a the date of the purge or return and if returned the name and address of the agency to which it was returned; and for appropriate system(s), notice will be given to the submitter at least 30 days prior to the required review and validation/purge date. 9.0 ?Accountability and Enforcement 9.1 Information System Transparency 1. A link to the Oregon TITAN Fusion CenterPrivacy Policy will be included on the publicly accessible Oregon Department of Justice website, - .state.or.us/. The link will be located Under ?Request for Public Records? and the sub?category Privacy Policy.? 2. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will designate a person who shall be responsible for receiving and responding to inquiries and complaints ab out privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections in the information system. The Privacy Of?cer may be contacted at 610 Hawthorne Ave, SE, Suite 210, Salem, Oregon, 97301, . - 9.2 Accountability for Activities 1. OD OJ will appoint a Director for the Center (Center Coordinator) who will have primary responsibility for the day?to?day operation of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center, including operations, its justice systems coordination of pers onnel; the receiving, seeking, retention, evaluation, information quality, analysis, destruction, sharing, and disclosure of information; and the enforcement of this Privacy Policy. - 2. Use of the Center?s information systems is limited to personnel who have been. selected, approved, and trained accordingly. Each individual user must complete an Individual User Agreement and is required to abide by this Privacy Policy in the use of information obtained by and through the Center. Individual users remain responsible for their legal and appropriate use of the information Oregon TITAN Fusion Center - Privacy Policy EXHIBIT Page 18 of 32 Page 18 contained therein. I 3. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center's Security Of?cer is designated and trained to serve as the Center?s security of?cer. - I 4. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center? will operate in a secure facility protected from external intrusion. Remote access to databases located at the Center?s headquarters 4 will be provided over secure network lines. 5. The Center will establish procedures, practices, and system protocols and use software, information technology tools, and physical security measures that protect information from unauthorized access, modi?cation, theft, or sabotage, Whether internal or external, and Whether due to natural or human-caused disasters or intrusions. The methods and techniques used shall be consistent With security practices that are generally accepted within the law enforcement community. 6. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will secure tips, leads, and SAR information in a separate repository system using security procedures and policies that are the A same as or similar to those used for a system that secures data rising'to the level . of reasonable suspicion under 28 CFR Part 23. 7. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will store information in a manner such that it cannot be added to, modi?ed, accessed, destroyed, or purged except by personnel authorized by law or agency policy to take such actions. - 8. Access to Oregon TITAN Fusion Center information will be granted only to center personnel whose positions an?djob dutiesrequire such access; who have successfully completed a background check and appropriate security clearance, if applicable; and who have been selected, approved, and trained accordingly. 9. Queries made to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center?s data applications will be . logged into the data system identifying the user initiating the query. 10. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will utilize watch logs to maintain audit trails of requested and disseminated information. 11. To prevent public records disclosure, risk and vuhierabilit-y assessments will not be stored with publicly available data. 12. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will adopt and follow procedures and practices to ensure and evaluate the compliance of its users and the system itself with the proVisions of this Privacy Policy and applicable law. This will include logging access to these systems and periodic auditing ofthese systems, so as to not establish a-pattern of the audits. These audits will be mandated at least . annually and a record of the audits will be maintained by the Privacy Of?cer or Center Director the Center. - EXHIBIT Page 19 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center A Page. 13.. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will require any individuals authorized to use any system located at the Center?s headquarters to provide a written acknowledgement of receipt of this policy and to agree in writing to comply with - the provisions of this Privacy Policy. Such authorized individuals include . personnel assigned to the Center and participating users. 14. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Executive Advisory Committee internally will annually conduct or coordinate audits and inSpections of the information contained in information systems located at the Center?s headquarters. The . 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. ?21. committee has the option Of conducting a random audit, withoutannouncement, at any time and without prior notice to staff of the Center. The audit will be conducted in such a manner so as to protect the con?dentiality, sensitivity, and privacy of the agency?s information. The Executive Advisory Committee will also be responsible for overseeing the investigation into any allegation of unauthorized or illegal use of the Center?s data or information, including alleged violations of this Policy. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Officer will annually review and update the provisions protecting privacy, civil-rights, and civil liberties in its policies and make appropriate changes in response to changes in applicable law and public expectations. This review will be performed with the Center?s legal counsel and such other persons as may be designated by the Chief Counsel of Criminal Division. Any changes made to this Policy will be presented to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Executive Advisory Committee for approVal. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will notify an individual about whom personal information was or is reasonably believed to have been obtained by an unauthorized person, where such action threatens physical, - reputational, or fmancial harm to the person. The notice will be made and without unreasonable delay following discovery or noti?cation of the unauthorized access, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement to investigate the circumstances surrounding the access or any measures necessary to determine the scope of such access and to reasonably restore the integrity of the information system; Notice need not be given if doing so meets the criteria specified in Section 7.6.3. The audit log of queries made to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will identify the uSer initiating the query. . - The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will maintain an audit trail of accessed, requested, or disseminated information. An audit trail will be kept for a Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy minimum of 20 years (pursuant to Oregon Department of Justice Records Retention Schedule and OAR 1?66?3 00?0015) of requests for access to I information for speci?c purposes and of what information is disseminated to each person in reSponse to the request EXHIBIT - Page 20 of 32 Page 20 9.3 22. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center?s personnel or other authorized users shall report errors and suspected or con?rmed violations of center policies relating to protected information to the Center?s Privacy Of?cer. Enforcement If a user is suspected of or found to have violated the provisions of this Policy regarding the collection, classification, retention, sharing, use, disclosure, or destruction of information, . the Director of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Will: . 10.0 10.1 10.2 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy 1. Suspend or discontinue the user?s access to information; 2. Take disciplinary action against the person as permitted by applicable personnel policies; A 3. Apply?other sanctions or administrative actions as provided in the Center?s personnel policies; - 4. Request the agency, organization, contractor, or service provider employing- the user to initiate proceedings to discipline the user or take other action authorized by the employer?s personnel policy; or 5. Refer the matter to appropriate authorities for criminal prosecution, as necessary, to effectuate the purposes of this Policy as stated in Section 1. The Oregon TITAN FusiOn Center reserves the right to restrict the quali?cations and number of personnel having access to Center information and to suspend or withhold service and deny access to any participating agency or participating agency personnel violating the Center?s privacy policy. Training The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will require the following individuals to participate . in training. regarding the implementation of and adherence to this Policy: 1. Personnel assigned to the Center; 2. Personnel providing information technology services to the Center; 3. Staff in other public agencies or private contractors providing services to the Center; and 4. Users who are not employed by the Center or a contractor. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center will provide special training regarding the Center?s requirements and policies for collection, use, and disclosure of protected information to personnel authorized to share protected information through the Information Sharing, EXHIBIT Envnonment. Page 21 of 32 Page 21 10.3 1. 2. 10.4 The Training will cover: The'purpose of the Policy; The substance and intent of the provisions of the Policy relating to the collection, use, analysis, retention, destruction, sharing, and disclosure of information retained by the Center; . The consec}uences of improper handling or use of information accessible Within or through the Center; and Penalties for policy violations, including possible transfer, dismissal, civil and criminal liability, and immunity, any. Originating and participating agency responsibilities and obligations under applicable law and policy. How to implement the policy in the day?to-day work of the user, whether a paper or systems user. The impact of improper activities, associated with infractions within or through the agency. Mechanisms for reporting violations of Center privacy protection? policies and - procedures. Copies of the Policy will be made available in electronic-and paper form toiall individuals listed insection 10.1 above. 2555321-v1 Or?gOn TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy EXHIBIT Page 22 of 32 Page 22 APPENDIX A . Terms and De?nitions Accesstata access is being able to get to (usually havingpermission to use) particular-data on a computer. Web access means having a connection to the World Wide Web through an access provider or an online service provider. Data access is usually speci?ed as read-Only and read/write access. . With regard to the ISE, access refers to the business rules, means, and processes by and through which ISE participants obtain terrorism?related information, to include homeland security information, terrorism information, and law enforcement information acquired in the ?rst instance by another ISE participant. . Access Control?~The mechanisms for limiting access to certain information based on a user?s identity and membership in various prede?ned groups. Access control can be mandatory, discretionary, or role?based. Acquisition?The means by which an ISE participant obtains information through the exercise of its authorities; for example, through human intelligence collection or from a foreign partner. For the purposes of this de?nition, acquisition does not'refer to the obtaining of information - widely available to other ISE participants through, for example, news reports. or to the obtaining of information shared with them by another ISE participant who, originally acquired the information. - Agency?The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center and all agencies that access, contribute, and share. - information in the Oregon justice infOrmation system. - Audit Trail?A generic term for recording (logging) a_ sequence of activities. In computer and network contexts, an audit trail tracks the sequence of activities on a system, such as user 10 g?ins and lo g-outs. More expanSiVe audit trail mechanisms would record each user?s activity in detail~What commands were issued to the system, what records and ?les were accessed or modi?ed, etc. Audit trails are a fundamental part of computer security, used to trace (albeit usually retrospectively) unauthorized users and uses. They can also be used to assist with information recovery in the event of a system failure. . Authentication?T?The process of validating the credentials of a person, computer process, or device.'Authentication requires that the person, process,-or device making the request provide a credential that proves it is what or who it says it is. Cominon ferms of credentials are digital- certi?cates, digital signatures, smart cards, biometrics data, and a combination of user names and passwords. see Biometrics. Autho?rizatiOn??The process of granting a person, computer process, or deviCe with access to certain information services, or functionality. Authorization is derived from the identity of the person, computer process, or device requesting access that is veri?ed through authentication. See Authentication. EXHIBIT Page 23 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy - Page 23 Biometrics?Biometrics methods can be divided into two categories:physiological and behavioral. Implementations of the former include face, (retina or iris), ?nger (?ngertip, thumb, ?nger length or pattern), palm (print or topography), and hand geometry. The latter includes voiceprints and handwritten signatures. center?Refers to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center andall participating state agencies of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center. Civil Lib antes?Fundamentalindividual rights, such as freedom of speech, press, or religion; due process of law; and other limitations on the power of the government to restrain or dictate the actions of individuals. They are the freedoms that are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights?'?the ?rst ten Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Civil liberties offer protection to individuals from improper government action and arbitrary governmental interferench Generally, the term ?civil rights? involves positive (or af?rmative) government action, while the term ?civil liberties? involves restrictions on government. Civil Rights?The term ?civil rights? is used to imply thatthe state has a role in ensuring that all citizens have equal protection under the law and equal opportunity to exercise the privileges of citizenship regardless of race, religion, gender, or other characteristics unrelated to the worth 'of the individual. Civil rights are, therefore, obligations imposed on gOvernment to promote equality. More speci?cally, they are the rights to personal liberty guaranteed to all United States citizens by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and by acts of Congress. Computer protection of information assets through the use of technology, processes, and training. . Confidentiality?Closely related to privacy but is not identical. It refers to the obligations of individuals and institutions to use information under their control appropriately once it has been 7 disclosed to them. One observes rules of con?dentiality out of respect for and to protect and preserve the privacy of others. See Privacy. Credentials?~Information that includes identi?cation and proof of identi?cation that is used to gain access to local and network resources. Examples of credentials are user names, passwords, smart cards,-and certi?cates. Criminal Intelligence Information?m?Consists of information on the activities and associations of: 1. Individuals who: a. Based upon reasonable suspicion are suspected of being or having been involved in the actual or attempted planning, organizing, threatening, ?nancing, or commission of criminal acts; or . b. Based up on reasonable suspicion, are suspected of being or having been involved in criminal activities with known 0r suspected crime ?gures. EXHIBIT Page 24 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy I Page 24 2. Organizations, businesses, and groups which: a. Based upon reasonable suspicion are suspected of being or having been involved in the actual or attempted planning, organizing, threatening, ?nancing, or commission of criminal acts; or b. Based upon reasonable suspicion are suspected of being or having been illegally operated, controlled, ?nanced, or in?ltrated by known or suSpected crime ?gures. I 0. Criminal intelligence recordsare maintained in a criminal intelligence syste per 28 CFR Part 23. Data?Inert symbols, signs,'descriptions, or measures; elements of information. Data Breacthhe unintentional release of secure information to an untrusted environment. This may include incidents such as theft or loss of digital media??including computer tapes, hard drives, or laptop computers containing such media?upon which such information is stored posting such information on the World Wide Web or on a computer otherwise accessible from the Internet without proper information transfer of such information to a system that is not completely open but is not appropriately or formally accredited for security at the approved level, such as e-mail; or transfer of such information to the information systems of a possibly hostile agency or environment where it may be exposed to more intensive techniques. Data Protection?Encompasses the range of legal, regulatory, and institutional mechanisms that . guide the collection, use, protection, and disclosure of information. Dis closureu?The release, transfer, provision of access to, sharing, publication, or divulging of perSonal information in any manner?electronic, verbal, or in \vritingwto an individual, agency, or organization outside the agency that collected it. Disclosure is an aspect of privacy, focusing on information which may be available only to certain people for certain purposes but which'is not available to everyone. - Electronically Maintained?wlnformation stored by'a computer or on any electronic medium from which the information may be retrieved by a ?computer, such as electronic memory chips, magnetic tape, magnetic disk, or compact disc optical media. Electronically Transmitted?Information exchanged with a computer using electronic media, such as the movement of information from one location to another by magnetic or optical media, or transmission over the Internet, intranet, extranet, leased lines, dial-up lines, private networks, telephone voice response, or faxb ack systems. It does not include faxes, telephone calls, video teleconferencing, or messages left on voicemail. 7 Fair Information Principles?~Thc Fair Information Principles (FIPs) are contained within'the Organisation for Economic Co?operation and Development?s (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flaws of Personal Data. These were developed around commercial trans actions and the transborder eXchange of information; however, they do provide a straightforward description of underlying privacy and information exchange principles and provide a simple framework for the legal analysis that needs to be done with regard to privacy in integrated justice systems. Some of the individual principles may not apply in all instances of an integrated justice system. Oregon TITAN Fusion Center - Privacy Policy . 4 Page 25 EXHIBIT Page 25 of 32 The eight FIPs are: - 1 . Collection Limitation Principle Data Quality Principle Purpose Specification Principle Use Limitation Principle Security Safeguards Principle Openness Principle Individual Participation Principle Accountability Principle Firew allwAsecurity solution that segregates one portion of a network fromanother portion, allowing only authorized network traf?c to pass through according to traffic-filtering rules. General Information or Datawlnforma?on that may include records, documents, or files pertaining to law enforcement Operations, such as computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data, incident data, and management information. Information that is maintained in a records management, CAD system, etc., for statistical/retrieval purposes. Information may be either resolved or unresolved. The record is maintained per statute, rule, or policy. Homeland Security Information?As de?ned in Section 892(f)(l) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and codi?ed at 6 U.S.C. 482(i)(l), homeland security information means any information possessed by a federal, state, or local agency that relates to a threat of terrorist activity; relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (0) would improve the identi?cation or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or would improve the response to a terrorist act. - Identification?A process whereby a real?world entity is recognized and its identity established. Identity is operationalized in the abstract world of information systems as a set of information about an entity that uniquely differentiates it from other similar entities. The set of informatiOn may be as small as a'single code, specifically designed as an identifier, or a collection of data, such as a given and family name, date of birth, and address. An organization?s identi?cation process consists of the acquisition of the relevant identifying information. Individual Resp onsibility?Because a privacy notice is not self?implementing, an individual within an organization?s structure must also be assigned responsibility for enacting and implementing the notice. . Informatioanncludes any data about people, organizations, events, incidents, er objects, regardless of the medium in which it exists. Information received by law enforcement agencies . can be categorized intofour general areas: general data, including investigative information; tips and leads data; suspicious activity reports; and criminal intelligence information; Such data may comprise personally identi?able information. Information Quality?Refers to various aspects of the information; the accuracy and validity of the actual values of the data, data structure, and database/data repository design. Traditionally, the basic elements of information quality have been identified as accuracy, completeness, currency, reliability, and context/meaning. Today, information quality is being more fully described in multidimensional models, expanding conventional views of the topic to include EXHIBIT . considerations of accessibility, security, and privacy. Page 26 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 26 . Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) SAR that has been determined, pursuant to a two?step process established in the FunCtional Standard, to have a potential terrorism nexus to be reasonably indicative of criminal activity ass ociated, with terrorism). Intelligence?Led Policing process for enhancing law enforcement agency effectiveness toward reducing crimes, protecting community assets, and preparing for reSponses.. . provides law enforcement agencies with an organizational framework to gather and use multisource information and intelligence to make timely and targeted strategic, operational, and tactical decisions. 7 Invasion of on one?s solitude or into one?s private affairs, public disclosure of embarrassing private information, publicity that puts one in a false light to the public, or appropriation of one?s name or picture for personal or commercial advantage. See also Right to Privacy. . . Law?As used by this policy, law includes any local, state, or federal constitution, statute, ordinance, regulation, executive order, policy, or court rule, decision, or order as construed by T'appropriate local, state, or federal officials or agencies. Law Enforcement Information??Per purposes of the 1313, law enforcement information means any information obtained by or of interest to a law enforcement agency or of?cial that is both related to terrorism or the security of our homeland and relevant to a law enforcement mission, including but not limited to information pertaining to 'an actual or potential criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or a foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or counterterrorism investigation; asseSSment of or response to criminal threats and vulnerabilities; the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means, methods, or activities of individuals or groups involved or suSpected of involvement in criminal or unlawful conduct 0r assisting or associated with criminal or unlawful conduct; the existence, identification, detection, prevention, interdiction, or disruption of or response to criminal acts and violations of the law; identification, apprehension, prosecution, release, detention, adjudication, supervision, or rehabilitation of accused persons er criminal offenders; and - victim/witness assistance. - Lawful Permanent Resident?WA foreign national who has been granted the privilege of permanently living and Working in the United States. - Least Privilege Administration?WA recommended security practice in which every user is provided with only the minimum privileges needed to accomplish the tasks he or she is authorized to perform. - _Logs??-?A necessary part of an adequate security system because they are needed to ensure that data is properly tracked and that only authorized individuals are getting access to the data. See also Audit Trail. EXHIBIT Page 27 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 27 Maintenance of Information?Applies to all forms of information storage. This includes electronic systems (for example, databases) and nonelectronic storage systems (for example, ?ling cabinets). To meet access requirements, an organization isnot required to create new systems to maintain information or to maintain information beyond a time when it no longer serves an organization?s purpose. - Metadata-?In its simplest form, metadata is information (data) about information, more speci?cally information about a particular aspect of the collected information. An item of metadata may describe an indiVidual content item or a collection of content items, Metadata is used to facilitate the understanding, use, and management of information. Themetadata required for this will vary based on the type of information and the context of use. Need to Knoww?As a result of jurisdictional, organizational, or operational necessities, access to sensitive information or intelligence is necessary for the conduct of an individual?s of?cial duties as part of an organization that has a right to know'the information in the performance of a law enforcement, homeland security, or counter-terrorism activity, such as to further an investigation or meet another law enforcement requirement. Nonrepudiatiom?A technique used to ensure that someone performing an action on a computer cannot falsely deny that he or she performed that action. Nonrepudiation provides undeniable proof that a user took a speci?c action, such as transferring money, authorizing a purchase, or sending amessage. - Originating Agency?w-The agency or organizational entity that documents information or data, including source agencies that document SAR (and, when authorized, information that is collected by a fusion center. Participating Agencwaefers to any criminal law enforcement agency that enters into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center and assigns personnel to work at the Center. PermissionswAuthorization to perform operations associated with a speci?c shared resource, such as a ?le, directory, or printer; Permissions must be granted by the system administrator to individual, user accounts or administratiVe groups. Personal Information or Data?Personal information refers to any information that relates to an identi?able individual (or data subject). Information that can be used, either alone or in Combination with other information, to identify individual subjects suspected of engaging in criminal activity, including terrorism. See also Personally Identi?able Information. EXHIBIT Page 28 of 32 Oregon TITANiFusion Center Privacy Policy Page 28 Personally Identifiable InformationMOne or more pieces of information that, when considered together or in the context of how the information is presented or gathered, are sufficient to Specify a unique individual. The pieces of information can be: Personal characteristics (such as height, weight, gender, sexual orientation, date of birth, age, hair color, color, race, ethnicity, scars, tattoos, gang affiliation,,religious affiliation, place of birth, mother?s maiden name, distinguishing features, and biometrics information, such as ?ngerprints, DNA, and retinal scans). I A unique set of numbers or characters assigned to a Specific individual (including name, address, phone number, social security number, e-mail address, driver? 3 license number, financial account or credit card number and assobiated PIN number, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identi?cation System identifier, or booking or detention system nIimber). . Descriptions of event(s) or points in time (for example, information in documents such as police reports, arrest reports, and medical records). Descriptions of location(s) or place(s) (including geographic information systems locations, electronic bracelet monitoring information, etc.). Persons?Executive order 12333 de?nes ?United States persons? as United States citizens, aliens known by the intelligence agency concerned to be permanent resident aliens, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. For the intelligence community and for domestic law enforcement agencies, ?persons? means United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. Privacy?Refers to individuals? interests in preventing the, inappropriate collection, use, and release of personal information. Privacy interests include privacy of personal behavior, privacy of personal communications, and privacy of personal data. Other definitions of privacy include the capacity to be physically left alone (solitude); to be free from physical interference, threat, or unwanted touching (assault,battery); or to avoid being seen'or oVerhea'rd in particular contexts. Privacy Policy?A printed, published statement that articulates the policy position of an- organization on how it handles the personal information that it gathers and uses in the normal course 'of business. The policy should include information relating to the processes of information collection, analysis, maintenance, dissemination, and access. The purpose of the privacy policy is to articulate that the Center will adhere to those legal requirements and Center policy determinations that enable gathering and sharing of information to 'occur in a manner that protects personal privacy interests. -A well?developed and implemented privacy policy us es justice entity resources wisely and effectively; protects the Center, the individual, and the public; and promotes public trust. Privacy Protection?A process of maximizing the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties When collecting and sharing. information in the process of protecting public safety and public health. I EXHIBIT B. Page 29 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 29 Protected Information?Protected information includes personal data about individuals that is subject to information privacy or other legal protections by law, including the US Constitution and the Oregon constitution; applicable federal statutes and regulations, such as civil rights laws and 28 CFR Part 23; applicable'state and tribal constitutions; and applicable state, local, and tribal laws, ordinances, and codes. Protection may be extended to organizations by fusion Center policy or other state, local, or tribal agency policy or regulation. Public includes: I 1, Any person and any for?pro?t or nonpro?t entity, organization, or association; 2. Any governmental entity for which there is no existing speci?c law authorizing - access to the agency?s information; I Media organizations; and I 4. Entities that seek, receive, or disseminate information for whatever reason, regardless of Whether it is done with the intent of making a pro?t, and without distinction as to the nature or intent of those requesting information from the agency. a. Public does not include: . I A 5. Employees of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center and participating agencies; 6. People or entities, private or governmental, who assist the Center and participating agencies; and . i 7. Public agencies Whose authority to access information gathered and retained by the Center is specified in law. Public Access??Relates to what information can be seen by the public; that is, information Whose availability is not subject to privacy interests or rights. - Recordm?Any item, collection, or grouping of information that includes personally identifiable information and is maintained, collected, used, or disseminated by or for the collecting agency or organization. Redres s_Laws, policies, and procedures that address public agency responsibilities With regard to access/disclosure and correction of information and the handling of complaints from persons regarding protected information about them Which is under the Center?s control-and which is exempt from disclosure and not disclosed to the indiVidual-to thm'the information pertains. Repudiation?The ability of a user to deny having performed an action that other parties cannot prove otheeriSe. For example, a user Who deleted a ?le can successfully deny doing so if no mechanism (such as audit files).can contradict that claim; I Retention?Refer to Storage. Right to Know?Based on having legal authority or responsibility or pursuant to an authorized agreement, an agency or organization is authorized to access sensitive informatiOn and intelligence in the performance of a law enforcement, homeland security, or counterterrorism activity. Right to Privacy?The'right to be-left alone, in the absence of some reasonable public interest in gathering, retaining, and sharing information about a person?s activities. Invasion of the right ti) privacy can be the basis for a lawsuit for damages against the person or entity violating a I . EXHIBIT person privacy. Page 30 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 30 -Role?Based Access?A type of accessauthorization that uses roles to determine access rights . and privileges. A role is a symbolic category, of users that share the same security privilege. . Security?Refers to the range of administrative, technical, and physical business practices and mechanisms that aim to preserve privacy andcon?dentiality by restricting information access to authorized users for authorized purposes. Computer and communications security efforts also have the goal of ensuring the accuracy and timely availability of data for the legitimate user set, as well as promoting failure resistance in the electronic systems overall. Source Agency-Source agency refers to the agency or organizational entity that originates SAR (and when authorized, information. - Storagee?In a computer, storage is the place Where data is held in an electromagnetic or optical fOrm for access by a computer processor. There are two general usages: Storage is frequently used to mean the devices and data connected to the computer through . input/ output operations?mthat is, hard disk and tape systems and other forms of storage'that do not-include computer memory and other storage. This is probably the most common meaning in the IT industry. . In a more formal usage, storage has been divided into (1) primary storage, which holds data in memory (sometimes called random access memory, or RAM) and other ?built-in? devices such asthe processor?s L1 cache, and (2) secondary storage, which holds data on hard disks, tapes, and other devices requiring input/output operations. Primary storage is much faster to access than secondary storage because of the proximity of the storage to the processOr er because of the nature of the storage devices. On the other hand, secondary storage can hold much more data than primary storage. With regard to the ISE, storage (or retention) refers to the storage and safeguarding of terrorisrn? related information?including homeland security information, terrorism information, and law enforcement information relating to terrorism or the security of our homelandm?by both the originator of the information and any recipient of the information. suspicious in the Functional Standard (Version 1.5) as ?observed behavior reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.? Examples of suspicious activity include surveillance, photography of sensitive infrastructure facilities, site breach or physical intrusion, cyberattacks, testing of security, etc. Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)??Off1cial documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity. Suspicious activity report (SAR) information offers a standardized means for feeding information repositories or data analysis tools. Patterns identi?ed during'SAR information analysis may be investigated in coordination With the reporting agency and, if applicable, a state or regional fusion center. SAR information is not intended to be used to track or record ongoing enforcement, intelligence, or investigatory activities, nor is it designed to support interagency calls for service. EXHIBIT Page 31 of 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 31 Terrorism Information?Consistent with Section 1016(a)(4) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), all information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of ?nance or materials support, or activities of foreign international terrorist groups or individuals or of domestic groups 9_r individuals, involved in transnational terrorism; threats posed by such groups or individuals tothe United States, United States persons, or United States interests or to those interests of other nations; communications of or by such groups or individuals; or other groups or individuals reasonably believed tobe assisting or associated with such groups or individuals Terrorism?Related Information?In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004 (IRTPA), as amended by the 9/11 Commission Act (August 3, 2007, PL. 110-53), the ISE facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland security information, as de?ned in IRTPA Section 1016(a)(5) and the Homeland Security Act 892(f)(l) (6 See also Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan (November 2006) and Presidential Guidelines 2 and 3 (the will facilitate the sharing of ?terrorism information,? as defined in the IRTPA, as well as the following categories of information to the extent that they do not otherwise constitute ?terrorism information?: (1) homeland security information as de?nedin Section 892(f)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. and (2) law enforcement information relating to terrorism or the security of our homeland). Such additional information may include intelligence information. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) information was de?ned and included in the de?nition of ?terrorism information? by PL. 110-53. Tips and Leads Information or Data??Generally uncorroborated reportsor information generated from inside or outside a law enforcement agency that allege or indicate some form of possible criminal activity. Tips and leads are sometimes referred to as suspicious incident report (SIR), suspicious activity report (SAR), and/or ?eld interview report (FIR) information. However, SAR information should be viewed, at most, as a subcategory of tip or lead data. Tips and leads information does not include incidents that do not have a 'criminal offense attached or indicated, Criminal history records, or CAD data. Tips and leads information should be maintained in a secure system, similar to data that rises to the level of reasonable suspicion. A tip or lead can come from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, the public, field interview reports, and anonymous or con?dential sources. This information may be based on mere suspicion or on a level of suSpicion that is less than ?reasonable suspicion? and, without further information or analysis, it is unknown whether the information is accurate or useful. Tips and leads information falls between being of little or no use to law enforcement and being extremely valuable depending on the availability of time and resources to determine its meaning. Us er??An individual representing a participating agency who is authorized to access or receive" and use a Center?s information and intelligence databases and resources for law?il purposes. EXHIBIT Page 32.0f 32 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Privacy Policy Page 32 Policy 3-1015 Social Media Non-Covert Investigation Policy E?ective Date." July 3 1, 2015 Applicability: All regular, temporary and volunteer employees References: ORPC 4.2 and 4.3 1. Non-Covert Investigative Use Social media can be a valuable source of information for use in Department of Justice (DOJ) work. Such information can be used to, among other things, identify witnesses, locate witnesses, locate a party, gather information about a party?s employment or assets, obtain admissions for use in litigation, gather information about expert witnesses, and discover evidence of a violation of a law. This policy governs the acquisition and use of public information from social media websites through passive means for any DOJ-related purpose. This policy does not address the acquisition of non-public information from social media sites. - Although it may be legally and ethically permissible to obtain non?public information, such activities should be approached with caution and may only be undertaken with the prior approval of a Division Administrator or designee. - Further, this policy does not address the use, covert' or otherwise, of social media for purposes of criminal investigations by the Criminal Justice Division. This policy also does not address the use of social media sites to disseminate agency?related information to the public. 2. Public vs. Non-Public Information; Passive vs. Active Use Personal pages on social media sites can be opened for viewing by the public or can have access restrictions. This will depend on the privacy settings chosen by each individual social media site user. Information that can be viewed on a social media site by every other user of that site is considered publicly available. Viewing such information does not require interaction with a user and is considered pasSive conduct. in contrast, information on social media sites that can only be viewed with the permission of a user is considered private, or non-public, information. Accessing non-public information is considered active conduct and implicates a number of ethical and legal considerations. Such use is not permitted under this policy. 3. Passive Viewing of Information on Social Media Sites Passive viewing of information on social media sites is permissible for DOJ employees. Authorization requires prior written approval of a supervisor (See paragraph 5 below). This includes social media sites that require logging into the site as a user in order to view other users? information. This policy does not authorize interacting with social media site users for 188 EXHIBIT Page 1 of4 investigative purposes through the use'of ?tweets,? ?friending,? or any other method except as described below in section 4. - . 4. _Messaging- If it is not possible or practical to contact a site user in another way, it is permissible to send a message on a social media site asking the site user to contact an individual or office with DOJ with contact information. Every message sent to a site must clearly explain the reason the DOJ employee is trying to contact the user. However, such contact raises potential ethical considerations. ORPC 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from contacting a social media site user who is represented by counsel. ORPC 4.3 provides that when contacting an unrepresented party a lawyer may not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. In addition, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer?s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. Lastly, ORPC 5.3 provides that a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over a non-lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person?s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. Consequently, these ethical concerns apply to non-lawyers contacting represented parties as well Division of Child Support employees). Therefore, any message to a site user requesting contact information should include a statement making it clear that, if the site user is represented in the matter, the site user should request the site user/party?s attorney to contact the DOJ. 5. Related Policy This policy should be read in conjunction with DOJ Policy 3-101, which authorizes internet access if it is necessary to perform an assignment or if it is related to an activity .that has been approved by DOJ. DOJ Policy provides that work-related use of social media sites such as Myspace or Facebook requires prior written approval ??om a supervisor and the Administrative Services? Information Services Section (IS). Each Division shall establish a process for identifying the employees who will be authorized to access social media sites for DOJ work and enablingthose employees to obtain written authorization using the DOJ Authorization for ini/estigative Use of Social Media form. See Appendix 3-1015. Social media site use authorized by this policy assumes an employee has obtained prior written approval. 6. DOJ Computer Network Security Accessing social media sites while logged onto the DOJ computer network may compromise network security. DOJ employees Who are authorized to access social media sites must do so only from authorized DOJ devices (computers, laptops, smartphones', tablets, etc.) or through remote access into the DOJ network. Accessing DOJ?maintained social media sites accounts or accessing social media sites for DOJ purposes on personal devices without accessing the DOJ network is prohibited. 7. Personal Safety and Con?dentiality Social media sites should only be accessed using DOJ-created social media accounts. DOJ employees should not log into social media sites using perSonal accounts. Use of personal 189 EXHIBIT Page 2 of 4 I- accounts could compromise an employee?s safety because of the potential to reveal personal identifying information. In addition, much of the work of the department involves con?dential and Sensitive matters. Conducting investigative work using personal accounts creates a substantial risk that such information may be improperly disclosed. 8. Use of Information from a User?s Social Media Site Provided by a Party or Third Party It is permissible for attorneys and non-attorney staff to use information obtained independently by third parties from a social media site provided it was legally obtained. The value and admissibility of such information may be questionable if the method of acquisition cannot be veri?ed. The best practice would be to require the party or third party to demonstrate, using a computer, how the information was obtained. 190 EXHIBIT Page 3 of 4 7: 191 EXHIBIT Page 4 of 4 Ellen F. Rosenblum Attorney General FUSION CENTER PROCEDURE Threat Assessments Risk Vulnerability Assessments September 18, 2015 DEFINITIONS: 1. Threat Assessment: Process of identifying or evaluating entities or events'for indications of potential harm to life, property, operations or information. These assessments involve investigative research which results in a written product identifying possible threats to a speci?c person or incident. Examples include Pendleton Round-up, Hillsboro Air Show or Governor?s Inauguration. Threat assessments may be conducted by an individual analyst or team of based on the complexity of the assessment. Risk Vulnerability Assessment: Physical appraisal or process which collects information and assigns values to risks facing an entity, asset, system, network or geographic area. These assessments involve a physical inspection and investigative research for the purpose of evaluating an assets ability to react and recover. from a man-made or natural attack or event. Risk and Vulnerability assessments will be conducted using a team approach and not by a single analyst. ASAC: Refers to the? Assistant Special Agent?in?Charge, assigned by the Oregon Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Division, to manage the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center. Refers to a Research Analyst 3 employed by the Oregon Department of Justice, Criminal Division assigned to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center. OPA: Refers to an Operations and Policy Analyst employed by the Oregon Department of Justice, Criminal Division assigned to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center. OTFC: Refers to the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center. DHS: United States Department of Homeland Security. PCII: Protected Critical Infrastructure Information. EXHIBIT I Page1 of2 9 -.-. an? Frederick Bo: Deputy Attorney Gener PROCEDURES: The ASAC will be given any request for a Threat or Risk Vulnerability Assessment received by the OTFC. The request should include the name and phone number of the requester, and any other pertinent information for review. Once reviewed, the aSsessment will be entered in the ?Assessment Log? by the ASAC and a tracking number will be issued. For a Threat Assessment, the ASAC will assign an and, based on the event, a timeline for completion will be assigned. It will be the reSponsibility of the to reach out to the requester to assist in completing the threat assessment. Once the Threat Assessment is completed it will be given to the ASAC for review. Once approved, the product can go out to the requester. The Threat assessment will be written as an unclassi?ed FOUO document unless speci?ed?otherwise. The document will include the following sections: Historical Information (date, time, loCation etc.) Key Judgements Potential Threats Summary Recommendations - Other sections as deemed apprOpriate (See appendix A for ?go I . For a-Risk Vulnerability Assessment, the ASAC will assign an as the team leader for this event. The team leader will contact the asset manager and determine a date/time for the physical assessment. The team leader will evaluate the number of personnel needed and these personnel will be assigned by the ASAC. The written product will be the responsibility of the team leader and will be approved by the ASAC prior to distribution. Once the date/time for the physical assessment has been established, a timeline for completion will be given. This timeline will include date for a draft of the written assessment to be completed, date for completion of the project and date for the product to be presented to the asset manager. 0 Risk Vulnerabilities products will be maintained in a locking cabinet in the CIKR area. Any assessment deemed to be PCII will fall under DHS established directives. The format for the Risk Vulnerability assessment will include an executive summary and the Risk and Vulnerability worksheet (See appendix B). EXHIBIT Page 2 of 2 Oregon Fusion Center Policy Regarding First Amendment Protected Events 1. Purpose of policy As articulated in the United States Constitution, one of the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right of persons and groups to peaceably assemble. Persons and groups engaging in First Amendment related activities have the right to: I - 1. Organize and participate in peaceful assemblies, including demonstrations, rallies, parades, marches, picket lines, or other similar gatherings. Conduct assemblies/ gatherings in public places. Express their political, social, or religious views in a peaceful assembly. 4. Freely associate with other persons and collectively eXpress, pursue, promote, and defend common interests. new Furthermore, Oregon law provides that no law enforcement agency may collect or maintain information about the political, religious or social views, associations or activities of any individual, group, association, organization, corporation, business or partnership unless such information directly relates to an investigation of criminal activities, and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the subject ofthe information is or may be involved in criminal conduct. Law enforcement officers, in turn, must ensure the safety of the general public while protecting the privacy and rights of persons practicing their First Amendment right to assemble peacefully. To support of?cers as they ful?ll these responsibilities, the Oregon Center and the Oregon Department of Justice Criminal Intelligence Unit (the Center) provide assessment and situational awareness review of First Amendment protected events. The purpose of this policy is to provide guidelines for the Center so that situational assessment and review of First Amendment protected events are in accordance with federal and Oregon law. II. Information Screening and Review A. The Center may review event information in order to assess the potential impact of the event on public safety. Such information will not be collected or maintained unless in compliance with ORS 181.575. The Center shall only review event information from the following sources: 1. Event permit requests filed with a government body. 2. The media. Approved by DET April 2012 - Page 1 EXHIBIT Page 1 of 4 3. Information published in any publicly accessible forum by event organizers or participants. 4. Direct statements made by event organizers or participants to any law enforcement of?cers or the CIU. 5. Investigations if the subject of the investigation Satis?es ORS 181.575. B. A review of information from the above listed sources does not constitute information ?collection? under ORS 181.575. N0 criminal intelligence ?le shall be created with such information and no storage or maintenance of the information reviewed shall occur unless in compliance with ORS 181.575, the Center?s Privacy Policy, and all other applicable Oregon and federal law. C. Information reviewed for this purpose must ?rst satisfy the Information Input requirements of OAR 137?090?0090 and the Oregon Center Privacy Policy 4.1 (1) which requires the CIU to ?rst determine if the information to be reviewed is relevant, reliable and valid and relates to a possible threat to public safety or the enforcement of the criminal law. D. Information reviewed shall be purged from all Center systems within 30 days unless the information warrants being maintained pursuant to ORS 181.575. Obtaining Information Permissible Means of obtaining information 1. - The Center may communicate openly and directly with any person involved in a public gathering regarding the number of persons expected to participate and similar information regarding the time, place, route, and manner of a public gathering and review documents submitted for such purpose, such as parade permit applications. 2. The Center may review publicly accessible information posted or published by the event organizers, sponsor organizations, or self?admitted participants. 3. The Center may review publically accessible media articles about the event, event organizers or participants. 4. The Center may collect any information, including from investigations, about a person or group who have indicated an intention to attend who are known to be or reasonably suspected of engaging in violence or other unlawful acts in order to determine Whether they are inciting or planning violence or other unlawful activities at this event. Information collected for this purpose must be accompanied by a statement which speci?cally articulates the unlawful activity related to the person or group and the speci?c basis of suspicion of violence or criminal activity. 7 . . Approved by DET April 2012 . Page 2 EXHIBIT Page 2 of 4 IV. Prohibited Conduct Relating to First Amendment Protected Events 1. Investigating and collecting, maintaining, using, or sharing information regarding persons or groups solely because they are involved in constitutionally protected activity. 2. Investigating and collecting, maintaining, using, or sharing information regarding persons or groups solely because of the content of their speech. 3. Investigating and collecting, maintaining, using, or sharing information regarding persons or groups? exercise of their First Amendment rights for a purpose unrelated to the event. 4. Instructing the debrie?ng of or questioning witnesses, event participants, or arrestees regarding their social, political, or'religious views unless speci?cally related to criminal conduct and then only as necessary to achieve the clearly stated objective of protecting the public or law enforcement personnel. Sharing Information Information reviewed under this section may be shared as situational awareness for law enforcement to aid them in their public safety duties as set forth in this policy. No criminal intelligence information may be shared unless such information otherwise meets the requirements of The Center?s Privacy Policy for information sharing (Section7), as well as all applicable Oregon and Federal law. B. All Center Bulletins and Situational Awareness publications shall n_ot be disseminated until reviewed and approved by one of the following: the Center?s legal adviser; DOJ CJD Chief Counsel; or DOJ Deputy Chief Counsel. C. Once a review of the relevant information is complete, The Center shall determine whether it should provide its ?ndings to agencies outside The Center. This determination should be based on a criminal predicate (pursuant to ORS 181.575) or other law enforcement purpose to justify sharing of information, including: 1. The size of the event (is it multijurisdictional). 2. Reasonable law enforcement purpose related to persons 0r groups associated with the event planning to engage in criminal activity in connection with the event or who have engaged in criminal activity during past events. 3. Whether the event will also take place in another jurisdiction. 4. Public safety impact on roads, hospitals or law enforcement resources. 5. A reasonable likelihood of violence between event participants and law enforcement, other citizens or other groups likely to be present near the event. VI. Required Warnings and Reminders Bulletin Contents Situational Awareness bulletins shall also contain the following reminders to law enforcement: 1. That the purpose of the Situational Awareness bulletin is the aid lawenforcement in the protecting of life and property. Approved by DET April 2012 Page 3 EXHIBIT Page 3 of 4 2. That Officers responding to First Amendment Protected events should ensure that all privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections are upheld in the performance of their duties. 3. That of?cers responding to First Amendment Protected events should practice fair and impartial enforcement of laws, statutes, and ordinances. VII. Information Collection, and Maintenance Information shall not be collected, maintained, stored or entered into a criminal . intelligence ?le unless it meets all the requirements of ORS 181.575, the Center?s Privacy Policy and all applicable Oregon and federal law. - i . Approved by DET April 2012 Page 4 EXHIBIT Page 4 of4 ELLEN F. R0 SENBLUM Attorney General FREDERICK M. BOSS Deputy Attorney General DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION 10/01/2015 Memorandum To: Dave Kirby, SAC Memorandum From: Special Agent Reference: Possible threats towards law enforcement by DOJ employee Sir, On September 30, 2015, at approximately 7:00 am, I was utilizing a demo program entitled, ?Digital Stakeout? during a product test period. This program takes user inputted keywords and searches multiple open source social media sites. Due to increased threats towards law enforcement, I used a hashtag search for, ?fuckthepolice,? and ?blacklivesmatter,? which are keywords and hashtags known for posting threats towards law enforcement. I narrowed the search by using ?Salem, Oregon? as a '1ocation.' I have also used search terms such as, ?White power,? and, ?Hells Angels? during my initial use of the program. I received numerous returns, and clicked on a feature entitled, ?Collage? which shows pictures posted to social media based on my search terms. - Scrolling through the returns, 1' observed numerous anti police posts and pictures posted by the same user on Twitter. Following the-link for the user, I was taken to an unprotected TWitter account. An unprotected Twitter account allows all postings to be viewed by any person with internet access. The account name was ?Erious ., Jr,? with a Twitter handle of - ?@EriousEsq.? I believe, based upon my o'bservatiOn of the account, the owner and poster of Tweets to this account is an attorney within the Oregon Department of Justice. The attached is a printed copy of the contents on the open Twitter account. They are for your review, and they can also be viewed on the Twitter website. Feel free to contact me with any further questions you may have. Criminal Investigator Oregon Department of Justice EXHIBIT 1162 Court St. NE, Salem, Oregon 97301 Telephone: (503)378?6347 Fax: (503) 378-1936 Page 1 of 28 About Home TWEETS FOLLOWING 590 58 Erious J., Jr. @ErlousEsq Strictiy an Observer 9 Salem. OR Joined June 2012 New to Twitter? Sign up now to get your own personalized limeline! Sign up You may also like . Relresh a: @TrueNkenge Rukalyah @RukaiyahAdams . Driving While Black @Su2824. Mariann Hyland @HylandMariann Trends #TravelForGood Promoted by Travelocity #PodcastDay Kim Davis #RuinAnAnimatedMovIe #TheLIsl #WakeUpTris Music To Watch Boys 1theeksary Tony Stewart IOS 9.0.2 Ogden-a Search FOLLOWERS 58 FAVORITES - 2 Have an account? Log In Follow EXHIBIT Page 2 of 28 Search Have an account? Log Inv Home About . I .0. Tweets Tweets repttes Photos wdeos Erious J., Jr. @ErlousEsq - Sep 26 . . It takes a nation of millions..#BMAInItiative @ulpdx #blacklivesmatter 4-. 1.11 a u. Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Sep 26 The Leaders of tomorrow? The BIack Male Achievement initiative's Summer Youth Experience..#BMAInitiative #de @ulpdx Erious J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Sep 17 If I was old. they'd probably be a friend to me. But since I'm young, they consider me the enemy: #IStandWithAhmed w- I 1 1 Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Aug 25 YOU ONE BLACK PERSON EITHER WORKING OR PATRONIZI NG THE PLACE. #pdx? EXHIBIT Page 3 of 28 Home About 4w 1.1 'k Erlous J., Jr. @EinUSEsq Aug 24 J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Aug 11 iVIy boo, President a CEO. doing her thingil #ulpdx @ulpdx @truenekenge #mealsonwheels #portland t1 1 on "7-3 Erious J., Jr. @En?ousEsq - Aug 1 ?1 Fight the power #travonmartin #saveourcities #blacklivesmatter #alivewhileblack EXHIBIT Page 4 of 28 3 Home About 4? 1 0.0 Erious @EriousEsq - Jul 31 #SaveOurCities at the 2015 @NatUrbanLeague Annual Conferencel "my 4? 2 on Erious J., Jr. @ErlousEsq --Ju129 - A Queen on yet another throne..@TrueNkenge #SaveOurCities . .. w. .v r: i {a 1 to. Erious J.. Jr. @ErlousEsq - Jul 29 My Pres. of the in #SaveOurCities rand . FORT unfun- sown umuo wel?omef 4" 1.1 ?k 1 u- Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jul 29 At the Leadership Luncheon #SaveOurCities @TrueNkenge EXHIBIT Page 5 of 28 Home About 45 1.11 *2 I I Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jul 23 In ?a nutsheli#b1acklivesmatter #alivewhileblack #growingupblack .rm-wa . an .022. t1 18 13 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jun 24 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq Jun 24 "i I I EXHIBIT Page 6 of 28 ?walla-:2 Home About gw'f?, arch Twitter Have an account? Log inv 1 Ertous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Jun 24 Dont mind call ?rst..#germanshepherd #watchdog i. on Erious J.. Jr. @EriousEsq Jun 24 Save the world or not. yard work still gotta get done ?5 1 Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jun 24 Urban League SWEETI EXHIBIT Page 7 of 28 'i 2 I I I Home About Search Twitter 0, Have an account? Log In - Erl?u?s?J" Jr. @ErIOusEsq - Jun 24 .1 My of the mountain #germanshepherd 4-. 1.1 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jun 22 Gangster by association. ..American that is. Won my trial later that 4-. 1.1 Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Apr 16 Sharon Gary Smith Inspiring the masses at Legacy Luncheon. #spreadiegacy ?h 1.1 1 1 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Apr 14 A proud Blackman and the proud Blackman that raised him. #bIackfathers #Biackman #blackfatherhood i iga?jau?' EXHIBIT Page 8 of 28 Home About 3 1 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Apr 12 #alivewhilebla ck #blacklivesmatter #ferguson #polioebrutality #wa Iterscotl ?Hwy.? 9am"- Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Apr 3 #blacklivesmatter #alivewhileblack #dwb @chrisrock have any idea how block you were driVing? on Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Apr 3 @Chrisro?ck #blacklivesmatter #alivewhilebiack -- - ?rr?s arm-it? We Ema-muss . M19 rm; 51:chva . ?i oo- "Z?i E?rlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Mar 27 EXHIBIT Page 9 of 28 ter 1 am am RONROCKS sec 207 3 Home About row-E! seats 7 galarcco??mesge m9? a1" ave an account? 09 In t1 1 'k Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Mar 27 BOOM Love sending the out first? no "'fj'f Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Mar 27 Cant have a BOOM without FirelErious J.. Jr. @E?ousEsq - Mar 27 Now that was a SICK .. - EXHIBIT Page 10 of 28 Home About 6 t1 I. Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Mar 27 Wanted a team to root as well be the ?5 oo- Erious J., Jr. @ErlousEsq Mar 21 . Im #SalemOr #homestead 5-. a i- 1 '5?ng Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Mar 21 But can your wife do this? #SalemOr #homestead Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Mar 15 Look at my Brownie it! #did #salemor EXHIBIT Page 11 of 28 Home About t1 no Why be Green. Its hard enough being Black. #alivewhilebiack 5-.. ??wa?m?fg? In}. '1 V- I avinjs-Al?xmm?i-isi" A HEWIOIREEK L?a?r'rea MAT House pa r; i Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq ?Mar11 Mrs. Harmon Johnson rocking her FAMUnlque IS it @TrueNkenge a {if} Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Feb 7 Get itl? #blackhistorymonth #blacklivesmatter #alivewmleblack 13531351 EXHIBIT Page 12'of 28 Home About .Search ijtlar am" Have a?ccount? Log in 4r Ertous J., Jr. @EriousEsq Feb 7 - #blackhistorymonth #blacklivesmatter #alivewhileblack 1m 6 13 1o 8 no Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Fab 7 I #blacklivesmatter #alivewhileblack #blackhistorymonth mm?) 4-. 1 Erlous J., Jr. @E?ousEsq - Feb 7 #blacklivesmatter #alivewhileblack #blackhistorymonth a I Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Feb 7 i #blackhistorymonth #blacklivesmatter #alivewhileblack 'p scrim .. . .4 mum so marr- Ama couw nun if cum RAN I??li? ?g so THAT we: ALL cm m. EXHIBIT Page 13 of 28 Home About ww?lanncom ?mam-mm ClInlr In vlaw Lamar nrlninr f?nndlu nf cannon 4? 1L1 0-- Erlous 3., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jan 19 I3: . In order to form a more perfect History belongs to the 3 #MartInLutherKingDay #alivewhileblack Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq Jan 19 - All in 29ether now..#MartinLutherKIngDay #aIIvewhilebIack #BlackLivesMatter EXHIBIT Page 14 of 28 3 Home About Have an account? Log inv ?3 Search Twner Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jan 19 Some things witl never change..#blacklivesmatter #Mar?tinLutherKingDay #alivewhiieblack :31, I . i 844, I HAVE 7 A g9! 4?41? 4-1 1.1 'k Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq -Jan 19 Consider 4:18 PM - 19 Jan 2015 - Details 1.1 i Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Jan 1 - - Heres to change. hope and evolution. HAPPY NEW #blacklivesmatter #rac?sminamerica mus Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 26 1 EXHIBIT Page 15 of 28 ?ome About lfits oodfortI-e a 'e [1.36 ualzt ISIIV ma er 9 I Sgarch Twitter a! ei-fave 3 account? Log inv Erlous J., Jr. @Eriousan Dec 25 Merry Christmas y?all. .. 4" t1 I gffz? Erious J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 23 #educatlon #employment4all #blacklivesmatter #blackness vim M. ?rm 1 6 on. Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 23 #blacklivesmatter #alivewhiieblack #education #equality4all 6 t1? 1 no Erious J., Jr. @En?ousEsq - Dec 23 Who says aint bout the holidays? EXHIBIT Page 16 of 28 Home About Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 23 My grandma. Hope it runs in the family. 4? nu Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 23 . i A brief history of education and civil rights in Farmville. Va. #civilrights #alivewhileblack #Equality4All ?5 oo- Erious J., Jr. @ErlousEsq - Dec 23 First stop. Farmville. Va. #civilrights EXHIBIT Page 17 of 28 Home About If}; Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 23 No words for this one.. *5 no. "if; Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq Dec 23 Give us free.. a 1 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq Dec 23 Never thought I'd see 21. Look I'm grown . ?g {a 1 oo- Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 22 . You gotta read the label..if you dont, you might get poisoned. #blacklivesmatter #alivewhileblack #blackness EXHIBIT Page 18 of 28 Home About on "If Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 22 _j we?! #blackness #civilrights .312 ?1017 suck MEDIA \Nc. THE WEARY ?m CKET Erlous J., Jr. @ErlousEsq Dec 21' EXHIBIT Page 19 of 28 - The onl Jet wr?rih tweetin I #n ts Home About JSearch Twine? we {a 1'3 coo ?5 oo- 5:37 PM - 18 Dec 2014 - Details 4-. Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq Dec 15 #blacklivesmatter #alivewhilebiack Wm? maximum 5 ,1 . V. . EXHIBIT Page 20 of 28 Home About Have an account? Log inv f. 2 1 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 14 Mountaintops anyone? #Af?rmativeAction #AIiveWhileBlack #BIackLivesMa?der #blackness mm" 4 ?ush: - \l 1:55 PM - 14 Dec 2014 - Details {5 I on Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq Dec 14 Never tooked at it this way. #Af?rmativeAction #blackne'ss #AliveWhileBIack #AliveWhileBlack IN A man: THAT Remus 9: Howard I NE men WHITE MEN. wm. HELP NEE rm? 5- mm HIBIT Page 21 of 28 Home About - i . itler .. Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 14 1" This one is for nostalgia's sake. _#BlackLivesMatter #racism #Iynching #AliveWhileBlaok l. :nunlmq Rou're aozog'mtb because W613. - af?n?r gee? Hera qou 6134th c, ?17 (are, ta FAA. . ?In Erious J.l Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 14 .1 may of us have them #racism L1 mam- Erlous J.. Jr. @ErlousEsq - Dec 14 ifA equais B. And equalsC. A MUST equal C. #BlackLivesMatter #AIiveWhiIeBlack #noindictment #PoliceBrutality Ul?yh Um? . a: dl??ewz?ve 4? 2 3 u. Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 13 Get it?l #alivewhileblack #biacklivesmatter In sauna Rum I I I I 3! EXHIBIT Page 22 of 28 Home About ?9 cm I . I Have an amf Int? Log .omwn sienna t1 Erlqus J., Jr. @EriousEsq Dec 13 . Watching my boss, AG Ellen Rosenblum. rally lhr- Dems! 4a Erious J., Jr. @En?ousEsq - Dec 13 My Sensei addressing the troops before feeding the homeless in Salem. #Eivegenerously 1-. *l Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 11 #schoolproblems #discipline #prisonpipeline #AliveWhileBlack #BlackLivesMatter -u .wn - - may 34mm" . - EXHIBIT Page 23 of 28 Home About Q. 1 no Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 11 #AliveWhiieBlack #education #PrisonReform #educolor #prisonpipeline t1 4 2 Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 11 Portland ls over the rainbow]! 6 t1 1 Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 10 One of the reasons I Iove The Punish?r: He's down with the Brownl #Superhero #nerdsrule #Marvel a EXHIBIT Page 24 of 28 Home About #noi ndictment??kgait?'iuriezg #Trayvchartin Mme-W. #E?ricGarner #i 'icha IBrown . a q-lave an account? Log feBIack #BIackleesMatter ?5 t1 4' i 2 if Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 9 #TamirRice #AliveWhileBlack #BlackLivesMatter ?5 1 000 "1?3 Erious J., Jr. @E?ousEsq - Dec 9 #TamirRice #AIiveWhiIeBlack #BIackLivesMatter 4w 2.1 Erious J., - Dec 3 Just so ya'll know. We are Top Ten Black Superheroes: youtu.belnwAkaZsK28 via @YouTube EXHIBIT Page 25 of 28 Home About Search Have an account? Log ?h 1.1 it - Erlous J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 8 Gone but not forgotten. #AliveWhileBIack #BlackLivesMatter #EricGarner #trayvonmartin #noindictment ?32; Erlous J., Jr. @ErlousEsq Dec 8 Post Apocaiypticism at its ?nest! Mad Max: Fury Road - Comic?Con First Look via @YouTube loo "4 Erlous J., Jr. @ErlousEsq - Dec 8 @OrangemanMaIZQ: is what chicken and dumplings looks iike playa. EXIBIT Page 26 of 28 3 Home About 4-5 t1 ou Erious J., Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 8 #EricGarner #MichaelBrown #AIiveWhiieBlack #RacismlnAmerica ?mg-r. .3 . ?ip Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 7 - #RacismlnAmerica #NativeLivesMatter #Redskins 4? 1.14 Erious J., Jr. @E?ousEsq - Dec 7 a The calm before the storm. 4-5 1 oo- Erlous J.. Jr. @EriousEsq - Dec 4 #MikeBrown #FergusonDecision #NoJusticeNoPeace #Nolndictment yvn? I IVV I 5 EXHIBIT Page 27 of 28 Home About Search .I I. Q?QHave an account? Log inv ll: f: Erious J., Jr. @ErieusEsq - bed 4 For my fellow geeks Erlous?J., Jr. @ErlousEsq - Dec 4 While on the theme of Erlous J., Jr. - Dec 4 . Hey..we do have a black president though. EXHIBIT Page 28 of 28 Walker, Carolyn From: Kirby David Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 9:49 PM To: Tweedt Darin Subject: FW: Erious Johnson Follow Up Flag: Foliow up Flag Status: Flagged Here's the string From: Tweedt Darin Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2015 3:57 PM To: Tuttle Stephanie Cc: Kirby David Subject: Re: Erious Johnson Thanks. Sent from a mobile device. On Oct 8, 2015, at 12:21 PM, Tuttle Stephanie wrote: Darin, i put it on your chair. Stephanie I. Tattle Gifegozt of Justice 503.378.6347 From: Tweedt Darin Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2015 2:38 PM 0: Kirby David Cc: Tuttle Stephanie Subject: Re: Erious Johnson Thanks. I'll review next week. That posting was the logo for the rap group Public Enemy. Sent from a mobile device. On Oct 8, 2015, at 11:20 AM, Kirby David wrote: Hello to you most of the information is benign, but the one that bothers me is his post on January 19th where there is a police officer in rifle scope crosshairs with the caption and he says ?Consider yourselves EXHIBIT 1 Page 1 of2 The packet was too big to send Steph, I'm gonna put it in your office and then have you pass it along to Darin as I?m out of the office David Kirby Special Agent in Charge Criminal Justice Division Oregon Department of: i'usizice 2250 Sf. SR, Ste. 1200 503.378.6347 EXHIBIT Page 2 of 2 Walker, Carolyn From: McIntosh Steven Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 11:24 AM To: Cc: Tweedt Darin Subject: Social Media Monitoring Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: . Flagged Effectively immediately all employees are to cease using any social media monitoring tool, and do not delete any saved searches off of your computer or software until further notice. Steven McIntosh Assistant Special .Agen him-Cl": Oregon Department of: justicel Criminal Justice Division 2250 .MZcGilchrist St. Suite 100 Salem, OR 97302 Office: 503?~934?2034 EXHIBIT 1 Page 1 of1 Walker, Carolyn From: Kirby David Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 1:50 PM To: Umscheid Lisa Subject: FW: Social Media Tool Search Terms. Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Flagged From: McIntosh Steven Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 3:47 PM To: Tweedt Darin Kirby David; Tuttle Stephanie Cc: 'McIntosh Steven' Subject: Social Media Tool Search Terms. Below is the response from my peeps regarding search terms used in the Social Media Monitoring too]. These are not all, but the ones that could be remembered. Search Terms: 0mg, mongolsmc, gjmc, blacklivesmatter, blackbloc, neonazi, whitesupremecy, whitepride, iSlL, uccshooting, ucc, odoj, bomb, shoot, sickofschooi, ymca, oregonstatecapital, salem government offices, mongolsnw, outlawsmc, Deckeniou, Free souls, Freesouismc, Hells Angels, oregonha, support81, lafferty, iulie senn, roadbrothersmc, roadbrotherssalem, vrooman,-nla, ?marion county courthouse, marion county jail, threepercenters, blm, Tango Blast, anonymous, Coosbayschoois, Sprague, Salem schools, Judsonms, SSHS, BCS, Crosslerms, CHS, CentraiHS, Umpqua Shooting. Steven McIntosh Assistant Special, Age-3n thiganharge Oregon Department of justicel Justice Division 2250 St. Suite '100 Salem, OR 97302 CHiifice: EXHIBIT 1 Page 1 of1 Walker, Carolyn From: Sent: Thursday, December 17, 2015 2:43 PM To: Walker, Carolyn Cc: Ederer Joseph Subject: Investigation Ms. Walker, you asked in my interview on 12/15/15 if! had ever searched #blacklivesmatter. I did not think that I had and answered no at the time. There was another hash tag that was circulating amongst fusion centers around the end of the summer, beginning of Sept. That hashtag was Unfortunately, I didn?t realize that that hashtag was linked with #blacklivesmatter. At the time, the hashtag was believed to be a threat to law enforcement and the general public. This information went out from the fusion center on 9/10/15. I know that September was only three months ago, but i distribute a lot of information which makes it hard to remember. Please let me know if you have any questions. Criminal Intelligence Analyst Oregon Department of Justice i Criminal Division Oregon TITAN Fusion Center 2250 McGilchrist St SE, Ste. 100 Salem, OR 97302 This e-mail may contain information that is privileged, con?dential, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the addressee or it appears from the context or otherwise that you have received this e?mail in error, please advise me immediately by reply e?mail, keep the contents con?dential, and immediately delete the message and any attachments from your system. 1 EXHIBIT Page 1 of4 - Walker, Carolyn Sent: Thursday, December 17, 2015 3:54 PM To: Walker, Carolyn Subject: more information iVis. Walker, this is what went out to our LE recipients on 9/10/15 from our office. Our non-sworn recipients received a shorter, redacted version. Ihope to hear from you soon. 1 EXHIBIT Page 2 of4 Criminal Intelligence Analyst Oregon Department of Justice I Criminal Division Oregon TITAN Fusion Center 2250 McOilchrist St SE, Ste. 100 Salem OR 97302 CONFIDENTIALITY This e-mail may contain information that is privileged, con?dential, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the addressee or it appears from the context or otherwise that you have received this e?mail in error, please advise me immediately by reply e-mail, keep the contents con?dential, and EXHIBIT 2 Page 3 of 4 immediately delete the message and any attachments from your system. EXHIBIT Page 4 of4 Public Enemy Reveal Origins of Name, Crosshairs Logo Rolling Stone Page 1 of4 Public Enemy Reveal Origins of Name, Crosshairs Logo The group also teamed with eyewear company Arnette for some specially branded shades BY KORY GROW August 18, 2014 ?f Share Tweet 8+ Share Cemment Email Flavor Flavor Flav of Public Enemy in New Orleans, LA, on April 25, 2014. Tim images Sunglasses company Arnette Eyewear, which has previously made branded shades for metal thrashers Slayer and hardcore legends Bad Brains, recently hooked up with a musical group known more for revolution than fashion: Public Enemy. Beginning Monday, the company is offering a limited~edition Public Enemy Collection as part of its ?Uncommon Projects? initiative. The glasses play off Arnette?s Witch Doctor frames and feature interchangeable arms in black and white, Sporting the group?s logo, as EXHIBIT Page 1 of4 4/6/2016 Public Enemy Reveal Origins of Name, Crosshairs Logo Rolling Stone Page 2 of 4 well as a micro-fiber cloth that also features the group?s logo. like to wear SIDEBAR sunglasses, but I don?t like to wear sunglasses at performances,? the group?s Chuck says. Hour of Chaos: "We decided to The 3351: Of do this because Publlc Enemy? we were tired of not having things for people. We?re not going to go do some lucrative vodka shit, where it?s the rapper goes big and has his own vodka. I can?t do that. I?m not part of that one. But I hope these do well.? Public Enemy Arnette Eyewear (liourtesy oi" Arne-tie ?i?yewear Since the frames feature both Public Enemy? name and their logo a man in the crosshairs of a gun sight that'lthe group constructed in 1986 Chuck explained their signi?cance to Rolling Stone. ?The crosshairs logo symbolized the black man in America,? he says. lot of people thought it was a EXHIBIT Page 2 of 4 sshairs-l. .. 4/6/2016 Public Enemy Reveal Origins of Name, Crosshairs Logo Rolling Stone Page 3 of 4 state trooper because of the hatthe ones that Run-- DMC wore. The B-Boy stance and the silhouette was more like the black man on the target.? Eeltow 1986 the construction of the logo, magic markers -white out copy machine -Exacto knife ..no computer or Photoshop 8:21 PM 2 Aug 2014 2,828 2,883 . The group?s name has more historical origins. "The United States Constitution once considered black people to be three??fths of a human being,? Chuck says. "If this is a public document, obviously we must be the enemy, so that?s where the name Public Enemy came from.? Earlier this year, Public Enemy celebrated the 25th anniversary of their song "Fight the Power,? which played heavily in the Spike Lee movie Do the Right 77ng where it got repeat EXHIBIT Page 3 of 4 .. 4/6/2016 Public Enemy Reveal Origins of Name, Crosshairs Logo Rolling Stone Page 4 of 4 plays. feel like Pete Seeger singing ?We Shall Overcome,? [when we perform Chuck told this past June. ?Fight the Power? points to the legacy of the of standing up in music.? (Lirmrtesy Amette .lijrl'yciewesr Share "i'weet Share Comment {Email Topics: Public Enemy Logo EXHIBIT Page 4 of4 4/6/2016 Walker, Carolvn From: McCauley Matthew matthew.mccauley@doj.state.or.us > Monday, November L6, 20L5 4:51- PM Tweedt Darin E FW: 2015 OCINTEL conference J U STIC E-#63 45425 -vl-Intel_Conference_201-5 _H ow_to*Col lect_Protected_lnfo rmation. PPTX; J U STIC E-#63 36446-vI- Sent: To: Subject: Attachments: < OC_INTE L_co nference_notes_fo r_lega l_presentation_201 5. DOCX Follow Up Flag: Flag Status: I taught at the presentation. LE Follow up Flagged conference in March 2015. The power point shows that I did a l-ur Amendment protected Civil Rights From: McCauley Matthew Sent: Monday, March 16, 2015 3:30 PM To: McCauley Matthew Subject: 2015 OC/INTEL conference Matthew R. McCauley Sr. Assrsfant Attorney General Oregon Department of Justice Criminal J ustice Division O rgan ized Cri me Secfion Phone (503) 378-6347 1 EXHIBIT L Page 1 of 77 t J t t I t Key Cuses from 2014 For Detectives ønd Commønd Sluff SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PRIVACY INTERESTS: Defendant does not have a protected privacy interest under Art. I, $ 9, in his bank-account records. State v. Ghim,267 Or App _, _ P3d _ (December 10, 2014) (Washington) (AAG Dave Thompson). Defendant was charged with first-degree theft and aggravated first degree theft based on a real-estate investment scam he ran with his codefendant wife. FIe moved to suppress records obtained by subpoena from banks where he and his wife had accounts. He argued that he had a protected privacy interest in those bank records under Art. I, $ 9, and that, because the subpoena the state used to obtain those records was not the equivalent of a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, the state violated his state constitutional rights. The trial court (Judge Gayle Ann Nachtigal) disagreed, denied the motion to suppress, and admitted those records into evidence altrial. Defendant was convicted as charged. Hstlonal tlty Bonk We¡t Falls" VÅ ÍIó21 Factory Workers Loosl 88S ggl0 E¡rfi Strcûr Wosi frllc, VÅ, gl$31 tHËcKll./G ÀtÇoul{T Date Ending Oate Seginning 000sÊ2f 56û? July l,â000 July 31,2000 Boginning Bslaflc€ S 1,878,S5 Tötsf oêpos¡ts Sâ,s¿8.7û Tolal $9,s71,38 Debits EndingBalancr Dn Chec* 1ü05 ChÊck 1È(}6 Oeposil üheck 16û7 thsck 16Ð8 Chetk 160â Check 1610 0hock t6ll TrËdil M€üìÕ ?9, ?000 ":lune July 5,2û0t July 10, åût0 July 14, 2000 July 15. 2000 July 19, 200t Jrlly 24, e0Þ0 July Êü. 2800 .¡uly 31" Ê00û $?,93ô.CS Drsr AMouHl s s s s s s1,876.{? ?.6$ 25.56 ss,920.85 1rt.87 5sr.0t 300.00 $1,47ü.00 s 150"00 $ 7,85 s1,850,8ß $4.771.7'r $4,653.44 $4,165,44 $3,853.44 $2,378.44 s2,¿U0,44 $ã.¿36.?9 T EXHIBIT L Page 2 of 77 FIeld: AfÏrmed (Sercombe, P.J.). The trial court conectly denied the motion to suppress. l)efendant's privacy rights under Art. I, $ 9, did not extend to the records held by his banks. The Oregon appellate courts have consistently held that, under Art. I, $ 9, an individual does not have protected privacy interest in business records held by a third-party service provider-whether a plrone carrier, an internet provider, or a hospital. See State v. ,lohnson, 340 Or 319,336 (rejecting the defendant's argument that the state needed a warrant, rather than a subpoena, to obtain 'orecords kept by a third party, his cellular telephone provider, respecting his cellular telephone usage"); State v. Delp,2i 8 Or App 17, 20,26-27 (2008) (no constitutionally protected privacy interest in records independently maintained by the defendant's Internet service provider, which containedoothe name, address, telephone number, subscriber number, local and long distance telephone billing records, length of service, and types of service utilized" for the defendant's account); State v. Gonzalez, 120 Or App 249,251 (1993) (no constitutionally protected privacy interest in hospital records that "included the results of defendant's blood alcohol test and a statement by one of the examining physicians... that defèndant 'appeared intoxicated,"' as "[t]he records subpoenaed by the state were owned, made, kept and guarded by the hospital"). http://wwv'.publications.ojcl.state.or.us/ciocs/A 1 52065.pdf SEARCH & SEIZURE-CONSEI{T: Although defendantos roommate had actual authority to consent to a search of their shared bedroom, she did not have actual authority to consent to search a closed container that belonged solely to defendant. qrt cnnsent? State v. Bonilla,267 Or App _, _ P3d _ (December 3, 2014) (Douglas) (AAG Pamela Walsh). A deputy and probation officer went to a home to investigate a report of drug use by a parolee. The address consisted of two houses-a front house and a back house (a freestanding garage). In addition to the parolee, several people lived there, including defendant and her elderly mother. The officers knocked on the door of the front house, and defendant's brother answered; he told them that the parolee was not home, but took them to the back house to talk to the parolee's girlfriend, allowing them to go through a closed storage area to get to the back house. They knocked on the door of the back house, and the parolee's girlfriend answered. While still standing in the storage area, the officers smelled an 'ooverwhelming" odor of marijuana. They told the girlfriend that they were looking for the parolee; she invited them inside. Defendant was sitting in the living room. The officers asked about the marijuana, and the girlfriend said that it was probably coming from defendant's mother in the back bedroom. 'l'he officer asked if he could to go the back bedroomo and the girlfriend said yes and led him 2 EXHIBIT L Page 3 of 77 there. Defendant's mother admitted that she was using marijuana and gave abag of it to the officer. She also consented to the offrcer checking the bedroom for additional drugs. In searching the bedroom with the mother's consent, the offrcer found a wooden box near the bed, and opened it, finding methamphetamine. The offrcer asked the mother if the drugs were hers, and she said that it must belong to her defendant. The officer asked why defendant's belongings would be there, and the mother said that she and defendant shared the bed. The officer then went into the living room to talk to defendant. V/hen the officer asked her where she slept, she said she slept in the bedroom with her mother. The officer then told her that her mother had consented to a search ofthe room and that, during the search, the offlrcer found methamphetamine. Defendant admitted that it was hers. The officer obtained her consent to oosnort tubes" with residue. Defendant conduct a second search of the bedroom, and found moved to suppress, arguing that the officers did not have actual authority to perform the search. The trial court (Judge Ronald Poole) denied the motion. On appeal, defendant argued that (1) defendant's brother did not have actual authority to consent to the officers' entry into the storage area to get to the door of the back house; and (2) defendant's mother lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the box in their shared bedroom. Held: Reversed and remanded (Haselton, C. J.). The trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress. [1] The Court of Appeals did not reach defendant's first argument, because it agreed with her second-that her mother lacked actual authority to consent to the search of the box, even though she had authority to consent to a search of the shared bedroom generally. "Access to joint space and access to personal items within that space are qualitatively distinct. The former does not determine the latter." Nothing in the record indicated that the mother used the wooden box, or that defendant consented to her having access to or using the box. [2] That the officer acted in good faith is immaterial; the state bears the burden of proving actual authority and it presented no evidence to show that the mother used, or had access to, the wooden box. [3] Because there was no valid consent, the warrantless search of the wooden box was unlawful. The daughter's admissions, and the subsequent discovery of the snort tubes, derived from the unlawful search, and therefore should have been suppressed. A153 SEARCH & SEIZURE-PRIVACY INTERESTS: Because defendant does not have a privacy interest protected by Art. I, $ 9o in the electric company's records of the power usage for his residenceso the state did not need a warrant to obtain those records. Stste v. Sparks,267 Or App _, _ P3d _ (November 26,2014) (Lane) (AAG Andrew Lavin). Defendant ran a marijuana operation out of three residences. He lived in one of those residences with his girlfriend and her two young children. The police conducted surveillance and observed activity that was consistent with marijuana manufacturing. A prosecutor issued a grand-jury subpoena to the electric company for the power records for the residences. The records revealed power use consistent with marijuana grows. Using the evidence from the surveillance and from the power records, police obtained and executed search warrants on the residences. Defendant was charged with unlawful manufacture and delivery and with child neglect, ORS 63.547(l)(aXB). He moved to suppress the evidence from the searches, arguing that the state 3 EXHIBIT L Page 4 of 77 unlawfully obtained the power records without a warrant. The trial court (Judge Debra Vogt) denied that motion. At trial, the court denied his motion for judgments of acquittal. And over defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that aooperson has control of a child either by virtue of their relationship to the child or by virtue of the person's ability to control the premises where the child is physically present." A jury found defendant guilty on all charges. ff No Privacy interest in records kept by third party on a defendant's electrical usage. Also relates to cell phone *. bill, internet bill etc... Police can use subpoena. Held: Convictions for drug convictions affirmed (Nakamoto, J.). The trial coutl correctly denied clefendant's motion to suppress and motion for judgments of acquittal. Motion to Suppress: [1] fhe record shows that the power records were "generated and maintained" by athird party for the party's "own, separate, and legitimate business purposes (such as billing)." Accordingly, "we hold here that defendant has failed to establish that he has a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest" in the power records and that, therefore, "the state did not need to get a warrant to obtain those records." [2] Even if defendant is correct that the grand-jury subpoena in this case was procedurally deficient, he was not entitled to suppression of the power records because ORS 136.432 precludes the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for such a statutory violation. [3] Given the evidence from the power records and from the police surveillance, the affidavits in support of the warrants established probable cause for the search of the residences and the searches were therefore lawful. http ://www.publications.oj d.state.or.us/docs/A I 5 03 23.pclf Note:'fhe Court of Appeals did not resolve whether it is improper for a district attorney to use a "grand-jury subpoena" to obtain records when there is not actually an on-going criminal investigation being conducted by the grand jury to which those records may relate. WBAPONS OFFENSES: "Ninja climbing claws" are not "metal knuckleso' for purposes of ORS 166.270(2)o which prohibits felons from owning specified weapons. State v. Behee,267 Or App _, _ P3d _ (November 19, 2014) (Benton) (AAG Erin Galli). Police executing a search warrant at defendant's home to look for evidence of child pornography found (in addition to child pornography) a set of "ninja climbing sl¿1rys"-"¿n elongated, ovalshaped metal band with metal spikes, or claws, on one side; the band fits over the fingers, but does not have separate finger holes. Defendant was charged with felon in possession of a 4 EXHIBIT L Page 5 of 77 restricted weapon, ORS 166.270(2), which prohibits felons from possessing, as relevant here, "metal knuckles." At trial, an officer testified that the claws were like metal knuckles in that they were metal, fit over the knuckle area, and could use them to hit someone and inflict injury. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state failed to establish that the claws were'ometal knuckles" for purposes of the statute. The trial court (Judge Janet Schoenhard Holcomb) denied the motion, reasoning that whether the item constituted "metal knuckles" was a jury question. The jury found defendant guilty. ! Note: The record does not reflect whether defendant is, in fact, a ninja. h. Held: Conviction for felon in possession of restricted weapon reversed; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed (Garrett, J.). The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Climbing claws are not "metal knuckles"; they "have a o'their design is demonstrable purpose that metal knuckles do not"-climbing trees-and inconsistent with the essential characteristic of metal knuckles, which is to enable more powerful punching." Even if the claws could be wom in a manner similar to metal knuckles, "whether an object canbe used for a particular purpose is not the correct inquiry under ORS 166.270(2). http ://www.publications.oi d. state.or.us/docs/A 15 28I3 .pdf SEARCH & SEIZURE-PRIVACY INTERESTS: When police officers obtained possession of a cell phone that belonged to someone other than defendant and they then used that phone to exchange text messages with her to set up a drug deal, that exchange did not violate a constitutionally protected privacy right of hers. Støte v. Carle,266 Or App _, _ P3d _ (October 8,2014) (Marion) (AAG Jake Hogue). Police officers rousted a man sleeping in a stolen truck. They arrested him and searched the truck, finding a cell phone. He told them the phone was not his and instead belonged to "Duane." While the offrcers were processing the incident, a text message popped up on the phone asking, "Do you know anybody that wants a30?" The officer knew that to be a request for drug transaction, and he texted back and forth with the caller and eventually arranged a transaction. At the appointed time, defendant showed up and the officers arrested her. Defendant was charged with conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, and she moved to suppress the text conversation with her that the officers had conducted on Duane's phone. The trial court (Judge Vince Day) 5 EXHIBIT L Page 6 of 77 deriied the motion, ruling that defendant did not have a constitutionally protected interest that was invaded by the ofÍìcers. Defèndant was convicted on stipulated facts. FIeld: Affirmed (Sercombe, J.). The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Il "The police searched a phone that purportedly belonged to "Duane," not defendant. Accordingly, we are not concerned with any privacy interest that defendant had in any digital copies of the sent text messages on her own phone. Nor are we concerned with what privacy interests Duane had with respect to the text messages on his phone. That is because evidence rnay be suppressed only if police invaded the personal rights of the person who seeks suppression;the violation of someone else's rights is not enough." [2] When defendant sent a text message to Duane's phone, she may have expected that police would not see it. But once a copy of the text message arrived on Duane's phone, she lost all ability to control who saw that message. As a result, under Art. I, $ 9, she "had no protected privacy interest in the digital copy of the message that police found on that found." [3] The result is the same under the Fourth Amendment: "The general notion that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in letters or text messages does not compel the conclusion that she has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a copy of a sent text message that is found on the recipient's phone. With respect to letters or goods sent through the mail via the United States Postal Service or a common carrier, courts have held that a sender's reasonable expectation of privacy, to the extent it is based solely upon the fact of his being the sender, terminates once delivery of the goods has been made." http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/clocs/A 1 50975.pdf Note:The court noted that it did not matter, for purposes of analyzing whether defendant's constitutionally protected privacy rights were invaded, whether "Duane" had viewed her text messages: "we find it dispositive that, once the message reached that phone, defendant could not control what Duane or anyone else did with the message." IIURGLARY: Evidence that defendant possessed a device consisting of a handle attached to a spark plug that is commonly used for breaking car windows, and that he knew that such a thing is used for that purpose, was not sufficient to support conviction for possessing a burglary tool, ORS 164.23s(r). State v. Cook,265 Or App _, _ P3d _ (September 17 ,2014) (Multnomah) (AAG Peenesh Shah). Defendant, a transient, was found in possession of a device that consisted of multiple spark plugs attached to handle, which is a tool commonly used for breaking car windows. FIe was charged with possessing a burglary tool, ORS 164.235(l), based on an allegation that he possessed it "with intent to use it to commit and facilitate a theft by physical taking." At trial, the evidence also showed that he knew that the device had an illegal purpose and that he associated with "car prowlers." The case was tried to the court, and defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove his intent to use the tool for car theI1. 'fhe trial court (Judge Leslie Roberts) denied the motion, and found him guilty. 6 EXHIBIT L Page 7 of 77 lf you Google "spark plug used to break window" this is what you get, Sooo..... Íleld: Reversed (Hadlock, J.). The trial court should have granted defendant's motion for acquittal. [] Because "intent" means that "a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described," ORS 161.085(7), a factfinder may find a defendant guilty of the charged crime only if the state proved both that (l) he possessed a burglary tool or theft device, and (2) he had the conscious objective to use the burglary tool or theft device to commit or facilitate a theft by a physical taking. [2] A person's knowledge that an item may be put to unlawful use is not sufficient to establish that he intended to use it in that manner. An unlawful intent cannot be inferred from lack of legitimate uses for a particular burglary tool. fherefore, the evidence was not legally sufficient to prove that defendant had the unlawful intent that is an element of the charged offense. htttr ://www.publ ications.oj d.state.or.us/docs/A I 52843.pdf Notes: fal The coufi noted that "the record does not reflect that defendant obtained the spark plugs in a way that, by itself, suggested he intended to use them to commit a crime. Nor does the record reflect that he was located near parked cars when the officer encountered him, that any car prowls or other thefts had just occurred in that area,thal he was engaged in any conversation or activity that suggested he planned to commit a theft, or that he had collaborated with other residents of the transient camp to commit other crimes in the past." [b] Judge Sercombe dissented: "Where, as here, the device that defendant possessed had no plausible use other than to commil theft, the factfinder need not resort to too great an inferential lcap or a'stacking of inferences' to conclude that clefendant intended to use the device to commit theft." INTERFERINGWITH POLICE OFFICBR: Trial court correctly denied def'endant's motion for acquittal on charge of interfering with a police ofIìcer, ORS 162,247, despite his claim that his conducted constituted only "passive rcsistance." State v. Putnesky,265 Or App _, _ P3d _ (September 10, 2014) (Jackson) (AAG Karla Ferrall). A police officer went to defendant's residence to talk with hirn about a hit andrun incident. Defèndant was in his driveway trying to put the doors and top back on a Jeep. When the offrcer tried to get his attention, defendant became "hostile and aggressive" and refused to cooperate. One thing led to another, and the officer ordered him to put down the top he was holding as he approached the officer. When he failed to comply, the ofhcer shot him with a Taser. Another officer arrived on the scene, and they took him into custody despite his resistance. Defendant was charged with interfering with a peace offtcer, ORS 162.247, among other charges. At trial, he argued that his conduct constituted at most "passive resistance" per ORS 162.247(3)(b) and ORS 162.315, and moved for a judgment of accluittal, contending that he was not violent and did not physically resist when he refused to obey lawlul orders by police ollhcers.'fhe trial courl (.ludge f,orenzo Mejia) denied the motion. and defèndant was found guilty. 7 EXHIBIT L Page 8 of 77 Ilelc{: Afñrmed (Ortega. J.). 'l'he lrial court correctly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acc¡uittal. 1l The text, context, and legislative history of ORS 162.247 show that the legislature o'an act intended that the "passivc resistance" exception applies when an individual is engaging in or techniclue of noncooperation that is commonly associated with government protest or civil disobedience." l2l The evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that delèndant was not engaged in passive resistance and that he had committed interfering with a peace officer. http ://www.publications.oi cl.state.or.us/clocs/A 1 4943 3.pdf IIACKBTEERING: The evidence sufficiently established that an organized shoplifting group that committed similar thefts in several Safeway stores in thc same manner, and that stole the same type of merchandise, \ryere an ooenterprise" for purposes of ORICO, OllS 166.720(3). + RICO State v. Vl/alker,356 Or App 4, _ P3d _(2014) (Clatsop) (AAG Pamela Walsh). Defendant and Williams stole "high dollar" items-frozen shrimp, beer, Huggies diapers, and Tide detergent valued at more than $1,000-from the Safeway store in Seaside. Video surveillance obtained from Safèway showed that, on two other occasions about two months earlier, the same two men stole the same types of items from a Safeway store in Sandy. Defendant was charged with or:re count of first-degree theft and one count of racketeering, ORS 166.270(3). At trial, he movecl for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state failed to prove an "enterprise" for purposes of ORS 166.120(3\ The trial court (Judge Philip L. Nelson) denied the motion, and the 8 EXHIBIT L Page 9 of 77 jury found defendant guilty on both counts. On appeal, he reasserted his argument that there was insuffrcient evidence that he was involved in an "enterprise." A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Affirmed (Linder, J.). The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. [] The text and context of the statute at issue, ORS 166.720(3), together with the legislative history of ORICO and decisions under the federal RICO Act, show that the term "enterprise" is expansive and "includes casual and informal associations of individuals in fact, as well as organizations with formal structures." Such an "enterprise" can exist "regardless of whether the association or entity has an existence separate from, and is independent of, its membership or activities. The key is whether the association or entity is engaged in ongoing, coordinated criminal activity." [2] "The relationship between defendant and Williams may oloosely organized'end of the 'associated-in- fact' spectrum. Butnoformal have been at the organization or structure was required. From the multiplicity and distinctive similarity of the thefts that defendant and V/illiams committed, the jury could find that the criminal conduct in which they engaged was based on a plan or design, that it was purposeful and systematic, and that defendant and Williams had an organized relationship of some longevity, even if it was solely for the purpose of carrying out the racketeering activity. In short, this is a case in which the evidence that permitted the jury to find that defendant engaged in a 'pattern of racketeering activity' coalesced to also permit the jury to find that defendant was part of an association-in-fact entity with sufficient purpose, relationship between the parlicipants, and longevity to qualify as an enterprise under ORICO. No formal structure or existence separate from the association's membership was required. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that defendant was associated with an 'enterptise' for the purpose of ORS 166.720(3)." or.us/docs/S060828.odf http //www.publ ications. oi d : Notes: fa] 'l'he particular items that defendant and Williams stole were ones that can be readily sold on the black market. Although the state did not present evidence that they had been selling such items, the Supreme Courl noted that "the nature and volume of the merchandise readily permitted that inference." [b] This case demonstrates that an association-in-fact enterprise can be proven by what the entity does, rather than by an abstract examination of its structure. I{ere, the planning and organizing behind each crime was apparent from the consistent pattern in which defendant and Williams committed the thefts. SEARCH & SEIZURE-SEARCHES PURSUANT TOWARRANT: [1] ThC police lawfully obtained a warrant pursuant to ORS 136.583(1) to obtain, from Yahoo in California, records of defendant's email communications with the victim. [2] The warrant was suffTciently particular for purposes of Art. I' $ 9. GoL)glc State v. Rose,264 Or App _, _ P3d _ (July 2,2014) (Polk) (AAG Doug Petrina). The victim is a 16-year-old girl, and defendant is the stepfather of her friend. After some sexually explicit online communications between them, and at his prompting, she emailed him, in June 2010, two 9 EXHIBIT L Page 10 of 77 topless pictures she had taken of herself. Pursuant to ORS 136.583, the police obtained a search warrant for all email records of the victim and defendant stored by Yahoo!, a California-based company; the warrant was executed in California. The pictures were included among those emails. Delèndant was charged with using a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct, ORS 163.670. Defèndant moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was invalid, because the warrant authorized the search and seizure of items located outside of Oregon and because the warrant was insufficiently particular. The trial court (Judge Fred Avera) denied the motion, and defendant was found guilty. IIeld: Affrrmed Q.Jakamoto, J.). The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. [] Under ORS 136.583(1), criminal process, including a search warrant, may be issued to a recipient regardless of whether the recipient or the items sought are located within Oregon, so long as the criminal matter is triable in Oregon and the exercise ofjurisdiction over the recipient is not inconsistent with the Oregon or federal constitutions. T'he statutory jurisdictional requirement requires the court issuing the warrant to have personal jurisdiction over the recipient, and here that was not disputed. Accordingly, ORS 136.583 authorized the court to issue the out-of-state warrant. [2] Even though the probable cause related to emails in June 2010, the wanant was sufficiently particular for purposes of Art. I, $ 9, because the warrant was limited to a particular location, and the description of the items to be seized left the officers with no discretion in the matter. [3] The "scrupulous exactitude" test that limits searches for material protected by the First Amendment does not apply here, because the warrant sought "material as evidence of a crime, and not for the ideas that it contains." http ://wwrv.publications.ojd. state.or. Lrs/doos/A 1 4763 5.pdf Noles: fa] 'l'he Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, "that defèndant had a protected privacy interest in the emails and electronic files produced under the warrant." [b] The opinion contains an extended discussion of the various provisions in the Stored Communications Act, 18 IJSC $ 2701 er seq. r1 ' l UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SEARCH & SBIZURB-INCIDENT TO ARREST: Searches of digital data on cell phone do not fall within the Fourth Amendment exception for searches incident to arrest, and generally require a warrant. Riley v. California, 573 US _ (June 25,2014). In two unrelated cases, police searched the cell phones of defendants whom they had amested, without warrants, under the search incident- 10 EXHIBIT L Page 11 of 77 to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. In the ftrst case, Riley, police found evidence on defendant's smart phone that defèndant was a member of the Bloods gang, which led to his prosecution for crimes (including attempted murder) committed during a gang shooting a few weeks earlier. In the second case, Wurie, police found evidence on defendant's flip phone that enabled them to identify an apartment associated with suspected drug activity, which they secured while they obtained a drug warrant; the subsequent warrant search turned up evidence that led to defendant being charged with drug and firearms offenses. Both defendants moved to suppress, arguing that the searches of their phones were not valid searches incident to arrest. Held: Reversed and remanded (Roberts, C.J.). [] As a general rule, police must obtain a search warrant to search digital data on a cell phone. The rationales underlying the search incident to arest doctrine as applied to physical objects-the government interests of ensuring the safety of police officers and preventing the destruction of evidence-have little force when applied to the search of digital data on a cell phone. "Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.. . . Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person,"-specifically, their "immense storage capacity" and pervasiveness in modern life. "Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life." [2] "Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone is accordingly simple-get a warrant." But "other case-specific exceptions fthan search incident to arrest] may still justify a warantless search of a particular phone" based on exigency. http://www.supremecourt. gov/opinions/ 1 3pd17 1 3- 1 32-8l9c.pclf SEARCH & SEIZURE-SCHOOL SEARCHES: After receiving information that youth threatened to bring a gun to school and shoot a particular fellow high-school student, school principal's timited search of youth's backpack was reasonable under Article I' section 9. Stnte v. A. J. C.,355 Or 552, _P3d _ (May 30,2014) (Washington) (SG Anna Joyce). Youth is a high-school student. One evening, he called V, a fellow student with whom he had a relationship, and told her that he was going to bring a gun to school to shoot her and other students. The next morning, V reported the threat to her school counselor, who then informed the principal, Smith. Smith was not familiar with V, who was new to the school, but knew youth, who had a history of disciplinary issues. Although he considered the threat to be "outside the realm" of what he thought could happen, he did not believe he could disregard the threat without further information. Smith searched youth's locker, finding no gun. He then went to youth's classroom, where youth was seated at a desk with his backpack under his seat. Smith asked youth to accompany him to his ofTrce, and Smith carried youth's backpack. TI EXHIBIT L Page 12 of 77 lE.- in the principal's office waiting for them were youth's mother and a police officer. Smith informed youth that V had reported that he had threatened to bring a gun to school and shoot her; youth denied making the threat, but admitted that he had a relationship with V. After several minutes, Smith told youth that he had to investigate the threat, and was going to search youth's backpack. Youth did not object or give consent. Smith opened the largest compartment of the backpack first, and found nothing incriminating. He then opened a smaller second compaftment, and found several .45-caliber bullets. In a third compartment, he found a .45-caliber handgun wlapped in a bandana. The police officer then arrested youth, and the state petitioned the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of youth for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute possession of a firearm in a public building, unlawful possession of a firearm, and menacing. Before trial, youth moved to suppress the evidence that Smith found in youth's backpack, arguing that the search violated Art. I, $ 9, because Smith lacked reasonable suspicion, and because the search was not justified under the circumstances. The juvenile court (Judge James Fun) denied the motion, ruling that the search was lawful under the school-safety exception to the warrant requirement, as afticulated in State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. M.A.D.,348 Or 381 (2010). The juvenile courl (Judge James Fun) found youth within its jurisdiction, and youth appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted review. On review, youth abandoned his argument that the principal lacked reasonable suspicion, and argued only that the search of the backpack was unreasonable because any immediate safety risk had dissipated. lletd: Affirmed (Baldwin, J.). The principal's search of youth's backpack was lawful under the school-safety exception. [1] In M.A.D., the Supreme Court held that, although students are entitled to the protections of Art. L, $ 9, those protections "may yield to permit school officials to undertake reasonable protective measures-such as conducting a limited search-in response to credible safety threats in a school setting. . . . If the protective actions taken by a school officialsuch as a limited search-are based on specific and articulable facts, and are reasonable, the school official's conduct does not violate Article I, section 9." l2l In determining "whether a school official's actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, the unique fèatures of the official's responsibilities and the school setting must factor into the assessment," so the analysis is not identical to the one that applies to officer-citizen interactions outside the school setting. [3] "Smith's search of youth's backpack was reasonable under the circumstances present when he conducted the search." Smith knew that the threat was more than a generalized safety threat, and youth's admission that he had a relationship with V strengthened the credibility of the information that Smith had already received. "Taken as a whole, the totality of the information known to Smith was sufficient for him to reasonably suspect that youth possessed a tìrearm for the purpose of shooting one or more students." [4] In addition, "Smith's actions in responding to the threat were particularized to the circumstances known to him." At the time of the search, he did not know what type of gun might be involved, or where it might be; he knew 1.2 EXHIBIT L Page 13 of 77 only that the gun was not in youth's locker. "No matter where the gun was located, whether it was in youth's immediate possession or not, it presented a danger to students. As a result of those factors, the threat of harm to others remained imminent at the time of the search." [5] For those reasons, Smith's "limited search of the parts of youth's backpack that could contain the gun was therefore reasonable." Because the search was limited to compartments that could contain a gun, and because Smith stopped searching once he found the gun, the search was not overly intrusive. "We will not now uncharitably second-guess his actions or demand that he could have performed the least intrusive search that we can conceive with the benefit of hindsight." [6] The court emphasized, however, that "the permissible range of options available to Smith was not unlimited. ... [S]chool officials are not licensed to engaged in an unlimited search of students and their belongings on campus based on generalized threats to safety." httn ://www.nuhl i cati on s.oi cl. state.or.us/docs/S06 I 1 9 1 .nd1' SBARCH & SBIZURE: Seizure of property from defendant's home by employee constitutes "state action" and is invalid under Article I, section 9; because that initial seizure led policc to apply for a warrant to seize additional items from defendant's home, the trial court should have suppressed evidence seized pursuant to that warrant. State v. Sines,263 Or App _, _ P3d _ (June 4,2014) (Deschutes) (AAG Rolf Moan). Two of defendant's employees-a housekeeper and a business assistant-regularly worked in defendant's home; they suspected that he was sexually abusing the victim, his nine-year-old daughter. The housêkeeper reported her suspicions to a DHS worker, telling him that she had seen "dischalge" on the victim's underwear, and asked what authorities might learn from the underwear if she took it from defendant's house. The DHS worker said he could "hook her up" with law enforcement officials who could test the underwear. The housekeeper asked what would happen if she obtained the underwear, and the DHS worker said he "could not tell her to do that," but also noted that "we oan't do anything without physical evidence." That same day, the DHS worker contacted a sheriffls deputy. DHS policy required the "completion of a safety check within 24 hours of a reporl of possible abuse" absent "good cause for a delay." The DHS worker and deputy concluded that there was a "good likelihood that the case was going to get stronger when fthe housekeeper] made [her] decision," and decided to "assign the case as a five day response" instead of responding immediately. They did not tell the housekeeper about DHS's safety-check policy or tell her that the safety check was being delayed. Also that sarne day, the housekeeper reported her conversation with DHS to defendant's business assistant. The assistant was scheduled to work the next day and agreed to seize a pair of the victim's underwear; the next day, she took a pair of the victim's underwear from defendant's laundry room and delivered it to the housekeeper. The housekeeper delivered the underwear to the police the following day; the underwear tested positive for sperm heads. Later that day, police-based on the test results and on information from the housekeeper, defendant's business assistant, and the DFIS worker-obtained a search warrant for defendant's home. They seized additional clothing of the victim's while executing the warrant, and testing revealed sperm heads on those items also. Defendant was charged with several sexual offenses, and he moved to suppress evidence, "including derivative evidence," obtained through the initial warantless search and seizure, and obtained through the testing of the initial pair of underwear. The trial court (Judge Alta Brady) concluded, however, that no o'state action" occurred when defendant's employee seized the initial pair of underwear. It thus denied the motion to suppress. 13 EXHIBIT L Page 14 of 77 Ileld;Reversed (Duncan, J.). The trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. [1] Although no state actor retrieved the underwear from defendant's houseo there was nevertheless "state action" for purposes of Art. I, $ 9 because "the state was sufficiently involved that the seizure of the underwear was state action" because the DHS worker (a) "knew what the fhousekeeper] planned to do and that she was likely to do it," (b) "communicated with [her] about her plans and offered law-enforcement support if she conducted the seizure," and (c) "delayed the safety check to allow [her] to accomplish the planned seizure." Because the seizure involved state action, was conducted without a warrant, and was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement, suppression was required. [2] The error in denying the motion to suppress was not harmless, because the results from the tests of the underwear led police to apply for and obtain the warrant that led to discovery of additional evidence on other clothes fbund in defendant's house. Under State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 (2005), defendant therefore proved that the seizure of the other clothes-although obtained during a warrant search"derived from the seizure of the underwear" by the housekeeper, and the trial court should have suppressed it. .o d.state.or.us/ Note: The Court of Appeals appears to have concluded that the warrant could not authorize the search even assuming that the remaining evidence in the search-warrant affidavit- that is, evidence aside from the sperm heads found on the underwear seized by defendant's employeeprovided probable cause to search defendant's home. SBARCH & SEIZURB-INVENTORY SEARCHES: Marion County post-booking inventory policy that allows offïcers to open all closed containers is unconstitutionally overbroad. Stntev. Cherry,262Or App_,_P3d_(May 5,2014) (Marion) (AAG SusanHowe). An officer arrested defendant for giving false information to a police ofÏcer and took him to jail. 'l'here, a corrections deputy inspected the contents of the pockets of defendant's jacket, discovering stolen checks. An investigation led to defendant being charged with identity theft. I'{e moved to suppress the checks, arguing that the inventory was unlawful. At the hearing, the prosecutor introduced a county policy that instructed corrections officers to, post-booking, open all of an inmate's closed containers to look for proof of identification, cash, valuables, medications, or contraband. The trial court (Judge Joseph Ochoa) denied the motion to suppress. l)efendant entered a conditional plea of guilty. Íleld: Reversed and remanded (Duncan, J.). The trial court should have granted defendant's motion to suppress. [1] The policy provision introduced, if standing on its own, was overbroad, because it authorizes deputies to open all closed containers. The prosecutor did not introduce the county'spre-booking policy provision, which required officers to remove all items from a suspect's pockets prior to booking, and would have provided a sound basis for the officer's actions. [2] The Court of Appeals refused to take judicial notice of the un-introduced policy provision, concluding that the trial record most likely would have developed differently if that policy had been introduced at trial. or.us/docs/A I 48450.odf http ://www. nubl ications.oi d. 1,4 EXHIBIT L Page 15 of 77 SEARCH & SEIZURE-PRIVACY INTERESTS: Officers did not violate either Art. I, $ 9, or the Fourth Amendment by entering defendant's tent, which he had erected unlawfully on a city sidewalk. State v. Teghnd,269 Or App 1, _ P3d _(2015) (Multnomah) (AAG Carson Whitehead). Defendant lived in a temporary tarp structure that he had erected partially on private land and partially on a City of Portland sidewalk, in violation of city code. Officers had previously asked him to remove the structure. Later, officers considered removing the structure and lifted a corner of the tarp. They saw defendant with drugs and drug paraphernalia and arrested him. He was charged with possession of methamphetamine. He moved to suppress, arguing that the officers performed an illegal search under Afi. I, $ 9, and the Fourth Amendment when they lifted the corneÍ of the tarp without a warrant. The trial court (Judge Janice Wilson) denied the motion, and he was found guilty. FIetd: Affirmed (Haselton, J.). tll "Although the fact that the referent space was someone's residence is highly significant, it is notper se dispositive. Rather, the touchstone, for purposes of Article I, section 9, is whether the space is a place that legitimately can be deemed private." [2] Defèndant did not have a right to privacy in his tarp structure protected by Art. i, $ 9, because (a) the structure violated city code; (b) the officers had authority to summarily abate the structure because it obstructed the right of way; and (c) the officers had previously warned him that the structure was illegal. [3] The officers' entry into defendant's tent did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because "a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a temporary structure illegally built on public land, where the person knows that the structure is there without permission and the governmental entity that controls the space has not in some manner acquiesced to the temporary structure." A148797 lica 15 EXHIBIT L Page 16 of 77 EXHIBIT Page 17 of 77 FTISTORY Protecting Civil Liberties AI{D I{OVf While identifying criminols EXHIBIT L Page 18 of 77 PROTECTED INTFÜRMATIOÏ{ ÏS. . . Informqtion relqling fo Areos Protected by the 1't ond 14th Amendments Is[ Amendmenû Congress slurllurake no latv respectirry iur i\; ;ï[çii# ii lffiifr mð:;î*i - fi- ti e¿r'ri, estúlisluucut ol' rcligìon, or prnhitriti ug ' "- thc [nc cncr"cisc thcreof or abridgiug tlrc iaw which shæif fihn'iilj,.::; flccdonl o[spcccl¡ or o[füc press; or ürc the privileges or imrrrriil:' ui;s right of thc pcoplc pcaccably lo asscmbl¡ . i: of pict'nrtccs. *itizens of the Unitcd $tm{iffi$, Fou rteenth Ante ßTd ffi mrd to pctition thc Gorcnrnrcul for rcdrcss ffi il"Ì ; EXHIBIT L Page 19 of 77 LIMTTTI\TG II{FÜR MATTOI\ CO LLECTEÐ BY POLÏCE oRs 181.575: No low enforcement ogency, os defined...,moy collect or mointoin informotion obout the politïcol, religious or sociol views, ossociations or octivities of ony individuol, group, ossociotion, orgonization, corporotion, busÌness or portnership unless such informotion directly relotes to on investigotion of criminol octivities, ond there ore reosonoble grounds to suspect the subject of the informotion is or mov be involved in criminol conduct. EXHIBIT L Page 20 of 77 BREAKIT{G IT " Low l. 2. 3. 4. 5. DOVVT\T enforcement ogencyn'' covers: County Sheriffs City Police Deportments Oregon Stote Police Low enforcement ogencies of other stotes ond Federol low enforcement ogencies EXHIBIT L Page 21 of 77 ffiRH,qKiNil TT'T}Üå,VN lnformolion Relotes to: ,'' Pol¡t¡col u Rel¡gious Views Associotions 'Sociol EXHIBIT L Page 22 of 77 BREAKTI{G TT DOWN Unless.... .! i .c. -{, ¡ Such informotion directly relotes to on investigction of criminol octivities, ond there ore reosonoble grounds to suspect the subject of the informotion ls or moy be involved in criminol conduct. "Reosonoble Grounds'n = Reosonoble Suspicion EXHIBIT L Page 23 of 77 ül\,'3':: i. ,r ,-l r\î_ _f,' ,i. i. î {_T l'î- "i 't; !+3! Cleqrly Not? Cleorly o Crime? f' r EXHIBIT L Page 24 of 77 you wont to know who these people Are? . - .1.) Naif t, 7W Rival: .23 7? ?r . -. EXHIBIT Page 25 of 77 ''SåTHHCFI'' Ü.þ A T}ÜLTTiilAl, VTEW TFTRÜUGH,q P#T-TT'TC,4L, A.ilT'TVIT'V A PETA event - Not reol dead people EXHIBIT L Page 26 of 77 KHASONAIBLE SUSPÏCIOÌ\J AT\J OVERVTEW Reosonoble suspicion meons thot on officer holds o belief thot is reosonoble under the totclity of the circumstonces existing of the time ond ploce the officer octs. be bosed on o subjective belief by the officer thot o crime hos been or will be committed, ond thot subjective belief must be objeclively reosonqble under the lolql¡ty of lhe circumslqnces. Thus, reosonoble suspicion must EXHIBIT L Page 27 of 77 fr-HA$ÜþiABtH 5TJST}T TTÛN Aþd ÜVHRVTHW Be qble lo hqve Specific qnd Articuloble focls to supporl your belief. DETÂILS NEED TO BE SHOWING YOU NOTTETTING YOU ': ,i: :il,jr¡ijid;ü"i ,, ¡",. j*:*f,¡h- ,r,.. ., EXHIBIT L Page 28 of 77 CR.TMES AI'.ID ORGAT{TZATTOT{S ' ' C onsplrocy = ogreement ,:: Aìd ond Abet CAUTION ,i Focilitote Conspiracy Theory Ahead EXHIBIT L Page 29 of 77 TYPES OF CRTME Any crime will do but look for... Trespossing Criminol mischief Disorderly Conduct Horossment Tox Crimes RICO Explosives Weopons offenses, ond... EXHIBIT L Page 30 of 77 WFTAT'S RTCO? (1 ()F IWAYS) It is unlowful for ony person ossocioted with on enterprise to conduct or pqrticipole directly or indirectly in the enterprise through o pottern of rqcketeering octivity i lt is unlowful for ony person to conspire lo commil ony form of rocketeering. o Closs A Felony with 20 yeor oo pnson moxlmum This is EXHIBIT L Page 31 of 77 WTRË F{TS POLTTåCAL VTElfuS üOOD TÜ KT\JTW? !,ü' How would you link information you had about his politics to reasonable suspicion of a crime? Timothy McVeigh City Bombing - Oklohomo EXHIBIT L Page 32 of 77 \,VF{AT- I}CIË;S TþTTS ÐäTJTCT? A socia group or a crimina org anization? What information on these guys can you collect and keep ¡f any? EXHIBIT L Page 33 of 77 ffiUT WHP"T ABOUT'üAi\JG ÐOCUMET{îATTÜþ{? There is no Oregon o'gong low requiring n' documentotiorì pr¡or to collecting gong reloted criminol intelligence. There is on Oregon requirement thot criminol intelligence involving personol identifying informotion hove reosonoble susp¡cion of o crime for o person or o group. Soooo...Whot's the crime? EXHIBIT L Page 34 of 77 F{OWDOYOU COLLECT TTIüFORMA'TIOI\T OI{ GAI\TGS ? SO {r Focus on the "gong" os on "enterprisenn ond use RICO "enterprTse theory" to bu¡ld RS thot gong is o RICO enterprise. i: See RICO 'oossociotion in foct." +r Gong members then ore ossociotes or porticiponts in RIC Enterprise. i:' for eoch member con then be ossembled. RS EXHIBIT L Page 35 of 77 TF{H GAI\TG,&5 E}üTHRPRTSE Tþ{H h4EMBHK AS ASSÜCTA:TE The "ossociole" The predicqle crimes in o pottern Ê,ü- The "enlerpríse" EXHIBIT L Page 36 of 77 RECÜR DII{G G,\I\GS AS EI\TTERPRISES ldentify the criminql orgonizolion: ¿, Colors Tots ,' Togetherness " Rules Members commit crime Mem bership focilitotes cnme Admissions - self descriptions Pulting lhe Associqte lmemberl with the Ènterprise (Gqng) ,Ì Colors (only by members) úr Tots (only by members) s Crime - linked to Gong . Associotions with other members iË Gong focilitotes crìmes of members ,' Self odmits EXHIBIT L Page 37 of 77 KEY QrJËSTrOr{S? onyone weor o gong tot? , Con onyone tog the gong nome? n, Con onyone weor the gong colors? 6Í: Con onyone pose os o gong member? .,: Whot hoppens ¡f they do without ä Con permission? EXHIBIT L Page 38 of 77 ET{TERPRISTI AI{D ASSOCIATE GANTG AT\TD GAI{G MEMBER : lrìformotion should be orticuloted in o police report. ,ì Opening o RICO cose or referring to the crime does NOT meon you hove to file it - but ¡t does ollow you to ,, "document" o RIC enterprise. EXHIBIT L Page 39 of 77 'a-- r :i :, CC coses ore best hondled os ong term prooct VC investigotions. Consider wire intercept ond tosk force opprooch. Center: Poul Costellono, Former Gombino Crime Fomily, NYC. Boss, Jusl FYI: The Gqmbino Fqmily used free trqde zones in Cqlifornio owned by on Oregon "businessmon" to move illegol cigoreltes from Chino which come vio Texqs ond were heoded to NYC. EXHIBIT L Page 40 of 77 WHAT ÏF YOTJR TI\TFORMATTOIrT I}{CLUDES ;\ POLITICAL VTEW? ji ¡F i, gr. :!F fr F ls there ony crime for v¿hich reosonoble suspicion opplies? EXHIBIT L Page 41 of 77 -¡J-!',qJrg¡,i hi\/AÅ\.\--,1. Å T? {--:.;TI;-1"Ç rr/ å\--l ï-;i-.,i \ i ¿a. -i ì '-i .'l ' ;i to,,rî,í-]î ,$ d"l ì. Downtown Portlqnd Oregon Criminol? A Poltern? - Orgonized? EXHIBIT L Page 42 of 77 ÜR A RHLTGTÜTJS VTEIV? A Tt{ü5Ë B t*tH n rr{siltT t5[Al-{ tor r ürø h imm* EXHIBIT L Page 43 of 77 I {ü*&' ,i ! ,j¡ V -lY) rff -rüd SI $XHFåå ffi}iV ft#fJ.VW}3*dþ{f 'tr9J.]gNf{t}} -i ¿Å'"T_ïÂrJ.} "í I'dTþ^'tåH] ÞfsiååY} íåiiÅ if åVF{,e/ï EXHIBIT L Page 44 of 77 ïi',i ,\ ì -T'--14 : åå lhiVESTir,r,,&TTüN GeTþ{ERg ï}üTTRh/å,&îTÜT{ ABÜ IJ T A RELTGTTLTS I\CTTVI'ilY \,' -r- IF j- i j.,i*; î'î-1,Ë, Peyote monufacture ond USE EXHIBIT L Page 45 of 77 ARE THF,SE SOCIAL 4,55ûCIATIOI\5 d¿ACTIVITIES üR A h,'fEl:TING OF ¡\ ilitTh4tllAr- ORt AI{IZATIûþ'í? EXHIBIT L Page 46 of 77 TRACK A CRIMII\TAtr-,S POLITICAL ASSOCIATIOI\TS & ACTIVITIES? CAT\T YOL] EXHIBIT L Page 47 of 77 WI-TEN {:,qN Yi}tj ü,:\î}{HR ;ft F'üRhdA fi ü}{ ûhi A PHT{.SONS REtIüIüLjg ASSOCIATIOI{S ßr ACTTVTTTË5? & i- -f i4 t {L EXHIBIT L Page 48 of 77 EXHIBIT Page 49 of 77 1. SUMMARY OF 181.575 î. lf informotion you ore collecting involves ct relig¡ous, sociol or politicol view, octivity or ctssociotion you MUST hove reosonoble suspicion of o crime reloted to the subject. :#. Use creotivity ond orticulote your reosonoble suspicion in some woy. ;3. Th¡nk of o wide voriety of crimes to form the bosis of collecting informotion you need. EXHIBIT L Page 50 of 77 #ffiffiffi# #&d#il tt.U ?ç'il ffi I ffi ;1 i'í'ã3lT'äEå" T'i' itårkî"ht:i',r, i-j i,iiî il).hi'v,\:i:)i,$$íl lr;:;,1':*i -i*. EXHIBIT L Page 51 of 77 T'FIH MTSSTÜru ÜF CRJh,'ï[}{AL TI\TTHTLTGET{CH The generol mission of criminol intelligence , ', " is: to develop knowledge obout individuols or groups who ore involved in criminol conspirocies; ond to understond how they function; And to describe their current octivities; ond forecost future octions they moy undertoke. IT IS ENTERPRISE /CONSPIRACY FOCUSED!! EXHIBIT L Page 52 of 77 T\ryü Cüþ-TCEPT'S Criminol intelligence requires reqsonoble suspicion I't lnformqtion collection: znd Requires q legitimote low enforcement purpose . i., L,I f,'._.. Lri'r cc t-* I. .:I r-i : l:.1 T Ì'( ) U fvr E N T :J ,: i: "1- íY . ' * ,:--- ..:l I D v t" U LJ ì :.t, i* '.] d ': o t-- :rU l.-, uJ \1:ì r'.1 ì ;q f',4 F 5 5hG Ë LU :a îf. Ê t"* twl .tì .:';'; N T L,¡,, ( Ì1 cc) IJ L cc = qr --/- tJ u- nr 'i. '.1-: K N nW L Ë r- I \l I i i\1fi i'j U I llr à tv1 t. l, t_ Êl W ,l T r t;t \: IJ lì r,! 'l ..:4. -j' 5 I lrj Lr L:;. F/r C' '.i 't: L] E A ï lvi Ë f) I r,t5 Ül 'ekd: LJ ¡, .i. N ÊC¡ /' t' :>- J. (: U M M EN DATI N TE Ç tiN ü"{ it flt4r S LU ã Jo rn D 5 5f Ë i.:' o l--- p'l- J l..i \- z = N F o R M AT to o l¡ 'i\ )-q rf Õ LLI ú LL I ili. 1..ì l:.-, :' ff I (-l R ì.j il w,'\n\,.shLlttersT0tk.c0m 126523163 EXHIBIT L Page 53 of 77 ï,VH,AT ARH THH KIJî-HS FÛR TNTEL PR.OCRAh{S? ïhe two primory sources for stote ond locol ogencies criminol intelligence efforts ore the Associqtion of Lqw Enforcement lnlelligence Units Criminql lntelligence (tElU) File Guidelines ond the Code of Federql Regulqtiohs, Tille 28, Pqrl 23 (28 CFR). The LEIU quidelines ore not stqlulorv ond ore not mondotory for ony ogency. The provisions of 28 CFR ore stotutory, but technicolly opply only to ogencies occepting federgl funds pursuont to the Omnibus Crime ond Sofe Streets Act for the purpose of creoting or sustoining on intelligence operotion. EXHIBIT L Page 54 of 77 HOWEVER . . . T\T() OI\-TH WANilS TO GET ST-TED r The ACLU ond other groups hove successfully chollenged police intelligence collection schemes oround the country. a Wrrwe " The LEIU stondords ond those set out in 28 CFR offer the best guidonce ond protection to the ogencies ond officers. il* EXHIBIT L Page 55 of 77 CRIMTT{AL Tþ{TEL SUPPORTS TT-{E LA\,V ENTFORCEMHhIT CEO The CEO must know: The full picture of i the criminol groups within the jurisdicfion. '¿: The # 's, strength, influence, criminol pursuits ond possible future octivities of criminol groups. EXHIBIT L Page 56 of 77 RSTA I{D T}iiG CRIMII\AL TT\ïTELLIGET{ CE,AI{Ð II{FORMATIONT UI\TD Ist o E - what is "criminal intelligence"? lnformation which has been evaluated to determine that it: (1) is relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity; and (2) meets the submission criteria required by 28 CFR S 23.20(b). EXHIBIT L Page 57 of 77 CRTMTT{AI ThTTE T-LTGH]V lnformotion; r Evoluoted; ,;i; Relevont to CE 'þ .rÍa identificotion of o person or orgonization; s And the person or orgonizotion is reosonobly suspected of involvement in criminol octivity. ¡r{lt't*li ffiil ûirËI¡s¡¡g . lll EXHIBIT L Page 58 of 77 WHAT TS T{OT CRIMII{AL TI{T]ELLICEI\TCE ,i Criminal investigative reports; ,ì¡ Case management systems (regardless of whether they are individual or multijurisdictional); üs Fingerprint storage and identification systems; ;!, Criminal History data systems. EXHIBIT L Page 59 of 77 tr/VHAT IS 28 üFK. & l,VFfY SFIOULT) YOU CARE 28 CFR S 23 is the United Stotes Code of Federol Regulotions section which covers oll criminol intelligence systems operoting through support under the Ornnibus Crime control ond Sofe Streets Act of 1986 (or ony of its omendments) . It is the stondord by which oll intelligence systems/operotions ore likely to be judged in o court chollenge for protection of civil liberty ond privocy protection. lf you hove on intelligence system covered by 28 CFR 23 then you should know those rules qnd procedures. WSIN (Western Stotes Informotion Network) ond HSIN ore covered b y 2B CFR 23 rules. EXHIBIT L Page 60 of 77 WFIAT WILL 28 C.F.R. $ 23 BE APPLIED TO? Criminol lntelligence Systems/Operotions thot: Collect ond mointoin criminol intelligence for the purpose of onolysis ond multijurisdictionol shored disseminotion. REMEMBER THAT EVEN ff 2B YO .J...ORS IBI .575 DOES CIR DOES NOT APPLY TO EXHIBIT L Page 61 of 77 T&VÜ TYPHS ÜF CRT}drþ,i,{L ïþüTELITTËI{CE Tocticol lnlelligence Tocticol intelligence is used to develop methods to counteroct immediote crimínol threots ond is usuoll Y directed of o soecific crime or criminol entitv. {-îSH Strotegic I nlelligence Strotegic intelligence provides o brooder view of the obilities, strenoths, weoknesses, ond tren,Cs of criminol enterprises. lt is on informed judgment on which conclusion ore drown obout future criminol endeovors. lt is used for long-ronge plonning; enobling LE to moke informed decisions on budgets, resources ond policy. EXHIBIT L Page 62 of 77 TACTICAL ANTD STRATEGIC IT{T]ELLIGEI\TCE Tocticol intelligence con provide the pieces of informotion thot ore the building blocks on which intelligence professionols build theTr strotegic onolysis. EXHIBIT L Page 63 of 77 T,{CTÏC,{L TþTTHL ST-{OULÐ CREATE TÏ{FÛRMATTO T FO R STRATEGIC T}JTEL Tocticql: u* How ,Coes this group pockoge meth? ,;;'How does this group protect stosh house? ì*How does this group move money? Stroleqic: -il,Con we find drug groups by unique pockogin g? "Í,,Whot risks do stosh houses pose for LE? con we intercept drug $$ in .r,fi;,'1-¡ow tronsit? EXHIBIT L Page 64 of 77 lack gntelhgence erol David M. Shoup on?r of the Morine Corps Medal of Honor EXHIBIT Page 65 of 77 WHAT REAL STRAT'EGTC CRIMII{AL IT{TELLTGEI\TCE CAI{ PROVIDE Criminol intelligence provides knowledge thot ollows low enforcement outhorities to estqblish o pro-oclive response lo crime. lt enobles low enforcement ogencies to identify snd underslqnd criminql groups operoting in their oreos. Once criminol groups ore identified ond their hobits known, low enforcement outhorities moy begin to ossess current trends in crime qnd lo forecqsl, ond possible prevent, future criminol octivities. Criminol intelligence olso provides the knowledge on which to bose decision ond selecl oppropriote lorgets for invesligqtions" lt olso provides low enforcement ogencies with the obility to effeclively monoge resources, budget ond meet their responsibility to forecost community threots in order to prevent crime. EXHIBIT L Page 66 of 77 THE COP ATND THE AI{ALYST THE CRIMTI{AL, IÌ{TELLTGEI{CE TEAM Police ore lhe best collectors of informolion Anolysls Need thqf informolion lo creqte intelligence i:,t'i.) j. : .l t, EXHIBIT L Page 67 of 77 CRIMIT{AL TI{TEL MATI{LY î-ÜOKS AT GROUPS, ORGANI T.ATIOI{S 6¿ EI\TTITIHS Criminql enlerprise? Criminol enterprise? EXHIBIT L Page 68 of 77 WE DOþ{'T KNTOWWHATWE DOT{'T I(}{ow... Do Oregorì's drug groups use smoll rurol oir strips? , Do Crip ond Blood sets toke direction from lorger Eost Coost leo,Cers? How,Co Portlond gongs get so mony :i How lorge is EK in Oregon? ,'Ì How mony crimes in Oregon ore gong reloted? ' Whot ports of the Stote hove the worst lD theft problems? guns? EXHIBIT L Page 69 of 77 WE DÜNUT KïqÜWWF{AT WH ÐÜNT'T KT{OW Who ore the violent onorchists in Oregon ond where ore they? r ls lSlS recruiting in Oregon? ji Are Oregon's Sovereign Citizens dongerous? &: Where ore white supremocists most octive ond whot ore their torgets? $' Quontify the ,Conger to Oregon from street gongs. *ï' Whot groups in Oregon ore the most threotening to criticol infrostructure? & EXHIBIT L Page 70 of 77 TFïH PRÜCM$S ÜF'TP,KTT\]T PARTS TÜ ffiilTlÐ, AWHOTE r.l I frt I i {ß* f ¡! 5itt 1t L *.. r!ù tt. I o lt EXHIBIT L Page 71 of 77 r.. .:-,..:: i¡. :l SIX BLIÏ{D MEI\T DESCRIBE AT{ ELEPFTAI{T ' f . :.r, t : ft"g a Fan! It's .: a rvVall I It's a i lr jl i1 [t's a Spear! R.ope ! : :; I It's ''i a Snake! ft"s a Tnee! EXHIBIT L Page 72 of 77 THE GOAL OF CRTMII{AL TT{TELLIGEI\üCE IS TO SEE THE WHOLE AS IT REALLY IS Only through strotegic criminol intelligence onolysis cctn you know whot you reolly hove to deol with. EXHIBIT L Page 73 of 77 Don?t have officers deployed for this EXHIBIT Page 74 of 77 en you re ave?r is pro EXHIBIT Page 75 of 77 tÜÜKU SEW' [JþJÐËrdSTANffi {K Sþ{ArdH ¡ f i I I , I i, lnvestigotive event "r(ay info Anolyst evoluotes ond odds informotion to other tntormoïton. . ? t. EXHIBIT L Page 76 of 77 MCCAULEY AT OREGON DOJ BY EMAIL AT EXHIBIT Page 77 of 77