No. 15-_______
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 2015
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
DANIEL ANTHONY LUCAS,
Petitioner,
-vBRUCE CHATMAN, WARDEN,
Respondent.
THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT
AND/OR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN A CAPITAL CASE
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________

BRIAN S. KAMMER
MARCIA A. WIDDER
Georgia Resource Center
303 Elizabeth Street, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30307
(404) 222-9202
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
(Execution Scheduled for TODAY, April 27, 2016, at 7:00 p.m.)
1.

In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), this Court determined that the transient

qualities of youth – lack of maturity, susceptibility to negative influences, and unformed character
– render the death penalty constitutionally excessive punishment for offenders who were under the
age of 18 at the time of their crimes. In light of post-Simmons advances in the scientific
understanding of human brain development (showing that the adolescent brain continues to
undergo significant development until the early-to-mid twenties and that young adults thus share
the same qualities of immaturity and vulnerability to outside pressures as their juvenile
counterparts) and a nationwide trend against imposing death sentences on youthful offenders,
should Simmons’ categorical ban on the death penalty be extended to offenders who were under
21 at the time of their crimes?
2.

Given that individuals under the age of 21 typically share the qualities of

immaturity, vulnerability to negative influences, and developing character that preclude imposition
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders, does Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), require
that, before a youthful offender may constitutionally be sentenced to death, the sentencer must first
consider the offender’s “youth and attendant characteristics” to determine whether the crime
reflects “transient immaturity,” rendering the death penalty constitutionally excessive, or
“irreparable corruption,” a finding permitting the death penalty’s imposition?

i

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .................................................................................. i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... v
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................................................................................... 4
JURISDICTION ............................................................................................................................. 4
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ........................................................................ 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................................... 5
A. Statement of Facts .......................................................................................................... 5
B. Proceedings Below ......................................................................................................... 8
II.

The Execution Of An Offender Under The Age Of 21 Years At The Time Of
The Offense Constitutes Cruel And Unusual Punishment, In Violation Of The
Eighth And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution And
Analogous Provisions Of The Georgia Constitution. ..................................................... 9
A. Summary of Argument ................................................................................................. 10
B. This Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Categorically Bars Execution
For Defendants Whose Diminished Moral Culpability Renders the Death
Penalty Disproportionately Harsh Punishment. ........................................................... 12
C. First, Courts Determine Whether There Is A National Consensus by Looking
at Legislation, Actual Sentencing Practice, Execution Statistics, and Other
Objective Indicia. ......................................................................................................... 14
1.

Atkins, Simmons and progeny. ................................................................................. 14

2.

A majority of jurisdictions do not execute those under 21 and only a
minority of states with the death penalty have carried out executions of
under-21 defendants in recent years. ....................................................................... 16

3.

In Georgia, there has been a precipitous decline in the number of
prosecutions of defendants under age 21, and the clear trend in the state
has been to not impose or carry out the death sentence in such cases. .................... 18
ii

 D. Second, Courts Must Examine Whether the Death Penalty Has a Legitimate
Penological Purpose. .................................................................................................... 20

III.

1.

Recent scientific and social science research robustly establishes that
people under 21 years are immature and vulnerable to peer pressure and
risk-taking behavior. ................................................................................................ 20

2.

That people aged 18, 19, and 20 are categorically less mature and less
responsible than adults 21 years and over is corroborated by state and
federal laws that set minimum age requirements at 21 years and those laws
that include 18, 19 and 20 year olds in the protections granted to
“children,” “minors,” or young people in general. .................................................. 27

3.

Capital punishment directed at offenders under 21 years has little or no
penological purpose and is unconstitutionally excessive. ....................................... 30

Mr. Lucas’s Death Sentence Is Constitutionally Infirm In Light Of This
Court’s Intervening Decision in Miller v. Alabama and New Scientific
Evidence Regarding Brain Development That Demonstrates Mr. Lucas’s
Lesser Culpability Based on his Youth at the Time of the Offense. ............................ 32

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 38
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................... 39
Age Restrictions under Selected Federal Laws ............................................................................ 39
APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................... 42
State Age Restrictions Related to Candidacy for Elected Office (Lower House) ........................ 42
APPENDIX C ............................................................................................................................... 45
State Age Restrictions Related to Handguns ................................................................................ 45
APPENDIX D ............................................................................................................................... 49
State Age Restrictions Related to the Possession/ Consumption/ Purchase of Alcohol and
Marijuana ...................................................................................................................................... 49
APPENDIX E: .............................................................................................................................. 52
State Age Restrictions Related Uniform Transfers or Gifts to Minors Act .................................. 52
APPENDIX F................................................................................................................................ 57
Maximum Age Limit for Free Public Education, by State ........................................................... 57
iii

 APPENDIX G ............................................................................................................................... 59
State Age Restrictions Related to Foster Parenting ...................................................................... 59

iv

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)................................................................................. passim
Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104 (1982) .................................................................................. 23
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ..................................................................................... 14
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)..................................................................................... 36
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) ................................................................................ passim
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ................................................................................. 12, 34
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) ...................................................................... 15, 18, 19, 34
In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284 (11th Cir. 2013)........................................................................................ 5
In re Holsey, 589 Fed. Appx. 462 (11th Cir. 2014) ........................................................................ 5
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) ..................................................................... 11, 17, 34
Lucas v. Georgia, 537 U.S. 1068 (2002) ........................................................................................ 9
Lucas v. Georgia, 537 U.S. 840 (2002) .......................................................................................... 9
Lucas v. Humphrey, 136 S. Ct. 135 (2015) ................................................................................... 10
Lucas v. Humphrey, 136 S. Ct. 571 (2015) ................................................................................... 10
Lucas v. Upton, 559 U.S. 979 (2010) ........................................................................................... 10
Lucas v. Warden, GDCP, 771 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2014)............................................................. 10
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) ............................................................................ passim
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).................................................................. passim
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) ....................................................................................... 15
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) ................................................................................ passim
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) ........................................................................ 2, 15, 17
v

 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).................................................................... 2, 24, 35
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) ........................................................................................... 8, 14
Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ......................................................................... 14, 15
State Cases
Lucas v. Chatman, Georgia Supreme Court Case No. S16W1408................................................. 4
Lucas v. Chatman, Warden, Butts Co. Superior Court Case No. 2016-HC-10 .......................... 4, 9
Lucas v. Hall, Butts Co. Superior Court Case No. 2003-V-677 ................................................. 6, 8
Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640 (2001) ................................................................................................. 8
State v. Daniel Lucas, Jones County Superior Court Criminal Case No. 98-CR-15256 ................ 9
State v. Santiago, 125 A.3d 520 (Conn. 2015) ............................................................................. 16
Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8) .................................................................................................................. 28
15 U.S.C. § 1637(p) ...................................................................................................................... 28
18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)(1) ........................................................................................................ 27
28 U.S.C. § 1257 ............................................................................................................................. 4
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) ........................................................................................................................ 4
28 U.S.C. § 2241 ............................................................................................................................. 4
28 U.S.C. § 2242 ............................................................................................................................. 4
28 U.S.C. § 2244(3)(A)................................................................................................................... 4
28 U.S.C. § 2244(B)(1) ................................................................................................................... 5
Alaska Stat. § 25.23.010 ............................................................................................................... 28
Ark. Code § 9-9-203 ..................................................................................................................... 28
vi

 Cal. Fostering Connections to Success Act, Assembly Bill (“AB”) 12 (2010) ............................ 28
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 19-5-202, 14-1-101 ........................................................................................ 28
Del. Code Tit. 13 §§ 903, 951 ....................................................................................................... 28
Ga. Code § 19-8-3 ......................................................................................................................... 28
Minn. Stat. § 260C.451, subdivision 1.......................................................................................... 29
Okla. Stat. Tit. 10 § 7503-1.1........................................................................................................ 28
Social Security Act, Pub. Law 110-351 §§ 201, 202 .................................................................... 29
The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110351............................................................................................................................................. 25
Va. Code §63.2-905.1 ................................................................................................................... 29
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. VI .................................................................................................................... 5
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.........................................................................................................passim
U.S. Const. amend. XIV..................................................................................................................5
U.S. Const. Art. I § 2 cl. 2............................................................................................................. 29
United States Const. Art. III ........................................................................................................... 4
Rules
Ariz. R. Ct. § 43(b)(1)(A) ............................................................................................................. 29
Del. S.Ct. R. 52 ............................................................................................................................. 29
Ill. S.Ct. R. 71(a) ........................................................................................................................... 29
Ind. R. Admis. B. & Disc. Att’y R. 12(2) ..................................................................................... 29
Miss. R. Gov’g Admis. B. IV § 5.A ............................................................................................. 29
vii

 N.Y. R. Ct. § 520.2(a)(1) .............................................................................................................. 29
Ohio Gov. B. Rule I(A)................................................................................................................. 29
R.I. S.Ct. Art. II Rule 1(b) ............................................................................................................ 29
S.C. App.Ct.R. 402(c)(1) .............................................................................................................. 29
United States Supreme Court Rule 20.4 ......................................................................................... 4
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 14-703(a)(1) ................................................................................................ 29
Regulations
27 C.F.R. § 478.99(b) ................................................................................................................... 27
49 C.F.R. §§ 391.11(b)(1), 390.3(f) & 391.2................................................................................ 29
Other Authorities
American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Center, Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal
Culpability (Jan. 2004).............................................................................................................. 34
Brief of Amicus Curiae Psychologists, Social Scientists and Neuroscientists, in Miller v. Alabama,
Supreme Court Case No. 10-9646 ............................................................................................ 23
E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968)............................................................................... 21
J. Giedd, “The Amazing Teen Brain,” Scientific American (June 2008, pp. 33-37) .................... 24
Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative, “The Adolescent Brain – New Research And Its
Implications For Young People Transitioning From Foster Care,” (2011) .............................. 26
Julie Seaman, Hate speech and Identity Politics: A Situationalist Proposal, 36 Fl.S.U. L. Rev. 99,
100 (Fall 2008) .......................................................................................................................... 34

viii

 Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children
from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. Rev.
431............................................................................................................................................. 34
L. Steinberg, “A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking,” Dev. Rev. Vol.
28(1) (Mar. 2008, pp. 78-106) ............................................................................................ 23, 25
NCLS, “Extending Foster Care Policy Toolkit,” Paper 5: “The Adolescent Brain – Key to Success
in Adulthood.”........................................................................................................................... 26
Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009 (2003).......... 21, 22

ix

 No. 15-_______
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 2015
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
DANIEL ANTHONY LUCAS,
Petitioner,
-vBRUCE CHATMAN, WARDEN,
Respondent.
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT
AND/OR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN A CAPITAL CASE
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
Petitioner, Daniel Anthony Lucas, respectfully petitions this Court to issue a Writ of
Certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia, entered in the above case on
April 27, 2016 (Attachment A) (Justices Hunstein and Benham dissenting), denying review of the
state habeas court’s order denying relief on April 27, 2016 (Attachment B). Alternatively, Mr.
Lucas seeks an original writ of habeas corpus in his capital case.
INTRODUCTION
Without this Court’s intervention, Daniel Lucas will be executed tonight despite the fact
that the horrific crime he co-perpetrated, at the age of 19, “reflected [his] transient immaturity,”
aggravated by the chaotic and abusive childhood he had only recently endured. Recent decisions

 from this Court addressing the Eighth Amendment’s limits on imposing the harshest of available
punishments on juvenile offenders, call for a reassessment of the validity of Mr. Lucas’s death
sentence – imposed by a jury that gave virtually no consideration to his youth for a crime that Mr.
Lucas’s exemplary record in prison shows was an artifact of the immaturity, lack of control and
poor judgment he has since outgrown.
Over the past quarter century, this Court has considered the limits the Eighth Amendment
places on the state’s power to punish juvenile offenders. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988), a plurality of the Court held that executing offenders who were under the age of 16 at the
time of their crime constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and barred the practice. One year
later, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the court rejected the argument that the Eighth
Amendment similarly prohibited capital punishment for offenders who were 16 and 17 at the time
of the crime. Sixteen years later, the Court revisited the issue and overruled Stanford. In Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), this Court held that the transient qualities of youth – immaturity,
impetuousness, poor judgment and susceptibility to negative influence – so diminish the personal
culpability of juvenile offenders as to render the death penalty excessive punishment for juvenile
offenders, though not for offenders 18 years of age and older.
The time has come once again for the Court to reconsider the line it has drawn and to move
it. The justification for precluding the death penalty for juvenile offenders – their diminished
culpability as a result of their tender years – applies equally to offenders who committed their
crimes between the ages of 18 and 21, a period in life during which, new scientific investigation
forcefully shows, individuals suffer from the same impairments in judgment and self-control that
prompted this Court to ban the application of capital punishment to juvenile offenders. As well, a
national consensus against imposing the death penalty on youthful offenders is reflected in
2

 sentencing trends in the continually diminishing number of states that persist in administering
capital punishment. For these reasons, the line drawn in Simmons between those under eighteen,
who may not be executed, and those older than eighteen, who may face execution, must be redrawn
to preclude the death penalty for offenders under 21 years of age.
This Court’s more recent decisions delineating the limits on applying the harshest
sentences shy of the death penalty, moreover, have bearing as well. Since Simmons was decided
in 2005, the Court has held that life without parole may not be imposed on juvenile offenders who
committed non-homicide crimes and that life without parole for homicide was unconstitutional
“for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016). See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012) (Eighth Amendment precludes mandatory life-without-parole sentence for juveniles
convicted of murder); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits lifewithout-parole sentence for non-homicide committed by juvenile offender).
As the Court explained in Montgomery, “Miller . . . established that the penological
justifications for life without parole collapse light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth’ and
“rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their
status’ – that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. For the same reasons that Miller precludes a mandatory sentence
of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, this Court should hold that capital sentencers
may not impose a death sentence on offenders under 21 years of age without first determining that
their “crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility,” rather than “unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”
Id. at 734-35 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455).

3

 OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, entered April 27, 2016, in Lucas v.
Chatman, Georgia Supreme Court Case No. S16W1408, denying Petitioner’s application for a
certificate of appealability from the denial of habeas corpus relief, is unreported and attached as
Attachment A. The underlying Superior Court decision in Lucas v. Chatman, Warden, Butts Co.
Superior Court Case No. 2016-HC-10, dated April 27, 2016, is unreported and attached hereto as
Attachment B.
JURISDICTION

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 2241, 1651(a) and
Article III of the United States Constitution.

This Court’s certiorari jurisdiction is invoked to

review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia denying Petitioner’s appeal from the denial
of relief, which was entered earlier this day, April 27, 2016, as Mr. Lucas asserts a deprivation of
rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. See Attachment A.
As required by Rule 20.4 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2242, Mr. Lucas states that he has
not applied to the district court for a writ of habeas corpus because that is precluded under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(3)(A) and binding Eleventh Circuit precedent precludes application to the circuit
court for leave to challenge the legality of Mr. Lucas’s death sentence in a second or successive
petition. See, e.g., In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 301 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that there is no
miscarriage of justice exception to the bar on successive habeas petitions asserting actual
innocence of the death penalty); see also In re Holsey, 589 Fed. Appx. 462, 466 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“The prior-panel precedent rule requires us to reject Mr. Holsey’s argument that he should be
allowed to file a second or successive habeas petition because he is actually innocent of the death
4

 penalty, irrespective of the literal language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(B)(1).”). Mr. Lucas exhausted his
state remedies on the questions raised herein when the state habeas court dismissed them as
procedurally barred (Attachment B) and the Georgia Supreme Court denied his Application for
Certificate of Appealability (Attachment A). The Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles denied
Mr. Lucas’s application for clemency on April 26, 2016.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This petition involves the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[n]o state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
Const. amend. XI § 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of Facts

Daniel Lucas was only nineteen (19) years old on the day of the crimes for which he was
sentenced to death. As undisputed evidence presented at trial and in prior habeas proceedings
demonstrated, Mr. Lucas was raised in a toxic home environment where he was exposed from
5

 infancy to “extremely pathological circumstances,” including “alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual
abuse and physical abuse” on the part of his parents and other adult caregivers, and became a drug
and alcohol abuser by the age of 12. Lucas v. Hall, Butts Co. Superior Court Case No. 2003-V677 at HT (Exhibits) 168-70, 175 (Report of Dr. Anthony Stringer); T Vol. 10 at 10-11 (testimony
of Dr. John Cusack); Petitioner’s State Habeas Post-Hearing Brief (PHB) at 4-15. His early life
exposure to the pernicious effects of his abnormal upbringing undoubtedly contributed to cognitive
deficits which significantly undermined his ability to exercise sound decision-making and
judgment, especially under circumstances of emotional stress. See Lucas, 2003-V-677 at HT
(Exhibits) 174-75 (Dr. Stringer report). By the time of the crime in April 1998, Mr. Lucas was
homeless and a severe drug addict.

He and his co-defendant, Brandon Rhode, had been

burglarizing homes in Jones County in order to feed their drug addiction. On the day of the crimes,
by all accounts, Mr. Lucas was extremely intoxicated, having ingested massive amounts of alcohol
and psychotropic medication, and was “stumbling around . . . and . . . slurring his words.” Lucas,
2003-V-677 at HT (Exhibits) 1762 (George Metz interview). See also PHB at 12-15.
The jury deciding whether Mr. Lucas should live or die was not asked to consider the
ramifications of his youth or impairments at the time of the crimes in making their decision, in
violation of his right to a fair trial and reliable sentencing. Indeed, the prosecution went out of its
way to describe Mr. Lucas as “that man” or “the man” or “a man like that” in closing arguments
in order to ensure that the jury saw him as a fully functioning, mature adult. No meaningful rebuttal
to this portrayal was provided by the defense.
Recent developments in science and the law since Mr. Lucas’s trial and prior habeas
proceedings establish that the State’s portrayal of Mr. Lucas as a mature adult at the time of the
crimes was profoundly misleading. While the Supreme Court’s decision in March 2005 in Roper
6

 v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), took into account scientific studies of adolescent brain
development in establishing a categorical ban on the execution of defendants under the age of
eighteen (18) at the time of their crimes, subsequent studies have robustly proven that brain
development does not stop at the age of 18. It is now accepted that the maturation process of the
brain – especially those parts of the brain associated with executive functions involving judgment,
decision-making, and appreciation of consequences – is not completed until at least the mid-20s,
and that persons as young as Mr. Lucas was at the time of his crimes, even absent the deleterious
effects of cognitive impairment and psychological trauma, cannot be deemed to be mature adults
in terms of their cognitive, emotional, or moral development. Indeed, in its recent decision in
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the Supreme Court acknowledged that the science of
brain development has become significantly more robust since the Court first addressed the issue
in Simmons.1
These scientific developments along with the clear trend, particularly in Georgia, away
from imposing the death sentence on defendants who are under 21 years of age now require that
defendants, including Daniel Lucas, must be exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment
and similar provisions of the Georgia Constitution because they “cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders.” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356

See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5 (“The evidence presented to us . . . indicates that
the science and social science [regarding adolescent brain development] have become even
stronger.”) See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology
and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence.”).
1

7

 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
B.

Proceedings Below

Mr. Lucas is a person in the custody of the State of Georgia under the terms of verdicts
entered September 16-17, 1999, in the Superior Court of Jones County, Georgia. Pursuant to these
judgments, Mr. Lucas was convicted of three counts of malice murder, as well as burglary and
kidnaping with bodily injury, and sentenced to death on the murder counts, life imprisonment for
kidnaping, and twenty years’ imprisonment on each of the two burglary counts.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Lucas’s convictions and sentence of death on
October 1, 2001. Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640 (2001).
Mr. Lucas thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court . The Petition was
denied on October 7, 2002. Lucas v. Georgia, 537 U.S. 840 (2002). Rehearing was denied on
December 2, 2002. Lucas v. Georgia, 537 U.S. 1068 (2002).
Mr. Lucas filed a state habeas corpus petition on August 13, 2003, and filed an amended
petition on March 1, 2007. The habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the claims raised
in the petition on July 9-11, 2007, and denied relief in an order issued on June 24, 2008, in Lucas
v. Hall, Butts Co. Superior Court Case No. 2003-V-677.
Mr. Lucas thereafter filed an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal
(CPC) in this Court on August 19, 2008. The Georgia Supreme Court denied the application on
June 29, 2009. His subsequent petition for writ of certiorari in this Court was denied. Lucas v.
Upton, 559 U.S. 979 (2010).

8

 Mr. Lucas filed a Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia on August 20, 2009. On March 25, 2013, the District Court entered an
order denying all relief.
Mr. Lucas appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and his appeal was denied
on September 17, 2009. Lucas v. Warden, GDCP, 771 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2014).
Mr. Lucas thereafter filed a petition for certiorari review in this Court, which was denied
on October 5, 2015. See Lucas v. Humphrey, 136 S. Ct. 135 (2015). Rehearing was denied on
November 30, 2015. See Lucas v. Humphrey, 136 S. Ct. 571 (2015).
On April 7, 2016, an execution warrant issued in State v. Daniel Lucas, Jones County
Superior Court Criminal Case No. 98-CR-15256, setting Mr. Lucas’s execution to take place
between April 27 and May 4, 2016.
On April 26, 2016, Mr. Lucas filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for
Stay of Execution in the Butts County Superior Court, Lucas v. Chatman, Butts Co. Superior Court
Case No. 2016-HC-10. The petition and stay were denied on April 27, 2016. See Attachment B.
On April 27, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia denied Mr. Lucas’s properly filed
Application for Certificate of Appealability and Motion for Stay of Execution. Attachment A. Mr.
Lucas’s petitions for writ of certiorari and for a writ of habeas corpus now follow.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
II.

The Execution Of An Offender Under The Age Of 21 Years At The Time Of
The Offense Constitutes Cruel And Unusual Punishment, In Violation Of The

9

 Eighth And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution And
Analogous Provisions Of The Georgia Constitution.
A.

Summary of Argument

“When the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality,
transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407, 420 (2008). “Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a
narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most
deserving of execution.’ [Citation.]” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (emphases
added). The death penalty is categorically barred for certain groups of offenders if a national
consensus develops against executing the particular group and if capital punishment fails to serve
the purposes of punishment, namely retribution or deterrence. See, e.g., Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560
(death penalty categorically barred for offenders who were under 18 years old at the time of their
crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (barring the death penalty for intellectually
disabled offenders); accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Here, a state-wide and national consensus has developed against executing defendants, like
Daniel Lucas, who were under 21 years of age at the time of their offenses. First, nineteen (19)
states, plus the District of Columbia, effectively ban the death penalty. Four (4) more States have
imposed moratoria on executions, and seven (7) states have demonstrated in recent years an actual
practice of neither executing, nor sentencing to death, offenders under 21 years. In the remaining
states that allow capital punishment, the practice of imposing the death penalty on offenders who
were under 21 at the time of the crime is sharply declining. Indeed, in Georgia, defendants between
ages 18 and 21 are rarely prosecuted for capital murder and are rarely sentenced to death or
executed and the last time a Georgia jury imposed the death penalty on an under-21 year old
10

 defendant was in June 2007. Consequently, there are thirty (30) states, and the District of
Columbia, that bar execution of offenders under 21 years by law or in practice and, at least in
recent years, the remaining states rarely, if ever do.
Second, science has confirmed that adolescents do not magically become “adults” once
they turn 18. Rather, they continue to be vulnerable to peer pressure and risk-taking behavior just
like people under 18 years. Indeed, neuroscience has shown that adolescent brains do not fully
mature until a person is in his mid-20s. Young adults do grow out of this behavior; that is, they
become more reflective, more risk-adverse, more mature, and less vulnerable to peer pressure.
That young adults, like Daniel Lucas, aged 18, 19, and 20 are categorically not as morally culpable
as those aged 21 and older is further confirmed by the numerous state and federal laws that impose
minimum age requirements (e.g., consumption of alcohol, obtaining a concealed carry handgun
permit), or that extend protections afforded to those under 18 years (e.g., extending foster care
benefits to foster kids up to age 21 years). Because young adults (aged 18, 19, or 20) as a class
are not fully mature, these offenders, just like their juvenile counterparts, are not the “worst
offenders” who may be subject to the death penalty. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569. Life without the
possibility of parole is a harsh punishment for a heinous crime committed by such offenders, but
as with juveniles, and for the reasons laid out below, “the State cannot extinguish his life and his
potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity” without violating constitutional
principles. Id. at 571-72.
This Court’s recent decisions in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama underscore that
the mitigating factor of youth so powerfully undercuts a defendant’s culpability that in all but the
rarest of cases, a juvenile defendant is not eligible to be sentenced to life without parole, a sentence
significantly less extreme than the death penalty, the most severe of all punishments. Those
11

 decisions are bolstered by concrete scientific knowledge about how the human brain continues to
develop through the early-to-mid twenties – information that was available at the time of Simmons
but which this Court has recognized has become far more compelling:
The evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the science and social
science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger.
See, e.g., Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 3
(“[A]n ever-growing body of research in developmental psychology and
neuroscience continues to confirm and strengthen the Court's conclusions”); id., at
4 (“It is increasingly clear that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions
and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse control,
planning ahead, and risk avoidance”); Brief for J. Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici
Curiae 12-28 (discussing post-Graham studies); id., at 26-27 (“Numerous studies
post-Graham indicate that exposure to deviant peers leads to increased deviant
behavior and is a consistent predictor of adolescent delinquency” (footnote
omitted)).
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464.
Thus, in this case, the death penalty must be precluded as a punishment for Daniel Lucas,
who was 19 years old at the time of his crimes.
B.

This Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Categorically Bars
Execution For Defendants Whose Diminished Moral Culpability
Renders the Death Penalty Disproportionately Harsh Punishment.

The Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g.,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). This right flows from the basic “‘precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’” Atkins, 536
U.S. at 311, quoting Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). “By protecting even those
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to
respect the dignity of all persons.” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560. Indeed, “barbaric punishments” are
unconstitutional under all circumstances, as are punishments that are without penological
justification. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58-59, 81-82. “The prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual
12

 punishments,’ like other expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to
its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and
function in the constitutional design.” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560.
To implement this framework, courts must consider “the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society” to determine which punishments are so
disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–101; accord Simmons, 543
U.S. at 561. “The Eighth Amendment ‘is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’” Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992
(2014) (emphasis added), quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). That is,
“standards of decency” necessary evolve, and what may have been acceptable to the courts and
society at large historically, may not prove acceptable even a few years later. Compare Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of the execution of intellectually
disabled offenders); Stanford,supra (holding constitutional the execution of juvenile offenders
who were 16 and 17 at time of crime); with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (prohibiting the execution of
intellectually disabled offenders); Simmons, 543 U.S. at 561 (prohibiting the execution of
offenders under 18 years of age).
The High Court has determined that certain groups must be categorically exempt from
capital punishment given the unacceptable risk that jurors might not give adequate weight to the
offenders’ diminished culpability in the face of the brutality of their crimes. For example,
discussing the need for a categorical bar on executing juvenile offenders, the Court noted that
[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability. An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or coldblooded nature of any particular crime could overpower mitigating arguments
based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective
13

 immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less
severe than death. In some cases a defendant’s youth may even be counted against
him.
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572-73 (emphasis added).2 “These rules vindicate the underlying principle
that the death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders.” Id. at 568-69
(emphases added).
This Court has accordingly set forth a two-part inquiry for considering such categorical
exclusions based upon the characteristics of a defendant: First, the courts must “review objective
indicia of consensus” regarding a particular sentencing practice. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564.
Second, the courts must examine whether the death penalty serves the purposes of punishment for
the particular group. Id. at 564. In addition, the courts consider other indicia of national and
international opinion, as well as exercise their independent judgment. Id. at 563-64.
C.

First, Courts Determine Whether There Is A National Consensus by
Looking at Legislation, Actual Sentencing Practice, Execution
Statistics, and Other Objective Indicia.
1.

Atkins, Simmons and progeny.

In determining the existence of a national consensus, the Supreme Court has examined
legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures and the decisions of sentencing juries, appellate
courts, and governors about whether to execute defendants in that group. Simmons, 543 U.S. at
563-65; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17.

“There are measures of consensus other than

legislation. Statistics about the number of executions may inform the consideration whether capital

Indeed, in Simmons’ case, the prosecutor used his youth as an aggravating factor.
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573.
2

14

 punishment … is regarded as unacceptable in our society.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433 (precluding
the death penalty for convicted child rapists).
For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, supra, the High Court found a national consensus
against executing those with intellectual disability. The Court examined objective indicia of
society’s standards as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to
executions of the intellectually disabled. In 2002, at the time of Atkins, 30 states prohibited the
execution of intellectually disabled offenders, including 12 states that – at that time – prohibited
executions all together. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–315. Even in those states that permitted the
practice of executing the intellectually disabled, it was rare. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–315. On the
basis of these indicia, the Court determined that executing intellectually disabled offenders “has
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.” Id.
at 316.
Likewise, in Roper v. Simmons, supra, this Court discerned a national consensus against
executing juvenile offenders. According to the Court, “30 States prohibit the juvenile death
penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but,
by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.” Simmons, 543
U.S. at 564. But the Court also considered the practice of executing juvenile offenders:
[E]ven in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles, the
practice is infrequent. Since Stanford [ v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989)], six
States have executed prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past 10
years, only three have done so: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564-65. “As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case—the
rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even
where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—
15

 provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used
respecting the mentally retarded, as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’” Id. at
567, quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; accord Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997 (counting states that have
abolished the death penalty or imposed moratoria on its implementation and noting that
“[c]onsistency of the direction of change is also relevant.”).
2.

A majority of jurisdictions do not execute those under 21 and
only a minority of states with the death penalty have carried out
executions of under-21 defendants in recent years.

Currently, 19 states3 and the District of Columbia have abolished the death penalty as to
all crimes, and seven of these states abolished the penalty in the past decade. On May 27, 2015,
Nebraska abolished the death penalty, and removed their eleven death row inmates from death
row. Although New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland did not initially make their abolition
retroactive to their then-existing death row population, Maryland has since commuted the death
sentences of all its death row inmates, and the Connecticut Supreme Court subsequently ruled the
penalty unconstitutional for those remaining on death row, see State v. Santiago, 125 A.3d 520
(Conn. 2015). New Mexico, moreover, has not actually executed any of their death row inmates
since its abolition statute was enacted.
Furthermore, the governors of four additional states have imposed moratoria on executions:
Pennsylvania (which holds a sizeable death row population), Oregon, Washington, and Colorado.

3

The States that have abolished the death penalty (along with the dates of abolition)
include: Alaska (1957), Connecticut (2012), Hawaii (1957), Illinois (2011), Iowa (1965), Maine
(1887), Maryland (2013), Massachusetts (1984), Michigan (1846), Minnesota (1911), Nebraska
(2015), New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), New York (2007), North Dakota (1973), Rhode
Island (1984), Vermont (1964), West Virginia (1965), and Wisconsin (1853).
16

 In Hall v. Florida, supra, this Court characterized the moratoria States as being on the defendants’
“side of the ledger” in the national consensus equation. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997. For example,
Oregon “executed only two people in the last 40 years.” Id. Neither Colorado nor Pennsylvania
has executed anyone in at least the last 15 years.
Put simply, in 23 states and the District of Columbia, no one under 21 years at the time of
their offense(s) would be executed for their offenses.
Moreover, seven states4 have not executed any offender under the age of 21 years in the
last fifteen years, and if they have offenders under 21 years on their death rows, they have not
imposed any new death sentences on offenders in that age group in the last 20 years. In Graham
v. Florida, supra, this Court noted that
under Florida law a child of any age can be prosecuted as an adult for certain crimes
and can be sentenced to life without parole. The State acknowledged at oral
argument that even a 5–year–old, theoretically, could receive such a sentence under
the letter of the law. [Citation]. All would concede this to be unrealistic, but the
example underscores that the statutory eligibility of a juvenile offender for life
without parole does not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through
deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration. Similarly, the many States
that allow life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders but do not impose
the punishment should not be treated as if they have expressed the view that the
sentence is appropriate. The sentencing practice now under consideration is
exceedingly rare. And “it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed
against it.” Atkins, supra, at 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). That is, the High Court’s recent pronouncements make
clear that actual practice – even among states that appear to authorize a particular punishment –
must be considered in determining true national consensus. Thus, the aforementioned seven (7)

4

Kansas, New Hampshire, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Idaho, and Kentucky.
17

 states should be counted on Mr. Lucas’s “side of the ledger” for purposes of the national consensus
equation because their execution and sentencing practices reflect a de facto prohibition on
executions of offenders under 21 years. This means that 30 states, plus the District of Columbia,
have banned outright or in practice the imposition of death sentences for offenders under the age
of 21 years.
Even in those remaining States with the death penalty is an authorized punishment for
offenders under 21 years, executions occur in a minority of the states. In the last ten years, for
example, only 12 states (out of 50) have actually executed offenders who were under the age of 21
years at the time of their offenses: Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Florida, Delaware, Mississippi,
Alabama, Ohio, Georgia, South Carolina, Indiana, and South Dakota. Since 2011, that number
has dropped to nine states. Indeed, of the 29 states that have had executions since 2000, 14 did
not execute anyone under 21 years, and four of those states have since repealed the death penalty
or imposed moratoria on executions.
3.

In Georgia, there has been a precipitous decline in the number
of prosecutions of defendants under age 21, and the clear trend
in the state has been to not impose or carry out the death
sentence in such cases.

In Georgia, there has been a marked and consistent trend away from seeking or imposing
the death penalty for defendants under 21 since at least as early as the Simmons decision in March
2005.5 That decision issued within only a few months of the inception of the Georgia Capital
Defender (GCD), which provides teams of highly trained attorneys and investigators specializing

5

There have, in fact, been no death sentences handed down in Georgia since 2014.
18

 in capital defense to represent indigent defendants who are facing the death penalty. Joshua
Moore, an attorney with the Georgia Capital Defender, testifies as follows:
Since the inception of GCD in January 2005, prosecutions for capital murder of
defendants under the age of 21 have been extremely rare and the number has
declined precipitously in recent years. Moreover, since 2005, 38 capital cases have
been tried before juries through the penalty phase. Of those 38 cases, only three
(3) involved defendants under 21 years of age. In those instances, one defendant
was 18, one 19, and one 20 years old. Of those three cases, two received a death
sentence. The death sentences, in the cases of Dorian O’Kelley (20 years old) and
Darryl Stinski (18 years old), were issued in 2005 and 2007, respectively. Since
that time, no one under the age of 21 has been sentenced to death in Georgia.
It has been the standard practice at GCD since Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005), was decided in March 2005, in cases involving defendants who were
approximately 23 or younger at the time of the crime, to marshal a defense
deploying the science surrounding adolescent brain development. Specifically,
GCD presents evidence that the human brain and, in particular, parts of the brain
responsible for executive functioning – faculties involving judgment, decisionmaking, planning, and appreciation of consequences -- do not cease maturing at the
age of 18, but continue to develop significantly through the early 20s.
This evidence has been crucial to negotiating pleas to sentences less than death and
has also resulted in prosecutors increasingly foregoing capital murder charges in
cases involving defendants under 21 years of age and even those who are slightly
older than 21.
I note that in the cases of Dorian O’Kelley and Darryl Stinski, discussed above,
GCD did not represent those defendants but did represent the 19-year-old defendant
who received a life sentence.
Affidavit of Joshua Moore (attached as Exhibit A) at 1-3.
There is thus a national and state-wide consensus that the death-sentencing and execution
of defendants under the age of 21 is unacceptable.

19

 D.

Second, Courts Must Examine Whether the Death Penalty Has a
Legitimate Penological Purpose.

After examining national consensus, the courts must examine whether the death penalty
serves the purposes of punishment for the particular group. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564. “Capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious
crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ [Citation.]”
Id. at 568.

A review of the recent sociological and neuroscientific research, as well as

consideration of the state and federal laws that impose age restrictions on people under 21 years,
leads to the conclusion that youthful offenders have the same vulnerabilities as juvenile offenders
such that they are not the “worst of the worst.” As a consequence, execution does not advance the
constitutionally accepted reasons for capital punishment – retribution and deterrence – and is
accordingly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.6 This is particularly true where the
harsh penalty of life without the possibility of parole is an option.
1.

Recent scientific and social science research robustly establishes
that people under 21 years are immature and vulnerable to peer
pressure and risk-taking behavior.

Examining this factor, the Simmons Court observed that there are “[t]hree general
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults [that] demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot
with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569.
First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent
and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-

“A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature
disproportionate to the offense.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
6

20

 considered actions and decisions.” [Citations.] It has been noted that “adolescents
are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior.”
Arnett, “Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective,” 12
Developmental Review 339 (1992). In recognition of the comparative immaturity
and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years
of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.
[Citation].
The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. Eddings [v.
Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104 (1982)] at 115 (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.
It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence
and to psychological damage”). This is explained in part by the prevailing
circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over
their own environment. See Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003) (hereinafter
Steinberg & Scott) (“[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults
have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting”).
The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed
as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.
See generally E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968).
Id. The Simmons Court concluded that “[t]hese differences render suspect any conclusion that a
juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and
irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that
of an adult.’” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 570, quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835
(1988).
Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate
surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for
failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment. [Citation.] The
reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable
to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of
irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided
to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility
exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed. Indeed, “[t]he
relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature
qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and
21

 recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.” [Citation]; see also
Steinberg & Scott[, supra, at] 1014 (“For most teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors
are fleeting; they cease with maturity as individual identity becomes settled. Only
a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal
activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into
adulthood”).
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added), accord Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. The High Court
continued this line of thinking in Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65, when it held that juvenile offenders
could not be sentenced to mandatory sentences of life without parole even for murder:
Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on what “any parent knows”—
but on science and social science as well. [Citation]. In Roper[ v. Simmons], we
cited studies showing that “‘[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents’”
who engage in illegal activity “‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior.’”
Id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (quoting Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003)). And in Graham,
we noted that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds”—for example, in “parts
of the brain involved in behavior control.” 560 U.S., at ––––, 130 S.Ct., at 2026.5
We reasoned that those findings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and
inability to assess consequences—both lessened a child's “moral culpability” and
enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development
occurs, his “‘deficiencies will be reformed.’” Id., at ––––, 130 S.Ct., at 2027
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65.7 Life without parole was not categorically prohibited for juvenile
offenders, but mandatory life without parole was unconstitutional as to children. Id. at 2468. As

7

This Court made similar observations regarding the intellectually disabled in Atkins when
it considered whether the purposes of punishment were served by execution such offenders:
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual
functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18.
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong
and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by
definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information,
22

 the Court recently explained: “Miller . . . established that the penological justifications for life
without parole collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth,” and that imposition of a
sentence of life without parole “violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (emphasis added).
But the characteristics that distinguish juveniles from adults do not dissipate when a person
turns 18 years old. Those same characteristics persist well into a person’s twenties:
[R]ates of risk-taking are high among 18- to 21-year-olds, for instance, some of
whom may be classified as adolescents and some of whom may be classified as
adults. Nevertheless, as a general rule, adolescents and young adults are more
likely than adults over 25 to binge drink, smoke cigarettes, have casual sex partners,
engage in violent or other criminal behavior, and have fatal or serious automobile
accidents, the majority of which are caused by risky driving or driving under the
influence of alcohol.
L. Steinberg, “A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking,” Dev. Rev. Vol.
28(1) (Mar. 2008, pp. 78-106) at 79.8 Laurence Steinberg, whose researched was cited
extensively in the Simmons decision, noted that

to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.
There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than
others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than
pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather
than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The personal culpability of a person who is intellectually disabled is
diminished even if the offender can distinguish right from wrong. Id.
8

See also Exhibit B to the Petition below in Butts Co. Case No. 2016-HC-10, Brief of
Amicus Curiae Psychologists, Social Scientists and Neuroscientists, in Miller v. Alabama,
Supreme Court Case No. 10-9646 (documenting significant advancements in scientific knowledge
23

 risk-taking increases between childhood and adolescence as a result of changes
around the time of puberty in what I refer to as the brain’s socio-emotional system
that lead to increased reward-seeking, especially in the presence of peers. Risktaking declines between adolescence and adulthood because of changes in what I
refer to as the brain’s cognitive control system – changes which improve
individuals’ capacity for self-regulation, which occur gradually and over the course
of adolescence and young adulthood. The differing timetables of these changes –
the increase in reward-seeking, which occurs early and is relatively abrupt, and the
increase in self-regulatory competence, which occurs gradually and is not complete
until the mid-20s, makes mid-adolescence a time of heightened vulnerability to
risky and reckless behavior.
Id. at 83. Another prominent scientist has added:
The most recent studies indicate that the riskiest behaviors [among adolescents]
arise from a mismatch between the maturation of networks in the limbic system,
which drives emotions and becomes turbo-boosted in puberty, and the maturation
of networks in the prefrontal cortex, which occurs later and promotes sound
judgment and the control of impulses. Indeed, we now know that the prefrontal
cortex continues to change prominently until well into a person’s 20s. And yet
puberty seems to be starting earlier, extending the “mismatch years.”
J. Giedd, “The Amazing Teen Brain,” Scientific American (June 2008, pp. 33-37) at 34.
Indeed, the full development of gray matter “peaks latest in the prefrontal cortex, crucial
to executive functioning, a term that encompasses a broad array of abilities, including organization,
decision making and planning, along with the regulation of emotion.” Giedd at 35. “The prefrontal
cortex functions are not absent in teenagers; they are just not as good as they are going to get.
Because they do not fully mature until a person’s 20s, teens may have trouble controlling impulses
or judging risks and rewards.” Id. at 36.9 Steinberg concludes that

as to adolescent brain development since the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida,
describing robust studies showing that significant brain development ongoing through the 20s).
Studies have suggested that “the presence of friends doubled risk-taking among the
adolescents, increased it by fifty percent among the youths [mean age 20], but had no effect on the
adults, a pattern that was identical among both males and females (not surprisingly, we did find a
24
9

 [t]he research reviewed here suggests that heightened risk-taking during
adolescence is likely to be normative, biologically driven, and, to some extent,
inevitable. There is probably very little we can or ought to do to either attenuate or
delay the shift in reward sensitivity that takes place at puberty, a developmental
shift that likely has evolutionary origins.
Steinberg. at 100. That is, “rather than attempting to change how adolescents view risky activities
[such as by focusing on educational programs] a more profitable strategy might be to focus on
limiting opportunities for immature judgment to have harmful consequences.” Id. at 99. “Some
things just take time to develop, and mature judgment is probably one of them.” Id. at 100.
This emergent research on the adolescent brain has been used to advocate on behalf of
people aged 18, 19, and 20 in non-criminal contexts. For example, after the enactment of The
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110351, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCLS) published a “toolkit” for extending
foster care under this law, which includes a pamphlet on the “brain science” of older youth in foster
care. This pamphlet provides:
[C]hildren do not go from adolescence directly into adulthood; they undergo a
complex and lengthy transition in a period called “emerging adulthood.”

main effect for sex, with males taking more risks than females). The presence of peers also
increased individuals’ stated willingness to behave in an antisocial fashion significantly more
among younger than older subjects, again, among both males and females.” Steinberg at 91.
Steinberg noted that there is an increase in oxytocin, the bonding hormone, in adolescence and
posits that this increase “leads to an increase in the salience of peer relations, and that this increase
in the salience of peers plays a role in encouraging risky behavior.” Id. at 90.
25

 NCLS, “Extending Foster Care Policy Toolkit,” Paper 5: “The Adolescent Brain – Key to Success
in Adulthood.”10 “Emerging adulthood” is defined as “[a] developmental period during which a
young person moves gradually from adolescence toward independence. This concept recognizes
that a young person does not achieve independence at a pre-determined age.” Jim Casey Youth
Opportunities Initiative, “The Adolescent Brain – New Research And Its Implications For Young
People Transitioning From Foster Care,” (2011), at 39.11 “As the understanding of the complex
transition from adolescence to adulthood has deepened, there continues to be general consensus
about these developmental tasks – coupled with an understanding that they now take longer to
achieve. With all these complex tasks to master, researchers theorize that the consolidation of
adult status likely occurs not at 18 or 21, but closer to age 30.” Id. at 17.
Thus, as with juveniles, there are three broad differences between youthful offenders aged
18, 19, and 20 and adults aged 21 years and over. First, youths aged 18, 19, and 20 are more prone
to impulsive risk-taking behavior than adults 21 and older, in part attributable to a “mismatch”
between the limbic system and the development of the prefrontal cortex. Compare with Simmons,
543 U.S. at 569. Second, this age group remains vulnerable to peer pressure as were juveniles. Id.
Third, their character is still not fully formed: Once their brains are fully mature as biological
“adults,” risk-taking tends to decline; they are better able to withstand the pressures of peers; and
they have the power to fully reflect upon the consequences of their actions. Id. In short, as with

10

Available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/extending-foster-care-policytoolkit.aspx.
11

Downloaded from http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/extending-foster-carepolicy-toolkit.aspx.
26

 juveniles, the character of offenders aged 18,19, and 20 is not fixed; they still have the capacity
“to attain a mature understanding of [their] own humanity.” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571-72. The
considerations mentioned in Simmons apply with equal force to offenders aged 18, 19, and 20.
2.

That people aged 18, 19, and 20 are categorically less mature
and less responsible than adults 21 years and over is
corroborated by state and federal laws that set minimum age
requirements at 21 years and those laws that include 18, 19 and
20 year olds in the protections granted to “children,” “minors,”
or young people in general.

This Court considered state statutes imposing minimum age requirements to buttress its
conclusion that the death penalty was a prohibited punishment for juvenile offenders: “In
recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State
prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental
consent. [Citation].” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569; see also id. at 579-587 (Appendices). Likewise,
in the context of offenders under 21 years, state and federal laws impose a minimum age of 21
years for various activities and extend the age of “minority” to 21 years for other activities. For
example, as is well known, all 50 States, plus the District of Columbia, impose some sort of
minimum age restriction of 21 years for the consumption, purchase or possession of alcohol or
recreational marijuana. See Appendix D.

Most states also impose minimum age restrictions

related to the sale and use of handguns: 41 states impose a minimum age of 21 years to obtain
concealed carry permits, (Appendix C), and federal law outright prohibits licensed gun dealers
from selling handguns and handgun ammunition to people under 21 years of age. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(b)(1), (c)(1); 27 C.F.R. § 478.99(b).
In addition, prospective adoptive parents must be married, or at least 25 years of age if
unmarried, to obtain immigration benefits under the Hague Convention on Protection of Children
27

 and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoptions. Indeed, some states impose heightened
age requirements on prospective adoptive parents, see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 19-5-202, 14-1101 (21 years); Del. Code Tit. 13 §§ 903, 951 (21 years); Ga. Code § 19-8-3 (25 years or married);
Okla. Stat. Tit. 10 § 7503-1.1 (21 years), and some states allow for the adoption of children up to
the age of 21 years.12 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-201, 14-1-101.
That youth under 21 years old should not be treated the same as those 21 years and older
finds support in the various laws that protect those under 21 years the same way that children are
protected. For example, the Credit Card Act of 2009 bans credit cards for people under the age
of 21 unless they have a co-signer aged 21 years or older, or show proof that they have the means
to repay the debt. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8); 15 U.S.C. § 1637(p). Consistent with this
rule, forty-two (42) states and the District of Columbia impose a minimum age of 21 years to
transfer gifts. See Appendix E. That is, in the majority of states, people under 21 years cannot
legally dispose of, or use, their property outright; transfers of “gifts” to “minors” must be subject
to approval by a custodian until the “minor” reaches the required age: most often, 21 years. Id.
Also, thirty-one (31) states provide free public education up to age 21 years; two States have higher
age maximums; and ten (10) tsates provide free education up to age twenty. See Appendix F.
Further, forty (40) states and the District of Columbia impose a minimum age of 21 years
to become a foster parent, (Appendix G), and several states extend foster care benefits to children
aged 18, 19 or 20 years. See, e.g., Cal. Fostering Connections to Success Act, Assembly Bill
(“AB”) 12 (2010) (extending foster care benefits up to age 21 years); Ind. Collaborative Care

12

Most States allow for the adoption of any person regardless of age. See, e.g., Alaska
Stat. § 25.23.010; Ark. Code § 9-9-203.
28

 Program (extending foster care benefits till 20 years and extend voluntary services until 21
years);13 Minn. Stat. § 260C.451, subdivision 1 (extending foster care benefits to 21 years); Va.
Code §63.2-905.1 (extending independent living services to former foster kids). Indeed, in 2008,
the federal Social Security Act was amended to extend eligibility for certain foster care, adoption
assistance and kinship guardianship payments for foster kids and adoptees up to age 21. See Pub.
Law 110-351 §§ 201, 202.
There are also categorical age-based limits affecting professional activities, further
corroborating scientific observations about the immaturity and impulsivity of those under 21 years.
For example, federal law requires a commercial driver to be at least 21 years of age or older to
drive a commercial vehicle interstate, or to transport passengers or hazardous materials intrastate.
See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.11(b)(1), 390.3(f) & 391.2. Twenty-one (21) years is also the minimum
age to become a lawyer in Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, New York, Ohio,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Ct. § 43(b)(1)(A); Del. S.Ct. R. 52; Ill.
S.Ct. R. 71(a); Ind. R. Admis. B. & Disc. Att’y R. 12(2); Miss. R. Gov’g Admis. B. IV § 5.A; N.Y.
R. Ct. § 520.2(a)(1); Ohio Gov. B. Rule I(A); R.I. S.Ct. Art. II Rule 1(b); S.C. App.Ct.R. 402(c)(1);
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 14-703(a)(1).
Finally, the federal and various state constitutions impose categorical age-of-candidacy
requirements for public office. For example, the minimum age to run for the U.S. House of
Representatives is 25 years, (U.S. Const. Art. I § 2 cl. 2), while twenty-seven (27) states impose a
minimum age-of-candidacy of 21 years for the lower legislative house, and six states have even

13

Downloaded from Indiana Department of Child Services website: http://www.
in.gov/dcs/files/6CollaborativeCare2012.pdf (on Aug. 5, 2015).
29

 higher age restrictions. See Appendix B. That is, regardless of an individual’s fitness for office,
he or she is categorically barred from holding such an office in thirty-three (33) States if he or she
is under 21 years of age.
In sum, it appears that heightened age requirements apply to activities for which a lack of
responsibility may have significant – and potentially irrevocable – consequences for the older
adolescent who behaves impulsively, without reflection, and without a greater sense of, or capacity
for, responsible action (e.g., consuming alcohol/marijuana, foster parenting, obtaining credit cards,
possessing a handgun). Likewise, federal and state laws extend protections that might otherwise
only apply to juveniles (see, e.g., foster care benefits, ability to dispose of property, free public
education) recognizing the vulnerability of this group and the need for society to offer protections
to this class of youthful offenders. Appendices A through G set forth the various age minimums
and maxima for each State for selected activities.
3.

Capital punishment directed at offenders under 21 years has
little or no penological purpose and is unconstitutionally
excessive.

“[P]unishment is justified under one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation,
deterrence, and retribution.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420. “Rehabilitation, it is evident, is not an
applicable rationale for the death penalty.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1991-92. “[C]apital punishment is
excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct
social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.”
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added), accord Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (noting that the death
penalty should serve these “two principal social purposes”). These are bedrock principles of the
Constitution’s promise to prohibit the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by the state.
30

 “Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity.” Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571.
Here, the culpability and blameworthiness of youthful offenders between the ages of 18
and 21 is diminished to a substantial degree by their youth and immaturity. American society
recognizes the dual need to provide greater protections for this group while at the same time
prohibiting them from participating in certain activities where youthful impulsivity and immaturity
could put them or others at risk. These youth are not granted by law the same rights and
entitlements of adults; and for purposes of punishment, they should not be treated the same as
adults. Just as with juveniles, the research suggests that this group can mature and “age out” of
the recklessness and impulsiveness that can characterize this age group. The fact that this group
can mature – can attain a better understanding of their own humanity – necessarily means that they
cannot be the “worst of the worst” so as to justify the ultimate sanction. This is particularly true
where life without parole, a harsh penalty that fully satisfies the need for retribution, is an available
punishment.
As for deterrence,
it is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent
effect on juveniles, as counsel for petitioner [the State of Missouri] acknowledged
at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. In general [the courts] leave to legislatures
the assessment of the efficacy of various criminal penalty schemes, [citation].
Here, however, the absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern
because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults
suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence. In particular, as
the plurality observed in Thompson, “[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.” 487 U.S., at 837. To the
extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth
noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is
itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.
31

 Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-320 (noting that the
impairments of intellectually disabled offenders – whether “adult” or “juvenile” – that make it less
defensible to impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes and less likely that the death
penalty will have a real deterrent effect particularly in that population).
The same is true here. Deterrence as a rationale for punishment necessarily requires the
ability to reflect upon the consequences of one’s actions. Late adolescents suffer from the same
impulsivity as younger teenagers: they act rashly, without reflection, and without full consideration
of the consequences of their actions. They do not grow out of this behavior until their midtwenties. The fact that the death penalty is a punishment is unlikely to deter murderous behavior.
In any event, it is likely to be as much a deterrent as a sentence of life without parole.
Put simply, capital punishment is only lawful if the offender’s “consciousness [is]
materially more ‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 433 (1980). The transient characteristics of youthful offenders so diminish their
individual responsibility and moral guilt as to categorically preclude a finding of irredeemable
depravity. Thus, the execution of a person like Daniel Lucas must be deemed categorically
unconstitutional.
III.

Mr. Lucas’s Death Sentence Is Constitutionally Infirm In Light Of This
Court’s Intervening Decision in Miller v. Alabama and New Scientific Evidence
Regarding Brain Development That Demonstrates Mr. Lucas’s Lesser
Culpability Based on his Youth at the Time of the Offense.
Although Mr. Lucas was nineteen years old at the time of the crime for which he has been

sentenced to death, see, e.g., T 8:347, virtually no attention was given to this significant mitigating
factor at his capital trial. To the contrary, the prosecutor on thirty-three (33) separate occasions
referred to Mr. Lucas as “that man,” “a man like that” or “the man” in his closing arguments in
32

 both phases of the trial (17 times in the guilt phase closing and 16 times during sentencing closing
argument). See, e.g., T. 10:122 (twice), 10:123 (three times), 10:124-25 (once), 10:127 (once),
10:134 (once), 10:135 (once), 10:137 (once), 10:138 (twice), 10:139 (twice), 10:141 (once),
10:145 (once), 10:146 (once), 23:198 (twice), 23:199 (three times), 23:200 (once), 23:202 (three
times), 23:203 (once), 23:206 (three times), 23:207 (twice), 23:208 (once).
This notion that Daniel Lucas was a mature adult was not countered in any meaning fashion
by the defense. Defense counsel presented no evidence regarding the mitigating qualities of youth
and made no effort even to point out such qualities to jurors in closing. The sole mention of Mr.
Lucas’s age was made in passing in penalty phase summation: “The fact that Daniel was a teenager
when this happened, I think you can consider that, his age.” T. 11:218.14
Developments in both science and the law demonstrate how profoundly misleading the
prosecutor’s repeated reference to Mr. Lucas’s status as a “man” was and how flawed Mr. Lucas’s
death sentence is. “An offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal
procedure laws that fail to take defendant’s youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”
Graham, 560 U.S. at 76. As detailed above, advances in the scientific understanding of human
brain development since the time of trial demonstrate that the brains of young adults do not fully
mature until their early 20’s:
The evidence now is strong that the brain does not cease to mature until the early
20s in those relevant parts that govern impulsivity, judgment, planning for the
future, foresight of consequences, and other characteristics that make people

This fleeting reference to Mr. Lucas’s age was hardly sufficient to establish Mr. Lucas’s
youth as a critical issue for the jury to consider. Moreover, “[e]ven if a [sentencer] considers a
child’s age before sentencing him . .. to a lifetime in prison [or death], that sentence still violates
the Eighth Amendment for a [defendant] whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity,” as Mr. Lucas’s clearly does. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
14

33

 morally culpable. . . . Indeed, age 21 or 22 would be closer to the “biological” age
of maturity.
American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Center, Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal
Culpability (Jan. 2004), at 2 (quoting Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, Patterson v. Texas, Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, J. Gary hart, Counsel) (available at
http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.a
uthcheckdam.pdf) (last reviewed April 25, 2016).15

See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 68

(“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control
continue to mature through late adolescence.”); Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The qualities that
distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.”). On the basis of
such scientific advances, the Supreme Court has outlawed both the death penalty and mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for homicide offenders under 18 years of age, and life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses. See Miller, Graham, Simmons.
Even assuming that the death penalty remains a constitutional punishment for homicide
defendants who were between the ages of 18 and 21 at the time of their crime, the Supreme Court’s

“‘The relatively recent discovery that brain development continues into adulthood has
turned the conventional wisdom that the brain is fully developed by early childhood on its head.’
This relatively late brain development is concentrated in areas of the brain that involve executive
function, including moral decisionmaking, impulse inhibition, and reasoning about the
consequences of one’s actions.” Julie Seaman, Hate speech and Identity Politics: A Situationalist
Proposal, 36 Fl.S.U. L. Rev. 99, 100 (Fall 2008) (quoting Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood
Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and
Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 431, 437 n.24).
15

34

 recent decision in Miller v. Alabama makes clear that a capital sentencer’s failure to give
meaningful consideration to evidence of youth to determine whether the crime, however
aggravated, was the product of the defendant’s immaturity, undermines the validity of a resulting
death sentence.
In Miller, the Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders,” because such a
sentencing scheme does not permit the sentencer “to take into account how children are different,
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court recognized that “children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing” given their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform . . . .” Id. at 2464. The Court noted several factors that render children less culpable than
their adult counterparts:
●

Children “have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’
leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.”

●

Children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures”
from family and peers, while at the same time they have “limited ‘control over their
own environment’ and “lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crimeproducing settings.

●

A child’s “character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’
and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”

Id. (quoting Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569-70). These features render a life-without-parole sentence
“an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’ – that is, juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
Significantly, in striking mandatory life statutes as applied to juvenile offenders, the Court
rejected the state’s argument that the lack of a “national consensus” prohibiting the use of
35

 mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders precluded a finding that such sentences violated
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. As the Court explained:
For starters, the cases here are different from the typical one in which we have tallied
legislative enactments. Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of
offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005)] or [v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)] . Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer
follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—
before imposing a particular penalty.
Montgomery, 132 S. Ct., at 2471 (emphasis added).
That same process clearly mandates consideration of significant information reflecting on
a capital defendant’s personal culpability before the sentencer, whether judge or jury, can be said
to have returned a reliable and proportionate death sentence. 16
Mr. Lucas’s sentence is constitutionally flawed. The prosecutor repeatedly characterized
nineteen-year-old Daniel Lucas as a “man,” while defense counsel took virtually no steps to
counter this misimpression. New science makes clear, moreover, that Mr. Lucas’s brain was not
yet fully matured in the very areas critical to assessing an individual’s personal culpability. The
lack of consideration of youth and its attendant infirmities, renders the jury’s death sentence
uninformed on a critical issue and fatally tainted under Miller and the Eighth Amendment:

The required process, however, is not a mere procedural rule, but is “a procedural
requirement necessary to implement a substantive guarantee . . . .” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735.
That new substantive rule, barring the harshest of punishments available to juvenile offenders, life
without parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility,” id. at 734, is a fully retroactive rule this Court must apply here. See id. at 729
(“[W]hen a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the
Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule.”). Under
Miller, a youthful offender over eighteen, whose crime was the product of the transient qualities
of youth, cannot be subjected to society’s most severe and irreparable punishment.
16

36

 That [Mr. Lucas] deserved severe punishment for killing [the victims] is beyond
question. But . .. a sentencer needed to examine all the[] circumstances before
concluding that [the death penalty] was the appropriate penalty.
* * * [M]aking youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that
harshest [punishment] . . . poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. If “youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of
incarceration without the possibility of parole,” id. at 2465, it doubly matters in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment for individuals just over Simmons’ cut-off of eighteen,
whose brains remain works in progress. A sentencer must “take into account how [young adults]
are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to [death].”
Id. Otherwise, the sentencer has blindly made “a judgment that [the defendant] is incorrigible
[even though] ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth’”17 and has accordingly failed, as here, to
ensure “that the death penalty is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the
most serious offenses.” Id. at 2465, 2467.
Because no meaningful consideration was given to Mr. Lucas’s youth and lack of maturity,
and because advances in science since the time of trial, combined with intervening Supreme Court
decisions, demonstrate the degree to which such evidence, in general, critically undermines a
youthful offender’s personal culpability to a degree that may render the death penalty

Mr,. Lucas’s exemplary prison record, see Clemency Petition for Daniel Lucas (filed
April 20, 2016, and available at http://pap.georgia.gov/sites/pap.georgia.gov/files
/PressReleases/Lucas%20application.pdf), in fact, beautifully illustrates the degree to which the
horrific crime he committed was the product of his lack of maturity, coupled with the severe
privations of his childhood. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468-69 (discussing the mitigating aspects
of the petitioners’ youth and abusive childhoods in assessing their personal culpability).
17

37

 unconstitutional, irrespective of the crime,18 this Court must, in the interests of justice, issue the
writ and vacate the death sentence.

CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in order to prevent Georgia from
causing yet another blatant miscarriage of justice.
This 27th day of April, 2016..

_________________________
BRIAN S. KAMMER
MARCIA A. WIDDER
Georgia Resource Center
303 Elizabeth Street, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30307
(404) 222-9202

COUNSEL FOR MR. LUCAS

“The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability. An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any
particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even
where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should
require a sentence less than death.” Simmons, 543 U.S., at 572-73.
18

38

 Attachment A

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Case No. S16W1408

Atlanta

April 27, 2016

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.
The following order was passed.
DANIEL ANTHONY LUCAS v. BRUCE CHATMAN, WARDEN
Upon consideration of Lucas’s application for a certificate of probable cause
to appeal the dismissal of his second state habeas corpus petition, the Warden’s
response thereto, and the record, the application is denied as lacking arguable merit.
See Supreme Court Rule 36 (“A certificate of probable cause to appeal a final
judgment in a habeas corpus case involving a criminal conviction will be issued
where there is arguable merit. . . .”).
Lucas’s motion for a stay of execution is also denied.
This Court notes that this successive habeas corpus proceeding was not
initiated until the day before Lucas’s scheduled execution. Despite this late filing, the
Court has fully considered Lucas’s application on the merits.
All the Justices concur, except Benham and Hunstein, JJ., who dissent.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk ’s Office, Atlanta
I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court
hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

 Attachment 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF BUTTS COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA
DANIEL ANTHONY LUCAS, 
CIVIL ACTION NO.
Petitioner, 

v. HABEAS CORPUS
9c
BRUCE CHATMAN, Warden, 
Georgia Diagnostic and 7"
Classi?cation Center, 
'k
7%

Respondent.
ORDER

This is Petitioner?s second state habcas petition. Petitioner alleges that he is
ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment as: he was under 21
years of age at the time of the commission of his crimes; and his alleged mental
immaturity due to his age. This claim was not presented in Petitioner?s ?rst state
habeas petition. Petitioner has not shown new facts or new law to establish that
thisclaim could not have been raised in his original state habeas proceeding. In
addition, as there is no precedent holding that 19-year?old offenders (who are
neither intellectually disabled nor incompetent) are ineligible for the death penalty,
he has also failed to show a miscarriage ofjustice Consequently, this claim is
waived and barred from this Court?s review. Se; O.C.G.A. 9-14?51. This Court

DISMISSES this claim.

 

El :8 Hd L2 Edit QIUZ

In the alternative, Petitioner?s claim fails to allege a constitutional Violation
in the proceedings which resulted in Petitioner?s convictions and sentences. 
O.C.G.A. There is no law that holds that offenders under the age of
21 are ineligible for a death sentence. Therefore, in the alternative, if not waived,
the claim would be DISMISSED as non-cognizable.

As this Court is able to determine from the face of the pleadings that the
claim in this petition is barred from this Court?s review, the petition is dismissed

without the necessity ofa hearing. See Collier V. State, 290 Ga. 456

 

(2012). Additionally, Petitioner?s request for a stay of execution is denied.


so ORDERED, this QL day oliApril, 20.16.

7/9

THOMAS Wist?i 
Chief Judge ofthe Superior Courts
Towaliga Judicial Circuit

Prepared by:

Sabrina Graham

Senior Assistant Attorney General
sgraham@law.ga.gov

APPENDIX A
Age Restrictions under Selected Federal Laws
A.

Immigration
1.

U.S. citizen can petition for an immigrant visa for any “immediate relative”

defined as spouse, “unmarried children under the age of 21,” (8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)),
or parents. (8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)).
2.

To petition for a parent, the petitioner must be a U.S. citizen, at least 21

years of age, and must have qualified as the “child” of the beneficiary as defined in 101(b)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Matter of Hassan, 16 I&N Dec. 16 (1976))
3.

To petition for “alien” children or spouse, a U.S. citizen can be any age;

however, to sign an “affidavit of support,” the petitioner must be at least 18 years old. To
obtain an immigrant visa for inter-country adoption pursuant to the Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption, prospective
parents must be married, or if unmarried, at least 25 years of age.
B.

Handguns
Sales of handguns and ammunition for handguns by a licensed dealer are limited to

persons 21 years of age and older. (18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)(1); 27 C.F.R. § 478.99(b)).
C.

Credit Card Act of 2009
Bans credit cards for people under the age of 21 unless they have adult co-signers

or show proof that they have the means to repay the debt. (15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8); § 15
U.S.C. § 1637(p) [parents, guardian or co-signer required to consent to any increase credit
limit where person is under 21 years).
39

 D.

Commercial Driver’s Licenses
Driver must be 21 years of age or older to drive a commercial vehicle interstate, or

to transport passengers or hazardous materials intrastate. (49 C.F.R. §§ 391.11(b)(1),
390.3(f) & 391.2).
E.

Health Care
“Medical assistance” may be provided to individuals who are, among other things,

“under the age of 21, or, at the option of the State, under the age of 20, 19, or 18 as the
State may choose….” (42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(i)).
F.

Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (Pub. Law

110-351)
Among other things, amends the Social Security Act to extend and expand adoption
incentives; creates an option to extend eligibility for certain foster care, adoption assistance
and kinship guardianship payments up to age 21. (Pub. Law 110-351 §§ 201, 202).
G.

H.

Age of Candidacy
1.

President: minimum age of 35 years. (U.S. Const. Art. II § 1 cl. 5).

2.

Senator: minimum age of 30 years. (U.S. Const. Art. I § 3 cl. 3).

3.

Representative: minimum age of 25 years. (U.S. Const. Art. I § 2 cl. 2).

Miscellaneous Professions / Labor Rules
1.

FBI Special Agent: minimum age of 23 years.

2.

DEA Special Agent: minimum age of 21 years.

3.

“Youth minimum wage” allows employers to pay youth less than the

minimum wage to individuals younger than 20 years of age for the first 90 days that they
are employed. (Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) § 6(g)).
40

 I.

Taxable Gifts
Certain gifts (i.e., college tuition) to a person under 21 years are not considered a

taxable gift (26 U.S.C. § 2503).

41

 APPENDIX B
State Age Restrictions Related to Candidacy for Elected Office (Lower House)
State

Minimum Age

Statute

Alabama

21

Ala. Const. Art. IV § 47

Alaska

21

Alaska Const. Art. 2 § 2

Arizona

25

Ariz. Const. Art. 4 § 2

Arkansas

21

Ark. Const. Art. 5 § 4

California

Not specified

Age not specified; but 18 is the age to vote.

Colorado

25

Colo. Const. Art. 5 § 4

Connecticut

18

Conn. Const. 3d Art. § 4 [representatives shall
be “electors”; see also Conn. Const. Amend. Art.
IX [an “elector” must be eighteen years]

Delaware

24

Del. Const. Art. II § 3

Florida

21

Fla. Const. Art. III § 15

Georgia

21

Ga. Const. Art. 3 § 2

Hawaii

18

Hawaii Const. Art. III § 6 [at least “age of
majority”]

Idaho

18

Idaho Const. III § 6 [representative must be
“elector”]; Idaho Const. Art. VI § 2 [elector must
be at least 18 years]

Illinois

21

Ill. Const. Art. IV § 2(c)

Indiana

21

Ind. Const. Art. 4 § 7

Iowa

21

Iowa Const. § 4

Kansas

18

Kan. Const. Art. II

Kentucky

24

Ky. Const. § 32

Louisiana

18

La. Const. Art. III § 4

Maine

21

Me. Const. Art. IV § 4

Maryland

21

Md. Const. Art. III § 9

Massachusetts

Not specified

Age not specified, but 18 years is the age to vote.

Michigan

21

Mich. Const. Art. IV § 4

Minnesota

21

Minn. Const. Art. IV § 6
42

 Mississippi

21

Miss. Const. Art. 4 § 41

Missouri

25

Mo. Const. Art. III § 4

Montana

Not specified

Age not specified, but 18 years is the age to vote.

Nebraska

21

Neb. Const. Art. III § 8

Nevada

21

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 218A.200

New Hampshire

Not specified

Age not specified, but must be at least 18 years
to vote in election.

New Jersey

21

N.J. Const. Art. IV § 1

New Mexico

21

N.M. Const. Art. IV § 3

New York

18

N.Y. Public Officers Law § 3

North Carolina

21

N.C. Const. Art. II § 7

North Dakota

18

N.D. Const. IV § 5 [representative must be
“qualified elector”]; N.D. Const. Art. II § 1 [U.S.
citizen and N.D. resident aged 18 is a “qualified
elector”]

Ohio

18

Ohio Const. Art. 15 § 4 [elected official must be
“qualified elector”]; Ohio Const. Art. 5 § 1
[“qualified elector” must at least be 18 years old]

Oklahoma

21

Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 17

Oregon

21

Ore. Const. Art. IV § 7

Pennsylvania

21

Pa. Const. Art. 2 § 5

Rhode Island

18

R.I. Const. Art. III § [must be “qualified elector”
to hold civil office]; R.I. Const. Art. II § 1]

South Carolina

21

S.C. Const. Art. III § 7

South Dakota

21

S.D. Const. Art. III § 3

Tennessee

21

Tenn. Const. Art. II § 9

Texas

21

Tex. Const. Art. 3 § 7

Utah

25

Utah Const. Art. IV § 5

Vermont

Not specified

Age not specified but must be at least 18 years to
vote.

Virginia

21

Va. Const. Art. IV § 4

Washington

18

Wash. Const. Art. II § 7 [legislators must be
“qualified voter”]; Wash. Const. Art. VI § 1
[voters must be at least 18 years].
43

 West Virginia

18

W. Va. Const. Art. IV § 4 [must be eligible to
vote to attain office]; W. Va. Const. Art. IV § 1
[any citizen of the State can vote if they are not
“minors,” among other requirements]

Wisconsin

18

Wis. Const. Art. IV § 6 [must be “qualified
elector”]; Wis. Const. Art. III § 1 [“qualified
elector” is at least 18 years old]

Wyoming

21

Wyo. Const. Art. 3 § 2

44

 APPENDIX C
State Age Restrictions Related to Handguns19
State

Minimum Age

Statute

Alabama

18

Ala. Code § 13A-11-57, 13A-11-76.

Alaska

21 [open or
concealed
carry]

Alaska Stat. § 11.61.210(a)(6); 18.65.705.

Arizona

21 [open or
concealed
carry]

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3112(S).

Arkansas

21 [concealed
carry]

Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-73-101(9), 5-73-109, 5-73309(3).

California

21 [purchase]

Cal. Penal Code § 27505(a) [handgun]; Cal.
Penal Code § 30300 [handgun ammunition].

Colorado

21 [concealed
carry]

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108.5(1), (2), 18-12213(1)(a); 18-12-203(1)(b).

Connecticut

21 [purchase
and possession]

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-34(b)

Delaware

21 [purchase]

Del. Code Ann. tit. 24 § 903

District of Columbia

21 [purchase
and possession]

D.C. Code Ann. § 7-2502.03, 7-2507.06(a), 224507

Florida

21 [concealed
carry]

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.06(2)(b); 790.17(2), 790.18

Georgia

21 [concealed
carry]

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-132(b); 16-11-129.

Hawaii

21 [purchase
and possession]

Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 134-2(d)

Idaho

21 [concealed
carry]

Idaho Code § 18-3302A; 3302(1)(l).

19

In general the minimum ages to possess a handgun is 18 years old, unless otherwise specified.
All federally-licensed gun dealers are prohibited from selling handguns to people under 21 years
in all States. (18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1)).
45

 Illinois

21 [purchase
and possession]

430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 65/3(a), 65/4

Indiana

18

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-2-3(g)(3).

Iowa

21 [purchase
and possession]

Iowa Code § 724.22

Kansas

21 [open or
concealed
carry]

Kan. Stat. Ann. Supp. § 75-7c04 [amended
4/5/15]

Kentucky

18

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.100; 2.Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 527.110(1)(a).

Louisiana

21 [concealed
carry permit]

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:1379(2)

Maine

18

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 17-A § 554-A, 554-B; 252003(1).

Maryland

21 [purchase
and possession]

Md. Ann. Code art. Pub. Safety § 5-134

Massachusetts

21 [purchase
and possession]

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140 § 130.

Michigan

21 [concealed
carry permit]

Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 28.425b(7)(a).

Minnesota

21 [carry
permit]

Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 16

Mississippi

21 [concealed
carry]

Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-37-13; 45-9-101.

Missouri

19

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 571.060; 571.101(2)(1)
[changed from 21 to 19 by S.B. 656, 2014]

Montana

18

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-344

Nebraska

21 [concealed
carry permit]

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 69-2404

Nevada

21 [concealed
carry]

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.310; 202-3657(3)(a).

New Hampshire

--

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 159

New Jersey

21 [purchase,
transport and
possession]

N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2C:58-6.1

New Mexico

19

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-2.2(C)(1).
46

 New York

21 [possess and
purchase]

N.Y. Penal Code § 400.00(1), (12)

North Carolina

21

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3).

North Dakota

21 [for Class 1
concealed carry
license]

N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-03-02, 62.1-04-03(1)(a).

Ohio

21 [possessing;
transporting]

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2923.21, 2923.211.

Oklahoma

21 [open and
concealed
carry]

Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1273; 1290.9(3)

Oregon

21 [concealed
carry]

Ore. Rev. Stat. § 166.250(1)(c)(A),
166.291(1)(B).

Pennsylvania

21 [concealed
carry]

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6110.1, 6109(b).

Rhode Island

21 [purchase]

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-47-30, 11-47-35(a)

South Carolina

21 [concealed
carry]

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-23-30, 23-32-215(A)

South Dakota

18

S.D. Code Laws § 23-7-7.1

Tennessee

21 [handgun
carry]

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-1351(b)

Texas

21 [concealed
carry]

Tex. Penal Code § 46.06(a)(2), 411.172(a)(2)

Utah

21 [concealed
carry

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509, 53-5-704(1)(a)

Vermont

16

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 4007

Virginia

21 [concealed
carry]

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.02

Washington

21 [concealed
carry]

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.41.070(1)(c)

West Virginia

21 [concealed
carry]

W. Va. Code § 61-7-4

Wisconsin

21 [concealed
carry]

Wis. Stat. §§ 948.60(2)(a), 175.60(a)(3)

Wyoming

21 [concealed
carry]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104(b)(ii)

47

 48

APPENDIX D
State Age Restrictions Related to the Possession/ Consumption/ Purchase of Alcohol and
Marijuana
State

Minimum Age

Statute

Alabama

21

Ala. Code § 28-1-5

Alaska

21

Alaska Stat. §§ 04.16.050, 04.16.051, 04.16.060

Arizona

21

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 4-101, 4-244, 4-249, 4-226

Arkansas

21

Ark. Code Ann. § 3-3-203; no explicit
prohibition on consumption

California

21

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 25658, 25662; Cal.
Veh. Code § 23224;

Colorado

21

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-47-901, 18-13-122(2)(a)
(alcohol); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-122(3)(b)
&(d) [marijuana]

Connecticut

21

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 30-1, 30-89, 30-87

Delaware

21

Del. Code Ann. Tit. 4 § 904

District of Columbia

21

D.C. Code Ann. § 25-1002

Florida

21

Fla. Stat. ch. 562-111

Georgia

21

Ga. Code Ann. § 3-3-23

Hawaii

21

Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 281-101.5, 712-12500.5

Idaho

21

Idaho Code §§ 23-1023, 23-1334, 23-949

Illinois

21

235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/6-16, 5/6-16.1, 5/6-20

Indiana

21

Ind. Code §§ 7.1-1-3-25, 7.1-5-7-1, 7.1-5-7-7,
7.1-5-7-17

Iowa

21

Iowa Code § 123.3, 123.47

Kansas

21

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2701, 41-727, 41-727a,
41-2652

Kentucky

21

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.085

Louisiana

21

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:93.10, 14:93.12

Maine

21

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 28-A §§ 2, 2051,

Maryland

21

Md. Ann. Code art. 2B §§ 1-201, 1-102; Crim.
Law 10-114
49

 Massachusetts

21

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138 § 34A, 34C

Michigan

21

Mich. Comp. Laws § 436.1703

Minnesota

21

Minn. Stat. § 340A.503

Mississippi

21

Miss. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-5, 67-1-81, 67-3-54,
67-3-70

Missouri

21

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 311.020, 311.325

Montana

21

Mont. Code Ann. § 16-6-305, 45-5-624

Nebraska

21

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 53-103, 53-168.06, 53-180.02

Nevada

21

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.020

New Hampshire

21

N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 179:10, 179:10-a, 259:3-b

New Jersey

21

N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2C:33-15, 33:1-81

New Mexico

21

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 60-7B-1

New York

21

N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. §§ 65-b, 65-c

North Carolina

21

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18B-302, 18B-103

North Dakota

21

N.D. Cent. Code § 5-01-08

Ohio

21

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4301.63, 4301.69,
4301.635

Oklahoma

21

Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1215, tit. 37 § 163.2, tit. 37 §
246, tit. 37 § 604, tit. 37 § 605

Oregon

21

Ore. Rev. Stat. § 471.430

Pennsylvania

21

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6308

Rhode Island

21

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 3-8-10, 3-8-13, 3-8-5.1

South Carolina

21

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-19-2440, 63-19-2450, 6319-2460

South Dakota

21

S.D. Code Laws § 35-9-2

Tennessee

21

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 1-3-113, 39-15-413

Texas

21

Tex. Alco. Bev. Code §§ 106.01, 106.02, 106.04,
106.05

Utah

21

Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-1-105, 32A-12-209, 7739-101

Vermont

21

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 7 §§ 2, 3, 657; 2000 Vt. Acts
& Resolves 160

Virginia

21

Va. Code Ann. §§ 4.1-304, 4.1-305, 4.1-200
50

 Washington

21

Wash. Rev. Code § 66.12.140, 66.44.270,
66.44.290 [alcohol]; Wash. Rev. Code §
69.50.4013(3), Initiative 502 § 20(3) [marijuana]

West Virginia

21

W. Va. Code § 11-16-19, 11-16-3, 60-3A-24

Wisconsin

21

Wis. Stat. §§ 125.02, 125.07

Wyoming

21

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-6-101, 12-6-103

51

 APPENDIX E:
State Age Restrictions Related Uniform Transfers or Gifts to Minors Act
State

Minimum Age

Statute

Alabama

21

Ala. Code § 35-5A-2(1), (11) [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 21 years and “minor”
as someone under 21 years].

Alaska

18

Alaska Stat. § 13.46.990(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 18 years and
“minor” as someone under 18 years].

Arizona

21

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:7651(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Arkansas

21

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-26-201(1),(11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

California

18

Cal. Probate Code § 3901(a), (k) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 18 years and
“minor” as someone under 18 years]; but see
Prob. Code, § 3920.5(e) [“The time for transfer
to the minor of custodial property transferred by
irrevocable gift under Section 3904 may be
delayed under this section only if the transfer
pursuant to Section 3909 provides in substance
that the custodianship is to continue until the
time the minor attains a specified age, which
time may not be later than the time the minor
attains 21 years of age.”]

Colorado

21

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-50-102(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Connecticut

21

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-557a(1), (10) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Delaware

21

Del. Code Ann. Tit. 12 § 4501(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

52

 Florida

21

Fla. Stat. § 710-102 (1), (11) [defining “adult” as
person who has attained 21 years and “minor” as
someone under 21 years].

Georgia

21

Ga. Code Ann. § 44-5-111(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Hawaii

21

Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 553A-1 [defining “adult” as
person who has attained 21 years and “minor” as
someone under 21 years].

Idaho

21

Idaho Code § 68-801(1), (11) [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 21 years and “minor”
as someone under 21 years].

Illinois

21

760 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20/2 )1), (12) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Indiana

21

Ind. Code §§ 30-2-8.5-1, 30-2-8.10 [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Iowa

21

Iowa Code § 565B.1(1), (11) [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 21 years and “minor”
as someone under 21 years].

Kansas

21

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-1701(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Kentucky

18

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 385.012(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 18 years and
“minor” as someone under 18 years].

Louisiana

18

La. Rev. Stat. § 9:751(1), (10) [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 18 years and “minor”
as someone under 18 years].

Maine

18

Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 33 § 1652 (1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 18 years and
“minor” as someone under 18 years].

Maryland

21

Md. Ann. Code § 13-301(b), (k) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years].

Massachusetts

21

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 201A § 1 [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 21 years and “minor”
as someone under 21 years]
53

 Michigan

18

Mich. Comp. Laws § 554.523(1), 554.524(4)
[defining “adult” as person who has attained 18
years and “minor” as someone under 18 years]

Minnesota

21

Minn. Stat. § 527.21 [defining “adult” as person
who has attained 21 years and “minor” as
someone under 21 years]

Mississippi

21

Miss. Code Ann. § 91-20-3(a), (k) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Missouri

21

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 404.007(1), (14) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Montana

21

Mont. Code Ann. § 72-26-502(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Nebraska

21

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2702(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Nevada

18

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 167.020 (1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 18 years and
“minor” as someone under 18 years]

New Hampshire

21

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 463-A:1(I), (XI) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

New Jersey

21

N.J. Rev. Stat. § 46:38-14(a), (k) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

New Mexico

21

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 46-7-12(A), (K) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

New York

21

N.Y. EPT Law. §§ 7-6.1(a), (k) [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 21 years and “minor”
as someone under 21 years]

North Carolina

21

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 33A-1 (1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

North Dakota

21

N.D. Cent. Code § 47-24.1(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]
54

 Ohio

21

Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5814.01(K) [defining
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Oklahoma

21

Okla. Stat. § 58-1202(1), (11) [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 21 years and “minor”
as someone under 21 years]

Oregon

21

Ore. Rev. Stat. § 126.805(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Pennsylvania

21

53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5301(b) [defining “minor”
as someone under 21 years]

Rhode Island

21

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 18-7-2(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

South Carolina

21

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-5-510(1), (13) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

South Dakota

18

S.D. Code Laws § 55-10A-1(1), (10) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 18 years and
“minor” as someone under 18 years]

Tennessee

21

Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-7-102(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Texas

21

Tex. Property Code § 141.002(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Utah

21

Utah Code § 75-5a-102(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone not yet 21 years]

Vermont

21

14 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 3211(1), (11) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

Virginia

18

Va. Code Ann. §§ 64.2-1900 [defining “adult” as
person who has attained 18 years and “minor” as
someone not yet 18 years]

Washington

21

Wash. Rev. Code § 11.114.010(1), (11)
[defining “adult” as person who has attained 21
years and “minor” as someone under 21 years].

55

 West Virginia

21

W. Va. Code § 36-7-1(1), (11) [defining “adult”
as person who has attained 21 years and “minor”
as someone not yet 21 years]

Wisconsin

21

Wis. Stat. § 54.854(1), (10) [defining “adult” as
person who has attained 21 years and “minor” as
someone not yet 21 years]

Wyoming

21

Wyo. Stat. §§ 34-13-114(a)(i), (xi) [defining
“adult” as person who has attained 21 years and
“minor” as someone under 21 years]

56

 APPENDIX F
Maximum Age Limit for Free Public Education, by State
State

Age

Statute

Alabama

21

Ala. Const. § 256

Alaska

20

Alaska Stat. § 14.03.070

Arizona

21

Ariz. Const. Art. XI § 6

Arkansas

21

Ark. Const. Art. Xiv, § 1

California

21

Cal Educ. Code § 46300.1

Colorado

21

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-102

Connecticut

21

Con. Gen. Stat. § 10-186

Delaware

20

Del. Code Ann. Tit. 14, § 202

District of Columbia

None specified

D.C. Mun. Regs. Tit. 5, § 2000.3

Florida

Varies by
school district

Fla. Stat. § 1003.21(1)(c) [to be set by individual
school boards]

Georgia

20

Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-150

Hawaii

20

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 302A-1134

Idaho

21

Idaho Code § 33-201

Illinois

21

105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/26-2

Indiana

22

Ind. Code Ann. § 20-21-1-6

Iowa

21

Iowa Code Ann. § 282.1

Kansas

None specified

Kansas Stat. § 72-977

Kentucky

21

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann §158.100

Louisiana

21

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:221.3

Maine

20

20a Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 5201

Maryland

21

Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-101

Massachusetts

21

Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 71b, § 1

Michigan

20

Mich. Comp. Laws § 388.1606

Minnesota

21

Minn. Stat. § 120a.20

Mississippi

21

Miss. Code Ann. 37-45-1

Missouri

21

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 160.051
57

 Montana

19

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-5-101

Nebraska

21

Neb. Const. Art. VII, § 1

Nevada

21

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.060 + “sunset” schools for
17-21 years

New Hampshire

21

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189: 1-A

New Jersey

20

N.J. Rev. Stat. § 18a: 38-1

New Mexico

21

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-8-2

New York

21

N.Y. Educ. Law § 3202

North Carolina

21

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115c-1

North Dakota

21

N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-06-01

Ohio

21

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.64

Oklahoma

21

Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 70, § 1-114

Oregon

21

Or. Rev. Stat. § 339.115

Pennsylvania

21

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 13-1301

Rhode Island

None specified

R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-19-1 [attend school]

South Carolina

21

S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-20

South Dakota

21

S.D. Codified Laws § 13-28-5

Tennessee

Varies by
school board

Tenn. Code § 49-6-3102

Texas

26

Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 25.001

Utah

19

Utah Code § 49-6-3102 [up to school boards]

Vermont

None specified

Vt. Stat. tit. 16, ch. 23-7002 § 945

Virginia

20

Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-1

Washington

20

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28a.225.160

West Virginia

21

W. Va. Code § 18-5-15

Wisconsin

20

Wis. Const. Art. X, § 3

Wyoming

21

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-301

58

 APPENDIX G
State Age Restrictions Related to Foster Parenting

State

Minimum Age

Statute

Alabama

19

Ala. Code § 38-7-3; 38-7-4; Admin. Code §
660-5-29.02

Alaska

21

7 A.A.C. § 50.200; Alaska Stat. §§44.29.020,
47.35.010

Arizona

21

Ariz. Admin. Code § 6-05-5823

Arkansas

21

Ark. DHS Pub-22 (Aug. 2013), at page 5.

California

18

DSS Manual tit. 22, § 89317; 89318 [any
“adult” may apply]; § 89201(a)(1) [defining
“adult” to be person 18 and older]

Colorado

21

12 Colo. Code Regs. 2509-8; 7.708.7.A.2

Connecticut

21

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-114(a)

Delaware

21

9 Del. Code of Regs. § 201.95.1

District of
Columbia

21

D.C. Code of Municipal Regs. § 29-6001

Florida

21

Fla. Admin. Code § 65C-13.030

Georgia

Married, or if
unmarried, at least
25 years

Ga. DFCS website

Hawaii

“a married couple”
or “an adult”
[implicitly 18 years]

Hawaii Code of Rules § 17-1625-8

Idaho

21

Idaho Admin. Code § 16.06.02.402.01

Illinois

21

Ill. Admin. Code Tit. 89, §§ 402.12(c)

Indiana

21

Ind. Admin. Code Tit. 465 § 2-1.5-3(a)

Iowa

21

Iowa Admin. Code § 441-113.12(a)

Kansas

21

Kan. Admin. Regs. § 28-4-802(b)
59

 Kentucky

21

Ky. Admin. Regs. Tit. 922 § 1:310 §
4(1)(3)(e)2

Louisiana

21

La. Admin. Code § 67:7313(B)

Maine

21

Me. Code of Rules 10-148-016, § 2; 9

Maryland

21

Md. Code of Regs. 07.02.25.04.C

Massachusetts

Does not specify,
but implicitly 18
years

110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.100; 7.103; 7.104

Michigan

18

Mich. Admin. Code R. 400.1902 Rule 2.(1)(a)

Minnesota

21

Minn. Admin. Code R. 2960.3060 subp.3.A.

Mississippi

21

Miss. DHS DFCS Regs. § F.II.A, page 522523

Missouri

21

Mo. Code of State Regs. Tit. 13, § 3560.030(1)

Montana

18

Mont. Admin. Rules, Rule 37.51.301(1)(a)

Nebraska

19

474 Neb. Admin. Code §§ 6-003.25B [foster
parents must attain age of majority which is
19 years]

Nevada

21

Nev. Admin. Code § 424.260

New Hampshire

21

N.H. Admin. Rules He-C 6446.04(b)(2)

New Jersey

18

N.J. Admin. Code §§ 10:122C-2.1(b).1

New Mexico

18

N.M. Admin. Code § 8.26.4.8.A.

New York

21

18 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. §
443.2(c)(1)(i)

North Carolina

21

N.C. Admin. Code Tit. 10A § 70E.1104(b)

North Dakota

21

N.D. Admin. Code § 75-03-14-01.1. [defining
“adult” as person 21 years and older]

Ohio

21

Ohio Admin. Code § 5101:2-7-02(A)

Oklahoma

21

Okla. Admin. Code § 340:75-7-12(a)

Oregon

21

Ore. Admin. Rules § 413-200-0308(2)

Pennsylvania

21

Penn. Admin. Code Tit. 55 § 3700.62(a)
60

 Rhode Island

21

R.I. DCYF, Foster Care & Adoption Regs §
3.I.B.1.

South Carolina

21

S.C. Code of Regs. § 114-550.G.(4)(a)

South Dakota

21

S.D. Admin. Code § 67:42:05:06(1)

Tennessee

18

Tenn. Code § 37-5-501(b)(2) [defining child
as person under 18 years]

Texas

21

40 Tex. Admin. Code § 749.2403

Utah

21

Utah Admin. Code § R501-12-5(1)(c)

Vermont

21

Vt. Code of Rules § 13 162 007 § 3 204

Virginia

21

22 Va. Admin. Code § 40-141-30.C.

Washington

21

Wash. Admin. Code § 388-148-1365(1)

West Virginia

21

W. Va. Code of State Rules § 78-2-13.1.c

Wisconsin

21

Wis. Admin Code DCF § 56.05(1)(d)

Wyoming

21

Wyo. DFS Website

61

 No. 15-_______
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 2015
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
DANIEL ANTHONY LUCAS,
Petitioner,
-vBRUCE CHATMAN, WARDEN,
Respondent.
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________

This is to certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing document this day by U.S. Mail
and/or electronic mail on counsel for Respondent at the following address:
Sabrina Graham, Esq.
Senior Assistant Attorney General
sgraham@law.ga.gov
132 State Judicial Building
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300
This 27th day of April, 2016..

_________________________
Attorney