62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

STATE O F MINNESOTA

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY O F RAMSEY

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Court File No. 62-CV-14-4330

Trivedi L L C , Trivedi Master Wellness
L L C , Trivedi Foundation, Trivedi
Products L L C , Mahendra Trivedi,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
Dennis Lang,
Defendant.
This m a t t e r came on for hearing of defendant's motion for summary judgment on
M a r c h 25, 2016, before the Honorable Robert A. Awsumb, Ramsey County District
Court Judge. N a t h a n Knoernschild, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. M a r k
Anfinson, Esq., appeared w i t h and on behalf of defendant Dennis Lang.
Upon a l l of the files, pleadings, records and proceedings herein, and based upon
the arguments and submissions of counsel,
ORDER
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is G R A N T E D i n its entirety.
2. Plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed w i t h prejudice and on the merits.
3. The attached Memorandum is incorporated herein as part of this Order.
L E T JUDGMENT B E ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: June 1, 2016

B Y T H E COURT:

Awsumb, Robert (Judge)
Jun 12016 2:54 P M

Robert A. Awsumb
Judge of District Court

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

MEMORANDUM
1. F a c t u a l B a c k g r o u n d .
a. I n t r o d u c t i o n a n d P r o c e d u r a l B a c k g r o u n d .
The factual background of the parties and this case is p a r t i a l l y summarized i n
the court's previous order issued on June 1, 2015. T h a t order and the
accompanying memorandum is incorporated into this memorandum to the extent i t
provides further background leading up to this motion. A t t h a t time the court
denied defendant Dennis Lang's ("Lang") motion to dismiss based on the a n t i SLAPP and statute of limitations arguments. Thereafter, the parties conducted
discovery and L a n g now moves for summary judgment.
I n the complaint, p l a i n t i f f Mahendra Trivedi ("Trivedi") and his related entities
("Trivedi Entities") sued L a n g for defamation, civil conspiracy, and tortious
interference w i t h contract. The three counts i n plaintiffs' complaint generally a l l
arise out of the same alleged wrongful acts—Lang's public statements about
Trivedi's operations, activities, character and information he had learned from
others d u r i n g his investigation. The factual allegations offered i n plaintiffs'
complaint are entirely based on communications made by L a n g t h a t plaintiffs
contend were defamatory. Thus, the focus of plaintiffs' action is their claim for
defamation. While plaintiffs also allege tortious interference and conspiracy, those
claims derive from Lang's alleged defamatory communications and are simply
alleged as a statement of damages allegedly resulting from the defamation.
There are dozens of statements referenced i n the complaint which plaintiffs
claim are defamatory. While each of the statements described i n the complaint may
2

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

constitute a separate defamation claim, many of those statements contain
essentially the same allegations about one or more of the plaintiffs. For purposes of
this motion, plaintiffs have therefore grouped the statements into categories based
on the particular defamatory meaning alleged. These categories are as follows:
A. Claims t h a t Trivedi is a sham, employs fake science.
B. Claims of sexual misconduct by Trivedi.
C. Claims t h a t Trivedi and his entities could be engaged i n u n l a w f u l activities.
D. General accusations of misbehavior and/or causing h a r m .
E. Miscellaneous statements not i n any other specific category.
F. Statements t h a t L a n g did not make.
The court w i l l not repeat a l l of the statements referenced i n the complaint, which
are also discussed i n the parties' briefs r e l a t i n g to this motion, and the exhibits
submitted by the parties.
The issue raised by this motion is whether Trivedi and the Trivedi Entities are
considered to be "limited purpose public figures" for purposes of these defamationbased claims. I f they are deemed l i m i t e d purpose public figures, F i r s t Amendment
considerations require t h a t plaintiffs must prove by clear and convincing evidence
t h a t L a n g published his statements w i t h actual malice, meaning t h a t at the time of
publication he h a d "a h i g h degree of awareness of their probable falsity." L a n g
argues t h a t there is no factual support to establish actual malice w i t h regard to any
of the alleged defamatory statements and t h a t a l l claims should be dismissed.
The parties dispute whether Trivedi and his entities are public figures.
Plaintiffs argue t h a t Trivedi was not very well k n o w n i n the world, or the U n i t e d
3

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

States, at the time Lang's statements were communicated. They f u r t h e r argue t h a t
there was no public controversy regarding the defamatory statements and t h a t even
i f a public controversy existed, plaintiffs are not considered l i m i t e d purpose public
figures, because L a n g created the controversy. As a result, plaintiffs argue t h a t
they need not prove actual malice.
I n general, there are two p r i m a r y paths t h a t defamation cases follow. I n cases
involving private plaintiffs who b r i n g suit against private defendants for a
defamatory communication t h a t is a matter of private concern, the common law of
defamation applies, along w i t h common law privileges. I n cases involving the
defamation of public officials or figures, or where the defamatory communication is
a matter of public concern, the common law rules are modified by decisions of the
U n i t e d States Supreme Court t h a t provide l i m i t e d F i r s t Amendment privileges for
the publishers of those communications. Those F i r s t Amendment limitations make
i t more difficult for a p l a i n t i f f to recover i n a defamation case. The Supreme Court's
decisions establish a F i r s t Amendment baseline. States may not make i t easier to
recover i n defamation cases, but they may make i t more difficult by applying more
stringent standards for recovery.
b. P l a i n t i f f M a h e n d r a T r i v e d i a n d the T r i v e d i E n t i t i e s .
Whether the p l a i n t i f f i n a defamation action is a public or private figure is a
question of law for the court, as discussed i n more detail below. I n this case, the
parties have submitted a number of affidavits, exhibits and discovery responses to
assist the court i n that analysis. The affidavit of Trivedi includes his own
statements about his claimed abilities and activities and those of his related
4

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

companies. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has previously noted t h a t T r i v e d i "and
the T r i v e d i entities provide nontraditional physical and mental-health services to
the public, p r i m a r i l y through personal, group, or remote blessings and energy
transmissions." Trivedi LLC v. Lang, No. A13-2087, 2014 W L 2807981 ( M i n n . App.
June 23, 2014) (unpublished). "Trivedi conducts his activities i n numerous states
and anyone 'around the world' may register to receive a long-distance remote energy
transmission." Id.
According to his testimony, T r i v e d i is the founder of the T r i v e d i Foundation and
other T r i v e d i business entities "dedicated to advancing their customers' well-being
and s p i r i t u a l i t y through products and services t h a t reflect my gifts and talents."
Mahendra T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 2. His stated mission, and the mission of the T r i v e d i
Entities, "is to help people function at a higher level by strengthening their health
and well-being." Id. According to the T r i v e d i Entities' executive Alice Branton,
" M r . T r i v e d i utilize[s] energy transmissions, known as the T r i v e d i Effect, t h a t have
the potential to transform l i v i n g organisms and non-living materials. Recipients of
M r . Trivedi's energy transmissions have reported a beneficial impact on their
health and well-being." Alice B r a n t o n Aff. ]j 4. She f u r t h e r states t h a t " M r . T r i v e d i
and the T r i v e d i Entities' goals have been to promote scientific study and reach out
to people who are i n need of M r . Trivedi's unique abilities."
Trivedi f u r t h e r states t h a t the T r i v e d i Effect "has benefited many people. The
Trivedi Companies created a website which compiles the hundreds of video and
w r i t t e n testimonials regarding the benefits of the T r i v e d i Effect." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 19.
He refers the court to his website located at www.triveditestimonials.com. He adds
5

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

t h a t "[s]ince 2009, the T r i v e d i Companies and l have invested hundreds of
thousands of dollars to see the impact of the T r i v e d i Effect." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 18.
According to his affidavit, the " T r i v e d i Entities have conducted more t h a n 4,000
scientific studies at major research institutions throughout the w o r l d and, as a
result, have received more t h a n a 170 publications i n leading international, peerreviewed scientific journals. The beneficial effects of the T r i v e d i Companies' services
and products, and the methodology behind the creation of those services and
products, have been demonstrated i n numerous studies and published, scientific
journals." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 5.
Trivedi identifies many publications regarding his stated T r i v e d i Effect and
states t h a t "[a]t the time M r . L a n g began publishing his defamatory statements, six
i m p o r t a n t scientific studies verifying the efficacy of the T r i v e d i Effect had already
been published i n peer-reviewed, scientific journals." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 30. He notes
t h a t "[t]he scientists, a l l experts i n their field, who reviewed the six studies,
determined t h a t the scientific protocols and methods involved i n the studies were
appropriate and followed by the researchers."

T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 3 1 .

The T r i v e d i Companies offer to the public a variety of goods and services related
to the T r i v e d i Effect. The T r i v e d i Foundation is a non-profit organization that
works w i t h research institutions to promote scientific progress related to the
advancement of h u m a n k i n d . The T r i v e d i Foundation has done so by promoting the
research of the effectiveness of the T r i v e d i Effect. Among other activities, the
Trivedi Foundation supports scientific research intended to test the efficacy of the
Trivedi Effect and the broader ability of h u m a n consciousness to alter l i v i n g
6

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

organisms and non-living matter. M r . Trivedi and the Trivedi Entities' goals have
been to promote scientific study and reach out to people who are i n need of M r .
Trivedi's unique abilities. Branton Aff. ]j 6. As the result of all of the research
referenced above, Trivedi has developed contacts and supporters throughout the
world. Trivedi Aff. ]j 6.
Lang's affidavit states t h a t Trivedi promotes himself on his websites and on
m u l t i p l e social media platforms, such as YouTube and Facebook, i n which Trivedi
claims he has performed such feats as "70, 000 medical miracles a l l over the world."
Dennis L a n g Aff. ]j 2. L a n g submits t h a t Trivedi has publicly claimed to have as
many as 200,000 patrons. He further notes t h a t Trivedi materials included such
statements as "There have been over 4,000 controlled scientific experiments t r y i n g
to disprove these (molecular) changes and each and every time science ultimately
gives credibility to h i m . " Lang Aff. ]j 5. Lang also refers to claims by Debra
Poneman, former Trivedi Foundation president and trustee, disseminated online
and i n webcasts t h a t "[Trivedi] restores happiness to cells," and statements by the
Trivedi Entities' m a r k e t i n g director Janice Burney t h a t "he's the Second Coming of
Jesus" and "the next Einstein." Id. Trivedi himself sates t h a t since 2009, he and
the Trivedi Companies have "invested hundreds of thousands of dollars to see the
impact of the Trivedi Effect," including on research occurred i n 2009, 2010 and
2011. Trivedi Aff. ]j 18.
Despite the extraordinary nature of the powers and abilities claimed by Trivedi
and the Trivedi Entities, Trivedi states t h a t he is "not nationally or regionally

7

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

famous i n the U n i t e d States or elsewhere i n the world." Trivedi Aff. ]j 6. He
further states:
Even w i t h i n the field of alternative medicine or energy transmissions,
I am very much u n k n o w n i n the U n i t e d States and the rest of world.
When I speak to individuals concerning the Trivedi Effect, I have to
introduce myself and explain the nature of the Trivedi Effect. Unless
the i n d i v i d u a l has been introduced to me by another m u t u a l contact,
the i n d i v i d u a l has never heard of me or the Trivedi Entities before.
This was especially true i n 2011 and 2012 when I had only been i n the
U n i t e d States for a few years.
Trivedi Aff. ]j 6. Nonetheless, i n 2014 Trivedi stipulated t h a t he was a l i m i t e d
purpose public figure for purposes of a related defamation lawsuit i n Pennsylvania.
Trivedi

v. Slawecki,

4:11-CV-2390, 2014 W L 6851429 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2014). I n

fact, the court's decision i n Trivedi

v. Slawecki

is very similar factually to this case

and involves similar issues.
According to Lang, he was exploring possible topics for a magazine article i n
2011 and encountered references to Trivedi. He decided to inquire further about
Trivedi and his activities and, i n furtherance of this effort, posted requests for
information from people familiar w i t h Trivedi on various websites. L a n g Aff. ]j 3-4.
His first request was posted on the Deepak Chopra Blog i n M a r c h 2011. L a n g Aff. ]j
4. L a n g asserts t h a t D r . Chopra introduced Trivedi to the American audience i n
February 2010 at his Sages and Scientists convention i n California. Id.
L a n g also states that he came into contact w i t h a researcher at Penn State
University studying Trivedi's claims who found: "No statistical variation between
samples 'blessed' by Trivedi and control samples." L a n g Aff. ]j 8. The Penn State
study results were published online i n May, 2011. Id. L a n g notes t h a t Trivedi
subsequently sued the Penn State author i n Pennsylvania for defamation and other
8

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

claims. Id. T h a t is the case where Trivedi conceded t h a t he was a l i m i t e d purpose
public figure for defamation purposes. Trivedi

v. Slawecki, supra.

Trivedi discusses

at length i n his affidavit his claims t h a t the Penn State study was inaccurate, as
well as " w i l d and outlandish." Trivedi Aff. If 10-15.
Lang's affidavit further discusses his efforts to further research the Trivedi
claims through a blog called PurQi.com, which was described as a forum for
discussion of alternative medicine practitioners, and which was emerging as an
online meeting place for people interested i n or concerned about Trivedi and his
enterprises. L a n g Aff. If 10-18. L a n g states t h a t i n early 2011, many people
contacted h i m or posted comments on the P u r Q i blog offering accounts of their
experiences w i t h Trivedi. L a n g says that "[t]hose sharing their experiences were
remarkably forthcoming, and their stories were for the most p a r t very consistent
and corroborated by many disparate sources." L a n g Aff. If 13. L a n g relays t h a t he
posted summaries on the P u r Q i blog of what he was learning along w i t h his
commentary and perceptions, a d m i t t i n g that "[m]any of my posts were indeed
highly critical of Trivedi and his operations, posts t h a t I felt were amply justified by
the information t h a t I was collecting about h i m from many diverse sources." L a n g
Aff. If 16.
I n 2011 Trivedi discovered Lang's writings on PurQi.com and noticed t h a t many
others contributing to the blog were what he calls "former disgruntled employees or
contractors who worked w i t h Trivedi Entities." Trivedi Aff. f 23-24. Shortly
thereafter, plaintiffs commenced l i t i g a t i o n against L a n g and others i n Arizona,
resulting i n a default judgment against L a n g which was overturned on
9

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

jurisdictional grounds by the Minnesota Court of Appeals i n Trivedi LLC v. Lang,
No. A13-2087, 2014 W L 2807981, at * 1 ( M i n n . App. June 23, 2014) (unpublished).
L a n g notes t h a t the Arizona default judgments entered against L a n g by each of the
plaintiffs i n the action, totaling $59,000,000, were based on claims of lost profits
and other damages, further supporting his claim t h a t Trivedi and his entities
clearly claim to have enormous public interest.
Plaintiffs commenced this action i n early 2014, asserting claims i n this matter
similar to those found i n the prior Arizona l i t i g a t i o n . Plaintiffs allege t h a t L a n g
generally made numerous false statements regarding Trivedi personally and his
entities and those false statements have significantly damaged Trivedi and his
related entities financially. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Lang's false
statements have caused losses to their profits and reductions i n seminar revenues.
This court previously denied Lang's motion to dismiss, and he now seeks summary
judgment on the issue of whether plaintiffs are l i m i t e d purpose public figures for
purposes of the defamation-based claims.
2. D i s c u s s i o n .
a. T h e A c t u a l M a l i c e S t a n d a r d A p p l i e s to L i m i t e d P u r p o s e P u b l i c
Figures.
I n New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686

(1964), the U n i t e d States Supreme Court held t h a t public officials who are libeled
must prove w i t h convincing clarity t h a t the libelous statements were published w i t h
actual malice. A c t u a l malice is established by showing t h a t the publication was
made w i t h knowledge of the falsity of the statement or i n reckless disregard of the
t r u t h or falsity of the statement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
10

376 U.S. at 279—

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

80. Reckless disregard means publication w i t h substantial doubts about the t r u t h
of the matter. St. Amant v. Thompson,

390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325, 20

L.Ed.2d 262, 267 (1968).
The holding i n New York Times was extended to public figures i n Curtis
Publishing

Co. v. Butts,

388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), rev.

denied, 389 U.S. 889, 88 S. Ct. 11, 19 L.Ed.2d 197 (1967). Later, i n Rosenbloom
Metromedia,

v.

Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S. Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the Supreme

Court held t h a t the New York Times actual malice standard applies to public issues
as w e l l as to public officials and public figures. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
held t h a t "Minnesota affords to nonmedia defendants the same first amendment
protection for criticism of public officials that i t grants to the mass media." Britton
v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 521 ( M i n n . 1991).
However, i n Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d
789 (1974), the Court rejected the New York Times actual malice standard for
defamation cases brought by private plaintiffs against nonmedia defendants. I n
Gertz, the Supreme Court held t h a t "so long as they do not impose l i a b i l i t y w i t h o u t
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of l i a b i l i t y for
a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual." 418 U.S. at 347, 94 S. Ct. at 3010—11. I n response to Gertz, the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a negligence standard for private individuals
asserting defamation claims i n Minnesota. Jadwin
Tribune

v. Minneapolis

Star

and

Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 ( M i n n . 1985). Thus, i n Minnesota, "a private

i n d i v i d u a l may recover actual damages for a defamatory publication upon proof t h a t
11

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

the defendant knew or i n the exercise of reasonable care should have known t h a t
the defamatory statement was false." 367 N.W.2d at 491.
b. D e t e r m i n i n g W h e t h e r a P a r t y is a L i m i t e d P u r p o s e P u b l i c F i g u r e .
The status of the p l a i n t i f f is i m p o r t a n t i n determining whether the actual malice
standard applies i n a defamation case. Whether the p l a i n t i f f i n a defamation action
is a public or private figure is a question of law for the court. Chafoulias
Peterson,

v.

668 N.W.2d 642, 649 ( M i n n . 2003), rev. granted ( M i n n . Sept. 17, 2003)

(case remanded to court of appeals to determine the issues raised i n alternative
grounds for summary judgment presented i n respondent Peterson's notice of
review); Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 ( M i n n . 1991); Jadwin

v.

Minneapolis

Star and Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 483 ( M i n n . 1985). D e t e r m i n i n g whether a
person is a private defamation p l a i n t i f f for purposes of a defamation action is a
process of elimination. Private persons are those who are neither public officials
nor public figures.
I n Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789
(1974), the Supreme Court established three categories of public figures:
Hypothetically, i t may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of t r u l y
involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most p a r t
those who a t t a i n this status have assumed roles of special prominence
i n the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power
and influence t h a t they are deemed public figures for a l l purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have t h r u s t themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies i n order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved. I n either event, they invite attention
and comment.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345. The first group includes the rare
"involuntary" public figure. The next category essentially contains celebrities and
12

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

prominent social figures who are deemed public figures for " a l l purposes." The f i n a l
group consists of l i m i t e d purpose public figures who a t t a i n their position by
t h r u s t i n g themselves into the vortex of a public controversy to influence i t s
outcome. Jadwin,

supra, 367 N.W.2d 476, 484.

There is no question that T r i v e d i is neither an "involuntary" public figure, nor
" a l l purpose" public figure. He is either a "limited purpose" public figure, w i t h
respect to his public claims of powers or abilities to alter the energies of the h u m a n
body and the n a t u r a l w o r l d through the "Trivedi Effect," or he is a private
i n d i v i d u a l . "The line between l i m i t e d purpose public figure status and private
i n d i v i d u a l status has proved difficult to draw." Jadwin,

367 N.W.2d at 484. Since

Gertz, the U n i t e d States Supreme Court has examined and developed the
distinction. The public figure standards were f u r t h e r i l l u m i n a t e d i n subsequent
cases. E.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 99 S. Ct. 2701, 61
L.Ed.2d 450 (1979); Hutchinson

v. Proxmire,

L.Ed.2d 411 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,

443 U.S. 111, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 61
424 U.S. 448, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d

154 (1976). The Minnesota courts have followed those standards. E.g.,
v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 652 ( M i n n . 2003); Jacobson
Communications
Minneapolis

v.

Chafoulias

Rochester

Corp., Inc., 410 N.W.2d 830, 833—36 ( M i n n . 1987); Jadwin

v.

Star and Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 485—86 ( M i n n . 1985).

Gertz arose from an article published by an arm of the John B i r c h Society about
an alleged Communist campaign to discredit the police. The 18-page article
concerned the t r i a l and conviction of a Chicago police officer for the murder of a 17year-old boy. The article was intended to persuade readers t h a t the policeman had
13

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

been the v i c t i m of a Communist "frame-up," p a r t of a larger conspiracy to lay the
groundwork for a national police force and, i n t u r n , a t o t a l i t a r i a n state. Elmer
Gertz, a Chicago lawyer representing the victim's family, was named only for his
role as counsel for the victim's f a m i l y i n the civil action against the policeman and
was accused of being an architect of the frame-up, labeled a "Leninist" and
"Communist fronter," w i t h a police file t h a t "took a big, I r i s h cop to l i f t . " These
statements, among others, were concededly false and defamatory. The question i n
the case was whether Gertz was a private or public figure w i t h i n the new rule.
The Supreme Court held t h a t Gertz was not w i t h i n any category of public figure.
He was not a public official or an " a l l purpose" public figure, notwithstanding his
considerable stature i n the community. The court also concluded t h a t for the
purposes of the defamation suit, he was not a "limited purpose" public figure w i t h
respect to his involvement i n the prosecution of the police officer. H i s role h a d been
confined to personal representation of the victim's f a m i l y and did not rise to the
level of "voluntary injectment into a public controversy necessary to trigger the New
York Times rule." Jadwin,
I n Time, Inc. v. Firestone,

367 N.W.2d at 484.
supra, the court concluded t h a t the Firestone divorce

proceeding, the subject of a Time magazine article, was not the type of "public
controversy" delineated i n Gertz. Although m a r i t a l difficulties of extremely wealthy
individuals are of interest to some portion of the reading public, M r s . Firestone h a d
not t h r u s t herself voluntarily into any public controversy. 424 U.S. at 454, 96 S. Ct.
at 965. Furthermore, she was not a prominent person outside of her local society.

14

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

424 U.S. at 453—55, 96 S. Ct. at 964—65. Thus, the t e r m "public controversy" cannot
be equated w i t h " a l l controversies of interest to the public." Id.
The Supreme Court next decided Hutchinson
Reader's Digest Association,

Inc., supra.

v. Proxmire,

supra, and Wolston v.

The lower courts determined t h a t the

plaintiffs were public figures i n both cases. Hutchinson

involved a defamation

action which arose from a "Golden Fleece of the M o n t h A w a r d " given by Senator
Proxmire for wasteful government spending. The lower courts found Hutchinson, a
professor and research director, a public figure because he successfully applied for
federal funds, reported to local newspapers of the grants and had access to "some
newspapers" and the "wire services" i n responding to the award. Hutchinson,

443

U.S. at 134, 99 S. Ct. at 2687.
The Supreme Court found none of these reasons persuasive. H i s access to the
media came after the alleged libel and was thus irrelevant. Id. F u r t h e r ,
Hutchinson neither "thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence
others" nor "assumed any role of public prominence i n the broad question of concern
about expenditures." I d . Moreover, the alleged "public controversy" h a d no prior
independent existence, but was created by the libelous publication. Id. Those
charged w i t h defamation cannot by their own conduct create their defense by giving
the claimant public figure status.
Wolston involved a Reader's Digest book falsely n a m i n g Wolston as having been
indicted as a Soviet espionage agent i n 1958. Wolston h a d been the subject of a
grand j u r y investigation at t h a t time and had received attention i n the press for his
refusal to comply w i t h a subpoena. The lower courts determined t h a t his w i l l f u l
15

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

failure to appear was sufficient public involvement w i t h a public controversy to find
h i m a public figure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding i t "more accurate to say
t h a t petitioner was dragged u n w i l l i n g l y into the controversy."

Wolston, 443 U.S. at

166, 99 S. Ct. at 2707.
The plaintiffs i n Gertz, Firestone,

Hutchinson

and Wolston were a l l private

individuals enmeshed i n personal lives or work which had momentarily caught the
attention of the press and public, largely as illustrative of some perceived social i l l .
They had neither impliedly consented to such exposure by " t h r u s t i n g themselves" i n
the public arena, nor sought to resolve a "public controversy" which existed prior to
the media's creating one by defaming t h e m . Each was ultimately found not to be a
l i m i t e d purpose public figure.
The Minnesota Supreme Court i n Chafoulias

v. Peterson,

668 N.W.2d 642, 652

( M i n n . 2003), reiterated the criteria to be used i n determining whether a person is a
l i m i t e d purpose public figure as suggested by Gertz:
(1) whether a public controversy existed; (2) whether the p l a i n t i f f
played a meaningful role i n the controversy; and (3) whether the
allegedly defamatory statement related to the controversy.
668 N.W.2d at 651. The court defined a "public controversy" as follows:
A public controversy is a dispute t h a t "has received public attention
because its ramifications w i l l be felt by persons who are not direct
participants." ... Private concerns are not public controversies simply
because they attract attention .... I n isolating the public controversy,
courts look to those controversies t h a t are already the subject of debate
i n the public arena at the time of the alleged defamation . .
B u t the scope of the public controversy, for this purpose, may be
narrower t h a n the breadth of the public's interest. M a n y stories may be
considered "newsworthy" and deserving of the public's attention, but
may not be a "public controversy." A public controversy requires two
elements: (1) there must be some real dispute t h a t is being publicly
debated; and (2) i t must be reasonably foreseeable t h a t the dispute could
16

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

have substantial ramifications for persons beyond
participants . .

the immediate

Under this definition, the existence of a private civil dispute is not
necessarily a public controversy. Although such a dispute may receive
publicity by inevitably becoming public when filed i n court, or when a
party chooses to make his or her allegations public, the courts have
recognized t h a t the mere participation i n the l i t i g a t i o n of such disputes
does not create a public controversy t h a t confers public figure status . .
668 N.W.2d at 652 (citations omitted).
I f there is a public controversy, the next step is to determine the role of the
person i n t h a t controversy. The court i n Chafoulias

relied i n p a r t on Gertz i n

concluding t h a t the issue is whether the person "'voluntarily inject[ed] h i m s e l f or
was 'drawn into' t h a t controversy." 668 N.W.2d at 652. That means considering
whether the person has "thrust himself to the forefront of the controversy as we
have defined i t so as to achieve a 'special prominence' i n the debate and become a
factor i n resolving the controversy." 668 N.W.2d at 653.
The person "must either 'have been purposely t r y i n g to influence the outcome' of
the controversy or must have realistically 'expected, because of his position i n the
controversy, to have an impact on its resolution.'" 668 N.W.2d at 653. This analysis
requires examination of the extent to which the person's participation i n the
controversy was voluntary, the extent to which the person had access to effective
channels of communication to counteract false statements, and the prominence of
the role the person played i n the public controversy. 668 N.W.2d at 653. The court
must also examine the relationship of the statement to the public controversy to
determine whether the statement "relates directly" to the controversy or is
"necessarily germane" to the controversy. 668 N.W.2d at 654.

17

 62-CV-14-4330

I n Chafoulias,

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

a hotel owner brought defamation claims against the lawyer

representing former employees i n a harassment lawsuit and ABC News. The court
confirmed t h a t there was indeed a public controversy i n existence at the time of the
ABC news report, thereby i n v o k i n g the public figure privilege as to ABC. The
existence of the private civil dispute between the employer and employees was not
necessarily a public controversy. The public controversy developed after the
publication of the allegations i n the lawsuit was "about whether the allegations
were being sufficiently investigated by the hotel or the local law-enforcement
officials." 668 N.W.2d at 652. Thus, by the time t h a t ABC aired its story, a public
controversy existed as to claims against ABC.
The court f u r t h e r determined t h a t Chafoulias was not "dragged u n w i t t i n g l y "
into the public eye, but t h a t his actions to hire a media consultant, issue a press
release, and w r i t e letters to the local television station and ABC producer were
sufficient to establish t h a t he " d i d t h r u s t himself into the public controversy."

668

N.W.2d at 653. Another i m p o r t a n t element of t h a t determination was the court's
finding t h a t Chafoulias assumed a role of "especial prominence i n society" t h a t
n a t u r a l l y "invites attention and comment" from the public and the press and
"assumed a position t h a t invites attention and comment about the manner i n which
he conducts his business affairs." 668 N.W.2d at 654.
W i t h regard to the lawyer, however, the supreme court held t h a t a defendant
"cannot take advantage of the l i m i t e d purpose public figure privilege w i t h respect to
a public controversy t h a t she caused." 668 N.W.2d at 654. I n that case, the
attorney-defendant filed sexual harassment claims against the p l a i n t i f f i n federal
18

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

court, which created publicity surrounding the harassment claims. The court held
t h a t i f the attorney "was the source of the media coverage that she relies upon to
establish a public controversy, she would be disqualified from asserting the
privilege for speech concerning a l i m i t e d purpose public figure." 668 N.W.2d at 656.
The court remanded the issue to the district court for f u r t h e r findings on t h a t issue.
I n Chafoulias,

the Minnesota Supreme Court provided guidance for the t r i a l

courts for resolving the constitutional issue of whether a person is a l i m i t e d purpose
public figure. The district court conducted a p r e t r i a l evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the p l a i n t i f f was a l i m i t e d public purpose public figure. The
supreme court held t h a t i t was a permissible alternative and t h a t the process the
district court followed was w i t h i n i t s discretion. Chafoulias

v. Peterson,

668 N.W.2d

at 650—51. The court concluded t h a t the U.S. Constitution p e r m i t t e d states to
resolve fact issues m a t e r i a l to the existence of the privilege by using traditional
methods t h a t could include submission to a j u r y w i t h a special interrogatory or a
p r e t r i a l evidentiary hearing subject to appellate review for clear error.

Chafoulias

v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d at 650.
Jadwin

v. Minneapolis

Star and Tribune Co. involved defamation claims against

the newspaper by a bond fund owner and two affiliated corporations r e l a t i n g to an
article appearing i n the newspaper.

367 N.W.2d 476. The article was unflattering

to J a d w i n and his companies and suggested he was inexperienced and h a d
misrepresented his background. J a d w i n wrote letters to the editor demanding a
retraction of the alleged false and defamatory statements. The t r i a l court found
t h a t J a d w i n was not a l i m i t e d purpose public figure because he had "neither invited
19

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

undue attention and comment nor assumed special prominence prior to the article's
publication." Id. at 483.
The supreme court independently reviewed the question and affirmed the t r i a l
court's finding t h a t J a d w i n was not a public figure. The court reasoned t h a t
Jadwin's accomplishments and activities "are not u n l i k e countless other finance
professionals and do not raise h i m to the level of public figure for purposes of this
libel action." I d . at 486. While the v i a b i l i t y and investment potential of Jadwin's
bond fund was certainly a matter of public concern w i t h i n the newspaper's
circulation range, soliciting public investment does not automatically transform any
small businessman into a public figure. I d . The Minnesota Supreme Court noted
"clear parallels" between the p l a i n t i f f i n Hutchinson

v. Proxmire

and Jadwin. The

court concluded t h a t "Jadwin at no time met the rationale of access to rebut the
alleged libelous publication t h a t is a distinguishing feature between private
individuals and public figures." I d .
c. T h e S t a n d a r d for L i m i t e d P u r p o s e P u b l i c F i g u r e C o r p o r a t e
E n t i t y D e f a m a t i o n C l a i m s Also R e q u i r e s P r o o f of A c t u a l M a l i c e .
The l i m i t e d public figure standard from Gertz applies i n defamation cases
brought by i n d i v i d u a l plaintiffs. The proper application of the Gertz categories i n
cases involving corporate plaintiffs has never been addressed by the U n i t e d States
Supreme Court. I t is clear, however, t h a t the court i n Gertz was deeply responsive
to the need for protection of uniquely h u m a n interests not possessed by
corporations. The New York Times rule was obliged to yield only to preserve "'our
basic concept of the essential dignity and w o r t h of every h u m a n being.'" See Gertz,

20

 62-CV-14-4330

418 U.S. at 341, 94 S. Ct. at 3008, quoting Rosenblatt

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92, 86 S.

Ct. 669, 679, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966) (Stewart, J . , concurring).
I n Jadwin,

the Minnesota Supreme Court held t h a t corporate plaintiffs must

prove actual malice when the defendants establish t h a t the matter published is of
legitimate public concern. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted t h a t the increasing
emphasis on the need for disclosure of commercial information proceeds side by side
w i t h the emphasis on the protection of personal privacy from defamatory disclosure
and i n t r u s i o n . I t held, therefore, "that corporate plaintiffs i n defamation actions
must prove actual malice by media defendants when the defendants establish t h a t
the defamatory m a t e r i a l concerns matters of legitimate public interest i n the
geographic area i n which the defamatory m a t e r i a l is published, either because of
the nature of the business conducted or because the public has an especially strong
interest i n the investigation or disclosure of the commercial information at issue."
Jadwin,

367 N.W.2d at 477-78. Such a rule w i l l encourage the media to probe the

business w o r l d to the depth which is necessary to p e r m i t the k i n d of business
reporting v i t a l to an informed public. 367 N.W.2d at 488.
I n Jadwin,

the court reviewed the various approaches around the country to this

issue. These cases reflect the increasing importance attached by the U n i t e d States
Supreme Court to disclosure of and access to commercial information. First
Amendment protection has been specifically extended to commercial speech on the
ground t h a t society has a strong interest i n the free flow of commercial information:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources i n large measure w i l l be made through
numerous private economic decisions. I t is a matter of public interest
21

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

t h a t those decisions, i n the aggregate, be intelligent and w e l l informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Virginia

State Board of Pharmacy

v. Virginia

Citizens Consumer

Council, Inc., 425

U.S. 748, 765, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1827, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976).
I n Jadwin,

the court held t h a t while J a d w i n himself was not a l i m i t e d purpose

public figure, the two related corporate plaintiffs were. Those plaintiffs were
therefore required to show actual malice by the Minneapolis Star and Tribune and
its reporter. Of the facts relevant to that decision, the court discussed the entities
were registered to advise and sell under federal and state law. Seeking customers,
the companies were actively seeking the attention of the media and the public i n
news columns, voluntarily subjecting themselves to and assuming the risk of public
scrutiny. The court noted t h a t "[t]his is precisely the sort of activity the public most
needs to have adequately investigated and reported and is the sort of economic
information afforded heightened F i r s t Amendment protection." 367 N.W.2d at 488.
The supreme court f u r t h e r stated t h a t the reputational interests of those
corporations were de m i n i m i s compared to the reputational interests of Thomas
Jadwin i n the financial community. The court reversed the t r i a l court's
determination t h a t the corporations were private individuals and determined t h a t
proof of actual malice was necessary to support their claims. After carefully
scrutinizing the record before i t , the t r i a l court concluded t h a t no genuine factual
issue of actual malice had been raised. The supreme court, after reviewing the
entire record, agreed. Since a showing of actual malice is an essential element of
the corporate plaintiffs' case, failure to raise a fact issue on t h a t question entitles
the defendants to judgment against those parties.
22

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

d. P l a i n t i f f M a h e n d r a T r i v e d i a n d h i s R e l a t e d C o r p o r a t e E n t i t i e s a r e
L i m i t e d P u r p o s e P u b l i c F i g u r e s R e q u i r e d to S h o w A c t u a l M a l i c e .
As noted i n the factual summary above, T r i v e d i admits t h a t he is the founder of
the T r i v e d i Foundation and the other T r i v e d i Entities "dedicated to advancing their
customers' well-being and s p i r i t u a l i t y through products and services t h a t reflect m y
gifts and talents." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 2. Their mission "is to help people function at a
higher level by strengthening their health and well-being." Id. The T r i v e d i
Entities' executive, Alice Branton, states under oath t h a t " M r . T r i v e d i utilize[s]
energy transmissions, known as the T r i v e d i Effect, t h a t have the potential to
transform l i v i n g organisms and non-living materials. Recipients of M r . Trivedi's
energy transmissions have reported a beneficial impact on their health and wellbeing." B r a n t o n Aff. ]j 4. The entire focus is on Trivedi's "unique abilities."
Trivedi claims t h a t the T r i v e d i Effect has benefited many people. "The T r i v e d i
Companies created a website which compiles the hundreds of video and w r i t t e n
testimonials regarding the benefits of the T r i v e d i Effect." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 19. The
website is located at www.triveditestimonials.com. That site identifies seven other
"Trivedi Global Sites" obviously aimed at m a r k e t i n g the T r i v e d i Effect to a global
marketplace. One such site claims to have changed 250,000 lives.
www.trivedieffect.com. T r i v e d i acknowledges t h a t "[s]ince 2009, the T r i v e d i
Companies and l have invested hundreds of thousands of dollars to see the impact
of the T r i v e d i Effect." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 18.
According to T r i v e d i , the " T r i v e d i Entities have conducted more t h a n 4,000
scientific studies at major research institutions throughout the world and, as a
result, have received more t h a n a 170 publications i n leading international, peer23

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

reviewed scientific journals. The beneficial effects of the T r i v e d i Companies'
services and products, and the methodology behind the creation of those services
and products, have been demonstrated i n numerous studies and published,
scientific journals." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 5.
Trivedi identifies many publications regarding his stated T r i v e d i Effect and
states t h a t "[a]t the time M r . L a n g began publishing his defamatory statements, six
i m p o r t a n t scientific studies verifying the efficacy of the T r i v e d i Effect had already
been published i n peer-reviewed, scientific journals." T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 30. He notes
t h a t "[t]he scientists, a l l experts i n their field, who reviewed the six studies,
determined t h a t the scientific protocols and methods involved i n the studies were
appropriate and followed by the researchers."

T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 3 1 . The T r i v e d i

Foundation promotes scientific research of the effectiveness of the T r i v e d i Effect
and the broader ability of h u m a n consciousness to alter l i v i n g organisms and non¬
l i v i n g matter. As the result of all of the research, T r i v e d i has developed contacts
and supporters throughout the world. T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 6.
I n addition to Trivedi's own statements and those of his entities and affiliates,
L a n g provided undisputed evidence t h a t T r i v e d i promotes himself worldwide on his
websites and on m u l t i p l e social media platforms, such as YouTube and Facebook, i n
which T r i v e d i claims he has performed such feats as "70, 000 medical miracles a l l
over the world." L a n g Aff. ]j 2. L a n g submits t h a t T r i v e d i has publicly claimed to
have as many as 200,000 patrons. The court notes that a T r i v e d i website now
claims t h a t number to be 250,000. L a n g also refers to claims by Debra Poneman,
former T r i v e d i Foundation president and trustee, disseminated online and i n
24

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

webcasts t h a t "[Trivedi] restores happiness to cells," and statements by the T r i v e d i
Entities' m a r k e t i n g director, Janice Burney, t h a t "he's the Second Coming of Jesus"
and "the next Einstein." Id. T r i v e d i himself states t h a t since 2009, he and the
Trivedi Companies have "invested hundreds of thousands of dollars to see the
impact of the T r i v e d i Effect," including on research occurred i n 2009, 2010 and
2011. T r i v e d i Aff. ]j 18.
The three-step analysis set forth i n Chafoulias

applies to determine whether

Trivedi and his entities are l i m i t e d purpose public figures. I n t h a t analysis, the
court must determine (1) whether a public controversy existed; (2) whether the
p l a i n t i f f played a meaningful role i n the controversy; and (3) whether the allegedly
defamatory statement related to the controversy.
The court finds t h a t Trivedi's and his related entities' m y r i a d of claims and
statements regarding his "unique ability" to open a connection to "Divine power"
purposely attracted public attention and controversy. The record is replete w i t h
claims, assertions and m a r k e t i n g materials from T r i v e d i and the T r i v e d i Entities
distributed worldwide at the time of or prior to the alleged defamatory statements
by Lang. T r i v e d i himself says t h a t i t was studied thoroughly through the scientific
method and t h a t he or his entities have advocated the veracity of those claims i n a
m u l t i t u d e of publications a l l over the world. The court does not i n t e n d to consider
or evaluate the accuracy or v a l i d i t y of Trivedi's claims or abilities. Nonetheless, the
claims of being Jesus-like or Einstein-like are, by their nature, controversial claims
likely to be challenged or refuted. To be sure, debate was occurring both on the
internet through the PurQi.com blog and by research professor Slawecki at Penn
25

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

State, who had publicly posted her summary of Penn State research questioning
Trivedi's purported abilities. These claims, along w i t h the self-proclaimed 4,000
scientific studies and publications i n "170 publications i n leading international,
peer-reviewed scientific journals" p u t Trivedi and his enterprise directly into the
global marketplace of ideas, obviously intended to reach a broad audience and
attract interest i n Trivedi and his enterprise. These vast claims of his personal
powers propelled Trivedi and his entities into the public arena to affirm, debate,
question and challenge his assertions, and i n so doing, his character and credibility.
Upon determining there is a public controversy, the next step is to determine the
role of the person i n t h a t controversy—whether the person "'voluntarily inject[ed]
h i m s e l f or was 'drawn into' t h a t controversy." T h a t means considering whether the
person has "thrust himself to the forefront of the controversy to achieve a 'special
prominence' i n the debate and become a factor i n resolving the controversy." This
analysis examines the extent to which the person's participation i n the controversy
was voluntary, the extent to which the person had access to effective channels of
communication to counteract false statements, and the prominence of the role the
person played i n the public controversy. Here there is no doubt t h a t Trivedi and his
related entities intentionally and deliberately placed themselves into the epicenter
of public debate by affirmatively m a k i n g the claims to a global audience and
seeking out thousands of "scientific studies" to support those contentions.
Finally, the court must examine the relationship of the alleged defamatory
statements to the public controversy to determine whether the statements relate
directly to the controversy or are germane to the controversy. As indicated at the
26

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

outset, there are numerous categories of alleged defamatory statements included i n
the complaint. Certainly, a l l of Lang's statements alleging generally t h a t the
Trivedi Effect is a "sham" and to the effect t h a t "Trivedi's claims are false" are
germane to the controversy.
There are claims of defamation relating to sexual misconduct and illegal conduct
on the part of Trivedi and the Trivedi Entities t h a t require separate consideration.
For example, the complaint alleges t h a t L a n g falsely accuses Trivedi of sexual
misconduct and sexual harassment. A review of the alleged defamatory statements,
and the evidence i n the record, confirms t h a t the statements relating to sexual
misconduct are directed specifically about allegations of sexual harassment and
misconduct i n v o l v i n g Trivedi employees or students and not of parties unrelated to
the Trivedi enterprise. They are a part of a theme of challenging Trivedi's
legitimacy and his integrity, work environment and professional ethics.
The court has reviewed the alleged defamatory statements i n the complaint and
the many pages of exhibits submitted by plaintiffs i n support of those claims. The
context of Lang's statements are t h a t he has received reports from people who were
involved w i t h Trivedi or conducted research or investigation into his work and
background. One such statement is a good example. L a n g is alleged to have said,
"Recently I received a copy of the copy (sic) of an email where Trivedi was accused of
sexually molesting young women by a prominent person i n the health field who was
then enrolled i n his Master Healing class." See Complaint, para. 17, m. Another is
i n paragraph 17, y, of the complaint i n which i t is alleged L a n g wrote, " I have h a d
reported to me m u l t i p l e accusations of rape on the p a r t of M r . Trivedi and spoken
27

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

w i t h two young women who were arranged i n marriage only to sponsor his
citizenship." There are numerous other statements alleged relating to Trivedi's
i m m i g r a t i o n status i n the complaint. Likewise, there are statements by L a n g
including allegations of financial fraud by Trivedi and the Trivedi Entities.
The record includes a plethora of emails, correspondence, reports and research
articles, blog posts and other materials showing the work done by L a n g to
investigate and publish to the world any and a l l evidence t h a t Trivedi and his
companies were not legitimate. Through that work, he communicated w i t h sources
who stated they h a d actual knowledge of wrongdoings and alleged u n t r u t h s about
Trivedi. L a n g used t h a t information to convince others to go public w i t h their own
experiences w i t h Trivedi. He also brought the allegations to the attention of l a w
enforcement, including the F B I , hoping that would lend legitimacy to his work and
further expose T r i v e d i as his sources were describing to h i m .
A l l of this work was done i n Lang's capacity as a blogger, journalist,
investigative reporter or simply as someone a i r i n g w h a t others believed to be the
t r u t h about Trivedi and his companies. The alleged defamation a l l relates to
remarkable claims of the Trivedi Effect, Trivedi's character and credibility, the
network of entities created by Trivedi and the products and services which he was
m a r k e t i n g around the world. I n short, Lang's statements went to the heart of the
controversy about whether or not the Trivedi Effect was credible. Because of the
nature of the Trivedi assertions, Trivedi placed his credibility and character directly
into the controversy. I n t h a t regard, a l l of the alleged defamatory statements
directly relate to t h a t controversy and are germane to t h a t controversy.
28

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

I n l i g h t of the foregoing, Trivedi and the Trivedi Entities are deemed l i m i t e d
purpose public figures for purposes of this defamation lawsuit.

While perhaps not

the conventional type of journalist, i t is apparent t h a t L a n g was acting as a
journalist i n a broad sense i n his investigative efforts as i t relates to the claims of
the corporate entities. The court concludes, therefore, t h a t the constitutional
privilege applies to their claims and t h a t they must prove by clear and convincing
evidence t h a t Lang's statements were published w i t h actual malice.
e. Plaintiffs F a i l e d to P r o v i d e Sufficient E v i d e n c e of A c t u a l M a l i c e
to O v e r c o m e L a n g ' s Motion for S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t .
Under the standard established i n New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

and Gertz,

l i m i t e d purpose public figures who are libeled must prove w i t h convincing clarity
t h a t the libelous statements were published w i t h actual malice. A c t u a l malice is
established by showing t h a t the publication was made w i t h knowledge of the falsity
of the statement or i n reckless disregard of the t r u t h or falsity of the statement.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. at 279-80. Reckless disregard means

publication w i t h substantial doubts about the t r u t h of the matter. St. Amant v.
Thompson,

390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 267 (1968).

L a n g seeks dismissal of all of plaintiffs' claims on the grounds t h a t plaintiffs
have not and cannot establish t h a t Lang's alleged defamatory statements, even i f
false, were made w i t h actual malice as defined by the Supreme Court. As noted by
L a n g i n his memorandum, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving t h a t each
defamatory statement was made w i t h knowledge of falsity or w i t h reckless
disregard as to t r u t h or falsity. Not t h a t he carries the burden on this issue, but
L a n g submitted a sworn affidavit along w i t h exhibits and discovery materials
29

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

demonstrating t h a t he had good reason to believe t h a t his statements were true. To
be sure, many of Lang's statements were relaying information from others, and he
often attributed his statements to those who provided h i m the information.
Plaintiffs' argument i n opposition to this issue is twofold. First, they argue t h a t
L a n g has "produced almost no admissible evidence to show t h a t his statements
were supported by reliable third-parties" and, second, t h a t L a n g did not believe or
had obvious reasons to doubt the t r u t h of the statements he made. As to the first
argument, plaintiffs attempt to shift the burden of showing good f a i t h onto Lang.
To the contrary, however, the constitutional privilege at issue here requires t h a t
plaintiffs "prove w i t h convincing clarity that the libelous statements were published
w i t h actual malice" as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

and i t s progeny.

As to the second basis for opposing summary judgment on the issue of actual
malice, plaintiffs argue t h a t L a n g relied on the statements of others who were
u n t r u s t w o r t h y . They argue, for example, t h a t the c r i m i n a l record of one source
should establish actual malice by Lang. They also assert t h a t plaintiffs' discovery
response is sufficient to establish clear proof of knowledge of falsity or indifference
by Lang. Plaintiffs stated i n their interrogatory answers t h a t "Defendant either
uttered these statements w i t h o u t proof or t r u s t w o r t h y support for the defamatory
nature of the statements or he relied upon information from individuals who were
obviously motivated to h u r t and injure Plaintiffs and who were k n o w n to Defendant
to be untrustworthy." Obviously this answer is not factual admissible evidence b u t
rather a repetition of the allegations i n their complaint.

30

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

They also argue t h a t L a n g admitted on several occasions t h a t other t h a n the
statements by sources, he h a d no independent proof t h a t w h a t he was being t o l d
was true. Requiring independent proof of statements by sources is not p a r t of the
standard plaintiffs must meet. Rather, plaintiffs must show clear proof of
knowledge of falsity or indifference by Lang. Such a standard does not require t h a t
L a n g independently prove the t r u t h or accuracy of his statements or those provided
by others. The record shows t h a t L a n g had m u l t i p l e sources for some of the
statements he published, i n c l u d i n g about sexual improprieties. The number of
sources, or scarcity thereof, as to each statement does not establish proof of
knowledge of falsity.
Overall, plaintiffs' arguments on this issue are focused on discrediting Lang's
sources. While perhaps a good t r i a l strategy for cross-examining those witnesses,
the arguments are insufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether there is clear
proof t h a t L a n g h a d knowledge of falsity or indifference. "[F]ailure to investigate
before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is
not sufficient to establish reckless disregard." Harte-Hanks
v. Connaughton,

Communications,

Inc.

491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989). Again, the burden is on plaintiffs to

meet this h i g h constitutional burden, and they have failed to do so at this critical
stage of the proceedings. Plaintiffs have not set forth enough evidence for a
reasonably j u r y to f i n d by clear and convincing evidence t h a t L a n g acted recklessly.
f.

S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t is A p p r o p r i a t e .

A public figure may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood w i t h o u t
clear and convincing proof t h a t the false "statement was made w i t h 'actual malice'31

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

t h a t is, w i t h knowledge t h a t i t was false or w i t h reckless disregard of whether i t
was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S. Ct.

710, 725-726 (1964). Judges i n such cases have a constitutional duty to "exercise
independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice
w i t h convincing clarity." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 514, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (1984). The sufficiency of the evidence to
support a jury's f i n d i n g of actual malice is a question of law.
Communications,

Inc. v. Connaughton,

Harte-Hanks

491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2694, 105

L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). "Judges, as expositors of the Constitution," have a duty to
"independently decide whether the evidence i n the record is sufficient to cross the
constitutional threshold t h a t bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported
by clear and convincing proof of 'actual malice.'" Id. (quoting Bose Corporation v.
Consumers

Union, 466 U.S. at 511, 104 S. Ct. at 1965). A genuine issue of fact as to

actual malice exists only i f the facts permit the conclusion t h a t the defendants " i n
fact entertained serious doubts as to the t r u t h of [the] publication." St. Amant v.
Thompson,

390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325 (1968).

Plaintiffs have provided scant evidence to establish t h a t Lang acted w i t h actual
malice. The affidavits submitted offer conclusory and self-serving statements t h a t
his statements were untrue and he knew i t or should have k n o w n i t . As a general
proposition, conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion
for summary judgment. See, e.g., Conlin v. City of Saint Paul, 594 N.W.2d 396
( M i n n . 2000). Moreover, the factual evidence offered by plaintiffs regarding this
issue establishes, at most, i n the l i g h t most favorable to plaintiffs, t h a t L a n g may
32

 62-CV-14-4330

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
6/1/2016 4:00:33 PM
Ramsey County, MN

have acted negligently. T h a t is insufficient to establish actual malice as a matter of
law. Consequently, the court finds t h a t a reasonable j u r y could not conclude by
clear and convincing evidence t h a t L a n g acted w i t h actual malice when m a k i n g the
statements at issue i n this case.
3. C o n c l u s i o n .
For the reasons stated above, the court finds t h a t plaintiffs are l i m i t e d purpose
public figures and therefore must establish actual malice on the p a r t of Lang. They
have failed as a matter of l a w to create a genuine issue for t r i a l i n t h a t regard.
Because a l l of plaintiffs' claims are premised on the alleged defamation, a l l claims
asserted i n the complaint are dismissed. Plaintiffs acknowledge i n their
memorandum (page 34) t h a t the damages sought through the conspiracy and
tortious interference claims "are directly related to the rise of Defendant's
defamatory statements."
When the gravamen of the claims are based on defamation principles, a p l a i n t i f f
cannot call a defamation "interference w i t h prospective advantage" or a civil
conspiracy and thereby avoid the application of the constitutional privilege to make
the statement. As one commentator reasoned, "plaintiffs would otherwise be able
simply to plead another tort and thereby evade the constitutional, statutory, and
common-law strictures on the cause of action for defamation." Robert D. Sack, Sack
on Defamation,

§13.4 (4th ed. 2010). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed.
RAA

33