Case: 1:11-cv-03054 Document #: 215 Filed: 12/04/14 Page 1 of 37 PageID #:2964

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MEANITH HUON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BREAKING MEDIA, LLC a/k/a BREAKING
MEDIA; BREAKING MEDIA, INC. a/k/a
BREAKING MEDIA; DAVID LAT; ELIE MYSTAL;
JOHN LERNER; DAVID MINKIN; GAWKER
MEDIA, LLC a/k/a GAWKER MEDIA; BLOGWIRE
HUNGARY SZELLEMI ALKOTAST HASZNOSITO
KFT; GAWKER MEDIA GROUP, INC. a/k/a
GAWKER MEDIA; GAWKER ENTERTAINMENT,
LLC; GAWKER TECHNOLOGY, LLC; GAWKER
SALES, LLC; NICK DENTON; IRIN CARMON; and
GABY DARBYSHIRE,
Defendants.

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No. 11 C 03054
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Meanith Huon (“Huon”), brings state law claims for defamation and related
torts against two groups of defendants: the Above the Law (“ATL”) defendants and the Gawker
defendants. 1 Huon initially sued the ATL defendants for publishing an allegedly defamatory
article on AboveTheLaw.com that discussed his criminal trial for sexual assault charges. He
subsequently amended his complaint to include claims against the Gawker defendants for
publishing an allegedly defamatory article on Jezebel.com about the filing of this lawsuit against
1

The ATL defendants are Breaking Media, LLC a/k/a Breaking Media; Breaking Media,
Inc. a/k/a Breaking Media; David Lat (“Lat”); Elie Mystal (“Mystal”); John Lerner (“Lerner”);
and David Minkin (“Minkin”). The Gawker defendants are Gawker Media, LLC a/k/a Gawker
Media (“Gawker Media, LLC”); Blogwire Hungary Szellemi Alkotast Hasznosito KFT
(“Blogwire Hungary”); Gawker Media Group, Inc. a/k/a Gawker Media (“Gawker Media Group,
Inc.”); Gawker Entertainment, LLC (“Gawker Entertainment”); Gawker Technology, LLC
(“Gawker Technology”); Gawker Sales, LLC (“Gawker Sales”); Nick Denton (“Denton”); Irin
Carmon (“Carmon”); and Gaby Darbyshire (“Darbyshire”).
1

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the ATL defendants. The current Fourth Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) seeks relief
against all the defendants for defamation per se (Count I), defamation per quod (Count II), false
light invasion of privacy (Count III), intrusion upon seclusion (Count IV), intentional infliction
of emotion distress (Count V), conspiracy to defame (Count VI), conspiracy to invade privacy
(Count VII), tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (Count VIII), and
cyberstalking and cyberbullying (Count IX). The ATL defendants have moved to dismiss all the
claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Several of the Gawker
defendants have likewise moved to dismiss all the claims against them. For the reasons stated
below, the Gawker defendants’ motion to dismiss [174] is granted and the ATL defendants’
motion to dismiss [178] is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Meanith Huon is an attorney licensed to practice law in Illinois. 2 On July 2, 2008, Huon
was charged with two counts of criminal sexual assault, two counts of criminal sexual abuse, and
one count of unlawful restraint. The charges arose out of his alleged interactions with “Jane Doe”
on June 29, 2008, in Madison County, Illinois. See Gawker Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 191, at 25
(Exhibit A). Approximately one year later, on July 17, 2009, Huon was charged with
cyberstalking and witness harassment based on allegations involving the same Jane Doe. See id.
2

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider: (1) the plaintiff’s complaint
and any documents attached to it, (2) documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are
critical to the complaint and referred to in it, (3) additional facts set forth in the plaintiff’s
response to the motion or in any documents attached to the response, as long as those additional
facts are consistent with the allegations in the complaint, and (4) information that is subject to
proper judicial notice (such as public records). Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th
Cir. 2012); Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2002). When considering
these materials, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Gessert v. United States, 703 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th
Cir. 2013). The factual background is therefore summarized with this standard in mind and,
except where otherwise indicated, is drawn from the Complaint (Dkt. 162) and accompanying
exhibits (Dkts. 162-1 through 162-21).
2

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at 29 (Exhibit C). Huon was tried on the 2008 sexual assault charges in May 2010 in Madison
County. The trial began on May 4 and ended on May 6 with his acquittal on both charges. See
Exhibit A to ATL Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 190-1, at 2-4; Exhibit B to ATL Motion to Dismiss,
Dkt. 190-2, at 2. The 2009 cyberstalking and witness harassment charges were ultimately
dismissed in December 2011.
The charges against Huon and his criminal trial received publicity in local media and
legal news sources; several of the resultant articles are relevant to the instigation of this case. On
July 2, 2008, the day the sexual assault and related charges were filed, an article about those
charges appeared in the Madison County Record (the “Madison County Article”). See Exhibit C
to Response to ATL Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 194-8. The following day, July 3, 2008, the legal
blog AboveTheLaw.com published a post by defendant Lat (the “2008 ATL Post”) that included
the one-line statement “Lawyer of the Day: Meanith Huon” along with a link to the Madison
County Article. Next, on August 24, 2009, a post discussing both the 2008 and 2009 charges
appeared on the blog LawyerGossip.com (the “Lawyer Gossip Post”). See Exhibit F to Response
to ATL Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 194-13. Finally, on May 6, 2010, AboveTheLaw.com published
an article by defendant Mystal titled “Rape Potpourri” (the “ATL Article”).
The ATL Article provided information and commentary on two “rape stories”: (1) the
arrest of former New York Giants linebacker Lawrence Taylor based on a rape allegation, and
(2) the allegations at issue in Huon’s criminal trial and the opening statement made by Huon’s
defense lawyer at trial. The section of the ATL Article on Huon purported to link to and quote,
inter alia, the Lawyer Gossip Post, the Madison County Article (which was also linked to in the
2008 ATL Post), and an article in the Belleville News Democrat titled “Testimony: Woman says

3

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she was raped by attorney posing as scout for models” (the “BND Article”). 3 At some point
following the ATL Article’s initial publication, an update was added toward the end of the piece
indicating that Huon had been acquitted of the charges discussed. 4 AboveTheLaw.com allows
readers to post comments on its articles (subject to certain terms of use), and the ATL Article
eventually generated over 107 comments or replies from users. 5
On May 6, 2011, one year after publication of the ATL Article, Huon sued the ATL
defendants and the John Does who posted comments on the ATL Article for defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light invasion of privacy. 6 See Initial
Complaint, Dkt. 1. The filing of this suit, like the criminal charges against Huon, generated its
share of publicity. On May 11, 2011, an article by defendant Carmon entitled “Acquitted Rapist
Sues Blogger for Calling Him Serial Rapist” appeared on the women’s interest blog Jezebel.com
(the “Jezebel Article”). 7 The Jezebel Article discussed Huon’s criminal trial for sexual assault,
3

In his response to the ATL motion to dismiss, Huon disputes the existence of the BND
Article. However, the copy of the ATL Article attached as an exhibit to the Complaint reveals
that the ATL Article presented the BND Article as one of its sources and indicates the title of the
BND Article. Huon does not dispute the ATL Article’s reliance on the Madison County Article
and Lawyer Gossip Post.
4

The update stated: “UPDATE: Meanith Huon was acquitted of these charges. Please
check here for our continuing coverage.” The words “check here” appeared in red text, as did
other words and phrases in the ATL Article that were presented as hyperlinks.
5

A saved version of the ATL Article is attached to the Complaint at Dkt. 162-8. The
ATL Article is no longer available on AboveTheLaw.com, but it remains available online via the
Internet Archive Wayback Machine at http://web.archive.org/web/20100512094544/http://
abovethelaw.com/2010/05/rape-potpourri/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
6

The ATL defendants were served on June 15, 2011. See Waiver of Service of
Summons, Dkt. 167; Waiver of Service of Summons, Dkt. 167-1. The current Complaint does
not name any John Doe defendants.
7

The headline of the Jezebel Article was changed at some point following the piece’s
initial publication. Screenshots of the original version are attached to the Complaint at Dkt. 16212 and at Dkt. 162-16, at 2. The version with the changed headline is still available on
Jezebel.com
at
http://jezebel.com/5800878/man-acquitted-of-sexual-assault-sues-blog-forcalling-him-serial-rapist (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
4

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his lawsuit against local law enforcement authorities for prosecutorial misconduct, and his initial
complaint against the ATL defendants in the instant suit. The Jezebel Article mentioned the title
of the ATL Article and included links to the ATL Article and other relevant sources. The Jezebel
Article also included an image containing Huon’s arrest photograph superimposed over a
screenshot of the start of the ATL Article. Users who are invited by Gawker Media editors or by
previously invited users may post comments on Jezebel.com articles (subject to certain terms of
use), and the Jezebel Article eventually generated over 80 comments or replies from such users.
According to Huon, some of the user comments were written by employees of the Gawker
defendants, posting under aliases.
On July 11, 2011, two months after publication of the Jezebel Article, Huon filed a First
Amended Complaint which added new allegations and defendants related to, inter alia, the
Jezebel Article and associated comments. The three individual Gawker defendants and “Gawker
Media” were among the defendants added to the suit in the First Amended Complaint. Huon
soon filed a Second Amended Complaint which removed certain of the other recently added
defendants. Gawker Media and the individual Gawker defendants were subsequently served on
August 24, 2011. See Waiver of Service of Summons, Dkt. 167; Waiver of Service of Summons,
Dkt. 167-1.
On September 21, 2011, the ATL defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint. Shortly thereafter, Gawker Media, the individual Gawker defendants, and
Jezebel.com (which has since been dropped from the suit) likewise filed a motion to dismiss. The
two motions to dismiss were fully briefed at the time the case was transferred to this Court’s
docket on August 3, 2012. Upon reviewing the case, the Court dismissed the Second Amended
Complaint without prejudice due to deficiencies in the allegations respecting diversity

5

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jurisdiction. The Court denied the two motions to dismiss as moot in light of that ruling. Huon
then filed a Third Amended Complaint which contained updated jurisdictional allegations, added
new claims and defendants, 8 and removed some defendants. Since the jurisdictional allegations
in the Third Amended Complaint were still insufficient, the Court again dismissed the complaint
without prejudice. 9 On November 15, 2012, Huon filed the current Complaint with further
updated jurisdictional information. The ATL defendants and certain of the Gawker defendants
subsequently filed their respective motions to dismiss which are now under consideration. 10
Based on the information in the Complaint and the notifications of affiliates filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 and Local Rule 3.2, this matter is properly before
the Court under diversity jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Huon, a citizen of
Illinois, is seeking compensatory damages in an amount well in excess of $75,000 and punitive
damages of $100,000,000. The corporate ATL defendants are: (1) Breaking Media, Inc., a New
York corporation that owns and operates AboveTheLaw.com and has its principal place of
business in New York, and (2) Breaking Media, LLC, an inactive limited liability company that
has merged into Breaking Media, Inc. The corporate Gawker defendants, which own and/or

8

The defendants added in the Third Amended Complaint were Blogwire Hungary,
Gawker Entertainment, Gawker Sales, and Gawker Technology. There is no evidence of service
on the docket as to these four defendants, nor have there been any attorney appearances for them.
Gawker Entertainment, Gawker Sales, and Gawker Technology are mentioned in the Gawker
notification of affiliates filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 and Local Rule 3.2;
however, Blogwire Hungary is not mentioned in that filing.
9

The Court provided guidance to Huon as to the jurisdictional deficiencies in his
complaints at the time of each dismissal.
10

The Gawker motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of “Gawker Media a/k/a
Gawker.com, Jezebel.com, Nick Denton, Irin Carmon, and Gaby Darbyshire.” See Gawker
Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 191, at 1. Jezebel.com is no longer named as a defendant in this case.
More important to note is the fact that the motion was not filed on behalf of the four Gawker
defendants that were named for the first time in the Third Amended Complaint. As previously
noted, there is no evidence of service as to those four defendants.
6

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operate Jezebel.com, are: (1) Gawker Media Group, Inc., a Cayman Islands corporation that has
its principal place of business in New York, (2) Gawker Media, LLC, a limited liability company
whose only member is Gawker Media Group, Inc., (3) Gawker Entertainment, a limited liability
company whose only member is Gawker Media, LLC, (4) Gawker Sales, a limited liability
company whose only member is Gawker Media, LLC, (5) Gawker Technology, a limited
liability company whose only member is Gawker Media, LLC, and (6) Blogwire Hungary, a
Hungarian entity that is similar to a U.S. limited liability company. 11 The individual ATL
defendants—John Lerner, the Chief Executive Officer of Breaking Media; David Lat, the
founding and managing editor of AboveTheLaw.com; David Minkin, the publisher of
AboveTheLaw.com; and Elie Mystal, a writer and editor for AboveTheLaw.com—are all
citizens of New York. Two of the individual Gawker defendants—Gaby Darbyshire, the Chief
Operating Officer of Gawker Media; and Irin Carmon, a reporter for Jezebel.com—are also
citizens of New York. Nick Denton, the founder and owner of Gawker Media, is a citizen of
Hungary and the United Kingdom.
DISCUSSION
“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.
11

The record does not reveal Blogwire Hungary’s members. This information is
necessary to determine Blogwire Hungary’s citizenship. See Fellowes, Inc. v. Changzhou Xinrui
Fellowes Office Equip. Co., 759 F.3d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[Since] Changzhou Fellowes is
closer to a limited liability company than to any other business structure in this nation, it does not
have its own citizenship—and it does have the . . . citizenship of its member . . . .”). But given
that Blogwire Hungary has not appeared or been served in this case, is not discussed in any of
the relevant filings besides the Complaint, and is likely a dispensable party that could be dropped
from the lawsuit at a later date if necessary, the missing information about its citizenship is not a
barrier to the Court’s current exercise of jurisdiction over this matter. Cf. Howell by Goerdt v.
Tribune Entm’t Co., 106 F.3d 215, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing a corporate defendant
named in the complaint whose citizenship was unknown and who was only briefly mentioned in
the case filings).
7

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2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “‘A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although a court must accept all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations
as true when reviewing the complaint, conclusory allegations merely restating the elements of a
cause of action do not receive this presumption. Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
A.

Liability for Publishing User Comments

All of Huon’s claims other than his intrusion upon seclusion claim seek to hold the
defendants liable for publishing “the actionable and offensive statements,” a phrase Huon uses to
refer collectively to the statements he challenges in the ATL Article, the Jezebel Article, and the
reader comments associated with each of those articles. The defendants argue that Section
230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), bars Huon’s
claims against them based on reader comments. 12 Section 230(c)(1) states: “No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” Id. The CDA explicitly preempts liability
under any inconsistent state or local laws. Id. § 230(e)(3). For purposes of the CDA, an

12

The Gawker defendants raised this argument in their motion to dismiss. The ATL
defendants did not address the question of their liability for reader comments in their motion to
dismiss or reply, and Huon did not raise the issue in his response to their motion—despite being
on notice of the CDA’s potential applicability to this case by virtue of the Gawker motion to
dismiss. Since the ATL defendants could simply file a subsequent partial motion to dismiss
premised on the CDA, or a summary judgment motion with respect to that issue, and Huon has
already presented his legal arguments on the statute’s proper interpretation in his response to the
Gawker motion to dismiss, the Court will address the import of the CDA with respect to both the
ATL defendants and the Gawker defendants.
8

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interactive computer service is “any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” Id. § 230(f)(2). An information content
provider is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.” Id. § 230(f)(3). In essence, the CDA says that “an online information system must not
‘be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by’ someone else.” Chi.
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir.
2008).
Huon argues that the reader comments do not constitute information provided by
“someone else,” and that the defendants therefore are not protected by the CDA. 13 In support of
this argument, he relies on the following allegations in the Complaint: (1) that the ATL Article
and the Jezebel Article were designed to incite users to post defamatory comments in order to
generate advertising revenue, (2) that the defendants encouraged users to post defamatory
comments in response to the articles and subsequently edited those comments, (3) that the
Gawker defendants intentionally placed defamatory comments about Huon in a prominent
location, which encouraged other users to post defamatory comments, and (4) that some of the
allegedly defamatory comments posted in response to the Jezebel Article were written by
employees of the Gawker defendants, posting under aliases. None of these allegations takes the
reader comments at issue outside the protection provided by the CDA.

13

Huon does not dispute that the defendants qualify as “provider[s] or user[s] of an
interactive computer service.”
9

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First, a website does not incite the posting of unlawful content merely by providing a
forum for that content. See Chicago Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671-72 (“Nothing in the
service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for
discrimination . . . .”). This approach has been applied even where the forum is likely to or
frequently does contain postings of an unlawful nature. See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 968-69 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing Chicago Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671)
(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Craigslist induced users to post unlawful ads by having an
“adult services” category and granting judgment on the pleadings for the defendant). Huon’s
argument that the defendants incited defamatory comments is further undercut by the ATL
defendants’ and Gawker defendants’ written policies, which Huon sets forth in the Complaint,
that prohibit the posting of defamatory or otherwise illegal material. See Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at
969 (“Plaintiff’s argument that Craigslist causes or induces illegal content is further undercut by
the fact that Craigslist repeatedly warns users not to post such content.”); see also Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he website did absolutely nothing to encourage the posting of defamatory content—indeed,
the defamatory posting was contrary to the website’s express policies.”).
Second, numerous courts have determined that the CDA applies even where a website
edits third-party content or manipulates such content to make it more prominent. See, e.g.,
Dowbenko v. Google Inc., No. 14-10195, 2014 WL 4378742, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014)
(finding that the plaintiff’s defamation claim was preempted by the CDA despite his allegation
that Google “manipulated its search results to prominently feature the article at issue”); Fair
Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1169 (“A website operator who edits user-created content—such as
by correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for length—retains his [CDA]

10

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immunity . . . .”); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[L]lawsuits
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish . . . or alter content—are barred [by the CDA].”).
Thus, the fact that the defendants allegedly engaged in editorial functions such as determining
the order of comments or making edits to them does not transform the defendants into
“providers” of the comments for CDA purposes.
Finally, the allegation (on “information and belief”) that some of the Jezebel Article
comments were written by Gawker employees using aliases contains insufficient factual content
to allow the Court to reasonably infer that the Gawker defendants were involved in creating
those comments. 14 The Complaint does not allege that any of the named individual Gawker
defendants posted comments to the article. Nor does it allege that the Gawker employees who
allegedly posted comments did so within the scope of their employment, which is a required
element of a respondeat superior claim in Illinois. See Wilson v. Edward Hosp., 981 N.E.2d 971,
978 (2012); cf. Marquis v. Omniguide, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (granting
a motion to dismiss with respect to an allegedly defamatory statement made by an unidentified
company representative, where the plaintiff failed to allege that the representative acted within
the scope of his employment). As a result of these pleading deficiencies, which are not resolved
by the additional allegations in Huon’s response to the Gawker motion to dismiss, 15 the

14

Huon makes no similar argument as to the ATL defendants.

15

The response states: “Gawker’s writers are under constant pressure to generate web
traffic to keep their jobs; writers’ compensation is based on the amount of web traffic the story
generates. Journalist Drew Johnson has traced hundreds of ‘anonymous’ comments posted to
promote Gawker stories to actual Gawker employees . . . .” Response to Gawker Motion to
Dismiss, Dkt. 192, at 2 (footnotes omitted). The response further states: “Mr. Johnson has
investigated Gawker writers creating aliases to promote their own stories and Gawker employees
creating fake accounts to promote Gawker stories on Reddit.com. He concluded that the practice
of creating fake accounts to post ‘anonymous’ comments online to promote Gawker’s stories
11

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Complaint fails to state a plausible claim that the Gawker defendants were “providers” of the
comments allegedly written by Gawker employees.
Accordingly, Huon’s claims are dismissed with prejudice to the extent they seek to hold
the defendants liable for publishing the reader comments associated with the ATL Article and the
Jezebel Article; the remaining sections of this opinion will address the defendants’ liability for
publishing only the content of the articles themselves.
B.

Defamation (Counts I and II)

Huon brings defamation per se and per quod claims based on statements in the ATL
Article and the Jezebel Article. “A defamatory statement is a statement that harms a person’s
reputation to the extent it lowers the person in the eyes of the community or deters the
community from associating with her or him.” Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 491, 917 N.E.2d
450, 459 (2009). The elements of a defamation claim for both per quod and per se actions are
“that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, that the defendant made an
unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused
appear to be a companywide policy.” Id. at 17. In support of these statements, Huon attaches a
2008 article indicating that Gawker writers receive a monthly salary plus a bonus based on the
number of page views their posts receive, a July 2012 article describing recently introduced
changes to Gawker’s comment system, and several online posts written by Johnson in 2012. See
Exhibits B through D to Response to Gawker Motion to Dismiss, Dkts. 195-2 through 195-7.
The posts by Johnson suggest that a Gawker writer hired in February 2012 writes his Gawker
articles using an alias and that, between March 2010 and November 2012, several Gawker
employees or interns used aliases to create “shell” accounts on Reddit.com in order to promote
Gawker articles. Read in conjunction with these supporting exhibits, none of the new factual
allegations in Huon’s response create a reasonable inference that Gawker employees, acting
within the scope of their employment, used aliases to post comments to the Jezebel Article. In
fact, none of the new allegations concern Gawker employees posting comments to any Gawker
articles. Rather, the new allegations either describe developments after the publication of the
Jezebel Article, suggest that some Gawker employees used aliases to post on non-Gawker
websites, or “reveal” that Gawker compensates writers based on the popularity of their works, an
unremarkable proposition which does nothing to push Huon’s claim regarding the Gawker
defendants’ responsibility for some of the comments across the line “between possibility and
plausibility.”
12

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damages.” Id. at 491, 917 N.E.2d at 459. The two types of defamation claims differ only with
respect to the plaintiff’s burden to plead and prove damages. In a defamation per quod action,
damage to the plaintiff’s reputation is not presumed and the plaintiff must plead and prove
special damages. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 501, 866 N.E.2d 114, 121 (2006); see also
Imperial Apparel, Ltd. v. Cosmo’s Designer Direct, Inc., 227 Ill. 2d 381, 390, 882 N.E.2d 1011,
1018 (2008) (“special damages [are] actual damages of a pecuniary nature”). In a defamation per
se action, damage is presumed if the statement falls within one of the five defamation per se
categories recognized in Illinois:
(1) statements imputing the commission of a crime; (2) statements
imputing infection with a loathsome communicable disease; (3)
statements imputing an inability to perform or want of integrity in
performing employment duties; (4) statements imputing a lack of
ability or that otherwise prejudice a person in his or her profession
or business; and (5) statements imputing adultery or fornication.
Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 501, 866 N.E.2d at 121. Even if a statement falls within one of these
categories, however, it is not actionable as defamation per se if it is reasonably capable of an
innocent construction. Id. at 502, 866 N.E.2d at 121. In applying the innocent construction rule,
“courts must interpret the words ‘as they appeared to have been used and according to the idea
they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader.’” Id. at 512, 866 N.E.2d at 123 (quoting
Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 93, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1217 (1996)). The
preliminary determination of whether a statement is actionable as defamation per se is a question
of law. Id. at 510, 866 N.E.2d at 126.
Statements that do not contain verifiable facts—such as opinions or rhetorical
hyperbole—are not actionable as defamation; it is a question of law whether a statement is
factual in nature. Madison v. Frazier, 539 F.3d 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2008). Statements that are not
about the plaintiff also are not actionable as defamation. BASF AG v. Great Am. Assurance Co.,
13

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522 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 221 Ill. 2d
558, 579, 852 N.E.2d 825, 839 (2006)). Further, statements that are privileged cannot support a
defamation claim. Solaia Tech., 221 Ill. 2d at 585, 852 N.E.2d at 839. As relevant here, the fair
report privilege protects publication of defamatory statements in a report of an official
proceeding, provided that the report is “complete and accurate” or is “a fair abridgement” of the
proceeding. Id. at 585, 588, 852 N.E.2d at 842, 843. Since the availability of the privilege hinges
not on the reporter’s status or source but on the accuracy and fairness of the report, the privilege
applies regardless of whether the reporter is part of the established press and regardless of
whether the reporter obtained the information directly from the official proceeding. See, e.g.,
Missner v. Clifford, 393 Ill. App. 3d 751, 761, 914 N.E.2d 540, 550 (2009) (“Both media and
nonmedia reporters may claim protection under the privilege.”); Bannach v. Field Enters., Inc., 5
Ill. App. 3d 692, 693, 284 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1972) (applying the privilege to a newspaper article
that was based on a wire service report of an official proceeding). 16 It is a question of law
whether the privilege applies. Solaia Tech., 221 Ill. 2d at 585, 852 N.E.2d at 842.
1.

Defamation Per Se (Count I)

Huon alleges that some of the statements in the ATL Article and the Jezebel Article fall
under the first, third, fourth, and fifth defamation per se categories, but does not specify which
statements are the basis of his defamation per se claim. The defendants argue that each
potentially actionable statement is protected by the fair report privilege, is not about Huon, does
not contain verifiable facts, does not fall into one of the defamation per se categories, or is

16

Huon’s contention that the privilege does not apply to bloggers because they are not
“reporters” is therefore incorrect.
14

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reasonably capable of an innocent construction. 17 The Court agrees with the defendants with
respect to most of the statements in the ATL Article and all of the statements in the Jezebel
Article, as explained below.
a.

The ATL Article

The allegedly defamatory portions of the ATL Article consist of: (1) five text blocks
summarizing Jane Doe’s testimony and defense counsel’s opening statement at Huon’s criminal
trial, 18 (2) commentary introducing and reflecting on the trial summaries in those text blocks, (3)
a section facetiously suggesting the use of sexual consent forms and proposing putatively
humorous language for such a form, and (4) a section containing quotations from the Madison
County Article and the Lawyer Gossip Post and suggesting that if Jane Doe had Googled Huon
before agreeing to meet him, she would have found those or similar articles. 19

17

The Gawker defendants also argue that the allegedly defamatory statements in the
Jezebel Article are not actionable based on the “incremental harm” doctrine. Illinois courts have
not recognized that doctrine, however. Trudeau v. ConsumerAffairs.com, Inc., No. 10 C 7193,
2011 WL 3898041, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2011) (citing Myers v. The Telegraph, 332 Ill. App.
3d 917, 925, 773 N.E.2d 192, 200 (2002)).
18

The ATL defendants assert that these five text blocks are quotations from the BND
Article. The ATL Article itself suggests that to be the case, although it is not a model of
journalistic clarity in that regard. Huon, for his part, disputes the existence of the BND Article, as
noted previously. This question is irrelevant, however; if the material in the text blocks is
defamatory and unprivileged, liability attaches regardless of whether it is original material or a
republication. See Owens v. CBS Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 977, 992, 527 N.E.2d 1296, 1307 (1988)
(“[T]he republisher of a defamatory statement made by another is himself liable for
defamation . . . .”); see also Hale v. Scott, 371 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Owens, 173
Ill. App. 3d at 994, 527 N.E.2d at 1308).
19

In his response to the ATL motion to dismiss, Huon also raises a new argument that the
inclusion of a hyperlink to the Lawyer Gossip Post in the ATL Article constitutes a republication
of statements in the Lawyer Gossip Post that Huon claims are defamatory. This theory is not
viable because the CDA, which is applicable to this case for the reasons explained in Section A,
provides liability protection for both linking to and posting third-party content. See, e.g., Nieman
v. Versuslaw, Inc., No. 12-3104, 2012 WL 3201931, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012) (finding that
the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy and defamation claims, which were based on links appearing
on the defendants’ websites, were barred by the CDA), aff’d, 512 F. App’x 635 (7th Cir. 2013).
15

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The text blocks summarizing Huon’s criminal trial are protected by the fair report
privilege. Although the ATL Article does not explicitly state that it is reporting on Huon’s trial, it
is clear both from the phrasing in the article (including references to “testimony” and defense
counsel’s opening statement) and from a comparison of the article with the trial transcript,
Exhibit B to ATL Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 190-2, that those portions of the article constitute a
report of an “official proceeding.” Huon takes issue with the fact that the article only reports on
material from the first day of his trial, but the fair report privilege does not apply only to
coverage of trials in their entirety. Cf. Solaia Tech., 221 Ill. 2d at 589, 852 N.E.2d at 844 (finding
that the privilege applies to reporting on a complaint even when there has not been any judicial
action). Further, while the article does not provide a complete report of everything that happened
during the first day of Huon’s trial, it is a “fair abridgment” of the proceedings. See generally id.
at 590 (noting that a report is a fair abridgment if it conveys a “substantially correct account”).
The article accurately summarizes Jane Doe’s testimony as well as the defense’s theory of the
case, as explained in the defense opening, and does not convey an erroneous impression of what
was said at the trial. See id. The fair report privilege therefore applies.
The commentary interspersed among the text blocks summarizing the trial likewise
cannot support a defamation claim. The statements suggesting that Huon was an alleged rapist,
that he listed Craigslist ads claiming to be a talent scout, that he came up with a scheme to meet
women, and that he lied about himself and his intentions are all protected by the fair report
privilege. 20 These statements, which serve to introduce and supplement the information in the

20

Most of these statements appear in the commentary about Huon that precedes the first
text block summarizing the trial; that commentary reads: “We cover the rape allegations of . . .
any alleged attorney rapists near you. . . . A St. Louis-area lawyer came up with an excellent
little game to meet women. Meanith Huon allegedly listed Craigslist ads where he claimed to be
a talent scout for models. . . . Huon’s potentially harmless lies allegedly turned dastardly, pretty
16

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text blocks, can be traced back to material in the trial transcript and do not convey an erroneous
impression of what was stated. 21 Other commentary statements in the article suggesting that
Huon’s version of the events was “incredible,” that his encounter with Jane Doe “end[ed] badly,”
and that Huon was “wanton,” “depraved,” “dastardly,” and a “potential rapist” are nonactionable statements of opinion (e.g., “Our next story [is] from the files of the wanton and
depraved . . . . [A]pparently there are a lot of depraved dudes walking around out there that are
potential rapists.”). The remaining commentary statements that Huon claims are defamatory are
simply not about him (e.g., “I [Mystal] once pretended to be an Ostrich rancher . . . .”).
The section of the article about sexual consent forms is also not actionable as defamation.
That section consists of the following text:
It seems to me that there is entirely too much (alleged) raping
going on in this country. If this keeps up, men and women are
going to have to start carrying around sexual consent forms on
their persons.
I, the undersigned, being of sound mind and hot
body, do hereby consent to affixing my ____ to the
other party’s ____. Such amorous undulations
include, but are not limited to, ____, ____, and

quickly.” In addition, a comment after the third text block summarizing the trial questions
whether “lying . . . about your job and your intentions to get [a woman] into [your] car counts as
consensual.”
21

Huon challenges the ATL Article’s use of the words “rape” and “rapist” given that he
was charged with “criminal sexual assault” and not “rape.” However, a report does not need to
use the exact verbiage as the official proceeding in order to be protected by the fair report
privilege. See, e.g., Harrison v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 555, 572, 793 N.E.2d 760,
774 (2003) (finding that the fair report privilege applied where an article stated that the plaintiff
had been convicted of kidnapping, even though she was actually found guilty of “wrongful
removal”); see also In re Det. of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 315, 776 N.E.2d 218, 227 (2002)
(“[T]he offense of rape was subsumed by the subsequently created offenses of criminal and
aggravated criminal sexual assault . . . .”). Moreover, the term “rape” was used multiple times on
the first day of Huon’s trial, including by defense counsel in his opening argument. Thus, the fact
that some of the statements in the ATL Article contain the words “rape” or “rapist” does not
bring those statements outside the protection of the fair report privilege.
17

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____, and all proposals will be considered so long
as no animals (barnyard or otherwise) are involved.
I claim no rights to future ____, ____, or ____, in
exchange for this brief interruption in my chronic
loneliness.
While I may be quite intoxicated right now, I know
damn well what I’m doing.
This section is not about Huon and does not contain any statements of fact, and therefore cannot
support a defamation claim.
By contrast, the section containing the statements about Googling Huon cannot be
disposed of so readily. That section appears after introductory material indicating that there were
rape allegations against Huon and that Jane Doe testified that she met him after responding to a
Craigslist ad he posted to recruit promotional models. The section states:
And this, people, is why God invented Google. Had the victim
Googled Huon, she would have found stories like this, from the
Madison County Record:
A Chicago attorney who was posing as a supervisor
for a company that sets up promotions for alcohol
sales at area bars was charged in Madison County
July 2, with two counts of criminal sexual assault,
two counts of criminal sexual abuse and one count
of unlawful restraint.
Meanith Huon, 38, of 3038 S Canal St. in Chicago,
was arrested by the Chicago Police Department on
July 1, and was transferred to Madison County the
next day.
Or she might have come across this link, at Lawyer Gossip:
Lawyer, Meanith Huon, 39, who was originally
charged with criminal sexual assault, sexual abuse
and unlawful restraint is now facing charges of
harassment and cyber stalking!
Read in context, this material suggests that Huon was charged with sexual assault and related
offenses, and then subsequently charged with harassment and cyberstalking, all prior to the Jane
18

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Doe incident. It thus creates the impression that he was alleged to have committed sexual assault
on two occasions—the first being the incident that prompted the sexual assault charges
mentioned in the Madison County Article and Lawyer Gossip Post, and the second being the
incident involving Jane Doe. The section also suggests that Huon posed as a promotions
supervisor in order to meet women on an occasion prior to his interactions with Jane Doe. Since
the section is erroneously presented as chronicling events unconnected to the Jane Doe incident,
it is not a “substantially correct account” of an official proceeding and the statements within it
are not protected by the fair report privilege. Further, since the statements convey the impression
that Huon was charged with sexual assault on a prior occasion and that he posed as a promotions
supervisor on a prior occasion, they qualify as defamation per se 22 and are not reasonably
capable of an innocent construction. Cf. Solaia Tech., 221 Ill. 2d at 593-94, 852 N.E.2d at 846-47
(finding that a statement implying that a civil complaint had accused the plaintiff of committing
a crime was not capable of an innocent construction); Kumaran, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 227, 617
N.E.2d at 199 (finding that an article that impugned the plaintiff’s personal integrity was not
capable of an innocent construction).

22

The suggestion that Huon was charged with sexual assault on a prior occasion falls
within multiple defamation per se categories. Cf. Solaia Tech., 221 Ill. 2d at 592 (finding that a
statement implying that the plaintiff had been accused of committing a crime fell “within several
of the recognized categories of defamation per se”). The suggestion that he posed as a
promotions supervisor on a prior occasion falls within the fourth defamation per se category,
since Illinois courts recognize that attacks related to personal integrity and character can
“prejudice” a plaintiff in his profession if he is engaged in a profession that requires a high
degree of integrity. See Cody v. Harris, 409 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Kumaran v.
Brotman, 247 Ill. App. 3d 216, 227, 617 N.E.2d 191, 199 (1993) (“By portraying plaintiff as a
swindler, the article could be found to prejudice his teaching ability and integrity because it
presented him as someone who would not be an acceptable role model for young students.”);
Green v. Rogers, 384 Ill. App. 3d 946, 959, 895 N.E.2d 647, 661 (2008) (noting that statements
impugning personal integrity can prejudice a lawyer in his profession), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 917 N.E.2d 450 (2009).
19

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Accordingly, Count I survives as to the ATL defendants only with respect to the
statements in the section about Googling Huon that imply: (1) that Huon was charged with
sexual assault on an occasion prior to the Jane Doe incident, and (2) that he posed as a
promotions supervisor in order to meet women on an occasion prior to allegedly posting the ad to
which Jane Doe responded (collectively, the “two actionable implications in the ATL Article”).
Count I is dismissed with prejudice with respect to all other statements in the ATL Article.
b.

The Jezebel Article

Huon alleges that the Jezebel Article is defamatory based on: (1) the original article
headline and the image placed directly below it, (2) the article’s report of his criminal trial, (3)
the article’s report of his lawsuit based on the ATL Article, (4) a statement in the article
commenting on the ATL Article and Huon’s lawsuit, and (5) the hyperlink to the ATL Article
placed at the bottom of the article.
The original headline of the Jezebel Article was “Acquitted Rapist Sues Blog For Calling
Him Serial Rapist.” The image below it contains Huon’s arrest photograph superimposed over a
screenshot showing the ATL Article’s headline (“Rape Potpourri”) and first two sentences
(“We’ve got a couple of rape stories, but I don’t have enough rape humor to fill out two posts. So
we’ll tackle them together.”). Huon alleges that the Jezebel Article’s headline and the placement
of his arrest photograph near the words “rapist” and “rape” in the headline and screenshot imply
that he committed rape. Although it is defamatory per se to falsely suggest that a person is a
rapist, the challenged items are not actionable as defamation per se because they are reasonably
capable of an innocent construction. See generally Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 502, 866 N.E.2d at 121.
The headline itself expressly states that Huon was acquitted, and even if one interprets it to imply
that, despite the acquittal, Huon is a rapist, it would still not be actionable as defamation per se

20

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under the innocent construction rule. Under Illinois law, “the innocent construction rule requires
a writing ‘to be read as a whole.’” Id. at 512 (quoting John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442,
181 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1962)). Therefore, “a headline and the text of the article to which it refers
are to be considered as one document and . . . . the ‘import of the entire article’ must be
considered in reaching a determination of reasonable innocent construction.” Harrison, 341 Ill.
App. 3d at 570, 793 N.E.2d at 772 (quoting Owen v. Carr, 134 Ill. App. 3d 855, 860, 478 N.E.2d
658, 662 (1985), aff’d, 113 Ill. 2d 273, 497 N.E.2d 1145 (1986)). However one might interpret
the Jezebel Article headline and accompanying image, the associated article clearly indicates that
Huon was acquitted of the charges against him. Indeed, its opening words are “A Chicago man
who was acquitted on a sexual assault charge . . . .” Thus, considered in the context of the article
as a whole, the headline and image are reasonably capable of an innocent construction and are
not actionable as defamation per se. Cf. Salamone v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 3d 837,
840-41, 807 N.E.2d 1086, 1090-91 (2004) (finding that a headline that implied that the plaintiff
was a mobster was reasonably capable of an innocent construction since the text of the article
indicated that the plaintiff was only reputed to be a mobster); Antonelli v. Field Enters., Inc., 115
Ill. App. 3d 432, 435, 450 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1983) (same); see also Knafel v. Chi. Sun-Times,
Inc., 413 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Salamone, 347 Ill. App. 3d 837, 807 N.E.2d 1086,
and Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d 432, 450 N.E.2d 876).
Huon’s allegations based on the report of his criminal trial in the Jezebel Article likewise
cannot support a defamation claim. Huon alleges that the report is defamatory insofar as it
suggests that the jury acquitted him partly on the basis of a bartender’s testimony. The
challenged statement appears at the end of the article’s discussion of his trial and reads as
follows: “Huon’s version was that it was a consensual encounter, and partly on the strength of a

21

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bartender’s testimony that the woman had been drinking and asked where to go to have fun, the
jury believed him.” Huon asserts that the Gawker defendants never spoke to any jurors and
simply invented the idea that the jury relied on the bartender’s testimony in reaching its decision.
That is an odd argument given that the bartender’s testimony about the victim’s drinking and
inquiry about where to go to have fun was almost certainly evidence that the defense elicited at
trial; Huon does not explain how a report that credits defense evidence with contributing to a
verdict of acquittal could defame the successful defendant. In any event, regardless of who
elicited the testimony, the statement about the jury’s deliberations is not actionable for the simple
reason that it is not defamatory, much less defamatory per se. See Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 491, 917
N.E.2d at 459 (“A defamatory statement is a statement that harms a person’s reputation to the
extent it lowers the person in the eyes of the community or deters the community from
associating with her or him.”). The import of the statement is that the jury found reason to
discredit Jane Doe’s claims and therefore acquitted Huon of the charges; it thus bolsters rather
than defames his reputation.
The challenged statements within the report of Huon’s lawsuit against the ATL
defendants are also not actionable as defamation. The text relating to Huon’s lawsuit reads as
follows:
A Chicago man who was acquitted on a sexual assault
charge is suing the legal blog Above The Law for implying that
he’s a serial rapist. If Meanith Huon gets his way, blogger
sloppiness may cost ATL $50 million.
....
. . . His beef with Above The Law stems from a roundup
post entitled “Rape Potpurri,” in which blogger Elie Mystal
mistakenly believes that news accounts of the same incident are
different incidents that should have tipped the woman off that
Huon was a serial offender. “The content of the article were [sic]
defamatory in that it incorrectly and recklessly portrayed Mr. Huon

22

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as a serial rapist by treating the same complaining witness as three
different women,” says the complaint, according to Forbes.
“And this, people, is why God invented Google,” wrote
Mystal in the original post, linking to articles that in fact described
the same case. The lesson learned: Google only takes you so far.
Huon argues that the description of his lawsuit suggests that he did not contest any aspects of the
ATL Article other than the implication that he was a serial rapist. In addition, he alleges that the
reference to “blogger sloppiness” minimizes the ATL Article’s inaccuracies and bolsters the
suggestion that he only objected to the serial rapist implication. These arguments are unavailing,
however, since the Jezebel Article contains a “fair abridgment” of Huon’s initial complaint and
is therefore protected by the fair report privilege. 23 Although Huon later amended his complaint
to add additional allegations about the ATL Article, the initial complaint was premised solely on
the serial rapist implication. See Initial Complaint, Dkt. 1. In addition, it asserted that Mystal
omitted relevant information, acted recklessly, and did not read “the original source.” Id. at 4-5.
Thus, in suggesting that Mystal was sloppy and that Huon only challenged the serial rapist
implication, the Jezebel Article conveys an accurate impression of Huon’s initial complaint.
The two remaining components of the Jezebel Article that Huon challenges are also
inadequate to support a defamation claim. Huon alleges that the comment at the end of the report
of his lawsuit (“Google only takes you so far”) implies that he has a criminal background that
does not show up in a Google search. But to a reasonable reader, this statement suggests that
Mystal should have performed further investigation when writing the ATL Article rather than
merely relying on Google; it implies that had Mystal done so, he would not have made the
mistake that he did. Contrary to Huon’s argument, the observation that Mystal was mistaken, and
23

The Court takes judicial notice of Huon’s initial complaint. See Scherr v. Marriott
Int’l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We may take judicial notice of documents that
are part of the public record, including pleadings, orders, and transcripts from prior proceedings
in the case.”).
23

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would have caught his mistake had he not relied exclusively on Google, suggests that Huon was
not involved in any prior similar episodes of sexual misconduct and implies nothing defamatory
about him. Finally, Huon alleges that the hyperlink to the ATL Article placed at the bottom of
the Jezebel Article constitutes a republishing of the allegedly defamatory content in the ATL
Article. As explained above, however, the CDA provides liability protection for hyperlinking to
third-party content in these circumstances. See Nieman, 2012 WL 3201931, at *8.
Since none of the statements or suggestions in the Jezebel Article can support a
defamation per se claim, Count I is dismissed with prejudice with respect to the Gawker
defendants.
2.

Defamation Per Quod (Count II)

Huon alleges that some of the statements in the ATL Article and the Jezebel Article,
while not constituting defamation per se, nonetheless are defamatory and support a defamation
per quod claim. The defendants argue that Huon has not pleaded special damages with the
specificity required by Rule 9(g). As the Seventh Circuit has recently explained:
[Rule] 9(g), says that special damages must be “specifically
stated”. It can be hard to know how specific is specific enough, but
“specifically” must be something less than the “particularity”
standard that Rule 9(b) prescribes for allegations of fraud. We need
not probe the meaning of “specifically”, because it is enough to
identify a concrete loss.
Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2829 (2014). In Pippen, the plaintiff’s complaint identified “specific business opportunities that
had been available to him earlier but that, following the defendants’ statements, were available
no more,” which the Seventh Circuit found sufficiently pleaded special damages. Id. at 615; see
also Underground Solutions, Inc. v. Palermo, No. 13 C 8407, 2014 WL 4703925, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 22, 2014) (citing Pippen, 734 F.3d at 614) (finding that special damages were sufficiently
24

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pleaded where the complaint quoted emails from specific customers expressing concerns about
using the plaintiff’s products after reading the allegedly defamatory reports). In a prior case, the
Seventh Circuit found that special damages were sufficiently pleaded where, “[a]lthough not
naming the particular customers it lost, plaintiff listed specific figures of its gross sales before
and after the publication [of the defamatory letter].” Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner
Co., 345 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 1965); see also Action Repair, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 776 F.2d
143, 150 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Continental Nut, 345 F.2d 395) (finding that the plaintiff’s
complaint failed to adequately plead special damages).
Here, the Complaint alleges that the allegedly defamatory statements “caused injury to
Plaintiff’s legal practice, business operations and good will,” Complaint, Dkt. 162, ¶ 186, that
Huon has “suffered damage to business, trade, profession and occupation,” id. ¶ 197, and that he
has suffered “pecuniary loss directly from a loss of clients in his legal practice and the loss of
profit from business deals and interactions,” id. ¶ 204. These allegations are nothing more than
general, conclusory statements of economic loss allegedly resulting from publication of
defamatory comments. In contrast to the plaintiffs in Pippen, Underground Solutions, and
Continental Nut, Huon has not identified—or even suggested the existence of—any specific lost
opportunities or clients, and has not provided any information indicating the relative success of
his legal practice before and after publication of the ATL Article and Jezebel Article. Therefore,
the Court finds that Huon has not pleaded special damages with sufficient specificity. Cf.
Tamburo v. Calvin, No. 94 C 5206, 1995 WL 121539, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1995) (finding

25

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that the plaintiff’s allegations of “lost sales,” “a devastating loss of business,” and “loss of
business reputation,” were not specific enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(g)). 24
In his response to the ATL motion to dismiss, Huon requests leave to replead his
defamation per quod claim. 25 Given that Huon has had numerous opportunities to amend his
pleadings and has been on notice of the potential deficiencies in his defamation per quod claim
since September 2011 (when the ATL defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint and raised the special damages issue), the Court finds that granting leave to replead is
not warranted. Cf. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012)
(affirming the district court’s dismissal with prejudice where the plaintiffs had three
opportunities to plead their claims, including an opportunity after a motion to dismiss in the case
had been fully briefed). Huon has had ample opportunity to buttress his damage allegations but
has not done so. Accordingly, Count II is dismissed with prejudice, and Huon can only move
forward on his defamation claims with respect to statements that are actionable as defamation
per se. 26
24

In his responses to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, Huon attempts to buttress his
defamation per quod claim by alleging that he also suffered a different type of pecuniary loss. He
states that after publication of the ATL Article (which reported that he had allegedly claimed to
be a talent scout) and the Jezebel Article (which linked to the ATL Article), a woman falsely
accused him of posing as a talent scout, and he incurred attorney’s fees in defending against the
charges. This creative line of reasoning does not save Huon’s defamation per quod claim,
however, since the “talent scout” statement in the ATL Article is not actionable as defamation, as
explained in Section B.1. Further, Huon has not plausibly alleged that publication of the ATL
Article and Jezebel Article “caused” him to incur the attorney’s fees, since he does not allege
that the woman in question read the articles.
25

Huon has not requested leave to replead any of his other claims.

26

Even if Huon had adequately pleaded special damages, his defamation per quod claim
would largely fail. Pursuant to the analysis in Section B.1.a, an adequately pleaded defamation
per quod claim would survive only as to the two implications in the ATL Article that the Court
finds to be actionable as defamation per se. And pursuant to the analysis in Section B.1.b, an
adequately pleaded defamation per quod claim might survive as to the original headline of the
Jezebel Article and the image placed directly below it, since the Court finds that material to be
26

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C.

False Light Invasion of Privacy (Count III)

Huon alleges that the defendants placed him in a false light by publishing the allegedly
defamatory statements in the ATL Article and the Jezebel Article. Three elements are required to
state a claim for the tort of false light invasion of privacy under Illinois law. First, the allegations
must show that the plaintiff was “‘placed in a false light before the public as a result of the
defendants’ actions.’” Raveling v. HarperCollins Publishers Inc., No. 04-2963, 2005 WL
900232, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005) (quoting Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 17,
607 N.E.2d 201, 209 (1992)). Second, the court “‘must determine whether a finder of fact could
decide that the false light in which the plaintiff was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.’” Id. (quoting Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill. 2d
411, 419-20, 534 N.E.2d 987, 990 (1989)). Third, the plaintiff must allege “‘that the defendants
acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless
disregard for whether the statements were true or false.’” Id. (quoting Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 1718, 607 N.E.2d at 209-10). Although false light is a branch of the tort of invasion of privacy, it is
closely related to the tort of defamation, and the same privileges apply to false light and
defamation claims. Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, where a
false light claim is premised on allegedly defamatory statements that a court finds are not
actionable as defamation, the false light claim fails as a matter of law. See Madison, 539 F.3d at
659 (“[B]ecause Madison’s unsuccessful defamation per se claim is the basis of his false-light
claim, his false-light invasion of privacy claim fails as well.”); Muzikowski v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Muzikowski has not asserted special

not actionable as defamation per se in light of the innocent construction rule, a rule which does
not apply to defamation per quod actions and which thus would not preclude a defamation per
quod claim based on the same material. See generally Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 501-02.
27

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damages, and so the claim can succeed only on the statements [that are defamatory per se].”); cf.
Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 515, 866 N.E.2d at 129.
The Court need only examine Huon’s false light claim with respect to the two actionable
implications in the ATL Article, since the Court has determined that the Jezebel Article and the
remainder of the ATL Article are not actionable as either defamation per se or per quod. The
Court finds that Huon has adequately stated a false light claim on the basis of the two actionable
implications in the ATL Article. Huon has adequately stated a defamation claim based on those
implications, a finder of fact could decide that the implications would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and the defendants have not challenged the sufficiency of Huon’s allegations
regarding actual malice. Accordingly, Count III is dismissed with prejudice as to the Gawker
defendants, survives as to the ATL defendants with respect to the two actionable implications in
the ATL Article, and is dismissed with prejudice as to the ATL defendants with respect to all
other statements in the ATL Article.
D.

Intrusion upon Seclusion (Count IV)

Huon alleges that the defendants intentionally and unreasonably intruded into his
seclusion. The Illinois Supreme Court has joined the Illinois appellate courts in expressly
recognizing the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of Ill., 983 N.E.2d 414,
425 (2012). The elements required to state a claim for the tort are: “(1) an unauthorized intrusion
or prying into a plaintiff’s seclusion; (2) the intrusion would be ‘highly offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable person;’ (3) the matters upon which the intrusion occurred were
private; and (4) the intrusion caused anguish and suffering.” Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (quoting Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 813
N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (2004)). “The nature of this tort depends upon some type of highly offensive

28

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prying into the physical boundaries or affairs of another person. The basis of the tort is not
publication or publicity. Rather, the core of this tort is the offensive prying into the private
domain of another.” Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 416-17, 534 N.E.2d at 989; see also Vega, 958 F.
Supp. 2d at 959 (quoting Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 417, 534 N.E.2d at 989). “Examples of prying
into private matters are opening a person’s mail, searching a person’s safe or wallet, and
reviewing a person’s banking information.” Vega, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (citing Lawlor, 983
N.E.2d at 424).
Huon’s Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that the defendants engaged in acts
of prying or intrusion. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges that defendants invented “facts,”
improperly interpreted or relied on various articles that were readily available online, and failed
to contact Huon or conduct investigations prior to publishing the ATL Article and the Jezebel
Article. Rather than painting a picture of overzealous journalists who pried into Huon’s private
affairs, the Complaint depicts shoddy journalists who made up information and could not be
bothered to do much more than copy and paste or summarize information from other articles
easily findable on the internet. As Huon has not alleged any intrusion, which is the first element
of this tort, he has failed to adequately plead his intrusion upon seclusion claim. 27 See Vega, 958
F. Supp. 2d at 961 (“Aside from peering into the windows of Vega’s private residence, none of
the other allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim for intrusion upon seclusion.
Accordingly, [the] motion to dismiss . . . is granted for all claims except the claim that the
investigators peered into Vega’s windows.”); Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 417, 534 N.E.2d at 989
(finding that the plaintiff had failed to adequately plead the tort of intrusion into seclusion of

27

In light of this ruling, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the remaining elements
of the tort or to reach the ATL defendants’ alternate argument that the fair report privilege
precludes Huon’s intrusion upon seclusion claim.
29

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another because “the alleged offensive conduct and subsequent harm resulted from the
defendants’ act of publication, not from an act of prying”). Count IV is therefore dismissed with
prejudice as to all defendants. 28
E.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count V)

Huon alleges that the defendants’ publication of the allegedly defamatory statements in
the ATL Article and the Jezebel Article constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements to state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Lewis v. Sch. Dist. #70, 523 F.3d 730, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir. 2001)). First, “the conduct involved must
be truly extreme and outrageous . . . . [It] must go beyond all bounds of decency and be
considered intolerable in a civilized community.” Honaker, 256 F.3d at 490. Second, “the actor
must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least
a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress.” Id. Third, “the conduct
must in fact cause severe emotional distress.” Id. In evaluating whether allegedly defamatory
statements constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct, Illinois courts consider the context of
the statements, including whether the defendant improperly used “‘a position of power which

28

To the extent that Huon’s Complaint can be read as attempting to state a claim for the
tort of public disclosure of private facts, it fails for a similar reason: Huon has not identified any
statements in the ATL Article or the Jezebel Article that reveal private facts about him. Since
“private facts” are “intimate personal facts,” matters of public record—including information
such as a person’s name, address, and age—do not qualify. Best v. Malec, No. 09 C 7749, 2010
WL 2364412, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2010) (citing Johnson v. K mart Corp., 311 Ill. App. 3d
573, 578-79, 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (2000) and Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 439,
390 N.E.2d 945, 948 (1979)). As explained above, the challenged portions of the articles consist
of statements that are about matters of public record (e.g., Huon’s arrests, criminal trial, and
lawsuits), statements that are allegedly false (e.g., the two actionable implications in the ATL
Article), statements that are not about Huon, and statements that are not factual in nature (e.g.,
opinions); by definition, none of these items constitute private facts.
30

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gives him the ability to adversely affect the plaintiff’s interests.’” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819,
842 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 22, 607 N.E.2d at 212).
Since statements that do not rise to the level of defamation logically cannot rise to the
even higher level of “extreme and outrageous conduct,” the Court need only examine Huon’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim with respect to the two actionable implications
in the ATL Article. Cf. Flentye v. Kathrein, 485 F. Supp. 2d 903, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“Under
Illinois law, defamatory statements, if sufficiently extreme and outrageous, can support an IIED
claim.”); Huon v. Beatty, No. 1-09-2234, 2011 WL 9717454, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011)
(“Because the plaintiff asserts the same allegations from his [unsuccessful] defamation claims as
the basis for his claims of IIED, the same allegations cannot constitute extreme and outrageous
conduct.”). 29 Drawing all reasonable inferences in Huon’s favor, Huon has adequately alleged
the elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the implication
that he was charged with sexual assault prior to his encounter with Jane Doe. Although the
defendants argue that none of the allegedly defamatory statements constitute “extreme and
outrageous conduct,” Illinois courts have held that making sufficiently egregious defamatory
statements can rise to that level in similar contexts. 30 See, e.g., Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 20-25, 607
N.E.2d at 211-13 (holding that radio disc jockeys’ derogatory statements constituted defamation
per se and supported a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also Flentye,
485 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (denying a motion to dismiss an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim premised on allegedly defamatory statements that included “assertions of a
sexually repugnant nature”). Accordingly, Count V is dismissed with prejudice as to the Gawker
29

This should come as no surprise to Huon, who was also the plaintiff in the Beatty case.
The conduct on which Huon sued in Beatty is unrelated to the events at issue here.
30

The ATL defendants do not challenge the adequacy of the allegations that the
statements were intended to inflict, and in fact caused, severe emotional distress.
31

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defendants, survives as to the ATL defendants with respect to the implication in the ATL Article
that Huon was previously charged with sexual assault, and is dismissed with prejudice as to the
ATL defendants with respect to all other statements in the ATL Article.
F.

Conspiracy (Counts VI and VII)

Huon alleges that the defendants conspired to publish the allegedly defamatory
statements in the ATL Article and the Jezebel Article in order to present him in a false light
(Count VII) and to defame him (Count VI). Under Illinois law, the elements of civil conspiracy
are: “(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of accomplishing by some
concerted action either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means, (3) in the
furtherance of which one of the conspirators committed an overt tortious or unlawful act.” Fritz
v. Johnston, 209 Ill. 2d 302, 317, 807 N.E.2d 461, 470 (2004). Where a plaintiff successfully
establishes the existence of a conspiracy, co-conspirators may be held jointly liable for actions
by other members of the conspiracy. See Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 750. Liability for conspiracy
requires an underlying tort, however; “if a ‘plaintiff fails to state an independent cause of action
underlying his conspiracy allegations, the claim for conspiracy also fails.’” Jones v. City of Chi.,
No. 08 C 3501, 2011 WL 1898243, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Fuerst,
345 Ill. App. 3d 929, 936, 803 N.E.2d 619, 626 (2004)). In addition, Illinois courts recognize the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which provides that “because the acts of an agent are
considered to be the acts of the principal, an agent acting within the scope of his employment
cannot conspire with the principal nor with other agents.” Milliman v. McHenry Cnty., No. 11 C
50361, 2012 WL 5200092, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2012) (citing Buckner v. Atl. Plant Maint.,
Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 12, 24, 694 N.E.2d 565, 571 (1998)); see also Frontline Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Comcast Corp., No. 12-CV-8527, 2013 WL 4777370, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2013) (“Illinois

32

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law is clear that a civil conspiracy does not exist between a corporations’ own officers or
employees.”).
Since conspiracy is not an independent tort, the Court need only consider Huon’s
conspiracy claims with respect to the two actionable implications in the ATL Article, which the
Court has found can support Huon’s false light and defamation per se claims against the ATL
defendants. Because the Gawker defendants are not liable for those claims, and because Huon
has not alleged that there was a conspiratorial agreement between the ATL defendants and the
Gawker defendants, 31 the Gawker defendants are not liable for the statements in the ATL Article
under a conspiracy theory. As to the ATL defendants, since Huon’s conspiracy claims based on
the ATL Article are premised on an alleged agreement between the individual ATL defendants,
all of whom are officers or employees of Breaking Media, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
bars his conspiracy claims. Counts VI and VII are therefore dismissed with prejudice as to both
the ATL defendants and the Gawker defendants.
G.

Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count VIII)

Huon alleges that the defendants tortiously interfered with his business interests by
publishing the ATL Article and the Jezebel Article. To state a claim for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage under Illinois law, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a reasonable
expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the
expectancy, (3) an intentional and unjustified interference by the defendant that induced or
caused a breach or termination of the expectancy, and (4) damage to the plaintiff resulting from

31

The allegations in the Complaint provide no basis to infer a conspiratorial agreement
between the ATL defendants and the Gawker defendants. Moreover, the additional allegations in
Huon’s responses to the motions to dismiss reveal that he has not premised his conspiracy claims
on such an agreement. See Response to Gawker Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 192, at 14; Response to
ATL Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 193, at 29.
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the defendant’s interference.” Voyles v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 300-01, 751
N.E.2d 1126, 1133-34 (2001) (quoting Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406-07, 667
N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable expectancy
“requires more than the hope or opportunity of a future business relationship.” Bus. Sys. Eng’g,
Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (citing Anderson,
172 Ill. 2d at 408, 667 N.E.2d at 1300), aff’d, 547 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Fredrick v.
Simmons Airlines, Inc., 144 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson, 172 Ill. 2d at 408,
667 N.E.2d at 1299).
The Complaint states that Huon “held a reasonable expectation of entering into valid
business relationships, both in his legal practice and in business,” and that he had an “expectancy
of entering into valid business relationships with members of the public including, but not
limited to, his retention as an attorney.” Complaint, Dkt. 162, ¶¶ 258, 259. The Complaint also
alleges that Huon has suffered “a decline in prospective business” and “remains concerned that
individuals and organizations including prospective legal clients will choose not to utilize his
services.” Id. ¶ 160, 164. These conclusory statements, which are unsupported by any facts other
than the assertion that Huon is a licensed attorney, are insufficient to allege that Huon had a
reasonable business expectancy. See Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc. v. Kinnavy, No. 07 C
5902, 2010 WL 1172565, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2010) (“Twombly does require that Kinnavy
set forth facts that make it plausible that she had a reasonable expectancy . . . .”). At best the
statements establish, when read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that Huon hoped to
obtain legal clients or enter into other business relationships. 32 As Huon has thus failed to

32

That Huon was facing criminal charges until December 2011 further undermines the
plausibility of his claim to have had reasonable business expectancies when the ATL Article and
Jezebel Article were published.
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adequately allege a reasonable business expectancy, see Bus. Sys. Eng’g, 520 F. Supp. 2d at
1022, it is unnecessary to consider whether he has satisfied any of the other elements of a
tortious interference claim. See Fredrick, 144 F.3d at 503 (affirming dismissal of a tortious
interference claim where the plaintiff “failed to allege any reasonable expectation of a business
relationship” and instead alleged “merely that he wished to continue working as a commercial
pilot”); Pulliam v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., No. 08 C 6690, 2009 WL 1586012, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2009) (dismissing a tortious interference claim where the plaintiff failed to
allege facts sufficient to support a reasonable business expectancy); Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l
Commuter R.R. Corp., No. 02 C 9303, 2003 WL 22176077, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2003)
(dismissing a tortious interference claim where the plaintiff alleged “no more than the mere hope
[of obtaining] concrete opportunities”). Accordingly, Count VIII is dismissed with prejudice as
to all defendants.
H.

Cyberstalking and Cyberbullying (Count IX)

Huon alleges that the defendants violated the Illinois cyberstalking statute, 720 ILCS
5/12-7.5, and asks the Court to create a private cause of action for cyberstalking. Illinois courts
apply a four-factor test to determine whether to imply a private right of action from a statute:
Implication of a private right of action is appropriate if: (1) the
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one the statute was designed to
prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the
underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right
of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations
of the statute.
Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 460, 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117-18 (1999).
With respect to the fourth factor, a private right of action is generally implied “only in cases
where the statute would be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless a private right of action were

35

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implied.” Abbasi ex rel. Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386, 395, 718 N.E.2d 181, 186
(1999). Since no Illinois court has addressed the question of whether there is an implied private
right of action under the cyberstalking statute, this Court must predict how the Illinois Supreme
Court would decide the issue. See Iowa Physicians’ Clinic Med. Found. v. Physicians Ins. Co. of
Wisconsin, 547 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court is mindful, however, of the Seventh
Circuit’s admonishment that federal courts sitting in diversity should be cautious in expanding
state law beyond the boundaries established in that state’s courts. See King v. Damiron Corp.,
113 F.3d 93, 97 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Markos v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 01 C 5544, 2002
WL 1008459, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2002) (citing King, 113 F.3d at 97) (finding that an
Illinois statute did not imply a private right of action).
Assuming without deciding that the first three factors of the Fisher test are met in this
situation, the Court declines to imply a private right of action because doing so is not necessary
to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the cyberstalking statute. The statute already
provides a stiff penalty by categorizing cyberstalking as a Class 4 felony, see 720 ILCS 5/127.5(b), which is punishable by between one and three years of imprisonment, 730 ILCS 5/5-4.545; see also People v. Sucic, 401 Ill. App. 3d 492, 494, 928 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (2010) (affirming
defendant’s conviction and three-year sentence for violating the Illinois cyberstalking statute). In
addition, and as Huon’s Complaint makes evident, a variety of tort remedies are potentially
available to individuals who allege that they are victims of cyberstalking. Huon offers no
argument that the combination of potential criminal prosecution and other civil causes of action
provides inadequate remedies to victims of cyberstalking; in view of these remedies, the Court
concludes that a private right of action under the statute is unnecessary and so declines to imply

36

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one. 33 Cf. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 42, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (2004) (“We cannot say
that the statutory framework . . . is so deficient that it is necessary to imply a private right of
action . . . to effectuate its purpose.”); Lane v. Fabert, 178 Ill. App. 3d 698, 702-03, 533 N.E.2d
546, 549 (1989) (declining to imply a private right of action where the statute at issue imposed a
“substantial” fine and where the complaint demonstrated that “a wide array of remedies” was
available to a plaintiff in such a situation). Accordingly, Huon cannot prevail on his
cyberstalking claim and Count IX is dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants.
*

*

*

For the reasons stated above, the Gawker defendants’ motion to dismiss [174] is granted
and the ATL defendants’ motion to dismiss [178] is granted in part and denied in part. All of
Huon’s claims against the Gawker defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Huon’s claims
against the ATL defendants in Counts II, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX are dismissed in their entirety
with prejudice. Huon’s claims against the ATL defendants in Counts I and III survive only with
respect to the two actionable implications in the ATL Article. Huon’s claims against the ATL
defendants in Count V survive only with respect to the implication in the ATL Article that he
was charged with sexual assault prior to his encounter with Jane Doe. Huon’s claims against the
ATL defendants in Counts I, III, and V are dismissed with prejudice in all other respects.

John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge

Date: December 4, 2014

33

In light of this ruling, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach the additional argument
raised by the ATL defendants that the cyberstalking statute does not apply to the activity at issue.
37