1 .21" '37: 1" m. But if this supposition is false, then there is no strategic justification for a Palestinian state. If several Arab states? hostility to Israel has no connection to the ?Palestinian question,? then ful?ll- ing some Palestinian aspirations will net necessarily lead to a leSSening of Arab?Israeli tensions. In other words, creating a Palestinian state may not end tensions between Israel and its We Com Live Wit/9 ll other neighbors. Indeed, if someone were to demon- strate that creating a Palestinian state would both weaken Israel and fail to end the Arabelsraeli con?ict, then it wOuld be foolish for Israel to support such a position. Moreover, if creating a Palestinian state were actually to encourage more aggressive Arab behav- ior against Israel, as well as increased conflict and regional instability, then it would be both strategically and mor- ally absurd to advance the creation of such a state. Our study, I believe, demonstrated the negative effect a Palestinian state would have on the region. The strategic argument has given way to a moral one because the practical claims for a two- state solution are unfounded. El Ephraim Size}: my former job as head of the Civil Administration on the West Bank, I frequently had the opportunity to brief visiting foreign delegations. On one such occasion, I remarked to a leading American foreign policy analyst that, unless there is movement toward territorial compromise, Israeli troops will have to patrol the streets of Hebron for the next one hundred years. His off-the-cuff reply was So what?? I was reminded of this incident upon reading the recent report issued by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies and summarized in Trilakmz by its principal author, Michael IWidlanski. This acceptance of the inev? itability of the status quo is the hallmark of the analysis presented by IASPS. Not surprisingly, the same visiting American foreign-policy analyst I refer to above is also a contributor to the IASPS report. The IASPS report claims to be an in-depth academic study of the conse- quences a Palestinian state would have for Israel ?5 security. But the characteriza- tion of its authors as objective, neutral, nonpartisan academic scholars who professionally analyze a strategic prob- lem is a deception. The Israeli con? tributors (with one exception) belong to the right wing of the Israeli political Ephraim Siren, brigaa?ier general (re- 53706), was the bead of the Civil Ad- ministration an [be West Bank 1985-87: He currently director general oft/1e Golda Meir Association, which teaches democratic values to Israeli big}; school students. .051?. Q. spectrum. An effort was made to bring together almost all the Israeli reserve generals who oppose the formula of ?territories for peace? there are nor too many of them, so it was easy to get them together. The civilians in the group, borh Israelis and Americans, are well known for their right-wing conviCtions. They are of course entitled to express their opinions about Israel?s security, but the IASPS report is not a study; it is a propaganda brochure, skillfully presented on glossy paper with striking maps and illustrations. What is absent from the maps of the IASPS report is the population of the territories it describes. For Vlidlanski and his contributors, the Wes: Bank and Gaza Strip are merely staging grounds for Arab troops, launching sites for missiles, hiding places for terrorists, geography without demography. The fact that 1.7 million Palestinians live there, and that these are human beings with personal and national aspirations, is negligible. So much for the obvious. The IASPS team also ignores recent developments in the Middle East, the role of Egypt in the peace process, and changes in the attitudes of the Palestinians themselves. Widlanski and his colleagues believe Arabs only when they make threats, not when they speak moderately. Not sur- prisingly, the report is full of deceptions and distorted presentation of facts: - The Allon Plan is mentioned in the report as an example of defense doc- trine opposing Palestinian sovereignty west of the Jordan River. In fact, the spirit of the Allon Plan is ?maximum security for Israel with minimum con- trol over the Palestinian population.? The Allon Plan provided for Israeli strategic positions in the Jordan River Valley while also providing sovereignty to the Palestinian population on most of the West Bank, not necessarily with geographical linkage to Jordan. Allon wrote his plan a few weeks after Israel?s victory in June 1967 and did not include Jewish settlements on the populated parts of the West Bank as part of his conception. The one hun- dred settlements built by the Likud government between 1977 and 1984 have made the Allon Plan inapplicable and impractical. The principles and spirit of the plan, however, remain the cornerstone of the Labor party doc- trine regarding territorial solution, and they are a far cry from the conclusions reached by the IASPS ?study.? - Widlanski emphasizes the threat of an Arab coalition on Israel?s ?Eastern Front.? Yes, this is a serious potential threat. But what exists now is a bloc of moderate Arab states that seek a peace agreement in the region. The extremist militant Syria is isolated today in the Arab world. \What may help Syria break its isolation and build an anti-Israel coalition amongst other states is a continuation of the status quo that prolOngs the Israeli?Palestinian con?ict. Iraq, with its military potential, is a regional counterbalance to Syria, especially as a backing to Jordan against its northern militant neighbor. But, if an anti-Israel coalition forms as a result 63 of the stalemated peace process, Iraq will join as a very powerful partner. In the wars of 1967 and 1973, Iraq did not form the aggressive coalition but joined it during the war. Israeli intransigence? what Widlanslti and the IASPS report so vehemently advocate?is the pre- scription for the uni?cation of the Arab world against Israel. - Widlanski ignores the 'changes that have occurred in the region in the last decade. In that time, most of the Arab regimes have come to the conclusion that the ideology which threatens their existence is not Zionism, but Muslim fundamentalism, inspired by Iran. Of the four Arab states which share bor- ders with Israel, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, and Jordan reached an agreement with Israel about the initiation of negotiations (the Hussein ?Peres Agreement signed in London in April of 1987). It was Shamir who rejected this agreement and blocked its adoption by Israel. Israeli z'atrarzsz'gertce? wlaat Wz'cllamlez' and the IASPS report so vehemently advocate?2's tlae prescription for tlae uni?cation of the Arab world a gaz'rzst Israel. The third state, Lebanon, is not a state any more, but a state of mind. Still, if only as an historical footnote, it, too, signed a peace treaty with Israel in May 1983. Now Israel successfully uses the southern part of Lebanon as a security zone and will continue to do so as long as terrorist organizations take advantage of the chaos which prevails in that country. The fourth state, Syria, with which Israel has the shortest border, still op- poses any peace process, and waits for the failure of the current process in order to regain leadership in the Arab world. Widlanski?s recommendation to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unresolved just because Israel?s neigh- bors maintain their animosity toward Israel ignores the strategies of the actual actors involved. - Widlanski speaks of ?massive retalia- tion? theories which are used by those 64 TIKKUN VOL. 5, No. 4 in Israel who favor territorial com- promise. They adopt ?Strangelovian? approaches, he says, to counteract the vulnerability of a smaller Israel. To substantiate his claim, Widlanslti quotes a distinguished Israeli geographer?a geographer, and not a political leader or strategic thinker. Widlanski?s selec- tive quotation does not represent any strategic school of thought in Israel. It is more accurate and honest to say that those in Israel who advocate the formula of ?territories for peace? strongly insist that even in conditions of peace, Israel must maintain its military superiority. Even when the prophecy of Isaiah becomes a reality, we would pre- fer Israel as the woif and not the lamb. The distance between Kfar Sava and Qalqilya is the same as that between Qalqilya and Kfar Sava, and the dis- tance between Ashkelon and Gaza is the same as between Gaza and Ash? kelon. This means that the densely populated Palestinian towns are as ex? posed to Israel?s military strength as Israeli towns may be to terrorist attack- ers. Israel Can rely on this sort of deterrence. - One of the illustrations in the IASPS report shows a terrorist hidden behind a bush as he launches a shoulder mis- sile at a 747 airliner landing at Ben- Gurion Airport. This is a concrete threat, often repeated to American Jews who use the international airport on their visits to Israel. The implication of such an image is, ?If we give back the West Bank, you will be unable to safely land at Ben-Gurion Airport.? Interestingly, there is another inter- national airport in Israel, the Eilat Airport, which has been in use for three decades and which lies only one mile from the border with Jordan. Hundreds of Israelis and tourists use it daily and not a single missile has ever been launched from Jordan at one of the aircraft landing or taking off. Are the Arabs in this area pro? Israeli? No. What matters is not the technical ability to shoot missiles, but who controls the other side of the border. A responsible government that cares for its own vital interests has an incentive to prevent such an attack and can do so effectively. - The report minimizes the demo- graphic problem and Widlanski en- tirely ignores three factors which may shift Israel?s demographic balance: the birth rate of the Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip is one of the highest in the Middle East; there is a permanent stream of Jewish emigration from Israel, mainly to the US. (between 1980 and 1987 the number of immigrants exceeded the number of emigrants by only two thousand people); and the emigration of Pales- tinians from the territories to Jordan and the Gulf States?an important factor in the slowdown of Arab popu- lation growth in the seventies and early eighties?has ceased. Due to the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War and the econOmic crisis in Jordan, these countries can no longer offer jobs to Palestinians who come from the out- side. Even if the immigration from the Soviet Union manages to maintain the Jewish majority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, an Arab minority of 40 percent means a bi- national state. In order to preserve Jewish dominance in state institutions, Israel must deprive the Palestinians in the territories of civil rights; while in order to preserve its democratic char- acter, Israel must add 1.7 million Pales- tinians to the 800,000 Israeli Arabs who are already Israeli citizens and grant them civil rights. \?(lidlanslti offers no solution to this existential paradox. - Widlanski speaks about the danger that a Palestinian state poses to Jordan, though once again he ignores the facts. More than 1.5 million Palestinians live in Jordan, approximately two-thirds of its population. The Palestinians there are fully integrated into Jordanian so- ciety. At the same time, there are family ties, shared economic interests, and other connections of the like between this Palestinian community and the Palestinian community in the occupied territories. It is unrealistic to assume that after permanent arrangements have been achieved, these two communities can be totally separated. It is also un? realistic to believe that the Hashemite kingdom can resrore its control on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Even- tually the pracrical afrangement will have to be a confederation of the East Bank, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Some initial understandings al- ready exist between the PLO and Jordan on this matter, though what really endangers Jordan?s stability is the radicalization inspired by the intifada. othing is more important to us, the Israelis, than ensuring Israel?s security within the framework of a peace agreement. It must be clearly said that no peace agreement will be achieved that does not provide Israel with satisfactory security guarantees while also satisfying Palestinian aspira- tions for sovereignty. The IASPS report correctly describes the \niLnerahility of Israel?s papillarinn: mainly concentrated within the narrow coastal plain. Israel must not be ex- posed to attack by troops deployed along its border from the West Bank, as almost happened in 1967. The IDF (Israel Defense Force) is composed mainly of reserve units, which are ready for battle only after a process of mobi- lization. To avoid a surprise attack, Israel will need suf?cient early-warning capability. No Israeli leader will sign a peace agreement that does not satisfy the country?s security needs. What are the essential guarantees necessary to en- sure Israel?s security? The West Bank and Gaza Strip have to be totally de- militarized so that they cannot serve as a springboard for a military offensive againSt Israel by standing Arab armies, or as a base for terrorist raids on Israel by extremist Palestinian organizations. This demilitarization would be, of course, a part of the peace treaty. De- ployment of military forces by Arab states would not be allowed, and only Palestinian policemen would be au- thorized to carry light weapons. Veri?cation of this demilitarization would involve Israeli control over a strip along the Jordan River, as well as the establishment of a few early-warning installations if and where airborne sys- tems are not suf?cient. The Israeli mili- tary presence along the Jordan River Valley would prevent any in?ltration by terrorists and arms smugglers since there are no airports or harbors on the West Bank. The only route of in?ltra- tion, then, is through the Jordan River, While the Jordan River Valley is a nat- ural obstacle with few points where a regular army might cross. The Israeli presence along the Jordan RiverValley would be substantial enough to con- tain any attack from the eastern side of the Jordan River. Of course, Israel would have the right to reinforce its ?These essays re?ect pain and hope, the pain that a caring Jew feels when Israel falls from grace and the hope that the Zionist ideal is self- correcting." HERTZBERG. . author of Tbejews i in America: Four Centuries of an UneasyEncomzter gig?M IELDS Houghton Milli: Company 1990 a ?Required reading for anyone attempting to understand Israel.? ELON, author of_]emsalem: City quirrors ?Will bevof great value to all of us concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of peace in the Middle East." striking mosaic which, like it or not, compels attention.? S. KHOURY, M.1.T. SAFRAN, Harvard University . troops there in case of imminent con- frontation. It should also be remem- bered that in the valley area the Palestinian population is very small, so it is likely that the friction would be kept to a minimum. The veri?cation of Gaza Strip de- militarization would be much easier. The Israeli navy could easily prevent any military use of the Mediterranean coast, while the army could protect the land borders. Egypt, meanwhile, could efficiently control the Strip?s southern border. Although providing these guarantees to Israel stands in contrast to absolute Palestinian sovereignty, this is the char- acter of the compromise: the meeting point of the two parties? demands is where Palestinian sovereignty might endanger Israel?s security. A detailed study of this issue by prominent Israeli military commentator Ze?ev Schiff has recently been published by the Wash- ington Institute for Near East Policy (?Security for Peace: Israel?s Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians?). Schiff?s study stands in direct con- trast to Widlanski?s report, which is riddled with anxiety and projected dangers that seem justi?ed when Only the military aspects of Israeli?Arab relations are discussed. But one has to remember that peace?not only war?~ has a momentum and dynamic of its own. Coexistence and open borders for trade and tourism may create incen- tives for both peoples to live in peace. Building common economic interests, for example, should be an integral part of a projected Israeli?Arab peace. The IASPS report is titled: ?Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?? But the question Israel faces now would be a more ?tting topic for the next report fromWidlanski and his coileagues:?Can Israel Survive the Status Quo?? CURRENT DEBATE 65