Mark D. Gundrum

N2 W28791 Sylvan Trail, Waukesha, WI 53188 (h); (c)

May 19, 2016

Governor Scott Walker 115 East State Capitol Madison, Wisconsin 53707

RE: Judicial Vacancy - Wisconsin Supreme Court

Dear Governor Walker:

The Honorable David Prosser has announced his upcoming retirement from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. It is with great enthusiasm that I seek your appointment to fill this seat.

Members of the judicial branch should resist the temptation to make legislative-type public policy changes from the bench. In this vein, the letter of the law should be carefully respected so the public has confidence that when a law, or contract, is written, it will be interpreted consistent with that writing. This is the type of judge I have been for six years now on the trial court and court of appeals. If honored with appointment to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, this is the type of judge I will be at that level as well.

My work as an appellate court judge has been very similar to that of the justices on our state supreme court - reading briefs and trial court records, researching the applicable law, interpreting statutes and contracts, engaging attorneys at oral argument, and carefully crafting written decisions so as to avoid unintended consequences and provide clarity for involved parties as well as the bench and bar. If appointed to our supreme court, I will be able to hit the ground running from day one.

As you know, prior to joining the judiciary, I served in the Wisconsin State Assembly. Over the years, I gained a reputation for working in a cooperative, bi-partisan manner for the good of our state. Our supreme court could greatly benefit from the appointment of an individual with a proven record of working in a collegial, cooperative manner, as I have done in the legislature and on the court of appeals.

In addition to working as a private attorney, lawmaker, and trial and appellate court judge, I have had the honor of serving our nation as a judge advocate officer in the Army Reserve for the past 16 years, including working directly with Iraqi judges as a Rule of Law Advisor while deployed to Iraq in 2008.

Governor Walker, I believe my background and legal experience will serve the citizens of this state well on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I hope you will honor me with the opportunity to provide that service, and I thank you for your consideration of my application for this important office.

Very truly yours,

Mark D. Gundrum

Court of Appeals Judge, District II

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Mark D. Gundrum

N2 W28791 Sylvan Trail, Waukesha, WI 53188



JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE

WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS Waukesha, WI

November 2011 - Present

Appointed in November 2011 and elected to full term in April 2013. Read briefs and trial court records, research applicable law, interpret laws and contracts, engage attorneys at oral argument, and carefully craft written decisions so as to avoid unintended consequences and provide clarity for involved parties as well as the bench and bar.

WAUKESHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Waukesha, WI August 2010 - November 2011

Elected to serve as trial court judge for Branch 2, defeating previously appointed incumbent 77%-23% in April 2010 election. Presided over full spectrum of criminal cases from first degree intentional homicide to sexual assault to drunk driving.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN Milwaukee, WI

June 1995 - June 1996

Served as full-time law clerk for Federal District Court Judge Rudolph Randa. Among other responsibilities, drafted Decisions and Orders for Judge Randa.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the SIXTH CIRCUIT Lansing, MI Summer 1993

Served as summer law clerk for Federal Court of Appeals Judge Richard Suhrheinrich. Wrote memoranda for Judge Suhrheinrich and assisted with drafting Opinions.

CIVIL LAW EXPERIENCE

HIPPENMEYER, REILLY, MOODIE & BLUM, S.C. Waukesha, WI January 2003 – July 2010

While serving full-time in the Wisconsin Legislature, practiced law part-time with the Hippenmeyer firm. Focusing primarily on municipal law, served as prosecutor for the Village of Mukwonago, prosecuting hundreds of local law violations each year. Handled various other municipal matters, including responding to open records requests and drafting municipal ordinances.

DEAN & McKOY, S.C. Waukesha, WI

August 1999 - June 2000

While serving full-time in the Wisconsin Legislature, practiced law part-time with this general practice firm.

KASDORF, LEWIS & SWIETLIK, S.C. Milwaukee, WI

September 1996 – May 1999

Practiced as litigation defense associate, representing insurance companies, businesses, and individuals in various legal matters.

FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP Madison, WI

January 1994 - May 1995

As part-time law clerk for the Foley firm, prepared memoranda and drafts of legal briefs, and provided consultation as requested.

OUTAGAMIE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Appleton, WI Summer 1994

Served as prosecution intern, including prosecuting own caseload with assistance from full-time prosecutors in the office.

MILITARY/RULE OF LAW EXPERIENCE

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

July 2000 - Present

Have served as a judge advocate for the 646th Regional Support Group (2014-Present), 214th Legal Support Organization (2000-2006 and 2011-2014), 91st Legal Support Organization (2009-present), 432nd Civil Affairs Battalion (2006-2009). Have counseled and represented individual soldiers on family law, estate planning, consumer protection, employment law, and other legal matters, as well as counseled and represented commanders. Selected by the command to serve as Legal Advisor and/or Recorder (akin to a prosecutor) for Administrative Separation Boards. Promoted to Major in July 2010, and currently up for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.

UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN IRAQ/XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS February-November 2008

Served as a Rule of Law Advisor in Iraq, working for XVIII Airborne Corps and the United States Rule of Law Coordinator under Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Worked directly with the Chief Justice of the Iraq Supreme Judicial Council (Iraq Supreme Court), as well as lower level Iraqi judges and members of the national parliament, to advance the Rule of Law in Iraq.

LAWMAKING EXPERIENCE

WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE Madison, WI

January 1999 – July 2010

Elected and re-elected to represent approximately 54,000 constituents in the State Assembly and serve said constituents with regard to various state matters. Personally wrote and/or helped usher into law state constitutional amendments and statutory changes. Blocked or amended as appropriate numerous legislative proposals. Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee from 2001-2008. Elected by Assembly Republican colleagues to leadership positions of Caucus Chairman and Assistant Majority Leader.

HALES CORNERS VILLAGE BOARD Hales Corners, WI

April 1995 - January 1999

Represented over 7,000 constituents as a Village Trustee on the Village Board. Drafted ordinances and responded to various constituent issues and concerns.

EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON

- Law School, Juris Doctor 1992-1994
 Law Review, Moot Court
- Undergraduate, Bachelor of Arts 1988-1992
 Political Science and Economics Degrees
 Graduated Phi Beta Kappa and with Distinction



SCOTT WALKER OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR STATE OF WISCONSIN

115 EAST STATE CAPITOL MADISON, WI

APPLICATION FOR JUDGESHIP

(Please attach additional pages as needed to fully respond to questions)

DATE: May 19, 2016

I. Personal Information:

Name (Last, First, Middle Initial)	Home Telephone Number (Area Code)	
Gundrum, Mark D.		
E-Mail	Work Number (Area Code)	
Court Applying For	Cell Number (Area Code)	
Wisconsin Supreme Court		
Age	Current Address	
<u>46</u>	N2W28791 Sylvan Trail	
Place of Birth	City	
<u>Milwaukee</u>	Waukesha	
Driver's License Active in WI?	County of Residence	
Yes No	Waukesha	
Wisconsin Bar Number	State	
1024370	<u>WI</u>	
Date Admitted to Practice Law in WI	Zip Code	
1995	53188	
Date Admitted to Practice Law in Another State	Year(s) at Current Address	
<u>N/A</u>	5	
	Are you registered to vote at this address?	
	Yes No	

II. Employment Information

Current Employer State of Wisconsin	Work Address 2727 N. Grandview Blvd
Title Court of Appeals Judge	City Waukesha
Telephone Number (Area Code) 262-521-5230	County Waukesha
	State WI
	Zip Code 53188

III. Marital Information

Marital	Status	
Single	Marrie [d 🔀

If married, please provide the following: Date of marriage, spouse's name, spouse's occupation 12/16/1996, Mary Gundrum, Homemaker/Owner of Mary Gundrum Photography, LLC If ever divorced, please provide the following: Name, former spouse(s)' occupation, and date of divorce(s)

Please provide the following for any children and stepchildren: Name, state of residence, and occupation

Name	State of Residence	Occupation
Jacinta Gundrum	<u>WI</u>	Student
Bernadette Gundrum	<u>·WI</u>	Student
Mark Gundrum, Jr.	<u>WI</u>	Student
Augustine Gundrum	WI	Student
Cecilia Gundrum	WI	Student
Philomena Gundrum Gemma Gundrum	WI	Students, and Agnes is one year old
Dominic Gundrum Agnes Gundrum		

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IV. Residential History
List all previous residences for the past ten years
5239 S. Guerin Pass, New Berlin, WI 53151

V. Personal Information Cont.

Do you currently have a physical or mental impairment that in any way limits your ability or fitness to properly exercise your duties as a member of the Judiciary in a competent and professional manner? Yes \sum No \sum to 100.
In the past ten years have you unlawfully used controlled substances as defined by federal or state laws? Yes \(\subseteq \text{No } \subseteq \) If yes, explain.
Since leaving high school, have you, other than for academic reasons, ever been denied enrollment, disciplined, denied course credit, suspended, expelled, or requested to end your enrollment by any college, university, law school or other institution? Yes \sum No \times If yes, explain.
Have you failed to meet any deadline imposed by court order or received notice that you have not complied with substantive requirements or any contractual arrangement? Yes \sum No \times If yes, explain.
Have you ever been held in contempt or otherwise formally reprimanded or sanctioned by a tribunal before which you have appeared? Yes \sum No \times If yes, explain.
Are you delinquent in your mandatory continuing legal education? Yes \sum No \sum If yes, explain.
Have you ever been a party to a lawsuit either as a plaintiff or as a defendant? Yes No If yes, please supply the jurisdiction and/or county, case number, nature of the lawsuit, whether you were the plaintiff or defendant, and disposition of each lawsuit. Johnson v. Burmaster, Ozaukee County, 2008 WI App 4, 2006AP1380. My wife and I, along with several other parents of children enrolled in the Wisconsin Virtual Academy, a start up on-line school, successfully moved to intervene in this case. In Johnson v. Burmaster, the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC) filed suit against Elizabeth Burmaster, then-State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Northern Ozaukee School District, the district through which the on-line school operated. WEAC's ultimate goal with the suit was to shut down the on-line school, which WEAC viewed as being in competition with brick and mortar schools in which WEAC's members taught. We moved to intervene in this case to ensure the interests of the children and families involved with the on-line school were properly represented in the suit. We won summary

	judgment in the trial court, but were reversed by the District II Court of Appeals. While
	the petition for review was pending in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Legislature
	provided the relief we sought through legislation that effectively mooted the case.
8)	Has there ever been a formal complaint filed against you, a finding of probable cause,
,	citation, or conviction issued against you?
	Yes No No
	If yes, explain.
	In 1999, my state assembly campaign committee, Citizens for Mark Gundrum, paid a \$50
	forfeiture because my mother, the campaign treasurer, failed to report a \$500 campaign
	contribution within 24 hours of the contribution being received by the campaign on
	October 10, 1998. The contribution was fully reported on the campaign's regular finance
	reports; however, because it was a \$500 contribution and was made in the final weeks
	before the November election, it should have been reported within 24 hours of the
	contribution being received. That 1998 campaign was my mother's first experience as
	treasurer for a state elected office.
9)	Are you presently under investigation by the Wisconsin Judicial Commission, the
<i>-</i>	Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the Office of Lawyer Regulation, or any other equivalent,
	in any jurisdiction?
	Yes No No
	If yes, explain.
	if yes, explain.
10)	If you are a quasi-judicial officer, have you ever been disciplined or reprimanded by a
,	sitting judge?
	Yes No X
	If yes, explain.
	17 you, out the same of the sa
11)	In the past five years, have you ever been cited for a municipal or traffic violation,
	excluding parking tickets?
	Yes No
	If yes, explain.
	I received a citation in Elm Grove in February 2012 for driving 15 mph over the speed
	limit. The citation was ultimately amended to a defective speedometer violation, and I
	paid the related forfeiture. Around this same time, I believe, I also received either a
	warning or citation for speeding in Oconomowoc. If I received a citation, I believe I
	would have just paid it.
12)	Have you ever failed to timely file your federal or state income tax returns?
	Yes No
	If yes, explain.
	See Question 13.
13)	Have you ever paid a tax penalty?
,	Yes No
	If yes, explain.
	In Fall 2009, my judicial campaign committee, Gundrum for Judge, hired an individual to
	assist with my 2010 judicial campaign. I utilized an accounting firm to take care of
	payroll and tax issues related to this "employee." I had to let the individual go after just a
	few weeks. I told him I would pay him for the weeks he worked; however, he never
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returned the necessary documents I had given him so that the accounting firm could properly process his pay and related taxes. Nearly a year later, in Fall 2010, the individual contacted me and asked to be paid for the weeks he had worked in December 2009. I gave him another copy of the documents, which he returned, I provided the documents to the accounting firm, and the individual was promptly paid by Gundrum for Judge. About three months later, I received an unexpected notice from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue informing me that I was being assessed a \$50.00 "late filing fee" related to the payment of taxes for this individual. Although I thought the fee was inappropriate, I promptly sent the D.O.R. a check for the \$50.00, along with a letter explaining the situation and appealing the assessment of the fee. The D.O.R. withdrew the assessment and refunded the \$50.00 to me.

14) Has a tax lien ever been filed against you?
Yes No No
If yes, explain.
Have you ever filed a personal petition in bankruptcy, or has a petition in bankruptcy been filed against you? Yes No If yes, explain.
Have you ever owned more than ten percent of the issued and outstanding shares, or acted as an officer or director, for any corporation by which or against which a petition i bankruptcy has been filed? Yes No No If yes, explain.

V. Education

High School Education Information

Name of School

Catholic Memorial High School

Address: Street, City, State

601 E. College Ave., Waukesha, WI 53186

Degree Earned

College Prep

GPA

Above 4.0; I believe I was third in my class of approximately 242 students

Dates Attended

1984-1988

Undergraduate Education Information

Name of School

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Address: Street, City, State

Madison, WI

Degree Earned

B.A.

GPA

3.793

Dates Attended

1988-1992

Law School Education Information

Name of School	
University of Wisconsin-Madison	
Address: Street, City, State	,
Madison, WI	
Degree Earned	
J.D.	
GPA	
The transcript does not say what my GPA was.	
Dates Attended	
1992-1994	

List and describe academic scholarships, awards, honor societies, extracurricular involvement, and any other related educational information. Note any leadership positions.

- -University of Wisconsin-Madison Undergraduate: Phi Beta Kappa and graduated with distinction
- -University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School: Law Review and Moot Court

VI. MILITARY EXPERIENCE:

List all military service (including Reserves and National Guard).

Service Branch	Highest Rank	Dates
United States Army Judge Advocate	Major	2000-Present
Reserve		

Type of discharge:

List any awards or honors earned during your service. Also list any citations or charges pursued against you under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal w/ Campaign Star, Army Service Ribbon, Army Reserve Components Overseas Training Ribbon, Armed Forces Reserve Medal w/ M Device, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, German Armed Forces Badge for Military Proficiency

VII. PROFESSIONAL ADMISSIONS:

List all courts (including state bar admissions) and administrative bodies to which you have been admitted to practice, giving the dates of admission, and, if applicable, whether you have ever been suspended or have resigned.

Court or Administrative Body	Date of Admission
Wisconsin State Bar	1995
United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin	1995

VIII. NON-LEGAL EMPLOYMENT:

List all previous full-time, non-legal jobs or positions held in the past eight years.

Employer	Position	Date	Address
Citizens of the 84th	State Representative	1999-2010	State Capitol
Assembly District			
			10 m and 10

IX. LEGAL EMPLOYMENT:

(If you are a sitting judge, answer the following questions with reference to before you became a judge.)

List the names, dates, and addresses of all legal employment, including law school and volunteer work.

Employer	Position	Date	Address
Hippenmeyer, Reilly,	Attorney	2003-10	720 Clinton St.,
Moodie & Blum, S.C.			Waukesha, WI
Dean & McKoy, S.C.	Attorney	1999-2000	20975 Swenson
			Dr., Waukesha,
			WI
Kasdorf, Lewis, &	Attorney	1996-99	11270 W. Park
Swietlik, S.C.	,		Place, Milwaukee,
			WI
Federal District Court	Law Clerk	1995-96	Milwaukee, WI
Judge Rudolph Randa,			
Eastern District of			
Wisconsin			

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Describe your legal experience as an advocate in criminal litigation, civil litigation, and administrative proceedings.

Through my employment as an attorney with Hippenmeyer, Reilly, Moodie & Blum, S.C., I served as the municipal prosecutor for the Village of Mukwonago from January 2003 through June 2010, except not the year I was deployed to Iraq (2008).

As an insurance defense litigation associate with Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., from 1996 to 1999, I represented and advocated for insurance companies, businesses, and government entities in cases filed primarily in counties around the greater Milwaukee area.

As a judge advocate in the Army Reserve, I have served as both a recorder (akin to a prosecutor) and legal advisor to administrive separation boards. I have represented and advised both individual soldiers and commanders on Army legal matters.

On multiple occasions between 1998 and 2007, I advocated for candidates and legislative colleagues, pro bono, on matters before the State Elections Board, such as election recounts, challenges to nomination papers, and campaign finance issues.

In your career, how many cases have you tried that resulted in a verdict or judgment?

Jury:	3	Non-jury:	15 (approximately,
			including municipal
			court)
Arbitration:	N/A	Administrative Bodies:	<u>5</u>

How many cases have you litigated on appeal? Provide case names and case numbers. If fewer than twenty cases, describe the nature of each case, your involvement, and each case's disposition.

Kosky v. International Association of Lions Club, 210 Wis. 2d 463 (Ct.App. 1997), was a recreational immunity case in which I represented the third party defendant-respondent. I wrote the appellate brief and advocated at oral argument before the District III Court of Appeals. We lost on appeal.

Armour v. Milwaukee Transport Services, No 97AP883, was a personal injury case in which I argued before the trial court that, based on the plaintiff's own version of the facts, as noted from his deposition, there was no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and that my client, Milwaukee Transport Services, was entitled to summary judgment. The trial court agreed. I continued my representation before the District I Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

Milwaukee Transport Services v. Circuit Court for Waukesha County, No. 96AP2862, was a case in which I represented Milwaukee Transport Services in seeking a writ of prohibition. Our request was denied by the District II Court of Appeals.

List and describe the three most significant cases in which you were involved; give the case number and citation to reported decisions, if any. Describe the nature of your participation in the case and the reason you believe it to be significant.

Kosky v. International Association of Lions Club, 210 Wis. 2d 463 (Ct. App. 1997), is discussed briefly above. While the court of appeals did not find in favor of my client, the recreational immunity issues in the case were important because of their potential impact on future landowner decisions regarding whether or not to open their land to the public for recreational uses.

Johnson v. Burmaster, 2008 WI App 4, 2006AP1380, is also discussed earlier. Although Michael Dean served as our legal counsel in this case, I worked with Attorney Dean in developing arguments at the trial court level and on appeal. The case was significant because the survival or elimination of virtual public schools in Wisconsin depended on the outcome of the case. The case helped prompt legislation addressing virtual schools.

I was involved with numerous other trial and municipal court cases; however, no other cases of significant consequence reached the appellate courts.

X. PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE:

Have you ever held a judicial or quasi-judicial office? If so, state the court(s) involved, position held, and dates of service.

Name of Agency/Court	Position Held	Dates		
Wisconsin Court of Appeals,	Appellate Court Judge	2011- Present		
District II				
Waukesha County Circuit	Trial Court Judge, Branch 2	2010-2011		
Court				

List the names, phone numbers, and addresses of two attorneys who appeared before you on matters of substance.

Lloyd Carter: then-Waukesha County Assistant District Attorney, now trial court judge

515 W. Moreland Blvd., Waukesha, WI 53188

(262) 548-7809 (w); (414) 418-3574 (c)

Peter Wolff: Wolff & Sonderhouse 400 W. Moreland Blvd., Waukesha, WI 53188 (262) 446-9222 (w); (414) 418-0143 (c)

Describe the approximate number and nature of cases you have heard during your judicial or quasi-judicial tenure.

I am not completely certain what is intended by the word "heard" here. I would fairly estimate that I handled/disposed of over 1500 cases while on the trial court bench. These included felonies, misdemeanors, criminal traffic cases, and civil forfeiture cases. While a trial court judge, I believe I presided over approximately a half dozen or more jury trials, ranging from sexual assaults to operating while intoxicated offenses.

As an appellate court judge, I have personally authored well over a hundred written decisions, including published and unpublished three judge decisions, as well as one-judge decisions. I have also served as supervising judge on one fourth of the per curiam and summary decisions from our district.

Describe the two most significant cases you have heard as a judicial officer. Identify the parties, describe the cases, and explain why you believe them to be significant. Provide the trial dates and names of attorneys involved, if possible.

As a trial court judge, I presided over a two day jury trial in State v. Danny Anton, which resulted in guilty verdicts on January 26, 2011. Mr. Anton was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child and three counts of second degree sexual assault of a child. This case was significant because of the severity of the offenses involved. At trial, Deputy District Attorney Debra Blasius represented the State and Attorney Maura McMahon represented Mr. Anton.

I also presided over the case of State v. Steven Osburn in late 2011. The case received significant media attention because Mr. Osburn was an Iraq war veteran who had shot and killed his friend, a Marine, while drunk. The case was fairly complex because it involved media

Application for Judgeship

attention, the possible affect of Osburn's deployment experience upon his criminal actions, and questions of self-defense. The State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Steve Centenario and Mr. Osburn was represented by Attorney Gerald Boyle.

The John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc. v. Jon Erpenbach, 13AP1187, is one of the more significant cases I have been involved with in the four and a half years I have served on the court of appeals. The case involved important issues related to correspondence sent to state lawmakers and the extent to which information in the correspondence must be disclosed to the public, upon request, under Wisconsin's public records law. Rick Esenberg represented the Institute and Thomas Pyper represented Senator Jon Erpenbach.

XI. PREVIOUS PARTISAN OR NON-PARTISAN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT:

Have you ever held a position or played a role in a judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization? If so, please describe your involvement. Assisted with numerous political, and some judicial, campaigns throughout the years.

List all instances in which you ran for elective office. For each instance, list the date of the election (include both primary and general election), the office that you sought, and the outcome of the election. Include your percentage of the vote.

I was appointed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District II, in November 2011, and then was elected to a full term in April 2013 (uncontested). In April 2010, I was elect to the Waukesha County Circuit Court with 77% of the vote, defeating the incumbent judge who had been appointed a year earlier by then-Governor Jim Doyle. I was elected to the Wisconsin State Assembly in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. I won contested primary elections for that seat in September 1998 and 2002 with 62% and 63% of the vote respectively. In 1997, I ran in a special election for Milwaukee County Supervisor. I won the June primary, but lost the July general election by about 2%. I was elected to serve as a Hales Corners Village Trustee in April 1995 and 1997.

List all judicial or non-partisan candidates that you have publicly endorsed in the last six years. Lloyd Carter, Waukesha County Circuit Court. I believe I also agreed to endorse one of Governor Walker's appointees to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court in 2012 or 2013, as well as Justice David Prosser in his 2011 re-election. I believe those are the only public endorsements I have made in the last six years.

XII. HONORS, PUBLICATIONS, PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER ACTIVITIES:

List any published books or articles, providing citations and dates.

In April 2001, then-State Senator Kim Plache and I published an article in the Wisconsin Lawyer magazine regarding the work we were involved with on a special legislative committee related to guardian ad litem issues. The following should be the correct electronic citation for the article: https://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=guardian_ad_litem&CONTENTID=48995 &TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.

In March 2005, I published an article in the Wisconsin Lawyer magazine, encouraging other attorneys to consider joining the Army Reserve. Below should be the correct electronic citation. http://www.wisbar.org/am/template.cfm?section=wisconsin_lawyer&template=/cm/contentdisplay.cfm&contentid=46886.

List any honors, prizes, or awards you have received, providing dates.

- -Wisconsin State Representative, 1999-2010 Judiciary Committee Chairman, 2001-2007; Assistant Majority Leader; Majority Caucus Chairman.
- -VFW Post 5716 Patriotic Citizen of the Year (2009)
- -Champion of Commerce Award Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce (2005-06)

- -Taxcutter of the Year Award Republican Party of Milwaukee (2005)
- -Open Government Badger Award Wisconsin Newspaper Association (2005)
- -Scales of Justice Award State Bar of Wisconsin (2004)
- -Friend of Agriculture Award Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation (2004)
- -Outstanding Legislator Award Wisconsin Counties Association (2004)
- -Voices of Courage Award Wisconsin Coalition Against Sexual Assault (2003)
- -Friend of the Housing Industry Wisconsin Builder's Association (2003)
- -Guardian of Small Businesses National Federation of Independent Businesses (2002)
- -ABC Legislative Award Wisconsin Associated Builders and Contractors (2002)
- -Outstanding Young Wisconsinite Award Jaycees of Wisconsin (2001)
- -Working for Wisconsin Award Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce (2000)
- -Friend of the Taxpayer Award Americans for Tax Reform (1999)
- -Distinguished Graduate Award Department of Elementary Schools of the National Catholic Educational Association, St. Mary's Parish School (1999)

List all bar associations and professional societies of which you are a member; give the titles and dates of any office that you may have held in such groups and committees to which you belong or have belonged.

Wisconsin Bar Association.

Describe any additional involvement in professional or civic organizations, volunteer activities, service in a church or synagogue, or any other activities or hobbies that could be relevant or helpful to consideration of your application.

-Have served as head or assistant coach for various basketball, football, and baseball teams on which my children have played.

Describe any significant pro bono legal work you have performed in the last five years. N/A

Describe any courses on law that you have taught or lectures you have given at bar association conferences, law school forums, or continuing legal education programs.

1) In 2003, a man wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for 18 years was released from prison after DNA testing confirmed the perpetrator of the original crimes was another man. Following this, I established and led a task force to study what led to the wrongful conviction and propose appropriate reforms for the criminal justice system. Those reforms, related to eyewitness identification procedures, electronic recording of custodial interrogations, and better use of DNA technology, were adopted in 2005.

Related to these efforts, Wisconsin Innocence Project Director Keith Findley and I spoke at multiple conferences regarding the reforms. These conferences included the Wisconsin Police Association's Mid-Winter Training in March 2005 in Kohler, WI, a Wisconsin Joint Legislative-Judicial Conference entitled "Addressing Injustices in the Justice System" in September 2004 in Madison, WI, and a state public defender's conference in Milwaukee, WI, among other presentations.

- 2) During the Wisconsin National Guard's May 2010 Judge Advocate General Readiness Conference at Fort McCoy, WI, I presented a one hour CLE block of instruction entitled "Working Towards the Rule of Law and Democracy in Iraq."
- 3) As Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, I spoke at various State Bar conferences and meetings throughout my years in the legislature, including serving on a panel with then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson and then-Attorney General Peg Lautenschlager addressing the topic "Access to Justice."

Describe any other speeches or lectures you have given.

After returning from Iraq at the end of 2008, I did multiple slideshow presentations of my Rule of Law work while deployed.

Prior to the adoption of the Marriage Amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution by the people of this state in November 2006, I spoke at multiple functions across the state regarding the amendment.

As a state representative, I spoke publicly at innumerable events over the years.

Reference 4

Telephone Number

Name

Address

	AL INVOLVEMENT: use now an officer, director, or otherwise engaged in the management of any
you or your spouse's My wife re-started Photography, LLC.	e of the enterprise, the nature of the business, the nature of your duties, and intended involvement upon your appointment or election to judicial office. a small (very small) photography business last year - Mary Gundrum I have no involvement with the business. I anticipate her continuing the ointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court; however, if it posed a problem in nut it down.
since being admitted	ss or profession other than the practice of law that you have been engaged in to the Bar. for the 84 th Assembly District.
business enterprise, i	compensation of any kind, other than for legal services rendered, from any institution, organization, or association of any kind that you have received ears. accident in 2012 and received a settlement from Farmers Insurance.
XIV. References	
Reference 1 Name	Attorney Paul Dedinsky
Address	Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office
Addiess	821 W. State St., Milwaukee, WI
Telephone Number	262-271-1188
Reference 2	·
Name	Judge Patrick Haughney
Address	515 W. Moreland Blvd., Waukesha, WI
Telephone Number	(c); 262-548-7548 (w); (h)
Reference 3	
Name	Judge Lisa Neubauer
Address	Court of Appeals, District II
	2727 N. Grandview Blvd., Waukesha, WI
Tolombono Number	(a)

State Representative Dale Kooyenga

Room 324 East, State Capitol, Madison, WI

XV. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Explain in 500 words or less why you want to become a judge/justice.

My professional interest over the last two decades has been for truth, justice, and the rule of law. Whether that has been as Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, as a Rule of Law Advisor in Iraq, as a Waukesha County Circuit Court Judge, or now as a court of appeals judge, this interest has always driven me to the career choices I have pursued. Serving on the Wisconsin Supreme Court would allow me to employ these ideals at the highest level in our state.

One of the most satisfying aspects of my service as a lawmaker and long-time Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee was reviewing significant court decisions and carefully crafting appropriate legislation to address concerns related to those decisions. I have found carefully wordsmithing decisions interpreting and applying the law on the court of appeals to be equally satisfying. I am confident performing the same thoughtful, careful type of work on the Wisconsin Supreme Court will be even more satisfying.

Respect for the law declines when respect for those interpreting and applying the law declines. Our supreme court is in desperate need of members who can start to rebuild and restore its image. Having spent more than a decade working cooperatively in the legislature with individuals of all political stripes and having spent four and a half years working cooperatively with individuals of varying ideologies and philosophies on the court of appeals, I am confident I can work cooperatively with all members of the supreme court and thereby assist with restoring the public's respect for the court.

In 500 words or less, name one of the best United States or Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions in the last thirty years and explain why you feel that way.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008), is one of the best opinions in the last thirty years, in part because of Justice Scalia's skilled writing of the opinion and in part because it judicially resolved a very important constitutional question. In that case, the Supreme Court considered "whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 2788. After providing a thorough analysis of the meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court, led by Justice Scalia, concluded the D.C. prohibition violated the amendment. Id. 2821-22.

Heller is an important decision because it squarely answers the question of whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right of possession and use of firearms or only the right to possession and use related to militia service. Heller explains the important distinction between "operative" and "prefatory" clauses, and the role of each, and clarifies that prefatory clauses, like "whereas" clauses, are not to be used to produce ambiguity but only to resolve it, if ambiguity exists. Id. at 2790 n.4. The opinion focuses first on the text of the Constitution, noting that, when addressing "rights," every usage in the Constitution of the term "the people"—as in "the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed"—refers only to an individual right of "all members of the political community," not the right of a collective body made up from a subset of that community, such as a militia. Id. at 2790-91.

In disciplined fashion, Heller walks through the individual words used in the Second Amendment, noting that, at the time the amendment was written as now, the word "arms" was not limited only to weapons and armor used in a military capacity, and "keep" and "bear" in no way suggested the amendment was limited to individuals only keeping and bearing arms as part of a structured military organization. Id. at 2791-94. Because the phrase "keep and bear arms" did not itself resolve the question of whether the Second Amendment protects an individual versus collective right, the court looked to "founding-era sources" to help illuminate the true intent of the amendment. Those documents provided significant support for the majority's conclusion that the right to keep and bear arms is an individual right. Id. at 2793, 2798-2803. The majority made clear that "both text and history" confirmed that the Second Amendment referred to the right of an individual to keep and bear arms. Id. at 2799.

In Heller, Justice Scalia also cleverly employed words Justice Ginsburg, one of the dissenters, authored in a prior decision to reinforce the majority's opinion of the intent of the Second Amendment: "Justice Ginsburg wrote that '[s]urely a most familiar meaning [of 'carries a firearm' in a federal criminal statute] is, as the Constitution's Second Amendment ... indicate[s]: 'wear, bear, or carry ... upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose ... of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person." Id. at 2793. Scalia then added, "We think that Justice Ginsburg accurately captured the natural meaning of "bear arms." Id.

Importantly, the majority also recognized that the Second Amendment did not GRANT to the people the right to keep and bear arms, but only protected that already-existing right from infringement. Id. at 2797-98, 2801-02.

In 500 words or less, name one of the worst United States or Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions in the last thirty years and explain why you feel that way.

In 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court released State v. Jerrell, 283 Wis. 2d 145 (2005), which was an example of the court, as then composed, engaging in aggressive policymaking "because it could." The court utilized its "supervisory power" to require that "all custodial interrogations of juveniles in future cases be electronically recorded where feasible, and without exception when questioning occurs at a place of detention." Id. at 151.

Jerrell was a 14-year-old boy who had been arrested in connection with an armed robbery. Following his arrest, Jerrell was held in custody and interrogated at the police station for a significant period of time. His requests to speak with his parents were continually rejected. Though Jerrell repeatedly denied any connection with the robbery, he eventually admitted to being involved in it and signed a statement to that effect.

Jerrell subsequently moved to suppress the confession, arguing that it was involuntary, unreliable, and a product of coercion. The trial court denied the motion and Jerrell was tried and adjudged delinquent as a party to the crime. In a postdisposition motion and on appeal, Jerrell continued to argue that his confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed. His motion was rejected by the trial court. The court of appeals affirmed.

Concluding that Jerrell's confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed, the supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. No justice disputed that Jerrell's confession was involuntary and that the delinquency adjudication was being properly reversed on those grounds. My concerns with the decision relate to the majority's failure to end its decision with the reversal of the adjudication based upon the involuntary nature of the confession. Instead, the majority went further and enacted a policy requiring police to electronically record future custodial interrogations of juveniles.

The overreach by the Jerrell court was particularly troubling because, at the very time the court issued its decision, the Legislature was working in a collaborative, bi-partisan manner to develop legislation that would properly address the issue of electronic recording during custodial interrogations. The legislative reforms were adopted by the Legislature in bi-partisan fashion and signed into law just months after the decision in Jerrell.

In addition to the obvious concerns about the Jerrell court's aggressive policymaking, it is important to note that the court's decision created a costly unfunded mandate on local police departments. By contrast, the Legislature was able to establish an appropriate funding source for law enforcement agencies to utilize for costs related to the new electronic recording requirement. Through the special committee established to help develop the legislation, the Legislature was also able to anticipate and directly account for many future legal issues related to the new policy, rather than wait years for such issues to be resolved through the court system, one case at a time.

Judges, even elected judges, are not elected to enact legislative-type public policy. In addition, courts are ill-equipped to craft public policy. Judges should merely decide the cases before them and not give in to the temptation to further public policy objectives simply "because they can."

In 500 words or less, describe your judicial philosophy.

It is critical that members of our state supreme court have a full appreciation of the different roles of the three branches of government, embrace the philosophy of judicial restraint, and exercise the discipline necessary to apply that restraint. I have all these characteristics and would bring them to the supreme court.

Judicial restraint, of course, means resisting the temptation to creatively interpret legislation or contracts in a way that achieves the result personally desired by the judge, but which does great injustice to the intent of the bodies properly enacting the legislation or parties crafting language in a contract. I believe lawmakers and contract drafters will be more cautious and exact with the language they choose to employ if they know the courts will hold them to the precise words chosen.

My experience running for election to the legislature and serving as a lawmaker, Judiciary Committee Chairman, and Assistant Majority Leader has afforded me unique insight into the legislative process. It is no small feat to translate concerns of citizens out in the public into legislation enacted into law. The process along the way is a thoughtful and deliberate one, which deserves deference and respect. It is an affront to the entire process and the citizens who vote for lawmakers to have one or a handful of members of the judiciary take liberties with enacted law so as to accomplish an end those judges personally desire.

If you have previously submitted a questionnaire or application to this or any other judicial nominating commission, please give the name of the commission and the approximate date of submission.

I submitted an application for appointment to the Court of Appeals, District II, in May 2011.

Describe any other information you feel would be helpful to your application.

I have served in the Army Reserve for almost 16 years now, including serving in Iraq in 2008. I thought it might be of value for the Judicial Selection Committee and Governor Walker to have the opportunity to consider some reviews of my performance as a judge advocate in the Reserve. To that end, I am including with this application Officer Evaluation Reports covering my last five years of service. As you will see from these OERs, during this time period, I have been rated as "Most Qualified" or "Best Qualified" by five different colonels.

Do you wish to request that your application remain confidential to the extent allowed by law?
Yes No No
Note: Such a request does not ensure that your application will remain confidential. In general, you should expect that all
materials submitted will be disclosed to the public upon request under the public records law. The Governor's Office will honor
such a confidentiality request to the extent the law allows. A request for confidentiality will not adversely affect your application
for appointment.

Please remember to upload your first writing sample, second writing sample, resume, signed signature page, and cover letter.

WAIVER AND AUTHORIZATION:

I hereby authorize any person acting on behalf of the Governor or his staff to seek information related to my interest in appointment as judge. I further authorize any recipient of a request for information from the Governor or his staff to provide such information for consideration of my application.

(Signature of Applicant)

NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE:

I acknowledge and understand that this application and supporting materials, when submitted to the Governor of Wisconsin, generally become public record. I therefore understand that this means my name, the fact that I have applied to be appointed as a judge, and my application materials could be released to the public.

(Signature of Applicant)

Please note that under certain, limited circumstances, applications for appointed positions may be exempt from disclosure under the public records law. If you wish your application to remain confidential to the extent allowed by law, please send a request to that effect in writing along with your application.

Such a request does not ensure that your application will remain confidential. In general, you should expect that all materials submitted will be disclosed. The Governor's Office will honor such a confidentiality request to the extent the law allows. A request for confidentiality will not adversely affect your application for appointment.

FIELD GRADE PLATE (C				REVALUATION TO SERVICE	ON REPO	ORT	St		vacy Act in AR 623-3.	
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Deputy Command Judge Advocate c. SIGNIFICANT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBI	TIES			JA						
Assist CJA in all areas for the 646th	RSG. Act:	as one of only	two atte	orneys in a con	nmand of	over 900 S	oldiers wi	ithin a mu	lti-state region.	
Provide legal advice to the Comma on military justice, administrative is investigations, FLIPLs, and other in sufficient and that the process for st	aw, ethics an aformal inves	d operational stigations. En	law mat sure tha	ters. Assist inv t adverse admir	vestigation nistrative	n officers w	vith AR 1:	5-6, RCM	303	
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Command Judge Advocate, LOD T	eam Lead, L	OD Deputy C	Comman	der						
c. THIS OFFICER POSSESSES SKILLS AND DIMA Operational Law Attorney, 1					MENTS					
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d1. Character: (Adherence to Army Values, Empathy, and Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos and Discipline. Fully supports SHARP, EO, and EEO.)	Sets a po Army Va respect.	sitive examp ilues and trea	le daily i ts every	n the appropria Soldier who co	ite practio mes in co	es of EO ar ontact with	nd Sharp. the JA off	MAJ Gu fice with o	ndrum lives the dignity and	

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d2. Provide narrative comments which demonstrate performance regarding field grade competencies and attributes in the Rated Officer's current duty position. (i.e. prioritizes fimited resources to accomplish mission, proactive in developing others through individual coaching counseling and mentoring, active learner to master organizational level knowledge, critical thinking and visioning skills, anticipates and provides for subordinates on-the-job needs for training and development, effective communicator across echelons and outside the Army chain of command, effective at engaging others, presenting information and recommendations and persuasion, highly proficient at critical thinking, judgment and innovation, proficient in utilizing Army design method and other to solve complex problems, uses all influence techniques to empower others; proactive in gaining trust in negotiations, remains respectful, firm and fair. Fully supports SHARP and creates a positive command/workplace environment.)									
COMMENTS: During this rating period, MAJ Gundrum assisted with all separation actions, including EO and SHARP cases, which arose within the command. With each and every case he provided excellent guidance and support to the IO and SARC as needed, as well as completed lozens of legal reviews on separation packets. With all these sensitive cases he was able to build relationships up and down the chain of command and create trust with all parties involved. Further, he volunteered to act as recorder on boards for the 103rd ESC.									
-	e. This Officer's overall Performance is Rated as: (Select one box representing Rated Officer's overall performance compared to others of the same grade whom you have rated in your								
A completed DA Form 67-10-1A was received	with this report and considered	in my evaluation and review: 🔀	Yes No (explain in comments below)						
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RO: GUNDRUM, MARK, K									
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FIELD GRADE PLATE (04 - 05; CW3 - CW5) OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT For use of this form, see AR 623-3; the proponent agency is DCS, G-1. See Privacy Act Statement in AR 623-3.										
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		PART	r III - DUT	Y DESCRIPTION					_	
a PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE Assist Judge Advocate				b. Position AC 27A00/JA	JC/BRANCE	H			_	
a. SIGNIFICANT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBIL										
Assist Judge Advocate for the 646th Regional Support Group. Act as one of only two attorneys in a command of over 900 Soldiers within a multi-state area. Responsible for providing all areas of legal advice to Commander, his subordinate battalion, company and detachment commanders. Advise and educate the command on military justice, administrative law, ethics, and operational law matters. Assist investigating officers conducting AR 15-6 investigations, financial liability investigations, commanders' inquiries, and similar investigations. Ensure that adverse administrative and military justice actions are legally sufficient, and that the process for such actions protects the rights of the Soldier involved.										
PART IV - PERFO			310	7.5	-					
a. APFT Pass/Fall/Profile: PASS Comments required for "Failed" APFT, or "Profile:		recludes performa		Height: 75 y, and "No" for Army		Weight: tandards?	250	Within \$	Stenda	lard? YES
b. THIS OFFICER POSSESSES SKILLS AND	√QUALITIES FO	R THE FOLLOW	ING BRUA	DENING ASSIGNA	MENTS					ŀ
Instructor TJAGLCS, Military Judge			*** ******	- Acricki						
c. THIS OFFICER POSSESSES SKILLS AND RSG SJA, Operations Attorney USA				ATIONAL ASSIGN	MENTS					
d1. Character:	MAJ Gu	ndrum goes a	ibove and	d beyond with l	his warri	or and serv	rice ethos.	He nev	er fa	ils to complete
(Adherence to Army Values, Empethy, and Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos and Discipline. Fully supports SHARP, EO, and EEO.)	any assig	gnment and vo sponsibilities a	olunteers and receiv	for work. He	took on took took	the challeng way with p	ige of the C ohysical fiti	GAFPB v	while	e managing all ut question and

HQDA#: 186901 NAME SSN PERIOD COVERED: FROM (YYYYMMDD) THRU (YYYYMMDD) 3053 GUNDRUM, MARK, D 20140101 20141231 d2. Provide narrative comments which demonstrate performance regarding field grade competencies and attributes in the Rated Officer's current duty position. (i.e. demonstrates excellent presence, confidence and resilience in expected duties and unexpected situation, adjusts to external influence on the mission or taskings and organization, prioritizes limited resources to accomplish mission, proactive in developing others through individual coaching counseling and mentoring, active learner to master organizational level knowledge, critical thinking and visioning skills, anticipates and provides for subordinates on-the-job needs for training and development, effective communicator across echelons and outside the Army chain of commend, effective at engaging others, presenting information and recommendations and persuasion, highly proficient at critical thinking, judgment and innovation, proficient in utilizing Army design method and other to solve complex problems, uses all influence techniques to empower others; proactive in geining trust in negotiations, remains respectful, firm and fair. Fully supports SHARP and creates a positive command/workplace environment.) Immediately upon his arrival, MAJ Gundrum took on numerous Separation files and 15-6 investigation legal reviews, which he completed with great competency and speed. He volunteered as Recorder on a separation board with positive outcome to the government. His civilian position as an Appellate Court Judge brings significant added value to the command, specifically guiding the command to proper action on a sensitive domestic case. Further, he manages two senior NCO paralegals to great effect. e. This Officer's overall Performance is Rated as: (Select one box representing Rated Officer's overall performance compared to others of the same grade whom you have rated in your career. Managed at less than 50% in EXCELS.) A completed DA Form 67-10-1A was received with this report and considered in my evaluation and review: X Yes No (explain in comments below) HQDA COMPARISON OF THE RATER'S PROFILE AND BOX CHECK AT THE TIME THIS REPORT PROCESSED EXCELS RO: GUNDRUM, MARK, D SSN: 3053 R-M SSN-DATE: 2015-04-22 TOTAL RATINGS: 4 RATINGS THIS OFFICER: 1 I currently rate ___1 Army Officers in this grade. MAJ Gundrum is in the top 5% of all Judge Advocates with whom I have served in my 17 year career. His technical ability is accompanied by his outstanding interpersonal skills, which have earned him the respect and confidence of all leaders and Soldiers within the command. His advice is taken and followed with fantastic outcomes for the command. He shows leadership through constant energy and enthusiasm for his work, which is infectious to other Soldiers. PART V - INTERMEDIATE RATER PART VI - SENIOR RATER a. POTENTIAL COMPARED WITH 8 Army Officers in this grade. b. I currently senior rate OFFICERS SENIOR RATED IN SAME GRADE (OVERPRINTED BY DA) c. COMMENTS ON POTENTIAL; HQDA COMPARISON OF THE SENIOR Major Gundrum has limitless potential to excel in task accomplishment and leadership responsibilities. RATER'S PROFILE AND BOX CHECK AT He continually exceeds expectations and he will make a positive impact to any unit assigned. Promote now, ahead of his peers and place in a key legal staff position or leadership position. Tremendous THE TIME THIS REPORT PROCESSED officer who is ready to work at the next level. MOST QUALIFIED RO; GUNDRUM, MARK, D SR: W

d. List 3 future SUCCESSIVE assignments for which this Officer is best suited:

Command Judge Advocate, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, LOD Deputy Commander

RATINGS THIS OFFICER: I DA FORM 67-10-2, MAR 2014

DATE: 2015-04-22

TOTAL RATINGS: 4

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a. NAME OF RATER (Last, First	, MIJ	SSN		RANK	1	овитом	_		SIGNATU				D		үүүммо
P. J. J. J. B. NAME OF INTERMEDIATE R	ATED deat first httl	SSN	2 9198	LTC			mmande	r	1000						40306
W NAME OF INTERMEDIATE R	ATER (Last, rust, MI)	55N		RANK	[P	DBITION			SIGNATU	RE			· []	ATE (Y)	YYYMMD
C. NAME OF SENIOR RATER (L	asi, First, MI)	SSN	***************************************	RANK	Pi	OSITION			61GNATU	RE				ATE (Y)	YYYMMD
R	L		3178	COL	C	ommand	er		R N						10306
SENIOR RATER'S ORGANIZATION	NC			BRANC		ditrocur	ELEPHONE NUM	EER	E-MAIL A			-			
214th Legal Operation:	s Detachment			JA		- Andreas	ish to make some	b mrs.7	o etestă			OFFICER	extension of	ATE (V)	YYMMDI
505 88th Division Road		IN 55111	-4008	O. IIIS IS B	(Jene 17 ca s	eport, so you y. Yes, comments		No No				NES 119057			10307
				PART III	I - DU'	TY DESCI	RIPTION					***********			
A. PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE L	T-G Team Chi	af		-		\		7,	POSITIO	ON ACC	BR 27	7A00/JA			
SIGNIFICANT DUTIES AND R			T Wa DA	EORH 67	O. f			1.	. room	- AGG	PN Z	ROOLSE			
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2. INTEGRITY: Possesses h 3. COURAGE: Manifests of			in word an	rd dead	X		ELFLESS UTY: Fulfi								쥚ㅏ
4. LOYALTY; Boars true fa	,		ution, the			·		ис ричесов	pitati tegu	n, and ne	oral ope				$\widehat{\mathbf{x}}$
D. LEADER ATTRIBUTES TTRIBUTES, two from SKILLS (Comments are mandatory	Competence), and three	from ACTIO	NS (LEADE												
o.1. ATTRIBUTES (Select 1)	N 2		1 40	NO	\square_2	PHYSI	CAL	¥ X 3	NG.	□ 3.	EMO:	TIONAL		V X S I	NC3
undamental qualities and	Possesses desi	re, will, initiati	J	cipiine		intains appi	opriate level e	J				elf-control; ca	alm undo:		æ
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kill development is part of sejr-	thinking, moral						tivating and					all tasks an		ns .	
evelopment; prerequisite to actio	4. 1ACTIO								nó warfigi	nting				V PE	10
.3. ACTIONS (LEADERSHI)	1			4						11				1 m	
INFLUENCING	1. COMMUN		X	—			-MAKING	بالتسا	NO	1		VATING	1-		NO.
ethod of reaching goals while etating / improving	Displays good or individuals / gro		d listening	skills for		iploys sound i uses resou	i judgment, la rces wisaly	gical reaso	oning			otivates, and complishmer		thers to	ward
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hort-term mission	Davelops detail	ed, executabl	e plans the	at are	Sh	ows tactical	proficiency, m	eets missio		Use	s after-	action and e		tools to	
toomplishment (MPROVING	feasible, accept 7. DEVELO		1	<u>"</u>	L		takes care of					onsistent imp			ao
IMPROVING ong-term improvement in the Arm			1 1	elop	_	BUILDIN ands time ar	L3 Id resources i	1 1	MO ams,			improvemen	<u>, </u>		
s people and organizations	individual subor	dinates as lea	ders		gio	ups and uni	ts; fosters eth	ical climate	·	gro		visioning, ad			
APFT: PASS	DATE: 2013110		HEIGHT		75		EIGHT:	247	YE:	\$					
I. OFFICER DEVELOPMENT -						PTs, LTs,	CW25, AN	<u>D W018,</u>					1 1 1 1	ا ا	A\$4
WERE DEVELOPMENT	AL TASKS RECORT	DED ON DA	FORM 67	7-9-1a AN	ID OU	ARTERLY	FOLLOW-II	P COUNS	SELINGS	COND	UCTE	D? YX	_ <u> </u>	ا لـــّـ	المسسيا
WERE DEVELOPMENT. DA FORM 67-9, OCT		DED ON DA	FORM 6				FOLLOW-U		ELINGS	COND	UCTE	D? 376°		Pa	ge 1 o

NAME GUNDRUM, MARK D.	SSN	3053	PERIOD COVERED 20130803	20131231
		MANCE AND POTENTIAL		
a. EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PERF			···	
OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCI MUST PROMOTE	SATISFA	ACTORY PERFORMANCE PROMOTE	E, UNSATISFACTORY PERFO	
b. COMMENT ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF T	HE PERFORMANCE, RE			
MAJ Gundrum continued his or	rtstanding perfor	mance as the acting	g LOT-S Team Chief in Milwa	aukee, a LTC position,
for the first month of this rating				
arrival. As a direct result of M.				
well-run team fully capable of p	erforming any n	nission at the highes	st levels of success. Addition	nally, MAJ Gundrum
continued to provide top-notch	legal assistance	and advice to Soldi-	iers and their families during t	the Milwaukee
Team's three-month on-call Leg				
Ordnance Company in Janesvil	e, Wisconsin; w	here, again, he pro	vided stellar leadership and i	impeccable support
and advice to the Soldiers and t				
214th LOD, MAJ Gundrum wil				
embedded JA with the 646th As				-
c, COMMENT ON POTENTIAL FOR PROMOT			TT's existent diam a performance	o and a stine I OT 0
Promote MAJ Gundrum to LTC				
Team Leader clearly demonstra			<u>.</u>	nigher rank, and he
will enhance his skills and leade	asmp by serving	in an embedded 37	A position.	
d. IDENTIFY ANY UNIQUE PROFESSIONAL S			HE ARMY THAT THIS OFFICER POSSESS	SES. FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE
CATEGORY CPT ALSO INDICATE A POTENT				
MAJ Gundrum currently serves				
He has served as an elected stat				
for numerous leadership posts.				
,	P/	ART VI - INTERMEDIATE I	RATER	
		PART VII -SENIOR RAT	ŒR	
a. EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PROM		THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE	currently senior rate	6 officer(s) in this grade
X BEST QUALIFIED FULLY	- Do Not	PROMOTE OTHER	A completed DA Form 67-9-1 v considered in my evaluation a	
b. POTENTIAL COMPARED WITH OFFICERS			f Jenes and American Will Linds	YES NO (Explain in e)
SENIOR RATED IN SAME GRADE (OVERPRINTED	c. COMMENT ON PERFO		I as of the ten true majors	In our samemond
BY DA) HQDA COMPARISON OF THE SENIOR			by one of the top two majors it	
RATER'S PROFILE AND BOX CHECK AT			tailed further by a one-month (
THE TIME THIS REPORT PROCESSED			sly passed the reigns of leader enabling the new leader to co	
OF MASS	-	-		
GENTER OF MASS			ner that MAJ Gundrum had do	
			ed by his tremendous support of	
RO: MAJ GUNDRUM MARK D			ness processing, the advice he	
			to serve as an embedded judg	
SR: COL R			of ILE, MAJ Gundrum should	
DATE: 2014 04 23	promoted to net	ntenant colonel and	assigned to positions of great	ter responsionny.
TOTAL RATINGS: 5		ASSIGNMENTS FOR WHICH THE E CATEGORY CPT. ALSO INDIC	IS OFFICER IS BEST SUITED. DATE A POTENTIAL CAREER FIELD FOR FUTUR	RE SERVICE.
RATINGS THIS OFFICER: 1			d Judge Advocate, LOT-S Ch	
	Digade Judge 2	Myocate, Comman	a Judge Advocate, LOT-5 Ch	ner

d. OFFICER DEVELOPMENT - MANDATORY YES OR NO ENTRY FOR RATERS OF CPTs, LTs, CW2s, AND WOIs.

WERE DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS RECORDED ON DA FORM 67-9-14 AND QUARTERLY FOLLOW-UP COUNSELINGS CONDUCTED?

MA

NO

γ**)**(ş

NAME GUNDRUM, MARK D.	88N 3053	PERIOD COVERED 20120803	20130802
	PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIA		
	FORMANCE DURING THE RATING PERIOD AND HIS	. —	- ATIES
OUTSTANDING PERFORMANC MUST PROMOTE	PROMOTE	DO NOT PROMOT	TE (Explain)
	HE PERFORMANCE, REFER TO PART III, DA FORM		
	mily member's major health concern		
	n Milwaukee, a LTC position, ensur		
	and physical assets. This outstand		
	Command FX at Ft. McCoy. Despite		
FX, MAJ Gundrum soldiered o	on, leading his team through all FX e	exercises, including weapons	qualification, where
	with his 9mm utilizing only one arm		
	ement during the FX. In October 201		
	briefings at SRPs for the nearly 300-		
	perb legal services for dozens of sol		
	unit. Finally, MAJ Gundrum encour		
	ch that Soldier won. His first rate ju		
have made nim a trememous as	sset to the Milwaukee Team, the 214	Ith LOD, and the JAG Corps.	
c. COMMENT ON POTENTIAL FOR PROMOT			
	oted to LTC immediately upon comp		
_	arly demonstrates that he is ready no	ow to take on greater respons	sibilities at the higher
rank.			
	SKILLS OR AREAS OF EXPERTISE OF VALUE TO THE	HE ARMY THAT THIS OFFICER POSSESS	SES, FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE
CATEGORY CPT ALSO INDICATE A POTENT			
	in elected state court of appeals judg		
	practicing law, he served as an elec		a decade, chairing the
Judiciary Committee and being	selected for numerous leadership po	osts.	
	PART VI - INTERMEDIATE F	RATER	
			ļ
			1
	PART VII -SENIOR RAT		
a. EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PROM	OTION POTENTIAL TO THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE	f currently senior rate	8 officer(s) in this grade
BEST QUALIFIED FULLY	DO NOT PROMOTE OTHER	A completed DA Form 67-9-19 Considered in my evaluation a	was received with this report and and review YES NO (Explain in c)
b. POTENTIAL COMPARED WITH OFFICERS	c. COMMENT ON PERFORMANCE/POTENTIAL		Ti
SENIOR RATED IN SAME GRADE (OVERPRINTED BY DA)	Magnificent performance by one of	the two best majors in my co	ommand. Once again,
HODA COMPARISON OF THE SENIOR RATER'S PROFILE AND BOX CHECK AT	MAJ Gundrum not only served flav	wlessly as leader of my two M	Milwaukee teams
RATERS PROFILE AND BOX CHECK AT	acting as a lieutenant colonel but	he did so in a location remote	e from the support of
	the unit's staff and leadership. Yet,		
	Operations Teams consistently boas		
	military readiness and morale, of all		
11911111	year's winner of the U.S. Army Res		
953	Affable, unflappable, professional,	•	-
	excelling at the lieutenant colonel le		nmediately and
	entrusted with positions of greater	responsibility.	
DATE: 2013 12 23		·	
TOTAL RATINGS: 4	d, LIST THREE FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS FOR WHICH THIS FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE CATEGORY CPT, ALSO INDICA		RE SERVICE.
RATINGS THIS OFFICER: 1	LOT-S Team Chief, Command Judg		
, ·	DOT S rount outer, communication	50 134100410, 202 22,200 22	////

WERE DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS RECORDED ON DA FORM 67-9-1a AND QUARTERLY FOLLOW-UP COUNSELINGS CONDUCTED?

NAME GUNDRUM, MARK D.	ssn 3053	PERIOD COVERED 20111020	20120802
	PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIA	AL EVALUATION (Rater)	
*****	FORMANCE DURING THE RATING PERIOD AND H	IIS/HER POTENTIAL FOR PROMOTION	
OUTSTANDING PERFORMAND MUST PROMOTE	E, SATISFACTORY PERFORMANC PROMOTE	E, UNSATISFACTORY PERF DO NOT PROMO	
	THE PERFORMANCE, REFER TO PART III, DA FOR		
Despite significant adversity du	iring this rating period, including be	eginning a challenging new jo	b and the major health
concerns of a close family men	nber, MAJ Gundrum unconditional	ly excelled in the challenging	position of Team
Leader, a LTC position. He pr	ovided outstanding leadership, ensu	uring full mission readiness of	f all team members.
while leading the team through	the double transformation from the	91st to the 214th and LSO to	LOD, simultaneously
	all personnel and physical assets.		
	ultiple training events including Sta		
Family Day events, and the Ft.	McCoy FTX and weapons qualification	ation at which he secured hig	scores in personal
weapons qualification with bot	h 9mm and M16. He ensured full	delivery of highly professions	al services at SRPs and
Yellow Ribbons where he and	his team provided outstanding lega	al assistance and briefings for	individual soldiers
	olay sound judgment and superb leg		
	leserve is evidenced by his continue		
his successful efforts in develop	ping junior soldiers. MAJ Gundrur	n should be promoted below	the zone to LTC.
c. COMMENT ON POTENTIAL FOR PROMO	TON		
The state of the s		al in the monformance of his i	bution TTo alexand
•	play outstanding leadership and excontunity should be promoted below	•	dues. He should
complete tere at the carnest opp	fortunity should be promoted below	the zone to LTC.	
	The state of the s		
	SKILLS OR AREAS OF EXPERTISE OF VALUE TO ' TIAL CAREER FIELD FOR FUTURE SERVICE,	THE ARMY THAT THIS OFFICER POSSES	SES. FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE
!			a 1 1
	pointed by the Wisconsin Governor		
	t judge. Prior to that, while also pr		
rawmaker for over a decade, ch	nairing the Judiciary Committee and		readership posts.
	PART VI - INTERMEDIATE	RATER	
_			
	PART VII -SENIOR RA	TED	
a. EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PROM	OTION POTENTIAL TO THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE		15 officer(e) in this grade
BEST QUALIFIED QUALIFI	DO NOT PROMOTE OTHE	A completed DA Form 67-9-1 (Explain below) considered in my evaluation	
b. POTENTIAL COMPARED WITH OFFICERS		The section of the se	and review YES NO (Explain in a
SENIOR RATED IN SAME GRADE (OVERPRINTED	c. COMMENT ON PERFORMANCE/POTENTIAL	autatandina in the demondina	rala of Tanya I andar
BY DA) HQDA COMPARISON OF THE SENIOR	MAJ Gundrum's performance was a Lieutenant Colonel position. He		
RATER'S PROFILE AND BOX CHECK AT THE TIME THIS REPORT PROCESSED	staff rides in January and July, 201		
THE TIME THIS REPORT PROCESSED	continues to serve as a key asset in		
ABOVE CENTER OF MASS	and FTX operations. He continues		
ABOVE GENTER OF MASS	members. MAJ Gundrum successi		
	the 91st to the 214th LSO, ensuring		
RO: MAJ GUNDRUM MARK D	assets. He provided outstanding le		
	members, whether individual soldi		
SR: COL B	Gundrum should be selected for a		
DATE: 2012 11 05	can serve as a LTC and he should		
TOTAL RATINGS: 17	d. LIST THREE FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS FOR WHICH TH		NO THE MOTHEROS.
	FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE CATEGORY CPT, ALSO INDI		RE SERVICE,
RATINGS THIS OFFICER: 1	Command Judge Advocate, Deput	y Commander, Military Judge) ,
l		, , , , , ,	

WERE DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS RECORDED ON DA FORM 67-9-13 AND QUARTERLY FOLLOW-UP COUNSELINGS CONDUCTED?

NAME GUNDRUM, MARK D.	99N 3053 PERIOD COVERED 20101020 - 20111019 -
+	PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (Rater)
a. EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE RATING PERIOD AND HIS/HER POTENTIAL FOR PROMOTION	
OUTSTANDING PERFORMAND MUST PROMOTE	E, SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE, UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE, OTHER DO NOT PROMOTE (Explain)
	THE PERFORMANCE, REFER TO PART III, DA FORM 67-9 AND PART IVA, b, AND PART Vb, DA FORM 67-9-1.
MAJ Gundrum once again exc	elled as Team Leader. He made "taking care of soldiers" a high priority and focused on
developing team members into	a superb unit. His outstanding mentorship ensured soldiers were well prepared to
mobilize rapidly in any judge a	dvocate role and guaranteed accountability for and effective utilization of all team
assets. Due to MAJ Gundrum	s efforts, three of his soldiers quickly mobilized in support of the Office of Soldier's
Counsel Mission to provide sup	pport for Wounded Warriors throughout the US. MAJ Gundrum ensured excellent
support for SRP/Yellow Ribbon missions within his AO, which provided soldiers and family members with	
outstanding service. He also n	nade certain Team 6 members assisted whenever possible with additional 91st missions
outside his AO. MAJ Gundrum supported the very successful judge advocate legal on-site in Chicago, IL, serving as	
lead for protocol responsibilities and acting as personal escort to TJAG. He participated in and assisted with FTX at	
Ft. McCoy, WI, serving as a Range Safety officer and stayed on extra days to receive additional training at the WI	
	eadiness Conference. MAJ Gundrum also performed two weeks of AT at Ft. McCoy,
assisting dozens of military clie	ents with legal assistance issues. His performance continues to be outstanding.
c. COMMENT ON POTENTIAL FOR PROMO	TIOAL
	Major Gundrum continues to display outstanding leadership while assigned to a
nosition normally held by a LT	C. He has unlimited potential and should be enrolled in ILE at the earliest opportunity.
	ng leadership positions and promote to LTC at first opportunity.
	5 reads supportantly.
	SKILLS OR AREAS OF EXPERTISE OF VALUE TO THE ARMY THAT THIS OFFICER POSSESSES. FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE TIAL CAREER FIELD FOR FUTURE SERVICE.
In his civilian profession, MAJ Gundrum serves as a state trial court judge (Criminal Division), a post he was elected	
to in 2010. Prior to that, while also practicing law, he served as an elected state lawmaker for over a decade,	
chairing the Judiciary Committee and being selected for numerous leadership posts.	
PART VI - INTERMEDIATE RATER	
!	
<u> </u>	
	PART VII -SENIOR RATER
	OTION POTENTIAL TO THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE 1 currently senior rate 8 officer(s) in this grade A completed DA Form 67-9-1 was received with this report and
BEST QUALIFIED QUALIFI	
b. POTENTIAL COMPARED WITH OFFICERS SENIOR RATED IN SAME GRADE (OVERPRINTED)	c. COMMENT ON PERFORMANCE/POTENTIAL
BY DA)	MAJ Gundrum's performance is at the highest level, excelling in the demanding role of
HQDA COMPARISON OF THE SENIOR RATER'S PROFILE AND BOX CHECK AT	Team Leader, a Lieutenant Colonel position. He once again successfully prepared his
THE TIME THIS REPORT PROCESSED	team for mobilization, mobilizing an additional three soldiers to join the four others
	from his team already mobilized to Office of Soldiers' Counsel and the PEB/MEB
ABOVE CENTER OF MASS	mission. He continues to serve as a key asset in all 91st missions, including
	SRP/Yellow Ribbon and FTX operations. He provided exceptional support to the
RO <u>: MAJ</u> GUNDRUM MARK D	Chicago legal on-site, put on this year by the 91st LSO, receiving specific recognition
8053	from LTG Chipman and BG Beck for his work. In the attorney role, MAJ Gundrum
SR: COL W	provided outstanding legal service during his two-week AT at Ft. McCoy, serving
	dozens of military clients with their legal needs. MAJ Gundrum should be promoted
DATE: 2012 01 19	at the earliest opportunity.
TOTAL RATINGS: 41	d. LIST THREE FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS FOR WHICH THIS OFFICER IS BEST SUITED. FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE CATEGORY CPT, ALSO INDICATE A POTENTIAL CAREER FIELD FOR FUTURE SERVICE.
RATINGS THIS OFFICER; 2	
İ	Command Judge Advocate, Operational Law Officer, Deputy Commander

860 N.W,2d 299, 2015 WI App 16

360 Wis.2d 369 Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

> Eric D. **CARLSON**, Plaintiff—Appellant,

FIDELITY MOTOR GROUP, LLC, Defendant—Respondent.

No. 2014AP695.

Submitted on Briefs Oct. 20, 2014.

Opinion Filed Jan. 14, 2015.

Synopsis

Background: Car buyer brought action against Illinois seller after discovering mechanical problems. The Circuit Court, Ozaukee County, Paul V. Malloy, J., dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Buyer appealed.

[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Gundrum, J., held that seller's advertisements on third party Internet websites and telephone conversation with buyer did not purposefully establish minimum contacts required for court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (6)

[1] Appeal and Error

Cases Triable in Appellate Court

Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is a question of law reviewed de novo.

Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Courts

Jurisdiction of the Person

On question of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant, plaintiff bears minimal burden of establishing prima facie threshold showing that requirements of both constitutional due process and long-arm statute are satisfied. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; W.S.A. 801.05.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3] Courts

⇒ Contacts with forum state in general

Courts

Allegations, pleadings, and affidavits

Courts

 Presumptions and Burden of Proof as to Jurisdiction

In reviewing whether plaintiff has made prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant, court may consider documentary evidence and weigh affidavits, accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in complaint unless controverted by affidavits of challenging party, resolves factual doubts in favor of the plaintiff, and

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must keep in mind that focus is not on plaintiff, but on the defendant's contacts with forum state. W.S.A. 801.05.

Cases that cite this headnote

[4] Courts

Presumptions and Burden of Proof as to Jurisdiction

Plaintiff carries burden on inquiry as to whether out-of-state defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in forum state as required for exercise of personal jurisdiction consistently with due process clause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

Cases that cite this headnote

[5] Courts

 Presumptions and Burden of Proof as to Jurisdiction

Defendant bears burden of showing that assertion of personal jurisdiction does not comport with fair play and substantial justice and thus violates due process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

Cases that cite this headnote

[6] Constitutional Law

Manufacture, distribution, and sale

Courts

Internet use

Courts

 Defective, dangerous, or injurious products; products liability

Illinois car seller's advertisements on third party Internet websites and telephone conversation with buyer did not purposefully establish minimum contacts required for court to exercise personal jurisdiction over seller consistently with due process clause in buyer's suit against seller after discovering mechanical problems; seller's advertisements were accessible to everyone regardless of location and represented merely potential contacts with state, seller did not send unsolicited communications into state or advertise for any relevant websites within state, the telephone calls amounted to no more than five minutes of conversation and were initiated by buyer, seller made one-time sale to Wisconsin resident, and connection to state was random, fortuitous, and attenuated. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

**300 On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Eric D. Carlson, Esq., Mequon.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Michael S. Kenitz of Kenitz Law Office LLC, Hartford.

Before NEUBAUER, P.J., REILLY and GUNDRUM, JJ.

Opinion

GUNDRUM, J.

*371 ¶ 1 Eric Carlson appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing his lawsuit against Fidelity Motor Group, LLC, related to his purchase of a 2006 BMW automobile from Fidelity. He contends the court erred in concluding it did not have personal jurisdiction over Fidelity, arguing that Fidelity's "advertisements on third party web sites and phone conversation with [him] meet the minimum contacts requirement" that must be satisfied for Wisconsin courts to have personal jurisdiction. We conclude that such advertisements and conversation did not meet the minimum contacts requirement and therefore are insufficient to establish jurisdiction. We affirm.

Background

¶ 2 Carlson commenced this lawsuit in Ozaukee County, Wisconsin, alleging "fraud by wire" and "negligent representation" by Fidelity related to his purchase of the BMW. Fidelity moved the circuit court for *372 dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Each party submitted an affidavit. Exhibits submitted with Carlson's affidavit include "screenshots" of Fidelity's own website and its advertisements on fourteen other websites, including "cars.com," and a copy of a portion of a cell phone bill showing phone calls made on March 16, 2013.

¶ 3 The relevant, undisputed allegations from Carlson's complaint and facts as averred in his affidavit and exhibits in opposition to Fidelity's motion to dismiss are as follows. Carlson is a resident of Wisconsin and Fidelity is an automobile dealership located in Illinois. On March 16, 2013, Carlson observed on his wife's cell phone a Fidelity advertisement for the BMW on the cars.com website. He called Fidelity's toll-free number listed on the website and spoke with a Fidelity representative for approximately four minutes, during which time the representative told Carlson the vehicle was in excellent condition with no known mechanical problems. The representative called Carlson back two hours later and spoke with him for approximately one minute regarding the vehicle. 1 Carlson and his wife traveled to **301 Fidelity that same day. Carlson test drove *373 the BMW and discussed the price with the representative. Both he and his wife requested that Fidelity change the oil at the time of purchase and the representative agreed Fidelity would do that. Fidelity took the vehicle to its service center and the representative indicated to Carlson that the oil had been changed. Carlson purchased the BMW.

Carlson asserts in both his brief-in-chief and reply brief, as he asserted in his brief to the circuit court, that a Fidelity representative called him back on the cell phone. Neither the complaint nor Carlson's affidavit explicitly state that a Fidelity representative called Carlson back. In Carlson's affidavit, however, he references a "first telephone conversation" with a Fidelity representative on March 16, 2013, and an exhibit accompanying the affidavit shows a four-minute call from the cell phone to a toll-free number of Fidelity and two hours later a one-minute call from another Fidelity toll-free number to the cell phone. Fidelity does not dispute that a Fidelity

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representative called Carlson back approximately two hours after Carlson first called Fidelity.

- ¶ 4 Five months later, Carlson experienced problems with and sustained damage to the BMW in Wisconsin, damage which he asserts was caused by the oil not having been changed at the time of purchase as had been represented to him. According to a mechanic who examined the BMW, the oil had not been changed for "tens of thousands of miles."
- ¶ 5 Fidelity's affidavit, by its executive vice president, provides the following relevant, undisputed facts. Fidelity is an Illinois limited liability company and has a single facility, located in Illinois, from which it sells motor vehicles. Fidelity has never

owned, used, maintained and had any office other facility or Wisconsin; ... employed any persons to perform services or deliver materials in Wisconsin; ... advertised or purchased any advertisement or solicitation within Wisconsin (except to the extent that Fidelity's website is accessible to Wisconsin residents); directed any mail or other solicitation to any Wisconsin residents; ... filed suit in any Wisconsin court; ... excepting this case, never been a Defendant in any case in the Wisconsin courts; ... performed any contract within Wisconsin; ... owned, leased or held any

interest in any personal property or real estate in Wisconsin[; or] engaged in any business in Wisconsin.

With regard to Carlson's purchase of the BMW, the vice president averred:

- *374 [T]he contract for sale was entered into in Illinois ...; delivery of the vehicle was made in Illinois; the Plaintiff and Defendant met at [Fidelity's] facility in Illinois to discuss the sale of the vehicle, sign the contract and make delivery; [and] any and all pre-sale inspections, repair and maintenance of the vehicle was performed in Illinois....
- ¶ 6 The circuit court granted Fidelity's motion to dismiss after a hearing and Carlson appeals. ²
- 2 Fidelity moved for dismissal solely on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction, and the parties' written and oral arguments before the circuit court and the circuit court's comments at oral argument addressed only that issue. In its oral ruling, however, the court, we assume mistakenly, stated it was dismissing the case due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its written order following its oral ruling, the court stated that it was dismissing the case based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Apparently following the court's oral pronouncement, Carlson indicates in his notice of appeal that he is appealing the court's decision to dismiss the action based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In their briefs on appeal, the parties focus only on the issue of personal jurisdiction, and that is the issue we address.

Discussion

[1] ¶ 7 Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is a question of law we review de novo. *Johnson*

Litho Graphics of Eau Claire, **302 Ltd. v. Sarver, 2012 WI App 107, ¶ 6, 344 Wis.2d 374, 824 N.W.2d 127.

¶ 8 On a question of personal [2] [3] jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the plaintiff bears "the minimal burden of establishing a prima facie threshold showing" that the requirements of both constitutional *375 due process and Wisconsin's long-arm statute, WIS. STAT. § 801.05 (2011–12), 3 are satisfied. Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 2001 WI 99, ¶ 8, 245 Wis.2d 396, 629 N.W.2d 662 (citation omitted). In reviewing whether this burden has been met, "we may consider documentary evidence and weigh affidavits." Id. We accept as true all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint, unless controverted by affidavits of the challenging party. Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir, 2003). "Factual doubts are to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff," Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶ 8, 629 N.W.2d 662 (citation omitted); however, we must keep in mind that the "focus in a jurisdictional analysis is not on the plaintiff but on the [defendant's] contacts with Wisconsin," Stayart v. Hance, 2007 WI App 204, ¶ 15, 305 Wis.2d 380, 740 N.W.2d 168.

¶ 9 Before proceeding to the due process question, courts generally begin the jurisdictional analysis by determining if the requirements of the long-arm statute are satisfied. See Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶ 8, 629 N.W.2d 662. Where, as here, however, it is clear the due process minimum contacts requirement is not satisfied, we may

proceed directly to this issue. See Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1157 (W.D.Wis.2004) (if due process requirements are not met, need not decide if WIS, STAT. § 801.05 is satisfied).

¶ 10 The due process question [4] [5] presents two considerations. First, we must determine whether the defendant "purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum State." Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶ 23, 629 N.W.2d 662 *376 (citation omitted). The plaintiff carries the burden on this inquiry. *Id*. If this question is answered in the affirmative, we then consider whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with "fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). On this consideration, the defendant bears the burden. Id. Here, we need not wrestle with the latter issue as we conclude Fidelity did not "purposefully establish [] minimum contacts" in Wisconsin.

[6] ¶ 11 Carlson asks us to determine that **Fidelity's** "advertisements on third party web sites and phone conversation with [him] meet the minimum contacts requirement." He directs us to our supreme court's decision in *Kopke* as support for his position that due process considerations permit Wisconsin courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over Fidelity. In discussing the due process question, the *Kopke* court stated:

Under the Due Process Clause, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper when the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not

³ All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011– 12 version unless otherwise noted,

offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "Minimum contacts requires that " 'the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.' " Essential to each case is " 'that there be some act by which the **303 defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." " The "purposeful availment" requirement has become the "baseline," the primary focus, of the minimum contacts analysis. "This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely *377 as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another party or a third person."

Id., \P 24 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

¶ 12 In Kopke, the plaintiff truck driver was injured when he opened a cargo container in Neenah, Wisconsin, and a pallet loaded with paper fell on him. Id., ¶2. Workers for an Italian cooperative had placed the pallet of paper into the cargo container prior to its shipping from Italy to Neenah. Id., ¶¶ 2, 4, 6. The truck driver sued the cooperative, among others, which moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id., ¶7.

¶ 13 Although the *Kopke* court ultimately did conclude the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over the cooperative, *see id.*, ¶ 48, the case is of no help to Carlson. Correctly noting the facts in *Kopke*, Carlson himself explains in his brief-in-chief that the *Kopke*

court held that Wisconsin had jurisdiction over the cooperative "because the facts showed there was 'a regular course of dealing that result[ed] in deliveries' of multiple units of the product into [the] forum over a period of years." Brief for Appellant at 26 (quoting Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶ 31, 629 N.W.2d 662). "Specifically," Carlson further writes, "the records showed that between November 8, 1996 and May 20, 1997, 'at least 40 containers were loaded by [defendant's] workers for delivery in this forum." Id. (quoting Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶ 35, 629 N.W.2d 662). Putting the nail into his own coffin with regard to the inapplicability of Kopke to this case, Carlson adds that "[t]he [Kopke] court also emphasized that this was not a 'one-time transaction.' "Id. at 27 (quoting Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶ 46, 629 N.W.2d 662).

*378 ¶ 14 In stark contrast to the facts in Kopke, here the record only shows that Fidelity made this "one-time transaction" the sale of the BMW-with a Wisconsin resident, Carlson. This is a far cry from " 'a regular course of dealing that result[ed] in deliveries' of multiple units of the product into [the] forum over a period of years," id., ¶ 31 (citation omitted), and highlights how inappropriate it would be for the Wisconsin courts to exercise jurisdiction over Fidelity based upon the record before us. See also Johnson Litho, 344 Wis.2d 374, ¶ 24, 824 N.W.2d 127 (out-of-state defendant's extensive business contacts with a Wisconsin company "cross[ed] the threshold from offending due process to sufficient minimum contacts," with the court emphasizing "[t]his was not a one or two time business relationship" (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)); cf. Hy Cite, 297

F.Supp.2d at 1162 (stating it "cannot seriously [be] argue[d] that *one* sale is a sufficient ground to hale defendant into a Wisconsin court for any suit").

¶ 15 Carlson contends Fidelity's use of Internet websites to sell its vehicles supports his position that Wisconsin courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over Fidelity. Neither party has directed us to Wisconsin Supreme Court case law on the effect of Internet websites on the question of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, and our review has uncovered no helpful cases. We gain guidance, however, from a case out of the United States **304 District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Hy Cite. 4

4 Carlson refers us to a federal district court decision out of Pennsylvania, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa.1997), which discusses a sliding scale test for determining the impact of a defendant's website upon the personal jurisdiction question. See id. at 1124. We conclude, however, that Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F.Supp.2d 1154 (W.D.Wis.2004)—which rejected the Zippo test as a substitute for the minimum contacts inquiry-provides a better approach by not looking to a separate test where Internet websites are involved, but rather simply considering such websites as a part of the overall due process question of "whether the defendant's contacts with the state are of such a quality and nature such that it could reasonably expect to be haled into the courts of the forum state." See Hy Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1161. As the Hy Cite court further observed: "The Supreme Court has never held that courts should apply different standards for personal jurisdiction depending on the type of contact involved. To the contrary, the Court 'long ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on "mechanical" tests.' " Id. at 1160 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). The Hy Cite court added: "The purpose of the 'minimum contacts' test set forth in International Shoe [Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945),] was to create a standard flexible enough

that specialized tests were not needed." Hy Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1160.

We also find persuasive the observation of another federal court that declined to follow the *Zippo* analysis:

[T]his court observes that the need for a special Internet-focused test for "minimum contacts" has yet to be established. It seems to this court that the ultimate question can still as readily be answered by determining whether the defendant did, or did not, have sufficient "minimum contacts" in the forum state. The manner of establishing or maintaining those contacts, and the technological mechanisms used in so doing, are mere accessories to the central inquiry.

Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F.Supp.2d 746, 750 (E.D.Mich.2000).

*379 ¶ 16 The plaintiff in Hy Cite was a Wisconsin corporation and the defendant was a West Indies company that owned and operated a website that displayed consumer complaints against businesses. Hy Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1156. Of 61,000 consumer complaints submitted to the defendant, thirty to forty were about the plaintiff. Id. The defendant also allowed businesses to purchase ad space on the website, although no *380 Wisconsin company had done so, and displayed a link for purchasing a book and solicited donations for itself on the website. Id. at 1156-57. One Wisconsin resident had purchased a book, but the defendant could not recall whether it had received any donations from Wisconsin, Id. at 1157.

¶ 17 The plaintiff e-mailed the defendant about ways to resolve the complaints posted on the website about the plaintiff, and the defendant responded with an e-mail informing the plaintiff of its "Corporate Consumer Advocacy Program" that was advertised on the website and in which the plaintiff could pay to enroll. *Id.* at 1156. The parties also communicated regarding this program via phone. *Id.* at 1163.

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The plaintiff did not enroll, nor had any other Wisconsin company enrolled, in the program. *Id.* at 1156. Instead, the plaintiff sued the defendant and the defendant moved to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. *Id.*

¶ 18 In addressing whether personal jurisdiction over the defendant comported with due process, the *Hy Cite* court stated that

a finding that a defendant uses its website to engage in repeated commercial transactions may support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, so long as there is a corresponding finding that the defendant is expressly targeting residents of the forum state and not just making **305 itself accessible to everyone regardless of location.

Id. at 1161 (emphasis added); accord be 2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that use of out-of-state defendant's website by twenty Illinois residents did not suffice to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant by the Illinois courts, with the court noting "[t]here is no evidence that [the defendant] *381 targeted or exploited the market in the state that would allow a conclusion that he availed himself of the privilege of doing business in the state"). Like our supreme court in Kopke, the Hy Cite court recognized that the ultimate question is "whether the defendant's contacts with the state are of such a quality and nature such that it could reasonably expect to be haled into the courts of the forum state." Hy Cite, 297

F.Supp.2d at 1161; see also Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶24, 629 N.W.2d 662.

¶ 19 The *Hy Cite* court concluded that the defendant did not have sufficient contact with Wisconsin for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. *Hy Cite*, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1163, 1167. The court observed that

[w]ith the exception of sale book one Wisconsin resident the communication between the parties, all of activities identified by plaintiff consist of nothing more than potential contacts. Further, although plaintiff defendant's characterizes internet-based activities as "soliciting" Wisconsin business, plaintiff has not alleged that defendant has done anything to target internet users in Wisconsin.

Id. at 1161. The court noted that the defendant did not "send mailings or unsolicited e-mails to the state" or "advertise for its [website] within Wisconsin," and pointed out that "the defendant does not control who views [the website] or responds to it." Id. at 1164. The court continued: "The closest plaintiff comes to a showing of solicitation is defendant's exchanges with plaintiff about the Corporate Consumer Advocacy Program. However, it is undisputed that it was plaintiff who contacted defendant without any prompting on the part of defendant." Id. The Hy Cite court acknowledged that the defendant had had

contact with multiple Wisconsin citizens who had posted complaints on *382 the defendant's website, but emphasized that the defendant "has not targeted Wisconsin citizens more than the citizens of any other state." *Id.*

¶ 20 We note even greater similarities between the case before us and Marschke v. Wratislaw, 743 N.W.2d 402 (S.D.2007), in which the Supreme Court of South Dakota concluded that personal jurisdiction did not comport with due process where an automobile sale was prompted by an Internet advertisement. Id. at 404, 407, 411. In that case, the defendant, who resided in Montana and was licensed there to sell used cars, advertised a 1971 Fiat on the Internet auction site eBay, Id. at 404. The defendant's business website and tollfree telephone number were displayed on the auction webpage for the Fiat. Id. The plaintiff found the vehicle while searching the auction website, but instead of bidding on it, called the defendant's toll-free number to discuss the vehicle. 5 Id.

- In his affidavit on the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff averred that during this initial phone call he informed the defendant that he was from South Dakota. *Marschke v. Wratislaw*, 743 N.W.2d 402, 404 n. 2 (S.D.2007).
- ¶ 21 The plaintiff spoke with the defendant by phone on at least two occasions, arranging the sale terms. *Id.* The defendant e-mailed the plaintiff to obtain his full name and mailing address, and subsequently mailed the unsigned purchase **306 agreement to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff signed in South Dakota and mailed back to the defendant. *Id.* at 408–10. The defendant executed the agreement at his Montana office. *Id.* The plaintiff wire-transferred payment for the vehicle to the

defendant. *Id.* The defendant then referred the plaintiff to a motor carrier, with whom the plaintiff arranged for transportation of the vehicle. *Id.* *383 When the vehicle reached the plaintiff in South Dakota, the plaintiff determined it was not in acceptable condition and commenced the lawsuit. *Id.* at 404–05. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the circuit court granted the motion. *Id.* at 405.

- ¶ 22 On appeal to the supreme court, the plaintiff argued that the defendant's use of the Internet to sell the vehicle, the communications that occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant's mailing of the unsigned contract to South Dakota for the plaintiff's signature, and the manner in which payment was made to the defendant constituted sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota to establish personal jurisdiction. *Id.* at 405, 408. The court disagreed. *Id.* at 411.
- ¶ 23 The court recognized that the defendant posted the vehicle for sale on eBay, along with a toll-free telephone number and a link to his business website, and that the defendant had acknowledged in his affidavit that he occasionally posted other cars for sale on eBay. Id. at 408 & n. 7. The court stated, however, that because the plaintiff did not buy the vehicle through eBay, the defendant's "use of eBay in this case constitute[d] no more than an extension, via Web link, of his own advertisement Website." Id. at 408. The court concluded that "any contact created through the use of the Internet as an advertising medium [was] attenuated." Id. The court then addressed the contract between the parties, noting that

"the United States Supreme Court has held that a contract with a nonresident party is not alone sufficient to establish minimum contacts." *Id.* at 409 (citing *Burger King Corp.*, 471 U.S. at 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174). The court continued, "[t]hus ... we must determine if the sum total of the rest of [the *384 defendant's] acts when added to the contract constitute sufficient minimum contacts." *Id.*

¶ 24 The court observed that there was no longterm relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and further added:

> [T]he sum total of [the defendant's] transactions in South Dakota could be characterized as a "one shot deal"—the sale to [the plaintiff]. Therefore, that [the defendant] had no physical contact with South Dakota before, during or after the period relevant to the sale of the [vehicle], is a factor that we consider. In the context of this "one shot deal," we also find it pertinent that [the plaintiff] initiated the telephone calls and negotiations leading to the ... purchase with [the defendant]. That [the defendant] sent a solitary e-mail into Cyberspace to obtain [the plaintiff's] contact information so that the unsigned contract could be mailed to him in South Dakota does not constitute

a significant contact among these facts.

Id. at 410. The court continued:

[The defendant] was not incorporated, headquartered or licensed to do business in South Dakota, Neither did he maintain an office or employees in South Dakota. He did not own real estate or maintain bank accounts here. He did not manufacture, distribute or sell products within the state, and in this case neither did he make delivery of any sale item to South Dakota. In short, [the defendant] had no presence in South **307 Dakota and his only connection with the state was through one isolated sale of a [vehicle] to [the plaintiff].

Id. at 410–11 (citations and footnote omitted). The court concluded that the defendant's contacts with South Dakota were insufficient for jurisdiction. Id.; accord Riverside Exports, Inc. v. B.R. Crane & Equip., LLC, 362 S.W.3d 649 (Tex.App.2011) (rejecting similar *385 arguments relating to minimum contacts, Internet presence, and contact through emails/phone calls and concluding it had no personal jurisdiction); see also Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (E.D.Mich.2000) (defendant who sold items via eBay to Michigan residents on two occasions, but did not target the state, did not purposefully avail herself of the

privilege of doing business there; rather, such sales constituted "random" and "attenuated" contact). ⁶

Wisconsin courts could have either general or specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. See generally Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp., 2011 WI 52, 335 Wis.2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623. The court in Hy Cite concluded that the defendant did not have sufficient contact with Wisconsin for the court to exercise either general or specific jurisdiction. Hv Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1161-67. In Marschke, the court specifically addressed the issue of specific jurisdiction. Marschke, 743 N.W.2d at 406. Carlson fails to specify whether his arguments are based on general or specific jurisdiction. Here, the facts fail to provide a basis for the exercise of either. For a discussion of the difference between general and specific jurisdiction in Wisconsin, see Rasmussen.

¶ 25 We turn now to the case before us. Consistent with the Hy Cite court's observation in that case, Fidelity's advertisements on its own website, cars.com, or other third-party sites represent merely potential contacts with the state of Wisconsin. See Hy Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1161. Significantly, Carlson has neither alleged nor shown facts suggesting Fidelity targeted Wisconsin residents with its Internet advertisements any more than any other state's residents; instead, the advertisements were "accessible to everyone regardless of location." See id.: see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (observing that "cyberspace" may be accessed by anyone, located *386 anywhere, who has an Internet connection). There is no evidence suggesting Fidelity sent unsolicited communications into Wisconsin or advertised for any of the relevant websites within Wisconsin. See Hy Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1164. Moreover, Fidelity does not control who views or responds to its own website or those of third parties. See id.; Riverside, 362 S.W.3d

at 654. Further, the two phone calls between Carlson and Fidelity—one from and one to Carlson's wife's cell phone—do not constitute significant contact by Fidelity with Wisconsin, as they amounted to no more than five minutes of conversation and were initiated by Carlson. See Hy Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1164; Marschke, 743 N.W.2d at 410; see also Johnson Litho, 344 Wis.2d 374, ¶¶ 21, 28, 824 N.W.2d 127 (which party initiates contact for a business relationship is relevant in determining whether sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state have been established).

¶ 26 Carlson has neither alleged nor presented any evidence indicating Fidelity has ever sold a vehicle to anyone else from Wisconsin, or even that it has ever had any contact with a Wisconsin business or resident other than Carlson (and his wife). Again, based on the record before us, this was a "one shot deal," a one-time sale to a Wisconsin resident, Carlson, with no ongoing, much less long-term, relationship between the parties. See Marschke, 743 N.W.2d at 410.

**308 ¶ 27 Contrasted against this nearly nonexistent record of "contact" with Wisconsin are Fidelity's undisputed averments that it has never

owned, used, maintained and had any office or other facility in Wisconsin; ... employed any person to perform any services or deliver any materials in Wisconsin; ... advertised or purchased any advertisement or solicitation within Wisconsin (except to the

extent that *387 [Fidelity's] website is accessible to Wisconsin residents); directed any mail or other solicitation to any Wisconsin residents; ... filed suit in any Wisconsin court: ... excepting this case, never been a Defendant in any case in the Wisconsin courts; ... performed any contract within Wisconsin; ... owned, leased or held any interest in any personal property or real estate in Wisconsin[; or] engaged in any business in Wisconsin.

And

the contract for sale was entered into in Illinois ...; delivery of the vehicle was made in Illinois; the Plaintiff and Defendant met at [Fidelity's] facility in Illinois to discuss the sale of the vehicle, sign the contract and make delivery; [and] any and all pre-sale inspections,

repair and maintenance of the vehicle was performed in Illinois....

¶ 28 Based on this record, we cannot conclude that Fidelity "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities" within Wisconsin and "thus invok[ed] the benefits and protections of its laws," or that Fidelity's "conduct and connection" with Wisconsin was such that it should have "reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court [here]." See Kopke, 245 Wis.2d 396, ¶ 24, 629 N.W.2d 662 (citations omitted). Fidelity's connection to Wisconsin was no more than "random," "fortuitous," and "attenuated." Id. (citation omitted). Fidelity did not "purposefully establish[] minimum contacts" in Wisconsin so as to permit the circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Id., ¶ 23 (citation omitted).

Order affirmed.

All Citations

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359 Wis.2d 246 Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

> KENOSHA COUNTY, Plaintiff—Respondent,

> > V.

Blaire A. FRETT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2014AP6.

Submitted on Briefs Oct. 27, 2014.

Opinion Filed Nov. 19, 2014.

Synopsis

Background: Defendant filed motion to expunge the record related to a littering ordinance violation for which she had paid a forfeiture. The Circuit Court, Kenosha County, S. Michael Wilk, J., denied the motion, and defendant appealed.

[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Gundrum, J., held that record was not subject to expunction.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (6)

[1] Criminal Law

Expungement or Correction; Effect of Acquittal or Dismissal

Infants

Adjudication or conviction

Defendant's plea to amended charge of littering, which included payment of forfeiture, was not subject to expunction under youthful offender expungement statute, as statute only applied to law violations where detention or probation could be ordered upon conviction. W.S.A. 973.015.

Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Appeal and Error

Cases Triable in Appellate Court Interpretation and application of a statute is a matter of law reviewed de novo.

Cases that cite this headnote

[3] Statutes

- Language

Statutes

- Context

The court interprets a statute by looking at the text of the statute; the statutory language is examined within the context in which it is used.

Cases that cite this headnote

[4] Statutes

Estatute as a Whole; Relation of Parts to Whole and to One Another When interpreting a statute, the court is to consider the role of the relevant language in the entire statute.

Cases that cite this headnote

[5] Statutes

Prior or existing law in general The legislature is presumed to know the case law in existence at the time it changes the statutes.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[6] Infants

Expungement or correction Statute providing for expunction of record for youthful offenders does not apply to civil forfeiture violations, W.S.A. 973.015.

Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

**397 On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Andrew R. Walter of Walter Law Office LLC, Elkhorn.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Tracey L. Braun, assistant district attorney, Kenosha.

Before NEUBAUER, P.J., REILLY and GUNDRUM, JJ.

Opinion

GUNDRUM, J.

*247 Blaire Frett appeals the circuit court order denying her motion pursuant to WIS.

*248 STAT. § 973.015 (2011–12) 1 to expunge the record related to a Kenosha County ordinance violation for which she **398 paid a forfeiture. Based upon the plain language of that statute, we conclude § 973.015 provides no authority for circuit courts to expunge the record related to such civil forfeiture violations. We affirm.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011–12 version unless otherwise noted.

Background

¶ 2 In 2012, Frett was cited for "underage consumption/possession of alcohol" pursuant to a Kenosha County ordinance. She pled to an amended charge of littering pursuant to a different Kenosha County ordinance and was ordered by a court commissioner to pay a forfeiture. According to circuit court docket entries in the record and referenced by Frett in this appeal, she paid the forfeiture on October 15, 2012.

¶ 3 Approximately one year after paying the forfeiture, Frett moved the circuit court to expunge the record. The court denied the motion after a hearing. Frett appeals. ²

This appeal was converted from a one-judge appeal to a three-judge appeal under WIS. STAT. RULEE 809.41(3).

Discussion

[3] [4] ¶ 4 This appeal requires us [1] [2] to interpret and apply WIS. STAT. § 973.015. Interpretation and application of a statute is a matter of law we review de novo. Moua v. Northern States Power Co., 157 Wis.2d 177, 184, 458 N.W.2d 836 (Ct.App.1990). "We interpret a statute by *249 looking at the text of the statute. The statutory language is examined within the context in which it is used." State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶ 12, 353 Wis.2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811. Further, we are to consider "the role of the relevant language in the entire statute." Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis.2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515.

¶ 5 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.015 provides in relevant part as follows:

Special disposition. (1) (a) ... [W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of the commission of an offense for which the person has been found guilty in a court for violation of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or less, the court may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence if the court determines the person will benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition....

- (c) No court may order that a record of a conviction for any of the following be expunged:
- 1. A Class H felony, if the person has, in his or her lifetime, been convicted of a prior felony offense, or if the felony is a violent

- offense, as defined in [WIS. STAT. §] 301.048(2)(bm), or is a violation of [WIS. STAT. §§] 940.32, 948.03(2) or (3), or 948.095.
- 2. A Class I felony, if the person has, in his or her lifetime, been convicted of a prior felony offense, or if the felony is a violent offense, as defined in [WIS. STAT. §] 301.048(2) (bm), or is a violation of [WIS. STAT. §] 948.23(1)(a).
- (2) A person has successfully completed the sentence if the person has not been convicted of a subsequent offense and, if on probation, the probation has not been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the *250 conditions of probation. Upon successful completion of the sentence the detaining or probationary authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect of expunging the record. If the person has been imprisoned, the detaining authority shall also forward a copy **399 of the certificate of discharge to the department. (Emphasis added.)

Frett contends § 973.015 includes forfeitures within its scope. We disagree.

¶ 6 Looking to the language of the statute, para. (1)(a) provides that a court may order expunction "when a person is under the age of 25 at the time of the commission of an offense for which the person has been found guilty in a court for violation of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or less." (Emphasis added.) We read this language as indicating that law violations for which expunction is available

relate to laws that include some "period of imprisonment." Thus, where there is no "period of imprisonment" associated with a law, that law is not one to which WIS. STAT. § 973.015 applies. As Frett acknowledges on appeal, the county ordinance she violated included no potential period of imprisonment. See KENOSHA COUNTY, WIS., ORDINANCE § 9.287.81 (2009) (providing that the penalty for violation of this ordinance "is a forfeiture of not less than \$25 nor more than \$500"); see also State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 84-86, 28 N.W.2d 345 (1947) (holding that municipalities and counties do not have the power to impose a penalty of imprisonment for violation of an ordinance other than as a means of enforcing payment). Therefore, expunction is not an option for Frett's civil littering violation.

*251 This interpretation is bolstered by language in WIS. STAT. § 973.015 establishing the process for effectuating expunction. Paragraph (1)(a) provides that "the court may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence." Subsection (2) states that expunction is to be effectuated as follows:

Upon successful completion of the sentence the detaining or probationary authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect of expunging the record. If the person has been imprisoned, the detaining authority shall also forward

a copy of the certificate of discharge to the department. (Emphasis added.)

This language indicates that expunction under § 973.015 applies to law violations where detention (or probation) can be ordered upon conviction. With Frett's civil forfeiture violation, neither detention nor probation could have been ordered. There also would be no issuance of a "certificate of discharge" related to the littering violation. The legislature simply provided no mechanism for expunction of a record following payment of a civil forfeiture.

¶ 8 In State v. Michaels, 142 Wis.2d 172, 176-77, 417 N.W.2d 415 (Ct.App.1987), we clearly held that WIS. STAT. § 973.015 did not apply to civil forfeiture violations. However, in 2009, the legislature revised the statute. Frett cites to Melody P.M., an unpublished onejudge decision of this court that held Michaels no longer controls the issue because of that statutory revision and, as revised, § 973.015(1) (a) does apply to civil forfeiture violations. State v. Melody P.M., No. 2009AP2994, 2010 WL 2303318, unpublished slip op. ¶¶ 4-7 (WI App June 10, 2010). We herein interpret revised § 973.015 *252 differently than in Melody P.M., and because that decision is unpublished, we may do so. See WIS. STAT. RULEE 809.23(3)(b).

¶ 9 Frett relies upon the *Melody P.M.* court's conclusion that revised WIS. STAT. § 973.015 applies to civil forfeiture violations because the revision changed the title of the provision from "Misdemeanors, special disposition" to just "Special disposition" and with this change "there is nothing in the plain language of § 973.015 limiting its application to only

misdemeanor **400 offenses." See Melody P.M., No. 2009AP2994, 2010 WL 2303318, unpublished slip op. ¶ 7. We agree the 2009 statutory revision expanded application of § 973.015 beyond just misdemeanors; however, we conclude that the expansion did not include forfeitures. Rather, the revision to the title as well as changes to language within the statute appear to have been for the purpose of expanding application from solely misdemeanors to also providing expunction as an option for certain felony convictions for which the maximum period of imprisonment is six years or less. Nothing in the language of revised § 973.015 indicates that the legislature intended to expand that statute to apply to civil forfeiture violations, and, as previously explained, the language of the statute clearly indicates that expunction is only available under this provision for misdemeanors and the identified felonies.

¶ 10 While we conclude that the language of the statute unambiguously demonstrates it does not apply to civil forfeiture violations, and thus there is no need to look to legislative history, we nonetheless note that the legislative history supports our reading of WIS. STAT. § 973.015. The revision to § 973.015 was made within the 2009–10 budget bill, 2009 Wis. Act 28. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 3384–86. The drafting file contains the *253 Legislative Reference Bureau analysis on an early draft of the proposed revision, explaining the proposal as follows:

Under current law, when a person is found guilty of a misdemeanor that the person commits before he or she was 21, the sentencing court may order that the record of

the conviction be expunged when the person completes his or her sentence....

Under this bill, a person is eligible to have his or her record of a conviction expunged if the conviction is for a misdemeanor or a nonviolent Class H or Class I felony that was committed before the person reached the age of 25 and the other current requirements of expungement are met.

Drafting File for 2009 Wis. Act 28, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 2009 A.B. 75 (emphasis added). A Legislative Fiscal Bureau (LFB) paper related to this statutory revision and prepared prior to its adoption in the budget states: "In his Budget in Brief, the Governor indicated his intent to expand eligibility for record expungement to include 'Class H to I felonies.' " LFB, Expunging Record of Conviction (Circuit Courts), Paper # 245 to Joint Committee on Finance, at 2 (Apr. 21, 2009) (emphasis added). At the time this paper was issued, based on the plain language of the statute and our interpretation in Michaels—and as referenced in the LFB paper itself-§ 973.015 only applied to misdemeanors and did not apply to felonies or forfeitures. Thus, we read this statement in the paper to indicate the intent to only expand the applicability of the statute from solely providing expunction as an option for misdemeanors to also providing it as an option for certain identified felonies. Further, we note that the LFB's comparative summary of Act 28, issued *254 shortly after enactment of the act, 3 describes the expunction revision as "expand[ing] the eligible offenses to include non-violent Class H or I felonies." LFB, 2009-10 Wis. State Budget, Comparative Summary

of Budget Recommendations, Circuit Courts, at 306.

- 3 2009 Wis. Act 28 was enacted on June 29, 2009, and the LFB comparative summary was issued in August 2009.
- [5] ¶ 11 When the legislature revised the expunction statute in 2009, our ruling **401 in *Michaels* that WIS. STAT. § 973.015 did not apply to civil forfeiture violations was the controlling law on the issue, and the legislature is presumed to "kn[o]w the case law in existence at the time it change[s] the statutes." *Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee*, 225 Wis.2d 837, 845, 593 N.W.2d 809 (Ct.App.1999). Thus, one would expect that if the legislature intended § 973.015 to thereafter apply to civil forfeiture violations in addition

to misdemeanors and the identified felonies, it would have demonstrated that intent with plain language to accomplish that objective. Instead, the legislature adopted language indicating a clear intent for the statute to only apply to misdemeanors and the identified felonies.

[6] ¶ 12 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that WIS. STAT. § 973.015 does not apply to civil forfeiture violations.

Order affirmed.

All Citations

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359 Wis.2d 255 Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff—Respondent,

٧.

Jennifer M. PARISI, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2014AP474-CR.

Submitted on Briefs Sept. 23, 2014.

Opinion Filed Nov. 19, 2014.

Synopsis

Background: Defendant pled no contest in the Circuit Court, Winnebago County, John A. Jorgensen, J., to possession of tetrahydrocannabinols with intent to deliver, and she appealed.

[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Gundrum, J., held that exigent circumstances existed so as to justify the officers' warrantless entry into defendant's apartment.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (5)

[1] Controlled Substances

Exigent circumstances

Exigent circumstances existed so as
to justify the officers' warrantless

entry into defendant's apartment; stood outside the officers apartment door, they were aware marijuana was being burned inside apartment, and with the occupants of apartment quieting or ceasing their conversation and not answering the door after officer knocked and announced the police presence, possibility of the intentional and organized destruction of the drug existed, exigency exception to the warrant requirement was not undermined by officer's actions in knocking on door to apartment and announcing his police presence in attempt to make contact with occupants, and had officers taken the time to procure a warrant before entry, the occupants would have had an entire apartment, including sinks and toilets, to utilize for destruction of the suspected marijuana, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4.

Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Searches and Seizures

► Necessity of and preference for warrant, and exceptions in general

Searches and Seizures

- Presence of probable cause

Searches and Seizures

Elikely escape or loss of evidence Warrantless entry into a residence is generally prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, but exception to this rule allows for such entry where there is probable cause to believe

evidence of a crime will be found in the residence and there is a risk that evidence will be destroyed if time is taken to obtain a warrant, i.e., an exigent circumstance. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3] Searches and Seizures

Elikely escape or loss of evidence Test for whether an exigent circumstance existed, so as to fall within exception to warrant requirement, is an objective one—whether a police officer, under the facts as they were known at the time, would reasonably believe that delay in procuring a search warrant would risk destruction of evidence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[4] Searches and Seizures

Presumptions and Burden of Proof

Burden is on the State to prove that an exigent circumstance existed so as to warrant exception to warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

Cases that cite this headnote

[5] Searches and Seizures

Exigent circumstance exception to warrant requirement does not

require that officers observe actual destruction of evidence taking place before making entry. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

**473 On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Jeffrey A. Mann of Mann Law Office, LLC, Oshkosh.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.

Before NEUBAUER, P.J., REILLY and GUNDRUM, JJ.

Opinion

GUNDRUM, J.

*257 ¶ 1 Jennifer Parisi appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after the circuit court denied her motion to suppress evidence of drug *258 activity obtained following the warrantless entry into her apartment by several city of Oshkosh police officers. She does not dispute that officers had probable cause to believe the apartment contained evidence of a crime, but asserts they violated her Fourth Amendment rights because exigent circumstances did not exist to validate their entry without a warrant. We conclude that exigent circumstances did exist and the entry was lawful. We affirm.

Background

¶ 2 Two of the police officers testified at the suppression hearing related to Parisi's motion. Their relevant, undisputed testimony is as follows.

¶ 3 Officer Derek Sell responded to a complaint of drugs at 1319 Clayton Court, Apartment 108. Sell met with the complainant, who described smelling burnt marijuana related to that apartment approximately an hour before Sell's arrival and also indicated that he had smelled marijuana there several times per week for several months. Sell went into the apartment complex hallway, in the area of Apartment 108, which was on the ground **474 floor. Due to a sinus condition, he could not smell burning marijuana, but he pressed his ear up to the apartment door and heard what sounded like an adult male and adult female conversing. Sell confirmed in his testimony that he was "positive" the voices were coming from Apartment 108. He knocked on the apartment door three separate times, each time announcing that he was a police officer. After he did this, no one answered the door and he "could no longer hear any voices inside."

¶ 4 Sell testified that another officer was positioned "on the outside patio door area." Sell asked that officer to come into the hallway to see if he could smell *259 anything. Sell stated that the officer was "probably at the point of just leaving the patio door and coming to me" around the time Sell knocked on the apartment door and announced a police presence. Because of this, Sell explained, there was about a "one to two minute[]" window of time where no one

was observing the patio door area outside the apartment. Sell confirmed that when the other officer was in the hallway by Apartment 108, the officer indicated that he could smell the burning marijuana.

¶ 5 Several additional officers arrived on the scene, including an officer with a drug-detecting dog, which alerted to Apartment 108. Believing there were persons in the apartment who were aware police were at the door and out of concern evidence would be destroyed if they waited for a search warrant, ¹ officers decided to enter the apartment without a warrant. Sell and other officers entered through the outside patio door, which had been slightly ajar prior to their entry. No persons were found in the apartment, but Sell observed "in plain view what appeared to be consistent with a baggie of marijuana on the living room coffee table area."

Sell testified that "filt appeared that whoever may have been inside was aware of our presence, and based on past experience... as time goes by, the ability for suspects to destroy evidence increases."

¶ 6 Officer Joseph Framke testified as follows. He arrived at the scene after the drug dog had alerted on Apartment 108. He explained that he had experience with drug investigations, including smelling burning marijuana, and stated that he smelled such an odor in the hallway area outside of that apartment. A collective decision was made to enter the apartment to secure it because the officers believed there were people inside *260 who were not responding to a known police attempt to make contact and the officers were concerned evidence would be destroyed if they waited for a warrant. Upon entry, Framke observed a rolled up plastic baggie on the couch "in plain view." He testified that "[i]t's very

common that controlled substances, including marijuana, are packed in such fashion." A field test of the substance in that baggie indicated it was marijuana. The officers applied for and received a warrant to search the apartment.

¶ 7 Parisi was charged with possession of tetrahydrocannabinols with intent to deliver. According to the criminal complaint, Apartment 108 was Parisi's residence and several baggies of marijuana were found throughout the apartment, along with \$630 in cash. Parisi moved to suppress the evidence, and after the circuit court denied the motion, she pled no contest. Sentence was withheld and Parisi was placed on probation. She appeals, challenging the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress.

Discussion

- [1] ¶8 Parisi contends exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the officers' **475 warrantless entry into her apartment. We disagree.
- [2] [3] [4] ¶ 9 Warrantless entry into a residence is generally prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

 State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶ 24, 327 Wis.2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463. An exception to this rule allows for such entry where there is probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the *261 residence 2 and there is "a risk that evidence will be destroyed" if time is taken to obtain a warrant, i.e., an exigent circumstance. Id., ¶¶ 26, 30. "In such instances, an individual's substantial right to privacy in his or her home must give way

to the compelling public interest in effective law enforcement." Id., ¶ 24. The test for whether an exigent circumstance existed is an objective one—"whether a police officer, under the facts as they were known at the time, would reasonably believe that delay in procuring a search warrant would ... risk destruction of evidence." State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶ 24, 233 Wis.2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621. The burden is on the State to prove that an exigent circumstance existed. Robinson, 327 Wis.2d 302, ¶ 24, 786 N.W.2d 463. In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, we will uphold a circuit court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review de novo whether those facts satisfy a particular constitutional standard, *Id.*, ¶ 22.

- Parisi does not contest the circuit court's conclusion that the officers had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found in Apartment 108. In light of the uncontested evidence at the suppression hearing, she would not have been likely to succeed had she made such a challenge. See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶¶ 21–22, 233 Wis.2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 ("The quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause to search is a 'fair probability' that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.... The unmistakable odor of marijuana coming from Hughes' apartment provided this fair probability.") (citation omitted).
- ¶ 10 Here, as the officers stood outside the apartment door, they were aware marijuana was being burned inside Apartment 108. Our supreme court has held that the smell of burning marijuana gives "rise to a reasonable belief that the drug—the evidence—was *262 likely being consumed by the occupants and consequently destroyed." *Hughes*, 233 Wis.2d 280, ¶ 26, 607 N.W.2d 621. As the *Hughes* court also observed based on the facts before it, an even greater exigency is

the possibility of the intentional and organized destruction of the drug by apartment occupants once they were aware of the police presence outside the door. Marijuana and other drugs are highly destructible.... It is not unreasonable to assume that a drug possessor who knows the police are outside waiting for a warrant would use the delay to get rid of the evidence.

Id., ¶ 26; see also Robinson, 327 Wis.2d 302, ¶ 31, 786 N.W.2d 463 ("Drugs like marijuana are easily and quickly destroyed."). In this case, with the occupants of Apartment 108 quieting or ceasing their conversation and not answering the door after Sell knocked and announced the police presence, "the possibility of the intentional and organized destruction of the drug" existed.

¶ 11 Parisi asserts that "law enforcement did not possess certainty that anyone was situated within Ms. Parisi's apartment." The record indicates otherwise. Although the circuit court did not make a specific finding as to whether Sell did or did not hear individuals speaking in the apartment prior to knocking on the door, the court did find the undisputed testimony of Sell and Framke to be "reasonable **476 and believable." And Sell's testimony was that he heard an adult male and an adult female "talking inside Apartment 108." He further confirmed he was "positive" the voices were coming from inside of that apartment and this was because he had "had [his] ear pressed up to

the door." In addition, two officers smelled the odor of burning marijuana, and *263 the drug dog alerted to the door of Apartment 108. ³ In that it is very unlikely the marijuana was burning without the aid of one or more persons, this provided additional support for the belief that there were persons in the apartment. ⁴

- We treat the evidence related to the drug dog's alert to Apartment 108 as valid. We need not analyze potential constitutional issues related to the alert because Parisi has not challenged its validity. We note for completeness, however, that the alert occurred prior to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Florida v. Jurdines, —U.S. ——, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013), which held, based on the facts of that case, that "[t]he government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1417–18.
- Although no direct evidence was presented at the suppression hearing of occupants within the apartment escaping out the back patio door, the undisputed evidence was that around the time Sell knocked on the apartment door and announced the police presence, the officer posted to watch the patio door left to come into the building, so that the patio door was unobserved for "about one to two minutes." It is also undisputed that prior to the officers subsequently entering this ground floor apartment through the patio door, that door was "slightly ajar."
- [5] ¶ 12 Parisi also contends exigent circumstances did not exist because "neither [officer] testified to hearing any sounds of destruction or so much as the flush of a toilet." The exigent circumstance exception, however, does not require that officers observe actual destruction of evidence taking place before making entry. To state the obvious, once an officer's presence is known and a toilet is flushed, at least some of the evidence has already been disposed. The exception rather requires only that officers have a reasonable belief "that delay in procuring a search warrant would ... risk destruction of evidence." Hughes,

233 Wis.2d 280, ¶ 24, 607 N.W.2d 621 (emphasis added).

*264 ¶ 13 After Sell knocked on the apartment door and announced the police presence, the individuals he previously heard conversing in the apartment became quiet and did not answer the door, creating a reasonable inference that they were trying to avoid police detection. ⁵ An officer could reasonably believe that a person (or persons) who appears to be attempting to avoid police detection in this manner when the odor of burning marijuana is in the air is more likely to also attempt to prevent evidence from being discovered by the police, including through destruction of such evidence. An officer could also reasonably infer that the now-quiet occupants may have ceased conversing and not answered the door because upon announcement of the police presence, they became otherwise engaged in destroying **477 id., ¶ 26 ("It is not evidence. See unreasonable to assume that a drug possessor who knows the police are outside waiting for a warrant would use the delay to get rid of the evidence.").

Although there was nothing unlawful about the previously conversing occupants ceasing their conversation and not answering the door, as is often the case, lawful actions—or inactions—nonetheless can create an incriminating inference. State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, § 32, 327 Wis.2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463; State v. Waldner, 206 Wis.2d 51, 59-60, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996); see also United States v. Robles, 37 F.3d 1260, 1263-65 (7th Cir.1994) (concluding that exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry existed where agents who were aware of drugs in a residence knocked on door and identified themselves as law enforcement agents but the occupants, who the agents had observed through a window, did not answer door).

¶ 14 Parisi appears to also assert that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant

requirement should not apply here because Sell created the exigent circumstances by knocking on the door. This position has been soundly rejected by both our supreme court *265 and the United States Supreme Court. In Robinson, which involved suspected drug activity in Robinson's apartment, our supreme court addressed a nearly identical argument and held that the officers did not "impermissibly create[] the exigent circumstances merely by knocking on [Robinson's] door and announcing" themselves as police, Robinson. 327 Wis.2d 302, ¶¶ 4, 32, 786 N.W.2d 463. In so acting, the court concluded, the officers "were conducting themselves in an utterly appropriate and lawful manner," and added that "[w]hen law enforcement agents act in an entirely lawful manner, they do not impermissibly create exigent circumstances." Id., ¶ 32 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir.1990)). The court continued: "It was not the officers' knock and announcement that created the exigent circumstances.... Robinson's choice to run from the door [after police knocked and announced they were police] created the exigent circumstances that justified the officers' warrantless entry." Id.

¶ 15 Similarly, in Kentucky v. King, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011), another police knock-and-announce case involving the smell of burning marijuana corning from behind an apartment door, the United States Supreme Court held that where police do not create the exigency "by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed."

Id. at 1854, 1858. The Court added, "the Fourth Amendment requires only that the steps preceding the seizure be lawful," and specifically held that the officers' "bang[ing]" on the door and merely announcing their police presence was conduct which "was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1858, 1863. Here, Sell merely knocked on the door to Apartment 108 and announced his police presence in an *266 obvious attempt to make contact with the occupants. This action was appropriate, lawful and reasonable; thus, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement was not undermined by Sell's actions.

¶ 16 Parisi cites to our decision in State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis.2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct.App.1997), in support of her assertion that no exigent circumstances existed. In that case, after smelling an odor of burning marijuana coming from behind Kiekhefer's closed bedroom door, officers entered his bedroom unannounced. Id. at 466, 569 N.W.2d 316. Although we concluded that the officers' entry was unlawful, id. at 480, 569 N.W.2d 316, Kiekhefer is of no assistance to Parisi because there was "no indication that Kiekhefer was aware" of the officers' presence outside his door. Id. at 477, 569 N.W.2d 316. As our supreme court noted while analyzing Kiekhefer in Hughes, the officers in Kiekhefer "entered the room based upon the odor alone, in the absence of any other facts suggesting exigency." Hughes, 233 Wis.2d 280, ¶ 28, 607 N.W.2d 621. Here, in addition to the smell of burning marijuana, the police had strong reason to believe the previously conversing occupants were aware police were at the door trying to make contact, and after Sell knocked

and announced the police presence, he could no longer hear them conversing and no one answered the door. As previously indicated, it is not a far stretch to conclude that those seeking to avoid detection by the **478 police when the smell of marijuana is present would also be likely to destroy the marijuana to prevent that evidence from being discovered. See id., ¶ 35 (With the smell of marijuana emanating from the apartment, the police "knew that once the people inside the apartment were alerted to their presence, the likelihood of intentional evidence destruction was extremely high.").

*267 ¶ 17 Kiekhefer is also distinguishable because, as we stated in that case, the suspected contraband there—"a large quantity of marijuana"—"could not be easily or quickly destroyed in Kiekhefer's bedroom." Kiekhefer, 212 Wis.2d at 478, 569 N.W.2d 316. In the case now before us, had the officers taken the time to procure a warrant before entry, the occupants would have had an entire apartment, presumably including sinks and toilets, to utilize for destruction of the suspected marijuana.

- ¶ 18 Faced with the facts of which the officers were aware when they decided to enter the apartment, "a police officer ... would reasonably believe that delay in procuring a search warrant would ... risk destruction of evidence." See Hughes, 233 Wis.2d 280, ¶ 24, 607 N.W.2d 621. The Fourth Amendment did not require the officers to take that risk. 6
- The State also argues that, even if we did not conclude that exigent circumstances existed, the independent source doctrine should nonetheless preclude suppression of the evidence. See State v. Carroll. 2010 W1 8, ¶

44, 322 Wis.2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1 (discussing the independent source doctrine). Because we conclude that exigent circumstances existed, we need not and do not address this issue. See Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis.2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct.App.1983) (this court need not address other issues when one is dispositive).

Parisi also argues that evidence obtained from within her residence should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Because we have concluded that the tree from which the fruit was obtained was not poisonous, the evidence is not suppressed.

Judgment affirmed.

All Citations

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