297-HQ-A1271788-D

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date:

05/30/2013

Report of:

IIC Christopher Davis

Case ID#:

297-HQ-Al271788-D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
07/18/2012

Office:

FBIHQ-INSD

Investigative Period: 07/18/2012-Present
Synopsis
On July 18, 2012, at approximately 5:15 a.m., an Agent-involved shooting occurred in
Queens I
LNew York. The Agent involved, SAi
I assigned to
the New York Field Office (NYO) Special Operations an4 Cyber Branch, Surveillance
Operations I
l was off-duty at his residence, I______________
New York.

•

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At approximately 5:00 a.m., SAJ
l'sl
Iheard a car alarm. Upon
looking out of a second story window of their residence, she observed two unidentified males
~ing to burglarize her vehicle. The vehicie was parked directly in front of their residence.
L__J began to bang on the window in an attempt to stop the subjects. SAi
Iasleep in ·
an adjacent room, was awakened by the commotion and was advised byl
ltheir vehicle
was b~ing burglarized. SAJ
Hooked out of the window, began yelling verbal
commands at the subjects and identified himself as a law enforcement officer. One subj,ect
turned toward SAi
I The subject reached to his waistband area and made suspicious
movements directed toward SAi
I SAl
I armed with his Bureau issued
firearm, fired one shot at the subject through the window screen of his second story bedroom
window.

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Video footage froml
Is security camera revealed two subjects approaching the
vicinity of SAi
ts personally owned vehicle. Approximately two minutes later, the
footage shows two subjects attempting to flee from the vicinity of SAi
fs vehicle. One
subject fell to the ground alongside a light colored truck parked between SAi
ts Bureau
vehicle and personally owned vehicle. The second subject ran back to the first subject and
dragged him down the street out of the surveillance camera's view. Subseguent investigation by
the NYPD revealed both subjects entered a vehicle at the comer of!
land
the vehicle d~parted the scene.

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 297-HQ-A1271788-D

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Icalled 911. NYPD officers responded to the residence. SA
1.-----....-ta-:d:-VI'.:"'s" ed":"-:"
th_e_
m~he fired his weapon one time. He surrendered his Bureau-issued
firearm, as well as the shell casing from the fired round to the NYPD. SAJ
lwas
uninjured, but was taken to a local hospital for evaluation as a precautionary measure.

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Shortly after the incident, an individual identified asl
!arrived at._I_ ____,
Hospital, Brooklyn, NY for treatment of a gunshot wound to his back. NYPD investigators
responded to the hospital and identified!
las the
Ito the hospital .
individuals who transportecil

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..___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____, departed the area of the hosgital with the vehicle and
was not seen until 07/22/2012 when he surrendered to the NYPD's 106 Precinct to address
charges related to the incident.

DetailS
The SIRT dispatched to the NYO during the evening hours of07/18/2012. Contact was
made with NYPD upon arrival at SAi
rs residence. NYPD officials provided the SIRT
with the following information:

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I

At approximately 5:15 am, an Agent-involved shooting occurred in!.__ _ _ _ ___.
(Queens), New York. sAI
I assigned to the NYO Special Operations and Cyber
I was off-duty at his residence, I
I
Branch, Surveillance Operations!
I
INew York, when the shooting occurred. At approximately 5:00 a.m.J
I
while attending tol
l heard a car alarm activate. Upon looking out of her second
story window, she observed two unidentified males attempting to burglarize the family's vehicle,
al
I The vehicle was parked directly in ·front of their residence. I
Ibegan
I asleep in an adjacent
to bang on the window in an attempt to stop the burglary. SAi
ltheir vehicle was being
room, was awakened by the commotion, and was advised byt
burglarized. SAi
lwent to the bedroom window, raised the blinds and observed a black
I
male wearing a white t-shirt at the rear of their vehicle "pulling" on the trunk. SAi
observed a "shin "ob· ect in the right hand of the subject, which he described as either a ratchet
or a knife. SA
pened the window and yelled "Police, what the fuck are you doing?"
S
stated he yelled the command twice. The subject did not respond and continued
ladvised the subject took his left hand and placed it in the
to pull on the trunk. SAl
area of his waistband, while still pulling on the trunk with his right hand. Based on his
!believed the waistband area to be a location where
experience and training, SAi
weapons were kept. Upon seeing this, SAi
lwent to a drawer.beneath his bed and
removed his Bureau issued service weapon from its holster, a Glock 23 (SN#I
t SA
I
~eturned to the window with his firearm and found the subject still pulling on the
trunk. SAJ
lagain shouted at the subject to move away from his vehicle. Immediately
l reached to his waistband area
following the command, the subject looked up at SAl
and made suspicious movements directed towards him. In response to the subject's actions, SA
~red one shot from his weapon. Following the shot, the subject fled westbound on

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I

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·sAI
Iwent outside and found his vehicle had been burglarized and recalled
seeing the passenger side window lying on the grass. Additionally, he looked westbound and
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observed a male lying near the crosswalk ofl
I The subject looked
towards him and stated, "You're killing me man." SAJ
twas unsure how many other
subjee<ts were in the area and did not go further. Video footage from al
revealed a subject, later identified asl
Lreturning to
!pulled)
lacross the crosswalk and both
the subject on the ground. I
!reported seeing a dark colored vehicle, possibly a
men entered a waiting vehicle. SAi
I
Imake au-turn near the intersection ofl
I A male
Ifrom the ground into the backseat. All
exited the passenger side and pulled!
I
subjects entered the vehicle and drove away westbound onl

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. Upon re-entering his residence, SAJ
Ifoundl
Ito be on the telephone with
!identified
a 911 dispatcher. NYPD officers arrived on-scene within minutes and SAi
himself as an FBI Agent. SA!
!advised a NYPD Sergeant he shot someone who was
I SAi
!described the individual he shot as a black
dragged into al
male, with a shaved head, wearing a white T-shirt and dark shorts. After being questioned about
!relinquished it, along with the spent shell casing, to the
the status of his weapon, SAi
Sergeant.

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!Hospital, Brooklyn, NY
. Shortly after the incident,!
!arrived atl
for treatment of a gunshot wound in his back. NYPD investigators responded to the hospital and
las the individuals who transportedl
Ito
identified!
the hospital.
departed the area of the hospital with the
vehicle and was not seen until 07/22/2012 when he surrendered to the NYPD's 1061h Precinct, to
address charges related to the incident.

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I Surveillance Team Leader for SAi
I SA
The SIRT interviewed SAJ
c::::Jaqvised he received a call f rSo m § ho told SAC:]he had been involved in a
unable to reach S
s immediate supervisor, contacted SA
shootin . SA
....,.._____.... a squad member of S
and instructed him to respond to SA
.....__
..... s residence.

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The SIRT interviewed SAi
twho advised he arrived at SAi
Is residence
lwhere the shooting incident
and observed h,im to be visibly shaken. He asked SAi
occurred, in an attempt to determine if the residence was a crime scene. He was unable to
reme~ber SAl
ts response, but recalled he mentioned someone breaking into his car,
ot provide any further details. He
and feeling he had to shoot. He requested SA§
to go to the hospital jd requered
advised on scene NYPD officers he wanted SA
they contact an ambulance. He accompanied S
in the ambulance to
Hospital,
Queens, New York.

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__

The above-noted information regarding the interviews of SAsI....______.lwas
documented via FD-302.

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·As part of the SIRT investigation, a digital copy of a 911 call made by!
I .;;..a,,-!r-w-as
--:-h-ear
---:"
d-:-to__.
on 07/18/2012 was received from the NYPD. As the 911 recording beq,an, ...
yell "shoot the car." She identified herself a~
J to the 911 operator,
provided her address, and told the operator two black males attempted to burglarize her vehicle.
She told the 911 operator al
lwas headed down!
land "they" picked
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someone up. She stated there were two or three black males and one of them was possibly
injured. She note
would be able to tell the police if one of the men was injured.
She told the 911 OIJerator
was outside looking at her car and "they" stole her radio.
She then identifie
as an FBI Agent. The 911 operator asked her if any weapons
were involved. I
lstatedl
Idrew his weapon and fired one shot. She told the 911
operator she did not know if"th.ey" drew a weapon and the incident occurred less than five
minutes before the 911 call.

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NYO, squadll began pursuing an AFO investigation ....____,______,
Agents responded toSAC
ts residenceJ
!Hospital, an
Hos ital on
the morning of the shooting. SAsl
!responded to...___ __,
Hospital and learned I
was treated for a gunshot wound to the back. The bullet
was not removed during surgery due to its proximity tol
ts spine. I
twas cleareq for
interview upon release from surgery at approximately 8: 15 a.m. on 07/18/2012. During the
interview with SAs
stated he went to Queens with his girlfriend and
two friends. He told the Agents he was walking in a crosswalk and "got shot." He then
terminated the interview due to discomfort from the surgery.

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On 07/19/2012, in exchange for immunity from prosecution, SAJ...._ _ _ _ _ _ _....
made statements to representatives of the Queens County District Attorney's Office (QCDAO)
and the NYPD. SAi
ts statement was consistent with his statement to NYPD on the
LAttorney for SAJ
!advised neither SA
morning of the shootin~. I
I
}..vould be available for an interview with the SIRT. As a part of the
ongoing 89B investigation1 NYO obtained a copy of the NYPD and QCDAO interview of SA
I
I These interviews were made part of the SIRT's investigation.

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As a part of the ongoing 89B investigation, NYO SAJ
lmet with the
QCDAO and the attorney for
on 07/22/2012. In exchange for
!provided the following information to the
immunity from prosecution forl
QCDAO, which conflicted with the information provided byt
Ito the FBI on
07/18/2012:
travelled to
I
LQueens, in the early morning of07/18/2012 to steal a car stereo and
!similar to the one driven by
All four men
navigation system from al
ook u look-out positions
met near the back of SA
at the opposite ends o
used tools,
to include a screwdriver, to burglarize the car. I
!heard someone shouting at him an!o~d
d then heard a gunshot. All four men began to flee the scene. I
!realize
as injured and assisted him as jey enteyd)
I After dropping o
I
IHospital
drove away inl
rs vehicle.

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I

;.

§

To date, the SIRT is not aware of any evidence indicating the subjects were armed.
Pursilant to a SIRT team request, on 07/19/2012, NYO ERT completed photographs and
ts residence and began Total Station processing.
video of the outside of SAl

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On 09/17/2013, in exchange for immunity from prosecution for violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1001,I
lmade statements to the SIR.T, the
USAO .for the Eastern District of New York, and
Special Legal Counsel, Civil

I

I

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,.

Rights Division, DOJ.
were interviewed separately in the presence of their
I and two friends were searching for al
I
attorney
stated heJ
similar to the vehicle owned by
Once they located thel
bwned by
I
Ithey devised a plan to break into the vehicle to steal the stereo so it could be
placed in thei
ts vehicle.I
land one of the friends acted as lookouts while!
I
broke the passenger side window of theI
Iand entered the vehicle. I
!attempted to
lused a screwdriver to access and remove
disarm the vehicle,s alarm with a small ratchet. I
the radio. During this time,!
!moved to the rear wheel of the driver's side of the vehicle.
I
lheard a male banging on a window and yelling, "What the fuck are you doing?" I
I
handed the radio to one of the friends who ran away with the stereo. I
Ihit the horn with his
feet while exiting the vehicle, causing the alarm to go off and the lights to flash on the vehicle.
lsaid "I got shot."
He began to run down the street when he heard a gunshot and thenl
Prior to hearing je t"nslo~ the last time he save:::::Jwas at the rear of the driver's side of the
who was lying in the street. I
!observed a male approach pointing
I
I He ran to
a handgun at them.
told the male, "You shot me, you really shot me." The male did not
lthen pulledj
Ito a sidewalk where one of his
say anything tol
j and they took!
Ito a nearby hospital.
friends picked them up in 8J

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Istated he
(identified
In a separate interviewJ
asl
Iby the NYPD) were driving around neighborhoods in two vehicles on the
morning of07/18/2012, looking for~sothey could steal the radio and install it inr=J
I
ts vehicle. Once they found a
hich met their criteria, they parked the vehicles
attempted to disarm the alarm with a screwdriver
and approached the vehicle on foot.
!moved to the
while!
!broke the passenger side window and entered the vehicle. I
!activated the
rear of the driver's side of the vehicle to act as a lookout. At some point,I
Inoticed blinds move in
vehicle alarm, causing the lights to flash and the horn to go off. I
an upstairs window of a house located near the vehicle and heard banging on the window.
I
klucked down behind the vehicle. I
Iheard(
Iyell, "Let's go," and(
I
began to run up the street. He heard one shot and fell to the ground. He thought he was shot
Itold I
Ihe was shot and looked back in the direction
but did not feel it immediately.!
of where it occurred. He saw a male with a gun pointed in his direction and told the male, "You
fucking shot me." I
lcould not recall ifthe male responded. I
I helped(
linto a
jand they drove to the hospital.
j

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The Subjects were:
Name·
Position
Sex
Race
Height
Weight
Hair
Eyes .

I
!Rear of car
Male
!Black
l5' 1O"
'.161 lbs
!Black
lBrown

!-:-~AN-:--tl

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iUnknown
Male
!Black
:S' 1O"
·1ss 1bs
tBlack
Brown

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Substantive Case Files
The following substantive case was opened regarding this incident:

Titie: I....- - - - - - -

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UNSUB(S);

l....._________.I- VICTIM;
. 07/18/2012

Enclosures
All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identified in the enclosed table
of contents.

A.

Administrative
The Shooting Incident Review Team CSIRD was coinprised of the following personnel:

Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) Christopher W. Davis
Inspector Thomas P. Ravenelle
Assistant Inspector (AI)/Team Leader (TL~

AIITLI

I

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--~~~~-

Assistant Inspector-in-Place (AllP)I

AIIf1

I

-----

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

-

On 07/18/2012, IIC Davis communicated with NYO Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
April D. Brooks to arrange logistics for the SIRT. SAC Brooks served as the point of contact for
the SIRT, The SIRT arrived during the evening hours of07/18/2012. On 07/19/2012, IIC Davis
and Inspector Ravenelle met with the NYO Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) Janice K.
Fedarcyk to discuss SIRT protocols. IIC Davis was informed the NYPD was conducting a
parallel investigation and would provide their reports to the SIRT. ADIC Fedarcyk was advised
all statements taken by the SIRT would be provided to the NYPD for inclusion in their
investigative file.
On 07/19/2012, IIC Davis met with all SIRT personnel, members of the NYO executive
management as well as the squad conducting the Assault on a Federal Officer (AFO)
investigation. IIC Davis introduced members of the SIRT and outlined the SIRT protocols.
There was an opportunity for dialogue regarding concerns, clarification, or questions prior to the
investigation commencing. On 07/19/2012, SIRT team members visited the scene of the
shooting along with members of the investigative squad
and a representative of the NYO
Evidence Response Team (ERT).

C:J

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I

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SAi
Ithrough the advice of his attorney!
appeared for an
interview with the NYPD and the QCDAO. The SIRT was provided a copy of a summary of the
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..

~

297-HQ-At27t788-D

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interview. SAl
!refused to. provide a Signed Sworn Statement to the SIRT. Additional
interviews, events and observations were documented in FD-302s. FBI personnel were
interviewed and allowed to read the FD-302 documenting their interview and confirm the
accuracy of the information provided.
Neither the FD-644 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide
Informatien on a Voluntary Basis) nor the FD-645 (Warning and Assurance to Employee
Required to Provide lnformatio~) were utilized. The interviews of witnesses were conducted
voluntarily. FD-927's (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information
Following a Shooting Incident) were executed for each Agent interview.
On 07/22/2012, an exit brief was provided by IIC Davis to ADIC Fedarcyk and SAC
Brooks.

C. Personnel Involved in the Shooting
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· SA._I_ _ _ ____.I (fired weapon)

D. Firearms Training

__.l

The NYO provided qualifications records for SA._I_ _
was in compliance with all firearms requirements.

INSD analysis revealed he

E. Deadly Force Training
CDQ
!advised FBI Deadly Force Policy Training was conducted on
12112/2011. This training was memorialized via Electronic Communication (EC) dated
11/09/2011, 66F-NY-9318, ("Schedule for Uniform Course of Legal Instruction for Third and
Fourth Quarter 2011 "). This EC included the topic of "DOJ Policy re Use of F 6rce." CDC
I
!provided the NYO Legal Instruction sign-in sheet, dated 12/2112011, which included the
I
signature of SAi

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F. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers
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SIRT investigation did not obtain information regarding SAl
fs use of body
armor during the incident. SAi
ldid not provide a statement to the SIRT.

G. FBI Indices and National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
National Crime Inf01;mation Center (NCIC), New York State (NYS) Division of Criminal
Fhecks for
Justice Services, Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS), andl
evealed
numerous entries which are detailed below. Additionally, FBI indices checks were completed
for all subjects and returned with negative results. Copies of the arrest reports were placed in the
lA section of the file.

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...._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Name: I
Date of Birth:

Kwounded subject)
_.I

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._I_ _ _

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Sex: Male
Race: Black
Arrest Date: I...- - -.. .
Arrest Charges: Robbery-1st degree: Cause Serious Injury;
Criminal Possession of a Weapon-2nd degree: Loaded Firearm-Other Than Person's
Home/Business; Attempted Assault 2nd Degree: Intent to Cause Physical Injury with
Weaponllnstrument;
Criminal Possession Stolen Property-4th degree: Property Value
Exceeds $1000; Robbery-1st degree: Forcible Theft Armed with a Deadly Weapon; Criminal
Possession of a Weapon-2nd degree: Loaded Firearm-Other Than Person's Home/business;
Criminal Possession Stolen Property-5th Degree

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Name:I
Mrounded subject)
Date of Birth: I....____,
Sex: Male
Race: Black
Arrest Date: I...- - - - .t\rrest Charges: Robbery-1st: Cause Serious Injury; Criminal
Possession of a Weapon-2nd: Loaded Firearm-Other Than a Person's Home/Business; Assault
2nd Degree: Intent To Cause Physical Injury with Weaponllnstrument; Criminal Possession
Stolen Property-4th degree: Property Value Exceeds $1000; Robbery-1st degree: Forcible Theft
Armed With A Deadly Weapon Criminal Possession; Criminal Possession of Stolen Property-5th
Degree

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Name: !
Date of Birth:
Sex: Male
Race: Black
Arrest Date! - - - - - .
Arrest Charges: Possession OfB~rglary Tools; Reckless Driving
Moved From Lane Unsafely; Traffic Device Violation - Passed Red Light
. _ I_ _ _ _ _ _ .

..

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Name: I
Arrest Datd ..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.
Arrest Number: K11626268
Arrest Charges: Reckless Endangerment-1st Degree, Unlawful Fleeing Police Officer In Motor
Vehicle-2nd: Cause Serious Injury Aggravated Unlicensed Operation Motor Vehicle-2nd J!egree
Reckless Driving Failure To Obey Traffic Control Device
Copies of the aforementioned printouts were placed in the IA section of the file.

H. Evidence Recovery and Laboratory Division Reports

=====

Prior to the arrival of the SIRT, NYPD Detective!
I Tax ID#1.. .I
accepted custody of SAi
ts Bureau-issued weapon from NYPD Sergean~
initially took custody of the weapon, and entered it into NYPD:

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j who

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DetectiveJ
lalso accepted custody of one (1) Glock model 23 magazine and 13
I All the items were taken to the NYPD
Winchester .40 caliber cartridges from Sergeari~
Police.Lab for analysis under voucher #6000002175 (a copy of which will be maintained in the
lA section of the file). Two (2) cartridges were test fired at the NYPD Lab by NYPD Det.
I
ITax IDM
I, and were retained as evidence at the NYPD Firearms Analysis
Section (FAS), under labratoJ #2012-084272. No mention was made of the spent shell casing
collected by the Sergeant
from SAi
lwithin the NYPD Property and Evidence
Tracking System (PETS), voucher.:#600002175. A copy of this report was included in the l A
section of the file .

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. On 07/18/2012, S § B u r e a u -issujd weapon and 11 cartridges were released
Squad1
NYO pursuant to an official written
to NYPD TFO Detective
request from the NYO. TFO
released the items into the custody of SSAJ
I
Squadc::J on 07/18/2012. SS.AC] relinquished custody of the weapon on 07/20/2012
to firearms instructor SAi
INYO Firearms Training Unit (NYO FTU), who accepted
the weapon for storage.

C:J

The NYPD Crime Scene Unit (CSU) processed the scene following the shooting incident.
On 07/20/2012, Bureau Chietl
LCareer Criminal Major Crimes Bureau,
QCDAO, met with IIC Davis.
jprovided IIC Davis with crime scene photographs of
SAJ
t s residence. NYPD conducted a forensic examination of the second story
window screen from the residence. Based on an analysis of the threads from the window screen,
NYPD was of the opinion the shot fired by SAJ
Iwas directed towards the rear portion
of thel
lowned byl
j Based upon the forensic examination of the
window screen and the supporting photographs, NYPD concluded the shot was angled towards
·
the rear of the vehicle.

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I

Also, on 07/20/2012, the following members of the NYO ERT res onded to SA
I....------.ts residence at the request of the SIRT: Specia:.,;lA~e:::::n!!.t~S~A~----=======
NYO ERT Senior Team Leader, SA.j
ISA
SAi
and SAi
I Also present was NYO PhotographerL--_ _ _ ____.

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NYO ERT and Photographer documented the exterior of the residence and the
surrounding area, through individual and spherical photography. They also collected digital
sketching data via Total Station. The original photographs were forwarded to the case file and
digital Total Station data was submitted to FBI Operational Projects Unit (OPU) for processing.
I
~efused the SIRT request for entry into SAi
ts residence. This precluded the
SIRT from obtaining the necessary data to complete Total Station Processing.

I.

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Medical Report

FBI Agents Involved in the Shooting:
No injuries.
Subjects:
Shortly after the incident, an individual identified asl
Iarrived at._I_ _ ____,
Hospital, Brooklyn, NY for treatment of a gunshot wound in his back. NYPD investigators

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responded to the hospital and identified..,,!___,.-....,......,...------------'lis the
individuals who transported I
~o the hospital.

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J. Declination by the Civil Rights Division
Upon completion of the on-site inquiry, IIC Davis coordinated SIRT investigative
ISpecial LeJal Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil Rights
findings withj
Division. By letter dated 10/04/2013,
~tated the evidence did not "support a
prosecutable violation of federal law'' and noted the USAO for the Eastern District of New York
concurred with the recommendation to close the matter.

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Mr;

K. Local Prosecution Opinion

In exchange for their statements, SAJ
!brothers were granted
immunity by the QCDAO. As a result, QCDAO was unable to present this information before a
Grand Jury, absent a signed and executed waiver by the affected parties. The attorneys
representing SAJ
land thel
Ireached an agreement in which neither
party would testify against the other. Due to this, on 03/05/2013, QCDAO dismissed all charges
against SAi
Iand theI
I
L.

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Inspector's Observations
The SIRT identified the following.issues:

OBSERVATION: SAi

Isurrendered his weapon without consulting NYO CDC or

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EM, and did not adhere to NYO's Crisis Response Plan.

ANALYSIS: MIOG, Part 12, Section 11.2, Guidelines for Intervention at the Shooting
Scene, states the following:
(4) Ifthe Agent's weapon is secured for evidence or ballistics tests, another will be issued
immediately unless there is cause not to issue a weapon. The Principal Legal Advisor, Office of
General Counsel, FBIHQ, or the United States Attorney's Office should be consulted if questions
arise regarding whether an Agent's weapon should be surrendered to local authorities.

The Crisis Response Plan for the NYO, updated 03/29/2012, docwnents the procedure to
be followed in the NYO in the event of an Agent involved shooting. The relevant section of
Annex D is cited as follows:
Crisis Response Plan New York Division
AnnexD: Shooting Incident Response and Notification
The policy below addresses and assigns responsibility for notification and immediate follow-up
response to shooting incidents. Given the unique circumstances associated with each incident,
this policy is intended to serve as a guide to ensure that the NYO response to each incident is
appropriate, timely and effective.
Any NYO employee, on or offduty, within or outside the NYO territory, who discharges a
firearm or who is fired upon, whether or not injuries occur, will immediately notify th,e NYO
10

NYT-10

 297-HQ-A1271788-D

Operations Center (NYOC).
For the agent involved in the incident:
1. Ensure your safety and that offellow personnel.
2. Contact 911, if necessary.
3. Contact the senior NYOC Duty Agent I

b7E - 5,9

~~1,...-....,....~...-~~--:-~~~,....-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'

5. Remain at the scene unless a pursuit occurs.

6. Secure the scene and protect evidence related to the shooting and the crime

7. Secure all weapons involved in the shooting; both yours and the subject's.
8. Make no statements to the authorities outside the FBI other than advising ofcurrent needs.
For the On-Scene Commander (OSC):
1. Ensure that the scene is secure tactically, physically, andfor the conduct ofthe investigation
that will follow regarding the shooting itselfand the criminal matter preceding it.
2. Ensure that FBI personnel are properly caredfor physically, mentally, and emotionally. The
OSC will determine if Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) members should respond on
scene.
3. Request medical assistance and FBI personnel as needed.
4. Coordinate jurisdictional matters and investigative responsibilities with local authorities.
5. DO NOT SURRENDER ANY WEAPONS TO AUTHORITIES OUTSIDE THE FBI If
there is any question concerning this, contact the CDC. (NYO emphasis added)
SIRT interviews and analysis ofNYPD reports indicated relinquished possession of his
Bureal,l-issued weapon to an outside agency without consulting the appropriate personnel.
Additionally, SIRT interviews revealed SAi
not contact the NYOC Duty Agent,.
not secure the scene.

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -9

!contacted SA personnel, but did
_,land .did

._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

INSTRUCTION la:
ADIC~ NYO

..

will ensure all Special Agent personnel are aware of MIOG, Part 12, Section 11.2,
Guidelines for Intervention at the Shooting Scene, as well as the Crisis Response Plan, New
York Division, Annex D: Shooting Incident Response and Notification.

RECOMMENDATION lb:
ADIC, NYO should consider changing the Crisis Response Plan, Annex D, #8, to more
accurately reflect acceptable statements between the Agent(s) involved in the shooting incident
and re~ponding law enforcement personnel.

11

NYT-11

 FD-1057 (Rev 5-8-10)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Kleotron lo Communloatlon

Title :
CC :

(U) Shooting Incident New York Division

Date :

02/18/2014
b6 -1

I

From :

b 7C - 1

INSPECTI ON
Contact:

Approved By : SHIELDS ROBERT J JR
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By :
Case ID # : 297 - HQ- Al271697 - D

(U) SHOOTING INC I DENTS

Synop sis :
(U) This commu nication was prepared to furnish the analysis ,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the meeting
held on 11/20/2013.
Administrative Notes:
(U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division's (INSD) Shooting Inci dent Repo r t d a ted 10/25/2013 b y forme r
Inspector In Charge (IIC) Christopher W. Davis . This communication does
not provide a complete a c count of the original INSD Shooting Incident
Report. A copy of the INSD Shooting Incident Report is electronically
attached to this communi cat i on .
Enclosure(s) : Enclosed are the following items :
1.
(U) INSD Shooting Report dated 05/30/2013
Details:
This communication serves t o memo r ialize the SIRT Inve stigation of
the captioned shooting incident involving New York Field Office (NYO)
SA i
and the results of the 11/20/2013 SIRG meeting .

b6 - 1

I

b7C -1

On 07/19/2012, the SIRT traveled to SA l
l's residence ,
Queens, New York, to review the s cene of the

I

L-~~~~~~~~-'

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT-12

 UNCLASSIFI ED
Title :
(U ) Shooting Incident New York Divis ion
Re:
297-HQ-Al271697-D , 02 /18/2014

shooting.
NYPD's Evi dence Response Team processed t he scene on
07/18/2012 . The SIRT was not allowed entry into SA i
ts

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

residence.
Federal Law Enforcement Off i cers Association (FLEOA)
attorney, Ll_ _ _ _ _ _r-l_w
.;.;.h~
; .: o"""""'r~e.p~r,fsented SA i
! advised the SIRT
he would not al l ow sA l
to provide a voluntary statement .
Th e New York Police Department (NYPD) provided the SIRT a
compilation of report s, the l
1 911 call , and yideq
survei l lance. The SIRT did not interview SA
The f o 1 1 owing th ree par alg_r_a_p_ h_s_ s_u_mm
_ a_ r _i _z_e_ t_h_e_ _ ___.
shooting inciden t:

I

I

I

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

At approxima t ely 5 :1 5 am, on 07/ 18/2012 , an Agent - involved shooting
occurred in l
(Queens), New Yor k.
SA i
assigned to L.,trh-e---:'N~Y~O::-~S-p_e_c~i-a~l~Ope rations and Cyber Branch, Surve i llance

I

Operations !

I

I

I was

off-duty at his residence ,
_...:...------L----~----,1 New York, when the shooting occurred .

I while

approximately 5 : 00 a . m., sA r

I hear~

I

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

At

attending

to l
a car alarm activate . Upon looking out of
her second story window, she observed two unidentif ied males at tempting
to burglarize the fam i ly ' s vehicl e,
l began

I

to bang on t h e window i n an attempt to stop the b urglary .
SA i
asleep in an adjacent room, was awakened by the
commotion, and was advised by l
~he ir vehicle was being
bu rglar i zed . SA i
l went to t he bedroom window, ra ised the
b li nds a nd observed a black male wearing a whi te t-shirt at the rear of
thei r vehicle "pulli ng" on the trunk .
SA i
!observed a "shi ny "
object in the right hand of the subject, whi ch he described as eit h er a
ratchet or a knife .
SA i
l opened the wi ndow and y e l led
" Po l ice , what the fuck are you doing? " SA i
l also yelled get
away from my car .

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

The subject di d not respond and continued to pull on

the trunk .
s p,j
l advised the subject took his left hand and
p l aced i t in the area of his waistband, while still pulling on the
trunk with his right hand .
b6 -1
b7C -1

Based on his experience and training , SA~l_ _ _ _ _ _l believed the

UNCLASSI FI ED
2

NYT-13

 UNCLASSIFIED

Title:
(U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re : 297-HQ-A1271697 - D, 02/18/2014

b6 -1
b 7C - 1

waistband area to be a location where weapons were kept. Upon seeing
this, SA i
l went to a drawer beneath his bed and removed his
Bureau issued service weapon from its holster. SA i
lr eturned
to the window with his firearm and found the subject still pul l ing on
the trunk.
SAi
~gain shouted at t he subject to move away
from his vehicle . Immedi ately following the command , the subject
looked up at SA i
reached to his waistband area and ma d e
suspicious movements d irected towards him. In response to the subject ' s
actions , SA i
!fired one shot from his weapon.
Followi n g the
shot, the subject fled wes t bound on

I

I

I

On 07/18 /2 013 , as part of the Assault on a Federal Officer

b6 - 1 , 7
b7C - 1 ,7

(AFO)investigation , NYO Agrnts responded toLl~~~~~~~~~~~Hospital.
_was being treated for a gunshot wound which
entered the riq ht rear side of his body. It was later determined

I

L-~~~~~~~~l was

burglarizing the vehicle of SA i

was shot .

Iwhen he

On 07/19/2012 , in exchange for immunity from prosecution, SA

'--~~~~__.land l

I provided statements

to representatives
of the Queens County District Attorney's Office (QCDAO), and NYPD . As
part of t he ongoing AFO investigation, NYO obtained a copy of SA
and
!statements .

I

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

I I

On 07/22/2012, .-N_Y_O~A_g_e_n_t_._~,.....-=-~~-:--" met with the QCDAO and j
Attorney
In
hange for immunity from .._~~prosecution fo
rovided the following
statement to the QCDAO :

'--~~~__.I

b6 -1 , 4 , 7
b7C - 1 , 4 , 7

.--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--,l and

L-~~~~~~~__.l travelled

to l
Queens, in the early
morning of 07/18/2012 . They intended to steal a car stereo and
navigation s y stem frof a l
!similar to the one driven byl~~~~-1~

~~-~~~~~~~~~-.._A~l~........
l ,f our

~

ends

I

met near the back of SA i
took up look-out

rs

positions L-a-t~t-h-e~o-p-0-9site

of l'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__.J used
UNCLASSIFI ED
3

NYT-14

b6 -1,7
b7C - 1 , 7

 UNCLASSIFIED

Title:
(U) Shooting I ncident New York Division
Re:
297-HQ-Al271697-D, 02/18/2014

I

I

b6 -7
b7C -7

tools, to include a screwdriver, to burglarize the car.
heard someone shouting at him and
l a~
n -d__t _h_e_n- heard a

I

gunshot.
realized

I

IL-----~---------"'.~I

All fo ur men began to flee the s c ene .
was injured and assisted him as
entered
After dropping off
at
Hospital ,
l drovLe_ a_ w_a _y_ i_n.,.._.__...__ _...,_
v_e_h_i.....c le.

L----------

~--------------b6 - 1 , 2 , 3
b7C -1,2,3

On 07/02/2013 1
Special Counsel , Civil Rights
Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) , requested SA

l erovide a voluntary statement through his attorne~

\L.- - - - - - - - - ' declined to allow SA i

I

I

to provide a voluntary

statement unless compelled .
On 09/17/2013 , in exchange for immunity from prosecution for
violation of Title 18 , United States Code, Section 1001, 1
l and
made statements to the SIRT composed of INSD Team
L....L-e_a_d"."'e"_r_s- r_ _ ___._ _ _ _ _I
nd
AUS~
Eastern

b6 - 1,3 , 7
b7C -1 ,3,7

I

Distr ict of New York, and
Special Legal Counsel, Civil
Rights Division, United States De artment o f Just i ce (US DOJ) . The
statements of l
~nd
were consistent with the
.__
prev ious statement provided by
to the QCDAO .

___

SIRG Deli.berations :

DAD Morgan began by providing each voting member with a copy of the
US DOJ Deadly Force Policy, which was reviewed by the SIRG members. OGC
SIRG member !
l also reviewed wi th SIRG members l angu age
from the United States Supreme Court in Graham v . Connor , 490 U. S. 386
(1989) regarding the test of " reasonableness u under the Fourth
Amendment. A presentation of the known facts of the Agent-involved
shooting, as detailed above, was made to the SIRG by Team Leader ~,--~

I

b6 -1 ,2
b7C -1 , 2

I

v ia a Power Point p res e ntation. The Power Point included
photographs of the scene taken by the NYPD , an FBI Laboratory Di a gram
of the scene, a recording of the 911 call made by l
and a copy of the video from
l as taken on the

I

I

UNCLASSIFIED
4

NYT-15

 UNCLASSIFIED

Title :
(U} Shooting Incident New York Division
Re:
297- HQ- Al271697-D , 02/18/ 2 01 4

b6 -2
b7C - 2

morning of 07/18/2012, which depicts a male r unning from the direction

....:o~f:....Ll~~~--~~~~__.l•s

vehicle and subsequ entl y falling

I

09~~~~--'

The SIRG voted r egarding t he application of deadly force .

Ei gh t o f
b6 -1
b7C - 1

12 voting members determined the use of deadly f orce by SA L'~~~~~~
violated t he DOJ Deadly Force policy.
The DOJ Deadly Force Policy provides a core principle that agents
"may us e deadly forc e o nl y when necessary , that is, when the officer
has a reasonable belief tha t t h e subject of such force poses an
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
to another person ."
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "the test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application." Graham , 490 U. S. at 396 . The
Court advised that "proper a pplication requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
seve r it y o f the crime at is sue , whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the of fi cers or others , a nd whether h e is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade a rrest by flight ." I d
. The Cou r t a l so st a t ed t ha t reasonableness " must be judged from the
perspect ive o f a r easonable officer o n the scene , rather t han with the
20/20 vision of hindsight" and that the "calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced t o make sp lit-s econd judgments- in circums tances that are tense,
uncertain , and rapidly evolving- about the amount fo force that is
necessary in a particular situation ." Id.at 396-97 . The ultimate
question is "whether the officers ' actions are ' objectively reasonable '
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, wi t hout
regard to their underlying intent or motivation ." Id. at 397 .

I

Some of the factors, while not al l -inclus ive , cited by the
voting members in evaluating the objective reasonableness of SA
use o f de adly force and the application of the DOJ Deadly
Force Policy core principle included: (1)
i nsu f ficient f a cts s howing

b6 - 1
b7C -1

I

UNCLASSIFIED
5

NYT-16

-

- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - -

- - -- -

- - -- -

- - -- -- -

 UNCLASSIFIED

Ti t le :
(U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re : 297-HQ- Al271697 - D, 02/18/2014

b6 -1,7
b7C - 1,7

it was reasonab l e for SA i
Ito believe that the subject out on
the street p osed an imminent dange r of deat h or se r ious bodi ly injury
to SA i
lor others; (2)
I was involved in a
minor property crime out on t h e street whi l e SA
l and his
fami l y were inside the house on the second floor of the residence; and
(3) the acti ons of SA
to include the presence of the
structure in which SA
resided , verbal commands issued by SA

I

I

L-~~~~~-1

and SA
ability to safe ly move away from the
window to retrieve his weapon prior to re- engaging the subject and
using deadly force .
b6 -1
b7C -1

In pa rticula r, the verbal commands issued by sA I
l were
"Police, What the fuck are you doing," and to get away from his car;
the se commands did not indicate that SAi
!believed that the r e
was an imminent danger to himself or others , b ut rather tha t he was
concerned about his car . Whi l e particul ar language for verbal commands
is not required by the DOJ Deadly Force policy , it was noted during the
SIRG t h at the standard language taught to all new SAs by PAU is "FBI,
don ' t move ," followe d by commands to the subject such a s "FBI, s h o w me
your hands, " in order to clearly address a threat posed to the agent or
others by the movement o f a subject . SAi
r erbal commands,
in contrast , reflected a concern about protecting his vehicle and its
con tents .
Four members of the SIRG requested fu rt he r information from SA
'--~~~~~-1 in the form of a voluntary statement, to determine if
additional circumstances existed wh ich might b e relev a nt to d etermining
whether SA i
l• s use of deadly force was reasonable . The four
voting membe rs who requested additional info rmation agreed that if SA
I
ldid not provide an additional statement that they would have
to rely upon t he e xis ti ng re cord , and based upon t he e x isting record ,
they would be unanimous in their decision that SA i
!failed to
adhere to t h e DOJ dea dly force policy .

I

Chief Inspec tor Shields contacted!
the attorney
representing SA i
on 12/10/2013 , in an attempt to allow SA

I

b6 -1
b7C -1

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

UNCLASSIFIED
6

NYT-17

 UNCLASSIFIED

Title : (U) Shooting I nc i de nt New York Division
Re : 297 - HQ- Al271697 - D, 02/18/2014

training :
Observation 2: s A I
! surrendered his weapon wit hout
consulting NYO CDC o r EM , and did not adhere to NYO ' s Cr isi s Response
Plan .

b6 - 1
b7C -1

Analysis: The Cris i s Response Plan for the NYO, updated
03 / 29 / 2 012 , docume nts the procedu re to be fo l lowed i n t he NYO i n the
event of an Agent i nvo l ved shooti ng . The rele vant sec tion of Anne x D i s
cited as fo l lows :
For the agent invoived in the incident:

6 . Secure the scene and protect evidence related to the shooting and
the crime
7 . Secure all weapons involved in the shooting; both yours and the
subject ' s .

8 . Make no statements to the authorities outside the FBI other than
advising of current needs .
For the On- Scene Commander (OSC):

4 . Coordinate jurisdict i on al ma t t ers and investigative responsibilities
with local authorities .
5 . DO NOT SURRENDER ANY WEAPONS TO AUTHORITIES OUTSIDE THE FBI . If
there is any question concerning this , contact the CDC . {NYO e mpha si s
added)
SIRT interviews and a na lys is o f NYPD reports indicated r e linqui s h ed
possession of his Bure au- i ssued weapon to an outside agency without
consulting the appropriate personnel .
Additionally , SIRT inte rviews revealed SA i
!contacted SA
personnel , but did not cont a ct the NYOC Duty Agent , and did not secure
the scene .
UNCLASSIFIED
8

NYT- 18

b6 -1
b7C - 1

 UNCLASSIFIED

Title :
(U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re:
297-HQ-A1271697-D, 02/18/2014

Instruction 2a : ADIC, NYO will ensure sA I
l is provided
remedial training regarding the application of the deadly force policy.

b6 -1
b7C -1

Instruction 2b: ADIC, NYO will ensure al l Special Agent personnel
are aware of the Crisis Response Plan , New York Division, Annex D:

Shooting Incident Response and Notifi cation.
Recommendation 2c: ADIC, NYO should consider changing the Crisis

Response Plan , Annex D, #8 , to more accurate l y ref lec t acceptab l e
statements between the Agent(s) involved in the shooting incident and
responding law enforcement personne l .

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary .

This matter is being referred to t he Internal I nvestigations
Section (I I S), I nspection Division (INSD) for potential administrative
action.
Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection
Division (INSD) , chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member . The
foll owing voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J.
Shields Jr ., Office of Inspec tions (OI) ( INSD); I
I Tr ial
Attorney, Crimina l Division , USDOJ; I
~ USDOJ ; Section
Chief (SC) Jayne Challman , Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory
D. Cox, Global Section, Count erinte lligence Division ;
Su pervisory
Specia l Agent (SSA) I
I Squad CR- 2, Washington Field
Off ice;
SSA ....__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Practical Applications Unit,
...... I nvestigative law
Training Division (TD) ;
SSA
Unit , Office of the General Counsel; ssA I
I Evidence
'---~~~--;::::=====-~~----.
Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Div i sion (LD); SSA I
Firearms Train ing Unit, TD ;
ssA I
I Specia~l_W_e_a
_
p_o_n_s_a_n_d_ __.

-----------

Tactics Operations Unit (SOU) , Critical Inc ident Response Group (CIRG) ;
and SSA I
I Defensive Systems Unit , TD . The following
non- voting membe rs were also in attendance: I
I
UNCLASSIFIED
9

NYT-19

b6 -1,3
b7C -1,3

 UNCLASSIFIED

Title : (U) Shooting Inc ident New York Divi sion
Re: 297-HQ-Al 271697 - D, 02/18/2014

Office of the Inspector General , USDOJ;
Inspectors David Paul Gelios and Shawn Stroud, OI , INSD; Team Leaders
OI, INSD ; SSA ~'~~~;===:::!...l~E~R~
T~,----.
._L_D
_ ; :1
~S-p_e_c_i:-a-1::--A
~s-s-:i-s-:t-a_n....Jt , 0 I , I NS D; Unit Chief
and Management Program Analyst ..____________. Inspection Management
Unit , INSD·.

I

::::::i:.i:.:::=_=_•_•_:ll 'j

b6 -1 ,3
b7C -1,3

._I_ _ _ __ _ .

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

AD IC , New York Divi sion, is responsible for ensuring each
Inspection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved . The
inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation
is addressed by the field office . The Inspector- in-Charge (IIC) will
review the field office's response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific act ions taken and not a
reci ta tion of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to implement.
ADIC, New York Division , is required to provide a written response,
via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation . Follow- up EC responses must be directed
to Unit Chief l
Inspection Management Unit (IMU) , INSD .
Once t he EC is serialized, p lease e-mai l t he Sent inel link to MPA

I

_ _ _____.I

UNCLASSIFIED

10

NYT-20

b6 -1
b7C -1

 UNCLASSIFIED

Title :
(U) Shooting Incide nt New York Division
Re : 297-HQ- Al271697 - D, 02/18/2014

••

UNCLASSIFIED
11

NYT-21

 UNCLASSIFIED

Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271697 - D, 02 /18/20 1 4

I

_______Ito

p rovide a voluntary statement .
again stated his
client would not be available for an interview , absent being compelled .
Accor dingly ,
the 12 members voted unanimous ly regard ing the SA
.______.l' s fai lure to adhere to the deadly force policy .

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

SIRG Observations

On 11/20/2013 , t he SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shoo ting
incident wi th t he intent t o :
1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SI RG unanimous ly
determined the application of deadly force by SA _l__________~n
07/18/2012 was not in compliance with t he Department of J ustice's
dead ly force policy . The SIRG made the following observation :
Observation 1:
policy .

b6 -1
b7C -1

SA _I_______.I d id not adhere t o t he deadly force

Analysis:
The SIRG vo t ed unanimous ly regarding SA i
fa ilure to adhere t o t he deadly force policy . As such , t he SIRG

b6 -1
b7C -1

b6 -1
b7C -1

l• s

recommended SA _l~~~~~~l be provided remed ia l tra ining regarding the
applica tion of the deadly force pol icy, and t he matter be referred t o
the Interna l Investiga tions Section (I I S) .
Instruction 1: AD , INS D, will refer this matter to the I IS for
action deemed appropriate .
2 . Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective action from an operational
standpoint.
b6 -1
b7C -1

The SIRG made no recommendations or observations concerning the
operational techn i q ues used by
d uring t h is shooting
incident.

I

sAj

3 . Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues
The SIRG made t he fol lowing observation reques t ing additional
UNCLASSIFIED
7

NYT-22

 CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
Notice w Close File
Datt.~~ ·····-Oct

To:

Re:

Cbiei~

4 > 2013•••••••••••••............................

Crim.in.al Section

FBI Agent!

I

b6 -1,7 per FBI
b7C -1,7 per FBI

IVictim

Queens, New York
144-52~ l l 62
.CIVIL RK1HTS"-.-

----

This matte.r should be closed for the reasons described. below:
L

Date..~?.LH1~..!Jlciderrt: July 18, 2012

2.

Synopsis of the L~!~.11ng Reasons for <;,~19~ing:

0~1 July 18, 2012, a.round 5; 15 a.m., in Queens>New York, F.BI Special Age:ntl
b6 -1, 7 per FBI
.-------"-.lsbot ami ·wollndt~d I
while he was inY()lved in the theff <,f ~) car rad~?c - l ' 7 per FBI
frum the agents.' fan.lily vehicle parked <)Ut~.ide his hotne. The agtmt shot through a \vindow
screen from a second .story .room striking!
lin the right.rear side ofhis b<.Kiy. I
I
sun»ived the \.vound without significat)t lasting adverse consequences,

I

The agent claims t'hat, after he was awakened by l
r s screams from the next r<.)(r b6 -1, 7 per FBI
he 1.ooked out the window and s<nvl
lbent down behind the car with a shiny tool, \Vhileb7C -1, 7 per FBI
another man \Vas inside the car. The ;.-tgent identified himself as ~'po.lice:~ ordered the intruders
away fro1n the car~ and grabbt~d his service weapon beneath his bed. According to the agt~nt.
wther tha:.n obey tJ1e comma:nds, the man at the rear of the car turned toward the agent \~1th the
shiny o~ject in his right hand and re~H,.:ht~d to his waist band \Vith his leit band for 'What the agent
!SI
b6 -3 per FBI
b7C -3 per FBI

Snec.ial Le12,al Counsel
A

«•••··---------·············
To: Rec(">rds Section
Of:fict~

'-

···--······································---··---··--------·················-- - - -- - - - - -

of Legal Administration.

The above numbered file has been closed as of th.is date

Date

- - ---·················..··•••····················••••··
Chid~ Criminal Section
FORMERLY CVR-3 FORM CL-3

NYT-23

 -2-

thought might be a gun. Fearing for himself and!
lat the wi11dow in thh6 -1, 2, 7 per FBI
room, the agent fired one shot at the man. I
Iand!
Kinside tl1?.7~_ ..-:- 1 ' 2 ' 7 per FBI
removing the radio) both claim tha~
Iwas n.mniug away in the street about a ca.r
length away frmn the :mbit.!ct's car vihen he \Vas shot. F<.)ren.sic. evidence, on the other band,
lwas at or near the rear nf the car ·when tbe agent fired and
supports the fact that!
wounded him.
The Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District
of New York c..arcfully reviewed the evidence from the ff..xleral investigation and. the independent
Queens District Attorney's office (Queens DA) in.vestigation to determine whether there wus
Sll.ffici.ent evidence to prove a fe.dera.1 criminal civil rights violation of the applicable statute~
18 United States Cnde, Section 242.. That evidence included the Qu.eens DA interviews of the
l an FB:l/Departrnent atton1ey interview of thd
b 6 - 2 ' 7 per FBI
agentJ
Land thd
I
Lthe FBI Lab enh.ruicement of a video that recordt.~d the events that appear to occur ju~:c - 2 ' 7 per FBI
after the shonting; and the ballistics testing and analyses perfonned by fhe Fireanns Analysis
Section of the NYPD Lab. The Queens DA dee.lined a c.riminal prosecution of the FBI agent for
any violation of state law.
A vio1atfon of the federal criminal civil. rights statt.1tes requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a subject law enJb.rcemt.~nt officer acted willfully$ that is, with the inte11t tn do
soruefhin.g that. he knew to be tmlawfuL Mistake of fo:c4 and eve11 seriously bad judgn1e11t,
would not establish such willful .intenL Th:i.m~ is insl.ifficient .cvidence to refute the agent;s claim
that he fired his tveapon in order to t-ounter what he believed. to he a tl.rre-at to himself and to Cb6 -2 per FBI
I
lin the \Vindow next to h.im -· a thief appearing to be rca.ching to his
b7c -2 per FBI
waistband to draw a hruldgun. Acco.rclingiy~ with the C{.)ncmrcnce of the United States
Attomey~s Office for lhe Eastern District of New York~ it is Tecommended th.at there is
insuffo:ieirt evidem:~~ to suppo1t a violation of Title 18, United Stat.es Code, Sectjon 242 beyond a
reasonable doubt and the matter should be closed.

The rr.urtter was immediately lnvestiga:ted by the FBi. ln.spections Division and the Queens
l re:Presentcd by counsel, were intervie\ved ib6 -2, 7 per FBI
District Attorney~s office. The agent. and I
~DA attorneys und Nev,; York Police Department (NYPD) investigators. AJterl
b7c -2, 7 per FBI
L__Jwas located in a hospital, he wa.i;; interviewed by the iiBI. Later~ both he and!..____
both represented by c.ouusel, were also interviewed by the Queens DA and NYP.D investigators.
A neighborhood investigation revealed there were no other witnesses to the shooting.
Signiikantiy: the.re was ~ video rccQrdipg of events 011 the street in frm.i t of the <1g.ent' ~home a.l
the time of the shooting. The fra:rne of the v.ideo recording included the front bumper of the
I
cari but lK>thing farther tu the n.!ar of the car. The video was enhanced by the F:ffb6 - 2 per FBI
•
.
. ,. ~ sl'gl
tl b .
l .
f~ l
dd
b7C -2 per FBI
latm.ratory. pnw1(J.mg
t'11t y etter reso ut1cm o t H~ recor e· events.

ts

Additioual.ly, the agent reenacted the shooting in his bedroom and prnv1ded locai law
taw enforcement
enforcement with the vv·indow screen through which he fired. Local
.
invcsti.gators took crime scene photographs of both the inside of the residence as well as the
~

NYT-24

 outside street area, They ma(le rneasurenwnt.s ofrekvant distances and: conducted ballistics
testing Qn the screen, FJ3Ilnspd:.:tors; local iliVestigators. m.1d attm:neys fn.).m Qu.een,<; DA arid
DOJ visited the ss;cne,
b 6 -2 , 7 per FBI
b7C -2, 7 per FBI

are represented by a.11atton;iey in potential civil.
.._-="'""""::'"l=====::::::;---""".:"'"~~-""".""""-.....
:litigation. Bmlil
Iagreed m he ~md. were interviewed by FBI inspccmrs and Department
a(tomeys, The aitom.ey repres~~nHng the agent ret"hsed to pen11it.e.ith~r the agent orl
Ito be
iri:tel'Vi:ewed. by the FBI/DOl
·

4-

~J~.hl~~~1) Version ofthe Events:

_ _ _..;.;.
T..;.;;
h..;.;.
e ag-enf D
ad vised. iht~ Qut.~ehs DA that she wt:ts 3\\"ake ruid
b6 - 2 per CRT DOJ' FBI
..__ _ __.lr<.)Orfl a<.ljacent to (he couple's bedroom o:tdhe second. t1oo.r in t e . n.)11t o-b 7 c -2 per CRT ooJ , FBI

\vheil she heard her car alarm go offatahout :5:15 a.q1. Lo<.~king out the \Vimiow1she observed
two individual$ breaking into her car, Sh~~ yelkd t<.) her husband who tvas .asleep in bed in the

next n)Otn.

I

The agent advised.the Queens DA that~ after he was afortf.d hyl
he look.ed·out the.
wrnd.\)W
and. saw one man inside
'
. . the car and a .sec6nd
' tnan 1it the. n%tr of. the
. car,
+. holdinfl·
. . ""'" a silver
. .
o~jcct, The agent opened the left-t.urnd-mostpm::i(~ of a. thrce-pai.1cd. bay wind6\.v and yelled,
1
'Vi».lke, get <1way frmn th~~ car (or words to that effect)." The men ignnred the Ci)m.mand. ·
The agent reached under h1.s bed f<.'Yr his service handgun and pointed h tO'\~b6 '....:2, 1 per ooJ CRT , FBI
repeating his C{)t:nma..nd. Th<> man behind the ec:1r (later identified a~
b 7 c -2 , 7 per ooJ CRT, FBI
stm holding the ol~ect that appe.(ired to the agei1tto be ~t wol .in.his right hand1 .and reached
to\.va:rds his k~n n.~ur waistband.area, tuming his hndy tn\var<ls. the agent. According to the agent,
he-bdicvcd the. man was h::aching for a we~lpon. ~md. H%1:r.hl for himself a.nc.H
h..n
the adjo.ining room, He fired one shi:.)tatthe man.
At!.cr lw fired the sh<.)~ the agent tm1 do\-\?Ustairs ~md. (HH th~.fn..mt dt)or: Oti.cc outside. he
Qbserved a rna:r.l dragging arn).thz~r :man t (:.1 !\ll aut<.mwbilc in .a noa.rby intersec.tk}n, Upon seein~
.more n:ien, lht: agent returned to his h~mse.
called. 91 l . (}ha. 911 recording,
( •pgrt ~ "I~ shoo~ing t~) the. dispa~cher. On the ~":rn~ n~c<m~ing, sb~~ ca.n bt~ heard yd ling tQO
n.nplormg him to shool at the men gettmg away ma. car.

I

I

th0

An att<.xney rcpresentiilg the agent .-mdl
hvas present when they wfre both
intervieived hy tbe Queens DA office. The ~igent also tx>nductcd a reenactment. of the. shoo.ting
in. his t)edn.H.)tn fo.r the Quet~ns DA, again w.ith hfa attorney present On that occasi\m, he also
pennittcd tbe Que-ct1s DA to fake custody of th{.~ S\.Tt~en ¥-rith a guhsh.<.)t hole for e:xamfoati<.)11.

NYT-25

 5.

_'Wjtn2~~ Accounts:

foitiaJly; when questioned by FBI agents at the hosphaq
!claimed that h~b6 -7 per FBI
was shot·w hik innocently walking in a crosswalk. Laier., '\v'hile represented by com1scl, he and b 7 c - 7 per FBI
I
!provided a proffer tt) the Qiu.!ens DA in wh.ich they admitted that tl1ey were involved
in a theft from the car at iht~ ti.me of the s.hoot.ing. Later, when interviewed sepurntely by the
Queens D.t\..,. thel
Iaccount<; evolved. They were initially deceptive about their
actions on the night of the incident. Also, their stoties were inconsistent. At first,I
I
I
ltold the Queens DA that he was merely passing by the location when he observed
anoth"-r individuai breaking imo the car and th~n, when as a good Sama.ritru1 he sought to stop
him, he was shot I
Pater admiited to being actively involved in breaking .into the cat a..'1.d
trying tl) ste-<11 lhe ~dfo. Afrer claiming it, was a crfrne of {)ppori\lnhy,I
luhfo:urtely
admitted that the car had bee.n spotted on a previous day.
:Mmlths later, afier the federal government made assunmces thatl
Iwould b6 -7 per FBI
not be prosecuted for previously making a false statement to a federal oft1cer, bothl
lwe11? 7 C - 7 per FBI
interviewed in the presence of their attorney by an FBI J:nspector and Department attorneys.

I

!candidly admitted t.hat~ with the help of two accomplices, they
broke into the car parked hl front of the a.genes home and stole its radio. Using a screwdr.iver,
I
~1ttempted to disable the alarm at the front l)f
car. He then went. to slru!d at tl1t~ rear of
the car~ ka.nin.g against it to appear less conspicuous t<.) p~-lss~~rs-by. !vkanwhile~ I
I
b'rnke out the side \Vindow, crawkxl into the car, removed the .mdin, and handed it O'utside to a

the

co:rrfrdt~rate.

lwere alerted to a pounding on the second floor window of the b6 - 7 per FBI
house in front of which the car was parked. I
Iheard pounding only. I
!heard someor~7 c - 7 per FBI
yeil "get the F - away fron:1 the c<1r (or words tr) that effect)," Both insisted they did not hea:r
Bothl

anyone yeil "police.•)

.___....Icfair.ns that he ducked d.O\Vl'l., trying t<.) hide behind the car~ when he heard the
pounding ut the i;.vi11dow. He still had the tool that be used to attempt w disarm the alam1 in his
hand or pocket I
lbeljeved that I
lwas in possess.ion of a.ratchet t<i<:>1~ not
the screwd.dveri which he G
t carried into the car. Significi.mlly,I
linsistt~d
that he never reached for his waist ha-nd when he was behind tht~ car.
Both!
Iran away from the cm: 1n the same directfon - 1
lor.b6 -7 per ooJ CRT, FBI
sidewalk. and I
lin the street Bnt11 claimed they heard a kn.id boom, later detern1:'.?..<:~-:?.: per DOJ CRT' FBI
them to be a. gunshot. I
Ieslimakd that he had n.i.n from the rear of the car to a place in the
street acUacent to the vehicle parked immediately hl fr<mi (>f tht.~ burglarized car, when he h~~ard a
bQom.
corroborated that., when ht.~ beard the boom, he saw, in his peripheral visi<.mJ
I
.___ __.running and falling at the approximate same spot fo the street.
When interviewed by foderaI authorities,!
~eca1led falling at the sound nfthe boorn
~vas interviewed eadier by
immediately upon being strnck by a huUet. However, whe1i
the Queens.DA, he stated that, while he had begun to run from the rear of the car, he did not
specificru1y rernember where he was when the bullet stmck him.
bonfirmectl
later claim. that he foll inmiediatcly v.·heu he was sh<.)t at previot1sly indicated l<,)c~tion.

I

rs

NYT-26

 -5.-

ladvisedthad
lcame tn the aid ull
land helped him tu the ncarb~b 6 - 7 per FBI
.
.
h
•
.
L ~. 1
I.
\:·1 b7C -7 per FBI
mtersec.twn. DC ore gettmg to t e mtersectlon~ vvt i men saw a.man came out o.t~tl1e uo.i1se.
r e
\'\'~"ts holding a gtm and potnting it at thei11. The m.as-1 did, riot say anything. I
Iran.to get a ci1r
parked nearby and with the help nf a con.federate pv:t I
linsidi:.~ th.t.~ car at the intersection
<Aid drove him 10 a ho:-ipitaL
Bott.J

•

.

.•

'rl

f~

v

.________.!was treated. for a g~msht1t WQtmd that t.~ntered. the. right n.~ar ~k!.e of his
hody \V.ith a tr~~iectory th~t t()\)k tbe btilkt near th:e s:pitie ~nd cau,siri.g .rb.innt liver damage. He has
fully n~t\(.W{..Ted and dcmnnst.rates m) sign.ifican{ly adverse fosfrng eiTects of having bt~en. sh<.it.
The Qm.~ens DA intervi:cwed the confe:derates wht) acted as l<)ok.onts during the crin1e.
They co.1~cocted c<mtllcti·ng accmmts. "\Vhile it is belicv~~<l that they were nearby ~t t11c fone of
the sfo'>,iting, it is not believed that they ad~ta.lly wiincssed the sholiting.

Signiffoant physical evidence V<-'as collected and .forensically itualyzed, As pa.l1. pf a
C.."l.ltvass by pol.ice:. video was ()bt<1ined ff<.)n:l a buH~ling across the street fr<>tn the agenfs.
re$tdence, Add1tionaHy, in~~ vk~tim's sand:als and: .a·silver mtch.1.:::t tm11 were fot1i1d in the street
ad.jac~~nt. to a

truck.parked hnmediafoly in fro't'lt of th~ agent's c<i.r in t.lw djret:tio:n that tht~
Iran.. Finally, the agent pnwided the wind.ow screen \\1th a hole thro:ugh it frnnb6 -7 per FBI
the gunsbQt he fin~.\..! to the Queen$ DA for forensic analysis.
b 7 c - 7 per FBI

I

Th~ video dnes not appear to capture. the actual sh(1oting, hut it do~s sho\'v _I_ __
- - -....hinnhlg ~md then falling to the ground. It initially appeared that the video rec~rded
....____,lfall to the ground a~ he ~vas shot. ffowever., other frm.~nsic {..~Yidt~nte· conttadicts such an
a:ssUmptkm at)d $t}pports the agep.t' s cQntention that I
lwas nea:I the rear of the car
·\vhen fa.(~ w~ts shot and then ran a fo:w stepsheforehe fen. 1n any event., in light of the \:!Jtulity of
th~ physical evidence, the.age.n f .s con.tet1ti.on that he shot ar a. n.mn when he tNas behind the car ....

and t111·n.hig toward him \V)th a hand at his wai$tband" ~ the agei:i.t further ci":lntemfa ·--·catmot be
refuted beyond a reasonable doubt.
Tht~

statiotlaty video camera. ran contim:i.all.y, The video fr~me d<Jes not fodude the·
agent•s residence. fn:->tead, it re.cords in. its frame a JX).rtion of the·street in front ofthe agent· s.
hbril.e. The fra.n;1~ fodu.dcs onlv the fl:oii.t ofthe age1if s car fin the ri.~ht~lu1'nd e(k~e t)fthe frmne.
lhe remaind.cr of the frame includes a view oft.he street from that point. forward in the dire.i;.:tio11
that th.el
lnm kY1Na,r.ds the intcrscctj<:1n a.halfhlock.a\vay.
b6
,...

•

•

........

•

.....

<rt.;.:•

•

- 7 per FBI
b7C -7 per FBI

The rec<.xding sh~J\.VS figQres approaching the agent's car. Then, a few seconds after the
car alarm engage5>~ a figut.e5 later d.ek~m1med to bt~ I
In1i1s on the sued Into the
frame front its right-hand edge. The.:figur~ falls as it crosses in front o:f a tn~c:k"parked
im.mediatdy in fron.t of the agent's car. Thereafi.er, the video rec~mJs am.)th.er :fig11r(~ <
:4"J---.t
drng thet'lgurethat fol.I do\vn th(~ '$treet t<.) HK~ intersection whetc a car cvcntuaUy arrives w carry
everyone a.way.

NYT-27

 -6-

The distance at which the figure fell is twelve feet from the rear l)f the agent's car. In that
f sandals Were d.iSCt)Ve.red. in the stn.K~t next to one anofucr, l:lS '.VeJb6 - 7 per FBI
as a silver ratchet A blood dn.ig W~lS al.$0 discovered in the sffcet from that spot to the
b 7c - 7 per FBI

same vicinit~·r\1

intersec1ion.

An examination of the agent's bedroom wi11dO'-V revealed a tear consistent \\'llh a bu!let
hole in the leJl-side bay "'~ndow screen. Weeks late.r, the agent conducted a reenactment of !he
shooting for the Queens DA. :For the re.em1ctrnenl vehicles were pJacc-d where crime scene
photographs pictmed them at. the time of the shooting. Measurements of distance-sand angles
were made.~ from the windo\a..' to the location at the .rear of the car the n..ight of the shooting, as
\·Veil as to the location where l
f sandals were dis,~overe<l, and the srune estirnate<l location
whe.re he foll on the video recording. Thereat'te:r, the Firearms Analysis Section of the NYPD
Lab conducted forensic ballistic testing wi.th the window screen. Also of forensic significance,
there is a large folly¥1eafed curbside tree in the front yard of the agent's residence that parfo~Ily
blocks the view from the bay ·v,:indow.

aftel

We concur ·with the opinion ultimately reached by the Queens DA. First,
multil)le,
b6 -7 per FBI
carefol reviews of the FBI lab enhancement of the video, the image is consislent with
I
hrippi,ng on his sa11dals, causing him. ll) fall, rather th.anl
Ifalling from the hnpactb7c - 7 per FBI
of a bul.let strike. Such a bullet impact would have jarred both hi.s body and his feet .fon.va:nt
Instead, in. the video n:x<ording,I
body falls. fo.rward while h.is Jeet remain sta.tfotuiry on
the strt~et

r

Seco.c.'1d, the agent had a dear line nf site from the window screen through which he shot
to the rear ofl
fs car. At the same time, the agent's vie"v of the area fr(>rn the .rear of the
car to the location on the street wherel
ltell would have been obscun.:d by the curbside
tree in addition to the window frame and window blinds covering the other parts nf the. bay
w.indt)\.V. Due to obstrnc·tions. it is highly unlike'ly that tbe aget.1t would have been able to hit
I
Iwith .a gunshot if he shot whild
lwas in the vicinity where he foll, t\vdvc foet
away from the rear of the car. Because pf t~jc,~t<.xy .angles~ it seemed almost. impossible that the
lru1y\vhcrc on the. street other than at the location at the rear of the
agent could have sbt)t l

CJscar.
Fi.na1ly1 to fu.rther confirm this conclusiont forensic testing was c<>ndu.cted on the window
screen. The actual window screen with the bullet tear hole was taken to the F1reanns "\nalysis
Section of the NYPD Lab. Upon examination of the \·Vim.tow screen$ t11e builet bole from the
incident was identified and marked. The screen fibers disturbed hy the round passing tlm.rugh it
·\:ven.~ photographed.. Then, the angles of fire that we.re consistent whh both the agent's statement
)tell, tts im.fa~a.ted. on the viden and by the location of h.is
b6 -7 per FBI
and the lQcation at which I
sandals, were .replicated. A weapon and amnmnitio.n, which were !d.en.tical ic.) that used. by the b 7c - 7 per FBI
agent during the incident, were used to fin.~ thrnugh the '-\indo"v screen in an attempt to replicate
the hole created at the time of the incident.

The ·results of tbe ballistic tesiing revealed that a hole generated by firing through the
Iwhere he feli in tbe videotape) was
screen .at ~in extreme angle (as if to shootl
inconsistent \Vith the hole created duri.n~ the incident. In fact,' it could. not have been more
-..;.

NYT-28

 ~7-

ditforent. The hole was much. bigg(.!f and the fibers when disturbed by the bu.llet at the extreme
angk bent interior on the top and exterior rm the bottom of the hole. Yet, tJ1e hole created by
firing through the. scree11 at ~m a.ng!e cl">nsistenl \\rlth firing toward the reru- of the car (the agent> s
version of the events) genenued a tear nearly .ide:ntka1 to the original hole in b<.)th s,ize ~nd.
dirt.!Ction of disturbed fibers, all bending outward. A,ccordingly, the ballistics experts opined. that
the hole created during the inddeu:t was consistent Y'vith the age11t's accow1t of where the victim
was located when the agent fired at him.

To prove a violatio11ofI8 l.LS.C § 242, the ~pplfoable federal criminal civil rights
statute, the govern.rnen:t must provei beyond a reasonable doubt, that a police offi.e-er snhjeci
\ViUfblly ttscd more force than was reasonably necessary und¢r the circumst'ances. This burden
of proof has both an objective and a subjective component The reasonableness of the amount of
force used is determined objectively a11d from the perspective of a re-<1sonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20i20 vision of hindsight Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386~ 396
(l 989). Allowance must be made for the fact that law enforcement officials are often forced to
make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense. nncertain, and rapidly evolving. Id,
396~97.

Even if then.~ is evidence of unrea.<>nnable ·forc.e, the g(}\'ernmem musr further show that
an ofi1cer acted willtUUy. that is ·with a. bad purpose to violate ~l:le law. Screws v. United States,
325 U.S, 91(.l945), Accident, misutl<e, misperception) fear, i)r even poor judgment, do not.
constitute willfi.ll conduct prosecutable under the statnte~ The officer must intend to do that
which he knew to be wrong.

-

There is irnmflkient evidence to refute beyond a reasonable doubt the agenCs claim that
he fired his \vcapon in order to eHtninate what he believed to be a threat to himself a11d to 0 b6 -2, 7 per FBI
I
lin the 'l.vindo\~' next to him .... a cru· thief appearing to be reaching to hib7c -2, 7 per FBI
wuistband to drm.v a handgw1, Fnrei1sic evidence supports the agent's claim, that he fired one
shot atl
l\.vhenl
Iwas aJthe n.!a.r of!
tscar. I
ladmits that he vvas bent
down behind the car when confronted by the agent, just as tbe agent daims HJ have seen him,
c==ladmits, and the evidence cnnfi.rms, th~lt he likely had a silver o~jcct in one hand. Even
uc::::::Jis cmwcl, that he did not reach tov-.rard his waist hand, the age11l's conletitin.n tbat he
believed that he saw such a move.me11t. cannnt be disproven, Further, the agent's claim that he
was afraid for himself and his farn.ily similarly cannot be disproven.
\Vhik it is diilicult to understand :why the a.gent \.:h,)se to shoot ratl1erthan to re.move
himself and I
Ifrom h.ann ~s way, such second guessiug does not prnve the.
specific criminal int~ml beyond a reasonable doubt necessary tn prosecute the aget1t i.rnder Title
18. United States Code, Sectkn.1 242. As .ind.ic<1t.ed in the previous section, a.cddent, mistake
mispcrceptfon~ foar, o-r even poor judgment, do not establish willful. conduct. Accordingly, ihe
evidence does not support a prosecutable vi<.)latinn of fodernl. law and it is recommended thut the
ina'lter should be closed. The United States Attorney's Ofl:1ct~ forthe Eastern District ofNe\v
Ymk C<.)ncurs with this recomnwndation,
3

NYT-29

 U.S. Departme.nt of.Justice
Federal Bureau oflm'(>Stigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-000!

December 16, 2015
PERSONAL

Md..__ _ _ ___.
Federal Bureau of fnve~c;tigation
New York, NY
·
Dear Mr...
I ____.
On May 8, 2015, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) proposed dismissing
you from the rolls of the FBI based on its finding that you: (1) intentionally fired your weapon
outside the scope of the Deadly Force Policy, in violation of FBI Offense Code '5.15 (Misuse of
Weapon -Intentional Discharge); (2) conducted yourself unprofessionally whiie off duty when
you entered into ap. agreement v.tith criminals to not testify against them .in exchange for them to
not testify against you regarding this shooting incident, in violation ofFBl Offense Code 5.21
(Unprofessional Conduct--· Off Duty); (3) yOl.i failed to comply with FBI guidelines for shooting
incidents when you voluntarily relinquished your weapon to t.he local police department and did
not contact your supervisor or another FBI manager to report the incident, in violation of FBI
Offense Code 5.23 (Violation ofMiscellanem;s Rules/Regulations); and (4) you Jacked candor in
your interview with t.he New York District Attorney's Office and New York Police Department
regarding this shooting incident, in violation of FBI Offense Code 2.5 (Lack of Candor/Lying No Oath). As the deciding official in this matter, I have given full a..11d impa1tial consideration to
aJl documentation and evidence upon which your proposed dismissal was based, your written
response, dated October 30, 2015, and your oral presentation on November 6, 2015. Based on a
preponderance of the evidence, i conclude allegations (1) ax1d (4) arc substantiated. I do not
find, however, that allegations (2) and (3) are substantiated and those allegations will not be
further discussed. Based on the circumstances of this case, for the efficiency of the service, and
co1to;;idering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the
Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, an.d aggravating!mitigat1ng factors, I am
dismissing you from the rolls of the FBI.
DISCUSSION

l.

Summa:ry

In the pre-dawn morning of July 18, 2012, at approximately 5:00 a.m., you confronted an
African American male (Individual), wbo was breaking into your!
I
~lly owned vef icle (Pb"V) parked on the street in front of their residence. Individual's
L__J(Itldividual's
was assisting Individual with the break-in. You were off duty and

I

' b6 -2,7
-2,7

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NYT-30

 Mr.

b6 -1
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._I_ _ _ _ __ .

inside your residence during the confrontation when you :fired your FBI-issued weapon a single
time from your second story bedroom window, striking Individual in the back. 1 Individual fled
the area, sought medical attention, and survived his injuries. The initial shooting investigation
was conducted by the FBI Shooting Iricident Review Team (SIRT) prior to the initiation of an
investigation by the U .S. Department of Justice - Office ofinspector General (DOJ-OIG). Prior
to DOJ-OIG's investigation~ the DOJ-Civil Rights Division (DOJ-CRD), U.S. Attorney's Office
(USAO), and the local District Attorney's Office (DA) all declined prosecution.2
You ande : Jrefused to cooperate v.rith the FBI SIRT, FBI Internal Inspection Section~
Inspection Division (ITS), DOJ-CRD, and DOJ-OlG investigations.3 The case file indicated you
cooperated with local police department (PD) and DA only under condition of immlmity from
prosecution and agreed to interviews with DA under those conditions. Eve.n with immmrity from
prosecution, you then entered into an agreement with the Individual and Individual's!
Ithat
neither party would testify against the other. During your oral presentation, your counsel denied
there was an immunity agreement with either the DA's office or Individual and Individual's
I
I I will address this later in this letter. Suffice it to say, your refosal to testify in the DA's
case with or without immunity resulted in the DA dropping its charges again.st .Individual a..'1.d
Individual's!
14 These agencie.s' decisions not to prosecute all occurred before DOJ-OIG
compelled you to speak with DOJ-OIG agents on May 1, 2014.

II.

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The Incident

I

On July 18, 2012, at approximately 5:00 a.m., before sunrise,!
she heard a car alam1. She looked out a second story window of your residence and
saw two Jl!ales attempting to break into
POV, which was parked directly in front of the
residence.=> C:Jbanged on the window in an attempt to stop the subjects; she may also have
called out to you; you were asleep in the adjacent bedroom. You awoke, heard from c::::Jthat
someone was brea.l<lng into the POV, went to the bedroom window and pulled up the blinds.
You observed Individual at the rear of the vehicle attempting to break into the trunk with some
sort of metal object or tool. 6 You opened tbe window and yelled at Individual to get away from
your car. You yelled about three times but Individual showed no reaction and continued to work
at opening the tnm...lc of the car.

C:::::::Jwhen

the

l During your orai presentation on 1li06/20i5, your counsel contended you did not shoot Individual in the back.
From the description of the injury and the photograph, the entry ofyour bullet was in the lower right side of
lndiv1d.uai's back.
.
2
DOJ-OIG ROI, page 1. According to SJI{f report, page l 0, DOJ-CRD declined prosecution with concurrence of
USAO on 10/04/2013. The SIRT repmt was dated 10/2512013.
3
DOJ-OIG had to compel your statement. c::::Jrefi.lsed to speak with DOJ-OIG.
"SIRT report, page 10. The DA dropped charges on 03/05/2013.
s Video footage later obtained fi:oml
fs security camera shows two subjects approaching the vicinity of
your POV. Approximately two minutes later, it shows the two individuals fleeing from that vicinity. One individual
foll to the ground and the other individual ran back to t.~e first ancl dragged him clown the street out of the camera's
view. Subsequent investigation revealed. both individuals entered a. vehicle and departed the scene. SJRT report,
page 1.
The tool was iater determined to be a screwdriver.

2

NYT-31

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 Mr.....
I _____....

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When Individual did not respond to your shouts, you left the window to get your FBI
issued weapon, which was a few feet away by the bed.7 You returned to the window and again
yeUed at Individual to get away from the car. This time, Indiv.idual started to tum towards you.
You claimed Individual then moved his left hand near his waist, while still working on the trnnk
with his right hand. You fired one shot at .Individual through the ""rindow screen of your second
story bedroom window; Individual fled do\vn the street.

You went outside, examined the POV, and found its passenger-side window had been
removed and the radio had been stolen. You looked westbound and observed Individual lying
near the crosswalk of your street and a cross street. Individual stated, "You're killing me, man."
You were unsure how many other subjects were in the area and did not say anything or go
lcame up to Individual and pulled him across the crosswalk and then
further. Individuai'sl
they both entered a waiting vehicle and left.

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yr

c=Jcalled 911 ar er
ran outside and PD officers responded to your residence. At
the lbegif ning of the call,
can be heard yelling, "Shoot the car." She identified herself as
the
of a federal agent to the 911 operator, provided her address, and told the operator two
black males attempted to break into her vehicle. She told the operator a black car was headed
down the street and "they" picked someone up. She said there were t\vo or three black males and
one of them was possibly tjured and thad
lwould be able to tell the police if one of
the imm was injured.
furH1er told the operator thad
lwas outside looking at her
car and "they" stole her radio. She then identified!
las an FBI agent. When the 911
operator asked wh ether there were any weapons involved,c:::Jreplied thatl
ldrew
his weapon and fired one shot. She did not know if"they" drew a weapon and the incident
occurred less than five minutes before the 911 call.8

b 6 -2, 7
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W11en PD anived, you advised them you fired your weapon once. You voluntarily
surrendered your FBI issued weapon to PD, along with the casing from the fired round. 9 You
did not inform the ~D officer you were not permitted to relinquish your weapon to anyone other
than an FBI agent. 10 I>D Evidence Response Team processed the scene that same day, July 18,
2012.
-Shortly after the incident, Individual arrived at a local hospital for treatment of a gu..11shot
wound to his back. Individual underwent surgery but doctors did not remove the bullet because
it was too close to Individual' spine. i 1
To date, there is no evidence that either Individual or Individnal's._I_ __.lwas armed at
the time of the shooting.

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7

Your statement to PD and DA differs here from your state.ment to DOJ-OIG about Individual '.s response or lack of
response prior to the shooting a.'1d the reason for your decision to get your weapon. This difference will be
discussed·later in this letter.

8

SIRT report, pages 3 - 4.
PD released your service weapon, magazine, and 11 of the 13 cartridges you had surrendered to PD earlier that
day. The remaining two rounds had been test fired by PD Lab and retained as evidence by PD Lab. FD-302 dated
9

07/20/2012.
w You later claimed you had not been informed t.11at it was FBI policy to decline to turn over one's weapon alter a
shooting incident to anyone other than FB1 agents.
11
SIRT repmt, page 4.

3

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NYT-32

 Mr.....
I ______.

III.

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Initial FBI Division Response and SIRT investigation

Shortly after the shooting, you called a Special Agent (SA) who was your close friend
and colleague on your squad (Friend) and told Friend that you were involved in a shooting. 12
After asking you a couple of times without getting a response as to whether you were going to
call the Supervisory Special Agent (Supervisor), or if you wanted Friend to call Supervisor,
Friend told you he would contact Supervisor. Friend thereafter called Supervisor but could not
reach him. Friend then. called another SA squad.mate (SA), because Friend. knew SA was on an
early shift and would be available to respond to your residence. Friend also proceeded to the
residence. 13

On his way to your residence, SA contacted an. Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge
(ASAC) to infonn her of the shooting. ASAC advised she would start making the appropriate
notifications. 14
When SA arrived at your residence, at approxjmately 6:00 a.m., he identified himself to
PD officers on scene and went m<>ide to you. SA observed you were visibly shaken. \Vhen SA
asked you where the shooting incident oc.cuxred, in an attempt to determine if the inside of the
residence was a crime scene, you said something to the effect of someone had been breaking into
your car and you felt you had to shoot, the individual ran away, two people assisted the
individual into a car, and they drove away. SA advised you not to provide him with any further
details. SA asked you where your duty weapon was and you told SA you had surrendered it to

PD. 15

SA advised the on-scene PD officers that he wanted you to go to the hospital and
requested an ambulance . .SA accompanied you to the hospital and the ambulance delivered you
to the hospital' ~
SA insisted you be taken to the emergency room (ER)
because, SA said, you were visibly shaking and SA was concerned you were showing signs of
shock. Supervisor arrived on scene and also requested you be transforred to the ER. You were
subsequently trnnsf~rred from thel
the ER. 16

I

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Ito

As patt of standard FBI shooting protocol, your division's Associate Deputy Counsel
(ADC) reported to the hospital and spoke with you in her capacity as emergency interim counsel.
Later that day, ADC confirmed that you had gotten independent counsel by obtaining your
attorney (Counsel) to represent you. 17

12

Friend was your team leader and friend who socialized frequently with you anctO
was Friend' s and your squad supervisor.
13
· Friend FD-302.
14
SA FD-302.
JS
16

outside of work. Supervisor

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Id.

Id. ln your oral presentation on 1 J/06/2015, your counsel made much of the fact that you were shaken by this
inc:ident. It is understandable that one would be shaken after a shooting, regardless of the circumstances or intent.
Therefore, I will not consider it a factor either in your favor or against you.
!? ADC l-'D-302. The SAC contacted your counsel, at about 8:00 a.m., who advised he would represent you (SAC
FD-302).

4

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NYT-33

 l

:rv1r.L..I_ _ _ _ __,

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Once you were cleared by the hospital for release, Supervisor drove you to the off-site to
relax and later transpo1ted you to a hotel. 18
Intense media coverage descended upon your residence. The growing media attention
required agents to movel
lout of the residence via a van they parked in the
rear of the residence. The media later cleared out only because of a storm. Agents had to stand
guard that night at your residence as well as relocate your two dogs that could not be taken to the
hotel. 19

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Your division opened an assault on a federal o:f:fice.r (.A..FO) case and continued to follow
its protocol for shootings and .A.FO investigations, including conducting interviews and assisting
SIRT in its investigation.
The SlRT was activated on July 18, 2012 and made contact with PD upon SIRT's arrival

at your residence that evening. PD provided Sil<.T with an overview of the events.
The follov.ring morning, July 19, 2012, SlRT was denief enty to your residence to
examine the scene and your counsel advised SIRT that you and
would not provide
vo.Iuntary statements.20 PD provided SIRT with a compilation of reports, the 911 call made by
and video surveillance. At no time in SlRT's investigation would yon orc::Jcooperate
with SIRT, or later SIRG and DOJ-OIG, or agree to interviews.2 1

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C:J

On July 20, 2012, the division's Evidence Response Team (ERT) and division
photographer responded to your residence at SIR.T's request. ERT and the photogi;apher
documented the exterior of the residence and the surrounding area, through individual and
spherical photography. They also collected digital sketching data via Total Station. SIRT, .ER.T,

10

Supervisor FD-302.
Friend FD-302.
20
I acknowledge ihat your refosal to provide a voluntary statement to the FBI or DOJ may be due to advke of
counsel in order to avoid self-incrimination that couid be used agaiJ1sl you in a criminal case. I find your Jack of
cooperation throughout this investigation to be significant and of grave concern as it impeded the intemai
administrative process. Even after vou were informe<l there would be no criminai prosecution (and therefore no
longer had a 51:, Amendment right t~ refuse to cooperate in an administrative proceeding), you and D refused to
cooperate with DOJ-OIG.
21
After DOJ-CRD and USAO had declined prosecution, FBI Chieflnspector contacted your counsel to again allow
you to provide a voluntary statement. Counsel again stated you would not be available for an interview, absent
being compelled. Four of the 12 SIRG members requested a voluntary statement by you in order to ascertain
whether additional information could be reievant to determining whether your use of deadly force was reasonable.
Without additional information from you, SIRG relied on the existing record and unanimously decided that you
failed to adhere to the DOJ deadly force policy. Inspection EC dated 02/06/20 I 4, pages 6 - 7. During the oral
presentation, your counsel acknowledged the Chiefinspector verbally informed him in October 20 l 3 that there
would be no criminal prosecution. Counsel also stated that, even if there was no risk of criminal prosecution, you
could still refuse a voluntaiy statement because it was not insubordination to do so and not misconduct. While your
counsel may be correct that it did not constitute insubordination, h~ is incorrect regarding whether it constituted
other misconduct: Failure to cooperate ia an administrative proceeding is a violation of l'I-H Offense Code 2.10 and
wrn be discussed later in this letter. I note here, however, that you not only failed to cooperate by refusing to be
interviewed voluntarily, you also failed to cooperate by refusing the FBI and DOJ-OIG access to your home or to
conduct a re-enactment.
19

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5

·-------------------------------------~-'\nhn.~~---- -------------------~--------------------------..-.n.11:---~-~----------------~.Nl---~-----------'™~":""--....VV.~-----'

NYT-34

 ·······-······-1
.tv1r......
I _______,

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and the photographer were denied entry into your residence by Counsel and thus were unable to
obtain the necessary data to complete the Total Station Processing.22

IV.

Interviews oflndividual and Individual's ._!_ ___,land Physical Evidence

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Fm SAs interviewed Individual and lndividual'sl
la couple of times. Initially,
they lied to agents but eventually, in exchai."1ge for immunity from prosecution for violation of
Title 18 United State~~ Code, Section 1001, thev provided some details that seemed more
23
accurate, although still with conflicting infonn~tion, to FBI, USAO, and DOJ-CRD.
24
Essentially, the twol
baid the following : in the early morning hours of July 18; 2012,
the Individual and two of their friends targeted your POV because it was similar to one ovmed by
Individual's!
J They devised a plan to break into the· POV to steal the stereo so it could
be placed in Individual's!
fs vehicle. Individual's!
land Individual broke into the
POV and Individual's!
Ibroke the passenger window and removed the stereo with a
screwdriver while Individual moved to the rear of the vehicle. From this point onward the two
I
stories differ in certain aspects, although both maintained they djd not hear anyone yell
"Police."

r

According to Individual'sl
I once he was inside the POV, he then heard a male
banging on a window and yelling, "Vlhat the fuck are you doing?" Individual'sl
!handed
the radio to one of the co-conspirator friends who ran away with it. Individual's!
lgot out
of the vehicle, triggering the car alarm while so doing, and started running down the street when
he heard a gunshot and then Individual say "I got shot." Individual's I
Iran to Individual
lying in the street and observed a male approach pointing a handgun at them. fadividual told the
male something to the effect of, «you shot me, you really shot me." The male did not say
anything to either ofthel
lai.1d Indivjdual'sl
lthen pulled Individual to a sidewalk
where one of their friends picked them up in a blue car. They took Individual to a nearby
hospital.

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Iwere at the POV, Individual
According to Individual, once he and Individual's I
attempted to disarm the alarm with a screwdriver while Individual's!
lbroke the passenger
side window and entered the vehicle. Individual moved to the rear of the driver's side of the
POV to act as a lookout. At some point, Individual's!
!activated the alai.-m and Individual
noticed blinds move in an upstairs window of a house located near the POV and heard banging
on the windo'\v. Individual claimed he ducked down behind the vehicle. shouted·to Individual' s
I
I "Let's go," and beg~ running up the street. Individual then h~ard one shot and fell to
the ground. Individual told Individual's!
H1e was shot and looked back in the direction
from where the shot came. He saw a male with a gun pointed in his direction and told the male,
"You fucking shot me." Individual could not recall if the male responded. lndividual'sl
I

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22

23

I

SJRT r~port, page 9. Again, I nlte your irusai to cooperate in the federal investigation.
Both Individual and Indivldual's
as well as their two co-conspirators, have criminal histories. The

Iwere nrrested

Individual's!

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12/3012009 for robbery and a weapons violation. However, the weapons charge for
lwas later dropped. lt is unclear whether it was dropped for Individual as well since tlie file
011

documentation did not include some of the same c1iminal history documents for lndividual as it did for Individual's
!regarding the same matter (see "Real Time Person File for [Individual's!
I" in tab Jil of the SIRT
report).
24
SIRT report, pages 4 - 5.

I

6

~~-------------------------------~----.-----------------.--------~-----~------·=~~~---.I

NYT-35

 :tv1r.._I_ _ _ _ _....

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helped Individual into a blue car and they drove to the hospital. Significantly, Individual insisted
that he never reached for his waist band when he was behind the POV.

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I

Both I
Iran away from the car in the same direction - Individual' sl
Ion the
sidewalk and Individual in the street. Both claimed they heard a loud boom, later detemuned to
be a gunshot. Individual estimated he ran from the rear of the car to a place in the street adjacent
to the vehicle parked immediately in front of the POV when he heard a boom. Individual's
I
!corroborated that, when he heard the boom, he saw in his peripheral vision his._I_ __.
nmning and falling at the approximate same spot in the street. 25
Individual was treated for a gunshot wound that entered the right rear side of his body
"INith a trajectory that took the bullet near the spine and caused minor liver da.inage.26

Physical evidence that was collected and forensically analyzed could not definitively
confirm whether you shot Individual in the back when Individual had already started to flee or
when Individual was still at the rear of the POV. As part of c. canvas by PD, video was obtained
from a building across the street from your residence. Individual' sandals and a silver ratchet
tool were found i...11 the street adjacent to the vehicle immediately in front of the POV in the
Iran. You provided the window screen wifa a hole t"hrough it from the
direction that thel
gunshot you fired to the PD for forensic analysis.

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The video did not record the actual shooting but it did show Individual running and then
falling to the ground. It initially appeared the video recorded Individual's fall to the ground as he
wa<> shot. However, other forensic evidence contradicted this a<;sumption and supported your
contention that Individual was near the rear of the car when he was shot and then ran a few steps
before he fell.
The video further revealed Individual fell twelve feet from the rear of th.e POV and
Individual's sandals w~re found in the same vicinity, along with a silver ratchet and a blood drag
in the street from that spot to lhe intersection. However, ·with FBI lab enhancement of the video,
it appears that it was possible Individual's fall was caused by him tripping on his sandals, rather
than fa11ing from the impact of a bullet strike. 27
An examination of your bedroom \Vindow screen revealed a tear consistent with a bullet
hole in the left-side bay window screen.28 Weeks after the event, you conducted a reenactment
29
of the shooting for DA. Thereafter, the PD Lab conducted forensic ballistic testing 'Nith the
window screen. The angles of fire consistent with your statement and the location where
Individual fell, as indicated in the video and by the location of his sandals (and as Individual
claimed), were replicated. The same type of weapon and ammunition as those of yours were
used to fire through the window screen in an attempt to replicate the.hole created at the time of
- - - - - - ---···············-··
25
"\Vhen Individual was interviewed earlier by the DA, he did not specifically remember where he was when the
!confirmed Individual's later claim that he fell immediately when he was shot
bullet struck him. Individual's I
near the vehicle parked in front of the POV.
26
According to the summaiy DOJ-CRD "Notice to Close Vile" summary, page 5, Individual fully recovered and did
not demonstrate any significant adverse lasting effects from the gunshot wound.
27
DOJ-CRD summary, page 6.
2
~ You did not provide the window screen to the FBI, you provided it to PD.
zy You refused to conduct a. reenactment for the FBI and DOJ-OlG, even after being infom1ed at your compelled
interview (at t11e latest) !here would be no crimim:l prosecution.

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7

I

I

l~.·-·.~.·.·.·-,·.•.=.·.w.w.·.·,.-,-·.·.·.···'·-

-

·---····················

••••-

NYT-36

•••......J

 -1

Mr.L-1_ _ _ ___,

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the shooting. The ballistic testing revealed that a hole generated by firing through the screen at
an extreme angle, as if to shoot Individual where he fell in the video tape, was inconsistent ·with
the hole created during the shooting. The hole created by firing through the screen at an angle
toward the rear of the POV (as you said you did) generated a tear consistent with the original
hole created by the round you fired.

v.

c::::Js Statements to PD and DA on 07/18/2012

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c::::Jwas .interviewed on July 18, 2012.30 c::Js memory of the incident was similar to
yours but did have a few difforences: she wasl
lat about 5:00 a.m. when she
heard a car ala.1111 going off. Vv'hen she looked out the window, she saw two black males by the
POV. One of the males was at the trunk of the car and another was in the street by the car. One
of the males was wearing a white t-shirt. c::::Jbegan to bang on the window to stop the men
from breaking into her vehicle. You were in tJie adjoining bedroom sleeping but awoke and
askedc::::Jwhat was going on. c::Jtold you someone was breaking into the POV. You went
t~ the bedroom window, opened it, and yelled, "Police, what the fuck are you doing." c::::Jthen
heard a single gunshot. Then, you l'fill dovmstairs and out. the front door. c::::Jwas downstairs
by the time you reentered your residence. c::::Jrecalled you told her to call 911 and she
subsequently did. 31
Notably, in neither interview repo1t doesc::::Jindi.cate hearing you yell for a second time
before firing your weapon.
interviews also indicate that you ran outside very quickly.32

c::Js

VI.

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Your Statement to DA on 07/31/201233
34

You were interviewed on July 31, 2012, by DA and PD. SIRT obtained a draft
interview report. You described the events essentially as outlined above: Your exterior house
light was not on and the nearest street light was about three houses away. At approximately 5:00
a.m., you were awakened byc::::Jalerting you to the fact someone was breaking into the POV.
c::::Jwas in the adjacent room a.11d you got out of bed, drew up the vvindow blinds, and saw a.
black male wearing a white t-shirt at the rear of the POV "pulling" on the trun.k. 35 You saw
something shiny in the right hand of Individual, possibly a ratchet or knife. You cranked open
the window of your second floor bedroom and began to yell through the screen "Police, what the
fuck are you doing." You yelled this tvvice but Individual did not move and continued to work
on the tnmk of the POV.

-

30

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-········- - -- - - -- -

The PD interview report indicates two Assistant Deputy Attorneys (ADAs), two PD detectives, and your counsel
were at the interview.
31
The first PD interview repo1t otc::J conducted at 5: l5am on 07/18/2012, does not include the details regarding
y0t1 going to the bedroom window, opening it, or yelling anything.
.
n This contradicts your statement to DOJ-OIG that you waited for a spell after shooting Individual before moving
methodically through the residence, ciearing it as you went.
33
Drall:/unapproved PD interview of you, dated 07/21/2012. During your oral presentation on 11106/2015, your
counsel explained the dates on this document were incorrect and the interview was actuaily on 07/31/2015. H.e aiso
stated you spoke to PD.and DA voluntarily with9ut immunity. He did not clarify, however, whether you had a
pj·offer agr~eme~t or any ot?er. type o'. agreement that your interview .would n~t be us~d against you.
The PD interview report md1cates six ADAs were present, along with the PD detectlve and your counsel.
35
Later identified as individual.

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8

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NYT-37

 . _l

- -- -·--··-- - -- - -

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Mr.

._!_ _ _ _ __ .

You stated that, then, Individual took his left hand and put it by his waistband and
continued to work on the trunk with his right hand with the shiny object. You said that, from
your trai~ing and experience, you knew the waistband to be an area where people keep
weapons...l6 You then went to retrieve your weapon, located in a drawer under your bed. You
unhoistered the weapon, with your finger off the trigger, and pointed the gun at the window
screen and yelled for Individual to get away from your car.
.A.fter you yelled this, Individual "did look up at [you] also with his left hand coming
from his waistband coming towards [you].',:i7 You fired one round at Individual, who was still at
the trunk of the POV. Individual then fled westbound.
You said you did not know at that moment if you had hit someone but you went
downstairs and outside. Outside, you observed that the POV had been broken into and the
passenger side window had been removed and was lying on the grass beside the POV. You then
looked westbound and saw Individual lying in the crosswalk, saying, "You're killing me, man."
You did not move closer to Individual because you were unsure how many people were
outside.38 You began moving backwards towards your residence. You noticed a dark colored
vehicle pull out of a spot and make a U-tum. A male exited the passenger side of the auto and
pulled Individual into the backseat of the vehicle. The car then drove away.
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You went back inside your home to findc=]on the telephone with 911. You called
Friend and then went upstairs and put on your pants, holster, handcuffs, and identification. You
came back downstairs and the police were onsite. You spoke with the sergeant and relinquished
your weapon to the sergeant, along with the shell casing from the one round yol} fired at
Individual.

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In the PD draft report of your statement to DA, you did not mention Individual' sl.__ _....
returning to where Individual was laying on the ground after you shot Individual or that
Individual'~
lpulled Individual across the crosswalk to where the vehicle picked them

up.39

Nowhere in the PD report does it mention that you feared for the safety ofl.______.
c=Jor that you gavec=]any fom1 of commands to get away from the window or to seek
cover, or checked on her before running outside. The report indicates· that even after the

~~At fae time, you had about three years of FBI experience. You had previously served in the military.·
,, The SlRT report, page 2, indicates on 07/18/2012 PD provided SIRT with details of the event, including that
Individual looked up at you, "reached to his waistband area and made suspicious movements directed towards [you}.
In response to the subject's actions, [you] fired one shot from your weapon."
38
In a PD document "Complaint-Follow up, Informationnl Report-General Investigation," a detective wrote that one
of the PD Officers who responded to your residence, was told by you that four males broke into your car and fled
westbound. This is not consistent with everything else in the documentation, which is that two individuals (the
I
~ were the ones breaking into the POV and two others helped them escape, including your statements to DA
and DOJ-OIG. As this discrepancy appears to be a mistake or misunderstanding by either the speaker or writer,
rather than due to any lack of candor, I will consider it as such and rely on the ether documentation.
39
In the SlRT report, page 3, iL is noted that video footage from a residence across the street showed Individual's
I
!returning to Individual on the ground and dragging him through the crosswalk to the vehicle.

9

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tvtr.I.________,

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shooting, your first interest was the.POV as upon exiting the residence you went to examine the
POV even before looking westbound and seeing Individual.40
Your Compelled Statement to DOJ-OIG on 05/0li201441
You refused to speak with DOJ-OIG voluntarily. 42 In a compelled interview on ~...fay l,
2014, you stated prior to your Bureau experience, you served as an army officer from 2002 to
2007. \:Vhile in the army, you served tvvo tours in Iraq, one between 2003 and 2004 and the other
between 2005 and 2006. You advised that during those two tours, you fired your weapon in
"excess of20 tin].es" in real life situations where you felt you did so in defense of your ovvn lifo
or others' lives.4" You had no law enforcement experience before coming to work for the FBI
and this was your first shooting incident as an FBI employee.
You recounted the shooting incident of July 18, 2012. You had been asleep in the master
bedroom on the second f1oor of
residence for just a few hours when at approximately 5:00
a.m., you were awakened by1
who told you someone was breaking into the POV. 44 C:J
was in the adjoining room,
and could see the same events
through the window in that room as you could see from the bedroom window.

yo(

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You got out of bed and went to the bedroom window where you observed Individual,
whom you did not know, attempting to open the POV's trunk. 45 Individual was using some sort
oft.ooi with both of his hands to try to open the ti:unk. 46 You estimated the horizontal distance
between yourself and Individual at apmoximately 30 feet and the vertical distance to be between
10 and 25 feet. 47
•

40

Agents are provided regular training, at the academy as well as througt1field firearms drills, to always scan the
entire area before deciding if a threat is eliminated after firing one's weapon.
4
! Compiled from DOJ-Ola RO J dated O1/05/2015, transcript of recorded compeiled interview on 05/{) li20 14, and
recording of compelled interview on 05i01/2014.
42
DA, USAO, and DOJ-CRD had all declined prosecution months before your compelled interview so you no
longer had a 5u' Amendment concern about providing a volunta;y statement. At the beginning of the compelled
interview, the interviewing DOJ-OJG agent stated the prosecuting entiiies had declined prosecution and the
!nterv~ew W?~purelylafor administrative purposes. A_t th~ e1:d of the intcrv!e:"', D~J-OIG agailyeguyrc~ an
.
mterv1ew wit
nd. a re-enactment of the shootmg mc1dent. After tlus mterv1ew, you and
agmn refosed w
cooperate with DOJ-OIG in these matters. At this point, if not at the time the FBI Chief Inspector informed your
counsel there would be no prosecution, you no longer had a right to refuse cooperation in an administrative

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f[~I~~~!pelled

interview trnnscript, page 119 ... 120. You did not provide a more accurate estimated range of
shootings, or elaborate on the circumstances of any of these shootings, nor did you explain your or the army's
definition for the appropriate use of deadly force.
44
You had worked a late surveillance shift the night before and also had a
t the time. In your
compelled interview, you stated you had at least four hcmrs cf sleep at the tune o t e mci ent page 38). However,
you also stated that getting up around 5:30a.m. was normai for yuur squad (page 115}. Although you had not
received much sleep by most standards, you did not indicate in your compelled interview that lack of sleep was a
factor in your decision making process and, therefore, I will not treat it as a mitigating factor.
45
You did not see anyone eise untii you went outside after the shooting.
46

7

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OiG compeHed interview transcript, page 40.

Looking at the photograph of the location of the vehicle in comparison to your house and second story window,
however, the distances <ippear to be greater than your estimate.

"

10

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 ·-·-1
Md.__ _ _ _ __.

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You acknowledged that what you saw was a property crime: someone breaking into the

POV, and that it was your goal at that point to get that person to leave.48 You did not have any

concern for your safety at this time.49 Only when asked directly by the interviewer whether you
Un the adjoining room, you said "yes."50 When
had concern for the safety otl
asked why, you stated, ~·well, this is a property crime. And usually people that commit.property
crimes, in our line of work, we know that they are probably into some sort of reselling of the
equipment, either for drugs or just for money. And they probably carry weapons. They have a
high probability of carrying weapons. And that there are multiple people usually involved. So
he's probably not alone... And it ccncemed me that I couldn' t see anyone else."51 When asked
what, at this point in the situation, would have constituted a threat, you replied, "They, they
f' who was near a window in the
could have discharged a weapon in the vicinity ofl
adjoining room. 52

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Tue interviewing agent asked why, if your concern was forl
fs safety,
was your first response not to simply remove them from the situation, as it was only a property
crin1e and the most danger that would happen would be for the subject<; to get away w.ith the car
radio. You replied, "Because I just wanted him to get away from the car. I didn't think it was
going to be that-." 53

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It was dark outside and you raised the blinds ("I wanted to be seen.. . It was an overt
54
movement-··." ), opened the window ("ensuring there's only a screen bet\veen my mouth and
5
his ear" \ and shouted at Individual something like "Get the fuck a.way from the earl'~ You
shouted this about three times, with increasing volume, with the intent to alert Individual to your
presence so that Individual would flee the area. Individual, however, showed no response to
your shouts and continued the motion that appeared to yon to be of trying to break into the POV.
You felt Individl.!-al should have heard and reacted to youi: command.
You stated that you felt that because Individual did not react in any way to your shoutc;
but continued working on the tnmk and, in vour mind, Individual now knew of your presence yet
I
did not flee, the situation was "escalating."56 Even still, you did not choose to move _
c=Jto a safer location in the residence than the adjoining room. Instead, your goal remained to
get Individual away from the POV. 57
The interviewing agent asked you whether, at this point in the events, you felt you were
in imminent danger of death or serious i~jury. You replied, "I, I know that now I'm dealing vvith
someone that is not complian.t."58 The interviewing agent stated this was because, in yo_u r
opinion, you had yelled loud enough that Individual should have been able to hear you. You
4

s OIG compciled interview transcript, page 4-0.
OIG compeiled interview transcript, page 41.
0
: OIG compelled interview transcript, page 4 J.
>I OIG compelled interview transcript, page 41, emphasis added.
2
~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 42.
3
' OIG compeiled interview transcript, page 46.
54
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 49.
5
~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 22.
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 24.
5
' OIG compelled interview transcript, page 50.
s& OIG compelled interview transcript, page 51 .
49

s:

I
I

11

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 -- -·- ····· - - - - - - - - ·- ---------------

---------------

-1
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N'.tr.IL--_ _ _ _ __,
replied, "At least look up and acknowledge me. " 59 You emphasized this again iater in the
interview, stating that "Maybe even ifhe [Individual] looked around to t1y to detennine where
the sound was coming from, that would have been okay with me. But there was nothing." 60
And, again, "I was looking for any kind of movement ~tall at that .voint, too."6 1
Because Individual did not acknowledge you, you claimed "Now it's a police action,"62
You briefly stepped away from the window to retrieve your FBI issued weapon from the drawer
under your bed about three feet away and unholstered it. To do so, you did not maintain a visual
on Individual but completely turned away from him and the window for perhaps about five
63
seconds. When the interviewing agent asked you whether it was your intent to affect an arrest
or still to drive Individual away from the POV, you acknowledged it was to drive Individual
away. 64
Only when the interviewing agent asked whether you still had the same safety concern
forl
Idid you say it had now "escalated" to yourself as well, despite having just
acknowledge.d your intent was still to drive Individual away from the POV .65 The interviewing
agent again asked you why, if the situation was escalating, did you not directL:]to take some
type of action to remove herself from the situation. You were not clear about why you did not do
so, offering suggestions that perhaps it was your dazed state of mind or your assumption that
c::Jwould walk towards the back of the house. You acknowledged that, at that point, you did
not know whetherc::Jwas still near the window in the adjacent room. You did not know this,
you said, because "I'm, I'm focused on him [Individual]." 66 You then added, "And, and I'm just
wondering what else is going on. How many other people are involved?"67
You stated that at this point you folt your life was in danger because Individual was a
"noncomplia..•1t crimina!,"68 because there was a pattern of crime in the area, there were "heavy
gangs'' to the east, there were knmvn drug transactions 1n the vicinity of your house, and because
you did not know what "they're carrying or, or what they're doing. There's a high probability
they have a weapon on them." 69 You added that over the two-year time that you andL:]had
lived in that residence prior to this shooting incident, that was the pattern you had seen. I note
you did not state - either in this compelled DOJ-OIG interview or in your written or oral
responses···· that you were aware of any of the neighborhood crimes involving guns or deadly
force situations. You mentioned there had been multiple car burglaries.
The interviewing agent observed ihat there was a difference between an agent's role and
duty as a law enf'brcement agent who has to go make an arrest, who therefore must engage in
action with a suqject, and tbis personal prope1ty crime. The interviewing agent again asked you
59

60
61

OIG compeiled interview transcript, page 51.
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 73.

OIG competled interview transcript, page 74.
~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 52.
6
·' OIG compelled interview transcript, page 75.
r.·1
·' OIG compelled interview transcript, page 52.
65
OIG compelled interview tr.mscript, page 52.
66
OJ.G compelled interview transcript, page 53.
c; OIG compelled interview transcript, page 54.
~8 OJG compe[led interview transcript, pages 54 - 55.
69
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 55.
6

12

NYT-41

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 Md._______.

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I

why, at this point in the incident (once you had yelled and Individual did not respond but before

you retrieved your weapon and shot Individual), did you not simply remove yourself,c::::J and
I
lfrom the situation by just getting away from the ·windows; f~om where did you think

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the danger was coming? You replied, "Now I've announced myself."' 0

You went on to speculate that whoever else was involved, and that it may not be
Individual, had time to take up a position of advantage and shoot. You now claimed that all you
could think about was ricochet. 7 1 You explained that your house was not very big, it had
multiple points of entry, especially through the bay window at which you stood,~~nd there was
"enough opportunity for any round, once it hits drywall, to, to ricochet around."'"" Hence, you
felt you could not retreat. I note you did not see anyone else and the person on whom you were
focused (Individual) still did not appear to have heard you. Therefore, I find your statements
lack credibility.
After you got your weapon from the bed..;;ide drawer, you returned to the window and
pulled tpe blinds the rest of the way up because you"... wanted to be seen. I wanted to be
3
heard."' You got in the "low ready" position74 to ensure the weapon was visible to Individual75
and again yelled at Individual, this time adding "police" and saying something like "Police, get
away from the vehicle." You had an lmobstmcted line of site to Individual and believed
Individual would be able to clearly see you and your weapon as there was a night light in your
bedroom that provided back lighting on you. However, I observe from your statement to DOJ-OIG that you were fully aware Individual had not actually seen you or your weapon because he
had not turned to face you.
The interviewing agent asked you at this point in the incident~ what was the inuninent
danger posed that you chose to announce yourself as police when you yelled for Individual to get
away from the POV. You maintained Individual was continuing to escalate the situation by his
lack of response. "Now I've announced that I'm a police officer... And he is still not
acknowledging me."76 Later in the interview, ·when the interviewer asked you how.long after
yelling at Individual 'Nith including the announcement "police" before Individual started the
motion of turning towards you, you contradicted this earlier statement when you replied, "That
one was almost, that one was almost immediate."77 You said that as soon as you yelled "police,
get c.way from the vehicle," Individual started turning towards you, at which time Individual's
left arm moved, and that was when you fired. 78
W11en Individual started to tum towards you, this was the first acknowledgement that
Individual heard you. \Vhile Individual's right hand stayed on the tool he was using on the trnnk
~o OIG compelled interview transc1ipt, page 57.
11

1

OIG compelled interview transcript, page 58.

~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 58.
13

OIG compelled interview transcript, page 28.
OlG compelled interview transcript, page 28. It appears you are reforring to what FBI firearms instructors also
call position 3. This is when the weapon is drawn and held in both hands in front of the body, partially raised in
~reparation for quickly extending to eye level into fae foll shooting position 4.
5
OlG compelled interview transcript, page 59.
0
: OIG compelled interview transcript, page 60.
11
OlG compelled interview transcript, page 76.
73
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 76.
14

13

NYT-42

 l

1tr.I.....__ _ _ _.....

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of the POV, as Individual began to turn his head and upper body towards you, you said you saw
Individual's left arm drop away to his waist. You said, based on "our experience, in our line of
work, that's the felony carry area. So, the next logical thing is he's going for a weapon."79 At
this point, prior to Individual completing his tum or even yet making eye contact \:\rith you, you
fired your FBI issued weapon one time at Individual because, you said, you feared imminent
death or serious physical injury to yourself or others.80 You later added that you believed
Individual was going to take aim at you because, "The whole time, he hasn't looked at me. The
one time he starts to look at me, his hand drops to his waistband."81 You claimed Individual was
attempting to acquire a target.82
After you fired the one round, Individual turned toward the street and disappeared from
your view. You folt "the threat [was] subdued." 83 You went to check onL:]and then went
84
do,¥Ustairs. You said that, when you came out of the front of the residence, you "inunediately"
"figured he [Individual] was gone."85 Later in the interview, you claimed you first scanned
"everything" to make sure the scene was safe before assessing the POV. You also claimed you
scanned the downstairs of your residence, in case someone had "breached downstairs"86 and you
87
1' when you opened the front door before exiting. You still kept your weapon in
'low ready" and went "straight for the [POV]" to a<;sess whether it had been broken into and/or

'f

b6 -2
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I

b7E -1

damaged.~ 8

After lool:Jng around the POV and discovering the removed side window and "ravaged"
center console, only then did you look to your right to start scanning the area for witnesses or the

79

OIG compelled interview transcript, page 29.
did not claim that you saw Individual retrieve any form of weapon from his waistband area. According to
your compeiled interview, you raised your weapon from the "!ow ready" position to eye level, got a sight picture,
and fired one rciund (page 29). ·while this is a series of movements that can be done very quickly by someone
trained in firearms, 1 note that this indeed would have been done extremely fast if you had in fact reacted to
Individual' movement --· rather than acted first- if you started to fire only after seeing Individual move his left hand
towards his waistband but before Individual couid complete his turn in your direction to look up at you. I note the
timing is also consistent with the shooter's finger already being on the trigger and firing from position 3 (rather faan
raising the weapon to position 4, acquiring a sight picture, and then firing), or with tiring first as opposed to firing in
reaction to any movement by Individual as reaction time takes longer than initiating action.
81
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 62. I note that earlier in the interview, you were upset that Individual
wcmld not even look at you. Here, lndividual. starts to tum ro look at you as you wanted, albeit Jndivid.ual's left arm
dropped as he turned, a natu.ral movement when someone is turning to look up at you.
82
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 62. I note Individual had not finished turning or looking up at you, nor
had his lt1ft arm or hand apparently made more movement indicative of reaching for a weapon and/or "acquiring a
target" than to have dropped down near his waistband. No evidence suggests individual was "acquiring a target."
Nor does it suggest he even had the opportunit; to see you and/or your weapon before you shot him.
s.~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 65. I note this contradicts your earlier statements where you maintained
that you were concerned about other subjects that you could not see and that someone besides Individual could
~pear and shoot, tmrmingl
I
· Later in the interview, you recalled first standing still for about 15 - 20 seconds after shooting Individual, looking
for a car or other people, or any type of response from the neighborhood. OIG compelled interview transcript, pages
76-77.
~ OIG compelled interview lranscri.pt, page 31.
~6 OIG compelled interview transcript, page 68.
7
s OJG compelled interview transcri.pt, page 6&.
a tactica.l procedure utilized by agents to identify
1>ossible thre!lt.s on the other side of a doorwav.
~8 OIG compelled interview transcript, page j 1.
8

l\ Yon

.-1-----.lis

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14

·····················-- - -----·-- - - - -- -- - - - ----·······-········-··

NYT-43

 -1
Mr.I.___ _ _ ___.

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89

getaway car. You heard someone say, "You're killing me, man" and you then noticed
Individual and his "buddy" who had dragged Individual along the street, leaving blood on tb.e
si~e~alk. Th~6' then got. into a dark sedan, w~ch did .a U-tum and ~rove ~lowly past y~u before
dnvmg away. You estimated you were outside, starmg at the POv mid 1ts removed w1ndow,
for over am.inute before you heard and saw Individual.91
You both at the time of the incident and in the compelled interview were focused. on the
POV and the fact the subjects removed an entire window. You stated, "I j ust stood up there. I
couldn't believe the window. I'm still focused on this window. And the trunk was up ..And I'm
just trying to assess, like, what happened. And, and I'm looking around. And it was, it was over
a minute." 92
You then went back inside your residence93 andL:]was downstairs on the telephone
with 911.
!when she came downstairs and when you went back
inside the residence. Two PD officers arrived and took the initial assessment. One of the
officers told you he needed your weapon. You unloaded your weapon and relinquished it to the
officer. You also retrieved the casing from the :fired round and gave that to the officer as well.
You a~knowledged that you voluntarily surrendered your FBI issued weapon to PD and that PD
merely requested the weapon but was not insistent and did not pressure you to relinquish the
weapon. You claimed you were not aware that you were not supposed to relinquish the weapon
to a:.1y other authorities outside of the FBI a:nd that no one ever told you not to do so.94 However,
you said you did know that you were not permitted to give a statement to PD. 95

I

You claimed you called your supervisor to notify the FBI of the shooting and that was
when the supervisor came to your residence. This "supervisor" also accompanied you in an
ambulance to a hospital because you were shaking uncontrollably by the time the supervisor
arrived on scene.96 You later identified the "supervisor" vou notified of the shooting was
97
However, further into th.e interview, you ac~n,;wledged that your squad supervisor
Friend.
was Supervisor and that Friend contacted Supervisor. 9~ You did not contact your division's
operations center and stated you were not aware you were required to do so. Later in the
interview, you affinn~d that you were aware of the requirement to notify one,s supervisor of a
shooting incident and said that you were trained on this about once a quarter. 99 You were not
famillar at the time of the requirement to notify your division's operations center and said the

~9 OIG compeHed interview transcript, page 32.
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 33 - 34.
91
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 78.
~J. OIG compe.Hed interview transcript, page 78.
3
, You, through many leading questions and statements by the interviewing agent, also described your actions to
· take cover or put yourself in a tactically sound position when you saw and heard Individual and watched as
Individual was dragged and loaded into fae car a."ld the car drove slowly by you. See OIG compe!Jt>,d interview
transcript, pages 79 -· 84.
~1 OIG compelled interview transcript, page 110 ··· 112, 113.
95
OIG compelled interview 1ranscript, page 113.
96
Oid compelled interview transcript, page 35-36.
~ CHG compelled interview transcript, page l 09.
8
" OIG cornpeiled interview transcript, page 112.
99
OIG compelled interview transcript, pages 102-103.
00

15

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 l

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1V1r. I
main focus in trainiTlg was to notii)r one' s supervisor who would then assist the repmiing agent
through the rest of the process, such as notify.ing the operations center. 100
The interviewing agent reviewed the DOJ Deadly Force Policy with you. You were
101
You
familiar with the policy and acknowledged you received training in it '•at least quarterly."
also advised that with any type of arrest or search 'x~arrant briefing, "Any type of operation we
do, we brief it [the deadly force policy] verbally." 10.l
The interviewing agent asked you to articulate how the facts and factors of this shooting
incident fit within the deadly force policy as an authorized use of deadly force. You explained
the factors you considered at the time that led you to conclude it was appropriate to use deadly
force were: There was a high rate of crime in the area, including car thefts on your block; 103 you
thought there was a h!gh probability these individuals were anned and there were possibly others
that were posing a danger; the "escalation" of Individual's noncompliance with your shouts; and
104
Individual's "fortive movement towards his waistband, which is a common felony can-y area."
Addition.ally, you applied each of the subcategories of the deadly force policy and how you were
not in violation of those, including that you did not fire a warning shot at Individual because, you
said, "I took aim" at Individuat 1°5
When asked in this compelled intervievv whether it was your opinion that you were in
complian.c e with the deadly force policy in this shooting incident, you fim1ly answered, "Yes, I
run.,,i 06 In answering the interviewer' s leading questions, you maintained that you did not shoot
Individual solely to prevent the property crime involving the POV but rather because you felt
your life and the lives of those aro~nd you were in imminent danger. 107
Again, the interviewing agent asked you why you felt there was no time du.ring this
incident to withdraw from the window and just allow the property crime to occur, and to can PD.
You maintained it was due to "possible accomplices that were armed and could gain a position of
tactical advantage. And from my experience clearing houses in small villages in the Middle
East, there's a high probabiliiy of ricochet.. . there really was no safe area inside the house." 108
During this discussion of whethei· there was a realistic option to seek safety in your
109
house, your counsel commented that the deadly force policy does not impose a duiy to retreat.
Counsel also noted that the issue to retreat would only come up "concurrently with the
movement of this individual to his waist, because that's when his behavior rose to the level of

100

OIG compelled interview, page 102. As pmt of this discussion, your counsel raised a question of the relevancy
of the FBI Inspection Division ~hooting Incident Guide because, although you used your service weapon to shoot
Individual, it was not a "mission-related" shooting and was "outside the scope of [your] official duties" (pages I 03 ···
104).
101
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 87.
1
~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 87.
10., OIG compelled interview transcript, page 94.
i0t. OIG compelled interview transcript, pages 89 - 90.
10
~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 92.
lC'C• OIG compelled interview transcript, page 93.
107
OIG compelled interview transcript, pages 94 - 95.
108
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 96.
109
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 98.

16

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:tvfr._I- - - imminence to justify the shooting... we're not suggesting that he, that sense of imminence
existed prior to that movement to the waist-!' 1 HJ
The interviewer, again through leading statements and questions, addressed the possible
argument that you yourself escalated the situation when you went to get your weapon. To
counter that argument, the interviewer allowed for the possibility that you "felt that there was no
safe place to retreat in the house, that may be a, a factor in that decision." You replied, "That's
111
correct."
I again note you were a sizeable distance from Individual and on the second floor ·
inside your house while he was outside on the street. When the interviewer asked if you felt it
was tactically sound, before retrieving the weapon, to getl
land move them
further into the residence and call PD, you then said, "I wasn't sure ifthere was a breach in the
main floor. So if somebody had entered the house and was making their way up... none of th.e
rest of the house had been cleared." 112 The interviewer also offered you the idea of whether this
1ncident could have been connected to work, to your assign.rnent of organized crime cases, and
related to a vendetta. You then answered that it was "always" a consideration and "yeah." 113

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The interviewing agent provided you with the opportunity to conclude the interview by
providing any additional infonnation you would like someone reviev.ring this interview recording
to know. You. stated, "Not that I can think of, other than, you know, once, once one shot was
fired, it was, everything for me was deliberate. It was, the, the threat was subdued, so you stop
firing. And, and that was it. That was it for me. Yeah."ii 4
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A:t the end of the interview, the interviewing agent requested to interview C)md that
you re-enact the event at your residence for DOJ-OIG in order to document all the facts. After
the interview, you declined to do so. 1 i 5

Your Written Response Dated 10i30/2015 and Your OraJ Hearing on 11106/2015
Your counsel provided a lengthy written response on October 30, 2015 to OPR's
proposal for your dismissal. In the first footnote, in the summary section of the vvritten response,
your counsel stated you '•voluntarily allowed the screen from [your] window to be removed from
[your] residence for forensic examination. SIRT and OPR subsequently reviewed this matter."116
I take exception. with this characterization of your supposed cooperation, not only in this footnote
but elsewhere in the written response and in your oral presen:tat'ion on November 6, 2015. At all
times, you were uncooperative with the FBI and DOJ-OIG and the FBI and DOJ-OIG had to
obtain all evidence in this matter from the PD and DA because you consistently refused to
cooperate, even after being advised the DA, USAO, and DOJ had all declined prosecution. In
your oral presentation, your counsel acknowledged the FBI Chief Inspector had informed him
verbally in October 2013 that all entities had declined prosecuti?n· He further acknowledged
- - -----···············-110
OIG compelled interview transcript, page 98.
11
~ OIG compelled interview transcript, page 99.
11
: OIG compelled interview transcript, page 101.
II, mo compelled interview transcript, page 101.
114 or~.
· transcript,
· page 116.
• <...1 compeiiec1•mterv1ew
iu OTG compelled interview transcript, page 118. You and0
later maintained your refusal to cooperate with
DOJ-OIG, despite the fact that - if not eariier - yc.iu had been informed in this compelled interview that there would
b~ no criminal prosecution and this was strictly an administrative proceeding.
11 ' Written response, page 2.

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 Mr.

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._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

DOJ-OIG informed you of this as well at your compelled interview on May 1, 2015. Simply
because the FBI was able to obtain the evidence from elsewhere does not alter the fact you
refused to cooperate at all stagt>:S of this process. Failure to cooperate in an administrative
matter, such as the SIRT investigation and the DOJ-OIG investigation, is a separate FBI Offense
Code (2.10), the only sanction for which is dismissal. l am, however, going to consider your
refusal to cooperate as an aggravating factor in this matter rather than a separate violation.
The written response stated this office was "conflating two separate issues and analyzing
one to prove the other" regarding your use of force. Your counsel then attempted to separate the
circumstances to justify his argument that you did not violate the deadly force policy, rather than
review them under the required "totality of the circun1stances" and "reasonable person" criteria.
He elaborated that you arming yourself was completely separate from the analysis of whether
justification to shoot was present and that there was no rule against you arming yourself when
someone was committing a crime in your presence. 117 He also stated your testimony indicated
you had your weapon at the "low ready" position and gained a sight picture. and fired your
weapon in a split second reaction to Individual's " threatening movements (despite notice to the
[Individual] to be compliant and stop his felonious activity), NOT in response to a property
crime. h{ou] pointed and fired [your] weapon in response to an imminent threat, not a property
18
crime."
However, your counsel's statement is in direct contradiction to your stateme.nts to
DOJ-OJG, under oath, that Individual up until that point had made no movement indicating he
heard you and that you wanted him to tum around and in some way acknowledge you.
The written response discussed various statistics regarding theft of automobile parLS and
organized crime and concluded there is a relationship between these property crimes and
violence. It claimed DOJ-OIG and OPR attempted to paint the crime ofindividual breaking into
your POV as a "crime of opportunity" rather than possibly a crime committed by experienced,
organized thieves. I take exception to this characterization: the proposal fully addressed the
planned nature of the crime by Individual and his companions, arld detailed their past criminal
history. Additionally, neither you nor your counsel addressed in writing· or orally your comment
in your compelled DOJ-OIG interview that Individual's activities with your vehicle could have
been a personal vendetta. Nor did you ever state that there had been violent crimes committed in
your neighborhood. Given your variance on your stance about your thought process at the time,
I find it diJficult to credit your and your counsel's focus in the written arid oral responses about
your concern at the moment that Individual was part of some larger and more dangerous
organized crime group.
Your counsel, in the written statement and the oral presentation, explained you were
legally authorized to utilize physical force under state law in this situation and arrest Individual.
He then attempted to rationalize that because SIRT, DOJ-OIG, and this office did not find your
use of deadly force reasonable and inquired as to why other options were not utilized instead, the
governtnent was somehow trying to enforce a duty to retreat. This is yet another.
mischaracterization of the facts and of applying facts to st@dard legal analysis.

- - - - - -----·--·----------·
117

l note that "in your presence" in this instance was outside, across the steps and sidewalk, to the street from where
you were located inside your house on the sewnd story.
118
Writte11 response, page 4.

18

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Mr.

._I_ _ _ _ ____.

Contrary to these mischaracterizations, vvhen you retrieved your weapon and pointed it in
the low ready position towards Individual is relevant to evaluating your actions under the totality
of the circumstances. Not only does it go to whether your mindset was reasonable at the time, it
is also relevant ·w hether you were candid in the initial PD/DA investigation because you told
them a different scenario than you told DOJ-OIG. This will be addressed forther in this letter.

I find no relevance to the argtm1ent that state law's permissiveness to use physical force
to stop a propert}1 crime was somehow related to you drav.iffig a deadly weapon on Individual a
floor level away vertica.liy, and across the stoop, stairs, walkway, and sidewalk away
horizontally, when you had no indication he was an imminent threat to your lite and when you
stated under oath yon were just t1ying to get him away from your car. The issue of the
appropriateness under state law of using physical force wouid only have arisen had you been
outside and in close proximity to Individual; but physical force is an entirely different matter
than deadly force.
Likewise, the various examples provided in both the ·written response and the oral. J1earing
of when law enforcement officers, in the normal course of their on-duty responsibilities, became
involved in deadly force situations that had begun as routine, non-deadly circumstances, entirely
miss the mark. In the examples, none of the officers reso1ted to deadly force before seeing a.
weapon or before shots were fired. All of these examples were oflaw enforcement officers on
duty who cru:ne into close proximity of the subjects. You, in contrast, were. in the second story
of your house while Individual was outside on the street, across the distance of y01.u porch steps,
walkway, and sidewalk. Individual was intent on breaking into the POV and was not making
a:.1y movement to indicate he even heard you or saw you until immediately before you shot him
in the back as he was beginning to twist around to respond to your shouting. 119 While you and
your counsel made much, both in the wTitten response and oral presentation, of the history of
auto break-ins in the neighborhood, you provided no evidence of crimes involving physical or
deadly force, or involving weapons or gunshots.
The v.Titten response quoted People v. Be1?/amin, 5j N. Y. 2d 267 (1980) to suppo1t the
argument that a law enforcement officer does not need to Rwait the "glint of steel" of a weapon
before he could act to preserve his safety. This case is unpersuasive because it is not on point for
the use of deadly force and actually mles against his argument that I must, when I evaluate your
use of deadly force, divorce the surrm.mding circumstances from the immediate rnoroen:t you
decided to pull the trigger. People v. Benjamin was a case regarding at what point an officer
could conduct a stop and frisk. Justification for conducti.ng a pat down is a far cry from using
deadly force. This case would have been appropriate to cite had you been outside with
Individual, rather tqan inside on the second floor of your house, and needed to articulate a reason
to conduct a stop and frisk. Be11famin did focus on articulating the totality of the ci.rcumst:ances
standard and applying it to the fact the officer had received a ca11 regarding men with guns
combined with the officer being on the same ground level as the subject, in a close proximity of
about 10 feet to the subject, and the subject's motion of stepping back and using both hands to
Again, r note you told DOJ~OIG that you wanted Individual to tum, to look at you, or to some way acknowledge
you. While you and your counsel fretiuently used the ttiml "noncompliant" regarding Individual's lack of
aclmowledgment of your shouts, the more accu.rate term would be "unresponsive." This is been.use there is no
evidence lndividJ.!.al was intentionally ignoring your shouts, and therefore refusing to comply, as he made n.o
reacti.on at all.
119

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Mr.I...._ _ _ ___.

grab at something at his waist. Thus, BerJamin affirms the need frn evaluating all of the
circumstances leading up to your decision to pull the trigger.
Your ·written response attempted to state your circumstances as those that a reasonable
officer would perceive as an imminent threat to his safety. It not only was unsuccessful, it
contradicted your previous statement .under oath to DOJ-OIG. The \Vritten response stated the
Individual had been "consistently non-compliant" with your commands to get away from the
POV, had "looked up" at you, and "made a ftirtive movement with his hand near his waistband"
and it was at this point you perceived a deadly threat and shot Individual. The response also
stated Individual was engaged in a crime with others which was traditionally linked to organized
crime, "and yes violence" and acted "in a manner consistent with an individual drawing a
weapon." Your written response argll;~d that all of these "reasonably perceived facts" gave rise
to 'justification in the use of force." 12u However, these statements were in direct conflict ·with
the evidence in the record:
•

You told DOJ-OIG Individual made no motion or indication he had even heard
you, so there is not conclusive evidence he was no.ncompliant rather than
oblivious (evidence such a<> hin1 looking at you and then going back to his task as you told the PD, or yelling something back at you, etc. would indicate
noncompliance).

•

Your Vi-Titten response stated Individual "looked up" at you but this is untrue
according to.your sworn statement to DOJ-OIG: you stated Individual had not
moved or looked up at you, or in any way ack.nowledgd your presence, and that it
was when he started to tum as if to look at you that his left hand dropped towards
his waist and you shot him. By your own testimony, you acknowledged
·
Individual had not looked at you before this. 121

•

As for the "furtive movement," in your DOJ.-OIG interview, you clarified
Individual's left hand dropped towards his waist area as he began to turn towards
you. To use the classic phrase "fmi ive movement" towards his "waistband" after
claiming Individual looked up at you when he had not yet done so is to paint a
difte.rent picture than your sworn testimony to DOJ-OIG that indicated Individual
may have been making a natural movement as he began to turn to acknowledge
your presence -- the very thing you told DOJ-OIG you wanted him to do.

•

\~11ile Individual was engaged in c1iminal activity of a property crime and there
was a history of property crime in. your neighborhood, you did not provide any
evidence of an awareness of previous violent crime or shootings in your
n eighborhood. Nor were you aware at the time you chose to shoot Individual of
other people involved in the criminal activity other than Individual.

- - - - -- --------------- - -

'. ~ Written response, page 8.
2
' ' During your oral presentation, you and your counsel maintained one ofthe factors in your belief that deadly force
was reasonable was lndividual had looked at you and had seen you holding your weapon but still did not comply.
This directly contradicts your testimony during your sworn statement to DOJ-OIG.

2

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Mr....

ANALYSIS

A. Misuse of Weapon - Inte.ntional Discharge
According to FBI Offense-Code 5.15, employees are prohibited from "[p]urposefully or

willfolly discharging a weapon. in violation of the deadly force policy.
The DOJ Deadly Force Policy states in. relevant part:

Law enforcement officers of the Depattment of Justice may use deadly
force only when necessary, that is, when tl1e officer has a reasonable belief122 that
the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious .Physical
injury to the officer or to another person.
A. Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect.
B. Firearms may not be fired solely to djsable moving vehicles.
C. If feasible and to do so would not increase the danger to the officer or others,
D . . A verbal warning to submit to the authority of the officer shall be given prior to
the use of deadly force.
E. Warning shots are not pem1itted.
F. Officers will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for handling resisting
subject5 which must be used when the use of deadly force is not authorized by
this policy.

In the written response, your counsel argued the evidence and applicable test under
Graham v. 0 'Connor (the analysis used by SIRT and DOJ to determine whether the DOJ deadly
force policy was violated), indicates your action foll within DOJ guideiines. Your counsel
provided an example of the application of the "objectively reasonable" standard of Pittman v.
Nelms. Again, you rely on a case that is not on point. In Pittman, while conducting a traffic
stop, an officer. reached into the vehicle and the vehicle began to flee, entangling the officer's
arm in the vehicle and dragging him vvith it for 25 ... 30 feet before the officer was thrown free of
the vehicle. After being freed from the vehicle, the officer's partner fired, striking the passenger.
The court determined the shooting officer did not use excessive force. Your counsel em~neously
stated that these facts of Pittman justify your response in your situation with Individual. 1'"'3
Pittman is not the correct measure for analysis i.n your case because it dealt with the actual use of
deadly force by the subject in close proximity to the officer, actually entangling the offic.er with
the vehicle and subjecting him to the actual risk of serious bodily injury or death. The officer's
partner's use of deadly force was in reaction to the su~ject's use of deadly force of utilizing the
vehicle to inflict serious bodily h~jury upon the officer. I am at a loss as to how you believe this
case to be applicable to your situation when you were on the second story of your house rather
than close proximity to Individual, and Individual had not just demonstrated - as in Pittman - the
complete disregard for human life by the use of a vehicle in such an intentionally unsafe manner.

121

DIOG Appendix F defines "reasonable beiief' as being synonymous with probable cause and to be detem;ined
"by the totality of the facts and circumstances known to agents at ilie time, and the logical inferences that may be
drawn from them."
123
Written response, pages 9-10.

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1

I

I

I
I

Both SIRG and DOJ-OIG reviewed the investigation findings and both concluded you
violated the DOJ Deadly Force Policy when you shot Individual. 124 You had not been compelled
to speak to DOJ-OIG at the time of SIRG's decision and, therefore, SIRG had ont(' your version
you told to PDiDA to rely upon for understanding your perspective on the matter. 2 ~ Of the two
versions of events you told, the one you told PD/DA, if anything, would have provided more
reason for SIRG to find the possibility that probable cause existed that Individual posed an
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to you or your family. This is because you
told PDIDA that you retrieved your weapon from under your bed in response to Individual
making a furtive movement to his ·waistband wiih his left hand. 126 You told PD that you fired
your weapon when Individual had already moved his hand to his waistband, turned to you, and
then s~a1ted to make a threatening gesture with the hand at his waistband by bringing it towards
12
you. ' Even with this misinformation in your favor, SIRG's review of the totality of the
circumstances revealed that your use of deadly force was not o~jectively reasonable and they
unanimously decided you violated the deadly force policy. i 28
Specifically, SIRG did not find it objectively reasonable that Individual, who was
involved in a relatively minor property crime on the street in front of your residence, posed a risk
of imminent death or serious bodily injury to you or your family on the second floor of the
residence. They also considered the facts that you and your family were in a solid structme and
you had time to move from your window, retrieve your firearm, and re-engage Individual. SIRG
noted you did not give any commands consistent with the training all FBI agents receive th.at
reflect a clear effort to address a threat posed by a subject such as "FBI, don't move" and to keep
one's hands visible and raised. To the contrary, your commands reflected your concern for your
property rath.er than a belief of imminent threat of death or serious iryury to yourself or your
family, as your shouts consisted of telling Individual to get away from the POV.
In your compelled DOJ-OIG interview, you admitted you retTieved your weapon
specifically because Individual was committing a property crime ar1d you wanted to get him
away from your POV. FBI agents are trained to always keep their weapons pointed in a safe
direction a.."ld to not point it at someone unless justified. Human safety is the justification to
point a weapon at someone, not a property crime. This is a significant change from your
statement to PD about retrieving your weapon because, you told them, Individual looked at you
and put his hand to his waist However, you acknowledged in your compelled DOJ-OIG
interview that you were not retrieving your weapon and pointing it at hldividual for safety
24
;
125

See the SIRG report and the .DOJ-OIG ROI for their analyses.
As previously noted, STRG gave you another opportunity prior to its final ruling (and after criminal prosecution
was declined) to orovide a voluntary statement. You refused.
26
i
You acknowl~dged to DOJ-OIG that fndividual made no movement or in any way acknowledged you the first
few times you yelled at Individual. Because Individual made no movement or ackn.owiedgement of you, you
retr[eved your weapon. This information indicates you had even less of an objectively reasonable belief that
lndividuai posed an imminent threat than in the version of events you gave DA/PD.
127
This is contrary ro your DOJ-OIG compelled interview, where.you said you shot Individual as his hand
"dropped" to his waist as he began to turn (he had not yet looked up at your, nor had he already put his hand to his
waistband, nor was there a second movement of his hand toward you).
m In the oral presentation, your counsel noted the draft PD repo1"ts relied upon by SIRT/SIR.G of your interview had
incorrect dates. Although counsel attempted to use fue mistake of dales as a way to cast doubt 011 the content of the
repoit, they provided no evidence or pointed tn any particular part of the content that they could identi.f'; as not
accurate. Therefore, except for tlte date of the interview, I will accept the content of the report as an acctu-ate
summary of what you told the PD and DA.

22

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reasons, you were pointing your deadly weapon, in the " low ready" position at Individual t()r a
property clime happening outside of your house on the ground floor, across the porch, steps,
walkway, and sidewalk while you were inside on the second floor.
Your counsel, in the oral presentation, attempted to claim that the FBI was simply
arguing over tactics and that which tactics you did or did not use were irrelevant to evaluating
whether you were justified in shooting Individual. I disagree and I accept SIRG's-reliance on
these factors as part of the analysis ofthe totality of the circumstances. Rather than being meant
as a critique of tactics, the mention of how agents are trained to respond versus how you
responded is relevant to dete11nining whether a law enforcement officer in your situation would
have reasonably believed the totality of the circumstances warranted the use of deadly force.
Your actions and/or inactions aid in deterrnining whether you reasonably feared for your lifo,
even though you were on the second story inside your house. Raising the blinds, turning on the
light, and actually trying to be seen by Individual as clearly as possible and wanting Individual to
turn around an.d look at you (as you state in your DOJ-OIG interview) would make you an easy
target, rather than shouting safety commands (to raise his hands, etc.) and insiinctively seeking
cover/concealment even if you decided not to retreat. 129 SIRG and DOJ-OlG considered these
circumstances along with the other factors, and concluded not only was your behavior not that of
someone who reasonably believed Individual posed an imminent danger of death or serious
physical injury to himself or ihose near him, but that the totality of the circumstances did not
warrant such a belief and therefore the use of deadly force was not necessary .
DOJ-OIG likewise found your use of deadly force to be unreasonable and a violation of
policy. Unlike in your PD/DA interview, you admitted to DOJ-OIG in your compelled interview
that you retrieved your weapon from under your bed because Individual ·w as unresponsive to
your shouts to get away.from the POV and it was still your goal to get Individual away from the
POV. You stood in the window with your weapon in the low ready and the blinds pulled aU the
way up because yon "wanted to be seen" and '"wanted to be heard." Only this second time did
you mmounce yourself as law enforcement by shouting "police" 130 and, even then, still
commanded Individual to get awav from the POV - rather than to not move or to raise his hands
above his head, etc. 131
,
In arriving at its finding of violation of the deadly force policy, DOJ-OJG took into
consideration the facts as articulated by you, the relevant background information known to you
before the shooting, your perception of events preceding your decision to employ deadly force,
the tactics you employed during the encounter, and the account you provided of your actions
during your compelled interview. DOJ-OIG concluded it was not reasonable to assume the
property crime in which Individual was involved carried a presumption of ·violence similar to

129

In both the \\.Ti!ten response and the oral presentation, your counsel equates the government's observation t.ltat
you could have stepped aside with an implied duty to retreat Again, your counsel is inaccurate. As you are aware
f!om your FBI training, seeking cover and concealment is not at all the equivalent of retreating.
0
"' In the PD/DA interview, you maintained that you identified yourself as "police" from the outset of your shouting
to Individual to get away from the POV.
1 1
~ This supports your admission that your goal was to get Individual to flee from the POV, rather than your later
statements, often at the interviewing agent's prompting, that you feared for your and your family 's satety, your
concern about ricochet, andior concern ihat an accomplice ofindividual may have entered the residence downstairs.

!

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that of armed robbery or narcotics·traf.ficking, as you claimed. 132 DOJ-OIG also noted that you
never ·~3
stated you observed Individual in any clothing •vou fa1ew to be indicative of a local street

gang.·-·

.

DOJ-OIG found your statements about believing your position in the window offered
insufilcient and limited cover from Individual, should Individual (who had not yet even shown
indication he heard you) fire upon you; about there being no safe location inside your residence
to which you and your family could seek safety because you did not know ifindividual had an
accomplice who had broken into the residence; and because the structure was constructed in a
way that would put you and your family in danger of a ricochet, to all be objectively
unreasonable and unsupported by evidence. I likewise find your claims to lack credibilitv.
~:rom
vVhen first asked why you went for your weapon rather than removel
the situation, you replied, "Because I just wanted him [Individual] to get a:way from the car." In
fact, when originally asked directly if you feared for your safety because Individual did not give
any indication of acknowledging you, you instead said that now you were dealing with a
noncompliant person and you at least wanted Individual to look your way and that you were
"looking for any kind of movement at all at that point, too." However, when Individual did just
that ·-- start to turn and look in your direction, you shot Individual.

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DOJ-OIG notes, and I concur, that your decision to leave the window to retrieve your
firearm and then return to the window is evidence that you were able to go to a position of safety
prim; to the moment that you claimed you believed Individual made a "fu1tive gesture" with his
left arm toward his waistband. Additionally, as DOJ-OIG observed, if ym1 actually believed
your own statements about a possible accomplice breaking into the residence do·wnstairs, it was
not objectively reasonable for you to return to the w indow to continue shouting warnings to an
oblivious Individual about the POV rather than to address the potential threat of an intruder.
Without considering the mischaracterizations of your \:vritten response and oral
presentation (when you and counsel also stated you believed Individual could see you holding
your weapon), the circumstance with which we are left is some sort of movement ofJndividual's
left hand near his waist as he began to turn towards you in response to your shouts when he was
committing a·property crime some distance away from you and a. floor below you. 'While this is
a factor a reasonable law enforcement officer would take into consideration, it is the only factor
and, even according to your counsel's cited case of Benjamin, is not in and of itself-especially
given your distance from Individual --- sufficient justification for the use of force. 134
I agree wlth SIRG's and DOJ-OJG's questioning of your j udgment in your decision to
confront Individual with your weapon over a property crime. A deadly weapon is not within the

- - -----------------·--- - - 131

l agree, especially in light of your answer to DOJ-OIG's suggestion that it could have been in retaliation, and in

!~~~t of the fo~t you never pr?vided a~y evidence of vi?lei:t crimes or t~se of wea.pons in your neighb?rhood. . .

.. ln your written response, it stated it was unknown tnat 1t was a requirement ot gang members to display certain
colors at all times or whether the observation of a certain color is dispostive of gang affiliation. I note that, if you
had observed some sort of indication of gang affiliation, it would have been another foct!>r DOJ-OIG wouid have
weighed when evaluating the totalitv of the circumstances.
134
BeriJamin explained that it was the multiple factors of the officer's receipt of a call regarding men wit.11 guns, his
close proximity of about 10 feet on the same ground level as the subject, combined with the subject's motion of not
only grabbing something at his waist with both hands but simultaneously stepping back that provided the totality of
circumstances t6 justif; a stop and frisk.

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Mr.I.___ _ _ _....
realm of the pem1issible use of physical force in a property crime as you attempted to argue. I
also agree with DOJ-OIG's questioning of your veracity regarding whether you actually feared
for your or your family's safety rather than shooting Individual over a property crip1e, especially
given the totality of the circumstances. You admitted multiple times in your compelled DOJOIG interview that your goal was to stop Individual from breaking into the POV. Your actions
support this as your motive rather than self-defense, especially making sure the blinds were all
the way up, the window open, and that y5~m· presence \x..·ith your weapon in full view in the
window would be visible to Individual. I.>:> Given these circumstances, the factor in. favor of your
action being that of a reasonable law eni{)rcement officer - the hand dropping towards the waist
- is not in and of itself significant reason to use deadiy force. 136
Furthermore, after shooting Individual, your actions contradict your claim that you were
concerned Individual was a noncompiiant anned criminal reaching for a weapon to use against
you: you rushed outside and went straight to the POV to assess it for damage and faeft. You did
not secure your residence, or even notice Individual nearby urrtil Individual cried out. Rather
than issuing commands to the man you thought was axmed and ready to shoot you, you stood
~o continue their actions unimpeded,
silently by and allowed Individual and Individual's!
thus kaving control of the situation in their hands. As DOJ-OIG concluded, your actions were
not indicative of a law enforcement officer's reaction to dealing with armed and dangerous
subjects.

I

Likev.TiseJ
lcall to 911 indicates no concern for the safety of herself,
lor
you. l n the recording of her 911 call,c=Jis heard yelling to you to shoot the car (presw,ablyl
the car that picked up thel
lafter the shooting). Although she told the operator that
lfired one round and there may be an injured person,c::::J,eemed more focused on the
POV, reporting the subjects had broken into the POVJ
lwas outside looking at the
POV, and "they" stole the radio. This does not indicate concern, present or immediately prior to
the call, of imminent physical harm.

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I

In your written response, you stated there was "insufficient evidence to refute [your)
claim that [you] fired ·vour V<iea on in order to counter what [you) believed to be a threat to
[yourself] and [you]
" 137 The only evidence you presented that contributes to a.
reasonable belief of 1mrmnent anger of death or serious bodily iPjury appears to be the
movement of Individual dropping his left hand as he began to tum in response to your shouts.
As Berifamin explains, the case cited in your written response, the movement of the hands
towards the waistband alone is not sufficient for a law enforcement officer to justify taldng
safoty measures to protect himself. If that one action alone is not enough for an officer to pat
dovvn someone, it certainly is not enough for an officer to use deadly force against someone.

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All FBI agents are extensively trained on the DOJ Deadly Force Policy, both at their
initial training at Quantico and then regularly in their assigned field office. You acknowledged
that you received tr<'lining in the deadly force policy "at lea&'t quarterly.'' You also noted that the
m Such actions are tne opposite of what a reasonable person in foar for his and his family's safety would do, which
would include seeking cover and concealment and issuing commands to stop and keep one's hands in view, rather
than framing oneself in an open \Vindow for a possible shooter to have a clear shot.
136
Including in light of Benjamin and Pittman.
m \Vritten response, page 9.

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Mr.I.___ _ _ __.
policy was reviewed in the briefings for every arrest and/or search warrant execution ope.ration.
Your division confinned you attended the legal training in which the policy was covered in
Dec.ember 2011. I assess you were very familiar with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy at the ti.me
of this incident.
In addition to the DOJ Deadly Force Policy, agents are also routinely trained in the
"cardinal rnles of safety" of :firearms. These rules include keeping one's finger o.ffthe trigger of
the weapon until one is ready to shoot and not pointing one's weapon at anyihing one is not
prepared to shoot. I note that you had your weapon pointed at Individual, in the "low ready"
position, for a property crime.138
When asked in your compelled interview whether you were comfortable that your actions
in this shooting incident were within policy, you maintained that you were. You claimed you did
not shoot Individual solely to prevent a property crime involving your POV but because you felt
your life and the lives of those around you were in imminent danger.
During your oral presentation, after discussing ·with you the multiple factors and totality
of the circumstances surrowiding this shooting incident, I asked you to state for me why you
believed Individual, who was on the street, was a threat to you when you were inside on the
second floor of your house, to the point you felt it was necessary to shoot him in the back. You
responded, "Because I'm a law enforcement officer and that's what I signed up to do."
Despite the preceeding discussion of the totality of the circumstances, your counsel stated
yon did not understand my question. He clarified for you that I was asking why you believed at
the moment you pulled the trigger why Individual was a threat to you. You responded, ,.Because
people who are reaching for their waist are reaching for guns. And he had an intent to shoot

me."
When I asked you to explain your concern in reiation to .the fact that yol1 were on the
second :floor of your locked house while In&vidual was a distance away on the street, your
counsel interrupted and claimed I was supposed to isolate the exact rnoment of when you
decided to pull the trigger from all the other factors. 139 That is incorrect. I believe you are
attempting tc parse out the totality of the circumstances because when considered as a whole,
yon were not justified in shooting Individual.
However, even examining only your thoughts at that exact moment, the result is the
same, that you were unjustified in shooting Individual: You stated you shot Individual because,
at that moment, his hand was dropping to his waist and ".Because people who are reaching for
their waist are reaching for guns. And he had an intent to shoot me." To consider only these

138
Aithough the record does not indicate one way or the other whether you had your finger on the !rigger, the timing
of events - that you shot lndividual in the back before Individual could finish 111ming to face you··· indicates this is a
likely possibilit'j.
.
m Specifically, your counsel said I was broadening the various factors that could have been considered but not
nece.ssarily were considered and that ::1sking you to consider your distance from Individual on the second floor and
other factors at the time Individual's hand moved towards his waist was a problem. Your counsel also stated such
other factors may never have crossed your mind at the moment you shot Individual. That is exactly the issue here: a
reasonable Jaw enforcement officer has to decide under the totality ofthe circumstances at the time, whether he is in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.

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thoughts at just that moment would be to conclude that anyone whose hand went near his
waistband had a gun and intended to shoot you. Obviously, this is preposterous. 140
I join DOJ-OIG in questioning your judgment in this very serious violation of the DOJ
Deadly Force Policy. I also have grave concem about your .lack of either ability or willingness to
acknowiedge your mistake and learn. from it. The ability to exercise good judgment under
pressure and to acknowledge when one does make a mistake is vital to an FBI Special Agent
.Armed agents are frequently placed in situations where they must make critical decisions in a
split second. It is understandable that occasionally mistakes will be made. When that happens, it
is essential the agent be willing and able to accept the consequences and leam from the mistake
so that it may not be repeated in the future. Your compelled DOJ-OIG interview, wherein you
contradicted your own story and still maintained you were ·within policy, occurred almost ti,;vo
years after you shot Individual while Individual was committing a property crime.
I note Counsel's statement in your compelled interview that the DOJ Deadly Force Policy
does not impose a duty to retreat and that the issue to retreat would only come up ('concurrently
with the movement ofthis individual to his waist, because that's when his behavior rose to the
level of imminence to justify the shooting...we're not suggesting that he, that sense of
imminence existed prior to that movement to the waist-." 141 Both the SIRG decision and the
DOJ-OIG conclusion take into account all the factors that led to the conclusion that- contrary to
Counsel's asse};"tion- there was not a level of imminence at any stage in the incident to justify
the shooting. 14~ Fu1t.hermore, while the policy does not impose a duty to retreat, neither does it
perrnit an FBI agent to himself create the deadly force situation over a property crime. 143
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude you violated Offense Code 5.15.
B. Lack of Candor1Lying- No Oath

According to FBI Offense Code 2..5, employees are prohibited from "[k]nov.ringly
providing false infomiation when making a verbal or vr.ritten statement, not under oath, to a
supervisor, ari.other Bureau employee in an authoritative position, or another governmental
agency, when the employee is questioned about his conduct or the conduct of another person.
4

; o Under this belief, leaving out tj).e totality of the dnmmstances as you sugge.st I do, you would he justified in
shooting anyone whose hand goes towards his waist, including all of your fellow agents who reach for their Bureau
!s~ued cell phones worn on their waists.
4
• • CHG compelled interview transcriot, page 98.
142
As part of their deliberations on tl~is incident, SIRG reviewed Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) regarding
the test of"reasonableness" under the 41" Amendment. In reviewing all of the facts and factors in this case to arrive
at their final decisii)n, SIRG applied Graham. Graham states that "proper application requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by :flight." Id. "[Reasonableness] must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . .[the] calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that poi ice officers are o1~en forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at
396-97. The ultirnate question is "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id. At 397.
143
I observe the prohibition on using deadly force to address a property crime is covered in the first year of law
schooL

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11r......

'False information' includes false statements, misrepresentations, the failure to be folly
forthright, or the concealment or omission of a material fact/information."
Some of your statements to PD!DA, when compared to your compelled DOJ-OIG
interview, are best misleading. 144 While it is not lmusual for minor details to be recalled
difforently two years after a stressful event 145 from when originally recounted shortly after the
event (the PD/DA interview), a change from some of your statements to PD/DA are significant,
two statements in particular. You told PD/DA that you retrieved your weapon because
Individual made a movement with his left hand towards his waistband. You also stated you shot
Individual when Individual made a motion of his left hand coming towards you from the
waistband area. However, in the compelled DOJ-OIG interview, you admitted you retrieved
your weapon precisely because Individual made no. movement or indication that he heard you.
In the DOJ-OIG compelled i.nte.rview, you said you shot Individual when Individual dropped his
left ann towards his waist-- rather than your claim to I>D/DA that the left hand was already at his
waist (the reason, you originaJly said, you went for your gun) a...'1d from there made a motion as if
to bring the left hand towards you.

at

These are serious material misstatements to PD/DA as they go to the heart of your
perception of the circumstances that led to your decision to first get your gun and then your
decision to shoot Individual. As your counsel explained in the oral presentation, your lack of
cooperation in the FBI investigation was, at least in part, for the purpose of having one
statement to be used by all investigating agencies. You therefore knew the PD report of your
statement would be provided to the FBI by DA. You also refused to cooperate with FBI and
DOJ-OIG, not only for an interview (you had to be compelled even after your counsel was
informed there would be no criminal prosecution), but you also refused to provide a reenactment or access to your home for the FBI to gather the needed infom1ation for complete
forensic analysis. 146 Therefore, the evidence indicates you made misrepresentations in an
attempt to still paint yourself in the best light possible for the federal investigation and obstructed
all investigative activity that could provide greater and/or contradicto1y infomiation than what
you chose to provide to the PD. 147 This calls into question your judgment and character as an
FBI employee.
Your counsel, in the written response and oral hearing, attempted to cast doubt o.n the
accuracy of the PD report. He noted the date of interview on the repo1t, July 19, 2012, was
inaccurate because you and he did not meet with the PD and DA until July 31, 2012. Therefore,
the draft date for the report was also incorrect. As discussed in the oral presentation, the PD was
conducting multiple interviews and tasks re.lated to investigating this matter during that
time:frarne and it was believed the author of the report had simply mixed up the dates. However,
beyond correcting the date of interview, neither you nor your counsel could point to anything

144

At the worst, they are blatantly unt11.1thful.
The compelled DOJ-OIG interview occurred almost two years after you shot Individual.
146
SIRT report, page 5.
147
Other than the difference in recollection over whether you tol<C:Jto call 91 l c::Js memory of events as told
to the PD/DA was remarkably simi lar to your statements to PDiDA.
145

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Mr......

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else in the report that was inaccurate. Therefore, aside from the date of the interview and report,
I credit the PD report as accurate. t4s
Your counsel also attempted to argue at your oral presentation th.at even though your
statements to the PD and DOJ-OIG were different., the threat was the same. He stated the threat
was that Individual was "noncomp!iant," he turned towards you, and his hand went towards his
149
waist.
Therefore, you and your counsel would have me conclude, you made no material false
statement and I should not find that you lacked candor. I disagree, not only regarding the
materiality of your false statements to PD, but also that any lack of materiality should nullify
your lack of candor.
I note that Individual's "noncompliance" in your PD·interview could possibly be
interpreted as noncompliance~ as in that scenario he looked up at you, thereby acknowledging
your presence, only then moved .his hand to his waistband, and then returned to his task. After
you retrieved your weapon in that scenario, Individual th.e n made a movement towards you \\.ri.th
the hand that had already been at his waist This is significantly different from the perceived
threat you described in your compelled DOJ-OIG interview. In the compelled interview,
Individual was not "noncomplianf' but, rather, unresponsive. Individual had never
acknowledged even hearing you and his hand did not make a movement towards you, nor was
the movement that of reaching or grabbing for something at his waistband. Rather, you
explained under oath that his hand "dropped" toward th.e waist as Individual began to turn in
direction of your shouts. In no way are these two threats the same, as you and your counsel
argued.
You al~~.o called your close friend on your squad (Friend), rather than Supervisor, to rep01t

the shooting. bv In your compelled DOJ-OIG interview, you claimed Friend was your
supervisor. While Friend was the team leader of your group at the time, this is not a supervisory
position. Friend even asked you multiple times whether you were going to contact Supervisor.
When Friend did not get a response from you, Friend told you he would go ahead and contact
Supervisor.
l find your statement to the PD and the claims regarding contacting your supervisor to be
incredulous and lacking in candor.
·
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude you violated Offense Code 2.5.

148

Your counsel implied the fact the PD report was a summary of your interview, rather than a verbatim account,
brought into quP,stion its accuracy. As both you and your counsel are aware, summaries of interviews (including
FBI FD-302s) are the accepted legal standard, even in criminal comt where the burden of proof is much higher than
it is here (proof beyond. a reasonable doubt rather than a preponderance of evidence).
149
Your counsel wouid have me exclude the other factors involved in this situation, arguing that "totality of the
circumstances" is not the appropriate analysis. It is indeed the appropriate analysis, even according to Benjamin, the
case upon which you rely in your written response, and something I presume you understood as well because you
otherwise would not have felt the neP,d to lie to the PD about these particular details in the hopes of better justifying
the shooting.
isn It is not clear from the documentation whether this phone cail to Friend was even me.ant to serve, i!1 your mind, as
the notification to a supervisor.

29

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PENALTY DETER1'1INATION
When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors,
including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior
disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors.

A. Misuse of Weapon-Intentional Discharge
The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5.15 (Misuse ofWeapon --Intentional Discharge)_ The standard penalty is a 30-day suspension. Mitigating factors warrant
a five-day to 14-day suspension, and aggravating factors wan:an:t a 45-day suspension to
dismissal.
I have considered all mitigating factors supported by the record, including, but not
limited to, your "successful" and "exceBent" performance ratings, the fact you were awakened
from sleep at the beginning of this incident, and the stress a law enforcement officer feels at the
prospect of himself being subject of a criminal investigation as well as a potential civil lawsuit
by the Individual. A shooting incident is an extremely stressful time for an agent and an agent
may need time to mentally process what happened.
Notwithstanding all relevant mitigating factors, I find aggravation is appropriate because
you still refuse to accept responsibility for your actions over lwo years later and at ali times
remained completely uncooperative V\,1th all federal entities investigating this matter, including
.FBI and DOJ-OIG. Your refusal to cooperate continued even after you were fr1,fonned there
would be no criminal prosecution and you therefore no longer had a Fifth .Amendment concern
about cooperating in the administrative proceeding. 151 Furthermore, you received a three-day
suspension for a loss of weapon violation afler the incident in question when, about a year later,
you left Bureau issued weapons in the trunk of your vehicle parked in your same neighborhood
as the shooting incident and the vehicle was stolen. This clearly shows that you still have not
learned appropriate weapon handling and safety.

If you could not by the time of the compelled DOJ-OIG interview, atler it was confirmed
for you that you were no longer facing the possibility of any criminal prosecution, admit that
your actions in this situation were objectively unreasonable, J believe you will never be able to
candidly examine your actions and acknowledge mistakes when you make them. This is a
significant risk to the FBI for multiple reasons, two of which are: the same mistake or poor
judgment may be made again; and when a mistake is made that could impact an investigation
and the employee is not willing to admit it (for example, accidental evidence mishandling), it
could lead. to negatively impacting an FBI case and preventing justice from being done.
I am also extremely concerned about your inability to appropriately apply the DOJ
Deadly Force Po.li.cy, given not only the events of this case but your reliance on your military
tactical training as part of your reasoning for believing certain factors contributed to thinking that
deadly force was appropriate (such as bullet ricochets as you experienced in small Middle
Eastern villages), and your extensive use of deadly force under a non-DOJ policy during your
isi Refusal to cMperate in an administrative proceedi11g is itself a violation of the FBI Offense Code and is
punishable only by dismissal.

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military career ("in excess of20 times"). From the evidence presented, you applied a different
standard for using deadly force than what is acceptable for an FBI agent and the FBI' s mission.
\X/hile the military's standard is appropriate for it.s soldiers' roles in combat zones, New York is
nota combat zone, nor is it a small Middle Eastern village. You are now an FBI agent in the
United States and it is FBI and DOJ policies by which you must abide. You must also abide by
the law, which includes refraining from using deadly force outside the scope of DOJ's deadly
force policy. The FBI employs numerous military veterans who have provided many significant
contributions to the FBI and the FBI appreciates the breadth of experience and dedication they
bring to their positions in the FBI. Most of these employees have transitioned well from their
military mission to the FBI mission. However, because you are either unrepentant and/or
incapable of acknowledging the severity of your actions in this situation, I am concerned you
will continue to justify the use of deadly force under a standard not appropriate for the FBI and
an FBI Special Agent.
Your conduct of refusing to testify in c. grand jmy and refusing to cooperate •vith the FBI
and DOJ-OIG was entirely unacceptable and reprehensible for an FBI employee. 152 Furthering
I
this disgrace and dishonor was the fact your refusal to testify against Individual
effectively deslroyed DA's ability to bring a case against tbem; hence, you obstructed justice,
conduct that seriously calls into question your judgment and character, especially given your
employment as an FBI Special Agent Should you have to testify in any FBI cases in the future,
the fact that you refused to testify and cooperate with this administrative process may have to be
disclosed. Thjs wiH not only impeach.your credibility, and therefore negatively impact FBI
cases, but it will also embarrass the FBI &'1d undermine its standing with the· public.

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Based on the circumstances in this case, I am dismissing you from the rolls of the FBI for
your 5.15 offense.

B. Lack of Candor/Lying- No Oath
The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offons~ Code 2.5 (Lack of Candor/Lying
· ··No Oath). The standard penalty is a seven-day suspension. Mjtigating factors warrant an oral
reprimand to a five-day suspension, and aggravating factors warrant a 10-day suspension to
dismissal.
I have considered all mitigating factors supported by the record, including, but not
limited to, your "successful" and "excellent" performance ratings, the fact you were awakened
from sleep at the beginning of this incident, and the stre.ss a law enforcement officer feels at the
prospect of himself being subject of a criminal investigation as well as a potential civil lawsuit
by the Individual. A shooting incident is an extremely stressful time for an agent and an. agent
may need time to mentally process what happened.
Notwithstanding all relevant mitigating factors, I find aggravation is appropriate because
you still refuse to be forthcoming about the differences in your statements to PD and DOJ-OIG
and to accept responsibility for your actions over two years later. Additionally, you at all times
152

I again note that failure to participate in an administrative proceeding and obstructing justice are both violations
of the FBI Offense Code. Rather than charging you with those separate violations, ram considering your conduct as
an aggravating factor.

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remained completely uncooperative with all federal entities investigating this matter, including

FBI a.."ld DOJ-OIG. Your refusal to cooperate continued even after you were informed there
would be no criminal prosecution and you therefore no longer had a Fifth Amendment concern
about cooperating in the administrative proceeding.153
Your misrepresentations to the PD/DA were material arid go to the heart of your
articulation of why you believed, however stiH um:easonably, you were justified to use deadly
force against Individual. These misrepresentations painted a more favorable picture for your
decision to shoot Individual than what you acknowledged the circumstances to be to DOJ-OIG
once the possibility of criminal prosecution was gone. Further.more, candor is essential for an
FBI agent for the integrity of FBI investigations.
You have refused to accept responsibility for your violations of the DOJ Deadly Force
Policy and you lacked candor in claiming you complied with the requirement to notify your
supervisor when you called Friend rather than Supervisor.
Based on the circumstances in this case, I am dismissing you from the rolls of the FBI for
your 2.5 offense.

CONCl,USION
In sum, a preponderance of the evidence substantiates that you violated Offense Codes
5.15 and 2.5. Violations of Offense Codes 5.15 and 2.5 both warrant dismissal. As a result, the
penalty of dismissal is appropriate. Your conduct, as set forth herein, represents a willful and
intentional violation of Bureau rules and regulations. As a result, I am dismissing you from the
rolls of the FBI. This action is necessary and warranted to promote the efficiency of the FBJ. 154

APPEAL IUGHTS

If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's
final decision, you must forward. a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Assistant
Director, Human Resources Division, Room 10903, Federal Bmeau of Investigation, J. Edgar
Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washhigton, D.C. 20535-0001. You
may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be
provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRD.
Your division head must be not.ified at the time you file an appeal. lf an appeal is filed for any

·

13

> Refusal to cooperate in an administrative proceeding is itself a violation of the FBI Offense Code and is
vunishable only by dismissal.
54
You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspect.ion Division's Internal
Investigations Section (US), OPR, the Human Resources Division's Appellate Unit (APU), the Security Division,
the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate
Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness
or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from HS, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are
admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are 1he
property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You
may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your
participation in this discipiinary inquiry and fo;- no other purpose.

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:rvrr.L-1_ _ _____.
action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the
appellate decision.

If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the AD, HRD,
will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar
days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The
standard of review on appeal in examining 0 PR' s factual findings and penalty is the substantial
evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either
the AD, HRD, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the AD, HRD, or the DRB identifies factors
that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case ·will be remanded to the
Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action.
Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that
the enclosed fonns are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney
handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and
provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to
re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals
Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals.
As a preference-eligible veteran, appeal to the AD, HRD, does not abrogate your right to
petition the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), in matters of suspension for more than
fourteen days, dismissal, or demotion, in accordance with the instructions contained in 5 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 1201. An appeal to MSPB may be filed on line or by mail,
facsimile, commercial overnight delivery, or personal delivery to the MSPB Regional Office
covering your geographic area, as specified in Appendix II of 5 CFR 1201. The facsimlle
number listed is TDD capable; however, calls will be answered by voice before being connected
to the TDD. Appeals must be filed no late!· than thirty calendar days from the effective date of
this action or thirty days after the date of receipt of this decision, whichever is later. Enclosed
for your assistance is a copy of the MSPB appeal form. For further infbrmation regarding the
MSPB appeal process, please visit their website at http://www.mspb.gov.
RF~FERRAL

TO OTHER DIVISIONS

In accordance with established poiicy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be
shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being
provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security
clearance.
NOTICE TO SEPARATED ElVl.PLO\'El!: REGARDING
FEDERAL EMPI.,OYEES HEALTH BENEFITS COVERAGE
Your Federal Employees Health Benefit (.FEHB) coverage will automatically continue at
no cost to you for 31 days after your separation.
Under authority of 5 U .S.C. § ·8905a and 5 C.F.R. § 890.1112, the Benefits Unit, Human
-Resources Division, has determined that this separation is for "gross misconduct" as defined by 5

33

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C.F.R. § 890.1102. As a result, the Bureau intends to deny you Temporary Continuation of
Coverage eligibility. This means your FEHB coverage \:\ill end 31 days after your separation
and you would not be allowed to em-oll for continued Federal Employees Health Benefits
coverage. You may appeal this determination to the Personnel Officer, HRD, FBI Headquarters,
Room l 0903, and a final decision on this matter ·will be issued in writing. A.n appeal must be
filed within ten calendar days following notification of your separation from the Bureau.
Sincerely yours,

Candice M. Will
Assistant Director
Office of Professional Responsibility,
Enclosures
1 - Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice
1 - ADIC, New York (Personal Attention)- Enclosure (See Note Pages 34-35)

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1-AD, OPR
1 ·· Security Division (Attn: Unit Chief, AIU, PAT-2/P-602) (For SecD records only--Do not
forward to RMD)
3 - HRD (Attn: Unit Chiet: PIPAPU~ Room 10997)
(Attn: Unit Chief, APU, Room 10283)
(Attn: Unit Chief, Benefits Unit, Room 10373) Insurance Matter
1 - Tickler Copy, OPR
Based on New York EC to OPR. 02/10/2015; OPR ROI, dated 04/16/2015; \\.Titten.response
from employee, dated 10/30/2015; and oral pr<".sentation on 11/06/2015.

I

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NOTE to ADIC: Th.is notice of dismissal is to be personally delivered to the employee by you
or your designated representative within seven calendar days from the date the Division receives
this letter. The Division should send OPR Unit Chie£1
Ian email advising of
the date on which the Division presented the letter to the employee. The date and time of
·delivery will serve as the effective date and time oftbis dismissal action. The employee should
be given a reasonable amount of time to secure personal belongings and thereafter be escorted
from the premises. Ensure the employee fully understands the reason for the Bureau's action· in
this matter, as well as the appeal rights, as outlined in the enclosed letter.
Furnish employee with a copy of Standard Form
Unemployment Compensation.

8~ Notice to

Federal Employee about

You should also telephonically provide the effective date and time of this action to the
Unit Chie±: Payroll/Personnel Actions Processing Unit, HRD, 202-324-8159, in order for that
unit to expeditiously detem1ine if any debt is owed to the Bureau by the employee.

34

..._____

···-··············· ... .

NYT-63

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 N.fr~L-------'

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Conduct exit interview and forward to the Unit Chief of the Payroll/Personnel Actions
Processing Unit of the HRD, JEH Room 10997.

It is your responsibility to ensure that the SF-52, Request for Personnel Action, is
electronically entered into HR Source for this dismissal action. It is imperative that the effective
date and time submitted on the exit interview match the information entered on the SF-52. The
Division shall enteT the following infom1ation in the "Justification" section of HR Source:
"Adjudication of disciplina...ry action."

L.......................................................................................- ................·-····························---

··----································--······· · · · - - - - - -

NYT-64

 V::

UNCLASSIFIED/~OR c>E flCIAL US f ! !NL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
· Federal ·Bureau of Investigation

Date:

03/18/2014

Report of:·

UC Dena Choucair ·

(U/~

Ca5e ID#:

297-HQ-A1271699-D

(U/~

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
TAMPA FIELD OFFICE, ORLANDO RESIDENT AGENCY
05/22/2013
.

(U/~

Investigative Peri6d: 05/22/2013 -03/14/2014

Office:

FBIHQ-INSD

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(U/$000) .Reference: E-mail on 05/22/2013 from Tampa Field Office A/SAQ.__ ___.
.____.Ito Chieflnspector.Robert J. Shields, Jr.

• b7C -1

(U/~ Synopsis:
(U/~ Report of a shooting incident which occurred oh 05/22/2013 involving
.:---.
Ibragim Abdulbakiyevich Todashev (Todashc::v) and FBI Bo~ton (BS) Field Office A ent
IMassachusetts State Police (MSP) Troopers
and
. . ._______I and FBI Tampa (TP) Task J:orce Officer (TFO)
of ·
the Orland~ Police Departm~nt (OPD).

I

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·I

(U/~ Details:
(U/~ On 04/2112013, after the Boston Marathon bombing, the TP Orlando
Resident Agency (ORA) received an iminediate lead regarding Todashev. The lead referenced
telephonic contact between Todashey and Boston MarathQn bombing ~uspect Tamerlan
Tsarnaev. TP ORA TFOI
lalong with another TP ORA FBI Agent conducted an interview
_ :ofTodashev on 04/21/2013. The interview was initially conducted at Todashev's residence and
then vtas moved to.the OPD. The purpose of this interview was to identify the nature of the
relationship between Todashev and Tsarnaev. During the interview, Todashev stated he had
trained as a Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) fighter with Tsarnaev in Boston. Todashev voluntarily
provi9ed his DNA and signed consent to search forms for his computer and five cellular
telephones. On 04/23/2013, TP ORA initiated a Full Investigation (Fl) on Todashev.

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(U/~ Todashev was a certified MMA fighter in both Florida and Massachusetts
with a prior history of assault which was known to TP' Age~t I
I and the MSP Troopers.
He held a Florida State Boxing Commission license, number FED#: 129-225 with an expiration
date of 08/08/2017, and a State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation,

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UNCLASSlFIED//.E )R OFFI@M:L t;SE (IN I.'[
Page 1 of24

NYT-65

 ~

UNCLASSIFIED/@R <!Ff'ICIAL US'E <INIJY

!vfMA Participant, license nwnber PART4184, with an. expiration date of 12/31/2012. In
addi~on, Todashev held a Massachusetts - Department of Public SafetY State Athletic
Commission MMA Amateur License, nwnber: A3105, with an expiration date of 07/18/2012.
Information obtained from local law enforcell).ent reports and a National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) report documented Todashev' s prior alleged involvement in violent interactions.
Specifically, in a Boston Police Department (PD) report of an incident on 02/11/2010, Todashev
was charged with Disorderly Person, Resisting Arrest, Reckless Drivi.ng, and Weaving. In an
Osceola County Sheriff's Office (SO) statement dated 07/07/2012, Todashev was mentioned as a
Iin a Simple Battery incident
participant with another individual,!
involving the attack on an employee of the Ali Baba Hookah Cafe. Todashev was not arrested or
charged in this incident. Most recently, an Orange County SO Incident Report of an incident on
05/04/2013, stated Todashev was arrested for Aggravated Batte.ry (causing bodily harm or
disability to another), a Second Degree Felony. In addition, MMA fights involving Todashev
were pos_ted on YouTube and had been observed by TP, Agentl
I an~ the MSP
Troopers.

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(U/~ Through BS's investigation, additional information was obtained indicating
Tod~shev's possible involvement in a tpple homicide in Waltham, Massachusetts on 09/11/2011.
Based on this infonnation, BS requested a second interview which was conducrd by TFO
I
lalong with another TP ORA FBI Agent. Agend
land Trooper
observed
the interview which was conducted at the OPD on 05/16/2013. The interview strategy focused
on establishing Todashev's timeline in tQ.e Boston area in September 2011 and his association
with Tsarnaev. During the interview, Todashev provided information which indicated his .
presence in the Boston area on about 09/10/2011, as well as further clarification on his contacts.
Todashev also mentioned a tentative plan to leave the co~try, hov.:ever no date was provided.

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·I

(U/~ . It was during this interview that TP contacted Citizenship and Immigration
Services CIS re ardingl
t--~~~~~~-as
__
~
t:o:dash_~
ev
_
w_a_
s~
b~
ei~
ng~
in
-terv
---.ie_w
_e~d~
. 1...---------------t .
This action b CIS was not well received by Todashev and
Todashev blamed the FBI fo

I

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--------------.-------'---------------

(U/~ After the interview, TP obtained information indicating Todashev had

tenta.tive travel plans to return to Russia on 05/24/2013. Due to Todashev' s possible departure
from the U.S., CTD requested another interview for the purpose of solidifying Todasliev's
timeline in the Boston area in September 2011 and to subsequently conf~ont Todashev with
forensic evidence associated with the homicides. On 05/21/2013, TFOI
!arranged an
interview with Todashev for later that evening at OPD. While preparing for the interview, Agent
I
land Troopers!
l~d l
lleamed Todashev did not want to meet at the OPD
due tol
jduring his prior interview with the FBI. Howeyer,
Todashev agreed to meet at his apartment. f'odashev's residence was an apartment with a
stanqalone address of 6022 Peregrine Avenue, Orlando, Floridi. AgeTI
rs supervisor
s supervisor was also
had been briefed the interview would take place at OPD. TFO
briefed the interview would take place at OPD; however, was subsequently informed the
interview location changed to Todashev'.s residence.

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'---- - ----'----- - - - - -- - -- - - - - -- -- -- - - --·- ·"··-

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J

 UNCLASSIFIED/lfOR I >l'FICtAt 'tlSE I >NI Y._ ·
(U/~ For the 05/21/2013 Todashev interview, no operational or arrest plan was

documented and there was no plan in place to arrest Tadashev. In addition, no communications
plan was established to provide operational updates to the appropriate FBI personnel on the
progress of the interview.
·
·
(U/~ While making arrangements for the interview and due to the change in
venue, Troope
lbriefly discussed recording Todashev's interview. Both
Troopers mentioned the recordin, devices they both possessed. On th,e way to the interview, the
MSP Troopers, Agend
and TFOI
lbriefly discussed whether Florida was a one
or two party consent state: No decision was made to record the interview. SIRT later
detennined Florida is a two party consent state with a law enforcement exception.

(U/~ On 05/21/2013, at approximately 7:35 p.m., TFOI
I Agent!..__ ___.
·and Troopers
met in the arking lot ofTodashev's residence with Todashev
an4 his frien
Todashev led. the MSP Troopers and Agent
I
Iinto his apartment while TFO
who had no involvement in the Waltham
homicide investigations, remained outside of the apartI:nent with Todashev's friend.._
! _ __.
Prior to entering Todashev's apartment, the law enforcement officer's obs~rved an image of an
AK-47 at the top of Todashev's front door. TFOI
Iprovided perimeter security, for the
duration of the ·interview.

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(U/~ TP had surveillance coverage on Todashev on the evening of05/21/2013,
from 4 p.m. to midnight. Tue surveillance team was in tlie vicinity ofTodashev's residence ·
throughout the evening and spot checked Todashev's parking lot for a specific vehicle associated
D·
with Todashev. At approximately 7:45 p.m., two un,known males (TFOI
were observed in Todashev's parking lot near said vehicle. At approximately 11 p.m., the
vehicle departed the parking lot and traveled to a gas stat~on before returning to the same parking
lot. Surveillance was tenninated at midnight.

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(U//~ Todashev's residence was a two-level apartment with a separate entrance.
The ground floor consisted of two rooms, a living room and a kitchen separated by a counter
which pennitted viewing from one room into the othe~. A small hallway next to the kitchen·
connected the apartment entrance to the living room. A sliding glass door was located at the rear
of the living room which provided access to a commo~ area behind the residence. A single
stairway in the living roor~ led to the upstairs loft and bathroom. Hanging on the stairwell wal~
in the living room was ametal sword. The approximat~ overall inner dimensions for the ground
floor were 14'5" by 32'2".

(U/~ Upon entering the apartment, Agen~
hook a seat, on the second
stair stel whichlled up to the loft. Troope4
Isat in a folding chair in the living room and
Trooper
stood against the stairwell wall, also in the living room. Todashev sat on the
floor next to a bed located in the comer of the living room, adjacent to the sliding glass door.
ts front left. Trool?er·
This was dire~tly across from TrooperC:]and to Agent!
!conducted the interview with occasional support from Trooperl
land Agent

I

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I

I
UNCLASSIFIED/@R QElitClftb ''SE oNLf
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UNCLASSIFIED/@& ( lf PICI:Af:; tJS e (>&r;y

iI
I

!

'

I

· ~ Shortly after entering T~dashev' s apartment, unbeknownst to the others,
Trooperc:::::::::J turned on his small portable MSP audio recording device concealed in his left
breast pocket. The interview began almost immediately and Todashev was described as calm,
.articulate, and not excited or agitated. Approximately 20 minutes into the interview, Trooper
I
Iremembered he had a personal JVC digital recorder in his bag. He decided to tum it on
anCi placed it on the table after he deleted some·ofhis family videos to.make room to record the
I
interview. This was also done unbeknownst to the others. As Todashev talked, Trooper!
continued to check the recorder and had to delete additional family videos on two occasions to
make more room to record. The first portion of the interview was also deleted in order to ensure
there was enough room to record once the conversation focused on the Waltham murders.

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(U/~ Throughout the duration of the interview, Todashev was free to move
around his apartment and allowed to smoke cigarettes, open and close the sliding glass door for
ventilation, and take both water and restroom breaks. Approximately two hours into the ·
interview, the questioning transitioned from Todashev's timeline in Boston and his conta:cts to
his i~volvement with the triple homicide.

i !

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I

___..

It was at this point, at approxim~tely 10125 p.m., when Trooper
rovided Todashev with his Miranda warning. Troope
verbally provided the
warnmg to Todashev and had him sign the Miranda warning fonn (FD-395). Th.is was captured
via Trooperl
ts personal JVC digital recorder. Todashev waved his ri hts and continued to
answer questions. At approximately the same time, Todashev's friend
rovided TFO
I
!with Todashev's cellular telep1'one and wallet and left the area. TFO
texted the
MSP Troopers he had p~ssession ofTodashev's property. Troope~
~xited the residence
to retrieve the property from TFOI
land then returned to the interview.

,,

(U/~ During the interview, Troop~rl

!provided updat~s to Middlesex
Assistant District Attorney (ADA)l
At approximately 10:30 p.m., ADA
I
Iheaded into his office in anticipation of drafting an indic.tment based on the information
I
.
provided by Troope~

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I

(U/~ A short time after Todashev signed the Miranda warning, the JVC battery

I
!·

failed.and Troo e
interview.

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used his ersonal cellular tele hone to continue recordin the

,___ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ ___, Todashev noticed Troo er

ecording with his
omplied. A short time later,
placed his personal cellular telephone on the dining room table and resumed
·

cell~arJelephor and requested it be turned off. Trooper

Troope
recording.

. (U/~ The recordings, both via Trooped
ts personal JVC digital recorder and
his person.a l cellular telephone, captured Todashev's description of both Tsarnaev's and
I
Todashev's participation in the triple homicide. In summary,!

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UNCLASSIFIEDl@R uf FICIA:Js '!SE uNty
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UNCLASSIFIED/~OR ( 1FFICIAI5 ! 1SF. ONLY
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;.

(UI~ Once the questioning f<;>cused on his presence in the Boston area during the
time .ofthe Waltham homicide~
Todashev's demeanor changed. TodaShev began to chain smoke, repeatedly glanced around the
room, appeared fidget)', and looked as if he was stretching his arms and legs as he spoke.

I

"

.

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With the sliding glass door open in the room, Todashev sat on the bed and
L -........- . -........_ _................................_ _........_ _................_ _ _ _........_ _ _ _........_ _........---9......................._ . .................----t At

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ci
I

(UI~ As Todashevl
Agentl
I moved
fs seat on the f\14ing
in front of the white
from his position on the stairs to Trooper!
table, approximately six to seven feet from Todashev. Trooper
stayed standing in his
original location next to the stairwell wall. ·As seen on Trooper
s· cellular telephone video
recording, Todashevl
lbegan to smoke and drink water as he scanned the
room, Todashev asked for more cigarettes even though a nearly full pack was on the· table in
believed Todashev was attempting to get him to leave the room.
front of him. Trooped

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I

(U/~ While Todashev

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Trooper._!_ .....
turned off his personal cell phone recording device in order to use his phone and review his
messages.
Trooper
heard.Todashev askAgent
.__................................................................................- Agent.___ _..... responded stating,.__............ Shortly
afterward, Todashev asked to go to the restroom.

· (UI~ For safety purposes, just like prior trips to the restroom, Trooper I
Iand
Agentl
laccompaniedTodashev upstairs to the restroom. Agentl
lwas at the
top of the stairs and Trooperl
!was standing on the stairs about halfway up where he could
maintain visual contact. Both were alert due to Todashev's deliberate behavior as Tcidashev was
moving extremely slow, looking around, and did not appear to have to use the bathroom.
·
Trooper!
land Agentl
lmade eye contact and gestured to on~ another to be aware
of the threat Todashev posed.

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(U/~ When Todashev finished in the restroom, Trooper!
!proceeded down
the stairs first, followed by Todashev, and then by Agent!
I Due to Todashev's

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·

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;

!·l
NYT-69

 UNCLASSIFIED/ZfoR < Q<FJCb'tb YSE 1 >Nl,Y

noticeable change in behavior, Trooped
lbecame concerned Todashev might try to flee or
attack them. Troopert
!previously observed Todashev looking around at the metal sword
and described Todashev as moving extremely slowly as if he was calculating in his mind. As
Troopere:::::Jturned toward the main room, he grabbea the sword which was hanging on the
wall, and as a safety precaution, quickly placed the sword behind a shoe ·rack next to the kitchen
entrance. Although Todashev was still on the stairs, Trooper!
!believed Todashev saw him
hide the sword due to his reflection in a large mirror positioned at the bottom of the stainvay.
This mirror appeared to be strategically placed to view the hallway leading to ihe front door from
fs training and experience, he was alert and felt the need to
the stairs. Based on Trooped
remove the sword hanging on the apartment wall as Todashev's demeanor had changed.
(U/~ Todashev returned to "his posi~on sitting on the bed I..._______.....
.....__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___, Agent!
I returned to sit in the
folding chair directly in front of the white table and Todashev. Trooper I
Ichanged position
and sat on the stairs, while Trooper!
Iremained.outside.

.
(U/~ Due to Todashev's continued methodical behavior, Tryperl I
lsent a
text mes.sage at 12:03 a.m. on 05/22/2013 to Agentl
land Trooper
which read:
"Be on guard. He is in vulnerable position to do something bad. Be on guard now. I see him
looking around at times." Troope~as on his cell phone at the time and was unaware of
the iJ:?.coming text message. Trooperc=Jwaited for Agentl
BlackBerry. to '~ding"
to signify the receipt of the text message. After about a minute, Trooperl
lstill did not hear
the "ding" so he looked down to check his cell phone to make sure the text went through.

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I

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rs

(U/~ Almost immediately at 12:04 a.m., Todashev was in the process ofl

!"
I

!

.

.:.

while Agent l
lw._a_s_ ....
...._--::-----::-:------:-----::-=--.....--......-'7"""-:-:----:-'7"""-:
reading his notepad and Trooper
was looking at his phone for the text message.
Suddenly, Agent!
!heard a loud noise and felt a blow to the bacl~ of his head. Trooper
I
lwas looking at his personal cell phone when he heard what he described as a roaring
noise and looked up to see the1table between Todashev and Agentl
!flying toward
Agerttl
I Todashev had flipped the table he was writing on, and Trooper!
I
believed it had. struck Agentl
Iin the head. Trooperl
Iimmediately yelled 'c=J
(Trooper!
t to alert Troope~
!there was trouble inside the residence. Agent
I
I who was knocked partially off his chair, saw Todashev run past him towards the
kitchen and trie~ to grab Todashev's legs but missed. Agentl
Ithen stood up, drew his
weapon, and gave verbal commands more than once to Todashev, to include, "sh.ow me your
hands!" Agentl
I observed Trooped
Ito his left but was focused on Todashev ~d
not aware ifTrooperl
lhad drawn his weapon.
(U/~ Agent I
Istood in the middle of the living room and saw Todashev
in the kitchen.and described what he heard as the sound of metal banging together like knives in
a hurried fashion. Agentl
Icontinued to give verbal commands for Todashev to show
Ibelieved Todashev had retrieved
his hands, but Todashev did nol complr Agentl
some type of weapon. Trooper
then observed Todashev run toward -the front door near
the kitchen area and began quickly scanning left to right as if looking for something. Trooper
I
Ithought Todashev was trying to flee and stepped towards him.. As Todashev reached the

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~·

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UNCLASSIFIED/@R <>EPICb*tb US E <>NU
front door he grabbed a red pole, approximately .five-feet long, which was leaning against the
wall near the front door. Trooperl
!described Todashev's movements as incredibly quick,
' "like· something in a movie." As he grabbed the pole, Todashev turned quickly, ran at full speed
Iand Agentl
I Agentl
Isaw
from the entryway directly toward Tr:ooperl
Todashev's left shoulder drop as he came through the entryway toward the living room where he
and Troopert
lwere standing. Again knoWing ofTodashev's prior arrests and status as a
MMA fighter, Agentl
lnoted that it was obvious to him that Todashev was in an attack
lsaw Toda~hev raise the pole above his head With both hands in a
posture. Trooper!
fighting position, arid charge toward Trooper!
I Trooper!
kaised his arms in front of
his face to protect himself and stated he believed Todashev was, "going to impale me with the
pole.' '
·

I·

·
(U/~ In the split second available to assess the threat posed by Todashev, Agent
· r::::::=:Jwas in fear for his life and the life ofTroop~rl
I In order to stop.this threat,
~
Ishot Todashev with two volleys of three to four shots per volley. Trooper
L__J heard the shots fired from 'the first volley off to his right and saw Todashev make two
twisting movements with his torso which indicated he had been impacted by the shots. Both
Iand Agent!
Iobserved Todashev fall and almost immediately re!..
Trooper!
establish his footing, suddenly lunging towards them at an angle. Still in fear for his and the
MSP Trooper's life, Agentl
lshot'Todashev with a second volley of three or four shots
!heard the shots and saw Todashev fall to the ground,
in order to stop the threat. Trooperl
face frrst. At that time, both Agend
land Trooper!
!believed the threat had been
eliminated. Agentl
Ifired seven shots in total using his Bureau issued Glock 23, all of
which hit Todashev with the fatal shots entering his head and heart.
(U/~ Immediately after the second volley of shots, Trooperl
lheard Agent
1..---.....:........;,lyell "call 91 l." Trooper!
!turned to look toward Agentl
land saw he
~as bleeding profusely fro~ his head. Trooped
!applied pressure to a large laceration near
rs head.
the back of Agent!

.
(U/~ Trooper!
I who was still outside on his cell phone with ADA...:il. .______.I
heard noise coming from inside the residence foll9wed by·several' gunshots. Troo...!p~er:.!l=___.l did
not notice anyone else outside, dropped his notes, and drew his weapon. Trooper!
L
followed by TFOI
I announced himself, and came through the front door of the apartn;ient
which was not locked. When Trooperc::::::::J entered the apartment, he saw Todashev lying on
the floor. It was apparent to Trooperc::Tdue to the multiple gunshots and lack ofmov~ment,
that Todashev was dead.
(U/~ Immediately after entry into the apartment, Trooped
lsaw Agent
-----.....Ibleeding fro~ the head profusely. Trooper!
Iapplied pressure to Agent
I
rs wound while Trooper!
Ichecked Todashev. Trooper!
Iused a rubber
medical glove and checked Todashev for a carotid and ulnar pulse. Trooper!
!was unable
to locate a pulse at either location and.Todashev's eyes were open and unblinking. Trooper
I
Ibelieved Todashev was deceased and did not mov.e llis.body further to keep from
disturbing the scene.

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(U/~ After entry, TFol
!stepped back out of the doorway and called
Emergency Medical Services at approximately 12:07 a.m. The Orlando Fire Department
responded and after arriving on-scene pronounced Todashev dead. Agentl
land
lwere taken to the hospital where lgentl I
lwas treated for a large gash
Trooperl
···on his head which required nine staples. Trooper
sustained no injuries other than a
temporary hearing impairment in his right ear due to the sound produced by the gunshots_.

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(U/~ The SIRT was initially not aware of the audio and video recordings taken
!advised the
during the interview ofTodashev on 05/21/2013. On 06/05/2013, Agentl
SIRT of the existence of the recordings obtained by the MSP Troopers during the interview of
Todashev. On 06/06/2013, the SIRT obtained the Todashev audio and video interview
recordings from the MSP. Three recording devices were used by the MSP Troopers at various
times during the interview. In total, the devices captured four recorded video segments, three
with audio, and one without. The recordings captured various portions of the interview and
confession ofTodashev; however, none captured the shooting incident. Florida is a two-party
consent state with a law enforcement exception. Therefore, the MSP Troopers, as law
enforcement officers, were within authority 'to record T0dashev without his consent. The
Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division concurs with this analysis and reviewed the
audio and video recordings.

.I

. (U/~ On 06/13/2013, the.SIRT re-interviewed Troopers !....- - - - - - ·regarding· the use of the recording devices.

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(U/~ On 07/24/2013, FBI Chief Inspector Robert Shields, Jr., Inspector Dena
~Assistant Inspector!
l and DOJ Civil Rights Attorneyc=J
l___Jtravelled to Orlando and met with Chief Medical Examiner Dr.I
land
Medical Examiner (ME) Dr.I
Ito discuss the Autopsy Report ofTodashev.
Todashev was shot seven times and the entry and exit points ofeach bullet and angles of impact
were fully discussed. Most importantly, the shots to Todashev's body were angled indicating a
twisting, bending, or turning of the body at the time of entry. The shots included three to the left
upper side ofTodashev's torso, two to the middle rigpt side of his back, one to the top left
shoulder, and one to the left side of the crown of his head. Based on the wounds and the internal
path of the bullets, it is likely-rodashev was moving throughout the incident. Dr. I
I
advised the trajectory of the bullets through the body indicated the shooter was to the left of
1'odashev. In addition, the results of the autopsy were consistent with Todashev falling forward
Iand Dr. O also indicated the shot to the
toward the shooter with head down. Dr.I
head was likely one oftlie final shots as it was incapacitating.·

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I

.r

· · (U/~ Dr.I
!advised the trajectory of the head and shoulder wounds, the . ·
combination of the seven entrance wounds to include the paths of the bullets, were inconsistent
with other possible scenarios. First, due to the extreme downward trajectory of the wounds to
the head ("A") and upper shoulder (''B"), these wounds were inconsistent with the shooter being
behind Todashev as if Todashev was running away. Rather, tho~e extreme downward
trajt;ctories could have occurred when Todashev had ~s back to tlie shooter, only if: 1.)
Todashev leaned backwards at a·severe angle toward the shooter; or 2.) Todashev was standing

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UNCLASSIFIED/~EPICIAis t'SF ~
Page 8 of 24

I

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UNCLASSIFIED/@R OFFICIAb ''SF. ONIJY:
below a shooter who was above him; or 3.) Todashev was shot while both he 'a nd the shooter
were prone on the floor.
(U/~ On 07/25/2013, a meeting was held with A!USAI

LNinth Judicial

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Circuit of Florida, State Attorney Jeffrey Ashton, and the State Attorney's Office Investigator
I A full briefing of the shooting incident was provided by Inspector Choucair and
disks/binders of the Sffi.T investigation were provided. The State Attorney expressed concern
about backlash from the public once the ME Report was release?, as it described shots to
Todashev's back and advised he would conduct an independent review of tht:: shooting. The·
State Attorney requested to re-interview the MSP Troopers and audio recor~ those interviews.

I

.

.

(U/~ The fyfSP Troopers were re-interviewed on 09/0~/2013 by the State Attorney
I These re-interviews did not provide any new substa!)tive information.
Investigator!
Observers to the interview incladed: MSP Command Staff, DOJ Civil Rights Division Attorney
I
IFBI Inspector Choucair, and Assistant Inspector!
I·

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(U/~ At the time of the SIRT, based on infonnation provided by OPD, a decision
was made by Inspector Choucair not to conduct a neighborhood canvass. Upon further
discussion and review by·FBIHQ Inspection Division, DOJ Civil Rights Division, and the State
Attorney, a decision was made to conduct interviews despite .the time period that had lapsed. On
12/04/2013, Assistant Inspector!
Iwith the assistance of a TP ORA Agent conducted a
neighborhood canvass of the residences surrounding 6022 Peregrine Avenue, Orlando, Florida, .
32819. Seventeen residences were approached, of which occupants of three residences described
hearing shots fired around midnight. Of the three, one resident observed the lights on, the sliding
glass door blinds open, and several males inside Todashev's residence. The resident thought this ·
was odd, because the blinds were never open. At approximately 12:00 a.m. on 05/22/2013, this
resident heard four loud pops, followed by three additional pops. Although he/she could not see
where the.noise came from, he/she believed the individuals across the lake were doing
construction, and looked out the window and observed several individuals "hovering" ovel
something on the ground. This resident advised hefshe did not call the police to report what was
heard because he/she thought the noise was attributed to construction.

(U/~ Todashev was described as:
Name:
Aliases:
Sex:
Race:
Date of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Height:
Weight:
Eyes'.
Hair:.
SSAN:
FBI number:

Ibragim Abdulbakiyevich Todashev
Ibrahim Todashev
Male
White
09/22/1985
Romania
5' 10"
165
Brown
Brown
012-92-3661
20549HD1

UNCLASSIFIED//£DR c!f FICI/xb \JSE ! >NL)C
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 UNCLASSIFIEDll°EOR < >~FICIAL USE I >NL'[
(U/~ Substantive Case Files:

(U/~
(U/~

. Case ID: 89B-TP-2886360
Title:
IBRAGIM TODASHEV;
SPECIAL AGENTl------------.
May 22, 2013

(U/~
(U/~

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Case ID: 343G-BS-2902066
Title:·
(SUBJECTS) IBRAGIM TODASHEV;
TAMERLAN TSARNAEV; UNSUB(S); .
(VICTIMS) BRENDEN MESS; RAPHAEL
TEKKEN; ERIK WEISSMAN; DOMESTIC
POLICE COOPERATION; HOMICIDE;
09/11/2011

(U/~ Enclos~res:
(U) All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identified in the enclosed
table of contents.

A. (U/~ Administrative:

(U/~ The Shooting Incident. Review Team CSIRT) was comprised of the following
personnel:
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Inspector-in-Charge (UC) Dena Choucair
Assistant Inspector (AI)/Lead Team Leaded.__ _ _ _ __.
AI/Tearn Leaded
I
Assistant Inspector-in-Place (AIIP)I.___ _ ___.

~~~I

I

(U/~ FBI Laboratory Shooting :1leconstruction Team CLSRT) Personnel:
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Team Leader SSA!
!- Evidence Response Team Unit
Photographed
Operational Projects Unit, Photographic Operations and
·
Field Photograph1 Programs
·
Visual Information Specialis~-Operational Projects Unit, Digital
Mappiqg and Documentation

F

B. (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Protocol:
(U) All members ofthe S~T reviewed 'the FBI produced video entitled, "The Rain After
the Storm - Shooting Incident Investigations" and the Inspection Division Shooting Review
Protocol.

UNCLASSIFIED/lfoB I !FIJIGb\L ~SE 1 >NI.'[
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"-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·..·-

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(U/~ On 05/22/2013, IIC Choucair spoke with TP ORA ASAC Robert C. Geeslin
who was acting on behalf of A/SAQ
Ito arrange logistics prior to arriving in TP
ORA. On 05/22/2013, the SIRTtraveled to TP ORA and upon arriving, IIC Choucair and the
SIR.T members went directly to the scene of the incident, 6022 Peregrine Avenue, Orlando,
Florida. Upon arriving, the SIRTwas greeted by ASAC Robert C. Geeslin, TP ERT Coordinator
IBS ssAI
I and MSP Detective Lieutenan~
I .
The SIR.Twas briefed by ASAC Geeslin and TP ERT Coordinator!
I The SIR.T
observed the scene through the front and rear door of the Todashev's residence as TP ERT
·
described the scene.

I

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j

(U/~t1Ci)" On 05/23/2013, IIC'Choucair met with Agent!
I TFOI
lthe
two MSP Troopers, their respective attorneys, and management personnel to explain the review
process and protocols.

I
:.

(U/~ Four Signed Sworn Statement ~SSS) were taken, two from the Agent
and two from the MSP Trooper who
directly involved in the shooting, Agent!
I Other interviews, events, and observations were
witnessed the sho9ting, Trooper!
documente~ via FD-302s. Trooper!
I TFOI
I ASAC Geeslin, and SSAI
I
I
lwere allowed to read their FP-302s to confirm the accuracy of the information provided.
Neither the FD-644 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information on
a Voluntary Basis) nor FD-645 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide
Information) were utilized: The SSSs and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily.

. (U) An FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee· Re,uested to Provide Information
Following a Shooting Incident) was executed by A.gentl
for his SSS.

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(U/~ On 05/24/2013, IIC Choucair, ASAC Geeslin, and TU
lheld a
conference call with the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) Chiefl
lofthe
Middle District of.Florida, and provided a briefing of the Agent-involved shooting. USAO Chief
c=Jprovided a verbal declination of prosecution to IIC Choucair regarding the Agent-involved
shooting incident which ·occurred on 05/22/2013.
~

.

. (U/~ On 05/24/2013, IIC Choucair, ASAC Geeslin, and TU
lheld a
conference call with the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida State Attorney Jeffrey Ashton. State
Attorney Ashton re·quested the documentation of the facts from-the Shooting Incident Response
Review. State Attorney Ashton verbally advised the actions taken by the FBI on 05/22/2013, to
include use of deadly force, were justified based on the verbal briefing provided by IIC
Choucair. State Attorney Ashton wanted the opportunity to review the documentation before
·providing the letter of declination and concluded with a verbal declination of prosecution. He
advised. a formal declination letter would be issued once all the facts are reviewed.
(U) On 05/24/2013, IIC Choucair telephonically contacted Attorney!.___ _ _ __.
Special Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division and provided an update on
the investigation.

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®LY

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(U) On 05/24/2013, IIC Choucair conducted an out briefwith ASA~ Qeeslin and
·. explained the ensuing steps of the $IRT process. UC Choucair also provided an out brief to
Agen~
land the MSP Troopers to explain the ensuing steps of the SIRT process.

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C. (U/~ Personn.el Involved in the Shooting:
1.
2.
3.
4.

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BS SAi
l(fired weapon)
- -....1---lllllLlo.;;;;;;,;I
MSP Trooper=====::;---·
MSPTrooperl
I
TP TFO and Orlando PD, Master Police Officer I____....

D. (U/~ Firearms Training:

(U/~ ·The BS Field Office provided qualification records for Age~~...._ ___.l A
review indiCated he was current on his firearms qualification certification.

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E. (U/~ Deadly Force Training:
;.

. (U/~ FBI Deadly Force Policy Training was conducted on 10/23/2012 during legal
training provided to the BS personnel. BS ssAI
I Chief Division Counsel,
advised SSAC:]or SSAl
l Associate Division Counsel were the presenters of
·this training, which was memorialized via Electronic Communication dated 01/17/2013. A
·
review of the attendance records conducted by SSAL:]indicated Agentl
twas present
fo! the training conducted on 10/23/2012.
·
·

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:.

F. (U/~ Use Of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers:

;.

(U/~ As the Agent and MSP Troopers were conducting an interview of TodasP,ev
.and not participating in a planned law enforcement action, none of them were wearing
identifiable ballistic body armor, nor were FBI or law enforceme11;t identifiers displayed.
However, all personnel verbally identified themselves as FBI and law enforcement officers to
Todashev upon their initial arrival at his residence for the interview.

G. (UI~)° Criminal History:
(U/~) The NCIC criminal history check contained two entries for Todashev which
documented two arrests for offenses including aggravated battery, disorderly conduct, and
resisting arrest. At the time of th~ NCIC query.on 05/23/2013, no active arrest warrants were
located for Todashev.
(U//~ In addition, three police reports were obtained for Todashev. A Boston PD
incident report on Todashev referenced a traffic altercation on 02111/2010 in which Todashev
was charged with Disorderly Person, Resisting Arrest, Reckless Driving, and Weaving. An
Osceola County SO incident report on Todashev referenced an assault at the Ali Baba Hookah
Bar on 07/07/2012. Alth~ugh not arrested or charged by the SO, Todashev was associated with
another individual,
who was charged and arrested for Tampering with a

.:

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Victim by Threat regarding this incident. An Orange Col,lllty SO incident report on Todashev
·dated 05/04/2013 indicated Todashev was arrested for.Aggravated Battery (causing bodily harm
or disability to another), a Second Degree Felony, for an incident involving two other individuals
·
over a parking space.
. H. (U/~ Laboratory Division Reports:
(U/~ The scene of the shooting was secured and processed by the TP Field Office
ERT-and the Laporatory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LRST) to include use of Total Station.
(U/~ TP ERT collected seven shell casings in the-vicinity of where Agent
lr---...._-;lfired his weapon. Six projectiles were recovered from the body ofTodashev during
· the medical examination. One projectile was recovered from the scene. This projectile was
believed to·have fallen out of the body ofTodashev with bodily fluids as the body was being
turned over by those assisting the Medical Examiner. FBI TP Total Station and FBI Laboratory
Laser Scanning and Spherical Photography were completed at the shooting scene. No Trajectory
Analysis was completed as all projectiles entered the body ofTodashev and had no other impact
points.

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· 1

I

(U/~ Recovered evidence items requiring laboratory testing were as follows:

l·

Firearmstroolmarks Unit Analysis
IB7 One expended .40 Smith & Wesson caliber cartridge casing
·1B8 One expended-.40 Smith & Wesson caliber cartridge casing
IB9One expended .40 Smith & Wesson caliber cartridge casing
!BIO - One expended .40 Smith & Wesson caliber cartridge casing
!Bl 1- One expended .40 Smith & Wesson caliber cartridge casing
IB12 - One expended .40 Smith & Wesson caliber cartridge casing
1B13- One expended .40 Smith & Wesson caliber cartridge casing
!BlOne projectile, .40/lOmm caliber copper jacketed hollow point bullet
1B23- Six projectiles, .40/lOmm caliber copper jacketed hollow point bullets
·1B22- Smith & Wesson_.40 caliber Glock pistol, Model 23, Serial NumberNMS622

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(U/~Two laboratory reports, dated 07/07/2013 and 09/30/2013, stated the seven
projectiles and seven cartridge cases were identified as having been fired from the barrel of the
Glock #23, Serial NMS622. This·was the bureau issued weapon of Agen~
I

.I

I

Latent Fingerprint Unit Analysis
1B2 - · Notebook
'1B3Sword
1B14 - Broom stick
;.

I
!

(U~ One laboratory report, dated 10/24/2013, stated one latent fingerprint of value
was detected on the sword and was not~ fingerprint of Todashev, Agentl
I or either of
the MSP Troopers. No latent prints of value were detected on the broom stick. Due to the many
factors involved in the deposition of a friction ridge print, neither the absence of a friction ridge

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print on evidence nor the exclusion of :;i friction ridge print with a given source disassoqiate ~at
source from having touched the evidence. One laboratory report, dated 11/13/2013, stated six
· latent fingerprints and· two latent palm prints of value were detected on the notebook containing
the handwritten statement ofTodashev. The latent fingerprints ~d a latent palm print were
identified as fingerprints and a palm print ofTodasliev. The remaining latent palm print was not
a palm print ofTodashev. No other major case prints were provided for analysis~

Nuclear DNA Unit Anal sis
1B4- Suit coat (Trooper,___ _,
1B32- White table
1B33- Shelf from white table
. 1B15 - Dark paiits (Agent.-:-!·-----..
1B16- Dark coat (Agend
•
1Bl8- White dress shirt ':"'(A'."""g-e-ntl..,._L--_-.

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(U/~ One laboratory report, dated 09/18/2013, stated blood was identified on the

suit coat (Trooper!
ts), the white table, and the shelf from the white table. The typing
results were positive for male DNA on all three items and Todashev was excluded as a potential
contributor:. The laboratory obtained Agentl
ts DNA fqr comparison from the bloodied
suit Agentl
lwas wearing during the incident. A second laboratory report, dated
10/28/2013, stated Agentl
!was the major contributor and source of the DNA obtained
from the suit coat (Trooper!
fs); the white table, and the shelf from the white table.

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Operational Projects Unit
(U/~ Additionally: the Operational :Projects Unit provided demonstrative·imagery and
~raphics

of the scene.

·

I. (U/~ Medic~I Report:

FBI Agent If!-volved in the Shooting: SA.

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. _ I_ _ _ _ __ _ ,

(U/~ On 05/22/2013, Agen~
lwas transported to Florida Hospital South,
601 East Rollins Street, Orlando, Florida to receive treatment from an injury to the head which
.he sustained in an Agent involved shooting incident. Agent!
!was examined and
received nine staples to close the wound slightly left of center on the rear of his head. Agent
I
lwas treated and released from the hospital.
,

Subjec_t: lbragim Todashev

(U/~ On 0512212013 at 12:05 am., the Orlando Fire Department received
notification via TFO!
lwho requested police and Emergency Medical Serviqes (EMS)
assistance. TFOI
lstated an FBI Agent (Agentl
I had been struck in the head
with ·a blunt object and a subject (Todashev) had been shot multiple times and was down. At
12:07 a.m., a 911 operator directed several responding police and EMS respo,n.ders to the scene.

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I

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(Ul?Eooo1 The Orlando Fire Department Ambulance arrived at the scene and described
Todashev as dead at the scene.

J. (U/~ Coroner'.s Report:
(U~) A copy of the Medical Examiner's report to include the investigative and
autopsy report for Case number: ME13-0062J, on lbragim Todashev was obtained from the
Ninth Circuit Medical Examiner's Office via TP on 07/09/2013. On 07/24/2013, the SIRT along
wit~
l DOJ Civil Rights Division, met with ME Dr.I
I M.D., anQ.
the Deputy Chief MEI
I M.J?. to obtain clarification on the ME's report.

,.

;.

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(U/~ A review determined the cause ofTodashev's death was "multiple gunshot
wounds." Gunshot wound "A" to the head was almost straight down and probably
incapacitating, meaning no purposeful movement after sustaining the injury. Gunshot wound
"B" to the back torso (upper shoulder, left of spine) was at a similar angle to the head shot and
hit the spine. This shot could have caused Todashev to drop, but was not incapacitating. The
ME stated, during these shots Todashev was diagonal to the shooter and would haye been bent
forward. Gunshot wounds "A" and ":a'' likely occurred as Todashev was falling down. The MEstated Gunshot wound "C" to the back torso (upper right shoulder) was not incapacitating. The
ME stated the bullet traveled left to right, back to front and downward. Gunshot wound "D" to
the back torso (lower right shoulder) was consistent with Gunshot wound "C," however it was at
a shal-per angle and was not incapacitating. The ME stated the bullet traveled left to right, back
to front and downward. Gunshot w~unds "C" and ~'ff' likely occurred as Todashev w~ twisting
his body. Gunshot wounds "E," "F," and "G" in the left side torso and left arm were likely
grouped, consistent with the shoot~r being at an angle to Todashev. These three shots. made
seven holes; two hit Todashev's heart and would have been incapacitating, although not
immediately. The ME stated the results of the autopsy were consi~tent with Todashev falling
forward.toward the ~hooter with his head down. Th~re was no evidence of close range firing in
any <?f the gunshot ;.vounds, no stipulating anq no close contact shots.
·

(U/~ T,odashev sustained seven gunshot wounds. Five projectiles were recovered
in the torso, and one was recovered in the head. One projectile exited the body and was
recovered at the scene. Toxicology results revealed a presence of nicotine arid caffeine. A full ·.
copy of the ME's report is included in.the appendix section.
K. (U/~ Civil Rights Division:

(U/!EOOO) On 05/31/2013, IIC Choucair contacted!

ISpecial Legal

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Counsel, DOJ and briefed him qn the shooting incident. Since the initial briefing, the SIRT has
continued to provide information as requested byl
I On 10/01/2013,I
!advised
DOJ has agreed to issue a report on their decision which is being drafted. As of the date of this ·
report, a prosecutive opinion for the DOJ, Civil Rights Division, was pending.

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L. (U/~ Local Prosecutive Opinion:
(U/~ On 05/24/2013, IIC Choucair telephonically contacted State Attorney Jeffrey
Ashton, Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida, to brief him on the details of the shooting incident.
Since the initial briefing, the SIRT has continued to provide information as requested by State
Attorney Ashton. As of the date of this report, a written prosecutive opinion from Ninth Judicial
Circuit of Florida State Attorney Ashton was pending.
·

M.

(U~

Inspector's Observations:

(U/~ Observations with Recommendations/Instructions:
(U/~ Observation 1: There was no documentation of SAC or designee approval
for travel into another field office's area of responsibility for operational activity.

(U/~ Analysis 1: Manual oflnvestigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) Part

2, Section 23-3.1 stated, "Investigative information from another field office is to be obtained by
that office unless extraordinary haste requires direct communication. When the exigencies ofa
case, emergencies, or economy and common sense dictate, an employee, if authorized by his/her
SAC, may enter the territory ofanother field office. The concurrence ofthe SAC ofthe entered
office is to be obtained prior to the travel."
(U/~ CTD held a Video Telecon(erence (VTC) with BS and TP to discuss the
interview ofTodashev tentatively scheduled for 05/21/2013. Although all parties were involved
in the VTC, SAC or designee approval for inter-divisional travel concurrence was not
documented.
·
·
·
(U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Boston will ensure SAC or designee approval is

appropnately documented prior to operatibnal travel into another field office's area of
responsibility. ·
(U~ Observation 2: No operational plan was drafted or approved for contact

with.an individual with a known proclivity towards violence and in which an arrest could have
· been reasonably anticipated.
(U~

Analysis 2a: DIOG, Section

19.2.~

stated, "The SAC is responsi{Jlefor

ensuring that arrests are carefully and thoroughly planned Proper planning and preparation
for arrest situations can greatly enhance the safety and effectiveness ofAgents and officers

during these high-risk situations. Whenever possible, written arrest plans must be prepared prior
to conducting law enforcement activities that may result in the arrest ofa potentially dangerous
subject. Arrest plans must ~ddress five topics: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and
Equipment, and Control and Commun[cations. I
I must be
utilized wheneverpossible ... Exigent circumstances may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu ofa
written plan, but the oral briefings must address the five topics required to be included in written
plans .... All arrest plans mus.t.be approved by ASACs or their d~signees ... "
UNCLASSIFIED/@B <'l'FlCtAb USE '
·

- - - - - - - - - - ------- ·---

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(U) DIOG, Section 19.2.4 stated, "An SSA may authorize a joint arrest witl:z state and
local authorities, United States Marshal 's Service (USMS), or other federal law enforcement
agencies. In Circumstances ofjoint arrests, the SAC remains responsible to ensure that there is a
well-considered arrest plan."
. . (U/~ Todashev was a certified MMA fighter in both Florida and Massach~etts
with a prior history of assault which was known to TP, Agend
l and the MSP Troopers.
Information provided by the State Attorney's Office showed Todashev held a Florida State
Boxing Commission license number FED#: 129-225 with an expiration date of 08/08/2017, and
a State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation MMA Participant license
number PART4184 with an e"piration date <?f 12/31/2012. In additi9n, Todashev held.a
Massachusetts - Department of Public Safety State Athletic Commission MMA Amateur ·
License number: A3105 with an expiration date of 07/18/2012. Information obtained from local
law enforcement reports and a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) report documented
Todashev's prior alleged involvement in three violent interactions. Specifically, in a Boston
' Police Department (PD) report of an incident on 02~11/2010, Todashev was charged with
Disorderly Person, Resisting Arrest, Reckless Driving, and Weaving. In an Osceola County
. Sheriff's Office (SO) statement, dated 07/07/2012, Todashev was mentioned as a participant
with another, individual
in a Simple Battery incident involving the attack
on an employee of the Ali Baba Hookah Cafe. Todashey was not arrested or charged in this
inciqent. Most recently, an Orange County SO Incident Report of an inciden,t on 05/04/2013,
stated Todashev wru;; arrested for Aggravated Battery (causing bodily harm or disability to
anqther), a Second Degree Felony. In addition, MMA fights involving Todashev were posted on
YouTube and had been observed-by TP, Agentl
land the MSP Troopers.
!

I
"

~.

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(U/~ Prior to Todashev's scheduled departure from the U.S., CTD held a Video
Teleconference (VTC) with BS and TP to discuss the interview of Todashev. The strategy of
the interview as stated by Trooperc=J?vas to solidify Todashev's travel timeline in the
Bostpn area in September 2011 and to subsequently confront Todashev with forensic evidence
associated with the triple homicide. During the preparation for the interview, neither BS nor TP
drafted an operational plan.

(U/~ Analysis 2b: TP had surveiilance coverage on Todashev on the evening of
05/21/2013, from 4 p.m. to midnight. The surveillance team was in the vicinity ofTodashev' s
residence throughout the evening and spot checked Todashev's parking lot for a specific" vehicle
land
associated witli Todashev. At approximately 7:45 p.m., two unknown males (TFOI
I
bwere observed in Todashev's parking lot near said vehicle.· Surveillance was
terminated at midnight. TFO I
Iprovided perimeter security for the duration of the
Iand the MSP Troopers conducted the interview.
interview while Agent!

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· 1

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(U~ The SIRT determined although surveillance coverage was utilized they
appeared t9 be unaware of the interview beil).g conducted. TP could have more effectively
utilized resources by ensuring coordination between the surveillance and interview teams given
the nature of the interview of an individual with a known proclivity towards violence.

Page 17of24

NYT-81

 UNCLASSIFIED/@R c>FFICIAJs TISr uN(.y

(U/~· Analysis 2c: FBI Executive Management was not kept abreast to the details
of the progress of the interview ofTodashev. The interview was originally scheduled to be
conducted at the OPD; however, Todashev refused to be interviewed at t~e OPD and requested
the interview be conducted at his·residence. The interview began at approximately 7:30 p.m. on
05/22/2013 . ..
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. It was at this point, at approxrlmately { 0:25 p.m., when Trooper.___ _,
provided Todashev with his Miranda warning. Troope
verbally provided the warning to
Todashev and had him sign the Miranda warning fonn (FD-395). At approximately 10:30 p.m.,
ADAI
!headed into his office in anticipation of drafting an indicµnent based on the ·
information provided by Troope~
I At approximately 10:45 p.m., TFOI
Iprovided
·the last update to SSAI
twhich stated, all was going well and the interview was ongoing.
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t - - - - - - - - - - - -.......----' Approximate y one our ater Troo er
t------------...&...l~ashevsatonthebed..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,
..______________,,,At approximately 11 :55 p.m., Trooper
infonned
Trooper
and Agent
he was going to step outside for a few minutes. Trooper
---~hen stepped outside in order to call the ADA!
land provide an update.
(U/~ The limited updates to SS.AC:]were not detailed and did not convey the

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significance of the situation. At no time during the course of this interview were any updates
·
provided to BS Executive Management.
(U/~ Instruction 2a: SAC, Boston will ensure operational plans are drafted and

approved for contact with individuals who have a known proclivity towards violence and where
an airest is or could be reasonably anticipated.
(U~

Recommendation 2b: SAC, Boston should ensure appropriate resources are
provided to support high risk interviews.
;.

(U/~ Recommendation 2c: SAC, Tampa and SAC, Boston should ensure
effective coordination and comm~nication prior to and during potential high risk operations.

· (U/~ Recommendation 2d: SAC, Tampa and SAC, Boston should ensure
Supervisors recognize their responsibility to provide clear leadership and direct approval for
action when warranted.

l;

(U/~ Observation 3: Tampa ERT failed to utilize established protocols while
collecting and documenting evidence.

Page 18of24

NYT-82

 b7E -5

(U/ZEooQ} TP ERT conducted the evidence recovery at Todashev's residence on
05/22/2013. The items collected were seized as a result of the shooting and placed in the.BS
inve.stigation, rather than the TP • Assault on a Federal .Officer investigation.
(U/~ TP ERT failed to recognize the item (white table) believed to be used by
. Todashev to inflict injury to the Agent could have trace evidence of the Agent's blood. The
white table had visible red smudges and droplets which appeared to be blood; however no
presumptive tests w.ere conducted: TP ERT failed to collect the white table which was later
detennined to be pertinent to the Assault on a Federal Officer investigation. The white table was
subsequently seized pursuant to a se.arch warrant for a BS investigation. This required the SIRT
to request the transfer of this item of evidence to the assault investig~tion for analysis.

MIOG Part 1 Section 308· 1 l.2.7 stated

(U/~ While processing Todashev's residence, TP ERT took several photographs;
however, the photos departed from the established protocol. Not all photographs clearly
·depicted the ·progression of overall, medium, and close·up views of the scene and the items of
· evidence. The use of a scale for size detennination was not utilized in all photographs
containing evidence, to include blood spatter. The photos lacked clarity, were out of focus, and
the scene was not thoroughly documented. In addition, there were no photographs to show the
overall position of the evidence with evidence markers within the scene.

(U/~ Photographs obtained by the ME's office included a photo of a stack of
evidence markers located outside Todashev's front door giving the appearance of evidence being
outside the residence.

b7E -5

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

·-·-··-···-····-

f

UNCLASSIFIED/~R oEJUC!Ah TISE ONL

(U/~ TP ERT should ensure if the field office's photographer was unavailable, :
backµp personnel were trained in accor dance with Evidence Response. Team Unit (ERTU)
standards for photography. In.addition, TP ERT personnel should be provided annual training on
ERTU standards for photography and familiarization training with photography equipment.· ·
MIOG Part 1 Section.308-11.2.8 stated '

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(U/~) MIOG Part 1, Section 308-11.2.9 stated, I

b7E - 5

I
I

..

:

.
.
(U/~ TP ERT utilized 'fetal Station ~o document the scene. Upon SIRT's review
of the Total Station sketches in comparison with the TP ERT photographs, there was a
discrepancy with the location of item number 15. SIRT determined from TP ERT, the Total
Station operator utilized the ERT sketch for a reference point for the location of the evidence.
TP ERT advised the ERT sketch erroneously marked item number 15 closer to the middle of the
living room. TP ERT also advised the ·ERT photographs accurately depicted the location of ite1'1
number 15. The utilization of the sketch rather than the exact location of the items of evidence
for the Total Station documentation resulted in an inaccurate depiction of the scene.
(U/~ TP ERT pers_o nnel should be provided annual trainipg on ERTU standards for
docuinentation of evidence through sketches artd the use of Total Stat~on.
·

(U/~ MIOG Part 1, Section 308-9 stated, I

b7E -5

Page 20 of 24

•·.

·-·-

. ...

···-·····- - -···· ·-·-

NYT-84

..··-· ··-- ·· .. . ·---····- - - ---·-- - - - - - -

 UNCLASSIFIED/~b'tb~
b7E -5

(U/~ Recommendation 3a: SAC, Tampa should ensure.Tampa ERT personnel

are provided annual training regarding the established protocols for collection and standards for
docwnentation of evidence (to include photography, sketching, and utilization of Totcil Station).

(U/~ Ob~ervation 4: No Domestic Police Cooperation investigation was initiated
the incident.

prio~ to

(U) Analysis 4: DIOG, Section 12.3.2.3(B) stated, "The FBI may provide investigative
assistance to.state, local, or tribaragencies: in the investigation ofmatters that may involve
federal crimes or threats to national security, or for such other purposes as may be legally
authorized."
·
·
(U) DIOG, Section 12.3.2.3.3 stated, "Investigative assistance using an investigative

method, other than those authorized in assessments, must be documented with the FD-999, filed
and uploaded to an appropriate file ... "
·
.'
(U) DIOG, Section 12.7.2(D) stated, "The FD-999 must be uploaded to a domestic
police co~peration file - 343 Classification."

(U/~ A~cording to Agen~

ts initial signed sworn statement dated:
05/28/2013, approximately one week after the 04/15/2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, he was
assigned and began to work with the MSP. The request was to assist the MSP with their .
investigation of a triple homicide in which Todashev was a suspect. INSD detemiined froiP. a·
review of Sentinel, the BS domestic police cooperation investigation was not initiated until
06/07/2013, approximate!y 45 days after-the assistance began.
·

b6 - 1

b7C -1

:.

· (U/~ Instruction 4a: SAC, Boston will ensure 343, Domestic Police Coope~ation

investigations are opened in a timely manner in accordance with DIOG.
(U/0000) Reco~mendation 4b: AD, RPO should consider modifying DIOG to ·
provide detailed guidance regarding 343, Domestic Police Cooperation investigations.
;.

;.

UNCLASSIFIED//f9R ()fflCL\L use
·
Page 21 of 24

(>NL'[

.

.'
I

 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Ele o tronio Comm unioatio n

Title:

(U) Shooting Inc i dent Tampa Field Office
05/22/2013

Date:

06 / 0 4/2 0 14

CC:I_--From:

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INSPECTION
DA- TDY
Contact:

Approved By: Trent R- Teyema
David Pau l Gelios
Nancy McNamara
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Drafted By:
Case ID #:

297 - HQ- A1271966- D

(U) SHOOTING INCI DENTS

Synopsis:
(U//~ This communication was p repared to f u rnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (S I RG) with respect to t he captioned shooting fol low ing the SIRG
mee ting held on 03/25/2013 _
Administrative Notes:
(U/ ~ Th is communication summarizes t he
Inspection Divis ion's ( INSD ) Shooting Incident Report dated 03 / 18 /2 01 4
by former Inspector Dena E- Choucair- A copy of t he complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to t h is
communication Details:

On 03 /25/2 01 4, the SIRG convened to rev iew a shooting incident which
occurred on 05/22/2013, involving FBI Boston (BS) Fie ld Office Agent
.__~~~~~~~....I On 0 5/2 1 /20 13 , BS Agent l..._~~~__,I and t wo MSP
Troopers conducted t he interview of Ibragim Todashev at h is residence The purpose of the interview was to solidify Todashev's time l ine in the
Boston area in September 2011 and to confront Todas hev with forensic

UNCLASSIFIED/~

NYT-86

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 UNCLASSIFIED/~

Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 /0 4 /20 1 4

evidence associated with t he Waltham homicides. After Todashev was
confronted regard ing his involvement in t he t r iple homicide, he signed
an Advice of Righ ts form and agreed to provide his statement . The MSP
Troopers recorded the interview which captured I

I Due to
Tod ash e v' s continued de liberate behavior, one MSP Troope r sent a tex t
to BS Agent l
l and the other MSP Trooper to inform them of the
threat posed by Todashev . Al most irmnediately, BS Agent I
I heard
a loud noise and fe l t a blow to the back of his head . Todashev ran
past BS Agent I
l and the MSP Trooper and armed h imsel f with a
red metal pole .
In the split second available to assess t he t h reat
posed by Todashev , BS Agent l
l was in fear for h is l i fe and t he
l ife of t he MSP Trooper .
In order to stop this t h reat, BS Agent
"'-~~~~-1 shot a vo lley of t h ree or fo ur shots at Todashev . Todas hev
fe ll and almost immediately re - established h is foot ing, and l unged
towards t hem at an angle . Still in fea r for h is and the MSP Trooper ' s
l ife, BS Agent ~l~~~~__,l shot Todashev with a second volley of t h ree or
four shots in order to stop the threat.

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--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

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Result of the SIRG

(U//~ On 03/25/2014, t he SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved
shooting incident with the intent to:
1.
(U /~ Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG
unanimous ly determined t he application of deadly force by BS Agent
--~~~~-I on 05/22/2013 was in compliance wit h the Department of
J ustice's deadly fo rce policy .
2.

(U/~

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Provide the Director with an evaluative analyses,

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning
operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

Th

e SIRG made t he fol lowing operational observations .

UNCLASSIFIED/~
2

NYT-87

 UNCLASSIFIED/~
Title :
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06/04/2014

(U//~ Observation 1: There was no documentation of SAC or
designee approval for travel into another field office ' s area of
responsibility for operational activity .
(U/~

Manual of Investigative Opera tions and

Analysis 1:

Guidelines (MIOG) Part 2 , Section 23-3 .1 stated , "Investigative

information from another field office is to be obtained by that office
unless extraordinary haste requires direct communication .

When the

exigencies of a case, emergencies, or economy and common sense dictate,
an employee, i f authorized by his/her SAC, may enter the territory of
another field office . The concurrence of the SAC of the entered office
is to be obtained prior to the travel ."
(U//~ CTD held a Video Teleconference (VTC) with BS and T P to
discuss the interview of Todashev tentatively scheduled for
05/21/2013 . Although all parties were involved in the VTC , SAC or
designee approval for inter-divisional travel concurrence was not
documented .

(U/~ Instruction 1: SAC , Boston will ensure SAC or designee
approval is appropriately documented prior to operational travel into
another field office ' s area of responsibility.

(U//~

Observation 2:

(U//~

Analysis 2a:

No operational plan was approved for
cont act wit h an individual in which an arres t could have been
reasonably anticipated .
DIOG , Section 1 9 . 2 . 3 sta t ed , "The SAC is

responsible for ensuring that arrests are carefully and thoroughly
planned .
Proper planning and preparation for arrest situations can
greatly enhance the safety and effectiveness of Agents and officers
during these high-risk situations .
Whenever possible, written arrest
plans must be prepared prior to conducting law enforcement activities
that may result in the arrest of a potentially dangerous subject .
Arrest plans must address five topics : Situation, Mission, Execution,

UNCLASSIFIED/~
3

NYT-88

 UNCLASSIFIED/~
Title :
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06/04/2014

Administration and Equipment , and Control and Communications .
The
must be utilized whenever possible...
Exigent circumstances may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of a
written plan , but the oral briefings must address the five topics
required to be included in written plans... All arrest plans must be
approved by ASACs or their designees ... "

b7E -5

..._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--'

(U)

DIOG , Section 19.2.4 stated , "An SSA may authorize a joint

arrest with state and local authorities , United States Marshal ' s
Service (USMS), or other federal law enforcement agencies .

In

circumstances of joint arrests, the SAC remains responsible to ensure
that there is a well-considered arrest plan . "

(U/~ Todashev was a certified MMA fighter in both Florida and
Massachusetts with a prior history of assault which was known to TP , BS
Agent l
~ and the MSP Troopers .
Information provided by the
State Attorney' s Office showed Todashev held a Florida State Boxing
Commission license number FED#: 129- 225 with an expiration date of
08/08/2017 , and a State of Florida , Department of Business and
Professional Regulation MMA Participant license number PART4184 with an
expiration date of 12/31/2012. In addition, Todashev held a
Massachusetts - Department of Public Safety State Athletic Commission
MMA Amateur License number : A3105 with an expiration date of
07/18/2012 .
Information obtained from local law enforcement reports
and a National Crime Information Center (NC IC ) report documented
Todashev's prior alleged involvement in three violent interactions.
Specifically, in a Boston Police Department (PD) report of an incident
on 02/11/2010 , Todashev was charged with Disorderly Person , Resisting
Arrest , Reckless Driving , and Weaving .
In an Osceola County Sheriff's
Office (SO) statement , dated 07/ 07 /2 0 12 , Todashev was mentioned as a
participant with another individual ,
in a Simple
Battery incident involving the attack on an employee of the Ali Baba
Hookah Cafe. Todashev was not arrested or charged in this incident .
Most recently, an Orange County SO Incident Report of an incident on
05/04/2013, stated Todashev was arrested for Aggravated Battery
(ca us ing bodily harm or disability to another) , a Second Degree

I

I

UNCLASSIFIED//~
4

NYT-89

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 UNCLASSIFIED/~
Ti tle :
(U) Shoot ing Incident Tampa Field Offi ce 05/22/20 1 3
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 / 04 / 201 4

I n addit i on , MMA f ight s involvi ng Todashev wer e pos t ed on
Felony .
YouTube and h ad been observed by TP , BS Agent l
and the MSP
Troopers .

b6 -1
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(U / ~ Prior t o Todashev ' s scheduled departu re f rom the U. S .,
CTD h eld a Video Te l econference (VTC) wit h BS and T P t o discuss the
int e r view o f Todashev .
The s t rat egy of the interview as s t ated by the
main MSP Trooper was t o solidi f y Todash ev' s t ravel timeline in t he
Bos t on a r ea in Sept e mber 2011 and t o s ubsequ ent l y confront Todashev
with forensic evi dence associat ed with the trip l e h omicide . Du ring the
p r eparation for the int e r view , nei ther BS nor T P draft ed or b rie f ed an
operational p l an which i nclu ded an arres t scenar io .

(U / ~

TP had surveil l ance coverage on Todash ev
on the evening of 05 / 21 / 2013 , f rom 4 p .m. to midnight. The
s u rveillance team was in t he vicinity of Todash ev' s residence
throu ghou t the evening and spo t checked Todashev' s parking lot f o r a
specific vehicle associated wi th Todash ev . At appr oxima t e l y 7 : 45 p . m.,
t wo u nknown males (T P TFO and Todash ev' s fr iend
-----~I were observed in Todash ev' s parking lot near said veh icle .
Su rveillance was terminated a t midnight . Th e T P TFO provided perime t er
secur i t y for the dur a t ion of t he interview whi l e BS Agent l
l and
t he MSP Tr oopers conducted t h e i n t erview .
Analysis 2b:

._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(U/~ The SI RT de t e r mined a lthough survei llance coverage was
utilized they appear ed to be unaware of t he interview being conducted .
TP cou ld have more eff ective l y u tilized resources by ensur ing
coordination be t ween t he sur vei llance and int erview t eams given the
nat u r e of t he interview o f an individua l with a known proc l ivity
t owar ds violence .

(U//~ Analysis 2c: FBI Executive Management was not kept
abreas t to the details of the p r ogress o f t h e i n t e r view of Todashev.
The i n t e r view was o riginally sch edul ed to be conducted a t the OPD;

UNCLASSIFIED/~
5

NYT-90

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 UNCLASSIFIED/~
Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 /0 4 /20 1 4

however , Todashev refused to be interviewed at the OPD and requested
the interview be conducted at h is residence . The interview began at
approximately 7 : 30 p . m. on 05/21/2013 .
(U //~

During the interview, the ma in MSP Trooper provided
updates to Middlesex Assistant District Attorney (ADA) . Todas hev

b7A -1

_____,I

I t was at this point, at approximately 10 : 25 p.m., when the
main MSP Trooper provided Todashev with his Miranda warning . The main
MSP Trooper verbally p rovided the warning to Todashev and had him sign
the Miranda warning form ( FD-395) . At approximately 10 : 30 p.m., t he
Middlesex ADA headed into h is office in anticipation of d rafting an
indictment based on the informat ion provided by t he main MSP Trooper .
At approximately 1 0 : 45 p . m., t he TP T FO p rovided the las t update to the
TP CT SSA which stated, all was going well and the interview was
ongoing .

..._

(U/~

I

b7A -1

I
Approximately one hou r later, the ma in MSP Trooper asked l
I Todashev sat on t he bed I.....-""'-------......-------~
...._
__,I At approximately
11:5 5 p.m., t he main MSP Trooper informed t he other MSP Trooper and BS
Agent l
l he was going to step outside for a few minutes. The
main MSP Trooper then stepped outside in order to call t he Middlesex
ADA and provide an update .

_____________________________
(U //~

The limited updates to t he T P CT SSA were not detailed
and did not convey t he significance of the situation . At no t i me
d u ring the course of t h is interview were any updates provided to BS
Execu tive Management .
UNCLASSIFIED/~
6

NYT-91

b6 -1

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 UNCLASSIFIED/~
Title :
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06/04/2014

(U//~ Instruction 2a: SAC , Boston will ensure either oral or
documented operational plans are approved for contact with individuals
where an arrest is or could be reasonably anticipated .
(U/~ Recommendation 2b:
SAC , Boston should ensure
appropriate resources are provided to support high risk interviews .

(U//~ Recommendation 2c: SAC , Tampa and SAC , Boston should
ensure effective coordination and communication prior to and during
pot ential high risk operat ions .
(U/~ Recommendation 2d: SAC , Tampa and SAC , Boston should
ensure Supervisors recognize their responsibility to provide clear
leadership and direct approval for action when warranted .
(U/~ Observation 3: No Domestic Police Coopera tion
investigation was init iated prior t o the incident.

(U)

Analysis 3:

DIOG, Section 1 2 . 3 . 2 . 3(B) s t ated , " The FBI may

provide investigative assistance to state, local, or tribal agencies :
in the investigation of matters that may involve federal crimes or
threats to national security, or for such other purposes as may be
legally authorized ."

(U)

DIOG , Section 1 2 . 3 . 2 . 3 . 3 stat ed , " Investigative assistance

using an investigative method, other than those authorized in
assessments, must be documented with the FD-999, filed and uploaded to
an appropriate file ..."

(U)

DIOG , Section 1 2 . 7 . 2(0) s t ated , " The FD-999 must be uploaded

to a domestic police cooperation file - 343 Classification ."
(U/ /~ According t o Agent I
I' s initial signed sworn
sta t ement dated 05/28/20 13 , approximat ely one week aft er the 04/15/201 3
Bos t on Mara thon Bombing , he was assigned and began to work with the
MSP . The request was t o assis t the MSP with their investigation of a

UNCLASSIFIED/~
7

NYT-92

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 UNCLASSIFIED//~
Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 /0 4 /20 1 4

triple homicide in which Todashev was a suspect . INSD determined from
a review of Sentinel, the BS domestic police cooperation inves tigation
was not initiated until 06/07/2013, approximately 45 days after the
assistance began .
(U /~

Instruction 3a:

SAC, Boston will ensure 343, Domestic
Police Cooperation inves tigations are opened in a t i me ly manner in
accordance with DIOG.

(U /~ Recommendation 3b: AD , RPO , in coordination with the
Criminal Investigative Division, should consider modi fying DIOG to
provide detailed guidance regarding the opening,
administrative/investigative, and closing requirements for 343,
Domestic Po l ice Cooperat ion investigations.
(U/ ~ Observation 4: Tampa ERT fai led to utili ze established
protoco ls while collecting and documenting evidence .

(U //~)

Analysis 4:

MIOG Par t l, Section 308- 11.2. 5 stated,

b7E -5

(U /~

TP ERT conducted the evidence recovery at Todas hev's
residence on 05/22/2013 . The items collected were seized as a result
of the shooting and placed in the BS invest igat ion, rather t han the TP
- Assault on a Federal Officer inves tigation.
(U //~ TP ERT fai led to recogni ze t he i tem (white table )
believed to be used by Todas hev to inflict in j ury to the Agent could
have trace evidence of t he Agent's b lood.
The white table had visible

UNCLASSIFIED/~
8

 UNCLASSIFIED//~
Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 /0 4 /20 1 4

red smudges and droplets which appeared to be blood ; however no
presumptive tes ts were conducted . T P ERT failed to collect the white
table which was later determined to be pertinent to t he Assault on a
Federal Officer investigation. The white table was subsequently seized
pursuant to a search warrant for a BS inves tigation . This requi red the
SI RT to reques t t he trans fer of this item of evidence to t he assault
investigation for analysis .
(U/~

MI OG Part 1 , Section 308-11 . 2 . 7 stated ,

I

b7E -5

(U /~

While processing Todashev' s residence, TP ERT too k
several pho t ographs ; however, the phot os departed from t he established
pro t ocol . Not all pho t ographs clearly depict ed t he progression of
overall , med ium, and close - up views of the scene and the i tems of
evidence . The use of a scale for size de t erminat ion was not u til i zed
in all phot ographs cont aining evidence , t o include blood spa t ter . The
pho t os lac ked clarity, were out of focus, and t he scene was not
thoroughly document ed . I n addition , there were no photographs t o show
UNCLASSIFIED/~
9

NYT-94

 UNCLASSIFIED//~
Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 /0 4 /20 1 4

the overall position of the evidence with evidence markers within the
scene .

(U /~ Photographs obtained by the ME ' s office included a photo
of a stack of evidence markers located outside Todashev' s front door
giving the appearance of evidence being outside t he residence .

(U /~

TP ERT should ensure if the field office ' s photographer

was unavailab le, backup personnel were trained in accor dance with
Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU) standards for photography . In
addition, TP ERT personnel should be provided annual training on ERTU
standards for photography and fami liariza tion t raining with photography
equipment .
MIOG Part 1 , Section 308 - 11 . 2 . 8 stated ,
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(U/~

MIOG Part 1 , Section 308-11 . 2 . 9 stated ,

I
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UNCLASSIFIED/~
10

NYT-95

 UNCLASSIFIED/~
Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 /0 4 /20 1 4

b7E -5

(U //~

TP ERT utilized Total Station to document t he scene .
Upon SIRT ' s review of the Total Station sketches in comparison with the
TP ERT photographs , there was a discrepancy with the location of item
number 15 . SIRT determined from TP ERT , the Total Station operator
utilized the ERT sketch for a reference point for t he location of the
evidence . TP ERT advised the ERT sketch erroneously marked item number
15 closer to the middle of t he living room. TP ERT also advised t he
ERT photographs accurately depicted the location of item number 15 .
The u til ization of t he sketch rather than t he exact location of the
items of evidence for the Total Station documentation resulted in an
inaccurate depict ion of the scene .
(U /~ TP ERT personnel should be provided annual training on
ERTU standards for documentation of evidence through sketches and the
use of Total Station .
(U /

MIOG Part 1 , Section 308 - 9 stated ,

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UNCLASSIFIED/~
11

NYT-96

 UNCLASSIFIED//~
Ti tle :
(U) Shoot ing Incident Tampa Field Offi ce 05/22/20 1 3
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 / 04 / 201 4

b7E -5

(U //~

Instruction 4:

(U / ~

Provide recommendations for administrative action if

SAC , Tampa , i n coord i nat i on wi th the
Evidence Response Team Uni t, wi ll ensur e Ta mpa ERT personnel a r e
provi ded annu al t r a i ning regard i ng t h e es t ablis h ed protoco l s for
collect ion and standards f o r documentat i on o f evidence ( t o inc l ude
pho t ograph y , sketchi ng , and ut i li zat i on o f To t a l Stat ion) .
3.

Th e SIRG r ecommended no admi nistr a tive action be
t a ken aga i nst BS Agent I
las a r esul t of his involvement in t h i s
s hoot i ng i nci dent .

deemed necessary.

(U/~ The S I RG was chaired by non- vo ting member Dep uty
Assistant Direct o r Mark Alan Mor gan , INSD. The f o llowi ng vo ting
member s were i n att endance : Chi e f I nspect o r David P. Gel i os , Offi ce of
Inspect ions (OI) , INSD; I
I Tria l At torney , Cr imi na l Divi sion ,
Uni t ed Stat es Department o f Just i ce (USDOJ) ; I
L Speci al
Lega l Cou nse l, Ci vi l Right s Divi sion , USDOJ ( t e l eph onic) ; Acting
Section Ch ief I
I Cr imi na l Inves tiga tive Divi sion ; Sect ion
Ch ief (SC) Sean M. Cox ,
Counterintelligence Divi sion ; Supervi sor Specia l Agent (SSA !'-;:====::;-~~
Squad CR- 2 , Washington Fi eld Office ; Un it Ch ief (UC) I.__~__.
I Pract ical Applicat i ons Uni t ( PAU) , Traini ng Divi sion (TD) ;
SSA I
l I nves t igat ive Law Uni t, Of f i ce o f the Gener al
Counsel (OGC) ; SSA I
l Evidence Response Team (ERT) ,
Labor a t o r y Divis i on (LO ) ; SSA
Firear ms Tra i ning
Uni t, TD; ssA I
I Spec i al Weapons and Tactics Operat i ons
Uni t, Cri tica l Incident Response Group (CIRG) ; and SSA !.___~__.
I
I Def ensive Sys t ems Un it, TD. The f o l low i ng non - vot i ng
member s were also in a t tendance : I
I Jr ., Office o f
Inspect o r Genera l, USDOJ ; I
I. Deput y Genera l Cou nse l,
OGC ; SC Jays . Tabb , Tactica l Sect ion , CI RG; ssA I
I and
Publ i c Affair s Speci alist
Office o f Pub l ic Aff a i rs ,

b6 -1
b7C -1

--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---"

===::::......,

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UNCLASSIFIED/~
12

NYT-97

 UNCLASSIFIED/~
Ti tle:
(U) Shooting Incident Tampa Field Office 05/22/2013
Re : 297 -HQ- A1271966- D, 06 /0 4 /20 1 4

National Press Office; I nspectors Howard S . Marshall , Shawn W. Stroud ,
R. Justin Tolomeo , Trent R. Teyema, OI ,INSD ; Team Leaders

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b7C -1

OI, INSD; I
Special Assistant , OI, INSD; uc l
I
l and Management and Program Analysts I
.------'======;-----:-~~~~Inspection Analysis Unit , INSD; and uc l
I and Management
Program Analysts
...... Inspection
Management Unit , I NSD .
--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Procedures for Responding to the Observations
(U //~

SAC , TP ; SAC , BS ; and AD , Resou rce Planning Office , are
responsible for ensuring each Inspection Ins truction/Recommendation is
satisfactorily resolved . The inspection process is not complete until
the Instruction/Recommendation is addressed by the field office . The
Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review t he field office ' s response to
determine if the I nstruction/Recommendation has been resolved or
requires furt her action . Reso l u tion is based upon specific actions
taken and not a recita tion of the actions t he field office/division has
under consideration or p lans to implement .

(U /~

SAC , TP ; SAC , BS ; and AD , Resou rce Planning Office , are
required to p rovide a written response , via EC, detailing the actions
taken by the fie ld office to resolve each Instruction/Recommendation.
Follow- up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief ~l~~~~~~~­
Inspection Management Unit ( IMU ) , INSD. Once t he EC is serialized ,
please E-mail t he Sentinel link to Management Program Analyst ~l~~~~1

I

••
UNCLASSIFIED//~
13

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INVESTIGATION RKPORT
CAS.E NlllVIDER: 2013-lN-0063

#5.) F.S.S. 776.06. Deadly.force.

(lj The term "deadly force " means force that is likely to cause death or great bodily
harm and includes, but is not limited to:
(a) The firing of a. fire.arm in the direction of the person to !)e aJ?fsted, even
though no intent ex1'sts to kill or in:flict great bodily harm; and
(l~ The firing of a .firearm at a vehicle in which the penwn to be arrested is
riding.

Summary
During the course crf Federal and State investigative efforts surroundit1g B<>ston Marathon.
bombing. suspect Tamed.an Tsamaev, .lhragim Todasbev became (1 person of interest fo a trip.le
homic.ide which occurr~d in Waltham, )\tlassadrnsetts on September 11, 2011. On May 21, 2.(H3~
Ft'Xl~.ral ~md

Stl:lte Law Enforcement Officers: from Massachusetts and Florida made.contact: with
:Mr. Todas.hcv in Orlando, Florida. Pdo.r to contact being made on this date: each. ofthe officers
involved was aware .M..r. Todasbev was a skilled Mi.xed Martial Arts (.~fMA) fighlel'. DiJring the
c-0urse of a non··custodial, consensual interview, which occurred in the confined space of JV!r.
Todashev's apartment.., Mr. Todasb.ev spontam.~ously attac..\<.~d and struck the :FBI Agent with a
coffoe table, causing a laceration to the back of the FBI Agent's head. Mr. 'fQdashev then ran
past both officers towards the kitchen area of the apartment. As \W r. Todashev arrned himself
with a broomstick type pok, he aggressivdy charged back towards Trooper One and the FBl
Agent in a manner they both perceived as being life threatening.
B~sed on the actions of 1Vfr. Todasbev, the ~"'BI Agent responded to the imminent tlrreai by
discharging his firearm at t\fr. Todas.hcv.. During the initial volky of gm1fire, J.\11'. Todashev
twjsted hjs ·upper torso twice as he was l1eing strnck by the projectiles, This· c_am~e-0. .Mi·.
Todas.hev to pause during his attack As Mr. Todsshcv regained his footing and made a
he.;idlong lu.nge toW~ltds the offi.~:ers, the FBI Agent CC\ntfoucd t0 engage t11e .thTeat hy
discharging a second voJley ot gunfire at 'M r. Todas.hev.
T.he FRl Agent fired. his isstied
handgun a total of seven (7) ti.n:.~es-fa 4n efl"Q1t to eliminate the threat posed by Mr. To:dashe-v.

Given the totality of the circumstances at the time of lhis incident, in my ophuon; the use of
dead.ly force by the FRI .Agt~nt on May 22, 20 l 3, was reasonable and justified, and therefore,

favvful.
02/26/'/.014
Date

State Attorney's Office
Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida

Chief of Investigations

I

I

b6 - 4
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PAGE 161

NYT-114

  



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OEJUSTECE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 05f15l2014 .
Report of: Inspector Paul D. Delacourt Of?ce: FBIHQ INSD
Case 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
I REPORT OF SHOOTING 
BALTIMORE FIELD 

041?112'2014

Investigative Period: 04/1 112014 osronzolzi

. 1. Executive Summary

(WM) On 04f11f2014, at approximately 4:32 pun; Federal Bureau of Investi ation
(FBI) Special Agents of
the Baltimore Field Of?ce and Detective I Baltimore County Police

Department (BCPD) were involved in a shooting incident in Baltimore, Maryland. Agents and

 

were supportingl Iinvestigation of a

 

Pursuant to a Court-authorized wiretap, Squad (21-11 was monitoring

 

 

While monitoring the 
investigators learned

 

their intended to establish surveillancel 


 

(WW During the'planned sm'veillance, Agents observedl I

 

I?l
I Agents and Det.l:lbriefed the AISSA, ASAC, and SAC

Harrison drove along an
access road leading to Reisterstown Road. Agents and Det.l driving three separate -
vehicles, followed Harrison. At the Reisterstovtn Road stop light, Harrison was positioned in the
right torn lane. Prior to the arrivtal of a marked unit, Agents decided to conduct a traf?c stop and
effect an arrest of Harrison. Agents. and Det.I:Ipositioned their vehicles in the adjacent
lane, alongl:l?s driver?s side, with Det.| ?s vehicle angled in front of
Harrison?s vehicle. Agents and Harrison?s vehicle, identi?ed 
themselves as police, issued verbal comman s, and ordered Harrison to exit the vehicle.
Harrison ignored commands and drove his SUV in reverse, striking a civilian

positioned behind him. - -

 

 

(WM Harrison, still in reverse, maneuvered his SUV between the rear Agent?s
vehicle and the Fearing for the safer of civilians and fellow Agents, Agentl:l
shot the tire of Harrison?s vehicle and Agentsl I?red their weapons at Harrison. 
Harrison?s vehicle struck and came to rest_against a| [which was positioned two

vehicles behind thel:lin the right lane. At the time of the incident,l:l

1
WCLASSIFIEDIM

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-1

b3 -2

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-1,4
-1
b?E -1,6

I36 '2:4
-2,4
-1

b3 -2
b6 -1,2
-1,2



 

 

UNCLAS Slamaner

 

 

 

 

(WM Harrison succumbed to his wounds at the scene. Emergency Medical
Services responded inmiediately and pronounced Harrison dead within ?ve minutes of the initial
call of shots ?red. No civilians or law enforcement personnel Were injured.

. ?lm SAsl I?red their weapons. and Eat.
I:_Idid not ?re their weapons. BCPD identi?ed and interviewed four civilian witnes3es to

the shooting incident. Baltimore Agents investigating the Assault. on a Federal Of?cer caSe

identi?ed and interviewed others. One local surveillance camera captured a portion of the

 

incident at a distance. Signed Sworn Statements of the Agents and an interview of Det. I:

presented consistent recollections of the events. The shooting Scene was processed by FBI BA
ERT, the Laboratoryr Division?s Shooting Reconstruction Team, and BCPD.

II. Incident Dian.
. Substantive Case Files and Background Information

(ll/E9195) Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantive: caso was.
opened: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title:

File number: I

Case Agents: SA
SA

 

 

 

(unheard) As a result of the Agent-Involved Shooting, the Baltimore Field Office
opened the following Assault on a Federal Of?cer Investigation:
Title: JAMEEL 
REISTERSTOWN, 
ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL 
AGENT-MOLVED SHOOTING
BALTIMORE, MD
04H 1/2014

89B-BA-4717270
SA
SA

File samba;
Case Agents-1,4
b7C ?1NWT-116

 

 

 



1). Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

discharged weapon) FBI BA

weapon) FBI BA

disoharged weapon) FBI BA
BA -

BCPD

c. Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

The Ba

 

ltirnore Field Of?ce Opened an investigation I

 

 

 

 

(111M) 011

I the Baltimore Field Of?ce obtained a signed Order

?om U.S. District Judge George Russell, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryiand,

authorizing the interception

 

 

of wire and/or electronic communicationsl I

associated with the investigation. I

 

 

[authorized for interception. On U.S.

 

District Judge George L. Russell, signed an Order authorizing the continued interception of

 

wir'e communications of 

I 
(reissue) Throu




ghout the investigation, Agents collaborated with Assistant United

 

 

State-?5 Attorneys (AUSAs

|regarding investigative and

 

prosecutorial strategies. 

 

 

I. In essence, Agents would

 

mldnenni?mstieators

this
the abilitv tol

 

'bE -1,4
-1-3,6

h? -3

-3
-1
-3,10

 

 

 

1

(WM) Onl information derived- from the wiretap led Agents -3,6,10

 

 

3
UNCLASSIFIEDIM



 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1371(oz/Foam Consistent with normal Baltimore Field crate proceduresa FBI Law
Enforcement Operations Orders were not preparedI I This was due to the
expectation the enforcement actionjwould be accomplished by the local authorities, with FBI hm 1
personnel acting as back up or as observers. When there was a reasonable eXpectation FBI ME 1 I 5 10
personnel would participate in enforcement action, SAC Baltimore required the completion of
l.
. Events Leading Up to the Shooting
. (UHM) I, at approximatelyl I, Agents listened to an
intercepted telephone conversationl - 3 -2
b6 ?1 7.
I Based on the new b'tc ?1 7
information, Agents discussed investigative plans with their supervisor, AJSSAI I. . WE '1 
Plans included conducting a surveillancel '1 3 5 10
I. NSSAI 
authorized thejnvesti ative activity and the information was shared with ASAC
and SAC  No Law Enforcement Operation Order was drafted.
whim Through the combined use of physical surveillanceJ While conducting surveillance of Harrison, Agents 1 3 6 10

 

 

 

discussed enforcement options and ultimater decidedl 
I DetectiveI I BCPD, was participating in the
surveillance and called for a marked police cruiser to respond to the areal 
El Agents contacted AISSA and received concurrence for the enforcement action.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mesa: noti?ed of the investigative strategy.

(Ut?eo?) While in the area ofI:I the surveillance team held a brie?ng. he 1
This meeting included Detectivel SAI During the meeting, the operational planI Iwas briefed. ME '1

 

 

The Agent?s intentions werel 

 

4


NYT-118

 

 

e-

 

 

 

WCLASSIFEDIM

 

 

h? -4
-4

 

area.

Shooting Incident Details

h?E -1

Detective] [called BCPD and requested the area patrol unit to respond to the

(WM On April 11, 2014, at approxirnately 4:40 surveillance units observed

 

Ileaving the Wal-Mart parking lot by way of an access road leading to 12-6 -1 . 7

 

. Reisterstown Road. Surveillance units then observed Harrison?s vehicle follow the same route a

?1,7
short distance behindEl Fearing an effective vehicle stop could not be conducted at the time,
SAI:|transmitted over the radio words to the effect, ?We?re not taking him here, we ?re
going to follow him.? Harrison proceeded to make a left hand turn onto the access road and
towards Reisterstown Road, followed by surveillance units.

(WM) Moments later, SAI:|transmitted over the radio words to the effect ?The

is gone.? SAI I who was in charge of the surveillance operation, understood this to
meanl lwas out of the area. then transmitted over the radio
words to the effect, ?He [Harrison] is here in the right lane, we can take him right here.? SA

understood this to mean Harrison was in a good position to conduct the vehicle stop.

Based on the series of events, .SA|:|transmitted the order to effect the vehicle stop of .
Harrison. This occurred 'on the access road just prior to the Reisterstown Road traf?c light. The
BCPD marked police cruiser had yet to arrive on the scene.

b6 -1,7
-1,7

 

(ox/Fond) While civilian traf?c was stopped on the acce .3 road at the Reisterstown
Road traf?c light, Detective positioned his at the front driver?side corner
of Harrison?s vehicle. SAI:|positioned his] [immediately adjacent to
Harrison?s driver? s-side, followed by SAI Civilian vehicles were stopped
in front and behind Harrison?s vehicle. Once the law enforcement vehicles moved into position,
SAI:Iactivated his emergency lights and Agents exited their vehicles and approached 
Harrison?s vehicle. All law enforcement officials were wearing body armor, with four of the ?ve
of?cials displaying the word on the front and back panels of the armor. Law -
enforcement officials were positioned as follows: I) SAI lat the driver?s side door, 2)
Detectivel:l at the front driver?s side corner, 3) SA at the front driver's side
corner, 4) SA|:|in from of the vehicle, 5) SA: at the passenger side of the
vehicle. -

 

b6 -1.4
-1,4
-6

 

 

 

 

 

..

(WM Law enforcement of?cials identi?ed themselves as ?Police? and gave
Harrison instructions to raise his hands. Harrison initially complied with instructions and raised
his hands in the air. Moments later, however, Harrison began to slowly look around then
lowered his hands from sight against lawful commands to keep his hands in the air. 
attem ted to open the driver?s side door, but was-unsuccessful because the door was locked. SA 
then attempted to breach the driver?s side door window by hitting the window with the
butt of his handgun. Again, he was unsuccessful. As law enforcement of?cials continued to yell
commands at Harrison to put his hands in the air, Harrison?s vehicle began to move forward
Harrison then switched gears and began moving in reverse in an apparent attempt to
Harrison?s vehicle struck the civilian car behind him. Fearing for thelife and safety  



civilians in the area, as well as enforcement of?cers attempting to apprehend Harrison, SA

?red two rounds from his handgun into the driver's side front tire in an attempt to
immobilize the vehicle. While doing so, SAl:|yeiled words to the effect ?I?m shooting the
tire, I?m shooting the tire.? Harrison?s vehicle continued to move backwards, at which point SA
|:|was unable to advance further because he was wedged between Harrison?s vehicle and
one of the FBI vehicles. - 

After colliding with the ?rst vehicle, Harrison continued to back his vehicle
toward other civilian vehicles and to disregard of?cial commands to ?Stop.? SAI:|and SA

then ?red their handguns multiple times at Harrison, striking Harrison six times in the
head, neck, and left shoulder. Both Agents stated they feared for_the life and safety of innocent
civilians in the area, as well law enforcement of?cers on foot in the area, causing them to utilize
deadly force. Harrison?s vehicle ?nally stopped after colliding with another vehicle. As Agents
approached the vehicle, Harrison a cared motionless and unresponsive. Detectivel:l
shattered the window and SA reached in, unlocked and opened therdtiver?s side door. SA

an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), assessed Harrison?s condition and

determined he had serious arterial bleeding. Harrison succumbed to his wounds at the scene. All
witness accounts were consistent regarding details of the shooting;

Post Shooting Details'

Baltimore County Fire Department Medic 19 responded to the area of 9750
Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills, Maryland. Upon arrival, Medic 19 observed Harrison in the
driver seat of the vehicle. The vehicle was ?on-and still in gear with the patient?s foot still on the
accelerator.? Medic 19 personnel turned the vehicle Medic 19 examined Harrison,
determined he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, and was deceased. Per normal protocol,
Harrison was left inplace until the Forensic Examiner of the Of?ce of the Chief Medical
Examiner (OCMB) responded to the scene. Following forensic examination, the body of
Harrison was transported to the OCME in Baltimore, Maryland, for autopsy.

. (UAW The Baltimore Field Of?ce Evidence Response Team (ERT), along with
members of the FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT), processed the shooting
scene at the 9750 Reisterstown Road, 'Owings Mills, Maryland. Members of the BCPD
Homicide Unit responded to the scene as part of a joint investigation with the FBI.

I (WM A neighborhood canvass revealed a local business located in close proximity
of the shooting scene recorded portions of the shooting. A copy of the video recording was
obtained and sent to the Forensic Audio, Video and Image Analysis Unit (FAVIAU) for
enhancement. 

- (maestro-1,4
-l,4

b3 ?2

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

(WM 3335 of the four Agents involved in the shooting, as well as an interview of
the BCPD Detective involved, were consistent and corroborated the factual accounting of the
shooting. No other law enforcement officers ?red their weapons and none were injured.

Accounting of Shots Fired 

SAI:|f1red eight rounds from his Glock 22 .40 caliber handgun.
Seven rounds were recovered in his weapon (one in the chamber, six in the 15 round capacity
magazine). Three additional magazines were recovered from Two 15'round
capacity magazines contained 15 rounds each and one 15 round capacity magazine contained 14
rounds (magazine recovered from vest).

(Him SAEI ?red nine rounds from his Springfield Annory 1911 .45 caliber
handgun. Eight rounds were recovered in his weapon (one in the chamber, seven in the eight
round capacity magazine). Two additional magazines were recovered from One 10
round capacity magazine contained 10 rounds and one eight round capacity magazine was
empty.

(WM SAlj?red two rounds from his Glock?ZZ :40 caliber handgun.
Fourteen rounds were recovered in his weapon (one in the chamber, 13 in the 15 round capacity
magazine). One additional magazine was?recovered from This 15 round capacity
magazine contained 15 rounds.

(WM) A total of 19 rounds were ?red, and all the shell casings were accounted for

- at the scene. No other personnel ?red their weapon.

. Subject Information

Name: Jameel Kareem Ofurum Harrison
Position: NKA

Sex: Male

Race: Black
Height: 5?19?
Weight: 1?10

Hair: Black

Eyes: Brown

DOB: 05H 11"1979
SSAN: 21394-9847
FBI 114684FB2

(UIZEBEQ) Harrison?s criminal history included 27 arrests for offenses including
narcotics and weapons violations, burglary, loitering, disorderly conduct and failure to obey a
Police Of?cer." Harrison was convicted seven times, most recently on January 27, 2014, for
Possession of a Controlled Dangerous substance Not Marijuana. The other six convictions

7
UNCLASSIFIEDKESQHQ

NYT-121

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-1

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?1

 

 

 

 



include Probation Violation (1999 and 2000), Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Dangerous
Substance (2000), and Possession with intent to Manufacture, Distribute, and Dispense a
Controlled Dangerous Substance (2002, 2005 and 2006).

- (WM At the time of the NCIC onery, no active arrest warrants were located for
Harrison. -

Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

 

 

(mined) SAsl_ 1 as well as BCPD Detective: were 106 ?1 4
body armor with insignia displayed on their front and back panels. SA|:Iwore NC -1 4
FBI issued body armor without or insignia diSplayed to maintain a discrete hm '1

pro?le for the surveillance. SAI Iwore his of?cial FBI badge displayed on his belt. I

 

 

 


Forensic Summary

(Wm On April 11, 2014, the Baltimore Evidence Response Team (ERT) and the 
. - FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) deployed to 9750' Reisterstown Road, .
Owings Mills, Maryland, the scene of the Agent?Involved Shooting. At 6:15 pm, ERT began .
processing the scene. The LSRT arrived at 10:55 p.111. and assisted ERT through use of Total
Station and Spherical Photography. Items recovered included ten .40 caliber shell casings and
nine .45 caliber shell casings, as well as the weapons, magazines, and ammunition carried by the
involved Agents. Evidence collected from the deceased subject included US
currency and two bags of an unknown white substance. A total of 56 items were collected. At
2:40 am. on April 1-2, 2014, the Infiniti used by the subject was towed from 9750
Reisterstown Road to the Baltimore Field Office and processing of the scene was concluded.

(HIM On April 13, 2014, pursuant to a Federal search warrant, ERT and LSRT
processed the vehicle at the Baltimore Field Of?ce. Among items recovered from the vehicle .
were an Oxycodone prescription bottle with three pills, six cellular telephones, and 15 bullet
fragments. LSRT identi?ed 35 holes, ten impacts, and 13 trajectories'on the hood and
windshield of the vehicle. All trajectories appeared to come from the front of the vehicle. LSRT
determined one projectile struck the left-front tire and one struck the rim and rotor of the left?
?'ont wheel. Projectile fragments were recovered from several points in the vehicle, including
inside the left-front tire, engine compartment, dashboard, and passenger cabin.

(WW An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items follows:

 

131 $1,830.00 In 3 Currency

 

132 .30 US Currency

 

1B3 Black And Gold Colored Wrist Watch Baring The Brand Gucci, Latin Grammy's

 

134 Hard White Substance Believed To Be Heroin; Total Drug Package Weight 136.41g .

 

135 Hard White Substance Believed To Be Heroin. Total Drug Package Weight 57.79g

 

 

 

 

1B6 One Shirt,

 

8


NYT-122

 

 

 



 

One (1) Black Jeans With One 1) Black Belt

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- b7C -1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

137
138 One (1) Black BoxerfUnderwear .
139 One (1) Pair Of White 1' Purple Jordan Shoes With White Sooks?
1.310 One (1) Tank Top -
Deformed Jacket Bullet From Skull (Between Left Occipital Lobe And Bone)
1311 -
(Copper? Colored Jacket)
1 B12 lJJefl'pnped Jacket From Subcutaneous Soft Tissue Of Left Neck (Yellow Colored
ac et
1313 Deformed Jacket From Outside Of Le? Sleeve Of Shirt (Yellow Colored Jacket)
1314 Blood Card 
.13 15 Deg)an acketed Bullet "From Brain (Inferior (R) Temp Area) (Copper Colored
. Jae at
1316 Spring?eld Annory .45 Caliber Handng 
13 17 One (1) Empty Chip McCormick Magazine, S-Round, .45 Caliber (SAI 
1318 One (1) Empty Chip McCormick Magazine, 10?Rouud, .45 Caliber (SAI 
1319 Ten (10) .45 Caliber Rounds (SA 
1320 One (1) .45 Caliber Round (SA .
1321 One (1) Chip McCormick Magazine, S-Round, .45 Caliber (SAI I)
1322 Seven (7) .45 Rounds 
1323 Glock 22 .40 Caliber Handgun, SIN 
1324 'One (1) Clock .40 Caliber, 15-Round Magazine (SAI -
1325 Fifteen 15) .40 Caliber Rounds, Smith Wesson (SA
1326. One (1)011on .40 Caliber lS-Round Magazine (SA
1327 Thirteen (13) .40 Caliber Rounds, Winchester (SA
1323 One (1) .40 Caliber Round, Winchester 
1329 Glock 22 .40 Caliber Handgun, SIN I (SA
1330 - One (1) Glock .40 Caliber 15-Round Magazine (SA -
1331 Fourteen (14) .40 Caliber Rounds, Smith Wesson (S
1332 One (1) Glock .40 Caliber 15-Round Magazine (SAI 
1333 Fifteen (15) .40 Caliber Rounds, Smith Wesson (sail
1334 One (1) Glock .40 Caliber 15-Roond Magazine (will
1335 Fifteen 15) .40 Caliber Rounds, Smith Wesson 
1336 One (I) .40 Caliber Round, Smith 8.: Wesson (SAI 
1337l One 1) Giock .40 Caliber Iii-Round Magazine (SA
- 1333 Six (6) .40 Caliber Rounds, Smith Wesson 
Three (3) Credit Cards: BOA - 4744 7701 34453935 Jameel K. Harrison;
1339 I I
I 
1340 Wallet and Paper 
1341 Fragment
1342 Rubber Item
1343 Rental Car Keys .
1344 Pocket Knife
1345 Keys
1346 Sunglasses

 

 

 

A 9 


NYT-123

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIEQHE

 

11347

Windshield Wiper - 

 

1B48

Black Plastic Which is Believed to be Part of Windshield Wi er

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11349 Half of In?nity Symbol from Subject Vehicle -
IBSO Bullet Fragment .
Black Plastic Piece Believed to be a Piece of Windshield Wiper
1B52 Silver Colored Ball of Metal Believed tobe Bullet 
11353 Bullet Fragment 
11354 .40 Caliber Shell Casing
11355 .40 Caliber Casing
1356 .40 Caliber Winchester Shell Casing
.40 Caliber Shell Casing
1353 .40 Caliber Shell Casing
11359 .45 Caliber Shell Casing
1360 .45 Caliber Shell Casing
1351 .45 Caliber Shell Casing
1B62 .40 Caliber Shell Casing
1B63 .45 Cal Shell Casing
1364 .45 Cal Shell Casing -
1B65 .45 Cal R.P Casing 
IB66 Copper Colored Metal Believed to be a Bullet
1136'? .40 Cal Speer Casing
11368 .45 Cal Shell Casing 
1B69 .40 Cal Speer Casing
1B7.0 .45 Caliber Shell Casing
1371 .45 Caliber R.P Casing
IBTZ .40 Caliber Shell Casing
1B73 .40 Caliber Casing
Black Piece Of Plastic
Bullet Fragment-
1B76 One (1) $100.00 Dollar Bill Us Currency With, Stain
137? Orange Pill Bottle WithWhite Cap Prescribed To Harrison, Janice]. Content Three (3)
- Pills. TotalDrug Package Weight 41.13 Grams
13?78 Hertz Rental Car Agreement Rental Record #118462982
11379 One (1) Virgin Mobile Receipt For Card #4436944920
lB80 Sarnsung Galaxy S3 Model: ng-T-999, IMEI: 354826?54935682
1B81 T-Mobile Cell Phone Model: One Touch 665A, IMEI: 013088006904205
1B82 One (1) Parking Permit 
One (1) Plate Pass On Box 9319'? E2 PASS 
1B84 Samsung Cell Phone Model: SPH - M270 HEX: 53 -
138's Business Cards One (HI I One One 
. 
1B86 Samsung Cell Phone Model SCH-U365, IMEID HEX: A0000045868775
1337 Samsung Cell Phone MODEL SCH-U365 MEID HEX:
A0000045818739 - 
1388 Samsung Cell Phone And Power Cord, Model SCH-U365 SKU SCI-HI 365HPP,

 

 

 

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NYTJ 124

b6 -2
-2

 

 

 

 



 

MEID HEX: A00000453CFDEF

 

11339 Bullet Jacket Fragment

 

1B90 Metal Fragment

 

1B9l One (1) Bullet Fragment

 

1B92 One (1) Bullet Fragment

 

11393 One (1) Bullet Fragment

 

?394 FTU Secondary Evidence Eight (8) Pieces of Filter Paper. Created During
Examination of Vehicle (VIN IN SCSIMW4DM173 194)

 

1395 Metal Fragment

 

11396 Hertz GPS Serial with Mounting Components

 

1897 Fragment -

 

1B98 Airbag Control Module

 

1B99 One Bullet Fragment

 

One (1) Bullet Fragment

 

13101 One (1) Bullet Fragment

 

1B102 Two (2) Bullet Fragments 

 

113103 One (1) Bullet Framnt

 

1B104 One (1) Bullet Fragment

 

 

 

113105 Two (2) Bullet Fragments

 

 

I k. Medical Summary

FBI Agents involved in the shooting:
No injuries.

Subiect:

Baltimore County Fire Department Medic 19, with Paramedich

and EMT . responded to 9750 Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills,
Maryland. Medic 19 was dispatcher. at 4:43 pm- and arrived on the scene at 4:45 pm. Medic
19 feund the Subject, ameel Harrison, in the driver seat of the vehicle. Medic 19 observed
Harrison sustained multiple gunshot wounds and displayed no signs of life. Paramedic 
con?rmed the subject was deceased and returned to service at 5:00 pm. 

 

(Wm Harrison was transported to the OCME for the State of Maryland and?
assigned case number 14-3 355. On April 12, 2814 at 9:00 am, Assistant Medical Examiner
MD, performed the autopsy of Harrison: The OCME opinion was as
follows: 

?This 34 year old, African American male, JAMEEL KAREEN OFORUM HARRISON,
died of MULTIPLE (6) GUNSHOT WOUNDS of the head (3), neck and left 
Two of the gunshot wounds of the head (A and B) injured the skull and brain. A bullet was
recovered in association with each of these gunshot wounds. One of the gunshot wounds of the
neck (D) injured the carotid arteries on either side of the neck. This was a ?uough-and-through
gunshot wound with no bullet recovery. A bulletjacket was recovered in association with the

11


NYT-125

b6 -4



?4

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM 

other gunshot wound of the neck (E). A builetjacket was recovered in association with the
gunshotwound of the left shoulder (F). By report, the decedent was shot by law enforcement
while he was in his car: The manner of death is 

(WM) Toxicology results associated with the autopsy revealed high levels of
Oxycodone as follows: 1) Blood Heart: Oxycodone 0.7: mgl-L; 2) Blood Femoral: Oxycodone
0.5 rug/L; 3) Urine: .Oxycodone Positive. 

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

a. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) Was comprised of the following
personnel: . 

Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) Shawn W. Stroud

Inspector Paul D. Delacourt 

Assistant Inspector Team Leader I
. 

Assistant Inspector-in-Place 
AHP

AI 1?
AIIP
AI IP
AHP
AIIP

 

 

 

 

 

 

- b. The FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) Personnel:

 

 

 

Supervisory Special Agentl [Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU)
Visual Information Specialistl [Operational Projects Unit (OPU)
Photographerl OPU -

Physical Scientist (PAS) I:l Firearms Training Unit (FTU)
vs: I FTU

IV. 1 Shooting Incident Review Protocol

 

(Ur/Eer On April 1 1, 2014, Baltimore sac Stephen B. spoke with Assistant
Director Nancy McNamara to report the Agent-Involved Shooting. Inspector Paul Delaeourt
spoke with Baltimore Field of?ce ASAC arrange logistics prior to arriving
in Baltimore, Maryland. 

. (Wm On April 11, 2014, the SIRT traveled to Baltimore and reviewed" the .
Inspection Division shooting review protocol. Inspector Delacourt, Inspector Shawn W. Stmud,
and the members met with Baltimore Field Of?ce EM and ERT personnel. The SIRT also
viewed the shooting scene, which occurred in the vicinity of 9750 Reisterstown Road, Owings

Mills, Maryland. 

12


NYT-126

_b 

.

On April 12, 2014, Inapector Delacourt and Inspector Stroud met SAC Vogt
to explain the SIRT process and protocols. Inspector Delacourt and Inspector Stroud met with
the BCPD Chief of Police, Jim Johnson, who stated his department had opened a homicide

investigation and agreed to work in coordination with the FBI. Inspector Delacourt and

Inspector Stroud also met with Deputy State?s Attorneyl:|to explain the 
process and protocols.

(Wm On April 14, 2014, the Baltimore iField office submitted a FD- 1 015,
Executive Situation Report to the Director. Inspector Delacourt and Inspector Stroud met with
the involved FBI Agents and management personnel to explain the SIRT process and protocols.

In total, 12 FBI interviews were conducted of Baltimore Field Of?ce
personnel. Eight interviews were documented viaiFD-B 02. 8883 were obtained from SAs

 

I The 8385 and interviews of witnesses were conducted
voluntarily. The Agents interviewed via signed a FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to
Employee Requested to Provide Information Following a Shooting Incident). Additionally,
members interviewed one BCPD Detective and six civilians. BCPD conducted four
videotaped interviews of witnesses, which were provided to the SIRT.

On April 14, 2014, the Baltimore Field Of?ce provided the SIRT with a

cop).r of a video recording recovered from a surveillance camera of a business located near the

area of the shooting. Review of the video recording revealed portions of the: Agent-Involved
Shooting were captured on the video. 

([me Pursuant to the shooting review, .SIRT members obtainedl

 

 

 

 

w__1

On April 16, 2014, Inspector Delacourt provided an exit brief to SAC 

and ?nnished SAC Vogt with a copy of the SIRT Report.

V: Administrative

. Firearms Training I

 

. Firearms quali?cations records for Iwerc
provided to the SIRT through the FIRST quali?cation database. SA last quali?ed with
his service weapon on February and was in compliance with the ?rearms quali?cations
requirements. SAl:I1ast quali?ed with his service weapon on February 28, 2014, and was in
compliance with the firearms quali?cations requirements. last quali?ed with his
service weapon on December 18, 2013, and was in compliance with the ?rearms quali?cations

- requirements.

1

13


arr-1'2?

b6 -4
b'i'C ?4
b6 -1
1570 -1
b3 ?2
b6 -1
.b'i'C -1

 

 

 

b.

C.

 



Deadly Force Training

(UAW) Deadly Force Policyiraining was provided to SAs on
October 29, 2013, during Baltimore Field Of?ce First Quarter Firearms Training
Session. This training was documented in the FBI Special Operations Unit (SOD) Training
Resources Management System (TRMS) database. A review of the TRMS further revealed SA
I am. SAI I

 

 

Baltimore Field Of?ce SWAT Team Leader SA

 

 

Icon?rrned the Deadly Farce Policy was briefed twice before each? SWAT

. operation.

(UILEOEO) Deadly Force.Policy training was provided to ion October 138,

2013, at the Washington Field Of?ce. Assistant Division Counsel (ADC)
presented the training. .SA |:|registered for the training in Virtual Academy and signed an
attendance form at the training. 

DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision


On May 7, 2014, Special Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division, provided a prosecutorial declination for FBI Agents

. involved in the AIS on April 11, 2014. The declination was provided to Inspector Trent Teyema

via E-mail dated May 7, 2014. In the Email, Special Legal- Counsell:ladvised, upon
review of the Inspection Division Shooting Incident Report, DOJ concluded the facts did not
warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation. I 

Local Prosecutorial Decision

(WEE-BIZ) I:l Deputy State?s Attorney for Baltimore County, Maryland,
provided a letter to the Inspection Division, dated April 21, 2014. The letter stated, based upon
the nature of the investigation and the Defendant?s gang af?liation, the Agents werejustified in 
their belief the suspect could be violent and a danger. The suspect disregarded the commands
made" by the Agents show his hands. Instead, he put' the car in .
reverse, striking two civilian?s car in an effort to escape. This created a grave threat to civilians
and Agents alike, and the use of deadly-force was justi?ed. Accordingly, no action will be taken

?by the State?s Attorney?s Of?ce for Baltimore County.

14


 

NYT-128

 



Inspector?s Draft Observations

Observation 1: SA discharged his firearm solely to disable
a moving vehicle, in violation of the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

Analgsis 1: The Deadly" Force Policy stated, ?Law enforcement o?icers
of the Department ofJustiee may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the o?icer has a
reasonable belief that the subject of such jbrce poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical
injury to the twicer or to another person. 

Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a ?eeing suspect.
Firearms may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles. 

13" feasible and to do so would not increase the danger to the o?icer or others, a
verbal warning to submit to the authority of the ojj?icer shall be given prior to the
use of deadly jbrce. 

D. Warning shots are not permitted



95:13}:

subjects which must be used when the use of deathforce is not authorized by this
policy. 

On April 1 I, 2014, SAI was involved in an AIS in the vicinity of 9750
Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills, Maryland. Fol owing the incident, SAI provided a
detailed account to SIRT members of the events leading up to the shooting. Within his account,
the following: - . .

 

 

 

?As Harrison?s vehicle continued to accelerate backwards, my gun was pointed at
Harrison through his driver-side window. His vehicle continued to apply force on the
civilian vehicles behind him. In the split second I had available to me toassess the

deadly threat to civilians and my colleagues, posed by Harrison, and myhelief his
vehicle, as operated by him, was a dangerous instrument which could imminently cause
grave bodily harm, I ?red two rounds into Harrison?s driven-side ?'ont tire in an attempt

'to immobilize the vehicle and neutralize the threat. I was within one foot of the tire at the

time I ?red these two rounds."

I (Wm Instruction 1a: SAC, Baltimore Field Of?ce, will ensure 
receives remedial training regarding the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

(UHEDEQ) Instruction 1b: SAC, Baltimore Field Office, will ensure all Baltimore
Field Of?ce personnel are appropriately trained regarding the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

(Wm Observatitm 2: Agents improperly utilized civilian vehicles as a blocking
mechanism during a high-risk traf?c stop.

(WM) Analgsis 2: On April 11, 2014, at approximately 4:40 FBI and BCPD
surveillance personnel initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle operated by Harrison, a subject of a
suspected narcotics transaction. Harrison was operating a gray 2013 In?nity bearing New
York license plate: GAK2131. The enforcement action occurred on an access road from a Wal-

15


O?icers will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for handling resisting 

arr-129

 

 



Mart parking lot in the area of 9750 Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills, Maryland. .At the time of
the initial enforcement action, Harrison?s vehicle was stopped on the access road and behind
civilian vehicles at a traffic light. A civilian vehicle was immediately behind Harrison?s vehicle.

 

To effect the traf?c stop, Detective |:|positioned his unmarked lat the front 136 -1 a
driver-side'comer of Harrison?s vehicle; SA|:|positioned his unmarke 337': -1 4
immediately adjacent to Harrison?s driver?s-side, followed by umnarke b7? '6

Once the law enforcement vehicles moved into position, activated his
emergency lights and Agents exited their vehicles and approached Harrison?s vehicle. All law
enforcement of?cials were wearing body armor, with four of the five of?cials displaying the
word on the front and back panels of the armor. Law enforcement of?cials were
positioned as follows: 1) SEthe driver?s side door, 2) Detective: at the ?oat
driver?s side corner, .3) SA at the front driver?s side corner, 4) ??ont
of the vehicle, 5) SA: at the passenger side of the vehicle.

(WM) Law enforcement officials identi?ed themselves as ?Police? and gave
Harrison instructions to raise his hands. Harrison initially complied with instructions and raised
his hands in the air. Moments later, however, Harrison began to slowly look around then
lowered his hands from sight against lawful commands to keep his hands in the air. Harrison 
then switched gears and began moving in reverse in an apparent attempt to ?ee. Harrison?s
vehicle struck the. civilian car behind him. Fearing for the life and safety of civilians in the area,
as well as enforcement officers attempting to apprehend Harrison, SA: ?red two rounds b6 - 1
fromhis handgun into the driver?s side front tire in an attempt to immobilize the vehicle. A?er WC ?1
colliding with the ?rst vehicle, Harrison continued to back his vehicle toward other civilian
vehiclesand to disregard official commands to ?Stop.? SA|:|and SA |:|rhen ?red their
handguns multiple times at Harrison, striking Harrison six times in the head, neck, and left
shoulder. Both Agents stated they feared for the life and safety of innocent civilians in the area,
as well law enforcement of?cers on foot in the area, causing them to utilize deadly force.
Harrison's .vehicle ?nally stopped after colliding with another vehicle. 

(mm The Practical Applications Unit (PAU) at the FBI Academy in Quantico,
Virginia conducts Raining sessions for all New Agent Trainees in the proper methods of
conducting motor vehicle stops. Agents are instructed to seek optimal tactical advantage in
conducting traf?c stops, while minimizing risks to innocent bystanders, law enforcement
- personnel, and subjects of the vehicle stop. Absent exigent circumstances, Agents should not
expose innocent bystanders to dangers associated with high-risk enforcement actions. In the
scenario described above, law enforcement personnel utilized civilian vehicles as a blocking
mechanism to effect a high-risk traffic stop. This placed the occupants of the vehicles at risk of
being introduced into the enforcement action, placing them in danger. Furthermore, the use of
civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism failed to ensure a proper blockade, which would have
minimized dangers associated with a non-compliant subject. -

CUIZEQHQ) Recommendation 2: SAC, Baltimore Field O?ice, should ensure all
Baltimore Field Of?ce Agents are trained in the proper methods of conducting traf?c stops.

16


NYT-13O

 

  

(Rm-1 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Shooting Incident Review Group Date: 11f24f2014
cc: b5 -1
?1
From: INSPECTION
Contact: I
Approved By: DELACOURT PAUL 
STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By:| I be '1
-1

Case ID 29TI-HQ-A4TI7ZTB BALTIMORE SHOOTING REVIEW 04?11?2014

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
This information is the property of the FBI and may be distributed to state,
tribal, or local government law enforcement officials with a need?to?know.
Further distribution without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions
should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a
manner that precludes unauthorized access.

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Agent-involved shooting
incident following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21f2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 05f15f2014,
prepared by Inspector Paul D. Delacourt. A copy of the complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report was uploaded to the captioned file.



NYT-131



Title: Shooting Incident Review Group

Re: 11/24/2014
b3 -2
h? ?1,4

Details: b?c ?1'4
-1

-1,3,6,10
On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an Agent-involved

shooting incident that occurred on 04/11/2014, involving Special Agents

{5351' I and

Detective I Baltimore County Police Department

Agents and were supporting al I
I Iinvestigation ofI I

 

 

 

 

 

Pursuant to a Court-authorized wiretap, the Federal Bureau of

 

Investigation I

 

I I While monitoring the investigators

 

learnedl I

I I Agents and 

briefed the AISSA, and SAC they intended to establish surveillance of


 

 

 

 

During the planned surveillance, Agents observed
I I b6 -2,4
b7c ?2,4
I I Harrison drove along an access road leading to qu _1

Reisterstown Road. Agents and driving three separate
vehicles, followed Harrison. At the Reisterstown Road stop light,

 

 

 

Harrison was positioned in the right turn lane. Prior to the arrival
of a marked unit, Agents decided to conduct a traffic stop and effect
an arrest of Harrison. Agents and their
vehicles in the adjacent lane, along Harrison?s driver?s side, with
Det. vehicle angled in front of Harrison?s
vehicle. Agents and Det. approached Harrison?s vehicle,
identified themselves as police, issued verbal commands, and ordered
Harrison to exit the vehicle. Harrison ignored commands and drove his
SUV in reverse, striking a behind him.

Harrison, still in reverse, maneuvered his SUV between
the rear Agent?s vehicle and Fearing for the safety of b6 -1,2
civilians and fellow Agents, the tire of Harrison?s ?1?2



2

NYT3132



Title: Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: l1f24/2014

 

 

vehicle and AgentsI Ifired their weapons at Harrison. b3 '2
Harrison's vehicle struck and came to rest against a 

which was positioned two vehicles behind the right

lane. At the time of the incidentJ I
intercept. I I


Harrison succumbed to his wounds at the scene.

Emergency Medical Services responded immediately and pronounced

 

 

 

 

 

Harrison dead within five minutes of the initial call of shots fired.

No civilians or law enforcement personnel were injured.

 

(UXEBEHOE Ifired their weapons. SA b5 _1r4

not fire their weapons. BCPD identified t?c "1'4
and interviewed four civilian witnesses to the shooting incident.

Baltimore Agents investigating the Assault on a Federal Officer case
identified and interviewed others. One local surveillance camera
captured a portion of the incident at a distance. The shooting scene
was processed by FBI BA ERT, the Laboratory Division?s Shooting
Reconstruction Team, and EOPD. Signed Sworn Statements of the Agents
and an interview of consistent recollections of

the events.

(Uli?b??i Harrison was transported to the Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner (OCME) for the State of Maryland and assigned case
number 14?3355. On O4fl2f2014 at 9:00 Assistant Medical Examiner

I I MD, performed the autopsy of Harrison. The OCME b5 -4
b7C -4

 

 

opinion was as follows:

?This 34 year old, African American male, JAMEEL KAREEN OFORUM
HARRISON, died Of MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS Of the head neck
{3)r and left shoulder Two of the gunshot wounds of the head 
and injured the skull and brain. A bullet was recovered in
association with each of these gunshot wounds. One of the gunshot

wounds of the neck (D) injured the carotid arteries on either side of

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

3

NYT1133

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: llf24/2014

the neck. This was a through-and-through gunshot wound with no bullet
recovery. A bullet jacket was recovered in association with the other
gunshot wound of the neck (E). A bullet jacket was recovered in
association with the gunshot wound of the left shoulder (F). By
report, the decedent was shot by law enforcement while he was in his
car. The manner of death is 

(Ufipb??j Toxicology results associated with the autopsy revealed
high levels of Oxycodone as follows: 1) Blood Heart: Oxycodone 0.7
mg/L; 2) Blood Femoral: Oxycodone 0.5 mg/L; 3) Urine: Oxycodone

Positive.

Laboratory examination of items recovered from the
person of Jameel Harrison revealed the following: 1) 136.41 grams of a
hard white substance was determined to be heroin; 2) 5?.79 grams of a

hard white substance was determined to be heroin.

SIRG Observations

(u/ijssoj On 10/21/2014, the 31m; reviewed the Agent-involved

shooting incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force.

a. The SIRE voted unanimously the application of deadly force
by discharging his firearm solely to disable a moving b6 ?1
vehicle was out of compliance with the Department of Justice (DOJ) b7c ?1

Deadly Force Policy.

b. The SIRG voted ten to one the application of deadly force by
SAs lon U4fllf2014, was in compliance with the DOJ

 

 

Deadly Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning

and execution, training, and/or safety issues.



4

NYT- 134



Title: (U/Zb?wg) Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: llf2412014

a. The SIRG determined his firearm solely 
to disable a moving vehicle, in violation of the DOJ Deadly Force b7c ?1
policy. Therefore, the SIRG proposed an observation with

recommendations for corrective actions.

 

b. The SIRG determined Itook appropriate

 

actions to protect themselves and others from the imminent threat posed
by Jameel Harrison. The SIRG noted, however, Agents improperly
utilized civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism during a high-risk
traffic stop and proposed an observation with recommendations for

corrective actions.

 

(UXEEDHQE Observation 1: Idischarged his firearm b6 ?1

solely to disable a moving vehicle, in violation of the DOJ Deadly b7c ?1

Force Policy.

Analysis 1: The DOJ Deadly Force Policy stated, ?Law

enforcement officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly force
only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief
that the subject of such force_poses an imminent danger of death or

serious_physical injury to the officer or to another_person.

A. Deadly force may not be used solely to_prevent the escape of a

fleeing suspect.

B. Firearms may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles.

0. If feasible and to do so would not increase the danger to the

officer or others,r a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the

officer shall be given_prior to the use of deadly force.

D. warning'shots are not permitted.

E. Officers will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for

handling resisting subjects which must be used when the use of deadly

force is not authorized by this_policy.?



5

NYT1135



Title: {U/sz??j Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: 11f2412014

On 04/11/2014, involved vicinity of 9T50 Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills, Maryland. Following b7c _1
the incident, a detailed account to SIRT members of
the events leading up to the shooting. Within his account, 

advised the following:

?As Harrison?s vehicle continued to accelerate backwards, my gun
was pointed at Harrison through his driver?side window. His vehicle
continued to apply force on the civilian vehicles behind him. In the
split second I had available to me to assess the deadly threat to
civilians and my colleagues, posed by Harrison, and my belief his
vehicle, as operated by him, was a dangerous instrument which could
imminently cause grave bodily harm, I fired two rounds into Harrison?s
driver-side front tire in an attempt to immobilize the vehicle and
neutralize the threat. I was within one foot of the tire at the time I

fired these two rounds.?

(UKEEBEQE Instruction la: SAC, Baltimore Field Office, will

ensure remedial training regarding the DOJ Deadly b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

Force Policy.

(UXEEOEQE Instruction 1b: SAC, Baltimore Field Office, will

ensure all Baltimore Field Office personnel are appropriately trained

 

regarding the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

Observation 2: Agents improperly utilized civilian

vehicles as a blocking mechanism during a high-risk traffic stop.

(UXEEBHQE Analysis 2a: On 04f11f2014, at approximately 4:40 
Baltimore FBI Agents and a BCPD TFO initiated a traffic stop of a
vehicle operated by Jameel Harrison, a subject of a suspected narcotics
transaction. Harrison was operating a gray 2013 Infinity. The
enforcement action occurred on an access road adjacent to a Wal?Mart
parking lot in the area of 9?50 Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills,
Maryland. At the time of the initial enforcement action, Harrison?s
vehicle was stopped on the access road and behind civilian vehicles at

a traffic light. A civilian vehicle was immediately behind Harrison?s

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

6

NYT- 136

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: llf24/2014

vehicle. To effect the traffic stop, his b5 ?1!4
unmarked at the front driver side corner of Harrison's hm _1'4

b7E -6
vehicle. SA - positioned his unmarked immediately

adjacent to Harrison's driver?s side, followed by unmarked

 

I I Once the law enforcement vehicles moved into position,
his emergency lights and Agents and the TFO exited
their vehicles and approached Harrison?s vehicle. All law enforcement
officials were wearing body armor, with four of the five officials
displaying the word on the front and back panels of the
armor. Law enforcement officials were positioned as follows: 1) SE

the driver?s side door, 2} the front

driver's side corner, 3) at the front driver's side

corner, 4) of the vehicle, 5) 

the passenger side of the vehicle.

Law enforcement officials identified themselves as
?Police? and gave Harrison instructions to raise his hands. Harrison
initially complied and raised his hands in the air. Moments later,
however, Harrison began to slowly look around then lowered his hands
from sight against lawful commands to keep his hands in the air.
Harrison's vehicle then began moving in reverse in an apparent attempt
to flee. Harrison?s vehicle struck the civilian car behind him.
Fearing for the life and safety of civilians in the area, as well as
enforcement officers attempting to apprehend Harrison, b6 -1
two rounds from his handgun into the driver?s side front tire in an _1
attempt to immobilize the vehicle. After colliding with the first
vehicle, Harrison continued to back his vehicle toward other civilian
vehicles and to disregard official commands to ?Stop.? SA
fired their handguns multiple times at Harrison, striking
Harrison six times in the head, neck, and left shoulder. Both Agents
stated they feared for the life and safety of innocent civilians in the
area, as well law enforcement officers on foot in the area, causing
them to utilize deadly force. Harrison's vehicle finally stopped after

colliding with another vehicle.

The Tactical Training Unit (TTU) at the FBI Academy in





NYT-137



Title: Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: llf24/2014

Quantico, Virginia conducts training sessions for all New Agent
Trainees (NATs) in the proper methods of conducting motor vehicle
stops. Agents are instructed to seek optimal tactical advantage in
conducting traffic stops, while minimizing risks to innocent
bystanders, law enforcement personnel, and subjects of the vehicle
stops. Absent exigent circumstances, Agents should not expose innocent
bystanders to dangers associated with high-risk enforcement actions.

In the scenario described herein, law enforcement personnel utilized
civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism to effect a high-risk traffic
stop. This placed the occupants of the vehicles at risk of being
introduced into the enforcement action, placing them in danger.
Furthermore, the use of civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism
failed to ensure a proper blockade, which would have minimized dangers

associated with a non?compliant subject.

Analysis 2b: In consultation with TTU, INSD assessed
NATs received minimal tactical training regarding the proper execution
of high-risk vehicle stops. New Agents training consists of 20 weeks
{approximately 100 days) of training, with nine days allocated to TTU.
Of the time allotted to tactical training, NATs receive approximately
two hours of instruction on compliant vehicle stops and vehicle
blocking techniques. An additional five hours are spent utilizing

vehicle stops in scenario-based training.

INSD has reviewed multiple Agent-involved shootings
associated with vehicle stops. INSD review and Shooting Incident
Review Group (SIRG) discussion evaluated the circumstances leading to,
and tactical execution of, the individual vehicle stops. INSD has not
reviewed TD curriculum. SIRG discussion advised and INSD recommends
the Training Division review the current curriculum regarding
high-risk vehicle stops and re-evaluate the sufficiency of the existing
training curriculum to adequately prepare Agents for the heightened

dangers associated with high?risk vehicle enforcement actions.

(UXEEDHQE Analysis 20: TTU advised the Law Enforcement Training

for Safety and Survival (LETSS) course was previously used by TD to

UNCLASSIFIEDHM
a

NYT- 138



Title: Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: llf2412014

address the continuing development of tactical skills in arrest
scenarios for tenured Agents and Task Force Officers on
operational squads, who were more likely to be involved in adversarial
actions as a result of SSTF, VOTF, JTTF or other investigations. TTU
advised LETSS was the only advanced FBI tactical training available to
Agents and TFOs. TTU advised no current funding is allocated for LETSS
in FY 2015.

Recommendation 2a: SAC, Baltimore Field Office, should

ensure all Baltimore Field Office Agents are trained in the proper

 

methods of conducting traffic stops.

 

(UXEEBHQE Recommendation 2b: AD, TD should review and assess the
sufficiency of existing New Agent training curriculum for high?risk

vehicle stops.

Recommendation 2c: AD, TD should assess the feasibility

of funding FY 2015 Law Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival

 

courses to facilitate the continuing development of tactical skills in

arrest scenarios for Agents and TFOs.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

 

 

necessary.

a. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken
against Ias a result of their involvement in the b6 ?1
04111;?2014 shooting incident. 137?: ?1

b. The SIRG found the actions of be out of
compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. Therefore, the SIRG
determined actions warranted referral to the Internal
Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any

further administrative action.

Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios,

INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The
following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector
UNCLASSIFIEDHM
9

NYT1139



Title: Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: llf24/2014

Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), Deputy b6 ?1,3
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States b7c ?1'3
Department of Justice Trial Criminal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division, SSAI I Investigative Law Unit, Office
of General Counsel; SSAI I, Squad CR-2, Washington

Field Office; Unit Chief I Practical Applications
Unit, Training Division SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group UCI I New

 

Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (USU), 
Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section,

Criminal Investigative Division; and SC Roger A. Coe, Global

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non?voting
individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmithl SWAT
Operations Unit, SSAI I Ballistics Research
Facility, SSAI I Protective Operations Unit,
Security Division; UCI I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit,

 

Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo,
Paul D. Delacourt, Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, 

Assistant Inspectorszeam Leadersl I

OI, Special 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OI, UCI Iand Management Program 
I Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), and MAPAI I Inspection Analysis

 

Unit (IAU), INSD.

Procedures for Responding to Observations

 

SAC, Baltimore, is responsible for ensuring the
Inspection Instructions and Recommendations are satisfactorily
resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the
Observations are addressed by the field office. The
Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office?s response to

determine if Instructions and Recommendations have been resolved or

UNCLASSIFIEDUM

lD

NYT114O



Title: Shooting Incident Review Group
Re: llf24/2014

require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions
taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under

consideration to implement.

SAC, Baltimore, is required to provide a written

response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to

 

 

 

 

resolve the Instructions and Recommendations. Follow?up EC responses

must be directed to Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management ha ?1
Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the b7c '1
Sentinel link to MPRI I

99



ll

NYT- 141

 

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in {hair be?ie? mat ma Euaga?i came? he vigith a?d a danger.

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be taken by this {af?ae? .

 

 

 

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3; aw: Simud 5

NYT- 142

 

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To: Teyems, Trent R.
Cetl Beiaceure. haul 
Sent: his Hey s? 15:19:29 261s

$Ubj??mf Beitisere FE: Sheeting

 

Inehecte: Trent Teyems
Inspection Division

 

 

FBI
Gh the afterheeh e5 April 11, EEI agehts. who were assigned to a
[Task Fares. shat-she fatally whensee Harris-shF a sheen ?3
meshes sf gang, while attempting es eehdees vehicle step and

arrest fellewihg a drug sale. The subject had a histery Qt vieieht armed activity
eheue which the task feree members. including the sheets: agents, were aware; The 
subject was attempting ts escape esrese is his vehicle, eheehgerihg the law
ehferhemeht effieers who were he feet. as well as the CiVllia? drivers ih-vehieies
?with which his vehicle eeliided er was about to collide. heseh uhhn rauiew ef'ihe
Inspectieh Divisieh Shooting Ihei?eht Regert, we have the: the feces he
nee a.feseral criminal civil rights.ihvestigstieh. The uses concurs with
GUI deeisienw The State?s Atserhey Beltimexe Ceuhsy, heryiehd, determined the
deadly farce wee ?sstifies. .

The two agents and several ether ?erce members blessed the subject?s
vehieie with their ewh vehicles on an access road hear a shepping sentes_whiie the
subject?s ear was lemmes in besweeh a lies hf civilian vehi,les in rushing iehe.
Emergency lights were activated and the fee: agents she ehe Baltimore peliee
detective surrhunheh the subjees?s he: he feet ww in irons, behind alongside it.
They were vests marked police, verbally identified themselves as "eelieerf and
ardered the suhjeet he "est the he: in pass? Uhleei the deersf Gee set sf the has!?
initially. the subject raised his hands. he-theh loweres his hands is the gear
shift and appeared te he ehhsi?ering his escape. I b3 ?2

 

 

 

 


The subject jerked his ear ferwar?. he then backed up. colliding with a
civilian whmeh*e ear behihh himl As his he: began :0 clear :hose vehicl?s to his
rear. he hegah he accelerate in reversei Qhe hi the agent's yelled ?Ben?s he it*
another egent'yeiied, "I?m shohrihg the sire?" ahd did es. The: sgeet elem saw a
women an feet running meet the sshjeet?s est. .
ht this paint the tee agents fired as she sshjeht shrcagh the wihdshieid

I'l'

 

L. seems ?g
NYT-143

r'w: 'uesfuuww rte-a deeming 1mg: .4. .4,

striking hie. Beth agents etetee that they feared fer the Safety end life ef the
ethet eqehte eh feet; e5 Well as civilians in the nearby care, because at the
tetject?e dangereet driving end thee they used deadly ?erce. The eetjeet*e tar thee
rolled ta stag and he-etpited free euitipie gunehet weunde.

The other thtee law enforcement officere cleime? that they had the
feet for their ewe tafety and the eefety of.ethete the weuie have fixed their
hed they had a ghee line at fire. The civiliee cetteheteted that
the subject eteve at he did, with the cert e5 they tried te clear
eat ef his watt They eettetetetee that the iew efficete were vette
marked Police and yelled the wereinge that were tepottee. Gee eemee teieted that she
had exited her tet end wee eh feet in the etteet es the ehfelded.

Under the totality ef the tittaettentet, the evidence tees not teepett 
tuet the egeete willfully farce that they te he er
unnecessary, the intent element require? fer vieletieh Df the ephliteele federal
criminal civil tighte statute? A fe?erel ttieinei titii tights invettigatien of the
sheeting it not Warr??t?d? We appreciate the agentt? toiuetety 
feeiliteting a fail? informed campiete yeet admieiettetive review.

 

teeth:

NYT- 144

b7E

-9

U.S. Department of Justice

 

Federal Bureau of lnvestigatitm

Washington, D.C. 26535?0001

 

 

Sect?
0 

PERS

 

 

3" Peder ureau nvestigation bar: ?1
Baltimore, MD
k? Dear 

I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you
disregarded the Department of Justice deadly force policy when you discharged your
weapon at a tire of a moving vehicle during a deadly force incident, in violation of Offense Code
1.3 (Investigative De?ciency Violation of Operational Based on a
preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the
circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to,
consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and

$aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar

. day.

5?

  

DISCUSSION
Summary
 On April 11, 2014, around 4:40 pm, you, Specal Agent 1 (3A1), Special Agent 2
t\ (3A2), and Special Agent 3 (3A3), and local police department Task Force Officer (TFO) were
involved in a shooting incident. You, agents and TFO (collectively, law enforcement of?cials

 

 

 

or LEOs) were support|i_ng aI |investigation of al I We -1

You planned to I b7E -1 6

 

 

During the surveillance, LEOs observed Subject conduct the
suspected narcotics transaction. Following this activity, Subject drove along an access road.
LEOs, driving three separate vehicles, followed Subject. Prior to the arrival of a marked unit,
LEOs decided to conduct a traf?c stop and affect an arrest of Subject. The LEOs approached
Subj ect?s vehicle, identi?ed yourselves as police, issued verbal commands, and Ordered Subject

 

You were also alleged to have violated Offense Code 5.15 (Misuse of Weapon Intentional Discharge). However.
this allegation is predicated on the same conduct forming the basis of the allegation that you violated Offense Code
1.3. According to the Penalty Guidelines, will exercise care in assessing multiple penalties where the

substantiated are essentially restatements of the same act of misconduct.? Therefore, I will limit my discussion to
Offense Code] .8.

 

b6 -1
?1

Mn:

to exit the vehicle. Subject ignored commands and drove his vehicle in reverse, striking a
civilian vehicle positioned behind him.

Subject, still in reverse, maneuvered his vehicle between the bucar of the agent in the rear
and the civilian vehicle. Fearing for the safety of civilians and fellow LEOS, you shot the tire of
Subj ect?s vehicle and 3A1 and 8A2 ?red their weapons at Subj ect.2 Subj ect's vehicle struck and
came to rest against a second civilian vehicle that was positioned two vehicles behind the ?rst
civilian vehicle.

Emergency Medical Services responded immediately and pronounced Subject dead
within ?ve minutes of the initial call of shots ?red. No civilians or law enforcement personnel
were injured.

Background

Prior to the shooting incident, you and others in your division were investigating a

[Subjects ofthe investigation he ?2

 

b'i'A -1

 

 

IAs part of the investigation, your division obtained an approved Title~lII ?1 6

Ithat authorized interceptions of wire and/or electronic

lassociated with the investigationl I

wiretap order]
communicationsl

 



Throughout the investigationj 

 

 

b3
- 1

Ithe investigative strategy shiftedl -2

 

I To accomplish this without compromisin the ME 3 10
federal wiretaps and larger criminal enterprise investigation, agents orchestratedl 

 

 

 

I In the days leading up to the shooting incident, information From the wiretaps led

 

agents I

 

 

 

 

Consistent with normal division procedures, written FBI Law Enforcement Operations
Orders (ops plans) were not prepared| This was due to the expectation
the enforcement action would be accomplished by the local authorities, with FBI personnel

 

b7E -1

 

 

2 3A3 and TFO did not ?re their weapons. 8A3 did not do so because and 3A2 were in line of ?re.
TFO did not do so because he could not see where 8A3 was and did not want to strike him. Also, TFO advised, the
other agents had better angles of ?re on Subject and TFO believed his line of ?re could have resulted in a stray
round hitting someone in the adjacent parking lot. All LEOs present, including 8A3 and TFO, believed Subject
presented an imminent threat of serious bodily injury to themselves and others. The Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRS) concurred and ruled that the use of deadly force in this incident was justi?ed.

3 All LEOs involved in the shooting incident were aware of Subject?s long criminal history and that he was
considered armed and dan erous.

Referring to the ability to I

5 FBI ops plans contain the deadly force policy. When the ops plan is briefed before the operation, it is
expected that brie?ng agents review the deadly force policy written in the ops plan.

-1

 

2

NYT- 146

 

 

be ?1

-1

acting as back up or as observers. Because the operation that led to this shooting incident was
intendedl I no ops plan was drafted. has ?1

 

 

Events Leading Up to the Shooting

Onl Iat I 133 -2

-l
b7E -1,3,6,10

 

 

I
IBased on this new information, with the approval of your
Acting Supervisory Special Agent (AJSSA), Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC), and
Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC), agents planned a surveillancel 

 

 

I b3 ?2
ILEOs conducted surveillance ontgg  3 6 10
_|While doing 50. Your surveillance team, to include all LEOs involved in this incident, 

I held a brie?ng about the planI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

TFO called the police department and requested the patrol unit to reSpond to the area.

 

 

 

Shooting Incident Details

On April 1 l, 2014, at a proximately 4:40 pm, your surveillance team observed
Supplier?sI leaving the parking lot by way of an access road leading to a road 1:6 
(Road). Surveillance units then observed Subj ect?s vehicle follow the same route a short MC ?7

distance behind Supplier. Fearing an effective vehicle stop could not be conducted at the time,
due to Supplier?s proximity to Subject, you transmitted over the radio words to the effect of,
?We?re not taking him here, we?re going to follow him.? Subject proceeded to make a left hand
turn onto the access road and towards Road, followed by the surveillance team.

Moments later, 8A1 transmitted over the radio words to the effect of, I:Iis
gone.? You, who were in charge of the surveillance operation, understood this to mean
Supplier? was out of the area. then transmitted over the radio something to be ?7
the effect of, ?He [Subject] is here in the right lane, we can take him right here.? You WC ?7
understood this to mean Subject was in a good position to conduct the vehicle stop. Based on
this series of events, you transmitted the order to affect the vehicle stop of Subject. The marked
police unit had yet to arrive on the scene.

While traf?c was stopped on the access road at the traf?c light for Road, TFO positioned
his vehicle at the front driver?side corner of Subject?s vehicle. You positioned your bucar
immediately adjacent to Subject?s driver?s side, followed by ?5 bucar. Civilian vehicles
were stopped in hunt of and behind Subject?sf? Once the surveillance team?s vehicles moved
into position, SAI activated his emergency lights and all LEOs exited your vehicles and
approached Subject?s vehicle. All LEOs were wearing body armor, with four of the ?ve

 

6 SIRT noted the danger in making a traffic stop in such a way that civilian vehicles were also blocking in the
subject's vehicle.

NYT- 147

M4: be -1

?370 ?1

displaying the word on the front and back panels of the armor. The LEOs were
positioned as follows: 1) you at the driver?s side door, 2) TFO at the front driver?s side corner;
3) 8A3 at the front driver?s side comer; 4) 8A1 in front of the vehicle; 5) 8A2 at the passenger
side of the vehicle.

LEOs identi?ed yourselves as ?police? and gave Subject instructions to raise his hands.
Subject initially complied with instructions and raised his hands in the air. Moments later,
however, Subject began to slowly look around and then lowered his hands from sight against the
commands to keep his hands in the air. You attempted to open the driver?s side door, but
it was locked. You then tried to breach the driver?s side window by hitting the window with the
butt of your handgun. Again, you were unsuccessful. As the LEOs continued to yell commands
at Subject to put his hands in the air, Subject?s vehicle began to move forward Subject
then switched gears and began moving in reverse in an apparent attempt to ?ee? Subject?s
vehicle struck the civilian car behind him. Fearing for the life and safety of civilians in the area,
as well as your fellow LEOs, you ?red two rounds from your handgun into the driver's side front
tire in an attempt to immobilize the vehicle. While doing so, you yelled words to the effect of,
?I?m shooting the tire, I?m shooting the tire.? Subj ect?s vehicle continued to move backwards, at
which point you were unable to advance further because you were wedged between Subject?s
vehicle and one of the bucars.

After colliding with the ?rst vehicle, Subject continued to back his vehicle toward other
civilian vehicles and to disregard of?cial to stop. 3A1 and 3A2 then ?red their
handguns multiple times at Subject, striking Subject six times in the head, neck, and left
shoulder. Both agents used deadly force because they feared for the life and safety of innocent
civilians in the area as well as the LEOs. Subj ect?s vehicle ?nally stopped after colliding with
another vehicle. As LEOs approached the vehicle, Subject appeared motionless and
unresponsive. TFO shattered the window and you reached in, unlocked and opened the driver?s
side door. 8A2, an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), assessed Subject?s condition and
determined he had serious arterial bleeding. Subject died on site. All witness accounts were
consistent regarding the details of the shooting.

Post Shooting Details

 

 

b3 -2

 

 

The county ?re department medic unit reaponded to the scene and, upon arrival, observed
Subject in the driver seat of the vehicle. The vehicle was still on and in gear, with Subj ect?s foot
still on the accelerator. Medic personnel turned off the vehicle, examined Subject, determined he
sustained multiple gunshot wounds, and was deceased. Per normal protocol, Subject?s body was
left in place until the forensic examiner of the medical examiner?s office responded to the scene.

 

While and TFO's statements do not mention whether the vehicle ?rst moved forward a small distance, the
other three (you. 3A1 and 8A3) recall Subject?s vehicle ?rst moving or lurching forward a short distance, before
Subject shifted gears and began driving in reverse.

NYT- 148

Mrl:| be -1

?1

Following forensic examination, Subject?s body was transported to the medical examiner?s o?ice
for autopsy.

That same day, your division?s ERT and Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction
Team (LSRT) processed the shooting scene. Members of the police department also reSponded
to the scene as part of a joint investigation with the FBI. Evidence gathered from Subject?s body
at the scene included $1880 in cash and two bags of a-white substance later determined to be
heroin. On April 13, 2014*, further evidence recovered from Subject?s vehicle included an
Oxycodone prescription bottle with three pills and six cellular telephones.

Also on the same day as the shooting, your division noti?ed FBIHQ and the Shooting
Incident Review Team (SIRT) process was started. Over the course of the next few days, SIRT
conducted its investigation, which included FBI interviews and interviews of non-FBI
individuals (TFO and civilians)? The police department conducted videotaped interviews of
witnesses, which it provided to SIRT. SIRT also obtained video recording recovered from a
surveillance camera of a business near the shooting location, I 133 ?2
Iand agents? ?rearms training and
deadly force policy training history.

On April 12, 2014, the medical examiner?s of?ce performed the autopsy of Subject.
They concluded Subject died of multiple gunshot wounds: Three in the head, three in the neck,
and one in the left shoulder. Two of the gunshot wounds to the head injured the skull and brain.
One of the gunshot wounds of the neck injured the carotid arteries on either side of the neck.m
Toxicology results revealed high levels of Oxycodone in Subject?s system.

Accounting of Shots Fired

On April 11, 2014, 8A2 ?red eight rounds from his Glock 22 .40 caliber handgun. 
?red nine rounds from his Spring?eld Armory 1911 .45 caliber handgun. Both 8A2 and 8A1
directed their shots at Subject. You ?red two rounds from your Glock 22 .40 caliber handgun.
You directed both of your shots at the front driver?s side tire of Subj ect?s vehicle.

Firearms and Deadly Force Training

You and the other agents involved in the shooting were found to be properly trained and
within with the ?rearms quali?cations requirements at the time of the shooting
incident.

You and 3A1, who were both on your division?s SWAT team at the time of the incident,
received deadly force policy training on October 29, 2013, during ?rst quarter ?rearms

 

a After the initial ERT scene processing on April 1 I, 2014, Subject?s vehicle was towed to your division in the early
morning hours of April 12, 20M for later processing.

9 All FBI interviews were voluntary, including yours and the other three agents involved in the shooting. 
report page 13. The Signed Sworn Statements of the agents and an interview of TFO presented a consistent
recollection of the events.

"3 This gunshot wound was a through-and?through wound with no bullet recovered from the body.

SIRT report, page 13.

NYT- 149

ml: be -1

?1

training session.? Both you and also each participated in over 20 SWAT operations within
the year preceding the shooting incident. The SWAT Team Leader con?rmed the deadly force
policy was briefed twice before each SWAT operation.

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) voted 10 to one that 8A2 and were in
compliance with DOJ Deadly Force Policy when they discharged their weapons at Subject.
SIRG voted unanimously that you were out of compliance with DOJ Deadly Force policy when
you discharged your weapon solely to disable a moving vehicle.

Declinations to Prosecute

in a letter dated April 21, 2014, the Deputy State's Attorney for the county provided a
letter to the Inspection Division that stated that based upon the nature of the investigation and
Subject?s gang af?liation, agents were justi?ed in their belief that Subject could be violent and a
danger. Subject disregarded commands made by the agents and, instead, put the car in reverse
and stuck two civilians? cars in an effort to escape. This created a grave threat to civilians and
agents alike and therefore the use of deadly force was justi?ed. Accordingly, the letter advised
that no action would be taken against the agents by the State?s Attorney?s O?ice.

On May 7, 2014, Special Legal Counsel, Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
declined prosecution of the agents involved in this shooting incident. DOJ-CRD
concluded the facts did not warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation.

ANALYSIS

According to FBI Offense Code 1.8, employees are prohibited from ?[k]nowingly or
recklessly failing to enforce or comply with an FBI or operational guideline or policy not
speci?cally delineated in any of the other ?Investigative Deficiency? offense codes provided
herein."

The DOJ deadly force policy states:

Law enforcement officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly
force only when necessary, that is, when the of?cer has a reasonable belief
that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious
physical injury to the of?cer or to another person.

A. Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a ?eeing

suspect.

Firearms may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles.

If feasible and to do so would not increase the danger to the officer or

others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the of?cer shall be

given prior to the use of deadly force.

D. Of?cers will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for handling
resisting subjects which must be used when the use of deadly force is not
authorized by this policy.

0P3

 

'2 This training was documented in the FBI training database. SIRT report, page 14. 3A2 received deadly force
policy training on l0f18i20l3, when he was assigned to a different division. Id.

6

NYT- 150

 

MI. 136 -1
etc ?1

 

 

 

SIRG concluded, as did the State?s Attorney?s Of?ce, that the use of deadly force against
Subject was justi?ed. Therefore, you and the other agents were reasonable in your belief that
Subject posed an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to themselves or others
when he failed to comply with their commands and began moving his vehicle without regard to
the safety of LEOs and civilians around him. In this aspect, you were within the scope of the
deadly force policy when you decided to intentionally discharge your 'weapon. At issue is the
target you chose, a vehicle the versus a human being, for your application of deadly force.

The deadly force policy permits the use of deadly force on a human being when
necessary to protect oneself or others from imminent serious bodily injury or death. Even when
deadly force is authorized, however, the policy expressly prohibits its use to be directed at a
moving vehicle solely for the purpose of disabling the vehicle.13

In your signed sworn statement, you acknowledged that you ?red two rounds into

Subj ect?s driver?s side front tire ?in an attempt to immobilize the vehicle and neutralize the
threat.? All FBI agents are trained on the deadly force policy, including the section that ?rearms
may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles. Additionally, agents review the deadly force
policy in all ops plans. While no plan was mitten for the subject incident, you were an
experienced agent who had been on many arrests and searches where ops plans would have been
required. Furthermore, as a SWAT operator, you were briefed on the deadly force policy before
each SWAT op.

While the desire to disable a moving vehicle without having to shoot the human subject
inside of it is understandable, the deadly force policy?s prohibition on such actions is for good
reason: as was seen in this incident, shooting the tires of a vehicle does not stop the vehicle and
therefore does not eliminate the threat and gives the driver more time to potentially cause
greater harm to those around him.

Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude you violated Offense Code 1.8
when you shot the tire of Subj ect?s vehicle.

PENALTY DETERMINATION

The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 1.8 (Investigative
De?ciency Violation of Operational Guidelines and Policies, Other). The standard penalty is a
five-day susPension- Mitigating factors warrant an oral reprimand to a three-day suspension.
Aggravating factors warrant a seven- to 30 day suspension. When determining an appropriate
penalty, 1 considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with
precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating
factors.

In mitigation, you have seven years of FBI service, a positive performance record,'the
support of your division, and no prior disciplinary actions. in further mitigation, the rapidly
unfolding events were extremely stressful, even for agents with the depth of experience and
SWAT training as yours, and called for Split second decisions by all LEOs involved. It is a very

 

'3 [t is acceptable, however, to shoot at or into a moving vehicle at a human target, as SAI and 8A2 did.



NYT- 151

Mi: be -1
1370 ?1

weighty decision to discharge one?s weapon in a real-life and real-time environment, as opposed
to a training environment, and potentially take the life of another human being, even when
justi?ed by the deadly force policy. You were attempting to eliminate the threat presented by the
moving vehicle to civilians and your colleagues, and your violation of the policy was to apply
force to the vehicle instead of the human driver?1 The shots to the tires did not cause harm to
any surrounding LEOs or civilians. Additionally, you were under a tremendous amount of stress
even before the incident, given your commute over a long period of time and overseeing
a complex signi?cant case with rapid developments and numerous dangerous operations over an
extended time. Based on the circumstances in this case, I am suspending you from duty, without
pay, for one calendar day for your 1.8 offense.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. The FBI
must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations,
and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI
views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to
receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense.l5

APPEAL RIGHTS

if you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following noti?cation of 
?nal decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Assistant
Director, Human Resources Division, Room 10903, Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar
Hoover Building, 935 Avenue, Northwest, Washington, DC. 20535-0001. You
may also fax your notice of appeal to Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be
provided an opportunity to review the ?le and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRD.
Your division head must be noti?ed at the time you ?le an appeal. If an appeal is ?led for any
action other than a dismissal, the OPE. disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the
appellate decision.

If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the AD, HRD,
will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar
days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The
standard of review on appeal in examining factual ?ndings and penalty is the substantial
evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either

 

1? As opposed to a scenario where an agent applies deadly force in a non-lethal situation and is therefore in violation
of policy entirely.

?5 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's I ntemal
Investigations Section (llS), OPR, the Human Resources Division?s Appellate Unit the Security Division,
the Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate
Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness
or potential witness about this inquiry without ?rst obtaining approval from IIS, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are
admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the
property of the FBI, and you are prohibited ?-om photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You
may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your
participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose.

8
NYT- 152

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EH: -1

the AD, HRD, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the AD, HRD, or the DRB identi?es factors
that require additional investigation andfor adjudication, the case will be remanded to the
Inspection Division andfor CPR for additional action.

Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that
the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney
handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and
provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to
re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Notice #023 SN (Disciplinary Appeals
Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals.

REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS

In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be
shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being
provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security
clearance.

Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent Mid-Level

Management Selection Board andfor the Director for their consideration on any future promotion
or other action requiring their recommendation.

Sincerely yours,

 

I bhief be -1
Adjudication Unit 11 MC -1
Office of Professional Responsibility

1 - SAC, Baltimore (Personal Attention) Enclosure (See NoteSecurity Division (Attn: Unit Chief, AIU, (For SecD records only--Do not
forward to RMD)
I Human Resources Division (Attn: Unit Chief, APU, Room 10283)
1 - Tiekler COPY, OPR
Based on Baltimore EC to Inspection Division, 01f21f2015, OPR ROI, 02f20f2015.
6)

 

NYT- 153

 

 

WCLASSIFIEDIM

. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date; - 05:2212015

'Report of: Inapector Trent R, Teyeina Of?ce: FBII-IQ . .
Case?ID#: .

Title: - . SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

- REPORT OF SHOOTING .
SAN ANTONIO FIELD 
AUSTIN RESIDENT 
09/030014

Investigative P_eriod: 09;;0912014 05! lSi?2015 . - - 
I I. ExecutiveSumn'Iary I

.  On '09f08f2014, Agents and Task Force Of?cers (TFOs) from the San 
Antonio Field Of?ce, Austin Resident Agency (ARA), were involved in a shooting incident
while attempting to apprehend Tyler Matthew Caraway-on a federal arrest warrant. Caraway
was injured and later died due to the severity of his injuries. The Shooting Incident Review
Team (SIRT) reported to territory on 09f09f2014. 

 

- (UIZEQHQ I On Acting Supervisdry Special Agent 
arawa'y was- 

obtained an arrest warrant for Caraway and a search warrant for his residence.

Tesponsible tor" the armed bank robbery ofthe Austin Chase Bank on 03f06f2014. In anticipation
of executing an arrest and'search warrant, Agentsand from Central Texas Violent
Crimes Task Force diacussed and plannedan arrest and search operation to be
conducted later in the afternoon on prepared an Operations
plan, which was approved by and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC)
In? addition, on 0910812014, an operations briefing was conducted at

approximately 5:00 pm. During 11115 bne?ng, AISSAI Iwent gver the plan and also m'e?ed

 

the Deadly Force Policy.

 

 

 

 

arrest Carawayl Although
discussed, the arrest team agreedl
I The arrest team believedI

(Him On 09/08/2014, at approitimately 6:40 pan, Caraway left the residence in a'
awhite Toyota 4Runner and was followed by two unmarked FBI vehicles[were in the ?rst vehicle while
NSSAI I SALI and TFO were in the second vehicle. Caraway drove
to a nearby commercial parking lot where he picked 'up a female adultirlater'identi?ed as:
I lsat in the froht passenger?s seat of Caraway?s vehicle: Caraway then

 

 

 

. i 1 
I .
UNCLASSIFIEDIM

I Since Caraway used' a pistol during the bank robbery; AKSSAI Iwanted -1,2,4
b7c ?1,2.4

154

 

 

 

 

 



drove to a nearby McDonald?s restaurant drive-titre and placed an'order for "food. While

Caraway" was in the drive-thru, AISSAIZdiscussed the possible arrest scenarios and

. contin encies with the arrest team in the _event  I
I Based on t_heir discussion_a AISSAI Imade the decision to arrest?Caraway if he

 

 

 

. GYM Caraway left the McDonald?s drive thru and drove to his residence. As - I - 
Caraway turned on his street he began to drive very slowly. This led the arrest team to believe
Caraway hat idgnti?ed them as law enforcement of?cers. TFOI TFO I and SA

. I Ithen As soon as
Caraway?s vehicle stopped, TFOI I TFOI I-and  exited the ?rst vehicle, .
and identi?ed themselves as the FBI and police. Caraway irninediately opened his car door and
pointed a pistol in the direction of TF 0 TFO observed Caraway pointing a
Eistol in his direction and yelled ?gun.? Caraway then ?red shots 'at TFO TFO -

 

 

 

 

immediately returned fire at Caraway. Agents and TE exited the second vehicle
to provide cover .to the taking ?re. As exchanged gun?re with Caraway,
. ITFOErbached the vehicle on the passenger side. When clear shot,?
and was not in the line of ?re, he ?red one round which struck Caraway in the head
behind his right ear. Caraway was immediately incapacitated. I:I?red one round over

 

- Caraway?s vehicle which embedded itself'into the residence. No Agents ?red their weapons as . 

they were moving to a position of tactical advantage. Caraway?s vehicle then rolled forward and -
came to rest once'it hit his residence. Caraway was removed from his vehicle and restrained._ 
Agentl:  a SWAT medic, immediately began to render aid to Caraway until the Travis
County Fire. Department and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) arrived on the scene. Caraway
was tranSported by EMS to a nearby hospital where he died as the result of his injuries. No. 
injuries were sustained by or to any of the Agents and TFOs who participated in'the_
arrest operation. . . . - -

(Ll/m At the scene,l:l, thanked Ifor not shooting her and stated
she was glad the Agents would be going borne safe. also stated Caraway told her he
thought they were being followed by undercover cops. . 

(U1333611) Agents and TFOs were not wearing ballistic armor at the time of the. arrest.
Agents and TFOs. did not display any markings to identify them as FBI or law enforcement]

r. 

-1

 

 

(WM :wereboth from the Austin Police - . 
Department (APD) while TFO as from the Round Rock Police Department (RRPD).
. After the shooting incident occurred, Executive Management (EM) from the FBI, APD, and
RRPD responded to the scene. Because the. shooting scene was locatedin unincorporated Travis
County, Texas, EM from all three agencies collectively decided the Travis County Sheriff?s 

Of?ce (TCSO) would process the shooting scene. The SIRT investigation was conducted jointly, 

by the FBI and TCSO. The Travis County District Attorney?s Of?ce expected to present the

matter before a state grand jury pending the results of the shooting investigation and the report of . 

the medical examiner.

I 2 .
UNCLASSIFIEDIEBHQ

- arr-1'_132rd
?1,2,4

be -1,2
?1,2

-1

'b6 -4
b7C -4

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

TI. Incident Details
a. Substantive Case Files and Background Information 

. Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantive 91A case was 

opened: -
Title: TYLER 
CHASE BANK, 
11800 DOMAIN DRIVE, 
AUSTIN, 
08!06/2014

File number: sin-sneer; 1 139.

Case'Agentsi 

i . (UIEEHQ) As aresult of the Agent-Involved Shooting, the San Antonio Field Q?ice
opened the following Assault on a Federal Of?cer Investigation: . 
TTLER MATTHEW CARAWAY 

ATTEMPT TO KILL A FEDERAL OFFICER
09(08/2014 -

- Title:

File number: aspen-5530253
Case Agents: SA 

b. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

 

TFO I(discharged weapon) -.APD
TFO (discharged weapon) -
weapon) - RRPD 
SA - - 
.. SA

FBI ARA

Case Review and Operational Briefings

 

 

APD 

 

emaww?



On 08f0612014 at approximately 11:13 a bank robbery occurred at the

Chase Banlt located at 11300 Domain Drive, Austin, Texas. During the robbery, an unlmown
white male entered the bank, ran to the teller station, jumped o'v'er- the counter, and verbally .
demanded money from one of the tellers. The male, who displayed a semi-automatic handgun, 
told the teller, ?It?s okay, juSt give me the money.? Because the teller was in fear fer her life, she
complied with the robber?s demands and gave him cash from her teller drawer. The robber then
took'additionai money from an adjacent teller drawer before Saying, ?I?m sorry.? The robber
then jumped back'over the counter and left the bank _witl_1 approximately $20,000.00 in US.
currency.





. . 3 


NYT-156

b7C -1-1,4

 

 

 

 

 



 After the robbery occurred, APD and responded to the scene to conduct
a joint investigation, On the ?teller. side? of the couhter, a Camel brand cigarette package was
found on the ?oor. Agents and Of?cers reviewed the bank surveillance video and determined
the pack of cigarettes fell from the robber?s right breast pocket during the course of the robbery.?
The package of cigarettes was collected as evidence. 3 

On 0312612014, the package of cigarettes recovered from the Chase Bank

was processed by an APD Crime Scene Specialist. A latent printjon the cellophane ?trapper was .-
recovered. 0n 092'03f2014, an Automated Fingerprint Identi?cation System (AFIS) search of the 

latent print identi?ed Tyler Matthew Caraway, date of birth 10f05?1989: The recovered latent
print matched Garaway?s right thumb. Based on the physical description provided by witnesses,
as compared with Caraway?s physical description, Caraway to be the bank.
robber.

(Wm On 0910412014, saljconducted surveillance at Caraway?s last kn0wn.
address, 13712-Maye Place, Austin, Texas. Parked at the residence on this date was a white
Toyota 4Runr?1er which was registered to Caraway. In addition, SA Edetermined Caraway
had an account with Chase Bank, and his debit card was used on 08f06l2014 to purchase a pack

of Camel cigarettes. This purchase was made approximately, 34 minutes before the bank robbery 

occurred. This purchase was made at the Shell gas station approximately two miles from the -
victim bank. -

Prior to obtaining an arrest warrant, SAI Iobtained a court orderl 
SA 
I lused this information to identify the-most strategic
time and location for Caraway?s arrest. A review of an APD police report, dated 0522310014, 
revealed Caraway owned two handguns which were registered to his 13712 Maya Place
residence. - - -

 

 

 

 

d. Events Leading-Up to the Shooting

. (WM On the morning ofMonday, 0910312014, sa

TPO and TFO: met as a team to discuss the case and formulate an arrest 

 

plan; Among the options discussed, Agents and TF Os consideredl 

 

 

 

 

 

lLat'er the same afternoon, AISSAI Iobtained a
federalist-rest warrant for Caraway and?a federal search warrant for his residence. SA
then drafted an Operations Arrest Plan which was reviewed and by ASAG

(WM At approximately 5:00 8A1 I AISSAI: TFO TFO
I  and TFOI:Istaged at thel I
. An operations brie?ng was conducted to include a review of the Deadly Force

 

 

. 4 .


b6 -1,4

b7E -l

-l,4

ran/Trish7C -l,4

h6 -1,4

b7E -l

 

 

 

 

 

-. UNCLassnisaneerti -.

Policy. The TFOs were advised to follow their respective department?s deadly force policy-as -

indicated in the Operations Order.

(mm At approximately abs SAl?l Areas: and TFO I:Idrove

by Caraway?s residence in 
was in the driveway, so TFOI lperkedhls vehicle 
visual surveillance of the residence and vehicle.

 

 

. e. Shooting incident Details

At this time, Caraway?s- Toyota 4Rum1er
own the street in order to maintain a 1

(WM At approximately 6:33 pm, a white male matching Caraway?s description
 exited the residence and entered the Toyota'4Run11er. As the 4Runner pulled out of the
drivet'vay, 'Agents and began to follow vehicle. AISSAI:Ipositively identified

Caraway as the driver of 4Runner.

(U seq?l TFO and TFO
while mesa sa and TFO

 

 

were in the ?rst FBI vehicle-

were in the second FBI vehicle: Caraway drove to

 

 

 

'a nearby commercial parking lot where he picked upl

Isat in the

front passenger?s seat of the vehicle. Caraway then drove to a nearby McDonald?s restaurant 
drive-thru and placed an order for food. While Caraway was in drive-thru, 

discussed possible arrest scenari

 

 

   

h? -1,4

b6 41.2.4
-1.2.4
h'?E



 

 

 

MM Caraway left the McDonald?s drive thru and

returned to his residence. As

Caraway turned on his street he began to drive very slowly: This led the arrest team. to believe

 

Caraway had identi?ed them aslaw enforcement of?cers. TFOI
then I

 

 and SA 

 

As soon as

Caraway?s vehicle stopped, TFOI I TF 0  and  exited the ?rst vehicle,
"and identi?ed themselves as the FBI and police. Caraway immediately opened his car door and

pointed apistol in the direction TFO 
shots at TFOI -TFO

 

pistol in his direction, yelled ?gun.? Caraway then ?rec

observing Caraway jointing a,

 

immediately returned ?re at Caraway. As TFO : exchanged gun?re with Caraway, TFO

 

 

 

 

 

 

behind his right ear. - 
The Toyota 4Runner then began rolling forward until it struck the residence.
- TFO ?red one round over Caraway?s vehicle which embedded itself into the residence:
- TFO went over to the driver?s side door and pulled Caraway out of the vehicle. TFO

 

 

Iapnroached the vehicle on the passenger side, When TFO .
was not in the line of ?re, he ?red one round which struck Caraway in the head

had e. clear shot, and

 went to the passenger side of the vehicle where he removed and detained
(ll/M At the scene,  :Ispoke brie?y to During this-

iconversa?om?l:  thanked for not shooting her and stated she was glad the

5


However, noti?cation was not made to the ASAC to advise {if the-'chainge in the plan. -

-2.4

arr?158

.b6 ?1,2,4
-1.2.4


-1b?C -2,4

lee-1,2
b7C ?1,2

 

 

 

I1

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

Agents Would be going home safe.  : also stated Caraway told her helthought
undercover police of?cers were following  as they turned into the driveway on Mayo Place.
No injuries were sustained by I:lor to any of the Agents and TFOs who participated in

the arrest operation. .
. .S-A a SWAT Medic, began to render medical aid to Caraway?s
injuries. TFO TFO and I:Ithen cleared the residence while SSA

l:l called 91 1 and requested assistance.
is Post Shooting Details

I (Ul/EO?ei?j TCSO and the Travis Coupty Fire Department 1' EMS reSponded to the
shooting incident scene. Due to the severity of his injuries, Caraway was immediately
transported to Saint David?s Hospital in Round Rock, Texas. Caraway was pronounced dead at
3:44 pm. as the result of multiple gun' shots. Caraway was later transported to the Travis County
Medical Examiner?s Office for an autopsy. The autopsy was conducted the following day on
0910912014. - 

(WM Law Enforcement representatives from the APT), RRPD, FBI ARA, and the - 

TCSO responded to.the scene. ASACIZI met .with executives from these agencies on the
'scene to coordinate the-shooting indident response. Since the actual shooting incident occurred
in unincorporated Travis County, Texas and there were no employees involved in the -.
shooting incident, requested assistance to process the shooting incident

scene. -It was decided the FBI and the TCSO would jointly conduct the shooting incident review. 

(WM of the' three Agents as well as statements by the three TFOs were
consistent with the physical evidence at the shooting incident scene. All three TFOs ?red their 
weapons during this incident. No Agents ?red their weapons during this incident. 

g. "Accounting of Shots Fired

. - (Wm nine rounds from his Smith and Wesson .40
caliber handgun. During the shooting incident, weapon malfunctioned, so he

1 cleared his weapon and reloaded with a fresh magazine: Once reloaded, TFO did not
?re any additional ro'unds. In his weapon at the time it was collected, TFO had one
round in the chamber, and 14 rounds in his 15 round capacity magaiine. TCSO

recovered TFO 
 :fs ?rst magazine. which contained seven rounds. . -

one round ?orh his Smith and Wesson lyich .40 caliber
handgun. in his weapon, at the time it was collected, had one round in the chamber,
and 14 rounds in his 1'5 round capacity magazine. -

I missed) TFO ?red one round from his (31ch 27 .49 caliber handgun over the
vehicle and .into the house. TFO I:Ihad one round in the chamber of his weapon and eight
rounds in his nine round capacity magazine at the time the weapon was collected._

5 - .


NYT?is'a

b6 ?2
hi?: -2

as -1.4
b7C ?1,4

b6 -1
"b7C - 

at the scene. No other wealions were ?red.

 

ionc?assiriaorieari
.. (UIEQHED Caraway ?red '13- rounds from his clack 22 .40 caliber handgun. In his

weapon at the time it was collected Caraway. had one round in the chamber and two rounds in the
15 round capacity magazine. All of the casings from the rounds discharged from Car?away?s

weapon were recovered however no bullets or'fragments were recovered at the?scene.?

 A total of 23 rounds and all the shell casings were: accounted for

h. Subject Information

Name: 'Tyler Matthew Caraway

. Seal: Male

Race: White

~Height: 6?0? . .  

Weight: 135

Hair: Blonds

Eyes: Brown 
DOB: 10!05f1939 (25 yoa)' 

634?10-3452

FBI 7672653118 .

- (UHM) ,Caraway?s criminal history included six arrests for offenses including
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, assaulting a public servant, possession of-marijuana.
resisting arrest, and two occurrences of driving while intoxicated. Caraway was convicted three
times, most recently on 04/24/2013, for resisting arrest. Hewas previously convicted for? -
resisting arrest on 061'20r'2012 and driving while intoxicated on 1211712009. -

(WM At the time of the NCIC query, no active arrest warrants were entered 'for

Caraway at the time of his arrest. The BI arrest warrant for Bank Robbery had yet to be entered I

into the NCIC system.

i. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers



 

 

land Ifailed to-

 

- . wear their body at the time of the arrest. The Agents and TF Os failed to'display 
identi?able markings to indicate they were law enforcement of?cers. The' Agents and TFOS
. wore. their FBI and police badges on their belts; however the badges were not prominently.
- displayed. The FBI leased vehicles driven by TFO [: and TFO :Iwere not equipped
. with any emergency lights, equipment, or markings to identify them as law enforcement 

vehicles. 

. Forensic Summary 

On Crime Scene Unit deployed to '1 3712 Mayne
Place,_Austin, Texas, the scene of the TFO-Involved Shooting. At 3:34 TCSD began
processing the scene: Items recovered included 11 Spear .40 caliber shell casin?gsand 13

. 7'
UNCLASSIFIEDIM

b6 ?1,4
-1,4

NYT- 

 

 

 



Homadv .41] caliber shell casings, as well as the weapons, magazines, and; arninunition?carried by 

the involved TFOs. I'Evidence collected from the deceased subject included the weapon he was
using at the time of the incident. A total of 60 items were collected from the shooting incident
scene: At 4:50 pm. on 09/09120 14, the Toyota 4Runner used by the subject was towed by the
TCSO from 13712Maye Place to their East Sheriff' Substation which concluded the forensic 
processing of the shooting incident scene.

(WM  inventorsr of all recovered evidentiary items at the shooting scene -
follows: . . 

 

SDI GSR Kit forl - . I
'-so25133have -1r4
GSR Kit for SDS Smith and Wesson pistol with magazine 
One Speer 40 live cartridge (Chamber) -
Fourteen Speer 40 live cartridges (Magazine)
SD9 Smith and Wesson pistol with magazine (Serial#l 
SD93. One Speer 40 S&W'live cartridge (Chamber) . 
Fourteen Speer 40 live cartridges (Magazine)
SD10 Glock Model 27 pistol withmagazine (Serial#  I
SDI 0a One Hornady 40 835W live cartridge (Chamber)
Bight Homady 40 885W live cartridges (Magazine)
SD11 Speer 40 ?red cartridge case
SD12 Bmerica sneaker (right, size 10) -
SD13 ,Speer 40 885W ?red cartridge case
SD14 Speer 40' 385W fired cartridge case - 
SD15 Speer 40 ?red cartridge case . I . .
SD16 Speer 40 ?red cartridge case 
SD12 Spear 40 tired cartridge case
-SD18 Spear 40 385W ?red cartridge case.
SD19 Speer 40 ?red cartridge case .
SD20 Speer 40 ?red cartridge case .
SD21 Magazine 'with seven Speer live cartridges I .
SD22 Projectile
SD23 Horned)r 40 ?red-cartridge case
SD24 Spe'er 40 835W ?red cartridge case
SD25 Spee'r 40 885W live cartridge
SD26 Small metal piece
SD27 Projectile 
SD28. Homady 40 cartridge case
SD29 Hornady 40 ?red cartridge case 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. I 8
 

raw-1551 .

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIEQBQ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SD30 Emerica sneaker (left, size 10)

Projectile 

SD32 . Homady 40 ?redcar'tridge case

Homady 40 ?red cartridge case

Homady 40 ?red cartridge case

Homady 40 885W ?red cartridge case

SD34 Projectile 

?Projectile

Hornady 40 ?red cartridge case 

Hornady 40 835W ?red cartridge case 1

Hornady 40 fired cartridge case 1 -

Glock Model 22 pistol with magazine (Serialtt- EWEZSSUS)
One Homady 40 live cartridge (Chamber)
Two Homady 40 live cartridges (Magazine) 

- SD38 Hornady 40* 385W ?red cartridge case

SD39 Homady 40 ?red cartridge case

SD40 Sivabs of apparent blood

SD41 Swabs of apparent blood

SD42 Swabs of apparent blood

SD45 Black-Sandals
SD46 Pink T-shirt

SD47 Blue Jeans

SD43 Brown Shoes 

SD49 Gray, Striped Polo Style Shirt

SD50 Blue ?Levi? jeans

 

 

 

(WM On 09t03t?2014, pursuant to a federal search warrant, TCSO processed the

interior of the Carawayl?s residence. TCSO seized a handwritten letter ?orn Caraway. On the

first page of the letter, Caraway
as follows: -

mote me in case of? The next page of the letter read -

Dear friends and family, if you are reading this, then I?m most likely in jail or dead. I?m

sorry but life has been quite a Bitch to me, I've done my best to pin)? the hand I've been

dealt: but I got a shitty hand. No reason to blame anyone, it?s no boay'sfault. It's just a
FUCKED UP WORLD we five in and I'mjust so tired ofall the bullshit. he
attempted suicide 7 times in my tire (mostly cries for help) and a?er the fast one, I've 
decided that I?m?not going out the easy way. going to die; it?s going to be for
something, for a purpose. The GREATER G003 Not with a with a

BANG. I tori-a each and every one DEARLK beyond Words. I love y?all with everythingf 

am. I would not have made it this long; if it wasn 't for myfamiiy and at! of you Crag??

'mother?ickers'l calt?-iends. So'my?nai words to you are, live each day like it's your

Become what you were meant to be.

last. do what makes you happy. Fuck anyone who doubts you; Find your DESTINY d:

Tyler Caraway

- 

arr-162"

 

 

 

 

 

 



CUIZEGHQ) An inventory of "all fecovered evidentiary items from inside Caraway?s

 

- Vehicle registration renewal notice Texas License Plate CY6F1 01 I

 

Social Security Card forI I

 

Two Glock Magazines containing .40 caliber rounds (Total of 29 rounds)

 

Black WindhamAR-IS with 30 round magazine

 

detour-a

One .40'caliber round, five .40 caliber shells, and eight 5.56 caliber shells' I, 

 

?Five boxes of ammunition; one box containing 15 rounds of Homady .40 caliber 

ammunition; one box containing 20 rounds .40 caliber ammunition; one box

'containing'EO rounds of PMC .223 caliber ammunition, one box containing 1.7 rounds

of PMC .223 caliber ammunition, and one box containing 49 rounds of Ultramax :40
caliber ammunition. .

 

Miscellaneous documents

 

Hand written note

 

9

Two Texas Driver?s Licenses issued to Tyler Caraway

 

10

Kawasaki title registered to Tyler Caraway

 

11

Green ballistic vest, tactical knife, four magazines with 119 rounds

 

12

Composition Book

 

13'

bedroom at the residence follows:
6
7
8

Chase Bank letter addressed to Tyler Caraway

 

14

Pistol holster and belt

 

15-

Digital camou?age folder with personal corre5pbndence

 

 

16

 

 

 

Black shoulder holster and magazine pouch

(Wm On'09a? 1212014, pursuant to a state search warrant, Crime Scene Unit 
ERT processed the vehicle at East Sheriff Substation. TCSO photographed Caratvay?s -
Toyota 4Runner, and conducted a trajectory analysis for each bullet path.

(HIM An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items from inside Caraway?s -
vehicle follows: . . . -

 



Projectile from driver side front seat back

 



Projectile fragment from cloth of driver side rear door interior 

 

SD52

Projectile freigments from inside the drive side rear door

 

SD53

Projectile?fragment from the elastic on the driver side front seat cover

 

SD54

Projectile fragments from under the driver side front seat

 

-SD55

Homady 40 fired cartridge case from the center-console front near the dash

 

SD56 

Smungce?phone with black Otter cover from passenger side ?ont seat .

 

SD57

Brown Ray Ban sunglasses with missing left len's from passenger side front seat -

 

SD58

Pieces of small tinted piastic from driver side front ?oorboard-

 

SD59

Projectile'from drive side pillar (marked as 1-1)

 

 

 

 

 

SD60

Projectile from driver side pillar (marked as 1-2)

It. Medical Summary

.- 10 




b6 -2
b7C -2

 

 

 

 

 

WCLASSIFIEDIZEQHII 

FBI Agents'and TFOs involved in the shooting:

 

 

(Wm No injuries.
Subject:
Travis County Fire-Department Paramedicsl I and . b6 4
responded to 13712 Maya Place, Austin, Texas. Due to the severity of his 137?? -4

injuries, Caraway was immediately transported to Saint David?s Hospital in Round Rock, Texas. 
Caraway was pronounced dead. at 8:44 pm. The deceased was transPorted to the Travis County
Medical Examiner?s Of?ce, 1213 Sabine Street, Austin, Texasfor autopsy. 

(U1733312) On 09f0912014-at 10:30 am, Deputy Medical Examiner: . I  b6 ?4
MD, performed the autopsy of Caraway. The preliminary examination observe . -4
multiple gunshot wounds to the head, buttocks, and knee. Dr. I:Iobserved the following
Wounds: . . -

One round entered behind Caraway?s right ear and exited from the lateral side of the
left eye. The round caused injury to the brain and fractured the skull. 

0 One round entered the left buttock causing two exit wounds located on the left and
right side of the penis where it attached to the torso. 

'0 One round entered the inner right knee, and an additional round grazed the right knee. -
One round was a tangential gunshot wound to the left thigh. 

The cause of death was listed as ?gunshot wounds? with the manner of death listed as a
?homicide.? -

 Shooting Incident Review Team Details

I a. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of: the following

 

 

 

 

personnel:
_In5pector-in-Charge (IIC) Trent R. Teyema (INSD) 1 be ?1
- Assistant Inspector Team Leader ?1
Assistant Ins ector-in-Place - . 
AIIP .- .
(SU) . - 
AIIPI 

 

. b. The FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) Personnel:
FBI LSRT personnel did not reapond to the scene.

IV. . Shooting Incident Review Protocol

. 11
.

NWT-164

 

 



On 09(08f2014, San Antonio Acting SAC spoke with
INSD Assistant Director Nancy McNamara to report the Agent-Involved Shooting. IIC Teyema
. spoke 'with San Antonio Field Office, Austin RA, arrange logistics to support
the SIRT arrival in Austin, Texas. 

(mm On 09f09/2014, the SIRT traveled to Austin, TX and reviewed the
InSpection Division shooting review protocol with all team members. IIC Teyema and the SIRT
members met-with Austin RA EM and supervisory personnel. The SIRT also viewed the
shooting scene, which occurred in the driveway located at 13712 Mayo Place, Austin, Tertas.
-IIC Teyema met with the Travis County Sheriff Greg Hamilton and Travis County Assistant. -
District Attorney and discussed the SIRT process.

- (Wm On sanctum, no Teyema met with the AP-D Chief of Police Art Acevedo
to, discuss the SIRT process. 

on 0911 112014,,the San Antonio Field Of?ce submitted a 
Executive Situation Report to the Director. IIC-Teyema met with Round Rock Police:
Department Chief Allen Banks and discussed the SIRT process. While on the scene, IIC 
Teyema also met with San Antonio SAC Christopher H. Combs, ASAC El, and ASAC
I:_Iand briefed them on the findings of the SIRT. -

(UIEGHQ) on 0911212014, 110 Teyema met with the FBI and TFOs involved in
the shooting incident and explained the SIRT process and protocols. 

 

form The srar obtained three from son
were obtained voluntarily in the preseace of their attorney. The Agents signed a FD-927 .
(Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Inforrnation-Followin a Shooting
Incident . The FBI SIRT participated in a joint interview with TCSO for TFO copy of
@s audio recorded interview Was provided to Both TFO

participated in a video recorded interviews and a walk-through at the crime scene. A
copy of the video for both TFO

and was provided to The SIRT

and TFO 

b6 -1
b7C -1

The 3333

did not conduct of the TFOs as their department?s regulation compelled a written or video 

recorded statement from the officers. In addition, the Travis County District Attorney?s Of?ce

compelled a video recorded walk through of the shooting scene by the of?cers. The TFOs were .

represented by an attorney for their statements and commentary during the video recorded walk .

through. . . 
V. Administrative

a. Firearms Training

 

- (Wm Firearms quali?cations records for  were
provided to the SIRT from their respective agencies: According to APD, both TEO and
TFO  :[last 'quali?ed on 0212812014. RRPD recordsindicated TFO I:Iiast quali?ed on

- 0211412013. TFQI Iwere current with their department?s ?rearms
quali?cation policy, TFOI_ vvas not current with his department?s ?rearms policy which 
requiredyearly qualification. 

12
UNCLASSIFIEDIW

NYT?l?-1,4
b7C -1,4

b6 -4
b7C -4

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDJM 

1). Deadly Force Training

 San Antonio?s Chief Division Counsel (CDC)I:Iprovided FBI .

. Deadly Force Policy Training to the ARA on 1210319013 and again on 121?0612013. A review of

the attendance training records veri?ed both Agent's I?Iwere present for the
training. The records did not re?ect SAI Iattending any of the training sessions in 2013:
According to the training was proyided onvniultiple other dates during the year, so it
was possible SAI:lattended on a di?erent occasion and failed to sign in. The last recorded
Deadly Force Training. attended by SAljwas on 114?0912012. .- I

 On UQIOSIZOM, briefed the FBI Deadly Force Policy to the 

arrest team during the operations brie?ng. - 

 

Iwere present for the brie?ng. SAI lalso reminded the TFOs they were

to follow their respective department?s deadly force policy. A copy of and 

'Deadly Force Policy was provided to the SIRT and are included in this report.

DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision

011 0515033015, after review lay Rights Division, prosecution of I
the-case was declined. . . . I

d. LocalBroseeutorialDecision

. wi?ee?) -0n' 0212012015. after review-by the Travis County, District Attomey?s 

Of?ce, it was determined the case would not beipresented to the Travis County Grand Jury:

13 . .


NYT?too

b6 -1
-1

b6 -1,4
b7C -1,4

 

3.:

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM
VI. Inspector?s Proposed Observations -
. (U1339312) Observation Agents and?TFOs were not wearing body armor at the time.
of a planned arrest of a dangerous subject.? 
states: 

12-13.} Policy Body'ArHtar (F armed}; 1.2-2.3.2) 1 
(HI 

 

 

 

- .- enforcement of?cers.

.
curiae-std) on sarcasm-4, AIS SAI:Ialong with so,

I Iwere part of the surveillance, search, and arrest teams for Tyler

. Matthew Caraway, subject of a federal arrest warrant for Bank Robbery, who was'known to be 

anned and dangemus; During the course of surveillance; the decisidn was made to affect the 
arrest when Caraway returned to his residence at'13712 Mays Place, Austin; Texas. SA

and had their body armor with them in the vehicle but did not wear it. 3%
failed to bring his body armbr with him for the surveillance and the planned arrest. SA

left his body armor in his Bureau vehicle which remained at the  [staging area.

- - Instruction 1: SAC, San Antonio will ensure Agents and TFOs wear their

 

. body-amior in-accordance with Manual of Investigative Operations Guidelines (MUG) Part 2' 
I 12.13.! Policy Body Armor. - - ..

(UAW Observation 2: Emergency lights or equipment werenot used during a high"
risk arrest operationAnalysis 2: The operation on 09f0812014,' for the surveillance, search, and

. arrest of Tyler Matthew Caraway, subject of a federal arrest warrant for Bank Robbery, knownto -

be armed and dangerous, was conducted usingl 
The plan called for the arrest of Carawayl l3

 

 

 

 

(UIM Recommendation 2: SAC, San Antonio should ensure Agents and Os
involved in a high risk arrest utilize emergency lights or equipment to_identify themselves as law

4.

Observation 3E Agents and TFOs did not wear any visible FEBI, police, or
law enforcement identi?ers at the time of the shooting incident. -

Analysis 3: When Agents and TFO's from the exited their
vehicles_to arrest Tyler Matthew Caraway athis' residence, 13712 Maye Place, Austin, Texas,
they were not wearing any police, or law enforcement identi?ers on their clothing. .

.

. Although when interviewed both the Agents and TFOs stated they had their badges displayed on

14 .




(WW m: The Manual of Investigative Operations Guidelines Part 2' 

has ?5

b7E -1

b6 ?1,4
-1,4

b7E -1

 

 



their belts, their un-tucked shirts obscured the area around their waistline. This restricted the
ability of the public to see their badges and identify them as law enforcement. 

Recommendation 3: SAC, San Antonio should ensure Agents and TFOs
wear Visible FBI or law- enforcement identifiers when involved in a high risk arrest.

(Wm Observation 4: Agents did not consult and ASAC concurrence once
the'arrest plan was changed. - 

 

(Wm Analysis 4: The arrest of Carawayr was to take placeI 5 . ME -1
Caraway did not travel tol I
- and instead 'picked up a female passenger and drove to a McDonald?s Restaurant before returning
to his residence. Once Caraway picked up the female passenger, the operational should
have been noti?ed of the signi?cant change in events.

 

I  Recommendation SAC, San Antonio should ensure Agents notify" the
operational ASAC when events dictate a deviation from the original Operations Order.

macho) Observation 5; SAl?ldid not attend or failed to sign in for; Deadly we ?1
Force Training. - . I 1:70 ?1

Analysis 5: . A review of attendance records for the San Antonio Dirision?s .
annual mandatory legal training re?ected did not attend' training in 20:13. Corporate be - 1
Policy'Directive 06481), Section 8.8. The Annual Le gal Training Policy consists of: b'i'C '1

. (UEEGEO) 8. 9. I. Mandatory training on core ropios?r all SAs

(UIZEQHCD 9.1.1. This includes a minimum a] hours total to address the I I i has ?5
following mandated topics: I .

 

 

 

 

 

(WM) ?Instruction 5: SAC, San Antonio should ensure Agents attend'mandatori!
annual legal training and document attendance. .

Observation 6: A Task Force Of?cer did not successfully complete his 
police department?s annual ?rearms training. - - .

(Wm Analg? sis Ii: A review of training records for the Round Rock Police

 

Department?s annual mandatory ?rearms training re?ected TFOI:Idid-not attend training in b6 - 4
. 2014. quali?ed his firearm on'02! 14/2013. Round Rock Police Department I 1370 '4
Policy 4l1 10.09 stated, ?All department members authorized looearry weapons shall ME '5

 

sac?ess?xlly complete annual trainingl 

I In

Recommendation 6: SAQ, San Antonio should ensure Os document I
attendance and successfully complete their department's mandatory ?rearms training?

15 
.

- 

 

 

 (Rev 5-3-10}

 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlmniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Date: 07f24f2015
Office
CC: b6 -1
-1
From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY
Contact: I
Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara
b5 -1
Drafted 
BY -1
Case ID 29TI-HQ-A5523925 San Antonio TFO Shooting
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 

Administrative Notes: (UXKEDHOI On 09109f2014, a Shooting Incident
Review Team (SIRT) traveled to Austin, Texas to investigate a
09f08f2014 shooting incident. On 09f11f2014, San Antonio submitted an
Executive Situation Report to the Directors Office.

Details:

On 07f01/2015, the SIRG reviewed a TFO Shooting incident

which occurred on 09f08f2014, in Austin, Texas involving Task Force

Officers I Austin Police b5 ?4
Department, Round Rock Police Department. '4
fired nine rounds from his Smith and Wesson .40 caliber handgun at

Tyler Matthew Caraway, striking Caraway three times. 

one round from his Smith and Wesson .40 caliber handgun at Caraway

striking him in the head. one round from his Glock 27

 

 



NYT1169



Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Office
Re: 07/24/2015

.40 caliber handgun which struck Caraway's residence. The shooting
took place as Agents and TFOs from the Austin Resident Agency (ARA)
attempted to execute a federal arrest warrant issued for Caraway by
United States Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin, Western District Of
Texas, for a bank robbery which occurred in Austin, TX, 08/06/2014.

On 09/08/2014, Acting Supervisory Special Agent 

I Iobtained an arrest warrant for Caraway and a search b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

 

warrant for his residence at 13712 Maye Place, Austin, TX. In
anticipation of executing an arrest and search warrant, Agents and TFOs
from ARA's Central Texas Violent Crimes Task Force discussed

and planned an arrest and search operation to be conducted later in the

 

 

 

afternoon on 09/08/2014. SAI [prepared an operations
plan, which was approved by Assistant Special Agent in
Charge I An operations briefing was conducted

 

at approximately 5:00 p.m. and the plan and
briefed the FBI's Deadly Force Policy. The overall plan called for

Agents and ?1

?l

On 09/08/2014, at approximately 6:40 Caraway left his
residence in a white Toyota 4Runner and was followed by two unmarked

FBI vehicles. and TFO I:Iwere in the first b6 -1,2,4
vehicle while and in the b7C _1!2r4

second vehicle. Caraway drove to a nearby commercial parking lot where

 

 

 

he picked up a female adult, later identified asI I
in the front passenger's seat of Caraway?s vehicle.

Caraway then drove to a nearby McDonald's restaurant drive-thru and

placed an order for food. While Caraway was in the drive-thru, 

discussed the possible arrest scenarios and contingencies with

the arrest team in the eventI I

I I Based on their discussion, the ESE-E1

decision to arrest Caraway I b7E _l

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



2

NYT1170



Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Office
Re: 07f2412015

{Ufife??j Following receipt of his order, Caraway left the McDonald's
drive thru and drove to his residence. As Caraway turned on to his
street, he began to drive very slowly. This led the arrest team to
believe Caraway had identified them as law enforcement officers. TFO

I I TFOI I and sal 

I As soon as Caraway's vehicle stopped,

TFO TFO and SA exited the first vehicle, and
I:l :l

 

identified themselves as the FBI and police. Caraway immediately b5 -1?2l4
opened his car door and pointed a pistol in the direction of TFO b7C _1r2:4
TFO Caraway pointing a pistol in his ?1

direction and yelled ?gun.? Caraway then fired shots at 
returned fire striking Caraway. Agents and TFO
the second vehicle to provide cover to the TFOs and the SA
taking fire. As gunfire with Caraway, 
approached the vehicle on the passenger side. When a
clear shot, not in the line of fire, he fired one

round which struck Caraway in the head behind his right ear. Caraway
was immediately incapacitated. one round over
Caraway?s vehicle which embedded itself into the residence. No Agents

fired their weapons as they were moving to a position of tactical
advantage. Caraway?s vehicle then rolled forward and came to rest once
it hit his residence. Caraway was removed from his vehicle and
restrained. a SWAT medic, immediately began to render aid

to Caraway until the Travis County Fire Department and Emergency
h? -1,2

Medical Services (EMS) arrived on the scene. Caraway was transported _1 2

by EMS to a nearby hospital where he died as the result of his

 

 

 

injuries. No injuries were sustained by or to any of the

 

Agents and TFOs who participated in the operation.

SIRG OBSERVATIONS

 

On 07f01/2015, the SIRG reviewed the TFO Shooting incident
with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the shots fired
resulting in the death of Caraway were not fired by the Agents, the



3





Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Office
Re: 07f2412015

SIRG did not evaluate the application of deadly force.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning

and execution, training and/or safety issues.

Observation 1: Agents and TFOs were not wearing body armor at the time

of a planned arrest of a dangerous subject.

 

Analysis 1: The Manual of Investigative Operations Guidelines Part 2
12-13.l Policy - Body Armor (Formerly states:
-5

 

 

 

 

On 09f08f2104, with 

_ were part of the surveillance, search, and arrest

 

 

teams for Tyler Matthew Caraway, subject of a federal arrest warrant b6 _1?4
for Bank Robbery, who was known to be armed and dangerous. During the ?1,4
course of surveillance, the decision was made to effect the arrest when b7E ?1
Caraway returned to his residence at 13712 Maye Place, Austin, Texas.
body armor with them in the vehicle
but did not wear it. to bring his body armor with him
for the surveillance and the planned arrest. his body
armor in his Bureau vehicle which remained at I
staging area. In addition, Iwere not

wearing body armor.

 

 

 

Instruction 1: SAC, San Antonio will ensure Agents and TFOs wear their
body armor in accordance with Manual of Investigative Operations 
Guidelines (MIOG) Part 2 12.13.l Policy Body Armor.

Observation 2: Emergency lights or equipment were not used during a

high risk arrest operation.
Analysis 2: The operation on 09/08/2014, for the surveillance, search,

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

4

17?2

 



Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Office
Re: ZQTI-HQ-A5523925, 07f24/2015

and arrest of Tyler Matthew Caraway, subject of a federal arrest
warrant for Bank Robbery, known to be armed and dangerous, was

conducted usingI I

I I The operation plan called for the arrest of -1
Caraway I

 

 

 

 

 

 

Recommendation 2a: SAC, San Antonio should ensure Agents and TFOs

 

involved in high risk arrests utilize emergency lights and equipment to

identify themselves as law enforcement officers.

Recommendation 2b: AD, should coordinate with Operational

 

Divisions to ensure all vehicles used for law enforcement operations to
include vehicles operated by Task Force Officers, are equipped with

permanent or temporary emergency equipment.

Recommendation 2c: AD, CID should coordinate with the to

ensure all bureau issued vehicles, to include vehicles operated by CID

 

sponsored Task Force Officers contain permanent or temporary emergency

equipment.

Observation 3: Agents and TFOs did not wear any visible FBI, police,

or law enforcement identifiers at the time of the shooting incident.

Analysis 3: When Agents and TFOs from the CTUCTF exited their vehicles
to arrest Tyler Matthew Caraway at his residence, 13712 Maye Place,
Austin, Texas, they were not wearing any FBI, police, or law
enforcement identifiers on their clothing. Although when interviewed
both the Agents and TFOs stated they had their badges displayed on
their belts, their un?tucked shirts obscured the area around their
waistline. This restricted the ability of the public to see their

badges and identify them as law enforcement.

Recommendation 3: SAC, San Antonio should ensure Agents and TFOs wear

 

visible FBI or law enforcement identifiers when conducting high risk



5

17?3



Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Office
Re: 07f2412015

operations which could culminate in a confrontation with an armed and

dangerous subject(s).

not attend or failed to sign in for

annual Deadly Force Training.

Observation 4:

Analysis 4: A review of attendance records for the San Antonio
Division?s annual mandatory legal training reflected not
attend or failed to sign in for training in 2013. Corporate Policy
Directive 0648D, Section 8.8. The Annual Legal Training Policy consists

of:
8.9.1. Mandatory training on core topics for all SAs

8.9.1.1. This includes a minimum of total to address the

following mandated topics: 

 

 

 

 

 

Instruction 4: SAC, San Antonio should ensure Agents attend mandatory
annual legal training, and accurate records reflecting said attendance

are maintained by the field office.

Observation 5: A Task Force Officer did not successfully complete his

police department?s annual firearms training.

Analysis 5:
Department's annual mandatory firearms training reflected 
not attend training in 2014. qualified with
his firearm on 02/14/2013. Round Rock Police Department Policy 4/1,

10.09 stated, ?All department members authorized to carry weapons shall

A review of training records for the Round Rock Police

 

successfully complete annual trainingl

 

 

 

Recommendation 5: SAC, San Antonio should ensure records are

 

maintained documenting TFO compliance with their Agency's mandatory





Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Office
Re: 07f2412015

firearms training requirements.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG determined no referral for administrative action
was necessary to the Internal Investigations Section Inspection

Division as a result of the captioned shooting incident.

Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non?voting Board Member. The following Board Members
were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of

Inspections (OI), Deputy Civil Rights 
Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice Unit Chief{UC) 

 

I I Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AISSAI I Sguad Washington Field Office; SSA
I I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD);
SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I

 

 

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group; Section Chief Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crime and Gang
Section, Criminal Investigative Division 
Defensive Systems Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, 
Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; and 
Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following
non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Inspectors Scott Vito,
Timothy M. Feeney, Eric Welling, Trent R. Teyema, Peterson,
Justin Tolomeo, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, 
Assistant Inspectors/Team Leadersl I


I 

I I OI, Management
Program Analyst I Inspection Management Unit
Supervisory MAPAI land 
Inspection Analysis Unit, and  
Safety and Occupational Health Manager, Occupational Safety and
Environmental Programs Unit; SSRAI and 

Investigative Law Unit, OGC.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





NYT1175



Title: TFO Shooting San Antonio Field Office
Re: OTX2412015

Procedure for Responding to the Observations

(Uf?ios?j Receiving offices are responsible for ensuring each
Instruction! Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until each Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the receiving office. The Inspector?in?Charge will
review the responses to determine if the InstructionfRecommendation was
resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific
actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has

under consideration or plans to implement.

SAC, RD, and RD, CID are required to provide a
written response, via EC, detailing the actions taken to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to
Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit INSD. Once b5 -1
the EC is serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel link to ?1



 

 

00

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

8

NYT- 176

 . 1370 ?1,4

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: I 
Sent: I-rida i-ebrua 20. 2015 5:10 PM 
To: itSAi 

Cc: I 

Subsect: Ht: lift.) Involved Shooting 9t3i2014



I?ve received word back from our First Assistant that we willrbe passing the investigation of the officer involved shooting

involving theTaSk Farce Off the for the.? Showing team to look at. We will not present this  4'4
investigation to a Travis Countv grand jurv. . . - 

Please let me know if you or anvone at the FBI has anv questions.

 

 

 

 

Director, Strategic Prosecution Division

Travis County District Attorneys Office
O. Box 1748
. Austin. TX 

 

 

 



 

 

 

(FBI) [mailtol lateral-eon I :gc?fi:
SenttWednesda Febrtiarv 18, 2015 1:03 PM I 
To: I .

Subject: RE: TFO Involved Shooting QKBIZIDM



Have you been able to obtain an answer on the 61 question? Ijust received another call from FBI HQ. I know you and
are realty busv and sorrvI for anti bother.

 

 

Thanks! I I I

Promo] Iimailtol Etraviscount'vbt?ov] - i b6 -1,a2l.II
Sent: Monday, Felztruari.?r 09, 2015 2:43 PM I I I ?1 
(FBI) - 

Subject: RE: TFO Involved Shooting 



Wanted to give you an up'ctate about the Questions you had for us regarding the TFO involved shooting. I spoke with
I our Fi'rst Assistant and asked if he'd lieard'about whether we'd be presenting this case to a state (31. He?s talked to our

Elected DA but a final decision has not be made vet.I She's out of the office today' but will be back tomorrow when he
and I will talk to her about this. 

1

-



Sorry I'don?t have a firm answer for you but didn?t want to let today pass without at least some response from me. 
Eat you know as soon as I know something. 

 

b6 -4
1:70 ?4

 

 

 

Director, Strategic Prosecution Division

Travis County Distribt Attorneys Office
Pt 0, Box 1748
Austin. TX 78?67

 



 

 

 

. 

'm?bs -1,4
From: laicrbiaov] hm _1 4
Sent: Frida February os,2o1se:2o PM. - I - 
To: 

Subject: TED Involved Shooting QISIZUH



Thanks again for taking the time out of your day to speak with me about this i55ue. It was a real pleasure getting to
know'you better! i iook forward to building a strong friendship as we work together:

 



 

 

 

I was hoping you'could help me with the following questions from my management: it} will the Travis County Office 
be taking this 'case to Grand Jury? 2] If so, when do you expect this case to be presented? Both my EM and FBI HWDOJ -
are requesting this information from me by COB Mondays Your assistance would be greatly appreciated.
twill run-down the answer for your question involving duty on Monday.

I'm looking forward to meeting in person! Piease reach out to me in the meantime if I can be of assistance.

Thanks for yourdedicated service to the communityAustin . .

NWT-178

 E.   
5am: Waejnesday? sawmizar ?sh 2M3 1:11:51 am
1?3: Brewing. ?12

 

 

Smizing
?i'y?igios?s



This ?5 mn?m?: is?: aiming: an  that. the Jim-'3 ii, 2313' Ear: ,t'k?mj?wrtme $33? em FEE:
?g?m   car dGeS nut wan?arzi? a risgih?'s inm?igm?m. Tm? auggmatf wax; driving
t?wass?ii? mm:- arm MEG were E0 arm-Si: h?m when tbs: Ssh-3mm sht?'s; 
3

mg: xsah?ci? am? {Jane Sif?i?i?g it Nature rift-?3 shuts:- ?rm? smack:  manger-+1352: awmm The: 
are {Tax-r: fi'?srn' that. am ami was at gimme: 

use; me.  ?315 {mixes 93:3 {zum?j?ei? a aa?i'rxure under the if?" Amandmem and ?'ham  m3
wii-E'fas'i 55h famamirrssenf 53mg: gy-mgasg vi?f?a??am! raw $569 is; r?Egm 
vi?immi mm ;??at?er {Meg wa rra n1: atriminai mWES?gatiai-?, Fiema: {:Gm?gieta iim? 
inquiry,

ngaa-cias'i  {fissmsei'
{Livii Right? {Eix?isgiare
LEE ?35: {szm??'mmi m? Marita

 

mi 

 

b6 
h7C -1,3

?ash)" {Fan-

 

 

 

{emf @usdujgw}

  

 

 

 

Sent. 35?, 5153mm 
Ta: . - -


R?z'San A?tmi? {Austin} TFQ invoked Shooting

?end mFtemn-?on Elam; Trent?:

and I have camplete? aur reviaw of the investigatian inta thef'
,Austin TEO_inuD1y&d_shnuting. 1: am dailining this matter far prps?cutiou. This ?mail serves. .
as'our'deciinatidn ?atiee.

?hgnk 



 

 

 

 

af dusfic? 
?Civil.Ri ?ts Biuisi?n;?Eriminalv?eCtian

  

 

 

Messageawfe? A

Tey?ma, [mailtoi Bi?,fbi gnu} I . b6 ?1,3
Sent: 2615 1:&8 PM . b7C ?1,3
Ta: 5.21195, David 9? {mm} 

Cc: {-25:53} - 7

 

 

 

SUbj?cf?r?EE San Ahienio {Austin} shunting



Ihankjyau-SG-muc? mgeting-with us last'week in discuss this inquiry.7 Flease.1?t me know
if yen have any further-questiwns in-nrder to samplers yaur asse?smeng,

Tiedt
treat him "feyE-ma'

Hea?qua?t395?v wa?hingtan, 

1m- 01': m.

 

 

 

siia??hi ?nal . 
Fram; (?aig {mailtal Eus?g?ggav] b6 -1,3
-?59nt: Tuesday, Agrir 9:32 am b7c ?1,3
To: .Gelio's, David {mam m} - - . -

:Ec; Tayema, Tr?nt Rf (INSD) 
.S?bj??ii RE: 3573?? Anto?i? Emmi-n} TFO Inv-?lved Shunting 
1

i

Hi Bave;

I re?giyg??the ?ind?r.?n9m.TrEnt have hut yet cumpleted my 

1911 let yo?.k?ow if 1..
. 5

 

Pram; Galina, mayig 

S?nt: Facade 7:a3 as mm_

Ta: 
-cc: Trent {:mspx g931);  

 
 

.I?Ye$a:
Subjg??g gan Antq?id {??stim) TED Involved Sho?ting

Good Mammal:l - 

Last we gent a Shgotigg Incident REView Texa$~t?
Since that time; we have our investigative-reviEW'
?an??abtained a ge?ljna?ioa Texas-authurities? Aon 

(INSD) QFBI)




Leager -prpvide? a hindar cuntaining the rspohiing related In uur review t0 yum?
affi?e; a TFO invulyed shunting, we don?t-always present the ?indings t6 fh?

Ef??'?nh TEO ?h??tings H$_their_awn agency's deadly farce pelicies ar? the which?

th?y .T?at gaid, ?g da-preseat TF?ginvql?g? shunts if NE gag
?t thaihihg}}SSUe? whiqh might ?park di?cussian by thg-SIR?g! We_ane_?1ways.
t?yinth? censi?ar;way33t$ impruue operational performance ?aringithesaemguntengt

jThel0n1??bie?e we reigning ?n the SIRE iS?thE'PES?lt a? gnur offia??s
revi?wf?f?t??;?h??ti?gv?;AS &eLhadn*t hgard back (TL left a fdllowk?p 
I ?ghted.$q gh?ak in see_if you need further'in?grmation; are-able ta p?ovi?e;a
?declinafian peiatige you believe ?a grosecutiva ?pininn ?5 ?acegsary in
?thi?'mai??fn - 

In3?2ti??~Trent IEyEMa.h?d lead in this 518? and TL 'was th? laad Isam headen; NE .
in the next_3@A~ 45 days and mauldVlike-to inqiu?g?fhiS'?h
aurfagea?g if we_g?n_pqi ?his.fina1 piece into'the repert.
review 50 naiu?aily we ?guid like ta clnse this 

Let?m?; have any qUesfiona abaut they?S-IHT?ewieww

?T?ah31??Qt - . I 
Da?e

rChi?f In5?ectb?_



It?s aur longg$t 

b6 -3
b7C -3

b6 -l,3
b7C -1f??rf<181?

 

 

513-1051: (Rev. 5?340)

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED



Electronic Communication

 

Title: Shooting Incident Report Date: 09/04l2014

From: NEW YORK

Contact: I I b6 ?1
'1

 

 

 

Approved By 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By:  I

case ID (U) Animal Shooting
- New York June 2014

Synopsis: (U) To report results of a review of an animal shooting 
incident involving Special Agent which occurred b6 ?1
06/10/2014. b?c ?1

Package Copy: (U) The following original documents are being placed in
Fne340 envelopes and mailed to the Inspection Division:

11 Original Signed Sworn Statement (ass: of dated be ?1,2
0?f07f2014. . b7C ?1,2
21 Original Fla-927 signed by dated 06/20/2014.

3} containing original interview notes and shooting records.

4} Original FD-927 signed by SA dated 08J01f2014.

5) Original Amended of dated 08/01/2014.

6} Five photographs ofl I New York..

7} One spent .40 caliber shell casing.

Details:
(U) 0n 06f10f2014, two rounds from'his b6 ?1
Personally Owned Weapon (POW) Glock 27, at a groundhog b7c ?1

which appeared rabid based on the actions of the animal. The shooting
incident review was delegated to the New York Field Office by the Chief
Inspector on Following are the results of the shooting
incident: review, which included a from 8131':

UNCIASSIFIED

NYT3182

 

 

 



Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09f04f2014

(U) Go at approximately 8:30 b6 -1,2
a phone call from his neighbor,l lexpressing concern she '1r2
had about a rabid groundhog in her yard. to her
home across the street from his residence soon after the call. Sh
Iobserved the groundhog at the bottom of the porch area of
[5 home in a crouched position, baring red eyes and foaming at
the mouth.

contact the local New York he -1,2

State Police to request dispatch of a Trooper. While awaiting a ?1r2
Trooper, back to his home to gather a baseball bat
and tarp with which to trap the groundhog. the
animal relocated to bushes against the porch when he returned to
home and the Trooper had not reaponded. the
baseball bat to strike at the area where the groundhog relocated to see
how the animal would react. The groundhog did not move, which would not
. reflect a normal reaction.

 

 

 

 

 

a follow-up phone call to the NYSP at b6 -1,2
approximately 9:30 p.m. since no Trooper responded. The Trooper, whose b7C ?1:2
not know, advisad the reaponding Trooper was diverted
to another the duty Trooper of SA 
presence and his position as 3. SA. The Trooper recommended SAZEI
shoot the animal if the concern with the groundhog continued.

(U) standing porch which was elevated b6 ?1,2

from the ground. the groundhog moving around in a "1:2
circular motion in the flowerbed area adjacent to the porch, still
appearing aggressive and foaming at the mouth. his POW
from a leather waist band holster, secured a twonhanded grip, and
discharged one round, striking the groundhog in the chest area. As

there was limited visibility, his light in the area to
assess the animal's condition as he walked down the steps to the ground,
level. After realizing the groundhog was still alive, 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

NYWZIBB

 

 

 

UNCLESSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09f04/2014

his POW again, assumed a two~handed grip and discharged one more round
which struck the groundhog in the neck area. The second shot from SR

the groundhog.

(U) a disposable shovel from his garage to
remove the groundhog. He scooped the animal and all surrounding soil,
and placed them into a cardboard Unsure of
proper disposal, he placed the box inside his garage overnight;

(U) 0n 06fll/2014, attended firearms training at the
west Point Firing Range, West Point, New York. At approximately 12:00
p.m. at the conclusion of firearms training, he placed a call and left
a voicemail message on Principal Firearms Instructor 
mobile phone. After leaving the voicemail message, SA
a call to the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation Region 3, New Paltz, New York. was
advised by the Wildlife Technician, whose name he did not acquire, to

double bag the carcass in plastic and bury it two feet deep. 

was also informed DEC only responds to potential rabies situations if
they involved a pet or someone was bitten.

(U) At approximately 1:30 a call from

He informed the animal shooting which
took place on 06/10/2014. complete

a Fla?1035 within 48 hours of the incident. During this time, 
informed his supervisor, Acting Supervisory Special Agent 

I Iof the shooting and the requirement for completing the 

 

32. land completed the 313?1035 on osxizxzom. 

 

 

I lsubsequently notified her supervisor, Acting Assistant Special

 

Agent-in-Charge (Nassau sa 
from him.

Is weapon was not taken

 

(U) The following reports and applicable were completed
and uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original notes and
records for all interviews were packaged in FD-34D envelopes and sent
to INSD.

UHCLASSIFIED

3

NYT3184

b6 -1,2
-1 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report i
Re: 09/04f2014

1. Shooting Incident Report, electronically
submitted osiizizoiq. 

 

2. FD-302s for interviews ofl Wildlife b6 ?1,2,3,4
Technicianl and Trooperl b7C '1.2.3.4
written by SSAI 

 

 

 

 

 

3. regarding firearms/training records for SA
the 13 month period before the shooting

incident.
{U)New York's review of the shooting incident involving b6 ?1
found no discrepancies between account of the shooting and 137?: ?1

the information obtained from witness interviews. The results of the
investigation have been coordinated with Assistant 

UNCLASSIFIED

4

NYT- 185

 

 

 

 

  

(Rev. 5-3-10}

 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlmniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: Shooting Incident New York Field Date: 11/28/2014
Office 06/10/2014.

 

CC: b6 -1
b7C -1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
Contact: I I

 

 

Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

 

 

Drafted By:  
Case ID 29TL-HQ-A5057T95 Animal Shooting
New York June 2014
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned animal shooting following a
SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: The shooting incident review was
delegated to the New York Field Office (NYFO) by the Chief Inspector on
06/13/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 09/04/2014, was
approved and submitted electronically by NYFO SAC Leo Taddeo.

Details:

On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an animal shooting incident
which occurred on 06/10/2014, involving NYFO Special Agent b5 ?1

'1
{u//?saoz On 06/10/2014, contacted by his neighbor

requesting his assistance to address a rabid groundhog. An attempt was
made to get the New York State Police to respond, but the dispatcher



NYT1186



Title: Shooting Incident New York Field Office 06/10/2014.
Re: 11f28/2014

advised there were no Troopers available. At approximately 9:30 

two rounds from his personally-owned weapon b6 -1
. - ?1

a Glock serial at the groundhog which

appeared rabid based on the actions of the animal. 

recovered one of two shell casings and did not take photographs or

conduct any other form of basic shooting scene processing.

to firearms training at the West Point b6 -1
Firing Range, West Point, New York on 06/11/2014. ?1

the shooting incident to a firearms instructor who advised 
to contact his supervisor and complete an FD-1085. as
he was instructed and also contacted the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC), Region 3, New Paltz, New York to

determine how he should properly handle the animal remains.

The shooting incident review was delegated to the NYFO on

06f13/2014. Investigation determined killed the animal since b6 -1
it posed a persistent threat to the family of a nearby neighbor. SA '1
qualified and trained to use his POW in accordance with FBI
policy.
SIRG Observations
On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting
incident with the intent to:
1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously
determined the application of deadly force by 06f10f2014 b6 ?1
-1

was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly Force policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, Observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational
planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made

three observations regarding this shooting incident:

Observation 1: The Agent involved in an animal shooting

failed to notify NYFO management of the shooting incident in a timely

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

2





Title: (u/Zioenj Shooting Incident New York Field offioe 06/10/2014.
Re: 11/28/2014

manner.
Analysis 1: his POW at approximately b6 -1
9:30 on 06/10/2014. not notify his supervisor of b7c ?1

the shooting until approximately 1:30 on 06/11/2014. The INSD
Shooting Incident Guide stated,"Following a shooting incident, an Agent
who discharges a weapon should ensure the field office operations
center and your immediate supervisor, or the next available member of

your chain of command, is contacted."

Instruction 1: EDIE, NY will ensure Agents involved in a
shooting incident notify management in a timely manner in accordance
with INSD's Shooting Incident Guide.

{U/ZEsan observation 2: NYFO did not notify INSD of the

Agent?involved shooting incident in a timely manner.

Analysis 2: The shooting incident was reported to NYFO EM
on 06/11/2014. The incident was not reported to INSD until 06/13/2014.

Rs specified in the INSD Shooting Incident Guide for animal shootings,

"The SAC or designee will immediately notify the Chief Inspector,

Inspection Division.

Instruction 2: ADIC, NY will ensure INSD is 
notified of all Agent?involved shooting incidents, to include animal

shootings, in accordance with INSD's Shooting Incident Guide.

Observation 3: NYFO did not have an ERT process the scene

following an Agent-involved shooting.

Analysis 3: Following the incident, there was no ERT
deployed to the scene. NY EM stated there was no ERT available due to

the location of the Agent?involved shooting being in a remote RA

location. Subsequently, SA did not take photographs, b5 ?1
_1

3

NYT1188



Title: {u/era?) Shooting Incident New York Field Office 06/10/2014.
Re: 11/2812014

immediately recover the shell casings, or conduct any other basic
shooting scene processing. neighbor recovered one of two b6 -1
shell casings on 06/11/2014. '1

Instruction 3: ADIC, NY will ensure the scene of an
Agent?involved shooting is processed by an ERT in accordance with INSD
Shooting Guide, whenever possible. If an ERT is not available, then an

Agent should conduct basic shooting scene processing.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken
a result of his involvement in this shooting b6 ?1,3
incident. h7c '1'3
Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD,
chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following
Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W.
Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), Deputy 
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States Department of
Justice Trial Criminal Division, SSA
I I Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel;
SSAI Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit
Chief (UCII I Practical Applications Unit, Training

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, UC

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group UCI New Agent

 

 

Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), and SC

Roger A. Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The

following non?voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith

SWAT Operations Unit, b5 -1
Ballistics Research Facility, SSAI I Protective b7c ?1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Operations Unit, Security Division; UCI  Firearms and

 

Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R.
Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Peterson, and Douglas A.
Leff, OI, Assistant Inspectors/Team LeadersI I
I I OI, Special Assistant

 

 

 

 



4

NYT1189



Title: Shooting Incident New York Field Office 06/l0/2014.
Re: llf28/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I I OI, UCI land Management Program b5 '1
I Inspection ?1
Management Unit (IMU), and MAPAI I Inspection

 

Analysis Unit INSD.
Procedures for Responding to the Observations

(Uf?fe??i ADIC, NY, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not
complete until the Instructions are addressed by the field office. The
Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will review the field office?s response to
determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

HDIC, NY, is required to provide a written response, via
EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each

Instruction. Follow up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief

 

I I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is b5 ?1
serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPAI _1

 

 

CO



5

NYT1190

 

I.
fp'

$5 mum?smnm

anti-?4 gash-inn Racial:

(Rev. 5-3-10) UNCLASSIFIED .. I

 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

Electronic communication
.Title: Shooting Incident Report Date: coilszzolq

From: PHILADELPHIA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PH-CYB2 b6 -1
Contact: ETC ?1
Approved By:
Drafted I
Case ID (U) animal Shooting
Synopsis: To report results of a review of an animal shooting b5 -1
incident involving SAI which occurred on 05f20f2014. b7c ?1

 

Package Copy: The following original documents are being placed in
envelopes and mailed to the Inspection Division:

 

1} Original Signed Sworn Statement of SAI I
dated 05/28f2014, maintained in an FD-34D envelope.
2}'0riginal signed by dated 05/2112014, maintained

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in an FD-340 envelope. b6 ?1'2
3} original 5355 and Fo?92?s for: . MC "1'2
ssaa  sn  sosl 
Automotive Workerl Details}
On 05f2012014, during the execution of a search warrant, 
nine rounds from his personally owned Glock 21
at a raccoon which had just severely bitten a member of Philadelphia's
Evidence Response Team The shooting incident review was b5 _1
delegated to the Philadelphia Field Office by Chief Inspector David - ch -1

Paul'Gelios on 05f20/2014. Following are the results of the shooting
incident review, which included a 535 from as well as from
all other FBI personnel who witnessed the shooting, ERT processing the

UNCLESSIFIED

NWT-191

 



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re: 297L-Ho?a4933733, 06/16/2014

scene, and_FD~3025 documenting interviews of State Police
and Lehigh county Coroner?s Office personnel. 

On 05f20f2014, the Philadelphia ERT was assisting the Lehigh County
Homicide Task Force regarding a cold case homicide investigation.
Evidence developed by the task force resulted in the issuance of a
search warrant. At approximately 8:00 ash the search team was
preparing to begin their search of a privately owned, heavily wooded
area when a member of the ERT, was severely bitten
by a raccoon which bit and latched onto her lower leg. 
to swing her leg and kick at the raccoon in an attempt to get it off
her. began to scream for help at which point other
members of the search team began to run*in her direction.

Shortly before other personnel got to raccoon let go
and ran down an embankment adjacent to the road. SAI Iof
the Allentown Resident Agency alerted personnel about the raccoon
stating words to the effect it needed to be killed and captured so it
could be tested for rabies.

 

ESP Deputy at

the raccoon. The raccoon was struck, but continued to move downhill,
parallel to the road and adjacent to a stream. Once 
Deputy at the raccoon, SA
fired nine shots at it. The raccoon stopped moving and soon died.

saw the raccoon and

Once the raccoon was dead, place it in a body bag
provided by the Lehigh Coroner (who was on scene as part of the
homicide investigation) before oarrying.it to a P3P vehicle. The PSP
made arrangements for the raccoon to be rapidly tested for rabies.

SAI: was treated with first aid and then transported by
ambulance to the Reading Hospital where she was treated. Subsequent
testing_of the raccoon showed it was infected with rabies and 
was treated with a series'of rabies vaccinations.

Once received first aidthe

UNCLASSIFIED

 

2

NYT-192

?1,4
-1

Title:
Re:

 



Shooting Incident Report
06/16f2014

 

hospital, Supervisory Senior Resident Agentl Iof the
AER, who was on scene, notified Assistant Special agent in Charge

 

 

Iof the shooting and injuries to 

The ERT processed the shooting scene and were able to recover six
.45 caliber shell casings by raking the underbrush. The remaining shell
casings could not be located.

Per guidance received from Chief Inspector Gelios, via an E-mail
sent to Philadelphia on 05f20/2014, INSD did not require the Agent
surrender his weapon for submission to the FBI laboratory for a
function check.

Due to her injuries, on sick leaVe for approximately

'one week which delayed the preparation of her 

The following reports and applicable FD-BOZs were completed and
uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. Original notes and
records for all interviews were'packaged in envelopes and'sent- .


1. Report, electronically submitted on
05/21f2014. 

2. FD-302 of PFII Iregarding firearms/training records
for for the 15-month period before the shooting incident.

3. of  regarding Deadly Force Policy Training.
4. for interviews of and Deputy 

S. of weather records.. -

5. ERT dated 95f29l2014.

7. All 5335 and associated interview logs, and draft 

 

 

Collected items of evidence will be maintained by Philadelphia
pending instruction from INSD regarding their disposal.

Philadelphia's review of the shooting incident involving 
found no discrepancies between account of the shooting and
the information obtained from witness interviews. The results of the

UNCLASSIFIED

3

NY71193

-1,4
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?1

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U1 Shooting Incident Report
Re: 06115/2014

 

investigation have been coordinated with 

 

OH.

- -- UNCLASSIFIED

4



b6 -1

h7C

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Title:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT or JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 06fl21'2014 
Report of: HG Shawn W. Stroud O?ice?: FBIHQ INSD
Case 

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE (DELEGATED)
05/20f2014

Investigative Period:_ 05f20f2014 06f04f2014

Reference: Email on 05/203014 ?'om Chief Inspector
David Paul Celios. . .

 

I. EXecutive summary

- On 05f20f2014, during the execution of a search warrant, Special Agent 
ischarged nine rounds from his personally owned Glock 21 at a raccoon which had
just severely bitten a member of Philadelphia's Evidence Response Team (ERT). The shooting
incident review was delegated to the Philadelphia Field Of?ce by Chief Inapector David Celina.

. II. Incident Details

On 053012014, the Philadelphia ERT was assisting the Lehigh County Homicide
Task Force regarding a cold case homicide investigation. Evidence developed by the task force
resulted in the issuance of a search warrant. At approximately 3:00 am, the search team was
re aring to begin their search of a privately owned, heavily wooded area when 
I I a member of the ERT, was severely bitten by a raccoon which hit and latched onto or
lower g. SAI:Ibegan to swing her leg and kick at the raccoon in an attempt to get it off

her. SA  also screamed for help at which point other members of the search team began to
run in her direction. -

 

 

Shortly before other personnel got to the raccoon let go and ran down an
embankment adjacent to the road. the Allentown Resident Agency
(ARA) alerted personnel about the raccoon stating words to the effect it needed to be killed and
captured so it could be tested for rabies. 

State Police (PSP) Trooperl:l and Deputy Coronerl:l
I: ?red at the raccoon. The raccoon was struck, but continued to move downhill, parallel to I

Page 1 of 5

NYT-1,4
-1,4

 

 

the road and ad')acent to a stream. Once Troopeli: and Deputy Corone11:Ishot at the

raccoon, saw the raccoon and ?red nine shots at it. The raccoon stopped moving and
soon died. Thereafter, helped place the raccoon in a body bag provided by the
Lehigh Coroner (who was on scene as part of the homicide investigation) before carrying it to a
PSP vehicle. The PSP made arrangements for the raccoon to be rapidly tested for rabies.

provided ?rst aid and then transported by ambulance to the Reading
Hospital where she was treated. Subsequent testing of the raccoon showed it was infected with
rabies and was treated with a series of rabies vaccinations.

. Once SAI Ireceived ?rst aidthe hospital, Supervisory Senior
Resident Agent (S lot? the ARA, who was on scene, noti?ed
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  of the shooting and injuries to SA



The ERT processed the shooting scene and was able to recover six .45 caliber shell
casings by raking the underbrush. The remaining shell casings could not be located.

 

a. Substantive Case File and Background Information

Prior to the shooting incident, the followincase was opened. No case was opened
as a result of this investigation.

 

 

 

 

Title: 
Victimi I
Domestic Police Cooperation

File Number: I I

Case Agent: 

b. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Shooting

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SAI (discharged, weapon)

Trooperl (discharged weapon)

Deputy Coroner] I(discharged weapon)
SAI  (bitten by raccoon)

SSRAI?Kwitnessed shooting)

SA I(witnessed shooting)

(witnessed shooting)

 

wimessed shooting)
SA witnessed shooting)

 

 

 

 

 

SOSI (witnessed shootin
Automotive Worker  (witnessed shooting)
. Automotive Work [witnessed shooting)

Page 2 of 5

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NYTuiae?

 

 

 

 

 

c. Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

FBI Philadelphia assisted the Lehigh County Homicide Task Force with a cold case
homicide investigation. A brie?ng at the search was conducted by the ERT Team Leader at a
staging area prior to the search.

(1. Accounting of Shots Fired

SA ?red nine .45 caliber rounds from his personally owned Glock model 2] . Six
shell casings were recovered at the scene?due to the heavy underbrush the?ERT was unable to
locate the remainin shells. After counting the remaining rounds in the gun?s magazine the
following day, the number of rounds ?red was nine.

e. Forensic Summary .

the ERT Team Leader, immediately processed the shooting scene, to 
include the preparation of a sketch, photography, and recovery of shell casings which were
subsequently placed into evidence. No further Laboratory analysis was conducted related to this
animal shooting incident.

An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items folloWS:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1B1 One .45 caliber cartridge casing
1B2 One .45 caliber carnidge'casing
1B3 One .45 caliber cartridge casing
11-34 One .45 caliber cartridge casing
135 One .45 caliber cartridge casing
136 One .45 caliber cartridge casing

 

.Medical Summary

severely bitten by the raccoon. In addition to receiving stitches, SE
was treated for possible rabies infection." She was cleared for duty one week after the incident. .

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

The Shooting IncidentReview Team comprised the following personnel:

 

SSA
SSA

 

 

 

Shooting Incident Review I?rotocol

The Shooting Incident Review was delegated to Philadelphia by Chief Inspector Gelios
on 0522012014.

Page 3 of 5

NYT 

On OSIZOIZOH, SSAI:Ibriefed sac% asac%
shooting investigation protocols. After the brie?ng, ASAC and SSAs

drove to the shooting scene which was approximately ?70 miles ?om Philadelphia. .

On 05l21f2014, with SAI:]and explained the review
process and protocols. SA as represent? Esq., who joined the
meeting by telephone conference. Therea?er rovided his Signed Sworn Statement
In total, ten were taken from FBI personnel who were involved in, or wintessed, the
shooting. Two FD-3025 documented interviews of other Law Enforcement Personnel who
discharged their weapons.

A FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information
Following a Shooting Incident) was executed by ali interviewed FBI personnel. Neither the PD-
644 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information on a Voluntary 
Basis) nor (Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information) were
utilized.

. Administrative

a. Firearms Training

Firearms gualifications records for-SAI:Iwere provided to the SIRT by FBI PFI

A review of the training records re?ected most recent
qualification with his personally owned Glock 21 was on 0305:9014 and he was in compliance
with'?rearms'guaii?cations requirements.

I). Deadly Force Training
Assistant advised FBI Deadly Force Policy Training was conducted
on 0911712013 at a ?rearms training session, which was memorialized via Electronic
Conununication (EC). 
VI. Inspector?s Draft Observations

No Observations.

Page 4 of 5

NWT-198

 

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(Rev. 5-3-10}

a
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolmniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT PHILADELPHIA Date: 08/15f2014
FIELD OFFICE 05f20f2014

 

b6 -1
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CC:

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
Contact: STROUD SHAWN W, 202-324-5069

Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

Drafted By: STROUD SHAWN 

Case ID 29TL-HQ-R4933T83 Animal Shooting

Synopsis: (Ufiyg??) This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following a SIRG
meeting held on 0?/31/2014.

Administrative Notes: (Ufi?b??j This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 06/12/2014,
prepared by Inspector Shawn W. Stroud. A copy of the complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report was uploaded to the captioned file.

Details:

On 07/31/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 05/20/2014, involving Philadelphia Field

Office Special Agent I On 05/20/2014, the b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

 

Philadelphia Evidence Response Team (ERT) was assisting the Lehigh
County Homicide Task Force regarding a cold case homicide
investigation. Evidence developed by the task force resulted in the
issuance of a search warrant. At approximately 8:00 the search

team was preparing to begin their search of a privately owned, heavily



NYT1199



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE 05/20/2014
Re: 08/15/2014

 

wooded area when 53' I a member of the ERT, was severely b5 '1
-1

 

bitten by a raccoon which bit and latched on to her lower leg. SA

and kicked at the raccoon in an attempt to get it
to release. to scream for help at which point members
of the search team ran to her. Shortly before team members arrived at

her location, the raccoon released her leg and ran down an embankment

 

adjacent to a nearby road. SAI Iof the Allentown

 

Resident Agency (ARA) alerted personnel and advised the raccoon needed

to be killed and captured so it could be tested for rabies.

State Police (P8P) b5 ?1

Deputy fired two shots at the raccoon. The -1

raccoon was struck, but continued to move downhill, parallel to the
road and adjacent to a stream. Once P8P Deputy

at the raccoon, the raccoon and fired
nine shots, killing the raccoon. The raccoon was placed in a body bag
provided by the Lehigh Coroner (who was on scene as part of the

homicide investigation} and transported to a facility to be tested for

rabies. The raccoon tested positive for rabies.
Results of the SIRG

On 07/31/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously
determined the application of deadly force by 05/20/2014 be ?1

was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly Force policy. b7c ?1

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational
planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made

no observations regarding this shooting incident.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

against a result of his involvement in this shooting b5 -1
-1



2

NYT1200

Title:
Re:



SHOOTING INCIDENT PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE 05/20/2014

08f15/2014



Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD,
The following members

Office



chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member.
were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Paul D.

of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,

United States Department of Justice I Special
Civil Rights Division, Section Chief Robert

Delacourt,

Legal Counsel,
E. Hughes, Criminal Investigative Division; Acting SCI I

Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) 

 

Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA

Unit Chief

 

Squad CR-2 Washington Field Office;
I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division
SSAI I Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU),
Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit,

Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group and UCI I

Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting individuals were

also in Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division,
I Office of Inspector

 

(Um I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

USDOJFI

General, I Internal
Affairs, Customs and Border Patrol I UC

I I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, 
ERTU, Inspectors Shawn W. Stroud, Timothy M. Feeney, Trent R.

and Douglas A. Leff, OI,


Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Peterson,

Team LeadersI

OI, 
Management Program 

I I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD.

 

I Special Assistant, OI,

 



3

land

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ig?.?lriuclny ..



UNCLASSIFIED 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Eleo?lronio Communication

Fin-.1051 (Rev. 5:340}

 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ANIMAL .Date: 0130312014
SHOOTING INCIDENT: DALLAS FIELD 
NOVEMBER 22, 2913

CC: David Paul Gelios

From: DAELAS

Contact:

 

b6 -1
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Approved I

 

 

Drafted Eyi  I

 

Case ID (U) Animal Shooting

Synopsia: (U) To report results of a review of an animal shooting
incident involving which odourred Hovember 22, Mid

Package Copy: (U) The following original documents are being'placed in
FD-34O envelopes and mailed to the inspection division:

1} Original.5igned Sworn Statement {535} of dated b6 -1
December 13, 2013,.maintained in an FD-340 envelope -1
2) original signed by dated December 13, 2013,
maintained in an envelope

3] FD-3403 containing original interview notes and records

Enclosurets): Enclosed are the following items:
1. 555 



333 Interview Log

Interview motes

.owm

Details:

 

On November 22, 2013r two rounds from b5 '1
his personally owned weapon a Glock 27, at an American lldog b7C '1

UNCLASSIFIED

 

NY11202

 

 

 

 

EIELD NOVEMBER 22, 2013



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ANIMAL SHOOTING EALLAS

Re; ?lf08f2014

 

which attacked him while he was retrieving his mail near his residence.

The shooting incident review was delegated to the Dallas Field ffioe
.by the Chief Inspector on November 23, 2013. Following are therresults
of the shooting incident review, which included 535 from SA and

coordination.with Arlington Police Department (RFD).

On November 22, 2013, home from.work at a out
6:00 p.m. out of his car and walked to his mailb x,
which is a community mailbox about one house to the north of hij
residents. After retrieving his to wal back
to his car when he felt something?st his side. a large,
white, muscular dog, which was trying to bite him. mped
back about 10 feet from the dog and yelled at the dog to stop 0 back
down. The dog was growling and appeared ready to attack. 5h
was without cover and, believing the dog was about to spring at him,
pulled out his Glock 27 and fired two rounds into the animal.

 

The dog stood and stared at about 30'seconds, then
turned and limped across the street and lay down in a neighbor?s
driveway. never seen this dog in his neighborhoot. There
was no one on the street at the time of the shooting.

Shljimmediately called 911 and reported. the shooting
incident. He-then called the Dallas Field Office switchboard ard told
the operator to inform.Dallas Executive Management he had been involved
in an animal shooting. 

 

APD officersl Iarrived on the scene.

himself to the ofiicers as an FBI SA. APB Patrol
the lead and conducted the majority of the

on?scene investigation. Animal Control also came to the scene.

 

APD officers.conducted a thorough search of the area and found two
shell casings the dog. There were seven rounds
left in the weapon. BED crime scene investigators took pictures of SR
his clothing, which one APB officer pointed out was dirty
where SAI kaid he first felt the dog attack him-1,4
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h? -1
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NY71203

 

 

 

Title:

UNCLASSIFIED

FIELD OFFICE: NOVEMBER 22, 2013
Re: ESTL-HQ-ASEQSUES, 01f08/2014

.APD the animal was at large in the
neighborhood, was not wearing a collar, and was not registered.

SHOOTING INCIDENT ANIMAL SHOOTING IALLAS

The owners of the dog took the injured animal to an animal hospital

in Mansfield, Texas. APD who was also present

 

at the

animal hospital, said the owners declined to pay to heal the injured
animal and'instead opted to have it euthanized.

On Monday, November.25, 2013, the

used by In a phone conversation with UCI

lock 27

 

Defensive systems Unit, on December 11, 2013, lind?cated
there was no need to send the Glock 27 to DSU for a serviceability
check as long-as there-were no questions surrounding the gun's

performance.

the Block 2? remains secured in the Dallas gun vault.

During a telephonic conversation with APD 

Friday December 13, 2013 and a subsequent meeting at the

Inasmuch as the gun performed properly in the shocting,

 

FBI Dallas Field Office on December 18, SSA
animal shooting incident was not going to be pres nted to
the state attorney for proseCution.

The following reports and applicable FD-3025 were cempleted and

uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original note: and

records to: all interviews were packaged in FD-340 envelopes an

to INSD.

I.

sent

?Ds1085, Shooting Incident Report, electronically subm tted

December 19, 2013
with attached APD Incident Report

FD-SUZ of PEI firearms/trainipg
records for SA for the 18-month period before the

shooting incident
of ADC-I: regarding Deadly Force Pol.
training

of PHI DSU ucl
serviceability check

for interviews of FBI SA

UNCLESSIFIED

 

Iregarding weapon

3

Loy



 

 

b6 -1,4
-1NYT32D4

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ANIMAL SHOOTING DALLAS
FIELD NOEEMBER 22, 2013
Re: 

 

 

7. for interviews of APB officersI - I

8. Fou302 of weather records from SIOC for Arlington. Tex on
_November 22, 2013

ssn :  obtained Incident Report 13-63830 on Dece ber 31,
2013. Detectivel Ives-assigned to the case and spoke
with the dog?s owner,I I on December 17, 2013. told
dog must have gotten loose through an open gate.
her dog as a protector and territorial.

 

 

At the conclusion of his report, 
the case-would be cleared administratively.

Dallas' review of the animal shooting incident involving I
found no discrepancies between account of the shooting and
the information obtained from APD officers. The results of the

investigation have been coordinated with 

 





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If: Mir-l.?








n; 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic communication

Title: (U) Animal Shooting incident summary Date: 12/24/2013

LITTLE ROCK
LR-E
Contact: I

From:

 

 

Approved By: I
SAC MARSHALL HOWARD 

 

Drafted By: 

Case ID (U) Animal Shooting

Synopsis: (U) To report results of a review of an animal shooting
incident involving Special Agent 15A) which occurred
November 18, 2013?

Packs 1] Original Signed Sworn Statement of SA

dated 12f19/2?13, maintained in a envelope
2} Original E's?927 signed by dated nan/2013', maintained in
a envelope
3] Original INSD interview log of SAI I
4) Original of SAI dated 12/18l2013, maintained in

a envelope

5} Original FD-QZT signed by dated nae/2013,
maintained in a enVelope

6) priginal INSD interview log of SA

1) envelopes containing original interview notesr records1 and
photographs

Details:

-On 11113Z2013, Special Agent seven
rounds from his FBI?issued Colt at a pit bull whieh was attacking
SAI Iduring an arrest operation atl I
Arkansas. The shooting incident was delegated to the Little
Rock Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 11X18f2013 and subsequently
assigned by Ito I
investigation. Following are the results of the shooting

 

 

SIFIED

amazon?.
I

Reconc-
l-m-nw-H-r 

- - eff" we? 
H: Ir."

b6 -1
hi-1,7

 



 

 

 

 

UHCLESSIFIED

Title: Animal Shooting incident summary
38:. 12/24f2013

incident review, which included Signed sworn Statements of 
I FD-SOZ interviews from 11 other members of
the Jackson Field Office SWAT team, and other related documents.

 

(U) The investigation maintained inl Iwas opened.in 201D
to'investigate violent drug trafficking in the  I Arkansas
area. This matter was assigned to the Little Rock
Field Office, Marion Resident Agency The investigation utilized
Iseveral Title intercepts
to gather evidence on subjects. In November 2013, 20 subjects were
indicted in the United states District Court, Eastern District of
Arkansas, wherein arrest warrants were issued. I I who
was to reside atl IArkansas, was
included among those with active arrest warrantsr

 

Approval to utilize Bureau SWAT teams for arrests of 13 subjects
in on 11/18/2013 was sought. The overall plan
was conceptualized to  I
The Jackson SWAT team was assigned to affect the arrests of



(U) SAI Ithe Jackson SWAT Team Leader along with
his Assistant Team Leaders arrived Arkansas on
Friday, 11f15f2?13. A briefing had been scheduled to familiarize
arrest TLs with the overall case and plans to affect the arrests on
11:1312013. This briefin was led in the ssan : 
and Little Rock SWAT and included the distribution of
arrest packets containing photographs of subjects and residences and
other documents to assist the TLs with planning their respective arrest
plans and Operational Orders. Each TL was also provided with contact
information forl PD officers who had been assigned
to assist with site surveys of arredt locations and familiarization of

the :  area and subjects.

(In On sa : and ATLs, Iand

surveys ofl Is known

residences. The site surveys included?1,7
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NYT3207

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Animal Shooting incident summary
Re: 12f24f2013

 

 

 

residences located at] I both of
which were located in the City of] I Arkansas. During the
I inquired

operational planning, 
Specifically about the presence of children, canines, or any pertinent

information which would be applicable to conducting an arrest operation
at either location. [Ilse officers reported there was no indication of
canines or children at either residence, though the possibility that

I Imay be present at the  Iaddress.

 

 

An Operational Order was developed which detailed Jackson's plan

to affect the arrest ofl I The plan outlined

 

I In the event this approach was unsuccessful, the

plan allowed for a 
I Based upon the site sdrveys, it appeared as though the

 

 

 

lelected_to
Ias the primary
In the event the breach directive was given during the

I Thereforer SAI

 

identifyl
breach pOint.
operation, 

 

Once access was gained at each of these points, those team members with
positions at the entrances were assignedI

{01 At approximately 10:00 a.m. on delivered
a briefing to the Jackson SWAT team and Troopers of the Arkansas State
Police who were assisting in the arrests. ASP's role included
traveling to both arrest locations with the Jackson SWAT team, 

I Darin the erational 'lannin it was

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Based on this, the possibility

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

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UNCLASSIFIED

Title:
Re: 

Animal Shooting incident summary
12/24f2013

 

 

allow for this possibility, sa  Ibriefed three of the ASP

To

 

 

TroopersI

The Operational Order briefing was completed using a PowerPoint 

format which was projected for viewing. The briefing.covered all
individual assignments of the Jackson SWAT team at both sites,

including the time line for the operation, maps of the area, vehicle
and equipment assignments for each operator and specific assignments

for the ASP representatives. During this briefing, 
reviewed out loud, the Deadly Force Policy, using the SWAT
Operations Unit-issued laminated card.

 

(U)

 

the Operational Order. SAI Iwas assigned to monitorl

For the arrest atl I SAI Iwas assigned to
secure a position on an exterior corner

[in

 

 

 

 

I SAI Is primary
assignment was to monitorl
I Iof the structure.

 

(U) hn.Electronic Communication created by also

distributed during this briefing.
case review and included a ?Concept of Operations" for the overall
arrest operation. This document also contained the Deadly
Force Policy.
who reviewed and initialed or signed it acknowledging their review

(U1

pom. po'm'.  
was submitted.

(U)
UNCLASSIFIED

4

This document contained an overall

The document was routed to each Jackson SWAT team member

The Operational Order Execution phase created by SAEwas
presented and briefed to LR Howard Marshall at approximately 1:00
AXSAC Marshall approved the plan which

Another briefing was held later on 11f17f2013 and was attended by

 

h? 
b?C -1,7
b?E -1

hE 
b7C -1NYT3209

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Animal Shooting incident summary
Re: 12/24f2013

all individuals involved with the arrest operation. This briefing was
completed using a PPT format and included briefings by the Case Agent,
SSRA, AISAC, Negotiations component, Tactical Operation Center (TOG),

Aviation support, and Medical plan. During this briefing, 
,read the DDJIFBI Deadly Force Policy.

Following this briefing, members of the Jackson SWAT team
conducted rehearsals of individual assignments and ensured vehicles and
other equipment was verified for operational readiness. The Jackson
SWAT team arrived at the Armory at approximately 2:30 a.m. on
11/13/2013 where they prepared to depart to conduct the arrests. Upon
being given the order to depart the Armory, all of the arrest teams

travelled to a location nearl I Arkansas which had been
designated as I 

 

The Toe-communicated authorization to affeCt the arrests and the
Jackson SWAT team.arrived at  I Arkansas at

approximately 5:00 a.m. as planned the SWAT vehicles and ASP units

(U) Pursuant to their assignment, SA and 
the SWAT van and moved by foot to their assigned
position near the corner of the residence. Both were equipped with
standard SWAT gear including handguns, and FBI?issued
protective gear including ballistic vests and helmets. 
was also carrying his medical bag pursuant to his collateral SWAT
assignments as one of the medics. As the yard, he
saw a pit bull aggressively advancing toward him from the northwest
side of the yard. his rifle's muzzle to confront the
advancing dog and saw that the dog was suddenly stopped as it was
attached to a restraint such as a chain or heavy rope. As the dog no
longer appeared to be a threat at this point, SA

of the dog's presence and they both continued to move to
their assigned position.

 

As there was no response to the team's knock and announce attempt,
an order to commence breaches at both pointsw As

UNCLASSIFIED



Title: Animal Shooting incident summary
Re: 297L-HQ-A3648070, 12I24f2013

 

assigned, I

I SAI Inoticed the pit bull had
retreated to an area near a dog house. As SA was focused on a
window and Covering agents in the process of breaching the door, he
heard He turned his attention to him and saw
that the pit bull had attacked SA and was biting the upper
right rear thigh of SAI I Ialso observed the pit
bull's restraint had become wrapped around SA 3 legs.
Recognizing that Sir: he could fall to the ground at any
instant and potentially be attacked in a vital area; 
to'employ deadly force. An opportunity presented itself when the pit
bull's hindquarters were outstretched from bodyr
allowing fire with minimal danger to SAI I After
the first shot, the dog released the bite and to
fire a total of seven rounds until the dog?s legs stiffened and no
longer presented a threat to either agent.

examined the injury and after
not finding evidence of excessive bleeding, returned his attention to
his assignment. his rifle with a fresh magazine and
when the residence was clear, collected the spent shell casings and
I lused during the operation.

 

the shooting to the TDC. Medical personnel
were immediately dispatched to the location where a more thorough
-examination of injuries was completed.

 

 

 

 

 

(U) Occupants of the residence did not includel I
 was present and indicatedl Imay be withI I
atl I Once it was determined SAI Idid not

 

require immediate medical care, the T00 authorized 
mobilize the Jackson team to travelI land attempt to

possiblyI Upon arrival at

they found he had been taken into custody by ASP Troopers.

(U) After checking one additional address 

was directed by the TOC to direct the Jackson SWAT team to the MBA.

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C ?1,7



 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Animal Shooting incident summary
Re:_ 12/24/2013

The seven spent shell casings and one magazine used during the
shooting incident were collected by Little Rock's Principal Firearms

Instructorl land 

(U) Control Office collected the deceased pit
bull and transported it to the MBA where it was photographed by Little
Rock The pit hull was taken to a local
veterinarian where it was prepared to be sent to the Arkansas
Department of Health for a rabies examination. The results were
negative for the presence of rabies.

 

 

SAI Icompleted a rough sketch of the area of the
residence where the shooting incident occurred. Photographs of SA
injury sustained during the attack were also taken by

Photographer 

(U) The following reports and applicable were completed and
uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original notes and
records for all interviews were packaged in Fo?aeo envelopes and sent
to INSDfD?BOZs?SAI
SAI 
FD-BOZs of ASP Troopersl I
FD-302 of ASP SAI I
Copy of Operations Order
Copy of Electronic Communication?Concept of Operations, dated
llf15/2013
8. ofl IAnimal Control Office
9. FD-EOZ of City of  [Police Officer
10. Department of Health Laboratory report
11 . of PFII 
12. Photographs of injuries to 
13. Photographs of the.deceased pit bull
14.. Sketch

 

 

Isnl 
I SA
sel 

 



 

UNCLASSIFIED



 

b6 -1,7
-1,7

b6 -1
-1

b6 -1,4,7
-1,4,7

NYT3212

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Animal Shooting incident summary
Re: 297L-HQ-A3648070, 12/24f2013

15. 
16. Photographs ofl

 

Inn
(U) Little Rock's review of the shooting incident involving 

found no discrepancies between account of the shooting and
the information obtained from.witness interviews.

#0

UNCLASSIFIED



 

NYT-213

b6 -1,7
-1,7

 

 

 

 

 

Dream. Pistons

L??awrr-pn -. 
I. Par-1.. a?grdl-H?l
?o - 



 

Faun?  5-3-10) 
19 

J.
.a i. 


UNCLASSIFIED
FEDERAL BUREAU. OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic com'munlca?on

 

Title: (U) Report of actions by NK as part of Date: 12/2612013
delegated shooting incident investigation
at SJ.

From: NEWARK

Contact: b6 

-1

 

 

 

 

 

Approved Ey: 

 

Drafted By;

 

 

 

Case ID Animal Shooting

Synopsis: To report to the San Juan Field Office investigative
actions completed.by the Newark Field Office as part of the delegated
shooting incident investigation of the animal shOoting which occurred
on August 28; 2013 in Puerto Rico.

Package Copy: (Hi The following original documents are being placed in
envelopes and mailed to the San Juan Field Office:

 

1.) Original signed statement (553) Of SAI I be -1
dated October 30, 2013, maintained-in a envelope. bag -1
2. Original E's-927 singed. by an: dated. October so, 2013-,
maintained in a FD-340 envelope. Original shooting review interview
log, dated October 30, 2013.

3.) Original notes prepared by SA after the shooting incident.
Original notes prepared by 'in preparation for the
operation related to the shooting incident {notes taken from three
separate notebOOks).

Original photographs, maps, and administrative notes provided to SA
for the operation related to the shooting

inci en .

6.) Original drafts {Draft a Draft 2) of snl:l's prepared
on October 30, 2013.
Original signed sworn statement (333} of SAI 
dated October 2013, maintained in a envelope.

Original 933-92.? singed- by dated October 2013.
maintained in a FD-qu envelope. Original shooting review interview

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

NYT-214

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Report of actions by NK as part of delegated shooting
incident investigation at SJ.

Re: 12/26/2013

log, dated October 2013.
containing Original notes of the SAI I
interview on October 17. 2013.
10.1 FD-340 containing original
interview on October 23. 2013.
11.} ED-340 containing original
interview on October 23. 2013.
12.} containing original notes of the SA

interview on October 28. 2013. Scanned copy of photographs provided by
SA during the interview.

13.) containin one original CD and one copy CD of photographs
provided by SA :Iduring the October 28. 2013 interview.
14.} 50-340 containing recor 5 provided by Iduring
interview conducted on October 29, 2013.
15.) FD-340 containing original notes of the I
interview on November 13, 2013.

16.) 90-340 containing original notes
interview on November 13, 2013.

17.) FD-340 containing original notes
on November 13r 2013.

18.) containing original notes
interview on 12/00/2013.

 

 

note of the 

 

notes the'SAI I

 

Enclosurets): Enclosed are the following items(0) Interview Log, SAI I
4. SA Notes
5. SA Notes
SA Notes
T. SA Notes
8. [01 SA photos a maps
.9. SA admin
10. (U) of SA Draft 1
11. (01 SSE of SA Draft Fla?~92? for sal I
14. Interview Log for 
15. SA interview notes
16. (U) SA Lnterview notes.
UNCLASSIFIED
2

 

NYT3215

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Report of actions by NK as part of delegated shooting
incident investigation at SJ.
as: 297L?Hoen3142161, 

 

17. (U) SA interview notes.

18. (U) SA interview notes and photos.
19. Original and one copy of photographs.

20. an Records provided by PM:

21. SE '11nterview-notes.

22. (U) SE interview notes.

23. SA linterview notes.

24. SA linterview notes.

b6 -1
b?C ?1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Details:

 

On august 28, 2013. SAI discharged three rounds b6 -1
from his FBI-issued Colt M4, at a pit bull breed dog which came b7C '1
charging at him and his team during the execution of an arrest warrant.

The shooting incident review was delegated to the San Juan Field
Office (SJ) with the assistance of the Newark Field Office (WK).

 

In June 2013, the Newark Field Office was contacted by the
SWAT Operations Unit (SOU) requesting support for the August 28, 2013.
mission in Puarto-Rico for the San Juan Field Office (SJ). WK
executive management offer two twelve member SWAT teams
for the operation. From mid-July through mideaugust WK
received several communications from SOU with guidance about the SJ b6 _7
operation. The communications included information about required _7
equipment, team assignments, and descriptions of the area-of ?1
assignment. The SJ operation was major takedown of approximately 100
targets of a large scale drug enterprise. The drug organization was
known to employ violence and to employ the use-of lookout towers in the
planned arrest area,  Information about the operation
-was distributed_to the NK SWAT operators by-email and during weekly
training sessions. The NK SWAT team conducted a firearms qualification
shortly before travelling to SJ for the operation.

On Saturday, August 24, 2013, the NH SWAT team met at Fort Dix, 
Jersey to caravan to the Washington, DC area. On Sunday the team
traveled by plane from Andrews Air Force Base to San Juan, The team
reported to Fort Buchanan on Monday for an ?All Hands" briefing. The

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

NYT3216

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Report of actions by HR as part of delegated shooting
incident investigation at SJ.
Re: 12f26!2013

?All Hands? briefing consisted of a full briefing of the mission- The
FBI Deadly Force Policy was briefed. It was clear and understandable.
Contingencies were addressed. On Tuesday the NK SWAE team reported
again to Fort Buchanan for breakout briefings with SWAT teams in
specific sectors. Each SWAT team leader was required to provide a
'brief back.

On Wednesday; August 23, 2013r the NK SWAT team reported to Fort
Buchanan to gather their gear and convoy with other SWAT teams to the
arrest locations. Both NK ]had two
arrest_m1?sions that morning. 

 

 

 

 



 

[lea tnel I

its second assigned location to clear a house
and execute a subject arrest. While clearing the interior of the house
through a door from the kitchen to an.exterior
stairwell. The stairwell led to an alley. SAI Ifoliowed
.he held a position on the stair to protect fellow SWAT
members from a potential threat posed by several dogs perched on an
adjacent structure. SAI  fo11owed 
the stairwell to clear the alley below. SAI planned to clear
the area to the right while the area to the left.
As soon as SA got to the bottom of the stairwell, a large,
light-brown, pit bull breed dog began charging at him. 
immediately recognized that the dog was attacking. Eearing for his
safety and the safety of his fellow SWAT operators, 
his weapon at the charging dog. After firing three rounds at the
charging dog. it retreated into a crawl spade under the house. As
soon as the dog retreated from View, on the radio
that shots had been fired, a canine had been struck, there were no 
operators or civilians injured, and there was no additional assistance
required at that time. as sans Senior Team Leader, ea:
advised the Tactical Operations Center of the shooting.

 

 

When the location was declared clear SAI Itoob

UNCLASSIFIED



 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Report of actions by MK as part'of delegated shooting
incident investigation at SJ.
Re: 12(26f2013

 

photographs of the scene where the dog was shot. SAI 
E::]pulled the dog's body out from under the residence. The dog's body
was placed in a plastic bag and the plastic bag was placed in a pet
carrier which was found at the scene. Sh ?Irecovered the spent
shell casings. The dog was Carried by SA ISAI 
I land SAI  to a designated.rally
point. A member of the NK SWAT team remained with the dog?s body until
it-was released to members of another EBI SWAT team.

 

 

 

the SJ Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI) to
report the discharge of his weapon. Custody of the weapon used in the
shooting incident remained with Interviews of the NK swam
team.regarding the animal shooting incident did not commence until the
SWAE team returned to NK.

The following reports and applicable FD-302s were completed and
uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original.notes and
records for all interviews conducted by NK were packaged in 
envelopes and sent to SJ.

 

Original signed sworn statement of 
dated October 30, 2013, maintained in a FO-340 envelope.

Original singed by dated October 3.0, 20:13,
maintained in a FO?S?O?enveloper Original shooting review interview
logr dated October 30, 2013.

Original notes prepared by the shooting incident.
Original notes prepared by SP. in preparation for the
operation related to the shooting incident {notes taken from three
separate notebooks).

5.) Original photographs, maps, and administrative notes provided to SA
preparation for the operation related to the shooting
incidEnt. 

6.) Original drafts [Draft 1 a Draft 2) of prepared
on October 30, 2013.

7.) Original signed sworn statement of SAI 
dated-OctOber 17, 2013r maintained in a envelope.

 

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT3218

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Report of actions by NK as part of delegated Shooting
incident investigation at SJ.
Re: 12/26/2013

8.) Original FD-927 singed by datEd October 17, 2013,
maintained in a envelope. Original shooting review interview
log, dated October 17, 2013.

9.1 FD-340 containing original notes for the corresponding FD 302'of
the SAI  interview on October 17, 2013.

10.) FD~340'containing original note for the corresponding ED 302 of.
the SAI  interview on October 23, 2013.

ll.) FD-340 containing original.notes for the corresponding ED 302 of
the on October 23, 2013.

12.) containing original notes for the corresponding ED 302 of
the on October 23, 2013. Scanned copy of
photographs provided by SA during the interview.

13.) FD-SQD containing one original CD and one copy CD of photographs
provided by during the October 23, .2013 interview.
14.) containing records provided by PFII Iduring
interview conducted on October 29, 2013.

15.} 20-340 containing original notes for the corresponding'FD 302 of
the SAI Iinterview on November 13, 2013.

16.) FD-340 containing original notes for the corresponding ED 302 of
the interview on NOVember 13, 2013.

17.) containing original notes for the corresponding ED 302 of
the SA interview on November 13, 2013.

18.) containing original notes for the corresponding FD 302of
the SAI Iinterview on 12/04f2013.

 

 

 

 

On October 30, 2013, SAI [provided Supervisory
Special Agents lthe three original .223 shell
casings collected at the scene of the shooting incident. These shell
casings have.been submitted to the NK Evidence-Control Unit for
shipment to SJ under the captioned file number.



UNCLASSIFIED

NY73219

 

 

 

50-1057 [Rows-340]

- Synopsis:

 

     
 

OFFI nL Fl one


 


FEDERAL. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Elealrnnia communication
Title: {UlhReporting results EC. . Data: 03/16/2015

cc: I:

Fron:. PITTSBURGH
ao~16 . . . .
Contact: I 

Approved By: I -
- asacl 
sac Scott S_Smith

 

 

 

Drafted By; I I

cage ID 

4

Pittsburgh Animal Shooting' 

(U) To report results of a review ofsan animal shooting_
incident involving which oceurred on Febr?ary_16,
2015. - 

Package Copy: following original documents are-being placed in
envelopes and mailed go'the Inspection Division:

Original Signed Sworn Statement (535) of 
03f05f2015, maintained in'a envelope. 

Original FD-BET signed dated 02l21/2015, maintained

in a envelope.

containing original interview notes and records.

Details:

0n 02f16f?0l5, at approximately 6:15 Pittsburgh (PG) 

 

Idischarged two rounds into a-deer from his

personally owed weapon (POW) Glook 27h serial The

Shooting Incident Review Team was delegated to Pittsburgh Field 
ofrioe by the Acting Chief Inspector On pzlla/zols. Following

are the results of the shooting'incident reviewf.which included a $53

-



NYT3220

 

b6 -l
1370 -hi?: -1

 

 



Titlef (U) Reporting results_EC. I.
Be: 03/16?2015

 

 

from I PEI review of the weapon and coordination 1 b5 ?132
with the Northern Regional'Police Department b7? '1'2

0n the evening of driving
his personal vehicle enroute to a soccer practice with] land
I Iin the backseat: At approximately 3:15
p.m. a deer jumped over the_guard'rail into lane of
traffic and collided with the front passenger side of his vehicle.

After he stopped the?vehicle, the deer was dead and

..assessed the damage to his.vehicle. SSA photographed the area of
damage and then observed the deer raise its head and attempt to move
with_two broken legs. I

approximately 6:19 the NEED to' b6 ?1
request assistance. The call to the NRPD rolled over to the-Allegheny - -1
County Emergency ?ervices dispatch for 911. The 911 dispatcher advised 
there would be no law enforcement sent'if the,vehicle?was driveable.
Duehto oncoming traffic and the subsequent stoppage of 

a safe direction by which to aim his weapon and

'euthanized the deer. two shots to incapacitate the
deer and then removed the:deer from the roadway.

fuzfion?j the~shooting to PGFO b6 -1
at 1 p.m. on Chief'Division ?1
Counsel then contacted the
Inspection Division. In discussions with PGFO was advised that
ERT deployment to the scene was not necesSary. There were no injuries
or property damage as a result of this shooting incident. The delegated-
SIRT documented Primary Firearm Instructor 
- review of the weapon,_magazine and ammunition count of eight rounds on
02l17?2015. sow was not sent to Quantico for review; The
EGFD SIRT also confirmed the call-to NRPP and the standard operating
procedures. Signed Sworn Statement {335} was completed on
03/05/2015. 

are - 

{piggsuoj The SIRT noted that although 333 states the b5 -1

incident happened.in the vicinity of the 500 block of-Pearce Mill Road, b7c -1

2 

NYT1221

 

 







.

I Title: Reporting results EC.
Re: 03/1exgo1s.

Wexford, PAi'Wexford is the mailing address where the incident occurred as ?1
and Pine Township is the actual municipality. b7C ?1
She Pittsburgh CDC confirmed SSA: received deadly force

training on 10f21-/2014. The Pittsburgh PFI confirmed ssnEI

 

 

was authorized to carry'the Glock 27, SSA:
last qualified on with the weapon. 

On 03f1612015, Pittsburgh CDC advised the he had researched
municipal codes for Pine Township and the incident did not violate of
-any municipal ordinances. As a result there was no need to seek a
prosecutive opinion. 

The following reports and applicable were completed'
and uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original notes and
records for all interviews were packaged in envelopes and sent

to INSD. - -
1513?1385,r Shooting Incident Report. electronically
submitted'03/05f2015. I - . . 
2. documenting post incident b5 ?1
response and weapon inspection. . -1
3.- Pirearms records of time from of Q-SI 

06/14f2013 until present.

4. documenting post incident

discussions with and Deadly Force Policy

training. 
documenting weather data and internet searches for

media reports?of the incident.

6. documenting vehicle damage to 
.vehicle. 

documenting call to the Northern
Regional Police Department.'

3. I documenting Pine Township municipal codes.

. 

review of the shooting incident involving SSA

.
3

NY73222

 

 

 


1



Title:_ Reporting results EC. 

Re: 



?dund no discrepancies in account 0% she shooting.
The fesults of the investigation have been coordinated with 

. 

bs -1
b7c -1

raw-223? 1

 

  

(Rev. 5-3-10}

 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Pittsburgh Animal Shooting 2/16/2015 Date: 

cc: b5 ?1
-1

From: INSPECTION

DA-OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS SECTION
Contact: FRANK s. VITO, I
Approved By: FRANK S. VITO
David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

Drafted By: FRANK S. VITO

Case ID 29TJ-HQ-R6128365 Pittsburgh Animal Shooting

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review

Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Animal Shooting incident

following the SIRG meeting held on 0?/01/2015.

Administrative Notes: (UXEEBHOE The shooting incident review was

delegated to the Pittsburgh Field Office by the A/Chief Inspector on

02116f2015. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 03f16f2015, was

electronically submitted by Supervisory Special Agentl I ha ?1

Pittsburgh Field Office. ?1

Details:

On 07/01/2015, the SIRG reviewed an Animal Shooting incident

involving Supervisory Special Agentl I Pittsburgh Field

Office 

On 02/16/2015, at approximately 6:15 Pittsburgh 

SSRI Idischarged two rounds into a deer from his

personally owned weapon (POW) Glock 27, serial The Egg?11

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

NYT1224



Title: (U) Pittsburgh Animal Shooting 2/16/2015
Re: 07/20/2015

Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was delegated to Pittsburgh Field
Office by the Acting Chief Inspector on 02/16/2015. Following are the
results of the shooting incident review, which included a from SSA

b6 -1
I I PFI review of the weapon, and coordination with the b7c _1

 

 

Northern Regional Police Department (NRPD).

On the evening of Monday, 02/16/2015, SSAI Iwas driving

his personal vehicle en route to a soccer practice withl I

andl Iin the backseat. At approximately 6:15 b5 -1f2
a deer jumped over the guard rail into lane of '1;2
traffic and collided with the front passenger side of his vehicle.

After he stopped the vehicle, the deer was dead and

assessed the damage to his vehicle. the area of

damage and then observed the deer raise its head and attempt to move

 

with two broken legs.

approximately 6:19 the NRPD to

request assistance. The call to the NRPD rolled over to the Allegheny
b6 -1

County Emergency Services dispatch for 911. The 911 dispatcher advised _1

there would be no law enforcement sent if the vehicle was drivable. Due
to oncoming traffic and the subsequent potential danger to other
vehicles, a safe direction by which to aim his
weapon and euthanized the deer. two shots to

incapacitate the deer and then removed the deer from the roadway.

 

(WM) SSA : reported the shooting to PG ASACI lat
7 p.m. on 02/16/2015. PG Chief Division Counsel

then contacted the

Inspection Division. In discussions with INSD, PG was advised that ERT b6 ?1

deployment to the scene was not necessary. There were no injuries or _1
property damage as a result of this shooting incident. The delegated PG

SIRT documented Primary Firearm Instructor review

of the weapon, magazine, and ammunition count of eight rounds on

02/12/2015. POW was not sent to Quantico for review. The



2

NYT122S



Title: (U) Pittsburgh Animal Shooting 2/16/2015
Re: 07f20/2015

PG SIRT also confirmed the call to NRPD and the standard operating
procedures by which they decided not to respond to the scene. SSA

Signed Sworn Statement was completed on 03/05/2015. b6 ?1
b7C -1

{Uf?ied?) The SIRT noted that although stated the
incident happened in the vicinity of the 500 block of Pearce Mill Road,
Wexford, PA., Wexford is the mailing address where the incident

occurred and Pine Township is the actual municipality.

The Pittsburgh CDC confirmed deadly force b6 -1
training on 10f2l/2014. Pittsburgh _1

authorized to carry the Clock serial 

had last qualified on 08f15f2014 with the weapon.
SIRG Observations

On 0?/01/2015, the SIRG reviewed the Animal Shooting with the intent
to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Inasmuch as the incident
reviewed was a mercy Animal Shooting, the SIRG evaluated the totality
of the circumstances and determined the use of weapon was b5 ?1

in accordance with policy. b7c -1

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning

and execution, training, and or/safety issues.

No observations were noted and use of his weapon was b6 ?1
b7C ?1

deemed to be appropriate and within policy.

Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non?voting Board Member. The following Board Members
were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of

Inspections (OI), Deputy Civil Rights b5 -1,3
Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice Unit Chief b7c ?1r3

 

I Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel

 



3

NYT1226



Title: (U) Pittsburgh Animal Shooting 2/16/2015
Re: 07f20/2015

 

I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; b5 ?1
SSAI I Practical Applications Unit, Training _1

DivisionITD}; SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, SSA
I I Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; Section Chief Robert E. Hughes,

 

 

Violent Crime and Gang Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit

Defensive Systems Section Chief (SC)
Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division and,

 

SSAI I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division.
The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance:
Inspectors Scott Vito, Timothy M. Feeney, Eric Welling, Trent R.
Teyema, Peterson, Justin Tolomeo, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas

A. Leff, OI, Assistant Inspectorszeam Leadersl

 

 

 

 

 

OI,
Management Program Analyst I Inspection
Management Unit (IMU), Supervisory MAPAI Iand MAPA

I IInspection Analysis Unit, I
Safety and Occupational Health Manager, Occupational Safety and

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Environmental Programs, SSRAI and SSA
I I Investigative Law Unit, OGC.
0?

4



 

FIE-1057 (Rev. 5-3-10)

 


[senses new ?is nmveevuceevaem

Electronic: communication

Title: (UIZIEECQ Atlanta Field Office Shooting A Date: 04/27/2015
?Incident Report - 

 

 

 

I
Trent R. Teyema
. b6 ?1
From: ATLANTA b7C -1

Contact: I

 

 

Approved Ey:  I

 

 

-nia;;ea sy:  

 

Case ID (U) Atlanta Field Office Shooting

Synopsis: The final EC is forwarded following investigative
. activities examining the agent involved shooting on February 3, 2015.
No corrective observations were noted as a result of the aforementioned
i investigation. 
..


Details:

Investigative Period: 02f03/2015 - 03/09/2015
I. Executive Summary

On 02/02/2015, Agents with the Atlanta Field Office (AT) SWAT Team
were-involved in a shooting incident while attempting to apprehend - .
Ion a federal arrest warrant issued from the Dallas b5 "1?7
Field Office of the FBI. any FBI personnel were? 
injured as a result of the arrested pursuant to
the charges.filed in Texas. However, Assault on a Federal Officer 
charges are under consideration. The Shooting Incident Review Team I
delegated to the.Atlanta Division for investigation on
02!02/2015. 

 

 

On 02102/2015, at approximatelv 6:00 a.m.r the AT SWAT team moved to





 

 

 

 

.
a
1
.
I

.





Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting'Incident Report
Re: 297J-Ho-ae059596, 

apartment. a knock and announce several

times. With each their official presen

ce and

legal authority to enter the residence. While at the door, a camera

above the door was identified and called out by SWAT Operators

because

of the compromise potential and related safety issues. After the third

knock without a response, SAI Imoved forward and hr
the door. With a positive breach, 

eached

moved into the apartment'and cleared the living room to the immediate

 

left of the front entrance. 
forward and to the-right to clear the dining room and kitchen.
I Imoved straight ahead to hold th

 

Imoved

area._SAs

hallway -,
and provide cover for the first two shield teams. 

 

in last and posted behind Shel

'Each operator announced as they crossed the threshold into the

apartment.

From his vantage point posting on the hallway, 
doorways for safety and search points to the SWAT Operators. A

lled out
3 he

called out the his head out of the doorway on

the left side of the hallway with what appeared to be a black

semi?automatic pistol raised to level and pointed at the SWAT

Operators. fired one round from his Bureau issued Glock

pistol striking the wall and yelled, ?He?s-got a gun, he's

got a gun.?

From his vantage point, could 'see_.an arm and blac
semi?automatic pistol raised and pointing down the hallway. SA

22



.

'viewed what appeared to be a black semi?automatic pistol in the
doorway, but could not see who or how the weapon was being held;

 

retreated back into the room and 

Imoved up

 

besideI I Numerous SWAT Agents then began shouting commands for

Ito come out with his hands came out of

another room and ?it's not a real

'However, when he did not comply with the many commands to come
I I Soon thereafter,
out of the room and surrendered. There were no physical

 

the room, SAI



2

 
out of

b6 -l,7

36 
?1,7
b6 -1,7
b7C 
h7E -1

NYT1229

 

 

 



Title= Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report
Re: 

injuries resulting from the entry and arrest:

 

I I be 
IWere assigned outside perimeter and transport Agent :1'7
duties subsequent to-arrest.-From their vantage point during the arrest
operation they could see and hear the knock and announcement. When
to open the doorIr they witnessed SWAT Operators breached
the door and entered the apartment. They could hear SWAT commands for
get his hands up. Shortly thereafter, a gunshot was heard
and Agents shouting ?he's got a gun!? and ?drop the gun!? They then
heardl IFollowing his afforded
medical care due to statements made relative to ingesting a controlled
substance (nycotin). 

 

 

 

his Advice of Rights with b5 ?1r7
present during the_transport by ambulance Center in' :1?7
them he was in the living room and heard 
the knock-and announce by the SWAT back into the
office on the left side of the-hallway to look at the computer which I
was connected to a camera outside the front door. Recognizing law
enforcement was at the door, he was over." He
retrieved a box with his drugs, a ?plastic? pistol, and an ?anonymous?
mask? stated he was shot at while he was in the hallway. When
he did not come out of the room as commanded by the SWAT Operators a
Itold ?probably
deserved to be shot seal I
?hypothetically speaking, if I were a cop, I would.have shot myself.?

Following the medical transported and
processed into the Atlanta Detention Center,'without further event.

 

After the.shooting incident occurred, FBI Agents secured the scene.r
obtained a search warrant, and processed the apartment to collect
evidence. Assault on a Federal Officer (AFB) charges are pending

Based upon the facts and circumstances Agents were b6 -7
-7



3

NYT3230

 

 

 



Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report

Re: 297J-HQFA6059595, 04/2?/2015

cleared of criminal liability by both state and federal prosecutors.

II. Incident Details

a. Substantive_Case Files and Background

The Agent Involved Shooting occurred while in the process_of
executing the arrest warrant initial lead to locate
and arrest was set by the Dallas Field Office based upon the
The Atlanta Field Office opened the
Assault on a Federal investigation following the shooting
incidentGEORGIAI 

ASSAULTING, KILLING OR ATTEMPTING TO KILL FEDERAL 

 

sa  

 

Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

 

. SA discharged weaponmomssmIED/Eou-1NYH3231

 

 



Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report.
Re: 0412712015

 

Case Review and Operational Briefings

On 01/29/2015, Atlanta received a priority lead from the Dallas
Field Office to locate and arrestl I
I [was a Federal Fugitive wanted on state-

 

 

 

warrants issued in Georgia and Alabama. Atlanta Case Agentl I

identified and confirmed: residence to bel I

I SAI Irequested SWAT
assistance based criminal history. and
received proper approvals of his Operation Plan from his supervisor,

Cle; and Sec J. Britt
Johnson. The designated On-Scene Commander was 

 

 

 

On-02/02/2015, SA conducted an operational plan briefing. In
doing so he coverEd all aspects of the arrest plan to include: suspect
information, case, background, location medical, communication, and FBI
Deadly Force Policy. As part of the operation plan, 
photos with identifying information for He
further to be considered Armed and Dangerous. 
a swan brief immediately afterwards. The SWAT plan
consisted of four two man shield teams for entry 
apartment with a SWAT medic and two additional SWAT Operators

performing perimeter security.

d. Events Leading_Up to the Shooting

on Thursday, 01129/2015, telephonic notification
from the Dallas Field Office of an incoming priority lead to arrest

IDuring the notification 

indictment contained a charge of ?Swatting." Swatting occurs when an

 

 

-individual contacts a law enforcement agency to falSely report an

extremely violent crime has cecurred at a residence..Crimi?als


5

b6 -1
b7C -1

b6 -1,7


b6 ?1,7
'b7o 

b5 -1,7
-1,7

NYT3232 .

 

 

 

I

Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report I
Re: 

frequently use this technique against law enforcement officers who

prosecute or investigate their crimes. this type of b6 -1
crime puts officers at greater danger Since it increases the risk of a- b7c ?1
blue?oneblue confrontation.

Due to the nature of the Swatting charges, 
decided he would rhquest the Atlanta Field Office SWAT Team to conduct
. the arrest A review of the case file also determined the
subject?s NCIC report contained Armed and Dangerous warnings. 
assigned.the lead to his experience as a former b6 -1.7
SWAT Supervisor and current SWAT Operator best suited him_for the b7c 
operation. the subject, and obtainedI I b7E -1
Friday, 01f30/2015. UsingI ISAI Ipresented a
draft operations plan-to SSAI Iby the close of business, with a
tentative plan to conduct the arrest Tuesday, 02/03/2015. 
_additional work on the plan Saturday morning and sent an updated copy
to SSA':Iapproved of the draft, and forwarded them to ASAC
I on Saturday for further review. I
the final discussion and approval would occur on Monday, 02/02f2015, in
the office. 

 

 

 

 

However, SAI:Icalled on Sunday, 02.101/2015, at 135 
approximately 10:00 p.m. The Dallas Field Office Case Agent called SA 
information to leave town as'
early as Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning. he
needed approval to move the operation to the next morning. 
not receive a response from email, text and voicemails left for ASAC
I Iby 10:30 p.m. Therefore, SWAT-ASAC
Iat 10:30 p.m. SSAI:Ibriefed 
forwarded him.a copy of the Operations Plan. the
- Operations Plan and Sent it to Special Agent?in?Charge J. Britt Johnson
for final approval. When approval from 
he relayed the approval to SAI I SAI Ialready had the
arrest team assembled and notified SSAI Iseveral substitutions of
personnel occurred due to the date change.

 

 

 

 





NY11233

 

 

 



Title: (U/E?a?j Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report
Re: 04/27/2015

arrived at the staging area near store in

SSA
,Georgia at approximately 5:00 a.m. on 
ASAC conducted the operations order briefing at 5:20 a.m. SSA

not attend the briefing as he conducted a spot check of the
subject's residence during the briefing. Visibility was clear, but the
only light was a porch light at the apartment door.
After returning from the spot check, informed SSA: local
deputies would drive with the convoy. The deputies also provided an
ambulance on standby in the area during the arrest.

The arrest team departed the staging area at 5:55 a.m. and proceeded
to the subject?s residence. At approximately the AT SWAT team
moved apartment to execute the arrest warrant.

e. Incident Shooting Details

a knock and announce several times. With each
with an arrest warrant. SA
moved forward and breached the door. With a positive breach, SAs
I [moved into the apartment and cleared the
living room to the immediate left of the front entrance. 
Imoved forward and to the right to clear the dining
[moved

 

 

 

 

room and kitchen area. 
straight ahead to hold the hallway and to provide cover_for the first
two shield teams. Imoved in last and
posted behind I Each operator announced as
they crossed'the threshold into the apartment.

 

 

Inside the apartment, out open doorways for safety

and Search points to the SWAT Operators. As he called out the doorways,
stuck his head out of the doorway en the left side of the

hallway with what appeared to be a black semi?automatic pistol raised
to level and Pointed at the one round
from his Bureau issued Glock 22 pistol striking the wall neer : 
and yelled, ?He?s got a gun, he's got a his vantage point,
SA could see an arm and black semi?automatic pistol raised and



7

b6 
-1-1,7
b7C 

NYT3234

 

 

_Title: Atlanta Field Office'shooting Incident Report
Re: 

pointing down the hallway. what appeared to be a black b5 -1,7


semi?automatic pistol in the doorway, but could not?see who or how the 

weapon was being back into the room.and SA's
Imoved up Numerous SWAT Agents then
began shouting commands out with his_hands up.

came out of another room and 

replied ?it?s not a real gun.? However, when he did not comply with the

 

 

 

many'commands to come out of the room, SAI I
I I Soon out of the room-and
I surrendered.

 

f. Post Shooting Details

There were no physical injuries resulting from the entry and arrest.
However, the arresting agents he ingested an unknown b6 -1,7
amount of Oxycotin prior to the FBI entry into the apartment. The SWAT _l'T

Team.Medic, SAI Iperformed an initial assessment and

 

 

request local EMS, staged nearby, to provide a full assessment. Based
verbal responses, it was determined he should be
transported to the Medical Center,  I
Georgia Following the medical examination,  Iwas
transported and processed into the Atlanta Detention Center, 254 I
Peachtree Street, SW, Atlanta,'Georgia, without further event.

 

After the shooting incident occurred, FBI Agents secured the scene,
obtained a search warrant, and processed the apartment to collect
evidence.?Seized items of evidence listed included a Crossman Phantom
air pistol (IE5) recovered from the left'room in exited b5 ?1surrendered to the FBI. b7c 

CDCI  received notification of the shooting after
on and proceeded to the scene of the Agent
Involved Shooting. at approximately ?:30 a.m, CBC
the Agent Shooter, Special AgentI advice
about the post shooting process, and gave him an opportunity to ask


El
NYT3235

 

 

 



Titleq (UIZEBEQE Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report,
Re: 04/27/2015 

questions about the process. CDC asked inquired of his
physical and mental health. the scene at
approximately 8:30 a.m. - 

Signed Sworn of nine Agents and interviews of 11?
others were documented to account the facts and cirCumstances of the

shooting. The statements, interviews, and utterances are
substantially consistent. Assistant United States Attorney 

to AFD on 
g. Accounting of Shots Fired

. round from his FBI issued Glock 22 pistol 
No other rounds were fired and no one was injured. 

hL Subject Information

Identifiers;

es

ir
B.
ssan


 

I I contained the following
criminal charges forl 
contained no driver history records and five

'criminal charges. The criminal charges included Fugitive from Justice,
Porn- intent to Distribute, Rape degree, Use/Possession of Drug

 



9

 

b6 -1
-1

b6 -3,7
?3NYT3236

 

 

 

uncrassIFIsD/Zt?nq

Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report
Re: 297J-HQ-35059595, 

Paraphernalia, and a second count of Porn? Intent to Distribute.
Iwas the subject of Dallas Field'Office investigation

An NCIC report}

The first

was an Escape Risk

 

 

dated 02/06/2915, contained multiple entries for

and Full Extradition was authorized for Failure to
Appear. Additional entries include: Extortion (13 months 
Unlawful Access to Stored Communication EXtortion (supervised release},

?Probation Violation, Failure to Appear, and nine charges of Failure to
support Child ?120 Days+).

. multiple entries include: five
arrests for offenses including two counts of Possession of a Controlled
Substance; Theft of Property; and two counts of Conspiracy to
Manufacture Controlled Substances. indicated current
warrants arrest in the state of Alabama for Failure to
Appear and Possession of a Controlled Substance.

i. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers

_Ail FBI personnel were wearing appropriate SWAT body armor with
attached FBI identifiers. I

j. Forensic Summary

On 02/02/2015 at 9:11a.m., the Atlanta ERT deployed 
Georgia where they recovered weapon and ammunition. Atlanta
ERT did a site_survey of the shooting incident location. The weapon'was
rendered safe by Firearms Instructor On examination
the weapon's magazine contained 14 duty rounds for the Glock 22

-and there was one duty round inside the chamber of the~Glock
22. Inside the apartment Atlanta ERT recovered an expended .40 caliber
round, an expended caliber shell casing, a black BB Pistol labels
andl I

 

An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items follows:'



10

 

message included a caution statement 

b7c ?1,7

b7E ?1



 

 



Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report
Re: 04l27f2015 - 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1131 Glock 22 3/11] - 136 ?1,7
132" Block 22 magazine with 14 rounds '1r7
1 round..40 cal {33333)
134 Shell casting .40 cal (SPEER)
1135 Black BB Pistol 
me I I .
137 Camera which.had been suspended over front door entrance
138 GB Wireless-Monitor
139 Sign Eardrum Theater
1310 .40 Caliber bullet
1311 Samsung Model see 1:399, 53] I
1312 Samsung Model 
1313 ASUS Table Black case Unk ModelfSN
1314 ASUS Laptop Pinkx?Black model 2407311 I
1315 Netgear wireless router I
1316' A503 (330111 Notebook 833 3/11] 
1317 Simple_tech external HD 1 Terabyte 
1313 Free Agent Goflex 2 Terabyte external hard drive
1319 San Disk Card Reader I
1320 Box with ID cards (Texas and Alabama Drivers Licenses)
1321 Canon Video Camera EN 
1322 35 unknown white pills, 9 broken pieces (44 total}
1323, 13 unknown white pills.
1324 - 2 blue pills?L368
1325 16 unknown white pills
1326 40 unknown red and blue pills
?132? 10 unknown white pills
1323 5 unknown yellow pills 
1329 20 complete pills and 49 pieces ?Xanax {69 total]
1330. 24 unknown pills {two tablets broken)
1331 unknown white pills 
1332 19 unknown white pills 
1333_ Pill bottles, bags, misc wrappers and cutting devices

 

 



11

NYT3238

 

 

 

 



_Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report
Re: 04/27f2015

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

v- I - 136??

.
1B34 HP anilion computer _7
On 03/l6/15, weapon.was received at the DefenSive I be _1
Systems Unit gun vault. On Gunsmithl ch -1

inepected and tested the captioned weapon. The weapon functioned as
designed and there were no'noted issues. 

k. Medical Summary
FBI Agents involved in the shooting:

No Injuries.

Subjects:

 

At-approximately 6:07 SWAT Team Medic SAI I
.examined subjectl .  in the apartment following his arrest.
After large amounts-of drugs
during the entry operation, he requested the assistance of an on call
ambulance. The ambulance arrived at 6:14 a.m. After the paramedics 

. . . b6 

they initiated transport him to t?c 
Center located at]  Georgia at 6:2? a.m.
I:Iarrived at the medical center at 6:50 a.m. Once  : arrived,
at the hospital he received treatment from 
-for the effects of an overdose of drugs. 
at_3:45 p.m. for transport by Agents to the custody of the US Marshals?
for the Northern District of Georgia. Prior to departing the hospital,
provided the visit records to the transporting

Ag?nts.

 

 

Incident Review Team Details

a. The shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the

following personnel:



12

NY13239

 

- Chief Qirision Counsel

 



Title: . Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report
Re: 04127f2015

 

seal FBI Atlanta
ass] FBI Atlanta

 

b. The FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team Personnel}:
Not applicable.
IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

011,02/02/2015, Atlanta ASACI:Iprovided a telephonic Executive
Situation Report to Bloc; which conducted subsequent notifications.
Additionally,.SAC Johnson telephonically provided Inspection Division

AD Nancy McNamara with the details of the shooting, noting no injuries'

occurred. Thereafter, Chief Inspector David Paul Gelios.notified ASAC
Agent Involved Shooting was delegated to the Atlanta
Field Office. 

. Administrative

a. Firearms Training

 

Special Agent (5A3I I Principal.Firearms Instructor
(PEI), assigned to the Atlanta Field Office provided an:
firearms qualifications. most recent qualification
score with his FBI issued Glock 22 occurred on Olf29X2015 and he was in
complience.with the firearms qualifications requirements.-

b. Deadly Force Training

3A Iattenced firearms and
qualified on-03f21f2014. SA Ialso receiVed_the-annual Deadly
Force Training utilizing the IES'system and legal briefing. Assistant
provided the legal training, and SA
the IES system. The comments section of the firearms
record contains the annotation of this training. SASalso 

 

 

 



13

NY1324O

 



Title: Atlanta Field Office Shooting Incident Report
Re: 04f27/2015

 

attended the operations order briefing prior to the[ I

arrest operation. the Deadly Force Policy to all
-Agents attending directly from.the operations order._ 

 

o. Prosecutorial Decision

On Assistant United States Attorney (AUSAJ 

the Northern District of Georgia provided Assistant Inspector?in?Place.
I la prosecutorial decision for SAI 
regarding the 02f0212015~3hooting Incident involving  
was: stated based on the facts presented, the United States
Attorney would not pursue any charges against 
also stated since the Sheriff Office Deputies did not complete an 
incident report about the Agent-Involved Shooting, he knows the local
District Attorney had no knowledge of the case at this time.

 

 

 

 

VI. Inspector's Draft Observations

No observations were noted.

9.6)



14

b6 -1.7
-1,7

b6 -1,3,7


NY71241

 

  

FD-1057 (Rev 5-3-10}

Eave? 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlmniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: Shooting Incident Atlanta Field Date: 07/20/2015
Office 02/02/2015

 

cc; b6 -1
b7C ?1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
Contact:

 

 

Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

 

 

Drafted By: 
Case ID Atlanta Field Office Shooting
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Agent Involved Shooting
incident following the SIRG meeting held on 07/01/2015.

Administrative Notes: The shooting incident review was
delegated to the Atlanta Field Office by the Chief Inspector on
02/02/2015. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/27/2015, was

 

electronically submitted by Supervisory Special Agent (SSAJ b6 ?1
I I Atlanta Field Office. b7C -1
Details:

On 07/01/2015, the SIRG reviewed an Agent Involved Shooting
incident involving SAI I Atlanta Field Office, on b6 ?1
02/02/2015. 137?: '1

 

 

On 02/02/2015, Atlanta Field Office SWAT operators were

involved in a shooting incident while attempting to b5 
a federal arrest warrant. A lead to execute the arrest b7c _7
warrant was issued from the Dallas Field Office. 

UNCLASSIFIEDUM

NYT1242



Title: {u/Ziae?b Shooting Incident Atlanta Field Office 02/02/2015
Re: 07/2012015

any FBI personnel were injured as a result of the incident. b5 ?7
. . . b'Ir'C 
was arrested pursuant to a federal warrant for his failure to appear in _1

 

court, related to earlier charges filed inl Iforl I
The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation was
delegated to Atlanta.

{Uli?b??i On 01f29/2015, Atlanta received a priority lead froml I
to locate and arrestl I b6 
also wanted and had a state warrant from Alabama issued for b7c 

her arrest for failing to appear relative to charges of possession of a

controlled substance. Atlanta SAI Iidentified and
residence as 
Georgia. requested SWAT assistance based upon
violent criminal history. and received
proper approvals of his Operation Plan from SSAI I
ASACI I and sec J. Britt Johnson. The
designated On-Scene Commander was 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 02f02/2015, an operational plan

briefing. In doing so he covered all aspects of the arrest plan, to

include the Deadly Force Policy. As part of the operation plan, SA b5 

photos with identifying information for both and b7C -1,7

He further briefed be considered Armed and b?E _1

Dangerous. A SWAT briefing was conducted immediately following the

 

operational briefing. The SWAT plan consisted of] I

I Ito make entry apartment. A

SWAT medic and two additional SWAT Agents were assigned to perimeter

 

 

security.

At approximately 6:00 Atlanta SWAT moved 55 -1r7
-1,7

 

apartment and SAI Iperformed a knock and announce
several times. With each knock, and arrest
warrant. While at the door, a camera above the door was identified and
called out by SWAT operators. After the third knock without a

response, SAI Imoved forward and breached the door.

 

 



2

NYT1243

Title:
Re:



Shooting Incident Atlanta Field Office 02/02/2015

07f20/2015

 

b6 -1
?1

With a positive breach, moved

 

into the apartment and cleared the living room to the immediate left of
SAs 

and to the right to clear the dining room and kitchen area.

 

Imoved forward
SAs

the front entrance.

 

 

Imoved straight ahead to hold

the hallway and provide cover for the first two shield teams. SAs

 

Imoved in last and posted

 

behind I

crossed the threshold into the apartment.

From his vantage point posting on the hallway, 
called out doorways for safety and search to the SWAT Agents. As he

called out the doorways, his head out of the doorway on
the left side of the hallway with what appeared to be a black
semi-automatic pistol raised to level and pointed at the SWAT
Agents. one round from his Bureau issued Glock 22

pistol, striking the wall 
back into the room and SAs 

up beside thwmous SWAT Agents then began

shouting commands come out with his hands up. 

However, when he did not comply with

The operators announced as they

 

b6 
-1,7

b6 
?1,7
-1

replied ?it's not a real gun.?

 

the many commands to come out of the room, SAI I

 

 

I Soon thereafter,  Icame out of the

 

There were no physical injuries resulting from
Following his taken to a
hospital and afforded medical care due to statements indicating he had
ingested numerous OxyContin pills. provided treatment for
potential overdose by the hospital medical staff.



scene, obtained a search warrant,
Atlanta?s ERT one shot had been fired and
recovered the round from within the apartment wall. The ERT also

recovered other notable items, such as BB gun, various drugs

several computers,

room and surrendered.

the entry and arrest.

After the shooting incident occurred, FBI Agents secured the
and processed the apartment to

collect evidence. confirmed

b6 -7

-7

in pill form, and other electronic media. Based



3

NYT1244



Title: {u/Zsas?b Shooting Incident Atlanta Field Office 02/02/2015
Re: 07/2012015

upon the facts and circumstances Agents were cleared of criminal
liability by both state and federal prosecutors. indicted b5 
on one count of Assault on a Federal Officer on 05/19/2015. ?7

SIRS Observations

On 07f01/2015, the SIRG reviewed the Agent Involved Shooting

incident with the intent to:

l. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG voted
unanimously and determined the use of deadly force was in accordance

with Department of Justice Deadly Force policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning
operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

The SIRG had no observations, recommendations or instructions.

Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non?voting Board Member. The following Board Members
were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of

Inspections (OI), Deputy Civil Rights b6 ?1,3
Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice Unit Chief ?1!3

 

I Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General
Counsel; AXSSAI Squad Washington Field Office;
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); I

Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I Special Weapons and

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group;
Section Chief Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crime and Gang Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; Defensive Systems
Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, Global Section,

Counterintelligence Division; and SSAI I Evidence

 

 

Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following non?voting

individuals were also in attendance: Inspectors Scott Vito, Timothy M.



4

NYT1245



Title: Shooting Incident Atlanta Field Office 02/02/2015
Re: 07f20/2015

Feeney, Eric Welling, Trent R. Teyema, Peterson, Justin
Tolomeo, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, Assistant

 

Inspectors/Team LeadersI b6 -1

-1

I I OI, Management Program

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Analyst I Inspection Management Unit (IMU),
Supervisory MAPAI I and MAPA 
Inspection Analysis Unit, I Safety and

 

Occupational Health Manager, Occupational Safety and Environmental
Programs, SSRAI I San Diego Field Office, and SSA
I Investigative Law Unit, OGC.

 

 

 

99



5

NYT- 246

 

 

(no. 5.3.10}

 

Baez-assures} 


Electronic Communication

Title: Shooting Incident Report Summary Date; 02/19f2015
- Cincinnati Division

-l

 

From: CINCINNATI

Contact: I I

 

 

 

ApproVed 3k: 
'bfafted Br: I:

Case ID 297L~Ho?a5336068 (in Cincinnati Field Office Animal
. Shooting

Synopsis: To report results-of a review of an animal
shooting incident involving SAEWhich occurred on December he -1
9, 2014. ?1

in Package Copy: (UXEEDEQE Eltotronic copy of related to shooting
incident. -

Enclosurets): Enclosed are the following items:



Details:_
On December 9, 2014, Specia'l'Agent of the . b6 
Cincinnati Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teamp discharged four b7C '1:7

'rounds from his FBI issued M4 rifle at a pit bull dog in the garage at
I I Ohio, the scene of a federal search
warrant. At the time of the shooting, the pit hull was charging toward
two Cincinnati FBI SWAT operators located on the stairwell leading from
?the garage into the main residence. The shooting incident review was
delegated to the Cincinnati Field Office by Chief Inspector Da?id
Gelios on December 9, 2014. The following are the results of the
shooting incident review, to include the signed sworn statements 





 

 

Title: [Uff
Re: 02f19f2015



Shooting Incident Report Summary Cincinnati Division

 

 

from 

 

incident.

I Evidence Responsa
Team documentation,_and witness interviews of the shooting

On December 3, 2?14, at approximately 2:00 United States
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman, from_the United States District
Court for the Southern District'of Ohio; issued a search warrant to

 

case agent SAI

 

I for the purpose of searching the property

atI I Ohio, including any garages. sheds,

vehicles, or outbuildings on the property, for heroin and any other
illegally controlled.suhstances or related paraphernalia.

The search warrant was requested following a thorough investigation
conducted by the Southern Ohio Safe Streets Task Force. the Bureau of
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATP), and the Drug Enforcement Agency

This investigation identified

as a large scale

narcotics dealerwsupplying several individuals in thel Iarea with

fentanyl?laced heroin from-North Carolina (NC).

Since late 2013, Ohio experienced a significant.
'During a proffer, a

increase in fentanyl?laced heroin overdose deaths.

 

sdbject of_a joint

 

Icase

 

identified Charlotte, NC, as the potential'source for the deadly

fentanyl?laced heroin. The same subject.identifiedl I

Ias the

main recipients and re-sellers of the fentanyl?laced heroin inI I

Ohio.



The investigation identified several additional narcotic dealers in

thel Iarea being supplied pyI I including:I

 

 

 

 

 

'The investigation identified several residences being utilized by

his associates to stqre, process, and distribute both heroin

and_cocaine. The addresses ofI

 

.were identified as two of these residences.

uncnassrsisn/ngug:

Additional

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tact-assures 1M

Shooting Incident Report Summary Cincinnati Division
29TL-HQ-A5836063, 02/19/2015 

Title:
Re:

intelligence identified the individuals associated with.these
residences.



runningI I

 

 

 

 

were identified as runningI and,

Iwere identified as

 

on December 9, 2014, the Cincinnati SWAT Team assembled at 7:45 a.m.
atI I Ohio, to execute two federal Search
warrants inI Iohio. One warrant was issued 

and a second warrant was issued forl I The
Senior Team Leader'?STL} SAI Ibriefed the teams
assigned to both locations on the operation orders associated with each
?target location. The briefing included an ovarview.of the FBI's Deadly
Force Policy along with the team's line?up. cowered:
individual operator assignments, specific areas of responsibility, and
the assignment of specialty equipment. Following the briefing, SA
the team as they conducted gear checks and mission
rehearsals. At approximately 9:45 the team was given the
-execution order and the team assigned to execute the
Ohio.

 

search warrant atl

 

The team assigned to eiecute the warrant atI I
included the following agents, with their designated assignments:

 

 

 

 

 

1. SA INumher one on 
2. INumber two on entry
3. SA Number three on entry;I I

 

 

 

 

4. SAI Number four on entry;I I

knock and announce

SA I Number five on entry:  I
6. SA I Number six on entry;I I

I I -
Number seven on entry;

 

 

 

7- SA:
8. Number eight on entry;

 

 

 

 

3. SA. Perimeter security;  I
_10? SA Perimeter security;  I


3

and 

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I 

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7:

 



Title: Shooting Incident Report Summary Cincinnati Division
Re: 297L?ho?a5336063, 02/19f2015

 

.garage door.

 

 

ll. SAI IPerimeter security;  I I

The SWAT Team set the perimeter and the outer
windows and door were both.barred. 'The SWAT breached the outer door of
the residence between 10:05 a.mi and 10:10 a.m.
first outer door, the SWAT Team moved into a porch area and then
encountered a second hardened door leading into the residence. After
breaching the second door, the SWAT Team entered the main residence.
hold on the stairs going up to the
second floor, while the remainder of the team cleared the first floor
and ended up in the-kitchen. someone was in the
house because the television was on and there was a bowl of cereal on a

After breaching the

table in the kitchen.

The SWAT Team encountered two doors in the kitchen. The first door-


SAI The second door led to the garage.
[positioned themselves to enter the
garagel I The agents encountered two doors leading to
the garage, a solid door and_a screen door, both of which were locked.
both doors and pinned the solid door open. The
garage-was dark. into the'garage with his flashlight
and determined it was a two?car garage with no cars present.
instructed the other two operators to find the button to activate the
The operators announced twice, come out with your

was identified as going downstairs to a basement.

 

 

hands up." After receiring no response, SAI I

 

 

I SAI Ientered the garage, followed by SAI Iand SA
I

 

After entering the garage, the automatic garage_door
by pressing the button located at the top of the stairs.
was opened, the operators could clearly see the contents of the garage.
The operators saw some dog cages, a heroin press, and some small child



4

Once the door



NYT3250

 

 

 



Title: Shooting Incident Report Summary - Cincinnati Division
Re: 

guad runners inside the garage. The operators also saw a 40 50 pound
dark brown Pit Bull exit of the garage and run circles in the driveway.

the garage and notified who was providing
perimeter security along the fence line adjacent to the search
property. to close the garage door to keep the dog-
outside. was a second dog outside, a
large pit hull, with a chain around its neck, but he was not sure if
the dog was secure.? I

to the garage and asked 

-if it was ?cool? to ?drop? the garage door. to the
stairs to close the.garage door, but was unable to get the automatic
door to close. to the stairs to assist 
back toward the center of the garage and noticed She

Iwere both on the stairs leading back into the
.kitchen trying to activate the garage door. back to
check on the dog and saw the dog?s ears pinned back as he charged
toward the StaiISr concerned
the dog would cause serious injury to SA
?dog? and said ?no, no, no.? The dog was not barking and
made no audible noise to alert the'operators to his movement. SA
the dog with four shots from his M4 rifle, from a range
of appronimately five feet. the first three shots in

 

 

rapid succession, then paused and fired a fourth shot. The dog skidded

to,a stop at the bottom of the stairs only a few inches from where SA

standing on the stairs.

1 After the shooting, with the operators-in the
garage and announced on the radio, ?shots fired, all operators ok."
outside the garage to verify Iwere
ok. check the side of the house to Iook
for any obvious bullet exit sites. one hole, but could
_not confirm it was a bullet hole. Ithen
assisted the SWAT team in clearing the remainder of the house.

 

 



5

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Shooting_Incident Report Summary - Cincinnati Division
02i19/2015

Title:
Re:

After the house was clear, the operators moved to the box truck for
extraction. the incident with .
and RISES: Prior to leaving the area, SAI:
secured rifle. On December 10, 2014, in the parking'garage
at the Columbus Resident Agency, photographs of SA
rifle; counted the rounds in the magazine, and returned'the

rifle to an:

on December 9, 2014,.at approximately 11:50 a.m4, members of the 
Cincinnati Evidence Response Team (ERT) arrived and began'processing
the scene of the agent?inVolved shooting atI I
The SCene'consisted of an attached two-car garage with the garage door
open and a deceased canine. ERT photographed the scene, drew a sketch,
and recovered four 5.56 mm.shell casings. ERT prepared a log of the
I At approximately 1:50 p.m. on December 9, 2014, BET

 

.recovered items.

completed the processing of the seene and departed the search location.-

The following reports and applicable were completed and
uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original notes and
records for all interviews Were packaged in envelopes and sent
to INSD. . 

Shooting Incident Report, digitally attached to this
communication and electronically submitted on December 23, 2014

Ho'le 1.- . 

2. ERT Evidence Log accounting for collection of four 5.56 mm shall
casings 

3. interview of Animal Resource Center employee

SIOC weather report Ohio for December 9, 2014

of_ SA: SWAT Operator

5. FD-302

6. of followsup interview of 
7. FD-BOQ of SWAT Senior Team 

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NYT-252

 

 

 

 



Title: Shooting Incident Report Summary Cincinnati Division
Re: . 

 

 

of Search Warrant,  labia b6 -1follow4up interview of SWAT 
the inspection of M4 and ammunition

10. of FBI Deadly Force Policy Training

11. of firearms training records_for
the 18-month period before the shooting incident*

12. FD-302 of SWAT SWAT

certification

 

13. Operational Plan forl I'o?io b6 ?1,7
. - ?1,7

14. FD-302 SWAT Operations Order

15) of BET administrative log, sketchIn photographs, and
photographic log

15. 533 for sal 

 

Jr;

The sheeting review identified no discrepancies between 
account of the shooting and information obtained from witness
intervie?s. 

 



.-

+4

UNCLASSIFIEDIZEBHQ:



 

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FD-IUS7 (REV. 5-3-10}

 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Date: 04f14f2015
Office
CC: b5 ?1
b7C -1
From: BOSTON
BS-ASCT
Contact: I

Approved By: THOMAS VADIM DANIEL

David Paul Gelios

TWERSKY RONALD

Nancy McNamara
Drafted By:  I
Case ID Cincinnati Field Office Animal

Shooting
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 
Administrative Notes: (UXZEQEQI The shooting incident review was
delegated to the Cincinnati Field Office by the Chief Inspector on
12109f2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 12f23f2014, was
submitted electronically by Supervisory Special b5 ?1
Cincinnati Field Office. b7c '1
Details:
On 03/17f2015, the SIRG reviewed an Animal Shooting incident which
occurred on 12f09f2014, involving Special Agent I be '1
-1

Cincinnati Field Office. four rounds from his

Bureau?issued M4 rifle into a pit bull breed dog. The shooting took



NYT-254

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Office
Re: O4fl412015

place as the Cincinnati Field Office SWAT Team executed a search

warrant, issued by the United States District Court, Southern District

 

Of Ohio, on a residence located atl I b6 -7
-7

 

Ohio. The purpose of the warrant was to search the property for heroin
and any other illegally controlled substances and related

paraphernalia.

On at approximately 10:05 the search warrant was

 

 

executed atI land after breaching several doors, b5 ?1:7
the SWAT Team made entry into the residence. with SAs 

 

I Iwere in the kitchen of the residence
and located a door leading to a garage. into the
garage with a flashlight and could not determine if anyone was present.
come out with your hands up." After no

response, SAI 

 

 

 

 

 

Ientered the garage. pushed an 135 -1

automatic garage door button located at the top of the stairs which b7c ?1

 

opened the garage door. As the door opened, I
observed a pit bull dog run out of the garage and onto the driveway.
out of the garage and advised a SWAT Team member
assigned to the perimeter of the residence that he was going to close
the garage door to keep the pit bull out of the garage while they

conducted a search.

 

 went back to the stairway and attempted to close b6 -1
?1

 

the garage door using the garage door button, however the garage door
would not close. standing in the center of the garage,
observed the pit bull run back into the garage. The Pit bull?s ears
were pinned back and the dog did not make any noise as it ran toward
Iwho were on the stairs. 
"dog," and "no, no, no." the dog could cause serious

bodily harm to land as the dog closed to within

five feet of the Agents, rounds from his M4 rifle

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

2

NYT-255

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Office
Re: U4fl4/2015

into the pit bull. The dog stopped at the foot of the stairs and

expired.

SIRG OBSERVATIONS

 

On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the Animal Shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined the
application of deadly force towards the pit bull breed dog was
justified under the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning
and execution, training and/or safety issues. The SIRG determined
there were no safety issues and operational plans were followed in

accordance with Bureau policy.

Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the

 

meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members

were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of

Inspections (OI) Deputy Civil Rights Division, b5 ?113
Criminal Section, Department of Justice I Criminal _1?3

 

 

Section, Supervisory Special Agent(SSA] I
Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; 

CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief 

Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSA

I I Firearms Training Unit, Special
Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group; SSAI I Violent Crime and Gang Section; 
Defensive Systems Section Chief (SC) Roger A.
Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; 
Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following

non?voting members were also in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In

Office Of Inspector General; UCI I


3

 

 

 

 

 

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Title: Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Office
Re: O4fl412015

Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. b5 -1
Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, Assistant ?1
Inspectors/Team Leadersl I

lor, 

UCJ land Management Program 

I I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), MAPA
I I Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistant



 

 

 

 

04*



4

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FED-1037 (Rev. 

     
  
 

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Mama-Hathaway:
arms in Ifa'tn-P min

  
 





Eleotronlo communlna?nn .

  

Title: Shooting Incident Report Summary Date; 

CC: STROUD SHAWN 

 

 

 

From: DETROIT

DE-CB

Contact: I I
Approved By:

 

 

 

 

Drafted Ey:l I
Case ID Animal Shooting

To report results of a review of an animal shooting
and 

Synopsis:
incident involving SA
which occurred on 10/;5/2014.

 

 

Package Copy: The following original documents are being placed in
envelopes and mailed to the Inspection Division:

1L FD-34Ds containing original interview notes, records, logs and
photographs.

Enclosurets}: Enclosed are the following items:

1. Fla-1035

Details:

 

On October 15, 2014, Special Agent (SAJI I
discharged one round from.his FBI?issued M4 rifle and Squad C-7 Task
Force Officer Idischarged three rounds from
_his Detroit Police Department {DPD}-issued handgun at a pit bull dog.
The pit bull acted aggressively toward them and other members of an
entry team during the execution of an arrest and search warrant. The
shooting incident review was delegated to the Detroit Field Office by
Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud on October 16, 2014. The
following are the results of the shooting incident review, to include



 

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momsrarso/ 13530:

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report Summary
Re: 11f21f2014

the sea from statement from processing

the scene, and witness interviews of the shooting incident.

On October 15, 2014, Case Squad C-7, received

authorization from.the 36th District Court, County of Wayne, State of
Michigan, Magistrate Judge to enter the residence located at

Detroit, Michigan for the purpose of searching and
securing  [was wanted for an outstanding felony
warrant, which was entered into NCIC by the Huntington Police
Department, Huntington, West Virginia. The warrant was issued for
an investigation revealed he shot a home-owner during a
home?invasion robbery in West Virginia.

Prior to October 15, 2014, received tip

information from the Detroit Police wanted for a
shootingfrobbery and might be staying at 
Michigan. On October 14, 2014, conducted surveillance
on this location and positively he was on the
front porch ofl I the home, an
requested assistance from.5quad 0?7 members to conduct
additional surveillance on the house. On October 14, 2014,
surveillance was conducted on the house_between 2:30 p.m4 and 6:30 p.m.

 

 

On October 15, 2?14 surveillance was initiated 
Squad observed several times leaving the
residence and standing on the front porch of the house then re?entering
the house. After several hours of surveillance, 
obtained a State of Michigan search warrant to enter the location to
A team comprised of two FBI Agents, eight Task
Force Officers, and four uniform Detroit Police Officers were assigned
to-serve the Search warrant and conduct the arrest 
Michigan. A team briefing was conducted at
approximately 1:00 PH on October 15, 2014 in a school parking lot
located on I I Detroit, Michigan. The
briefing was attended by all participants of the operation except for



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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report Summary
Re: ll/ZleOl?

and who were conducting surveillance
on the house to not leave. 

all aspects of the operations order, including the FBI's Deadly Force
Policy.

The team was comprised of the following members:
Agent)
SAI 

TFOI I
we:

TF0 

TFO 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DPD Police Officer  I

0P6 Police 

DPD Police Officer : 
DED Police Officer:

On October 15, 2014, at approximately 2:00 PM, the team departed
the school parking lot located atI land
drove directly tol One DPD police car {two
officers} drovel I

moms Imam/@090:

3

 

 

 

 

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Title: Shooting Incident Report Summary

Re: 11f21/2014

 

the second DPD police oarI

When the entry team

who were

house, positioned themselVes on
fled the house.

Once the entry team arrived

positions on the porch of the house.
knocked on_the front door and announced,
announcement was repeated numerous times.

arrived atl

TFO

 

still conducting surveillance on the
the outside perimeter in 

 

atl

"police,

Ithey took their
Several of the entry team members
search warrant." The
Approximately one minute

passed and no one answered the door or made their preSEnce known. TFO

 

 

and TFOI

Once the door was openedr a pit bull dog immediately
appeared at the threshold of the door and barked, growled, and lunged

towards the entry team. The pit bull was aggressive and 
others on the entry team believed they would be

attacked by the pit bull. TFOI
believed they were in imminent danger of being attacked.

 

one round from his FBInissued M4 rifle striking
the pit bull one time. The pit bull fell and immediately got back up.
The pit bull started barking again and lunged again towards the entry
team. himself and others were in imminent
danger of being attacked by the pit bull and fired
three rounds from his Detroit Police Department-issued Smith Wesson
.40 caliber handgun. The pit bull stopped its aggressive attack and

ran off the porch and down the street.

The other members were not in a

position to fire at the dog since they were focusing their attention to

the inside of the house.

The entry team entered the residence and continued to announce
their presence. They searched the house for approximately ten minutes

before the occupants identified themselves to the Agentsa

was

talked with the individuals for 10-15 minutes before they decided to

momentary/M

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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report Summary
Re: 297L-HQ-A5637323, llIZl/Z?ld

were located in the rear bedroom of the house. 
andI Ifollowed directions given by SA: and
exited the bedroom. Both were handcuffed, removed from the residence
and transported to DPD's detention center.

A second search warrant was obtained to recover two pistols and
three long guns discovered inside the bedroom whereI land
were hiding. Three pit bull dogs were located in the
house, but during the search one ran out the front door. A City of
Detroit Animal Control Officer arrived and picked up the two pit bulls
in the house and located the shot pit bull several blocks away.

 

 

While talked toI:IandI: he requested 

who is a sergeant with the Detroit Police Department, to call
the Detroit Police Department Dispatch and advise themI I
I I The process would initiate I
I TFOI IalSo
contacted Supervisory Special Agent Squad 
supervisor and advised him of the situation. at the
location twenty minutes later. SSA :contacted Assistant Special
Agent in ChargeI Iand updated him on the situation prior
to arriving at the location. After the subjects were arrested, SA

I I a SWAT team member arrived, met with SAI: and
secured his M4 rifle. W'o inspection of the weapon or round count was
performed.' On October 15,1014, ASACI IauthoriZed SA

to retrieve his M4 rifle from 

On October 15, 2014 after the scene was secure, and TFO

I Imet with TFO: to inspect his 1Weapon, a

process required by Detroit Police Department policy. is a
sergeant and TFOE is a lieutenant with the Detroit Police

Department. TFO I:Idetermined TFO: carried the

DPD-issued Smith Wesson M59 .40 caliber, serial numberI:I
handgun. TFOI:IobserVed three rounds missing from the magazine in

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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Title: Shooting Incident Report Summary
Re: 11/21/2014

gun. two fully loaded Spare

magazines with BED-issued ammunition. permitted TFO
to keep his gun under Detroit Police Department rules.

On October 151' 2014 at approximately 5:30 PM. Detroit Field Office
Evidence Response Team arrived atl I ERT
photographed the scene and recovered three .40 caliber shell casings
and one 5.56 mm casing. At approximately 6:30 PM, ERT left the
location.

 

The following reports and applicable were completed and
uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original notes and
records for all interviews were packaged in FD-340 envelopes and sent
to INSD. 

1; Shooting Incident Report. electronically submitted on
November 14. 2014.

 

2. FD-302 of 
records for 
shooting incident.

Iregarding firearms training
Ifor the 18-month period before the

 

3. FDH302 of regarding the FBI Deadly Force Policy
Training.

 

4. FD-302s for interviews of I

5. of Search Warrant, 

 

 

I Detroit,r Michigan;

 

6.. of NCIC printout forl I

 

7. of ERT sketch. photographs and photograph log.
8. FD-302 SIGC weather report for October 15, 2014.

9. Operational Order.

warranties/@060:

.6

 

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NYT-263

 

 

 

 

 



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report Summary
Re: llf21!2014

 

10. FD-302 SWAT training for SAI 

 

 

ll. FD-302 Firearms qualification scores for SAI I

 

12. FD-302 of Detroit Police Department form.

13. Memorandum of Understanding between FBI and Detroit Police
Department.

14. Interview with City of Detroit Animal Control Department'
Supervisor.

15. Weapon and Ammunition.

Detroit's review of the shooting incident involving 

and TFOI
their account of the shooting and information obtained from witness
interviews.

 

Ifound no discrepancies between

0





1.

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(Rev. 5-3-10}


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolmniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office Date: 01/08/2015

cc; 1313 ?1
-1

From: INSPECTION

DA-TDY
Contact: I I
Approved By: Justin Tolomeo
David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

Drafted By:  I

Case ID 29TL-HQ-A5637323 Animal Shooting

Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,

comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group

with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG

meeting held on 12/15/2014.

Administrative Notes: (U) The shooting incident review was delegated

to the Detroit Field Office by the Acting Chief Inspector on

10/15/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 11/06/2014, was

submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent b6 -1

Detroit Field Office. -1

Details:

On 12/15/2014, the SIRG reviewed an Animal Shooting incident involving
sal Detroit Fie1d Office, on 10/15/2014. 

discharged one round from his Bureau-issued M4A1 rifle at a pit bull

 

breed dog. The shooting took place as the Detroit Field Office, Violent
Crimes Task Force, consisting of Squad Special Agents and Task
Force Officers from the Detroit Police Department, executed a

search warrant, issued by the State of Michigan, District Court, on a



NYT1265



Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office
Re: 

 

residence located atl I Detroit, Michigan. The b5 ?7
purpose of the search warrant was to arrest a fugitive wanted in West b7c _7
Virginia for a violent home invasion and enhance an ongoing violent
gang investigation. The fugitive was suspected of being a member of the
Dirty Dogs street gang investigated by the Detroit Field Office, but
not listed as a subject or reference in the case. The Dirty Dogs street
gang was involved in multiple robberies and shootings in Detroit and
West Virginia. Detroit executed the state warrant in an attempt to
garner more information about the gang and the subject. The Detroit
Field Office did not initiate a separate fugitive investigation nor was

a federal Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAF) warrant obtained.

On October 15, 2014, at approximately 2:15 Squad Agents and

TFOs approached the front door of the residence located b6 ?1,7
Detroit, Michigan, while other TFOs and uniformed police b7c 
maintained a perimeter around the residence. Agents and TFOs knocked

loudly on the door and announced their presence. After approximately

one minute and a lack of response, Agents and TFOs breached a steel

gate located approximately three feet in front of the main door

threshold. Agents and TFOs subsequently breached the wooden front door

to gain access to the residence. Immediately upon opening the door, a

pit bull dog lunged aggressively towards the entry team barking and

growling. Fearing the dog was going to attack the entry team, SA

 

I Ifired one round from_his FBI-issued rifle at
the dog striking it on the neck area. The dog fell to the ground but
immediately got up and continued charging towards the entry team. A TFO
then fired three rounds from_his DPD?issued Smith Wesson .40 caliber
handgun at the dog striking it at least once in the face. The dog
stopped charging and ran away towards the street. The pit bull dog was
recovered several blocks away by the Detroit Animal Control Department

and subsequently euthanized.

SIRG Observations



2

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Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office
Re: 

On 12/15/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Animal Sheeting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined the
application of deadly force towards a pit bull breed dog was justified
under the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning

and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

Observation 1: Detroit did not properly follow requirements for

Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) investigations.

Analysis 1: Criminal Investigative Division, Fugitive Policy
Implementation Guide, 0404PG, Section 3.4.2 indicated requirements to
initiate fugitive investigations. The Fugitive Policy Implementation
Guide (FPIG) requires local authorities to have a warrant for a
subject's arrest and agree to extradite and prosecute upon
apprehension. A request for assistance must have been received by the
local FBI Field Office and the United States Attorney's Office (USED)
must authorize the filing of a complaint. Per the FPIG, there "must be
sufficiently articulated facts to show with reasonable certainty that

the subject fled interstate fer the_purpose of avoiding_prosecution."

Field Offices have the option of initiating an 88 classification
Preliminary Investigation "to ascertain if an articulable factual

basis of interstate flight exists or to establish_probable cause of

interstate flight for obtaining a UFAP warrant."

Detroit did not receive a request for assistance from local authorities

for the arrest of the fugitive and did not seek U.S. Attorney's Office

concurrence for a UFRP warrant. Detroit obtained a state of Michigan

3





Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office
Re: 

search warrant to locate the fugitive and effect a West Virginia arrest

warrant.

The Detroit Field Office did not follow the requirements stated within
Section 3.4.2 of the Criminal Investigative Division, Fugitive Policy
Implementation Guide, D404PG.

Instruction 1: SAC, Detroit will ensure fugitive investigations follow
the requirements listed under section 3.4.2 of the Fugitive Policy
Implementation Guide, D404PG.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG found this Animal Shooting to be justified under

the DOJ Deadly Force Policy and did not recommend any administrative
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action be taken against SAI

 

Acting Deputy Assistant Director David P. Gelios, INSD,
chaired the meeting and was a non?voting Board Member. The following
Board Members were in attendance: Deputy Civil

Rights Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice; Supervisory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Special Agent I Investigative Law Unit, Office
Of General Counsel; SSAI Squad Washington Field
Office; Unit Chief Practical Applications Unit,
Training Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit,
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI I New Agent
Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), Section

Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence

 

Division; SSAI Evidence Response Team, Laboratory
Division; and Inspector Trent R. Teyema, Office Of Inspections (IO),
The following non-voting members were also in attendance:
Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas and Douglas A. Leff, Assistant



4

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Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office
Re: 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspectors/Team Leaders  GI, b6 -1
UCI Program Management b7c ?1
Inspection Management Unit (IMU), and Special Assistant

OI, INSD.

 

Procedures for Responding to Observations

SAC, Detroit, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection
Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not
complete until the Instruction is addressed by the field office. The
Inspector?in?Charge will review the field office?s response to
determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to

implement.

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Elaclronio communica?un
Title: Shooting Incident Report Date: 11/1812013
CC: BRETZING GREGORY 

From: MILWAUKEE

-Contact:

 

 

 

 

 

Approved By:

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By:

Case In Animal Shooting

Synopsis: (U) To report the resui a review of an animal shooting
incident involving MW Division SA which occurred on

October 24, 2013

 

-Details:

On ThUrsday, October 24, 2u13, five rounds
from his FBI approved, personally owned Glock at an injured deer.

The shooting incident review was delegated to the Milwaukee Field
Office by Chief Inspector Gregory T. Bretzing on October 25, 2013. The
following are the results of the shooting incident review, which
included a from reports obtained from the
Marquette County Sheriff?s Office:

On October 24, 2013 at approximately 9:20 am, Milwaukee Division SAI:
driving his Bureau vehicle from Wausau to the
Madison Resident Agency. While traveling southbound on Interstate
39, near miler marker 100, just south of Highway 23 and the Endeavor on
ramp, a disoriented and injured deer on the left
shoulder of the interstate, adjacent to_the median that separated nerth
and southbound traffic. Interstate 39 is a four-lane divided highway
separated by a downward sloping natural median. The deer was

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED  I row

1-: ?nu-59 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 11le/2013

struggling to stand on the roadway's shoulder, moving towards the far
left lane of southbound traffic. The deer's movement caused at least
one southbound vehicle to swerve out of the left lane into the right
lane causing a second vehicle to drive onto the far right shoulder. As
vehicle passed the deer, he observed the deer was
continuing to struggle to move between the median and left shoulder. As
a result, the deer posed a threat to the safety
of passing motorists and returned to the scene. He subsequently
activated his emergency lights, exited his vehicle and approached the
deer to better assess the situation.

the deer appeared panicked and continued to
struggle to stand. the deer had been struck by a
passing vehicle and suffered significant injuries to its rear legs
and/or back area. He believed the deer not only posed a threat to
passing motorist, but was also likely in severe pain and Suffering from
its injuries. he a result, it was in the best
interest of both the public and the deer to humanely use his bureau
approved handgun to euthanize the animal.

The deer was located in the center, downward sloping, grassy median
moving away from SAI SAI Iwaited until there was no
northbound traffic. He subsequently drew his bureau approved,
personally owned weapon, a Block 27 (serial number handgun and
from of distance of approximately 15 yards, fired four (4) rounds. All
four rounds were fired downward into the median from an elevated
position and struck the deer in the back. As a result, the deer
collapsed. However, it was still alive and moving. SA

approached the deer and fired one additional rodnd, striking the deer
in the neck causing its death. All five rounds are believed to have
struck the deer and were accounted for. However, due to the deer's
body position, SAI Iwas unable to examine its entire body.
There were no injuries to Ior anyone else.

 

to his Bureau vehicle and notified Supervisory
Senior Resident Agent of the incident 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 297L-HQ-A3454153, 11/18f2013

then contacted the Marquette County (WI) Sheriff's Department
to report the incident.

On Thursday, October 24, 2013 at approximately 9:43 am, MCSD, Squad
244, Deputy Sheriffl  arrived at the scene. Deputy

with confirmed that the deer had

injuries to its rear hind quarter that were consistent with being

struck by a vehicle. Deputy also observed a visible bullet
wound to the deer?s neck. Deputy cleared the scene at 9:50 am.

He subsequently filed Incident Report 13?803439.

 

On Friday, October 25, 2013, a copy of the
referenced incident report. On Tuesday, October 29, 2013, SA

provided MW  a copy of the referenced MCSD report,
as well as a narrative report he drafted describing the incident. A

review of the report indicated it supported account of
the incident.

On October 29, 2013, with noes Deputy
I However, on vacation/annual leave
and unavailable until after November 20,.2013.

On Tuesday, November 5, 2013, 

interviewed the referenced shooting incident.
SSA read SA the ?Warning and Assurance to

Employee Requested To Provide Information Following a Shooting

Incident." provided a statement, which was
memorialized in a Signed Sworn statement 

 

 

The following reports and applicable were completed and
uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original notes and
records for all interviews were packaged in envelopes and sent

to INSD.

1. FBI Executive Summary Report, electronically submitted on

. October 24, 2013.
2. Shooting Incident Report, electronically submitted on

October 29, 2013.
UNCLASSIFIED

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.91.

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 11/18/2013

FD-302 of records for BA
for the 24?month period before the shooting incident.
4. Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested To Provide
Infermation Following A.Shooting Incident
5. Signed Sworn Statement of 5A
6. Inspection Division Shooting Review Int?rview Log
Marquette County Sheriff?s Department Incident Report 13-303439.

Lo

Miiwaukee's review of the shooting incident involving 
found no discrepancies between account of the shooting
and information documented in the MCSD incident report.

#9

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

[Ul?iIEE-lw 

{Electron-?lo damn-Indulgence
Title: IUI Shooting Incident Report Date: 09111/2014
From: LOS ANGELES

LA-C-1 ssnI I - -1

Contact: I I ?1

 

 

Approved By: SSAI I

 

Drafted I

Case ID Los Angeles Shooting Incident

Synopsis: To report results of a review of an agent involved
shooting involving occurred in ChatSWorth, he ?1
California on July 30, 2014 at approximately 6:45 p.m. ?1

Reference: Serial 23
Serial 35
297J-HQ-A5319916 Serial 3?

Details:
1. Executive Summary
On July 30, 2014, off-duty SAI Iintervened inl I b6 

 

kidnapping at gunpoint ofI I b7C ?1r5r7
from the parking lot of LA Fitness Gym, located in
Chatsworth. California. During the a
handgun at SAI I Fearing for his Safety and the
safety ofI ISAI I after repeatedly identifying himself as
law enforcement and repeated verbal commands drop his
handgun, fired nine (9) rounds from his perSonally?owned, FBI-approvedIr
Glock 27 least once. fired at least one
round at During the exchange of gunfire and unknown to law
enforcement at that handgun was made inoperable when a
bullet fragment struck the front ofI Is handgun and became logged

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

NY73274

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09f11/2014

in the recoil spring housing. This caused the slide to become
dislodged and partially separated from the frame, making the handgun
inoperable.

After shooting due to his weapon being empty,

shooting and responding law enforcement in her] [was
able to escape the   when she made a turn onto a side
street. down a bystander who assisted her in getting
to the Los Angeles Police Department 

now driving  Icontinue to flee from police.
At the intersection of Woodlake Avenue and Ventura 
pointed his handgun at a California Highway Patrol Officer as he was
driving. The officer, fearing for his safety and 
about to fire his handgun at him, fired eight rounds 
drove by him.

to drive him away for the scene of the

 

 

 

 

 

After a high?speed pursuit involving several local law
enforcement agencies on Los Angeles freeways and mountain roads,
his vehicle at the Malibu Bluffs Park in Malibu,
California, approximately 21.3 miles from the scene of the AIS. As he
fled on foot from his handgun at a responding
officer. Fearing for that officer?s safety and 
was about to fire his handgun at that officer, another LAPD officer
fired one round atl
the park and eventually discarding the handgun in a bush.

Approximately two hours after the initial taken
into custody by LAPD's SWAE on the hillside below the Malibu Bluffs
Park.

 

Ithen ran down a steep cliff from

II. Incident Details

3. Substantive Case Filings and Background Information

UNCLASSIFIED

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UHCLEESIFIED

Title:
Re: 

(U) Shooting Incident Report


Prior to the shooting the FBI did not have an active FBI

bornl 

There was an active LAPD domestic violence investigation with felony
criminal charges pending As a result of the
Agent?Involved-Shooting, the Los Angeles Field Office opened an Assault
on a Federal Officer investigation.

 

 

investigation intol

 

 

 

 

Title: I I

ASSAULT FEDERAL OFFICER:
O?!30i2014

File Number: I I 

Case Agent: 

 

In addition, LAPD Robbery Homicide Division is conducting
an investigation and has filed a 12?count complaint in Los Angeles
Superior Court two counts each of Attempted
Murder and Assault with a Firearm (Victims and SA: and

one count each or Kidnapping [Victim Carjacking (Victim
Criminal Threats [Victim 

Stalking (Victim
Disobeying Domestic Relations Court Order

[Victim
Injuring a Spouse After a Prior Conviction

 

[Victim
Possession of Firearm by a Felon, and Evading an Officer.
FBI and LAPD are jointly pursuing the investigations into this matter.

b. 1 Listing of Personnel Involved in Incident
1. (discharged weapon)
o. Case Review and Operational Briefings

This event did not involve an active FBI investigation nor was it
part of an active FBI operation. At the time of the
AgentHInvolved-Shooting, off-duty on his way to have dinner
with his family when he encounteredl I

UHCLASSIFIED

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NYT3276

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: IUI Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09f11/2014

d. Events Leading Up to the Shooting

On Wednesday, July 30, 2014, home from work and
changed into exercise attire in preparation to go to the gym. Prior to
departing for the gym, him they needed to
retrieve their second personally?owned vehicle from a car dealership in
Woodland Hills, California. Instead of going to the gym, 
I Ito the dealership to retrieve their second vehicle.

dress in his exercise attire. Prior to leaving his
residence, SAEI retrieved his FBI credentials, his personallyeowned,
FBI?approved, Glock 27, his handcuffs, and his personal and bureau
mobile telephones. The Glock 27 was loaded with one nine-round
magazine. There was not a round in the chamber of the weapon at the
time his residence.

 

 

at some point, SAI Idecided that they would have
dinner at Chipotle Restaurant located on De Soto Avenue north of
dordhoff Street in Chatsworth, California after retrieving their second
vehicle. Now driving their second personally?owned vehicle, 
followedl Ito the Chipotle Restaurant. Upon arriving
at the restaurant, unable to locate parking in the lot for
the restaurant so he drove south in an alleyway to a large parking lot
where he found a spot in the northwest corner of the lot. 
later learned this was the parking lot for the LA Fitness located
at 9143 De Soto Avenue, Chatsworth, California.

While SA and his family were traveling to the Chipotle
Restaurant, bornl I [hereinafter

referred to as "the victim") was driving to the LA Fitness located

 

 

 

 

at'9143 De Soto AvenueI

 

 

 

 

I The Victim's] I born
I {hereinafter referred to as "the Subject"I knew
this and was lying in wait for her to arrive in the parking lot. In

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED 

Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09111i2014

the Subject's possession was a Glock 35, .40 caliber saw, and a bag
containing, among other things, five 36?inch zip ties and pepper
spray.

As of July 30, 2014, the Victim had a Civil Restraining Order and a
Criminal Protective Order, against the Subject. The Subject was
prohibited from purchasing andfor possession a firearm, as well as
contacting or being within 100 yards of the Victim. During the March
22, 2014, felony?level domestic violence incident that resulted in the
Subject?s arrest and issuance of the Criminal Protective Order, the
Subject told the Victim "I'm going to buy a gun and I?m going to finish
you.?

When the Victim stepped out of the parking lot of
the LA Fitness Gym, the Subject approached the Victim and stated 
have a gun, just get in the car." The Victim attempted to flee, but
the Subject grabbed her by the hair and would not let her go. The
Subject took the keys to continued to struggle with the
Victim. no knowledge these events were taking place.

While switching to his second personally?owned vehicle in Woodland
Hills, California, that the shortness of his exercise
shirt failed to properly conceal his Glock 27, resulting exposure of
his weapon in public. Not wanting to expose his weapon while in the
Chipotle Restaurant, SA decided to secure his Glock 27 by locking
it'in the glove box of his personally?owned vehicle. with
him his telephones, FBI credentials, handcuffs, and keys, all of which
were_placed in his pockets. secured his vehicle and began
walking east towards De Soto Avenue.

After a few steps, a ruckus consisting of several
loud voices. Having his view blocked by a large vehicle, 
continued walking east and cleared the vehicle blocking his view. SA

Ithen observed the Subject and the Victim arguing near a:

 

observed the Victim screaming and the Subject

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

Title: [01 Shooting Incident Report
Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 09/11f2014

attempting to force the Victim into the driver's seat of ha ?5
pushing her head, pulling her hair, and shoving her body. The Victim b7C '5
was resisting the Subject's efforts.

the Subject and the Victim in a casual manner b6 ?1
and asked in a low, non-aggressive voice something to the effect of '1
"Hey guys, what?s going on?" The Subject was bladed at a 45? angle to
he approached. Upon hearing voice, the Subject
pulled out a black semi-automatic handgun with his right hand from his
midsection and pointed it directly at The Subject continued
to hold onto the Victim with his left hand. At the same time as the
Subject produced the handgun, the Victim began yelling "Help!" "Help!"
to recognized the handgun was authentic
and not a toy or replica gun.

both hands in the air, tilted his head down, and began b5 ?1
backing away from the Subject while stating something to the effect of -1
"This is your business, not my business." Maintaining a visual on the
Subject and the handgun, the Subject move the muzzle
of the handgun away from him and point it directly at the Victim's head
as he continued to try to force the Victim_into the car. The Victim
continued her cries for help.

e. Shooting Incident Details
Upon reaching the cover of the large vehicle, Sill: fearing for b6 ?1
the safety of the Victim, ran to his vehicle to retrieve his Glock 27. b7c ?1

the Subject was about to seriously injure, kidnap,
andfor kill the Victim. his Glock 27, chambered a
round by racking the slide, placed his mobile telephones and handcuffs
on the car seat, and retrieved his FBI credentials from his pocket. SA

:1 then returned to the large vehicle where he peered around the
vehicle while using it for cover.

At this time, the Victim in the driver?s seat of be ?1,5
the Subject entering the front passenger seat. The Victim '1:5
attempted to flee the vehicle through the driver's door but the Subject

UNCLAS SIFIED

6



 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 

grabbed the Victim from the passenger side of the vehicle and pulled
her back into the vehicle. The Victim continued her screams for help.

then ducked down and low-walked east to the vehicle parked h6 '1;5
directly in front of While behind cover, b7c ?lr5
up his FBI credentials and held them in his left hand so anyone facing
him could clearly see his picture, name and title on his FBI
credentials. sa : he1d his Glock 27 in his right hand. he as
stood up and faced the Subject, he raised his FBI credentials above his
head, pointed his weapon at the Subject and stated repeatedly in a loud
and authoritative voice, "Police! Drop the weapon! Show me your
hands!" The Subject was still seated in the passenger seat of the
the passenger door closed. The Subject heard 
commands, looked at and immediately pointed his handgun at SA
 :]through the front windshield.

Shl: irmnediately ducked behind the cover vehicle fearing that
the Subject was about to fire his handgun at him through the
widdshield. Due to the Subject willingness to point his handgun at an be -1
armed and identified law enforcement officer, as well as point it at ?1
the Victim, in the split second available to him to
assess the threat that the Subject was an imminent threat to himself
and the Victim. feared the Subject would shoot him, the
Victim. or both.

he down, he placed his FBI credentials on the cover
vehicle and assumed a two?handed grip to reduce the chance of injury to
the Victim. He then immediately stood up and used a two?handed
shooting grip to engage the Subject. This motion took approximately
One second and to identify himself as police and he _1
ordered the Subject to drop his weapon. his weapon into ch _1
the front passenger area where the Subject was seated. 
the nine rounds in his weapon resulting in the weapon locking-back on
an empty chamber. The Subject fired at least one round from inside the
vehicle at During the exchange of gunfire, a bullet fragment
struck the Subject handgun head?on and became logged in the recoil

UNCLASSIFIED



NYT1280

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09/11/2014

spring housing lobated directly under the barrel. This fragment caused
the slide to become dislodged and partially separated from the frame of
the weapon.

During the engagement with the Victim, while leaning to
her left in the vehicle towards the open driver?s door window, observed
the Subject having trouble with his handgun. The Victim.observed the
Subject pulling the slide of the magazine back and tapping the bottom
of the magazine repeatedly. During this time, the Subject also told
the Victim to drive away but the Victim could not because the Subject
retained possession of her keys. After giving her the keys, the Victim
began driving the car while the Subject pointed the handgun at her head
and neck. The Subject told her to drive south on De Soto Avenue, west
on Nordhoff Street, and then south on Owensmouth Avenue. While in the
car, the Subject repeatedly struck the Victim in her head with the
handgun.

f. Post Shooting Details

hs the LA Fitness parking lot, 
followed the vehicle on foot through the parking lot using parked
vehicles for cover. after the vehicle and was able to
reach the strip mall parking lot on the northwest corner of De Soto
Avenue and Nordhoff Street as westbound on Nordhoff.

Realizing he could not maintain visual of the vehicle, 
sprinted back to the scene of the shooting to secure the scene and any
witnesses. he ran south and then back north through
the parking lots, he continued to display his credentials above his
head and identified himself as law enforcement. Once he returned to
the scene of the shooting, able to speak with a 911
operator using a witness's mobile telephone. gave a
description of himself, the direction of travel of the

El and the fact the Subject was bleeding.

a Shortly thereafter, the initial LAPD units arrived and assisted SA
:in securing the scene. At that time 3194:] attempted to notify
his supervisor, SSAI I but only reach his voice mail as

 

 



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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09/11/2014

in a plane returning to Los Angeles. b6 -1
called and spoke with ASACI I who made appropriate b7C ?1

 

notifications and started the FBI response to the scene.

As the Victim continued to drive away from the scene following the

'Subject's orders, she observed LAPD squad cars responding to the

shooting. As the Victim drove south on Dwensmouth Avenue, the Subject

ordered her to turn on to Schoenborn Street, a smaller side street.

Knowing she was near LASD's Topanga Area Station and not wanting to go

down the side street, the Victim.used the time it took to make the turn

to jump from flee on foot. The Victim was able to flag b5 ?5
down a bystander who drove her towards LAPD's Topanga Stationthe station, they flagged down a LAPD squad car and obtained

assistance. The Victim was eventually taken to Northridge Hospital

where she was treated for a laceration to her right ear.

?tter the Victim fled from the Subject drove b6 ?4,5

the area and parked along the curb on Woodlake Avenue just north of h7c '4r5
Venture Boulevard and the entrance to the westbound 101 Freeway. While
parked there, California Highway Patrol who was
driving-westbound on Venture Boulevard looking for heard
an airship broadcast the location of 
responded to the area with lights and sirens. As he turned north on
Woodlake Avenue from westbound Venture Boulevard, he observed 
his car on Woodlake Avenue just north of
Venture Boulevard but south of exited his vehicle standing
behind the driver's door with his .40 caliber Smith and Wesson service
weapon unholstered.

Seeing the Subject accelerated south on Woodlake b6 -4
Boulevard toward Venture Boulevard driving past h7C '4
the Subject point a black semi-automatic
handgun at him as he drove south on Woodleke Boulevard. Fearing for
his life and believing the Subject was abOut to shoot him, Officer

UHCLASSIFIED

9



 

 



Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re; 09f11/2014

eight rounds at the Subject as he drove south on Woodlake :3 '44
Boulevard. The Subject fled the area by driving onto the westbound 101 -
Freeway.

The Subject proceeded to lead several local law enforcement
agencies on a high?speed pursuit west on the 101 and south on Malibu
Canyon Road ending at Malibu Bluffs Park, in Malibu, California,
approximately 21.3 miles from the scene of the AIS. As the Subject
exited the vehicle in Malibu Bluffs Park, he pointed a handgun at an
LAPD Officer. Fearing for that officer's safety and believing the
Subject was about to shoot that officer, another LAED officer fired one
round at the Subject.

The Subject fled on foot through the park, dropping a bag but
maintaining possession of the handgun. He ran down a steep cliff,
falling through bushes and cactus. The Subject eventually discarded
the handgun on the hillside. The Subject was taken into custody by
LAED SWAT approximately two hours after the initial AIS occurred in
Chatsworth, California.

9. Accounts of Shots Fired

nine FBI .40 caliber SSW Winchester 180*grain,
hollow-point service rounds from his personally owned Glock 27. Nine
discharged .40 caliber SEW cases with the head stamp marking
"Winchester 40 Ssh? were recovered at the scene. Eight of 
fired rounds have currently been accounted. Three fired copper
bullets, unknown caliber with brass disks at their base, were recovered b5 1:5
from the cinder block wall directly behind the area where 1'5
parked in the LA Fitness parking lot. One (1) fired copper bullet,
unknown caliber with brass disks at its base, was recovered from the
front right floorboard of IDne bullet fragmentu
unknown caliber, was recovered from the right rear passenger seat of
One fired copper bullet with a brass disk at its
base was recovered in the right shoulder area of the shirt the Subject
was wearing at the time of the shooting. One fired copper bullet
with a brass disk at its base was found in the right?Side hood-area of

UNCLASSIFIED

10



 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re:_ ZSTJ-HQ-A5319916, 09f11/2014

the hooded sweatshirt the Subject was wearing at the time of the

shooting. One bullet fragment was found logged in the recoil

spring housing, located directly under the barrel, of the Subject's

Glock 35. Additional fired bullets and bullet fragments were located

in Scientific Investigation Division reports b6 -5
regarding these bullets and fragments are still pending at the time of ?5
this writing. A preliminary review of photographs of the recovery

suggest these rounds are similar to the other fired copper bullets of
unknown caliber with brass disks at their base.

 

h. Subject Information
ame
Position at time of shooting b5 '7
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.eight
eight
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en 
h.criminal history check prior arrests for b6 ?7
battery, kidnapping, stalking, terrorist threats, domestic violence, 57C ?7
Ealse imprisonment, and driving under the influences 
i. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers
At the time of the Agent-Involved?Shooting, was off?duty, b6 ?1
dressed in exercise attire, going to meet his family for dinner, after b?c ?1

having driven his personally?owned vehicle. As such, not
wearing, nor did he have immediate access to, his bureau-issued body

UNCLASSIFIED

11

NY13284

 



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 09f11/2014

armor or raid jacket. Using what was available to him, 
diSplayed his FBI credentials in a prominent and continuous manner such
thatl land all interviewed witnesses stated that they
either saw FBI credentials, heard him identify himself as a
law enforcement officer, or both.

 

 

j. Forensic Summary

 

On July 30, 2014, at approximately 7:30 

 

collected 27, .40 caliber and one
nine-round magazine, from the incident scene, 9143 De Soto
Avenue, Chatsworth, California. At the time it was collected, the
Block 27 and the nine?round magazine did not contain any ammunition.
The firearm was entered into FBI LA Evidence after being cleared by a
certified firearms instructor.

one to the nature of the events and the State of California
criminal charges to be filed, FBI, LAPD, and CH9 agreed LAPD would be
the lead investigative agency and would take possession of and conduct
all analysis of any evidence found and collected.

On July 30, 2014, at approximately 8:52 p.m. FBI LA ERT arrived at
9143 De Soto Avenue, Chatsworth, California and began processing the
scene.
discharged .40 caliber saw cartridge cases with the head stamp marking
"Winchester 40 three fired copper bullets, unknown caliber
with brass disks at their base, the smashed passenger?side window of
and one water bottle. FBI ERT's request of
the Operational Projects Unit to process ERT survey data and complete
crime scene diagrams is still pending.

Items recovered included nine

CHP conducted the crime scene investigation of the CHP
Officerelnvolved-Shooting scene located at the intersection of
Woodlake Avenue and Venture Boulevard. Items recovered included eight
discharged .40 caliber Saw cases with the head stamp marking "Win 40


UNCLASSIFIED

12

b6 -1,5,7
b7C 

NYT1285

b6 -1
-1

b6 -5
-5

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09/11f2014 

LAPD SID conducted the crime scene investigation of the LAPD DIS
scene located in the Malibu Bluffs Park, Malibu, California. LAPD SID
also conducted the crime scene investigation of the Victim?s:
rental car which was located one block east-of the
hgent?Involved-Shooting scene.

LAPD SID's examination of the six bullet
holes in the passenger-side of the front windshield. Preliminary
findings indicate that five bullet holes were entrance holes from shots
fired outside the vehicle going into the vehicle. The sixth bullet
hole appears to be an exit hole from a shot fired inside the vehicle
going out of the vehicle toward the front of the vehicle.
copper bullet, unknown caliber with brass disks at its base, was
recovered from the front right floorboard of A bullet
fragment, unknown caliber, was recovered from the right rear passenger
seat of Preliminary information from LAPD SID's
examination showed at least one additional fired bullet and one
additional bullet fragment were located in the right, rear
passengereseat area well as blood found on the console
between the driver?s seat and the front passenger seat. SID reports
containing their official findings are pending at the time of this

One fired

writing.

SID's examination of the Subject's rented 290 found
five zip ties and a hand written note stating ?My car broke down
[sic] Will come back tomorrow to take it [sic] Please Please dont [sic]
tow 

LAPD SID's examination of the Subject?s weapon revealed it was a
Glock 35, .40 caliber At the time it was recovered,
the weapon had one discharged .40 caliber saw cartridge case, with the
head stamp of 40 in the chamber. A ten?round magazine
loaded with five live rounds, all .40 caliber saw with the head stamp
A bullet
fragment was found logged in the recoil spring housing located directly
under the barrel. This fragment caused the slide to become dislodged

40 saw," was seated in the magazine well of the handgun.

UNCLASSIFIED

13

b6 -5,7
-5,7

NYT 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: ZQTJ-HQ-A5319916, 09f11/2014

and partially separated from the frame of the weapon. A.visual
inspection of the exterior of the metal recoil spring housing revealed
little to no damage indicating the fragment-entered from the front of
the housing and not the side.

LAPD SID conducted a function test of Glock 2? and b6 -1
obtained ballistic samples using FBI?issued Winchester .40 caliber 55W, b7c ?1
ISO?grain, hollowhpoint service ammunition. The Glock 2? was found to
be properly functioning at the time of the testing. LAPD SID noted to
writer on the day of testing that the ballistic samples of the FBI
service ammunition revealed that the FBI service round is a copper
bullet with a brass disk in its base.

A partial inventory of all documented items in possession of LAPD
as of this writing. which is currently 109 items, is in contained in
serials 23, 35 and 3? of captioned case file. In addition, FBI Los
Angeles is in possession of and analyzing at RHD request two mobile
telephones and a laptop computer.

k. Medical Summary

FBI Agent involved in shooting:

 

no injuries

Subject:

After Subject's arrest by LAPD SWAT, an initial assessment of the
Subject indicated he received one throughuanduthrough gunshot wound to
his shoulder and one through?and-through gunshot wound to his right
cheek. He was airlifted from Malibu, California to UCLA Ronald Reagan
Emergency Department, in Los Angeles, California. Doctors determined
the wounds were superficial and released the Subject to LAPD for
booking that evening.

Victim:

UNCLASSIFIED

14

NYT-287

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U1 Shooting Incident Report
Re: 09f11f2014

After fleeing from the Subject and getting assistance from LAPD,
the Victim was treated by Los Angeles Fire Department paramedics for
lanerations to her right ear and transported to Northridge Hospital
where she was treated for a 5 inch laceration to her right ear, which
also had a piece missing. The medical report indicated the injury was
the result of the Subject striking the Victim with his handgun andfor
flying glass debris. The Victim was released later that evening.

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

On July 31, 2014; the shooting incident review was delegated to
Los Angeles Field Office, Violent CrimesfMajor Offender Squad, C-l, by
the Chief Inspector. The review team consisted of the following
personnelInspection Team Leader, Inspection Liaison

 

 

 

 

 

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

On July 30, 2014, FBI Los Angeles contacted SIOC and Inspection
Division to advise them of the Agent?Involved Shooting. FBI Los
Angeles, through the Operations Communications Center, submitted
Fnjl?l? Executive Situation Report. FBI Los Angeles coordinated
investigative efforts with LAFD and CHP.

On July 31, 2014, FBI Los Angeles was advised that the Chief

UNCLASSIFIED

15

NYT3288

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re:? 

Inspector had delegated the shooting incident review to Los Angeles
Field Office. Los Angeles Field Office submitted Shooting
Incident Report. FBI Los Angeles continues to document investigative
activity to the substantive 893 file as well as the 291J administrative
investigation file.

To date, one voluntary 353 was taken of who b6 -1

read and signed an attorney was present during his ch ?1
335. Interviews of witness present during the AIS were conducted

jointly by FBI Los Engeles and LAPD RHD, with the interviews being

recorded per LAPD policy. Three crime scenes and two vehicles were

processed for evidence. One State of California search warrant was

executed, jointly by FBI Los Angeles and LAPD RHD, on the Subject's

residence. Processing of evidence continues with reports being

generated when completed.

v. administrative

 

a. Firearms Training

Firearms qualifications records for provided he -1
by Los Angeles PFII I A review of the training records b7C ?1
revealed that SA is current on his firearms training attendance.

shot his Glock 27 during the Second Quarter 2013 Firearms
Training earning a score of 59 out of 60. On September 5. 2014, during
FBI Los Angeles' ongoing Fourth Quarter 2014 Firearms Training, 
qualified with his Glock 2T, obtaining a score compliance with firearms qualifications requirements as
established in MIDG Part 2 Section 12.

 

 

h. Deadly Force Training
Los Angeles ADCI ladvised that Department of be ?1
Justice Deadly Force policy training was conducted during the Second -1

Quarter 2014 Legal Training held during May and June 2014. A review of

UNCLASSIFIED

16

NY71289

 

 

 



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 

attendance records revealed 31%: attended that training on b6 -1
June 15, 2014. h7C ?1

1

17

NYT-ZQU

 

 (Rev 5-3-10}

 

/393(
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident Date: 01/05/2015

cc; b6 ?1
?1

From: INSPECTION

DA-OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS SECTION
Contact: LEW DOUGLAS 
Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

Drafted By: LEFF DOUGLAS A

Case ID Los Angeles Shooting Incident

Synopsis: Following the SIRG meeting held on 12/15/2014,

this communication was prepared to furnish the analysisr comments, and

recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with

respect to the captioned shooting.

Administrative Notes: Reference Shooting Incident Report ha _1

submitted electronically by Special Agent Idated b?c _1

09/11/2014.

Details:

On 07/30/2014, at approximately 6:45 SAI I

from the Los Angeles Field Office was involved in a shooting incident

in Chatsworth?r California. On 07V30/2014,r home from be 1 2

work sometime after 5 p.m. SAI I ch _i!2

 

drove their personally owned vehicle (POW) to a car dealership to pick
up their second POVZ his second POV to Chipotle
restaurant in Chatsworth to get dinner. dressed in 
clothes. Prior to exiting his vehicle, locked his personally



NYT1291



Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident
Re: 

owned weapon (POW), a Glock 27 .40 caliber handgun, in the glove box of

his vehicle. Earlier, he loaded the POW by inserting a nine-round

magazine in the slide, but did not put a round in the chamber: 
was current on his POW qualification.

his POV in the parking lot and exited his
vehicle carrying his mobile phones, FBI credentials, handcuffs, and car
keys. After exiting his vehicle, several loud voices
arguing in the parking lot. male I

and female 0 arguing near aI Iwas

screaming to into the driver?s 
seat of theI head, pulled her 

hair, and shoved her body in an attempt to get her into thelC::] SA
approachedl land asked what was going on.
pulled a black semi-automatic handgun from his midsection and
pointed it at immediately put his hands up and his

head down to minimize any impression he posed a threat. He stated

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

something to the effect of, ?This is your business, not my business,"
and backed away with his hands in the air. As away,

pointed his weapon directly at the head of 

continued to try to get her into 

After reaching the cover of a large vehicle, to b5'4u5r7
his FOV, retrieved his BOW, and chambered a round by racking the _1?5?7
slide. He put his mobile telephones and handcuffs on the car seat and

retrieved his FBI credentials from his pocket. Concerned for

safety, ran back to the large vehicle for cover.
I: was in the driver's seat of the Sand I:Ientered the

front passenger seat of theI Itried to exit the vehicle
from the driver?s side door her and pulled her back
into the vehicle. continued to scream for help.

 

While behind cover, held his FBI credentials in his b6 -1f?

left hand to ensure anyone facing him could see his picture, name, and b7c 

title. He held his handgun in his right hand. up from
his place of cover, pointed his handgun at and repeatedly



2

NYT1292



Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident
Re: 

stated in a loud authoritative voice, ?Police! Drop the weapon! Show

me your hands!" who was seated in the front passenger seat b5 
with the door closed, looked at pointed his weapon at SA ?1?7
the windshield.

Fearing for his life and the life of b5 
immediately ducked down behind cover for a split second to secure a two b7c 
handed grip, stood up, and fired nine rounds. at least

one round at During the exchange of gunfire and unknown to

law enforcement at the time, a bullet fragment struck the front of

handgun and became lodged in the recoil spring housing. This

caused the slide to become dislodged and partially separated from the

frame, and made the handgun inoperable.

drive the car out of the parking b6 

lot and into the street. kept his credentials above his head ?1?5?7
and continued to verbally identify himself as ?police.? 

parked cars as cover and chased order to assess whether he

could successfully rescue also so he could gather

information for responding law enforcement. THREE::]accelerated and SA

unable to keep up. to the parking lot,

continued to display his credentials, identified himself as ?police,?

and used a bystander's telephone to provide a description of the events

to a 911 operator. Approximately one minute later, a Los Angeles

Police Department (LAPD) vehicle responded and gave chase.

was able to escape from thel: when she made a 1:6 

turn onto a side street. flagged down a bystander who b7c ?5!7

assisted_her in getting to the LAPD. now 
continued to flee from police. At an 
pointed his handgun at a California Highway Patrol Officer. The
officer, fearing for his safety and about to fire
his handgun at him, fired eight rounds he drove by.

After a high?speed pursuit involving several local

law enforcement agencies on Los Angeles freeways and mountain roads,

the Malibu Bluffs Park in Malibu, b6 
?5 '7


3

NYT-293



Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident
Re: 01f05/2015

California, approximately 21.3 miles from the scene of the Agent

Involved Shooting (AIS). As he fled on foot from b6 -5,7
pointed his handgun at a responding LAPD officer. Fearing for the b7c 
officer?s safety and about to fire his handgun at

the officer, another LAFD officer fired one round atI I

 

 

then ran down a steep cliff and eventually discarded the handgun in a
bush. Approximately two hours after the initial 
taken into custody by LAPD SWAT on the hillside below Malibu Bluffs
Park.

taken to UCLA medical hospital where he was b6 ?5f7
treated for what was erroneously believed to be a superficial gunshot b7c 
wound to the chin, but was later determined to be a cut sustained
during a fall while he fled on foot from the police. He was released
into LAPD custody after several hours. was treated by Los
Angeles Fire Department paramedics and transported to Northridge
Hospital, where she was treated for a half-inch laceration to her right
ear. The medical report indicated the injury was the result 

striking her with his handgun or was caused by flying glass debris.

released later that evening.

On 07/30/2014, at approximately 8:52 FBI LA ERT
arrived at the AIS scene. Items recovered included nine discharged
Winchester .40 caliber cartridge cases, three fired copper bullets
of unknown caliber with brass disks at their base, the smashed

passenger-side window of UwaE::] and one bottle. b6 -7


LAPD Robbery Homicide Division conducted an investigation
and filed a l2?count complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court which

two counts each of Attempted Murder and Assault b6 
with a Firearm {Victims  : and one count each of 137': "115:7

Kidnapping Carjacking Criminal
Threats Stalking Disobeying a

Domestic Relations Court Order Injuring a Spouse
After a Prior Conviction Possession of Firearm by a

Felon, and Evading an Officer.



4

NYT1294



Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident
Re: 

SIRG Observations

(UHM On 12515,!2014, the ems reviewed the AIS incident with the
intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG

unanimously determined the application of deadly force by b6 -1
O?f30f2014 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's b7c ?1
deadly force policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

operational planning and execution, training, and safety perspective.

The SIRG made the following observations:

Observation 1: Los Angeles Field Office failed to provide
INSD with updated, accurate information on the subject?s medical

condition.

Analysis 1:

The shooting took place on Initial reporting
one through?and?through gunshot wound to his b5 -7
shoulder and one through?and?through gunshot wound to his right cheek. b7c ?7
On INSD booking photo. Upon receipt of

the photo, INSD not have a gunshot wound through

the cheek, but instead had a band?aid on his chin. INSD followed up

with Los Angeles Field Office (LAFO) to confirm injuries. On

08/26/2014, LAFO uploaded a medical report (serial 36}, dated

which wounds were superficial. LAFO

either had not followed up to determine in fact

sustained gunshot wounds through the cheek and shoulder, or was aware

but failed to notify INSD. In either case, this resulted in inaccurate
information which was relayed to FBIHQ senior executive management. It

was LAFO's responsibility to properly update INSD medical

condition as the investigation progressed.



5

NYT1295



Title: Los Hngeles Shooting Incident
Re: 

Recommendation 1: ADIC, Los Angeles, should ensure INSD is
advised of significant investigative developments when handling a
delegated AIS.

Observation 2: Los Angeles Field Office failed to

immediately send weapon to the Defensive Systems Unit 

Analysis 2:

LAFO collected firearm immediately after the AIS
and turned it over to the LAPD so it could be processed consistently
with the remaining evidence to be used in the state criminal case
On 08/15/2014, INSD sent en email to LAFO which
reminded them of the need to send to DSU as quickly
as possible. Instead of doing so, it was returned to who
qualified on it and then sent it to DSU on 09f08f2014.

Recommendation 2: ADIC, Los Angeles, should ensure immediate

coordination with DSU after collection of weapons from an HIS.

Observation 3: POW was not in the proper on?duty

carrying configuration.

Analysis 3:

{Wm MIOG Section OF paragraph 6

stated, "When 5A5 are armed, handguns must be fully loaded." Although

not further defined in the MIOG, DSU indicated "fully loaded", based
upon common industry language and consistent with entry level and

recurring firearms training provided by the FBI, required a round in

the chamber and the magazine filled to either the manufacturer's stated

capacity or an alternative capacity set forth by DSU for a particular

weapon. In the case of a Glock "fully loaded" required a round in

the chamber and a full magazine. Although formally superseded by
Corporate Policy Directive (CPD) 0634D, MIOG Section 12?2.2 is still

incorporated by reference on the Training Division, Firearms Training



6

NYT1296

b6 -1
b7C -1

b6 -l,5
-1,5

b6 -1
-1



Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident
Re: 

Unit (FTU) website and the guidance to always carry a "fully loaded"
firearm is still taught by the FTU. (Despite the supersession, CPD

0634D does not address carry configuration).

After the initial confrontation ran to b5 '1/7

his POV, retrieved his handgun, and chambered a round by racking the b7c ?1?7
slide. As noted above, FTU guidance was for all handguns to be fully
loaded. have already had a round

chambered.

Recommendation 3: ADIC, Los Angeles, should ensure all

Agents adhere to the proper firearms carrying configuration.

{U/zig??j Observation 4: his weapon in an unauthorized b6 ?1

container in his vehicle. b7C -1

Analysis 4:

CPD 0634D, entitled, "Firearms Security," Section 8.4.2.1,
provided, "Glove boxes/consoles are never considered a secure container

whether they are locked or not."

Prior to exiting his vehicle, his firearm in ESE-E1

his vehicle's glove box. This was prohibited by the above policy.
Instruction 4: ADIC, Los Angeles, will remind Agents of
policy prohibiting firearms from being left unattended in a vehicle

glove compartment, whether locked or unlocked.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary. The SIRG unanimously determined there would be no
referral to the Internal Investigations Section INSD for

potential administrative action.

Acting Deputy Assistant Director David P. Gelios, INSD, b5 '3

chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following ?3

Board Members were in attendance: Deputy Civil





NYT-297



Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident
Re: 

Rights Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice; Supervisory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Special Agent Investigative Law Unit, Office b6 ?1
Of General Counsel; SSAI I Squad CR-E, Washington Field ?1
Office; Unit Chief I Practical Applications Unit,

Training Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit,

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,

Critical Incident Response Group; New Agent

Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), Section

Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence

 

Division; SSAI Evidence Response Team, Laboratory
Division; and Inspector Trent R. Teyema, Office Of Inspections (OI),
The following non?voting members were also in attendance:

Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas and Douglas A. Leff, OI, Assistant

 

Inspectorszeam Leaders  OI, 
Program Management 
Inspection Management Unit (IMU), and Special Assistant
OI, INSD.

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

ADIC, Los Angeles is responsible for ensuring each
Inspection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The
inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation
is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will
review the field office's response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

(Ufit?u?j ADIC, Los Angeles is required to provide a written response
via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each

InstructionfRecommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to



8

NYT1298



Title: Los Angeles Shooting Incident
Re: 01f0512015

 

Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit INSD. Once he '1
the EC is serialized, the Sentinel link should be e-mailed to MPH ?1

 

 

#0



9

NYT-299

PATRICIA ANN BALDWIN JAMES E. BRYAN

 

 

Prosecuting Attorney Chief Deputy
HENDRICKS COUNTY PROSECUTOR Criminal Division 2nd Floor
6 SOUTH JEFFERSON STREET Telephone (3171 7459233

DANVILLE, iN 46122 

 

 

Dena Elaine Choucair
Lead Inspector FBI

935 Ave NW Roornl:  b6 ?1
Washington, DC 20535 1:70 ?1
May 15, 2013

Re: Special Agentl
Special Agent

Dear Ms. Choucair:

 

As Prosecuting Attorney of the 551th Judicial Circuit, Hendricks County, State of Indiana, I decline
to prosecution any criminal activity that may have arisen out of the incident which occurred in
Plainfield, Hendricks County Indiana on May 10, 2013 surrounding a robbery at the State Bank
of Lizton in Plainfield, and the subsequent fleeing, capturing and shooting of a suspect. Iarn
requesting the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take over any investigation or prosecution of
anything arising frorn this incident.

Sincerely,

22.; 

Patricia Ann Baldwin
Prosecuting Attorney
Hendricks County
55th Judicial Circuit
State of Indians

 

t' at Victim Assists; rdinator
b6 -4

b7c ?4
NYT-3OO

Pram:
Tm

Gm
Subjeet: -
nets: Smear 29! 2h 13- neese AM

b6 -l,3
b7C -1,3

 

 

inspecter Cheuceir
inepectiens Bieisien?. FBI

Base-ii super: 21 review {if materials from yeur sheeting inquiry, we have
determined! there is insuf?cient evidence he warrant a federal criminal civil rights
inte a sheeting by me FEE agents near indienepeiis, Indiana. en May 10,
2313, that in the death ef McKnight, an escaping armed bank robber
whe pointed. a handgun at one ef the agents and refused eemmaede te drep the gun.
The evidenee estabiishes that the agents both shot McKnight based upee reasenehie
ex?peetetien that: the use of deadly feree was necessary because efthe threat prised. The
local District Atterney hes aise presecutiem The USAG is the
eceempiices fer the bank rehberyi

The eeid indicates that the FBI agents were pert ei a task fer-ce eenducting
surveillance en McKnight end his aecempiiees, enether men and a wemen driver:
euseected ef hank robberies in the area. Pursuant te a warraetl b'7E -6

 

 

During ef the vehicle?s travels, twe masked men were observed leaving the
State Bank ef Lieten, Piain?eld, Later, video eeniirmed that they had just
rubbed the bank at 

Twe FBI agents Ied the pursuit ef the escaping gang of three hank rubbers, who
?ed in the tracked vehieie. After chase, the eehiele stepped in e. residentiei area. The
first FBI agent teak weer behind. his ear with. his weepee drewm after he sew McKnight
. hail em; hi the vehicle with a handgun. The sewed. agent stepped his ear "behind the
?rst; and, when he sew McKnight armed with hemigun pointed at: the first agent. he
else {irew his weapen re preeide sever. McKnight i geared cemmeeds to iier the gun
and insteed ee'ntinued to peiet it at the first agent. Beth agents ?red their weapens.
MCI-{eight died frem gunshot weende. The ether two hank. rehhere ran in 3 different
directien and were arrested nearby witheui: incident. The egente? amounts eerreherete
each ether and radie treffie their knowledge that McKnight was armed. There
is he evidence te eeniradiet the accounts.

McKnight was attempting te escape frem an armed hank rebhery and refused te
drop gun painted at an armed agent There is insuf?cient evidence- te support a
cuneiusien that either agent willfully violet-ed the 4th Amendment?s requirement 01?
seizure and thee 18 USE: 242, the eppiieehle federal criminal eivil rights
statute. Beth agents had a reesenehle expectetien that deedi}! three wee necessary in
eliminate the risk pesed by Meiinight?s refuse] to drop his gen and petentiei intent to
fire it.

A federal criminal civil rights investigeiien ef the agent?s action is unwe?rrentedi
We appreciate the agents" eeluntery statements that permitted a fully infermed
reseietien of this matter. continue yeur administrative review and eetieei



 

b6 ?3
Special Legal Counsel b?7c ?3
Civil Right? Diviaion
15.3. Department (212? justice

 

NW-BQE

 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

OFFICE

 

 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF omens? DATE mvesnonnve 
BIHQ FBIHQ OSIOWZOIB 11/152012 11f24l2012
LE OF CASE REPORT MADE BY TYPED BY
HOOTING 
REPORT OF SHOOTING HC Thomas Ravenelle ram
ALTMORE FIELD CHARACTER OF CASE
1115:9012 SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

 

I REFERENCES:

I
.
I

Telephone call on 1 11' 15/2012 from Baltimore SAC Stephen E. Vogt to Chief
Inspector Eric S. Bimbaum.

 

APPROVED (W  

MASSISTANT
I DIRECTOR

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

 

OPIES MADEJ

14 - Inspection (Arm: SIRG)

1 (Attn: FTU)

Ell/r1

I 


 

 

 

 

 

 

I DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT

 

 

 

. ency
equest Read.
ate Fwd.

 

How Fwd.

 

 

 

3'

 

 

 

Notations

 

A
Cover Page

NYT-303

 

 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT or JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 05f07f2013
Report of: HC Thomas P. Ravenelle Office: FBII-IQ INSD
Case 297-HQ-A1270951-D
Title: REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
BALTIMORE FIELD OFFICE
ll151'2012 

Investigative Period: 11f15l2012 1 1/24f201 1

Reference: (U) Telephone call on 11/15l2011 ?orn Baltimore SAC Stephen E. Vogt to Chief
Irrepector Eric S. Bimbaum.

 

Synopsis

- (UIEQHQE 0n 1131512012, at approximately 6:05 am, SAI Iwas
participating in a Baltimore SWAT operation in support of Operationl I a Washington
Field Of?ce SSTF investigation. The Operation included Baltimore SWAT securing two
residences located across the street from each otherI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

Maryland. After SWAT conducted a knock and announce atI [the
front door was breached and was deployed. SAI 
entered the house prior toI I He nristoolcl  as a shotgun blast

 

 

 

and ?red his M-4 carbine ?ve times at] ho was standin in an archway on the
other side of the house approxirnately 20 feet opposite to SAI Iwas treated on
the scene for minor injuries, transported to the Prince George?s Hospital, and released. The

Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team as well as Baldinore and Washington Field Of?ce
ERT processed the scene. No weapons were located. . - 

Details

(unread) 0n 111150012, at approximately ?it: Baltimore SWAT team

executed two search warrants in support of Operation Washington Field Of?ce

 

- SSTF'investigation. The case was predicated on information thatI I

 

I Iwere Operating signi?cant drug networks throughout the DC. Metro area.
These individuals were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in the District of Columbia and search
warrants were obtained for nine locations utilized by members of the criminal organization
throughout the metro Washington DC. area. Two of these search warrants were for single
family residences in Maryland and would be executed by Baltimore SWAT, NOC, and TOC

Page 1 of 8

b6 ?1,2,7
?1,2NYT1304

 

 

1 a
.

.1 a A

 

teams. The addresses for these homes were] I he ?7

Maryland (hereinafter referred to   - 7

I On llil3f2012 at approximately 1:00 P.M., Baltimore SWAT Senior Team Leader
(STL)I:Iconducmd an operations brief. The approved operations order called for
Baltimore SWAT to divide into two eight-man entry teams with each team assigned to a
residence. The teams were designated Blue and Gold; Gold team Was designated to enter and
secureI:IBlue team was designated to enter and securel I Intelligence from a WFO
CHS indicated the primary subject atl lhad received prior
military trainin and Was armed with an AK-47 and several handguns. Due to the close
proximity Baltimore SWAT believed there was a probability weapons may be located at

I:Ilas well.

The ?oat door and windows ofl:k:rovided a clear view of the front door 0
where Blue Team would make entry. Due to this threat, Baltimore EM approved a plan or Inc
Team to make entry atl:[3efore Gold Team entered:lallowing Blue Team operators to
avoid exposing themselves to any danger posed 1331 135 '7
was authorized for use by both Blue and Gold teams. Blue Team planned to deploy a MC 7
Iif the knock and announce was not answered and a bjE 1
breach of the door was necessary. If the occupants ofl:  opened the door when commanded,
I [would be deployed in the hunt yard ofl: signaling Gold
Team to enter 

136 -1,7
b'?C 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0n 1111532012, at approximately 5:00 A.M., Baltimore SWAT, along with the Tactical
Operations Center (TOC) and Negotiation Operations Center (NOC) personnel met at the
designated staging area and conducted an operations and safety brief. Upon completion, all
members moved to their assigned stations. .TOC and N00 were located in the TOC vehicle
while the On?Scene Commander, ASAC and SWAT Supervisor, b6 -1
positioned themselves in ASAC vehicle. Both Blue and Gold teams proceeded we 1
to the residences utilizing one vehicle arriving at approximately 6:00 A.M. Once there, both
teams proceeded to their assignments. Blue Team, assigned to 6709, was comprised of the
following members in entry order and assignment: .

 

 

I?Entrv .
Ent lAssistant Breacher . A b'i?E ?1
Entry 

SA me

l? 

SA Security

At approximately 6:05 A.M., Blue Tean was positioned at the ?oat door Id:lwhere ha -1
STDnitiated the operation. SAI conducted a knock and announce by yelling, mg -1
search nor-rant. Come to the door!? SA Irepeated this sequence, after which STL b'i?E ?1

I:Icounted aloud to 20. No indications of movement were observed in the house at the

 

 

 

anawewwe

 

 

Page 2 of 8

arr?305

 

 





I
1
a
-

 

forcibl breach the

 

completion of 3E5 count. as directed 3

door. After SA breached the door, SA

inside the house. Almost immediately after] [,sal
entered the residence before[  and stood in the living room,.

a roximately ?ve feet from the threshold. He faced east and scanned left to right. SA
baw a female, later identi?ed asl I crouched
approximately 20 feet away in an archway inside an alcove which so arated the living room
from the bedrooms located in the rear of the residence. As contact with
She saw a ?ash of light, heard a loud bang, and felt a strong movement of air on his
right side which he perceived to be from a shotgun blast fired at him by

Iprematurely

 

 

initially ?red two shots towardl:  from his M4 and both shots
missed her. One embedded in the wall of an unoccupied bedroom in the southeast corner of the
home. The other hit the corner of the living room wall, immediately adjacent to the arch. SA
I:Iadjusted his point of aim from right to left, as  Iran back into her bedroom in
the northeast corner of the residence. Iperceived thatl Imoved into a
stairwell rising to the second ?oor. The stairwell was between the living room where SA

as standing, an 5 bedroom, and actually descended into the basement.
According to he believedl  would use the stairwell as a position of coVer
and ?re at him and his fellow team members again. SA trod three additional shots at
the wall separating the living room from the stairwell. djusted his aim from right
to left as he ?red these three shots. The third through ?fth shots impacted the living room wall
and passed through the stairwell, hitting the opposing wall. One of the rounds also impacted a
closet door in the hall area, adjacent to :s bedroom door.

SA[:Iwas the second Agent to enter the residence, clearing to the south toward the
kitchen area. overhead shouting, ?shots fired? and, ?come on SA

then moved to cover a second stairwell on the north side of the house, which ascended to
the second ?oor. While in this position, was aware of individuals being called out
and taken outside by other SWAT members. Five individuals were cleared from the house.
They were: 

 

- I was located downstairs at the time of entry. He was
the primary target He had a prior criminal history for drug related offenses, but
he had no history of weapons possession. -

 

 

 

 

 

 was located in the bedroom in the northeast corner
of the main ?oor.  is thel She had no criminal
history.

9 Iwas located in the bedroom in the northeast corner
witl?l She had no

 

criminal history.

Page 3 of 3

as ?1,2
b'i'C -1,2
ma -1

b6 -1,2
-1-1,2,7
 

NYT-306

 

 

 

 

.1 .r

I

 

a I was located in the bedroom in the northeast corner
withl Sh? had 1'10 b6 -2 7 
criminal history. bit: -2 7 

 

 

 

Iwas located upstairscriminal record for felony burglary in Prince George?s County, but no
history of weapons possession._

 

:Isustained three superficial injuries. Ail were approximately 2-4mm in
size. One was located on her left arm, one was located on her left cheek, and one was located on
the back, left side, of her head above the neck.  : was treated at the scene by Baltimore
SWAT medic She initially declined to go to the hoSpital, but agreed and
was transported to Prince George?s hospital. She was admitted at approximately 7:08 AM and
discharged at approximately 7:18 AM. Her wounds were cleaned and adhesive bandages were
applied to her face and arm. While being transported back to the scene from the hospital by
Baltimore Agents,l:lremoved a small piece of metal from the back of her head, which had
remainedin her hair near the abrasion. She voluntmily provided it to the Agents and it was
maintained as evidence.

136 -1,2
-1,2

The scene was secured and processed by ERT ?'om the Baltimore and Washington Field
Of?ces. SAI Is issued M-4 was rendered safe and entered into evidence. Five b6 -1
Winchester .223 casings,l . 137?: '1
Iwas deployed upstairs during clearing) were recovered from the ME '1
residence. No weapons were recovered.

 

Baltimore EM and all Blue and Gold SWAT team members were interviewed. 0n
1 If 16l2012, SAI Icompleted a Signed Sworn Statement During his interview,
SAI Istated he "could not initially recall whether or no brior to
entry? and, upon ?u'ther re?ection he ..rea1iz:ed was used and began to suspect I ?12132
entered the residence beford: went SA rther stated .he now ME _1 
believes it is possible what he perceived to be the muzzle flash of the shotgun.. .may have been a
re?ection fromI However, at the time of the shooting, SASbeiieved

posed an imminent threat and she had ?red at him stating ?When I ?red my

M4 ri?e at the female subject, however, I believed she had ?red a shotgun at me and was
moving to a position of cover." No operational personnel observed his
weapon.

 

 

Substantive Case Files

The following substantive matter was under investigation at the time of the shooting on
1 if i 5001 2:

OPERATIONI I

 

-1
1371!. -1

 

 

 

Page 4 of 8



 

 

 

 a a- a 

 

 

After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL 

 

 

 

 

I b6 
MBER 15 2012; b'i'C ?v
?1
Enclosures

(U) All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the enclosed
table of contents.

A. Administrative
The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was composed of the following personnel:

Inspector-in?Charge (IIC) Thomas P. Ravenelle ?35 1
Assistant Inspectorfl? earn Leader I 1370- '1
AFT 

Assistant Inspector-in-Place 
AIIP
AIIP
AHP
AIIP -
AIIP -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

All members of the SIRT reviewed the FBI produced videotape entitled, "The Rain After
the Storm - Shooting Incident Investigations," and the INSD Shooting Review Protocol.

On 1 ?1512012, 110 Ravenelle communicated with Baltimore ASAC :Ito be -1
arrange logistics for the SIRT. Rockviile Resident Agenc and SSA 137?: -1
Iserved as the points of contact for the SIRT. IIC Ravenelle, Mleil

 

 

and Mel Itraveled directly to the scene, where they
were briefed by Baltimore ASACI All viewed the undisturbed scene before it

was processed. Local authorities, Prince George?s County and District Heights Police 7
Departments provided security but did not participate in any aspects of the investigation. IIC
Ravenelle met with Baltimore SAC Stephen E. Vogt to discuss INSD SIRT protocol. Also on
1 1/1512012, IIC Ravenelle met with all SIRT personnel, and separately with members of the
Baltimore SWAT team, to discuss SIRT procedures. There was an opportunity for dialogue
between the SIRT and the involved personnel to address concerns, provide clari?cation, and
answer questions prior to the SIRT commencing.

Page 5 oft!

NYT-308

 

 

.During the SIRT, one Signed Sworn Statement was taken from the FBI A ent
directl involved in the shooting, 
Esq. Other interviews, events and observations were documentedvia FD-BDZS. All FBI
personnel were allowed to read the FD-3 02 summarizing their interview to confirm the accuracy
of the information provided. The and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily.
A Fill-92? (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information Following a
Shooting Incident) was executed by all those interviewed.

0n 1111612012, IIC Ravenelle conducted an exit brief to Vogt and met separately
with SA reiterate the SIRT process.

C. Personnel Involved in the Shooting
1.FBISAJ 

Other Participants in the Operation



10Firearms Training

A review of ?eld of?ce training records for 8104:] who discharged his weapon,
revealed he was in compliance with ?rearms quali?cations requirements. During CY 2012, SA
 : attended ?rearms training on seven separate occasions and quali?ed usin
SWAT issued weapon, a Colt model serial number-I last quali?ed
on 10112312012 with a score of 100%.

b6 -1,2

I.vho was represented by
b7C -1121C -1

SAC Ste hen E. Vo
ASACI his FBI

 

Page 6 of 8

NYE-309

 

 

 

 

 

 

. .-
.. I
. 1' . -

 

 

 

E. Deadly Force Training

Chief Division Counsel provided instruction on the FBI Deadly Force
Policy to Baltimore employees during the ?rst quarter ?rearms training on ill/1519012 and
10f26f2012. SA : attended ?rearms training on and 102612012. 011
111'132'2012, the deadly force policy was briefed and discussed by participants during the
operation?s brief. The policy was not briefed on the day of the incident.

F. Use of Body- Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

SAI:Iwore FBI SWAT issued tactical clothing including body armor with law
enforcement identi?ers clearly visible on the outside of his clothing.

G. FBI Indices and National Crime Information Center CIC

 

 

A search of FBI Indices revealed one reference for the namel Iwith no
other listed identi?ers. One reference was also determined fed Iwith no other listed
identi?ers. There were no references forl I

NCIC revealed no outstanding warrants for any of the ?ve individuals.
has a prior criminal history for multiple theft and drug violations dating back to 1977. His last

reported arrest was on by the Metropolitan Washington DC. Police Department for
distribution of heroin. had a prior criminal history of felony burglary and was

 

 

arrested on by the Prince George?s County Police Departrnent. There was no report

of a criminal history for]

 

H. ERT Report

A comprehensive ERT Casebook report was completed and is attached.

I. FBI Lab Report

On the M-4 SAI:Iused was examined. All modi?cations were
determined to be authorized and conducted by FBI gunsmiths. Twenty rounds were test ?red
and the weapon functioned as designed. A Shooting Incident Reconstruction examination dated
02/252013 is attached.

I. Medical Reports

:Iwas treated on the scene by SWAT medic, for
minor abrasions and lacerations. SAl:Iprovided a Copy of the FD-393 Emergency Medical
Incident Report. I was also treated for minor abrasions and lacerations at Prince
George?s hospital.

 

Page -2,7,9

b6 -1
-1

b6 -1,2
-1,2

NYT-310

 

 

a _u .- - 4

K. Declination by the Civil Rights Division

Upon com Ietion of the on-site inquiry, IIC Raveneile coerdinated SIRT investigative
?ndings  Special Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil Rights

Division. On 12/060012, he was provided an incident summary and copies of all interviews.
0n 04f10f2013, Mr.l:ladviscd the circumstances of the Agent-involved shooting did not,
"warrant a federal criminal investigation of this matter."

L. Local Prosecutive Opinion

 

Upon completion of the on-site inquiry, IIC Ravenelle coordinated SIRT investigative
?ndings with Mal State?s Attomeyfor Prince George?s County,
Maryland. On 12f06!2012, she was provided an incident summary-and copies of all interviews.

0n 02f27/2013, Ms.I:Iprovided a letter declining to prosecute SA : for his
actions during the execution of the search warrant on lif15f2012.

 

M. Inspector?s 

Observation 1: Baltimore SWAT 0 erators should receive training on the safe and
effective] 

Anal sis: eci'al Wea ons and Tactics Polic Im lementation Guide 0239/2012

 

 

I Senior Team Leaders (STLs or their
designees must conduct annual training for each SWAT team member in.the use of

I I The STL must document the annual training and certi?cation in the of?ce SWAT file,

using'theI ISWAT checklist. The STL must also report to SOU via TRMS
that each team's operators have been annually certi?ed. Prior to any training event in which

 

Iwill be used, the team leader, or his?ter dcsignee, should cover the delivery
sequence "dos and don?ts" for thel I .

SIRT investigatjon determined SWAT operator ntered the room before a
causinghirn to take offensive actions due to his

 

 

belief he was being ?red upon.

Recommendation 1: SAC, Baltimore ensure SWAT members are trained on the use of
develop protocols to prevent early entry before

 

 

 

commendation 1a: AD CIRG ensure SWAT teams are conducting annual training

on the use I

 

Page -1,4
-1,4

-1NYT-311

 

 be ?3
To: Dena E. 1370 '3
Cc: 

Sent: Fri Jet 19 15:45:33? 2013

Subject: Dayten Sheeting

inspector Dena Cheiucair
FBI inspectien Division

Based upon the in-fermatian preaided in your Sheeting incident Repert, we have
determined that an FEE agent sheeting during the executiarr ef anarreat in Dayten, Ghie err
13, resulting irr the death at iermaine Ceieman and weenriing at another subject, deer.
net warrant federal criminei investigatien. There is insufficient evidence te sappert an
inaestigatien ta determine whether the federal criminal civii rights statutes were 'vielated.

 

 

Fear agents were attempting te Eeeate twel bin/ranted b6 ?7
en Feta! warrants fer vehicuiar aesauit and possessien ef herein in the vicinity at a Beaten, Obie  

maii behaved ta be where their drug transactiens occurred. The two subiecta were 
canducting drug deals out of arr eut-omehiie, which was being driven by a third unidenti?ed
maie. The agents feliewed the su'bjects? vehicle ta a drive-attire beverage Stare windew with
anti; e?ne entrance and ene exit. Based on the abs-erred felony drug transaetiens and the arrest
warrants, they decided to affect an arrest an the occupants ef the vehicie.

0n prier eccasiene, Saw enter-cement agents had attempted to: step valet-ties with thee-e
twe subject-s at? the. warraeta They refused to step and escaped. There ie a ?rte chase? law
enfereement peiicy in the state at Ghie, which is. eemmeniy knewn by criminals and has
heightened their attempts in escape, knewing law enforcement will. not fellow.

The agents twe cars with twe agents in each car into the beverage drivethru,
making the subject aehicie in the enciesed area by biecking bath the entrance and exit. AS the
passenger agent: (if each FBI ear exited In effect the arrest. in the area, the driver at the
auspecta? ear made arr attempt ta escape by crashing that vehicle trite bath FBI
vehicles. The car ?rst attire-Ir. the rear 581 vehicle, which fete-ea the passenger deer ta strike that
agent as; he exited, than rieieritiy crashed inte the frent FBI vehicle aimeet Striking the ether
passenger agent whe else arrived the car.

That agent in ?eet ear ?red fear times frem mutate-e his car at the driver te step anether
deiiberate ?I?he driven Ceiemam was weuecied twice and cited ensreute to the heepitalt
it was later deteneined that Ceiaman was wanted an a warrant fer imprepetiy discharging a
?rearm, Cine ef  annexing subjects, whe was shot ems-a and suffered Hematite threatening
we'uedsb admitted that they all had been sailing nareetiear the other was mtiejured,
Ne weape'na were found in the vehicle- er err the subjects.

The aheater agent saw the auhj-ects? car smash into the FBI ear to its rear impacting it St)
as to cause him te fear that timer: agents; had been injured. His ear was then struck and he were

NW3 12,

almost. struck himseif. When he ?red, he saw the driver tanking t0 his reer as if he intended te
re~eellide with the FBI ear te his rear. The ghee-tee agent claims he ?red te step the ear frem
injuring ether agents. The ether agents erevide generally eeneistent The fetensie
evidence is eensistent with the agents" accounts. The Skeeter agent and twe medically trained
ether agents attempted to render aid te the me?elly weunded driver.

The twe surviving subjects were federe?y charged by the Seuthem Distriet etVOhie fer
nareetiee dise'ibutien and esseuit en a federal et??eer. Based upee the, infermetien teemtiedg the
heel et?ee deeiined to eenduet a criminal review ef the. sheeting

Under the tetelity ef the circumstances, there is insuf?cient evidenee tn contradict the
agent?s expreseed eiei'm ef'why he fired his weepen. there is insuf?cient evidence
to establish that the agent used more three then was teammath and that he believed.
wee reasonably to prevent death er grieveue hedily hem te himeelf and ethers.

Specie! beget Ceunsei _3
Cent Rights Division
11.5. Dena rtment ef Justice


cell 

501 E3 Street, 

Reeml:l 

Washingten teem

NW3 13

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date:

12/2012013
Report of: IIC Shawn W. Stroud Of?ce: FBIHQ 
Case 297J-HQ-A3094975
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT 

REPORT OF SHOOTING 
NEW YORK. FIELD OFFICE - WHITE PLAINS RESIDENT 
Oil/2812013

Investigative Period: 08!28f2013 12/20/3013

I. Executive Summary

- On at approximately 11:45 SAI Ifrom the New York Field
Of?ce (NYFO) was involved in a shooting incident a cunt Vernon, New York (NY).
NYFO, Squad (3-26, White Plains RA (WPRA) and the Westchester County District Attorney?s Of?ce
(WCDAO) were conductin a joint investigation into narcotics traf?cking and gang activity in Mount
Vernon, NY. as wanted on a local narcotics wa rent. The WCDAO along with the
Mount Vernon Police Department (MVPD) planned on arrestingEon August 28, 2013.

 

At approximately 11:00 am, on 0812892013, ceived a telephone call from a

WCDAO investigator, who indicated WCDAO investigators established surveillance en : s vehicle

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

on the Mount Vernon. NY, and planned to arres hen he was

observed. Idrove to the vicinity of thel

to articipatejn the surveillance and to conduct the post-arrest interview. While drivingr pastl I
lil a known address for Iobserve .standing in front

of the house. SAI bservedl Istare at him and Having not observed any

WCDAO investigators need I and knowing the WCDAO surveillance team was near

 

vehicle, parked a few blocks north, exited their Bucar, in order
to prevent ?'om eluding arrest. Ilost s..ght of] I They
approached the house and walked down an adjacent driveway to the rear of the house. WCDAO
Investi ato pproached the dent of the house from the posite direction. In the rear of the house,
approached the passenger?s door of associated wi and SA
I approached the driver?s door. SAI card the 5 en 'ne start. SA

Igave commands to the driver of the who he believed to to turn off the
car and get his hands up. SAI Idetennined the driver was and instructed him to turn off
the vehicle.

:Iignored SA commands, put thel:lin reverse and be an to back
down the driveway. WCDAO Investigated Itook a standin :osition behind the He was
struck twice by the vehicle as it moved in reverse. feared for Investi ate 5 life and
aimed his weapon at: however, SA [was in his sight icture. SA red one
round from his Glock .40 caliber pistol into rear passenger tire of?s vehicle, When the vehicle
did not stop, SA immediater ?red a second round from his istoi into the front passenger tire
oDs vehicle, which stopped the vehicle. WCDAO Investigate moved from the rear of the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EE 
b7C -1,7

b6 


b6 -1,4,7


NYT-314

 

 

 

 

I Ito the driver's side and smashed the driver?s window. He and SA : extracted


ho was resisting, from the vehicle, and arrested him.

 

There were two Agents and one Task Force Of?cer (TF O) in close proximity to the shooting
incident and four other law enforcement of?cers within a few block radius. Only one Agent and the 
actually witnessed the shooting incident. Statements regarding the shooting incident from both the Agent
and TFO were consistent with 5 account of the incident. The did not participate in
the enforcement action. There were no injuries as a result of this incident. No other law enforcement
of?cers ?red their weapons. The shooting scene was processed by NYFO ERT.

II. Incident Details
a. Substantive Case Files and Background Inforniation

Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantive Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Force - Gangs case was opened:

 

 

 

 

 

Title:

File number:

Case Agents: SA
SA
SA

 

 

 

The NYFO opened an Assault on a Federal Of?cer investigation onl:las a result of
the shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

Title: ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL OFFICER 

IMOUNT VERNON, NEW 
03(28f2013
File number: 
Case Agent: I

 

13. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

 

. 1.3.4.
2. sa

3.TFOI I

 

 

ldischarged weapon)


 

h? 
-1WWI-315

 

c. Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

. Squad 0-26 ofthe NYFO opened and assigned: to we ?2
address gang-related crime in Mount Vernon, New York. The opening BC was predicated on a previous
meeting between the FBI and the MVPD Commissioner, whereby the WPD made a formal request for
the FBI's assistance in regards to an escalating violent gang problem in Mount Vernon, NY.

 

The investigating determined

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

bin. -1
?3
la CHS provided information which indicatedl I
 b6 -7 a
1:70 
- 1
13731 -1
11. Events Leading Up to the Shooting
- On 0312312013, the wcnaodiscuss the arrest ci1:  b6 4 7
The WCDAO and MVPD agreed to jointly arrestl on 08!28f2013, on a local warrant. On hm 7
0812812013 the MVPD was not'available for the arrest Operation. The WCDAO decided to execute the ME _1 3
arrest oil: oh (tentacle, without the assistance of the MVPD. Deputy Chief[:  wcoao, 
discussed a general tactical plan over the telephone with his investigators. The operational plan called for
the WCDAO investigators to arres and the FBI would dehrie after the arrest. Based on
this interview] the FBI would determine
At approximater 9:40 am. on amazon, WCDAO investigators to the
vicinity otl lin Mount Vernon, NY, to locate] Is vehicles. The b5 4 7
WCDAO investigators fonndl ls vehicle parked on thel WCI I b7c -4 
assi ed WCDAO Investigators[ land New York State Police Investigator] I
?o conduct surveillance on the vehicle. 
At approximately 1 1:00  on 08f28l2013, SEreceived a telephone call from a
WCDAO investigator, who told SAgthe WCDAO had established surveillance cu :rs
vehicle on the Mount Vernon, NY, and planned to arrestl:lwhen he was
observed. Idrove to the vicinity of Ito b5 1 7
participate in the surveillance and conduct the post-arrest interview. While driving pastl I ch -1 I 7

a known address ?01! I Iobservedl [standing in front of the

house. SAI [observedl  at him and SAI I Having not observed any

 

NYT-316

 

 

 

 

 

WCDAO investigators nearl:land knowing the WCDAO surveillance team was near
5 vehicle arked a few blocks north, SAsl  exited their Bucar, in order
to preven from eluding arrest.

 

 

e. Shooting Incident Details

 

Ilost sight of El They approached the house and walked
donn'an adjacent driveway to the rear of the house. WCDAO Investigate approached the front of
the house ?oor the opposite direction. in the rear of the house, approached the passenger?s

door of al:lassociated with]: and  approached the driver?s door. SA

card th 5 engine start. ave commands to the driver of the:
i who he believed to he to turn off the car and get his hands up. determined
the driver wasl:land instructed him to turn off the vehicle. I:Iignored 
commands, put than: reverse, and be an to back deem the driveway. WCDAO Investigator
Check a standin osition behind thel He was struck twice by the vehicle as it moved in
reverse. SA feared for Investigated 's life and aimed his weapon at: however, SA
?red one round ?om his Glock .40 caliber pistol into

was in his si icture. SA
rear passenger tire vehicle. When the vehicle did not stop, SAZIimmediately

 

 

 

?red a second round from his pistol into the front passenger tire 5 vehicle, which stopped the
vehicle. WCDAO Investigate oved from the rear of th to the driver?s side and
smashed the-driver?s window. He and  exnactedl:  who was resisting, ??om the
vehicle, and arrested him.

f. Pest Shooting Details

There were ?ve Agents and one Task Force Of?cer (TFO) in close proximity to the shooting
incident and four other law enforcement of?cers within a few block radius. Only one Agent and the TFO
actually witnessed the shooting incident. Statements regarding the she oting incident from both the Agent
and TFO were consistent with account of the incident. There were no injuries as a result
of this incident. The MVPD did not participate in the enforcement action. No other law enforcement
officers fired their weapons._ The WCDAO and the FBI responded to the scene. The MVPD did not
respond. The shooting scene was processed by NYFO ERT.

g. Accounting of Shots Fired

two rounds and was the only shooter. Two .40 caliber shell casings
were recovered at the scene. The front and rear passenger side tires were shot, ERT did not
recover any bullets or bullet ents ?om the scene or the tires. Witnesses reported hearing
two shots ?red. SAI: gaIdlvised during his SIRT interview he regularly loaded only 13 or
14 rounds into his 15 capacity magazine due to arthritis in his thumbs.

h. Subject Information

 

Name: I I

 

Position: Driver

 

 

 

b6 

b6 -1,4 

 

 

Hair:
Eyes:
DOB:
SSAL
FBI 

 

 

 

to include six arrests for offenses including narcotics and robbery with the a earance of a

?rearm. At the time of the NCIC query, an active arrest warrant was identi?ed fo

was issued on 071310.013, by the MVPD for Criminal Possession of Narcotic Drug-Fourth Degree.

. i. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers

 

Both SAI

necks.

j. Forensic Summary

When they exited

On 03:23:2013, Itook custody of weapon. SSA
etumed to the WPRA with Is weapon, and secured it in the sguad safe. On

0312912013, entered the following items into evidence; SA

lS-round capacity magazine and 11 .40 caliber cartridges.

On 08f23f2013, the NYFO ERT deployed Mount Vernon, New York. At
4:27 ERT began processing the scene. Items recovered include: two .40 caliber handgun shell

casin from the discharged weapon. At 8:45 processing of the scene was concluded. 
I used by the subject was towed to the ERT offsite.

 

On 08f29f2013, ERT began processing drel:lat 10:20 am. The items recovered from
the vehicle were one Mount Vernon Police Association Card, one document from: and

 

the front and rear passenger side tires. Search and processing of the vehicle concluded at 2:45 pm.

Spherical photography was taken by ERT submitted a lead to the Operational Projects Unit

A National Crime Information Center (NCIC) criminal history check included multiple entries for

The warrant

Iwore their FBI-issued body armor. Neither Agent displayed
a law enforcement identi?er because of the pre-arrest surveillance to locate
their Bureau vehicle, to confrontl:l both Agents displayed their FBI shield from a chain around their

8 weapon, one

to process the survey data and provide an interactive digital exhibit linking evidence and photographs.

- The following items were entered into evidence in the AFC case onl

 

 

134

One document ?'oni I

 

185

One Mount Vernon Police Association Card.

 

138

Two .40 caliber handgun shell casings.

 

 

 

189

 

The front and rear passenger side tires.

 

k. Medical Summary

 

NYT-318

b6 -7
b7C -7

b6 -1 

FBI Agents involved in the shooting:
No injuries.

thiects involved in the shooting:

. No injuries.

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

a. The Delegated Shooting Team (DST) was comprised of the following
personnel:

Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) Sham W. Stroud

Inspector-in-Place i Team Leader Patrick J. Carroll

Assistant Inspector-in-Place (ADP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AHPI
b. The NYFO ERT Personnel:
Search of Mount Vernon, NY
SA NYFO Evidence Response Team, Team Leader
SA NYFO ERT, Total Station
SA 0 ERT, Total Station
SA NYFO ERT, Total Station
SA 0 ERT, Evidence Custodian
NYFO ERT, Evidence Log
SA NYFO ERT, Sketch
SA NYFO ERT, Photographer
NYFO ERT, Photograph Log
SA ERT, Search
SA NYFO ERT, Search
INYFO ERT, Search
Search of Registration:
Special Operations Branch
SSA O, Squad 30?14
SA 0, ERT Coordinator
SA NYFO ERT, Team Leader
SA NYFO ERT, Evidence Log
SA NYFO ERT, Photographs
SA NYFO ERT, Photograph Log
SA 0 ERT, Search
. SA NYFO ERT, Search
SA NYFO ERT, Search
SA INYFO ERT, Search
SA IMO, Squad (3-13, AFO Case Agent

h? -1
b7C -1

b6 -1,7
-1,7

b6 -l,7
-1,7

NYT-319

 

 

 

 

INYFO, Automotive Worker b6 1
-1

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol
0n DSIZSIZDB at 'ipproximately 12:39 pm, SAC Brooks was noti?ed by b6 -1
unty ew

and AIASACI of a shooting incident involving FBI Agents in Westchester Co -1
York. and SAI I Squad (3-26, were deployed with the Westchester County Safe

Streets Task Force when SA discharged his wea on. There were no injuries. SAC Brooks
directed arsac : shd eraser: advise settle take possession of 3.4le

weapon.

 

 

 

A Immediater thereafter, SAC Brooks noti?ed the NYFO ADIC, and SIOC. SS
Operations Center, distributed the FD-IOIS to SIOC via E-mail. SAC Brooks then
contacted AD Nancy McNamara, INSD, by telephone to report the incident. AD McNamara delegated
the inspection to the NYFO due to the fact there were no injuries and only one Agent discharged a
weapon.

While on route to the scene, SAC Brooks directed take b6 -1 4
to the hospital for a post-traumatic ph sical examination. At approximately 2:45 SAC Brooks WC '1 4
arrived at the incident scene. AIASAC On-Scene Commander, provided SAC Brooks a short brief
on the circumstances of the incident and described the scene. NYFO personnel from the ERT, Squad 
19 and CPA were on scene as were personnel from the WCDAO. SAC Brooks oke with WCDAO -
Chief investigate and wooao Deputy Chief hivestigatorI?_LI SAC Brooks
checked on the condition of offered support, and directed him to leave the scene and
return to the WPRA. SAC Brooks was advised the FBI was in possession of SD ?rearm.

At approximately 3:25 SAC Brooks contacted First De a District Attorne . 1:6 -4

who put sac Brooks in contact with Focal?i] FDDAltlwould ?e

serve as the WCDAO point of contact on the Assault on a Federal Officer (APO) hivestigation. The
WCDAO would not open an investigation into the shooting, and did not request participation in the

shooting incident interview process. The MVPD never responded to the scene and did not open an
I investigation into the shooting.

At approximately 4:20 p.rn., SAC Brooks contacted Acting Chief Inspector Howard Marshall, 136 - 1
INSD, to determine who from INSD was overseein .the matter. Inspector Shawn W. Siroud was -1
assigned as the Inspector in Charge. ASAC NYFO, was assigned the Delegated
Shoo?ng.

I In total, two Signed Sworn Statements were taken item the FBI Agents directly
involved in the shooting. Other interviews, events, and observations were documented via FD-
3025. The 8885 and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily. A (Waming
and Assurance to Employee Re quested to Provide Information Following 3. Shooting Incident)
was signed by the Agents interviewed via 

oh 10:2112013, SAC Brooks, and ASA et with WCDAO b6 -1.4
and Second Deputy District Attorney (SDDA in the WPRA to briefthem on the ?ndings 137?: 1 4
of the'DeIegated Shooting Team (DST). FDD con?rmed she would like a cc of the DST
report to assist her of?ce in making a prosecutorial decision. 011 12812013, with

SDD the WCDAO Of?ce and rovided the DST report to him. On 1320/2013, SDDA
telephonically advise WCDAO had declined to prosecute the case.

 

NYT-32O

 

 

 

 

 

 

V. Administrative 

a. Firearms Training

rearms quali?cations records for Siamided to the SIRT by 

I A review of the training records re?ected SA 5 most recent quali?cation with his
FBI?issued Glock Model 22, Serial Number was on 08f01l2013, and he was in compliance
with the ?rearms quali?cations requirements.



 

b. Deadly Force Training

CD dvised the NYFO provided instruction on the FBI's Deadly Force
Policy during its Uniform Course of Legal Instruction, in the last quarter of FY 2012. Attendance at the
training was maintained by a sign-in sheet. The sign?in sheet re?ected the attendance of 
01/9912013. The Legal Unit previded training on the Deadly Fcrce Policy during the last quarter

11

each FY. CD rovided the schedule and sign-in sheets for the aforementioned training event.
c. DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision

On Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department
of Justice declined prosecution this case.

(1. Luca! Prosecutorial DecisiOn

On nae/2013, SDDA : :e1ephonicauy advised ASAC  : rae wcuao had
declined to prosecute the case.

VI. I Inspector?s Observations

Observation 1: A thorough arrest plan was not produced prior to an arrest operation.
Analzsis l: DIOG Section 19.2.3 provided policy regarding arrest plans:

?The SAC is responsible for ensuring that arrests are carefully and thoroughly
possible, mitten arrest plans must be prepared prior to conducting law enforcement
activities that may result in the-arrest of a potentially dangerous subject. Arrest plans must address ?ve
topics: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Equipment, and Control and Communications.?

In addition, DIOG Section 19.2.4 provided policy guidance regardingjoint arrests:

?An SSA may authorize ajoint arrest with state and local authorities, United States Marshal?s
Service (USMS), or other federal law enforcement agencies. In circumstances of joint arrests, the SAC
remains responsible to ensure that there is a well-considered arrest plan.?

 

Iparticipated in the surveillance to locate and
arrest  An arrest plan was not prepared nor did either Agent participate in an arrest
brie?ng before they were involved in the surveillance and arrest 0

. h7C -1-1,4

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7

 

 

 

 

Instruction 1: ADIC, New York will ensure joint arrest plans in support of other law 
enforcement agencies are well?considered in accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.3 and DIOG Section
19.2.4.

Observation 2: Agents did not participate in an arrest operations brie?ng prior to participating
in the arrest of a violent subject.

Analysis 2: DIDG Section 19.2.3 provided policy regarding arrest plans

?When brie?ng the arrest plan, the brie?ng Agent should stress to the
participants of the operation that any arrest has the potential to become dangerous. Exigent
circumstances may necessitate an oral brie?ng in lieu of a written plan, but the oral brie?ngs
must address the ?ve topics required to be included in written plans. The planning and execution
of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to experienced Agents. All arrest plans must be
approved by ASACS or their designees.?

 

339' Iparticipated in the surveillance to locate and

arrestI arrest plan was not prepared nor did either Agent participate in an arrest.

brie?ng before they were involved in the surveillance and arrest 0

Instruction 2: ADIC, New York will ensure Agents participate in an operations brie?ng prior
to participating in the arrest of a subject in accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.3.

Observation 3: SAI INYFO, did not have his handgun immediater
accessible during the arrest oi] 

Analysis 3: The MIOG, Section 12-22 provided policy regarding a handgun being secured:

must be armed at all times when on of?cial duty. Handguns must be secured to the Agent's
person in a holster, handbag or waist {fannya?butt} pack. Immediate access to the handgun and its security
are paramount. SAs should consult with the PFI concerning the use of holsters other than their Bureau-
issued holster.?

8% had his Glock 21" handgun holstered on his ankle during the arrest of:
An ster did not afford the Agent immediate access to his handan should a quick-

reaction draw been necessary.

Recommendation 3: New York should ensure all personnel wear their pistol in a
hoistei readily accessible during planned activity which can be reasonably expected to culminate in an
arrest or when entering a potentially hostile environment where a quick-reaction weapon draw might be
necessary. 

b6 
?1,7

b6 
b7C -1,7

b6 -1,7


NYT-322

 

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation .
Date: osmosis
- Report of: EC Thomas O??oe: in E1812)
Case one: 
Title: - snoose?re ?nscmem? seesaw
REPORT OF SHOOTING memem
ms VEGAS FIELD QFFICE . .
0211932913 . - . 
Insestigative Period: nemesis 0323:2013

Reference: (ox/seed) Telephone cellos ?ElefEDiB,fron1 Las Vegas AzsAC :Ito . - be ?1

C?ieflmpeotor Robert 3. Shields 11:, and Las Vegas FD-1015, Situation Report to the 137?: -
Difeetor dated 0251 9:301 3. . . . 
SE 1' oasis

{Him Report of a shooting ineident which occurred on 03199013, mselvieg'e
?lgitive subject Javier Reyes, and the FBI Les Vegas Criminal Apprehension Team 
eomposed of FBI and Las?Veges Metropolitan Police Department personnel.

Details

{Um on women, the ems requested the assistance of seams Vegas :0
assist in Iooetiizg and apprehendieg fugitive Easier Salomon Reyes, wanted out of Les Vegas for
Robbery Deadly Weapon, Assamt with Deadly Weapon, 3113 other misdemeanor
{merges Reyes had erimioai history and was know to he sinned and dangerous.
Based. on the request received from FBI Les Vegas opened 3436 investigation to
assist wi?1 locating Reyes. - 

(DIM On ajoiet FBI and LVWD CAT received information ?'om a 
CH3 regarding a potential location for Reyes. After the CAT received the information, plans 
wese made to arrest Reyes. Reyes an associate as a decoy to <3an Law Enforeeinent 
suive?lenee sway ?rom a house where he was ioeeted. Reyes then exited the house and ?ed in 
the opposite direction of LB. A CAT TFG eonoeeting smeillenee observed Reyes leaving anti
pursued him. The TFO saw Reyes turn :1 corner as he ?ed. The TFO used the {wick peak
technique to cheek wooed the corner before grooeediog end Reyes wesweitin?g in ambush,
holding a handgun just 15 feet from the corner. Reyes success?: 11y eluded LE by entering e?home
of anelderly couple, confronting them, and then stealing their oer.

Page 1 of 9

haw-323

 

 

 

 

sewers on'eznaoms, the Las Vegas om, comprised of so: sag, memo TFOs, 

and Henderson PD of?cer, identi?ed a house where Reyes was believed to be staying. The

CAT established smeillaoee and requested a series teem, Ks? units and air support. However, 

before assistance torrid arrive; Reyes exited the seer of the house and began walking sway,r on a
utiliiyeaseroers. As Reyes nested two Agents and a 'ifFG, he hogan wooing. The SAs ans TFO
beoame separated as they pursued Reyes into a neighborhoods As the search for Reyes

 

 

 

continued, FBI SAI Ipurseeri Reyes into a section of backyards through the
neighborhood. . . 
seaweed Reyes in the backyard ofl I Les

 

V?gss, NV, standing near a-iree and breathmg to give Reyes
verbal commands to stop; however upon hearing 3 Reyes started torso again SA
I:Ibelieved Reyes ran eml:lms otters ea in sterile] Re es?
movements ?orri ?ue neighboring yarri located a While Sb
was in the yard o? I Reyes ?red a .49 caliber shot at the
adjoining beekde oil I At this time, was unaware the
gunshot was directe? at him and beiieveri the gunshot re suited ?om Reyes ioteraetioo with
?feiiow CAT members. Shortly morea?er, Reyes repositioned himselfin the haeiiyarci ofI:I
and ?red four shots at SAI SAI Idid not know

exactly from where the shots were coming. After SAI:Irerealied hearing the ?rst shot, a

 

 

 

second shot %sed is? his head and showered debris upon hisfaee ?'orn its impact with a. nearby 

hoiise.? ?rmed to fees the ?nest and was immediater shot center mass in his

vest, approximateiy 4-5 inches below his throat. ed and retreated

- from the threat and was hit again in the iower bees portion of his vest, spprosimareiy

one-quarter inch above the bottom of his vest. This shot removed a seeriori of ?esh from his
Bee a . I 

.4.

. The shots towards letopped for a. "reasonabie" period of time,
so 8 he an to search again for Reyes. As SAI  siowiy moved through the
seems be observed Reyes standing onnthe roof of
I: raoving back and forth behind an air-conditioning oriif. Reyes appeared to be orooe red

over-with his elbows bent along the waist straining his seek to iooic over the side ofthe roof;
down tor.de SAI beiieveci Reyes was scanning
theories for law enforcement of?cers so engage, whiehI beiieved posed a ?threat to the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. CAT below due to Reyes? tastiest! advantage ?ow the roof. Knowin Reyes already used timely

foiee, end Reyes disregarded o?ieers? commands to stop, ?red his wee ii at .

Roses  him three times, with Reyes feling demon the third shot. 8d coasted

?riri bet rovided cover until hesaw Reyes was under the control of feliow IE o?ioers. SA
?ea sought medical atierrtion. He was treated for his injuries at a hospital and
Isis-seeds 

(Wm Whiie on tiie roof, Reyes was restrained by opproaeiring LE personnei.

Durmg a search ofReyes,' a Smith and Wesson .43 caliber pistol hand gun and an empty
magazine in. the gun was found is his possession. 

Page -1,2
-1,

b6 -1,2
-1,

NYT-s-za 

1

2

2

 

 

 

(Wm During the pursuit, CAT members leeated hisck pistel lying on the ground
in'pne ef the areas Reyes previeusly ran through. AJse, found was a basebin cap, believe? to he
were by Reyes during the {pursuit The pistol found en. the ground was later determhled to be a
rcp?ea tey pistel. This replies toy gun was consistent with infematien gathered during the"

n? .

investigation which indicate? Reyes was seem to sometimes carry two guns. .

Personnel assisting in the surveillance eperetien included: 

  
 

TFGS LVNIPD .

 

 

 

 

{Wm Reyes we Meyened in a local hespital where he was opereied on, but

sueemnbed is}: his 
Reyes is desbrihed es:
Name: levier Selemen Reyes
Sex: Msie
Ra?e: Hispanic

Date ef Birth: 10.1213?1930
Place of Birth: Nicaragua

Height: 5?03"
Weight: 196

Eyes: Bram

Hair: Black
SEAN: 609??7~5510
FBI Na: 174 018 K33

Page 3 of 9

?red weaponNYT-325

 

 

 

 

Substantive Case Files

Case ID: mew-mam
Title: JAVIER REYES
ROBBERY WITH ADEADLY wearer?!

 

 

 

 

GWZGI 3 .

Case ID: b6 ?1
Title: JAVIER SALOMON . ?1
lemme, ?1
ASSAIETING A FEDERAL OFFICER . 
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 3
02!} 992013  
i
(U) All enclosures have been reede pert of this report and are identi?ed it} the 
table of contents. -


The ?heo?gg Incident Re?ew Team wee eemgrise? inf-the fe?ewieg germane]:

 

m?peeterein-Cherge (EC) Themes P. Revenelle
Mantle} Aiverez Jr. 5
Assistant hmpectorffeam Leader Assistant I



 

 

 

 

 



 

. A1

 

FBI Laboreterv Sheetieg Recenstrue?en Team {1.31m Personnel:

Evidence Response Team Unit ?a Team Leaeer 195 1
and Teelmexks Unit -- Physical Seientist b7?: ?1
Firearms and Teehnarks Ueit 
Operational Projects Unit

Prejecte Unit Photographer

    
  

.. 

Pege  

SHOQTEIG INCIDENT REVIEW PROTOCQL:
(U) All members of the SERT reviewed the Inspection Division Shooting Review

 

Protocol.

5 (mm on OEKIWZBIB. no Raveneiie spoke With Les Vegas be 1 .2

5 *5 arrange logistics prior to arriving in Las Vegas. On 023202291 3, the SIRT traveled to Las Vegas. WC ?1 2
Uses arriving, HC Raveneile and the members rnet oath Les Ve as EM and SSA
personnel before traveling to the shooting scene which occurred in th' look between

 

I ILas Vegas, Nevada.

{Wm On WROIZGIS, Reveneiie met with the involved FBI 5.95.1b TFO, and
management personnei to explain the review process and protocols.

 

(Wm One Signed Sworn Statement was taken from the FBI Agent directly
involved in the shooting, SAI I Other interviews, assets and observations were 135 - 1
documented via Ali FBI and TFO personnei were aiiowed to read their m302 to WC 1
con?rm the accuracy ofthe information provided. Neither the Poise (Warning and Assurance
so Empioyee Requested to Provide information on a. 1?e'oluntary Basis) nor Fill-.645 (Warning and
Assorsnce to Employee Required to Fronds Memories) were utilized. The and utterviews
ofwimesses were conducted The read the following prepared statement
before being interviewed:

My supervisor has ordered me to submit this statement. I give this statemem at his
order, as a condition of my snipioyroent because I have no alternative but to give this
statement or fees diseipiine or termination. I an: giving this infomation based on the
meerstanding that this statement, and any information derived ?oni this statement,
cannot he used against me in a eriruutai proceeding. I hereby reserve my sight to remain
silent under the us. Constitution and any other rights prescribed by law. -I rely
speei?caiiy upon the protection afforded me under the doctrine set forth in Garrity 
New Jersey, 335 US. 493 (i 967) shouid this statement he used for any other purpose."

(U) An (Warning and Assmanee to Employee Requeseed to Provide Bifonua?on
Following a Shooting hteitient) was executed by ail FBI personnel interviewed.

(U) 011 0212322013, so Raveneiie conducted an out some: SAI: ami b6 - 1 :4
explained the ensuing steps of the process. Into -1 

On KC Reveneiie met ?Wi?l Clark Co unity District Attorney (DA) Steven
Wolfson and Clark County Assistant DAI Ito brief thorn on the details of the
shooting incident. 

 

 

.  (U) On enemas, an exit brief was provided no Raveneile to NSACEI no
i. Raveneiie also conducted an out brief with Sdand explained the ensuing steps of the
process. 

Page 5 of 9

 

. 

 

 

 

LAS VEGAS FIELD OFFIQE INVOLVED 
5.3.: 

SA k?red 1Emma};mm) . b6 -1


.33 137:: ?1

SA 

Us LVMPI)

 

 

 

 

i ?b6 ?4
b7C ?4



 

 

 

FIREARMST ING:

 

FBI L215 Veg?s grati?ed quaii?ca?ons racords for SAI A be 1
review ofthe records re?ected the fallpwinggm: recentquaii?ca?on wim his FBI-issued Springfield

1911A, SerialNum 
DEADLY FORCE mm: 
(vim The has: :1me force ?153? trai?ing: which was re nixed far all Las Vegas

FBI 8A3, was laminated by CD June 2012. CDC emana?y met with 1:6 1
the FBI Las Vegas Speciai Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team and the CAT together on ?1
QSIUSJQGI 2, to discuss the FBI Deadly Force Policy, shunting review processes, 8385, and 1
oomp??ed statements. TFOS assigned tn the CAT were also resent at the 0810332012 training,
andim the best sal ISAI land
SAI Iattanded.

 

H?n

(Him INSD determined SAI brepared a written Opera?anal Pian b6 1

a. 0' Plan) on 02f19f20i3, which was approved by land -1
than briefed to all immune] in the oparation. The 1301.me Deadiy Force

. Palicfy was writtain into the: Ops Plan.

Page 6 of 9

nmm?mnnmi 

NYT-328

 

 

 

 

 

RUBY ARMDR AND LAW memmgg:

(0.3M Ali SA and TFO involved in the cperaticn were ballistic heriy
anccr. FBI or law identi?ers were arena. and perscnael verbally identi?ed
?rereseivee re the subject pricr tc engaging subject in the shearing. .

 

WALL. merrier:
(er/ram FBI Spendacted an immigration recerris check for Reyes 1
which determined he was a rcaraguarr aaticaai previously rammed from the 13.8. by MC 

and Caetcms en 10125121101, for an Aggravated Feicay charge.
Additicaaiiy, aNatienal Crime Infereratica Ceater.(NCiC) warrant ahd arrest record check was
run an Javier Reyes, barn 11312111980, which indicated the following active arrest warrants as the
tirae cf the incirieat:

Rebbery with a Deadiy Weapon
Felony Assault with a Beadiy Weapon
Felony Demeeric Battery by Stranguiatica
Miederneancr Battery Bemestic Violence 2m1
Misdemeanor Battery
Miedemeancr Battery .1Sit
Misdemeanor cheetic Battery 1st
(U {1331513} 011 {1232312613, an additicnai NCIC wrest warrant and records check for
Javier Reyes, hem 1012111931}, was conducted, and determined the arrest warrants for Reyes had
been administratively cleared when Reyes was taken in re casted)! and transperteri te- the heapitai
en 0211932013. 

LABGRAE DRY REPDR IE:

(WM) The scene efrire sheeting was secured and precessed by LV ERT, LA ERT,
and the Lahcratery Sheeting Racer-retraction Team re inciarie use cf tetai station.

(Wm evidence items requiring iabcratcry testing were as fences:

Firearms?cei a a tin
?134 Smith Wesson .40 caliber hand gun WI P3113543

135 Magazine from a Smith Weseerr .40 caliber-hand gun

133 Three expended .40 caliber aireii casings

139 - Two expended .45 caliber eheii casings

11310 Dec expended .45 caiiber sheii caein

1311a pistol ear . b5 '1

. 1312 - Projectile hulier?-agmeats . 1

. 11313 - 011a expended .40 eaiiber eheii?caeing 
11314 Gne expended .40 caliber sheii casing

1315 - Ballet fragment -

1316 Ballistic veer green in ccier

Page cf 9

 

NYT-329 .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. . .
I 136 Replica toy pistol black in coin:

one. Testing 
1137 - Royal blue baseball cap with a white size it":

(HIM) Additionally, the Laboratory Division, oknerics Unit was
requested to generate a shooting incident reconstruction report. The Operational Piejeeie Unit

. ms requested to prepare supporting demonstrative imagery and grapi?ee of the scene.

MEDICAL REPORT:
FBIAgent Involtedin the Shooting: Sail I

(names on men/2013, at theI:IMedieni Center

?inemmt from an injury he sustained in an Agent?invoked shooting incident.
8 examined e?er being shot in the upper chest, and lower heck area of the

beliistie vest he was wearing whiie pursuing Ianier Reyes. Examination detemiined SA 
Sustained a small sim?ow son tissue injury to his chest, and a ?ihomeoinmoer? deep

museie abrasive wound with apparent home to the side of his lower back. '3

mooted and reieas?d from the hospital the same day.

 

 

Su?-jet! In vie: Ewen

(or/3on6) FBI SAI Iresponded to the one Trauma
Center/intensive Care Unit (ICU) at 1809 West Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada, to
transfer custody of the body of Javier Reyes, b?m i??ifi to the Cleric County Comner's
Of?ce Reyes died of injuries sustained timing an Agent?involved shooting ineiciem on
{12!19121313?

 

1 0n GZIIQIEOIS, at appeoximateiy 11:45 pen, noti?ed by
SS that Reyes had been pronotmeed dead at the hospital. At approximater 1:05
min.It on 021203913, SApeke to Coroner Investigate and arranged to
meet her at the hospitni.

. {Him SAI:ImIived at the hospital at approximater 1:2? and found .
Reyes body in Room #310 in the UMC Trainee ICU. Reyee' body was being guarded by a
LWD Corrections Of?cer at that time. Indicators of medicaifsurgieai intervention were
e?dent in the room and on the hospitai bed. 

hvestigato? land Crime Scene Anni st 5 rvisor (GSA)
Iilar?ee? at Room 81 at approximately 1:45 em. mvenigetot%an her
external examination of Reyee' body. This process was photographed-by GSA At
epproxim?ely 2:19 3.131., personnel from Vaiiey Mortuary arrived_to transport Reyee? body from

the hospitei to the Cleric County Coroner?s Of?ce. Reyes' body was mapped in a new sheet and
pieced in a new body bag which was sealed with Coroner's seal nmnber 0494K.

 

 

Page -1,4
-1,4

 

b6 -1,4
-1,4

NYT-33O

 

 

 

(Wm Investigate hated that the hospital?S medical records revealed Reyes - 6 2 4
was yranounced (had at 10:22? pm, on WI 913913, by Bantam Per LIME medicai recnrd ?2 4
#0030902274, he su??ered a ?ver laceration, T11 ?act?re, right arm ?aamw' and was status 
po'st migratory Iapamtomy, iigatiun right- hepatic artery, right thar?cotnmy and resection of
his right loweriohe. Mica} history prior to this event was unknown. investigate
indicated the associamgi Comer?s 0mm case number was 1 371303.

 

 

 

cm RIGHTS. BEWSION: .
I I (Um On 9212'4f2013, 11C Ravenelie contacted Ignacial Legal 136 - 3
Game}, {1103' and briefed him on the shunting incident. 0131 0212512013,  Emailed b7C -3

11C. Ravemelle to dacumcnt the mipt ofthe Iii?mail and inqmm as to the manic ()me local 
AUSA with whom he net:de to coor?inate. . 9

Wm On?mmxzom, pmvidgd a ?ip? ?fths Clafk County
EMS ?nai shooting repm? i, .,

(mm (in mama 14, Insp?ctor Shawn w. 3mm recs-ma an E-mail from Mr.
I:Ito document the pmsecutoxial opinion?fer the Department of Justice, Civil Wis
Diirisia?. In this E-ma?, noted federal ?riminai civil of the
shaming and its a?erm??is not matted.? . 

 

 

 

 

mam; FROSECUTIVE OPINIQN:
(mm) gamma 11c Ravencii? met with Ciark County DA Wolf:an be 1,4
and Clark County Assistant 1315. (ADAM [to brief them 911 the details ufthe 1 WC -1 4
sh?ating indidmt. . i
5 0n 0412222014, ?nai sheeting r?port to 
The report canaluded the actions if are masanabla and legally justi?ed?

OBSERVATIONS:
(WW) The 3131* did not i?en??r any is?sues or qbservg?ons.

Page 9 of?

 

 

 

 (Rm-1 5-3-10}
moms I FIED 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

Title: Report of Shooting Incident Las Date: 06X11f2014
Vegas Field Office 02f19f2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CG: b6 -1
b?C -1
From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY
Contact:
Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
b6 -1
Drafted 
BY -1
Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 05f21f2014.
Package Copy: INSD Shooting Incident Report dated 02/28/2013
Details:
On 05/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 02/19/2013, involving Las Vegas Field Office
. b6 -1
SpeCial Agent I _1

 

On 02f04f2013, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department requested the assistance from FBI Las Vegas to aid
in locating and apprehending Javier Reyes. Reyes was wanted out of Las

Vegas for Robbery Enhancement Deadly Weapon, Assault with a Deadly



NYT1332



Title: Report of Shooting Incident Las Vegas Field Office
02/19f2013

Re: 06/11/2014

Weapon. Reyes had a criminal history and was known to be armed

and dangerous.

(UXZEQHQE On 02f19f2013, the Las Vegas Criminal Apprehension Team
comprised of FBI SAs, TFOs, and a Henderson PD officer,
identified a house where Reyes was believed to be staying. The CAT
established surveillance and requested units and air support.
However, before assistance could arrive, Reyes exited the rear of the
house and began walking away on a utility easement. As Reyes neared
two Agents and a TFO, he began running. The SAs and TFO became

separated as they pursued Reyes into a neighborhood. As the search for b5 -1

 

Reyes continued, FBI SAI Ipursued Reyes into a section b7c ?1

 

of backyards through the neighborhood.

 

(UXZEBEQE SAI Ifollowed Reyes through various
backyards and over cinder block walls that defined each property line.
After crossing through six backyards, observed Reyes

 

standing near a tree, breathing heavily. He gave verbal commands to

initiate an arrest, but Reyes immediately ran south between two houses

and toward the street. to parallel Reyes? be -1
movements from the neighboring yard, but before exit '1

the backyard, Reyes apparently turned and fired a .40 caliber bullet at
the adjoining yard. The bullet struck the top most
cinder block of the wall separating the two yards. 
believed the gunshot resulted from Reyes' interaction with fellow CAT

members and did not realize he had been targeted.

(UXEEBHQE Reyes quickly moved to another yard, behind the yard

where was standing, and fired four shots at 

Reyes? first shot passed by head, impacted a house, and b5 ?1

showered debris from the house face. ?1

quickly realized the shot came from behind and turned to address the
threat. was immediately shot in the center of his
ballistic vest, approximately 4" below the top of the vest. The bullet
lodged in his vest. and retreated from the threat,

but was hit near the bottom center of his ballistic vest, approximately



2

NYT1333



Title: Report of Shooting Incident Las Vegas Field Office
02/19/2013

Re: 06/11/2014

one-quarter inch from the bottom of the vest. This bullet lodged in
the vest; however, the bullet's impact with the vest caused a section
of flesh to be removed from back. An additional .40 b6 ?1
caliber shell casing was recovered, but the bullet could not be b7c ?1
located, despite extensive searching. saw Reyes

shoot at him, so he did not return fire.

when the shooting stopped for a b6 ?1

"reasonable" period of time, he began to search again for Reyes. SA _1

Reyes standing on the roof of a house which was two
properties away from his location. Reyes was behind a roof
air-conditioning unit and was straining his neck to look over the side
of the roof. Reyes was scanning the area for law
enforcement officers to engage. Reyes posed a
threat to CRT members below due to Reyes? position of tactical
advantage, so three shots at Reyes and struck him in

the right shoulder, forearm, and chest.

Subsequently, cover from his

location until Reyes was under the control of law enforcement. An
empty Smith and Wesson .40 caliber pistol was found in Reyes?r
possession. Reyes was transported by emergency medical services to a

local hospital where he later succumbed to his wounds.
SIRG Observations

On 05/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved

shooting incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG
unanimously determined the application of deadly force by b5 '1

on 02/19/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice?s Deadly ?1

Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective action from an

operational standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or



3

NY01334



Title: Report of Shooting Incident Las Vegas Field Office
02119f2013

Re: 29T-HQ-A1271699-D, 06/11/2014

observations concerning the operational techniques, training,
procedural, and/or safety issues regarding its post-incident response

to the shooting incident.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be
taken against a result of his involvement in this b6 ?1,3
shooting incident. b7c ?1?3
(UXZEQHQE Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P.
Gelios, Office of Inspections (OI), I Special
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;Section Chief (SC) Robert

E. Hughes, Violent Criminal Threats Section, Criminal Investigative

 

 

Division; SC Roger A. Coe, East Asia Section, Counterintelligence

 

Division; Unit Chief I FTU, Supervisory Special
Agent I Squad Washington Field Office; SSA
I I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division
5533.: Defensive Systems Unit, 3531:
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA

Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG). In addition to the
voting members in attendance, DOJ SIRG member unable to

attend but reviewed the Shooting Incident Review Team report and

 

 

provided his vote in writing prior to the SIRG. The following

 

non-voting members were also in attendance: I be ?1
Office of Inspector General, Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, b7c ?1
Shawn W. Stroud, Paul D. Delacourt, and R. Justin Tolomeo, OI, 

Team Leadersl I

or, 

FTU, Special Assistant, OI, UCI I

and Management Program I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 



4

NYT1335

REPORT ON
USE OF FORCE 

Legal Analysis
Surrounding the
Death of Javier Reyes
on I
February 19, 2013

Introduction

 

On February 19, 2013, the Las Vegas Criminal Apprehension Team comprised of
FBI Special Agents (5A5), Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Task Force Officers
and a Henderson Police Department officer, identified a house where Javier
Reyes (Decadent), a felon known to be in possession of firearms, could be living.

After surveillance was in place, officers requested a tactical team, Units, and air
support. Before that assistance was in place, Decedent exited the residence and began
running from officers.

CAT team officers followed Decedent on foot. SA  1 pursued Decedent through a series
of residential backyards. When SA 1 got within 15 feet of Decedent, he instructed
Decedent to stop and show SA his hands. Instead of complying, Decedent fled. SA I
attempted to parallel the route of Decedent. Before SA I could exit a neighboring yard,
Decedent shot at SA I from an adjoining va rd. Decedent fired at least three shots at SA
l?one bullet passing by his head, two hitting him in the chest and back.

Initially, SA I could not tell the location from which Decedent was shooting. SA I took
cover and observed Decedent on a roof of a residence. Decedent was looking down
from over the roof. Believing that Decedent was looking for other officers to harm, SA 

 

1 At the request ofthe FBI, the names of all Special Agents and Task Force Officers have been
removed from this Report. 

 

Page 1 of28 pages



 

fired at Decedent, striking him three times. After the third shot, Decedent fell. SA 
ceased firing and was transported for medical treatment.

The District Attorney?s Office has completed its review of the February 19, 2013, death of
Decedent. it was determined that, based on the evidence currently available and subject
to the discovery of any new or additional evidence, the actions of the Special Agent were
not criminal in'nature. This review was based on all of theevidence currently available.

This report explains why criminal charges will not be forthcoming against the Special
Agent involved. it is not intended to recount every detail, answer every question or
resolve every factual conflict regarding this law enforcement encounter. This report is
intended solely for the purpose of explaining why, based upon the facts known at this
time, the conduct ofthe Special Agent was not criminal.

This decision, premised upon criminal-law standards, is not meant to limit any
administrative action or to suggest the existence or non-existence of civil actions by any
person where less stringent laws. and burdens of proof apply.

A Police Fatality Public Fact-finding Review was not conducted in this case. Clark County
Code 2.14 mandates such a review when a police-involved death occurs, and the
prosecutor preliminarily determines that no criminal prosecution of the officer is
appropriate. The definition of "officer" is limited by NR5 Chapter 289 to state and local
law enforcement personnel. In the instant case, SA was acting in his capacity as a federal
law enforcement agent; therefore, he was not an "officer" for purposes of Clark County
Code 2.14. 

The Events at Alpaca Circle and Starridge Lane, Las Vegas,

Nevada, on February 19, 2013

Task Force Of?cer A

TFO A has been a Metro police officer since 2003. In November or December of 2012, a
Public Information Official asked TFO A if he could post her contact information

for any tips regarding the whereabouts of Decedent. TFO A agreed, but ultimately no
usable information came from that effort.

TFO A investigated Decedent?s background. She learned that Decedent was involved in
a home invasion at the residence of his err-girlfriend. He got into a fight with two males
present in the residence at the time. During the fight, Decedent retrieved a knife and
cut the shirt off a female in the residence. He also pointed a gun at the sister of his ex-
girlfriend. TFO A interviewed the ex?girlfriend?s sister. The sister related another

 

Page 2 01?28 pages

NYT-337

 

incident where Decedent got into a fight with her father, pulled out a handgun and
discharged a round into the ground. This was not reported to police.

On February 7, 2013, TFO A received a call from a confidential source reporting that
Decedent was inside an apartment in the Las Vegas area and would be departing
shortly. TFO A contacted Repeat Offender Program teams, K9 units, and an air unit and
asked them to respond to the apartment until she and her team could arrive.
Approximately 15 minutes after her arrival, a subject in dark clothing ran from the
apartment and toward a vehicle.

TFO observed a person believed to be Decedent moving away from police. TFO A
determined a subject in dark clothing who ran toward a vehicle was not the target,
Decedent, and directed officers to the area of TFO F. TFO got into a foot chase with
Decedent, but lost sight of him. TFO A later learned Decedent scaled a second floor
balcony, entered an apartment and held the elderly occupants hostage, while holding a
pistol in each hand. He took their keys and drove their car out of their garage through
the police perimeter undetected. After Decedent departed, the residents called 911.

The air unit observed the stolen vehicle and alerted the ground team. TFO A located the
vehicle. TFO A engaged in a vehicle pursuit where Decedent was driving in excess of 100
mph. I-le escaped.

TFO A conducted additional investigation and learned of a possible location for
Decedent at 1272 Pleasant Brooks Street.

On February 19, 2013, the CAT team targeted Decedent. TFO A conducted the in-person
briefing for officers. She emphasized his liker possession of firearms. Officers then
attempted to locate Decedent. 

When TFO A exited her vehicle'in a parking lot near the location of the incident, she
heard a CAT team member radio that an individual resembling Decedent had gone over
a wall and was walking soutthund.

TFO A drove to Eastbrook Drive Where she saw They waived her
away, indicating the area was covered, so she proceeded to South Christy Lane. TFO A
heard radio traffic advising that Decedent was seen running sooth. TFO A drove south,
I trying to parallel the foot chase. She heard, "[hle's on the roof!" and "[e]astbound"
over the radio. 

TFO A parked on Starridge Way. She heard a male commanding, "[I]et me see your
hands!? and "[glet on the ground!" Immediately after, she heard one or two gunshots
from between the houses and a yell. She and other officers moved toward the sound of
the gunshots. As she proceeded, she saw Decedent on a roof while officers shouted
commands at him. She saw Decedent roll from one side of the roof to another, where

 

Page 3 of 28 pages

NYT-338

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On February 16, 2013, SA updated SA on the search for Decedent. On February 19,
2013, the CAT team had a potential location for Decedent and the officers made plans
to attempt to locate him. 

SA I arrived at the staging area for the operation at 1:30 pm. The location was near

Sahara and Nellis. TFO A briefed other officers. She discussed Decedent?s propensity

for violence, history of running from law enforcement, and that he was known to carry

two guns. At the time, Decedent had pending charges for robbery, narcotics offenses,
domestic violence, home invasion and robbery with a weapon.

As is customary, TFO A reviewed the deadly force policy with officers. SA I reviewed FBI 
deadly force policy as well.

The objective of?the operation Was to confirm the location of Decedent. The

confirmation would later be used in a search warrant to be executed by a tactical team.
TFO A advised that and air Units would be en route. Other Metro officers had
established a perimeter.

Supervisors assigned SA to identify the residence and conduct perimeter support. bue
to safety concerns, SA understood that the surveillance team would pursue Decedent if
he fled.

SA I put on a protectivevest with word POLICE printed on the front. He carried his
SWAT-issued, .45 caliber Springfield 1911 handgun. The magazine held 8 rounds and 
the weapon had one round in the chamber. SA I wore a maintenance shirt over the top
of the vest to conduct covert surveillance.

After leaving the staging area, SA I received a description of Decedent?s clothing. SA I
was with SA ll-. Once at his assigned location, SA I saw Decedent. Decedent looked
directly at SAs land ll. Decedent immediately fled with his hands going into his
waistband. SA and SA ll pursued. I

The agents followed Decedent along an easement and into a cul-de-sac. SA I saw SA II
draw his weapon. SA did not have his weapon drawn at that point. SA issued verbal
commands to Decedent, which Decedent ignored. 

As the agents pursued Detedent, SA I lost sight of SA ll. Eventually, made visual
contact with Decedent along the roofline of a house, 5415 Alpaca Cirtle. SA 1 was on the
east side of the house and Decedent was on the roof. With his weapon drawn, SA I
instructed Decedent, "[pIolice! Stop! Show me your hands!? Decedent did not comply.
Decedent jumped from a high roof toa lower patio roof and over a wall. SA 1 lost sight
of him. SAI radioed other officers that Decedent was headed east.

 

Page 5 of 28 pages

NYT-34O

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The second shot {shot 2) seemed to come from the north and I turned to
engage. As I faced north, 1 was struck by a gunshot (shot 3) in the front
center of my ballistic vest. immediatelyturned and moved to the far
southeast corner of the rear yard, away from the direction of the gunfire.
As 1 faced south, I was struck by a gunshot [shot 4] in my back.

I could not exit the yard due to a wall and a very large and overgrown .
oleander tree, blocking the narrow space between the two houses. I
assumed a low profile tactical position in the southeast corner of the rear
yard and scanned the area in an attempt to relocate Reyes. I reached
around and felt blood on my back. -

After the gunshots ceased, I slowly and methodically proceeded north,
while attempting to maintain cover behind the wall. -I spotted Reyes
standing on the roofof a home, which I later learned was at the 
intersection of Alpaca Circle and Starridge Way. Reyes was standing and
moving back and forth behind the air conditioning unit with his elbows
bent and hands along his waistband. Reyes was craning his neck to look
over the side of the roof down to the street.

I believed Reyes'was scanning far officers on the ground to shoot. I knew
Reyes had shot at me three times and was highly willing to use deadly
force against law enforcement officers. I was also aware of Reyes? recent
history of violence, his continued disregard of officers? commands, and 
other CAT members Were well within Reyes? shooting range at the time.
Reyes posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to my
fellow CAT team members.

I took a stable firing position, utilizing the top of the cinderblock wall to 
support my hand and stabilize my weapon. .I also used the bushes as

concealment. Due to my prior tactical training, I knew I could shoot

through the bushes and I fired at Reyes. I could tell by Reyes? movements

the shot hit him; however, Reyes remained on his feet and still moving.

As he continued to pose a threat, I fired two more shots at Reyes. I could

tell by Reyes? movements the shots hit him. After the third shot, Reyes

went to'his knees and then down on his back.-

At this point, I concluded that Reyes was no longer an imminent threat. I
maintained cover with my weapon on Reyes until I saw take
control of Reyes on the roof. At that point, I believed there was no
longer a threat from Reyes. I called over the radio was shot, and sought
medical help. -

 

Page 7 of 28 pages

NYT-342

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Special Agent 

SA was at the scene. Once another officer announced over the radio that he had seen
Decedent, SA Ill drove from his surveillance location to Eastbrook Drive and then to
Alpaca Circle where he picked up SA ll who was running east.

SA exited his vehicle with SA II. He heard four to six possible gun shots and saw
Decedent jump onto the roof of the residence at the corner of Alpaca Circle and
Starridge Way. SA saw Decedent move to south of the roofand heard him yell,
"[fluck you pigs!? and other expletives. SA heard another three possible gunshots,
heard Decedent yell, and saw him fall to the ground.

Some team members responded to the roof to apprehend Decedent. SA and TFO 
went to Eastwick Circle where they encountered SA I who explained he had been shot.

SA Ill remained at the scene after SA was transported to the hospital.

Task Force Of?cer 

TFO is detective with the Henderson Police Department. TFO was part of the
surveillance team.

He heard the radio call indicating another member had seen Decedent. TFO got out of
his vehicle and attempted to block Decedent into an area. Decedent ran from the area.
TFO saw two law enforcement officers chasing him. TFO chased as well.

He met up with other team members and saw SA ll standing on a wall. TFO went in
that direction and both he and SA II jumped over walls in an effort to follow Decedent.
In the path, TFO saw a blue baseball cap and the receiver ofa Glock handgun on the

ground. He did not stop to pick up these items.

Eventually, TFO ended up on Alpaca Circle. - He heard multiple gunshots. TFO took a
tactical position behind a pillar. He saw a head on the other side of the wall. TFO 
moved locations and the individual came over the wall and was 15 feet from'TFO B. TFO
pointed his weapon and commanded, "[g]ive me your hands!" The individual did not
respond, but, because he did not see the person?s face, TFO 3 did not shoot as he was
concerned the person may be a fellow law enforcement officer. The individual then
climbed a wall and TFO saw a silver object in his hand, but then lost sight of him.

I Next, TFO saw the individual on the roof of 5441 Alpaca. TFO lost sight of the

individual when he moved to the south side ofthe roof of 5441 Alpaca. heard SA
I call, "[m]edical, medical over the radio. TFO next heard someone call 'out,
?[s]uspect down." -

 

Page 10 of 28 pages

NYT-345

 

Task Force Officer 
TFO was involved with the investigation involving Decedent on February 7, '2013.

On February 19, 2013, TFO C?s responsibilities were logistics and placement of CAT
members at various locations.

TFO heard over the radio that another team member had seen Decedent. TFO then
heard a team member say, running southbound.? TFO proceeded southbound.
While en route, TFO heard SA I announce "[e]astbound" over the radio. From SA l?s
i breathing,.TFO believed he was running. TFO then heard SA 1 say, "[s]hots fired 
 foiiowed by a keying of the radio with no voice and then 5A1 saying, "I?m hit!? TFO 
radioed back to SA I, ?{w]here are you?" SA I responded, a backyard,? but SA I was
unclear as to which backyard. 

TFO then proceeded on Eastbrook Drive. Over the radio,_he heard, "[hJe?s up on a
roof." Once it appeared Decedent was confined on a roof, TFO went looking for SA I.
Next, he heard TFO radio, have and WFS. Will transport."

Task Force Of?cer 

TFO was involved in contact with Decedent on February Ti, 2013. During that incident,
7 TFO saw Decedent and drew his weapon on him. Decedent looked at TFO and

. clutched his waistband area and ran. TFO lost sight of Decedent.





was involved on February 19, 2013, as well. He was at the corner of Eastwick and
Starridge when he heard, "[l]et me see your hands." About five seconds later, he saw
the oleander shrubs moving and he called out, "[p]iants moving," Thereafter, he heard
one shot, a short pause, and then two to three more shots, all of. which sounded
familiar. 

At that point, multiple peeple were using the radio causing interference. TFO saw
Decedent on the roof moving around. He was yelling expletives at law enforcement-
officers and walking from side to side. TFO heard a ?shot and saw Decedent stumble,
but stay upright. TFO heard two more shots and Decedent fell to his back.

TFO saw SA I emerge from between two houses clutching his chest, saying he had
been hit. SA I said he needed to get to a hospital. TFO removed SA l?s vest and saw
blood on his back, three or four inches above the beltline to the left of the spine. TFO 
did not think the wound looked like a normal bullet wound because the edges were
jagged. He thought it was possibly an exit wound. TFO checked SA I for other injuries.

 

- Page 11 of 28 pages



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5A5 i and II pursued on foot, over a fence. TFO drove his vehicle south to intercept.
TFO heard yelling, "[I]et me see your hands? and observed people coming out oftheir
homes. He instructed civilians to get inside.

TFO saw SA I briefly between two houses and SA I said, east." TFO said,
"[h]ow far?? and SA I responded, east." 

TFO ran down Alpaca Circle to see if he could locate Decedent. He went back to his
vehicle and drove with his car door propped open. He heard a gunshot. He retrieved
his rifle and heard a second gunshot. He joined the group of officers moving toward the
sound of gunfire. TFO heard numerous gunshots.

TFO saw officers on the corner of Alpaca Circle and Starridge Way. He heard yelling.
He walked around the residence until he had a visual on Decedent. He saw him on a
roof, crouched down. TFO issued commands to Decedent to show his hands. 
and moved toward Decedent. TFO believed the scene was contained and focused
on finding SA I. He encountered other officers who reported that SA I had been
transported.

Task Force Of?cer 

Decedent came to the attention of TFO in November 2012. TFO received
information that Decedent had committed robberies and carjackings and was wanted
for domestic violence. also received information that Decedent said he would
kill a police officer if necessary.

On February 7, 2013. while working the Christopher Dorner-Los Angeles matter, TFO 
was informed about a possible location of Decedent. TFO c0uld not leave Dorner?s
Las Vegas residence as a search warrant was about to be served. He was later informed
of the encounter with Decedent.

On February 19, 2013, TFO was assigned to start surveillance in a church parking lot.
TFO eventually radioed seeing an individual scaling a wall behind the target residence.
TFO soon lost visual contact but he relayed the activity. The target apparently saw
officers and ran south. TFO called out the activity, rammed his truck through the gate
of an easement and drove. He saw Decedent jump a wall and head east. TFO exited
his truck and drew his gun on Decedent, giving Decedent commands. Decedent backed
up saying, kill me." TFO heard other officers issuing commands. Decedent
continued backing up and suddenly dove onto the other side of the roof, out of view of
TFO G.

 

Page 14 of 28 pages

NYT-349

 

. TFO holstered his handgun and retrieved his shotgun from his truck._ TFO saw SAI
pursuing Decedent. TFO ran east on Eastwick and encountered other officers yelling
that Decedent-had started running in the opposite direction. TFO ran back and saw
Decedent in the backyard ofa residence. TFO saw Decedent pull a gun from his
waistband. TFO yelled, three or four times and ran west. He tried to access a
backyard, but got stuck in oleander bushes. While trying to get through, he heard three
to four shots, but the location of the shooting was unknown. TFO looked into
backyards, but saw nothing.

TFO ran back onto Eastwick and to Starridge. At that location, he saw law
enforcement officers commanding Decedent. TFO heard Decedent yell, "[?uck you
cops? from a roof. TFO (3 continued toward Alpaca when he heard two 'shots. He heard
Decedent say, fuck," and saw him drop down. -

TFO climbed the roof to Decedent?s location with other officers. When they
approached Decedent, he said, "[f]uck you." TFO grabbed Decedent?s right hand to
halndcuff him. Decedent resisted and another officer struck him in the back until he
stopped resisting.

T-FO frisked Decedent and found a gun magazine on Decedent?s right side and a
handgun in Decedent's front waistband. The handgun was a semi-automatic.

TFO heard other officers ask, A few moments later, TFO saw SA I
. Ilvalking toward Starridge. 

Minutes later, para medics arrived for Decedent. TFO (3 saw a bullet hole on Decedent?s
torso on the right side.

Task Force Officer 

On February 19, after heariog TFO announce seeing Decedent, TFO saw him walking
south. Hearing radio traffic of a foot pursuit, TFO drove his vehicle to Alpaca Circle
and Starridge Way. He heard six to seven possible gunshots.

Fifteen seconds after hearing possible gunshots, TFO saw Decedent jump onto a roof
of a residence on Alpaca Circle. TFO and other officers yelled to Decedent to stop
moving and get to the ground. Decedent told them to, "[f]uck off," among other
expletives. TFO heard another three possible gunshots, heard Decedent grunt, and a
saw him fall. TFO and other officers responded to the roof. 

Decedent resisted being handcuffed. TFO struck Decedent and kneed him to free his
left hand. TFO searched Decedent and pulled a gun with a black receiver and sliver

 

Page 15 of28.pages

NYT-BSD

 

 

slide from Decedent?s waistband?as well as a wallet, cash, pills, gloves, and a green
leafy substance.

Medical personnel arrived'to treat Decedent and remove him from the area.

OTHER OFFICERS AT THE SCENE

Of?cer 

Officer I was present at scene, heard gunshots and a radio request for medical
assistance, but did not see either shooting.

Officer 

Officer] was ta king an auto burglary report on East Charleston when he heard
over the radio that a fugitive was running through the nearby golf course. Officer J, who
was in full unifOrm, drove to the location. The radio reported ?[s]hots fired!" Officer]
got out of his vehicle and saw Decedent running on the roof of a residence. Officer]
saw TFO with a shotgun. Officer] drew his weapon and pointed it at the subject on
the roof, commanding Decedent to "[g]et down! Get down on your stomach!"

Someone advised that they should not shoot over rooftops and Decedent ran again.
Officer] was on the east side of a house when he heard three gunshots. He saw
Decedent sit, and then go to his back.

With TFO G, OffiCer] and other officers climbed the fence, wall, and up onto the roof.
Officer] took possession of Decedent?s money, marijuana, and a pink substance in a
plastic bag. DecedentOfficer].

I Officer] heard Decedent say he was thirsty, but nothing else. Officer] put Decedent?s
property into a rubber glove by Decedent?s gun. Officer] saw the fire department
transport Decedent.

Of?cer 

Officer is assigned to the Repeat Offender Program. On February 19, he was
assigned to surveillance. When he arrived at the incident location, he heard reports via
- radio indicating the subject was fleeing the area. Officer drove to Alpaca based on
radio information. He heard two to three gunshots from two different guns. The radio
requested medical. When Officer arrived, he saw a subject face down on the roof and
officers with their weapons drawn.

 

Page 16 of 28 pages

NYT-351

 

Officer 

Officer also is assigned to the Repeat Offender Program. When he arrived at
the incident location, he heard over the radio that the Subject was running toward
Alpaca Circle. Officer proceeded to that location and exited his vehicle. He heard
three to four gunshots, possibly from two different guns. Another officer pointed to a
house. Officer proceeded to that location and saw TFO on the roof with Decedent
handcuffed. 

Sergeant 

Sgt. met TFO A on February 19, 2013, to be briefed. Sergeant heard via
radio that the subject had gone over a wall and was heading east. He then heard four to
five gunshots. .The radio still indicated that the subject was fleeing eastbound. Sergeant
heard ?ve to six gunshots. Sergeant could see officers on a roof giving commands
to a subject. He saw the subject collapse and of?cers go to the roof to apprehend the
subject.

Of?cer 

Officer responded to the incident location and was assigned to an apartment
complex north of Charleston. 'Over the radio, he heard TFO advise that the subject
had jumped over a wall and was in a wash area. Officer moved his car to the corner of
Alpaca Circle and Starridge when he saw Decedent on the roof. Officer got his
shotgun from his vehicle and took a cover position since Decedent had a tactical
advance. Officer heard other officers veil, "[l]et me see your hands.? He heard
Decedent repeatedly say, "[f]uck you" to the officers. He heard three to six gunshots
followed by anotherthree or more shots. Someone called out not to shoot over the
roof so Officer maintained his position. When Decedent came into view, Officer 
instructed, "[l]et me see your hands, Metro police." Decedent rolled back to the other
side of the foof and Officer heard two more shots. The next person Officer saw on
the roof was TFO GI. -

- Officer 0

Officer was working on February 2, 2013, when officers attempted to arrest
Decedent. On February 19, 2013, Officer 0 was set up on Christy and Starridge. He
heard five gunshots in the distance, a break, and then more shots. By the time he
moved closer, the subject was in custody. I

 

Page 1? of28 pages

NYT-352

 

Of?cer 

Officer responded to the incident location as directed. Once at the location,
he heard over the radio that the subject was fleeing the area and headed toward
Eastbrook Drive. Officer drove to that area. He saw TFOs F'and and SA II on foot.
Officer could hear officers shouting, Stop!? and "[g]et on the ground.?
Officer proceeded to Alpaca Circle. Once there, he heard two shots. He could see
Decedent He heard officers announce to Decedent to get on the ground or they would
shoot. He saw Decedent drop to the ground and roll out of sight.

While he was chasing the subject, Officer saw a possible gun between the block wall
and a small shed. A different officer was assigned to keep an on the .item.

Of?cer 

. Officer (1 worked on February 7, 2013, in the effort to apprehend Decedent;
thus, Officer Owas aware of Decedent's past actions. On February 19, 2013', Officer 0,
was in his vehicle when he heard over the radio that a subject was fleeing the area.
Officer Qstopped his vehicle in front of the residence where the Decedent was on the
roof. He heard officers announce they were the police. He went on the roof with TFOG
to handcuff Decedent. While on the roof, Decedent called the officers "motherfuckers"
and said, "[s]uck my dick? multiple times. He also said, want to die.? 

FBI AGENTS NOT AT THE SCENE THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT
Supervisory Special Agent IV

SSA IV was the Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge on February 19, 2013, because
the Assistant Special Agent in Charge was on leave at the time. SSA IV reviewed and
approved the operation plan.

Before approving the plan, SSA IV Spoke to SSA V, who supervises Squad 5 and the
Criminal Apprehension Team. SSA IV told SSA that the plan seemed "kind of skimpy"
but, after SSA explained the usual and customary plans utilized by CAT, SSA IV
understood why an abbreviated plan was used.

Later, SSA informed SSA IV that an agent was involved in a shooting. SSA iV drove to
the scene of the incident and notified Acting Special Agent in Charge VI and Acting
Special Agent in Charge VII of the situation. SSA IV also called the FBI Las Vegas Chief

 

Page 18 onS pages

ANT-353

 

Division Counsel. SSA IV asked FBI Las Vegas Division Chief Counsel to ensure the FBI
Strategic Information and Operations Center was-notified. SSA IV was in contact with
Captain who was the on-scene commander for Metro.

SSA IV spoke to SA who informed him that SA I was the officer who ?red his weapon.

Because it was an FBI agent who fired, the FBI took over the scene. Metro crime scene
assisted in gathering evidence.

Supervisory Special Agent 

SSA approved some of the investigation done on Decedent prior to the incident. 
approved the Operational Plan to locate Decedent. - She emailed the plan to SSA IV.
Once SSA IV approved the plan, SSA informed SA of the approval.

During the operation, SA briefed SSA electronically. Just before 3:00 pm, SA 
informed SSA that SA I had been shot, that Decedent had been shot, and that both
had been transported to the hospital.

SSA noti?ed SSA IV and others and went to the hospital. SSA spoke with SA I.

TFO told SSAV that he had SA l?s gun. SSAV designated a room at the hospital for
collection of evidence and the gun was placed there.

PARAMEDICS

The Clark County Fire Department Battalion Three Chief responded to the scene. He
went onto the roof with other CCFD members to treat Decedent. He did not recall any
conversation. -

EMT I responded to the scene. He was the first medical responder on the roof. He
noted Decedent was awake but refused to answer EMT 1?s medical questions.
Decedent said, hate you people? and "fuck." EMT 1 cut Decedent?s sweatshirt and
identified two wounds. He loaded Decedent onto a backboard. 

EMT 2 reSponded to the scene and was on the roof as well. During the ride to the
hospital, Decedent told EMT 2 to "[f]ucl< off? several times. 

Fire Fighter responded to the roof as well. He did not recall Decedent saying anything.

FirefighteriParamedic responded to the roof. He noted Decedent was conscious and
trying to talk, but he was unsure what he was trying to say.

 

Page 19 of28 pages

NYT-354

CIVILIANS

Witnesses 1, 2, and 3 were all in the same residence. Witness 1 is the boyfriend of
Witness 3. Witness 2 is the father of Witness 3.

Witness 1

Witness 1 was talking to his mother on the phone when he heard what he thought were-
firecrackers outside his house. His girlfriend called him to the front door and told him
that police officers were in the street. As he approached the door, he heard two to
three gunshots. He activated his phone recorder and recorded a man on a roof of a
house. He could hear police officers shouting at the man, but could not hear what theyr
said or if the man was shouting back. He then saw officers get on the roof and take the
man into custody.

Witness-1 took the video from his phone and downloaded it to a computer, removing
the audio of him making comments about the actions. of police. He did not want that
broadcast online. His opinion was that the use of force by police was excessive. He
uploaded the video to YouTube. He also gave a copy of the video to investigators. The
video does not depict either shooting. -

Witness 2

Witness 2, a male in his sixties, was home when he heard eight to ten gunshots. He
walked to the front door of his residence with his daughter and looked out. He saw
multiple police officers on the street pointing their guns at a roof. He saw a male
standing on a roof. He saw a police officer fire two shots, striking the man on the roof.
The second shot caused the man to collapse. Other police climbed the roof to handcuff
the man. Witness 2 said there was a struggle to ha ndcuff the man and officers used
force on the male. -

3

Witness 3

Witness 3, a woman in her twenties, was at home on her laptop when she heard police
sirens.

Witness 2 informed Witness 3 that her brother was trying to call the house. When
Witness 3 got on the phone with her brother, the brother told her that there were
gunshots and police activity? at his nearby house.

 

Page 20 of 28 pages

NYT-355

Witness 3 went to her front door, opened it and looked outside. She saw two to four
officers pointing their guns at the roof. She saw a male standing on the roof. She heard
the of?cers yelling at the man, but could not recall what they said or ifthe man said
anything. 

She heard a single gunshot fired from an officer in?front of her house, but she was
unsure which one. She thought this shot struck the man in the leg. Police officers
cbntinued to yell at the man on the roof who was still moving around. She then heard a
Second shot. She looked away. When she looked back, the man was lying prone on the
roof. She saw officers climb the roof and said the officers Were hitting the male on the
roof. 

Witness 4

Witness 4 is a woman in her thirties. She was home on February 19, 2013, when she 
heard people shouting, "[flire, fire!? She also heard banging on her home. She ran

outside and found a law enforcement officer who directed her to get back inside. She

complied.

She heard an officer yell, ?[s]top, police!" and "[?reeze, get down!" It was clear to her
that the officers were identifying themselves as law enforcement. She heard multiple
gunshots. She saw an agent on the side of her house firing shots and then climbing over
a wall.

She heard additional gunshots from "all over the place." She said she heard at least 15
gunshots, possibly more. She said she heard three bursts of gunfire. The first on the

Iside of her home, consisting of four or five shots, the second being four to five shots

from her backyard, and the third being two to three shots from a rooftop in the back of
her home. 

Witness 

Witness 5, a man in his thirties, was at home on February 19, 2013. His home had been
burglarized two months prior. As he was working in this garage that afternoon, his dogs
became agitated. -He thought someone might be burglarizing his house again. He ran to
his backyard and saw a male running. Witness S-chased after the man until the man
identified himself as law enforcement. At that point, Witness 5 could see that the man
was chasing someone. Another officer told Witness 5 to go back inside his house.
Witness 5 saw another male on top of a roof. Once inside his house, he heard 
gunshots. He looked out a window and saw the man who was running from police on a
roof.

Witness 6

 

Page 21 onS pages

NYT-356

 

Witness 6, atwenty year old man, was visiting his cousin the afternoon of February 19,
2013. He went to the backyard to smoke a cigarette and saw a person jump out of the
neighbor's yard into another yard. Immediately after, he saw "detectives" chasing the
man with guns drawn. One of the "detectives" was wearing a vest which said 

Witness 6 heard the officers yell, "[ilt?s the police!? and ?[sltay in the house!? He heard
4-5 gunshots followed by 3-4 gunshots about a minute later. Witness 5 went to the
front of his cousin?s house and saw officers standing in a ditch.

Witness 7

Witness 7 is a man in his thirties. He was at home when he noticed several law
enforcement officers getting out of their cars. At least one had on a jacket. He
saw of?cers focus on a house across the street. He heard officers yell, "[glet down!?
and what he thought was 12 gunshots.- Then he saw paramedics take a man down from
the roof on a backboard. - 

Witness 8

Witness 8 is a nineteen year old woman. She was at home in her parents' residence
when she heard a male tell someone to put their dog away. She looked out a window
and saw a man with a police radio talking over the fence to her neighbor. Soon this man
jumped over the fence of her residence and walk through other yards. A minute later,
she heard 445 gunshots, but she did not see who fired. She heard a neighbor yell, 
ran that way!? -

Witness 9

Witness 9 is a man in his fifties. He was home when he heard male voices yelling. He
looked out a back window and saw a man standing in a neighbor?s side yard requesting
that Witness 9 put his dog in the house. The dog is a pit bull. Witness 9 complied.

Witness 9 saw another male wearing a green vest standing in a neighbor?s yard. He saw
this man point his gun and yell, "[d]rop the gun! Drop the gun!?

Witness 9 moved to a different section Of his house. He heard two rounds of gunfire
and then a male voice saying, "[d]oes anyone hear me?" Witness 9 then heard one
more round of gunfire. 

 

Page 22 of 28 pages



 

After a few minutes, officers arrived in Witness 9?s backyard and the officers identified
themselves and said they were looking for evidencehis
jacket. 

Witness 10

Witness 10 is a male in his twenties. He received a call from his friend in the
neighborhood telling him that the police were in front of his house. Witness 10 opened
his garage and saw officers. Witness 10 saw a man on a roof and told officers what he
saw.

Witness 10 heard the officers tell the man on the roof to get down. Witness 10 ran to
his aunt?s house. He heard gunshots and the man on the roof fell down and was yelling.
Witness 10 recorded some of the events on his phone. He gave the recording to
investigators. 

- Witness 11

Witness 11 is a male in his seventies. He had just returned home with his Son when saw
law enforcement officers chasing a man. One officer instructed Witness 11 to go inside
his house, which he did.

As Witness 11 made his way back inside his house, he saw the man who was running
from police on his roof. He heard gunshots, but did not See the shooting.

OTHER CIVILIAN WITNESSES

Agents interviewed other lav witnesses. None of these witnesses saw either shooting.
In addition, agents canvassed 10 other residences in the area and received no answer.
Finally, Metro officers collected two voluntary statements from individuals and provided
them to the investigating agents. Those witnesses also did not see either shooting.

EVIDENCE AT THE SCENE

A Smith at Wesson .40 caliber handgun was recovered from the scene. This was the gun
in Decedent?s possession. The gun was reported stolen from California in 2009.

A total of five .40 caliber casings were recovered from the scene. One casing was
recovered from 5438 Eastwick and four were recovered from 5433 Alpaca Circle. FBI
ballistics testng indicated that all five casings were fired from the .40 pistol.

 

Page 23 of 28 pages

NYT-358

 

 

Investigators found three .45 Auto caliber cartridge casings. Two were located at 5434
Eastwick and one was found at 5438 Eastwick. Ballistics testing indicated that all three
were fired from SA 1?5 .45 Auto caliber Springfield Armory pistol.

SA WEAPON

TFO took possession of SA l?s loaded Springfield 1911A1 with holster, a magazine
pouch containing 2 magazines, and handcuffs.

The weapon was ultimately transported to the FBI and found to have one round in the

chamber and five rounds in the magazine. The two additional magazines had 8 rounds
each.

AUTOPSY OF DECEDENT

The Clark Coonty Medical Examiners Office performed the autOpsy on Decedent. The
pathologist concluded that Decedent died from three gunshot wounds.

A blood sample taken at time of autopsy indicated that Decedent was under the
in?uence of marijuana at the time ofthis incident.

SEARCH OF RESIDENCE
On February 19, 2013, Metro officers executed a search warrant at Decedent's
residence. This occurred after the shootings. Decedent had been renting a room from

an individual. The warrant was for only Decedent?s room.

The following was recovered:

1. black jacket

2. black beanie

3. 100 baggies, scale, substance

4. photos of two female juveniles

5. - additional plastic baggies

6. 16 9mm cartridges

7. 10 .40 caliber Smith 8: Wesson cartridges

8. 6 _.44_caliber cartridges retrieved from a .44 Magnum revolver
9. .44 Magnum revolver, smith 8: Wesson 
10. Smith 8: Wesson 32 Magnum revolver

1'1. camouflage back pack

12. 3 9mm cartridges

 

Page 24 of 28 pages

ANT-359

 

13. 4 .22 cartridges

14. baggie of white substance, small
15. large baggie of white substance
16. 2 .44 caliber cartridges

CRIMINAL HISTORY

Decadent had been removed from the United States for-an aggravated felony. There is
no record of a legal re-entry.

On February 12, 2013, Decadent had active warrants for Robbery with Use ofa Deadly
Weapon, Felony Assaultwith Use of a Deadly Weapon, Felony Domestic Violence,
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence 2d, Misdemeanor Battery (2), and Misdemeanor
Domestic Violence.

Legal Analysis

The District Attorney? 5 Office is tasked with assessing the conduct of officers involved in
any killing which occurred during the course of their duties. That assessment includes
determining whether any criminality on the part of the officers existed at the time of
the killing. As this case has been deemed a homicide by the coroner, the actions of
these officers will be analyzed under the State?sjurisprudence pertaining to homicides.

In Nevada, there are a variety of statutes that define the various types ofjustifiable
homicide (NR5 ?200.120 - Justifiable homicide defined; NRS ?200.140 ?Justifiab e
homicide by a public officer; NRS ?200.160?Additiona  cases ofjustifiable homicide}.
The shooting of Decadent wasjustifiable under two theories: The killing of a human
being in self-defensefdefense of others; and (2) justifiable homicide by a public officer.
Both of these theories will be discussed below.

A. The Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Another

The authority to kill another in-defense of others is contained in NRS 55200120 and
200.160. "lustifia ble homicide is the killing of a human being in necessary self~defense,
or in defense of  person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence
or surprise, to commit a felony against the other person. NR5 

Homicide is also lawful when committed:

[i]n the lawful defense of the slayer,  or of any other person in his or her presence or
company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the
person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to
any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished 

 

Page 25 of 28 pages

NYT-360

 

NRS 

The Nevada Supreme Court has refined the analysis of self-defense and, by implication,
defense of others, in Runion v. Store, 116 Nev. 1041(2000}. The relevantJUry
instructions as articulated in Runion and modified for defense of others are as follows:

The killing of person in [defense of another] isjustified and not unlawful when the
person who does the killing actually and reasonably believes:

1. That there is imminent danger that the assailant will either kill [the other person]
or cause [the other person] great bodily injury; and

2. That it is absolutely necessary under the circumstances fOr him to use in
[defense of another] force or means that might cause the death of the other person, for
the purpose of avoiding death or great bodily injury to [the person being defended]. 

A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a killing. To justify
taking the life of another in [defense of another], the circumstances must be sufficient
to excite the fears of a reasonable person placed in a similar situation. The person
killing must act under the influence of those fears alone and not in revenge.

Actual danger is not necessary to justify a killing in [defense of another]. A person has a
right to defend from apparent danger to the same extent as he would from actual
danger. The person killing is justified if:

1. He is confronted by the appearance of imminent danger which arouses in his
mind an honest beliefand fear that [the other person] is about to be killed or suffer
great bodily injury; and

2. He acts solely upon these appearances and his fear and actual beliefs; and

3. A reasonable person in a similar situation would believe [the other person] to be
in like danger.

The killing is justified even if it develops afterward that the person killing was mistaken
about the extent of the danger. -

If evidence [that a killing was in defense of another exists], the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in [defense of another].

Id. at 1051-52.

 

Page 26 of 28 pages

NYT-361

 

In this case, Decedent posed an objectively reasonable imminent danger to SA and
other CAT Team officers-as well as citizens in the area. Decedenthad refused
commands by officers multiple times and shot at SA 1, striking him twice and nearly
hitting him in the head. At the time he fired, SA I had an objectively reasonable belief
that Decedent posed an imminent danger, which created an honest belief that either he
or another team member were about to be killed or suffer serious bodily injury.
Accordingly, SA was justified in acting upon those appearances, fears and actual
beliefs. 

B. Iusti?ahle Homicide by a Public Officer

"Homicide is justifia ble when committed by a public officer  [w]hen necessary to
overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate or order of a
court or of?cer, or in the discharge of a legal duty." NR5 This statutory
provision has been interpreted as limiting a police officer? 5 use of deadly force to
situations when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
threat of serious physical harm to either the officer or another. See 1985 Nev. Op. Att?y
Gen. 47 (1985).

in this case, SA 1 had probable cause to believe that Decedent posed a threat of serious
physical harm either to himself or other persons. Decedent had failed to comply with
CAT team members? directives and engaged in a foot chase. At one point, Decedent
shot at SA at least three times, striking him in the upper chest and back. Decedent?s
failure to comply with CAT team members? directives and attempts to kill SA l, were all
circumstances which created probable cause in SA I?s mind that Decedent posed a
threat of serious physical harm either to himself'or others.

In light of all the evidence reviewed to date, the State would be unabie to prove that the
actions of SA 1 were in fact unjustified "in the diSCharge of a legal duty.? Decedent?s
actions leading up to the shooting led SA I to reasonany believe that Decedent was in
possession of a weapon and would use it again.

C. FBI Deadly Force Policy

Law enforcement officers may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the
officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger
of death or serious physical injury to the officer or another person. .k 
A. Deadly force may not be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing subject (must be
able to articulate a threat outlined in the bold'ed core principle above].

 

Page 27 of 28 pages

NYT-362

 

B. Firearms may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles {must be able to
articulate a threat outlined in the bolded core principleabove).

C. If feasible and if to do so would not increase the danger to the officer or others,
- a verbal warning to submit to authority of the officer shall be given prior to the use of
deadly force.

D. Warning shots are not permitted outside the prison context.

I SA I?s actions complied with this policyas well.

Conclusion

Based on the review of the available materials and application of Nevada law to the
known facts and circumstances, it has been determined that the actions of SA I were
reasonable and legally justified. The law in Nevada clearly states that homicides which
are justifiable or excusable are not punishable. (NRS ?200.190}. A homicide which is
determined to be justifiable shall be ?fully acquitted and discharged." ?200.190).

As there is no factual or legal basis upon which to charge the agent, and unless new
circumstances come to light which contradict the factual foundation upon which this
decisionis made, no charges will be forthcoming. 

STEVEN B. WOLFSON
District Attorney

3?

PAMELA WECKERLY

Submitted March 13, 2014
I Chief Deputy District Attorney

 

Page 28 of 28 pages

NYT-3I53

 

 

 

"f b6 ?1,3,4

 

 

 

b7c ?1,3,4
From: Sheen, Shawn W.

Th:

Suhieot: Fe: Lee Vegas Fee ems shooting

,Hene is the D63 declination. Thanks.

wanna Gniginal Message asses

Frem:  I Husdnj.gov>
Tn: Stnnud, Sheen e. .

Cc:  insane); (cm)
Sent: Tue May as 13:34:24 Zhle

Subject: Las Vegas Fen 2813-shooting

 

 

Sent: - Tu . .2e-1ze-1esenn
i



Inspectnn Shawn Strand
inspection hivision
FBI

0n the at February in, 2813, an FBI agent shot and fatally wounded Javier
Reyes? the subject 0% a law enfortement task force arrest warrant, after 3 feet chase through
an occupied residential area and after the subject, who was believed tn he} and in fact was,
armed and dangerens, shut and enuneen the egent. Bases upen a review at the Inspection
Biwision Sheeting Incident Report and a Clark County, Les veges District Attorney Repett en
Use at Fence; we have that the tacts no net warrant a tederel criminal civil rights
investigatien. The nsne cencnes with nee decision. The Clark County ?tetnict'ettotney
declined prosecution. .

the agent was part of a tedehelflocel task force assembled tn attempt to capture and
arrest a repentedly armed subject for whom an arrest warrant had been issued and who had 
nt vioient armed activity ahent which the task fence members} including 
agent, were briefed. During surveillance on a residence where the subject was believed to
hell he left the henidence. When centennted ontside; the Subject retesed to nhey?hepeated
cnmmands by several law enforcement nFFicets to step and to shew his hands. Instead, he ran,
attemnting to elude ennest. There was a foot chase through e,residential area in which some
civilians were else entsiee their hemes.

The FBI agents contrented the subject and he centinned tn Flee with his hands at his
weisthenn. ?ne of the agents remencennteten the subject. The subject again refused to ehey
cnmnands and Fan. The agent was centinning his search toe the subject when he was shut from
an unknown position.' The agent was hit in the front nt his-vest and: after he turned,-he was
struck in the back by a bullet that penetrated the vest. The agent Cheetah inte bushes fer
concealment and then visibly lecated the subject on neaehy The agent stated that
the subject had his hands at his waistband and appeared tn he leaking Fer ether law.
entnecement efficees to sheet. The agent tired nne shet endg'etten the subject did not
initial telly-he tired ten more shots. The subject was struck by hullets in the arm,
shnulder enn chest. The agent did net continue to sheet after the subject tell en the
Poet. . .

The three wounds tn the subject were tired by the agent?s handgun. handgun was found
in the subject?s waistband and a magazine nearby en the neettep. The subject's neepon had
tired tine Penman; the one that struck the agent.

Gther law officers climbed to the rootten end the Subject. He was
evacuated and treated by EhTs hut Succumb tn his wennds, dying at the hospital.

There are severe} lee enforcement and civilian eyewitnesses tn part5 n? the chase and
the shooting. nccounts very, hut bath lee civilian observations consistently
indicated that the subject was runningJ law officers were pnenuing himg ann he

1
f?trfa3tht

 

 

 

wee net eheying pelice commehes. Some lee eefercement efficera Saw the subject with a gun in
his hand he was shete

Two civilian observed the handcuffinge ?ee witness claimee that law
enforcement efficers hit the euhject and another civilian witness epined that the Ferce was
The latter witness a videe retarding free hie Cell phehe 9% agents
hendcuifieg the subject an the roof. The'reeordihg net depict use force that appears
excessive. Hewever} the taek Feree G$?ieere ehe heneeuffee the subjeet stated that
he wee reeisting the handcurfing. And, one teak force efficer admitted that he struck the
subject in the hack te gain cemplienee during hehdcefiing. I

The evidence supperte a cenelusiee that the agent whe ehet the subject 
believed the subject had just shot him and was preparing to sheet other 
perseenel as they were cleeing en his reeftep vantage Quint. The hallietics evidenee
ehat the euhjeet ghee the agent, Law eefereement efeicers were searching fer the
eubjeet and civilians were in petentiel jeeperdy outside their hemes in the residential area
when the agent rired. The evidence ?ees net sepeert a tenelueieh that the agent willfully
used reree that he knew to he or unnecessary, the intent element required fer a
violation of the applicable federal criminal civil righte statutev

Further, the teak farce effieer admits striking the resieting euhjeet in The beak while
handeuffing him. The videe net te depict an excessive use of force under

- Circumstances ef handcuffing hf subject whe was armed and invelved in a Sheeting. Again3

the evidehee eeuld eat support a that the task farce effieer wiilfully used force
that he knew te he unreaeenahle er unnecessary. I a.

A federal criminal eivil rights inveetigetieh of the sheeting and its artermath is net
warrantee. we appreciate the agent?e veluntery statement, faeilitatieg a ?u11y infermed
Please eemplete yeur administrative review. 



 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIXPA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# lE?cv?09133

Total Deleted Pageis} 4

Page 11 b5 b6 

Page 13 b5 b6 
Page 14 b5 - - 

Page 15 b5 



Deleted Page{s) 
No Duplication Fee 
For this Page 



 

EXECUTIVE SUWY
W113i) STATES OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau ef Inves?gatien

Date: ?ex-amen
Report of: m: Christeper weave Of?ce:- Femewmsn
amine: 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
mom OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
LAS VEGAS FIELD emce
Daemon

Investigative Period: GSI??fl?u - OSIGWEOIZ
Referenee: (WW Teiephene cell on 08IOEFZ012, from Acting Chief hlspecter Erie S.

Bimbamn and Inspector Christephee W. Davis. Las Vegas Urgent Report to Director, dated
631?023?20} 

Sammie

 

mama) On August 02, lentil

Iof the Las Vegas Field Office (LY) shot Jeshue Bureheil while attempting to effect
his arrest. Bureheii brandished a handgun and failed to yield to agent commands to step and
drep the weapon 'Ihe arrest 01? Betcha: was a effert we the Las Vegas Safe
Streets Vielent Crimes Task Force also known as fhe Criminei Apprehensien Team
(CAT) and SWAT.

 

Details

(?Him 0n August 02, 2012, at approximater 2:5 1 pm, 
I Iwem involved in a sheeting in Las Vegas, Nevada. The sheeting
(reamed when the LV SWAT and members attempted to arrest Jeshua Burehell at
Arizona Charlie'e Hetel and Casino pursuant te a request frem the Les Vegas Metropolitan
{3393:1111th and Henderson Felice Beyer-{meet Burchell was a
eemdcted felon with an extensive crimmal histery dating back to 1996. Burche? was wanted by
?ze en two separate arrest warrants fer Robbery wi?1 Deadly Weapon and Burglary
with 3. Deadly Weapon

and

 

Beth and H91) are minim afthe SAI: wes a member'ef LV SWAT and 
was at member efLV SWAT and the 
1

NYT-366

 

On July 26, the an Unlaw?zl
Eight Te Avoid teseentien (UFAP was opened an Barehe? by the
{Squad Extensive e??erts to locate Barehe? by were unnecessful and
it was believed Bmehe? had left the state of Nevada far Califnmia. Hewever, baseline checks

were {inane on Bnmhell which reveaied a California driver?s license beating a Glendera,
California address. intended to obtain a UFAP warrant fer the arrest of Eureka-11;
however the shooting ineideni (lectured, before this warrant was. issued.

On July 30, 2012, the ebtainedl
through we District Ceart efCiark Cnanty, Nevada. The investigatinn identi?ed an of
Bureheii, whom law enfereement conic} ieverage fer 

 

(mm 011 August 1,2012, the associate was interviewed by Lv agents an
ultimately agreed to he a Cooperating Wimess The CW advisedl

 

 

 

 

I
(Him TFO membeta ef the requested the use nf the 


Bureheil due in the ?uidity of the operatic tel}? 19:15 pm,  
I:halled SWAT Team Leader 0 request SWAT "0 can act

arrest on 08.50232012. Sm?efed STL the inventigatien te innate Btnehe?.

(Him: The Elan called furl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The plan wan verbaily presented to SSA
Las Vegas SWAT Cmrainater and ASA The plan was
ver 3* approved on 031mm CI land SSAI was deagnated as the 011--

 

Seene Cemmnder 03C). SS Geordinated with SWAT STL Ito ?nalize the arrest
plan. SWAT 3111 as in charge of the SWAT nperatinn and con neted a site survey prior

 

to the arrest pian being ?nalized.

 

I E??arts 1e the Henderson Felice Departtnent SWAT Team met with negative results due tn the short antice
previded print to the pianmed apemtien 

 

WWI be -1,e

operational plan was briefed to b7?? -1 . 8
included a discussion of -1
the arrest plan and contingencies. The Arrest Team so conducted a. wok-through of the second
room, where the arrest Was to take place.

{Wm A?er the brie?ng, the SWAT and PST Team perfonned rehearsals,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

supervised by STL The Deadly Force Policy (DEF) was reviewed draingrhe b6 - 1
brie?ng. The SWAT STL egaa writing an Operations Order at 8:116 are on 0311123012, prior to rm: - 1
leasing the office for the site survey, but it was never completed or approved by LV 
1- management
be -1 a
?1,3
I This information was conveyed to each member of the 1
Arrest TeernJ -1
(WW1 

 

 

 

 

 

I This information was reiayed on the radio
to arrest ersonnel. At approximately 2:50 ?211, Bureheli exited the room, at which thee SWAT
S'I'LIinsseed the'comznand to execute arrest.

(WM The SWAT "fears: exited the hotei room to arrest Bercheil. Butche? ignored
repeated commands and ran towards agents positioned outside the hotel room with his istol
drawn. Egret three rounds from a Bureau issued Coir sam?red 1:6 - 1 . 2
fear rounds at a erase issued .45 caiiber Spring?eid 1911 handgun at wine tame ureheli 137:: ?1 2

 fell to the ground. Wanner approached behind the cover of a shield and 

handcuffed him. Sr Parametric,
MedieWest Ambrdance then approached the subject to provide emergency medmel treatment.
Burchell was transported to Sunrise Heapital and Medical Center by Medich Ambulance,
where he undement emergency surgery.

 

 

 

 

At rot-timeter 3:00 pm, ASAC received a call at his desk ?ora b6 - 1
33 who advis 'rn ofthe shooting inc?d t. was told Burehell was 13713 ?1
hit and all personnel on scene were safe. ASA Informed SAC Kevin
Farmer: of the incident and proceeded to the scene. While en route to the scene, at
approximately 3:20 :13, ASA eat a test message to the A1 .tomey and the First

 

Assistant to adviser em ofthe racr eat. ithin narrates, ASACI Mas copied on an 
mail message sent by SAC Farreau to DD Sean Joyce and AD Keith Bennett, INSD, to report

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the shooting incident.
3 Upon arriving at the scene, ASACIzlwas met by 83:1:de 1:6 - 1 . 4
SWAT ST had aiready taped an offered to provide assistance to b'i'C ?1 4
eting this was an scene." ASAC Deputy Chief
had a conversation and the crime scene was re eased to LVWD for processmg.
A8510 met oath SAlFland SA determined they were not injured.
ASAC offered them semees of the Assistance Program although they
decline}! ?e Her.

 

 

NYT-368

 

 

 

Burchell was pronnunced dead at 7:24 pm.

(HIM The Subject was Joshua Osbar Burcheil, also k?own as Joshua Austin
Bumhell:

Oscar Burcheil

911977
AN 34-198?
I 

 

Substantive Case Files

i?rior t0 the skating incident; the fa?nwing substantive case was aligned on
OWZEIEMZ:

Title: IDSHUA BURCI-IELL

ROBBERY i A DEADLY 

Enclasum:

{Him Ail endow have been made part of this repurt and are identi?ed in the

enclosed table of contents.
A. ??ministm?ve
mam} The Shaot?gg Incident Review 1 was ?gmgrisad of the following
.

Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) Christopher W. Davis

 

 

Assistant 01' ?81"!me Leader (TL)
AFT I
- Assistant Mental-?inmi?lace (A111): 



 

 

 

NYT-369

-

b6 -1
EH: -

 

 

 

 

 

a Team - Totai Station Operators:


. 1

   

 

 

 

B. an Incident Review Preface!

 

(WEB-HQ) 0a amazon, 110 Davis spoke with Las Vegas Field Of?ce SAC 
- arrange lagisties aria: ta arriving in Las Vegas. SAC Favreaa assigned SSA
We serve as the paint of contact for the during the iaveatigatiea period. -
era era ef?ie traveled ta Las Vegas on On GSIGSIZGH, 11C Davis and
members afthe viewed the sheeting scene, 4575 South Boulder Highway, Las Vegas,
Nevada. 'Ihe iacatiea was the parkiag iot of miaena Charlie?s Hotel and Casine.

0a 03f03f2012, at: Davis h?efedl:l Special Legai Counsel
1301 Civil ?ghts action an the shaming

. (mm 011 0810412012, the SIRT met with all invalved managers and agents ta
explain the sheeting re?ew protocols. 

(DIMTWO Signed Sworn Statements were taken from the twe FBI A eats
a?i 

who ?red theif weapons. who was represented 
(FBIAA) an Esq. and Iwho was represented
by (FLEOA). Six other were taken ??om agents who witnessed the sheeting.

Other interviews, events, and observations were docmnented via FDGGES. All FBI perseanei
were allawed to read the summarizing their interidi te cen?m The accuracy of the
preview. The and inhereiews of aimesaes wre conducted valuntariiy. A
(Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide infermatien Foliewing a

 

. Sheeting Incident) was executed by 311 mesa interviewed.

(mm (In Gammon, ac: Davis met with the Ciaric County Diai?et Attorney
(DA), Steven Wolfsea who advised. he maid re?ew the Bi?s Sheeting Incident Review Repert
upaa its eempietien, at which point Mr. Welfsen waxed then issue a preseeative epinien.

. (us/Fem 0a 9310mm, an Exit Briefwas pro?ded by ac: Davis to sac Famau.

NYT-37O

-1,2
-1,2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
     
   
  
  
 

 

 

 

 

Persennel Directly Invelved in the?Shee?ng;
SA Agent {waived in Sheeting Incident
SA Agent hweived in Shooting Imident
Personnel Whe Witnessed the Sheeting:
SA SWAT Team Memim' (Shieic?
SA Case Agent
SA SWAT Team Member {Breacher}
SA PST Member
SA PST Member
SA SWAT Team Member (Entry)
Personnel Inveiveti it; the Arrest ?eemtiee:
08C)
,3 
WATuMedie)

SSTF)


TFO
TFO
SA  Determines Centerf?mergency Medieei Technician)
SA
-  (Paramed:e, MedleWest Amhmance)
Firearms Treinygg?

{mm Review of LV eainmg records for all Agents who discharged weapons
revealed all were in eemplienee with ?rearms quali?cations requirements. 

E. - Deagig Feree Training
{mm The Beedly Force Policy was reviewed during {he'verba} meet plan brie?ng
on OSIGZIEGEZ.

F. Use ef Bed? Armor and Law Enforcement Etien??ere

(Him All personnel on scene were wearing body armor. Severai members of the
Ages: Team were charged with a physieai miliame of the subject and were net maxing Iaw
enforcement identi?ers, e? other persennei was maxing {aw enfercement identi?ing clawing.

NYT-371

-1,4
?1,4

 

b5 -1,2

?1

 

 

G. FBI Indiees and National Crime Information Center 

(anemia) NCIC nos queried on enema 12 and containe? Innitiple arrests and
convictions for Butcheli. NCIC records also contained two outstanding warrants, one from the
Giendorn California Police Department and Las Vegas Nevada Metropolitan Police Department.
 The Giendorn warrant, dated GHMIZOII was for Burglary. The Las Vegas warrant, (one
omenon was for Robbery with Deadly Weapon.

{mm The NCIC results for omen were as foliows:

Charge 1: Robbery with a Deadly Weapon

Chaxge 2: Banglary with use ofwith a Deadly Weapon

Conviction Stems: Felony 

Arrest Date: 0610mm 1

a Arresting Agency: MP1)

Disposition; Dismissed ??fl?fl?i?

Chane: Possession of Drug Paraphernalia

Conviction Stains: iv?sdc?mennor

Ann-st Date: 

Meeting Agency: 

Disposition: Not Speci?ed

(UK. Records aiso reveaied iocai charges in Califonna and Nevada. The
Caiifornin gee were:

Charge: i?C-Possessfongeli Dangerous WPNJETC

Date: 041i 41'1996

Among Agency: Giendora California Police Department

Conviction Status: Misdemeanor 

Disposition: Convicted W15i1996

Charge: PC-Vanoeiinn: Damage Progeny

Date: ?28011996

Arresting Agency: Glendon California Department

Conviction Status: Misdemeanor 

mepon?on: Convicted 62H 3! 199??

Charge: PC-Vondaiiem: Damage Property

Daiez' 0581! 1997 

Arresting Agency: Glendon California i?oiice Department

Conviction Status: Medemeonor

Disposition: Not Speci?ed

Charge 1: Under In?uence of Connoiled

Substance

Charge 2: PCwFalse Identi?cation to speci?c Fence
- O?'ioers .

Date: 0936(199? 

Arresting Agency: Glendon California Poiice Depament

1:

E. NYT-372

 

 

Conviction States:
Disposition:

Charge 1:

Charge 2:

Charge 3:

Charge 4:

Date:

Arresting Agency:
Conviction Status:
Disiaositioa:

Charge:

Dare:

Amsiing Agency:
Convictien Status:
Disposition:

Charge:

Date:
Arresting Agency:

Conviction Status:

Disposition:

Charge:

Dare:

Arresting Agency:
Conviction Status:
Disposition:

Charge:

Date:

Arrestng Agency:
Connection Status:
Diapoaition:

 

Misdemeanors .
Charge 1 - Convicted 
Charge 2 - Convicteci 12:39.! 1 99?

PC?Burgiary 
PGReceive?te known Stoien Property
PC?Falee Checkefiiecords! Certs! Etc
Attempted Grand Theft

omoaocoe 
Monrovia Caiifornia Police Department
Misdemeanor

Charge 1 - Convicted 024?0622094
Charge 2 a Not Speci?ed

Charge 3 {Dismissed HEIDGIZGM
Charge Not Speci?ed

HS~Pcseeasioe of a Controlled Substance


Aausa Caiifomia Police Department
Probation 

Drug Tre ?tment Placement 98:1?2?2094

Use Under In?uence ofa Controlied
Substance



Gleadora California Poiice Depareaeat
Controlled Substance - Mice.

Burglary - Feiony

Charge Use 2 Under influence of
Controlled Substance Dismissed 01f 1412003
Charge a PC Burglar}r 

PC?Burgiary:Firet Degree

04! 131201}?

CA Correctional Facility
Not Speci?ed

Not Speci?ed

VG DUI Aicohoi Drugs



Azalea California i?o?ce Deparueeat
Medemeanor

Charge DUI Alcohoi 1' Drugs
Convicteri 02:26:28}: 0

HS Use! Under In?uence of Controlled
Substance 

Convicted 

NYT-373

 

Charge:
Date:

Arresting Agemy:
Con?detien Status:
Disposition: 

Date:
Charge:
Agency:
?iepositioe:

Date:
Charge:
Agency:
Disgosition:

Date:
Charge:
Agency:
Diapoeitioo:

Date:
Charge:
Agency:
Disposition:

 

 

Possossion of Umew?? I?erephemalia
12! 1 8.02609

Azuse Califon?a Department
Misdemeanor

Convicted 02f26i2010

. (WW The Nevada charges were as foliows:

euemm

i?ossession of a Substance
MPD

Convicted

1
Robbery
MPD
Dismissed

??iWZ?li .
Burglary with a Deadly Weapo


Dismissed

05!?251?201 1

Possession of Nemeties Femphenmlia
MPD 

Convie?ed

Evidence Recovery and Lahorgtory Bivision Regen-ts:

The scene of the shooting was secured and proeessed by Las Vegas,
Metropoiitan Police Department Crime Scene investigation Section LY ERT,
and Les Angela-1 ERT acting as the Shooting Recommetion Team to ineiude use of tote} station.

Testing
JIM) Weapons discharge? by agents, a Colt 16:31  serial number
and Spring?eld Arms 19:1 handgun bearing serial nmnhe were sem: to the

 

Laboratory for ?mc?oneiity testing. The Unit provided 134 SD with a ?nal
repoet regarding the Agent?s weapons on 10f21!2013. There were no abnennalities noted
regarding the weapons.

NYT-374

 

b6 -1
-1

 

 

I. Medical Ream-t
FBI Agen? Involved in the Shoa?ng:

(01m No injuries.
Subject:

(Uf Burchell was shot at Arizuna Chariie?s Hate}. and Casino and transp?rted to
Sunxixc Hospitai and Medicai Center via ambl?ance. All life sexing measures were met with
negative results. Btuche? was pronounced dead at 7:24 pm.

The: Preiinn'nary Autopsy Report, Case Number: 12-07009, dated. 031703;};
stated the cause Bmcheil's death as muttiple gunshot waunds. A totai 0f six rounds were
accounted for from the muopsy results. One: wannd was accounted for at the
because the: pmjec?le was removed during smgery and the entry wound was must likeiy
obscured durhxg the surgery. 0f the ?ve remaining wounds one: was penetrating and
$111  In addition, there was a graze womd an the left forearm and ??ag'ment an

uttnc -

J. Dedina?an the Civil Ri his Divisian
We Civil Rights Section, mm, was noti?ed of the shooting by INSI).
paciai gal (301111531, [30.1 was briefed on 08313322912. 01:: 10f25/2013,
cc

dm a criminal civil rights investigation against the Agents invulved in this shuonng
inci ant. 

 

K. Luca! Prosecution (minim:

(WM 011 08! 1222013, Clark County District Attomey Steven Welfson deciin?d
proaecu?on against the Agents in regards to the um: cf force smunding the {13361 of Mr.
Burcheii. 

IG

 

 

b5 -3
-3

 

 

Ghserva?en 2: Las Vegas failed te assign an appropriate OeuScene
Commander for the SWAT Gperatice.

{Uf Mamie 2: The Special Weepens end Tactics I?clicy Implementation
Ge?de: Section 2. .2 stateti:

mgr/E9196?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

?5
(views 
. eve -5
(ex/med} I
mif?eez? The seer the SAC was never briefed on the re eueg be 1
the operation leading up te the shoe . incident. Al?e the SIRT faced mg _1
delegated the 03C rele to SSA Ihewever SSA is net the LV 

 

We no Operatiens Order was prepared, it is clearly evident this was a SWAT eperation. As
such, an OSC shenld have been designated.

(WM Instruction 2: SAC, Les Vegas will ensure an appropriate 03C is assigned
for all SWAT operations.

12



 

  

FD-1057 (REV. 5-3-10}

a"
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlmniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: (U/ZanQj SHOOTING INCIDENT Las VEGAS Date: 05/30/2014
FIELD OFFICE 08f02/2012

 

CC:

b6 -1
?1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY

Contact: I I

 

Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios

Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By: I

 

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 02/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the b5 -1
Inspection Division?s Shooting Incident Report, dated b7c '1
08/05/2013, prepared by Inspection Team Leaders land



Enclosure(s}: Enclosed are the following items:
1. Las Vegas Shooting Incident Review Team Report

Details:

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 08/02/2012, involving Las Vegas Field Office
b5 -1

SpeCIal Agent land SA _1

 

 

 

 

 



NYT1381



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT LAS VEGAS FIELD OFFICE 08/02/2012
Re: 05/30/2014

The Agents shot Joshua Burchell while attempting to effect his arrest.
Burchell brandished a handgun and failed to yield to Agents' commands
to stop and drop the weapon. The arrest of Burchell was a coordinated
effort with the Las Vegas Safe Streets Violent Crimes Task Force
also known as the Criminal Apprehension Team (CAT) and LV
SWAT.

SIRG Observations

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG
unanimously determined the application of deadly force by b6 ?1
08/02/2012 was in compliance with the Department of b7c -1

Justice?s Deadly Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective action from an
operational standpoint. The SIRG board reviewed the four observations
for this shooting incident. After review, the board removed three of
the found observations. The board found the efforts to effect the
arrest of Joshua Burchell on 08/02/2012 by the FBI LV SWAT team
required the designation of an On-Scene Commander (080) in accordance
with SWAT Policy. The OSC for the SWAT operation was b5 ?1
the SSA over LV-S. The SIRG made the following observation regarding _1
the assignment of an OSC on 08/02/2012:

Observation 1: LV failed to assign an appropriate On?Scene

Commander for the SWAT Operation.

Analysis 1: The Special Weapons and Tactics Policy

Implementation Guide, Section 2.2.2 stated:

 

 

-5

 

 



2

NYT-382

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT LAS VEGAS FIELD OFFICE 08/02/2012
Re: 05f30f2014

 

-5

 

 

The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) determined the SAC was
never briefed on the details regarding the operation leading up to the
shooting incident. Also, the SIRT found the OSC b5 -1
role to however, not the LV SWAT coordinator. b7c ?1
While the formal Operations Order was not finished, it was verbally
briefed by SWAT Senior Team Leader, which made it evident the arrest
was a SWAT operation. As such, an appropriate OSC should have been

designated.

Instruction 1: SAC, LV will ensure an appropriate On-Scene

Commander is assigned for all SWAT operations.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and
or/safety issues. The SIRG made no recommendations or observations
requesting additional training for the Agents involved in this shooting

incident.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if

deemed necessary. The SIRS recommended no administrative action be

 

taken against Ias a result of their involvement b5 -1
-1

 

in this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

3

NYT-383



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT LAS VEGAS FIELD OFFICE 08/02/2012
Re: 05f30f2014

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,

 

chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office
of Inspections Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, b5 -l.3
United States Department of Justice I I Special b7c ?1'3

 

Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chief

I I Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC)
Roger Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; 
Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; SSAI I
Practical Applications Unit Training Division SSA

I I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; I Evidence Response Team (ERT),
Laboratory Division SSAI Firearms Training
Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics Operations
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group and 
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting

members were also in attendance: I I Office of b5 _1r3
-1,3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspector General, Inspectors David Paul Gelios, R. Justin
Tolomeo, Howard Marshall, Paul Delacourt, Trent R. Teyema and Shawn W.

Stroud, Team LeadersI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I OI,
INSD: SSAI I ERT, LD: Unit Chief IPAU,
DAD Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism Division; SSAI I

 

Office of Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb, Assistant Director
Michael Prout and DAD Blair Deem, OI, United States Marshal Service;
I I Special Assistant, OI, SC Tracy A. Paige, OI,

and Management Program 
I IInspection

Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observation

{U/Z?g?ai SAC, LV is responsible for ensuring the Inspection
Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not
complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is addressed by the field

office. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the field office's

WCIASSIFIEDW

4

NYT1384



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT LAS VEGAS FIELD OFFICE 08/02/2012
Re: 05f30f2014

response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires
further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and
not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or

plans to implement.

SAC, LU is required to provide a written response, via EC,
detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve the
Instruction. Follow up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief

I I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MAPEI

 

00

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

5

NYT-385

REPORT ON
USE OF FORCE

- .
- 

cc

"be. 

Legal Analysis
Surrounding the
Death of Joshua Oscar
Burchell on August 2,
2012

 

INTRODUCTION

On August 2, 2012, the FBI task force, known as the Criminal Apprehension Team 
located a murder suspect by the name of Joshua Oscar Burchell. The members of the
CAT task force included FBI agents, as well as officers from the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department and the Henderson Police Department. The CAT task force
requested the assistance of SWAT in arresting and taking into custody the murder
suspect.

A plan was created to take the murder suspect into custody who was staying at the
Arizona Charlie?s HoteIICasino located at 45?5 Boulder Highway in Las Vegas. Three
adjacent rooms at the hotel were utilized by SWAT and the CAT task force to set up and
effectuate the arrest. Surveillance equipment was placed in the room the suspect was
in to allow the police to verify that the suspect was in fact armed, which he was. In fact,
the murder suspect was armed with a firearm that had previously been stolen from a
corrections of?cer.

The plan was to arrest the murder suspect in his room. However, the murder suspect
left his room and an order was then given to the team to effectuate the arrest. The
members of the SWAT and CAT task force exited the adjoining room, announced their
presence as FBI agents, and issued commands to the murder suspect to not move. The
murder suspect did not comply and ran away from the SWAT and CAT task force to the
parking lot of the hotelfcasino. Once in the parking lot, the murder suspect pulled a

 

Page 1 of 11 pages

NYT-386

?rearm from his waist area and pointed it at police. Special Agents fired at the murder
suspect and he fell to the ground as he was hit by the gunshots. Medical aid was
administered quickly at the scene and the murder suspect was taken to the hospital
where he was later pronounced dead.

The Decedent was a suspect in a murder that occurred in late July of 2012. The
Decedent shot a man he knew in the head and stole a painting from the murder victim.
The Decedent later made admissions about killing the victim. Decedent also had an
outstanding warrant from Clark County for Robbery with Use of 3 Deadly Weapon and
another warrant out of California for Burglary.

The District Attorney?s Office has completed its review of the August 2, 2012, death of
Joshua Oscar Burchell, {Decedent}. It was determined that, based on the evidence
currently available and subject to the discovery of any new or additional evidence, the
actions of the Special Agents were not criminal in nature. This review was based on all
the evidence currently available.

This letter explains why criminal charges will not be forthcoming against the Special
Agents involved. it is not intended to recount every detail, answer every question or
resolve every factual conflict regarding this police encounter. This letter is intended
solely for the purpose of explaining why, based upon the facts known at this time, the
conduct of the Special Agents was not criminal.

This decision, premised upon criminal-law standards, is not meant to limit any
administrative action by the FBI, or HPD or to suggest the existence or non-
existence of civil actions by any person where less stringent laws and burdens of proof

apply.

A Police Fatality Public Fact-finding Review was not conducted in this case. Clark County
Code 2.14 mandates such a review when a police-involved death occurs, and the
prosecutor preliminarily determines that no criminal prosecution of the of?cer is
appropriate. The definition of "officer" is limited by NR5 Chapter 289 to state and local
law enforcement personnel. In the instant case, the Special Agents involved were acting
in their capacity as federal law enforcement agents; therefore, they were not ?officers?
for purposes of Clark County Code 2.14.

 

Page 2 of 11 pages



THE EVENTS AT ARIZONA 
LAY WITNESSES

Housekeeper

On August 2, 2012, Housekeeper was working at the Arizona Charlie?s HotelfCasino
when she was moving from one room to another between cleanings. Housekeeper saw
a tall man run past her towards the parking lot. The man was being chased by other
men who had guns drawn and who Housekeeper perceived were police officers. As the
man in front was running, Housekeeper saw him stop, turn around, and pull a black
obiect from his right side but she could not tell what the object was. Immediately after
seeing this motion, Housekeeper heard 2 to 3 shots and she dropped to the ground and
got behind her cleaning cart.

Patron 1

On August 2, 2012, Patron ii 1, who lives out of state, was in Las Vegas with her husband
of 50 years, as well as their grandson. They were staying at Arizona Charlie's as they
were bringing their grandson to Las Vegas so he could catch a flight at McCarran
International Airport. Patron it 1, her husband, and her grandson had checked into the
hotel and were in the process of going to their room. In fact, Patron it 1 was in the
parking lot waiting for her husband and grandson to bring the car around. As she was
waiting, a man with a badge ran directly towards her telling her he was with the F31 and
that she needed to leave the area. Patron 1 next saw a man she described as a white
male with grey hair wearing shorts come out of a room and run towards her direction.
The man was followed by several men who were wearing jackets with the letters FBI on
them who were yelling repeatedly at the man with the grey hair telling him to stop. The
man with the grey hair, however, did not stop and kept running in her direction. Patron
it 1 said she then heard a single shot but she could not tell who had shot. She
immediately got on the ground but she could see the FBI men were trying to render aid
to the man with the grey hair who was down on the ground.

Patron 2

On August 2, 2012, Patron it 2, who lives out of state, was in Las Vegas with his wife,
Patron it 1, as well as their grandson. Patron it 2 and his grandson were in the process of
driving their car around to the back of the hotel/casino when they were met by an
officer in plain clothes with a badge who told them they would have to go around a
different way. As Patron 2 drove around the parking lot, he saw a male running and
heard someone shouting but he could not tell what they were saying. Patron it 2 then
heard more than one gun shot and saw someone on the ground but he did not see who

 

Page 3 of 11 pages
NYT-388

did the shooting. Patron 2 then backed his car out of the area and checked on his
wife.

Patron 3

On August 2, 2012, Patron it 3, who lives out of state, was in Las 1v?egas with his
Grandmother (Patron 1) and Grandfather (Patron it 2) so he could catch a ?ight back
to his home state. Patron it 3 was with his Grandfather as they drove from the front of
the hotel to the back after checking in. As they were driving towards the back, a law
enforcement officer told them they needed to turn around. Grandfather then drove in a
different direction. As they were driving, Patron 3 saw a man running in the parking
lot followed by 4 to 5 men who were following behind dressed in clothes with FBI
insignia. The 4 to 5 men chasing the one man were yelling to the man to get down and
to put his hands up. Patron 3 then heard what he thought was 1 or 2 gunshots. Later
Patron it 3 saw the man that had been running lying on the ground and the police
personnel attempting to render aid.

POLICE WITNESSES

Special Agent 11

On August 2, 2012, Special Agent it 1 was working as a part of the SWAT team
tasked with taking the Decedent into custody. Speci?cally, SA 1 was to be the ?rst
officer in the stack of SWAT of?cers that would enter the Decedent?s room and take him
into custody. The SWAT team rehearsed the plan and subsequently took position in the
accompanying room to where the Decedent was located. The SWAT team prepared to
take the Decedent into custody in his room. However, the Decedent exited the room
before the SWAT team could make entry to the room. As such, the order to effectuate
the arrest was given and the SWAT team exited their room and SA it 1 shouted, 
don?t move.? The Decedent immediately ran away from SA 1 and his team through
the parking lot. SA 1, however, did not pursue, which was consistent with the
standard operating procedures and instructions he had been given previously.

As the Decedent ran away from SA if 1 and the members of the SWAT team, SA ll 1
observed the Decedent pull a gun from his waist. SA 1 yelled out, "Gun" and saw the
Decedent then turn to his left. Next, SA fl 1 heard gunshots from his left and he
saw the Decedent fall to the ground. The Decedent was handcuffed and medics came
and rendered aid. SA it 1 also noted an unfamiliar older female on the ground in the
area of the shooting, which was Patron ti 1.

 

1 At the request of the FBI, the names of the FBI Agents have been removed.

 

Page 4 of 11 pages
NYT-389

Special Agent 2

On August 2, 2012, SA if 2 was working as a part of the SWAT team tasked with taking
the Decedent into custody. Specifically, SA 2 was to be the second of?cer in the stack
of SWAT of?cers that would enter the Decedent's room and his responsibility was to
cover SA if 1 as they took the Decedent into custody. As they observed the surveillance
inside the Decedent?s room before he exited, SA 2 saw that the Decedent had a gun in
his hand. As the SWAT team exited their room they encountered the Decedentboth announced who they were and ordered the Decedent not to move and
to put his hands up.

The Decedent, however, took off running through the parking lot. SA it 2, per prior
instructions, did not pursue the Decedent. SA ff 2 saw the Decedent pull a gun out as he
ran through the parking lot. SA 2 observed the Decedent aim the gun in SA it 2's
direction. Based on being confronted with lethal force by the Decedent, SA if 2 ?red his
handgun one time at the Decedent. The Decedent did not react to the shot so SA 2
?red another round, but the Decedent continued to run. Consequently, SA 2 ?red a
third time, after which the Decedent fell to the ground.

Special Agent 3

On August 2, 2012, SA ff 3 was working as a part of the SWAT team tasked with taking
the Decedent into custody. SA ft 3's responsibility, along with the east of the parking lot against a wall opposite the hotel in the event of a "runner"
scenario. SA 3 received information from his investigation that the Decedent was
armed with a gun, which SA if 3 relayed to the other police personnel. SA it 3 then saw
the Decedent running in the parking lot towards him and SA it 6. SA if 3 ran towards the
Decedent and saw the Decedent pull a gun from his waistband and point it directly at
him. At the same time, SA ff 3 heard other agents yelling to the Decedent to drop the
gun. SA 3 then retrieved his weapon and pointed it at the Decedent but realized that
there were crossfire concerns based on the position of the other agents and of?cers
who were behind the Decedent.

Because of concerns cross?re shots could hurt one of the other officers, and due to
concerns for his own safety, SA if 3 found cover in the parking lot behind a carheard gunshots and looked to see the Decedent fall to the ground. After
the Decedent fell, 5A it 3 observed SWAT team personnel handcuff the Decedent.
Medical aid was then rendered to the Decedent.

Special Agent 4

On August 2, 2012, SA if 4 was working as a part of the SWAT team tasked with taking
the Decedent into custody. SA ll 4 was the third in the stack and as such his

 

Page 5 of 11 pages
NYT-SQO

responsibility was to breach the room with a room key and handcuff the Decedent.
When the command to go was given, SA it 4 saw the Decedent just outside his room.
Commands were given to the Decedent, but he ran away from the police towards the
parking lot. As the Decedent was running, SA 4 heard two or three shots, which had
different sounds. After the shots, SA it 4 saw a dark object fly out from the Decedent?s
body as the Decedent stumbled and fell to the ground. SA if 4 then approached the
Decedent and put him in handcuffs. The medical team then took over and rendered aid.
SA it 4 remained with the Decedent as he was transported to the hospital and while he
was in the hospital.

Special Agent 5

On August 2, 2012, SA 5 was working as a part of the Las Vegas Field Office's
Perimeter Support Team (PST) tasked with taking the Decedent into custody.
Specifically, SA fl 5 monitored the video surveillance. Additionally, SA 5 was to exit the
adjoining room upon implementation of the plan and post there with a shield. When
the command to effectuate the arrest was given, SA it 5 exited his room and observed
the Decedent running away from the building in the parking lot. SA 5 yelled that he
was with the FBI and told the Decedent not to move. The Decedent, however, did not
relent and continued to run. SA it 5 heard someone yell, ?Gun, gun, gun" and saw the
Decedent drop some sunglasses. Next, SA ii 5 heard 4 to gunshots and saw the
Decedent fall to the ground. Someone pointed to the Decedent?s gun on the ground so
SA 5 stood next to the gun until he was later called away. SA 5 also observed
medical personnel administer aid to the Decedent.

Special Agent 6

On August 2, 2012, SA 6 was working as a member of CAT tasked with taking the
Decedent into custody. SA it 6 was positioned with SA 3 in the parking lot. SA it 6 saw
an elderly woman in the parking lot as well. SA 6 went to the woman and identi?ed
himself and told her to get back. As he was doing this, SA A 6 heard SWAT members
repeatedly yell, get down.? As SA 6 turned back he saw the Decedent running
towards him and saw the Decedent pull out a handgun and point it at him. SA 6 yelled
?gun? and took cover behind an electric box.

From the vantage point behind the electric box, SA 6 saw the Decedent turn back
towards the SWAT members running behind him and point his gun. Because the
Decedent posed a threat to SA ll 6, SA 3, the SWAT team members, and the elderly
woman in the parking lot, SA 6 ?red his weapon at the Decedent. The Decedent did
not stop running towards SA 6, SA ti 3, and the elderly woman, and his gun was
pointed at them again. As such, SA 6 aimed his weapon again and, as he did, he heard
a gunshot. SA 6 then fired three times at the Decedent who then fell. The Decedent
appeared to push himself up with his hands so SA it 6 aimed at him again. However, the

 

Page 6 of 11 pages
NYT-391

Decedent no longer appeared to be armed so SA it 6 did not fire again. SWAT then
handcuffed the Decedent and medical personnel worked on him.

Special Agent 7

On August 2, 2012, SA if 7 was working as a part of the Las Vegas Field Office's
Perimeter Support Team tasked with taking the Decedent into custody. SA 7 was
positioned together with SA 5 in the room next to where the Decedent was staying the
hotelwere to use their shield and block the Decedent opposite the
SWAT team in a pincer movement.

When the order to effectuate the arrest was given, SA 5 opened the door to their
room and SA observed the members of the SWAT team in the stack running towards
the parking lot. SA 5 then followed after the SWAT team and SA it 7 followed SA 5.
When SA 7 got to the parking lot he was able to see that the Decedent had a gun. SA 
7 heard people yelling, "Gun, gun, gun? as well as, "Stop running. FBI, stop moving." SA
7 then heard shots and saw the Decedent drop to the ground. Medical staff attended
to the Decedent and the area was searched for the Decedent?s gun. When the
Decedent?s gun was found, agents took turns guarding it until it was collected as
evidence.

Special Agent 8

On August 2, 2012, SA 8 was working as a part of the SWAT team tasked with taking
the Decedent into custody. SA it 8 was the fourth person in the stack behind the room and was tasked with opening the door. Information was
obtained that the Decedent was exiting the room so the order to go was given. Upon
getting out of the room, SA it 3 saw the Decedent and yelled to him, get your
hands up. Don?t move." The Decedent did not listen and instead ran away to the
parking lot. SA it 8 observed that the Decedent had a gun in his hand as he ran off. SA 
8 heard someone yell, "gun, gun, gun" and then heard three shots ?red from the
direction to his left. SA 8 then saw the Decedent fall to the groundthen approached the Decedent and put him in handcuffs. Medical staff then rendered
aid.

THE REVIEW OF THE WEAPONS

SA 2 carried a Colt M16A1. The magazine removed from the Colt M16A1 contained 28
rounds. A review of SA 2?s weapon indicated that it was fired 3 times during the
incident. SA 6 carried a Springfield 1911. The magazine removed from the Spring?eld
1911 contained 5 rounds. There were two additional magazines for the Spring?eld that
contained 8 rounds. A review of SA 6?s weapon indicated that it was ?red 4 times
during the incident. The stolen weapon the Decedent was in possession of was a Glock

 

Page of 11 pages
NYT-392

model 19, 9mm, which had a 15 round magazine with 14 rounds in the magazine and
there was one round in the ?ring chamber at the time the weapon was recovered. The
Glock was operational.

THE AUTOPSY OF DECEDENT

On August 3, 2012, an autopsy was performed by Deputy Medical Examiner Doctor Gary
Telgenhoff on the body of the Decedent at the Clark County Coroner?s Of?ce. it was
determined Decedent died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. A total of 6 gunshot
wounds were found on the Decedent?s body. One of the gunshot wounds was not as
visible due to surgical intervention. The five remaining gunshots wounds consisted of
one penetrating and four perforating. A graze wound was also noted to the Decedent's
left forearm. Additionally, toxicology tests were performed from liver samples which
revealed that the Decedent had the presence of Amphetamine, a metabolite of
methamphetamine, in his system at a rate of 310 nanograms per gram. He also had
Methamphetamine in his system at a rate of 3900 nanograms per gram. Violent and
irrational behavior has been associated with high levels of methamphetamine.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The District Attorney?s Of?ce is tasked with assessing the conduct of officers involved in
any killing which occurred during the course of their duties. That assessment includes
determining whether any criminality on the part of the officers existed at the time of
the killing. As this case has been deemed a homicide by the coroner, the actions of
these of?cers will be analyzed under the State?s jurisprudence pertaining to homicides.

In Nevada, there are a variety of statutes that define the various types of justifiable
homicide (NR5 ?200.120 Justi?able homicide defined; NR5 ?200.140 - Justifiable
homicide by a public of?cer; NRS ?200.160 - Additional cases of justi?able homicide}.
The shooting of Decedent was justifiable under two theories: The killing of a human
being in self defense/defense of others; and justi?able homicide by a public officer.
Both of these theories will be discussed below.

A. The Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Another

The authority to kill another in defense of others is contained in NR5 ??200.120 and
200.160. ?Justi?able homicide is the killing of a human being in necessary self?defense,
or in defense of  person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence
or surprise, to commit a felony against the other person. NR5 ?200.120(1j.
Homicide is also lawful when committed:

[i]n the lawful defense of the slayer,  or of any other
person in his or her presence or company, when there is

 

Page 3 of 11 pages
NYT-393

reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of
the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great
personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and
there is imminent danger of such design being
accomplished 

RS 

The Nevada Supreme Court has re?ned the analysis of self defense and, by implication,
defense of others, in Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041 (2000). The relevant jury
instructions as articulated in Runfon and modi?ed for defense of others are as follows:

The killing of person in [defense of another] is justified
and not unlawful when the person who does the killing
actually and reasonably believes:

1. That there is imminent danger that the assailant
will either kill [the other person] or cause [the other
person] great bodily injury; and

2. That it - is absolutely necessary under the
circumstances for him to use in [defense of another] force
or means that might cause the death of the other person,
for the purpose of avoiding death or great bodily injury to
[the person being defended].

A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient
to justify a killing. To justify taking the life of another in
[defense of another], the circumstances must be suf?cient
to excite the fears of a reasonable person placed in a
similar situation. The person killing must act under the
influence of those fears alone and not in revenge.

Actual danger is not necessary to justify a killing in
[defense of another]. A person has a right to defend from
apparent danger to the same extent as he would from
actual danger. The person killing is justi?ed if:

1. He is confronted by the appearance of imminent
danger which arouses in his mind an honest belief and fear
that [the other person] is about to be killed or suffer great
bodily injury; and

 

Page 9 of 11 pages
NYT-394

2. He acts solely upon these appearances and his fear
and actual beliefs; and

3. A reasonable person in a similar situation would
believe [the other person] to be in like danger.

The killing isjustified even if it develops afterward that the
person killing was mistaken about the extent of the
dangen

If evidence [that a killing was in defense of another exists],
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in [defense of another].

id. at 1051-52.

In this case, the Decedent posed an imminent danger to the SWAT and CAT police
personnel involved in the efforts to take the Decedent into custody, as well as the
patrons of the Arizona Charlie?s HotelfCasino. The Decedent, while armed with a 9mm
handgun, ran from police into the parking lot area of the hotel. The police repeatedly
announced themselves and ordered the Decedent to stop. As this happened, the
Decedent ignored the police orders and instead pulled out his 9mm handgun and
pointed it at the police. In fact, as he ran away from the police following him, he ran
directly at other police who had set up a perimeter. The Decedent?s actions posed an
imminent danger to the of?cers and others, including Patron 1. Thus, the police
personnel were confronted by the appearance of imminent danger which created in
their minds an honest belief and fear that they, or others, were about to be killed or
suffer great bodily injury. Accordingly, the officers were justi?ed in acting upon those
appearances, fears and actual beliefs.

B. lusti?able Homicide by a Public Of?cer

"Homicide is justi?able when committed by a public officer  [w]hen necessary to
overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate or order of a
court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty." NR5 This statutory
provision has been interpreted as limiting a police officer?s use of deadly force to
situations when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm to either the officer or another. See 1985 Nev. Op. Att?y
Gen. 47 (1985}.

lo this case, the Special Agents who fired at Decedent had probable cause to believe
that Decedent posed a threat of serious physical harm either to the themselves or other
persons. Decedent, while ignoring commands to stop, pointed his handgun toward
police personnel as they tried to take him into custody. These circumstances created

 

Page 10 of 11 pages
NYT-395

probable cause in the officers? minds that the Decedent posed a threat of serious
physical harm either to the officers or others. In light of all the evidence reviewed to
date, the State would be unable to prove that the actions of the officers were in fact
unjusti?ed "in the discharge of a legal duty.?

CONCLUSION

Based on the review of the available materials and application of Nevada law to the
known facts and circumstances, it has been determined that the actions of law
enforcement involved in the efforts to take the Decedent into custody were reasonable
and legallyr justified. The law in Nevada clearly states that homicides which are
justi?able or excusable are not punishable. {2200.190}. A homicide which is
determined to be justifiable shall be "fully acquitted and discharged.? ?200.190).

As there is no factual or legal basis upon which to charge the officers, and unless new
circumstances come to light which contradict the factual foundation upon which this
decision is made, no charges will be forthcoming.

DATED August 9, 2013

STEVEN B. WOLFSON
District Attorney

Bv

GIANCARLO PESCI
Chief Deputyr District Attonrev

 

Page 11 of 11 pages

NYT-396

trarrl=l:lisrm [mailtul:husdoiaovi hi or?

Sent: Friday, October 25, 2013 4:18 PM 12763 -1 3 ,4
To:

Cc: ICRTM Shields, Robert J. 
Sub egos Aug 2 FBI shooting

Assistant lnspectorl:|

inspection Division, 

 

 

 

Based upon a review of materials from the inspection Division shooting inquiry, as well as
information from the Cleric County, Nevada District Attornev, we have determine that the facts
do not warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation into a shooting in: two SWAT
agents that resulted in the death of Joshua Burchell in Las Vegas on August 2, 2012. Rather, the
facts reveal that, as he ran from an SWAT arrest team, Burchell posed an imminent threat
by pointing a loaded handgun at agents and civilian hvstanders. Thus, both agents who fired
their weapons had legitimate reason to believe that deadli,a force was necessary to prevent the
death or serious bodily harm. The Clark Counts,r District Attorney also declined prosecution.

SWAT deployed to arrest Burchell at a hotel where he was lodging. Burchell was suspected
in a recent murder, had outstanding arrest warrants for crimes of violence, and was known to
he armed at the time with a handgun. Alerted to the presence of the arrest team, Burchell ran
from his hotel room into the hotel parking lot. The arrest SWAT team, dressed in jackets
displaying pursued him as he ran toward a SWAT blocking perimeter.

The shooter agents? accounts are consistent with the accounts of other agent witnesses
and civilian patrons of the hotel who were in the parking lot, as well as the forensic evidence.
As he ran, Burchell ignored commands to "stop" yelled bv several agents who identified
themselves as ?Fill.? instead, Burchell pulled a handgun. Several agents repeatedlyr veiled
?gun.? Burchell pointed the gun in the direction of the Hill agents and civilians. Burcheil?s gun
was loaded with a round in the chamber.

The ?rst shooter agent, who was in pursuit, saw the gun aimed in his direction and fired twice
as Burchell continued to run. Then he fired a third time after which Burchell fell. The other
shooter agent saw Burchell running toward him in the blocking perimeter, ignoring commands.
He saw Burchell point the gun at pursuing agents and then in his own direction. An elderly
woman was near the second shooter agent. He too tired three shots.

SWAT medical personnel attempted unsuccessfully to revive Burchell after he was
clown. He was struck six times and died from multiple gunshot wounds. The autopsy results
also revealed methamphetamine in his blood, at a high level associated with violent and
irrational behavior.

NYT-397

There is no evidence that FBI agents vieiated the 4th Amendment's requirement
of reasenabie seizure when they fired at an armed and dangerous man who was pointing a
leaded weapen at agents and A federai criminai civil rights investigation is
unwarranted. We appreciate the agents? veiuntarv statements that helped us make a fully
informed prosecution decision. Please continue your administrative review and ectien.

 

 

b6 -1

 

 

?1
Specaai Legal Counsel

Civil Rights Division
US. Department efiustice

NYT-398

 

UNCLAssnrenEsoa? 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 1013112015
I Report of: . IIC  Ileterson I Of?ce: -
Case ms: 2971-HQ-A5789301
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT 
REPORT OF snoormo ..
ST. LOUIS FIELD 
1112672014 - 

. Investigative Period: 1112712014 1013112015 

had determined Washington was located. FBI ASACI


a .

I. Executive Summary

some - JNSD

(Him 01: 1112512014, the St. Lean Field Of?ce SWAT team was involved in an.
agent-involvedrshoo?ng while attempting to apprehend Major Earl .Washihgton in St. Louis,

Missouri. Washington was a suspect in the 1112412014 homicide of his mother, as well as the - 

non-fatal shooting of a responding University City Police Department (UCPD) of?cer: After
?ring from concealment during a SWAT clearing operation, striking a SWAT operator in' the
shoulder, Washington was shot multiple times by FBI SWAT operators, and, died from a self-

in?icted gunshot wound to the head. In the exchange of gunfire,- a second FBI SWAT operator 

sustained a gunshot wound to the leg from what was later assessed to he ?'iendly ?ne. The
Shooting Incident Review Team arrived in st. Louis on 111'2?3'2014.

. (1.1113980) The St. Louis FBI SWAT team Was deployed in response to .a request by the

st. Louis-County Police Deparmlent (SLoro), Which had been contacted by UCPD for -

assistance in apprehending Washington after receiving infomation regarding his whereabouts: is  

tactical team was occupied with the ongoing violent protests in Ferguson, Missouri.

At the request of anda?e'r

P. Woods .direct?ed'SWAT and other tactical assets to assist UCPD.

(UIZEQETO) At approximately 9:00 p._m..on 1112512014, FBI tactical elements arrived at 
a single-family residence in St. Louis where UCPD 

 

a staging area nearl

 

Cominander SAC Woods monitored the operation ?rm: the at the ?eld- of?ce.

consulting with the St. Louis CDC and QGC, SAC William

. Over the next several hours, St. Leuis SWAT and prisis Negotiators (CNS)
made numerous attempts to establish contact with Washington utilizing a loudspeaker; a throw

phone; and athird-narty intiermediaryzl

. Unmanned/mono

5



Iwas the On-Scene. . 

-.bc ?1,2
{bro ?1,2

has ?1

 

 

 



mimosa) At approximater 12:30am; on memoir, a St. Louis county-and City

- (SLCC) Bomb and Arson  utilized totclear most of the interior ?rst ?oor of the

house and vi uall ound-level windows.

SAC'Woods decided against

cta' 'o two

 

 

 

 

-  because the DEA SWAT team providing perimeter security was not equipped with

(WW After all attempts to con?rm Washington?s presence in the residence were
unsuccess?ll, SAC Woods authorised an FBI SWAT tactical entry of the residence, to include
I approximately 2:53 am. on'11126/2014, the swat
team made entry into the'residence, cleared the ground ?oor, and ?scally inspected the attic. At
approximately 3:02 am, a UCPD was released into the basement in an attempt to determine
_Washh1gton?s location. The rethrned to the handler without alerting to the presence of an
individual in the basement. . . . 

 

. (U3333930) At approximately 3:07 the SWAT team, consisting of the Senior Team
Leader (STL) and 10 operators, descended the stairs hour the ?rst ?oor and began clearing the
basement. At approximater 3:roached a large, portablewardrobe in ihe northwest quadrant of the basement. As SA
ulled the zipper to Open the wardrobe, Washington ?red a Glock 22 .40 caliber pistol
from a seated position of concealment inside, striking SA: in the left shoulder. SA 
fell to the?oor and returned ?re with his M4 carbine ?om a seated position.

 

I  Responding to the threat ?our a standing position beside the wardrobe, SA

also ?red his M4 carbine at Washington The remaining nine operators heard %hots

but inititally struggled to pinpoint the source of the hostile. gun?re. Three operator

 

[while attempting to identify Washin en?s location.
Ultimately, eight of the 11 operators in the basemenglincluding SA End 
{?ed their M4 carbines to?elirninate- the threat from Washington. T. exc go of
consisted of multiple volleys as operators worked to identify, locate, and neutralize the threat. In .
the cornea of the gun?re exchange, 3 received a gunshot wound to theleft leg, which

shattered his tibiar Through forensic examination, a bulletjacket ?-agment recovered ?om SA
leg was determined to have characteristics similar to the .223 caliber ammunition

 

:used in the SWAT op erators? M4 .carbines. It could not be conclusively determined whether the 

. removing Washington?s'body. Operators dragged and carried 

bullet was ?red ?om one ofthe SWAT- operators?_ carbine's; however, Washington was not 

equipped with 'a .223 caliber ?rearm.

(Ill/?930) At approximately 3:12 am., as assistea to evacuate ?om the
basement'under his own power; As the remaining operators continued to address the threat from
Washington and render aid to SA: they observed a ?re had started in the northwest
quadrant of the basement. Observing Washington appeared to be deceased from multiple
gunshot Wounds, SA 'emoved a black,- .40 caliber Glo ck 22 pistol which was lying
on top body and placed it on a nearby clothes dryer. The rapidly intensifying
?re forced the SWAT team to evacuate the basement with haste and revehted them from

Alibi: the-stairs are .

basement ?lled with smoke. By  17 non,  operators had escaped the burning residence, with

UNCLAS 
6

Nit-4st)

 

~b7E - 

UNCLAS SEEM 

 

I I'Ihe two wounded Agents were I . -1
transported to Bames-Iewish Hospital for treatment. SAC Woods respondedto the scene upon
notification of shots ?red?and assumed on?scene command. 

w/M) .The 1 1D712014 autopsy report of the 'St. Louis County Medical Examiner
concluded Washington?s manner of death was suicide, and the immediate cause of death was a
self-in?icted gunshot wound to the head. The entry wound, on the right side of Washington?s.
head, exhibited characteristics of a contact wound, to include a muzzle abrasion and stippling.
FBI LD Unit (ETU) concluded a bullet fragment removed ?cr?n
Washington?s brain was ?red from a polygonally ri?ed barrel, indicative of'a ?rearm
manufactured by Glen ck. - - 

(almond) In addition to th? self-in?icted gunshot wound, the autopsy identi?ed 16
additional gunshot wounds sustained during the exchange of gun?re with the SWAT them, as
well as post-modem thermal injuries from the ?re. Several bullets and fragments associated
with prior injuries of unknown origin were also recovered during the autopsy. 

(WM) Ten of the 11 SWAT operators who were present in the basement provided 
voluntary Signed Sworn Statements during the ems was b6 -1
delayed until due to his medical status andhis request to provide a compelled - WC ?1
bio outside law enforcement agency representative discharged a weapon or sustained an' injury
during the incident. A Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Teain collected and
submitted evidence retrieved from the crime scene, which was extensively contaminated ?om
?re and water damage. 

The SLCC Bomb and Arson Unit conducted an- investigation into the cause
of the ?re wid?n the house, and concluded the cause of the ?re was undetermined. The SLCC
. investigation noted the presence of combustible materials in the northwest'corner of the
basement, where the ?re begarnand concludedl Icould not be eliminated as a' 1:751 -1
cause ofthe ?re. - - 

- I  0n-08i?06l2015, Richard G. Ca?ahan, the United Statics Attemey for the
EasternDish-ict of Missouri, declined to issue charges against the Agents involved-in the
shooting incident. 0n 10l28?0'15, Robert C. McCulloch', St. Louis County Prosecuting

Attorney, issued a writtendeclination of prosecution in the death of Major Washington.

II. Incident Details
a. substantive case Files and Background Information
I (WM) Because the St: horns SWAT foam was providing imniediate assistance-to a
local enforcement agency, there was no pending FBI investigative ?le at the time of the shooting 

incident. As a result of the Agent-Involved Shooting, the St. Louis Field O?ice opened an 
Assault on a Federal O?icer investigation: . -


7



 

 

additional

 

 



 

Title: MAJOR EARL WASHIHGTON

ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL
. - .
1 11261201 4
File number: .

 

 

 

 

Case Agent' I I

1 h. Personnellnvolvedinthe Incident'

 
      
 
  

 

 

1. discharged weapon)
2. 
3-.
4. weapon)
- 5. SWAT Senior Team Leader (discharged weapon)
discharged weapon)
7. SA discharged weapon)
-8. SAEQischarged weapon)
9. 
10. (discharged weapon) .

 

 

11. SA  (discharged_ weapon)
c. Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

A?er receiving arequest for assistance from at approximately 7:00 

2.111. on 11f25f2014, St. Louis SWAT and tactical elements deployed to a staging area near

St. Louis, Missouri. At approximately 9:00 an operational brie?ng was
delivered by to all assembled FBI and'DEA to- include SWAT, TOC, 
SABTs, and QNs. ST tilized an FBI SWAT Operations Unit (BOW-issued .
Situation, Mission, Execution, Action, Control SMEAC) card as a template. The card contained
the FBI Deadly Force Policy, which read verbatim.  explained the
overall strategy, the delivery plan for movement into a danger_ area, the areas of responsibility for

 

and DEA personnel, the order of movement, and individual responsibilities. Assembled FBI
?and DEA personnel were informed Washington was a suspect in the 11f24f2014 homicide of his.

mother and the shooting of a responding UCPD of?cer, and?was considered armed and
dangerous. Additionally, personnel were informed the legal resident of] Ian
associate of~Washington nam also known as '1 said Washington was inside
the house with a gun and had expressed his ntent to commit suicide by cop.. SWAT operators

 



. were briefed?le'objective was to determine whether Washington was in_the house, establish 
communications with him, and-negotiate his surrender. . 

At approximater 1:00 am. on 1 IIZGIZOIS, STLI Ibriefed an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

erations assault plan, which included i 
STL reiterated the FBI SWAT team had responsihi itv-forl I 
I with DEA having responsibility for I The FBI SWAT team 
?UNCLas?stsisDI/aearz . I - 
8

NYP402

?-1;2
-1,2

 

be 
?1
b7E ?1

 

 

 

 

UNCLAS SIFIEDIIEBEQ

 

 

 

 

(1. Events Leading Up to the Shooting

- (UIIEQECD On 11r25r2014, UCPD requested the assistance of chro to resend

Washington after receiving information he was located inside a residence at

 

Dueto the ongoing violent protests in nearby Ferguson, Missouri, the tactical.

phone, and, as a third-party intermediary,
I I

team, which ordinarin would have provided support to UCPD, was unavailable.

(UKEEGEU) At approximater 7:00 p.ni..on 14, Chief I on M. Belmar
contacted SAC woods and requested the FBI to assist the UCPD. After consulting with his 
CDC and OGC, Woods determined FBI SWAT assistance was appropriate and agreed to
deploy SWAT assets to assist UCPD. In addition, SAC Woods requested DEA tactical resources
to augment the effort. SAC Woods had previously arranged for Title 13 deputation for the St.
Louis DEA SWAT team in anticipation of joint operations.

(Wm At approxirnately 9:00 pm. on 1.1l25l20l4, FBI tactical elements, including

 

 

 

SWAT, TOC, SABTs. and tibia; arrivedat a staaina area nearl FBI assets
included aI IFBI,
UCPD, and assets were present at the scene, with ASACI Ias

 

the Orr-Scene Commander . SAC Woods monitored the operation from the CP at the ?eld
of?ce. UCPD maintained a perimeter around the residence until FBI SWAT arrived;

. The 0st approved an oral escapes to determine whether Washington 
was in the house, establish communications with him, and negotiate his surrender, with a SWAT

tactical entry as the last resort. :Iprovided consent to law enforcement to search the
residence. - . . . .

(Iii/?960) fiver the next several hours; St. Louis SWAT and CNs made numerous 
attempts to establish contact with Washington inside the house, utilizing. a loudspeaker,,a throw

 

(Ur/seam At approximately 12:30 ant. on Hammer and at the request of the FBI. an

 

 

Iin' an. uhsuccess?rl'e??ort to determine Washington?s? location.

. Folloan extensive,? unsuccessful efforts to elicit a response from
Washington or determinehis location, SAC Woods authorized a SWAT tactical entry of the
residence, to include authority forl IDEA Was assigned to provide
perimetBr security. A verbal brie?ng of the op cratith plan, to include a verbatim recitation of
the Deadly Force Policy, was provided to all FBI and DEA Agents. SAC Woods re-1,2
-1NYT-403

 

 

 

 

UNCLAS motherhood

dif?de Esets from?the'Ferggsog Missouri protests to provide]: 3 ME '1
I at the ?eld of?ce CP and the TOC. . 

 

 

e. Shooting Incident Details

(ox/Foes} At approximatelv 2:53 am. on masher-4, SWAT made entry into the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

residenceJ I SWAT cleared the ground ?oor of the ME ?1
residence I According to the approved plan, at approximater
3:02 am.
I I 1
(WM) At approximately 3 :07 am, the SWAT STLI ME 1

 

down the basement the base of the stairs, in the southwest corner of the
basement. The STL and 10 SWAT operators then descended the stairs, announced their
presence, andbegan to clear the basement. The basement was extremer cluttered with ?rrnitur?e,
storage units, and large volumes of clothing which was piled on' the ?oor and stored in hanging
and-upright wardrobe bags. Operators were forced to navigate through narrow pathways carved
. through the clutter in the basement, slowing the pace of the clearing operation. 0 erators split
intolte?ams to clear Sectors of the basement. At approximately 3:10 am, working
his way north along the western wall of the basement, approached a large, portable wardrobe

 

 

 

 

closet standing upright r. ear the washer and dryer on the northwest side ofthe basement. At the
same time, SA approached the upright wardrobe from the north. With .136 '1
providing cover, SQ  began to open the zipper on the front of the wardrobe. Observing. WC 1
motion inside, SA recoiled, and was struck in-the left clavicle by a round ?red from

inside the wardrobe. He fell to the ?oor, crawled to a position of cover, and returned ?re with
. his M4 from a seated position. The found which struck SAEIi-?rachrred his clavicle and
lodged in his shoulder strap annor insert. -

In response to thethreat,? his M4 into 'the wardrobe from a
. standing position beside it. .Other operators initiail}r 'had dif?culty pinpointing the source of the
hostile qn?re; however, upon identifying the wardrobe as the source of the hostile gun?re, SA


 

 

 

 

 

 

Al ISAI land SA I:Idisc_harged their b6 ?1
weapons to eliminate the threat. In all, eight of the 11 operators ?red M4 carbines durin the MC ?1
course of the exchange of gun?re. Additionally, SAI I I and SAijl ME '1
I The-exchange of gun?re

 

 

consisted of multiple volleys as operators worked to identify, locate, and neutralized the threat.
In the course of the exchange of gun?re, SAI:Ireceived a gunshot wound to his left leg,
which shattered his tibia. It was later determined through forensic and visual examinations 
erfo'rmed by LD, FTU, and TD, Ballistics Research Facility (BRF), the bullet which struck SA
had characteristics similar to ammunition ?red from .223 caliber carbines, such as those
carried by FBI SWAT operators. 
(UIZEGEII At approximately 3:12 am, 5 evacuated the res'dence with the
assistance of and Deputy.U.S. Marshal (DUSM) who was assigned 1 3
to the DEA TF. As- operators remaining in the basement continued to address the threat from me _i 3
Washington and render aid to they obserr'rcd a ?re had started in the northwest area 

UNCLAssr'Frnorhueelj 

 

 

 

 

 

1-0

NYT-4D4

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

of the basement. By approximately 3:15 a.m..l I
which was be ginning to spread throughout the structure. SWAT craters determined
Washington appeared to be?deceased ?'om multiple gunshot wounds. SA 'emoved a black,

- Glock 22 .40 caliber pistol from Washington?s chest and placed it atop a nearby clothes dryer.
Operators evacuated the residence at approximately 3: 15 am. as the basement ?lled with smoke. -

Several operatorsreportetl they were at the point of losing consciousness ?om smoke inhalation
while ascending the basement stairs; however, operators did not seek medical treatment for
smoke inhalationand did not report?lingering effects from expoSure to smoke. All erators
evacuated the residence by 3:17 am, at which time smoke wasclearly visible]:
emanating item the chimney as well as ground ?oor windows. The urgency of the evacuation
from the basement precluded the removal of Washington?s body. Agentsl I
were transported to Barnes?Jewish Hospital for treatment of gunshot wounds to the left clavicle
and left leg, respectively. -

(Wm At approximatel 3: 14 am. East Central Dispatch Center received -
noti?cation of shots ?red atl approximately 3 :24 3.111., a second

call was received requesting ?re and rescue.
Post Shooting Details

Upon the noti?cation of shots ?red, SAC Woods immediately responded to
the-scene and coordinated the re5ponse with UCPD and SAC Woods ma'de noti?cation
of the shooting to the Deputy Director and CID AD Joseph S. Campbell.

Washington?s body was "recoye?red after the ?re was extinguished and the
scene was secured. Washington was ronounced dead at 10:32 am. on 1132612014 by St. Louis
County Medicclegal Examined?:I
St. Louis County Medical Examiner?s facility for an autopsy. The autopsy was conducted on
11.970014. - . . 

(U/tseecrj Signed Sworn Statements of 11 1 SWAT operators and interviewees over '40

. FBI Agents, DEA Agents, DEA TFOs, and" local police of?cers were documented. The

statements corroborated the accounting of the shooting made by the SWAT operators, and were
consistent with the physical evidence.- No other law enforcement of?cers outside "of the FBI

. ?nd their weapons or-were injured.

g. Accounting of Shots Fired

The LD examined 69 .223 cartridge casings from SWAT operator 
weapons recovered at the scene. 01? the 69 cartridge casings, 64 were attributed?to speci?c
weapons. The remaining ?ve cartridge casings lacked suf?cient microscopic marks of value to

- be attributed to speci?c weapons. 'Although eight SWAT Operators. stated they ?red their

weapons, cartridge casingscould be attributed to only seven weapons. Because ?ve cartridge
casings could not be associated with a speci?c weapon and because some operators were unable
to report exactly how many rounds were loaded ill-their magazines, complete attribution of
rounds ?red to weapons could not be achieved.

1-

 

Washington?s body was later transported NWT-405

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIEDUQ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SWAT Operator Ri?e con?rmed Shots
rt .
SA Colt mm (.223 daiibei) 4
SAI Colt M4A1 (.223 caliber) - 20
SAI Colt (.223 caliber) 3
SAI Colt M4A1 (.223 caliber) 5 -
Colt (.223 caliber) 23
SAI . Colt M16A2 (.223 caliber) 4
SAI I Hydra-made Division I 5
3 General Motors Corp oration
. M16A1 (.223 caliber) 
SAI I Colt (.223 caliber) Unknown -- none identi?ed

 

 

 

Slibject Weapon"

Washinan ?red at least three rounds from a Glock 22, .40 caliber
pistol, Serial iiI:I based on three recovered shell casings. The Glock 22 was recovered
from on top of the dryer where SA laced it prior to-evacuating the basement. The Glock

22 was recovered in an unloaded condition with the slide open, along with?an empty .40 caliber .

Glock magazine and two unspent .40 caliber cartridges. LD, FTU determined rounds ?red from
the 'Glock 22 included the_bullet recovered from shoulder strap armor insert; the
bullet?'agments recovered ?om Washington?s brain, and an additional bulletjacket as Well as.
bullet jacket ?agments. Due to the high degree of scene contamination from ?re and water, as
well as the ?agmentadon of recovered items, it was not possible to conclusively detennine the
?total number'of rounds ?red from Washington?s weapon. The Glock 22 functioned normally
when tested with the magazine seized with the pistol. No DNA or latent prints of value were
recovered ?om the weapon. - 

(Him A gueg of the National Crime Information Center CIC) database

for a Glock 22, serial numbe as performed bui no record was located. An FBI Trace
Summary Report revealed the weapon was purchased legall from a Shooters Shack in Poplar
Bluff, Missouri on 03! 1212013 by an individual residin Missouri. The original buyer
re-sold the weapon privately to a buyer  Missouri, in approximately June 2013.
fIhe second owner reusold the weapon privately in early 2014 to an' individual residing 
Missouri. The third owner reported the weapon stolen to ihe St. Louis MetroPolitan Police
Department on 09279014; however, the victim did not provide the serial number at the time of
the theft. The owner reported the weapon stolen ?om his vehicle while parked at the City
Mu?eum in St. Louis. . - 

 

(WM) On 081269015, the UCPD took possession from the'FBI of
Washington's weapon in furtherance of the ongoing investigation into the homicide of .
Washington?s mother. . -

Subject Information:


. 12- -

 

be ?1,2

NYT-406

b6 -1
b7C -1

b7C -1,2

b6 -2
b7C -2

 

 



ashington, Major

lack
[211
70 

rown
lack
1/1981
96-84-7003
. 2859NBO

 

An NCIC criminal histon record included arrests for possession of controlled.
substances, burglary, assault of a law enforcement of?cer, and resisting arrest. A review of
Missouri Departht of Corrections records revealed Washington was incarcerated ?'om 
06/14/2006 through 104(123'2006 and 0492/2011 through 01/05!2014. As-a result of the
11122f2015~and 11f24f2015 incidents at his mother?s residence, the UCPD issued a ?wanted?
neti?cation in the Rogional Justice Information Service (REHS) for Washington pending formal
charges, which had not been issued at the time of Washington?s death. 

i. Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

@9an an members of the St. Louis FBI SWAT team wore ballistic helmets and 
body armor with FBI flaps displayed in the front and back.

- (Uni/FE:in TD, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) inspected the annor kit worn by SA
 : durin the incident. The body armor Was manufactured 
Was Mode I In addition, Iwore 

 

 

{Wm DSU examination indicated no damage to the ?oat or rear armor panels of SA.
5 armor. kit; however, left shoulder strap insert sustained severe damage
?'om the bullet ?red by Washington, which was encapsulated in the ballistic shoulder strap
insert. DSU asserted without the augmentation of the shoulder armor irrserts, sElwsuld
have sustained a penetration in the area o?his left clavicle. DSU assessed the shoulder
strap armor inserts performed as designed. - 

j; Forensic Summary

 St. Louis Field Of?ce ERT processed the scene. Items recovered included 69
- .223 caliber cartridge casings, a Glock 22 (.40 caliber) pistol, three .40 caliber cartridge casings,
and numerous bullets, bullet jackets, and bullet jacket ?agments. Additionally, ERT seized



13-

Fi?-40?



b6 -

13713

136 -
b7C
b7E

 

-1
-1

-1
-1

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

bullets, bullet jackets; and bullet ??agments recovered from Washingtonfs body subsequent to his .
. autopsy. All of this evidence was examined by Li). 

(ll/m SAI:IGunshot Wound

(tn/need) During the exchange of gun?re with Washington SA:
sustained a gunshot wound to his left leg. No photographs of the gunshot wound were obtained
because the severity of the injury necessitated emergency surgery. subsequently obtained
medical racerds relating to the treatment of the hot wound at Barnes-Jewish Hospital.
Surgical records indicated the bullet entered 3&5 lea leg at mid-calf, transited the leg,
"in?icting a comminuted fracture of the left tibia, and exited on the right side of the calf. The
round shattered on impact, producing shrapnel which lodged in the soft tissue of SA :fs
leg. A quantity of small shrapnel was visually and radioscopically observed but was not
removed, with the exception of single bullet jacket fragment which was removed ?om SA
:5 leg and processed by ID, FTU. determined the bullet jacket fragment was ?our
a barrel ri?ed with lands and grooves with a right twist, consistent with FBI-issued .223 carbines.
Due to a lack of corresponding microscopic marks of value, no conclusion could be reached as to
whether the bullet jacket ?agment was ?red?om a SWAT operator?s weapon; however, the
ri?ing was similar to the ri?ing produced by the SWAT operators? weapons. .

- In order to determine the caliber of the bullet jacket fragment, 
Ballistic Research Facility (BRF) test ?red .223 and .40 caliber rounds into clothing similar to

- that worn by 342cm 111262914. BRF utilized a GIo'ck 22 pistol and a current FBI issue

.223 carbine to conduct the test. All shots were ?red at a distance of 10 feet. BRF conducted a
visual comparison of the bullet holes in the clothing worn by End the bullet holes
test-?red into similar clothing. BRF concluded the holes in clothing were simiiar
in appearance to the .223 test shots. The .40 caliber test shots were noticeably larger in diameter

than the holes in SASS clothing.

BRF examined the the bullet holes test-?red into clothing similar to
that worn by which resulted ?'om direct-?re, and observed they were round,
symmetrical, and clean-edged in appearance, consistent with the bullet holes in 

trousers and thermal undergarments.

(HIM). LD, FTU conducted a visual impaction of the bullet holes in the
clothing worn by SA : on 1122612014. SAI s_tactical trousers and thermal
undergarment both contained two small, round, symmetrical bullet holes on either side of the left I
leg at mid-calf; consistent with the track of the bullet as described in the medical records: The

 

.trousc'rs and undergarments were microscoPically examined and chemically processed for

gunshot residues. A muzzleto-target distance could not be determined based upon the available,
forensic evidence.

(UM) Based upon available forensic evidence and examination by LD and

the SIRT investigation concluded SA : was liker shot by direct fire' from a .223

?rearm and hence, through elimination, by a SWAT operator?s M4 carbine. The bullet-jacket
fragment recovered from 5 leg lacked su?icient lands and grooves to forensically

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

. 

 

UNCLAS 

associate it-with an identi?ed operator weapon. Although it was not possible through
?rearmftoolmark or trajectory analysis to correlate the ?'agment recovered ?om SAJ I
with an individual operator?s Weapon, SA 5 account of the incident suggested he was
shot early in the exchange of gun?re, before most operators had returned ?re. Additionally,
several operators were aware ad been shot prior to discharging their own weapons.

 

(Wm Major Washington Injuries and Cause of Death:

(UK/Baht!in A .223 caliber'eopper jacketed bullet was removed from
Washin on?s right shoulder. This bullet Was forensically determined to have been ?red from
SAlilsweapon- . .

Two .223 caliber copperjacketed bullets were removed from
Washington?s left buttock and Washington?s lower 5 inc, res ctively. These two bullets were
forensically determined to have been ?red ??om SA?weapon.

Two .223 caliber copper jacketed bullets were removed from
Washington?s left upper back and left clavicle, reapectively. These two bullets were forensioally
determined to have been ?red ?'orn weapon.

(WM) A .33 caliberf9uun copperjacketed bullet was removed 
Washington?s right arm'. A check of the FBI Laboratory's General Rifling Characteristics (GRC)
database produced a list of ?rearms with GRCS like those present on this bullet, including pistols
and revolvers marketed by Colt, Davis Industries, and Smith and Wesson. The autopsy report
i characterized the bullet as an ?old bullet fragmen 

(UIZEQED) A copperjaclcet bullet fragment ?red from a polygonally ri?ed barrel
(indicative of a ?rearm manufactured by Glock) and several lead fragments were removed ?oin
Washington?s brain. The associated gunshot wound of the right temporal scalp had a muzzle
abrasion and stippling, indicatative of a contact wound. There was a corresponding exit wound

on the left temporal scalp. The autopsy report indicated the wound was fatal. 

(mm The autopsy of Washington was conducted on 11l27t2014 by St. Louis
County Assistant Medical Examined I MD. The autopsy determined the
manner of death was suicide, and the immediate cause of death was a self-in?icted gunshot
wound to the head. The autopsy identi?ed total gunshot wounds, to include the self-in?icted
gunshot wound to the head and 16 additional gunshot wounds. In addition, the autopsy
identi?ed several bullets and bullet fragments in Washington's back, liver, and right arm which
the autopsy report characterized as ?old bullet fragments.? The toxicology report revealed the
presence of cannabinoids in Washington?s system at the time of his autopsy.

 

(UMEQEO) Cartridge.Casings 

(U/lf?ugj Sixty-nine .223 cartridge casings were recovered subsequent to the
incident Due to a lack of suf?cient corresponding microscopic marks of value, no conclusion
. could be reached to attribute ?ve of the .223 cartridge casings to Speci?c weaponshi?: -1
b6 -1
?1
1:16 -4
-4

NYT-409

 

 

 

 performed by FBI gunsmiths. SA

 



remaining 64 .223 cartridge casings were-attributed to the SWAT operators as identi?ed in the
Accounting of Shots Fired section of this report 

(WW) Three .40 caliber cartridge casings recovered at the. scene were
identi?ed as having been ?red from Washington?s pistol.

. (oi/seem Carbine
(Unicorn no 0311312015, DSU conducted an inpeetion andtesting of all

SWAT weapons involved in the St. Louis AIS on li26!201.4. Colt serial number

assigned to was inspected and while the selectorfsafety was
present, DSU determined it was not fully Speci?cally, there was no positive detent'
engagement to maintain the selector position in the safe, semi auto, or full automatic position.
DSU determined there was an indication the grip was removed and reinstalled improperly,
causing the spring to be bent and the detent to fail. The spring for the detent was observed bent
over and trapped between the grip and the lower receiver. Given this condition, while shooting
in the semi?automatic mode, it was possible for the selector to move to fullyr automatic.

(Him forensic examination of recovered rounds identi?ed four I

 

rounds ?red ??om I?s weapon, including one recovered from Maj or Washington?s
- body._ In his ass, SAI:Ireported having ?red 1-5 rounds during the exchange of gun?re.

 

(Hi/nears on iononms, interviewed by INSD. He
acknowledged having removed the grip of his assigned M4 carbine the evening of 1 11232014 in
order to replace the standard-issue grip with an a roved Hogue rubber grip he acquired while
assigned to Atlanta several years earlier. long intended to replace the standard
grip, which had a slick texture, with the rubber Hogue grip. The Hogue grip-did not come with
any instructions, and not aware replacing the grip could impair the function of
the ?rearm. He was not aware Bureau olicy required'all alterations to assigned ?rearms be

Iilcon?rmed his M4 carbine functioned normally in
semi?automatic mode on 1112612014, and he did not experience any mal?mctions with the

-- weapon.

(WM) 'Ihe Firearms Policy Directive on Policy Guide stated, 
gimmiths must conduct alterations to, repairs to, and re?nishing of assigned ?rearms; no other

. FBIpersonneI are authorized to! alter FBI ?rearms or Bureau-approved POWS.

 

 

Investigation into the fire at  

The SLCC Bomb and Arson Unit conducted an investigation into the
cause of the ?re which started in the basement. The area of origin of the ?re was identi?ed as
the southeast corner of quadrant H4 (the northwest quadrant of the basement), in the'area of two
mattresses adjacent to a futon.- Fire investigators noted the area of origin contained a very. large
amount of combustible materials including clothing, mattresses, corrugated boxes, and ignitable
liquids which could have been easily ignited by a competent ignition scarce?. Fire investigators

UNCLAssniEnineno
16 



ions ? 



detenpined'the ?re originated above ground level in the basement, based on a Iacle of ?re
damage to combustible materials at or near ground level, even in the area of origin.

2' ?re-inves? ators noted - . - gm -1

 

 

 

 

 

research could be found regarding] Ia?Sa competent ignition source of ?re and
how they could contribute to ?re spread. .

. - (Wm Fire intrestigators concluded all accidental causative factors could not
be eliminated because of the signi?cant alteration of the ?re scone prior to the arrival of the fire

- investigators, and because the lack of competent research on  las a source of ME -1
ignition. Based on the ?re scene examination and the infomatiOn available at the time of their
investigation, it wasthe combined opinion of the participating ?re investigators the cause of the
fire was undetermined; however, ?re investigators concludedl I

in the direction of Washington may have provided a competent ignition source for

the combustible materials and ignitabie liquids located in the area of origin and could not be
eliminated as a cause of the ?re.

 

 

 

in. Medical Summary

- (UJZEQHIE SA: The Barnes-Jewish Hospital Emergency Room summary b6 -1

- report indicated a comminuted ?acture of SDS tibiaand the presence of a large bullet - b79- ?1

fragment. SAI was discharged from the'hos ital on 118 012014, although his medical 
treatment continued. Subsequent to the incident, Sbas placed in the following

administrative status with the FBI, where he remained: Leave Without Pay- Of?ce of Workers?

 

 

Compensation Programs. -
(UIZEQEIEI) SA The Barnes-Jewish Hospital Emergency Room summary report b6 ?1
indicated a fracture of SA left clavicle and the presence of a bullet ??agment inside the b7?: ?1

wound. There was no evidence bullet ?'agments traveled beyond clavicle. SA

asldischarged from the hospital onll 1/27/2014 . Subsequent to the incident, SA 
was placed in the following administrative status with the FBI, where he remained:
Leave Without Pay Of?ce of Workers? Compensation Pregrams.

 

 

 

 

Shooting Incident Review Team'DetaiIs

a. The Shootiuglncident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following 

personnel: 
inspector-in-Charge (IIC) Peterson - - b6 ?1
rInspector Trent R. Teyema - -- . -1
Assistant Inspector Team Immoral]: 
Unmassoinnrkeei'
l?

i
[fire investigators determined no -
1

 

 

 

 

 

.UNCLASSIFIEDM

 

AUTL -
AIJTL

. Assistant (AIIP) 

 

 

 

 

AIIP
AHP -
ADP
AIIP - 
An?
All?
AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

- b; The FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction 

 

Evidence Reaponse Team Unit a- Team Leader
Evidence Response Team Unit
Firearms and Toolrnarks' Unit
- firearms and Toolniarks Unit
Firearms and Toolrnarks Unit
I- Operational Projects Unit

Operational Projects Unit
Operational Projects Unit

Technical Hazardous Response Unit
Technical Hazardous Response Unit

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- (In/Poem On 1 1125:2014, Chief Inspector David Paul Gelios noti?ed no 
Peterson and- Inspector Trent R. Teyema of a shooting incident atl Iin St.

Louis, Missourie' IIC Peterson and the other Inspection Ieani members arranged logistics for 
travel to St. Louis. .

 

(LI/East?) On 11:27:2014, the SIRT traveled to St. Louisand reviewed the Inspection
Division shooting review protocol. One member of the SIRT observed the autopsy of 
Washington while the remainder of the  viewed the crime scene.

(WM On 11l28/2014, IIC Peterson, Inspector Taverna, and the SLRT members met
vvith St. Louis EM. IIC Peterson and Inspector Teyerna also met with the Agents involved in the
shooting along with the management to explain the SIRT process and its protocols. The UCPD
and Chiefs indicated there would be no investigation of the FBI Agent Involved
Shooting by their respective agencies. - 

0n IIC Peterson and Inspector 'I-?eyema met with the US

Attorney?s Of?ce and DEA EM.

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

'13

I 

b6 -1
1: 

 

UNCLAssmmEenci

(UXZEQHQ) Eleven 3885 were taken from the FBI A cute involved in the 'shooting
incident. One was compelled at the request of who executed an Fill-645
(W timing and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information). Approval to compel 
Silt-0:5 statement was received from DOJ, CRD on 011153014. Au FD-927 (Warning

 

and. Assurance to Employee Request to Provide Information Following a Shooting Incident) was .

executed by the 10 Agents ivho provided voluntary 8883. Other interviews, events, and 
observations were documented via FD-S 02s. .

. (waned) On 12x01i2014, an EAP crisis team. led by? Umved to

- support St. Louis personnel as a result of the shooting incident.

(Ir/noses On 1210212014, no Petersen provided an exit briefto SAC Woods, the US
Attorney?s Of?ce, St. Louis Count},r District Attomey?SOf?ce, UCPD, DEA, and the
US. Marshals Service. - . -

(Um On 1210212014, 110 Peterson and Inapector Teyema updated the DOJ, Civil
- Rights Division (CED) on the outcome of the SIRT investigatian

V. Administrative

a. Firearms Training

St. Louis Principal Firearms Instructomrovided ?rearms

quali?cations records ?oor the Firearms Information and egistration an Shooter Tracking
(FIRST) system for Agentsl 

I I The ri?e and pistol quali?cation scores of the SWAT
operators for the period of 01/22f2013 to 0930412014 weie provided to the SHIT: All members
of the St. Louis SWAT team were in compliance with FBI ?rearm:- requirements.

 

 

b. Deadly Force Training.

Louis CDC, provided annual Deadly Force Policy brie?ng
- to all Agents  the aid of?ce. This was typically done at one of the quarterly ?rearms
training sessions. All SWAT operators involved in the AIS received Timothy,r Force Policy
training in 2014, as detailed below: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Date of Training Presenter . Attendees
02/133014 CDCI I SAsl I
. Serial 385
021' 18.32014 SAS
Serial 336 
041? 16120111 IZ-SL-C 192793 - SAs
. Serial 395 and
. 
19

NYT-413

 

 



e. United States Attorney?s Office Prosecutorial Decision

(urner) Orr 08f06f2015,Richard G. Callahan, the United States Attorney (USA) for the
Eastern District of Missouri, provided a prosecutorial declination for Agents involved in the
11f26r'2014 AIS incident. The declination was provided via letterhead to KC Peterson

advising upon his review of the investigation conducted by IN SD, USA Callahan determined the

circumstances justi?ed the involved Agents? use of deadly force.'

(1. Local Prosecutorial Decision 

(UM) On 10/283901 5, Robert C: McCulioch, St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney,

- provided a written declination of prosecution in the death of Major Washington.

- e. DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision

concurred with declining the matter for prosecution.
VI. . Inspector?s Draft Observations

Observation 1: SWAT operators were unaware of the number of rounds

loaded in their weapons and extra magazines.

(111M Recommendation 1: SAC, St. Louis, should-ensure all SWAT operators
have knowledge of the weapon status at all times.

. (Wm Observation 2: -An unauthorized alteration was performed on a SWAT Colt
seriall:l, assigned to .

(1m Instruction 2: SAC, St. Louis, will ensure alterations to, rcpairs to, and

re?nishing of assigned ?rearms are conducted in accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive

and Policy Guide 0741DPG. 

Observation 3: SWAT operators carried a mixture of authorized service
ammunition and to include training rounds.

Instruction 3: SAC, St. Louis, will ensure Agents carry only authorized
service ammunition while in duty status, in accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive and
Policy Guide 


. 20

On 1 1m x2015, Deputy can, advised nor can -

hE -3
-3

b6 -1
-1

NYT-414

 

 (Rm-1 5-3-10}

 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolroniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Date: 01/15/2016
Shooting

 

CC:

b6 -1
b7C -1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY

Contact:

 

 

Approved By: PETERSON 
Timothy M. Feeney
TWERSKY RONALD
Nancy McNamara

 

 

Drafted By:  I
Case ID St. Louis Field Office Shooting
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,

comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 11/16/2015.

Details:

{Ux?iosdf On 11/16/2015, the SIRG reviewed an 11/26/2014
Agent-involved Shooting (AIS) that occurred in the St. Louis Field
Office AOR.

On 11/26/2014, the St. Louis Field Office SWAT team was
involved in an AIS while attempting to apprehend Major Earl Washington
in St. Louis, Missouri. Washington was a suspect in the 11/24/2014
homicide of his mother, as well as the non?fatal shooting of a
responding University City Police Department officer. After
firing from concealment during a SWAT clearing operation, striking a

SWAT operator in the shoulder, Washington was shot multiple times by



NYT-415



Title: (U) St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 

FBI SWAT operators, and died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the
head. In the exchange of gunfire, a second FBI SWAT operator sustained
a gunshot wound to the leg from what was later assessed to be friendly
fire. The Shooting Incident Review Team arrived in St. Louis on
11/2?/2014.

{Ufgfb??i The St. Louis FBI SWAT team was deployed in response to a
request by the St. Louis County Police Department which had
been contacted by UCFD for assistance in apprehending Washington after
receiving information regarding his whereabouts. tactical team
was occupied with the ongoing violent protests in Ferguson, Missouri.
At the request of and after consulting with the St. Louis CDC
and OGC, SAC William P. Woods directed SWAT and other tactical assets
to assist UCPD.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on 11f25f2014, FBI tactical

elements arrived at a staging area nearl a b6 ?l,2
?1,2

 

 

single?family residence in St. Louis where UCPD had determined
Washington was located. FBI ASACI  was the On?Scene
Commander SAC Woods monitored the operation from the CP at the
field office.

 

 

Over the next several hours, St. Louis SWAT and Crisis
Negotiators (CNs) made numerous attempts to establish contact with

Washington utilizing a loudspeaker, a throw phone, and a third?party

 

intermediary. I I ?1

 

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on 11/26/2014, a St. Louis
County and City (SLCC) Bomb and Arson utilized to clear

most of the interior first floor of the house and visually inspect a

portion of the basement through two ground?level windows. -1
SAC Woods decided

against I Ibecause the DEA SWAT team providing perimeter
security was not equipped with:

After all attempts to confirm Washington's presence in the

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

2

NYWZ416



Title: (U) St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 01/15/2016

residence were unsuccessful, SAC Woods authorized an FBI SWAT tactical

entry of the residence, to include ?1
At approximately 2:53 a.m. on 11/26/2014, the SWAT team made

entry into the residence, cleared the ground floor, and visually

inspected the attic. At approximately 3:02 a UCPD K-S was

 

 

released into the basement in an attempt to determine Washington?s
location. The K-9 returned to the handler without alerting to the
presence of an individual in the basement.

(u/Z?as?j At approximately 3:0? the SWAT team, consisting of the
Senior Team Leader (STL) and 10 operators, descended the stairs from

the first floor and began clearing the basement. At approximately 3:10

 

 

 

 

 

SAI land SAI Iapproached a large, 

portable wardrobe in the northwest quadrant of the basement. As SA

the zipper to open the wardrobe, Washington fired a Glock

22 .40 caliber pistol from a seated position of concealment inside,

striking left shoulder. to the floor

and returned fire with his M4 carbine from a seated position.

Responding to the threat from a standing position beside the

wardrobe, fired his M4 carbine at Washington. The

remaining nine operators heard gunshots but initially struggled to

pinpoint the source of the hostile gunfire. Three b6 -1
Iwhile attempting to identify :i

 

Washington?s location. Ultimately, eight of the 11 operators in the

basement, including fired their M4 carbines
to eliminate the threat from Washington. The exchange of gunfire

consisted of multiple volleys as operators worked to identify, locate,

and neutralize the threat. In the course of the gunfire exchange, SA
a gunshot wound to the left leg, which shattered his
tibia. Through forensic examination, a bullet jacket fragment

recovered from leg was determined to have characteristics
similar to the .223 caliber ammunition used in the SWAT operators? M4
carbines. It could not be forensically determined whether the bullet
was fired from one of the SWAT operators? carbines; however, Washington

was not equipped with a .223 caliber firearm.

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

3

NYWZ417



Title: (U) St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 

At approximately 3:12 assisted to

evacuate from the basement under his own power. As the remaining

operators continued to address the threat from Washington and render

 

aid to they observed a fire had started in the northwest b5 _1
quadrant of the basement. Observing Washington appeared to be deceased 57C ?1
from multiple gunshot wounds, SAI Iremoved a black, .40 b7E _1

 

caliber Glock 22 pistol which was lying on top of Washington's body and
placed it on a nearby clothes dryer. The rapidly intensifying fire
forced the SWAT team_to evacuate the basement with haste and prevented
them from removing Washington's body. Operators dragged and carried SA
the stairs as the basement filled with smoke. By 3:1? 

all operators had escaped the burning residence, with heat signatures

 

and smoke clearly visiblel I
The two wounded Agents were transported to Barnes-Jewish
Hospital for treatment. SAC Woods responded to the scene upon

notification of shots fired and assumed on-scene command.

{Ufi?E??i The 11/22f2014 autopsy report of the St. Louis County
Medical Examiner concluded Washington's manner of death was suicide,
and the immediate cause of death was a self?inflicted gunshot wound to
the head. The entry wound, on the right side of Washington?s head,
exhibited characteristics of a contact wound, to include a muzzle
abrasion and stippling. FBI LD Firearmszoolmarks Unit (FTU) concluded
a bullet fragment removed from Washington's brain was fired from a
polygonally rifled barrel, indicative of a firearm manufactured by
Glock.

{Uli?b??h In addition to the self?inflicted gunshot wound, the autopsy
identified 16 additional gunshot wounds sustained during the exchange
of gunfire with the SWAT team, as well as post?mortem thermal injuries
from the fire. Several bullets and fragments associated with prior

injuries of unknown origin were also recovered during the autopsy.

Ten of the 11 SWAT operators who were present in the

basement provided voluntary Signed Sworn Statements during the

SIRT on-site. was delayed until 2/05/2015 due 

Title: (U) St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 

medical status and his request to provide a compelled No outside
law enforcement agency representative discharged a weapon or sustained
an injury during the incident. A Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction

Team (LSRT) collected and submitted evidence retrieved from the crime

scene, which was extensively contaminated from fire and water damage.

The SLCC Bomb and Arson Unit conducted an investigation into
the cause of the fire within the house, and concluded the cause of the
fire was undetermined. The SLCC investigation noted the presence of

combustible materials in the northwest corner of the basement, where

 

the fire began, and concludedl Icould not be ?1

eliminated as a cause of the fire.

oh 08f06/2015, Richard G. Callahan, the United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri, declined to issue
charges against the Agents involved in the shooting incident. On
10128/2015, Robert C. McCulloch, St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney,
issued a written declination of prosecution in the death of Major

Washington.

SIRG Observations

{of/M On 11/16/2015, the SIRG reviewed the St. Louis 11.13 with the

intent to:
1. Evaluate the application of deadly force.

{Uli?b??j The SIRG determined the application of deadly force by each
of the SWAT operators who discharged their weapons was justified under

the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning

and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

{Ufii?aqi Observation 1: St. Louis SWAT operators were unaware of the

number of rounds loaded in their weapons and extra magazines.



5

NYT-419



Title: (U) St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 

Analysis 1a: Signed Sworn Statements of St. Louis SWAT
operators revealed some were unaware of the number of rounds loaded in

their weapons and extra magazines.

Analysis 1b: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide
UT41DPG Section 4.1.1 stated, "All SAs are responsible for knowing the
loaded condition (total number of rounds) of their_pistols and/or
shoulder weapons and must be_prepared to report that number in
connection with any_post?incident debriefings, reviews, or

investigations."

Instruction 1: SAC, St. Louis, will ensure all Agents have
knowledge of the total number of rounds contained in their weapon(s}
and extra magazines in accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive
and Policy Guide 0741DPG.

Observation 2: An unauthorized alteration was performed on
a SWAT Colt M4A1, serial assigned to SAI b6 -1

-1
Analysis 2a: Colt M4A1, serial tested and
inspected by DSU gunsmiths on 08f13f2015. While the selectorfsafety wa

present on this rifle, it was not fully functional. There was no

 

positive detent engagement to maintain the selector position in safe,
semi automatic, or full automatic positions. This was an indication
the grip was removed and re-installed improperly causing the spring to
be bent and the detent to fail.

Analysis 2b: interviewed by INSD on b6 ?1
10f30/2015. he unilaterally replaced the grip ?1

on Colt 

Analysis 2c: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide
OT41DPG Section 4.10 stated, gunsmiths must conduct alterations
to, repairs to, and refinishing of assigned firearms; no other FBI

personnel are authorized to alter FBI firearms or Bureau?approved Paws.



@0210;

6

NYT-42O

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: (U) St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 

Instruction 2: SAC, St. Louis, will ensure alterations to,
repairs to, and refinishing of assigned firearms are conducted in

accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG.

Observation 3: SWAT operators carried a mixture of

authorized service ammunition and training ammunition.

(u/[anqj Analysis 3a: LD examined the unspent .223 caliber
cartridges collected from_all magazines carried by SWAT operators
involved in the shooting incident. TD's Ballistic Research Facility
and Defensive Systems Units also examined the collected unspent .223
caliber cartridges. The collective examination identified the presence
of training ammunition within magazines carried by some SWAT operators

involved in the shooting incident.

Analysis 3b: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide
Section 4.9 stated, must only load their Bureau?approved
firearms with ammunition_provided or authorized by the FBI. Only

authorized service ammunition may be used for duty carry."

Instruction 3: SAC, St. Louis, will ensure Agents carry
only authorized service ammunition while in duty statusJr in accordance

with the Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary.

The SIRG found the actions of the SWAT operators who
discharged their weapons to be justified under the DOJ Deadly Force
Policy and did not recommend any administrative action be taken against

any of them.

Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members
were in attendance: Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney, Office of
Inspections (OI), Deputy Chief Rights b6 ?3
-3
UNCLASSIFIEDHM
7

NYT-42 1



Title: (U) St. Louis 11/26/2014 Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: lelS/ZDlE

Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice; Supervisory Special

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Agent (SSAII I Investigative Law Unit, Office Of b6 -1
General Counsel; SSAI I Squad CR-2, Washington Field _1
Office; SSAI Practical Applications Unit, Training

Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, SSA

I I Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,

Critical Incident Response Group; Unit Chief New

 

Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit 
Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-3, East Asia Section,

 

 

Counterintelligence Division; and SSAI I Evidence
Response Team, Laboratory Division (LD). The following non-voting
members were also in attendance: Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas, R. Justin

Tolomeo, Douglas A. Leff, Peterson, Frank S. Vito, Eric
Welling, OI, Assistant Inspectorszeam LeadersI 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I I OI, Program
Management I Inspection
Management Unit (IMU), Internal Investigations
Unit (IIU), Special Assistantl OI, 

 

 

Scientific Analysis Section, I

Firearms Toolmarks Unit, Operational

Projects Unit LD.

09

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

8

NYT3422

 

 

FD-IDST (Rev. 5-3-10}
- 

a - ?inging Flacqu

 

 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ecu-emu communleauen 

Title: {Up Report of 0CD SWAT shooting . Date;
investigation. 3

TWERSKY RONALD

OKLAHOMA CITY
.
Contact: 

From}

 

 

 

 

_lpproved By: I. 

 

Drafted By:

 

 

 

case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDEHTS

Synopsis: (U) This report is an overall review of investigations,
interviews and evidence collection regarding the shooting incident
injuring Iduring coo SWAT training on lil?!2013.

 

Details:

Ehis report will address an incident during Oklahoma
City SWAT firearms training which was conducted at the Edmond Oklahoma
Police Department Firearms range and shoot house. The scheduled
training took place on l/l?f2013. The event involved SWAT team member
sn  Ifiring a round that ultimately struck Team
member upper leg. Appropriate Headquarters
entities.r including Inspection Division, were notified of the situation
and the shooting inquiry was delegated to Oklahoma City Division (GOD).

The Oklahoma City SWAT Team Leader 

scheduled training for 1f10f2013, which included instruction and
training regarding the.use of flash bang devices and conducting olose'
quarter battle training. SAEwas appointed SWAT rl?aauu leader
in 2003. The group was to initially gather at 0CD training room and
then training would he moVed to the Edmond PD range oh East Danforth

 

_Uncinssisiso

02f05/2013

NYT-423

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: Report of GOD SWAT sheeting inVestigatioH.
Re: 297-HQ-31271801-D, 02f05f2013

St. in Edmondr approximately 14 miles from 0CD HQ. Present for the
training on?l/lOilB were the following individuals [all 0CD SWAT Team
members}: - 
391:1 

SAI 
an:
[22:22:225351:
[2:222] I
SAI I 
ETI 

 

[There were five SWAT Team members not present at this training. SAs


(InformatiOn in this report is based on a collection of accounts
supplied through interviews of the above listed participants,?
collection of documents, ERT reports, medical records, and various
external interviews, as well as on site observations. This 
investigation was supervised by ASACI ]and coordinated

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

'by I Interviews were conducted'
by 0CD 5535 includinq: SSAI Teal SSAI and see.
.

 

0n l!10/13, SWAT Team members met-as directed at 8:15 AM

in the-second floor (smaller) training room at 0CD HQ office. 
provided information regarding future expected operations and training.
He also provided a Power Point presentation on the use and dep10yment

UNCLASSIFIED

2

NYT3424

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Report of 0GB SWAT shooting investigation.
he: 02f05{2013

of flash bangs. Accounts vary regarding the exact time of completion
but sometime between and 10:30 AM the team departed for the

Edmond PD firearms range (hereafter ?the range"). It was noted there
would be live flash bang training and live fire CQB exercises at the
range.



Once at the range, members parked in the area designated
near the shoot house. demonstrations of the proper b5 _1
handling and deployment of flash bangs in the open range area. Several -1
of the operators with less-experience using flash bangs were instructed
and allowed to throw live flash bangs in this setting. I

Sergeant, Edmond b5 -4

provided a briefing on use of the shoot house. Members recalled this b7C ?4
briefing occurred after the flash bang training and immediately before
breaking for lunch or occurred immediately after lunch but before_any
.shoot house training was initiated. In this 
a verbal brief and walk through of at least a
portion of the shoot house. Within this brief,  I
noted numerous issues. Primary-among them was past damage done to the
shoot houSe by another law enforcement agency during misuse of the
facility. Some members recalled this misuse involved repeatedly
shooting inappropriate walls and support posts of the shoot house. The
interior shoot house rooms were_shown to team members and descriptions
of which walls should not be shot were provided. It was also noted
shots above a specified height should not be made due to the trajectory
of the bullet and-the height of the earth berm which acts as the
backstop for rounds fired. 

 

 

An examination of the Edmond shoot house shows it to be a rectangular
fully covered single story structure with a metal roof. The outside
dimensions of the shoot house are 60 ft. by 36 ft. The structure has
telephone type poles as primary supports. Interior walls are
constructed using panels of approximately one quarter inch plywood. The
exterior walls of the house are made of fiberboard and 2x45. Wall
supports throughout the shoot house are predominately zxds. The floor

UNCLASSIFIED

3

as

.

 

 

 

 

 

 

-memhers recall hearing only exterior walls were allowed to be used for



Title: Report of 0CD SWAT shooting investigation.
Re: 021051201?

of the facility is asphalt. The height of the roof, at its peak is
approximately 20 ft., with_a gap at the top to allow outside light into
the house. In the scenario involving this shooting, the house was 
configured with 16 rooms. Some interior walls of the shoot house have
the ability to be moved, reconfiguring the interior layout of the
facility; Some walls have doorway.gaps in them for ?room-entry"
abilities. The house is surrounded by earth berms on three sides which
serve as the backstop for bullets fired within the house. The terms
height is estimated to be approximately 12'to 13 ft. tall. The fourth
side of the house is open to the parking lot and is where the initial
entry door is positioned. When using simunitions, Set-degree target
placement was allowed inside the shoot house. Photographs of the shoot
house, exterior and interior, were taken by 0CD ERT following the
shooting incident in question. In addition, ERT drafted a diagram
depicting the shoot house as it was configured at the time of the
shooting event in question. This diagram was used by SShs.during
interviews of the SWAT Team._The alpha labeling of the rooms on the
diagram was done by ERT members. 

I.

Interviews with the members varied on the exact
comments made [in his brief regarding which b5 _4
walls were allowed to be fired at during live fire exercises. Some - b7: -4

 

target placement and shooting in live.fire exercises. Others do not
recall such a specific statement. Experience levels of the SWAT Team
?operators varied but all had been to the Edmond PD Range in the past
and all had used the Edmond PD shoot house in the past. However, there
were some operators who used the shoot house only for simunitions
training. For these operators, it was the first participation in live
fire exercises in Edmond PD's shoot house. Many of the operators noted
they had been involved in training in'other shoot houses at other_
ranges, some of which involved live-fire exercises. Live fire 
exercises,-by most accounts of those interviewed, required shooting at
only exterior walls. in his statement, noted he had been - b5 _1
to?the Edmond PD range ?several times? and he had used the Edmond -1
shoot house ?multiple times.? explained he had"

UNCLASSIFIED

4

NYT3426

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: (U) Report of 0CD SWAT shooting investigation.
Re: 0210512013

participated in LETTS training at the Edmond PD range in May of 2012,
which involved the use of the shoot house. This training lasted a week.
stated he had used both handgun simunitions and
?bluebolt M?d ammunition" in the shoot?house.

 

gwas interviewed as part of this.
investigation and noted in his interview that 0CD SWAT Team_members,
particularly an: sal land {former
0CD SWAT Team member) had extensive training and experience in use of
the shoot house and were considered [by.Edmond PD) qualified to operate
the shoot house without the presence of any Edmond PD training 
personnel. (It. should be noted, neither nor SAI:Iwere
present during the shooting incident. 0CD has an MOU'with Edmond PD
regarding use of the range.) Followingl
he relinquished control of the shoot house to departed
the shoot house area of the range.

 

 

There were small variances and degrees of recollection
regarding specific instructions and the briefing SAZIprovided
prior to initiation of the CQB training in the shoot house. All noted
team members were guests, use of the facility was
important, the team.was to be aware of past misuse of the facility by
other organizations and avoid similar use?and damage to the facilities.
Most recall being told the standard or target was the target
being used in the exercises during the training day. Through the
interviews it was noted only 
they were not aware targets were the targets being shot during this
training. this would be a live fire exercise and.weapon
discipline was verv important. No members recall any specific brief?or
training this day regarding contingencies-for any medical problems. It
was noted each operator carries a.medica1 trauma kit on their tactical
vests and each carries the telephone number for mediflight air
ambulance.in their tactical helmet. 

responsible for running the training
exercises. in charge of the entry team and directing

UNCLESSIFIED

5

 

[s briefw.

b6 -1
-1

b6 -1,4
-1 

Title:
Re: 02/05f2013

 

UNCLASSIFIED

(Ur Report of 0CD SWAT shooting investigation.

tactical response to the situations which in the
shoot house. Both exercises would he
room.entry and clearing with the use of law enforcement, slow and
deliberate entries [or ?clears"] as well as faster dynamic entries. Sh
make the determination as to the type of entry to he
conducted and direct team responses both outside and inside the shoot
house. Not all of the shoot house would he used for each exercise. SA
set up and designate which rooms were not part of the

exercise. The team would enter the shoot house without being supplied a

blue?print of the current layout or configuration of rooms within the
house. Through the various scenarios, there were instances where
breaching was a component of the exercise as well as the use of flash
bangs. Execution of these specific elements was directed by 
or Not all exercises utilized breaching and flash hangs.

There were five to seven (7) specific scenarios made?
in the house leading to the final run_of the'day, which involved the
shooting of Each scenario used all eleven {11) operators
at the training that def, with the training. All
briefings'were conducted orally prior to'entry. In order for all
operators to get_varied training experience, the positions of each
operator was altered on each run. If a specific operator had been the

number one man on a previous run, they would move to a position further

back-in the stack.

During the various exercises in the shoot house, there was
a limited placement of targets within each scenario, Several operators
noted they had not engaged any or more than one or two targets through
the entire training day. Protocol for entries was described by all
interviewed as standard operating procedures. This entailed the weapon
{shOulder weapon for these-scenarios] having the safety on, the
operator's finger off the trigger and outside the trigger guard. It
also involved muzzle control. Once a target was identified, the weapon
was brought on_target, the safety disengaged and shotts] fired into the
target. Once this was completed, the weapon was returned to safe and
the finger placed outside the trigger guard. I

UNCLASSIFIED

6

NY1342B

 



Title: (U) Report of GOD SWAT shooting investigation.

. Re:_ 02/05x2013

'Interviews revealed, on one earlier run, possibly the
first one, a guestion of not shooting a target was mentioned. SA
he entered a room where a target was positioned
partially behind a piece of furniture. He chose not to fire as he felt
the amount of the target exposed did not allow him to account_for the
subject's hands. He chose to hold his aim on the target and call them
but to show their hands or give up. Following the termination of this
exercise, SA emplained to the operators for this day's exercises

all.Q targets were to be considered threats which should be engaged. SA.

this account of events during his interview.

Regarding the final exercise of the day, the following
general issues were determined in the interviews: 1] the entry started
'from outside the shoot house, 2) rooms labeled as and were being
used and many felt those rooms had not been used prior to this exercise
and 3} in the middle to back of

the original lineup {stackj'as they entered the shooting house.

On this exercise, team members at theifront of.the stack
entered and secured room A on the diagram. Members moved Up?to secured
areas to stage for their next assignment on a clearing team. Room was

'then cleared and secured. At this point, for the

clearing of room and G. he deployed a flash bang and
confirmed the flash hang was deployed in room E. It is clear
room and immediately engaged a target with
two shots. This target was on the enterior wall directly across from
the entry doorway. after firing thrned to the right, cleared
the corner and moved to-that corner to*complete securing of the room.
Following and secured the left side of the
room. and filled the middle of the room.

behind, but moving simultaneously to this entry,__'

a group of three operators were moving to enter and secure room G. SA
entered the room and secured the left side of the room upon

entry. behind him and moved to the right to

secure_the corner. to secure the





.7

NY73429

 

 

. According to 5254:} he' told 



Title:
Re:

(U) Report of SWAT shooting investigation.
02105?2013

middle of Room ELISA: upon checking the right corner,
observed a target stand with a target attached. The target was not a
target but rather a character target depicting a man holding a
handgun. Shl:ltook the safety off his weapon [his assigned
Iii-41, .fired one shot at the target, then engaged the safety of his
weapon and. moved to complete the securing of Room G. 
stated he shot the targetonly once because he ?felt it was
sufficient." No other agent in room fired a shot.

At this time. SA: (-in room E) stated that
something hit him. A ?Code real world emergency was called out. SA
 : began examining SA: and SA: entered to determine
what had occurred. A call for a medic was made. 
{both team reaponded immediately. and began applying first aid.
After this was initiated, SA called out ?who shot?" SA
stated that he had. 911 and for a
helicopter to tranSport SAI I SAI  went to 5A
:3 vehicle to trauma EMT kit and brought them to
Room to assist with first aid. Shaas directed to advise
Edmond PD officials at the range of the incident, which he did. Edmond
PD personnel responded to the shoot hou'se. Emergency personnel from
Edmond Fire Department also responded. At the same time, -OCD SWAT team
members began preparing an area for the helicopter to arrive for 

transport of 

. During the time initial first aid was being provided to SA
SA : was approached in Room by SA  I
he Ishot the target. SA
stated Shl:ltold him it was an accident and wasn?t his
fault. Sh ? talked with Sal?[prior to this and hated he (as
had shot. Both sal: ahd sa  Iagreed that as
?Calm down" and noted he
was ?highly emotional right now.? 521.: moved
outside following his discussion with SA: SA: secured SA
:3 weapon and made it safe. ERT accounted for collection of
the weapon and magazine and 24 .223 rounds. SA: has advised

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED



NYT-430

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Titie: (U) Report of 6CD SWAT shooting investigation.
02/05/2013 

'operators when filling their magazines, not to fill them completely
{30 rounds} as it could ?jam? the magazine and cause a failure to
properly load rounds in the weapon. Rather, he recommends that by
loading 25 rounds the operator would have a significantly full magazine
and a clear recollection of the number of rounds loaded. 
not give these directions on this training day but has made these
recommendations in past training. 

While the EMTs were providing first aid and the helicopter
was enroute, SWAT team.members and Edmond PD members began pulling down
walls within the shoot house to allow medical personnel entry and exit
with the stretcher which would be used to transport 
(Note: The ERT diagram was made a?ter the walls in the shoot house were
reconstructed, by Edmond PD Officers, as they existed prior to team
members removing'them.for extraction of 
was stabilized and the helicopter arrived. loaded in
the helicopter and transported to Oklahoma University Trauma Center,
Oklahoma City. Medical records'obtained regarding treatment of SA

noted, patient is aD-year-oid male status post
gunshot wound to the right groin. The patient was taken to the
operating room for exploration of wound, found to have no vascular or
major nerve~damage. Wound was irrigated and closed with staples. 
drains were placed. The patient was noted to have a graze wound to his
right side of his scrotum which was Dermabonded." (official Medical
records have been acquired from 0U Medical Center regarding SA

injuries and treatment, which have been uploaded to this 
file.)

The remainder of the OED SWAT team.moved to the Edmond PD
Range training room. They were met by and ASAC
I They discussed the review process which would be in
place and no one had to give a statement at that time. Members were
told the con Squad 5 Agents, along with can ERT,
would be conducting an investigation at the scene;

 

all 0CD SWAT members chose to consult with their attorney,



9

NY11431

 

ED

Title: Report of 0CD SWAT shooting investigation.
Re: 02/05l2013

all represented by arson. FLEOA in b6 -2
Oklahoma City on Monday lildf2013. Interviews with assigned 6CD b7C ?2
began on 1/14113, following their consultation with 0CD SWAT Team
one of his associates sat in on the interviews
either live or via teleconference. Once completed, the ED-Bozs and the
signed sworn statement were reviewed by the SWAT Team member
interviewed the reports were finalized.

In his interview, he felt the target b5 -1
he saw upon entering room was an imminent threat.-He stated it was -1
not immediately apparent to him the target was not on an exterior wall..
He did not recall any specification or demonstration during the day
that any specific target was to be used that day. 
explained, based on his positioning on the entry team for each
exercise, he had not taken a shot at any target prior to taking this
shot. {It should he noted he started out using only
two targets per exercise and part way-through the various exercises
went to only one target per exercise.) stated he was
aware the exterior wall was made of a different material than the
interior walls but due to the speed with which this event occurred, he
was focused on the threat and not the wall. He also stated he felt the
-target was on an exterior wall as this would be the only wall a target.
was to be placed on during live fire. He felt upon entering, the target
was approximately 5 to 6 feet away, in a stand and sat a bit shorter
than most people; he only fired once at the target
as he felt it,was sufficient. He stated he?has normally trained to
shoot each target 2 or 3 times.

in his interview, he was.solely b6 _1
responsible for setting up each scenario ahd any targets involved. He ?1
arranged the room configuration and placed targets for each exercise.
He would provide the background for each exercise. SA
to act as the team leader for.the operators entering the
shoot houee to deal with the described threat(s}l not
walk through the shoot house prior to any scenario, and did not assist
in moving walls within the shoot house. SA started out using two


.-


.- x'



10

NYW1432

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: Report of 0CD SWAT shooting investigation.
Re: 02l05f2013 

targets per exercise. Later in the day, he reduced it to'one 

target per exercise. For the training scenario in which 3134:?; -

injury occurred, SAI: positioned only one target and placed it on
an exterior wall in room E. added that prior to this exercise
rooms and had not been used in ?any scenarios. SA I:Ihad done
the reconfiguration to use and G. SAI: entered room G, past the
entry threshold. He looked around the room and did not see any targets
during this inspection. He noted he did not place a target in room 
but also recalled that there was some furniture in that room. 3295:]
noted that at the time of this last scenario the lighting in the'shoot I
house was becoming dim. SAI:Imoved out of the area and began
watching this exercise. All accounts indicate no one else made to
the shoot house from this point until- the SWAT Team made entry. I:
recounted direction by satho have teams move up- to clear both
rooms E: and G. as: noted room was flash banged and two teams
moved into the rooms.= He heard shots fired in room and a shot from
some other room.

SAEsaw on the floor in room E.
Iandl Iresponded to provide medical aid to SA
 as: then moved tolroom_G. Once there, he spoke with
SA : and asked what happened. pointed to a
target stand in the extreme right corner with a paper character target
attached. an: stated he had not previously _seen the target or
target stand and immediately discerned that he had overlooked the
target stand in his walk through of the shoot house prior to the CQB
scenario. described the target as the profile of a man from
the rear where the target is pointing a weapon away from whoever faces
the target. stated he 'had never seen this target before. He.
described it as an old Edmond PD target. He also noted he used
charactertargets in some past SWAT training exercises_but never this

Specific target. not used any character targets in SWAT
training for over 6 months. i

0CD processed the shoot house and collected both the
firearm ?used by BA: and later the bullet removed from SA

UNCLASSIFIED

1.1

 

NWT-433

hi?: -1

 

 

 



Title: (U) Report of 0CD SWAT shooting investigation.
Re: 

leg. These items were placed into evidence and sent to the
FBI Laboratory for processing. Extensive photographs and a diagram of
the scene were completed and are available for review in this file. In
discussion with (Team Leader for OCD ERT) he
explained that ERT efforts would not allow for an exact trajectory of
the'bullet which impacted leg. This is due to the fact
there exists only one point of consideration on the bullets?path and
two points are required for such evaluation. there
was one hole in the interior plywood wall that could be associated with
?the bullet. The target shot by dangling from the
target stand in room.G upon their arrival and the baqking on the stand
had numerous holes in it. Most of those holes appeared to be larger
handgun rounds but there was at least one smaller hole that could
possibly be associated with the M-4 round fired from 
weapon. It was located in what was estimated to be a lower center mass
area, if the target had been held properly against the'backing. For
both point} 
point}, their exact positioning at the time of the event could only be
estimated. Thus, given the evidence available at the time ERT processed

'the scene, the bullet's specific trajectory could not be determined.
Even with these observations, the height of the bullet hole in the

',plywood wall was consistent with the path to leg.

been an 0CD SWAT team member since late
2011.'Records of his SNAT training were acquired and were uploaded to
this file. It was noted by completed Basic SHAT
training-at Quantico. Additionally, firearms records
for the last two years were acquired and uploaded to this file. 
records reflect he is current on qualifications and has
passed all sessions. 

Sh:was interviewed regarding his recollections
of events. He stated he had entered room with SAsl 
not shoot and the room was secured. This was called
out by each operator in room E. while the three of
them stood inside of the door to room E, he'saw a flash and felt NY13434

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title:
Re: 

(U) Report of 0CD SWAT shooting investigation.
02/05/2013

concussion blast hit his mid?section. He believed a flash?bang had
exploded and he was hit by the blast. The concussion'pushed his groin
protector into his groin causing pain. As he assessed the situation, he
started feeling intense pain in his leg. He believes he yelled ?it
burns? as he collapsed to the floor and rolled onto his back. His
recollections beyond this are fragmented.

There was initial media coverage of this training
accident. This involved coverage by local television stations,
including helicopter_video coverage of the range and some team members.
There was additional coverage in place at the hospital where SA 

treated. It also involved a media statement given on
scene by the 0CD Media Representative, authorized by 0CD SAC. Following
the initial coverage on the day of occurrence there was no follow up

coverage of note.

Conclusions

and oversaw SWAE training in the shoot
house. He was aware Edmond PD personnel provided safety briefings which
directed live fire to be done only on exterior walls. 

_that only targets were to be used for this training and all targets

were to be considered a threat. on the last exercise, he placed one 
target in room of the shoot house. He entered room but did not

observe a target stand or older character target in room prior to the.

seenario in question.

in training and prior to-the
last erercise had not engaged any target. He was aware he was only to
shoot on exterior walls. He did not recall being told only targets
were being used. He did recall being told.any target was a threat. He
entered room.G. identified a character target and shot it one time. He
did not identify the target was on an interior wall.

shot in the upper thigh while conducting

UNCLASSIFIED

NY71435

 

 

 



Title: Report of GOD SWAT.shooting investigation.
Re: 02/05f2013

a SWAT training live fire scenario. SAI :was in room of the -b6 ?1
shoot house. He was struck by a round fired by BA from his - h7C '1
M-4 while in room G.'This shot was fired by he
entered the room and saw a stand and target in that room. The target in
room had been inadvertently missed for removal or moving by 
ddring his pre?scenario inspection. This target was not a target bot
an older Edmond PD character target. This target was placed on an
interior wall. provided first aid on scene,
transported to a trauma center and is expected to fully recover.

 

 



UNCLASSIFIED

14

NY73436

 

 

 

 



- - ST. LOUIS ooumw JUSTICE CENTER -
ROBERT MRCULLOGH 100 SOUTH GEWL WEWE {314} 615-2600

Pnosecume A1TOFIMEY 53195 - {314} 615-5267



.Ootober 28} 2015

Special Agent in Charge
Bill'Wood

FBI 

2222 Market Street

St. Louis. MO 63103

Major washington fatal ehooting
Dear Agent Wood:

Based upon a thorough examination of all of the evidence in
this that the use of_force was justified and not

excessive under the circumstances.'

There is no further action to be taken'in this matter. Please
contact if you have any questions or if any additional
information is discovered. . 

. b6 ?4
137?]. -4

A detailed final report will be finalized and delivered as
soon as poeeihle. - .

Very truly yours,

Robert P. McCulloch ff" $64 

Prosecuting Attorney
St. Louis County, Missouri



  

(Rev. 5-3-10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolronio Gommunioali on

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION Date: 
06f28f20l2

TO: DA-INSPECTION FRONT OFFICE

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: I I b6 ?1
?1

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:  I

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

 

 

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on O6f28f2012, involving Special Agent

Iof the Cincinnati Division. During the execution b6 ?1
of a search warrant, Iresponded to threat presented by b7C '1

subject Fallacy M. Myers, and fired three rounds from his Bureau-issued
Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, fatally wounding the subject. SIRG
members recommended that no administrative action be taken against SR
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident. Two
Observations and associated Recommendations were adopted by the SIRG
for the Cincinnati Division.

Administrative Notes: Reference report of Inspector Ronald
Twersky, dated 10/22X20l2.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and

recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 06/26/2012, a case was opened regarding alleged criminal

activities of Fallacy M. Myers. Investigation revealed Myers may have

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT1438

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

been engaged in activities including transportation, coercion, and
enticement of a minor; money laundering; tax evasion; distribution of
controlled substances; and possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person.

Pending the issuance of a search warrant for Myers' residence, an
operational plan was completed and approved by Cincinnati Division

Executive Management on 06f2?f2012.

At approximately ?:00 on 06f28f2012, FBI Agents and Dayton

 

 

Police Department (DPD) personnel met for an operational briefing. SA
I Iled the briefing and reviewed the operational plan, b5 '1
including the FBI Deadly Force Policy. Following the briefing, FBI b7c ?1

personnel, accompanied by a uniformed DPD officer in a marked cruiser,

drove to the subject's residence.

 

 

At approximately 7:30 SAI Iknocked and b6 ?1
announced the presence of law enforcement personnel. After receiving b7c '1
no response from the occupants of the residence, 
to breach the door with a ram. Following ram attempts, which did not

breach the door, Myers opened the front door. He stepped onto the
front porch, where he was handcuffed and patted?down for weapons by SA
Hyers remained with the house while
other Agents conducted a protective sweep of the residence. Myers
requested to use the bathroom, and was escorted inside by 
a more detailed protective sweep of the
bathroom and removed a lockbox. Myers' handcuffs and
Myers was allowed to use the restroom with the door open. After Myers
used the restroom, he was again handcuffed by 

 

Myers was escorted through the house to the backyard under the

 

 

 

 

control of I to remove Myers? b6 -1
handcuffs and advised him he was not under arrest and was free to leave b7c _1
if he so chose. Iescorted Myers further away from

the residence to an area in the backyard. Myers was compliant and

cooperative and agreed to be voluntarily interviewed.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

NY11439

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

During the search, Myers was taken inside the residence, where he

assisted Agents in identifying personal property. He was then escorted

 

to the kitchen by I where the interview continued. b5 ?1
During the interview, in the kitchen with Myers, who _1

was not handcuffed.

 

Four handguns were recovered during the search, and in b6 ?1,3
coordination with Acting Supervisory Senior Resident Agent ?1'3
I land Assistant United States Attorney 

determined a probable cause arrest of Myers was warranted for

possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.

 

 

 

After the decision was made to arrest Myers, I b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

offered him the chance to get dressed. Myers was seated, without
handcuffs, in the kitchen when he was advised by he was
going to be taken into custody by the DPD and transported to the
Montgomery County Jail. As to escort Myers to the
bedroom to obtain clothing, Myers ducked around and moved to
the kitchen table. Although Myers' back was to he observed
Myers' shoulders and arms moving in a motion consistent with someone
loading a firearm magazine. his handgun and yelled for
Myers to stop what he was doing. Myers raised his hands to show SA
was slashing his wrists with a knife. Myers to
drop the knife and subsequently called out for a Taser from the DPD

officer located outside the residence.

Myers slowly walked backwards toward who continued b5 ?1
telling Myers to drop the knife. Myers turned around, faced b7: _1
and Myers feigned as if he was going to move quickly toward 

Myers dropped the knife in compliance with commands. Myers
then grabbed a larger knife from a knife rack, turned away from SA
and retreated further into the kitchen. Myers stood with his
back to continued cutting himself, inflicting lacerations
to both wrists and his neck. yelling for Myers to
drop the knife. Hearing the initial commotion, SA
the doorframe area between the kitchen and the living room.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

NYTZ44O

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

 

Iwere searching a vehicle outside the b5 ?1
b7C -1

 

residence when they heard shouting. They ran to the front door and SA
toward I Because no one responded

to calls for a Taser, take his

place so he could go to the front door to locate the DPD officer.

Myers was still facing away from the Agents, so back

and to the left of the doorframe area.

Both  had their weapons pointed at Myers.

 

 

 

 

into the kitchen in an effort to de-escalate the b5 ?1
situation with Myers. She then observed Myers pivot toward her with b7c _1
the blade of the knife facing her and Myers started to
step around the kitchen table toward the Agents. feared for
her life and the safety of and retreated backwards to the
kitchen doorway and started to pull the trigger on her Bureau-issued
service pistol. Simultaneously, arm appeared in SA
line of fire, and as she began to drop to one knee to avoid
friendly fire, she stumbled. As her balance, she

heard multiple gunshots.

 

SAI Iwas positioned in the living room during the b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

confrontation and moved in front of the bedroom doorway. She observed
Myers holding a knife at sternum height, with the blade pointed out
toward the Agents, who were staggered along the kitchen doorframe. SA
Myers make a movement toward the Agents prior to hearing

shots.

instructed Myers to stop and drop the knife. SA b6 ?1
observed Myers pivot to the right with the knife in his T1
right hand. Myers presented an imminent threat of
death or grave bodily harm to who had moved within
approximately six feet of Myers. As Myers continued the pivoting

motion and stepped toward a final

command for him to stop and drop the knife to no avail. At that point

three shots at Myers.

Myers collapsed on his back to the floor and was subsequently

 

UNCLASSIFIED

4

NYT1441

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

pronounced dead at the scene by responding paramedics from the Dayton
Fire Department. Throughout the confrontation, Myers did not say

anything to the Agents or respond verbally to their commands.

 

Immediately following the shooting, DPD Officerl I who b6 ?1,4
?1,4

 

was positioned outside the residence at the time of the shooting,
entered the house and immediately called for a paramedic. 

the first telephonic notification of the Agent?involved shooting to

at 11:48 a.m.

Ito move away from the
kitchen doorway, and they went into the living room. 
positions in the kitchen doorway to maintain the integrity

 

 

of the scene.

Prosecution of the law enforcement officers involved in the

shooting was declined First Assistant, Prosecuting b6 -4
Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor?s Office, on 07/13/2012. b7c _4

 

On Civil Rights Division, United b6 ?3
States Department of Justice advised the shooting did not ?3

?establish sufficient evidence of willful conduct to warrant a federal

 

criminal civil rights investigation of this matter.?

On 05f23f2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned
shooting incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields,
Inspection Division chaired the meeting and was a non?voting
member. The following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief
Inspector Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections b5 -1,3
Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of b7c _1'3
Justice I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,

 

 

 

Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent I
Sguad Washington Field Office; SSAI Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI I
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; 

Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

5

NYWZ442

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

 

 

Response Group SSAI Firearms Training b5 '1
Unit, and SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The _1
following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Gregory T. Bretzing, Christopher W. Davis, and Ronald Twersky, OI,

Team Leaders I I
I IOI, SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit, TD 

I I Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I

Operations and Training Unit, SSAI I Resource
Planning Office, Director?s Office; SSAI I SWAT

Operations Unit, Safety and Occupational Health 
Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit,

Facilities and Logistics Services Division; Management and Program

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AnalystI I Inspection Analysis Unit, and

 

 

Management and Program I

 

Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); 
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary .

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against a result of his b6 -1
involvement in the shooting of Fallacy M. Myers. The shooting was b7c '1
deemed in policy and the use of deadly force was determined to be

justified under the circumstances.

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following observations and

recommendations of the SIRT:

UNCLASSIFIED

6

NYT-443

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

Inspector's Observations:

 

Observation 1: Agents did not maintain positive control of the

subject, Fallacy Myers, throughout the search operation.

Analysis 1: Agents planned and briefed the search warrant operation,
and demonstrated positive control of the subject upon their initial
encounter with him. Myers was handcuffed, searched, and detained
outside the residence, while other Agents conducted a protective sweep
of the house. Myers was subsequently allowed to use the restroom,
re?handcuffed, and escorted through the residence to the backyard.

This was consistent with guidance from the Legal Handbook for Special

Agents, Section 5-2.2.5, Controlling the Premises, which reads in part:

After having made entry, Agents should take whatever reasonable steps
are necessary to_protect themselves. They may control the movements of
persons found inside the_premises and may conduct a limited search of
people for weapons if the Agent has a reasonable suspicion that they
are armed. While executing a search warrant on_premises, Agents have
authority to detain occupants while the search is being conducted.
Agents may conduct a limited search of_persons for weapons only if
Agents have a reasonable suspicion that the person searched is armed.
Restraining devices may only be used when to do so is reasonable under

the circumstances.

Agents were permitted to detain Myers for limited purposes, as

referenced in the Legal Handbook for Special Agents, Section 4-2.4, Site

of Detention, which reads in part:

As a general rule, Agents have the authority to detain anyone_present

at a location, be it a_private residence or business establishment open
to the public. The_primary_purpose for this detention is to ensure the
Agents' safety during the execution of the warrant. A second reason is
to ensure the_presence of the occupants to whom_possession of evidence

or contraband found during the search may be attributed.

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

Although he was the subject of a sexual exploitation of children

investigation, Myers was not under arrest at the start of the search.

Once Myers was in the backyard, he was under the control of 
decided to remove Myers' handcuffs and told him he

was free to leave if he so chose. The Agents asked Myers to submit to

an interview, and read him his Miranda rights to ensure there was no
question concerning the voluntariness of Myers' statements. Myers
consented to the interview and signed the Miranda waiver. Myers was

isolated with the Agents in the rear of the backyard at that time.

 

Agentsl Iinterviewed Myers intermittently for more than
three hours. consistently left to maintain control of

 

Myers. between the interview with Myers and the search

activity. Myers was 6?4" and 2?0 pounds, and he did not display

physical limitations. During the time the Agent{s} remained with Myers

in the backyard, the distance between the location of the interview and

the residence largely mitigated the threat to other searching

personnel. At some point, a decision was made to move Myers closer to

the residence, and later inside the residence. It was noted the
temperature during the search rose to the upper 80s, and Myers was

moved in part to get relief from the increasing late morning heat.

While in the backyard, Myers looking at his service
weapon, which was secured in a tactical holster. made

uncomfortable by Myers' gaze, so he moved his chair from the shade into

the sun to distance himself from Myers. Myers also made multiple
statements to the lines of "Buddy, if I was in your

shoes, I wouldn't believe my fucking lies."

The decision to arrest Myers had not been finalized when Agents moved
Myers into the kitchen. Searching personnel advised 

kitchen had been "searched," and the Agents moved with Myers into the
kitchen. Myers was also permitted to enter his bedroom, under escort

and while not handcuffed, in order to point out items of the bedroom

UNCLASSIFIED

8

NYT-445

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

which belonged to him. During the search, Agents recovered four

firearms from the residence, and Myers was queried about the recoveries

by b6 ?1

?1

Upon consultation with the USAO, a decision was made to arrest Myers

for possession of the recovered weapons by a prohibited person. After

Myers was advised he would be arrested and booked into the local county

jail, he was told he could obtain a change of clothing from the

bedroom. Myers would be escorted through the b5 ?1
residence to the bedroom because several Agents and unarmed b7c ?1
Professional Support employees were involved in search?related
activities in the residence. As Myers began to be escorted to the
bedroom, with behind, Myers suddenly turned and
ducked around and obtained the first of two knives he would

utilize to inflict injury to himself and prompt the use of deadly force

by 

Proper Arrest Plans and Techniques were detailed in SAC Memorandum.27-20
01, dated December 28, 2001, which was codified in MIOG, Part 2,

Section 11. MIOG, Part 2, Section 11 was later superseded by DIOG,
Section 19. Relevant sections of the DIOG and the MIOG (prior

controlling policy} are cited as follows:

MIOG, PART 2, SECTION II. TECHNIQUES AND.MECHANICS OE.ARREST
ll-l ARREST TECHNIQUES
ll-l.l General

(2) A_person who is heing_placed under arrest may do one of several
things: submit peacefully, attempt to flee, attempt to injure or kill
the arresting personfs), affect a rescue by confederates, or commit
suicide. The arrest team should consist of enough Agents/officers,

whenever_possible, to cope_properly with those or other situations

 

which may arise. 

 

-5

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

9

NYT-446

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

 

 

 

 

 

-5
ll-l.2 Initial Approach
(3) When a person is arrested, heXshe should not be permitted to move
about; however, if movement is necessary, the subject(s) should be
accompanied by Agents/officers. If it is necessary to obtain clothing
for the subject(s) the Agentonfficers should locate the clothing and
search it thoroughly before giving it to the subject(s).
ll-l.3 Search of the Person
ll-l.3.l High-Risk Search/Full-Body Search/Handcuffing
-5

 

 

 

(2) Agents are responsible for the welfare and condition of a person

UNCLASSIFIED

10



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

once he or she is placed under arrest, and it is required that all
arrested_persons be handcuffed with hands behind the back, back-toiback,
and double-looked. If circumstances necessitate handcuffing with the
hands to the front, then the hands must be back to back, and the cuffs
must be belted down and double locked. Agents are reminded that
handcuffs and other restraining devices are only temporary controls and
Agents must maintain a close guard over subjects at all times,
preventing any attempts at self?injury and/or suicide, until they are

released to another authority.
BIOS, Section 19, reads in_part:
DIOG, Section l9.5.3. RESTRAINING DEVICES

Temporary restraining devices, such as handcuffs, shackles and/or belts
may be used to secure an arrestee. Use of such devices is lawful and
proper, and Agents are expected to employ reasonable judgment under the
circumstances in the use of these devices and to resolve any doubt in

favor of their use.

Recommendation 1: SAC, Cincinnati should effect training to ensure

 

Agents maintain positive control when handling subjects during search

and arrest operations.

 

Observation 2: I both of whom were involved in the b5 ?1
-1

 

confrontation with subject Myers, remained at the scene over four hours

after the shooting.

Analysis 2: The field office responded quickly to the shooting
incident. Cincinnati management removed the

scene and provided him support and appropriate counsel from the

 

Associate Division Counsel. However, I both of whom

 

were also involved in the critical incident, remained at the scene for
over four hours after the shooting. The delay in removing 
scene may have exposed them to additional trauma,

UNCLASSIFIED

ll

NYT-448

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

presented opportunities for them to be prematurely questioned by
responding investigators, or exposed them to circumstances which could

affect their independent recollection of the shooting incident.

In order to ensure an effective response, the Critical Incident
Handbook, 2011 Edition, was available as a guide field offices can use
to establish localized shooting response plans. The handbook provides
a checklist from the June 2003 publication "Shooting Incidents: Issues
and Explanations for FBI Agents and Managers." Included in the
checklist is the instruction to "separate and remove involved Agents(s)

from the scene."

Recommendation 2: SAC, Cincinnati should ensure Agents involved in a

 

shooting incident are removed from the scene as soon as possible.

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE 

The Inspection Division (INSD), Inspection Management Unit
is responsible for ensuring that each Inspection
InstructionfRecommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains
an Inspection Instructionszecommendations database and provides the
INSD Assistant Director (AD) a quarterly report reflecting all
outstanding InstructionsfRecommendations. The inspection process is
not complete until all Instructions{Recommendations have been

satisfactorily resolved.

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector?in?Charge
who will determine if each Recommendation has been resolved or
requires further action. Resolution will be based upon specific
actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the division has
under consideration or plans to take in the future. If the IIC
determines an InstructionfRecommendation has not been resolved, an EC
will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon
resolution, all InstructionsfRecommendations will be appropriately

noted in the database.

UNCLASSIFIED

12

NYT-449

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI DIVISION 06/28/2012
Re: 08f01f2013

SAC, Cincinnati is required to provide detailed responses
addressing the Recommendations in this EC, pages 6 through 12,

including corrective actions taken and/or intended actions with time

frames for completion. Each Observation which results in an
Instruction/Recommendation must be responded to in a one-page, stand
alone response. The Observation and related Recommendation is to be

recited verbatim from the inspection EC, followed by the division's
detailed response (it is not necessary to repeat the analysis section
of the Observation in the response}. If supporting documentation is

available, it should be enclosed with each response.

All initial and follow?up responses must be sent to the IMU on
plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Inspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room b6 -1
In addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached _1

responses, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MPAI

 

 

.0

UNCLASSIFIED

13

NYT-450

 



 

 

?FD-zas (Rev. 10-18-2012)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

REPORTWG OFFICE . OFFICE OF ORIGIN DATE 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FBIHQ - IN SD FBIHQ . 04! 121201 3 03! 1419013 03f19/2013

TITLE OF CASE - REPORT MADE BY - TYPED BY

Inquiry - .

Report _of Shopting Incident giggzg?ggeneue . b6 i?1
A1me Field Of?ce Shootian Incident Review MC _1 
031' 1412013 - 

 

 

REFERENCES: 

Telephone_ball on 03/14f2013 from Albany SAC Andrew W. Vale to NChief Insp?btor
prard 8. Marshall and In5pector Thomas P. Ravgnelle.



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 

l' DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES MADE: 

1 - Inspection (Atm: SIRT)

1 INSD (297-HQ-A1270912-D

DISSEMINATIDN RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT Notations
Agancy I 
Request Read:
Date Fwd.
Haw Fwd.
By
A
COVER PAGE
n. um; ..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

STATES OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 04112x2013 .

 

Report of: HG Thomas P. Ravenelle Of?ce: - FBIHQ MSD


1

Case 

Title: I SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
i ALBANY FIELD OFFICE.
03I14I2013
- 
Inyestig'ative Period: 03f14r'2013 (ts/1912013

Reference: (U) Telephone call on 03f1412013 from Albany SAC Andrew W. Vale to Isl/Chief

Inspector Howard S. Marshall and Inspector Thomas P. Ravenelle.

 

 

. . -

On 03!] 312013, Kurt R. Myers, of 32 South Washington Street, Apt. 
Mohawk, NY 1340?, shot six people, killing four of the victims, in a Herkimer County, NY
shooting spree. After the shootings, Myers hid in an abandoned building located at 243 Main

Street, Herkimer, NY. .

{mm On. 03f14t'2013, after being located by FBI and New York State Police (NYSP),

Myers ?red several rounds '?om his shotgun at law-enforcement. One of the rounds fatally struck

an Hostage Rescue Team (PERT) named HRT Special Agents returned gun ?re
striking Myers several times causing his death. 

Details
(WED-EEK) On 03f13f2013, subject Kurt Myers shot- six people, killing four of the victims,

in a Herkimer County, NY shooting spree. During the shooting spree, Myers utilized a Mossberg
pistol grip 12 gauge shotgun. After the shootings, Myers hid in an abandoaed building located at

248 Main Street, Herkimer, NY. Upon being located and surrounded by law enforcement, he ?xed

four' shots at them. A Deputy U.S. Marsha] unsuccessfully returned ?re at Myers.

(WW) On 03132013, the NYSP Special Operations Response Team (SORT)

.- requested assistance from the FBI Albany Field Of?ce SWAT Team and the I-IRT. On 031? 1412013, 

HRT members arrived with a complement of nine operators, one medic, two mobility Specialists.
and two K-9 operator/handlers] ME ?1

 

NEW-452

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(WM) At approximately 8:00 on 03f14!2013, the designated teams entered the
- building and utilized a slow, methodical ?law enforcement? clear technique-to search for Myers.
HRT SAsl IWere members of
the ?rst team, and they proceeded to clear the right side of the building. After SAsl I 

 

an individual later-identi?ed as Myers. lreturned ?re and re?traced
their. steps with regain a tactical position of cover. . 
The Agents called for Ape and his handler to come forward and provide

support. The Agents: '31 anticipation of releasing Ape into
the room from where the gunshots emanated. Ape was released and Agents followed Ape?s path
toward the room where the subject was located. As Ape entered the room, Myers ?red a ri?ed slug
and struck Ape, lotoclting him down. Ape immediately got up and again went after Myers: The
subject ?red his shotgun again, striking Ape in the side. As Myers continued to shoot, SA
immediately engaged Myers through the doorway, continuing to shoot at Myers until he emptied
his magazine. He called out that his magazine was empty and ?rolled? out of the room. 
believed Myers was still a threat, so he ?red six or seven times into the room. S- toppe
?rin before another operator called out the subject was down. During the exchange of gun?re, SA

?red in the direction of Myers through the wall, at a point opposite from where he
believed Myers was located. HRT and NYSP SORT operators entered the room, discovered Myers
lying on the ?oor, and restrained him using ?ex cuffs.

 

 

(ll-KM) HRT medical personnel provided-?rst aid to Ape"j however, he succumbed to

his injuries. APE had been training with his handler, for a year and was 
and the Agents. 'Four Agents fired a total of 39 .223 caliber rounds at Myers.

The four deceased victims of the shooting spree were identi?ed as:
- Thomas Steka, employee at Gaffey?s Lube

'Michael Renshaw, a customerat Gaffey?s Lube

Michael Rancier, barbershop customer

Hairy Montgomery, barbershop customer

.I-II

 

(UIZEQEQ) Critically injured victims of the shooting spree were identi?ed as:
.

 

 

 

 

I bntered' one of the rooms, they were ?red upon from an adjacent rear room by . 

placed into action only a month before this encounter. Myers ?red ?ve rounds ofri?ed slug?_b'7C -5

NYT-453

 

 

 

 

FBI Personnel involved in the operation included: I.

HRT

 

SA
SA

(Fired weapon) 
Fired weapon) 

 

 



(Fired weapon)

 

SA
SA

 

?red weapon)
HandlerFBI. ALBANY SWAT

 

SubStantive 

ase Files

 

Case ID: 
Ti?e: MYERS, KURT R.

 

Subject
NAME: KURT R. MYERS

DOB: 10128f1948

 

 

Nil?@?

 

 

 

 

 

Residence: - 32 South Washington Sixteen Apt. 
Mohawk, NY 13407 



(U) All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed. in the enclosed
table of contents. . 

anninmsraarivs:

a I The Shooting Incident Review :Team was comprised of the following personnel:

Inspector-in-Charge (11C) Thomas P. Ravenelle
Inspector-in-Place (HP) John H. Derbas . A -
Assistant'htspectorfl?eam Leader I

MTL
Assistant lnspector?in?Place 
AIIP 
AIIP
AIIP
All]?I
AIIP
AIIP
- AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team Personnel:
-SSAI kLab Team Leader)

- Evidence Response Team Unit
Firearms and Toohnarks Unit
- Operational Projects Unit Photographer

 

 

 

 

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW PROTOCOL:

 

All members of the SIRT reviewed the Inspection Division Shooting Review

Protocol. -

(mm On amazon, Ravenelle spoke with Albany sac Andrew w. Vale to

arrange logistics prior to arriving in Albany. 011 03H 41(2013, the SIRT traveled to the Albany Field

O??ice. Upon arriving, HC Ravenelle and the SIRT members met with Albany EM and SSA

ii

NYT-455

 

b5 -1
-1

h? -1
-1

 

 

 

 



 

 

 



 

personnel before traveling to the shooting scene, which occurred at an abandoned building located

at 248 Main Street, Herkimer, 

(WM On 03! 14/201 3, 11C Ravenelle met with the involved HRT, SWAT SAs, New

York State Police, and management personnel to explain the review process" and protocols.

(UIZEGEU) Five Signed Sworn Statements were taken ?om the HRT Agents
involved in the shooting. Other interviews, events, and observations were documented via FD-

'3025. All FBI and TFO personnel were allowed to read their FD-302 to con?rm the accuracy of the

information provided. Neither the FD-644 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to
Provide Information on a Voluntary Basis) nor FD-645 (Warning and Assurance to Employee
Required to Provide Information) were utilized. The and interviews of witnesses we
conducted voluntarily. .

An (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide
Information Following a Shooting Incident) was executed by all FBI personnel interviewed.

On 03f21f2013, IIC Ravenelle conducted an out brief with SAC Vale arid
ASA and explained the ensuing steps of the SIRTproccss.

(Ill/E3986) On 0312049013, IIC 'Ravenelle met with District Attorney (DA) Jeffrey S.
Carpenter and NYSP Senior Investigator: to brief them'on the details of the shooting
incident. 

.

PERSONNEL INVOLVED:



SA  (Fired Weapon)

SA Fire Weapon)

SA Tired'Weapon)
SA  (Fired Weapon)

SA HandlerNYT-456

 

 

-SA

FBI ALBANY SWAT

 

NYSP

 

 

 

 

 

raw-?45?

 

 

 

 

 

FIREARMS TRAINING:

(WW-BIO) HRT provided ?rearms quali?cations. records for SAs
A review of the records indicated all four were
current on their ?rearms quali?cation certi?cations.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

W1
(UK/seen) On inns/2013, Supervisory Special Agentl Iwho is the b6 -1
Chief Division Counsel for CIRG, rovided the dates of when ?Use? of Deadly Force? training was -- MC '1
provided to CIRG personnel. SSAI ted the ?Use of Deadly Force" presentation was part of 
a training session conducted by at FBI Headquarters on approximately -
0905/2012, which was video recorded and distributed via email to all members in 1210012.
On 0311712013 Assistant Inapector Team Leaded telephonically contacted HRT
UC ho con?rmed HRT personnel completed ?Use of Deadly Force? training on
the following dates:- -
b6 ?1
03.070013 . . - . 137?: '1
0138.901 3 -
70013
(WM) On 03!} 7.0013, HRT UCI Iprovided INSD a copy of the

 

Operations Order (OPORD) for the 03l14!2013 Operation involving subject Kurt R. Myers. The
OPORD contained the following information: . 


Execution - task organization
Situation - subject information
Situation - supporting agencies

54. Execution - HRT Blue

l5. HRT Blue deployment manifest
6. Execution - coordinating instructions
37. Contingencies

Execution DOJIFBI Deadly ForcePolicy

I.

USE OF BODY ARMOR AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IDENTIFIERS:

 

cur/Boers All ssn, so, and NYSP personnel involved in the operation wore ballistic body
armor. or law enforcement identifiers were worn, and personnel verballyidenti?ed themselves
as law enforcement to the subject.

HISTORY:

Senior Investigator: NYSP Troop D, Major Crimes Division, b6 ?4
voluntarily provided the FBI Lead Worksheet Number 168 containing the results of the Alcohol, MC ?4

Tobacco, and Firearms (ATP) Trace for a Mossberg Model 590 12 gauge pump action shot gun
bearing serial number, L804944. The trace form indicated thesweapon was originally sold on



NYT-458

 

 

 

 

09127.6(] 995, at the? Gun Brokerage, 2120 Whitesboro Street, Utica, New York. The original -
purchaser was identi?ed  

 

  lleGEQ) NYSP NYSP Investi 

of Frank's Guns, 9103 River Road, Marcy, NY. provided investigators a
records check conducted at Frank?s Guns which indicated the suspect?s shotgun, a Mossberg 1?2
auge, Model 590, serial number, LSD-4944, was listed as ?received? on 11i10r'l995, fromI:]
IIE I NY. The records further indicated the same shotgun was .
later, purchased ?om Frank?s Guns on 0412711996, by Kurt Myers, date of birth 101231943,
driver?s license number 363-174?534, address 9408 Main Street, Holland Patent, NY.

 

(U1339601) A National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) inquiry forKurt R. Myers,
born-10f28/1948, determined he was arrested on 05!27f1973, for Operating 3. Motor Vehicle while
intoxicated. 0n 06l09!1973, Myers pled guilty to the lesser charge of misdemeanor Operating a
Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.

LAISORATORY DIVISION REPORTS:

(WM The scene of the shooting was secured and processed by Albany ERT, New
York State Police Evidence Recovery Unit, and the Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team to
~include use of total station. . -

. kill/BOSE!) An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items is included within this report in
Tab XIV Shooting Scene. As of the date of this report, New York State and FBI Laboratory
testing'i?esults were still pending. 

Testing .r

The Laboratory Division (LD), Firearms-.Toolmarks Unit was requested to
generate a shooting incident reconstruction report, and the Operational Projects Unit was requested
to prepare supporting demonstrative imagery and graphics of the scene. As of the date of this .

. report, the LD products were pending: They will be included within this report in Tab XIV 

Shooting Scene. 
MEDICAL 

(UIEQBQ) FBI ERT Team Leader SA : requested travel
to Cornell University (CU) and attend the necropsy of the I-IRT K-9 killed in the line of duty,
named ?Ape.? ?Ape? was shot by Kurt Myers on 0311412013, while-accompanying HRT as they
attempted to arrest "Myers in an abandoned building located at 243 North Main Street, Herkimer,

NY, SAl:In1et I-IRT Operator an unidenti?ed NYSP Of?cer as they

- arrived at CU with Ape's body. Ape?s necropsy was conducted by at the CU

Necrology Lab, located at 240 Earrier Road, Ithaca, NY. 

During the necropsy, Dr. found four Unnatural- holes in Ape?s body,
indicating Ape was hit by two projectiles; Dr retrieved two large metal fragments which
SAI:Isecured as evidence. Additionally, ook multiple photographs during the 



8

-1,2

hart?1459

b6 -2
-2

 

b6 -2,4,6
-2,4,6

b6 -1,2

b6 -1,2
b7C -l,2

 

 

 

 

neeropsy which he safe%ded at the FBI Binghamton RA. Upon completion of drafting the ?nal

necropsy report, Dr. forwarded the report to Herkjmer Vet ServicesCIVIL RIGHTS DWISION: . . .
(Hf/?9313) On 03f14l2013, IIC Ravenelle contactedl:l Special Legal b6 -3
Counsel, D01 and briefed him on the shooting incident. WC '3

(WM As of the date of this report, a prosecutive opinion for the Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division, was pending.

- 

- 0n 03/18f2013, no Ravenelle met with Herkimer County DA Jeffrey s.
'Carpenter?to brief him on the details of the shooting incident. 

As of the date of this report, a prosecutive opinion from Herkimer County DA
Jeffirey S. Carpenter was pending. 

INSPECTORS OBSERVATIONS:
- (Lil/E95826) The SIRT did not identify?eny issues or observations. 

. . 

muse?

 

 

 

HES-1.05 .7 (Rev. 5-3-3 

 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEETIGATION

Eianlronin communication

Title: EHOOTENG EECEDENT ALBENY FIELD Date: 
3 

 

CC:
b6 ?1

-1

 

 

 

From: 
Contact:  in  1; en es, 

 

 

Approved By: David Paul Gelioe
Nancy McNamara

Drafted By: STRUUD SHEEN 
Case ID 

Synopsis: Tnie communication was prepared to fntnieh the
analysisr comments, and recommendations of the Shooting incident Review
Stoop with teepeot to the oeptionet enooting following SIRS

r~r1 

meeting held on orgleEOle.

Administrative Notes: {Uf?ipeqj Tnie communication the
Inspection ?ivielon {teen} enootinq Incident Report dated ??flEfEGl?,
prepared by former lnepectoi Themes P. Revenelle. A copy of the
complete INSE Shooting Incident Report wee uploaded to the captioned

file.

.

Details:

{UffE?a?E On the SIRS oonvened to review shooting

incident which oponttei on involving Hoetene Rescue Team

136 ?1
?1

 


I - -.
Spepiei Agente {Snell I

.. 1, 
I I On ?BfijfEUi enoieot

 



3
Kurt Myers shot six people with lie?enge tnotgun, killing tout Vittime in HEEleel County, n1 epiee. Myeie pet ipeoeo



himself in en ebendonee building looeted et 2&8 Main Street, HEtkimet,



NYT3461

 KM

INCIDENT FIELI GFFICE 


Re: 

NE, and tired at law enforcement eftieersr including an eaehange with a

Deputy U.S. Marshal. The New Ecrk Etate Peiice 

Operatiens Team requested assistance from the FBI

Albany Fieid Office Team and HRT. ?n HRT members

arrived with a complement ef nine operaters, cne medier twe 

speciaiists, and tea Kw? operatersfhandlers. FBI HRT, FBI hibany BERT

and SORT members approximately 
en ?3/iif2?13, the team entered the building and a slew


methodical law enfereemeht? clear technique to search fer hye

 


. ., .. . "i . .
ART SAEI I preteeoed te the

rigit side of the building. After Shel I

 

 

1

entered one or the roamsr they were fired seen trem an ariacent rear

.2

n; l" 0

room by an indiv?deai iater identified as Myers. an.
fire and rewtraced their steps with

1

revain a tactical besition of cover. The agents fer a sma te

   

te

 

come forward, ant subsequently

 



in anticipati?n er releasing the inte the room where the gun shets
in

.. .. a . . 
emanatee. ems ape was r-ieasee and Agents Ape been

a 

toward the teem where the suh?ect was iecated. he ape entered the
room, Myers fired. ens shetgrn sing street Ape knce'irg him dean. Ape
got up and again went after the subject. The subject tired his shotgun

 

again striking Age in the side. Shs   immediateiy

 

engaged the subject threngh the de*rwty, continuing te sheet at Myers 

nntii they believed he was no longer a threat. aiso tired in

the directien er My rs threueh the eel at a point opposite tram where
ted. Subsequently, and arse SORT

eperators set




- 1E6 the teem, nieceveiee HEELS iying the 


a
restrained him using fi
Results of the SIRE

On the SIRS reviewed the hgent-inveived sheeting

incident with the intent tn:



2

NYT-462



Title: SHOOTING FIELI GFFICE U3Xlif2313

he: Egl?h?whlET?gl?r?, 

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

 

determined the apciication of deadly force by Shel I be ?1

 

 

Ion ?SfldeUlT was in comnliance with the Decartmeni ?1

of Justice's Beadly Force policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational
planning and execution, training, and?or safety issues. The SIRS made
the following ohservetion concerning the handling of meeoons utilised

in the shooting incident:

Observation 1: eat operatrrs removed accessories from firearms used in

a shooting incident prior to surrendering them as evidence

Analysis 1: Field Evidence Management and Operations Poll

Implementation Guide {so} Section 4.8 required seized firearms to

include all accessories, parts, ammunition and as
5:

inclniing but not limited to sites, holster rayonets, cases, scones,
flash .npnressors, magazines, morale attachments, and 
sighting devices that are designed or meant to he used in conjunction
with a firearm, and are to he classified and stored as a firearm and

in
Crete





orired and entered into the central record kee1ing
systemicallected items as a ?Firearms?dther.?

ear SC Cornelius anr HRT had a limited number of be -1
I for their weapons. in an effort to maintain ?mission ?1
tormq tor who?E r- 4~ r? 1?5? FNMA J-n  ?1
{?nal Q's-lief 
from the firearms used during the shooting incide prior to

 

 

surrendering them to the hihany Princioai Firearms instructor.

Instruction 1: AD, will ensure compliance with Field Evidence
Management and operations PG, Section 4.8.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary. The SIRE recommended no administrative action he taken

 

agains" Shel lee a result of their b5 ?1
-1



3

NYT1463



i''1tie: {Ugfr? imCiDnNi ELERNY GEFILE O3/ie?r?i?
e: 29?*H?w?i27?932*?, 

invnivement

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

{sf??sa?j Aeting ?egnty Assistant Gireetor David Fani Geiias, iaSD,
chaired the meeting anJ was a nonwvotine member. The fellowing members
were in attendance: aetfng Chief inspeottr Paul E. Office
or Inspections Trial Attorney, Criminal ?ivision,
?nited states Department tf Justine I Sp elal
Legal Gonnsel, Ci"li Rights Givisitn, Seetien Chief Bonert
E. Hughes, griminai Investigative BiviSion: Acting ELI I
Bivieion; Supervisory Rgent 
investigative Law Unit, Oifice oi the senerai Counsel: SSA
I I Squad CR-E Washington Fieid Grfioe; Unit Jnief
Prartieai appiieations Unit, iraining 
SSAI I Eminence Resjense Team Unit 
Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit,
Veagons and Taotius Operations ?nit,
Critie=i Incident Respense iron? and UCI I
Defensive S?stems ?nit, TE. The feiiowing individuals were
also in attendanoe: LETUEE Chief, Livii Rights Divisien,
I ?ffioe of inspecter
Generai, I Internal
Affairs, Customs ano Eor'er Patrri I UC

 

 

 

 

I I Firearms and Tooimar-t Unit, Ls; 
ELTU, Inspectors Snawn W. Strono, Timetny a. Eeeney, Trent R.
Teyema, R. Justin Toiomen, Peterson, and Dost'as n. Leif,
ENSD: Team Leadersl 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i and Xanaqement Pronran analyst? 
I I inspeotion Management Un East.

 

 

?i an, CIEG, is rot ensuring eat? Inspection
instructionfreeommendation is satisfactorily reseived. The inwL

process is not complete until the InstructionfRecommenda+ion is

NY13464



gitle: SHOOTING IJC DENT FIELI GFFICE O3f1?f2313

re: 4

s??4

s"
1..)

p1.-

by the division. ?ie Ineoeetotuie-Cherne will review

F.

the *ivision'e to determine it the 

hes been resolved or requitee further action. Resolution is based upon

epeoitie eotiwne taken and not of the eotione the division
t.

. .141 . 1. . . 
E}.ch LOfibiUEtL-?tl :11 O): icil?lb to lIE?Lpiis?Jttn?





{efiioe?i AB, QERG, is required to a teeponee?Ll-?1g L-

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5

NYT-465

 ATTORNEY
COUNTY OF HE    

39;? Main Washi-agtm: Stx?eai; 313535: 3:16 
?fhrir 29?}
"f??iephmm {3 2 ii} i 
Facsimiia: {3 i  i343
Email: 

   

First ??sismmt ?ieiri? sig?mr?fy
iiaimri Mc?mw

a?zisha?am ?ist'rict A?umu?
Rabat: R. {315%} .ir.

M, Amiga:

{Tii?heti (I. ii-Eiscnimi?

Jeffrey  (Iarpmt?er
El?istri? mmer

Jam .13, 2433 6;

insp?zmr Shawn WA Simud
Blame-{ion ?i?simh Rom
1313mm: {If Irweaiig?timi
Pennsyivania Ava 
Wasshingum, Di: HESS

b7C

{mime-m

{In?ed Sigma Mam?ais Service
Of?ce Emma-mm In?icrzmi affairs
?lfif? .I?tf'i?erm? San-?is Highwa
silmandria, VA 2233!};

R355: iim-?estigaii?nw Kurt It. Simuting
March 1344, 2m??

53A. 'l?iicr #:3135131
?am?amm;

i haw thmnughiy {ex-"imw? in in: entirety; Em: ixwtsiiga?m mm 131% {21:31 Sheeting 0f Kurt R.
My?? aim Mam}: 3m 3c {>55 an which camaistad af?ihe. iiwegtigmiua 133* the:
New Y?rk Stale Paiicm crime: 3mm: 3333:3333, mag-3&5: anti mgm??e suitenmnisgt stam?nwn?i
 ?aw in?w?lw? in in?idmi am! {331;} aumpgy K. an Myers. Te hem-r undersi?md
my ct?m?usiom I wi? 3&2: But ihe 'i'?amai izaakgmun? {3f the case, as ih'ii?w?:



March 3 2i} i 3:

 

fat 1 ppmxirnaf?iy 51:30 am" an individual, ide?ti?m?  Kari Ra ?dye-r5 {kiwi} 133333913; 5:31
?re: to an {mirupimi mu?figie hamzzi?g un?t at 313 ??uth Wmhing?mn Street? Mnhawk;  E?ark. 
that pmme?ad Satan?s Harm? Shugzs Eacawd a: "3 Main Strata-L Muhawkg New "Yark whereby be smart ?i
and di??imrg?d a. 7' M. am} s?viiahaaei Rana-2:3: amt?
vitrificain 

Mgr-n; than pmceeded {fia??ky?s Fast 313$ :?x-flohawk ?57:er E?isrkiman  E?ark wimreby
hi:- eniam? and ?ischargg?? a 'i.2~gamg? ?lm-Egan wuunding Michael  fimshawand Ste-$21.

{31:31 immadiawiy ?ed the- ?aming Eti?u?aw}; Street i'i?i?ki??i?i} NEW Y?i?k. it: a Rii??
5:32p Wrangl?r hearing  Registraiien $3131.09}  it is; new knawn that Mgr-s- ;?smaeedad in a. mega?
muhipi?vunii in?icting ?amed at 243 Narnia. M?in Street, ?4ieri?imen  Var}; whamin ht:
r35! rmin?d surrmmii?d i3}! REEL Siam and 'I'Eij?tf?} iaw er?bmanwai unite; iintii Mamh H, 13% 3.,





   

 

 

NYT-466

136 -1,3

-1,3

136 -5
-5

him?: 13, Ems:-
Page :2

A: appmximamly 1 :Bii Elm, Mia-1% upim iaw mammals-r1: who: miume? inn) {hit h?uildi?g.
it has; hit?i?: {iamm?si?ed ihai {ha ?ayuiy {Mimi} Swim Mam?aih th'} return?ii fire, did mi  

"Thai, mt Mare-h 13, L285 3 and swimming; in March 239% 3? .mui?pi? attempts were mack, m}
maxi}? it} negotiam {hi3 sum-Mar af?kiyars is iaw wiih the: 
{im'iws 

Giver: ?it: mime of {Mrs 'is'tciif?nn tngaihm- whiz its incatitm, a {i?cisim was. made. regatta: that:
?ssisia?ce {)f?the :i'iim'iage 34:35am "i?eam (itiR?i?) nzf'the Ft?deral Human alfiriwstiga?tm 

-1

March H, 2% 3:

agapmximamiy ?rm} MIL: ihe mam arrived in H?rkinm!? amt staged at]: b7E -1
I Yark! h?y?ina?er 
?au?iinlaimd .. . . . . .  . .. .. .. .. ..

5-3 appmximm?y sun, 3. hi?ie?ng was: hem at the pm}? wims??in it wag dimi?m? {Em
muhipie teamm Emmi?ing of magmas ?rm-i 1hr: team, if}: F85 Aihany ?aws and 113:: N?w
Sign: Po?ce  {)pemtimzs Tarzan: wanid be dapiuyad in 243 North Main
Sil??i?ti, Her?aimcr?, 1'0 seam}: and. agpmimnd. Kari R. Myers. this mamh?rs
Wilm- insn?uai'ed an that?. Fifii?s- {Eaais?y Farm Path}: 35 war?! as: ?at appiicahie New Yuri: State E?enai Law
Artie}: ??ui?kfeme ref? Jugti'?mtion {iraciusive {sf  9f g?usgimi ?ame and Lisa. {31' {1mm}: phyaica'i fame}.
A?dii?i?am?y. units. were i??iud?d in thia- {:petras?m.

Th?e??er? :hc abaw-mfm?cnc?d {reams were- deployed 10 2143 Mar-?11 Mair: Sim-2:, i?ierkimen New


{?33m} Entry inn: 3613 Nuri'h Main ?nger, 2:35:11 team baggy: {u perihrm thair ratspective a?xignmenia in
3:1 shuf?e and insilmciicaiiy search far Kari IL Myra. .513 the: search was ??g?ing the:
51.25pm: ?red 13pm 23w membam mam membm'sl I WE ?1

I [ramm?d Era, HRT Hr? 
was: aim d?gaiaayed. mm the. area Wham ashe- Simpeci was whemin ha and mmnhars afthe mm:
were ?lm? 13332311. sa?aimd ihtai mam memhaz's Mamas} ?re. gyms?;
the Suap?r?h Kiwi  is?v'iwrs, ?rim-air: he stsm?ne? $3313.} gun?im?i wanmais.

{damn may ink} 31:: mum when: 11in: 31.253383: was ?xated? he was restmiued  is maxim} 
gn?o?es?um and was an awaiting; {aw vehiei? 1hr :1
gwi?e?ctem?tined veiszts?inary can: 'faailiiy..

.Aii iaw mif?mcem?nf yermnnei im?ivm?i than {it {he canmaand pas-st m-??iemin may began the
{Mugging mama mam 13am diaghargad their ?r?amiaa auwgudared {hair weapma
f0? primes-rising and timber a?32??}?5i3.

Thar- 31 2533 Nari?! Main. Sirwh i??n?kimer, Nit-w Vinsrk wars seamed they {I?m  Yam St?ii?
111w procarssi?g am? anaiygis.

 thamugh anaiyais was; {hrs weamm {hai' 1mm {iig?harged by law @i'iihi?a?m??i
paw-1730:1118} eumfm?mn with that a1 Ei?m Same as we?. 33 ?lms-i: r?immrei} {mm the gmra??
R. kiwi-?3. it has; ham {i?armim? that Ra? R. Myerz?s ?ied as a resuitnfn1u?iipitz gt?ansshat 
his; that,  um}; 3hr: physica} eviciaznce: $15 wail 331% matwuenis 33:? 33w were: tin:
(?rect. remli' ?f?te return ?xer mmz'zhm?? af?l? mam.

Cnmias?ea:
Thai, bagc? ume the. 313mm the. ?i?fica 0f" the Hmkirmr Camry Di?'i?rici' Mammy mlfiaves that ?ne
shami?i?g Kurt R. Mym'? by mm: Jaw m?amemm??. mfi?ic?ra mummi?ed pursuant New Pena?

Lem- ?nish: 33 and? as} 5.21mi}, xvii} amt any aiming} prayset??a?m is? ?13033 Saw anihrce-ment 
ilwg?siwd. Sp??i?ca?y?, ?it: Of?ce 0f 13%: {Lioui?iiy {Itisi?ct skimmer}: is d-tciining t0 

NYT-467

ul?irwe?iga?na; Swami Agarm

.Ft?xiara} Eurasia Hf irz'v?aiigaii?n; and Spmi?i ?kg?nil

511m: 5:3, 
Riga:





 

I ed?raii Bureau

Iii'tdemi Burma: auf investigmiu?z?s: Smciai Agenil I

Ifi?f?b?ig?i?t?l I  Mar?zais Sar?w;  Agend

I Fed?mi Burma m?

husgzsi'igmim 1hr {Emir Examimmcn?? in the Sizocf?ng {31? Kurt R. Myers. if yam require- Emything 'li?unhen

g?eam d0 nut hasimte :0 WHERE: 1116,

'l appvecia?a yum Ea ma?a. ?E?hamkiug gun, I ma{Liaptaid I 
3mm? investigated I NYSE:




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. 
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b6 -1,3
-1,3

b6 -4
-4

NYT-468

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

               
    
  

 



1-. .

 

 
   

 

  
   

 
   

Ln:ng  -.


  

 

b6 -3
1:378 -3

 


op}- to:

lport of:

.r

.- 

I

Date:


lie:

ETEGICII

nopsh:

 

 

sn-zo4 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

IIC Robert I. Shields, Jr.
. 01f29f2013



SHOOTING INQUIRY

REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
DALLAS FIELD OFFICE

08f02l2012

I SHOOTING 

On 08/02/2012, Dallas SWAT executed a.search warrant
at a rural residence in Texas related to
I I believed to. 
responsible for five bank robberies. As the SWAT team
approached the residence, itl Ito
divert attention from the front door. Other SWAT personnel
simultaneously deployed around the residence and turned on
their poliCe emergency lights to clearly announce a law

-enforcement resence. 'The entry team breached the front
door,  then held a position outside
the front door. As lexited the 
residence, she said" Iwere inside armed with guns.

The entry team pulled back to a tactical position and
I into the residence.

 

 

 

 

 

Shortly thereafter, through a bedroom window on the
side of the residence, 
.his revolver at three SWAT operators. then
moved to a position inside the residence near the open
front door and fired in the direction of SWAT op rators
positioned outside. SAI lobserved
fire and returned one round, which struck
in the right shoulder. Approximately ninety minutes
later, bothl lemerged from the
house and surrendered. No one else was injured.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ifired two rounds from 

b6 -2,7
-2,7
b7E -1

b6 


NYT-470

 

 

(Rev. 

Details:

OPERATION

 

'On.05/2a/2012, Dallas Squad c-a opened an investigation_
into the 05/18/2012 armed robbery of a Bank of America branch in

-Forne Texas. The Dallas Bank Robbery Coordinator, SA
connected the two unidentified subjects in the

orney an robbery to four other recent bank robberies. ?The
local media referred to the subjects as the ?Laurel and Hardy
Bandits." -

In June 2012, a source connected

 

 

 

 

Texas to the five bank robberies, and provided
information_corroborated by witness statements.

 

In mid-June 2012, Acting SSAI ad 

 

 

 

 

advised SHAT Senior Team Leader of the
facts of the case and the potential need for SWAT assistance.
STL subsequently planned the operation and wrote the

 

 

 

operations order.

On 07i26/2012, Squad obtained a Search Warrant for
I Texas. At the time, the peso did not

believe sufficient robable cause existed to authorize arrest
warrants for I .

On 07/31 2012 a few days after the Search Warrant was
signed, STL briefed the operations order to SWAT team
members at a as Field Office using a slide presentation.
During the presentation, STLI briefed the FBI Deadly Force
Policy, which was displayed in a slide at the end of the
presentation. -

 

 

On (Jami/2012; .STLI Imet with SAC Diego G. Rodri ez,
ASACI I I, and 
and obtained SAC approval for the operations order.


Durin this meeting, SAC-Rodriquez ap roved the use of
and delegated authority to: to ASAC I:

the.On-Scene Commander 
OPERATION AUGUST 2, 2012

on 08/02/2012, prior to the start of the operation,

participants were E?mailed a copy of the final operations order:

 

 

At approximatel 5:40 atl
Texas, the operations order to all personnel
directly involved with the operation, including the following

FD-2CI4 (REV. 10-17-2012}

OSC:
ASAC-I

 

Dallas SWAT Team:

SA

 

SA

 {Team Leadeerlue team(Team Leader/Gold team)

 

 

SA

HSTL

 

Tactical Operations Command 

 

 

 

SA

 {Paramedic)

 

Crisis Negotiators:

 

SA
SA

 

 

 

Squad C-4:

 

TFO
TFO

{Case Agent]

 

SAI

 

 

SSA
TFO

 

 

 

SA
SA

 

 

(Bank Robbery Coordinator]

 

Texas Deaartment of Public Safetv'Uniformed Officers:

 

Sergeant
Corporal

 

 

 

 

After STLI Fs briefing, the Blue and Gold team

Leaders, SAsl
respective teams.

At 5:56 
personnel departedl

which faced South.

I. conducted brief?backs with their

the SWAT team and otaer law.enforoement
and proceeded to the
The SWAT team arrived -1,4
-1NY71472

 

 



. -PEI-204 (Rev. 

 

six vehicles at 6:05 a.m. At 6:06 SAI I
on the Northwest side of the house from the front

 

. passenger seat of the first SWAT vehicle to arrive on-
This vehicle, driven by SAI I also transported SA I
11c es,

 

After SAI the five SWAT ve
including a Humvee, surrounded the house and turned on the
police emergency lights.

 

Separately, a SWAT van transported the SWAT Gold team,
including the entry team, froml Ito the
residence. Approximately 200 yards from the residence, the
entr team, which consisted of SAs land
the van and transferred to?the Humvee, which was
driven by SA and transported the front
passenger sea and SA in the rear passenger
compartment. Imounted the driver-side
rails of the Humvee and Imounted the
passengereside rails.  erited the van, mounted the
back of the Humvee, and covers the entry team with his sniper'
rifle as it approached the residence. .

 

 

-After the Humvee near the Southeast corner
of the house,.t a entry team disembarked and approached the
front door of the residence, which was-located inside a
screened-in porch. As the entry team approached, SA
continued to provide cover while SA 'exited and covered the
entry team with his M?e from the iron of the Humvee. ASAC
and SA remained in the Humvee. . 

 

 

"stacked" on the right
side of the door while SAI lpoSLtioned himself on the left
side of the door. At 6:06 SAI breached the front
door with a battering ram. After the breacn SA ave a
procedural warning to the entry team and
approximately one Eoot inside the door. While 

other members of the entry team

 

 

 

 

 

 

continued to announce words to the effect, We have a
search warrant. Come to front door." As this announcement was
made,  I appeared and
walked toward the front door. While she walked, she confirmed
the presence ofl linside the residence. At 6:07

complied with instructions provided to her by SA
the residence.

responsibility was to provide
'cover for shield team #2 and handle prisoners, es
to the rear of the van. While doing so, she told 
subjects were inside the house, were'in possession of a lot of
guns, including handguns and an AK-47 rifle, and the subjects
would fight it out with law enforcement and out with a
bang." SA. turned over to and SA

 

 

 

NY73473

 

-1,2
b?C -1,2
-1

b6 -1,2
-1,2

 



after which she made similar statements, which b7: -1


epor ed over the radio.

presence until SA made the radio announcement, at which
time they retreate to positions of cover behind the Humvee.

h7C ?1

After iz i ?1
order over the radio
 hetween 6:15 a.m. and 6:26 a.m.

Members of entff team continued-to announce the FBI's

 

 

On the Northwest side of the resid after receiving the
orderl Ifrom STLI SA gave the order to

SA I Iretrieved I 
from ve icle. I ISA Iidentified two he -1

'West side windows, which he described from left land A2, in whichl I SAI ithen b7E -1
I SAI I

heard Iask STLI [via radio whetherl I

In preparation,  retrieved eight
additionalI I from the vehicle, ich subsequently
I I .

Upon arrival, SAI drove an SUV to the Northeast side 
of the residence, SA was the passenger. Both were on

the SWAT Blue team. In accordance with the operations order SA
Iturned on the rphicle's nolice l'ghts b6-i,2
SAs covered the win ows'and ch ?1,2
door on the Nortn side of the reSidence. Several minutes after ?1
I lexited the residence,.SAI Ireoeived an
order from STLI I SA Iretrieved his
from the back.seat of the vehicce,  
andl lover the course of approximately
three minutes. I I which did not hit its?
target, was fired at the easternmost window on the North side of
the residence A1). at the
North A2 window and again at the North A1 window. Both found
their mark. During the three?minute period, SA
announce over the radio shots had been fire
pproximately five to ten minutes later, at STL I ha ?1
request, SAI Iinto b7c ?1
the East A2 window. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SAI Idid not lupon the initial
orderl LaterJ I b6 -1
Iafter retrieving it from his vehicle. ch -1

-1

 

 

 

 

After the entry team members took positions behind the
Humvee, the FBI Crisis Nagotiators, I who
had_moved from the van to a position just off the driver's side

5

 



 

 

u-

. .-
a-
. I


 

FD-2D4 (Rev. 10-1T-20121

of the Humvee, used a bullhorn to announce the-FBI had a search
warrant and forl Ito exit the residence. SAs
[did not carry a "throw" phone or a "rescue"
phone because there was no room in the van, which was
overcrowded with 10 to 12 personnelh

 

Neither SAI Inor SAI I After
I both moved to the rear of the van,
farther away from the residence. SA was also at the rear
of the van withI I WhenI I
the four of them moved further away.

~At request, Ireturned to
the van and used the hullhorn to continue to call out the
subjects. Shortly thereafter, STL advised the call-outs
were not loud enough. SA attempted to use the van's PA
system without success. STL and SAI Ithen walked
to the van and asked SA to move it approXimatelv 20 
yards closer to the house. Again, SAI I
utilized the bull horn to continue announcing the FBI's
presence. At this time,  and the
SUbjects had not yet made ver a con ac wi 3 team or

negotiators.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Shots Fired

 

I. IFi?red'Two Shots West Side:

At 6:29 as SAI Iwae eitherI I

or after he beganl 

 

 

 

 

 

rd, and both 

 

 

 

observed, the muzzle flash of two gun shots fired in rapid
.succession coming from_the west A2 window,

 

I IFired One Shot - South Side:

 

A few minutes after the beginning ofI I SA
moved the Humvee to the front of the residence to provide
cover from an angle at which SWAT operators had a better view of
the open front door and interior of the residence. ASAC
and SA remained in the Humvee. At 
direction, SA
facing the front cor. - -

 

At 6:30 after the vehicle was in its new positiOn,
while looking throuth the front_passenger-side window at the
front door, SAI observed a man wearing a white shirt,
standing in the front doorway, raise a chrome firearm and fire
one round through the front door toward the Humvee. SA

observed the same individual point a gun toward the
Humvee, eard a gunshot come from this individual?s direction,
and heard a subsequent round fired back.

6

 

 

 

 

positioned the Humvee with the passenger side

b6 -1,7
b?C ?1,7

b5 -1,2
-1b?C ?1,7
-1

b6 
b?C ?1 

 

 

{Rem 

SAI IReturned a Single .223 Round from a Colt M-4

 

After 3 moved the Humvee, through
a tactical poSition at the rear of the Humvee with a direct view
of the front door. During one of his rotations, he used the
laser/flashlight mounted on his Colt .223 rifle to
illuminate the residence. He switched the laser on in order to
discourage aggressive action by the subjects. Using the
flashlight, SA could see into the residence, including 
what-appeared to a ack wall.

- At 6:30 SA saw a person with disheveled hair,
wearing a white shirt, emerge from.behind a piece of
unidentified furniture near what appeared to be a back'wall. SA
this person movin and repeatedly shouted for this
person to show his hands.  observed a muzzle flash
come from this person. SA immediate thought he was
Out of concern.for his safety and the safety
of others, SA. took his Colt M-4 rifle off safe mode and
using the weaphn?sl Idischarged one .223
caliber round, After SAI Ifired, the subject immediately
dropped out of his sight. - .

After "Ln shots, SAI Iopened SAI Ps door and
directed SA I and  to exit the Humvee
on the side 1g away rom tie front door and to get on the 

ground. SA then used a ballistic shield to protect them.

 

being fired upon.

 

 

 

 

 

fired his weapon, asked him
said he observed a man

realizing SA

to descri at he saw. SA

 

 

 

inside the residence discharge a gun, but was unsure whether his-

return fire struck him.

Just AI [heard over dio shots were
fired, SA advised via radio 5'
telephone was in the residence. At 6:35 after-SA
Efii?ii?gf?fled it five times to no avail,  Icalled
SA 's cellular telephone. Over approximatelv the next
hour and twenty?five minutes, SAI Ispoke

several times. During these phone calls,   told SAI 
he had been.shot.

after

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

At 8:09 lexited the house and
surrendered. He was wearing a white, blood-stained shirt. One
minute later, exited the front door of the house
and surrendered.

-While examining'and bandaging his gunshot 
several unsolicited remarks, including he a ot
out back and front of the residenceNYTI476

b6 -7


 

 



FDH2D4 

At 3:26 Dallas SWAT cleared the residence.

At 8523 transported to Hunt County,
Jail.

 

At 3:33 am. Iwas transported to:

Medical Center.

 

OPERATION

 

ASAC notified SAC Rodriguez via Blackberry E-mail
shots had een fired. Upon learning this, SAC Rodriguez
requested ASACI to notify SIOC. SAC Rodriquez
subsequently notified DAD Cory?B. Nelson, INSD, and ADD Kevin L.
Perkins. While driving to the-scene, SAC Rodriguez contacted

Chief Division Counsel, Dallas Field Office.

 

 

 

 

 

SAC Rodriguez arrived at the scene just prior to the
surrender of the subjects, which he?observed from his vantage

oint. He learned the basic facts from including SA
fired his weapon, and his weapon an magazines had

sen secured by ERT. He observed SWAT enter and clear the

location}

I SAC Rodriquez spoke with land determined he was
okay, then.separated personnel direct involved in the

operation to determine how they were, and to advise them of what
the administrativ?'process would.be over the nExt several days.

 

 

SAC Rodriquez ensured the crime scene was secure before it
was turned.over to ERT. At approximately 8:30 a search
was initiated by the Dallas ERT at1 
Texas. -

Post-incident a neighbor, 
of birth witnessed the incident. At
6:00 afterl lby the Dallas
SWAT team,  Iwho lived at I approximately
50 yards Southwest of the  residence, exited his residence
and observed a long line cars with red and blue lights
flashing parked along Iheard a 
repeating I please come out."

observed a Humvee parked in front of house. At

 

 

 

 

 

some point, heard-a shot, which sounded'as if it had
come from the cues. Immediately following this,

observed someone standing behind the Humvee'fire a shot from a
long gun into the house. heard no more shooting after
this 

 

PEI-204 (Rev. 10-1?-2012l

ACCOUNTING OF SHOTS FIRED

b6 -1,7

The FBI Laboratory has received seyeral Dallas examination b7c 1 

.requests, to include SAI Is Colt M4A1 Carbine, four
magazines, 111 rounds of .223 ammunition, and one spent casing.
Also pending is the.analysis of ammunition and a .35? Smith and
Wesson revolver recoveredl I
address.

 

MEDICAL RECORDS

 

 

A full copy ofl ls medical records was obtained b5 ?7

?rom Medical Center. A review of these records -7
indicate was hospitalized_and examined on 08 02 2012,
and release on he same-date.- The report stated had a

single puncture wound and laceration with controlled bleeding
located in the rear of his right shoulder. An X?Ray showed a
bullet traveled over the right posterior shoulder region. Areas
of shrapnel were noted in the deltoid region as well as a second
area of shrapnel within the right trapezius. There was also a
fracture of the right shoulder bone. 

 

   
  
  
 

b6 -7

A full copy records will be_retained INSD.

 

INSPECTOR-s 

SIRT Observation 1: The OSC improperly placed himself
in a'tactical position.l

Analysis 1: According to the SWAT Policy Implementation
Guide (PG). Section 2.2.2 {ongQ/zolg, revised 04/25x2012ASAC
took a position in the Humvee, which transported the entry
team to the target location, and was positioned approximately
seven to ten yards from the front door to the residence. When
the operation escalated, he was not in the optimal location to
assess the situation and make critical decisions.

 

 


..

DL SIRT Recommendation 1: SAC, Dallas should ensure OSCs
are.knowledgeable of their role and responsibilities during SWAT
operations. 

?ed! DL SIRT Observation 2: TOC personnel were assigned non-TOG
functions. . .

Analysis 2: TDC the Humvee transporting the

entry team to the residence and positioned it approximately 15 b6 _1

-1

1.-


yards from the front door. -SA subsequently repositioned
the Humvee approximately seven en yards from the front door.
exited and took a tactical position at the front of

9

NY11478

 

 

i. k.1 
.
.
Ell 






.-

(Rev. 10-17-2012?

team with his M?e.

 

 

a medic, as well as ASAC
personnel, were also in the Humvee.

the Humvee, covering the entpf

and position relative to the front door of the residence, these
individuals were unnecessarily exposed to potential harmi In

 

due to their proximity and position; SAs
witnessed the subject discharge his weapon.
Recommendation-2:

65ersonnel participating in SWAT tactical operations are
qualified,-properly trained, and appropriately utilized.

DL SIRT Observation 3:
or did not utilize the proper protective equipment.

Analysis 3:


land

SAC, Dallas should ensure all

Participants either did not possess

According to the SWAT PG, Section 3.4,

 

 

 

 

operators, ASACI 

in close proximity to the.ent
SWAT equipment, except for SA
his standard Bureau body armor.

and SA
team.-

 

ASACI I SAI
Humvee, and Crisis Negotiators, 
positioned outside the van, did not have  
adversely affected due to their close proximitv 
Afterl 
move 100 yards further away from the residence, 
Ithen take a protected position inside

SA

 

 

SAI I a SWAT operator located'near SUV #5 did
I lunon the initial orderl 
afterl 
retrieVing it from his_vehicle.

 

 

DL SIRT Recommendation 3:

Although not SWAT
'were positioned
None wore the required
who wore ballistic plates in

I SAI I positioned in the

All were

Iwere forced to 

the van

to resume attem ts to contact the subjects. 
but did not bring it to the operation.

not

Later,

 after

SAC, Dallas should ensure all

personnel participating in SWAT operations are issued and

properly utilise the required protective equipment.-

:?lswuunL SIRE Observation 4: The SWAT team and Crisis
Negotiation team did not utilize standard equipment.

Analysis 4:
phone? at the staging area.

The Crisis Negotiation team left the ?{throw}
The negotiators were able to

converse with the subjects only-after repeatedly calling a

mobile phone in the house.

10

SA I
the both non?tactical
Because of their proximity

1:6

1:70

136
1370


136



b6

b?E

NY71479

- 


.{Rem 10-1?-2?12]

DL Recommendation 45

SAC, Dallas should ensure the

Crisis Negotiating team utilizes the proper equipment during

crisis negotiations.v

11



 

 

 

tie-ms? (Rev. 
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEETIGATION

Eianlronin communication

 

FROSTING INCIDENT DIVISION Date: G?f28f?013


b6 -1
Exam: -1
BEHINSPECTIGN MANATEMENT UNIT
Contact: I

 

 

Approved By: ROBERT .3 JE

hen-3y McNamara

 

Drafted By:  

 

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: The Sheeting in: dent Review Group reviewed a

Sheeting incident that occurred on USE??fzuir, inveiving Agent
Ief the Dailee Divisieh. During the execution ef b6 ?1




 

 

3:





ireh warrant, SRI  fire? one round from hie Heir b7C ?1
Mme striking ehe of the subjects in the right

.223 caliber carbine,
eheuider. SIRS membere re
ageiee? a re 

incident. Peer Gheervetiene end were adopted


I "9-7 -1 ?i 
by LEE elee fer the lelSlO?.

Leheed he erminietreEive action he 

?it OI hie i.volvement in thie ehw



.5

Administrative Netee: Reference repert of Robert rum. Han-1'
ei;r9;iei3.

Details:

This cemmuniceriee wee ereperee he fureieh the eheiyeie, and



ei the SIRS with reference te the captioned Sheeting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

. .?e/i?/e?iar tee eJehee regarding the ?d/lE/e?ig dimee 01 Benn mi Emeriee hienen in

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT-481

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: SHOOTING INCIDEQT BALLAS BIVISIDN GeEOs/s?i?

Fe: ?7f28?2013



Fsrhe?. Texas. The Dailss Baht Rehhery Ceerdihster, b??il?
-1,7

 

I Ieenheetee the tee unidentified subieets in that rehhery

.4

 




to fear other recent hank robberies. In uuse 3012, source connected

 

I Ito the five bank

3 statements.

I-c'




H.
I..(HI52..
(a

If,
nJ


$012, hetihg sheer"isery Agent b6 ?1,7


 

 

 

advised Special Fes?ens end Teetie Be ier Team 
Leader let the tese ahe the :eLehtisi need for

SWAT assistance. elahne? the egerstieh and

the Operetiehs order. Oh U?f?652012, a Search Warrant was

obtained EerI Texas. en set

 

hrieted the eperstiehs order including the FEE Deadly Force

Policy to SWAT team members.

samixsrii, setI:I   53m: Eiege e. Redriquez, tsie b6 ?1



I I HJAEI I see 33ehtaihed set apprev:i fer the ejeretiehs order. hating the meetihg
.5:
.L

SEE Redriquet appreved the use 0 eelegeted sethtrity to
ts ha the thSeehe Commender 

 

 

eperetiehs titer. At espreximsteiy 5:d0 etI I b6 ?1


th, the .perttiehs srfer hel reetiy leveived with the 05ersti . -.Ler 

:ietihg, the SWAT Blue and Geld Team Leaders

 

5 






LO
3:5
U)





 

 

I I conducted brief?beets with their respective teams.

At 56 the SEAT teem and ether aw enforcement persehhei

depertedl land te 

I 1 4- 
sie she arrived at Ezs: 5:60 se  

 

in b5 -1.T
-1,7
-1



 

 

 

 


n. .

Neithwest side of the heese efter I

 


I I the five SWAT vehicles, in:

 

aria} Heavee, 

the heuse she aetivete. their peliee emereehey

 

esprOLimateiy EGO yards free 
eonsister of seal



"UNCLASSIFIED

2

NYT3482

UNCLASSIFIED

. '1


..-
Inn-r

FAA.

itle: SHOOTING INCIDEQT BALLAS BIVISIGN 

Fe: 

exited their van end transferred to the Humvee, which wee b6 -1

driven by Rise in the Humvee wee the '1

front passenger seat =hd SAI I l? the rear 

 

 

.-- . - - 1' 4.: .t 
temgertmeht. Shel Imeehtee the errver eree rarra 0L

 

 



the hemvee ahd Shel Imeuhtee the rails.

 

Imhehtee the hi the Humvee, end covered the

 

entry teem with hie ehiper rifle ee they appreaehea the 

hfter etepped the Hemvee heer the Seutheaet eerher ot the b6 -1
heuee, the entry teem eemherted end approached the treht deer er the ?1
reeidehee. he the ehtry team 

previde cover from the reer er the Humvee,

 

entry team free the freht of the Humvee.

remained in the 

 

I"eteekee" en the tieht side bee?12'?
meet while hlmeelf en the Left er the weer. 
-1

After the breach, warning te th; eztry

teem ehf   appreeimete1v ehe feet iheiee the de r.

 

 

 

other eemhere of the entry

 

51;

team eehtlheed te 'hheuhee weree to the effect, 'e have a eeareh


werreh . Come ?e freht deer." he the ahheuheemeht was made, the

 

I I eppeered end welted tewerd the

 

 

 

 

.-., Gerbil . the Lorieei??i?i the filth-tenet? fail e.uf temelree WLLH rhetrueurOhe

 

and exited the residenceMembere e" the eetry teem centiheed to announce the F?l?e 

UNCLASSIFIED

LO

NYT-483

NYT-484

UNCLASSIFIED

meve

r1
I

Lt


LP.



DEERE

. 4-.
Judi Law

?13

II.

then
20 

we}
erde

.ke?
13

to


th?


va 
6?




aeked
an?e

 B.

eyeten

1 L.

he

theree


T.

.1363

ed

. 1
173mute were

.-.
751--

st

leu



en.uqn.

53331 137?:

?1

b6

-1

 

 

3.

. 



the 




 

 

 

 

 

 



-1,2
-1

 


be

Which


..


.




3


I

Wed ?55-1pher

eperetie

 

 



?252

t; .1

-1,7

 

 

Imeed

:31

b6 -1,7

1..
la

 .311.


I

members

be

Ewe

?er:

 

 

 

 

   

 

 





'1

order

received

t:




N..-

u.







1




A





aute

Gaffe:-

1r


 



-1,2
-1

the


4..

?Eider



.31 

eve

Li.

.w
5.3

 

 

 

b6 -1,2

eube;

 

 

 inte

1-.
I

he 





*Genee.

eel

 

 

 



1..


ET
[u .
t._J
if]

in

etreeted

1

?eie

:3 


1.

.a


i i?

Ilt,

b6 -1
-1



Eel




LBS

FAA.

.
L'ur

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: SHOOTING ENCIDENT DALLAS DIVESEON 


he: 29?whe hiETii?iw?, ??/2ef2013

the huiiherh te continue ehheuheihg the b5 '1
-1
b7E -1

 

hresehce. ht this time,  I and the subjects

 

1

had het yet made vereai contact with the SWAT team er negotiators.

ht 5:29 and both seal Iehd b6 ?1
the muzzle flesh of two gun shets fired is ?f ?1

coming free wihdew.

 

 

A few mihutes after the hegihhihg efthe Humvee te the front ef the residence te proviee eever trem an angle
at which SWAT operators hee better View ef the epeh treat deer end

ih the

ion, 53%. pesitiOhee? the i-hinivee with


L?l


interior er the residence. a
Humvee. At


the geesehger side facing the front deer.

ht 6:30 while looking threugh the front passengerwside window
at the treht deer, men wearing white shirt, b5 ?1

standing in the trait reise ehreme firearm end fire one b7C '1
in


1e freht detr toward the Humvee. 

round threugh 1
Observed the same indivi?uei paint the gun tewere the Humvee, heard 
gunshot heme tree this iheividuei?s directieh, end heard suhsegueht

reund fired heck.

rrem hie pesitieh a person with 
wearing white shirt, emerge from hehihd a piece ef
whet appeare? to he a heck weii. this herseh moving and
repeatedly sh uteg fer him to show his hands. a
muzzle flesh some from the hereon and immediatei' thought he was heihr



isheveied heir, b6 ?1
?1

urhiture hear



fired upeh. Concerned fer his refety s5 qeii es the


0

ss 1
ehe uhd. The subject immediateiy dreepee eut



or sight.
hfter the gun shots, 5e epehee deer and directed b6 ?1

ee.c to exit the Iu.vee oh the side b7c ?1

facing away frem the treht deer and re get eh the ground. 


tie shield to protect them.

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT1485

UNCLASSIFIED

Inn-r

FAA.

SHOOTING INCIDENT BALLAS BIUISIGN UQHOEXHG

Fe: ?7f28f2013


.-
Int



I I
I'm.

M.


 

Jest heard ever the radio shets were fired, SA
vie reeiel . 'eiephene wee
neide the residence. ?t 6:35 e?ter it
mes te he eveil,  Ieelied cellular

I

leehene. Over epereximetely tie next hour and twehty?five mieeteeIspehe severei times.

had been shet.

?1 
Sh euring these phone

 

 

.-- - r.

Ieeited the house and surreheered. une
a

the front deer of the

s?rrendered. immediate medie=i eesistehce wee growieed

.. . 2and released the same a

l?

3:
(53
II

..J

heuee and




minute set 



 

I'll

iy.

Os ??f?uf2?13, the BERG met tt riseuse the sheetihe

?nLlicnt. Acting Assistant hiretter J. inspectieh

Divieien chaired the meeting and wee henwveting member. The

 

 

 

 

fellewine "eting Hemhers were in ettendenee: Acting ?hief Inspector
Howard 53. Office of  Trial
?ttersey, Criminal Divirien, United Stetee )epettmeht ef Justise
I Speeiti Legal Counsel, Civil Rights ULvisieh,
USDOJ, ?ettiee Shier 3C Gregtry L. $03, eiehei Seetieh,
reenterinteliigenee Divisieh; Sgeeiel Agent I

 

Squad CRHE, heehihgten Field Of?iee; SSAI

 

. r-u w. ..
t, exititer Emergent

 

.., . m. r-I 
Specier weepehe ene Laetits {gear} Gpetetimee Uni
Reesehse Group SSAI I Firearms Training

Unit, end 35% 

 



I De?eheive S~etems Unit, Tr. rhe
feliewint nehuvetieg members were else in attendance: Inspectere
.1

Gregory T. EretEihg, Chrietepher W. Beers, ene iwersty, 

 

Team Leaders]

de- ., 
 me e. .1

 

 

 

Gperetiene ehe Training Unit, I 

UNCLASSIFIED

b6 
-1,2,7

b6 -T
-7

b6 -1,3
-1,3

b6 -1
?1

NYT3486

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT DALLAS DIVESEON 


Re: 29?whe ei/etxeeia

 

Elanning foiee, 3i I SWET b6 -1
Operatiene tnit, CIRG: Safety and Occupatienal health _1
Occupational Safety and Envitenmental Programs Uni

Facilities and Legietiee Services Divieien; Management and Ptegtam

:?teetet'a Office; LSAI

 





 

Analyetl lnepeetien Analysis Shit, and MPRS

 

 

I I Inapeetien Management Unit,

 

Observations and Recommendatiene of the SIRS

The BERG reviewed the aheve eynepeiaed iheident with the intent
te: evaluate the applieatieh et deadly feree; provide the
Diteetet with an evaluative analyeie, eheetvatieha, and 
fer eetteetive aetiene teem an epetatienai etandpeiht {it any}; 
ptevide eeneethihq training andfet aatety 
etevide redeemehdatiehe tet adminiattative aetien, it deem


SIRS agreed that the et deadly feree


empieyed by the Agent wae juetified and in eentetmanee with the FBi?e


lted in the 



headly Fetee Peliey. Thie teat
+1
IL.

,ien be taken ageihet a result he ?1
-1

that he administrative ac

ef hie invelvement in thia sheeting ineit t. BERG membere unanimenely

4:

.un
adapted the feliewind eheetvatiene and ef the BERT:

OBSERVATIONS

 

Observation The 088 imptepetly placed himself in a tactical

 

peeitien.

Analxeie: a eetding t' the Special Weapene ant Taetiee Pelity
r' P. 


implementation Guide Section 2.2.2 lei reviaed
54:25:2013}, the b5 -1
-1
-5

 

 



 

 

 

aeael Iteet a peeitiee in the Humvee, which transported the entry
team te the target leeatien, and peeitiened apptetimateiy seven te

ma
ten yatda item the treat deer te the t,eidenee. When the epetatien

UNCLASSIFIED



mmwAh>z




HI Urn
mmwp?m Emm?nmpm MT: mmwm?? awnm??a?? whey 053 

4m HJM .u?mE??Sww ?m?m ?wp?mwmu GEM ?ue? ?m?z .Emwu hnwg? w?n

 

 

GM hu??wxomm mm??m ?wco?u?mc? mnm3_ n?m am

 

 

 

 

GEE  madam Es gmzow.m ?z?uuwm

 

 

 

h?u?amxmmawn hm me w?u a? mmw?nouu 

nu. .. r. Ix nu. .L 

.ucw?aw?vm um?ong

 

cu mMHH?ug Mn won uw?u?m mw??gwu?wu?m ?mm ?na?mtn$m?5

.Lm gun m?mum?HQOMQum ?cm n?mm??up

HEEH 

 

wh?m?? u?mm ?Wm 

 

.mwmpumao mommua?e?u?mog ?cm muw??moma n?m?w 0? man ?c?u??bm
cw .Enm? a??p?mwoo mwmmumcaz m?mUJ?b?b?? 
my Ea?u?mom 
mama? mo mm?mumm m?u omam mam? m?wrmui?cg ?pou
Hume mg? mm m?mz mm NemeE .qnz m?g Np?g
Emmy hww?m ?sh a??pmbou hmmb?zm m?u mo ugamm m3 u? mowu?mom amo?wumw
moon wawmm mw?w?HHmem .MOGG umonm Eanm m?pmh g?u on

ambmm mwb?mm m?p ?m?o?pwmoumw 

HI Urn u?omm Scum m?mmh ma hqmum??mca??m w? Uch?u?me ?aw 

HI ma cu Emmw manna mg? mc?uuogmcmuu wwh?mm m?u 009 

 

MmQCOmpmm we? "mt cadum>nwm?0

 

F?ah UEHHSU WHGM HO



mmum? Wh?m?? HMEOHE 

.mmowm?um? mama 

??dum?gwm Om coammuom Hm?awmo mm ?mm mm: w? ?@Q#MHmumm

mwacammxro ?Ix

m??mxl?mm? ?zmk??mm may nm?w?h



UNCLASSIFIED



FAA.

Title: CIDOTING INCIDENT BALLAS BIVISIGN Duf?e/HG

Fe: 37f28f2013

 

Crieie Negotiatore, EASI I positioned outeide the vanere not Air were eevereeiy arteotee te 

I I -1
?rterI SRSI I

were foroe? to more yarde turther ewey from the reeidenoerl I

 

 

 

 

. . .. ..ah . . -: w; 
?16351 Lethe c3: {JDeitrOh L363


wen te resume attemote to oonteot the subjects. 


but did net bring i?

a EMA: eperetor loceted neer SUV #lumen tne rattlei oroerl I taterr 
-1

I hel letter retrieving it from his

to the oeeretlon.

 

 

 

eneere ell 

 

participating 1n SWAT eyeretloe? ere and preperly utiltee the

 

4 ?u

Analxeie: The crisis Negotiation teem left the ?throw enoee? at the
etegiec area. The negxtieto:e were able to converse witn tne :eejeet:

mebile gnome in the neuee1?4}
if.)

:3

(11

Recommendation SEC, Be_lee Should ensure the triers ?eqotieting

 

teem utilize the proper eoeremen' eerie? triers neqetletroee.

1?1 w.  *rh 
the nrvreion rnegettron eenegement enrt reeponerbie L03 eneerrne that eetn Inetreotionom?
Retommendetroe re remorved. maintaine en Inepettron
Iretruotione/ee?ommeedetione end provrdee the I?un
uerteriy report reflecting ell 

I.
Tr w? a 1- 1,:1  1i"? r? 3.12:1 r- ?at
meted; rial?-m- . 1L. ii?J 
(5.

*omnrete


.. . enter at fave been metrereeterriy

reeolved.

UNCLASSIFIED

9

NYT3489

omwAh>z



t.

 

_mm? on xC?? mg? H?m?im 
HI Una ngumwnm w?w ?wwg m? Um ?w Mmumm Emc?w?m?m aw 

 

 

HI w? EDGE 
OH ?w?umiw? OM mm 
33M 0N H?wm MQ me?O?m?h Adm



?umm t?m?m??w mg ?A?ogw u? .m??mA?mbm m? mnwupa??mm

MH m.?hw%

mo w?m?m mg? mg umao??ow .um 

EOMM E?u??hmb ?mwdumh w? OH m? Umwm?mm

b?m m?b .mm?o?mww ?mammimco on 

m? Em mw??mmw EUMME 

.EO?umMm?ou How mm?mww m??u np?z mco?wum Uw?cmwn? Mambnm dmxmu 
(a ..J 

mb?uumnmcu hm aw m$wmm ham m?xw mm



mwm?eCmmH bm??mwmb mmwboma on ?wkw?me mw mm?anx humm



.wmm?mwm? mgu Umuo:
h?mumwmpou?mm mg ma?a mmo?um?cm?aouwmamgo?u0$pumcm m?m ?cowwm??mmn
4 .p HQ go?num magnumm v??umj?vmm ?mtpmauow mg @H?a
Um mm ?mm? GWGH wa? ?ca max gm mwc??pwumt
UHM m?p mm cw mxmu 0w mgm?m no ao?QMpm??mccv pm?c?

ca?m?bwv mgu m?a? um wag: we :O?umu?uwh gm?p Hm?wmn mgo?uum


U?w?U??m COED MQ Haw? ?eww??cmwm .COHHUM M??xh?w HO

awm? gumm ma mmw?pmuw? aq?? 033

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mammxwin?upauumammH an H?m w??bommagmammxh? .im

ZOHMHEHQ mi?dm? wsz??mm nm?w??

.
I 



Hammett be 
Sent: Thursdra-?gr Septemhar 27* ?812 3&6 PM 1370 -1 3 4
Ta: Shieids, Robert 3,

ml 

Subject: {Faitas Agent inwived Sim-rating rm 

 

Robert Shields:

Based upan a review at materiais that you pra'vitied fr?um 1wear!" Shoottng mquiry, we have determined

 

 

 

 

that the ghosting and wannding Bfl:lort October 1:1, mm, by Speciai Agent b6 -1 7
during the exemtion rt? 3 Search warrant darts not warrant a criminal investigation. b7C -1 2 7
are heaviiy armed inside their hmme andl:lihad ?red shots at 1?73 '1
inside the h??ust.? extracted tram the Mural?[advised that?I?I
were hawttyarmed and wautd not aurrendar. The SWAT team then I
the hauser Watching thraugh the tram deer about a hair an haw tater, Isa-mi Immersed

 

him tn them his hand-2:, saw a mantra ?ash f-ruml:ls positimn, and fir-ed a singie shot waundingl 
in the Shautder, Another agent corroborated atwunt arndl:liater tampiiemented the
agent far shot,? Bath men tarrandered within minute-s afterl:lwas wmunded,

There is evidante that mntraditts the wiuntary stateme?t warmed by SD?hat he firm b6 ?1 4 7
under the: shave describe ton?ittans and that he feared for his safety and that safety at anthers, The b7C -1 4 7
totaitty? at the Evidence a sanctusim; that than: was no vistat'itm at the tedarat crtminat 
?ghts Statutes. Hunt DEreviewed the Sheeting I mutt}: documents and

comptemtnted thetr tamgieteness and quaiittr, expressing a derire ta share the reparts with hit awn

uf?cers as an exampie at a mmdet investigatian. Ha further advised that Eats! investigatian w?ouid ht!

conducted. The is prasatutingEIfm-r attauit an a teeters! Uf?cer. We appreciate the agent?s

ta prwide a voluntary statement tn enahte 3 mm detisitm in thi? marten

Piease tnmgiete ynur administrative review of t?is? mattar. Addititmatly, piease- provide b6 ?3
 : Crimina? Chief, MD at TX, with tit datumentt generated by inSpectim Written, inciuding b7C '3

the tinat far his review tn insure his carrier.- tuitiitt its dimmers: ebtigaticns "in the AFG criminai
prusacutiancall 4

 

Civil Rightg hivision

US ??partmant 0f Sustica
a Stratt, NH
Emem

  ..  r- 
JUULIG

NW-491

  

(Rev. 5-3-10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlronio Gommunioali on

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION Date: 08/02f2013
03fl5f20l2

To: DA-INSPECTION FRONT OFFICE

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

ContactApproved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:  I

 

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

 

 

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 03f15f2012, involving Special Agent

Iof the Springfield Division. SIRG members b6 ?1
recommended that no administrative action be taken against b7C ?1

as a result of her involvement in the shooting incident. Three
Observations and associated Recommendations were adopted by the SIRG
for the Springfield Division.

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference report of Inspector Ronald
Twersky, dated 11/06/2012.

Details:

 

On 03/15/2015, eel assigned to the Springfield b6 -l.4
b7c ?1,4

 

Division's Fairview Heights R.A., was involved in a shooting incident
following a traffic stop of a vehicle in East St. Louis, Illinois.
Participating in the traffic stop with Illinois State
Police Sergeant {Sgt.)l I and 
a City of O'Fallon (Illinois) Police Officer assigned as an
SA to the ISP's Metropolitan Enforcement Group of Southern Illinois

 

The three law enforcement officers were part of the Working
Against Violent Elements (WAVE) detail, a multi-agency initiative which

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT1492

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION 03/15/2012
Re: 08f02f2013

included vehicle patrols to establish an enhanced law enforcement

presence in the East St. Louis area.

On 03f15f2012, at approximately 4 a WAVE detail briefing was
held at the ISP Headquarters in Collinsville, Illinois. FBI b6 -1,4
the briefing, which included a review b7c ?1r4
of recent intelligence regarding violence in the Metro East. Steven
Holmes, a local "shooter" wanted by the ISP, was shot and killed on
03/11/2012. Holmes? murder triggered a "war" between those loyal to
Holmes and a rival violent group believed to be responsible for Holmes'
death. Also discussed was the recovery of two assault weapons and
another killing which occurred during the previous WAVE operation on
03/14/2012.

Vehicle stops were discussed and participants were reminded to
ensure members were backing each other up, calling out the location of
the stop, andl Iof b5 ?1
the stop. Istressed the importance of the detail's goal of -1

b7E -1
"slowing down? the shootings and violence. Attendees were reminded

 

 

shootings tend to happen in "groups and bunches," and caution was
needed. advised the ISP's SWAT team was assisting the
WAVE later that evening. The FEI's deadly force policy was not

discussed during the briefing.

Later in the evening, Sgt. (driver), b5 _1r4rT
{front?seat passenger), and SA {rear?seat passenger} stoPPed a -1,4,7

car occupied  {driver} andl I
{passenger}. Sgt.  Iapproached the driver's side of the vehicle
and engaged the occupants in conversation while 
themselves on the passenger side. 
observed a semi?automatic handgun on the driver's side floorboard of
the vehicle, which was accessible to the occupants. 

to the front of the vehicle with his weapon drawn and ordered the

 

 

 

driver to open his door. The driver of the vehicle subsequently
accelerated and lunged the vehicle forward, striking 
right leg. As the car moved forward the passenger

UNCLASSIFIED

2

NYT-493

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION 03/15/2012
Re: 08f02f2013

of the vehicle lean towards the middle of the seat, as if he was
reaching for the firearm. At approximately the same time, b6 ?1

heard a muffled gunshot. Fearing for his life, seven b7c ?1
rounds at the passenger.

When the car initially accelerated forward, a b5 -1
gunshot. Realizing the vehicle posed an imminent threat to SA b7c ?1
she fired two or three rounds at the driver to stop the
threat. As the vehicle continued moving forward, one
additional round, stopping when she observed of the
vehicle.

The vehicle came to a stop after travelling approximately 55 to 65
feet. Both subjects exited the vehicle and were taken into custody.

None of the law enforcement officers were injured by gunfire. SA
who was struck by the vehicle, was taken to a hospital with b5 '1
a minor injury. ?1
The driver was injured with an abrasion to the b6 
?7

side, and he complained of back pain. He was treated and taken to the

St. Clair County jail. The passenger was shot multiple
times in the torso area. He was treated at the scene by two members of

the ISP, Special Weapons and Tactic team, and subsequently transported
to the St. Louis University Hospital, where he was released

approximately one week later.

On 03/20/2012, St. Clair County First Assistant State?s Attorney
advised Inspector Twersky his office did not b5 ?1.4

 

 

 

anticipate receiving a case from the ISP regarding FBI b7c _1?4
MEGSI SA : related to the 03/15/2012 incident. ISP Master
Sergeantl I Division of Internal Investigation, who was
present at the meeting, concurred no such case was being pursued by the
ISP.
On 05/07/2012, Mr.  I Special Legal Counsel, Civil 

 

Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, advised the circumstances

of the officer-involved shooting did not "establish sufficient evidence

UNCLASSIFIED

3

NYT-494

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION 03/15/2012
Re: 08f02f2013

of willful conduct to warrant a federal criminal civil rights

investigation of this matter."

On 05f23f2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned

shooting incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields,

Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting

member. The following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief

Inspector Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections be '1r3
Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of ?1'3
Justice I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights

Division, Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,

 

 

 

Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent (SAII I

Sguad CR-2, Washington Field Office; SSAI I Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI I

Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSAI I

Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; 

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

 

Response Group SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, and SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The

 

 

following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Gregory T. Bretzing, Christopher W. Davis, and Ronald Twersky, OI,

Team Leaders I I b5 ?1
SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit, TD b7c ?1
I IFirearms Training Unit, SSAI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Operations and Training Unit, SSAI I Resource
Planning Office, Director's Office; SSAI I SWAT
Operations Unit, Safety and Occupational Health 
Safety and Environmental Programs Unit,
Facilities and Logistics Services Division; Management and Program

 

 

 

 

AnalystI I Inspection Analysis Unit, and

 

 

Management and Program I

Inspection Management Unit, INSD.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT1495

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION 03/15/2012
Re: 08f02f2013

to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); 
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary .

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against a result of her be ?1
involvement in the shooting incident. The SIRG determined the use of b7c _1

deadly force by justified and within policy.

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following observations and

recommendations of the SIRT:

OBSERVATIONS

 

Observation 1: Members of the Working Against Violent Elements 
detail did not conduct periodic tactical training as a unit,
particularly with respect to vehicle stops, in the period preceding the
03/15/2012 shooting incident.

Analysis 1: The WAVE was a multi?agency detail comprised of law
enforcement officers from local, state, and federal agencies. The WAVE
consisted of a core group of ISP and FBI full?time members, who were
augmented on a regular basis by members of various TSP units, to
include the MEGSI and the ISP SWAT team, and other law enforcement
agency members. FBI Agents participating in the WAVE detail were
routinely assigned to patrol with their state and local counterparts
during operations. The WAVE detail routinely engaged in car stops based
on identified traffic violations. WAVE members trained with their
respective agencies, and detailed briefings were conducted prior to
WAVE operations. Also, a Springfield EC dated 01/05/2011, documenting
additional requirements and guidance to the WAVE ?Standing Operations
Order/Plan,? included procedures on felony car stops. However, the WAVE
detail did not conduct periodic tactical training, particularly with

respect to car stops, as a cohesive unit.

UNCLASSIFIED

5

NY11496

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION 03/15/2012
Re: 08f02f2013

Recommendation 1: SAC, Springfield should ensure members of an

 

FBI-involved detail or task force conduct periodic training on tactical
scenarios reasonably expected to be encountered during operations, to

include car stops.

Observation 2: Deficiencies were noted in the post?shooting office

response .

Analysis 2: Springfield responded quickly to the D3115f2012
Agent?Involved Shooting (AIS). However, the office did not utilize or
have a formal AIS response plan. In order to ensure an effective
response to an AIS, the Critical Incident Handbook, 2011 Edition,
relating to AIS incidents, was available as a guide field offices can
use to establish localized shooting response plans. The handbook was

applicable in light of the following:

The Springfield CDC was notified of the shooting and coordinated
with Springfield however the CDC did not respond to the scene in
order to provide counsel. CDCs are trained to obtain emergency
representation for Agents involved in a shooting. In addition, it is
good practice for the CDC to meet with those involved in a shooting
incident to provide any legal information, most often the legal
distinction between a voluntary and compelled interview. The CDC can
provide routine legal information and answer basic legal questions,

particularly issues relevant to shooters and non?shooters.

A Springfield Agent participating in the WAVE detail questioned the
involved Agent about the shooting, beyond a public safety inquiry,
shortly after the incident while both were still at the scene. While
the Agent was concerned about the well-being of the involved agent, it
is standard practice for post?shooting inquiries to be conducted by FBI

personnel not directly or indirectly involved in the AIS.

Recommendation 2: SAC, Springfield should consider establishing a

 

formal AIS response plan and office procedures regarding AIS incidents.

UNCLASSIFIED

6

NYT-497

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION 03/15/2012
Re: 08f02f2013

Observation 3: Springfield did not document all law enforcement

contacts initiated as part of WAVE detail operations.

Analysis 3: The WAVE Initiative Strategy (EC dated 09f20f2011)
employed concentrated enforcement actions, such as warrant sweeps,
probable cause traffic stops, knock and talks, and controlled drug

purchases to further investigative objectives.

FBI reports of traffic stops, knock and talks, and other WAVE
detail law enforcement actions involving FBI Agents were completed if
the law enforcement activity yielded firearms, drugs, ?actionable

I

intelligence,? or intelligence deemed of value. Reports were not
routinely completed to document negative law enforcement contacts or
operations, such as traffic stops which did not yield actionable
intelligence. It is prudent to memorialize enforcement?related contact
with members of the public, to include traffic stops resulting in
temporary detentions. A negative contact report or log can be utilized
to summarize the identity of persons stopped, the timefdate of the stop
or contact, and the duration. Such documentation can be used for
reference purposes should the stop or contact be the basis of a

complaint or civil action at some future date.

Recommendation 3: SAC, Springfield should ensure FBI law enforcement

 

contacts or actions, whether positive or negative, are documented to an

appropriate file.

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Inspection Division (INSD), Inspection Management Unit (IMU) is
responsible for ensuring that each Inspection Instruction!
Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains an
Instructions!Recommendations database and provides the INSD Assistant
Director (AD) a quarterly report reflecting all outstanding
Instructions/Recommendations. The inspection process is not complete
until all Instructions/Recommendations have been satisfactorily

resolved.

UNCLASSIFIED



NYT-498

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD DIVISION 03/15/2012
Re: 08f02f2013

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector-in-Charge (IIC),
who will determine if each Recommendation has been resolved or requires
further action. Resolution will be based upon specific actions taken
rather than a recitation of what actions the division has under
consideration or plans to take in the future. If the IIC determines an
Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved, an EC will be
forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon resolution,
all Instructions/Recommendations will be appropriately noted in the

database.

SAC, Springfield is required to provide detailed responses
addressing the Recommendations in this EC, pages 5, 6, and 7, including
corrective actions taken and/or intended actions with time frames for
completion. Each Observation which results in an Recommendation must be
responded to in a one-page, stand alone response. The Observation and
related Recommendation is to be recited verbatim from the inspection
EC, followed by the division's detailed response (it is not necessary
to repeat the analysis section of the Observation in the response). If
supporting documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each

response .

All initial and follow-up responses must be sent to the IMU on
plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Inspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room b5 ?1
In addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached _1

responses, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MPAI

 

 

#0

UNCLASSIFIED

8



FD-ll157 (Rev 5-3-10}

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD Date:
OFFICE 09f11f2012

To: DA-INSPECTION
From: INSPECTION

MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: I I
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

Nancy McNamara

Drafted I
Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG)

shooting incident that occurred on 09f11f2012,

 



execution of a federal arrest warrant,
her Bureau-issued Glock Model 22,
aggressive pitbull dog.

administrative
involvement in
Recommendation
Office.

Administrative

Notes:

 

SAI

08f22f2013

reviewed a
involving Special Agent

Iof the Los Angeles Field Office. During the

SA
.40 caliber pistol,

injuring an

fired one round from

SIRG members unanimously recommended that no
action be taken against a result of her
this shooting incident. One Observation and associated
was adopted by the SIRG for the Los Angeles Field



Reference Electronic Communication

I dated 11f29f2012.

 

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,

(EC)

comments,

of

and

recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned shooting.

On 09/11/2012,

Details of the Shooting Incident

 

forI

 

at his residence located

Sguad CE-S was executing a federal arrest warrant

 

at

 

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT-SOO

  

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 09/11/2012
Re: 08f22f2013

 

ICalifornia. The operations plan included information b5 
. . . . 
regarding the presence of dogs at the location which resulted in one
team member being equipped with a fire extinguisher to repel any

aggressive dog, if necessary.

At approximately 6:00 the arrest team lined up to the left of

the front door of the residence and knocked and announced the presence

 

of law enforcement personnel. SAI Iwas assigned to b6 -1
-1

 

 

provide cover for SAI Iwho was covering a window to

 

the right of the front door. During the knock and announce, the front
door opened from the force of the knock and an aggressive dog exited
the apartment and charged at the arrest team. The Agent holding the

fire extinguisher discharged it at the dog, driving the dog away from

 

team members. The dog charged toward I SA
for the dog to cross past the open door, indicating the

dog was not going back inside the residence. When the dog was

 

approximately one foot away from SAI I SAI Ifired one round

 

striking the dog in the leg. The injured dog retreated inside the

apartment and the subject was taken into custody.

On 05f23f2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned shooting
incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Jr., Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member. The
following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector
Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections (OI), Trial b5 -1,3

Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice b7c ?1?3

 

I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent I
Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; SSAI I Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI I
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; 

Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; 

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Response Group SSAI Firearms Training
Unit, and SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The
UNCLASSIFIED
2

NYT1501

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 09/11/2012
Re: 08f22f2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Gregory T. Bretzing, Christopher W. Davis, and Ronald Twersky, OI,

Team LeadersI b5 ?1
SSRI I Defensive Systems Unit, b7c _1
I I Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I

Operations and Training Unit, SSA I Resource

Planning Office, Director?s Office; SSA ISWRT

 

 

Operations Unit, Safety and Occupational Health 
Safety and Environmental Programs Unit,
Facilities and Logistics Services Division; Management and Program
AnalystI Inspection Analysis Unit, and MPAs

 

 

I I Inspection Management Unit,
INSD.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent to:
evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the Director
with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for
corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any}; provide
recommendations concerning training andfor safety issues; and (4)

provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force
employed by justified and in conformance with the FBI's b6 -1
Deadly Force Policy. This discussion resulted in the recommendation ?1
that no administrative action be taken against a result
of her involvement in this shooting incident.

SIRG members adopted the following observation and recommendation
of the Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT):

OBSERVATION

Observation 1: Policy regarding the use of fire extinguishers during

enforcement operations does not exist.

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT1502

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 09/11/2012
Re: 08f22f2013

Analysis 1: Prior to the execution of a federal arrest warrant, an
approved operations plan noted the presence of a dog at the arrest
location. As a safety precaution, one Agent was equipped with a fire
extinguisher for use against the dog if necessary. During the
execution of the search and arrest warrants, Agents encountered a Pit
Bull dog which exited the apartment while Agents knocked and

announced. While still outside of the apartment, one of the entry team
Agents utilized a fire extinguisher against the dog with minimal
effect. Almost simultaneously, a second Agent discharged her weapon at
the dog. One round struck the dog, after which the dog re-entered the

apartment.

Recommendation 1: AD CIRG, AD TD, and AD FLSD should establish policy

 

on the use of fire extinguishers during enforcement operations.

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE 

The Inspection Division (INSD), Inspection Management Unit (IMU) is
responsible for ensuring that each Inspection Instruction/
Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains an Inspection
Instructions/Recommendations database and provides the INSD
Assistant Director (AD) a quarterly report reflecting all outstanding
Instructions!Recommendations. The inspection process is not complete
until all InstructionsfRecommendations have been satisfactorily

resolved.

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector-in-Charge (IIC),
who will determine if each Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved
or requires further action. Resolution will be based upon specific
actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the division has
under consideration or plans to take in the future. If the IIC
determines an Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved, an EU
will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon
resolution, all InstructionsfRecommendations will be appropriately

noted in the database.

AD, CIRG is required to provide detailed responses addressing the

UNCLASSIFIED

4

NYT-SEB

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS HNGELES FIELD OFFICE 09/11/2012
Re: 08f22f2013

Recommendation in this EC, pages 3 and 4, including corrective actions
taken and/or intended actions with time frames for completion. Each
Observation which results in an Instruction/Recommendation must be
responded to in a one-page, stand-alone response. The Observation and
related Recommendation is to be recited verbatim from the inspection
EC, followed by the field office's detailed response. If supporting

documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each response.

RD, TD is required to provide detailed responses addressing the
Recommendation in this EC, pages 4 and 5, including corrective actions
taken and/or intended actions with time frames for completion. Each
Observation which results in an Instruction/Recommendation must be
responded to in a one-page, stand-alone response. The Observation and
related Recommendation is to be recited verbatim from the inspection
EC, followed by the field office's detailed response. If supporting

documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each response.

AD, FLSD is required to provide detailed responses addressing the
Recommendation in this EC, pages 4 and 5, including corrective actions
taken andfor intended actions with time frames for completion. Each
Observation which results in an InstructionfRecommendation must be
responded to in a one-page, stand-alone response. The Observation and
related Recommendation is to be recited verbatim from the inspection
EC, followed by the field office's detailed response. If supporting
documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each

response .

All initial and follow?up responses must be sent to the IMU on

plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit

Inspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room

In addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached

responses, please E?mail the Sentinel link to MFA

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

NYT-SEH

b6 -1
-1

  

(Rev 5-3-10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION Date: 11/07f2013
05f24f20l2

CC: DA-INSPECTION FRONT OFFICE

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT b5 -1

Contact: -1

 

 

Approved By: BRETZING GREGORY 
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:  I

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

 

 

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 05f24f2012, involving Special Agent

Iof the New Haven Division. During an b6 ?1
attempted arrest, SAI Ifired three rounds from his personally h7c ?1

owned, Bureau-approved Glock Model .40 caliber pistol at a subject
who accelerated a vehicle at a high rate of speed toward Supervisory
Special Agent I SIRG members unanimously
recommended that no administrative action be taken against 
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

 

b6 -1
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference report of I _1
andl Idated 08/08/2012.
Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments,
and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned

shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

Since February 2012, the New Haven Division, Bridgeport,

Connecticut, Resident Agency (BRA) Safe Streets Task Force has

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT1505

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: 11/07/2013

 

conducted an investigation intol

 

?1

 

 

 

On 05/10/2012, New Haven Division Executive Management and the
United States Attorney arranged for a meeting between the United States
Attorney's Office and BRA SSTF personnel to receive an updated briefing

and discuss the future investigative plan.

During the meeting on 05/15/2012, an Assistant United States

 

Attorney (AUSA) summarizedl

 

b7A -1

 

 

 

 

 

Information provided by a Confidential Human Source (CH8)

identifiedl Ias a suspect in a shooting onl I he ?7
-T

 was a subject ofl bq? _1
-l

 

 

 

 

 

 

another subject of both investigations, were identified as
suspects shootingfhomicide based on CHS information.

In response to the increased violence and as a result of the

 

I I a Federal Grand Jury delivered a true bill

which resulted in federal arrest warrants being issued bj? -1
Isubjects were deemed dangerous enough to

 

 

 

require the utilization of Special Weapons and Tactics teams
from New Haven and Albany Field Offices, as well as from state and

local law enforcement agencies.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

NYT3506

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: 11f07f2013

An operations plan was drafted consisting of the execution of
search and arrest warrants on 05/24/2012. A Command Post and a
Tactical Operations Center were established to facilitate and
coordinate the operational activity. Night time ?no knock? arrest
warrants and one search warrant were authorized as a result of the

subjects?r violence.

On 05f24/2012, at approximately 4:30 the warrants were
executed. As a result of the subjects being nomadic, a pre-operation
briefing was held the day before the execution of the warrants in order
to discuss alternate locations where the subjects may be located.
Another briefing of the teams was held on the morning of the takedown
at approximately 3:00 a.m. During this briefing, the Deadly

Force Policy was briefed to participating law enforcement personnel.

One subject was arrested at his primary location and a second
subject was arrested at his secondary location. Law enforcement

personnel continued to attempt to locate and arrest the remaining 

 

fugitives, includingl I Arriving at a residence

b6 -2,7
associated New Haven SWAT Agents observed b7c _2r7
in the driveway. SSTF Officers b?A ?1

operating this vehicle the day before duringl I
The SWAT team entered the residence and while searching for

encountered an individual subsequently identified 

who was questioned, identified, and released.

 

 

On the morning of 05f24f2012, the team assigned to

arrestl I Upon being granted access to her residence, the

inside. I 

was living in an apartment inI I but he did not know the he ?1r2r7
-l,2,7

 

 

 

 

apartment number. After returning to the Command Post, law
enforcement personnel reviewed information provided by a CHS, as well
as tenant listings forI land determinedl:lwas
likely to be living in Apartmentl IinI I

 

 

 

 

A plan was developed to effect a knock?and?talk at b6 

?1,7
and and traveled in SA

UNCLASSIFIED

3



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: 11f07f2013

 

vehicle while 
to the location in van.

in with the Bridgeport Police Department

Itraveled

 

The plan consisted of checking


to inform them of FBI presence as well as the possibility of an

Mobile Operations Post

arrest. Following the check in, they planned to don the appropriate

gear and effect the plan.

 

While en route to  Ito 

Ipreviously operated byI I
traveling in front of them. a moving surveillance
of the vehicle while for marked BPD units to stop

The two

 

 

observed thel

the vehicle and identify the driver and any other occupants.

law enforcement vehicles followed a short period of time

until the driver of a U-turn and proceeded in the
opposite direction at which time the driver of
theI

 

 

IasI I

The :l turned right from onto I I and

parked behind another vehicle in front of the residence located 

I I the vehicle and the two law

vehicles attempted to pin arrest the

 

 

enforcement

 

who was believed to bel I
and moved behind the trunk of his car, 
accelerated in reverse at a high rate of speed and crashed into TFO

van. As the passenger side 

vehicle, forward at a high rate of speed toward

fired three rounds at the driver of The driver of the
fled the area and crashed a short distance from where the shots

were fired.

driver,

his vehicle

him.

 

The driver, identified asl I was arrested.

 

No personal injuries were incurred as a result of the shots fired

and the third skipped across the hood of a parked car,

Two rounds were recovered from the subject's vehicle
struck the wall

of a nearby house, and landed on a coffee table inside a residence.

It should be noted that investigators recovered digital video of

UNCLASSIFIED

4

b6 -1,4
?1,4

b6 -1,4,7
h7C -1,4,7

b6 -1,2,7


b6 -1
-1

NYT1508

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: 11f07f2013

the shooting incident recorded by a school bus which was passing near
the scene. SIRG members opined that the presence of the school bus
could have created a serious safety issue if an exchange of gun fire

has ensured.

On 08f14f2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned shooting

incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Jr., Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in Trial Attorney,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice 
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section
Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Criminal Investigative Division; SC
Gregory D. Cox, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Special
Agent 

Supervisory Special Agent 

 

 

 

I Practical

 

 

Applications Unit, Training Division 
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; 

 

Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division 

 

Firearms Training Unit, and 

Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting members were also
in attendance: Assistant Director Nancy McNamara, Inspectors
Gregory T. Bretzing, Dena Elaine Choucair, and Ronald Twersky, OI,
Team Leader  IOI, SC Stuart P. Fronk,
Internal Investigation Section, SSAI Training
Unit, ssal
and Program Analyst 
Unit, and 
Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

I Evidence Response Team, Management

 

I Inspection Analysis

 

 

Inspection

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent

to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; provide the

Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations

for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); 

provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and

UNCLASSIFIED

5

I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office;

b6 -1,3
?1,3

NYT1509

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: 11f07f2013

provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary .

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force by SA

 

I Iwas justified and in conformance with the b6 ?1
-1

 

deadly force policy. SIRG members adopted the following observations

and instructionfrecommendations.

Observation 1: not activate his police lights or b6 -1,7
sirens, nor did he use the public address (PA) system to relay any b7c 
commands during the attempted car stop and arrest of 



Analysis: The Ground Surveillance Policy Implementation Guide, Section
4.7 stated, vehicles responding to emergency or pursuit situations
must utilize an adequate warning system such as a siren, flashing
lights, or other device required by local statutes where use of such

equipment will not compromise the discreet surveillance requirement."

The Training Division Vehicle Stops Lesson plan version 2.0
published by the Practical Applications Unit, last updated and approved
on 06/26/2012 consisted of three primary learning objectives. Enabling
Learning Objective (ELO) #2 elaborated on the considerations for
determining and selecting an apprehension/vehicle stop location. The
training detailed the need by law enforcement personnel to utilize a
Radio/PA system during a vehicle stop. Emphasis was added regarding

issuing commands over the PA system.

In an attempt to apprehend and arrest the subject a car stop was
executed. The subject's vehicle was positioned behind an unoccupied
vehicle along the side of the road. his vehicle b6 -1,4
alongside the subject?s vehicle thereby preventing the car from pulling b7c ?1?4

away from the curb at an angle. While the second law enforcement

 

vehicle driven by Ipulled in behind

 

the subject?s vehicle. Neither car activated their police lights or
sirens, nor were any verbal commands given over the PA system. While

it cannot be assumed the subject would have complied with commands, all

UNCLASSIFIED

6

NYT1510

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: llfD7f2013

possible attempts should be made to ensure police safety and subject

compliance.

Recommendation 1: SEC, New Haven, will ensure all personnel utilize

 

the bureau vehicle and EA systems during vehicle stop

operations.

Observation 2: The car stop and attempted arrest were conducted within

the immediate vicinity of a school bus occupied by children.

Analysis: The Ground Surveillance Policy Implementation Guide, Section
4.12.2 stated, ?The following guidelines are supplemental to DIOG Secti

 

on 19 and Appendix F. S?s are encouraged to review and become familiar
with both sections prior to executing an arrest in conjunction with
surveillance operations. S?s must be cognizant of the following in
conducting arrests: Prior and continuous training, good judgment,
proper planning, and adherence to basic law enforcement principles all
contribute toward enhancing the maximum level of safety and

effectiveness during these high risk arrests."

Video surveillance cameras installed in both the front and rear of
the school bus captured the two arresting vehicles on an oblique angle
illustrating the Agents and TFOs were approximately 20 feet from a
school bus full of children.

three rounds at the subjectvehicle. One of the three rounds skipped off the b7c ?1
hood of a nearby parked car, struck the wall of a house, and landed on
a coffee table inside the residence. Had an exchange of gun fire
ensued, the school bus would have been in the direct line of return

fire to law enforcement positions.

Recommendation 2: SEC, New Haven, will ensure all personnel critically
evaluate their surroundings and the overall safety of innocent

bystanders prior to executing a car stop or arrest.

Observation 3: carried his personally owned Glock 27 as b6 -1
-1
UNCLASSIFIED
7

NYT1511

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: llfD7f2013

his primary weapon system in lieu of his higher capacity FBI-issued
Glock 22.

Analysis: The M106 section 12?3 stated, 53s are authorized to
carry and utilize only issued or Bureau?approved personally owned
weapons (POWs) regardless of on or off?duty status.? This section
further stated, ?Small?framed handguns Smith and Wesson revolver
Models 36, 49, 60; Glock 26 and 2? pistols, etc.) are most useful when
concealability is important and should not be considered as a primary

firearm in most situations.?

On the morning of his personally b5 

owned Glock 2? as his primary weapon system during the planned arrest b7c 

 

of subjectI When it was discovered the subject was not
her residence, the subsequent surveillance which led
up to the shooting. While Agents routinely carry their personally

 

owned weapons on and off?duty, during a planned arrest scenario, the

higher capacity FBI?issued handgun is the preferred option.

Recommendation 3: SEC, New Haven, will ensure all personnel carry their

 

FBI-issued weapon system during planned arrest situations, in lieu of

their lower capacity small?framed handguns.

Observation 4: the vehicle after it was positioned b5 ?1
alongside the subject?s vehicle to ?pin in? the subject. This created b7c _1
increased risk to himself and a heightened likelihood of an Agent

involved shooting.

Analysis: The Training Division Vehicle Stops Lesson plan ELO #3
described the recommended positioning of the vehicles during the
vehicle stop and the activities of each member of the team. The
occupants of the two forward vehicles are recommended to open their
doors in a position of cover, yet keep their feet inside of vehicle in
the event the subject vehicle becomes ?mobile? or is ?used as a

weapon."

In his attempt to pin the subject vehicle, his b6 ?1
-1

UNCLASSIFIED

8

NYT1512

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: 11f07f2013

vehicle so close alongside the subject vehicle, not able b6 -l,4
to open his door. The second vehicle driven by did not close ?1?4
the gap in time and afforded the opportunity for the subject to put his

vehicle in reverse and strike vehicle. Once the subject?s

vehicle backed up, to get out of his vehicle and

unnecessarily put himself in the forward driving path of the subject

vehicle. Since there were only two vehicles utilized to conduct the

car stop, the team was not able to effectively cover the danger areas.
Additionally, with salt: in the driving path, felt

compelled to fire his weapon as in imminent danger of

being struck by the subject's vehicle.

Recommendation 4: SEC, New Haven, will ensure all personnel who
participate in high risk vehicle stops are trained in the proper

vehicle placement and Agent positioning.

Observation 5: not wearing FBI issued b6 -1

 

Ballistic Protective Undergarments (BPU) during the arrest operation. b7c _1
Analysis 5: MIOG, Part 2, Section states: I b7E ?5

 

 

 

 

It was determined through interviews bs?irT

were not wearing body armor at the time of the shooting incident. Both b7c 

men were traveling to the Bridgeport Police Department Mobile

 

Operations Center located at the Iapartment complex.

 

Their intent was to put on their vests and raid jackets prior to
approaching of another subject. While driving
en route to the apartment complex they spotted someone they thought to
be one of the fugitives and executed a car stop and attempted arrest

without putting on their BPUs.

This operation contained multiple subjects requiring SWAT arrest
teams, so there was every indication arrests associated with this

operation could involve a violent altercation. Under such

UNCLASSIFIED

9

NYT1513

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: llf07f2013

circumstances, it is imperative participants wear appropriate

protective gear and BPUs during the operation.

Instruction 5: SAC, New Haven, will ensure all Agents comply with the

MIOG requirement to wear BPUs during operational activity.

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE 

The Inspection Division (INSD), Inspection Management Unit (IMU) is
responsible for ensuring that each Inspection Instruction/
Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains an Inspection
Instructions/Recommendations database and provides the INSD Assistant
Director (AD) a quarterly report reflecting all outstanding
Instructions/ Recommendations. The inspection process is not complete
until all Instructions/Recommendations have been satisfactorily

resolved.

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector-in?Charge (IIC),
who will determine if each Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved
or requires further action. Resolution will be based upon specific
actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the division has
under consideration or plans to take in the future. If the IIC
determines an Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved, an EU
will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon
resolution, all Instructions/Recommendations will be appropriately

noted in the database.

SAC, New Haven is required to provide detailed responses addressing
the InstruetionfRecommendations in this EC, pages 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10,
including corrective actions taken and/or intended actions with time
frames for completion. Each Observation which results in an
Instruction/Recommendation must be responded to in a one-page,
stand-alone response. The Observation and related
Instruction/Recommendation is to be recited verbatim_from the
inspection EC, followed by the field office's detailed response. If
supporting documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each

response .

UNCLASSIFIED

10

NYT-S 14

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW HAVEN DIVISION 05/24/2012
Re: 11f07f2013

All initial and follow-up responses must be sent to the IMU on
plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Inspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room. b6 ?1
In addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached b7c _1

responses, please E?mail the Sentinel link to MPAI I

 

 

.0

UNCLASSIFIED

11

NYT-S 15

 

A



(Rev. 5-8-10)

 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Gommunlcatlon
mitla: (U) Miami SWRI shooting?Animal Date; 03/10f2015

From: MIAMI
Contact: I I ch _1

 

Approved By: AIASACI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By:
Case in (U) Miami Shooting
Synopsis: To report results of a review of an animal shooting b6 1
incident involving SAI I which occurred on June 26,
- b7C -1
2015. 
Peekage Copy: The following original documents are being placed
in FD-340 envelopes and mailed to the Inspection Division:
1}briginal Signed Sworn Statement of SAI dated
July 9, 2015, with two drafts, interview notes, interview log and
FD-SZT.
2} Original 555 of SAI notes, hand drawn diagram,
interview log and 
310rigina1 of notes, interview log and 
4)One DVD of BET scene photos. b6 1 
5)SAI:IFirearms qualifications, SWAT certification, official i 

records of training, FrontfRear photos SIOC email
reference weather conditions.

6} Copy ofl Iarrest warrant

7)  deadly force policyilegal training attendance records.
8}-One insert which included an 50?340 envelope which included a
statement from the veterinarian, Animal Services Officer information
and an FD-SQT receipt.

9) One insert which included an FD-340 envelope which includes the
original FBI Miami SWAT operations plan in support'of the arrest on
June 26, 2015. 

Details:

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT3516

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Miami SWAT shooting?Animal
Re: OBXIOIZDIS

 

On June 26, 2015, SAI Idischarged six rounds from his
FBI-issued Springfield 1911,.45 caliber handgun, at a pit bull mix dog
which had just attacked and bitten a fellow SWAT team member during the
execution of an arrest warrant. The shooting review was delegated to
the Miami Division by Chief Inapector David Gelios on June 26, 2015.?
The following are the results of the shooting incident review, which
included a from other witnesses at the scene, and the
Miami ERT processing of the stene.

 

 

On June 4,.2015, Case Agentl I Squad CHE, obtained a
federal arrest warrant for the arrest ofl I in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(d}(1) to wit: Knowingly
transfering a firearm to a convicted felon, who was known to reside at
IFlorida.

 

 

In order to safely effect the arrest the Miami SWAT team was
assigned to serve the arrest warrant. The team consisted of 2?
Operators, four Crisis Negotiators, two Assistant Special Agents in
Charge, three Tactical Operation Command (TCC) Specialists and the SWAT
coordinator. A team briefing was held at 4:15 a.m. on June 26, 2015,
attended by all participants in the operation. The briefing was led by
Senior Team leader (STIJ all aspects
of the operations order, including the FBI Deadly Force Policy. Team
"members were provided copies of the Operations Order.

On June 26, 2015, at approximately 6:16 Miami SWAT arrived at the
target location. It was previously known that dogs were present at this
location. The house was surrounded by SWAT operators. Miami SA's and
task force officers were positioned on the outer perimeter. The plan
'was for Miami SWAT to knock and announce their presence and call
residents out of the house. Verbal commands were given to the
residents, later determined to be eight, including The
residents were nonwcompliant from the beginning by refusing to open the
door. Upon calling the residents out, one resident ran away from the
front door into the interior of the residence. Ultimately, the subjects
who were removed from the residence were yelling and screaming at the

UHCLASSIFIED

2

b6 -1
h7C -1

b6 
-1NY11517

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Miami SNAT shooting-Animal

Re: 08/10/2015

SWAT operators as the situation continued to be resolved. Due to the
non-compliance of the residents, that an
alternate breach be commenced at the back door of the residence.
Attempts were also being made to place subjects under arrest on the
front side of the residence where a breach had been made as subjects
were non~compliant. One subject was observed attempting to carry a dog
in his arms out of the house. him radio commands to
stop fearing the subject would throw the dog, described as a pit'bull
mix; at SWAT operators at the front door threshold. The subject then
handed the dog off to a black female in a white shirt. Whilensubjects
were being taken into custody in the front yard, the aforementioned pit
bull mix became loose and exited the house. The owners did not have
control of the animal when it exited the residence and it was running
around the front yard, going from person to person. 
verbal and radio commands for a resident to take control of the dog.

At this point, SWAT operator to the threshold of
the front door, handcuffed a female resident and walked her away from
the house: The dog darted across the yard and jumped up at 
The dog jumped up a second time and bit right arm. After
seeing SA  : get bitten, STL
dog and observed SA. separate from the handcuffed subject.
Fearing that sustain serious physical injuries if the
dog latched on, and that he could possibly be bitten himself, STL
his Bureau issued pistol and fired rounds at the dog.
The dog did not collapse?at the first volley of approximately two
shots. but did so at the front door after the last volley of
approximately three to four shots. within
approximately five feet of the dog and had to avoid the legs of SA

because the dog was spinning around while continuously trying
to bite SAI I shooting when the dog
separated from he perceived the immediate threat was
over. the dog with his weapon and observed him
run to the front door (where SWAT members were positioned) and collapse
at'the threshold. where he eyentually died.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

went across the yard to the 

b6 -1,7
b7C -1MIT-518

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Title: Miami SWAT shooting?Animal
Re: OBXIDXZOIS

wearing standard SWAT issued gear on this mission. b6 ?1
After the shooting of the dog, everyone on the 'b7c '1
team was checked and inspected by the SWAT medics to confirm no one
else had sustained injuries. Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
I land ASACI Iwere present on scene
during the operation. Supervisory Special Agent 
of the Miami Ar3 squad was notified and responded. 
of the 0-18 squad, Miami Shooting Response Team leader, was
also notified and responded to the scene, as did SSAI Iof
the 6?15 squad. Miami's Evidence Response Team was notified and
responded to the scene. ERT took photographs, created a sketch of the
scene and collected three shell casings.

 

 

 

 

The weapon used by collected by Assistant Principal b6 ?1,4
Firearms Instructor who was present as a SWAT team b7C _1r4
operator. A replacement Weapon, magazines and ammunition were issued to

A physical check of the Springfield 1911 was conducted

and a round count indicated six rounds had been fired. The dog was

transported from the scene and examined by Animal Control Officer

I Iof the Miami Dade Animal

Services conducted a necropsy and determined the cause of death to be

from multiple gunshot wounds which affected the liver, stomach and left

 

 

lung.
On July 23, 2015, ssa :land Assistant State Attorney be ?1,4
the matter and the facts were presented for a- _1r4

prosecutorial decision. As a result, formal
presentation of the incident for prosecutorial consideration.

The following reports and?applicable FD-3025 were completed and
uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original notes and
records for all interviews were packaged in envelopes and sent
to INSD.

l. Shooting Incident report, electronically submitted June 29,

2015. .
2. FD-302 of firearms training, SWAT b5 '1
b?c -1

4



 

 

 

 

 

UHCLASSIEIED

Title: (U) Miami SWAT shooting?Animal
Be: OBKIDXZOIS

certification and official training records for the b6 ?1,4,7
24 month period before the shooting incident. b7c ?1r4r7
3. FD-302 regarding Deadly Force policy training.

4. FD-302 of arrest warrantfindictment of

5. Assistant State Attorney, Miami?Dede County,

regarding prosecutorial decisioni.

Miami?s review of the shooting incident involving b6 -1
no discrepancies between account of the shooting and '1
the information obtained from witness interviews. The results of the

investigation were coordinated with Chief Division Counsel 







5



 

 

 

 

(Rev. 10-18-2012)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REPORTING OFFICE OFFICE OF ORIGIN DATE INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
06/04/6013 06/04/2013 06/11/2013
TITLE OF CASE REPORT MADE BY TYPED BY
Shooting Incident Review . . .
Report of ShOoting Incident ig?'g?gg?sin
Albuquerque Field Of?ce
06/04/2013
REFERENCES:
Telephone call on 06/04/2013, from Albuquerque Field Of?ce (AQ) SAC Carol K.O. Lee
to the Inspection Division
ASSISTANT
APPROVED DIRECTOR DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES MADE:

 

1 - Inspection (Attn: SIRT)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT Notations
Agency
Request Reed.
Date Fwd.
How Fwd.
By
A
COVER PAGE

 

MYT- 5.21

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 06/10/2013
Report of: IIP ASAC Eliasib Ortiz, Jr. Of?ce: FBIHQ 
Case 297-HQ9A1270914-D
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE
06/04/2013

Investigative Period: 06/04/2013 06/ 1 1/2013

Reference; (Wm Telephone call on 06/04/2013, ?om Albuquerque Field Of?ce (AQ)
SAC Carol KO. Lee to Inspection Division.

. 1 on June 4, 20.13, AQ Task Force Of?cer (TFO)

participated in a drug buy/walk operation. The plan called for the buy/walk to

 

 

I was identi?ed as associated wi

occur at about 4:00 followed by a traf?c stop conducted by a marked police unit to identify
the subjects. FBI and TFO surveillance units were assisted by Albuquerque Police Department
(APDI [and were positioned to monitor the buy/walk. The buy was made from
an associate of the sub'ect later identified as The transaction
 executed from inside a The plan called for a traf?c sto to identify the subject;
however surveillance lost th AQ personnel ran the] license plate
information and obtained an add:ess assoc .ated with a female subject,  I who
the buy. The associated address wasl 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Albuquerque, NM. I Ireported 4  depart the
Isurveillance observed sub'ects matching known descriptions
inside thel Isurveillance lost the land 
I Ire-located the IFBI case
A en

_ announced the decision to sic and arrest the subjects over the radio 
surveillance to the?vicinity oil I TFO drove his task force
vehicle with in the passenger seat tol TF 0  omentarily
stopped the vehicle when confronted by th 'ving toward em at a iigh rate of
speed. At approximately 5:45, SAI lexited the vehicle with his MP5, and took
position near his vehicle. ?red his we non three times toward the driven:

 Ivehicle approached. SA feare as attempting to
drive his vehicle into their vehicle with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. Two
Shots fired impacted houses and one hit the subject?s vehicle. I?ed in his vehicle and
was arrested shortly thereafter by APD of?cers. No injuries resu te om the shooting.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 1 of 16

b6 -1,2,4,7
b7C -1,2,4,7
b7E -1,6

NYT-SEE

 

 

 

Details

On 06/04/2012, Special Agents assigned to Albuquerque (AQ) SQ-4,
members of the Albuquerque Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF) and other local law enforcement
personnel executed a buy and walk operation in southwest Albuquerque, New Mexico. The plan
called for an undercover task force officer TFO to make contact with a sub'ect known to

 

 

 

 

(Wm lcase Agent and UC handling Agent, prepared an
operations order for the proposed buy/walk operation. The operations order was si ed on
06/03/2013 by SSA the Squad 5 SSA, and by SSAI Ithe Squad
4 SSA who was the Acting ASAC. At approximately 2:00 pm, on 06/04/2013, I
conducted an operational brie?ng at the FBI Albuquerque Field Of?ce for all personnel involved
in the operation. In attendance at this operational briefing were Squad 4 FBI Agents and Task
Force Of?cers (TFOS), Las Cruces Police Department TFOs, and Albuquerque Police
Department (APD) Gang Unit members. APD supported the operation, but did not
attend the operational brie?ng.

 

(til/1Eij At the brie?ng, the planned undercover drug purchase followed by a traffic
stop by marked APD units to identify the subjects was briefed by The operation
was planned for approximatel 3:00 in the same day. The Deadly Force Policy was read
by SAI I instructed TFOs to follow their own deadly force policy.
All personnel participating in the operation knew their roles and responsibilities. Questions were
solicited, but no questions were asked. The operations order did not direct the execution of an
arrest of nor was such approval sought.

When the brie?ng concluded, the team members left the
FBI of?ce to set up surveillance of the operation. At approximately 3:00 pm, surveillance was
established in the area of IAlbuquerque. As
a member of SQ-4, Iwas supporting the drug buy/walk surveillance
operation. The plan called for the buy/walk to occur at Albuquerque, New
Mexico, however, was changed to the vicinity of thel I
in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This change was at the request of the subject, who wanted
the buy to occur in that area of the cit . FBI, TF surveillance units, and Albuquerque Police
Department (APdesitioned near the address and monitored conversations
between a task force UC and the subject who was later identified as: aka:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

who was in telephonic contact with the UC, altered the bug location


m??u ?nally outside inth arking lot. tered
the meeting location, based upon his concern that law enforcement was ossibly in the area.
After numerous telephonic conversations between the undercover andl the drug
transaction was executed by an individual later identi?ed an associate of

After some rudimentary counter-surveillance, condu?ted the transaction from
inside 4 Iwith the undercover who approached the vehicle on foot.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page b7E -1,6
b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7
b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7
b7E -1,6
b6 -7
b7C -7

NW- 523

 

 

 

$15

to crac ?cocaine, with the UC fo

xchanged a clear plastic ba containing a white rock like substance, which appeared

dollars in cash.

The plan called for APD marked units to conduct a traf?c stop upon
completion of the purchase in order to identify the subject. However, surveillance personnel lost

 

the
the
the
the

 

FBI AQ surveillance lost theI

plate of theI

ISurveillance observed a female, later identi?ed

land obtained an address of I

 

Mexico.

(U/Eoe?)
ked adjacent to th
and into the open cgarage of the

3%
minutes laterl
residenceI
description of]

view of theI

eillance units later found

arking lot located behind
I approach

land return to the  

I HoweVer FBI AQ ran checks on the license

I and AQ FBI determined the vehicle was registered to

I Albuquerque, New

before a traf?c stop could be execu?ed. 
Iparked and unoccupied in a nearby

 

 

 

 

 

I?om 

 

 

 

 

reported locating th I

 

 

 

 

ddress and observed a subject wa away from th
address. Approximately 36
observed a] Idepart the garage of the
Isurveillance units obse jects matching the
linside surveillance lost

Iandl to determine the location and progress of

 

 

the vehicle. Upon reacquiring the subjects, SAI Iwho had recently learned the drugs
purchased were not narcotics, announced the decision to stop and arrest the subjects over the

radio. 

SSA

id not speci?cally seek or obtain authorization from his supervisor SSA
to execute a warrantiess arrest otI
prepared or briefed an arrest plan, nor was AQ Executive Management (EM)

 

I Neither SA : nor

noti?ed of the change of scope of the Operation.

At approximately 5:47 

to the vicinity 

and male occupant hastily exit thel
sassenger) and TFOI

arrived at

 

enforcement lights or audio equipment-2,7
b7C -2,7

b6 
b7C -1,2,7
b7E -1,6

 

IAlbuquerque, New Mexico, and reported seeino a female

I At about 5 
[driver) driving hi sedan

Ivehicle was not equipped with law
momentarily stopped the vehicle in

ITFOI

order to reverse direction and follow another TFO on another street. While stopped, TFO

 

 

 

 

 

Iwas confronted by theI Iurnin the comer at the end 0
land driving towards them at a high rate of speed. SA : exited the
with his bureau issued MP5, and assumed a ?ring position adjacent to 1

 

 

 

eve ce. A

believed his actions would cause the subject to stOp his vehicle allowing an arrest to be

affected. TFO

and was consequently unable to exit the vehicle. 
behind the steering wheel and accelerate toward theI
blue .body armor vest with the word lettered across the front and bac
for a clear ?eld of ?re, 

Idriving his vehicle into SAI
wo shots impacted nearby houses an one ot impacted the 
3 vehicle smashed into the driver?s side door of TF 0  [5 vehicle and the



 



also attempted to exit the vehicle, but forgot to unbuckle his seat belt

 

 

'tnessed the sub'ect duck down
I SAI was wearing a
r. After checking

 

in fear
 causing death or serious

shot three times toward the driver

 

Page 3 of 16

b6 -1,4,7
b7C -1,4,7
b7E -1,6

Fi?-524

 

 

 

 

 

driver?s side mirror of a vehicle parked nearby.  Ithen ?ed the scene and was arrested
shortly thereafter by responding APD patrol of?cers. Iwas later located and

detained by law enforcement, but released for insuf?cient evidence. I  remained at
large.

b6 -2,7
b7C -2,7

 

(WM) There were no other Agents, Task Force of?cers (TFOs) or other law
enforcement personnel in close proximity to the shooting incident. No other law enforcement
of?cers ?red their weapons and none were injured.

The shooting scene was rocessed by FBI AQ ERT and the:
as processed by the SAI ?s issued MP5 was rendered safe and b5 _1 I 7
entered into evidence. Three 10mm caliber shell casings were recovered which were consistent b7c 1 7
with the ammunition used in weapon. FBI AQ initiated an Assault on a Federal
Officer (APO) case as a result of this incident. APD is pursuing local charges against


The occupants of the subject vehicle were:

 

at time of accident 

b6 -2,7
b7C -2,7

 

The shooting incident resulted ?om AQ Agents attempting to affect a vehicle
stop on individuals who had recently engaged in a narcotics transaction with an UC.

Substantive CaseFiles
After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

(Subject);

Assault on Federal Of?cers; b6 - 7
Albuquerque, New Mexico we ?7


Enclosures 
Page 4 of 16

NW-SEE

 

 

 

 

(WM All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the
enclosed table of contents. 

A. Administrative
The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following

i personnel:

Inspector-in-Charge (IIC)E1iasib Ortiz, Jr.
Inspector Gregory T. Bretzing

 

AIIP b6 ?1
AIIP b7C -1
AIIP

AIIP

AIIP

 

 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

On 06/05/2013, IIC our; spoke with AQ arrange b6 -1 . 2
logistics prior to arriving in Albuquerque. On 06/05/2013, the SIRT traveled to Albuquerque. 57?: ?1 2
On the moming of (16/05/2013, IIC Ortiz and the SIRT members met with AQ EM and SSA
personnel before traveling to the shooting scene which occurred in the vicinity 0

:Im southwest Albuquerque, New Mexico.

(Ill/?33913 All members of the SIRT reviewed the FBI produced video entitled, ?The
Rain After the Storm Shooting Incident Investigations,? and the Inspection Division Shooting
Review Protocol.

On (16/05/2013, IIC Ortiz met with the involved FBI SAs and management
personnel to explain the review process and protocols.

One Signed Sworn Statement was taken from the FBI Agent directly
involved in the shooting. Other interviews, events and observations were documenied via FD.-
3023. Neither the (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide
Information on a Voluntary Basis) nor the FD-645 (Warning and Assurance to Employee
Required to Provide. Information) were utilized. The and interviews of witnesses were
conducted voluntarily. An FIB-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide
Information Following a Shooting Incident) was executed by all FBI personnel interviewed via


(U) On 06/11/2013, IIC Ortiz communicated via email With Chief De District
Attorney] ?of the Bernalillo County District Attome '3 Of?ce. equested b6 -4
and received a copy of the Shooting Incident Review results. Iilstated his of?ce would b7C '4

 

Page 5 of 16

hi?r?T- 5.2%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

review the Shooting Incident Review and provide a decision regarding a declination
recommendation. The decision would be communicated to the appropriate Inspection Division
personnel, as well as the Albuquerque Field Of?ce, to include SAC Lee.

CU) On 06/11/2013, IIC Ortiz and AlIPI: met with AUSA

for the
District of New Mexico, to provide an update on the investigation. AUElicated

his of?ce would allow another District to review the shooting and render an opinion. This action
was based on the decision to prosecute the subject, and the possibility that a declination from the

District of New Mexico would show bias against the subject.

 

(U) On 06/11/2013, IIC Ortiz provided an exit brief to SAC Lee and her CDC.

C. a Personnel Involved in the Shooting
1. SAI

(Um FBI Albuquerque provided quali?cation records for SAI

 

I (fired weapon)

2. 

D. Firearms Training

 

A

review of the of?ce training records for SE who discharged his weapon, revealed he

was in compliance with the ?rearms quali?cations requirements for his bureau issued Glock 22
handgun, however he had not quali?ed with his bureau issued MP-S in the last year. The
training records for the previous ?ve quarters re?ected the following:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Date Make Model Nsenal Score Point Scale Quah??mg
umber Score
05/02/2013 Glock 22 100 90
05/02/2013 Colt M16A1 100 80
05/02/2013 Glock 22 100 60
01/13/2013 Glock 22 300 
12/20/2012 Glock 22 100 80
. 12/20/2012 Colt M16A1 100 80
12/20/2012 Glock 22 Vault 100 80
12/20/2012 Glock 22 60. 48
10/25/2012 Glock 22 60 48
09/27/2012 I Glock 22 100 80
09/27/2012 Glock 22 100 80
09/27/2012 Colt 1 M16A1 100 80
09/27/2012 Glock 22 60 48
08/28/2012 Glock 22 6O 48
08/28/2012 Glock 22 100 80
08/28/2012 Glock 22 60 48
08/28/2012 Glock 22 60 48
Page 6 of 16

 

 

b6 -l,3
b7C -1,3

b6 -l,4
b7C -1 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

08/28/2012 Colt M16A1 100 80
05/21/2012 Glock 22 60 48
05/21/2012 Glock 22 100 80
05/21/2012 Glock 1 22 60 48
05/02/2012 Colt 3 M16A1 100 80
05/02/2012 C911 1 M16A1 100 80
04/04/2012 Glad; I 22 100 80
04/04/2012 (31091: 1 22 100 80
(34/04/2012 Cult M16A1 100 80
04/04/2012 Glock I 22 60 48

12/16/2011 Cult 1 Vault 100 80
12/16/2011 100 80

1 12/16/2011 (316615 22 100 80
12/16/2011 Glock 22 100 80

1 12/16/2011 131661; 22 100 80
12/16/2011 (11661; 22 100 80

1 11/08/2011 (11661: 22 100 80
11/08/2011 Glogk 22 300 

11/08/2011 Colt M-4 Vault 100 80

a 11/08/2011 (11661; 22 100 80

11/08/2011 cult M.4 Vault Pass/Fail Pass

1 11/08/2011 Colt MIGAI 100 I 80

09/23/2011 (31661; 22 100 80.

09/23/2011 Colt M16 100 80

09/23/2011 (116.61; 22 100 80

09/23/2011 C611 M16 100 80

1 07/26/2011 (31661; 22 300 MA

07/26/2011 (11661; 22 100 80

1 07/26/2011 Co1t M4 Vault 100 80

1 07/26/2011 100 80

07/26/2011 100 80

1 07/26/2011 Glock 22 100 80
07/21/2011 Glock 22 100 80

07/21/2011 100 80

07/21/2011 Glock 22 100 80

07/21/2011 Glock 22 100 80

06/03/2011 Glock 22 100 80

03/18/2011 Remington 870 100 80
03/18/2011 Vault 100 1 80

03/18/2011 Glock 22 100 1 80
03/18/2011 Glock 22 100 1 80
03/18/2011 Glock 22 100 i 80

Page 70f 16

NYT- 5.28.

b6 -1
I370 -1

 

 

 

 

E. Deadly Force Training

As a SWAT team member and SQ-4 Agent, SAI:Iparticipated in
multiple operations, which included controlled drug buys, arrests, and surveillances. Almost all
occasions included the presentation of the Deadly Force Policy. advised
FBI Deadly Force Policy Training was conducted on March 19, 2013 at the Albuquerque Field
Of?ce as part of Surveillance and Tactical Training provided to Albu uer ue uads Four and 17
as well as Task Force Of?cers (TFO) associated with the SSTF. CDCI lprovided the
training. All members of Squad Four to include SA were present for the training.
In addition, on 06/04/2013, the day of the shooting, ISTA :WI1ducted an operational brie?ng
at the FBI Albu uerque Field Of?ce for all personnel involved in the operation. In attendance
was SA The FBI Deadly Force Policy was briefed at that meeting.

F. Use of Bed Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers

SAI lwas wearin a blue body armor vest with the word 
lettered across the front and back. was wearing a black buttoned shirt over his
issued ballistic vest with "Albuquerque Po ice on the upper right chest and Albuquerque Police

badge emblem on the upper left chest. TF had "Police" in large? block letters
on the back.

 

 

G.  Indices andlgationgl Crime Information Center (NCIC)

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC), criminal
history check included multiple entries to to include eight arrests for offenses
including bribery, auto theft, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, child abuse, possession of
a ?rearm by a felon, sexual penetration in the ?rst degree, robbery, extortion, false
imprisonment, and kidnapping with a sexual offense. Ihas been convicted at least three
times, most recently on March 28, 2012, for probation violation.

 

H. Evidence Recovery and Laborgtow Division Reports

(ll/M At approximately 6:3 0pm. on 06/04/2013, in the process of responding to
the scene of  Agent-involved shooting, CDC an Albuquerque Field Of?ce
Firearms Instructor, collected the following: MPS submachine gun2 caliber 10mm, serial
numberl: assigned to Special Agent 22 rounds of 10mm
service ammunition in one magazine removed from the MP5 submachine gun, serial
numbed I The MIPS submachine gun and ammunition were recovered on June 04,
2013 at approximately 6:00 pm. nearl IAlbuquerque, New Mexico, from
SAI I secured by SSAI lin his vehicle before being delivered to


 

 

The scene of the shooting was secured and processed by AQ ERT. New
Mexico State Police conducted a virtual shooting reconstruction to include the utilization of a

Page -1,4
b7C -1,4

b6 -7
b7C -7

b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

 

 

 

Leica scanner. The AQ ERT collected 3 spent cartridge casings in the vicinity of where SA
F?red his weapon. Two projectiles were recovered from residences in the area of the
ootmg. One projectile was recovered atI land the other projectile at

Pursuant to aNew Mexico State search warrant, APD conducted a review of
theI Idriven by subject There was one apparent bullet
hole in the ?ont bumper of the vehicle. Probable bullet residue was located on the vehicle. This
residue was tested by APD with positive results. The bullet itself could not be located. The
bullet trajectory seemed to be from the driver?s side to the passenger side of the vehicle.

Recovered evidence items requiring laboratory testing were as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Firearms/1? oolmarks Testing
Spent 10mm case 
1B2 Spent 10mm case -
1B3 Spent 10mm case -
.l'B6 Projectile -
1B7 Projectile 
lB14 MP5 submachine gun, caliber 10mm, serial numbeij 
Loaded MP5 magazine

 

 

 

 

Results of Laboratory Examinations:

Specimen Q1 was a fragmented copper jacketed bullet. Specimen Q1 was
identi?ed as having been ?red ?om the barrel of a Heckler Koch ri?e, Serial Number:
with scope), sling, and ?ashlight (1B14, E5163818).

(WM Specimens Q3 through Q5 were 10mm Auto cartridge cases which bore the

headstarnp of Federal ammunition. Specimens Q3 through Q5 were identi?ed as having been
?red from the same Heckler Koch ri?e.

(Um The 10mm Auto Heckler Koch ri?e, Model ri?e functioned
nornially when tested in the Laboratory.

1. Medical Report
FBI Agents Involved in the Shooting:
No injuries.

Subjects:

No injuries.

Page 9 of 16



b6 -1,2
b7C -1,2

b6 -7
b7C -7

b6 -1,2
b7C -l,2

b6 -1
-1

 

 

 

 

Innocent Bystander Victims:


J. Declination by the Civil Rights Division
On 12/04/2013 ,I: Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights

Division, US. Departrnent of Justice, completed his review and opined the use of force did not
constitute a seizure under the 4th Amendment and there was no information to suggest a willful
5th Amendinent due process violation. Therefore, no federally protected right was violated and
the matter did not warrant criminal investigation. 

K. Local Prosecution Opinion

(U/Eo?d) .On 11/26/2013] Chief Deputy District Attorney for
Bernalillo County Districts Attome '5 Of?ce com' leted her review of DA File 2913-93671-1,
involving Special Agentl: and She concluded SA
Fired his weapon in an attempt to protect the life and safety of Of?cerl:  which
was justi?ed by law in terms of any criminal charges.

 

 

 

L. PROPOSED OBSERVATION:
PROPOSED OBSERVATION:

PROPOSED. OBSERVATION 1: The case Agent lacked an exigent circumstance to
justify a warrantless arrest.

ANALYSIS 1; The DIOG, Section 19.6.4 stated, ?If an Agent has a reasonable belief
that the?s?ubjeetuwill ?ee before a warrant can be obtained, or there is a substantial likelihood that
the subject will dispose of evidence before a warrant can be obtained or there is increased danger
to Agents or others if entry is delayed to obtain a warrant, exigent circumstances exist which
may justify entry into premises to make a warrantless arrest or entry into third party premises
without a search warrant to make an arrest.?

and decided to stop and arrest the subjects because the subjects
had sold fake drugs (soap) to the undercover, and had demonstrated they were not likely to deal
with the same undercover again. The decision was made to apprehend after the association of at
least one subject with a home address and vehicle registration had been determined. While the
subjects could have disposed of evidence, they had already been lost several times, and entered a
residence once during the course of surveillance. At any one of these points, some portion of
evidence, namely the cash ?om the buy?walk, could have been disposed of or otherwise hidden.
The decision to arrest did not have any consequence to the preservation of evidence. 

While there was indication of intent to evade surveillance on the part of the subjects,

there is no articulation of any law enforcement announcement, or any indication the subjects had
any speci?c indication they were being followed by the police or the FBI.

Page -1,4
b7C -1,4

b6 -1
b7C -l

WET-5.31

 

 

 

There was no indication or suggestion the subjects posed a physical threat to Agents,
Task Force Of?cers, or the Public. To the extent evasive efforts to cross through red lights and
stop signs posed a threat to the general public, it was also the result of aggressive surveillance
which failed to announce a law enforcement purpose.

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION 1a: SAC, Albuquerque, will ensure all Special Agent
personnel have a reasonable basis for the exercise of warrantless arrests based upon exigency.

 

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION 1b: I

?l

PROPOSED OBSERVATION 2: Executive Management was not noti?ed of a high
risk operation, nor was an appropriate arrest plan formulated before the attempted arrest.

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS 2: DIOG Section 19.3.1 stated, ?Whenever possible, SAC and USAO
authority must be obtained before making a warrantless arrest. Agents are authorized to make
warrantless arrests for any federal crime (felony or misdemeanor) committed in their presence.
Agents also have authority to make warrantless felony arrests for a crime not committed in the
presence of the Agent if there is probable cause to believe the person to be arrested committed a
federal felony. A warrantless arrest must only be made when sound judgment indicates
obtaining a warrant would unduly burden the investigation or substantially increase the potential
for danger or escape.?

 

DIOG, Section 19.2.3 also states in part, ?Thel Imust be
utilized Whenever possible. . . .Exigent circumstances may necessitate an oral brie?ng in lieu of a
written plan, but the oral brie?ngs must address the ?ve topics required to be included in written
plans. The planning and execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to
experienced Agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or their designees. . . 

 

DIOG, Section 19.2.4 states in part, ?An SSA may authorize a joint arrest with state and
local authorities, United States Marshal?s Service (U SMS), or other federal law enforcement
agencies. In circumstances of oint arrests, the SAC remains responsible to ensure that there is a
well~considered arrest plan.?

probationary agent, Albuquerque Field Of?ce, made an operational decision
to stop and arrest the subjects. .While there was some discussion requesting the engagement of
marked police units, there was no discussion with artici ating Special Agents and Task Force
Of?cers (TFOs) of a substantive arrest plan. SAIipldid not speak with his supervisor, SSA

to offer or discuss a ?well considered arrest plan.? Further, the law enforcement unit
that eventually attempted to make the car stop was not equipped with emergency lights or siren

SS stated he supported the decision through his silence. While he did not
make any statement on the radio during the surveillance, he believed all members of the
surveillance would reasonably infer his support for the arrest decision based upon his previous

 

Page 11 of 16

NYT-EBE

b6 -1
b7C -1
b5 -1 

 

express direction as well as the training he provided in March 2013. SSA: did not :2  2
articulate an operational arrest plan through oral brie?n either over the air, or in person, and MC 1
remained silent throughout the effort to arrest. SSAI Istated that he would have

sunnorted the decision. and ultimately acquiesced to announcement. I

 

 

 

 

 

Additionally, should the limited articulation of the decision to arrest be considered ?the

brie?ng of a plan,? neither nor ommunicated such plan to either be -1
ASAC. Further, no effort was made by either SSA or SAI to obtain verbal b7C -1
approval or consultation ?om anyone prior to the announced decisron. might

 

reasonably permit tactical decisions to be subject to his after the fact authorization, but there is a
critical distinction between making a decision to arrest and having a plan.

When heard the decision to arrest, he elected not to address the issue with b6 -1
the SAC or USAO. SA did not disclose the reason for the arrest, so SSAQS b7C '1
decision was not supported by the same information. As the warrantless arrest progresse SSA

had time to call and reconcile the ongoing operational effort with the chain of command
but failed to do so.

INSTRUCTION 23: SAC, Albuquerque should ensure executive -
management noti?cation and authority is obtained prior to potential high risk operations.

PRQPOSED INSTRUCTION SAC, Albuquerque should ensure an FBI Arrest
Plan Form, or oral brie?ng which addresses the ?ve t'opics required to be included in Written
plans, be utilized whenever possible prior to an arrest.

 

PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION 2c:  b5 -1 2

 

 

 RECOMMENDATIODLZQ: SAC, Albuquerque should ensure
Supervisors recognize their re5ponsibility to provide unambiguous leadership and clear approval

 

 

 

 

for action when warranted.
PROBQSED 3: SAI: failed to qualify b5 -1,2
on the weapon used in the operation. ti; 1

 

ANALYSIS 3: The MIOG, Section 12-10.2.4 stated, must qualify with each
assigned shoulder weapon at least once per year. Agents are encouraged to train with weapons
they regularly carry at every training session. SAs with assigned shoulder weapons MUST use
those speci?c weapons when qualifying. Agents not assigned a speci?c shoulder weapon must,
at a minimum, demonstrate pro?ciency with the shotgun and MP5 at least once per year on an
approved quali?cation course or combat course as speci?ed in the Annual Field Firearms
Program.?

Page 12 of 16

NYT-SEE

 

 

 

 

 

 

I  The date of 135 -1,2
the shooting incident was June 4, 2013.

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION 3: SAC, Albuquerque will ensure all Special Agent
personnel qualify at least once per year with each assigned shoulder weapon.

PROPOSED OBSERVATION 4: All participants in the operation did not attend the
pre-Operational brie?ng.

 

ANALYSIS 4: DIOG, Section 19.2.3 states inpart,  NE -5
must be utilized whenever possible. . . .Exigent circumstances may necessitate an oral brie?ng in
lieu of a written plan, but the oral brie?ngs must address the ?ve topics required to be included
in written plans. The planning and execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned? to
experienced Agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or their designees. . 

 

 supported the operation, but did not attend the pre- b7E 1 6
operational brie?ng.

 

PROPOSED RECOMMENATION  SAC, Albuquerque will ensure all personnel
involved in operational activity participate in all pro-operational brie?ngs.

Page 13 of 16

NET-534

 

  

(Rev. 5-3-10}

a
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolroniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE Date: 06/12f2014
FIELD OFFICE 06f04f2013

 

cc; b6 -1
?1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION

Contact:

 

 

Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

Case ID HQ SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (Ufi?e??j This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis,r comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRS) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 05/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: (Uff?b??i This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division's Shooting Incident Report, dated
06110/2013, prepared by Inspector Gregory T. Bretzing. A copy of the
complete INSD Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to
this communication.

Enolosure(s}: Enclosed are the following items:

1. (UK Shooting Incident Report, dated 06f10f2013
2. E-mail from DOJ Attorney documenting dissenting opinion.

Details:

On 05/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting

incident which occurred on 06/04/2013, involving Albuquerque Field



NYT-SBS

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06fl2f2014

 

Office Special Agent _Iand Task Force Officer be '1r4r7
I were involved in ?1?4?7
a drug buy/walk operation and a subsequent attempted traffic stop of a

vehicle driven by subjectI The original plan called

for the buy/walk to occur at about 4:00 followed by a traffic

 

 

stop to identify the individual(s) who AFO anticipated would sell drugs
to an Undercover TF0. The plan did not call for an arrest.
Surveillance team members were given specific assignments. Both SA
tasked to conduct surveillance only. An
additional unmarked surveillance unit with lights and siren

capabilities was assigned as the traffic stop unit.

FBI, TFO surveillance units and Albuquerque Police

Department Iwere positioned to monitor the

 

 

 

 

 

buy. The buy was executed an associate of another b6 
subject later identified asI I AfterI Iinstructed an b7c 
undercover officer from APD to parking lot, -1?6
the transaction occurred insideI Iparked at this

location.

Following the drug buyfwalk, surveillance personnel lost the

when it left the buy location. APD personnel ran the b6 ?1,2,7
Eicense plate information and obtained an address associated '112!7
With a female I a known associate of _1'6

At the associated address,  I
Albuquerque, 

departing the residence,I Isurveillance observed individuals
matching the subjects? descriptions sitting inside the 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

surveillance lost the] Ito determine
the vehicle location. When the air unit reacquired theI I
case Agent SA Iannounced the decision to stop and
arrest the subjects over the radio. Prior to making this decision, SA

the drugs purchased earlier in the day were a fake
substance.

 

I surveillance to the vicinity of b7E ?1:5

 



2

NYT-536



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

 

I I drove his task force vehicle with SA b5 ?1r2r4r?
the passenger seat to this location. 
momentarily stopped his vehicle when confronted by 

driving toward them at a high rate of speed. At approximately 5:45

the vehicle with his MP5 and took position near

his vehicle. Ifired his weapon three times toward the

 

 

driver,  I asI [s vehicle approached. 
attempting to drive his vehicle into their vehicle
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. Two shots

fired impacted neighboring homes, and one struck the subject?s vehicle.
the scene in his vehicle and was arrested shortly
thereafter by APD fled the area without being captured

by police. No injuries were suffered by 


SIRG Deliberations:

A presentation of the known facts of the Agent?involved
shooting, as detailed above, was made to the SIRG by INSD Team Leader

 

Ivia a Power Point presentation. The Power Point b6 -1
included photographs of the scene, an ERT diagram of the scene, a b7c '1

diagram of the firearm trajectory as it related to the shooting scene,

and statements made by those participating in the operation.

The DOJ Deadly Force Policy provides a core principle that
Agents "may use deadly force only when necessary, that is,r when the

officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force_poses an

imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
to another_person."

The SIRG voted regarding the application of deadly force.
Ten of 12 voting members determined the use of deadly force by SA

in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. The b6 -1,4
majority determined have reasonably believed the use ?1'4
of deadly force was necessary because the subject made no effort to

slow down or avoid striking the vehicle sitting in.



3

NYT1537



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

The subject did not deviate from his course until b6 -l.4
three rounds. In his statement, believed that the _1?4
subject utilizing his vehicle posed an imminent danger of serious
bodily harm or death to Even though the vehicle
swerved to avoid a head on collision, the subject's vehicle
still struck the driver's side door of the vehicle 

sitting in.

One of the voting members abstained from voting on this
particular shooting incident. Another voting member, DOJ Attorney 
dissented, expressing the belief the application of deadly force in
this instance was not in compliance with the DOJ's Deadly Force Policy.
The dissenting member requested and was provided the opportunity to
document the factors for his belief the application of DOJ's Deadly

Force Policy was violated.

DOJ Attorney #1 documented his dissenting opinion via an
E?mail sent to Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark A. Morgan on
05120f2014. In this document, DOJ Attorney #1 outlined why he believed
there was no exigent circumstance or immediate threat in this shooting
incident which would justify the Agent using deadly force without

identification or warning. DOJ Attorney #1 concluded:

"As there were no exigent circumstances which at that_point justified
the Agent?s immediate threat of deadly force without identification and
warning, in my view the Agent?s subsequent use of deadly force violated
the Department?s Deadly Force Policy. That the Agent?s failure to
adequately warn of his authority and intent to use deadly force was not
reasonable under these circumstances is also reflected in the subject
calling 911, staying on the_phone for several minutes, expressing'fear
that he was being shot at and then relief when his car came to a stop
and AQ_police intervened. In reaching this conclusion I understand
that others conclude that the only relevant time period is the instant
before the Agent fired his weapon. I respectfully disagree here,
because here the Agent training'his weapon on the subject car without

reasonably identifying'his authority and purpose in a manner that could

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

4

NYT-538



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

reasonably be expected to be understood by the subject_precipitated the
subject accelerating, ducking behind the dashboard and attempting to

drive around the vehicle in which the Agent was riding."

SIRS Office of General Counsel (OGC) voting member,

concurred the use of deadly force by SAI in this be ?1
-1

 

 

incident was in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. OGC's

opinion on this decision is outline below:

The DOJ Deadly Force Policy provides a core principle that
Agents ?may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the

officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force_poses an
imminent danger of death or serious_physical injury to the officer or

to another_person.?

The United States Supreme Court has explained that ?the test
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise

definition or mechanical application." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.390,

 

396 (1989). The Court advised that Vproper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.? The Court also stated that reasonableness ?must be
judged from the_perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight? and that the "calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split?second judgments?in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolvingeabout the
amount of force that is necessary in a_particular situation.? Ed; at
396-9?. The ultimate question is ?whether the officers? actions are
?objectively reasonable? in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or

motivation.? Id. at 397.



5

NYT1539



Title: {U/gib?ag SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

belief that the subject posed an imminent b5 -1,4
danger of death or serious physical injury to Task Force Officer (TFO) b7c ?1?4
reasonable based upon the facts in the record. In his
signed sworn statement, that he and 
were conducting surveillance on the subject?s vehicle{s} after Sh
heard over the radio that the drug transaction had occurred

and the subject's vehicle had left the parking lot. While conducting
surveillance, that he put on his vest to ?clearly

mark me as a law enforcement officer.? He advised that the ballistic
vest had written in large white letters on the front and back
of the vest.

the decision was then made to detain the 55-ir4

subject and not let him walk, as had been planned previously. SA b7c ?1'4

that they could safely conduct the
traffic stop of the subject?s vehicle if they both exited their vehicle
on either side. description of the events of the shooting

incident as he perceived them was as follows:

was expecting to exit the vehicle at the 136 ?1,7
same time I did but he seemed to be having difficulty. At this point I b7c 

saw and heard the driver of vehicle and head
straight for our vehicle at a high rate of speed. As he approached our
vehicle, I quickly scanned the street and saw no one outside. In
addition, I saw an unoccupied car_parked on the east side of the street
just south from our vehicle which could act as a backstop for any
rounds that I shot. I saw the vehicle speeding toward us. I also saw
the male driver duck down behind his steering wheel and aim his vehicle

directly at us, continuing at a high rate of speed."

still not exited the vehicle and appeared b5 ?4
-4
to have his left leg on the ground outside of the vehicle with the back

door open. I found out later that he had not removed his seat belt. I
believed that the subject utilizing his vehicle posed an imminent
danger of serious bodily harm or death to I disengaged

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

6

NYT-54O



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

my weapon?s safety moving the selector to the semi?automatic fire

position and fired two shots in quick succession at the driver?s side
door followed by a third round at the driver as the vehicle passed our
vehicle. I was attempting to stop the driver,

and ending the threat to 

because I was concerned about cross fire with my_partner.

thus stopping the car

I knew the

IQ mm rounds would penetrate the body panels of the vehicle and hit the

driver. I fired at the driver because I believed deadly force was
necessary because the subject in his vehicle speeding towards us posed

an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to my partner

"At the last moment, able to pull his leg

back into our vehicle and escaped serious injury. The subject vehicle
The

Iat a high rate of speed and

hit both our vehicle as well as the parked car as it sped by us.

 

vehicle continued down 

fled the scene.?

statement corroborates version

of the facts. that he attempted to exit the
vehicle but was restrained by his seat belt and had one foot out the

door. He observed the vehicle and ?heard 
being revved.? He then observed 

accelerating. He and attempting to exit their vehicle
to execute the arrest of the subject because "they could no longer

safely back?up or evade.? the subject duck down
behind the vehicle console and continue ?straight toward front center"

His statement also indicated that ?[t]he rapid

pull his foot.back

car,r and draw his frame as as_possible, bracing for

not see the driver of 

was within one or two car in front of their vehicle.
He heard shots fired and observed right "immedi
ately before directly colliding with the front center of [their
vehicle].? he ?feared for his life as the

 

of their vehicle.
approach
into the
impact.?

until it

UNCLASSIFIEDHM



I did not fire any more rounds

b6 -4
b7C -4

b6 -2,4
b7C -2,4

b6 -1,4,7
-1,4,7

NYT-541



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

directly toward his position, and [he] b5 '4r7
b7C -4,7
could not exit the vehicle or otherwise take action to remove himself

from the path.? He stated that he only
managed to further pull his body toward the center console of his

vehicle ?just prior to impact,? and that the
vehicle?s door, forcing it closed, and drove body ?up

onto the center console inside [their vehiclej.? stated

that down the street without appearing to
slow down.

The subject was also interviewed, and his statement

corroborates the facts of the incident as described by both b6 -l,4
and The subject advised that he saw the Agents? vehicle _1?4
blocking the street with both front doors open and observed the muzzles

of two rifles coming out of the vehicle. The subject did not realize,

however, that they were law enforcement officers and instead believed

that they were persons who the subject had just ripped off in the drug

deal who were coming to kill him because the subject gave them fake

drugs. The subject called 911 to advise that his life was in danger.

The subject stated he then ducked behind the steering wheel and

attempted to escape. Although he stated that he was not trying to hit

the Agents' vehicle, he confirmed that he was accelerating towards

their general position and estimated his speed to be between 40?50 

as he attempted to pass by the other vehicle. He heard the shots fired

at him and continued to flee in his vehicle.

Based upon the facts related by all individuals involved in

the incident, including the subject, it is undisputed that the subject

gunned his engine and accelerated his vehicle towards the law

enforcement officers at a speed of 40?50mph while trying to flee. TFO
trapped partially outside the vehicle due to his seat b5 ?4
belt and managed to pull his body inside the vehicle only just prior to _4
impact by the subject?s vehicle, which struck vehicle

door and drove his body up onto the center console of the officers?

vehicle. the shots fired as he was trying to pull


a

NY11542



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

his body away when the subject's vehicle was within one to two car
that the three shots were fired at

the subject as the subject?s vehicle was passing their vehicle in an

attempt to stop the threat to 

amply support a reasonable belief by the subject posed

an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death to TFO




Agent was riding did not have emergency equipment flashing

away.

These undisputed facts

DOJ Attorney #1 argues that because the vehicle in which the

lights} and the Agent assumed a shooting stance with a long gun that
would presumably conceal his vest?s law enforcement lettering, that the
DOJ Deadly Force Policy was violated because there was not a reasonable
announcement of authority and purpose to the driver of the oncoming car
that the failure to comply would be met with the use of deadly force.
The fundamental flaw in this argument is that it examines the facts
from the perspective of the subject and not from the perspective of the
reasonable Agent, who believed that he was effecting an arrest, that he
was wearing a ballistic vest that identified himself as a law
enforcement officer, and that the subject who was attempting to flee
posed an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to his
partner, who was trapped halfway out of a car that was directly in the
DOJ Attorney #1 is
essentially arguing that the Agent who was faced with this split-second

path of the subject?s rapidly approaching vehicle.

decision in a highly tense and rapidly evolving situation should have
been thinking about whether the subject could read the letters on his
vest and not whether the subject posed an imminent danger to himself or

his partner such that he should use deadly force.



to submit to the authority of the officer must be given prior to the

The DOJ Deadly Force Policy provides that a verbal warning

use of deadly force feasible and if to do so would not increase
the danger to the officer or others." DOJ Attorney #1 suggests that
because the subject?s car was ?approximately two football fields away"
that there was plenty of time to give a warning in addition to the

markings on the ballistic vest that may not have been adequately



9

b6 -1,4
b7C -1,4

NYT- 543



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

visible to the subject. Even assuming that the initial approximate

distance of two football fields away when the subject gunned his engine

and accelerated towards the Agents was correct, that would amount to

only 240 yards/720 feet, which a vehicle being driven at a speed of

40-50mph would have completed in approximately 9.8 to 12 seconds. DOJ

Attorney #1 opines that the Agent could have safely ?stood in the

middle of the street, displaying the law enforcement lettering on his

vest, and perhaps his badge, raised his hand and indicated his

authority and intent to have the vehicle stop.? In so opining, DOJ

Attorney #1 disregarded the collective opinion of the experienced law

enforcement officers on the SIRG that this would not have been a safe

option for the Agent under the circumstances of a vehicle approaching

at a high rate of speed and the danger to his partner, whose body was

partially exposed outside their vehicle. The undisputed record

adequately demonstrates that the use of additional verbal warnings was

not feasible and would likely have increased the danger to TFO

possibly even if he assumed a position in b5 _1r4
front of the rapidly approaching vehicle with his hand extended and his _1?4

weapon lowered, which DOJ Attorney #1 suggests was a reasonable option.

DOJ Attorney #1 also argues that another safe option would
have been to simply let the subject?s car pass by and wait for a marked
unit to assist with the arrest. In theory, it would always be a safe
option to simply not try to arrest a subject if a marked unit is
unavailable to flash lights at the subject. From a law enforcement
perspective, this argument is not practical as marked units are not
always available, nor does the DOJ Deadly Force Policy require that law
enforcement officers not execute arrests in the absence of a marked
unit. This also does not present a safe alternative for an Agent who
has already started to execute the arrest believing that the Agent?s
law enforcement markings on his vest were sufficient identifiers, and
the situation escalated in seconds because the subject was attempting
to flee.

DOJ Attorney #1 also argues that the DOJ Deadly Force Policy

was violated because the street was lined by houses that were



10

NYT- 544



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

relatively close to each other and to the street and that two of the
Agent?s bullets struck the homes, which DOJ Attorney #1 believed
?effectively served as backstops for any stray rounds.? b6 -1

did, however, consider the risks to the public, as he advised in his '1

statement that he ?quickly scanned the street and saw no one outside? a
nd that he "saw an unoccupied car parked on the east side of the street
just south from our vehicle which could act as a backstop for any
rounds that I shot.? While his target on two shots
and had also failed to qualify recently on the gun that he was
carrying, those facts speak to his marksmanship and the importance of
attending training in accordance with Bureau policy, which can be
adequately addressed through observations and recommendations in the
findings. These facts do not reflect that to
consider the risks to the public and that those risks so outweighed the
use of deadly force to protect his partner, who was in imminent danger
of serious physical injury or death, that the DOJ Deadly Force Policy

itself was violated.

SIRG Observations

On 05f21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG voted
regarding the application of deadly force. Ten of 12 voting members
determined the use of deadly force by in compliance with b6 -1,4
the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. The majority determined b7c ?1'4
have reasonably believed the use of deadly force was necessary and the
vehicle presented an imminent danger to when 
fired the shots. As a majority opinion, it was determined 

was in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.

One of the voting members abstained from voting. Another voting
member dissented, expressing the belief the application of deadly force
in this instance was not in compliance with the DOJ's Deadly Force

Policy. The dissenting member requested and was provided the

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

ll

NYT-54S



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

opportunity to document the factors for his belief the application of

DOJ's Deadly Force Policy was violated.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, Observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational

planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

Observation 1: The Case Agent lacked an exigent circumstance to

justify a warrantless arrest.

Analysis 1: The DIOG, Section 19.3.1 stated, "Whenever_possible, SAC
and USAO authority must be obtained before making a warrantless arrest.
Agents are authorized to make a warrantless arrests for any federal
crime {felony or misdemeanor) committed in their presence. Agents also
have authority to make warrantless felony arrests for a crime not
committed in the_presence of the Agent if there is_probable cause to
believe the_person to be arrested committed a federal felony. A
warrantless arrest must only be made when sound judgment indicates
obtaining a warrant would unduly burden the investigation or

substantially increase the_potential for danger or escape."

SSA  : and SAI: decided to stop and arrest the subjects

because the subjects had sold fake drugs (soap) to the undercover and
had demonstrated they were not likely to deal with the same undercover
again. The decision was made to apprehend after the association of at
least one subject with a home address and vehicle registration had been
determined. While the subjects could have disposed of evidence, they
had already been lost several times and entered a residence once during
the course of surveillance. At any one of these points, some portion
of evidence, namely the cash from the buy?walk, could have been
disposed of or otherwise hidden. Given the aforementioned, there was
no exigent preservation of evidence issue which would have necessitated
Further, APDI Ihad re?established

visual contact with the subject vehicle precluding any exigent

 

an exigent arrest.

 

justification to arrest prior to the arrival of appropriately equipped

marked units.



l2

NYT-546

b6 -1
-1




Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

While there was indication of intent to evade surveillance on the
part of the subjects, there was no articulation of any law enforcement
announcement, or any indication the subjects had any specific

indication they were being followed by the Police or the FBI.

There was no indication or suggestion the subjects posed a physical
threat to Agents, Task Force Officers, or the Public. To the extent
evasive efforts to drive through red lights and stop signs posed a
threat to the general public, it was also the result of aggressive

surveillance which failed to announce the law enforcement purpose.

Instruction 1: SAC, Albuquerque will ensure all Special Agent
personnel have a reasonable basis for the exercise of warrantless

arrests based upon exigency.

Observation 2: Executive Management was not notified of a high-risk
operation, nor was an appropriate arrest plan formulated before the

attempted arrest.

Analysis 2: DIOG Section 19.3.1 stated, Whenever_possible, SAC and

USAO authority must be obtained before making a warrantless arrest."

 

DIOG, Section 19.2.3 also stated in part, ?Thel I -5

 

must be utilized whenever_possible.mExigent circumstances may
necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of a written_plan, but the oral
briefings must address the five topics required to be included in
written_plans. The planning and execution of arrests, raids, and
searches should be assigned to experienced Agents. All arrest_plans

must be approved by ASACs or their designeesm.?

DIOG, Section 19.2.4 stated in part, "An SSA may authorize a joint

arrest with state and local authorities, United States_Marshal?s
Service (GEMS), or other federal law enforcement agencies. In
circumstances of joint arrests, the SAC remains responsible to ensure

that there is a well?considered arrest_plan.?

SA a Probationary Agent, Albuquerque Field Office, made he '1
-1

l3

NYT- 547



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

an operational decision to stop and arrest the subjects. While there

was some discussion requesting the engagement of marked police units,

there was no discussion with participating Special Agents and Task

Force Officers of a substantive arrest plan. not b5 ?1;4
speak with his supervisor, to offer or discuss a ?well b7c _1?4
considered arrest plan.? Absent any direction from SSA

and lacking any specific contingency planning that could have

been included in a well considered arrest plan, TFO
to make this arrest with a vehicle not equipped

with emergency lights or siren.

he supported the decision through his silence. b6 ?1
While he did not make any statement on the radio during the b7c _1
surveillance, he believed all members of the surveillance would
reasonably infer his support for the arrest decision based upon his
previous expressed direction as well as the training he provided in
March 2013. not articulate an operational arrest plan
through oral briefing either over the air, or in person, and remained
silent throughout the effort to arrest. he would
have supported the decision, and ultimately acquiesced to the

announcement.

Additionally, should the limited articulation of the decision to
arrest be considered ?the briefing of a plan," neither nor b5 ?1
such a plan to either the SAC or ASAO. INSD b7c -1
assessed since there was no exigency (see Observation for a
warrantless arrest, have notified the ASAC and SA
have communicated the circumstances of the situation to
the USAO and sought authority for a probable cause arrest. No effort
was made by either obtain verbal approval
or consultation from anyone prior to the announced decision. SSA
reasonably permit tactical decisions to be subject to his
after the fact authorization, but there was a critical distinction

between making a decision to arrest and having a plan.

When the decision to arrest he elected not to b5 ?1
-1

l4

NY11548



Title: {U/zig??j SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

address the issue with the SAC or USAD. did not disclose
the reason for the arrest, so decision was not supported
by the same information. As the warrantless arrest progressed, SSA
had time to call and reconcile the ongoing operational effort

with the chain of command but failed to do so.

Instruction Ea: SAC, Albuquerque will ensure executive management

 

notification and authority is obtained prior to potential high?risk

operations.

Instruction 2b: SAC, Albuquerque will ensure an FBI Arrest Plan Form,

 

or oral briefing which addresses the five topics required to be
included in written plans, be utilized whenever possible prior to an

arrest.

Recommendation 2: SAC, Albuquerque should ensure Supervisors recognize

 

their responsibility to provide unambiguous leadership and clear

approval for action when warranted.

 

Observation 3: SAI

used in the operation.

Ifailed to qualify with the weapon

 

Analysis 3: The MIOG, Section 12-10.2.4 stated, ?535 must qualify with

each assigned shoulder weapon at least once per year. Agents are
encouraged to train with weapons they regularly carry at every training
session. SAs with assigned shoulder weapons.MUST use those specific
weapons when qualifying; Agents not assigned a specific shoulder
weapon must, at a minimum, demonstrate_proficiency with the shotgun and
REE at least once per year on an approved qualification course or

combat course as specified in the Annual Field Firearms Program.?

 

SAI Iwas issued the MP5 rifle he used in the shooting
incident on 06113f2012. first documented qualification
score on this weapon was not until lDlefZUlB. The date of the
shooting incident was 06f04f2013.

Instruction 3: SAC, Albuquerque will ensure all Special Agents qualify



15

NY11549



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

at least once per year with each assigned shoulder weapon.

Observation 4: All participants in the operation did not attend the

pre?operational briefing.

 

 

 

 

 

Analysis 4: SAI I Case Agent and UC-handling Agent, b6 -1
prepared an operations order for the proposed buy/walk operation. The b7c _1
operations order was signed on 06/03/2013 by I the

Squad 5 SSA, and by SSAI the Squad 4 SSA who was the

 

Acting ASAC. At approximately 2:00 on 06f04f2013, 

conducted an operational briefing at the FBI Albuquerque Field Office

for all personnel involved in the operation. In attendance at this

operational briefing were Squad 4 FBI Agents and Task Force Officers

Las Cruces Police Department TFOs, and Albuquerque Police

Department (APD) Gang Unit members. the ?1,6

operation, but did not attend the operational briefing.

At the briefing, the planned undercover drug purchase

followed by a traffic stop to identify the subjects was briefed by SA

The operation was planned for approximately 3:00 pm the same b5 ?1
day. The Deadly Force Policy was read by SAI I b7c '1
TFOs to follow their own deadly force policy.

All personnel participating in the operation knew their roles and

 

 

responsibilities. Questions were solicited, but no questions were

asked.

Recommendation 4: SAC, Albuquerque should ensure all individuals

 

expected to participate in a scheduled operation attends the

operational briefing.

 

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRS recommended no administrative action be taken
against Ias a result of his involvement in this b5 ?1

 

shooting incident. -1

Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection

Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The



16

NYT1550



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

following voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P.

Gelios, Office of Inspections (OI), I Special b6 ?1,3
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief Robert ?1?3
E. Hughes, Violent Criminal Threats Section, Criminal Investigative

Division; SC Roger A. Coe, East Asia Section, Counterintelligence

Division; Unit Chief I FTU, Supervisory Special

Agent I Sguad CR-2, Washington Field Office; SSA

Practical Applications Unit, Training Division

Defensive Systems Unit, 
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA

I I Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division

Special Weapons and Tactics Operations

Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG). In addition to the

voting members in attendance, DOJ SIRG unable to b6 ?1,3
attend but reviewed the Shooting Incident Review Team report and ?1r3

provided his vote in writing prior to the SIRG. The following

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

non?voting members were also in attendance: I I
of Inspector General, Inspectors Trent R. Teyema,
Shawn W. Stroud, Paul D. Delacourt, and R. Justin Tolomeo, OI, 

 

Team Leadersl I
I I
IOI, 

FTU, ISpecial Assistant, OI, ucI?I

Management Program I
Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

SAC, Albuguergue is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will
review the field office's response to determine if the

Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further



l?

NYT-SSI

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE 06/04/2013
Re: 06f12f2014

action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

SAC, Albuquerque is required to provide a written response,

via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
InstructionfRecommendation. Follow?up EC responses must be directed to

Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit INSD. Once b5 ?1
the EC is serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel link to b7c _1



 

00



18

NYT-SSZ

 

136 -1,4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

?1,4
From: I  @ea2no.state.nm.ns]
Sent: 26, 2013 5:50 PM
To:
Be:
Subject: Requested senate on a nonuiniory FBI Agent-invested Shooting

Dear Agent 

I have completed my review of DA File a 2613?936?1~11 involving Special b5 '1r2r4
and TFOI lat I which occurred on June a, -1:2;4
2313. As you are awareJ I examined this case strictly for any criminal violations which
might have been committed by he discharges his weapon three times towards the
suspect?s venicie which was being driven in an assaultive manner towards his
partner TFGI I At the time when SA tired his weapon his partner, TF6
I was stuck inside their vehicle and Agent stated that he was fearful For
Giticerl ls life and satety under these circumstances. These circumstances were
contirmeo in rs statement to investigators. The vehicle occupies by TFO
was nit by the sospect?s vehicle along with another, unrelated nearby vehicle.
Alt oogh there was some property damage from these shots. it is very fortunate that no one.
including any innocent third parties, were injured.

 

 

I have concluded that SA fired his weapon in an attempt to protect the life and b6 ?1,4
safety of another, namely Officer which is justified by law in terms of any -1,4
criminal charges in this case. i will vet review my conclusion with the ?istrict Attorney
within the next week or so. If she agrees with my recommendation, I will send yes a formal
letter and close this case without further action. If she wishes to me conduct any further
investigation of this matter I will let you know right away.

it you have any additional questions please contact me be ?4
b7c -4

Sincerely yours,

 


Chief Deputy Bistrict Attorney

Second Judicial District

This message has been scanned for malware by Sorttontrol pic. 


NYT3553

  

(Rev. 5-3-10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION Date: 08/13f20l3
06f29f20l2

To: DA-INSPECTION FRONT OFFICE

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: I b5 ?1
?1

 

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted I

 

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

 

 

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting that occurred on 06f29f2012, involving Special Agent (SA)

I Iof the Boston Division. During the attempted arrest ha ?1
of a drug supplier, SA fired two rounds from his Bureau?issued '1

Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol. SIRG members recommended that no
administrative action be taken against a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident. One Observation and associated
Instruction was adopted by the SIRG for the Boston Division.

 

 

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference report of Assistant Special Agent

in Chargel dated 07'f03f2012. b6 ?1
b?C ?1

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and

recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 06/29/2012, members of the Western Massachusetts Gang Task
Force assisted the Holyoke Police Department Narcotics

Unit and the Vermont State Police (USP) in a narcotics investigation.

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT-554

Title:
Re:

discuss details of the operation which was scheduled to

UNCLASSIFIED

SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION 06/29/2012
08fl3f2013

(U)


On the morning of 06/29/2012 Supervisory Senior Resident Agent
(55ml
to address administrative issues.
Federal Officer (EEO), Lieutenant SSRA

 

Iwent to the Springfield Resident Agency (SEA)

 

Upon arriving at the SEA, Special

 

 

b6 -1,4

occur later that afternoon. advised the HPD b7C ?1:4
planned After being briefed on the proposed operation, SSRAI _1

 

approved other members of the to participate in

the purpose of

providing support to this investigation was to enhance intelligence

the operation and arrest.

collection and develop sources in furtherance of the mission.
he did not request a written operations order
knowing the HPD was the lead agency. He was aware of the HPD policy
which did not require written operations orders, only verbal
briefings.

At approximately 1:00 participants attended a pre-operational

 

briefing provided by HPD Detective was present

 

b6 
-1,4,7,3

?1
-1
-1

 

 

 

I He provided a photo ofl I his

criminal history, and possible vehicle description. Arrest team

members were provided information prior connection to

 

Ias well as the need to assess
the subject would be
The plan to

al

 

him as

 

 

 

arrested prior to any controlled purchase taking place.

 

arrestl
Iwas the primary means of communication for the
Members of the task force, including had

trained together on this technique during a 2009 vehicle operations

operation.

training course.

he had approximately two hours from the time of b6 -1
-1
UNCLASSIFIED
2

NYT1555

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION 06/29/2012
Re: 08fl3f2013

the briefing before the operation would take place. He advised he _1 4
and going to meet a source and it was -1r4
possible they would be unavailable for the operation. Upon completion b7A '1

of his meeting with the source, 

over the radio the operation would take place in 

 

 

 

parking lot of theI I be _1f4
-1,4
advised he and -1
in the vicinity of theI land would participate

 

in the operation. to plan :bs -1r4?7:3
was to upon his arrival, and they would box him in wittlbIC 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

their vehicles to effect the arrestSAI Iand SFOI Ientered theI
SA
observed Massachusetts State Police SergeantI Iparked

 

in the near theI I SAI Iand SFOI I
were parked in the front right corner of theI Iparking lot.
the West Springfield Police Department (WSPD) to

provide details of the operation. The WSPD responded and advised SFO
from their department would be responding to assist in
the operation. the information to the other team

members. At this point, b6 _1 7

approximately five minutes away. b7C ?1,7

 

While waiting forI I SAI Icontacted the arrest team and

made arrangements for arrest team vehicle placement.

participants be arriving

any minute and statedI I
I I Immediately after 

communication, HPD arrived in a

I I arrival,I I
b6 



 

 

 

 

?1
UNCLASSIFIED b7? ?1
?1

3

NYT3556

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION 06/29/2012
Re: 08f13f2013 b6 _1r4??r3
b7c 
?1

I ldrove through the] I h7D ?1

parking lot, heading towards 

positioned themselves in a parking space facing the  I
drove in front of made contact with 
and made a left hand turn, and traveled across the parking lot
back towards theI I the
team to effect the arrest. a position
approximately four feet away rear bumper to block him in
and activated the vehicle emergency lights. Detective  
pulled his vehicle side and SFO 

his vehicle in front of 
Subsequent to the blocking of: SA : and b6 
b7c ?1,4,7

exited their vehicle. SA moved along the passenger side of

shouting "Stop, Police" with his firearm drawn. 

immediately drove his vehicle forward and struck vehicle.

SAI: continued yelling "Stop, Police" and : put his vehicle
in reverse, moved backwards and struck vehicle. 
was approximately three feet away vehicle and 
positioned to the rear. and
observed him rapidly turning the steering wheel to the left and heard
the engine revving loudly and the tires spinning. 

directly at made him believe the front end of 

vehicle was going to either strike him or 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in reverse, the front end of his vehicle swung
directly toward Fearing for his and safety, SA
his Glock 22, Serial and then a second
time struck vehicle a second time. In an
interview with the Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT), SFO 
indicated he also feared for his life. forward again and
drove past vehicle, traveling over a median strip and onto
the road between thel I

towards thel Iexit. running 

vehicle, believing he may have been struck by one or both rounds and

b6 
1378 

 

 

would be unable to continue driving.

UNCLASSIFIED

4



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION 06/29/2012
Re: 08fl3f2013

 

DEA Group Supervisor Icalled out a "no b6 ?1,3
-l,3

 

pursuit" order to his personnel and subsequently stopped to pick up SA

As they traveled a short distance, SSRA

and left messages advising of the incident. SA

called Relief Supervisor the call was

directed to voice mail and he did not leave a message.

During the operation, all law enforcement officers executing the b6 1
arrest were wearing identifying clothing; however, SFO ch _1
not wearing ballistic protection.

evaded Agents and officers; however, he was arrested at 4:26

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

later that day while attempting to conduct personal injuries were incurred as a result of b5 -1

discharging his weapon. b7C -1
On 05f23f2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned shooting

incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Inspection

Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The

following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector

Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections (OI), Trial

Attorney, Criminal Division, Special Legal

Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief Gregory D.

Cox, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSAI I be ?1,3

 

Applications Unit, Training Division 
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA

I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; SSA

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group SSAI 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Firearms Training Unit, SSAI Defensive Systems
Unit, and SAI I Squad Washington Field
Office. The following non-voting members were also in attendance:

Inspectors Gregory T. Bretzing, Christopher W. Davis, and Ronald
Twersky, OI, Team Leadersl I

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

NYT1558

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION 06/29/2012
Re: 08fl3f2013

 

 

andI I OI, SSAI I Defensive Systems

Unit, SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, 

Operations and Training Unit, SSAI I 
Resource Planning Office, Director's Office; SSAI

 

 

 

 

SWAT Operations Unit, Safety and Occupational Health Manager

 

I I Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit,
Facilities and Logistics Services Division; Management and Program
Analyst I Inspection Analysis Unit, and

 

 

I Inspection Management Unit,
INSD.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); 
provide recommendations concerning training andfor safety issues; and
4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

.

The discussion of this incident resulted in the recommendation
that no administrative action be taken against a result b6 ?1
of his involvement in the shooting incident. The SIRG determined the ?1
use of deadly force by justified and within policy.

OBSERVATION:

Observation 1: not wearing his FBI issued Ballistic
Protective Undergarment (BPU) during the arrest operation. b6 _1
b7C -1
Analysis 1: not wearing ballistic protection during k?E ?5

this operation. briefed the details of the operational
plan hours prior to the operation, yet failed to wear any ballistic
protection during the operation. According to FBI policy found in the
Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) Part 2,

Sections 1243.1 and 12-13.2, theI 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

6

NYT1559

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION 06/29/2012
Re: 08fl3f2013

 

 

 

 

I Every indication
was that this arrest could "reasonably" involve a violent altercation.
Under such circumstances, it is imperative Executive Managers and SSAs

in the Boston Field Office ensure all personnel wear BPUs in accordance

with the MIOG.

Instruction 1: SAC, Boston will ensure all Special Agents are issued

FBI approved BPUs, and utilize said protective devices during all

planned arrest operations.

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE 

The Inspection Division


Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved.



is responsible for ensuring that each Inspection Instruction/

Inspection Management Unit

IMU maintains an Inspection
Instructions/Recommendations database and provides the INSD Assistant


Instructions!Recommendations.

Director a quarterly report reflecting all outstanding
The review process is not complete until

all Instructions{Recommendations have been satisfactorily resolved.

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector-in-Charge
{110}:

requires further action.

who will determine if the Instruction has been resolved or
Resolution will be based upon specific
actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the division has
If the IIC

determines an Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved,

under consideration or plans to take in the future.
an EC
will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon
resolution, all Instructions/Recommendations will be appropriately

noted in the database.

BBC,
the Instruction in this EC, pages 6 and I,

Boston is required to provide detailed responses addressing
including corrective actions
Each

Observation which results in an Instruction/Recommendation must be

taken and/or intended actions with time frames for completion.

responded to in a one-page, stand alone response. The Observation and

UNCLASSIFIED



NYT-SSO

b7E -5

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BOSTON DIVISION 06/29/2012
Re: 08fl3f2013

related Instruction is to be recited verbatim from the inspection EC,
followed by the division's detailed response {it is not necessary to
repeat the analysis section of the Observation in the response}. If
supporting documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each

response .

All initial and follow?up responses must be sent to the IMU on
plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Inspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room. b5 -1
In addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached ?1

responses, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MPAI

 

 

#9

UNCLASSIFIED

8

NYT-561

 

Date:
Report of:
Case 
Title:

 

 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation .

08x1912015? 

Inspector'Vadim Thomas
2971-HQ-A636201 1

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING 
DENVER. FIELD 
051'081'2015. -

Of?ce: INSD

Investigative Period: - 08/18/2015

I.

Executive Summary

(Wm On at 4:15 pm, Denver FBI SWAT and members of the 'Denver
Field Of?ce Rocky Mountain Safe Streets Task Farce were involved in a shooting
incident while attempting to apprehend Jesus Emmanuel Avilal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(mm 
I On 05(0612015, utilized the
collected items and thel to draft af?davits for a federal arrest warrant for Avila, as well as a
federal court order for al land a federal search warrant to initiate

 

Additional] a SWAT Operations Order was
prepared and a SWAT Warning Order was issued. Orig: the aforementioned federal

warrants and order were signed. The SWAT Operations er was approved contingent upon
the successful location and positive identi?cation of Attila.

(mm 011 

 

the 

established surveillance at?the Essex House Motel, 53 90 Santa Fe Drive, Littleton, Colorado

 

based onl

Avila at the motel. Upon deployment to the area of the Essex House Motel, Denver SWAT

1
UNCLASSIFIEDIM 

[visual con?rmation of

NWT-562

 

b7A -1

-4
h3 -1
-l

-4

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

determined a primary and secondary tactical plan. The primary plan was to call Avila out and
the secondary plan was to breach and hold. When Denver SWAT operators were in place, a call
was placed to Avila?s motel room. Avila answered the telephone and was advised there was a
warrant for his arrest. Avila'was also instructed to exit the room and to follow the instructions of
law enforcement personnel. Avila agreed, but after a period of time, did not exit the room.

Additional unsuccessful attempts were made to telephonically contact Avila. Thereafter, Denver

SWAT operators began shouting commands for ?Avila to exit'the room. Denver SWAT operators
then observed movement in the window area of Avila?s room. Shortly thereafter, the on?scene
commander authorized the SWAT team to breach and hold. Along with six Denver SWAT
Operators, maneuvered into position'and executed the breach. Upon doing
so, two shots were ?red by Avila and a third shot followed seconds later. was struck
in the lower left knee area by one of the ?rst two shots fired and was evacuated ?ow: the scene.
Inasmuch as the door shut immediately after the breach, Denver SWAT operators retreated,
without returning ?re, to areas of cover and awaited further instruction. After approximately 90
minutes with no movement in the room or contact with Avila,l Iinto
Avila?s room. I lit was determined Avila was incapacitated from an
apparent self-in?icted gtm'sh'ot wound. As a precaution, a K-9 was released into the room to
assess a response ?om Avila. After observing no response, Denver SWAT entered the room,
and secured the area and Avila. No Denver Field Of?ce personnel or other law enforcement
personnel ?red a weapon during this incident. SA : was transported to the hospital with a
non?life threatening bullet wound below his le? knee and was expected to make a recovery
after approximately four to six months of physical therapy. 

(Wm The Denver Evidence Response Team processed the scene. Three 9mm shell
casings were recovered as well as a loaded Kel-Tec, 9mm Luger Pistol. Also recovered
was a Sprint LG cellular telephone. The screen image was locked on the webpage ?Firearms:
Shooting yourself; Information on suicide by using a gun.?

On {315)r 1 2(2015, an autopsy was conducted on Avila. Preliminary re5ults
determined the method of death to be a suicide and the cause of death to be a self-in?icted
gunshot wound to the head. 

 

 

 

II. Incident Details
3. Substantive Case Files and Background Information

(WM Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantive 91 case was ripened:

 

Title:

 

 

 

 

File number: I I  

Case Agents: Task Force Officer I
TFOI 

 

2
UNCLASSIFIEDIM

b6 -1,7



-1
?371 -1
b5 -4
-4
b7]! -1

NYT-563

 

 

 

. UNCLASSIFIEDIM

As a result of the Agent?Involved Shooting Denver Field O?ice
opened the folloWing Assault on a Federal Of?cer Investigation:
- . b6 -1
Title: JESUS EMMANUEL . b7C ?1
- 

ASSAULTING, KILLING OR ATTEMPTIN

TO KILL A FEDERAL 

0510322201 5

 

File number: 

Cement: SA:

b. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Shooting Incident

NSACI 

ASA (ASAC) 
SSA On scene commander) 
SA (FBI Denver SWAT Senior Team Leader, Team Two)

Denver SWAT Team Leader, Team Two)

SA Denver SWAT Team One BreacherNictim) 6 4
SA Denver SWAT Team One Cover) MC 4
SA (FBI Denver SWAT Team One Ballistic Shield) - i

. i 3] Denver SWAT Team Two Cover) 

10. BI Denver SWAT Team Two Shield)

11. TFO Denver Police Department Crisis Negotiator)
12. (FBI Denver SWAT Operational medicfERT Leader) -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
 





c. Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

(LU/Feed) From 0le 9/20 15 to determined Jesus Emmanuel
Avila committed or attempted to commit nine bank robberies in the Denver Metropolitan area.
During each robbery, Avila 'produced a demand note requesting money and threatened a weapon.
Avila never displayed a Weapon during the robberies.

(WM On 03f04f2015, the Denver Field Office Rocky Mountain Safe Streets Task

Force 1nv v1 w' 

accounts of MA 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wigner?) On 05106f2015, TFOI _ 1eamed ofa report taken by the
Lakewood Police Department, dated 04099015. 

 

 

b6 ?4
-4
-1

 

 

3
UNCLASSIFIEDIM

NWT-564

 

 



WCLASSIFEDIM

 

 

 

 

(UIEQHQ) From 5 to OSIOEIZDIS, members searched FBI databases
and Avila?s social media accounts in an attempt to determine his whereabouts. Additionally,
they conducted surveillance of land her residence located at
I IColorado. However, they were not able to locate Avila.

 

 

On I:Ithe Denver Field Of?ce obtained a federal: arrest warrant for
Avila, as well as a federal court order for land a federal search
warrant tol The warrants were signed by
the Honorable Michael E. Hagarty, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the District of Colerado.
Additionally, a SWAT Operations Order was approved contingent upon the success?il location I
and positive identi?cation 'of Avila I 

 

(WM) On 030722015, The Denver Field Of?ce prepared an FBI. Law Enforcement
Operation Order for the arrest of Avila atI I-esidence. The Operation Order was
signed by Acting Special A ent in Charge (AJSACN I Denver SWAT Senior
Team Leader briefed the plan andadvised Avilal I

as considered armed and dangerous. STLI  also advised of an incident which
occurred on 031?20f2015 between the Denver Police Department and Avila, in which Avila was
found asleep in a vehicle and became extremely combative with responding of?cers. Avila was
instructed to exit the vehicle and, a?er a verbal con?'ontation with the reSponding of?cers, Avila
was tased twice as'he was forcibly removed from the vehicle by the responding of?cers. A
subsequent search of the vehicle recovered a .380 caliber handgum Avila was incarcerated in the
Denver City Jail and released on 04I14l2015. -

 

lsrLEIwas

(UfZElelIi) On pursuant to al

advised Avila wasIFat the Essex House Motel, 5390 South Santa Fe Drive, Littleton, 

Colorado. Prior to execution of the standing Operational Order from OSIOWZOIS, an
operational brie?ng occurred at a staging area located atl 
Avila was ositively identi?ed at the Essex House Motel by land
STLI:Ireceived verbal approval from Ito execute the standing
Operations Order at the Essex House Motel. During both operational brie?ngs, FBI Denver
SWAT team operators were advised of Avila?s criminal history, the tactical plans, and read the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Deadly Force Policy.

4 .
UNCLASSIFIEDIM

 

 

--1,2
b7C -1,2
-1

b6 -1,4
-1,4
b?E -1,4

NYT-565

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIEEIQ

d. Events Leading Up to the Shooting

 

(oner On once/2015, pursuant toI ISAI 

 

 

 

 

lat the Essex House Motel, 5390 South Santa Fe
Drive, Littleton, Colorado 'at approximately 3:10 p.m.

 

SSAI Supervisor, advised AfSACI:Iofthe?
I INSACI

on the operational and contingency plans, AISACI lapproved the arrest plan and
designated On-scene commander.

(whom SSAI:h-lobilized personnel to the Essex House Motel and

established surveillance. SS roceeded to a staging location near the intersection of
- 

At approximately, 3:14 TFOs I
positively identi?ed Avila as he walked through the motel parking lot in the direction of an
adjacent strip mall. SSAI:Iadvised AISA personnel he wanted to
arrest Avila in the Essex House Motel parking lot on his return. At approximately 3:18 pm,
AJSACI:Iauthorized.the arrest; however, SS determined there were not enough

personnel present to safer effect the arrest. Avila retumed to the motel and entered
Room 235.

 

(WW At approximately 3:25 pm, SSAI:Ibriefed FBI Denver SWAT team
operators at the staging location of the primar tactical option, which was to call out Avila
1' ?tuIFBI Denver SWAT Igave
the final operational brie?ng. The Operation Order and photograph of the subject were

reviewed. All SWAT team operators were aware of the tactical plan and contingencies and the
D01 Deadly Force Policy was read by At approximately 3 :45 the SWAT team

operators departed the staging area to the south side of the Essex House Motel and took their
positions. 

 

 

 

 

e. Shooting Incident Details

(trained) 0n 1 5, at approximately 3:50 TFO certi?ed FBI
Hostage Negotiator, proceeded to the manager?s of?ce of the Essex House Motel. The of?ce
manger connected TF room 235. Avila answered the room telephone and TFO

I:Iidenti?ed himself as law enforcement and advised Avila there was a warrant for his

arrest. TF also advised Avila the motel vvas .surroundedby law enforcement and to

come out of the room and Surrender to?them. Avila res ended in English, ?ok, I am coming out."
Avila did not hang up the room telephone and TFglEe?heard Avila talking to someone

in English, presumably on his cellular telephone. ung up the of?ce telephone and

5.
UNCLASSIFIEDIM

Iordered SWAT to deploy and, after being briefed



h? -1,4
b7C -1-1,4
-1 

 

 

 



advised the team, via the radio channel, Avila had agreed to come out of the room.
After approximately 10 minutes, Avila did not exit the room. TFO made additional
unsuccessful attempts to call Avila on his room and cellular telephone numbers. At
approximately 4:10 Denver SWAT operators, positioned outside of Avila?s room,
attempted to verball call Avila out of the room for approximately five minutes. During the call
out, 3d Denver SWAT operator, observed the curtain move in the window area
of Avila?s room and saw who he believed to be Avila. At a roximately 4:15 
gave the order to ?breach and hold? the room. Mali Denver SWAT operator,
moved into position and executed the breach. As'the door swung open, 3 bserved
'Avila standing directly in front of him. Avila immediately ?red two shots; one struck 

below the left knee area and the other, the ceiling inside the room, in the vicinity of the door
frame. SAI Idid not return ?re and was evacuated to the Casualty Collection Point by SAs
I A third shot was heard from the room seconds later.
Due to the force of the breach, the door bounced off the interior concrete wall and shut almost 
immediately after the breach. Denver SWAT operators retreated without returning ?re, entered
vacant and occupied hotel rooms on opposite sides of room 235 for cover, and awaited further
instructions.

Shorty after the shooting, NSAC assumed Orr?Scene Command. At
approximately 5:00 the LPD established an Incident Command Post. A?et approximately
90 minutes with no movement in the room or contact with Avila, a plan was briefed by FBI
Denver and LPD SWAT  condition. At
approximately 5:52 pm. it was determined
Avila was incapacitated from an apparent self-in?icted gunshot wound to the head. At
approximately 6:23 an LPD was introduced into Avila?s room. The dragged Avila
out of the chair and onto the ?oor. Avila. was unresponsive and the K-9 was called out of the
room by its handler. Denver SWAT entered and cleared the room. No other occupants were in
the room. A loaded handgun was observed approximately six inches from Avila?s body. SA

kicked the-handgun away from Avila?s body, under a chair, and Avila was

secured. enver SWAT Operational Medic, entered the room and observed Avila
and his lnjunes. 8 determined Avila was deceased. - .

 

 

 

 

 

(WM No Denver Field Office rsonnel or other law enforcement personnel ?red a
weapon during this incident. Sdas transported to the hospital with a non-life
threatening bullet wound below his left knee and wasexpected to make a full recovery.

f. Post Shooting Details

(WM 011 0530812015, at approximately 7:00 the Denver Evidence Response
Team (ERT) began to process the scene and concluded at approximately 1:50 am. on
05{09f2015. Three 9mm shell casings were recovered as well as a loaded Kel-Tec, PF-9, 9mm
Luger Pistol. Also recovered was a Sprint LG cellular telephone. The screen image was locked
on the webpage ?Firearms: Shooting yourself; Information on suicide by using a gun."

(WM On 0510812015, at approximately 10:30 Avila?s body was recovered by the
Arapahoe County Coroner?s Of?ce.

6




b6 -1,4
b7C -1 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

The autopsy of Avila was conducted on (Bill/2015 by Coronerl:  b6 -4

M.D., Arapahoe County Office of the Coroner. It was determined Avila Sustained a 137?: '4
perforating gunshot wound to the front forehead at contact range. The manner of death was
"classi?ed as a suicide.

On at a roximately 7:30 pm, SAI: obtained a ~b5 -1 4 3
cellular telephone from Detective?b LPD. The cellular telephone belonged to We '1 4 3
Iwhcr
wimessed the shootin incident item the hotel parking lot, videota ed the incident on his cellular
telephone. Detectivt] obtained the cellular telephone from approxiniately 5:30 pm.
on 0510812015. The telephone number, serial number, and IMEI for the Samsung Galaxy 
cellular telephond Iprovided to Detectivel:lwere: I land

respectively.

(Wm During the SIRT investigation, 10 Signed Sworn Statements and 24 external and
internal interviews were conducted. Interview results were consistent and corroborated the
factual accountin of the shooting incident as well as the cellular telephone camera footage. On
0511312015, SAIilwas released ?'orn the hospital and was expected to make a full recovery b6 -1
following four to six months of physical therapy. 1570 1

 

g. Accounting of Shots Fired

(WM No Denver Field Of?ce personnel or other law enforcement personnel fired a
weapon during this incident. .

(WM Denver ERT recovered three 9mm shell casings from the shooting scene. One
shell casing Was located inside room 235 on the floor next to the front door. A second shell
casing was located inside room 235 on the ?oor next to the 9mm Luger Kel?Tec Pistol. The
final shell casing was located inside room 235 one television shelf.

The Denver ERT recovered two 9mm bullets. One was recovered in the South
ceiling area of room 235, which was consistent with where Avila was believed to have been
sitting when he initiated the self-in?icted gunshot. Another was recovered in the North ceiling
area of room 235, which was consistent with one of the two shots Avila ?red as SA b6 -1
executed the breach. The ?nal bullet was never recovered. The bullet entered 1370 1
lower left knee area and exited through his calf. Denver BRT conducted a search North of the
immediate area for the bullet impact, but the bullet or evidence of the bullet?s impact was not
located or observed. 

h. Subject Information

Name: Jesus Emmanuel Avila
Position: 

Sex: Male

Race: WhitelI-Iispanic
Height: 5?1 1?

Weight: 150

7 .


NWT-568

 

31

 



Hair: Brown

Eyes: Brown

DOB: 01f26I1996
SSAN: 522-959-3294
FBI 182564EH.

(HIM Avila?s criminal history included arrests for felony-burglary, felony damage to
property, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor resisting arrest.

(DIM At the time of the NCIC query, there was an active, warrant for Avila. The 
warrant was issued by the Honorable N?chale E. Hegerty, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the District
of Colorado on for Bank Robbery. 

Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

(HIM All seven members of the Denver SWAT tactical team were wearing their FBI-
issued ballistic helmet as well as their standard issue Level IV SWAT body armor with trauma
plates and FBI identi?cation emblazoned on the front and back of the vest.

Forensic Summary

(WM 011 051'08120'15, at approximately 7:00 pm, the Denver ERT began processing
the'scene of the AIS incident at the Essex House Motel, 5390 South Santa Fe Drive, Littleton,

Colorado. SAI

 

IERT TL, provided a Forensic Summary Casebook-of the

shooting incident. Items recovered ?om room 235 included three 9mm :shell casings, a loaded
Kel~Tec, PF-9, 9mm Luger Pistol, two 9mm bullets, a Sprint LG cellular telephone, and $266 in
US currency. A total of 25 items were collected. Denver ERT concluded processing the scene at
approximately 1:50 am. on 05f09f2015.

(WM On 05f08f2015, the Denver ERT conducted 360 spherical imaging of room 235
at the Essex Heuse Motel, 5390 South Santa Fe Drive, Littleton, Colorado. Denver ERT
identi?ed two holes, two impacts and two trajectories. The trajectories appeared to come from
the location where Avila was believed to have been standing when room 235 was breached and
where Avila was believed. to have been sitting when he initiated the self?in?icted gunshot.

(ll/?9612) An inventory of all evidentiary items recovered ?om the scene and the vehicle
were as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1B1 Cartridge case on floor next to front door.

132 American Eagle; Out?tter receipt on floor, south side'ofbed

?33 KeI-Tec pistol, Model Luger, serial number SR160 on ?oor next to 
deceased . 

lB4 Kyocera cellular telephone (black) on table

IBS Cartridge case - on floor next to Item 3 pistol

136 LG cellular telephone (Sprint) white on table

1B7

 

 

 

Black vest on ?oor, south side of bed next to triatst

- 




b6 -1



-1

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

138 Dark hooded sweatshirt on bed 
139 Black shirt on ?oor behind chair
1310 $265 in US Currency in wallet on table 
1311 Cartridge Case on television shelf 
1312 - 2 black and yellow Stanley screwdrivers -'on north 
1313 1 black and yellow Stanley screwdriver?on south 
1314 Metal lock pick pocket of Item vest
13 -15 $1 in US Currency - on north 
1316 Blue button-up shirt on ?oor next to bed
13 17 Dark jeans - on ?oor next to bed . .
IBIS adagazine containing 3 cartridges and 1 cartridge removed from chamber from Item
- pisto
1319 Green organic matter labeled marijuana table and black backpack
1320 Tools -- under bed -
1321 White plastic wedge north 
1322 White plastic wedge Black backpack
1323 Bullet ceiling on north end of room, associated with trajectory 
1324 Bullet? ceiling on south end of room, associated with trajectory 2
1325 Brown leather wallet, social security card in the name of Jesus Emmanuel Avila (522-
99-3295), Essex House Motel receipt, South Suburban taxi card (blank) - room 235
1326 Black sweat pants, 2 black socks, 2 black shoes, 2 black socks, black sweat pants, 2

 

 

 

black tank tops,-blue jeans (1ight),black back pack, 7 black socks - room 235
k. Medical Summary -

FBI Agent involved in the-shooting:

0n 05/03f2015, at approximately 4:15 SA  : was shot by Avila as he
breached room 235 at the Essex House Motel, 5390 South Santa Fe Drive, Littleton, Colorado.
At approximately 4:20 pm, as transported to the Swedish Medical Center where he
underwent surgery for a non-life threatening bullet wound below his left knee. SA was
released from the hospital 'on 05/ 1.312014.

Subiect:

0n 0510812015, at approximately 6:30 Denver SWAT members made entry
into room 235 at the Essex House Motel, 5390 South Santa Fe Drive, Littleton, Colorado. Avila
was unresponsive and appeared to suffer from a self-in?icted gunshot wound to the head. SA

Denver SWAT Operational Medic, entered the room and observed Avila and his
i_nj uries. !detennined Avila was deceased. At approximately 10:30 pm, Avila?s
body was recovere the Arapahce County Coroner?s Of?ce. 

An autopsy of Avila was conducted on use 1f2015 by Coronerl: 

M.D., Arapahoe County Of?ce of the Coroner.. It was determined Avila sustained a
pa crating gunshot wound to the front forehead at contact range. The manner of death was
classi?ed as a suicide.

9 .


NYT-57O

 

 



Shooting Incident Review Team Details

The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following
personnel: 

Inspector-in-Charge (HG) Vadim D. Thomas

Inspector Peterson 

Team Leader I 135 1
I b7c 
Assistant InapectOI-in-Place 

AIIP 

AJIP
AIIP
MIR
AIIP
AIEP


 

 

 

 

hr. The FBI Denver Evidence Response Team (ERT) Personnel:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ERT TL: . b6 -1
ERT: photo Log) . ?1
BET: Sketcher) .
ERT:  (Evidence) 
ERT: (Evidence)
ERT: I(Evidence)
Photographerd K360 Spherical)
Photographer:l
ERT TL: I ..
ERT: 

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

(WW) 0n 051?08/2015, INSD AssiStant Director Nancy McNamara was noti?ed via the
PEP-s Strategic Infonnation and Operations Center of the AIS. InSpec?tor Vadim D. Thomas 135 -1
spoke with Denver Field Of?ce arrange logistics prior to the WC ?1
arrival in Denver. .

(Wm 0n05f09f2015, the SIRT traveled to Denver. Upon arrival, Ins ectors Thomas
and Ks? Peterson met with Denver EM, well as ASACs:

I On OSIIOIZOIS, Inspectors Thomas and Peterson met ASACs b6 -1 8
to formerly explain the SIRT process and protocols. During the meeting, the 1370 ?1 3
Denver Field Office showed the SIRT a cellular telephone video of the incident. The video was
taken by : a private citizen. ~Inspector Thomas also met with the involved FBI

10


NWT-571

 

 

 

 

 



UNCLASSIFIEDJTEGEQ

Agents to explain the SIRT process and protocols. The Denver Field Of?ce submitted a PD-
1015, Executive Situation Report. -

wasted) On 0511112015, the SIRT viewed the shooting scene at the Essex House Motel,
5390 South Santa Fe Drive, Littleton, Colorado. Additionally, Inspector Thomas spoke with
First Assistant, United States Attorney (FAUSA), United States Attorney?s Of?ce
A Denver, Colorado. FAUS dvised the USAO was aware of the circumstances
surrounding the AIS and declined any prosecution.

(UHEDHIZD On 0511212015, [nepector Thomas spoke with Chief Doug Stevens of the
Littleton Police Department (LPD). Chief Stevens advised the LPD would assist the FBI should
the FBI request assistance, but LPD had no investigative interest in the AIS which occurred on
Additionally, Chief Stevens advised-LPD would not seek any prosecution with the
18m Judicial District Attorney?s Of?ce. Inspector Thomas also Spoke with Chief De ut District
Attome or the 18H1 Judicial District of Colorado. Chief DeputyIL:l
advised the 18 Judicial District of Colorado had no interest in investigating or prosecuting
anyone related to the AIS incident.

(U1339611) The SIRT conducted 34 interviews, of which twenty-three were of Denver Field
Of?ce personnel and nine were of external law enforcement. Ten of the,23 Denver Field Of?ce

 

obtained from sad

 

 

 

I-The Agents interviewed via signed an
FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information Following 9.
Shooting Incident). The remaining interviews were documented via 

(U1r On 05f13t'2015, Inspector Thomas provided an exit brief to AISAC I
I as well as Assistant United States AttornevJ United States
Attorney's Of?ce for the District of Colorado, Major .Crimes Division. AISA was also

provided with a copy of the SIRT Report.

 

V. Administrative

3. Firearms Training

(UHEBEQ) On 0511212015, Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI),

 

 

 

 

 

Denver Field Of?ce, provided copies of Firearms Information, Registration and Shooter
Tracking (FIRST) reports pertaining SAI ISAI land The quali?cations

 

 

scores were for the period of 12/04/2013 through OSIOIUZOIS. The aforementioned SAs were all
current and in compliance with ?rearms quali?cation requirements. -

1). Deadly Force Training

In November of 2014, the Denver Field Of?ce provided FBI Deadly Force
Policy Training during mandatory quarterly legal training brie?ngs. The trainings were

11 
UNCLASSIFIEIMCEQHQ:

WWI-572

?1,3
are ?1,3
b6 -1
are ?1

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIEBEQ

conducted by Chief Division Counsel memorialized in case
identification number 3333-DN-69506, serial S4. FBI Deadly Force Policy Training was also
conducted in November 2013 by CDCI:Iduring Denver Fieid O?ice mandatory quarterly
legal training briefmgs. The trainings were memorialized in case identi?cation number 
69506, serial 42. bompleted
mandatory annual Deadly Force Training in FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014, with the exception of SA

I:Iin FY 2013.
rovided Denver Field Of?ce SWAT training records

 

(Utmost?) On 05x131201 s, sn :b
pursuant to the review of the AIS on 05(0812015 at the Essex House Motel, 5390 South

Santa Fe Drive, Littleton, Colorado: A review of the records provided indicated all members of
the FBI Denver SWAT, including the seven SWAT members involved in the AIS incident on
QSIUBIEOIS, were Basic SWAT certi?ed.

c. DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision

(Ii/rseecn On uses/2015, via email, Deputy Chief]: D05, Civil Rights Division,
Criminal Section, provided Inspector Thomas a prosecutorial declination for FBI Agents. 
involved 'in the AIS on 05/03f2015. In the email, Deputy ChiedeiSed, upon review of the
Inspection Division Executive Summary, the Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, declined
prosecution of the matter.

(Hi/Been) On osn USAO, Denver Colorado forwarded,
via email, a prosecutive declination to Inspector Thomas. FAUS advised the USAO
was aware of the circumstances surrounding the 05/03! 2015 AIS and declined any prosecution.

(1. Local Prosecutorial Decision

(UHEQHQ) 0n Deputy District Attorney, 1 8'11 Judicial
District, Denver, Colorado: forwarded, via email, a prosecutive declination to Inspector Thomas.
Chief Depu advised the IS1th Judicial District of Colorado had no interest in
investigating? or prosecutng anyone related to the 05/08f2015 AIS incident.

 

VI. Inspector?s Draft Observations: There were no-observations noted 

 

-
. .

 OFFIGIELEDHD
I t:
- Mm hp. 
on"! urn.

    

 

(REEF. 5-3-l 0)

  

UNCLASSIFIEDIM
til: Ill\!lEEi1rltallanCIll

Electra-Illa comm unlaatlun

  

Title; (ufignegg Shooting Incident Report . Date: 03l03f2015

From; BALTIMORE


Contact: _b5 -1

?1

 

 

 

Approved By:-

 

 

 

 

Drafted Ey:  - I I

 

Case ID '(UJ_Baltimore Animal Shooting

Synopsis: To report results of a review of an animal
shooting incident'inVolving SA which occurred b5 ?1
December 25, 2014 b7c -1

Package Copy: (UXEFBEQE The ?ollowing original documents are being
placed in FD-340 envelopes and mailed to Inspection Division:

Original Signed Sworn Statement (sea) of sal 
dated January 2, 2915, maintained in a envelope

Original Fla?927 signed by dated December 31, 2014,
maintained in a FD-340 envelope -

containing original interview notes and records

4.) containing a sketch and CD with digital photos of the scene

Details:,

 

(UXZEEHQE On December 26, 20l4, SAI [discharged two b6 ?1
rounds from his FBI?approved personally owned weapon Glock 26 at a 57C ?1
Great Dane.which charged at him and attacked the miniature schnauzer he
was walking. The shooting incident review was delegated to the
Baltimore field office by the Chief Inspector on December 26,
2014. Following are the results of the shooting incident review, which
included a 553 from BA Evidence Response Team 
processing the scene, and coordination with the Anne Arundel County
Police Department (AACPD). - 1

womesrsr?oj/Em?



 

 

 

 



Title: Shooting Incident Report 
Re: 03f03f2015

On the morning of December 26, 2814, SAI I b5 -1,2
was miniature schnauzer on a trail near his. b7c "1'2
residence at  I 

At approximately 11:15 AM, the miniature schnauzer
approached a footbridge on the trail, and at the time 
noticed a woman,  I with a large dog, a Great Dane, on the
bridge walking toward wait for
her and the Great Dane to exit the bridge before he proceeded any
further. to the rightmost part of the path near the
entrance to the bridge with theeschnauZer on a leash. The leash was
held in left hand and looped around hisaleft wrist.

 

 

 

 

 

exit the bridge and while she and b5 '1r2
the Great Dane were approximately 15 feet from where b7c '1'2
the Great Dane lnnged at the schnauzer and The Great Dane,
which had been on a leash, off her feet and broke free
from her, causing her to fall and lie on the floor of the bridge. The
Great Dane charged towards the schnaUZer and 
immediately began attacking the schnauzer by biting it. While the
schnauzer was being attacked, it remained on the leash which was still
held in saI?Ie left hand _and attached to his left wrist. an

I Istepped back off the path onto the grass and turned his body
to the left in an attempt to pull the schnauzer away from the attacking
dog. The Great Dane continued to attack the schnauzer. The'attack
lasted a few, short seconds.

Due to the aggressive_and unpredictable nature of the
attack, for his safety because he believed any b5 '1
motion on his part, or any attempt'to physically stop the attack, would ?1
result in the Great Dane turning its attack onto him. 
tall and weighs While standing on its four legs, the
Great Dame's back was level with SA 5 hips and it weighed
approximately 130 lbs.

(UKZEBHQI Fearing for his safety, FBI?approved
personally owned weapon from an inside the waistband holster and fired



_2



 

 

 



Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re: 03f03f2015

two rounds. Using his right hand, a single handed grip b5 "1:2

with the pistol pointed in a downward direction away from the walking b7? '1'2

path toward the Great Dane which stood approximately one foot from SA

After two rounds, the Great Dane released
its bite of the schnauzer and walked back was
still lying on the floor of the bridge. SAI  holstered his

?weapon, retreated backwards onto the walking path and identified
himself as a law enforcement officer.

911 from his FBI?issued mobile phone b5 ?1
and identified himself as a FBI Special Agent to the dispatcher while we '1
AACPD officers were en route to'the scene. At 11:20 AM, AACPD officers
arrived on scene and himself. With AACPD
officers on scene, his acting supervisor, AISSA
the Newark Field Office (NK) to report the incident.

Soon thereafter, calls from NK Chief Division

NK Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
and men 

In the presence of AACPD, his magazine- b5 '1
from his pistol and counted the ammunition remaining. The round count '1
of 10 confirmed he had fired two rounds of ammunition. Prior to the
shooting, the magazine, which had a capacity for 11 rounds, had been
full and the_weapon had been topped off with a round in the chamber
accounting for 12 rounds of ammunition. Upon inspection after the
shooting, the magazine contained nine rounds, and the chamber of the
weapon contained one round. surrendered his weapon,
magazine, and all ammunition to at the scene, and was
issued a replacement weapon, magazine, and ammunition.

Pictures of the scene were taken by AACPD and a sketch was
completed by BA ERT. Two spent shell casings were recovered at the
scene by and no spent rounds were recovered at the scene. A post
mortem exam was performed on the Great Dane by a veterinarian from Anne
Arundel County Animal Control. The veterinarian report noted the Great
Dane had two bullet holes in the skin on-the dog?s right side



_3

NYT3576

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDXM

Title: Shooting Incident Report
Re: 03/03f2015

approximately mid thorax and one on the left side, also mid thorax.

The Great Dane died as a result of "life ending bleeding" from a bullet
which entered through the right side of the Great Dane and punctured
the vena cava at its entry point into the heart. No bullets were
located in the Great Dane's body and a radiographic examination was
unavailable.

On December 30, 2014, one spent round which was lodged in
the schnauzer was recovered by SSAI lat the b6 -1
Emergency Veterinarian Clinic, 32 Mellor Avenue, Catonsville, Maryland 57C '1
21228. The weapon, magazine, ammunition, two spent shell casings, and
one spent round were delivered'to the Defensive Systems Unit by BA SA

February 27,2{115z
(HIM On January 3, 2015, Detective : of the AACPD b6 -1,3,4

advised the local from Maryland's State's b7C _1r3r4
Attorney?s Office, is not likely to pursue charges against 
but is withholding final determination until a review of the which
ShZIp?rovided to the FBI is completed. has closed their
investigation of the shooting incident. On January 23, 2015, the 
was provided to AAEPD with a FBI Letterhead Memorandum for
nondisclosure of the On February 4,_2015, BA 
notification of the Shooting InCident 
First Assistant U.S. Attorney's Office of Maryland. On
February 26, 2015, AACPD Assistant State's Attorney
with the owner of.the deceased Great Dane and advised
the owner no charges are being filed against for his
involvement in the animal shooting. 

 

The following reports_and applicable FD-302s were
completed and uploaded via Sentinel to the captioned file. The original
notes and records for all interviews were packaged in envelopes
and sent to-Inspection Division. 

l. Shooting Incident Report, electronically submitted,
A scanned and serialized on January 12, 2015.

 

 

2. of PFII Iregarding records b5 '1
. ?1

4



 

 

 

 



Title: {U/Zzoeoi?Shooting Incident Report
-Re: 03/03x2015

the 24?month period before the shooting b5 '1r2r4
incident . 137': _1 2 4
3. FD-302 of NK Assistant Division 
Deadly Force Policy training. 
4. for an interview of witness
5. Electronic Communication which contained the weather
records Maryland on December 26, 2014.
for contact with AACPD provided the
. AACPD Report and witness statements of the incident.
FD-302 of Public affairs the
media reports of the shooting incident. -
8. for contact with AACPD provided the
Anne Arundel County Animal Control Bost Mortem report of the Great
Dane. -

Baltimore's review of the shooting incident involving SA
found no substantive discrepancies between b5 '1
account of the shooting, the information obtained from witness ch _1
interviews, and the AACPD report or the incident. The results of the
investigation have been coordinated with BA CDCI I

 

 

40?

rev?578

 

 

  

(REV. 5-3-10}

/E>e1ii 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: Baltimore Animal Shooting Date: 04f09f2015
Incident 12f26f2014

 

CC: b6 -1
h7C -1

 

 

 

NK-SAC (SAC)

From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY

Contact:

 

 

 

Approved By: David Paul Gelios
TWERSKY RONALD
AKAD TWERSKY RONALD

 

b6 -1

Drafted By:
?1

 

Case ID Baltimore Animal Shooting

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

Synopsis: Following the Shooting Incident Review Group
meeting held on 03/17/2015, this communication was prepared to
furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
respect to the captioned shooting incident.

Administrative Notes: Reference Shooting Incident Report
submitted electronically on 01/02/2015 by ssa :  b6 ?1

Baltimore Field Office. ?1

Details:

On l2/26/20l4, at approximately ll:l5 BA:
from the Newark Field Office was involved in a
shooting incident in: Maryland. SA I:Iwas TDY



NYT1579



Title: Baltimore Animal Shooting Incident 12/26/2014
Re: 

to Ouantico as a Firearms Instructor and visiting family members

in Maryland during the federal holiday on Friday, 12/26/2014.

Soon after arriving at residence, bE-?
offered to walk Miniature Schnauzer dog. During hTC'i
the course of the walk, a Great Dane dog broke loose from its

handler, lunged at and attacked the Miniature

Schnauzer. Fearing for his safety during the attack, 
discharged two 9 mm rounds from his personally owned weapon (POW)

Glock 26 into a Great Dane dog.

immediately moved to a position of safety, b?'i
administered medical assistance to the Schnauzer, offered the dog b7c i
handler medical assistance to the Great Dane, and called 911 to

report the shooting. The Great Dane expired from blood loss

shortly after the two shots. then contacted his

chain of command in the Newark Field Office and in coordination

with the Inspection Division, the shooting incident was delegated

to the Baltimore Field Office on 12/26/2014.

Baltimore's delegated Shooting Incident Review Team

(SIRT) processed the scene of the shooting incident jointly with

the Anne Arundel County Police Department. The weapon, magazine,
ammunition, shell casings and one projectile were properly passed

to Quantico for further analysis. remained on?site b5 ?1
until released upon completion of the local investigation. b7c-i

The Maryland State's Attorney's Office declined
prosecution. The USAO advised no federal prosecutive opinion was
necessary inasmuch as there was no applicable federal violation

SIRG Observations:

(UHEQEEZ) On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved
shooting incident with the intent to:



2

NYT158O



Title: Baltimore Animal Shooting Incident l2/26/2Ul4
Re: U4f09/2015

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG
unanimously determined the application of deadly force by SA
12/26/2014, was in compliance with the Department of 

Justice's deadly force policy. h7c'i

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint. The SIRG made no observations concerning
this shooting incident.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed ne
cessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken
against as a result of his involvement in this b6 -1
shooting incident. b?c'i

Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD,
chaired the meeting and was a non?voting Board Member. The
following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector
David P. Gelios, Office Of Inspections (OI), Deputy Chief
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section,Department

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of Justice ICriminal Section, 
Supervisory Special Agent IInvestigative
Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSAI I Squad

 

Washington Field Office; Unit Chief I be _1 3
Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSAI I 

Training Unit, Special

Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

Response Group; SSAI I Violent Crime and Gang
Section; SSAI [Befensive Systems 
Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; SSAI I Evidence

 

 

 

Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following non?voting
members were also in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

3

NYT1581



Title: Baltimore Animal Shooting Incident l2/26/2Ul4
Re: 

Chargel Office Of Inspector General; b?'d

I I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; bTC'i
Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff,
OI, Assistant Inspectors/Team Leadersl I

 

 

 

 

I OI, land
Management Program (MAPAs)

I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), MAPAI I
Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistantl I

OI, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

00



4

NYT-582

 

FD-263 (Rev. 10-13-2012}

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REPORTING OFFICE OFFICE OF ORIGIN DATE INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
FBII-IQ - INSD FBIHQ 0410412013 04l05l2013 04!08f2013
TITLE OF CASE REPORT MADE BY TYPED BY
Shoutmg Inqu - IIC Dena Elaine Choncair 
Report of Shootmg Ineldent CHARACTER OF CASE .
Cincinnati Field Of?cefDayton Resident Agency . . .
0 M) 49013 . Shootlng Incldent ReVIew
REFERENCES: 
Tele hone call on 041042013 to the Chief Inspector, Inspection Division from Acting SAC
I I 136 ?1
-1

 
  

 
 
 
 

ASSISTANT

DEECTOR DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

      
  

 


I
1 Inspection (Arm: SIRT)
INSD (297-HQ-A127I286-D



i

 
 
 

Notations

Reed.

 
 
   
 
 

How Fwd.

 

COVER PAGE

NYT-583

 

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 07l30f2013
Report of: HG Dena Elaine Choucair Of?ce: 
Case 297-HQ-A1271236-D

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT 
FIELD RESIDENT AGENCY
U4f04f2013

Investigative raise: 04IOSI2013 - 04r08I2013

 

A. SYNOPSIS

 On April 4, 2013, at approximately 3:05pm, FBI Special Ag??tsI:

were
conducting a surveillance on a Southern Ohio Safe Streets Task Force (SOSSTF) investigation.

lDuring the surveillance the A ents observed multiple
hand to hand drug deals by the subjects from their vehicle, al I The
Agents followed the subjects? vehicle to a drive-thru beverage store known as the Beverage

 

 

 

Palace located at 3980 Kingsridge Drive, Dayton, Ohio. As this was an enclosed area, the 

Agents felt this would be the safest opportunity to apprehend the subjectsl I



Ias Agentsl Iexited the
?'ont vehicle, the subjects attempted to escape by reversing out of the drive-thru and crashing
into SAI Is vehicle. The subjects then accelerated forward ramming SAs

I Is vehicle. SA narrowl escaped being hit by the subjects'
vehicle and believed his partner at the rear, had already been struck by the vehicle.
SA feared for his safety and those around him. As the subjects? vehicle continued to
inove, SA ?red four rounds from his FBI SWAT Spring?eld handgun at the threat.
The driver of the subject vehicle, ennaine Clemente Coleman Jr. was shot and died of multiple
gunshot wounds while en-route to the heapital. I Iwas shot
once in the shoulder andI I was uninjured. The scene was
processed by Cincinnati ERT, Pittsburgh ERT (total statiOn) and members of the LSRT. Several
bags of drug capsules, later identi?ed as heroin, were found inside the vehicle, but no weapons
were found in the vehicle or on the subjects.

 

 

h? 
b7C -1NYT-SS4

 

 

 

 

 

B. DETAILS

0n 04r04r2013, Agents ?ora the Cinchmati Field Of?ce, Dayton RA were
participating in a surveillance supporting the SOSSTF. The surveillance targets
- Iwhose participants were known to distribute heroin in the Dayton, Ohio
AOR and who were prone to violence. Law enforcement in Dayton, Ohio is subject to a ?no-
pursuit? policy. Gang members in the AOR are aware of this policy and exploit it on a regular
basis to evade arrest or detention.

 

 

 

(re?ned) The surveillance was initiatedl 
I Ohio. Participating in the surveillance were Agents] I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Coordinator),  I
andI I Also participating were SOSSTF I
and 
surveillance was to

 

 

 

I Both were known to have outstanding state arrest warrants for
violent crimes. On 4/0312013, the day before the shooting incident,I:Ihad evaded police
as the attempted to arrest him. The morning surveillance on 04JO4I2013 was to re-locate

The surveillance lasted from] Iwith negative results, so the team
members separated to perform other duties.

 

 

At approximately 2:30 pm, driving a? with
SA as his passen er, drove to the area near the Dayton Mali. SA driving a

 

I with SA as his assen er, had received intelligence from a
(II-IS, managed by Detectivel I indicating were selling drugs in the
area. Using the intelligence ?rm the CH8, SAI  identi?ed aI
occupied by  - with a third male, subsequently identi?ed as Jermaine
Clemente Coleman In, driving in he parking lot of the Penn Station Restaurant, 8927
Kingsridge Drive, Dayton, Ohio. SA itnessed three hand-to-hand drug transactions
occur from the vehicle. At approximately 3:00 pm, th departed the parking
lot, North on Kingsridge Drive and pulled into the parking lot of the Beverage Palace at 3900
Kingsridge Drive, Dayton, Ohio. The Beverage Palace was a convenience store with drive-thin
service whereby vehicles enter at the rear of the building, drive through a garage width tunnel
and order requested items ?om an employee who delivers the items to the vehicle. The vehicle
then exits through the front of the store facing Kingsridge Drive.

 

 

 

drove into the Beverage Palace arking lot to determine if he.
could witness additional drug transactions and discovered the had entered the drive-thru
portion of the Beverage Palace. Ihad brief radio communication

b7A -1

b6 -1,4,7
-1,4,7
-6

b6 -1,7
b7C 
b7E -E

 

whereby they determined the wouldl
and effect an grrest. I

b6 

 

bic -1,7
-l

 

 

As soon as SA

drove into the drive~thru, Coleman immediately reversed direction and rapidly
accelerated into SAI '5 vehicle which had followed th
time of impact, SA was in the process of exiting the vehrc and was hit in the upper

 

 

into the drive?thru. At the

NYT-SBS

 

 

 

 

torso by the door at irnpact. Coleman then-put the Elm drive and rapidly accelerated

towards vehicle.
1M while exitin 
d; vehicle and the door strike 

vehicle, saplyeued FBI, get down!? Thinking 3
injured and arin Serious bodily injury to himself and injury to 
?red a shot at th which de?ected off the door ?ame. SA recognized he may
have been engaged in a cross-?re situation with A ents behind the and moved closer to
thel I Inoticed the passenger reach under his seat and around the
passenger side door and believed he was reaching for a weapon. Smen noticed
Coleman turn to .look over his right shoulder, as if intending to drive backwards toward SA
5 vehicle a ain. Fearing the vehicle would cause additional serious bodily injury to SAs
g?I SAI I?red two rounds through the front windshield of the
I Iobserved one of the rounds impact Coleman in the side but it did not stop
his actions.  determined the windshield had deflected his rounds and moved
towards the open driver side window and ?red one round at Coleman through the on window.
This round struck Coleman in the back and the vehicle stopped moving. SA assessed
the immediate threat to be over as had stopped moving and the velnc came to a stop.
a total of four rounds during the incident.

   
    
 

 

(Wm Ipulled Coleman out of the vehicle and placed him in the prone
position behind the vehicle. I Ihad exited the vehicle and were responding to
commands by the other Agents. TFO 'ved on scene approximately 30 seconds after
the shootin incident and assisted in securing the subjects and providing medical assistance to
Coleman. baa handcuffed, searched, and determined to be uninjured.  : was
handcuffed, searched, and determined to have been shot in the left shoulder.

(WM Approximately three minutes and 20 seconds after the shooting incident SA

arrived on scene and provided medical attention to   is a trained FBI
medic. At about this time, of?cers ?'om the Miami Township Police Deparnnent also arrived on
scene.

 

(WW Approximately six minutes and 15 seconds after the shootin incident,
Emergency Medical Services personnel arrived on scene to treat Coleman an
Coleman was transported to the hos-:ital ambulance approximately eight minutes and 10
seconds after the shooting incident. was transported to the hospital by ambulance
approximately nine minutes and 45 seconds after the shooting incident. Coleman was declared
dead the hospital approximately 36 minutes after the shooting incident.  :]was treated for
his wound and detained on federal charges of assault on a federal of?cer and heroin distribution.

as also detained on federal charges of assault on a federal of?cer and heroin

distribution.

 

b6 -1,7
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NYT-586

 

 

 

SUBSTANTIVE CASE FILES

(Wm The following substantive matter was under investigation at the time of the
shooting incident on 04f04f2013:

 

 

 

 

(Um After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

JERMAINE CLEMENTE COLEMAN, JR 

 

 

 

 

eta!



D. ENCLOSURES

(WW All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the
Appendix.

E. ADMINISTRATIVE

(Him The Shooting Incident Review Team was composed of the following

personnel:

Inspector-in?Charge (IIC) Dena Elaine Choucair
Inspector-in?Place (IIP) Trent R. Teyerna

Assistant InspectorfTeam Leader (AWL):
AUTH I

Assistant In5pector-in-Place 

All?
All?
AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

 

 

 

F. SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW PROTOCOL

(Wm All members of the SIRT reviewed the FBI produced videotape entitled,
?The Rain after the Storm Shooting Incident Investigations,? and the Shooting Review
Protocol.

 

to arrange logistics for the SS

I Dayton RA (DRA) served
as the point of contact for the SIRT.

 

 

Val/153m) 0n IIC Choucair, IIP Teyema, mm land
AIIP ?ew from Washington DC to Cincinnati, Ohio where they were met by SSA

land MEN transported to the DRA.

 

On 04ID4I2013, IIC Choucair communicated with Cincinnati NYT-587

 

 

 

 

 

turmeric) IIC Choucair provided a brie?ng to SSRA
I ISSAI land CDCI Ito discuss INSD SIRT shooting
incident protocol. During this brie?ng, Iarrived at the DEA.
After this brie?ng, SSRAI:]briefed the SIRT on the shooting incident of 0410412013.
There was an opporhmity for dialogue between the SIRT and the involved personnel to address
concerns, provide clari?cation, and answer questions prior to the investigation commencing.
The SIRT was then taken to the shooting scene where they were met by viewed
the scene while it was being processed by Cincinnati ERT and personnel from the Laboratory
Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT).

(Ui?tlFGIE-ljl During the SIRT investigation, four Signed Sworn Statements were
taken from SA directly involved in the shooting, and the three Agents present
at the shooting, IAll
Agents were represented Esq. Other interviews, events, and observations
Were documented via FD-3025. mtervlewed FBI personnel were allowed to read the FD-302
summarizing their interview to con?rm the accuracy of the information provided. The and
interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily. An Fill-927 (Warning and Assurance to
Employee Requested to Provide Information Following 3. Shooting Incident) was executed by all
those interviewed.

 

(UILEQHQ) On 04:0832013, no Choucair and 11? Teyema met with the Assistant us.
Attorneys  Ito brief them on results of the SIRT investigation.
IIC Choucair and HP Teyerna had personally informed of the Prosecuting
Attorney?s Office for Montgomery County, Ohio about the shooting incident and spoke with her
again telephonically. I:Iadvised her of?ce would not review the shooting incident, and
would not pursue any state charges pertaining to the incident. nly provided a verbal
declination but nothing written, as to do so would require presenting the matter to a Grand Jury.

On 04l09t'2013, an exit brief was rovided IIC Choucair to AISAC
SSRAI ISSA 

G. PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE SHOOTING

 

 

 

 

Ehl

SA I(?red weapon)

SA
SA
SA
SA

 

 

 

 

TFOS

Montgomery County Sheriff?s Of?ce

Dayton Police Department

 

 

Fi?-588

b6 -1
-1

b6 -1,2
-1,2

b6 -3,4
?3 

 

 

 

 

H. FIREARMS TRAINING

(WM FBI Cincinnati provided quali?cation records for SA: A
review of the records indicated he was current on his ?rearms quali?cation certi?cation.

I. DEADLY FORCE TRAINING

Documentation provided by the Cincinnati Field Of?ce indicated SA
eceived training on the FBI Deadly Force Policy ?om the previous CDCJ I
on During a SIRT interview, current CDC dicated the
Cincinnati Field Of?ce Principal Firearms Instructor read the deadly,r force policy to all Agents
prior to conducting each ?rearms session.

winner? SA :Iadvised in his he last read the FBI Deadly Force training
on 03f28i'2013 prior to a planned arrest operation in which helparticipated.

J. USE OF BODY ARMOR AND LAW ENFORCENIENT IDENTIFIERS

(WM The SIRT team determined through interviews, and by viewing the
surveillance video of the shooting incident, the four Agents involved were all wearing ballistic

body armor, however proper FBI or law enforcement identi?ers were not appropriater displayed

en the vests.

(Wm Agent and witness interviews indicated Agents did identify themselves
as FBI prior to engaging the subjects in the shooting.

K. FBI INDICIES AND NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER CIC
The SIRT was provided with the results of the National Crime Information

Center warrant and arrest record check for Coleman,  ]which indicated
active state arrest warrants at the time of the incident:

 

 

1) Jermaine Clemente Coleman Jr. Improperly discharging a ?rearm at or into a

habitation.

 

l? Vehicular Assault

31:? Possession of Heroin

L. ERT AND LABORATORY DIVISION REPORTS

 

The scene of the shooting was secured and processed by CI ERT and the

LSRT to include the use of total station, 360 degree spherical photography and laser scanning of

the site.

(WM Recovered evidence items requiring iaboratory testing were as follows
(evidence was maintained i 

1135 - .45 cal Spring?eld Pistol, sml: 

NYT-SBQ

 

117': -1
137151. -1

 

1B6 - One Magazine, McCormick Custom LLC, containing three .45ca1
rounds and one round recovered ?om chamber

11316 - One bullet fragment

11329 - Two bullet fragments

1B65 - Bullet and Foam

1370 - Shell casing

1B74 - Shell casing a

1383 - Shell casing

11384 - Shell casing

Projectiles recovered from hospital

(U) Operational Projects Unit, Laboratory Division (LD) provided with a compact
disk containing three dimensional imaging of the shooting scene as well as embedded spherical
photography and video captured from the Beverage Palace security system.

(U) Additionally the Firearmszooimark Unit, LD provided 1NSD with a shooting
reconstruction and ?rearms testing reports which are included in Tab IX of this report.

M. MEDICAL REPORT

(WEI-396) On April 5, 2013, FBI bserved an autopsy performed
of Jermaine Clemente Coleman Jr. at the Montgomery County Coroner's Of?ce, 361 West Third

Street, Dayton, Ohio, 45402. The autopsy was performed by Doctor his
assistants.

(WM) SA Iarrived and entered the examination room at approximater 8:34
am. Coleman was on the table and being assessed by During the course of the
autopsy, DrEIidenti?ed two bullet wounds on Coleman's back and recovered two bullets
from inside Coleman's body.

 

(WM Dr. dvised one of the bullets entered Coleman's body in the upper
center back, just below the neck line. It traveled in.a left to right direction and was recovered a
few inches to the right of the wound, just below the skin. The other bullet entered Coleman's
body,?r in the upper left back, near the le? shoulder. It traveled in a left to right direction and was
recovered from or near the right pectoral muscle. The bultet traveled through the left upper
second rib, left upper lung, and braciocephalic (BC) trunk of the heart. It bruised the right upper
lung and stopped between the first and second right ribs. damage sustained to
the "lungs and BC were the most signi?cant and lead to death. X?rays were taken and did
not identify any additional bullets or bullet fragments inside Coleman?s body. Fingerprints were
taken of Coleman, which positiver identi?ed him. Toxicology.r tests revealed acute marijuana
intoxication and the presence of chlorpheniramine and hydrocodone.

N. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION

(Wm On 04(061'2013, IIC Choucair contacted :] Special Legal
Counsel, D01 and briefed him on the shooting incident.

git/Feed) 0n 04f17f2013, IIC Choucair, mu: and slammed

at his of?ce, 601 Street, NW, Washington, DC and provided him with a binder
containing pertinent documentation identi?ed by the SIRT regarding this incident.-

NW-SQG

 

1:6 .1:4
-1,4

b6 -4
-4

b5 -1,3
b7C -1,3

 

 

 

 (HIM) On IIC Choucair with an email message 135 - 3
i indicating no federal criminal investigation would be sought in this matter. ?3

i 0. LOCAL PROSECUTIVE OPINION

(Ulg%) On 04l08l2013, IIC Choucair made contact telephonically with Attorney

 

the Prosecuting Attorney's Of?ce for Montgomery County, Ohio who 136- - 4 7"
provided a verbal declination and advised her of?ce would not review the shooting incident as 137?? '4 7
the US Attorney?s Of?ce had ?led charges against  [for Assault on a

 

Fe deral- Of?cer.
P. OBSERVATIONS
(UIEBULQ) The following observations were noted:

Observation 1: The arrest scenario resulting in the shooting incident did
not have an approved operations plan and participants did not display visible FBI markings.

(Ill/2360:) Analysis 1: A review of substantive case: and Agent 1071?: -1
interviews determined Operations plans associated with arrests for this investigation were used

inconsistently. it was further learned through interviews and signed sworn statements not all of
the Agents engaged in this incident understood if they were on a surveillance mission or an arrest
operation. The Case Agent also failed to obtain executive management authorization to conduct
the arrest. 

(UllEQisl?j DIOG Section 19.3.] provides policyr guidance as it pertains to warrantiess
arrests for federal crimes:

(0) Whenever possible, SAC and USAO authority must be obtained before making a
warrantless arrest. Agents are authorized to make warrantless arrests for any federal crime
(felony or misdemeanor) committed in their presence. Agents also have authority to make
warrantiess felony arrests for a crime not committed in the presence of the Agent iftlrere is
probable cause to believe the person to be arrested committed a federal ?lony. A warrantless
arrest must only be made when sound judgment indicates obtaining a warrant would unduly
burden the investigation or substantially increase the potential for danger or escape.

(mm From a safety perspective the use of lights and sirens and visible markings
on ballistic vests or other outer coverings increases the safety to Agents as it alerts subjects,
bystanders or other law enforcement of an ongoing investigation.

A review of video surveillance obtained at the shooting scene indicated two
employees of the Beverage Palace were inside the store at the time of the incident. It is
incumbent Upon FBI Agents to censider the safety of innocent bystanders in any operation. The
presence of the store clerks should have warranted additional safety considerations.

Recommendation 1.1: SAC, Cincinnati should ensure operations plans are
written and approved prior to arrests.



 

 

 

(WM Recommendation 1.2: SAC, Cincirmati should ensure Agents display
visible FBI markings on ballistic vestsand outer garments.

Observation Cincinnati Field Of?ce, Dayton RA, improperly utilized
investigatio? Eo targe? I

(WM) Observation 2.2: Cincinnati Field Of?ce executive management did not
provide suf?cient oversight regarding thel:linvestigation or its planned operations.

Analgsis 2: Substantive easel Iwas opened as a predicated
The
investigation of the as listed as a sub?le under the] lease. The onl
affiliation between th?'denti?ed in the case ?le was one serial 
the phone numbers of] Iloeated in his cell phone.

I: reiterated inl I states the

following:

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

(WM A review 011: indieatedl I had onlyr a tangential

connection to the main subjects of the investigation and was an unrelatedl I
thus a separatel Ior criminal investigation should have been opened to investigate this

 

(Wm Recommendation 2.1: I

 

(WM) Recommendation 

 

 

Observation 3: Cincinnati Field Of?ce does not have a Shooting Annex
incorporated as part of its Critical Incident Response Plan.

Analgsis 3: A review by the SIRT indicated the Cincinnati Field Of?ce did
not have a Shooting Annex as part of its Critical Ineident.Response Program. This was veri?ed
by the CDC and the Critical Incident Response PCOR

(Him The Cincinnati Field Of?ce, to include the Dayton RA, has been involved in
three Agent shootings since 2007 and one non-Agent shooting involving a TFO on an FBI task
force. For this reason, the Cincinnati Field Of?ce may bene?t from a Shooting Annex to its
Critical Incident Response Plan to assist the of?ce in the deployment of resources following any
subsequent Agent involved shooting incidents-l,2
-1

NYT-592

 

 

 

 

 

(WM Recommendation 3: SAC, Cincinnati should consider preparing a Shooting

Annex to the Cincinnati Field Of?ce Critical Incident Response Plan.

NYT-593

 

 

  

(Rev 5-3-10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Date: 04f23f2014
Office

co: b6 ?1
-1

From: INSPECTION

Contact: 

Approved By: Nancy McNamara

Drafted I

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,

comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review

Group (SIRS) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG

meeting held on 02f21f2014.

Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection

Division's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated 07f30f2013, prepared

by former Inspector Dena Elaine Choucair. A copy of the complete INSD

Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to this

communication.

Details:

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting incident

which occurred on 04/04/2013, involving Cincinnati Field Office Special

Agent (SAJI I participating in a be '1:4r7

surveillance with the Southern Ohio Safe Streets Task Force _1?4?7

The surveillance team consisted of Agentsl 

Coordinator),  I

Ialong with Dayton

Police DetectivesI I also participated. The SOSSTF

 

attempted to locate and identify vehicles associated with two subjects,
I I

I Iwho were wanted on local arrest warrants.

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT3594

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Office
Re: 04f23f2014

 

A review of the file,I I along with interviews of

 

agents, revealed there was no operations plan to undertake any

enforcement action on 04f04f2013. Additionally, the review showed
inconsistent use of operations plans throughout the investigation. The
file also indicated did not target I

The predicated investigation targetedI I

 

 

 

Based on CHS information, Agents responded to the area of the

 

Dayton Mall where they observed aI Ioccupied by

 

I I A third male, later identified as Jermaine

Clemente Coleman Jr., was driving During the surveillance,
the Agents observed multiple hand to hand drug transactions from the

to a drive?thru beverage store, the Beverage Palace, located at 8980

 

 

The Agents then followed the subjects? vehicle

 

Kingsridge Drive, Dayton, Ohio. AgentsI Iagreed,

 

via radio communications, on a plan to arrest the subjects when their

vehicle entered the enclosed drive?thru area of the Beverage Palace.

 

AgentsI Iintended to use their vehicles to contain

the subjects? vehicle while in the drive?thru to facilitate the arrest.

 

Once the subject vehicle entered the drive-thru, the Agents quickly

positioned their vehicles to block the Beverage Palace entrance and

 

exit. AgentsI Ipositioned their vehicle to block

 

the exit and AgentsI Ipositioned their vehicle to

 

 

While AgentsI Iexited their
vehicle, the subjects attempted to escape by reversing and crashing
into SAI The subjects then
accelerated forward ramming Ivehicle. SA
escaped being hit by the vehicle and believed SA

already been injured. fired four rounds from

his FBI SWAT Springfield handgun at the driver of the vehicle. The

block the entrance.

 

 

I vehicle.

 

 

driver, Jermaine Clemente Coleman Jr., was shot and died of two gunshot

 

wounds while en?route to the hospital. I I

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

-1
b6 -7
?7

b6 
-1,7

b6 
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NYT1595

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Office
Re: 04/23/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

was shot once in the shoulder andl b5 
. . 
I I was uninjured.
SIRG Observations
On 02/21/2014, The SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting
incident with the intent to:
l. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously
determined the application of deadly force by SA Ion b5 -1
?1

04/04/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly

Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations,and recommendations for corrective actions an
operational standpoint. The SIRG made the following observation and

recommendation concerning the operational techniques used by SA

shooting incident. b6 ?1

?1
Observation 1: Agents did not have an approved

operations plan.

Analysis 1: INSD review determined no operations plan
existed for the enforcement action which resulted in the shooting on
04/04/2013. A review of substantive casel land Agent -1

interviews determined operations plans were used inconsistently for

 

 

arrests. Agent interviews and signed sworn statements revealed not all
Agents engaged in this incident anticipated taking enforcement action
during the surveillance. The decision to arrest the subjects was based
on observations of suspected drug transactions coupled with the
existence of local arrest warrants. No authorization was sought or

obtained from the SSRA or Cincinnati EM to take enforcement action.

DIOG Section 19.3.1 provides policy guidance as it

pertains to warrantless arrests for federal crimes:

UNCLASSIFIED

3

NYT1596

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Office
Re: 04f23f2014

(U) Whenever_possible, SAC and USAO authority must be obtained

before making a warrantiess arrest. Agents are authorized to make
warrantless arrests for any federal crime (felony or misdemeanor)
committed in their_presence. Agents also have authority to make
warrantless felony arrests for a crime not committed in the presence of
the Agent if there is probable cause to believe the_person to be
arrested committed a federal felony. A warrantless arrest must only be
made when sound judgment indicates obtaining a warrant would unduly
burden the investigation or substantially increase the_potential for

danger or escape.

Review of video surveillance obtained at the shooting
scene, as well witnesses interviews, indicated two employees of the
Beverage Palace were inside the store at the time of the incident. It
is incumbent upon FBI Agents to consider the safety of innocent
bystanders in any operation. The presence of the store clerks should
have warranted additional safety considerations which would have been

addressed if an operations order was completed.

Recommendation 1: SEC, Cincinnati should ensure arrest

operations include a written operations plan when practical and have

 

appropriate management approval prior to execution.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues. The SIRG made the following observation regarding safety

issues:

Observation 2: Participants in the arrest operation did
not display visible FBI markings.

(Ufag?ag? Analysis 2: From a safety perspective, the use of lights,
sirens, and visible markings on ballistic vests or other outer
coverings increases the safety to Agents as it alerts subjects,

bystanders, or other law enforcement of an ongoing investigation.

A review of video surveillance and interviews revealed

some Agents did not display visible FBI markings on outer
UNCLASSIFIED

4

NYT-597

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Office
Re: 04f23f2014

garments. The vehicles involved did not activate available emergency
lighting. One vehicle involved in the operation was not equipped with

any type of emergency lighting package.

(UXEEQHQE Recommendation 2a: SAC, Cincinnati should ensure, when

operationally practical, Agents display visible FBI markings on

 

ballistic vests and outer garments during enforcement activity.

(Ufiib??g Recommendation 2b: SAC, Cincinnati should ensure

vehicles involved in enforcement activity are equipped with and display

 

emergency lighting.

4. Provide recommendations for Administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG made the following observation regarding

Administrative issues:

Observation 3: Cincinnati Field Office, Dayton RA,

 

 

 

improperly utilized investigationI Ito he '1
I I ?7
-7

 

Analysis 3: Substantive caseI Iwas opened

as a predicatedI Iinvestigation on al I
I I. The investigation of theI I

was listed as a sub?file under The only affiliation
between theI Iidentified in the case file was one serial

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

indicatingI Ihad the phone numbers ofI I
I Ilocated in his cell phone.
I Ireiterated inI I
stated the following: b?A ?1

b?E -5

 

(Macao)

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

NYT1598

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Office
Re: 04f23f2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-1
-5
A review ofl only a
tangential connection to the main subjects of the investigation and was
an unrelatedl I thus a (or other
appropriate classification), investigation should have been opened to
investigate this criminal enterprise.
(UXEESHQE Recommendation 3: SAC, Cincinnati should review SOSSTF b7A -1

 

matters, includingl I to ensure proper predication has been

 

established and documented for additional targets not originally

identified in the initial investigative matter.

Observation 4: Cincinnati Field Office does not have a
Shooting Incident Annex incorporated as part of its Critical Incident
Response Plan 

Analzsis 4: A review by the SIRT indicated the
Cincinnati Field Office did not have a Shooting Incident Annex as part
of its Critical Incident Response Program. This was verified by the
CDC and the Critical Incident Response FCOR.

(UXZESHQI The Cincinnati Field Office, to include the Dayton RA,
has been involved in three Agent shootings since 2007 and one non?Agent
shooting involving a TFO on an FBI task force. For this reason, the
Cincinnati Field Office would benefit from the preparation of a
Shooting Incident Annex to its CIRP to assist the office in the
deployment of resources following any subsequent Agent involved

shooting incidents.

(UXEEOHQE Recommendation 4: SAC, Cincinnati should prepare a
Shooting Incident Annex to the Cincinnati Field Office CIRP.

 

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD, chaired the

UNCLASSIFIED

6

NYT1599

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Office
Re: 04f23f2014

meeting and was a non-voting member. The following voting members were

in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office of Inspections

Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States b5 _1r3
Department of Justice I Special Legal Counsel, -1,3
Civil Rights Division, Acting Section ChiefI I

 

 

 

Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC) Roger Coe, Global

 

Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSAI ISguad
CR-2, Washington Field Office; SSAI I Practical
Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division 
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
I I Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division
Firearms Training Unit, 
Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group and SSAI I Defensive Systems

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also in attendance:

 

I I Office of Inspector General, Inspectors David

 

Paul Gelios, R. Justin Tolomeo, Howard Marshall, Paul Delacourt, Trent
R. Teyema and Shawn W. Stroud, OI, Team Leaders  
I land

OI, ERT, Unit Chief
IPAU, DAD Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism

Division; SSAI I Office of Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb,
Tactical Section, Assistant Director Michael Prout and DAD Blair

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Deem,OI, United States Marshal Service;I I Special
Assistant, OI, SC Tracy A. Paige, OI, UCI land he -1,3
Management Program I and PTC ?1r3

 

 

I IInspection Management Unit, INSD

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observation

SAC Cincinnati is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge will
review the field office?s response to determine if the

Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further

UNCLASSIFIED

7,

NYT1600

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Cincinnati Field Office
Re: 04f23f2014

action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to implement. SAC Cincinnati is required to provide a written
response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to
resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must

be directed to Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit b5 ?1
b7C -1

 

 

INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel
link to MPAI 

 

 

#0

UNCLASSIFIED

8

NYT-601

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 07f26t?2013
Report of: HG Dena Elaine Choucair Of?ce: FBH-IQ INSD
Case 297-HQ-A1271510-D

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
INDIANAPOLIS FIELD OFFICE
O?fl 09013

Investigative Period: 05.Ir 10l2013 05! 1422013

Reference: (U) Telephone call on 05l10f2013 from indianapolis 
Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields.

 

 

Synopsis

051'1 09013, the Indianapolis Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF), via a state-
authoriz as monitoring the activity of a white Chevrolet Monte Carlo owned by
William McKnight. The Monte Carlo was identi?ed in a FBI bank robbery investigation (91A-
as potentially used by subjects in a bank robbery which occurred on 0412612013.
Six FBI Special Agents (8A5) and four Task Force Of?cers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Departmentwere following the Monte Carlo which contained two males (later identi?ed

I?htelinight and and one female (later identi?ed

(U) During the morning, the Monte Carlo made multiple stops at banks throughout the
Indianapolis area, with the female entering the banks and returning to the vehicle after
approximately three to eleven minutes. At approximately 10:53 am, the two males exited the
Monte Carlo and surveillance identi?ed them as they were about to enter the State Bank of
Lizton, located in Plain?eld, Indiana. They were wearing hooded sweatshirts andgloves. The
surveillance team suspected a bank robbery was about to occur, but waited for the suspects to
exit the bank to avoid a potential hostage or barricade situation. A few minutes later, the males
ran from the bank. One male was seen carrying a handgun as both males entered the Monte
Carlo. As the Monte Carlo departed the area, the SSTF called for marked police units to conduct
a vehicle stop believing the males hadjust robbed the bank. Before marked units could arrive,
the Monte Carlo appeared to identify the surveillance and drove into a residential area at a high
rate of speed. A few minutes later, with SSTF vehicles followin the Monte Carlo stopped and
the two males exited the vehicle. sel?E??  driving separate
vehicles, encountered one of the males, William Me 'ght, age 43, on Springcrest Street,

 

Plain?eld, lndiana. McKnight pointed a gun at moved towards him, re?ised to comply

 

1

b6 -1
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Fi?-602

 

 

with commands, and attempted to secure a tactical advantage behind the engine block of SA

 

 

vehicle. Due to the imminent threat and fear for his life, his FBI issued b6 ?1
Glock 22 seven times. Due to the imminent threat and fear for his and life, - 1
?red his FBI issued Glock 22 six. times. McKnight was struck six times and died at the scene.
(U) The other male] agel land the female,l:  age be 
El were arrested nearby by other members of tie SSTF and Plain?eld Police Department. - 7

 

(U) The shooting scene was processed by the Indianapolis Evidence Response Team
Detroit ERT and members of the Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT).
I Thirteen .40 caliber shell casings were recovered which were consistent with .40 caliber

 

ammunition used in and SA weapons. Nine projectiles were recovered, b6 ?1
 including four located in McKnight?s body. A .45 caliber Hi Point handgun was found next to b'i'C 1

the body of McKnight; the weapon had not been ?red.

Details

Indianapolis, Indiana area. Immediately following the bank robbery on 04f26l3013, a witness at
a nearby store identi?ed two suspicious individuals. The individuals got into a white Chevrolet
Monte Carlo and the witness identi?ed the license plate number. Investigation determined the
vehiclewas registered to William McKnight, 1656 N. Livingston Avenue, Indianapolis, Indiana,
46222.

(U) FBI Indianapolis Safe Streets Task Force
SSTF), were assigned the bank robbery investigation (FBI Case Number 91A-IP-2723197was the Indianapolis Field Of?ce Bank Robbery Coordinator and TFd: was the WC ?1 4
Assistant Bank Robbery Coordinator. On TFOI Iobtained a state-authorized WE ?5
I [for the white Monte Carlo which was installedl During
the week ofl I land TFOI:Iconducted daily
surveillance of McKnight?s residence during the morning. The timing of the surveillance was
based on the time the 04/241'2013 and 04126/2013 bank robberies had been committed.
Throughout the week, McKnight?s movement outside of work had been limited.

(U) On the morning of Friday, 051'r 1012013, SAI Iwas noti?ed via BlackBerry the

 

 

 

 

[contacted but SOS

 

approximately 8:00 am and directed him to begin tracking the movements 0 onte arlo in 335 -1
real-time. then initiated surveillance with other members of the Indianapolis Safe '2

Streets Task Force (SSTF). considered it unlikely McKnight would engage in a bank
robbery that da as the 04/24l2 and 04I'26f2013 robberies had yielded approximately
$30,000. 5 experience was bank robbers did not typically engage in additional robberies
in the immediate aftermath of such success.

(U) Throughout the morning, various members of the SSTF joined the surveillance. The
Monte Carlo stopped at multiple banks on the southern outskirts of Indianapolis and, later in the

2




(U) On the mornings of 04!24/2013 and 04f26i'2013, bank robberies occurred in the
NYT-603

 

 

 

exited the vehicle and entered the bank for a period of three to eleven minutes. MC 1 7
urveillance also identi?ed twcl:lma1es, later identi?ed as William McKnight and
in the Monte Carlo. Throughout the surveillance, directed the team
to maintain a very oose surveillance, to allow optimal intelligence to be derived without alerting
the subjects. He maintained a surveillance log of the team?s observations as he received them
over the radio.-

mornin in eastern Hendricks County, Indiana. At each bank, al:lfemale, identi?ed asl:  b5 '1 7
Eh 510:5

 

(U) At approximately 10:29 am, the Monte Carlo drove through the parking lot of the
Huntington Bank at the intersection of Quaker Boulevard and Stafford Road, Plain?eld, Indiana.
Member's of the surveillance team parked at various locations around the area. By this time, the
surveillance team included six FBI SAs and four TFOs. The female entered the Huntington
Bank and subsequently returned to the Monte Carlo. The Monte Carlo left the area and drove
away toward a residential area west of the bank. The surveillance team remained in the area of

'n on bank to avoid detection the Monte Carlo in the residential area, allowing the
Imamgt?LI ME ?6

 

 

 

 

At approximately 10:45 am, SOS dvised the surveillance team: he 1
the subject vehicle entering Em- Street in a residential area west of the MC - 1
Huntington Bank. SAI Idirected teams to stay back from the residential area and allow the WE '5

 

(U) At 10:48 am, SOS :Iadvised by radio the Monte Carlo was heading east on

Stafford Road back toward the Huntington Bank and then turned back west toward Elm Street.
Shortly thereafter, TFd: radioed he saw two guys with gloves and hooded sweatshirts
walking in the direction of the Huntington Bank, but did not know if they had exited the Monte
Carlo, and asked if anyone else saw them. There was no response from surveillance team 6 4
members. At approximately 10:53 am, the two males entered the State Bank of Lizton, which WC _i 4
was located just west of the Huntington Bank, at 2100 Stafford Road. At the same time, SA

and :each radioed they had witnessed a woman crouching behind a car outside
of the State Bank of zton. Based on the sequence of events, the surveillance team determined
a bank robbery was liker in progress. Team members donned tactical ballistic vests, including



(U) A few minutes later, the males ran from the bank. T'Fd:l - b5 '4
saw one male carryin a hand gun as both males entered the Monte Carlo parked at Elm Street. MC ?4
TFO : and each radioed the observation to the other surveillance team
members. -

 

 

(U) SA : directed all team members to switch their radios to the countywide
frequency and requested a dispatcher to monitor the chemo] to facilitate assistance from .135 1
Hendricks County and Plaiu?eld Police Departments. SA :Iradioed to the surveillance team 137;; -1
his plan to have a marked police unit conduct a tra?ic stop once the Monte Carlo had reached an

area-away from the bank. As Bank Robbery Coordinator, it was standing policy to not
engage subjects at or near a bank to avoid potential hostage or barricade situations.

NYT-604

 

 

 

TFO

- (U) SAI:Idrove west on Stafford Road from the direction of the State Bank of Lizton.
As he approached Elm Street, he saw the Monte Carlo on Elm Street waiting to turn west onto
Sta??ord Road; As he passed Elm Street, the Monte Carlo turned onto Stafford Road
immediately behind him. Three?other surveillance team vehicles driven by SA

 

I  and TF

 

 

followed directly behind the cute Carlo. As

the team drove west on Stafford Road, the Monte Carlo appeared to identify the surveillance and

accelerated into the center lane, passing 
turned sharply left into a residential area sou ol
surveillance team followed the Monte Carlo as it
speeds, making sharp turns to avoid pursuit. SAI

 

and another vehicle. The Monte Carlo then
iStafford Road on Brookside Lane. The

traveled through the residential area at high
adioed the Monte Cario?s location,

direction of travel, and cross streets, as the team followed it through the residential area. 

and 

and the subjects.

activated their emergency-lights. During the pursuit, the surveillance team
. lost sight of the Monte Carlo and continued through the neighborhood to conduct a search for it

(U) As 8 turned right (east) onto Springcrest Street from Almond Drive, he saw
the Monte Carlo par on the right side of the road, with only the two left tires on the road. SA

Edrove towards the vehicle and as he approached, a male, later identi?ed as McKnight, rolled

out of the passenger side of the vehicle with some momentum. A handgun also came out of the

Monte Carlo and landed on the ground between McKnight and SA
and fell before regaining his footing and picked up the handgun. 

McKnight stumbled

vehicle, drew his gun and took a position close to his driver-side door, using his vehicle for

cover. SA
eastbound on Springcrest Street. 

Al:lwho was drivin behind 
SA : and SAl?Iin pursuit of the Monte Carlo. rso I:lstopped his
remained focused on the immediate threat posed by

 

 

 

vehicle directly behind SAI I SA

 

'ved and stopped his car directly behind 

 

 

drove past

McKnight, aizned his weapon at McKnight and issued verbal commands drop the gun?
several times. McKnight raised the handgun and pointed it in SA direction. SA : and

150 issued verbal commands for McKnight to drop the gun and show
them his hands. McKnight continued moving toward and his vehicle. SA

 

continued repeating the command for McKnight to drop gun, but recognizing the increasing

threat to himself, and believingr McKnight was attempting to gain a tactical advantage behind his
AI tired several rounds at McKnight. After SAD

 

vehicle engine block, 
subject remained on his feet and turned left. 
handgun at McKnight from the driver side of his

 

 

 

and ?red six rounds at McKnight. SA 

b6 -1,4
-1,4

b6 -1,4
-1,4

stopped and exited his 

the Monte Carlo sped 

first volley, the

ho had exited his vehicle and aimed his

vehicle, saw the threat McKnight posed to SA
also ?red a second volley of rounds at

McKnight, ?ring a total of seven rounds. McKnight fell to the ound and rolled toward the
bottom of the ditch with his head away from SA : and 

(U) TFO. Iran up to 

 

 

and took a position to the left of 

covering

McKnight with his gun. McKnight ha rolled into the ditch, coming to rest on ts srde.

McKnight?s handgun was separated from him. 

seriously injured and incapacitated. SA. ltold 
:e

 

McKnight given McKnight?s incapacitai condi

[:hequested medical assistance while TFO

approached the subject and saw he was
'ght to hold on. No one handcuffed
tion. TFOI:Iradioed "shots fired" and SA

I:Icovered McKnight with his gun.

b6 -1,4
b7C -1,4



 

 

(U) SDwent to the corner of Almond Drive and Springcrest Street to determine he 1 4
their location to radio for an ambulance. radioed over the countywide channel, shots -1 4
had been ?red a subject was down and an am ance was needed. renuned to McKnight
where TFO ijas encouraging the subject to hold on. Countywide dispatch advised an
ambulance was en route. 

(U) SAI: telephoned the Indianapolis Field Of?ce main switchboard, identi?ed hE 1 4
himself, told them he had been involved in a shooting and requested they make appropriate - 137': 1 . 4
internal FBI noti?cations. SA  radioed for the status of the ambulance and was told an
ambulance was on the way. T16 subject was wheezing and his eyes were rolled back in his head.

 

 

(U) Uniformed of?cers and TFOEIan-ived at the scene and conducted a search for
the second subject. The second subject was apprehended one block to the west of the shooting
location a short time later.

CU) Two ?re medics subsequently arrived with a gumey. The medics rolled McKnight

over and checked his pulse. They determined McKnight was dead. McKni ht was then covered
with a sheet. Shortly thereafter, Acting Supervise ecial Agentl and later, b6 ?1
Assistant Special Agent In-Charge (ASAC arrived and too arge of the scene. MC -1

 

(U) The Plain?eld Police Department maintained security for the shooting scene until
051'11f2013. Indianapolis ERT, Detroit ERT and members of the Laboratory Shooting
Reconstruction Team (LSRT) processed the scene. Thirteen .40 caliber shell casings were
recovered which were consistent with the .40 caliber ammunition used weapons. Nine projectiles were recovered, including four located in McKnight?s body. bro ?1
A .45 caliber Hi Point handgun was found next to the body of McKnight; the weapon had not
been ?red. The Hendrick?s County Coroner removed McKnight?s body and the ERT processed
the scene for evidence. The security perimeter was maintained until the scene was released by 
and the LSRT on the evening of 05H lf2013.

 

Substantive Case Files

 

(U) 91A-IP-2723197 .
ma _1

Enclosures

(U) All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the enclosed
table of contents.

A. Administrative

 

(U) The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was composed of the following
personnel:

Inspector In-Charge (IIC) Dena Elaine Choucair
Inspector In-Place?lP) Roger A. Coe

5



 

 

 

 

 

As i Ins tor earn Leader (TL): 136 ?1
we 
Asst Ins ector n-Place I

AIIP



All?

AIIP
AIIP

 

FBI Laboratory Shobting Response Team:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SS vidence Response Team (13le Unit 136 ?1
Physical Scientist( Unit 1
PSI Unit

Photo mnherl  Operational Projects Unit

SA Indianapolis ERT Senior Team Leader

SA Detroit ERT Total Station

SA lDetroit ERT Total Station

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

(U) All members of the SIRT reviewed the FBI produced videotape entitled, "The Rain
After the Storm - Shooting Incident Investigations". 

(U) On 05/ 10(2013, IIC Choucair communicated with Indianapolis Division Special
Agent in Charge (SAC), Robert Allan Jones, to arrange logistics prior to arriving in Indianapolis,
Indiana. Members of the SIRT arrived during the evening of 051'1 0(2013 and the morning of
0511 112013. On 05f11I2013, IIC Choucair met with all sonnel and outlined SIRT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

protocols. IIC.I Choucair then met with SAC Jones, ASAC ASA b6 -1
and CDCI Ito exp the rctocol of the shooting inquiry. SAC . ones assignec bro ?1
ASACI and ASAC. lto serve as the Points of Contact for the SIRT

during the investigation period. Later at ay, 10 Chocair met with FBI personnel and TFOs

involved in the shooting incident and explained INSD and SIRT protocols. During each of the
meetings there was an opportunity for dialogue regarding concerns, clari?cation, or questions
prior to the investigation commencing. Over the next four days, SIRT went to the scene of the
shooting to visually examine the site, and conducted interviews of FBI and TFO personnel. In
addition, they reviewed evidence collected by ERT, supporting documentation and audio and
video recordings.

(U) Signed Sworn Statements were taken from four FBI SAs and one TFO who
were directly involved in the shooting or related events. Two of the SAs were represented by
counsel. They were: 

Ire-aresented I b6 ?1,2
SA represented byI I we -1,2

Copies of were provided to those interviewees who requested them. Other interviews,
events and observations were documented in FD-3025. The FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to
Employee Requested to Provide Information Following a Shooting) were executed by all SAs
who provided All 8335 and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily.

(U) On 05! 1412013, Inspector Choucair and SAC Jones met with Patricia A. Baldwin,
Prosecuting Attorney (PA) for the 55Th Circuit for the State of Indiana and briefed her on the

 

 

 

 

6



 

 

facts. of the shootin incident. PA Baldwin stated her of?ce would issue a letter of declination
relative to SA and their actions during the shooting incident.

(U) On 05f15i'2013, an exit brie?ng was provided by IIC Choucair to SAC Jones;

 

 

 

 

 

 

C. Personnel Iyolved in the Shooting

SAI I[Glock 22 Serial Number

0? SA (Glock 22 Serial Num 

a TFO arrived on scene during the shooting);

- NSSKI IFrIived on scene at the conclusion of the shooting);

I Karrived on scene at the conclusion of the shooting).
D. Firearms Training

- (U) Indianapolis Division provided quali?cations records for S'Asl:  A
review of the records re?ected the following:

on

is 1115131: recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Clock 22, Serial Number
19 2013.

- most recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Glock 22, Serial Number
was on 04f26{2013.

E. Deadly Force Training

(U) The IP CDC rovided Deadly Force Policy training to members of Squad
0-5, including SAs
Simulator scenarios.

(U) so reviewed the FBI Deadly Force Policy during a brie?ng related to the
execution of a scare warrant on 0412112013 and again on either 049243013 or 04f25l2013.

(U) No operational plan was prepared for the surveillance activities on 0511012013.

F. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

(U) were wearing tactical ballistic vests. vest had an
FBI placard on out and ac . SAI [had an FBI placard on the back 0 vest, but not
on the front. believed it must. ave come off while putting on his vest in the vehicle

 

during the surver an e.

(3. FBI Indices and National Crime Information Center 

(U) On 05f1112013, ASACI:Ipr-ovided National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) criminal history reports for William McKnight] 

The criminal history reports included:

7

on 02.97.0013. The training incorporated Firearms Training

NYT-6OB

b6 -1
b?C -1

b6 -1,4
b7C -1-1,7
b7C 

 

 

 

(U) William McKnight, also known as (aka) Deandre Lewis, aka William Randolph, aka
Deandre McKnight, black male, date of birth: 08l14f1969, Social Security Account Number:
324456-9100, FBI number 714035KA1, address: 1656 N. Livingston Avenue, Indianapolis,
Indiana. NCIC print out for William McKnight contained a notation of probation or supervised
release and multiple arrest entries to include arrests for multiple burglaries, armed robberies,
aggravated robbery, resisting arrest and prison sentences of 13 years in 1994 and seven years in
2008.

 

(ml 

INCIC print out for
 disclosed a notation of probation or supervised release and an

 

arrest onl Iior stolen property, theft, robbe and armed robbery. was
convicted and sentenced to six years in prison for the Iarmed robbery charge.

 

 

 

record also disclosed the arrest on]  for theft and armed robbery.

 

{Ull 
print out

disclosed a lifetime ersonal protection ?rearms permit. 
recor? so me ose the arrest onle for aiding armed robbery.

H.

 

ERT Report

(U) On 06! 12.1201 3, Assistant Inspectorl Ireceived via FBI internal mail 

 

 

two compact disks from Laboratory Division, Operational Projects Unit,
telephone numbe containing an Interactive Diagram related to the Plain?eld,

Indiana shooting incident on 05(10f2013. The disks contained a diagram of the shooting scene
with interactive links to photos of evidence markers and spherical images.

I. FBI Lab Report

(U) "On 01l061?2014, Assistant Inspecto eceived the FBI Laboratory
Report for the Plain?eld, Indiana shooting incident on 05(1012013. The report was prepared by

 

FBI Laboratory Division, Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, telephone number

 

 

and ocumented the analysis of the items received on 053'29/2013. .The report

 

included the ?rearm examination and searches of the National Integrated Ballistics Information

Network (NIBIN).

J. Medical Reports

(U) On 0511012013, Dr. Hendricks County, Indiana, Coroner
performed an autopsy on William McKnight. The autopsy determined McKnight was hit up to
six times with at least one or two rounds exiting and re-entering his body. The wounds were
located in his right check, right shoulder, left chest, left lower back, right forearm, and left upper
arm. There were four bullets recovered from the body that were each an expanded large caliber
copper jacketed hollow-point bullet. One of the bullets caused a hemorrhage and an

8

NYT-E-Hit:

136 -1


136 -4
1370

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

approximately 200 milliliter left hemothorax. Another bullet caused focal lacerations of the left
kidney and partial transection of the spinal cord. The autopsy listed the cause of death as

?Multiple Gunshot Wounds."

K. Declination b1 the Civil Rights Division

On 101'291'2013, Inspector Dena Choncair received via E-mail a declination letter
froni I US. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Section, Washington, DC. The

letter stated there was insufficient evidence to warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation
into a shooting by two FBI agents near Indianapolis, indiana, on 05/ 1012013, that resulted inthe
death of William McKnight. 

L. Local Prosecutive Opinion

. (U) On 05128262013, Inspector Dena Choucair received via US. mail a declination letter
?rom Hendricks County, Indiana, Prosecutin Attorne Patricia Ann Baldwin, 6 South Jefferson
Street, Danville, Indiana 46122;te1ephonelil The letter referenced Special Agent
SAI stated as Prosecuting Attorney of the 55th
Judicial District, Hendricks County, State of Indiana, Baldwin declined to prosecute any
criminal activity that may have arisen out of the incident on 05H 010.013 surrounding the robbery
at the State Bank of Lizton in Plain?eld, Indiana, and the subsequent ?eeing, capturing and
shooting of a suspect. .

 

M. Insgector?s Observations

(U) No observations.



hE


-3
-3

b6 -1,4
?1,4

 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 03l13f201 3
Report of: 11C Christopher W. Davis Of?ce: IN SD
Case 697-1)
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT

KNOXVILLE FIELD OFFICE

03106201 3
Investigative Period: 03f06i2013 03/1112013
Reference: Telephonelcall on 03!06!2013 from SAC Kenneth E. Moore to Chief Inapector

Robert]. Shields In, and Knoxville 015, Executive SituationReport to the Director dated
031'061201 3. 

 

?gnopsis

On 03f04l2013, a criminal complaint and federal arrest warrant were isSued against
Scott Edward Evans for Distribution of Child Pornography and Receipt of Child Pornography.
A search warrant was also issued for Evans? residence, 2332 Stapleton Road, New Market,
Tennessee, in order to obtain evidence related to an ongoing child 
Evans had no prior criminal history but did possess a valid handgun permit.

Agents and Task Force Of?cers (TFOs) assigned to the Knoxville (KX) Johnson City
Resident Agency (JCRA), along with other local law enforcement of?cers, planned to execute
the arrest and search warrants on 03l06l2013. At approximately 7:30 AM, the Case Agent,
Special Agent met with the search and arrest team to brief the 135 1 2
Operations Plan and FBI Deadly Force Policy. Following the brie?ng, team members drove to 137?: '1r 2
Evans? residence in law enforcement vehicles with emergency lights activated. All team
members were clearly identi?able law enforcement clothing and protective equipment. The
entry team advanced to the ?ont door of Evans? residence, knocked, and clearly announced the
presence of law enforcement. After waiting a reasonable amount of time with no resoonse,
Agents forced entry and cleared the residence. While Agents detained
:Iin the living room, ?ve additional Agents proceeded to a rear bedroom where Evans
was located. The Agents [observed Evans holding a bolstered handgun pointed at his head.
13va ignored repeated demands to drop his weapon, which remained in its holster. Evans
unholstered the handgun, exposing the trigger, at which point FBI SAI I?red
three .223 rounds from his Colt M4 ri?e. All three rounds struck Evans and emergency personnel
were summoned. Evans was determined to be deceased at the scene by two paramedics, who

 

 

Page 1 of 9



 

 

 

 

 

responded in less than 10 minutes.

The shooting scene was processed by KX ERT and the Laboratory Division. All on?
scene work, total station, and spherical photography were completed. Evans? Ruger handgun,
cooked and loaded with six .35? rounds, was recovered from Evans? hand. Dozens of other
weapons were located in Evans? residence, to include handguns, ri?es and one crossbow. One of

the ri?es was re orted stolen. At the time of the operation,
Iwere in the residence. They were detained at the scene and released after

 

 

 

Iinterviewed by FBI KX.

 

Details

On 02fi312013, Knoxville received a lead from the Violent Crimes Against Children
Major'Case Coordination Unit (formerly the Innocent Images Operations Unit) entitled 
EDWARD EVANS, aka iones32100@yahoo.com and jonesUOl 15@yahoo.com.? An
I I revealed Evans had been receiving and distributing
child pornography on-li?ne. Knoxville received a digital video disk containing numerous images
of child pornography obtained from the search of Evans' Yahoo! Incorporated email account,
iones32100@.vahod.com- The United States Attorney?s Of?ce, Eastern District of Tennessee,
Greeneville, Tennessee, committed to prosecuting captioned matter and a case was subsequently
opened. -

On 03(0412013, a criminal complaint and federal arrest warrant were issued against
Evans for Distribution of Child Pornography and Receipt of Child Pornography. A search
warrant was also issued for Evans? residence, 2332 Stapleton Road, New Market, Tennessee, in
order to obtain evidence related to the ongoing child pornography investigation. Evans had no
prior criminal history but did possess a valid handgun permit.

Agents and TFOs assigned to the .ICRA of the Knoxville Field Office, along with other
local law enforcement of?cers, planned to execute the arrest and search warrants on 03:06.20 I 3.

An Operations Plan was drafted by the Case A ent and approved on 03/049013 by
Supervisory Senior Resident A ent (SSRA) Assistant 3 ecial A ent in
Charge and Chic ounsel SA

thoroughly briefed the Operations Plan, which included the FBI Deadly Force Policy, to
the search and arrest team on 03039013. The brie?ng includedl I

 

 

Although Iwas a Probationary Agent, she was

 

assisted by multiple senior Agents in the CRA, to include members of the Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Team, and her Training Agent, SA a former ASAC. The
tactical ortion of the operation brie?ng was conducted by a senior Agent in the CRA, SA
a member of the swat Team.

On the morning of 03/06f20 3, the with the search and arrest ream prior
to execution of the warrants to brief the Operations Plan and FBI Deadly Force Policy- In
addition to the personnel who were briefed on 0310512013, personnel from local agencies were
present who had not participated in the brie?ng the previous day. Following the brie?ng, team
members drove to Evans' residence in law enforcement vehicles with emergency lights

Page  

activated. All team members wore clearly identi?able law enforcement clothing and protective
equipment. The entry team advanced to the front door of Evans? residence, knocked, and clearl),r
announced the presence of law enforcement. After waiting a reasonable amount of time with no

response, Agents forced entry and cleared the residence. While Agents detained

11']

the living room, ?ve additional Agents 

I proceeded to a rear bedroom where Evans was located.

The Agents observed Evans holding a bolstered handgun, pointed at his head. Evans ignored
repeated demands to drop his weapon, which remained bolstered. Evans made a sudden
movement with the handgun, exposing the trigger, and three .223 rounds from
his Colt M4 ri?e. Evans was struck three times and an ambulance was summoned. Evans was
determined to be deceased at the scene by two paramedics, who responded in less than 10
minutes. A Ruger handgun, cocked and loaded with six .35? rounds, was found in Evans? hand.

The Knoxville Evidence Response Team (ERT) recovered three .223- casings from the

top of Evans? bed. An autopsy was performed on and three bullets were recovered
from the right upper back, right mid back, and right lower back of Evans. The provisional
autopsy report, dated 03? 112013, concluded there were three gunshot wounds with entrances in
the left side of the neck, the left upper arm, and the left chest wall.

 

Substantive Case Files

Case ID: mater-2743323 (initiated 03/04/2013)

Title: SCOTT EDWARD EVANS,
a.k.a.jone532100@yahoo.corn, ionesOOl 15@gahoo.com;
INNOCENT IMAGES NATIONAL INITIATIVE

.Enclosures

All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the enclosed table

of contents.

A.

Administrative
The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was composed of the following personnel:

Inapector-in-Charge (IIC) Christopher W. Davis

Assistant Inspectorffeam Leader 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 3 of 9

136 -1,2
h7c ?1,2

NW-EIB

I 136 -1
1370

-1

 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

On 03f06f2013, IIC Davis spoke with Knoxville SAC Kenneth E. Moore to arrange
logistics prior to arriving in Knoxville. On 03f06f2013, the SIRT traveled to Knoxville. 11C
Davis and the SIRT members met with Knoxville SAC Moore.

On 0310712013, 110 Davis met with the involved FBI SAs, TFOs, and management
personnel to explain the review'proeess and protocols. On 031?07/2013, IIC Davis and the
AlsiTLs traveled to the shooting incident location,..2332 Stapleton Road, New Market,
Tennessee. -

One Signed Sworn Statement was taken from the FBI Agent directly involved in
the shooting, SAI I Other interviews, events and observations were 135 '1
decumented via FD-302s. All FBI and TFO personnel were allowed to read their FD-3 02 to WC '1
con?rm the accuracy of the information provided. Neither the {1-644 (Warning and Assurance
to Employee Requested to Provide Information on a Voluntary Basis) nor D4545 (Warning and
Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information) were utilized. The and interviews
of witnesses were conducted voluntarily. 

 

An FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information
Following a Shooting Incident) was executed by all FBI personnel interviewed.

On 031'081'2013, IIC Davis conducted an out brief with his attorney and . b5 -1 4
esplained the ensuing steps of the SIRT process. . b7C -1 4

On 03!] 112013, IIC Davis and the Aisl'I?Ls met with Assistant District Attorney General
lState of Tennessee, Cooke County Branch Of?ce; State of Tennessee
and briefed him on the details of the shooting incident. 

0n can 112013, an exit brief was provided by no Davis and the AIszLs'to SAC Moore.
C, Persoan Involved in the Slrootinggr

FBI

3 I(?red weapon) b5 ?1
SA Ease Agent) blPhotographed 

 

 

 

 

*These individuals wimessed the shooting

Page 4 of 9

NYT-614

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Other Lari: Enforcement -

TFO [Washington County Sheri??s Of?ce

TFO  Johnson City Police Department

Detective "Investigatorl IKnoxville Police Department

DetectiveI Morristown Police Department

Detective Sergeantl Jefferson County Sheriffs Of?ce
Sergeant I Jefferson County Sheriff?s Of?ce

Sergeant IJefferson County Sheriff?s Of?ce

 

 

D. Firearms Training

 

FBI Knoxville provided quali?cations records for SAI I A review of
records re?ected he was certi?ed for the weapons he had during the operation.

 

E. - Deadly Force Training

The most recent dead] force olic training, which was required for all Knoxville FBI
8A5, was conducted b3; November 2012 as part of Knoxville?s fall
2012 legal training session. The training was memorialized via Electronic Communication (EC)
dated llf3 0i2012',  lLe al Training Provided). Attendance records note the
following attendees from .8un 7: SSRA I SA ISAI I

SAI  and SA. 

IN SD determined SA re ared a written 0 erations Plan which was approved on
0310432013 by SS ASAC and CDC then briefed to all personnel

involved in the operation. The Deadly Force Policy was written into the Operations
Plan, 

 

 

F. Use of Bud Armor and? Law Enforcement Identi?ers

 

All SA and law enforcement personnel involved in the operation were ballistic body
armor. FBI or law enforcement identi?ers were worn, and personnel verbally identi?ed
themselves to the suhj ect prior to engaging the subject in the shooting.

G. Criminal Histogg

A National Crime Information Center (NCIC) warrant and arrest check for Scott E.
Evans, DOB 0310711972, SSAN 411?35?3435, revealed Evans had no prior criminal history or
active warrants on ?le?the arrest warrant FBI Knoxville had secured for Evans was not entered
into NCIC. 

Page 5 of 9

NYT-615

1376 -1
-11
b6 -1
hilt: ?1

 

 

H. ERT Report

The scene of the sheeting was secured and processed by Knoxviile ERT.. Recovered
evidence items requiring laboratory testing were as follows:

Items 2332 Stapleron Road, New Market, Tennessee:
Item 1 - M4 - 
Item 2 - Two (2) magazines and .223 ammunition

Item 5 - Spent casing, .223 .

Item 6 - Roger (TIP-100 revolver

Item 10 - Spent casing, .223"

Item 12 - Spent casing, .223

Item_13 - Six (6) rounds, .35? ammunition

Item 14 Forty-four (44) rounds, .357 ammunition

Items recovered during autopsy:
Item 18 - Projectile (bullet)
Item 19 - Projectile (bullet)
Item, 20 - Projectile. (bullet)

1. FBI La. Report

The Laboratory Division, Fireanns-Toolmarlts Unit was requested to generate a. 
shooting incident reconstruction report. The Operational Projects Unit was requested to prepare
supporting demonstrative imagery and graphics of the scene. -

J. Medical Reports

- An autopsy was performed on subject Scott Evans on 03/079013 by the Jefferson
County Medical Examiner. According to the Provisional Autopsy Report, three bullets were
recovered from Evans' body. The ?rst bullet entered the left side of the neck and was wooVered
Earn the right upper back. The second bullet entered the left upper arm and was recovered ?om
the right mid-back. The third bullet entered the leii chest wall and was recovered from the right

lower back. 

K. Declination by the Civil Rights Division

In an E-mail dated Special Legal Counsel, DOJ, Civil
Rights Division, determined no federal criminai investigation'was warrarited.

L. Local Prosecutive Opinion

In a letter dated 03/142013, District Attomey General James B. Dunn deciined'local
prosecution, stating the actions of SA : were reasonable and justi?ed.

M. - Inspector?s Observations

No observations.

Page 6 of9

136 -1,3
-1,3

NYT-616

 

 

 

b6 -1,3

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

b7C -1,3
Pram: ?avist Chriatopher W,
Sam: Tuesday, April 139. ram 3 3256 PM
To: Shiaids Ember! 
S-ubiect: Fw: Knaxvi?e Shuu?ng
All: Fyimnttaahed new: isl:l?$ Declinaztian.
CB
- 
Tn: ?3
Ca: wanna -3

Suhgect: Re: ?naxviile Shoating
Sant: Apr 3; 2313 11:11 AM
Thanks:
?9
inal Massa 
m: be -3
Th: Christupherc Davis b7C ?3
at: USATNE)
Cc: 
Subject: Knexville Sheeting
Sent; Apr 9, 2613 11:19 AM
Inapettnr Bavis
F51 Inspectian Divisinn
Based upnn the infarmation in ycur Shasting Incident Repart and Eonsultatian with tha USAG in
Knoxville, we have that the incident in which a Knuxville FBI agent was invalva?
in a shoating during the exeautien nf an arrest warrant in ?ew Market, Tn, an BJEI13,
resulting in the death a? Scatt Evans, ?nes not warrant federal criminal investigation. The
&istrict attarney far Sevierville, Tn canaluded that there was no vialaticn of Tannessea law.
Thare is nu evidenca ta suppart an investigation :0 detevmine whether t?e federal criminal
civii rights statutes were viclatE??
Knaxville agents and TFGs were attempting to latate and arrest Evans and search his mahile
hams residenca ?Qr eyidenc? relevant tn child parnogwanhy charges. After their knockin. an
the deer was ignured, the SWAT team breathed the frant $969, enceuntered and b6 -2

[in a Paam, and latated Evans in a bedroom? He was naked on a bed b7C -2

 

hmlding a .35? handgun in its holster tn his haad? ngeral agents 5urrounded him in a
crawded rnam {the r??m ather weapsns} and identifie? themselvea. They repeate?ly
cammanded him ta "drop the gun.? Hg ignnre the cummands, maved araund in the 950m, and
eventually the handgun. As Evans ramovad the handgun frum its nae 6f
the agents fired three times, striking and martally wanndi?g him.

Under the circumstances, the expressed perceptian by the agents who ware present in tha
bedreum that Evans presented a risk 9? daadly harm was reasonable. The witness actaunts are
tansistent. Additiunaily, an agent was.bitten by a dog dUring the attiuna

1

17

we are grateful that the ahaoter agent properly previded a voluntary agceunt 3f the incident

and, accordingly {agilitated a fully ?ecisian.
review of the matter.

5 acial La.a; Counsel

 

 

call I I

Civil Rightginivisinn

US ?apartment 0f Justice
861 Str?et, HM

395m
Dot. 

 

 

 

 

Flease complete the administrative

NW-mg

b6 -3
b7C -3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIXPA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# lE?cv?09133

Total Deleted Pageis} 2
Page 1 ReferraliCensult;
Page 2 ReferraliCensult;



Deleted Page{s) 
No Duplication Fee 
For this Page 



 

- UNITED STATES OF JUSTICE 
Federal Bureau {if Investiga?en

1 Date: 073352013
Repert- ef: HC Shawn W. Strand FBIHQ INSD
Case we} 
Titie: SHOOTING WCLDENT REVIEW
- REPORT OF SHOOWG WCEDENT
LAS VEGAS FIELD emerge
{359112013 .

Inveetigetive Perieti: {3512212013 ?SIZiifZ?l 3

- Reference: (U) Telephone call Gil (ii-Q1301 from 310C to MAD Rehett J. Shieids 31:, and
Les Vegas 13134035, ExecutiveSituetien Repert to the Direeter dated 9512212013.

 

'Smegsie

- (WM 011 ei approximater 3:45 FBI Lee Vegas Division Special
Weepeiis and Tactics Teen Assistant Team {cede}; SA and members
of the FBI Les Vegas SWAT teem participated in an. operation in supper: efeese number
a Les Angeles Fieid Of?ce fugitive investigatien. The ezetien included the
Lee Veges' SWAT team executing an arrest warrant for ?igitive subjectl I

his the SWAT team attempted to make entry intol I 
ILes Vegas; Nevecie, by striking the deer With a breaching
I?red multinie .45 eaiiher rounds at the SWAT team three the ef?uent deer
 and well. A?er SAI lend the SWAT team meaneed memeelves?red additional
i rounds at the SWAT team through the deer and well. was instructed in exit his
3 apartment and 0 out onto his balcony. At this point, 8 beer the free: deer move and 
preparing to peii {he deer epen and a sheet ei the team. 5 ed

the trajectory at? the rounds to estimate the location 0%?3 apartment. 3

?red his M4 carbine nine Subsequently, ired additienel re?nes -

threugh the baieeny slidinggiass dean Feilewing unemeess?il negetiatien efforts,
I Iwes deployed inn) the apatheth an shortly

thereafter semderedi  wes m?njureti arid trenspereeti te the Clark County Jail.

 

 

 

 

1:3an

 

 

 

Details
- (U I The San Bemexdine Sheri??e Office San Bernadine, Califen?e,
identi?e a 511st in 03311,!2013 homicide where the victim was shot numerous

times. On 95 0312?13, a Celifen?e state warrant was issued for the arrest efl:lfer the

Page 1_ of 1?

a. -n nun. ?iihm

 

h? ?1,7

-1

b6
h7C -7

NYT-619

 

 

 

 

 

ran-r ?Inf-n 1.

murder. SBSO ?roqoestod the assistance of FBI Los Angoios's Mano Regional Approhonsioa
Toam (IRAT) appreheocii FBI Les Aussies opened an mamas Flight to Avoid 
Prosooiitioo was and used search warrants and pea register orders on known sosisoot -

tolophoao numbers to identify the location of

. {vi/Boot?) Go woman, the Las Vegas Field Of?ce noti?oii tho ZRAT an 5
informant orovidec? The informant b6 ?7
indicated was iiviog in Las Vegas, Nevada. The MT roqoostod assistanoo from tho b7c 
Las Vegas sis-i in locating and apprehenth a stats Poo RogistorfTrap and b'm - 1
Trans Ordorl Iwas written and approved by . I
osiziooi 3. 

 

 

 

 

 

i 

During the momin hours of 033132.013, Criminal Apprehension "foam
(CAT) and SWAT team mambo: SAI looti?od CAT members of the possible b6 1 7
arrest. tois hone records while: Las Vs CAT and SWAT -1 i 
toss: mambo: 3 Based on the ME - 5
anaiysis, SAI land harrowodl Ito one. or two
apartmoom i I, Las
Vegas, Nevada. 

 

 

. (HIM SAI Ia Las Vegas SWAT toam and CAT mombor,

. ~oontaotod so: Las Assistant Team Leaderl:l at not) am. to notify
him of the possible arrest operation. informed the subject was know to make
throats agaias?i law onforoomoot and had an oxiaosivo criminal history. He was further 
the sobjooi was possibly in possession of a firearm. Due 'to those factors, the seriousness oftho
charges, and source iofoonation his and would not be
taken alive, 3 beliovod justification for the of SWAT was met. 
advised to discuss SWAT with and obtain oonoun?onoo from squad
supervisor SS 

b6 
Hit: 

a: approximatol 1:00 members of acts?? were hriofoci on the

Operations Plan? Ups Pisa} to mesa During the hrio?og, SAI: iold CAT b6 -1 i 
mombois was known to the door when he was in his rssidoacs, to be: armed 137?: 1 7
and dangerous, to wear disguises, and to change his telephone SADssignod
sash CAT mambo: their positions; Ho briefed the DOJIFBI Doadly Force and the Boodl)? Force!
Policy under the Memorandum ofU?dorstaoding. He also told tho members of CAT a goal of
their operation was to collect suf?cient ovidooio regarding tho location Ito obtain a
sian search wanani. The Las Vegas SWAT team wouid' phon make: tho airost,



?has!

 

 

{oi/Boom A?sr tho brie?ng, CAT mombors, including assumod as:
positions at tho sob?oot?s ssihio location. For several hours, mombors of the CAT aitomptoci to.
visually con?rm Ifl? Iwas is. one: of the identi?ed aparimonts. As point, thiswoman associated  loavel I 1 2 1'
SAI Iaskod tho Repeat fooador Progran Task Force for ME - 1
assistance with suriio?laaoo oil I Sal Ialso asked a 

.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page} of 1?

 



 

 

 

 

5

 

(Uth At a roaimateiy 1:00 pan, SDegan ore arin an Ops Pine fora b5 ?1
SWATioperation. SAIflroaintained telephonic contact with SA?i-egarding the 137?: ?1
possible location cftbe subject. SAI: sent an Email to the SWAT team indicating there 
would be a SWAT brie?ng at the ?eld of?ce.

 

 

 

 

 

At approximateiv 1:30 SACIverba?v briefed MAS-AC: b6 - 1 7
Las Vegas Field Of?ce SWAT Coordinator about the draft 0 a Plan. Also eseot was 137': ?1 7
SWAT Probationary Operator SAI ISWAT Operator SAI and
Tactical Gperation Center (TOO) SAI At approximately 3:15 pm, additional
information was received from dicating staying at the
pertinent. the Ops Plan-to re?ect a search and arrest scenario.
(WWCIs propensity for violence, intelligence he carried a ?rearm, and the b5 1 7
high probability he would barricade, led SAI Ito employ a ?no knee arresb?Searoh warrant 1373 ?1 7
execution strategy. SAI Ifurtner planned] ?1

 

[prior to earrant execution when the team was
set. At that time, tire breacher would strike the subject's door with the rare two times. if the door
did not open, a shotgun breach against the took would be to gain entry.

 

{Wm M4130 one, i5 SWAT operators, two paramedics, T00 b5 - 1
personnei,  an Electronic Tecimician participating in the operation were briefed train on 177?: ?1
0 stations Order PowerPointoresentation. FBI Las Vegas Senior Team Leader (SIDE

:1 FBI Las Vegas SWAT operator 'were in Reno, Nevada, at the time of
the brie?ng. ?During the brie?ng, SAI lowered the DOJZFBE Deadly Force Policy. 
outiined the subject's criminal history, is against law enforcement, his practice to barricade
his door and carry a ?rearm on him at alt times. SAI: showed pictures of the subject, route

. to the location, and briefed standard equipment to be used in the operation to include wea one,
ballistic rotection, and radios. Pho raphs of the location were obtained from SA 

Sodom used in the brie?ng, After the brief, operators went to
the ?eld of?ce noticing iot and conducted a rehearsal. Following the rehearsai, the operators
were reieased and remained on cali anti} infomation was received from the CAT 
regarding the location of the sobject.

 Around Eon, SAI Iwas notifies
Las Vegas, Nevada. 

. so?cient information was deveioped to obtain a state search or
SWAT team to meet at the field of?ce. Updates from Sergeant
supervisor, indicated no children were present in tire apartment nor was  a .
female associated with the apartment.

 

 

 

 
   
 

asseenatl:l b6 

57?: ?1r2r4r7

 

 

 

 

(orgasm a; so? pro, no? Detectivel:ltelephonicaliv be -1 .4 .7
obtained a state search warrant from Las Vegas Township Justice Court Judge Kephart 137': 1 4 7
to search]  Vegas, Nevada. 

Page 3 of 1?

NYT- 621

 

 

 

 

 

. . . . . . .5 . .  

 

While waiting for the warrant and arrival oftite SWAT team, the.
team ti toned the perimeter around the subject?s building. They 3180 brought in a
canine io ease ieit the residence before they obtained the warrant. Boring this
Surveillance, the surveillance teams observed lights come on within the subject?s apartment and
saw an individual matching the subject?s description brie?y walk out onto the hale-soy. Aside
froml:  no additional occupants were observed or were loeated in puhiie records.
cheeks. 

(WW Upon arriving at the ?eid of?oe, SDrovided an update to SWAT
team personnel. The SWAT team next movedto the staging area, thel 

 

Having returned

 

from Reno, Nevada, STLI land 'oined the team at the staging area. 

directed retain command. oftite SWAT operation. The teem arrived at the Staging
iooatioo at ap?rosimateiy 8:1? om. SS ere aiso present at the
staging area. Ail operators were ballistio heiroets on green rests with FBI visible in

black ietters on the front and Stack, and usedl I

 

{Liam The Ups Pian was tiiseussed and rehearsed again at the sta area. Having
spent time a the subject?s aparmtertt complex, SAI:Iauti set-asses a wall
partialiy obstructing use ofthe southeast side ofthehuiiding. odi?eti the team?s

aggroaeh route in favor of a route around the south and west sides of the building where

would be partiain obstructed. The teamwode then proceed north along the
western wall, and into the stairoeii at the center of the building.

mom} Following discussions and rehearsals at the staging area, all personnel

conducted a radio cheek with the T00. SWAT operators loaded into their vehieies and NASAC

resided authoriti: to proceed to the suspects loeation. At approximater 3:45 121.111., the
SerT team entered into the apartment eompiex and proceeded to the vehicle drop off point
southeast of the suspeet?s building. The team exited their vehieies and approaehed the building
as plazmeri. ?i?wo operators took positions to sorter the suspects balcony. The six operators'in
the stack approached the stairs. The breaehiog element remained on the stairs while fear
operators went up the stairsto the landing and the target door. carried the hailistie
shield and was the ?rst in the stack. 8 Was second in the cover position. SA

 : oras third and fourth. When the operators were in asitioo, S?l 
stated "Set" over the tactical channel. This was done to ini?at

With the. team in position, 3 ave the order to breach the door over the: tactical ehanoei.
SAI:Iapproaehed and some the suspects door with the ram. The door opened about one
inch and returned to the closed position. uici see the door jamb paint color was
?oru the trim eolor, but he eouiti not see insitie the suspeet?s apartment. Around the
time as preparing to strike the door a second time, gun?re started and rounds came

. through the suspects door from the inside;

 

The breaching element retreated down the stairs. SAI I SAI I
and SDoved to the northeast corner of the landing and packed themseives
bei?od the baliistie shieid. This position minimized exposure to rounds ?red from the
apartment. "Police." and titres or four times tel:lso he would

Page ii of 1?

NYT-622

b6 -1,2

-1-1Jr

7

7

 

 

 

 

4. m. nun-an-

.. mum.

know the Agents were not a rival gang or a criminal element attempting to Steal from him. More
shots 1attire fired from within the apartment and rounds again come through the door. According

to SA: the newer? ofthe second burst of gun fire appeared to come etceer to their b6 - 1
position. SAljsaw a iarge round skip across the landing towards the team. SDgaiu MC 1
yelled ?Tolice? and and checked on the team 

u. 

 

?(Uim Wantin 0 exit his apartment, but not feeling it was safe to have be - 1 7
him exit via the front door, 3 instructeDo exit his apartment and go out onto his WC ?1 7
haicony, where he would be observed by the cover team.? as heard aaydng'soniething
from inside the apartment, but it was not comprehendi?oie. as also heard moving
around inside the a moot. At dais point, saw the front door rnove. Sal: was
concemodljxavnaa reacting to pull the apartment door open, not his arm outthe door, and
shoot at the team. 'felt an imminent threat of death or bodily harm for his team the
neighbors, and himself. lassessed ?oor the theorem},' of the rounds the was
iikeiy located behind the lmoh side of the door. laced a burst of nine rounds front his
ltd-4 through knob side of the subject?s door. The subject ?red?a third burst of gun?re, this time
out the weetu?acing lzialcon],r ending glass doors. - - -

- ?nned to inane commands to : through the door. b6 -1 . 
a

 

 

 

 

led out, ?I?m hit." Sid oted his voice was casual. Front 3A In experience, i370 -1 . 7
voice did not sound like someone who was injured or bleeding.

 

Au expandable ladder was placed up against the north end of the landing?n
east railing. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and mouthed over the railing and need the ladder to exit the b5 - 1 . 7
tending. A second ladder was placed on the soothend of the east railing, and a cover team b7?? '1 7
ascended the ladder to cover the aparorrent door to facilitate the remaining team membere? ME ?1
agreea- SAI:lrequestedI 
FBI SWAT SAI and
A and SA ddidrew from the tending via the northern ladder. Though a .45
caliber round struck SA a ballistic vest during the suspect?s third discharge ofrounds,
none of the SWAT operators were injured. A barricaded subject situation ensued.
(02m FBI and negotiators attempted to convineel Ito surrender. b6 
After initial dialogue,l;lstopped communicating with negotiators and [?an was 1370 '7
prepared. At approximate 31 :03 am, on 0532:2013, FBI SWAT rsonnei ME ?1
12:36 ant, urrendered.

 

After a medicai evaluationd  Waedetern1ined to be manned. He was handcuffed and
transported to the Ciark County jail. 

(HIM In his interview, {as Ve as Acting SAC Iain: arrived on Scene 136 1
after the subject was NSACl?:Istated NASAE the On Scene . - 1
Commander, was responsible for the operation. In his interview, ASA stated when he 
could not reach he traveled to the operation site. This took place at-
approximately 11:30 pm. 

Personnel participating in the SWAT operation included:

Page 5 of 1?

 

NYT- 623

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i
 3.31 b6 -1
 SA ?red weapun) (SWAT) 137?: 1
 SA 
 SA .
 SA (SWAT) I
 SWAT) I
 SA 
 Acgjg ASACI  {0n~Scene Cummander)
 SS ?Ig Substantiye Squad Supervisar)
 STL 
 SAI 
 SAEIWM)
 SA 
 .sm?kswm
 
 
 SA:Icswm
 
 SA I SWAT
 
 SA (Negotiatnr)
 SA. agctiatar}
 3A1 1 (Toe),
 Supper!) b6 ?1
 KRadio Operatnr) 137': ?1
 Acting SACI I (Arrived on scam after subject in cusm?y) .
 ASA I (Arriveci an scene some?me aim: 1 1:60pm}
 LWPD
 Lieutenant
 Lieutem 
 Sergeant 
 Betectiv 
 Sergeantl
 {Detectiw b5 4
 5 Dct?ctive hm -4
 Detective
 Detectiv?e
 Betmtive
 Detective
i Detective

Detective

Detective I
Page 5 cf 1?
NYT- 624

 

 

 

 

 

 

Detective
Detective
Detective

 

b6 ?4
-4

 

 

Kw? Of?eed

Paremedid 
described as: i b6 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b7c 
Name:
Sex:
Race: 
Dateef Birth: I
Height: i
Weight: I
Eyes: 
Hair: 
SSAN:
FBI Nee
Sn {retentive Case Files:
Case ED: 
Ti?e: I - b6 -7
Fugitive UFAP Murder 1370 - 7
0520;2013 
Case 11): b5 -1,7
I Titie: b7: -1,7
?1


(Him Ali enclosures were made part ofthis report and were identified in the
enclosed table of cements; .

1) ST 
The Shooting Incident Review Team wee eoninri 38d of the ihliowing personnel:

I nepeeterdn?harge Shawn W. Strand -
Assistant Ins eeiorfl?eam Leader (AWLM 136 1



 

AIIPI

Assistant 
I

 

 

 

?1

Page 7 1?



 

 

 

 

 

 

Mi?
MIP
All}?

i? 


 

 

 

FBI Labome Shooting Reconstruction Team Personnel:

I Evidence Response Team Unit Team Leader
Fire ?i and Unit-m Physics} Scientist

Fireenos and Tooimerke Unit in Physieai Seieriee

 

 

 

 


I Projects Unit Visual Information
Is eielist .

 

 

Operational Projects Unit Photographer
Loo Angeles Fieid Of?ce ERT
Les Angeies Fieid G?iee 

Les Vega; Fieid Of?ce Evidence Ieem Pergoiinelt

ERT Team .
Evidence Teehnieien

Photographer

Investigative Operations Analyst
Ana! yet

 

  
  
    
 

SA

 

 

SA
SHGOTING INCIDENT REWEW PROTOCOL:

reeme of the SIRT revieweti the Inspection Division Shooting Review
Protocol. 

0o IIC Stioed Spoke with Las Vegas oeeigoaied point of
eoniect 38 to arrange iogieties prior to mixing in Las Vegas. 0n {Hill/2013,
the eaveled to [es Vegas. Upon arriving, IIC Strood and members of the SIRT haveied to
the shooting scene which ocemed tool 

lLee Vegas, Nevada. Subsequently, EC Seoud met moth
Les Vegas Field Of?ce EM end SWAT WHEEL 

 

 

(Um Gne Sigied Sworn Statement (883) was taken from the FBI Agent directly
invoived the shooting, SA and five 3533 were taken from other FBI Agents in
the imediate proximity ofthe shootingand
Other interviews, events, and observations were documented via 

 

 

Page 8 of 1?

NYT-1,7
-1,7

b6 -1
-1

 

 

 

 

Persennel were not mandated to review their ?36623; hewevei, these persennei who went-ed to
review their were afforded the eppertnnity. Neither the FIB-644 {Warning and

Assurance te Empieyee Requested to Preside Infennetien en a Velentexy Basis) ner Fill-645
(Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Preside Information) were utilized. The 535s
and interview of witnesses were cendneted velnnteriiy. The made innelved personnel
essilebie in the SIRT. ef interviews annotated personnel who voluntarily
presided statements and personnei who Were eeinpelled by their depernnent in preside
statements. 

(UHEDEQ) lei (Warning and Assurance te Einpieyee Requested te Preside
Information Fellewing a Sheeting incident) was executed by ail FBI persennel interviewed.

On HG Strend met with Clark Curlew-District Attemey's Office b5 '3 i 4
(CCBA) Chief Deputy District Chief Depnty metric: Attorney - MC '3 4
espiain the ensuingsteps efthe SIRT process. 011 OSIESIEOI 3, IIC Streud met

with CODA Chief Dr:qu District Attorneyl:lte brief hire en the results ef the
sheenng ineident review.

gem) On 052231;:me sense telephenieaily contaer Speeini Legs] Cennsei
Civii Rights Division, D01, and advised him ef the SIRT deployment in Les
Vegas due to en Agent-invelned sheeting.

?59m On 6512412013, IIC Strend met with Assistant United States Attorney
 Chief, Criminni Division, United states Attorney?s Of?ce (usage, nieth of
Nevertheless Vegas, to explain the ensuing steps ef the SIRT process, Snbseqnentiy, AUSA
:Ifeliened up with eiel Legal Cennsell: and deferred to I303 the use of force
detenninetien. AUS Aeelined a brie?ng regarding the results ef the shooting ineident
review - .

b6 -3
I378 -3

andtheCDC be _1
b7c ?1

(we? en? esesxzel 3, an exit brief was provided by? EC Streud te 

LAS VEGAS FIELD INVOLVED PERSONNEL:

SA Il?red ere-seenmemes:

{vim FBI Les Vegas presided quaii?eetiens records fer A
review of the Agent?s re?ected the feliendng: . . 

Page 9 of 1?

 



 

 

 

 

{Him SAI Is most recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Coii MeAi, Serial b6 - 1
Numberl_l was on 041?0312913. - MC ?1

DEADLY FGRCE TRAINING:

(oi/Bead) The last deadiy foi'ce training, which was requised for all Las Vegas FBI sag,
was provideti by CDCI:Iand'SAI:Idniing the 043125191 3 Shooting Incidents brief at the
Las Vegas Field Of?ce Bin Conferenee. provideii an E?maii dated
93!} $201 3, from CD Las Vegas Agents and TFOs ishioh provided noti?cation of the:
DOJJFBI Deadiy Force Policy. Weboast training regarding the Deadly Force Policy
was piovided on 1212mm; for ail'Las Vegas Agents and TFOs. An E-Inaii, dated i?ii??iz,
?'om SAl: lo Las Vegas Agents provided noti?cation of changes a the FBI Lanai-.3131
Device Policy iinpiemenialion Guide to all Agents An E?rnail, dated ?om CDC 
to Las Vegas Agents provided noti?cation of mandatory in gal framing for Agents and
TFOs. 

(mm man determined repaired awritten ops Plan on - be ?1
0532112013. The Ups Pian was briefed to NASA and all personnel invoked in the b7?: -1
operation. The DOJIFBI Deadly Force Poiiey was mitten into me pian. I

nan on ages Alamo}; AM) naw aysoacamam IHENTIFIERS:

(UIIEBHQ) All and TFO personnei invoived in the operation were ballistic body
armor. FBI or iaw enforcement identi?ers were wom. The operation involved use of the ?110*
knee ?f tactic. Doeumenieci risk {actors justi?ed use of the technique, Personnel verbally 
identi?ed themselves to the subject prior to ?ring at the subject; to 135 ?7
?re at Agents. I ma -7

CRIMINAL HISTORY:

(Lil/1331929) asapmifa a printed copy ofi?iationai Crime Information Center b6 
(NCIC) Wanted Notice dated 05323120113, for Homicide in San Bernadino, 137?: '7
California, Caseii Iwan?ant dates} 0303:9013, for: Additional! an NCIC hm 11
Criminai History {Board check was run onl IDate of ?nial?:I 
FBI numbed  whieh iden?rified the offenses:

. Borgia?try
Robbery .
FomefAssauit Deadly Waapon Not Fireann: Great Boaiiy injury Likely
Assault Deadly Weapon
Fight Public Place
Discharge of a Pam-Negligent Mamas
Cm Loaded Firearm: Pub-lie Piaoe 
Carry Concealed Weapon in Vehicle
Obsimotszesists Pubiio Qf?cerz??tc

Page 19 of 

 

NYT-628

 

 

 

 

Ide .-

Threaten SohooifPublio 
Threaten Crime with Intent to Tonnrizo
Sn?tobmade Knife
Hit and Run: Death or Injury
Hit and Run: Propeny Damage
Grand Theft Antornobiie 
Po?ssesoioanurohnse for Solo Contro?od Substance
Receivef?to Known Stoien Property
Participate inn Known Street Gang .
Disordcriy Conduct: Intoxicated 
Failure to Appear 
1M 0n 05(23?01 3, SSACIprovidod prions! copy of an Iranians check for
The Indians chock provided hits on two ?les, an

LABORATQRY REPORTS:

The noeno of {no shooting was secured and processed by LY LA ERT,
and tho laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team to include use ofTotai Station.



Recovered ovidnnoo itoms requiring inborntory resting worn as follows:

Firearmsl?foolmn?rs Testing

13} Colt M4AI bearing serial 
1B2 ?Ihre?o magazines and 65 rounds of ammunition.

1133 Ono (I) sing.

1134 0113(1) build.

1135 0118(1) boiler rntrioxrnd ?orn 
1136 One (I) sing. 

.113? magazine.

138 Our: (1) sing. 

1B19 l2 bullets in a pianos bag.

11320 One (1)45 oniibcr casing, silver in color.

132% One (1) buliet.

12324 ?ne (I) 45 caliber casing, brass in color. -

11325 Four (4) 45 oaiibor casings, brass in coior, and one 45 caliber casing. silver in
onion -

11326 16 Winchester 33 special boilers, siivor and copper in color, in plastic bag.

H328 Three (3) CS nxponried onrtridgos.

1329 Motai ?agmonr, siinnr and brass in ooior.

1330 Onoil) 45 oaiiber casing, brasn in color.

1333 Two 45 caliber onsingo, brass in color, and one (I) 45 caliber casing. siivor in
onion -

1334 0no(1)45 caliber casing, brasn in color, and one-(1) 45 caliber casing, silver in color.

Page 11 of 1?

NYT-629

 

b6 
?37113 -1,
13711 -1

b6 -1
EH: -

 

'7

 

 

ssa

 

 

1535 One 45 caliber buiiet, brass in color. - 
133? Kirnher, stainiess steel and blank 45 caliber handgun, seriai#l:l
134i One (1) bullet. 

1343 Fonr (4) boilers, copper in color, anti. one (I) builet fragment.

.3344 One (I) 45 caliber easing, copper in color. - 

1134'? One bullet, copper in onion

{Wm The Laboratory Division, Firearrns~Toolmarks Unit, was requested to
generate a shooiing ineident reconstruction report. The Operational Proj eats Unit was i'e?quested
to pmpme supporting demonstrative imagery and graphics of the scene.

DECLINATION BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS BIVISION:

I (Wm Upon corn ietion of theemsite inquiry, IIC Srrond coordinated SIRT
investigative ?ndings Legal Counsel, Depanment of Justice, Civil
 Division. On 033412013, he was provined an incident sinnrnary. {1n 3, Mr.

advised the of the shooting not, ?warrant a federal

criminal investigation of this matter.?

. K. PROSECUTIVE OHNIGN:

{13$er on osnsnen, no Stroud nret with neon ChiefDeputyI:Ito
brief him on the resuits ofthe shooting incident review By letter dated QSEEQIZQJB, the Ciark
County DA stated the facts of this did not meet the criteria for fennel review and he --
considered the nratter oinsedr 

msennron?s oeseRVATIons:

. SHIT Observation 1: Les Vegas?Fieiti ?f?oe did not have orisis negotiator
elements ere-stagedt . 

. (0W Analysis: Based upon numerous iriteririews, it was determined erisis
negotiaiors ??Bif? not: deployed on the GSEZUEGIE incident until after SWAT encountered a.
barricaded sirbjeot. - 

. (Wm Les Vegas Field Of?ce has no fonnei polite;r on the depiossnenr of crisis
negotiation staff with SWAT depioyrnents. However, per an ail-Agent FBENET Email from
SWAT Coordinator, on omens: 3, the foliowing was established:

?As a general ride a erisie negotiation teem manner WILL NOT sings with SWATdnrirrg

- their operations. The crisis negotiation team will be on standby and macro of the 3933?
operation emf depioy wineries-d. There are eireanrstoeoes when crisis negotinnon.
teem memories will stnge with primarily, when there are nrtieninble?rer?s that
Moore they should be presses Somefnets include: the subjects involvement in a prior
barricade the subject may be suicide}, has vowed no! to be taken
(dies, or isprepnreo' and woitingfor into! Liza! the area where the subject is

l? .

Page  

located is hemilyjorfi?ed; or, ony_o?her informotfoo rho: {he subject will we no:
:ourreoder ever: when con?omed by SW24 .

'mfmgeme from both the LA Fieid Of?ce and a Con?deneai Human

 

Source iodi was known to barricade himself in places he was stra?ng, he was b5 -7
known to carry a ?rearm, he was facing a substeniiai seeteeoe for murder, and he had made WC ?7

statements he would never be taken alive.

my:er omen crisis negotiators were reqoeeted during the women incident, there
was a substantial delay both in response and in coordination o?t?orts between SWAT, FBI
management, and FBI crisis oegotiotors. Additionally, there was a?cieiay in coordination with the
Las Vegas Metropoiitan Police Deparoneot ingo?atore.

(UIZEGEQ) Recommendation NSAC Las Vegas should ensure assessments
of proposed SWAT operations are conducted, and FBI LV negotiators'are prostageti Wi??i
SWAT. . 

SIRT Observation 2: 'Approvai of the Les vega?s SWAT Operaiions Order,
dateci 05f}. 1&013, was not oieariy articulated by the Special Agent in Charge, or his designee.

-.- .- .-

WW A?eiggis: Corporate Policy Directive 02421), Requireoleot for Written

 

 

 

 

Gpereiion Groer - Field Gpera?ono, Section 7.1 requiresl 6 1
b7: ?1
ISection 3.2.2.1 steth 97E -5

 

 

ISeotion 11.3.1 statesl I

I I The Les Ve res SWAT team utilizeo the
 for the operations order. SWAT Assistant Team Leader [prepared the

 

 

 

 

operations order. Lao-Veg 32, Commend end Centre}, listed 53
the UmSoone Commander. SS was the NASAC and the SWAT Coorciinator.
According to the AKSAC in his interview, he asked NASAC to be the Oancen 

Commander. Las Vegas :Ipage 34 was titled Approvaile?ioniy; it did not the
plan was approved, or who approved The plan. The Approvaif?othority page waooever signed
by the Special Agent in Charge, or designee. and there was no indication fem-lei approve] of {he

 

     
  
 

 

plan was granted. . 
-: Boring his INSD interview, SAI:Isieted copy of the ?nai vegsion of b6 - 1
the emotions order is typically pic-video to the SWAT Coordinatof, who notes opproirai. SA 197?: ?1
stated MA SAC revieWEd a draft paper copy of the operations order and. roamed it. .
stated NASAC 'd not Sign a copy of the pian. nor did he state he approved
the plan. From NASAC 9 presence at the operations order presentation, and iack of
negative feedback, SA the opere?oos order to be approved.
(Him During his INSD ioierviow, NASAC: stated he Genie verbal approval b6 - 1
of the operations order e?er iistooiog to the brie?ng of SA NASA rated a - 1

 


.

w?tten: operations order was not provided to him by 8

?age 13 of 17

NYT-631

 

I:

 

 

 

 

(HEM) Based on Las Vegas personnei interviews, the Shooting Incident Review
Team detemiined there was con?mion regarding the procedures for approving the operations
order. As observed above, the?On-Scene Commander and the SWAT Assistant Team Leader had
different recollections of irowihe operations order was approved. A signed plan wonid have
alleviated any con?rsion regarding this matter.

SIRT Instruction 1: AISAC Las Vegas will ensure he, or his designee,
provides written or electronic approval of ail written operations orders for the asecntion of every
Arrest and Search 1i?e?arrant and any other activity in which this praciical application of ?rearma
might be reasonably aznicipated. The approval should occur before the operations order is'
presented to the participants. 

(WW Observation 3: Infonnation regarding: the DSQIIZBIS crisis situation
one not commented to the Las Vegas Field Of?ce Communications Center.

{Um Analysis: it was detennined the Las Vegas Fieid D?ice Communications
Center did not receive a copy of the SWAT Operations Order-and was coir adadsed
telephonicaily of a pctentiai SWAT operation on 0532152013. During the SWAT operation and

subsequent barricade situation, the Communications Center was not given infonnarion regarding

the initiation ofthe arrest situation, shots being ?red, one barricaded subject. The
Center was also not informed of the possible iniinsr so an Agent. This
presented the Communications Center from being an ef?cient communications coordination

point for the ?eld omen in support of the crisis.

?lm Lat-n that same evening, ihe Communications Center was contacted by Las
Vegas Charms} 3 News inquiring about the SWAT arrest and shooting incident. AAIthongh
Communications Center personnel reacted properly, they were caught bf; surprise by the press
mainly. Frevions knowledge of the crisis would have allowed the Communications Center to be
better prepared to handle press inquiries and other pertinent regarding the
incident

 SIRT Recommendation 3: AISAC Las Vegas snouid ensure pertinent
infonoation regarding SWAT operations, to include initiation, completion, and anyoni?cai

situations note the operation are communicated to the Las Vegas Field Of?ce

Communications Center.

(unseen) Observation 4: Alas Vegas Field D?ice SWAT operator unlined an

unauthorized weapon chain 

Minoan} seine Las Vegas nae Of?ce soar resin meniber SAI
advised'dne to low light levels outside the subject?s residence, and because his FBI-issued

 

id not have a sight system suitable for low light environments, he utilized a 
 provided by the Las.Vegas Metropolitan Police Depaitrnent 
Tirol Iorovided by SWAT contained an E0 Tech sight ?inch
Was cotter suited for low iight en?rornnents. SA received a familiarization brief from an .

Page wimm.a.- .



be ?1
?1
-1

NYT1632

 

 

 

 

 

SWATeperetor prior to using the weapon. I I

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Iby SAI lead We SWAT operators who were using . b5 -1
additional LVWDI 137{Wm Las Vegas Field Of?ce SWA.T Senior Team Leader 
Eleon?med SAI?Iused al [provided by SWAT and
maiuifeetureti 12:31 - - .

 

Appent?x in the Critioai Incident Response Group, weapons and
Teeties, Poiiey Impiementation Geode published GZIEQQD 12, contained the foiloe?ag' ?st of
authorized field SWAT weapons, which did not ineluoe a  Manufactured 

551 
Appendix F: Authorized Fisk! SWA Weepens

 

 

(Li! Current its: ofBareoa approved weepoas'oeqaired specifz?cefiy for SWAT operations:


C(w
?(59
0([3 ?1




*rw

(mm sm'r Instruction 4: meet: Les sagas will ensure tee Vegas field Of?ce
SWAT operators, in the absence of exigent circumstances, only-use weapons authorized in the
Special} Weapons and Tactics, Poiiey Implementation Guide.

 

 

 

 

 

(HEM) SIRT Observation 5: De?ciencies were identi?ed in Las Vegas Fieid
Of?ce?s Crisis Response Plan. - .

 2 Anaizsis: Crisis M?gemeet Program Policy Implementation Guide (PG), 3
Section 5.2 states I BEE 5
Toe Les Vegas Field {)ffiee has a Crisis Response Plan which indicated it we
revised on GiBiiZGil It contained an appendix {Appendix D) for Agenoiavoived shootings, . i
which was dated 06f2009. The Introdaetion section identi?ed and quoted policy on the i
use ofdeadiy force and referenced it as being set forth in MIOG, Part II, Section 123.1 suit in
the Legal Handbook for Special Agents {Less}, Section 3-6.4.

 

 

. (mm ease, Part 11, Section 12o: was superseded by the Domestic
- investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), Appendix F, dated its? 15031 1. DIOG, Appendix
F, and the references LPISA, Seotion 3-5.4, sets forth the Depamnent ofiustice Deadly Force

Page 15 of 1?

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Policy. The Les Vegas Fieid Office Crisis Response Plan does not cite or set forth the current . i
deadly force policy.

SIRT Instruction 5: NSAE, Las Vegas will ensure the Las Vegas Field

. Of?ce Crisis Response piano cites and quotes current FBI policy.
?lm SIRT Gbsorvation 6: There-was a failure to obtain approvei to: ME -1
Mm Anaivsis: Section 3.11 in the Critical incident Response Group, Special
Weapons and Tactics, Policy Impieinentatioii Guirie published stated:
I ?5
(WW AISACI I Istateo in his interview that he gave blanket - b5 - 1
authority to the err-scene commander to us during SWAT operations due to the MC 1
cation; of tactical situations which can occur but he did riot know what policy or authorization WE 1
levei was needed to: not speci?caiiy give the authorization to
us
in his INSD interview he did not authorize the b6 - 1
Once he enivcd on scene, AS?CDelieved he was the OSC and was 137?: 1
aware a decision tol lhad already been made. ASACEIWES in agreement with 1
however, he were not aware SWAT was even equipped to  

(us/meg) emcee stated in his men interview, he he was the
OSC, even after ASA 'ved on scene. NASA stated he was never
opwi?caily asked for enamorin for any team member to He stated he
was sent durin dieeussions behween on Lieutenant regarding the
but beiieved SWAT would he:

(HIM) [stated in his interview NASAC gave b5 1
approval for the use o? [to get the armed honicecied fugitive out the - b7?: ?1
apartment. If? ?1

. IN The SWAT summer}: his ENSD interview meseo
I was resent dining discussions with the SWAT Lieutenant regarding the
(mm Les Vegas Free; of?ce SWAT team member 8335: advised he be - 1
had not received au?iorizotion to : froni any FBI of?cial. He received the command to ?1
from a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department SWAT operator. SA WE ?1
believed once SWAT arrived DIE-303116, it become ajoint operation, and since
leaders from both agencies were in agreement thatl the comand to

 

received by the SWAT operators also extmded to him.

Page 16 of 1?

 

NYT- 634

 

 

 

af?nnaiive appmval man prior to th

the approval 

I


 

{Wm SIRT Recommendation gig: NSAC Las Vegas sho?ld ensure every
participant in an FBI upemtinn is made aware 0f who is the OSC. Ifthe 03C changes dtuing?the
aparation, an a?'mna?va m??catim an all participants if The new OSC should he made.

{mm 1111? Recammendatinn 6h: AISAC Las Vegas shm?d ensure there is an
The: OSC shm?d at?nna?v?iy issue
and the SWAT Team Le'agier should a?knuwiedgc the approval.

Page  (REV. 5-3-10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlmniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Las Vegas SIRG Date: 06f11f2014
CC: b6 -1
-1
From: INSPECTION
Contact: I
Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By: b6 ?1
b7C -1
Case ID 297-HQ-31271699-D SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 05/21/2014.
Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated prepared
by Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) Shawn W. Stroud.
Enclosure(s}: Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) INSD Shooting Incident Report, dated 
Details:
On 05f21f2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 05f21f2013, involving Las Vegas Field Office
Special Agent I b6 ?1
-1
On 05/21/2013, at approximately 8:45 Assistant Team
Leader SAI land members of the FBI Las Vegas Special
UNCLASSIFIED

NYT-636

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

Weapons and Tactics team participated in an FBI Las Vegas SWAT
operation in support of case number 88A-LA-2876913, a Los Angeles Field
Office fugitive investigation. The operation included the Las Vegas
SWAT team executing a search warrant for fugitive subject

I As the SWAT team attempted to make
entry intoI I Las
Vegas, Nevada, by striking the door with a breaching 
multiple .45 caliber rounds at the SWAT team through the apartment door

 

 

 

 

b6 
and wall. After the SWAT team announced themselves, ch -117

fired additional rounds at the SWAT team through the door and b7E ?1
wall. instructed to exit his apartment and go out onto his
balcony. At this point, the front door move and feared
preparing to pull the door open and again shoot at the

team. the trajectory of the rounds to estimate the

location inside the apartment. his 
carbine nine times additional

rounds through the balcony sliding glass door. Following unsuccessful

 

negotiation efforts,I I
I Ishortly thereafter surrendered. 

was uninjured and transported to the Clark County Jail.

 

SIRG Observations

On 05/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG

unanimously determined the application of deadly force by b6 _1

?1
05f21f2013, was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly

Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective action concerning
operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. Th

SIRG made the following recommendations and observations:

UNCLASSIFIED

2



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

SIRT Observation 1: Las Vegas Field Office did not have

crisis negotiation elements pre-staged.

 

Analysis: Based upon numerous interviews, it was determined
crisis negotiators were not deployed on the 05f21f2013 incident until

after SWAT encountered a barricaded subject.

Las Vegas Field Office had no formal policy on the deployment

of crisis negotiation staff with SWAT deployments. However, per an
all?Agent FBINET E?mail from SWAT Coordinator, on b5 -1
01,124,12013, the following was established: 1?75 '1

?As a general rule a crisis negotiation team member WILL NOT stage with

SWAT during their operations. The crisis negotiation team will be on
standby and aware of the SWAT operation and will deploy if needed.
There are circumstances when crisis negotiation team members will stage
with SWAT,_primarily, when there are articulable facts that indicate
they should be present. Some facts include: the subject?s involvement
in a_prior barricade situation; information the subject may be
suicidal, has vowed not to be taken alive, or is prepared and waiting
for_police; intel that the area where the subject is located is heavily
fortified; or, any other information that the subject will likely not

surrender even when confronted by 

In addition, the SWAT Operations Unit clearly
articulated to all field offices, via communication with the Senior
Team Leaders at the annual SOU Conference, their recommendation to

deploy FBI Crisis Negotiators to the scene of each FBI SWAT operation.

Intelligence from both LA Field Office and a Confidential

Human Source known to barricade himself in places b6 -7
he was staying, he was known carry a firearm, he was facing a b7c ?7
substantial sentence for murder, and he had made statements he would

never be taken alive.

When crisis negotiators were requested during the 05/21/2013

incident, there was a substantial delay both in response and in

UNCLASSIFIED

3

NYT-638

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

coordination efforts between SWAT, FBI management, and FBI crisis
negotiators. Additionally, there was a delay in coordination with the

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department negotiators.

{Uf?g??gj SIRT Recommendation 1: SAC, Las Vegas should ensure

assessments of proposed SWAT operations are conducted, and FBI LV

 

negotiators are pre?staged with SWAT.

{Ufgig??j SIRT Observation 2: Confusion existed as to who approved,
and at what level approval was necessary, for the Las Vegas SWAT
Operations Order, dated 

 

Analysis: Corporate Policy Directive 0242B, Requirement for

Written Operation Order Field Operations, Section 7.l requires the

 

b6 -1
?1
?5

 

 

 

 

Section

 

8.2.2.1 states

 

 

 

Section ll.3.l statesl

 

 

The Las Vegas
SWAT team utilized the  Ifor the operation order. SWAT Assistant
Team Leader SAI Iprepared the operations order. Las Vegas
32, Command and Control, listed SSAI Ias the
On?Scene Commander. was the AKASAC and the SWAT
Coordinator. According to the AXSAC in his INSD interview, he asked

be On?Scene?Commander. Ias 34 was
titled ApprovalfAuthority; it did not indicate the plan was approved,

 

 

 

 

 

 

or who approved the plan. The Approval/Authority page was never signed
by the Special Agent in Charge, or designee, and there was no

indication formal approval of the plan was granted.

During his INSD interview, a copy of the final b6 ?1
version of the operations order is typically provided to the SWAT b7c ?1

Coordinator, who notes approval. 

reviewed a draft paper copy of the operations order and returned it.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

NYT-639

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

not sign a copy of the planstate he approved the plan. From presence at the

operations order presentation, and lack of negative feedback, 

understood the operations order to be approved.

During his INSD interview, AKASAC he gave
verbal approval of the operations order after listening to the briefing
of a written operations order was not
provided to him by 

Based on Las Vegas personnel interviews, the Shooting
Incident Review Team determined there was confusion regarding the
procedures for approving the operations order. As observed above, the
On?Scene Commander and the SWAT Assistant Team Leader had different
recollections of how the operations order was approved. A signed plan

would have alleviated any confusion regarding this matter.

SIRT Instruction 2: SAC, Las Vegas will ensure she, or her

designee, provides written or electronic approval of all written

 

operations orders for the execution of every Arrest and Search Warrant
and any other activity in which the practical application of firearms
might be reasonably anticipated. The approval should occur before the

operations order is presented to the participants.

SIRT Observation 3: Information regarding the 05/21/2013

crisis situation was not communicated to the Las Vegas Field Office

 

Communications Center.

Analysis: It was determined the Las Vegas Field Office
Communications Center did not receive a copy of the SWAT Operations
Order and was only advised telephonically of a potential SWAT operation
on 05f21f2013. During the SWAT operation and subsequent barricade
situation, the Communications Center was not given information
regarding the initiation of the arrest situation, shots being fired, or

a barricaded subject. The Communications Center was also not informed

UNCLASSIFIED

5

NYT-640

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

of the possible injury to an Agent. This prevented the Communications
Center from being an efficient communications coordination point for

the field office in support of the crisis.

Later that same evening, the Communications Center was
contacted by Las Vegas Channel 3 News inquiring about the SWAT arrest
and shooting incident. Although Communications Center personnel
reacted properly, they were caught by surprise by the press inquiry.
Previous knowledge of the crisis would have allowed the Communications
Center to be better prepared to handle press inquiries and other

pertinent communications regarding the incident.

(UXZESEQE SIRT Recommendation 3: SAC, Las Vegas should ensure

pertinent information regarding SWAT operations, to include initiation,

 

completion, and any critical situations stemming from the operation are

communicated to the Las Vegas Field Office Communications Center.

SIRT Observation 4: A Las Vegas Field Office SWAT operator

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

utilized a non-FBI-approved weapon duringl I b5 -1
-1

Analzsis: Las Vegas Field Office SWAT team b7E _1

advised due to low light levels outside the subject?s

residence, and because his FBI-issuedl Idid not

have a sight system suitable for low light environments, he utilized a

I [provided by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police

Department Thel Iprovided by SWAT

contained an E0 Tech sight which was better suited for low light

environments. received a familiarization brief from an 

SWAT operator prior to using the weapon. I I

Iby 5154:] and two SWAT

operators who were using additional 

Las Vegas Field Office SWAT Senior Team Leader (STL) SA

I Iconfirmed al Iprovided b5 -1

by SWAT and manufactured :1

Appendix in the Critical Incident Response Group, Special

UNCLASSIFIED

6

NYT-641

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas 07/16/2013 SIRG
Re: 06f11f2014

Weapons and Tactics, Policy Implementation Guide published February 29,
2012, contained the following list of authorized field SWAT weapons,
which did not include al Imanufactured -1



AppendiX'F: (U) Authorized Field SWAT weapons

 

(U) Current list of Bureau approved weapons acquired specifically

for SWAT operations(ml 
(U)
(UXEEQHQE SIRT Instruction 4: SAC, Las Vegas will ensure Las Vegas
Field Office SWAT operators, in the absence of exigent circumstances,
only use FBI?approved weapons authorized in the Special Weapons and
Tactics, Policy Implementation Guide.
SIRT Observation 5: Deficiencies were identified in Las
Vegas Field Office?s Crisis Response Plan.
Analzsis: Crisis Management Program Policy Implementation
Guide (PG), Section 5.2 statesl b7E '5

UNCLASSIFIED

7

NYT- 642

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

 

I I Las Vegas Field -5

Office's Crisis Response Plan contains an annex for Agent-involved

 

shootings. The Introduction section identifies and quotes FBI's policy
on the use of deadly force and references it as being set forth in
MIOG, Part II, Section lZ-2.l and in the Legal Handbook for Special
Agents Section 3-6.4.

MIOG, Part II, Section 12?2.l was superseded by the Domestic
Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), Appendix F, Dated
10/15/20ll. DIOG, Appendix F, and the referenced LHSA, Section 3-6.4,
sets forth the Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy. The Las
Vegas Field Office Crisis Response Plan does not cite or set forth the

current deadly force policy.

SIRT Instruction 5: SAC, Las Vegas will ensure the Las

Vegas Field Office Crisis Response plan cites and quotes current FBI

 

policy.

SIRT Observation 6: There was confusion as to whether FBI

EM gave approval tol I ?1

Analysis: Section 3.11 in the Critical Incident Response
Group, Special Weapons and Tactics, Policy Implementation Guide
published February 29, 2012, states:

 

 

 

 

 

 

-5
Istated in his INSD interview, he be '1
gave blanket authority to the OSC to the :1

operation, but did not know what policy or authorization level was

needed Idid not specifically give the

authorization to usel I

IEHK1E::]stated in his INSD interview he did not authorize

thel I Once he arrived on scene, he

was the OSO and was aware a decision already been

UNCLASSIFIED

8

NYT-643

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

made. in agreement withl I however, he was not 135 -1

aware FBI SWAT was even equipped tol 

in his INSD interview, he believed he
was the on?scene commander (OSC), even after 
on scene. he was never specifically asked for
authority for any FBI SWAT team member He stated he was
present during discussions between LUMPD Lieutenant

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

regarding thel but believed SWAT would be

(waged) coc  Istated in his mso interview Maser: b6 ?1
approval for the use of al Ito get the 
armed barricaded fugitive out of the apartment.

SWAT STLI Istated in his INSD interview 
present during discussions with the SWAT Lieutenant

regarding thel I

Las Vegas Field Office SWAT team member SAI I ha ?1
advised he had not received authorization any FBI 

official. He received the command from a Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department SWAT operator. 
believed once SWAT arrived on-scene, it became a joint operation,

and since leaders from both agencies were in agreement that

the command by the SWAT operators

also extended to him.

SIRT Recommendation Ga: SAC Las Vegas should ensure every

 

participant in an FBI operation is made aware of who is the OSC. If
the OSC changes during the operation, an affirmative notification to

all participants of the new OSC should be made.

SIRT Recommendation 6b: SAC, Las Vegas should ensure there

is an affirmative approval process prior to thel I The ?1

OSC should affirmatively issue the approval and the SWAT

Team Leader should acknowledge the approval.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT-644

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken
against a result of his involvement in this shooting

incident.

b6 ?1
-1

Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection

Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The

following voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P.

Gelios, Office of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, b5 ?1,3
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice b7c '1r3
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;Section

Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Violent Criminal Threats Section, Criminal
Investigative Division; SC Roger A. Coe, East Asia Section,

Counterintelligence Division; Unit Chief FTU, 

 

 

 

Supervisory Special Agent I Squad 
Washington Field Office; SSAI I, Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division Defensive
Systems Unit, SSAI IInvestigative Law Unit,
Office of the General Counsel; SSAI I Evidence
Response Team Laboratory Division Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response

 

 

 

 

 

Group (CIRG). In addition to the voting members in attendance, DOJ

SIRG unable to attend but reviewed the Shooting

Incident Review Team report and provided his report in writing prior to

the SIRG. The following non-voting members were also in attendance:

I I, Office of Inspector General, 

Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Shawn W. Stroud, Paul D. Delacourt, and b6 -1,3

Justin R. Tolomeo, OI, Team Leadersl I b7C _1r3
and
so Jay s. Tabb, ssa :  Evidence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Response Team, UCI I FTU, I Special
Assistant, OI, UCI land Management Program 
I I Inspection

 

Management Unit, INSD.

UNCLASSIFIED

10

NYT-645

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Las Vegas SIRG
Re: 06fllf2014

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

 

SAC, Las Vegas is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
InstructionfRecommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (TIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
InstructionfRecommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

#0

UNCLASSIFIED

ll

NYT-646

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

 

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD Date: 02/18/2014
OFFICE 03/01/2012

 

CC:

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6 -1
b7C -1
From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY
Contact:

Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 

SHIELDS ROBERT JR

Mark Alan Morgan

Nancy McNamara
Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following a SIRG meeting
held on 11/20/2013.
Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 04/22/2013 prepared by
former Inspector Thomas P. Ravenelle. A copy of the complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to this
communication.
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) INSD Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/23/2013.
Details:

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG convened to review a shooting incident
which occurred on 03/01/2012, involving Los Angeles Field Office
Special Agent I On 03/01/2012, at approximately b6 -1
b7C -1

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 03/01/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271741-D, 02/18/2014

8:33 participating in a joint FBI and Los Angeles

Police Department (LAPD) operation to locate and arrest Frank Eric

the November 2011 homiCide of two leaders Within his gang, the State b7E 

Street Boys. Investigation, to include 
located Martinez at a residence in La Mirada, CA. When FBI
Agents and LAPD Officers approached the residence, Martinez fled to the

Martinez. Martinez was a fugitive charged with two counts of murder for

garage roof on the house next door. Despite repeated commands to raise

his hands and comply with directions, Martinez refused and continually

secreted his right hand inside his pants. Believing Martinez was

concealing a weapon, LAPD Officers and FBI Agents told Martinez

multiple times in English and Spanish to put his hands up and come down

from the roof. As a LAPD Officer came forward with a shotgun and

non?lethal bean?bag rounds, Martinez quickly moved the right side of

his body in the direction of After hearing a single gun he '1
shot, fearing for his life, fired his assigned Colt k?c _1
rifle 22 times at Martinez. Three LAPD Officers also responded to

Martinez? actions and fired their service weapons. Martinez was struck

multiple times and died at the location. A subsequent investigation

determined Martinez was unarmed. Further investigation determined the

cellular telephone in the subject?s possession at the time of the

shooting contained the Android?based telephone application ?Russian

Roulette,? capable of generating simulated gunshot sounds.

Results of the SIRG

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

 

determined the application of deadly force 03/01/2012 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's deadly

force policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,

and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 03/01/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271741-D, 02/18/2014

standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or observations b6 _1
concerning the operational techniques used by this b7c ?1

shooting incident.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues. The SIRG made no recommendations or observations requesting

additional training for the agents involved in this shooting incident.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken
against as a result of his involvement in this shooting b6 -1
incident. ?1
Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection Division
(INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following
voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields,
Office of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice 
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC)

 

 

Jayne L. Challman, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox,

Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent

I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; 
Practical Applications Unit, Training Division

I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the b6 _1!3
General Counsel; Evidence Response Team (ERT), b7c _1,3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Laboratory Division I Firearms Training
Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)

Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group and 
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting
members were also in attendance:  
Office of Inspector General, Inspectors David Paul
Gelios and Shawn W. Stroud, OI, Team Leadersl land

OI, ERT, 
Special Assistant, OI, Unit and Management
Program Analyst  Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

I Date: 04/22/2013

Report of: IIC Thomas P. Ravenelle Of?ce: FBIHQ 

Case 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW:
REPORT OF SHOOTING 
LOS ANGELES FIELD 
03/01/2012

Investigative Period:' 03/01/2012 03/08/2012

Reference: Telephone call on 03/01/2012 from Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) Steven
M. Martinez, Los Angeles Field Of?ce (LAFO), to Chief Inspector Kenneth L. Moore,
Inspection Division (INSD), and telephone call from Assistant Director Keith L. Bennett, INSD,
to ADIC Martinez on 03/01/2012. 

 

?mms

 

On March 1, 2012, at approximately 8:33 am, LAFO SAI  was
involved in a shooting incident in La Mirada, California. SAI  was participating in a FBI
and?Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Fugitive Task Force (F TF operation to locate and
arrest Frank =Eric Martinez. Martinez was a fugitive charged with two counts of murder for the
November 2011 homicide of two leaders within his gang, the State Street Boys.

 

The investigation, to include court-authorized I indicated Martinez may
be located at a residence in La Mirada, CA, a suburb situated southeast of Los Angeles. The
FTP established surveillance of theI La Mirada residence after a 5:30 am.
operations brie?ng on March 1, 2012. Assessing the need for additional personnel to assist in
the Operation, the FTP requested support from the LAPD, Hollenbeck Division, Career Criminal
Detail (CCD) to effect the apprehension of Martinez. A coordinated operations plan called for
the FTP to maintain surveillance in advance of the CCD conducting a surround and call-out for
Martinez at the residence. 

When the CCD aeresidence, Martinez ?ed to the garage roof
of the residence next door Despite repeated commands to raise his
hands and comply with of?cers, Martinez refused and continually secreted his right hand inside
his pants. LAPD of?cers and FBI Agents attempting to arrest Martinez believed he may have

held a concealed weapon. Martinez was told multiple times by the of?cers in English and

 

 

 

 

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Spanish to put his hands up and come down ?om the roof. Martinez used his left hand to make a
call with his cellular telephone. His right hand remained tucked inside his pants. SA
heard Martinez on his tele hone say, ?Hey baby, I?m calling to say goodbye, I?m just callin7 to
say goodbye.? SAljwho was positioned at ground level at thel
residence, approximately 19 feet ?'om the elevated Martinez, attempted to engage Martinez in
dialogue and told him to come down from the roof and talk. Martinez looked at 
said, ?Fuck you, I?m not talking to you.? equested an LAPD of?cer
retrieve a shotgun with non-lethal bean-bag rounds.

 

 

 

Martinez tried to make another telephone call, which SAI:Ibelieved was
unsuccessful. Martinez appeared agitated and continued to yell profanities at the of?cers. As
the LAPD of?cer came forward with the shotgun and bean-bag rounds Martinez quickly moved
the right side-of his body in the direction of The bul evident in Martinez? pants,
where his right hand was concealed, was thrust toward SA Concurrent with this
movement by Martinez, SA other of?cers heard a single shot. elieved
Martinez had ?red a shot at him and fearing for his life, ?red his assigned Colt 
ri?e multiple times at Martinez. Three LAPD CCD of?cers, positioned to the rear of SA:
behind a cinderblock wall, also responded to Martinez? actions and ?red their service weapons at
Martinez. Martinez was struck multiple times and died at the location. He was subsequently
determined to be unarmed. 

 

Details

On November 30, 2011, a double homicide occurred in the city of Los Angeles, CA, in
Hollenbeck area. During the homicide investigation, LAPD homicide detectives
identi?ed one of the suspects as Frank Eric Martinez, a 27-year-old Hispanic male, who was a
member of the State Street Boys gang, a violent HisPanic gang in East Los Angeles. The two
victims were identi?ed as leaders in the same gang. Martinez was charged with two counts of
murder for the double homicide.

At the request of Hollenbeck Division, the Gang and Narcotics
Division TF attempted to locate Martinez. Utilizing a court ordered]

in the area of] Iin La Mirada, a suburb situated southeast of Los
An eles. Further investigation by the TF determined Martinez had associates at:
On February 29, 2012, the TF developed a plan to conduct surveillance the
follovving morning to determine if Martinez was hiding at thel:lresidence.

 

On March 1, 2012, at around 5:30 the FTP briefed an Operations Plan in a parking
lot located at the intersection of] in La Mirada, to
establish surveillance and possibly arrest Martinez. Based uponl I
Iwas believed to be located

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

at thel laddress. FTF TFOI Ialso obtained
Ithroughl
Icourt orders.  Iincluded statements
indicatingl 
Page 2 of 13

 

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l.

 

 

 

 

 

 

A review of the FTP erations Plan, time stamped March 1, 2012, at 5:30 am,
indicated LAPD'Detectiv as the investi atin of?cer and LAPD Detectivel I
as the coordinating supervisor. Detectiveliland SAI Ithe LAFO

Case Agent, provided background information, photographs, and  
The plan speci?ed the subject of the surveillance was Martinez and

 

 

he was believed to be at thel Iaddress. The plan noted Martinez had a
criminal history, was wanted for a double murder, and was considered armed and dangerous.
The plan required part cinants to law a raid jacket, body armor, ?ashlight, and hand-held radio.
According to the plan, was requested and

I Iwas checked to ensure the TF would not interfere
with another agency?s investigation at the residence, or enter into a blue-on-blue situation. The

CCD would rovide additional support if needed. 

[:2Iwas provided to the participants. Of?cer the Hollenbeck Division
(Homicide) Investigating Of?cer, provided updates and case information to participating
personnel.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Personnel participating in the surveillance operation included:

  
  

 

Police Of?cer (TFO) (LAPD)
Police Of?cer (TFO) (LAPD)
Police Of?cer (TFO) 

 

 

 

Police Of?cer
SA FBI)
SA (FBI)

The mission was to monitor the residence located atI
and con?rm or eliminate the location as the place where Martinez was hiding out.
indicated Martinez was at the location, the FTP wanted to verify his presence
through physical surveillance. The plan stated] I


I CCD personnel were placed on standby. If Martinez? presence
was con?rmed, the CCD would be contacted to effect the apprehension of Martinez through a
coordinated surround and call-out of Martinez at the residence. The arrest operation would
includel I

(LAPD)

 

 

 

 

in La Mirada,

 

 

 

Of?cer: and TFO Detectivel: conducted a

leaders' brie?ng and discussed the need for additional personnel. The plan noted if the subject
refused to comply with orders to surrender, noti?cation to the LAPD Metropolitan Division
would be made for a LAPD SWAT response. Of?cerl:lwould draft a search warrant for the

Page 3 of 13



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b6 -1,4
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location. SAI:Irecommended LAPD SWAT be contacted and made aware of the
operation. 

SA. advised the FTP did not have enou gh personnel to contain the subject if
located at th residence. Of?cerI informed SAI Ithe CCD had
additional of?cers available. Of?cerl:lcontacted Homicide Detectivel  and
requested he respond with CCD personnel to provide standby support. The CCD was re-tasked
from Parole Compliance Checks to support the FTP.

 

 

 

CCD ersonnel met at the Hollenbeck Station and briefed the Operations Plan. Of?cer
rovided the of?cer assignments for the arrest operation. Of?cerl:lbriefed
the CCD participants on the fugitive case, to include] I

 

 

 

Of?cer] contacted Of?cer

I  and obtained the information needed to complete an Operational Pl an for CCD personnel.
Their assignment was to contain the residence. If Martinez left the location in a vehicle, the
CCD of?cers would become the arrest team, as the were equipped with a marked black and
white police vehicle. After the brie?ng, Detective along with Of?cers
Iresponded toI
 and met with SAI Iwho provided an update regarding the status

 

 

 

 

 

 

of the surveillance.

CCD personnel were dressed in' plain clothes with utility belts and tactical vests marked
"Los Angeles Police" on the front of the vest and "Police" in white lettering on the back. CCD
personnel participating in the operation included: 

 

Detective 111' I Supervisor

Police Of?cer Containment/Arrest
Police Of?cer II Containment/Arrest
Police Of?cer II Containment/Arrest
Police Of?cer II Containment/Arrest
Police Of?cer II Containment/Arrest

 

 

 

 

At approximately 7:00 am. the FTP proceeded to the area of I I and
commenced surveillance. as carrying a Spring?eld 1911, .45-caliber pistol in his
holster, and he stowed his Glock 22, .40-caliber pistol next to the driver?s seat of his FBI vehicle,
a black Sport Utili Vehicle, to access the weapon more quickly when seated on a stationary
surveillance.? SA placed his blue ballistic vest with the word across the front,
on his front passenger seat, and also placed his loaded 5.56 45mm caliber Colt, M-4A1 ri?e,
serial numberl:l on the front passenger seat. SAI: stated his decision to not wear
his ballistic vest during the initial surveillance was an effort to conceal his status as a law
enforcement of?cer. parked his vehicle on the north curb line cg facing
west. He was positioned east and out of view of the target residence. TFO as parked
at the'southeast corner o? land had the primary view of the
residence. SAI  pIaced a sun screen over his Windshield, turned off the vehicle, and

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listened to radio traf?c. SA ommunicated with members of the task force on a Sprint-
Nextel telephone and his FBI radio. TFO : and Of?cer I:Icoordinated with of?cers
?om the CCD containment team.

At approximately 7:30 am, DetectiveI Iobserved aI Imale drive

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

away froml Iin al Iaccom anied 
I Imale. Of?cerl Ifollowed the vehicle to a nearby busmesinl?lcated
atI approximately 7:50 am, CCD personne were requested to
I CCD Of?cers
Iresponded andI Iand Of?cersI

 

 

 

 

I Of?cers learnedl I

 

Iand DetectiveI
ears of age, was driving the vehicle and had dropped of?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

years of age, atI land Of?cerI
interviewed him. I Istatedl

FresidenceI Iyears of age,l Ideparted the residence a
ort-time laterI IMartinez was at the
residence.

At a roximatel 8:12 am. art of the CCD team moved toI I
I near th esidence. With con?rmation Martinez was within the
Iresidence, a planned chan of tactical command was made from
Detective of the FTP to Detective Hollenbeck Division-(Homicide and LAPD
was requested. The CCD waited for the requested LAPDIjbefore
continuing W1 the operation. TFO irected the TF surveillance team to tighten up
their coverage. At this time, put on his ballistic vest with the word across

the front, and repositioned his vehicle forward, closer to the comer near the
residence.

 

 

 

 

 

 

At around 8:15 am, the LAPDI I announced on the radio it was
seconds away. At approximately 8:20 am, Detective Ianived at the staging location to
relieve Detectiv ho left the location to respond to the LAPD Police Administration
Building. The CCD team put on tactical gear and proceeded to the residence to execute the plan
to surround the residence and call-out Martinez. SAI Iarrive and move
into al I TFOI Itold SAI Ihe (SAI I would
be responsible for the north side perimeter and TFOI Iwould take the south side
perimeter. TFO Ibroadcasted on the radio the CCD of?cers were approaching the
residence. to execute the surround and call-out.

 

SAI Iwaited until the CCD of?cers passed his location, then drove his vehicle to the
west curb line of I Iand parked facing west towards the northern side of the target
residence. ad containment resPonsibility for the north side of the residence. SA

aw one marked and one unmarked CCD police cars approach the residence, and each

arked on the south side of the residence, facing east toward the front of the target residence. SA

activated his emergency lights, grabbed his M-4 ri?e, and exited the vehicle. 

stood in ?'ont of his vehicle and watched the north side of the target location. As 

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INN-654

 

 

direction of Martinez. SAI:Iheard 

 

 

 

view was obscured 3y heavy vegetation, he repositioned several yards north and west of his
vehicle. was carrying his M-4 slung across his chest.

 

 

A female, later identi?ed asl Iyears of age, exited
the residence and was quickly escorted clear of the area by the LAPD. Soon after, another
female, later identi?ed asl Ivears of age,
departed the residence and was also escorted clear. Martinez was therea?er observed looking
over/through a fence at the of?cers. The CCD of?cers shouted at Martinez, ?Police, Stop.? SA

bserved Martinez climb onto the roof of the residence immediately north of the target

residence. SAI: recognized Martinez based on photographs he saw earlier in the day. SA

gave Martinez commands to stop, and identi?ed himself. bserved Martinez
move northwest across the roof away ?rom his location. SAI:Iyelled to other of?cers to
indicate Martinez was on the roof. around the northeast corner 0

and continued running west across the yard ad 1 SA saw SA

ove ?orn north to south across (1 point his weapon up in the

give commands to Martinez to put his hands
up. SA : also gave commands to Martinez to put his hands up. Martinez had moved onto
the roof of the garage west of the residence ad I The pitched garage roof of
theI Iresidence was a separate structure with a connecting partial cover over
the adjoining courtyard between the residence and garage.

SA : saw SAI: move to a position on the west side of the garage, so SA

Imoved to a position on the east side of the garage. Three CCD Of?cers,

Ipositioned themselves outside a wall located at the northern edge of the
co ard, which provided the of?cers a clear view of the garage roof, and of Martinez. SA
?oved down the driveway and encountered a wooden gate leading to an area with access
to the east side of the garage. SA kicked the gate open and moved through it into the
small courtyard in order to provide coverage on the east side of the garage. The courtyard had a
narrow passage between the house and the garage, which led to a pool in the backyard. SA

00k a position in the courtyard .and pointed his M-4 towards the roof of the garage.

Martinez was on the west side of the garage roof and moved back and forth across the pitched
roof. SA : and the TFOS along the wall continued to yell at Martinez to stop and put his
hands up.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Martinez had his right hand tucked inside his pants. the three CCD
of?cers along the wall 1 all reported Martinez appeared to be
holding something heavy, and all said they observed a bulge in his pants where his right hand

 

was concealed. Martinez was told multiple times by the of?cers, in English and Spanish, to put 

his hands up. Martinez used his left hand to make a call with his cellular telephone. His right
hand remained tucked inside his pants. SAI:Ibelieved he (S was exposed and
without suf?cient cover, and moved to the northwest corner of the residence atI I

SAI:Icould hear Martinez on his tele hone say, ?Hey baby, I?m calling to say
goodbye, I?m just calling to say goodbye.? Martinez, ?Don?t do that. Come

down, let?s talk about it. Just come down and talk to me.?

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During the encounter, SAI:Iopened the door to the residence at I I

yelled ?police? to notify any occupants of his presence. SAI  opened the door in
order to have somewhere to go for better cover and concealment because he would have neither
if Martinez moved to the northem edge of the garage roof. who was positioned
approximately 19 feet from the suspect, lowered his weapon while attempting to engage
Martinez in dialogue, telling Martinez to come down from the roof and talk. Martinez looked at
SAI:hnd said, ?Fuck you, I?m not talking to you.?

Noting Martinez was not complying with instructions, used his radio to
request a bean-bag shotgun from his LAPD FTF counterparts. Of?cer moved from the
back yard of I Ito his vehicle, where he retrieved a bean-bag shotgun and
handed it to Detective "Detectivel:lmoved from the car towards the garage
where Martinez was pacing on the roof.

Martinez tried to make a second telephone call, which elieved was
unsuccessful. Martinezappeared agitated and continued to yell profanities at the of?cers. As
Detective pproached the garage with the shotgun and bean-bag rounds, Martinez
swun his body around and quickly moved the right side of his body in the direction of SA

The bulge evident in Martinez? pants where his right hand was concealed was thrust
outward toward SA: SA: heard a single gunshot and believed Martinez had just
shot at him. Fearin. for his life, SAI I?red his assigned Colt M-4 ri?e multi 1e times at
Martinez. Of?cers Ipositioned to the rear of SA behind a
cinderblock wall, also responded to Martinez? actions and ?red their service weapons at
Martinez.

 

A 06/26/2013 of?cer-involved shooting report of the Of?ce of the Inspector General,
Board of Police Commissioners, City of Los Angeles, included statements from LAPD
interviews of Of?cersl I(the INSD Shooting Incident Review
Team did not interview the three of?cers). According to the statements, Of?cers
I hlso observed Martinez with his right hand inside his pants. The three
of?cers stated they perceived Martinez was concealing a weapon, and each of the three of?cers
heard the sound of a gunshot as Martinez thrust his right leg forward in the direction of the Agent
and of?cers. Each of?cer reported Martinez? actions caused them to be in fear for their life, and
all three ?red their pistols.

Martinez subsequently fell onto the roof and continued to move with his right hand out of
View of SA the three LAPD of?cers. The Agent and of?cers advised they continued
to ?re until Martinez? movements stopped and he no longer posed a threat. Martinez was struck
multiple times and died at the location. As re?ected in the medical reports section below,
Martinez was struck 18 times.

A video recording of the incident was made by an unidenti?ed citizen and broadcast on
television station KNBC, Los Angeles. The recording showed Martinez on the garage roof and
the LAPD of?cers at ground level, pointing their weapons at Martinez. The poor quality
recordin ca tures portions of the shooting incident. A second recording made by a neighbor,

showed Martinez walking on the garage roof with his right hand inside the

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waistband area of his pants. The second recording showed Martinez move out of sight, followed
the sound of gun?re. The recordings were generally consistent with the accounts of SA

 

 

 

.and Of?cers  Ibut the poor quality provided limited
details.
Following the shooting, of?cers cautiously entered the courtyard area next to the garage.
TFO sumed 5 position covering the subject, and SA looked around his

area in an attempt to locate the impact mark ?om the round he believed Martinez ?red at him.
No gun was found on Martinez? person. No evidence of a shot ?red by Martinez was found by
SA : or the LAPD personnel who processed the scene. The LAPD led the subsequent
crime, scene investigation, assisted by FBI LA ERT.

As noted in the FBI Laboratory Report section below, it was determined the cellular
telephone in Martinez? possession at the tirne of the shooting contained the Android-based
telephone application ?Russian Roulette,? capable of generating simulated gunshot sounds.

Substantive Case Files

. The following substantive matter was under investigation at the time of the shooting on
03/01/2012: 

Frank Eric Martinez, A.K.A. Toker;
Fugitive (A)

UFAP-Murder (2 Counts)

00: Los Angeles



I After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

Frank Eric Martinez, A.K.A. Toker;
Special Agent - FBI Victim;
03/ 1/2012
Assault on a Federal Of?cer (AF 
00: Los Angeles



A. Administrative

The Shooting Incident Response Team (SIRT) was composed of the following personnel:

Inspector-in?Charge (IIC) Thomas P. Ravenelle
Inspector Ronald Twersky

Assistant Inspector/Team Leader 




Assistant Inspector-in-Place (NIP:

Page 8 of 13

 

 

 

 

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AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

All members of the Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) reviewed the FBI produced

videotape entitled,? "The Rain After the Storm - Shooting Incident Investigations."

On 03/01/2012, IIC Ravenelle communicated with LAFO 
arrange logistics for the SIRT. The SIRT traveled to Los Angeles on 03/01/2012 and arrived

during the late evening hours. On 03/02/2012, IIC Ravenelle met with LAFO ADIC Martinez to

discuss IN SD SIRT shooting incident protocols. IIC Ravenelle was informed the LAPD was

conducting a parallel investigation and would provide copies of their reports to the SIRT. ADIC

Martinez was advised signed sworn statements and taken by the SIRT would be
provided to the LAPD for inclusion in their investigative ?le.

On 03/02/2012, IIC Ravenelle met with all SIRT personnel and explained INSD SIRT

procedures. The SIRT met with members of the LAFO West Covina RA, which was assigned to
investigate the assault on a federal of?cer case initiated in response to the shooting incident. IIC

Ravenelle introduced members of the SIRT and outlined the SIRT protocols. There was an
opportunity for dialogue prior to start of the investigation. The SIRT subsequently visited the

scene of the shooting, and met with Force Investigation Division to discuss investigative

activity conducted and to coordinate the investigation.

During the SIRT investigation, one Si%ed Sworn Statement was taken ?ow. the

FBI A ent who discharged his weapon, 

who was represented by attorne

Federal Law Enforcement Of?cers Association. Other interviews and investigative

results were documented via Other FBI personnel, who participated in the surveillance
and arrest operation but were not directly involved in the ?shOOting, were allowed to read the PD-
302 documenting their interview and con?rmed the accuracy of the information provided. The

and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily. An FD-927 (Warning and

Assurance to Em 10 ee Requested to Provide Information Following a Shooting Incident) was

executed by SA

On 03/08/2012, an exit brief was provided by IIC Ravenelle to ADIC Martinez.

 

 

 

 

 

C. Personnel Involved in the Shooting
1. 
2. LAPD Police Of?cer II
3. LAPD Police Of?cer II
4. LAPD Police Of?cer II
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MVP-5538

 

 

 

Other Participants in the Operation


LAPD Detective II 
LAPD Detective II
LAPD Detective (TFO)

LAPD Police Of?cer (TFO)
Police Of?cer (TFO)
LAPD Police Of?cer (TFO)
LAPD Police Of?cer 
LAPD Detective 

LAPD Police Of?cer 
LAPD Police Of?cer I

 

 

 

 



0.
1.

D. Firearms Training

A review of LAFO training records for SAI: revea1ed he was in compliance with
?rearms quali?cation requirements.

E. Deadly Force Training

The Of?ce of Division Counsel for the LAFO provided quarterly legal training to Agents
during eleven training sessions conducted in October and November 2011. During each of these
sessions, training was provided on the Deadl Force Policy. The legal training sign-in sheet for
10/18/201 1 included the signature of SA Additionally, provided the

Deadly ?Force Policy during a meeting called by 02/23/2012, and again on
03/01/2012, when the Deadly orcehPolicy was briefed to participants of the Operation.

 

 

 

F. Use of Dodv Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

SA ore FBI SWAT-issued tactical clothing, including body armor, with the word
clearly visible across the ?ont of his clothing.
G. FBI Indices and National Crime Information Cegter (N CIC)

 

. On March 4, 2012,: Center Operations Specialist, LAFO, conducted
record checks of the California and National Crime Information Center (N CIC) for Frank Eric
Martinez (deceased), date of birth December 22, 1984, FBI number 366740VB9. Martinez?
criminal history documented four instances where Martinez was armed when arrested, one
instance in which he evaded law enforcement, and one violent felony. The criminal history
included the following information:

On December 31, 2001, at age 17, Martinez was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance.

On May 18, 2003, at age 18, Martinez was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance while armed. Martinez was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and

Page 10 of 13

MVP-659

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possession of a loaded ?rearm. Martinez was sentenced to 36 months probation and 180 days
jail.

On October 27, 2003, at age 18, Martinez was arrested for false imprisonment. Martinez
was convicted of false imprisonment, felon in possession of a loaded ?rearm, and possession of a
controlled substance for sale, and sentenced to six years in prison.

On November 17, 2006, at age 21, Martinez was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance for sale, and a violation of parole. He was convicted of felon in possession of a
?rearm, and sentenced to two years in prison.

On August 14, 2008, at age 23, Martinez was arrested for evading a peace of?cer and
possession of a ?rearm with a prior violent felony conviction. Martinez was sentenced to two
years in prison.

On August 26, 2010, at age 25, Martinez was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance and violation of paiole. Martinez was sentenced to two years in prison.

In addition, the CALGANG database record for Martinez listed him as a documented
member of the State Street Boys street gang with the moniker "Toker." The State Street Boys
gang 'was a violent Hispanic street gang based in East Los Angeles.

 

On March 4, ILAFO Center Operations Specialist, LAFO, ?96 '1 I 4
provided information obtained from  IParole Agent 1, Gang Global Positioning '1 4
System Agent, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDC), regarding a 
CDC?record for Frank Eric Martinez, date of birth December 22, 1984, CDC number V37978.
Robles indicated Martinez? record showed a social security account number of 551-83-0631,
Criminal Identi?cation Information number A22684072, and California Driver's License number
D3190207. Martinez had a special condition of parole not to have contact with any known or
unknown gang members. Martinez had been wanted as a parolee-atularge based on a warrant
issued on December 12, 2011.

H. ERT Report

The LAPD processed the scene. LAPD evidentiary ?ndings were included in the Force
Investigation Division, F011-12, Of?cer-Involved Shooting Investigation Report, which is
attached to this report as Appendix 1.

1. FBI Laboratory Report

The cellular telephone used by Martinez, a Samsung Galaxy, was recovered tom me 6 2
shooting scene at 2

b3 -1
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NYT- 65$}

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Operational Technology Division, and Electronic Analysis Unit?s
analysis of Martinez? cellular telephone revealed a total of 115 applications installed,
downloaded/cancelled, o'r uninstalled. One of the applications was the ?Russian Roulette?
Android-based telephone application developed by Sela?el. This application simulated the
sound of a gunshot when played. The application was installed in the telephone on January 12,
2012. Laboratory analysis could not determine if the application was accessed or running at the
time of the arrest operation.

The LAPD conducted ?rearms testing and magazine cartridge counts for the four
weapons ?red by the law enforcement of?cers. Each weapon was found to function as designed.
Investigation and analysis indicated SA ed 22 rounds from his 5.56 45 mm caliber
Colt, Model M4A1 ri?e; Of?ce ?red ei ht rounds from
his Smith Wesson, .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol, Model 4506; cer ?red 18
rounds from his Glock, .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol, Model 21; and Of?cer ed nine
rounds from his Smith Wesson, .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol, Model 4506. All counts
were .based upon each weapon being fully loaded prior to the incident, as indicated by each of the
involved of?cers/Agent.

Casings recovered from the scene included 22 casin matched to 5.56 45
mm caliber Colt, seven casings matched to Of?cer Smith Wesson .45 caliber pistol,
18 casings matched to Of?ceer Glock .45 caliber pistol, and eight casin matched to
Of?ce 3 Smith Wesson .45 caliber pistol. Shot calculations for Of?cer
were equal to the number of casings matched to their weapons. Casings matching the
weapons of Of?cer] and Of?cer I:Iwere one less than the LAPD estimated shot

counts. The discrepancy could be attributed to casings not being recovered at the scene, or to the
of?cers? weapons not being loaded to capacity before the incident.

 

 

J. Medical Reports

On March 4, 2012, Deputy Medical Examiner for the Los 'Angeles County
Coroner's Of?ce, conducted the autopsy of Martinez. Initial information ?om the autopsy
indicated Martinez was hit 18 times, with ten rounds being fatal. Of the 11 rounds recovered
from Martinez? body, ten were .223 caliber and one was .45 caliber. The Medical Examiner
categorized the gunshot wounds as follows:

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Total gunshot wounds 18

Fatal shots 10

Non-fatal shots 8 
Bullets recovered 11 (ten .223 and one .45)
Wound locations:

Head 3 shots (2 fatal, 1 non-fatal graze)
Right Upper Arm 1 upper arm (non-fatal shot)
Right Lower Arm 2 lower arm (non-fatal shots)
Chest and abdomen 7 (fatal shots)

Abdomen 1 (non-fatal shot)

Right buttock/?ank 2 (non-fatal shots)

Right thigh 2 (non?fatal shots)

The majority of rounds entered Martinez? body ?'om an angle consistent with a trajectory
from below and to the right of Martinez. According to Dr. 3 evaluation, Martinez would
not have survived his injuries even had medical attention been provided immediately after the
shooting incident. The amount of internal trauma to the lungs and vital organs would have
caused death Within seconds, and the bullet wound to the left side of Martinez' head resulted in
an "instant kill." The initial cause of death was reported as "Multiple Gunshot Wounds."

K. Declinat_i_9_1_1 by the Civil Rights Division

Upon com letion of the on?site inquiry, IIC Ravenelle coordinated SIRT investigative
?ndings with Special Legal Counsel, De artment of Justice, Civil Rights
Division. On August 27, 2013, Special Legal CounselI?:Inoti?ed Ins ector Twersky the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) declined prosecution of and the LAPD
of?cers for their actions during the shooting incident on March 1, 2012. This declination
represented the prosecutive decision of the DOJ Civil Rights Division and the United States
Attorney?s Of?ce for the Central District of California. This decision was memorialized in the
September 30, 2013 DOJ Civil Rights Division Notice to Close File located in Appendix C.

L. Local Prosecutive Opinion

Upon completion of the on?site inquiry, IIC Ravenelle coordinated SIRT investigative
?ndings with the Los Angeles County District Attorney?s Of?ce. On February 13, 2013,
IDeputy District Attorney, Los Angeles County District Attome ?5 Of?ce
provided a letter advising the District Attorney?s Of?ce declined to prosecute SA and the
LAPD of?cers for their actions during the shooting incident on March 1, 2012.

 

 

M. Inspector?s Observations

None.

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FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

 

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION Date: 08/21/2013
04/26/2012

From: INSPECTION
DA-INSPECTION MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: b6 ?1
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Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:  I

 

Case ID 297-HQ-A1271921-D (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

 

 

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 04/26/2012, involving Special Agent

[of the San Juan Division. While walking toward b6 ?1
a bank, a masked male hitting a bank customer on the b7C ?1

head with a handgun. five rounds from his Bureau?issued
Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol injuring the subject. SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against 
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident. One Observation
and associated Instruction was adopted by the SIRG for the San Juan
Division.

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference report of Inspector Robert J.

Shields, Jr., dated 07/05/2012.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and

recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

 

On 04/26/2012, at approximately 11:30 b6 ?1

was walking toward the Banco Popular Bank to make an ATM withdrawal. b7C ?1

As he approached the bank, a masked male, later

UNCLASSIFIED

NTWZEEB

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 04/26/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271921-D, 08/21/2013

 

identified asI I attacking a bank customer. b6 '1,7
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saw the subject possessed a handgun and was repeatedly hitting the

victim in the head with the weapon.

 

himself behind a parkedI I b6 '1y5l7
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by  SAI Iremoved his firearm, took aim at

and shouted I Iturned toward 

while holding the handgun. Fearing for his life, one
round at the subject. toward al I
parked in front of the bank and fired one round at SAI Ias he
reached the vehicle. four additional rounds at
he entered the getaway car. The getaway car, driven by
an individual later identified as  I sped from the
scene and crashed into the front driver?s side area of 

the crash and was run over by the

getaway car as it became dislodged from 

 

 

 

 

the getaway car on foot, obtained the license b6 ?1
plate number, and contacted the San Juan office to advise he was b7c ?1
involved in a shooting. He requested the receptionist contact 
I I and send assistance to the scene. call was

subsequently transferred to the radio room and he advised of the

 

 

shooting and requested that the local police be notified and respond to
the scene. He also provided the license plate number of the getaway

vehicle and requested an NCIC check.

aid subsequently entered the b6-i,5

bank to ensure the safety of everyone inside. b7c "1,5

was located a mile alway in the Rio Hondo 4 b6 '7,8

neighborhood. Two residents provided San Juan investigators recordings b7c ?7?8
from their residential security cameras at the time 

was abandoned. The first resident's camera captured 

parking across the street from the resident's house. AI I

I land

I Iexited entered front

passenger seat and rear passenger side. The second resident's security

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2



 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 04/26/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271921-D, 08/21/2013

camera briefly captured thel Ientering the neighborhood,
followed by Thel Ithen passed by the residence at

reported stolen on

 

approximately 11:30 a.m.
04/11/2012.

Based on the circumstances of the robbery, San Juan determined the

 

 

 

On 04/27/2012, FBI SAs and TFOs were conducting interviews of
family members at a residence Puerto Rico.

I Iarrived at the residence, was placed under arrest, and

 

 

taken to a hospital where he was treated for two gunshot wounds and

released to law enforcement authorities.

 

On 05/21/2012,  was also arrested for his involvement

in the robbery and shooting incident.

 

 

On 05/05/2012,  Assistant United States

Attorney Criminal Division Chief, District of Puerto Rico, advised an

 

investigation into the shooting incident was not warranted.

 

On 08/22/2012, Mr.
Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ), advised the

Criminal Section, Civil Rights

 

circumstances of the Agent?involved shooting did not, "warrant a

federal criminal investigation of this matter."

On 05/23/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned shooting
incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Jr., Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector
Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections (OI), Trial
Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice



 

I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,

 

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 04/26/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271921-D, 08/21/2013

Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,

Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent I b6 -1
Squad Washington Field Office; SSAI IPractical b7c ?1
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI I

Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; 

Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; 

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Response Group SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, and I Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Gregory T. Bretzing, Christopher W. Davis, and Ronald Twersky, OI,
Team Leaders  
SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit, 

Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Operations and Training Unit, I Resource

 

 

Planning Office, Director?s Office; SWAT
Operations Unit, Safety and Occupational Health 
Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit,
Facilities and Logistics Services Division; Management and Program
Inspection Analysis Unit, and MPAs

 

 

 

 

I I Inspection Management Unit,
INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent to:
evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the Director
with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for
corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4)

provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force

employed by was justified and in conformance with the b6 ?1
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UNCLASSIFIED
4



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 04/26/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271921-D, 08/21/2013

Deadly Force Policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against 

as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following observation and

instruction of the Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT):
OBSERVATION

Observation The shooting response plan was not activated by the

 

San Juan Radio Room.

On 04/30/2012, the SIRT reviewed the San Juan Crisis Response Plan,
Section Annex 5, Tab A detailing the response protocol for the
Radio Dispatch Room.

Analysis: The San Juan Radio Dispatcher had responsibilities to:
gather information about the shooting; support the Agent involved;
dispatch emergency medical assistance; and if tactical, dispatch backup
units; and immediately notify specified field office personnel. The
radio dispatcher was to support the Agent involved by providing
additional information as it became available, pending the arrival of
additional FBI personnel at the scene and, advise/remind the Agent of
the Agent's responsibilities as they pertain to an Agent involved
shooting incident. In addition, the radio dispatcher was to dispatch
emergency medical assistance, such as ambulance or EMS, and additional

backup units if the situation was still tactical.

The SIRT determined the San Juan Radio Room Dispatcher did not make

any notifications regarding the shooting incident.

Instruction SAC, San Juan will ensure the San Juan Radio Room

 

personnel are appropriately trained to activate the Crisis Response

Plan when an Agent Involved Shooting occurs.

UNCLASSIFIED

5



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UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 04/26/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271921-D, 08/21/2013

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE 

The Inspection Division (INSD), is

responsible for ensuring that each Inspection Instruction/

Inspection Management Unit (IMU)

Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains an Inspection
Instructions/Recommendations database and provides the INSD
(AD)

Instructions/Recommendations.

Assistant Director a quarterly report reflecting all outstanding
The inspection process is not complete
until all Instructions/Recommendations have been satisfactorily

resolved.

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector?in?Charge (IIC),
who will determine if each Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved
or requires further action. Resolution will be based upon specific
actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the division has
If the IIC

determines an Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved,

under consideration or plans to take in the future.
an EC
will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon

resolution, all Instructions/Recommendations will be appropriately

noted in the database.

SAC 
the Instruction in this EC, pages 4 and 5,

San Juan is required to provide detailed responses addressing
including corrective actions
Each

Observation which results in an Instruction/Recommendation must be

taken and/or intended actions with time frames for completion.

responded to in a one?page, stand?alone response. The Observation and
related Instruction is to be recited verbatim from the inspection EC,
followed by the field office's detailed response. If supporting
documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each

response .

All initial and follow?up responses must be sent to the IMU on
plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Inspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room
I addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached

responses, please E?mail the Sentinel link to MPAI I

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

6



b6 -1
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 KATHERINE FERNANDEZ RUNDLE

 

 

- 'sj 

STAT-E, ATTORNEY
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT or FLORIDA
E. R. GRAHAM-BUILDING
1350 AVENUE
FLORIDA 33l36?21 ll

STATE ATTORNEY

June 6, 2014

Mr. George Piro

Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation
16320 Northwest 2"d Avenue
North Miami BeaCh, FL 33169

Re: Special Agent : 

Dear Special Agent Piro:
,You should please accept this letter as the State Attorney?s ?nding that Special Agentl:l
5 use of deadly force on July 2012 in Miami Dade County, Florida, was legally

justi?ed pursuant to Section 776.012, Florida Statutes, which permits the use of deadly'force 

when a person reasonably believes such force?ris necessary to prevent imminent death or great
bodily harm to himself or prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 

Ordinarily, our established procedure in these types of matters concludes upon the issuance of a
formal police shooting close-out memorandum. In this case, in order to facilitate the prosecution
of the surviving subjectl Iwe'procee'ded with the issuance of Sub oenas to

. the involved shooting law enforcement of?cers, including Special Agent We
conferred immunity on all inVolv'ed. shooting officers. 

A formal memorandum will be generated regarding the incident of July 3-1, 2012. When that
memorandum is completed, a copy will be forwarded ?by. the State Attorney to 'you as the
employing agency head for Special Agent

As we have provided most if not all Of the investigative reports in thisrcase to counsel for Mr.

in accords withour state discovery rules of procedure, then these papers are now part I

of the publicrecord. As a courtesy to yOtir agenCy, a complete copy of the investigative ?le-has
been prepared and is available to you. .

TELEPHONE (305)547-0100


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.

 

Mr. George Piro

 

 

 

 

June 2014
Special Agent: b6 ?1 4
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Please do not hesitate to contact me or my colleague,  should you have "any qUeStions.
Sincerely,
KATHERINE FERNANDEZ RUNDLE
State Attorney
b6 ?4
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By:
Assistant?taWemey;

 

 

 

 

Assistant State Attorney

 



 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date:? 12/16/2013
Report of: Thomas P. Ravenelle Of?ce: FBIHQ INSD
(mm Case 
(UI/Eoetr? Title: SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI
07/31/2012 -

(ll/M Investigative Period: 07/31/2012 03/04/2012

 

(mined) Reference: Telcal on 07/31/2012 between 
and Inspection AD Keith L. Bennett.

 

Synopsis:

occurred in the from yard ofl

On 07/31/2012, at approximately 6:45 pm, an Agent-involved shooting
IMiami, Florida. The Agent involved, SE
was assigned to the High Intensity Drug Traf?cking Area (HIDTA) Task Force, Squad

 

C-13. SA : was involved in a static surveillance of a suspected ?Grow House? with four
Miami Dade County police of?cers. All the of?cers were FBI TFOs assigned to Squad C-13.

While ap

roaching a male who was observed coming out of the front door of the residence, SA

 

 

and the TFOs were ?red upon by a subject later identi?ed as Gerardo Delgado, who

exited a vehicle parked in the driveway of the residence. TFO as struck three
times and received injuries to his lower torso and pelvic area. SA and the TFOs

returned ?re striking Delgado four times in the torso and once in the head.' Delgado expired as a

result of his wounds. TFO

as operated on and fully recovered.

Details:

(WM On 07/31/2012, at approximately 6:45 pm, a static surveillance was

conducted by FBI SAI land four TFOs from the Miami Dade Police

These TFOs were Sergeantl

De artment. 
Detectivel:l Detective:

 

 

and Detectivel:l All four TFOs and SA  were assigned to an FBI-lead HIDTA

Task Force
operated at

Squad C-13. The team was reacting to a tip a marijuana ?Grow House? was
I Miami, FL. The surveillance was in support of 
I. The residence was located in a lower middle-class

 

 

neighborhood of Miami, not known for this type of activity.


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NYT- 6? l;

 

 

 

 

LY

(Wm All ?ve team members were in individual vehicles positioned in the area
011 I TFOI Iwas observing the rear of the residence from one block east.
The residence was a one story single family structure facing west. A driveway was located on
the north and south sides of the property and connected by a concrete pad. A large : tree
was located in the front yard of the house. AI Iwith Florida license
platel land al Iwith Florida license plate] !were parked in the north
driveway. AI Iwith Florida license plate was parked in the
south driveway.

 

(Wm A security video system, with audio, located inside of the residence,
captured the event through two cameras, one located on the porch of the home facing west and
the other on the northeast corner of the home facing west southwest, effectively covering the
'front yard where the incident occurred. The system was recovered during the execution of a
search warrant at the residence. Subsequently, a separate search warrant was obtained to recover
audio and video data from the security system.

(WM TFO : was parked across the street from the residence with the "eye"
on the location. His vehicle was parked in a nearby driveway facing away from the residence.
An individual, later identi?ed as Gerardo Delgado, male, Hispanic, DOB 12/08/1955, wearing a
blue and white ?annel shirt, jeans, and hat exited the residence atI land stood
on the porch. other TFOs and SA : to move towards the residence to
make contact with the individual. TFOI: then backed his vehicle onto the street before
exiting it, blocking the south side driveway. Delgado, unobserved, exited the porch, moved a
short distance to thel land entered the vehicle. Almost simultaneously, an individual,
later identi?ed asl exited the home and
stood on the porch. Iwas wearing similar clothes and resembled Delgado.

(WM TFO I:Irounded the high fence on the south side of 

[and was the ?rst to enter the yard. He did not see Delgado enter the: TFO
Ifocused on who was on the front porch. He approached the porch
attempting to engag in conversation. TFOI [approached the: but moved

 

 

 

away to support TFO  : becaus began moving towards the north side of the
?yard _in a non-compliant manner. SA moved towards the confrontation in the yard,
west of the tree.

 

As TFOI I TF OI land SAI:Imoved towards

- dc driver's-side door of thel:lopened; Delgado exited, and immediately pointed
a Colt MK-4 Government Model 80 caliber semi-automatic handgun (Serial GMU-298) at SA
As the door opened, TFO SAI:Iimrnediately turned towards the
car, reacted to the weapon, and drew their handguns. Both gave a verbal command and then
?redmultiple times at Delgado. Delgado was struck multiple times in the chest and
subsequently moved north to the large tree in the center of the yard for cover.

(U HM SAI Imoved backwards, westbound, while engaging Delgado.
Delgado ?red multiple times at TF 0   as'T oved northeast towards the


Page 2 of 11

LY

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b6 -4,7
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NYT- QEE

 

 

 

 

 

LY

house'and the parke
of approximately four yards.

(WM was struck three times, stumbled, and moved around the

ruck for cover. grabbed TFOI Ibehind thel:l punched and

kicked him several times and TFO dro ed his weapon defending himself. After a
signi?cant struggle with TF escaped westbound down the driveway after
the shooting ended. TFO ell to the ground behind truck and was given

medical assistance by responding of?cers. He had two ?through and through? wounds, one- to
his left upper thigh and another to his right pelvis. The third shot possibly struck the lower part
of his vest and redirected into his body, damaging his spleen and lower intestines. He was
airlifted to Jackson Memorial Hospital for surgery.

11 the driveway, while continuing to engage Delgado at a distance

(Wm TFOI: pulled up in his truck facing south and blocking the north side
driveway. He exited his vehicle and took a position of cover behind it. SAI:Imoved
behind TFO truck. TFO I:  Engaged Delgado while moving westbound to join SA

and TFO ehind TFO truck. TFO ired from behind the truck and
struck Delgado once in the right upper cheek area with a de?ected shot off of the tree Delgado
was utilizing for cover. Delgado fell to the ground, dropped his weapon within reach, and
remained there until the time he was removed for medical attention. Delgado continued to make
noises and periodic body movements the entire time he was on the ground. 

 

 

No immediate approach was made to Delgado or the house due to the
unknown potential dangers within the residence. was not cooperating and Was hiding
near the location of TF 5 weapon. Delgado was eventually removed tactically by
several uniformed officers who arrived on the scene after the shooting had ceased.

(WM who had moved during the incident to the northeast corner of
the house, could be heard talking to a 911 operator on the video. Once marked units arrived on
the scene, complied with commands and surrendered by moving to the street.
Commands to both Iand Delgado were given in English and Spanish.

(WEEKS) covering the rear of the residence and was not
involved in the shooting.

(WM SAI:If1red his duty weapon, a Glock 23, seven times. TFO
I:I?red his duty weapon, a Glock 17, 10 or 11 times. TFO ired once with his
Glock 17 duty weapon. TFOI: f1red his duty weapon, a Glock 17, four times. Subject
Delgado ?red four times with a .380 Colt semi-automatic pistol. He experienced a stove-piped
jam on'his fourth shot. The casing remained in the stove pipe position when the weapon was

dropped.

(WM SAI Iwas wearing a ballistic vest marked TFOs
I Iwere wearing ballistic vests marked 

 

. 

Page 3 of 11

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LY

Delgado expired from his wounds at Kendall Regional Hospital at
approximately 7:39 pm. 

The Metro-Dade Police Department TFOs involved in the shooting
incident gave statements and were represented by Metro-Dade Police Department PBA
attorneys. was represented by FLEOLA during his Signed Sworn Statement given
on 08/04/2012. 

 : was interviewed by the Metro-Dade Police Department on the
night of 07/31/2012. He stated he was not sure if they Task Force members] were cops
or if it was a rip-off. was charged with the following violations of the Florida Penal
Code:

Second Degree Felony Murder - 782.04(2) 

Traf?cking marijuana over 25 lbs. 893.135

Possession of a place used to manufacture controlled substance - 
Possession of Cocaine .5 grams - 893.13

(Wm The Metro-Dade Police Department processed the scene. FBI
Miami ERT was not involved. As of the date of this report, it is unknown whether
spherical photography was completed by the Metro-Dade Police Department.

(Wm The autopsy of subject Delgado occurred 08/02/2012, and the results
were pending as of the date of this report. -

I: and Delgado were known

to be involved in the jewelry
business in the area. . .

(Wm U.S. Military Records Check:

I (WM) A check for service in the U.S. Military was conducted with negative
results for both subjects.


(ll/M Miami Dade Coung Police Department Reports:-

In 06/2014, the State Attorney?s Of?ce of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of
Florida provided INSD with the Miami Dade County Police Department?s investigative report,
of?cer reports, crime scene reports, and photographs pursuant to the Agent-involved shooting on
07/3 1/2012.

(Wm Medical Reports:

In 06/2014, the State Attorney?s Of?ce of the Eleventh Judibial Circuit of
Florida provided INSD with the Miami Dade County Medical Examiner Department Report 
dated 07/31/2012. - 

UNCLASS LY

Page 4 of 11

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-7

 

 

 

NLY

Enclosures:

(U) All enclosures have been made part of this report and were identi?ed in the
enclosed table of contents.

A. (WM Administrative:

(Wm The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was composed of the
following personnel: .

Inspector-in?Charge 110 Thomas P. Ravenelle
Team Leader  I

.

Assistant Inspector-in?Place 
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol:_

All members of the SIRT reviewed the Inspection Division Shooting
Review Protocol.

 

(U/Eon?) On 07/31/2012, 110 Ravenelle spoke to the 
about the limited information surrounding the incident and arranged logistics for SIRT arrival.

(wiped) On 08/01/2012, the SIRT personnel traveled to Miami, Florida, and met at
the Miami Field Office. The team attempted to view the location of the incident, but was
limited due to media attention. The SIRT was briefed on the investigation and incident by-
Sergean't Homicide Bureau Miami-Dade Police Department.

(Wm On 08/01/2012, the SIRT met with Miami Executive Management to
explain the review process and protocols.

C. Personnel Involved in the Shooting:

Personnel present at time of discharge of weapon:

 
   
 

Of?cer
Of?cer
Officer

iami-Dade Police Department)
(Miami-Bade Police Department)
(Miami?Dade Police Department)

 

LY

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b6 -l,4
b7C -1,4

 

 



(WW FBI personnel interviewed during reviewAntonio Field Of?ce)
SA Antonio Field Of?ce)
TIS
OS
CTOC 
CTOC 
D. Firearms Training:
Review of Miami and San Antonio training records for SA: b6 -1
revealed he was in compliance with ?rearms quali?cations requirements. 137?: '1
E. (DIM Deadly Force Training:
(WM Review of San Antonio CDC records revealed SAI:Ire_ceived .
?deadly force training on 09/23/2011 and 12/09/2011.
P. Use Of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?erswere in plain clothes wearing body armor with law
enforcement identi?ers and markings.
- G. Criminal Histog:
A check for concealed weapons permits in the State of Florida
was negative for Delgado. I:Iwas issued a concealed weapons permit with an b6 -4
expiration date of 01/24/2017. b7C '4
. b3 -4

(Wm NCIC checks were negative for Delgado and: ACS
search results were negative for Delgado. Onel:lreference forl:ldated
was identi?ed.

H. (mm Evidence Recovery and Laboratory Division Reports:

(Wm Metro-Bade PD processed the crime scene. There was no FBI ERT
involvement regarding the processing of the crime scene.

OR LY

Page 6 of 11



 

l, 

 

 



(Wm Metro-Dade PD provided c0pies of all crime scene photographs taken to
FBI Miami, and they were subsequently forwarded to INSD for inclusion in this report.

(U Metro-Dado PD took custody of all TFO wea ons involved in the
shooting. ook possession of SAEPS weapon upon arrival at the
shooting scene. SA ook possession of the wea on, cleared it, and facilitated
Metro-Dado photographing of the weapon. Squad C-13 supervisor,-
then took custody of the wea on and took it to the HIDTA of?ce where he locked it in his safe.
On 08/02/2012, SSAI:EIprovided the weapon to Criminalis Firearm and
Tool'Mark Examiner, Metro-Dado PD for a ?rearm operability test. At the completion of the

test, the weapon was returned to SS and subsequently turned into the Miami Field
Of?ce.

I. Medical Report:

FBI Agent Involved in the Shooting:

(Um No injuries.

TFO Involved in the Shooting:

TFO gnawed three gunshot wounds. He received two ?through

and through? wounds, one to his 1e upper thigh and another to his right pelvis. The third shot
possibly struck his lower vest and redirected into his body, damaging his spleen and lower
intestines. 

Subjects: 

(U/lE?lle) Delgado was struck four times in the torso and once in the head. Delgado
expired as a result of his wounds. 

I. (unheard) Civil Rights Division:

(Wm On 08/01/2012, IIC Ravenelle contactedl:  Special Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division and briefed him on the shooting

incident.

(Um/76m On 03/15/2013, Special Legal Counsel provided a declination
by the DOJ Civil Rights Division to IIC Ravenelle. Mr. stated, ?There is no evidence
to support an investigation to determine whether the federal criminal civil rights statutes could
have been violated.?

 

K. (Wm Local Prosecgtive Opinion:

. (mm On 06/06/2014, State Attorney Katherine Fernandez Rundle of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida provided a letter of declination to INSD. State Attorney



Page 7 of 11



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LY 

Rundle stated the State Attorney found that, ?Special Agentl:ls use of deadly force
on July 31, 2012 in Miami Dade County, Florida, was legally justi?ed pursuant to Section 
776.012, Florida Statutes, which permits the use of deadly force when a person reasonably .
believes such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.?

L. Inspector's Observations!

(U/fgoerj None.-



Page  

IUD-1057 Giev.5-8-10)


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD Date: 08/15/2014
OFFICE 07/31/2012

 

b6 -1

CC:
b7C -1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
Contact: STROUD SHAWN W, 202-324-5069

Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

Drafted By: STROUD SHAWN 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following a SIRG
meeting held on 07/31/2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 12/16/2013,
prepared by former Inspector Thomas P. Ravenelle. A copy of the
complete INSD Shooting Incident Report was uploaded to the captioned
file.

Details:

On 07/31/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 07/31/2012, involving Special Agent (SA)

I I On 07/31/2012, at approximately 6:45 a static b6 '1r7
surveillance was conducted by FBI Miami four TFOs b7c 
from_the Miami Dade Police Department. All four TFOs and 
were assigned to an FBI?led HIDTA Task Force. The team was reacting to

 

 

 

a tip a marijuana ?Grow House" was operated atl I







Title: (U/Zibe?? SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 07/31/2012
Re: 08/15/2014

Miami, FL. During the surveillance, a TFO noticed an individual, later
identified as Gerardo Delgado exit the residence and stand on the

porch. The TFO notified the surveillance team to move towards the

residence to make contact with the individual. As the team began to

move from their static positions, Delgado, unobserved, moved a short

distance to entered the vehicle. Almost simultaneously, b6-4q?r7

 

 

 

an individual, later identified asI I exited the b7c _1?4?7
home and stood on the porch. wearing similar clothes
and resembled Delgado. As TFOI Iapproached the house, he

 

focused who was on the front porch, not realizing
Gerardo Delgado had moved to the vehicle. along with TFO

the porch attempting
to conversation. moving away in
a non?compliant manner. TFOI IfollowedI I 

who was approaching the house with TFOI I moved towards TFO
I I As the TFOs and towards

the driver's?side door of trE2E::]Opened; Delgado exited

and immediately pointed a semi?automatic handgun at TFO

turned towards the car, reacted to

the weapon, and drew their handguns. Both gave a verbal command and

 

then fired multiple times at Delgado, who fired his weapon four times.
Delgado was struck multiple times in the chest and subsequently moved
to a in the center of the yard for cover. TFO b6 -1,4,7

struck three times by Delgado. As for b7c _1?4?7

Aiter a significant struggle

down the driveway and fell to the

ground behind a TFO vehicle and was given medical assistance by

responding officers. a position of cover with TFO

 behind a TFO vehicle. From behind the vehicle, 
fired one round and struck Delgado in the right upper cheek

area. The round had deflected off of Delgado fell

to the ground and remained there until officers took him into custody

 

 

 

and removed him for medical attention.  were
transported to the hospital. surgery and
eventually made a full recovery. Delgado succumbed to his wounds.



2





Title: (U/ng??b SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 07/31/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271748-D, 08/15/2014

moved during the incident to the northeast b6 -7

corner of the house. Once marked units arrived at the scene, b7C ?7

complied with commands and surrendered.

Results of the SIRG

On 07/31/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously
determined the application of deadly force by b6 ?1
was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly Force policy. b7c ?1

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational
planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made

no observations regarding this shooting incident.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken
against a result of his involvement in this shooting b6 ?1
incident. b7c ?1
Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD,
chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following members
were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Paul D. Delacourt, Office
of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
United States Department of Justice I Special
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC) Robert

 

 

 

E. Hughes, Criminal Investigative Division; Acting SCI I
Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent 
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
I I, Squad Washington Field Office; Unit Chief

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division
SSAI I Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU),
Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit,
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,

3

NITZEBI

UNCLASSIFIEDHEQEO:

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 07/31/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271748-D, 08/15/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Critical Incident Response Group and UCI I b6 -1,3
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting individuals were b7c _1?3
also in Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division,

I Office of Inspector

General, Internal

Affairs, Customs and Border Patrol I UC

 

 

 

I I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, SSAI I
ERTU, Inspectors Shawn W. Stroud, Timothy M. Feeney, Trent R.
Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI,
Team Leaders] I

I I and

I IOI, I Special Assistant, OI,

Management Program 

Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

09

NIWZQBE

 

OPHCE GF- WE srmas 
Cam CUUNTV. iLmes

ANNA PRQSECUTWNS EUHEQU

23:53 SGUTH AVENUE
EGGM: 13.818
EGWP
b6 ?4
STATES ATTURNEY b7C ?4
m3: 613-4963

Augu?i 5+ 293 3

inspecmr Shawn W, Stde
?nial-3i Bur-em: 0f 
Enspcul?im?z Divissim

93:3 Ava. NW
Waxhingtmi, EEC, H3535

RE: 35$ 

Dali?3T 'Euap?ci?r Strand,

This; latter is in muf?n: ?it-M Ihe Prnf?s?imial Standards Uni? m" me {Teak County (IL) Static-?5 Atmmay?s

0mm mv?eweii this case the. mw??ai shaming- Special Again 135 ?1 7
that warmed m1 March El 3013? in Chicagu We hat-E mnaiude? that conduct nf?SA in this NC '1 I 7

inci-?mu gives rim: it? marge him with any State crimi?naai offense.

We appreciate your ihmuugh and campieta im~*estigatim this matter. Please me if gnu have
an}; 

Reamer 1?13: ha

 

 

b6 -4
b7C -4

 

 

Assismm State?s Amway

Supmvimr

Pm?t?aim?al Standard? 

(301me Siatc?s Atmmey?s 
Efx?i}  Cah?n?nm A we,



Chi??g?, IL 606%



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# 15?cv?O9133

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No Duplication Fee 
For this Page 



 

  

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Date: 06/11/2014
Incident: 03/25/2013

 

CC: b6 -1
b7C -1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
Contact: I I

 

Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:  

 

Case ID 297-HQ-A1271285-D (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 02/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division?s (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/12/2013, prepared
by Inspector?in?Charge Shawn W. Stroud.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) Chicago SIRT Report dated 0/25/2013

Details:

On 03/25/2013, at approximately 12:30 three Chicago

Field Office Agents,  I while b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

going to lunch and looking for a place to park at a parking lot located
at 1220 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, noticed an individual

kneeling near a sport utility vehicle. When the individual got into

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

 

the driver?s side of an adjacentI I (herein

referred to as sedan), repositioned it to the other side of the sport

 

utility vehicle and got out, Idetermined the

driving and did not

 

individual was stealing hubcaps.

see what the individual was doing.

 

the Bureau vehicle and 

immediately got out and approached the sedan. Upon seeing the Agents

approach, the individual stealing the hubcaps got back into the sedan.

The sedan had three occupants, who were later identified as driver

 

 

and rear
Iwanted to get the
license plate of the sedan, identify the occupants, and then call the

I I front passengerl

 

 

 

passengerl I 

 

police.
the sedan and near the back passenger window.



identified himself as law enforcement.

occupants to turn off the engine and get out of the vehicle. The
occupants of the sedan did not follow directions. SA
who had gotten out of his Bureau vehicle, but lagged behind

 

I had returned to his car and repositioned it to the

 

row near where the sedan was parked, a short distance away from the

stated he could clearly hear I
identify themselves as law enforcement officers and direct the

 

sedan.

occupants of the sedan to stop.

vehicle emergency lights.

who was driving, appeared very fidgety to 
the vehicle in reverse and abruptly backed the
sedan out of the parking space into the driving laneavoid being struck by the sedan.
felt the situation had escalated and drew his service weapon. SA
his car and remained near the driver side door.
Suddenly, the sedan lurched forward and to the left nearly hitting SA
The sedan stopped briefly, and then it swerved to the

right, towards At this point, perceived the

UNCLASSIFIED

2

himself near the front passenger window of

his Blackberry and
took a photograph of the two men while commands to the

activated his

SA:

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b7C -1,7

b6 -1,7,9
b7C -l,7,9

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

direction of travel of the sedan as a direct threat to his safety and
he commanded the sedan to stop. Subsequently, the sedan struck the
left front bumper area of the BUCAR. As the sedan careened past the
front driver side of the BUCAR, it was close enough for to b6 -1,7,9
fear the sedan would hit him. himself to be in b7c ?1?7?9
imminent danger and indicated he made this determination based on the
following: (1) he did not see the incident which prompted 
initially approach the individual, but he did see 
the occupants of the sedan, identify themselves as
FBI Agents, and start issuing commands; (2) he was unable to see the
hands, gestures, or actions of the occupants of the sedan; (3) the
sedan nearly struck occasions; (4) one of his partners,
who he worked with on a daily basis, perceived enough of a threat to
draw his weapon; (5) the sedan had struck his BUCAR in an attempt to
flee law enforcement, after all law enforcement personnel present
identified themselves as such, orally and by activating emergency
lights BUCAR, and were issuing commands to stop; and (6)
in a position where he could turn the wheel of the sedan and
crush the sedan and BUCAR. Since 
in imminent fear for his life, he drew his handgun, a Glock 23,
identified himself as an FBI Agent, and raised his left hand while
issuing verbal commands to stop. failed to comply with the
commands to stop, 10 rounds at  land
were each hit once and suffered minor, non?life threatening
wounds. estimated the total time that elapsed between the
first and last shot was only a few seconds.

 

 

Following the shooting, the sedan left the parking lot at a
high rate of speed. An ambulance crew parked in the parking lot
observed the incident. The ambulance, with its emergency lights and
siren engaged, pursued the sedan. The sedan crashed into a passenger
car and light pole approximately a quarter of a mile away from the
parking lot. Occupants of the passenger car sustained minor injuries
and were briefly hospitalized. Upon observing the sedan leave the
parking lot, the Agents returned to the BUCAR and followed in the

direction the sedan was observed travelling. The Agents arrived at the

UNCLASSIFIED

3



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

crash scene approximately one minute after the crash. b6 ?7r9
b7C -7,9

 

apprehended, andI Ileft the accident scene before law
enforcement arrived. later located and interviewed.
himself in to the FBI Chicago Field Office on 03/29/2013.

FBI Chicago initiated an AFO case as a result of this incident.

 

I [was charged with violating Title 18, United States Code,

 

Sections and Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain

Officers or Employees While Engaged In (or on account of the

 

performance of) His/Her Official Duties. I were not

 

charged.

The shooting and crash scenes were processed by the Chicago

Field Office ERT. SA issued Glock 23 was rendered safe and b6 -1

entered into evidence. Ten .40 caliber shell casings were recovered b7c _1

which were consistent with the ammunition used in weapon.
The subject?s sedan was processed by members of the Laboratory

Shooting Reconstruction Team.
SIRG Deliberations:

A.presentation of the known facts of the Agent?involved
shooting, as detailed above, was made to the SIRG by IIC Stroud via a
Power Point presentation. The Power Point included photographs of the
scene as enhanced by the FBI Laboratory, an INSD Diagram of the scene,
an enhanced copy of a video from the parking lot as taken while the
incident occurred, and a copy of a video showing the vehicle of the

subjects engaged in an auto accident.

The DOJ Deadly Force Policy provides a core principle that
Agents ?may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the
officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or

to another person.?

The SIRG voted regarding the application of deadly force.
Ten of 12 voting members determined the use of deadly force by SA

in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. The b6 -1
b7C -1
UNCLASSIFIED
4



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

majority determined that have reasonably believed the b6 -1
use of deadly force was necessary because the subject ignored lawful b7C '1
commands to stop and while attempting to flee, almost struck 

twice, hit a Bureau car, and almost ran over causing him

to move quickly to the side to avoid being hit by the vehicle. The

vehicle was still in close proximity to the other

agents, and presented an imminent danger to them when 

the shots in a matter of seconds.

Two of the voting members dissented, expressing the belief
the application of deadly force in this instance was not in compliance
with the Department of Justice?s Deadly Force Policy. The dissenting
members requested and were provided the opportunity to document the
factors for their belief the application of Deadly Force Policy
was violated.

 

The dissenting opinion ofI I Special Legal b6 -3
Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ, was provided to INSD in a b7c _3
letter, which is noted as follows:

To: Mark Mbrgan

Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division

 

From: I I

 

Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division

Date: February 24, 2014
Subject: Chicago 3/25/13

At the February 21, 2014 FBI Shooting Incident Review Group meeting, I
cast a vote that was one of two votes adjudging the non?fatal shooting
by a Special Agent in Chicago on March 25, 2013, to be in violation of
the Department?s Deadly Force Policy. As Committee Chair, you advised

that you were considering recording the majority vote the shooting

UNCLASSIFIED

5

NTWZEEB

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Invo1ved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

was within policy along with the rational of the dissenting voters.
This memo presents a summary of my reasoning to assist the drafting of

such report.

I concur with the effort to better articulate and record the decisions
of the Group to provide an historical record that may assist future
decisions by reference to the analysis employed in past matters. The
facts of this matter and the Group?s differing conclusions offer an

excellent case study to archive.

Also, I have no objection to sharing my analysis with other Group

members if you feel it is warranted.

 

In my view,

 

b5 -1,2

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

6



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Invo1ved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

 

b5 ?l,2

 

 

 

Finally, my vote as a member of SIRG is

 

solely my conclusion and is not necessarily the view of the Department

or the Civil Rights Division.

The dissenting Tria1 Attorney, Crimina1 b5 '3

 

 

 

 

Division, USDOJ, was provided to INSD in an E?mail, which is noted as b7c _3
fo1lows:

Fromzl Busdoj.gov>

To: Morgan, Mark Alan

Sent: Mon Feb 24 20:30:13 2014

Subject: My response re: Chicago hubcap shooting
well done, although I cannot conclude that

b5 -1,2

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

9



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

 

 

 

 

 

b5 -l,2
In rebuttal to the opinions expressed, the FBI provided the
following information:
b5 -l,2
b6 -1
b7C -1

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

10

NW-QQB

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

 

 

 

 

b5 -l,2
b6 -1
b7C -1

SIRG Observations

On 02/21/2012, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG voted

regarding the application of deadly force. Ten of 12 voting members

determined the use of deadly force by in compliance b6 ?1

with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. The majority determined _1

could have reasonably believed the use of deadly force was necessary
and the vehicle presented an imminent danger to the involved Agents
when fired the shots. As a majority opinion, it was
determined SAI Iwas in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force

Policy.

Two of the voting members dissented, expressing the belief the

application of deadly force in this instance was not in compliance with

UNCLASSIFIED

18

NW- 701

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

the Department of Justice?s Deadly Force Policy. The dissenting
members requested and were provided the opportunity to document the
factors for their belief the application of Deadly Force Policy

was violated.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective action concerning operational
planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made

the following observations and recommendations:

SIRT Observation 1: The Chicago Field Office Agent Involved
Shooting Response Plan (AISRP) was not followed by Chicago Field Office

 

personnel.

Analysis: On 03/29/2013, the SIRT reviewed the Chicago
Field Office AISRP. The AISRP was dated November 2010. As cited
verbatim in the Chicago Field Office AISRP Introduction Section, ?The
purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Chicago Division
employees who may become involved in a shooting incident, either as a
participant or one who responds to an incident. Checklists have been
devised to prioritize actions of those involved." AISRP Section 

(1) ?The Involved Agent Notification Checklist? stated, ?When an
Agent becomes involved in a shooting either he or an Agent in his
presence should notify the Chicago Radio Room and request any necessary
medical or other assistance. Depending on exigent circumstances, it

may be necessary to first notify Emergency Services 911.?

The SIRT determined, based on 12 interviews, neither the
involved Agent nor an Agent in his presence provided notification of
the incident to the Chicago Field Office Radio Room as outlined in the
AISRP.

SIRT Recommendation 1a: SAC, Chicago Field Office should
ensure all Chicago Field Office personnel are appropriately trained
regarding the AISRP.

 

SIRT Recommendation 1b: SAC, Chicago Field Office should

 

UNCLASSIFIED

19

NW- 702,

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

ensure the Chicago Field Office AISRP is reviewed and updated annually.

SIRT Observation 2: Intervention to enforce minor

infractions of the law could fall outside the scope of employment.

 

Analysis: The 03/25/2013 Agent?involved shooting incident
evolved from Chicago Field Office Agents engaging with a subject they
believed was stealing hubcaps in violation of Illinois Compiled
Statutes (ILCS) Subdivision 5., General Theft, Section 16?1., Theft.
The Agents involved in the shooting incident stated it was not their
intention to arrest the subject, but just to identify him, determine
what he was doing, and provide the information garnered to the Chicago

Police Department.

DIOG, Section 19.3.3 states the following regarding non?federal crimes:

?There is no federal statutory authority for Agents to intervene in
non?federal (state) crimes. FBI_policy_permits certain types of

non?federal arrests in exigent circumstances.

As a general rule, an Agent should only make an arrest for a state
crime if'a serious offense (felony or violent misdemeanor) has been
committed in his or her_presence and immediate action by the Agent is

necessary to prevent escape, serious bodily injury, or destruction of

property.

Agents are also authorized to arrest a_person who is the subject of an
FBI Predicated Investigation when a state or local arrest warrant for
that person is outstanding, and the person is encountered during the
investigation and would likely escape if not arrested. Similarly, an
Agent working with state or local law enforcement officers who request
assistance to apprehend a nonfederal fugitive who has been encountered
during the course of a federal investigation is authorized to provide
the requested assistance when intervention is otherwise permitted for a

state crime as described in the preceding_paragraph.

In some states, there is legislative authority for an Agent to

UNCLASSIFIED

20

NW- 703

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

intervene in certain types of state crimes as a peace officer rather
than as a_private citizen. Deputization as a state_peace officer
allows a federal Agent to make arrests for state offenses with the
authority and immunities of a law enforcement officer of the state or
one of its subdivisions. Of greater significance is whether
intervention by an Agent in a particular nonfederal crime falls within
the scope of employment. Agents who intervene in serious nonfederal
crimes committed in their_presence or who arrest a state fugitive under
the circumstances previously described will normally be considered to
be acting within the scope of their employment. While the
determination to provide legal representation depends on the facts and
circumstances of each circumstance, the DOJ, as a general rule, will
provide legal representation to Agents who act in accordance with this

policy.

It is important to note that the DOJ has indicated that efforts to
enforce minor infractions of the law, such as shoplifting or traffic
violations, are not generally considered to be within the scope of
employment. Civil actions against federal_personnel concerning acts
which fall outside the scope of employment will not be removed to
federal courts, and employees in such circumstances will not be
eligible for legal representation provided for by the An Agent's
status with respect to civil liability in such circumstances will
depend on a particular state?s law, which may require an employee to

defend himself/herself as an ordinary citizen.?

The State of Illinois afforded federal law enforcement
officers, to include the FBI, ?Peace Officer Status,? for the purposes
of sections concerning unlawful use of weapons, for the purposes of

assisting an Illinois peace officer in an arrest, or when the

commission of any offense (emphasis added) under Illinois law is
directly observed by the person. Therefore, under ILCS, the Agents
were considered ?peace officers? when they approached the subject
stealing hubcaps. The theft of hubcaps, not exceeding $500 in value,

was a Class A misdemeanor in the state of Illinois.

UNCLASSIFIED

21

NW- 704

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

Being afforded Illinois ?Peace Officer Status? means the
Agents likely would not have to defend themselves against civil
liability as an ordinary citizen; however, the Agents may not be
provided legal representation by the DOJ due to the question of scope.
As stated in the DIOG Section 19.3.3 referenced above, DOJ indicated
efforts by Agents to enforce minor infractions of the law, such as
shoplifting or traffic violations, are not generally considered to be
within the scope of employment. Taking action to thwart the theft of
hubcaps could be interpreted as the enforcement of a minor infraction
of the law. To not be afforded federal representation in civil actions

needlessly exposes Agents to state legal issues and procedures.

SIRT Recommendation 2: SAC, Chicago Field Office should

ensure all Agents are trained regarding intervention in non?federal

 

crimes, and potential liability attached thereto.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

against a result of his involvement in this shooting b6 -1
incident. _1
Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,
chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office
of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, b6 -i,3
United States Department of Justice I Special b7c _1?3
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chief

 

 

 

I Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC)
Roger Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; 
Squad Washington Field Office; SSAI 
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSA

I I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel; SSAI I Evidence Response Team (ERT),

 

 

Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,

 

UNCLASSIFIED

22



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

 

 

 

Critical Incident Response Group and SSAI I b6 ?1,3
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also _1?3
in attendance: I I Office of Inspector General,

 

Inspectors David Paul Gelios, R. Justin Tolomeo, Howard
Marshall, Paul Delacourt, Trent R. Teyema and Shawn W. Stroud, OI,
Team LeadersI I

I, 01,

ERT, Unit Chief IPAU,
DAD Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism Division; SSAI I
Office of Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb, Assistant Director Michael
Prout and DAD Blair Deem, OI, United States Marshal 
Special Assistant, or, sc Tracy A. Paige, or, UC

and Management Program I

I IInspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

SAC, Chicago Field Office, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

SAC, Chicago Field Office, is required to provide a written response,
via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow? up EC responses must be directed

to Unit Chief  Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

 

Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MPA

 

 

I applied the following standards:
UNCLASSIFIED

23



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

(1) at the outset, the conduct of an agent should be presumed to be

within policy;

(2) the burden of establishing that the conduct is not within policy
should be the burden,

(3) the proper standard of proof should be a preponderance of the
evidence, as there is no rational basis to employ a lower standard or a

higher one, such as clear and convincing;

(4) the agent?s proffer of his own state mind (as recorded in a sworn
statement) is significant evidence to establish this critical factor,

but it should not be dispositive of the agent?s state of mind;

(5) all surrounding circumstance and facts, including statements of
others, factual and forensic information, and video documentation

should be considered to adjudge the agent?s state of mind;

(6) the ultimate issue is whether all the available evidence supports
a conclusion that the use of deadly force was within the Department?s
policy as articulate by the plain language of the policy. What an
objectively reasonable law enforcement officer would have done is a
factor, but not the ultimate issue as it would be in determining civil

liability in a constitutional torts case.

It is noted that DOJ Attorney #1 applies a preponderance of the
evidence standard and establishes certain presumptions that DOJ
Attorney #1 states the SIRG should apply to the incident, but admits
that these standards and presumptions are not set forth anywhere in DOJ
policy. The DOJ Deadly Force Policy, however, is based upon a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard, which looks to all the facts and
circumstances to determine whether an agent had a reasonable belief
that the subject posed an imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury to the agent or another person such that the use of deadly force
was necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED

24

NW- 

 

  

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Date: 06/11/2014
Incident: 03/25/2013

 

CC: b6 -1
b7C -1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
Contact: I I

 

Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:| 

 

Case ID 297-HQ-A1271285-D (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 02/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division?s (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/12/2013, prepared
by Inspector?in?Charge Shawn W. Stroud.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) Chicago SIRT Report dated 0/25/2013

Details:

On 03/25/2013, at approximately 12:30 three Chicago

Field Office Agents,| I while b6 ?1
b7C -1

 

going to lunch and looking for a place to park at a parking lot located
at 1220 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, noticed an individual

kneeling near a sport utility vehicle. When the individual got into

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

 

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014
the driver?s side of an adjacentI I (herein

 

referred to as sedan), repositioned it to the other side of the sport

 

utility vehicle and got out, Idetermined the

driving and did not

 

individual was stealing hubcaps.

see what the individual was doing.

 

the Bureau vehicle and 

immediately got out and approached the sedan. Upon seeing the Agents

approach, the individual stealing the hubcaps got back into the sedan.

The sedan had three occupants, who were later identified as driver

 

 

and rear
Iwanted to get the
and then call the

I I front passengerl
SAs I

identify the occupants,

 

 

 

passengerl I

 

 

license plate of the sedan,
police.
the sedan and near the back passenger window.



identified himself as law enforcement.

occupants to turn off the engine and get out of the vehicle. The
occupants of the sedan did not follow directions. SA
who had gotten out of his Bureau vehicle, but lagged behind


row near where the sedan was parked,

 

 

a short distance away from the

stated he could clearly hear I
identify themselves as law enforcement officers and direct the

 

sedan.

occupants of the sedan to stop.

vehicle emergency lights.

who was driving, appeared very fidgety to 
the vehicle in reverse and abruptly backed the
sedan out of the parking space into the driving laneavoid being struck by the sedan.
felt the situation had escalated and drew his service weapon. SA
his car and remained near the driver side door.
Suddenly, the sedan lurched forward and to the left nearly hitting SA
The sedan stopped briefly,

right, towards 

and then it swerved to the
At this point, perceived the

UNCLASSIFIED

2

himself near the front passenger window of

his Blackberry and
took a photograph of the two men while commands to the

I had returned to his car and repositioned it to the

activated his

SA:

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7

b6 -1,7,9
b7C -1,7,9

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

direction of travel of the sedan as a direct threat to his safety and
he commanded the sedan to stop. Subsequently, the sedan struck the
left front bumper area of the BUCAR. As the sedan careened past the
front driver side of the BUCAR, it was close enough for to
fear the sedan would hit him. himself to be in
imminent danger and indicated he made this determination based on the
following: (1) he did not see the incident which prompted 
initially approach the individual, but he did see 
the occupants of the sedan, identify themselves as
FBI Agents, and start issuing commands; (2) he was unable to see the
hands, gestures, or actions of the occupants of the sedan; (3) the
sedan nearly struck occasions; (4) one of his partners,
who he worked with on a daily basis, perceived enough of a threat to
draw his weapon; (5) the sedan had struck his BUCAR in an attempt to

flee law enforcement, after all law enforcement personnel present

b6 -1,7,9
b7C -1,7,9

identified themselves as such, orally and by activating emergency
lights BUCAR, and were issuing commands to stop; and (6)
in a position where he could turn the wheel of the sedan and
crush the sedan and BUCAR. Since 
in imminent fear for his life, he drew his handgun, a Glock 23,
identified himself as an FBI Agent, and raised his left hand while
issuing verbal commands to stop. failed to comply with the
commands to stop, 10 rounds at| land
were each hit once and suffered minor, non?life threatening
wounds. estimated the total time that elapsed between the
first and last shot was only a few seconds.

 

 

Following the shooting, the sedan left the parking lot at a
high rate of speed. An ambulance crew parked in the parking lot
observed the incident. The ambulance, with its emergency lights and
siren engaged, pursued the sedan. The sedan crashed into a passenger
car and light pole approximately a quarter of a mile away from the
parking lot. Occupants of the passenger car sustained minor injuries
and were briefly hospitalized. Upon observing the sedan leave the
parking lot, the Agents returned to the BUCAR and followed in the

direction the sedan was observed travelling. The Agents arrived at the

UNCLASSIFIED

3



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

crash scene approximately one minute after the crash. b6 ?7r9
b7C -7,9

 

apprehended, andI Ileft the accident scene before law
enforcement arrived. later located and interviewed.
himself in to the FBI Chicago Field Office on 03/29/2013.

FBI Chicago initiated an AFO case as a result of this incident.

 

I [was charged with violating Title 18, United States Code,

 

Sections and Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain

Officers or Employees While Engaged In (or on account of the

 

performance of) His/Her Official Duties. I were not

 

charged.

The shooting and crash scenes were processed by the Chicago

Field Office ERT. SA issued Glock 23 was rendered safe and b6 -1

entered into evidence. Ten .40 caliber shell casings were recovered b7c _1

which were consistent with the ammunition used in weapon.
The subject?s sedan was processed by members of the Laboratory

Shooting Reconstruction Team.
SIRG Deliberations:

A.presentation of the known facts of the Agent?involved
shooting, as detailed above, was made to the SIRG by IIC Stroud via a
Power Point presentation. The Power Point included photographs of the
scene as enhanced by the FBI Laboratory, an INSD Diagram of the scene,
an enhanced copy of a video from the parking lot as taken while the
incident occurred, and a copy of a video showing the vehicle of the

subjects engaged in an auto accident.

The DOJ Deadly Force Policy provides a core principle that
Agents ?may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the
officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or

to another person.?

The SIRG voted regarding the application of deadly force.
Ten of 12 voting members determined the use of deadly force by SA

in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. The b6 -1
b7C -1
UNCLASSIFIED
4



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

majority determined that have reasonably believed the b6 -1
use of deadly force was necessary because the subject ignored lawful b7C '1
commands to stop and while attempting to flee, almost struck 

twice, hit a Bureau car, and almost ran over causing him

to move quickly to the side to avoid being hit by the vehicle. The

vehicle was still in close proximity to the other

agents, and presented an imminent danger to them when 

the shots in a matter of seconds.

Two of the voting members dissented, expressing the belief
the application of deadly force in this instance was not in compliance
with the Department of Justice?s Deadly Force Policy. The dissenting
members requested and were provided the opportunity to document the
factors for their belief the application of Deadly Force Policy
was violated.

 

The dissenting opinion ofI I Special Legal b6 -3
Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ, was provided to INSD in a b7c _3
letter, which is noted as follows:

To: Mark Mbrgan

Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division

 

From: I I

 

Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division

Date: February 24, 2014
Subject: Chicago 3/25/13

At the February 21, 2014 FBI Shooting Incident Review Group meeting, I
cast a vote that was one of two votes adjudging the non?fatal shooting
by a Special Agent in Chicago on March 25, 2013, to be in violation of
the Department?s Deadly Force Policy. As Committee Chair, you advised

that you were considering recording the majority vote the shooting

UNCLASSIFIED

5

NTWZEEB

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Invo1ved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

was within policy along with the rational of the dissenting voters.
This memo presents a summary of my reasoning to assist the drafting of

such report.

I concur with the effort to better articulate and record the decisions
of the Group to provide an historical record that may assist future
decisions by reference to the analysis employed in past matters. The
facts of this matter and the Group?s differing conclusions offer an

excellent case study to archive.

Also, I have no objection to sharing my analysis with other Group

members if you feel it is warranted.

In my view, whether DOJ Deadly Force Policy was violated in this matter
presents a close question. My earlier decision on behalf of the Civil
Rights Division, that there was insufficient evidence that the conduct
might have violated the applicable criminal civil rights statute, 18
USC 242, was not a difficult one. There, the issue was whether
sufficient evidence existed to support a conclusion that the shooter
acted willfully an essential element that was necessary to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt to constitute criminal conduct. Willfulness
requires the specific intent to do that which the subject knew to be
unlawful. As indicated in the written declination, the evidence was
not sufficient to establish that the shooter knew his conduct was
unlawful and acted intentionally despite that knowledge. Additionally,
a criminal violation demands_proof of each element beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The issue for the SIRG is whether the conduct violated a specific
Department policy, the Department?s Deadly Force Policy. I applied
certain fair and reasonable procedures and standards that I believe
should apply (although I have never seen them articulated) in making my

decision as a voting member.[1]
Employing these standards, I concluded that:
I. There was no evidence that the agent acted with malice or improper

UNCLASSIFIED

6



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Invo1ved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

motives. Also, he was involved in a fast moving, dangerous

situation. Based upon all the available information, it appears that
he either fired his weapon to protect his own life from imminent danger
(as articulated in the Policy at Principle I) or to_prevent the escape

of a suspect (Principle I.A.) or both.

2. Under Department_policy, (Principle I) Department law enforcement
officers may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the
officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
to another_person. And, (Priniciple I.A) deadly force may not be used

solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect.

3. The agent?s_proffered an explanation of his six reasons for using
deadly force. I considered his explanation in the context of the
entirety of his signed sworn statement, recorded statements of other
witnesses, available factual and forensic evidence, and videos

(primarily the ambulance video).

4. I concluded these critical facts were relevant the agent had
reason to believe that the initial criminal activity was the stealing
of hubcaps; the agent saw the encounter between the other two
agents and the hubcap thieves in their car from a distance, to include
an agent displaying his gun and an agent jumping out of the way of the
suspect?s car as it rapidly backed up in an effort to escape, arguably
elevating the criminal activity to assault on a federal officer; (C)
the driver sped directly at the agent and almost struck him and nearly
pinned him between the suspect?s moving car and the agent?s parked car
and the agent reasonably believed that the driver was attempting to run
him over or indifferent as to whether that might occur; the agent
fortunately extricated himself from the front of the car and
side?stepped himself into a position where he was directly alongside of
the driver?s window with his feet on the ground, upright, and in
contact with the suspect?s car; as he did this, the agent
upholstered his weapon and quickly_pointed it at the driver through the

window and fired; the agent knew there were other individuals

UNCLASSIFIED

7



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

inside the suspect?s car other than the driver the agent fired
ten shots apparently at the driver as he moved on foot to keep up with
the car; and the agent continued to fire after the car_passed, as
it was driving away from him, and when he was no longer in contact with

the car.

4. The assessment warranted by these facts, in plain language, boils
down to determining whether the agent fired all shots because he
reasonably believed the use of deadly force was necessary to_protect
himself 25 fired shots solely to prevent the escape of the suspect.
The first shots by the agent arguably were not necessary to protect
him. HOwever, given the rapid development of events, I believe the
agent warrants the benefit of the doubt and therefore conclude by the
preponderance of the evidence that it was reasonable for the agent to
believe that it was necessary to shoot his weapon to protect his life
as he extricated himself from the danger facing him and when he first
fired. Nonetheless, also by the preponderance of the evidence, I
conclude that the agent had sufficient infOrmation and time to
recognize, and that he did recognize, that the imminent danger to him
had passed when he fired the last of his ten shots. Significant to
this conclusion is the agent?s contention in a carefully constructed
writing with benefit of counsel that he continued to fire at the driver
of the car as the car passed him. The video shows the agent,
stretching out his arm, aiming the handgun at the driver (consistent
with firing the weapon) after the agent had separated from the car and
the car was_pulling away from him. Hence, at that point, there is no
reason to shoot other than solely to_prevent escape. Using deadly

force solely to_prevent escape violates_policy.

5. Decision?making under these circumstances requires quick reaction,
as it necessarily should, and once initiated it is difficult to
disengage from such conduct. But,_policy requires that our federal law
enforcement officers make exactly these time?sensitive, difficult
decisions. Here, the agent claimed that he was firing at a car as it
passed. His contention is consistent with the video representation

that the car has passed him and thus he has had sufficient time to

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Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

recognize that he is no longer in jeopardy. The evidence supports the
conclusion that, at least at this point in the incident, the agent is
not firing to_protect himself but solely to_prevent the suspect?s
escape. It is equally important to decide when deadly force is no
longer necessary as it is to decide when it is. Both decisions are

required to be made under trying, rapidly unfolding circumstances.

6. If a_part of the use of deadly force is not within by the
Department policy, the use of force itself is not within policy. My
conclusion that there was a violation of policy does not address
whether the conduct met constitutional requirements, just as it does
not dispute my_prior finding that there is insufficient evidence of
willfulness to support a criminal prosecution. The Department Deadly
Force Policy, just as in the case of other Department policies, demands
more of federal employees in my view than simple compliance with
constitutional requirements. Finally, my vote as a member of SIRG is
solely my conclusion and is not necessarily the view of the Department

or the Civil Rights Division.

The dissenting opinion Tria1 Attorney, Crimina1

 

Division, USDOJ, was provided to INSD in an E?mail, which is noted as be _3
fo1lows: b7C ?3
Fromzl pusdoj.gov>

 

To: Morgan, Mark Alan
Sent: Mon Feb 24 20:30:13 2014

Subject: My response re: Chicago hubcap shooting

well done, although I cannot conclude that the first shot(s) were at
all justified. The sole reason for believing an escalation had
occurred was one agent drawing his weapon. The gun wasn't pointed and
nothing indicating urgency or escalation (such as "gun") was shouted.
Also, the shooter shot from the side, there was absolutely no danger to

him or anyone else at the time he chose to fire. Setting that aside, I

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Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

also cannot square shooting 10 times into a vehicle that he knew was
occupied with two others, by all accounts older innocents, as ever
being justified under these circumstances. The fbi's training scenarios
themselves say shooting at a subject who?d fired on agents before
turning and running into a crowded restaurant is unjustified because
the risk of injuring innocents outweighs the use of deadly force. That
is the case here, and the precipitating event (a car pulling away from
a suspicion of a local misdemeanor encounter, not even a federal
felony) is almost non?existent, and surely not such that the use of
deadly force was justifiable. Finally, I think your vote is more than

just your own. I think you represent a division within the department.

In rebuttal to the opinions expressed, the FBI provided the

following information:

DOJ Attorney #1 stated during SIRG deliberations he

considered the first couple of shots taken by the agent to be within

the DOJ Deadly Force Policy and possibly the next few as well, but the

last few shots were clearly outside the scope of the DOJ policy because

the vehicle had passed the agent when it appeared b6 _1
extending his arm to shoot again. In DOJ Attorney #l?s subsequent b7C -1
written submission, in which he noted the issue of whether the DOJ

policy was violated in this case ?presents a close question,? DOJ

Attorney #1 concluded:

The first shots by the agent arguably were not necessary to protect
him. However, given the rapid development of events, I believe the
agent warrants the benefit of the doubt and therefore conclude by the
preponderance of the evidence that it was reasonable for the agent to
believe that it was necessary to shoot his weapon to protect his life
as he extricated himself from the danger facing him and when he first
fired. Nonetheless, also by the preponderance of the evidence, I
conclude that the agent had sufficient information and time to
recognize, and that he did recognize that the imminent danger to him
had passed when he fired the last of his ten shots. Significant to

this conclusion is the agent?s contention in a carefully constructed

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writing with benefit of counsel that he continued to fire at the driver
of the car as the car passed him. The video shows the agent,
stretching out his arm, aiming the handgun at the driver (consistent
with firing the weapon) after the agent had separated from the car and
the car was pulling away from him. Hence, at that point, there is no
reason to shoot other than solely to prevent escape. Using deadly

force solely to prevent escape violates policy.

The United States Supreme Court has explained that ?the test
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application.? Graham, 490 U.S.390, 396
(1989). The Court advised that ?proper application requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.? Id. The Court also stated that reasonableness ?must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight? and that the ?calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split?second judgments?in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.? Id. at
396?97. The ultimate question is ?whether the officers? actions are
?objectively reasonable? in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.? Id. at 397.

The opinion of DOJ Attorney #1 judges the situation with the
vantage of 20/20 hindsight, as opposed to the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene who is making a split-second decision
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving.[2]
Even with the opportunity to review an extensive factual record,
including a videotape of the incident, DOJ Attorney #1 is not able to
clearly identify exactly how many shots were justified versus how many

were not in compliance with the DOJ policy but is instead relying upon

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the fact that the agent appeared in a videotape to extend his arm while

separating from the car as it pulled away from the agent to determine

that this was the point where the agent should have stopped shooting.

The record indicates, however, that the shots were taken in a time

frame amounting to seconds, and there was sufficient evidence to

support a reasonable belief by the occupant of the b6 -1
vehicle posed an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to ?1
the other agents. This imminent danger existed when
the speeding car approached him directly from the front and immediately
afterward, when in a manner that DOJ Attorney #1
analogized in his written prosecutive opinion to being like a matador
avoiding a charging bull, managed to move from a position directly in
front of the speeding car to a position immediately to its side when he
fired the shots.

Based upon the interviews of the agents, bystanders, and

even the passengers in the subject/driver?s vehicle, it is undisputed

the agents identified themselves loudly as law enforcement officers and

instructed the car to stop multiple times. When up b6 -1
in his vehicle to attempt to block the exit in the parking lane, he '1
heard the other two agents identifying themselves, and 
activated the emergency lights on his vehicle. 
the vehicle back up a short distance and saw the front
fender or hood on the driver?s side with his hand. At that point, SA
believed that there was a danger that SA |:|and 
would be struck or run over due to their proximity to the moving
vehicle. his vehicle and stood directly behind its
door. As the other agents continued to identify themselves and direct
the vehicle to stop, the vehicle lurch forward and
turn to the right, almost hitting then saw one of
the agents, later identified as draw his handgun and the
driver then accelerate the vehicle back towards who also
yelled for the driver to stop. The vehicle then struck the left front
bumper area of the BUCAR and careened past the front driver side of the

BUCAR. SA advised he could tell that the vehicle would pass b6 ?1
b7C -l

 

 

 

 

within approximately two feet of where he stood and that he felt pinned

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by the driver side of the BUCAR after the vehicle had struck it. SA
away and because he felt in imminent danger for his b6 -1
life, he drew his weapon, identified himself as an FBI Agent, and b7c _1
raised his other hand while issuing verbal commands for the driver to
stop. When the driver did not comply, two to four
rounds at the Driver. He heard the sound of breaking glass and
continued backing away while firing another two to three rounds. As
the vehicle continued past him, he fired an additional two to three
rounds at the Driver and noticed bullet holes in the driver side rear
door. the total time that elapsed between the
first and last shot to be only a few seconds. One of the civilian
witnesses, a former security guard, had also noted that ?if [the]
officer had not shot the suspect vehicle, it would have run the officer

over.?

advised that as the vehicle continued to the b6 -1

corner of the parking lot, he ceased firing because he believed that b7C '1
the distance between himself and vehicle was not appropriate for

continued engagement, he was concerned about the traffic on the road in

the proximity of the surrounding neighborhood, and his prior experience

taught him to conserve ammunition in case the subject returned.

The driver demonstrated a clear intent to ignore lawful

commands from a law enforcement officer, almost hit with the

vehicle, struck a bureau vehicle, and then attempted to run over SA
trying to flee. have reasonably

believed that the threat from such an individual still existed even

after he had moved to the side of the vehicle due to SA 

close proximity to the vehicle when he fired the shots. SA b6 '1
even cited as one reason for his belief that he was in imminent danger _1
that ?the driver of the Sedan was in a position where he could turn the

wheel and crush me between the two cars and seemed to be proceeding to

do so.? In similar circumstances, courts have recognized the

reasonableness of an officer?s belief that imminent danger existed such

that the use of deadly force was necessary. See Wilkinson v.

 

Torres, 610 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010)(officer could have reasonably

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believed that deadly force was necessary against the driver of a moving
vehicle who ignored police commands and attempted to accelerate the
vehicle within close quarters of two officers on foot in a ?tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving? situation); Thomas v. Durastanti, 607

 

F.3d 655 (10th Cir. agent?s use of deadly force was
reasonable because the agent could have reasonably perceived that the
subject?s vehicle posed an immediate threat to the agent when it was
moving directly towards him and he was in a confined area, and at the
time the agent fired the second shot, he had just been struck by the
vehicle and spun around, so he could have reasonably perceived that the
vehicle?s threat had not passed); McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201

 

(11th Cir. 2009)(deputies could have reasonably concluded that the
subject/driver of a vehicle posed a direct threat of serious physical
injury justifying deadly force where an officer was pinned within a few
feet between the subject?s vehicle and his own and the subject revved
the engine and began spinning the wheels of his vehicle, especially in

light of the speed in which the incident unfolded); Robinson v.

Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1109
(2006)(even if hindsight showed that the officer could have perhaps

 

escaped, the officer had probable cause to believe that a subject posed
a threat of serious physical harm where the officer was standing in a
narrow space between two vehicles, the subject disobeyed orders to put
his hands up, the subject?s vehicle was suddenly moving forward, and
the officer had to make a split?second decision of whether he could

escape before he got crushed).

When realize that the distance between him b6 -1
and the vehicle had increased and that the vehicle was continuing to _1
the corner of the parking lot, he ceased firing because, at that point,
he recognized that the imminent danger had passed. The ?calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers
are often forced to make split?second judgments-in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving?about the amount of force

that is necessary in a particular situation.? Graham, 490 U.S. at

396-97. The fact that it may have taken who had just b6 ?1
b7C -1
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Title: (U)
Re: 

Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013

06/11/2014

jumped out of the way of a vehicle driven by a subject who had tried to

run him down after hitting a bureau car and almost striking the other

agents, a few seconds to realize that the vehicle might now be
sufficiently far away such that the threat had passed, was not

unreasonable.



Further, the subject attempted to run over 

his vehicle after the agents repeatedly identified themselves as law

enforcement officers and FBI and ordered him to stop,

which would give

a reasonable agent probable cause to believe that the subject had just

committed or attempted to commit an assault upon a law enforcement

officer.

The Supreme Court has advised that ?if the suspect threatens

the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he

has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction

of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to
where feasible, some warning has been given.
471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
fleeing from an encounter where he had just attempted to inflict
serious physical harm to him over and still
posed an imminent danger to him due to the close proximity of the

vehicle to in the act of fleeing.



prevent escape, and if,

ee Tennessee v. Garner, Here,

 

DOJ Attorney #2 concurs with the opinion of DOJ Attorney



the subject was

#1

but opines the first shots by also violate the DOJ



Deadly Force Policy because [t]he sole reason for believing an

escalation had occurred was one agent drawing his weapon? and ?[t]he

gun wasn?t pointed and nothing indicating urgency or escalation

as ?gun?) was shouted." This argument, however,

SA

does not appear to

factually accurate based upon the record. observed far

(such

be

more than just SA drawing his weapon and pointing it in an unclear
direction before SA used deadly force. As discussed

previously, not even draw his own weapon until after he

and then strike the BUCAR before
proceeding directly towards SA and he did not fire the weapon

until he had managed to escape being run over by quickly moving from

saw the vehicle almost hit SA

directly in front of the subject?s vehicle to a position at its side.

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Further, the suggestion that required to shout something b6 ?1
like ?gun? to a reasonable law enforcement officer b7c '1
could have concluded that the situation had escalated or that danger

existed does not take into account the types of tense and quickly

evolving situations that officers face on the street. In the absence

of facts suggesting a lack of imminent danger, the mere fact that an

officer?s partner pulls his/her weapon while confronting a subject

would be enough to lead a reasonable officer to believe that the

situation had just escalated in that his/her partner saw or heard

something that caused the officer?s partner to draw a weapon even if

the officer did not see or hear what it was that caused the partner to

react in that manner.

DOJ Attorney #2 also advised that he ?cannot square shooting
10 times into a vehicle that [the agent] knew was occupied with two
others, by all accounts older innocents, as ever being justified under
these circumstances.? In support, DOJ Attorney #2 cites the 
training scenario where an agent shoots through a crowded restaurant at
a subject who had fired previously on the agents. In this training
scenario, the agents initially dived for cover when the subject shot at
them and then pursued the subject into a nearby crowded restaurant.
From the entrance of the restaurant, the agent observed the subject
making his way through the crowd toward the rear exit. At that point,
the agent fired at the subject. The training scenario advises the use
of deadly force would violate the policy in that instance because
although there is reason to believe the subject is fleeing the scene of
a violent confrontation where he has just attempted to inflict death or
serious physical injury, shooting into a crowded restaurant creates an
unreasonable danger to the public that is not outweighed by the likely
benefits. The scenario also noted pursuing an armed and dangerous
subject under those circumstances would also create an unreasonable
risk to the agent and, under the policy, agents are not required to

assume unreasonable risks.

The training scenario cited is factually very different than

the circumstances faced by A more closely analogous FBI b6 -1
b7C -1
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training scenario is one in which an undercover Agent purchases cocaine
from two subjects seated in an automobile in a deserted parking lot at
A team of agents moves in on foot to arrest the subjects,
identifying themselves as law enforcement officers and asking to see
their hands. The subjects? car suddenly veers towards them with the
apparent intent to strike them, and the agents fire. The training
scenario advises that the use of deadly force is permissible and that
the subject is not using the vehicle merely to escape but rather as a
weapon to attack the Agents. The training scenario advises that deadly
force is permissible to protect the Agents and others in the vicinity
and that the Agents would not be required to permit the subjects to
escape from the vicinity of a violent confrontation where they have
just attempted to inflict death or serious physical injury on the
agents. Further, verbal warnings were given before the shots were
taken and were ignored by the subjects. This training scenario also
advises that consideration must be given to whether the use of deadly

force creates a danger to third parties that outweighs its benefits.

The restaurant scenario clearly involves a situation that
poses unreasonable risks to the public because the agent would be
shooting at the subject through a crowd of innocent bystanders. In
contrast, circumstances where he believed there was
an imminent danger to him from the nearby vehicle because the subject

had demonstrated intent to use the vehicle as a weapon by running him
b6 -1

over. While passengers were also present in the car, the balancing of _1

interests regarding dangers to third parties is not so clear as the
restaurant scenario because here, it was reasonable for SA 
believe that the passengers who were in the car were also involved in
the criminal conduct, unlike a crowd of clearly innocent persons who
were at a restaurant. In a split?second decision where 
in imminent danger of being seriously injured or killed by the driver
of a vehicle which was still in close proximity to him, the use of
deadly force was not unreasonable even if there were also passengers in

the car.

Finally, DOJ Attorney #2 argues that ?the precipitating

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Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

event (a car pulling away from a suspicion of a local misdemeanor

encounter, not even a federal felony) is almost non?existent, and
surely not such that the use of deadly force was justifiable."
SA

did not shoot at the subject because he was stealing hubcaps;

Again,

 

this argument ignores the actual facts of the incident.

 

 

 

he shot
at him because the subject attempted to run him over with his vehicle
and believed, based upon all the facts and circumstances,
that the subject still posed an imminent danger to him even after he
had moved to the side of the vehicle instead of being directly in front
of it due to the proximity of the vehicle to himself and the other

550 U.S. 372 

use of deadly force to terminate a high speed chase of a subject who

agents. See generally Scott v. Harris,

 

was fleeing the scene of a minor traffic offense was reasonable where
the subject?s flight itself posed a threat of serious physical harm to
607 F.3d at 668
officer who is faced with the possibility of danger has a right to take

others); Durastanti, (noting that a law enforcement

reasonable steps to protect himself regardless of whether probable

cause to arrest exists).
SIRG Observations

(UHM On 02/21/2012,

incident with the intent to:

the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting

The SIRG voted
regarding the application of deadly force. Ten of 12 voting members
determined the use of deadly force by in compliance
with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. The majority determined 

could have reasonably believed the use of deadly force was necessary

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force.

and the vehicle presented an imminent danger to the involved Agents

when SAI Ifired the shots.

determined SAI Iwas in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force

As a majority opinion, it was

Policy.

Two of the voting members dissented, expressing the belief the

application of deadly force in this instance was not in compliance with

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Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

the Department of Justice?s Deadly Force Policy. The dissenting
members requested and were provided the opportunity to document the
factors for their belief the application of Deadly Force Policy

was violated.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective action concerning operational
planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made

the following observations and recommendations:

SIRT Observation 1: The Chicago Field Office Agent Involved
Shooting Response Plan (AISRP) was not followed by Chicago Field Office

 

personnel.

Analysis: On 03/29/2013, the SIRT reviewed the Chicago
Field Office AISRP. The AISRP was dated November 2010. As cited
verbatim in the Chicago Field Office AISRP Introduction Section, ?The
purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Chicago Division
employees who may become involved in a shooting incident, either as a
participant or one who responds to an incident. Checklists have been
devised to prioritize actions of those involved." AISRP Section 

(1) ?The Involved Agent Notification Checklist? stated, ?When an
Agent becomes involved in a shooting either he or an Agent in his
presence should notify the Chicago Radio Room and request any necessary
medical or other assistance. Depending on exigent circumstances, it

may be necessary to first notify Emergency Services 911.?

The SIRT determined, based on 12 interviews, neither the
involved Agent nor an Agent in his presence provided notification of
the incident to the Chicago Field Office Radio Room as outlined in the
AISRP.

SIRT Recommendation 1a: SAC, Chicago Field Office should
ensure all Chicago Field Office personnel are appropriately trained
regarding the AISRP.

 

SIRT Recommendation 1b: SAC, Chicago Field Office should

 

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NW- 702,

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Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

ensure the Chicago Field Office AISRP is reviewed and updated annually.

SIRT Observation 2: Intervention to enforce minor

infractions of the law could fall outside the scope of employment.

 

Analysis: The 03/25/2013 Agent?involved shooting incident
evolved from Chicago Field Office Agents engaging with a subject they
believed was stealing hubcaps in violation of Illinois Compiled
Statutes (ILCS) Subdivision 5., General Theft, Section 16?1., Theft.
The Agents involved in the shooting incident stated it was not their
intention to arrest the subject, but just to identify him, determine
what he was doing, and provide the information garnered to the Chicago

Police Department.

DIOG, Section 19.3.3 states the following regarding non?federal crimes:

?There is no federal statutory authority for Agents to intervene in
non?federal (state) crimes. FBI_policy_permits certain types of

non?federal arrests in exigent circumstances.

As a general rule, an Agent should only make an arrest for a state
crime if'a serious offense (felony or violent misdemeanor) has been
committed in his or her_presence and immediate action by the Agent is

necessary to prevent escape, serious bodily injury, or destruction of

property.

Agents are also authorized to arrest a_person who is the subject of an
FBI Predicated Investigation when a state or local arrest warrant for
that person is outstanding, and the person is encountered during the
investigation and would likely escape if not arrested. Similarly, an
Agent working with state or local law enforcement officers who request
assistance to apprehend a nonfederal fugitive who has been encountered
during the course of a federal investigation is authorized to provide
the requested assistance when intervention is otherwise permitted for a

state crime as described in the preceding_paragraph.

In some states, there is legislative authority for an Agent to

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NW- 703

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Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

intervene in certain types of state crimes as a peace officer rather
than as a_private citizen. Deputization as a state_peace officer
allows a federal Agent to make arrests for state offenses with the
authority and immunities of a law enforcement officer of the state or
one of its subdivisions. Of greater significance is whether
intervention by an Agent in a particular nonfederal crime falls within
the scope of employment. Agents who intervene in serious nonfederal
crimes committed in their_presence or who arrest a state fugitive under
the circumstances previously described will normally be considered to
be acting within the scope of their employment. While the
determination to provide legal representation depends on the facts and
circumstances of each circumstance, the DOJ, as a general rule, will
provide legal representation to Agents who act in accordance with this

policy.

It is important to note that the DOJ has indicated that efforts to
enforce minor infractions of the law, such as shoplifting or traffic
violations, are not generally considered to be within the scope of
employment. Civil actions against federal_personnel concerning acts
which fall outside the scope of employment will not be removed to
federal courts, and employees in such circumstances will not be
eligible for legal representation provided for by the An Agent's
status with respect to civil liability in such circumstances will
depend on a particular state?s law, which may require an employee to

defend himself/herself as an ordinary citizen.?

The State of Illinois afforded federal law enforcement
officers, to include the FBI, ?Peace Officer Status,? for the purposes
of sections concerning unlawful use of weapons, for the purposes of

assisting an Illinois peace officer in an arrest, or when the

commission of any offense (emphasis added) under Illinois law is
directly observed by the person. Therefore, under ILCS, the Agents
were considered ?peace officers? when they approached the subject
stealing hubcaps. The theft of hubcaps, not exceeding $500 in value,

was a Class A misdemeanor in the state of Illinois.

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NW- 704

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Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

Being afforded Illinois ?Peace Officer Status? means the
Agents likely would not have to defend themselves against civil
liability as an ordinary citizen; however, the Agents may not be
provided legal representation by the DOJ due to the question of scope.
As stated in the DIOG Section 19.3.3 referenced above, DOJ indicated
efforts by Agents to enforce minor infractions of the law, such as
shoplifting or traffic violations, are not generally considered to be
within the scope of employment. Taking action to thwart the theft of
hubcaps could be interpreted as the enforcement of a minor infraction
of the law. To not be afforded federal representation in civil actions

needlessly exposes Agents to state legal issues and procedures.

SIRT Recommendation 2: SAC, Chicago Field Office should

ensure all Agents are trained regarding intervention in non?federal

 

crimes, and potential liability attached thereto.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

against a result of his involvement in this shooting b6 -1
incident. _1
Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,
chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office
of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, b6 -i,3
United States Department of Justice I Special b7c _1?3
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chief

 

 

 

I Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC)
Roger Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; 
Squad Washington Field Office; SSAI 
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSA

I I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel; SSAI I Evidence Response Team (ERT),

 

 

Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,

 

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Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

 

Critical Incident Response Group and SSAI I

Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also

 

in attendance: I I Office of Inspector General,

 

Inspectors David Paul Gelios, R. Justin Tolomeo, Howard
b6 -1,3

Marshall, Paul Delacourt, Trent R. Teyema and Shawn W. Stroud, OI,
b7C -l,3

Team LeadersI I

I, 01,

ERT, Unit Chief IPAU,
DAD Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism Division; SSAI I
Office of Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb, Assistant Director Michael
Prout and DAD Blair Deem, OI, United States Marshal 
Special Assistant, or, sc Tracy A. Paige, or, UC

and Management Program I

I IInspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

SAC, Chicago Field Office, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

SAC, Chicago Field Office, is required to provide a written response,
via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each

Instruction/Recommendation. Follow? up EC responses must be directed

 

to Unit ChiefI Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. b6 -1

 

Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MPA b7C ?1

 

 

I applied the following standards:
UNCLASSIFIED

23



UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Chicago Agent?Involved Shooting Incident: 03/25/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/11/2014

(1) at the outset, the conduct of an agent should be presumed to be

within policy;

(2) the burden of establishing that the conduct is not within policy
should be the burden,

(3) the proper standard of proof should be a preponderance of the
evidence, as there is no rational basis to employ a lower standard or a

higher one, such as clear and convincing;

(4) the agent?s proffer of his own state mind (as recorded in a sworn
statement) is significant evidence to establish this critical factor,

but it should not be dispositive of the agent?s state of mind;

(5) all surrounding circumstance and facts, including statements of
others, factual and forensic information, and video documentation

should be considered to adjudge the agent?s state of mind;

(6) the ultimate issue is whether all the available evidence supports
a conclusion that the use of deadly force was within the Department?s
policy as articulate by the plain language of the policy. What an
objectively reasonable law enforcement officer would have done is a
factor, but not the ultimate issue as it would be in determining civil

liability in a constitutional torts case.

It is noted that DOJ Attorney #1 applies a preponderance of the
evidence standard and establishes certain presumptions that DOJ
Attorney #1 states the SIRG should apply to the incident, but admits
that these standards and presumptions are not set forth anywhere in DOJ
policy. The DOJ Deadly Force Policy, however, is based upon a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard, which looks to all the facts and
circumstances to determine whether an agent had a reasonable belief
that the subject posed an imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury to the agent or another person such that the use of deadly force
was necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED

24

NW- 

 

 

(Rev. 10-18-2012)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REPORTING OFFICE OFFICE OF ORIGIN DATE, INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
FBIHQ - INSD InSpection Division 04/12/2013 03/25/2013 03/30/2013
TITLE OF CASE REPORT MADE BY TYPED BY
Shooting Inquiry 
Report of Shooting Incident g?gg?g 
Chicago Field Of?ce Shooting Incident Review
03/25/2013
REFERENCES:

Telephone call on 03/25/2013, from Chicago Field Of?ce SAC Cory B. Nelson

to Chief InSpector Robert J. Shields J12, and Chicago Field Of?ce
Situation Report to the Director, dated 03/25/2013.

FD-1015, Executive

 

ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR

APPROVED 

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

 

COPIES MADE:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT Notations
Agency
Request Reed.
Date Fwd.
How Fwd.
By
A
COVER PAGE

 

 

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 04/12/2013
Report of: IIC Shawn W. Stroud Of?ce: FBIHQ INSD
Case 297-HQ-A1271285-D
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
. REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
03/25/2013

Investigative Period: 03/25/2013 03/30/2013

Reference: (Wm Telephone call on 03/25/2013, from Chicago Field Of?ce SAC Cory
B. Nelson to Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields and Chicago Field Of?ce FD-1015, Executive
Situation Report to the' Director, dated 03/25/2013.

 

Synopsis
(Wm On 03/25/2013, at approximately 12:30 three Chicago Field Of?ce

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Special Agents Iwere going to lunch and
looking for a place to park in a ocery store parking lot, when  observed a
man stealing hubcaps. SAlilparked the bucar and limmediately Jot
out of the vehicle and approached the individual, later identi?ed asI

identifying themselves as law enforcement and commandingI?Ito stop. SAI  1agged
well behind SAs and did not initially interact with retreated to his
vehicle, al and got in the driver?s seat. There were two o?ier occupants

 

 

in the vehicle.   pulled the vehicle out from the parking space. almost hitting SA and

and then stopped momentarily. While SA were enga ed with SA
had returned to his bucar and repositioned it to the row w.1ere

 

 

 

was parked. When

 

 

 

 

 

vehicle began to move again, he was again commanded by SAs Ito stop
and get out of his vehicle. Instead of com lving with commands with his two
companions, drove off striking SAI bucar and subsequent eading straight for SA

 

who was standing next to his bucar. motioned and called for the vehicle
to sto . When the vehicle continued to advance on fearing for his life, SA

ed 10 shots ?'om his Glock pistol and wounded and one of the other
occupants. Each sustained minor injuries. The vehicle ?ed from the scene and was involved in a
vehicular accident a short distance from the parking lot. The escaped, but turned
himself in to the FBI Chicago Field Of?ce on 03/29/2013.  : was charged with Assault on a
Federal Of?cer (APO).

 

 

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Details

(Wm On 03/25/2013, at approximately 12:30 pm, three Chicago Field Of?ce
Agents,  Iwhile going to lunch and looking for a
place to park at a parking lot located at 1220 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, they
noticed an individual kneeling near a sport utility vehicle. When the individual got into the
driver?s side of an adjacentl ICherein referred to as sedan), repositioned it .
to the other side of the sport utility vehicle and got out, SAs determined the
individual was stealing hubcaps. SA as driving and did not see what? the individual
was doing.

'(U/Eeer? SAI:Iparked the Bureau vehicle and SA
immediately got out and approached the sedan. Upon seeing the Agents approach, the individual

stealing the hubcaps got back into the sedan. The sedan had three occu ants, who were later
identi?ed as driverl I front passengerl:l and rear
passengerl I SAsl Iwanted to get the license plate of the sedan,
identify the occupants, and then call the olice. SAI [positioned himself near the front
passenger window of the sedan and as near the back passenger window. 
identified himself as law enforcement. SA used his Blackberry and took a photograph of
the two men while issued comman to the occupants to turn off the engine and get
out of the vehicle. The occupants of the sedan did not follow SAI Is directions. SA
who had gotten out of his Bureau vehicle, but lagged behind SAsl had
returned to his car and repositioned it to the row near where the sedan was par a ort
distance away ?om the sedan. stated he could clearly hear SAs

identify themselves as law enforcement officers and direct the occupants of the sedan to stop.
SA :lsubsequently activated his vehicle emergency lights.

. was driving, appeared very ?dgety to 

ut the vehicle in reverse and abruptly backed the sedan out of the par space into the
driving lane. SA moved out of the way to avoid being struck by the sedan. SA
 : felt the situation had escalated and drew his service weapon. exited his car
and remained near the driver side door. Suddenly, the sedan lurched forward and to the left
nearly hitting again. The sedar sto ed brie?y, and then it swerved to the right,
towards SA At this point, SA Iperceived the direction of travel of the sedan
as a direct threat to 3 safety and he commanded the sedan to stop. Subsequently, the sedan
struck the left front bumper area of the bucar. As the sedan careened past the front driver side of
the bucar, it was close'enough for SA : to fear the sedan would hit him. 
believed himself to be in imminent danger and indicated he made this determination ase on the
following reasons: (1) he did not see the incident which prompted Ito
initially approach the individual, but he did see SA onfront the occupants of
the sedan, identify themselves as FBI Agents, and start issuing commands; (2) he was unable to
see the hands, gestures, or actions of the occupants of the sedan; (3) the sedan nearly stuck SA
on two occasions; (4) one of his partners, who he worked with on a daily basis, perceived
enough of a threat to draw his weapon; (5) the sedan had struck his bucar in an attempt to ?ee

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

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law enforcement, after all law enforcement personnel present identi?ed themselves as such,
orall and by activating emergency lights on his bucar, and were issuing commands position where he could turn the wheel of the sedan and crush 8%
between he sedan and bucar. Since felt in imminent fear for his life, he ew 
handgun, a Glock 23, identi?ed himself as an FBI Agent, and raised his left hand while issuing
verbal commands to stop. When ailed to comply with the commands to stop, SA

ed 10 rounds at him. I were each hit once and suffered minor,
nonlife?threatening wounds.

 

 

The sedan left the parking lotat a high rate of speed. An ambulance crew
parked in the parking lot observed the incident. The ambulance, with its emergency lights and
siren engaged, pursued the sedan. The sedan crashed into a passenger car and light pole
approximately a quarter of a mile away ?om the parking lot. Occupants of the passenger car
sustained minor injuries and were brie?y hospitalized. Upon observing the sedan leave the
parking lot, the Agents returned to the bucar and followed in the direction the sedan was
observed travelling. They arrived at the crash scene approximately one minute after the crash.

 : was apprehended, andl Ileft the accident scene before law
enforcement arrived. was later located and interviewed. turned himself in to
the FBI Chica 0 Field Of?ce on 03/29/2013. FBI Chicago initiated an case as a result of
this incident. I Iwas charged with violating Title 18, United States Code, Sections
111(a)(1) and I [were not charged.

The shooting scene and crash scene were processed by the Chicago Field
Of?ce ERT. SA 3 issued Glock 23 was rendered safe and entered into evidence. Ten
.40 caliber shell casings were recovered which were consistent with the ammunition used in SA
3 weapon. The subject?s sedan was processed by members of the Laboratory Shooting
Reconstruction Team.

 

The occupants of the subject vehicle were:

 

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1

 

 

 

 

3)

?_urbstantive Case Files

After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

 

I(Subject);

 

. VICTIMS: SAI SAI
ASSAULT ON FEDERAL 


25 MARCH 2013



Enclosures

SAI 

 

. All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the
enclosed table of contents. 

A. Administrative

The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRE) was comprised of the following

personnel:

. Inspector-in?Charge (IIC)?Shawn W. Stroud
Inspector Gregory T. Bretzing

Assistant Inspector fAIl/Team Leader 
Assistant Inspector-in-Place -

AIIP

AIIP

 

 

 

 

FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Personnel:

SSA Evidenoe Response Team Unit Team Leader
SS Evidence Response Team Unit
Firearms and Toolmarks Unit Physical Scientist
Firearms and Toolrnarks Unit
Omaha Total Station Operator

 

 

 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

(II/mean) On 03/25/2013, IIC Stroud spoke with Chicago Field Of?ce 

to arrange logistics prior to arriving in Chicago. On 03/25/2013, the SIRT traveled to
Chicago. On the morning of 03/26/2013, IIC Stroud and SIRT members met with Chicago Field
Of?ce EM and SSA personnel before traveling to the shooting scene which occurred in a parking
lot of the Jewel Osco Grocery Store located at 1220 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. 

Page 4 of 14

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All members of the reviewed the Inspection Division Shooting Review
Protocol.

On 03/26/2013, IIC Stroud met with the involved FBI SAs and management
ersonnel to explain the review process and protocols. HC Stroud, Ins ector Bretzing, and TL
Ip:lmet with the Chicago Police 12th District who stated she
was not opening an investigation, and did not need for her personnel to participate in any
interviews. 

(Wm Three Signed. Sworn Statements were taken from the three FBI
Agents directly involved in the shooting. Other interviews, events, and observations were
documented via FD-3 025. Neither the FD-644 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested
to Provide Information on a Voluntary Basis) nor the FD-645 (Warning and Assurance to
Employee Required to Provide Information) were utilized. The and interviews of
witnesses were conducted voluntarily. An FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee
Requested to Provide Information Following a Shooting Incident) was executed by all FBI
personnel interviewed via 

(U) On 03/27/2013, 11c Stroud, Inspector Bretzing, and withI?I
Criminal Chief of the Cook County State's Attorney's Of?ce. I Iindicated he
would like to receive a copy of the Shooting Incident Review results. He anticipated sending the
results to their Professional Standards Unit, headed by Supervisory Attorney

(U) On 03/27/2013, IIC Stroud had a conference call with Attorneyl:l
Special Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division and AUSAI I
Northern District of Illinois, to provide an update on the investigation. I bsked   to
participate in the conference call due to the US. Attorney Office?s interest in reviewing the
results of the shooting investigation.

U) On 03/29/2013, IIC Stroud provided an exit brief to SAC Nelson and the CDC

C. Personnel Involved in the Shooting

1. SA
2. SA
3. SA

 

(?red weapon)

 

 

 

D. Firearms Training

FBI Chicago provided quali?cations records for SA: A

review of the of?ce training records re?ected the following:
(WW 3 most recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Glo ck 23,
Serial Numbe was on 12/26/2012.

Page 5 of 14



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E. Deadly Force Training
(WM Since 10/27/2012, SAI: participated in approximately 20 operations,
which included controlled drug buys, ?rearms purchases, arrests, and tracker installations. All
occasions included the presentation of the Deadly Force Policy. CDCI:Iadvised 
Ela?ended an All Agents Conference on 09/30/2011, where a review of the FBI Deadly
orce olicy was part of the curriculum. CDCII;Iprovided a copy of the conference sign-in
log verifying SAPS attendance. CDC also advised the Chicago Field Of?ce
Primary Firearms tructor  reviewed the FBI Deadly Force Policy during
?rearm quali?cations and training sessions.
F. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers
As the three Agents were on their Way to lunch and not participating in a
planned law enforcement action, none of them were wearing ballistic body armor, nor were FBI
or law enforcement identi?ers displayed. However, all personnel verbally identi?ed themselves

as FBI and law enforcement of?cers to the occupants of the vehicle. This was veri?ed by
witness statements.

G. FBI Indices and National Crime Information Center (ECIC)

The National Crime Information Center (N CIC), criminal
history check included multiple entries forl land
I Iwas the subject of 40 arrests for offenses including narcotics and

weapons violations, robbery, and assault. as convicted 14 times, most recently on
06/09/2006, for Burglary.

 

 

(Um criminal history included 47 arrests for offenses including 
resisting arrest as well as narcotics and weapons violations. as convicted eight times,

most recently on 02/21/2006, for Forgery. as also an identi?ed member of the Vice
Lords street gang.

criminal histo? included 31 arrests for offenses

including narcotics, robbery, and weapons violations. as convicted six times, most
recently on 01/08/1998, for Possession of a Controlled Substance.

H. Evidence Recovery and Lgboratog Division Reports

(Ill/E3303 At approximately 1:45pm., on 03/25/2013, in the process of responding to
the seene of an Agent-involved shooting, Supervisory Special Agent I
and SSAI Icollected a loaded Glock 23 pistol bearing serial numberl 
1 and an additional Glock 23 magazine from SAI I SAI Iadvised he had changed
1 . magazines prior to the collection of the weapon.  and  conducted a
1 manual round count of the weapon and extra magazine.

 

 

The scene of the shooting was secured and processed by the Chicago Field
Of?ce ERT and the Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LRST) to include use of Total

1 Page -7,9
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2. lwas shot in the hip. The round was recovered at Stroger
Hospital. He also had a rod surgically implanted in his leg on 03/26/2013, due to a
broken leg. The leg injury was due to the impact of the subject vehicle with a non-
police vehicle and subsequently a light pole. The accident happened several blocks
away ?om the shooting scene.

3. I: was not injured.

Innocent Bystander Victims:

1. I was driving his car southbound on
South Paulina Street.  was a passenger. As was about to turn
eastbound onto West Flournoy Street, he sto ped when he observed an ambulance.
After allowing the ambulance to pass proceeded with his turn and observed

car driving straight at him. Both cars collided in the intersection of South
Paulina Street and West lournoy Street. as released from the
hospital on 03/26/2013. He suffered a cracked sternum, cuts, and bruises.

 

 

 

 

 

2. (Wm The passengerJ I was released ?om the
hospital on 03/25/2013, the day of the accident. She suffered two cracked ribs, cuts,
and bruises.

J. Declination by th_e Civil Rights Division
(Wm On 03/27/2013, HC Stroud contacted Special Legal Counsel,

DOJ, Civil Rights Division, and briefed him on the shooting ineldent. On 04/03/2013, 
hand-carried a copy of the Signed Sworn Statements and corresponding diagrams to Mr.
3 of?ce, located at 601 Street, Washington DC.

 

- On Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights

Division, US. Department of Justice declined prosecution of this case.

K. Local Prosecution Opinion

Upon completion of the on?site inquiry, IIC Stroud coordinated SIRT

investigative ?ndings wi Criminal Chief of the Cook County State's
Attorney's Of?ce. He provided the ?ndings to their Professional Standards Unit, headed by
Ifor his review and opinion. On 08/05/2013, Mr.

Su ervisory Attorney]
I:Iadvised he concluded, ?that no conduct of SA : in this incident gives rise to
charge him with any state criminal offense.?

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NYT-HS

 

 

 

 

L. Inspector?s Observations

SIRT Observation 1: The Chicago Field Of?ce Agent Involved Shooting
Response Plan (AISRP) was not followed by Chicago Field Of?ce personnel.

Analysis: On 03/29/2013, the SIRT reviewed the Chicago Field Of?ce AISRP. The
AISRP was dated November 2010. As cited verbatim in the Chicago Field Of?ce AISRP
Introduction Section, ?The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Chicago Division
employees who may become involved in a shooting incident, either as a participant or one who'
responds to an incident. Checklists have been devised to prioritize actions of those involved.?
AISRP Section HI (1) ?The Involved Agent - Noti?cation Checklist? stated, ?When an Agent
becomes involved in a shooting either he or an Agent in his presence should notify the Chicago
Radio ,Room and request any necessary medical or other assistance. Depending on exigent
circumstances, it may be necessary to ?rst notify Emergency Services 911.?

The SIRT determined based on 12'interviews, neither the involved Agent nor an Agent in
his presence provided noti?cation of the incident to the Chicago Field Of?ce Radio Room as

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

outlined in the AISRP.
The below table outlines, based on SIRT analysis, the calls made regarding the Agent
Involved Shooting:
CG Emp loyee Calls Made Where Located at Time of Call Comments

At the scene of the accident (intersection

SA: 911; CDC . of South paulina Street and west Involved in shooting incident.
Floumoy Street).

None Involved in shooting incident.
Called when the vehicle he was riding in

A: 911 was attempting to cross West Roosevelt Involved in shooting incident,
Road while exiting the Jewel Osco
parking lot.

?fe; En route to scene. Role was and osc.
CG Radio Room (Dayshitt 8:00 Directed by SS

9n .
4.45 pm). to call.

Bank of .
America . .
Secmity Jewel Osco parking lot. Dispatched to scene.
Specialist; SSA
CDCI En route to Magistrate?s of?ce. Dispatched to scene.

 

SA involved;

 

 

 

 

 

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CG Employee Calls Made Where Located at Time of Call Comments
SAC
ADCI I SAC En route to Magistrate's of?ce. Dispatched to scene.

 

 

At the scene of the accident (intersection
of South Paulina Street and West
Floumoy Street).

SSA of the three Agents
involved in the shooting.

031%"
com

 

 

 

 

 

SIRT Recommendation 1a: SAC, Chicago Field Of?ce should ensure all Chicago
Field Of?ce personnel are appr0priately trained regarding the AISRP.

SIRT Recommendation 1b: SAC, Chicago Field Of?ce should ensure the Chicago
Field Of?ce AISRP is reviewed and updated armually.

(WM) SIRT Observation 2: Intervention to enforce minor infractions of the law could fall
,outside the scope of employment.

Analysis: The 03/25/2013 Agent-involved shooting incident evolved from Chicago Field
Of?ce Agents engaging with a subject they believed was stealing hubcaps in violation of Illinois
Compiled Statutes (ILCS) Subdivision 5. General Theft, Section 16?1. Theft. The Agents
involved in the shooting incident stated it was not their intention to arrest the subject, but just to
identify him, determine what he was doing, and provide the information garnered to the Chicago
Police Department.

DIOG, Section 19.3.3 states the following regarding non-federal crimes:

?There is no federal statutory authority for Agents to intervene in non-federal
state) crimes. FBI policy permits certain types ofnon-federal arrests in exigent
circumstances.

As a general rule, an Agent should only make an arrest for a state crime if a
serious o??ense felony or violent misdemeanor) has been committed in his or her
presence and immediate action by the Agent is necessary to prevent escape, serious
bodily injury, or destruction of property.

Agents are also authorized to arrest a person who is the subject of an FBI
Predicated Investigation when a state or local arrest warrant for that person is
outstanding, and the person is encountered during the investigation and would likely
escape if not arrested. Similarly, an Agent working with state or local law enforcement
o??icers who request assistance to apprehend a non?deral?igitive who has been 

encountered during the course of a federal investigation is authorized to provide the -
requested assistance when intervention is otherwise permitted for a state crime as
described in the preceding paragraph.

Page  

In some states, there is legiSlative authority for an Agent to intervene in certain

types of state crimes as a peace of?cer rather than as a private citizen. Deputization as a
state peace of?cer allows a federal Agent to make arrests for state offenses with the
authority and immunities of a law enforcement of?cer of the state or one of its

I subdivisions. 0f greater significance is whether intervention by an Agent in a particular
nonfederal crime falls within the scope of employment. Agents who intervene in serious
non?ederal crimes committed in their presence or who arrest a state fugitive under the
circumstances previously described will normally be considered to be acting within the
scope of their employment. While the determination to provide legal representation
depends on the facts and circumstances of each circumstance, the DOJ, as a general
rule, will provide legal representation to Agents who act in accordance with this policy.

It is important to note that the DOJ has indicated that e?orts to enforce minor
in?actions of the law, such as shopli?ing or tra??ic violations, are not generally
considered to be within the scope of employment. Civil actions against federal personnel
concerning acts which fall outside the scope of employment will not be removed to
federal courts, and employees in such circumstances will not be eligible for legal
representation provided for by the DOJ. An Agent's status with respect to civil liability in
such circumstances will depend on a particular state's law, which may require an
employee to defend himself/herself as an ordinary citizen. 

The State of Illinois affords federal law enforcement of?cers, to include the FBI, ?Peace
Of?cer Status,? for the purposes of sections concerning unlawful use of weapons, for the
purposes of assisting an Illinois peace of?cer in an arrest, or when the commission of any o?'ense
(emphasis added) under Illinois law is directly observed by the person. Therefore, under ILCS,
the Agents were considered ?peace of?cers? when they approached the subject stealing hubcaps.
The theft of hubcaps, not exceeding $500 in value, was a Class A misdemeanor in the state of
Illinois.

Being afforded Illinois ?Peace Of?cer Status? means the Agents likely would not have to
defend themselves against civil liability as an ordinary citizen; however, the Agents may not be
provided legal representation by the DOJ due to the question of scope. As stated in the DIOG
Section 19.3.3 referenced above, DOJ has indicated that efforts by Agents to enforce minor
infractions of the law, such as shoplifting or traf?c violations, are not generally considered to be

within the scope of employment. Taking action to thwart the theft of hubcaps could be
interpreted as the enforcement of a minor infraction of the law. To not be afforded federal
representation in civil actions needlessly exposes Agents to state legal issues and procedures.

(ll/M SIRT Recommendation 2: SAC, Chicago Field Of?ce should ensure all Agents are

appr0priately trained regarding the engagement in non-federal crimes.

Page 11 of 14

18

 

 

Stating}. Tim Chicagc Fi?-ii. Qf??e EERT-wllecmd W'Sheil! ca?iugs in?ilze vicinity Mayhem SA

?red his Weapm. The LRST :argmumad {hr nine: nfthea?: wands.  mmpleteslugs
were .rec-evemd {mm the which with one pa?ialfragmmt One slug Was mwwre?ci? ?um

she pagan-gar 3f tha- Sabiect'v?hicie. ?ne impam: paint-was d-isxzmemd an ?le- raiged

curb dire-my apimaim :he: sub-jest vehicle where and ?red. The
impaibt paini?iemet?g gagiti?ve ?lial? ?t?arms lgad, "but the Mina} Sing; found. FEE Chicaga
T173131 Statim 3.115; Spherical 211? the? Shoatng and crash scenes.
Trzgiecmry Anaiiysis was cumpig?t?d'mn ma Subjem vehicle..

b6 -l,9
b?7C 

 Rec-waved {Evidenw items. rat-wiring laberatmy testing were as ih'ilgwa:

Tea-tin -

   

 

 

 

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 fret-n! 
 Bill-15:: ?va 

 I Bu?ets -- 

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 Ia?tidge cases; mlEct??-Ei?fmm 
  
 i349  WinCha?st?r .40. 
5'  ammuniti?n anti 313 mantis 20f Spear .40 anununitim i3 mumis
 Wera {mm ?it: magazine? and ma mum was f?mm
 133?  {mic-:Gipck magazine: Wi?ltW?l?Uu?d? Gf Spear 8&339 ammxmi?m 
3:  anti enemund ?f'W'ij?'?h?Si'er ammuniti?n {the ammuni?mn war; 

 132  011:: ?lm: Madal ?23 AG :c?a?ber serial numberAdditi?naiiy; the: Laburamry Di?xri'simn3 Firearms??06111121ka 'U-n-itwa?
requested. 1'0 generate a shaming rep-Uri;

I. Medital?? m1

 

FEE Agmts" in this: Shw?ng:

 

Na in?u?e?.

New:

 

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I.  011m in ?le 'uppar Wig? 0f his He _7

135?: Mm Emry and am Wat?id? were-visiblc from tha- samf: side: 9133;103:363 the
foraann.
Page '17 af ?14'

NW- 719

OFFICE OE THE STATES ATTORNEY
McHenry County

 
       

. lune 5, 2013

Christopher Davis
Inspector
Inspector Division

935 Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Inspector Davis,

Our office has reviewed the attempted armed robbery incident which occurred at the

Associated Bank in Richmond, lL on May 10th, 2013. We believe that Special Agents 

I  were justified in the use offorce which A. . b6 -1
resulted in the death ofTony Starnes. The evidence clearly established that Starnes was 1:70 -1
engaged in a forcible felony Of attempting to rob the bank and when the?Special Agents
intervened he attempted to strike Agentl:lwith his vehicle. The Special Agents I
responded by discharging their weapons. These actions were necessary to defend
themselves against lethal force. Accordingly, this office will not file criminal charges against
Special Agents]  lfyou have any questions or comments please
contact me. 

ry tru?ly m: I 
. l: I 

 

 

Louis A. Bianchi
State?s Attorne?

 

I 4 A b6 ?4
>b7C ?4

 

 

 

MCHENRY COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER 2200 NORTH SEMINARY AVENUE 6 WOODSTOCK, ILLINOIS 60098
815-334v4159 (phone) 815637-0872 (fax) - . 

 

 

IUD-1057 Giev.5-8-10)


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office Date: 06/12/2014
05/10/2013
CC: b6 -1
b7C -1
From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY
Contact: I I
Approved By: Justin Tolomeo
David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By:  I
Case ID 297-HQ-A1271285-D (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to captioned shooting following the SIRG meeting on
05/21/2014.
Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated 09/26/2013, prepared
by former Inspector Christopher W. Davis. A copy of the complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to this
communication.
Details:
(U) On 05/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting Incident
which occurred on 05/10/2014, involving Chicago Field Office Special
Agents] I These agents b6 _lr7
b7C -1,7

were participating in a surveillance and arrest operation targeting a

 

robbery crew led by] I

 



NW- 72 I



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

(U) In August of 2010, CG initiated a case his crew was involved in  I qu -1,6

I I investigators
identified a "work car" associated crew, a stolen silver
2005 Honda. Chicago Squad CE-7 agentsl I

I I An Operations Plan was

 

associates including Anthony "Tony" Starnes andI

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

developedI I

I I The
Operations Plan was a combination surveillance and arrest plan and
indicated SWAT elements would be lead in the actual arrest with CE-7

 

 

 

agents acting as surveillance units and perimeter security. The timing
of the arrest was based on overall public safety concerns as the

scenario developed.

(U) The Operations Plan was briefed on 05/07/2013, however not

all Agents scheduled to participate in the arrest were present. The

 

Operations Order was signed by ASACI Ias the On Scene b6 ?1

Commander. b7c -1

 

(U) At approximately 7:30 am on lb6 "1:7
. b7C -l,7
I I At apprOXimately 9.30 am, ASAC b7E _l?4?6
contacted by advise the Operational Plan
briefed on 05/07/2013, had been activated. Squad Agents conducted
surveillance of the Honda, driven by subject Tony Starnes, and 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Utility Vehicle (SUV) driven byI Iwith
passengerI I The surveillance began in Chicago and ended
in Richmond, Illinois. Surveillance units included agents, SWAT

 

agents, SWAT Senior Team Leader 
and the SWAT coordinator, During the surveillance,

Agents observed both subject vehicles stopped in a parking lot in

 

Wisconsin, approximately one mile North of Associated Bank in Richmond,
Illinois (IL) in to the Honda carrying a bag.

(U) The subjects drove back to Richmond, IL where the SUV entered



2





Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

and parked at a car wash across the street from the Associated Bank.

The Honda circled the bank and neighborhood twice at which time the SUV
followed the Honda into the parking lot and stopped in front of the ACE
Hardware store. The Honda stopped in front of the bank. SWAT and 

Agents confirmed arrest authority given by SWAT STL b6 ?1,7
I b7C -1,7
b7E -1

 

 

 

Immediately SWAT 

exited vehicle. Iengaged the
subjects yelling FBI, police, and giving instructions not to move. The
Honda sped backward then lurched forward as to 
to run out of the car's path. When the
car lurched forward towards agents   they both fired
at the driver. The vehicle struck SAI rs SUV and continued to
proceed forward through the parking lot. who had taken a
position to the rear of feared for the safety of others
around him and also fired at the driver. The car accelerated and

 

 

 

crashed into a light pole in the parking lot causing it to halt. SAs

 

 

I Iarrestedl Iwas arrested by Agents in
the ACE Hardware parking lot without incident. STARNES was pronounced
dead at the scene. Starnes was stuck by four rounds, once in the head
and once each in the shoulder, arm and not stuck
by any rounds.

(U) During a subsequent interview he advised he told b6 -7
Starnes to stop and confirmed they knew the agents were law b7c _7

enforcement. he did not know why Starnes refused to
stop and tried to flee.

SIRG Observations:

(U) On 05/21/2014, The SIRG reviewed the agent?involved shooting

incident with intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

 

determined the application of deadly force by land b6 ?1

in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly Force b7c '1
Policy.

 



3





Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning
and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made the
following observations and recommendations concerning operational

oversight of the operation.

(U) Observation 1: The command and control structure was poorly

defined for the surveillance and arrest operation.

(U) Analysis 1a: The SIRT review determined there was inadequate
delegation of roles and responsibilities for the operation. The
Operations Plan included 11 Agent personnel and 21 SWAT
personnel to be involved in the surveillance and arrest. While arrest
scenarios were clearly defined in the approved Operations Plan, it was
not clearly delineated if this operation was intended as a SWAT
operation or an operation supported by tactically?trained Agents.

Overall control of operational activity at the scene was unclear.

(U) Analysis 1b: SWAT Policy Implementation Guide (PIG), Section
2.2.3 states the following:

(U) SWAT Coordinator

 

 

WNW) ME ?5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(U) The SIRT determined verbally given on?scene b6 ?1
command of the operation to was the SWAT b7c ?1
Coordinator. However, SSAI Igave the final approval on
scene to arrest the subjects. Interviews indicated this resulted in


4

NW- 724

 



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

confusion among the CE-7 Agents and SWAT personnel as to the

appropriate chain of command.

(U) Analysis 1c: DIOG 19.2.3 Arrest Plans requires the b7E '5

I Ibe used in lieu of SWAT

resources are employed.

situations where an FBI SWAT Team(s) or the Critical
Incident Response Group?s (CIRG), Tactical Section is involved, the
must be used in lieu of See the k?E -5
Special weapons and Tactics Policy Implementation Guide (PG), O444PG
and HOstage Rescue Team PG, O5OIPG for more on the use of the SWAT
Teams and CIRG, Tactical Section in high risk 

 

 

(U) Interviews confirmed some Agents believed the entire operation
was a Squad operation with tactically?trained Agents assisting,
while others believed this was a SWAT operation. The  b7E ?5

was written and briefed by Agents without SWAT input as
to the placement or use of the SWAT operators.

 

 

(U) Analysis 1d: SWAT Policy implementation Guide, Section 3.3
Rehearsals and Brief?Backs states as follows:

(mm m: _5

 

 

 

 

 

All interviewed SWAT operators believed this to be a SWAT operation
as they were tasked with the arrest scenarios. However, no official
SWAT briefing was conducted to include all the SWAT operators involved
in the planned arrest. The operational briefing held on 05/07/2013
included some, but not all, of the involved SWAT operators. While the

Operations Plan was electronically provided to those absent, the SIRT



5

NW- 725



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

determined a fully attended SWAT briefing with all assigned operators

should have been conducted prior to this operation.

(U) Recommendation 1a: SAC, Chicago, should ensure the proper

 

chain of command is adequately communicated to all participants

involved in felony vehicle stops and/or arrest operations.

(U) Instruction 1b: SAC, Chicago, should ensure SWAT elements

 

deployed to an arrest operation are under the direct control of the
SWAT Coordinator or SWAT STL in compliance with SWAT PIG Section
2.2.3.

(U) Instruction 1c: SAC, Chicago, should ensure operations

 

involving SWAT use in compliance b7E '5

with DIOG Section 19.2.3 and the SWAT PIG.

 

(U) Instruction 1d: SAC, Chicago, should ensure, when feasible,

 

all team members of a proposed SWAT operation are briefed directly by
the SWAT STL prior to deployment of the operation in compliance with
SWAT PIG Section 3.3.

(U) Observation 2: The ASAC designated as the On Scene Commander
(OSC) for the operation failed to maintain oversight of the operation
or effectively delegate operational responsibility to an appropriate

supervisor.

(U) Analysis 2: the designated On Scene Commander b6 ?1
(OSC) was conducting a community outreach program at the firearms range b7c -l
in Waukegan, IL. He did not immediately deploy to the scene or an area
where he could maintain effective control of the operation. Further,
not clearly designate which SSA, 
or SWAT coordinator was in charge at the scene.
Interviews with involved agents confirmed it was unclear to them who
had overall control of the operation. While 
assigned OSC responsibility to INSD interviews revealed ASAC
telephonic contact with multiple agents and

supervisors to include ultimately provided the final



6





Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

approval on scene to effect the arrest. not limit b6 ?1

command and control directives to one consistent point of contact. -1

(U) Recommendation 2: SAC, Chicago, should ensure the OSC be in a

 

position to maintain appropriate oversight of operations utilizing SWAT

resources .

 

(U) Observation 3: SSA and surveillance team

member not wearing FBI issued Body Armor during
the arrest operation.

 

(U) Analysis 3: MIOG, Part 2, Section states: ?Wearing
of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory during planned arrests,
execution of search warrants and surveillances which can reasonably be
expected to culminate in a confrontation with armed and dangerous



 

(U) The SIRT determined through interviews SSAI and b6 -1
b7C -1

 

 

SAI Iwere not wearing body armor at the time of the
shooting incident. he was wearing an FBI armband,
and no further explanation was provided as to why he was not wearing
body armor. he did not have time to put on the body

armor as he did not want to draw attention to himself while on

 

surveillance.

(U) Every indication was an arrest associated with this operation
could involve a violent confrontation. Under such circumstances, it is
imperative Executive Management and SSAs in the Chicago Field Office

ensure all personnel wear body armor in accordance with the MIOG.

(U) Instruction 3: SAC, Chicago, will ensure all Special Agents

utilize FBI approved body armor, during all planned arrest operations.

 

 

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative actions be taken
against SAs I b6 '1
-l

7





Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

(U) The SIRG was chaired by non-voting member Deputy Assistant
Director Mark Alan Morgan, INSD. The following voting members were in
attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office of Inspections
(OI), ISpecial Legal Counsel, Civil Rights b6 -l,3
Division, Section Chief (SC) Roger Coe, Global Section, ?1?3
Counterintelligence Division; Supervisor Special Agent 
Squad Washington Field Office; Unit Chief 
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSA

I I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel SSAI I Evidence Response Team (ERT),
Laboratory Division SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit,
and Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG). In addition to the voting

members in attendance, DOJ SIRG unable to attend

but reviewed the Shooting Incident Review Team report and provided his

 

 

 

 

 

 

vote in writing prior to the SIRG. The following non?voting members
were also in attendance:I I Office of Inspector
General (OIG), ASACI I OIG, sc Jay s.
Tabb, Tactical Section, I Violent Criminal Threat
Section, I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, FBI

 

Laboratory; Inspectors Shawn W. Stroud, R. Justin Tolomeo, Trent R.

 

Teyema, and Paul Delacourt, OI, Team LeadersI

 

 

 

 

 

 

OI, Special Assistant, OI, 
Management and Program Analyst   Inspection Analysis

Unit, and Management Program 

I I Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

(U)Procedures for Responding to the Observation

(U) SAC Chicago is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection

process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is



8





Title: (U) Shooting Incident Chicago Field Office 05/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271285-D, 06/12/2014

addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in-Charge (11C) will

review the field office?s response to determine if the

Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further

action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a

recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement. SAC Chicago is required to provide a written response,

via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to

Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once b6 -1
the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to b7c _l



 

 

?06



NEWZTEQ

 (Rev. 10?18-2012)

OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REPORTING OFFICE OFFICE OF ORIGIN DATE INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
FBIHQ - INSD FBIHQ 05/10/2013 05/11/2013 05/15/2013
TITLE OF CASE REPORT MADE BY BY
Shooting Inquiry . 
Report of Shooting Incident HC Dams 

. . CHARACTER OF CASE
Chmago Flew Of?ce Shootin Incident Review
05/10/2013 . - 



Telephone call on 03/06/2013 to the ChiefInspector, Inspection Division;
7 
ASSISTANT 7 

APPROVED . DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES MADE: 

1 Inspection (Attn: SIRT)
1 INSD (297-HQ-A1271285-D

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Notations
Agency
Request Reed.
Date Fwd.
How Fwd. -
By
A

COVER PAGE

 

b6 -1
b7C -l

 

 

NW- 7315:}

 

Date:

. Report-of:

Case 

Title:

UNCLASSIFIED a

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

09/26/2013

IIC CHRISTOPHER W. DAVIS



297-HQ-AI271285-D

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW.
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
05/10/2013

Investigative Period: 05/11/2013-05/15/2013

1. Executive summary

On 08/11/2010, CE-7 SAI lopened criminal enterprise investigation:

 :bredicated by CHS reporting. SA

 

Of?ce:

FBIHQ-INSD

I

 

 

ISA

 

 was designated the co-case A ent.
The investigation focused on a local crew of subjects conducting armed robbei?ljrl
I The crew was led by

utilizedl

 

determine the crew utilized a stolen Honda Civic with stolen license plates to conduct the
robberies. When not being used for a ?job,? the Honda was stored at a paid, public parking lot

facility. A court order was obtained forl

- At approximately 7:30 am on 

 

 

 

 

 

and communicated it to squad members and SWAT operators. Agents conducted 
surveillance of the Honda, driven by subject Tony" Starnes which was accompanied/followed by

a

The surveillance began in Chicago and ended in Richmond, Illinois. During the

surveillance A ents observed both subject vehicles stopped in a parking lot in Wisconsin1

n :g grabbed a bag frOm the trunk of the Honda and switched vehicles to ride in the 
backseat of the HOnda driven by Starnes. The subjects droVe back to Richmond where the SUV 
entered andsat at a car wash across the street from the Associated Bank, 10910 North Main
Street, Richmond, Illinois. The Honda circled the  and neighborhood twice at which tifne
the SUV followed the Honda into the parking lot and stopped in front of the ACE Hardware
store, located adjacent to the Associated Bank. The Honda stopped in front of the bank. Upon
observing Starnes andl:lwearing masks. andl Iholding a handgun, the SWAT Senior
Team Leader (STL) obtained verbal authority from SSAI

wherei

Agents compiledl

 

Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) driven by

 

The city. of Richmond, Illinois is less than one mile from the bOrder between? Illinois and Wisconsin. This parking
lot is located'one mile from the Associated Bank, 10910 North Main Street, Richmond, Illinois. 

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7
b7A 
- b7E ?1,4,6
Ito 

I b6 ?r,7
b7C ?1,7
b7E ?1,4,6

with passenger

Ito initiate the ?rst

Page 1 oflct

 

 

NW- 73 1

UNCLASSIFIED

 

arrest scenario as described in the Operations Plan. STLI I

Immediately
thereafter, SAsl Iexited SAI Is
vehicle to engage the subjects. The Honda then sped backward and lurched forward as if to
strike SAI land collided with SAI I SA ran out of the vehicle?s
path. SAsl I?red at the driver. As the vehicle continued to accelerate forward,
SAI I?red at the driver. The vehicle then crashed into a light pole in the parkin lot and
was disabled. Agents arrested Starnes was pronounced dead at the scene.gl: 
was arrested by Agentsin the ACE Hardware parking lot. without incident.

 

 

The scene was processed by Chicago ERT. Twenty .223 caliber shell casings were
recovered, consistent with ammunition used in I weapons.

 

Three hand guns were found in the vehicle driven by Starnes and occupied 

II. Incident Details
Substantive Case Files and Background Information

The following substantive matter was under investigation at the time of the shooting 
incident on 05/10/2013:

 

 

 

 

1 CASE ID:
CASE TITLE:
ACT
Date Opened: 08/11/2010

After the shooting incident, the following substantive case Was opened:

 

 

 

 

CASE ID: -
7 CASE TITLE: . .
ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL OFFICER
Date Opened: 05/10/2013 

B. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident


ASA On-Scene Commander - OSC) .

SS

 
   
 
   
  

fired weapon)
fired weapon)
?red weapon)

STL)



Page 2 of 14 

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7
b7E -1,6

 

b6 -l,7

.b7C -1?b7C -1

 

 

NW- 732,

UNCLASSIFIED 

. I
SSA SWAT Coordinator?Briefings I i 

On 05/06/2013, an erations Plan utilizing CE-7 Agents and SWAT A ents was
approved by ASACI I, the designated OSC, with SS as the

reviewing of?cial. The plan was briefed to available and SWAT personnel on 05/07/2013.
The Deadly Force Policy was read during this brie?ng. The Operations 'Plan was a combined
Surveillance and arrest plan. The investigation being conducted by CG indicated
and his crew used a Honda stored at a paid, public parking parking lot facility to commit armed
robberies. The surveillance portiOn of the Operations Plan authorized initiation whe

013-7 and SWAT
personnel would then follow the Honda to determine if it was being used to conduct an armed
robbery. 

 

 

The arrest portion of the Operations Plan detailed two arrest scenarios. I

 

 

 

 

111 Initial Entry/First Contact

On 08/11/2010, SAI Iopened criminal enterprise investigation:
I:Ipredicated by CHS reporting; SAI Iwas the co-case Agent. The

investigation focused on a local crew of subjects conducting armed robberies at

I The crew was led byI I

Iand his co-conspirators was obtained from a con?dential

 

 

 

 

I Initial intelligence onI

 

 

 

 

human source (CHS) during the course
vestigation. In the fall of2012I ISAS Iand
tiliZedI Iand surveillance to determine the

 

crew utilized a stelen Honda Civic with stolen license plates to conduct the robberies. Whennot

Page ?b6 ?1,7

b7C -1,7
b7E -1,4,6

?b7E -1

 

b6 -1,7
b7C -l,7
b7A -1

b7D -1
b7E -1,4,6

 

 

NW- 733

 

UNCLASSIFIED

being used for a ?iob,? the Honda was stored at a paid, public parking lot facility. A court order
was obtained forl



On 05/10/2013 at approximately 7:30 am,I I
SAI hdvised SSAI lthe Honda was moving and?
requested approval to activate SWAT and CE- personne as outlined in the approved 0 erations
Plan. SS pproved this request and SAI: contacted STdo advise

him SWAT deployment was approved.

At approximately 9:30am, contacted by advise

the Operational Plan briefed on 05/07/2013 had been activated. ASAC noti?ed the
SAC via the CG Operations Center at 10:00am that the vehicle was moving and a car stop would
be conducted when it was safe to do so. At the time, ASAC who was the
designated in the Operations Plan - was at the Chicago ?rearms range conducting an
outreach program.- ASAC advised he remained at the range and monitored the
surveillance via radio and received updates by cellular telephone. He did not immediately join 
the surveillance as the length of the surveillance and ?nal destination were unknown at that time.
He envisioned joining the operation when a determination was made on an arrest location.

 

 

 

 

As the surveillance determined the target location appeared to?be the Richmond, Illinois
'area, ASAC eft the range at approximatel 11:10am and headed towards Richmond
to join the operation. While enroute, ASACI:LIinformed SS the SWAT
Coordinator, that if the SWAT elements were in a position to make the arrests and if enough
probable cause existed, they were authorized to effectuate the arrests. Based upon SWAT staff
on-scene, ASACI:Ibelieved and advised SSA he thought there were enough
SWAT personnel available to execute the arrest if needed.

i During the surveillance, it was determined the Honda, driven by Statues, was being
accompanied/followed by a  SUV, driven by] Iwithl Ias a passenger.
The surveillance folloWed the two vehicles to the Illinois/Wisconsin border and the town of
Richmond, Illinois. Both vehicles turned onto North Main Street in Richmond and traveled over
the border toa parking lot in Wisconsin. At approximately 11:20am, the surveillance team
observed the three men talking outside the vehicles and witnessedl: obtain a bag from the
trunk of the Honda and get into the back seat of the Honda with Starn'es driving.

 

 

Bothvehicles returnedto Richmond, Illinois and the SUV parked in the car wash
business across the street from the Associated Bank, 10910 North Main Street, Richmond,
Illinois. The surveillance team observed the Honda drive past the bank several times before
driving into the bank parking lot and stopping. The SUV also moved from the parking lot of the
car wash to the parking lot of the ACE hardware store adjacent to the bank. 

 

According to the Operations Plan,  

 

IThe SWAT
personnel were divided into 4 vehicles. I

 

Page 4 of 14

Iwere in a   (hereinafter referred to as V1). SAs 

b7E -1,6

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -l,4'b7C -1
b7E -1,6

 

NW- 734

UNCLASSIFIED



I le?ere in 21' I(hereinafter b6 ?1

 

 

 

 

 

 

referred to as V2).  Were in a b7C -1
hereinafter referred to as V3). and b7}; '1 I 6
were in ad [hereinafter referred to as V4). All 

 

 

personnel were designated] 

 

E. Shooting Incident

 

 

 

 

 

At approximately 11:30am, Agents witnessed Starnes and Iwearing masks in the b6 -1 '7
Honda andl Iwas observed holding a handgun. SAI the STL, obtained verbal - b7C '1 7
approval from !to initiate arrest scenario one, as outlined in the Operations Plan, 
as it appeared Starnes and were preparing to rob the bank. gave the 

command for the SWAT teams to effect the arrests as he drove into-the bank parking lot himself.

STU I. 
Once V1 hit the Honda, all the Agents exited V1 to r. bjE ?1
engage the subjects Starnes immediately reversed his vehicle, stopped, and then accelerated forward

 

towards  and SA : had positioned themselves initially in front of the b6 -1 7

Honda; STL witnessing the Honda coming forward towards him jumped back into V1. b7C -1 7

At about this same was also in front of the Honda, had to jump out of
the way to avoid being hit as the Honda sped past him, ?ring what he believed was two to three
rounds as the car passed. -

 

Upon exiting V1, SAI:Itook a position three feet from driver?s window of the Honda, 106 -1
identi?ed himself, and ordered the driver (Starnes) to stop. SA : heard what he thought was 137?: ?1
the Honda hit a vehicle as it was backing up and then saw it start to accelerate forward. SA 
believing Iwere positioned in front of the Honda, perceived a

 

threat to them. SAI Imoved his weapon closer to the driver?s window, aimed it downward,
and ?red three rounds into-the driver?s window. Due to the shattering of the glass and the smoke
from the barrel of his weapon, vision was temporarily obscured and he did not see 
what his rounds impacted. 

initially taken a position to the left of SA: however as the Honda ?b6 -1 7

be an to accelerate forward he moved to a position at the back passenger corner saw the Honda accelerate past and fearing the driver would injure additional people

?red what he believed were eight rounds at the driver of the Honda.

'As' the SAs in V1 were engaging Starnes andl:lin the Honda, SA
who was originall ositioned across the street from?the parking lot, witnessed V2
stop to effect the arrest ofI?_mlin the SUV. nOt realize V4 was

approaching to provide support to the SAs in V1. into the bank parking lot I
to assist the Agents engaging Starnes and: As 5 1 so, a round entered her vehicle

Page 5 of 14

 

 

NW- 735

 

UNCLASSIFIED 

through the front windshield on? the passenger side and embedded into the back seat. As soon as
the round entered her vehicle, SA : exited the vehicle and sought cover.

As the Honda accelerated past V1, it drove over a curb in the parking lot, continued to
accelerate forward before jumping another curb, hitting a light post, and ultimately coming to a
stOp on an embankment.

 

[followed the Honda on foot, while V4 followed the
Honda through the parking lot. As Agents approached the driver?s side of the vehicle they saw
brain matter on the ground and signi?cant blood splatter on the inside of the Honda. It appeared
Stames was deceased. Iordered ut of the back seat of
the Honda and arrested him without further incident. Three handguns were found in the Honda.

 

At the same time the shooting incident occurred= Agents in V2 and V3 arrestedl: 
without incident. 

F. Post Shooting

After the shooting, Chicago Field Of?ce ASAC : reSponded to the
location and coordinated the subsequent investigation. ASAC : arrived on scene at about
12:40 pm. Chicago Field Of?ce ERT and the Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team
processed the scene. ASAC rived on scene at approximately 12:30 pm. SAC
Corey'Nelson arrived on scene at approximately 1 :10 pm.

G. Accounting of Shots Fired
Twenty shell casings were seized by ERT. All ballistic testing was conducted by the
Firearrns/Toolmark Unit. An analysis of these casings is contained in the attached laboratory
report dated 01/28/2014.

H. Subject Information

The SIRT was provided with the results ofNational Crime Information Center warrant
and arrest record check for Stames,l Iwhich indicated the following:

 

1) Anthony Starnes - Twenty?two arrests and eight convictions to include weapons, drug
and assault offenses. 

Eight arreSts and five convictions to include assault and robbery .
offenses.

Twenty-three arrests and one conviction to include weapons, drugs
and assault offenses. -

Page 6 of14

-b6 -1
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UNCLASSIFIED

I. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers

The SIRT determined all Agents involved in the shooting incident were wearing ballistic
bod armor, with markings identifying them as FBI agents. 
who were part of the perimeter team and not engaged directly in the shooting incident, .
were not wearing ballistic body armor. 

Agent Signed Sworn Statements and witness interviews indicated Agents identi?ed I

themselves as FBI prior to engaging the subjects in the shooting.
J. Forensic Summary
See attached laboratory report dated 12/18/2013.

K. Medical Summary

 

On 07/11/2013, SSRAI Ireceived the completed Autopsy Report for
Anthony Starnes from the McHenry County Coroner?s Of?ce. The report identi?ed the 
fellowing gunshot wounds sustained by Starnes: - 

 

- 1) Through and through gunshot wound to the head with no evidence of close range ?re.
The wound coursed frOm left to right along a straight path. A deformed copper jacket fragment
was recovered from a black hood worn by Starnes. The wound caused lacerations of the brain
and brirising of the eyes. This wound also caused multiple skull fractures.

2) A gunshot wound to the left shoulder with no evidence of close range ?re. The wound
coursed from left to right, front to back and downward. The wound course involved
skin, muscle, soft tissue, the left humerus, left lung, heart and right hemi-colon. A deformed 
small caliber lead bullet was recovered. This wound also caused a left hemothorax,
hem'opericardium and fecal peritoneum. -

3) A gunshot wound to the left abdomen with no evidence of close range ?re. The
wound coursed from left to right, soft tissue.

The toxicology report indicated Starnes tested positive for marijuana.
Shooting Incident Review Team Details

The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was composed of the following
personnel: .

Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) Christopher W. Davis

Assistant Inspector/Team Leader I


Assistant Inspector-in-Place .

Page  



 

AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

On 05/ 10/2013, IIC Davis communicated with Chicago SAC Cory Nelson to arrange
logistics for the SIRT. ASACI Iserved as the point of contact for the SIRT.

Due to varying travel plans, SIRT members traveled to Chicago on 05/10/2013 and
05/11/2013. On the morning of 05/11/2013, SIRT members were met at their hotel by 
ho provided four vehicles from the Chicago motor pool for use by the SIRT.
rove the SIRT to the Chicago Field Of?ce/North RA, 1600 Golf Road, Rolling
Meadows, Illinois where the SIRT was provided work space. 

IIC Davis provided a preliminary brie?ng to the SIRT members present 

and I:Ihad not yet arrived in Chicago.) also addressed the SIRT
and provided team and partner assignments. 

 

ASACI 
Iwith the names of the Chicago personnel involved in the shooting incident.

discussed the SIRT checklist and provided a status update on the items on the
list. Ithen drove the SIRT to the shooting scene where they were met by ASAC

and viewed the scene While it was being processed by Chicago ERT and personnel
from the Laboratory Evidence Response Team (LERT). also provided a detailed
brie?ng of the shooting incident. I -

During the SIRT- investigation, eight were taken from FBI Agents: three-from the
agents directly involved in the shooting: I
(all represented byI?I Esq). The remaining ?ve 8883 were obtained from SAs

Other interviews, events, and observations were documented via FD-302s. All interviewed FBI
personnel were allowed to read the FD-3 02 summarizing their interview to con?rm the accuracy
of the information-provided. The 888s and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily.

An D-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information Following a

Shooting Incident) was executed by all those interviewed.

.On 05/ 14/2013, IIC Davis and with the Assistant State?s Attorney

and Criminal Division Chieonf the McHenry County State?s
Attorney Of?ce, Woodstock, IL who advised they Would review the information collected from
the SIRT and provide a written declination of prosecution if the facts were consistent with the
information verbally provided.

Page 8 of 14

I arrived at the North RA and provided IIC Davis and 

-1,2,4
b7C -1,2,4

 

 

NW- 738

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED 

1 On 05/15/2013, an exit brief was provided by no Davis to SAC Nelson, b6 ?1
-1
V. Administrative I 7

A. Firearms Training

FBI Chicago provided quali?cation records dated 11/15/2012 for SAs  b6 -1
I A review of the records showed the Agents had b7}: ?1
successfully quali?ed on the weapons used in the shooting incident. -

 

Deadly Force Training

CDC : provided training on the FBI Deadly Force Policy annually at the b6 -1
mandatory All Employee's Conference. Attendance at the All Employee's Conference Was - b7C '1
documented and maintained via sign-in sheets. CDCI:Iprovided the sign-in sheets for the
training events for 2012 and 2011. The 2011 sign-in sheets re?ected the attendance of SA 1

and SA: The 2012 sign-in sheet re?ected the attendance of SA: There
is no record of SAI:Iattendingeither training event. CDCI:ktated the Chicago Field
Of?ce did not have an of?cial?make-up? session for the annual training however, the training
materials were provided to Field Of?ce personnel via the Intranet. In addition, the Deadly Force 
Policy was regularly read to personnel at operational brie?ngs. 

C. DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision
On 09/12/2013, 110 Davis was contacted by: Special Legal Counsel, . . b6 -3

DOJ who advised his of?ce had declined a criminal civil rights investigation against the Agents 137?: '3

involved in this shooting incident; 7

D. Local Prosecutorial Decision

On 06/05/2013, IIC Davis was contacted by Louis A. Bianchi, State?s Attorney for
McHenry County, Illinois who advised his of?ce had declined a criminal investigation against
the Agents involved in this shooting incident. at 

Page 9 of 14

 

 

law-73s

UNCLASSIFIED

VI. Inspector?s Observations:

Observation 1: The command and control structure was poorly de?ned for the surveillance and
arrest operation.

Analysis 1: The SIRT determined the approved Operations Plan in this instance had an
arrest component consistin of SWAT personnel performing a Felony Vehicle Stop. The plan
was approved by however, the SIRT was not rovided with dOcumentation
indicating SAC Nelson had delegated this authority'to 

b6 -1
b7C ?1

 

 

b5 -1,2

 

 

- operation to SSA

The SIRT determined the command decisions made prior to the shooting incident were
not clearly delineated or communicated to personnel participating in the operation. The
Operations Plan included 11 Agent personnel and 21 SWAT personnel to be

involved in the planned surveillance and arrest. While arrest scenarios are clearly defined in the

approved Operations Plan, it is not clearly delineated if this operation was written intended as a
SWAT Operation or an operation supported by tactically-trained Agents.

Interviews con?rmed some Agents believed the entire Operation was a Squad 
operation with tactically?trained Agents assisting, while others believed this was a SWAT
operation. The operation was written and briefed by CE-7 Agents 'without SWAT input as to the
placement or use of the SWAT Operators. 

Conversely, all interviewed SWAT operators believed this to be a SWAT operation as
they were tasked with the arrest scenarios. However, no of?cial SWAT brie?ng was conducted
to include all the SWAT operators involved in the planned arrest. The operational brie?ng held
on 05/07/2013 included some, but not all, of the involved SWAT operators. While the
Operations Plan was electronically provided to those absent, the SIRT determined a fully
attended SWAT brie?ng with all assigned operators'should have been conducted prior to this
operation.  105 '32

The SIRT determined verbally given on-scene command of the

ho was the SWAT CoordinatOr. However, b6 -1
gave the ?nal approvals on scene to deploy the arrest portion of the operation. - '1
Interviews indicated this resulted in confusion among the CE-7 Agents and SWAT personnel as

to the appropriate chain of command.

 

Page 10 of 14

NW- Yell}

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

b6 -1
b7C -1
135 -1,2

 

 

 

Recommendation 1a: SAC, Chicago, should ensure the proper chain of command is

adequately communicated to all participants involved in felony vehicle stops and/or. arrest 
operations.

 

Recommendation 1b: I

b5 -1,2

Recommendation 1c: SAC, Chicago, should ensure all team members of a proposed
SWAT operation are briefed directly by the SWAT STL prior to deployment of the operation.

 

Recommendation 1d: SAC, Chicago, should ensure SWAT elements deployed to an
arrest operation are under the direct control of the SWAT Coordinator or SWAT STL.

 

Observation I
l. b5 -1,2

 

 

 

 

 

 

Analysis 21' I
57E -5
b5 -1,2
136 -1
b'7C -1
b5 -1,2

 

 

 

Page 11 of 14

 

mar-741

 UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

?Recommendation 2: I

 

 

 

 

 

Observation SAI: were not wearing FBI issued Ballistic
Protective Undergarment (BPU) during the arrest operation.

Analysis 3: MIOG, Part 2, Section states: ?Wearing of body armor by SA
personnel is mandatory during planned arrests, execution of search warrants and surveillances
which can reasonably be expected 'to culminate in a confrontationpwith armed and dangerous



The SIRT determined thrOugh interviewsSSA   and SAI
were not wearing body armor at the time of the shooting incident. 
stated he was wearing an FBI armband, and no further explanation was provided as to why he

 

 

was not wearing body armor. SAI:Iadvised he did not have time to put 0n the body armor;

as he did not want to draw attention to himself while On surveillance.

Every indication was an arrest associated with this operation could involve a violent
altercation. Under such circumstances, it is imperative Executive Management and SSAS in the
Chicago Field Of?ce ensure all personnel wear in accordance with the MIOG. 

Instruction 3: SAC, Chicago, will enSure all Special Agents utilize FBI approved BPUs,

during all planned arrest_0perations.

Page 12 of 14

NW- 742,

b5 -1 

IUD-1057 Giev.5-8-10)

 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Date: 06/11/2014
Field Office

 

CC: b6 -1
b7C -1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION

Contact:

 

 

Approved By: MARSHALL HOWARD 
David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

 

 

 

Drafted By: b6 -1
b7C -1

Case ID (U) Non-Delegated Shooting

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 03/25/2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report prepared by
former Inspector Gregory T. Bretzing. A copy of the complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to this
communication.

Details:

On 03/25/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting

incident which occurred on 07/30/2013. The incident involved New

 

Orleans SAI [who was participating in a surveillance along b6 -1
b7C -1

 

with other members of Squad 11 as well as New Orleans Police Department

(NOPD) task force officers.

0

NW- 743



Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014
The subject of the surveillance was Allen Desdunes, a

 

predicated subject of a gang investigation
detained on 05/01/2013, for distribution of heroin. I

 

I who was

 

 

 

 

 

I Eventually, the New Orleans Field Office sought a federal
arrest warrant for Desdunes and scheduled an appointment with a

Magistrate on the afternoon of 7/30/2013.
surveillance on 07/30/2013 wasl

order to assist in the development of an arrest plan.

(WM

parking lot of a Studio 6 Extended Stay Hotel in New Orleans,

The purpose of the

 

Iin

 

Utilizing a court orderedl I

 

Desdunes was quickly located in the
Louisiana. He was observed conducting hand?to?hand drug transactions

with the occupants of other vehicles. Two Agents and a TFO from the

 

surveillance team

 

 

 

 

After confirmation of the drug transaction, two Squad 11

decided to approach Desdunes in the Motel 6 parking lot. 
and in one vehicle and in another. As the

Agents approached Desdunes in their vehicle, they ?chirped? their siren

(UH)ng

Agents I

 

to identify themselves as law enforcement officers. Desdunes attempted

to escape by ramming the Agent?s and vehicles. During this

encounter, Desdunes? vehicle was pinned against a curb by the Agent?s

vehicle. The Agents and TFO exited their vehicles, with 
SA

a position of cover to the rear passenger side of Desdunes? vehicle.

 

approached the driver?s window with his M4 carbine. SA

 

 

 

noted the driver?s side window airbag deployed, obstructing

 

his view of Desdunes. Desdunes put his vehicle in reverse, rammed the



2

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b7D -1

b7E -l,4,6

b6 -7
-7
b7D -1
b7E -l,6

b6 -1,4
b7C -l,4

NW-



Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

Agents? car, and continued to try to escape. Desdunes did not respond

to commands to turn off his vehicle and exit.

(U) his M4 carbine to break the driver?s side window

in an attempt to subdue Desdunes. Desdunes reached behind the

passenger's seat and made a turning motion towards a

bag of drugs in his hand. As the Agents and TFO continued to yell b6 ?1,4,7
commands at Desdunes Desdunes made a second motion towards b7c ?1r4r7

the back seat and turned quickly who was holding the
deployed air bag with his left hand while aiming his carbine at
Desdunes. Based on Desdunes? actions, and his failure to respond to
commands, fearing for his safety and the safety of
others, fired one shot at Desdunes, fatally wounding him. 
observed the same sudden, aggressive movements by Desdunes. 
stated he would have fired his weapon, however he was in a potential
cross?fire situation. He also noted Desdunes? car continued to slam
against the FBI vehicle, thereby obscuring his shot. 

the vehicle presented a danger to himself and others.
SIRG Observations

On 03/25/2014, the SIRG reviewed the agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG

unanimously determined the application of deadly force by b5 ?1
07/30/2014 was in compliance with the Department of b7c _1
Justice's Deadly Force Police.

2.Provide the Director with evaluative analyses,

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning
operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The

SIRG made the following observations regarding safety issues.

(U/Zfbg?i Observation 1: The TFO involved in the shooting incident
was not wearing body armor.



3





Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

Analysis 1: MIOG, Part 2, Section stated:

 

b7E -5

 

 

 

during his interview he was not b5 '4

wearing body armor at the time of the shooting incident. b7c _4

Instruction 1: SAC New Orleans will ensure, when feasible,
all personnel assigned to FBI?led Task Forces utilize body armor during

all planned or potential arrest operations.

Observation 2: Agents failed to observe proper arrest,

search, and detention techniques.

Analysis 2a: Proper Arrest Plans and Techniques were

detailed in SAC Memorandum 27-2001, dated 12/28/2001, which was codified
in MIOG, Part 2, Section 11. Portions of the MIOG, Part 2, Section 11
were later incorporated into DIOG, Section 19. Relevant sections are

cited as follows:

MIOG, PART 2, SECTION ll. TECHNIQUES AND MECHANICS OF
ARREST

ll-l ARREST TECHNIQUES

 

11-1.1 General

(2) The arrest team should consist of enough Agents/officers, whenever

possible, to cope properly with those or other situations which may

 

arise. 

 

b7E -5

 

 

 

11?1.3 Search of the Person



4

 





Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

11-1.3.1 High-Risk Search/Full?Body Search/Handcuffing

 

 

b7E -5

 

 

 

it is required that all arrested persons be handcuffed with hands
behind the back, back to back, and double locked. If circumstances
necessitate handcuffing with the hands to the front, then the hands
must be back to back, and the cuffs must be belted down and double
lockedm

11-1.3.2 Final Search and Collection of Evidence

 

(1) A high?risk search, even though believed to be thorough, cannot be
relied upon to be adequate. A more thorough full?body search of an
arrested person should be conducted as soon as possible before
transport. Under existing Bureau instructions, the final search will

usually be conducted in a place of local detentionm

11?1.4 Transportation of Arrested Persons

 

(2) It will usually be necessary for Agents to transport persons
arrested from the place of arrest to the place of local detentionm
With one subject and two or more Agents/officers, one Agent/officer
should ride in the rear seat with the subject. This Agent/officer
should be seated directly behind the driver. When more than one
subject is transported in an automobile, it is desirable to place the
subjects in the rear seat of the car with one subject on the passenger
side and the other in the middle. An Agent/officer should be



5

NW- 747



Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

positioned behind the driver and maintain strict control over the
subjects. Every precaution should be taken during the planning of the
arrest to ensure that adequate personnel with corresponding emergency
vehicles are available to avoid a ratio of more than one subject per
vehiclem Subjects should not be transported by only one Agent unless
exigent circumstances or Agent safety dictate. The Bureau vehicle
should be searched both before and subsequent to the transportation of

any subject.

DIOG 19.5.3 (U) RESTRAINING DEVICES

Temporary restraining devices, such as handcuffs, shackles
and/or belts may be used to secure an arrestee. Use of such devices is
lawful and proper, and Agents are expected to employ reasonable
judgment under the circumstances in the use of these devices and to

resolve any doubt in favor of their use.

DIOG 19.7 (U) SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST

The authority to search incident to an arrest is an
exception to the warrant requirement. Under this exception, an Agent
may conduct a full and complete search of the person of the arrestee
and the area within the arrestee?s ?immediate control." Immediate
control means ?the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.? Once an arrestee has been secured and
can no longer reach into the area to be searched, there is no longer
justification for a warrantless search. The purpose for the exception
is to protect the arresting Agent, prevent escape, and preserve any
evidence in possession of the arrestee. The right to search flows from
the fact of arrest, not the nature of the crime for which the arrest

has been made.

 

 

INSD determined SAI I SAI  and b6 -1,4,7
TFOI b7C -1,4,7
b7E -1

 

 

 

 





Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

 

b6 -1,4,7
b7C -1,4,7
b7E -1

 

Shortly afterwards, TFO

Ideparted the scene, leaving Iwith the detained
individuals.

 

 

 

After learning of the shooting incident, SA b6 -1,7
withI land returned to the Motel 6 b7c 
parking lot. transportedl
approximately 1.1 milesl Ito a parking lot adjacent
to the Studio 6 parking lot. not conduct a search of
I Iprior to transporting them and he was
unaware if anyone had conducted a search after they were detained. In
addition, Ito the New Orleans
Police Department?s Seventh District with the assistance of 

Analysis 2b: INSD determined after the shooting incident,
handcuffed after being taken out of Desdune?s b6 ?7
vehicle and left in a seated position at the rear of the vehicle. b7C ?7
was subsequently left unattended and no high risk search was conducted

by the arresting agents.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Recommendation 2a: SAC, New Orleans should ensure, when

feasible, Agents are not left alone with multiple subjects.

Recommendation 2b: SAC, New Orleans should ensure, when
feasible, arrested subjects are transported in a Law Enforcement

vehicle properly searched before and after transport.

Recommendation 2c: SAC, New Orleans should ensure, when

feasible, arrested subjects are transported with more than one Agent.

Recommendation 2d: SAC, New Orleans should ensure high risk
searches are conducted on subjects post?arrest.

Recommendation 2e: SAC, New Orleans, should ensure all
restrained subjects are properly controlled.



7

NW- 74%



Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

4. Provide recommendations for Administrative action if

deemed appropriate. The SIRG made the following observation regarding

Administrative issues.

Observation 3: Executive Management was not notified of a
high risk operation.

Analysis 3: DIOG Section 19.3.1 stated, Whenever
possible, SAC and USAO authority must be obtained before making a
warrantless arrest. Agents are authorized to make warrantless arrests
for any federal crime (felony or misdemeanor) committed in their
presence. Agents also have authority to make warrantless felony
arrests for a crime not committed in the presence of the Agent if there
is probable cause to believe the person to be arrested committed a
federal felony. A warrantless arrest must only be made when sound
judgment indicates obtaining a warrant would unduly burden the
investigation or substantially increase the potential for danger or
escape.?

The goal of the surveillance operation b7E "1:416

 in anticipation of executing an

arrest warrant scheduled to be obtained in the afternoon. The

objective of the surveillance changed when Desdunes was observed

engaging in criminal activity. in b6 -1,7
their signed sworn statements they decided to approach Desdunes b7c _1?7
I I They

intended to elicit Desdunes? cooperation, and if he refused, to conduct

 

 

 

 

 

a probable cause arrest. They failed to notify their SSA, ASAC or the
USAO when the purpose of the operation changed.

(U/Zfb??a Upon reviewing the totality of the circumstances leading to
the shooting incident, INSD determined the Agents had sufficient time
to notify their management of the change of objective. In addition,
Agents could have requested additional resources to assist in the
arrest operation, including marked law enforcement vehicles, and to

obtain USAO concurrence with a probable cause arrest. It should be



8





Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

 

re?stated, New Orleans agents had court approved

 

This

 

ensured Agents had the ability to locate Desdunes if he left the

location prior to the arrival of additional resources.

WNW

possible,

Instruction 3: SAC, New Orleans should ensure, whenever

executive management notification and authority is obtained

prior to potential high risk operations.

(WM
chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member.
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office of
Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
United States Department of Justice I I Special
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ (telephonic); Acting

Section ChiefI I Criminal Investigative Division; Section
Chief (SC) Sean M. Cox,I I

Counterintelligence Division; Supervisor Special Agent 

ISquad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief 

IPractical Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSA
 Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,
The following voting

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel; SSAI I Evidence Response Team (ERT),

 

Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics Operations
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group and 
Washington, Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting
members were also in attendance: Office of Inspector
General, I IDeputy General Counsel, Office of
the General Counsel; SC Jay S. Tabb, Tactical Section, SSA

I Iand Public Affairs SpecialistI I
Office of Public Affairs, National Press Office; Inspectors Howard S.
Marshall, Shawn W. Stroud, R. Justin Tolomeo, Trent R. Teyema and OI,

 

 

 

 

 

Team Leaders I I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

andI I OI, Special
Assistant, OI, UCI Iand Management and Program
I Inspection Analysis Unit, 

9

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b7E -7
b6 -1,3
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Title: Shooting Incident New Orleans Field Office
Re: 06/11/2014

 

Management Program I bG-?
Inspection Management Unit, INSD. b7c _1

Procedures for Responding to the Observation

SAC New Orleans is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until each Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office's response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to implement. SAC New Orleans is required to provide a written
response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to

resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must

 

be directed to Unit Chief  Inspection Management Unit b6 ?1
(IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link b7c '1
to MAPA 

 

 

 

00

NW- 752,

 

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 07/30/2013
Report of: IIC Gregory T. Bretzing Of?ce:
Case 297I-HQ-A2974031
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE
07/30/2013

Investigative Period: 07/31/2013 08/02/2013



 

I. Executive Summary

On 07/30/2013, members of New Orleans Field Of?ce (N OFO)

Squad 11 were

conducting surveillancein support of a pending gang investigation. The subject of the
surveillance was Allen Desdunes, a predicated subject of the gang investigation who was

 

detained on 05/01/2013 for distribution of heroin. 

 

 

 

IThe NOFO began
working with the USAO to obtain a federal arrest warrant for Desdunes and had an appointment

with the Magistrate on the a?emOon of 7/30/2013 to ?le a complaint and obtain a warrant. The

 

purpose of the surveillance on 07/30/2013 wad
assist in the development of an arrest plan.

 in order to

During the surveillance, Desdunes was located in the parking lot of a Studio 6/Motel 6
located at 12300 South Service Road, New Orleans, Louisiana where he was observed
conducting hand-to-hand drug transactions with the occupants of other vehicles. Two Agents

and a TFOfrom the Surveillance teaml

b7D -1
b7E -1,4,6

b6 -7

 

 

b7C -7

 

 

and NOPD TFO

decided to approach Des
Motel 6 parkinglot. SAI land SA

ere in one vehicle

Alter con?rmation of the-dru transaction, two Squad 11 Agents 
ELI d?esan in the

and TFO was in

another. As the Agents approached Desdunes? vehicle, they ?chirped? their siren to identify

themselves as law enforcement/of?cers. Desdunes attempted to escape by ramming the Agent?s

and vehicles. Duringthis encounter, Desdunes? vehicle was pinned against a? curb by the

Agent?s vehicle. The Agents and TFO exited their vehicles, with 

UNCLASSIFIED

taking a cover

b7E -1

b6 -l,4,7
b7C -1,4,7

NEW-753

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

position to the rear passenger side of Desdunes? vehicle as ?SAI: approached the driver?s b6 -1 4 I 7
window with his M4 carbine. SAI:Inoted the driver?s side window airbaghad deployed, b7c '1 4 7
obstructing his view of Desdunes. Desdunes put his vehicle in reverse, rammed the Agents? car,
and continued to to escape. Desdunes did not respond to commands to turn off his vehicle
and exit. SA used his M4 carbine to break'the driver?s side window in an attempt to
subdue Desdunes. At this point, Desdunes reached behind his seat and made a turning motion
towards SAI:Iwith a bag of drugs in his hand. As the Agents and TFO continued to yell
commands at Desdunesanl? Desdunes made a second motion towards the back seat and
turned quickly towards who was holding up the deployed side of an air bag with his
left hand while aiming his carbine at Desdunes. Based on Desdunes? actions and his failure to
respond to commands, fearing for his safety and the safety of others, ?red one shot
atDesdunes, fatally wounding him. TFO : observedrthe same sudden, aggressive movements
by Desdunes, but did not ?re his weapon due to a potential cross-?re situation. He also noted
Desdunes? car continued to slam against the FBI vehicle, thereby obscuring his view. I:Iwas
subsequently removed from the vehicle and arrested.

FBI Agents canvassed the area for eyewitnesses or video surveillance of the incident. No
video surveillance was located and no Motel 6 employees or guests indicated they observed the
incident. A- group of laborers behind a wall to the parking lot-where the incident occurred
claimed they heard shouts and sounds of a car crashing, however the-dividing wall obstructed
any VleW.

The scene was processed by the Louisiana State Police (LSP), assisted by the NOFO
ERT. Spherical photography and Total Stationacti?vities were concluded on 07/3 0/2013, after
which Desdunes? car was transported to Baton Rouge by the LSP for additional processing.
II. Incident Details

A. Substantive caSe ?les and background information

The following substantive matter was under investigation at the time of the shooting
incident on 07/3 0/20 1 3:

 

 

 

 

 

CASE ID: 23:7
CASE TITLEDate Opened:
2


 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE to: 

CASE TITLE: ALLENDESDUNES 
SPECIAL AGENT 
sA  
TASK FORCE OFFICER (TFO worm;
ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL OFFICER (AFO)

DATE OPENED: 07/30/2013

3. Listing of personnel involved in the incident


SA (?red weapon)
SA

 

 

 

 

TFOS
New Orleans Police Department

C. Brie?ngs.

There was no formal brie?ng for the surveillance conducted on 07/3 0/2013. The purpose

 

 

 

of the surveillance operation was! lin
anticipation of executin an arrest warrant la er th ially
consisted of SAs and TFO

 

 

 

D. Initial ennyl?rst contact

During the surveillance, Desdunes was located in the back parking lot of the Studio
6/Motel 6, 12300 South L10 Service Road, New Orleans, Louisiana where he was observed
conducting what a cared to he hand-to-hand drug transactions. A passen er in'the ?ont- seat,
later identi?ed asI Iappeared to be assisting Desdunes. SA and TFQ

 

 

IShortly afterwards, TF 0  [departed the scene, leaving land
I Iwith the detained individuals.

SAI ISAI mmioproach Desdunes and : 
I Prior to confronting Desdunes,

SAsl Iput on their ballistic armor, however, TF did not. SAs
 weresin one vehicle and TFO  : was in a second vehicle.

 

 

 

 

 

Fi?-7535

b6 -1,4,7
b7C -l,4,7
b7A -1

b6 -1,4
b7C -1,4

b7E -1,4,6

b6 -1,4
b7C -1,4

b6 -1,4,7
b7C ?l,4,7
b7E -1

b6 -1,4,7
b7C -l,4,7

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

E. Shooting incident

driving his FBI vehicle, chirped his siren as his vehicle and 
vehicle approached Desdunes in the parking lot. SAsl lbelieved Desdunes
would recognize them as they had been present when Desdunes was first detained by the FBI in
May 2013. SA tackled Desdunes trying to escape while handcu?'ed during this initial
detention. As the Agents approached Desdunes, he rammed their vehicle in an effort to ?ee.
Desdunes? vehicle was forced into a raised sidewalk at the rear of the motel where SA
attempted to restrict its movement. Upon initial impact, SA exited SA 3
vehicle and approached Desdunes? driver?s side window with his Colt M4 carbine. Afterward,
SA TFO Bxited their vehicles and covered Desdunes with their ri?es. SA
was at the rear driver?s side of Desdu?nes? vehicle? and the rear passenger
side. Wiile Desdunes continued to ram SAI Is vehicle, the Agents were shouting
commands to Desdunes to stop and exit the vehicle. SAI Iapproached the driver?s
window and broke it with his ri?e. His view of Desdunes was obstructed by the driver?s side air
bags which deployed. Using one hand to steady the ri?e, SA : raised the air bag and
jabbed Desdunes with the tip of his rifle while shouting commands to stop the vehicle. Desdunes
made a quick movement to the rear of his vehicle and turned back around quickly. He grabbed
the steering wheel with his left hand while holding a plastic bag in his right hand, continuingto
ram his vehicle back into 8%Desdunes then made a second sudden move
towards the rear of the Vehicle. SA believing Desdunes was turning back around to
shoothim and feeling an imminent threat, dropped the air bag, bladed his body, and ?red one
shot at Desdtines. not see the impact of the shot, but noticed Desdunes stopped
moving. No additional shots were ?red.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The passenger in the vehicle,l:l was detained and uninjured.

F. Post shooting

 

I After the shooting, NOFO Iresponded to the!
location and coordinated with the New Orleans Police Department and Louisiana State Police
(LSP) regarding the subsequent investigation. It was agreed the LSP would process the scene
and conduct a Total Station review with the assistance of the NOFO who conducted
spherical photography of the scene. LSP seized all pertinent evidence at the scene and
transported Desdune?s vehicle to Baton Rouge, Louisiana for further processing.

 

G. Accounting of shots ?red

One shell casing was seized by the LSP. All ballistic testing was conducted by the LSP.
Ananalysis-of this casing was pending at the time of this reportb? 

l"

W?m

UNCLASSIFIED

H. Subject information

The SIRT was provided with the results of the National Crime Information Center
warrant and arrest record check for Desdunes. The report noted ten arrests and multiple
convictions for offenses including several narcotics violations and multiple instances of a felon
in possession of a firearm.

I. Use of body armor and law enforcement identifiers
The SIRT determined the two Agents involved were both wearing ballistic body armor.
However, not wearing ballistic body armor. The ballistic body armor had visible
markings indicating the Agents we?re law enforcement.
J. Forensic Summary
The Louisiana State Police provided the FBI will a full forensic report of all evidentiary
items seized as well as crash data and ballistic testing. The complete report is includedin its

entirety in Tab VII.

K. Medical Summary

On the New Orleans Coroner?s Of?ce, provided the FBI

with a 90 of the coroner?s report on Desdunes. The report indicated the round'?red ?om SA-
Ijentered Desdunes? left cheek and was rec'overed in the right occipital scalp
subcutaneous tissue. The complete report is included in Tab VI.

111. ShOoting Incident Review Team Details

A. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following
personnel:

Inspector-in-Charge (11C) Gregory T. Bretzin

Assistant Ins ectorlTeam Leader 
I

Assistant Inspector-?l-Place 

AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

 

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

On 07/30/2013, IIC Bretzin with NOFO ASAC arrange
logistics for the SIRT. ASAC and SSA : served as the points of contact
for the SIRT 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

On 07/31/2013, 110 Bretzing ltraveled from Washington, b6 ?1
DC to New 0rleans,_Louisiana where they were met by SAsl 1370 - 1
and transported to the NOFO.

IIC Bretzing provided a relimin brie?ng to SAC Michael Anderson, b6 -1
and CDCFIO discuss INSD SIRT b?ic -1
shooting incident protocol. After this brie?ng, ASAC briefed IIC Bretzing and 

 

IThere was an opportimity for dialogue between the IN SD team and the
involved personnel to address concerns, provide clari?cation, and answer questions prior to the
investigation commencing. The SIRT then went to the shooting scene where ASAC
provided a walk-throngh of the shooting incident. The scene was processed by the LSP, with the
assistance of the NOFO ERT. The vehicles involved in the incident and seized evidence had
been removed.

During the SIRT investigation, Signed Sworn Statements were taken from 
land Both Agents were represented IEsq. Other b6 -1 2

interviews, events, and observations were documented via FD-302s. All FBI personnel were 107?: 1 2
allowed to read the FD-3 02 summarizing their interview to con?rm the accuracy of the
information provided. The and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily. An
FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information Following 3.
Shooting Incident) was executed by all those interviewed.

 

 

 

On 07/31/2013, IIC Bretzing contactedl:l Special Legal Counsel, 1301 and b6 ?1 3
briefed him on the shooting incident. -1 3

On 3/01/2013, 110 Bretzing and met with the United States Attorney (USA)

 

 

 

 

Dana Boente and  to brief them on the
SIRT investigation.

On 08/01/2013, IIC Bretzing and with the New Orleans Parrish District b6 -1 4
Attorney Leon ?Cannizzaro and Assistant District Attomeyl  to brief them on b7C - 1 4
the SIRT investigation.

On 08/02/2013 an exit brief was ?rovided by HG Bretzing to SAC Anderson, ASAC

CDC

V. Administrative

A. Firearms training

(WM The NOFO provided quali?cation records for SA: A review b6 -1
indicated he was current on his ?rearms quali?cation certi?cation. b7c 1
6

NW- 758

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

l3. Deadly Force training

Documentation provided by the NOFO indicated CDC rovided annual guidance
regardingthe FBI deadly force policy to all Agents. CDC dvised the deadly force policy
was read during each operational brie?ng within the ?eld of?ce.

SAI:Iadvised in his he last read the FBI Deadly Force policy approximately
three weeks. prior to the shooting incident in preparation for a planned arrest operation in which
he participated.

There was no operational plan or ferrnal brie?ng for the surveillance as the purpose was
I I Therefore, the FBI Deadly Force policy was
not reviewed prior to the surveillance.

 

C. DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision

On 01/15/2014, IIC Bretzing was contacted by: Special Legal Counsel,
DOJ who advised his of?ce had declineda criminal civil rights investigation against the Agent
involved in this. shooting incident.

D. Local Prosecutorial Decision

On 12/24/2013, Inspector Gregory T. Bretzing received an E?mail from:
I:Iofthe New Orleans Field Of?ce which contained as an attachment a letter from the
Of?ceo?f the OrleansParish District Attorney. The letter was addressed to SAC Michael .
Anderson and Inspector Bretzing and was dated 12/20/2013.

The letter stated the Orleans Parish was referring the Agent-involved shooting matter of
07/30/2013 to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana for review
pursuant to Federal Law Standards as the Orleans Parish lacked the necessary jurisdiction to
proceed with ?nther prosecution.

 

The letter was signed byI
the OrleansParish District Attorney.

 

IFirst Assistant District Attorney, Of?ce of

b6 -1
b7C -l

b7E -1,4NYT-FEQ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

VI. Inspector?s Observations

Observation 1: The TFO involved in the shooting incident was not wearing ballistic
armor.

 

nal sisl' Part2 Section 12?13.1 1 stated: 

 

 

 

 

_l

TF advised during his interview he Was not wearing body armor at the time of the
shootinginci ent.

Instruction 1: SAC, New Orleans, will ensure all personnel assigned to FBI?led Task
Forces utilize ballistic armor during all planned or potential arrest operations.

Observation 2: Agents failed to utilize proper arrestsearch, and detention techniques.

Analysis 2a: Proper Arrest Plans and Techniques were detailed in SAC Memorandum
27-2001; dated 12/28/2001, which was codi?ed in MIOG, Part Section 11. Portions of the
MIOG, Part 2, Section 11 were later incorporated into DIOG, Section 19. Relevant sections are
cited as "follows:

MIOG, PART 2, SECTION 11. TECHNIQUES AND MECHANICS OF ARREST

11-1 ARREST TECHNIQUES

1-1.1 General
(2) A person who is being placed under arrest may do one of several things. .. The arrest
team should consist of enough Agents/of?cers, whenever possible, to cope properly with

mse or other situations? which max arise1371-3 -5

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

1-1.3 Search of the Person

11?1.3.1 High-Risk Shearch/Full-Bodx Search/Handcuf?ng

 

 

 

 

(2)  it is required that all arrested persons be handcuffed With hands behind the back,
back to back, and double locked. If circumstances necessitate handcufiing with the hands
to the front, then the hands must be back to back, and?the cuffs must be belted dawn and
double 

1.1-1.3.2 Final Search and Collection ovaidenc'e

(1) A high-risk search, even though believed to be thorough, cannot be relied upon to be
adequate. A. more thorough full-body search of an arrested person should be conducted as
soon as possible before transport. Under existing Bureau instructions, the final search
will usually be conducted in a place of local detentidn. . .

1 1-1.4 Transportation of Arrested Persons

(2) It will usually be necessary for Agents to transport persons arrested from the place of
arreSt to the place of local With one subject and two or more
Agents/of?cers, one Agent/of?cer should ride in the rear seat with the subject. This
Agent/of?cer should be seated directly behind the driver. When more than one ?subject is
transported in an automobile, it is desirable to place the subjects in the rear seat of the car
with one subject on the passenger side and the other in the middle. An Agent/of?cer
should be positioned behind the driver and maintain. strict control over the subjects.
Every precaution should be taken during the planning of the arrest to ensure that adequate
personnel with corresponding emergency vehicles are available to avoid a ratio of more
than one subjectper Subjects should not be transported by only one Agent
unless exigent circumstances 01' Agent safety dictate. The Bureau vehicle should be
searched both before and subsequent to the transportation of any subject.

 

INSD determined 

 

 

 

 

Shortly afterwards,

TFO :heparted the scene, leaving SAs : with the detained individuals.

9

NW- 761

 

-5

b6 -1,4,7
b7C -1,4,7
b7E -1

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

- A?erlearning ofthe shooting incident, SA left SAI:Ialone withlEl be ?1.7
andl: and returned to theMotel 6 parking lot. timately transported b7C - 1 7

and  : approximate1y 1.1 milesl Ito a parking lot adjacent to the Studio
6/Motel 6 parking lot. SA : did not conduct a search of] 
prior to transporting them and he was unaware if anyone had conducted a search after they were

 

 

 

 

detained. In addition; transportedl Ito the New Orleans Police
Department?s Seventh District with the-assistance of 

Analysis 2h: IN SD determined after the shooting incident, subjectl:lwas handcuffed b6 ?7
after being taken out of Desdune?s vehicle and left in a seated position at the rear and outside of WC - 7
the FBI vehicle which was directly behind Desdune?s vehicle. as subsequently left

 

 

unattended and no high risk search was conducted by the arresting agents.

Instruction 2a: SAC, New Orleans will ensure. Agents are not left alone with multiple
subjects.

Instruction 2b: SAC, New Orleans will ensure arrested subjects are transported in a
Law Enforcement vehicle properly searched before and after transport.

Instruction 2c: SAC, New Orleans will ensure arrested subjects are?tranSported with
more than one Agent.

Instruction 2d: SAC, New Orleans will ensure high risk searches areconducted on
subjects postuarrest.

Recommendation 2e: SAC, New Orleans should ensure all restrained subjects are
properly controlled.

Observation 3: Executive Management was not noti?ed of a high risk operation.

Analysis 3: DIOG Section 19.3.1 stated, ?Whenever possible, SAC and USAO authdrity
must be obtained before making a warrantless arrest. Agents are authorized to make warrantless
arrests f0r any federal. crime (felony or misdemeanor) committed in their presence; Agent's also
have authority to make warrantless felony arrests for a crime not cormnitted in the presence of
the Agent if there is probable cause to believe the person to be arrested committed a federal
felony. A warrantiess arrest must only be made when sound judgment indicates obtaining a
Warrant would unduly burden the investigation or substantially increase the potential for danger
or escape.?

 

The goal of the surveillance operation was to determinel I 1973 -1 I 4 I 6
in anticipation of executing an arrest warrant scheduled to be obtained inthe
a?erndon. The obj e?ctiverof the. surveillance changed when Desdunes was observed engaging in
criminal. activity. SAsl [s signed sworn statements indicated they decided b6 ?1 7
to approach Desdunesl They b7C -1 7

 

10

NYT- 3-62

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED


intended to elicit Desdunes? ecoperation, and if he refused, to conduct a probable cause arrest.
They failed to notify their SSA, ASAC or the USAO when the purpose of the operation changed.

Upon reviewing the totalityr of the circumstances leading to the shooting incident, IN SD

determined the Agents had sufficient time to notify their management of the change of objective

from surveillance to arrest. In addition, knowing Desdunes had attempted to escape during a

previous detainment I 1379 -1
there was an increased likelihood he would resist. Agents could have NE ?1 I 6

requested additional re'Sources to assist in the arrest operation, including marked law

enforcement vehicles, and obtained USAO concurrence for a probable causearrest. Further,

New Orleans agents had a court approved  ensuring

Agents the ability to locate Desdunes if he left the location prior to the arrival of additional

resources.

 

 

 

 

 

Recommendation 3: SAC, New Orleans should ensure executive management
noti?cation and authority is obtained prior to potential high risk Operations.

11

tart-753 

 

 

Of?ce of the Orleans Parish District Attorney

Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr.

 

 . DISTRICT ATTORNEY
.4 n: .7 .-


0?    ht

 

First Assisemt District Attorney

 

6 -4
December 20, 2013 . MC -4
Mr. Kenneth Allen Polite, Jr. Michael J. Anderson
United States Attorney Special Agent in Charge
Eastern District of Louisiana FBI- New Orleans Division
650 Poydras Street, Suite 1600 2901 Leon C. Simon Boulevard
New Orleans, LA 70130 New Orleans, LA 70126
Gregory T. Bretzing
Inspection Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535
Dear Sirs:
On? July 30, 2013, Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents met at a Motel 6 in the City of New
Orleans 'to arrest Allen Desdunes for distributing heroin. Based on the evidence presented and
reviewed, the Agents believed that the actions they took of their
duties and were necessary, proper, reasonable, and justi?ed. Indetermining whether or not to institute
prosecution arising from a fatal shooting. of a suspect by Federal Law Enforcement Agents when acting
in the course of effecting an arrest of a suspect for Federal Drug Law violations, local prosecutors are
bound by the limitations of Federal Law granting immunity under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution of the United States of America. Thelaw does not require that the actions of a Federal
Agent be in fact necessary or in retrospect justi?able, only that'he reasonably thought it to be. Further,
there is no indication that the Agents manifested malice towards the-deceased. Therefore, this matter is
being referred to the United States Attorney fer the Eastern District of Louisiana for his review
pursuant to Federal Law Standards because this o?ice lacks-the necessary jurisdiction to proceed.
However, should you come to possess any information or evidence-indicating.that the Agents involved
acted upon malice towards Mr. Desdunes,  of?ce will- further consider'this matter.
b6 ?4
b7c -4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

619 South White Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70119 504?822?2414 A 
NW- 

 

KEVIN S. BRACKETT


March 3, 2014

. b6 -4
SpeclalAgent :  . _4

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
PO. Box 21398 -
Columbia, South Carolina 29221?1398

Re: File 34-14-02

Agent:

I I am writing in reference to the above ?le you submitted to my of?ce for review. I have
reviewed the ?le and based on the evidence gathered and interviews of the witnesses I have
concluded that the only individual criminally culpable for any actions occurring during the

 

 

 

 

shooting incident itself isb7C ?4,7
Detective of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department was attem ting to arrest
Mr. on an outstanding warrant for Armed Robbery at a residence inle South
Carolina. He was accompanying local sheriff?s deputies in a consent search of the home When
he came an upstairs bedroom in possession of a ?rearm that he was pointing .
'at the of?cer. Shots were exchanged. . i 
he ?red ?rst but does not diSpute that he was pointing a handgun at the 1b: Sic?f A77

of?cer who he knew to be attempting to arrest him. Indeed, it appears that the armed Mr.
was laying in wait for an of?cer to come through the door of the bedroom where he was hiding.

Detectivel:bsserts the ?ring may have been simultaneous 0 may have ?red ?rst.
Under South Carolina law it is immaterial who ?red ?rst. Detective was faced with a lethal

threat through no fault of his own and was entitled to ?re his weapon in self?defense the very
moment he realized he wasbeing menaced by South Carolinians are generally a
sporting bunch but neither our law nor our sense of fair play requires an individual to allow their
assailant the ?rst shot. 

Moss JUSTICE CENTER
1675-1 A YORK HIGHWAY YORK, SOUTH CAROLINA 29745?7422
(803) 628-3020 ?3 FAXI (803) 628?3025

NYT- W55

The use of force by Detectivel:  was lawful and the level of force employed appropriate to the
occasion. 

I am being forwarded the investigative ?le of the FBI and will review it upon receipt. If there is 

anything in that ?le that might cause me to reconsider my opinion I will alert you, otherwise I
consider this aspect of the incident to be closed.

Sincerely,

  

Kevin S. Brackett

16th Circuit Solicitor

cc: Deputy Inspectod IF ederal Bureau of Investigation
Chief Rodney Monroe, Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department
Sheriff Bruce M. Bryant, York County Sheriff 

 

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

Title: Revised SIRG observations. Date: 09/25/2014

From: INSPECTION

 

 

 

 

DA-TDY
Contact: b6 '1
b7C -1

Approved By: Trent R. Teyema

STROUD SHAWN 

David Paul Gelios

Nancy McNamara
Drafted By:  I
Case ID (U) Shooting
Synopsis: To provide SAC CE with revised SIRG observations.
Details:
On 08/29/2014, INSD provided SAC CE with observations,
analysis, and recommendations resulting from the 07/31/2014 SIRG
serial 54). After a discussion between SAC CE and
AD INSD, INSD revised Observation 1 and Recommendation 1c. The
revision is included in the Observations provided below:
1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the application of
deadly force in this instance involved a CMPD TFO rather than an Agent,
the SIRG did not evaluate the application of deadly force with respect
to whether it was in compliance with the Department of Justice?s Deadly
Force Policy. As bound by the Deadly Force Policy, b6 -4
his application of Deadly Force was evaluated by the CMPD. ?4
2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning
and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

Observation 1: investigation lacked managerial b6 -7
b7C -7

oversight, and was not conducted in accordance with CID Fugitive



NW- 7957



Title: Revised SIRG observations.
Re: 297I-HQ-A4046109, 09/25/2014

Policy.

Analysis 1: Charlotte Squad CE08 responsibilities included
supervision of the Violent Crime SSTF and the following threat issues:
1) Transnational Organized Crime West 2) Transnational
Organized Crime East 3) Violent Incident Crimes?Domestic.
Fugitive investigations were worked under the Violent Incident?Domestic

threat issue.

 

Squad CE08 was led by SSH and comprised of nine b6 -lr4
b7C -1,4

 

Agents and 14 full?time TFOs assigned to the Safe Streets Task Force
(SSTF). Two of the 14 full?time TFOs were CMPD, officers 

 

I Prior to being assigned to the SSTF,

 

 

Iwere assigned to CMPD's Violent Criminal

 

Apprehension Team (VCAT). As members of the SSTF, their mission was to
focus on the apprehension of dangerous fugitives where a federal
investigative interest existed, and develop probable cause necessary to

obtain UFAP warrants. There were no FBI Agents assigned to work

 

fugitive investigations on Squad CE08. As such, I

 

relied on other VCAT team members who were federally deputized

 

to pursue FBI UFAP investigations. TFOs Ialso provided
support to VCAT members in non?federal cases as needed. 
in approximately 400 arrests during 2013. In
contrast, Squad CE08 had 14 federal fugitive investigations pending

 

during on?site review.

I I as a b7c _l!4?7

Investigation on 12/18/2013. The predication for this

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b7E -2
investigation was a state arrest warrant on an Armed
Robbery of a fast food restaurant whereI I On
Friday, 01/03/2014, TFO otified CE08 SSA via UNET
E?mail, that he and TFO iwere traveling toIJ:I-l South Carolina
to pursue a lead on UFAP investigation. TFO also
stated they would be pursuing a lead in an unrelated case
I I inI I South Carolina and meeting with the
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). 


2





Title: Revised SIRG observations.
Re: 09/25/2014

acknowledged receipt of E?mail and requested specific
addresses at which the TFOs would be pursuing the leads. 
reminded needed to provide more advanced notice of

potential operations to so he could make the necessary
notifications to the Columbia Field Office and the Charlotte Criminal
ASAC.

After being notified of the above activity on 01/03/2014, SSA

notified SSAI

the Columbia Field Office, via FBI UNET E-mail.

 

I his counterpart in

an arrangement whereby they notified each other in this

manner when their squads needed to pursue leads in the other?s AOR. It

was also practice to notify his ASAC via telephone,

E?mail, or Instant Messaging, although he does not recall notifying his

ASAC of the activity on 01/03/2014.

On occasion, ASAC

would seek additional information on a matter after electronically

acknowledging receipt. The SIRT was unable to determine if such

notification was made to the ASAC by 

 

On Monday, 01/06/2014, [traveled to al I

South Carolina to pursue another lead onl I SSA

not notified by the TFOs prior to going to At

Ilearned al
lived atI South Carolina.
known to drive TFO Inotified SSA

UNET E?mail of the investigation?s developments, indicated
he had requested assistance from the York County Sheriff?s Office, and

was proceeding to 

 

 

 

they were going to make contact the following morning. SSA
again notified these developments. However, SSA

not certain if he notified 
also uncertain if he received an Instant Message from 
01/06/2014, regarding the noted investigation and the intended

investigative steps. no other communications
with including E?mail, telephonic, or otherwise, regarding



3



Since no vehicles were parked
in the driveway when the TFOs drove by, 

b6 ?4,7
b7C -4,7

b6 -1
b7C -1

b6 -1,4,7
b7C -l,4,7



Title: Revised SIRG observations.
Re: 09/25/2014

this investigation, prior to 01/07/2014. after b6 ?1,4,7
Iobtained the information from they b7c '1'4'7
did meet in person at the Charlotte Field Office and discussed the
informat?x1obtained 

 

 

As per DIOG 7.1, a Full Investigation may be opened if there is
an ?articulable factual basis" of possible federal criminal or national
threat activity. As a result of this incident, CID published an
Electronic Communication dated 04/14/2014, to
clarify Fugitive Investigation Policy, the Violent Crimes Unit (VCU)

 

instructed fugitive matters be opened asl I b7E ?2

 

 

I I once the following standards were met:

 

 

b7E -5

 

 

 

The Charlotte UFAP opening Electronic Communication (EC)



4





Title: Revised SIRG observations.
Re: 297I-HQ-A4046109, 09/25/2014

verified an outstanding felony arrest warrant existed 
Robbery With a Deadly Weapon. The EC did not articulate a factual
basis for possible violations of federal law, did not document contact
with the USAO, did not confirm a request for assistance from a local
prosecutive authority, and did not set a lead to for 

factual review.

There was no arrest plan prepared prior to the 01/07/2014
incident. Although there was not definitive information indicating
at the residence, the TFOs acknowledged his presence was a
possibility. As per DIOG 19.2.3 ARREST PLANS:

The is responsible to ensure that careful and thorough

planning is conducted for the successful execution of a high risk
arrest operation involving a potentially dangerous situation or
subject. The arrest plan must be adapted to each situation and must
include relevant details to enhance the safety and effectiveness of the
agents and officers involved in the search operation. The_planning and
execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to
experienced Agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or their

designees.

Prior to conducting an arrest operation deemed a high risk, the

I to include the

five critical categories: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration

 

agent must prepare a writtenl

 

and Equipment, and Control and Communication (SMEAC), and must utilize
thel IForm

 

 

 

 

 

I In situations where an FBI SWAT Team(s) or the Critical Incident
Response Group?s (CIRG), Tactical Section is involved, 

must be used in lieu of the Special

weapons and Tactics Policy Implementation Guide (PG), O444PG and
Hostage Rescue Team PG, for more on the use of the SWAT Teams

and CIRG, Tactical Section in high risk operations.
The be presented in an oral briefing 

Title: (U/?Engi Revised SIRG observations.
Re: 09/25/2014

all personnel involved in the execution of the arrest warrant(s) prior
to the operation. During the briefing, the briefing Agent should stress
to the participants of the operation that the arrest(s) has the

potential to become dangerous. At the discretion of the field office

 

approving official, the may review thel I and/or b7E '5

 

participate in providing the FBI deadly force briefing to the arrest

operation participants.

Exigent circumstances emergency, pressing necessity

requiring immediate action) may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of

the The ASAC or designee must approve the use of an b7E ?5
oral briefing in lieu of a written and exigent

circumstances. An oral briefing must follow the requirements of a
to address the SMEAC categories identified above.

Documentation of the oral briefing must occur as soon as possible

 

fOllowing the operation by_preparing and filing thel I

 

 

ITemplate, whichever is appropriate for the situation.

 

The SSA may consider utilizing, and/or alerting local

authorities to the planned arrest, if appropriate under the
circumstances. Although the time of notification is left to the
discretion of the SSA, he/she must consider the jurisdiction of local
law enforcement, its responsibility to its community and its need to be

aware of law enforcement actions in its jurisdiction.

The term ?Agent? in the context of this section includes FBI

Special Agents and other federal, state, tribal, or local law
enforcement officers who have been deputized under either Title 18 or
21 of the United States Code and are working on behalf of or at the
direction of the FBI, e.g. task force officer, JTTF, etc.

INSD determined there was informal communication between TFOs
and FBI personnel regarding the fugitive investigation prior to the
incident on 01/07/2014. However, Charlotte lacked sufficient guidance
or documentation outlining a strategy or expectations for TFOs while

conducting federal investigations, to include a process by which



6

NW- 772,



Title: Revised SIRG observations.
Re: 09/25/2014

detailed and timely information from TFOs was received to facilitate
informed decisions and appropriate oversight. There was no documented
squad guidance or protocol regarding fugitive investigations or
specific responsibilities of VCAT and FBI personnel. The current
Memorandum of Understanding signed on 05/01/2013, did not
adequately address the TFOs responsibilities to communicate with FBI

personnel during potential arrest situations.

Based on intelligence obtained from the interviews of b6 -1,2,7
I I prior in South b7c'q?2?7
Carolina, and the actions taken by the TFOs on site (use of LRAD and

 

 

large law enforcement team), INSD assessed there was a reasonable
be at the residence. his
managerial responsibility to ensure there was logical operational
planning with consideration of contingencies by permitting FBI TFOs to
conduct FBI fugitive investigations with little more than an
expectation of cursory notification of their investigative activities.
as a mere conduit to the adjacent Field Office by
only notifying the Columbia SSA via E?mail his TFOs would be in the
Columbia AOR conducting a fugitive investigation. in his
capacity as the SSA of the TFOs, should have been more engaged in the
discussion and planning for what could have reasonably been expected to

be an arrest scenario.

Instruction 1a: SAC, Charlotte will ensure UFAP
investigations are worked in accordance with existing DIOG policy, the
Fugitive Policy Guide, and recent CID guidance 

Serial 1081) on fugitive investigations.

 

Instruction 1b: SAC, Charlotte will ensure an operations

 

plan is utilized when conducting a potential high risk

arrest.

Recommendation 1c: SAC, Charlotte should ensure guidance is

 

provided to Squad CE08, consistent with current DIOG policy, the

Fugitive Policy Guide, and CID Guidance outlining UFAP investigative



7

NW- 773



Title: Revised SIRG observations.
Re: 09/25/2014

requirements and delineating responsibilities to include those

related to communication and command and control with FBI personnel, to

facilitate informed decision making.

Recommendation 1d: SAC, Charlotte should ensure

communications between supervisors and EM regarding TFO investigative

 

actions are appropriately documented.

Observation 2: There was no documentation of SAC or designee
approval for travel into another field office?s area of responsibility
for operational activity.

Analysis 2: Manual of Investigative Operations and
Guidelines (MIOG) Part 2, Section 23?3.l stated,
information from another field office is to be obtained by that office
When the

economy and common sense dictate,

?Investigative

unless extraordinary haste requires direct communication.
exigencies of a case, emergencies, or
an employee, if authorized by his/her
another field office.

is to be obtained_prior to the travel.

SAC, may enter the territory of
of the SAC of the entered office



The concurrence

cross?border travel occurred frequently
with Charlotte personnel traveling into South Carolina and South
to include TFOs,

This travel was common due to the close proximity of the state line to

SSAI: routinely

Per Charlotte,
this practice was verbally approved by Charlotte and Columbia SACs,

Carolina personnel, traveling into North Carolina.
downtown Charlotte.
coordinated the travel through unclassified E?mail.
but

not documented via EC.

Instruction 2: SAC, Charlotte will ensure SAC or designee

approval is appropriately documented prior to operational travel into

another field office?s area of responsibilityFD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Date: 08/29/2014
Field Office
CC: b6 -1
b7C -1
From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY
Contact:

Approved By: Trent R. Teyema

STROUD SHAWN 

David Paul Gelios

Nancy McNamara
Drafted By:  I
Case ID (U) Shooting
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 07/31/2014.
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. CE SIRT Report
Details:
On 12/12/2013, the Charlotte Mecklenburg, North Carolina,
Police Department (CMPD) obtained an arrest warrant forI I b5 '4r7
the Armed Robbery of the restaurant Jack?in?the?Box located ?25?

in Pineville, North Carolina.

have fled North Carolina to South Carolina,

 

CMPD TFO

Streets Task Force (SSTF), opened a UFAP 



After receiving 
on 12/18/2013,
Iassigned to Charlotte Field Office Violent Crimes Safe





Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 08/29/2014

On 01/07/2014, at approximately 6:12 CMPD b6 _4r7
b7C -4,7

 

I I accompanied by three CMPD Violent Criminal
Apprehension Team (VCAT) officers and four deputies from the York
County, South Carolina, Sheriff?s Office (YCSO), drove to 

South Carolina. A vehicle known to belong tol I

I I was in the driveway of the

 

 

 

residence. For approximately 25 minutes, the Charlotte TFOs attempted

to answer the front door. the door at
approximately 6:37 a.m. the not in the
residence and provided verbal consent to a cursory search.

(WW TFO CMPD OfficerI CMPD Officer b6 ?4,7
CMPD LieutenantI I and YCSO b7C ?4f?

entered the residence. Officers  I
accompanied by proceeded upstairs to clear two
bedrooms. Officers   entered the bedroom
located on the left side of the stairway. saw an individual
seated or crouched on a bed with a handgun drawn and pointed at TFO
recognized this individual previously
viewed photograph. TFO immediately fired his weapon 
firing four rounds, once in each leg.
four rounds from a .22 caliber handgun
at Two of the .22 caliber rounds struck one in the

left shoulder and one in the pelvic region. No other officers were

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

injured. Both  recovered from their wounds.

 

SIRG Observations

On 07/31/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting
incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the application of
deadly force in this instance involved a CMPD TFO rather than an Agent,

the SIRG did not evaluate the application of deadly force with respect



2



Title:
Re:



Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
297I-HQ-A4046109, 08/29/2014

to whether it was in compliance with the Department of Justice?s Deadly
As bound by the Deadly Force Policy,
his application of Deadly Force was evaluated by the CMPD.

Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning

and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

investigation lacked managerial

and was not conducted in accordance with CID Fugitive

Observation 1:
oversight,
Policy.

Analysis 1: Charlotte Squad CE08 responsibilities included
supervision of the Violent Crime SSTF and the following threat issues:
2)

Violent Incident Crimes?Domestic.

l) Transnational Organized Crime West Transnational
3)

Fugitive investigations were worked under the Violent Incident?Domestic

Organized Crime East

threat issue.

 

Squad CE08 was led by 
Agents and 14 full?time TFOs assigned to the Safe Streets Task Force

 and comprised of nine

 

 

 

 

(SSTF). Two of the 14 full?time TFOs were CMPD, 
I I Prior to being assigned to the SSTF,
Iwere assigned to CMPD's Violent Criminal

in approximately 400 arrests during 2013.

 

Apprehension Team (VCAT). As members of the SSTF, their mission was to
focus on the apprehension of dangerous fugitives where a federal
investigative interest existed, and develop probable cause necessary to
obtain UFAP warrants. There were no FBI Agents assigned to work

As such, I
relied on other VCAT team members who were federally deputized


support to VCAT members in non?federal cases as needed.

 

fugitive investigations on Squad CE08.

 

 

to pursue FBI UFAP investigations. Ialso provided



In
Squad CE08 had 14 federal fugitive investigations pending

 

contrast,

during on-site review.

TFO opened

 

Ias -l,4
b7C -1,4

b6 -4,7
b7C -4,7
b7E -2





Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 08/29/2014

Investigation on 12/18/2013. The predication for this
investigation was a state arrest warrant on an Armed b6 ?1,4,7
Robbery of a fast food restaurant where I On 137?: '1'4?7
Friday, 01/03/2014, CE08 UNET

E?mail, that he and traveling South Carolina

to pursue a lead on investigation. 

stated they would be pursuing a lead in an 

I I inI I South Carolina and meeting with the

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). 

acknowledged receipt of E?mail and requested specific

addresses at which the TFOs would be pursuing the leads. 

reminded needed to provide more advanced notice of

potential operations to so he could make the necessary

notifications to the Columbia Field Office and the Charlotte Criminal

ASAC.

 

 

After being notified of the above activity on 01/03/2014, SSA

 

 

notified SSAI I his counterpart in b6 -1
the Columbia Field Office, via FBI UNET E-mail. SSA b7c '1
an arrangement whereby they notified each other in this

manner when their squads needed to pursue leads in the other?s AOR. It

was also practice to notify his ASAC via telephone,
E?mail, or Instant Messaging, although he does not recall notifying his
ASAC of the activity on 01/03/2014. On occasion, ASAC
would seek additional information on a matter after electronically
acknowledging receipt. The SIRT was unable to determine if such
notification was made to the ASAC by SSA 

 

On Monday, 01/06/2014,  traveled to b6 -1,4,7

in South Carolina to pursue another lead SSA b7c "1'4'7

not notified by the TFOs prior to going to theI I At

Ilearned al I

lived atI I South Carolina.

was known to drive SSA

via UNET E?mail of the investigation?s developments, indicated

he had requested assistance from the York County Sheriff?s Office, and



4

 

 

HHU





Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 08/29/2014

was proceeding to 

in the driveway when the TFOs drove by, notified 
they were going to make contact the following morning. 
again notified these developments. However, SSA
 : was not certain if he notified was
also uncertain if he received an Instant Message from 
01/06/2014,

investigative steps.

regarding the noted investigation and the intended
no other communications
with including E?mail, telephonic, or otherwise, regarding
this investigation, prior to 01/07/2014. after
Iobtained the information from they
did meet in person at the Charlotte Field Office and discussed the
information obtained regarding 

 

 

As per DIOG 7.1, a Full Investigation may be opened if there is

an ?articulable factual basis? of possible federal criminal or national
CID published an

dated 04/14/2014, to
(VCU)

instructed fugitive matters be opened as  I

threat activity. As a result of this incident,


clarify Fugitive Investigation Policy,

Electronic Communication

the Violent Crimes Unit

 

 

 

I Ionce the following standards were met:

Since no vehicles were parked, b6 ?1,4,7

b7C -1,4,7

b7E -2,5

 

 

 

 

NW- 77%



Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 08/29/2014

 

b7E -5

 

 

 

The Charlotte UFAP opening Electronic Communication (EC)
verified an outstanding felony arrest warrant existed b6 ?7
Robbery With a Deadly Weapon. The EC did not articulate a factual b7C ?7
basis for possible violations of federal law, did not document contact b7E -5
with the USAO, did not confirm a request for assistance from a local
prosecutive authority, and did not set a lead to for 

factual review.

There was no arrest plan prepared prior to the 01/07/2014
incident. Although there was not definitive information indicating
at the residence, the TFOs acknowledged his presence was a b6 -7
possibility. As per DIOG 19.2.3 ARREST PLANS: b7c ?7

The is responsible to ensure that careful and thorough

planning is conducted for the successful execution of a high risk
arrest operation involving a potentially dangerous situation or
subject. The arrest plan must be adapted to each situation and must
include relevant details to enhance the safety and effectiveness of the
agents and officers involved in the search operation. The_planning and
execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to
experienced Agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or their

designees.

Prior to conducting an arrest operation deemed a high risk, the

 

agent must prepare a writtenl I to include the b7E ?5

 

five critical categories: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration
and Equipment, and Control and Communication (SMEAC), and must utilize
the  IForm

 

 



6





Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 08/29/2014

 

 

situations where an FBI SWAT Team(s) or the Critical Incident
Response Group?s (CIRG), Tactical Section is involved, 

must be used in lieu of the See the Special

weapons and Tactics Policy Implementation Guide (PG), O444PG and
O5OIPG for more on the use of the SWAT Teams

and CIRG, Tactical Section in high risk operations.

Hostage Rescue Team PG,

The be presented in an oral briefing to

all personnel involved in the execution of the arrest warrant(s) prior

to the operation. During the briefing, the briefing Agent should stress
to the participants of the operation that the arrest(s) has the

At the discretion of the field office
Iand/or

participate in providing the FBI deadly force briefing to the arrest

potential to become dangerous.

 

approving official, the may review theI

 

operation participants.

Exigent circumstances emergency, pressing necessity

requiring immediate action) may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of
the The ASAC or designee must approve the use of an
oral briefing in lieu of a written and approved exigent
circumstances. An oral briefing must follow the requirements of a
address the SMEAC categories identified above.
Documentation of the oral briefing must occur as soon as possible

following the operation by_preparing and filing the 
ITemplate, whichever is appropriate for the situation.

 

 

The SSA may consider utilizing, and/or alerting local

authorities to the planned arrest, if appropriate under the
Although the time of notification is left to the

discretion of the SSA, he/she must consider the jurisdiction of local

circumstances.

law enforcement, its responsibility to its community and its need to be

aware of law enforcement actions in its jurisdiction.

The term ?Agent? in the context of this section includes FBI

Special Agents and other federal, state, tribal, or local law





Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 08/29/2014

enforcement officers who have been deputized under either Title 18 or
21 of the United States Code and are working on behalf of or at the
direction of the FBI, e.g. task force officer, JTTF, etc.

INSD determined there was informal communication between TFOs
and FBI personnel regarding the fugitive investigation prior to the
incident on 01/07/2014. However, Charlotte lacked sufficient guidance
or documentation outlining a strategy or expectations for TFOs while
conducting federal investigations, to include a process by which
detailed and timely information from TFOs was received to facilitate
informed decisions and appropriate oversight. There was no documented
squad policy or protocol regarding fugitive investigations or specific
responsibilities of VCAT and FBI personnel. The current 
Memorandum of Understanding signed on 05/01/2013, did not adequately
address the TFOs responsibilities to communicate with FBI personnel

during potential arrest situations.

Based on intelligence obtained from the interviews b5 ?1r2l7

 

I prior in South b7c ?1?2?7

 

Carolina, and the actions taken by the TFOs on site (use of LRAD and
large law enforcement team), INSD assessed there was a reasonable
be at the residence. his
managerial responsibility to ensure there was logical operational
planning with consideration of contingencies by permitting FBI TFOs to
conduct FBI fugitive investigations with little more than an
expectation of cursory notification of their investigative activities.
as a mere conduit to the adjacent Field Office by
only notifying the Columbia SSA via E?mail his TFOs would be in the
Columbia AOR conducting a fugitive investigation. in his
capacity as the SSA of the TFOs, should have been more engaged in the
discussion and planning for what could have reasonably been expected to

be an arrest scenario.

Instruction 1a: SAC, Charlotte will ensure UFAP

 

investigations are worked in accordance with existing DIOG policy, the
Fugitive Policy Guide, and recent CID guidance 



8

NW- 782,



Title: (U/iEb?Qj Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 297I-HQ-A4046109, 08/29/2014

Serial 1081) on fugitive investigations.

Instruction 1b: SAC, Charlotte will ensure an operations

 

plan is utilized when conducting a potential high risk

arrest.

Recommendation 1a: SAC, Charlotte should coordinate with CID

 

to ensure a squad fugitive policy is developed, delineating 
responsibilities regarding communication and command and control with

FBI personnel, to facilitate informed decision making.

Recommendation 1b: SAC, Charlotte should ensure

 

communications between supervisors and EM regarding TFO investigative

actions are appropriately documented.

Observation 2: There was no documentation of SAC or designee
approval for travel into another field office?s area of responsibility

for operational activity.

Analysis 2: Manual of Investigative Operations and

Guidelines (MIOG) Part 2, Section 23?3.l stated, ?Investigative
information from another field office is to be obtained by that office
unless extraordinary haste requires direct communication. When the
exigencies of a case, emergencies, or economy and common sense dictate,
an employee, if authorized by his/her SAC, may enter the territory of
another field office. The concurrence of the SAC of the entered office



is to be obtained_prior to the travel.

cross?border travel occurred frequently b6 -1
with Charlotte personnel traveling into South Carolina and South b7c ?1
Carolina personnel, to include TFOs, traveling into North Carolina.
This travel was common due to the close proximity of the state line to
downtown Charlotte. 
coordinated the travel through unclassified E?mail. Per Charlotte,
this practice was verbally approved by Charlotte and Columbia SACs, but

not documented via EC.



9

NW- 783



Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 297I-HQ-A4046109, 08/29/2014

Instruction 2: SAC, Charlotte will ensure SAC or designee
approval is appropriately documented prior to operational travel into

another field office?s area of responsibility.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. As the application of deadly force in this instance
involved a CMPD TFO rather than an Agent, the SIRG made no
administrative action recommendations; deferring to the CMPD review of
the application of deadly force. As it related to FBI personnel, the

SIRG made no administrative recommendations.

Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD,

 

chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following members

were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Paul D. Delacourt, Office

of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, b6 ?1,3
United States Department of Justice I Special b7c 

 

Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC) Robert
E. Hughes, Criminal Investigative Division; Acting SCI I
Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent 
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
I I, Squad Washington Field Office; Unit Chief

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Practical Applications Unit, Training Division
SSAI I Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU),
Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit,
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group and UCI I
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting individuals were
also in Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division,
I Office of Inspector
General, Internal
Affairs, Customs and Border Patrol UC

 

 

I I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, 

ERTU, Inspectors Shawn W. Stroud, Timothy M. Feeney, Trent R.
Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI,
Team LeadersI I

I land



l0

 

 

 

 

 



UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office
Re: 08/29/2014

 

 

I IOI, Special Assistant, OI,
UCI land Management Program 

I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD.

 

Procedures for responding to the observations of the SIRG.

SAC, CE, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in-Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

SAC, CE, is required to provide a written response, via EC,
detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to
Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once
the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# l5?cv?O9133

Total Deleted Page(s) 2 
Page 5 b7E 



Deleted Page(s) 
No Duplication Fee 
For this Page 



 

 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 03/27/2014 .
Report of: IIC Trent R. Teyema Of?ce: FBIHQ INSD 
Case 297I-HQ-A4046109 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING 
CHARLOTTE FIELD 
01/07/2014 . 

Investigative Period: 01/,07/2014 03/27/20i4
1. Executive Summary

(WM On December 12, 2013, the Charlotte Mecklenbur?, North Carolina, Police b5 -4 I 7
Department (CMPD) obtained an arrest warrant forl Ifor the Armed . :2 7
Robbery of a Jack in the Box restaurant located in Pineville, North Carolina. After receiving 
informationl:lmay have ?ed North Carolina to South Carolina, on December 18, 2013,

CMPD assigned to the Charlotte Field Of?ce Violent Crimes Safe Streets

- Task Force (SSTF), opened a : 1nvestigation. duties on the
SSTF were to conduct violent fugitive investigations. This investigation was opened to allow
investigative steps to be conducted to determine if did in fact ?ee the state to avoid
prosecution. 

 

On January 7, 2014, at approximately 6: 12 am, b6 -4 7

accompanied by three CMPD Violent Criminal Apprehension Team (VCAT) of?cers MC '4 I 7

and four deputies from the York County, South Carolina, Sheriff?s Of?ce (YCSO), drove 
I I South Carolina. A vehicle known to belong to: the 
known: was in the driveway of the residence. For approximately 25 minutes,

the Charlotte TFOs attempted to -getl:lto answer the front door. These attempts included

repeated knocks on the door, verbal requests through an Open bedroom window, and the use of a

police-Long Range Acoustical 'Device (LRAD), a device which ampli?ed and directed speech.

swered the debt at approximately 6:37 am. I:Itold the TF04: was not in the
residence and provided verbal consent to a cursory search.

 

 

CMPD, North Carolina, Of?cersl - b6 ?4
Lieutenantl land YCSO, South Carolina, Deputy I:Ientered the MC '4
- .- ?residence. TFCI:IOfficersl accompanied by 
upstairs to clear two bedrooms. TFO : and Of?cersl Ientered the bedroom
located on the left side of the stairway. saw an individual seated or crouched on a bed

 

 

 

1 


HWY-7385

 

 



with a handgun drawn and pointed at TFO TFO  : teeognized this individual as .

from a previously viewed photograph. TFO : immediately ?red his weapon at: ?ring
four rounds, striking twice, once in each leg. four
rounds ?om a .22 caliber handgun at Two of the .22 caliber rounds struck 
one in the left shoulder and one in the pelvic region. TFO : was assisted out of the room by
otherof?cers: Two YCS 0, South Carolina, deputies entered the room following the shooting,
handcuffed: and secured weapon without further incident. During the arrest,
 : told the deputies he wanted to die and wished the of?cers had killed him.

(WM The shooting scene was processed by the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division (SLED), who, at the request of the York County, South Carolina, Sheriff, took the lead
on the investigation. Voluntary statements were'obtained by SLED from all of?cers and
deputies involved in the incident, with the exception of TF Os I: whose statements
were documented through FD-3 025. All voluntary statements, evidentiary reports, and'photos
were provided to the SIRT by the SLED and the York County Sheriff?s Of?ce.-

II. Incident Details
a. Substantive Case Files and Background Information

(Wm Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantive 88A case was

 

 

 

 

opened:
Title: I
WITH 
DEADLY WEAPON 

CHARLOTTE, NC
12/1 8/2013

File number: 88A-CE-3900107
Case Agent: TF

(Wm As a result of the Agent-Involved Shooting, the Columbia Field Office
opened the following Assault on a Federal Of?cer Investigation:

ASSAULT ON A EDEH L, 

TFO-INVOLVED SHOOTING
COLUMBIA, SC
01/07/2014

 

Title:

 

File number: 89B-CO-4050113
Case Agent: SAI

2


 

b6 -4,7
b7C -4-1,7
b7C -1,7

'l?hl?l?T- 

 

 

 



1). Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

1. TFO lgdischarged weapon) FBI CE, CMPD, North Carolina
2. TFO FBI CE, CMPD, North Carolina

 

 

 

 

3. LTI CMPD, North Carolina . .
4. Deputyl CMPD, North Carolina b6 -4
5. SGTI CMPD, North Carolina b7C '4

 

 

6. Detective CMPD, North Carolina
7. North Carolina
8. SGTI YCSO, South Carolina

Deputy  YCSO, South Carolina

6. Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

(Wm On December.12, 2013, investi ation by the CMPD, North Carolina,
developed probable cause that] committed the offense of Robbery with a
Dangerous Weapon (Gun), a felony offense punishable by up to 10 years in prison under the b6 
laws of the State of North Carolina. CMPD, North Carolina, detectives obtained an arrest WC _7
warrant for the subject on December 12, 2013, for the Armed Robbery of a Jack in the Box b-yE -2
restaurant located in Pineville, North Carolina. Initial law enforcement efforts to locate the
subj ect in and around Charlotte, North Carolina were unsuccessful. Based on unsuccessful
invastigative efforts and the belief the subject may have traveled interstate to South Carolina
with the intent to avoid prosecution, FBI Charlotte opened a unlawful ?ight to avoid prosecution 
lInvestigation 900107). This investigation was opened to allow
investigative steps to be conducted to determine ifl:ldid in fact ?ee the state to avoid
prosecution. 

 

 

 

(WW Per Fugitive Policy Implementation Guide Criminal Investigative Division
0404PG dated April 30, 2011:

 

b7E -5

 

 

 

3 .


783

 

 

 

 

$1



A review of the openin communication showed that an arrest warrant was
Obtained on December 12, 2013, chargingI Iwith Robbery With a Deadly Weapon. The 
communication did not cite a Speci?c reason whyI Iwas believed to have traveled interstate -
with the intent to avoid prosecution, only it was reasonable .to believe he did. SIRT interviews 
revealed the basis for the. belietI:Imay have traveled interstate was due to the close 
proximit? to the South Carolina state line (approximately four miles) andI:Ihad a

b6 ?2,7
b7C ?2,7

 

who resided in South Carolina The opening communication did not address any of
the other criteria outlined in Sections 3.4.2 and 4.2.2.

(1. Events Leading Up to the Day of the Shooting

 On January 3, 2014, at 7:33 am, TFOent an unclassi?ed E-mail to
SSA

Charlotte Squad indicating he and were heading to
I I South Carolina to conduct an investigation on: A wanted poster 0 was
attached to the E?mail. noted in the E?mail they would also be driving an address.
inI:I South Carolina to look for.aI:Isuspect connected to one of TFO SSTF
fugitive investigations. TFOI:Iwrote in the E-mail they would be meeting up with SLED,
and FBI investigative cases were open on both,I:Iand theI  subject. 
re uested both addresses, which were provided by TFO During the interview of SSA
SIRT members, SSAI:Iadvised he had reminded needed to
give him more notice of potential operations so prOper noti?cation could be made to the
Columbia Division and his ASAC. At 8:04 am, an unclassi?ed E?mail to
Columbia Field Of?ce and requested permission for his TFOs to travel
into the Columbia Division area of reSponsibili (AOR) to conduct the investi ations. SSA
acknowledged receipt of SSA 5 E-mail. Imet with
members of the Chester County, South Carolina, Sheriff?s Of?ce (CCSO) atI I
South Carolina. The residence belonged toI land

was identi?ed through Open source record checks. TFOS along with members
of the CCSO, conducted a consent Search of the residence. was not located, andI:I

 

b6 -1,2,4,7
b7C -1,2,4,7

I:Idid not provide any information onI:I whereabouts.



(WM On January 6, 2014, TFOs from the made contact with management at

th located offI South Carolina. I Iwas

prevmus employed at thisl The manager identi?ed date of birthI I
7 The information provided led to the identi?cation-of 

I Is residence,l

ISouth Carolina.
On January 6, 2014, at 10:34 am, an unclassi?ed E-mail

 

 

b6 -1,4,7
b7C -1,4,7

 

to SSAI Iadvising him his TFOs received a lead on and they were en route to 
I I South Carolina. At 10:41 am, TFO sent an unclassi?ed E-
mail to SSAI:Iadvising they drove the residence and there were no vehicles in the
driveway. TFOI:Inoti?ed would attempt contact the morning of

January 7, 2014. Durin the SIRT interview of SSAI:Ibelieved he noti?ed
ASAC. Ivia= instant messenger (IM) the TFOs would be traveling to the 

 

5




 

 

 

 

-

South Carolina address on January 7, 2014. SIRT investigation could not corroborate if
this IM was sent, and could not state for certain he received the 1M. During the
SIRT interview, SSA advised cross border travel occurred frequently with Charlotte
personnel traveling into South Carolina and South Carolina personnel, to include TF Os, traveling

. into North Carolina. This travel was common due to the close proximity of the state line to
downtown Charlotte. routinely coordinated the travel through
unclassi?ed E-mail, which although not documented via BC, was approved by Charlotte and
Columbia SACs. -

b6 
b7C -1,7

e. Shooting Incident Details

(WM There was no Arrest or Operations Plan prepared prior to the incident. An

operational brie?ng was conducted the morning of the shooting incident, January 7, 2014. The'
brie?ng was conducted a parking lot nearl I
South Carolina. TFO briefed all personnel that a ?Knock and Talk? would be conducted
at the residence to determine present and could provide any information on the b6 -4 7
whereabouts ofI:I As customary with fugitive-related ?Knock and Talks? conducted by the 1370 '4 7
VCAT, the TFOs planned for the possibilityl Icould be in the residence. This planning ME '1
consisted ofl 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(WM On January 7, 2014, at approximately 6: 12 am, TFOs
accompanied by three C-MPD, North Carolina VCAT of?cers and four YCSO, South Carolina
deputies drove to   South Carolina. A vehicle known to belong to

 

 

as in the driveway of the residence. For approximately 25 minutes, the Charlotte TFOs b6 -4 '7
attempted to get : to answer the front door. These attempts included repeated knocks on 1370 ?4 7
the door and verbal requests through an open bedroom window. through the use of a
LRAD, called out the address, identi?ed the persons present outside the house as law
enforcement of?cers of the ?York County Sheriff?s Of?ce and directed the occu ant(s) to
answer the front door. Using the LRAD and believingl Iwas resent, TFO called her
out by name. After using the LRAD for approximately 15 minutes,  answered the front
door. identi?ed asI I told the was not in the residence, and
she provided verbal consent to a cursory search. I Itold the of?cersl:lwere
"upstairs in their bedroom of the residence. -

 

 

CMPD, North Carolina Of?cersl I b6 ?2 4 7
Lieutenan and YCSO, South Carolina Deputyl:lentered the residence. 1:70 ?2 4 7
repeated she had no knowledge regardingl:l?s whereabouts.? A search of the ?rst ?oor was

negative. :Ireiteratedl:l were upstairs.  : requestedl:lcome to the

?rst ?oor. According to : was a heavy sleeper, on medication, and likely would .
not wake up and come down.

Of?cerI?I Of?ced?I and 'Deputy I:Icontinued :gc'f 4
on to Search the second floor of the residence. TFOI  and Deputyl:lremained on the 

6


NW-791

 

 

 

 


Pi

- of?cers to seek medical attention. YCSO, South Carolina Deputiesl Ithen



 

earched and cleared the upstairs hallway b6 '2 I 4 7
bathroom before TFOLr?land Of?ce assumed a position of cover on the door bedroom located on the at the top of the stairs. The door to this room was closed, but not
locked. Simultaneously, Deputy! entered the bedroom located on
the light at the top of the stairs. They con?rmed the was in the bedroom on the right, and
spoke with him brie?y. Of?cers decided they would not move thel:lto the ?rst floor.

?rst ?oor' witH I TFO

 

While watchin the door of the bedroom on the left of the stairs, 
heard the presence of a dog. TFO directed contactl:ldownstairs anc.
request she remove the do . 
bedroom spoke to no one. provided no information to TFq: or other of?cers
regarding the presence of anyone in the bedroom.

and Of?cei:lthen entered the bedroom at b5 '4 7


the left of the stairs. TF was the ?rst person through the door with his smith and Wesson 137?: '4 7
.40 caliber semi-automatic hand gun drawn. The weapon was loaded with 15 rounds in
the magazine and one in the chamber and it was equipped?with a flashlight. TFO was also
wearing a ballistic protection vest with visible police markings. Upon entering, noted
the lights were not turned on in the bedroom and the area was completely dark except from the
light on his Weapon. Due to a recess in the wall, view of the room was limited.
TFO : could not see all of the room to the right due to tie bedroom door and restriction of its
movement by the wall or furniture. Limited Space in the of the room prohibited either
of the other of?cers from entering the room with TFO : progressed further into
the room and cleared the portion to the left and observed no one present. Upon sweeping to the
right, TFO saw an individual seated or crouched on a bed. He had a handgun drawn and
pointed at TFO TF OI: recognized this individual ad:lfrom a previously viewed
photograph. TFO : immediatel ?red his weapon four tirnes, striking him twice,
once in each leg. Simultaneously, ?red a .22 caliber handgun at discharging
four rounds. Two rounds struck Tl one in the left shoulder and one in the pelvic region.
TFO : believed he ?red ?rst. TF attempted to re-holster his weapon, but dropped the
weaponon the ?oor. TF etreated from the robin, noti?ed the other of?cers he had been
shot, and he. had dropped his weapon in the room. He then moved downstairs assisted by other

 

 

  
 

 

  
 

 

 

entered the room following the shooting, handcuffed: and securedl Iweapon, a
Ruger .22 caliber pistol, without further incident. During his arrestl told the deputies he
wanted-to die and wished the of?cers had killed him. The YCSO, South Carolina deputies also
recovered Weapon from the room. 

 

Post Shooting Details

 

Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTS) responded toI - I I b6 -4 7
South Carolina and transported TFO across state line, to Carolina?s 1?70 ?4 7
Health Care System in Charlotte, North Carolina.

(mm The shooting scene atl South Carolina, was
processed by the SLED, who, at the request of the York County, South Carolina Sheriff, took

 

7 .




 

 

.

lead on the investigation. Voluntary. statements were obtained from all of?cers and 

deputies involved in the incident, with the exception of TF Os whose statements b6 -4 7
were-documented through FD-3 025. All voluntary statements were provided to the SIRT. All b7C '4 7
other evidentiary reports and phdtos were provided to the SIRT by SLED and the YCSO. FBI 
Charlotte Agents conducted a canvass of the neighborhpod for the SIRT.

(Wm Statements taken from of?cers and deputies who observed the? actions taken
by his account of the shooting. No other law enforcement of?cers ?red
their weapons, and no other of?cers or deputies were injured. A loaded .22 caliber handgun was
recovered in the bedroom.

(WEEKS) On January 7, arrested and charged with Ob?truction of
Justice by the YCSO, South Carolina. 

 On Januar 8 2014 was interviewed at the hOSpital by SLED A'gerit . b6 -1 4 . 7

and Columbia Division. admitted to pointing his . b7C '1 4 I 7
gun at and stated the of?cer had a right to shoot him. said TFO shot him
in the legs ?rst and he ?red at to get him to shoot higher. I:Iadvise wanted -
the of?cers to kill him. 

(WM) on anuary.9, 2014, after being released from the hospital,l:  was taken
- into federal custody'for the December 12, 2013, Armed Robbery of the Jack in the Box
restaurant. . 

On January 10, 2014, a criminal complaint was signed by United States
Magistrate Judge David S. Cayer, for the United States District Court in the Western District of
North Carolina, chargingl:lfor Hobbs Act Robbery in violation of Title 18 USC Section
1951, related to the robbery of the Pineville, North Carolina Jack in the Box restaurant he
committed on December 12, 2013.

g. Accounting of Shots Fired

(Wm four .40 caliber rounds atl:lstriking him twice, once in be ?4 7
each leg. The remaining two rounds were recovered from the bedroom wall behind the bed. b7C -4 7
Four .40 caliber shell casings were recovered at the scene. The number of rounds ?red (four)
and the .number of rounds' remaining in TFO :I?s ?rearm (Melve) corroborated he carried his
semi-automatic handgun fully loaded with 13 rounds in the magazine and one round in the
chamber. A round count was conducted by SLED investigators of all TFOs, CMPD of?cers, .and
YCSO, South Carolina deputies in the proximity of the scene to verify no other personnel ?red
their'weapon.

 

Subject Information

 

Namezl I I
-??Posi-t-ion: 
Sex: Male -

Race: 

8 .




 

 

 

 

Height:

UNCLAS 

 

Weight:
Hair:

Eyes:
DOB:
SSAN
FBI #2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(WM) A National Crime Information Center (NCIC) criminal history check
revealed multiple entries forI The documents contained multiple entries

 

 

for include six arrests for offenses to include narcotics and weapon violations, robbery 

with?a dangerous weapon, and domestic violence. I [was convicted two times, most recently

gal [The other conviction was for[:[
I?l . -

(WM) At the time of the NCIC an active North Carolina state
warrant for Armed Robbery, dated. December 12, 2013. .

 

i. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

(WM All personnel wore body armor, tactical gear, and clothing clearly
identifying them as law enforcement. No member of the entry team wore clothing with FBI
markings. -

j. Forensic Summary

(Ill/?g) At approximately 9:00 an. on January 7, 2014, SLED Crime Scene
Investigator collected TFO Smith Wesson .40 caliber
handgun, serial numberl from Icer[ [at the incident scene located atl:[
I South Carolina. There were 12 rounds of Winchester .40 caliber
service ammunition in the Smith Wesson .40 caliber handgun, 11 rounds in the inserted
magazine, and one chambered round. Two additional magazines for the Smith and Wesson .40
caliber handgun, with 15 rounds each of Winchester .40 caliber service ammunition, were
retrieved from TFOIEFSM vest. Investigatorl [collected a Ruger .22 caliber
pistol, serial number from Officeq [which was the weapon secured froml:[
There were ?ve rounds of .22 caliber ?Rem? ammunition in the Ruger pistol, four- rounds in the
inserted magazine and one chambered round. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. The Charlotte Field Of?ce provided the SIRT with one compact disk
(labeled 89B-CO-4050113, Spherical Photography,  [South
Carolina, 01.07.2014). This disk contained 187 photographs (JPEG image ?les) and 28 spherical
photographs (QuickTime movie ?les) with an accompanying photo log. These photographs
depicted the shooting incident scene located atl I South Carolina

(mm The Charlotte Field Of?ce provided the SIRT with one compact disk .
(labeled 2971-HQ-A4046109, YORK Crime Scene Photos, 1/7/2014) containing 94 photographs-4,7
b7C -4,7

b6 -7
b7C -7

 

 

 

5)






 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6 -7
.These photogra hs de ict the shooting incident scene located at  MC -7
South CarolinaIiI - 
(Wm An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items follows (All item numbers
are SLED inventory numbers): -
001 One Smith and Wesson .40 handgun with mounted light. Serial Numberl I
with one magazine containing 11 car i one cartridge from the
chamber headstamped ?Winchester 40 SN I 
002 One Ruger .22 cal Long Ri?e Automatic Pistol with one magazine containin four
?cartridges and one cartridge headstamped Rem? from the chamber, SNI I
003 One Traditions Lightning Lightweight .50 caliber 1.32 ri?e (muzzleloader) with one be '4 7
BSA Classic scope contained in a green and black 11 case with one Stanley MC 4 7
serewdriver and miscellaneous tools, SNI I
004? One cartridge case headstamped ?Winchester 40 from marker one
005 One cartridge case headstamped ?Winchester 40 from marker two
006 One cartridge case headstamped ?Winchester 40 from marker three
007 One cartridge case headstamped ?Winchester 40 from behind white table in
bedroom 
008 One cartridge case headstamped ?Rem? from marker ?ve
009 One cartridge case headstamped ?Super from marker eight
010 One cartridge case headstamped ?Rem? from marker nine
011 One cartridge case headstamped ?Rem? from marker 10
012 One unfired cartridge headstamped ?Super from marker 12
013 One projectile from marker four
013.1 One piece of fiber taken from tip of item 13
014 One projectile ?om pillow on bed
015 One projectile from wall below hole 2
016 - One jacket from wall near hole 2
017 One ?agment from wall near hole 1
018. Two pieces of fragment from Marker 11 on bed
019 One magazine with ten cartridges from marker six
020 One clear plastic ammo case with three un?red cartridges from backpack
021 One camo backpack containing miscellaneous items found in bedroom 
022 One camo mask from-backpack .
023 . One camo hat with bill from underneath loveseat
024 One black hat with bill from floor between mattress and wall
025 One cell phone with from foot stool in bedroom
026 One cell phone from bed
027 Two swabs from suspected blood on steps
028 Two swabs from suspected blood on carpet in bedroom 
029 One notebook from closet 
030 One pair of blue boxer underwear with suspected blood
031 One black ?Call of Duty? shirt
032 One GSR kit fromI b6 ?7
b7c -7
10




 

 

. 

 

 

033 Two buccal swabs-?oml I b6 -7
034 One pair of brown Lowa boots, size 10.5 . b7C '7
035 One pair of socks

036 One black ballistic vest

037 One pair of black tactical gloves

038 One black ballistic vest

039 One wanted photo of I 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

040 One pair of Haines underwear
041' One pair of black Under Armour pants
042 One pair of ?eece Patagonia pants

 

043 One black sweatshirt
044 One black shirt
045 One pair of black Kohl pants
a 046 One green 5.11 coat

047 One gray t?shirt
048 One Patagonia shirt
049 . One tactical vest
050 Two pair of handcuffs 
051 One taser X2, serial number X29000V7V
052 Two magazines containing 15 cartridges each
. 053 One LRAD remote headphone 
054 One ?ashlight
055 One medical pouch
056 One ASP baton
057 One holster
058 One knife 
059 One DVD of photographs taken ofI [at the hospital photographs taken by Deputy] [at scene - 137photographs taken by SLED at scene -
062 One purple blanket from bed

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

k. Medical Summary

FBI A ents involved in the shootin 

 

3 None; a full-time Charlotte SSTF TFOb7C ?2,4,7

(Ill/m At 6:47 am. on January 7, 2014, Piedmont, South Carolina EMS Division

received noti?cation via South Carolina radio dis atch of a police-involved shooting at
South Carolinale EMS Technicians were dispatched.

at 6:48 am. in ambulance EMS 7. EMS 7 arrived on scene at 6:57 am. and rendered aid to TFO

who was suffering from two gunshot wounds, one to the pelvic region and one to _the left

a? . .. shoulder. At 7:06 am, EMS 7 tr'anSported TFO  across state lines, to Carolina?s Health
Care System in Charlotte, North Carolina, arriving at 7:30 am. care was transferred

to Emergency Room Docto? 

 

 

 

 

 

11


 .- 

 

 

 

 

5)



A review of the hosPital examination records of TFO  : indicated his
neurological state was . .alert and oriented to person, place, time, and situation, normal sensory
observed, normal motor observed, normal Speech observed.? The hospital examination detailed
the ?Differential Diagnosis? as a . .gunshot wound, penetrating injury, traumatic shock,
puncture wound, hemothorax, solid organ injury, hollow organ injury, internal hemorrhage.?

TFO : was discharged from the hospital on January 13, 2014, and was
expected to make a full recovery. .

Subjects:

(Ll/m Ambulance EMS F211 arrived on scene at 7:04 am. and took control of
I:Iwho was suffering from two gunshot wounds, one to each leg. At 7:17 am, EMS F211
transported across state lines, to Carolina?s Health Care System in Charlotte, North
Carolina, arriving at 7:44 am. 5 care was transferred to Emergency Room Doctor

Due to privacy laws, medical records fori:lwere not obtained by the
SIRT. .

(Wm On January 9, discharged from the hospital and taken into
federal custody by FBI Charlotte.

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

a. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following
personnel:

Inspector-in?Charge (IIC) Gregory T. Bretzin -
Assistant Inspector Team Leader (TL)



Assistant Inspector-iml? ace I
AIIP

AIIP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- b. The FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) Personnel:
None I
IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol
(WM On January 7, 2014, Charlotte Field Office SAC spoke with

Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields and submitted a Situation Report to the

Director. IIC Bretzing spoke with SAC arrange logistics prior to arriving in Charlotte,
North Carolina-2,7
b7C -2 

 



(Wm On January 7, 2014, the SIRT traveled to Charlotte and reviewed the
InSpection Division shooting review protocol.

On. the evening of January 7, 2014, IIC Bretzing and the SIRT members met
with Charlotte and Columbia Field Of?ce EM and ERT personnel- The SIRT also viewed the 
shooting scene which occurred atl I South Carolina.

 

On January 8, 2014, IIC Bretzing and SIRT members met with Charlotte
Field Of?ce EM, Columbia Field Of?ce EM, and members of the SLED and the YCSO to
explain the SIRT process and protocols. 

On 01/09/2014, IIC Bretzing met with CMPD EM at the Charlotte Field
Of?ce. 

(WM In total, ?ve FBI interviews were conducted of Charlotte Field Of?ce
management and of both primary TFOs, to include the TFO who was shot. These interviews
were documented via FD-302. Additionally, seven voluntary statements of of?cers at the scene

were taken by SLED and provided to the SIRT.

(mm) On 01/09/2014, no Bretzing provided an exit brief to 
V. Administrative . - I
a. Firearms Training -
(Wm with his service weapon on November-.11, 2013 and

completed law enforcement training sessions documented on 21 pages bearing the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police, North Carolina Training Academy Of?cial Seal

b. Deadly _Force Training
(WM) CMPD, North Carolina provided the SIRT with its of Deadly Force

Policy, which was dated effective 12/31/2004. Records indicated TFO  : attended Use of
Force Training sessions in 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012, and most recently, with a completion

date of12/31/2013.

c. DOJ Civil Rights Division-Prosecutorial Decision

. (Wm provided:  Special Legal Counsel, Department of

'Justice, Civil Rights Division, SLED Memorandum of Interviews of I land
Mr.  Ireviewedithe interviews and provided a
prosecutorial declination on January 15, 2014-2,3,7
b7C -2,3,7

NW- 

 

 

 



(1. Local Prosecutorial Decision

(Ul/Eoe?) On January 7, 2014, 110 Bretzing and TL : met with District Attorney be ?4 7
(DA) for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit York and Union Counties, Kevin S. Brackett. Based on - 1?70 '4 7
the facts presented, the DA did not see any issues regarding the use of deadly force.

(WM) On March 3, 2014, DA Brackett (also known as ?Solicitor?) noti?ed INSD
via E-mail, based on his review of the SLED investigative reports, the of?cers were justi?ed in,
their use_of force and level of force employed by them was appropriate given the nature of threat
posed by: An of?cial declination letter was received by INSD on March 27, 2014. i

. VI. Inspector?s Draft Observations

(Ullm Observation 1: investigation lacked managerial . b6 -7
oversight,? and was not conducted in accordance with CID Fugitive Policy. b7C 

Analysis 1: Squad CE08 responsibilities included supervision of the Violent
Crime SSTF and the following threat issues: I) Transnational Organized Crime West (TOC-
West); 2) Transnational Organized Crime East 3) Violent Incident Crimes-
Domestic. Fugitive investigations were worked under the Violent Incident-Domestic threat
issue.

(Wm Charlotte Squad CEOS was led by comprised of . b6 -1 4
nine Agents and 14 full-time TFOs assigned to the Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF). Two of the - 1370 ?1 4

 

14' full-time TFOs were CMPD, North Carolina officers

Prior to being assigned to the SSTF,  were assigned to CMPD,
North Carolina?s Violent Criminal Apprehension Team (V CAT). As members of the SSTF,
their?mission was to focus on the apprehension of dangerous fugitives where a federal 
investigative interest existed, and develop probable cause neceSSary to obtain UFAP warrants.
There were no FBI Agents assigned to work fugitive investigations on Squad CE08. As such,
 relied on other VCAT team members who were federally
deputtzed to,pursue FBI UFAP investigations. TFO also provided support to
VCAT. members in non-federal cases as needed. Both I participated in
approximately 400 arrests'during the past year. In contrast, Squad CE08 had 14 federal fugitive
investigations pending during on-site review.

. (Ul/Eono) TFO  : opened  Ias a  [Investigation be -1 4 7
on December 18, 2013. The predication for this investigation was a state NC '1 4 '7
arrest warrant for ased on an Armed Robber of a fast food restaurant where
I On Friday, January 3, 2014, TFO oti?ed CEOS SS via

UNET E-mail, that he and were traveling to South Carolina to pursue a lead
?on investigation. TFOI Ialso stated they would be pursuing a lead in an
unrelatedl: case I inI I South Carolina and meeting with the South'
Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED).  acknowledged receipt of TFO

3 E-mail and requested 5 eci?c addresses at which the TFOs would be pursuing the leads. 
SS reminded TFO he needed to provide more advanced notice of potential 

 

 

 

 

 



 

14




 

 

 

 

 





also SS



operations to So he could make the necessary' noti?cations to the Columbia Field
Of?ce and the Char otte Criminal ASAC. 

?After being noti?ed of the above activity on January 3, 2014, SSA:
immediately noti?ed SSAI I his counterpart in the Columbia Field O?ice, via
FBI UNET E-mail. SSAI land SS
each other in this manner when their squads needed to pursue leads in the other?s AOR. It was
practice to notify his ASAC via telephone, E?mail, or Instant Messaging,
'althou he does not recall notifying his ASAC of the activity on January 3, 2014. On occasion,
ASAC would seek additional information on a matter after electronically
acknowledgin recei t. The SIRT was unable to determine if such noti?cation was made to the
ASAC by 

On Monday, January 6, 2014, Itraveled to al:lin'

South Carolina to ursue another lead on 
TFOs prior to going to th At thel I 

I SSAI IJwas not noti?ed b. the
earned a
Ilived atl I South Carolina. was

knov'vn to drive all Iminivan. TFOI Inoti?'ed SSAI Ivia UNET E-mail of'the
investigation?s developments,_indicated he had requested assistance from the York County

  
  

 

Sheriffs Of?ce, and was proceeding to th ddress. Since no vehicles were parked in
the driveway when the TFOs drove by, TFO noti?ed SS the were going to
make contact the folloviring morning. again noti?ed SS of these
develo ments. However,  was not certain if he noti?ed ASAC ASAC
I:E was also uncertain if he received an Instant Message from SSA on January 6,

 

2014, regarding the noted investigation and the intended investigative steps. ASACI I
remembered no other communications with SS including E-mail, telephonic, or
otherwise, re ardin this investigation, prior to January 7, 2014. SSAI Irecalled after
TF Os obtained the information from the  lthey did meet in erson at
the Charlotte Field Of?ce and discussed the information obtaine regarding theI?_LI
address. SS iewed the TFOs going to the residence as following up on lead
information, as they had done on January 3, 2014 and January 6, 2014. -

As per DIOG 7.1, a Full Investigation may be opened if there is an
?articulable factual? basis? of possible federal criminal or national threat activity. Per CID 
Electronic Communication dated April 14, 2014, regarding Fugitive
Investigation Policy, the Violent Crimes Unit (VCU) instructed ?igitive matters be opened as

I once the following standards were met:

had an arrangement whereby they noti?-1,4,7
-1,4,7

b7E -2,5

NYT- 8-

 

 

5:

 



 

 

 

 

The Charlotte UFAP openin Electronic Communication (EC) veri?ed an
outstanding felony arrest warrant existed Robbery With a Deadly Weapon. The EC
did not articulate a factual basis for possible violations of federal law, did not document contact
with the USAO, did not con?rm a request for assistance from a local prosecutive authority, and
did not set a lead to forl: factual review. 

There was no arrest plan prepared prior to the January 7, 2014 incident.
Although there was not de?nitive information indicatinwas at the residence, the TFOs
acknowledged his presence was a possibility. As per DIOG 19.2.3 ARREST PLANS:

(U) The is responsible to ensure that careful and thorough planning is
conducted for the successful execution of a high risk arrest operation involving a
potentially dangerous situation or subject. The arrest plan must be adapted to each
situation and must include relevant details to enhance the safety and effectiveness of the
agents and o??icers involved in the search operation. The planning and execution of
arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to experienced Agents. All arrest plans
must be approved by ASA Cs or their designees.

(U) Prior to conducting an arrest operation deemed a high risk the agent must prepare a
writtenl Ito include the ?ve critical categories: Situation,
Mission, Execution, Administration and Equipment, and Control and Communication
and must utilize theI IF arm

I P. In
situations where an FBI SWAT Team(s) or the Critical Incident Response Group ?s

(CIRG i al Section is involved, the Template must be used in lieu
of the See the Special Weapons and Tactics Policy Implementation Guide (PG),
0444PG and Hostage Rescue Team PG, 05 01 PG for more on the use of the SWAT Teams
and CIRG, Tactical Section in high risk operations.

 

 

 

 

 

(U) The written : must be presented in an oral briefing to all personnel
involved in the execution of the arrest warrant(s) prior to the operation. During the
briefing, the briefing Agent should stress to the participants of the operation that the
arrest(s) has the potential to become dangerous. At the discretion of the ?eld o?'ice
approving o?icial, the may review theI I and/or

 

16
-

NYT 

3)





participate in providing the FBI deadly force brie?ng to the arrest operation
participants. -

(U) Exigent circumstances emergency, pressing necessity requirin immediate
action) may necessitate an oral brie?ng in lieu of the written The ASAC or
desi nee must approve the use of an oral brie?ng in lieu of a written and approved
@nt circumstances. An oral brie?ng must follow the requirements of a
written to address the SMEAC categories identified above. Documentation of
the oral brie?ng must occur as soon as possible following the operation by preparing and

filing thel ITemplate, whichever is appropriate for the
situation.

(U) The SSA may consider utilizing, and/or alerting local authorities to the planned
arrest, ifappropriate under the circumstances. Although the time of notification is left to
the discretion of the SSA, he/she must consider the jurisdiction of local law enforcement,
its responsibility to its community and its need to be aware of law enforcement actions in
its jurisdiction. 

(U) The term ?Agent? in the context of this section includes FBI Special Agents and
other jederal, state, tribal, or local law enforcement o?t?cers who have been deputized
under either Title 18 or 21 ?of the United States Code and are working on behalf of or at
the direction of the FBI, e. g. task force ,o??icer, JTTE etc. 

INSD determined there was informal communication between TFOs and
FBI personnel regarding the fugitive investigation prior to the incident on January 7, 2014.
However, Charlotte lacked suf?cient guidance or documentation outlining a strategy or
expectations for TFOs while conducting federal investigations, to include a process by which
detailed and timely information from TFOs was received to facilitate informed decisions and
appropriate oversight. There was no documented squad policy or protocol regarding fugitive
investigations or speci?c responsibilities of VCAT  FBI personnel. The current FBI-CMPD
Memorandum of Understanding signed on May 2013', did not adequately address the TFOs
responsibilities to communicate with FBI personnel during potential arrest situations. 

#3936 Based on intelli ence obtained from the interviews of
prior intelligenc worked in South Carolina, and the actions taken by

the TFOs on- site (use of LRAD and large law enforcement team), INSD assessed there was a
reasonable presumptio ould be at the residence. SSAI:Ineglected his
managerial responsibility to ensure there was logical operational planning with consideration of -
contingencies by permitting FBI TFOs to conduct FBI fugitive investigations with little more
than 'an expectation of cursory noti?cation of their investigative activities. SSA cted
as a mere conduit to the adjacent Field Of?ce by only notifying the Columbia SSA via E-mail
his TFOs would be in the.Columbia AOR conducting a" fugitive investigation. in
his capacity as the SSA of the .TF Os, should have been more engaged in the discussion and
planning for what could have reasonably been expected to be an arrest scenario.

17- 
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8:32

 

i)

 

 



(WM Instruction la: SAC, Charlotte should ensure UFAP investigations are
worked in accordance with existing DIOG policy, the Fugitive Policy Guide, and recent CID
guidance (319W-HQ-A1487699-CID, Serial 1081) on fugitive investigations.

Recommendation ID: I

 

 

 

 

(WW) Recommendation 1c: SAC, Charlotte should ensure communications
between supervisors and EM regarding TFO investigative actions are appropriately documented.

(Ll/?9612) Recommendation 1d: SAC, Charlotte should ensure an operations plan is
utilized when conducting a high risk arrest.

Observation 2: There was no documentation of SAC or designee approval
for travel into another ?eld of?ce?s area of responsibility for operational activity.

- Analysis 2: Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) Part
2, Section 23-3.l stated, ?Investigative information ?om another field office is to be obtained by
that o?ice unless extraordinary haste requires direct communication. When the exigencies of a
case, emergencies, or economy and common sense dictate, an employee, if authorized by his/her
SAC, may enter the territory of another ?eld of?ce. The concurrence of the SAC of the entered
o??ice is to be obtained prior to the travel.? . 

(WM) SS dvised cross border travel occurred frequently with Charlotte
personnel traveling into South Carolina and South Carolina personnel, to include TF Os, traveling
into North Carolina. This travel was common due to the close proximity of the state line to
downtown Charlotte. SS routinely coordinated the travel through
unclassi?ed E?mail. Per Charlotte, this practice was verbally approved by Charlotte and
Columbia SACs, but not documented via BC.

I (Wm Instruction 2: SAC, Charlotte will ensure SAC or designee approval is
appropriately documented prior. to operational travel into another ?eld office?s area of
responsibility. 

18


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IUD-1057 Giev.5-8-10)

 

 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

11/14/2014

Date:

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD

EIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014

 

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CC:

 

 

 

INSPECTION
Contact:

From:

 

 

Justin Tolomeo
STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

Approved By:

 

Drafted By:  I

Case ID (U) Springfield?Peoria Shooting Incident

Review 06?14?2014

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Agent?involved shooting
incident following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 09/18/2014,
prepared by Inspector R. Justin Tolomeo. A copy of the complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report was uploaded to the captioned file.

Details:

(UHM On 10/21/2014,
incident that occurred on 06/14/2014 involving Special Agent

the SIRG reviewed an Agent?involved shooting
(SA)

 

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I Springfield Field Office.
TFO) arrived at The

At approximately 7:30

 

P.M., SAI



 

UNCLASSIFIEDHEDEIQ

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014
Re: 297I-HQ-A5065721, 11/14/2014

Fifth Quarter Sports Bar Pizzeria in East Peoria, Illinois. The

 

purpose of the visit was to attendl rs high school b6 ?4
b7C -4

 

reunion.

(U/Zb?mi) Jason A. Moore, born 10/12/1973, entered the establishment

at about 7:45 P.M. and had a brief conversation with the greeter at the

door. At approximately 7:49 P.M., he drew a Sig Sauer 9mm handgun with

a laser sight, walked a short distance into the bar, and shot his

ex?wife, Lori A. Moore, and her boyfriend, Lance Griffel, once each in

the head. Jason Moore then walked back to the greeting area. Jason

Moore pointed his handgun at his own head as well as at a crowded

dining area where standing. While the weapon was b6 -1
pointed at his head, Jason Moore fired one round in what appeared to be _1
a suicide attempt; however, the bullet only grazed his left cheek. As
Jason Moore pointed the weapon at the crowded dining area, 
fired two rounds from his Bureau?issued Glock 23 .40 caliber handgun
hitting Jason Moore once in the shoulder and once in the upper right
side of his torso. Jason Moore died at the scene. Lori Moore and
Lance Griffel were transported to the Order of Saint Francis Medical
Center in Peoria, Illinois, where they were pronounced dead. There

were no other injuries.

An autopsy of Jason Moore determined the cause of death to
be a gunshot wound which punctured his aorta. Jason Moore?s toxicology
report listed the ethanol alcohol level in his blood as 0.354. The
report also indicated the presence of a prescription antidepressant.
Interviews conducted by local authorities indicated Jason Moore had
ongoing issues with Lori Moore regarding their divorce, which occurred
about one year earlier. Text messages reviewed from the day of the
incident revealed several messages between Jason Moore and Lori Moore
where Jason complained of matters such as child custody, support
payments, and Lori Moore?s new boyfriend. The last text message from
Jason Moore to Lori Moore was sent at 7:14 P.M. and read, ?anywho, I?m
gonna show up just to piss you off.? Another interview with a friend
of Lori Moore indicated at about the same time Lori stated Jason was

going to ruin her night.



2

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014
Re: 297I-HQ-A5065721, 11/14/2014

SIRG Observations

On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG voted

unanimously the application of deadly force by 06/14/2014 b6 -1
was in compliance with the Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy. _1
2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning
and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG determined SA
appropriate actions to protect himself and others from the
imminent threat posed by Jason Moore. Therefore, the SIRG did not

propose any observations.

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken
against a result of his involvement in the 06/14/2014 b6 '1

shooting incident. b7C -1

Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD,

chaired the meeting and was a non?voting Board Member. The following

Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W.

Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), Deputy 

Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States Department of

Justice Trial Criminal Division, SSA. b5 -1l3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; b7C '113
SSAI I, Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit

Chief I Practical Applications Unit, Training

Division SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, UC

 

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,


3

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014
Re: 297I-HQ-A5065721, 11/14/2014

 

Critical Incident Response Group UCI I New Agent
Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), and SC
Roger A. Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The
following non?voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith

SWAT Operations Unit, SSAI 

Ballistics Research Facility, SSAI

 

 

 

1 Protective

 

Operations Unit, Security Division; UCI I Firearms and
Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R.
Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Peterson, and Douglas A.
Leff, OI, Assistant Inspectors/Team Leadersl I
I I OI, Special Assistant
or, Uc 


Management Unit (IMU), and MAPAI
Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

land Management Program

 

 

 

Inspection

 

 

Inspection

 

?06



4

 

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UNCLASSIFIEDM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
_Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 09/18/2014

 

 

Report of: IIC R. Justin Tolomeo O?ice: - FBIHQ-INSD
Case 297I-HQ-A5065721
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE
PEORIA RESIDENT AGENCY
(36/14/2014
Investigative Period: 06/14/2014 09/25/2014
I. Executive Summary
On 06/14/2014, at approximately 7:36 SAI land

 

 

 

 

I Ian FBI Task Force Officer (TFO), arrived at The Fifth Quarter
Sports Bar Pizzeria, 1 10 North Main Street, East Peoria, Illinois 6161 attendl Ihigh school reunion.  was at the
bar for only a few minutes when Jason A. Moore, DOB 10/12/1973, entered the establishment.
Jason Moore had a brief conversation with the greeter at the door. At approximately 7:45 
Moore drew a 9 mm handgun, walked a short distance into the bar, and shot his ex?wife, Lori A.
Moore, and her boyfriend, Lance Griffel, once each in the head. Lori Moore and Lance Griffel
were also at the bar to attend the high school reunion. Jason Moore then walked back towards
the front door of the establishment. He stopped just inside the doorway and faced a crowded
dining area of the bar. Moore pointed his handgun at his own head as well as a crowded dining
area where as standing. Jason Moore ?red one round while the weapon was
pointed at his head in what appeared to be a suicide attempt; however, the bullet only grazed his
left cheek. two rounds from his Glock .40 caliber handgun hitting Jason
Moore once in the shoulder and once in the upper right side of the torso. Jason Moore died at the
scene.

(WM Lori Moore and Lance Griffel were transported to the Order of Saint Francis
Medical Center in Peoria, Illinois, where they were pronounced dead. No others in the bar or
surrounding area were injured. An autopsy of Jason Moore was performed on 06/ 15/2014 by
Coroner?s Physician Dr.  lwho determined the cause of death to be a gunshot
wound where the projectile entered the right side of Jason Moore?s body and traversed to the left
side of hischest and punctured the aorta. Two other gunshot wounds, one to the right shoulder
and another to the left cheek (self in?icted) were super?cial. A review of available video from .

 



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the bar as well as witness interviews and Signed Sworn Statement were all be -1
consistent. 3?70 ?1

(Wm Interviews conducted by local authorities indicated Jason Moore had an
ongoing issue with his divorce from Lori Moore. Text messages reviewed ?om the day of the
incident revealed several messages between Jason Moore and Lori Moore where Jason
complained of matters relating to his divorce such as child custody, support payments, and Lori
Moore?s new boyfriend. The last text message from Jason Moore to Lori Moore was sent at 7:14 I
pm, and read ?anywho, I?m gonna show up just to piss you off.? Another interview with a
?iend of Lori Moore indicated at about the same time, Lori stated, ?Jason was going to ruin her

night.?
I II. Incident Details
A. Substantive Case Files and Background Information
There was no substantive case which predated this shooting incident.

After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

 

CASE ID: 89B-SI-5069714
CASE TITLE: JASON A 
SAI b6 ?1

 

EAST PEORLA, IL. b7c ?1
ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL OFFICER (APO) .
DATE OPENED: 06/15/2014

B. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

 

 

 

 

 


SA b6 ?1 4
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I lEast Peoria Police Department
C. Brie?ngs

(ll/E936) This incident was a response to an active shooter scenario and not a
substantive case. There was no brie?ng associated with this incident.

D. Initial Entry/First Contact







(Wm On 06/14/2014, at approximately 7:36 SAI land he -1, 4

 

I Iarrived at The Fifth Quarter Sports Bar Pizzeria in East Peoria, WC -1 . 4
Illinois. SAI lwere off duty and the purpose of the visit was to attend


Page 2 of 7

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDM

 

I Ihigh school reunion. At approximately 7:40 Jason A. Moore entered
the bar and spoke with two female greeters at the door for several minutes. Shortly after, at
approximately 7:45 he drew a 9 mm Sig Sauer handgun, walked a short distance into the
bar, and shot his eX-wife, Lori A. Moore, and her boyfriend, Lance Griffel, once each in the
,head. 

E. Shooting Incident

(Ll/m Subsequent to shooting his ex-wife and her boyfriend, Jason Moore walked
back toward the front door of the establishment. He stopped just inside the door and faced a
crowded dining area of the bar. Moore ointed his handgun at his own head as well as a
crowded dining area where deas standing. There were over 100 people in the bar at
the time of the incident. Jason Moore ?red one round while the gun was pointed at his head in
what appeared to be a suicide attempt: however, the bullet only grazed his left check. As Moore
continued to manipulate the gun, SA 1red tworounds from his Glock .40 caliber
service handgun hitting Jason Moore once in the shoulder and once in the upper right side of the
torso. Initial response to the scene was by the Fondulac Park Police Department and the East
Peoria Police Department. Jason Moore died at the scene. Lori Moore and Lance Gri?fel were
transported to the Order of Saint Francis Medical Center in Peoria, Illinois, where they were
pronounced dead. No others in the bar or surrounding area were injured. Tazewell County
Deputy Coroneri: arrived at the scene of the shooting and pronounced Jason Moore
dead at 11:20 pm. A review of available video from the bar as well as witness interviews and
Signed Sworn Statement were all consistent. not
carrying a ?rearm at the time of the incident.

F. Post-shooting

(U/Ezoerf Iwas notified of the shooting via telephone by
approximately 7:56 pm. Since not in the area, he
 as the acting supervisor and directed him to the scene. SA
contacted SAI land they responded to the scene, arriving at approximately
8:46 pm. SA ook possession of ?rearm and ammunition which
included his Glock 23 and the Glock 23 magazine ich was in the weapon along with a Glock
22 magazine had in his pocket at the time of the shooting. A round count taken
indicated a total of four rounds were missing including one from the are Glock 22 magazine.
SA : advised and evidence con?rms he ?red two rounds. rther advised
he intentionally carries his magazines with one less round than they are des1gned to hold. SA
arries the Glock 23 magazine with 12 of the possible 13 round capacity and the Glock
22 magazine with 14 of the possible 15 round capacity.

Spring?eld the Spring?eld ERT coordinator, and

a ?rearms instructor as well as other ERT members ?om the Spring?eld HQ city of?ce also
responded to the scene. They coordinated with the East Peoria Police Department (EPPD) and
the Illinois State Police (ISP) regarding scene processing and investigative responsibilities. It
was agreed the ISP would process the scene and complete a digital 3D mapping of the location

 

 

desi nated 

 

 


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with the assistance of the Spring?eld Field Of?ce ERT. An FBI Chicago ERT photographer
conducted spherical photography of the scene. The ISP seized all pertinent

evidence at the scene and later signed over the evidence to the East Peoria Police Department,
which then provided all requested evidence to FBI Spring?eld for processing at the FBI
Laboratory. There were 114 patrons at the bar of which approximately 37 were identi?ed as
witnesses with the majority of these interviewed by EPPD. Additionally, a video taken ?om the
establishment?s video surveillance system was obtained and reviewed. Although there were
several cameras in the bar, only four recorded. A review of this video revealed the four cameras
did not directly capture the incident with the exception of Jason Moore being shot while SA

is off camera. 

G. Accounting of Shots Fired

(UHM There were a total of ?ve rounds ?red during this incident, three by Jason
Moore and two by SA Jason Moore ?red one round into the head of Lori Moore and
one round into the head of Lance Griffel. Each-round passed through the heads of the victims.
One round was recovered from an interior glass partition behind the victims in the middle of the
bar. The impact location of the second round was observed by the ISP in a partition 'wall in the
middle of the bar. However, they were unable to locate and recover the round. The third round
?red by Moore, in an apparent suicide attempt, went through the roof and was not recovered.
Both rounds ?red by SA Istruck Jason Moore and both were recovered from Moore?s
body at autopsy. - 

 

H. Subject Informati0n

(WM The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was provided with the results
of the National Crime Information Center (N CIC) warrant and arrest record check for Jason A.
Moore. NCIC showed Moore, a White Male; DOB, 10/12/1973; address: 632 Carola Street,
Creve Coeur, IL 61610, had no criminal history. A US. Military record for Moore was located
and revealed he was discharged by the US. Army after four months and seven days of service.
The record indicated the reason for separation was ?chronic right ankle pain.?

I. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identifiers
(WW was not wearing body armor at the time of the incident.
J. Forensic Summary

FBI Laboratory report dated 09/25/2014 revealed both weapons functioned in
the testing environment. The Laboratory con?rmed the two .40 caliber bullet fragments
recovered from the body of Jason Moore were ?red from SA 3 service weapon.
Additionally, the .38 caliber/9 mm bullet fragment recovered from the bar was ?red from the Sig
Sauer weapon used by Jason Moore. 

UNCLAS 
Page  

 



K. Medical Summary

An autopsy of Jason Moore was performed on 06/15/2014 at 12:00 pm. by
Coroner?s Physician Dr] I Dr I Idetermined the cause of death to be a
gunshot wound where the projectile entered the right side of Moore?s body and traversed to the
left side of his chest and punctured the aorta. Two other gunshot wounds, one to the right
shoulder and another to the left cheek (self in?icted) were super?cial. A toxicology report
indicated Jason Moore had a blood alcohol level of 0.3 54 at the time of his death.

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

A. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following
personnel: -

Inspector-in?Charge (IIC) R. Justin Tolomeo
InspectOr Trent R. Teyema
Assistant Inspector/Team Leader 

Assistant Inspector?in?Place 
AIIP .
AIIP
. AIIP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

On 06/15/2014, Inspector Teyema communicated with Spring?eld Field
Of?ce ASAC to arrange logistics for the SIRT. AO

served as the points of contact for the SIRT.

On 06/15/2014, IIC Tolomeo, Inspector Teyema, and Al/Tle land
traveled to Peoria, IL. They were met at the Peoria Regional Airport by SA
an transported to the Peoria Resident Agency (PRA). Three of the four AIIPs arrived at the
PRA at this time as well. One AIIP arrived later in the evening.

 

(U/l IIC Tolomeo and Inspector Te ema rovided a preliminary brie?ng to
ASAC 06/15/2014 and to NSAcltl on 06/16/2014. Additionally,
on 06/ 15/2014, IIC Tolomeo and Inspector Teyema met with the Agent
involved,  land provided a description and overview of the SIRT process.

 

Subsequently, on 06/15/2014, IIC Tolomeo convened a meeting involving the SIRT, ASAC

Smith, PRA Agents, the EPPD, and the ISP. A full brief between the law enforcement agencies 

and FBI components was provided relative to the shooting incident and the responsibilities and
expectation of the various agencies and the SIRT. There was an opportunity for dialogue
between the SIRT team, the involved personnel, and outside law enforcement agencies to 
address concerns, to provide clari?cation, and to answer questions prior to the investigation
commencing. The SIRT then went to the shooting scene where SA  : provided a walk-


Page  

 

 



through of the shooting incident. The scene had been processed by the ISP with the assistance of
the Spring?eld Field Of?ce ERT. 

 

During the SIRT investigation, a Si ned Sworn Statement was taken
from SAI SA Iwas represented An interview with
TFOI took place at her residence and was documented in an 02

as also represented by MI Other interviews, events, and observations were
documented via FD-3 025. The maj ority of the witness interviews were conducted by the EPPD,
who provided copies of their written reports and, when available, copies of audio and video
recordings of the interviews. The and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily.
An FD-927 (Warning and Assurance to Em 10 ee Requested to Provide Information Following a
Shooting Incident) was executed by .

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 06/16/2014, IIC Tolomeo contactedl:  Special Legal
Counsel, DOJ Civil Rights Division, and briefed him on the shooting incident.

(Wm On 06/16/2014, IIC Tolomeo and Inspector Teyema met with Supervisory
Assistant United States Attorney Ito brief her on the SIRT
investigation.

 

 

On 06/16/2014, IIC Tolomeo and Inspector Teyema net with Tazewell
County Chief Assistant State?s Attorne to brief him on the SIRT
investigation.

(U/Eoeij On 06/18/2014, an exit brief was provided by 110 Tolomeo to 
EPPD, and ISP. .

V. Administrative
A. Firearms Training
(WM The Spring?eld Field Of?ce provided quali?cation records for SA:

sed his issued Glock 23 during the shooting incident. A review of SA
[3 record reveated was current in all quali?cations.

 

 

 

 

B. Deadly Force Training

1 Documentation provided the Spring?eld Field Of?ce indicated SA
legal advisor, provided deadl force training to Squad 7, the Peoria and Quad
Cities Criminal Squad, on 04/19/2014. was present for this training. Additionally,

SA : was present for Deadly Force Policy and Judgmental Shooting training for SWAT

personnel provided by Chief Division Counci on 05/08/2014.

 


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arr-sis

 

 

 

 



C. DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision

(WM) An E-mail from Special Legal Counsel DOJ Civil Rights
Division, was received by HG Tolomeo on 06/27/2014. Mr. dwsed the facts

suggested the Agent, who may or may not have been acting under the color of law, ?red his

weapon to protect himself and others from potentially more deadly re from the subject.
Based on these and additional facts known to him at the time, Mr: advised a criminal
civil rights investigation was not warranted.

 

D. Local Prosecutorial Decision

IIC Tolomeo received a letter dated September 10, 2014, from Tazewell
County State?s Attorney Stewart J. Umholtz. The letter noted Umholtz completed his review of

the incident and assessed SA acted appropriately and his actions were lawful.
Additionally, Umholtz advised SA should be commended for his actions.
VI. Inspector?s Observations

None.


Page 7 of 7

WET-814

STEWART J. UMHOLTZ

TAZEWELL COUNTY ATTORNEY

TELEPHONE: 309-477-2205
FACSIMILE: 309-477-2241


TAZEWELL COUNTY COURTHOUSE
342 COURT STREET, SUITE 6
PEKIN, ILLINOIS 61554-3298

 

September 10, 2014

R. Justin Tolomeo 7- 
Inspector 

Federal Bureau of Investigation

935 Avenue, NW.

Washington, DC 20535 

Dear Inspector Tolomeo:

I have reviewed the incident reports and investigation surrounding the shooting'incident
which took place on June 14, 2014, at The Quarter Sports Bar Pizzeria, 1110 North Main
Street, E. Peoria, Illinois. Speci?cally, I have reviewed Special Agentl I?s b6 ?1
use of deadly force which resulted in the death of Jason A. Moore. NC '1

 

Based upon my review of this incident I am of the opinion that Spec. Agent : s
use of deadly force was lawful in. that it was based upon a reasonable belief that Jason A. Moore
had caused the in?iction of death or great bodily harm to two other persons, that deadly force
was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to another person and that such force was
necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape.

Every police of?Cer knows that in every situation in which an officer must discharge his
weapon that he will face intensive review of his conduct which may result in civil and/or
criminal litigation. Despite these concerns, Special Agent : responded in a way that he b5 ?1
had been trained by taking decisive action in response to Jason A. Moore?s act of executing two we '1
innocent citizens: Lori A. Moore and Lance E. Griffel.

Spec. Agentl: sh0uld be commended for taking appropriate action in a dif?cult
situation while maintaining concern for the safety of bystanders.

 



 

 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REPORTING OFFICE OFFICE OF ORIGIN DATE INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
FBII-IQ FBIHQ 09105/2013 03:04:2013 4307:2013
TITLE OF CASE REPORT MADE BY BY
SHOOTING he -1
REPORT OF SHOOTING IIC Dena E- Choucalr mg -1
CHARLOTTE FIELD CHARACTER OF CASE
0310422013 SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

REFERENCES:

Telephone call on 03I04I2013 from Charlotte Chief
Robert J. Shields.

 

APPROVED

ASSIST 
DIRECTOR I

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

 

COPIES MADE:

14 InSpeCtiOn (Ann: SIRG)

1 TD (Arm: FTU)

- Charlotte (297-HQ-A1270963-D)
1 



 

 

 

 

 

 

DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Notations
?ame)!

Request Read.

Date Fwd.

How Fwd.

By

A
Cover Page

NYT-816

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTNEENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 09f05f2013
Report-of: no Dena E. Choucair Of?ce: . 
Case 297-I-IQ-A1270968-D

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW -
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHARLOTTE FIELD OFFICE
03f04f2013

Investigative Period: 03:04:2013 enamels

b6 ?1
Reference: (U) Telephone call on 03l04f2013 from Charlotte Chief we -1
Inspector Robert J. ShieldsSynopsis

(HIM) On 0310432013, at approximately 7:00 a.rn., FBI Special Agent]:
|:|was assisting the US. Marshals Service Task Force Middle District of North he -1

Carolina, Charlotte Of?ce, with the arrest of Anthony Meekf. a know momma WC ?1
l. was erotridins3r NE ?1 4
I Once
his pdsition was determined, the planned to execute his arrest. located
Meeks at 35? Freedom Street Southwest, Apartment 613, Concord, NC. The took
positions at the front door and along the perimeter of the building. positioned
himself on the rear perimeter on a corner of the building while Deputy Marshals of the 
knocked and announced their presence. Within seconds of the knock, Meeks broke a window in
- the rear of the apartment and exited with a handgun.

(WEB-HQ) Meeks? actions were observed by members and: As
Meeks exited the window, observed Meeks point the handgun at other be 1 3

members on the perimeter positioned on the opposite comer. yelled ?Gun!? b? _1 i 3
multiple times while simultaneously drawing his FBI issued Glock 27 handgun, and ?red four ME -1
times at Meeks. Deputy U.S. Marshal who had moved alongside:

Es position, also ?red his U.S. Marshal service issued weapon, an ri?e, two

times at Meeks. Out of the six shots ?red, Meeks was struck twice, once by|:|and

once by EM: and died at the scene. The FBI Laboratory Division and the Charlotte

Field Of?ce ERT processed the scene. Four pistol and two ri?e shell casings were located near

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 1_of 13



 

 

l:|and Deputy position. A loaded Taurus Judge .410145 Long b6 -1 3
Colt pistol was located near the broken window Meeks had exited. A fully loaded .380 3
HIPOINT handgun was located in the apartment Meeks had exited, along with approximately 14

grams of marijuana.

Details

On 0310412013, at approxhnately members of a U.S. Marshals
Service Task Force Middle District of North Carolina, Charlotte Of?ce, were
attempting to arrest Anthony DeShon Meeks, date of birth 09f27l1990, on six local arrest
warrants for numerous state violations to include narcotics, robbery with a dangerous weapon,
assault, and felon};r probation. Meeks was a known member of the ?Eastside 9 Tre Bloods,? a
local chapter of the national ?Bloods? gang, and was involved in various illegal activities to
include drug and weapons trafficking.

- (Him On 07/092012, Meeks? was found guilty on two felony counts for
possession of narcotics with intent to sell and possession of a stolen weapon, and two
misdemeanor charges for possession of drug paraphernalia and resisting arrest. He was given a
sentence of eight to 19 months of confinement which was suspended, and 30 months of
superviSed probation. On 12f20i2012, NC Probatioanarole Of?cer I?Iand local law b6 1 2 4

 

 

enforcement of?cers conducted a Warrantless search of Meeks? residence, located at we _1 2 4
I The search was authorized as a condition of Meeks? probation hm -1 i 
and was conducted in his presence. Narcotics and other drug paraphernalia were discovered. As

such, Meeks was subject to additional charges in addition to probation violation. The new

charges were: one count for simple possession of 5 Xanax tablets; one count of possession with

the intent to sell and deliver 8.8 grams of marijuana; and one count for knowineg and

intentionally keeping and maintainin a dwellin hou 

 

-1

 

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(U4593112) I

 

 

 

 

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(wooed) 0n cataracts, Mocks called CMPD and Sergeant
I:l Cabarrus County Sheriff?s Of?ce (CCSO), and threatened to kill anyone who
attempted to arrest him. Sergeantl:ldistributed an interstate law enforcement notification of
Meeks? threats andnnoti?ed Concord and Kannapolis, NC Police Departments as well, since b5 4
Mocks was known to reside in theirjurisdictions.l I -4
I Ithe three local arrest warrants for the 1320/2012 narcotics charges '2

were sworn out against Meeks by Sergeantl

 

 

 

 

On 02!} 812013; a' fourth arrest warrant was issued for Mocks for felony
probation violation. On 02125120131 IPoliee were responding to a domestic violence
call between Mocks and her residence,| I ha -2
Before they arrived, Meeks had ?ed. Meeks was described as having in his possession a MC ?2
handgun and had cellular phone as she called 911. Subsequently, on
0205:2013, two additional local arrest warrants were sworn out against Macks. One was for
robbery with a dangerous weapon and the second was for domestic criminal trespass, assault on a
female, and interference with emergency communication.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(WM) 011 Sergeant| lobtained court authorized| b5 _1 I 4
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|Agent| [requested
[5 assistance in locating Mocks.
. . (viscera On 02r27r2013,|
identi?ed Meeks in the vicinity of Concord, NC. Also on 02r2712013,! I
received a call from CMPD Detective I:lregarding Mocks. Detectiv as a
member of the Violent Criminal Apprehension Team and the Through his b5 -1 3 4
association with these ?ve task forces, DetectiveElhad learnedI I -1 3 4
Mee?ks and offered to have the apprehend him based on the outstanding arrest warrants ME ?1 4

and Meeks? felony probation violation. I:Ihad worked with Detective: before
and was con?dent in his and the abilities. with utilizing the
and requested Sergeantl:lbe included on the apprehension team due to his
khowledge of Meeks. I:Iagreed and began coordination with Deputy U.S. Marshal
(Dm|:|ofthe on'possibl'e locations for Meeks. DMI:Iserved as
the team leader of the for Meeks? apprehension. According to]: on
0212812013, he advised his supervisor, he was working with the to

Pages of13

NYT-S 19

 

 

 

locate Mocks. On Friday, 03l01l2013,l:land Detectivel:lagreed to meet on
Monday, 03f04!2013 at 6:00 A.M. to try to locate and apprehend Meeks.

 

(UIM) At approximately 5:00 AM. on I
I:Iand identi?ed a previously unknown location of Meeks, 35? Freedom St. SW,
Concord, NC (hereinafter 35?? Freedom was noti?ed and indicated he would
conduct surveillance of this location. At approximately 6:30 A.M., members of the 
and other iaw enforcement of?cers supporting Meeks?s arrest, met in a church parking lot near 
Meeks? suspected location for an operational brie?ng. As this was a operation, the 
brie?ng was in accordance with US Marshal's protocols. The following is a list of those who 
participated:

Leader


Deputy Marshal (DM)
Deputy Marshal (DM)
Deputy Marshal (DM) 

Deputy Marshal (DM) 

N.C. Department of Public Safety Corrections Of?cer 
NC. Department of Public Safety Corrections Of?cer .
NC Department of Public Safety Corrections Officer I
Charlotte?Mecklenburg Police Department DetectiveI 

9. Mecklenburg County Deputy SheriftI
10. I FBI Charlotte .

11. Of?cer Cabarrus County Sheriff?s Of?ce
12. Sergean Cabarrus County Sheriff?s Office

During this brie?ng, briefed the team on Meeks probable
location and provided aerial photographs from the intemet of 357 Freedom St. Concord, 

   
 

 

 

 



 



DMI: also introduced: to other members of the team. Several of the

members were new to the and had not worked together before. I Idescribed
to the team]

 

I
I I SergeantI I

provided a brie?ng on Meeks?s violent background to include his threats to law enforcement and
the likelihood he was in possession of a .410L45 Long Colt Taurus ?Judge? revolver. DM

I Iandl Idiscussed primary role was to locate Meeks and, as such,
he was not assigned any speci?c arrest duties. After the brief; all participants proceeded to
Meeks? suspected location.

 

(UHBQEIQ) At approximately 7:00 A.M., all members of the arrest team arrived at 357
Freedom St, a two-story multiple unit apartment complex shaped like a horseshoe. Upon

arrival, I:Idetermined Meeks was-more than likely located in one of the apartments on

the-right side (South end) of the building. put on a ballistic vest with police

 

 

markings and he and Detectivel hxited their vehicle to locate Meeksl

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I: As the rest of the arrest team took positions around the perimeter,I?I and
walked around the South end of the huildingl I
etermined Meeks was located on the second floor in apartment 613. He informed
ho radioed Meeks? location to DM who in turn, had all members
take their assigned positions. Rather than walk across an unsecured open area around the
apartment, proceeded to the southeast comer of the building on the perimeter.

 
 
  

 

According to the operational plan,| I
IWere positioned to.the.le? of the door to
apartment GB and Iwere on the right. SergeantI:Iand O?icer 
|:|were positioned at the bottom of the landing leading up to apartment 6B near 

 

 

 

- I I Detectivel:lwas positioned on the opposite side of the landing nearest

I NC. Corrections of?cerI:I was positioned on the east 
perimeter of the building between Detectivel IandI hovering a potential exit for-
Meeks. N.C. Corrections o?cers| and Mecklenburg County Sheriff?s Deputy
I:Iwere positioned on the southwest perimeter comer of the building opposite



(Wm Once everyone was in position, DMEconducted a knock and
announce at apartment 613 stating clearly ?Police, US. Marshals. Anthony Meeks, come to the
door.? A voice responded ?who is it? whereby DMI:Irestated clearly ?Police, US.
Marshals.? At this point, DMI:Iheard movement in the apartment. Shortly thereafter,
heard Deputy Sheriffl:lannounce over her handheld radio Meeks was
trying to exit through a rear window and he had a gun. Meeks had broken the rear window to
apartment 6B and jumped to the ground. As he was standing up, he faced N.C.-Corrections
of?cers and Deputy SheriffI:I brandishing a handgun. As all three
retreated to position of cover, who was located on the corner directly opposite,
observed Meeks?vactions and loudly announced "Gun"! According to Signed
Sworn Statement, he . . .saw glass breaking and a gun protrude from the window followed by a
male who held the gun. I yelled-gun multiple times. . . .I knew the of?cers on the opposite side of
the building were exposed to the threat posed by the armed subject. I felt they were in imminent

 

danger". |:|recalled Meeks was bladed at an angle to him and in a runner?s stance 
pointing his handgun at the of?cers located across from Taking into consideration 

Meeks? violent history and fearing for his fellow o?icer?s safety, I:I?red four rounds
from his FBI issued Glock 27 at Mocks. One round struck Meeks in his lower left buttock
causing Meeks to  to the ground where he rolled down a small embankment into the street
(Freedom Way); one round missed Meeks and was'hot recovered; another round missed Meeks
and struck a vehicle parked in a drive way across the streetl land was
recovered; a fourth round missed Meeks and entered the residence located at] I
through a ?rst ?oor window and embedded into a wall. This round was also recovered. Th

residence atlea?s occupied but no one was ihj ured. 

Page 5 of13

 

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As Deputy Sheriff: announced Meeks? exit through the rear

window, left the entry team and proceeded toward :I's position.
According to he did so as he realized the rear perimeter was secured with only

TFOs and they may need assistance. As he nearedl:l?s position, he heard:
|:|yell ?Gun!? several times and' observed him ?re three to four rounds. DMI:Itock
position beside and aimed his U.S. Marshal at Meeks. DIM:
observed Meeks teaching-toward his waistband and issued several verbal commands to Meeks,
who was non-compliant and continued to reach toward his waist-band. Fearing Meeks still
possessed a handgun; DMI:Ifired two rounds at Meeks from his One round
missed Meeks and was not recovered. The second round entered Meelrs?s left chest and was
recovered. By this time, all the U.S.~Marshals on the entry team had moved to the rear of the

apartment near: and location.

(vim lapproached Masks and handcuffed him. Of?cer
for emergency services (EMS) and back up units from CCSO. EMS units from
Cabarrus County were noti?ed at approximately 07:23 A.M. and arrived on scene at
approximately?07:33 AM. EMS reports from the scene indicated Meeks Was unresponsive and
was determined to be deceased. The scene was secured and :5 Glock 27 was
rendered safe and entered into evidence. AR-ISMS was rendered safe, secured
by the US. Marshals, and was entered into evidence by FBI Charlotte on OSXOSQUIS. ?The scene
was processed by FBI ERT Charlotte and a FBI Laboratory Division Shooting Reconstruction
Team. Four .40 caliber casings and two .223 casings were recovered from the scene. One .40
caliber round and one .223 round were recovered from Meeks? body. One ?rlly loaded .410L45
Long C-olt Taurus ?Judge? revolver was recovered on the ground outside the window Mocks had
exited. Additionally, a hilly loaded HIPOINT .380 automatic pistol and 14 grams of marijuana
were located inside the apartment.

 

(HIM) FBI Charlotte conducted neighborhood interviews. Two individuals
witnessed the event. Their statements corroborated the statements made by the law enforcement
officers involved in the operation. A separate interview was conducted of a juvenile who was in
the apartment with Meeks before the attempted entry. According to him, he had gone
to Meeks' apartment to purchase marijuana and arrived at the apartment at approximately 7:30
AM. Once inside, he went to use the bathroom. While there, he heard loud banging at the front
door. He quickly ?nished and, as he. Opened the bathroom door, Meeks told him it was ?the
Marshals". The juvenile noticed Meeks held a silver handgun and watched him use the butt of
the weapon to break the window and jump through it. The juvenile then exited the apartment
through the front door where he was detained by of?cers.

(Wm All law enforcement of?cers present during the operation were interviewed
as well as FBI Charlotte BM,

Page 5 of13

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(Wm Substantive Case Files

The following substantive matters were under ingestigation at the time of the shooting on
03l04f2013: -

 

 

 

 

After the shooting incident, the following substantive case was opened:

ANTHONY MEEKS - 
357 FREEDON ST 

CONCORD, 

ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO USMS

(UIEGEIG) Enclosures

All enclosures haVe been made part of this rcport and are identi?ed in the
enclosed table of contents.

A. Administrative

The Shooting incident Review Team (SIRT) was composed of the following personnel:

InSpector-in-Charge (11C) Dena E. Choucair
Inspector Gregory T. Bretzing

Assistant Ins ectorfTeam Leader 
on:

Assistant Insyector-in-Place 

All?
AIIP
AIIP
IAIIP
AILP

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 7of13

NYT-B23

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

(WM All members of the SIRT reviewed the FBI produced videotape entitled,
"The Rain After the Storm - Shooting Incident Investigations," and the INSD Shooting Review
Protocol. 

 

 

on amazon, 11c communicated with Charlotte b5 '1
to'arrange logistics for the SIRT. arsed: and master: '1
served as the points of contact for the SIRT. IIC ChouCair, Inspector Bretzing, arid
ANT Ls Itraveled directly to the scene, where they were briefed by

 

 

AISIAC The scene was secured "and forensic processing had been started but was not
completed. The locol Concord Police Department provided security but did not participate in
any aspects of the investigation. The remaining members of the SIRT arrived later in the
evening.

0n IIC Choucair met with Charlotte EM and separately with all
SIRT personnel to discuss SIRT procedures. IIC Choucair also discussed SIRT procedures with
the local District Attorney, Ms. Roxann Vaneekhoven, and representatives of the North Carolina
Bureau of Investigation. In all instances, there was an opportunity for dialogue between the
SIRT and the involved personnel to address concerns, provide clari?Cation, and answer questions
throughout the SIRT investigation.

 

(WM During the SIRT, one Silgned Sworn Statement was taken from the

 

FBI Agent directly involved in the shootingEsq. Other interviews,'events, and observations were documented via WC ?1 2
All'personnel were allowed to read the FD-302 summarizing their interview to con?rm the {am _1

accuracy of the information provided. The and intenriews of witnesses were conducted
voluntarily: A FD-927 (Waming and Assurance to EmplOyee Requested to Provide Information
Following a Shooting Incident) was executed by all those interviewed.

0n IIC Choucair conducted an exit brief with Charlotte EM and
the District Attorney and reiterated the SIRT process.

C. Personnel Involved in the Shooting

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. FBI SA I .
2; Deputy U.S. MarshalI I he ?1 3, 4
. -1.3.4
(wining) Other Participants in the Operation -1
1. Deputy U.S. Marshal
2. Deputy U.S. Marshal
3. Deputy U.S. Marshal
4. NC Department of Public Safety Community Corrections Of?cer
5. NC Department of-Public Safety Community Corrections Of?cer
6. NC Department of Public Safety Community Corrections Of?cer

 

 

 

Page 8 of13

NYT-824

 

 

 

was at ?rearms. Prior to this,

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Detectivel I-
Mecklenburg County De outy Sheriff] 

. Cabarrus County Of?cer. 
0. Cabarrus. County Sergean
D. maestro) Firearms Training

(UIEQHQ) A review of ?eld of?ce training records for: who discharged
his weapon, revealed he was in compliance with ?rearms quali?cations requirements. These
records indicated ast quali?ed with his FBI issued weapon, a Glock model 27,
serialnumbe on It}! 10I2012. -

 

were

E. Deadly Force Training

(WW Associate Chief Division Counsell:lindicated training on FBI
Deadly Force policy is provided yearly during the all employee conference. For the past two
years, this conference was held on 12!09!2011 and 122'07/2012. There is no docmnentation
|:|attended either conference nor had he conducted any make up training.
stated he. had last received trainin on the Deadly Force Policy on 02l04l'2013 while he

?recalled receiving Deadl Force Training during an

operational ?brief in support of the gang takedown Operation According to FBI
Charlotte, this brie?ng occurred on 0511722012.

 

F.  Use of Bud Armor and Lav?r Enforcement Identi?ers -

(UIZEQEIQ) I:Iwore FBI issued body armor with law enforcement identi?ers
clearly visible on the outside of his clothing. 

G. (Wm FBI Indices and National Crime Information Center 
(UMEQHUJI

 

 

 

 

 

revealed three outstanding local warrants for Meeks. Anthony Meeks
had a prior criminal history dating ?om through 03/041120 3. Violations included
possession of a concealed weapon, possession of a stolen weapon, assault of a government
of?cial, assault of a woman, resisting arrest, robbery, parole violations, and several other
narcotic related charges. 

- H. (UIEQEQJERT Report

(ll/E19613) A comprehensive ERT Casebook report was completed and is attached.

Page 9 of 13

NYT-82S

 

 

 

 

I. watered) FBI Lab Report
(U1533511) Meeks?s, and weapons as well as all

recodered bullets, cartridge casings, magazines, and un?red ammunitions were examined by the
FBI LD FireatrnsiToolmarks Unit. As detailed in L1) report 130322003 PM KG dated 
07l09l3013, all weapons ?mctioned normally and the casings were physically consistent with the
un?red ammunition. The three recovered .40 caliber bullets were ?red from a six grooved ri?ed
barrel with a right twist similar Glock 27.? However, due to insufficient
microscopic marks, the LD could not make a conclusion they were ?red 
weapon. The recovered bullet from DM: 5 was positively identi?ed as being
?red from his weapon. A Shooting Incic ent Reconstruction examination,?report number

13041.5 008 AEL dated 092271201 3 is attached. 

I. (WM) Medical Reports

(Wm Anthony Meeks was treated on scene by Emergency Medical Service (EMS)
personnel ?-orn Cabarrus County. EMS records indicate they werenoti?ed of the incident at
07:23 A.M. and arrived at 07:31 A.M. According to their report, Meeks was unresponsive. He
was'placed on a cardiac monitor which showed he had Pulseless Electrical Activity. He was
pronounced dead and no further resuscitation efforts were conducted.

W) On 03f05r?2013, an autopsy of Anthony Meeks was conducted by Dr.l:]

the Mecklenburg'Coimty Medical Examiners Of?ce. Preliminary results indicated
Meeks was struck by two bullets. One was consistent with a ri?e round and one was consistent
with a pistol round. The ri?e round appeared to have entered into Meekis? upper. left chest,
traveling through the heart, coming to rest in the lower right back. The pistol round appeared to
have entered Macks through his lower left buttocks area, traveling through the femoral artery and
came to rest in the Meeks? mid-right hip area. Both rounds were considered fatal and were
recovered from the body. A ?nal report,_dated 08H 132013 and signed by Dr.

continued Meeks? injuries and listed the cause of death as gunshot wounds.

K. Declination by the Civil Rights Division

(Wm Upon com letion of the on-site inquiry, Choucair coordinated SIRT
investigative ?ndings  Special "Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division who was rovided an incident summary and copies of all interviews. On .
08f12f2013, Mr. advised the circumstances of the shooting involvingEIand
DMI If?does not warrant federal criminal investigation of whether the federal criminal
'civil rights statutes were violated".

 

L. (UIZEQHQ) Local Prosecutive Opinion

(WW IIC Choucair coordinated SIRT investigative ?ndings with Ms. Roxann
Vaneekhoven, District Attorney for Cabal-ms County, North Carolina. On 03102f2013, she was
provided an incident summary and co ies of all interviews. On 0411912013 Ms. Vaneekhoven
provided a letter indicating neither Sb nor Deputy Marshalljutilized excessive
force while attempting to arrest Meeks and, as such, she would-not be pursuing any criminal
charges against either of them.

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M. Inspector?s Observations

(Dim Observation 1: Charlotte did not ensure a thorough arrest plan was
established prior to the Operation. 

(HIM Analysis 1: DIQG Section 19.2.3 provided policy regarding arrest plans:

(U) The SAC is responsible for ensuring that arrests are carefulb; and thoroughly
Whenever possilale, written arrest plans must be prepared prior to conducting law
enforcement activities that may result in the arrest of a potentially dangerous subject. Arrest
plans must address five topics: Situation, Mission Execution. Administration and Equipment,
and Control and Communications.

(Ht/Elem) In addition, DIOG Section 19.2.4 provided policy guidance regardingjoint
arrests:

(D) An SSA may authorize a joint arrest with state and local authorities. United States
Marshal ?s Service (USMS), or other federal law enforcement agencies. In circumstances of joint
arrests, the SAC remains responsible to ensure that there is a well-considered arrest plan.

Macao) 0n Meeks in the general vicinity of
Concord, N.C. On the same day, he received a call from CMPD Detective I:
Detectivel:lwas a member of both the CMPD Violent Criminal Apprehension Team and the
and offered to have the apprehend Meeks based on his outstanding local
arrest warrants. I:]agreed and began coordinating with team
leader ofthe 0n 02l28l2013,l:lverbally advised his supervisor, SSA
I: he would be providing technical support to the in locating Meeks to
facilitate his immediate arrest. This was con?rmed by SSAEduring her interview.
However, she stated |:|did not provide Speci?c details of the operation, only that it
was pending and would occur within the next few days. On Oil/0110.013, Detective]:
contactecI:Ito discuss a plan to locate and arrest Mocks on 03l04l20l3 at
approximately 6:00 AM.

(unseen) On O3t04t2013, and Detective: participated in the
operations brief conducted by Did: This brief included Mocks? violent
history, aerial photographs of his suspected location, and team assignments. :Iwas
introduced and his primary function was described as only providing technical support in
locating Meeks. As such, he was not assigned any arrest duties but was aware Mocks would be
arrested immediater upon location. His role in the operation was not timber de?ned.

new] at I

 

 

 

 

I After he

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accomplished this,I:Istationed himself on a far corner of the building.? Even though
he was not assigned any arrest duties, his position was near the perimeter which allowed him to
actively participate in the operation if needed. 

(WW advised detailed brie?ngs of technical operations in support of
other law enforcement operations were not required to be briefed to Charlotte EM. Instead, she-
would provide weekly reports to the ASAC outlining the prior week?s tracking activity as well as
any upcoming events. For the Mocks arrest, the FBI was providing technical assistance because
the US. Marshals Service did not have available resources.

(IJIIEBHQJ When interviewed, NSACI:]indieated requests for assistance
from outside agencies did not rise to either the ASAC or SAC levels. Though this was not an
FBI led operation subject tothe requirements in DIOG Section 19.2.3, interviews of Charlotte

EM indicated they were unaware [:1was supperting the in Meeks? arrest on
03i04f2013. As such, they were not in a position to ensure the arrest plan was
adequate as it pertained to [:Iin accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.4.

Interviews of previously had EM oversight of the

Iprogram, and indicated it was not standard 'ractice for:
According to once

the provided technical assistance, they would retreat to their vehicle. -
|is not often an active part of an arrest plan. He is either in thel:|

 

 

 

 

 

vehicle or on the'perimeter.

Instruction. 1a: SAC, Charlotte will ensurejoint arrest plans in support of
other law enforcement agencies are well-considered in accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.4.

(Wm Recommendation 1h: AD, OTD should promulgate policy regardingl:|
support in conducting electronic surveillance and actively participating in the Operation.

Observation 2: Charlotte did not document FBI technical assistance
provided to other law enforcement agencies in accordance with FBI Operational Technology
Division Corporate Policy Directive (OTD CPD) 0189B and DIOG.

(UHEQHQ) Analysis 2: OTD CPD 0139D Section 3 (is) requires all requests for FBI
technical assistance to be submitted in writing by an executive level of?cial of the requesting
agency. The request may be via letterhead, e-mail, facsimile, or other similar means.
Furthermore, DIOG Section 12.5.3 requires the use of the FD-999 when any technical assistance
is provided to other agencies (domestic of foreign). In support of this requirementl I

 

 

 

 

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NYT-828

 

 

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Instruction 2a: SAC, Charlotte will encore requests for FBI technical
assistance are submitted in accordance with CPD 0189]).

mineral) Instruction 2b: sac, Charlotte will ensure the 1:13.999 is utilized for FBI
technical assistance provided to other agencies in accordance with OTD CPD {it 89D and. DIOG.

Observation 3: Charlotte did not utilize electronic surveillance (BLSUR)
resources appropriately in accordance with FBI OTD CPD 01891).

(or/gong) Ana?sis 3: on) CPD clean Section 8 (4a a) outlines the requirements

 

when the FBI may provide technical assistance to other agenciesl

 

 

 

 

(WW Instruction 3: SAC, Charlotte will ensure all requests for technical
assistance by localfstate agencies are an appropriate use of resources in accordance with OTD
CPD 018912).

Page 13 of13

NYT-829

 

  

FD-1057 (REV. 5-3-10}

 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolroniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Date: 04/21/2014
Office 03/04/2013

 

CC:
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From: INSPECTION
Contact: I

 

Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:| I be ?1
-1

 

Case ID 29T-HQ-A12TI656-D SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 11/20/2013.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division's Shooting Incident Report dated 9/5/2013 by
former Inspector Dena E. Choucair. A copy of the complete INSD Shooting
Incident Report is electronically attached to this communication.

Enclosure{s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. Summary of Charlotte Shooting Incident

Details:

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 03/04/2013, involvingl I ha ?1
Charlotte Field Office (CE). -:
assisted the U.S. Marshals Service Task Force Middle District
of North Carolina, Charlotte Office, with the arrest of Anthony Meeks,

 

 

 



NYT-830



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office 03/04/2013
Re: 04f21f2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

a known violent felon. SAI

and was not included as part of the arrest plan for b6 _1
perimeter security. Once his position was determined, the took -1
positions at the front door and along the perimeter of the building in '5
which Meeks was believed to be located. positioned himself

on the rear perimeter on a corner of the building while Deputy Marshals
of the knocked and announced their presence. Within
seconds of the knock, Meeks broke a window in the rear of the apartment
and exited with a handgun. As Meeks exited the window, 
observed Meeks point the handgun at other members on the
perimeter positioned on the opposite corner. ?Gun!?
multiple times while simultaneously drawing his FBI?issued Glock 2?

handgun and fired four times at Meeks.

Result of the SIRG

 

(UXZEOHQ3 On 11f20f2013, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved

shooting incident with the intent to:

1. (UKZEEHQE Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG

unanimously determined the application of deadly force by b6 ?1

03f04f2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's deadly b7c ?1

force policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint. The SIRG made the following operational

observations.

Observation 1: role in the arrest of subject was not be ?1
clearly defined or known by the SBA and EM. ?1

Analysis 1: DIOG Section 19.2.3 provided policy regarding arrest

plans:

?The SAC is responsible for ensuring that arrests are carefully



2

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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office 03/04/2013
Re: 04/21/2014

and thoroughly_plannedm. Whenever possible, written arrest plans must
be prepared_prior to conducting law enforcement activities that may
result in the arrest of a_potentially dangerous subject. Arrest_plans
must address five topics: Situation,.Mission, Execution, Administration

and Equipment, and Control and Communications.?

In addition, DIOG Section 19.2.4 provided policy guidance

regarding joint arrests:

?An SSA may authorize a joint arrest with state and local

authorities, United States Marshal?s Service (USMS), or other federal
law enforcement agencies. In circumstances of joint arrests, the SAC
remains responsible to ensure that there is a well?considered arrest



plan.

On 02/27/2013, Meeks in the general b6 ?1,3,4
vicinity of Concord, N.C. On the same day, he received a call from b7c '1'3'4
Charlotte?Mecklenburg Police Department Detective 
was a member of both the CMPD Violent Criminal
Apprehension Team and the and offered to have the 
apprehend Meeks based on his outstanding local arrest warrants. SA
and began coordinating with DMI I team leader
of the On 02/28/2013, verbally advised his
supervisor, he would be providing technical support

to the in locating Meeks to facilitate his immediate arrest.

 

This was confirmed by her interview. However, she
stated not provide specific details of the operation,
only that it was pending and would occur within the next few days. On
03/01/2013, discuss a plan to
locate and arrest Meeks on 03/04/2013 at approximately 6:00 A.M.

(WW On 03/04/2013, and Detectivel:| b6 ?1,3,4

participated in the operations brief conducted by bTC'Jq3r4
This brief included Meeks' violent history, aerial photographs of his
suspected location, and team assignments. introduced and

his primary function was described as only providing technical support



3

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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office 03/04/2013
Re: 04f21f2014

in locating Meeks. As such, he was not assigned any arrest duties but
was aware Meeks would be arrested immediately upon location. His role

in the operation was not further defined.

 

 

 

 

 

 

(UXEEBEQE Meeks?r location at 35? Freedom St. b6 ?1
?1
-1,4
I After he
accomplished this, himself on a far corner of the
building. Even though he was not assigned any arrest duties, his

position was near the perimeter which allowed him to actively

participate in the operation if needed.

detailed briefings of technical b6 -1
b7C -1

operations in support of other law enforcement operations were not 1

required to be briefed to Charlotte EM. Instead, she would provide

 

weekly reports to the ASAC outlining the prior week?sl I

 

as well as any upcoming events. For the Meeks arrest, the FBI was
providing technical assistance because the U.S. Marshals Service did

not have available resources.

(UKZEEHQE When interviewed, requests b5 ?1

for assistance from outside agencies did not rise to either the ASAC or '1
SAC levels. Though this was not an FBI?led operation subject to the b7E _1
requirements in DIOG Section 19.2.3, interviews of Charlotte EM
indicated they were supporting the in
Meeks? arrest on 03f04f2013. As such, they were not in a position to
ensure the arrest plan was adequate as it pertained 

accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.4.

Interviews of ASAC who previously had EM b6 ?1

oversight of thel Iprogram, and indicated it was not b7c ?1
-1,4

 

standard practice forl

I
I I According to oncel I

provided technical assistance, they would go back to their vehicle.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

4

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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office 03/04/2013
Re: 04f21f2014

not often an active part of an arrest b6 -1
plan. He was either in the armored technical vehicle or on the b7c '1
perimeter.

(UXEEDEQE OTD CPD 0189D was used to support the observations and
recommendations. Charlotte should be aware of the superseding CPD and
FIG (0554DPG) published on 01f23f2014.

Instruction 1: SAC, Charlotte, will ensure well considered arrest
plans are prepared when supporting joint law enforcement agency arrest

operations in accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.4.

 

Recommendation la: SAC, Charlotte, should ensure effective
oversight support of joint operations. b7E -1
Recommendation 1b: AD, Operational Technology Division, should

 

promulgate policy in arrest operations
following completion of electronic technical support to pre?arrest

operations.

Observation 2: Charlotte did not obtain a request for FBI
technical assistance provided to other law enforcement agencies from a
Requesting Agency Official (RAO) in accordance with FBI Operational
Technology Division Corporate Policy Directive (OTD 0189D and
DIOG.

Analysis 2: OTD CPD 0189D Section 8 required all requests
for FBI technical assistance to be submitted in writing by an executive
level official of the requesting agency. The request could be via
letterhead, e-mail, facsimile, or other similar means. Furthermore,
DIOG Section 12.5.3 required the use of the FD-999 when any technical

assistance was provided to other agencies (domestic of foreign). In

 

support of this requirement,

 

 

 

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 39:10:

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office 03/04/20l3
Re: 04f21f2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-5
Instruction 2a: SAC, Charlotte, will ensure requests for FBI
technical assistance are submitted in accordance with CPD and PIG
0554DPG, which superseded CPD 0189D.
Instruction 2b: SAC, Charlotte, will ensure the is utilized
for FBI technical assistance provided to other agencies in accordance
with OTD PIG 0554DPG and DIOG.
dbservation 3: SAC, Charlotte, did not authorize the provision of
FBI technical assistance to the USMS.
Analysis 3: OTD CPD 0189B Section ll required all requests
for FBI technical assistance to other law enforcement agencies be
approved by the SAC. I
-5
Instruction 3: SAC, Charlotte, will ensure all requests for FBI
technical assistance are reviewed by his office and the CDC.
3. Provide recommendations concerning training and safety
issues. The SIRG made the following observation requesting additional
training.
dbservation 4: Glock 27 backup magazine was for a b5 ?1
-1

Clock 22 weapon.



6

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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office 03/04/2013
Re: 04f21f2014

Analysis 4: When his FBI-issued Glock 2T

weapon and two magazines after the shooting incident, it was dete

b6 -1

rmined ?1

one of magazines was for his FBI-issued Glock 22 weapon.

Recommendation 43:

 

the proper backup magazine for the weapon utilized.

Recommendation 4b: SAC, Charlotte,

Firearms Instructor reminds all Agents,

 

during firearms training,

SAC, Charlotte, should ensure 

should ensure the Principle

about

carrying the proper backup magazines for the model of weapon being

utilized.

4.

deemed necessary.

taken a result of his involvement in this shooting

incident.

(WW

Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan,

The SIRG was chaired by non?voting member Deputy
INSD. The following voting

members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields,

Provide recommendations for administrative action if

The SIRG recommended no administrative action be

b6 -1
b7C -1

Office

of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,

 

United States Department of Justice 
USDOJF

Criminal Investigative Division;

Legal Counsel, Section Chief
L. Challman,

Section,

Civil Rights Division, (SC)

SC Gregory D. Cox,

Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent

 

 

I,

Practical Applications Unit, (TD)

I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General

Training Division

 

 

Counsel; SSAI

Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms Tra
Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics 

I Evidence Response Team (ERT),

 

 

 

Special
Jayne
Global

(SSA)

I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; 

SSA

b6 -1,3
?1,3

ining

Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group and 

Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting

 

members were also in attendance:|
USDOJ:
Team Leaders

Office of Inspector General,
Stroud, OI,

Inspectors David Paul

 

 

 

Gelios and Shawn W.

 





and

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Title: (U) Shooting Incident Charlotte Field Office 03/04/2013
Re: 04f21f2014

 

 

or, ssaI:l ERT, 136 ?1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Special Assistant, OI, Unit Management ?1
Program Analyst MPAI I Inspection Management Unit,
INSD.
Procedures for Responding to the Observations

SAC, CE, and AD, Operational Technology Division, are
responsible for ensuring each Inspection InstructionfRecommendation is
satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until
the InstructionfRecommendation is addressed by the field office. The
Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will review the field office?s response to
determine if the InstructionfRecommendation has been resolved or
requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions
taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under
consideration or plans to implement.

SAC, CE, and RD, Operational Technology Division, are
required to provide a written response, via EC, detailing the actions
taken by the field office to resolve each InstructionfRecommendation.
Follow? up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl b6 ?1
Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, b7c ?1
please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPAI 

UNCLASSIFIEDHM
8

NYT1837

 b6 -3
To: Choucair Dena E. b7c: ?3


Sent: Mon Aug 1216:02:01 2013
Subject: Charlotte

Inspector Dena Choucair
FBI Inspection Division

Based upon the information provided in your Shooting Incident Report, we have
determined that the FBI agent and DUSM shooting during the execution of an arrest warrant in
Concord, N.C., on March 4, 2013, resulting in the death of Anthony Meeks, does not warrant
federal criminal investigation of whether the federal criminal civil rights statutes were violated.
The local district attorney has declined the matter as well.

FBI agents and DUSMs were attempting to arrest a suspected armed robber at an
apartment. The arrest team was composed of a number of task force members who had been
briefed that the subject could be expected to be armed and dangerous. Task force members
were positioned around the apartment when the entry team knocked. A civilian witness
was inside the apartment and another was near his vehicles outside in the parking lot.

According to a civilian'witness inside the apartment, Meeks immediater armed himself
with a silver handgun and broke a back window through which he exited to escape. Several
agents, DUSMs and a civilian witness outside the apartment saw Meeks exit the window with
the hand gun. An FBI agent who was nearer to the subject and saw his escape gun-first 
through the window, yelled "gun" and called for the subject to "drop it.? Others gave similar
warnings and commands. Meeks did not heed the warnings and ran with the gun in hand,
posing a risk to the arrest team, as well as to the civilian witness towards whom the subject
ran. Several agents and DUSMs saw or heard the window break, heard the yell, "gun" and saw
Meeks running. Some of them also saw the gun in Meek?s hand.

The FBI agent who saw Meeks exit the window, gun-first, and yelled the warning and
commands, advised that he feared Meeks would shoot at him or at other more exposed and
vulnerable agents. He fired four times with his Glock handgun, striking Meeks in the buttock
and femoral artery and causing him to fall to the ground and drop the handgun. A DUSM
armed with an M3 rifle, who had heard the glass break and heard the warning yells "gun" and
the commands, joined the agent at his position and also fired at the running subject, missing
him.

Once Meeks was'down the agent, who had seen the gun drop from his hand, did not fire
again. Some task force members saw the gun drop; others did not. The DUSM, who had fired
his M3, maintains that he did not see the victim?s hands as he ran and as the DUSM fired in
support of the agent who was firing and yelling gun and also did see the subject's gun fall to the
ground. The DUSM was also not aware that the subject had never returned fire. 
maintained that he watched the subject attempt to rise from the ground while commands were

NWT-838

being yelled for him to show his hands and stay down. He further maintains that, when Meeks.
reach for his waistband, he feared that he was reaching for a weapon and the threat
increased. The DUSM fire one shot, striking Meeks in the chest.

Other DUSM witnesses corroborate the account of what he claimed that he

I observed after the subject fell. Also, the first gunshot wound was located so as to explain a
hand movement toward the waist band. The forensic evidence is consistent with the various
witness accounts. Task Forcemembers attempted to render aid to the mortally wounded subject.

Under the totality of the circumstances, there is insuf?cient evidence to establish that
either shooter will?illy used more force than was reasonably necessary and that he believed was
reasonably necessary to prevent death or grievous bodily harm to himself and others.
Accordingly, there is insuf?cient evidence to warrant a criminal investigation of this shooting of
an armed fugitive attempting to escape the execution of an arrest warrant. Please advise if you
have a contact in the USMS to whom we can forward this finding. Also, please complete your
administrative action.

Special Legal Counsel hate _3
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice


cell  

601 Street, NW.
Roo
Washington D.C. 20004

NWT-839

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Pu: 

Ms. Dene E. leapector
Federei Bureau 0? Investigation
Of?ce of inspections

935 Pennsyivenie Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 2?535

Aprii I9, 233
Beer 

I have cempieted my review efthe materittis the FBI provided regarding the
ef?eer inveived sheeting ease en Merci: 4, 2913, in Caberrus Ceunty inveiving Anthem}?
Meeks. Based on of the facts contained in the it?tve?tiF?tiw: re cut, it is the Distriet
Attenteys {Jf?ee?e conclusion that neither Special Agenti I no: eriity
Marsheif used excessive ferce in the perfermanee of their duties when
attempting te arrest Anthony Meets. Therefbre the Cebemis County District Attemey'e
Of?ce wiif not be pursuing any mimith charges egaittet either of these in this
ease. Please fer-were this tenet te eeyene as: in yeti: agency that may need a copy for
their ?le. it?yee have any Queetiens regarding this matter, do net hesitate to contact me.

 

ineerei 3a

eneekheven
District Attorney 19A

Canter-r Cues menus:
Conconn, Kc new

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NYT-S4O

 

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: amazon

Report of: 11C Ron Twerskg?lc Paul Delacourt Of?ce: FBIHQ I

Case tote 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT 
REPORT OF SHOOTING 
PHILADELPHIA FIELD 
07/2230 13

Investigative Period: 0702/2013 071273013

I. Executive Summary

On ?7f22f2013, two Philadelphia (PH) FBI Agents and a Philadelphia PD (PPD) Task
Force Of?cer (TFO), all assigned to Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF), Squad (3-4, were
involved in a shooting incident with two subjects in northwest Philadelphia. One subject was
shot and killed, and the other shot and wounded.

., The PH VCTF personnel were engaged in a surveillance operation related to a Federal
fugitive case. The subject,| I was charged by the Commonwealth of
with murder and robbery, and was considered a suspect in additional murders.

I 21-year-old Tevin Hammond, were subjects of a PPD Of?cer Safety

 

 

 

. onI I

Bulletin which recommended of?cers use extreme caution. VCTF intelligence determined
Hammond were aware they were being pursued by law enforcement and intended to
engage police when- confronted. . -

Anal sis oil I
I Iand members of the VCTF deployed in an attempt to identify a speci?c location.

 

 

 

Iand TFOI Iwere parked in a minivan onI I 
?th a view ofthe rear-alley oil I The other three members, SA 

ISAI land TFOI Iwere in a second minivan
. . I

 

Shortly after the members staged their vehicles, Hammond andI:Iexited the
rear_ofI land walked slowl down a narrow alle toward the minivan

occupied by TFOI I(driver) and SA TFO and SAIEbserved

the two, with Hammond leading the way down the narrow alley; Hammond and were
described as ?creeping? down the alley in what appeared to be an attempt to conceal themselves.

 

Additionall Iresolved toI SA

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b6 


 

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As Hammond closed the distance

between themselves and the VCTF minivan, Hammond reached toward his waistband as if to

retrieve a weapon. Fearing an ambush, SAgxited the vehicle to address the threat. TFO

so exited the vehicle and an exc ange .of gun?re ensued. During the gun?ght,

 

and Hammond retreated back down the narrow alley and wound up near the end of the
fenced-in alley, where the gun?ght continued. The three VCTF personnel in the other minivan,
who had been alerted to the presence of the subjects via radio, responded to the shooting.

Witness accounts and review of ballistic evidence determined TFOI 
the subjects with his Glock 21 upon exiting the driver-side of the minivan 0
Shell casings from a Glock 26 possessed by Hammond were also recovered near the entrance
(northwest) of the alley where the initial exchange of gun?re occurred. After-I land 
Hammond retreated to the end (southeast) of the alley, TFOI Iproceeded down the alley
and sought a osition of cover in the backyard ofl land Hammond initially
exited. TF

 

 

ontinued to dischar his wea on while SAI assumed a tactical
position at the entrance of the alley alongl?l

3 Hammond took a position of cover behind a pole at the southeast end of the alley. After
whil%observed Hammond raise his arms holding the gun, and appeared to ?re at
-SA In response, discharged his Glock 22 at Hammond in a series of three
volleys (two to three shots each) from a kneeling position. Alter SA ?red seven total
rounds, Hammond fell toward the ground and out of sight of S-AI SAI [recalled

 

observingl:las being low to the ground in the alley, a few feet away from Hammond.

SA: who assumed a position near the kneeling SA: a roximately 35-40
yards from the subjects, gave commands tol:lto show his hands. did not com 1
and appeared to SA|:|to be attempting to get up. Overljs left shoulder, 
observed a black handgun pointed in the direction of the Agen?iwaalso heard 
ell, ?They are stilI ?ring at us.? After telling TFO move out of the line

ontinued-to see the black handgun. Believing] [posed 
?red his rifle at:| until |:]fell to the ground.

During the gun?ght with the VCTF, Hammond was struck three times, including a round
which: penetrated his neck. He died at the scene, and the black Glock 26 weapon was recovered
from underneath his body. was struck approximately eight or nine times (in the neck,
back, and buttocks), and ended up on top of Hammond.

0 re int alley, SA
deadly threat, SAI

 

Two days later while still at the hospital was in stable condition and consented to
an in?custody interview. During the interview, _a dmitted direct involvement in four
murders. Under Miranda, he also provided details of the confrontation with the VCTF.
stated he and intended to kill police of?cers, and said Hammwd ?red the

. Glock 26 during the gun?ght with the VCTF.

A total of 33 shell casings were recovered by the Crime Scene Unit: six .40
caliber casings; eight .223 'caliber casings; 15. .45 caliber casings; and four 9 millimeter caliber
casings. It was estimated approximately 3? rounds were ?red during the incident by TFO

legal Hammond. SAI:|and not

discharge their weapons. |was determined not to have fired a weapon. .
i 2

 

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II. Incident Details
a. Substantive Case Files and Background Information
Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantive fugitive (88) case was opened.

As a result of the Agent?involved shooting, the Philadelphia Field Of?ce opened an Assault on a
Federal Of?cer (89) investigation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: I 
. FUGITIVE: 
worms:
UFAP-ATTEMPTED MURDER SA
eczema 
TFO
VC-AFO

 

 

 

 

 

File number: 5050 893-PH-2964179
Case Agent: SA SA
TFO SA

b. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. SA (discharged weapon)

2. SA discharged weapon)

3. SA

4. TFOI (discharged weapon)
5. TFO

 

 

 

Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

During the ?rst week 'of July 2013, LieutenantlEl a PPD TFO assigned to the
VCTF, advised Squad C-4 PPD Homicide was looking for a suspect in multiple
homicides who had threatened to shoot law enforcement of?cers. The information was
summarized in a PPD Criminal Intelligence Unit of?cer safety bulletin on two subjects,l:l
and Hammond. There was an active warrant arrest.

On 07119.!2013, TFOI:|infonned fgqlabout. information obtained from a
con?dential human source (CHS) rcgardin3r On] I TF
learned throu a CHS|:|planned to I TFO interpreted this phrase to
mean intended to shoot and kill a olice officer. TFO pened a fugitive
investigation (SBA-PH-2950507) hours later. Although Hammond was
suspected of involvement in some of the same homicidesl Iwas believed to have
committed, there was no arrest warrant for on 07?22f2013. |and Hanunond

 

 

 

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were known to befclose associates (subsequently determinede who were
hiding from police together.

After discussions with SSAI :Intelligence Operations Specialist (10A)
Iassisted TFO in obtaining nformatiod I

IN 
resolved to the vicinity 011 
Preliminary PPD investigative information revealed no known contacts of the subject in this
area.

SAI:Ibriefed the general location, and SS concurred

with a plan to conduct surveillance in the area, as the VCTF did not have the precise address
identi?ed. PPD Homicide to give them the information. The VCTF

surveillance consisted of TF SAI land SAI:lin aEIminivan, and TFO
|:hnd SA: in Lil lmimvan. 

Prior to departure, the team reviewed the law enforcement bulletin regardind:land
Hammond. The bulletin contained recent facial pictures of b0 (1 Hammond. TFO
I:Ibriefed to the surveillance team both subjects were considered armed and dangerous.
Additionally, the team was advise wanted for robbery and homicide, and
intelligence reveale recently stated he wanted to The Surveillance team
departed the of?ce at approximately I 

 

 

 

 

 

 

'dicall rec

While to the TF

    

The investigative cal 1e or survei area to
determine a location of the subject(s). - 

TFO |:|was in charge of the fugitive investigation and was tasked with
directing the surveillance. If more information regarding the subjects was gathered, a detailed -
arrest plan, to possibly-include the utilization of SWAT, was to be completed.

Events Leading Up to the Shooting 

Prior to arriving in the area o? ISAI
I Additionally, IOAI

 

Iwas advised

 

.13le

 

Iascertainedl 

TFOI:keceived information from Lieutenant% attempt to
arrest the two su 'ects would be made by PPD SWAT (also known as 
stated LieutenantI':I determined the violent history and threats to kill police officers
,warranted the use of the PPD SWAT. The VCTF mission was to conduct surveillance to
ascertain the location of the subjects, and hold the osition until SWAT arrived. The VCTF 
members utilized PPD radio channel  The task force. typically carried PPD
radios in order to communicate with the PPD.

 

 

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Atl Iforwarded to his VCTF artners an updated
hoto ra o? Iin an attached E-mail, originally sent by IOAI I At approximately
both surveillance vehicles were in the area. Thel kninivan had
parked ori Iwith a view of both the| Iresidences. The
Imini.-van I I parked onl?lwith a view of the alley
behind the| lesidences. .

The three occupants of the I:Imini-van donned their ballistic vests and SE
did

 

 

 

 

I retrieved his M-4 from the middle of the vehicle?s interior. and SA

not wear their ballistic vests.

e. Shooting Incident Details

Approximately ?ve to ien minutes after parking, both surveillance'vehicles observed a
%e walk to the corner oil I talking on a cellular phone.

Th male stopped and made contact with The individual did not match
the description of either of the two subjects, but acted as though he was possibly a lookout. After
making contact with SA: the individual turned around and went back toward

Within a minute of seeing the|:Imale on the cellular phone, SA looked to his
left and observed two ales, one wearing an orange shirt, walking slowly down the alley
toward their[:Iminivan. They were hugging the right side of a wall and "creeping" down the
alley in what appeared to be an attempt to conceal themselves. TFOI:Ireported over the
radio there were two men who resembled the sub'ects walking his way, one wearing a-white
shirt, and one wearing an orange shirt. said he was ?100 percent sure these

 

 

. were our guys.?

SEalso believed the two men resembled Hammond and: respectively.

They were walking in a single ?le, with the individual wearing orange leading the way.? TFO
land SA|:|both reclined their seats to conceal themselves. However SA

ultimately made contact with the man wearing the orange shirt, who 

recognized to be Hammond. Additionally, SA|:|recognized the second man 

 

 

As Hammond andl lapproachedl land clo'sed the distance between
themselves and the| Iminivan, bserved Hammond reach for his waistband. SA
I%iewfoit was the intent of both men to ambush the police surveillance. 
and SA pened their doors simultaneously. As SA|:|placed his foot onto the
sidewalk to exit the car, he heard the distinct sound of gunshots. The gunshots sounded like they
were coming from more than one gun. Though his back was turned away from the approaching
men as he exited the passenger side of the vehicle, SA|:|believed 
involved in an exchange of gun?re. card approximately a dozen shots before he
came around the rear of the minivan and observed TFOFtaking cover near the concrete



steps of a residence with a vantage point of the alley. saw TFOI I from a
position of cover, ?ring his Glock 21 down the alley, though SAI Icould not see

5

 

raw?ses?

bE 
-1,4,7
-6

b6 -1,4
-1,4
-6

b6 
-1,2,7

b6 
-l,2,4,7
-6

 

b6 -1,4,7
-1,4,7

b6 -1,4,7
-1,4,7

 

 

 

 

Hammond andI Ifrom his position. As SAI:baused at the rear of theI:I 12:6 -1 . 4 7
minivan, he observed TFOI Isprint down the alleySAI:Imoved to the same added of cover formerly held by NEnear 

the concrete stairway. When SA reached this position, he saw TFO duck into
a yard to the southwest side of the alley. SAI Ilooked down the alle and observed 
Hammond had taken cover behind a pole at the end of the alley. could clearly see
Hammond?s orange shirt. SAI:Ialso observedI:I who appeared to be injured and
kneeling close to the ground at the end of the alley, a few feet ??om Hammond.

 

Hammond raised his arm holding a 9mm Glock 26 and, according to began his - 1 4
shooting at SAI White no 9mm shell casings were recovered in the vicinity of 137?: ?1 4
Hammond, SA stated he saw smoke and heard gun shots. In response, 
approximately two shots at Hammond. SAI:Ipaused behind cover before leaning out and
?ring two or three additional shots at Hammond, who continued to point his Glock 26 at SA

I I SAI Iregained cover again before leaning out and ?ring his last two or three
rounds at Hammond. The PPD forensics unit processed the scene with assistance from
the FBI Evidence Response Team. No shell,casings were recovered in the vicinity of the pole
behind which Hammond reportedly ?red his Glock 26 at an]: Four shell casings
were recovered from Hammond?s Glock 26 where the ?rst exchange occurred with TFO

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After last shot, he saw Hammond fall toward the ground and disappear he -1 "i
from view (the area where Hammond fell was an area of unkempt foliage and uneven groundwas unsure if Hammond had gone down, or left the alley and 'was attempting to ?ee.
SA awl Iwas still low to, or kneeling on, the ground. -

TFOI ISA. I and SAI Iapp'roached from the intersection ofthough SAI Iwas unaware of their presence while he was ?ring at 137?: "1:4 7

Hammond. SA ran to the location where gains kneeling, and askedhim, ?What .
do we have?? SkEtated there were two ales and words to the effect, ?the ?re
shooting at us.? SA oved to the other side of the alley with his M-4 out. 

looked down the alley and saw male wearinir a white shirt near the far end.
was on his knees with his back towards SAI: and appeared to be trying to get up.
ould not see his hands,~nor wasEcomplying with SAEs orders to ?show
his hands.? OverI:Is left shoulder, SA I:Icould see a black handgun pointed at him.
did not see an one else, including Hammond or anyone wearing an orange shirt. SA
ed to TFO rid asked him to broadcast ?the shooter in the orange shirt
[Hammond] was gone." 

Simultaneously with s?observation of a gun, he heard TFO yelling?They are still ?ring at us!" SA was getting ready to shoot when TFO h7e - 1 4 7

appeared midway in the alley, ?'om a backyard. Both elled at TFO

 



 

 

to get out of the line of ?re. TFOI:|irnrnediately moved out of the way. SA
again looked dovm the alley and continued to see the black handgun over 

shoulder. elled, ?Show me your hands, show me your hands!? Who 'd
not comply, SA ischarged his M4 ri?e. between eight and 10 rounds

until he observe fall to the ground.

 

 

6

 

hiY?E846?-

 

 

 

 

 

After a brief pause, TFO yelled if it was to come otit to which SA 136 -1 4

eplied, ?Yes.? TFO retraced his steps andjoined the entrance of b7C ?1 4
the alley. Hammond?s whereabouts were still unknown as SAI:Icontinued to cover the 
alley with his ltd?4- After yellin commands such as ?Don?t move,? and ?show me your 
and receiving no response, Stabeloaded his hat-4 with a full magazine, even though he
only .?red approximately 10 rounds. This procedure to ?top-oft? his weapon with a fully loaded
magazine was standard protocol in the event there may have been a further engagement. There
were no more shots ?red. 

Post Shooting Details

TFOI land saljwete concerned Hammond may have run he ?1 . 4 . 7
{tom the area, as SAI |to1d .them Hammond had disappeared from sight after SA: 137?: 1 4 7
shot him. I:Iand SA: proceeded southeast down|:| .
toward a group of police of?cers who just arrived and were standin in the street. SAs
and TFDontinued to move 
I In an attempt to locate Hammond. Their plan was to circle the area of houses until they
reached the end of_ the alley from the opposite side.

 

 

 

Meanwhile, SA: and TFOI:Imoved slowly down the alle to where they b5 -1 4 7

 

could see one subject on top of the other. The male with the white shirt was on top of 1379 1 4 7

the male with the orange shirt (Hammond . asked ?Where is the 
I:Ireplied he did not have it. TF handcuffed TFOI?also

askedEf he had been shot andl:lresponded, ?All over.? SAI:Iarrived in time

to hear 5 response. 

 

Knowing Hammond andl Iwere accounted for, TFOSI I and b6 -1 4 7
SAs alked back to their vehicles and waited for their supervisors 137?: 1 4 7

to arrive. Other of?cers remained with the two subjects. Iwere soon met

 

 

 

 

 

 

tn SAC Edward Hanko, coc|:| and seal SAI ldrove
'them back to the office. I

On 07t25t2013, in a Mirandized statement, |:]edm1tted he andl . as -2 . 7
Hammond were staying onl During their 137': '2 7

 

stay, they took turns watching out the windows to determine if the police were outside, and at all.
times had a loaded Glockuhandguri. ?tated he had arrived atl:ls house the dayr
before and had checked tint the alley behind the house and knew the only clear exit from the
alley was out ontd "(newr the alley going inthe other direction was
overgrown with trees and bushes.

 

 

 

I tated when he and Hammond exitedl:ls house, Hammond had the gun b6 -2 1'
(Glock 26) in his possession. When they got to the rear gate ofI is residence,| Isaw 137?: '2 7
two police officers in a mini-van parked at the end of the alley onl lstated

 

he pointed them out to Hammond and said to Hammond, ?There go the cops right there."
|:Istated the police officers jumped otit of the mini-van when "they seen (sicjl:|
with the gun." 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

I:Irelayed_ after he and Hammond ?ed back up the alley,l:lwas hit by gun?re 

and fell. I:lstated Hammond, who had already been shooting at the police o?icers, ran past 
him and was still shooting at the police of?cers from the back of the alley.

police yelling "get down." 

I:Iheard the

I:Iadrnitted before the shootin he told his family members arid other people he
was not going to let the cops lock him up.

- have to kill him or he would kill the police offliners.
?not let the cops lock them up? and would shoot it out with the police.

proclaimed the police were going?to

and Hammond a eed they would
stated he believed
he could not ?ght these cases (homicides) and he was ?in too deep.? [:Ifelt if he had a gun
on the morning of July 22, 2013, he never would have let the police of?cers exit their mini-van
because he would have shot them while they were still in the van.

|:|stated they only had one magazine for the Glock. I:]knew he had ten
bullets in the magazine on the morning of July 22, 2013, because he had 13 bullets before he shot

"TefI in the face three times
10 bullets left because several days before July 22, 2013



tated after he shot "Tef?1 Otif Wright) he knew there were
ceded the magazine and

reloaded the bullets to ensm?e his ?ngerprints were on each bullet so people would know what he

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

did.
I:Iwas subsequently charged with three homicides by the Commonwealth of

1. 07f09l'2013 Murder of Carlos Barnes
2. 07f15f2013 Murder of Tyrone Hayes
3. 07/18f2013 Murder of Otif Wright
g. Accounting of Shots Fired
Involved Agent or Weapon of  Rounds Rounds collected Rounds
. Mags capacity carried w! gun expended
5 Glock 22 (.40) 15 15 7 magi] chamber 7
. magfl?
M4 (.223) 2 so so 1 mag124 re
DB 11 (in PPD
Gloek 2] (.45) 2 13 Not interviewed report)l 16
Eli'th Weapon - of Mag Rounds Rounds collected Rounds
Mags capacity carried w! gun expended
Tell? Hamund Glock 26 . in. custody . . 5 in mag/1
9 mm 1 10 interview (l0) chamber 4
Deteciiv as not formally interviewed as per PPD pdlicy. He provided information to Sergeant

carried a Glock 21 and at Eggs; rounds (nvo l3-round magazines loaded at capacity with one
round in the chamber (13 2 pins 1 Eleven live rounds were recovered from his weapon or magazines at the
scene and 15 shell casings were found at the scene (27 rounds carried 11 rounds still on his person 16 rounds
fired). If he did not "top-off? his weapon, this could explain the possible missing shell casing in the next chart. 

3

136 

b'l?C

b'l?C

 



 

1:6 -1,
-1,4

h'i'C

 

sin?343 

 

 

Accounting of shots ?red by ammunition type 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-1,4,7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ammo Type Individual who fired Shell casings Rounds ?red (based on Shell casings not
. . - - recovered interviews and collected . recovered
evidence) .
.40 caliber SA 6 7 I
.223 caliber SA 3 ll} 2
.45 caliber TFOI I 15 16 1
9mm Hammond (subject) 4 4 0
- Total 33 37 4

 

 

Subject Information

ame evin Hammond deceased)
ex

lack
Bi 1 61']
40 lbs.

lack
rown 
1992
59-74-3879
I HDS

 

A National Crime Information Center (NCIC) criminal history check for Tevin 
Hammond included ?ve arrests; the offenses included narcotics possession with intent to deliver,
and assault. Hammond was convicted most recently on February 14, 2012, for Possession with
intent to deliver. There were no active arrest warrants located for Hammond, though he was on
state probation for the 2012 narcotics conviction.

The Commonwealth of Philadelphia Criminal History check forl:lincluded
four arrests; the offenses included murder, assault, robbery, recklessly endangering, unlawful
restraint, possessing an instrument of a crime, and criminal homicide. A PPD Bulletin re?ected
active warrants fed Is arrest for murder (warrant #134783, dated 7f13f2013) and robbery
(warrant #133688, dated 6! 1012013). .

 

i. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

land their ?FBIfPoIice? labeled ballistic
vest (front and back). They donned them immediater after parking their mini-van in the
surveillance location. -

SA|:|and not wear their ballistic vests or clothing with law
enfor'cementfpolice markings. Both TFO|:hnd SA|:|had their badges displayed
on their belts.

 





 

 

bS -1,4?1,4
-1,4

 

 

 

 

 

 

j. Forensic Summary

SAI

 

ERT Team Leader assigned to the Philadelphia Field Of?ce,

'?irnished to the Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) four FBI documents, a CD, and three

Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) documents pertaining to the 07f22f2013 Agent-involved
shooting. The CD and the three PPD documents were products of the PPD Crime Scene Unit
(CSU), which processed the scene of the shooting with assistance from FBI ERT. The FBI
documents, the CD, and the PPD documents revealed the following;

The FBI documents consisted of a three-page sketch of the scene prepared by 
071'221'22013; prepared by Idated 07/23f2013 detailing 
the date and time the FBI weapons were collected ?'om |(07f2212013 at
3:12 and the corresponding for the weapon'retrievals for storage in the FBI
Evidence Control Room. The FBI weapons were transferred to PPD custody for examination on
at 2:22 pm. 

The PPD CD contained 212 ?les of photographs depicting the scene of the shooting, and
evidence located and tagged for collection.

The three PPD documents were Property Receipts and represented a log of the evidence
items collected at the scene. The receipts were:

1. 9015566 for items #1 57, being all items collected on 071'221'2013 and 07f23f2013;
Some of the items included are 33 total ?red casings, comprised of 15 .45 caliber
casings, six .40 caliber casings, eight 5.56 mm casings, and four 9 mm casings.

2. 9015567 for item #53, being a Glock 26, 9mm handgun, serial number 
with one magazine containing ?ve live 9mm cartridges and one live 9mm cartridge in
the chamber.

3. 9015577 for items and B, being two cotton-tipped applicators used to swab the
above Sleek and the accompanying magazine and live cartridges.

According to the PPD Property Receipts,.on 079212013 at 7:00 pm, CSU concluded
processing of the scene.

Additionally, the PPD Office of Forensic Science, Firearms Identi?cation Unit (FIU),
provided a final Laboratory Report dated 04f24t?2014. The FIU Laboratory Report is part of this
report in 'l?ab 9 Shooting Scene.

k. Medical Summary
FBI involved in the shooting:

No injuries.

m:

10

i

 

b'?In

'7

 

 

 

Both subjects sustained injuries as a result of the Agent-involved shooting; Hammond
died at the.scene as a result of his wounds. transported via ambulance to thel:l
I:IMedical Center. The arrival time to the emergency room was 1:41 pm. The body
injury chart forl:|was prepared by PPD Detectivesl 
. at 2:40 pm. Noted on the body diagram were nine gunshot wounds to the back, neck and
buttocks, and- an to the left elbow. |:|had surgery on 0?l23!2013 and
recovered from his wounds; he signed a Health Information Privacy Act form consenting to
release his medical records. No ballistics evidence was removed fro' doctors.

 

 

An auto 5 was conducted ofHammond on July 23, 2013. The autopsy was conducted
by unlike the City of Philadelphia Of?ce of the Medical Examiner, 321

University Avenue, Philadelphia, 19104 (case number 13?02997). -According to a
Findings and Opinions document provided by Hammond sustained one gunshot
wound to the velar left forearm gunshot wound to the posteromedial (back) le?:
thigh, and one gunshot wound to the right upper back with exit on the right side of the neck

region. The cause of death was listed as ?Gunshot Wound to the Back Involving Nec and the

manner of death was listed as ?Homicide.? During the autopsy, projectiles and bullet fragments

were recovered from both the left forearm and the left thigh. The gunshot wound to the shoulder
was a through and through wound, with the projectile exiting through the neck. Detective
|:|took custody of the projectiles and fragments recovered from Hammond.

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

a. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following
personnel: 

Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) Ronald Twersky
Assistant Ins ector.? Team Leader (TL) 


Assistant Inspector-in-Place I
AIIP - 
AIIP

AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

 

 

The FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) Personnel:

The LSRT did not deploy. The scene was processed by PPD.

IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

0n 07f22f2013 Philadelphia SAC Edward J. Hanko spoke with Chief Inspector Robert J.
Shields In, and submitted a 085, Executive Situation Report to the Director. IIC 
spoke with Philadelphia ASAC to arrange logistics prior to the SIRT arrival in
Philadelphia. -

_11

  - --N-YT-851

 

1:370

 



 

b6 -1

BIC

1:370

 

 

 

On 0792112013, the SIRT traveled to Philadelphia and members were briefed on the .
Inspection Division shooting review protocol by IIC Twersky. 

On the moming of 0722312013, IIC Twersky and the SIRT members met with

Philadelphia EM and SSA personnel. The SIRT also viewed the shooting scene, which occurred

 

 

 

in the vicinity of an alley behind the residences atl lPhiladelphia.
On 07f23f2013, IIC Twersky met with the involved FBI Agents and management
personnel to explain the SIRT process and protocols. IIC Twersky and TL met with PPD

 

 

 

 

Lieutenantl KInternal Affairs Division) and Detective 
(Homicide) regarding interagency cooperation and evidence collection processing.

 

In total, three Signed Sworn Statements were taken from the FBI Agents involved
in the shooting incident. Other interviews, events, and observations were documented via 
3025. The $835 and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily. A FD-927 (Warning
and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information Folldwing a Shooting Incident)
was signed by the Agents interviewed via 

On 07r?25f2013, IIC Twersky telephonically contacted Special Legal Counsel Attorney
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division-to provide an update on the
investigation. 

on 07126112013, IIC Twersky conducted outbriefs with the SAC, ASACs, and squadSSA.
The IIC met wi an Assistant Chief in the District Attorney?s Of?ce, to provides
brie?ng of the investigation. IIC Twersky also telephonically provided a brie?ng to AUSA
|:|from the Eastern District of A copy of the reports created by the SIRT

were provided to PPD 

V. Administrative

a. Firearms Training -

Firearms quali?cations records for and SAljwae provided to the 
by Philadelphia PFII A review of the training records re?e?cted SA 
most recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Glock 22 was on 6f24I2013. SA ast
quali?ed on his FBI?issued M4 on 03f11f2013. They were hothjn compliance with the ?rearms
quali?cations requirements. .

b. Deadly Force Training

CDCI:Iadvised FBI Deadly Force Policy training was conducted 30, 2012 during the Philadelphia Division?s Annual Employee Conference. the 

presenter of this training, which was memorialized via EC dated 0580/2012, under 
Serial?767. The PowerPoint presentation utilized by CD as also E?mailed to all ?eld
of?ce Agents on 058112012. Subsequent deadly farce policy training was provided to Agents
during ihe fourth quarter ?rearms training session. A review of the Philadelphia Division

12

NYT- 852-?

 

?1,4
-1,4

 

-4,3
-4 

 

 

Firearms trainin log revealed SAI:|was present during the session held on September 9,
2013. not present for the Deadly Force Policy review during the fourth quarter
?rearins training session. The Deadly Force Policy was not discussed prior to this surveillance;

however the Deadly Force Policy is on all operational plans. Squad C-4 averages at least one
operational plan per week. 

DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision

0n 02f181'2014, Special Counse advised via E-mail, ?there is
insuf?cient evidence to warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation into a shooting by

two FBI agents and a local police task force of?cer in Philadelphia on July 22, 2013, resulting in
[in order to arrest

the death of Tevin Hammond and the wounding of 
them on homicide related charges.?

(1. Local Prosecutorial Decision

District Attorney (DA) R. Seth Williams reviewed the interviews and investigation reports

of the PPD, the FBI, the Of?ce of the Medical Examiner and the Internal Affairs Division, and

concluded no criminal charges were warranted. Accordingly, the DA's of?ce terminated their
investigation on 1 10712013.

VI. Inspector?s Draft Observations

Proposed Observation 1: not wear his ballistic vest during the
operation.

Analysis: The MIOG, Section 12-111 states in part: ?Wearing of body armor by SA
personnel is mandatory during planned arrests, execution of search warrants and surveillances

which can reasonably be expected to culminate in a confrontation with armed and dangerous
subjects.? 

 

At approximately I I before departing on the surveillance, TFO
|:|and Igathered their gear, which included their ballistic vests containing
additional magazines of ammunition, handcuffs, and law enforcement identi?ers. They placed
their ballistic vests'in the minivan?s rear seat within arm1 reach from the front seats.
Surveillances are inherently dangerous, especially when searching for a snapect in multiple
homicides who had threatened to shoot law enforcement officers. When the circumstances of
the surveillance necessitated uicldy exit his yehicle, he placed himself in a
situation where he lacked. adequate ballistic protection, and was forced to abandon the extra

magazines attached to the vest. TFO similarly exited the minivan without his
ballistic vest.

Proposed Instruction 1: SAC, Philadelphia will ensure all personnel wear ballistic

protective vests during planned activity which can be reasonably expected to culminate in a
confrontation with armed and dangerous subj ects. 

13

 

 

NYT-853 

h? -1
h?C -1

b6 ?3,7
b?C -3,7

 

h? -1
b?C -1

b6 -1,4
b7C -1,4
?6

 

 

 

 

 

 

Proposed Observation 2: A speci?c operational plan was not formulated to account for
a potential arrest. 

 

. Analysis: DIOG, Section 19.2.3 states in part:

?Proper planning and preparation for arrest situations can great! enhance the safety
and e?ectiveness of Agents and o?icers during  nigh-risk situations. Wheneverpossibie,
written arrest plans must be prepared prior to conducting law enforcement activities that may
result in the arrest of a potentiaiiy dangerous subject. Arrest plans must address ?ve topics:

Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Equipment, and Control and Communications. .
Thel must be utilized whenever possible. When briefing the . -5
arrest plan, the brie?ng Agent should stress to the participants oftize operation that any arrest 
has the potentt'air to become dangerous. Exigent circumstances may necessitate an oralT briefing
in lieu of a written plan, but the orai brie?ngs must address the five topics required to be
included in written plans. .

 

. - On the morning of 07i22/2013 the investigation ofI:Iwas opened, and the case b6 -1 4 7
Agent, TFO: briefed SS Ion information he received. They discussed several MC - 1 4 'i
investigative strategies, to incluclel Ultimately, WE 1 5

it was intended PPD SWAT would arres but the initial idea was for the VCTF to
determine if the information received from

SSAl:Iconcurred with the initial strategy and ensured each team member saw the
Subjects? photographs and the Of?cer Safety Bulletin. Five experienced agents and TFOs went

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to Survey the site: PPD TFOI ITFOI ISAI understood an attempt to arrest the subject(s) would be made by PPD SWAT. b6 -1 7
SA stated the ?mission was to hold and conduct surveillance until SWAT MC '1 7

 

arrived.? ?The plan was to drive out to the| 
location scout the area, and call PPD SWAT when the suspects? location was identi?ed.? SA 

was ?clear regarding the general plan to conduct surveillance. to locate the subjects.?
SA- ?understood if more infotaiation regarding the subjects was gathered, a more
detailed plan, to possibly include SWAT, would be developed.?

 

The intent to conduct more detailed planning did not fully account for the possibility that
time and circumstances would necessitate the VCTF to effect an arrest. -

Proposed Recommendation 2: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure a surveillance plan
which involves a high risk subject with an active arrest warrant, addresses the potential for an
arrest scenario, consistent with the ?ve topics in written arrest plans.

Proposed Observation 3: The Philadelphia Agent-Involved Shooting Response Plan
(AISRP) was not implemented. . 

Analysis: On 0723/2013, the SIRT reviewed the Philadelphia Field Of?ce AISRP. The
AISRP was dated June 2012. -

 

NET-854

 

 

 

 

As cited in the Philadelphia AISRP Noti?cation Procedures section, ?When an Agent
becomes involved in a shooting, the Agent, and/?or other Agents present, should render emergency
medical assistance to any injured persons, or request such assistance. Following whatever logical
steps are necessary}r to control the situation, the Agent should thereafter immediately notify the on?
duty personnel in the Communications Unit at the PHHQ Switchboard by calling 215-418-4000.?
Additionally, AISRP Section (7) reiterates Agents involved in a shooting have the 
responsibility to notify PHHQ Switchboard personnel that an AIS has occurred.

The SIRT determined none of the involved Agents provided noti?cation of the incident to
the Philadelphia Communications Center (PHI-IQ Switchboard) as outlined in the AISRP. Nor
did anyone in the of?ce who received a call from the involved A ents notify the radio room: -An
interview of Operational Support Technician (DST)I:LIdetennined there was no .
radio tra?ic or telephone calls about a shootin incident on July 22, 2013. At approximately 2:00

pm, co-worker, informed her of an article on ww.philly.com
mentioning information about the referenced shootng. OSTaid the article stated the
information was heard via the Philadelphia Police Department?s radio traf?c.

 

An E-rnail from sent to all employees within the division at
2:20 pm. on July. 22, 2013 with a subject line of ?Agent Involved Shooting? and stated
??Ladiestents, Two 04 agents were involved in a shooting. All FBUpolice personnel are safe.



More to follow. -

 

After the shooting, DST stated multiple supervisors asked her numerous times if -
?anything came across the radio? or if ?any calls came in.?

Proposed Recommendation 3a: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure ?eld office personnel
are-appropriately trained regarding the AISRP.

Proposed Recomendation 3b: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure the ?eld of?ce AISRP
is reviewed annually.

 

15

 

-- - NYT-BSS

1:6 -1

b'i'C

 

b6 -1

b'?C

-- 

 

-1

-1

 

  

(Rev. 5-3-10}

/Eba< 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlmniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Date: 08f29f2014
Office OTKZZIZOIB

 

CC: b6 -1
-1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY

Contact: I

 

 

Approved By: DELACOURT PAUL 
David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

 

 

Drafted By:| I
Case ID Shooting (Non?Delegated)
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on O?f31f2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division's Shooting Incident Report dated 06f07f2014
by Inspector Paul Delacourt and former Inspector Ron Twersky. A copy of
the complete INSD Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached
to this communication.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. Philadelphia Field Office Shooting Report

Details:

On 0?/31/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on involving two Philadelphia (PH)
FBI Agents and a Philadelphia PD Task Force Officer (TFO), all



NYT-856



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Office 
Re: 08f29/2014

assigned to Violent Crimes Task Force (VOTE), Squad C-q. The
Agents involved in the shooting were SAI land b5 _lr4

The TFO involved in the shooting was b7c ?1r4

One subject was shot and killed, and the other shot and
wounded.

 

 

(UKEEBHQE The PH VCTF personnel were engaged in a surveillance

operation related to a Federal fugitive case. The subject, b6 -7
-7

 

I I was charged by the Commonwealth of with

murder and robbery, and was considered a suspect in additional

 

murders. I I 21-year-old Tevin Hammond, were

subjects of a PPD Officer Safety Bulletin which recommended officers
use extreme caution. VCTF intelligence Hammond
were aware they were being pursued by law enforcement and intended to

engage police when confronted.

Shortly after the UCTF members staged their vehicles,
Hammond the rear of| Iand walked b6 
slowly down a narrow alley toward the minivan occupied by bTC'q?4?7
(driver) and the two,
with Hammond leading the way down the narrow alley. Hammond 

were described as ?creeping? down the alley in what appeared to be an

 

 

attempt to conceal themselves.

 

 

(ELM) As Hammond andl:|approached| and b6 ?1,4,7
closed the distance between themselves and the VCTF minivan, Hammond '1?4'7
reached toward his waistband as if to retrieve a weapon. Fearing an

ambush, the vehicle to address the threat. TFO
exited the vehicle and an exchange of gunfire ensued.
During the and Hammond retreated back down the narrow
alley and wound up near the end of the fenced?in alley, where the
gunfight continued. The three VCTF personnel in the other minivan, who
had been alerted to the presence of the subjects via radio, responded
to the shooting.

(UXEEOHQE During the gunfight with the VCTF, Hammond was struck

three times, including a round which penetrated his neck. Hammond died



2





Title: (U) Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Office 
Re: 08f29/2014

at the scene, and a black Glock 26 weapon was recovered from underneath
his body. struck approximately eight or nine times (in the b5 

neck, back, and buttocks}, and ended up on top of Hammond. 

(UXEEDBQI: Two days later while still at the 
in stable condition and consented to an in?custody interview. 

admitted direct involvement in four murders. Under Miranda, he
provided details of the confrontation with the VCTEH stated he

on killing police officers, 

Hammond fired the Glock 26 during the gunfight with the VCTF.

Result of the SIRG

 

(u/Zysagj On 07/31/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved

shooting incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG
unanimously determined the application of deadly force by the Agents on
was in compliance with the Department of Justice's deadly

force policy.

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning
operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety. The SIRG

made the following operational observations.

Observation 1: not wear his ballistic b6 -7

vest during the operation. 

Analysis 1: The MIOG, Section 12?13.1 states in part:
?Wearing of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory during planned
arrests, execution of search warrants and surveillances which can
reasonably be expected to culminate in a confrontation with armed and

dangerous subjects."

At approximately 12:45 p.m. on O?f22f2013, before
departing on the surveillance, and b5 ?1,4

b7c ?1,4


3

NYT1858

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Office Dl/22/2013
Re: 08f29/2014

their gear, which included their ballistic vests containing additional

magazines of ammunition, handcuffs, and law enforcement identifiers.

They placed their ballistic vests in the minivan's rear seat within

arm?s reach from the front seats. Surveillances are inherently

dangerous, especially when searching for a suspect in multiple

homicides who had threatened to shoot law enforcement officers. When

the circumstances of the surveillance necessitated b6 ?1,4
exit his vehicle, he placed himself in a situation where he lacked b7c ?1r4
adequate ballistic protection, and was forced to abandon the extra
magazines attached to the vest. exited the

minivan without his ballistic vest.

Instruction 1: SAC, Philadelphia will ensure all
personnel wear ballistic protective vests during planned activity which
can be reasonably expected to culminate in a confrontation with armed

and dangerous subjects.

(Ufi?b??j Observation 2: A_specific operational plan was not

formulated to account for a potential arrest.
Analysis 2: DIOG, Section 19.2.3 states in part:

for arrest situations can greatly
enhance the safety and effectiveness of Agents and officers during 
high?risk situations. Whenever_possihle, written arrest plans must be
prepared_prior to conducting law enforcement activities that may result
in the arrest of a_potentially dangerous subject. Arrest_plans must

address five topics: Situation,.Mission, Execution, Administration and

 

Equipment, and Control and Communications. The| ?5
must be utilized whenever_possible. When briefing the arrest

 

plan, the briefing Agent should stress to the_participants of the
operation that any arrest has the potential to become dangerous.
Exigent circumstances may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of a
written_plan, but the oral briefings must address the five topics

required to be included in written_plans.?

On the morning of the investigation of



4

NYT1859



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Office 
Re: 08f29/2014

|:|was opened, and the case Agent, briefed b5 

on information he received. They discussed several investigative 

 

strategies, to includel I

Ultimately, it was intended PPD SWAT would but
the initial idea was for the VOTF to determine if the information

received froml I SSA

with the initial strategy and ensured each team
member saw the subjects? photographs and the Officer Safety Bulletin.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Five experienced agents and TFOs went to survey the site: PPD TFO
l:l ml Sm land
SAI 

 

an attempt to arrest the b6 ?1,7
subject{s) would be made by PPD SWAT. the b7c 
?mission was to hold and conduct surveillance until SWAT arrived.? SA

said, ?The plan was to drive out to thel I
Ellocation, scout the area, and call PPD SWAT when the suspects?
location was identified.? ?clear regarding the
general plan to conduct surveillance to locate the subjects.? SA
if more information regarding the subjects was

gathered, a more detailed plan, to possibly include SWAT, would be
developed.?

 

 

 

(U/Z?g?ai The intent to conduct more detailed planning did not
fully account for the possibility that time and circumstances would
necessitate the VCTF to effect an arrest.

Recommendation 2: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure a
surveillance plan which involves a high risk subject with an active
arrest warrant, addresses the potential for an arrest scenario,

consistent with the five topics in written arrest plans.

Observation 3: The Philadelphia Agent-Involved Shooting
Response Plan was not implemented.

Analysis 3: On the SIRT reviewed the
Philadelphia Field Office AISRP. The AISRP was dated June 2012. As

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

5

NYT-SEO



Title: (U) Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Office 
Re: 08f29/2014

cited in the Philadelphia AISRP Notification Procedures section, ?When
an Agent becomes involved in a shooting, the Agent, and/or other Agents
present, should render emergency medical assistance to any injured
persons, or request such assistance. Following whatever logical steps
are necessary to control the situation, the Agent should thereafter
immediately notify the on-duty personnel in the Communications Unit at
the PHHQ Switchboard by calling 215-418-4000." Additionally, AISRP
Section (A) reiterates Agents involved in a shooting have the
responsibility to notify PHHQ Switchboard personnel that an AIS has

occurred.

The SIRT determined none of the involved Agents provided

notification of the incident to the Philadelphia Communications Center

Switchboard} as outlined in the AISRP. Nor did anyone in the

office who received a call from the involved Agents notify the radio

room. An interview of Operational Support Technician b6 ?1
there was no radio traffic or telephone calls about b7c ?1
a shooting incident on July 22, 2013. At approximately 2:00 DST
co-worker, OSTI informed her of an article on
mentioning information about the referenced shooting.
the article stated the information was heard via the

Philadelphia Police Department?s radio traffic.

 

 

 

An E-mail from ASAC Iwas sent to all b6 -1
employees within the division at 2:20 p.m. on July 22, 2013 with a b7c _1

 

subject line of ?Agent Involved Shooting" and stated ?Ladies/Gents, Two

C-4 agents were involved in a shooting. All FBI/police personnel are

safe. More to follow. 
After the shooting, multiple

supervisors asked her numerous times if ?anything came across the

radio" or if ?any calls came in.?

Recommendation 3a: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure

field office personnel are appropriately trained regarding the AISRP.

 

Recommendation 3b: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure the

 



6





Title: (U) Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Office 
Re: 08f29/2014

field office AISRP is reviewed annually.

3. (UXEFEQQE Provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be
taken against the Agents as a result of their involvement in this

shooting incident.

Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios,
INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following
members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Paul D. Delacourt,
Office of Inspections Trial Attorney, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice I
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC)
Robert E. Hughes, Criminal Investigative Division; Acting 
Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent 

I I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel; SSAI Squad Washington Field Office;

Unit Chief I Practical Applications Unit, Training

Division SSAI I Evidence Response Team Unit b6 _1r3
Laboratory Division SSAI I Firearms _1r3

 

Training Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group and 

Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting
individuals were also in Deputy Chief, Civil
Rights Division, I Office
of Inspector General, Iand 
Internal Affairs, Customs and Border Patrol I 

UCI I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, 

ERTU, Inspectors Shawn W. Stroud, Timothy M. Feeney, Trent R.
Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI,
Team Leadersl I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I I and
I IOI, Special Assistant, OI,
and Management Program 
I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD.

 





NYT1862

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Philadelphia Field Office 
Re: 08f29/2014

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

 

(UXEFQHGI SAC, Philadelphia is responsible for ensuring each
Inspection InstructionfRecommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The
inspection process is not complete until the InstructionfRecommendation
is addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
InstructionfRecommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

(UXZEEHQE SAC, Philadelphia is required to provide a written

response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to

 

 

 

 

resolve each InstructionfRecommendation. Follow?up EC responses must
be directed to Unit Chief| Inspection Management Unit b6 ?1
INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel b7c ?1
link to MAPAI I

8

NYT1863

 <1 busdoioow

To: Bretzing, Greg T.

Cc: Shields, Robert J. 
Sent: Tue Feb 18 15:50:15 2014

Subject:

FBI inspector Greg Bretzing
Inspection Division

Based upon a review of materials from your shooting inquiry, we have determined that there is
insufficient eyidence to warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation into a shooting by two FBI
agents and a local police task force officer in Philadelphia on July 22, 2013, re5ulting in the death of
Tevin Hammond and the wounding of: Members of an FBI Task Force on Violent Crime
were searching for Hammond andl |in order to arrest them on homicide related
charges. Recent informant information advised that the two men-were armed and intended to resist
arrest. Hammond, who was in fact armed with a handgun and ?red it. was killed. |:|was
wounded. The District Attorney declined prosecution. The United States Attorney? 5 Office for the
District of is prosecuting the surviving subject and has thus recused its office from this
decision.

 

Attempting to evade arrest, the Mo subjects were sneaking along a wall down a narrow
alleyway unknowingly toward an FBI agent and task force of?cer seated inside a car parked on an
adjoining street. Both pairs of men observed each other at about the same time. The law enforcement
of?cers quickly exited their car when they saw Hammond reach to his waist band. The agent and task
force officer exchanged gunfire with Hammond as he andl:lretreated down the con?ned area
of the alleyway. The task force officer followed and took cover partway down the alley and continued

. to ?re. Soon, a second FBI agent joined the first'agent at the-front of the alley and also ?red at the two

By then, they had moved to the far end of'the alley next to and behind a utility pole and were
down on the ground. The task force officer, closer to the subjects. yelled at the men to ?show your 
hands" and warned the agents that the subjects were still shooting.

Hammond sustained three wounds and died at the scene. I:I.vas struck with at least eight
builets and survived. No'law enforcement officer was wounded. Examination of the weapons of the
two agents and the task force of?cer and the handgun found with Hammond revealed that they had all
been fired. The visibility in the confined alleyway was limited. it is likely that the sound of echoing of
shots among the buildings surrounding the alley impacted a determination of who was firing at any
given point in the moving gun battle.

The law enforcement officers related consistent accounts and explained that they ?red their 
weapons because an armed subject was ?ring at them. They stated that they thus feared the imminent
threat of the subject?s use of deadly force. |:|corroborated the law enforcement of?cers?
accounts. He stated that the law enforcementof?cers jumped out of their car when they "seen my

with a gon.? Further, hestated that Hammond fired at the of?cers because he wanted to die
rather than be incarcerated for his crimes. Also according to: he and Hammond had agreed to -
either kill the police or be killed by them and 'were planning to kill another young man in order to get a
second gun. 

NYT-864

The evidence does not establishes that any of the three law enforcement officers willfully
intended to use force that he knew to be unreasonable andunwarranted under the exigent and 
extremely dangerous circumstances in violation of the criminal civil rights statutes. A criminal
investigation is not warranted and the administrative review of the agents?. conduct'should be
completed.

 

 

 

 

Special Legal Counsel
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

NYT-865

b6 -3
-

3

 

 

unh- u-u . 
rung, 

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE
THREE SOU TH PENN SQUARE
PHILADELPHIA. 
man HEB-EDEN)

 

SETH WILLEAMS 
U13 mm ?Toms? November 27, 2013-

Tho Honorable Charles Ramsey
Polioo Commissioner
Philadelphia Police Dopartment
Police Headquarters Building
89' and Race Streets. Room 312
Philadelphia. PA 19106

 

Re: PS  Police Discharge by Philadelphia Police Detective: 135 -1,4,7
I Badge itI til I FBI Task Force, and FBI Special 137?: 4 7
Agentsl Iresulting in the death of Tevin

Hammond and wounding of I I

 

 

Dear Police Commissioner Ramsey:

 

 

 

 

 

 

On Monday, 7?2/13, at approximately 5 PM, DetectiveI Iwas b5 - 1 4 5 7
dressed in civilian ciothing and assigned to conduct surveillance with Speciai AgontSI 1370 'the-I I The Violent Crimes MD '1
Task Force had been searching forI Ianri Tevin Hanunond, one of 

 

whom was wanted in connection with the: recent shooting and robberv of A Ion
f4! 13) and the shooting death onyrone Hayes (on 7! 15:13)] I

 

 

 

 

[both mod and Willing to shoot 1t out win

 

police who _con??onted thorn.

 

Upon anivai onI Ivhioh is adjacent to the rear yards ofthd Detectivol land Special Ang IsawI [and 137?: 1-H: 7
Hammond attempting to Iowa through a small alley behind the hauses on ?nal I

As the of?cers identi?ed themselves Hanunond ?red a 9mm Giock Model

26 handgun saver-a} times at ?ue-m. Detec?veI:Irenuned ?re and took cover in a
nearby yard. Hammond ran southbound through the alloy, more gun?re
erupted ?'om them. DetectivoI I?rod a ain and the males ?211 to the ground. As
DetectiveCIapproachod Hammond and yelling for them to show their hands,

NYT-866

 

 

 

Ullu u-v nun-nu; Iu'uu- urn-UH .uu 

I begun to tire upon approaching otticcrs. Detectivel:lmd Special Agents 1:6 -1 i 4 i 7

returned tire. 1370 

The gun tired ut the otticers was from underneath the body ot'ilarnmond.
who cx ired .11 the several gunshot wounds and was to
?ndedicni Center for treatment. No other injuries resulting from this incident
were reported.

Our otticc has carci'uily reviewed the available interviews ot'witnesses and the
investigation reports ot'the Philadelphia Police Department, the FBI, the Office of the Medical
Examiner and the Internal Allhirs Division, and has concluded that no Criminal charges are
Accordingly, have instructed the investigations Division ot'the DistriCt
Attnmey's Of?ce to terminate our investigation.

 

cc: IFirst AssistantDisn-ict Attorney he -4
I Deputy, lnves?gations Division Me ?4
IChief, Special Investigations Unit
Assistant District Attorney, Special Investigations Unit
Deputy Commissioner, Office of Professional Responsibility

Captain, Internal Attairs Division - Shooting Team

 

 



 

 

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION

 

Notice to Close File

 

 

 

 

 

File No. 1444204131 - Date:   '35 

To: Chief, Criminal Section

Re: FBI Agentl I :jc'fi?:
LAPD Of?cers| Subjects 
Frank Martinez (decease) - Victim
CIVIL RIGHTS

This matter should be closed for the reasons described below:
1. Date of the Incident: March 1, 2012

2. Svnoosis of the Facts and Reasons for Closing

On March 1, 2012, in La Mirada, California, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
and FBI were attempting to arrest by warrant Frank Martinez for a gang related double-
homicide. Mr. Martinez ?ed to evade capture to a nearby rooftop and was shot and killed by
gun?re from three LAPD of?cers and a special agent of the FBI. The three LAPD of?cers and
the FBI agent ?red simultaneously at Martinez after be repeatedly refused to obey their
commands to show his hands and to surrender and aggressively respond to those conunands.
Martinez pretended to be concealing and pointing a handgun at the law enforcement of?cers, and
made a sudden aggressive movement, after saying goodbye to a girl friend on a cell phone. The

 

 

 

 

 


136 -3
Special Legal Counsel hm '3
To: Records Section
Of?ce of Legal Administration
The above numbered ?le has been closed as of this date. 
?7 ,3 .
Date Deputy Chief, Criininal Section
FORMERLY (NR-3 FORM 
Co: USA, Los Angeles, CA Chrono Re. T. 9x30x13 Egg":
mar shoot closedoe -

NYT-868

 

 

 

shooters were aware th?at?Mar?Ei?ez Was believed to be armed and dangerousl

 

 

 

After the shooting, however, it was determined that Mr. Martinez had not been
armed with a handgun or any weapon.

The events on the roof immediately before and during the shooting were observed by
other law enforcement and civilian witnesses and recorded on video by an unidenti?ed by-
stander. The shooting entailed an initial eight-second volley of heavy gun?re {dozens of
overlapping gunshots). After a ?ve-second pause, seven gunshots were separately ?red, one-at-
a-time, over an eight-second period. Martinez su?'ered eighteen gunshot wounds, at least eight
of which were fatal wounds. Projectiles were extracted from the body of the deceased man,
while other wounds were through?and-through gunshot wounds and no bullet slugs were
recovered from inside the body. As discussed below, neither forensic nor other evidence can
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez was struck by a gunshot ?red from other than
in the initial volley. While bullets mgy be striking Martinez body during the second volley (as
possibly re?ected in the video and as assumed by at least one witness), the medical examiner
cannot opine when any particular wound was in?icted nor whether any wound was in?icted as a
result of the second volley of sporadic gun?re. Nor can the medical examiner opine exactly
when Martinez expired from his several fatal wounds.

Each of the four law enforcement of?cers maintains that he fired his weapon dining the
initial volley of gun?re and again after the initial volley. Each maintains that he thought
Martinez had a weapon concealed in his sweat pants, which he was pointing at them, and that
Martinez ?red ?rst before any of?cer ?red. Each of the four also claims that Martinez attempted

to rise after he dropped prone on the roof and thus continued to present an imminent threat to the
law enforcement of?cers.

Since Martinez bad no weapon, we now know that he did not ?re at the of?cers. At the
same time, the shooters accounts of what they observed and their perceptions regarding their
observations are supported by other law enforcement personnel, civilian witnesses, and the video
recording. Beside the fact that Martinez did not in fact have a weapon or ?re one, there is no
other evidence that credibly contradicts these asserted perceptions.

. A violation of the federal criminal civil rights statues requires prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that a subject law enforcement of?cer acted will?illy, that is, with the intent to do
something that he knew to be unlawful. Mistake of fact, and even had judgment, would not
establish such willful intent. Accordingly, the United States Attorney?s Of?ce for the Central
District of California concurs with a recommendation that the evidence does not support a

violation of the applicable federal criminal civil rights statute, 18 United States Code, Section
242.

3. Predication and Alleggtions inves?ated:

The matter was immediately investigated by the FBI InSpections Division, the LAPD,

and the Los Angeles District Attorney (LADA). The FBI agent shooter provided a voluntary
signed sworn statement. LAPD compelled statements from its shooter of?cers.



b3 

. -1,6

 

 

b3 -5.

 

 

 

The LADA declined prosecution, ?nding the conduct of the four law enforcement
of?cers justi?ed by self?defense and defense of others. The LAPD found the shooting to be
within LAPD policy. After reviewing all the other relevant evidence, we elected to read the

compelled statements of the LAPD of?cer shooters in order to make a fully informed decision in
this matter.

A federal civil suit has been initiated by Frank Martinez? successors. The law suit is
pending.
136 ?1,4 per DOJ CRT
4. Subject?s Version of the Events: MC -1,4 per DOJ CRT

 

 

 

 

NYT-870

 be ?1,4 per nocr CRT
-1Witness Accounts and Video . gm -3 Per no.3 CRT

A number of other law enforcement petsonnel and civilianl:|observed some or
most of the relevant conduct while Martinez wason the roof. An unidenti?ed person a block
away from the rooftop began to video tape the events while Martinez was atop the roof and
during the gun?re. The LAPD of?cers are visible on this video behind a wall below the roof.
The video has an audio component. The original version was provided to local TV Channel 4
and, pursuant to subpoena, provided to the of Justice. The FBI laboratory attempted
to enhance the video and its audio. The enhancement resulted in only a improved image
of the events. 'In any event, the video and the other witness accounts are generally consistent
with the version of events provided by the shooters.

1n the video, Martinez paces back and forth on a slanted roof while he holds one
hand inside his pants and holds a cell phone in the other hand. He appears to be talking on the
cell phone. Immediately before gun?re is heard on the audio of the recording, Martinez makes a
sudden movement in the direction of the o?icers who then ?re their weapons.

Just before the volley of shots, an LAPD of?cer ?racked? his shotgun he chambered a
bean bag round into the gun preparing to ?re the less lethal device at Martinez. An FBI agent
saw Martinez react by abruptly moving away from the sound of the shotgun ?racking.?
According to this witness, the gun?re immediately followed this sudden movement by Martinez
in the direction of the police of?cers who ?red.

NYT-871

-5-

 

involved at the attempt to capture Martinez
corroborate the accounts of the of?cers who ?red their weapons. For instance, the FBI agent, .
who described the shotgun racking, corroborated the shooters account of Martinez? conduct and b6 -1
heard the LAPD of?cers commanding Martinez in both English and Spanish to take his hand out '37: ?1
of his pocket. Additionally, that agent spoke with SAI:Iinimediately after the shooting. SA

old him that ?he had his hand in his pocket, he said *k you, he moved his hand, and I

heardasho . he ?s per noJ onper DOJ CRT
Significantly, civilian witnesses who observed the events also perceived that Martinez

appeared to be concealin a on and considered 

example, th and
observed Martinez on the roof. He described Martinez as pacing while he was holding a cell
hone and holding his other hand tucked into his pants like he had a concealed weapon. This



 

vised that the police of?cers repeatedly asked him to surrender and raise his hands.
also saw Martinez make a quick move just before he heard a volley of gunshots.
Anotherl:ladvised thaCI-saw Martinez repeatedly ignor the police commands and

reach for something in his pocket just before the police started shootingFBI, DOJ CRT
Additionallyi, a married couplel Iobserved the events on the root wge'Fner

The husband,| I saw one of
Martinez? hands in his pocket the entire time, as the police yelled show us your hands. Martinez
refused to obey the instructions and eventually pointed the hand in his pocket toward the of?cer
with the ri?e The husband advised that he perceived Martinez to be a threat and -
would have shot the subject in response to the threatening gesture. His wife proffered the same
factual observations, adding that Martinez started down the roof toward the police immediately
before the volley of gun?re. She believed that Martinez had a gunper DOJ CRT
Most Witnesses ducked or took cover after the uM?W?ot observe the
second sporadic volley of shots. However, the husband observed the police 

 

 

 

moving back as they ?red those shots and expressed his view that, once the man was down, he
stopped moving and that any movement in his body was only the result of bullets striking him,

In the video, Martinez drops to a prone position on the rooftop after the ?rst volley. As
he lies with his head higher than his body partially on his side and stomach, the seven shots can
be heard ?red at a random pace over the eight second period of time. Movements of Martinez?
body and arm are visible in the video. It is debatable whether the movements are voluntary,
involuntary, or the result of his body being struck by bullets.

6. . Forensic Evidence:
. Ballistics and Autopsy

The four law enforcement of?cers? weapons had all been ?red. The agent was armed
with a semi-automatic ri?e that ?red .223 caliber rounds of ammunition. The LAPD o?cers
were equipped with handguns that ?red .40 caliber rounds.

NYT-872

 

Ali?but one or" the bullet projectiles recovered horn Martinez' body were .223 caliber 
projectiles (?red by SA 3 ri?e). The additional projectile recovered from the body was a be ?1 4
.40 caliber (?red by oaiil handgun). Several of the .223 caliber wounds were fatal ?1 i 4
and the .40 caliber wound was fatal as well. Accordingly, shots ?red by the one
shot ?red by LAPD Of?cer I:Istruok Martinez and caused fatal wounds. 

The medical examiner could not with scienti?c certainty determine the order in which the
wounds were sustained nor whether a speci?c wound was sustained during the initial volley or
during a shot ?red during the second volley. Nor could the medical examiner opine whether any
of the wounds were sustained from any of the seven shots ?red during the second volley.

Finally, the medical examiner further could provide no opinion to scienti?c certainty as to
whether Martinez was still alive if he was struck by a bullet during the second series of shots.

B. The Video

The video is grainy and recorded from a distance greater than the distance that the
shooter of?cers were from the rooftop. The shooters were positioned immediately below the
roof. The video recorder was a block away. The recording is obviously not three-dimensional.
The FBI ?Lab enhancement provides a modest improvement in the image. Undoubtedly, the four
shooters who were closer to Martinez, and who observed reality in three-dimensions, had a much
better view than what can be seen on video. 

7. Legal Issues

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. 242, the applicable federal criminal civil rights
statute, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a police of?cer subject
. willfully need more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances. This burden
of proof has both an objective and a subjective component. The reasonableness of the amount of
force used is determined obj ectively and from the perspective of a reasonable of?cer on the
scene, rather than with the 20120 vision of hindsight. Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989). Allowance must be made for the fact that law enforcement of?cials are often forced to
make Split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. 
396-97. 

 

Even if there is evidence of unreasonable force, the government must further show that
an of?cer acted willfully, that is with a bad purpose to violate the law. Screws v. United States,
325 US. 91 (1945). Accident, mistake, misperception, or even poor judgment, do not constitute
willful conduct prosecutable under the statute. The misperceptions that the of?cers obviously i
had 4 Martinez was not armed and not about to shoot them cannot be proven to be

unreasonable perceptions, especially since the same perceptions were held by several witnesses
to the events. -

Additionally, the statue requires that the victim of unreasonable force be a ?person.?
While we were unable to locate any law relevant to the issue, a jury should be instructed that it
would need to determine that Frank Martinez was alive when he was subjected to unreasonable
force. This presents a serious problem when evaluating the second volley of shots. As discussed

NYT-873

 
   

      
  

  

. ungl-alrIvHIi-1? I 
opine that Frank Martinez was alive when the seven shots were ?red at him during the second

volley. Without such proof, a violation of 242 cannot be established as to those gunshots.

3. Conclusion:

A violation of the applicable federal criminal civil rights statues, 18 11.8.0. 242 requires
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a subject law enforcement of?cer acted will?rllv, that is,
with the intent to do something that he knew to be unlaw?il; that he did what he did knowingit
was wrong. Mistake of fact, and even had judgment, cannot establish the requisite will?il intent.
Accordingly, the evidence does not support a prosecutable violation of federal law and it is
recommended that the matter should be closed. The United States Attorney?s Of?ce for the
Central District of California concurs with this recommendation.

NYT-874

?Wm LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT OFFICE

?e BUREAU AND CORRUPTION PROSECUTIONS

5 JUSTICE SYSTEM INTEGRITY DIVISION

James Laces more: semi - soon- a. scam . mm

SHARON J. MATSUMDTD Chief Danny ?strict Attomay
P. ESPOSITD - Maintain District Attorney

       

Loi 

February 13, 2013

Captain Robert 

Force Investigatio Division
Los Angeles Police Department
100 West First Street,.Suite 431
Los Angeles, Califomia 90012

Re: 1.3.1.15). Fina 12-0154
Lane. #Fop-Iz

Dear Captain Lopez:

The Justice System Integrity Division of the Los Angeles County District Attorney?s Of?ce has
completed its review of the fatal shooting of Frank Eric Martinez by Los Angeles. Police
Department (LAPD) Of?cers Rudolph Rivera, Juan Zendejas, Miguel Contreras and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Matthew Parker. We ?nd that the o?icers acted
lawfully in self-defense and in defense of each other.

The District Attomey?s Command Center was noti?ed of the shooting at 8:12 am" on

March 2, 2012. The District Attorney Response Team, comprised of Deputy District Attorney
Stephanie Sparagna and District Attorney Senior Investigator Gregory Frum, responded to the

scene and were given a brie?ng of the circumstances of the shooting and a walk-through of the
scene.

The foilowing analysis is based on reports submitted by LAPD Detective Luis Maroon, Force
Investigation Division (FID). Compelled statements of Of?cers Rivera, Zeaciejas and Contreras
were not considered in this analysis.l 

FACTUAL ANALYSIS

On January 25, 2012, the Los Angeles Caunty District Attorney?s Of?ce Hardcore Gang
Division ?led charges against Frank Martinez and Martin Figueroa for a double homicide and
issued felony warrants for their arrest. The murder investigation was conducted by LAPD
Hollenbeck Division. The case was featured on Most Wanted.? In an attemPt to locate
Martinez, detectives monitored telephone calls and electronic communications made between
Martinez and his girlfriend, Marlene Mona, who had texted Martinez that he was identi?ed as the
murder suspect on the television show. Martinez expressed to Menu his intent to kill the police:

 

LAPD Sergeant David Gomez obtained Public Safety Statements from Rivera, Zendejas and Contreras in which
the}' acknowledged discharging their weapons.

 

Gian Foil: Criminal Justice Center
210 West Toronto Strut

Lea Angdiaa. CA 000124210

[2131 9114-3838

Fax: [2131 020-1208

WEBSITE: 

NYT- 875

Captain Lopez
Fehmary i3, 2013

Page 2 of?
MARTINEZ: ?l?m going to take one out when they come get me."
MENA: ?Who??
MARTINEZ: cop."
MENA: ?There are too many. . . [t]hey have bulletme vests."
MARTINEZ: don?t care, I?m not going back.?

The telephone tracking continued for over a month. On February 29, 2012, Martinez" phone was

pingedto a residence occupied by Gregory Luna and his famin located at 15509 Escalona Road
in the City of La Mirada. 

On March 1, 2012, a task force was assembled and a plan devised for the capture and arrest of
Martinez. The task force was comprised of Hollenbeck Division, Career Criminal Detail (CCD)
Of?cers Juan Zendejas, Rudolph Rivera, Miguel Contreras, Ricardo Huerta and Aaron Shiver,
FBI Agents Scott Garriola and Matthew Parker and members of LAPD Gang and Narcotics
Division (0ND), Fugitive Warrant Section. During a brie?ng, of?cers were informed that
Martinez was a gang member, wanted in a double homicide involving his use of a gun, known to
be armed and dangerous, and that he told his girlfriend he would not go back to prison and would
be willing to kill an of?cer tried to arrest him.

The task force arrived at the Luna residence where the}Jr set up a perimeter and conducted
The of?cers detained Gregory Luna as he left the house and learned that Martinez
was inside the residence asleep on the couch. GND and FBI personnel maintained the perimeter
and surveillance. The CCD of?cers were assigned to support the surveillance operation and if
Martinez left the location they would become the arrest team. CCD of?cers were dressed in
plain clothes with irtility belts and wore tactical vests marked ?fLos Angeles Police? and ballistic
helmets. The plan was to surround the location, place a black and white police car in front of the
residence and order out. Air Support Division was requested to respond to the location
to assist with the operation. 

The of?cers moved closer to the residence as they waited for Air Support. Some of?cers placed
themselves in a position to observe the rear of the residence. Christine Luna exited the house
and looked up and down the street on two occasions causing the o?icers to speculate that the
element of surprise for the operation had been compromised. Christine Luna was ordered to
walk away from the house. Within moments, an of?cer broadcasted that Martinez exited the
residence through the rear door, ran along the side of the propertyr toward a side gate and was
holding his front waistband as if he were concealing something. Martinez climbed over a fence
and onto a shed located north of the fence. From there, he climbed onto the roof of a detached
garage on the property next door. Of?cers surrounded the garage area and commanded Martinez
to stop and put his hands up for two to three minutes. Martinez did not comply. He quickly and
aggressively moved down the roof toward the of?cers and appeared to possess a gun in his
pocket. Believing Martinez reached for a gun, the of?cers ?red their service weapons killing
him.

 

I The immediate area is comprised famin residences.

NYT-876

Captain Lopez
February 13, 2013
Page 3 of?

?ora Statement of ?pecial Agent Matthew Parker3

Parker saw Martinez climb onto the roof of a home next to the residence he exited. Parker
identi?ed himself and commanded Martinez to stop and raise his hands. Martinez ignored
Parker?s commands and climbed on to the roof of the garage. Parker positioned himself in the
passageway on the east side of the property near the garage. Parker pointed his ri?e toward the
roof where Martinez was moving back and forth along the peak. Parker was aware of other
of?cers standing behind him who were also ordering Martinez to raise his hands. Martinez
moved to the east side of the roof toward Parker. Martinez nicked his right hand deep inside the
front of his pants. Parker believed he was holding something heavy and could see a bulge in his
pants where his right hand was concealed. Parker continued to command Martinez in English
and Spanish to come off the roof and put his hands up. Martinez did not respond to any
commands. Martinez used his left hand to make a call with his cell phone. His right hand
remained nicked deep inside the front of his pants. Parker believed Martinez was concealing a
weapon.

Parker heard Martinez say, "Hey baby, I?m calling to say goodbye." Parker stated to Martinez,
.?Don't do that. Come down. Let?s talk about it. Just come down and talk to me.? Martinez
tried to make a second phone call, said ?Fuck? and lowered the phone from his car. He looked
directly at Parker who again stated, ?Come down and talk to me.? Martinez responded, ?Fuck
you, I?m not talking to you.? Martinez-looked aggravated, swung around and lunged the right
side of his body in Parker's direction. Concurrently, Parker heard a single shot. Fearing for his
life, Parker ?ipped his selector to semiautomatic, raised his ri?e and ?red. Martinez fell to his
left side. Parker continued to ?re at Martinez because he was still moving and Parker could not
see his hands. Parker was aware that officers positioned behind him had also discharged their
weapons.

of Special gent Qatriola

Gan-iola saw Parker kick the gate to enter the area east of the garage. Garriola ordered of?cers
to get a bean bag shotng Garriola saw an of?cer get the bean bag shotgun, heard a shotgun
rack and an of?cer say, ?i got the bean bag.? Martinez looked in the direction of the sound of
the shotgun ranking and moved quickly to the east side of the roof. Garriola heard one gunshot
followed by thirty to forty shots in rapid succession. Garriola asked Parker what happened
Parker stated, ?He had his hand in his pocket. He said ?Fuck you?, moved his hand and i heard a
Shot.'ll 

 

Parker was not aware of any statements provided by LAPD of?cers.

The investigation revealed that Of?cers Rivera, Zendejas and Conn-eras were standing along the cinder block wall
which ran parallel to the garage and near the shed were Parker stood.

A bean bag shotan is a shotgun loaded with non-lethal ammunition.

NYT-877

Captain Lopez
February 13,2913
.Page 4 of?

Statemegt of Justin Whetsell

Whetsell was in his living room when he heard the sound of a helicopter circling above his
neighborhood. He walked outside, looked toward Luna?s property and saw eight of?cers stacked
up along a brick wall and two to three ctf?cers standing next to the wooden gate which forms an
intersection with the wall. Some of the of?cers were wearing civilian clothes with vests
identifying them as the police and several of them were Kevlar helmets; The of?cers
commanded Martinez, who was standing on the garage roof walking towards the peak, to show
his hands. The of?cers clearly stated, ?Get your hands up.? Martinez did not comply, screamed
something incomprehensible at the omens and acted extremely belligerent. Martinez wore
baggy clothing. He grabbed at his shirt to pull it up and attempted to get something out of his
waistband or pocket. Whetsell never saw a weapon. However, based on his experience in the
militaryr and as a special agent for the Army, Whetsell believed that Martinez was reaching for a
weapon and moving in a threatening manner. Once Martinez? right hand went toward his
waistband, the of?cers discharged their weapons and Martinez went down. Whetsell estimated
twenty-?ve to thirty-five rounds were ?red. After the initial burst of ?re, Whetsell ran back
inside to ensure his family was safe and heard a second burst of gun?re of approximately ?ve to
ten rounds. Whetsell opined that Martinez either had a weapon or committed ?suicide by cop.?

Statement Steve DeRuse

DeRuse?s home is located behind the Luna property. DeRuse saw Martinez on the roof and two
of?cers near his shed pointing their ri?a; at him. They ordered him multiple times to raise his
hands and get off the roof. Martinez  back and forth trying to use his cell. His right hand
was in hispants ?as if he had a concealed weapon.? An o?icer scaled the fence and went into
the backyard. Martinez seemed agitated and quickly moved down the roof away from DeRuse?s
view. As Martinez came down the roof; DeRuse heard gun?re and lost sight of him. Martinez
never complied with the of?cers' commands and never took his hand out of the waist-band of his
pants as he ran down the roof out of sight.

Strategist of Gong-go Villa

Villa, a Denney police officer, resides across from the Lama property. Villa saw Martinez
pacing back and forth on the roof with his hands in his pockets. Six officers pointed their guns at
Martinez and ordered him to put his bani-ls up. The of?cers spoke in both English and Spanish.
Martinez did not comply with their commands. He used his left hand and pulled a cell phone out
of his left pocket. He stopped pacing  stood at the peak of the roof'where he made two phone
calls. He kept his right hand in his poclcet the entire time. Suddenly, Martinez ran down the
slope of the roof toward an of?cer positioned below in a shed located across from the garage.
Martinez tilted his hand up as if simulating a ?rearm. Villa heard a shot followed by ten to
twelve shots. Martinez looked like he back pedaled trying to run from the rounds hitting him and
fell backward landing on his side. Villa: believed that Martinez had a weapon.

NYT-878

Captain Lopez

I-?ebntary 13,2013
Page 5 of?

Statement of Tamara 

Martinez acted ?like there was nobody he was disoriented.. .he was not listening to 
anything they were saying.? Martinez reached for his pocket to get something out when the
of?cers' yelling escalated and shots were ?red.

Firearms Evidence

 

Martinez was not in possession of a gun:

Rivera ?red 9 rounds from his .45 caliber Smith and Wesson semiautomatic service weapon.
Zendejas ?red 8 rounds from his .45 caliber Smith and Wesson semiautomatic service weapon.
contra-res ?red 18 rounds from  .45 caliber Glock semiautomatic service Weapon.

Parker ?red .22? rounds from his Colt semiautomaticl?ill-automatic bureau issued ri?e.

Antone}; Toxicology Reports

On March 4, 2012, Los Angeles County Associate Deputy Medical Examiner Doctor Cho Lwin
performed an autopsy on Martinez and concluded his death was a homicide from multiple
gunshots wounds. A toxicology analysis-detected the presence of marijuana and alcohol in his
body.

Other Evidence

 

An unidentified nimess captured the 013 on video from the northwest comer of Escalona Road
and Cheshire Street. The National Broadcasting Company (NBC) Television Channel 4 obtained
a copy of the video from that witness and broadcasted part of it during their newscast
programming. The video depicts Zendejas and Contreras standing along the south portion of
Cheshire Street. Martinez is depicted standing on the roof and when gun?re erupts, he collapses.
Steve DeRuse videotaped a portion of the incident from his residence. The video depicts some
movement by Martinez just prior to the DIS. Martinez is seen with his right hand secreted in his
right waistband area.

A forensic analysis was completed on the. cell phone belonging to Martinez. He called his
mother, Hortencia Castillo, and his giri?'iend, Darlene Mona, moments prior to the DIS.

Martinez was a documented member of the ?State Street Boys" street gang and was known by
the monikers of ?Frankie? and ?Token? Martinez has numerous prior arrests and convictions for
drug related activity, possession of concealed weapons, and taking hostages. At the time of this
incident, Martinaz was on parole for possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health
and Safety Code section I 1350(a] in Case No. GAOEltll?.

NYT-879

Captain Lopez
February 13.2013 f:
Page 6 of? i

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

California law permits the use of deadly}force in selfldefense or in the defense of others if it
reasonably appears to the person claiming the right of self-defense or the defame of others that
he acnrally and reasonably believed that {he or others wore in imminent danger of great bodily
injury or death Pee-pie v. Hombre}; (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1032; see also, California Criminal
Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) No. 505. i

in protecting himself or another, a person may use all force which he believes reasonably
necessary and which would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstance,
to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears to be imminent. CALCIUM No. 3431}. If the
person?s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. Id.

?When the peril is swift and imminent and the necessity for action immediate, the law does not
weigh in too nice scales the conduct of the assailed and say he shall not bejusti?ed in killing
because he might have resorted to other means to secure his safety.? People v. Collins (1961)
189. Cal. STS. .

?The ?reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable of?cer on the scene, rather than the 20120 vision of hindsight. . . . The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police of?cers are often forced to make
split~second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham v. Conner (l 989) 490
386, 396-397.

"An of?cer is not constitutionally required to wait until he sets eyes. upon the weapon before
employing deadly force to protect himself against a ?eeing suspect who turns and moves as
though to draw a gun." Ihompson v. Hubbard (200i) 257 F.3d 396,899

The test of whether the officer?s actions were objectively reasonable is ?highly deferentiat to the
police officer's need to protect himselfand others."
Munoz v. City ofUm'on City (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4Ill 107?, 1102

CONCLUSION

O?cers Contreras, Zendejas, Rivera and Agent Parker responded to a residential area attempting
to execute a felony arrest warrant. The of?cers were briefed that Martinez was an armed and
dangerous gang member wanted in a double homicide case. They also knew he told his
girlfriend he would not go back to prison and would be willing to kill an of?cer if given the

opporttmity.
Although mistaken, the officer's belief that Martinez was armed was reasonable under the

circumstances not only because of what they had been told, but also because of what they
observed. Martinez ran from the of?cers and recklessly climbed onto the garage roof in an

NYT-BSO

Captain Lopez
February 13. 2M3
Page 7' of?

attempt to escape arrest. Martinez disregarded numerous commands to put his hands up and to
come down. Martinez was heard saying goodbye to his girlfriend. He responded to Agent
Parker?s plea to come down from the roof and talk to him with disdain and furtively moved in a
manner with his hand in his waistband which any reasonable person would interpret as a threat.
Numerous civilians believed Martinez was armed and that his actions were dangerous justifying
the of?cers? lethal response.

Under the natalin of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to fear that Martinez
was armed and dangerous with the to harm them and the residents in the community. It
was also reasonable for the of?cers to believe Martinez would endanger the lives of others in his
attempt to ?ee he had shown no regard for his own life. The oi?cers were required to
make a ?split second? decision when they ?red their guns at Martinez. The events that were
unfolding were the very ?tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving? circumstances that the United-
States Supreme Court had in mind in Graham v. Conner. The of?cers based their decision on
what was known to them about Martinez in conjunction with his aggressive movement on the -
roof. In reasonable fear of great bodily injury or death, the of?cers ?red their service weapons at
Martinez, ending the threat. We ?nd that Of?cer Contreras, Officer Zendejas, Officer Rivera
and Special Agent Parker acted in law?rl self-defense and in defense of each other. We are
closing our ?le and wili take no further action in this matter.

Very truly yours,

JACKIE LACEY
District diatoms),r

Br 63 . 
STEPHANIE SPARAGNA 3

Deputy District Attorney
(213) 9?4-3338

c: O?icer Rudolph Rivera #34735
Of?cer Juan Zendejas #3414?
Of?cer Miguel Contreras #31300
Special Agent Matthew Parker

NYT-881

 

Force Investigation Division

F01 1 
OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING
INVESTIGATION

 

 

Force Investigation
Division Investigators

investigative Team:


Seriai No.

HII
Serial No.

Serial No.

Serial 

m:
Seriai 

 

 

Date and Time of Incident:
Location of Incident:
Area of Occurrence:

Suspecti 5):

DR No.

Invoived 

March 1, 2012, 0833 Hours

 

I 136 -l,2,4
b'i'C ?1,2,4

City of La Mirada

Frank Eric Martinez

Male Hispanic, 27 years of age,
Multipie gunshot wounds
(Deceased)

12-99 09137

 

Police Of?cer n| 
Serial I Hollenheck Area

 

Police Of?cer II
Serial Hollenbeck Area

 

Police Of?cer I
Serial I Hollenbeck Area

 

 

Special AgentI I
Federal Bureau of Investigation

 

 

 

NYT-882

Copy No.

For:

 

 

1 AL REPRT

THE CHIEF OF POLICE. causmEgg- .jri'rfgi-sgz-glgEPonT 
ACCESS REPORT :5 ,?lfi??-ffuoss BY THE
CHIEF OF POLICE. CONTAINS mmk'MA'rIon

FROM USE INCIDENT.
ANY UNAUTHORIZED. USE oF' L08


  
 



F011-12

NYT-BSB



 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Subiect Page No.
 -- . . . 
Scene Description .. IO
Canvassing For Witnesses .. 11
Suspect lnfonnation .. 11
Injuries ..12
Autopsy .. 12
Clothing Analysis -.14
Weapons ..15
Firean'ns Analysis .. 17
Evidence ..17
Serology .. 18
Visual Documentation ..18
Noti?cations ..18
Personnel at Scene .-18
communications .. 18
Justice System Integrity Division .. 19
Related Reports  .. 19
Investi gator?s Notes .. 19
Diagrams .. 24

NYT-884

FED No. 13011?12

Transcribed Statements

Police Officer. I (Pages 
Detectivel (Pages  . ..
Deiective {Pages  . .

Police Officer 1-38} ..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

{Pages 
[Pages 
(Pages 1-48) 

 

 

 

I(Pages  . .

 

 

  
   
 

(Pages 1-17) .

(Pages 

 

I |(Pages 
?Pages 

Fire Captain (Pages  .. ..  
Paramedic (Pages 1-14)   
Paramedic (Pages 1?14)  .

 

Police Of?cer 1-43} ..
Police Of?cer (Pages 143)  ..
Police Of?cer 11 {Pages 1-25} 
Police Of?cer L26) ..
Detective II I(Pages 
eteclive ?Pages 1-21} ..

Police Of?cer ages 1-18} ..
Police Officer Ii images 147; ..
Sergeantl (Pages 1'27) 

Sergeant 1' I(Pages  

I(Pages 

. . . . . . - - I(Pages  
I ?Pages  .. 

Pages   .

?gs  .  .
(Pages ..  
Eages  
(Pages . ..

Images 
I:I(Pages 1?13) ..
1-17) ..

I(Pages 
I(Pages   

- - ages 1-33(Fags - --  


..NYT- 885

b6 -4
-4



Adm

Addendum No.

Addendum N0.

Addendum No.

Addendum No.

Addendum No.

Addendum No.

Addendum No.

Addendum No

Addendum No

Addendum No

Addendum No

Addendum No

Addendum No.

Addendum No.

Addendum Nogeles Police Department, Murder Investigative Report of
Jesus Rendon, DR No. 11-04 17320.

Los Angeles Police Department, Murder InveStigati ve Report of Art
Gomez, DR No. 11-04 17521.

Los An geles Police Department, Murder Follow-up Investigation.
DR Nos. 11-04 171320 and 11-04 17321.

Los Angeles Police Department, Fugitive Task Force
Game Plan dated March 1, 2012.

136 -1
13712 -1

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Speciai Agent:
Form No. dated March 2, 2012.

Federai Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Special Agentl:|
No. FD-302, dated March 7, 2012.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Signed Sworn Statement of Special

A gent|:| dated March 6, 2012.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Signed Sworn Statement of Special

Agent: dated August 2, 2012.

Los Angeles Police Department, Operation Plan for Hollenbeck
Personnel dated March I, 2012.

Hollenbeck Patrol Division Watch Commander's Daily Report,
Watch 214, dated March 1, 2012.

Sergeant?s Daily Reports, Dated March 1, 2012.

Los Angeles County Consolidated Criminal History System Record
for Frank Eric Martinez.

Criminal Information Index Rap Sheet for Frank Eric Martinez.

Los Angeles County Fire Department, Emergency Medical Services
Report for Frank Martinez, Form No. FZ. 358074, dated March 1,
2012.

Les An geles Police Department, Death Investigation Report of
Frank Martinez, DR No. 12-99 09137.

NYT-886



Addendiun No

Addendum No

Addendum 

Addendum No.
Addendum No.
Addendum No.
Addendum No.
Addendum No.
Addendum No.

Addendum No.
Addendum No.
Addendum No.

Addendum NoA-E,

27

23

County of Los Angeles, Department of Coroner, Autopsy Report
for Frank E. Martinez, Case No. 2012?01480.

Los Angeies Police Department, Scienti?c Investigation Division,
Laboratory Report of Distance Determination, DR No. 12-99
09137, ?nalized on August 13, 2012.

Los Angeles Police Department, Scienti?c Investigation Division,
Laboratory Report of Officerl:l? Firearm Test Fire,
DR No. 11-99 0913?, ?nalized June 8, 2012.

136 -1,4
1378 -1,4

Los An geies Police Department, Scientific Investigation Division,
Laboratory Report of Office Firearm Test Fire,
DR No. 11?99 09137, ?nalized June 8, 2012.

Los Angeles Police Department, Scientific Investigation Division,
Laboratory Report of Off'i cerl:| Firearm Test Fire,
DR No. 11-99 09137, ?nalized March 16, 2012.

Los Angeles Police Department, Scienti?c Investigation Division,
Laboratory Report of Special Agentl:ls Firearm Test Fire,
DR No. 11-99 09137, ?nalized June 29, 2012

Los Angeles Police Department, Scientific Investigation Division
Laboratory Report of Bullet Path Analysis, DR No. 12-99 09137,
finalized on August 2, 2012.

Los Angeles Police Department, Scienti?c investigation Division,
Laboratory Report of Bullet/Cartridge Casing Comparison, DR No.
12-99 0913?, ?nalized on August 22, 2012.

Los Angeies Police Deparnnent, Scienti?c Investigation Division,
Laboratory Report of Evidence Collection, DR No. 11-99 0913?,
?nalized April 2, 2012.

Los An geles Police Department, Property Report for Item Nos. 1
through 7'1, DR No. 12199 09137.

RACR Incident Notificati on Log, Dated March 1, 2012 for Incident
No. 120301001009.

b6 -1

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Special Agentl:l
?1

Form No. FDK302, dated March 5, 2012.

Federal Bureau of investigation, Statement of Special A gentl:|
|:|Form No. 1313-302, dated March 1, 2012.



FED N0. 13011?12

Addendum N0. 29 A-F-

Addeudum N0. 30 A-M

State of Califomia, County of Los Ssarch Warrant and
Affidavit forl Mirada,

 

b6 -2

Dated March 1, 2012. -2

Facial-31 Bureau of Investigation, and 
Analysis Unit. Davies Case Report, Case No. 89B-LA-2597UT.



FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION
REPORT OF AN OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING
FID N0. 011-12

The following report was prepared by Force Investigation Division The report mg
?include any information from the of?cers directly involved in the Categorical Use of
Force incident. The report was drafted via the statements of uninvolved police personnei
and independent witnesses in the ease. The speci?c actions, tactics, and statements of the
involved of?cers will he addressed in the report completed by Force Investigation Division,
Administrative Investigation Section.

ATIVE SUMMARY

On Wednesday, November 30, 201 l, at approximately 0014 hours, a double murder occurred at
3133 City View Avenue, Los Angeies, California. The victirns were identi?ed as Art Gomez. 
years of age, and Jesus Rendon, 36 years of age {Addenda Nos. 1 and 2).

Hollenbeck Detective Division, Homicide Unit, Detective ill|:| Serial ?95 '4 7
and Police Of?cer No.l:l were assigned to investigate the murders. MC ?4 7
Their investigation identi?ed Frank Eric Martinez, a male Hispanic, 2? years of age, and
a male|:|years of age, as the individuals responsible for the murders
of Gomez and Rendon. On January 25, 2012, Of?cerl:lpresented the case to the Los
An eles County, District Attorney?s Of?ce, Hardcore Division. Deputy District Attorney:
I viewed the case, ?led murder charges and issued feiony warrants against Martinez and
'Eon Case Nos. LACBA39317501 and LACBA39317502, respectively (Addendum

 

No. 3).

numerous follow?ups in an attempt to locate Martinez and

Without SUCCESS. On February 18, 2012, in an effort to develop leads, the case was featured on ha 

?LAis Most Wanted" Channel Fox 11 News. - . .
-1,6
133 -1

 

Additionally, via a court order, of?cersI I

 

 

 

 

assist in investigating leads and information obtained from the court order, Of?cer
Irequested the assistance of Gang and Narcotics Division (GNU), Fugitive Warrant
Section (FWS) Task Force. This task force was comprised of several Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) of?cers and two Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, whose
primary focus is assisting divisional detectives with the surveillance and capture of outstanding
felony suspects.

 

Gang and Narcotics Division, Detective II I Serial and 1331 Special 136 ?1 4
Agent Serial Nol Iwere the lead investigators res onsible for the E:  ?2
analysis of information obtained through the court order. The tracking ofl:| b3 _1 

 

NYT- 889

FID 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 2
Detectivel land SAI Ievenniallv determined Martinez wasl I 
I .r 
- 1333ch I 
IDetectiveI land lutilizedl b3 _1
b6 ?1 ,2 ,4
D?wctivel land Special Agentl Iconducted computer :26 4
checks, obtained background information on the residents at this address, and planned a b3 _1 

surveillance to determine if Martinez was hiding at the location. A. brie?ng for the surveillance
was scheduled for March 1, 20l2, at approximately 05-30 hours. Of?cerl:lwas noti?ed of
the brie?ng and purpose of the surveillance.

On March I, 20l 2, at approximately 0530 hours, the following GND and Bi ersonnel attended
?1'3 brie?ng SA ISAI Serial No. Police Officers ?35 ?1 A

Serial No. [serial No'l andl lse?a} b'l'C ?1,4
No. and Detective Ill |Serial No.| IJ Of?cerl Iwas also present

during the brie?ng and was aware that the Hollenbeck Division, Career Criminal Detail (CCD)
Unit was on duty and available as an additional resource (Addendum No. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note: All the above listed personnel were in plain clothes and drove unmarked plain
vehicles. Detective was the su ervisor in char Dune b'l'C -1,2Detectivel land SAI Iprovided background information, photographs and the b3E_1
content of] lo the above listed personnel. The purpose of the
Surveillance was to monitor the activity at| land determine whether or not

 

Martinez was at the location. This would be accomplished by having an Observation Post (0P)
orEland several units around the perimeter. If a vehicle was observed leaving the
residence, of?cers would stop the vehicle and attempt to gain information about Martinez?
whereabouts. If con?rmation was obtained that Martinez was at the residence, Hollenbeck
Division CCD personnel would be requested to assist.

 

 

136 -1,4
b'i'C -1,4
-1

 

 

 

Special AgentsI [provided a voluntary statement during this investigation; however, their
interviews were not recorded in accordance with FBI policy. Their statements contained in this report were derived
from Signed Sworn Statements and Statement Forms which are included in this report (Addenda Nos. 5 through
8).

?1 Noti?cation of the surveillance was made to Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) Norwalk Station
Communications Division, Bureau Communications Coordinator and (3ND Lieutenant 11.:l
Serial No,

NYT-BQO

 No. 011-12
Page 3

After the brie?ng, DetectiveI Itook a position on the east side ofI Ias the 
OP. the north, SAI Icovered the south, Of?cersI ME 
covered the west and SA I:Icovered the east side or" the surveillance. Communications

between the 0? and perimeter units was accomplished viaI:Iradios and cellular

telephones.?

 

OfficerI:Iwas not an active member of the surveillance, as his role was to provide 11:: 
hackgmund information on Martinez and reqUest additional resources if needed. Because 13?: _1:5
Martinez?l IOf?cerI:I hg -1
had a strong snapiclon Martinez was possibly at this location. At a roxTrnately 0700 hours, he

telephoned Hollenhecl: Detective Division, Detective HII I Serial No and

requested him to respond with his CCD personnel to the City of La Mirada. Detective

was familiar with the murder case involving Martinez and was informed a surveillance was

under way, however no movement or con?rmation had been made whether Martinez was indeed

at the residence.

 

Note: DetectiveI:Iwas the supervisor in charge of the Hollenheck Detective Division ?4

one unit, which consisted ofthe followin ersonnel: Police Of?cer 111 l?l '4
Serial No and Police Officers I Serial No] 

Serial No. Serial No.| IandI I Serial No.

I I The CCD of?cers were dressed in plain clothes with utility belts and wore
tactical vests marked in white lettering ?Los Angeles Police" on the front of the vest and
?Police? on the back of it.6

 

 

Of?cerI:Icontacted Of?cer Iand obtained the information needed to complete an Egg?f4
Operational Game Plan. Of?cer then briefed the CCD personnel at Hollenbeck Station.

Their assignment was to support the sorveillance Operation as containment of the residence, and

if Martinez left the location in a vehicle, the CCD of?cers would become the arrest team since

they were equipped with a marked black and white police vehicle (Addendum No. 9).7

 

 

After the brie?ng, Detectivel I along with Of?cersl '35 ?1 r2 r4

Ian
:Ir?spond?d m| land met with SAI '1 :2 4

who provided a brief update regarding the status of the surveillance.

 

 

 

5 The officers were using frequency ChannelDo communicate with theirl:|radios, which was not recorded b6 '4
by Cornrnunications Division. b?C -4
?5 Of?ccr| Of?cer] b?E -s

 



I Of?cerl Idrove a marked black and white police vehicle, Sh No] Icquipped with

ha] or panels and Of?ce was the passenger. Of?cer drove plain police vehicle, Shop
No

 

 

 

 

O?icerI:Iwas the front passenger, Detective was the right rear passenger and Of?cer
was the left rear passenger.

Detectiv noti?ed the Hollenbeck Watch Commander and also Hollenbeck Detective Division, Lieutenant 
Serial No: in regards to CCD personnel responding to assist with the surveillance
in a 

operation. ition. Of?cer: noti?ed LASD Norwalk Station.

 



FID No. 01 1-12
Page4

 

At approximately 0730 hours, Detectivel Iobserved a| ImaleI Idrive away

 

 

 

 

 

froml Iin al
accompanied malel I Offload Ifoliowed the vehicle to a nearby
business, located atI Career Criminal Detail

 

 

 

 

personne were requested to In??

two males were subsequent identi?ed as| Ivears of age, an 
Iresponded and

chars of age. Officersl
Of?cersl land Detectivel lassisted them wit

I land him about
Martinez" whereabouts.

 

 

 

 

 

Note: At this stage of the invesrigation, it was unknown whether the residents at:
were harboring Martinez.

 

 

IThis information was
immediately communicated to all the personnel involvad in the surveillance. Detective:
made the decision to conduct a surround and call out; having CCD personnel as the arrest team
and (3ND and FBI personnel maintain the perimeter to contain the residence. The plan was to

 

 

 

 

Note: Initially, Detectivel:land the CCD unit were suppert personnel for the
surveillance. When Martinez was con?rmed to be inside the residence, Detective:
became the Incident Commander and supervised the surround and call out operation
assisted by (3ND and FBI personnel as containment and support.

 

At 0811 hours, O?icerl [Unitl I used his I?Iradio to broadcast on Hollenbeck
frequency that they were Code| |atI I Detectiv quested the
of?cers on the perimeter to close in to get a visual of the residence, and in particular, a view of
the rear of the property. The CCD personnel staged at| Ito
don their tactical gear, which included their tactical vest and ballistic helmets. At approximately

0815 hours, and requested I:|respond to

the location to assist with the operation.

 

 

Note: At approximately 0820 hours, Gang and Narcotics Division, Detective 11
Serial arrived at the staging location to relieve Detective who
left the location to respond to the Police Administration Building.

Division, Police Of?cer I Serial No] land Police
Officer 11-1-5 Serial No.| |(observer)| I responded to assist. They

communicated with the CCD officers via radio and advised them of their estimated time of
arrival (ETA).

 

b6 -2,4
-2,4
-1

b6 -2,4
?2-2,4
-2NYT-892

FID Nomi-12?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 5
While the CCD personnel waited for the arrival oil Isome of the GND and FBI b6 ?2r4
personnel moved in closer to the residence. Of?cersl lentered the rear vard of MC ?2 4
land placed themselves in a position to observe the rear yard ME ?1
I3 Special Agent moved his vehicle to the northeast corner 
Of?cer moved to the staging location and maintained custody of
inside his vehicle to prevent him from alerting Martinez or anyone inside the
residence of the police presence.
Sine-cl Ihad not returned home afterl I 
Iexited the residence and from the sidewalls; 
looked in both directions for any signs oil I She then returned to her residence and
sentl I to search for] Detective |:|ohserved
exitl land ride a bicycle southbound toward the area where
CCD personnel were staged. a unit to detain
Of?cer: with the assistance of Of?cer detainedl without incident at
the intersection of I continued Martinez
was inside the residence and Ottlcerl Icornmunicated this information to the rest of the units
on the surveillancel Iwas then placed with the back seat of
Of?cerl:l?s vehicle.
Note: I:Iwas detained pending an investigation to determine whether he was 
involved in harboring Martinez. 
A few minutes later, unaware thatl Ihad been detained:
exited the residence and attain looked up and down the street and appeared to use her cellular
telephone. Detectiv communicated actions to the rest of the of?cers.
Detectivel:lbelieved the element of surprise for the operation had been compromised and 
directed the CCD personnel to drive to the residence to initiate the surround and call out. O?icer 
drove the black and white police vehicle north onl Ifollovied by Of?cer
Of?cerI?I Detectivel land Officer| [in their respective vehicles. Detective
|:|requested Agent] Ito cover the north part of the containment and Officerl:lto
cover the south. As the of?cers south away from the
residence. 
Simultaneously, arrived over the residence and O?icerl:lcommunicated his 
observations to el units. his black and white police vehicle onto ME _1 
the driveway,r atl stopped facing the front door of the residence
followed by Of?cerI Detective| Imade contact with|:|and ordered her
to continue walking south away from the residence.
Note:|:| was not detained, she walked south past the of?cers and witnessed
the incident standing along the west sidewall; south of Lowe Drive.
3 Of?cww with a Department shotgun and Of?cerI?Iwi :h a Police Rifle. 
9 Specie gen was wearingl He drove a plain vehicle and carried 

 

 

a concealable ballistic vest marked ?Police.?

NYT-893

FID No. Oil-12
Page 6

When Of?cerl:| drove onto the driveway, SAI Idonned his ballistic vest and drove
his vehicle along the west curb and stopped just north of 

'mrnediately exited his vehicle, armed himself with his ri?e and stood by the front
passenger side of his vehicle. A few moments later, SAI Imoved behind a tree located

along the property line hetvveenl



approximately five residences south ofI

to hold the southern end of the containment.

Of?cerl:lexited his vehicle armed with his shotgun. which he kept at a low ready position,
and tool; cover behind the driver?s door. Officerl:lexited the vehicie armed with a police

ecial A gent

Special Agentl Iaisc

drove in closer and stopped his vehicie at the northwes't corner o?

 

rifle. which he kept at a low ready osition, and tool: cover behind the front passenger door.
OfficerI:Iand Detectivel__Llexited their vehicle and took cover behind the trunit of

their vehicle. Detective upholstered his service pistol and maintained it at a low ready
position. Of?cers] land Dctectivel:lstated the reason why they drew their

weapons was because Martinez was considered armed and dangerous.

As the of?cers deployed around the residence,|
years of age, exited the residence through the front door. Detective] Iirnmediately directed

her to walk away from the residence and" toward him. For a moment, she appeared to hesitate but
then complied. Detectivel:lholstered his pistol whenl

 

him. Since the scene was active and Martinez was not in custody, Detective

was necessary to protectl

trunk of his vehicle. A few seconds later,l Ia female

exited the residence carryingl

to the rear of his vehicle. A few seconds later, Detectiv

elieved it

I He directed her to kneel down behind the

ears of age,

walk south away from the residence and directed them past Officersl I

 

Note: According to]

recalled seeing him at the door (Investigator?s Note No. 1).

 

A few seconds afterl

lexited the residence, Officerl:lohserved a

male (Martinez) wearing a grey shirt and black pants exit the residence through the rear door.
Martinez looked: and went back inside the residence. Of?cerl:l
communicated his observations to Approximately 30 seconds later, Officer
|:|observed Martinez again exit through the rear door. Martinez immediately ran north to

the northwest corner of the house and then east along the north side of the property toward a side

gate. Of?cerl:lbroadcast the direction Martinez ran and that he was holding his front

waistband as if he was concealing something.

 

 

Df?cerl:lcommunicated with thel

recorded by Communications Division.

lvial

 

Iradio]

Iwhich was not

la femalel:l

lapproached

I Detectivel lal so directedl I

elieved it was safe for them to

IMartinez was behind her when she was at
the front door moments before the of?cers made contact with her. None of the of?cers

b6 -1,2,4
-1,2,4

b6 -4
-4

b6 -2,4
-2,4

b6 -2,4
-2NYT-894

FID No. (ll l?l:

 

 

 

Page 

Of?cerl:lohserved and recognized Martinez exit the rear of be '4
the residence and orde ed him to get on the ground. Martinez ignored ran 1
north, then 5331 along t' north side ofthe house out of view. Trising his:

radio. Of?cerl Ibroadcast Martinez d'rection or" travel. From the iron: of the residence.

Officersl loosened lvlartinez reach the side gate and also recognized him. The

of?cers ordered Martinez to put his hands up. Martinez looked in the o?'icers' direction and
immediately ran back west away from the gate and out of the officers? view.

 

    

    

 

 

Of?cerl:lohserved Martinez climb over a fence and onto a shed located 
directlv north of the fence. From there. Martinez climbed onto the roof of the property ME _1 
and ran wes: along the roof. Of?cerl:lcontinued to relay his observations
to thel:|urtits.
b6 ?2
?2
- at 
Martinez? route along Martinez? route along the root at 
Simultaneousle ISAI Iheard the commotion Martinez made as he ran away Egg?13:4
from the gate. He moved south and observed Martinez climb onto the roof of 

. ?1
Specral Agentl:lordered Martinez to Stop. Martinez failed to comply and
ran west out of view. Special Agentl:lattemnted to contain Martinez and ran to the
southwest corner of hile yelling rematedljv, ?He?s on the
roof When SAI [reached the corner. he observed SA I:Ion the north side of
|pointing his pistol at an elevated position.

According to SA he observed Martinez move west along the roof atl I '35 '1 2 ?1
land ordered him to stop. Special Agentl:lthen crossed to the south side oil I we _1 2 4

Inear the west side of the garage. Special Agentl:lob3erved the west

side covered and decided to tighten the nerirneter around Martinez. He quickly walked west

along the south sidewalk of|:|to a cinder bloci; wall that extended from the house

to the detached garage enclosing the rear yard. Speciai Agentl:lbeiieved he would have

better containment from inside the rear yard. He observed a wooden gate that allowed access

into the rear yard and quickly walked to the gate and entered the rear yard. He cleared it of any

potential threats. then looked up and observed Martinez at the crest of the roof. He then moved

to the northwest corner of the house and aimed his rifle at Martinez. Special Agent

remained on the sidewall: west of the garage.

 

Note: The roof of the garage was pitched and extended down east and west from its
highest point.

NYT-895

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 3
Of?cersl Iwere positioned southwest of the garage when the}! observed 11373 -4
Martinez reach the wes: Side or the roof. The}: immediately Ordered Martinez to get down and
noticed he held a cellular telephone with his left hand which he kept by his left ear as if he was
talking on the telephone. Martinez right hand was completely secreted inside his rig front
waistband area. He ignored the officers: orders and walked back to the east .ection of the roof.
Note: All of the officers and agents present at this incident were aware of the
circumstances of the murder case which involved Martinez. the fact a firearm was used
during the crime. he was considered armed and dangerous, and| ME ?6
I 133 ?1

Special Agent: ordered Martinez. both in English and Spanish. to get down and to show '35 ?1 :2 r4
his hands. Martinez failed to oomph-1 imitate. he maintained his tight hand tucked dee inside 4

the front of his pants which gave impression he had a weapon in his right hand. Special

Agentl:|0bserved several o?icers behind his position. referring to Officers:

and |:|also felling commands at Martinez.

Note: Since Martinez refused to with the officers? commands, 
requested a bean bag to be eployed. to the requestand
retrieved his bean bag shotgun from his vehicle which was parked on 
Of?cerl:lhanded the bean bag shotgun to DetectiElwho
immediately walked back toward Martinez. According to Detective he
chambered a round into the bean bag shotgun and irnn'iediatcl}I Martinez walked from the
west to the east side of the roof. The 018 occurred as Detective I:Iwas
approaching Martinez? location.

Martinez continued to refuse to comply with the officers? verbal commands. Instead, he quickly

moved toward them and moved his right hand} resulting in an The following describes the

perception and actions taken by SAI:|howeveri it does not represent the sec ence in which '35 ?1 :4 3
the of?cers diScharged their weapons, since Of?cersl and SA: 1370 -1 i 4 i 3
discharged their weapons simultaneously.

 

 

 

Note: The 013 was videotaped by an unidenti?ed citizen and was later broadcasr on a
local channel newscast. Fmther information pertaining to this video is documented in the
?Visual Documentation? section of this report. in addition, civilian WitnesseSI:|

I [described Martinez" actions
as a quick and aggressive move toward the officers while attempting to get an object out
of his waistline or pocket area

 

Special Agentl:hood in the backyard area using the northwest corner of the residence as 135 '1
cover. He observed Martinez place the cellular telephone to his left ear and heard him say! ?Hey hm ?1
baby. calling to say goodbye. I?m just calling to say goodbye.?



 

 
   

b5 ?1
-1
Position ofSAI:Iand Martinez during the DES
Special to deescalate the situation by making contact with Martinez E: {1
and reason with him. He lowered his rifle and continued to focus on Martinez?s eyes and
right hand but Martinez ignored him.
According to SA: Martinez made another telephone call which appeared not to go 

through. Martinez Said, ?Fuck? and lowered the telephone from his left ear. Special Agent
I:|still trying to reason with Martinez said, ?Don?t do that. Come down, let?s talk about it.
Just come down and talk to me." Martinez looked directly at him and said, ?Fuck you, I?m not
talking to you." Martinez?s facial expression changed and he appeared to become more
aggravated. Martinez turned counter clock wise and lunged the right side of his body toward SA
Simultaneously Martinez the protrusion where his right hand was concealed. and
where he was holding a firearm, toward him. Special Agent believed
Martinez aimed his right hand directly at him. Concurrent with this mo 'ement. SA heard
a single gunshot and fearing for his life. he moved his ri?e?s selector lever from safe to
semiautomatic and fired at Martinez from an approximate diStanoe or" 39 feet. Special Agent
|:|continued ?ring at Martinez?s center body mass as he transitioned from a standing
position to iving on his left side on the root". Martinez?s continual movement posed a continuing
threat to SA]:Iand to the other officers present. He continued to fire at Martinez because
Martinez was still moving and he could not see his hands. When h-tardnez Stopped moving. SA
Delimited Martinez was no longer a threat and ceased fire. then he placed his title?s
selector lever on safe.

NYT-897

FIE) hie. {til-l:
Page 10

Believing Martinez had ii ed directly at him. searched for the impact or" 135 ?1 r4
Martinez? round along the wall and surrounding area where he had been standing. but found no we ?1 4
'oullet impacts.

Note: Special .s.gentl:lwas aware the of?cers positioned behind him had also
discharged their weapons. re "erring to Ofiicers| I Special
Agentl:|did not know the number of rounds he ?red. Based on the evidence
ecovered. it was determined he fired a total 0522 rounds.

A er the OIS. at 0 32:42 hours broadcast on Holienhecit frequency a 135 ?1 :4
request for 3 RA unit to respond to the scene. the Norwallt Sheriff's b7: '1 4
Station and requested units to respond to assist securing the scene.

Detectivesl Iwalked toI land identi?ed the involved 
O?'icersl Iwere eparated and ordered not to discuss the cider-n.
while Special Agent| |stood by with Special Agent: Since ?tinez was net in
custody, everyone maintained their positions until Fire Department personnel arrived and
provided a ladder to access the roof. Although Martinez was not movinn. he was believed to still
be armed. O?icersl Ifollowed by Detectivel:| climbed the ladder
to the roof. Officer| |handcuffed Martinez and Officerl:lconducted a quick pat down
search for weapons. however none were located. The paramedics then conducted their medical
assessment and determined Martinez dead at cene at approximately 0840 hours.

Detective|:lre nested DetectiveEo return to the scene to monitor the involved of?cers b5 '4
while Detective] Imade noti?cations to Lieutenant: who in turn noti?ed the MC ?4
l-lollenhecl: Watch Commander. At approximately 0835 hours, Hollenbeck Patrol Division

Sergeant Serial No: Unitl:| was requested to respond to the scene.

Once Detectiv arrived at the scene, he assisted monitoring the involved officers along
with Detectives until additional supervisors reSponded. Sergeantl:|arrived

at the scene at approximately 0906 hours and individually tool: a Public Safety Statement from
Officersl 

Perce investigation Division Detective reviewed all
documents and circumstances surrounding the separation, monitoring and admonition not to
discuss the incident to of?cers prior to being intervie ed by FIB investigators. All protocols
were followed (Addenda Nos. 10 and 11).

SCENE DESCRIPTION

 

b6 -2

The DIS occurred at] Miracle. California. This oroserty is located at NC 2

the southwest corner of] is a two lane
thoroughfare traveling north and south. approximately 40 feet in width with parking available at
the east and west curbs. |:|intersects|:| and is also a two lane
thoroughfare traveling east and west approximately 30 feet in width with parking available at the
north and south curbs.

 

NYT-SQB

 

 

act -
The immediate area is con-indeed of single family eridences and is bor ?ered he '2
to the north and to the south. The preperty atl Iconsisrs or" a ?2

 

 

 

 

single story family residence with a detached garage. The driveway is located aiong| 

allowing direct access to the garage. The front and north side yards of the property are
open allowing access from- the sidewa its aioncl I The rear
yard is enclosed by a red cinder bloci; wall approximately Si}; tee: in height. which extends north
l'rorn the house to the sidewali; then west to a wooden gate. The wooden gate extends south
from the sidewall: to the detached garage enclosing the rear yard. The tire enclosed rear yard
of a concrete patio that surrounds a swimming pooh which is located along the south
side or" .e rear yard and exrends behind the garage. The enclosed concrete rear yard contained
several items that included a "?Popup" style trailer, a barbecue grill. a large piasric storage
container. a table. chairs and other miscellaneous items. Wood beams co ected the ear of the
house it the detached garage we covered with corrugated piastic sheets that provided shade 1:
a small are of the rear yard.

 

Tl incident occurred during daylight hours and the location or" be street lights and other
arti?cial illumination was not a factor. The weather was approximately 57 degrees Fahrenheit
with partially clear skies and no discernable wind.

FOR WITNESSES

Force Investigation Division and Federal Bureau of investigation personnel conducted a canvass
of the immediate area for witnesses to the of?cet'ninvolvcd shooting. The parameters of the
canvass included the locks ofl land thel I be ?2
i . - 'l-l 1 1  ?2
biocks of During the canvass detectives located several tnomouats wno
observed or heard the incident; however. some refused to have their interview recorded. The
transcribed statements of the witnesses that were recorded are contained in this report
(Inves?gator?s Note No. 2).

 

 

 

 

SUSPECT INFORMATION

Frank Eric Martinez was described as a male Hispanic. black hair. brown
eyes, ?ve feet nine inches in height, 214 pounds, with a date of birth of
December 22, 1984. His last known address was listed as 131'? North
Sierra Bonita Avenue, Pasadena, California.

Martinez was identified by the following numbers: CH No. #:2684072,
FBI No. MAI No. 30133?24- Social Security Nos. 
063?. and 551-83-3106. California Department ofCorrections No.
and California Driver License No. DBIQOZOT. Martinez was a
documented member of the ?State Street Boys? street gang and was known by the monikers of
?Frardc? and ?Tolter.?

 

At the time of the officer-involved shooting, Martinez was on parole for possession of a
controlled substance. No. NEGAOSIOISOI.



FIB No. l?lE
Page March 14. 201.1. Detective onned California Department of Pasadena Ofnce No. i. Parole Agent of Martinez death. In addition. there was a warrant roi-
Martinez? arrest for murder on Case  7?50 l. Martinez? criminal history included
prior esrs for possession oi? a controlled substance. possession of marijuana for sales.
possession or" a concealed weapon. possession or" a firearm by a felon. hit and run. taking
hostages. violation ot?parole. evading. and carrying a loaded tire  {Addenda Nos. 12 and 

INJURIES

approximately 0835 hours. the Los Angeles County Fire Department received an alarm to

respond tel I Engine No. 49 and Rescue Ambulance (Peril lsc. Egg?f4
49 were dispatched and responded. Engine No. 4.9 consisted of'C?aptainI I Serial hie.
I?IEngineer' I Serial No: and Fire?ghterl I

Serial No] Rescue Ambulance No. 49 consisted of 

Serial No: and: Serial No:

Engine No. 49 and RA No. 49 arrived at the location at approximately 0839 hours. The

paramedics observed Martinez on the roof of the garage laying on his left side. Since Martinez

was believed to be armed. the of?cers used a ?re department ladder to climb onto the root" of the .
garage and take Martinez. into custody. Once in custody, Paramedic climbed onto the b5 '4
roof and conducted an assessment of Martinez? injuries. ParamediclElr-ioted Martinez had we ?4
multiple gunshot wounds to his upper torso and head. He was neither conscious nor breathing,

and had no pulse or signs of life. A substantial loss of blood and brain matter was visible from

the head injury. ParamedicI:Idetermined Martinez? death at 0340 hours (Addendum No.
14, investigator?s Note No. 3).

 

 

 

At approximately l219 hours. FID Detective ll Serial No: noti?ed the Los 
Angeles County Department of Coroner regarding Martinez? death. Martinez was assigned

Coroner?s Case No. 2012-01480. At approximately 1410 hours, Coroner?s Investigator:
I:Iarrived at the Scene to conduct her reliminary ?eld investigation. At approximately

17'35 hours, Forensic Attendant transported Martinez? remains to the Los Angcles

Forensic Science Center, located at 1104 North Mission Road, Los Angeles California

(Addendum No. 15).

AUTOPSY

Martinez: post mortem examination was performed on March 4, 2012, at approximately 0825
hours, at the Los Angeles Forensic Science Center, The examination was conducted by Deputy

Medical Examiner Doctorl:l Force Investigation Division Detective ll :gc'fi:
. erial No.l:l Los Angeles County. District Attornevls Of?ce Senior Investigate 

|:|and FBI Agentsl Iwitnessed the autopsy.

 

During the autopsy. Doctorl:lnoted 18 gunshot wounds to Martinez? body. The gunshot
wounds were arbitrarily labeled and do not indicate the sequence of when the injuries occurred.
Doctorl:|ascribed the cause of death to multiple gunshot wound injuries and ruled the
manner of death a homicide.

NYT-QOO

FID No. 
Page 13

Gunshot wound No. was a fatal wound located on the left side of the head with no exit wound.
The direction of this wound was left to right= hack to front and Upward. A deformed
projectile was recovered from the brain.

Gunshot wound No. 3 was a non-fatal graze wound to the right temple. Gunshot wound No. 
was a fatai through and through wound to the right eye. The direction of this wound was left to
right and front to back with no projectile recovered.

Gunshot wound No. 4 was a non-fatal through and through wound to the right arm. The
direction of this wound was ieft to front" to hack and upward with no projectile recovered.

Gunshot wound Nos. 5 and 6 were non-fatal through and through wounds to the right forearm.
The direction of these wounds was right to left and heel: to front with no pro'ectiles recovere 1.

Gunshot wound Nos. '17 and 8 were fatal wounds to the right chest. The direction of these
wounds was right to left, front to back and upward with projectiles recovered in the left chest and
Spine 

Gunshot wound No. 9 was a fatal wound to the lower right chest. The direction of this wound
was right to left, front to back and upward with a projectile recovered in the soft tissue of
the back.

Gunshot wound Nos. 10 through 13. were fatal wounds to the center area of the chest. The
direction of these wounds was right to left and front to back with four projectiles recovered from
the soft tissue of the back.

Gonshot wound No. 14 was a fatal wound to the stomach. The direction of this wound was front
to haclt, right to left and upward with a projectile recovered from the tissue of the hack. Gunshot
wound No. 15 was a non-fatal, nonnpenetrating wound to the right abdomen.

Gunshot wound No. 16 was a non-fatal wound to the right buttock. The direction of this wound
was right to left front to back and upward with a projectile recovered from the tissue of the back.

Gunshot wound No. 17 was a nonfatal through and through wound to the right thigh. The
direction of this wound was left to right, front to back and upward with no projectile recovered.

Gunshot wound No. i8 was a non-fatal wound to the right thigh. The direction of this wound
was right to left, front to back and upward with a projectile recovered from the tissue of the back.

Note: The direction of the gunshot wounds described above are consistent with Martinez
being shot while facing the of?cers in an elevated position in relation to the shooting

 

of?cers.
The projectile recovered from gunshot wound No. 7 was fired from Of?ce pistol. The ten additional 55 ?1 4
projectiles recovered during the autotisy were ?red from Special Agent 3 ri?e. See additional information 1379 ?1 4

listed under the Firearms Analysis section.

NYT-QOI

FID  Gil?l2
Page 

In particular, gunshot wound Nos. 5. 6 and 15 are consistent with Martinez being shat
while his right arm was in front of his torso close to his body and facing the of?cers.

A laboratory screen was completed on Martinez' urine. blood and vitreous humor. Los Angeies

Count}! Coroner's Of?ce- Supervising Criminalist Ii. the {0x19019543 b5 -4
report on April 9, Bill: Martinez? toxicology results indicated he had marijuana and alcohol ii:- hm '4
his body (Addendum No. 16, lnvestigator?s Note No. 

CLOTHING ANALYSIS

Martinez was attired in a grey long sleeve shirt, grey undershirt. black sweatpants. black shorts.

black and blue underwear, hiacl: socks and black shoes. The clothing was collected and booked

as evidence {Item Nos. 71L through NR). On August 13, 20:2: Criminally-L If b6 ?4
Serial No: completed the examination of'the above clothing items for the presence ni? MC ?4
firearms related defects andr'or impacts, and found the following:

Forty?three holes/defects were observed in the shirt.
- Thirty-one were located on the front.
a Four were located on the back.
a Four were located on the front of the right sleeve.
. Three were located on the back of the right sleeve.
. One was located on the back of the left sleeve.
Fifteen holesfdefects were observed in the undershirt.
- Ten were located on the front side.
a Five were located on the back side.

Eleven holesr?defects were observed in the pants.
- Five were located on the front. Two on the left front lower leg and three on right upper
leg area. 
I Six were located on the left side. our on the lower left leg area and two on the left
buttock area.

Six holesldefects were observed in the shorts.
0 Two were located on the right front area.
I Four were located on the back side.

Fifteen holesfdefects were observed in the underwear.
Eleven were on the right front area.
a Four were on the back side of the shorts.

No holesfdefects were observed on the shoes and socks; therefore, no further analysis was
conducted on these items. In addition. since the underwear and undershirt were consistent with
being worn as undergarments. which precludes the deposit of gunshot residues on these items, no
further chemical anal ysis was performed on these items. 

NYT-902


Page 25

Chemical analysis was performed on the defects found in the shirt and in the sweatpants and
some residues consistent with the discharge of a ?rearm were observed on some of the holes;
however, due to the absence of discernible gunshot residue patterns, a muzzle to garment
distance could not he etermined. The location of the defects noted on the clothing items
'escribed above was consistent with the location of the gunshot wounds to the upper and lower
torso (Addendum No. 17}.

WEAPONS

Of?cerl:lwas armed with a Department approved Smith St Wesson, .45 caliber 11:: Cf 4
semi?ul?m?tic 1315101. 4506, Serial which he carried in a single retention
drop down black nylon holster.

On March 1, 20l2, at approximately 1500 hours, FIB Detective Ill ISerial No.
conducted a post incident weapon inspection of Of? cr| |s pistol. Detective
|:|found the pistol to be loaded with seven live cartridges in the magazine and one live
cartridge in the chamber. O?icerl:lcarried two additional magazines inside a magazine

pouch attached to the front of his tactical vest. Officerl:ls second magazine was empty and

his third magazine was loaded with eight live cartridges. Officerl:ls ammunition was

Federal, 230 grain, .45 caliber, jacketed, hollow point ammunition (Investigator?s Note No. 5).

Note: Based on the results of the magazine count, it was determined Of?cerl:l?red
nine rounds during this incident.

 

On June 8, 2012, SID Criminalist ISeriaI examined and test he '4
?red Of?cerl:rs .45 caliber pistol, Smith a. Model 4506, Serial No. ?4
Criminalist|:|determined the pistol functioned as designed and the measured trigger

pull was within the Department?s established range. The pistol?s ammunition capacity was eight

rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber (Addendum No. 18).

O?icerl:fs pistol was recorded in the LAPD Firearms Inventory Tracking System (FITS)
on November 8, 2006, and on the same date, he completed the Firearms .45 Pistol Transition
SchooL

b6 -4

Officeer was armed with a Department aggroved Smith ?is Wesson, .45 caliber MC 4

semiautomatic pistol, Model No. 4506, Serial No which he carried in a single
retention black leather holster.

On March 1, 2012, at approximatel 1517 hours, DetectitiErlconducted a post incident
weapon inspection of Of?cerI?_L| pistol. Detective found the pistol to be loaded
with ?ve live cartridges in the magazine and one live cartridge in the chamber. Of?ce

carried two additional magazines inside a magazine pouch attached to the ?ont of his tactical
vest. The second magazine was loaded with two live cartridges and his third magazine was
loaded with eight live cartridges. Of?cerl:| ammunition was Federal, 230 grain, .45
caliber,jaclteted, hollow point ammunition (Investigator?s Note No. 6).

NYT-903

FID No. Gil-12
Page l6

Note: Based on the evidence recovered and the results of the magazine count. it was
determined eight rounds during this incident. . b5 '4

?4
On lane 8. 20l2. Criminalier Iexamined and test tired Officer .43 caliber.
Smith Wesson. Model 4506. Serial No] I Criminalist etermined the

pistol functioned as designed and the measured trigger pull was within the Department?s
established range. The pistol?s ammunition capacity was eight rounds in the magazine and one
in the chamber (Addendum No. 19).

 

Of?cerl:| pistol was recorded in the LAPD FITS on May." 2, 2012 (luvestigator?s Note
No. 

armed with a De artment approved .45 caliber semiautomaticModel No. 21, Serial No. which he carried in a single retennon crop down black

nylon holster.

On March 1, 2012, at approximatel i 1530 hours, DetectinEIconducted a post incident
weapon inspection of pistol. Detective found the pistol to be loaded
with eiaht live cartridges in the magazine and one live cartridge in the chamber. Of?cer
|:|carried two additional magazines inside a magazine pouch attached to the front of his
tactical vest. The second ma azine was empty and his third magazine was loaded with 13 live

cartridges. Office ammunition was Federal, 230 grain, .45 caliber, jacketed. hollow
point ammunition.

Note: Based on the evidence recovered and the results of the magazine count, it was
determined 18 rounds during this incident.

On March 16. 2012. SID Criminalist Seri? examined and test ?red '35 '4
Of?cer: .45 caliber- Glock. Model 21, Serial No. Criminalist|:| WC -4

determined the pistol functioned as designed and the measured trigger pull was within the
Deparnnent?s established range. The pistol?s ammunition capacity was 13 rounds in the
magazine and one in the chamber (Addendum No. 20}.

Of?cer: pistol was recorded in the LAPD FITS on May 2. 2012, and he completed the
Semiautomatic Glock Transition School on March 29, 2005 (Investigator-?3 Note No. 

Special Agentl:|was armed with a 5.56 a 45 mm caliber Colt, Model 
semiautomaticlfull-automatic rifle. Serial No: The rifle was equipped with a scope 

and a tactical light which were mounted on the upper receiver. it was found unloaded and
secured in the trunk area of vehicle.

Note: LAPD personnel did not conduct a magazine count on the rifle. Based on the
evidence recovered, it was determined Special Agentl:lfired 22 rounds during the
incident (Investigator?s Note No. 9).

NYT-904

 No. (ll i?iE
Page 1?

On March, 2, 2012, SID Criminalist ISerial Nol Iexarnined and test ?red SA

rifle: a Colt; Model rifle, Serial Nol I Criminalistl:ldetermined the
rifle functioned as designed. The ri?e had an ammunition capacity of 30. rounds in the magazine
and one round in the chamber. The measured trigger pull was approximately 6 it to pounds in
semiautomatic mode and 9 it to 10 pounds in full?automatic mode (Addendum No. 

FIREARMS ANAL-Y SIS

On March 1.2 l2. sro Criminalist It Serial the assistance of
Criminalist|:|conducted an examination and analysis of the of?cer-involved shooting
scene for bullet paths. bullet impacts and ballistic evidence.

There were i impacts: and one defect found at the scene. with some or" these impacts being
associated as having been caused by the same projectile. A totai of nine distinct projectile
pathways were documented. Five pathways were caused by projectiles traveling east to west
which struck the garage at or near the east side. he additional four pathways struck the root" of
the garage. These were shallow graze impacts that yield limited information (Addendum

No. 22).

Criminalistl:|compared the expended cartridge casings, ?red bullets and projectiles
recovered from the of?cer-involved shooting scene to the test ?red bullets and cartridge casings

from the of?cers? weapons and projectiles recovered during Martinez? autopsy.

Criminalistl:lconcluded eight expended cartridge casings (Item Nos. 1-3, 5?7, 30 and 54]

were ?red from Of?cetl:ts pistol. Seven eXpended cartridge casings (Item Nos. 4, 8, 9. 17.

20, 55:, and 56) Were ?red from Of?cerl:| pistol.

Eighteen ex nded cartridge casings (Item Nos. 10-16, 18. 19, and 21-29) were ?red from
Of?cerI?il pistol, and twenty-two expended cartridge casings (Item Nos. 32-53) were
?red from Special Agentl:l?s ri?e. -

In regards to projectiles? comparison= Criminalistl:lconcluded that ten ?red bullets
recovered during the autopsy (Item Nos. were ?red from SA ri?e. The
eleventh ?red bullet recovered during the autopsy (Item No. 71A, recovered from the left chest}
and Of?cer test ?red bullet (Item No. 60'} had polygonal ri?ing and were not
microscopicall con'rpared.l2 One ?red bullet recovered from the scene (Item No. 57) was ?red
from Of?cer 3 pistol. The remaining fragments and projectiles had no microscopic
comparison value (Addendum No. 23).

EVIDENCE

There were a total of 71 items of evidence booked in conjunction with this investigation. The
evidence included discharged cartridges. expended projectiles, live ammunition, clothing, blood
swatch, and other miscellaneous items (Addenda Nos. 24 and 25).

 

'3 According to Department policy= polygonal rifled bullets are not microscopically compared. 
was the only of?cer that carried a Giock pistol which has a polygonal ri?ed barrel.

b6 -1,4
-1,4

b6 -4
-4

b6 -1,4
-1,4

b6 -1,4
?1,4

b6 -4
-4

NYT-QOS

FlDiv?o. 01 Li:
Page i3

SEROLOG 
There were no items that were swabbed to collect potential biological material.

VI AL DOCUMENTATION

 

On March I, 20l2, SID Photographer ilil:| Serial and be ?4
photographed the scene, the evidence prior to its recovery, Martinea? remains and the positions 
of the of?cers. Force Investigation Division Sergeant Ill:| Serial No: took

additional photographs of the scene and evidence. The photographs were documented under
Controi Nos. 0361984 and 031214: in addition. Photographer Hi I:lSeriai 
tooltl lot" the scene under Control No. 036l995.

 

 

During the incident, an unidenti?ed witness captured the 018 on video from the northwest corner
Oil I Toe Nationai Broadcasting Company ?remission b6 -2 ,4
Channel Four obtained a copy of the video from that witness and broadcast part of it during their MC ?2 4

newscast programing. The video de icted Of?cersl Istanding
along the south portion ofI:| Martinez is depicted standing on the roof and when

gun ?re erupts, he collapses. A copy of the newscast was obtained and booked at SID
Electronics Section under CD Box No. 620903 (Investigator?s Note No. 10].

Witnessl ltook a photograph of Martinez from his residence located atl:l ?35 '3
I I The photograph depicts Martinez standing on the roof of the garage. A copy of the him ?3
photograph was stored at SID Photographic Lab under Control No. D31 E949. I:Ialso

videotaped a portion of the incident from his residence. The video depicts some of Martinez=

movements just prior to the 018. A copy of the video was booked at SID Electronics Section

under CD Box No. 620904 (Investigator?s Note No. 11).

 

 

Note: In this video, Martinez is seen with his right hand secreted in his right waistband
area, which corroborates witnesses and of?cers? statements. 

NOTIFICATIONS

Information pertaining to noti?cations about this incident were documented at Real Time
Analysis and Critical Response (RACR) Division and is on ?le at FID (Addendum No. 26).

PERSONNEL AT SCENE

Information pertaining to the personnel at scene of the categorical use of force is contained in the
FID ?le and is available for review. On March 1, 2012 at approximater 0935 hours. Captain 

|:|Serial Mo: was the ?rst representative from to arrive at the scene. b5 ?4
?4

COMMWICATIONS

A copy of the Communications Division (CD) computer printout reiative to this incident is on
file at FLU.

NYT-906

FID No. Git-l2
Page19

A ems}.r of the CD Master Tape of the Hollenbeclt Area Frequency and the 9} 1 can relatcd 1-0 this
incident are on ?le at FID. The origins} recorded interviews of the of?cers, civilian 
and the responding Supervisors are stored on the Dictaphone database: 103mm at 
Standards Bureau.

JUSTICE SYSTEM INTEGRITY 

Upon completion of the Criminal Investigative Report. FID investigators submit this case
for review to the Justice System Integrity Division of the Los Angeles County, District
Attorneys Of?ce.

RELATED REPORTS

The following reports relevant to this investigation are on tile at Force investigation Division.

1. Chief of Police 24?Hour Occurrence Log, FID No. 01 1-12.

L.)

Communications Division Incident History Printout,?tncident No. 12030100i009.
3. Crime Scene Log, Incident No. 120301001009.

NOTES

 

b6 -2

l. I Iindicated when she exited her residence, an officer used we _2

profanity as he directed her to the ground. In addition, when she was placed at the rear of
the police vehicle, the same office?r pushed her against the vehicle. The allegations of
inappropriate language and being pushed were documented under Complaint Form No.
12000865 and forwarded to IAG.

2. During the canvass for witnesses, i4 citizens were located who only heard the gunshots
during the 013. The number of gunshots heard by witnesses varied from five to 50 and
from one volley of gunshots to a volley. a pause and then additional gunshots. A Heard-
Only Witness form was completed for each, and the forms are contained in the F10
investigative ?le, and are available for review. in addition, during the interviews of some
of the Witnesses, the foliowing issues were identified:

Witnessl:lindicated her husband was also present during the 018. Her 
husband was identi?ed as: He was interviewed and his transcribed
statement is included in this report.

 

Witnessl:lindicated| Iwas present during the 013 and

also heard the gunshots. Force Investigation Division detectives attempted to interview

him on three occasions and ie? business cards and messages requesting him to call back.
As of the date of this report, he has not been interviewed.

 



FED Ne. (11 I333
Page 20

 

b5 -3

Witnessl indicated he exited his residence after he heard the aunshots hm 

and his ?loved ones? followed him outside. These citizens were identi?ed as
Iwho both refused to provide a statement about the case.

 

I lindicated people from her residence walked outside after the 013 They
were identi?ed as]
Iwere interviewed in regards to the
DIS. however,| Irefused to provide a
statement. Ind1cated| Florle photographs after the
incident and possibly posted them on the social media site Faceboolt. lnvesti gators were
unable to determine if in fact she posted photographs of the incident.

I:Iindicated her neighbor identified as|:|a male approximately?vcars Ego?1
of age, was outside his residence and had apparently taken photographs of the scene after

the shooting. Detectives contactedl lwho indicated

he had not witnessed the incident and had only recorded a portion of the scene and of the

aftermath with his cellular telephone. The video was viewed and did not depict the

incident.l:lwas unable to download or forward the video to investigators.

tol I witnessed a portion
0

incldent from outside his residence. I [refused to provide a statement
about the case. In addition,| ?ndicated his ?kids? had told him that FBI
personnel were involved in the 018. His kids were identi?I:|1nd1cated his wrfe was present. She was identi?ed as|:|who was ?2,a
intervieWed and her transcribed statement 15 included in this report.

|:|indicated his wife and grandmother were home during the incident and

had onlf heard the gunshots. A Heard-Onlv Witness form Was completed on his wife,

but his grandmother: refused to be interviewed, however
indictaed she had onlyr heard gunshots.

Prior to the OIS,I:Iobserved two officers on the roof at:
:l however. the investigation revealed no of?cers had been on the roof of any
structure prior to the shooting.

During her reference to a diagram for orientation purposes '35 '3
only. Since she did not mark the diagram, it was not included with her transcribed b7: -3
statement. The same diagram was later utilized by her husband who

marked his position at the time of the 013 on the diagram. The marked diagram was

included transcribed statement.

I:Idid not witness the 015 and her statements were documented on a Heardr
Only form.

NYT- 908

FID No. 1?13

 

 

 

 

Page 21
Iindicated a neighbor identi?ed asl:lhad b5 ?33
witnessedl |being tackled by of?cers when he was detained. WC 
was intenriewed and did not state he was tackled by of?cers. Additionally nd
who witnessed the detention, did not indicateI Iwas tackled
hv of?cers. investigators were unable to identify-1 lindicated a

 

neighbor had recorded the incident. This neighbor was identi?ed as| Iwho
was previously identi?ed and interviewed for this invesrigation.

Los Angeles Countv Fire Department Engineerl:|and Fire?ghterl1:70 ?4

reaponded to the scene but did not w1th Martinez medical assessment or make

contact with an}: of the involved of?cers. Battalion Chief I Ialso responded but

remained outside the crime scene. Engineerl lFire?g?nterl land

Battalion Chiefl:|were not formally interviewed.

4x

On March 1, 2012, during her ?eld investigation, Coroner's investigator

completed a Gunshot Residue (GSR) test on Martinez? hands, GSR Kit No. CTESB. The
GSR kit was not analyzed since the investigation determined there was no evidence to
support Martinez had discharged a ?rearm.

b6 44

5. Based on Of?cerl:ls magazine count, there were a total of nine rounds discharged; hm _4

however, onlj,r eight expended cartridge casin, recovered from the scene were
determined as having been ?red from Of?cerbs pistol.

 

6. During the magazine count of Of?cer: pistol, it was determined he ?red a total
of eight rounds during the incident; however, only seven recovered expended cartridge
casings were determined as having been fired from Officer: pistol.

Note: The crime scene was not immediately secured and fire department vehicles
and personnel travelled through the area where some of the expended cartridge
casings were located. 

111 additl?n: Of?cer  ammunition, which was head stamped ?Federal 45 Auto 
had been phased out on April 1, 201i and was not authorized to be carried on duty.13

7. At the time of the 018, the .45 caliber Smith Wesson pistol carried by Of?cer
had not been recorded into the LAPD FITS. On April 30, 2012, Detective

advised Of?ce of this discrepancy and on May 2, 2012, he took his pistol to the
Department where it was recorded into the system.

Of?cer: TEAMS report does not indicate he attended the .45 Caliber Transition
Course, however, on March 1, 20} 1, the Department phased out the .45 Caliber Handgun
Transition Course and since, has allowed personnel to carry .45 caliber pistols if they had

 

?3 Of?ce of Administrative Services Notice dated October it), 2010, titled ?Transition to the new .45 caliber
ammunition.?

NYT-QOQ

FTD No. Olltl2

Page 22
been trained and certi?ed to use them.'4 On December 15-: 20l l, Officerl:| ?35 '4
successfully quali?ed with his Smith 3: Wesson .45 caliber pistol. ful?lling the ?4

requirement to carry this type ofpitstot

s. As ofthe date ofthe 013, the  caliber Glock pistol carried by Offcerl:lhad
not been recorded into the LAPD FITS. On April 30, 2012. Detectiyd:ladvised
Of?cerl:lof this discrepancy and on May 2. 2012. he took his pistol to the
Department Armory where it was recorded into FITS.

 

Note: The information ahour Of?cersl i FITS discrepancy
along with the use of phased out ammunition by Of?cer] has hrought to
the attention of Hollenhecl; Area Commanding Of?cer, Captain Ill I

Serial 

The condition of ri?e was veri?ed and documented by 195 ?1
the scene of the DIS. Special Agentl:|found the ri?e with the bolt locked MC ?1
rearward. the safety engaged and the magazine removed which contained eight live .223

caliber rounds. The ri?e was subsequently tranSported to and secured by 

Eat the West Coyina Resident Agency Armory Locker (Addenda Nos. 27 and

 

KO

 

 

 

 

28).
10 b3 ?5
ll. On the date of the 018, Witnessl:brovided FID investigators a copy of a 135 ?3
photograph he had taken depicting Martinez standing on the roof. He also captured a MC ?3
portion of the incident on 1rideo. On April 23, 2012. DetectiyeI:Ireceived a copy
of the video taken by:

 

Los Angeles Police Department, Firearms and Tactics Section= Approved and Authorized Handguns notice, dated
March l, 2m 1.

NYT-QIO

FTD No. {ll l?ll

 

 

 

Page 23

12. I IWere interviewed in regards to their knowledge of Martinez' ESQ-22
wanted status and about the 013. in addition, a search warrant was obtained for their
residence at| I The investigation determined there was not enough

 

evidence to charge them or anyone else living at the residence with harboring Martinez.
I lwere released after their interviews {Addendum No. 29}.

l3. Martinez? cellular telephone was sent for a forensic analysis to the FBI and
Electronic Analysis Unit. In regards to calls made from the telephone, the analysis
revealed three telephone calls made during the morning of March 1, 2012. The ?rst call
was made at 0826:50 hours to telephone I:Iwhich lasted one minute and 39 b5 ?2
seconds. The second call was made at 082835 hours to telephone I:Iwhich MC ?2
lasted one minute and 22 seconds. The third call was made at 0:330:06 hours to telephOne
I:Iwhic'n lasted for E9 seconds. The above telephone numbers were
associated withl andl 

Force Investigation Division detectives attempted to interview them but they
refused to provide a statement.

 

 

Note: The above listed times are consistent with the of? cers= observations who
describe Martinez utilizing his telephone prior to the 018.

The analysis revealed at total of 15 ?Apps? that were either installed,
downloadedfcancelled, or uninstalled in the telephone. One of these Apps was the
?Russian Roulette? Android based telephone application developed by Sela?el. This
application can simulate the sound of a gunshot when played. The application was
installed in the telephone on January 12, 2012; however the analysis could not determine
if the application was accessed or running at the time of the DIS. The results of the
analysis are contained in a detailed laboraton report which is 439 pages long, however
only Pages Nos. 1 through 13 contained pertinent information regarding the telephone
and calls made. These pages are included as an addendum. The entire laboratory report
is kept in investigative file and is available for review (Addendum Na. 30}.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPROVED:
b6 -4
b7c ?4
Lieutenant aptain
"Of?cer?ImCharge, .nvestigation Section Commanding O?icer
Force Investigation Division Force Investigation Division

Date: ri?i/Z (fr/g La



 NO. DEE-12

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

P212324

 Scene Diagram
 
 a - I
z; Not to Scale 
.
?1,2,4
b7c -1,2,4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      
 

 

 

 

 

25?. 
.egend
Du O?iqergl as
de. note ice stark i.
of 018 as epncted 
in I a I
Eta?Of?cer end . i
pf QIS as ep :2th i
In woes
- Special Agentl:lil araue

 

 

 

Martinez

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NYT-912

OFFICIAL CODE SECTION 1040
INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

 

DATE: June 26, 2013

TO: Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Inspector General

SUBJECT: SHOOTING 011-12 FOR 07l02l13 CLOSED-
SESSION AGENDA

Division Dgte Time 0 -On Off Uniform-Yes No

Outside City 3I1I12 8:33 am.

Of?ce 5 involved in Use of Force Len of Servi

 

 

 

Total Involved Officeqsl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 I Get. Ill
3 PO 
Wounded ll Non-Hit (1
Frank Martinez: Male Hispanic, 27 years of age.
COP R?mndations
gredctics Tactical Debrief, Oetectivel:lalong with Of?cers] Egg-f4

 

DrawingIExhibiting - In Policy, No Further Action, Detective: along with Of?cers
I I

 

Lethal Use of Force In Policy, No Further Action, Of?cersl 

and|:|

IG Recommendations

 

Tactics Same as COP.
DrawingIExhihiting - Same as COP.
Lethal Use of Force Same as COP.

NYT-913

Table of Contents

Investigation

Annotated Force Investigation Division (FID) Incident Summary
Chief of Police Report

Chief of Police Analysis

Chief of Police Findings

Inspector General Review

Inspector General Analysis

. Inspector General Recommendations

9. 22

p. 24

p. 39

NYT- 9 14

INVESTIGAHON
Annotated Force Investigatim Division Incident Summagg?

On Wednesday, November 30, 2011, at approximately 0014 hours, a double murder
occurred at 2133 City View Avenue, Los Angeles, California. The victims were
identi?ed as Art Gomez, 31 years of age, and Jesus Rendon, 36 years of age (Addenda
Nos. 1 and 2).

Hollenbeok Detective Division, Homicide Unit, Detective No.
I:Iand Police Of?cer Ill Serial No.l:l were assigned to
investigate the murders. Their investigation identi?ed Frank Eric Martinez a male
Hispanic, 2? years of age, andl Ia male|:|years of age,
as the individuals responsibie for the murders of Gomez and Rendon. On January 25.
2012, Of?cerl:l presented the case to the Los An eles County, District Attomey?s
Of?ce, Hardcore Division. Deputy District Attomeyl Ireviewed the case, ?led
murder charges and issued felony warrants against Martinez and| Ion Case
Nos. LACBA39317501 and LACBA39317502, respectiver (Addendum No. 3).
Of?ce conducted numerous foilow-ups in an attempt to locate Martinez and
'thout success. On February 18, 2012, in an effort to develop leads. the
case was featured on Most Wanted' Channei Fox 11 News.

 

Additionaily, via a court order, of?cers monitoredl I

 

 

 

 

assist in investigating leads and information obtained
from the court order, Of?cer requested the assistance of Gang and Narcotics
Division GN D), Fugitive Warrant Section (FWS) Task Force. This task force was
comprised of several Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) of?cers and two Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, whose primary focus is assisting divisional
detectives with the surveiliance and capture of outstanding felony suspects.

Gang and Narcotics Division, Detective Fl Serial and FBI

Special Agent Serial No. were the lead investigators responsible
for the analysis of information obtained throng the court order. The tracking of the

 

 

 

I Detectivel |and Sgcial ?gentl leventuailv Wires
2 Based

IDetective| |and Special Agent| 


supplemented with annotations by the OIG- Ali annotations are referenced as an Note.? All
other references and citations in the reproduced FID incident Summary to investigator?s Notes or
Addenda items) are reproduced direcliy from FlD's report Unless otherwise stated, all information
provided in ONE annotations is derived from lD's investigation ofthis incident.

 

 

 

 

b6 
?4,7

b5 -4,7
?4,7

b6 -2,4

?2,4

b3 -1

b5 -1,4

-1,4
-1,6
b3 -1

b6 -1,2,4
-1,2,4
-1,6
b3 -1

NYT-915

 

believedl Iutilizedl b5 '2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-2
?1-1,2,4
Detective] land Special Agent ME _1r 5
Iconducted computer checks, obtained background information on the residents
at this address and planned a surveillance to determine if Martinez was hiding at the
location. A brie?ng for the surveillance was scheduled for March 1, 2012. at
approximately 0530 hours. noti?ed of the brie?ng and purpose of the
surveillance.
On March 1, 2012, at approximately 0530 hours, the followin GNU and FBI personnel
attended the brie?n cial Agentl IDetectiveI ISpeciaI Agentl I 135 '1 4
Serial No- Police Of?cers Ill ISerial No] b? 
Serial No] ISerial No-| land Detective 
Serial Of?cerl [was also present during the brie?n
and was aware that the Hollenbeck Division, Career Criminal Detail (CCD) Unit was on
duty and available as an additional resource (Addendum No. 4).5
Note: All the above listed personnel were in plain clothes and drove
unmarked plain vehicles- the supervisor in charge of b5 ?4
the GNU personnel?1,2,4
Detectivel:land Special Agentl Iprovrded background Information, MC _1:2!4
photograpl'e'. and the contentl Ito the above Irsted ME _1 6
onnel- The purpose of the surveillance was to monitor the activity at b3 _1 
and determine whether or not Martinez was at the location. This would
be accomplished by having an Observation Post (OP) onnd several
units around the perimeter. If a vehicle was observed leaving the residence, of?cers
would stop the vehicle and attempt to gain infomiation about Martinez' whereaboutsSpecial Agents] Iprovided a voluntary statement during this investigation: however. b6 - 1 i 4
Theirstatementsomtainedintlis -1i4

report were derived from notes taken during their intenriews.

5 Noti?cation of the surveillance was made to Los Angeles Sheriffs Department Norwalit Station.
Communications Division Bureau Communications Coordinator (ECG). GND Lieutenant ll

I:I5m'ai Nol:l



continuation was obtained that Martinez was at the residence, Hollenbeck Division CCD
personnei would be requested to assist-

After the brie?ng, Detectivel Itook a position on the east side ad I '35 
as the OP. Of?cerl Icovered the north, Special Agent covered the south, 1?2 4
Of?cers] |oovered the west and Special Agen Icovered the

east side of the surveillance. Communications between the OP and perimeter units was
accomplished vial:lradios and celiular telephones.?

 

 

Of?cerl:lwas not an active member of the surveillance, as his role was to provide 135 -2 ,4

background infme  Z: 
Because Martinez' b3 -1 
Of?cerI |had a strong suspicion Martinez was possibly at this location. At

a roximatel 0700 hours, he tele honed Hollenbeck Detective Division, Detective ill
El Serial No. and requested him to respond with his 000

personnel to the City of La Mirada. Detective |:Lvas familiar with the murder case

involving Martinez and was informed surveillance was under way, however no

movement or confirmation had been made whether Martinez was indeed at the

residence-

Note: Detectivel:lwas the supervisor in charge of the Hollenbeck
Detective Division COD unit which consisted of the following personnet:

 

 

 

 

Potice Of?cer Serial No. and Police Of?cers It
ISerial No. Serial No.| I '35 ?4
ISerial hie-I Iandl ISerial No. We ?4
The CCD of?cers were dressed in plain clothes with utility belts

 

and wore tactical vests marked in white lettering ?Los Angeles Police? on
the front of the vest and ?Police? on the back of it.7

Of?ce nd obtained the information needed to compiete '35 '4
an Operational Game Plan. Of?cer on briefed the CCD personnel at ?4
Hollenbeck Station. Their assignment was to support the surveillance operation as

containment of the residence, and if Martinez left the location in a vehicle, the COD

of?cers would become the arrest team since they were equipped with a marked biack

and white police vehicle (Addendum No. 5)}i

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5 The of?cers more using frequency Channell:lto communicate with  which was not b'i'E -6
recorded by Communications Division-
1' or?oeit 01ml b6 -4
Wood We -4

IO?icer vehicle. WE ?5

No. luiPPed with batlistic door and passenger- Of?cer
plain police vehicle, Shop No] Of?cer is the front passenger,
the right rear passenger and Officer has the left rear passenger.
Detective| noti?ed the Hoilertbeck Watd't Commander and also Hollenbeck Detective Division. b6 ?4
Lieutenant ll Serial No in regards to COD personnel responding to assistwith the FTC -4
surveillance operation. In  Ot?cer noti?ed LASD Norwalk Station.
5



 

After the brie? Detectivel Ialong with Of?cersl
I responded tol

met with Special Agent| Mho provided a brief update regarding the status of the

surveitlance-


End

 

At approximater 0730 hours, Detectivel Iohserved aI Imalel Idrivle

 

 

 

awa frorn| Iin a

lil accompanied metal I Of?cerl Ifoltowed the vehicle to a
nearby business. located atl I Career Criminal
Detail net were requested to|

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The two males were subsequently identi?ed as! lyears
of andl Ivears of age. Of?cersl land
responded andl
Of?cersl
and Detective assisted them| |was detained

 

without incident a

Note: At this stage of the investi ation, it was unknown whether the

residents atl

 

ere harboring Martinez.

him about Martinez' whereabouts.

 

 

infonnation was immediat
surveillance- Detective

This

communicated to all the personnel involved in the
made the decision to conduct a surround and call out;

having CCD personnei as the arrest team and GND and FBI personnel maintain the

 

perimeter to contain the residence. The plan was 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note: Initially, Detectivel:land the CCD unit were support personnel
for the surveillance. When Martinez was con?rmed to be inside the
residence, Detectivel:lbecame the Incident Commander and

supervised the surround and call out operation assisted by GND and 

personnel as containment and support.

At 0811 hours. Of?cerl:hsed hifElMef
frequency that they were Codel lat

cast on Hcilenbeck
Detective

requested the of?cers on the perimeter to close in to get a visual of the residence, and
in particular, a view of the rear of the property. The CCD personnel staged at

Ito don their tactical gear, which included their tacticai vest

and ballistic helmets. At approximately 0815 hours, Of?ce

operation.

telephonedEI
|:|Division and requested |:|respond to the location to assist with the

b6 -1,2,4
-1,2,4

b6 -2,4
b?C -2,4
?1

b6 -2,4
-2,4
-1

b6 -4
-4

b6 -2,4
-2,4
?1

NYT-918

to relieve Detective who left the location to respond to the Police 

Administration Building.

|:|Division, Police Of?cer wig Seriai - and
Police Of?cer Serial 0 (observer) responded

to assist. They communicated with the CCD of?cers via radio and advised them of their
estimated time of arrival (ETA).

Note: At a roximatel 0820 hours, Gan andNarcotics Division,
Detective tr%3enar No arrived at the staging location b5 -4

 

 

 

 

 

While the CCD personnel waited for the arrival and F31 1:6 -2 ,4
personnel moved in closer to the residence. Office tered the b7": ?2 4
rear yard of ?Iand placed themselves in a position to observe the HE ?1
rear yard of Specia?ge?mpmoved his vehicle to the

northeast corner of| to the

 

staging location and maintained custody of| |inside his vehicle to prevent
him from alerting Martinez or anyone inside the residence of the police presence.

Sincel Ihad not returned home afterl I M, -2 I 4
I lexith the residence and from 1?79 ?2 4

the sidewalk, looked in both directions for any signs of| IShe then
returned to her residence and sentl Ito search for
Detective] |observed| Iexitl 
and ride a bi southbound toward the area where CCD personnel were staged.
Detective equested a unit to detain Officerl:lwith the
assistance of Of?ce detained out incident at the intersection of
-- ?rmed Martinez was inside
the residence and Of?cer] [communicated this information to the rest of the units on

the was then placed withl:rn the back seat of

Of?ceri Is vehicle.

 

          

 

 

 

b6 -2

Note: |:|vvas detained pending an investigation to determine MC _2

whether he was involved in harboring Martinez.

 

A few minutes later, unaware that] |had been detaide be ?2 4
exited the residence and again looked and down the street and b7: '2 4

a ared to use her celluiar telephone. 

FEE. actions to the rest of the officers.

Detective I:Ibelieved the element of surprise for the operation had been
compromised and directed the CCD ersonnel to drive to the residence to initiate the
surround and call out. Of?ce drove the black and white police vehicle north

 


- .r
'0 SpedalAgenClwaswearind Il-ie droves plain vehicle

and carried a concealabie ballistic vest mart-ted ?Police.?

 

7


 Ifollowed by Of?cerl Of?cerl IDetectiv nti Of?cer :ic'ffq
|in their respective vehicles. Detective requested Agent to cover 
the north part of the containment and Of?cer to cover the south. As the of?cers
south away from the residence.

 

over the residence and Of?cerl:lcommunicated b5 ?2 r4
?is Obsewa?ons 10 "lei?I units. Of?cerl Idrove his black and white police WC ?2 i 4

 

 

 

vehicle onto the driveway atl and stopped facing the front door of HE ?1
the residence foilowed by Ot?cerl I Detective made contact with
I:Iand ordered her to continue walking south away from the residence.

Note: as not detained, she walked south past the Egc'fiz?:

of?cers and witnessed the incident standing along the west sidewalk south

of|:l

When drove onto the driveway, Special Agentl:ldonned his
ballistic vest and drove his vehicle along the west curb and stopped just north of

Special Agentl:|immediately exited his vehicle, armed himsetfwith his title and b5 ?1 :2 it
stood by the front passenger side of his vehicle. A few moments later, Special Agent hm ?1?2?4
moved behind a tree located along the property line betweenl
Special Agentl Ialso drove in closer and stopped his vehide at
the northwest corner of| I

 

 

Of?cersl Istopped approximately ?ve residences south of 
|to hold the southern end of the containment.

 

Of?cers] Iexited their police vehicle, unhoistered their service pistols b6 *1
and stood behind their open doors. Ofticerl:lexited his vehicie armed with his MC ?a
shotgun, which he kept at a low ready position. and took cover behind the driver?s door-
Of?cerl:lexited the vehicle armed with a police ri?e, whim he lie at a low ready

position, and took cover behind the front passenger door. Of?cer and

Detective exited their vehicle and took cover behind the trunk of their vehicle.

Detective lunholstered his service istol and maintained it at a low ready position.

Of?cersl iand Detectivel:lstated the reason why

they drew their weapons was because Martinez was considered armed and dangerous.

 

 

 

 

 

As the of?cers depioyed around the residence] Ia female ?35 ?2 '4
years of age, exited the residence through the front door. Detecti WC ?2 4

immediately directed her to walk away from the residence and toward him. For a

moment, she appeared to hesitate but then complied. Detectivel:|holstered his

pistol whenl lap reached him. Since the scene was active and

Martinez was not in custody, Detective bbelieved it was necessary to protect

He directed her to kneel down behind the trunk of his vehicle.

A few seconds later, a female|:| years of age, exited the

 

NYT- 920

 

 

FBSid?nGe canyingl I Detectiv also directed|:| 2: "2:4
to the rear of his vehicle. A few seconds later, Detectiv believed it was safe for 
them to walk south away from the residence and directed them past and

 

Note: According to| IMartinez was behind her b5 '2
when she was at the front door moments before the of?cers made contact 1?75 '2
with her. None of the of?cers recalled seeing him at the door

(investigators Note No. 1).

 

 

 

 

A few seconds alterl Iexited the residence, Of?cerl:l ?35 ?2 *4
observed a male (Martinez) wearing a grey shirt and black pants exit the residence 4
through the rear door. Martinez lookedl land went back inside the

residence. Of?cerl:| communicated his observations to th units.11

Approximately 30 seconds later, Of?cerI:Iobserved Martinez again exit through
the rear door.

Martinez immediatety ran north to the northwest corner of the house and then east

along the north side of the property toward a side gate. Of?cerl:lbroadcast the b5 ?4
direction Martinez ran and that he was holding his front waistband as if he was We ?4
concealing something-

Simultaneouslyj and recognized Martinez exit the b5 ?4
rear of the residence and ordered him to get on the ground. Martinez ignored Of?cer '4
|:|and ran north then east along the north side of the house out of O?icerI:I5 ME '1
view. Using his: radio, Of?cerI?Ibroadcast Martinez' direction of travel-

From the front of the residence, Of?cersl bbserved

Martinez reach the side gate and also recognized him. The of?cers ordered Martinez to

put his hands up. Martinez looked in the of?cers? direction and immediately ran back

west away from the gate and out of the of?cers' view.

 

rved Martinez ctimb over a fence and onto a shed b5 ?25:
located directly north of the fence. From there, Martinez climbed onto the roof of the 

 

property and ran west along the roof. Of?cerl:lcontinued
to relay his rvatlons to th units.

Simuttaneouslyl:|, Special Agentl:lheard the commotion Martinez '35 -1,2,4

 

 

 

 

 

 

made as he ran away cm the ate. He ved south and observed Martinez :1?2?4

climb onto the roof of Special Agentl:|ordered Martinez to

stop. Martinez failed to comply and ran west out of view. Speciai A cut

attem ted to contain Martinez and ran to the southwest corner . nd

I Iwhile yelling repeatedly, ?He?s on the roof.? Of?cer followed

Special AgentI |to the corner and unholstered his pistol once he observed

Martinez on the roof. When Special Agentljeached the corner. he observed

Iwhich was 135 -4

not recorded by Communications Division. WC ?4
-1



Special Agentl:lon the north side ufl:lpointing his piste: at an be -1 :2 :44
elevated  

According to Special Agent: he observed Martinez move west aiong the roof at
land ordered him to stop- Special AgentI:Ithen crossed to

the south side of ar the west side of the garage- Special Agent
|:|observed ad the west side covered and decided to tighten the

perimeter around Martinez. Hef aloha with Of?cer Iquickly watked west atong

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the south sidewalk of a cinder biock wall that extended from the

house to the detached garage enclosing the rear yard.

Special Agentl:l and Of?cerl tood behind the wall and maintained their ?95 "1:4
weapons aimed at Martinez. Special Agent believed he would have better We 

 

 

containment from inside the rear yard. He observed a wooden gate that allowed access
into the rear yard and quickly waiked to the gate and entered the rear yard. He cleared
it of any potential threats, then tacked up and observed Martinez at the crest of the roof.

are Note No. There is no evidence that Agentl:lcornmunicated
or coordinated his redeployment into the rear yard with other of?cers.
Agentl:|recaiied that, upon entering the rear yard, ?f eiso beiievedi
was exposed without suf?cient cover from the weapon in Martinez" right
hand. 2

He [Agentl:l then moved to the northwest corner of the house and aimed his ri?e '36 -1,2,4
at Martinez. b'i'C ?1,2,4

Once Special Agentl:lpositioned himself in the rear yard, Of?cers and
I:kedeployed to the southwest corner ofI I
When the of?cers reached the corner, they observed Martinez on the roof of the arage-
With their pistols unholstered and at the low ready, Of?cers
walked behind the cinder block wall and took cover next to Of?cer| Special

Agentl:lremained on the sidewalk west of the garage.

 

 

 

 

Note: The roof of the garage was pitched and extended down east and
west from its highest point-

 

b5 -4

Of?cersI Iwere positioned southwest of the garage when they hm _4

observed Martinez reach the west side of the roof. They immediately ordered Martinez
to get down and noticed he held a cellular telephone with his ieft hand which he kept by
his ieft ear as if he was talking on the tetephone. Martinez? right hand was completely
secreted inside his right front waistband area. He ignored the of?cers' orders and
walked back to the east section of the roof.

 

Note: According to Of?cerl:| when he ?rst approached the
garage, Martinez was crouched down on the roof. A few seconds later,

 

"1:|Signed Sworn Statement, Page 3, Lines 10-11. EEC-44

1O
NYT- 922

Martinez stood up and Of?cerl:ltook cover behind the cinder
block wall. in addition, the of?cers and wimesses that were in a position to
see Martinez, desa'ibed him as having his right hand either inside his
waistband or in his right front pants pocket.

016 Note No. 2: The majority of the witnesses reported seeing Martinez'
right hand inside his right front pants pocket.

0flicers| Ialong with Speciai Agentl:l ordered
Martinez, both in English and Spanish, to get down and to show his hands. Martinez
failed to comply. Instead, he continued to hold the cellular telephone with his left hand,
which at times he bring up close to his left ear giving the impression he was
talking to someone- Other times, Martinez looked down at the cellular telephone's
screen and appeared to manipulate it with his ?ngers as if he was dialing. Martinez
maintained his right hand inside the right front section of his waistband. His right hand
was pressed against the fabric of his pants which gave the of?cers the impression he
was concealing a weapon. During the entire time, Martinez appeared nervous and
agitated and constantly looked around and paced back and forth.

 

According to O?i Martinez kept saying, ?No, hell no, this is not he pening,
no way!? and appeared disoriented and talking to himself. From Of?cer 5
position, he could not understand what Martinez was saying but described him pacin
back and forth and talking on the telephone. According to O?icerl 
appeared to be upset and responded to the of?cers? orders saying, ?Fuck you, I don?t
want to talk."

According to Special Agent|:|lhe protrusion of the right hand inside the pants was
a clear threat. He observed Martinez place the cetluiar telephone to his left ear and
heard him say, ?Hey baby, I?m calling to say goodbye baby.?

Note: All of the of?cers and agents present at this incident were aware of
the circumstances of the murder case which involved Martinez, in addition

to the fact a ?rearm was used duri
and dangerous,
I

Martinez continued to refuse to comply with the of?cers' verbal commands. Instead, he
quickly moved toward them and moved his right hand, resulting in an OIS. The
following describes the perceptions and actions taken by each of the of?cers; however,
the order in which they are listed does not represent the sequence in which the of?cers
discharged their weapons, since the shootin happened simultaneously:

 

 

 

 

Note: The DIS was videotaped by an unidenti?ed citizen and was later
broadcast on a local channel newscast- Further information pertaining to
this video is documented in the ?Visual Documentation? section of this

11

b6 -4
-4

b6 -1,4
-1NYT- 923

 

remit magma swam W?mmgesl I b5 '3
Martina? a?iang a2; a ?3
quick and mauve tewarz? 1M2 a?wm wh?a a?ampii?g ta get an

sweat $133 a? waisctiine car mm: areaw

Nate: Since: Mar?nea: raftmazi ta wmpiy with ?w a?cers? 
833mg? Ageamraque?tw a imam bag is} he ?apiayec?. Wm: ?35 ?1r?1
smnded as $339- requegi anti remeve? his bean bag Eh?i an b7: "1'4
hi5 vehi?e with was} parked G?l Q1 Sf??er
ha?ndm? the Man bag sha?gun {a ?etegt?v? mm
immed?ateiy? wake? ham: tewar? Amrding ta Qaiec?ve
he chamberec? a wand gum $38 bean hag amtgm and
imme??amiy Martinez: wa??icea? imam the wees: in its e33: aide ?he rm?
The {3&3 Gmurma? as; {Deteci?vmas apgkmashing Mamimz?
imtian.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

       

b6 ?1 4
b7C -1,4

{Paa?ian a? dar?ag $2
mmEi?i?aiiy mm cm a. smaii ?awef bee: 3% the. mama-5i mmar gf the may 

wag. Thia aiavaied Mamet: atiawad him in mi: angewe Martin-a2: but is: 55:59
Eats: me rear yam? Wham Epac?a?? Aga?i was ?aming. A?ar a few mem?ms.? 
bri-{zka 3f the ?ame: bed miiapsed am: {?fin mama? narthwasi is} She sidewmk
next is: G?wr: E?er this 5:33am Q??mr mum $52; See Mama-a:

    
 

NYT-924

without obstruction.? According to ander? Martinez had his right hand inside his
right front pants pocket. O?icer| |observed the outline of a handgun in the pants
fabric and although he did not see one, he believed Martinez was sorted with a
handgun inside his pocket. Martinez, with his right hand inside the right pants pocket,
moved his right leg forward and lifted his right hand upward (still inside the pocket).
Immediately, Of?ce heard a gunshot and formed the opinion the gunshot came
from Martinez- Of?ce believed Martinez had lifted his right hand in order to give
him an angle to shoot toward the of?cers instead of shooting down at the round. In
immediate defense of his life and the life of the of?cers near him, Of?cer raised
his service pistol in a two?handed isosceles shooting stance, aimed at Martinez? center
body mass and ?red consecutively until his pistol went to slide lock, from an
approximate distance of 46 feet.

 

 

Note: Of?cerl:helieved he ?red a total of nine rounds before his
pistol went to slide lock, eight from the magazine and one from the
chamber-

Of?cerl:lassessed as he ?red the rounds and attempted to see if Martinez
dropped the gun, lifted his hands up or went down. Martinez did not go down and
although O?icerl:ldid not hear any additional shots from Martinez, he ?rmly
believed Martinez had a gun on his person. Of?cer ted, ?So if he used it
once, he tried to shoot us one time, what makes me think he?s not going to do it
again.? Of?cerl:l indicated that as long as Martinez was standing with his right
hand concealed, he was still a threat-

an out of battery speed reload while looking at Martinez and
noticed he had gone down on his stomach, with his right hand tucked under his body.
From his position, Of? uld see the right side of Martinez? body but not his
right hand. Of?ce believed Martinez' right hand was outside the pocket and he
was trying to push himseif up with his forearm. Of?cerl:ldid not know if Martinez
had been hit or had dropped down to avoid getting shot.

the only reason Martinez tried to push himself up was to
continue to shoot at them. Of?cer aimed his pistol at Martinez' center bod mass
and ?red one additional round from an approximate distance of 46 feet. Of?cerl I
then heard Of?cer yell, ?Assess, assess, assess." Office assessed,
observed Martinez was no longer a threat, decocked his pistol and holstered it. After
the shooting, since the scene was not secured, Of?cerl:lzlecided to pick up the
empty magazine he had dropped during the out of battery speed reload and placed it in
his tactical vest.

 

 

 

?3 omceil Iwas| |in height, the cinder biock wall was approximateiy six feet in
hem and the beginning of the roof of the garage (the fascia board} was appraidmately eight feet {our
inches above ground level.

?1:|Pade 38, Lines 19-21.
13

NYTNote: aware Of?ce had also discharged his
pistol at Martinez. ccording to Of?ce ?red all of his rounds
from the same location; however, video ootage depicted him ?ring while
he stood on the ?ower bed and while he transitioned to the sidewalk.

 

Of?cer stood between Of?cersl Ion the sidewalk looking
over the cinder block wall at Martinez. Of?ce
hand inside his right front pants pocket. Martinez eld some type of hard object with his
right hand and pressed it against the pants causing see the outline
of the object in the pants fabric- Of?cer believed the object Martinez held was
a small caliber weapon. After failing to comply with the of?cers' commands, Martinez
walked in a northeast direction toward Special Agent|:| Martinez stepped forward
with his right leg, leaned his upper body backwards and to his left and lifted his right
hand, while still inside the pocket At the same time Martinez made this motion, Of?cer

|:|heard a gunshot emanating from Martinez? pocket area and observed what
appeared to be muzzle ?ash. In fear for his life and the life of the other of?cers present,
 his pistol, used a Weaver stance and ?red ?ve consecutive
rounds at Martinez from an approximate distance of 44 feet. He assessed after the ?fth

round and observed Martinez lying down on the roof with his hands stitl moving.

Note: O?icerI:I indicated he yelled at Martinez to stop while he
?red the ?ve initial rounds.

Officer was not sure how many rounds he ?red; however, he knew his pistol
had an ammunition capacity Of eight rounds in the rn azine and one in the chamber.
In the event he had to re-engage Martinez, Of?cer conducted an in-battery
speed reload and assessed ain.15 At this time, I a nez was on his left side with his
right hand still moving- Of?cer tieved Martinez was still armed and a threat
so he fired three additional consecutive rounds at Martinez.

 

Note: Of?ce to not recalt whether Martinez" right hand was
inside the pants pocket or not; however, he relied Observing movement
with the right hand that he perceived as a threat-

Of?cer

roof making no additionai threatening movements. Of?cer believed he

maintained his pistol unholstered until he was contacted and separated by Detective
however, he was not sure at what point he bolstered his pistol.

Of?ce ubsequently picked up the partially loaded magazine he had dropped
when he conducted the inebatte eed retoad. As he did this, a live round ejected
from the magazine. Of?cer|if?joiaced the partially loaded magazine in his left
rear pants pocket and left the ole live round on the ground (Evidence Item No. 31).

 

?5 Duringthernagazlne ootuitaiierme Ols. he had?red?ve roundsduringti'le
initial sequence attire.

14

indicated Martinez kept his right

ssessed and Observed Martinez stitl lyin down on his left side on the

b6 -4
-4

b6 -1,4
-1NYT- 926

 

Note: Of?cer

well as Special Agnt
indicated Special Agent
Martinez.

as aware that Of?ce Ias
also discha ir weapons. He
was not in his line of ?re when he ?red at

 

Officetated Martinez kept his right hand inside his front waistband area and
refused to comply with the of?cers' commands. At times, Martinez cursed at the officers

who continued to yell orders. Martinez then took two steps toward Of?ce

and said, ?Fuck you guys.? At the same time Martinez leaned back, he pushed his hips
forward. Of? card a gunshot emanating from Martinez and observed the
shape of a handgun underneath Martinez? waistband area.16 O?icerl:kormed
the inion Martinez had ?red at him from a gun he kept in his right hand. Of?cer

had maintained his pistol pointed at Martinez and, when he heard the
gunshot, he immediately ?red what he believed were ten consecutive rounds at
Martinez from an approximate distance of 43 feet using a two hand semi-weaver
stance.

Note: Based on the magazine count, it was determined Of?cerl:l
?red 13 rounds during this initial sequence of ?re.

Of?cer ssessed between the rounds and observed Martinez still advancing
toward him. Of?cer said, ?He's still turing to me that he is still armed and
he is a threat to me.? According todehjlartinez was still a threat and was not
going down. Of?cerl Iconducted an in-battery speed reload, assessed and
observed Martinez still standing. I Iused a two hand semi?Weaver stance and
?red what he believed were two additional rounds at Martinez from an approximate
distance of 43 feet.

Note: Based on the magazine count, it was determined Of?cer
?red ?ve rounds during the second sequence of ?re and a total of 18
rounds during the entire incident.

Of?cerl?lassessed the situation and observed Martinez was no longer a threat.

Martinez Is knees, then onto his Ielt side with his right hand tucked underneath
his torso. Martinez to show his hands but observed no
movement. He heard someone request a rescue ambulance (RA) to respond and then
he holstered his pistol.

Note: Officer advised he continued to ?re at Martinez until he
collapsed because he was still a threat, however, video depicted Martinez
had collapsed to the roof before O?icerl:loonducted his lit?battery
speed reload. also advised he was not able to see

 

'5  the gunshot ?red by Martinez as a small caliber discharge.
Page 53. Lines 24-25.

_15

b6 -1,4

b?C -1Special Agent ut could hear his voice. Once he holstered his
pistol, Of?ce picked up the magazine he had ejected from his
pistol during the in?battery speed reload and placed it in his pocket.

Special Agentl:lwas standing in the backyard area using the northwest corner of
the residence as cover. He attempted to deescalate the situation by making 
contact with Martinez and reason with him. He lowered his ri?e and said, ?Don't
do this, let's talk, look, just come down and talk to me,? but Martinez ignored him.

According to Special Agent: Martinez made another telephone cat! which
appeared not to go through. His facial expression changed and he appeared to become
more aggravated. Martinez maintained his ht hand inside his waistband area as if he
was holding an object. Special Agent raised his ri?e again and aimed it at
Martinez. Martinez made contact with him and said, ?I'm not talking to you! Fuck
you!? Martinez made a fast motion with his ri ht hand, leaned his 
pushed his right hand toward Special Agent Special Agent heard a

emanating from Martinez. Believing Martinez had ?red at him, Special Agent
?moved his rifle?s seiector lever from safe to semiautomatic and ?red at Martinez
from an approximate distance of 19 feet. Special Agent ?red until Martinez
collapsed and was no longer a threat. Believing Martinez had ?red directly at him, he
immediately searched for the impact of Martinez? round along the wall and surrounding
area where he had been standing, but found no bullet impacts. -

Note: Special aware the of?cers positioned behind him
had also discharged their weapons, referring to Of?cersl I

and|:| Special Agent|:|did not know the number of rounds

he ?red. Based on the evidence recovered, it was determined he ?red a
total of 22 rounds.

 

Alter the 018, at 0332:42 hours broadcast on Hollenbeck
frequency a request for a RA unit to respond to the scene. Of?cer ti?ed the
Norwalk Sheriff's Station and requested units to respond to assist securing the scene.

Detectives| Iwalked tol land identi?ed the involved

of?cers. Of?cers-3| were separated and ordered not to
discuss the incident, while Special Agent stood by with Special Agent:|
Since Martinez was not in custody, everyone maintained their positions until Fire
Department personnel arrived and provided a ladder to access the roof. Although
Mrtinez was not moving, he was believed to still be amied. Of?cersl
andl:|followed by Detectiv climbed the ladder to the roof. Of?cerl
handcuffed Martinez and Of?cer conducted a quick pat down search for weapons,
however none were located. The paramedics then conducted their medical assessment
and determined Martinez dead at scene at approximately 0840 hours.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Detective: requested Detectivel:lto return to the scene to monitor the involved
of?cers while Detectiv made noti?cations to Lieutenant. who in turn
noti?ed the Hollenbeck Watch Commander. At approximately 0835 hours, Hollenbeck

 

16

torso back and I

b6 -1,4
b?C -1,4

b6 -1
-1

b6 -1,4
-1,4

b6 ?1,2,4
-1,2,4

b6 -4
?4

NYT- 928

 

Patrol Division Sergeant II ISerial No.| IUnitl I was requested to be '4
respond to the scene. Once Detective| |arrived at the scene. he assisted hm ?4
monitoring the involved of?cers al with DetectivesI Lintil additional

supervisors responded. Sergean arrived at the scene at approximater 0906

hours and individually took a Public Safety Statement from Of?cersl I

and

Force Investigation Division Detective tlI:I Serial reviewed all
documents and circumstances surrounding the separation, monitoring and admonition
not to discuss the incident to of?cers prior to being interviewed by ID investigators. All
protocols were followed (Addenda Nos. 6 and 7).

[ml
Injuries
[ml

Gunshot wound No. 1 was a fatal wound located on the left side of the head with no
exit wound. The direction of this wound was left to right. back to front and 
upward. A deformed projeotile was recovered from the brain-

I
Gunshot wound No. 2 was a non-fatal graze wound to the right tempte.

Gunshot wound Ho. 3 was a fatal through and through wound to the right eye. The
direction of this wound was left to right and front to back with no projectile recovered.

Gunshot wound No. 4 was a non-fatal through and through wound to the right arm.
The direction of this wound was left to right. front to back and upward with no projectile
recovered.

Gunshot wound Nos. 5 and 6 were non-fatal through and through wounds to the right
forearm. The direction of these wounds was right to left and back to front with no
projectiles recovered.

Gunshot wound Nos. 7 and 8 were fatal wounds to the right chest. The direction of
these wounds was right to left, front to back and upward with projectiles recovered in
the left chest and spine respectively.?a

Gunshot wound No. 9 was a fatal wound to the lower right chest. The direction of this
wound was right to left, front to back and upward with a projectile recovered in
the soft tissue of the back.

 

'stol. Theten b6 ?1,4
additional projectites recovered during the autopsy were ?red from Special Agent ri?e. See b'i'C ?1 4
additional infonnation listed under the Firearms Analysis sedion.

17
NYT- 929

Gunshot wound Nos. 10 through 13 were fatal wounds to the center area of the
chest. The direction of these wounds was right to left and front to back with four
projectiles recovered from the soft tissue of the back.

Gunshot wound No. 14 was a fatal wound to the stomach. The direction of this wound
was front to back, right to left and upward wid1 a projectile recovered from the tissue of
the back.

Gunshot wound No. 15 was a non-fatal, non-penetrating wound to the right abdomen.

Gunshot wound No. 16 was a non-fatal wound to the right buttock. The direction of
this wound was right to left front to back and upward with a projectile recovered from the
tissue of the back.

Gunshot wound No. 1? was a non-fatal through and through wound to the right thigh.
The direction of this wound was left to right, front to back and upward with no projectile
recovered.

Gunshot wound No. 1B was a non~fatal wound to the right thigh. The direction of this
wound was right to left, front to back and upward w'rth a projectile recovered from the
tissue of the back-

Note: The direction of the gunshot wounds described above is consistent
with Martinez being shot while facing the of?cers in an elevated position in

. relation to the shooting of?cers. In particular, gunshot wound Nos. 5, 6
and 15 are consistent with Martinez being shot while his right arm was in
front of his torso close to his body and facing the of?cers.



Martinez? toxicology results indicated he had marijuana and alcohol in his body
(Addendum No. 12, Investigators Note No. 4).

[ml
Visual Documentation

During the incident, an unidentified witness captured the DIS on video from the
northwest corner of I The National Broadsting
Company (NBC) Television Channel Four obtained a copy of the video from that
witness and broadcast part of it durin their newscast programing. The video icted
Of?cersl Istanding along the south portion 0

Martinez is depicted standing on the roof and when gun fire erupts, he
collapses. A copy of the newscast was obtained and booked at Electronics Section
under CD Box No. 620903 (lnvestigator?s Note No. 9).

 

b6 ?2,4
1378 -2,4

 

18
NYT- 930

Witnessl Itcok a photograph of Martinez from his residence located at
The photograph depicts Martinez standing on the roof of the

garage. A copE of the ?hotograph was stored at SID Photographic Lab under Control

No. 0311949. also videotaped a portion of the incident from his residence.
The video depicts some of Martinez? movements just prior to ?te 018. A copy of the

video was booked at SID Electronics Section under CD Box No. 620904 (investigator's

Note No. 10).

Note: in this video, Martinez is seen with his right hand secreted in his
right waistband area, which the of?cers? statements.


Investigators Notes

 



Iindited when she exited her residence, an ot?cer used

profanity as he directed her to the ground. In addition, when she was placed at the

rear of the police vehicle, the same of?cer pushed her against the vehicie- The

allegations of inappropriate language and being pushed were documented under

Complaint Form No- 12-000685 and forwarded to 

During the canvass for witnesses, 14 citizens were located who only heard the

gunshots during the (MS. The number of heard by witnesses varied from
?ve to 50 and from one volley of gunshots to a votley, a pause and then additional
gunshots. A Heard-Only Wimess form was completed for each, and the forms are

contained in the F10 investigative ?le, and are available for review.



he ?red consecutiver at Martinez until his pistol went to
slide lock, where he conducted an out of battery speed reload and ?red one
additional round. Assuming Of?cerl:l

had all of his magazines loaded to full

capacity, he presumably ?red a total of nine rounds during the initial sequence and

one round after, totaling ten rounds. Based on the magazine count, there were a

total of nine rounds discharged; however, only eight expended cartridge casings
recovered from the scene were determined as having been ?red from Of?cer
pistol.

6. During the magazine count of Of?cer

pistol, it was determined he ?red a

total of eight rounds during the incident; however, only seven recovered ended

cartridge casings were determined as having been ?red from Of?ce
pistol.

Note: The crime scene was not immediately secured and ?re department

vehicles and personnel travelled through lhe area where some of the expended

cartridge casings were located.

19

NYT-931

In addi?on. Of?cer: ammunition, which was head stamped ?Federal 45 

Auto had been phased out on April 1, 2011 and was not authorized to be
carried on duty.?

7. At the time of the DES, the .45 caliber Smith 8: Wesson pistol carried by Of?cer
had not been recorded into the LAPD FITS. On April 30, 2012, Detective 
dvised this discrepancy and on May 2, 2012, he took
his pistol to the Department Armory where it was recorded into the system-

 

Officer]: TEAMS report does not indicate he attended the .45 Caliber
Transition Course, however, on March 1, 2011, the Department phased out the .45
Caliber Handgun Transition Course and since, has allowed personnel to carry .45 -
caliber pistols if the had been trained and certi?ed to use themm On December 15,
2011, Of?cer ccessfully quali?ed with his Smith 8: Wesson -45 caliber
pistol, fuifiiling requirement to carry this type of pistol.

a. As of the date of the OIS, the -45 caliber Glock pistoi carried by Of?ceer be -4
had not been recorded into the LAPD FITS. On April 30, 2012, Detective|:| WC -4
advised Of?ced:lof this discrepancy and on May 2, 2012, he took his pistoi
to the Department Armory where it was recorded into FITS-

 

 

Note: The information about Of?cersl I FITS discrepancy
aiong with the use of phased out ammunition by O?icerl was brought to
the attention of Hollenbeck Area Commanding Of?cer, Captain 

Serial 

9- b3 ?5

 

 

 

 

 

 

?9 oriice ofAdn'iinistrative Services Notice dated October 10, 2010, titled "Transition to the new .45 caliber
ammunition."

3' Los Nigeies Police Deparbnent, F's'eanns and Tactics Section, Approved and Authorized Handguns
notice, dated March 1, 2011.

20
NYT- 932

 

b3 -5

 

 

 

10.0n the date of the FID investigators a copy of a 115 ?4 3
photograph he had taken depicting Martinez standing on the roof. He also captured ?4 I 3
a portion of the incident or ?ijln April 23, 2012, Detective |:Ireceived a
copy of the video taken by

 

 

b5 -2

11] Iwere interviewed in regards to their knowledge of hm _2

Martinez' wanted steals and about the DIS. In addition, a search warrant was
obtained for their residence at| I The investigation determined
there was not enough evidence to charge them or anyone else living at the
residence with harboring Martinez. Iwere released after
their interviews (Addendum No. 24).

12. Martinez? cellular telephone was sent for a forensic analysis to the FBI laboratory-

As of the date of this report, the analysis has not been completed. When completed,
the report will be placed in the HO investigative ?le.

[This section intentionally left blank]

21
NYT- 933

CHIEF or POLICE 

Chigf of Police Ma?is
Tactics

0 In his analysis of this incident, the Chief identi?ed the following tactical
considerations:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Tactical Planning

O?icers must approach every contact with oii?icer safety in mind. Complacency,
overcontidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers
vulnerable to attack. (California Commission on Peace O?icer Standards and
Training, Learning Domain 21).

In this instance, the FBI, GND and the CCD did not have an all-inclusive brief prior to

the contacting the suspect. However, a brief was conducted with GND and FBI

personnel regarding the surveillance of a location that possibly contained Martinez-

To augment personnel, CCD personnel were advised during a separate

brief, that they would assume the role of containment and arrest team if necessary.

In the event that Martinez refused to submit to an arrest, Detectivel:|would '95 '4
notify Metropolitan Division regarding a possible barricaded suspect. MC ?4

Operational success is directly related to proper planning, thus minimizing
unforeseen obstacles. Detective was aware of the oerations plan as it
related to GND and FBI personnel. Furthermore, Detective Idirected Of?cer

to complete an operations plan for all CCD personnel assigned to the
incident- Consequently, all personnel assigned to the incident were aware of their
designated assignments relative to the apprehension of Martinez.

 

In this so, while the Chief was comfortable that all personnel were briefed and fully
aware of the critical roles of the operation, he would have preferred that an all-
inclusive brief had taken place to ensure that each involved person was fully aware
of the roles and reaponsibilities of the others.

In evaluating the of?cers? actions, the Chief determined that based on the totality of

the circumstances their actions did not represent a substantial deviation from .

approved Department tactical training. However, Detective I:Iis reminded that b6 ?4
communication is paramount to of?cer safety. including all personnel assigned to an MC ?4
operation in a single brief ensures each entity is cognizant of their roles as well as

those operating around them. The Chief will direct that this topic be discussed

during the Tactical Debrief. -

 

21 The provided in this section summarizes the analysis and ?ndings set forth in the Chief of
Police's report for this case.

NYT- 934

Debrie?ng Point No. 2 Utilizing Cover

Cover is something that will stop an Opponent?s bullets. Officers should utilize cover
when involved with an armed suspect. Of?cers should be aware of what type of
cover is required to stop handgun, shotgun and ri?e ?re- {Los Angeles Police
Department Regular Basic Course Version 3, Firearms Session 14 Lesson Plan,
Page 4)

Cover: Any object mat is believed to be capable of stopping a bullet. Cover may
include, large trees, block walls or parked cars. (Use of Force- Tactics Directive 3. ?i 
Foot Pursuits, January 2011)

Pursuing Armed Suspects: When pursuing a suspect believed to be armed, officers
should generally do so in containment mode while considering the available tactical
advantages, including cover and concealment where available. The goal is to
maintain observation of the suspect and the tactical advantage while coordinating
the response of additional units and other resources for a perimeter with the
objective of containing the suspect and taking him into custody safely. (Use of
Force- Tactics Directive 3. 1, Foot Pursuits, January 2011)

In this instance, the tactical situation was ?uid and dynamic. Martinez had jumped
several fences and climbed onto the roof of a detached garage. With the assistance

 

 

of thel:| Of?cersl 1were able to effectively ?44
contain Martinez. In addition, Of?cersl Iutilized :1

 

available cover by standing behind a cinderblock wall approximately 46 feet south of
Martinez.

 

b6 -4
b'i'C ?4

 

Of?cers were faced with a situation that was rapidly
unfolding and responded to Martinez' tternpt to escape by positioning themselves
behind a cinder block wall. Martinez maintained the advantage by the mere fact that
he had a higher vantage point white standing on the detached garage. Of?cers
I [were forced into a position that afforded ample
cover while still maintaining a line of sight. This essentially eliminated any
opportunity for Martinez to jump onto the ground and potentialty escape into the
residential neighborhood.

 

 

In this case, while the of?cers could have sought better cover relative to Martinez?
ition on the roof, the Chief determined that Of?cersl ?Iand b6 -4
[Eh actions of taking cover behind the cindeiblock wall did not represent a MC ?4
substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training. Of?cers
Iutilized the best available cover that enabled them :0
effectively cover, communicate, and contain Martinez. However, the Chief will direct
that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

 

 

 

23
NYT- 935

Debrieting Point No. 3 Command and Control

Line Supervision - Defined. A supem'sor who has the speci?c of
issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as
having the duty of line supenrisor and shall be held accountable liar achie ving
conformance with the directions and orders that lie/she issues. (Los Angeies Police
Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135)

in this instance, Detectivel:lwas the Of?cer in Charge (OIC) of the tactical b6 -4
portion of the operation. DetectiVeI:|was instruments! in devising the tactical hm '4
plan to take Martinez into custody after the DIS. Detective Iresponded to

Of?cch I location and veri1 led their status. Detective

Iwas advised by OfTicersl Ithat they were

involved in an DIS. Detective| |separated the invotved otficers and advised

them not to speak to each other. Eventuaily, Detectivel:l accompanied by

Of?ced Iascended the garage roof and took Martinez into

custody.

Detectivel:lbecame directly involved ascendin onto the rooft and taking
Martinez into custody. Although Of?cersl Iwere
property separated, the scene was not fully secured- Various tasks required
immediate attention. The target location had not been searched and logistical

concerns had not been addressed.

 

b6 -4

in this instance, Detectivel:ldid not make required noti?cations regarding WC _4

medical treatment, the La Mirada Sheriff Department, as well as Real Time Analysis
and Critical Response Division (RACR) as required. Additionally, the immediate
area required canvassing to ensure that the surrounding area did not have any
additional victims as a result the amount iangle of the involved of?cer's gun?re.

In evaluating Detectivel:ls actions, the Chief would have preferred that Detective

made the necessary noti?cations. However, based on the dynamic
circumstances involved, the Chief determined that based on the totality of the
circumstances, Detective|:| actions, relative to command and controt, although
not optimal, did not represent a substantial deviation from approved Department
tactical training- However, DetectiveI:|is to be reminded of the overall
supervisory responsibilities at the culmination of an DIS. As such, the Chief will
direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Chief of Police Findings

The Chief recommended the following ?ndings in this case:

 

- Tactics - Tactical Debrief, Detective alon with Of?cers] [and b5 -1 n14
Additionally. FBI Special Agent ill be invited to attend the Tactical b7? 
Debrief.

24
NYT- 936

. DrawinglExhibiting In Policv,|No Further Action, Detectivel:| along with Of?cers b6 ?1

I 1370 -4

- Lethal Use of Force - In Policy, No Further Action, Ot?cers| |and

 

Positive Aspens

initial investigative efforts to locate Martinez were well planned, involving the use of

recess and the additional efforts involved. All personnel are be '4
commended for those diligent efforts. Z: 6
I A tactical plan was completed and noti?cations to the Los Angeles County Sheriff 
Department were completed.

a The of?cers utilized tactical vests that clearly identi?ed themselves as police of?cers
and appropriately donned their ballistic helmets.

- Detectivel:lutilized additional Department resources, includind:l to
effectively contain the residence.

I Thetactical .. - . -   wastobeutilized

 

 

 

Lessle?tai munitions were requested to assist with taking Martinez into custody-
Effective communications were utilized to broadcast Martinez? movements as he
attempted to flee.

Tactics

Department policy relative to Tachbal Debriefs is: ?The coiiective review of an
incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those
areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a
Tacticall Debrief is to enhance future performance. (Use of Force Directive, July
2003)

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that of?cers
are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic
circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident
speci?c. Each tactical incident inherently results in considerations for improvement.
Each incident must be looked at objectiver and the areas of concern must be
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

The Chief recognizes how unique the circumstances involved in this case are, -
including the involvement of the FBI in the joint operation. The Chief considered
those circumstances in conducting his review and in making his recommendations.
in his asseaament, the Chief believed that all personnel involved worked well
together, in a coordinated effort, to locate a wanted homicide suspect. Furthermore.
their efforts resulted in their successful containment of the suspect in a timely
manner.



Regarding the tacties of all personnel, the Chief agrees with the UOFRB that there
are identi?ed areas for improvement; however, the tactics utilized did not
substantially and unjusti?any deviate from approved Department tactical training.

 

The Chief will direct Detective|:| along with OftioersI land b6 -1.4
to attend a Tactical Debrief. The Chief will also ensure that an invitation is "1?4
extended to Special Agentl:lto attend the Tactil Debrief.

Note: in addition, the Tactical Debrief shall include the following
mandatory discussion points:

Use of Force Policy;

Equipment RequiredlMaintained;

Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code-B);
Tactical Planning;

Command and Control and;

Lethal Force.

DrawinglExhibiting

- Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: ?An of?cer?s
decision to draw or exhibit a ?rearm should be based on the tactical situation and the
o??icer?s reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate
to the point where deadly force may be justi?ed. When an o??icer has determined
that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the of?cer shall, as soon as
practicable, secure or holster the ?reann.? (Los Angeles Police Department Manual,
Volume 1, Section 556.80)

 

In this instance, Detective |:|along with Of?cersl I '35 ?4
responded to the location of an identi?ed murder suspect wanted in connection with MC ?4
a double homicide that occurred in the Hollenbeck Area- The above personnel had

previously attended a brie?ng regarding the surveillance of the murder suspect and

the facts surrounding the case.

 

Furthermore, Detectivel:lalong with Of?cersl I
were informed that the was utilized in the homicide was a handgun-
Consequently, Detec?velfl along with Ol?cersl I
arrived at the residence and drew his service pistol.

b6 -4

Of?ce ecalled, _4

"At that particular point with the rhfonnation we had that our murder suspect was in
the house. We were unsure who ?5 in the house. i worked gangs for a lot of years so
llrnow if diere?s one gang member possibly on the location, there ?5 multiple gang
members and if there?s a possibly one gun, there?s more than one. So unholstered

NYT- 938

knowing that, you know, we weren?tjust doing a tithe probation  or chasing a
misdemeanor warrant. This guy was wanted for murder so i knew thatunhoistered it on the initial approach just due to the information that we had on 
on the suspect. He was wanted for the have murders. We had good information that
he was inside the residence. The information that we had that he (Martinez) was
trying to obtain guns. He (Martinez) was wiiting to shoot it out with the police and he
wasn?t going to be taken, you know, without- without any incident. . .So i beiieve it 
wouid the situation was would teed to a use of force or a deadly deadly use of
force situation. "23

I be ?4

1370 ?4

?t un-hoister my weapon here knowing the fact that suspect couid come in my
direction and was dealing with a murder suspect. i unhoistered my weapon here
and then i move. 

Detective|:lstated the reason why he drew his service pistol was because of
the following,

?This was a suspect that was wanted fora doubts murder. A gun was used in the
murder. An active State Street gang member and i wasn't sure whether he was
going to comply and come out or ?ght it out or barricade himself??5

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Chief determined that of?cers with

similar training and experience as Detectivel:|and Ot?cers 135 '4
andl:l faced with similar circumstances would reasonabty believe that there ?4
was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadty force

may be justi?ed.

 

 

 

 

Therefore the Chief found Detective|:| along with O?icersl 
and Drawing/Exhibiting to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Note: In addition to the above listed employees, there were additional
persons that drew or exhibited ?rearms during this incident. This
drawing/exhibiting was appropriate and requires no speci?c ?ndings or
action in regard to these officers.

 

Dane 22. Lines 11-23. I: ?44


Page 22. Lines 9-20.

39, Lines 21-24.

?1:|Page 21. Lines 1&20-

NYT- 939

Lethal Use of Force

I Law enforcement of?cers are authorized to use deadly force to:

Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,

- Prevent a crime where the subject?s actions place person(s) in imminent
jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,

- Prevent the escape of a violent ?eeing felon when there is probable cause to
believe the escape will pose a signi?cant threat of death or serious bodily
injury to the of?cer or others if apprehension is delayed. in this circumstance,
oit?icers shell, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might
subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury. (Los
Angeles Police Department Use of Force - Tactics Directive, Use of Force
Policy Revised, July 2009gear: -45 caliber, nine rounds ?red from a distance of approxrmately 4B hm _2 4
?1

In this instance, D?icerl Iexited his police vehicle and assumed his designated
containment position while Of?cerl I broadcast that Martinez

?was attern ti to ?ee by jumping fences. Of?cerl Igoceeded northbound 95?
land covered the southwest corner 0

O?icerl lassumed a containment ition on the north side of the
residence of 0ft] served Martinez standing on

the roof with his right hand in his pocket. Of?cer ave verbal commands in
English and Spanish to raise his hands.

 

 

 

Of?cerl:lrecalled. ?i personally was just yelling, ?put your hands up. Put your 4
hands up.? Because his right hand never came out of his pocket.?

Officerl:| continued to verbalize with Martinez, while Martinez held a cellular
telephone in his left hand. Martinez was involved in telephone ll while holding his
right hand in his waistband. Of?cerl:lopined that Martinez was utilizing his
right hand to conceal a handgun in his waistband.

?i believe he had - he had, yea, he had some type or
weapon on him just from knowing how gang members act, how they -- how they
carry their guns. That he was holding onto it because he had sweatpants. He
probably didn't have a lot of, you know, a lot of elastic on him. They usually wear
belts when they carry guns with - sweatpants. Sol knew he had something in
there. knew there was something that it wasn?t a cell phone because saw his

 

24,Lines 13-15. ?35 ?4
age _4

NYT- 940

ceil' phone. it wasn?t a waitet. it wasn?t a of water. it was something that
coutd possiny hurt me or my partner. ?3

Mohamed Special Agentl:ldptoy to the rear yar'tl??Erl 

ile armed with his ri?e. During the interview of Of?ce
Detective! Serial Nol:| provided a description of Officer
[a demonstration of Martinez' actions relative to movements prior to the 

 

 

Detective .Istated. ?Okaycihiow. you just described what you just did. You Egg?:1 4
were kind ofrn this standing positan and then you brought your ieg forward and
with your right hand you ?re simulating that you?re - you're tithng the gun away. if 
wait, if it - if your right hand is against your body. ait of a sudden you?re titting it
forward and up upward??

- - b6 -4
observed a hole In Martinez pants. MC _4

?There was he didn?t have a hate in his ?ght front pants
pocket prior and beiieve i saw after - otter that sound went otif and the shooting
that there was a hate there which to me shows that he did ?re a round at us.
yeah.

Based on the above observations made by Ot?oerl:| he believed Martinez had hit -1r4
?red at him. O??ers Ior Special Agentl I in defense ?c ?1r4
of his life and the lives oersl land Speeiat Agent

at Martinez.

recalled. "The round goes orr. Now, know that rr was directed at
anyone of us. 

b6 -4

Of?cerl:lfurther stated. ?i mean, i can?t say he was aiming for mewas aimi at my partner. He was aiming at the group in general to hit
somebody. "3

 

Of?cer ?red eight rounds from his service pistot and went to ?slide lock.?
Officer conducted an out?of?battery speed reload and assessed Martinez?
actions. Of?cerl:lobserved that Martinez had fallen onto his left side with his
right hand concealed under his body. that Martinez was
attempting to raise himself into a position where he could continue shooting the

 

 

 

 

2? id. Page 27. Lines 21-25 and Page 28. Lines 1-7.

21: Page 32. Lines 19-25. b6 ?4
?4

Page 34. Lines 3-7.

3? is, Page 35. Lines 22 and 24-25.

3? td.. Page 36. Lines r-1o.

NYT- 941

 

handgun at him, Of?cersl lat Special Agent: :3 ?1:.La14
Consequentiv. Of?cer| |?red one additional round at Martinez. 

mecalled, ?t -- i thought he was trying to push up at? his forearm off the
rooftop. w, i don't know how many times he had been hit. i mean, he had at!

those rounds ?red. Did sit the rounds hit him, i don 't know. Maybe he never 
maybe he didn?t even get hit. Maybe he just ducked and felt and hit the deck to
avoid being shot."32

 

Of?cerl :oontinued, "There?s no other - why run at this point. Why why do it; 
why try and give up at this point. Just, i believe, he ?s trying to .get up and to continue
shooting at us. ?33
Of?cerl:bbserved that Martinez discontinued his movements and surmised
that the threated posed by Martinez ceased. Consequentiy, Of?cerl:l holstered
his service pistol.
recalied, ?And then i remember -|:|going, hey - what do 

they call, l'ni sorry assess, assess, assess. He was yetting that out. i assess, i
deposited and once I realized that he wasn't going anywhere, the threat was over,
i had hoistered my weapon. 

Of?cer: .45 caliber, eight rounds ?red from a distance of approximately
46 feet.

In this instance, Oi?oerl Iopeewea Martinez on the rooftop of the detached b5 ?2 r4
garage located atl 0f?cer|  commands to H: '2 4
Martinez to raise his hands- Martinez failed to comply and kept his right hand in his
waistband while attempting to use a cellular telephone with his left hand. Of?cer
based on Martinez' actions formed the opinion that Martinez was
attemptin to cor seal a handgun in his waistband while holding it with his right hand.
oriice ?And i actuain remember teiting him to, you know, iet go
of the weapon, drop the weapon because at that point that?s what i believe he had
in his hooters-35

 

 

 

Of?cerl:loontinued to verbalize with Martinez for approximately 3-4 minutes Egg-:44
when Martinez began to watk down the roof toward the direction of Special Agent 
FWD was positioned in the rear yard. Martinez, ,while hoiding his right hand in

waistband, loaned back and to the left and immediater heard a gunshot. Based
on Martinez movements, coupled with a single gunshot emanating, Office

 

32111,!3398 41, Lines 2145 and Page 42, Lines 1-2.

3? td., Page 42, Lines 2325.

3? ld., Page 45, Lines 5-10.

3? onioerl:|Pepe 33, Lines 12-15. b5 ?4

Hit: -4

NYT- 942

surmised that Martinez had ?red his handgun at him, as well as at Of?ce b6 ?1,4
and: and Special I Consequently, Of?cer ?red ?ve ?14

rounds from his service pistol at Martinez.

 

Of?cerl:lrecailed, "That's where i saw movement. it looked a bit more
of muzzie muzzle ?ash as he's as he ?s doing that motion and hearing the sound
and l?m looking right at him as he ?5 doing this. . .i'm in fear for my life. i?m in fear for
the iives of FBI agents and my two partners. i ?re my weapon to stop the suspect?s
[Martinez] actions. ?36

 

 

 

 

Of? ?red ?ve rounds and Martinez fell onto the roof. As Martinez fell, 1?5 '1 r4
he tan onto his left side, facing the o?ioors with his right hand still beneath him. ?1 i 4
Of?cer [conducted an in-battery speed re-load and assessed the situation.

O?icer |believed Martinez was still armed and was moving his hands

around. Based on the movements of Martinez, Of?cerl Isurrnised that

 

 

Martinez' right hand possessed a handgun and was still moving into a ?ition to

 

 

 

 

reengage Of?cersl land Special Agen
Consequently, Of?cer ?red three additional rounds at Martinez.
Of?ce recalled, ?Just his hand movements and i knew he had a weapon in 
his hand.
Of?cerl:lrecalled, "So, you know, i didn?t want to take a chance of him just
reaching out and shooting again, so that was my concern- ?33
Of?cerl:| subsequently assessed the situation and determined that Martinez '35 ?4
no longer posed a threat. Accordingly, ?re. hm '4
we heard - weii, i i maintained the visuai or the
suspect to make sure there was no more threat at that time. "39
Note: The Fit) investigation revealed eight rounds :52:

during the incident.

Of?cer:- .45 caliber, 18 rounds ?red from a distance of approximately 43
feet.

in this instance, Of?cerl Iobserved Martinez on the rooftop of the detached
garage located atl I behind a cinder
block wait and observed Martinez holding a ceilular telephone in his left hand while

 

3? td., Page 39. Lines so and Lines 9-11.
37 id, Page 45, Lines 
3? tot, Page 45, Lines 10-12.
3" itt, Page 46, Lines 4-6.
31
NYT- 943

holding his right hand in his waistband. Officerl:lwith negative results.
verbalized with Martinez to raise his hands.

Officer-Deana, ?i teii him, 'Let me see your hands. Let me see your
hands. on need to get otiF the root now. And he ?Fuck you guys- t?m not getting

oti'.? He?s on the phone and i don ?t know if he hangs up or now but he just keeps
motherfucking us. 

with his commands and formed the opinion that
Martinez was holding a handgun in his right hand while concealing it inside his
waistband-

Of?cerl:lrecalled, "i saw a gun in his front waistband. 

According to Of?cerl:lafter a few minutes Martinez moved toward him,
Of?cers and Special Agent|:|and simulated a handgun.
Simultaneously, Of?cer heard what he believed to be a gunshot and
formulated the belief that Martinez had ?red the handgun that was concealed in his
waistband at him and Of?cers| |and Special Agent:

Ot?cerl:lrecalled, ?Like i say, minutes tater, or moments later he - he has
his hand in his in his front down his front waistband and he advances towards
the oh'icers or to myself and - and he simuiates a handgun and i hear pap, pop, a
gunshot. 

Of?cerl:lcontinued, ?i - from my knoMedge it was coming from the front of
it and he (Martinez) shot from his gun or his hand that was inside his front waistband
he shot horn from that position. 

We?, tsaw i saw a shape of a gun that he was
hoiding underneath his waistband and ?red one round towards my partners and i. 

Con uently, Of?ce red approximately 10 rounds at Martinez. Of?cer
nducted an in-battery speed reload and believed that Martinez was still

armed and advancing toward him and his partners. Consequently, Of?cer

?red an additional two rounds at Martinez.

 

?3 O?icerl:l Page Lines 14pm.
id., Page 48. Lines 14?15-

?is. Page 51. Lines ?Mi.
?3th Page sz lines 11-14.

1a., Page 54, lines 14-16-1,4
?1NYT- 944

Of?oerl Irecalled, he threat was still was still coming towards me. Egg:

thought it was coming still towards me. ?He's
(Martinez) still gesturing to me that he's still armed and he?s a threat to me. 

 

omeer|:pelieved that he ?red the initial ten rounds, conducted an in?battery
speed reload and ?red the additionai two rounds prior to Martinez fallin onto the
roof. asked why he stopped ?ring and 
recailed,

"l saw the soapect, the threat that was there was no more threat to me and saw
the suspect fall fall on the top of the garage. 

The UOFRB recognized that diacrepancies exist beMeen Of?cerl:l '35 ?4
recollection of his sequence of ?re and the other available evidence to be we ?4
considered. Speci?cally, he ?red 10 rounds, conducted

an in?battery speed reload and then ?red an additional two rounds. totaling 12

rounds ?red. However, based on the magazine counts and the casings recovered at

scene, it was determined that 13 rounds, conducted an in-

battery Speed reload and then ?red an additional ?ve rounds, totaling 18 rounds

?red.

A thorough and comprehensive review of the available video footage of the incident

tends to establish that Of? nducted the in-battery speed reload alter 1?5 
Martinez fell to the root; hence, Of?cer red his last ?ve rounds not as we ?4
Martinez was still standing but rather after Martinez had fatten to the roof.

The Chiefs analysis of Of?cerl:l recali is based in part on well accepted
and peer reviewed research into memory and recall during deadly force encounters.
That research supports that traumatic incidents, such as deadly force encounters,
will inevitably result in some degree of memory impairment- The actual impact that
stress has on memory may vary from one individual of?cer to another and may vary
depending on their role in the incident or physical position in the tactical
environment.

In adjudicating prior CUOF cases, the issue of altered memory and or recall has

been critical to the analysis of of?cer accounts. The Chief considered this well

founded phenomenon when considering the weight of Of?cerl:lstatement. b6 -1i4
(See Additional, Memory and Recall) ?1 4

FBI Special Caliber Ri?e, 22 rounds ?red from a distance of
approximately 19 feet.

 

?5 ld.. Page 53, Lines 1349.
t? id, Page 53, Lines 2+25.
?7 Page 64. Lines 5?3.

NYT- 945

Regarding the actions of Special Agent|:|the FBI is conducting an be "1:24
independent assessment of his invoivement, based on their policies and procedures. ?1'2?4
Special Agen provided a signed, sworn statement regarding the incident

which was made available to the Department.

Special Agent statement indicated that he had moved from his containment
position, behind the cinder block wall adjacent to Of?cersl ?|and
proceeded into the rear yard oil I He indicated that he
verbalized with Martinez while Martinez was on the roof of the detached garage
located at| I Agentl:indicated he gave commands to
Martinez to raise his hands while Martinez concealed his right hand in the front of his
pants. ?The bulge evident in Martinez? pants where his right hand was concealed,
and where believed he was holding a ?rearm, was thrust outward toward me at the
same time that he abruptly turned in my direction. (See Special Agentl:|s
Statement Page 9).

Special Agentl:lcontinued to verbalize when Martinez abruptly turned in his 
direction and aimed the ?bulge,?where Martinez' right hand was located, in Special
A ent 5 direction. Concurrent with Martinez' overt movements, Special Agent

ea a shot. Consequently, his ri?e at Martinez.

According to Special Agent]: ?Martinez transitioned from a standing position to
a lying on his leti? side on the roof. His continual movement posed a continuing
threat to me and others. iccntinued to tire at Martinez because he was still moving
and i could not see his hands. When He stopped moving, and believed the threat
was eliminated, ceased tire, and place my selector lever on safe. (See Agent

[a Statement Page s10).

 

Note: According to the Autopsy Report, Martinez sustained 1B gunshot
wounds, 11 projectileslbullets were removed from his body. The LAPD
Scienti?c Investigation Division (SID) Firearms Projectiie Comparison
Re rt identi?ed that 10 of the projectiles were ?red from Special Agent
ri?e, to include the single projectile that was recovered from the
right frontal brain. The eleventh projectile was recovered from the left
chest and was determined to have polygonal rt?ing, a characteristic
uni ue to the Glock pistol. This projectile can be attributed to Of?cer
he was the only of?cer with a Glock pistol-

b5 -1,4
-1,4

In reviewing this case with regards to Department personnel, the Chief conducted a
comprehensive and objective assessment of the actions of each of?cer involved in
this incident - in light of the facts known to them (individually) at the time they ?red
their weapons. The Chief also reviewed the video recordings of the incident and ail
information pertaining to the trajectory and impact points as well as other available

evidence, including the statement provided by Special Agen

NYT- 946

In reviewing the case, the Chief aiso considered the ?ndings of the Coroner and
content of the Autopsy Report. The Report identified that Martinez sustained two
fatal gunshot wounds to the head- After a complete review of the evidence including
the videos, wound track analysis, movements by Martinez and the positioning and
perceptions of each of?cer, the Chief agreed with the UOFRB that it cannot be
determined when the fatal rounds occurred or what Martinez' position was when
they were ?red. Therefore, the ?ndings and opinions of the Coroner do not refute
the available evidence or the Chiefs recommendations.

 

b6 -4

Consequently, in assessing the lethal force used byI land MC _4

the UOFRB evaluated the totality of the available evidence to determine the
objective reasonableness of each of?cers' actions and did not solely rely on the
events as depicted by each individual of?cer. The Chief agreed with the UOFRB
that an of?cer in their individual circumstance, with similar training and experience,
would reasonath believe that Martinez posed and imminent threat of death of
serious bodily injury and would have used deadly force. The lethal force used by
Of?cers| Iwas objectively reasonable and within
Department policy.

Additionally, the United States Department of Justice has initiated its own use of
force investigation regarding the role of FBI Special Agent|:| EEC-11

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

- Reasonable suspicion: Reasonabie suspicion exists when the detaining o?icer
was aware of speci?c facts which reasonabiy indicated the detainee, was in the
process of committing a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction, (2) was about to commit
a crime, or (3) was wanted for a crime that had aiready occurred. (Los Angeies
Poiice Department Legs! Buiietin, Voiume 20, issue 2 October 15, 1996-)

In this instanoel iwas conducted after he left: b5 -2

I [was cooperative and indicated Martinez was inside 1?75 '2
the residence. |was subsequently detained pending an investigation ME '1
regarding his involvement regarding harboring a fugitive. Additionally, all occupants
of the aforementioned address were detained pending the outcome of the harboring
a fugitive investigation- The investigation determined there was insufficient evidence
to charge any of the individuals with harboring Martinez. The individuals were
released at the conclusion of their interviews. The Chief will direct that the topic of
reasonable suspicion be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

- Los Angeles Police Deparb'nentiOutside Agencies Protocols:

Su?nrision grid Control:

7. Each Los Angeies Metro Task Force on Vioient Gangs member 
be subject to the taws, reguiations, poiicies and personnel rules appiicabie to his or

35
NYT- 947

her respective agency. FBI Participants will continue to adhere to the Bureau?s
ethical standards, including Department of Justice regulations relating to
outside employment and prepublication review matters, and will remain subject to
the Supplemean Standards of thicai Conduct for employees of the DOJ.

My Force and Shmtigg lnciQnts:

41. Members of the will follow their own agency?s policy concerning
fireanns discharge and use of deadly force. it personnel from more than one
agency are involved in the incident, representatives from the a?ected
agencies agree to conduct a joint investigation unless, under the circumstances, a
joint investigation is determined by the parties to be impracticable or undesirable. it
a joint investigation is not agreed upon, each agency may investigate the conduct of
its own personnel according to its own procedures and policies and will do so in a
manner that does not interfere with or obstruct any other agency's investigation.
Regardless whether a joint investigation or multiple investigations are conducted,
each agency agrees to share information among the affected agencies consistent
with each agency?s rules and regulations. in addition, in the event multiple
investigations are conducted, the affected agencies agree to confer on their reported
?ndings and, to the extent practicable, to resolve any signi?cant differences.?

The tactical operation consisted of personnei from the Los Angeies Police

Department and the FBI. in this instance, Agentl:|plaoed himself into the b6 -1
tactil scenario involving a murder suspect that was believed to be armed and ?1
moved into a position that potentially left him exposed and an OIS occurred. The

involved LAPD of?cers were unaware of the FBI tactical protocol speci?c to

containment, arrest, or their deadly force policy. The integration of various law
enforcement personnel, into a tactical situation, may create concern regarding

possible conflicting tactics and use of force standards and policies. The Chief fully

appreciates the critical relationships between the Department and the various

federal law enforcement agencies, and realizes the signi?cant value of such joint-

operations. However, as there is often room for improvement in such joint

operations, the Chief will direct that the Department evaluate the processes

involved, including the participation in joint Tactil Training and Debrief sessions.

Accordingly, the Department will extend an invitation to Special Agent|:Ito

attend the Tactical Debrief for this incident

istol Inspection The post OIS weapon inspection revealed Of?cer
service pistol was not recorded into the LAPD Firearm inventory Tracking 
System (FITS). On December 15, 2011, Of?cerl:lsuccessfully quali?ed with
his Smith and Wesson .45 caliber pistol, ful?lling the requirement to cany the pistol.
The service pistol was subsequently registered to Of?cerl:land met all
Department speci?cations.

 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Los Angeles Me?tro Task Force on Violent Gangs Memorandum of
Understandng. June 2012.

36
NYT- 948

Of?cerl Iservice pistol was not recorded into the LAPD FITS. Of?cer 
|was advised of this discrepancy and on May 02. 2012, Of?cer
took his service pistol to the Department where it was recorded into FITS.

Captain Serial No.I:ICommanding Of?cer, Hollenbeck Area, was
advised Issues and will conduct a comprehensive audit of each of the
specialized units within Hollenbeck for simiiar concerns- The Chief will direct that
this issue be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

a Service Pistol Magazine Loadin During the post OIS weapons inspection, it
was discovered that Of?ce a service pistol magazine contained seven live '35 '4
rounds. which is one less than full capacity of eight rounds. This tepic will be h? '4
discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

- Unauthorized ammunition - Of?cer| service pistol was loaded with
Federal .45 Auto ammunition at the time oi the shooting. This ammunition was
phased out of service by April 1, 2011. This issue was brought to the attention of
Captain: Additionally, the Chief will direct this issue he discussed during the
Tactical Debrief.

 

The Chief will direct that the Use or Force Review Division publish information
regarding these issues in a TacOps Newsletter and relay the information to
Department operational commands.

b5 -2

- Profanity -I:Istated when she was exiting the residence; an _2

unidenti?ed of?cer used profanity as he directed her to the ground. The allegations
of inappropriate language and being pushed were documented under Complaint
Form No. 12-000865 and forwarded to lntemal Affairs Group The Chief will
have this topic discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional
- Research on memoryrrecail and perceptual distortion

Various researchers have conducted and published [peer reviewed and well
accepted] studies on the impact of traumatic events such as deadly force
encounters. on memory and recall.? Those studies were supported in part by
hundreds of interviews of of?cers in various agencies involved in shooting incidents
over several years. As indicated, of?cers may not record (memory) or recall details
of an incident that would have been clearly remembered under normal 
or not remember details in factuai order. Additionally, various other
considerations may impact memory and or recall. When an of?cer is multi-tasking
reloading, transitioning between weapon systems, giving commands etc), the
ability to record or recall each of those acts may be effected as wet.

 

?9 Dr. Audrey Honig (LASD), Dr. Alexis Artwhol, or Bill Lewimky [Force Science Institute}.
37
NYT- 949

A related phenomenon impacting memory is teenagetrierl distortion, which is de?ned
as a lack of correspondence between the way a stimulus is commonly perceived and
the way an individual perceives it under given conditions.

This phenomenon is another reason why an of?cer may never record (receive) part
of an incident and may ciearty remember the suspect in one position when in reality
they had changed their position or location and or may never see or hear other
peripherai events or occurrences taking place around them.

A 1998 study of 348 OIS incidents investigated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department reveaied that 90 percent of of?cers involved in these incidents
experienced some degree of percele distortion. in a separate peer reviewed
study. 15? of?cers reported memory anomalies as follows:

52% experienced memory loss of some part of the event
46% experienced memory loss of their individual actions
34% heard diminished sound volumes

21% experienced memory distortion

As indicated, the consideration of these very-real factors is important to the
adjudication of CUOF incidents, speci?cally when assessing the individual accounts
of the of?cers involved.

 

b5 -2,4

Outside Agency Noti?cation - In this instance. Of?cerl 
-2,4

I and
noti?ed her regarding the DIS. Of?cer| |is reminded that noti?cations
subsequent to an in areas outside the city should be coordinated through the
Incident Commander. The Chief will direct the Commanding Of?cer. Hollenbeck
Area, to document and discuss this issue with Of?cerl:|

Chief's Direction



in the area of Command and Controi, supervision was transferred between

supervisors alter the initial brie?ng. A supervisor was at scene during the entire

incident but it would have been bene?cial if one supervisor oversaw the incident.

The Chief will direct Detectives Serial and :1 Serial No.
Gang Narcotic Division, to attend the Tactil Debrief.

b6 -4
-4

General Training Update (GTU)

 

On March 20, 2012, Of?cersl Iattended a GTU and
all mandatory topics were covered as well as Armed Suspects and Force Option
Simulator. Detective has not completed the GTU-

NYT- 950

INSPECTOB GENERAL REVIEW

I Ge al si

Investigation Quality

I No signi?cant issues of concern were identi?ed in relation to investigation quaiity.

Training Issues

a No signi?cant issues of concem were identi?ed in relation to training.

Equipment issues

a No signi?cant issues of concern were identi?ed in relation to equipment.

Additional

- The DIS noted that Agentl:lre?deployed into the rear yard, without '35 ?1
communicating andfor coordinating with other of?cers- By his own admission, the hm ?1
move compromised Agentl Is safety by leaving him exposed to Martinez.
Although Agent| Is perfonnance is not evaluated as part of the Department
and OlG's review of this case, it is clear that his actions had the potential to
the tactical approach employed by the involved LAPD of?cers, as well

as to increase the risk that an OIS would occur by exposing Agentl:lto any
threat posed by Martinez.

 

As noted in the Chiefs report, the involved LAPD of?cers were unaware of 
tactil protocol, and the integration of various law enforcement personnel into a
tactical situation may create concern regarding possible con?ict in tactics and other
policies. Given the potential for inconsistent tactical standards to compromise
performance, as well as to limit the ability of Department supervisors to exercise
effective command and control during tactical situations, the GIG concurs with the
Chiefs direction that the Department evaluate the processes associated with joint
operations.

In or Ge - Recommendations
Tactics

The DIS cmcurs with the Chiefs ?ndings.
DrawinglExhibiting

- The DIG concurs with the Chiefs ?ndings.

39
NYT- 951

Lethal Use of Force
a The DIS concurs with the Chief?s ?ndings.

In Although all of the involved officers gave statements that, in some respects,
con?icted with other sources of evidence. the OIG recognized that the incident was
stressful and dynamic- In such circumstances, it is not uncommon for of?cers'
recollections to differ- In evaluating each of?cer's decision to use lethal force during
this incident, the OIG considered those features of the incident that were established
to a preponderance standard by testimonial andfor other sources of evidence,
inciuding the video recording of the incident.

While the cell phone video obtained by NBC News was somewhat unclear, it
showed that Martinez was facing the of?cers while on the roof. Martinez' right hand
appeared to be in his right front pants poCket or near the associated waist band,
consistent with the of?cers' and several independent witnesses? statements. While
in this position, Martinez appeared to quickly move toward Agentl:l Although b6 -1r4
the video does not clearty show Martinez pushing his right hand forward, or ?1r4
otherwise simulating a ?rearm, several of the involved of?cers described seeing
those motions. As described by Of?cerl:l ?His [Martinez'] hand was in his
pocket and it?s like a - like in the movies- You know, you see a guy put his hand in
the in his jacket pretending he has a gun-?5? As recalted by Of?cerI:I?As
he's walking maybe a couple steps toward the the agent he makes a
movement where he lifts the hand, his right hand towards the agent and us."51
According to Of?cerl:l advances towards the of?cers or to myself and
simulates a handgun.?52 Given this evidence, in concert with the of?cers? prior
knowledge regarding the type of crime for which Martinez was wanted, and his prior
communications regarding obtaining a gun to use against police of?cers, the DIS
believes that it was objectiver reasonable for the involved of?cers to believe that
Martinez was threatening their lives with a handgun which was concealed in his
pocket or waistband- Further, although the investigation did not establish who ?red
the ?rst round of the DIS, each of?cer described hearing a gunshot. Given Martinez'
apparent simulation of a handgun, the officers each apparently mistook the gunshot
for it having been ?red by Martinez.

Alter the initial series of rounds was fired, Martinez fell to the roof. Although it
appears from the video that Martinez moved as the incident continued, appearing to
move for the last time in the moments when the ?nal rounds were ?red, the quality of
the video is such that his precise movements exact position of hands, etc).
cannot be determined.

 

Dame Lines 10-13. 135 ?4

b7: ?4
34, Lines 1447-

Lines9-11-

NYT- 952

in reviewing the second series of rounds ?red by the involved of?cers, the DES noted

that Martinez had based on autopsy and video evidence, sustained multiple serious

injuries and fallen to the roof at the time those rounds were ?red. As such, this

series of rounds warranted particularly close scrutiny to establish whether the

of?cers' continued use of force against Martinez was objectivety reasonable. In

considering this question, the OIG noted that the video evidence could not clearty

resolve whether Martinez' actions still presented a threat, although it did establish

that he was still moving and was generally facing in the direction of the LAPD

of?cers. The only source of evidence to provide a more detailed accounting of

Martinez' actions during this portion of the incident were the statements of Of?cers

I land of AgentI:I53 These three statements were broadly 1?5 '1 '4
consistent in describing Martinez as having his right arm under his torso, pushing MC ?1?4
himself up. Given the above-noted reasonableness of the of?cers' belief that

Martinez was armed and prepared to use a gun against police of?cers, the GIG

believes that this testimony supports, to a preponderance standard, an objectively

reasonabie belief that Martinez was continuing an attempt to assault the of?cers with

a ?rearm that was concealed upon his person- As such, the OIG concurs with the

Chiefs recommended in?policy ?nding.

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6 -4

1376 -4
Inspector General
b6 -4
testimonial his ?4


of?cers'usesofforce.

41
NYT- 953

  

(Rev. 5-3-10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD Date: 02/18f2014
OFFICE 01f17f2012

 

CC: b6 -1
-1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY

Contact:

 

 

Approved By: STROUD SHAWN 
SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:| 

 

Case ID SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis;r comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following SIRG
meeting held on 11/20/2013.

Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated 09/08/2012, prepared
by former Inspector Thomas P. Ravenelle. A copy of the complete INSD
Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to this
communication.

Enclosure(s}: Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) INSD Shooting Incident ReportIr dated 09f08f2012.

Details:

On 11f20f2013, the SIRG convened to review a shooting incident
which occurred on 01f17f2012, involving Los Angeles Field Office 

Special Agent Task Force Officer b6 ?1,4

-1,4
UNCLASSIFIED

NYT-954

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 01/17/2012
Re: 02f18f2014

SA: and TH): were both participating in a 135 ?1i4i7

Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF) operation to locate and b7c ?1'4?7
conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. While conducting

 

surveillance at the intersection ofl I

Los Angeles, California, both SAI land 

ambushed and fired upon in a drive-by shooting committed by a subject

 

who was unrelated to the target of the operation. During the encounter,
fearing for their lives, fired at the
shooter later identified asl two
rounds from his Bureau-approved while TFO ?|fired seven
rounds from his issued Glock 22. TFOI received a slight

 

 

injury in the form of a bruise to his leg. SE was not injured.
Two other occupants of the vehicle used by who were later
identified asl__ I were arrested. The

 

escaped and was apprehended inl I Nevada, a

week later examined at the University Medical
Center Las Vegas, Nevada. Medical reports 
sustained a gunshot wound to his abdomen and two superficial wounds to
the left side of his head.

SIRG Observations

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

determined the application of deadly force by 

01117/2012 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's deadly

force policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,

and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational

standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or observations

concerning the operational techniques used by this b5 ?1
-1

shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

NYT1955

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 01/17/2012
Re: 02f18f2014

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues. The SIRG made the following observation requesting additional

training.

Observation 1: A weapon was not properly charged prior to the

initiation of an enforcement action.

Analysis 1: The MIOG Part 2, Section 12-2.2, "Carrying of
Weapons," Paragraph T, stated, "Unless operationally deployed, shoulder
weapons should be maintained with an empty chamber. Prior to entry into
areas where potential danger exists, a round should be chambered in all
shoulder weapons. The safety should remain engaged until the

circumstances require placing the weapon in the "fire" mode."

Signed Sworn Statement indicated he commenced a be ?1
surveillance and arrest operation for an armed and dangerous subject, b7c ?1
in a highly dangerous area controlled by a violent gang, without a

round chambered in his 

Instruction 1: ADIC, LAFO, will ensure all LAFO personnel are
appropriately trained regarding the loading and subsequent charging of

shoulder weapons prior to operational deployments.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRS recommended no administrative action be taken
a result of his involvement in this shooting b5 ?1

incident. _1

Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection Division

chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member. The following
voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields,
Office of Inspections Trial Attorney, Criminal b5 ?3

 

Division, United States Department of Justice I ?3

 

Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC)
Jayne L. Challman, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox,

Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent

UNCLASSIFIED

NYT1956

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE 01/17/2012
Re: 02f18f2014

 

I Sguad CR-2, Washington Field Office; b5 ?1;3
I I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division b7c ?1?3
SSAI I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the

General Counsel; SSAI I Evidence Response Team 
Laboratory Division Firearms Training

Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics 

Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group and 
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting
members were also in attendancezl I
Office of Inspector General, Inspectors David Paul
Gelios and Shawn W. Stroud, OI, Team Leaders| |and

I, o1, ERT, I
Special Assistant, OI, Unit Chiefl |and Management
Program Analyst] I Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observation

ADIC, LAFO, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
InstructionfRecommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

ADIC, LAFO, is required to provide a written response, via EC,
detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
InstructionfRecommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed

to Unit ChiefI I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. b6 ?1
-1

 

 

Once the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPA



 

UNCLASSIFIED



  be -a

To: Stroud, Shawn w. 1370? -3
Shields, Robert J. 

Sent: Fri Oct 25 14:11:02 2013

Subject: LA Jan 17, 2012 shooting declination

Inspector Shawn Stroud
Inspection Division
FBI

Based upon a review of materials from your shooting inquiry, we have determine that the facts do not

warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation into a shooting by an FBI agent and task force officer

that resulted in the wounding ofl:lin Los Angeles, California, on January 17, 2012. Rather, b6 -7
the facts support a conclusion thatl:|a gang member who claimed to have mistaken the law WC ?7
enforcement of?cers for rival gang members, ?red ?rst. Thus, both the agent and the task force of?cer

returned ?red, legitimately fearing thatl:luould kill them. The Los Angeles District Attorney has

also declined prosecution.

The agent and task force officer were in a high crime area in civilian clothing conducting surveillance

while seated inside an unmarked truck wher|:|approached theml:bulled a handgun, when his ?7
approximately 15 week away, and ?red at the task force of?cer, the driver, and the agent, the 1370? ?7
the truck with gunfire that penetrated into the front cab but struck no one. When

both the agent and task force officer returned and continued to fire back at the truck.
nine shots, while the task force of?cer fired seven shots and the agent ?red two shots.

|:|was struck and wounded by a bullet. He escaped the scene and the bullet was never removed

from his body. Accordingly, we do not know which, if either, of the two law enforcement of?cers ?red

the shot that struck him.

The forensic evidence is consistent with the accounts provided by the law enforcement b6 
survived his wound and was later captured in another state. During a custodiai interview,l:l 1373 ?7
admitted participating in the shooting, claiming he shot at the truck because he thought he was engaged

in a shootout with rival gang members.

There is no evidence that either law enforcement officer willfully violated the 4m Amendment?s
requirement of reasonable seizure when he ?red at a violent gang member who was shooting at them.
A federal criminal civil rights investigation is unwarranted. We appreciate the agent?s voluntary
statement that helped us make a fuliy informed prosecution decision. We apologize for our recent delay
in deciding this matter. Please continue your administrative review and action.

Special Legal Counsel MC ?3
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice




NYT-QSB

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itwea?gatian swim Agent We cam: 11 a . lat Gf?ce-I |:|and
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the: sewmi amped, a. twek 13m, maiicatc? that he had bean 51:71:11: {luring {ha incident,

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AL. MEALYSIS

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Special Agent wars candm?ng for a federal fugitiv?. Gf?mr b7c ?1,4 7

 

 

 

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was in ihe {mm passenger seat. Whiia:

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was driving. A mag-agar was; imh? backsaat; Each ?fthe-

 

 

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pick-3d him 123} anti ?mve him cut 0f mm

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a. crawisgaca at

 

?reman-vsm?iuas?ed with $3113 mtmei in the: cham?mr and munds in ?tha magazmm sc'riai

1.1mmhar m3 ?rearm was: abii?mrg?ed.





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red :1 mirmr Erma womd;
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NYT-QEO

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I3ege 3 e?'fi bet: _4
te Street E3221, Vie telephene celle, investigetere iterated

the was in thel:let ?ne ?time ef the sheeting. be 
later eqimiee? Eyeing in the vehzc-Ee ace. the eerie ef the Sheeting. but did not idee tify the eheeteri. 1370 -7

 

 31133632338? 32:012.; mxseeiigeiers en 11131.15. ee? stating that the
eei'vesi in the e?eet?ng wee knew: as end lived at The
eewl:| ?eeing. the scene, weed with a handgun and appeared- te have been she 

Emilee: IGI:INevetia.

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e319; ghee?ti?e. Whiie ie statements; end admitted Sheeting-e:
but eiexxieci mowing the were effieere 101d
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feed beak wee te seep the of?cers were ?ri at him-I  ?es medieetiee to
treat Iwitfe egampteme that include end

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:33; 9mg? Rammed Sig Sauer semi?eetemetie eietei, seven expended .ee eeiiber eesiege
that had been d?eehwgeetby1:Is ?remen am} {we ri?e cartridge-e thief bee been

 

 

 

 

 

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es Eeevieted-ef Energieng time in county jeii and. was placed en prebetien. Aise
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As 23 juvenile: 131:3 sustained petitiees fer rebbery, receiving stelen. ereye?y anti
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NYT-961

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in gammcting himseifa: amthex: a parsanmay use ail fame which he: believas reawnably
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mange he might have rammed If; {Him means in Emma 1113 safety.? Easg?e Eal?ns, {1961-}
@853} ?331.. App?d STE. . 

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massm?i?. ia?iqm' {an  5mm, raiher  with the: 29136} visit-1n of hindsight; The caiaulus; 0f
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secargd judgments that are tame, unamain, and'rapid?y waiving abaut? the
ni? farm: that is nacessarz: in a gm?icular simation.? imam {1939) ai?f} 
38:3, 39541-393?. 

 

 

 

 


Tm: evidenm Shaw; that whiz: muducting SLWEiHanse. in the area bf 'b6 ?1 4 
LAPZ) Off}.ch Find FBI Spec-i311 age-ml lab-sawee? I NC ?1 4 7

 

 
     
 

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d?vm by Tim cimva away, 539w}? pa?sixgg the of?cers

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?ha?ly mamas: a: and mtm?md tea the]: As {ha :Iz'amnad towar?s |:|and
exited the rear d?wr?s aids den: and pointad a .hamigun at. the ef?cars.
in ?3.31" fir-r his li'f? ami the: lif?: =34: ?rm at: 51111103:
simuitaneeusl? |fim<i at the ch21's. ?rm additional mums atl:| .

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nmz-??ai gmahct uremia during the imi?mt; two in the and a graze: his=
heai 

NYT-962

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we ?ang?nd?g 3133; mad Symial A,ng a?f?d in a?d
dafema of We are mm: 0m :3 03ng an: file an? wili take no fu?her actian in 12112 maria.

Very tally years,

 

 
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. b5 -4
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c: Qi?cm

 

 

 

 

NYT-963

mm ?w .m 

 

 

 

UNCLAS 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE i 5
Federal Bureau of Investigation 1 

Date: 03f21f2014

Report of: HG Trent Teyema@ Of?ce: FBIHQ 

Case 297I-HQ-A4214067 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW - 
REPORT OF SHOOTING 
PHILADELPHIA FIELD 


Investigative Period: 01f2'7f2014 - 05/05/2014
I. I Executive Summary

(Wm On January 27, 2014, at approximately 2:58 am, SAI Ifrom

 

the Philadelphia Division was involved in a shooting incident in the] [block ofPhiladelphia, assigned to Squad -C-3, which covered Violent b7C - 1 2 . 3 4
Gang and Criminal Enterprise investigations, to include complex investigations of narcotics WE 1 5

 

distribution. Pursuant to a federally authorizedl Iwarrant, conducting a


 

 

I The investigation was jointly
led with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Also present at the location were

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEA TF
land Philadelphia Police Department.(PPD) 
After successfully completing land and
attempted to locatel I - 
(UIEEHQ) While on] i I alone in his FBI vehicle, SAI:[heard

 

through PPD radio, shots had been ?red in the area and a subject was being pursued by of?cers
from the PPD and the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police (PHAP). A physical description, to 
include clothing, was provided over the radio. Following the broadcast, 
over the DEA radio he was responding to the area. SA: who was in the general area at the
time of radio broadcast, saw an individual matching the description of the subject run vehicle. SAI:Ialso observed the subject carrying a ?rearm. SAI:Iactivated his b?m I  I ,3 7
emergenc 1i ts assisted in the chase, and drove his vehicle one and a half blocks to the
block of [Lil where the subject was cornered in a fenced, vacant lot. SAIEI
stopped his vehicle and positioned himself on the driver side of the vehicle op?posite subiectl.
PI-IAP Of?cersl I lalong with PPD Of?cer
sto ed and took positions along the edge of the roadway. The subject, later identi?ed as I:
pointed his ?rearm at the Agent and officers. SAI land all three of?cers ?red their
weapons atI Istriking him ?ve times. I Iwas struck ohce in both shoulders, once in
his left thigh, once in the stomach, and once, in the head. The ?ve rounds were not removed from
body. placed into custody,?he was transferred to l-lahnemanu
Hospital in Philadelphia, in critical condition. No of?cers or Agents were injured.

 

 

 

1


-.

 

raw-9'64

 

 

. 

The shooting scene was processed by the PPD  the assistance of FBI
Philadelphia ERT. A Lorcing .380 caliber handgun was recovered from the scene. PPD took
lead on the investigation and provided all reports, interviews, and crime scene analysis results to_

the SIRT. A Signed Sworn Statement was taken from SA|:|on January 29, 2014. be -1
?1

Hi Incident Details

a. Substantive Case Files and Background Information

 

(Dim Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantivel:] case was . b6 - 1
opened: ?1
. . but ?1

 

Title:

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Wm As a result of the Agent-Involved Shooting, the Philadelphia Field Of?ce
opened the following Assault on a Federal Officer Investigation: 

 

 

Title: I I . . b6 -1.7
ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL - . WC. 
AGENT-INVOLVED SHOOTING
PHILADELPHIA, PA -
0112mm

File number: 89 
Case Agent: SA

 

 

 

 

b. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

1. discharged weaponOf?cer ldischarged weapon) - PHAP . - WC '1 4
3. Of?cer (discharged weapon) - PHAP

4. Officer (discharged weapon) - PPD

 

 

 

 

 

c. Case Review and Operational Brie?ngs

 

The Philadelphia Field Of?ce opened an hivestigation I I A Mn ?1
on thel Iin Philadelphia, I I

 

 

 

2
UNCLASSIFIEDIEGHQ

 





- File number: 
Case Agent: SAI

 

 

UNCLAS swam/361$:

 

?1

 

 

i 
(WM) 'To support the investigation, on lanuary 16, 2014,| b6 -1
Request 1 was sent to I 1:70 -1
requesting thel I The request was sent by ME ?1 5
a roved by ASACI I The
authorityle was do curnented in] Isigoed
January 17, 2014, by US Magistrate Judge Jacob Hart. Upon receipt of theI I
Request, prepared al I, which included photos of
the subject, a description of the subject, photos of subject vehicles, and the 1301 Deadly Force
Policy. TheI:Iwas coordinated with the and SSAI I Per SET
interviews the operation was considered an
surveillance operation. As such, only the I:Iwas used, and Squad C-3 did not prepare a
separate Operations plan and there was no formal brie?ng conducted. -

 

 

 

 

 

 

d. Events Leading Up to'the Shooting

. ?1 On Jana 2?7, 2014, at acproximatelsl ISAI |metDEA TFOI and PPD Officerd land we -1,2,3,4,7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sta ed in the area oil I The plan called ?011 Iand ME ?1 '5
to perform] Iwhile the rest of the teanli
The first vehicle, a| I
was located 1mmed1ately andl lwas successful. lwas
accomplished without incident at approximatelyl I SAI then directed the team to
search the area for the second vehicle, al At approximately 2:53 while
searching for thel I SAI Iheard via PPD radio shots were ?red in the area of:
which was in the same vicinity as A'physical 

 

description of the suspect was broadcast over the radio. SAI:Iannounced over the DEA
radio he was responding to the area. SAI:Ithen observed an individual matching the subject
description approximately 50 yards east of the intersection ofI
I also observed the subject carrying a silver handgun in his right hand. SA
Iannounced over the radio he located the subject, activated his emergency lights on his FBI
vehicle, and pursued the subject to an empty lot in theI:Iblock o?

 

 

 

 

 

 

- e. Shooting Incident Details

(Uri/E36 On January 27, 2014, at approximately 2:58 am, SAI Ipursued the b6 -1 4 7
subject approximately one and a? half blocks to a vacant lot in th'el Iblock of 137?: "1 4 I 7
The vacant lot was surrounded on two sides by a wooden fence, which prevented the subject, 

identi?ed @g any further. SAI:Icould hear an of?cer, later
identi?ed as PHAP Of?cer yelling multiple times, "sto Jolice, stop.? 

stopped his vehicle parallel to the lot, but angled-to the right. baited his vehicle an -
repeatedly identi?ed himself as FBI. A second uniformed of?cer, later identified as PHAP

|:|approached the lot ?'om the rear (east side) of his vehicle. Of?cer 

 

 

3 .
UNCLASSIFIEDIM

.NYT-966

 

 

 

 

 

 

. ?issue several verbal commands tol:ltellihg hirnto stop and to drop his  Of?cer





was standing by the corner of a building adjacent to the lot. Qi?ce after jumping
a short wooden fence, was lying in a prone position in the lot to the front (west side) of SA
vehicle. A third officer; later identi?ed as PPD Qf?cerI?I approached
from the rear of took a position on the opposite side of the roadway. SAI I
was positioned a few feet in heat of his vehicle?s left front fender. illuminated by SA

vehicle headlights, initially had his back to the o?icers. After a few
and faced SA and- the officers. i [had the ?rearm in his
right hand, pointed at the ground. Office ontinued to issue verbal commands for
drop the gun. WhenI:Irefused to comply with the commands, 

to, step backwards towards the driver side of his vehicle to use as cover. As 
the front bumper to his vehicleiEraised his ?rearm and ointed it in 

direction. Fearin for their lives, Of?cer?
|_?Jwas struck ?ve times: once in both shoulders; once in his left thigh; once in i
the stomach; and once in the head. was-placed into custody without ?rrther incident.

No of?cers or Agents were injured.

 

 

 
   

 

Post Shooting Details

I - Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs res ended to thel:lblock of
Philadelphia, and transported Hahnernann Hospital in
Philadelphia, 

(Wm The shooting scene at thel:lblock of I: Philadelphia,
was processed by PPD, who took lead on? the investigation. PH ERT assisted
in processing the crime scene. Interviews were conducted by PPD Detectives of PPD Of?cers

whoassisted inl land PHAP. Of?cers? The reports were 
provided to the SIRT by PPD. On April 21, 2014, Of?ce was interviewed by the PPD.
A was taken from The and o?icer interviews corroborated the factual

accounting of the shooting. All other evidentiary reports and photos were provided to the SIRT 
by PPD. Additionally, PPD conducted a neighborhood canvass, which met with negative results.

(Him was charged by the PPD-with Aggravated Assault on a Police
Of?cer by Handgun. as not charged federally for Assault on a Federal Of?cer.

 

 

g. Accounting of Shots Fired I

seven rounds from his Glock 26 9mm handgun. Four
rounds were recovered in his weapon (one in the chamber, three in the magazine . An additional
magazine containing ten rounds was also recovered from SE Of?ce ?red six
rounds from his Glock .40 caliber handgun. Six rounds were recovered from his weapon (one
round in the chamber, ?ve rounds in the magazine). O?icerl:l?red two rounds from his
Glock .45 caliber handgun. Eleven rounds were recovered-?om his weapon (one in the chamber,
ten in the magazine). Critic rred six rounds from his Glock .40 caliber handgun. Eight
rounds were recovered from his weapon (one round in the chamber, seven rounds in the 
magazine). A total of 21 rounds were ?red, and all shell casings were accounted for at the scene.
No other personnel ?red their weapon. The PPD Firearms Identi?cation Unit Laboratory Report

4




b6 
-1,4,7


b7C ?1,2.4
nan ?1,s

b6 ?7
.b?c ?1

b6 -1,4
h7C -1,4

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDM

identi?ed all of the recovered rounds and attributed them to their corresponding weapons. The 
?ve rounds which struck]:de not be medicailjirr recovered from the subject. An b6 - 7
catamination could not be performed to determine the weapon(s) of origin. The report also I '7
indicated all' FBI, PPD, PI-IAP, and the subject?s weapons were tested and determined to ?Jnction 
as' designed. . . 

SuhjectInformation

Name: - b6 -7
Position: NIA MC -7
Sex: Male
Race:

Height:
Weighg
Hair:
Eyesf
DOB:
SSAN:
FBI 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(WM) criminal history contained multiple entries, to include 13 arrests b5 1
. for offenses including narcotics, assault, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering, resisting P70 ?1
arrest, weapons violations, robbery, theft receiving stolen property, driving under the in?uence,
and p'oSSessing instruments of a crime. :Iwas convicted three times, most recently on I
August 7, 2000, for aggravated assault. The other convictions included simple assault (1997)
and narcotics (1999). -

(WM At the time of the NCIC query,l:lhad no active warrants.

i. Use of Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

 

 

 

 

r. 

'In order to maintain a discrete pro?le for the surveillance: b6 -1
SAI IWas not wearing body armor or identifying FBI clothing. PHAP WC '1
and PPD officers were in uniform and wearing body armor. 1373 ?1 5

j. Forensic Summary

(Wm On January 27, 2014, FBI PH ERT and Philadelphia Police Forensic
Science Center Crime Scene Investigators were noti?ed of the shootin at .
approximater 3:40 am. At 5:05 am, ERT deployed to thel:|bloclr 0 b5 -1 2
Philadelphia, the scene of the Agent?Involved Shooting, and assisted PPD in 137': ?1 2
processing the scene. At 2:30 pm, ERT departed, while PPD maintained control of the shooting -
scene. At 6:15 pm, PH ERT returned to conduct nighttime Spherical photo -a hs. Items
recovered from SAI:Iincluded a Glock 26 9mm ?rearm, serial number with one
round in the chamber and three rounds in the magazine and one extra 9mm magazine which
contained 10 rounds. personnel recovered two .40 caliber Glock 225, one .45 caliber

5
- UNCLASSIFIEDXM

 



 

 

Glock 21, and associated ammunition used by PPD of?cers who discharged their weapons. In
addition, personnel recovered casings located at the shooting scene. While the subject .
was taken into custody, PPD recovered one projectile funlmo'mi caliber) ?om the clothing by the

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

subject's right thigh. The four rounds that struck ere not recovered, and could not be b6 - 1
removed from the subject?s body. When the subject was taken to Hahnemann Heepital MC ?1
Emergency Room, the following items were seized by PPD: one blackjacket; one grey hooded
sweatshirt; one white undershirt; one pair of black pants; one pair of black thermals; one pair of
black socks; one pair of black sneakers; one black glove; one 20 dollar bill, ?ve one dollar bills,
and one zip lock bag containing suspected marijuana. On January 27, 2014, at 6:55 PM,
processing of the scene was concluded.
. (WM Philadelphia ERT provided the with two compact disks containing
crime scene photographs with an accom anying photo lo . These ahotographs depicted the 
shooting incident scene located in th block of I IPhiIadelphia, Penna Ivania. b6 -2
For recordin oses, ERT used the address of the residence abutting the vacant lot, 137?: ?2
?hiladelphia, PH ERT also provided an SIRT with a copy of
the BRT Workbook.
An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items follows (all item numbers
are PPD inventory numbers - some items did not have an inventory number):
1 FCC ?Federal .45 auto?
2 FCC ?Federal .45 auto?
3 FCC ?Win 9mm Luger?
4 FCC ?Win 9mm Luger?
5 FCC ?Win 9mm Luger?
6 9mm Luger?
7 FCC ?Win 9mm Luger?
3 ?Win 9mm Luger?
9 FCC ?Win 9mm Luger?
10 FCC ?Federal .40 
ll' FCC ?Federal .40 
12 . FCC ?Federal .40 
13. FCC ?Federal .40 
14 FCC ?Federal .40 
15_ . CC ?Federal .40 
16 FCC ?Federal .40 
17 Gun Lorcin Model L380, serial |semi~auto pistol,? loaded with one live b6 -7
cartridge in the chamber and the three live cartridges in the magazine . b7?: '7
18 FCC ?Federal .40 38500?
19 FCC ?Federal .40 
19 FCC ?Federal .40 
20 FCC ?Federal .40 
21 FCC ?Federal .40 
'22 FCC ?Federal .40 
23_ FCC ?Federal .40 

 

 

6


NWT-969

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDIM

 

FCC ?Federal .40 

 

24 
- Projectile copper and lead base lodged in subjects clothing 

 

Clothing removed from subject

 

$20 bill and ?ve one dollar bills taken from subject

 

Suspected marijuana taken from subj ect

 

 

rounds 

Glock 22 .40 caliber handgun, serial I(Of?ced magazine with six

b6 -4
?4

 

 

4

Glock 22 .40. caliber handgun, serial #1 Imagazine with eight rounds (Of?cer 

 

 

I Gloek 21 .45 caliber handgun, serial - Iw 11 rounds (Of?cell

 

 

 

k. Medical Summary 
FBI A ents? involved in the shootin 
(Him SAI:|was not injured in the shooting.

Subjects:

 

(vi/13315113 PPD EMS ?Medic 7? was dispatched on January 27, 2014, at 3 :01 am. .

EMS ?Medic 7? arrived on scene at 3:10 am. EMS ?Medic 7? departed the scene at 3:13 am. ..

 

and arrived at Hahnernann Hos Jital at 3:35 am.  The attending emergency room

 

physician was 

's currently in Grateford Prison, Philadelphia, 

is con?ned to a eelchair with partial paralysis. The five rounds were not removed as

they were lodged in or near the lumbar 4, thoracic 11,'thoracic 12 vertebrae, and the skull.

Shooting Incident Review Team Details

personnel:

Inspector-in-ICharge (IIClGiegory T. Bretzin . 
Assistant Inspector Team Leader (Hal:
- -

Assi?tant Inspector?in-Place 

 

AJIP
AIIP
AIIP
ans
AIIP

 

 

 

h. The FBI Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction f'ersonnel:

None.

7 .


a; The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the following

.bG 
*b?C -l,2 

 



IV. Shooting Incident Review Protocol -

. (Wm On January 27, 2014, Philadelphia Field Of?ce SAC Edward J. Hanko,
spoke with Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields and submitted a Executive Situation
Raport to the Director. IIC Bretzing-spoke with ASAC
toi?arriving in Philadelphia, 

 On January, 27, 2014, the SIRT traveled to Philadelphia and reviewed the
InSpection Divisionshooting review protocol.
(newts .
members met with Philadelphia Field Office EM, PPD EM and ERT ersonnel. The SIRT also
viewed the shooting scene, which occurred in theEblock ofl:l Philadelphia,
.

..
I-

l.
(Him On January 2'7, 2014, IIC Bretzing met SAC Hanko to explain the SIRT
process and protocols.

arrange logistics prior

b6 -1
-1

On January 27, 2014, at approximately 2:00 IIC Bretzing and the SIRT

b6 -2
-2

(WM In total, seven FBI interviews were conducted of Philadelphia Field Of?ce 

- personnel. Six interviews were documented via FD-3 02. A was obtained ?om 

Additionally, nine PPD interview'reports of PPD and PHAP of?cers were provided to the SIRT

by PPD.
(Him On January 30, 2014, IIC Bretzing provided an exit brief to SAC Hanko.
Administrative 

Firearms Training 

(Wm Firearms quali?cations records for SAI:lwere provided to the SIRT
through the FIRST quali?cation database. SAI:Ilast quali?ed with his service weapon on
september 3, 2013, and was in compliance with the ?rearms quali?cations requirements.

Deadly Force Training

(WM) FBI Deadly. Force Policy training was conducted by CDC
on eight occasions throughout 2013. The last training SA|:|participated in 'was on
September '3 0, 2013. . .

c. DOJ Civil Rights Division Prosecutorial Decision I

(WM) INSD providedl:l Special Leqal Counsel, Department of

Justice, Civil Rights Division, PPD interviews of PHAP Of?cers
and the of Agentl Mr.| lreviewed the interviews and and
provided JNSD a prosecutorial declination on May 5, 2014. 

 

. 3 - - 
UNCLAS SIFIEDIW

PPD O?icer

-1,3,4
-1,3,4

NYT-971

 

 

 

 




 

 

 

UNCLAS 

(1. Local Prosecutorial Decision 

(origami) On January 29, 2014, no Bretzing and AI|:|mst with Assistant District
Attorney IADA as assigned to the Special Investigations I.
Unit, Philadelphia District Attorney?s Of?ce, 3 South Penn Square, Philadelphia, 
telephonel I Also present was SSA SSA for
Squad C-3, Philadelphia Field Office. ADAI Iadvised he reviewed the initial Philadelphia

Police Department reports from the January 27, 2014, shooting incident which occurred in the

 

 

I: block 0 Philadelphia, From his initial review, ADA
did not see any crimina issues with the use of deadly? force by other o?icers
involved" in the shooting. AD anticipated that it would take approximately two months
to complete his review of the investigation and submit his report and recommendations to the
District Attorney for his approval. provide the ?nal and approved report to the
SIRT- upon its completion. As of April 14, 2014, the SIRT has not received the ?nal and
approved report ?om the Philadelphia District Attomey?s Of?ce.

VI. Inspector?s Draft Observations

(Wm Observation 1: Al I was
prepared for[ |but not briefed to the surveillance team prior to the

operation.
. Analysis 1: On January 16, 2014, SAI sent anI 
to SSAFrequesting technical assistance I

SSA assigned the request tol I
Pursuant to theI [prepared aI Ifor this operation. Utilization of a
as standard operating procedure for thel I

I The request was approved by SSA The request included the 
I photographs of the subjects, subject vehicles, and the DOJ Deadly Force Policy.
Although the plan was discussed between the: the plan was not briefed to SA: or

DEA prior to the operation.

Recommendation 1: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure theI:Iis briefed
to all team members involved inEoperation.

. (Dim Observation 2: not wearing his body either at the time of
the shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(WM Analysis 2: Manual of Investigative Operations Guidelines Part 2 states:

12-13.] Policy - Body Armor (Formerly 

'Wearing of bony armor by SA personnelr is mandatory daringpianned arrests,
execution of search warrants and which can reasonably be expected to culminate
in'a con?ontaiion with armed and dangerous sabjeci(s).

On January 27, 2014, part of the surveillance and cover team forI I
I I While on surveillance, SA. as made aware via rad of an

 

 

 

. 1




b6 -1,2,4
b7C -1,2,4


I

h?E -1,6

b6 -1,3,4

-1,3,4
-1,6

b7E -1b7E -1,6

 

 

 

armed rebbeyy in the area. SAI:Iobserved the subject, gave chase, and was involved in an
agent-involved shooting of the subject. .SA

the shooting incident. 8

(HIM) Recommendation 2: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure Agente wear their



body armor in accurdanee with MIOG Policy.

10


as not wearing his body arm0r at the time of
5 body armor was in the trunk of his vehicle.



b6 -1



-1

 

  

(REV. 5-3-10}

 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elanlroniu Gnmmunioali an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Philadelphia Shooting Incident Date: 06f11f2014
cc; h? ?1
-1
From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY
Contact: I I
Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By:| I
Case ID 297I-HQ-A4214067 PHILADELPHIA SHOOTING INCIDENT
Synopsis: (UIEEDHQE This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 05/21/2014.
Administrative Notes: (UXEEBEQE This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division's Shooting Incident Report, dated
03121f2014, prepared by Inspector Trent R. Teyema. A copy of the
complete INSD Shooting Incident Report is electronically attached to
this communication.
Enolosure(s}: Enclosed are the following items:
1. (UfiE??i) SIRT Report
Details:
On 05f21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting incident
which occurred on Olf17f2014, involving Philadelphia Field Office
Special Agent I SAI Iwas participating operation belonging to
-1,6

 

 

 



NYT1974



Title: Philadelphia Shooting Incident

 

Re: 06f1112014 b5 -1!2!3r4!7
b7C 
b?A -1
subjects of an activel investigation. While

 

providing surveillance during the operation, an armed robbery occurred

at a nearby housing project. During the robbery, the subject, later

 

identified asI I fired a weapon at the victim. Two

 

Philadelphia Housing Authority Police (PHAP) officers were in the area
and reported the shot{s)fired. SA heard the broadcast via PPD
radio and advised over DEA TFO radio he would be
responding. As part of the Safe Streets Task Force, a PPD

radio channel in his vehicle. I

 

 

I SA Iannounced over the DEA
radio he would be responding. SAI Iwas already in the general
vicinity and shortly thereafter observed the subject run by his vehicle
carrying a firearm. the two PHAP officers, and a
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) officer a vacant
lot in the| Iofl I Philadelphia, 
cornered in the lot by a fence, pointed his .380 caliber Lorcing
handgun at three officers. Fearing for their lives,
and the officer fired a total of 21 times atI I

was struck five times: once in both shoulders; once in his thigh; once

 

 

 

 

 

 

in his stomach; and once in the head. No Agent or officers were

injured.
SIRG Observations

On 05/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

 

determined the application of deadly force 01!2?f2014 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's deadly

force policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, Observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational

planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

Observation 1: not wearing his body armor at the time b6 ?1
-1

2





Title: Philadelphia Shooting Incident
Re: U?fll/2014

of the shooting incident.

Analysis 1: Manual of Investigative Operations Guidelines Part 2

states:
12?13.1 Policy Body Armor (Formerly 12?2.3.2)

WEaring of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory during planned
arrests, execution of search warrants, and surveillances which can
reasonably be expected to culminate in a confrontation with armed and

dangerous subject(s).

On January 27, 2014, SAI Iwas part While on surveillance,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SA was made aware via radio of an armed robbery in the area. SA 1?6
the subject, gave chase, and was involved in an
Agent-involved shooting of the subject. not wearing his
body armor at the time of the shooting incident. body armor
was in the trunk of his vehicle.
Instruction 1: SEC, Philadelphia should ensure Agents wear their
body armor in accordance with MIOG Policy.
Observation 2: An Operations Plan, specifically al I -1,5,5
I I was prepared forI I
The Operations Plan was not briefed to the surveillance team prior to
the operation.
Analysis 2: On January 16, b5 '1
Ito requesting I ?1
-1,5,6
SSA
assigned the request to I
Pursuant to thel IpreparedaaE::]for this operation.

 

Utilization of al Iwas standard operating procedure for the 

I The request

was approved by SSAI I The request included theI I

plan, photographs of the subjects, subject vehicles, and the DOJ Deadly

 



3

NYT3976



Title: Philadelphia Shooting Incident
Re: U?fll/2014

Force Policy. Although the plan was discussed between the b5 ?1r3
. . brle prior b?E _1f5f6
operation.

Recommendation 2: SAC, Philadelphia should ensure briefed

to all team members involved inI hperation.

 

 

 

3. Provide recommendations for Administrative action if deemed

necessary. None

Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection Division 

 

chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office of
Inspections Special Legal Counsel, Civil b6 ?1,3

 

Rights Division, Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Violent ?1'3

Criminal Threats Section, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Roger A.
Coe, East Asia Section, Counterintelligence Division; Unit Chief (UC)
I I FTU, Supervisory Special Agent 
Sguad CR-2, Washington Field Office; SSAI 
Practical Applications Unit, Training Division 
Defensive Systems Unit, SSAI I Investigative
Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSAI I
Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical
Incident Response Group (CIRG). In addition to the voting members in
attendance, DOJ SIRG unable to attend but reviewed

the Shooting Incident Review Team report and provided his vote in

 

 

 

 

 

writing prior to the SIRG. The following non?voting members were also

 

in attendance: I I Office of Inspector

 

General, Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Shawn W. Stroud, Paul D.
Delacourt, and R. Justin Tolomeo, OI, Team 

IOI, INSD: UCI FTU, 

 

 

 



4



UNCIASSIFIED 

Title: Philadelphia Shooting Incident
Re: U?fll/2014

 

 

I I Special Assistant, OI, UCI land he '1
-1

 

 

Management Program I and

 

I IInspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

SAC, PH, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
InstructionfRecommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the InstructionfRecommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
InstructionfRecommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

SAC, PH, is required to provide a written response, via EC,
detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
InstructionfRecommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed

to Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. b5 ?1
-1

 

 

Once the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPA

 

CO



Teyema, Trent R.

From: b6 ?3
Sent: on ay. ay .2014 5:55 PM 57? -3

 

To: Te ema TrerltR.
Cm 
Subject: Philadelphia 1127714 FBI shooting .

Inspector Trent Teyema
Inspection Division
FBI

During the early morning hours of January 2614 an FBI 5 ecial agent and three
local Philadelphia police officers shot at and Following an armed b6 ?7

robbery and shooting by the subject and after the subject pointed his weapon at the law 
enforcement officers. Based upon a review of materials from the Inspection Division Shooting
Incident Report, we have concluded that the facts do not warrant a federal criminal civil
rights investigation. The Philadelphia County District Attorney's Office concluded that no
criminal charges were warranted.
The agent was involved in an unrelated law enforcement activity on a Philadelphia
street at about 2 a.m. when he heard a radio broadcast that shots had been fired close to his
location. The broadcast included a physical description of the subject. As the agent drove
toward the area, he saw a man fitting the description running with a handgun. Meanwhile,
three uniform local police officers were pursuing on foot after they heard shots and
encountered the victim of the robbery, learned the subject had robbed and shot at the victim,
and saw the subject running with a hand_gun.
During the foot chase the police officers yelled, "Stop! Police! Drop the gun!" The
subject continued to run until the agent and three police officers cornered him in a vacant
lot. Initially, when the subject stopped, he had his back to the agent, who identified
himself as and the three officers. But, he turned toward them and pointed the gun in
their direction. All four law enforcement officers fire several rounds each. The subject
sustained bullet multiple bullet wounds, but nOne were fatal. He survived and is facing
various local criminal charges.? I
The statements of the four law enforcement officers involved in the shooting are
consistent. They are the only witnesses to the shooting.' Other officers quickly arrived and
corroborated that the wounded subject was still armed with a .38 caliber handgun. None of
the forensic evidence contradicts the consistent accounts. The .38 caliber handgun had been
fired. A .38 caliber cartridge casing was recovered; however, there were insofficient
markings on the casing to permit comparison with the subject's .38 caliber weapon. The victim
identified the subject as the man who robbed and shot at him moments before the law -
enforcement shooting. - .
The evidence supports a conclusion that the agent and the police officers reasonably
believed that the subject was fleeing after committing an armed and violent crime and was
prepared to fire his weapon at the law enforcement officers. The evidence does not support a
conclusion that the agent or the police officers willfully used force that they knew to be
unreasonable or.unnecessary, the intent element required by the federal criminal civil rights
statutes. .
A federal criminal civil rights investigation of the shooting and its aftermath is not
warranted. We appreciate the agent's voluntary statement, facilitating a fully informed -
decision. Please complete your administrative review. .

I - b6 ?3
SpeC1a Lega Counsel -3

Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

 

NYT-979

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l.t.l I Internal Affairs Divisinn.?Shouting 'I'eam . 135 ?1r4
From: I It'hiel'. Special lnvestigatiuns Unit hr?: 4
Re: 'Rectumnientlatiun In L'luse Criminal lnvestigatiun ul?
Discharge by:
Philadelphia i?fUI 
Philadelphia {musing Anthurity Wt) 
Philadelphia {lensing Authority I

 

 

 

 

Special Agentl I

I have reviewed the available information pertaining in the above-referenced incident.
Based on that review. the District Attorney?s Ul'lice has concluded that no criminal charges are

 

 

 

wairtinted against PstI Ier b6 -1 i 4

a result of the discharges of their lircarms on January 27. 20 I4. 137?: '1 4
b6 -4
b'i'C -4

 

 

 

Chief. Special investigations Unit

Date: A

cc: Deputy District Attorney. investigations Division 135 '3
Law Clerk, S.l.Ll. 137:: ?3

I IAssistant District Attorney

 

 

NYT-980

 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTDJENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 03/12f2013
I Report of: HG Gregory T. Bretzing Of?ce: FBIHQ r- INSD
Case 
ma; SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT

MOBILE FIELD OFFICE

02f04f2013
Investigative Period: 02/041?2013 02H 

Reference: (U) Telephone call on 02f04a?2013 from AD Ronald Hosko to AD Keith Bennett.

Smogsis

 

(U) On February 4, 2013, at approximately 3:30 pm, an Agent-involved shooting
occurred in Midland City, Alabama (AL). The Agents involved, Hosta Rescue Team (HRT)
Operatorsl were participating in b6 -1 . 5
an FBI hostage rescue operation. On January 29, 2013 subject Jimmy Lee Dykes boarded a -1 . 5
school bus, shot and killed the bus driver and took aI I-year-old boy hostage from the bus in
Midland City, AL. Dykes barricaded himself with the hostage in a bunker structure located on
his preperty at 256 Private Road 1539, Midland City, AL. Dykes called 91 1 and directed ?rst
responders to communicate with him through a PVC communications tube located at the
entrance of his property. An IED was later discovered in the PVC tube. Negotiators made
contact with Dykes and learned his demand was to exchange the hostage for a reporter to record
his story and then observe him commit suicide. HRT and other CIRG components arrived on
scene on January 30, 2013. Over the next ?ve days, HRT gathered intelligence and prepared for
several different rescue scenarios as negotiations continued. Dykes became increasineg
agitated and indicated violence was likely.

 

(U) By February 4, 2013, negotiations with Dykes had deteriorated. According to expert
analysis, Dykes? increasing agitation indicated the use of violence was likely and imminent.
Authorization for a deliberate assault utilizing an explosive charge to breach the bunker hatch
was received. HRT operators successfully breached the bunker hatch and safely removed the
hostage while Dykes (awed the I-IRT Operators with gun?re. The situation ended with 156 ?1
Operatorsl? shooting Dykes, who died inside the bunker. - 1

 

Details

(U) Jimmy Lee Dykes was a 65?year-old white male who lived alone on an undeveloped
one acre parcel of land at 256 Private Road 1539, Midland City, AL. Dykes was a Vietnam
veteran and former truck driver with an arrest history of drug, theft, and ?rearms-related
offenses. Dykes was estranged ?orn family, ?'iends, and neighbors. Dykes had, however,

Page 1 of 15

NYT-981

 

 

established an acquaintance with Charles Albert Poland, a school bus driver from the local

school district. A year prior, as an apparent gesture of friendship, Dykes excavated a turnaround

point adjacent to his property on Private Road 1539, giving Mr. Poland more room to turn his

bus around. On January 29, 2013, Mr. Poland was transporting approximately 20 children home

from school and stopped the bus in the turnaround point near Dykes? residence. At 3:33 pm

Dykes boarded the bus, displayed a handgun, and handed Mr. Poland a handwritten note. Dykes

verbally demanded Mr. Poland provide two children to accompany him. Mr. Poland told Dykes

he could not allow any children to leave the bus. A confrontation lasting approximately four

minutes took place between Dykes and Mr. Poland in which Dykes continually demanded two

children. During this confrontation, one of the children on the bus placed a call to the Ozark?

Dale County Emergency 911 line without Dykes noticing and described what was taking place.

Dykes grew increasingly agitated during the exchange as Mr. Poland continued to refuse his

demands, and at 3:37 pm, Dykes shot Mr. Poland ?ve times. Dykes then took aEIyear-old b6 - 5
boy from the bus and ?ed on foot to an underground bunker structure he built on his property at MC ?5
256 Private Road 1539. Mr. Poland died at the scene.

(U) At 3:40 pm, Dykes called the Ozark-Dale County Emergency 911 line and stated he
had a hostage and had to shoot the school bus driver because he didn?t follow Dykes?
instructions. Dykes called back seven minutes later and instructed the 911 operator to direct
police to a PVC communications tube at the entrance gate to his property. First responders from
the Dale County Sheri??s Of?ce (DCSO) arrived at the scene while Dykes was making his ?rst
911 call. 

(U) FBI Mobile and several other state and local law enforcement agencies were
immediately noti?ed. on noti?cation, Mobile SAC Stephen E. Richardson met with several
SSAs and gather information and assess the situation. SAC b6 - 1
Richardson also assembled Mobile?s crisis response leaders, SWAT, Negotiators and Special 137:: ?1
Agent Bomb Technicians SABTs). SAC Richardson contacted CTD, CID AD Ronald T. Hosko b'i'E ?1
and CIRG AIAD to nfonn them of the situation. He also spoke with HRT SC-
Kevln Cornelius and HR and requested HRT to be placed on
standby. He ordered Mobr omrnand Post personne to be deployed to Midland City, along
with the Mobile SWAT Team Leader and ASAC SAC Richardson also requested
Birmingham Division SWAT support and OTD Technical Response Unit resources. SAC
Richardson ensured all Mobile crisis response assets were en route to Midland City by 5:00 pm.

 

  
    

 

(U) By approximately 5:00 pm, responders from the Houston County Sheriff?s Of?ce

 

 

 

   
   
 

 

 

 

(I-ICSO), Alabama State Police, Ozark PD Dothar, PD, and Newton PD were on scene. FBI
Mobile SWAT Team Leader SAI arrived at the scene at approximate 6:30 pm, b6 - 1
and Montgomery SSRA arrived at approximately ?:00 pm. When SSRA I MC ?1
arrived at the incident si? 'sed a perimeter had been established by the HC. and HIE ?1
Dothan PD SWAT teams. SS met with supervisors from the HCSO and Dothan PD to set 
a Command Post (CF). The was set up in the midlding, app :er
#fmm the incident site. At approximate obile ASAC arrived
at mot cut scene. 
(U) Upon his arrival, ASACI:Iassurned command. Also at the scene were Dale b6 -1 4

un Sheri if Gary Wallace Olson and Alabama Bureau of Investigation (ABI) Lieutenant (Lt) me ?1 4

I The roles and responsibilities of the hostage taking investigation had been divided
etween BI, the DCSO, and the ABI. The DCSO was responsible for the intake of

information through their 91 I call center, the perimeter of the incident site, and tactical elements.
The ABI was handling the homicide investigation while the FBI was handling leads generated by
the investigation.

Page 2 of 15

NYT-982

 

 

 

 

ASAC ent to the incident site to assess the situation. He met with Mobile 136 - 1 4
1 HCSO Deputy Sheri?' Lt. who were the first MC -1 4
negotiators to cornmuuicate with Dykes. The ac otiators spo WI vkes throagh a 170- foot
PVC pipe leading into the bunker. SAI:Ihhriefed ASAC on the subject?s only
demand, which was to have a reporter come into bunker, record his ife story, and observe
him commit suicide. Negotiators also learned the hosta required medication and convinced
Dykes to allow medicine and toy deliveries. provided a copy of the letter
Dykes left on the bus outlining his demands for a female reporter in exchange for the hostage.

 

 

 

 

(U) At approximately 9:30 pm on January 29, 2013, Dykes informed the negotiators he
was goin to bed. He sealed the bunker-end of the PVC tube and ceased communications.
ASAC called SAC Richardson shertly thereafter and fully briefed him on the situation. be 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

?1
(mm Tater that evening ASACI I
Ieffectivelv with the subiect. At
a roximatelv 4:48 am on January 30. 2013.] ME _1
personnel formulated a
'mnl I
With the subject until negotiators provided the
subject a ?throw phone.?
. (Ll/m Dykes woke up at a

 

munications

I Ne otiators discussed rovidin Dykes with a throw phone for
communication purposesJ b7E ?1

 

 

 

 

 

[The negotiators also obtained Dykes? approval to begin
medication deliveries for the hostage. At 10:08 am, the ?rst medicine delivery was made, and at
12:12 pm the throw phone was delivered.

 

 

i
 (U) SAC Richardson arriv 1e CP early the morning January 30, 2013 and assumed
I .

 

on-scene command duties. ASAC became the de ut on scene commander and was be - 1
involved in planning and investigative support. ASA worked a shift which overlapped ?1
I with SAC Richardson?s 6:00 am to 1:00 am shift. b'?E ?1

(U) At approximately 1:00 pm on January 30, 2013, CIRG Tactical Section Chief Kevin
R. Cornelius authorized HRT de lo cut to Midland City in response to SAC Richardson?s

Wigglasshtame. The departed Richmond, VA at approximately 2:30 pm.
UC SS and other

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

|Enernbers reviewed intelligence and imagery xii-Ed an emergency assault plan
a en route 'Ie a I-IRT Master devised a preliminary
explosive breaching plan. 

(U) Thel:hnived in Midland City at approximately 3 :30 pm. SAC Richardson
met with SC Come ms and began developing a tactical plan. They discussed options for
resolving the event and shared these options with heads of local law enforcement, to include

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dale?County Sheriff Gary Olson. UC, eported to the CP and assumed the role of ground he - 1
force commander. UC commended to SAC Richardson a course of action for the ?1
Ito immediately prepare for emergency and deliberate assault options, as well as a utih b'?E ?1
The utili mission included medicine and toy deliveries to the bunkerJ
Upon
conclusion of the initial in?brief, and for the remainder of January 30, 2013, HRT assumed

Page 3 of 15

NWT-983

 

 

 

 

control of the tactical operations at the incident site and began assisting in the medicine
deliveries. During a medicine delivery at ?i:20 pm, HRT spoke to the hostage who stated he
received the medicine. 

(U) Early on the morning of January 31, HRT searched several structures on Dykes?
property and discovered no threats to law enforcement personnel. HRT utilized canines to check
the area around the other structures on Dykes? property, which were a FEMA trailer, a Cortex
box, a small shed, and a Ford van. The canines did not locate any IEDs on the property other
than the IED in the communication pipe. -

- (U) Starting January 31, 2013, SAC Richardson held two daily brie?ngs. The ?rst was
at 8:00 am and the second at 6:30 pm. The meetings were attended by members of the following
groups: Tactical Teams, Bomb Technicians, Negotiators, Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU),
Legal, Medical Support and Aviation. These briefings provided a venue for discussions
regarding current circumstances and potential solutions. SAC Richardson continued this practice
for the duration of the crisis.

(U) Within the ?rst 12 hours of the incident, Dykes? letter explaining his demands was
sent to the BAU for analysis. Based on the contents of the letter and Dykes? actions, BAU
assessed Dykes would follow through with his threats and would probably not come out from the
bunker alive. BAU also assessed the hostage to be in danger.

January 31, 2013, aircraft fr OTD and the Atlanta and Oklahoma City

Field Of?ces arrived on scene and commencedi i
I CP personnel continued to monitt? 

|Dykes had previously
told negotiators about an IED he built and had with him in the bunker. Dykes said he would
detonate the IED should his demand not be met. Dykes further advised he did not want to hurt
the hostage, but he would if necessary. Negotiations with Dykes this day met with negative
results as Dykes continued to demand to speak to a reporter.

(U) On Februaryl 2013, HRT Agents Itwo medicine
deliveries and continued preparations as negotr ations continued. UC Cornelius,
SAC Richardson, and negotiators developed a deliberate assault plan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IWhlle
assault plans were formulatedJ bommenced an alternating cycle of planning,
rehearsals, and medicine and toy dehvenes to the bunker. As there was no predetermined team
for the deliberate assault, both teams prepared and trained for the same mission. This allowed
both teams to adapt and re?ne the assault plans as circumstances changed or intelligence
provided additional information.

 

(U) On February 2, 2013, negotiations, medicine deliveries, assault preparations, and
rehearsals continued.

(U) On February 3, 2013, a federal criminal complaint and arrest warrant were issued by
U.S. Magistrate Terry Moorer, United States District Court, Middle District of Alabama.
Medicine deliveries and assault preparation continued, however changes in Dykes? and the
hostage?s behavior were noted. The hostage refused medicine, and negotiations with Dykes
became longer with Dykes becoming increasingly agitated. Dykes set a deadline of 5:00 pm
February 4, 2013 for the reporth to be produced or he would no longer communicate with the
negotiators. I 

Page 4 of 15

-1,4,6
-1,6
-4

NYT-984

 

 

 

 

(U) By February 4, 2013, BAU Ihad

worked closely with Crisis Negotiation Unit (GNU) 

Ito assess Dykes?

behavior and prepare negotiations strategy. BAU prepared three on-site assessments
documenting evaluations of Dykes? history, current behavior, and possible future behavior.

(U) BAU reported the following consenting Dykes to the negotiators, I-IRT management,
and SAC Richardson:

The best predictor of ?rture action is past behavior. Dykes demonstrated a clear
history of using lethal force when his demands were not met. BAU cited Dykes?
January 29, 2013 murder of school bus driver Charles Poland for refusing to
deliver two of Poland?s minor passengers to Dykes. BAU also cited Dykes?.
recent bludgeoning to death of a neighbor?s dog after warning the neighbor he
would kill the dog if it appeared again on his property.

Dykes repeatedly warned during negotiations, ?this will go bad? if his demands
were not met. BAU advised Dykes must be taken at his word in this regard.

Although Dykes never speci?cally threatened to kill the hostage, he left no room
for his plan to be altered. If his demands were not met, violence was Dykes? only
Option.

 

 

 

 

 

Dykes was isolated,

 

 

abu rvet ramn members a?d had a msto of cilttin off famil
relationships. I I

overall ?nding was there could be no assumption Dykes would not hurt
the hostage. lDyices? history, coupled
with his behavior following his abduction of the hostage, indicated a very high
risk of violence toward the hostage and others.

 

BAU observed Dykes to be more dif?cult to placate in the 24 hours preceding the
?nal assault on the bunker.

 

 

 

 

Dykes also issued more hard deadlmes tor his demands.

(U) BAU concluded from these factors Dykes was about to realize his mission was going
to fail. Based on his prior history of being uncompromising, he would realize he had no other
option than lethal violence.

 

D) From the everdng of February 3? into the morning of the 4th, HRT UC SSA

i [and seal:

 

,?nalized the deliberate assauit'plan which contained a dea orce

Page 1:16 -3.
h7C -1

 

 

policy annex. The Operations order and deadly force policy were briefed each of the previous
?ve days as the deliberate assault plan was prepared and ?nalized.

(U) The plan called fori

 

 

 

 

 

The plan was

 

forwarded to UC

 

eceived brie?ngs

(1 SC Cornelius for their review. Prior to the end of his shi?,
the negotiators which. indicated the negotiations and

subject emeanor continued to deteriorate.

(U) During the morning of February 4, 2013, a conference call was held to discuss the
hostage situation and the assault. Participants in the conference call included FBI Director
Robert S. Mueller Deputy Director Sean Joyce, Executive Assistant Director Richard A.
McFeely, Assistant Director Ronald T. Hosko SAC Richardson SAC Steven E. Ibison, SC

 

 

Cornelius, UC

 

l:l 

 

SABTEI and ABI

Major Neil Tew. Director Mueller instructed SAC Richardson to call him once the decision was
made to initiate the assault. SAC Richardson advised SC Comelius to prepare for the deliberate

assault.

 

(UH

(U) SAC Richardson called EAD McFeely and AD Hosko at approximately 1:50 pm to
notify them the operation was going to be initiated. He gave permission to SC Cornelius to

move HRT forward to conduct the assault. SAC Richardson then gave UC

he authority

to initiate the deliberate assault, effect an emergency assault if it appeared Dykes was about to
harm the hostage, or pull back from the bunker if necessary.

(U) At approximately 2:00 other HRT elements moved to a forward

staging area on the perimeter of Dykes? property and awaited permission to take positions around
the bunker. The following personnel were tasked to conduct or support the deliberate assault and

deployed to the immediate bunker vicinity:

Name

Role

 

 

 

 

b6 

b7: ?1

?1Page 6 of 15

NYT-986

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(U) UCI Ir
sted permission to position the teams. UCI 
I and SC Cornelius at the TOC. At approximately 2:30 pm, the teams moved into their

 

?nai' positions.
(U) UC

emission to execute deliberate assault. SC Cornelius provided UCI
I [several minute5 later. I

adioed the Tactical Op= Center (TOC) from the staging are
aintained radio contact with be

 

qwioed SC Cornelius and requested I [which meant
hneant UC

 

 

was authorized to execute or abort the assault without having to request ?mher permissron.



up to the bunker
to their cover position and reported the charge had been set. At 3:00 pm, th

element positioned the ram a ainst the bunker retaining wall and returned to err cover
position. At3:05 pm, S)de HCSO used to the bunker,
established contact with Dy

13mi?
. UCI

radioe?prepare for the assault. The breach team moved
tc and place reac charge. At 2:59 pm, the breach team returned
support

 

es, an inserted medicine and toys into unker hatch. At 3 :08
linto the hatch and immediately returned to cover

 

 

Through radio contact with SAI IUCI Icon?rmed the hostage was away from the
bunker access tube.

Page 7 of 15



b6 -1,4
-1,4
-1-1,4
-1,4
b7E -1,4,6

 

 

 

 

(U) At 3:09 pm 
UCI_Isignaled SAI Ito detonate the breach charge.

 

 

 

(U) The ex losive breach detonated and Newt halfway open. Half the assault
. element, SAI 3 moved from the left side of the
van and approached the er cm the stairs leadin up to the bunker hatch. The rer'rainin

assault element on the right side of the van, SA and SA I
side of the hatch. SAI Itr?ipped and fell

approached the bunker by using the ramp on

coming off the ramp onto the bunker and assumed :I?s responsibility to clear the
hatch from the openin . SA ed to clear the hatch for assaulters to
enter the opening. SA 
opening. The bunker entrance was partially obstruct

assaulters? view was obscured by dust and smoke.

(U) Gun?re erupted from within the bunker. SAI I

 

 

 

  
  
   
 

 

cables below the opening, and the

 

ISA

 

Idropped into the bunker ladder well usmg a bracmg bar and rope. SAI Imoved
orward to the bunker entrance yelling ?go, go, go.? Further gun?re came from within the
bunker.

(UIIDES) SAC Richardson was in the TOC with several othersl I
He watched as the breachm
charges were detonated and saw the ?rst operator attempt to enter the bunker.

 



 

b7E

 

 

 

 

I SAC Richardson heard radto to include
?shots ?red,? and could see assault personnel moving around the incident siteI I

(U) as unable to descend be ond an obstruction in the bunker entrance and
yelled ?back, bac ackl? SA immediately pulled SA ut of
the opening. believing SA ha een 3 ct, used his pistol to cover unker
hatch as as pulled from the structions in the ladder well. SA observed
several muzzle ?ashes from inside the bunker during this time and ?red nine . caliber rounds
?'om his FBI issued Glock 22 towards the muzzle flashes.

(U) The entry momentarily stalled after encountered the obstructions in the
bunker ladder well. Gun?re from within the bunker continued as Dykes yelled from inside the
bunker ?I?ll kill all you fuckers? and ?I?ll cook this thing 0 Dykes detonated the IED inside
the PVC tube which was folldwed by a back draft of air from inside the bunker.

Em 3;!11nmtg 3:12 pm, assault element personnell

into the bunker, and succeeded in fully removing
the hatch from the bunker opening. At 3 :12 pm, SAI Imoved 'orward and inserted a canine
into the bunker opening. The canine also became entan in the bunker ladder well obstruction
and was pulled back out. From 3: 12 pm to 3: 13 SA?g?red a breaching shotgun at the
obstruction, and SAII: assisted by ulle out debris and cut thrbugh the
obstruction with ho cutters. Post-incident investigation revealed evidence indicating the
obstruction was metal cabling Dykes used to secure the hatch in a closed position. As this was
taking place, members of the assault element gave voice commands to Dykes to release the

hostage and to surrender and come out of the bunker. (has refused to come out of the bunker
and continued to curse at the assault team. SSAI Itold assaulters to ?go, go, go? and ?you

 

 

 

 

 

 

got to go get the kid.?

(U) The obstruction was cleared from the bunker ladder well at 3:13 m. 
immediatelyjumped down into the bunker, followed by SAs SA

Page 3 of 15

NYT-988

-1,4 

 

Qen climbed down the ladder behind 3.64:] but did not fully enter the bunker
an

(U) As Operatorl:lfelt his way to the left inside the bunker, he encountered the
hostage, covered him, and began to crawl with him toward the exit. At the same time, SAs
lusing their hands to feel their way through the bunker, climbed over SA
land the hostage to enga ge Dykes. They physically encountered Dykes and a struggle

ensued. SA evacuated the hostage to the exit while SAsl I
attempted to subdue Dykes. Throughout the ?ght. SAs ere unable to see
or control Dykes? hands. Both Istated Dykes posed an imminent threat
to themselves and the hostage. ?red two .40 caliber rounds from his Glock 22 at
Dykes? torso. 's Gloc ctioned and he transitioned to his rifle. He
?red ?ve .223 ca 2 into Dykes? chest. SA observed Dykes continue to
struggle with SA and ?red approximately ee . caliber rounds from his Gloc 22
upward from below kes? jaw into his head. Dykes ceased struggling at this point. SA
heard either lor 3 say and understood the hostage was located.
is the standard term used by en a hostage is located. The hostage was handed
om inside the bunker who passed him to another agent outside the bunker at 3:14
then heard an Agent in the bunker say I
terminology to communicate a subject is incapacitated. lwent back
"into the bunker to check on the other Agents and to ensure Dykes was secured. Once SA
received audible continuation the Agents were okay, he gave a verbal command to the A ents 
the bunker to handcuff Dykes for safety purposes. Dykes was handcuffed by 8A4 and
Due to minimal visibility inside the bunker, Agents were unable to clear es person
0 IEDs, which would have enabled them to render ?rst aid or remove him from the bunker.

(U). At 3:18 pm, the last HRT member exited the-bunker. Dykes died at the scene as a
result of his gunshot wounds. irected the team to move the hostage to the
ambulance. medic, remained with the hostage and the team
returned to the staging area.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lber rou

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 
  

 

 

(U) Tactical operational control was maintained at the incident site until February 6,
2013 when bomb technicians cleared the bunker of IEDs. Evidence Recovery Teams removed
Dykes? body from the bunker and processed the site for evidence. The security perimeter was
maintained for several more days during this period to ensure public safety and preservation of
evidence.

Substantive Case Files

(WI 

Enclosures

 

(U) All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the enclosed
table of contents.

A. Administrative

(U) The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was composed of the following
personnel:

Inspector-in?Charge (IIC) Gregory T. Bretzing
Page 9 of 15

NYT-989

 

Inapcctor Howard S. Marshall
Inspector-in?Place (IIP) Zachary T. Lowe. I r.

Assistant Ins ectoreram Leader (T 
TH 


Assistant Inspector-in?Place 
AIIP


AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AHP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
MAI

FBI Laboratory Assets:

SSAI 

Physical Scientistl 

Visual Information Specialistl 
Photographed 
Physical Security Specialist (I-IazMat)| 
Telecommunications Specialis

 

 

 

 

 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

(U) All members of the SIRT reviewed the INSD Shooting Review Protocol.

(U) 0n 02(04f2013, IIC Bretzing communicated with Mobile Division Special Agent in
Charge (SAC) Stephen Richardson to arran logistics prior to arriving in Midland City, AL.
SAC Richardson assigned serve as the Point of Contact for the SIRT
during the investigation period. em ers SIRT began arriving during the early morning
hours of 02f05f2013. On 02(051?2013, Inspector Marshall addressed approximately 200 FBI,
state and local law enforcement personnel and explained INSD and SIRT protocols. Later that
day, IIC Bretzing and Inspector Marshall met with-SAC Richardson to explain the protocol of
the shooting inquiry. They also met with all SIRT personnel and outlined SIRT protocols. There
was an opportunity for dialogue regarding concerns, clari?cation, or questions prior to the
investigation commencing. Over the next two days, SIRT personnel reviewed recordings of the
011293013 kidnapping and bus driver shooting incident, and the 02(04/2013 HRT operation
which resulted in the rescue of the hostage and shooting death of the subject. SIRT personnel
also went to the scene of the shooting to visually examine the bunker in which the deceased
subject barricaded himself and the hostage for six days.

(U) Signed Sworn Statements were taken from ?ve FBI personnel who were
directly involved in the shooting or related events. Copies of 8335 were provided to those
interviewees who requested them. Other interviews, events and observations were documented
in 02s. The (Warning and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide
Information Following 3. Shooting) were executed by all personnel providing SS 35. Neither the
FD-644 (W arming and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information on a Voluntary

Page 10 of15

NW-QQU

 

it

.
'15



 

Basis) nor the (Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information)
were utilized. All 8835 and interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily and each
interviewee was afforded the Opportunity to review his statement.

(U) 0n 02H 112013, a telephonic exit brie?ng was provided by HG Bretzing and
Inspector Marshall to SAC Richardson.

C. Personnel Involved  the Shooting

 

 

 

I I. SAI [Rock River LARIS Serial Number: Glock 22 Serial
Nurnberl 1* -
2. SA

 

 

 

. KGlock 22 Serial NumberE
3. SA [Glock 22 Serial Number 
D. Firearms Training

(U) and Training Division provided quali?cations records for 
I A review of these Agents? records re?ected the following:

SA ?5 most recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Glock 22, Serial
Number was on 12f18f2 most recent quali?cation with his FBI-
issued Rock River LARIS, Serial was conducted on 10/26/2012.

most recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Glock 22, Serial Number
I iwas on 11/02f2012

J) SA most recent quali?cation with his FBI-issued Glock 22, Serial Number
1 was on {2012. .

 

 

E. Deadly Force Training

(U) The CIRG CDC provided annual legal training to FBI CIRG employees on
091?25/2012, and the Deadly Force Policy was briefed. The CIRG CDC advised HRT
Was provided a_ DVD of the annual legal training presentation following the 09f25f2012 brie?ng.
The CDC further advised policy required the Deadly Force Policy be briefed before
every nnssion. 

(U) determined a written operation plan was prepared for the 02f04f2013 hostage
rescue mission and briefed to all personnel involved in the operation. The Deadly
Force Policy was written into the operation plan. 

F. Use of_ Body Armor and Law Enforcement Identi?ers

(U) All HRT personnel who entered the bunker and engaged the subject wore ballistic
body armor bearing FBI identi?ers on the front and rear, and ballistic helmets. I-IRT personnel
verbally identified themselves to the'subject as FBI prior to entering the bunker and prior to
engaging subject.

G. FBI Indices and National Crime Information Center 
(U) On February 6, 2013, Intelligence Analyst, Mobile Division,

conducted a Universal Index search for Jimmy Lee Dykes, white male, date of birth?4f09f1947,
social security account number 418434-3336, FBI number 1563 OF. The search yielded results

Page ll ofllbNYT-991

 

 

for the pending hostage taking case in the Mobile Division. The search met
with negative results for all other investigative matters.

(U) On February 10, 20] AW Forensic Accountant, Mob? le D'vision,
provided printouts ?om the Nation nme ormation Center (N CIC) and the
with criminal history information for Jimmy Lee Dykes,
white male, date of birth 0410911947, social security account number 41 8-64-3 336, FBI number

15630F.

(U) The print-outs contained multiple records for Dykes including the following three
most recent entries: 

 

 

 

 

0 0n 1212212012, Dykes was arrested for menacing, noting the charge was a
misdemeanor. The report generated from]: provided case number
2600DC201200103700 and a case status of ?Bond.? No further information was
provided in the report.

0 On 0412212000, Dykes was arrested for drug possession by the Bonifay, Florida
police department. He was sentenced to twelve months probation and a two
year driver?s license suspension. 

On 0212411995, Dykes was arrested for the unlawful display of a ?rearm by the
Bay County, Florida Sheriff?s o?ice. The charges were dismissed on
0612211 995.

Prior arrests on charges of petit larceny, destroying property, marijuana possession,
insulting a police of?cer, and driving while intoxicated were recorded 061?30/1964 through
01124 1930.

(U) In 1977, Dykes served a one-year prison term in the Houston County, Alabama jail
for marijuana possession. He was released on parole on 0812811978.

H. Evidence Recove Team 

(U) Mobile ERT, under Lab Division supervision, conducted post-incident shooting
trajectory analysis and evidence recovery. 

(U) On 0210612013, ERT executed a search warrant, issued in Circuit Court of Dale
County by the State of Alabama, at 256 Private Road 1539, Midland City, Alabama. The
purpose of the search was to process the crime scene in connection with the joint investigation
between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Alabama Bureau of Investigation
(A31). The search of the bunker located on the property address resulted in the collection of
approximately 94 overall items of evidence. The search of a trailer, which served as the subj ect?s
residence, resulted in the collection of 36 evidence items. Three items of evidence were
collected from a large shipping container (referred to as the CONEX) located on the property and
17 additional items were recovered from the search of the property grounds. All items of
evidence collected were being processed by the FBI Laboratory for inclusion in the Mobile
investigative ?le.

(U) BRT Iprovided IN SD with copies of the ERT evidence
collection logs, sketches, photograph logs, and photographs. Mobile ERT 
provided three additional CDs containing scene photographs.

 

Page 12 of 15

NYT-992

 

 

I. Laboratorv Division Reports

(U) A Shooting Incident Reconstruction (SIR) was performed by members of the FBI
Labdratory Shooting Reconstruction Team on 02/051'2013 throu - 02/089013. The members of

the LSRT were Ph sical ScientistlForensic Examine Visual Information b6 -1
Specialis?and Photo ahe perational Projects Unit, and MC ?1
Supervisory peer gen of the Evidence Response Team Unit. The results of
to this report.

 
   

the examinations are inclu as an appen

J. Medical Examiner Reports

(U) On February 7, 2013, Dr.[ IState Medical Examiner for - b6 ?4
the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, conducted the autopsy of Jimmy Lee Dykes. 1370 '4
Initial information from the autopsy of Dykes indicated he was shot 12 times, with wounds
located in the face and chest, with the exception of one wound in the left hand. There were
multiple overlying wound tracks and trajectories, and individual wound channels could not be
identi?ed. Four projectiles of unspeci?ed caliber were recovered from the chest, skull, back, and
neck. Multiple non-retrievable small fragments were located in the chest and shoulder. The
initial information is categorized as follows:

 

 

Total Gun Shot Wounds 12

Fatal shots Undetermined
Non?fatal shots Undetermined
Bullets recovered 4 (unidenti?ed)
Wound locations:

Head 3 shots

Neck 1 shot

Chest and abdomen 7 shots

Left Hand 1 shot

(U) The majority of rounds entered Dykes? chest and face. The seven chest entry I
wounds were surrounded by stippling or soot. The ?nal cause of death was reported as "Multiple
Gunshot Wounds."

K. Declination by the Civil Rights Division

on completion of the on-site inquiry, IIC Bretzing coordinated SIRT ?ndings with
Special Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. On be ?3
0 03 2013, was provided an incident summary and copies of all eyewitness interviews. On -3
he was provided a copy of the autopsy, a copy of the Medical Examiner intendew,
and copies of diagrams and sketches of the bunker. On 06/139013, Mr. advised the
circumstances of the Agent-imolved?shooting did not, ?warrant a federa. criminal investigation.?

 

 

 

L. Local Prosecutive Opinion

Page 13 of 15

NYT-993

 

 

 

 

(U) 0n 03073013, District Attorney Kirke Adanis, 33m Judicial Circuit, Dale and
Geneva Counties, Geneva, Alabama, provided SAC Richardson with a letter in which Mr.
Adams stated his of?ce declined presentment of the facts to the Grand Jury and declined
prosecution of an};r FBI employee.

M. Inspector?s Observations

CU) Observation 1: I-IRT operators removed accessories ?om ?rearms used in a
shooting incident prior to surrendering them as evidence.

(U) Analysis 1: Field Evidence Management and Operations Policy Implementation
Guide (PG) Section 4.8 required seized firearms to include all accessories, parts, ammunition and
associated items, including but not limited to: sites, holsters, bayonets, cases, scopes, ?ash
suppressors, magazines, muzzle attachments, and ?ashlights/laser sighting devices that are
designed or meant to be used in conjunction with a ?rearm, and are to be classi?ed and stored as
a firearm and categorized and entered into the central recordkeeping systemfcollected
items as a 

(U) mar so Cornelius and stated I-IRT had a limited number of:
|:|for their weapons. In an effort to maintain ?mission status,? HRT operators were
directed to removel? and other accessories ?'om the ?rearms used during the shooting
incident prior to surren ermg em to the Mobile Principal Firearms Instructor.

(U) Instruction 1: AD, CIRG will ensure compliance with Field Evidence Management
and Operations PG Section 4.8.

(U) Observation 2: HRT Team Leaders (TLs) did not exercise adequate command and
control over HRT personnel and their actions at the bunker.

(U) Analysis 2 During operational brie?ngs leading-up to the 0204/2013 hostage
rescue mission, I-IRT personnel were advised of the possibility of a bunker cave?in and of the
presence of an IED inside the bunkerl

 

 



 

 

 

I HRT TLs at the bunker should have recognized the
inherent danger to the hostage and operators inside the bunker with so many personnel on top of
the bunker. TLs should have further recognized the risk to personnel inside and on top of the
bunker created bvthe potential detonation of the IED inside the bunker. Given the timeline of
eventsl Ias well as stated during witness interviews, TLs had ample
time to direct personnel off the top of the bunker who were not essential to the bunker assault
team? 8 mission, therebyr reducing risk to all personnel involved.

 

Page 14 of 15

NYT-994

-l,4,6

b6 -1
-1
?1

 

 

 

 

 

(U) Analysis 2h: The composition of the I-IRT assault team which ultimately entered
the bunker deviated from the original operations plan. The operations plan designated

Upon the
breach, SAI [a entry into the bunker was impeded by debris from the breach blast. The

0 eration paused as HRT operators devised a plan to clear the obstruction. Once cleared, SA
likmered the bunker as planned. However, he was followed by SE who was
assigned a perimeter position and not directed by TU Ior 0 enter. SA
|:]was followed by I was also assigned a perimeter
position, and was not directed by TL|_|or AJTIJ to enter. as then
followed by MT During his interview, SA stated he had no idea who was in
the bunker with him untI after the subject had been shot and killed. tated he did

not know SA|:|was in the bunker until after SA|:|left the bunker.

(U) Recommendation 2: AD, CIRG should ensure Team Leaders maintain command
and control of personnel during small unit tactical operations.

 

 

 

 

(U) Recommendation 2: AD, CIRG should ensure Operators execute operations orders

unless directed otherwise.

Page 15 oflS

NYT-QQS

b6 -1
hi?: -1
-1

 

 

Ell-.195 .7 (Rev. 5-3-3 

 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Iiianlronin communication





Title: STING ITCIBENT FIELB QFFICE Date: 
31?

(E 
0256 f?

p.


 

CC:

b6 -1
?1

 

 

 

Exam: ENSPECTEGN


Contact:

 

 

Approved By: 31mm}. 53
Da?id Paul Gelios

Fancy Mcbamara

 

Drafted By:

 

Case ID SHOOTENC 
sis: This commun'cati?n wag reoared t5 furnish the analvaisr
A 


comments, anu recommendations oi the Sheeting I?Cl??nt Hewlew Grmum
I. 

with raspect the fallawiug the EIEG

1.

U1 

meeting wela on 03/2 f201?l

Administrative Notea: Thia ce?municatlon summaxizas ?ne insuectiun


Shouting i?CidE?t Revert, datJd 0'

E-E


Division's 
by EngpactioJ Team Laadetal I b6 -1
-1

 

Enclosurefs}: are the Lm#low
1. Sheeting Incident Report

Details1..-.  . - - .-. 
{ijrux an ?3325,:m a, Lh? JIIG LUHEIHEG to walEW 

-w    .- . - 
mhuoLnn? i?tl?u?t Whl?? an l?hGLVi?q age

 

Reacu: Team ?peratorsl I bE-i

rwlne H?i upergtoru inst and niil??

 







Title: SIDOTING INCIDENT HGBILE FEELS OFFECE DEIGQKEOEB


he: 

Jimmy Lee hvkes eft sis day stand off. ?ghee held 
year old boy captive in his uiderjround hunter after shooting and
killing the boy?s has driver. ooerators executed a
deliberate assault plan. During entry, Sykes fired severei h6-1,5
rounds at the Operators end detonated an 133. Fearing for b?c'4'5
the life of ineretorl I who was in thes' lin; of
fire, et Bytes from the too of the hunter.
1 de

 

 

once i ei the hunterf onerators physically encountered
?ytee and a struggle ensued. Throughout the fight, ineretore
were unable to see or :ontrol hvkes? hands. Sykes reneetediv
ijnored verhei commands end posed an ongoing deadly threet to the
hostage end ineretore. Uperetorel Ifired
their weenone et Sykes ending the struggle.

 

 

SIRG Observations

WJI 1 w?r~ 4 4 1w
[ori?tni? oh o?325320ie, the side reviewed Lh?v?g??hut? oived

shoot ng incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force.

1; detereired the appiioetion of teaei
Ion eeree;2:i

ors
with tee hepartment of Justice's neediy Force

.r






The unanimor

I.




 



b6 -1
-1

 

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions
concerning operational planning and execution, training, andfor
safety issues. Tie SIRS hoard reviewed the BERT Report?s two

oiservations and correspondinj instraction/recommendations:

ories from firearms

Observation 1: HRT ooeretors removed acois


J.

U:


used in a shooting incident orior to surrendering

I.



'nem ?3 



vidence Management and Operations Policy

Analxsis l: Fielo

Implementation Guide Section 4.3 required seized Eireerms to



2





*itie: SHOOTING INCIDENT FIELD 02f04f2013



include all accessories, jarts, ammunitien and aesoeiatee items,r
including but not limited to: sites; holrters, hayehets, eases, scopes
ash sepgreeaors, magazines, attachmentsr and tieahi te ase

.4
1

ihg devices that are ?ee ghee or meant

classified and

Jr?-

syetemfeolieetee items as a "Firearmep

and are to he

a firearm,



:1

categorized and entered into the a eentrai record}

.herCornelius and BET had a limited number FF

ior their weaeohs. In an effort to maintain ?miseioh
states,? BET operators were qireeted to removel I and other
accessories from the firearms used during the sheeting incident prior
to surrendering them to the Mobile Prihoigai Firearms Instructor.

SIRE mi}

.1


ruin.





v1 I
r4173. Cir? ECG

Instruction 1: ea,

hegemeht the ?peratiti

mpiiahee
Vii-"1

1 4?31.

Qbservation 2: at? Team Leaders

 

command and control oeer HRT personnel and tueir aot on at the hunter
enalxeis 2a: During operationai briefings leading up to the
hostage rescue mission, petsohhei were advised of the
of a heater cave?in she of the presence if ah ihside
the heater. I

 

 

 

 

 

 

I HET TLs at the bunker should have recognized the
inherent danger to the hostage and operators ihsife tue bunker with so
many petsonnei in top of the hunter. should have further
reooqeit the risk to setsoehei inside ana on top of the banker
created by the potential detohation of the ith inside the banker.
Giveh the timeiihe of eventsl I as well {a

 

-1,4,6

NYT1998

 KM

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT FIELQ 

eteted during interiiewe, TLs had ample time to direct
hereonnel off the tov of the hunter who were not to the

bunker teem?e thereby reducino risk to hereonnei

involved.

Analxeis 2b: The oomooeition of the HRT aedanlt team which

oitimateiy entered the bunker deviated from the oridinal oplrations

I b6 ?1
-1
b7E ?1

plan. The operations plan desionated She
I zip-an 
hreeohr sa| Iehtry into the hunter wee imoeded by deorie from the

breech hieetq ?fhe operatirniEMMJeed ee HRT onerehnire deviseo ailoien to

clear the ohetrdotion. Onoe cleared, SA Ientered the hunter ee

 

F.d

 

olenned. However, he was fol owed by SA who wee 
herimeter poeition and not directed by TL or to

enter. foiiowed by Ehel I ELI Iwee

 

also a perimeter poeitioh, and wee not directed by TL

or enter SR wee then followed by 

During hie interview, 31 stated he had no idea who was in the

hunter with him until after the subject hed heer shot and LETL


eteted he did not know in the bunker untii ej'te?
the bunker.

Recommendation Be: an, orae should ensure Team Leaders maintain

 

command and eontrol of pereonn;i derino emoii unit taoti?al ojerationo.

Recommendation 2b: an, should ensure operatore 

 

operations orders unless directed otherwise.

The SIRE Board oonoorred with observation in it's entirety

howev,r, the ooard did not concur with Goservation 2. The heart stator

the operations plan allowed for operators to react as they did, based
on the fluid nature of the taotioal response. reco disagreed.
o} Following t? review, iwso rewrote the analjsis for

Deservetion 2 to inolod facts whion further illustrated 

womeIFrEn/W





1

NCIDEQT HGBILE

?r 
enfzayetr



Title: SFDOTING 


RE:

knowledge of riske and oontingenciee they planned for,

during the execution of the operation.




?einetated Observation



in part,

RT

over

Team Leadere

c: omea 

Observation 2:

and oontroi HBT pexeonnei
onerationai 

{13} 
at?

hoetage rescue

Analysis 2: During

axis;

Sl?h,

of a hunter oavevin and of

1?11? 
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SPEECE 

disregarded,

ref-+1 
?ion .1. LN.)

Eoilowe:

ton? 
axes}

id not exeroiee adequate

and theii aetione at the hunter.

tiefinge leading on to the
personnel were advised on th;

the of an inside

 

the EUHEEI.

-1,4

 

 

 

 

Thi

 

threat to the hostage and HRT Qperatore.

was identified as a potential
HRT operational planning

recognized the hazard and assigned HRT Operators specific roles to
include several to perimeter positions.






Once the deliberative assault began,|

 

 

-1,4,6

 

 

HRT TLS at

 

 



inherent danger LO

many personnel the JUHREK.

teoognieed the
detonation

oreated by the potentiai

the bunker

oetage and operatore

_eteonne1 ineide and on top of



.I

should have recognized the

ineide tne bunker with so

The should have further

the EED ineide

 

Given the evente




 

Stated during interviewer The

personnel off the top of the

bunker aeeanlt team?e

involved.

Recommendation 2: en, CIRG

 

Junker who were

thexeny reducing tiet

Shoo}

had ample time to direct

not to

to all

_o Team Lealer maintain



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UNCLAssrers/Zzse?:

title: SIDOTING HGBILE FIELD OFFECE OEIGQKEQEB

1E: 

 

Pregrem linsnentien b6'1
1 .. ?1
Management Unitf inst.

 

for Responding tn the Observation

.nn, CIRG is reenen ibis fer en urine Inspection
instruction: and Recommendations are reseived.

The inspectien process is net eemniete until the inetrnetiens
end Reesmmenestiens are addressed by the divisisn. The
It} will review the division's reenenses to
determine if the instructiens end here been
resolved er require further setien. Reseintien is based npen
specific eetiens teten end not reeitetien of the eetiens the

iivisien has under sensiderstien er pisns tn imniement.

en, CIRG is required ts nresiee written respensee, vie

EC, detei inq the sstiens taken by the divi inn ts reseive essh
Feline up EC respensee must he

directed tn Unit Chiefl I inspectien Management Unit bs'i
INSQ. Once the EC is serieiired, please E?msii the bTC'd
Sentinel  tn 

 

 

 

 

Oi



NY111002

 

 

Imui 136 -1,3

 

 

. bto ?1
From: Easement-9W1 '3
Sent: Thursday. June i3, 2013 11:36
To: i T.

Co: 
Subject: Manama Shooting declination

inspector Greg Bretsing
inspections Division

Based upon the information that i have reviewed from the Shooting incident Inquiry, we have
determined that the shooting during a hostagerescue by Fat Hostage Rescue Team operators on February 4,
2013, near Bothen, Alabama, resulting in the death of iirniny tee Sykes, does not warrant federai criminal
investigation. There is no evidence to support a determination that there was a yioiation of the federai
crirninal ciyii rights statutes.

On January 29, 20.13, jimmy Lee Bytes abducted a child from a school has, the driver, and took
the 5 year old boy as a hostage into an underground hooker on his property. His motives and demands were
irrationai and {Jykes rigged the hunter and surrounding area with iEDs {improvised exniosiye devices). to
assist locai iaw enforcement, a contingent of Specialized oersonnei were ouiciriy amassed to evaluate the
situation, plan a reacue, and attempt to negotiate with Dyke's. The team included supervisors, negotiators,
behaviorai experts, tags! and medica'i oersonnel, and SWAT, aviation, and booth technicians. A Navy
construction crew. built a mock opof the entry and insides of the boniter to be used by HRT to practice a
rescue of the hostage.

 

 

 

Communications were established an air duct at {Eykes suggestion. When it'was discovered
that ?yires had rigged an 150 to theair duct I ME _1
I it was known that Sykes was armed with a handgun and a tong

 

gun and. had already kiiled the bus driver with whom he had a ore-yiousiy friendly reiationship. Meanwhile,
locai iaw enforcement and Fat negotiators continued efforts of the next week to attempt to persuade Sykes to
surrender and not to act on his threats to kili the hostage. Meanwhile, HRT practiced breaching the banker.

The FBI decision-makers faced no good aiternatiyes. The continuing stalemate posed the risk that the
hostage wouid be kitted. Each day, Dykes faced increasingiy desperate circumstances; he continued to
demonstrate bizarre behavior,- and it was 1Feared that he saw the hostages yaiue to hint as decreasingiy iess
ieyerage. On the other hand, breaching the bunker presented its own risks. Entry into a bunker where an
armed, dangerous {he had iriiled days earlier), and irrationai rnan held a iittle boy as a hostage, posed deadiy
risks. When provoked by the actuai reality of an entry, ?ykes could shoot and kili the hostage. He cooid shoot
and kill HRT operators as they entered his ground through a narrow entrance and were very yoinerahle. Since
Dykes had some lEDs, he could have more, others rigged in a fashion ca?pahie of blowing up and coiiapsing the
bunker on inside. 

On February at, the seventh day of a tense and deteriorating stand-off, an F81 HRT team breached the
bunker, rescued the chiid unharmed, and shot and kilied tiykes during an exchange of gunfire in the darken
bunker as Dykes ?red at the HRT operators, detonated presset IEDs, and grappied with the operators in

1
NYT- 1003

the darkness alongside the terrified hostage. iite young boy was physicailv unharmed and no personnei
were seriousiy injured.

The FBI officials and agents involved in the decision to breach the bunker and those who heroicaliy
fought their way inside to engage Sykes and to save the hostage ail provided voiuntarv, consistent accounts,
which were not contradicted by the other information, including the autopsy. The HiiT operators? complete
and thorough accounts enahieci a {oily informed decision and were appreciated.

Review disciosed no evidence that there was a violation of the federai criminai ciuii rights statutes. A
federal criminai investigation is not warranted and the administrative review of this matter shouid be
compie?ted.

 

 

1:6 -3

 

 

Specie}.  Counsel ?3




clams hsgnee osesesee

NYT- 1004

 

OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY

as? ctneUIT
DALE AND GENEVA ooumrss
P031 0H:ch Egg KIHKE ADM. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 1, HONE
GENEVA. ALABAMA cacao ooum
. tees] set-Gee?
POST OFFICE cox teas
?1 i" 3835? one commr

. tastier-1.95m

February 7, 2013

Of?ce of the Chief Inspector
Federal Bureau of Investigation

To whom it may concern:

The of?ce of the Dale County District Attorney has fully assessed the facts and
circumstances surrounding the hostage taking by Mr. Jimmy Lee Dykes, at 256 North Private
Road 1539 in Dale County, Alabama. Based on the totality of the circumstances it has been
determined and concluded by this of?ce that the actions taken to include the use of deadly force
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on February 4, 2013, were justi?ed, proper and
necessary in order to rescue and ensure the safety of the hostage.

As a result of the above determination, this of?ce has declined a presentment of the facts
to the Grand Jury and declined prosecution of any FBI employee involved or connected to the
hostage rescue operation.

Sincerely,

we?
Kirke Adams
Dale County District Attorney

136 -4

NYT-IOOS ?4

ZRIZFI TIRE-1H DZIFIT 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIXPA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# lE?cv?09133

Total Deleted Pageis} 

Page 4 b6 - 1; - l;



Deleted Page{s) 
No Duplication Fee 
For this Page 



 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date: 12f20f2013

Report of: IIC David Paul Gelios Of?ce: FBIHQ INSD

Case 297I-HQHA3034064

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW
REPORT OF SHOOTJN 
SALT LAKE CITY FIELD OFFICE
0811019013

Investigative Period: 08H 112013 030712014

Reference: (U) TelephOne call on 08! 1012013 ?om AD Ronald Hosko to AD Nancy McNamara.



I. Executive Summary

(U) On 08f10l2013, at approximately 5:20 pm, an Agent-involved shooting occurred in
the remote area of Morehead Lake near Cascade, Idaho. The Agents involved, Hostage Rescue
Team Operatorsl I were participating in an
FBI hostage rescue operation. On 0810412013, while responding to a ?re at the Boulevard,
California residence of James Lee DiMaggio, the California Department of Forestry discovered

ina Anderson and her son, Ethan Anderson. I
was missin . A San Diego area highway camera captured video of

 

 

DiMaggio driving vehicle with as a passenger. On 03l06l2013, the San
Diego County Sheriff?s Of?ce (SDCSO) obtained an arrest warrant for DiMaggio charging two
counts of homicide and one count of arson, and the San Diego Field Office (SD) initiated a
kidnapping investigation.

On 08f08a?2013, the Salt Lake City (3U) Field Office, Boise Resident Agency, was
noti?edbbserved an unknown male and an unknown female hiking with a. gray
cat in a erness area in Valley County, Idaho. The thought the male and
female were out of place, and noted they were carrying ue ac pacts. Intelligence received
?'om the SDCSO indicated DiMaggio liker purchased two blue backpack covers, and his gray
cat was missing from his residence in California. The eported ti?g after
he and his three companions returned home and saw a'1 er relating to
On 08f09l2013, DiMaggio?s Nissan Versa was located abandoned near a trail leading
to the wilt emess area. The sightings triggered a manhunt and deployment of FBI and law
enforcement resources, to include SU investigative, Crisis Management, SWAT, Crisis
Negotiation Team (ONT), and Evidence ReSponse Team (BRT) personnel.

(U) In the late morning and early afternoon of 08f10f2013, United Sates Marshals
Service (U SMS) and FBI aviation assets observed a campsite consistent with earlier reporting
placing DiMaggio and orth of Morehead Lake near Cascade, Idaho. FBI aviation
assets assumed the lee: or ongoing surveillance and observed a male, femal
and cat at the campsite. Based on the surveillance infonnation, HRT deploye 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 1 of18

hE -1,5
h7? -1,5

b6 -5,8


h? -5
-5
h?E -1

NW- 1006

 

 

 

Operators to hike into the campsite to locate and identify the individuals observed near
Morehead Lake.

(U) At 2:08 pm, the ?rstle-IRT Operators were inserted at a landing zone
approximately kilometers from the campsite. This unit of I-IRT Operators hiked for more
than two hours over dif?cult terrain toward the campsite. As the HRT Operators patrolled
towards the campsite, FBI aviation assets observed the male attempting to camou?age a tent and
the female attempting to signal aviation assets. FBI aviation assets advised the distance between

the male and female was increasing. At approximatel 4:22 or SU and CIRG command staff at
[if authority to execute a rescue
ent

the CP in Cascade, 1D granted the HRT Operatdrs
The rimary assault force 
sea 5 ecial A ent SA) 3 34:]
and Iacoornnanied bv his canine.

and arrest operation at the campsite.
[As

they reached approximately 100 meters from the campsite, !spottcd an individual he
believed to be DiMaggio. As the assault element moved forwar aggio elect! a ri?e in the
direction of the assault 'force and ?red two shots. 3 and SA eturned ?re and
Struck DiMaggio ?ve times. As and quickly closed tie distance to
DiMaggio, they witnessed him reac mg or a handgun In is waistband. SA ?red one
additional shot striking DiMaggio in the head. Operators then moved in to securel 
handcuff DiMaggio, and clear the scene for explosives. Located on or near DiMag io?s bod
were a .22 caliber ri?e, 9mm pistol in his waistband, and knife. Operators escortedElto
a nearby landing zone where she was ?own out of the area.



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Incident Details
a. Substantive Case Files and Background Information

Prior to the shooting incident, the following substantive kidnapping investigation was
opened. As a result of the Agent-involved shooting, the Salt Lake City Field Of?ce opened an
Assault on a Federal Of?cer (39) investigation.

 

Title: James DiMa io Subject; James Lee DiMaggio (Deceased);
i Hostage Rescue Team a- Victim;
Ethan Anderson Victims Assault on Federal Of?cers,
Valley County, Idaho, Morehead Lake,
08l102?2013
File number: 7C-SD-3018376 
Case Agent: 3 SA

13. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident

The following personnel were tasked to conduct or support the rescue operation:

Page 1371?.

1:6


NYT- 1007

-



 

 

c. Events Leading Up to the Shooting

(U) James Lee DiMaggio was a 40-year-old white male who lived alone at 2071 Ross
Avenue, Boulevard, California. On (lg/0412013, at approximately 8:00 pm, the California
Department of Forestry (CDF) received a call reporting a structure ?re at this address. The CDF
immediately responded to the scene where they found the north side of the residence, described
as a two story log cabin, fully engulfed in ?ames. A grey Chevrolet Trailblazer, bearing
California license plate GZJH489, was parked on the northwest side'of the residence. While
?ghting the ?re, CDF personnel noticed a glow and Smoke coming from a three car detached
garage to the northwest of the main residence. Through a broken window, a CDF ?re?ghter
extinguished the ?re and returned to ?ghting the ongoing ?re at the residence.

(U) After the ?re?ghters gained control of the ?re at the residence, two ?re?ghters
returned to the garage and entered throu a edestrian door. Inside. thev discovered a green
tarp on the ground near the doorl I Upon li?ing the tars,

 

 

 

the discovered a human bodyl
I .In addition, a crow bar and what appeared to be blood was discovered on the ground next
to body. After further investigation, a deceased dog was located under a sleeping bag.

(U) The body in the garage was identified as Christina Marie Anderson, date of birth
07f0111969. Anderson-?3 home address was identi?ed through her California Department of
Motor Vehicles license asl San Diego, California. The grey
Chevrolet Trailblazer parked in hunt ofDiMaggio?s burnt residence was registered to Anderson.
As the search continued through DiMaggio?s residenceJ Ia small child were
discovered. The child was later identi?ed as Anderson?s eight year old son. Ethan Ski jack
Anderson. It was also determined i was
missing. Investigation determined

Iby an 11
(U) Interviews of famil and friends determined DiMaggio to be a long time famil
friend who takeri Ion several trips. the most recent being toI I

I At approximately 12:10 am
On USN-451013, a San Diego area highway camera on tured v'deo of DiMaggio driving his
Nissan Versa with a female believed to bel as a passenger. An Amber Alert
was issued on 03/05f2013.

 

had been picked up from
own person on 08! 03f2013, at approximate pm.

 

 

 

 

 

(U) 0n 0810612013, a State of California arrest warrant was issued charging DiMaggio
with two counts of Murder and one count of Arson. In response, a massive manhunt involving
the FBI, SDCSO, and the USMS was initiated to locate DiMaggio and rescu While
working in cooperation with each other, the FBI conducted a kidnapping investigation, the
USMS a fugitive investigation, and the SDCSO a homicide investigation.

(U) 

 

Irenorted an unusual
'ng withl land two friends,
advised the four were riding horses on
08! 0712013 at approximately 9:30 am in a remote area near Cascade, Idaho. The group was
riding on Sand Creek Trail, past a small air?eld on Pistol Creek Ridge. near Honeymoon Lake,
where they encountered two individuals hiking on foot. The two individuals stepped off the left
side of the trail to let ti horses pass. One hiker appeared to be a forty year old male and the
other female. The male remarked about wishing they had horses as well.
nought the man seemed susPicicus, and ?didn?t like his look.? also thought it
the male was in such a remote area with fema 0 dis not appear
ppeared nervous. As the group passed the hikers,| inquired as to

I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

related.

 

 

Page 4 of 13

'be ?s,a
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where they were going. The male stated they were headed to the Salmon River. The group
passed the two hikers and continued on their intended route.

(U) The male was described as white, approximately forty years old, five foot, ten inches
tall, slim to medium build, with a three to four day growth of beard. He was wearing a grey
sweatshirt, grey sweat pants, and tennis shoes. The male did not appear to be armed and was
carrying a backpack. He did not appear dressed for strenuous hiking in a remote area.

(U) I Ifemale was described as al Iwith a

 

 

 

I She was approximatel itall. She weighed approximater

 

|pounds. She was wearingl I

 

 

Like the male, she did not appear dressed for strenuous
hiking in a remote area.

(U) At approximately 4:30 pm, as they were preparing to de art their ?shing site, the
group again encOuntered the two hikers. Since their ?rst encounterbstimated the hikers
had traveled on foot twelve miles with large packs to reach their current location near Morehead
Lake. The male was holding a grey cat in his arms. Everyone in the group was an rised to see
him with a cat, as the location was remote and known to be inhabited by wolves. i]
asked the man where they were headed. The man stated they were traveling to the Salmon
River. directed them to follow the trail to Creek, then toward Dagger Falls. From
there, old them the Salmon River was a ?straight shot.? The male thanked :Iand his
companions for the information. The male commented the hiking trip was his choice this year
anti stated the prior year, the female decided they would visit Hollywood and the Los Angeles,
Ca ifornia area.

 

 

female was several yards away from the man, soaking her feet in Morehead
Lake. I a ajoke Suggesting the female would hten the ?sh with her feet in the water.
The ferna did not reply. As the get left the area,| heardl Istate, ?We?re in
trouble now.? Although everyone in Is group had an uneasy feeling about the two hikers,
they did not believe the female was in danger.

(U) [El?rst learned of an Amber Alert, while watchin the local news on
0810812013. urm news segment, photos of James DiMaggio and?
appeared, andgfinstantly rec sgnized the photos as the two hikers the group a encountered

the prior day. veryone in Is group agreed the photos in the Amber Alert appeared to be the
two hikers.

(U) On OSIUSIZOIS, a Command Post (CP) was established at the Valley County, Idaho
Sheriff?s Of?ce and staffed by SU FBI, Idaho State Police (151?? and Valley County Sheriff?s

Of?ce (V CSO) persoanel. Initial] Actin SSA coordinated FBI resources
under the direction via telephone. During this
time, ASACI provided te ep omc r1e to SAC Mary Rook.

 

 

 

 

 

(U) On 08109l2013 at approximately 8:30 am, a conference call between the SU and San
Diego (SD) Field Of?ces, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), and Criminal hivestigative
Division (CID) was held, and a decision was made to deploy CIRG and San Francisco (SF) Field
Of?ce aviation assets, SF and Portland (PD) Field Of?ce SWAT personnel, and CIRG Tactical

Section ersonnel to Idaho. Subsequent to the conference call, SAC Mary Rook designated
ASAC Ias the On?Scene-Commander (OCS) of the operation. Shortly
er,

 

therea eparted Helena, Montana and arrived at the Cascade CP at
approximately 3: pm. ln addition, SU Supervisory Senior Resident Agent (S 
arrived at the CP. ASAC eld an inter-agency brie?ng which included the V080, ISP,
United States Customs and Border Protection (U SCBP), USMS, and the United States Forest

 

Page 5 of18



-5 

Service (USPS) during which kecapped the eventsz reviewed current intelligence,
and developed a plan to conduct

(U) On 0810912013 at approximately 9:00 am, DiMa io?s Nissan Versa was located
abandoned near a trail leading to the wilderness area where ?ls group encountered the male
an female on 0810712013 in Valley County, Idaho. SU ERT personnel responded and
processe the scene.

On 08/0912013 at approximately 3:00 pm Eastern Standard Time (EST), HRT I
Unit U?hlmceived noti?cation and authority from CIRG Assistant Director James
Yacone an actica ection Chief (SC) Jay Tabb to deploy I-IRT personnel to Boise, ID to assist
in the rescue 0 Due to the limited intelligence available and the lack of a
speci?c location, had a enerai conce tof operation to conduct rural foot patrols in order to
locate DiMaggio andle UC was des' tical Section On-Scene?
Commander (TS OSC), and led the ep oyment omnit HRT personnel from
Richmond, VA to Boise, ID.

(U) After arriving in BoiSe, UCI land Tao ical Section nerso el 
SSAI I SSAI rand SSA aveled to the CP in
Cascade. They reported to the CP at approximately 3:30 am on Saturda 013111012013. 

 

 

 

 

 

the SU Field Of?ce, Boise Resident Agency, provided UC and his team 
a situational update.
(U) On 081' 10122013 at approximately 7:00 am, UC attended the morning
situational update brie?ng at the CP conducted by SU ASA Subsequent to the briefmg,

UCI land his Command Staff developed an operational plan and general scheme of
maneuver to deploy I-IRT Operators, assisted by SWAT Team A ents from the SU, SF, and
Portland (PD) Field Offices, to search for and rescuel?

(U) At approximately 8:00 am, conducted a conference call with CIRG
Tactical SC Jay Tabb and other members of the Tactical Section Command Group. During this
call, an operational plan was developed and re?nedl

 

 

 

 

 

 

Upon arrival to canpsne, HRT planned to conductl

I At the conclusion of the meeting, UC participated in
a conference call with the Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) at during
which a situational update was provided. Participating in the call were personnel from 
CIRG, SD, SU, Operational Technology Division, and the Salt Lake Emergency Operations
Center.

 

At approximately 10: 15 am, all remaining I-IRT personnel departed Boise and
traveled by vehicle to a staging area adjacent to the CP, arriving in Cascade at approximately
12:15 pm. 

(U) At approximately 12:00 a campsite and a blue tent near
Morehead Lake. Shortly thereafter, an aviation asset relieved the 5 part of a

shi? change. At approximately 12:30 111 while continuing surveillance of this location, the FBI
pilots identi?ed one male, one femal a cat, and a blue tent at the campsite. In
response to the new intelligence, UC and his staff modi?ed their tactical plan. Changes
were made because the were con?dent DiMa via and ad been located. The tactical
plan was altered

 

 

 

 

 

UC plit the Tactical Operators into three assault elements, and held one of the
ements as a nick Reaction Force (ORE). The FBI Field Of?ce SWAT Teams were not
directly involvedl Ibut were included in the plan in a

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supporting role. The plan was verbally briefed and UCI:Iprepared to deploy the I-IRT h? - 1
Operators. we ?1

va ?1.v

(U) Prior to deploying the I-IRT Operators, Uand the BET Operators reviewed
communications procedures, the medical plan, and the FB eadly Force Policy. HRT
Operators were divided intol

I
Iconsi A SSA SA
I SAI ISAI isiil ISlf?land

his canine, and |and his canine.
d. Shooting Incident Details
(U) At 1:40 pmwe arted in two helicopters from the CP toward the b6 -1
campsite. At approximate v1%inserted approximate] 'lometers hi?: -1
southwest of the campsite. as unable to land at the original mse 1011 point because ME ?1 

of the terrain. They inserted at a secondary point further awe and hiked up a mountain to their
pla med insertion point where they rallied together. and lead route navigator

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SAI discussed the route. The surveillance aircraft continued to communicate intelligence
?'om campsite. At 2:55 pm, the remaining were inserted
on the ground using the same insertion point.
arched forward until they were approximater one kilometer away 136 1 5
from the campsite. At this pointI SSAI then designated the locatio ?1,5
hvE ?1,7
1 hrough relays rrom the aircrart, SS otiried the tactical Ufaeranor Ue?ter
(T OC) 1heir ETA to the campsite would be approxmately 45 minutes. SS assigned roles
to each opergtorJ 
(U) I Icontinued toward the campsite. 136 -1
[The plan was for SSAI Is team 1| mo ?1

 

 

 

SSAI Iteam wasl have ?1

 

 

Surveillance aircratt reported the campsite was 50 meters "om 

 

 

 

nerth edge of the lake. There was a small ridgeline between the lake and the camp. SSA 5
team discovered they had no oversight of the camp because of the 'idgeline and trees. While

 

 

 

 

 

his team were making thei? gssent up the ridge, reported they were 150
meters out and spotted the subject. SSA his element continued to move forward.
SSA rdered SSA I:Ito stop until steam was in position to assist andcover. The

 

surveillance aircraft reported the subject an emale were now approximately 100 feet apart.
his team reached the top and realized they were not going to be able to provide
support without compromising their positions. Surveillance aircraft reported the distance
between the individual believed to be DiMaggio and the female had doubled. SAslgland
were able to see DiMaggio walking around the campsite gathering wood. At 1s point,

Page 7 of 18

NYT-IOIZ

 

 

 

gave execute authority over the Operation to advised his group to
move forward when ready.

(U) called over the radio ?we? to moving? and the assault was initiated. SSA
5 team are orward toward the camp. SA observed DiMaggio directly in ?oat of
1m as SA moved forWard using trees as cover. observed a ri?e in
DiMaggio rig and. With several trees between SA an DiMaggio, 
observed DiMaggio raise the ri?e at a 45 degree angle om grOund and ?re one round. SA
hen momentarily lost sight of DiMaggio as he continued forward. eard
a io ?re a second round and believed DiMaggio was ?ring at him. Att same time, SA
I Iobserved DiMaggio facing west while holding a ri?e with the muzzle elevated and stock
dropped. jhad a view of the right side of DiMaggio?s body. SA I:|heard
DiMaggio say some ing similar to ?It is go time? or ?Here we go? before ?ring two rounds in a
westerly direction. A?er the shots were fired 3 oved to acquire a better view and
observed DiMaggio looking toward SAI 15 ri?e ointed in SA [3 direction.
Fearing DiMaggio was about to shoot SKI ISA ?red two shots at .aggio using
his HSLK Model 416 ri?e. analysis determined SA ?red ?om approximately 68
out to 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

feet.) Simultaneously, SA observed i a gio turn rifle in his direction and

 

believed DiMa io was ab re. SA lso believ ngo?s actions posed a
threat to SA?ho was positioned just tot west of SA In response, SAI I

 

 

 

 

?red six rounds using his Colt M-4 ri?e. (ERT analysis determined SA ?red from
approximately 99 feet.) DiMaggio was struck ?ve times and dropped to ground.

(U) As Icontinued to advance on DiMaggio, they observed
DiMaggio, while on the ground, make a bar at movement toward what both believed to be a
handgun in his waistband. In response, ?red one shot (ERT analysis determined SA

Ifired this last shot from ap roximate eet) striking DiMaggio in the head. SAs
andl Iran towardEho was screaming ?Oh my God, help m6.? SA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

handedl off to 3 an other operators for medical screening and evacuation.
Alter SA clearer the tent, scene was secured. At approximately 5:26 pm, SAs

onducted a canine search of the campsite for explosives with negative
resu s.

 

 

(U) After the search for explosives was completed, SA roached DiMaggio?s
body, rolled him over, and handcuffed his hands behind his bac . performed a quick
search for weapons and removed a ri?e, handgun, and knife from DiMaggio. DiMaggio?s right
hand was positioned on the rifle stock and his left hand was positioned on his torso near the
pistol under his shirt. The knife was located in a front pocket. moved the weapons
away ?'om DiMaggio?s body and rendered them safe. SS a cert: ted emergency
medical technician, determined DiMaggio was not breathing an ad no pulse.

(U) Upon hearing shots, SSA asked a situation report. SSAI I
re orted the subject was ?down hard? an the victim was safe. At approximately 5:21 pm, SSA
hardl

 

 

 

advised the TOC the subject was ?down hard? and ?Jackpot, Jackpot, Jackpot.? ?Down
meant the subject was dead and ?Jackpot? meant the hostage had been rescued. A
erirneter search was conducted and the scene secured. A medical assessment conducted by SA
I Idetermined |:|was unharmed but had a minor knee injury.

(D) At approximately 6:08 pm, :was evacuated ?'om the area via helicopter and
transported to an area hospital for medica treatment. Two members of the SU ERT and four
members of SU SWAT arrived at the campsite at approximately 6:30 pm and conducted an
initial assessment. SS and Ishowed the ERT and SWAT
personnel the sites from 1ch| l?red their weapons and the locations of the
shell casings. SF SWAT arrived at approximately 9:00 pm and secured the scene until the SU

 

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ERT was able to process the scene the following morning. Physician?s Assistant (PA) 135 '1 2 5
|:]was inserted after the scene was secure and pronounced DiMaggio dead. -1 2 5

(U) At approximater 6 :11 pm, the Salt Lake City Emergency 0 erations Center
provided with a situational update summarizing the rescue and shooting of
DiMaggio.

CU) From 6 :00 pm until 9:00 pm, coordinated the insertion of SWAT and
ERT personnel, and the extraction ??om the rescue site of all HRT personnel. At 9:30 pm, the
remainin I-IRT operators returned to the Command Post. On 8/11f2013 at approximately 9:15
am, and HRT personnel returned to Boise, ID.

Enclosures

CU) All enclosures have been made part of this report and are identi?ed in the enclosed
table of contents.

111. Administrative

A. Shooting Incident Review Team 
(U) The SIRT was composed of the following personnel:

(IIC) David Paul Gelios

Inspector Ronald Twersky

Inspector-in-Piace (HP) Michael Rankin

Assistant Inspectorfl?earn Leader (TL: 136 1
TL ?1
TL
Assistant Inspector-in-Place 
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP

AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP
AIIP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FBI Laboratory Assets:

SSAI Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU) b6 - 1

Physical Scientisq [Firearmszoolmarks Un It (FTU) bro ?1
Supervisory Security Specialis Technical Hazardous

ReSponse Unit 

 

B. Shooting Incident Review Protocol

(U) All members of the SIRT reviewed the IN SD Shooting Review Protocol.

Page 9 of18

NYT-1014

 



 

(U) On 08/ 10/2013, IIC Gelios communicated with SU Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
arrange logistics prior to arriving in Boise, Idaho. SAC Rook assigned ASAC
to serve as the Point of Contact for the SIRT during the investigation period.
Members of the SIRT began arriving at approximately 1:00 pm on 08/11/2013. IIC Gelios and
Inspector Twersky met with SAC Rock to explain the protocol of the shooting inquiry. SIRT
protocols were outlined to all SIRT personnel and team members were given an opportunity to
dialogue regarding questions and concerns prior to the investigation commencing. Over the next
?ve days, SIRT personnel prepared over 100 investigative reports, reviewed surveillance video
of the shooting incident, and visited the scene of the shooting at Morehead Lake near Cascade,
Idaho.

(U) Signed Sworn Statements were taken ?om ?ve FBI personnel who were
   flied 'n the shooting er related events. All ?ve FBI personnel were accompanied by
Federal Law Enforcement Of?cers Association (FLEOA) General Counsel.
er in erviews, events, and observations were documented. in FD-302s. The (Warning
and Assurance to Employee Requested to Provide Information Following a Shooting) was
executed by all personnel providing 3885. Neither the FD-644 (Warning and Assurance to
Employee Requested to Provide Information on a Voluntary Basis) nor the FD-645 (Warning
and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information) were utilized. All 5355 and

interviews of witnesses were conducted voluntarily and each interviewee was afforded the
opportunity to review his statement.

(U) On 08/ 15/2013, an exit brie?ng was provided by IIC Gelios to District of Idaho US.
Attorney Wand Olson, Idaho State Police Major In Hutchins, and Chief Deputy U. S.
Marshallil SU SAC Rock and ASAC participated telephonically.

 

 

C. Personnel Involved i1_1 the Shootigg

Colt Serial Number
(Heckler Koch 416 Serra

 

1. SA
2. SA

 

 

 

D. Firearms Training

(U) The HRT and Training Division provided quali?cations records for SAnd
A review of these Agents? records re?ected the following:

most recent qualification with his FBI?issued Colt (Serial
Number was on 10/19/2012.

(U) SAI most recent quali?cation with his FBI?issued Heckler Koch 416,
(Serial Number was on 06/24/2013.

 

E. Deadly Force Training

(U) The CIRG CDC provided annual legal training to FBI CIRG employees on
09/25/2012, and the Deadly Force Policy was briefed. The CIRG CDC advised HRT
was provided a DVD of the annual legal training presentation following the 09/25/2012 brie?ng.
The CIRG CDC further advised CIRG policy required the Deadly Force Policy be briefed before
every mission.

(U) INSD determined a verbal operation plan for the 08/10/2013 hostage rescue mission
was briefed to all ersonnel involved in the operation. The Deadly Force Policy was
briefed by on 08/10/2013 prior to commencement of the operation.

Page 10 oflS

NYT-IOIS

?1,3
-l 

 

F. Use of Body Armor Law Enforcement Identi?ers

(U) All I-IRT personnel who engaged the subject wore ballistic body armor bearing FBI
identi?ers on the hunt and rear, and ballistic helmets.

G. FBI Indices and Natiogal Crime Infornlation Cegter (NCIC)

(U) On 08f12f2013, I Investigative Operations Specialist, Salt Lake
City Division, conducted a Jniversal Index search for James Lee DiMaggio, white male, date of
birth 01/1711973, social security account number 45437-6522 . The search yielded results for
7C-SD-3018376, the pending San Diego Division kidnapping investigation, and 89B-SU-
3029104, the pending Salt Lake City Division Assault on a Federal Of?cer investigation. The
search met with negative results for all other investigative matters.

(U) On 08/11f2013,m0perational Support Technician, Salt Lake City Division,
provided a printout dated 03 11 2013 cm the National Crime Information Center (N CIC) for
James Lee DiMaggio, white male, date of birth 01fl7f1973, social security account number 454-
37-6522 which contained no information regarding prior arrests or convictions. No current arrest
warrants were listed.

 

 

 

 

(U) On 08/069013, a State of California arrest warrant was issued charging DiMaggio
with two counts of Murder and one count of Arson. The arrest warrant was entered into NCIC
on the same date and canceled subsequent to the shooting on 03!r 109013..

H. ERT Report

(U) The Operational Projects Unit (OPU) was requested to prepare supporting
demonstrative imagery and graphics for the SIRT. OPU obtained total station survey data,
photographs and other imagery from SU ERT. The collected data was processed to create two-
dimensional diagrams of the incident scene and the evidence locations. Additionally, OPU
utilized the diagrams to produce an interactive presentation which linked photographs collected
at the scene to the two-dimensional diagrams. -

I. FBI Lab Report

(U) The FBI Laboratory, Firearmsz ookmarks Unit issued a report dated 03/ 14(2014
which determined the nine Winchester 5.56 mm cartridges recovered at the scene were ?red
from weapons used by SAsI:kth1-ee rounds) andl:l(six rounds). One bullet
?'agment removed ?'om DiMaggio?s body was identi?ed as having been ?red ?om 
weapon and another from SA 5 weapon. Three .22 Long Ri?e caliber cartridges
recovered at the scene were identi?ed as having been ?red ?om DiMaggio?s Marlin ri?e.

(U) The Latent Print Operations Unit issued a report dated 12f0412013 reported no latent
?ngerprints of value were detected on DiMaggio?s weapons, cartridges or magazines.

J. Medical Examiner Reports

(U) On 08f12/2013, BL: Forensic Pathologist, Of?ce of the Coroner fer
Ada County, conducted the autopsy of James Lee DiMaggio. The of?cial autopsy report dated
10!10i'2013 indicated DiMaggio was shot six thnes, with wounds located in the head, chest,
abdomen, upper right arm, right side of the body, and lower left leg. The information is
categorized as follows:

Page 11 of18

NYT-IUIEJ

 

 

Total Gun Shot Wounds 6
Fatal shots Undetermined
Non-fatal shots Undetermined

Wound locations:

Head 1 shot

Chest 1 shot (fragments of core andjacket recovered)
Abdomen 1 shot (single small caliber projectile recovered)
Upper Right Arm 1 shot

Right Side of Body 1 shot

Lower Left Leg 1 shot

(U) The ?nal cause of death was reported as "Multiple Gunshot Wounds."

K. Declination by the Civil Rights Division

on completion of the on-site inquiry, IIC Gelios coordinated SIRT ?ndings with
ecial Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. On 136 -3
as provided an incident summary and copies of all eyewitness bro ?3
interviews. 0n 12f05f2013,:Iwas provided a copy of the autopsy, and a copy of the
Medical Examiner interview. On 05f07r'2014, following coordination with US. Attorney Wendy
Olsen, District of Idaho, Mr advised the circumstances of the Agent-involved shooting
did not, ?warrant a federal investigation.?

L. Locgl Prosecgtive Opinion

(U) 011 05l07f2014, Jay Kiiha, Valley County Prosecutor, Valley County Prosecuting
Attorney?s Of?ce, Cascade, Idaho, declined presentrnent of the facts to the Grand Jury and
declined prosecutiOn of any FBI employee.

M. Insgectcr?s Observations

(WM) Weagons Evidence Observation 1: HRT personnel retained ammunition
magazines used in a shooting incident prior to surrendering the magazines as evidence.

(WM Analysis 1: FBI post shooting incident review guidelines, as established by
INSD, required ?rearms and ammunition be collected, entered into evidence, and submitted to
the FBI Laboratory for logical forensic examination(s).

(WM The Field Evidence Management and Operations Policy Implementation
Guide, Section 4.8, stated a ?firearmfother? included ?all accessories, parts, ammunition and
associated items, including but not limited to: sites [sic], holsters, bayonets, cases, scopes, ?ash
suppressors, magazines, muzzle attachments, and sighting devices that are
designed or meant to be used in conjunction with a ?rearm, and are to be classi?ed and stored as
a ?rearm and categorized and entered into the central recordkeeping system/collected
items as a "Firearmsf0ther.??

Page 12 of 18

NWT-1017

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Ir/mourn INSD determined Itumed
over their ri?es to Unit Chief Ifor evidentiary purposes on 03/10/2013. On

08/1 1/2013, both ri?es were turned over to SAI SU Evidence Response Team,
fer entry into SU evidence. Through interviews, determined UC |:|advised SA

and their magazines did not need to be submitted as evidence, rather UC

ejected the chambered round from each ri?e, taped the round to the ri?e, and returned the
magazines to SAsi When INSD discovered the ma azines were not entered
into evidence, the magazines were collected by CIRG Ion 08/ 12/2013,
and turned over to SU Evidence Technician| Ithe same day.

 

 

(ll/M Instruction 1: AD, CIRG will ensure all weapons and ammunition utilized
during Agent-involved shootings are placed into evidence in compliance with
established 1N SD post shooting incident response protocols and Field Evidence Management and
Operations PG, Section 4.8.

SES Air Transport Observation 2: SAC Mary Rook, Salt Lake City (SU)
Field Office, experienced a several hour delay in securing approval to use an FBI aircraft.

Analysis 2: On 08/09/2013, SAC Rook contacted the Office of Integrity
and Compliance (OIC) to request authorization to use an FBI aircraft to travel to an incident
Command Post (CP) in Cascade, Idaho to lead search and rescue operations for a|:|year-
old female who was kidnapped by James DiMaggio, a wanted murderer. OIC AD Patrick Kelley
approved SAC Rock?s request and copied OGC Attorneyl lWhO also
concurred with the request. This cencurrence was based on the understanding of Attorneyi
the aircraft was to be used to aid in the search operation. I

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 08/10/2013, at approximately 1:30 pm, SAC Rook directed 3. SU ASAC
to contact the SU Aviation Supervisor to schedule air tranSport from Salt Lake Ci Utah to
Idaho. A few minutes later, SAC Rook learned Assistant Section Chief 
Surveillance and Aviation Section (SAS), said the aircra? could not be utilized because SAC





 

Rook did not have OGC approval. ASCI bontacted Attomey|

 

 

 

 

I This changed the analysis under the
pertinent regulation, OMB Circular A-126.

Thereafter, OGC Attorneyl:lrequested additional information regarding
commercial ?ight availability and travel time to Idaho by automobile. SAC Rook determined
there were no additional commercial ?ights to Boise that day, and it was an approximately nine

hour 51:13 Cascade, Idaho. After receiving this information. OGC Attornev'l 

 

 

 

IThereafter, D01 concurrence was obtained the next business day.

 

Page 13 of18



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 Of?ce of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-126, Section 5,
paragraph c, de?ned ?Of?cial Travel? as travel to meet mission requirements, (ii) required
use travel, and other travel for the conduct of agency business.?

Bureau Aviation Regulations (BAR) Manual, Section 3.3.3, Of?cial Travel,
stated, ?Under certain circumstances aircra? may be used for of?cial travel.? The BAR Manual
de?nition of ?Of?cial Travel? mirrored the de?nition contained in OMB Circular A-126. While
the BAR Manual required prior OGC approval for Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel
under the ?required use? and ?other travel to conduct Bureau business? provisions, per the BAR
Manual and OMB Circular ?travel to meet mission requirements? involving SES
employees did not require approval by the ?agency?s senior legal of?cial or hisfher principal
of?cial.?

(WM OMB Circular de?ned ?Mission Requirements? as ?activities that
constitute the discharge of an agency?s of?cial responsibilities. Such activities include, but are
not limited to, the transport of troops andfor equipment, training, evacuation . .. intelligence and
counter-narcotics activities, search and rescue  transportation of prisoners, and other such
activities.?

(Wm Based on the totality of the circumstances, SAC Rock?s efforts to obtain
OGC authorization may not have been necessary as the need of an SAC, in some narrow
circumstances, to utilize an FBI aircraft to expedite travel to a crisis site to lead crisis or incident
operations would arguably meet the de?nition of ?travel to meet mission requirements.?

(WW Recommendation 2: General Counsel, OGC should coordinate with the
Department of Justice, Deputy Attorney General?s Of?ce to evaluate whether a more expansive
interpretation of OMB Circular A-126 strictures regarding ?travel to meet mission requirements?
could be applied to SES utilization of FBI aircraft in exigent circumstances necessitating the
timely travel of SBS to lead crisis site or major incident operations.

(HIM) Federal Arrest Observation 3: FBI San Diego (SD) did not
obtain a federal warrant for the arrest of James DiMaggio.

 

 

135 -2

 

 

On 08l0412013, the United States Marshals Service (USMS) responded to a
request for assistance from the San Diego County Sheriff?s Department in the
homicide investigation of James Lee DiMaggio. investigators also believed DiMaggio

 

 

kidnappe land requested assistance from FBI SD on 03f05/2013. b6 -5
SD thereafter initiated a federal kidnapping investigation on 08/06/2013. 137?: '5
Page 14 of 13

NWT-1019

 

 

 

WWI
On 0810612013,

obtained a State of California arrest warrant charging DiMaggio with two counts of
murder and one count of arson.

0n 08l06f2013, SD SSAI |5poke to a Supervisory
Deputy of the USMS about FBI plans to obtain an Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP)
warrant for DiMaggio. The Supervisory Deputy indicatedl

 

 

 

 

 

 

_l

(UIZEQEQI On 081083013, FBI Salt Lake City (SD), Boise Resident Agency, received a
credible report of a possible sighting of DiMaggio and Sin a wilderness area in Valley
County, Idaho. On 0810912013 at approximately 9:00 am, DiMaggio?s Nissan Versa was located
abandoned near a trail leading to the wilderness area. The sighting and recovered vehicle
established a suf?cient basis for the issuance of a federal arrest warrant for a violation of Title
13, USC, Section 1201 (Kidnapping).

 

 0n 08100120 13, the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) located and rescued
a remote campsite nearby Morehead Lake in Valley County, Idaho. During
an exchange of gun?re, James DiMaggio was fatally shot.
:94:

 

 

 

(WW Recommendation 3a: SAC, SD should ensure federal arrest warrants are
obtained in Predicated Investigations when suf?cient probable cause exists.

 

 

 

 

 

Page 15 oflS

NYT-102U

b3 -1

b3 -1
b6 -1,5
-1FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIXPA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action# lE?cv?09133

Total Deleted Pageis} 
Page 9 b5 2,3;



Deleted Page{s) 
No Duplication Fee 
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(Rev. 5-3-10}

 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elnolmniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: Salt Lake Date: 06/24/2014
Agent?Involved Shooting

 

cc; b6 -1
?1

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
Contact: I I

 

 

Approved By: David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara

 

 

Drafted By:| 
Case ID Shooting Incident Non?Delegated
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 05/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division?s Shooting Incident Reportr dated
05/0?/2014, prepared by Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) David Paul Gelios.

Enolosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. Shooting Incident Report Dated 05/07/2014

Details:

On 05/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 08/10/2013, involving Hostage Rescue Team

Special Agents {SAjl I be ?1
-1

 

On 08/10/2013 at approximately 5:30 two FBI Hostage
Rescue Team (HRT) Operators were involved in a shooting incident in the

remote area of Morehead Lake near Cascade, Idaho. The subject was at a



NY111021



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06/24/2014

 

campsite with al Ihe kidnapped in Boulevard, b6 -5
California on or about 08/03/2013. The subject was shot and killed, b7c '5
safely recovered. No HRT operators were injured.

 

On 08/04/2013, while responding to a fire at the Boulevard,
California residence of James Lee DiMaggio, the California Department
of Forestry discovered the deceased bodies of Christina Anderson and

her son, Ethan Andersonwas missing. A San Diego area highway camera captured video

 

of DiMaggio driving his vehicle with| |as a passenger.
On 08/05/2013, the San Diego County Sheriff?s Office requested
assistance from the FBI. On 08/06/2013, the SDCSO obtained an arrest

warrant for DiMaggio for two counts of homicide and one count of arson,

 

and the San Diego Field Office (SD) initiated a kidnapping

investigation.

{U/m On 08/08/2013, the Salt Lake City Field Office, Boise

Resident Agency, was notified al [observed an unknown male b6 
-5,8

 

 

and an unknown female hiking with a gray cat in a wilderness area in
Valley County, Idaho. Thel Ithought the male and female

 

 

were out of place, and noted they were carrying blue backpacks.
Intelligence received from the SDCSO indicated DiMaggio likely

purchased two blue backpack covers, and his gray cat was missing from

 

his residence in California. Thel Ireported the sighting

 

after he and his three companions returned home and saw an Amber Alert

 

relating to] I On 08/08/2013, DiMaggio's Nissan Versa

 

was located abandoned near a trail leading to the wilderness area. The
sightings triggered a manhunt and deployment of FBI and law enforcement
resources, to include SU investigative, Crisis Management, SWAT, Crisis

Negotiation Team (CNT), and Evidence Response Team (ERT) personnel.

On 08/08/2013, a Command Post was established at the
Valley County, Idaho Sheriff?s Office and staffed by SU personnel. On
08/09/2013, a conference call between the SU Field Office, San Diego
Field Office, Critical Incident Response Group and

Criminal Investigative Division (CID) was initiated, and a decision was



2

NY111022



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

made to deploy CIRG and San Francisco (SF) Field Office aviation
assets; SF and Portland (PD) Field Office SWAT personnel; and an HRT
contingent composed of 41 CIRG personnel. CIRG personnel, including
HRT Command Staff, arrived in Cascade, Idaho at approximately 3:00 a.m.
on 08/10/2013. The initial mission planned for tactical personnel to
search, assisted by aviation assets, for DiMaggio 

b6 -5
In the late morning and early afternoon of 08f10f2013, h7c ?5
United Sates Marshal's Service (USM) and FBI aviation assets supporting b?E _l
the search for DiMaggio a campsite consistent
with earlier reporting placing DiMaggio of Morehead

Lake near Cascade, Idaho. FBI aviation assets assumed the lead for

 

ongoing surveillance and observed a male, femalel I and

 

cat at the campsite. Based on the surveillance information, HRT

 

 

 

deployed HRT Operators to hike into the campsite to locate and

 

identify the individuals observed near Morehead Lake.

At 2:08 the were inserted at a
landing zone from the campsite. This
unit of HRT Operators hiked for more than two hours over difficult
terrain toward the campsite. As the HRT Operators patrolled towards
the campsite, FBI aviation assets observed the male attempting to
camouflage a tent and the female attempting to signal aviation

assets. Based on the additional intelligence, HRT Team Leaders

 

continued traveling in the direction of the campsite.| b7E ?1

 

 

 

 

FBI
aviation assets advised the distance between the male and female was

 

increasing. At approximately 4:22 SU and CIRG command staff at
the CP in Cascade, ID granted the BET Operatorsl I

authority to execute a rescue and arrest operation at the campsite.

 

 

The primary assault force consisted of Team Leader

Supervisory Special Agent I Special Agent (SA) b6 ?1
-1

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

3

NY111023



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-1,5
. . b7C -1,5
I Iand SAI I accompanied by his _1

 

 

 

canine. I

 

 

As they reached approximately 100 meters
from the campsite, an individual he believed to be

DiMaggio. At this point, the over-watch element advised they were not

 

able to advance further without compromise of their position. The
operators in that element did not see DiMaggio the
shooting. As the assault element moved forward, DiMaggio raised a

rifle in the direction of the assault force and fired two shots. SA
fire and struck DiMaggio multiple times.

As closed the distance to DiMaggio,
they witnessed him reaching for a handgun in his waistband. 

fired one additional shot striking DiMaggio in the head. Operators
then moved in to secure handcuff DiMaggio, and clear the
scene for explosives with two canines. Located on or near DiMaggio's
body were a .22 caliber rifle, 9mm pistol in his waistband, and knife.
Operators a nearby landing zone where she was

flown out of the area.

SIRG Observations

On 05/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

 

determined the application of deadly force by SAsl Ion b6 ?1
08110/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice?s Deadly b7c ?1

Force Policy.

 

2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational
planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made

the following recommendations and observations:

 

weapons Evidence Observation 1: HRT personnel retained



4

NY111024



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

ammunition magazines used in a shooting incident prior to surrendering
the magazines as evidence.

Analysis 1: FBI post shooting incident review guidelines,
as established by INSD, required firearms and ammunition be collected,
entered into evidence, and submitted to the FBI Laboratory for logical

forensic examination(s).

{UfiEQ??i The Field Evidence Management and Operations Policy
Implementation Guide, Section 4.8, stated a ?firearmfother? included

?all accessories, parts, ammunition and associated items, including but

not limited to: sites [sic], holsters, bayonets, cases, scopes, flash
suppressors, magazines, muzzle attachments, and flashlights/laser
sighting devices that are designed or meant to be used in conjunction
with a firearm, and are to be classified and stored as a firearm and
categorized and entered into the central recordkeeping

system/collected items as a 

 

INSD determined b6 ?1
over their rifles to Unit Chief Ifor b7c ?1

evidentiary purposes on On 08f11f2013, both rifles were
turned over to SAI I SU Evidence Response Team, for entry
into SU evidence. Through interviews, INSD determined 
SAI:|and SAI:|their magazines did not need to be submitted as
evidence, rather the chambered round from each rifle,
taped the round to the rifle, and returned the magazines to 
and When INSD discovered the magazines were not entered into
evidence, the magazines were collected by CIRG SSAI Ion
08/12/2013, and turned over to EU Evidence the

same day.

 

 

 

 

{Ufi?E?ii Instruction 1: AD, CIRG will ensure all weapons and
ammunition utilized during Agent?involved shootings are placed
into evidence in compliance with established INSD post shooting
incident response protocols and Field Evidence Management and

Operations PG, Section 4.8.



5

NY111025

 



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

SES Air Transport Observation 2: SAC Mary Rook, Salt Lake

City (SU) Field Office, experienced a several hour delay in securing

 

approval to use an FBI aircraft.

Analysis 2: On 08f09f2013, SAC Rook contacted the Office of
Integrity and Compliance (OIC) to request authorization to use an FBI

aircraft to travel to an incident Command Post (CP) in Cascade, Idaho

 

to lead search and rescue operations for a female who be ?1,5
was kidnapped by James DiMaggio, a wanted murderer. OIC AD Patrick b7c ?1r5
Kelley approved SAC Rook?s request and copied OGC b5 ?2'3
I I who also concurred with the request. This concurrence

 

was based on the understanding of AttorneyI Ithe aircraft was to be

used to aid in the search Operation. I I

 

 

 

 

 

On 08/10/2013, at approximately 1:30 SAC Rook directed
a SU ASAC to contact the SU Aviation Supervisor to schedule air
transport from Salt Lake City, Utah to Idaho. A few minutes later, SAC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rook learned Assistant Section Chief (ASCII I Surveillance b6 -1
and Aviation Section said the aircraft could not be utilized EEC ?13
because SAC Rook did not have OGC approval. ASCI Icontacted I
AttorneyI
I This changed the analysis

under the pertinent regulation, OMB Circular A-126.
Thereafter, OGC additional b6 -1
information regarding commercial flight availability and travel time to b7c '1

b5 -2,3

Idaho by automobile. SAC Rook determined there were no additional
commercial flights to Boise that day, and it was an approximately nine
hour drive to Cascade, Idaho. After receiving this information, OGC
Attorneyl I

 

 

 

 

 



NY111026



Title: Salt Lake Agent?Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

Thereafter, DOJ concurrence was obtained the next business b5 -2,3
day.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 
Section 5, paragraph c, defined ?Official Travel? as travel to
meet mission requirements, (ii) required use travel, and other

travel for the conduct of agency business.?

Bureau Aviation Regulations (BAR) Manual, Section 3.3.3,
Official Travel, stated, ?Under certain circumstances aircraft may be
used for official travel.? The BAR Manual definition of ?Official
Travel? mirrored the definition contained in OMB Circular While
the BAR Manual required prior OGC approval for Senior Executive Service
personnel under the ?required use? and ?other travel to conduct
Bureau business? provisions, per the BAR Manual and OMB Circular 
?travel to meet mission requirements" involving SES employees did not
require approval by the ?agency?s senior legal official or his/her

principal official."

OMB Circular A7126 defined ?Mission Requirements" as
?activities that constitute the discharge of an agency's official
responsibilities. Such activities include, but are not limited to, the
transport of troops and/or equipment, training, evacuation 
intelligence and counter-narcotics activities, search and rescue 

transportation of prisoners, and other such activities."

{U/i?gmii Based on the totality of the circumstances, SAC Rook's
efforts to obtain OGC authorization may not have been necessary as the
need of an SAC, in some narrow circumstances, to utilize an FBI
aircraft to expedite travel to a crisis site to lead crisis or incident
operations would arguably meet the definition of ?travel to meet

mission requirements."

Recommendation 2: General Counsel, OGC should coordinate
with the Department of Justice, Deputy Attorney General?s Office to

 

evaluate whether a more expansive interpretation of OMB Circular 





NY111027



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

strictures regarding ?travel to meet mission requirements" could be
applied to BEE utilization of FBI aircraft in exigent circumstances
necessitating the timely travel of SES personnel to lead crisis site or

major incident operations.

Post SIRT Discussion with DOJ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

{Uf?i?a?j On 11f25/2013,| I Justice Management b5 '1r3
Division, United States Department of Justice, responded in an E?mail ?1?3
to a request froml OGC, regarding the use of a
government plane for critical mission?related work which would qualify
as ?travel to meet mission requirements.? The E?mail response is noted
as follows:
Ehrmul [mailto:| Eusdoj.govf b5 ?1:3
Sent: Monday, November 25, 2013 10:29 AM _1'3
To:| I
?so: (m2: (m
subject: of Government Plane

b6 -1

-1

b5 ?2 3

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

8

NY111028

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b5 -2,3
b6 -3
?3
Office of General Counsel
Justice.Management Division
U.S. Department of Justice


Based upon the response from DOJ regarding the use of
aircraft for mission?critical needs,r INSD considers this recommendation
resolved and no further response is necessary.
Federal Arrest Warrant dbservation 3: FBI San Diego 
did not obtain a federal warrant for the arrest of James DiMaggio.
{Ufi?g??i Analysis: On 08f04f2013, the United States Marshal Service
responded to a request for assistance from the San Diego County
Sheriff?s Department in the homicide investigation of James Lee
DiMaggio. investigators also believed DiMaggio b5 ?5
I land requested assistance from FBI SD on -5

 

08f05f2013. SD thereafter initiated a federal kidnapping investigation
on 08f06f2013.

momma 1?3 ?1

 

 

 

 

 

 

I On 08f06f2013, obtained a State of California arrest
warrant charging DiMaggio with two counts of murder and one count of
arson.



lO

NYT- 1030

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

 

On Dams/2013, so SSAI Ispoke to a

Supervisory Deputy of the USMS about FBI plans to obtain an Unlawful

 

Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) warrant for DiMaggio. The

 

Supervisory Deputy indicatedl

 

 

 

 

On 08f08f2013, FBI Salt Lake City Boise Resident
Agency, received a credible report of a possible sighting of DiMaggio
a wilderness area in Valley County, Idaho. On
OSXOQKZOIB at approximately 9:00 am, DiMaggio?s Nissan Versa was
located abandoned near a trail leading to the wilderness area. The
sighting and recovered vehicle established a sufficient basis for the
issuance of a federal arrest warrant for a violation of Title 18, USC,

Section 1201 (Kidnapping).

On 08f10f2013, the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) located

and rescuedl

 

lat a remote campsite nearby Morehead Lake

 

in Valley County, Idaho. During an exchange of gunfire, James DiMaggio

was fatally shot.

While FBI policy as specified in both the Legal Handbook for

Special Agents and DIOG allows for the arrest of an individual who is
the subject of an FBI Predicated Investigation when a state or local
arrest warrant is outstanding, and the person is encountered during the
investigation and would likely escape if not arrested, DIOG, section

19.2.1, stipulates ?Whenever possible, an arrest warrant must be

obtained prior to an arrest.? The Legal Handbook for Special Agents,

section 3?3.1, states ?Whenever possible, prosecution should be
authorized by the U.S. Attorney, and a warrant issued prior to an

arrest.?

mom) I 



11

 

 

b6 -l,5
b7C -1NYT- 103 1



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

 

b5 -5
-5
b5 -2

 

 

 



(UXEEDQQE Recommendation 3a: SAC, SD should ensure federal arrest

warrants are obtained in Predicated Investigations when sufficient

 

probable cause exists.

(UXEEDEQS Recommendation 3b: AD, CID should coordinatel -5

 

 

 

 

3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

 

against SAsl Ias a result of their involvement in this be ?1

 

shooting incident. b7C ?1

Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection

Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member. The

following voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P.

Gelios, Office of Inspections (OI), (INSD) Division, United States

Department of Justice I Special Legal Counsel, b6 -1,3
Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, b7c ?1'3

Violent Criminal Threats Section, Criminal Investigative Division; SC

 

 

Roger A. Coe, East Asia Section, Counterintelligence Division; Unit
Chief I FTU, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
I I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; 
Practical Applications Unit, Training Division SSA

Defensive Systems Unit, SSA I

Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; 
Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division SSA
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,

 

 

 



l2

NY111032



Title: Salt Lake Agent-Involved Shooting
Re: 06f24/2014

Critical Incident Response Group In addition to the voting
members in attendance, DOJ SIRG unable to attend b6 ?1,3
but reviewed the Shooting Incident Review Team report and provided his ?1?3

vote in writing prior to the SIRG. The following non-voting members

 

were also in attendance:l I Office of
Inspector General, Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Shawn W. Stroud,
Paul D. Delacourt, and Justin R. Tolomeo, CI, Team Leaders




or, so Jay 3. Tabb, 
Evidence Response Team, UCI FTU,
I Special Assistant, OI, UCI land

Management Program I and

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

 

AD, CIRG, AD, CID, and SAC, SD are responsible for ensuring
each Inspection InstructionfRecommendation is satisfactorily resolved.
The inspection process is not complete until the
InstructionfRecommendation is addressed by the field office. The
Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office?s response to
determine if the Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or
requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions
taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under

consideration or plans to implement.

AD, CIRG, AD, CID, and SAC, SD are required to provide a

written response via EC, detailing the actions taken to resolve each
InstructionfRecommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to

Unit ChiefI Inspection Management Unit, INSD. Once the b6 ?1
EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to b7c ?1



 

 

NY111033

U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
District afhtaho

 

 

IWENDY J. OLSON United States Attorney.r Washington Group Pia:a IV
First Assistant United States Attorney 300 E. Park Bird. Ste. 600 1:6 -3

Criminal Chief Boise. MFR-.7783 -3
Civil Chief {203,3 33442?

NEWS RELEASE

 

 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
0N MAY 7, 2014

CONTACT: b6 -3

Public Information Of?cer -3
WENDY J. OLSON

United States Attorney

(208) 334-1211

JAY J. KIIHA
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney
(208) 382-7120

Wendy J. Olson, United States Attorney for the District of Idaho,
and Jay Kiiha, Valley County Prosecuting Attorney, Jointly
Announce Criminal Charges Not Warranted in FBI Agents?

shooting of James DiMaggio Last August

Agents heipea? rescue sixteen-year-ala' hostage from remote campsite near Morehead Lake

Based Upon the information reviewed from the FBI Inspection Division Shooting
Incident Inquiry, including the Autopsy Report and Post-Rescue Interview of the sixteen-year-
old victim, and evidence gathered by the Valley County Sheriff?s Office, the United States
Attorney?s Of?ce for the District of Idaho, the Civil Rights Division ofthe United States
Department of Justice, and the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney?s Of?ce have determined
that the shooting by FBI Hostage Rescue Team agents on August IO, 2013, near Cascade, Idaho,
resulting in the death of James DiMaggio, does not warrant federal or state criminal
prosecution.

The United States Attorney?s Of?ce and the Civil Rights Division have concluded that

the evidence is insuf?cient to support a determination that there was a violation of the federal
criminal civil rights statutes and that a federal criminal investigation is unwarranted. The Valley

NYT-1034

County Prosecuting Attorney?s Of?ce has determined that the FBI Hostage Rescue Team agents
used reasonable force in defending themselves andr'or another as relating to the death of Mr.
DiMaggio.

In early August 2013, DiMaggio kidnapped a sixteen year-old? girl after killing members
of her family in Boulevard, California. Pursuant to local tips on August 8 and 9, a law
enforcement airplane located DiMaggio and his hostage on August ID at a campsite near
Morehead Lake, approximately forty miles from Cascade, Idaho.

Hostage Rescue Team agents were taken by helicopter and dropped within hiking
distance ofthe campsite. They hiked to the campsite, tactically surrounded it, and began to close
in through a wooded area to attempt to arrest the subject and rescue the hostage. The wooded
area was steep, and the terrain difficult to negotiate. The airplane remained above the campsite
and provided its observation of the activities of the subject and his hostage to the Hostage Rescue -
Team. Infrared video recorded from the airplane showed the arrest and rescue, including an
overhead view of the action of the individuals involved and the heat from the shots that were
?red.

Some ofthe Hostage Rescue Team agents moved in when it was reported that DiMaggio
was separated from the hostage. When several agents got within approximately IOU yards of the
subject, DiMaggio fired two ri?e shots. Two agents, who could see DiMaggio and were directly
within his ?ring line, believed DiMaggio was shooting toward them. The two agents returned
fire, striking DiMaggio multiple times. A third agent found and safely removed the hostage.

Under federal law, in determining whether a law enforcement officer has willfully used
more force than is necessary, prosecutors examine all of the facts and circumstances from the
perspective ofa reasonable law enforcement officer. Based on the consistent evidence gathered
during the shooting incident review and the Valley County Sheriff?s Of?ce investigation,
both the US. Attorney?s Office and the Civil Rights Division have concluded that it cannot be
established beyond a reasonable doubt that either Hostage Rescue Team agent acted willfully,
intending to violate the law, when they fired at DiMaggio. Accordingly, the US. Attorney?s
Of?ce and the Civil Rights Division decline to pursue any prosecution or further investigation of
the agents.

Under Idaho State Law, force that a person may lawfully use in self-defense is limited by
what a reasonable person in the same situation would believe to be necessary. A person may act
in self-defense ifa reasonable man, in the same situation, would bejustified in believing himself
in danger. As such, the Valley County Prosecutor?s Office declines to pursue any further
prosecution or investigation of the agents.



NYT-1035

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

INSPECTION DIVISION
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

 

REPORT

AGENT INVOLVED SHOOTING
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
February 24, 2015

 

?ow?

Ronald Twersky
Deputy Assistant Director
Inspection Division

WCLASSIFIEDIM

WIT-1036

 LY

 

CHICAGO DIVISION, AGENT INVOLVED SHOOTING
February 24, 2015
Executive Summary

   

 

 

 

DeliberativeProcess Privileged Document

(LIAM On February 24, 2015, at approximately 4:55 pm, Special Agent (SA)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Ifrom the Chicago Field Of?ce, was involved in an Agent Involved 135' ?1 :5 7 3
Shooting (AIS) in Chicago, Illinois. sal:|was part ofal I  5. 7 a
supporting] loperat-ion linked to a predicatedl hm _1
Investigation ll it. During the operation, one of the subjects (I ME _3

I:b dismayed and pointed a weapon at: SA I:Iresponded and issued
commands forI:Ito drop the weapon. Whenl:ldid not comply,| I?red one round
. from his FBI issued Glock Model 22 handgun, serial number| . The round missed 
who quickly surrendered and was taken into custody. No injuries or property damage were
identi?ed as a result of the AIS. The investigation was delegated to the Chicago Field Of?ce.

Background

On July 24, 2014, the Chicago Field Of?ce opened a predicated

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

investigationd I) to target the| b6 4:43:33
I I Throughout February of2015, SAI Iworkedl 57?: '1'4'7'3
with Chicago Police Department (CPD) Police Of?cerl Iauthority to 3
participate in| Iwas properly . MD 
documented with appropriate approvals. Of?cerl land SAI Iparticipated in several

 

 

 

 

 

SAI |drafted an operation plan which was approved by by

AIASAC SAI Ibriefed the operation team on February 23, 2015, and
planned to conductl 
:l Chicago, Illinois.

SAI:lrescheduled and re-briefed the operation on February 24, 2015, he ?1

 

 

 

 

  
 
 

 

 

 

due to operational need. The DOJ Deadly Force Policy was incorporated into the operation plan,  
and SAI:Ibriefed the Policy to the operation team during the February 23rd and 24th
brie?ngs. In addition, SAI:Iadvised CPD Task Force Of?cers (TFO) to follow the CPD
Use of Force policy. Although brie?ngs were conducted on the 23rd and on the 24th, several
team members expressed during their interviews confusion about their assigned roles. In
addition, Agent and TFO personnel indicated they were unfamiliar with the participating CPD
f?cers. - . -
(U/f On February 24, 2015, at approximately 1:59 pm, SAI ITFO b5 ?1 a 4 3
and CPD Of?cer met withl b7?: '1 4 3
At approximately 2:07 TF 3

:with negative results. SA

approximately 2:08 pm,

 

NYT-1037

 I b6 ?4 a

 

 

b7C -4,3
I b7D -l
I -1,3

 

 

a 

TC -1,4,7,3

TA -1
TD -1
-1,3



 

 

 

(WW At approximately 4:55 pm, observed an unknown black male b6 -4 5 1'

 

 

 

 

approach from the South on foot. As the unknown male (later identi?approached] TFOI:|called out the identi?ers to the cover team but '1

via radio. Iwalked past'thel I continued Northbound, and out of sight. I: ME ?3
reappeared wearing a mask over his faceI Ibrandished a revolver,

pointed it in the direction of I I and demanded cash.

 

Members ofthe FBI cover team, comprised Special Agents, as well

 

 

 

 

 

TFDs andl IOf?cers, observed the actions ofIindicating was robbing The cover team moved scene led by TF 0| |and SA Upon arrival, SA placed his weapon in his 3'

. left hand, pulled on the door handle with his right hand, announced himself as a law enforcement
of?cer, and issued commands to not comply. PerceivingI:Iposed an
imminent threat to himself}: FBI Agents, and CPD Officer's, SA. lfired a single
shot from the back seat of vehicle. I:Iimmediately surrendered, was taken into

custody, and a fully-loaded Rossi revolver was recovered. No other Agents orlaw enforcement
of?cers ?red their weapons.

(WM |:Iwas not hit by bullet. A subsequent interviewl 136 -1 5 ,7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and the post?arrest and recorded statements of the subjects con?rmed] ?1 5 7
conSpired to rob| luntil ?1 3
approximatelyl I I


2

NYT- 1038

 Lv

There were four Agents, three TFOs, andproximity to 'the shooting incidentresponded to the scene at approximately 5:40 pm. and

secured SA Glock 22. Chicago ERT began processing the scene at approximately
7:30 PM on February 24, 2015. Among the 11 evidentiary items collected, a Rossi Revolver-
handgun?, serial number: and associated ammunition were recovered. The casing from
the round ?red by SA|:|was recovered from the rear passenger bench of the: 
driven by At 1 1:45 on February 24, 2015, BET completed processing the
scene. Though an extensive search was conducted, the single round ?red by was
not recovered.

(UH At approximately 7:45 pm, Chicago Field Office Acting Special Agent in
Charge Inoti?ed Chief Inspector David Gelios ofthe AIS. At b6 -1 . 7
approximately 7:50 AIASACI Inoti?ed SIOC of the shooting, and at WC '1 '7
approximately 11:08 I:]submitted an (ESR) to 3100. We '1

(Wm On February 25, 2015, as a result of the AIS, Chicago Field Of?ce opened
an Assault on a Federal Of?cer Investigation (1 II withl Ias
named subjects. A National Crime Information Center (NCIC) criminal history check for

I Iincluded prior arrests for Assault, Larceny, Robbery, Dangerous Drugs,
Armed Robbery with a Firearm, and Violation of Parole. The NCIC criminal history check for
I Iwas negative. Neither] |had active warrants on record.

(WEB-HQ) On February 27, 2015. FBI issued Glock 22, serial: be -1
handgun ?was submitted to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), for a Weapon 137?: ?1
Serviceability Inspection. DSU reported-the Clock 22 passed all function tests. 

graduated from New Agent Training in: A

review of his FBI Academy ?rearms training record revealed be last quali?ed with his pistol on 
December 8, 2014, when he shot three PQCs  On January 07, 2015, SAI I
quali?ed with the Colt Pattern Carbine when he shot one CQC  SSAI Iof
the New Agent Academy staff, indicated primary legal instructor was SSA

She also indicated scored a I:Ion his October 10, 2014, legal
exam, which covered the FBI Deadly Force Policy. . -

 

 

 

 

 

(UIM) SA|:lsigned an (Warning nhdAssnrance Employee b6 ?1 4 5 
Requested to Provide Information Following a Shooting Incident) on March 6, 2015 and si ned '1 4 5 7
the Signed Sworn Statement (333) on April 24th, 2015. Other witness interviews included hm 

 

I IThese additional interviews, events, and witnesses
were documented via FD-302s. The and witness interviews were conducted voluntarily by


 

was consistent with the information
provided by the'other Agents and law enforcement personnel at the time of the shooting as well
as the statements of I 

 

 

 

 

3

NYT-1039



INSD determined many participants interviewed during the AIS
investigation admitted they were unable to recall who was present during the operation brie?ngs

and who participated in the actual operation. Additionally, members of the CPD: b6 -1 4
were unfamiliar to the Agents and TFOs. In SA 5 interview, he stated he was 137?: '1 4
who was present for the operational briefing." TFO advised she was not aware of the team ME '3

members who had changed between February 23rd and February 24th. During 
interview, he stated he was not sure who from the FBI teams were dropped and who were the
new additions. TFO added during her interviews: ?Since she did not personally know
these additional CPD f?cers, nor know all the other Agents on the operation, she could not
be sure of each and every individual on the operation, nor changes in the personnel from Monday
to Tuesday since replacement did occur due to scheduling conflicts.? Police Officerl:|stated
he, ?never met individual team members on either February 23rd or 24th."

(Ll/@1635) Chief Division Counsel Iverified Department, of b6 -1,3.5
Justice Civil Rights Section Attorney,| |declined to pursue any 137?: '1 I  5
prosecution of the AIS, ?given that nobody was hit by the shots.? Cook County State?s Attorney
Michael Golden advised the actionStaken by the FBI on February 24, 2015, to include
the use of deadly force, were justi?ed and necessary in response to a reasonable belief-the
. subject posed an imminent danger ofdeath or serious physical injury to:

4 

NYT- 1040

UNCLASSIFIEDKW -

Proposed Observations

PROPOSED OBSERVATION The operation plan brie?ng was inadequate, as de?ned 
roles and responsibilities were not communicated to all members of the multi-agency operation.

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION SAC, Chicago will ensure Operation plans are properl},r
briefed for operationsl I 135 ?2

PROPOSED OBSERVATION The Special Agent involved in the AIS reviewedl:l has -1

|:]shortly after the incidentPROPOSED INSTRUTION SAC, Chicago will ensure personnel involved in shooting
incidents are separated to ensure their independent account of events is not unduly influenced.

PROPOSED OBSERVATION Personnel assigned were not wearing their body armor at
the commencement of the operation. 

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION SAC, Chicago, will ensure personnel assigned to Operations
are fully equipped and wear their issued body armor, in accordance with DIOG 19.2.3.

5

NYT-1041

 (Rev. 5-8-10)

 

 


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

I Electronic Communication

Title: Agent Involved Shooting_{AIS) Date: 05/15/2015

 

CC:

 

 

 

From: CHICAGO
CG?wc-3
Contact: I

 

 

Approved By:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted Ey:| 

Case ID I (U) Chicago Field Office Shooting
Incident

~Synopsis: To Report results of a review of a shooting incident'

involving-Special-Agent I which occurred on

February 24, 2015L 

Administrative Notes: (U) None

Package Copy: (U) None
Details:

I. Executive Summary

 

In July 2014, Special Agent (SAJI Iinitiated a

|Investigation 

 

 

predicated on

 

Confidential Human Source (CH8) reporting, which 

 

Iof ChiCago, Illinois.

 

 

 

I .



NYW31042


Burr-m arm-cm Inn: 55:35:: in?
vr-N-ed it 5'
F5: Wen-Jim tyre-?-

SA
:and his squad intended tol -1,8
-1,8
b7A -1
b?D -1
b7E ?1,3



Title: Agent Involved Shooting (AIS)
Re: 05/15f2015

 

 

 

 

 

In early February 2015, SAI Iwas introduced to a
I b6 ?l,3

lhe could _1

 

 

 

I b7E -1,3
In coordination with CPU, SAI I
orchestrated and drafted the operation planI I
originally scheduled for February 23, 2015. Due to the in-availability
I Ion the originally?planned operation date of Monday,

February 23, 2015, the operation occurred on the afternoon of Tuesday,
February 24, 2015. 

conducted a number of interviews ofl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



On February 24, 2015, as the operation commenced, a meeting occurred

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I I about 4:55 p.m.

I b6 
I The second subject, later identified as l?  :1'4?5?7
I subsequently walked up, and wearing a face mask, _1'3 I

 

brandished a revolver, pointing it in the direction of 
Members of the FBI-cover team, comprised of FBI Special
Agents, as well as CPD Task Force Officers and| 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Officers, observed the actions ofI I
robbingl I The cover
team moved in, led by a vehicle that contained FBI I

 

Upon arrival, himself as a law enforcement
officer, gave commands were not complied with, and then
fired a single shot in order to eliminate the threat posed by
I and other responding law .. be -115!?
enforcement officers. actions, 
immediately surrendered, was taken into custody, and his weapon was
recovered. It was later determined neither of the subjects were hit.by

bullet. A subsequent interview of and the

 

 



2





Title: Agent Involved Shooting 
Re: 05/15/2015

post?arrest and recorded statements of the subjects, confirmed the
subjects were attempting to gunpoint.

There were approximately ll Agents, TFOs, 

close proximity to the shooting incident. 'The Signed Sworn b6 -1,5,7

 

 

Statement of who fired his weapon, was consistent Egg'jfgr7
with the statements of the law enforcement personnel present at the 
time of the shooting, as well as the two subjects. No
other law enforcement officers fired their weapons and none were
injured. The shooting scene was processed by FBI Chicago ERT. A
fully?loaded Rossi revolver was recovered on the
ground, in close proximity 
II. Incident Details
a. Substantive Case Files and Background Information
Prior to the shooting incident, the following 
was opened. As a result of the AIS, the Chicago Field Office opened an
Assault on a Federal Officer Investigation. The two cases are as
followsFile number:l 
Date opened: July'24, 2014
Case Agent: Special Agent

Supervisor: Supervisory Special Agent 

Squad: 

 

 

2] Title:(U} I I

SA - VICTIM

RFO



3





Title: Agent Involved Shooting (AIS)
Re: 05/15/2015

:1

 

 

 

 

 

File number:| I I -b5 '1
Date opened: February 25, 2015 :1
Case Agent: Special Agent SRI I

Supervisor: Supervisory Special Agentl I

 

Squad: vc?1

b. Listing of Personnel Involved in the Incident 

 

SA . I b6 ?1,4,5

SA h7c -1,4,5
b7E -3

SA

SA
CPD 
CPD TFO
CPD 
CPDI 

0. CPDI
1.

l?l

c. Case Review and Operation Briefings

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FJLD as gain UJPU 

 

In early February 2015, SAI Iwas introduced to b5 

I -1,7,a

137151 -1
he could
I ?1

a number of interviews ofl I t?E _1r3


As'a result of development of 
I The operation
I 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

order, titled ?Operations order for

 

I was originally briefed on
February 23, 2015 (seel by the
Chicago Field Office._All of the agents and TFOs, who were listed in
the?original Operations Order, participated in one of the two briefs,

 

 

which occurred on February 23, 2015, and in a summariZed, abbreviated



4

NYW31045



Title: {U/ZEas?i Agent Involved Shooting (are)
Re: 05/15f2015 

fashion on February 24, 2015 prior to the operation's commencement. The

- DOJ Deadly Force Policy was incorporated into the operations order, and 
SA: briefed the DOJ Deadly Force Policy to the surveillance teams b6 ?1
during the February 23, 2015 briefing, while mentioning can TFOs would b7? '1
follow their own can use of force policy. -

The following personnel were present at the February 23, 2015

 

briefing in CE?l's squad area and later, participatedl b6 ?1,4
I Ion February 24, 2015: b7C _1r4

 

 

-I(Conducted briefing]

CPD TFO
CPD TFO . 
SSA (initially supervised by radio from office;

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Grtnib 

 

 

 

deployed after shooting occurred}

The following personnel were also-present during the-February 23,

 

 

 

 

'2015 briefing but'were unavailable for[ Ion February 24, b6 -1,4

2015: ?1CPD TFOI ..

lor'The following personnel were present for the February 24, 2015

 

 

 

 

 

 

briefing in CE?l?s squad area and participated in b6 -1

eration1.



.Title; Agent Involved Shooting (AIS)
'Re: 05115/2015 .

 

 

 

 

4. can TFOI I I b6 -1,4
5_ SAI I I- . b7c ?1,4
6. CPD TFO {briefed enroute] - 

7. CPD TFO 

 

 

The following were briefed by b6-1,4

a CPD OffSite: just prior to the operation commencing. b7c "1:4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. -3
However, the below did not attend a joint
briefing with personnel listed above at the FBI Chicago Field Office on
either February 23 or 24, 2015:. 
1. CPD Officerl 
2. CPD Sgt.| I
.3. CPD Officerl I
A photograph of the handed out to all be ?7,3
present for the Operational briefing on February 23, 2015. The ":r3
briefing, held on February 24, 2015, where those who had not attended _1 3
. I . I
the first briefing received a copy of the operational plan, which
included a copy ofl Is attached photograph. I
d. Events Leading Up to the Shooting
In February 2015, SAI Iwas workingl b6 -1,7,3
explained I 'if7'3
Throughout February 2015, Case a number of. I b7E_q_3
interviews ofI b7D -1

 

 

 

 

 

 

I |side of.
Chicago on February 23, 2015, later re?scheduled for February 24, 2015.

 

In the late afternoon of February 24, 2015, FBI Chicago Division's



6



 

Title: Agent Involved Shooting (AIS)
Re: U5f15/2015

 

 

 

conductedl I b6 
b7C ?5,7
b?A ?1
-1,3
b7D ?1

 

 

 

e. Shooting Incident Details

 

I b6 ?1,4,5,7
?1,4,5,7
. I . -1
subject, later identified asl subsequently walked up wearing a _1!3

face mask, brandished a revolver, and pointed it in the direction of

 

an unknown

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Observing this real time,| 
members of the FBI cover team,

 

 

 

comprised of FBI Special Agents, CPD TFOs, andl 
Officers, responded in an effort to eliminate the threat tol land
others. The first cover team vehicle arrived shortly after threats

were made. This first responding vehicle contained FBI and

CPD Upon arrival, SAI Iannounced himself as

 

 

law enforcement, gave commands to that were not_complied with,
and then fired a single shot at in an effort to eliminate the
threat tol I SAI Ihimself,-and other responding-law 

 

enforcement officers. Following 

immediately surrendered; was taken into custody, and his weapon
recovered. It was later determined.neither of the subjects were hit by
bullet. Post?arrest interviews of subjects
confirmed the subjects were attempting to rob at gUnpoint. All
witness accounts were consistent regarding the details of the Shooting.

f. Post Shooting Details

Immediately following the shooting, CPD who was part of b6 41,4
the cover team, made radio contact with CPD diSpatch to alert the local "1'4

police district. Primary Relief who was part of the cover
team, immediately assumed control of the scene. Along with Sgt.

made the initial liaison with responding police

officers and ensured the safety of all personnel, including SA

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

3

N?q31048



Title: (U/{Esagj Agent Involved Shooting 
Re: 297JeHoeA6151928, 05f15!2015

who had monitored the team's radio traffic b6 ?1

throughout the operation and learned of the shooting via FBI radio occurred; responded to the scene immediately thereafter. The b?E _3

surveillance captured by mobile video camera by SA
I I after which, the arrests and shooting were recorded by the

interviews of the three Agents, and interviews of the two CPD

TFOs, who observed the actions taken by corroborated the b6 -1.7
h7c -1,7

 

 

factual accounting of the shooting - No other law enforcement officers
fired their weapons and none were injured. The shooting?scene was
processed by the Chicago FBI ERT team, and the loaded Rossi revolver
was recovered from the ground, under a jacket located 
just following the take down and arrests of the subjects.

The Chicago Field Office-took precautions to minimize the threats to

 

the community during] b6 ?1

 

_b7c ?1
ova -1,3

 

 

 

I The task force personnel assumed

 

positions to minimize potential cross fire and maximize direct
observation ofl I The emergency
medical plan was detailed and briefed appropriately. While

was the mission, Case and planned to cease
the operation within 30 minutes of dusk to ensurel I

 

 

 

 

 

 

g. Accounting of Shots Fired

one .40 caliber round from his'weapdn. The single b6 ?1
shell casing was_recovered from his surveillance vehicle by the Chicago b7c_?1
ERT team at the scene. Though an extensive search was conducted of the
area post?shooting, due to the numerous snow banks surrounding the area
of the.incident, the bullet was not recovered. .The response team, to
include-representation from the Chicago Field Office management team,



8



'u
4'5. .
?i 




Title: Agent Involved Shooting 
Re: 05i15f2015

ERT Team, and members of squad that handled the post-shooting
investigation into the assault of federal officers, conducted-an on
scene review and confirmed no other personnel_fired their weapons

during the operation.

h. Subject Information

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Name b5 -7
Position b7c 
Sex/Race
Height
eight
Hair
Eyes
DOB
SEAN


The National Crime Information Center criminal history check I

for] Iwas negativeThe NCIC criminal history check forl Iincluded
prior arrest for assault, larceny, robbery, dangerous drugs, armed
robbery with a firearm, and violation of parole. Neither nor
active warrants on record. I

1. Use of_Body Armor and.Law Enforcement Identifiers'

All Special Agent members of Force wore Level IV b5 ?1:4
body armor with FBI andfor Police flaps displayed in the front, and/or :g'4
the back.? SAI |confirmed the wearing of 
body armor, as did I

 

that, as the threat of the second subject became-
apparent and to move their vehicle from the outer
perimeter toward the parking lot, "the group in TFO 
put on their vests (FD-302, page It was
also noted some placards may have not been visible, as task force



9

NYT-IUSD



Title: Agent Involved Shooting 
Re: 297J-HQ-A6151928, 05/15f2015

members on the perimeter wore their body armor under winter clothing,
given their surveillance responsibilities. noted his
FBI placard had been removed at the time he addressed the threat of

to the covert nature of his surveillance responsibilities.

j. Forensic Summary

On February 24, 2015, the Chicago ERT deployed to the rear of the
residential property located atI Chicago.
Illinois, At 7:30 20 minutes after arriving, ERT began
processing the scene. At 8:10 Chicago photographers began

 

_Spherical Photography, while ERT began utilization of Total Station to

complete mapping of the location of the shooting. Among the 11
evidentiary items collected, a Rossi Revolver handgun, serial number
(Item #1813] and associated ammunition {Item #10, 

were recovered. The casing from the one round fired by 

 

(Item was recovered from the[ Iof the
by At 11:45 on February 24,

2015, processing of the scene was concluded.

An inventory of all recovered evidentiary items follows:

 

 

 

 

. PACKAGING
RECOVERED
ITEMS METHOD
DESCRIPTION WHERE FOUND NOTES
OBSERVED BY
LG Cell. Top of
1 
Phone garbage can ara ay ag
Apple Top of - .
. Farada Ba
2 1Phone garbage can 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



JD

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7
b7E -3

b6 -1
-1

NYT31051



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Agent Involved Shooting tars
Re: 05/15/2015 
Apple .
_3 iPhone Top of Paper
Charger and garbage can
Ear Phones
Boxes
4 of Cherry 12r::02tC:: Plastic
'Head Candy 9 
5 Blue Bic Top of Plastic
Lighter garbage can
Ground in
6 .Black Cap front of Paper
garbage can
Black Down Ground in
7 front of Paper
. Vest
garbage can
8 Plastic
CaSing .
Moved from
.original
Rossi position.
Revolver Secured by
9 Serial Gun Box SA
Number prior to
ERT arrival
. and
packaging
Moved from
original
position.
- Secured by
38 
10 Special Plastic prior to
cartridges I ERT arrival
and 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

packaging

 

 

 

 



11

b6 -1,7
b7C -1,7

NYW11052-



Title: (UKEEesoj Agent Involved Shooting (AIS)
Re: 05/15/2015

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Moved from tic?11
Undetermine original
11 d-amount of Plastic position;
US Dollars . I - Secured 
SAI I
k. Medical Summary
No injuries of FBI Agents or arrested subjects.
Shooting Incident Review Team Details-
a. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) was comprised of the
following personnel:
Inspector-in-Place (IIP) David W. Faun
Assistant Inspector?in?Place (AIIP) b5 ?1
I b7c '1
IV- Shooting Incident Review Protocol
On February 24, 2015, at approximately ?:45 Chicago Field
Office Acting.Special Agent in Charge (AJSACJI Inotified b5 '1
Chief Inspector David Paul Gelios of the shooting incident. At b7c _1
approximately ?:50 p.m,r Itelephonically'

 

notified SIOC of the shooting, and at approximately 11:08 
submitted an Emergency Situation report (ESR) to SIOC. I

On February 25, 2015, the SIRT team assignments were made and the
local AIIPs reviewed the Inspection Division shooting review protocol
with 11? Faun, after having met with Chicago Division EM regarding the
previous evening's incident. The same morning, SIRT members met with
the involved FBI agents, CPD TFOs, and_management personnel to explain
the SIRT process and protocols, explaining their intention to schedule
interviews of all witnesses in an expeditious manner. After 
consultation with CPD, it was determined that since no CPD TFOs had



l2

raw-1053'



Title: Agent Involved Shooting (AIS)
Re: 05f15/2015

fired their weapons, CPD would not be open an investigation, and would
not need CPD investigative participation for CPD personnel interviews,
outside.of Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) representation, if so

requested employees.

 

In total one was taken from SA . who was directly. - b5 '1r5
b7C -1,5

 

 

 

involved in the shooting. Other witness interviews included three FBI
Agents, six CPD officers, These additional interviews,
events, and witnesses were documented via 302s. The and witness
interviews were conducted voluntarily. A (Warning and Assurance
to Employee Requested to,Provide Information Following a-Shooting_ 
Incident) was signed by the Agent interviewed by 

 

CDCI Iverified the Department of Justice's (DOJJ - b6 -1,3,5
-1,3,5

 

 

Civil Rights Section representative,l I had declined to
pursue any investigation into this matter, and declined to review for.
federal criminal prosecution Agiven that nobody was hit by the shots.?
CCSA Micheal Golden advised the actions taken by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on February 24, 2015, to include the use of deadly force,
were justified and necessary in response to,a reasonable belief the
subject posed an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to

Neither DOC Attorney nor CCSA Golden requested a

copy of the Shooting Incident Review results.
Administrative

a. Firearms Training

9

Since SA had only been out of the FBI Academy for b6 ?1
his firearms qualifications records were b7c '1
provided to the SIRT by Primary Firearms
Instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. A review of the
training records reflected most recent qualifications
with his FBI?issued Glock handgun on December 8, 2014, all of which
reflected he was in compliance with the firearms Qualifications
requirements.



13.

NYT31054

- 

Title: (orgiesoj Agent Involved shooting 
.Re: 

b. Deadly Force Training

 

SSAI I of the FBI Academy staff, indicated SA I b6 -1

primary legal instructor was SSAI I She also ?1

indicated on his October 10, 2014 legal exam,
which covered the FBI Deadly Force Policy. -

 

 

 

c. DOJ Civil Rights Prosecutorial Decision

On February 2015, Chicago Division's Chief Division Counsel I
(coo)| Iwas notified the 0.5. b6 -3,5
Attorney?s Office for the Northern District of Illinois (NDIL), that 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Section 
had declined to pursue any investigation into this matter,

and declined to review for federal criminal 

I land since the actions taken by the Federal

 

 

'Bureau of Investigation on February 24, 2015, to include the use of
deadly force, were justified and necessary in response to a reasonable
belief the subject posed an imminent danger of-death or serious bodily

harm 

d. Local Prosecutorial Decision

Cook County States Attorney (CCSA) Michael Golden, Chief of the
Public Integrity Unit, advised the actions taken by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation on February 24, 2015, to include the use of deadly
force, were justified and his office declined prosecution based_upon I
_the facts in a detailed e-mail communication, b6 
noting the facts reflected SA announced himself as law b7c "1?5'7
enforcement, gave commands to that were not complied with, and
then fired a single shot at in an effort to eliminate the threat
others, who were being threatened by the unknown
subject. With the and post?arrest, recorded
statements of the-subjects confirming the subjects were attempting to

gunpoint, CCSA Golden advised he needed no further

 

14

NYT-IUSS

 

Title: (UfMAgent Involved Shooting 
Re: 05X15X2015

information, nor an inspection report upon its completion based upon
tho facts provided.



NYT31056

  

FD-IUS7 (REV. 5-3-11?


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Elaolmniu Gnmmunioali on

Title: Agent Involved Shooting (MS) in Date: 07/21/2015
the Chicago Field Office

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CC: b6 -1
-1
From: INSPECTION
Contact:|
Approved By: Timothy M. Feeney
David Paul Gelios
Nancy McNamara
b6 -1

Drafted 

BY -1
Case ID Chicago Field Office Shooting

Incident

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Agent Involved Shooting
(AIS) following the SIRG meeting held on 02/01/2015
Administrative Notes: The AIS review was delegated to the
Chicago Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 02/24/2015. The AIS
Report was submitted electronically by SSA Ion b5 ?1
06/01/2015. 137?: '1
Details:
D) On 07/01/2015, the SIRG reviewed an AIS which occurred on
02/24/2015, involving sn| SA Iwas 136 ?1,4
participating was positioned in 
the back seat of the vehicle driven by Chicago Police Department (CPD) _1 3

TFOI Iwhere his role was to take photographs 
I I During the operation, an

UNCLASSIFIEDHM

NYT- 1057



Title: Agent Involved Shooting (AIS) in the Chicago Field
Office

Re: 297J-HQ-A6151928, 07/21/2015

 

 

UNSUB, wearing a mask, approach the vehicleI I The b6 ?5,7
UNSUB, later identified asI I brandished a revolver, ?55?
-1,3

 

 

pointed it in the direction ofI land Subjectl

and demanded cash.

 

On O?f24f2014, the Chicago Field Office opened a predicated
investigation I to targetI I
I I Throughout February of b5 

2015: 53' Iworkedl hith.CPD Police :1?4?7'3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Iauthority to participate inI I -1
I Iwas properly documented with b7E ?1:3
appropriate approvals. OfficerI land SAI Iparticipated in

drafted an operation plan which was approved by SSAI land
by ISAI the operation team on
02/23/2015, and planned to conduct Ithe
same afternoon in the vicinity ofI Chicago, Illinois.
(UXEEBHQE and re?briefed the operation on b5 _1
02/24/2015, due to operational need. The DOJ Deadly Force Policy was h7C -1

incorporated into the operation plan, and the Policy
to the operation team during the February 23rd and 24th briefings. In
addition, CPD TFOs to follow the CPD Use of Force
policy. Although briefings were conducted on the 23rd and on the 24th,
several team members expressed during their interviews confusion about
their specific assigned roles. In addition, Agent and TFO personnel
indicated they were unaware of all law enforcement Agents and Officers

participating in the operation.

 

 

 

 

b5 
(UXEEBQQE At apprOXimately _1!4!8
-1
-1


 

 

NY131058




 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Agent Involved Shooting (AIS) in the Chicago Field 
Office ?1
Re: 297J-HQ-A6151928, 07/21/2015 b7D ?1
?1,3
positioned in the back seat of the vehicle TFOI I th 
riven an rom a poSi ion anne a I I 
photographs ofl Isurveillance vehicle was poSitioned
approximatelyl Ifroml I

 

 

Approximately an hour later,| Iapproachedl land he _1r4r5r7


-3,6

 

 

 

TFOI land SAI Irelocated to a surveillance

position approximatelyl lfroml Iwith

 

 

 

a direct line of sight.

At approximately 4:55 02124f2015, an
unknown black male approach from the South on foot. As the unknown male

(later identified asl approached b5 -4f5,?
out the identifiers to the cover team via b7C ?4r5rT

radio. walked past continued Northbound, and out of


sight. reappeared wearing a mask over his face and approached

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Ibrandished a revolver, pointed it in the direction of
threatened to shoot and demanded cash.

 

 

Members of the FBI cover team, comprised of FBI Special
Agents, as well as CPD TFOs andl IOfficers, observed the

 

 

 

actions of| Iindicating
I IThe cover team, believingI I life was

b6 -1,4,5,7
at risk, moved to the scene led by Upon 
arrival, his weapon in his left hand, pulled on the qu -3

door handle with his right hand, announced himself as a law enforcement



3

NY131059



Title: Agent Involved Shooting in the Chicago Field
Office

Re: 07/21/2015
b6 -1,4,5,7

-1,4,5,7
officer, and issued commands to not comply. Perceiving
an imminent threat to FBI Agents, and
CPD Officers, a single shot from the back seat of TFO
surrendered, was taken into custody,
and a fully-loaded Rossi revolver was recovered. No other Agents or law
enforcement officers fired their weapons. There were no injuries, and

there was no property damage.

not hit by bullet. A subsequent

interview the post-arrest and recorded statements of the b5 ?1r5r7

subjects confirmedl [conspired to 

 

 

 

 

 

SIRG OBSERVATIONS

 

{W/?ch On 07/01/2015, the SIRG reviewed the AIS with the intent to:

l. Evaluate the application of deadly force.

{Uff The SIRG voted unanimously the application of deadly force by

SA on 02/24f20l5 was in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force b5 ?1
. b7C ?1

Policy

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning

operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues.

OBSERVATION The Special Agent involved in the Agent

 

 

 

 

 

 

Involved Shooting reviewedl Ishortly after the '1
incident.

(U/be??j ANALYSIS SAI Ireported in his Signed Sworn b5 _1r3
Statement, he reviewedl Ishortly following the incident :1?3


4

NY111060



Title: Agent Involved Shooting in the Chicago Field
Office

Re: 07/21/2015

On page page 30 of the Inspection Division's Shooting
Incident Guide, direction is provided to the Agents involved in a
shooting as follows: ?Understand you will be removed from the scene and
separated from any other involved Agents and Task Force Officers as
soon as possible. This is done to minimize exposure to the media or
information or circumstances which could affect your independent

recollection of the shooting incident."

INSTRUCTION SAC, Chicago will ensure personnel involved

in shooting incidents are removed from the scene and separated to

 

ensure their independent account of the shooting incident is not

compromised.

(U/Zfb??f OBSERVATION Personnel assigned were not wearing their

body armor at the commencement of the operation.

 

ANALYSIS INSD interviewed personnel assigned to the
Chicago FiEld Officel operation who reported b7E ?1:3

 

 

 

they only put on their body armor after hearing reports of shots fired

and prior to moving into the scene.

Defensive Systems Unit Principal Firearms Instructor
Administrative Reference, revised 05/12/2015, stated: Wearing of DSU
issued FBI body armor by SAs is mandatory during planned arrests,
execution of search warrants, the conducting of surveillance or any
operation which can reasonably be expected to culminate in a

confrontation with armed and dangerous subject(s}.

(u/Zies?i INSTRUCTION SAC, Chicago, will ensure personnel assigned

to Operations are fully equipped and wear their issued body armor, in

 

accordance with the PFI Administrative Reference.

 

OBSERVATION The operation plan briefing was inadequate,
as specific roles and responsibilities were not communicated to all

members of the multi?agency operation.

 

ANALYSIS 1mm determinedl Operation b7E -1,3

 

 



5

NY111061



Title: Agent Involved Shooting in the Chicago Field
Office

Re: 07/21/2015

order was well written; however, the briefing of the plan was
inadequate. Personnel assigned to the Chicago Field OfficeI I

were unfamiliar withI I and

Agent and TFO personnel indicated they were unaware of all law

?1,3

 

enforcement Agents and Officers participating in the operation. In
addition, many members were uncertain of their specific roles. INSD
interviews determined at least one FBI Agent admitted he was unaware of

the non-verbal distress signal for this specific operation.

RECCOMENDATION SAC, Chicago will ensure operation plans

are thoroughly briefed and all participants are familiar with their

 

assigned roles and the identities of other participants.

3. (U/Zim??i Provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary. The SIRG determined the captioned Agent Involved
Shooting incident would not be referred to the Internal Investigations
Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential administrative

action.

Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members
were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of

Inspections (OI), Deputy Civil Rights b6 ?l,3
Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice Unit Chief b7c ?1r3

I Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General
Counsel; AXSSAI I, Squad Washington Field Office;

SSAI [Practical Applications Unit, Training

 

 

 

 

Division{TD}; SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, SSA

 

 

I ISpecial Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit,

 

Critical Incident Response Group; Section Chief Robert E. Hughes,

Violent Crime and Gang Section; Systems
Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, Global Section,

 

Counterintelligence Division; and SSAI I Evidence

 

Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following non?voting
individuals were also in attendance: Inspectors Scott Vito, Timothy M.

Feeney, Eric Welling, Trent R. Teyema, Peterson, Justin

UNCLASSIFIEDHEWQ

E-

NY111062



Title: Agent Involved Shooting in the Chicago Field
Office

Re: 29TJ-HQ-A6151928, 07/21/2015

Tolomeo, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, Assistant

Inspectors/Team LeadersI I b6 -1
?1

 

 

 

 

 

IOI, Management Program

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Analyst I Inspection Management Unit (IMU),
Supervisory MAPAI I and MAPAI I
Inspection Analysis Unit,I I Safety and Occupational
Health Manager, Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs, 
SSRA and SSAI I Investigative Law
Unit, OGC.

Procedure for Responding to the Observations

SAC, Chicago is responsible for ensuring the inspection
Instructions and Recommendation are satisfactorily resolved. The
inspection process is not complete until the Instructions and
Recommendation are addressed by Chicago. The Inspector?in?Charge will
review responses to determine if Instructions and Recommendation
are adequately addressed or require further action. Resolution is
based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions

the division has under consideration or plans to implement.

SAC, Chicago, is required to provide a written response, via
EC, detailing the actions taken by Chicago to resolve the Instructions
and recommendation. Follow?up EC responses must be directed to Unit

ChiefI Inspection Management Unit, INSD. Once the EC is b5 -1
I ?1

 

 

 

serialized, please email the Sentinel link to MAPAI
Any questions may be directed to Assistant InspectorfTeam LeaderI I

 

 

 

 

#0





NYT- 1063

Page 1 of 2

From b6 -3
Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 4:09 PM b7?: ?3
To: Stroud, Shawn W.

Subject: Chicago Shooting March 25, 2013 -

Inspector Shawn Stroud
Inspections Division

Based upon a review of materials from your shooting inquiry, we have determined, and the.
USAO for the ND of Illinois concurs, there is insuf?cient evidence to warrant a federal criminal civil
rights investigation into a shooting by an FBI agent in Chicago on March 25, 2013, that resulted in a
non-life threatening wound to a passenger in a car driven while escaping apprehension toward the agent
so as to endanger his life. The local District Attorney has also declined prosecution.

Three FBI agents observed a man behaving suspiciously in a parking lot. Two agents approached
the man and the car that he was entering and exiting and observed that he was stealing hub caps from
another car. The two agents approached from the rear of the car. They noticed two passengers in the
car, another male and a female, in addition to the male driver, and loudly identi?ed themselves as 
and ?police? and instructed the car to ?stop.? Instead, the driver accelerated in reverse and almost struck
one of the agents who jumped out of the way.

Meanwhile, the third agent moved his car to block the exit in the parking lane. That agent was
unaware of what the other two agents had observed and only saw what he thought was the subj ect?s car
strike another agent who had drawn his weapon. The fleeing car then sped toward the front end of the
agent?s car that agent exited, blocking the escape route with his body and his car. The subject car struck
the front of the agent?s car, centinuing toward the agent.

The agent backed up alongside his car and eventually away from the back of his car to avoid
being pinned between the cars. The agent stated that he feared he would be crushed between the cars or
run over as the car came head on toward him. He dodged the car and ?red multiple shots aiming at the
driver, through the window and through the driver side door.

In addition to the two other FBI agent witnesses, there were a number of non-law enforcement
witnesses and a video of much of the action taken by a video cam in a nearby parked ambulance. The
two witness agents and other witnesses saw the subject car speeding toward the agent who before the
agent fired his weapon. One witness] I observed that had the agent not ?red at b5 -3
the driver of the car he believed ?it would have run him over.? MC '3

 

The best evidence is a video that records the action between the time that the subject car has
cleared the rear of the agent?s car and is aimed directly toward him. About two seconds expire between
when the subject car appears to strike the agent head on (the agent does not think he was hit by the car)
and the agent appears to ?re his weapon at the subject car that he has avoided and is just passing him. In
that time period, the agent draws his weapon and tires at the driver. The agent keeps his body up and
away from going under the front of the car speeding at him while drawing and then ?ring his weapon 
very much like a matador avoiding a charging bull.

The subjects? car sped away from the parking lot and the three agents gave chase in the Bureau
car. The subjects? car travelled some distance before it crashed and the male passenger was
apprehended by the agents at the accident site with a wound to his leg. The driver and other passenger
ran from the scene but were identi?ed and later located. The passenger subjects admitted to stealing hub

NYT- 1 064
?lerffz'C wszemporary%2 2f5f2014

Page 2 of 2

caps and driving to escape law enforcement. The driver was later captured and charged with
assault on a federal of?cer.

Given the driver demonstrated an intent to run over the agent with his car, the rapidly unfolding
events, the information known to the agent (another agent appeared to have been already struck by the
car), and the fact that the agent?s agility alone prevented his being run over by a speeding car, there is

insuf?cient evidence to support a that the agent willfully violated the 4th Amendment?s
requirement of reasonable seizure and thus the criminal civil rights statutes. A federal criminal civil
rights investigation of the agent?s action is unwarranted. Please continue your administrative review and
action.

 

b6 -3
I I 1370 -3

 

Special Legal Counsel
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

l?I
cell-I I

601 Street, NW.

Rooml:|

Washington 0.0 20004

 

 

From; b6 ?3
Sent: "ue a Ju 16, 2013 12:1? PM me ?3

To: (CRT)
Subject: FW: Agent?Involved Shooting March 25, 2013 - 

 

Promi:kStates Attorney) [m il cookcoun il. v] b6 -3 ,4
Sent: Tuesda July 16, 2013 10:46 AM b'i'C 4
To; USAILN)

Cc: I(States Attorney);| I(States Attorney)

 

 

Eject: Agent-Involved Shooting March 25, 2013 - 



As we discussed, the SAG has declined prosecution in the above-referenced matter. Please give me a call if you
have any questions. Thanks.

Chief, Special Prosecutions Bureau

Cook County State's Attorney's Office, 13th Floor
2650 South California Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60608

NYT- 1 065
file:h?x?C :fU Windowsz emporary%201nternet%20F i. .. 2/5 {20 14

rw.? rags 1 _o1 1

Fur: Peoria Shooting
Tolomeo, R.Justin
Sent: Friday, June 27, 2014 3:34 PM

- . ch ?1

Please route to file.

 

Justin

Justin Tolomeo

 

 

 

Inspector-

Federal Bureau of investigation
Desk:

Mobile: . .

I Eic.fbi.gov

Original Message . 
From:l 'b5 -3
To: Tolomeo, R.Justin; Teyema, Trent R. - -3
(DIG)

Sent: Fri Jun 27 14:5?:21 2014 

Subject: Peoria Shooting

 

 

 

Gentlemen 

Based upon the information that the Inspection Division has provided by telephone,

we have concluded that the agent involved shooting resulting in death of Jason Moore

in Peoria, Illinois, on June 14, 2014, does not warrant a federal criminal civil

rights investigation. It is our understanding.that the agent was fortuitously

present at a social event when Moore arrived and shot and killed his?ex-wife and her ~c
boyfriend. The agent then fired his weapon killing the subject shooter.

The facts suggest that the agent, who may or may not have acted under the color of
law, fired his weapon to protect himself and others from potentially more deadly
gunfire from-the subject. We need not resolve whether the agent acted under the
color of law. The information provided indicates that the agent did not act
"willfully," that is using force that he knew to be unlawful. Accordingly, a federal
criminal civil rights_investigation is not warranted.

Please continue your administrative review. -If in the course of the administrative
inquiry, you determine that there are contradictory relevant facts suggesting that a
federal criminal investigation may be warranted, please advise. -

- b6 -3
Special Legal Counsel 2 b7c ?3
Civil Rights Division -
U.S. Department of Justice

6127;2014 
NY131066,



 1r ran-a arehangar-wearerarenas?"    

  

    

Tweraky, Ronald

From: can madden} b6 ?3
Sent: Monday, July ?16, 2012 31d? PM we _3
To: ?(wars-Ky, Ronaid

Subieet: Dayton FBI shooting

inspector Ron Tearsky

Yfloflz

Inspections division

Based upon the information reported by Inspector Twershy and a review or the statements of

the a ents present at a shooting in Dayton on June 28, 2812, by FBI Special b6 ?1
resulting in the death of arrestee Fallacy M. Myers, I have determined that this ?1

insufficient information to
Additionally, the local
it will not conduct a

matter does not warrant federal criminal investigation. There is
suggest a violation.of the federal criminal civil rights statues.
district attorney?s office has reported to Inspector Twersty that
criminal investigation nor present the matter to its grand jury.

Mr. Myers from about a distance of six teat inside Myers' kitchen, aster-he b5 -1
had repeatly stabbed himself with a knife, refused orders to drop the knife, and turned with b7c -1
the-knife extended toward both SA and a second agent, who was slight closer the

'sobject and next to 

FBI agents had conducted a search of Mr. Myers' home pursuant to a federal search warrant for
evidence related to?tederai crimes, including crimes related to children. The USAD had

advised the agents to arrest Mr. Myers based the tact that four firearms had been discovered
during the search and the subject was a person prohihited from possessing firearms. while

Mr. ?ver was being escorted to dress-himself, he grabbed a knife in the kitchen and with his

back to the arresting agents began to stab himself. sn and other agents gave severalbo -1
commands to drop the knife and drew their weapons but did not initially fire them. ?1
Eventbally, as one a ent moved cloSer toward Mr. Meyer, he turned and raised the knife toward

that agent and SA both of whom had remained near the kitchen doorway. Both agents
believed that hovers, who had already-severely stabbed himself, might next stab an agent.
Neither agent had immediate cover. After a quickly issued final order to drop the knife was
ignored, 5n fired three shots. The other agent, who advised that she also intended

to fire, was unable to shoot betore so had done so and did not-Fire. a medic on the

scene respond quickly after the shooting and the subject who had been shot in the chest, was
pronounced dead.

a voluntary statement, which was consistent with facts presented during b5 -1
interviews of the other agent witnesses. We appreciate SA 5 willingness to provide ab7c ?1
voluntary statement to help an informed, timely decision on the merits of a criminal

investigation. The Inspector's OFFice should complete its administrative investigation.



Special Legal Counsel
cell 1 I

Civil Rights Division
US Department of Justice
661 Street, as

R00m1::;:]
Hashing on D.C. 28664

136 -3
1376 -3

3.4

NY111067

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Inepeeter Christopher Semis
U3. Department of Justice
Federea Bureau at Enuestigetien
935. Peneeyivenia Avenue NW

{5'35qu ?335 rm: A3 
WILLFW entmumw MMSH
(WHERE:

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FAX {423? 333-2052
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PM: (13:55; 

Weehingtoe, [333. 20535

Re: incidents Surreunding the ?nest of Seett Evens: {Maren 213)?! 3)

Beer inspector Bevie:

 

Heaee be advised that at my requestJ |Depuiy District Attorney
for my of?ce, has reviewed ail the statements and other deeumente contained in
the hide: yen preview regarding the unfortunate events that new rred March 5.

2033 at the reeidetnee ef Scott Evans, 2332 Stepieten Read, New Market.

Tennessee.

it appeere this review that there was empie probable cause for ?ne

rement 0f the criminal complaint and search warrant. it further
appears {eat yew agents were appreprieteiy equipped with ineignies end ether
indketere of their sietus as 53w enforceMent officers when they were in the
games ef sewing the e?minat compieint and search warrant. it farmer appears
thai SKI |reiying on the aforesaid ineigniee as well es verbal
enewecemente made both at the faint deer ef the Evans reeidenee before entry
and inside the residence and directed to Seett Evens, reasoneny gave notice 01"
h?e identity es 3 iaw enforcement Of?cer end that deediy force might be used

 

b6 -4
1370 ?4

NYT- 1068

136 ?1
1370 -1

 

unless resistance ceased and that Seett Evens muet acquiesce to SA 3 b6 -1
orders he disarm. As such. actions were in full compliance wat We ?1
Tennessee Code Annotated Sectien 39-1 ?1-620 regarding the use 01? deediy force

by we enforcement of?cer in effecting an arrest.

izurthermere, fer the same reasons and eddi?eneiiy it appears that

there was a :eesenebie heiief the? mere wee imminent danger of death or serious

bedi?y iniuw te SA S?sl emeng others: endier te Scott Evane SA b5 _1
eetiene wem in eemp?enee with Tennessee Cede Anneteted hm _1

Secfiees 394 $61? and E512 legerdieg the use ef eeif defense and defenee of
{hire persona

Themfere. bee-ed en the foregeing, ekheugh the ieeidente of March 6 2913
unfestuneteiy in the deem of Seetf Evens, the actiene of 33 were he ?1

 

 

reasenebie sane ieeti?ed under and by the circumstances then and there existing. b7?: ?1
Sineereiy.

.56 N?s We?

x" .
James Dunn  b6 ?4
?istriei Attorney Gene-rel 1370 -4

 

 

 

NYT- 1069

Miami shooting declination Page 1 of 1

Miami Sheeting eeciieetien

@usdoj.gov] b6 -3

h7C ?3
Sent: Friday, Meet?! 15, 2013 iz?ci AM
To: Raveneile, Thomas P,

on: 

 

 

 

 

inspector Roveneiie
Inspection Division

soseci upon information provided i3}: yew of?ce one eoosoitotion with the USAO in Miami, we hove
determined the: the shooting that on agent in Miami on itiiy 31, 2013, which in the
tie-orb of Gereio?o Deigeio and the wounding of iocoi task force detective. does not warrant criminoi
investigation. There is no evie?eoce to support on investigation to determine wire ther the federal crimieoi ciuii
rights et-ototes couki have been violated.

Two video i?eeoidiogs from cameras insteiied outside the Miami home, "Grow House," where the shooting
octurreti; provide on 'ueequivomi record of whet ocrtirred before and during. the exchange of gunfire between
the Jew enforcement efficers and the shooting victim. Mr, ?eigodo initio ted the fotoi exchange of gunfire by
aiming :1 hand gm: of the iowenfoi?eemeot of?cers as he unexpectediy exited or car parked in the driveway.
Hi3 aggressive condoet with doogemu?s weopon wooio? have created a fear for the safety of seif
and others, justifying the a return of gunfire that resuited in Mi; ?eigodo?s death.

Fleese compiete the administrative review of?the matter.

 

 

b6 -3

 

 

bit: -3

 

. .  

Peterson, (men; (FBI)

 

 

From: b6 -3
Sent: Wednesday: November ?34. 2015 5:23 PM we -3
To: Peterson. 

$ub?ectz RE: 51. Louis A18

Hi we we concur in declining this case For prosecution.

Thanks 

 

From: Peterson, (INSD) 

Sent: Wednesda November e4, 2E15 a:@1:01 en
be ?1,3

Subject:.Fw: St. Louis n13 b7C -1,3

 

e~mail documenting BO) approval to compel-SA]
Kate

Peterson
inspector

Office of Inspections
desk
cell

 

 

 

 

b5 -3
Sent: Thursday, January is} 1915 11:1? AM ch -3
To: Peterson, 

Subject: RE: St- Louis A15

Thanks Kate. I confirm DO: approvai to compel, Let me know how it goes and if you need
anything else.



Deputy Chief
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section
U.S. Bepartment of Justice

 

From: Peterson, [mailtoi [riicnhf?iige?] b5 _1f3
Sent: Thursday, 3anuary 15, 2915 11:19 AM ch -1!3



Subject: St. Louis n15

 

The St. touis SAC reached out this morning regarding the interview ofl |is
ready to be interviewee but still Wants to be compelled. He is having additional surgery in

1
NY111071

three weeks and would like to be interviewed prior to the surgery. INDS is prepared to move
forward with the interview but I wanted to reach nut and confirm DOB appeeval of the
compelled interview. AIDAD Gelios is also confirming the ?th {leer approval.

Call me if you have any questions or want to distuss.

Thanks

Kate

Peterson

 

Inspector

Office ef'inspections

desk

cell b6 -1
b7c ?1

 

 

 

NY111072

Page .1 of 2

From: . . 136 ?1,3

 

 

 

Sent: . - Thursday, January 16, 2014 2:25 PM . 1379 ?1 3
To: - Bretzing, Greg T. -

Cc: - 

Subject: RE: MOI Revised

Inspector Bretzing

Inspection Division I -

Based upon the reports provided by this email, as well as the summary of the incident previously provided, no

further 001 review is necessary of this shooting involving local officers on an FBI task force. Civilian witnesses

and the subject himself corroborate the law enforcement officers? account that, while task force officers 

searched for the fugitive subject, he hid from them in a second story room and ambushed them as they entered.
The subject was wound ed and he wounded one of the task force officers. A criminal civil rights investigation is

not warranted. Please complete your administrative inquiry.

Special Legal Counsel
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department oflustice

 

1:6 

Sent: Wednesda January 15, 2014 7:18 PM . b'?C ?1,2 3
. . 
. Cc: Bretzing, Greg T. (FBI) 

Subject: Fw: MOI Revised

 

Attached are the statements of the subject of the fugitive investigation] I all were in
the house at the'time of the incident.

Please let me know if you have any trouble opening them and if you need anything else.

 

Thank?
From: - b5 -1

Sent: Wed Jan 15 1?:41:09 2014
Subject: Fvv: MOI Revised

You may receive these from Charlotte, too. but I just wanted to be sure you got them. These are the Memoranda
of Interview you were waiting for. .

 

 

 

 

From:l 

Toi 
Sent: Wed Jan 15 17:38:23 2014

subjeCt: FW: MOI Revised

 

Zissi?i?gn

Page 2 of 2

 

From:| Imailtol . 136 ?1,4
Sent: Wednesday, January 15, 2014 5:2? PM - ?1 4
To:| 
Subject: MOI Revised

Ok I think they are done?Jet me know



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 wahicagoRichmond_Ill_shooting
From: Davis, Christopher W.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2013 6:06 PM
To: . .3361
Subject: w: Chicago/Richmond, Ill shooting
CD
- From: (CRT) @usdoj.gov> :gc?ffs

 

 

 

 

 

 

To: Davis, Christopher W. .

Cc: (CRT)
Sent: Th?u Sep?12 17:24:27 2013

Subject: W: Chicago/Richmond, Ill shooting

 

 

 

 

InspeCtor'Chris Davis
Inspection Division

Based upon a review of materials from your shooting inquiry, we
have determined, and
the USAO for the-ND of Illinois concurs, there is insuf?cient-
evidence to warrant a federal . .
criminal civil rights investigation into a shooting by two FBI agents
in Richmond, Illinois, that
resulted the death of Anthony Starnes, on May 10, 2013. The facts

support a conclusion that the

agents were attempting to thwart a bank robbery, from which Starnes 
was escaping apprehension, 

by ramming the agents? vehicle and driving a car toward the agent-so
as to-endanger his life. The

Page 1

NYT-1078

 .
local District Attorney has also declined prosecution.

A team of FBI agents followed three men, suspected of
involvement in previous armed . 
bank robberies, as they drove in two cars from Chicago to Richmond
and deployed their cars in a
parking lot near a bank that they intended to rob. While parked in a

Honda that was driven by
Stames and was to be used as the get-a-way car, Stames and another

man donned masks. They
had three handguns inside the Honda.

The team of FBI agents moved in on the two men in the Honda
after an arrest was
approved by supervisors.

 

b'i'E -12

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

three agents approached on foot to make the arrest. Commands to
?Show me your hands? were
given and the agents identi?ed themselves as The driver

elected to attempt to escape in
the Honda.- He rammed the SUV and accelerated toward one of the .

agents on foot. That agent

and a second agent, who saw that the ?rst agent was in jeopardy, 
?red multiple shots at the

driver of the Honda, striking and killing him.

The occupant of the Honda and the occupant of the second car 
were arrested and 
charged with attempted armed robbery. The occupant of the Honda

Page 2



 

 w_ChicagoRichmond_Ill_shootin 
admitted that the three men
were preparing to rob the bank while armed and were waiting for
customers to vacate the bank.

Given the driver rammed the agent?s car, demonstrated an
apparent intent to run over an
agent with his car, the rapidly unfolding events, the information
known to the agents (that the 
men in the car were about to commit an armedrobbery), there is
insuf?cient evidenCe to support 
a conclusion that either agent willfully violated the 4th Amendment?s
requirement of reasonable
seizure when he ?red at the speeding driver escaping from an attempt
to rob a bank while armed. I
A federal criminal civil rights investigation of the agents? action is
unwarranted. We appreciate I 
the agents voluntary statements that helped us make a fully infonned
prosecutive decision. . 
Please continue your administrative review and action.

 

 

 

 

Special Legal Counsel
Civil Rights Division
US. Department of Justice

 

 

 

 

cell -

 

 

 

Page 3

NYT-IDBU

b6 -3
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To: Bretzin Greg T.


Sent: Wed Jan 15 15:48:11 2014
Subject: New Orleans shooting

Inspector Gregory Bretzing
Inspection Division

Based upon a review of materials from your shooting inquiry, we have determined that there
is insuf?cient evidence to warrant a federal criminal civil rights investigation into a shooting by
an FBI agent in New Orleans on July 30, 2013, resulting in the death of Allen Desdunes. An FBI
task force team initiated an arrest of Desdunes during a surveillance after he was observed
selling narcotics. Desdunes attempt to evade arrest by striking blocking FBI task force cars with
his car. An FBI agent ?red once after the subject refused commands to step, continued ramming
the blocking law enforcement cars, and appeared to reach for a weapon. The local District
Attorney has declined prosecution.

Desdunes was a gang member well known to the FBI. He had previously been arrested on
narcotics and weapons chargesl I
The FBI agent, who shot the subject, had used non?deadly physical force to arrest Desdunes on a
prior occasion when he ran from arresting agents.

 

On uly 30, an FBI task force was conducting surveillance on Desdunes in order to plan a
later arrest by warrant. During this surveillance, Desdunes was observed selling drugs in a motel
parking lot. Based upon that law violation, the surveillance team decided to detain the subject
then and there. They were all known to Desdunes because of prior contact with him, but
nanetheless donned clothing identifying themselves as police to detain him.

The two agents and a task force of?cer drove two of their vehicles into the parking lot to
box-in Desdunes car. As Desdunes saw the cars approaching, he tried to evade them and
attempted to escape in his car. Eventually, the drivers maneuvered the two law enforcement cars
and boxed Desdunes? car between them. The two agents and the task force of?cer exited their
cars as Desdunes drove his car alternately in forward and reverse to ram the blocking law
enforcement cars. The law enforcement team yelled commands, ?don?t move,? ?open the door,?
?stop,? and ?put your hands up,? and words to that effect. As a result of the ?rst collision, the
airbag in?ated inside the subject?s car, causing ?irther confusion and limiting vision.
Nevertheless, Desdunes continued to ignore commands and drove his car back and forth,
ramming the other cars. The shooter agent broke the driver?s window, pointed his M-4 ri?e
through the car window at Desdunes, and repeated the commands.

Despite this dramatic show of force, the subject continued to ignore commands and to drive
back and forth attempting to open a space between his car and the others. He then reached into
the back seat. The shooter proffers that he perceived this action to be a threat to himself and the
other of?cers. The agent was aware that Desdunes had been convicted of carrying a ?rearm and,
based upon that knowledge and the subject?s desperate behavior, he believed Desdunes was
reaching for a gun. The agent was further alarmed by the subject?s unwillingness to submit to

NYT- 108 1

b6 -3
1376 -3
1375 -1

the law enforcement show of force. He states that he in fact feared that the subject had reached a
gun in the back seat with which he would shoot the agent. The agent moved his body to protect
himself and, at the same time, ?red one shot. He did not ?re again when he saw the subject go
limp.

The other two law enforcement of?cers relate a consistent account. Signi?cantly, both saw
the subject reach into the back seat and also thought that the subject was going for a gun. The
beliefs were understandable, but mistaken. No weapon was found in the car. However,
Desdunes? friend, who was a passenger in his car, provides some supporting information. He
observed that Desdunes attempt to evade arrest in his car, heard commands -- the same
commands described by the agents -- repeatedly given, and conceded that Desdunes refused to
obey the commands. There were no independent witnesses to the events at the time of the
shooting. The Inspection Division attempted to interview family members whom claimed to
have relevant information, but Desdunes famin refused to talk with the FBI.

Based on the available, non-contradicted facts, a federal criminal civil rights investigation of
the agent?s action is unwarranted. Regardless of the viability of the arrest plan and problems
with its execution, the agent?s perceived fear that the subject?s action posed a deadly threat was
not unreasonable. There is insuf?cient evidence to support a ?nding that the agent acted with an
intent to do anything that he believed to be unlawful, a conclusion necessary to prove a willful
violation of the 4th Amendment?s requirement of reasonable seizure, a necessary element of 18
USC 242. We appreciate the agent?s voluntary statement that permitted a ?rlly informed
decision in this matter. Please continue yOur administrative review and action.

Special Legal Counsel
Civil Rights Division
US. Department of Justice

 

b6 -3
1376 -3

NYT- 1082

  

FD-1057 (Rev. 5?8?10}
UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic communication

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Division Date: 02/18/2014
b6
CC: b7C
From: INSPECTION b5
Contact: b7C
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
b6
Drafted By: b7c
b7A
Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SERG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the meeting
held on 11/20/2013.
Administrative Notes: (U) This communication summarizes the Inspection
Division's (ENSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 10/25/2013 by former
Inspector In Charge (110) Christopher W. Davis. This communication does
not provide a complete account of the original INSD Shooting Incident
Report. A copy of the INSD Shooting Incident Report is electronically
attached to this communication.
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) INSD Shooting Report dated 05/30/2013
Details:
This communication serves to memorialize the SIRT Investigation of b6
b7C

the captioned shooti incident involving New York Field Office (NYC)
84 and the results of the 11/20/2013 SIRG meeting.

b6
On  the traveled to SA:residencel b7C

New York, to review the scene of the

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Inhident New York Division
Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

shooting. Evidence Response Team processed the scene on

07/18/2012. The SIRT was not allowed entry into 

residence. Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA)
advised the SIRT
to provide a voluntary statement.

 

attorney, who represented SA

he would not allow SA

 

 

 

 

The New York Police Department (NYPD) provided the SIRT a
compilation of reports, thel I911 call, and video

surveillance. The SIRT did not interview SAI

 

 

The following three paragraphs summarize the

 

 

shooting incident:

At approximately 5:15 am, on 07/18/2012, an Agent?involved shooting
occurred in SA

 

 

 

assigned to the 

 

i was off-duty at his residence,  I
INew York, when the shooting occurred. At
approximately 5:00 SAI I

 

heard a car alarm activate. Upon looking out of

 

her second story window, she observed two unidentified males attempting

 

to burglarize the family?s vehicie,  began
to bang on the window in an attempt to stop the burglary.

 

 

SA asleep in an adjacent room, was awakened by the

 

 

commotion, and was advised by their vehicle was being

 

burglarized. SA went to the bedroom window, raised the

 

 

 

blinds and observed a black male wearing a white t?shirt at the rear of

 

 

their vehicle "pulling" on the trunk. SA observed a "shiny"

 

 

object in the right hand of the subject, which he described as either a
ratchet or a knife. SA opened the window and yelled
"Police, what the fuck are you doing?" SA also yeiled get
away from my car. The en ject did not respond and continued to pull on
the trunk. SA advised the subject took his left hand and
placed it in the area of his waistband, while still pulling on the

trunk with his right hand.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Based on his experience and training, SA believed the

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Inc?dent New York Division
Re: 2/18/2614

 

 

 

 

waistband area to be a location where weapons were kept.
this, SA
Bureau issued service weapon from its holster. SA

Upon seeing

 

 

and removed his

 

 

 

returned
to the window with his firearm and found the subject still pulling on
the trunk. SA again shouted at the subject to move away
from his vehicle. Immediately following the command, the subject

looked up at reached to his waistband area and made

suspicious movements directed towards him. In response to the subject?s

actions, SAI Ifired one shot from his weapon.

shot, the subject fled

 

 

 

 

 

 

Following the

 

 

 

 

On 07/18/2013, as part of the Assault on a Federal Officer
(AFO)investigation, NYO Agents responded to

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

was being treated for a gunshot wound which
entered the right rear side of his body.

 

It was later determined
Iwas burglarizing the vehicle of SA
was shot.

 

when he

 

 

 

On 07/19/2012, in exchange for immunity from prosecution, SA

Iandl provided statements to representatives

of the and NYPD. As
part of the ongoing AFO investigation, NYO obtained a copy of SA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and statements.
On 07/22/2812, NYO Aoentl Imet with the QCDAO and
Attorney In ex hange for immunity from

 

 

 

 

 

prosecution fo provided the following

 

 

 

statement to the

 

 

 

 

I I land
I  travelled tol Iin the early
morning of O7/l8/20l2. They intended to steal a car stereo and

navigation system from to the one driven by
Ali four met near the back of SA

took up look?out positions at the Opposite

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ends of and and used

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

and then heard a

 

 

 

 

 

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re: 02/18/2014
tools to include a screwdriver, to burglarize the car
heard someone shouting at him and
gunshot. All four en began to flee the scene.
realized was injured and assisted him as they entered

 

 

After droopind

 

 

 

 

 

On 07/02/2013

Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ),

 

offl

at

 

 

 

drove away in

 

 

vehicle.

 

 

I Special Counsel, Civil Rights

requested SA

provide a voluntary statement through his 

 

 

 

On 09/17/2013,
violation of Title 18,

Leadersl

declined to allow SA
statement unless compelled.

 

 

 

to 

 

AUS

 

 

District of New York, and

Rights Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ).

 

 

Special Le

 

 

 

 

statements ofl 

previous statement provided by to thel

SIRG Deliberations:

were consis

 

 

rovide a voluntary

in exchange for immunity trom prosecution for
United States Code, Section 1001,

Imade statements to the SIRT
End

and

composed of INSD Team

Eastern
gal Counsel, Civil
The
tent with the

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Division b7A
Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

morning of 07/18/20l2, which depicts a male running from the direction

b6
of! kehicle and subsequently falling b7c

The SIRG voted regarding the application of deadly force. Eight of

12 voting members determined the use of deadly force by b6
. b7C
violated the DOJ Deadly Force policy.

The DOJ Deadly Force Policy provides a core principle that agents
?may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer
has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
to another person.?

The United States Supreme Court has explained that ?the test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application.? Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The
Court advised that ?proper application requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id

The Court also stated that reasonableness ?must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindSight? and that the ?calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split?second judgmentsein circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving?about the amount to force that is
necessary in a particular situation.? Id.at 396m97. The ultimate

 

question is ?whether the officers? actions are ?objectively reasonable?
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.? Id. at 397.

Some of the factors, while not all-inclusive, cited by the

voting members in evaluating the objective reasonableness of SA b6
use of deadly force and the application of the DOJ Deadly b7C
Force Policy core principle included: (1) insufficient facts showing
UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

it was reasonable for SA to believe that the sub?ect out on
the street posed an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
to SA or others; 
minor property crime out on the street while SA
family were inside the house on the second floor of the residence; and
(3) the actions of SA to include the presence of the
structure in which SAI
and SA

window to retrieve his weapon prior to re?engaging the subject and

 

 

Iwas involied in a

 

and his

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

resided, verbal commands issued by SA

 

 

 

ability to safely move away from the

 

using deadly force.

In particular, the verbal commands issued by 

?Police, What the fuck are you doing,? and to get away from his car;
believed that there
was an imminent danger to himself or others, but rather that he was

these commands did not indicate that SA

concerned about his car. While particular language for verbal commands
is not required by the DOJ Deadly Force policy, it was noted during the
SIRG that the standard language taught don?t move," followed by commands to the subject such as show me
your hands,? in order to clearly address a threat posed to the agent or
others by the movement of a subject. SA erbal commands,
in contrast, reflected a concern about protecting his vehicle and its

contents.

Four members of the SIRG requested further information from SA

in the form of a voluntary statement, to determine if
additional circumstan existed which might be relevant to determining
whether SAI use of deadly force was reasonable. The four

voting members who requested additional information agreed that if SA

 

did not provide an additional statement that they would have
to rely upon the existing record, and based upon the existind record,
failed to

 

they would be unanimous in their decision that SA
adhere to the DOJ deadly force policy.

Chief Inspectorl Icontacted the attorney
representing SA on 12/10/2013, in an attempt to allow SA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Division b7A
Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

provide a voluntary statement. again stated his b6

client would not be available for an interview, absent being compelled. b7c

 

Accordingly, the 12 members voted unanimously regarding the SA

 

Ifailure to adhere to the deadly force policy.

 

SIRG Observations

 

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting

incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6
determined the application of deadly force by S4 pn b7c
07/18/2012 was not in compliance with the Department of Justice's
deadly force policy. The SIRG made the following observation:
Observation 1: not adhere to the deadly force :gc
policy.
b5
b6
b7C
Instruction 1: AD, INSD, will refer this matter to the IIS for
action deemed appropriate.
2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective action from an operational
standpoint.
The SIRG made no recommendations or observations concerning the b6
operational techniques used by SA during this shooting b7c
incident.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues

The SIRG made the following observation requesting additional

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

Title: (U) Shooting incident New York Division
Re:  b7A
training:

Observation 2: his weapon without
consulting NYO CDC or EM, and did not adhere to b5

b7C
be

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b5
SIRT interviews and analysis of NYPD reports indicated relinquished
possession of his Bureau?issued weapon to an outside agency without
consulting the appropriate personnel.
Additionally, SIRT interviews revealed SA contacted SA b6
personnel, but did not contact the NYOC Duty Agent, and did not secure b7C

the scene.

UNCLASSIFIED

8

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Divi?ion

 

Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

Instruction 2a: ADIC, NYO will ensure SA

remedial training regarding the application of the deadly force policy.

 

 

 

 

is provided

Instruction 2b: ADIC, NYC will ensure all Special Agent personnel

are aware of 

New York Division,

 

 

 

 

Recommendation 23: ADIC, NYO should consider changing the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b7A
b6
b7C
b7E
b5
b6
b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

9

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

ADIC, New York Division, is responsible for ensuring each
Inspection instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The
inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation
is addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (EEC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

ADIC, New York Division, is required to provide a written response,
via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow? up EC responses must be directed
to Unit Chief Inspection Management Unit (EMU), INSD.
Once the EC is serialized, please ewmail the Sentinel link to MFA

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

10

b7A

b5
b6
b7C

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

Title: (U) Shooting Incident New York Division
Re: ?32/18/2014 
.0

UNCLASSIFIED

11

 0? 

 

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The {iieemehed re the duriee evening here?s of 3  Cent-rm was
made with Pi} ripen arrival at SA residenee. ef??eiels previded the '05


 

 

 

wire the feiiewr'ng ier'ere?refiee:

 

A: epereeimmeiy 511:3 mm re: ?geninirwelee? eleu'ariee id I
I ghee: re the I

 

 

 
 

 

ere: eff?rim? :31 his: reeiriene'

 

 

 

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Iteerri a. ere eerieere. [Efren {eeia'ing euref her Seeimi

 

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I?I?he eehiele wee earked ?ireerie in free er? their residenee eegerr

 

 

 

?1 'e Bureau re?ned eereiee weapon rem rte 1e! rates; (?ee 33  I  --
??iurried rhe with hie ?rearm end {erred the Subject 51%} gm hug en the

 

 

{e hang en the wiedew in rm etiempi? re: grep the burgiery. Sr? asleep in an 
roe-m, were awakened he the and were advised by Ii?heir vehicle was being;

 

 

aren't {e the hedreem reindeer, raised {he blinds; and ebeerr-e? e, Mae-3s; b6
meie wearing r1 'wh'r'ie at the. rear eftherr eehieie en the trunk;  ch

{reserved 51 ?eHm-? rat-reef}: 'rr rile right hand errhe xei'rieh he described es either 51 felt-he:
er knife.  deemed the window and. yeHe-e- whet the fuck-ere year. during?"
Se elated he the eemmeed twiee. The eehjeet ere rret reepeed and 
re put: en the trunk. SA advised ere. subject reek his Ee?. hand and piece? it in the
eree efhis weietbemi em eta. ian en The trunk with hie right here}. Base-ii err his
experierree errd training,  {he weistireed eree 1e he at where
weepens were kepr. Liprm ere Cr were. re :1 dram-er beneeih his; bed are}



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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?red Sher frern his; Wei-1pm}. I-?e?rm-?ing; ihe ehet, [he subjeei ?edI:I

 

 

  

 

 

Sr eer?. ?ee 1701131931 his; vehieie had been bergierrze? and 

 

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"k

1.



 

 

 

 

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exam: mt: p?smnger 51th: and palm:  ?h1tm ?ih? ground into that backseat. Ml

emam? ihe which: and (in; 

{Emu :?evmm?ng his resideth  {hand in he an the mienhmw wig}:

a 9i i arrivt: within {funnies an; dami??d
himsei?m an FBI Agar: 1? Sergem? in: shot sonmnm W?h? was

dragged inn: 1 Ita? ci?scrihed the indiw-?iduai he she: as at ?ack b6
mam, wiih a sum-hid heat wearing: a whiff:? T~3i1xrfauduhirk almn?t A?m? being {guestimm? ahuui hm
1hr: grams {if his weapst SEE r?iinquished ii, ?im?ig with the spent sheii Easing, if} {ht
Sergeant.

Show}: after the: incid?ni, 
1hr treat: 3: ?1 m: a wtrum iu'nis back. irwcsiigamrs fume lwmgimi and
id??i'i?i?i? KI Eli-1'5 the individuals when 
imp: aparteci the: {if ?.21 nhh: Eau?gitasi wit 1 the
Whiti? arid wait mi Sizer: anti} when he: surrmildcrea? the: 106m Pmuinct', i0
chargma {$13ch 11?: the. inc-Mam.

?i?he inierv?mmi 3223?s Twin {hr  SA :0

dw?i?e? '1 ?tile-?mi a mi} frank  what} mini  had been await-ed a
unabh: Iii-E13311 Eris 'mrnadiate sum?-?ism, centacmd 
a aquad nurmimr SA and instrucied him to FitSpoi to SA
cala?enuc.

The: immiwm  win} a?vih??d he arriv??i a: be
and him in has visiibly Shake-11.. He asked 331 Wham tbs: shunting maids-st}: we
{mantra}. in atlai?iemni datam?tizm if {he msi?mg? was 11 mime 3cm was. unashig?. 
Rainmaker" SA i?GSpC-tn??, hut magi} ?imwd sums-mm breaking into his car,
and fittiing ht hat: in H's: ream.st SEA :1 provide my furthm? dma?is. He
advismf on seem: NYPI) {3131mm he mini-214;!  0 gr; if} the. Ems-pita} and rmii?sk?
thaw- mnim? an imthuimce Ht: in the. zaiinhuianee 1:33

?flu: ain'nsaawnoicd inihmmtiun rcgarding, the inf?rvimars' {if 5M5 an: was; :36
via {.1432 {33.

:13 part GfE?i?tG iiw?t??igatium a: digitai cup}! EH i call ?112:th bl EEC

51. 

 

.2 n'e ?Pm was beam? 

 

   
 
 

{m remix-"ed from that N?f?ii?f.)
y?ii ?sham tax.? Shii- idanii?mi hmse?? :15
prim-?ned 31$? kiddie-SS, and mid that": oaemmr {wt} black mama attain ?uid in hurgiarim hat a?ehic-I?.
She ?uid that 9} {?pcr?tm?? was headed daer ind ?they? phi-33a.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3



gamma: up. 311:: Si?ttd than: wars: ham tinte- ?niack mates. and mm nfihmn was pimsihiy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

injured. mm x- r: 13$ able :0 12:21? 1th poiim the- men war? injur?d. b6
Sin: mid the: SH nyamtn was ouisid -. making at her car and ?they? sti?e Em: radii), WC
She then idcni'?mi ?93 3 :?ipm??iur asked her Hang Wifagmns

were inmiwd stated draw his weapun ami ?re-d mm shut; 521m: RIM {he 1?

 

 

 

 

 

 

{)?p?rati?si? 5h aim. nm Rnuw if ?they? air: a wrapam and the. maids: 1i fess ?lm?s. fix-'5:
minute? b?f?f? 111::- 9? i E.

 


rm:


 

 

Vi}: squad: Imam; nixrmtil'ig am A iiwesi?inaiticjl'l
Eagenis rasmnda? legitimize 1
*3 "mg; ?fths: s! Nun's! ems? gamma 

mi Mame" was 'ir?a?eL fur a Hungarian wan:  The Emile:
wax; net rammed during surgaqr aim: its itimximity {cl Igpine va?s sigma-d fm?

inmnriew 11pm refeasa {hum gummv a: aware)in with; S: i  mm U133 8933}  {flaring {he

mien-dew with ?x?mtn? mated he; went till w?il land
Hi3 mi: 1. gems he: was; waiking in a sumsswalk and ?gm Slmif? He then

tarminatai {hi3 int??-?iew due in dismm?m from ?lm surgery.

 

 

 
 

 

 
  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rim {17351 WERE, in mahauge fur immunity {mm land I be
ma?a statenmnm in re: resentali?sm mi" 111:: Qua-13m; Gummy ii?isirim 9338?: i??lih?3? MC
and the.  YPD.  taimncn: with his simman 11:: on the:
warning {if 13:: Sh??ti?? I?Jmmey .E'hr advised Hakim: SA
I?hml Ivi?n?d be. available an intcn?i??part of??te

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31193 i W??t?iu??im?z, ubtainec} a, (?if the. and QCDAO intervimv at" 3&1

5-131: The-3e. inwrvicws we?: manila p311. ?fths im-tstigatiun.

 

 

 

 

 a part nf aha mnguin?i ??513ilmazgtig'zm?iam   mist-t with the b5
(3:31.310 and mi: aummy :m-l in ux'uharigt?: i'm? b7?-
inmzunit}! ?mn ,mvicicd 1h: I ini?unrnjation tilt {hit
{Kill-M3, er?iti'l wiih ihc the FBI m1
85391 3: Ian] Irm-?ciicd If:

Iii} {ht} een?iy rmer r111; M6131 R) Siva} EL calf Sier?f? arid

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

gym-em {mm w; Iaimi'istr i?t? {me drive. I ?mr max":
mitt new that back {If 34%. Hit! lfm?c'k? 1m I pushime
31% the. ands 0  Ie? itgmia
in?ame a to inargiarixe {hit my] INS-it?d shaming: him an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

Hui {hm heard i?i gunshm. AH men imgan Iii: ?lm: this realm:

 

 

 

 

 

 

was minted and assisted him .213 ?lm S'Ili?l?m I ?t dragging 

 

 

ira?sv: away 31? a-?Hhi?i?.

 

 

 

 

 

To time, the. is mt aware- i'jf? an}? widence indjca?ng rim Etihi??i?  

Pursuant ?3 3 {at?im faintest, an and
Yielth tit-f the: Buni?c {if  residents: and "'lhtai Simian prutessing?

 

b6


 

 

 

{Tm in {arachana? f0? imnmuif'y {ram} prs'mecuiimn fur Fiok?ic?? ii?fTii'H: i3!
States; (Sada, Satetictm 1:363 I1:th Im? {i111 St?t?mmii? in the {he b6
LEqu it): the fiasi?m Disfric: of NEW York and Special Large}? (fix-?1 
4

 

 

 

 

 

 



Rights Dix-ism}, my. I Inn-J Erviewed separa'teiy in LEE: nftheir MC
ariorrmj lat 3nd tW? frimtuis was: *arching f?f a
Simiim the which Once may iocaim? i?hq fumed by

 

b6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

{hm lwised a raisin In break mm the which it: 51ml {he Mis?t} so it. mm?d ht:
ghac-a 3i vehici?. md um; {fth {timid? Mimi as 
the passanger Side wim??w and emared {hi-2 
disarm ihi: whicia?a alarm-with a small ran: he: ugm a aurawdriwr to mums- and mnem:
iht?: mdia, During; this tim: mm??ad the mar whii?i 13f {he drivm"s side at" the which.

re:- rt'i a make: imaging {m a windnw and ?What the: ?it-k. are mu ?ning??
h?n??td this: radin if) one. m? 111:2: {Wands ram away with the. Marta. zit the: ham with his
while mitji?ig 111:: Which, causing, the tr} g0 {:ffand the. ?g 1L3: 33h an ?lm which
He: 'b?gsm run Lim'm {ha :31er Wham he heard 3 masher and {In mid Sham."
Jumhnh iht?: East Emile he saw wag: at rear :he. driver?s side either

was; tying in the sires nbserved a malt: apprmaei?s painting.

a handgun Iii. t?r- -.

mid the. main. "Tm: shin rH   shot me.? The. male: die} am:
am: .2131?in :1 .121 .1: . 5w: .y 6-1 sh; "awa': rte 0m :15? 1&5;
 315,? hi mile. i. it. .13? iLt Lil

picked than} up in  land that}! am if} a nearby hmpifal,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
  
   
 

 

 

1' hearing 131::
rant

  
 
  

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6


 

 

 

 

 

In a mmrau: imam-?ew Mind in: and .iaicmi??c?
 3 that ware driving armmci {we mutants {m {ha
Hmri?iina? Ef??h, Making; {hr am they could 516:3! the radii} and it?sataii it it

whic-ia. 021cc Hasty {ml m! which [hair critaz'ia, they parked the 

an: emnmamimd the. which an {?00 {Haunted diszmn {he alarm with a scrim-driver
while bz?akt: {he passengm ?3 mu: ml: and. ante-red {he mm? 1d is: the:
rear of [hi3 driver?s Side uf?m which: it} act as a Inukuui?. Al 5mm: 3min: =ctivaied the
mime afarm, {musing 1hr: iigi?s ?stah and the ham it?! go eff. blinds move- in
an um airs; winduw m? :1 333.1512: Imam near Eh": \r?chiuic and 1: $111! banging m1 aha: WE "Linc-v
{Iuckei'i dawn behind the. which I can] 3133?. ?huh gm? and
began to run up the: Street, He htt?r? mm: 5110! emd 111*: i-i?r: though: he was smart
hm diati :10: feci it y: I I mi: in: was: she-3,1: and kinks-2% had; in this; siireea?on
{If when: ii attained. He. saw a mah?: with a gun panni?ci in M5: {?irtation and mid the: ma!  ?Vim
fucking Rho: me.? Imm'id um meal! iftim nmie mspiand?dsi?ig?e Into a
um? i. my dam: it} the huspitaf.

 

 

 

 

 

 

   
    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

?I?hc Suhjecl?s ware:

 

 be


Pes??rm Ream char

 ..
..

Weigh: 62 EM

Eiiack

?19m Ham-:1 Emu-n

 

 

 

 

 



Substagtive Cam Fii?s

Thai: i?l?inwing auhmamiw mm: was upwind regarding ihi? incident:

 

 

Titie: EEC
hm

 


(mi 3:331 2

 

 

 

 

Enclusu res

Mi minimum: have: made part mi? this regim't. and an: idenzif?md in the: encirm?d white
:11 whit: IRS.
5?5. Administratim

ni? tin: ii?irmirm netsomci:

limpet-tanirM'Ihau'ae {(33 {I?Tm?istapher W, Davis:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      

'I?apccuni '95
shah-2mm ?i?emn chi??r 

Aasit tam Inwm?tm?muPrice: 
?ail?"
B, Slimming: Incitient Review l?mtmmi
On i EEC 'fl?avis cmzm'mmieafed with NET) Emeiai again in Chang: 
April firm?x arremge. lugisii?s fur the SEEP. SAC E?rt?uzeks served as thr; paint ufcontam 
ihe 531K311 arrivmi during {ht Evening-g haura mi." {31331 On .11 Eli: Davis;
and inspect; bun with the 33. saisiamt Dircciur in {.Than?ga Jamiitt: K. EEC

 

14.2 (iixaus? pminrst'?s. EEC Davis was {hi} was conducting a
p?ifizi??i im??mtigmion and wuuki pmvi?a timir pagans, in the. AIME mm 
ail {aka-Er?: in}! that would in: prim-Maid {a {he  YZPD fur inuimiaten in limit
im-?ggi?igativw ?ie.

(33:1 13C Thu-is met whim-1H persumm'?, m? the NET) 
management as chi :13 aquad muting-ting, this? summit cm a: 135??rderai Of??i?ii' 
inwstigation, NC Davis; inimduee-ci mambcr? nf?thit and amtlimzd um: SERT pmumnis.
'i'htaa'c WEES an ?jn' di?iogm z'?gamin mum-2mg, 'giari'?amim. 0r quesiimm print in the
Emrestigeuim': amines-wing. 9521'}:  team} viaila? 5mm? af?x:
shaming aan with men-imam af?x: Sql.ladl:  and a itpres??mgjm m??m NYQ 1373
Respon?? T's-s 

 

n. . . be
ME. thwugh the. ?ame-{a 0? aimrna} {:ipima?f? are we

mien-?e?: with th?- NYPD and ihi?. Qii?a?l 'i?ht: was pmvi-Lkn? 3: mp}; ?i'a summary {lithe
f;

 

 

 



intm?view, Elfiwifit': :1 Signad Swarm Staies'naili to {hit SSERT, 
inmwiewg? events am? were. {imam-irmcd in FBI wen:
jam-viewed ami a??wed R) mm? the. {incumenting {hair iniern??imv mid {:csn?i?m 
acwracy of the: praw?rd?d.

Naithm' 1h: {Warning and Iin'zplt?sy?e Riziili?si??d E?l'?vidt:
infatsrma?on {In a mammary Basia} nor ?Ii: 5343:1155 {Warning ?xsaurance Empleym
Raquimd Frmisie infirsnnai?iimj W?l?t} utilized. 'i?lm ir?arviews 0f were c?m?wted
HLQETH {Warning and Assurath If} E?i'nnl?yee 'R?qucm?? in Pn?n?ide infurmatiml
ll?uiinwing a Sht'n'?irzg timid-em} ware- axecul?d {Ur each Ag?i?. inte??im?vt

{3:1 an exit briefwax pmvitkd by Hi: ?an-it: to AME: F'edat?cyit' and 
Sarah's.

C. 'l??mannei Inw-niwd in ihe Shnn?ng

 

 

 

Sr? w?e?mm?i}

 

I), Firearms Training

 

 

 

amaiysis {Emailed he.

"I?he. Yi?} pram-Mai quaiif?icmima rewards i'm Fi?-s
was: if: mnnpiianw w?ih alt ?r Wanna: raiquit??m?i??.

 

E. Heading Fan Training

 

adx?i?ed 1) ?er Puiicy 'i?mining was an
32.51 353:}: H133 was Hematiig?ix?d via Electrimig Cun'?i'mz'??afian dai'itd
i nah-'28? I, 55', (?Sc?hedui? for Unif?mn?: Clause of Luga} 'Insirumiun far Third ami'i
Fm:th {3112mm 205 This EC initiu??d {This ii?g?ii; {If P?iic CDC
wavid?d that NYQ Exgai Inglruatim?: Sign?i1?: si?w?i, datmi 33521521}! E?s'ili?h i?Ciufi?ii 111:3
si?gnamm :31? SA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F. the a? Emir Armnr am? Identi?ers

 

inwmigatiam did mi ?htai :1 iu?brmaiinn regarding, SA use: nf hmiy
armor aiming; thg?: Sic1: iid amt pron-Ede a ?an-mm? the 5.4531:

G. FBI Indiccs anti Natiunal {frime [nf?rmatinn Center 

Nanimai {?rima [Eli??rm?ti?? Cart'im? Nt?w York. State: Uf?iriminai
j?ustisr: Sam-imam for
[and I'?i?tmim.
maxnewua amrieg {1 Eh am: datailad bei?w. .-i::iditi0 2131i}; Fm checks were mn?lpieied
far 311 subjirats mini mun-mad with negative results. {Limits ezrf the: arrest F?fpl'jfi? were: piac?d in the
'3 martian Uf?iht: File.

Naif-31?: I wuumied ?lihj-i??}

33311-2 of Birth

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6


b6


136


b6
b'i'C

b6



 

Sex: Male,

Rate: mack
A Flam:
Aries: Charges I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Name-J qunda? subject}

Data mail}:

Sex: Mala:
ace: Biack

 

 

 

 

 

sin-M: {haw I {?hm'uml

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Namatl I
Data ufBirth:
Sm?: Maia?
Ram: mack
Arms: Dam
Chamesl 

 

 

 

 

 

Emmi 
Ham:

 

 

 

(?ham-Iii

 

 

 

Cnpias uf?tht: a?wcm?mimmd prim?ui?s were piacad in the. 1, settim oftha ?316..

I-L Evidence Ream-cry and Lahoratun? '?ivisinn Renurts

SPrim if} {he writ-11f (af?x: 

accept?d musing-33' 0f  fin ?cam?is?su?d weapiiul Sea?gwni
ini iaiiv Husk custmiy i 34:: mmpon, and i1 ium  Tiff}:

 



 

 

 

 

win;

b6


b6


Eff} '43!

b6

cussm'v 1 (?ack made! 23 magmaim and 13 MC

Winches?mr {umber mu-t?dgm from all the. Emma were. taken 1:3 {he 
Fa?ice Lats ibr maiyxis undar vault-hm
a: 73?: cartridges were {eat fire-d at that. Lab by ?at

and war: rctaimd as. evidence at the. Fireamm .r?anz?
Setliun ia mention was; In Eith {if {ha 5pm}! she]! msi?g
wii?ct?i by {he S?rg?a? within that me?y and Evi??nm
'E?taeking; Swim)?: wiuszhe A copy uf?tia mgm? was inciud?d Eu {11:3 EA
semion {3:23: 3, M3 Juraau- wanme and I Was-n: b7:

1a} Drieat?x-?I Squad pin'suani if: an nf?ciai ME
*51 mm the NYC). claimed the. imnis imn that t?st??y M78511-

I Squad {m E. A reiinqui?shmi Cli?t?d?j? af?ne wmpt?m (m {Hz-"3153112
i?iraanna instrucer $55 Training Uni: Whi?} 
mt: magma fur signage,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

?1?}113 NYPIJ Crima Sew ?nit TE the 5:2ch ?triiowing the. showing ins?dmt.
{in 1 2, Burma (Shier Cartier {Iriminal Majm? Crimes Bureau,
mat with {if} Davis mwided Emit; with crime smile phetogi?apm {If
Imaidmmai. mndu?cd a ?lt?iit??ia: manniriatiun nf aha second {Hairy
win' tram this. r?sidenw. Basad an if ?2 ale rsfihc {Elma-d5 frczun thy: window Harem,
"3 was {minimal iht'. ?i?tld 1W were dimmed Inwardia ihe. rear pm?i?im':
ufi?hcl :wned  Balsa? ume ft?Jr?nsia {:xan?iimni?n ui?ihi?:
windan scream anti ihc?: cumiuded the: {mm mm: amgi?d tim-Eir??
1m: rear {he w-?chiezkr.

136
1370

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

m1 WERNER 2, the. ?hilmving nmm?mm {film T0 in SA
residence: {21115112 {if 3 swim imam {$11.1

Swim-r- Tm?n Lmdar, SA SA 

and SA an pmsent wait: .i?immgraphe

136
1:78

 

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y0 ifiRT? and Phumgraphm docmnanlm? {he exterim? of?m emf} {11?
mmugh imiividual and spharizjmi ?11m unlicet?d {iigiia?ai
ak?ching data via "ihmi Etaiimil. The m?iginaaf phi?i?gf?pi13 wer?r ti} i316: ca?i?: and
digit-31 ?I?mal Simian data. mm submi?cd ?01331 {mammal Pro?t-i5 Limit 1111? precessing-

:?c?xse? the $151"? J?mucst {hr mar}; into  'esiaienct; 'E'Ezu'? prcciudud the.

 - 5mm uhiuining the mamasarg dam in cmr?ipieta Simian I?ri??xassing

 

b6


 

 

 

Mmiica! Regart

FBI luv-312m? in the ?lm??ng:
Nit: irgiuricg.

 

 

?uhjecisz

1? .L . - 1: 1-  
miter 231:: maids-m, an :_ndn-aduz1 iaimniimd em ?rm-:11 at



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

{or imminent Ufa gamma: wammji i115; hack. :m'ustigatm??

 

 

 

 Ermspundm? it) the inmpna] and ant as the hm
imiim-?idual? whit! imammrim the hmzp?ai.

.5. ?eclination the Civil Rights ?iViEi??
Um} 1? taunaite inquiry, IIC coordinatad ii?-??f?igi?i?f? b5
. Spa-cm} {Jami Dwartm?m ml??hmiiuc. (Iivii Rights WC
Divisi??. 33" Eclim? dated HNEMEEQEF stamd the: evidence did an? ?Support a
Viaia?tim fittieral law? and Eli?si?d that": ?u the: {Bastian} 1.3i31rici nf'New York
mucurmd with. the. {tin-5:: E113: maticr.
bi. Lanai Frasmntian {minion-
cxchamge fur their stat?anwms, SA ?l?dl  grantmi 13112:}? by that As a team, Qt. 3A0 was; anal-?e to prawn}. Lina: harm: a
{hand Jury. abattnt. 21 xigm? and 63:5: 'tutssd waive-r11); {he ?fi??ct'ed pariic?m. T11: {-1119ch
33%   nd 1:11;; am agre?m?ni in which nai?wr
part}; wmri? against the (?ner. Hue. Io Ling. 3. diSliliSSEd an charg?s
against. 83%  Frail I
()hsewati?g?
?I?he 3112."? the fi'?iuwing Ewes:
- . 
03521311?? ATiGa?i:  ISurrmda-lmd 3115 W?mmn wuiumt cunsuiimg 0 L131. hm
and did {mi adth it 

 

 

 

ANAEXSIS: IE. Sec-1:501} I L3, Guid?iines far It?dcrs??cm'ion at i?he Si'n'n?ing
Stem, statics the I'hliuwing:

{f 133:? 935333; 'u-?mpam is5-19ctm-szedj?r mafia-sexy w? huffim'm? mm. {muf?er 3958 in: fianwd
sza+.szr {hm-a! is trauma mm; In {Him :3 ?E?I?g-r Legm? ("$33369 {if
{Ecmwaf (Liana-251$. FEIHQ, (Jr {he Shims giffg'xrrzejx  {Effigy .s??mzdd Em {ra'msz?fnaia? {fl?gnanficma?
arm? nasgw'e'if?g wfacrfher cm Aggy-:1" 'ar mow hr: .e?w'rwmf?rmzf ?uff-{GrfIMJL

 

a; pda {mi 03.53 93? :21 {murmurs the pmuecium In 

he in. ihi:  YT.) in nix-3:111 131'? Elf! Kigali. inw?vad shaming. "Th-c: relevamt Section {If

 

 

 

 

 

cited as Haiku-*5: hm

 

 

 

 

 

b5

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

imm?viewg and analysis {If J'epm'tb: inaii-uatml ralii'iquishgr? pays-65.451er of his
?urcau-ds?ued ?sealant-a an {Jumid? agmuy u??it'lhtjui mnm?ting {he agrapmpna?tc personnel

 

 

 

hymn-isms mveaiad $.34

mntamed SA but did

 

not mama the ET) .ihii'}; A gem]
nn!? Sgt-Eire: the scam.

i3:

AIME, wili ensure: 3111 ?pmei?? A gem painting! am: aware. Farr 12'. Section .1 LE.
(:iuideiines Inicn-??mion ai ?it: Shooting Same.  well 51:; the:

land did

 

 

 

 

RECGM h:

 

 

AWL Shm?d camid?r changm 

 

 

 

 

 

1?

b5

b6





h5

 

 

 



i

?232


aw Yer f? 
dm?

.

in.

  



 

 

CIVEL DIVEION
f0 (3135:: Fi?:
File: N13. i??w Date: ??at 4, 

Tn: (thief, Criminai Seaman

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

136
Re: E3531 geml 137::
I ?ctim

i hi? i if};

CIVIL 

This marwr shank! ht: aimed 1111' the de?ari bed lat-31am:

3- 5111? Rm 

E, Si?wmm?s ?f?thr: Facts and ?lm ?inging:

13, '2le around 5: :3 mm iv . Special A331: :36

ha: maxi whiie he: was jammed in the: 1m} mfg; car radii:

fraism that agem?? family which parkad 'Bt??idt?: hr? harm; ?Fl-1t: again ihmugh :1 winduw
airmen from a semnd ?t?ilry Ring in the: right rear side: uf?his hwy
Survived the wmimi withm?? signi?tam ashng: mix-=12 r33 mansmyumces.

The: ageni c- aims than;~ after ha  awakuned by scr?m?s from ih?? :1er room,
his?? mam cum tin?: win?uw mm 52am hm: {inwn behi 11d ih?i- car with a Shiny Wh?e: '35
mth: mar; wags (in: car. Egan: id??ii??d himse??as ?mime,? micrad {hi-r. intrudem 1373
an .i'Tmm the am, and grahimd hi5 sen-ice wrapan beneath his bad. .mzenrding the: atgmm
mint: than aha}? the: mn'u?s?iands. aim 111311 at the: rear af?x: my myriad inward 5:11-53- ;ngth with thi:
shiny nbjeci in his ?ght. hand and reamhtd his; waist baad with his ic? _1and 1hr what {he agent

I 136
1:71:

Spaciai ?egaf (Timings!

 

 

Tu: Reminds Kecl'igm
Of?cer. :1sz Legal Admmisim?en

?I?he ahm'a: mum hatred ?le has bean {11:33:33 as; af?iia dam

illiicf; Criminal S?cii?n
FORM 

[Jam

 

[haught' might b: a gun. Fearing for himseif anth lat Elm wiuumw in the; maxi
?mm {:13 ??id ima- ?hui 2st. 1h  maul km; (inside: {113 cm?
rcn?mvii?ig the radio} birth claim that was waning away if: the: 3.1mm abaut :1 12:1!?
Ea?glh i?h?n the CENT Ebrh?? hf. ?2'35 Sui-11:. Ft?J-i??n?i? g?r?g?ange? {in tithe? hand?
suppo?a the fat! that  at 01" near {his rear oftht'; {hit again: ?md and
wmmded him.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

'i?he {livii Righ?i Divitaim} and tin: fig?: Emma} 
New York tarefu? twig:ch this widen-m: frmu the i??ierai iin-?e-?stigaiimz arid the. indepeudmt
Queens Distn?c: nf?w {Queens 33%) investigaiicm dawmim: whether there: wag
suf?cient cvitien?e ?0 pmvt?: a Miami aiming}? cit-i} righix vimaliun Qi'?u: appiicabit?: stz?'uw,
I3 



    
  

 

    

 

nil this an i" 'I?kpanmen 1' imarview ?fth:

 

 

 

9 {ii-mi? R??i'i?n Tim? evi?emc inciudizd. the: E333 intewiwmm?I

 

 

 

{Id-ab enhancemam 0.1: a vidm that recorded evenis ?Ehat apme to wearing:
after fh'c shaming; anti {has hailisiics testing and analyses peril-mum by I?m: Fin-23mm Ana'iysis
Sac-Lian (If me. NYFD Lab. ?I?he Queens 135-? dwline? a crimixmi prmmu?m?i ?fthe FBI again fa)?
any vimia'tim; {if 5mm iaw,

A. viaia?on ufthe criminal civil I?ighis 513mm tequims pm?i? beyumi a rezmaunabic
Thai 3 subjmt ?iaw acted willf?u?}; that ?15? with  imam {if}
that he imam-1t? hi: uniaw??. Mistak? Inf fact; am} even sm?iousiy bad judgment,

ram catabii?h Such ?r:an "i?here is; inm?icia?i evidmmc It: rafm?c the agmi?g chain?;
that hi: ?rm his. waapun in :?iriicr it} ?syusmtr what he haiiaved In be: 1-1 ihmz?' to himseifand ta.

[in {he windnw new. t1} him: -- a mi?fappeming In in: reaching :43 hit:
waistband to draw  han?gun. with. the minimum: ofthe {LE-nimd 
$110131  Uf??e the Eagtem ?isuict ?ka, it is 1*ecm?u11?ki?d that than: is
i??uf?ti?nt evidmce to supptm. vima?on at? 1113:: .18, {?ning-E $13135; (Simian 3mm 34:3. hey-{3nd a
r?iasun?hi? dumb: and 1hr: maimr shm?d be aimed,

 

LL 

- ?tn-han?

he: mam: was immediate?y imam ?amed. t] FBI Insp?ui?uns {Jiviaion and Queens

    

 

 

 

Districi Mtumay?? {.tf?cii. The. ?g?ili an epmsemed by cmmsah ware 
{35:1 aiw??l?y? anstw {.1321 men: 

was imam} in a heapit'L-IL he. was inmwiaww by the FBI. but}: he: an

 

 

 

 

 

mi .1 mpr?a?nm? by warm aim int?i?x-?iexa-?cd Qucam DA emd 

A :migi?m?hund inwstigatim rcvmied that I 
Signi?cantm mare waa a Vidal?: ramming mfweni
me: time ei?the shaming, ?i?he ??aum: n?ht: mm .z-ecmdina "neludadl 
The via 60 mm by the. H31
iatmramm a sligmly batter i'i'f. the recurd?d wants.

   

 

 

 

Addit?i?naliy, the. agent fin: shaming; in his im?romn and pmvidmi Ema} haw
mf?ommwm with the wingigsw scrum: Ehmugh which he: ?red. IL..qu iaw 
mak- crim: scam: lahaizmgraphs of but}: the insiaie 91?? 131:: maximum 3:3 wail as; me

136
1:78

1:6
b'i'C

b6


1:6
1:70

b6


maids Efrem 351:3, ?i?hay made {if relwamt distances and cmzducmd halii?tics
testing on the: screen. F81 Emcal and mammary-'3 fh?nn (Emma 13% and
viaitad the. Emma

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
      

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

       
 

 

 

713:8 agent 31:33 weli as hath J?c?neii i0 testi ?v hi-?i?E?W-P EEC
Quem?sg grand jury-u 'l?hc Qumna EA cit-mined prosecutmn oi the agent and 01? the
111111 are mpmsenmd by an attm?n?y in mint-?lial b5
igmcd but: and were by FBI in?p??mr? and f??na?m?ni 
atiamaya The mama}: rapmseniing ths?: agcnt r?fuged to pennif ?ther menu: it? be?:
iniewiewad by rimagent. advised the. Qu?mm DA thai SIN: was  I 
{mm .m?ac?tnt Hm mums-3?5: bedmum {m the aemnd ?uur in the: {mm 0f the: imam:
was 11:. ward 1131? a; 31mm gt) affix: a?bum 5:15 am. naming am the windum she ubaarrw?
mm Em?vidm?s hrsaking inn; he: car. Shit yelled Whit) was asiaap in b?d it?; that?.
mm. mm}.
136
'i'im agmt. advi?sad? the. Quanta 13%; that, Hiker he: was aim?? ha: tanked 0m the 
window am} saw cane: man inside the: car anti .1 3:360:14} 1113.11 Elf. the rear {ii-"I118 {5111; imiding a silver
The agent {imamd 1hr: panes {If a {in?eenpaimd hay winduw 51:15: 35%? M113,
?Paiim, gar away the car (01? words 10 that Tilt: men {hi-I Ci?t??i?m?s?da
'I?he agent rcache? 113119113? his bed fur hi3 hamlng arr minim it ?lm-11m ?ue. men, '05
mgwating his The mam hchimi the, car {Iaier ide-?ti??d a? imam-:1 up, MC
hmdi?g The ?bj?iili that appeared to 111:? ?ght be. a moi in his right han?i Eii?lt?i 
Kmart-15 his: le?? war waistband ems-a1, turning his handy towards $341ng Awarding the: ag?nn
 heiiewd 111:: mm was maching a wcapun and ?lmed himsaif anal  in
l?h?i? mom. H: ?md um: shut at min-1:1.
Mia: 11:: ?md the shah {11: again: r311 Limarnsiz-iira am am 111:: 13m 11'. d?i?sr. (317535 {Jul?it?im he
uhaerwd a man dragging ?t?ii?j?l?t? man an muomubila in caring Up )3 Stain 
{ht} agani rammed hi5 human mile-:63 9?s  Ch: :1 $.33 I mum-ding b5
shaming {a the dispamhmx {Tm :2 3211118 {warding Shit can be. hard ye?ing 11? 1?7:
I imploring him it: {sham at: E'ht'i mm geiting away in 3 cm.
. b6
An {hit gag-ant ans; wais- when they were hm

 

 

 

intawieweci 1:79;; {hit Queantz DA 'l?he agent ism enmim: ed a recnacimt 311? {if the 
in his bedm?m far 121:: again wiih his pmsem. {in that he 3:130
permin {hit {31.1mm [39. is) ?269: custm?y at" me: ?rmer: with a gunshoi h?i? far cxamxtmimn.

,ag.

5? 

 

 

 

Initiaityp Wham quasti?n?d by ill-?3133mm at the: hampiial aiaimad {hat ha
was aim: v. hilie walking in a Crusswaik, Lawn While?: wprasenmd by {rum-1m? he amd
Pl'm?idw 3 Pf'i?l?'i?f 1123 Ill-?3- Qum?s I) A in Whi??i they admittad that that? ilnr?t?ih-?ifd
in a :he? {mm m: cat at tin: time; 0 the. shouting. Lawn what: intcwiaww saparareiy by {ha-E
Qum? 93%? 1m Ewe-cunts W'?mi. 211:? Mm initial}? daceptiwe: ahm? t? :ir
simian"; WI i118 night {11? that umd?m. Aim, 1h?:i1? sinrics Was?re: imamistem. first

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mid that Que?{3115 DA [hm he was nmreiy passing by the lecaziun when he. uhserwd

 

 

zinceincr andividu i hm??xirg ink: that: car and that, when; as a good Samarium he: If; 3mg:
him, he: was shut later mlminad in beng actimly inmh?a? in braking into the: cm" emxi
trying it: 3:3an the radii}. After chiming it was a crime altime??efy
admitted that Tim car had ham spuited {m a gym-1:3 ?13 day,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  
  

-- .Ed

NETE

Puf?mhg later, a?'er that ?dcml govemmcm made. assumneei {113'

:10: En: prassecut?d for pm vimtsiy making :21 Edge statement if} a fbderal m, A.
imewiewcd in the pair-mum {3 ?their mama}; by an it?pemw and Departn'zcni a. army;
land candidiy minimum! that, with that: heip aft-Wt} may

imam he car parka-3d 1:1 {mm {11f the agent?s Imme- ami Emit}. its; radio. fixing; g: 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

aria-mptad disabie: thi?i ztiai?m {he .fhmt {If ibi: car. He {ham want In Stand at the: ?a u?

 

 

ma car, 3:351:1ng ageing: it if} 3:333: armrl?pic?ous If: M?amvhiia
br?k?r am! the: skin: windmw, c-rawimi inn: the: car, I'ezxn'ncud that radin, and {minim H. mttside to 
ma?a-denim.

 

 

 

 

Bath were aim?ied in a *munding 011 that second $14301; win '1ch mi." mg:
in from whim mt: cm: was parked? imam p?m?kdi?g uni}! snmemm
y?ii ?get the .F ~21.qu aha: can {02* wards to that af?ict?? Bath insisted did mu: hear
any-12:11:: Fall ?puficm?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bf?lit??s 11131 in?: duckad dam-"n, {Tying if: .?nida habimi this. can when her: hearci the:
paum?ng as: the. ?an - had that moi ma: 3w. mm- attempt. it} {ii?lii'i'n ihe? in his
hanii or packet. ueliev?d 1h: new}.an m? :1 with *1 target, me!
{hit screw?rivcz, 'Wi?ilCi'l h' {:au?rirzd inm the car. S1gni?canti? insigch
he new: reached far wise W353: hand 11:: was; behind the: can

 

  
  
 
 
  
  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

{an away the car in that same? direciinn an that?.
Sidewalk "at. Bath {?air} mi 131$}; Ward a mud hoaan Eater daiennined by
Ham: :0 tn: {1:11am i313: he had run from that war Uf??iit car In a place in their
smite: mime-n: in that .c a: parked immcdiatci in {iv-mu (:rf?m hul?ghifiz?d car, Wham he heard 21
MW that, when he I?ward 131$ $.3an ha Sam-?5 in 1159 paripherai visium

 

 

 

?il?f?z??ig and .?zliing; a: 111i": Eippri?milmtt?: 55mm: pair in the sirmi.

 

 

 

When i:n?rviawed  Edam! auihmi?m, ?aii'?g at the mum! boom
iimn?di?i?ik? hag-?Lg ?milk hi? 3 3:31ka H01- ?m BL mm: was .i?i?rviewed earlier in};
the HIE he Siai?d that, Whiie he: had hugun is} run ?fths:- 3211', he did In}:
Emcifim?y when: he was Wham me. buiiazi muck hin?a?lmnm?zn??

Eatm' 5:135:11 {hm hit fail when he: was; Shut. at grammars}? indicated Eucminnt

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

136
1:78

136
137C

136
1370

1:6


b6


1:6
1:70

A-
..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and haipad him t0 1hr: mathy

Bilih acivised ihul:  ?ame: ta the aid mi
mars: f?et?r?e getting {a the Saw a man mm m5? aft image, H's;

 

 

 

was balding a gun and puiming it. at than: mar- ri?ir? ?rst WV ?mvthing.
par-km tummy and with thc: heip cant?edemta pu?
311:3 draw him in a: hmpi {315?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1m to gas: :3 ear
inside me car 51?, me. iniax'saciima

was for a gunshz?n' wannd that marred the right rear side ofhis
body With a Irajcmm}: mat. imk t'hc builet 12532111115: Spine: and causing mimi- jib-er daunaga, I?{e has:

{1133: mm wrad and daznunmat?? no Sig dfican?y advarsa: mining Eff?t??s bass-n simt.

111*: Queens 13:3 ii?ewi?wed the. cmafederal'es who amt-:1 as; hm aiming. the en?ma.
.i hazy wamawd cnn?icting amounts. While? ii is; b?liewd than they were nearby at the. ?rm: ?f

the shaming, i1. i3 mi hcfieved that the}! aetua?y \a?itnemsd the: shaming,

ii. and Physicai and?prgn?it 

Signi?cant was con?ded {mammal 3* anaiyxitd. ?5 part {3f 3.

has mime, E?idtt? was 2mm.de

 

 

mk?ti?naii? the victim} sandais and a ?iiver ratchet 11ml {band in

 

 

2111 3mm {a a 1? parkmi in mam nf? 11w. agent?s ear in dit?eatinn ma: {hit
I am. Finail}: the agmu pmvid?d that windmv 35mm: @111 Emir. ?n'tmgh it {mm

 

 

{hit gunshm he. ?reci in the: Qmens [m 1111* {ha-ensia analysis.

the 31mm

 

 

 

 

wide-0 {hints not appear DapI'Ufi: the ?lmm?ng, but it dues; show

 

 

 

 

 

mimimpimn anti supprma the: um?a?iion {hat

 

 

?unni?g and that ?1113ng that gn?mnd. 31? Miriam}: that the widen 
In the: gmnmi as his was :?shoL 'i-i'uwever. evid?nce Such an
was near [ht- mar nflhe ?at

when he. wax 513m and than ram a few steps he?lbre hi: {tr?ii. in any if:me in tight oi?the tummy 01"

the phygimi if}: agani?s ml?'erliiun 1113 he 511:)? a? a man: when he. wag h?hind this car 
and turning reward him with a hand at hi5 m?isihmid, as iht?:  11 mntmiis 

r3 fumd beyt'md a: raasun?hie (inuth

mun-m hr:

The- matirasnanr? video mmem rm: cantinuailm The. violate: frame duet; nut i??fudi? the:

 

IEM?Jnaaiiw it i :1 in; ?zmml

 

 

 

 

 

ht: ramming shuws ?gmss .
car ai?in?n kangages? a ?gun:S Eater dmemvaine? to ba

 

 

 

11:22:, a after {11:13:
rims ml the art-? intn 131::
[Tim fig-um fails as if magma: E11 hunt aha truck paer

 

En?unec?e??iy in {him 3.?th: agent?s cm: that Vida) rcaurds mmhm? figure.

 

 

 

drag the. ?gure: that: fa?! down {Em si'rcm to 11m isn'ersec?o :1 Wham a cat: evmiua?}: 3H
away.

.ws :9 gang

b6


b6


b6


b6


1:6
1370

136
1:78

Th: ci'atancc: a e: ?gure: ?ail  twelve. feari- {mm ih? mar an" the ageni?s mar. in that
mini: viainity ?madam were in tin: 51136: next in em: 311311133, :15 wan
as. a 551w:- ramhei. A blend chug was 1133;: {iiscmered in the. street Thai 3th 1c: the.
interseatiun.

 

Ran maminatiun {11"in agent? hadmum wimiuw ravmlad a rear mmsisi?em with 3 i311? it?f
huh: in the l??-Sid? bay window semen. Weak law, the agent: cunducfad a. reaxmcimem uffhe
shaming. far {he Qii?em KIA. Fm" the re?nasmmni whicias were plamd Wham a: inn: acme.
ghumgraphs pictured than: 311113;: Qf'the Shouting. Maasm?anwms anci 3:131:32:
ware mm?it?: {mm tilt: winde is.) the. at that war 1111'" the car the: night. mi? the. as
Wail} as the: Eacation wh?rm?amdais wen: disarm-aired, and {he same animated i?cmi?n
where he: fit? an the: vi?m rattan? 1mg. 'hm??a?irr, the: Erasmus Anaiysis Semis-m 9f the 
Lab mnducted ?tnwsic ballistic testing winduw same?n. Man an" flue-mic. aigni?camee.

. that-?3 13;: huge ??iy?ien?td curbside tree. in 111:: {mm yard inhr: :??gidenc: thai gamiaiiy
himks the. view Hm bay wimduw.

We with {he {slaiuimm matched by ihi?. {gum-I13 DA. Pia-$1, afte' mum?? 
?fths: FBI lab anhancmnem ?fth? video. the. in?ame ism} ?131? :51th with
tripping his; san??is. causing him it's fail. rather {ham ?131ng the impaat
bu?et smiling. Such a male: in: vac: War-um have. jarred hath his. may and his fan-2.1; ?nward.
instead, in. the?: vidm bedy i?bmm? whiit: his faet remain staiimnm'y on

the meet.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sac-011d. atgant had a: {tie-air hm?: ?fsitc. {mm 131:: winduw screen thmugh which he shot
:0 mt: mar At the Sims: ?rms. the agent?s vigw mi" 131::- area from aha: mar afth?t
can? 111:: in?atiun an {he Hirif?t Wham {1221! would. hat-'3 tram}. (Eugenia? by he {:urhsiczit':

1m:- in addition it} th? wiud?w ?ame and wm?mv bliuda tux-?ring, ihe ut?her penis ufthe hay

 

 

 

 

 

 

winer [3136 Obsn?uciimm. it. is. high}? uniike?y that 1hr: again wauid have haven 31131:: It} hit
with a gunsimt ifhe shat 21:11}? was: in [hit viainity? he far?1L tweiva ?rtei'

 

 

 

away trm?n the rear ni?the em. Hagan-m trait-ratnry angiax. if we:de 31111051 impassihie that {ha

a. ?n . :de have simEa:.1ywiwre an {hir- street 0mm 11mm: the: ia?mai'imfs 31 the rear Babe.
I lira-r.

Fina?y, to {tinker mm?rm this; machmim}. ??mmic tesiiug wag minimum the wimhm?
.?remw. Th: u-?i?d?w with the. buii?i tear hark: was {Email an ih?i- Firamm Mia-{35m
Section af?m Lab. Ij'pun amminaiitm ofihs: win?aw scream, the: Emma huh: the:
in?iderit was idami??d and markad. The. scram mach; disturbed 133? that passing thruugi?; it
were. "i?he 1. that an ?s  :31" ?re that warm Cs?m?i?i?m wifh 111%. ?gs-3.1113: statesman!
and that :Eugatimi at which hit, as; indicamd on {ha vidm?: anti by 111:: warming} of big
madam, were rep?caied. A waagmn amid which wart ?aming-i! in that inset? 3:13; that
agent during the. incid?nt. mad ?re through the windm?s swam: in an atti??l?ipi mis?t-ate
{ha iwia craamd at {her time af?rm: imidam.

 

 

 

 

 

The ?fth?t taming. 51 hula gmmramd by ?ring thi:
Semen a: an exircmt?: angle {as if in shoe: Ki?v?i?i?il?? he: ?rii in the. ??mtupe} was
inwmistam with the h?i? Heated during ih?: in that; it ?nish} :10! ham-?52. ham: mare-:-

 

 

 

1:78

136
1370

b6


b6
b7C

b6


different. The heie was maeh trigger and the fibers when disarrbea by the bullet a: the extreme
angle bee: imerier en the iep and exterior en the batten?: 0f the hele. Yea the .heie ereai?ed 
?ring through the screen at. an angie with firing award the rear ef the ear {the agent?s
verai?n (if the enema} generateai a tear nearly identieai the Lirigiuai heie in but}; aize and
eiireeiimi afdian?ahe? fibers! all heading nah rard. Awarding}; the eape?a {mined the:
the imie created during the incident was Whit the agent's aeeotmi i?if'where {he vies-in:
was heated when the agent .i'iree at him.

1 

?Ife prev? a vielatim} 0f .13 USE. 242w the applieabie federal ?rii??i?ai eivii rights:
statute. the geveraaient meat peeve, heyem? a reaaenabie doubt, 1M: :1 ef?eer aahieet
used mere three than waa reameabiy necessary ail-am the eireamaianeea. This burden
ef preefaae her}: an ebjeetive and a subjective eempeaem. 'I?he reasonableness e?f ihe ameimt ei?
three used  detennineci ebjeeti'aeiy and ii?eia the pei?apee?ae ei?a reaeenahie e??ieer en ihe
53:36:13,, i?aihei' than with the 3&3le {if himiaigliil, Li '3 3335 396
{1939}, meat he made the {he fact thai iaw eu?a?eetnem of?cials ale: f?t'it?d 
make jadgmema in eiremnaiancea iha: are 1enae, aaeertaim and rapi?iy? waiving 
396$?

if there is: evidence a? fhree, 131a gavemmem mast {Lather Shaw that
an af?  acted that is; with a had purpt?jae? i0 the 3am .
3?33 LES. 91 Aeeidem, mistake, .miaeereeptien, fear, e: even peeriudgmem, an em
wili?ii eendecf preseeatebie under the statute. The ei?i'ieer .Inuat iraemi Ea tie that
whieh he knew be meme:

S. 

There is evideaee' to refute heyen? a {ieuht ihe ageam eiaim that

he fireei his weapen in er?er te eiiminate whai he heiieveei in he a ihreai a} b6

 

In] the wiatiew neat t'a hind:  a car Iihiefappeariag be reaching his 137?:
waiaih-and te draw a eeideaee ea mania the a aei'zt?a claim that he fired ?ee
aimi a she was ai {he rear ei?l leer. aimita ihai he was hen:
dewa behind the ear ween eenl?mmed by [he ageai, just aa ?re ageni? ciaima to have seen him.

lira, and the eeitienee ean?ra?m that he. Iikaiy hae a Silver utilect in hand. Hair?
i a eerreet, that he did net reward hia waiat head, the ageai?a eemiemiea that he
he Saw each a agent?s elaiiti that he
was afraid far liaiiseifanei his ?amiija aimiieriy cannot be diapre'aea.

Han??nn

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

W?h'ie it ie to aderaemii why the. agent eheae are aheei rather than to retrieve
an feign} hami?s; way, such sewed guessing dues. am prime the
apeei?e er?imiaai intent heyaad a reaaenaiile doubt {a ?ie? agent under 
i8, Limited States Cadet. Seatim?i 232. As in the S??li?n, ?ccid??h 
mispereeptiou, Ear, {if even poerjudgmeni, {in mat establish emld'uei. ?it-carding}; {the
evidence does; net Support a vieiatien (if .f?edei?ai ia'w anti it is: ?le? the
matter aimaid he Git?jS?i?i?i. The Limited (J??iee fer the East'em Dietriei ei? New
Eerie with thia 

 

b6


 

 

 



 

 

 

 

DJ 3444534 E62

b6


 

 

.Esquir?

 

 

 

 

 

Rt: ?44624 I Q:

 

Bea.

 

 

 

is menmria?xe our prior and it} mq nest 12131 3.1m:

recensidar 3:011: aa?isr dacisi germi: valuntmy intervigw by me. and the: FBI b5
afynur clicm, Spain-I'm Agent an hm

 

 

 

 

 

 

As gnu the hmpactien Divisiim and the Civii Righ Ijivisicm arr
canductin 1' a i stigaiion Df {ha Juiy 18, EU 3A :36
umi?g the agent?s ham? in damning: wha?zer
the sigma w: 3; mm unmasanable fame under mix mm: 'vzniatmn 01?18 {inita? Stings
{fade [Timing the Queens Uisuict Attamey?E criminal investiga?un. which
uitimateiy canciudcd with a deciim?an of any uhgrgea mated in y?ur ciient?s; conduct; he spoke.
with that of?m. Whiie we haw Mam adviw? vi" the (1613513 (If that mtervimuu w?
wank? the same uppn?unity hear his account nf?tht: wants: and qu?stion him.

 

 

 
   

 

 

 

 

 

1:6
1:70

 

 

Fur yam bifonnaiiam Lt'mmay? has agmmi to permit an interview a? his
ciient in this fbdemi investigation. we Kmagnim that yaur client has a {Em Amendment
privilega to d?c?n? provide a wiuntary inimview, we; would ubvinusly prefar It? hear an 
Wham: anaemia assess them in unier make a {any decisian in this immr?iant
ma?a,

 

b6
Rectum I I 1? mm s: '3

Cat: {Ihmn

 

 



 

 

H3,

Wt wiil con?der any gmamd rules fur such an imm?i?w, excapt use immunity {as}
inmwiaw wifi he at this; i2ng ufaur raview}. Maggi: advise: me ni?y?ur at
war wriiaa: canvenienca car if yin: wish {a discusa my rcqucst thriller. My office number is;

 

 

1:6
1:70

 

 

Sincereiy,

 

 

 

 

hp?csai L?g'?j Launsel

PEOPLE V. ADRIAN .RICKETI S
PEOPLE V. ANJ~Rp,J3 PICKET ‘S

2012QN039081
2012QN039274

S17~’r~*~’1- !~‘j
~-O4~r

Ci~ec~i’~m

~eeco~)

AT THIS TIME, THE PEOPLE ~IOVE TO DISMISS BOTH DOCKETS CURRENTLY
BEFORE THE COURT. THE D STRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE HAS CONDUCTED AN
ALMOST 8 MONTH INVESI1C ATION INTO TI-iTS INCIDENT.
WE BELIEVE THE PERTINEN ‘FACTS SURROUNDING THIS INCIDENT TO BE AS
FOLLOWS: ON JULY 18,2012 ~ROTHERS ANDRAF AND ADRIAN RICKETTS WERE BREAKING
A.~)
INTO AN AUTOMOBILE OW~ ED B~FBI AGENT ~LJ*O~øI~J*t~ THEIR ACTS
WERE OBSERVED THROUGI THE WINDOW BY THE AGENT’S WIFE WHO WOKE UP
HER HUSBAND. THE FBI AG NT YELLED SEVERAL TIMES, “POLICE GET AWAY
FROM THE CAR” AT SOME OINT THE FBI AGENT BELIEVED THAT ADRIAN
RICKEITS WAS REACHING] OR A WEAPON AND HE FIRED ONE ROUND FROM HIS
SERVICE WEAPON, STRIK1N ~ ADRIAN PJCKETTS IN THE SIDE OF HIS BODY, AFTER
WHICH, THE RICKETTS BRO EHERS FLED THE SCENE. BOTH RICKETTS BROTHERS.

-T-~- F~

AS WELL AS AGENT L~

___

AND HIS WIPE HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED,

DURING THE PROGRESSION OF THE INVESTIGATION, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE LEARNED TI{ROUGI THEIR ATTORNEYS THAT NEITHER ANDRAE NOR
ADRIAN RICKETTS WOULD /OLUNTARILY TESTIFY IN THE GRAND JURY
WITHOUT A GRANT OF IMN~ JMTY SIMILARLY WE LEARNED FROM THE FBI
~‘L F,C~
WOULD
AGENT’S ATTORNEY LAWP ENCE BERGER, THA~AGENT ~
NOT TESTIFY BEFORE THE ~RAND JURY IF HE WAS REQUIRED TO SIGN A WAIVER
OF IMMUNITY. THE DISTRI( T ATTORNEY’ S OFFICE WILL NOT “CHOOSE SIDES
WITH REGARDS TO THIS IN ~IDENT. IT WAS OUR INTENTION TO SUBMIT THE

 • ENTIRE MATTER TO A GRA1 D JURY FOR ITS’ CONSU)ERATION. IT APPEARS THAT
THE A1TORNEYS FOR THE ~ GENT ANJ) THE RICKETTS HAVE AGREED TO HAVE
THEIR CLIENTS NOT TESTIF

AGAINST EACH OTHER. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S

OFFICE WAS NOT A PARTY’ O ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT I HAVE CONFERRED
WITH MR BERGER AND MR. DAVID LEVINE WHO REPRESENTS THESE
DEFENDANTS. EACH HAS T( LI) ME THAT THEY EXPRESSLY ENDORSE DISMISSAL
OF THE CASE AGAINST THE UCKETTS BROTHERS AND REALIZE THAT AS A
RESULT, A GRAND JURY WI) L NOT CONSIDER THE FBI AGENT’S ACTS THAT

NIGHT. EACH PARTY PURT: [ER UNDERSTANDS THE FINALITY OF THIS DISMISSAL AND
THAT WE WILL NOT LATER: E- ENTERTAIN ANY COMPLAiNTS 4RISING FROM TIlE EVENTS
OF TULY 18, 2012.

  

 







 ls 055mm. 

g. .u hand WE: yarn}.
 (Rev.  I raj-slum.- hum: r; 

 5? MM FBI Wanan Wu"


Electronic communication

 

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION Date: 06/06/2013
10/14/2010

To: INSPECTION (Route)

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: I a b6
b7C

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

b6

Drafted By:
b7C

 

 

 

Case ID 297-HQ-A1271921-D (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/14/2010, involving Su ervisor
I I b6

ecial Agent land Special Agent (SA)
I of the Critical Incident Res onse Group (CIRG). During the b7C

rescue 01 a kidnap in victim fired approximately eight to
ten rounds and SA fired approximately five rounds, resulting
in the death of a subject as well as a dog. SIRG members recommended
that no administrative action be taken against SSA and SA

as a result of their involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

 

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Report of Former Inspector Aaron
T. Ford, dated 10/21/2010.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments,
and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned
shooting.

Detail of the shooting Incident

On 10/08/2010, a local businessman from a
wealthy family in was kidnapped. Jose Antonio

land an unknown b6
b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 10/14/2010
Re: 06/06/2013

coconspirator were involved in the held
hostage at an unknown location and an initial ransom demand of $1
million, later reduced to $250,000, was made. .Because Ortiz?Albarran
and] Idid not wear face coverings there was concern

lmay be killed, rather than be released.

 

 

At approximately 4:00 p.m. on 10/12/2010, a secure video

teleconference (SVTC) was held between San Juan Special Agent in Charge-

(SAC) Luis S. Fraticelli, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC)
ISan Juan Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Senior Team Leader IHostage
Rescue Team (HRT) Special Agent land (Critical
Incident Reaponse Group) CIRG personnel Assistant Director (AD) Robert
A. Blecksmith, Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) M. Chris Briese, HRT
Section Chief (SC) James F. Yacone and HRT Assistant Section Chief
I A Type B, partial deployment of HRT resources
comprised of fewer operators than a full team, was approved by AD
Blacksmith during the SVTC. The deployment was to be immediate, with
HRT to arrive in San Juan at approximately 12:50 a.m. on 10/13/2010.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

San Juan FBI identified the location where was being
held hostage at 

 

 

As part of the investigation, physical surveillance identified a.

delivery of a Burger King bag to the afternoon of
10/13/2010. A proof of life call was received later that evening and

during the call advised he had eaten Burger King for lunch.
With this information SAC Fraticelli, was confident the hostage was

being held inside 

On 10/13/2010, at approximately 11:00 an Operations Order
prepared by HRT personnel was briefed to SAC Fraticelli, which he
verbally approved. SAC Fraticelli advised he would not authorize the
execution of the Operations Order until he received confirmation the
hostage was located inside ofl IThe original written

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 10/14/2010
Re: 06/06/2013

Operations Order bore the approval signatures of SAC Fraticelli, ASAC

I IASACI IChief Division Counsel (CDC)

and ASC

 

The Operations Order was briefed to all HRT members, with each
respective Team Leader (TL) briefing the members of their team.
Approximately half of the San Juan SWAT Team were responsible for
effecting the arrest of who was expected to be located_
other than half of the team was to

provide rear security during the operation to be undertaken by HRT.

 

During the briefing the deadly force policy was read verbatim.

After a proof of life call was successfully accomplished, and
during which the victim indicated he had eaten Burger King for lunch,
SAC Fraticelli directed the Operations Order be executed at
approximately 4:00 AM.

as the On-Scene-Commander. While en route to
the scene the Command Post advised ASACI Ithatl Iwas
inia Mercedes~Benz, possibly heading towards thel IBecause
the rescue'operation was imminent, ASACI Iinstructed SSAI
I Iwho was pre-positioned with a Task Force Officer (TFO)

 

 

 

 

 

 

at the entrance to the subdivision, to preventl Ifrom
entering. San Juan SAs to set up a road
block on the main road, adjacent to the subdivision entrance.

rammed the road block, broke through and was pursued.
was later arrested at another location.

 

 

 

 

 

As HRT members entered the rear yard of a residence adjacent to

motion sensor lights'were activated, and the
entire yard was illuminated, making it possible for team members to be

seen HRT members positioned themselves, and
compensated for the activation of the lights, two dogs, which had
started barking when the lights were activated, started to become more
agitated and aggressive. Suddenly, the dogs stopped barking and
retreated towards a door previously identified as the breach point.
SSA one of the HRT TLs, saw a man, later identified as

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 10/14/2010
Re: 06/06/2013

Jose Antonio Ortiz-Albarran, exit the residence. a b6
handgun in the man?s right hand. the presence of b7c
the man over the HRT radio. The man began to slowly move away from the

door and appeared to be assessing the area.

his team members were at their last point of b6
concealment before moving into position, could be given the command to b7c
execute the rescue operation at any moment, and would be in imminent
danger if they proceeded. Additionally, cognizant the
armed man could not be allowed back inside the residence because he
could injure or kill

Through his Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), see
the laser of his and SAI IBureau?issued Hecker&Koch

 

 

416 weapon on the man. In a loud, clear, commanding voice, SSA
told the man, "Alto, policia," which he knew to mean, "Stop,
police," in Spanish. Immediately after "Alto,
policia," the man. who was still moving away from the door, looked in
SA. direction and stretched his head in a
forward motion as if he was attempting to see one or both of them
better. As to command "Alto, policia" a second time,
the armed man raised his handgun from his hip to his chest level. The I b6
barrel of the man's handgun was pointed directly towards b7c
Fearing for his personal safety, his 
416 weapon eight to ten times at the man, and ceased shootin when he
and were no longer in imminent danger. the
man fall backwards onto the ground, with his left shoulder lying in a
flower bed. The man's handgun fell to the ground nd lan ed a short
distance from his right hand. Simultaneous to SSA observations
and actions saw the man and thought the man could see
him. SA saw the man raise his weapon and point it in his
direction. SA called out the observation of the man but, due
to the short time perio to react. not issue verbal

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
    
    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

commands to the man. SA fired his 416 approximately five
times at the man. The man was approximately l3~14 yards away from SSA
and SA at the time they fired at him.

 

 

 

 

 

 

I ED

4

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 10/14/2010
Re: 06/06/2013

The weapons fire indicated a compromise had occurred and the'
command, "Execute, execute, execute" was broadcast over the HRT radio
channel. Immediately, the explosive breaching charges were initiated
and all entry team personnel moved forward toward the

his position and continued to cover the downed man.
Out of his-peripheral vision, team members moving down
the side perimeter wall and along the back side of the residence. As
the assaulters reached the corner of the house near the canopy and side
door, the larger of the two dogs began barking wildly and aggressively
moving toward the assaulters. the dog posed an
imminent threat to team members. SSA used his 416 and fired
four to six rounds, striking the dog. Assaulters at the corner of the
residence covered the downed man and 

into the rear yard 

Entry team members broadoasted "Jackpot" to b6
communicate his safe recovery to other personnel. Entry team members b7C

of the side 

was attended to by a physician.

b6
b7C

The weapon was moved away from the downed man and he was
initially assessed by SSAI Ia trained Emergency Medical b6
Technician. Once the scene was secured, the man was assessed by the b7C
HRT medic, SAI [There was sufficient light for the
medical assessment to be conducted and an entry wound to the left side
of the man's head could be seen as well as substantial blood in his
ear. SSA informed man showed no signs of life.
SA checked the man again and determined he had sustained
injuries incompatible with life, the residence and
informed the physician of his observations of the man. The physician
agreed no additional medical efforts would be beneficial to the man
because of his gunshot wounds and continued to provide medical

attention to the hostage, assisted by 

HRT secured the scene and accounted for all personnel. No law
enforcement personnel were injured.

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 10/14/2010
Re: 06/06/2013 -

 

By letter dated 10/19/2011) [District
Attorney in Charge, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico (DJPR),
advised no criminal charges would be filed against FBI agents SSA

SAI [for the death of Jos? Antonio

Ortiz?Albarran. By letter dated 08/22/2012, the United States
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised a criminal

 

b6
b7C

 

 

investigation is not warranted in this matter.

On 11/28/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned
shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director Cory B. Nelson,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting
member. The following voting members were in attendance: Former Chief
Inspector Eric S. Birnbaum, Office of Inspections (OI), b6
Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice b7c
Trial Attorney, Civil Rights.Division, 
Section Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Violent Criminal Threat Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent 

 

 

 

ISquad CR-Z, Washington Field Office; SSAI

 

 

[Practical Applications Unit, Training Division SSA

 

 

IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General

 

Counsel; SSAI IEvidence Response Team, Laboratory
Division; ISpecial Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
Operations Unit; Critical Incident Response Group SSAI

 

 

IFirearms Training Unit, and SSAI

 

 

 

 

Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting members were also .

 

in attendance: Inspectorsl I
Iandl IOI, Assistant Inspector-
OI, SSAI Unit
Chiefl ISWAT Operations Unit, 
Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and
Logistics Services Division; and Management and Program Analyst

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspection Management Unit, OI, INSD.

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

 

 




UNCLASSIFIED

1 Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN DIVISION 10/14/2010
Re: 06/06/2013

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint
(if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues; and provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force

employed by the Agents was justified and in conformance with the 

deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the recOmmendation

that no administrative action be taken against SA b6
as a result of their involvement in this shooting incident. b7c

No other recommendations or observations were made by SIRG
members.

9*

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED



Lealeeport

Precedence: Routine Date:
Lead Type: Action
Deadline: 08/22/2013

Lead Number: 1

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT
Contact:

 

 

 

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

Drafted By:  I

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Reference: Serial 67

06/23/2013

Details: That no administrative action be taken a aipst 
and Special Agentl as a result of

 

their involvement in this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

1.

(Rev. 5-8?10) UNCLASSIFIED

EBIJIRIEILIJ 

Electronic communication

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT Date: 06/06/2013
RESPONSE GROUP 12/02/2010

To: INVESTIGATIONS SECTION

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact:

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

 

 

Drafted By:

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 12/02/2010, involving Supervisory
Special Agent of the Critical Incident ReSponse
Group (CIRG). SSAI Iaccidentally discharged one round from his
Bureau-issued Glock, Model 27 pistol while participating in firearms
training, injuring his upper right thigh. SIRG members recommended that
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this shooting incident.

 

 

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Communication of Office_
Services Specialist dated 12/06/2010.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRS with reference to the
captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

 

On 12/02/2010, at approximately 2:20 SSAI
was participating in the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) firearms training on
the HRT range at Quantico, Virginia. While withdrawing his weapon from

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

b7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 12/02/2010
Re: 06/06/2013

its holster, accidently discharged one round into his
upper thigh.

Immediately following the incident Agents participating in
firearms training on the same range began to administergfirst aid. The
CIRG, Tactical Section?s Physicians Assistant also responded and
provided advanced care.

Following the initial treatment, transported 
to Mary Washington Hospital in Fredericksburg, Virginia, via Bureau
helicopter where he was treated and released the same day.

On 12/03/2010, firearm was forwarded to the
Defensive Systems Unit, Training Division, for inspection to determine
if the weapon was working properly. The inspection of the weapon
determined the weapon contained dust and lint; the spring loaded
bearing and extractor depressor plunger spring had light rust. The
weapon also had unauthorized modifications and/or parts including a
Scherer floorplate on the magazine and the rear underside of the
trigger guard had been modified. However, examination determined the

modifications did not contribute to the accidental discharge.

On 11/28/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director Cory B. Nelson,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting
member. The following voting members were in attendance: Former Chief
Inspector Eric S. Birnbaum, Office of Inspections (OI), 

Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of
Justice Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
Section Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Violent Criminal Threat
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)

 

 

I Squad Washington Field Office; SSA

I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division 
SSAI IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; SSA I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory
Division; SSA Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 12/02/2010
Re: 297-HQ-A1271970-D, 06/06/2013

 

Operations Unit; Critical Incident Response Group SSAI
I I Firearms Training Unit, and SSAI
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting members were also

 

 

 

 

 

in attendance: Inspectorsl I

 

IOI, Assistant Inspector

 

 

IOI, SSAI Unit
Chiefl ISWAT Operations Unit, 
Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and

Logistics Services Division; and Management and Program 

Inspection Management Unit, OI, INSD.

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluatiVe analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint
(if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues; and (4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.

 

SIRG members unanimously recommended that SSH
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and
receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to this

 

shooting incident.

91'

UNCLASSIFIED

3

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED



Precedence:
Lead Type:
Deadline:
Lead number:

Leadl?eport

Routine Date: 06/11/2013
Action

08/10/2013

3

From; INSPECTION
DA-INSPECTION MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: I I

Approved By:

 

 

SHIELDS ROBERT JR -

 

Drafted 

Case ID 

(U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Reference: Serial 69

Details: (U) That SSAI

 

Ibe censured and suspended from

duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the Assistant

Director of CIRG to ensure SSA

receives remedial

firearms training regarding the proper handling of firearms
and to properly document this training.

UNCLASSIFIED

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

Re:

UNCLASSIFIED
297-HQ-A1271970-D

Lead: 3, 06/11/2013

 

 

Location
7T0: .DAHINTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION
Recipient: INVESTIGATIONS SECTION
Assignee:
Attn: Section Chief Stuart P. Fronk
Status: Covered
Coverages:

00

 

06/11/2013 
Reference: Serial 69
(U) Read and cleared.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

b6
b7C

 

 



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE . I Date: 07/19/2012

To: Inspection ?.Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett

From: Inspection
Office of Insnections

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contact: b6
b7C
-  
Approved By. Rennett Ke1th h?
Drafted By: I I
Case ID 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
MILWAUKEE DIVISION
02/03/2011
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 02/03/2011, involving Special
Agent  of the Milwaukee Division. While be
conducting a vehicle stop, SA fired one round from his b7c
Bureau?issued Glock Model 22, . caliber pistol, striking the
non?complaint subject in the right thumb. SIRG members 
unanimously mmended that no administrative action be taken
against SAI as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative:.Reference report of former 
dated 07/18/2011. b6
- b7c
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the_Shooting Incident
On 02/03/2011, at 8:39 SAI I be
b7c

telephonically requested the assistance of SAI Iwith the
surveillance and eventual arrest of] I
the subject of an arrest warrant for a state drug
offense. met with SA and Milwaukee Police
Department (MPD) Task Force Officer  who

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

eTo: Inspection From: Inspectidn_
Re: 07/19/2012

were all members of the High_Intensity Dru Trafficking Area/Drug

Task Force (HIDTA). The Agents and TFOI 'planned to b6
conduct a "traffic stop" to arrest  Altaougt no written b7c
Operations Plan existed, the participants decided TFO
would'initiate the stop of the subject's vehicle, and SAI

would "box in" the vehicle from the front to prevent the
subject?s escape. 

At approximatel 9:15 on 02/03/2011, b6

and along with Iinitiated a surveillance of b7C
at a residence in I At

approx1mately 12:00 SAI  observed the subject exit.his

residence and enter a green minivan. As the t. 1 

enforcement vehicles followed the snaject, TFO Iradioed

the Agents that he observed lean over toward the right

side floor board of his vehicle causing believe he
was hiding drugs or reaching for a weapon,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TFOI lactivated his emergency lights and b6
immediately pulled over to the right side of the street. b7c
TFOI  pulled within approximately eight feet behind
I Iminivan and SA vehicle was approximately eight
feet behind SAI  pulled in front of the subject

 

 

 

vehicle to revent his escape, quickly exited, and walked toward

TFO I SAI Iexited his vehicle and took a position
near the rear left corner of his vehicle. As 
toward the front of the subject vehicle with his weapon drawn, he
shouted "Police, the vehicle, hands, hands." TFO

I Iordered to exit his?vehicle several times;
howeverd  refused to comply. TFOI Iadvised

he was under arrest.? SAI  heard 

shouting commands for  lto eXit the vehicle, a
subject reply, "No I'm nOt gOing to get out," and saw
rolling up his window.

 

 

shifted his vehicle into reverse, b5
shifted into rive, and aggressively proceeded forward toward SA b7C
As the subject vehicle approached closer, SA braced

nimseli against the hood with his left hand as the front 
bumper hit his right shin and spun him. SA I
planted his feet and fired one round which penetrated the glass

 

of the front passenger side window. fled the scene.

Law enforcement personnel briefly -b6
however, lost sight of him in traffic. The pursuit was b7c
discontinued and the three law enforcement officers returned 
secure the scene. SA and TFO notified their
and HIDTA supervisors of the shooting inCiden_ by eel

1r_] rt

03 


UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

Within hours, was arrested by an FBI Agent and

MPD officers assi ned to the HIDTA Task Force. Investi ators
determined round 
thumb.

 

On 04/20/2011, IMilwaukee County
District Attorney, opined SAI  "responded to a lethal threat
with an appropriate and justifiable use of force, and that the
use of force was privileged as self defense and defense of
others."

 

 

On IUnited States Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised the facts do not
warrant a federal investigation as a potential willful use of
unreasonable deadly force.

. On 05/22/2012, the to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
-Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Violent Criminal
Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
I I Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training
Division UCI IFirearms Training Unit, UC
Special.Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI 
Defensive Systems Unit, UC IInvestigative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

Eviden Res onse Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fice, Office of

Inspections (OI), Special Assistant I
OI, SSAI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

Team Leaderl

 

 

 

 

 

PAU, 9 gram (MPAs)
land Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD. 
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Direcror with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations

UNCLASSIFIED

.1


 

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

136
3070

 

 

-To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unaiimously agreed that the use of deadly-

 

force by SA was justified and in conformance with
the deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the

iendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
I 'as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations made by the Shooting Incident Review Team:

OBSERVATION #1 

 

SAI Idid not prepare a written operations
plan for the surveillance and arrest of the subject.

 

A written operations plan was not prepared for the
surveillance and arrest of the subject, who had a conviction for
carrying a concealed weapon and demonstrated reluctance to
cooperate with law enforcement as a source in the past. The plan
was_finalized and verbally briefed within an approximated 36 to
51 minute window from the time SA contacred SA on
02/03/2011, at 8:39 to requesr his participation in the
operation, and the initiation of surveillance at the subject's
residence between 9:15?9:30 a.m. There were no exigent
circumstances which precluded appropriate preparation of an
operation plan.

 

Corporate Policy Notice 0242N, Requirement for Written
Operations Order Field Operations, datEd 07/15/2010, states; in
part: 

8. Policy Statement:

8.1 The necessity to have clear, concise, and complete
operational plans, in the form of operations orders, is
essential to successful arrest and search operations
and any other activity in which the practical
'application of firearms might be reasonably
anticipated. Operations orders are the vehicle through
which the Case Agent's and/or On?Scene Commander's
strategy is reduced to a tactical directive. Their
mosr important function is to ensure success. By
standardizing format, the chance for omission of
essential data is eliminated'thus providing subordinate
elements with the complete picrure for mission
completion.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

 

window. Once   decide

 

'To: Inspection_ From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

8.2 Written Operations Orders: Absent exigent
circumstances, written operations orders will be
prepared prior to conducting arrest and search
operations and any other activity in which the
practical application of firearms might be reasonably
anticipated.

8.3 Exigent Circumstances: Exigent circumstances may
necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of the written
operations order.

13. Definitions:

13.1 Exigent circumstances: Generally, an emergency, a
pressing necessity requiring immediate action.

9. Roles and Responsibilities:

9.1. Case Agent -
9.1.1 Responsible for preparing the operations order
9.1.2 Responsible for briefing the operations order

9.2. Substantive Squad Supervisor . 
9.2.1 Supervisory Special Agent responsible for
reviewing the operations order

Instruction 

That SAC, Milwaukee ensure Milwaukee personnel comply
with the above Corporate Policy Notice. 

OBSERVATION 

a vehicle block in'a manner . b6
inconsistent with FBI tactics. b7c

 

TFOI Iactivated his emergency lights to

 

 

 

 

 

initiate a vehicle stop 0 vehicle. 
immediately pulled over toward snow bank on rig side of
the street. TFO .pul'ed within approximately eight feet
behindl minivan. SA pulled in front of and in
alignment with Ivehicle. SA backed up and parked

 

 

 

 

within one foot of front bumper to ?box in" it
vehicle, in order to prevent him from fleeing.  quickly

exited his vehicle and stood the rear of his own vehicle,
while TFOI Iaddressed through the driver?s
not

to cooperate with TFO
verbal commands, the positioning of SA

UNCLASSIFIED





 

 

 

 

'To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

b6

vehicle, alon with the eight feet between: rear bumper b7c
and bumper, afforded room to

maneuver to flee.

 

 

 

b7E

 

 

 

Instruction 

That SAC, Milwaukee ensure_Agent personnel receive
additional training in vehicle stop and vehicle block techniques,
consistent with FBI tactics. Task force personnel should be

_afforded the opportunity to observe FBI tactics to improve
interoperability.

OBSERVATION 

 

b6
b7C

SAI Idid not wear his issued ballistic
vest during the operation as mandated by Bureau policy.

After the initial stop ofl Ivehicle bv TFO
SA Imaneuvering to block. 
ve 1c e, -I stopped a proximately eight reet in 

lvehicle. his vehicle, took a

pos; ion near the rear left corner of his own vehicle, and

 

 

 

 

remained there until fled the scene. SA : was not
wearing his ballistic vest; tie vest remained on the front seat

 

 

 

of SA ehicle. a conviction for carrying a
concealed wea on and made movements while being stopped, which
caused TFO to believe he may have been reaching for a
weapon. TFO immediately announced movement

 

on the HIDTA radio to all participants.

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

 

 

 

 

Inspection From: Inspection

'Re; 07/19/2012

The issued ballistic vest can be reconfigured to
support surveillance operations by removing the ballistic panels
and wearing them in the issued concealment carrier. The outer
tactical carrier with FBI markings can be donned over clothing to
facilitate identification as law enforcembnt during the
transition from covert to overt activity.

The MIOG, Section 12?13.l states, in part:

"Wearing of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory
during planned arrests, execution of search warrants and
surveillances which can reasonably be expected to culminate in a
confrontation with armed and dangerous 

Instruction 

That SAC, Milwaukee ensure all division personnel
comply with the above MIOG requirement.

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

 

 

 

 

?Fo: Inspection From: Inspection
- Re: 07/19/2012

Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

That no administrative action be taken against b6
a result of his involvement in this shooting b7C
inc; ent. -

 
 
     
   
    
  
 

  

 

 

 

 

1 Mr. Joyce, Room 7142
1 Mr. Perkins, Room 7142
1 Room 7427
1 SDOJ b6
1 USDOJ WC
1 a 1man Room 3246
1 Quantico
1 Quantico
1 atory
1 - Quantico

1 Rooml
I I
- CIRG

+0

UNCLASSIFIED

8

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Rev. 5-8-10)

    
   

    
   

05mm?. Rec.qu



9" FBI mm Wu?l

UNCLASSIFIED


Electronic Communication

 

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY Date: 05/17/2013
DIVISION 05/04/2011

From: INSPECTION 7
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: I

 

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

Drafted By: 

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Oklahoma City Division on

05(0512011. special Weapons and Tactic team Special Agents (SAs)

 

 as well as two

 

Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) Troopers, fired rounds at a subject
aiming an in the direction of law enforcement personnel. SIRG
members recommended that no administrative action be taken against the
Agents as a result of their involvement in this shooting incident.

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference report of 
dated 06/13/2011.

Details:

On 05/03/2011, at approximately 9:42 Supervisory Special
Agent (SSAH Iof the Jacksonville Division,
telephonically contacted Oklahoma City ASACI land
JTTF SSAI I the Jacksonville
Division obtained a federal arrest warrant for Sandlin Matthews Smith,
who was considered armed and dangerous, and was wanted for the bombing
advised Smith was believed to

 

 

 

 

 

of a mosque in Jacksonville. SSA
possess explosives and an rifle; was known to abuse drugs and
alcohol; and, waS?possibly suicidal. Smith's cellular telephone was
tracked to the vicinity of Enid, Oklahoma. advised Smith
operated a black Toyota Tundra with a Florida license plate and a

UNCLAS SIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 05/04/2011
Re: 05/17/2013

silver tool box in the bed. He also provided Smith's drivers license
information and a photograph via blackberry.

Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) James E. Finch, while SSAI I b5
contacted the Oklahoma Highway Patrol Troop responsible for the Enid b7c
territory. SAC Finch was briefed on the information provided by SSA

and authorized the deployment of the division?s SWAT team.
Iwas designated the On?Scene Commander (OSC). As SSA
and to Enid, SSA
that recent information indicated Smith's phone was stationary

in the area of Glass Mountain State Park. The SWAT team was redirected
by travel to Glass Mountain, located in Orienta.

Upon arrival in Orienta, with be

OHP personnel and established a forward command post. The OHP, with b7C
the assistance of a Oklahoma Department of Wildlife Game Warden

Officer, established a perimeter around the state park with roadblocks

at all exits.

 

 

 

 

 

b6

to relay information as it was obtained b7c

through ongoing interviews in the Jacksonville area. Investigation
determined Smith made "goodbye" calls and stated he "cannot do twenty,"
meaning he could not go to prison. Interviews revealed Smith made
recent statements referring to dying at the hands of law enforcement
because he could not go to prison, and could not kill himself. During
the execution of a search warrant at Smith's residence, Agents seized
ammunition for a .270 caliber weapon wrapped in tin foil which
indicated a triggering device for an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

Although continuous attempts were made throughout the night to
contact Smith via his cellular phone in order to initiate negotiations,_
Smith never answered. No additional "pinging" was detected, indicating
the phone was most likely turned off.

On 05/04/2011, at approximately 1:30 the Oklahoma
Division SWAT team arrived at Glass Mountain and established a joint



2

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 05/04/2011
Re: 05/17/2013

command post with the OHP:

and Team Leader 

devised a two part plan to apprehend Smith. The first part of the plan

 

initially

 

 

established and

 

 

Isouth of Smith's location. The second part of
the plan, involved thel

 

 

 

 

ISmith as he was leaving the park. The

 

operation plan was briefed to the entire Oklahoma Division SWAT team
and Assistant TL specific roles to each team member.
Team members rehearsed the scenario focusing on officer
safety concerns due to the intelligence regarding Smith's use of
explosives, possession of firearms, drug and alcohol abuse, and his
overall mental instability. .

 

At approximately 3:00 TL directed the deployment
?of a comprised of SAs a

location atop a large butte which overlooked the area where Smith's
cellular telephone last transmitted a signal. The Agents were
instructed to search for Smith near the base of the back side of the
butts and report on his location; however, due to dangerous conditions
they returned before reaching their assigned position.

At approximately 7:00 the Oklahoma City Division
surveillance airplane arrived in the area to assist in the search for
Smith and his truck.? At approximately 7:15 the surveillance
spotted a vehicle and tent in the same location as the last known
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) coordinates for Smith's telephone.
The tent was essentially a one-person cot with a supported fabric cover

 

 

 

and flaps to enter and exit. At 7:30 thel Iof
andl: established an elevated position atop a butte
210 yards south of Smith's tent and vehicle. land] I

 

observed and reported the entrance'flap of the tent was facing to the
north and what he believed to be a subject laying on

a cot inside. Between 9:30 and 10:00 see the top?

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C
b7E

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 05/04/2011
Re: 05/17/2013 

of Smith's head inside the tent. Later Smith exit
the tent, look around, sit up on the edge of the cot, then lay back
down on the cot with his hands across his chest. He saw Smith's head

extend outside the tent's door~flap and then quickly retreat inside on

at least two occasions.

The operations plan was modified to approach to Smith's
position, attempt to engage him verbally, and persuade him to
surrender. The plan was tol I
I From his
position, lwould verbally guide the drivers of the SWAT

 

 

vehicles into close proximity of Smith's position. Once vehicles were

 

in place, SA was to cover Smithl
with SWAT membersl

to give verbal commands directing Smith to surrender.
The SWAT team was assembled and briefed by the modified
operations plan which covered all facets of the operation including
situation, mission, execution, administration/equipment, and

 

 

control/communication. Other contingencies were addressed including
medical issues, specifically staging an ambulance with paramedics
nearby in the event of a critical injury.

Prior to deployment, the FBI Deadly Force
Policy over the FBI radio to all SWAT team members, who responded by
affirming their understanding of the policy.

The SWAT team, staged at the Command Pest, just outside Glass
Mountain State Park, began their approach to Smith's location in the
shortly before 12:00 p.m. At approximately

 

 

12:30 the SWAT vehicles arrived near Smith's location while Smith

 

remained under surveillance by the 
Stopped approximately 40?50 yards away from Smith's location. TL

 

the presence of the FBI, and gave verbal commands to

surrender, including: "Sandlin Smith, you are under arrest. This is

the FBI. Please come out of the tent with your hands over your head.

We do not want to hurt you." These commands were repeated for over one
UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

bis
b'7C
b7E

 

 

 

 



Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 05/04/2011
Re: 05/17/2013

 

hour with no response from Smith. OSCI and SSA
based on Smith?s drug and alcohol history, Smith . b5

 

 

 

may have overdosed, passed out or committed suicide. b7c
to observe Smith while the verbal commands were given
and Smith appeared to be "completely out." As a
result, TL onsulted the OHP Trooper Negotiator regarding
options.
After a long period of unsuccessful attempts to engage Smith in
conversation, an OHP Lieutenant offered the use of a canine to obtain a'
response from Smith. with the OHP canine handlers, while
SAI continued to use the PA system to call out to b6
. . . . b7C
Smith. OSCI approved modifying the plan to use the OHP canine
and SWAT personnel to protect the canine unit.
The OHP canine unit personnel met with discuss b6

details of the canine unit's operation, including the need for FBI b7c
personnel to remain in their positions as motionless as possible. TL 
briefed on the canine teams capabilities, and was advised

if Smith was asleep, the canine would not bite. The canine team was

provided with an FBI radio for communications and proceeded to Smith's

tent.

all SWAT members the Oklahoma Troopers would
deploy a canine, and to maintain their positions. The SWAT team Was . be
told to remain motionless to prevent the canine from becoming b7c
distracted from the intended target. Subsequently, OHP Troopers
I land Canine Trooper moved closer to the
tent, and noted the positions of the FBI SWAT team positioned east of
the tent. target identification with the
canine, and deployed the dog which started moving toward the FBI SWAT
however, with a subsequent command the dog turned toward Smith
according to it appeared Smith saw the canine
advancing and reached down and grabbed a black rifle, with his hand on
the pistol grip. Believing Smith posed an imminent threat to law
enforcement officers on the multiple

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIOENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 05/04/2011
Re: 05/17/2013

rounds from his Colt Model .223 caliber carbine. b6
observed the dog make contact with Smith and retreat. Smith reached b7C
into the tent and came out with an assault weapon in his left hand

pointing the weapon at the FBI SWAT team. four

rounds from his Colt Model .223 caliber carbine. 

Observing the subject with a gun and believing he posed an
imminent threat to law enforcement officers at the scene, b6
fired one round from his Colt Model .223 caliber carbine; SA b7C
fired multiple rounds from his Rock River Arms Model
.223 caliber carbine; 3A1 fired multiple
rounds from his Colt Model A1, .223 caliber carbine; SA
fired one round from his Cot Model A1, .223 caliber
carbine; SAI Ifired one round from his Rock River Arms,
Model .223 caliber carbine; and SAI Ifired
one round from his HS Precision Model 2000, .308 caliber sniper rifle.

 

 

 

 

 

 

When the gunfire stopped, Smith was prone, face down next to
his tent, with a rifle within his reach. In order to ensure a safe
approach, OHP Trooper

To determine if Smith was feigning injury, Trooperl Idischarged
a non?lethall Ifrom a shotgun striking Smith,
who did not respond. The FBI SWAT team, using a ballistic shield for
protection, approached Smith, removed the rifle and secured him with
handcuffs. Agents immediately provided emergency medical assistance to
the subject until paramedics arrived and transported him to Fairview
Regional Medical Center where Smith was later pronounced decreased.

On 05/09/2012, Assistant District Attorney b6

b6
b7C
b7E

 

 

 

 

 

opined the shooting was unavoidable and justified, and he declined 
prosecution.

On 08/07/2012,  'Civil Rights Division, USDOJ bg?
advised the incident did not warrant criminal investigation.? I b7c

On 11/28/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned
shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director Cory B. Nelson,

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 05/04/2011
Re: 05/17/2013

Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting
member. The following voting members were in attendance: Former Chief

Inspector Eric S. Birnbaum, Office of Inspections (OI), b6
Trial Attorne Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice b7c
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, 

Section Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Violent Criminal Threat Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)

I Squad Washington Field Office; SSA

IPractical Applications Unit, Training Division SSA
IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; SSAI IEvidence Response Team, Laboratory -
Division; SSAI I Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
Operations Unit; Critical Incident Response Group 
IFirearms Training Unit, and SSAI
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting members were also

in attendance: InspectorsI I
IOI, Assistant Inspector

IOI, seal I Unit

ChiefI ISWAT Operations Unit, I

Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and

Lo istics Services Division; and Management and Program 
Management Unit, OI, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent'
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint
(if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues; and (4) provide recommendations_for administrative action if

deemed necessary.

UNCLASS IFIED

'7

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 05/04/2011
Re: 297-HQ-A1271801-D, 05/17/2013

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force

employed by the Agents was justified and in conformance with the FBI's

deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the recommendation
that no administrative action be taken against SAsl I b5
as a result of their involvement b7c

 

 

 

in this shooting incident.

No other recommendations or observations were made by SIRG
members.

y.

UNCLASSIFIED

8

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Lead Report I

Precedence: Routine Date:' 06/07/2013
Lead Type: Action
Deadline: 08/06/2013

Lead Number: 5

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT
Contact: b6
b7C

 

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

Drafted By: b5
b7C

 

 

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Reference: Serial 132

Details: (U) That no administrative action be taken against b6
b7C

 

 

 

Ias a
result of their involvement in this shooting incident.

 

UNCLAS I FIED

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Re: 
Lead: 5, 06/07/2013

Location
To: INSPECTION

Recipient: INSPECTION

Assignee: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Attn: 'Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Jr.

status: Assigned

90

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

(Rev. 5-8-10)

..

.

I I 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD Date: 06/07/2013
OFFICE 08/09/2011

To: DA-INSPECTION FRONT OFFICE (AD)

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT
Contactzl

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

Drafted By:  

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

 

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/09/2011, involving Special Agent_
[formerly of the New York Field Office, currently

 

assigned to the Training Division. During the execution of an arrest
warrant, five rounds from his Bureau-issued Colt Model
M4, Carbine, killing an attacking pit bull dog. SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against SA as
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent dated 10/12/2011.

 

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and
recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/09/2011, at approximately 5:00 members of the New York
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team executed an arrest warrant in
Yonkers, New York. SWAT breachers knocked on the door of the
residence, and announced the presents of the arrest team. After a
short time without response, forced entry was made into the residence,

UNCLASSIFIED

Etuasrlassoan
AM pawl-w mu. ?ame m.
vantage-I lum- Inn mm a

  .wL-d Mob-n unwb7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/09/2011
Re: 06/07/2013

 

utilizing a breaching tool. SAI Iwas the first to

enter the residence followed by SAI I Upon entering the SWAT

Operators were confronted by an aggressive pit bull dog in the living 

room area. SA observed an individual in a bedroom directly b6

ahead, and started to move across the living room SA followed SA b7c
into the living room and focused his attention on the dog. SA

 

 

ordered the dog to ?stay?, but the pit bull was unresponsive,
moved closer to the bedroom, the

 

and became more agitated. As SA
pit bull moved towards him while barking, growling and baring its
teeth. Once the pit bull stated to move aggressively towards SA
posing a threat of serious injury to SAI ISAI Eired 2 rounds
at the dog. As the pit bull continued to move towards SAI ISA

2 additional rounds, and one final round, all in rapid

succession killing the pit bull.

On 11/28/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director Cory B. NelSon,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non-voting
member. The following voting members were in attendance: Former Chief
Inspector Eric S. Birnbaum, Office of Inspections (OI), 

Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of
Justice Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
Section Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Violent Criminal Threat
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA),
I Squad Washington Field Office; SS

[Practical Applications Unit, Training Division 
SSAI IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; SSAI
.Division; Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
Operations Unit; Critical Incident Response Group SSA

b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

Evidence Response Team, Laboratory

 

 

 

 

 

 

IFirearms Training Unit, and SSAI

 

 

Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also
in attendance: Inspectorsl I

 

 

land IOI, Assistant Inspector

 

 

 

OI, SSAI Unit

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/09/2011
Re: 06/07/2013

 

 

Chief SWAT Operations Unit, I

Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and

Logistics Services Division; and Management and Program 
Inspection Management Unit, OI, INSD.

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent

to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, Observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3)

provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.

SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of deadly force by
SA was justified and in conformance with the FBI's
Deadly Force Policy. This discussion resulted in the recommendation
that no administrative action be taken against a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

0.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

(DI: 

Lead Report

Preceaence: Routine Date: 06/11/2013
Lead Type: Action
Deadline: 08/10/2013

Lead Number: 3

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT
Contact:

 

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

Drafted By:  

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Reference: Serial 71

Details: (U) That no administrative action be taken against 
as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

UNCLAS IFIED

 

 

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

Re:

UNCLASSIFIED



Lead: 06/11/2013

Location
To: DA-INSPECTION
Recipient: 
Assignee: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Attn: Chief Ihspector Robert J. Shields, Jr.
Status: Covered
Coverages:
06/14/2013 by SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Reference: Serial 71



(U) Read and Cleared

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 Darrow. 81;;an

 
  

 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OMAHA DIVISION Date: 05/03/2013
08/29/2011 

To: OF PROF RESPONSIBLITY (Route)
INSPECTION (Route) Attn: Section Chief Stuart P. Fronk?

From: INSPECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MANAGEMENT UNIT
Contact: b6
7 b7C
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Drafted By: I I b6
b7C
ng?

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shOoting incident that occurred on 08/29/2011, involving Special Agent
Iof the Omaha Division. While ?dry firing?. b6
his weapon inside his apartment, discharged one b7c
round from his Bureau?issued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol,
striking the frame of the window. SIRG members recommended that SA

be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days,
and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to this
shooting incident. -
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Communication of 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Idated b6
09/07/2011. b7c

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting..

Details of the Shooting Incident

 

b6

On 08/29/2011, at approximately 10:40 SA b7C

 

UNCLAS SIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OMAHA DIVISION 08/29/2011
Re: 05/03/2013

was ?dry firing? his weapon inside his apartment. According to be
prior to beginning practice, he emptied and rendered his - ?7c
weapon safe. After several successful draws, he reloaded the pistol.
Approximately ten minutes later, to practice drawing
his weapon again. Dropping the magazine but forgetting to clear the
chambered round, he pointed his weapon toward the living room window,
and pulled the trigger. The expended round struck the aluminum frame
of the window and penetrated through the screen. 

 

 

 

SA immediately notified Omaha Division management of b5
the incident and advised the management of the apartment complex the b7c
following day.

 

No personal injuries Were incurred as a result of b5
accidental discharge and he paid to have the minimal property damage b7c
.repaired.

On 11/28/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned
shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director Cory B. Nelson,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non-voting
member. The following voting members Were in attendance: Former Chief
Ins ector Eric S. Birnbaum, Office of Inspections (OI), b5
[::ijrial Attorne Criminal Division, United States Department of b7c
Justice ITrial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
Section Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Violent Criminal Threat
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent.(SSA)
bquad Washington Field Office; SSA
I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SSA IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; SSAI IEvidence Response Team, Laboratory
Division; ISpecial Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)

 

Operations Unit; Critical Incident Response Group SSA
I IFirearms Training Unit, and SSAI
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also
in attendance: InspectorsI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OMAHA DIVISION 08/29/2011
Re: 05/03/2013

 

 

Iandl OI, Assistant Inspector b6

 

 

b7C

 

IOI, SSA Unit

 

 

Chiefl ISWAI Operations Unit, CIRGFI 

Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and
Logistics Services Division; and Management and Program Analyst
Inspection Management Unit, OI, INSD.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synOpsized incident with the intent
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
reCommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint
(if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues; and provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.

 

b6

SIRG members unanimously recommended that SA b7c

be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days,
~and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to this
shooting incident.

 

?06

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED 
Ill?lli?i1fhli?f'1til?

Lead Report

Precedence: Routine Date: 05/07/2013
Lead Type: Action
Deadline: 07/06/2013

Lead NUmberz- 1

 

 

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
DA-INSPECTION MANAGEMENT UNIT
Contact: b6
1370
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Drafted I b6
1370
Case ID #5 297-HQ-A1271802-D (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Reference: Serial 12
Details: (U) That SAI Ibe censured and suspended be
1370

 

from duty for a period of three days in regard to this
shooting incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the

ecial Agent in Charge of the Omaha Division to ensure SA
remedial firearms training regarding the

proper handling of firearms and to properly document this
training.

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Re: 
Lead: 1, 05/07/2013

 

 

Location .
To: INVESTIGATIONS SECTION
Recipient: INVESTIGATIONS 
Assignee: b5
Attn: Section Chief Stuart B. Fronk b7c
Status: Assigned -

09

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Rev. 5-3?10)

 

I

3
I-F v?ndt?h" Mn be: ?do: rra

UNCLASSIFIED mm mm 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic communication

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION Date: 07/29/2013
09/03/2011

To: FRONT OFFICE

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Oontact:

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:  I

 

Case ID (U) Shooting Incident

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shootin incident that occurred on 09/03/2011, involving Special Agent
the Cleveland Division. During the apprehension of
a violent fugitive Brian Lipp, SA fired two rounds from his
Bureau?issued Rock River rifle. SIRG members recommended that no
administrative action should be taken against SA as a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident. 

 

Administrative Notes: (U) ReferenCe report of Former Inspector Deirdre
L. Fike, dated 09/21/2011.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and
recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned shooting.

Detail of the Shooting Incident

Brian Lipp was being sought in connection with a violent crime
spree which began on 08/29/2011, with the armed robbery of a Rite-Aid
Pharmacy in Toledo, Ohio. Three days later Lipp committed an armed
robbery of a drug store and was also suspected of being responsible for

 

a home invasion robbery of] 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION 09/03/2011
Re: 07/29/2013

where money and a Ruger 9mm semi-automatic - :3
. 
pistol were stolen.

On 09/02/2011, Toledo Police Department (TPD) officers re3ponded to
reports from a business owner who recognized Lipp near a recycling
business in the Toledo area. Responding officers conducted a search
using K?9s and helicopters with negative results.

09/03/2011, at approximately 9:17 Lipp was confronted by a
TPD officer while walking near the Towne Square Mall in Toledo. Lipp
pointed a weapon at the officer, who took cover as Lipp fled the scene
on foot. In a second confrontation with the officer, Lipp was captured
on video as he brandished a firearm while the officer sought cover
behind a vehicle. Lipp Conducted an armed carjacking of a citizen and
fled the scene in the stolen vehicle. At approximately 9:28 
responding TPD officers pursued Lipp in the stolen vehicle as he
entered the northbound lane of 1?75 traveling in a southerly
direction. Lipp's actions caused a head?on collision between a
responding TPD unit and a civilian motorist which resulted in the
motorist death. 

At approximately 11:00 the TPD contacted all available task

force personnel, to enlist support in apprehending Lipp. b6
i a member of the Northwest Ohio Violent Crimes/Fugitive Safe 
Streets Task Force, contacted Acting Supervisory

Special Agent, to request approval to participate in the fugitive

I investigation. Assistant Special Agent in Charge

to provide background information of the-
situation. ASAC concurred with providing FBI assistance and

instructed SA to determine the task force requirements.

A meeting for all available task force members was scheduled for



11:00 a.m. Prior to leaving his residence, on his :3


 

 

 

Bureau-issued ballistic vest and placed his Rock River in the
front seat of his vehicle. While traveling towards Toledo, 
overheard radio traffic indicating the pursuit of Lipp was headed in
his direction. traveling southbound on when the

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION 09/03/2011

Re: 07/29/2013

suspect passed him in the northbound lanes being pursued by the TPD and
Ohio State Highway Partol (OSHD). visual sighting of
the pursuit and heard the radio report of the subject crashing his

vehicle.

As SA
'observed confronting the subject who was
his 
site to support the reSponding officers.
interviewed, Brian Lipp was conscious in

arrived on the scene,
vehicle.
appeared to be a semi-automatic pistol.

commands of the responding officers. On
Lipp smoking a ?crack?pipe.? At 12:03 p.

law enforcement personnel were
still inside the stolen

rifle and proceeded to the

According to participants

the vehicle and waving what
Lipp refused to respond to

one occasion officers observed
Lipp brandished his weapon

in a threatening manner to the responding officers, to include SA

several shots were fired in response. SA

rounds from his rifle.

fired two

Brian Lipp was pronounced dead at the scene and transported to the

Lucas County Coroner?s Office.

A post mortem examination of Lipp
determined neither of the two rounds fired by SA

struck Lipp.

 

 

 

 

 

On 

 Civil Rights Section, Department

of Justice, stated the matter had been reviewed, in consultation with
the United States Attorney Office for the Northern District of Ohio,
and determined the Agent?involved shooting did not, "warrant a federal

criminal investigation of this matter.

On 05/23/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned shooting

incident.

Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Inspection

Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The

following voting members were in attendance:

Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections

Acting Chief Inspector

(OI), Trial

Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice



Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION 09/03/2011
Re: 07/29/2013

Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent I b6
Squad Washington Field Office; SSAI Practical b7C
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI
Investi ative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
Response Team, Laboratory Division; SSA
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group SSAI IFirearms Training
Unit, and SSAI IDefensive Systems Unit, TD. The
following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
OI,
Team Leaders I
'01, SSA Defensive Systems Unit, 

Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I
IResource

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Operations and Training Unit, SSA
Planning Office, Director?s Office; SSA ISWAT
Operations Unit, Safety and Occupational Health ManagerI I

Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit,
Facilities and Logistics Services Division; Management and Program
IInspection Analysis Unit, and
Management and Program IandI
Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
,Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3)
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action, if deemed

necessary.

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
b6

b7C

administrative action be taken against the SA as a result

of his involvement in this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION 09/03/2011
Re: 07/29/2013

There were no observations noted during the review of the shooting
incident.

Q9

UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICIAL. Recon; 
FED-1057 (Rev. 5-8?10) Wily-5231:; 4m"; w'm- 2
UNCLASSIFIED {Wy?g?gg' 'm ww- .  .

.. 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Eiootronio Communication
Title: (U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011 Date: 06/06/2013
To: INSPECTION (Route)

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contact: b6
b7C
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
b6
Drafted By. I b7c
Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) The shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
serious accident that occurred on 09/13/2011, involving SA b6
of the Washington Field Office (WED). While discussing the - - b7C
functionality of flash bang diversionary devices with another WFO SA,
SAI  was severely injured as he handled what he believed
to be a used diversionary device. SIRG members unanimously recommended
that no administrative action be taken against the result
of his involvement in this flashubang incident.
Administrative Notes: (U) ReferenCe Report of Former b6
dated 09/16/2011._ b7c

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned serious accident.

Details of the Serious Accident

By way of background, on 02/12/2011, the WFO Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) team took part in an operation in which three flash
bang diversionary devices were utilized. At the time of the operation
the NFC SWAT team utilized both the NICO flash bang and the Combined

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011
Re: 297-HQ-A1271970-D, 06/06/2013

device, and Spulled the striker back on the NICO device body b6
and inserted the spoon. a paper clip in the safety b7c
pin well of the device, securing the spoon in place. SA and
the amount of "give" or slack in the NICO's spoon

versus the spoon in the CTS device. SA retrieved a CTS device

body and spoon from the bag and pulled the striker back on the CTS

device and inserted the spoon. a paper clip in the

safety pin well of the device, securing the spoon in place. 

held the CTS device and the NICO device as they

discussed the difference in the devices.

 

 

 

 

SA and SA discussed different techniques to

 

 

 

 

 

 

safel deliver several devices simultaneously by a single operator. SA
the second CTS device from the bag and held it close

to his body in an attempt to insert the device spoon. SA

noticed one of the prongs which secured the spoon, was damaged; 'He b6

held the device in his left hand and pulled the hammer back with his b7c

right thumb, attempting to fasten the firing pin behind the remaining

prong on the device. While to reinsert the spoon,.
the firing pin came forward and struck the striker plate. SA

had turned away from heard the detonation of the

device. As he turned back he saw SA standing up and looking at

his hand. powder burns on his hand and face. He looked

down, grabbed his side, and fell to the ground. SAI Iapplied

pressure to a wound on his side and lremoved his shirt and

used it to apply additional pressure.

 

 

SAI Iwas seated in Squad area when she
heard the device detonate. After she determined an accident had
occurred, 9?1?1. Her call was routed to the Wfo
Command and Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) and she was asked for her-
name and telephone number by the operator. WFO Occupational Health

 

b6
b7C

 

Nurse (OHN) called and asked her to describe what
happened.

 

 

 

 

 

 

WFO CTOC Specialist received the call b6
b7C

 



3

 

 

 

 

Title:
Re: 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011

06/06/2013

from called the WFO Nurse's Station before she called

9~l~l.

After speaking with 

9?1-1, provided the building address and requested an ambulance.

CTOC Specialis

operator, she transferred the call to the WFO Nurse's Station.

Since
was unable to provide details to the 9-1-1
The WFO

Nurse?s Station did not answer the telephone, the call went to

voicemail and CTOC Specialist

had already disconnected. The

9~lrl operator never received the details of the accident. Two

Emergency Medical Technicians, SAsl

and two Paramedics, SAsl land
with OHN until

 

 

 

 

Iandl

 

 

 

responded to the scene and provided treatment alon

an ambulance arrived.

An ambulance from the Washington D.C. Fire Department 

arrived with a gurney to transport SA
necessary medical supplies to properly treat him.

 

but did not have the
The ambulance was

only a Basic Life Support Unit and the medics were not sufficiently
trained to treat The personnel advised
they were not provided specific information regarding the injury prior
to their arrival and would have to wait for the arrival of additional

As a result, SA

and OHN requested SA

ersonnel.
transported immediately to George Washington University

Hospital. While en route to the hospital, 

I Icontinued to provide emergency medical treatment to

 

SAI I I


 

WFO SWAT was provided a document titled, 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Iby the SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), CIRG.

 

This 29 page document served as a training aid for the mandatory annual
certification 

Bullet three, page nine of the manual stated, "Once deployedL

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011
Re: 297-HQ-A1271970-D, 06/06/2013

 

I we

 

This paragraph was followed by

 

 

 

bullet four which read,

 

 

 

 

 

. . b6
On 09/14/2011, Unit Chief (voyl land Training NC

Specialist (TS) (300), were intervieWed by the Serious b7E
Accident Investigation Team (SAIT). Idevice had

I land a partial detonation was not possible. TSI I

stated, without visual inspection of the device, a hang fire could have -
occurred during the February 2011 SWAT operation. A hang fire occurs

when the striker does not strike the percussion primer and, therefore,

the delay element and main charge of the device are never ignited.

 

On 09/14/2011, SOU issued a bulletin to all SWAT Team Leaders
and the Laboratory Division implementing new procedures which prohibit
use of the device as an inert training aid. Deployed DD bodies must be
disposed of. (SWAT Operator Plans and Power Point Training
Presentations have been edited to reflect this change in policy.) If
training DD's are required, the Field Office can purchase the

This is a re?loadable

b7E

 

 

system.

the proper visual inspection 
is not the hammer resting on the primer and the detachment of the spoon 23C

and pin from the body, but the discoloration of the bottom of the b7E
device. TS stated a hang fire may occur and create a

"light" indentation on the primer, but does not strike the primer hard

enough to ignite the element and main charge.

On 11/28/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned
shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director Cory B. Nelson,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting
member. The following voting members were in attendance: Former Chief 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011
Re: 06/06/2013

Inspector Eric S. Birnbaum, Office of Inspections (OI), b5
Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of b7c
Justice Attorney, Civil Rights Division, 

Section Chief (so) Jayne L. Challman, Violent Criminal Threat
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)

I Squad Washington Field Office; 
IPractical Applications Unit, Training Division 

 

 

 

 

 

SSAI IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; SSAI IEvidence Response Team, Laboratory
Division; I Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)

 

Operations Unit; Critical Incident Response Group 
I IFirearms Training Unit, and SSAI
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also
in attendance: Inspectors] I

I IRobert J. Shields, Jr., andI IOI,
Assistant Inspectorl loz, SSAI 
Unit ChiefI ISWAT Operations Unit, 
IOccupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit;
Facilities and Logistics Services Division; and Management and Program
AnalystI IInspection Management Unit, 01, INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: (1) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions (if any); (2)
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety iSSues; and
(3) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against the Agent as a result of his
involvement in this serious accident.

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011
Re: 06/06/2013

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following observations and
recommendations of the SIRT:

OBSERVATIONS:

 

 

Issue I b7E
by the SWBE
Operations Unit (SOU), Critical.Incident Response Group provided

 

conflicting guidance.

Analysis: Bullet three, page nine of the manual stated, "Once

deployed, the b7E
I I This paragraph was

followed by bullet four which read,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 09/14/2011, SOU issued a bulletin to all SWAT Team Leaders
and the Laboratory Division implementing new procedures for the
device. Bullet one of the document stated, b7E

 

 

 

 

 

Instruction AD, CIRG ensure 500 set and document policy officially
prohibiting the use of the This b7E

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011
Re: 06/06/2013

policy will include a Standard 0 erating Procedure (SOP) detailing the
steps to determine has been fully detonated. This b7E
procedure will include and standardize the following:

1. Standards for operator level visual inspection of a device in order
to determine if the device has been detonated. 

2. SOP for the Clearing, removal and safe rendering of a suspected
hang fire or malfunctioning device by qualified personnel.

3. Mandate all SWAT teams train to the new standards within 60 days of
the date of publication. 

Issue WED personnel were not able to call 9~1~l directly.
Emergency telephone calls were routed through the WFO Command and
Tactical Operations Center ICTOC).

 

 

 

 

Analysis: On 09/13/2011, at approximately 1:20 pam., 
seated in the squad area when she heard the device
detonate. After she determined an accident had occurred, 
called 9?1-1. Her call was routed to the CTOC and she was asked for
her name and telephone number by the operator. WFO Occupational Health
SA and asked her to describe what
happened.
b6

WFO CTOC Specialist received the call from 
called the WFO Nurse's Station before she called 9-1-1.

After speaking with Nurse CTOC 
9?1-1, provided the building address and requested an ambulance. Since he
CTOC Specialis was unable to provide details to the 9-1-1 b7c

operator, she transferred the call to the WFO Nurse's Station. The WFO
Nurse?s Station did not answer the telephone and CTOC Specialist

had already disconnected from the call. The 9~l?l operator
never received the details of the accident.

UNCLASSIFIED

8

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SERIOUS ACCIDENT INQUIRY 09/13/2011
Re: 06/06/2013

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) arrived with a gurney to
transport did not have the necessary medical supplies to b6
properly treat him. The ambulance was only a Basic Life Support Unit b7C
and the medics were not sufficiently trained to treat SA
injuries. The EMS personnel advised they were not provided Specific
information regarding the injury prior to their arrival. Had they been
provided detailed information, they would have sent a supervisor and a
paramedic unit.

Recommendation That ADIC, WFO allow direct 9?1?1 calls and not
route emergency calls through the CTOC.

Issue Inspection of the DD by qualified personnel was not
conducted after ERT collected the DDS on 02/12/2011.

 

Analysis: I

 

b7E

 

 

Recommendation That Ach; WFO should standardize and document

procedures to clear and render safe all deployed devices. Visual 

inspection of a device by individual SWAT operators may not be

sufficient to ensure the safety of all those who come in contact with

the device after its deployment, as misfires may occur. All SWAT

operators should be mandated to review the CIRG SOU lesson plan

regarding the handling requirements of thel I b7E

 

UNCLASSIFIED

9

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Lead Report

Precedence: Routine Date: 06/23/2013
Lead Type: Action
Deadline: 08/22/2013

Lead Number: 4

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT
Contact: I I

 

 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR

 

Drafted By 

 

Case ID 297-HQ-A1271970-D (U) SHOOTING 
Reference: Serial 70

Details: (U) That no administrative action be taken against SA

a result of his involvement in this serious
acc; ent.

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Re: 

Lead: 4, 06/23/2013
Location
To: 
Recipient: 
Attn: 'Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Jr.
Status: Covered
Coverages:

06/23/2013 by SHIELDS ROBERT JR

Reference:

Serial 70

(U) Read and Cleared



 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

I 0?:ch 
a 


   



Electronic communication

Title: Accidental Discharge, Date: 02/28/2013
WFO 

 

Tozl I
SHIELDS ROBERT JR

From: INSPECTION
Contact:

 

 

 

Approved I
MARSHALL HOWARD 

 

Drafted I

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: To document the results of an administrative
shooting investigation concerning the accidental discharge of a Bureau
handgun by Special Agentl Iwhich occurred in his
residence,  on
10/17/2012 at approximately 10:15 pm.

 

 

Administrative Notes: A arallel Internal Investigations
case was opened by IIU-II and notified of such by SSA

 

As a result, compelled rather than voluntary

 

 

statements were obtained from FBI employees. These reports were
included as part of the shooting investigation. The shooting
investigation was conducted in coordination with SSAI I


 

 

Enclosure{s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. Ifinalized Signed Sworn Statement


2. Interview notes, 

3. version 1

535 version 2

5. 

6. Alexandria Police Department (APD) incident reports
7. BC from dated 11/05/b7C

 

 

 

Title:

Re: 



Accidental Discharge, WFO

02/28/2013

8. Write-up by I
9. EC to SAI Ipersonnel file

Search warrant

Interview notes, 

10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15; 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Details:

ASAC
ASAC
ASAC
SA

 

version 1
version 2

 

 

 

finalized 
finalized 

Interview notes (2)
Questions for interview



Nonedisclosure agreement

 

 

 

 

Interview notes (1)
Finalized APD incident report, case number 01?12?0144113

This document was prepared by Assistant Inspector

 

after review of the following source documents:

a) Shooting Incident Report, dated 11/02/2012, from the
Washington Field Office to the Training Division.

b)

Incident Report,

case number OlwlZ-l4?ll3, from the APD

I c) EC, Serial 1036, dated 11/05/2012, prepared by SA

d) EC to SA

prepared by .
e) A summary document prepared by date provided)
f) A copy of a search warrant and affidavit prepared by Detective

 

 

IAPD.
g) 8333 from SAI 

On I bornI

file, dated 11/16/2012,

 

 

 

 

 

IofI I
Ireturned home after a
IShortly after his

return,  Inoticed what he believed was a bullet hole in his living
room wall. A bullet appeared to have traveled from beyond the common



b7C

 

 

 



Title: Accidental Discharge, WFO

Re: 02/28/2013

wall between his apartment and the neighboring apartment, passing
through the back of a closet, and through the closet door before

becoming lodged in his front door. Officers from the APD responded and,-

upon examining the holes, concluded the bullet travelled from the
adjacent apartment, The APD began a canvass of the
apartment building and identified a vehicle in the parking lot
registered toI I Additionally,
the occupants ofl Itold the APD they had heard a loud bang
approximately a week ago but assumed it was a door slamming.

 

 

 

 

At approximately 9 SAI Iarrived at
the-apartment complex. Officerl Iapproached and
asked if he lived in Isal Itold him he did. SA

 

 

told Office Ihe was an FBI Agent and displa ed his credentials.
Officer explained why they were there. asked if he
had an accidental discharge in his apartment..He replied he had not. SA

Officerl

Ihe lived alone, had left his apartment at
approximately 5:30 and had not returned all day.

 

the APD his apartment key and officers
conducted a search for any possible gunshot victims. None were found.
Officers could see an apparent bullet hole on the common wall shared by

asked repeatedly whether he knew the origins

of the bullet hole. He told the lead Detective,  he did 

 

not. It was suggested his supervisor.

At approximately 9:30 contacted his
supervisor, Isnl Itold the APD was at
his apartment, were investigatin an apparent shooting, and there were
bullet holes found in both S. apartment and those of his
neighbor. he did not know what had happened,
telling the APD was looking into the possibility there had
been a break?in. Iresponded to at SA

requestb7C

 

 

 

 



Title: Accidental Discharge, b6

 

Re: 02/28/2013 
After speaking with SA was introduced b5
to the ranking officer present, Lieutenant Lieutenant b7c
told SA based upon the evidence, it appeared the bullet -
came from SA apartment and asked if there had been an accidental
discharge. SA said he had no knowledge an accidental discharge. SA

was further questioned and asked if he had any additional weapons,
if he had any visitors, and if anybody, other than himself, had access
to his weapon. SAI Isaid he had no visitors, other than maintenance
personnel and a group of friends from a Bible study. 
he did not know what had happened, or who else may have had access to

 

his weapon.

The APD secured a search warrant for SA. Iapartment, I b6
which was executed at approximately 10:15 p.m. In addition to the b7c

bullet recovered froml theiAPD also seized SA
Bureau issued firearm, a Glock Model 23, serial number No other

items were seized by the APD, although digital photographs were taken.

 

 

 

At approximately 10:20 p.m. and, 
after conferring with APD detectives and officers, spoke privately with
approximately 40 to 50 minutes.
During his conversation with SA :3


be candid. some difficulty recollecting and
focusing on specific details of the accidental discharge, which 
to the stress of the presence of the APD. When asked
,about possibly dry?firing his weapon, he was feeling
stressed after dry-firing his weapon the previous week and had a
restless night due to a dream about a gunfight. In his 
recounted how he did not know what happened, saying
if he had done this, he would tell the truth.

to encourage be candid. b6

Between 11:20 p.m. and 11:30 returned to b7c
SA partment, where AED officers were waiting. The APD officers

and detectives did not accept SA Iexplanation. They felt it was

vague. According to APD officers warned SA if he

 

 

 

 

 

Isouo

4

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

b6
b7C

 

 

Title; Accidental Discharge, SA WFO
Re: 02/28/2013

 

failed to be candid the police report would reflect his false account.
with private, urging him to be candid b6
with the APD. fully explained he had an accidental b7c
discharge which occurred on 10/17/2012, while drwairing his weapon. SA

provided the following account to the APD:

On 10/17/2012, dry fired his weapon while b6
listening to classical music and watching television. Prior to this SA b7C
conducted a safety check. fired successfully for
several minutes before reloading his weapon and bolstering. A short
while later, to dry fire but did not conduct a full
safety check. He removed the magazine but did not check the chamber. As
a result, a round was discharged.

 

 

 

 

the shell casing fell into his tactical b6
bag, which was sitting on the floor next to him. He subsequently put b7C
the casing into his garbage can and later disposed of it in the
I ISAI Isaid he was scared after the

 

 

accidental dischargel 

As the APD completed their interview with ASAC he

arrived. Prior to his arrivalh he had several telephone b7C

conversations with in which he repeatedly directed 

to relay to SA the importance of telling the truth. 

relayed these instructions to After the APD left, ASAC

and with and ex lained the

administrative process which would occur. a referral

to the Employee Assistance Program.

On 03/01/2013, provided a 553 to INSD. It be
reflected the following: told should b7C
cooperate with the APD and be honest. During his telephone
conversation, SA told him he did not fire his weapon but would
admit it if he did. SA was adamant he had "nothing to do with
this." During their first in person conversation, 
did not know what happened, stating he was "an honest guy,"
and, if he had done this, he would tell the truth.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



5

 

 

 

 

 



Title: Accidental Discharge, 

Re: 02/28/2013

 

On 03/04/2013, ASAC provided a $55 to INSD. It b6
reflected the fact he did not have any conversations with b7c
after SA had completed his interview with the APD, by which time
SA had admitted the accidental discharge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 03/06/2013, a 535 to INSD. In it he b6
acknowledged the accidental discharge, discussed his embarrassment, and b7c
admitted his lack of candor (not under oath). Specifically, he admitted
he was not candid when first asked by the APD if "something had
happened which caused [his] gun to be discharged." He responded by
saying there had been some friends over for Bible study the previous
Tuesday (10/16/2012) and apartment maintenance had been checking each
apartment's water meters. A detective not recall who)
spoke with him in private and attempted to get him to admit what had
happened. SA said her "continued to deny any knowledge of the
incident.? SA then contacted told him, did not
know how it happened." and spoke with SA SA

stated he could not bring himself to be "completely forthright due
to being in shock of being questioned and interrogated by the police."

After speaking with Ifor about 30 minutes, they returned to
and spoke with he tried to

tell the truth but was still ashamed and could not say exactly what

happened. frustrated and walked away. 

and again spoke in private, at which time 

found the strength to admit what had happened." 
returned and the accidental discharge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6

On 03/19/2013, Assistant Inspector 
b7C

Sergeantl Itelephonel IAPD. Sergeant

told All IDetectiveI Idetermined no charges should be filed.
Misdemeanor offenses, of which this was an example, were referred for
prosecution at the discretion of the investigating officer. In this
case, Detective elected not to make a referral. Sergeant

also provided AI with a copy of the complete Incident Report,

case number 01?12?144113, which was placed in an 

 



6

 

 

 

 

 

Title:

Re:

APD.

 



Accidental Discharge, WFO

02/28/2013

has remained in the custody of the



0n advised SA

Principal Firearms Instructor for the Washington Field Office (WFO),
the Weapon could be retrieved from the APD. SAI Iwas aware the
weaponl

 

 

On 03/22/2013, was provided with a

draft copy of this EC and he concurred with its contentsb7C

 

 

 

 

FIB-1057 (Rev- UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic communication

 

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT Date: 07/08/2013
RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012

To: DA-INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION

From: INSPECTION
DA-INSPECTION MANAGEMENT UNIT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  

 

    

Contact: b6
b7C
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara
- I b6
Drafted By.  I b7c
Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 11/02/2012, involving Special Agent b6
[while he was assigned to the Hosta Rescue b7c
Team New Operator Trainee (NOT), Generation 27. 
securing gear and weapons at the conclusion of training in the NOT cage
area. As he was attempting to holster his Bureau?issued Glock, Model 27
pistol in an in?the?pants holster, SAI Iaccidentally discharged
one round striking SA in the left shoulder. SIRG members
recommended that be censured, suspended from duty for a
period of three days, an receive documented remedial firearms training
as a result of this shooting incident.
Additionally, based on past precedent, the Internal Investigations
Section (115), Inspection Division, should levy any additional penalty b6
deemed appropriate to his unauthorized use of a b7C
practice flash bang prior to the accidental discharge.
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference report of 
dated 11/09/2012. :gc

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments,

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title; (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012
Re: 07/08/2013

and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned
shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 11/02/2012, the NOT team finished training at approximately 2:30
p.mu The team?s day consisted of physical training in the morning,
classroom training until 11:00 an early lunch, Primary
Qualification Courses(PQC) with M4 and Glock pistols, and concluded
with approximately two hours of Immediate Action Drills. At the
conclusion of training, the NOTs were released and told to prepare
their equipment for the next week?s training before departing for the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

weekend.
I I b7E
I ?Cages A
and 

b6
With the exception his cage at approximately 2:50 p.m. While SA
returning phone calls in the hallway near the break room,
announced to the NOTs in Cage A he was going to ?bang? SA
he entered Cage A. The other NOTs understood this to mean SA
was going to toss a practice flash bang device at SAI Ias a
prank. As Cage A with his head down, he noticed a
practice flash bang device rolling at his feet and turned right facing
his locker. not see who tossed the device at him;
however, the device went off between SAI I



After tossing the practice flashbang towards SAI ISAI I be
reached into his locker for his Glock 27 pistol. He held the weapon b7c
with the muzzle pointed upwards and conducted a ?press check? to
determine if the weapon was loaded. attempted to

when

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

holster the weapon in an in~the~pants holster located on the right
front of his pants. While lifting his shirt to clear the opening of

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHCOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271971-D, 07/08/2013

the holster, the weapon was pointed towards the entrance of Cage A when

 

 

 

 

 

one round discharged. SA did not remember pulling the trigger. b6
Approximately three to five seconds elapsed between the flashbang b7c
detonation and the accidental discharge from SA Glock 27

pistol.

The expended round struck SAI Iin the left arm stopping in
his chest cavity. SAI Idid not see who shot him and described
the impact as being hit in the arm with a ?bean bag.? 
after feeling the impact, layed down in the entrance of Cage A and Was
immediately assisted by the other NOTs. SA

left the cage area to notify the medical staff, the
front office, and their supervisor of the situation. The other NOTs
applied first aid to SAI Ifor a short period until 
nd SAI Ifrom the HRT medical program arrived
and assumed medical treatment. lwas transported by HRT
helicpter to Mary Washington Hospital in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

b6
b7C

 

 

A search of the area by the Evidence Response Team (ERT) and the
Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) revealed loaded weapons were
stored next to or near Simunition weapons. Several cages contained
live practice flash bangs. SA was aware he had his Glock 27 b5
with live ammunition in his hand and not a Simunition weapon when the b7c
accidental discharged occurred. Interviews revealed the NOTs engaged
in pranks.involving Simunition and practice flash bangs on other
occasions within the Medical Annex Building. HRT supervisory staff was
unaware of this practice due to the location of the NOTs when out of
the training environment and the activity either not being observed or

 

 

 

 

reported.

After taken to the hospital, the NOTs were left b6
unsupervised and began cleaning up the scene.? was b7c
cleaned up and his clothes were placed in a'nearby trash can. The
expended practice flash bang and its spoon were picked up by the NOTs
and placed in an unsecure cabinet in the hallway. Twelve expended
practice flash bangs and four spoons were located in the cabinet.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012
Re: 297-HQHA1271971-D, 07/08/2013

 

ASCI Ihe would secure the b5
b7C

scene after the incident. SSAI Ilocked Cage A with a combination
lock and left the HRT facility. SAI Iwas given the
combination by allowed to enter Cage A to remove personal
property without supervision. A log was not kept to document who
entered the scene or who removed what item. Several NOTs, including SA

Cage A without supervision.

Although HRT provided instruction on the use of practice flash
bangs, no policy was in place on how to store them. The practice of
detonating them outside of the training environment was not approved.

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 11/28/2012, was inspected by the Defensive b5
Systems Unit, Training Division, to determine if the weapon was working b7c
properly. The inspection of the weapon determined the weapon was dirty
with carbon and dry of lubrication. However, the examination
determined this did not have any impact on the accidental discharge.

On 03/10/2013, SA was reassigned to the Washington Field b6
Office. b7c

On 05/23/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned shooting
incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector
Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections (OI), 

Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice
lSpecial Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent (SAN I
Squad Washington Field Office; SSA IPractical
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; SSA
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group SSAI Firearms Training
Unit, and SSA IDefensive Systems Unit, TD. The

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

 

 

 

 

Team Leaders I

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012
Re: 07/08/2013

following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
I  and  OI,

land] I

IDefensive Systems Unit, TD 

 

OI, ssal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Firearms Training Unit, SSAI b6
Operations and Training Unit, SSA I Resource b7c
Planning Office, Director?s Office; SSA SWAT

 

 

Operations Unit, IOccupational Safety and
Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and Logistics Services
Division; Management and Program Analyst] I

 

 

 

Inspection Analysis Unit, and Management and Program 

 

Iandl lInspection Management Unit,

 

INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to:r (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3)
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.

A discussion ensued regarding the unauthorized use of
practice flash bangs by the NOTs before and after training events.
Specifically, members discussed SA use of a practice flash b5
bang immediately prior to accidentally discharcing his firearm, I b7c
resulting in serious injury to SA The members of the
SIRG inquired whether the unauthorized use of practice flash bangs
would be addressed by the FBI Inspection Division?s Internal
Investigations Section (IIS). Robert J. Shields, Jr. advised IIS
would review this unauthorized use of government property. In
addition, OGC Attorney indicated the Department of
Justice, Office of Inspector General, would also have the opportunity
to review the results of shooting investigation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012
Re: 07/08/2013

 

members unanimously recommended that SA be
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and receive
documented remedial firearms training in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, based on past precedentf IIS, Inspection
Division, should levy any additional penalty deemed appropriate to SA

regarding his unauthorized use of a practice flash bang prior
to the accidental discharge.

 

members unanimously adopted the following observations
instructions/recommendations of the SIRT:

OBSERVATIONS:

 

Observation 1: Practice flash bangs and Simunitions were used for
unauthorized purposes.

Analysis 1: The SIRT revealed the unauthorized use of practice flash
bangs and Simunitions within the designated NOT equipment storage
area.' The NOTs, in pursuit of humor, detonated practice flash bangs
and shot each other with Simunition weapons while within the equipment
storage area of the Medical Annex Building. Interviews of the NOTs
revealed they engaged previously in these activities as pranks and no
one had been injured.

Prior to handling his Glock 27, SAI hdmitted to tossing a
practice flash bang at SA Approximately three to five seconds
after the practice flash bang detonated SA unintentionally
discharged his Glock 27 striking SA

While the investigation did not reveal SA handled both the
flash bang device and weapon at the same time, the unauthorized
activity aided in the distraction of to his
unintentional discharge of his firearm.

Recommendation 1: AD, CIRG should ensure HRT property is used for
training and operational events only.

 

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

 

 

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012
Re: 07/08/2013 

Observation 2: Simunitions were stored next to loaded weapons of the
same make and caliber within NOTs equipment storage areas.

Analysis 2: During the processing of the scene by ERT, multiple
Simunition rounds were noted on the floor of the NOTs equipment area.
Simunition weapons were stored next to operational weapons of the same
make. At least one of the Simunition weapons was loaded. Even though
the Simunition weapons were painted orange, some were missing paint due
to use. The duty weapons and Simunition weapons were stored next to
each other in the cages or were hanging from the same hook.

Recommendation 2: AD, CIRG should ensure Simunitions (weapons and
ammunition) are stored separately from operational weapons. .

 

Observation 3: The NOTs were not properly supervised.

Analysis 3: The NOT supervisor was located in the HRT main building.
The NOTs were housed away from supervisors and other HRT operators in

 

I The NOTS were aware they were not b7E

 

 

supervised while inI Interviews of NOTs
revealed practice flash bangs were detonated approximately 10 to 12
times in the cage area since the beginning of training. The detonation
was loud enough for anyone in the Annex to hear. Interviews of EM and
HRT personnel revealed they were unaware of this practice by the NOTs.

Recommendation 3: AD, CIRG should ensure the NOTs are appropriately

 

supervised.

Observation 4: The location of the shooting incident was not properly
controlled after the accidental discharge of the weapon.

AnalySis 4: The NOTs cleaned up blood and the practice flash bang

device after the shooting without direction from the supervisory 
staff. Interviews revealed SSA Isecured the cage where the b5
shooting took place. SSAI ?secured the cage but then gave the NOTs b7c
the combination after he left the facility. Several NOTs, including SA

the cage area to retrieve personal items without

 

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012-
Re: 07/08/2013

supervision. No entry log was maintained documenting entry of
personnel or documenting what was removed from the area.

Recommendation 4: AD, CIRG should ensure access is controlled to

 

incident sites.
PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE 

The Inspection Division (INSD), Inspection Management Unit (IMU) is
responsible for ensuring that each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains an
Inspection Instructions/Recommendations database and provides the INSD
Assistant Director (AD) a quarterly report reflecting all outstanding
Instructions[Recommendations. The inspection process is not complete
until all Instructions/Recommendations have been satisfactorily
resolved.

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector?in?Charge (IIC),
who will determine if each Instruction/Reoommendation has been resolved
or requires further action. Resolution will be based upon specific
actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the division has
under consideration or plans to take in the future. If the IIC
determines an Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved, an EC
will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon
resolution, all Instructions/Recommendations will be appropriately
noted in the database.

AD, CIRG is required to provide detailed responses addressing the
Instructions/Recommendations in this EC, pages 6, 7, and 8 including
corrective actions taken and/or intended actions with time frames for
completion. Each Observation which results in an
Instruction/Recommendation must be responded to in a one?page, stand
alone response. The Observation and related Instruction/Recommendation
is to be recited verbatim from the inspection EC, followed by the
division's detailed response. If supporting documentation is available,
it should be enclosed with each response.

UNCLASSIFIED

8

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED
SHOOTING INCIDENT CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP 11/02/2012

Title: (U)
Rezi 07/08/2013

All initial and follow?up responses must be sent to the 

plain?bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Chief lInspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room b5
after the EC is serialized with the attached b7c

 

 

 

I In addition,
responses, please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPAI

 

90*

UNCLASSIFIED

9

 

 

 

 

0-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

 

UNCLASSIFIED



Electronic Communication

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION Date: 07/25/2013
11/15/2012

To: FRONT OFFICE (AD)

From: INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contactzl b6
b7C

Approved By: SHTELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted I be
b7C
at!

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 11/15/2012, involving Special Agent

Iof the Baltimore Division. During the be

execution Of a search warrant, SA lfired five rounds from his b7c

Bureau-issued Colt .223 calioer rifle causing superficial injuries

to one of the residents. SIRG members recommended that no

administrative action be taken against as a result of his

involvement in this shooting incident-

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference report of former b5
dated 05/07/2013. b7C

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments,
and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned
shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

on 11/15/2012, at approximately 6:05 the Baltimore Special
Weapons and Tactic (SWAT) team executed two search warrants in support

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION 11/15/2012
Re:? 297-HQ-A1270951-D, 07/25/2013

of a WFO Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF) investigation. The case was

predicated on information thatl I b6
operating significant drug networks throughout the D.C. _b7c
Metro area. These individuals were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in

the District of Columbia and search warrants were obtained for nine

locations utilized by members of the criminal organization. Two of the

search warrants were for single family residences inI I
would be executed by Baltimore SWAT, Tactical Operations

Center (TOC) and Negotiation Operations Center (NOC) teams.

 

 

On 11/13/2012, at approximately 1:00 Baltimore SWAT Senior

Team Leader conducted an operations brief. The be
approved operations order Called for Baltimore SWAT to divide into two b7c
eight?man entry teams with each team assigned to a residence.- The Gold

team was designated to enter and secureI I.
I land the Blue team was designated to enter and secure

theI I(herein referred

toI I Information indicated the primary subject at

I I had received prior military training and was

armed with an and several handguns. Due to the close proximity
SWAT believed there was a probability weapons may be

located well.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The front door and windows a clear view of the b6
front door the Blue Team would make entry. Baltimore b7c
Executive Management (EM) approved a plan for the Blue Team to make b7E

entry the Gold Team allowing Blue Team
operators to avoid exposing themselves to any danger posed 

The use ofI Iwas authorized for use by
both teams. The Blue Team planned to deployI I
the knock and announce was not answered and a
breach of the door was necessary. If the occupants ofI Iopened the
door when commanded,I Iwould be

deployed in the front yard oq Isignaling the Gold Team to enter

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION 11/15/2012
Re:. 297-HQ-A1270951HD, 07/25/2013

On 11/15/2012, at approximately 5:00 Baltimore SWAT, along
with the TOC and NOC personnel met at the designated staging area and
conducted an operations and safety brief. Upon completion, all members
moved to their assigned stations. TOC and NOC were located in the TOC
vehicle, while the On?Scene Commander, ASACI I and
SWAT Supervisor, SSAI  positioned themselves in ASAC
vehicle. Both teams proceeded to the residences utilizing one
vehicle arriving at approximately 6:00 a.m. Once there, both teams
proceeded to their assignments.

 

 

 

At approximately 6:05 the Blue Team was positioned at the
front door to where the operation. SA
conducted a knock and announce by yelling, 
search warrant. Come to the door!" SA repeated this sequence,
after which aloud to 20. No indications of movement
were observed in the house at the completion of SA

was directed by STLI Ito forcibly breach the door. After
SA breached the.door, SAI Ideployed 

Iinside the house. Almost immediately after the
was tossed, SAI Iprematurely entered the residence
before the detonated and stood in the living room,
approximately five feet from the threshold. a
female, later identified asl I crouched approximately 20
feet away in an archway inside an alcove which separated the living
room from the bedrooms located in the rear of the residence. As SA
contact saw a flash of light, heard
a loud bang, and felt a strong movement of air on his right side which
he perceived to be from a shotgun blast fired at him 

fired two shots both shots

missed her. One embedded in the wall of an unoccupied bedroom in the

southeast corner of the home. The_other hit the corner of the living

room wall, immediately adjacent to the arch. his

point of aim from right to left, as ran back into her bedroom

in the northeast corner of the residence. SAI Iperceived that
moved into a stairwell rising to the second floor. The

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION 11/15/2012
Re: 07/25/2013

 

 

 

stairwell was between the living room where SA was standing,
andl Ibedroom, and actually descended into the basement.
would use the stairwell

 

 

 

 

 

According to SAI lhe believed
as a position of cover and fire at him and his fellow team members
again: SA fired three additional rounds at the wall

 

 

 

 

 

separating the living room from the stairwell. The three rounds missed

and impacted the living room wall and passed through the
stairwell, hitting the opposing wall. One of the rounds also impacted
a closet door in the hall area, adjacent door.

SA was the second Agent to enter the residence and overheard
SA shouting, ?shots fired? and, ?come out.? 
to cover a second stairwell on the north side of the house, which
ascended to the second floor. Five individuals were cleared from the

 

residence.

 

sustained three superficial injuries. She was
treated on the scene by Baltimore SWAT medic SA and
subsequently transported to Prince George?s hospital where she was

 

 

 

treated for minor abrasions and lacerations to her face and arm and
released.

 

On Chief, Special Prosecution Unit,
Prince George?s States Attorney' Office provided a letter declining to
prosecute discharging his weapon during the execution
of the search warrant on 11/15/2012.

 

 

On Special Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised the circumstances

 

of the Agent?involved shooting did not warrant a federal criminal
investigation.

On 05/23/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned shooting
incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector
Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections (OI), Trial

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION 11/15/2012
Re: 07/25/2013

Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice

 

 

 

 

ISpecial Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, b6
Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section, b7C
Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent I

Squad Washington Field Office; SSAI I Practical

 

Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI I

Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
Response Team, Laboratory Division; SSA

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Response Group SSAI [Firearms Training

Unit, and SSAI IDefensive Systems Unit, TD. The

following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

I onr

Team Leaders I I
SSAI Defensive Systems Unit, TD 

IFirearms Training Unit, SSAI I

Operations and Training Unit, SSA IResource

Planning Office, Director?s Office; SSA ISWAT

Operations Unit, IOccupational Safety and

 

Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and Logistics Services

 

Division; Management and Program AnalystI I
=Inspection Analysis Unit, and Management and Program 
IandI IInspection Management Unit,

 

 

 

 

INSD.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRE

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized inCident with the intent
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with-an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3)
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION 11/15/2012
Re: 07/25/2013

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against the Agent as a result of his
involvement in this serious accident. 

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following observations and.
recommendations of the SIRT:

OBSERVATIONS

Observation Baltimore SWAT operators should receive training on
the safe and effective deployment of diversionary devices.

Analysis: Special Weapons and Tactics Policy Implementation Guide
(02/29/2012?

 

 

 

 

Senior Team Leaders (STLs) or their designees
must conduct annual training for each SWAT team member in the use of
diversionary devices. The STL must document the annual training and
certification in the office SWAT file, using the diversionary device
SWAT checklist. The STL must also report to SOU via TRMS that each
team's operators have been annually certified. Prior to any training
event in which diversionary devices will be used, the team leader, or
his/her designee, should cover the delivery sequence "dos and don'ts"

 

for the diversionary device.

SIRT investigation determined SWAT operator the
 detonated causing him to

 

room beford
take offensive actions due to his belief he was being fired upon.

 

Recommendation SAC, Baltimore ensure SWAT STL and members are
trained on the use of] land develop
protocols to prevent early entry before

Recommendation #1a: AD, CIRG ensure SWAT teams are conducting annual
training on the use and deployment ofl I

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

 

 



b6

b7E

b7E

b7E

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION 11/15/2012
Re: 07/25/2013 

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Inspection Division (INSD), Inspection Management Unit

(IMU) is responsible for ensuring that each Inspection

Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains
1 an Inspection Instructions/Recommendations database and provides the
INSD Assistant Director (AD) a quarterly report reflecting all
I outstanding Instructions/Recommendations. The inspection process is
not complete until all InstructionsfRecommendations have been

satisfactorily resolved.

IMU will provide all responses to the Inspector-in-Charge
(110), who will determine if each Instruction/Recommendation has been
resolved or requires further action. Resolution will be based upon
specific actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the
division has under consideration or plans to take in the future. If
the IIC determines an Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved,
an.EC will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification.
Upon resolution, all Instructions/Recommendations will be appropriately
noted in the database.

SAC, Baltimore is required to provide detailed responses addressing
the Instructions/Recommendations in this EC, page 6 including
corrective actions taken and/or intended actions with time frames for
completion, Each Issue which results in an Instruction/Recommendation
must be responded to in a one~page, stand alone response. The Issue
and related Instruction/Recommendation is to be recited verbatim from
the inspection EC, followed by the division's detailed response. If
supporting documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each
response.

All initial and follow-up responses must be sent to the IMU on
plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Chiefl IInspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room b6
I In addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached b7C
responses, please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPA

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

 

 

 

 

Title:

Re:

00

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) SHOOTING INCIDENT BALTIMORE DIVISION 11/15/2012

07/25/2013

UNCLASSIFIED

8

 

 

 

 

I

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

Glasgow. 85595::

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naked lamina Ir?m

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 



Eleotronio communication

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI DIVISION Date: 07/09/2013
12/17/2012

To: INSPECTION (Route).

Fromz' INSPECTION
MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: 

Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted I
Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 12/17/2012, involving Special.Agent
Iof the Miami Division. During a confrontation
with an intruder on his property, SA accidentally discharged
one round from his Bureau-issued Glock, Model 22 pistol. SIRG members
unanimously recommended that no administrative action be taken against
the result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent] dated 01/16/2013.

 

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the

captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 12/17/2012, at approximately 4:00 
I Iwas leaving his residence to go to work. As he unlocked hi

vehicle, SAI Inoticed the normally closed gate to the back of

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

b6
b7C

136
3070

b6
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b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI DIVISION 12/17/2012
Re: 07/09/2013

his residence was open. his weapon from his ankle
holster because he was not comfortable with the gate being open and
felt that he should have his weapon out in case there was an intruder.

standing between his residence and a standalone utility

shed, which is located in the middle of the back yard On the right
side. He looked at the rear of his residence to see if there were any
persons or obvious signs of forced entry to any of the rear residence
doors. When he did not see anything, he focused his attention on the
shed area and observed an unknown subject standing just outside of the
opened shed. SA could tell that the subject was a male;
however, due to the darkness he could not see whether the subject had
any type of weapon in his hands. SA yelled ?Stop, put your
hands up!" As the subject fled towards the rear of the residence, SA

 

pursued him to the far right corner of his property. SA

 

 

 

ran into the subject in the dark, congested corner of the

 

yard. While SA was holding his firearm in his right hand, he
fell into the subject anc struck him in the head with his weapon. SA

fell to the ground, put both hands out to break his fall; and
upon landing he inadvertently pulled the trigger of his pistol.

 

the subject who had run towards the closest
road north of his residence, entered a van, and rapidly drove off. SA
back into his residence, called 911, and Miami Division
Executive Management.

The Miami Division Evidence Response Team (EAT) responded and
took photos, searched all surrounding properties for damage, and
performed a close search utilizing metal detectors for the bullet, but
could not locate the expended round. Metro?Dede Police Department
(MDPD) responded to in order to take the
burglary report. During examination of the rear corner of the
yard, the shell casing was discovered. 

No personal injuries or property damage were incurred as a
result of SA accidental discharge.

On 05/23/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI DIVISION 12/17/2012
Re: 297-HQ-A1271748-D, 07/09/2013

shooting incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non-voting
member. The following voting members were in attendance: Acting Chief

 

Inspector Howard 3. Marshall, Office of Inspections (OI), b5
Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of b7C
Justice ISpecial Legal Counsel, Civil Rights

 

Division, Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent 

Squad Washington Field Office; SSA I Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI
Investi ative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
Response Team, Laboratory Division; SSA I

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Response Group SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, and SSAI I Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
I loi:
Team Leaders I
OI, SSA Defensive Systems Unit, TD 
Nathan Williams, Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I
Operations and Training Unit, SSA IResource
Planning Office, Director's Office; SSA ISWAT
Operations Unit, IOccupational Safety and

 

Environmental Programs Unit, Facilities and Logistics Services

 

Division; Management and Program AnalystI I
Inspection Analysis Unit, and Management and Program 
I IandI IInspection Management Unit,
INSD.

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with.the intent
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI DIVISION 12/17/2012
Re: 07/09/2013

recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint
(if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues; and (4) provide recommendations for administrative action if

I deemed necessary.

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against the SA as a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

 

b6
b7C

 

No other recommendations or observations were made by SIRG
members.



UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

 

 

 

 

 

thou-mi mun: mun-1mm an.

(Rev. 5-8-10)

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UNCLASSIFIED - mm ms- mm

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic communication

 Cleanser-.5599?
em;

I

 

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT PHOENIX DIVISION Date: 10/10/2013
04/18/2013

CC: DA-INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION

From; INSPECTION
DA-INSPECTION MANAGEMENT UNIT

Contact: b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

Approved By: MARSHALL HOWARD 
Nancy McNamara

 

b6
b7C

 

Drafted By:

 

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 04/18/2013, involving Special Agent

Iof the Phoenix Division. While at the range b6
confirming the serial number of his Bureau-issued Glock Model 23, .40 b7C
caliber pistol, discharged one round into the

cement. SIRG members unanimously recommended that 

censured, suspended from duty for.a period of three days, and attend

documented remedial firearms training as a result of his involvement in

this shooting incident.

 

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Communication (EC) of

Supervisory Special Agent Idated 05/15/2013. b6
b7C

 

 

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments,
and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned
shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 04/18/2013, the Tucson Resident Agency conducted quarterly
firearms qualification training at the Pima Regional Training Center in

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT PHOENIX DIVISION 04/18/2013
Re: 10/10/2013

Tucson.

 

 

 

According to upon his arrival to the range, SA
the Assistant Primary Firearms Instructor instructed
participants to unload their service ammunition. As 
provided a round count of ammunition needed for the first practice
shoot, his magazines with the designated round count
and reloaded his weapon while standing at the ammunition table. 
he needed to verify the weapon serial numbers of all
shooters in the group. While facing in a safe direction, 
locked the slide back on his weapon to read the serial number. He
walked from the ammunition table to an area away from the participants.
Forgetting he placed a loaded magazine into his weapon, 
released the slide on his wea on and pressed the trigger causing one
round to discharge. SAI 'mmediately holstered his weapon and

waited for the arrival of 

After determining no personal injuries were incurred as a result of

a decision was made to allow SA to
complete the firearms training with the group. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

'On 08/14/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned shooting
incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Jr., Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in Attorney,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ)

Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section
Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Criminal Investigative Divisionf SC
Gregory D. Cox, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Special
Agent I, Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office;
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) IPractical
Applications Unit, Training Division SS
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
Evide ce Response Team, Laboratory Division SS
Firearms Training Unit, and SSAI
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

b6
b7C

b6
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b6
b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT PHOENIX DIVISION 04/18/2013
Re: 10/10/2013

in attendance: Assistant Director Nancy McNamara, Inspectors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lox, b6
Team Leaderl IOI, SC Stuart P. Fronk, b7c
Internal Investigation Section, SSAI ITraining
Unit, SSAI IEvidence Response Team, Management
and Program Analyst IInspection Analysis

 

Unit, and Iandl hnspection
Management Unit, INSD. 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent to:
evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the Director
with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for
corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4)
provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

 

b6

SIRG members unanimously agreed that SAI should be 
7C

censured, suspended ?rom duty for a period of three days, and attend

 

documented remedial firearms training as a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident.

?06

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

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outlaw! mm?m mun.

 

UNCLASS IFIED 

(DI: 

Electronic communication

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Shooting Incident Indianapolis Date: 03/26/2014
Field Office 05/13/2013
From: INSPECTION
Contact: b6
b7C
Approved By: b6
b7C
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
Drafted I b5
. b7C
CasellD (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting on 02/21/2014.
Administrative Notes: A copy of the complete INSD Shooting-
Incident Report is electronically attached to this communication.
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. SIRT Report
Details:
On 02/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting incident
which occurred on 05/13/2013, involving Indianapolis Field Office
b6

 

Special Agentd land [As members of the

Indianapolis Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF), b7c

participating in a surveillance operation of bank robbery suspects.

The suspects were observed robbing the State Bank of Lizton and
exiting the bank with a handgun., The SSTF followed the suspects into a
residential area. the suspects on
Springcrest Street, where one of the suspects, identified as William
McKnight, exited the vehicle brandishing a .45 caliber handgun.

UNCLAS 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

VL?yd-u-wu?uu -. .

Title: Shooting Incident Indianapolis Field Office 05/13/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

McKnight pointed the firearm at refused to be
comply with verbal commands to put down the weapon. Fearing for their b7c

lives, 13 rounds at McKnight, striking'him
six times. McKnight died from his wounds on scene.

SIRS Observations

 

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting
incident with the intent to: 

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously
determined the application of deadly force by SA was
in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly Force Policy.

 

b6
?b7C

 

 

 

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint.
The SIRG made no recommendations or observations concerning the
operational techniques used by SA and SA iuring the shooting
incident.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and safety issues. The
made no recommendations or observations concerning training and

safety issues by SE and the shooting incident. b5
b?7C

 

 

 

 

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

against a result of their involvement in the b6

 

shooting incident. b7c
Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting members were_
in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office of Inspections
(OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States b5
b7C

Department of Justice I Special Legal Counsel.
Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chiefl
Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC) Roger Coe, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSAI Squad

 

 

 



2

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: Shooting Incident Indianapolis Field Office 05/13/2013

Re: 03/26/2014

 

 

Washington Field Office; SSA

I Practical

 

 

Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSAI I

 

 

33d

I IInvestigative Law Unit, OffiCe of the General Counsel; SSA
IEvidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division
I Firearms Training Unit, 

Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident

Reaponse Group and SSA

IDefensive Systems

Unit, TD. The following nonrvoting members were also in attendande:

 

 

IHoward

 

I,Office of Inspector General, Inspectorsl

S. Marshall,
'01, Team Leaders

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and OI, SSA

 

 

 

ERT, Unit

 

 

Chief IPAU, DAD
Division; s34 IOffice of
Assistant Director Michael Prout

 

 

Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism
Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb,
and DAD Blair Deem,OI, United

 

states Marshal Service?
Tracy A. Paige, OI, Ud

Special Assistant, OI, SC

 

 

Iandl

Management Unit, INSD.

IInsPection

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

There were no InstructionsIReCOmmendations from the 

ONO

3

 

 



and Management Program 

 

b6
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UNCLASSIFIED 

Ir 

FEDERAL BOREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Washington Field Date; 02/18/2014
05/22/2013
CC: b6
b7C
From; INSPECTION
DA-TDY . b6
Contact: b7c
Approved By: b6
SHIELDS ROBERT JR b7C
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By: b6
b7C
Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 11/20/2013.
Reference: Serial 73
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference submitted electronically
by SSAI I dated 06/07/2013. Reference accidental b6
discharge report by SSH Idated 06/13/2013. b7C
Details:
On 11/20/2013, the SIRG reviewed an accide tal discharge that occurred
on 05/22/2013, involving Special Agent (SA) Washington :3
Field Office SA was preparing for firearms training and 

 

 

 

was conducting holster and dry fire exercises. After finishing the dry
fire exercise, she charged her weapon in the kitchen, a departure from

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Washington Field 05/22/2013
Re: 02/18/2014

her normal routine of charging in the garage of her residence. On

05/22/2013, at approximately 11:10 as 3 had finished 3?36
b7C

 

 

 

 

preparing her range equipment for the firearms training course, she
decided to conduct one more practice draw and pulled the trigger which
fired one round out her kitchen window.

SIRG Observations

 

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting incident
with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined this
incident was not a deadly force issue. 

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint.
The SIRG made no recommendations or observations concerning the
operational techniques used by this shooting b6
incident. b7C

3. .Provide recommendations concerning training and safety issues. The
SIRG made the following observation requesting additional training.

Observation 1: Suffered an accidental discharge while 305

 

 

 

 

conducting dry fire exercises. b7c
Analysis 1: As SA finished preparing her range equipment 
for the firearms training course, she decided to conduct one more
practice draw and pulled the trigger which fired one round out her
kitchen window.
Recommendation 1: ADIC, WFO, will ensure b6
b7C

 

remedial firearms training.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary. This matter is being referred to the Internal

Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential


2

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Washington Field 05/22/2013
Re: 02/18/2014

administrative action.

The SIRG was chaired by nonmvoting member Deputy Assistant Director
Mark Alan Morgan, INSD. The following voting members were in 
attendanbe: Chief Ins ector Robert J. Shields, Office.of Inspections
(OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice Special Legal Counsel,
Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman,
Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section 
Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). I
Squad SSA I Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division SSAI I
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; $84 I
Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division SSA
Firearms Training Unit, SSAI I
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group and SSH I Defensive Systems
Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also in attendanceu[::]
I IOffice of Inspector

 

b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

General, Inspectord OI,
Team Leadersl IOI, SSA
Special Assistant, OI, Unit
Chie? lane Management Program Analyst 

 

 

Inspection Management Unit, INSD.
Procedures for Responding to the Observations

ADIC, WFO, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in~Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to'implement.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Washington Field 05/22/2013
Re: 02/18/2014

ADIC, WFO, is required to provide a written response, via EC, detailing
the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to

 

 

 

Unit Chie? Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once b6
the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to b7c
9.,

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

 

 

 

 

Precedence: Routine - Date: 02/20/2014
Lead Type: Action
Deadline:

UNCLASSIFIED



Lead?neport

04/19/2014

Lead NUmber: 9

From: INSPECTION

Approved


Contact:

 

 

 

 

 

By:

 

SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By:  I

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Reference: Serial 78

Details:

(U) ADIC, WFO, is required to provide a written response, via
EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve
each Instruction/Recommen?ation. Follow up EC responses must
be directed to Unit Chie Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e?mail
the Sentinel link to MPAI 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Re:? 
Lead: 9; 02/20/2014

Location
To: 
Recipient: 
Attn: ADIC Valerie Parlave
Status: Set
00

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED
FWEIJIEFIIHL EBIJFIEUHIJ CiF?IITV?EEB111i?rfltill

Lead Report

Precedence: Routine Date: 02/20/2014
Lead Type: Information
Deac'uine: 04/19/2014

Lead Number: 10

From: INSPECTION.
DA-TDY
Contact: 

 

 

Approved Byi
SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

 

 

Drafted By:

 

Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Reference: Serial 78

Details: (U) SIRG members recommended this incident he referred to the
Internal Investigations Section, Inspection Division for any
further administrative action.

UNCLAS IFIED

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

Re:

Lead:

UNCLASSIFIED



Location

To:

10, 02/20/2014

DA-INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION

"Recipient: INVESTIGATIONS SECTION

66

Attn:
Status:

SC Stuart Fronk
Set

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 



 

(Rev. 5-8-10)
. UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION Date: 09/25/2013
I 05/30/2013

CC: DA-INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION

From: INSPECTION
DA-INSPECTION MANAGEMENT UNIT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contact: b6
b7C
Approved By: MARSHALL HOWARD 
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By: b6
- b7C
Case ID (U) Shooting Incident
Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 05/30/2013, involving Special Agent
Iof the Cleveland Division. As he reached for his be
Bureau?issued Glock Model 23 pistol as it fell towards the ground in 
his office space, discharged one round,
injuring his right lower leg. SIRG members unanimously recommended that
SA be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days,
and attend documented remedial firearms training as a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Communication (EC) of 
SA ldated 06/27/2013. b5
b7C
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments,
and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned
shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 05/30/2013, at approximately 4:00 in his :6
7C

office located at the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. While

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION 05/30/2013
Re: 09/25/2013

on the phone with the Evidence Response Team, decided to sit b5
in the chair at his desk. As he sat down, his holster grabbed at his b7c
chair and he partially stood up to remove the holster and pistol from

his pants so he could sit down. Unable to get the holster removed from

his_belt, his gun from the holster to set it on his

desk. He lost his grip on the gun and as it fell toward the ground, SA

reached for it causing a single round to discharge, travel

through a desk, and enter his right lower leg.

 

his office to seek assistance at the Transportation b6
Security Administration (TSA) office. Finding the TSA office empty, SA b7c
returned to his office and contacted his supervisor to advise
of the incident. a tourniquet on his leg, called
911, and advised his wife of the incident.
Airport fire and police'personnel responded and rendered first
aid.. Cleveland Division personnel also responded to the scene. SA
transported to the MetroHealth Hospital where the round was b6
extracted and he was released from the hospital that evening. b7C
?On 08/14/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned shooting
incident. Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields, Jr., Inspection
Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in attendance: Trial Attorney, :3


Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ)
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section
Chief (SC) Jayne L. Challman, Criminal Investigative Division; SC
Gregory D. Cox, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Special
Agent (SAH ISquad CR-Z, Washington Field Office;
Supervisory Special Agent IPractical
Applications Unit, Training Division $84 I
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division SSAI
I IFirearms Training Unit, and SSAI
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non~voting members were also
in attendance: Assistant Director Nancy McNamara, Inspectors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CLEVELAND DIVISION 05/30/2013
Re: 09/25/2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OI, b6
Team Leader OI, sc Stuart P. Fronk, We
Internal Investigation Section, SSAI [Training
Unit, SSAI  Evidence ReSponse Team, Management
and Program Analyst IInspection Analysis
Unit, and IInspection
Management Unit, INSD. 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3)
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.

 

SIRG members unanimously agreed that SA should be b5
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and attend b7c
documented remedial firearms training as a result of his involvement in

 

this shooting incident.

99

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

 

FD- 1037 (Rev. 5-8-10}

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BEEREAU 0F 

Eiec?ronic Communication

Title: SHOOEING INCIDENT DETROIT FIELD OFFICE Date: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 ?a
. b6
b7C
CC:
From: INSPECTION :38

Contact: I I
Approved 
SHIELDS ROBERT JR b6
Mark Alan Morgan - b7c

Nancy McNamara

b7C
Case ID (U) ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE

Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRS) with respect to the captioned shooting following SIRG meeting
held on 11/20/201?.

Reference: Serial 6.

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference FD-1085 submitted electronically
by SS dated 07/16/2013. Reference accidental discharge be
report by SSA dated 07/31/2013. b7C

 

Details:

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG convened to review a shooting incident
which occurred on 07/03/2013, involving Detroit Field Office Senior

I At approximately 9:10 b5
b7C

 

Supervisory Resident Agent 
discharged his Glock Model 22 handgun

during firearms training. SSRA had unuholstered his weapon to

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT DETROIT FIELD OFFICE 07/03/2013
Re: 02/18/291?

ial number in order to enter this information on the

shooting log. A ter the weapon from his holster, he b6
proceeded to clear his Glock handgun to ensure it was safe. -During b7C
this process, pulled the trigger on what he believed was a

safe and empty weapon.

retrieve the ser

HI

SIRG Observations

rOn 11/20/2013, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting
incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined
this incident was not a deadly force issue.

2. Provide.the Dire?tor with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint. Theq?l?s made no recommendations or obServations
concerning the dperational techniques used by this b6

 

 

accidental discharge: b7c
3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety

issues. The SIRG made the following observations requesting additional

training.
Observation 1: Detroit Field Office EM was not notified in a

timely manner by the Firearms Instructor or the b5

accidental discharge. b7c
Analysis 1: SAI report indicated he was the b6



Firearms Instructor on 07/03/2013. While preparing to brief the
Agents, who were at the range for training, a gun
shot. motioned his location and told him
about the accidental discharge. After ensuring nobody was injured, SA
continued with the firearms training. At the end of training,
ISA notified the Detroit Field Office's Principal Firearms
Instructor about the accidental discharge.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIEIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT FIELD OFFICE 07/03/2013
Re: 02/18f2014

During her investigation, Supervisory Special Agent b6
etermined not only did SAI Ifail to report this incident b7c
tely to PFEI I but SSRAI Idid not report the
to Assistant Special Agent in Charge 



until fir arms training had concluded.

 

Recommendation 1: SAC, Detroit Field Office, should ensure all
Detroit personnel are appropriately trained regarding the importance of
reporting any shooting-related incident to EM immediately after the

shooting incident occurred.

Observation 2: Detroit Firearms Instructors did not secure the
scene following the accidental discharge.

 

Analysis 2: After the accidental discharge occurred and after 


 : and SSRA

training continued as scheduled. Detroit Evidence Response Team (ERT)

termined there were no injuries, firearms b6
b7C

arrived and took control of the scene at approximately 2:30 p.m.

Between the time of the actual accidental discharge, approximately 9:10

and the time ERT arrived to process the scene at approximately

2:30 the shooting scene was not secured.

Recommendation 2: SAC, Detroit Field Office, should ensure all
Detroit personnel are appropriately trained regarding the importance of
securing a shooting scene immediately after the shooting incident has

 

occurred.

b6

Observation 3: of pulling the trigger of his 

weapon as part of the process to determine whether the weapon was empty
and safe-was in conflict with established procedures and unsafe.

Analysis 3: When at the range for firearms be
training, he walked over to one of the cleaning tables and un?holstered b7c
his weapon in order to retrieve the serial number. While rendering the
weapon safe, the weapon in what he characterized as
a safe direction toward the pavement at the "bottom of a wall" and

pulled the trigger on what he believed was an empty weapon. 

UNCLASSIEIED

9


 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: (UE SHOOTING INCIDENT DETROIT FIELD OFFICE 67/03/2013
Re: 02/18/2014

stated he did this in order to clear the weapon similar to the manner
he gun cleaning room.

Fl?

ne cleared his weapon on the range or in
Following the accidental discharge, an Agent standing nearb
remove a magazine from his weapon, rack the slid point the b6
weapon down range, and pull the trigger again. The Agent heard a b7C
"click" following second trigger pull.

?7



Recommendation 3: sac, Detroit Field Office, will ensure b6
b7c

attends remedial firearms training.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended this matter be referred to the
Internal Investigations Section Inspection Division (INSD), for
any further administrative action. 

Deputy Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, Inspection Division
(INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following
voting members were in attendance: Chief InSpector Robert J. Shields,

Office of Inspections (OI), Attorney, Criminal b5
I b7C

 

Division, United States Department of Justice 
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC)

 

Jayne L. Challman, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox,
Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent

 

 

 

 

 

Squad Washington Field Office; 
I [Practical Applications Unit, Training Division
SSAI IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel; SSAI Evidence Response Team (ERT),
Laboratory Division SSAI IFirearms Training

 

Unit, Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)

Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group and 
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non?voting
members were also in attendance: 
? Office of Inspector General, Inspectors]

IOI, Team Leadersl land

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT DETROIT OFFICE 
Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

ssal SEE, b6
Special Assistant, OI, Unit Chiefl land Management b7C
Program Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observation

SAC, Detroit Field Office, is responsible for ensuring each
Inspection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The
inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation
is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to implement.

SAC, Detroit Field Office, is required to provide a written
response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to

 

 

resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must
'be directed to Unit Chiefl  Inspection Management Unit b6
(IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel b7c

 

link to MBA 

 



UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

13-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

 

UNCLASSIFIED lsovo

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic: Communication



Title: (U) Accidental Discharge CJIS Division Date: 03/13/2014
08/05/2013 -

 

CC:

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION

Contact:

 

 

 

 

 

Approved By:

 

 

 

Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

 

 

 

Drafted By:
Case ID (U) Accidental Discharge
Synopsis: (0) This communidation was prepared to furnish the analysis,

comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 11/20/2013.

?eference: Serial 4

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference FD-1085 submitted electronically

by SSA dated 08/27/2013. Reference accidental discharge.
report by SS dated 09/22/2013.

 

- Details:

On 11/20/2013, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge
that occurred on 08/05/2013, involving FBI Police Officer 
Security Division. P0 was conducting his yearly
qualification utilizing an AR-15 assigned to the FBI Police at the
Criminal Justice Information Services Division. The qualification took

UNCLASS IFIED 

 

31m. mm m. w.

. - 
mummpmarhmw Wayne-b7C

 

 

 

 



Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Division 08/05/2013
Re: 03/13/2014

place at the firing range located at the Clarksburg Police Department,
Clarksburg, West Virginia.

SIRG Observations

On 11/20/2013 the SIRG reviewed the Agenteinvolved
shooting incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG
determined this incident was not a deadly force issue.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

operational standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or

observations concerning the operational techniques used by . b6
during this shooting'incident. b7C

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and safety
issues. The SIRG made the following observation requesting additional
training.

Observation 1: PO Mason, while conducting yearly firearms training
with the suffered an accidental discharge.

Analysis 1: Subsequent to the accidental discharge, at the
completion of firearms training, a safety check and b6
lead firearms instructor Pol lverified a safe and empty b7C
weapon. to disassemble and clean the firearm and
placed it into the crate with the rest of the rifles assigned to

the FBI Police.

 

Instruction 1: AD, Security Division will ensure FBI Police
personnel are aware weapons involved in accidental discharge matters
must be collected and submitted to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU),
Training Division (TD), for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection.

 

b6

Recommendation 1: AD, Security Division should ensure PO b7C

 

 

 

 



2

 

 

 

 

 



Title: (U) Accidental Discharge CJIS Division 08/05/2013
Re: 297K-HQ-A3074077, 03/13/2014

attends remedial firearms training.

Provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary. This matter is being referred to the Internal
Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential
administrative action.

The SIRG was chaired by non-voting member Deputy
Assistant Director Mark Alan Morgan, INSD. The following voting.
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office
of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
United States Department of Justice I Special
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Section Chief (SC) Jayne
L. Challman, Criminal Investigative Division; SC Gregory D. Cox, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)

 

 

 

 

ISquad Washington Field Office; SSA

 

 

 

Practical Applications Unit, 

 

 

Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSH
IEvidence Resoonse Team (ERT), Laboratory Division SSA

 

 

 

 

Firearms Training Unit, SSA I

 

 

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

Response Group and SSAI TD. The

following non-voting members were also in attendanced I
I pffice of Inspector General, 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspectorsl Team
Leaders '01, SSA
ERT, I Special Assistant, OI, Unit Chief

nd Management Program Analyst MPA Inspection

 

 

 

Management Unit, INSD.

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

 

AD, Security Division, is responsible for ensuring each
InSpection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The
inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation
is addressed by the field office. The Inspector~in?Charge (IIC) will



3

 

 

b6
b7C

 

 

 



Title: (U) Accidental Discharge CJIS Division 08/05/2013,
Re: 03/13/2014

review the field office?s response to.determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based ?pon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to implement. .

AD, Security Division, is required to provide a written
response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to
resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must
be directed to Unit Inspection Management Unit b5
(IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel b7c
link to MPA 

 

 

?09



4

 

 

 

 

. mum lama-?113?- may rig-?01.
?Winnie-v: been WAT-1
term-36 ?81 Wm Inla-

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD Date: 04/10/2014
OFFICE 08/28/2013 - .

 

cc: b6
b7C

 

 

 

From; INSPECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6
Contact: 
Approved By: 3 . b6
b?7C
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamaral
Drafted By:  - - . b6
b7C
Case ID (U) Delegated Shooting New York
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 02/21/2014.
Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection DiviSion's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated
12/20/2013, prepared by Inspectorl IA copy of the b6
complete INSD Shooting Incident Report'is_electronically attached to b7C
this communication. -
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. Shooting Incident Report, dated 12/20/2013
Details 
On 02/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 08/28/2013, involving New York Field Office 
(NYFO) Special Agent INYFO, Squad White b6
b?7C

 

UNCLASSIFIED F0130

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013
Re: 



Plains Resident Agency (WPRA), and the Westchester County District
Attorney's Office (WCDAO) were conducting a joint gang and.nartotics
investigation- ?On 08/28/2013, investigators from WCDAO and officers
from the Mount Vernon folice Department planned on arresting a target
of this joint investigation,  I who was wanted on a local b6
narcotics warrant. SA land SA drove to the b7C
arreSt location, so they codld participate in surveillance and conduct
the post?arrest interview While driving past an additional address
associated SAs and observed Hilton
standing in front of the house. After momentarily losing sight of
SAs land Fpproached the house and walked
down the adjacent driveway to the rear of home. While approaching a
parked Ford SUV associated heard the vehicle's engine
start. SAs the driver, who was 
identified as verbal commands to turn off the car and get his
hands up; however, ignored the commands and put the Ford SUV in
reverse. Because a WCDAO investigator took a standing position behind
the Ford SUV he was struck twice by the vehicle as it moved backwards.
SA feared for the investigator?s life, so he aimed his istol
at Because in his sight picture, 
fired one round into the rear passenger tire When
the vehicle did not stop, fired a second round

into the front passenger tire, which stopped the vehicle. 
then removed from the vehicle and arrested without further incident.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
   
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SIRG Observations

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting
incident with the intent to: -

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously
determined the application of deadly force by SA lon b6
08/28/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly b7c

Force Policy. . ,i

 

 



2

 

 

 

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013?
Re: 04/10/2014

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,

and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint. Because policy dictates an agent should not fire solely to
stop vehicle. SIRG members had a discussion about the technique used
by SA Due to the potential cross fire situation if SA

 

 

 

 

 

shot towards the subject instead of the vehicle, SIRG members

 

 

 

concurred with the Agent's decision to shoot at the vehicle tires in
this situation. By disabling the vehicle, the
threat striking and seriously injuring the 
investigator, who was standing behind the vehicle at the time. Shooting
at the tires was not to solely disable the vehicle. In addition, the
SIRG made the following observations. 

Observational: An arrest plan was not ?roduced prior to an arrest
operation.

Analysis 1: DIOG Section 19.2.3 provided policy regarding arrest
plans:



"The SAC is responsible for ensuring that arrests are carefully'and.

possible, written arrest plans must be

prepared_prior to conducting law enforcement activities that may result-

in the arrest of a potentially dangerous subject. Arrest plans must
address five topics: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and
Equipment, and Control and Communications."

In addition, Section 19.2.4 provided policy guidance regarding'

joint arrests:

"An SSA may authorize a joint arrest with state and local
authorities, United States marshal's Service (USMS), or other federal
law enforcement agencies. In circumstances of joint arrests, the SAC
remains responsible to ensure that there is a well?considered arrest
plan."

 

 

[and] Iparticipated in the

 



3

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013
Re: 04/10/2014

 

surveillance to locate and arrestl An arrest plan was

not prepared nor did either Agent participate in an arrest briefing
before they were inVOlved in the surveillance and arrest 

 

Instruction 1: ADIC, New York will ensure joint arrest plans in_
support of other law enforcement agencies are well?considered in
accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.3 and DIOG Section 19.2.4.

Observation 2: Agents did not participate in an arrest operations
briefing prior to participating in the arrest of a violent subject.

Analysis 2: DIOG Section 19.2.3 provided policy regarding arrest
plans:

"When briefing the arrest plan, the briefing Agent should stress
to the participants of the operation that any arrest has the potential
to become dangerous. Exigent circumstances may necessitate an oral
briefing in lieu of a written plan, but the oral briefings must address
the five topics required to be included in written plans. its planning
and execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to 
experienced Agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or
their designees." 

 

 

SAs . and participated in the

surveillance to locate and arrestl I An arrest plan was

not prepared nor did either Agent participate in an arrest briefing
before they were involved in the surveillance and arrest of Hilton.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Instruction 2: ADIC, New York will ensure Agents participate in an
operations briefing prior to participating in the arrest of a subject
in accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.3.

 

Observation 3: SA NYFO, did not have his
handgun immediately accessible during the arrest of

 

 

 

 

 

Analysis 3: The MIOG, Section 12?2u2 provided policy regarding a.
handgun being securedb7C

 

 

 

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT new YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013
Re: 04/10/2014'

must be armed at all times when on official duty. Handguns
must be secured to the Agent's person in a holster, handbag or waist
(fanny/butt} pack. Immediate access to the handgun and its security
are paramount. 3A3 should consult with the PFI concerning the use of
holsters other than their Bureau?issued holster."

 

b6

SA had his Glock 27 handgun holstered on his ankle
b7C

during the arrest ofl ankle holster did not afford
the Agent immediate access to his handgun should a quick-reaction draw

 

 

 

been necessary.

Recommendation 3: ADIC, New York should ensure all personnel wear
their pistol in a holster readily accessible during planned activity
which can be reasonably expected to culminate in an arrest or when

.entering a potentially hostile environment where a quick?reaction

 

weapbn draw might be necessary.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues. The SIRG made no training recommendations or observations
requesting additional training for the Agent involved in this shooting

incident.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if-deemed

necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

against a result of his involvement in this shooting b6
incident. b7c

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,
chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Chief InSpector Robert J. Shields, Office
of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, 7 b6
United States Department of Justice I Special b7c
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chief
 Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC)
Roger Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division 
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Squad 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



5

 

 

 

 

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013
Re: 04/10/2014

 

Washington Field Office; SSAI Practical

 

 

I A lications Unit (PAU), Training Division SS I

 
 

ative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division

 

 

 

SSAI Firearms Training Unit, 

 

 

Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group and SSAI  Defensive Systems
Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also in attendance:
I Office of Inspector General, 

 

 

b6
b7C

 

OI, Team Leaders

 

and

CI, SSA ERT, Unit Chief
PAU, DAD Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism
Division; SSH IOffice of Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb,
Assistant birector Michael Prout and DAD Blair Deem,OI, United
States Marshal Service; Special Assistant, OI, SC
Tracy A. Paige, OI, UCI land Management Program 
land
Inspection Management Unit, INSD. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observation

ADIC, New York is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. .The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The lnspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office's response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action.- Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

ADIC, New York is required to provide a written response,
via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each

Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to:



6

 

 

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013
Re: 04/10/2014

 

Unit Chief

 

Inspection Management Unit (IMU), I SD.

Once

 

 

 

the EC is

 

90

 

serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MAPA

 

 

 



7

 

b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

- 
'15 Dum?mwmmamhm marques.

he hum Micah-1
term: 13?: vie-mm mm-

     
  

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

  



(JG: 

Electronic communication

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN FIELD Date: 03/26/2014
OFFICE 08/28/2013 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CC: 136
b7C
From: INSPECTION I 
b6
t: .
Contac b7c
Approved By: b6
b7C
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By: b6
b7C
Case ID (U) Animal Shooting
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG

-meeting held on 02/21/2014.
Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
InSpection Division's (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated
12/26/2013, prepared by San Juan Field Office Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA) and SSA b6
b7C
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U) INSD Shooting Incident Report, dated_12/26/2013
Details:
On 02/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a Shooting 
incident which occurred on 08/28/2013, involving Newark Field Office
(NK) Special Agent (SA) The NK SWAT team traveled to 136
b7C

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

lsouo

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

Puerto Rico in support of a major takedown of a large-scale drug

enterprise operating in San Juan. While entering an assigned arrest

location, clearing the interior of the residence when . b6
he proceeded through a door from the kitchen to an exterior stairwell. b7c
As soon as to the bottom of the stairwell, a large pit

bull breed dog began charging at him. Fearing for his safety and the

safety of his fellow SWAT operators, SA fired his weapon at

the charging dog. After firing three rounds, the dog retreated into a

crawl space underneath the house and later died.

 

 

 

 

SIRS Observations

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting
incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously
determined the application of deadly force by SA on
08/28/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly
Force Policy. 

 

b6
b7C

 

 

 

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, Observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or observations
concerning the operational techniques used by this b5
shooting incident. - b7c

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues. The SIRG made no training recommendations or observations
requesting additional training for the Agent involved in this shooting
incident.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

against a result of his involvement in this shooting b6

incident._ 7b7C

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,



2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN JUAN FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office

of Inspections (OI), Trial ttornev. Crimi al Division, b6

United States Department of Justice Special b7C
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chief

I I Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC)
Roger Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSA

quad Washington Field Office; SSA
ractical Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSA

I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General

Counsel; SSA Evidence Response Team (ERT),
Laboratory Division SSAI IFirearms Training
Unit, SSAI Fpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group and SSA
Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting members were also
in attendanced I Office of Inspector General, 
Insnectord I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OI, Team Leaders

 

 

 

 

 

IandI r_J OI, SSA IERT, 
Unit Chief (UC) PA . DAD Joshua Skule,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counterterrorism Division; SSA Office of Public Affairs;
SC Jay Tabb, Assistant Director Michael Prout and DAD Blair
Deem,OI, United States Marshal Service; Special
Assistant, OI, SC Tracy A. Paige, OI, DC and
Management Program Analyst? land

 Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

"56



3

 

 

 

 

 

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:1 layman-cv- my one" mm 
mltl'f-? Rd Inf-awe 5m

913-1057 (Rev. 5-3?10)

 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

 

Title: Accidental Discharge New York Date: 03/26/2014
Field Office 09/13/2013
From: INSPECTION

Contact:

 

 

 

 

Approved By:

 

 

 

'Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

 

 

Drafted By:

 

Case ID (U) Accidentally Discharge

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review,
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 02/21/2014.

Reference: Serial 19

 

Administrative Notes: Reference accidental discharge report
by SSA dated 10/31/2013.

 

 

 

Details:

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge that
occurred on 09/09/2013, involving SAI I New York Field
Office. SA was participating in 4th quarter FBI pistol
qualification course (PQC) at the Suffolk County Police Range in
Westhampton, NY: After firing the first phase of the PQC from the
three yard line, SA attempted to holster his firearm, when
his firearm became hung up on his concealing garment. In an attempt to
holster his weapon, harder while his finger was

 



 

 



b7C

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 09/13/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

along the slide of the weapon. This caused an accidental discharge of
the weapon. One round was fired, hitting the concrete approximately
three feet in front of SA firing position.

 

 

 

 

SIRS Observations

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting
incident with the intent to:

1r' Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined this
incident was not a deadly force issue.

2.. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint.
The SIRG made no recommendations or observations concerning the

during the shooting

 

operational techniques used by SA

 

 

 

incident.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and safety issues. The
SIRG made the following observations requesting additional training.

Observation 1: SA experienced an accidental discharge
while attempting to holster his weapon at firearms training.

 

 

 

Analysis 1: SA attempted to bolster his weapon after
firing the first phase of the PQC. The weapon became hung up on his
to push.down harder in an

 

 

concealing garment, causing SA
attempt to holster his-weapon. This action caused an accidental

 

discharge.

Recommendation 1: ADIC, NY, will ensure attends
remedial firearms training.

 

Observation 2: Firearms instructors did not secure or photograph
the scene, or retain the weapon and holster immediately following the
accidental dischargeb7C

 

 

 

 

 



Title: Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 09/13/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

Analysis 2: The PQC continued immediately following the accidental
discharge. The incident was not reported to the PFI until later that
afternoon. The FIs were only then instructed to take possession of SA

. b7C
Recommendation 2: ADIC, NY, will ensure Shooting Incident Review
protocols are followed.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. This matter is being referred to the Internal
Investigations Section (ITS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential
administrative action.

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting members were
in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office of Inspections
Attorney, Criminal Division, United States b6
Department of Justice I Special Legal Counsel, b7c
Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chiefl
-Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC) Roger Coe, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSAI  Squad
Washington Field Office; SSAI FEractical
Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSAI I
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
lEvidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SSAI Firearms Training Unit, 33
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group and SSAI IDefenSive Systems

 

Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also in attendance:
LOffice of Inspector General, Inspectors

 

 

 

 

 

 

I OI, Team Leadersl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

andl  01, SSA ERT, Unit

Chief IPAU, DAD Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism

Division; 884 I Office of Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb,


3

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title:



Re: 03/26/2014

Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 09/13/2013

Assistant Director Michael Prout and DAD Blair Deem,OI, United

 

 

 

 

States Marshal Service;  I Special Assistant, OI, INSD
Tracy A. Paige, OI, UCI land Management Program Anal
Inspecti

 

 

 

 

Management Unit, INSD.

ADIC, NY, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspect
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office's response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or 
to implement. ADIC, NY, is required to provide a written response,
EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
InstructionzRecommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directe
Unit Chief Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD.

 

 

SC

on

ion

lans
via

to
Once

 

 

 

the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link b7C

 

 


UNCLASSIFIED ear?

. .-

ESE: 

Electronic Communication

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title; (U) Accidental Discharge Denver Field Date: 02/18/2014
Office
From: INSPECTEON

Contact: SA b5
b7C
Approved By: b5
SHIELDS ROBERT JR b7C
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
I
Drafted By: SA b6
b7C
Case ID (U) Accidental Discharge Denver
I I
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of?the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) withdrespect to.the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on.l/16/2014.
Reference: Serial 7
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference submitted electronically
by SSAI I dated 10/9/2013. Reference accidental b6
discharge report by SSAI Ion 12/20/2013. b7C
Details:

On 1/16/2014, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge that occurred
on 9/26/2013, involving Special Agent Denver b6
Field Office. Prior to the incident, SAI  was instructed to turn - b7C
in his personally owned Glock 27 pistol to the Principal Firearms
InStruCtor (PFI), to be sent for service at Quantico, Virginia. SA
arrived at the range in preparation for firearms training and to
turn in his Glock 27. Prior to giving his weapon to the~PFI, 
removed the weapon from his gun safe located behind the rear passenger
seat of his vehicle. SA attempted to clear the weapon, while

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: (U) Acc den
Re: 

simultaneouslv pulling the 




inadvertently pulled the trigger and discharged one round.

SIRS Observations

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

releasing the magazine. SA

 

 

'1

On 1/16/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting incident

with the intent to

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force._ The SIRG determined




this incident was not a deadly force issues-

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,

and recommendations for corrective actions from an Operational

standpoint.. The SIRG made no recommendations or observations

concerning the operational techniques used by SA

shooting incident.

5

 

during this

 

 

 

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety

issues. made the fqllowing observations requesting additional

traini??gl.J

Observation 1: SA

an accidental discharge while

attempting to clear his weapon.

 

attempted to clear his weapon, he

 

Analysis 1: As SA

 

 

simultaneously pulled the slide to the rear and released the magazine,
then pulled the trigger which fired a round into the trunk of his FBI

vehicle.

Recommendation 1:
firearms training.

SAC, Denver will ensure remedial

 

Observation 2: SA

did not secure the scene of the accidental

 

 

 

discharge.

Analysis 2: Af


firearms training,

 

 

 

the accidental discharge, SA completed
then drove to his residence. Once home, 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Denver Field Office
Re: 02/18/2014

 

 

 

 

discovered damage to his FBI vehicle made by the round. SA then
drove back to the range and contacted his supervisor.
Recommendation 2: SAC, Denver will ensure his personnel are familiar

 

with the protocols of securing a shooting incident scene.

Observation 3: to notify Denver Management of the
accidental discharge in a timely manner.

Analysis S: After the accidental discharge, 
firearms training and failed to notify his Supervisor, or notify the
PFI who was at the scene. SA drove to his residence. Once
home, damage to his FBI vehicle made by the round.
SA then drove back to the range and contacted his supervisor.

 

 

 

 

Recommendation 3: SAC, Denver will ensure his personnel report
shooting incidents to Denver Management in a timely manner.

Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. This matter is being referred to the Internal
Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential
administrative action.

The SIRG was chaired by non?voting member Deputy Assistant Director
Mark Alan Morgan, INSD. The following voring members were in
attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office of Inspections
(OI) Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice Assistant Section Chief 
Criminal Investigative Division; ASC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special
Agent(SSA)  IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel; Squad Washington Field
Office; SSA Practical Applications Unit,
Training Division SSA I Special Weapons (SWAT)
Operations Unit, SSAI I Firearms Training
Unit, 

Laboratory Division and SSA

 

 

 

Evidence Response Team (ERT),
Defense Systems

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Denver Field Office
Re: 297K-HQ-A3266118, 02/18f201?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also in attendance: b6

Office of the Inspector Generalr Inspecror4 b7c
I or, men; Team

Leaders OI, 

sszi IERT, Special Assistant, or,

men; Unit Chief IInspection Analysis Unit, men,-

UCI and Management Program (MEAN
and Inspection Management Unit,

INSD.

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

SAC, DN is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
.action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plane
to implement.

SAC, DN, is required to provide a written response, via EC, detailing

the actions taken by the field office to resolve each

Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to

Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once he
the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPA b7C



 

 

 

 

 

 



UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 



r??.0maeaa?aamp
my a- 

. 5-8-10)


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UNCLASSIFIED r? sea ?mm 371w-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic communication

 

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY Date: 07/28/2013
DIVISION 01/10/2013

From: INSPECTION
UNIT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contact: b6
. b7C
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
Nancy McNamara.
Drafted By: b6
b7C
Case (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 01/10/2013, involving Special Agent
of the Oklahoma City Division. During the b6
Special Weapons and (SWAT) firearms training, b7C
fired one round from his Bureau?issued Rock River LAR15, .223
caliber carbine, striking SAI Iin the upper thigh. SIRG

 

members recommended that no administrative action be taken against SA

5 a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
One Observation with an accompanying Instruction was adopted by INSD
for the Oklahoma City Division.

Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Comm. -
Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs) land be

dated 02/05/2013. b7C

 

 

 

Details 

This Communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and
recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the captioned shooting.

. Details of the Shooting Incident

 

 

 

Oklahoma City SWAT Team Leader SA scheduled SWAT be
training for 01/10/2013. The.training included instruction and b7c
training regarding the use of flash bang devices and conducting close

 

UNCLAS SIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 01/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271801-D, 07/28/2013

quarters battle (CQB). On 01/10/2013, SWAT Team members met in the
training room in the Oklahoma City Division, where a
presentation on the use and deployment of flash bangs. At
approximately 10:00 a.m.r the team departed for the Edmond (Oklahoma)
Police Department (EPD) firearms range. Participants were aware the
training would include live flash bangs and live fire CQB exercises.

 

 

 

SA conducted demonstrations of the proper handling and
deployment of flash bangs in the open range area. Several of the
operators with less experience were instructed and allowed to throw
live flash bangs. EPD SergeantI Iprovided a briefing on
use of the shoot house. The interior shoot house rooms were shown to
team members, and instruction about which walls should not be shot was
provided. It was also noted shots above a specified height should not
be made due to the trajectory of the bullet and the height of the earth
berm which acts as the backstop for rounds fired.

 

 

 

An examination of the EPD shoot house showed it to be a
rectangular fully covered single story structure with a metal roof. The
outside dimensions of the shoot house were 60 ft. by 36 ft. The
structure had telephone type poles as primary supports. Interior walls
were constructed using panels of approximately one quarter inch
plywood. The exterior walls of the house were made of fiberboard and
2x45. The height of the roof, at its peak was approximately 20 ft.,
with a gap at the top to allow outside light into the house. In the
scenario involving this shooting, the house was configured with 16
rooms. Some interior walls of the shoot house had the ability to be
moved, reconfiguring the interior layout of the facility. Some walls
had doorway gaps in them for ?room entry? abilities.

34 Iwas responsible for running the training exercises.

 

 

 

 

 

SM was in charge of the entry team and directing
tactical responses to the situations constructed by Both SA
and SA noted exercises would be room entry and
clearing. SA would make the determination as to the type of

 

entry to be conducted and direct team responses both outside and inside

UNCLASSIFIED

2

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 01/10/2013
Re: 297-HQ-A1271801-D, 07/28/2013

the shoot house. set up and designate which rooms were b6
not part of the exercise. The team would enter the shoot house without b7c
being supplied a blue print of the current layout or configuration of

rooms within the house. There were instances where breaching was a

component of the exercise as well as the use of flash bangs.

There were five to seven specific scenarios made in the house
with each using all eleven operators. All briefings were conducted
orally prior to entry. During the various exercises in the shoot
house, there was a limited placement of targets within each scenario.
Protocol for entries was described as standard operating procedures,
including the weapon (shoulder weapon for these scenarios) having the
safety on and the operator?s finger off the trigger and outside the
trigger guard. It also involved muzzle control. Once a target was
identified, the weapon was brought on target, the safety disengaged,
and_shot(s) fired into the target. Once this was completed, the weapon
was returned to safe and the finger placed outside the trigger guard.

During an earlier exercise, a question of not shooting a

explained to the operators that all b6
b7C

target was mentioned. SA
targets were to be considered threats which should be engaged.
During the final exercise, team members at the front of the stack
entered and secured room A. Members moved up to secured areas to=stage
for their next assignment on a clearing team. Room was cleared and
secured. SAI Icalled for the clearing of rooms and G. SA
Ideployed a flash bang in room E. SAI I
entered room and immediately engaged a target with two
shots. SAI Iturned to the right, cleared the corner and moved to

 

 

 

 

 

 

that corner to complete securing the room. SAI Ientered
and secured the left side of the room. SAI Entered and
filled the middle of the room. behind, but moving
simultaneously to this entry, a group of three operators was moving to
lentered the room and
Ientered and moved to the right to
Ientered to secure the

 

enter and secure room G. 
secured the left side. SAI

secure the corner and SA
middle of the room. Upon checking the right corner, SA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

Title:

 

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 01/10/2013

Re: 07/28/2013

observed a target stand with a target attached.

The target was not a

target but rather a character target depicting a man holding a

handgun. the safety from his weapon} fired
one shot at the target, then re-engaged the safety, and moved to

complete the securing of Room G.

remained in room E, stated that something

hit him.

'mmediately began applying first aid. SA
requested a helicopter to transport SA

A ?Code real world emergency was called out.

began examining SAI las to determine what
happened. While waiting or :he arrival of a medic, 8A4 and

SA:

 

 

 

called 911 and
Edmond Police

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Department personnel responded to the shoot house as well as emergency
personnel from the Edmond Fire Department. SA was
stabilized and transported to the Oklahoma University Trauma Center.

According to believed the target he saw

upon entering the room was an imminent threat.

 

 

 

He also advised he did

not recall any specification or demonstration during the day advising
of any specific target being used for the training exercises. SA

advised he was solely responsible for setting up each scenario
as well as any target involved in the exercises.

After the shootin incident, SA
what happened. SAI Ipointed to a target stand with a paper

 

 

asked SA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

character target attached.

SAI Ftated he had not previously seen

the target or target stand and immediately realized he had overlooked
the two items during his walk through of the shoot house prior to the

CQB exercise.

On 05/23/2013, the SIRG met to discuss the above?captioned

shooting incident;

Acting Assistant Director Robert J. Shields,

Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non?voting

member.

The following voting members were in attendance:

Acting Chief

Ins ector Howard S. Marshall, Office of Inspections (OI), 
Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of

 

Justice 

 

Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

b7C

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 01/10/2013
Re: 07/28/2013

Division, Section Chief (SC) SC Gregory D. Cox, Global Section,
Counterintelligence Division; Special Agent b5
Squad Washington Field Office; I Practical b7c
Applications Unit, Training Division 58]
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA
Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; SSA
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Response Group SSA Firearms Training
Unit, and SSAI Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
or,
Team Leaders I I
IOI, SSA Defensive Systems Unit, 
IFirearms Training Unit, SSAI 
Operations and Training Unit, SSAI IResource
Planning Office, Director?s Office; SSAI ISWAT

 

Operations Unit, Safety and Occupational Health Manager
Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs Unit,

 

 

 

Facilities and Logistics Services Division; Management and Program
IInspection Analysis Unit, and
Management and Program Iandl

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspection Management Unit, INSD.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: (1) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions (if any); (2) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and (3)
provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed nedessary.

~This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against a result of his b6
involvement in this serious accident. b7C

INSD adopted the following Observation and Instruction:

UNCLASSIFIED

5

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 01/10/2013
Re: 07/28/2013

Inspector's Observation:

Observation: Deficiencies were noted in the adherence to training
protocols for live?fire, close quarters combat, shoot house exercises.

 

b6
b7C

 

 

Analysis: Interview of Oklahoma City SWAT TL who was
responsible for running the training exercise at the Edmond PD shoot
house, indicated up the training scenarios, including the
placement of targets in the respective rooms of the shoot house.
Following the training accident, he overlooked a
character paper target when he conducted a walk-through of the shoot
house rooms prior to the CQB exercise. iThe overlooked target was

. engaged by SA during the exercise, leading .to the gunshot

Instruction: SAC, Oklahoma City will ensure adherence to live?fire
shoot house training protocols. 

 

PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE 

The Inspection Division (INSD), Inspection Management Unit
(IMU) is responsible for ensuring that each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. IMU maintains
an Instructions/Recommendations database and provides the INSD
Assistant Director (AD) a quarterly report reflecting all outstanding
Instructions/Recommendations. The inspection process is not complete
until all Instructions/Recommendations have been satisfactorily
resolved. 

IMU will provide field office responses to the Inspector?in?Charge
(IIC), who will determine if the Instruction has been resolved or
requires further action. Resolution will be based upon specific
actions taken rather than a recitation of what actions the division has
under consideration or plans to take in the future. If the IIC
determines an Instruction/Recommendation has not been resolved, an EC

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION 01/10/2013
Re: 07/28/2013

will be forwarded requesting further action or clarification. Upon

iresolution, all Instructions/Recommendations will be appropriately

noted in.the database.

SAC, Oklahoma City is required to provide a detailed response
addressing the Instruction in this EC, page 6, including corrective
actions taken and/or intended actions with time frames for completion.

Each Observation which results in an Instruction/ Recommendation must
be responded to in a one?page, stand alone response. The Observation
and related Instruction is to be recited verbatim from the inspection
EC, followed by the division's detailed response (it is not necessary
to repeat the analysis section of the Observation in the response). If
supporting documentation is available, it should be enclosed with each
response.

?All initial and follow-up responses must be sent to the IMU on
plain bond paper as enclosures to a transmittal EC, directed to Unit
Chie? IInspection Division, Inspection Management Unit, Room b6

 

I addition, after the EC is serialized with the attached 

responses, please e?mail the Sentinel link to MPAI

 

00

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A

r.

 

FD-I 057 (Rev. 5-8-l0) UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title; (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT RICHMOND DIVISION Date; 07/11/2013
02/14/2013

To: DA-INSPECTION

From: INSPECTION
DA-INSPECTION MANAGEMENT UNIT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contact: b5
b7C
Approved By: SHIELDS ROBERT JR
'Nancy McNamara
Drafted By: I b6
b7C
Case ID 1U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRE) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 02/14/2013, involving Supervisory
Special Agent  of the Richmond Division. After b5
seeing a vehicle strike a deer, SSAI Ifired one round from her b7c
Bureau?issued Glock Model 22, .40 ca 1 er pistol, killing the severely
injured'?nimal. SIRG members unanimously recommended that no 
administrative action be taken against SSA as a result Of her
involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference Electronic Communications (ECs) of
Special Agent  and dated - b6
02/19/2013 and 03/04/2013, respectively. b7c
Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments,
and recommendations of the SIRG Nith reference to the captioned
shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 02/14/2013, at approximately as b5
was riding in a vehicle driven 5; another individual, she b7C

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIEIED



 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT RICHMOND DIVISION 02/14/2013
Re: 07/11/2013

observed a small truck strike a deer. The unknown male driver (later

identified asl I of the truck, as well as the b6

driver of the vehicle in which 'was riding, stopped. SSA b7c
I kxited her vehicle as exited his truck. 

assistedl lby briefly stopping oncoming traffic while he pulled

the injured deer to the right side shoulder of the road.

After the deer was moved to the shoulder of the road, b5
called the police to report the incident. He advised SS that b7c
the police advised it was going to be a while before a marked unit
would respond to the scene. the deer thrashing
about on the side of the road and became concerned that the deer was

going to move back into oncoming traffic or cause an accident as a
result of the distraction to drivers caused by the deer?s actions.

her concern and she had a :30

concealed weapon and would shoot the deer. After ensuring there was no
oncoming traffic or bystanders who would be at risk, SStood
above the deer and fired one round into the back of the deer?s head.

would wait for the police to arrive be

so he could report the damage to his vehicle. After reSponding to the b7c
scene, the police officer advised that a game warden would be contacted

 

 

 

to retrieve the dead deer.

b6

the Richmond Division Principal Firearms 

Instructor of the incident the next afternoon.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the intent
to: evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an operational standpoint (if any); (3)
provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title; (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT RICHMOND DIVISION 02/14/2013
Re: 07/11/2013

(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed

necessary.

SIRG members unanimously opined that no action should be taken
against SSA as a result of her involvement in this

 

 

shooting incident.

#07

UNCLASSIFIED

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129-1057 Rev. 5-8-10 - . a.
UNCLASSIFIED id's: nits-11;? maid 

 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication
Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report Date: 03/26/2014

From: INS PECT ION


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contact: b6
1370
Approved By: MARSHALL HOWARD 
306
Mark Alan Morgan b7C
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By: b6
1370
Case ID (U) Animal Shooting
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,

comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG on
02/21/2014.

Reference: Serial 9

Admin'st t' Notes: (U) Reference Animal Shooting report by SA
I dated 11/18/2013. b6
b7C

Details:

 

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an animal shooting which occurred
on 10/24/2013, involving SA IMilwaukee Field Office. SA be
driving in his Bureau vehicle from Wausau, Wisconsin to b7c
the Madison, Wisconsin RA. While traveling southbound on Interstate
39, an injured deer on the shoulder of the
roadway. The deer appeared to have been struck by a vehicle and posed
a risk to oncoming traffic. Believing the injured deer could cause an
accident, his emergency lights, pulled to the
side of the road, approached the injured deer on foot, and fired four

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 03/26/2014

rounds after ensuring no other traffic was present. The initial four
rounds did not kill the deer. SAI ?fired an additional round b6
into the deer's neck killing the deer. b7c

 

SIRG Observations

 

on 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting incident
with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously

determined the application of deadly force by 
10/24/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly 

Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint.
The SIRG made no recommendations or observations concerning the

operational techniques used by SA during the shooting b5
b7C

 

 

 

 

incident.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and safety issues. The
SIRG made no recommendations or observations concerning training or
safety issues.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken

against SA as a result of his involvement in this shooting b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

incident.

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD, chaired the
meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting members were
in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office of Inspections
(OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States b5
Department of Justice Special Legal Counsel, b7C
Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chiefl I
Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC) Roger Coe, Global
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSAI Squad

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Shooting Incident Report
Re: 03/26/2014

 

b6

Washington Field Office; SSA I, Practical
b7C

Applications Unit (PAU), Training Division SSA
nvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA

 

 

 

 

 

 

Evidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division

 

 

 

354 lFirearms Training Unit, SSA
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group and 834 befensive Systems

 

Unit, TD. The following non?voting members were also in attendance:
I I Office of pector General, Insuector
Howard S. Marshall,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IOI, Team Leadersl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and OI, SSAI IERT, Unit
Chief (UC) DAD Joshua Skule, Counterterrorism
Division; SSAI Office of Public Affairs; SC Jay Tabb,
Assistant Director Michael Prout and DAD Blair Deem,OI, United
States Marshal Service;  Special Assistant, OI, SC
Tracy A. Paige, OI, Ud and Management Pro ram 
and Inspection

 

 

 

 

 

Management Unit, INSD.

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

There were no Inspection Instructions or Recommendations.

90*

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

umlms rumng
We? haw.- bcel RUM .I
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FIB-1057 (Rev. 5-3-10)
UNCLAS FOUO



Eleolronlo Communication

 

Osagee?eman]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: Rock Agent-involved Date: 04/10/2014
Shooting 11/18/2013
b6
b7C
CC:
From: INSPECTION b5
b7C
Contact: I I
Approved_By: b5
b7C
Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara
,Drafted By: b6
b7C
Case ID (U) Animal Shooting
Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 02/21/2014.
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. INSD Shooting Incident Report, dated 12/24/2013
Details:
On 02/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident which occurred on 11/18/2013, involving Jackson Field Office
(JN) Special Agent I b6

 

b7C
On 11/18/2013, SWAT, discharged seven

rounds from his FBIvissued Colt at a pit bull breed dog which was

attacking SAI IJN SWAT, during an arrest operation in - b6

support of the Little Rock Field Office (LR). The JN SWAT team was b7c

 

 



 

 

 

 

 



Title: Little Rock Agent-involved Shooting 11/18/2013
Re: 04/10/2014

participating in a multiple subject LR arrest operation and was
assigned to affect the arrest of subjectsl land

Upon arrival atl lthe residence of
lSAl land lmoved to their assigned position
near the corner of the residence. As entered the yard he saw
a pit bull breed dog aggressively advancing towards him. The dog
suddenly stopped as it was attached to a restraint. 
the dog?s presence and they continued to move towards
their assigned position. lwhile focused on covering Agents
assigned to breach the door, heard lscream. 
turned to see the dog biting lon the upper right rear
thigh. the dog's restraint had become wrapped
around SA legs. Recognizing the danger to 
SA lfired a total of seven rounds at the dog, eliminating the

threat to land 

SIRG Observations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 02/14/2012, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved
shooting incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG
unanimously determined the application of deadly force by 
11/22/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice?s Deadly
Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective action from an
operational standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or

observations concerning the operational techniques used by 
during this shooting incident.

7 3. Provide recommendations concerning training,
procedural, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made the following
recommendation to Little Rock regarding its post-incident response b7C

 

 



Title: Little Rock Agent-involved Shooting 11/18/2013
Re: 04/10/2014

the animal shooting:

Observation 1: The scene of the Agent?involved shooting
was not secured and subsequently processed by ERT.

Analysis 1: The Inspection Division?s Shooting Incident
Guide delineates field office response to Agent?involved shooting
incidents (AIS). Per the Shooting Incident Guide, Section E,
Field Office Response, the SAC, in the event of an AIS, is responsible
for identifying and dispatching an FBI On?Scene Commander (OSC) and the
Chief Division Counsel (CDC) or Assistant Chief Division to the scene
CDCs are trained to advise Agents of the shooting incident
review process and to assist in seeking emergency legal interim legal
representation, as appropriate. The SAC should also deploy the 
Evidence Response Team (ERT) and any additional supporting personnel to

the scene as appropriate. ?Minimally, ensure there is FBI ERT
involvement at every shooting scene, to include a strong preference 
the FBI to have the lead responsibility in shootings involving only RBI

Agents.? Little Rock did not deploy ERT to process the scene of the
animal shooting. There were no photographs, video, or sketches made of
the scene at the time of the shooting.

Recommendation 1: SAC, Little Rock should ensure
Agent?involved shooting scenes are processed by an FBI Evidence

 

Response Team where possible.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if

deemed necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be

taken against a result of his involvement in this shooting b6
incident. b7C
Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,

chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office

 

 

of Inspections (OI), Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, b6
United States Department of Justice I [Special b7c


3

 

 

 

 

 

 



Title: Little Rock Agent-involved Shooting 11/18/2013
Re:r 04/10/2014

Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Acting Section Chief
Steven Burdelski, Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief (SC)
Roger Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSA

ISquad Washington Field Office; b6
I Practical Applications Unit (PAU), b7c

Training Division SSAI I Investigative Law Unit,

Office of the General Counsel; SSAI IEvidence

Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division SSA
Firearms Training Unit, SSAI ISpecial Weapons

and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group

and SSAI IDefensive Systems Unit, TD.

The following non?voting members were also in attendance:
I Office of InSpector General, Inspectors

IOI, Team Leadersl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and IOI, SSA
ERT, Unit Chief IPAU, DAD Joshua Skule,
Counterterrorism Division; SSAI IOffice of Public

 

Affairs; SC Jay Tabb, Assistant Director Michael Prout and

DAD Blair Deem,OI, United States Marshal Service; I I

Special Assistant, OI, SC Tracy A. Paige, OI, UCI I
and Management Program I

andl IInspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

SAC, Little Rock Division, is responsible for ensuring each
Inspection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The
inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation
is addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to implement.

A

4

 

 

 

 



Title: Little Rock Agent?involved Shooting 11/18/2013
Re: 04/10/2014

SAC, Little Rock Division, is required to provide a written
response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to
resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow? up EC responses must

 

 

 

 

be directed to Unit ChiefI  Inspection Management Unit b6
(IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel b7C
link to 




5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

.


ElectI-onic Communication

Title: Dallas Agent?involved Shooting Date: 03/26/2014

11/22/2013

 

CC:

 

 

 

From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY

 

Contact: I I

 

Approved By: 

 

Mark Alan Morgan
Nancy McNamara

 

Drafted By: 

Case ID 

(U) Animal Shooting

Synopsis: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis,.comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIBG
meeting held on 02/21/2014.

Administrative Notes: This communication summarizes the
Inspection Division?s (INSD) Shooting Incident Report, dated
01/08/2014, prepared by Dallas Field Office Supervisory Special Agent

 



Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the folloWing items:
1. Shooting Report dated 01/08/2014

Details:

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting
incident Which occurred on 11/22/2013, involving Dallas Field Office

(DL) Special Agent 

6:00 PM, SA

 

On 11/22/2013, at approximately
returned to his residence following work and walked

 



 

 

136
1378

. b7C

 

 

 

Jul-cu, I a. 

Title: Dallas Agent~involved Shooting 11/22/2013
Re: 297L-HQ-A3696065, 03/26/2014

to retrieve his mail at the neighborhood community mailbox. While

returning to his residence, an American Bulldog appeared at :Sc
side. The dog growled and attempted to bite efforts

to separate himself, the dog appeared to be preparing to attack. SA

two rounds from his personally owned Glock 27 handgun,

striking the dog twice. The dog was later euthanized by the owners.

The owners stated the dog had escaped from its yard and later described

the dog as territorial.

SIRG Observations

On 02/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent~involved-shooting
incident with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG

unanimously determined the'application of deadly force by 
11/22/2013 was in compliance with the Department of Justice?s Deadly

b6
b7C

Force Policy.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
I observations, and recommendations for corrective action from an
operational standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or
observations concerning the operational techniques used by b7c
during this shooting incident.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and
or/safety issues. The SIRG made the following obserVations regarding
post?shooting incident reSponse protocols:

Observation 1: Dallas dispatched no investigative
personnel to the scene of the November 22, 2013 animal shooting

involving - . be
b7C

Analysis 1: The Inspection Division?s Shooting Incident
Guide delineates field office response to Agent?involved shooting
incidents (AIS). Per the Shooting Incident Guide, Section E,
Field Office Response, the SAC, in the event of an AIS, is responsible



2

 

 

 

 

 

vA-?vd-u-ng?n. gnu?an I .- v9.-

Title: Dallas Agent-involved Shooting 11/22/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

for identifying and dispatching an FBI On?Scene Commander (OSC) and the
Chief Division Counsel (CDC) or Assistant Chief Division to the scene
CDCs are trained to advise Agents of the shooting incident
review process and to assist in seeking emergency legal interim legal
representation, as appropriate. The SAC should also deploy the
Evidence Response Team (ERT) and any additional supporting personnel to
the scene as appropriate. ?Minimally, ensure there is FBI ERT
involvement at every shooting scene, to include a strong preference for
the FBI to have the lead responsibility in shootings involving only FBI

Agents.?

Per the Shooting Incident Guide, Section D, Field Office
Response, the OSC is responsible for identifying himself/herself as the
senior FBI official on scene as well as requesting additional resources
as needed. The OSC shall also preserve the incident scene in its
entirety to the extent possible, and ensure discussions with the Agent
Shooter are limited to his or her welfare, whether or not the sCene is
secure, and the status of all subjects.

While there is a distinction between the level of response logically
sufficient for an off?duty, Agent?involved animal shooting, in which no
injuries were incurred versus an operational Agent?involved shooting,
there must be an appropriate level of response by the FBI to any
Agent?involved shooting. At a minimum, a reasonable interpretation of
the Shooting Incident Guide would have called for an SSA, or an SAC,
Dallas designee, to respond to the scene of the incident, in order to
ensure investigative requirements were addressed. Further, a Dallas
field office representative, other than the Agent involved in the
shooting, should be dispatched to ensure assistance and'support is made
available to the involved Agent.

Instruction 1: SAC, Dallas will ensure appropriate
investigative personnel respond to the scene of all Agent involved
shooting incidents.

Observation 2: Dallas did not collect the Glock 27



3

 

 

 

 

 

 

may, I vv'v

Title: Dallas Agent~involved Shooting 11/22/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

handgun, ammunition, and magazines used in the shooting incident until
November 25, 2013.

Analysis 2: The Inspection Division?s Shooting Incident
Guide delineates field office response to AIS. Per the Shooting
Incident Guide, Section - E, Field Office Response, the SAC, in
the event of an AIS, will ?Make provisions for the collection of
weapons, magazines, and ammunition from involved Agents, and the

issuance of replacement weapons and ammunition.?

b6

SA was involved in an Agent?involved shooting at approximately


6:00 PM on Friday, 11/22/2013. No Dallas Field Office personnel 
responded to the Scene. The Glock 27 handgun, ammunition, and magazine
were not collected by Dallas Field Office personnel until Monday,
November 25, 2013. Appropriate response by Dallas Field Office
personnel would have ensured timely collection of the weapon,
ammunition, and magazine used in the shooting incident.

Instruction 2: SAC, Dallas will ensure provisions are in
place for the prompt collection of weapons and ammunition by FBI
personnel from Agents in all Agent involved shooting incidents.

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be
taken against a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident. 

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Mark Alan Morgan, INSD,

chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting

members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office

of Inspections (OI), Attorney, Criminal b6
Division, United States Department of Justice I I b7c
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Acting

 

 

 

 

 

Section Chiefl ICriminal Investigative Division;

Section Chief (SC) Roger Coe, Global Section, Counterintelligence

Division; SSAI Squad Washington Field Office;


4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

unlit-0" 4- 

Title: Dallas Agent?involved Shooting 11/22/2013
Re: 03/26/2014

b6
ssal I Practical Applications Unit (PAU), b7c

 

 

Training Division SSAI
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; 
I IEvidence Response Team (ERT), Laboratory Division 

 

 

 

ssal IFirearms Training Unit, 
I ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group and SSAI  Defensive Systems

 

Unit, TD. The following non-voting members were also in attendance:
IOffice of Inspector General,USDOJ; Inspectorsl

 

 

 

IOI, Team LeadersI

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

andI IOI, SSAI IERT,
Unit Chief IPAU, DAD Joshua Skule,
Counterterrorism Division; SSAI Office of Public

 

Affairs; SC Jay Tabb, Assistant Director Michael Front and

DAD Blair Deem,OI, United States Marshal Service; Loyda Santiago, 

Special Assistant, OI, SC Tracy A. Paige, OI, 
and Management Program I

and Inspection Management Unit, INSD.

 

 

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Instruction

SAC, Dallas Division, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspectiOn
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office. The Inspector?in~Charge (IIC) will
review the field office?s response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans

to implement.

SAC, Dallas Division, is required to provide a written response,
via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow?up EC responses must be directed to



5

 

 

 

 

 

iitle:

4-5114 1 I 

Dallas Agent?insolved Shooting 11/22/2013

Re: 03/26/2014

Unit Chiefl

 

IInspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once

 

the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to 



#6



6

 

 

 

b6
b7C

 

 

 

 


  
a 
.9: van-Mr?: mu: hr.- ?I.th a
mu?: EH maxim mks.

      

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-340)

 
 

UNCLASSIFIED



Electronic -COmmunication

 
 

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Los Angeles Field Date: 02/18/2014
Office

From: INSPECTION
DA-TDY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6
t: SA
on ac b7C
Approved By: b5
SHIELDS ROBERT JR b7C
Mark Alan Morgan-
Nancy McNamara
Drafted By: SAI I b6
b7C
Case ID (U) SHOOTING INCIDENTS
Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG
meeting held on 1/16/2014.
Reference: Serial 184
Administrative Notes: (U) Reference submitted electronically
by SSAI dated 12/10/2013. Reference accidental b6
discharge report by SSA Ion 1/8/2014. b7C
Details:

On 1/16/2014, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge that occurred
on 12/9/2013, involving Special Los Angeles Field b6
Office. In preparation for an operation the next day, b7C
conducting a safety check of his MP5 while at his residence. After SA
determined the weapon was safe and empty, he inserted a loaded
magazine in the weapon and move the slide forward. The slide moved
forward slowly and appeared to malfunction. the
magazine, pulled the slide back, but failed to eject the round from the
chamber. the slide several time but did not eject the

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Los Angeles Field Office
Re: 02/18/2014 

round. the weapon at his mattress and pulled the
trigger three times and did not hear a click. the
trigger a fourth time and fired one round into his mattress.

SIRG Observations

On 1/16/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent?involved shooting incident
with the intent to:

1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined
this incident was not a deadly force issue.

2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, obServations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint. The SIRG made no recommendations or observations
concerning the operational techniques used by this
shooting incident.

3. Provide recommendations concerning training and/or safety
issues. The SIRG made the following observations requesting additional

training.
Observation 1:

an accidental discharge while conducting a safety
check on his MP5 weapon.

Analysis 1:

During a safety check, to eject a round from his

MP5 after several attempts. the weapon three times by
pulling the trigger with no results, yet on the fourth attempt, the
weapon fired one round.

Recommendation 1: ADIC, Los Angeles will ensure 
remedial firearms training.

Observation 2: ADIC, Los Angeles failed to notify Inspection Division
UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Los Angeles Field Office
Re: 02/18/2014

in a timely manner.

Analysis 2: After the accidental discharge, his b6
Supervisor, responded to the scene. An immediate b7c

report was not made to the Inspection Division.

Recommendation 2: ADIC, Los Angeles will ensure his personnel report
shooting incidents to the Inspection Division in a timely manner.

 

4. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary. This matter is being referred to the Internal
Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential
administrative action.

The SIRG was chaired by non?voting member Deputy Assistant Director
Mark Alan Morgan, INSD. The following voting members were in
attendance: Chief Inspector Robert J. Shields, Office of InSpections
(OI) Attorney, Criminal Division, United States b6
Department of Justice Assistant Section Chief b7C
Criminal Investigative Division; ASCI
Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special
IInvestigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel; SSAI Squad Washington Field
Office; SSAI IPractical Applications Unit,
Training Division SSAI I Special Weapons (SWAT)
Operations Unit, SSAI IFirearms Training
Unit, SSAI Evidence Response Team (ERT),
Laboratory Division and SSA IDefense Systems
Unit, TD. The following non-voting members were also in attendancei
IOffice of the Inspector General, Inspectors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 oI, Team

 

 

Leadersl IOI, 
SSAI ERT, Special Assistant, OI,
Unit Chief (UC) IInspection Analysis Unit, 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Title: (U) Accidental Discharge Los Angeles Field Office
Re: 02/18/2014

 

UCI and Management Program 

I andl I Inspection Management Unit,
INSD.

 

 

Procedures for Responding to the Observations

ADIC, LA, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection
Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection
process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is
addressed by the field office- The Inspector-in?Charge (IIC) will
review the field officefs response to determine if the
Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further
action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a
recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans
to implement.

ADIC, LA, is required to provide a written reSponse, via EC, detailing
the actions taken by the field office to resolve each
Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to
Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once
the EC is serialized, please e?mail the Sentinel link to 

 

 

 

 

 

 

?99

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

 

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE I Date: 07/19/2012

 

 

To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Insnections

Contact: I IExtension

 

 

 

 

1
Approved By: Bennett Keith  
Nelson Cory 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By: :llh
Case ID b6
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT b7c
MILWAUKEE DIVISION
02/03/2011
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ircident that occurred on 02/03/2011, involving Special
Agent (SA) Iof the_Mi1waukee Division. While
conducting a vehicle stop, SB fired one round from his
BureauHissued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, striking the
non-complaint subject in the right thumb. SIRG members
unanimousl recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SA as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative: Reference report of former Inspector April D.
Brooks, dated 07/18/2011.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 02/03/2011, at 8:39 SA
telephonically requested the assistance of SAI Iwith the
and eventual arrest of I b6 

?he subject of an arrest warrant for a state drug b7C
offense. SA, met with Milwaukee Police
Department (MPD) Task Force Officer Iwho

 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

were all members of the High Intensity Drug Traff?cking Area/Drug
Task Force (HIDTA). The Agents and TFO planned to
conduct a "traffic stop" to arrestI Although no written
Operations Plan existed, the participants decided TFO

would initiate the stop of the subject's vehicle, and

would "box in" the vehicle from the front to prevent the
subject's escape.

 

 

 

 

 

At approximatel

 

I on 02/03/2011, SAs
along with TFO itiated a surveillance of
at a residence in Wisconsin. At
approximately 12:00 p.m. SA observed the 'subject esit his
residence and enter a green minivan. As the three law

 

   

 

 

enforcement vehicles followed the subject, TFO radioed
the Agents that he over toward the right
side floor board of his vehicle causing SA to believe he

 

 

was hiding drugs or reaching for a weapon.

 

TFOI activated his emergency lights and

Fm iately puiled over to the right side of the street.
pulled withf imately eight feet behind


minivan and SA [vehicle was approximately eight
feet behind SAI Ipulled in front of the subject
vehicle to prevent his escape, quickly exited, and walked toward b6

TFO his vehicle and tiff:f]position lo?C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

near the rear left corner of his vehicle. As SA walked-
toward the front of the subject vehicle with his weapon drawn, he

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

shouted "Police, off the vehicle, hands, hands.? TFO

I Iordered to exit his vehicle several times;

however.l Irefused to comp FO advised
he was under SA heard TFO

shouting commands for to exit the vehicle, ar

 


subject reply, "No I'm not gOing to get out,? and saw I
rolling up his window.

 

 

 

abruptly shifted his vehicle into reverse,
shifted into drive, and aggressively proceeded forwa rd SA

As the subject vehicle approached closer, SA braced
himself against the hood with his left hand as the front ri ht
bumper hit his right shin and spun him. 
planted his feet and fired one round which penetrated the glass
of the front passenger side window. fled the scene.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Law enforcement personnel briefly pursued
however, lost sight of him in traffic. The pursuit was
discontinued and the three 'aw enfOrcement officers returned to
secure the scene. SAI land TFOI notified their FBI
and HIDTA supervisors of the shooting incident by cell phone.

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

Within hours,  was arrested by an FBI Agent and

MPD officers assi ned to the HIDTA Task Force. Investi ators'
determined round 

thumb.

 

 

On 04/20/2011, IMilwaukee County
District AttOrney, opinec  "responded to a lethal threat
with an appropriate and justifiable use of force, and that the
use of force was privileged as self defense and defense of
others."

 

 

On I United States Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised the facts do not
warrant a federal investigation as a potential willful use of
unreasonable deadly force.

. On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above~
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.

 

 

 

Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was.a b6
non?voting member. The following voting members were in b7C
attendance: I I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights

Division, rTrial Attorney, Criminal Division,

Section Chief Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)

I Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training
Division (TD): UC I Firearms Training Unit, UC
Special Weapons and Tactics Onerstinnq UnitI
Critical Incident Response Group; UC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Defensive Systems Unit, UC IInvesti ative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

Washington Field Office. The
follow1ng non?veting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fire. Office of
Inspections (OI), TNSD: Special Assistant I

TNSD: Team Leaderl i OI, 

I IPAU. (MPAs)
I land Inspection Management

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA was justified and in conformance with
the FBI's deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA

as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations made by the Shooting Incident Review Team:

 

 

OBSERVATION - b6
b7C
SAI Idid not prepare a written operations :b7E

 

plan for the surveillance and arrest of the subject.

A written operations plan was not prepared for the
surveillance and arrest of the subject, who had a conviction for
carryino a concealed weaponl

 

The plan
was_finalized and verbally briefed within an approxin 6 to
51 minute window from the time SA contacted SA 
02/03/2011, at 8:39 to request his participation in the
operation, and the initiation of surveillance at the subject's
residence between 9:15?9:30 a.m. There were no exigent
circumstances which precluded appropriate preparation of an
operation plan.

 

 

 

 

Corporate Policy_Notice 0242N, Requirement for Written
Operations Order Field Operations, dated 07/15/2010, states, in
part: 

8. Policy Statement:

8.1 The necessity to have clear, concise, and complete
operational plans, in the form of operations orders, is
essential to successful arrest and search operations
and any other activity in which the practical
application of firearms might be reasonably
anticipated. Operations orders are the vehicle through
which the Case Agent's and/or On-Scene Commander's
strategy is reduced to a tactical directive. Their
most important function is to ensure success. By
standardizing format, the chance for omission of
essential data is eliminated thus providing subordinate
elements with the complete picture for mission
completion.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
07/19/2012

8.2 Written Operations Orders: Absent exigent
circumstances, written operations orders will be
prepared prior to conducting arrest and search
operations and any other activity in which the
practical application of firearms might be reasonably
anticipated.

8.3 Exigent Circumstances: Exigent circumstances may
necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of the written
operations order.

13. Definitions:

13.1 Exigent circumstances: Generally, an emergency, a
pressing necessity requiring immediate action.

Roles and Responsibilities:
Case Agent 
.l Responsible for preparing the operations order

9
9.
9
9 .2 Responsible for briefing the operations order

0 I 


9.2. Substantive Squad Supervisor 
9.2.1 68414 Supervisory Special Agent responsible for
reviewing the operations order

Instruction 

That SAC, Milwaukee ensure Milwaukee personnel-comply

with the above Corporate Policy Notice.

OBSERVATION 

 

 

 

b6
b7C
b7E

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

 

 

 

 

Instruction 

 

 

b6
- .- . b7c
That SAC, Milwaukee ensure Adent personnel receive
additional training in I b7E

 

 

 

 

OBSERVATION 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SA did not wear his issued ballistic
vest during the operation.as mandated by Bureau policy.

After tre initial stop of vehicle TFO

and SA maneuvering to block
vehicle, SA stoppe Ximately eight feet behind TFO
I vehic_e. his vehicle, took a
position near the rerr lett corner of his own vehf nd
remained there until fled the scene. SA was not

 

 

 

 

 

wearing his pillistic vest* the vest remained on the front seat
of SA, vehicle. had a conviction for carrying a
concealed Yeangn_andlma movements while being stopped, which
caused TFO tr believe he may have teen rearhing for a

weapon. TFO immediately announced movement
on the HTDTA radio to all participants. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

6

To:
Re:

Inspection From:


Inspection
07/19/2012

 

 

 

b7E

 

d?

- confrontation with armed and dangerous subject(

I The outer
tactical carrier with FBI markings can be donned over clothing to
facilitate identification as law enforcement during the
transition from covert to overt activity.

The MIOG, Section 12?13.l statesr in part:
"Wearing of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory

during planned arrests, execution of search warrants and
surveillances which can reasonably be expected to culminate in a

S) tn
Instruction 

That SAC, Milwaukee ensure all division personnel
comply with the above MIOG requirement.

UNCLASSIFIED

7

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

 

 

 

That no administrative action be taken against SA

 

a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

 

Mr. Joyce, Room
Mr. Perkins, Room

Mr. Weissmann Room
USDOJ
IUSDOJ

 

 

 

 

Room

Quantico

Quantico

I 

IQuantico
- WFO

Rooml I

- Attention: I I

CIRG
1 


0

 

 

 

 




 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

8

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Precedence: ROUTINE - Date: 06/27/2012

To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett

From: Inspection 
Office of Tne?e?tinhe
Contact: Extension

re

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson CoryiB?g?*>

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By: :llh

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION b6
02/08/2011 b7C

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on U2f08/2011, involving Special
Agent (SADI Iof the Tndianapolis Division.
While conducting_an interview, two rounds from
his Glock Model 23, .40 caliber pistol, killing a subject who
refused to obey law enforcement commands and was turning toward
a weapon in his hand._ SIRG members unanimously
ded that no administrative action be taken against SA
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference report of former Inspector Michael J.
Erbach, dated 02/25/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

FBI SAs and-Task Force Officers from the Little
Rock and Indianapolis Divisions were conducting an investigation
involving the production and distribution of child pornography by
an unknown subject. The three Indianapolis Division TFOs
consisted of detectives from the Kokomo and Brownsburg, Indiana,
Police Departments who were assigned to an Internet Crimes

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inapection From} Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

Against Children LICAC) Task Force sponsored by the United States
Attorney in the Southern District of Indiana.

Investigation identified an Internet Protocol (IP)
address used to cistribute child pognooraphv belonging to an
individual named IArkansas.

On 02/07/2011, SAs: and lof the
Indiana olis Di ong with Detectivesl I
and] arrived at the Jonesboro, Arkansas


Resident Agency (JRA for a briefing regarding a search warrant'
which was planned for the morning of 02/0822011. Also present at
the briefing were Little Rock Division 

I Supervisory Senior Resident
Agent (SSRADI rah officer from the Arkansas
State Police, and an FBI photoqrapher.

 

 

 

 

 

 

On the morning of 02/08/2011, the Indianapolis SAs and

TFOs met with Little Rock ersonnel at the JRA and drove to a gas
station-where SSRA again briefed the operations order
including the Dea Force Policy. At the of
the briefing, all of the participants proceeded 
f?sigfnce. Upon their arrival, it was determined tha

was inside his resi with SA
and Detective interviewedl while SA

and Detectivel Other members of
the search team began searching the residence for evidence of D6
child pornography and an I?Phone which was believed to have been b7C
used to access the internet connection at the residence. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Through interviews of the residents, information was
develooed indicating Brandon Fountain, who_lived
I I may be the unknown subject invo veo in t'e
production and distribution of child pornography. Based on this
information, team members decided to attempt a knock and talk
interview with Brandon Fountain.

 

At approximately 12:00 an
observed Fountain enter his driveway. Approximately one hour
later, law enforcement personnel observed Fountain exiting his
residence and entering a vehicle. SA and Detective

approached Fountain as he was leaving and introduced
themselves. Fountain invited them inside his residence, closed
the door, and invited them to sit at a kitchen table. As they
sat down, Fountain was asked if he had any weapons in the house
at which time he removed a pocket knife from his front pocket and
placed it on the table. He also told them there was a in
the top drawer of his dresser and a in the bedroom across
from the bathroom. At that time the

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From:l Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

residence remained standing near the door. 
Detective informed Fountain they wanted to tai about
some strange internet activity in the neighborhood. During the

interview, Fountain made statements consistent with the
information the unknown subject had posted on the Internet.

At one point during the interview, Fountain attempted
to move to his back bedroom to nforcement officers the
location of his computer. Fountain to return
to the kitchen table. At approximatelv 1:9? SA
stepped outside to contact AUSAI to inform him of

ormation obtained from Fountain. Iadvised SA
that_he would begin working on a complaint and also

authoriied the arrest of Fountain and advised he was pre a
search warrant application for Fountain's residence. SA
entered untain's residence to watch Fountain while SA

and outside.

TFO Ire?entered the residence
to resume the interView. TFO lverbally advised Fountain
of his rights at which time Fountain waived his rights and signed
the Advice of Rights Form. Fountain continued to be cooperative
and compliant, and was permitted to et water from his
refrigerator several times. asked b6
Fountain to bring the water to the table and to stop getting up. ld7C
A short time later Fountain's telephone rang. He had a short
conversation and advised the caller he was being interviewed by
the "police."

 

 

 

 

 

 

When Fountain a search warrant
was being obtained for his residence, Fountain confessed to
taking photographs of three children with whom he.had contact
while his girlfriend was babysitting. As Fountain stated he
would consent to a search, TFO produced a Consent.to
Search Form, and began explaining im. Fountain stated he
needed to use the restroom and SAI Iagreed to accompany
him. As Fountain moved to the restroom, te suddeily ran down the

ntered the back bedroom with SA and TFO.

in ursuit. Fountain slammed the bedroom door behind
him with and giving verbal commands for him

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to stop. SA opened and entered the bedroom door as
Fountain was removing a handgun from a night stand drawer. After
repeating verbal commands for Fountain to put his hands up, and
while Fou i turning toward him with the firearm in his
hands, SAE:E:E:ffjfired two rounds striking Fountain in the rear
center torso. Fountain immediately fell to the floor.

the bedroom just prior to the
shooting and upon earing the commotion from the outside, FBI SAs

.UNCLASSIFIED

 

r,
3

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

as well as Arkansas State Police 

residence arriving in the bedroom immediately after the
shooting. Law enforcement personnel continued to give verbal

 

commands for Fountain to sto which he verbally
res onded and complied. TFO ?sarmed the subject and
him. TFO removed a . 5 caliber

Patriot, semiautomatic handgun and two loaded magazines from the
subject.

Emergency medical assistance was reque The EMTs
treated the subject at the scene and advised SA the subject
was not going to survive. Fountain was transported to the South
Mississippi County (SMC) Regional Medical Center in Osceola and
airlifted to the SMC Regional Medical Center in Memphis,
Tennessee, where he was pronounced dead.

 

 

 

On 06/21/2011, District Prosecuting
Attorney, Second Judicial District of Ark vised his
office reviewed the case and concluded justified
in using deadly force and that no further review of this matter
'was necessary. 

 

 

 

On I US Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised the matter did not b6
warrant a federal criminal investigation into whether there was a b7C

violation of the criminal civil rights statutes.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory 8.
_Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) IViolent Criminal

Threat Section. Crim nal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Practical Applications Unit (PAD), Training

Q)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division UC Firearms Training Unit, UC
I Special Weapons ard Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Grouo: UC

Defensive Systems Unit, DC I Toveetigative

 

 

 

 

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSA
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I, Washington Field Office. The
following nonevoting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Pike. Office of
Inspections (OI), TNSD: Special Assistant I
Team Leaderl . or, ssn  

PAU, Management and Program (MPAs) 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

- 4

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 

 

 

 

 

land Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section SAS), INSD.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with

the intent to: (I) evaluate the application of deadly force;

(2) provide the Director with-an evaluative analysis, b6
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an I b7c
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations

concerning training and?or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAI Iwas justified and in conformance
with the FBI's deadly forCe policy. This discussion resulted in
the recommendation that no administrative action be taken against
SA as a result of his involvement in this shooting
.inCident.

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations, instruction, and recommendations made by the
Shooting Incident Review Team: 

OBSERVATION 

FBI personnel were not wearing body armor when the
shooting occurred. Although personnel wore body armor at the
original search location, all personnel removed their body armor
when the site was deemed secure. The investigation proceeded to
a second location where the shooting occurred. FBI Policy
regarding the wearing of body armor, MIOG, Part 2, 12?13.lfl)
states: "Wearing of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory
during planned arrests, execution of search warrants and
surveillances which can reasonably be expected to culminate in a
confrontation with armed and dangerous 

Instruction That sac, Indianapolis and sac, Little
-Rock ensure personnel are directed to wear body armor throughout
the course of search/arrest operations.

OBSERVATION 

The three TFOs participating in the operations were
members of the ICAC Task Force in the Indianapolis Division's
Area of Responsibility. They were incorporated in the operations
order for the execution of the search warrant under the
supervision-of an FBI SSRA. .Unknown to both the Indianapolis and

UNCLASSIFIED





'To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

Little Rock Divisions, the ICAC TFOs were not deputized, and
therefore did not have Federal Law Enforcement Officer status. A
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)-was not in place between the
Indianapolis Division and the ICAC Task Force.

Racommendation #Za: That SAC, Indianapolis ensure an
MOU is established between the Indianapolis Division and the ICAC
Task Force documenting roles and responsibilities when conducting
joint investigations.

Recommendation #Eb: That SAC, Indianapolis ensure
Indianapolis ISAC Task Force personnel participating in FBI
operations are deputized as Federal Law Enforcement Officers
prior to their participation in FBI and federal tactical
operationsi

These observations will be brought to the attention of
the SACs of the Little Rock and Indianapolis.Divisions with
accompanying Instruction/Recommendations.

UNCLASS IFIED

6

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT D.C.

That r0 administrative action be taken against SA
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting
inCident.

b6
b7
1 Mr. Joyce, 
1 Mr. Harrington, Room
1 - Mr. Weissmann Room
1 
1 IUSDOJ
1 Rooml: 
1 Quantico
1 Quantioo
1 ILaboratory
1 Quantico
1 WFO 
1 Room
(Attention: I

1 ICERG
1 ?1 I Rooml: 
0*

UNCLASSIFIED

7



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Tnveetications
SC

 

 

 

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: Extension

 

 

 

 

 

1"



Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory  

 

Drafted By: 
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT

CHICAGO DIVISION I 

06/11/2011 b6
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a ED7C
shooting incident that occurred on 06/11/2011, involving Special
Agent (SA) the Chicago Division. After removing
his Bureau-issued Glock Model 23, .40 caliber pistol from its
holster, SAI Islipped and accidentally discharged one round,
injuring his toe. SIRG members recommended that SA be
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and
receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to this
shooting incident.

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) dated
07/26/2011. .

 

 

 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director?s.0ffice From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/20l2

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 06/11/2011, after concluding a breakfast meeting

 

with another Age s-the Chicago Division and a Confidential
Human Source, SA drove-to the Chica 0 office. After leaving
his personal property at his desk, SA proceeded to the men's

restroom and.removed his pistol from the holster on his right hip
to place it on the back of the commode. After removing the gun
from the holster, SAI Islipped causing one round to discharge
from the weapon. The expended round grazed SA big toe and
entered the restroom floor.

 

 

 

 

 

 

SAI limmediately contacted Division
management to advise of the incident. SA drove himself to
Rush University Medical Center, identified himself to the staff,
and explained the circumstances of his injury. was
sutured by medical personnel and he was released the same day.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

non?voting member. The fol"owing voting members were in' b6
attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights b7C
Division, I Trial Attornev, Criminal Division,

Section Chief I Violent riminal

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)

I IPractical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

Division (TD): UCI IFirearms Training Unit, UC

 

ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group: UC
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI IInvestioative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl 

I ma?, :eam .eaderl ., OI, I
PAU. ram (MPAs)

land InspeCtion Management

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: _Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations
concerning training-and/or safety issues; and provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that SA b6
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, 

and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this shooting incident.

WCLASSIFIED

a


To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

 

That SA be censured and suspended from duty
- for a period of three days in regard to this shooting incident.
Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the Special Agent in Charge
of the Chicago Division to ensure SA receives remedial
firearms training regarding the proper handling of firearms and
to properly document this training.

 

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE

 

AT OPR FO, DC

That the Adjudication Unitr OPR, review the
?recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6 
b7C

Mr. Joyce, Room:?

1 Mr. Harrington, Roon

- Mr. Weissmann, Room

1 USDOJ

I IUSDOJ

Room 

I Quantico

Quantico

- ILaboratory

Quantico

WFO

I I I

l?Attention1 I

- CIRG

1 I Rooml: 

OQ

UNCLASSIFIED

4



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Tnsnections

Contact: I Extension

 

 

 

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith Lgig
Nelson Cory Bgi.

 

Drafted By: I Illh
Case 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES (CJIS) DIVISION
07/07/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 07 07/2011, involving Police

Officer I I Officer fired one round from his
Bureau?issued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, killing a

severely injured deer. SIRG members recommended that no

administrative action be taken against a result b6
of his involvement in this shooting incident. 

 

Administrative' Reference Plectro ic Communication of Supervisory
Police Officer dated 07/19/2011.

 

 

 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 07/07/2011, police officers assigned to the CJIS
West Gate received a report from an employee that she struck-a
deer on a road ?eadin to the CJIS facility. One of the officers
radioed Officer who was-assigned to site patrol, advised
him of the situation, and_requested that he attempt to locate the
'wounded deer. After locating the animal, Officer
determined the injuries were so severe the deer would have 
eliminated. Ensuring no vehicles were approaching, OfficerIE:E::]

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inspection From:' Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

fired one round into tfe deerfs shoulder, killing the injured
animal. Officer contacted his supervisor and advised him
'of the situation. 

 

 

 

 

On 05/22/20l2, the SIRG met to discuss the abovee
captioned shooting incident., Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting mber. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

 

 

 

attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I Violent Criminal

 

 

Threat Section. Crim nal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Practical A plications Unit (PAU), Training
Division UC IFirearms Training Unit, DC
I Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI I
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I
i Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA
I I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike. Office of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl b6
rwsn- Team Leaderl or, ssn  1337?:
I. PAU. Management and Program (MPAs)
Iandl IInSpection Management

 

 

 

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (8A8), INSD.

Observations and-RecommendatiOns of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members vnanimouslv aoreed that the use Of deadly
force by Police Officer was justified and in
conformance with the deadly force policy. This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no administrative action be
taken against a result of his involvement in'
this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no administrative action be taken against Police

Officerl Ias a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident._

 

Mr. Joyce, Room I

Mr. Harrington, Roonl

Mr. Weissmann, Room

I IUSDOJ

USDOJ

Rooml: 

Quantioo

Quantico

ILaboratory

Quantico

WFO

Rooml I

(Attention: I
ICIRG

1 I 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


I

 

 

 


I

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

b6
b7C

(Rev.05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Investigations
SCI I

 

From: Inspection 
Office of Inspections

Contact: I I 


Approved By: Bennett Keith Lg?,

Nelson Cory 

Drafted By: :llh b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION
08/18/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/18/2011, involving Special
Agent (SAJI of the Miami Division. While
preparing for an arrest, SA Iaccidentally discharged one
round frOm his Bureau?issuec Remin ton 12 gauge shotgun. SIRG
members recommended that censured, suSpended from
duty for a period of three days, and receive documented remedial
firearms.training in regard to this shooting inCident.

 

 

 

 

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent I dated 09/12/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the Captioned shooting. 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Directoris Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/18/20'l at anorovimately 4:00 SA
met Miami Division SA and Task Force Officer

(TFOH lat a parking garage used by West Pa .
Beach Resident Agency (WPBRA) personnel. The SAs and TFOI
were preparing for a joint arrest operation and were gearing up

and preparing their weapons for the arrest before proceeding to
the Customs and Border Protection office in West Palm Beach.

 

 

 

 

 

 

his shotgun from the trunk of his
vehicle, visually cleared the weapon, installed a sling, and
loaded the shotgun with four slugs. SA racked the
shotgun, loaded a fifth slug, ard was geing to place the gun
inside its case. As SA moved the shotgun to the case,
one round accidentally discharged.

 

 

 

 

Althou he was unsure of how the accidental discharge
occurred, he was trying to determine if the
safety was on when his finger must have went inside the trigger
guard, accidentally depressing the trigger.

and TFO heard a loud ban and saw SA
:holding ?:gun. After determining SA, Iwas

not injured, SA took the weapon and unloaded the b6
remainin rounds. As they began to look for t. ed round,

SAI collapsed. After b7c
assistance to SA and determined emergency medical

services were not needed, he notified division management of the

incident, The expended round was subsequently located in the
ceiling of the parking garage.

No perso ies nor property damage were incurred
as a result of SA accidental discharge.

On 05/22f2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) IViolent Criminal

 

 

Threat Seetinn. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
. Practical Applications Unit (PAD), Training
Division UCI I Firearms Training Unit, UC
I ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operation 'Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UC
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Evidence Response_Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike. Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistant I
INSD: Team Leaderl OI, SSA

I PAU. (MPAs)
land Inspection Management

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRE b6
b7C

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with

the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;

(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

operational standpoint (if any}; (3) provide recommendations

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide

recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that 
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three

days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

a
.3

To: Director?s Office From: InSpection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

That SAI Ibe-censured and suspended from?
duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed t? 1

Agent in Charge of the Miami Division to ensure SA
receives remedial firearms training regarding the proper handling
of firearms and to properly document this training.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE

 

AT OPR F0, DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6
b7C

1 Mr. Joyce, Rooml I

1 Mr. Harrington, Room

1 Mr. Weissmann,.Room

IUSDOJ

1 IUSDOJ

1 Room

1 Quantico

1 Quantico

1 ILaboratory

1 Quantico

- WFO

1 Rooml I

(Attention: I 

ICIRG

1 4 IRoom

#0 

UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rev. 05-01?2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Inspections

Contact: I 

za-

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory 

 

 

 

Drafted By: :llh

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
08/20/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/20/2011, involving Special

 

 

Agent Iof the New York Field Office. While

in an offHduty status, SA fired one round from her Bureau?

issued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, killing an injured

deer. SIRG members recommended that no administrative action be b5
taken against a result of her involvement in this b7C

shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Supervisory
Special Agent I dated 08/29/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRS with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/20/2011, at approximately 4:45 SA
was operatin her personally~owned vehicle in Princeton, New
Jersey. SAI Isaw a deer lying on the side of the road,
stopped her vehicle, and walked toward the animal with her gun
drawn. Seein the severely injured deer bleeding and unable to
get up, one round, killing the deer. She
immediately contacted the New York Field Office regarding the

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Inspection
06/20/2012

To:
Re:

Inspection From:


incident and a local olice cruiser arrived on the scene.
Officers advised road department would remove the

animal from the area.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above~
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, ITrial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief I Violent Criminal
Threat Section, Crininal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC).
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training
I Firearms Training Unit, UC
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,

 

 

 

Division UC

 

 

 

 

Critical Incident Response Group; UC

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory DivisiOn and SSA

Washington Field Office. The

following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of I 
SSA

Inspections (OI), Special Assistant I
(MPAS)

Team Leader OI, 
I PAU, Management and Program 
IInspection Management

rlnvesticative

 

b6
b7C

 

IandI
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synOpsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

ously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA was justified and in conformance
with the FBI's deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in
the recommendation that no administrative action be taken against
SA as a result of her involvement in this shooting
incident.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

QT WASHINGTON, DC

That no administrative action be taken against SA
I Ias a result of her involvement in this shooting

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

incident.
b6
b7C

1 Mr. Joyee, Room

1 Mr. Harrington, R00

1 Weissmann Room

1 IUSDOJ

1 - USDOJ

Room

1 - Quantico

Quantico

4 ILaboratory

IQuantico

- WFO

1 Rooml I

(Attention: 

ICIRG

1 I 

OQ

UNCLASSIFIED

r,
.3



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett'

Internal Investi ations
SCI I

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: I I Extension


. ?6

Approved By: Bennett Keith L?gj
Nelson Cory  

Drafted By: I Illh

 

 

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION

 

08/29/2011 b6
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a 
shooting incident that occurred on 08/29/2011, involving Special
Agent Iof the Chicago Division. While

 

disassembling his Glock Model 22, pistol for cleaning, SA
pulled the trigger, resulting in the accidental discharge of one
round. SIRS members recommended that censured,
suspended from duty for a period of three days, and receive
documented remedial firearms training in regard to this shooting
incident. 

Administrative:. Reference Electronic Communication of 
Supervisory Special Agent (SSAJI dated 09208X2011.

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/29/2011, squad had a range day at the
Chicago Division?s firing range. Following the last training
cycle, the grou did not clear their weapons on the line.
According to he policed the range with other
individuals, and cleaned an MP5 in the cleaning roomi A short
time later, to the charging barrel to safely
disassemble his pistol for cleaning. As he pulled the trigger,
one round discharged into the charging barrel. 

No personal injuries were incurred as a result of SA
accidental discharge. He immediately notified Chicago
Division management of the incident.

On 05/22/2012, met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights b6
Division, USDOJJ Trial Attornev, Criminal Division, :b7c
Section Chief (SC) IViolent Criminal

 

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief 
I I Practical A plications Unit (PAU), Training

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division UC Firearms Training Unit, DC

I Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
ritical Incident Response Group; UCI I
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI IInvestigative

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I I CRHZ, Washington Field Office.' The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike. Office of

 

 

 

 

 

Inspections (OI), Special AssistantI I .

Team Leaderl I, 01, ssa  
PAU, Management and Program (MPAs)

I Iandl I Inspection Management

 

 

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2).provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

SIRG members unanimously recommended that b6
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, b7c
and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this shooting incident. 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
.INSPECTION

-AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

That SAI Ibe censured and suspended from
duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the
Agent in Charge of the Chicago Division to ensure SA
receives remedial firearms training regarding the proper handling
of firearms and to properly document this training.

Set Lead 2: (Action)
OFFICE

AT OPR FO, DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

b6
b7C

Mr. Joyce, Rooml I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


1 Mr. Harrington, Room
1 Mr. Weissmann, Room
1 USDOJ
- USDOJ
- 
1 Quantico
Quantico
ILaboratory
Quantico
WFO
Rooml I
(Attention: I I
1 4 ICIRG
I Room:
#0
UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rev.05-01.2003)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BURHU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L: Bennett
Internal Investioations
SCI
From: Inspection

Office of Insoections

'Contact: I I 
12?;

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory?B??W/

 

 

Drafted By: I 
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION

 

09/07/2011 b6
Synopsis:. The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a :b7c
shooting incident that occurred on 09/07/2011, involving Special
Agent (sag r_ Iof the Miami Division. While

 

conducting dry firing exercises inside his residence, SA
accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau?issued Glock
Model 22, .40 caliber pistol. SIRG members recommended that SA

be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days,
an receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this shooting incident.

aAdministrative: Reference Elec ronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) dated 09/21/2011.

 

 

 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On the night of 09/07/2011, conducting dry
firing exercises inside his residence. Due to receiving low
qualifying scores on his official firearms qualifications and
based on the recommendation of Miami Division Firearms
Instructors, dry firing to improve his trigger
control and hand grip.

In preparation of conducting the dry firing exercise,
the pistol and ejected the round in the chamber,
ensuring the weapon was safe and empty. He dry fired the pistol
for approximately five to ten minutes before inserting the
magazine into the weapon and releasing the slide forward to place
a round in the chamber. As he was preparing to place the gun
inside a fanny pack, SAI ldecided to feel the difference in
the weight of a fully loaded pistol versus an empty one. As he
aimed the loaded weapon at the bathroom wall, while concentrating
on his grip pressure, one round discharged entering the bathroom
wall and exiting to the outside of the residence. Ensuring no
personal injuries nor additional progerty damage were sustained

 

as a result of the discharge, SA telephonically contacted
his immediate supervisor and reporte the incident.

According to SAI I both of his hands were firmly on b6
the weapon at the time of the cischarge; however, he could not
recall if his finger was on the trigger when the incident :b7c
occurred.

 

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

attendance: I I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, I Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I I Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Practical Aoplications Unit (PRU), Training
Division UC Firearms Training Unit, UC
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group: UC 
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSH
I I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections ruse; Special Assistantl

I
Team Leaderl OI, SSAI I
UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

 

I IPAU, Manaoement and Program (MPAs)
I Iandl Ilnspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with b6
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force:
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,r I :b7C
observations,'and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that SA
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days,

an receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this sheeting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

 

That SA be censured and suspended from
duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the BERG has instructed ti: fpfcial

 

 

Agent in Charge of the Miami Division to ensure SA receives
remedial firearms training regarding the proper han ing of
firearms and to properly document this training.
-Set Lead 2: (Action)
OFFICE
AT OPR F0, DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

b6
b7C

 

 

 

Mr. Joyce, Room
Mr. Harrington, Roon
Mr. Weissmanr, Room
USDOJ
- IUSDOJ 

- Rooml: 
Quantico

Quantico

ILaboratcry

I Quantico

- WFO

RoomI I
(Attention: I I
- I CIRG

I Room

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


I

 

 

 

 

OFAFJ
1

UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rsv.05-Ol-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

'Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 07/18/2012
To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett

CIRG Attn: AD Robert A. Blecksmith

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: I Extension

 

 

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith ha}
Nelson Cory 

 

Drafted By: I Illh
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION b6
lO/llXZOll b7c

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/11/2011, involving Special
Agents andl Iof the Norfolk
Division. During the execution of an arrest warrant in the
Little Rock Division area of responsibility, both Agents returned
fire at a subject who fired eight rounds toward law enforcement
personnel from inside his residence. SIRG members unanimously
recommended tr no administrative action be taken against SAs

andn Ias a result of their involvement in this
shooting incicent.

 

 

 

Administrative: Reference report of Inspector Robert J. Shields,
Jr., dated 10/18/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting."

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 10/11/2011, the Little Rock Division, Arkansas State
Police (ASP), 33 FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, as
well as the ASP SWAT team, conducted "Operation Delta Blues."
The purpose of the operation was to serve arrest warrants on 70

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

subjects who were indicted on federal public corruption,
narcotics, and weapon charges.

Multiple briefings were held on 10/06/2011, 10/07/2011,
and 10/09/2011, with SWAT Senior Team Leaders (STLs), Assistant
Team Leaders (ATLs), and Executive Management of the Little Rock
and Louisville Divisions. The briefings included discussion of
the targets, time lines, basic SWAT operations, and an overview
of the operation. 

On 10/10/2011, each SWAT STL was given 20 minutes to
- -- .- rations plan to Deputy On?Scene Commander (DOSCI 
and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
Special Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group (CIRG), for final approval. .

        
 

   

 

 

For the phase one Norfolk SWAT target, a "knock and
announce" was planned, although a "no knock warrant" was

 

 

 

 

 

approved. If the subjects I landl I

were noncompliant, a ram would be used to breach the door, b6
followed by a flash bang, and the Norfolk SWAT team entry. Upon

approval, STLI briefed the plan to Norfolk SWAT :b7c

 

team, Evidence Response Team (ERT), Arkansas State Police, and
Drug Enforcement Agency personnel assicned to the chase one
Hillcrest Street.location. Case Agent was
present at the briefing and information.
Based on information provided by SA if Black
Mercedes was not at thel Iaddress, it was assumed
and her two children were not at the residence. During the

rie ing personnel assignments, vehicle deployment/staging
locations, individual safety/tactical equipment requirements, and
the FBI Deadly Force Policy were reviewed. During the briefing,
the ERT vehicles were advised to stay out of sight of the target
house until the scene was cleared by the STL and they were
requested via radio. Rehearsals of the entire operation were
performed using an outline of the target house painted in the
grass.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 10/11/2011, at approximately 1:00 the Norfolk
SWAT team reported to a specified location at the Memphis
International Airport, where required SWAT equipment was
inspected and loaded into two vehicles. Communication checks
were performed, including a check with the Memphis Division ERT
assigned to execute a search at the arrest location. All SWAT
and ERT personnel reported to the staging area outside of
Marianna, Arkansas. At approximately 4:00 the execute
command was received and the vehicles proceeded to their target
locations. -

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

The four?vehicle team approached the target house
'located on Hillcrest Street, with two ERT vehicles holding a
position on Pearl Street. All SWAT personnel exited the vehicles
and assumed their assigned positions. Two rear cover team
operators reported lights on in the basement. The seven
remaining entry team members were stacked along the walkway in
front of the house. 

 

The breaching team of Operatorsl land

 

 

approached the front door and positioned

 

 

themselves to the right of the door. Operatorl I
with a ballistic shield, moved to a position on the front lawn
approximatelv feet in front of the front door with Operator
directly behind him. Operator knocked
loudly on the door with his baton and announce warrant,
come to the door" three times. As planned, two other
participants activated their vehicle emergency lights to indicate
a police presence at the house. Receiving no response from
inside, STL gave the breach command followed by the
breachin of the door with one swing of a single-person ram while
Operator applied pressure to the lower right side of the
door with his left foot.

 

 

Simultaneous to the door being breached, eight gunshots
were rapidly fired from inside the residence toward the SWAT

team. Operator returned fire with three shots from his M4.

In accordance with the operational plan, a flash ban was thrown

into the house through the open front door. STL gave b6
the recall order to the team directing members to obtain a :b7c

position of cover. Multiple SWAT Operators were shouting "shots
fired" over the radio. As backing down
the front lawn with the light from his M4 directed at the window
immediately to the left of the front door, he saw an arm with a

wee on in the hand slide the curtains from left to right.
two shots from his M4 at the arm.

As the command to "cover and hold" to
the team, Operator called out on the radio he was shot.
to   location and provided immediate
medica rea ment until the arrival of medical personnel.
Paramedics assumed care of who was subsequently

transported by helicopter :o the Elvis Presley Memorial Trauma
Center in Memphis, Tennessee.

 

 

 

 

Team members called the subjects out of the house.
I lexited first and was taken into custody. She
advised law enforcement personnel there were children inside.
Approximately three minutes later,  lexited the
residence and was arrested.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

residence, Operator heard children's voices and instructed
the children to approac . Law enforcement personnel maintained
custody of the two young children.

As participants were clearing the first floor of the

 

On I US Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised no investigation was
warranted as no one other than injured during the
incident.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above4
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and.was a

 

 

non?voting mFmberl The following voting members were in
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, ITrial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief I Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
IPracticaI Applications Unit (PAD), Training

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division UCI Firearms Training Unit, UC

I I Special Weapons ard Unit,

Critical Incident Response Group; UC I

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI IThvestinative b6
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSH

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA :b7c

 

I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistant I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Team Leaderr OI, ssa
IPAU, gram 
Iand Inspection Management

 

 

 

 

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimouslv agreed that the use of deadly
force by IandI Iwas justified and
in conformance with the FBI's deadly force policy. This

UNCLASSIFIED

4

To: Inspection .From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

discussion resulted in the ecommendation no administrative
action be taken against 8A5 and as a result of
their involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations, instruction, and recommendations made by the
Shooting Incident Review Team:

OBSERVATION b6

 

 

b7C
b7E

 

 

OBSERVATION 

The FBI?trained breaching procedure of applying
positive pressure or tension on a door to facilitate ramming was
not documented in a training manual.

UNCLASSIFIED

5

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

Recommendation #Za: That AD, CIRG ensure the SOU re?
evaluates the use of positive pressure when ramming is used to
breach a door to determine if the risk of exposing a body part
outweighs the improved success of the breach when tension is
applied.

Recommendation #2b: That AD, CIRG ensure the SOU
documents the use of positive pressure when ramming is used to

breach a door if the continued use of this practice is
determined. 

These observations will be brought to the attention of
the AD of the CIRG with accompanying InstructionXRecommendations.

UNCLASSIFIED

6

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

 

What no administrative action be taken against 

 

 

andI Ias a result of their involvement

 

 

in this Snoozing incident.

Mr. Joyce, Room

Mr. Perkins, Room

Mr. Weissmann, Room
IUSDOJ

- IUSDOJ

Quanticc

Quantico

- ILaboratory

Quantico

- WFO


Attention: I

- CIRG

- 

 

 

 

 




 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

7

b6
b7C



(Rev.054n-2ons}

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Director?s Office Attn: OPR
I AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
In ernal Investications
SC
From: Inspection
Office of Insoections
Contact: Extension
. 
Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory Egg??
Drafted By: I 
Case ID 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT b6
LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE b7C
10/21/2011
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting ircident that occurred on 10/21/2011, involving Special
Agent (SA) Iof the Los Angeles Field Office.
While performing a function check of her Bureau?issued Glock
Model 23, .40 caliber pistol, SA accidentally discharged
one round inside her residence. SIRG members recommended that SA

be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting incident.

 

 

Administrative: .Reference report of Special Agent in Charge
Daphne Hearn, dated 10/25/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

shooting range earlier that evening.

From:
06/20/2012

Director?s Office
2974HQ-A1271741-D,

To:
Re:

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident

At approximately 8:00 on 10/21/2011, 
cleaning her handgun inside her residence after being at the 
As she completed cleaning
the weapon, SA realized she did not lubricate it. She
disassembled the weapon, applied the lubrication, and reassembled
it. After reassembling the weapon, SA did a safety check
prior to conductin a function check. ter completing the
safety check, SAEfE::]inserted a magazine into the weapon,
pointed it in a safe directio performed a function check.
During the function check, SA pulled the trigger,
discharging one round through the dining room rug and into the
hardwood floor of her residence.

 

Los Angeles management of the
incident and a team responded to conduct an investigation of the
incident.

No personal injur'
incurred as a result of SA

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?.
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a

non?voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights

Division,  Tria1 Attorneyi Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) Violent Criminal

Threat.Section. Criminal_lnvestigative Division; Unit Chief 
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

minimal property damage were
accidental discharge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(row; UCI Firearms Training Unit, UC
ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI 
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI r_lnvestigative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel (OGC): SSAI I
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA
I CR-2, Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl I
insn: Team Readerl OI, SSA
PAU. ianaoement and Pr gram (MPAs)
land Inspection Management
Strategic Anainis Secrion SAS), TNSD.

Division

 

 

 

 

 

Unit (TMU),

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that b6
I Ibe censured, suspended from duty for a period of jb7c

three days; and receive documented remedial firearms training in
regard to this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DQ

 

 

That SAI Ibe censured and suspended
from duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the Assistant

'rector in Charge of the Los Angeles Field Office to ensure SA
lreceives remedial firearms training regarding the proper
handling of firearms and to properly document this training.

 

Set Lead 2: (Action)
OFFICE

AT OPR FO, DC

 

That the Adjudication Unit, OFR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mr. Joyce, Room

1 Mr. Harrington, Roor

Mr. Weissmann, Room

1 USDOJ

- Rooms

1 Quantico

1 Quantico

- I Laooratory

4 Ouantico

- WFO

- RoomI I
(Attention: I I



1 Room

09

UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rev.05-Gl-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPE
I AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Investidations
SC

 

 

 

From: 'Inspection
Office Of Tnsoections

Contact: I I 
(35 

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory 

 

Drafted By: I Illh
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION

 

11/10/2011 b6
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a b7c
shooting incident that occurred on 11/10/2011, involving Special
Agent Iof the Little Rock Division.

 

While dry firing his Bureauwissued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber
pistol inside office space, accidentally dischar ed one
round into the floor. SIRG members recommended that 
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and
receive documented-remedial firearms training in regard to this
shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) dated 11/15/2011.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, commentsr and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 11/10/2011, in preparation for a squad maintenance
shoot scheduled later in the day, SA dry firing his
weapon inside the office space at the Fayetteville Resident
Agency. SA his dry firing exercise, reloaded the
pistol, and placed it in its tolster. Looking for tips on
becoming a better shooter, SA searched the internet. After
reading information regarding stance and trigger press, and
forgetting he had loaded his gun after his previous dry firing
session, SA. drew his weapon, pressed the trigger, and
accidentally discharged one round into the floor.

 

 

 

 

 

reported the incident to his
supervisor. No personal injuries and minimal property damage
were incurred as a result of discharge.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a

 

 

 

 

 

non?voting member. The fol owing voting members were in b6
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights jb7c
Division, Trial Attornev, criminal Division,

Section Chief (so) I Violent criminal-

 

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

 

 

 

 

 

Division UCI IFirearms Training Unit, UC
I I Special Weapons and Tac i Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UC

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI  Investigative

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division (LD): and SSA
Washington Field Office, The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl I

- Leaderl or, ssa
PAU, Management and Program (MPAs)

Iandl I Inspection Management
Unit (IMO), Strategic Analysis Section INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRS

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations



2

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that b6

censured, suspended from duty for a period of three b7c
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

That SAI lbe censured and suspended
from duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the Special
Agent in Charge of the Little Rock Division to ensure 
receives remedial firearms training regarding the proper handling
of firearms and to properly document this training.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE

 

AT OPE F0, DC

 

That the Adjudication Unit, OPE, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

b6
b7C

Mr. Joyce, Rooml

Mr. Harrington, Room

Mr. Weissmann, Room

IUSDOJ

4 IUSDOJ

- Room

Quantico

Quantico

lLaboratory

Quantico

- NFO

Rooml I
(Attention: 

4 

Room

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

eswreraeJelwrereeaelw
I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FJH


 



UNCLASSIFIED

4

[Rev.05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Inspection .Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Inspections
Contact: IExtension

 

 

 

 

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith Lgi?
Nelson Cory 809w?

Drafted By: I Illh

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
SAN ANTONTO DIVISION
11/17/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 11/17/2011, involving ecial

Agent Iof the San Antonio Division. 

fired two rounds from'his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22, .40 b6

caliber pistol, killing an injured deer. SIRG members :b7c

recommended that no administrative action be taken against SA
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Special
Agent I dated 11/21/2011.

. Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis,'comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 11/17/2011, at approximately 6:00 p.m 
traveling on a road in Boerne, Texas, when he observed two
ve1'c tempting to slow traffic. One individual approached
SA vehicle window and explained that a deer had been hit
by a car and was laying in the middle of the road. The man also
advised local law enforcement authorities were notified; however,
he was uncertain if they were going to respond to the scene. 
After seeing the severely injured deer attempting to stand, SA

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

_To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

the deer needed to be immediately removed from
the area. Enguring the safety of the two individuals on the

scene, SA fired two rounds into the 'ck of the deer?s
head, killing the injured animal. SA removed the deer from

the road and departed the scene.

 

'On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory R.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

attendanCe: I I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, I_Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I I Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
I I Practical Applications Unit (PAD), Training

 

 

 

 

 

Division UCI I Firearms Training Unit, 0C
I Special Weapons ard Tactics Operations Enit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UC

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I I Washington Field Office. The

following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors b6
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of 

Inspections (OI), ecial Assistantl I
Team LeaderI I, OI, SSAI 

PAU. Management and Program (MPAs)
IandI Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SASJ, INSD.

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force; 
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
obServations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA was justified and in conformance with
the deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

'2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

That no administrative action be

as a result of his involvement in
incident. 
1 Mr; Joyce, RoomI I
1 Mr. Harrington, Room
1 Mr. Weissmann, Room
1 - I USDOJ
1 - I USDOJ
1 - Room 
1 - Quantico
1 Quantioo
1 Laboratory
1 Quantico,
1 WFO
1 RoomI I

(Attention: 

1 ICIRG
1 I 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

a.
3

taken against 

this shooting

b6
b7C

(Rev.05-01-2008)



FEDERAL BUREAU. OF 

 

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director?s Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Investigations


From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: IExtension

 

 

 

 

f5
Approved.By: Bennett Keithng?j
Nelson Cory 

Drafted By: 11h

 

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE

01/26/2012
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a b5
shooting incident that occurred on 01/26/2012, involving Special :b7c

 

Agent Iof the New York Field Office. While
attempting to holster his Bureau?approved, personally?owned
Glock, Model 27 pistol, SAI laccidentally discharged a
single round into a tile-wall of a restroom. The expended round
subsequentlz struck the bathroom floor. SIRG members recommended
that censured, suspended from duty for a period of
three days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in
regard to this shooting incident. 

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communications of Special

 

 

 

Agent land Supervisory Special Agent
 dated 01/27/2012 and 03/29/2012_respectively.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED



To: Director?s Office From:
Re: 06/21/2012

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 01/26/2012, at approximately 11:40 as SA
was preparing to use a bathroom at the Columbia Grammar
and Preparatory School, he unholstered his weapon and placed it
on top of a trash can. After utilizing the facility, SA
who was wearing a left handed Galco, leather, in the pants
holster, retrieved his weapon. As he attempted to holster the
weapon while standing in a crouched position, one round
accidentally discharged striking a tiled wall.

was the only person in the bathroom. The
Director of the school was standing outside the bathroom door and
was aware of the discharge. No personal injuries and minimal
property damage were incurred as a result of this shooting
incident.

his immediate supervisor who
dispatched two SAs to the scene to conduct the investigation.
According to SA his finger was placed outside of the
trigger along the slide when the weapon discharged.

SA weapon, magazine, and holster were
forwarded to the Defensive Systems Unit Gunsmiths for
examination. The weapon was inspected and test fired and was
found to meet all factory specifications as designed.

b6
b7C

On 05/22/2012,
captioned shooting incident.

the SIRG met to discuss the above?
Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJJ Trial Attornev, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I Violent Criminal
Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)

I Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

 

Division UC I Firearms Training Unit, UC

 

SpeCial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI I
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I I CR-2, Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Pike. Office of
Inspections (OI), Special AssistantI I
Team eaderI or, SSA

I PAU, Management and Program (MPAs)

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

 

 

 

 

I land Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section SAS), INSD.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with

the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force; b6
provide the Director with an evaluative analysisf :b7c
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that 
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting-incident. 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

Toz- Director's Office From; Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Set Lead 1: (Information)
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information only. This matter was not referred to

I Investiga
effective 0

HrehdewdrehJHiekaeJH



Harrington
Weissmann,

  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 

USDOJ

- 


51C)

- 
- 

(Attention: 
ICT

 

 

 

 

tions Section due to the retirement of SA
4f30/2012.

Mr. Joyce, Room] I

Mr.
Mr.

 

Room
Room
USDQJ

Rooml I

uantico
uantico
ratory

Quantico


ooml I

RG



UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

4

b6
b7C

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE I Date: 07/19/2012

 

 

To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Insnections

Contact: I IExtension

 

 

 

 

1
Approved By: Bennett Keith  
Nelson Cory 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By: :llh
Case ID b6
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT b7c
MILWAUKEE DIVISION
02/03/2011
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ircident that occurred on 02/03/2011, involving Special
Agent (SA) Iof the_Mi1waukee Division. While
conducting a vehicle stop, SB fired one round from his
BureauHissued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, striking the
non-complaint subject in the right thumb. SIRG members
unanimousl recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SA as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative: Reference report of former Inspector April D.
Brooks, dated 07/18/2011.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 02/03/2011, at 8:39 SA
telephonically requested the assistance of SAI Iwith the
and eventual arrest of I b6 

?he subject of an arrest warrant for a state drug b7C
offense. SA, met with Milwaukee Police
Department (MPD) Task Force Officer Iwho

 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

were all members of the High Intensity Drug Traff?cking Area/Drug
Task Force (HIDTA). The Agents and TFO planned to
conduct a "traffic stop" to arrestI Although no written
Operations Plan existed, the participants decided TFO

would initiate the stop of the subject's vehicle, and

would "box in" the vehicle from the front to prevent the
subject's escape.

 

 

 

 

 

At approximatel

 

I on 02/03/2011, SAs
along with TFO itiated a surveillance of
at a residence in Wisconsin. At
approximately 12:00 p.m. SA observed the 'subject esit his
residence and enter a green minivan. As the three law

 

   

 

 

enforcement vehicles followed the subject, TFO radioed
the Agents that he over toward the right
side floor board of his vehicle causing SA to believe he

 

 

was hiding drugs or reaching for a weapon.

 

TFOI activated his emergency lights and

Fm iately puiled over to the right side of the street.
pulled withf imately eight feet behind


minivan and SA [vehicle was approximately eight
feet behind SAI Ipulled in front of the subject
vehicle to prevent his escape, quickly exited, and walked toward b6

TFO his vehicle and tiff:f]position lo?C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

near the rear left corner of his vehicle. As SA walked-
toward the front of the subject vehicle with his weapon drawn, he

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

shouted "Police, off the vehicle, hands, hands.? TFO

I Iordered to exit his vehicle several times;

however.l Irefused to comp FO advised
he was under SA heard TFO

shouting commands for to exit the vehicle, ar

 


subject reply, "No I'm not gOing to get out,? and saw I
rolling up his window.

 

 

 

abruptly shifted his vehicle into reverse,
shifted into drive, and aggressively proceeded forwa rd SA

As the subject vehicle approached closer, SA braced
himself against the hood with his left hand as the front ri ht
bumper hit his right shin and spun him. 
planted his feet and fired one round which penetrated the glass
of the front passenger side window. fled the scene.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Law enforcement personnel briefly pursued
however, lost sight of him in traffic. The pursuit was
discontinued and the three 'aw enfOrcement officers returned to
secure the scene. SAI land TFOI notified their FBI
and HIDTA supervisors of the shooting incident by cell phone.

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

Within hours,  was arrested by an FBI Agent and

MPD officers assi ned to the HIDTA Task Force. Investi ators'
determined round 

thumb.

 

 

On 04/20/2011, IMilwaukee County
District AttOrney, opinec  "responded to a lethal threat
with an appropriate and justifiable use of force, and that the
use of force was privileged as self defense and defense of
others."

 

 

On I United States Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised the facts do not
warrant a federal investigation as a potential willful use of
unreasonable deadly force.

. On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above~
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.

 

 

 

Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was.a b6
non?voting member. The following voting members were in b7C
attendance: I I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights

Division, rTrial Attorney, Criminal Division,

Section Chief Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)

I Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training
Division (TD): UC I Firearms Training Unit, UC
Special Weapons and Tactics Onerstinnq UnitI
Critical Incident Response Group; UC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Defensive Systems Unit, UC IInvesti ative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

Washington Field Office. The
follow1ng non?veting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fire. Office of
Inspections (OI), TNSD: Special Assistant I

TNSD: Team Leaderl i OI, 

I IPAU. (MPAs)
I land Inspection Management

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA was justified and in conformance with
the FBI's deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA

as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations made by the Shooting Incident Review Team:

 

 

OBSERVATION - b6
b7C
SAI Idid not prepare a written operations :b7E

 

plan for the surveillance and arrest of the subject.

A written operations plan was not prepared for the
surveillance and arrest of the subject, who had a conviction for
carryino a concealed weaponl

 

The plan
was_finalized and verbally briefed within an approxin 6 to
51 minute window from the time SA contacted SA 
02/03/2011, at 8:39 to request his participation in the
operation, and the initiation of surveillance at the subject's
residence between 9:15?9:30 a.m. There were no exigent
circumstances which precluded appropriate preparation of an
operation plan.

 

 

 

 

Corporate Policy_Notice 0242N, Requirement for Written
Operations Order Field Operations, dated 07/15/2010, states, in
part: 

8. Policy Statement:

8.1 The necessity to have clear, concise, and complete
operational plans, in the form of operations orders, is
essential to successful arrest and search operations
and any other activity in which the practical
application of firearms might be reasonably
anticipated. Operations orders are the vehicle through
which the Case Agent's and/or On-Scene Commander's
strategy is reduced to a tactical directive. Their
most important function is to ensure success. By
standardizing format, the chance for omission of
essential data is eliminated thus providing subordinate
elements with the complete picture for mission
completion.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
07/19/2012

8.2 Written Operations Orders: Absent exigent
circumstances, written operations orders will be
prepared prior to conducting arrest and search
operations and any other activity in which the
practical application of firearms might be reasonably
anticipated.

8.3 Exigent Circumstances: Exigent circumstances may
necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of the written
operations order.

13. Definitions:

13.1 Exigent circumstances: Generally, an emergency, a
pressing necessity requiring immediate action.

Roles and Responsibilities:
Case Agent 
.l Responsible for preparing the operations order

9
9.
9
9 .2 Responsible for briefing the operations order

0 I 


9.2. Substantive Squad Supervisor 
9.2.1 68414 Supervisory Special Agent responsible for
reviewing the operations order

Instruction 

That SAC, Milwaukee ensure Milwaukee personnel-comply

with the above Corporate Policy Notice.

OBSERVATION 

 

 

 

b6
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b7E

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

5

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

 

 

 

 

Instruction 

 

 

b6
- .- . b7c
That SAC, Milwaukee ensure Adent personnel receive
additional training in I b7E

 

 

 

 

OBSERVATION 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SA did not wear his issued ballistic
vest during the operation.as mandated by Bureau policy.

After tre initial stop of vehicle TFO

and SA maneuvering to block
vehicle, SA stoppe Ximately eight feet behind TFO
I vehic_e. his vehicle, took a
position near the rerr lett corner of his own vehf nd
remained there until fled the scene. SA was not

 

 

 

 

 

wearing his pillistic vest* the vest remained on the front seat
of SA, vehicle. had a conviction for carrying a
concealed Yeangn_andlma movements while being stopped, which
caused TFO tr believe he may have teen rearhing for a

weapon. TFO immediately announced movement
on the HTDTA radio to all participants. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

6

To:
Re:

Inspection From:


Inspection
07/19/2012

 

 

 

b7E

 

d?

- confrontation with armed and dangerous subject(

I The outer
tactical carrier with FBI markings can be donned over clothing to
facilitate identification as law enforcement during the
transition from covert to overt activity.

The MIOG, Section 12?13.l statesr in part:
"Wearing of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory

during planned arrests, execution of search warrants and
surveillances which can reasonably be expected to culminate in a

S) tn
Instruction 

That SAC, Milwaukee ensure all division personnel
comply with the above MIOG requirement.

UNCLASSIFIED

7

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/19/2012

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

 

 

 

That no administrative action be taken against SA

 

a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

 

Mr. Joyce, Room
Mr. Perkins, Room

Mr. Weissmann Room
USDOJ
IUSDOJ

 

 

 

 

Room

Quantico

Quantico

I 

IQuantico
- WFO

Rooml I

- Attention: I I

CIRG
1 


0

 

 

 

 




 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

8

b6
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UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Precedence: ROUTINE - Date: 06/27/2012

To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett

From: Inspection 
Office of Tne?e?tinhe
Contact: Extension

re

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson CoryiB?g?*>

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By: :llh

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION b6
02/08/2011 b7C

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on U2f08/2011, involving Special
Agent (SADI Iof the Tndianapolis Division.
While conducting_an interview, two rounds from
his Glock Model 23, .40 caliber pistol, killing a subject who
refused to obey law enforcement commands and was turning toward
a weapon in his hand._ SIRG members unanimously
ded that no administrative action be taken against SA
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference report of former Inspector Michael J.
Erbach, dated 02/25/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

FBI SAs and-Task Force Officers from the Little
Rock and Indianapolis Divisions were conducting an investigation
involving the production and distribution of child pornography by
an unknown subject. The three Indianapolis Division TFOs
consisted of detectives from the Kokomo and Brownsburg, Indiana,
Police Departments who were assigned to an Internet Crimes

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inapection From} Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

Against Children LICAC) Task Force sponsored by the United States
Attorney in the Southern District of Indiana.

Investigation identified an Internet Protocol (IP)
address used to cistribute child pognooraphv belonging to an
individual named IArkansas.

On 02/07/2011, SAs: and lof the
Indiana olis Di ong with Detectivesl I
and] arrived at the Jonesboro, Arkansas


Resident Agency (JRA for a briefing regarding a search warrant'
which was planned for the morning of 02/0822011. Also present at
the briefing were Little Rock Division 

I Supervisory Senior Resident
Agent (SSRADI rah officer from the Arkansas
State Police, and an FBI photoqrapher.

 

 

 

 

 

 

On the morning of 02/08/2011, the Indianapolis SAs and

TFOs met with Little Rock ersonnel at the JRA and drove to a gas
station-where SSRA again briefed the operations order
including the Dea Force Policy. At the of
the briefing, all of the participants proceeded 
f?sigfnce. Upon their arrival, it was determined tha

was inside his resi with SA
and Detective interviewedl while SA

and Detectivel Other members of
the search team began searching the residence for evidence of D6
child pornography and an I?Phone which was believed to have been b7C
used to access the internet connection at the residence. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Through interviews of the residents, information was
develooed indicating Brandon Fountain, who_lived
I I may be the unknown subject invo veo in t'e
production and distribution of child pornography. Based on this
information, team members decided to attempt a knock and talk
interview with Brandon Fountain.

 

At approximately 12:00 an
observed Fountain enter his driveway. Approximately one hour
later, law enforcement personnel observed Fountain exiting his
residence and entering a vehicle. SA and Detective

approached Fountain as he was leaving and introduced
themselves. Fountain invited them inside his residence, closed
the door, and invited them to sit at a kitchen table. As they
sat down, Fountain was asked if he had any weapons in the house
at which time he removed a pocket knife from his front pocket and
placed it on the table. He also told them there was a in
the top drawer of his dresser and a in the bedroom across
from the bathroom. At that time the

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From:l Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

residence remained standing near the door. 
Detective informed Fountain they wanted to tai about
some strange internet activity in the neighborhood. During the

interview, Fountain made statements consistent with the
information the unknown subject had posted on the Internet.

At one point during the interview, Fountain attempted
to move to his back bedroom to nforcement officers the
location of his computer. Fountain to return
to the kitchen table. At approximatelv 1:9? SA
stepped outside to contact AUSAI to inform him of

ormation obtained from Fountain. Iadvised SA
that_he would begin working on a complaint and also

authoriied the arrest of Fountain and advised he was pre a
search warrant application for Fountain's residence. SA
entered untain's residence to watch Fountain while SA

and outside.

TFO Ire?entered the residence
to resume the interView. TFO lverbally advised Fountain
of his rights at which time Fountain waived his rights and signed
the Advice of Rights Form. Fountain continued to be cooperative
and compliant, and was permitted to et water from his
refrigerator several times. asked b6
Fountain to bring the water to the table and to stop getting up. ld7C
A short time later Fountain's telephone rang. He had a short
conversation and advised the caller he was being interviewed by
the "police."

 

 

 

 

 

 

When Fountain a search warrant
was being obtained for his residence, Fountain confessed to
taking photographs of three children with whom he.had contact
while his girlfriend was babysitting. As Fountain stated he
would consent to a search, TFO produced a Consent.to
Search Form, and began explaining im. Fountain stated he
needed to use the restroom and SAI Iagreed to accompany
him. As Fountain moved to the restroom, te suddeily ran down the

ntered the back bedroom with SA and TFO.

in ursuit. Fountain slammed the bedroom door behind
him with and giving verbal commands for him

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to stop. SA opened and entered the bedroom door as
Fountain was removing a handgun from a night stand drawer. After
repeating verbal commands for Fountain to put his hands up, and
while Fou i turning toward him with the firearm in his
hands, SAE:E:E:ffjfired two rounds striking Fountain in the rear
center torso. Fountain immediately fell to the floor.

the bedroom just prior to the
shooting and upon earing the commotion from the outside, FBI SAs

.UNCLASSIFIED

 

r,
3

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

as well as Arkansas State Police 

residence arriving in the bedroom immediately after the
shooting. Law enforcement personnel continued to give verbal

 

commands for Fountain to sto which he verbally
res onded and complied. TFO ?sarmed the subject and
him. TFO removed a . 5 caliber

Patriot, semiautomatic handgun and two loaded magazines from the
subject.

Emergency medical assistance was reque The EMTs
treated the subject at the scene and advised SA the subject
was not going to survive. Fountain was transported to the South
Mississippi County (SMC) Regional Medical Center in Osceola and
airlifted to the SMC Regional Medical Center in Memphis,
Tennessee, where he was pronounced dead.

 

 

 

On 06/21/2011, District Prosecuting
Attorney, Second Judicial District of Ark vised his
office reviewed the case and concluded justified
in using deadly force and that no further review of this matter
'was necessary. 

 

 

 

On I US Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised the matter did not b6
warrant a federal criminal investigation into whether there was a b7C

violation of the criminal civil rights statutes.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory 8.
_Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) IViolent Criminal

Threat Section. Crim nal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Practical Applications Unit (PAD), Training

Q)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division UC Firearms Training Unit, UC
I Special Weapons ard Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Grouo: UC

Defensive Systems Unit, DC I Toveetigative

 

 

 

 

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSA
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I, Washington Field Office. The
following nonevoting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Pike. Office of
Inspections (OI), TNSD: Special Assistant I
Team Leaderl . or, ssn  

PAU, Management and Program (MPAs) 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

- 4

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 

 

 

 

 

land Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section SAS), INSD.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with

the intent to: (I) evaluate the application of deadly force;

(2) provide the Director with-an evaluative analysis, b6
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an I b7c
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations

concerning training and?or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAI Iwas justified and in conformance
with the FBI's deadly forCe policy. This discussion resulted in
the recommendation that no administrative action be taken against
SA as a result of his involvement in this shooting
.inCident.

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations, instruction, and recommendations made by the
Shooting Incident Review Team: 

OBSERVATION 

FBI personnel were not wearing body armor when the
shooting occurred. Although personnel wore body armor at the
original search location, all personnel removed their body armor
when the site was deemed secure. The investigation proceeded to
a second location where the shooting occurred. FBI Policy
regarding the wearing of body armor, MIOG, Part 2, 12?13.lfl)
states: "Wearing of body armor by SA personnel is mandatory
during planned arrests, execution of search warrants and
surveillances which can reasonably be expected to culminate in a
confrontation with armed and dangerous 

Instruction That sac, Indianapolis and sac, Little
-Rock ensure personnel are directed to wear body armor throughout
the course of search/arrest operations.

OBSERVATION 

The three TFOs participating in the operations were
members of the ICAC Task Force in the Indianapolis Division's
Area of Responsibility. They were incorporated in the operations
order for the execution of the search warrant under the
supervision-of an FBI SSRA. .Unknown to both the Indianapolis and

UNCLASSIFIED





'To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

Little Rock Divisions, the ICAC TFOs were not deputized, and
therefore did not have Federal Law Enforcement Officer status. A
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)-was not in place between the
Indianapolis Division and the ICAC Task Force.

Racommendation #Za: That SAC, Indianapolis ensure an
MOU is established between the Indianapolis Division and the ICAC
Task Force documenting roles and responsibilities when conducting
joint investigations.

Recommendation #Eb: That SAC, Indianapolis ensure
Indianapolis ISAC Task Force personnel participating in FBI
operations are deputized as Federal Law Enforcement Officers
prior to their participation in FBI and federal tactical
operationsi

These observations will be brought to the attention of
the SACs of the Little Rock and Indianapolis.Divisions with
accompanying Instruction/Recommendations.

UNCLASS IFIED

6

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/27/2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT D.C.

That r0 administrative action be taken against SA
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting
inCident.

b6
b7
1 Mr. Joyce, 
1 Mr. Harrington, Room
1 - Mr. Weissmann Room
1 
1 IUSDOJ
1 Rooml: 
1 Quantico
1 Quantioo
1 ILaboratory
1 Quantico
1 WFO 
1 Room
(Attention: I

1 ICERG
1 ?1 I Rooml: 
0*

UNCLASSIFIED

7



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Tnveetications
SC

 

 

 

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: Extension

 

 

 

 

 

1"



Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory  

 

Drafted By: 
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT

CHICAGO DIVISION I 

06/11/2011 b6
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a ED7C
shooting incident that occurred on 06/11/2011, involving Special
Agent (SA) the Chicago Division. After removing
his Bureau-issued Glock Model 23, .40 caliber pistol from its
holster, SAI Islipped and accidentally discharged one round,
injuring his toe. SIRG members recommended that SA be
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and
receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to this
shooting incident.

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) dated
07/26/2011. .

 

 

 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director?s.0ffice From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/20l2

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 06/11/2011, after concluding a breakfast meeting

 

with another Age s-the Chicago Division and a Confidential
Human Source, SA drove-to the Chica 0 office. After leaving
his personal property at his desk, SA proceeded to the men's

restroom and.removed his pistol from the holster on his right hip
to place it on the back of the commode. After removing the gun
from the holster, SAI Islipped causing one round to discharge
from the weapon. The expended round grazed SA big toe and
entered the restroom floor.

 

 

 

 

 

 

SAI limmediately contacted Division
management to advise of the incident. SA drove himself to
Rush University Medical Center, identified himself to the staff,
and explained the circumstances of his injury. was
sutured by medical personnel and he was released the same day.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

non?voting member. The fol"owing voting members were in' b6
attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights b7C
Division, I Trial Attornev, Criminal Division,

Section Chief I Violent riminal

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)

I IPractical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

Division (TD): UCI IFirearms Training Unit, UC

 

ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group: UC
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI IInvestioative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl 

I ma?, :eam .eaderl ., OI, I
PAU. ram (MPAs)

land InspeCtion Management

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: _Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations
concerning training-and/or safety issues; and provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that SA b6
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, 

and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this shooting incident.

WCLASSIFIED

a


To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

 

That SA be censured and suspended from duty
- for a period of three days in regard to this shooting incident.
Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the Special Agent in Charge
of the Chicago Division to ensure SA receives remedial
firearms training regarding the proper handling of firearms and
to properly document this training.

 

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE

 

AT OPR FO, DC

That the Adjudication Unitr OPR, review the
?recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6 
b7C

Mr. Joyce, Room:?

1 Mr. Harrington, Roon

- Mr. Weissmann, Room

1 USDOJ

I IUSDOJ

Room 

I Quantico

Quantico

- ILaboratory

Quantico

WFO

I I I

l?Attention1 I

- CIRG

1 I Rooml: 

OQ

UNCLASSIFIED

4



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Tnsnections

Contact: I Extension

 

 

 

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith Lgig
Nelson Cory Bgi.

 

Drafted By: I Illh
Case 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES (CJIS) DIVISION
07/07/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 07 07/2011, involving Police

Officer I I Officer fired one round from his
Bureau?issued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, killing a

severely injured deer. SIRG members recommended that no

administrative action be taken against a result b6
of his involvement in this shooting incident. 

 

Administrative' Reference Plectro ic Communication of Supervisory
Police Officer dated 07/19/2011.

 

 

 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 07/07/2011, police officers assigned to the CJIS
West Gate received a report from an employee that she struck-a
deer on a road ?eadin to the CJIS facility. One of the officers
radioed Officer who was-assigned to site patrol, advised
him of the situation, and_requested that he attempt to locate the
'wounded deer. After locating the animal, Officer
determined the injuries were so severe the deer would have 
eliminated. Ensuring no vehicles were approaching, OfficerIE:E::]

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inspection From:' Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

fired one round into tfe deerfs shoulder, killing the injured
animal. Officer contacted his supervisor and advised him
'of the situation. 

 

 

 

 

On 05/22/20l2, the SIRG met to discuss the abovee
captioned shooting incident., Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting mber. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

 

 

 

attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I Violent Criminal

 

 

Threat Section. Crim nal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Practical A plications Unit (PAU), Training
Division UC IFirearms Training Unit, DC
I Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI I
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I
i Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA
I I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike. Office of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl b6
rwsn- Team Leaderl or, ssn  1337?:
I. PAU. Management and Program (MPAs)
Iandl IInSpection Management

 

 

 

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (8A8), INSD.

Observations and-RecommendatiOns of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members vnanimouslv aoreed that the use Of deadly
force by Police Officer was justified and in
conformance with the deadly force policy. This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no administrative action be
taken against a result of his involvement in'
this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no administrative action be taken against Police

Officerl Ias a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident._

 

Mr. Joyce, Room I

Mr. Harrington, Roonl

Mr. Weissmann, Room

I IUSDOJ

USDOJ

Rooml: 

Quantioo

Quantico

ILaboratory

Quantico

WFO

Rooml I

(Attention: I
ICIRG

1 I 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


I

 

 

 


I

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

b6
b7C

(Rev.05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Investigations
SCI I

 

From: Inspection 
Office of Inspections

Contact: I I 


Approved By: Bennett Keith Lg?,

Nelson Cory 

Drafted By: :llh b6
b7C

 

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION
08/18/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/18/2011, involving Special
Agent (SAJI of the Miami Division. While
preparing for an arrest, SA Iaccidentally discharged one
round frOm his Bureau?issuec Remin ton 12 gauge shotgun. SIRG
members recommended that censured, suSpended from
duty for a period of three days, and receive documented remedial
firearms.training in regard to this shooting inCident.

 

 

 

 

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent I dated 09/12/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the Captioned shooting. 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Directoris Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/18/20'l at anorovimately 4:00 SA
met Miami Division SA and Task Force Officer

(TFOH lat a parking garage used by West Pa .
Beach Resident Agency (WPBRA) personnel. The SAs and TFOI
were preparing for a joint arrest operation and were gearing up

and preparing their weapons for the arrest before proceeding to
the Customs and Border Protection office in West Palm Beach.

 

 

 

 

 

 

his shotgun from the trunk of his
vehicle, visually cleared the weapon, installed a sling, and
loaded the shotgun with four slugs. SA racked the
shotgun, loaded a fifth slug, ard was geing to place the gun
inside its case. As SA moved the shotgun to the case,
one round accidentally discharged.

 

 

 

 

Althou he was unsure of how the accidental discharge
occurred, he was trying to determine if the
safety was on when his finger must have went inside the trigger
guard, accidentally depressing the trigger.

and TFO heard a loud ban and saw SA
:holding ?:gun. After determining SA, Iwas

not injured, SA took the weapon and unloaded the b6
remainin rounds. As they began to look for t. ed round,

SAI collapsed. After b7c
assistance to SA and determined emergency medical

services were not needed, he notified division management of the

incident, The expended round was subsequently located in the
ceiling of the parking garage.

No perso ies nor property damage were incurred
as a result of SA accidental discharge.

On 05/22f2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) IViolent Criminal

 

 

Threat Seetinn. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
. Practical Applications Unit (PAD), Training
Division UCI I Firearms Training Unit, UC
I ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operation 'Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UC
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Evidence Response_Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike. Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistant I
INSD: Team Leaderl OI, SSA

I PAU. (MPAs)
land Inspection Management

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRE b6
b7C

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with

the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;

(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

operational standpoint (if any}; (3) provide recommendations

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide

recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that 
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three

days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

a
.3

To: Director?s Office From: InSpection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

That SAI Ibe-censured and suspended from?
duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed t? 1

Agent in Charge of the Miami Division to ensure SA
receives remedial firearms training regarding the proper handling
of firearms and to properly document this training.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE

 

AT OPR F0, DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b6
b7C

1 Mr. Joyce, Rooml I

1 Mr. Harrington, Room

1 Mr. Weissmann,.Room

IUSDOJ

1 IUSDOJ

1 Room

1 Quantico

1 Quantico

1 ILaboratory

1 Quantico

- WFO

1 Rooml I

(Attention: I 

ICIRG

1 4 IRoom

#0 

UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rev. 05-01?2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Inspections

Contact: I 

za-

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory 

 

 

 

Drafted By: :llh

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
08/20/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/20/2011, involving Special

 

 

Agent Iof the New York Field Office. While

in an offHduty status, SA fired one round from her Bureau?

issued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, killing an injured

deer. SIRG members recommended that no administrative action be b5
taken against a result of her involvement in this b7C

shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Supervisory
Special Agent I dated 08/29/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRS with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/20/2011, at approximately 4:45 SA
was operatin her personally~owned vehicle in Princeton, New
Jersey. SAI Isaw a deer lying on the side of the road,
stopped her vehicle, and walked toward the animal with her gun
drawn. Seein the severely injured deer bleeding and unable to
get up, one round, killing the deer. She
immediately contacted the New York Field Office regarding the

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Inspection
06/20/2012

To:
Re:

Inspection From:


incident and a local olice cruiser arrived on the scene.
Officers advised road department would remove the

animal from the area.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above~
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, ITrial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief I Violent Criminal
Threat Section, Crininal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC).
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training
I Firearms Training Unit, UC
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,

 

 

 

Division UC

 

 

 

 

Critical Incident Response Group; UC

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory DivisiOn and SSA

Washington Field Office. The

following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors

Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of I 
SSA

Inspections (OI), Special Assistant I
(MPAS)

Team Leader OI, 
I PAU, Management and Program 
IInspection Management

rlnvesticative

 

b6
b7C

 

IandI
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synOpsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

ously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA was justified and in conformance
with the FBI's deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in
the recommendation that no administrative action be taken against
SA as a result of her involvement in this shooting
incident.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

QT WASHINGTON, DC

That no administrative action be taken against SA
I Ias a result of her involvement in this shooting

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

incident.
b6
b7C

1 Mr. Joyee, Room

1 Mr. Harrington, R00

1 Weissmann Room

1 IUSDOJ

1 - USDOJ

Room

1 - Quantico

Quantico

4 ILaboratory

IQuantico

- WFO

1 Rooml I

(Attention: 

ICIRG

1 I 

OQ

UNCLASSIFIED

r,
.3



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett'

Internal Investi ations
SCI I

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: I I Extension


. ?6

Approved By: Bennett Keith L?gj
Nelson Cory  

Drafted By: I Illh

 

 

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION

 

08/29/2011 b6
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a 
shooting incident that occurred on 08/29/2011, involving Special
Agent Iof the Chicago Division. While

 

disassembling his Glock Model 22, pistol for cleaning, SA
pulled the trigger, resulting in the accidental discharge of one
round. SIRS members recommended that censured,
suspended from duty for a period of three days, and receive
documented remedial firearms training in regard to this shooting
incident. 

Administrative:. Reference Electronic Communication of 
Supervisory Special Agent (SSAJI dated 09208X2011.

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/29/2011, squad had a range day at the
Chicago Division?s firing range. Following the last training
cycle, the grou did not clear their weapons on the line.
According to he policed the range with other
individuals, and cleaned an MP5 in the cleaning roomi A short
time later, to the charging barrel to safely
disassemble his pistol for cleaning. As he pulled the trigger,
one round discharged into the charging barrel. 

No personal injuries were incurred as a result of SA
accidental discharge. He immediately notified Chicago
Division management of the incident.

On 05/22/2012, met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights b6
Division, USDOJJ Trial Attornev, Criminal Division, :b7c
Section Chief (SC) IViolent Criminal

 

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief 
I I Practical A plications Unit (PAU), Training

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division UC Firearms Training Unit, DC

I Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
ritical Incident Response Group; UCI I
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI IInvestigative

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I I CRHZ, Washington Field Office.' The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike. Office of

 

 

 

 

 

Inspections (OI), Special AssistantI I .

Team Leaderl I, 01, ssa  
PAU, Management and Program (MPAs)

I Iandl I Inspection Management

 

 

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2).provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

SIRG members unanimously recommended that b6
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, b7c
and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this shooting incident. 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
.INSPECTION

-AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

That SAI Ibe censured and suspended from
duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the
Agent in Charge of the Chicago Division to ensure SA
receives remedial firearms training regarding the proper handling
of firearms and to properly document this training.

Set Lead 2: (Action)
OFFICE

AT OPR FO, DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

b6
b7C

Mr. Joyce, Rooml I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


1 Mr. Harrington, Room
1 Mr. Weissmann, Room
1 USDOJ
- USDOJ
- 
1 Quantico
Quantico
ILaboratory
Quantico
WFO
Rooml I
(Attention: I I
1 4 ICIRG
I Room:
#0
UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rev.05-01.2003)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BURHU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L: Bennett
Internal Investioations
SCI
From: Inspection

Office of Insoections

'Contact: I I 
12?;

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory?B??W/

 

 

Drafted By: I 
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION

 

09/07/2011 b6
Synopsis:. The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a :b7c
shooting incident that occurred on 09/07/2011, involving Special
Agent (sag r_ Iof the Miami Division. While

 

conducting dry firing exercises inside his residence, SA
accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau?issued Glock
Model 22, .40 caliber pistol. SIRG members recommended that SA

be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days,
an receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this shooting incident.

aAdministrative: Reference Elec ronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) dated 09/21/2011.

 

 

 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On the night of 09/07/2011, conducting dry
firing exercises inside his residence. Due to receiving low
qualifying scores on his official firearms qualifications and
based on the recommendation of Miami Division Firearms
Instructors, dry firing to improve his trigger
control and hand grip.

In preparation of conducting the dry firing exercise,
the pistol and ejected the round in the chamber,
ensuring the weapon was safe and empty. He dry fired the pistol
for approximately five to ten minutes before inserting the
magazine into the weapon and releasing the slide forward to place
a round in the chamber. As he was preparing to place the gun
inside a fanny pack, SAI ldecided to feel the difference in
the weight of a fully loaded pistol versus an empty one. As he
aimed the loaded weapon at the bathroom wall, while concentrating
on his grip pressure, one round discharged entering the bathroom
wall and exiting to the outside of the residence. Ensuring no
personal injuries nor additional progerty damage were sustained

 

as a result of the discharge, SA telephonically contacted
his immediate supervisor and reporte the incident.

According to SAI I both of his hands were firmly on b6
the weapon at the time of the cischarge; however, he could not
recall if his finger was on the trigger when the incident :b7c
occurred.

 

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

attendance: I I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, I Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I I Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Practical Aoplications Unit (PRU), Training
Division UC Firearms Training Unit, UC
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group: UC 
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSH
I I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections ruse; Special Assistantl

I
Team Leaderl OI, SSAI I
UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

 

I IPAU, Manaoement and Program (MPAs)
I Iandl Ilnspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with b6
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force:
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,r I :b7C
observations,'and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that SA
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days,

an receive documented remedial firearms training in regard to
this sheeting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

 

That SA be censured and suspended from
duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the BERG has instructed ti: fpfcial

 

 

Agent in Charge of the Miami Division to ensure SA receives
remedial firearms training regarding the proper han ing of
firearms and to properly document this training.
-Set Lead 2: (Action)
OFFICE
AT OPR F0, DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

b6
b7C

 

 

 

Mr. Joyce, Room
Mr. Harrington, Roon
Mr. Weissmanr, Room
USDOJ
- IUSDOJ 

- Rooml: 
Quantico

Quantico

ILaboratcry

I Quantico

- WFO

RoomI I
(Attention: I I
- I CIRG

I Room

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


I

 

 

 

 

OFAFJ
1

UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rsv.05-Ol-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

'Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 07/18/2012
To: Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett

CIRG Attn: AD Robert A. Blecksmith

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: I Extension

 

 

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith ha}
Nelson Cory 

 

Drafted By: I Illh
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION b6
lO/llXZOll b7c

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/11/2011, involving Special
Agents andl Iof the Norfolk
Division. During the execution of an arrest warrant in the
Little Rock Division area of responsibility, both Agents returned
fire at a subject who fired eight rounds toward law enforcement
personnel from inside his residence. SIRG members unanimously
recommended tr no administrative action be taken against SAs

andn Ias a result of their involvement in this
shooting incicent.

 

 

 

Administrative: Reference report of Inspector Robert J. Shields,
Jr., dated 10/18/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting."

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 10/11/2011, the Little Rock Division, Arkansas State
Police (ASP), 33 FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, as
well as the ASP SWAT team, conducted "Operation Delta Blues."
The purpose of the operation was to serve arrest warrants on 70

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

subjects who were indicted on federal public corruption,
narcotics, and weapon charges.

Multiple briefings were held on 10/06/2011, 10/07/2011,
and 10/09/2011, with SWAT Senior Team Leaders (STLs), Assistant
Team Leaders (ATLs), and Executive Management of the Little Rock
and Louisville Divisions. The briefings included discussion of
the targets, time lines, basic SWAT operations, and an overview
of the operation. 

On 10/10/2011, each SWAT STL was given 20 minutes to
- -- .- rations plan to Deputy On?Scene Commander (DOSCI 
and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
Special Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group (CIRG), for final approval. .

        
 

   

 

 

For the phase one Norfolk SWAT target, a "knock and
announce" was planned, although a "no knock warrant" was

 

 

 

 

 

approved. If the subjects I landl I

were noncompliant, a ram would be used to breach the door, b6
followed by a flash bang, and the Norfolk SWAT team entry. Upon

approval, STLI briefed the plan to Norfolk SWAT :b7c

 

team, Evidence Response Team (ERT), Arkansas State Police, and
Drug Enforcement Agency personnel assicned to the chase one
Hillcrest Street.location. Case Agent was
present at the briefing and information.
Based on information provided by SA if Black
Mercedes was not at thel Iaddress, it was assumed
and her two children were not at the residence. During the

rie ing personnel assignments, vehicle deployment/staging
locations, individual safety/tactical equipment requirements, and
the FBI Deadly Force Policy were reviewed. During the briefing,
the ERT vehicles were advised to stay out of sight of the target
house until the scene was cleared by the STL and they were
requested via radio. Rehearsals of the entire operation were
performed using an outline of the target house painted in the
grass.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 10/11/2011, at approximately 1:00 the Norfolk
SWAT team reported to a specified location at the Memphis
International Airport, where required SWAT equipment was
inspected and loaded into two vehicles. Communication checks
were performed, including a check with the Memphis Division ERT
assigned to execute a search at the arrest location. All SWAT
and ERT personnel reported to the staging area outside of
Marianna, Arkansas. At approximately 4:00 the execute
command was received and the vehicles proceeded to their target
locations. -

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

The four?vehicle team approached the target house
'located on Hillcrest Street, with two ERT vehicles holding a
position on Pearl Street. All SWAT personnel exited the vehicles
and assumed their assigned positions. Two rear cover team
operators reported lights on in the basement. The seven
remaining entry team members were stacked along the walkway in
front of the house. 

 

The breaching team of Operatorsl land

 

 

approached the front door and positioned

 

 

themselves to the right of the door. Operatorl I
with a ballistic shield, moved to a position on the front lawn
approximatelv feet in front of the front door with Operator
directly behind him. Operator knocked
loudly on the door with his baton and announce warrant,
come to the door" three times. As planned, two other
participants activated their vehicle emergency lights to indicate
a police presence at the house. Receiving no response from
inside, STL gave the breach command followed by the
breachin of the door with one swing of a single-person ram while
Operator applied pressure to the lower right side of the
door with his left foot.

 

 

Simultaneous to the door being breached, eight gunshots
were rapidly fired from inside the residence toward the SWAT

team. Operator returned fire with three shots from his M4.

In accordance with the operational plan, a flash ban was thrown

into the house through the open front door. STL gave b6
the recall order to the team directing members to obtain a :b7c

position of cover. Multiple SWAT Operators were shouting "shots
fired" over the radio. As backing down
the front lawn with the light from his M4 directed at the window
immediately to the left of the front door, he saw an arm with a

wee on in the hand slide the curtains from left to right.
two shots from his M4 at the arm.

As the command to "cover and hold" to
the team, Operator called out on the radio he was shot.
to   location and provided immediate
medica rea ment until the arrival of medical personnel.
Paramedics assumed care of who was subsequently

transported by helicopter :o the Elvis Presley Memorial Trauma
Center in Memphis, Tennessee.

 

 

 

 

Team members called the subjects out of the house.
I lexited first and was taken into custody. She
advised law enforcement personnel there were children inside.
Approximately three minutes later,  lexited the
residence and was arrested.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

residence, Operator heard children's voices and instructed
the children to approac . Law enforcement personnel maintained
custody of the two young children.

As participants were clearing the first floor of the

 

On I US Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised no investigation was
warranted as no one other than injured during the
incident.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above4
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and.was a

 

 

non?voting mFmberl The following voting members were in
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, ITrial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief I Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
IPracticaI Applications Unit (PAD), Training

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division UCI Firearms Training Unit, UC

I I Special Weapons ard Unit,

Critical Incident Response Group; UC I

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI IThvestinative b6
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSH

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA :b7c

 

I Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistant I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Team Leaderr OI, ssa
IPAU, gram 
Iand Inspection Management

 

 

 

 

Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimouslv agreed that the use of deadly
force by IandI Iwas justified and
in conformance with the FBI's deadly force policy. This

UNCLASSIFIED

4

To: Inspection .From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

discussion resulted in the ecommendation no administrative
action be taken against 8A5 and as a result of
their involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations, instruction, and recommendations made by the
Shooting Incident Review Team:

OBSERVATION b6

 

 

b7C
b7E

 

 

OBSERVATION 

The FBI?trained breaching procedure of applying
positive pressure or tension on a door to facilitate ramming was
not documented in a training manual.

UNCLASSIFIED

5

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

Recommendation #Za: That AD, CIRG ensure the SOU re?
evaluates the use of positive pressure when ramming is used to
breach a door to determine if the risk of exposing a body part
outweighs the improved success of the breach when tension is
applied.

Recommendation #2b: That AD, CIRG ensure the SOU
documents the use of positive pressure when ramming is used to

breach a door if the continued use of this practice is
determined. 

These observations will be brought to the attention of
the AD of the CIRG with accompanying InstructionXRecommendations.

UNCLASSIFIED

6

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 07/18/2012

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

 

What no administrative action be taken against 

 

 

andI Ias a result of their involvement

 

 

in this Snoozing incident.

Mr. Joyce, Room

Mr. Perkins, Room

Mr. Weissmann, Room
IUSDOJ

- IUSDOJ

Quanticc

Quantico

- ILaboratory

Quantico

- WFO


Attention: I

- CIRG

- 

 

 

 

 




 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

7

b6
b7C



(Rev.054n-2ons}

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Director?s Office Attn: OPR
I AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
In ernal Investications
SC
From: Inspection
Office of Insoections
Contact: Extension
. 
Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory Egg??
Drafted By: I 
Case ID 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT b6
LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE b7C
10/21/2011
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting ircident that occurred on 10/21/2011, involving Special
Agent (SA) Iof the Los Angeles Field Office.
While performing a function check of her Bureau?issued Glock
Model 23, .40 caliber pistol, SA accidentally discharged
one round inside her residence. SIRG members recommended that SA

be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting incident.

 

 

Administrative: .Reference report of Special Agent in Charge
Daphne Hearn, dated 10/25/2011.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

shooting range earlier that evening.

From:
06/20/2012

Director?s Office
2974HQ-A1271741-D,

To:
Re:

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident

At approximately 8:00 on 10/21/2011, 
cleaning her handgun inside her residence after being at the 
As she completed cleaning
the weapon, SA realized she did not lubricate it. She
disassembled the weapon, applied the lubrication, and reassembled
it. After reassembling the weapon, SA did a safety check
prior to conductin a function check. ter completing the
safety check, SAEfE::]inserted a magazine into the weapon,
pointed it in a safe directio performed a function check.
During the function check, SA pulled the trigger,
discharging one round through the dining room rug and into the
hardwood floor of her residence.

 

Los Angeles management of the
incident and a team responded to conduct an investigation of the
incident.

No personal injur'
incurred as a result of SA

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?.
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a

non?voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights

Division,  Tria1 Attorneyi Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) Violent Criminal

Threat.Section. Criminal_lnvestigative Division; Unit Chief 
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

minimal property damage were
accidental discharge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(row; UCI Firearms Training Unit, UC
ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI 
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI r_lnvestigative
Law Unit, Office of General Counsel (OGC): SSAI I
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA
I CR-2, Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl I
insn: Team Readerl OI, SSA
PAU. ianaoement and Pr gram (MPAs)
land Inspection Management
Strategic Anainis Secrion SAS), TNSD.

Division

 

 

 

 

 

Unit (TMU),

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that b6
I Ibe censured, suspended from duty for a period of jb7c

three days; and receive documented remedial firearms training in
regard to this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DQ

 

 

That SAI Ibe censured and suspended
from duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the Assistant

'rector in Charge of the Los Angeles Field Office to ensure SA
lreceives remedial firearms training regarding the proper
handling of firearms and to properly document this training.

 

Set Lead 2: (Action)
OFFICE

AT OPR FO, DC

 

That the Adjudication Unit, OFR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mr. Joyce, Room

1 Mr. Harrington, Roor

Mr. Weissmann, Room

1 USDOJ

- Rooms

1 Quantico

1 Quantico

- I Laooratory

4 Ouantico

- WFO

- RoomI I
(Attention: I I



1 Room

09

UNCLASSIFIED

4

(Rev.05-Gl-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director's Office Attn: OPE
I AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Investidations
SC

 

 

 

From: 'Inspection
Office Of Tnsoections

Contact: I I 
(35 

Approved By: Bennett Keith 
Nelson Cory 

 

Drafted By: I Illh
Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION

 

11/10/2011 b6
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a b7c
shooting incident that occurred on 11/10/2011, involving Special
Agent Iof the Little Rock Division.

 

While dry firing his Bureauwissued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber
pistol inside office space, accidentally dischar ed one
round into the floor. SIRG members recommended that 
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and
receive documented-remedial firearms training in regard to this
shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) dated 11/15/2011.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, commentsr and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 11/10/2011, in preparation for a squad maintenance
shoot scheduled later in the day, SA dry firing his
weapon inside the office space at the Fayetteville Resident
Agency. SA his dry firing exercise, reloaded the
pistol, and placed it in its tolster. Looking for tips on
becoming a better shooter, SA searched the internet. After
reading information regarding stance and trigger press, and
forgetting he had loaded his gun after his previous dry firing
session, SA. drew his weapon, pressed the trigger, and
accidentally discharged one round into the floor.

 

 

 

 

 

reported the incident to his
supervisor. No personal injuries and minimal property damage
were incurred as a result of discharge.

On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a

 

 

 

 

 

non?voting member. The fol owing voting members were in b6
attendance: Trial Attorney, Civil Rights jb7c
Division, Trial Attornev, criminal Division,

Section Chief (so) I Violent criminal-

 

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)
Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

 

 

 

 

 

Division UCI IFirearms Training Unit, UC
I I Special Weapons and Tac i Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UC

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI  Investigative

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division (LD): and SSA
Washington Field Office, The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of
Inspections (OI), Special Assistantl I

- Leaderl or, ssa
PAU, Management and Program (MPAs)

Iandl I Inspection Management
Unit (IMO), Strategic Analysis Section INSD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRS

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations



2

To: Director?s Office From: Inspection
Re: 

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that b6

censured, suspended from duty for a period of three b7c
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

 

 

That SAI lbe censured and suspended
from duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the Special
Agent in Charge of the Little Rock Division to ensure 
receives remedial firearms training regarding the proper handling
of firearms and to properly document this training.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE

 

AT OPE F0, DC

 

That the Adjudication Unit, OPE, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

b6
b7C

Mr. Joyce, Rooml

Mr. Harrington, Room

Mr. Weissmann, Room

IUSDOJ

4 IUSDOJ

- Room

Quantico

Quantico

lLaboratory

Quantico

- NFO

Rooml I
(Attention: 

4 

Room

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

eswreraeJelwrereeaelw
I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FJH


 



UNCLASSIFIED

4

[Rev.05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/20/2012
To: Inspection .Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
From: Inspection

Office of Inspections
Contact: IExtension

 

 

 

 

 

Approved By: Bennett Keith Lgi?
Nelson Cory 809w?

Drafted By: I Illh

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
SAN ANTONTO DIVISION
11/17/2011

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 11/17/2011, involving ecial

Agent Iof the San Antonio Division. 

fired two rounds from'his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22, .40 b6

caliber pistol, killing an injured deer. SIRG members :b7c

recommended that no administrative action be taken against SA
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Special
Agent I dated 11/21/2011.

. Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis,'comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 11/17/2011, at approximately 6:00 p.m 
traveling on a road in Boerne, Texas, when he observed two
ve1'c tempting to slow traffic. One individual approached
SA vehicle window and explained that a deer had been hit
by a car and was laying in the middle of the road. The man also
advised local law enforcement authorities were notified; however,
he was uncertain if they were going to respond to the scene. 
After seeing the severely injured deer attempting to stand, SA

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

_To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

the deer needed to be immediately removed from
the area. Enguring the safety of the two individuals on the

scene, SA fired two rounds into the 'ck of the deer?s
head, killing the injured animal. SA removed the deer from

the road and departed the scene.

 

'On 05/22/2012, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Cory R.
Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in

 

 

 

attendanCe: I I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, I_Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I I Violent Criminal

 

Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
I I Practical Applications Unit (PAD), Training

 

 

 

 

 

Division UCI I Firearms Training Unit, 0C
I Special Weapons ard Tactics Operations Enit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UC

Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I I Washington Field Office. The

following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors b6
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Fike, Office of 

Inspections (OI), ecial Assistantl I
Team LeaderI I, OI, SSAI 

PAU. Management and Program (MPAs)
IandI Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section (SASJ, INSD.

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force; 
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
obServations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA was justified and in conformance with
the deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

'2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 06/20/2012

Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

That no administrative action be

as a result of his involvement in
incident. 
1 Mr; Joyce, RoomI I
1 Mr. Harrington, Room
1 Mr. Weissmann, Room
1 - I USDOJ
1 - I USDOJ
1 - Room 
1 - Quantico
1 Quantioo
1 Laboratory
1 Quantico,
1 WFO
1 RoomI I

(Attention: 

1 ICIRG
1 I 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

a.
3

taken against 

this shooting

b6
b7C

(Rev.05-01-2008)



FEDERAL BUREAU. OF 

 

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2012
To: Director?s Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Keith L. Bennett
Internal Investigations


From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: IExtension

 

 

 

 

f5
Approved.By: Bennett Keithng?j
Nelson Cory 

Drafted By: 11h

 

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE

01/26/2012
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a b5
shooting incident that occurred on 01/26/2012, involving Special :b7c

 

Agent Iof the New York Field Office. While
attempting to holster his Bureau?approved, personally?owned
Glock, Model 27 pistol, SAI laccidentally discharged a
single round into a tile-wall of a restroom. The expended round
subsequentlz struck the bathroom floor. SIRG members recommended
that censured, suspended from duty for a period of
three days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in
regard to this shooting incident. 

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communications of Special

 

 

 

Agent land Supervisory Special Agent
 dated 01/27/2012 and 03/29/2012_respectively.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED



To: Director?s Office From:
Re: 06/21/2012

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 01/26/2012, at approximately 11:40 as SA
was preparing to use a bathroom at the Columbia Grammar
and Preparatory School, he unholstered his weapon and placed it
on top of a trash can. After utilizing the facility, SA
who was wearing a left handed Galco, leather, in the pants
holster, retrieved his weapon. As he attempted to holster the
weapon while standing in a crouched position, one round
accidentally discharged striking a tiled wall.

was the only person in the bathroom. The
Director of the school was standing outside the bathroom door and
was aware of the discharge. No personal injuries and minimal
property damage were incurred as a result of this shooting
incident.

his immediate supervisor who
dispatched two SAs to the scene to conduct the investigation.
According to SA his finger was placed outside of the
trigger along the slide when the weapon discharged.

SA weapon, magazine, and holster were
forwarded to the Defensive Systems Unit Gunsmiths for
examination. The weapon was inspected and test fired and was
found to meet all factory specifications as designed.

b6
b7C

On 05/22/2012,
captioned shooting incident.

the SIRG met to discuss the above?
Deputy Assistant Director Cory B.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nelson, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a
non?voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJJ Trial Attornev, Criminal Division,
Section Chief (SC) I Violent Criminal
Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)

I Practical Applications Unit (PAU), Training

 

Division UC I Firearms Training Unit, UC

 

SpeCial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; UCI I
Defensive Systems Unit, UCI I Investigative

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division and SSA

I I CR-2, Washington Field Office. The
following non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors
Robert J. Shields, Jr., and Deirdre L. Pike. Office of
Inspections (OI), Special AssistantI I
Team eaderI or, SSA

I PAU, Management and Program (MPAs)

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

 

 

 

 

I land Inspection Management
Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis Section SAS), INSD.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with

the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force; b6
provide the Director with an evaluative analysisf :b7c
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that 
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting-incident. 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

Toz- Director's Office From; Inspection
Re: 06/21/2012

Set Lead 1: (Information)
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information only. This matter was not referred to

I Investiga
effective 0

HrehdewdrehJHiekaeJH



Harrington
Weissmann,

  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 

USDOJ

- 


51C)

- 
- 

(Attention: 
ICT

 

 

 

 

tions Section due to the retirement of SA
4f30/2012.

Mr. Joyce, Room] I

Mr.
Mr.

 

Room
Room
USDQJ

Rooml I

uantico
uantico
ratory

Quantico


ooml I

RG



UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

4

b6
b7C

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UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: Date: 

Te: Attn: A::;nq EL Hen??tL L. 

my. 1- 1- 7-: 

4.0mApproved By: CI: ?en?etn 

 

Drafted By: I 

Case ID 

 

      

 

 

 

 

Title: THCIDZHT
JUSTICF 
Slf??fl?ll
Synopsis: The Shooting incident Review Group (FIRE) reviewed a
ehe::in: in:;deJ: the: etcurrgc We 'nvalvine 
?3351 I :71" 1h: CJIE
POI Ifired an; Tsuh: :ron :15 burcet-iss1ed $102k
Ma?a; .23 :alibe: 3157:;r n+71_ng in 1njured coyoze. P3
f;red six roumd: fgem Bureau?ie;ued Coit, PFHLE rifle
tilang cne and ;L]ur;ng a Seemed. membere recommended
?t adr;nis;ra:;ve rczier be tale; ageing: 93E 
a3 a resul: cf :heLI invo;v3me:: in :h;s sqoatimc inc: e?z.
I 

 

 

A J?n? .- -. -, 
ne-e:1nce LeatULChlu Vermertca :e genera 
F1 _Ij _hJ_ rn 
HUEL. Iagte? it 

 

 

--. 4-5 .-  A 
Detalls: the; CummuL,Cdede was y::e;1:A ?twer
.crud 
:e?ererze :art'bned 
Details of the shooting Ineldent

app-sx-maLE,g E.a, -J: FE-
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F?ye 9 ?ea In: bdnel?? res?Init_;ie? _eaeihdee ,he eljhiaj aid
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UNCLASSIFIED



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UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: .QUTimi Date: WEHCLIZSZI
To: inspection .Attn: Actino AD Kenneth L. Moore
From inspection

office tr lnsoections

 

Contact: I I 

Approved By: Moore Kenneth 

 

Drafted By: I Il?h
Case ID 
Title: INCIDENT
NEW HAVEN 
k6

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on G2fll/2011, inVleing Special

 

 

Agent {Shil lot the New Haven Division. While
ore'arino for Special Weapons and Tactics training, Se
E::fifired four rounds from his Bureau?issued Glook 22, .40

calibe: pistol, killing an injured fawn. SIRS members
amended that no administrative action be taken against se
as a result of his invoivement in this shooting incident.

 

 

Administrative: Reference Communication of Supervisory Senior
Resident Agent dated 02/2df2C11.

 

 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and resemmendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

0n the mo ning of 02/11/2011, members of the New Haven
Division SWQT team arrived at an outdoor training facility in
Middletown, Connecticut to Conduct SWAT training. The renqe was
surrounded by a chain link fence topped with razor wire. Upon
arrival, SWAT team members unlocked the auto entranoe into the
range and saw a female deer with three fawns inside of the range
compound.

UNCLASSIFIED

io inspeCiion irom Inapco Lor
Re: 297riQ?alETJlae?D, lax?1 

The animals were located in the middle of the iirearms
had to be removed oefore training could begin. ea
approached, the deer panicked and ran aWay Crashing
Eenc ?ne of the towns was lying or its side, bleeding
to Get up. as the? approacneo the injured fawn, the




,rlirea the animal wee sit E?ihg and coal not Survive
a: that time, 31 ladvised he would euthaniZe

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0n the SIRE met to diacnaa the aoovee


'i

rt


JD {7tioneo shooting incident. Former acting neeietant Director
nifer Smith Love, inspection Division chaired the
ting and was a non?voting member. The following voting

mbera were in attendance: Kenneth L. Moore. Chief Inspector,
Office of inspectiOna I Trial Attorney,

Civil Rights Division, I Trial Attorner Criminal
Division, Assistant Section Chief I

Violent Criminal Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
SC Robert Allan Jones, Courterinteliigence Division; Acting
Unit Chief (UCJI Defensive Systeme Unit, kw
Training Division Acting ULI ecia] 
Weapons and Tactice Operations Unit, Critical incident Response

Group; SSAI I ltveatioative Law Unit, Office of
General Counsel Aiting DC I Evidence

Peenonee Team T1nit (ERTUE, Laboratory and 33%

Washington Field Ofiiee. The following
non?voting members were also in attendance: inspectors April U.
Brooks, Joseph S. Campbell, Deirdre L. Pike. and Stephen E.
Richardson, Ol, Special aisrantI I 

UCI IStrat ic Analysis Section 

Inspection Management Unit SSAI 

5A8, InspectiOn Analysis Unit Management and Prooram

ISAE, IEU, and
5A5, IMG, INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

 

 

 

?5
?9


(I

 

The SIRS reviewed the above svnopeizea incident with

the intent to, evaluate the application of deadly force:

provide the Director with a: evaluative anaive'e,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actione from an
operational stanopoint [it anyi; provide rocommendati?na
concernini training and/or safer} issues: and provioe
recommendatiOna for administrative action it deemeo 

UNCLASSIFIED



Te: leepeetien From: Inspection
Re: 12/01/2011

eed that the use of eedly
ed and in conformance with


 

 


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. deadly feree peliey. T445 resulted in the 
recommendation that f? administre:;ve be taken ageinet SE Ejp
a rerJit ef h_e inveJJenent 1n :h;e shooting incident. 

UNCLASSIFIED

Lt)

.1.

LEADIS):

Set Lead 1:

El 

LJA-L.

'nspectimn


7TJTBE-D.

Inspectia:
1230152011

From:

(Action)

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

That n0 adminiSCIaLive
lag a resul: cf his
anident.
1 Mr. ngce, Room 7142
1 Mr. Harrington, Room 7142
1 00m 7&2?
USDGJ

3; h: 
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(Attention: I
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UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROLTINE Date: lzf?lfi?il
To: Tneneetior Attn: Acting 3E Kennett L. Moore
From: Inepeetion

Office of Treneeridne

Contact: 

Approved By: Moore Kenneth 

 

 

 

 

 

Drafted By: :Ilh

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
CLEVELAND DIVISION
08/30/2010

 

Synopsis: The Shooting Insident Review Group 

reviewed a
j?Cident that occurred on 08f30/2010, invo;ui

ng Specie;

 

 

 

 

Agent (SA) of the Chicago Division. While on
vacation in the Cleveland Division territory, SA and a
friend were victims Of an armed robbery. SA fired four

rounds from his personally?owned, Bureau-approved Clock 2?
pietoi, injuring one of the subjects. SIRG membe nmended
that no administrative action be taken againsr as a
result of his invoivement in this shooting incident.

 

Administrative: Reference report of Inspector?in?Charge April 2.
Brooke, dated DEHOBHEOII.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysie, comments, and reeJMmendatiore of the 32.6 with
reference to the captioned shooting.



fj\




Details of the Shooting Incident

 

 

 

 

On OBKBOHZGTU, eel Iof the Chicago
Division was vieitinql J(a childheed friend
residing inl IOhio. Following dinner at a local
eetaurent, SAI landl Iwaiked through a neighborhood

 

Before eritind the part, they

perk toward   reeidenoe.
two young males, one armed with a

were approached from behind by

UNCLASSIFIED

To: inspection om: Inspection
Re: 

pistol, who robbed both \lCZimS or their personal propertj,
includino Sh credentials anc oadge

Io.?

'33
3

J.
U:

0

SP5. 
however, the ,ieet, later identi
observed his aetion, pointed his weapon
face and sai ?Put your fucking hands up
brains ouL." not search the wai
and was unaware he was wearing a wec:o_
nn ng away from the victims toward stair '2 4 I
tment and out of the mark I I, began hacking
from eel?and Iwhile continuing to poi
at them. Sh quietly rew his weapon and vel.ed,
get down." was noncompliant and eontinued
his weapon at the victims. Believing both he and 
fri were in imminent danger of death or serious injury. 5
three rounds immediately turned a
started runnir toward the stairs leading out of the park.
chased up the stairs which led up Lhe embankment to

an adjacent roadway. Yelling several times for t? 5? ject to
stop with negative resultsr turn

towards him while raising his hand 'niig his weaponCV1

 

 

 

 

fired one additional round

 

Both subjects continued to run between rosi
into hack yards using SA to lose sight of th ..
stopped his pursuit of the sub ects ard contacted police.

Before he talked to anyone at Ell, Sh saw a marked unit

from the Cleveland Heights Police Department (CHPD), stopped the

patrol car, identified himself as a law enforcement offioer, and
provided details of the incident. Responding police officers
subsequently located and his acoomplioo who were each he
charged with two counts or robbery in juvenile Court. a third hl?
person was arrested; however, it was determined he did not

participate in the armed robbery and all ohargos were dismissed.

 

Medical reports gunshot
wounds to his rioht thigh and right rear shoulder. On
released from the hospital and placed in
juvenile detention pending his criminal proceedings.

It was subsequently armed with a
Crossman pellet pistol during the robbery. The victims' property
was recovered by law enforoement personnel.
-he City of Cleveland heights, Ohio Law Department, was


?lm
v.3-

1:93 condueted an jEVestigation and determined the



.rr'r. 
advised on



UNCLASSIFIED

?1

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: :2/0152011

shooting was jcstilied. Based or tie CHPD finding, Lhe matter
was not presented to the Frosecntor's Office for review

On the LS DepartMin: of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, ao"ised the facts of the case did not warrant a
federal investigation.

0n the SIRS met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. noting assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love, Inspection Division chaired the meeting and

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

was a non?voting member. The following voting members were in
attencanse: Kenneth Adore. Chief Irspector, Office of

Inspections Trial Attorney, Civil

Fights Division, Trial Attornevr Criminal

Division, nsooj; Assistant seetitn Chief {soil 

Violent Criminal Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division;

SC Robert Allan Jones. Counterintelligence Division; noting

Unit Chief I Defensive Systems Unit, as
Trainino Division ctino Specia; tic
Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response

Group; SSRI llnvestioative Law Unit, Office of

 

General Counsel Acting UCI Evidence
Response Team Unit Laboratory Division 3; and BSA
Washington Field Offici. The lollowing
non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors horil D.

 

 

 

 

Brooks, Joseph S. Campbell, Deirdre L. Iike and qtenhen 
Richardson, OI, INSD: Special Assistant 
US I Strategic Analysis Section (BASE,

 

 

 

Inspection Management Unit (EMU), SSAI I
3.8, Inspection Analysis Unit (ZED), Management and Procram
re sas, inn, Insn: and

3A3, IMU, INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIEG

The SIRS rev' Jed the above synopsized incident with

i l] . to the application of deadlv icrce:

{23 provide the Direct ith an evaluative analysis,
observations, and rocomme dations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any}; provide recommendations
concerning training andfor safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessaryi

SIRS members unanimously agree that the use of deadly

 

 

force by SAI lwas justified and in conformance 
with the FEI's deadly force polio . This discussion resulted in 3b?


the recipiendation that no administrative action be taken against t?

as a result of his irvolvement in this shooting



incident.
UNCLASSIFIED




 

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UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: RGUTINE Date: 
To: :n5pectioc Attn: Acting AD Kenneth L. Moore

From: Inspection
Office of Teeneccione

Contact: I I 
Approved By: Moore Kenneth 

Drafted By: I Illh

 

Case ID EBT?nghl271466?D

Title: SHOOTING 
DENVER DIVISION


 

Synopsis: The Shooting incident Review Group (SIRE) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on llf2?f2GlO, invoivin ecial
Agent Iof the Denver Division. SA

 

accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued Giock
Model 23, .40 caliber injuring his left leg. SIRS members
recommended that censuredr suspended from duty for a
period of three daysr and receive documented remedial firearms
training in regard to thie Shooting incident.

Administrative: Reierence Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (ESSA) I dated
?if?gf?plc.



 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To: From: Inspection
Re: 
Details of the Shooting Incident

Dn at 7:o0 p.m SA was
waLChing television h:s reSJdence. Accoroing to SA
he stood in, ris service weapon, and attemp ed to piece
it 2L the rig:t rear p0C<Et of his jeans As no was Jlacin; the
out it the octet, one round accidentally discharged striking nis
leg. SA advised his finger was not on the trigger and b6
believed the handle of his kn fe caught to: gun's trigger causing hj?
the discharge.

his wife of the incident and she called
911. Medical personnel, as well as members of the local
Sheriff's Office responded to the scene and transported 
by ambulance to the St. Mary's Corwin Hospital. SAEwaa
_ischarged from the hospital on ll/EleOlO, and expected to make
a full recovery.

Dn the SIRS met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Acting Assistant Director Jenntier
Smith Love, InspECtion Division chaired the mee ing and
was a non~voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Kenneth L. Moore, Chief Inspector, Office of
Inspections I Trial Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, [Trial Attorrev, Criminal
Division, Assistant Section Chief (SC) I
Violent Criminal Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
SC iobert Allan Jones, Counterintelligence Division; Acting
Unit Chief I Defensive Svstems Unit, ea

. Acting UCI I Sp cial 

 

Training Division 
apons and Tactics Doerarions Jnit, Critical Incident Response

 

 

 

 

we

Group; SSAI I Investigative Law Unit, Office of
General Counsel Acting UCI IEvioence
Response Team Unit (ERTU), La oratory Divisior (LD and BSA

 


I CAFE, Washington Ficid Office. The following
non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors April D.
Brooks, Joseph S. Campbell, Inspector Deirdre L. Pike, and
Inspector Stephen E. Richardson, DI, Special Assistant

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Insa; vol I Strategic
Analvsis Section InspeCtion Management Unit (INC), 
SSAI I SAS, Inspection Analvsis Unit (IAU).
:nso; Management and Prooram 
EAS, andl see, :nsn.

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

is
The i a


the intent to: fl)




eviewed the above synopsized incident with
evaluate the application of deadlv force:

UNCLASSIFIED



Te: From: inspectien
Re 09/20f2811
p;evide Lhe Director with an evelustive analysis,
Observations, and recommendations for correeLive ectiens frem at
operational Standpeint (if any?, provide 
eeneer?ihg training sedge: ty iSS?es end preside

a


mmendatjens Eel administ ctiQi if deemed secessary_

1
(D
('21


SIRG members unanimously ses?mmended the: 
censured, depended from duty fer a periad of emsr

I r. I I I 1 31:76
and aeaumented tireerms trainieg in regara t3 i?c
this shooting incident. However, this EC is being submitted for

informatics due t0 the retirement of Oi/ElfQCil.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To Erom Thspeotion

Re 466?3, 


Set Lead 1: (Information)

of





ET WASEIJGTON, DC

 

For information oniy. This matter wa?
shtEttal Investigations Section due to the rotiroment of SR

fectiVE 

Mr. Murphy, Room 7142

Mr. Harrington, Room 7142

mi Room 7427
USDOJ



   
 
        
   
   

Room 32%

Quantioo

Laborator'
EAttention:

Mr. Jones Room 9005
rT?
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q?

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- Room 3343

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

4

not refEer



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-- I .--N. 3- 

 

 





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h&ppaning$ Am individu?l :?ld than a 
a 7:
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W?ap?n at S?l aglieving_hig_lifg wag gm 
gaimmim?mt 

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and 

waapbm.an?s?ia.?mwn an aha gr?un? with hiS armg '?37
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g- . 
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ha ragpgm?a? in mmx?3_??_thg affg?t aw_tfyi?? 
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nat-cendu?t a ?rimimai 
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;g?h??ting di?f?at.fall u?der.the ??lmr-af 
Ithapag??t?wagy?ff?d?ty ?t thezin?idemtm 3-

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

    
 
  

3. 


 

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(Rev. 054112003)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 
To: Director's Office Attn: OPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Amy Jo Lyons

Internal Investigations
SC Michael Kaste

From: Inspection
Office of Inevections

Contact: I I Extension:

1 
Approved By: Lyons Amy Jo M??f
Love Jennifer sm' 

Oswald Donald a??il

   

 

Drafted By: I Ilrr

Case ID 




Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
LAS VEGAS DIVISION

09/17/2010
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a
shooting rred on 09/17/2010, involving Special
Agent (SA) of the Las Vegas Division. Two days
after atten 'n ecial Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) training
session, was preparing to clean his SWAT-issued

 

Springfield 1911Al pistol. While in the process of removing the
weapon from its holster. SA accidentally discharged one
round through a metal un eaning able. SIRG members
recommended that censured, suspended from duty for
a period of three days, and receive documented remedial firearms
training in regard to this shooting incident.

 

 

Administrative: Reference Else?Tonic Fommnnication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I dated
10/06/2010.

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting-

UNCLASSIFIED

 

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 12/27/2010

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 09/15/2010, w? attended SWAT
training, qualifying with his ?issue prin field 1911A1

pistol. At the conclusion of the training, 
the training area without cleaning or replacing service
ammunition into the weapon. His pistol remained uncleaned,
loaded with training ammunition, and stored inside a gun vault
inside his Bureau vehicle.

On 09/17/2010, at approximately 7:30 
reported to the Las Vegas Division and retrieved his rifle

and Springfield pistol from his vehicle. After visually

verif ing the rifle was clear and the bolt locked back, SA 
up the holstered pistol which had a magazine ibfc
inserte . He did not clear the pistol at and carried

both weapons to the gun cleaning area. SA placed his

rifle on one cleaning bench and his pistol on a second bench.
Realizing he left his rifle cleaning equipment inside his
vehicle, SA left both weapons on the gun cleaning benches
to retrieve his cleaning equipment.

Upon his return to the cleaning area, SA

partially disassembled his rifle then moved to the second
bench and retrieved his holstered pistol, while talking to SA

He picked up his pistol from the bench with his
right hand, pointed it in a safe dire began to remove
it from the holster. According to SA had the grip of
the weapon in my right hand and I was holding the holster in my
left hand, in an upside down I broke the thumb break of the
holster, depressed the magazine catch to remove the magazine, and
then pressed down on the safety. I released the safety in order
to lock the slide back, expel any unused ammunition, and then
perform a visual clear of the barrel. As I continued to remove
the weapon from the holster a round was discharged; I had never
fully removed the weapon from the holster.?

 

 

After the put the weapon down and
Checked to ensure was okay. No personal in ur and b6
minimal property damage were incurred as a result of hT?

accidental discharge.

On 12/07/2010, the SIRG met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Chief Inspector Donald E- Oswald,
Office of Inspections (OI), Inspection Division (INSD), chaired
the meeting and was a non?votin member. The following voting
members were in attendance: Trial Attorney,

Civil Rights Division, Trial .ttorner Criminal
ief I

Division, Assistant Sec ion
UNCLASSIFIED

   
    
  



 

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 12/27/2010

 

 

 

 

Violent Crfmes_?egzion__iriminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (UC) Firearms Training Unit, Training
DivisiOn Ucl IDefensive Systems Unit, 
UCI ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations
Unit, Critical InCident Response Group; SSAI I

 

Investi ative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSA
Evidence Re Team Un;t Laboratory
Division SSAI Practical Applications
Unit, and SSAI I Washington Field
Office. Inspectors Eric S. Birnbaum and Kenneth L. Moore
attended to present the Kansas City and Detroit shootings to
board members. The following nonwvoting members were also in

Fitg?dan?e: Inspector A ril D. Brooks, OI, 
ERTU, SSAI I Legal Instruction Unit,
UCI Strategic Analzsis Section 
Inspection Management Unit UC SAS,
Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), Mans ement and Program
SAS, ISpecial

INSDJ I sas, IMU, andl 
IMU, INSD.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

 

1b5



 

 

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations . .
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide ibf
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary. EJFC

It was noted that was examined by
the Training Division?s Weapons anagement Facility and
determined to function properly.

SIRG members unanimously recommended that 

censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
ays, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard

to this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

1
1

 

To: Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 12/27/2010


Set Lead 1: {Action}


AT WASHINGTON DC

 

That SA: be censured and suspended from
duty for a period of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, the SIRG has instructed the soeci
Agent in Charge of the Las Vegas Division to ensure 
receives remedial firearms training regarding proper han ing of
firearms and to properly document this training.

 

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE k6




That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, review the
recommendation and adjudicate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mr. Murphy, Room 7142
1 Mr. Harrington, Room 7142
1 - Ms. Ca roni Room 7427
USDOJ
1 Mr. Johnson, 32
(Attention:
1 Quantico
Quantico
(Attention: I I
1 Quantico
1 Quantico
1 Laboratory
1 WFO
1 com 6387
1 Room 3043
+0
UNCLASSIFIED

4



UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 
Te: Inspectien Attn: Acting AD Kenneth 1? Moore
From: inspectiee

Office of Inspections

Contact: I I Extension 

 

Approved By: Meere Kenneth 

 

Drafted.By: 11h

 

 

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
12/20/2010

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on involving Special
agent {sail Iof the New Yerk Field Office. as

fired three rounds from her Bureau?issued Glock Medei 22,
.40 caliper pistol at two aggressive and unleashed approaching
dogs. SIRE members recommended that no administrative action be $6
taken against SAI Ias a result of her involvement hie
in this shooting incident.

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Suoervisory
Special Agents  andl
dated 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, echments, and recommendatiens of the SIRS with
refereiee to the captioned sheeting-

Details of the Sheeting Incident

roximately 8143 
a

On 12(20/2010. at
we a" hicle with recently purchase'

WE

  
      

1 SA observed a maie with two
a ed dogs in the parking lot. SA opened her
ack ;d flipped the thumb brake from the - star at her
that time, the degs charged toward SA and her
Fearing for their safety, her weapon and

 

ng the process,
sh

 

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 

tnree rounds at the dogs. Both dogs retreated and returned
i

No personal injuries or property damage were incurred
as a result of this sheeting incident.
On Gsf?sfz?ll, the SIRE met 2 is
captioned shooting incident. acting essi.ta
Smith Live, Inspection Division chaired the 
was a non?voting member. The following voting member? 
attendance: Kennetn L. Moore, Chief inspector, Office of
Inspections (GI), Trial Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, Trial Attornev, Criminal
Division, AssistanL Section Chief I
Violent Criminal Threat Section, Criminal Inves
SC Robert Allan Jones, CD72, Conn erintelligence i
Unit Chief Defensive Systems Un
Training Division Acting UC Special
Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical lnCident Response
Group; ssal I Investigative Law Unit, Office of
General Counsel Acting UCI I Evidence
Resoonse Team Unit LaboratOrv Division and SSA
I ICE-2, Washington Field Office. The following
non?voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors April D.
Brooks, Joseph S. Campbell. Deirdre L. Fike, and Stephen E.


?7

Pl



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Richardson OT TNQD: Qnecial Assistantl I INSE:
vol I trategic AnalySiS Section (sas),
Inspection Management Unit INSD: 353' I

 

SHE, Inspection nnalvsis Unit Management and Program

lws?? I SEE, IAU, and
SAS, lose.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

 

 

 

 

 

The SIRS reviewed the above synopsised incident with
the intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;



 

 

2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational scandpoint (if any); provide recommendations
concerning training andfor safety issues: and provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRS members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly L,

force by SAI [was justified and in conformance with 
:te Fal's deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the urn
recommendation tnat no administrative action be taken against SA
as a result of her involvement in this snooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 09220/2011


Set Lead 1: (Action)

- f?
27 Do

That no adminisLIaLive action be taken ageing;

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SHI I as a result of her involvement in this

Shooting intioent

1 - Mr. Murphy, Room 1142

1 MI. Harrington, Room 2142

1 MS. CaEroni, Room 1427

1 - USDDJ

1 I URUOJ

1 Room 3246
(Attention: I

-I I mantioo
(Attention: 

1 Quantioo
{Ettentio?z I I

1 -I Laboratory
{Attention: I

1 Mr. Jones, Room 9005

I NFC

1 i Room 6387

1 Room 30%3



UNCLASSIFIED

La.)

 

(Rev. 05-1"! i JOURJ

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date 
To: Director?s Office Attn: 
AD Candice L. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Amy Jo Lyons

Internal Investigations
SC Michael Kaste

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: Extension

 

 

 

 

 

Love Jennifer Smith
Oswald Donald

APProved BY: Lyons Amy Jo??a 0 L15

 

Drafted By: I 



1?5

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT

NEW YDRK FIELD OFFICE



1b 

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRE) reviewed a MIC
shooting incident that occurred on 05104f2310, involving Special
a ent (sapl Iof the New York Field Office. As an
I was conducting a second safety check of his weapon prior to
departing a friend's residencer he accidentally diScharged one
round from his Bureau?issued Gloc 22, .40 caiiber pistol.
SIRG members recommended that SA be censured, suspended
from duty for a period of three Gays, and receive documented
remedial firearms training in regard to this shooting incident.

 

 

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of

 

 

Supervisory Special Agent {85hll I dated

Details: This CDmmunicetiOh was prepared to furnish the

analysis: commentsr and recommendations of the SIRE with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: irector?

0
Re: 297+HQ?e12ll

fice From: Inspection
8

7 12/07f2010

Details of the Shooting Incident

 

On Cb/04f2010, sal Iaccidentallv discharged
one round from his Bureaurissued weapon into a drawer of
cabinet located at a iriend'a residence.

According to he arrived in
Massachusetts at approximately ?:lS to attend the funeral
of a friend. After inquiring about the planned events of the
evening, he askedI I the occupant of the residence,
if he had a safe place to store his weapon. advised he
stored a friend?s police-issued weapon on occasion, and felt
comfortable storing in his home because no
children were present and he nad the only Key to the residence.

his weapon 

4:
i I
a winter Style bomber cap, and placed it in
the kitchen.

er a rosimately 4:30 before departing the
the weapon after everyone except
ei 

it; 
th

placed it in
cabinet Leighton exite residence. He removed the weapon from the
cabinet anc roceeded to remove it from the holster at a downward
angle. as felt pressure on the trigger and saw a flash

 

from the more e. He put the weapon down, Surveyed the area
cleared the weapon, and conducted a function check. 
stated the weapon operated correCtly. It appeared as though SA

did not remove the magazine after clearing the chamber
prior to storing the weapon.

the area and Located a hole through a
desk and the wall. He immediately contacted his supervisor to
report the incident.

No personal injurv 'nimal property damage were
incurred as a result of an accidental discharge.
b5

On the BERG met to discuss the abovee hie
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love chaired the meeting and was a non?voting member. The
following voting members were in attendance; Chief Inspector
Donald E. Oswald Office of Inspections, Inspection Division

I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
Trial Att- in Division,
Assistant tion Chief Violent Crime
1 -

cc
ina Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section m_ 
Firearms aining Unit, Training Division DC
Defensive Systems Unit, Supervisory
Special Agent I, Special Weapons and Tactics
UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

 

 

 


1?
4.





Ts- DireCtor's r:the From: Inspection

Re: 297?HQ-a1271laa?0, 22/07/2010

3 erations Unit, Critical incident Response Group; SSA s6
Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel: SSA th

Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory
31v;sion; and ssn  Washington Field
5 ca. The following non-voting members were also in
4 

 

i
?nee: Manaoement and Program 
I Endl Inspection Management Unit 

trat gic Analysis Section, INSD.

to
(9

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRE reviewed the above synopsized incident with
intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observatiODS, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
Operational standpoint (if any}: (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for adminiSZrative action if deemed necessary.

110 

lo 7? 

SIRS members unanimously recommended that 
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard

to this shooting incident.

The only observation pertained to not
being submitted to the Weapons Management Facility for
examination. in order to ensure the FBI exercises due diligence
'n all accidental discharges, all weapons involved in ccidental
Scharges should be returned EXpeditiousiy to the WMF for
spection and documentation. This examination will ensure all
mechanical aspects of the weapon are within factory tolerances
and no, as yet undetected mechanical malfunction exists that may
have contributed to the accidental discharge. This matter will
be disensseo with the Assistant Director in Charge (ADICJ of the
New York Field Office.



UNCLASSIFIED

Eu.)

 

 

 

Inspeerien

instructed the

 

 

receives

 

 

,nq of

lhe censured and suspended frOm

ADI: of the

remedial
firearms and to

To: Director?s Office From:
Re: 12/07/2010

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

RT DC

That SPLI
duty for a perjed of three days in regard to this shooting
incident. Additionally, Lhe SIRE res
New York Field Office to ensure SA
firearms training regarding proper handl:
properly deeamen: this training.
Set Lead 2: (Action)





ET OPP FOE DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPE,

E'w'

the

rennmmendatien and adjudieate this incident accordingly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 Mr. Murphy, Room 7142

- Mr. Harringten, Roam Tie?
1 Ms. Canroni, Ream 7427

USDOJ

USDQJ

M: Johnson, Room 3280

i - QuanLiCO

1 Quantieo

Quantisd

1 - Laboraeery
WFO

1 - Room 6387

1 a Ream 3043


UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

f3 
 

 ?008)

UNCLAS I FIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 
To: Director's Office Attn: 
AD Candice M- Will
:nspectioc Attn: as Amy Jo Lyons
Internal Investigations
SC Michael Kaste

From: inspection

lffice Ins aetions
Contact: I 
i  
Approved By: iyons Amy Jo M. i
Love Jennifeo Sm?gn 
Oswald Donald 

Drafted By: I  :lln

 

 

Case ID 

In}

TlnguD

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
PITTSBURGH DIVISION


To 

ETC

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS, reviewed a
sheeting incident that occurred on 09/16/2010, involv'ng Special
Agent Iof the ?ittsburgh Division. While
preparing ber Bureau-issued .40 caliber semi?
automatic pistol for cleaning, SA accidentally discharged
one round into a "clearing trap"t SIRE members recommended that
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of tnree
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this shooting incident.

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Supervisory
Special Agent :ssa:  Idated 10/04?2010.

the anaiysis,

Details: This communication was prepared to is.
ference to the

commentsr and recommendations of the SIRG witt
captioned shooting.

rn
IE

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Director's Offi From: Inspection
Re: EQT?HQ?Hlillagg-D, 

Details of the Shooting Incident

 

On UQHLEHECEC, cal Iaccidentallv discharged
he: weapon in too gun cleanin? room at the range.

Upon completion of firearms training and range clean?up,
dropped to: magazine from her weapon and proceeded to
the gen cleaning room. She entered the gun cleaning room, placed
tne barrel of the weapon into the canister used for clearing
weapons prior to cleaning, and pulled Lne trigger in order to
disassemble tne weapon for cleaning. As she pulled tne trigger, a
round discnarged into the canister.

Ho _ersornl injury or property damage was incurred as a
result of ccidental discharge.

was inspected by the academy armorers 
for any malfunc ion, and it was determined to be in proper working i6

i _r 
.r 

On the SIRE met to discuss the above?


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

captioned shooting incident. Ctie inspector Donald E. stald,

Cf ice of Inspections Inspection Division chaired
the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting
members were in attendance: ITrial Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, ITrial Attornev, Criminal
Division, Assistant Section Chief I
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal investigative Division; Unit
Chief IFirearms Training Unit, Training
Division DUI I Defensive Systems Unit, TD:
UCI Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI I

Investi ative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSA 

  

Evidence Res onse Team Unit Laboratory

 

 

 

Division SSE Practical Applications
Unit, and SSRI Washington Field Office.
inspectors 

ric S. rnbaum and Kenneth L. Moore attended to
present the Kansas City and Detroit shootings to board member .
The following nonwvoting members were also in attendance:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspector April D. Brooks, OI, SSAI I FRTU,
SSAI I Legal Instruction Unit, UCI I
I Strategic Analysis Section Inspection
Management Unit UCI 3A8, Inspection
Anaivsis Unit INSD: Manaoement and Program (HPAs)
I SEE, Special Adviser, 
I see, rev, andI  sas,

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 Director's Office From: Inspection
Re: 1?f23/2010

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

. . 
The a_?o the abLJe no? 1

raised incident wit} the
intent to: evaluate the application of deadli force;
crowide the Director with at evaluative analysis,
oosw *atlons, and recommendations for CorreCtive actions from an
operational standpoint [if any), (3: provide recommendations
concerning training andror safety issues: and ii} previde
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRE members unanimously recommended that 
suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training in regard
to this sheeting incident.

members made one observation regardin this hr
incident which pertained to a safety check of b:
not being conducted. In an EC dated the Training
Division provided the following guidance to all offices regarding
the adminiStration of the Firearms Training Program:

at the conclusion of firearms training shooters will

Conduct a safety check. Prior to holstering or removing

weapons from the firing line, a final safety check of

all weapons must be conducted by a Firearms Instructor.

regarding the accidental discharge, it was noted by SIRG members
that proper safety checks were not conducted upon completion of
firearms training by the Firearms ln tractor.

UHCLASSIFIED



 

irecter'e Gifice From: :cspectie:
.. 
Re: ?9x?HQ-ArrilE99?D, 


Set Lead 1: (Action)
3 1-0111

$JFifliiJ Tifiif?jfi, 

 

 

 

Tie: eel Ibe censuree an: suspended from
d?uw fer perieg ef three days in regard te this eheetieg
idect. Heditienaiiy, the BERG has instructed the SAC ef the
teburgh Division cc ensure remedial firearms
re rm

5 and to properly

-
II


?Eining regarding proper handling ef fi
:Eiie. :reair1ir1g-

Set Lead 2: (Action)
OFFICE

ET men we he b5
re
MTG
That :ee Adjudicatiee Unit, 39-, review che
end adjudicate :his incident accordingly.

. Murphy, Ream T142
hgten, Ream ?142
i Recm 7427
USDGJ

    

USDOJ
Jehneenr Room 3283
Eccentioc:



I

r?Jr












 

i441 I ML

 

 

 

- Quanticc
Quantice
- Laboratory

 

 

 

- Roam c3

 

 

l _1

-L
h-
L)

 

 


*0

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

.         sandice Hill 

?;agah: am? 



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thf??nd&ygrg . 

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t?yb?gin the 
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GEE fauna 
partiam Q?.a wavda? tabla an?ggtr??k the 7H';j4'?

 

 

 

 

 

   



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as a~result Qf 

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:Eir?armg txainimg gagardimg praper han?ii?g_af firearms 

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{Rev 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PIECedence: ROUTINE Date: 
To: Director's foice Attn: OPE
AD Candice M. Will
Tnspe?tioh Attn: Acting ED Kenneth L. Moore

internal investigations
SC Michael Kaste

From: inspection
Office of

Contact:
Moore Kenneth LLIHJ



Toeoe"*ione

Extension:

Approved By:

 

Drafted By: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case ID 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT

SECURITY DIVISION


Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a
Shoeti?g incideet that occurred on 10f31?2010, involving FBI t?
Police Officer I?Djl Iof the Security Division. $73
After attending cuarteriy firearms qualifications at the FEIEQ
indoor range, PO aCCidentain discharged one round from
his Bureat~issuec Giock Model 22 SIRS

.40 caliber pistol.
members recommended that be censured, suspended from
duty for a period of three daya, and receive documented
firearms training in regard to this shooting incident.

1
I

remediar

Administrative: Reference Ele
pervieory Special Agent 



ctronic Communicat on of
dated

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and reCOmmendarions of the SIRS with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

 

(D C)

Director?s Office From: inspection
29?~ncra1qansii?o, saris/2011

TH

Details of the Shooting Incident

On iUfiifZUlU, at approximately 10:15 PC 
a_tended .is quarterly firetrms oualifications at the 
range. Although PC pistol misfireo three times
airing tis gaaliiloation, he co?ilfied on his first attempt.

as ?ns tens: to gr to nis ne
walaeo tn: sun cleaninc roor. s:ei the room was dark and
emptv, ne occideo to oil on the rails and slide of tne
weapon is remotes Lie nagaiine ano turned to the wall to break
down ta: pistol. As he pulled the trigger in order to release
tie slice, one roind disenargec throng? :ne cleaning table with a
fragment lodging in the wall behino the table

No personal injuries were incurred as a result of PO b5

accidental discharge. tic

On the SIRG met to discuss the aboveF
captioned shooting incident. Acting assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love, Inspection Division chaired the meeting and
was a non?voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Kenneth L. Moore, Chief Inspector, Office or

 

 

 

 

Inspections i323, Trial Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, Trial Attorney, Criminal
Division, Assistant Section Chief I

 

Violent Criminal Threat Section, Criminal Investigative DiviSion;
SC Robert Allan Jones. Counterintelligence Division; cting

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unit Chief {Ele I Defensiva Systems Unit,
Training Division Acting UCI I, Special
Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group; ssal Investigative Law Unit, Office of
General Counsel acting UCI Evidence
Response Team Unit (ERTU Laooratory Division and SSH
I I shington Fielo Cities. Tne following
nor-voting members were also in attindance inspectors April 
Brooks, Joseph S. Campbell, Deirore Fire, and S+eonen Et
Richardson, DI, Special Assistantl I INSD:
I Strategic Analysis Section (SASJ,
inspection Management Unit ssal I
SEE, Inspection Analvsis Unit LIEU), Management and Prooram
3A3, IAU, and

 

?nalist {MFAsll I
sis, inso.

Qbservations and Recommendations of the SIRG

above synopsized i
to the application of nasal

UNCLASSIFIED

 

Pram:



Lh: rector with an evaiu
and recommendations for
?Tafdl*UU?1 Stan?pciht [if any}; 
TUUPFIHLZ4 training audio: SafeLy {sag
aam:n;5:rat;ve 
SIRE mambe.s unanimvusLy


as suspenjed from d?

UNCLASSIFIED

La)

at
corrective actions


ive analysis,

from an

?guide 1830mmendatians

and

previde
if deemed necesaary.

 

To:
Re:

Director's

LEADIS):

Set Lead 1:

INSPECTION



     



Office


09/

(Action)

DC

From: Inspection

16/2011

 

 

That POI Ibe ctnsured and suspended from
a period Of days 1n regard to this sh?otjng
?dditimhally, Lhe SIRS has instructed :49 Assistant
ml the Security iviELon to en?ure PG receives
remedLal f;:ea:m3 trai?Lng the praper sane inq 0f
f-rc;rmb and to properly document this training.

Set Lead 2:

recommendation and adjudica 9 this incident

l?I 1.4L

.IJHIAFH






(Action)

OFFICE

 

AT CPR DC

That the Adjudica

Mr. Room 7142

Mr. Harrington, Room F:
?a Roam 7&2?
USDGJ

 

[Attention:l

(Attention:

r] I

?f

 

   
 

Ll

Room 9095

F0
2

 

 

I.

 

 

Room 3246

antiCo

Laborato:

Dom 638?
30%

EW the

ien Unit, .
OrdingTy.

OPR, rev:
acc

1b 

1b "if 

 
 
      
     

?2


UNCLASSIFIED

4

{Rev 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: llf22f2?l?
To: Uirector*s OffiCe Attn: CPR
AD Candice M. Will
Inspection Attn: AD Amy Jo Lyons

Internal Investigations
SC Michael Haste

From: Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: Extension

 

 

 

 

 

Love Jennifer 3 1'th
Oswald Donald 

Approved By: Lyong Amy Jo  

 

 

 

Drafted By: .llh

 

Case ID 

Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
TRAINING DIVISION
03/20/2010



re


?2

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group reviewed a
shooting inciden: that occurred on involving Special
Agent [snjl lof the Albany Division. While
ring the Firearms Instructor School at the FE: Academy, an
laccidentally discharged his weapon while practicing "dry
firinc? in his hotel room. SIRE members recommended that SA
he censured and suspended from duty for a period of three

days in regard to this shooting incident.

 

 

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Supervisory
Special Agent  dated 

 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the analysisr
comments. and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

To: irector's Office From: Inspection
Re: 297?HQ?Al?llg?d?D, 

Details of the Shooting Incident
DU SA

at appro
accidentally disch rg 
p' to 

ll:
ed his personally?owned, Bureaus
pproved Gloct Model 21, Pside his hotel room.

F1:

on the morning of G3f20f2010, his
pistol, conducted a safety check, and practiced "dry firing?.
Upon completion of his ?dry firing", Ireloaded the
weapon and took a shower- A short time later  decided
to "dry fire" again and as he pre trigger, one round
discharged striking a mirror. SA realized the weapon
contained a magazine and he failed to conduct a safety check
before ?dry firing" the second time.

No personal i ties were incorred as a result of SA
accidental discharge, and property damage was minimal.



a weapon was inspected by Defensive Systems
Unit Gunsmitn and determined to be in
proper working order.

 

 

he
on 08/10/2010, the SIRG met discuss the shoves 
captioned shooting incident. Deputy assistant Director Jennifer

Smith Love chaired the meeting and was a nonevoting member. The
following voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector

Donald E. Oswald Office of inspections, Inspection Division

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
I Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
Assistant Section Chief :Stll Violent Crime
Section Criminal InteSZigative DiVision; Unit Chief 
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division UC
Defensive Systems Unit, Supervisory
Special Agent I Special Weapons and Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA
Investigative Law Unit, Uffice of General Counsel; SSA
IEVidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory
Division; and SSAI Washington Field Office.
The following non~voting members were also in attendance:
Hana amen: and Program (MFASJI 

 

Inspection Management Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis
estion, INSD.



Observations and Resommendations of the SIRS

The SIRE reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

UNCLASSIFIED

r?

To: Directer's Of?ice Frem: Inspection
Re: 11/22/2010

cperatienal Standpein: (if any}; (3) provide rec
concerning training and/or safe: issues; and (4
reCOmmendatiens for administrative action if dee

emmendations
provide
med necessary.

if]
1?

SIRS members unanimously recommended that be
be censured and suspended from duty for a pericc t-ree b?c

says Ln regard to this shooting incident.

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

To Directer?s Office From: Inspection
Re 


Set Lead 1: (Action)
INSPECTION

ET WASHINGTOHJ DC

 

ed and Suspended

That SAI lbe cans 
I ga to this shooting

ram for a period 0: three days in






Set Lead 2: (Action)

OFFICE

 

 

AT OPR FOE DC

That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, raview the
recemmendation and adjudicate this incident accardingly.

1b 6

 7, 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 Mr. Murphy, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7&2?
I - USJGJ
1 a USDOJ
I MV. Jahns?n, Room 3280
1 Quanti;
I - Quantico
1 Quantico
1 Laboratory
1 WFO
1 - 00m 6387
1 Ream 3J43
ii
UNCLASSIFIED

4

{Rut 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 

 

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: leBL/EGll
To: Inspection Attn: AD Amy Jo lyons
From: Inspection

Office of Insoections

Contact: I IExtension

 

 

 

 



Approved By: Lyons Amy Jo??lff

 

 

Love 
Drafted By: I 
Case ID Li 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT
DETROIT DIVISION to
10f28/2009 hie

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/28f2009, involvin Detroit
Special heapons and Tactics (SWAT) Special Agent 
Critical Incident Response Group (CIRC), Hostage
Rescue Team Sunervisorw Special Agent 
and Her seal and During the
execution of federal arrest warrants, the tour Agents returned
fire killing a Subject who fired three rounds in their direction
and resulted in the death of an HRT SIRG members
unanimously concluded that the use of deadly force by the Agents
was justified and no administrative action should be taken
against any Agent involved in this shooting incident.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Administrative: ReferenCe report of Inspector Kenneth L. Moore,
dated 

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRS with
referEnce to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

On during the execution of federal arrest
we rants at a planned undercover meeting, Lugman Ameen Abdullahknow as christo her Thomas was shot and killed bu members
1

UNCLASSIFIED

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 

of the Detroit Division SWAT team and the SIRE, HRT. Four Agents
returned fire after the subject fired three rounds from his Gioch
nine millimeter weapon in the direction of the Agents which
resulted in the death of an HRT 

Abdullah was the leader of a nationwide radical
fundamentalist Sunni group whose primary mission was to establish
an ?Ummah,? a separate Islamic state inside the United States
governed by Shariah Law. Investigation revealed Ahdullah and his
followers, many of whom were conviCCed felons, trained regularly
in the use firearms, martial arts, and sword fighting.
Additionally, investigation determined Abdullah advocated
violence against the government and law enforcement.

In October 2008, the Detroit Division initiated an
UnderCD Operation targeting Abdullah who, along with his
associat s, were knowingly involved in receiving and sellin
stolen property from interstate shipments.

On a briefing regarding the impendin
arrests of Abdullah and his associates was held at an 

I I The briefing was held
to review the operations order, tactical assignments, and conduct
rehearsals of possible arrest scenarios 



i (I) (ll

I Additional 
Acting Associate Division Counsel SAI I

 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge

 

 

 provided Special Agent in Charge (SAC) 
Andrew G. Arena with a_summar and progress of the plan. SAC -b5
Arena requested that etermine if any alternative big

re 7? 
at.) .1

methods of conducting the arrests or locations for conducting the 
arrests provided a safer scenario. SSA

land the Detroit SWAT Team to explore other

options for the arrests for consideration by SAC Arena,

on lOf22f2009, asacl:l ass I 5a

and SWAT Senior Team Leader (STL) met
with SAC Arena to discussl I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

To: inspection From: Inspection
Re: 297?Ho?a227idsn?o, 03/31/2011

 

 

 

 

On 10/23/2009, Detroit management and two HRT SSAs met
a" the Detroit Field Officel 
I rEne ear sees
believed the clan was tacticallv sound and reasonable. Believing

J.
additionall 

asac  land HRT ssAl

Arena of the HRT 5 assessment and obtained sac a: 
I sac Arena als:

official request for HRT assistance.
On 10/25/2009, the updated
operational plan to the SWAT Team an HRT members which included

At the conclusion of the briefing, SWAT and HRT
partiCLpantsI kg?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lsal I

 

 

 

lsal

 

 

 

 

On le27f2009, an all participant briefing was held to
review the operations order, assignments, contingency plans, and
the FBl's Deadly Force Policy. Following the briefing, an
executive briefing regarding the arrest plan was provided to
senior members of the Dearborn Police Department (DPD), Detroit
PD, and the Wayne County Sheriff?s Office.

Dn the Evening of 10/27/2009, ASAQ I Ireceived an
email message from case A entl Ireoardino new
information obtained from

 

ch
l?D

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 03/3lf2Dll

On at approximately 8:00 Detroit SWAT
and HRT teams assembled at the designated staging area. STL
conducted a mission brief and received brief backs

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Prior to the departure oi assembled personnel, SAC
Arena addressed the group reminding them to have trigger and
mission discipiine and remain focused on their assignments.
At approximatelv 9:30 the tactical team were
transoorted covertlv tol I



 

 

 

 

At the completion or the brieiing, SWAT and HRT operators
proceeded to their assigned positions in the warehouse awaiting
the arrival of the subjects.

At approximately 11:d3 Abdullan and four bf?
companions arrived at the warehouse  bib

 

 

 

 

assumed control of the scene and hes 
countin down from five. When the count reached ore. PET QAI I g?
detonated diversionary devices and STL I -V

I 5b 
instructed the arrest team to ?execute.? The tactical teams
quickly exited their rooms and moved to cover positions. Th

 

 

 





UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: Egl?HQ?n1271480e?, 

diversionary devices startled and disoriented the subjects who
attempted to find hiding places and/or exit the warehouse through
a locked door. all of the subjects were forced to return to the
immediate loading deck area of the warehouse.

At the command, ?shields up,? three shield teams
advanced forward while the team moved forward toward the
north wall, in the direction of the subjects. As the arrest team
moved forward, loud and repetitive commands of get down,?
were given. As the team reached the end of the counter near
the trailer bay doors, the remainder of the arrest team cleared
the danger areas and formed a half circle. According to the
participants, repeated loud and clear verbal commands were iven
to the subjects, identifying the arrest team as FBI and
instructing the subjects to assume a prone position with their

hands visible. he the commands were given, three of the five
subjects assumed prone positions in front of the trailer
containing the televisions. A fourth subject laid prone behind a
pallet partially loaded with televisions; however, abdullah
continued to disobey law enforcement commands. He moved into the
trailer containing the televisions, peering out as arrest team
members approached. As law enforcement personnel continued

shouting commands, Abdullah moved into a prone position hiding
his hands beneath his body. Law enforcement personnel instructed
Abdullah to expose his hands and was told if he continued to
disobey commands, a dog would be released. Abdullah maintained
hi ion with his hands tucked underneath his body. HRT SA
was told to move up wi HRT ?Freddy.? 
moved forward with 52% to serve as his cover team.

 

Af"er anduilah failed to comply with additional

 

 

 

 

commands, SA released ?Freddy? towards Abdullah. ?Freddy?
bit the subject in the upper portion of his left arm and the palm ha
of his left hand. sal Iobserved what appeared 579

 

to be a pistol in hbdullah's right hand and yelled ?gun,
gun." Abdullah fired three rounds, striking the at least

twice. Fearing for their lives as well as the safety of ether
team members, four arrest team members returned fire striking

Abduilah with each round.

 

 

SAsl I and I Imoved into
the trailer to secure Abdullah. Roiling him onto his chest and
handcuffing him, SA recovered the subject's ?eapon and SR

the weapon. At that time, SA a SWAT
Operator/Tactical EMT, conducted an initial assessment and
advised Abduliah was deceased. The remaining four subjects were
handcuffed and turned over to the prisoner handling team.

UNCLASSIFIED

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 03/31/20::

 

Shortly after the shooting incidentr STLI I
ised the Command Post/Tactical Operations Center and the
est team members at the scene that Adbuliah and ?Freddy? had
shot, five subjects were in custody and a MEDIVAC was needed
the ?Freddy? was transported via ERT helicopter to the
inarian Emergency service for treatment; however. he died as
of his injuriesSTLI Icontroiled the scan a
members of the eve to respond to the warehouse to assess the
subject. ava responded at approximately l2:l7 however,
they were initially prohibited from entering the scene for
approximately ten minutes by the DPD who had units controlling
the perimeter. units were not familiar with the Eva?s role
and were unaware they had been contracted bv the FBI to provide
emergency medical services. SAI Isubsequently
noticed the Hva was waiting to gain access to the scene and
arranged for EVA Paramedics to enter the warehouse. Paramedics
determined the subject was deceased and assessed there was no
need to attempt resuscitation.

Dn Wayne Count Pro3ecuting ttorney

briefed on the incident. recused her
sed on the long?tern federal nature o: the

gation, classified portions of the investigatiOH, and her
that her office would not have complete access to possible t6
federa rand 'ury or Title information. Prosecuting 
Attorney requested the Office of the Attorney General for
the State ichigan conduct an investigation.

nd arranged for

 

 

 

 

Ell 

.1.

HM)

DJTH

ice
vesti
lief





On Inapector Moore and command staff
met with the Bureau Chief of the Michigan Attorney General?s
Office and provided a briefing of the incident to him and staff
members. a second meeting was scheduled for to allow
a representative of the Attorne' General?s Office to review
signed sworn statements and other evidence.

On 10/13f2010, the Civil Rights Division, United States
Department of Justice, concluded no federally prosecutable civil
rights violation associated with the evidence existed.

On the SIRE met to discuss the above?
captioned shooting incident. Chief Inspector Donald E. Gswald,
Office of Inspections Inspection Division chaired
the meeting and was a non?voting member. The following voting b5
mem ers were in attendance: I [Trial AttorneyI E70
1 Rights Division, Attorrev. Criminal
sion, assistant Section Chief {soil I


cJ'" 
nt Crimes action. crimina- investigative Division. Unit

 

(J'j .-

UNCLASSIFIED

6

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 03f31f2011

 

 

 

 

Chief [UCpl IFirearms Training Unit, Training
Division USI I Defensive Systems Unit, 
UCI Special Weapons and Tactics Operations

 


init,

ical Incident Response Group; SSAI I
ive Law Unit, Office of General Counsel SSAI I


Evidence Resnonse Team Unit Laborator


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SSAI IFractical Applications
tnit, and SSAI I Washington Field
?ffice. Inspectors Eric S. BirnbaUm and Kenneth L. Moore b5
attended to present the Kansas City and Detroit shootings to bio
board members. The following nonevoting members were 1 
attendance: Inspector anr?l Rroots OI, SSA

earn. in: ssal I Legal Instruction Unit,
UCI Strategic Analvsis Section 
Ins?ection Management Unit UC 
Inspection Analysis Unit Manacement and Program
see, ISoecial
Adviser, I SAS, IMU, and

 

ass, IMU, insn.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
intent to: evaluate the application of deadly force;
3 provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
servations, and recommendations fer corrective actions from an
rational standpoint (if any); provide recommendations
cerning training andfor safety issues; and provide
commendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

Inspector Kenneth L. Moore, who conducted the shooting
investigaLion, provided SIRS attendees an in-depth review of the
incident, including video taken during the operation.

SIRS members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by the Agents was justified and in conformance with
the FaI's Deadly Force Policy. This resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action should he takes

 

 

 

 

 

against seal?  snl I
and SAI  as a result of their involvement in
this shooting incident.

t?r
?Hi 

.


3

4

SIRS members unan'
observation! instruction i
Review Team 

mouslv adopted the following
at ied by the Shooting Incident

 

 

OBSERVATION as] I eras, ear, aid 
wear his issued ballistic ves: during the operation as mandated
by Btreau policy.

UNCLASSIFIED

7

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 

The Manual of Tnvestigative Operations and Guidelines
States ?Wearing of body armor by BA personnel is mandatory
during planned arrestsr execution of search warrants and
surveillances which can reasonable be expected to culminate in a
confrontation with armed and dangerous subject?sj.?

INSTRUCTION: That Assistant Director (AD), CIRG, ensure

.C

ators comply with the MIOG requirement sniper

This matter will be discussed with the AD, CIRG, to
ensure future compliance.

Additional areas of discussion centered aroundl I
r_
I as well as the utilization of less than
lethal force methods during the apprehension of subjects.

 

 

 

 

A second DQJ representative noted the operator had no
cover and queSCioned why an available ballistic shield was not
used during the operation. Members advised that once deadly
force is applicable, a shield protects the per5on holding the
shield but does not protect all persons involved. The second
comment made by the attendee pertained to less than lethal
options that could have been used instead of deadly force.
Members emphasized the fact that use of a canine was a less
lethal option and the distance was too large for the user of
tasers.

UNCLASSIFIED

8

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re: 03/31/2011

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

DC

RT WASHINGTON.

That no administrative be taken against SSA

ISAI ISAI I and SH
 as a result of their use of deadly

in this shooting inoioent.

Ll

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 Mr. Murphy, Room T142

1 Mr. Harrington, Room 7142

I Ms. Caproni, Room 742?

USDOJ

1 - USDOJ

- Mr. Johneon, Room 3280
(Attention:

I Quanrioo

1 Hanfiro
(Attention: I

1 Quantloo

1 - Quantieo

1 Laboratory

1 I 

1 Room 638?

1 - Room 3043

#0

UNCLASSIFIED

9

 

 

 

 


0'

E1)
ET)

b6



 

(Rut. 

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROITINE Date: 
To: Attn: Attic? RE Kenneth L. Mccre

From: Inspecticn
Gfiice oi Inspections
Contact: I 

 

 

 

 

Approved By: Mccre Kenneth 

 

Drafted By: I Iiin
Case ID 
Title: SHOOTING INCIDENT

DETROIT DIVISION
IEHEEHEOOQ

 

 

      
 

Synopsis: The Sheeting incident Review Group (BERG) reviewec a

shooting incident that occurred cn IQHBEIEDDQ, involving Special

Agent (3A3I let the Detrcit Divisicn. During the
apprehension cf subject esce_ "1 tcdy whiie in the Flint,

Michigan Resident scency se fired five rcunds from

his Bureau?issued Ccit mcdei n4s1 ri is, killing the subject. he
SIRS members unanimous reccmmended that ne administrative MIC

ns

in

action he taken age; a result of his 


J.

in this sheeting incident.

Administrative: Reference report of Inspector Joseph S.
Campbell, dated IEK2EXEGIO.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis. comments, and recommendations cf the SIRS with
reference to the captiened sheeting.

Details of the Shooting Incident

In December 2009, a member of the Genesee County Safe

 

 

 

 

 

Streets Test Force hrietet FRA St ertiscry Se t6
Resident Agent on the status ct aT:ff::] 
I Iinvestigaticn. to Task Fcrce Otiicer m7;
I encugt crcbeble cause existed to arrest

Kenneth Hose-Alce Muse fer the state criminai charge cf

 

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 0
I?l
1

?pection ?rom: IUSpection


7'3 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

en and
diseussed an arrest p-en to apprehend Muse
Arte: rustle? various detebese rheroics, Le TFOs began I
surveillance sf Muse's lest tnosr 're "e F_int TF3 FF
also cont?eted Parole Toent of the Flint ?er:ie 
office. In order to err st Euse it a relet.weij secure and safe 
oustion, tiet FA teleohonicelly contest
Muse to schedule ruse parole meeting for ti?n 'hing oi
at the Flint Perole Otiiee. TFCI Isubseduestlv
irieted the errest pier.
On a search werre?t for
Ense?s lest knewn residence end drafted a state criminal err st
re?t warren: for Muse which was to
a 

affidavit to obtein en er
IF


be
issued the followin' mo .ing. On 12f22f2609, white wei ing for
the judge, TFOI leoordineted Muse?s nlanned anoeerence the he
parole office with his

them to arrest Muse on probeble if he arrived at the parole
office prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant.

A short time let I, PAI lephohed 
ea ?3

informed him Muse had arrived 15 minutt"


3 

escempanied by his mother and girlfriend. 
-: so 1im,


 

 

bserved Muse*s arrival, entered the ne . i
and transported him to the PEA while TF the
arrest warrant.

 

Upon arrival at the FHA, Muse was escorted and placed
in tn: polygraph/processing room by TFO The subjeet was
placed in a eheir with one wrist to a well mounted
restraint bar and his opposite wrist unSeoured. TFOI I t6
:eme?ned in Lhe room with Muse end sweited TFQI I arrival. 

st approximete 11:06 
the authorised arrest warren;
for an unrelated meeting. 
Muse from the 


of!


r+?ti? 
DJ
til-'5'}

 

(lrfriLl




-.J

sing room Lo a
_wfeonference room for interrogatior. Muse steted he did he?
to do best to prison and althouah I

{Tl (J



e-{D 1"

I) E).



 

1i
513

 

 

 

 

Muse's mother and girlfriend arrived It the FRA to
Obta?? infer Muse A short "i-e later, Muse's lengetime
arrived met tn the sibjeot?s e6
motier end girlfriend ans estorted them to the *oow wdere Ease 
had been interrogated. in one presence of ??0s I
they were permitted to spear ts Muse. Following a brief
the subject's tlrlirlehd wee esoor*ed beet 0 tie

UNCLASSIFIED

2

- 



rom: Inspection
THEMEDL 12/02/2011

I. Muse from the interview room hack to
polygraph/processing room, place him in a ehair, and

secured and handcuffed he or his wriSLs to the wall mounted
estraint oar. TFO the last resoon ?t?e for
as 


securing Mose, exited the room i vino him thattit'

 

 

 

 

 

At that point, andl [interviewed I6
I who stated she was familiar 
withl rand advised she I I hag

 

she knew nothing  
I

 

I
I 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

when he arrived at her resideneel I
lfinished his line of dues-iotins and
exited the room leavingl land TFO in the interaiew
room.

Although handcuffed and restrained oy one Wrist to tne
wall mounted restraint barf Muse was able to slip his wrist from
the handeeff and free himseli. Muse exited the security door
leading to the RA lobby, met his girlfriend, and they proceeded
to the as parking lot.

At approximately l2:48 inside
the room where Muse nao been restrained an saw he was gone. TFO F,
Checked the adjoining areas and telephonioaliy EEC
contacted Ito advise of Muse's escape. After 
determining the Chevrolet Avalanche belonging to Muse's mother
was not in the parking lot, radioed police dispatch and
placed a lookout for the vehicle.

 


n.

 

the FRA breakroom and requested that
in the hallway Lo discuss the sit'ation.
After learning of Muse?s escape, adviged Pri?ci a1
Relief Supervisorl  and 

 

or the situation.  also advised he had to leave
i Ah for a scheduled in the Detroit office. TFO
advised bf Muse's esoa was told to,

"find Nose and inform of his capture!"  indim he 
would, "take care of the FBI side." at that time, SEER did 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PL.-
noL not?fy the ESAC or SAC of the escape. 
IandI land tor the
prior planted search warran at Muse's last known residence 2:
was anticipated Mose may have stopped at the residense foi_ow*n
his escape. a verbal operations plan was developed for the
potential search and apprehension of Muse at tis residence

UNCLASSIFIED

 

To: Inspection From: 
29T?H?eelgfl?s??D, 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

?oon their arrival, and enecfed and
announced the oresence of law enforcement. Ins'dc toe residence
werel I an female, and the :enale's
infant. WTQs and eoents secured the perimeter of the residence
red conducted a search Three firearms were found and
torfiscatsd; however, Muse was not located-
to 6
st anorex-mate E70
the slack colored Chevrolet being
driven in the vicinity nt Winona Street. as called Sh
his assistance and attempts were made to
locate a marned solicc vehicle to find and stop the subject
vehicle Before the marked police vehicle arrived, the Avalanche
pulled _nto a driveway and stopped. The tnree occupants of 'he
veh?cle were called out into the street. after interviews of tee
occupants were completed, two were taken to another location
whl'e the third, who claired to rave knowledge of Muse's
location, stayed with TFO
informed confidential sourCe
recently observed Muse at the Vincent Court Apartments in Flint.
although no specific apartment 'as identifie' a deneral
descri tion of the building was relayed. SAs and be
as well as TFO denarted the FRA enroute to toe bl?
apart? a. Additionally, s-s Iandl [along with
proceeded to the apartment complex.
Efforts were coordinated to sorround the per meter of
the anartments with additional uniformed law enforcement
personnel. Shel as well
as initially set up surveillance outside
tne date of the apartments. The complex consisted of three
separate bdild_ng structures, each containing multiple townhouse
style floor plans

Based on the initial description of the apartment
provided by it was believed that Muse may have been
secluded in the south building structure. When the marked 3335

 

 

     
    
   

  

oatrol vehicles arrived in the vicinity, Shel and
advanced forward into the on o7 

 

 

ealing ti -ves
behind a metal garbage dumpster. SA and TFO Iset
up a rear perimeter around tie side as rear of the sout? 
building structure while TFol Iremained on the street just 33F

 

outside the complex.

at the complex the confidential
source who identified the specific location where Muse was last
observed. relocated the source at an undisclosed

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 

To: Inspection From: Inspection
Re 29T?HQ?hl2ll?gd?D, 12/0233011

location, returned to the scene, and parked in front of the
complex.

 

Genesee County Assistant rosecuting Attorney seen;
the radio traffic and telephone calls and
deserved tex;?emai? messages or device
Based on the inter?. 1? "e i?
information from t' c' 
escape, and the re
authorized an exig . 
apprenEHd Muse. E20
Shortly after 2:33 TFD ex ted his uehi la
and without stopping or communicating, walked past all law
enforcement personnel set up at the adjacent south hu lding

 

 

1
structure and proceeded to he east buildini st ucturc.
Displaying only his agencv badge, TFGI lkrocvod on



 

 

the door
oil I I andl I F,llowed my
other law enforcement personnel, left their concealed positions
to stare aimed TFOEmoved to cove:
the rear of the east building a ruc ure.

 

After TFO knocked on the apartment door, a
juvenile African AmerLCan Lemale opened the door. TFO

identified himself and asked if Muse was inside tfe anartment.
after replying negatively, the juvenile indicated

 

 

 

 

(Musel was upstairs hv oointing in d? *ction. TFDI ric

followed ov heal I ano along Wlt? 

Deputiesl land I entered the apartment

 

 

after being permitted entry by the juveni e. after a short
interview with the juvenile, the law enforcement team moved
forward to conduct a safety check of the residEDce.

 

moved along the wall on the main
floor toward the kitchen area, clearing the dinino room/Kitchen

area. As the main f'oor was beiro re?, TFO an
Deputy and Deputy eacended the stairway

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

toward the upstairs level accompanied by the juvenile. Team
members announced, ?Sheriff?s Office? and - nultiple
occasions while calling out Muse?s name. As SAI entered
one bedroom, he was met by a female, later identified as  I

who was escorted to another room with the juvenile. he
loservin the subject in a crouched position behind one of the h?c
nods, Sh directed Muse to show his hands. Ignor'g law
enEQICemen commands Muse aggressivaly lunged toward SAI

 

q?
and attempt his rifle. As Muse began to
scuffle, Sh the floor with Muse on top of him.

b?l 1
perce'vino an imminent threat of death or serioi 'odily harm, 3a
fired five rounds striking Muse. TFO heard the

UNCLASSIFIED


1
'1

$13

ED 


:1




5

To: inspection From: lnspoC'ion
1 

 

 

commotior and ran to assist firing two rounds from his
pietol. One round W?se in the hack of the head and the
secono route street Si in the foot

Due to the absence of em:rgenc) mnoi;:i sernites it the b6
scene, were dfleL to a nosoital _r a tatrc; bl?
vehicle. a: DECS DepotyIParame.ic, who hai assisted with
trovidind perimeter support during the arrest, determined Muse
eas not breathing. She telephoned a Hurley Medical Center
Emergency physician to advise of her assessment. The doctor

concurred and pronounced deceased,

 

 

sa recoVered from his injury.

 

nmediately followino the shooting, ss
-o telephone SSRA to advise of the iHCident. The

 

 

 

 

attemoted 
call failed and ss  telepsonicallv contacted so

a

I at the FRA who contacted SSRAI lat the Detroit
iold foiCe and irformed him of the incident. SSRAI 


 

 

oersonally contacted Special Agent in Charge 

hrer' anc Assistant Soecial Roents in Charge i k?
I and to advise of the incident. 

ETC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 12122I2GIC,Genesee Edunty Prosecutorl I
advised his ox old not authorize criminal charges against
Special Agent for his ctions in this incident. On
11/22/2310, Deputy caief ICriminal Section,

D-S. Department of Justice recommended the matter be
closed due to insufficient evidEUCC to support a prosecution


 

and the criminal civil rionts statutes.

an the SIRE met to discuss the above-
caotioned shooting inciden . Acting Assistait Director Jennifer
Smith Love, Inspection Division chaired the meeting and
was a non?voting memb r. The following voting membe were in
attendanc nna ef

 

 
   

inspections
Rights Divisi Trial Attorrev, Criminal
Division, use J: Assistant Section Chief (SC) 
Violent Criminal Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division;


L. Moore. Cni


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SC Robert Allan Jones. Counterintelligence Division: Acting
Unit Chief [soul I Defensive Systems Unit,
Training Division Acting Special
Weapons an: Tactics erations Unit, Critical InCident nesoonse
Group; SSA I lrvestioative Law Unit, Office of
General Counsel Acting DC I Evidence
Response Team Unit (ERTDB, Laboratsry Division lle, and see

I Washington Field OffiCC. The Following

 

non?voting members were also in attendance: inspectors April D.
UNCLASSIFIED

6

To: Inspection Frow: Inspection
Re: l2KO2f?Uli

Brooks, Joseph S. Campbeii, Deirdre L. Eike, and Steohen E,
Rietardson. OT. TMSD: assistartl
UCI ISLrategio stalys
oenmnit Uri}: TNSLU 193
End

. 
ivsis Unit [let]. hanagement and Eroorsm

CC 
ans; 5 Iness;  see, IRU, rose; and 
l:l5335, EMU, inst).

r" l'

15 b5
J. Ewe





 

 

 

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRE reviewed the see nopsised incident with
intent to: evaluate the app tion of deadlw force; 52;
'svide the Director with an evaluative analysis, obs-rvations,

recommendations for corrective actions from an rationel
ndpeint {if any}; provide recommendations concerning
ining andror safetv provide recommendations




Ii??



ED 'E'ji 








,1


issues; and 
administrative aotion if deemed neoessary,


El

U3

i '1

oenL provided by
reed that the use


b6

Ci
Inspector Campbell, SIRE members unanimously ag
ETC

of deadly force by Eel I was s_i,ied and in
conformance with the FEI's deadly force polioy. This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no administrative action be
taken against SA as a result of his involvement it this
shooting incident.

 

SIRE members unanimously adopted the following
observations and recommendations of the Shooting incident Review
Te

OBSERVATION sub-jac:
while in ous:ody, was left unatte

me: ?use was interviewed by 

Kennezh Moses~sloe Muse 
ndeo in the 

 

 

I I he was assorted bank to the polygraoh/orooessing

roam. While in the room, placed eg
Muse in a chair, and with a set of handouirs, secured and bit
handcuffed one of Muse's wrists to a wall mounted restraint bar;

Muse's opposite wrist remained unseoured. TFO then ief:

the room leaving Muse unattended.

Standard law enforcement praotioe indicates law
enforcement officers ere responsible for the weiiare and
condition of any prisoner brought into a temporary holding
{the supErvision, welfare, and seed ity of that
prisoner) u.tfl turned over to another law enforcement official,
detention iaoility, or released. Prisoners, whiie orosen: in an

UNCLASSIFIED

7

To: Inspection From' Inspection
Re: 

unmonitored temporary holding facility, should not on left
unattended. law enforcemen officers, while in a faci itv,
must maintain close guard over prisoners at all times.
Additionally, handcuffs are only a temporary restraining devise
and should not be intended for long term immo?iliration. Law
enforcement officers should still remain vigilant over such
temporarily restrained prisoners as a prisoner cause injd
to themselves in an attempt to defeat the restraining divine or
escape. Though immobilized, a prisoner should continue to as
evaluated as a threat to tne safety of themselves, the law
enforcement official, or to the public at large.

RECOMMENDAIION That SAC, Detroit ensure all law
erforocmen personnel [Agents and Task Force Officers: are aware
of the necessity to safeguard persons in temporarv custody as a
deterreit to injury or an escape attempt.

Prior to
a verbal Operations Plan did not 

OBSERVATION 

Aloe Muse ill,

the arrest of Kenneth Moses-

Prior to the entry of the 1222 Vincent Court Apartment
FER and personnel did not develop an oral operations plan
underStood by appropriate law enforcement participants.
According to MIOG, Part IT, Section ll-l.l, ?Certain situations
may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of the written plan in
exigent circumstances. Any oral briefing should follow the
requirements of written briefings by addressing five categories,
specifically, Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and
Equipment, and Control and Communications."

By properly planning and preparing for arrest

situations, the safety and effectiveness of Agents and officers
can be enhanced during high?risk situations. Understanding tnat
in :his exigent circumstance a written plan would have been
problematic, efforts should have been made to organize law
enforcement participants and develop an oral plan to encourage
safe and coordinated law enforcement activity. Activities that
may result in the arrest of a potentially dangerous subject :as
defined in MIDG) include: service of an arrest warrant; service
of a search warrant at an occupied residence or building; and
vehicle stops and surveillances conducted with the intent or
reasonaole likelihood of a resulting arresr of a dangerous
subject.

INSTRUCTION That SAC, Detroit ensure all FRA and
sworn law enforcement persinnei comply wit; the aoove NYSE

reosiroment.

UNCLASSIFIED

8

To: Inspection From: inspection
Re: 12/02/2811

OBSERVATION The FHA failed to establish and
maintain leadership following the escape 
fennetn Moses?aloe Mose iron the sen.

When a subiect in C'Stodv escapes [row an F31
maintained facility, an increased risk Of harm tc the public ano
additional criminal activity is created. This necessitates
expedient action by law enforcement to quickly resolve this
mat: To ensure the most effective execttion of this action,
leadership must engage and take control of the situation,

is centrii should include air ctino organized i teraeenov
efforts and communication with partner aoency command personnel
to ensure a coordinated, safe, and outcome.

After being informed of a euojeCt in custody escaping

or an FBI maintained facility, the FRA SSRR opted to travel to

IITL
(Ti 

a qua City to detain evidence to be returned to the sea, a
or of less importance which could have been rescheduled.

:3 FT 

THE

Whe a dangerous assignment arises in which the practical
application of firearms might be reasonabi? anticipated, the
supervising official should take personal responsibility. the
supervisor or his/her designated representative must assume
leadership in such incidents where liaison and moiti?agency

coordination may be necessary. Additionally, the supervisor
should oversee the planning and conduct of the Operation at hand,
as it is hie/her responsibility to ensure all participants are
aware of their roles and adhering to agency policy and procedure.

RECOMMENDATION That SAC, Detroit Field Office
srpervisorv personnel are aware of their leanership

OBSERVATION Upon the escape o" a prisoner from an
F3 maintained facility, Executive Managemen: overs ng the


facility was not appropriately notified or the i

With the exception of the flint SSRA, notification to
Detroit Field Office Executive Management as it pertained to
an escaped risoner from an FBI maintained facility was not
communicated. It was not until after the shooting incident
occurred that information relating to the initial escape was
briefed to EN. As a result, coordinating efforts between
jurisdictional law enforcement agencies occurred oniy after the
shooting incident.

RECOMMENDAEION That
notifications are made to EM i
from FRI space or personnel.

UNCLASSIFIED

9

 Inapection From: inapection
Re: 12f92f2011

OBSERVATION soon being permitted Agents ano

Law enforcement officers failed to restrict movement ano controi
ci a no*?law enforcement individuai, thee jeopardiaing ?ne saiety
i +'nose present; both oificers and individa'is.

es iaw enforcement UfchErs announced their presence at
the residence, a juvenile femaie was initialiy enCocnteredi The
juvenile 1nciicazed the subject was located in the upstairs area
of the residence. iiter a oriei interview and being nermitted
:etrv inside the residence, Agents and officers began to conduct
a ?safety ciear? of the residence in orcer to secure the scene
for further investigation. The juvenile was germitteo to
accompany the Agents and officers to the upstairs ievei ?nes
Agents and officers encountered the soapectr an altercation
quickly ensued which was allowed by gUnshots. As a result, the
suspect in this matter was mortally woundedr and one Agent
sustained injury. By being permitted to scoompany the law
enforcement team to the upstairs level, the juvenile was placed
in a position of potential danger andfor capabie of interfering

in tactical law enforcement action.

Restricting the movement of non?law enforcement
personnel for safety purposes and when tactical action is a
oossibility is an important function of responding
Additionally, restricting the movement of
non-law enforcement personne] is essential to maintaining crime
sienc integrity, officer safety, safeguarding evidence, and
P?nimizing contamination.

RECOMMENDATION That SAC, etroit ensure Special

Agents an? Task Force Ofiicers are aware ot the necessity of
securing and controlling non?law enforcement personnel for safety
purposes and when tactical actiOn is a possibility.

UNCLASSIFIED

10

1?1


To: Inspection

rom: Inspection
2o: 

lif?EfECll



Set Lead 1: (Action)


.1 . mJu.

a? o:

 

?ha* ho adrinierative ao*i3F o: takew agains_ SD
Ias a resoit of his use of dog 1% foroo in f??E

 

Ehoo2ing incident.

To 

Mr. Joyce, Room 7142 

Mr. HarringLon, Room ?142

Ms. Caoroni, Room 742?

USDGJ

I riqrw?j

I Room 32'6
{attention: I 

1 

r-Jn?l
I

 

 


I

 

 

 

 

(Attention: I I
1 QuanLioo
{Ptt??ti??i I
- Laboratorv

 

 

(Attention: I
Er. Jones, Room 9005
WFO

 

 

 

 

 

 

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UNCLASSIFIED



 

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a  f* :.53i5L ?j ;??E?E1i1f?2?2bi? Lf.i; 
51 ;f Hf5hiIJ,; ?if

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firaarms training; {agaidantally?jgc:g? }g;;jrfi

  gidiSQhaxggd GHQ E?u?d?fr?m Rig Glm?k MQdel i 

&thmatiC she gu5j-  

i' d??y 

firearms tr?iming*imgragard ?a
.. Sh?Gti?g i??i?gmt,* mH_ 3_    

 

       

 

 

I Jwah-
JiiFm..- th?~SIRGIwith  _w
Shmatinga--. Wm -., 

 



 

 

  
 
  
 

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?u;33_ . th? trigger th? pigt?li?augi?g ?ne  
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?r??mnigrimg?al imve?tigati?a ?ivi?imn; wait 
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y] @?f??giVQ-S??tama whit; 

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?Ei?igi@?: Egg Egg] I 
 i foi?B;??ThQ :9::thI

and .- . --  
Lg??l I Imgp?ati?? Ma?a?QmQ?t_8?it?frm?ip  
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  -   I.    I       

 

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duty -- mm a. ipariczd mf ,tmrm,  -.   

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u?m? ?rriVing latg t? a 3

a weapam Exam bahim?,tha firing lime-Whilg: ngg,w 

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. gamg9_an? any manipulatian mf_fir&arms within 

. be digcugg??.With th?;Tampg1 ?T5h
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ta enSuKe-SA 

 







 

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:14


 

 

   

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2010

 

______las

(Rev. O5O1-2OO8)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF ‘INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact:

approved By:

Drafted By:

11/24/2010

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Extension 4-1838

Lyons Amy Jo
Love Jennifer S
t

b6

b7 C

I

Case ID

#:

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
02/02/2010

297-HQ-A1271954-D

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 02/02/2010, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
While
Jof the Springfield_Division.
attempting to locate two fleeing subjects, SA J
Illinois
and
J
State Police (ISP) Sergeant (Sgtjl
Jencountered an
armed subject at the dooof a residence.
Fearing for their
Ifired three rounds each from
safety, SAl
land Sgti
their Glock Model 22 pistols, injuring the subject.
SIRG members
iended that no administrative action be taken against SA
1
i-romr
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Synopsis:

Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector
dated 05/14/2010.
Details:

L

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

b6
b7C

 To:
Re:

From:
inspection
Inspection
lg54_D, 11/24/2010
9
?HQ—A127
2
Details of the Shootinq Incident

While working with local law enforcement authorities in
n
tio
WAVE (Working Against Violent Elements>, Agents from the
era
Op
Fairview Heights Resident Agency (FH) were conducting
investjgajQ into gang/drug related activity in East st. Louj,
5
Illioj
.
5
On 02/02/2010, Federal, state, and local law enforcement
personnel attempted to interview four individuals located inside a
vehicle in the vicinity of a reported open air drug market.
The
four individuals fled the scene and were subsequently stopped
Two of the subjects were detained by local
several blocks away.
authorities and two fled the scene on foot.
Investigation determined a nearby residence was
with the subjects
Three State Troopers along with FBI
SA
proceeded to the identified residence to
conduct urt er investigation
SAand Sgt.
approached the front door of the residence while tw
roo ers proceeded to the rear of the house.
As SA
and Sgt.
knocked and announced their presence a subject, later
identified asj appeared inside the front door.
Law
enforcement personnel repeatedly announced vvPoliceIr and ordered
the subject to show both hands.
efused to comply with law
enforcement commands and was observed olding a black semi
automatic Pistol in his right hand.
cO

IEEEzj

Believing their lives were in d
his pistol toward them, SAafld Sgt.
rounds, injuring the subject.

e
fired multiple

Emergency Medical Services were notified andwas
transported to the Kenneth Hall Region Hospital for treatment
of multiple gunshot wounds.
Once stabilized, he was transported
to the St. Louis University Hospital for surgical procedures
was released from the hospital on 02/18/2010, and arrested
upon his release.
Captain
advised the ISP preferred
investigat be adudicate
the 0
e Federal Southern District
y
of Illinois.
Captain
advised it was not necessary to
obtain a local prosecutive opinion from the St. Clair County
District Attorney.
On 03/09/2010
a declination of prosecution
was received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the action of law enforcement personnel
discharging their weapons.

2

b6

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271954—D, 11/24/2010

On 08/10/2010, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love chaired the meeting and was a non—voting member.
The
following voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector
I Office of Inspections, Inspection Division
(INSD)
Fi’rial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ; I
I Trial Attrnev. Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Assistant Section Chief (SC> I
Violent Crime
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)I______
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (TD); UC
Defensive Systems Unit, TD; Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA) I
1 Special Weapons and, Tactics
Onerations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
ITnvpsitive Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA
Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory
Division; and SSA
CR-2, Washington Field Office.
The following non-voting members were lso in attendance:
Management and Program Analysts (MPAs)I
land
I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), Strategic Analysis
Section, INSD.

J

L

,

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The S1RG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to:
(1> evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2> provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actiors from an
operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA I
Iwas justified and in con±ormance with the FBI’s
deadly force policy.
SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
recommendation of the Shooting Incident Review Team:
RECOMMENDATION:
SAC, Springfield should consider
documenting a WAVE initiative Standard Operations Order (S0O)
detailing the roles of FBI personnel.
The SOC should contain the
FBI’s Deadly Force Policy and the locations of all trauma centers,
including their levels.
The SOC should also include guidance
regarding mobile arrest scenarios as well as criteria which wOuld
trigger the utilization of a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
team.
Additionally, it should include criteria regarding ASAC and

tYNCL.SSIFIED
3

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271954—D, 11/24/2010

All FBI personnel
SAC notification of initiative operations.
participating in the initiative should be presented with and
briefed on the SOC.
This matter will be discussed with the Special Agent in
Charge of the Springfield Division.

UNCLASSIFIED
4

 _______
________

To:

Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271954—D, 11/24/2010

LEAD(s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SA
1 as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident

L

1

1
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

—

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr
Mr
Mr
Mr
Mr
Mr
Mr
Ms
Mrs.

Room 7142
Room 7427
USDOJ
JSDOJ
Room 3280
Quantico
Quantico
Laboratory
b6
b7C

Room 3043

4,

tJNCLASS IFIED
5

 _______________jExtension

___

___________

___________

___________

___________

______

(Rev. O5Ol-2OO8)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF iNVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Case ID #:

I

4-1837

Lyons Amy Jo
Tnvp Jennifer Smith

Drafted By:

Title:

AD Amy J
0 lyons

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact:

Approved By:

12/13/2010

Jirr

b7C

297-HQ—A1271966--D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
TAMPA DIVISION
05/19/2010

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 05/19/2010, involving Special
Agent (SA)L
I of the Tampa Division.
During a confrontation with an amed and noncompliant suhect, SA
I fired two rounds from his Bureau—issued M—4 rifle,
killing the subiect.
SIRG members unanimously_recommended that
no administrative action be taken against SAl
las a
result of his use of deadly force during this incident.
Administrative:
Reference report of Inspectorj
dated 07/30/2010.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

SAl

II

UNCLASSIFIED

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 ____

____

____

To:
Re:

From:
Inspection
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271966_D, 12/13/2010

On 05/19/2010, he was traveling with SSA
n
a Washington Field Office 5ur nr
was a
AI
a training conference on the
_jand SSA
were departina the AFB in SAL
I Bureau vehicle. As they
approached the Dale Macry Gate, AFB Security Forces (SF)
Initiated “look down” procedures r
ultjn in the closure of all
S
entries and exits to the base.
]drove around stopped
traffic near the guard house, identified himself and SSAL
as FBI Agents, and asked f assistance was needed.
A SF officer
advised shots had been fired on the base and the subject, later
identified as Ronald lames Bullock, was on a motorcycle being
pursued lother officers toward their location.
The officer
asked SAL
and SSAL
if they were in Possession of
long guns.
S
advised he had a long gun, parked his
vehicle, and retrieved his FBI—issued M—4 from the rear storage
container of the vehicle.
SAL
put on a Special Weapons
an Tactics (SWAT) tactical belt and holster which contained his
Bureau-issued Glock pistol, three extra magazines, handcuffs,
SSA
batonnd mace.
assumed a oosjtio of cover next
to SAL
vehicle.

Z1

contj
Officer
d pursuit of Bullock while SR
sand SSA_________ assumed positions of cover.
As
Bullock struck a perimeter barrier cable with his motorcycle,
seven officers enpaged in the oursuit exited their vehicles and
assumed OO5tOfls behind him.
Bullock crossed the barrier cable,
produced a knife, and threatened SE’ Dersonnel.
He oroceeded in
the direction of SF Officers and SAL
1 As Bullock

advanced, officers verbally directed him to drop the knife and
get on the ground.
Bullock continued his approach, making
threatening gs:ures with the knife as he shouted “kill me, just
kill me.”
SA
yejled, “FBI, drop the knife, drop the
knife.”
Failing to obe
forcement commands, Bullock
briskly moved t ward SA
As he moved within three to
four feet of SR
ncpntinued to make threatening
movements with his knife, SAL
feared for his life and
fired two rounds from his M-4 striking Bullock in the chest.

Immediately following the shooting, two SF officers
ed
oach
Bullock who was face down on the ground.
appr
Bullock
struggled with the officers as they attempted to remove the knife
from his hand and apply handcuffs.
After a short struggle, the
knife was removed from Bullock’s hand and he was handcuffed with
his hands behind his back.
One officer rolled Bullock onto his
back and checked for a pulse with negative results.
SF personnel
began cardiopulmonary resuscitation until Emergency Medical
Service personnel arrived and determined Bullock was deceased.

UNCLASSIFIED

bE

b7c

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271966—D, 12/13/2010

On 11/04/2010, the Hillsborough County State Attorney
opined SAl
lactions did not violate Florida state
statutes and declined prosecution in this matter.
On 08/18/2010,
the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
advised no federal criminal investigation was warranted regarding
the actions of SAl
during this incident.
On 12/07/2010, the SIRG met to disc
hmT—
cap:oned shooting incident.
Chief :nspec:or
Office of Inspections (01) , :nspectior. Division (INSD)
chaired
the meeting and was a non-voting member.
The following voting
members were in attendance: L.
I Trial Attorney,
Civil Rigots Division, USDCJ,
ria1 Attorney, Criminal
Division, USD00; Assistant Section Chief (SC) T
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal investigative Division; Unit
Chief (UC)I
IFirearms Training Unit, Training
Diion (TD); UC1 Eefensive Systems Unit, TO;
jiaeapons and Tqctics Ooerations
UI
Unit, Crttioa Incicent Response Group; SSAI
Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel (OGC); SSA
I Evidence Resoonse Team Unit (ERTU), Laboratory
Division (LD) ; SSAI
j, Practical Applications
Unit, TD; and SSAI
[-2, Washington Field
Office.
Inspectors[
land
I
attended to present the Kansas City and Detroit shootlngs to
board members.
The fo’lowina non—voting members were also in
attendance:
Inspector
1
I 01, INSD; SSA I
Legal Instruction Unit,
I ERTU, LD; SSAL
OGC; UCI
Strateg
An’’
ic
i Snnn
,
Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; UCI
I SA

J

inspection Ana1is Unit (IAU), INSD; Mana ement and Program
Analysts (MPAs) I
Soecial
I SAS, IAU,
Advisor, INSD,1____________________ SAS, IMU, INSD; and
SAS, NU,

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Chief Inspector I
overview of the incident to SIRG members.
UNCLASS ZFEP

I

provided a brief

b5
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 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271966—D, 12/13/2010

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAJ______________________ was justified
and in
conformance with the FBI’s Deadly Force Policy.
This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no adrninjsrratjve
action be
taken against SAJ
las a result of his use of deadly force
in this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED
4

b6

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271966—D, 12/13/2010

LEAD(s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

I

DC

That no administrative action be taken against GA
las a result of his use of deadly force
in this shooting incident.

I
1

Mr. Murphy, Room 7142
Mr. barrington, Room 7142
I
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
1-Mr,
gDOJ
IrlSflQJ
1—N
-

b6
b7C

-

—

1
1
1
1
I

1
1
1
1

—

-

—

—

-

-

-

—

-

Nr.
IRoom 3280
(Attention:
Mn
Mr.
IQuantico
Mr.
Juantico
(Attention:
Mn
uantico
Mr.l
Mr. f
Quanrico
Mr.1
J, Laboratory
FO
Mr.l
Ms.
I, Room 6387
Mrs.
Room 3043

I
I

UNCLASSIFIED
D

 ed

(Rev 05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Data:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

12/10/2010

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of Tnsnections
Contact:

[

Approved By:

Lyons Amy
Tôve Jennifer

b2
ro
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Draf ted By:

L

Case ID #:

297—HQ—A1271788—D

Title:

7

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
06/16/2010

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 06/16/2010, involving Special
Agent (SA)l
1°f the New ‘fork Fi1d Office. During
the execution of an arrest warrant, SAl
Ifired three rounds
from his Colt Model M4, .223 caliber carbine, killing an
attacking pit bull dog.
SIRG members rec?mmended that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
as a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident.

7

Administrative:
Reference Electrnnir (Thmmnnirtinn
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
07/26/2010.

J

pf
dated

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 06/16/2010, members of the New York Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) Team executed an rrest warrant in Jamaica,
New York.
SWAT operatorsj
landi
I were
assigned to the rear perimeter of the residence.
SAs[
land
two ladders against a large opaque fence located at
UNCLASSIFIED

b6
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 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re;

Inspectj
From:
71
2
7
8
1
-A
9
8
Q
2
-H
7
,
0
_

Inspection
12/10/2010

the rear of the Property Which as aPproximately six feet tall
vegetaj Covering the entire fence.
with overgrown 0
At aPproximately 4:44 a.m., the house was breached and
gs
an
hb
were deployed inside the residence and the back yard
as
fl
due to the presence of a dog pen COntaining pit bull dogs as well
as additional loose dogs in the yard.
As the flashbangs were
e
jump
deployed in the yard, a large pit bull 0
house
and attempted to jump
e to attack SA
The
charging dog forced SA Jump off Oder to avoid
injury.
SA
Fearing for SA
ired three
safety
rounds killing the dog.
On 12/07/2010
the SIRG met to disc
tor
d
g
ne
nt
tin
io
de
oo
pt
Chief InsPec
ci
Sh
ca
in
Office of Inspections (01), Inspection Divjsio
the meeting and was a flofl-v
e following Voting
members were in attendance:
Trial Attorney,
Civil Rights Division, USD0,
Division, USDQJ; Assistant Section chi (SC)
Violent
ctlon Criminal Investigj vlvisidp,
Unit, Training
ve Systems Unit, TD;
si
en
ef
D
Specia
Weapons and Tactics Operaions
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA
ative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel
OGC
d
Res onse Team Unit ERLaboraory
Evi
Practical Applications
Unit, TO; and
R 2
Washjn ton Fjeio
Inspect
Office
attended to present the
The fo
ng members were
board members
n
:i
e
c
n
a
01, INSD; SSA
nd
Legal Instruction Unit,
OGC; UC
s Section
SAS),
trategic An
ni
MU), INSD; U
SAS,
Inspection Managem
INSD; Mannt and P
Inspection Anal sis Urii
Analysts

bservatjo arid R
3
O
ecommentj
0

of the SIRG

The SIRO reviewed the above Synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
UNCLASSIFIED
2

b6

 UNCLASSI FlED
To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271788—D,

Inspection
12/10/2010

(2) provide the Director with an evaluative
analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corre
ctive actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
1nnirnr11]u concurred
SIRG
that the use of
deadly force by SAl
was justified and in
conformance with the FBIs Deadly Force Polic
y.
This discussion
resulted in the
idation that no administrative action be
b6
taken against SAl
as a result of his involvement in this
1
b7C
shooting incident.

I

UNCLASSIFIED

 nn

UNCLA.S S IFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271788—D,

Inspection
12/10/2010

LEAD(s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SA
a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
b6

las

f

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1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

—

—

—

-

—

—

-

Mr. Murphy, Room 7142
Mr. Harrington, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr.J
I USDOJ
I [LflQj
Mr.
Mr.[
Room 3280
(Attention:
Mn
Mr.
Quáiiflco
Mr.
(Attention:
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.I
Quantico
Mr.L
Mr.J
Laboratory
WFO
Ms.
I, Room 6387
Mrs.
Room 3043

I

,

—

I

—

—

—

-

—

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Mr.j

UNCLAS SI FlED

4

 ____________________

44

-

FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

I

Report of:
Date:

Uhf
DECEMBER 28, 2009

Case ID #:

297HQA1271741-D

Title:

SHOOTiNG INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE
NOVEMBER 18, 2009

Charactcr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

Special Agent (SA]
his home in Yorba Linda,
California, at :flO irp. on November 1, 2009, preparing to depart for a SWAT
operation. SAj
Iplaced two gear bags, one of which contained his FBI
credentials and his Bureau issued Springfield SWAT pistol, along with a cooler in his
garage, then partially opened the roll-up garage door to exit the garage on foot and
retrieve his dm2 deteçtioa trained canine from the backyard. As he neared his
backyard, SAL
hbserved a pickup truck, with at least two individuasin it U-turn
at the cul-de-sac adjacent to his home and drive back past his home. SAl
I
returned to his garage a minute or two later and encountered three white males in his
garage. SAl
I drew his Bureau approved, nernqp1ly owned, Sig Sauer P229, .40
caliber pistol and confronted the subjects. S
41
4
Iecajne involved in a
1
altercation with one ofthe subjects as the other two ran -from the garage. SAl
subsequently chased the third subject from the garage to a pickup truck, where the
other two were waiting. SAl
lattempted to stop the subjects from departing by
reaching into the truck to remove the ke s from the ignition. However, the driver put
the truck into gear and steered into S
hue accelerating. SAl
I feared he
would be killed or seriously injured, so he fired six rounds in rapid succession, hitting
the rear window once, the tailgate three times, and both right tires before he
determine4 the threat was no longer imminent. No one was injured by the shots, but
SA
ustained minor injuries during the struggle.

Office:

San Francisco

Iwas at

DETAILS:
Special Agent (SAj
kntered on duty on May 23, 1999. He
was assigned to the Washington Field Office (WFO) after completing New Agents
Training at Quantico, Virginix While assigned to WFO, jie servqd on an applicant
squad, a violent gang squad, and a fugitive task force, SAJ
oined the WFO
SWAT Team as an operator in April 2002. He transferred to the Los Angeles Field

This document contains neither recommendations nor aonalusioni of the FBZ • tt is the property of the WEt
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to he distributed outside your agency.

IbG
k7C

 _______

297-HQ-A1271741 -D
Office in November 2003 and was assigned to work violent gang investigations. He was
assigned to Squad 3 in the West Covina Resident Agency and served as the VjnInt gang and
Safe Streets Task Force coordinator. Since approximately February 2006, SAl
Ihas bçen a
SWAT operator in the Los Angeles Field Office. In addition to SWAT training, SAl
Ihas
received Safe Streets and a variety of other training related to tactics and violent crime. SA
ihas extensive investigative and arrest experience.
I
On November 17, 2009, S1
participated in early morning SWAT
operations with the Los Angeles Field Office SWAT Team. On November 18, 2009, SP4
I
was again scheduled to particjintj SWAT operations which etinired hi nrenee at 3:30
6
a.m. briefing. Therefore, SAI__Iwent to bed in his home ati
I Yorba b7c
Linda; California, at 6:30 p.m. (Pacific Standard Time) on lJovemker 17,2009. He slept soundly
until he awakened at 1:15 a.m. on Novepiber 1L8 2009. SAl
ot ready for work and began
to depart the residence at 2:00 a.m. SAl
Iwas wearing green military-style cargo pants and
a green jacket. He was not wearing anything that would identify him as an FBI Agent. However,
he was wearing an in-the-pants holster holding a Bureau approved, personally owned, Sig Sauer
P229, .40 caliber pistol, on the right side of his waist. The pistol, which holds 12 rounds in the
magazine and one in the chamber, was fully loaded with Bureau issued ammunition.
SAl
kxited through his kitchen into the attached, two car, garage. The
kitchen door enters the garage through the east corner. The roll-u two car garage door is on the
northwest wall and there is a window on the southwest wail. S
fe’s sport utility
vehicle, a silver Acura MDX, was parked in the garage, nose pointe in, on the left side, along
the northeast wall. The right parking space was not occupied by a vehicle. Once in the garage,
Iplaced a cooler, a backpack, and a “Blackhawk’ gear bag on an exercise mat, which
was on the floor on the right or southwest side of his garage. The backpack was unzipped and
contained, among other items, SAl
IFBI credentials and his FBI issued Springfield Arms,
model 1911, .45 caliber pistol. The pistol was fully loaded and in a holster on the top ofthe
backpack. SAniade one more trip into the house to retrieve his keys, then returned to the
garage to complete his departure.
S 41
Jpartiauy opened the roil-up garage door by using his automatic garage
door opener. SAl
[topped the door from raising when the door was approximately three to
four feet above ground level. The interior arage door light was illuminated and there was also
an exterior floodlight illuminated. S
ucked under the partially opened door to retrieve
his narcotic detection trained canine, which was housed in the backyar4, before loading his gear
into his Bureau vehicle. SAl_______ residence is the last home on the southeast side of the
strect, and there is a cul-de-sac just west of his residence. There are no houses situated directly
on the cul-de-sac. S
alked alongside the south side of his home as he walked east to
the backyard. As he neare e southeast corner of the residence, be observed a light colored
Ford F-150 pickup truck drive down the Street and U-turn at the cul-de-sac. The truck cpntinued
-Ibserved
back in a northeast direction, past SAl
Iresidence and out of his view. S?J
a whit male in the front passenger seat and the driver also appeared to be a white male. SA
ktopped apd waçched the vehicle for about five seconds because his neighbor had been
I did not believe the occupants of the truck could have seen him. SA
ized. SAl
1
burala
I
Icontinued mt
9 the backyard, opened a gate, and retrieved his canine from a temporary
holding pen, situated just inside the gate He attached a leash to the canine and broughther into
the front yard by the partially opened garage door. Although the canine was not barking, she was
excited and there was some noise made by the metal rings that attach her leash to her collar.
-

2

 S

297-HQ-Al 271741 -D
As he approached the south end of his partially opened garage door, he heard an
unknowr) male voice coming from within. The cml other occupants of the residence were SA
wife and liii
I
jS
elt down and looked into .age,
seeing a pair of legs standing in the garage just a ew ee
e roll-up door. SAL.......Jlrew
his Sig Sauer pistol and ducked back into the garage. S
‘macif standing arms
length from a white male, hereafter referred to as Subject
held his pistol in his
right hand, but retracted an dose tp his shoulder, and he extended his left hand in a defensive
position foç nrotecoa. SAI_
Identified himself and issued a command of “police, don’t
move. SP$
epeated the command and then noticed another subject, hereafter referred to
as Subject #2, standing on the exercise mat.next to his backpack that held his Springfield pistol
and his FBI credentials. Subject #2 was looking down at the backpack and his body was facing
northeast toward the Acura. Due to the positipnin’ nf Subject #2, SPI
Feared that Subject
#2 may have taken his Springfield pistol. SAl
ontinued to order the two subjects to get
down, repeatedly identifying himself as the p6u. ioth subjects froze, but neither obeyed his
commands to get down.
.

I

I

SAl
‘continued to issue similar commands to both subjects, when he
observed a third subject, hereafter referred to as Subject #3. Subject #3 was standing on the step
that leads from the garage into the kitchen. Subject #3 was looking at S
d the kitchen
door was ajar. SAl
hpld not be sure if he left the door ajar, or whe er u ject #3 had
ooene4 the door. SAL
Ihen begap addresing his commands to all three subjects. SA
concerned for his wife and I
I who were in the house, and he feared that the
subjects, who clearly outnumbered him, may have possession of his Springfield pistol. SA
j did not see the pistol in their hands and did not know for sure if they had taken the pistol.
Subject #3 then ran along the north wall, onth
ide of the Acura and
toward the roll-up door, which was still partially opencd. S
eared that Subject #3 was
moving into a tactical position, and be also observed that Subjects #1 and #2 started approaching
hrn •ubjct #2 thn moved toward the garage door while Subject #1 rushed and attacked SA
I
I S
ontinued to hold his pistol in his right hand in a retracted position, and he
ard Subject #1 by the hair and began pushing him back and down with his left hand. SA
I did not fire his weapon, but tried to maintain awareness of all three subjects while he
moved into a defensive position, and pushed
1 Suhi ec #1 to the ground. Subject #1 grabbed SA
I
hround the waist, in a bear hug, as SA
htrugg1ed to push him away. SAl_____
recalled that the strugl knnked thinas over in the garage. Subject #1 then “bucked up” an
began swinging at SA I
id a
1
S
LIid not recall getting hit, but later realized tlw’ h h
bump and some swelling on his foreheed, Subject #1 grabbed the right sleeve of SAl
I
hi forearm, while SAl
jacket,
Icontinued to hold his pistol with his right hand. At that
point, SAl
Ibegan swingina_at the head of Subject #1 with his left fist, possibly hitting
Subject #1 in the head. S4______ did not fire at the suiect hcause he feared that Subject #1
was so close that the round could hit both of them. SAl
I was able to push Subject #1 away
and issue further commands of “police, get down” or something similar. Subject #1 then ran
from the garage. This struggle lasted approximately 10-15 seconds.

SAl
]conducted a quick scan of the garage for other subjects, then began to
pursue the subjects, fearing that they may have his ureau-issued Springfield pistol. He pursued
Subject #1,
only about 15 yards in front of him, but was running north at a full sprint in
frnritqf SAl
Ihouse. Subject #1 was running toward the Ford F-150 pickup truck that SA
I
Ihad observed earlier. The truck was parked on the south side of the street approximately
3-4 houses northeast of Sf
jesidence. Subject #1 opened the driver’s door and got in,
3

6
7c

 297-HQ-A1271741-D
then closed the door as S
as at the left rear of the truck. As SAarrived t the
driver’s door, he observed t at t e driver’s window was rolled down about halfway.
I
SAk
stood by the left front quarter panel, facing the driver, as the mjrrnr nrçssed into his left
side
lower back. Subject #1 attempted to roll thç window up, as 54
I reached in and held the
window open with his left hand. SAl
Icontinued to hold his pistol in his right hand and in a
retracted position by his right shoulder. SAl
lordered the subjects to get out of the truck
and continued to identify himself as the police. SAl
Lommands were issued forcefully
and probably included some obscenities. SAl
bbserved three white males in the truck,
with two in the front seats and one in the right rear seat of the extended cab.

b6
ib 7 C

SAl
lealized the truck was runnixm. so he reached in with his left hand and
attempted to remove the keys from the ignition. SAl
Lvas pressed tight against the truck,
with his left hand over the steering column. SM
Jontinued to order the subjects out of the
truck as he tried to remove the keys, and Subject #1 slapped at his arm, while the others were
yelling. SAl
Iheard the engine
feared that he may be killed if he didn’t get the keys
out of the ignition. At that point, SAL_Jwas stil’ nressed tightly against the truck, with his
left arm inside the truck, almost to his shoulder. SAl
flaerd the enale race as Subject #1
turned the steering wheel sharply to the left, toward SAl
I SAl
Iheard a bang as the
truck’s manual transmission was shifted into gear, and he be! jeved Si4ject #1 was trying to run
him down. The truck lurched to the left, pressing against SAl
hiJA hc left arm
Ibody, 1
was caught within the driver’s window. The truck continued moving into SAl
Ichest,
striking his left leg and throwing him o’balane. As his face was pressed against the truck and
his arm was still inside the window, SAl
Imade the decision to
the driver because
he feared that he was in imminent danger, and going to be killed. S
ed six rounds
from his Sig Sauer pistol in very quick succession, less than two seconds. Even after his arm was
freed from the window his body continued to come into contact with the truck as it accelerated in
his direction. The first shots wre fire1 one handed with his right hand, but his left arm was
freed from the window and SM
lended in a standing twoS handed shooting position. SA
btopped firing when the truck was five to seven yards away and be realized he was no
I
longer in imminent danger.
SAranbacktowardhishouse andtriedto call 911 whilerunning,buthis
cell phone woulcLnçt work. He checked the garage to ensure there were no other subjects
present. SAl
Ichecked to see if his Springfield pistol was missing, and found that it was
still in the backpack in his garage. He then asked his wife to call 911, but subsequently called
himself when he realized that jiis wifç did not know what had happened. After describing the
events to the 911 operator, SAl
lunloaded his Sig Sauer and placed in on the kitchen
counter to comply with a request made by the 911 operator.
The Brea Police Department (BPD), which contacts with the City of Yorba Linda
to provide police services, responded, cordoned off most of the street, and conducted a
neighborhood canvass for witnesses. S
oprovided a short, public safety, statement to
the
Al
ladvised the first respon ing officer that he had slight pain in his lower back.
S
did not believe that anything was missing from his home.
At approximately 6:00 a.in. that same morning, the BPD received citizen’s
renort of a suspicious vehicle, a truck with possible bullet holes, which was located ati
I
I
J Yorba Linda, California. The BPI) responded and located the vehicle, which was a
Ford F- 150 pickup truck, California registrationi
‘The truck’s rear window was
shattered, and there appeared to be three bullet holes in the tailgate and two deflated tires on the
4

}b7C

 _____Idid

____incterstood

____

297-HQ-A1271741-D
right side of the vehicle. The pickup truck was registered t
1
Drive, Yorba Linda, California. The BPD arranged for SAl
identified it as the same vehicle that the subjects had fled in.

ho view the vehicle and he

I

contacted by the BPD and advjsed that her nickup truck had
Linda and it had bullet holes in iti
bdvised that
had been out with the pickup truck, but he was upstairs in their home. Subject
he BPD, who informed him of the damage to the truck and asked if he
stated that he was okay, then spontaneously stated that he didn’t have
stated that he had been using the pickup truck until 11:30 p.m. on 11/17/2009,
rked on Valley View, near his hoiid
I
jclaimed that he walked to
home and stayed there until 5:30 a.m.I
kiild not explain what happened to the
ie parked and locked the truck, but admitted that none if his pther keys were
admit
with
landi
I
during the previous evening
denied being involved in the burglary/assault, but male a
statement which indicated he was aware that the truck had been shot while driving away. I
I
was subsequently arrested by the BPD and he requested an attorney after being advised of his
Miranda Rights. I
us described as a white, male, DOB I
I height
5’7”, weight 155 pounds.
in,,
being in the truck that evening. I
Ihad
after the incident, and both admitted that they had been shot at, but no one was
I menti9ned .njnetlüg about a garage, but
Jasked why someone had shot at them.I
I
Icould nqt recall the details of whati
Ihad said.I
Iriade similar statements and
advise4
Ihat the tires had been shot out.
-

I
I was contacted by the BPD and FBI and placed under arrest by the
BPD. I
‘originally requested an attorney when contacted, but reconsidered er peaking with
his father. He subsequently spoke with the po “a iT th. flPTh
athnitte
ne truck and riding around with_______________________________
asked the other three, “you want me to go up on Valley View?
comment
as an offer to break into something. The four subsequently drove down a cul
I
in Yorba Linda, U-turned at the end of the cul-de-sac, and passed by a partially opened
garage floor. 1he garage door was approximately half way up, and the light was on inside the
garagei Ipulled over and asked
hidvid that he andl
jifhe wanted to hit it. I
I
exited the pickup truck, whilel
stayed in the truck.I
[tated tba4
I andi
I
went into the garage, under the dqorl
bw a do coming around the corner and a leash,
while he stayed atthe doori
he had a gun. I
Isaw a guy (SAl
I
I come ar
yelled “run” and he begai to rup toward the truck1
heard S
ying “get on the
ground.” I Iieard SA1 I say other things, including “what are you doing, get on the
ground.”
ttnn

I

Ian to the truck and got in the passenger sidel
I got back in the driver’s
side door and close4 the dqor; however, the window was down. Accordhg to I
I once the
door was closed, Sil
I came up to the driver’s door and pointed the gui ati
jhead,
saying “I’m going to flicking kill you! Get out of the flicking truck.” F
]tell SA
I heard I
I
TI give up, just don’t shooj)’I _Jbserved SAl
leach inside the truck, as if he was
trying to put the truck in “Park.” I
lso stated that SA I
Ivas leaping through the door
5

 ______land
__________ladvised
______

$

*

297-HQ-A1271 741 -D
and hai
un some sort of headlock. I J1aimed that
Ut U oi
as if to give
up, while he slowly placed the key into the ignition with
Lctated, “I’m
d. SAl
going to shoot you if you drive o” I
Irecalied that S
s were ir the vehicle as
i’egan to drive off, and SAl
I was screaming that be was going to kill I
I
I
drove off andieard 5-7 gunshots, with some striking the truck as he ducked for cover.
that no qne was hurt from the gunshots. However, one bullet struck
wherd
I was sitting and I
I felt something, but there were no marks on his person.
After leaving the area, they headed toward I
Icondominium complex, but could start to feel
the truck lean to one side.I
Isurmised that the truck was leaning because the tires had been
shot outj
propped them all off and said he had to find a place to park the truck.

I

Idid not get into a physical altercation with SAL
I
land he did not believe
Jsay “Police” during the incident I
Idid not hear SAl
Idid either.l
us
described as a white, male, BOB I
Iheigbt 6’O”, weight 140 pounds.
Iwas also arrested by the BPD and he admitted thati
I
I
he were in the vehicle. I
said he wa sleeviqg in the back of the truck when he
awoke and saw “some guy” (SAl
Iwith a gun tot
head, and yelling “get out of the
car.” I
Iclaimed that he was riding around with the other three, fhiuing in and out of sleep.
He recalled ending up jn a cuj-de-sac, but he fell asleep shortly after getting into the cul-de-sac.
When he woke up, SM
Iws yelling, “get oif fthC car, get out of the car, I’m going to kill
you, get out of the car!’
9
Iniay have stuck 14s hand in thç truck and
lbelieves.that SA I
struck [
Iheight
described as a white, male, DO
5’S”, weight 160 pounds.

J

us

lorange

Assistant District Attorney (ADAI
County District
Attorney’s Office (OCDAO), was initially assigned to handle the home invasion investigation.
He believed that another attorney from the OCDAO would be assigned to determine, whether SA
‘had violated any California state laws when he fired his weapon. On December 11 2flf9,
ADAI
Ldvised that he was also aa
determining whether SA I
had
violated any laws of the State of California.
basedon a review of
the evidence, and absent forensic evidence
d with
any crimes for the shooting incident,
been
stated I
formally charged with burglair and
lb 6
custody, even
lb 7 C
unable to identif’ either of them. A
that both
placed himself at the garage and he
SA
suhieqt in the garage, then chased
truck,
lip the dijver’s seat of the tn
that because
identif3l
I and no one placed
1
the
not be pursued furth
to plac
garage. According
ined in
Lvas intervi
incident, I
arrested. BPD advised
was
essentially homeless, having been thrown out of his parents’ home. L
vas
vehicle
as a wami place to get somç sleep that evening.
-

4 rviw nf rrirnin1 rnrd fnr tlw t1wç subjects jn4jcated that there were no
records forl
I had prior convictions for burglary,
receiving stolen property, possession ot marijuana, driving under the I
e of alcohol or
drugs, possession of a controlled substance, and a probation violation,
as on probation at

6

 297-HQ-A1271741-D
I

the time of the incident and had other arrests for which he was not convicted. I
1iad no convictions, but had been arrested for burglary.I
Ihad a conviction
for possession of burglary tools, although the sentence was vacated.
On January 4, 20 10,1
im
residential burglary. They were both sentence

o

ntered guilty pleas felony first-degree
o years in prison.

INSPECTOR’S OBSERVATION:

Observation: SAI
railed to maintain control of one of his firearms, leaving
it in an unattended backpack on the ttoor of his open garage.
Recommendation: ADIC, Los Angeles, should ensure Special Agent personnel
are reminded to maintain control of their firearms at all times.

7

I

 (Re45-O1-2OO8)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTiGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attn:

Inspection

From:

05/10/2010

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection
Extension 4-1838

Approved By:

0
Lyons Amy J
Love Jennifer S i
Galligan .Mary E
llh

Drafted By:
Case ID

It:

Title:

SHOOTING INOIDENT
DENVER DIVISION
10/08/2009

297—HQ—A1271466—D
-

L.

The shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
cident that occurred on 10/0872009, involving_Special
1
shooting ir
Jof the Denver-Division.
Agent (SA) I
Ishot
SAl
and killed an aggressive skunk while walking his two dogs in a
rural area of Wyoming.
SIRG members recoimndci that no
I as a result of
administrative action be taken against SAl
his involvement in this shooting incident.
Synopsis:

-

Administrative:
Special Agent

Reference Electron4c Communication of Supervisory
(SSA) j
I dated 10/14/2009.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference, to the
captioned shooting.
-

UNCLASSIFIED

 ___________________I,

.

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Enspection
297—HQ—A1271466—D, 05/10/2010
Details of the Shooting rncident

On the evening of 10/08/2009, SAl
Iwas
walking his two dogs in a rural area of Wyoming.
A skunk
exhibiting aggressive behavior attacked one of the dogs and then
sprayed SAl
land both dogs. After the dog f;eed itelf, the
skunk continued •its aggressive behavior toward SAl
land his
dogs.
L who believed the skunk was rabid, fired two
SA I
rounds from his Bureau issued Glock 22 pistol, killing the skunk.
SAl
‘transported .his dog to a veterinarian for
treatment.
The veterinarian instructed him to transport the
deceased skunk to his office and the test determined the skunk was
not rabid.
Ofi 03/03/2010, the SIRG met todiscuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love observed while Chief Inspector Mary E. Galligan,.’
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non—
-voting mmbr.
The following voting members were in attendance:
I
I
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ; I
I, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Section Chief (SC) Ralph Butler, CD—i, Eurasian Section,
Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson, Vio1en (rims
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC) I
I
I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (TD); UC
Defensive Systems Unit, PD; uci
I
SpeciaJ. Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical
Inridrii- Rçonse Group; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
I’
I
I, Practical Applications Unit, TO; SSAI
I
I Tnv1gative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA
I
I, Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; and
SSAI
ICR-2, Washington Field Office.
The
following non—voting members were also in attendance:
Inspectors
I Office of
landi
I
Insoections tQi), INSLJ; Management and Program Analyst (MPA) I
I
I
.Inspection Management Unit (IMUStrat.egic Analysis
Section (SAS), INSD; and MPAI
I IMU, SAS, INSD.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necssary.
t3NCLASSIFtD
2

 To:
Re:

I

From:
Inspection
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271466—D, 05/10/2010

SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
,ias justified and in conformance with the FBI’S
deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
recommçndation that no administrative action be taken against SA
las a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

UNCLASSIFIED
3

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
InspectIon
297—HQ—A1271466—D, 05/10/2010

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,
ThM

SAl
incident.

DC

n’ administrative action be taken against
I, as a result of his involvement in this shooting

7

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms.- Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Kowaiski, QSDOJ
Mr.j
I EJSDOJ
Mr. Butler, Room 5845
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
Mr.
I Quantico
Mr. I
I3uart±co
(Attention:
Mr.l
1
Mr.
uancico
1
Mr.
IQuantico
I Laboratory
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
IWFQ
1.
Ms.
room 6387
1
Mrs
I Root 3043
—

-

—

—

-

—

-

-

I

—

—

—

-

-

++
UNLASSI?XED

4

 (PAw. 05-01-2008)

UNCtASSI?IED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON
?recedence:
To:

ROUTINE

nate:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

AD Amy Jo Lyons

1

Extension 4-18.38

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact:

Approved By:

Dra.ted By:

05/lO/201’O

Lyons Amy Jo&7S
Love Jennifer SijW
Galligan_t1ary_ENV

I

11Th

Case ID

It:

Title;

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
10/16/2009

297—HQ—A1271895-D

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG)- reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/16/2C09, involving Special
Agents (SAs)l
I of the
land I
Philadelphia_Division.
During the execution of a search warrant,
SA8I
I andi
I shot and killed an aggressive pit bull dog.
SIRG member-s recQmmended_that no administrative action be taken
land I
against SAsI
las a result of their involvement in
this shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic_Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) 1
1 dated 01/06/2010.
This communication was prepared-to furnish the
Details:
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

 ___________-,

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, 05/10/2010
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 10/16/2009, Philadelphia Division SAs and members of
the Philadelphia Police Narcotics Field Unit executed a search
warrant at a Philadelphia address.
At approximately 5:3Op.m.,
personnel made entry into the house and observed a subject,. later
identified as I
I flee down to the basement area.
SA
and
Kj
I
I
I were the first Agents
to enter the house and immediately took a position at the top of
the basement stairs.
Both Agents yelled commands to the subject
to show his hands and surrender himself.
An aggressive it bull
charged up the bäement stairs toward SAsI
andI
I
Fearing for their safety, as well as the safety of othe± Agents
SA I
1 fired two rounds from his Colt, M—4 rifle and SAJ
I
fired one or two rounds from his Colt, M-16 rifle, fatlly
wounding the dog.
On 03/03/2010, the SIRG met to discus the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love observed while Chief Inspector Mary E. Galligan,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a hon—
voting member.
The following voting members were in attendance:
I
L Soecial Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ;I
I Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Section Chief (SC) Ralph Butler, CD—i, Eurasian Section,
es
4
Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson, Violent r
SectioN Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief .(UC)I
I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (TD); UC
Defensive Systems Unit, TD; UC I
I
I, Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, CritLca1
Incident Response Group; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
I
Practical Applications Unit, TD; SSAI
I h7
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA
Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division;
and SSA
CR-2, Washington Field Office.. The
fo11owing non-vp
also in attendance:
Ijkspectors
-

-

of Inspections

I

INSD; Management and Program Analyst (MPA)
1 Inspection Managemqnt Unit (IMUL St.ategic
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD;.and NEAl
IMU,
SAS, INSD.
(0

,

I

Observations and. Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analyjs,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
UNCIA.SSIFIED

2

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, 05/10/2010

operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommeidations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIG meberq unar4mously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAsI
Iwas justified and in conformance with
landi
the FBI’s deaI force policy. This discussion resulted in the
reccmmendation that no administrative action be taken against S
I
landi
I as a result of their involvement in this shootinc
rLC
incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271895--D,

Inspection
05/10/2010

I
E
1
D(s)
Set Lead. 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against

J andi
involvement in this shooting incident.

SAsI

I., as a result of their

ib7C

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Kowaiski, tJSDOJ
1
l-Mr.I
IUSDOJ
Mr. Butler, Room 5845
1
1
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280.
Quantico
1
Mr.I
IQuantico
1
Mr.’
(Attention:
Mr.I
jQuan’tico
1
Mr.I
1
Mr.I
I Quantico
i Laboratory
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
IWFO
Room 6387
Ms.
1
,
1
Mrs. j
p Room 3043
—

—

—

-

-

-

—

I

-.

—

—

—

4+
UNCLASS IFID
4

 (Rev. 05-01-2008)

t)NCIASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

05/13/2010

AD my Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of

Contact:
Approved By:

Drafted By:

TnntInns

I

Lyons Amy Jo
Love Jennifer mi,.)1h
Galligan Mary E
t”

/

I

Ilrr

Case ID

4t:

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
11/04/2009

297—HQ--A1271917—D

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting inc
ident that occurred on 11/04/2009, involving Special
1
Agents (SAs)L
jDuring the
land’
execution of search and arrest warrants, SAL
I fired two
rounds and SAl
Ifired one round at an aggressive pit bull
dog.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative action be
taken against SAsI
las a result of their
I andi
involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Assistant
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Thomas P. Ravenelle, dated
12/21/2009.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
In connection with a Mexican Drug Trafficking
Organization investigation, San Francisco Agents, along with
other Federal and local law enforcement officers, planned to
execute search and arrest warrants at two locations on
11/04/2009.
IIASSXFID

 UNCIaAS S IFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—HQ-A1271917—D, 05/13/2010

On 11/02/2009, Team Leaders conducted joint site
surveys of the respective targets and met to discuss a plan to
ensure the safety of all participants.
I provided a briefing
On 11/03/2009, S2\I
to Agents assigned to his team and advised a large dog was
located on the property.

I

On 11/04/2009, members of both teams met atthe San
Leandro Police Department for a final j,oint briefing, with SA
a providing an overview of the cas. Aftr
I
approximately 15 minutes the teams separated and SAl
provided a final briefing for his team, including a review of the
FBI Deadly Force Policy. The team’s ñtission was to gain access
to the property, conduct a knock and announce, secure the
residence, arrest the subject, and conduct a search of the
property.
To gain access to the property, the team had to get
over a four foot tall metal fence with pointed steel tips.
SA
Ireiterated the fact that a large dog was located on th
property and offered local officers a fire extinguisher to scare
the dog away, if necessary.
The local officers decided to gain entry to the yard by
placing aladder over the spiked fence, and at approximately 6:01
a.m., officers led the team over the fence and into the yard.
a called out that a large dog was located at
the top of the stairs. As team members scaled the fence and
stood on the property, the growling and barking dog continued
Fearing for his
moving down the stairs toward the entry team.
safety, as well as the safety of team members, a local detective
fired one round from his service weapon striking the dog in the
I
SI
muzzle.
The dog stopped its approach and laid down.
I
Iptovided cover as the team moved past the dog and
continued with the entry.
After the tam entered ihe residence, the dog moved
under a truck with SAl
Icontinuing to watch to ensure
it did not pose a threat to any team members. After the
residence was secured, an Animal Control Officer (ACO) was
requested to take care of the injured dog. The ACO retrieved a
snare pole from her vehicle and requested that the Agents provide
protection to her in case the dog tried to attack. A lengthy
struggle by the ACO to secure the aggressive dog proved
unsuccessful.
Fearing for her safety, the ACO requesed tha
Based on the ACO’s request, SAl______
Agents shoot the dog.
visually cleared the area, provided a verbal warning to others,
arid fired one round frQm his FI-issued Glock 22, .40 caliber
UNLASStFIED

2

 UNCLASS IFID
4

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271917—D,

Inspection
05/13/2010

pistol, striking the dog in the head.
Although not dead, the dog
became subdued.
At that point, the ACO attempted to get the
cable loop around the dog’s head, but the do inserted a paw
After a second struggle to gain control,
inside the cable loop.
the dog again became aggressive and began biting at the ACO’s
snare pcle.
At that point, the ACO requested_that the Agents
fired one round
shoot the dog in the heart and lungs.
SAl
from his Bureau—issued Gock 22, .40 caliber pis ol, hitting the
s body.
T
dog
The dog continued to advance towards the ACO as she
The ACO requested that SA
continued to struggle to gain control.
jsecond round slowed
I shoot the dog again and SAl
I
The ACO instructed
the dog which stopped its attack on tne
Agents to place a secoqd snare pole around the dog’s head while
she obtained her euthanasia kit and set up the drugs to euthanize
the dog.
On 03/03/2010, the SIRG met to discuss the aboveDeputy Assistant Director Jennifer
captioned shooting incident.
Smith Love observed while Chief Inspector Mary E. Galligan,
Inspection Division (INSO),, chaired the meeting and was a non—
toting meitiber.
The following voting members were in attendance:
Barry Kowaiski, Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ; I
I Trial Attorney, Criminal.: Division,
USDOJ; Section Chief (SC Ralph Butler, CD-i, Eurasian Section’,
Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson, Violent_Crimes
1
Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (TD); UC
I
Defensive Systems Unit, TD; UCI
peciai weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical
Incident Resooçise Group; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
I
Applications Unit, TD; SSAI
SSA
General
Counsel;
of
Office
Law
Unit,
lInvestigative
I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division;
The
L CR-2, Washington Field Office.
and SSAI
Inspectors
following non—voting members were also in attendance:
I andi
I Office
(MPA)
Analyst
Program
and
Management
f Inspections (01), INSD;
I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), Strategic
L IMU,
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; and MPAI
SAS, INSD.
Observations and ecommendatioas of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
the intent to:
UNCLASSIFIED

3

7

 UNCLA.SS IFIED
To:

Inspection

Re:

297—HQ—A1271917—D,

From:

Inspection

05/13/2010

(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint •(if any); (3) -provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG membçr 1nnimrm91y concurred that the ue of
deadly force by SAsI
I andi
Iwas
justified and in conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
This djscussiàn resulted in th recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against either Agent as a result
of their involvement in this shooting incident.

UNcI.ASS IFIED
4

 ________IQuantico

UCIJSSIFID

To:
Re:

In.spction From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271917—D, 05/13/2010

LEAD(s):
Set Lead. 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
•AT WASHINGTON, DC
no adninistrative action be taken against.
SAsI
L arid
I as a resu1t of their
involvement in this shooting incident.
Phi

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Kowaiski, USDOJ
Mr.I
I tJSDOJ
Mr. Butler, Room 5845
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
Mr
1 Quantico
Mr
Mr.I
(Attention:
puantico
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
1, Laboratory
ylFO
1-Mr
L Room 6387
MsJ
1
1
Mrs.I
I Room 3043
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UNCLASSXEIED

5

 __________________

FD-2C)4 (Rev. 124.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Rcpot ot

lid

Date:

02112/2009

case ID ii:

297A-HQ-A1271895-D

Title:

SHOOTiNG INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

-

0111cc:

Philadelphia Field Office

02/09/2009

Character

Synopsis:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
Subsequent to an armed bank robbery of TI) Bank, 2520 Grant Avenue,
Philadelphia, PA, on February 6,2009, a confidential source provided information to
the Philadelphia Division of the FBI that “Danny” LNU had robbed a bank earlier in
the day. Logical investigation conducted by FBI Philadelphia led to the identification
of Danny LNU as Daniel Trinsey, white male, date of birth November 12, 1960.
Further investigation by FBI Philadelphia also resulted in probable cause to believe
Trinsey was the individual responsible for the TD Bank robbery on February 6,2009.
A query of law enforcement data bases revealed an active State of Pennsylvania arrest
warrant for Trinsey for parole violation, where the underlying charge was robbery of a
dwelling with a weapon.
On Monday, February 9,2009, the source began. to participate in consensual
telephone calls with Trinsey, during which Trinsey advised he was going to commit
another armed robbery. As a result, Philadelphia Diyision’s Sauad C4. Violeqt Crimes
Task Force, established surveillance in the vicinity ol
I
Philadelphia, PA, a single family home (“the residence”) believed to be occupied by
Trinsey. The surveillance team consisted of eight FBI agents and seven Detectives
from the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), all of whom were Task Force
Officers (TFOs) assigned to Squad C4. Surveillance identified Trinsey was in fact in

the residence.

During the surveillance, the source was in frequent telephonic contact with
Trinsey. The source updated Squad C4 members regalar1y during the surveillance via
cell phone. The source advised Trinsey was most likely armed, and planned to rob
either a bank or a drug location. The source advised Trinsey had said he would shoot
the individuals he intended to rob ifnecessary, and he was not going back to jail.
These updates regarding Trinsey’s intentions were passed on via radio to all the Task
Force personnel participating in the surveillance of Trinsey’s residence.
Zhis dooument contains neither recondatjona nor conclusions of the FBX. It is the property of the FE!
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 297A-HQ-A1271895-D

As the surveillance proceeded, Squad C4 members formulated a verbal plan over
their squad radios to arrest Trinsey on the State warrant when he exited the residence. At
approximately 3:00 pm, Trinsey came out of the residence carrying a duffle bag, and began to
walk across the driveway of the residence, westbound toward Verree Road. Task Force
personnel confronted Trinsey, identified themselves as police officers, and ordered Trinsey to
stop and get on the ground. Trinsey dropped his duffle bag on the driveway and began to walk
slowly backward toward the residence. Agents and Detectives from the arrest team continued to
order Trinsey to stop and get on the ground. Trinsey continued to ignore the commands. He then
stopped and looked from side to side, apparently surveying the arrest team. Trinsey then reached
into his waist band and removed what appeared, to multiple arrest team members, to be a
handgun. Trinsey raised the gun, initially pointed in the direction of two PPD Detectives west of
the residence. Trinsey then turned the weapon toward a group of seven Agents to the east. In
fear for their lives and the lives of their partners, three Agents and one PPD Detective fired their
weapons at Trinsey (a total of seventeen rounds). Trinsey fell face-down onthe front lawn of the
residence, and was later pronounced dead at the scene. The weapon was later determined to be a
toy handgun. Examination of evidence photographs and witness statements confirmed the
authentic appearance of the handgun.
DETAILS:
For background tiurooses. the Agents identIfied as firing thejr weanons during
shooting incident were SAl
pnd SA
I SAl
SAl
lentered on duty as an SA with the FBI on November 24, 1996.
Upon graduation from the FBI Academy, SA
Ivas assigned for three months to the
Philadelphia Division’s New Town Square RA. From approximately June 1997 until present, SA
ihas been assigned to Philadelphia’s Violent Crimes/Fugitive Task Force, Squad C4. b 6
I
Ihac been a member of the Philadelphia Special Weapons And Tactiq Team
SAl
(SWAT) since October 1998. Prior to entering on duty with the FBI, SAl
Iserved as a
Police Officer with the Baltimore County Poljce Denartjnent (BCPD) for approximately seven
years. During his tenure with the BCPD, SAl
spent approximately six and one half
years as a patrol officer, and six months as a vice and narcotics detective.
SAl
lentered on duty as an SA with the FBI on April 4, 2004, Upon
graduation from the FBI Academy, SAl
twas assigned to the Philadelphia Division’s
Major Theft Squad, C2. From October 2005 until prçsnt SAl
Ihas been assigned to
Squad C4. Prior to entering on duty with the FBI, SAl
lerved as a State Trooper with
the MarvlandState Police (MSP) for approximately ten years. During his tenure with the MSP,
SAl
I spent approximately five yearwin patrol and five years as an auto theft investigator.
SAI
lentered on
SA with the FBlon July 14, 1991. Upon
graduation from the FBI Academy, S
as assigned to the Philadelphia Division’s Labor
k1r Theft Squad for
Racketeering Squad for approximately six mon and thei
approxirpfPlv 1 years. From Ju
until pitt, SAJ
has been assigned to Squad
e4. SAl
Las been member of the Philadelphia SWAT Team since October 1993, and has
been certified as an FBI Tactical Instructor since April 2002. Prior to entering on duty with the
2

 _______

297A-HQ-A1271895-D

FBI, SAl

Iserved as a U.S. Capitol Police Officer for four years.

The SIRT determined that Squad C4 was a very active Violent Crimes/Fugitive
Task Force, which engaged in arrest, search, and surveillance operations on a weekly basis. A
vast majority of the operations involved violent, armed and dangerous subjects. The Task Force
was comprised of FBI SAs and Detectives from the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). The
Task Force consistently engaged in arrests and searches as a team, affording personnel the
opportunity to become familiar with one another and their tactical capabilities. Additionally, the
SIRT determined that SAs on the squad routinely participated in firearms together, where they
often practiced arrest scenarios.
On Friday February 6,2009 at approximately 7:00 pm, SAL
Iwas
notified by the Philadelphia Division’s switch board operator that the TI) Bank, 2520 Grant
Avenue, Philadelphia, PA, had been robbed. SAl
Ithe Squad C4 Bank Rnbherv
Coordinator, tqlenhnnjcally contacted his partner, PPD Detective (Det.
jand
requested Det. I
Irespond with him to the scene of the bank robbery. Due to pnor
commitments, Detective I
I was unable to accompany SM
Ito the robbery. SAl
then responded alone, where he met with uniformed officers of the PPD.

I

Witness interviews conducted by SI
Irevealed the bank robbery subject
entered the bank, stood in the teller feeder line, and waitedTor the next available teller. When
the next teller (a female) became available, the subject approached the teller, displayed a
handgun, and demanded “big bills.” The teller handed the subject a $100.00 bilL This only
agitated the subject, who demanded more money. The teller then gave the subject approximately
$1,550 in cash and a wrapped bundle of one dollar bills. As he was departing the bank, the
subject dropped the $100.00 bill and the wrapped one dollar bills. Witnesses described the
robber as a white male, 5’6” to 6’, between thirty and fifty years of age, wearing a dark hooded
sweatshirt with white lining inside, a dark colored skull (knit) cap, khaki colored pants, a winter
type brown glove on his left hand, and a white surgical glove on his right band. Witnesses also
noted the subject.had a prominently chipped top front tooth, and drove a black or blue twodoot
vehicle.
While SAl
‘was still at TD Bank, SPI
Ireceived a telephone
call from a closed CHS who reported he knew an individual who had some “hot” information.
The former CHS then placed a three way call between himself/herself, SAl
I and this
individual (hereafter referred to as the “source”). During the call, the source advised he was
interested in providing information regarding a robbery in return for consideration of a Rule 35 (a
motion requesting a reduction in sentence
Ivho was incarcerated in federal
prison. No promises were made to the source, and the

Tha nurca dcrh
d Danny as a white male, with “messed up teeth.”j
1
the was dressed in tan pants, a hooded sweatshirt ana was
wearing latex gloves. The ouree also provided two telephone numbers to SAI
lone of
which was an older cellular telephone number for Danny and the other was the current cellular

I

3

lb 6
lb7C
lb 7 P

I

 _________

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297A-HQ-A12 71895-0

telephone number being utilized by Danny. The source advised that Danny drove a blue Acura,
and provided a license plate number for the vehicle.
V(hile talking with the source, S
ived an e-mail over his blackberry
from SAl
Iegarding the bank robbery at the
ank on North Grant Avenue. This
prompted SAl
I During the telephone call, SAl
o telephonically contact SAl
I
provided sA
several details of the TD Bank roblerv which included the robber
s
t
I
description and a description of the getaway vehicle. SA
un turn briefed SAl
regarding the information he had received from the source. The Agents began to suspect Danny
LNI.J as the robber of the TD Bank, and focused their attention on identifying him.
-

b/c

After sneaking with Ai
iS.4
Imet with the source and they drove to
I Philadelphia, PA. The source identified the address as the
the vicinity of I
location at which he had previously seen Danny park his vehicle. During this meeting, the source
also visually ider4fled thç Acura he had seen Danny drive, and corrected the prior license tag he
hqd nmvided SAIL
Ireguested a query of the tag; and identified the vehicle was registered
I SAl
Ithen called PPD and requested any information they could obtain
oni
I
I

Later in the evening, Sj
Ireceived an e-mail on his blackberry from SA
1which contained a bank surveillance video photograph of the subject who had committed
I then met with the source, and showed the photograph to
the robbery of the TB Bank. SM
the source. The source identified the individual in the surveillance photograph as Danny. The
snurce fhrther

direction of SAl
success.

Ivised the hnnded sweatshfrt in the nhntnorsnh wa. identical tn the sweathirt

____________IAtthe

L the source tried to telephonically contact Danny several times, with no

The source also informed SAl
khat Danny had committed other bank
robberies in the past, had robbed an unidentified drug store where he disarmed an employee, arid
that he was planning on robbing the Verree Health Mart on Saturday, February 7,2009. SA
I
lalerted PPD Detectives to the potential for a robbery at the Verree Health Mart.
04
1 SAl
Iwas contacted by the source. The
into two separate three way telephone calls between the source and
source patcled SA4
Danny. SA[ I was unable to record these telephone calls. During the first telephone call,
SAl
I overheard Danny imply to the source that he had committed a robbery, and that the
proceeds from the robbery were minimal. During the second phone call, SAl
Iwerheard
Dannytdll the source that he (Danny) had lost his gun, and requested that the source assist him in
acquiring a handgun which was larger than a .38 caliber.

On February 8,2009, SAl
Iconducted multiple database checks from the
information he had been provided by the source to date, arid ultimately identified an individual
named Daniel Trinsey with an active Pennsylvania State arrest warrant for a parole violation.
The underlying charge was robbery of a residence with a weapon. SAl
Ihen prepared a
photo spread with Trinsey’s photograph and showed the photo spread to two of the TD Bank
tellers and one of the bank managers. None ofthe bank employees could identify Trinsey as the
robber.
4

6

h7C

b7C

 _______land
_______

297A-HQ-A1271895-D

Imet with the sqnrce The
Fo!Jnwinf’ the meetii,p with the hank tellers SAl
source showed SAl
I
I SAL
noted the photograph of Danny clearly d itea
with ächipped front tooth. Based on all the
information he had collected to date, S
can cnnviVced that Trinsey was the
individual responsible for the robbery ofT]) Bank. SAl
Ithen provided the source with a
tape recorder and instructions to record his future telephonic conversations with Trinsey.

7

On Monday, February 9, 2009, at appioximately 11:00am, SAl
I and Det.
rt a female witness to federal cott w1o was
9
I PPD, volunteered tq transn
being prepared to testify in a case for SAl
I The Squad C4 Supervisor, SSAI
I
I was outof t13e divisiçn, and SAl
Iwas the acting supetvisor that day. When
SAl
land Det.I
Iwent to the basement parking garage of the Philadelphia
Diyisinn they found SAl
vehicle was bloded in a Darkin2 suace by another vehicle.
liehicte (a black Nissan
Ithen obtained permission to utilize Det. I
SA
Altima) instead. Inasmuch as this was a routine witness transport assignment, SAl
heft
his tactical equipment behind in his assigned Bureau vehicle.
At approximately 11:55 sin, SAl
leceived a telephone call from the source.
The source advised Trinsey was about to commit apother hank robbery. SJ
Iwas in court
preparing to start a trial at thç time n jie asked SAl
Jo Contact Pet.
request he (DetJ
then thoroughly briefed
Ideal with the source. SM
the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) Violent Crimes prosecutor he was working with regarding the
FBI’s development of the cooperating source, and the consensual monitoring plan. The USAO
concurred with the consensual monitoring of the source’s telephone conversations with Trinsey.

I

Just prior to arriving at the female witnesses’ home, SAl
land Det.
‘were advised the witness had arranged other transportation to court. SA________
telephoned the source, who subsequently advised Trinsey had planned to rob the PNC ank pn
Cottman Avenue, Philadelphia, PA. The source further advised Trinsey was located at’
I
1 Avenue, Philadelphia, PA, and was trying to recruit a getaway driver.

I

I then proceeded to the vicinity of Borbeck Avenue.
SAl
and Deti
While en route, SAl
I
I notified Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge (AJASAC) I
telephone
ha
evçning,
robbery
Bank
on
Friday
regarding
the
armed
and
of
of
TD
SA
I
Irjevelopment of a source wko was in current communication with the subject. SA
I
I
dvised A/ASA
Jhe subject Trinsey) was believed to be resicHjio al
I
I
venue, and was planning to commit another robbery later in the day. SAl
informed AJASAU
hat the plan was to arrest Trinsey on an outstanding arrest warrant
for a parole violation in order to prevent the bank robbery he was planning. SAl
land
A/ASA
jiscussed that Trinsey was considered armed and dangerous in the context of
all operations, given he (Trinsey) had utilized a weapon during the perpetration ofthe TD Bank
robbery on February 6,2009.
A/ASAC1
[Id not direct a written operations plan be prepared due to the
overall fluid nature of the operation. Although the source information was somewhat specific
concerning the residence of Trinsey and his intent to commit another robbery, Agents Were
unaware of exactly when Trinsey would execute his plan, and his plans were likely tochange
5

C

 ____

297A—HQ-A1271895-0
rapidly and unexpectedly. AJASACI
hf he needed additional
Is)ced SM
resources to handle the opcratipn S1
dvised AIASAC Cosenza Squad C4 had
sufficient personnel. A/ASA(1
Istated he. was confident in the on-scene command aid
control capabilities of SAl
1he acting. Squad Supervisor, and SN___________
case agent for this operatirn.
+

Det

sted additional Squad C4 resources be directed to the area of
lephoned Sergeant (Sgt.)l
IPPD, who was at
the FBI office, and requested he have all available C-4 personnel rally in the vicinity of Borbeck
Avenue.

I

I Avenue.

I

I

Upon arrival al
I conducted a
land DetI
lAvenue, SAl
reconnaissance of the area which surrounded Trinsey
s home and started to develop a plan to
t
effect the arrest ofTrinsey. They surveyed the area looking for any alleyways with access tot J
IAvnue, identification of the bordering streets, and positively identified the residence of
lAvenue. .This reconnaissance was done in preparation for the ariival of thq other
resnnndjpg Task Forcç personnel so assignments could bç properly made. SA
land Det.
parked their vehicle on
Risin2 Sun avenue, just south of Borbeck Avenue. This
1
allowed them to see the front door o
lAvenue.

While eq route to he vicinity of Borbeck Avenue, SAl
lcçntinued to receive
text messages from Det
I updating him on the situation. Deti
I advised Trinsey
was still believed to be m the house a4
Avenue,
have
did
not
he
a
gun yet, and that
J
he still needed a getaway driver. While waitig at the Rite Aid Pharmacy near Borbeck Avenue
to meet with Squad C4 personnel, SAl
used his wireless laptop and prin
S the
Pennsylvania Justic&Network (iNet) and download a photograph of Trinsey. S
ted
several copies for the team. SAl
_jwas then advised Task Force members Det.
I
I ha4 arrived together in Sgt
L and Sgt.l
J Deti
vehicle. They were positioneti on Borbeck Avenue near Verree Road, and had estab is
surveillance on. the residence.
At approximately 1:00 pm, SAasked Det.I
Lo team up with him
so there would be two Ta$ Force meiribers in each vehicle while they waited for the remainder
of the team to arrive. Det.I
nd SAl
)net at the corner ofBorbeck Avenue and
Verree Road, and they drove together in SI
jvehicle looking for a good spot from which
to watch the rear of Trinsey’s house. SAl
po noted that SAl
land Det. I
had established an eye on the front of the house trom their position on Rising Sun Avenue, South
of Borbeck Avenue. Personnel from C-4 began arriving in the area and were conmimicatin yia
PPD police radio, on channel Major Crimes One (MC1). At this point, Deti___________
reported over MCi he had arrived in the area.
SAl
nd Deti
kook up a position to the rear ofi
011 afforded SAl
Avenue on Griffith Street This lnci
land Deti
bit excellent•
view of the rear door tot
lioted
I Avenue. Upon establishing this position, S4
while the storm door to the rear ot the house was closed, the rear door stood partially open.
Just prior to 2:00 pm, SAl
Icontacted SA4
blackberry and requested he assist with the arrest operation. SA I
6

1via

jequested SAl

I

b6
7

 ______

297A-HQ-A1271895-D

bring t1
long guns.” SAJ
Itelephoned SAnd requested additional details and then
handed the p}inne tn AI
Iwho was the seni[or Agent present in the squad area. SAl
I and fuLLy briefed SAl
spoke tn S A
Itold SAl_______
Ion the situation. SP
SA I
Ihad learned through contact with the source Trinsey was now planning on
committing either a bank robbery or a home invasion of drug dealers. SAl
tated Trinsey
either had, or was attempting to obtain, a gun, and was awaiting the arrival ot a getaway driver at
his residence.
JspJ
Based on the briefing from SAJ
Idirected those persons present
in tb C4 quad area to gather their equipment and proceed tj the vidnjty of Borbeck Avenue.
SAl__- Iproceeded in his vehicle, armed with an M4. SSPI
ladvised he approved the
issuing ofM4s to non-SWAT SAs on C4 due to the violent crime mission of the squad.

L

IS
eamedupwithS.l
andSA
assigned black Chevrolet Subur
nts were seate as
follows:
was in the rear nassenger seat, S
as in the driver’s side rear
seat, S
was driving, and S
Iwas in the front passenger seat. SAwas
armed with an M4.

I

I in

SAl
hiad received a blackberry message regarding the
impending arrest of’rinsey from SAl
Iwhile in the parking garage of the FBI office. He
observed SAl
land his team preparing to respond as wel3,jnd changed his clothing and
responded to Borbeck Avenue. As a member of Sauad C4, S
as armed with his
approved M4. Al
Jteained up with Deti
veto the vicinity of Borbeck
I an
Avenue in Deti
Ivehicle. While en route to Borbeck Avenue, radio transmissions were
overheard by the responding agents which explained Trinsey had planned on committing another
bank robbery and another subject was to arrive at the residence, possibly with a bag of weapons.
During the approximate twenty minute drive to Bdreck Ayenue, SAwas
I was receiving
momtonng channel MCi. While en route to Borbeck Avenue, SAl
information from S4
hegarding the positioning of pe
e. SAa
I advised
SAI
oposition his vehicin in
1 he had a photograph of Trinsey, and directed S
the vicinity of Rising Sun Avenue and Borbeck Avenue.
At
the source had a three way telephone call with Trinsey
(monitored by
stated that he had arranged a getaway
h
driver and had
a handgun. During this
call, Trinsey also asked the source if he
Iwas speaking with the
source, Deti
/ communicated with SAl
tin at least two occasions, and relayed the
updated information regarding Trinscy. SAl
En turn provided the information via radio to
the personnel on scene, and to those responding.
,

1e1)t Trinsey’s PPD arrest photo to the
At approximately 2:08 pm, SAl
Squad C4 arrest team via their blackberries. SN
1istributed the photograph in this
manner because he wanted to ensure everyone who was going to participate in the arrest of
Trinsey knew what he looked like, and also because he realized it was impractical to try to hand
out the hard copy of the photos he had printed earlier in his vehicle.

7

D

 _____Iwas

297A-HQ-A1271895-D

Avenue. Si
1
land his team were proceedjnc to 1orbeck
I
WhUe SuI
I or Deti_________ who
recalled receiving information over the radio from either SAl
advised the source was talking directly to Trinsey, and had told the source he had been mjail and
was never going back. Sgti
broadcasted over radio channel MCi Trinsey was leavmg
the house in a blue Acura with an unknown male. Trinsey returned minutes later in the blue
Acura with the male and a second unknown male. Trinsey parked the blue Acura directly in
front oil
I Avenue facing eastbound in the westbound lane of Borbeck Avenue, and
the three went inside the house.
SAl
land his team arrived in the area of Borbeck Avenue a few minutes
after Thnsey returned to the residence. As SAl
land Deti
I arrived, they were
instructed to take up a position in the area of Verree Road and Borbeck Avenue. They were
instructed to block the intersection of Borbeck Avenue and Verre Road çf any vehicle or
pedestrian traffic when the commanji to “executed was given. SAl
Ithe last person to arrive
on scene, was directed to the rear oil
lAvenue and staged in the 900 Block of Griffith
Street. This allowed him to see the northwest corner of the residence.
-

Once the black Suburban arrived in the area, SA
Iliad the vehicle
positioned facing southwest on Rising Sun Avenue a few car lengths from the intersection of____
I
Borbeck Avenue. Behind the black Suburban was Det I
I A blue Tahoe driven by Det I
parked on Bprbeck Ayenue facing westbound, east of Rising Sun Avenue. The black
Nissan occupied by SAl
land Deti
Iwas staged on Risjn Sun venuejpt south
of the intersection with Borbeck Avernie. A yehicle occupied by Sgt. I
Ian4)etI
was
beck Avenue west oil
lAvenue. A vehicle occupie1 by SAl
land
De
positioned on Verree Road to the north of Borbeck Avenue facing south. Lastly,
S
vehicle., and the vçhicle occupied by S
d Deti
Iwere positioned
tothereanofthel
lAvenueonGrifflthS ee.
At approximately 2:35 pm, the perimeter. aroundi
I Avenue was
effectively established. The weather at thç time ws determined to be partly sunny,
approximately 49 degrees Fahrenheit. SAl
Icalled over MCi and asked how the team
intended to effect the arrest of Trinsey. Sgt4
Ithen stated that the plan would be if
Trinsey and the two unknown males left the nouse and headed for the blue Acura, all three would
be stopped as they were preparing to get into the car. The contingency plan was if Trinsey and
the others were able to get into the car before the arrest team could converge and make the arrest,
the personnel on Rising Sun Avenue would dnve west on Borbeck Avenue and block the Acura
from leavuin east on Borbeck. Sgt.l
bud Deti
Ivehicle, along with SA
I
and Det
1 ivebicle, would block the Acura from gaining access to Verree Road. S
Ilesignated the Suburban as the primary arrest vehicle which would come from Rising
I
Sun Avenue on to Borbeck Avenue, along with Detd
Iblue Tahoe. The two SUV would
pull onto Borbeck Avenue and block the road preventing the Acura from leaving to the east, and
also_providing cover for the law enforcement personnel in those vehicles. SAl
linstructed
SAl
Ito concentrate on his role as the driver, and reminded all occupants of the Suburban to
take up a position of coverupon exiting the vehicle. Sgtl
nnounced he would give the
execute” signal over the radio, based on him having the primary eye on the front ofthe
t
‘
residence.

Through both visual and radio contact, SAl
8

L SAl

I and SAl

I

I

 ________

____

297A-HQ-A1271895-D

were cçnfldent the nIacement of the vehicles, as stated above, had established a tight perimeter
around
!kvenue, and the Task Force personnel were stationed appropriately to
cifectively conduct the arrest of Trinsey.
Shortly after 3:00 pm, SgtI
lzalled out on the radio that Trinsey was
leaving the house alone carrying a duffie bag. SgtJ
hnonitored Trinsey’s movements,
and when he got to the corner of the yard. west of the Acura, SgtL
Igave the command
over the radio to execute the arrest. The black Suburban and blue Tahoe moved westbound on
Borbeck Avenue. The Nissan fell in behind the Suburban and the Tahoe. The black Suburban
was slightly ahead of the blue Tahoe, and slowed to J1nw the hjue Tah tn catrij up so the road
I and Del
could be effectively blocked as verbally planned. SAl
I also moved
their vehicle in to the rear ofthe Suburban and the Tahoe, and stopped in the middle of Borbeck
Avenue.
I

lb

lb

SI
and SAl
lexited their vehicles behind[Z1
I Det.llAvenue, and began to move toward the rear of the residence. Deti
hnd SAl
I
blocked the intersection of Verree Road and Borbeck Avenue Dreventing both vehicular and
pedestrian traffic from going east on Borbeck Avenue. Deti
Iblocked traffic from entering
Borbeck Avenue to the east from Rising Sun Avenue.

As the Suburban stopped, SAI1and SAl
hook up an initial position
the engine block of the vehicle, on the driveis side, for cover. SAl
J and SA
sition of cover behind a telephone
As
the .nhiirhip, he observed Sgt.
me see your nanasr SAl
lobserved Trinsey
looking at
ed, at this time, he was recalling from his training and
experience a subject in this situation would typically do one of three things: I) they could run; 2)
mply with the commands and give up, or; 3) they could choose to stand and fight.
SA
ought since Trinsey was not nmning or complying, he was going to fight.
Commands by Task Force personnel such as “FBI,” ‘Police,” “stop,”, and “get
I
down on the Eround,” continued to be yelled at Trinsey. Trinsey was still facip2 StI
and DetI
lat this time. Trinsey then walked backward away from Sgt.I
Land Det.
1, stood still for a moment, and then began moving his head and upper torso back and
I
forth, appearing to scan the area. Trinsey then xlropped the bag and reached into his waist band.
Trinsey pulled out what appeared to be a back semi-automatic pistol (latter determined to be a
toy or replica handgun), Trinsey raised the weapor n this ditection of the 1iw enforcement
personnel on the scene, first in the direction of Sgt.I
Im)d Deti
to the west- Te
then turned slihtlv and pointçd the weapon toward SAl
Deti
LSA
SAI
I,
I,
I. SAl
I
Ito the east.
L and SAl
SAI
1 rniI
Ifired their weapons at Trinsey multiple
times. SA
I andi
i each stated, at the time, they
were in fear for their lives and the lives of their fellow law enforcement officers when Trinsey
removed the weapon from his waist band and pointed it in their direction.
Det. I
I. in a statement to Sgt.
Is part of the P21)
shooting investigation, advised he fired one round from his 9mm hand gun at Trinsey because
9

lb 6
lb C

.

 297A-HQ-A1271895-1)

Trinsey had pointed a gun at him.

I

Trinsey fell to the ground on his face. When the gunfire stopped, SAJ
Itold
everyone to hold their positions so they could assess the threat. SA [
Inoted Trinsey had
blood coining from his nose, but he was still moving. He also observed the gun was very close to
Trinsey’s tight hand. Additionally, there were still unknown individuals in the Jirnise ho
presented a nqential threat to the personnel on the scene. After a moment, SM
I directed
Sgti
Ito holster their weapons and prepare to handcuff Trinsey. SA
tnoved forward and handcuffed Trinsey.
After the shooting stopped, spJ
land SAl
lentered the
I Deti
residence to secure the subjects inside. In the living room they encountered two males and one
1 The female was moving toward the front door. The two males were securqd by S
female
I
I Qnce the males were handcuffed, they were left with DetJ
land
L SA I
SAl
Icleared the remainder of the home. When S
d SAL
Ieturnedto the
living room area of the home, other law enforcement personne were insic inc house. The
female had run from the house in an effort to secure her dog, and was sitting on a bench outside
of the front of the home.
Det.alled for medical assistance. S
a trained paramedic, saw
Trinsey layin face down in the front yard. He roiled
e recovery position, and
checked his airway and pulse with negative results. S
elieved Trinsey was dead and
waited for paramedics to arrive. He searched Trinsey for additional weapons th nea1ive
results, but did locate some money and other miscellaneous personal items. S‘remained
with Trinsey until paramedics arrived. The paramedics determined Trinsey was deceasecL At
this point Trinses body was covered with a sheet
While waiting for the paramedics to arrive, SASked Sito secure
the handgun. SA
photographed the weapon, and as he placed the weapon in an evidence
bag, he realized it was a plastic toy gun. Examination of photographs of the gun by the SIRT
confirmed the authentic appearance of the “handgun.”
A search of Trinsey’s duftie bag by PPD Homicide Detectives revealed items
which matched the clothing worn by the subject in the TD Bank robbery on February 6,2009.
Items recovered included a black hooded jacket, a black wool/knit cap, brown gloves, and latex
gloves.

b

The PPD’s Homicide Unit responded to the scene, as is protocol for all law
enforcement involved shootings in the city of Philadelphia. The PPIYs Mobile Crime Scene Unit
in coordination with FBI Philadelphia’s ERT conducted the crime scene survey. Seventeen shell
casinas were recovered from the scene. One 9 mm shell casing was recovered from in front of
I
lAvenue, to the west of the residence near where Deti
lexited his vehicle.
Nine .40 caliber and seven .223 mm shell casings were recovered in tront oil
I.
Avenue. These shelj ca.cin were all located in the vicinity ofthe blue Acura and the telephone
pole, near where SAl
dvised they had fired their
I SA4
I and SAl
weapons.
At the time of the shooting, SAj

Iwas armed with his FBI issued M-4
10

b7

 ________

______________

297A-HQ-k1271895-D

I

(serial#: 5632901). s1
Istated he believed he fired approximately four rounds frpm a
dtin of 35 to 20 feet. His weapon and magazine were secured by ERT S1
I
Ifollowiag the shooting. One round was in the chamber ofthe weapon, and seven
rounds were in the magazine. SAl
dvised he typically loaded his magazines with 25
rounds, but had not counted the rounds inside of the magazine when loading his M-4 before the
shooting, thus he was uncertain of the number of rounds in the magazine. According to PPD
crime scene reports, seven .223 mm shell casings were recovered at the scene. A PPD lp1listic
comparison of the recovered .223 mm shell casings with the M-4 carried by SAl
irn the
day of the shooting indicated the casings were most likely were fired from the M-4. The PPD’s
ballistic analysis did confirm two projectiles removed from Trinsey
s right arm were fired from
t
I Additionally, the ballistic report stated that one .223 projectile
the M..4 carrie1 by S4
fired from SAl
Is M4 was found under Trinsey’s body at the scene (possibly a through and
through round).
-

S
Iwas armed with his (flock 22 pistol (serial #: GMl.J1 11) at the time
of the shooting. SA
ladvised he had loaded his weapon to capacity with .16 rounds of
.40 caliber ammunition. SAl
Iwas approximately 25 feet away from Trinsey behind a
position of cover near tke blue Acura when he fired four to five shots frqm hc wtrncm pt
Trinsey. SAl
Iweapon was secured and examined by ER.T SAl
latter the
shooting, and found to have one round in the chamber and nine rounds in the magazine. A
ballistic analysis completed by PPD revealed five of nine .40 caliber shell casings recovered from
the scene were fired from SAl
tllock 22 pistol.

SAl
Iwas rmed with his Glock 27 personally owned, FBI approved
handgun, (serial #: LLP57O). SAl
Iwas in a kneeling position behind a teleplone nole
approximately fifteen to twenty feet away from Trinsey when he fired his weapon
I
1 SAl
advised his (Mock 27 was loaded with nine rouqdA at the time ofe shooting. SA
I
weapon was secured and examined by ERT SAl
I and found to have one round
in the chamber and four rounds in the magazine. A ballistic examination completed by PPD
deterxnine4 four of the nine .40 caliber shell casings recovered at the scene were fired from SA
I personally owned’ Glock 27.
As previously stated, Dcii
dvised Sgt.
PPD shooting investigation, he fired one round from ‘his 9 mm handgun.

I as part ofthe

Interviews of all eight FBI personnel present at the shooting revealed all personnel
were wearing some form of insignia which iditifled them as FBI or police officers. All FBI
personnel, with the exception of SAL
I were wearing ballistic vests, with FBI lettering
either in yellow or black on the exterior of the vests. One agent also wore a raid jacket on the
outside of his vest which identied him a FBI, and two of the eight agents also had their FBI
badge clipped to their belts. SAJ
ihad left his protective equipment in his assigned
vehicle when he departed the office earlier in the day to pick up a witness for court. Because of
the fast moving events, SAl
jwas unable to retrieve his equipment.
PPD Homicide Detecflve ideptifled the other occupants ol
Ivenue
asl
I son), andi
I Investigation revealed
they were not part of Trinsey’s planned robbery. I
Uiad met Trinsev one week earlier atid
had offered to let him stay at her house, where she lived with I
Iwas identified

U

b6
lb 7 C

 __________________jPhiladelphia,

a

297A-HQ-A1271895-D

asafriendi

I

I
ladvised he saw Trinsey with a black gun inside his waistband as he
wac leaving the housel
lalso heard police outside sayiny. “Get 4own, get down!”
I
Laid those commands were then followed by gunshotsi
Isaid he saw Trinsey
leave the house with a red bag. Shortly aftjr Trincjy left the house, I
beard people yelling,
“Get Down, get down, get on the Uound!’l
‘aid he lookd out the front door and then
Iwhep Trinsey came
heard gunshots. I
Itated she was in the bacic bedroom. oft
to the door with a red and black colored ban and told her he was leaving. I
Ithen heard
what she described as popping soundsi
hen came to her room and advised her Trinsey h 6
had been shot.
b7C
A neighborhood canvass conducted by PPIYs Homicide Detectives resulted in. the
I wht rpale, age 72,1
lAvenue,
identification of a witness to the shooting:I
IAienue.I
iwas walking back
Philadelphia, PA (directly across the street from’
saw the man stop for a
from his mailbox when he saw a male carrying a red duffie bag. I
oh rved several police
minute and look around first in the direction of Verree Road.I
then saw the subject look
officers with their guns drawn, yelling “Police!” and “Get down!”
around and look in the direction of the police behind
The subjec en reached into his
jacket with his right hand and pulled out a black gun.
d the shooting then began and he
saw the subject fall to the ground.
Trinsey was determined to have an extensive criminal record dating back to 1979.
Trinsey had been convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, theft,
resisting arrest, bank robbery, simple assault, aggravated assault, burglary and robbery. The
SIRT verified that at the time of the shooting, there was an active State of Pennsylvania arrest
warrant for Trinsey for parole violation, where the underlying charge was robbery of a residence
with a weapon. Additionally, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) printout which
identified the active warrant for Trinsey, listed a caution advisory that Trinsey had violent
tendencies and was known to abuse drugs,
The City of Philadelphia, Office of the Medical Examiner (OME) conducted an
autopsy and toxicology report. The autopsy findings stated Trinsey had been shot seven separate
times, and the cause of death was identified as multiple gunshot wounds. The manner of death
was classified as Homicide. The autopsy report detailed the following wounds: a gunshot entry
wound to the left shoulder which exited the right side of the body and reentered the right arm,
where a bullet was recovered; a gunshot entry wound to the left shoulder which exited the right
side of body and reentered the right arm were a bullet was recovered; a gunshot entry wound to
the lateral left chest which did not exit and resulted in the recovery of two bullet fragments; a
gunshot entry wound and exit to the right arm where no bullet or bullet fragments were
recovered; a gunshot entrance wound to the right hip which exited the right buttock and no bullet
or fragments were recovered; a gunshot wound to the posterior left shoulder which resulted in the
recovery of a bullet from the lateral right back; a gunshot entry wound to the left back which
exited the mid left back and no bullet or bullet fragment was recovered. The toxicology report h 7 C
from the OME showed there was a presence of narcotics in Trinsey’s urine which included
cocaine, codeine, methamphetarnine and oxycodeine.
In summary, the FBI Philadelphia Division’s Violent Crimes Task Force went to
PA on February 9, 2009 in an effort to locate and arrest
12

 297A-HQ-A1271895-D

Daniel Trinsey on an active arrest warrant for parole violation. The Task Force planned the
arrest under time sensitive conditions in order to prevent Trinsey from effecting an armed
robbery At the time of the operation, the Task Force collectively believed Trmsey had
committed an armed bank robbery three days earlier and was actively niannina a second robbery

I Additionally, at the time, the Task Force believed Trinsey was either armed, or in the process of

locating a firearm, and was gathering co-conspirators to assist him in the robbery. Finally, the
Task Force was aware Trinsey had made statements to the source that he would not go back to
prison. Review of the recorded conversations between Trinsey and the.source by the SIRT
verified the information which the source had provided to law enforcement prior to the shooting.

The Task Force confirmed Trinsey was inside ofthe house and established a
robust perimeter around the residence. When Trinsey departed the residence at approximately
3:00 pm, he was confronted by the Task Force at gun point. The Task Force appropriately
identified themselves as Police and FBI, and ordered Trinsey to the ground. Trinsey failed to
comply with the law enforcement commands and reached into his waist band with his right hand
and removed a black handgun, later determined to be a toy or replica weapon. Trinsey raised the
handgun in the directionof law enforcement personnel, threatening the lives of multiple Task
Force members. In order to defend themselves and their team mates, four Task Force personnel
fired their weapons at Trinsey (a total of 17 times) until he collapsed to the ground. Trinsey was
later pronounced dead at the scene.
The City of Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (PDAO), reviewed a report of
this incident prepared by the Philadelphia Police Department. O Sentember 10, 2009, the
PDAO issued a written opinion that SAsI
pMI
Iwere 1
5ustifled in
discharging their weapons under 18 Pa. C.s.A., section 505, Use of Force in Self Protection; and
18 Pa. C.S.A,, section 508, Use of Force in Law Enforcement.” The PDAO advised they
subsequently closed their investigation of tins matter.,
This report was forwarded to Deputy Chief]
J. Criminal Section,
Department of Justice, for federal prosecutive opinion. A decision is pending.

13

b6
7C

 I

FD-204 (Rev. lZ-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

UCE
0210612009

Case ID ii:

297-HQ-A1271786-D

I

Office:

Inspections

SHOOTING ENQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
02/04/2009
Character:

Synopsis:

ADMINISTRATiVE INQUIRY
On February 4, 2009, the New Haven Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) executed a large scale, multi agency, arrest and search operation
targeting 44 federally indicted subjects in ci OrQanized Crime Dpg Enforcement Task
Force (OCDETF) investigation codename
I
tuing the entry of one target location in Bridgeport, Connecticut,, SAL
I
a member ofthe New Haven SWAT team, accidentally discharged (AD) his
MI6AI conversion carbine weapon (herqfler refèrredto as “M-49. The AD resulted
Iwas
in one .223 caliber round striking subjecti
transported to Saint Vincent Medical Center (SVMC) in Bridgeport, Connecticut, for
treatment ofa non-life threatening wound.
DETAILS:’
On January 29, 2009, a Federal Grand Jury sitting in New Haven, Connecticut
returned indictments on 44 subjects for felony drug conspiracy and distribution
charges.
The indicted subjects were members or associates of th
I Drug
Trafficking Organization (DTO), considered to be the most significant suppliers of
narcotics in and around the Bridgeport, Connecticut area. In addition, ongoing and past
1)TO had extepsive
investigations revealed that many members of thel
criminal histories of violence and drug trafficking activity. One memberj
was believed to be tesponsible for the first homidide in 2009 in Bridgeport,
Connecticut.
The New Haven piviinn tmteil thjs violent DTO through an OCDETF
investigation codename I
F Information developed through

This doaweant contains neither recoimnendating nor conclusions of the SEX. It is the property of the FBI
and is loaned to your agency; it and it contente are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

,

70
)7E

 _________________________

297-HQ-A1271786-D

authorized wiretaps, confidential human sources, and from other law enforcement. agencies,
indicated that several subjects met the “higher than normal risk’ criteria as defined by the Manual
of Investigative Operations and Guidelines. These risks included vio[ertt criminal histones,
possession of weapons by the subjects, presence of weapons at target locations, difficult
breaching obstacles, and the presence of dogs used for protection.
Based on the above, New Haven Division determined the circumstances
necessitated the. utilization of Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) teams to plan and execute
arrests and searches at seven locations to reduce the risk to agents, innocent persons, and
subjects. The New Haven Division coordinated this operation with the Critical Incident
Response Group (CIRO), SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), beginning in December 2008. It was
determined that SWAT teams from New Haven, New York, Boston and Albany Divisions, along
with SWAT teams from the Connecticut State Police (CSP) and the Bridgeport Police
Department (BPD) would jointly participate in the operation.

I

One of the subjects indicted in this investigation wa1_______________
Iwas indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and conspiracy to
distnbute heroin and cocaine base, in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 846.

I criminal history revealed the following: 1)
A review of’
arrested 06/13/2003, possession of narcotics, sale of hallucinogenic/narcotic substance; 2)
arrested 08/31/2003, possession of narcotics, sale ofhallucinogenic/narcotic substance,
interfering/resistance; 3) arrested 01/22/2004, sale of illegal drug, sale of hallucinogeniclnarcotic
substance; 4) 01120/2006, operating a motor vehicle without a license, run(ning) from police,
probation violation; 5>01/20/2006 criminal use of motor vehicle without permission, larceny 2,
interfering/resisting; 6) arrested 01/21/2007, breach of peace, mnterfering/resistence; 7) arrested
07/12/2008, run(ning) from police, failure to appear; 8) arrested 07/12/200 8,
interfering/resistence, reckless endangerment, risk of injury, breach ofpeace; 9) arrested
10/14/2008, interferiug/resistence; 10) arrested 10/2112008, evade-iijury1property, under
suspension, run(ning) police; 11) sale of illegal drug, sale ofhallucinogenic/narcotic substance.
On February 3,2009, the final New Haven FBI SWAT Operations Order was
approved by New Haven Division Special Agent in Charge (SAC> Kimberly K.. Mertz. The
SWAT Operations Order identified the following locations and assignments in Bridgeport,
Connecticut, for SWAT operations:
Location

SWAT team

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

NewYork
New York
New Haven/Albany
Boston
Boston
CT State Police
Bridgeport PD

IBridgeport,
Investigation determined thati
Connecticut, was a location where drugs were stored by the DTO. As such, it was the target of a
2

b7c

 ____________________

4

297-HQ-A1271786-J)

federal search warrant. Although subjects were known to frequent the location from time to
time, it was not a specific residence of any of the subjects.
On February 3, 2009, at 3:00 p.m., all team leaders (SWAT and Non-SWAT)
participated in an operational briefing held at the Marriott hotel, 180 Hawley Lane, Trumbull,
Connecticut. Following this briefing, at 4:30 p.m., there was an all SWAT operator briefing at
the same location which included updated case information, brief-backs, and tactical rehearsals.
On February 4,2009, at 4:00 a.m., there was an all hands briefing for all personnel
involved in the operation at Sacred Heart University, 5151 Park Avenue, Fairfield, Connecticut.
At approximately 5:45 a.m., all tactical teams were in position at their designated staging
locations. The National Weather Service website indicated the weather conditions on February
4,2009, at 5:52 a.m., taken at the Sikorsky Memorial Airport in Bridgeport, Connecticut, was 19
degrees Fahrenheit, wind out of the North at 14 mph, and overcast skies with visibility at ten
miles.
At approximately 6:00 a.m., the order was given for the SWAT teams to
commence their respective tactical operations at the above listed locations.
The following New Haven (NH) and Albany (AL) SWAT team members were
I
assinned and tarticipated in the execution of the search warrant at I
I Bridgeport, Connecticut:
Name

Division/Assignment

S
SI
SI

Albany I Perimeter
Albany Paramedic / Perimeter
New Haven / Perimeter
Albany / Perimeter

SI
SI
SI

Albany I Hallways
Albany / Hallways
New Haven / Hallways

SI
SA
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI

New Haven / Entry #1
New Haven / Entry #2
New Haven/Entry #3
Albany/Entay#4
Albany/Entry #5
Albany/Entry#6
New Haven / Entry #7 (Team Leader [TLj)
Albany / Entry #8
New Haven Paramedic / Entry #9

SI
SI

New Haven / Breather
Albany I Breacher

3

 ____the

_________

297-HQ-A1271786 -D

The NHJAL SWAT team initiated their operation by breaching the
door of the location. They entered the building, sec’ired the
second floor.

floor entry

I

[8)
positioned on the
the
recçivinno response,
I then tossed a diversiotarv devjce into the apartment. The
SAl
I
I followed by SAl
land
L entered the apartment
-

moved directly forward, announced “?BI et down”, and utilizing the flashlight
SAl
I oving away from
on his M-4 title, observed a subject, later identified a4
ade a decision to
A
him. Because of his momentum and close proximity tol
prengjo place his
go “hands on” with the subject in order to secure him. Just as SA
a
M-4 rifle to his side, he tripped and fell towards the floor. Unbeknownst to SA(jher
box spring and mattress on the floor of the apartment just to the right of the doorway. S
made contact with the mattress at or below his knees, well below his line of sight. With
o
momentum of his movement toward the subject, the contact with the mattress caused SA
lose his balance and fall forward,
-

elf for the fall while attempting to maintain positioning adcon1rol
brac
S
I
of his M-4 e. S
reasserted his right hand grip on the M-4 rifle as he fell. SP1
advised that his M-4 n e was on “safe” prior to entering the apartment. SAbelieved the
nt contact with
motion of his hand carried the safety into the “fire” position and led to
fall, but he did not
the trigger. The weapon discharged one round at some point during.S
recail the exact moment
ot back on his feet and visullv reauied1
S
I who had also fallen to
was
subdued when he
ensure
he
the groind.
Ipositioned himself oven
o
and observed what appeared
Jlifted the subjec’
noticedi
Iwas wounded. S.4
ecalled that someone in the
to be a gunshot wound somewhere above the waistline. S
room called for the SWAT medic and an ambulance.
-

SAad followed S
into the apartment after the detonation of the
diversionary device. SPturne_to the right to cover thefar corner of the room. Upon
making his turn to the right, SAl_made contact at or below the knees with the same mattress
that was on the floor. This contact caused him to momentarily lose his Jalancç. He then stepped
1
on top of, and over the mattress to cover the far corner of the room. Se
Iww a subject, out
of the corner of his eye, who appeared to be moving in front of, and to SAl
I right
Iheard a gun shot. He did not
After crossing the bed and reaching the other side, SAl
observe a muzzle blast.’ He looked toward the subject who was on the ground to see if he was a
threat, and determined he was not. SAl
Icontinued to clear his area until it was detennined
the subject had been wounded.
mo’

SA[

Ihad followed SAsI
landlI into the apartment. He observed SAI_
ight ahead and SJ
hurpinLto the right, sohe filled the gap between SAd
Upon entering the room, SAl
Iheard a “pop” and saw a flash of light. SA
4

6

h7c

 ______Iwas

297-HQ-A1271786-D

I

Idid not know if it was amuzzle blast from a firearm or a flashlight being turned on.
After taking a couple of steps into the rcnrn SAl
was on his kneçs
Inoticed S
on top of a subject who was on the around. SAl
moved closer to SA
to check for any
weapons near the subject. SAF
6oticed a small red circle on the subjects ack and thought
the subject may have been shot. He did not recall any comments being made at this time, except
for the subject crying out in pain and cursing.

SAl
htlvised he did not observe any other members of the entry team that were
behind linz enter th room, as the space was very small. He heard someone call out for a “cuffer”
and SA I
[utered the room and placed handcuffs on the subject
Team Leader s.4
Iwas positioned in the tactical formation outside of
when he heard the detoq’” ‘f4he diversionary device. A few seconds later, SA
I
Iheard a gun shot. When SAl
lentered tJi mrfnlent he observed the subject
lvin rn the floor with a small hole in his right side. SI
I calleçl for the medic, and SA
I
1Medic) imm
onded from the hallway. SAl
[egan to administer
aid to the subject. S
en radioed the Command Postfiactical Oneratiqns Center
(CPITOC) and advise : s ot
subject down, send ambulance.” SAl
Idiirected SAs
I
landi
Ito leave the apartment. SAestablished control over the scene
by limiting access to the apartment and ensuring overall security of the building.

b 70

t #6
1
anartmer

SAl
ladviséd he had been positioned in the tactical formation outside’
I
when he heard explosions he assumed were diversionary devices. Sho
, SAl
heard someone say “medic up,” which meant someone was mjured. S
ediately
made his way into the apartment. He observed the apartment to be dark, Wi a thick layer of
smoke. SAl
lobserved the apartment was cramped and the only source of light was from
SWAT team operators’ flashlights.
-

SAl
lobserveci
lying on his side in a somewht nrnne nsition. He
observed a SWAT team operator placing handcuffs on this sübjct. SA
csessed
1
I
liujuries noting he was responsive to verbal stimulus. He checked the subjcct’s vital
signs and determined he was prqbahlv in hqck. SAl
bbserved what appeared to be an
entrY wound on the right side ofi
I body and an apparent exit wound on the left flank.
SAl
Itated it appeared to be a “through and through” wound associated with the lower
abdomen, and very survivable. SAl
klid not detect signs of internal injuries.
SAl
Irequested the assistance of the other medic on the
SAl
Ito bring
additional equipment including oxygen and a backboard. SA
an
I continued to
administer aid tol
placed in the
I until a civilian ambulance arrive.
ambulance, and SM
lode with the subject to Saint Vincent’s Medical Center (SVMC) iii
Bridgeport, Connecticut.
The CP/TOC advised SAl
Ithe Connecticut State Police (CSP) Quick Reaction
Force (QRF) would be arriving at the apartment to take conVol of thscene. The CSP QRF
arrived at the aoarttiient at approxirnatel.y6:5O a.m., and SP4
Iturned the scene over to
them. SA I
then instructed the SWAT team to withdraw from the scene.

5

I

 297 -HQ-A12717 86-0

The CSP. Western District. Major Crimes Squad (MCS), processed the shooting scene at
Iased on a state search warrant. Examination of the scene
I
revealed a bullet hole in a window on the far wall of the apartment opposite the front door. The
spent .223 caliber shell casing from SAl
IM-4 was recovered. All evidence/items collected
by the CSP MCS were turned over to the New Haven Division Evidence Response Team (ERT).
A neighborhood canvas was conducted for ppssibje witnesses to the shooting and none were
j M-4 could not be located No collateral
identified Additionally, the bullet from SAl
damage was observed outside I
lirom where the round exited the apartment window,
Upon completion of the state search warrant, the CSP MCS turned the scene over to the
NH ERT which executed thç federal earch warrant for the apartment, pursuant to the underlying
IDTO. The NH ERT recovered, among other things,
criminal investigation of thl
approximately $785 in cash, and various documents and cell phones.
Troopeil
1f the CSP MCS responded to SVIVfC 25O0 Mpin street,
I In his
Bridgeport Connecticut, and obtained a written statement from I
1
when
he
heard
a loud bang
statement..F
paid he was asleep at approximately 6:00 a.m.
and got upto look out the window. When he turned away from the windoW he saw a masked
man coming through the apartment door. He saw other men as well, and knew they were police
officers because they had uniforms with the word “Police.” He saw a flash and then fell to the
ground. He thought he had beeti struck with a “tazer” and felt a burning pain in his back. He did
not hear a gun shot and did not realize he had been shot. AIer he fell on the flcyr hc
were then handcuffed behind his back. He was then transported to the hospital.I_________
signed a medical release form authorizing the SVMC to release his medical records to the P.
IWas presented before a U.S. Magistrate’ Judge in
On February 5,2009 I
his hospital room at SVMCI
Iwas then emandëd tçi the custody of the United States
Marshal’s Service ((JSMS). On February 6,2009,1
Iwas released from the SVMC and
remains in the custody of the USMS.
On
concerning

I

SVMC, was interviewed
was the attending Emergency Room
was admitted with a gunshot wound. Dr.
‘e threatening, gun shot wound to his abdomen,
abdomen and exiting his right rear flank.
ig heavy, ançl due to tIe location of the wound,
I was
iad not
organs. Dr[
t further stated
had some bruising ofhis kidney from the percussion of the round, but indicated the
wounds were of a non-life threatening natur rw4 tht thj’ kidney would heal itself within days.
Medical records concerning the treatment oI
Iwere obtained from Saint Vmcent’s
Hospital and made a part of the SIRT report.

,

.

was forwarded to the FBI’s
The MI6A1 conversion carbine rifle utilized by SA
Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), Quantico, Virainia for technic inspection. The technical
I The results of the inspection were
inspection was conducted by Gunsmithl
documented in an EC dated 04117/2009, and reported the following:
“A visual inspection of the exterior of the weapon noted no mechanical deficiencies. It
6

-.

 297-HQ-A1271786-D

was noted an H&K MP-5 sling was attached to the weapon and that a plastic cable tie had been
used to affix the rear portion of this sling to the weapon.
A visual inspection and disassembly ofthe internal mechanics of the weapon similarly
noted no deficiencies, only that the chamber and bolt carrier were dirty. The weapon was found
to be fully functional, with all safety and operating mechanisms working properly and within
factory specifications. The selector lever was found to have positive engagement in both the safe
’
t
and semi-automatic positions and the trigger weight was measured at 7.5 pounds.
The Inspection Division requested DSU to determine if it was possible for the weapon’s
trigger to be pressed simultaneously with the selector lever being moved from the safç position.
ladvised the selector lever on all Colt style carbines (such as the M16A1),
Gunsmithi
when positively engaged in the safe mode, is designed to completely block the trigger tail from
moving upward. It is this blocking of the trigger tail that makes the weapon safe. Once the
selector lever is rotated from the positive safe position (off safe) absolute blocking is no longer
possible.
The EC from DSU also stated:
“When tested with a National Rifle Association (NRA) trigger weight set, and.the selector
lever staged approximately half-way between the safe and semi-automatic positions, the New
Haven Division weapon required 27 pounds of force applied to the trigger to cause the hammer
to move to the forward position. With the selector lever staged approximately two-thirds the
distance betwen the positive safe and positive semi-automatic positions, the weapon required
15.5 pounds-of force-to cause the hammer to move to the forward pàsition. It should be noted
that normal trigger weight, as established by Colt, is 5.5-8.5 pounds.”

7

L
-.

  

 

 

FBI I
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

2009

 

 

D.2o4 (Rcv. 12445)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of InvestIgation

Copy

to:

Report of

IICI_____________

Office:

Inspections

Date:

03/2012009

caae in #:

297-HQ-A1271725-J)

Tidc

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DWISION, TEXARKANA RESIDENT AGENCY
02/13/2009
ADMINISTRATiVE INQUIRY

Syuopi

Jeremy Ray Reed was charged with Possession of a Firearm by a Person After
a. Court Order Prohibiting Same, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections
922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2). On February 4,2009, an attempt to serve a federal arrest
warrant on Jeremy Reed was made by law enforcement officers, On that day, it was
reported that Jeremy Reed was residing at his grandfather’s residence, located on the
property of 138 Highway 71 North, Ashdown, Arkansas. The arrest team primarily
consisted of two FBI Special Agents and two local police officers. Upon arriving on
the scene, and after securing the perimeter, an Agent identified himself as a federal law
enforcement officer to Jeremy Reed, while Jeremy Reed was inside the residence of
the grand1ther. Upon being notified ofthe presence of law enforcement officers,
Jeremy Reed exited the residence carrying a long gun and began to flee to. the
residence belonging to Jeremy Reed’s mother, which was located nearby on the same
property. Upon fleeing the grandlhther’s residence,.and while attempting to gain entry
into the mother’s residence, firearms were disharged when Jeremy Reed, who failed
to heed law enforcement commands to drop his weapon, pointed his weapon in a
threatening manner in the direction of the law enforcement officers. A total offive
shots were fired. One shot was fired by Jeremy Reed, two shofc wr Thy a Local
police officer, and two shots were fired by Special Agent (SAl
lofthe
Little Rook Field Office, Texarkana, Resident Agency (RA). None ofthe law
C)!
enforcement officers were strticL Jeremy Reed, struck by buckshot from one of the
shots fired by the local police officer, sustained non-life threatening injuries.
Subsequent to being struck by buckshot, Jeremy Reed gained e
hispiother’s
ce. After gaining entry into his mother’s residence, S
1
rr
dl
I
arid a local Sheriff initiated negotiations with Jeremy R in an attãmpt to
gain his surrender. Jeremy Reed refused to surrender and sustained a fatal, selfinflicted gun shot wound. Jeremy Reed was pronounced dead on February 4,2009, at
11:12p.m.

This docusent contains n.ithex r.con,a.nd&ticns nox conclusions of th. FBI • It is the property of th. FBI
and is loaned to your sgncy.; it and its contents axe not to be distribntad outsid, your agency.

 297—HQ-A1271725-D
DETAILS:

On October 21, 2005. Jeremy Reed allegedly assaulted his spouse at the Electric
Cowboy in Texarkana, Arkansas. Jeremy Reed crossed the state line into Texas while
transporting his spouse to Ogden, Aikansas, where he allegedly continued to assault her. The
spouse of Jeremy Reed was treated at a hospital emergencr room and she later filed charges
against Jeremy Reed for 3rd Degree Domestic Battery. A state protective order was subsequently
issued against Jeremy Reed in Little River County Arkansas. Based on provisions of the state
protective order, Jeremy Reed was prohibited from receiving or possessing a firearm under Title
18, United States Code, Section 922.
On March 3, 2006, Jeremy Reed posted bond after being arrested bythe
Texarkana Arkansas Police Department (TAP])) on the Domestic Battery charge.
On August 5, 2007, the TAP]) was notified that Ashdown Police Department
(APD),, Ashdown, Arkansas was in possession of an arrest warrant for Jeremy Reed, who was, at
that time, reportedly in Texarkana, Arkansas. The warrant pertained to Jeremy Reed allegedly
“pistol whipping” an individual in Ashdown, Arkansas. In addition, the TAP]) was warned
Jeremy Reed was in possession of a handgun. Ultimately, TAPD officers located Jeremy Reed in
Texarkana. Although he was armed with a loaded handgun and resisted arrest, Jeremy Reed was
disarmed arid taken into custody.
On August 15, 2007, an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) was made
aware of the matter and expressed intent to prosecute Jeremy Reed upon confirmation that he
violated federal criminal statutes,
On June 25, 2008, an Indictment was filed with the US. District Court, Western
District ofArkansas, Texarkana Division, which consisted of One Count, which asserted “On or
about August 5, 2007, in the Western District ofArkansas, Texan ana Division, the defendant,
Jeremy Ray Reçd, who was subject to a court order issued by the Little River County Circuit
Court on November 29, 2005, in case number DR200S-155-2, which was issued after a bearing
ofwhich he received actual notice, and at which he had anopportunity to participate, restraining
him from harassing or threatening an intimate partner, that by its terms explicitly prohibited the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner that would
reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury, or that included a finding that the defendant was a
credible threat to the physical safety of the intimate partner, did knowingly possess a firearm,
specifically an HR .22 caliber revolver, serial number AC32264, which had been shi?ped and
transported in interstate commerce, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections
922(,g)(8) and 924(a)(2).”
On 3uly 08, 2008, the United States District Court, Western District of Arkansas,
Texarkana Division, issued a federal arrest warrant for Jeremy Ray Reed charging him with
Possession of a Firearm by a Person After a Court Order Prohibiting Same, in violation ofTitle
18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2).

‘i’.’’

On February 4, 2009, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Bl; sA
I TifffA
Rock yield Office, Texarkana Resident Agency (ThA), was pdvised liv API Detective j
I that information had been received indicating that MI
I
hhe grandfather o
Jeremy Reed, was near death and was being treated at St. Michael’s Hospital, 2600 St. Michael
Vrive, Texarkana, Texas. Detectivel
lopined that Jeremy Reed would likely be visiting his
2

I)

 297-HQ-A1271725-D

grandfather at the hospital. SAl
I also assigned to the Little Rock Field
lad SA I
Office, Texarkana RA, proceeded to the hospital. While en route, the SA’s contacted Texarkana
Texas Police Department (TTPD) dispatch and reauested tjPD assist in the location and
potential arrest of Jeremy Reed. FBI SAl
JOallas Field Office, co-located at the
ThA.. was lso nntifle and responded to the hospital. Upon arriving at the hospital, SAsI______
1 anc
Jrnet with uniformed ITPD officers and, after briefing them on the matter
pertaining to Jeremy Reed. nroceeded irnediately to the nursing station on tjie 6th fjoor of St
Michael’s Hospital wher
Iwas receiving medical attention. SAl
met with the
nursing staff caring for[
I The nurses were shown a photograph ot Jeremy eed
onflVned the individual in the photograph was the same person that had been visitingi
I
I In addition, it was learned that Jeremy Reed departed the hospital approximately 30
minutes prior to the arrival of the SM. The SAs then showed a photograph of Jeremy Reed to a
hospital security guard. The hospital security guard stated he thought Jeremy Reed was in the
hospital cafeteria. The SAs then proceede4 to the cafeteria, but Jeremy Reed was not found. The
SAs provided the security guard with an FBI business card and Blackberry telephone number,
and the guard advised he would notify them immediately should Jeremy Reed return to the
hospital. A photograph of Jeremy Reed and FBI business card were also provided to the nursing
staffand they were asked to call if Jeremy Reed returned. Thereafter, a search of the hospital
parking lot was conducted in attempt to locate Jeremy Reed, but he was not found. The SAs then
returned to the TRA.
On February 4, 2009, at approximately 6:20 p.m., API) DetcctiveF
I
was telephonically contacted by City of Ashrlpwn 4yor Earnest Wayne Reed who is Jeremy
Reed’s uncle. Mayor Red c1icrrI Detectivd Jthat Jeremy Reed was threatening his
(Jeremy 1pM” rnother,1
Iiis sister, and his children. Mayor Reed also advised
JflJr1y Reed had barricaded himself in his grandfather’s residence, located
Detectiwl
IAshdown, Arkansas, and that Jeremy Reed had infoimed his mother
4
h6 would till an3bOdy who tried to remove him from the resIdence. Mayor Reed also advised
Detectivd )hat during a prior conservation, Jeremy Reed had stated he would kill any
police officer who tried to take him into custody m1 wpuld then idli himself. At the conclusion
ofhis conversation with Mayor Reed, Detectiv4
Icontacted the Little River County Sberis
ce (l,RSO) and discussed the matter with Shen’L)anny Russell, inasmuch asi
I
I
J Ashdown, Arkansas, is located a short distance outside the city limits of Ashdown,
-

Arkansas.

On February 4,2009, at approximately 6:3Qpm., API) etectv
telephomcally contacted the TRA and spoke with SA[
I Detectivd
I advised S
that Jeremy Reed had barricaded himself in his grandfhther’s residence that he repo
a
shotgun, and that he was reportedly threatening to kill his family. SA’__land
responded irnmediately to the LRSO, which is located in Ashdbwn. En route to the LRSO, SA
Ielephon.ically notified Senior Supervisory Resident Agency (SSRA
who was physically
Fort Smith, Arkansas, which is located several houI3 wnv
Ashdown. As SS
as already familiar witlij.nly Reed matter. S4
provided an. up4ate on the latest developments. SSR4_..._..ncouraged Si
Ja Special
Weaaops And Tactics (SWAT) Operator, to utilize SWAT, ifpossible and appropnale._SSRA
I ]requested S(
Iceep him advised of developments and advised SAl__Ihe fully
supported the TRA’s efforts to work in concert with local authorities tq resolve the ma11r. SA
a
enntated LR Headquarters City SWAT Team Leader SA[
L who,
like SS1Jl
was previously brietbd on the Jeremy Reed matter. SAI
bade SA
laware that SWAT Team assistance may be needed. Upon arriving at the LRSO, SA’s
I
3

 297—HQ—A1271725—D

and Detectivi
I jerationa1
I an4 n1n inI the
biscussed the situation and developed a verbal
presence of LRSO deputies, as wellas in the presence of API) Detective

I The operational pLan included a strategy to access and secure the premises, assess
the situation, and extricate ihmily members.
On February 04,2009, also sometime around 6:30 p.m., Detectivel
telephonically contacted Sheriff Russell. Detectiv
vised SheriffRussell he had
received information that Jeremy Reed was at his gran a er’s residence, and Jeremy Reed had
made several threats indicating he would kill his entire family, ku
lice officer that tned to
arrest him, and kill himself as well. Sheriff Russell and Detectiv
it would be
prudent to establish perimeter security an the noperv She
iffRuse1 met pt the LRSO with
4
Detective I
I Afterwards, Sheriff
I SA I
1 API) Detectivel
land SAl
Russell roceeded to the area and established surveillance of the driveway leading to the property
and awaited the arrival of other law enforcement personnel.

OtI February 4, 20Q9. whil Detectivd
Iwas still at the LRSO with SA’s
I Mayor Reed. telephonically re-contacted Detective
Detective I
Ithat his (Mayor Reed’s) wife was on the telephone
with
ithe mother of Jeremy Reed, who informed Mayor Reeds wife that Jeremy Reed
was barricaded in his grandfather’s house, was in possession of a shotgun, and was threatening to
killi
I his two children and another child, and himselL Mayor Reed also informed
that Jeremy Reed was kicking at the walls of the grandfathers.resicjenee. ajd
Detectivef
I
I was anxious for law enforcement to arrive. Mayor Reed asked Detectiv4
[or
hiimetjate law enforcement assistance in resolv n2 thi matter. While
RSO, SA
Itelephonically contacted I SAl
I
t she, her
I was advised
mother (the grandmother of Jeremy Reed), two children belonging to Jeremy ReecL and anpther
child were in a mobile home trailer, which was also located on thel
I
property apprnxhm
tely 70 feet away from Jeremy Reed’s grandfather’s house.I
1
Iãlso
advised SAl
Ithat Jeremy Reed was armed with a shotgun, he was knocking hole in wails,
and that she feared for her life. I
I while still on the telephone with SAl
I stated on
two occasions, ‘Tve already signed my death waranL’1
then became distraught to the
point that she was unable to speak, and asked S
Ito.speak with her mother (who was also
in the trailer). SAl
mother It they were all capable of exiting the trailer
1 askedl
through the back door, and advised them to go the end of the driveway and meet Sheriff Russell.
Whila nn
telephone, SAl
Ioi4d hear some minor commotion in the background, and
I
Imother advised SAl
Ihey were all exiting the trailer.

I

and
I, and Detective I
I iMayor
Reed advised

-

Sheriff Russell had established a staging area near the property and instructed his
deputies to assemble there. Sheriff Russell positioned his patrol unit on the side of the toad
south of the driveway leading to the property. After a brieftjme ha4-elapsed, Deteçtivel
I
telephonically contacted Sheriff Russell and advised that SAl
I had spoken tcl
telephone and had convinced her to take her family and leave the property, and thj1l
and her family would be leaving the property by way ofmotor vehicle. Detective I
requested SheriffRussell stop the vehicle otJ
upon its departure from the property.
Detectivd
ithen proceeded to the staging area where Sheriff Russell was located.
Subsequently, Sheriff Russell observed a vehicle transiting the driveway, leaving the property,
and accessing a major roadway. Sheriff Russell followed the vehicle to a safe location and
effected a traffic stop. Sheriff Russell then escorted I
her mother, and the three children
back 7n Rfjgingarea sçuth of the driveway leading to the property. At about this same time,
SA’s I
I audi
I as well as API) officers-arrived at the scene.
4

 297-HQ--A1271725—D

Upon arriving at the staging area, S
ecked their
operational equipment, and cliscssed ai operational p an Wi. lo
aw enforcement officers at
the scene. It iyas determined SAl
I a trained FBI Crisis Negotiator, would communicate
withi
I in an attempt to gain relpvsnt hifriligence in the even negotiations with Jeremy
Reed ensued. lt was also determined 5.4
ould a roach the area.
I and Detectiv
of the house and trailer to establish a perimeter and initiate survei axice, as S
most
familiar with the area.
under cover of darkness and natural foliage,
Ldfather and made a sweep of the north, east, and
were no lights visible, and no apparent activity inide. SA
ablishFd static surveillance, with Detectivi
I positioned on
and SAl
Ipositioned on the east sideof the residence.
After debriefing I
Is
4 Detectiv4
lwalked down the
dnvewa.y of the property and positioned themse yes at the south end orthe house; this location
also positioned them facing the front of the trailer parked adjacent to the house. This position
was maintained for a period of time, with no activity being noticed within the house.

It appeared to SAl
Ithe house was unoccupied, and considering the
possibility Jeremy Reed had left the prop
re the arrival of law enforcement, or that
Jeremy Reed had committed suicide, SA
try to contact Jeremy Reed
any request was made for SWATdeplo
.telephonical
SAl
and advised he was in a positior to knock on the door o e house S
ulsed his
flashlight in the direction of SAl
1° indicate his position.
.

I

to the north si4e ofthe residencç and aqain pulsed his flashlight
mud. SAl
I could see Detective
window and aflnounced his presence and
hae.
i-icnocked and announced” on two
a voice from inside the residence respond, “Come get me.
and the occupant of the residence having dialogue.

According to s1
land to the best of his recollection, the following
dialogue between he and Jeremy Reed took place:
.3.4Who i’ ;t

L____11t’sI

lwiththeFBL
RWhat do you want?
I Jeremy, we need to talk to you.
I
Reed: ipi not coming out You’re going to have to come in and get me.
I
ileremy, we’re nøt going to come in and get you. The police have your
house surrounded. Jeremy, we’ve already talked about this. We have a warrant
Ed: Yeah I know, but rm not coming out Yourc going to have to come in and
get me. You just need to go away and leave inc alone.
L]ereniy, you know we can’t do that.
I

S?l_
Ibelieved Jeremy Reed was moving inside the house and
close to his location and became concerned Jeremy Reed was targeting his position. SA
then discontinued the conversation and quickly moved away from the house into the b
5

 ______lobserved

_______

297—HQ—A1271725—D

I
I

si

Iwas

ad not observed any doors on the north side of the residence.
concerned
Jeremy Reed would try to escape and, therefore, he moved to a position covering the southeast
side of the residence.
As SAl
Iconfirmed Jeremy Re
side the house, he notified SA
Ihe was going to contact the SWAT team. SA
then co
AT Assistant
Team Leader SAl
(as SWAT e
Of town),
and requested deployment of SWAT to the location. S
ere was no
Vise
reason for the on-scene law enforcement officers to make entry into the house, an t
option was for them to maintain the perimeter until FBI SWAT arrived on scene. S
reqìjecte.-i 5jA I
Ito cnntijt SSRAI
land provide him with an update on the situation.
SA I
ladvised SA I
lie contacted the Little Rock SWAT Team, and further advised it
would take the SWAT team three to four hours to arrive on scene.
SAl
I he was going torneet with SllAriffRilcseIl to brief
[idvised SA
him on the situation and coordinate a negotiation strategy. Afterwards, SAl
Iheard a noise
near the house and he observed Jeremy Reed now outside the residence with a long gun in his
hand while looking around and walking toward the adjaeent trailer. SA
Ithen shouted,
“Jeremy, dioo von
1 weapon!” Jeremy Reed did not comply and instead began running toward the
trailer. SAl______ lost sight of Jereru
but again shouted, “Jeremy, drop ycurweapon!”
Still unbie to see Jeremy Reed, SM
Ihoute4 ‘Drop your weapon” once again. Detective
Iheard sometl1inI in fl’e effect of SAl
I
lveffing at Jeremy Reed to drop his gun and
get down. Detective I
Ithen observed Jeremy Reed, carrying a long gun that was believed
to be a shotgun, moving towards the trailer.
-

-

SAl
‘attempted to regain visual sighting of Jeremy Reed by maneuvering in
the direction of where he had previously observed Jeremy Reed. SAl
Ithen heard a loud
‘boom” which he believed was a.shotgun being Jischared, which he thouaijt was initiated by
I as it came from near Detectivd
Detectivel
1 then regained sight
Ilocation. SAl
of Jerepy Reed, observing Jeremy Reed standing on the steps at the front of the trailer. SA
Jeremy Reed holding the long gun horizontally. SAl
‘now fearing for
the safety of the other law enfnrc.epient officers, raised his Bureau issued rifle in preparation to
engage Jeremy Reed. S4
Ithen heard the sound of Jeremy Ree’ ‘‘ging his weapon,
and visually observed a muzzle-flash from Jeremy Reed’s location. SAl
I then brought his
M-4 rifle into firing position and noticed the reticle of the EO Tech electronic sight was not
illununate4. Since the rear factory sight had been removed to accommodate the EO Tech sight,
SM
lused the EO Tech sight as a rear peep sight, centered the top of the front sight post in
the glass display ofthe EO Tech sight, put the front sight post at
of mass of Jeremy
Reed, and then fired his M-4 rifler. Jeremy Reed didnot react. S
en held the front
sight post slightly lower and fired his M-4 rifle a second time and 0 serve Jeremy Reed flinch.
Jeremy Reed then entered the front door of the trailer, aid SAl
I lost sight of him. Almost
simultaneous to firing his M-4 rifle the second time, SAl
Ihear4 a shotgun blast from the
right of hia nositi
n and heard someone state, ‘I hit him.” (SAl
9
I later learned it was
Detectivel
Iwho fired his shotgun, and the buckshot from the shotgun fired by Detective
Istruck Jeremy Reed.)
I
-

I

SAl
then moved to a position on the east side nFth friler and checked to
ensure Jeremy Reed had not escaped out the back of the trailer.
Ihen heard Jeremy
Reed moving around inside the trailer. Se[
I also heard Jeremy Reed moaning and heard
him yell, “I’m bleeding out!” SAJ
Ithen yelled for Jeremy Reed to come out of the trailer

sA

6

L

-

 297—HQ—A1271725—D

in order to receive medical assistance. Jeremy Reed responded he was not coming out, and stated
again that he was shot and was “bleeding out.” SAl
Ibelieved Jeremy Reed was movina
westward inside the trailer, and thinking he aught come out the front of the trailer, SAl
I
began to move along the north side (front) of the trailer toward the front door.
During the time Jeremy Reed was moving from the house to the trailer, SAl
I
was.chcussing the situation ‘with Sheriff Russell. Upon hearing gunfire, SheriffRussell and SA
ntered Sheriff Russell’s vehicle and proceeded to the house and the trailer. Once
I
near the two residences, and upon exiting the velicle, SAL,Jcalled out to Detective I
I
to de
e if he was airight. Detective I
lindicated he was airight and then briefed SA
to what had jusj tmnpired, and indjcatacl that Jeremy Reed had taken refuge in the
trailer. At that time, SAl
noving in the direction of the trailer.
lobserved SAj

h7

SAl
lontinued to attempt to co
remy Reed to leave the trailer in
order to receive medical attention. Subsequently, S
ormed Jeremy Reed that he was
having trouble hearing him and was going to push the on. oor open a little so he could
understand him better._Unon pushing the door open, through 11w hinge gap between the door and
the door frame, SA
Iwas able to see Jeremy Reed. SAi
observed that Jeremy Reed
had sustained injuries to his right wrist and right thigh. SPJ
lalso okcPruPli Jeremy Reed
was holding his weapoti by the barrel with his left hand. It appeared to SM
Ithat Jeremy
Reed was no longer wanting to engage law enforcement personneL sM
bain offered
medical asiiçç to Jeremy Reed and Reed again, refused. It was about this time SM
I
joined SA[Joutside the trailer, near the front door.
-

SAs I
land
eec!, and SAl
Ii called out to J
Icould hear
moaning coming from within the tr
t one point, S
eard Jeremy Reed state “man,
I’m bleeding out.” SA
egotiated with eremy Reed, encouraging him to exit
I an
the trailer so he could be taken to a ospital. Jeremy Reed refused to leave the trailer and at one
point commented, ‘Tm going to finish myself off.” Jeremy Reed also stated there was no way he
was going back to jail.

SAlmi1
Icontinued to negotiate and offer assistance, and Reed
continued
point, Jeremy Reed stated, “You Sons of bitches shot rae and I’m
bleeding out.”
pened the door a littler wider in effort to get a better view of Jeremy
Reed. SA(
lo setv Jerem’ Reed in the hallway of the trailer with blood stains on the
right leg of his jeans. Based on his crisis negotiation training, Si
believed the longer
Jeremy Reed was engaged and talking, the more likely he was to surrender. Therefore, SA I
attempted to maintain ongoing dialogue with Jeremy Reed. All-the-while, Jeremy Reed refused
to exit the trailer.
g the stand ofi Jeremy Reed stated he had taken sixty-five pills, including
Xanax. S
obsçrved Jeremy Reed become unsteady on his feet Jeremy Reed then
threatened suicide. SAl
Ithen observed Jeremy Reed put the shotgun down. SAl
I
subsequently advised
ad he was going to take one step into the living room and talic to
him face to face. S
j now positioned in the doorway of the trailer, observed
and
Jeremy Reed walking ,perio cally from the hallway to a room adjacent to the hallway. Ontwo
occasions Jeremy Reed walked out of the adjacent room with the shotgun, holding the barrel end
with his left hand. On one occasion, Jere
with the shotgun pointing toward
the floor of the trailer. All-the-while, S
being at the doorway ofthe trailer,
continued to negotiate with Jeremy Reed.
7

I

6

c

 297—HQ-A1271725-D
As SAIJ
I
Ianc
Icontinued to negotiate with Jeremy Reed, SAl
requested Sheriff Russeil to come to the door of the trailer to assist in the negotiation for Jeremy
Reed’s surrender, as the Sheriff and Jeremy Reed were very familiar with each other. Shetifi’
RusçJl coipplied and thereafter participated in the negotiation. After nearly an hour, SAsI
I
ani
lioticed a change in Jeremy Reeds demeanor. Jeremy Reed then walked into the room
adjacent to th
y of the trler and closed the door. Within seconds, muifid blst wa
heard by S
I as well as by Sheriff
and
eli. Detective
land I
I
outside the tral er, also heard the muffled blast. S
called out to J
ad by name a
number of times, but Jeremy Reed did not çesoond
1
e, Detective
his
police radio to request an ambulance. SA
ptered the aliacei4 room saw
(and
Jeremy Reeds body slumped, in a chair. It was obvious to As I
Jthat Jeremy
I andi
Reed placed the barrel of the shotgun under his.chin and discharged the weapon. Detective
subsequently advised of the details, and he then contacted the LRSO Dispatcher and
requested a Coroner. He also requested an Arkansas State Police (ASP) Investigator be
dispatched to the scene.
On Februai,r 4.2009. t 10:50 p.m., the LRSO Dier contacted ASP Senior
Special Agent (SSA)
I for assistance. ASP SSALJthen contacted his
supervisor, ASP Sereano
iand.advised him ofthe matler. At approximately 11:16
p.m.. ASP SS4
I arrived on. scene. ASP SSAI
L being assisted by ASP SA’s
I andi
I as welles ASP Sergeanti
I conducted a State of Arkansas
Crime Scene Search and initiated aDeath Investigation.

I

IM.D., Associate Medical Examiner, Arkansas State Crime
Laboratory, issued a report advising an examination was conducted on February 06,2009 on
decedent Jeremy RM Teremy Reed was pronounced dead at 1 1:2 p.m. on February 4,2009, at
I
IAshdown, Arkansas. The manner of dsath was determined to be suicide,
with the caus of death being a shotgun wound to the neck.
On February 13, 2009L
I Irosecuting Attorney, Judicial Districth
9th West, State of Arkansas, advised ASP .S$AI
I. with respect to his Death
b7c
Investigation of Jeremy Reed, “Pursuant to our telephone conversation today, I am writing tç
notify you: that! have reviewed the Arkansas State Police’s investigative Ille in regards to this
matter. Alter review ofthe statements from the witnesses, thepictures and diagramsof the
scene, I do not find that the police officers or the agents (sic) from the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (sic) did anything to violate Arkansas criminal law.”

8

6

 4

1

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFXED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To;

Date:

ROUTINE
Attfl:

Inspection

From:

Drafted By:
Case ID *:
Title:

AD my Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of Inspections,
Contact: I
Galligan Mary

Approved By:

12/11/2009

I

E,4L

I

Ilrr

297-HQ-A1271285-I)

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
08/14/2009

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
Synqpsis:
shooting incident that occurred on 08/14/2009, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
I During the execution of an
arrest warrant, A1
I fires. five rounds from his Bureauissued Colt Model M1641, .223 ca1ibr carbine killing an
attacking bull dog.
51kG members recommended that no
]as a. result of
adninistrative action be taken against
I
his Involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative: Reference
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)

I

I

of
dated 08/17/2009.

Details:
This commwiication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the 51kG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

I

On 08/14/2009, at approximately 6:00 p.m., membera of
the Violent Crimes Task Force executed an arrst warrant for
or a zpmiber of bank
Iwho was wante
bias inside a
robteries.
Investigation determined
residence located in Chicago.
Iknocked
Upon arrival at the residence, S?1
on the door of the residence and ann9unced. law enforcement
presence.
Receiving no response, 829
1 noticed the door was
DNCLS SIFt ED

 ‘

•I

UNCIASSIFZB1)

V
To:
Re:

Inspection From:, Inspection
297-HQ--A1271285—D, 12/11/2009

a. ar and pushed it open. As the dnp’ ti-ied, a large white bull
I yelled “dog” and kicked
dog charged at the arrest team. szL
I located
r’rritnued to attack. SA I
at the animal
I pulled him away from the dog and fired
directly behind SA I
five rounds killing the dog.

I

After the shots were fired, a number of individuals
exited the residence through the back door. Perimeter Agents
detained the individuals, conducted interviews, and determined
jwas located in the basement of the residence. The
suij ect su±rendered and was taken into custody without further
incident.
On 12/03/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Acting Deputy Assistant Director
Mary E. Galligan, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting
and was a non-voting member. The following voting members were
in attendance:
Barry Kqwa.lski. SDecial Legal Counsel, Civil
I Trial Attorney,
Rights Division, USDOJ; L
Oswald, Office of
Criminal Division,. USDOJ; Inspector Donald
Inspections, INSD; Section Chief (SC) Ralph Butler, CD-i,
Eurasian Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J.
Johnson, Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
Unit Chief (UC)I
Ipractical Applications Unit, TD;
I.
Response Team, Laboratory
Thrijce
SSAI
I, CR-2, Washington ?ield Ofice:
Division; SSAI
I
CI
1, Firearms Training Unit ‘m
and
_______
Tfl;
SSAI______
Defensive Systems Unit,
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel.
roi.iowifig non-voting members were also in attendance: Sc Linda
M. ICriect, Internal Investigations Section, Inspection Division;
I Inspection Management Unit (IMU),
UCI
Strategic Analysis Section (SAS) INSD; Management and Procram
IMU, SAS, INSD; and MàPA
Analyst (MAA) I
INU,
flTSD.
I
SAL
.

•

1

[

Observations and Recoimaendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recotmuendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
U1CLSStFXED
2

h6
h7c

 UNCIzASStFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271285-]), 12/11/2009

SIRG meniers unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by SAL
as justified and in conformance with
the FBVS deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
I
j as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

VNCXASSI?IED

3

 UNCIIASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection Prom:
297-HQ-A127I285-D,

Inspection
12/11/2009

2b6

Set I
ead 1:
1

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASflINGTOL DC
4strative action be taken against
m
p
4
a result o his involvement in this

SAl____________________ aá
shooting incident.

1
Mr. Pistole, Room•7142
3.
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Kowaiski, USDOJ
1
I USDOJ
Mr.I
Mr. )thderson., Room 4825
1
Mr. Jobnson, Room 3280
1
3.
Mr.
1 Quantico
3.
Mr.
uantico
Mr.
1
J Quantico
1
Mr.
Faboratory
1FO
1-Mr.
3.
Ms.
I. oom 6387
1
j Room 3043
MraI
-

-

-

*

-

-

-

-

-

-

++

UNcLASSIFIED
4

 (Rv 0541-2008)

TJNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE

From:

AD

Attn:

Inspection

12/11/2009

Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of T1tit
Contact:

I

C-alligan Mary

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

I

Jlrr

i4’t

297-HQ-A1271741-fl

SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE
08 / 12/2009

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/12/2009, involving Special
Agent (sAl
I While securing a rear perimeter area
If ired two
during tIie execution of a search warrant, 5?4
rounds from his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22 pistol, injuring an
SIRG members recommended that no
attacking pit bull dog.
administrative action be taken against SAas a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.
fl.eference report of Assistant Special Agent in
Administrative:
Charge James L. Struyk, dated 08/12/2009.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
Iparticipated in the
On 08/12/2009, sAl
execution of a state search warrant. At approximately 9:00 a .m.,
a briefing was held at the Los Angeles Police Department in
Culver City.
At the conclusion, of the briefing, SAl____ and
approximately 30 other law enforcement personnel proceeded to the
location to execute the search warrant.
At approximately 10:30 a ,m,, the entry team approached
the initial entry point to the business. A locked white metal
UNCLASSIFIED

I

 t3NCLRSStFID
Inspection
Inspection From:
297-HQ-A127J.741.-D, 12/11/2009

To:
Re:

I

security door had recently been installed and a decision was made
iter through the preplanned secondary entry point while SA
I and a
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Agenti
local police officer maintained the perimeter at the security
1 a.
door.
As the entry team went to the secondary entry point
with
complied
door,
security
construction worker appeared at the
the law enforcement comman to unlock the metal door? and was
I proceeded down a narrow path
SAl
subsequently_detained.
Imanhiied his position at the security door.
while SAl
Irunning toward him
Moments later SAl
lobserved sA[
pit bull dog chasing and
yelling “dog, dgfl and observed
I
I As SAl
Ipassed SAl
growling at SAl
to
dog
injured
the
causing
position, SAl
If ired two rounds
retreat.

1

1,

On 12/03/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Acting Deputy Assistant Director
Mary E. Galligan, Inspection Division (XNSD), chaired the meeting
and was a non-voting member. The following voting members were
in attendance:
Barry Kçwalski, Special Legal Coi.znsel, Civil
1 Trial Attorney,
Rights Division, USDOJ;I
Criminal Division, USDOJ; Inspector Donald B. Oswald, Office of
Inspections, INSD; Section Chief (SC) Ralph Butler, CD-i,
Eurasian Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David 7.
Johnson, Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
1 Practical Applications Unit, TD;
Unit Chief (Ucil
I
Response Team, Iaboratory
SSA
CR-2., Washington Field Ofice;
Div;sion; 55A1
SSAI
I Firearms Training Unit TD; SSAI
I
Unit, TD; and SSA I
Systems
Defensive
Investigative Law Unit, Of f ice of General Counsel. The
SC Linda
following non-voting members were also in attendance:
Division;
Inspection
N. Kriea. Internal Inveqtigations Section,
I Inspection Management Unit (IMU),
UC I
Strategic Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; Management and Program
I IMU, SAS, INSD; and MAPAI
I
Analyst (MAPA) I
I IMU, SAS, INS]).

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to;
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from a-n
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
tUWILASSIFXED
2

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A127].741-D,

Inspection
12/11/2009

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

•

SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the FBI’s
deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
[ jas a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

DNCLASSIFIBD
3

7C

 UNCLASSIFIED

S.

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271741-D, 12/11/2009

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, VC
That no Idministrative action betalen against
SA I
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

-

-

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.’
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Pistole, Room 7142
caproni, Room ‘7427
Kowaiski, USDOJ
‘USDOJ
1 Room 4825
.nderson
Johnson, Toom 320
,

Quantico

1
IQuaxitico
1
Mr
Quantico
1
fLa.boratory
Mn
1—Mrj
I. oom 6387
1
Mz[
3.
Mrj________ Room 3043
-

-

.

-

-

-

+4

UNCLASSIFIED

4

 ________

(Rev. OS-O1-2003)

UNCLASSIFIBD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date: 12/10/2009

ROUTINE
Attn:

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Office o
Contact:

Approved By:

?JD .niy Jo tyons

Tnnn

I
zyv

Gailigan Mary

Drafted By:

p

Case ID *:

297-HQ-A1271984-D

.

bZ’
b IC

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
TRAINING DIVISION
08/07/2009

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group CSIRG) reviewed a.
shooting incident that occuçred en 08/07/200, involving )aw
I LESI
If ired
Enforcemex.t specialist (I
ES
1
one round from his Glock Model 23, .40 caliber S&W pistol killing
a. severely injured deer. SIRG members recçmunended that no
las a result of
administrative action be taken against LESI
his involvement in this shooting incident.
-

Administrative: Reference report of Assistant Director Brian D.
Lamkin, dated 08/10/2009.
Details:
This communication was repared to furnish the
analysis, comments, anc recômmndations of the Si with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
I

I

On 08/07/2009, a.t approcimatc1y 5:45 a.m., IDES
Iwas driving to work at the FBI Academy when he encountere
The
a 13. 5. Mazine standing next to an injured female deer.
Marine was in the oncoming lane of traffic using a flashlight to
signal traffic to slow down because the deer was struggling to
stand and was dragging itself across the roadway.
Due to the darkness, increasing traffip. laclç of
jshot and
emergency lights, and location of the deer, r.,ESI
UNCI*.SSIFIED

 ______

UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271984-D, 12/10/2009

killed the injured deer to eliminate the traffic hazard and
prevent potential injury to personnel in the area.
It should be noted that Game Wa.rdenà usually handle
these situations; however, all Game Wardens were assigned
temporary duty assignments in South Carolina at the time of the
incident.
On 12/03/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned sboting incident. Acting Deputy Assistant Director
Mary B. Galligan, Inspection Division (‘INSD), chaired the meeting
and was a. non-voting member. The following voting members were
in attendance:
Barry Kowaiski, Special Legal Counsel, Civil
Rights Division, UsDOJ;I
j Trial Attorney,
B. Oswald, Office of
Donald
Inspector
Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Inspections, INSD; Section Chief (SC) Ralph. Butler, CD-i,
Eurasian Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J.
Johnson, Violent Crimes Section Criminal Investigative Division;
Practical Applications Unit, TD;
Unit Chief (Uc)I
I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory
SSAI
Division; SSAI
I OR-2, Washington Field Office;
1 TD; SSAI
I
IFirearms Training Unit
SSA I
I
and
SSAI
TD;
Unit,
Systems
IDefensive
I
I
Envestigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel. The
SC Linda
following non-voting members were also in attendance:
N. Krieg, Internal Investigations Section, Inspection Division;
1 Inspection Management Unit (IMU),
tIC! I
(SAS), XNSD; Management and Proqram
Section
Strategic Analysis
I IMU, SAS, INSD; and MAPAI
I
Analyst (MAPA) i
INSD.
SAS,
INtl,

I

6
1
b

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action .if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously aqreed that
Ias a
action should be taken against LESI
It was
involvement in this shooting_incident.
were
actions
LBS
members that although
tfl1CXASSIPIED
2

no administrative
result of his
noted by the
humane, the

b7c

 UNCIASSXFXD
To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271984-D, 12/10/2009

shooting of the in ured deer was not within the current deadly
force policy.
This matter will be discussed with the Assistant
Director of the Training Division.

UNCLASSIFIED
3

 ___________las

__________

NCIABSIFIEP

Inspection
Inspection Prom:
297-HQ-A1271984-D, 12/10/2009

To:
Re:

LEAD Cs):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC

That no administrative action be taken against LES
a result of his involvement in this shooting

incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

-

-

-

-

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.I
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Pistole, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Kowalslçi, USD(XT
I USDOJ
Anderson, Room 4825
Johnson, Room 3280
Quantio

IQuantico
I Quantico

1
1
M
1-Mu
-

-

1

-

Mrs.

I

raboratory
K?O
L Room6387
I Room 3043

UNCASSIPXED
4

 (Rey. 05.0 l-200$)

UNCLASSXFtD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Frcm:

Attn:

Inspectipn
Office of
Contact:

10/01/2009

AD 2my Jo Lyons

I

I

Approved By:,/s_Michael S
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

I

Iirr

297—HQ-A1271912—D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
06/19/2009

]b2
lb 6
lb7C

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipcident that occurre on 06/19/2009, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I While executing a federal arrest
warrant, SAl
If ired one round from his Bureau—issued Glock
Model 22, .40 caliber pistol at an aggressive pit bull dog.
SIRG
members reçcimnndji that no administrative action be taken
against SN
I as a result of his .nvolvement in this
shooting incident.
-

Reference Electronic Communication of Assistant
Special Agent in Charge D. True Brown, Jr., dated 07/15/2009.

Administrative:

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting tnd.dent
On 06/19/2009, San Antonio Division Agents, along with
local police officers, were executing an arrest warrant on an
indicted gang member.

I

f1ntr t.r5 held at approximately 2:30 p.m., and SA

ladvised team metnbers that two large pit
bull dogs had been observed at the residence within the previous
two weeks.
SAS p
I
andp
Iwere assignea to approach tne
j,
I
tLsSI7±:ED

 .4

.

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271912—D, 10/01/2009

front of tbe residence accompanied by a uniformed officer. Two
additionaJ.Aënts. and a uniformed officer were tb provide rear
security of the residence as Agents attempted to make contact
with the individuals inside the residence.

I andj
SAsI
Itraveled to the
residence in one vehicle. Upon arrival, SAsI
Iand
I
lexited nd ben moving toward the front door of the
I exited and assumed a position behind SAc
residence.
p
qandl
As the Agents proceeded to the front
door, sia
Iheard barking and crrowlinç and observec a
large dog charging toward her and SAl
I SAl
ipointed
his weapon and fired one round at the dog which was inches away
from his right leg.
The shot did not strike the dog; however,
the pit bull retreated allowing Agents time to move to a location
of safety.
On 09/09/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, nspection Division (JNSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member. The following voting menibers were in
attendance:
Barry Kowaiski, Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USD031
I Attorney, Criminal Division, tJSDOJ;
Chief Inspector Mary E. Galligan, Office of Inspections, INSD;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage
‘Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Jçhnson,
Violent Crimes Section Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (CC
fling Unit, Training
Division
Practical Applications
Unit, TD; DC
Special Weapons ançi Thr±ic
OiDeratiojls Unit, Critica Inci ent Respoise Group: Uci
I
I
I
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSAI
Investigative Law Unit, Office of Genetal Counsel; and SSAI
I CR-2, Washington Field Office. The following non-voting
I
members were also in attendance: SC Ellen B. Icochea, Strategic
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; DCI
‘nspectioa
I
Management Unit (IMU), SAS, INSD; SSAI
Inspection Anavsis Unit (IAU’J. SAS, INSD; Management and Program
1
Analyst (MAPA) I
I lAD. SAS, INSD; MPA I
I lAD, SAS,
IMU, SAS, INSU; MAPAI
INSD; and MAPAI
p IMU, SAS, INSD.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

I

 UNCIL.SSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297RQ—A12719l2—D, 10/01/2009

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

I

SIRG_mernbçrs unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
FBI’s deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommndatjon that no administrative action be taken against SA
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

ASSI’IED
1
‘UNCt

3

 i

t3NCLASSXXZD

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271912—D, 10/01/2009

hEAD(s):
Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no adxnLnistrative action be taken against
SAF
L, as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

aD7c

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Mr. Eisto1e, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
M._Köwalski, USIJOJ
Mr.t
I tJSDOJ
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
Mr. Johnson Room 3280
Quantico
Mr.I
Mr.I
IQuantico
(Attntinn__Mn
I
1—Mr.[
IãIRG
1
uantico
Mr.I
1
Ms..I________ Room 6387
—
-

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1

3.

—

Mr.I

—

Mrs’i

Room 3043

UNLASSI?IED

4

 S

‘

(Rev. Q5.O120O8)

tThTCLASSIFIBD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Attn:

Inspection

From:

Date:

ROUTINE

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

12/14/2009

I

LYons MIy
[]Jrr

Case ID

It:

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
09/11/2009

1)2
b7C

297-HQ-A1271895-D

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting izcidnt that oicured on 09/11/2009, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
I While_conducting a cellular
I fired two rounds from his
telephone tracking operation, SN
Bureau-issued Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol at a subject who
was backing a vehicle toward him and a. local police officer.
SIRG members_recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
gas a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent F
I dated 11/17/2009.

This communicaEion was prepared to furnish .the
Details:
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 09/11/2009, Agents and Task Force Officers (TFOs)
were conducting_a cellular telephone tracking o eration on
Iced his
L
During the operation,
fugitive,’
e r
jparked
vehicle and Detective j
yehicie directly behind iaim.
land Detective
ect.
lexited. their vehicle while issuing commands to
I
was positioned behind the rear passenger side of
Detective j

sat

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271895--D, 12j14/2009

the subject vehicle and SAl
Iwas s±uatqd along the passenger
side.
In an attempt to seek cover, SAL
I repositioned himself
to the rear passenger side forcing Detective L Ito the rear of
the vehicle.
Attemptino_o prevent the subject from leaving the
area, Detectivel
I repositiqnd the pracking vehicle along the
Iilaced his car in reverse
side of the subject’s vehicle. I
I Believinu ho
and BA I
and backed toward Detective I
were in imminent danger of being znjured or killed, BA I
ired two rounds at the subject.
Jwas not struck by the fired rounds and fled the
I
His vehicle was recovered by local police and the two
expended rounds were recovered from the rear of the vehicle.
scene.

On 12/03/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above-

captioned shooting incident. Acting Deputy Assistant Director
Mary E. Galligan, Inspection Division (INS!)), chaired the meeting
and was a. non-voting member. The following voting members were
in attendance: Barry Kçwalski. Special Lega, Counsel, Civil
Trial Attorney,
Rights Division, USDOJ; I
Criminal Division, USDOJ; Inspector Donald B. Oswald, Office of
Inspections, INS!); Section Chief (SC) Ralph Butler, CDl,
Eurasian Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J.
Johnson, Violent Crimes Section Criminal Investigative Division;
Practical Applications Unit, TD;
tJni Chief (tTi
Response
Team, Laboratory
I.
vidençe
SSAI
Division; SSA I
I. CR-2, Washington Field Off i’t
I
SSAI
I Firearms Training UnitTD;. SSAI
Washinqon, Defensive Systems Unit, TD; and SSAI
I.
L Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel. The
oliowing non-voting members were also in attendance: SC Linda
M. TCriea. Intrria1. Invetigations Section, Inspection Division;
UC I
L Inspection Management Unit (IMU),
1 INS!); Management and Program
Strategic luialysis Section (SAS)
1 INtl, SAS, INSD; and MAPAI
Analyst (MA.A) I
I IMU, SAL INS!).

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Observations and. Recommendations o the SING
The SING reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
cpørational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
UNcLASSIFIED
2

-

 tThTCIZASSIFIED
TO:

1e:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A127189S-D, 12/14/2009

concerning training arid/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations fo administrative action i,f deemed necessary.
force by
with the
UI
SA
inc ent.

SR nnther unanious1y agreed that the use of deadly
I was justified and in conformance
sI
FBI’s deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in
endation that no administrative action be taken against
as a result of his involvement in this shooting

ASSIPIED
1
UNCI

3

 U1CLAS8tFXD
TO:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-IQ-A1271895-D, 12/14/2009

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
SAl
shooting incident.

9ministrative actionbe taken against
I as a result of his involvement in this

bG
7C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproxii, Room 7427
1
Mr. Kowaiski, USDOJ
1 -Nr.i
ItJSDOJ
1
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
1.
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
-

-

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-

1 -Mr.

Mr.
1
Mr.
1
1
Mn
1-Mn
1
Ms.1
1
Mr
-

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-

-

I Quantico

jQuantico
Quantico
ELaboratory

I

l’

oom 6387
I, Room 3043

UNCLASSIFXD

4

 _____Ishot

__________________

(Rev. OS-OI’2008)

UNCLàSSIFIBD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence;
To:

ROUTINE

Date;

Inspection

from:

Attzi:

08/05/2009

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of Tniicn
Contact: I_

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Approved. BY4tens Michael S
Drafted. By:

i

Case ID #:

297—HQ-A1271801-D

Title:

ilrr

SHOOTING INCIDENT
OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION
03/07/2009

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occur:çed on 03/07/2009, involving Special
Agent (SA)
While hiking along an Oklahoma
highway, S
and Icilled an aggressive dog. SIRG
members rem
nnçed that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
jas a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic Conmiunicatiçn of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)j________________ dated
03/l0/2009
Details;
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 03/07/2009, as sN
Iwas hiking along a highway
outside of Woodward, Oklahoma a large mixed breed dog approached
him in a menacing manner. SAl
hooked around to determine if
the dog’s owner was in the area, nowever, the nearest house was
approximately two hundred yards away from his location. SAl
I
attempted to continue his walk several times; however, each time
he turned his back to the animal, the dog aggressively_charged
him.
After several attempts to leave the area, SAl
Iturned
arid continued to walk toward town. H heard the dog barcing in
tNcI,ASStF’IED

 UNLASSIEIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—RQ—Al27180l—D, 08/05/2009

an aggressive manner and as he turned h w the dog running
toward hint.
1 SAl
Idropped his
Fearing for his safety
backpack to the ground and drew his weapon from his fanny pack.
As the dog continued approaching him, SAl
I fired one round
killing the dog.

SAl
Icontinued his walk toward town and while on a
secondary road, observed two County Sheriff’s Deputies. ae
advised them of the incident and was informed the dog’s owner had
also reported the incident.
On 05/28/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance:
Barry Kowals)ci, Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
I Attorney, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Division, USDOJ;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson,
Violent Crimes Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (tJC)!
j Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (wi; uui
i Practical Applications Unit,
t1C i
i Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSA
I
I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory
•Division; SSA
I Special Weapons and Tctics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
1
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L Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; and
I
SSAI
I CR—17, Washington Field Office. DCI
Inspection
Management
Unit
01,
(IMU),
INSD,
and
j
I
Nanagement program Analyst I
IMU, OX, INSD, non
voting members, were also in attendance,
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA I
I was justified and in conformance with the FBI’ s
deadly force policy.
This discusion resulted in. the
UNCLASSIFIED

2

*

]b6
h7C

 ______las

xED
t
uNcL.ssx

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271801—D, 08/05/2009

recoxtujendatjon that no administrative action be taken against SA
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

UNCLASSXFXED

3

 ___IUSDOJ
______ICIRG

DNCIASS XFID

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271801—D, 08/05/2009

LEAD(s):
Set. Lead. 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
PhM

SAl

r

shooting incident.

dLninis.trative action be taken against
I., as a result of his involvement in this

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr._Kowalski, USDOJ
1—Mn
1
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
1
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
1
Mr.
I Quantico
I
Mr.
IOpantjco
1—Mr.
(Attention:
Mr.I
I
1
Mr.
IQuanticQ
Ms.I
1
Room 7326
1.
Quantico
Mr4
WFO
1-Mn
1
Mrs.I__________ Room 3043
—

—
—

—

—

-

—

—

-

—

UNCLSSIID

4

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FO-2O4(Rev 12-1-95)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

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Report o

TIC Donald B. Oswa1dC
7
03/0912009

case in

297-HQ-A127096fl)

TitIc

SHOOTING iNQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
BUFFALO DIVISION
02/26/2009

Choractet

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

Synopsis

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omc Inspections

The Buffk1 Division conducted an investigation entitled

I which focused on the cocaine distribution activities of the 3l Street

I

(lang,” also known for extreme violence, including several murders. In January 2009,
a joint law enforcement operation was conceived to obtain and simultaneously execute
warrants, II search warrants for residences, and five search warrants for
vehicles. Execution of the operation occurred on Thursday, February 26, 2009 and
involved the FBI’s Buffalo Division, New York State Police (NYSP), City of Buffalo
Police, and numerous other federal, stat% and local agencies. During the operation,
the Buffalo Division’s SWAT Team was assigned to clear two residences, in both of
which were thought to live potentially anned subjects. Both residences located in the
City of Buffalo were to be searched following clearing by the SWAT Team.
The first residence cleared by the SWAT Team was located all____

I and was executed as planned. The second residence was located at

Iwhere recent intelligence indicated the subject had obtained an assault e
and two hand guns. The SWAT Team deployed a flash bang grenade and made entry
into the residence. As the SWAT Team entered the living room, two SWAT operators
broke off from the stack to clear a room along the right side wall ofthe living room.
The remainder ofthe team proceeded through the living room to the threshold of the
dining room located behind the living room. Within the dining room, there was a
closet at the far left corner of the room, a hallway atthe far right corner leading to the
kitchen, and another doorway along the right side wall. Several operators stacked at
the threshold between the living and LHning rooms and began prokHno wr r the
dining room and the far doorways, while one ofthe operators, S
moved into the dining room. AA he entered the cinjng room, S
0 served a
clothcoVering thedoorway along the right wall billow o ii
into
dining
room. Believing someone was in the adjacent room, S
ulled down the
covering, and conducted a quick peek into the room. S
was unaware this
.

nx.

This dooument containa neither zecoosondationa nor ccno2reiODa of the
Xt is the proezty of the FEZ
and is loaned to your agcy; it and its contents are not to be distributnd outside your agency.

b

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doorway was a second entrance into the same room SWAT operators had previously entered
from the living room.
During the quick peek, SAl
Law the silhouette of a man ho1dii an assa4t
nfle which was moving up and down as if being handled by an untrained person. SAj
I
munechately backed away, took a tactical crouching position açd fired at what he believed to be
an armed subject about to engage his weapon. Unknown to S21
I
! SAl
one of the SWAT operators clearing the room along the right side wall ofthe living room, had
inadvertently passed the covered doorway and was standing on a box
two mattresses,
which were located in front of a closet he was attempting to clear. S
ed four rounds
from his M-4 .223 caliber rifle, the first two of which truck the adiaceat rooms exterior wall and
1 and em1dded into the neighboring house al
window
I After slightly adjusting his
ann, S4
lired a tbirçl round wilch first penetrated the door jam, ad then struck SA
I
but wa stcrnne4 by
I tactical vst in the kidney area. SL1
I forth
round stçuck SAl
liii the shoulder with the bullet eventually lodging in his neck. SA
twas iziunediately attended to by the SWAT Team’s Medic and a special medical
I
response team trauma surgeon, following which he was transported to a nearby trauma center.
He was released from the hospital on Saturday, February 28, 2009, and was expected to make a
full recovery.

:

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DETAILS OF OPERATION:
On April 10, 2007, the Buffalo Dvisnn’R Vinlent crime/organized Crime Squad
(Squad Four) opened an OCDETF investigationi
linvolving the “31 Street
Gang.” The “31 Street Gang” was knqto be a violent gang involved primarily in cocaine
distribution. During the nvastiatkmi II’ftlq ifis were initiated on numerous members of the
:r,
gang tol
Jmci
i Numerdus controlled drug
purchases, physicaL surveillances and e1ectrorc trcidn devieas were utilized durliW the
investigation. The Buffalo Division operatedi
I who
targeted the gang and obtained additional intelligence. Use of the various investigative
techniques identified the scope ofthe cocaine trafficking conspiracy by the gang, as well as
numerous gang members and gang associates. In addition to cocaine trafilcldng, the “31 Street
Gang” was believed to be involved in violent assaults, homicides, and money laundering. In
June 2008, the OCDETF investigation involving the “31 Street Gang” was selected by FBIHQ as
a Top 30 FBI gang investigation.

‘.‘-

In February 2009, subsequent to the vehicle stop, a decision was made by the
investigators t9 arrest all i4entiflcd subjects. A contributing factor in this decision was one ofthe
main subjeotsj
I was becoming increasingly aware of surveillance and began
confronting surveillance teams. On February 24,2009, the Bufthlo Division obtained 34 federal
arrest warrants for members and associates ofthe “31 Street Gang” and 17 federal Stach

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297-HQ-A127096 ID

SWAT TEAM PREPARATIONS
SAl
iecame the Buffalo Division SWAT Team Leader (TL) in
June2008. TEA
ilaadbeenamemberoftheteamsjnce200l. Sinceassunilngtheroleof
TL, he led two SWAT operations prior to the captioned operation. The SWAT Team trained
three days each month and one full week each year A training matrix was used to determine
what training was necessary to fulfill FBI requirements and the specific needs of the Buffalo
Division, from which the training schedule for the year was established In November2008, the
Chief Division Counsel (CDC) provided training on the FBI’s Deadly Force Policy to the SWAT
Team, The SWAT Team conducted firearms and tactics training on a regular basis, including
standard operating procedures (SOP) for weapons handling The SWAT Team SOP for weapons
handling concurred with FBI policy.

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On Monday, February 23,2009, the SWAT Team held regularly scheduled
training at the Alden SWAT Training facility owned by Brie County, NY. The facility was
equipped with pistol and rifle ranges, as well as a shooting house. Training consisted of
discussions on. various topics from the recent SWAT
uce. One of the items discussed
was the weapon safety manipulations policy, which
reviewed with the participating
members ofthe SWAT Team. Training was provided on e
gas gun, including
familiarization fire and qualifications. The team also reviewed Close Quarters Battle (CQB)
techniques, specifically movement in hallavs. at çloorways, and at room entrances. Link-up
procedures were also discussed. Vy’hlle TEl
latten4d ameethig on the upcoming operation
from 10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., SAl
I conducted M-4 training drills with the
SWAT Team.
During the afternoon portion ofthe training,
y briefed the
Operations Plan using a PowerPoint presentation. Included hi presentation were a target
matrix describing potential threats at each location, identification ofthe assembly area location,
maps, intelligence on the subjects sought at each address, photographs of each subject, aerial
photographs of each location, reconnaissance-and site survey data for each location, and weather
information for the date ofthe operation. Paper copies of the presentation or the draft Operations
Plan were not provided during the briefing. After the briefing, a rehearspl ‘‘
each location. The shoot-house was utilized to simulate thp flrt 1n1nn
I
and the “Hogan’s Alley” range was utilized to simulate thee
location. The SWAT
Team rehearsed vehicle positioning, positions inside vehicles, dismount, approach, assigned
positions, actions at the entry points, and breach procedures.

.

Due to the overall intelligence reardln thp subjects of the investigation ana
mfçmnatinp which indicated subjects at the I
Ilocation were expected to be armed,
TEl
I felt an entry utlli4n the deploynient of a flash bang grenade was the best method to
use for the SWAT entry. Th
I felt it was the safest method by which to execute the search,
as it would provide an element of surprise and provide the SWAT Team a tactical advantage.
completed the Operations Plan on Tuesday, February 24,2009. On
Wednesday, Fcbuary ,.201)9, he briefed SSM
% the SWAT Team Coordinator
arul Squad 4 supervisor. Subsequently, they both briefed ASAC Richard W. Koilniar arid. ASAC

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297-HQ-A1270961D

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In order to rehearse closer to the actual day ofthe operation, the SWAT Team
scheduled a r
for the early morning on the day of the operation. In preparation for the
reb
ed chalk to draw distinct mock-ups ofthe front of I
I
and
on the floor ofthe Electronic Technicians (ET) bay. The outlines included the
fro o eac rear ence, window locations, porches, front entrances, and stairs.
EARLY MORNNCl OPERATIONS: FEBRUARY 26.2009
On Thursday, February 26,2009, SWAT Team members arrived at the field office
around 3:30 a.m., to get dressed for the operation. They had been directed to arrive by 3:45 am.
The SWAT Team dressed in the same uniforms, which consisted of green BDUs, olive drab
SWAT tactical vest with plates inserted, black tactical boots black balaclava, flight gloves,
kevlar helmet, goggles, crotch protector, and knee pads. Si1
IWore a green flight
stilt .c I did not possess BDUs. The rear perimeter team,
nd SAl
I
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Iwore black vests, as they did not have olive drab vests. Each SWAT Team member bad
their issued (3lock pistol and M-4 rifle, and extra loaded magazines for caciL Each operator also
had a flashlight, either attached to one or both weapons, and/or a tactical light They were also
equipped with Pelcor hearing protection devices.

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n the plan. During the briefing, Tn
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hequested approval for the deployment
of flash bang grenades inside each ofthe two residences. Although the Operations Plan did not
require the use of flash bangs in the interior portion of the houses, be requested the approval in
case a situation arose that called for such use. ASAC IColimar approved the deployment of flash
bang grenades. ASAC Kollrear provided both verbal and written approval ofthe SWAT
2peratlons Plan at that tune SAC Laune Bennett approved the Operatons Plan later that day
lire final approved version ofthe Operations Plan was uploaded to the SWAT folder
ti
Buffalo Division’s Shared Drive, where team members could access it. SWAT Team member
were also sent an e-mail with a copy of the Operations PowerPoint presentation by Thi
I

When the team reported, SAl
he had injured
ladvised TL
himself and asked to b
Iwas may to the SWAT
from the entry team. SM
driver position and S
was moved to the number six position in the entry team line..up.
All SWAT Team mem era involved in the operation rehearsed their planned entries and
breaching options by walking through the chalk mock-npsjn the ET ]iay from approximately
4:30 a.m. until almost 5:00 am. Prior to the rehearsal. SAl
Iprovided additio
information from his CHS to the SWAT Team thatj
.J who resided
I
4ecently came into possession ofa AX-47 or.AR-15 assault rifle and two
which bad been brought tot
leceived this information the day prior
IS
to the operation.

.

M 5:00 a.m.,therewas ageneral briefing attheBuffaloFieldOfficeforall
personnel involved in the operation. Some SWAT Team members attended this briefq, while
othersdidnotorattendedoiilyaportionofthebrieflng. SACBennett,SSAJ
Iandthc
case Agent made remarks and provided infoanation about the operation. The 34 attest teams
wei’e also present for the briefing, Bach arrest team had completed their own briefing on
Wednesday, February 25,2009. CDC David Szumsld reviewed the FBPs Deadly Force Policy at
the 5:00 am. brjefing, and advised officers of other departmen
w their own Deadly
Force policy. During or shortly after the 5:00 a,m. briefing,
briefed the NYSP
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297-HQ-A1270961D

troopers regarding escorting the SWAT Team on the operation. T1dvised the NYSP to
Ori the emergency lights oftheir vehicles when the SWAT Tea inädientry.
$2 EMSUE STREET
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At the conclusion ofthe briefing, the SWAT
I A federal arrest warrant had been issued for residen
a e 8
search warrant had been issued for the premjses. A nair ofDety U
States Marshals had
taken up a position in a backyard adjacent td
I The Marshals were confronted
by a Great Dane, which they shot and killed In spite ofthis evert. it was detrnnnçd by ASAC “Kolimar, On-Scene Comn,nder, the execution ofthe warrants at
I could
proceed as planned.

_____

At approximately 6:00 a.rn., entry was achieved al
hnd the
subject was located and apprehended. Three babies were found inside the premises. The
Operations Order called for an arrest team to be on scene to deal with matters such as this, but
the team djd tint arrhr8 cieduled. As a result the SWAT Team was required to remain in
control of1
Ituitil the ajTest team arrive& Jt took approximately one hour for the
SWAT Team to complete operations a
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There was no set time for the SWAT Team to arrive al
or the
second operation. However, according to interviews of SWAT Team members
3 both operations
were to be conducted prior to daylight The late arrival ofthe arrest team made this virtually
impossible. When irterviewe& snrçe SWAT Team members indicated they felt a sense of
urgency to get to thel
location.
ITII
Iconducted an
Upon concluding the operation ad
after action çlebriefinn witji the team and then directed the sniper/observers, SAl
land SA
101
Ito conduct an advance surveillance ott the house.

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At approximately 7:15 a.m., the sniper/observers arrived in the vicinity
I
bad approached the residence from a direction which allowed them to observe the right
side ofthe house,
served lights on inside the front room at the residence and reported the
information to
‘a radio channel T-5, dedicated to internal SWAT Team
communications. The sr$ner/observers pulled their vehicle alongside the curb in front of a large
brick btuldmg adjacent td
a short distance from the target house which provided
cover and concealment, and waited forthe arrival ofthe rest of the team.

_____

Th rmnbg

SWAT operators were en route in the SWAT van driven by SA
JIove the SWAT truck equipped with a winch, and brought along SA
I the rear perimeter observers. 1oth SWAT vçhicles stopped in front of
a warehouse located on m1th Street directly behind thel
residence, where SWAT
Team members repositioned in the vehicles, and deployed the rear perimeter observers to a
surveillance position on the warehouse roof. The warehouse rooftop provided a direct view of
the backyard ofthe residence ati
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297-HQ-A1270961D

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Up` n. n` tificati` n ` fthe SW” ‘im4nent arrival, sA
hud
taged ` n. the sidewalk adjacent tc
land awaited the remainder ` f the team.
The SWAT van and the winch truck m` ved int` p` siti` n, and. subsequently tw` marked NYSP
vehicles bl` cked ` ff each end ` f C` it street. ASAC IC` llmar’s vehicle was in fr` nt ` f the NYSP
vehicle at the mtersecti` n ` f H` ward Street and C` it Street. The SWAT Team exited their
vehicles, ` ff4` aded their gear, and stacked-up al` ng the
residence. The ` rder ` f the stack ` n the

‘Medic/left side security).

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Once ip p` siti` n, SAl
linitiated the ready check and when the check was
c` mplete, TL{
have the ` rder t` the team t` advance t` ward the d` ` r ` f the h` use. The
teap m` ve4 deliberately t` ward the fr` nt steps ` f the residence c` vering all visible windnws.
Si
I m` ved up the fr` nt stairs p` siti` ning himself anainstthbanistqr ` n the riit,
assessed the d` ` r and ann` unced “FBI Search Warrant.” S
d SAl
Ithen left
their p` siti` ns in the stack f` rmati` n and m` ved t` ward the fr` nt ` ar t` p` siti` n themselves f` r
its breach. The NYSP vehicles activated their emergency lights at this tine Shiiii1ane` usly,
multiple SWAT Team members ann` unced “FBI Search Warrant”and SAl
p` siti` n #8)
left his p` siti` n in the stack t` take a p` siti` n near the winch truck in case the initial breach
attempt was unsuccessful and a chain needed t` be attached t` the ` uter metal security d` ` r and
winch truck t` null the I` ` r fr` m its hinpe The .tack ` rder at the me inst pri` r t` breaching
fr,n iri SAl
tpsifi` n#), SAJ
‘(pa”
l(pcsiti` n#3), SA
), SAl
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‘(p` siti` n #4)
[p` sitI` n #6) SAI
p` siti` n
(p` siti` n #5), SAl
#7), and SA I
f.p` siti` n
-

SM
et the Halligan t` ` l at the st` rm d` ` thl` ` r jam gap and SAl
struck the Ialligan t` ` l with a ram. The st` rm d` ` r ` pened ` utward fr` m this strike. A
J hit the fr` nt d` ` r tw` ` r three times with the tam and the d` ` r ` pened inward. SA
I
lentered the vestibule and ` bserved a
r t` the left, c` nsistent with the limited
intelligence available ` n the h` use lay`
led f` r a sec` ndary breach but turn d
the d` ` r kn` b and f` und it unl` cke
pened the sec` ndaiy d` ` r and SAl
called f` r a flash bang grenade. S
ep ` yed a flash hang grenade int` the living r` ` m.
The grenade det` nated a few feet past e sec` ndary d` ` rway in the living ça` niresqlting in a
` fni
.
significantaju` unt 1
Isec` nd, SA
hnteredtbc livingr` ` m first, S1
and SAl
` urtb.

I

1

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The lighting c` nditi` ns in the living r` ` m were m` derate. SA
Im` ved
fr` m the sec` ndary d` ` rway al` ng the wall parallel t` tie street and yelling “FBI Search
Warrant” until reaching the r` ` m’s c` rner. Si
I t` ` k a p` siti` n by a c` uch at a sec` ndary
d` ` rway arid identified a l` ng hallway g` ing fr` m the living r` ` m, thr` ugh a dinin r` ` m, and
int` a kitchen. The dining r` ` m was dark, but the kitchen are ws we1I-li S
` ved
farther int` the living r` ` m al` ng the
SA
hncl
liden e a ` ` rway
tn t1i riàht, ` ff` f the living
called ` ut f` r an` ther SWAT ` perat` r. SA
r` ` m. SA
ackiL` wlc4gcg1 aM mciv
` ff ` f tle living rp` m which was
I
` prw
later identified as a bedr` ` rii. SA
passed SAl
dS
bn the right and
6

br

 _______moved

I
I
entered the bedroom yelling “FBI Sçarth WarinL” SAl
bntered the bedroom first and
went to the far wall ofthe room, SE4
jentered the bedroom second, button-hooked left
and stayed to the interior wail.

•

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h trained his weapon on the hallway through the dining room and into
SA
the kitchen area and called, “I’m frnc, “while moving to aositionatthe doorwayto the dining
room. Prom this position, SJ
hooked into the dining room and identified a cloth
covering over a doo
ght and called out identil’ing the door and the need for two
SWAT operators. S
ved from his positi
ofthe living room and
posted adjacent
and said “got one.” S
responded, “no, need two.”
Subsequently, S
1 entifled the cloth cover
on. the yiaht Tight from the
kitchen made for in
I considered the
ng in the dining room. S
and SA I
doorway on the right to be an entrance for a second room on t e right, andtliereforO considered it
an unaddressed danger area.
SHOOTING OF SAE

I

I a{
and S4 I, SM
ugh the bedroom. The lighting
conditions in the bedroom were dim to moderate. S
oved through the doorway to the
far wall arid identified a long room with several mattresses an a closet at far
,SA
I saw a
moved from the doorway to the near wall, and identified same. SM
I
doorway on the left covered by a cloth, but believed it to be a doorway where other SWAT
operators were on. the other sjde. He djd not believe it to be a danger area and therefore did not
call it out to SAl
along the fir wail. weanon trained on the closet,
I
intermittently employing the tactical light on his M-4, s4
Imoved more slowly along
the interior wall and did not engage his tactical light. SAl
Idvanced towards the closet
along a path blocked by three stacked mattresses that had a height of one foot and seven inches
off the 4oor. Having a blind-covered window on his right and a covered doorwv cm hinjeft, SA
I
‘pped out, the mattress and continued to move toward the closet SAj
hedidnotinitiallyseethedoorwayorelsehewouldnothavemovedinfrontofat. SAl
I
moved short of the stacked mattresses and stayed along the interior wall.

SAl

Simultaneous with the advance of S

I having made entry into the bedroom, a

S
I moved forward into the dining room along the wall adjacent to the
bedroom, tactic y s icing to address the cloth covered
on the right in a semi-crouched
position with the tactical light of his M-4 engaged. SI
lobserved the cloth covering the
doorway flutter or billow into the dining room, and according to his statement, y11etl “hpw me
your hands,” and observed the cloth covering return to its original position. SM
freached
ouljwith h jeft hand, pulled the cloth covering down, and did a quick peek into the bedroom.
SAl
lidentifled a pair of hands holding an assault rifle wi
arallel to the
exterior wall, in front ofthe blinds-covered bedroom window. S
r observed the
assault rifle n h hn1jhing up and down as if being fuithlçd with by an untrained operator
(actullv 1
Jdid not identi the individual.
Iwalidng across the mattresses.) SM
as&
I
SAl
‘ook his M-4 to the high-ready position, stepped out pivoting away
from the bedroom d9orway in transition towards a kneeling position, while disengaging the
safety. SAl
I fired four rounds in rapid succession to address what he believed to be a

6
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297-HQ-A1270961])

subject preparing to engage a high-powered weapon against him and other SWAT Team
operators.

I

Nearly all witnesses described hearing three or four gunshots. SAwas
described as falling backwards just slier firing the shots. He was making noises described as
high-pitched moaning. He was thought to have been shot. The SWAT Team had only been in
the residence approximately 15 seconds at this point. S
members yelled repeatedly,
“Where’ the shooter?,” and, “Who has the shootcr?
Jked SA.
SAl
t1?Iere he had been hit and ifhe ciiM mn’(e, but recetved no response. TIl
hnd
S4
I had coverage on the room SAl
I w “ rn coul4 e it wi clear, but did not
kncw if fliers were threats iii the adjacent rooms. SI1
Iuick1y grabbed
land TEl
SAl
nd pulled him into the living room near the large couch.
Immediately after the gunfire, S
as behind TL[Jn the stack
on the living çoom door, turned to his right and saw SA
fall fkce down next to the feet of
SAl
I I-fe believe4 S4
as lying on the floor and
Jiad been shot, as
not moving. SA[
Iyelkdfor help and pulled S
y ofthe
bedroom. SAl
eat and dragged
mmediatcly went into the room, gr e A
him to the front entrance of the house, which had been identified as e cas
collection point
during briefings prior to the operation.
The SWAT TL tho
operators had been shot, and believed there was still
an active shooter in the house.
instructed the interior team to continue clearing the
residence and he disengaged from
to go to the casuaIy collectiqu. noint tq identify
which operator hr1 h shot. S
I Aft several
as ins
to stay With ftl
moments,Al
At that time, S
I
]ias heard crying out, “I shj I shot i
secured S
I M-4 and pistoL

The SWK Team cleared the rest of the house and located no occupants. After
the house was cleared, IlL
Igathered the team in the living room for a debrief. During SA
I
Iportion ofthe debrief; he was able to make a statement to the effect he had shot SA
I
MEDICAL I MANAGEMENT RESPONSE
Medical response planning and efforts at the scene were noteworthy. A detailed
medical response plan was incorporated within the SWAT Team Operations Plan. As part of
their medical response plan, the Buftuilo Division coordinated with local medical entities and
arranged for a Specialized Medical Response Team (SMART) to be on standby for the operation.
This resulted in an ambulance and a trauma surgeon assigned to SM.&RT arriving op scene
within approximately two to four minutes. Initially, the SWAT Team’s Medic, SAl
I
was on scene and provided immediate treatment to SAl
I Within minutes, the SMART
tuna surgeon also assigned to SMART arrived approximately two minutes later.
S
was transported to the
Medical Center (ECMC) at 462 Grider Street,
B
o, NY. With police escort, S
ved at the hospital within four to five minutes
ajid was taken immediately to the trauma room. An MRIadministered at the hospital revealed
the trajectory ofthe bullet caused non-life thxening tissue aniskeletal damage. SAl
I
was transported separately to the ECMC. as indicated in the SWAT Operations Plan.
.

8

h6
b 70

 •1
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SAC Bexmett responded immediately to the scene and shortly thereafter responded
to the hospital. EM notified the families ofboth Agents, Bach ofthe Agents were allowed, with
the concurrence of the SAC, to speak with each other, which proved extremely helpful in
reheving the anxiety ofthe jncident. The meeting also immediately aided the emotional well
being ofboth. SAl
twos provided with the services ofa hospital staffpsychiatrist and
EM) counselor p
Iwbo had been deployed to the Buffalo Division to assist
employees with the trauma stemming from the Continental Flight 3407 crash on February 13,
2009. Tie crai i
ncident required the employees ofthe field office to work and process the crash
1
site. spj
Istated the ability to talk with EM) in the hospital was helpful to his emotional
well-being.
POST SHOOTING
Tn
hiad a standard procedure for an operational debrief following the
executin? of a mision. The ‘FL jield a debriefwith the entire SWAT Team, including SA
I
I once the!
Ijocation was sethirei This allowed an opportunity to establish
what occurred during the incident, pause any potential rumors, provide welfare status to the
entire team, inform the team of SM
last known medical status, and provide procedural
guidance to the team as a whole.
At the scene, it was deteihw1 rniin&g frpin the shooting incident had impacted
and penetrated the neighboring residenc
I Buffalo Division’s EM aknow1e4aed
the
for
collateral
welfare
check was conducted atl
I
casualties
and
ensured
a
notertial

I
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1
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The BUffalO Division’s Evidence Response Team (ERT) was called to,
I
Upon arrival, the ERT was not allowed to enter the residence while
y SSAI
the SWAT Team conducted their debrief. It was evident that there was a lack of clarity with the
team as to whether or not ERT would be processing the scene. ASAC ICoilmar clarified ERT
would process the scene and gave the approval to do so.

____

Th 1,r.r1nli1 earch for drug evidence conimenced by the previously assigned
search team fol
This coincided and, at times, overlapped with the processing of
the shooting event by those aiuned tç do so. In one instance, Agents assigned to the shooting
scene processing departed thel
location and allowed the drug search team full access to all
areas ofthe residence. The Agents assigned to the shooting event returned and had to replace
moved items to complete their processing.
h7c
Agents assigned to the shooting investigation were unaware ofthe extent the
scene needed to be processed and the detail needed in reporting due to unfamiliarity with a
Shooting Incident Response involving an FBI Agent As a result the scene was prematurel
released and a consent to search had to be subsequently obtained from the subject to reenter
on February 28,2009, to obtain a scale drawing, generate a recreation ofthe shooting
I
scene, and take additional photographs. Ifthe subject would have been uncooperative, a
thorough and detailed review of the shooting scene would not have been possible.
SAJ
IvestandS
TeamintheteamsgunIockerattheB
.

0 ic

.eaponwere maintainedby the SWAT
cc. ERTobtainedandenteredSA

Ic

 _____fired

_

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incident

IM-4 and ballistic vest into evidence on March 2,2009, four days after the shooting

The U.S. Naval Observatory, Astronomical Applications Department provided the
following information regarding the weather for Buffalo, NY on February 26,2009: the morning
temperature was in the low 4(Ys and the sky was overcast The phase ofthe moon was a waxing
crescent with 3% of the moon’s visible disk illuminated. CiviL twilight was at 6Q7 a.m. and
simrisewasat6:56a..m.

In summary, Buffalo Division’s SWAT Team operator SAl
I while
participatjng in the clearing ofa house at which a federal_______ t was being executed,
mistakenly identified 84
Iis a threat S
four rounds from his M
4 rifle to neutralize the threat, hittin it twice, The mdlvi u was subsequently idt41ii
fellow SWAT Team operator S
ho was clearing the room in which SAl
Ihad
looked and mis-identified as a threat.
Based op investigation subsequent to the shooting incidexit the SIRT identified
potential factors which may have played a contributing role in the shooting of SA I
I
including:

I

The first house cleared by the SWAT Team had a similar physical layout as the
Ilocation, but had two small bedrooms instead of one long bedroom with two
doorways. This different layout contributed to both Agents’ inaccurate situational awareness.
-

S
while clearing the long bedroom a
‘nced
tunnel vision) focusing on a closet and failing to notice the danger area to 1
The tunnel
vision was caused by him. focusing on the closet as the only perceived threat He inadvertently
stood in front of the danger area (the sheet-covered doorway) while attempting to clear the closet.
-

SAl
I failed to verbally call out si “nmr area” (doorway left) he
obrrir h
bedroom which could have prevented SAl
jfrom crossing in front ofit as
SA
ttempted to clear the bedroom closet.
-

I
I

Intelligence received the morning of the operation indicated the resident
iiad recently obtained an AK-47 or AR-iS assault rifle and two hand guns.
-

1s an armed subject, and shot SA

SA
Ixnisidentifled SPI
before full target acquisition.
-

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1
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INSPECTOR’S OBSERVATIONS:
The SIRT identified the following issues:
Issue #1: A Buffalo Division SWAT
a fcdcral
warrant.

search

operator shot another SWAT operator while
10

ofI

  

 

 

2009

 

d

___

__

(Rev. 05-01.2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INV
ESTIGATION
Prcedence:
o:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection
Training

From:

Inspection
Office of
Contact:

Attn:
Attn:

.L.A& F_fl

10/21/2009

AD Amy J
0 Lyons
AD Brian D. Lamkin

._.,Li%a

-

Approved By:

Lyons Amy Joe’
Clemens Mich.ij

b2
b7C

Dra

fted
By:

Case ID #:
Title:

297-HQ—A1270961-D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
BUFFALO DIVISION
02/26/2009

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Grou
p (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occure
d on 02/26/2009, involving
Special
Agent (SA)
I During the ezeution of a search
warrant, SA
four rounds from his Bureau-iss
ued
Colt .223 caiioer, ii6de1 M4A1
carbine.
On of th rounds f5red
by SAl
Iresulted in an injury to SAl
SIRG membe;s recommçnded that
I
no administrative action be take
n
against SAl
las a result of his involvement in
this
shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector
dated 05/13/2009.

L

1

Details:
This communication was prepar
ed to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recomme
ndations of the SJRG with
reference to the captioned shootin
g.
Details of the Shooting Inciden
t
The BuffaloDivision conducted
an investigation
focusing on the cocaine distribu
tion activities of the tt3l Stre
et
Gang” who were known for extre
me violence, including several
murders.
In January 2009, a joint law enfo
rcement operation was
planned to obtain and simultaneo
usly executive 34 arrest
TJNCLASS IFIED

Savage-21 17

]b6
3b?C

 ONCLASSIFtED
To:
R:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270961—D, 10/21/2009

warrants, 11 search warrants
for residences, and five.search
warrants for vehicles,
On 02/26/2009, Agents of the Buf
falo Division, as well
as officers of the New York Sta
te Police, City of Buffalo Police,
arid numerous other federal,
state, and local agencies execute
d
the operation.
Members of the Buffalo Division’s
Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) Team were
assi
where potentially armed subject gned to clear two residences
s were thought to reside.
Both
residences were to be searched foll
owing clearing by the SWAT
Team.
The first residence was cleared
and the operation was
executed as planned.
Investigation indicated a subject
residing
in the second residence had obt
ained an assault rifle and two
handguns.
The SWAT Team deployed a flash
bang grenade and
entered the residence. As the
leam entered the living room, two
SWAT operators broke off from
the
right side wall of the living roomgroup to clear a room along the
.
The remainder of the team
proceeded through the living room
to
the
threshold of the dining
room which was located behind
the living room. Within the din
ing
room, a closet was located at the
far left corner, a hallway was
located at the far right corner
leading to the kitchen, arid
another doorway was located alon
g the right side wall. Several
operators stacked at the thresho
ld between the living and dining
rooms an nrvidr rnvr n the
dining room and far doorways,
while SAl
Imoved into the dining room. As he
entered the room, SAl
bse
doorway along the right wall bill rved a cloth covering the
ow out into the dining room.
Believing someone was in the adja
cent room, SA I
ulled
down the covering and peeked into
the room.
SA I
Iwas
unaware this doorway was a seco
nd entrance into the same room
SWAT operators previously ente
red from the living room.
During his quick look,
I saw the silhouette
of a man holding an asault rifl SRI
e which was moving up arid down as
if being handled by an untrained
person. SAl
I immediately
backed away, assumed a tactical
crouching position, and fired at
what he believed to be an arme
d subiect about to naaae his
weapon. 9
Althou unknown to SAl
h
ISA!
one of the SWAT operators clea
I
ring the room along the right side
wall of the living room, had inad
vertently passed the covered
doorway and was standing on a box
spring and two mattresses whiöh
were located in front of a closet
he was attempting to clear.
SA
I
Ifired four rounds from his M—4, .223
caliber rifle.
The
first bwo rounds struck the adja
cent room’s exterior wall and
window, and embedded into a neig
hboring house. After slightly
IYNCLASSTE’IED

2
Savage-21 18

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1270961—D, 10/21/2009

adjusting his aim, SAl
ifired a third round which first
penetrated th door
and struck Sal
I The round was
stopped by SAl
1 tactical yt in the kidney area.
SA
round struck Sal
un
the
shou
lder
with
the bullet eventually lodging in
his neck.

sal
Ireceived immediate medical assistance
from
the SWAT Team’s medic and a special
medical response team trauma
surgeon.
He was subsequently transported to
-a nearby trauma
center where he received medical treat
ment and was released on
02/28/2009.
sAl
Iwas expected to make a full recovery from
his injury.
The Buffalo District Attorney opined
his office had no
interest in this matter, nor was an
investigation into this
shooting incident opened by the Buff
alo Police Department.
By
email dated 05/08/2009, the DOJ Civ
il Rights Division advised no
criminal investigation was warranted
regarding this shooting
incident.
On 09/09/2009, the SIRG met to discuss
the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INS
D), chaired the meeting and
was a non—vJ1ti1 imhfollowing voting members were in
attendance:I
,J Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ;l
Jttorney, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Chief Inspector I
I Office of Inspections, INSD;
Section Chief (CyRobert Ancierson
, Jr., àD—4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division
; SC David J. Johnson,
Violent C1im ctinn. r
iininal Investigative Division Unit
1
;
Chief (t3C)
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (TD); SSAI
Practical Applications
Unit, TD; UC
ecial Weapons an Pctin
Ooeratiqns Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group; ad
I Defensive Systems Unit, TO; SSA
Investigative Law Uflltr Office of Gene
ral Counsel; and SSAI
11h6
Washington Field Office.
The following non—voting
members were arso in attendance:
sc lln R. 1
Iconha Strategic
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; ad
I TpspectJ.on
Management Unit (IMU), SAS, INSD;
SSA
I___
____
____
____
_
Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), SAS,
INSD; Manágemen nd Proram
Analyst (MAPA)I
117W, SAS, INSD; MA?AI
I
I IMU, SAS, INSD; MAPAI
IIAU, SAS,
.LNL); and MAP
IMU, SAS, INSO.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

Savage-21 19

 i

UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection

From

297—HQ—A1270961—D,

Inspection

10/21/2009

Observations and Recommendations of the
SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized
incident with
the intent to;
(1) evaluate the application of deadly
force;
(2) provide the Director with an evalu
ative analysis,
observations,, and recommendations for
corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any);
(3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issue
s; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative actio
n if deemed necessary.

Subsecruent to an overview of the incident
provided by
Inspector I
mvhvg 9
iin
p
usni
1y agreed that the use of
deadly force by SAl
Ias ustif led and in
conformance with the FBIs deadly force
resulted in the icommndtion that no policy. This discussion
administrative action be
taken against SA I
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
SIRG members discussed the fact that a mod
ified dynamic
entry procedure was used instead of
a slower, methodical entry
causing increased pressure on participan
ts.
Contributing factors
n thic jncident included a mod
ified layout of the house, SA
I
Idid not acquire full target acquisitio
n before firing,
and SA I
Idid not realize he was in a danger area.
The SWAT Operations representative opined
SAl
made an error in judgment and target acqu
isitio
n.
Empha
sis was
placed on the fact that a Senior Team
Leader has the
responsibility to ensure individuals are
ready to participate in
operations and all training is up—to-da
te.
The main concern of attendees pertained
to the decrease
in training Bureau—wide, including target
identification drills.
Members opined the decrease in overall train
ing may be a causal
factor in the increase of “b].ue on blue”
and “friendly fire”
incidents.
SIRG attendees emphasized the need for incre
ased
Bureau—wide training.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

Savage-21 20

I

.

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ--A1270961—D,

Inspection
10/21/2009

LEPD(s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

flSPEcTION
AT 7ASHINGTON,

DC

That no adinistrative action be
taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
Set Lead 2:

(Action)

TRAIN ING

AT QUANTICO,

VA

That AD, TD, review the upward trend
of “blue on blue”
or “friendly fire” situations
to determine if an increase in
Bureau—wide training, in particu
lar target identification drills,
will result in a decrease of this
type of incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

—
-

—

—
-

Mr. Pistole, Room.7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr..l
I USDOJ
Mr.l
I. EJSDOJ
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
Mr. Johnson Room 3280

Mr.j

Mr.I

Quantico

Quantico

(Attention:
ri________
Mr.___________
Mr.
uantico
Ms.
Room 6387
Mr.
Mrs.
Room 3043
-

—

-

—

—

—

+4

t3NCLASSIFIED

Savage-2121

 (Rcv. 05-01.2008)

UNCLASSXFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attu:

12/01/2009

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of Tnnetions

Contact:

Approved By:

[

I

mv
ty°

Drafted By:
Case ID #:

Title:

Jllh
297-HQ--A1271725-D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION

02/04/2009

Synopsis:

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
involving Special
Agent (SAl
j During the execution of a federal
arrest warrant, SAl
l4red two roi.inds from his Colt M4, .223
caliber rifle.
AThhough Aj
rounds did not injure the
subject, he was subsequently snot an injured by a
local police
officer.
In addition to incurring non life threatening injuries,
Reed sustained a fatal self-inflicted gun shot wound
to the neck.
SIRG inembe
ended that no administrative action be taken
against S
as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
shooting incident that occurred on 02/04/2009,

4
A
n
ltrarn
tive:
Reference report of former Inspectorl
I dated 02/20/2009.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCIASSXFIED

Savage-2 122

I

 tYNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection Prom:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271725-D, 12/01/2009

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 07/08/2008, a federal arrest warrant was issued
charging Jeremy Ray Reed with Possession of a
Firearm by a Person
After a Court Order Prohibiting Same.
On 02/04/2009, SAl
assigned to the
Texarkana Resident Agency (TRA), was advised by
local authorities
that information indicated I
I the grandfather of
Jeremy Reed, was near death and being treated
at St. Michael’s
Hospital in Texarkana, Texas.
Local authorities believed Reed
would likely be visiting his grandfather at the hospita
l.

I

sAsi

While en route to the hospital,
I
landi
bontacted Texarkana Texas Police Department (TTPD
dispatch and reqiested assistance in locating
and arresting
Jeremy Reed.
SAl
I a Dallas Agent who is co
located at the TRA, was also notified and responded to the
Upon arriving at the hospital, SA
I, and
met with uniformed TTPD officers to brief them on the
matter and proceeded to the nurses station. The nurses
confirmed
th ndiyjçal in the photograph shown
by the Agents had visited
Jand further investigation revealed the subject left
the hospital approximately 30 minutes before
the Agents’ arrival.

p.m.,

At approximately 6:20
Ashdown Police Department
I was telephonically contacted by the
city Mayor, who is the subject’s uncle.
advised Reed
barricaded himself inside his grandfather’s residence,
threatened
his family, and stated he would kill anybody who tried
to remove
him from the residence.
Additionally, the subject stated he
would kill any police officer who tried
take him into custody
and would then kill himself.
(APD)

Detective I

He

to

F

I

At approximately 6:30 p.m., Detective
advised SAt
lof the situation. SASI
and L
I responded immediate.v to te Little River County
Sheriff’s Office (LRSO) and SAl
Ite3.eohonicallv notified
Senior Supervisory esideit Agent (SSRAI I
Jof the
developments.
SSRA I
I encouraged SA I
I a Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) flr jor, to utilize SWAT ifpssible
and
appropriate. SSRAI
Irequested that s)[
keep him
I
advised of developments and ,in,nnvted efforts to work
in concert
tj-h 1,e’,1 iithrtjes
SAl
Icontacted SWAT Team Leader SA
I who was also familiar with the investigation,
and advised SWAT assistance may be needed.
Upon arriving at the
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I

LRSO SAl
SAl
I and Detective I
Idiscussed the
situation and developed a verbal operation
s plan (OP)
The OP
included a strategy to access and secure the
premises, assess the
situation, and extricate family members.
*

Detectivel
him of the situation.

Icontacted Sheriff Russell and advised
Agreeing it would be feasible to establish

perimeter wivr11-y on the property, Sheriff
rith
Russe]Ll met 1
Detective[
I Detectivel
and SAs I
land
I
I Sheriff Russell proceeded to the area and establishe
d
surveillance of the driveway leading to the prop
erty while
awaiting the arrival of additional law enforc
ement personnel.

I

While DtectiveI
‘remained at the LRSO with SAs
land Detectiv
Ian4
I Mayor Reed contacted
Detective J
requesting immediate law enforcement assistance.
He advised nis wife was on the telephone
with Jeremy Reed’s
mother who confirmed the subject was barri
caded in his
grandfather’s house, possessed a shotgun, and
was threatening to
kill hçr, his two children another child
, and himself. SA
Icoritactedi
liho advised she, her mother, two
children belonging to Jeremy Reed, and anot
her child, were in a
mobile home located approximately 70 feet away
from Jeremy Reed’s
grandfather’s house.
She stated Jeremy was armed with a shotgun,
was knqckina hol
es in the wall, and advised she feared for
1
her
life. I
Istated, “I’ve already signed my death warrant.”
Becoming distraught and unable to speak, she
asked SAl
-_Ito
speak with her mother.
SAl
lasked L
mothe
r
if
they
I
were all capable of exiting the trailer throug
h the back door.
He told them to ao 1o the end of the driveway
)6
axd meet Sheriff
7c
Russell.
SA L
Iheard minor commotion in the background and
advised they were all exiting the trailer.

contacted Sheriff Russell and advised
jbad spoken to
y phone and convinced her to
take her tamily and leave the property. He advi
sed she and her
family would be leaving the property in a vehi
cle and requested
that Sheriff Russell stop the vehicle upon depa
rture from the
property. At that time Sheriff Russell observed
a vehicle moving
in the driveway which left the property and
accessed a major
roadway. Sheriff Russell effected a traff
ic stop and escorted
the occupants to the staging area.

SAl

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Upon arriving at the staging area, SAs
their operational equipment and discussed the OP
withça1 law enforcement officers.
It was decided that SA
I trained
L
Crisis Negotiator, would communicate with
l.n an attempt to gain relevant .ntellience should
negotiations with Jeremy Reed occur.
SAl
Jand Detective
I
Iwould establish a perimeter and initiate surv
eillance at
the house and trailer.

land

I

SAl
land etectivel
pproache
made a sweep of the north, east, and sout idss. d the house and
h
With no lights
visible and no apparent activity inside,
sAl
land
Detective
lestablished s]-t-ic rveillance, with
Dete
ctive
l
Ion
the west side and SA[
Ion the east side.

I

-

After debriefing’
I SAl
land Detective
Iproceeded to the south end of the house which
faced the
front qf the trailer.
The house appeared to be unoccupied and SA
Iconsidered the possibility Reed had left the prop
erty or
committed suicide.
He decided o attempt to contact Reed before
requesting SWAT deployment. SAl
Icontacted S31
land
adyised hp was in a position to knock
on the door of the house.
SA
banged on a window, nnramçd his presence, and calle
d
out to Jthemy Reed.
Detectivel
Iheard a voice from inside
the residence respond, “Come get me.”

[.

When SAL
I confirmed Reed was inside the house, he
contacted SWAT Assistant Team Leader SAl_
________________
and requested deployment of the SWAT team.
]advised SA
SAl
I
Ithere was no reason for the on-scene law en.torcement
officers to make entry into the house, and the
best option was
f or them to maintain the perimeter un
SW1T arrived.
SAl_______
requested that SAl
I contact A
bnd update him on tfle
situation.
SAl
jadvised SN
Ihe contacted the SWAT
Tead it would taice three to four
for their arrival. SA
he was going to brief Sheriff Russell on the
situation and coordinate a negotiation strat
egy.

hours

SAj
I heard a noise near the house
Reed outside the residence with a long gun in his and observed c
Jiand looking
around and walking toward the trailer.
SAl
bhou
ted,
“Jeremy, drop your weapon!” Reçd did xot compl
y and began
running toward the trailer.
SAl
host sight of Reed, and
again shoutqd “Jerçrny, drop your weaponi”
Unable to see the
subject, SAl
Iagain shouted_“Drop you weapon.” According to
Detective i
I he heard SAl
I yelling at Reed to drop his
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gun and get down. Detective I
Ithen observed
carrying a long gun while moving toward the traile Jeremy Reed
r.
As S21
lattempted to regain visual sighting of
Reed, he heard a loud oom” that he believed
was a shotgun being
discharged.
S?
jbsexved Reed standing on the steps at the
front of the trailer hlding his gun horizopt-lliz
Fearing for
the safety of law enforcement personnel, SA
Iraised
his
Bureau-issued rifle, heard Reed discharge his weaprn
.
observed a muzzle-flash from Reed’s location.
Ibrough
his M-4 rifle into firing position and noticed SAI
the reticJ.e of the
EO Tech electronic sight was not illuminated.
Since the rear
factory aght had been removed to accommodate the
EO Tech sight,
SN
lused the EO Tech sight as a rear peep sight, centered
the top of the front sight post in the glass
display of the EO
Tech sight, put the front sight post at the center
of i’
Reed and fired one round. When Reed did not
react, SAl
I
held the front sight post slightly lower and
fired a second time.
He observed Jeremy Reed flinch and enter the
front door of the
trailer. As he fired his rifle the second time,
SAl
Iheard
a shotgun blast from his right and heard someo
re state. “I hit
him.” SA I
hater learned it was Detectiv
kho fired
his shotgun and the buckshot struck Jeremy Reed.
I moved to a position on the east side
SAl
of the
trailer and checked to ensure Reed had not escape
d. He heard
Reed moving around insisth frailer moaning arid
heard him yell
“I’m bleeding out” SAL
linstructed Reed to exit the
trailer in order to receive medical assistance
and Reed responded
he was not coming out.
Reed stated again that he was shot and
“bleeding out.”
Upon hearing gunfire, Sheriff Russell and SA
I
I
drove toward the house and the trailer.
SAl
Icalled
to
_out
Detectivel
biho advised he was okay and briefed
on the events.
I
While continuing to convince Reed to leave the
trailer
for medical attention, SAl
Jtold him he was having trouble
hearing him and was goinp to Duli the front
door open. As he
pushed the door open, Sl
Isaw Reed had injuries to his
right wrist and thigh and observed him holdin
g his weapon by the
barrel with his left hand.
It appeared Reed no longer wanted to
engage law enforcement personnel and SAj
Jagain offered
medical assistance which was refused.
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SAl
‘joined SAL..
“litside the trailer and each
of them called out to Reed.
SAl
Icould hear moaning from
within the
-i1c and heard Reed state, “man I’m,
I’m bleeding
out.” SAs I
Inegotiated with Reed, encouraging
I and I
him to exit the trailer so he could be taken to a hospita
l. Reed
refused to leave the trailer and commented, “I’m going
to finish
myself off.” Reed also stated there was no way he was going
back
to jail and tated. “You sons of bitches shot me and
iing
1
T’ h1ø
out.” As SAl
bpened the door a little wider, sA
observed Reed in the hallway with blood stans on h,s jeans. I
Based on his crisis negotiation training, Si1
Ibelieved the
longer Reed was engaged and talking, the more likely he was
to
surrender
Reed stated h hc3 tken 65 pills, including Xanax, and
threatened suicide.
SAl
I observed Reed put his shotgun down
and told him he was going to take one step into the iving
room
and talk to him face-to-face.__SAsI
landl
Icontinued to
negotiate with Reed and SAl
I requested Sheriff Russell’s
assistance since he and Reed were familiar with each other.
Approximately one hour later, SAsL
I andi
Inoticed a
change in Reed’s demeanor.
Reed walked into a room adjacent to
the hallway of the trailer, clçsed thç door, and within
seconds,
a muffled blast was heard.
SAl
balled out to Reed a number
of times, receiving no response. SA
Jandl
lentered
the room and. saw Reed’s body slumped in a chair.
An ambulance, coroner, and Arkansas State Police
investigator were dispatched to the scene.
It was subsequently determined Jeremy Reed died as a
result of a self-inflicted shotgun wound to the neck.

On 09/09/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above-

captioned shooting incident.
Former Deputy Assistant Director
Michael S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired
the
meeting and was a non-votin
nib r. The following voting
members were in attendance:
S ecial Iegal
Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
Attorne
;
Criminal Division, USD03; Chief Inspector
Office of Inspections, INSD; Section Chief (SC) Robert Anders
on,
Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage Section, Counterintelli
gence
Division; SC David 3. Johnson, Violent crimes Section, Crimin
al

Investigative Division; Unit Chief (tIC)
L.
Training Unit, Training Division (TD); SSA
I
Practical Applications Unit, TD; tIC

I

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Special

 UNCLASSXFIED
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Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response
Groun tici
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSA
I
,
Investigative Law Unit, Office of General
Counsel; and SSAI
ICR-2, Washington Field Office.
The following non-voting members were also in. attendance:
SC
Ellen B. Icochea. rategic Analysis Section (SAS), INS]); UC
I
I, Inspection Management Unit (INU), SAS,
INS]); SSAI
JInspection Analysis Unit (IAU), SAS,
INS]); Management and Proaram Analyst (MAPA) I
1 IAU,
SAS, INS]); MAP?J
? IMU, SAS, INS]); MAPAI
I
I
I ‘AU, SAL INS]); and A
IMU, SAS,
INS]).
-

Observations and Recouunendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

I
I

SERG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with
the FBI’s deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
røoinmridation that no administrative action be taken against SA
las a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
The only observation made by the SIRG pertained to SA
of the factory installed standard rear sight to
facilitate the installation of the 30 Tech holographic sight on
his Bureau-issued M-4 rifle.
The Manual of Investigative
Operations and Guidelines, Part 2, Section 12-3(5) states, “Any
changes or alterations to any assigned weapon must be authorized
by the Firearms Training Unit and must be accomplished by the
Weapons Management Facility at Quantico.
Exceptions to this
requirement must be requested in writing and approved by the
Weapons Management Facility.” This matter will be discussed with
the Special Agent in charge of the Little Rock Division to ensure
proper procedures are followed regarding changes or alterations
to assigned weapons.

IremovaJ.

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LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPEcTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC

I

incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.j
Mr.
Mr.

I

That no administrative action be taken against SAl______
a result of his involvement in this shooting

las

Pistole, Room 7142
Capronj, Room 7427

IUSDOJ
I USDO

Anderson, Room 4825
Johnson, Room 3280

IQuantico
buantico
(Attention: Mr.I

Mrl

Mr.I

Mn________

Mn

MsL

MrL
1
Mrs. I

CIRG

FLuantico

jRoom 6387

I

Room 3043

TJNCLASSIFIED

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 (Rev. O5-Ol2OO8)

UNCIASS IFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact:

I

Approved By:

—

Lyons Amy Jo
Love Jennifer S

Drafted By:

L

Case ID #:

297-HQ-A1271917-D

Title:

05/13/2010

]b
b7

-I lrr

SHOOTING INCIDENT
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
11/04/2009

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting jri•ricnf thpt rrçurr nn 11/fl4/2009. inyolving Special
Agents (SAs)I
land
I During the
execution of iearc
nd arrest warrants, SAl
if ired two
rounds and SAl______ fired one round at an aggressive pit bull
dog.
SIRG member recommendqththat_no administrative action be
taken against SAsI
land[
las a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.
-

Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of Assistant
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Thomas P. Ravenelle, dated
12/21/2009.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
In connection with a Mexican Drug Trafficking
Organization investigation, San Francisco Agents, along with
other Federal and local law enforcement officers, planned to
execute search and arrest warrants at two locations on
11/04/2009.
UNCLASSIFIED

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A
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IED
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On 11/02/2009, ream Leaders conducted joint site
surveys of the respective targets and met to discus
s a plan to
ensure the safety of all participants.
On 11/03/2009, SAl
Iprovided a briefing
to Agents assigned to his team and advised a large dog
was
located on the property.
On 11/04/2009, members of both teams met at the San
Leandro Police Department for a final joint brief
ing, with SA
I providing an overview of the case. Aftr
approximately 15 minutes the teams separated and SA
I
I
provided a final briefing for his team, including
a review of the
FBI Deadly Force Policy.
The tearn
s mission was to gain access
t
to the property, conduct a knock and announce, secure
the
residence, arrest the subject, and conduct a search
of the
property.
To gain access to the property, the team had to
over a 1
f our foot tall metal fence with pointed steel tips. get
SA
Ireiterated the fat that a large dog was located
on
the
property and offered local officers a fire extin
guisher to scare
the dog away, if necessary.
The local officers decided to gain entry to the yard
by
placing a ladder over the spiked fence, and at approx
imately 6:01
a.ip.. officers led the team over the fence and into the
yard.
SAl
Icalled out that a large dog was located at
the top of the stairs.
As team members scaled the fence
stood on the property, the growling and barking dog continand
ued
moving down the stairs toward the entry team.
Fearing for his
safety, as well as the safety of team members, a local
detective
fired one round from his service weapon striking the dog
in the
muzzle.
The dog stopped its approach and laid down.
SAl
I
I
rovided cover as the team moved past the dog and
continued with the entry.
After the team entered the residence, the dog moved
under a truck with SAl
Icontinuing to watch to ensure
it did not pose a threat to any team members.
After the
residence was secured, an Animal Control Officer (ACO)
was
requested to take care of the injured dog.
The ACO retrieved a
snare pole from her vehicle and requested that the
Agents provide
protection to her in case the dog tried to attack. A
lengthy
struggle by the ACO to secure the aggressive dog proved
unsuccessful.
Fearing for her safety, the ACO requested that
Agents shoot the dog.
Based on the ACO’s request, S?4
I
visually cleared the area, provided a verbal warning to
others,
and fired one round from his FBI-issued Glock 22, .40 calib
er
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_____

___

___

__

UNCLASSIFIED

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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271917—D, 05/13/2010

Pistol, striking the dog in the head.
Although not dead, the dog
became subdued.
At that point, the ACO attempted to get the
cable loop around the dog’s head, but the dog inserte
d a paw
inside the cable loop.
After a second struggle to gain control,
the dog again became aggressive and began biting at the
ACO’s
snare pole.
At that point, the ACO requested_that the Agents
shoot the dog in the heart and lungs.
SA I
I fired one round
from his Bureau-issued Glock 22, .40 caliber pistol, hitting
the
dog’s body.
The dog continued to advance towards the ACO as she
ntined to struggle to gain conj-rrl
T)e ACO requested that SA
Ishoot the dog again and SAl
I second round slowed
the dog which stopped its attack on the ACO.
The ACO instructed
Agents to place a second snare pole around the dog’s head
while
she obtained her euthanasia kit and set up the drugs to euthan
ize
the dog.

I

On 03/03/2010, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love observed while Chief Inspector
I
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a I
non
rdir ininhør.
The following voting members were in attendance:
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ;I
j Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Section Chiet (SC) Ralph Butler, CD—i, Eurasian Section,
Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson, Violent_Crim
es
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (tJC)I
1
I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (TD); UC
I
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; tICI
I
I
ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical
Incident Response Group; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
I
I
1 Practical Applications Unit, TD; SSi
I
1
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA
Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division;
and
jCR-2, Washington Field Office.
The
following non—voting members were also ‘
Insoectors
LI_______ andi
I Office
tf Tnqrpntionq (On, INSD; Manag
ement and Program Analyst (MPA)
Inspection Managemnt Unit (IMU), Strategic
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; and ?IPAI
IMU,
SAS, INSD.

Ispeciai

I

ssiq

I

I

Observations and Recoumendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1> evaluate the application of deadly force;
UNCIASSIFIED

3

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Inspection
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(2) provide the Director with an evaluative
observations, and recommendations for; corre analysis,
ctive actions from an
operational standpoint (if any);
(3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issue
s; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative actio
n if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that
the ue of
deadly force by SAsI
Iandj
Iwas
justified and in conformance with th
i’s
This discussion resulted in the recommendat aeaJ.y rorce policy.
ion that no
administrative action be taken against
either Agent as a result
of their involvement in this shooting incid
ent.

UNCLASSXFIED

4

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 tJNLASS IFID
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Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ—A1271917—D,

Inspection
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LEAD(s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

Phi- n adiinistrative action be taken
against
SAs I
hndf
as a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.

I

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

—

-

—

—

-

—

—
—

Mr. Pistole,
Ms. Caproni,
Mr.
Mr.
Mr. Butler,
Mr. Johnson,

Mr.

Mr.I

Room 7142
Room 7427
USDOJ
SDOJ
corn 5845
Room 3280
I Quantico

IQuarr

(Attention:
Mrj
1
Mr.
puantico
I
Mr.
IQuantico
1
Mr.
Laboratory
1-Mr.
FO
1
Ms.
I Room 6387
1—Mrs.j
jRoom3O43

I

-

—

—

—

TJNCLASS IFIED

5

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UNCLAS$IFID

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attxi:

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

11/30/2010

AD Amy J
0 Lyons

(Extension 4—1837

73

Lyons Amy Jo
Love Jennifer Smith
I
_ic1

I

b7C

rr

Case ID

It:

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
DALLAS DIVISION
09/21/2009

297—HQ—A1271464—D

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG
) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 09/21/20
09. inv9lvinq Special
Agents (SAs)l
I and
I
I of the Dallas Division.
Durina the attempted_arrest of a
bank robbery fugitive, SAs
andp
I along with
local law enforcement perscfrme.i, reLurnea
multiple rounds of fire
after the suspect fired through a locked
bedroom door.
SIRG
members unanimousv recommended that o adiu
ipistrative action be
taken against SAs!
L andi
las a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.
-

Administrative:

dated 10/23/2009.

Reference report of Inspector

I

Details: This communication was prepared
analysis, comments, and recommendations of to furnish the
the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2 135

I
I7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271464—D, 11/30/2010
Details of the Shooting Incident

The Dallas Division Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF
)
conducted a bank robbery investigation of Jerry
Lee Gray, who was
believed to be responsible for 11 bank robberies.
Subsequent investigation confiriied Gray’s participation
in at least one of the robberies and the Dallas
SSTF requested
the placement of Gray’s photograph on six electronic
billboards
throughout the Dallas metropolitan area.
The placement of the
photographs resulted in a witness’s recognition of
Gray as the
occupant of an apartment in Dallas.
In an attempt to execute a federal arrest warrant
issued for Gray, an Operations Plan was executed and a
verbal
operations plan briefing was held at 5:00 p.m., on
09/21/2009.
During the briefing, assignments and positions were
made for
members of two teams responsible for the surveillance
of two
locations.
Each team member received maps, photographs of Gray,
and a copy of the arrest warrant.
Team members discussed Gray’s
brother who was similar in appearance to him and was
reportedly
mentally unstable, the need for clothing identifying
team
personnel as law enforcement, Gray’s dip1ay of.weapons
during
robberies, as well as his propensity for violence.
Both teams met at a McDonald’s restaurant and a re
briefing of the Operations Plan was conducted which included
two
members absent from the original briefing.
During the second
briefing, the Deadly Force ‘Poilcy was reiterated to all
participants.
At approximately 7:00 p.m., surveillance of two
locations frequented by Gray was established.
Although Gray was
not loãated at either of the two addresses, information obtain
ed
revealed Gray’s current lcscation, a description of his
vehicle,
and confirmed he was currently located inside his apartm
ent.

Believing all arrest team personnel were needed on the
arrest at the identified location, Acting Supervisory Specia
l
Agent (A/SSAI
jdirected a task force officer
(TFO) to lead the caravan to the subject’s identified locatio
n.
At 9:20 p.m., A/SSAI
ladvised the Command and Tactical
Operations Center (CTOC), the team was en route to Gray’s
location.
As the caravan entered the apartment complex through
officers
an unrelated
shooting incident.
A/SSA[
ladvised the DPD officers they

the east gate, several Dallas Police Department (DPD)
were present at the apartment_complex in response to
UNCLASSIFIED

2

Savage-21 36

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Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-4{Q—A1271464—D, 11/30/2010

were attempting to locate a bank robbery susp
ect and asked the
officers to assist with the outer perimeter.
A green Hyundai, believed to b Gray’s, was park
ed near
a dumpster.
At that time, A/SSAI
rdered the team to
spread out and enter the complex and attempt
to locate Gray’s
apartment.
Additionally, the team was told to secure the seco
nd
floor of the complex based on the description
of Gray’s
residence.
rirn

tering the complex, TFcI
I and SA
Iquestioneci a man, who identified himself as
the
Maintenance Manager for the comex.
SAl
1ad TEQI
I
descri’’
‘
showed thel
Ia photograph of
Crv. I
Iconfirmed Gray was the occupant of Apartmen
t
I
I and verified Gray was currently located inside the
apartment.
Two additional apartment residents also
iHru1-lf led
Gray from photographs and verified his apar
tment asi
I
Two TFOs took_positions at the front door
of Gray’s
apartment with A/SSAF
I A/SSAI
nnounced, “FBI,
police, open the door, we have a warrant,”
several times
one of he TFOs used’ his foot to knock on the
door
I indicated he was ready for entry and
A/SSA
ca
e
out fo Gray to “get on the ground and
put your hands up,” before
instructinga TFO to breach the door.

I

As the door was breache.d with a single strik
e, A/SSA
lentered the apartment and proceeded to a
posi
tion
to the
right w-dle one TFO went to the left,
and three Agen
I
I.
Law enforcement personnel repeatedly anno ts followed
unced “FBI, we
have a warrant.” f1r 1
g’ii,-ir several
smal
ler
areas
, A/SSA
I
Iasked TFO I
Ito breach the door of a locked
bedroom.
TFOI
Ihit the dooç once and the ram penetrated
the
hollow-core door.
As TFI
Imade contact with the door a
second time, a shot came from inside the
bedroom hitting him in
the right side below his vest.
TFOL
Iwent down immediately,
stumbled_backwards, and fell to the floor
saying, “I’m
A/SSAI
Isaw the muzzle flash from the back of the hit.”
bedroom
near the window and was hit in the left side
of his body armor
with the second shotgun blast from the bedr
oom.
A/SSAI
I
was knocked off of his feet by the impa
ct of the shotgun blast.
SAl
I entered the apartment as the
bedroom door was breached and positioned
himself to the left of
the bedroom door behind SAl
I and TFO I
I TFO I
1
fired his M-4 into the bedroom and
SAl
ired from his Mp-S
I
toward the threat inside the bedroom, whil
e /SSA I
hnd TFO
back into the living room area.
A/SSAI
jsaw

I

UNCLASSI?IED

3

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muzzle flashes from the subject and believed
he was still taking
fire from the bedroom.
He saw the outline of a person during
each muzzle flash arid believed multiple people
were in the
bedroom.
When the firing stopped, A/SSAI
I stood up. SA
he heard another vpe of firearm_being tired from
within the bedroom.
As SAl
land TFOsI
heard
the subject fire açin frnm the bedroom, a second lanai
ol1e
of
y
gunfire ensued.
Si1
Ifired his MP-5 toward the threat in the
bedroom until the weapon’s bolt locked back.
All firing stopped.

A/SSAI

C

I

began removing his team members, and the
DPD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), as well
as medical
assistance, were requested.
SAl
Icalled the CTOC to advise
of the shooting and a trained FBI Negotiator unsu
ccessfully
attempted to make verbal contact with Gray.
Team members voiced concern regarding the safet
y of
anyone occupying the adjoining apartment.
Forced entry was made
into the ac.joining apartment in order to conduct
a welfare check;
however, no one was located inside the apartmen
t.
Immediate medical assistance_was provided to
TFOI
until the ambulance arrived.
TFOI
Jwas transported to a
local hospitalfor medical assistatice.

I

TFOI
I sustained internal and external pellet wounds
from the subject’s shotgun and was also transporte
d to a local
hospital by ambulance.

Dallas Division Executive Management (EM) arrived
on
the scene as well as DPD SWAT team members.
After unsuccessfully
attempting verbal communication with Gray, a camera
-equipped
search robot was sent into the residence.
The camera showed Gray
motionless on the bedroom floor.
The robot nudged Gray’s leg
with no response. An entry team entered the apartm
ent and a
tactical physician pronounced Gray dead at the scen
e.
After
being examined,, it was determined that A/SSA
[
irece
ived a
dimple in his right bicep from a gun pellet.
On 10/11/2009, TFOj
Iwas released from the
hospital.
Fle received long—term damage as a result of his
abdominal wounds from the shotgun blast.
An autopsy determined Gray died as a result of mult
iple
gunshot wounds.

tYCLASSIYtED

4

Savage-2138

 To:
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Inspection
From:. Inspection
297—HQ—A1271454—D, 11/30/2010

on 05/19/2010, the case was presented to the Dallas
County Grand Jury and a no-bill of indictment was returned,
finding no misuse of force or any prosecutable criminal offense
.
On 06/18/2010, the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, advised no federal criminal investigation was
warranted regarding the actions of law enforcement personnel
discharging their weapons.
On 08/10/2010, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love chaired the meeting and was a non—voting member.
The
following voting members were in attendance: Chief Inspector
I
j Office of Inspections, Inspection Division
(INSD);I
Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ,t
Trial Attrrr’v. Crimina’ Division,
USDOJ; Assistant Section Chief (SCI
Ivioien Crini
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief
(UC)1
I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (TD); UC
Defensive Systems Unit, TD; Supervisory
I
Speciai. pgent S5A)
I Special Weapons and Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Iifcident Response Group; SSAI
I
iTnvi-imtjve Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA
I
I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory
Division; and SSAI
ICR-2, Washington Field
Office.
The following non—voting members were also in
attendance:
Management and Program Analysts (MPAs)I
I
landi
I
Inspection Management Unit (IMU),
I
Strategic Analysis Section, IND.

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
1b6
1b7C

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

sI
r,1 fh.t thuse of deadly
force by SAsI
I and
Iwas justified and in conformance with the FBI!s Deadly
I
Force Policy.
This discussion resulted in the recommendation
that no administrative action be taken against the Agents as a
result of their involvement in this shooting incident.
--

I

SIRG members commented on the importance of tilizina
body armor and noted the use of body armor saved A/SSAI___________
UNCIaASSIFIED

Savage-2 139

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From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 11/30/2010

from serious injury during this incident.
SIRG members
unanimously adopted the following observations and
recommendations of the Shooting Incident
Revirew Team:
OBSERVATION #1:
The operation leading up to the
shooting was a planned arrest situation and was not
considered an exigent circumstance.
The written
operations plan, which was not reviewed by Exec
utive.
Management (EM), did not address contingencies for
commonly confronted scenarios such as a barricade
d
subject.
RECONMENDATION:
SAC, Dallas should direct SSAs,
A/SSAs, and Relief Supervisors to develop detailed
operations plans containing specific continge
ncies
which could be expected to be confronted in
a planned
arrest situation, particularly commonly confronte
d
scenarios such as a barricaded subject and fligh
t.
Additionally, SAC, Dallas should require writt
en
operations plans for planned arrests be revie
wed and
approved by EM in advance of the execution of
the
operation.

OBSERVATION #2:
During the course of their
investigation on the evening of 09/21/2009,
the Dallas
SSTF identified with a high level of confiden
ce, a
third location deerniined to be Gray’s curre
nt
residence.
A/SSAI
Inotjfjed the Dallas
operations center of his plans to divert the
team to
this third location to locate and arrest Gray;
however,
he did not notify or consult with ASAC Blai
se P.
Mikulewicz before proceeding to Gray’s resid
ence and
executing an arrest operation.
RECONNDATION:
SAC, Dallas should direct SSAs,
A/SSAs, and Relief Supervisors to notify and cons
ult
with EM, absent exigent circumstances, when
operational
developments dictate a diversion from a pre-appro
ved
operations plan.
OBSERVATION#3: On its own initiative, the Dall
as SSTF
developed and engaged in team tactical skills
training,
including officer down drills, breaching, surv
eillance,
shield use and law enforcement clearing, and
felony
vehicle stops.
Several of these skills were
successfully employed by the arrest team in the
execution of the operation on 09/2/2009.
UNCLASSIFIED

6

Savage-2140

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Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 11/30/2010
RECON?ENDATtON:

SAC, Dallas should continue to
support the tactical skills training by the SSTF
and
encourage its adaptation by other squads arid task
forces as a best practice.

The last item discussed by TR( mcmhr pertained
to
comments provided in an FD-302 by SA I
Ithe Dallas
Division’s Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI).
SIRG members
opined that any issues identified by PFII
Iregarding range
]b’;c
time, as well as consultation issues with the
Chief Division
Counsel regarding Deadly Force Policy training,
should be
resolved with Dallas Division EM.
This matter will be brought to
the attention of the Dallas Division Special Agent
in Charge.

UNCLAS S IFIED

7

Savage-2141

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From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 11/30/2010

IiED(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTI ON
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

ThM- no

F

ntiQn be taken against SAs

landi

result of their involvement in this shooting incid
ent.

1
1
1

Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1 —Mr.I
l-Mr.
Ms.I
1
-

-

—

—

-

-

-

-

-

—

1

-

Mrs.

Murphy, .Room 7142
Harrington, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
USOOJ
SDOJ
Johnson, Room 3280
Quantico
IQuantico
L Quantico
Laboratory

I

F°
I Room 6387
Room 3043

4+

tCLASSIFIED

8

Savage-2142

lasa

 (Rev. 05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence;
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: I

proved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:
Title:

Attn:

Lyons Amy Jo
Love Jennifer

I

05/10/2010

AD AmyJo Lyons

I

Extension 4—1837

(
llrr

297—HQ—A1271895—D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
02/09/2009

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incJdent that occurred on 02/09/2009, involving Specia
l
Aaents (SAs) I
I andl
1
I
lof the Philadelphia Division.
During the attempted
arrest of a suspected bank robber who was non-compliant and
raised a gun toward law enforcement personnel, the Agents and one
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) Detective fired multiple
shots, killing the suspect.
SIRG members unanimou1v recqinmended
1-hM- nQadininlcl-TM-iye action be taken agains
t SAsL
I
L and
las a result of their involvement in this
shooting incicent.
Administrative:
Reference report of former Inspector
dated 02/09/2009.

I

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference t the captioned shooting.

UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2 143

 To:.
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, 05/10/2010
Details of the Shooting Incident

Subsequent to an armed bank robbery on 02/06/2009,
information was provided to the Philadelphia Division that
“Danny” LNU robbed a bank earlier that day.
Investigation
identified “Danny” LNIJ as Daniel Trinsey, who was believed to
be
the bank robber.
A query of law enforcement data bases revealed
an active State of Pennsylvania arrest warrant for Trinsey for
parole violation pertaining to a previous robbery of a dwelli
ng
with a weapon charge.
On 02/09/2009, a source participated in consensual
telephone calls with Trinsey who advised he was going to commit
another armed robbery.
Based on information provided by Trinsey
during these calls, members of the Violent Crimes Task Force
established surveillance near a Philadelphia residence believe
d
to be occupied by the subject.
Surveillance determined Trinsey
was inside the residence and information was received that he
was
most likely armed and planned to rob either a bank or a drug
location.
Additionally, task force members were advised Trinsey
said he wculd shoot the individuals he intended to rob if
necessary, and he was not going back to jail.
As the surveillance continued, task force members
formulated a verbal plan over squad radios to arrest Trinse
y on
the state warrant as he exited the residence.
At approximately

3:00 p.m.
1 Trinsey exited the residence carrying a duffle bag
walked across the driveway toward a road. At that time, task and
force personnel confronted Trinsey, identified themselves as
police officers, and ordered him to stop and ge on the ground
.
Trinsey dropped his duffle bag on the driveway and began to
slowly walk backward toward the residence while law enforceaent
officers continued to order him to stop and get on the ground.

Trinsey continued to ignore law enforcement commands, stoppe
d and
looked from side to side, reached into his waist band, and

removed what appeared to be a handgun.
Trinsey raised the gun
and initially pointed in the direction of two PPD detectives,
then turned the weapon toward a group of seven Agents.
Fearing

I

fnr thr 1ivs.

s wfl

s th Hv of their oartnrs.

SAs
las
well as PPD Detective I
I fired a total of 17
rounds at Trinsey.
The subject fell face down on the front lawn
and was pronounced dead at the scene.
InHj

SAl
liristructed everyone to hold their positions
until he assessed the threat.
He observed the subject moving and

I

also noted the subject’s guriys vei-y close to his hand.
1M--

9I

Moments

Idirected SAl
land Sergeant [
Ito holster their weapons and handcuff the subject.
t3NCI.ASS IFIED

2

Savage-2144

b6

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895--D, 05/10/2010

SAl
Ia trained paramedic, checked the
subject’s airway and pulse with negative results.
Ee remained
with Trinsey until paramedics arrived and determined the subject
was deceased.
Subsequent examination of the subject’s weapon
determined it was a toy handgun.
The Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy and
toxicology examination which revealed Trinsey had been shot seven
times, and the cause of death was identified as multiple gunshot
wounds.
The toxicology report showed a presence of narcotics
including cocaine, codeine, rnethamphetamine and oxycodeine.
On 09/10/2009, the City of Philadelphia Dt-rit
Attorney’s Office issued a written opinion that SAI
1
I were justified in discharging their weapons,
andi
and cLosed its investigation into the matter.
On 12/01/2009, a
declination of prosecution was received from the United States
Department of Justice, Ci7i1 Rights Division, regarding the
actions of law enforcement personnel discharging their weapons.
-:

On 03/03/2010, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Jennifer
Smith Love observed while Chief Inspectorl
I
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non
voting member.
The following voting members were in attendance:
I
L SDecial Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ; j
J, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Section Chief (SRalph Butler, CD-i, Eurasian Section,
Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson, Violent Crirn
Sctinn Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (tJC)I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (TDi; tiC
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; tiC I
1
ispeclal Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical
inciaern Resoonse Group; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
I., Practical Applications Unit, TD; SSAI
lInvestiqative Law Unit, Office of General iounse±; ss
I
I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division;
and SSA I
I CR-2, Washington Field Office. The
following non-voting members were also in attendance:
Inspectors
p andl
I Office
of Inspections (01), .ENSD; Management and Program Analyst (MFA)
I Inspection Managemnt Unit (IMU) Strategic
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; and MPA[
IMU,
SAS, INSD.

I

I

UNCLASSIFIED
3

Savage-2145

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, 05/10/2010
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analy
sis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective
actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recomm
endations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deeme
d necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that tI’e use of dady
force by SAs
t
I
I arid
iwas justified and in conformance with the FBI
s deadly
T
force policy.
This discussion resulted in the reconunendation
that no administrative action be taken against the
6
Agents as a
result of their involvement in this shooting incid
a)?
ent.

Iwas

Noting SAl
not utilizing body armor at the
time of the incident, SIRG members unanimously
adopted the
following recommendation of the Shooting Incid
ent Review Team:
RECONNENDATION:

SAC, Philadelphia wiLl ensure all
division personnel are reminded the use of body
armor
during arrest operations is mandatory.

During the discussion of this incident, a SIRG memb
er
commented on the effective use of a blackberry
to transmit the
subject’s photograph to members of the arrest team
ensuring all
participants could identify the subject.
This matter will be
discussed with the Special Agent in Charge of the
Philadelphia
Division.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

Savage-2146

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, 05/10/2010

LEAD(s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against SAs
landi
lasa
±esult of their involvement in this shooting incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1
J.
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr.fi
jJSDOJ
•1 USDOJ
Mr.’
Mr. Butler, Room 5845
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
Mr.j
Quantico
Mr.I
IQuantico
(Attention:
Mr. I
1
Mr.
uantico
1
Mr.
Quantico
I Laboratory
1
Mr.
FO
1-Mr.I
1
Ms. I
I Room 6387
1—Mrs.I
IRQom3043
—

—

—

—

-

-

-

I

-

—

-

—

UNCIASS IFIED

5

Savage-2147

 ____Ilr

____

__

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

UWCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
?recedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

Front:

Attn:

Inspection
Office of
Contact:

pproved By:

05/27/2010

AD xny Jo Lyons

Tr’44rr

I

Lyons 1my Jo
Love Jennifer Smi

Drafted By:

Case ID #:
Title:

297—HQ-A1271741—D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE
11/18/2009

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group
(SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occur;ed on 11/1
8/2009, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
I While preparing to deart for
a
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT).operation
, SAl
I
encountered three subjects in the garage of
his home.
SAl______
fired six rounds from his personally—owned,
Bureau—approved Sig
Sauer model P229, .40 caliber semi—automa
tic pistol at the
subjects.
SIRG members_repommended that no adm
inistrative action
be taken against SAl
s a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

I

Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector—in—Place.
rated 12/28/2009.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish
the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of
the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of

the

Shooting Incident

On 11/18/2009, while prçoarinq for parti
cipation.in
early morning SWAT operations, SAl
Idressed for work and
exited his kitchen into an attached, two—car
garage.
Although
not wearing anything identifying himself as
an FBI Agent, SA
pwas wearing an ih—the-pants holster containin
I
g a Bureau
tNCL.SSIFIED

Savage-2148

b6

 tYNCLASS IFID

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ—A127].741—D,

Inspection
05/27/2010

approved, personally—owned,

Sig Sauer P229,

.40

caliber pistol.
The pistol was fully loaded with Bureau-is
sued ammunition with 12
rounds in the mag
azine and one in the chamber.

SAl
i exited_through his kitchen into the garage.
Once in the garage, SAl
Jplaced a cooler, a backpack, and a
“Blackhawk” gear bag on an exercise mat.
The backpack was
unzipped and contained SAF
I FBI credentials and his Bureau
isèued Springfield Arms Mode]. 1911, .45
caliber pistol which was
fully loaded and in a holster on top of
the bacjoack.
After re
entering his residence to retrieve his
keys, SAl
Iretu
rned to
the garage and partially opened the roll—
up
gara
ge
door
.
He
ducked under the partially opened door
to retrieve his narcotic
detection trained canine from the backyard
before loading, his
gear into the Bureau vehicle.
As SAl
Iwal
ked to the corne.r
of his residence, he observed a light colo
red
truck drive down
th strt and make a U—turn.
Although the truck continued past
SAl
1 residence and out of view, he observed
a male in the
front passenger seat and the driver of
the vehicle.
Due to a
recent burglary in his neighborhood, SAj
Iwatched the vehicle
for about five econd.
Believing the occupants of the truck
did
not ee him, SAj
jcontinued into the backyard, leash
ed his
dog, and took tffdog into the front
yard near the partially
-opened garage door.
As he approached the garage door,
SAF
I
heard an unknown male voice coming from
Knowing no other males were in his hous within the_aarge.
ehold, SAl
knelt
down, looked into the garage, and saw
a pair pf lqs standing in
the garage just a few feet from the door
.
SAl
I drew his
pistol, entered the garaqe,_and stood
a
short distance from the
white, male subject.
SAl
I identified himself and stated,
“police, don’t move.” As SAl
Irepe
time, he noticed a second subject stand ated the command a second
ing on the exercise mat
near his backpack containing his pistol
and FBI credentials. As
SAl
Icontiiiued to order both subjects to get
down, they froze
but did not obey his commands.
.

While contiruing to issue verbal com
mands to the first
two subjects, S1
I observed a third subject standing
on a
step leading from the garage into the kitch
en_whre the door was
ajar.
The third subject was looking at
Iwho did not know
if he left the, kitchen door ajar or if SAl
the subject had opened it.
At that point, fearing for the safety
of his wife and
daughter inside the residence, SAl
laddressed his commands to
the three subjects. The third subject
ran toward the arage door
while the first two subjects began appr
oaching SAl
I The
second subject’moved toward the garage
door while the first
UNCLASSIFIED

2

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j

 UNCLASSIFflD

To:
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297—HQ—A1271741—D,

Inspection
05/27/2010

subject rushed and attacked SAl
I who held his pistol in his
right hand while grabbing the subject by
the hair nH began
pushing him back and down toward the floo
r.
SA I
lattempted
to maintain awareness of all three subjects
whil
e he moved into a
defensive position, pushing the first
subject to the ground.
The
subiect grabbed SAl
round the waist in a bear hug while SA
I
i tuggled to push him away.
The subject began swinging at
SAl
I and grabbed the riah sleeve of his jack
et.
Following a
short struggle, with SAl
lissuing further commands, the
subject ran from the garage.
b 7C

SAl
Iscanned his garage and determined the three
subjects fled; however, was concerned they
may have taken his
pistol from the backpack.
He pursued the first subject who was
approximately 15 yards in front of him
and running toward the
suspect vehicle.
The subject opened the driver’s_door
o the
truck, entered, and closed the door.
As SAl
Iärri
ved
at the
driver’s door, the window was partially
down.
He
stoo
d
by
the
left front panel facinq the driver.
The driver attempted to
close the window as SA I
Ireached in and held the window open
and demanded that the subjects exit the
vehicle.

I

Realizing the truck’s engine was running,
SAl
I
rehd 1
n and attempted to remove the keys
from the ignition.
S2J
Icontinued to order the subjects from
the vehicle as he
attempted to remove the keys.
Twp of the subjects were yelling
and one subject began slapping SAl
‘arm.
SAl
Iheard
the vehicle’s engine race and believed he
may be killed it he
didn’t get the keys out of the ignition.
SAt
Iwas pressed
tightly against the truck with his left
arm inside. As the
driver turned the steering wheel sharply
to the left toward SA
I he heard a bang as the transmission shifted
into gear and
believed the subject was attempting to
run him dpwn.
The truck
lurched to the left, pressing against SAL
Ibody while his 7(
left arm was cuaht ir the driver’s window.
The truck continued
moving into SAl
I chest, striking his left ]eg and
throwing
him off balance.
Fearing for his life, SAl
Ifire
d
six
rounds
from his Sig Sauer pistol until the truck
was
appr
oxim
ately
seven
yards away from him.
SAl
iran toward his house while dialing
911;
hdwever, his cell phone was not working.
He checked his garage
to ensure no other subjects were inside
and also verified his
pistol was still in his_backDack inside
the garage. After
calling the police, SA I
unloaded his
ol and placed it on
the kitchen counter to comply with the 911 pist
operator’s request.
UNCLASSIFIED

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 UNCLASSIFIED

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297—HQ—A1271741—D,

Inspection
05/27/2010

The Brea Police Department (BPD) arri
ved on the scene
and conducted a neighborhood canvass
for witnesses.
At
approximately 6:00 a.m., the BPD rece
ived a report of a
suspicious vehicle, with possible bul
let ho1es located in the
area.
The BPD located the vehicle and SA
I identified it as
the same vehicle the subjects occupied
.
The owner of the vehicle was contacted
and .he
her son,I
I had been out in the truck but was advised h7c
currently located inside her residen
ce. I
ladmitted he and
three other individuals had been tog
ether the night before but
denied involvement in the burglary/as
sault. I
las well as
two of the other subjects, was subseque
ntly arrested. j
‘and
one other subject were formally charged
with burglary and
assault, and entered guilty pleas to
felony first-degree
residential burglary.
Both were sentenced to two years
in
prison.
On 01/27/2010, a declination of prosecuti
on was
received from the United States Depa
rtment o JustLce, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the acti
ons of SA I
I in this
incident.
On 03/03/2010, the SIRG met to discu
ss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Dirertor Jnpifer
Smith Love observed while Chief Insp
ector I
I
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired
the meeting and was a non
voting metnbex.
The following voting members
in attendance:
I
I Special Iegal Counsel, Civil were
Righ
ts
Division,
USDOJ; I
i Trial Attorney, Criminal
Divi
sion,
USDOJ; Section Chief (SC> Ralph Butler,
CD-i, Eurasian Section,
Counterintelligence Division; SC Davi
d 3. Johnson, Violert Crimçs
Criminal Investigative Division;
Jnit Chief (UC)I
Firearms ‘training Unit, Training
Division (Tm: t1C
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD;
uci
I
F
ISpecial Weapons and Tactics Operations
Unit, Crijical
Incident Resçonse Group; Supervisory
Special Agent jA)l
I, Practical Applications Unit,
TD; SS
I.
I Investiçative Law Unit, Office of Gene
I
ral Counsel; SSA
F
I Evidence Response Team, Laborator
y Division;
and SSAI
I CR-2, Washington Field Office.
The
following non—voina members were also in
nrr
Tnspectors
[
I I
I and I
I, Office
of Inspections 1QI), II’1SD; Managem
ent and Program Analyst (MPA)
I
I, Inspection Management Unit (IMW Strategic
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; and
MPAI
IMU,
SAS, INSD.

I

I

[

UNCtASSIFIED

4

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70

 UNCLAS SIFEED

To:
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297—HQ—A1271741--D,

Inspection
05/27/2010

Observations and Reconimendations of the
SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized
incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly
force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analy
sis,
observations, and recommendations for
corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any; (3) prov
ide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues;
and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative actio
n if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that
the use of
I was justified and in
conformance with the FBI’s deadly force
policy.
This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be
taken against SA[
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
deadly force by SAl

I

The Inspector’s observation was discussed
regarding SA
lfailure to maintain control of one df
his
firea
rms,
leaving it in an unattended_backpack on the
floor of his open
garage.
Members noted SAl
Iwas retrieving his dog to
complete the. loading of his vehicle and
deemed his actions
appropriate.
This discussion resulted in an agreemen
t that the
Inspection Division will place a reminder
on its website advising
all Agents to be cognizant of the locat
ion and security of their
weapons at all times.

TJNCZASSIFIED

Savage-2152

G

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271741—D.,

Inspection
05/27/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken
against
SA I
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

—

—

—
—

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

—

-

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caoroni, Room 7427
Mr.I
EJSDOJ
,

Mr.’
IJSDOJ
Mr. Butler, Room 5845

Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
Mr.
I Quantico
Mr. I
IQuaqi-ic-n
(Attention:
Mr.I

Mr.

uantico

Mr.
Mr.

IQuantico

I Laboratory

Mr.I
Msi
Mrs.

1

FO

E

1 Room 6387
I Room 3043

+4
UNCLASSIFIED

6

Savage-2153

 (Rev O5OI-2OO8)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attn:

Inspection

From:

12/30/2010

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Inspection

Office of Inspections

7

Contact:

Approved By:

Extension 4-1837

Lyons Amy
Love Jennife

Drafted By:

[

Case ID #:

297—HQ—A1271659—D

jlrr
b6

b7C
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
KANSAS CITY DIVISION
11/01/2009

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting inqident that occurred on 11/01/2009, involving Special
Agents (SAs)[
1
I andl
1,
Each Agent fired multiple
1 of the Kansas City Division.
rounds at a subject who had shot at a task force officer (TFO)
SIRG members unanimously recommended that no adm
inistrative
1
action be taken against SAsL
1 I
andL
I
result of their involvement in this shooting incident.
Synopsis:

las a

Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector
dated 03/01/2010.

I

1

This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details:

Details of the Shooting Incident

.b 6

Pursuant to an Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution
(UFAP) warrant, the Kansas City Division’s Violent Crime Task
Force (VCTF) planned the arrest ofL
I a
convicted felon who was known to be armed and dangerous.

UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2154

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From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271659—D, 12/30/2010

On 11/01/2009, at approximately 3:30 p.m., an arrest
team, consisting of a TFO and six Agents, was advised of an
arrest briefing at the Overland Park, Kansas, Police Department
(flPKPD
During the oral irfinp, which was provided by SA
and TFcL
photographs were
provided of theflbect his girlf,riendJ_and vehicles associated
withL
jadvised ofL
I TFOL
1criminal background
involving weapons violations, crimes of violence, possession of a
bullet proof vest, methamphetamine use, and his access to various
weapons, including a MAC-li type gun.
Utilizing a diagram, SA
1 explained where ie wanted personnel positioned during
the oceration and provided photographs of the location.
SA
Z1 did not have a written operations plan but referred to
the tsk force “Standard Operating Procedure” (SOP)
According
to SAL
the Task Force arrested many fugitives with
ZJ
backgrounds similar to[
] therefore, he did not believe
written guidance beyo th SOP was needed.
Acting Supervisory
Special Agent (A/SSA) L
]was the only management
official notified regarding the arrest plan since personnel
considered it a “routine” arrest, making use of the SOP.
.

]

]

.

b6

b7c

b6

b7c
As arrest team members moved their vehicles into
position at the third location,j
Ibacked their
vehicles into spaces in the parking lot.
As the arrest team van
approached, they
Ivehicle. [
girlfriend, who was located inside his vehicle, yelled to
that she suspected the approaching unmarked van was a law
enforcement vehicle.
As team members exited the van to arrest
him,[
ran back to his vehicle, entered, closed the driver’s
side door, and displayed a hanaun,pointing it in the direction
of a TFO.
As the TFO observed
Iointing the weapon at him,
he dove for_cover at the front of
]vehicle.
Evidence
fired at the TFO resulting
indicatedLZ
three
the arrest
team Agents reurning fire. L
1 who was shot multiple times,
was arrested, provided medical care, and_transported to the
Overland Park Regional Medical Center.
Jwas released from
the hospital on 11/07/2009.

sawl

L 1

J

in

J

C

UNCLASSIFIED

2

Savage-2155

of

h7D

 __J,

_______________

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271659—D, 12/30/2010

C

7

FBI, Laboratory Division analysis revealed SA
fired seven rounds from his Springfield Professional, .45 ACP
revolver, SAEZ
ed 18 rounds from his Colt M4, .223
]
caliber rifle, and SA
] fired four rounds from his
Springfield, .45 ACP revolver.
Anaiis also determined a pistol
recovered from the interior of
jvehicie was fired twice.

L

n 06/29/2010, Johnson County, Kansas, District
Attorney L
determined the use of deadly force by
SAsL
]was legal and justified under
1 L
], and’I
Kansas statutes.
On 05/24/2010, the United States Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, determined insufficient evidence
existed to warrant a criminal investigation in this matter.
On 12/07/2010, the SIRG met to discu the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Chief Inspector L
Office of Inspections (01), Inspection Division (INSD), chaired
the meeting and was a non-voting member.
The following voting
members were in attendance:
Trial Attorney,
Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Jrial Attorney, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; Assistant Section Chief (SC)
Violent Crmes Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (UC)
1 Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (TD); UC[
Defensive Systems Unit, TD;
UCL
Special
weapon
and
T,actics Operations
]
Unit, Critical Incidnt Response Group; SS[
Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel (OGC);

7

SSAL 7

1 Evidepc Response Team Unit (ERTU), Laboratory
Division (LD); SSA
J, Practical Applications
Unit, TD; and SSA
L—2, Washington Field
Office.
Inspectors
f and L
attended to present the Kansas iry nd Detroit shootings to
board members.
The foowing non-voting members were also in
attendance:
b6
InspectorL
1 01, INSD; SSAL
b7c
FRTU. LD; SSAI
L
Legal Instruction Unit,
OGC; UC
Strategic Anais Section (SAS),
Inspection Management unitIMU), INSD; UCL
SAS,
Inspection Anais Unit (IAU), INSD; Managent_andProgram
Analysts (MPAs[
] SAS, IAU; L
1 Special
Advisor, INSD; L
SAS, IMU, INSD; and
SAS, IMU, INSU.

],

C

7

]

L

1

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
UWCI
A
1
SSIFIZD

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operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendatio
ns
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

inspectorr

incident Review Team
to SIRG members.

(SIRT),

f

who led the Shooting
providëd an overview of the incident

S1RG members unanimpilv agreed that the ae of deadly
J,[________________ andL
was justified an in conformance with the FBI’s Deadly
Force Policy.
This discussion resulted in the recommendation
that no administrative action be taken against any of the Agents
as a result of their involvement in this shooting incident.

force by SAsL

SIRG members unanimously adopted the following
observations and recommendations of the SIRT:
OBSERVATION #1:
Ballistic protective vests (BPVs)
not worn by two occupants in the arrest team van.

were

INSTRUCTION #1:
Every indication was that this arrest
was “reasonably” going to involve a violent
altercation.
Under such circumstances, it is
imperative Executive Managers and SSAs in the Kansas
City Division ensure all personnel wear BPVs in
accordance with the MIOG, or that BPVs are immediately
available.
OBSERVATION #2:
The written SOP utilized by the Task
Force, dated 03/10/2009, was inadequate to support the
11/01/2009 arrest circumstances.
The SOP provided
sufficient guidance regarding static arrest sites and
vehicle pursuits, but it did not provide sufficient
guidance_regarding mobile arrests.
The SOP, authored
by SAL
J had the following sections: Arrest
Plan Brief, Uniform and Equipment, Target Location
Surveillance, Movement To The Objective, Deployment and
Entry, Special Considerations, Contingencies,
Transportation of Arrestees, Vehicle Stops, Vehicle
b6
Pursuits, Pre—Arrest SOPs, and Post Arrest SOPs.
b7c
The SOP did not include the FBI’s Deadly Force Policy
.
Additionally, numerous arrest team members stated the
FBI’s Deadly Force Policy was not discussed in detail
at the pre-arrest briefing and SAJ
had advised
the arrest might require deadly force and they “all
know the policy.”
Numerous arrest team members stated
UNCLSS I FlED

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2010
they were familiar with the
Deadly Force Policy, since
it had been briefed extens
ively relative to another
arrest two weeks before the
11/01/2009 arrest.
The SOP did not provide spe
cific guidance regarding
what criteria would requir
e Special Weapons and Tacti
cs
(SWAT) utilization for an
arrest.
It did not provide a
sufficient Medical Response
plan.
The “Emergency
Medical Situation” sectio
n stated, should a medical
emergency occur, 911 should
be called immediately.
This was insufficient bec
ause it did not include the
location of the nearest trau
ma facility.
The Violent Crimes Section
, Criminal Investigative
Division (CID), indicated
to the SIRT it had issued no
guidance to the field reg
arding the use of SOPs versus
formalized Operation Plans.
CID delegated this
specific authority to fie
ld offices and the respectiv
e
Special Agents in Charge
(SACs)
RECOMMENDATION #2:
The Kansas City Division sho
uld
make the Task Force SOP
a more detailed and versat
ile
document.
At a minimum, the FBI’s Dea
dly
For
ce
Pol
icy
and the locations of all trau
ma centers, including
their levels, should be add
ed.
The SOP should also
include guidance regarding
mobile arrest scenarios
as
well as criteria which wou
ld trigger the utilization
of
a SWAT team.
In addition, it should incl
ude criteria
guiding when the Assistan
t Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) and SAC should be not
ified of an arrest.
All
participants in task forc
e arrests should be briefe
d on
the SOP before arrest sce
narios.

During this discussion,
SIRG members commented on the
use of the Standard Operati
ng Plan utilized by tas
k force
personnel.
SIRG members emphasized the
availability of the
fillable Form FD-885, Law
Enforcement Operations Ord
er.
Completion of this form
would provide relevant info
rmation to all
involved participants.
OBSERVATION #3:
Better post incident care
needs to be
provided to personnel••

The overall medical respons
e planning for this
operation was inadeouate.
Foll-’”’ 1
e oral briefing
provided by SN
and TFcI
I
I Captaini_______
Overland Park Police Dep
artment (OPPD), arranged
for an
ambulance to be staged_in
the vicinity of the
operation.
After
was in custody and his tru
ck
UNCLASSIFIED

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From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271659—D, 12/30/2010

I

was cleared, sergeantL
OPPD, requested medical
assistance, which arrived a short time
later.
Additionally, once the scene was secu
re, SA
checked to see if any arrest team perso
nnel were
injured.

L

I

After the arrest, S
ihad a significant amount of
blood on both hands fromi
which transferred to SA
Iwhen he pul1ed[
Jfrom the truck.
SA
provided hand sanitizer to
sL
and the
responding ambulance oronpe1 prov
ided him with some
antiseptic foam.
SAl
Ibecame concerned after the
shooting because he could not ob4inin
formation
rdingl
j HIV status.
SAI
Jalso believed
subect’s girlfriend) was HIV pos
itive.
Although b6
SA
did not have any open wounds, he
was
still
h7c
concerne about_follow—up_treatment
after coming into
contact with
and[
I

J

I

J

Additionally, while at the scene SAL
Itold ASAC
Jones he was fine.
However, during his interview with
the SIRT and in his Signed Sworn
Statement he said,
after arriving home his “ears bega
n to hurt and there
was a ringing sensation.
My ears are still ringing
(11/08/2009) as a result of the shoo
ting incident.”
RECOMMENDATION #3:
Following a shooting incident, it
is the responsibility of Executive
Management to ensure
adequate experts such as Blood Born
e Pathogen
Coordinator, Medic, and Nurse are
made available to all
involved personnel, ensuring the
timely identification
and resolution of medical issues.

UNCLASSIFIED

6

Savage-2159

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271659—D
, 12/30/2010

LEAD(s)

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrativ
e action be taken ag
ainst SAs

1 andl
a result of their us
las
e of deadly force in th
is shooting incident.

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

—

-

-

-

—

1—
1—
1—

Mr. Murphy, Room 7142

Mr.

Harrington,

Room 7142

Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr.j
1USDOJ
Mr.L
IUSDOJ
Mr.I
I Room 3280
(Atten1On:
Mr. Lasky)
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
(Attention:
Mr.l_________
Mr.I
IQuantico
Mr
)uantiCo
Mr
Laboratory

1— Mr
1— Ms
1— Mrs.

b6
b7C

om 6387
Room 3043

4,

UNCLA.SS IFIED

7

Savage-2160

  

 

FBI
Shooting Incident Report 
Summaries

2008

 

 

4

(RevO5.O1.2OO8)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
o:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Attn:

Inspection
Office of InsDections
Contact: I

08/25/2008

I Extension 4—1837

Approved By: gs Kevin L
I Clemens Michaei,’
Drafteday:

Ilrr

I

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271787—D
Title:

I

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW ORLEANS DIVISION
04/13/2008

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 04/13/2008, involving
Agent (SA) I
I While visiting a friend, SAl
fired two rounds from her Bureau-issued Glock Model 22, .40
caliber pistol injuring an aggressive pitbull dog.
SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against SA
las a result of her involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:

Reference Elecfrrn1
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I

t

Cnmm”nl cation of

I dated 04/17/2008.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of thö Shooting Incident
On 04/13/2008, SAl
lvisitedj
friend who owned a small dog. nticiqating beiqa
residence for several hours SAl
I rqde with
the dog to the residence of
1
I andi

I.

I a
from her
I to take

Approximately three hours later, S
I and
I
completed their errards and çeturned to the I
is residence to
retrieve the dog.
54
Iremained inside the vehicle while
tJNCLASSXFIED

I

 ______Iguidingi

16

To:
e:

I

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271797—D, 08/25/2008

Iproceeded to the front door of the residence. As 3k I
sat in the vehicle, she observed a red truck park down the street
and a male knn-, sI
I along with a dog, exit the truck. At
that time, I
li-eturned to her vehicle to ask SA p
1a
question and re—entered thel
[residence.

I

I
sI
I observed I
lezit the residence withi
I
I dog on a leash. As they_walked down the
steps toward the vehicle, SAl
]dog
ladvisedi
Ithatl
was rapidly approaching.

few mr-mpntq 1ter.

-

I, andi

As I
lattemptect to crete a playful
land the I
environment for the dogs, SAl
inoticedi
Ipitbull dog
was not being plvful nd was attackinga
I and
1 the I
I
k dog. Asi
Itempted to protect
Iand[
the small dog, the pitbull lunged at I
1
I Commands from I
and thel
j along with physical force, seemed to make the
pitbull more aggravated and vicious. Additionally, the owner of
the pitbull did not come to the scene of the inàident despite
hearing and seeing the activity. nsuring all individuals were
in a safe are and faring for her safety, as well as the safety
of others, SAl
Iretrieved hr weapon and fired two rounds
injuring tie pitbull dog who ceased its attack.
The local police and animal control authorities were
notified of the incident. The insured pitbull dog was removed
from the scene by local animal control authorities.
On 08/19/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-voina member. The following voting members were in
L T;ial Attorney, Civil Rights
attendance: I
1b6
Division, USDOJ;’
Trial Attorney, Gang Squad, USDOJ;
1
b7c
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr.., CD—4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC Thomas A. Nunemaker,
Violent Crimes Section. Criminal Investigative Division (dO);
Unit Chief (tiC) I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (TO); UCI
I Defensive Systems Unit, TO;
Acting UC
I Practical. Applications Unit, TO;
j Special Weapons and Tactics
Acting uci
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
I
I
1 Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; and
SSAI
I cR-2, Washincton Feld Office.
Management Program Analyst I
I Inspection
Management Unit, 0!, INSO, a non-voting member, was also in
attendance.
.

t3NcI.ASSXFtD

2

 *

1.
To:
Re:

Inspection From;
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271787—D, 08/Z5/2008

Observations and Iecoiamendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified. This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no administrative action be
taken against SAp
; as a result of her involvement in this
shooting incident.

tNCL.SS?XZD

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ-A1271787—D, 08/25/2008

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

!NSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC
rPTj
no administrative action be taken against
SA. I
I as a result of her involvement in this
shooting incident.

7C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Roow 7427
1
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
1
Mr. Nunemaker, Room 3280
1
Mr.I
I Quantico
1
Mr.
I Quantico
1
Mr.
IQjiantico
1—Mr.
JCIRG
I.
Ms.
room 7326
I
1-Mr.
1
Mrs.
Room 3043
—
—
—
-

—
-

—

-

1

++
tYNcLA.sSz’IzD
4

 FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

IECI
02/15/2008

Case ID #:

297-HQ-AJ 271895-D

Title,

SHOOTh’IG INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PBILADELPHIA DIVISION
01/28/2008

Charac(cn

ADMtNISTRATIVB INQUIRY

Syjiopsir.

Darius Hill was the subject of a child pornography investigation. On January
28, 2008, a federal search warrant was served at RilPs residence in Perkasie,
Pennsylvania. The search tçam was composed of six Agents arid four uniformed
police officers. The subject’s wife opened the kitchen door to allow the team to eater.
As the team was clearing the second floor, the subject was observed with a pistoL The
subject began to point the pistol at himself. The Agents, from behind concealment,
ordered the subject to drop the weapon. The Agents negotiated with the subject for
approximately 15 to 20 minutes and threatened suicide. The subject made a
threatening movement by lowering the weapon towards the Agents. The Agents,
feeling their lives were in dsnger, fired at the subject After the initial Ageüt fired and
hit Hill, the subject was still able to place his weapon into his mouth and fire one shot
while also being struck four additional times by the Agents’ rounds. Agents attempted
to render aid to the subject. Paramedics pronounced the subject dead at the scene.

Office:

Inspections
b6
]b7C

DETAILS:
On Ianuaiy 2,2008, the Philadelphia Division (PH), Ft Washington Resident
Agency (RA), received a lead from the Innocent Images National Initiative (JINI) Unit
in Calverton, Maryland. The lead reported an Internet Crimes Against Children
([CAC) Task Force in Utah, working in an undercover capacity, determined a
computer registered to 836 Callowhill Road, Perkasie, Pennsylvania, was engaged in
criminal activity relating to child pornography. Darius Theodore H.ilI resided at the
residence and was believed to be the individii1 cnvnnimikatin# pith the undercover
Utah officer. The lead was assigned to SPI
Ivho worked with the
United States Attorney’s Office to obtain a searcn warrant to seize computers located
in the residence.

This document contains neither recozaandations nor coaclusion. of the yBZ • Xt is the property of th. FEZ
and is leaned to yonc aqency it and its cantonts axe not to b distri.hutod outside your agency.

 _______

297 —HQ-A1271B95-D

spent several days to freshen the probable cause for the search
warrant. S
btained upto date computer 1
in reference to current
conversations in e undercover Utah officer. S
o conducted criminal
background checks on the subject. The subject haLl a e ony criminal record from his time in the
military for selling stolen military weapons and also had a complaint filed with the Hilltown
Township Police Department (HTPD) for improper sexual contact with a minor.

6

The search warrant affidavit was prepared and presented to the Assistant United
States Attorney (AUSA) on Wednesday, 1/23/2008. On Friday, 1/25/2008, a federal search was
authorized by Federals Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Also on. Friday,
1/25/2008, SAl
Icontacted Ft. Washington RA Agents to request assistance on serving the
search warrant on Monday, 1/28/2008.
.

At 3:00 pm, 1128/2008, the search team assembled at the HTPD for a briefina.
Presqnt were FBI SA
I
I as well 54 Hilitown Township Police Lieutenant (Lt.) I
I The briefing was led
by SAl
Iwhich included providing copies of the warrant and affidavit; description and
photograph of Hill; HilPs criminal history; searcWeaty team roles and assignments; notification
of potential children in. the residence description of items to be seized; and a contingency plan
on breaching the residence ifneeded to preserve evidence. There was no written operation plan
for the search warrant, nor was there a specific briefing on the FBft Deadly Force Policy. SA
I
1 arrived late to the briefing, due to being in court, andreceived a briefing from
jrior to the execution of the warrant.
SAl
The plan was to execute the warrant when the subject was at his residence in an
attempt to interview him regarding his involvement in child pornography. There were no
locations for a static surveillance near the residence, so the team conducted drive-by
surveillances every twenty to tiirtv minttes to determine if the subject was home. The initial
drive-by was conducted by SPJ
liust prior to his search warrant briefing.
At 6:00 pm, sA
Ireceived information from the undercover Utah officer
that Hill’s computer was online. This wa an indication that Hill was at the residence.
The team re-assembled at the HTPD. SAl 1 briefed three additiçrnal
uniformed nolice officerwbo joined the team to assist. The additional officers werd
I and I
I The team lined up the vehicles consisting of
two FBI vehicles and three marked Hilitown Township cruisers, and proceeded to the location b 1
which was a. short distance from thelfl’PD.
Ib7C
At

‘ A
6:39mm th team arrived at the location. SAF
I SAl
i
1
ILt
I
land Officed
SAL
approacbed the kont door, while SA
1
an fflcer
i and[
Lvent to the side door. SAl
I,vas on the northwest corner
of the house. As the team approached the front door, the subject was observed through a window
and motioned the team to gc to the side door.

The team at the side door then n1 cnntt ‘with tht’ 1tht’RI
and entered the residence. As the team entered1
LmdI
Iwere in the
Jçjtchen yea and were advised the FBI had a search warrant fir the residence. Agents asked
lwhere Darius was, and she Indicated she thought he was in the front of the residence.
2

I

 297-HQ-A1271895-])
_A,c the team proceeded to the front of the residence, Hill was heard upstairs.
Office4
Ivas at the base of the stairs, located in the center of the home, and yelled up to
Hill telling mm it was the police/FBI serving a search warrant and ordered him to come
downstairs.

Hill did not respond to the verbal commands, so OfficeiF
I
land SAl
ascended the stairs. Upon arrival on the upstairs landing, they cleared a bedroom to their left.
Then, both law enforcement officers looked down a hallway to their right and observed Hill
standing in the master bedroom door)vav witk a pistol pointed under his chin. He was
threatening to sicot himself and SAl
lbeaan to negotiate with him to put the gun down.
Office’ I
I ndI
kint of the house.
to g
Iwent dx,n f1ii
Officed
Iplaced I
hncl I
liii a cruiser, then took them to the
HTPD.
S
ntinued to negotiate with Hill, advising him top the gun down
and show his ban a.
stated, “.Pve been through this befQre. Pmjaot going back to jail. I
might as well jpst enti i now.” During the negotiations, SAl
ame up the stairs to provide
backup for SAl
I Hill was standing in the doorway of the bedroom which was located
approximately 12 to 14 feet from where the Agents were located.
lam’
Iwere on the second floor with Hill, other
Although only SAsI
Agents and officers on-scene and located at the base of the stairwell overheard Hill’s statements.
The Agents and officers heard the following:

biking to Hill telling him, “we can’t talk to you when
Iheard SA
SAl
you have a gun. Take your finger off the trigger. No on
jug to be arrested,
this is strictly a search warrant. Put the gun down.” SA
could barely hear
Hill, but heard Hill say, “being arrested and suicide.”
Iheard Hill and he sounded agitated. Hill was speaking as if he had
an ooj cot in ins mouth. Hill said, “dont rush me man... don’t come in here... I
know you guys don’t want suicide by cop.”

SAl

SAeard Hill say, “no, I won’t drop it.”

Offioer

[ieard Hill say, “suicide by cop.”

Sil
Iontinued to negotiate with Hill for approximately 15 to 20 minutes.
Throughout the negotiations, Hill continued to put the weapon in his mouth and point it uxiderth
chin. Hill was facing
ts during most of the negotiations, but did occasionally move
around the room
as originally at the top of the stairs peering around a corner wall
to view Hil
eyed across the ball into the laundry room to çht’in h’tter view of
Hill. S
en moved up the steps into the position vacated by SAl

I

b 70
I continued to give Hill commands to drop the weapon, and .Hifl
SAl
continued to say be was not going back (to jail). He stated, “NCIS screwed mc” [the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) conducted the investigation resulting in Hill’s felony
conviction and four years incarceration seutencel. At one point Hill said, “what is this going to
be, suicide by cop?” .kfter the dialogue continued for several more minutes, Hill said, “Pm
I
going to blow my brains out by this window because I don’t want to make a mess.” SAl
3

b6
70

 ______

4

4

297-HQ-A1271895-D
told Hill they were only there to seize his computers and not arrest him. At this point, there was
a noticeable change in Hill’s demeanor. Hill became very quiet and began to back up towards the
bedroom window.
Aiound this time, S
who was on the upstairs landing lost sight ofHill.
To imprqv his tpctical nosition, SA
1rossed the hallway mt
dry roam doorway
with SAl
L SAl
Iwas in a low kneel position while S
as in the standing
high position.
*

According to SAl
‘li’s co
cuts conveyed he felt there was no way out
of the uation. SAl
Ieminded S
that they could not gout react thIs guy.” SA
I
“eminded himself of training exercises emonstrating law enforcement officers can’t react
fast enough if an armed subject makes the first move to shoot, which included scenarios with
suicidal subjects.
As Hill backed towards the window, he lkced the Agents in what S1
I
perceived as a combat stance._Although Hill was clearly making suicidal comments and pointing
his weapon to his head, SAl
Ifelt Hill was preparing for a gun battle with the Agents. SA
I
Ibased this on Hill’s repeated suicidal comments were becoming sispect because he had
plenty of opportunity to actually ommiL suicide; Hill moved to close proximity of an egress
point, the window; and Hill held the weapon in a combat grip.
Hill lowçred the weapon from his chin towards the Agents. This caused both 5k
lired the first round strikiu.Hjjj..hi the
Ito fear for their lives. SAl
chest lill was able to place his weapon back I
Ui and fire one round. SAsI]and
fhought Hill was returning lire, and SA______ ed one additional round and SA
J
Ilired five rounds. All rounds were fir in approximately two seconds. Hill was struck
I
a total of five times by Agents’ rounds.

I

I and S1

Hill had six wounds located as follows: intra-oral (mouth) close contact entry
wound with exit wound out of the back ofhis head; right thumb with re-entry into right chest;
left chest, left ear/neck/chest; left neck/chest; and right thigh. The iritra-oral wound was Hill’s
self-inflicted shot, and the bullet exited hitting the windew frame and splintered, A bullet was
recovered in each of the other five womds: two rqunds were from SAl
Iweapon and three
rounds from SAl
Iweapon. SAl
bther two rounds cleanly pierced the bedroom
window to the exterior of the house and were not recovered. Recovery of shell casings
confinned eight shots were fired (Hill one; S4
two)
j. five; and SAl
-

jAI
_Jan
approached Hill, kicked his weapon away, and began to
render aid. SA
Ic
medic, checiced Hill’ pulse, but was not able to locate any
signs of life from Hills S
lwho had come up the stairs, to take
then told LtJ
control of the scene. Param cs arrived a short time later and pronounced Hill dead.
The Bucks County District Attorney’s Office Investigators responded, as is
protocol for all law enforcement involved shootings in Bucks Cointy. The investigators
conducted the crime scene and interviews ofHill’s wife and all ofthe HTPD ofilcers at the scene.
The toxicology report was negative for drugs or alcohol in Hill’s system.
4

7

 4,

297-HQ-A1271895-D

Based on investigation subsequent to the shooting incident, the SJRT identified
potential factors which may provide indicators as to why Hill reacted so violently to law
enforcement during the execution of a lawful search warrant, which included:
A forensic computer exam ofHilPs computer seized during the search warrant

•

•

revealed 300,000 graphic images of child pornography and 5000 videos of child
pornography, incest, and bestiality.

I

I revealed Hill threatened suicide during their marriage,
to include placing a handgun to his head.
Hill was suspecç o gesingj

who is the
rrom I

Hill was suspected of molestin

I

According to a family member, Hill’s wife sent him cell phone text messages on
the day of the shooting about getting a divorce.
On 02115/2008, the Bucks County Attorney’s Office, Bucks County, Pennsylvania,
declined local prosecution. On 04/07/2008, the Department of Justice declined federal
prosecution.
In summary, subject Hill fled to a bedroom as Agents executed a lawful federal
search warrant at his residence. Hill obtained a weapon and threatened to kill himseE After 1520 minutes ofnegotiations, Hill began to point the weapon in the direction of the Agents.
Agents, in fear of their lives, fired striking Hill. After being shot, Hill was able to place his
weapon in his mouth and fire one round. Agents, ‘thinking they were being shot at, fired six
additional rounds at Hill.
iNSPECTOR’S OBSERVATIONS:
The SIRT identified the following issue

Issue #1: The search warrant plan was not converted into a written
operation plan, nor did the plan require Agents to wear body armor or marked law
enforcement clothing and did not provide a FBI Deadly Force Policy brief.
The ease Agent and all team members conducted an oral brief prior to the search
warrant. The case Agent personally briefed one Agent who missed the brief due to a court
appearance, as well as three local officers assisting. The plan was thorough and complete, with
three exceptions. The plan did not require Agents to wear body armor or ma*ed law
enforcement clothing and did not provide a FBI Deadly Force Policy brief. None of the six
Agents participating wore body armor or marked law enforcement clothing. Additionally, the
plan was not converted to a. written format. A written plan could have added value by 1)
stimulating rigorous thought by the case Agent working through a standardized format which
could lead to plan improvements/refinements; and 2) allows for independent review by more
experienced managers; and 3) facilitates a complete and thorough oral pre-operation brief.
5

 ______________L
_______________Iirr
_____Ifired

(Rev: OS-O1-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attn

Inspection

From:

08/07/2009

0 Lyons
AD Aitiy J

Inspection
Office of Insoections
Contact

I

Approved ayyjns_Michael S
Drafted y:
Case ID #:

Title:

297-HQ-A1271786—D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
10/01/2007

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ir}cident that ocurred on 10/01/2007, involving Special
Agent (SA)
During the attempted arrest of two
subjects, S
six rounds from his Glock Model 22, .40
caliber pisto at a second subject who was firing at law
enforcement personnel from inside a business establishment.
SIRG
meitbers recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
s a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative: Reference New Haven Division E1ec’trrnir
Communications of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
I
dated 10/02/2007 and 10/11/2007, and subsequent Connecticut State
Police report.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

In September 2007, three local Police Departments (PDs)
requested the assistance of two SM assigned to the Bridgeport
Resident Agency regarding an interview of the subject of a local
investigation involving illegal gambling.
The Bridgeport Agents
had an extensive background in conducting Organized Crime
UNCLASSIFIED

-

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—I4Q—A1271786-D, 08/07/2009

investigations, and it was believed the subject was associated
with Organized Crime members in another county.
A second request was received from the Branford PD
requesting the assistance of personnel for general manpower
needed to search two locations. The requests resulted in six SAs
attending a briefing of the operation at the Trumbull PD during
the evening of 10/01/2007. At approximately 6:30 p.m., a
briefing of the operation was conducted and a summary assignment
sheet was drafted and discussed. Five of the six Agents were
assigned to the subject’s Trumbull residence search location to
assist with the search ff the residence was secured and
conduct interviews. SAl
I a Probationary Agent, was assigned
to the team responsible for searching a Mobil gas station in
Bridgeport.
Upon arrival at the gas station, two Trumbull Police
officers attempted to secure the individuals located inside the
business. While the first subject who was standing in the
doorway raised his hands over his head to surrender, the_second
subject began firing on law enforcement personnel.
SAl
I
along with other local officers located outside, returned fire
injuring the shooter in the hand and arm.
Since the incident was not related to a pending FBI or
FBI task force investigation, the crime scene was processed by
the Connecticut State Police (CSP) Major Crimes Unit and the
investigation was conducted by the CSP.

I at approximately 8:30 p.m., on
According to SAl
10/01/2007, an Agent located at the subject’s residence advised
him team members were walking up to the primary search location
and that SAl
ream should execute the search warrant at the
second location.
The group d.rove to the location in three
unmarked police vehicles and one marked Bridgeport Police
Department vehicle.
SAl
I wearing a blue protective vest
with large yellow letters “FBt,” exited the unmarked van and
followed a local officer toward the front door of the business.
The local officer had his service weapon drawn from its holster
holding it against his leg pointed toward the ground.
SAl
I
drew his weapon and held it in a similar manner as they walked
toward the open door of the gas station. SAl
I heard someone
say, “Police Officers; search warrant,” and an individual
standing in the doorway raised his hands over his head to
surrender. He also observed a second person moving in a back
room; however, stayed focused on the individual who was
surrendering.
UNCLASSIFIED

2

h7C

 UNCLASSflIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271786—D, 08/07/2009

As the local officer reached the man ip the çioorway, he
passed him to other officers. At that point, SAl
Isaw a
muzzle flash from the interior of the room and knew someone was
shooting at law enforcement personnel.
lie moved to his left for
cover and fired six shots through the glass window irto th
interior of the room. A local officer instructed SAl
Ito
move back and he moved behind a police vehicle to insert a new
magazine into his weapon.

SAl
lobserved a local officer handcuff the man in
the doorway.
Additional officers were yelling, “police, police”
and instructinq the shooter to drop the gun and come out. At
that point, SA I
j,las instructed to get behind a civilian
vehicle parked on an adjoining street to ensure the shooter did
not attempt to flee out the back door.
Within moments, the
individual inside the gas station was arrested. As officers were
attempting to handcuff the subject, it was determined he had been
shot in the arm.
A ballistics examination did not make a conclusive
match between the bullet extracted from the victim’s wrist and SA
weapon.
I
On 05119/2009,, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of_Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SAl
I
On 05/28/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael.
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—vqtina memhr.. e following voting members were in
attendance:
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, Usu,;
fttorney, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Section Chief (Sc.) iooerr Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson,
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (UC)
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (TD); UCI
I Practical Applications Unit,
TD; UCI
I Defensive Systems Unit, TO; SSA
I Evidence Response Team UnitS, Laboratory
I
Division; SSAI
iSpecial Weapons and TaFtics
Ooeratina Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA I
I
llnvestigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; and
SSAI
I CR-17, Washington Field Office. UC
p
llnspection Maqçement Unit (IM. 01, INSD, and
I
Management Program Analyst I
INn, 01, INSD, non
voting mombars, wore also in attendance.

p

t3NCLZSSIFIED

3

 •

UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From;
Inspection
297—NQ—A1271786—D, 08/07/2009

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAFZJ was justified and in conformance with the FBI’s
deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against S
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
I
Members made several observations regarding the
incident including the fact that although a clear threat existed,
SAl
If ired six rounds toward a muzzle flash he saw through a
window without acquiring target identification.
The second observation pertained to the fact that New
Haven Executive Management was not aware FBI personnel were on
the scene when the incident occurred.
Both observations will be
discussed with the Special Agent in Charge of the New Haven
Division.

UNCLASSIFIED

4

C

 ______

UNCIIASSIFXD

-

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ-A1271786—D,

Inspection
08/07/2009

LEI4D(s)
Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
A WASHINGTON. DC
SA I
incident.

Tht np administrative action be taken against
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting

b6
1b7C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
a usooJ
Mr.L
1
Mr.1
I USDOJ
1
Mr. Anderson
1 Room 4825
1
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
1
M.
Quantico
I ‘yantico
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
JCIRG
(kttention:
Mr.
1
Mr.
I Quantico
1
Ms.
I Room 7326
1
Mr.
,
uantico
wwq
1-Mr.
1
Mrs.
Roots 3043
,
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

+4
UNCLASSIFIED

 t7

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

cI.SSI’IED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact;

2pproved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

Attn:

03/24/2009

Perkins Kevin I ‘
Clemens Michaelj
Haley Patrick J’a’mes

I
tk./

I:lrr

I
297—HQ—A1271285—D

SHOOTING INCIDENf
CHICAGO DIVISION
07/10/2008

Synopsis:. The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occuzre4 on 07/10/2008, involving Special
Agent (SA)
I During the forced ntry of a
residence in an attempt to locate a kidnaping victim, S?J
I
and two local law enforcement officers shot aM killed two
•aggressive dogs. •SIRG members_recoiuended that no administrative
action be taken against SA I
las a result of his
involvement in this ho.oting incident.

Administrative: Reference Electronic_Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
i dated 07/16/2008.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 07/10/2008, an unknown number of armed subjects
abducted the fiancé of a bank employee and threatened to kill the
victim unless the bank employee removed all of the money from the
vault of the bank where she was employed.
An arranged drop was executed where money, along with a
tracking device, was placed in a bag and dropped in a
ULcIJS SIFtED

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 UNCLASSXFIE1

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—!Q—a1271285—D, 03/24/2009

predesignated area; After the subjects retrieved the money, they
were followed to a residence in Chicago where a number of
individuals were observed entering the residence. Due to exigent
circumstances related to recent threats made to the victim’s
fiancé, and fear the tracking device would be located by the
assailants, forcible entry was made into the residence. Law
enforcement officers located the kidnaping victim bound to a
chair with duct tape wrapped around his head and covering his
eyes.
During the clearing of the residence, Agents and local
officers encountered two large pit bull dogs upon entry into an
upstairs bedroom where one of the assailants was hiding.__Fea4ng
for their safety when the dogs lunged toward them, SA I
I
and two local officers shot and killed the dogs. Law enforcement
personnel continued to clear the residence and ultimately located
and arrested five subjects hiding in various locations on the
second floor. Additionally, a sixth subject was arrested during
a traffic stop as he attempted to flee the scene
On 01 /3O/200 9, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection DivisiQn (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a nofl-v*in mmhzi-. t
T’Jie following voting members were in
attendance: I
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, tiD0J; I
Attorney, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Chief Inspector Patrick James Maley, Office of Inspections (01),
INSD; Section Chief (SC) Jill Marie Eulitz, CD—i, Eurasian
Section, Counterintelligence Division; A/SC Ronald J. Koziol,
Violent Crimes Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
IW1m ‘1’ aining Unit, Training
Chief (UC)I
.Lyiiuii tTh
UI
eiv-Sytw UuiL, 1Dr
tJCI
I Practical Applications Unit, TD; UC I
I
I
Ispeclal Weapons and Tactics ODerations Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group; SSA[
I
InvesticTatjve Law Unit, Office of General counsel; SSA I
I
I Evidence Resooqse Team Unit, Laboratory Division; and
I
5524
I CR-2, Washington Field Office. UC
I Inspectipn Management Unit (INU), 01, INSD,
I
and Management Program Analysti
I INU, 01, INSD,
non—voting members, were also in attendance.
—

Obseivatjous and Recommendations of the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident wtb
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
UNCLASSIFIED

2

 uc’ss’’z
To:
Re:

InspeotLon From: Inspectoi
297—HQ—A1271285—D, 03124/2009

(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for orective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recoxnmendation
concerning training and/or safety issies; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SRG membes unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by BA I
Iwas üstified and in conformance with the
E’BI’s deadly force policy. TN.s discussion resulted in the
recOmmnatjon that no administrative action be taken against SA
I
las a result of his involvement ifl tiis shooting
incident.
*

tThTcsflxp
-

*

3

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 ___

S

‘1

tJNCI
A
1
SSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Lnspectioh
297—14Q--A1271285—D, 03/24/2009

Set Xxead I:

<Action)

T1iSPECTXON
‘AT WASHINGTON, IC
That no acimipistrative action be taken against
L as a result. of his involvement in this
hoOting incident.

1 ‘—Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
.1
1

-

1
Mr
3SD0J
I USDOJ
Mr.I
Mr. pdeson, Room 4825
(Attention: Ms. ü1itz)
Mr. Kbzjoj, Room 3Z80
Mr. I
I •Quantico

1
1
3.
•
1—.Mr.
Mr.
1
1
Ms.
—

—
—

I

—

1

—

Mr. i

1-Mrs
1
Mrs.
—

IQuatico

ICXRG
.untiço
Room 7326

Quantico

I

I

•WFO
Room 3043

++
t1NCIASSXFXED

4

 ______________

_______

FD-204 Rev. 1.t-9S)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

.

Report of
Date

rrci

case ID’#:

297-HQ-M271 748-D

Thte:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION
07/0112008

Clumctcr

SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW

Synopsis

On Febniary 19,2008, a Gang/Criminal Enterprise investigation was
initiated by the West Palm Beach Resident Agency (WPBRA), Miami Division. The
investigation targeted a violent criminal enterprise associated with drag trafficking
activities in the area ofWest Pahu Beach, Florida. The investigation was conducted
by Agents and officers of the WPBRA Safe Streets Task Force.

Office:

Inspections

UHI II2UVö

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had “goons with
During these contacts,_______
guns, AK-47’s, Uzt s, big pistols, guns,” w
ry out the CHS’s robbery plan
of the drug dealer. These facts, coupled with intelligence on the day ofthe operation
of the subjects carrying large ca1bcr weapons, created an extremely high threat level in
the minds of the SWAT teara at the time of the confrontation with subjects on July 01
2008.

I
This doconent contains fl8ithaf xocoinandations no oono.usions of th. F8Z. Zt is tha property of th. FBZ
and is ioanad to ou agency; it and its content,’ aro not to ha distributed outside your agency.

 _________landSil

.
297-HQ-A1271748-D

IHariaer in

Miami .wii ream nati depIoyeu operarors onto the rooftops of the two
warehouse buildings and an adjacent building.
ww rii.

•

•

•

•

1b6

J

I

ICaidwell, anl
Ito the warehouse complex 0
!drovel
the fictitious dnicr dealer.
Iremajned in his vehicle outside the warehouse while
I
Iaud
I both armed with handguns, and Caidwell, armed with a rifle,
entered into the fenced parking lot ofthe warehouse complex. As the subjects neared one of the
iich
1
warehouse buildina doors, a FBI SWAT operator yelled to the men, HFBI, dont move.” at w
still
timcl
dropped to the ground. Caidwell, still carrying anile, and I
armed with a pistol, disregarded the warnings and ran towards the operators on the opposite
building, which was also in the direction of the gate opening.

I

D

FBI SWAT operators observed. two non-compliant, arme&iadividuais, who
intelligence described as having high powered weapons, attempting to gain a position oftactical
advantage. This caused concern for the imminent threat to the safety of law enforcement
personnel in the outer perimeter and the danger these men posed to the civilian population in the
immediate area, as well as the threat posed to SWAT operators. To eliminate this threat, FBI
SWAT onertnrc fired a total of fifty six (56) rounds at the two men who posed the greatest
threat I
ceived numerous bullet wounds, to include leg wounds requiring the
6
amputation ofhis left leg below the knee. Caidwell received numerous bullet wounds and was
proilounced dead at the scene. a
L who dropped to the ground after FBI
commands, was hit with one .223 caliber bullet, likely a ricochet, that penetrated one leg then
lodged in his other legi
httemptedto flee the location in his vehicle, but his
vehicle was struck and disabled by another motorist. He was then arrested by the West Palm
Beach Police Department SWAT team which secured the operation’s outer perimeter.
I)ETAJLS:
On February 19,2008, a Gang/Criminal Enterprise investigation (281D-MM110766) was initiated targeting a violent gang/criminal enterprise associated with drug
trafcking activities in and around West PthBeach, Honda. The investigation was assigned to
f the WPBRA, who were assigned to the FBI
BRA Safe Street Task Force (SSTF). The identified gangs, “Ace Click” and “44 Live”, had
4
‘
an aggregate membership of sixty fourindividuals suspected of being involved in drug
trafficking robberies, shootings, burglaries, and weapons offenses. This investigation was
approved as an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task orce (OCDETF) investigation (#
FCFLS 1604) on May 05, 2008, and the case classIficationchanged requiring a new case file
number of 2451)-MM-i 10766.

2

6
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297-HQ-A1271748-D

.

•
7C
b7 f)

6id Detectiv4
I
On June 25,2008, A/SSF
j SA
WPBP]), provided a briefing to AUSAI
Eited States Attqmev’s Qfilce(USAO),
Southern District ofFlorida. Based upon inc piesentation, AUSAI
lopined he foresaw no
issues of entrapment.
On June 25 2008, SA
Ipepared an Operations Plan (OP) for the
proposed arrest qi
)nd his unidentified accomplices while committing the purported
robbery. AJSSAI
1iasmuch
Isubmitted the OP for review to A/ASA(I
as ASAC Parlave was on travel at the time. A/ASAg
ubted the OP to SAC
Jonathan L Solomon for his review and approval.
I

On June 25,2008,1
‘as fully identified a
IPompano Beach, Florida, with a date of birth oil
naa an extensive drug criminal history.

3
I

I

I

 _____Iwas

297-HQ-A1271 748 -D
identified on the day the OP was prepared. At that time, there was
no specific intethgence coanectin4
Ito a known drug frffir1dn organization (DTO) or an
armed robbery crew. the basis or mc operation was to arrestl
land his unidentified
henresentntinn he had “AK-41’s. Uzl’L guns, and big pistols”
“aanasters” based oiil
I According to the
I
SAU and other division personnel, South Florida had experienced an increased frequency of
violence with high powered weatons, thus the division felt compelled to address the potential
public safety threat frond
laud his unknown accomplices in an expeditious manner.
On June 26,2008, SWAT Siior Teai Leader (5Th))
nr
a
9
rin a nian tn effect the arrest ol
bnd his unidentified accomplices. SA
I and Detecfivei__‘met with WPBPD SWAT leadership,
ISA I
discussed the tactical operation, and delineated assignments and responsibilities for the
respective SWAT teams. It was detennined during the meeting FBI SWAT would be responsible
for the inner perimeter of the arrest location and WPBPD SWAT would be responsible for the
outer perimeter of tije arrest location. In furtherance of the planned operation, STLI
I
and SAl
bonducted a site survey of the arrest location.

)easn

•

•

On June 27, 2008, STTI
‘prepared an FBI SWAT OP which documented
areas of r cn flqihj1tV fhr both the FBI and WPBPD tscticai components. The OP was submitted
by SSM
nd then forwarded to
ito Administrative A/ASAI
A( .Tnnhan L Solomon. The OP review group, comprised of 5Th
JAJASAC
I and AJASAq
Ibriefed SAC Solonion regarding the tactical considerations
of the OP. After consultation with the group, SAC Solomon óoncurred andapproved the OP.
On June 30, 2008, a detailed OP briefing was conducted at the Miami Division
I
/ STT’
Field Office; in attendance were SAl
)and SSM
STL1
hnet and briefed ASAC Parlave, who was assigned as the On Scene Commander
md SA
for the operation. ASAC Parlave also conducted a conference call with A/SSAI
I
t to discuss the OP.

.
On the same day at 800 n.m.. anOP briefln was conducted by STLJ
I
iwest
fortheSWATteamattheWPBPDi
Palm Beach, Florida. The OP briefing was conducted at the approximate time of the planned
robbery to allow SWAT operators to observe the lighting conditions at the location as it would
potentially appear at the time of the operation. The SWAT OP briefing and rehearsals were
conducted for approximately two hours. As previously discussed, FBI SWAT would be
responsible for activities within the inner perimeter, and WP
team would be
responsible for the outer perimeter. During the briefing, S
dvised FBI SWAT
operators to be familiar with and to further review the FBI D
y orce alley.

4
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________

297-HQ-A1371748-D
The FBI SWAT Blue Team would take positians on the rooftops of the North and
South buildings in the warehouse complex, 1118 Old Okeechobee Road, West Palm Beach, as
well as on the rooftop of a one story warehouse building west of the warehouse complex, 1109
Old Okeechobee Road. The FBI SWAT Gold Team would be responsible for securing the
subjects upon completion of the operation The Gold Team would be staged in a room inside the
South building. A decision was made to partially close the western gate ofwarehouse complex
and secure it with a lock and chain to urevent entry bY a vehicle and require the subjects to silo
through a small opening. I
Iwhtch would be provided tol
Itor lila use in
comnutting the planned robbery.

.

.

I

h6

At 5:00 p.m., STLJ
ASAC Parlave, and Agents ofthe WPBRA arrived
at the ‘yPBPD to attend an OP bnetlng. During this briefing, SM
nd Detective
‘provided an overview of the investigation to the Agents of WPBRA, WPBPD SWAT,
‘WPBPD surveillance, and WPBPD command staft The CHS and UCE were introduced to the
Agents and officers to minimize the potential for misidentification during the operation.

/t)

At 8:00 p.m., the FBI SWAT team staged at the WPBPD garage and were
provided an adcliti
g on the SWAT OP, as well as provided updated intelligence
information. S
gain briefed the FBI Deadly Force Policy. Upon completion of the
briefing, FBI SW
mem ers proceeded to the WPBPD undercover warehouse complex. FBI
SWAT was si,lit into two teams. the Gold Team and Blue Team. The Gold Team was comnried
of SM
I
I

I The Gold Team was divided into four, three operator arrest teams.
The Gold Team was deployed inside the South building and would respond when directed to
secure the subjects. SAl
t was also staged with the Gold Team as a communication
link to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).
R1iit’ Tm mpynlipr. dPnriuPrI nn fI,i., nith

I

hiiiT1h, wpr

I

__

I WPBPD SWAT snipers I
Iwere deployed on the
hnd I
rooftop of the South building to cover the rear of the South building overlooking Old
Okeechobee Road. STLI
hnd ASAC Parlave also took positions on the South building
where they monitored a Remington Bail camera covering the warehouse complex interior
parking lot. The actions of the subjects as viewed through the Remington Ball camera were not
recorded. SThI
land ASAC Parlave monitored the main FBI and WPBPD operations
radio channels, then STLI
Irelayed relevant information to FBI SWAT operators via the
FBI SWAT simplex channel.

5

6

 ____________________

.
297-HQ-A1271748-D

I•

TThi. T2m U! 4T
--

. ..

the roof of the North building were SM

I Blue Team SWAT members deployed on

Iandj

tile rootof a warehouse building west oi Inc warehouse conplex, 1109 Old Okeechobee Road,
wereSAsi
landi
I

•

.

•

I were located in the TOC vehicle
I and
SAs I
located in the vicinity of Clare Avenue. West Palm Beach, Florida. Also in the vehicle were
AISSAI
ndSN
IWPBRA.

6

WPBPI) SWAT operators were staged in two WPBPJ) vehicles. One located on
Clare Avenue and the other on Frederick Street, both within close proximity to the warehouse
complex.
The WPBP]) SWAI’ Command Staff was located in a WPBPD vehicle lçcated at
the Holiday Inn on Belvçdere Road. West Palm eacb. The vehicle was occupied by WPBPD
I
I and Sergeant I
Captahi
ICaptair
I Sergean
‘WPBPD Command ta1Iwould monitor the communications being received through
I
a transmitter worn by the UCE. The monitored communications would then be relayed to all
personnel monitoring the WPBPD operations radio channels. Additionally, approximately
fifteen
WPBPD units had established stationaiy surveillance along the anticipated
route o
d his accomplices from the Holiday Jim to the warehouse complex.

At 10:15p.m.
1 theBrowardCountySheace(BCSO)swvei1lance,which
had been surveilhingl
d other subjects traveling
tince 4:40 p.m., report
WestPalm Beach. At 10:17
nort1ound.oiJnterstate95 North inagoldHyundai appro
nd other subiects arrived at the Holiday Inn, Belvedere Road, West Palni Beach,
p.m.J
lupon their arrival at the Holiday Inn, the BCSO terminated
I
meir surveailnce.

.
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_____________

.
297-HQ-A1 271748 —D

At 10:43p.m., the FBI TOC broadcasted and’ logged the vehicle with all four
subjects was anticipated to arrive at the warehouse complex within qiree minutej and they were
armed with long guns. This was relayed to the SWAT team by Sill
I

7
7

At 1046 prnJ
xited the vehicle,
I Caidwell, andi
whild
Iremained in the vehicle. They entered the warehouse complex parking lot
through a gate locked with a chain, but te chain had snfflçient slack to let a. person slip through
a small opening. The order of entry wasj
loarrying a. set of bolt cutters and a
concealed handaup,
Iarrying a handgun, and CaIdwell carrying a long rifle.
‘walked towardj the &w qf the North
Ifoliowed by Caidwell andd
I
oinioing. All tnree were observed entering the parking lot by both STLI
land ASAC
Parlave, who monitored their movements with the use of a Remington Ball camera. Both ASAC
Parlave and STII
lobserved all three subjects enter into the parking lot with what they
believed to be weapons.
At 10:47 p.m., afterl
and Caldwell got near the North building
door andi
vas halfway from the qate opening and the North building, ASAC Parlave
1
gave the execution order to STLI
Iwho then communicated the order tp FBI SWAT
operators. The SWAT operators had been advised via radioby STLI
Ll three subjects
were armed, inasmuch as all operators were secreted to prevent silhouetting which also prevented
operators from directly observing the subjects entering the warehouse complex.

S
od up. from his pçsition on the Soi4h building and in a lou4 clear
vOice stated, “FR get own.” At this voixit.l
Iwas at theNorth building door
I was 25 feet from the-same
and Caidweft was several feet behind I
door which was about halfwa etw
e e opening and the door. All three subjects turned
towards tle South buildin
dropped to the ground while Caidweil and
I
Iran in the direction o e gen
the South building which was also in the
direction of the gate opening. Caidwell and
Jcommands and
disobeyed SAl
continued to run ‘towards the South building an
opening in the gate with uus in hand.
Agents believed the non-compliant, armed Caidwell and
Iwere moving to a position of
tactical advantage and/or presented a grave danger to the public and other law
enforcement officers. Bight Agents front the roof tQps ofthe North and South buildings
discharged their weapons at Calciwell andi
I and one Agent from the West building
discharged his weapon at
hfter he exited the warehouse complex and moved towards
concealment of a truck parked-on Old Okeechobee Road.
-

-

I
Iwas able to get through the gate opening and was reaching for the
passenger side rear door handle of the gold Hytmdai when it pulled away. He then proceeded to
move towards a truck parked on Old Okeechobee Road when he succumbed to his wounds and
collapsed next to the truck. I
Feceived numerous bullet wounds, to include Legs wounds
requiring his left leg to be amputated below the knee. Caidwell received numerous bullet
wounds, collapsed in the gate opening, and was pronounced dead at the scene.
who dropped to the ground after FBI commands, was hit with one .223 caliber bullet, likely a
7
I

1-6
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 297..HQ-A12.71 748 -D
ricochet, that penetrated one leg then lodged in his other i.e,A
ttempted to flee the
location in his vehicle, but his vehicle was struck and disabled by another motorist. He was then
arrested by the WPBPD SWAT which secured the operation’s outer perimeter.
A total of 56.223 caliber rounds were fired, and there was no evidence the
subjects discharged their weapons. The shooting lasted less than five seconds. Streetlight
illumination created good lighting conditions in the warehouse complex and on Old Okeechobee
Road outside the warehouse complex’s gate. SWAT operators had mounted lights on their
weapons, but did not use light enhancing scopes.

6
Lo

There were 15 FBI Agents and two WPBPI) SWAT operators on top of the three
buildmg rooftops during the incident. Ten FBI Agents provided voluntary statements, as did
both WPBPD SWAT operators. Ofthe 10 FBI voluntary statements, four were from Agents who
discharged their weapons. Five Agents, all ofwhom discharged their weapons, did not elect to
provide voluntary statements.
Each, of the four witnesses providing voluntary statements and discharging their
weapons will be summarized in detailed. Unique information from the other eight witnesses
providing voluntary statements but did not discharge their weapons will be set forth, as well asa
voluntary observations made by subject Anthony Yackson subsequent to the shooting incident.
Agents Discharging Their Weapon
•

weapon and was locatel on the South building. He
Idisc
SAl
clearly heard SA
[tood up from his position.
ommands. When SA I
he ohserycd the su ject closest to the North building door, presumably I
I
I
Ibut was unable to determine if he had a weapon. The second subject,
presumably CaidwejI. was holdjng what appeared to be a long gun, and the third
sub’
Iwas closest to the gateopening holding a pistol.
sumabl)4
S
bserved a gold vehicle on Old Okeechobee Roal narke by the gate
Iommands, he
opening with no one outside the vehicle. After hearing SAl
observed all three subjects
a the South building and run in the
dircction of the Agents
card gunfire from FBI SWAT operators to his
right on the rooftop
olding a pistol, ran towards the opening ofthe
parking lot gate. S
on ed numerous times for the subject to stop and
drop his weapon, buti
heft through the front gate opening and attempted
Ithen
to enter the gold Hyundai but it pulled away headingnorthbouad.h
Ito fire two or three rounds
ran towards a parked
‘ch caused SM
from his M-4 rifle. S
font thse shots incapacitated the subject because he
iattemted
fell in the street. S
discharged his weapon because’
to run to a stationary ye c e would have given him tactical advantaae. exposmg
believed
the SWAT operators who were without cover or concealment SAl
other SWAT operators on the rooftop of the North building were in imminent
danger due to the lack of cover and concealment caused by the angle of the roof
The subject presented an imminent threat to the WPBPD SWAT members
responsible for the outer perimeter, as well as the community at large had the
subject escaped.
-

.

SAI
Idischarged his weapon and was located on the South building.
As the three subjects entered the warehouse complex, STLI
I radioed the
8
I

c

 297-HQ-A127 1748-1)
subjects were armed. SAl
have the FBI’s initial commands by stating, “FBI,
get down.” The subjects spun around and ran directly towards the South building
which was also towards the gate opening. He observed one subject with a long
gun. He had been trained that anyone moving aggressively with a weapon. could
gain a position of tactical advantage. The subjects also presented a grave danger
to the public and other law enforcement ofticers if they fled from the confined
area of the warehouse complex. He fired two to four rounds from his M-4 rifle.
Be aimed at the subject with the long gun, presumably Caidwell, and he may have
shifted to a second subject. The gold Hyundai drove northbound; he covered it
but did not shoot.

SAl

1ischarged his weapon and was located on the South building. When
ktood up, he observed three subjects. One subject, presumably I
I
lt cutter and possibly something in his other hand. He then
2
I
I Jiui h
heard SAJ
J commands, and the other two subjects, presumably Caidwell
andj
South
fi tume1 and. sprinted towards the SWAT team onathe
building. SAl
bbserved one individual as be turned wjth lng gun in his
band and the other appeared to have a pistol in his hand. Se81
Ibeieved that
the subjects were nuining to gain a tactical a4vantage of either cover or
concealment and felt an imminent danger and threat from the subjects. SAl
I
fired two to three rounds from his M-4 rifle at the subject, presumably Caidweli,
who was oanying the long gun. He did not fire at the subject with the handgun
inasmuch as the subject left SAl
larea of responsibility (AOR).
SAt

Idischrged his weapon and was located on the North building. He
SAl
heard SAL
Iozninands to the three subjects. SAl
began to hear
gunfire when he observed the subject, presumabl)1
I armed with a
hncImm pioving towards the gate, then through the gate, evcnj:uallviçohing
‘o1d Hyundai parked on Old Okeechobee Road. SM
Ibeieved
L
Jwas moving towards a position oftactical advantage, or retrieving more
I
weapons from the vehicle. At that
only been able to account for two
subjects and was expecting four. S
e
re was an imminent
threat if the subject had reached the ye c 6.
red two to three rounds
from his M-4 rifle at thp subiet, presumabl
he approached the
passenger side door of I
Ivehicle.
*

Aaents Not Discharging Their Weapons
S
sub cc

as on the South buiIdin and did not fire his weapon. The only
a AOR was the subject with the bolt cutters, presumably
who did not appear to have a weapon.

I

54
Iwas on the North building and did not fire his weapon. His
radio was inadvertently on the wrong channel and he did not hear the “execute”
radio signal. He only realized the operation had begun after he hearçl discharges
from M-4 rifles. Due to his radio malfunction, all the weapons firing was
complete before he was able to get to the edge of the roof. Upon. getting to his
assigned position, he saw a subject downjust outside the gate opening and the
gold Hyundai speeding northbound on Old Okeçchobee Road. He saw a subject
run on Old Okeechobec Road, just underneath his position and took coverbehind
9

6

 ________

291-HQ-A12.71748-n
a trpc1c SAl
n the West building.
Icalled out commands as.did SAI
SAl
maintained cover on this area until four WPBPD SWAToperators
secured the subject.

•

SAl
iwas on the West building and did not fire his weapon. He was
new to the SWAT team, and was positioned behind the other two SWAT
operators on the West building. When he reached the edge ofthe roofton to
observe the warehouse complex and Old Okeechobee Road, SAl
bseried
one subject, presumblv Ca1dwll, down in the gate opening, and a second
subject, presumably I
jiown next to a truck on Old Okeechobee Road.
5111
land ASAC Parlave were on the South building and did not fire
their weapons. Both were next.to each other behind the SWAT operators. They
both only moved forward to view the warehouse complex and Old Okeechobee
Road after the firing had ceased and all subjects were down and not moving.
I

SAl

Iwas on the West building and did not fire his weapon. After SA
Ishouted out commands, he heard gunfire. When S.i
ot to his
position, he saw one subject, presumably CaIdwell, laying in the gate opening. He
saw another subject, presumablyl
ifleeing uorthboun4 on Old
Okeecbcibee Road, then someone shot him in the leg and he fell to the ground.
SM
Idid not fire because ho did not see any weapons on the subjects.
OfficerI
6id Officerl
vere on the South building
behind the FBI SWAT team which at the roofs edge facing the parking lot. While
on the roofprior to the operation, both heard over the WPBPD radio that subjects
were armed with large caliber weapons. Both officers reported an FBI Agent
giving loud and clear coimnands to the subjects. Both officers could not observe
the subjects from their vantage points. Both diçl observe the gold Hyundai drive
northbound on Old Okeechobee Road. Officeil
I reported seeing a subject
down on Old Okeechobee Road, and then he called in perimeter WPBPI) officers
to secure the subject.

I

I

isA

I
ISM
ISA
ll discharged their weapons and did not provide voluntary
statements. All five Agents requested to be compelled to provide a statement, which are not
contained in this report,
S4

J and SAl

I SAl
SAL
erçon the South building and SA
‘and S
Iwas on the North building. The Agents and o cers on the South and North buildings
who submitted to voluntary interviews provided consistent statements on non-compliant, armed
subjects running towards a position of tactical advantage andlor presented a grave danger ta
the public and other law enforcement officers. An inference can be made that these four
Agents had similarobservations which predicated them firing their weapons.
AI
I
Iwas on the West building with tw9 other SWAT operators, SAl
and SAL
both ofwhom did not fire their weapons. SN
1 initial observation of the
warehouse complex and Old Okeechobee Road was after all the subjects were down. SA
I
saw only one moving subject, presumably a
land did not shoot because he did not see a
weapon. At the time of the initial FBI comniands,I
Ihad a pistol in his hand. The pistol
10

IC

 .
297-HQ-A1271748.-D

was found in the par
Iposition at the
the warehouse complex, not far fromi
time of commands.
id not have a weapon on his person when scured çn Old
Okeechobee Ro
jSouth
e truck. However, two other SWAT cmer4ors, 54
building) and SA
(North building), both obseryedl
_jwith a. pistoi mhis hands
while inside the ware ouse complex and both fired oi
ffer he exited the gate opening
and ran n4thbound on Old Okeechobee Road believini
Iwas still carrying the ii’’
SAl
I even verbaljv coordinated with SM
I
bn inc we building because SM
could not seel_______ as he got near the truck. SAl
Ia Dresutnablv aware all subjects
were armed when entering the warehouse complex based on Sm
radio traffic and he
likely saw two other SWAT operators who observed the shooting mside warehouse complex
firing on
s he ran northbound.

•

.

At the conclusion of the shooting,’
Iwas iayin in close proximity
to the North building with a bolt cutter next to him on the ground. I
I who bad exited the
parking lot area through the open gate, was laying in the street of Old Okeechobee Road adjacent
to the warehoi €mnlx. Caidwell was layingpartially thtough the opening in the warehouse
complex gate. I
Iwho fled the scene, became involved in a traffic accident j au
uninvolved motorist at the intersection of Okeechobee Road and Parker Avenue.
‘
arrested at the scene of the accident. He and the citizen driver suffered no major injuries.

•

At annrnc{jnately 10:49 p,m.. the F Gold Team exited the South building and
secured I
Jwith flex cuffs. M
I Caldwe]l, andi
I removed a .38
I
caliber revolver trom the right front pnts rocket of I
I FBI SWAT Meditl
I
Iprovided medical assistance to I
bud Caldwefl. WPBPD SWAT provided
medical assistance to
I
At approximately 10:5l p.m., alter the location was secure, the West Palm Beach
Fire Denartn,ent (JD was notified. and responded to provide medical assistance to the subjects.
I
hndl
here transported to Saint tvfary’s Medical Center for further
medical treatment. Caidwell was pronounced dead at the scenci
Iwas transported to
Saint Marys Medical Center after a traffic accident and later placed into custody at the West
Palm Beach County Iail.
h
lb
The WPBPD Crime Scene Unit, with assistance from the Miami Division ERT,
processed the scene for evidentiary purposes which resulted in the recovery of a Hi Point Model
995, 9mm rifle; a Smith and Wesson model 30, .38 caliber revolver a Lorcin Model L380, .380
caliber pistol; a Halloween mask; and fifty-six (56) .223 caliber shell casings. Based on the
results of the recovery of weapons and shell casings, the subjects appeared not to have fired their
weapons.
FBI Laboratory ballistic tests detemined the 56 shell cains. aJi .223 r1ilw
were tryi to tliç following Agents weapons: SAl
I
I(13); S4
1(2); SM
(3); SAl
4); and unknown
(6); SI
110); SAl
(10); SAl
I); St
(3). Of the bullets/bullet fragments recovered from the subjects, only one bullet from Caidwdil
was uositively identified by the FBI Laboratory with an FBI weapon, which belonged to SA
On July02, 2008. a complaint was filed in United States l?islriot Court. outhem
District of Florida, charging I
ndI
I with

Ii

•

lb

lb 7 C

 297-HQ-A1271743-j)
Violation of Title 18 U.S.C. 841 (a)(1) and 846, conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute cocaine.
On July 04, 2008,1
Iwas_contacted at the Saint Mary’s Medical
Center, 901 45th Street, West Palm Beach, Florida. I
Iwaived his rights qpd was
mterviewed concerning the shootinincident which oqcurred on July 01. 200. I
I
stated that he, along with Caidwelli
I and hi
I went to the
location to commit a robbery of an unknown individua.
I advised the intended
victim would have money and between six and eight kilograms of cocaine.I
Ihad
p!aced three weapons in the yehicle for theiç use, to include a .38 caliber revolver, a black 9mm
pistol, and a long black run.I
Iwas going to be unarmed and remain in the vehicle
as a getaway driver, I
Ifurther stated there was a Halloween mask in the vehicle
for him to wear during thç robbery. I
I descri1d Cal dyell as “crazy” and a
“shooter,” andl
Ielieved he could “out run bullets.’l
I stated that prior to the
robbery they were told the intended victim may have a dog
[tated Caidwell responded it
did not matter, because he (Caidwell) “will shoot anything that moved.”

•

•

I

I
Itated when he got to the door of the building, he knew
something was wrong and then heard someone yell what he thought was “FBI” or “Police,”
followed by a command to “get down, get down.” I
tated as soon as he heard
the commands, he sa’vl
un and realizing it was the police, threw the bolt cutters down
to the ground and dropped. I
I understood from his prison experience, when he
heard the command to “get down,” it was law enforcement. I
relieved he
received adequate time to comply with the commands before he heard any shooting. I
I
also saw law enforcement looking pcople in helmets, vests, and guns with lights on the rooftops.
I further stated when he saw the large law enforcement presence he knew his brother must
have “talked them up big, they had big guns.”
All four subjects had criminal histories. Cory Caldwell, date of birth 08/2211989,
had four arrests, to include aggravated battery, battery, resisting an officer, and trespassing.
iato of birth
Ihad three arrests, to include cocaine possession,
I
attempted murder, and failure to appear. I
I had eight
I date of birth I
arrests, to include resisting an officer (2), cocaine trafflçkin (2’L amblng, concealeçl weai,on,
aggravated fleeing and eluding, and disorderly conduct’
Idate ofbirthl
I
had thirteen arrests, to include drug trafficking (3), drug possession (8), burglary/aggravated
assault, and resisting an officer.
INSIECTOR’S OlSERVATION:

The Inspector did not identify any issues with this shooting incident. The Miami
Division developed an outstanding OP and executed the plan in a highly effective and efficient
manner.

12

6
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 (Rcv 05.01-2008)

UNCLRSSTh’XED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attn:

Inspection

From:

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Inspection
Office of

Tnq+4rnq

Contact:

Approved By:

I

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Michael J4J
Maley Patrick James

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297—HQ—A1271749—D

Title:

03/23/2009

lrr

SHOOTING INCIDENT
MILWAUKEE DIVISION
06/18/2008

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 06/18/2008, involving Special
Agent (SA)L
While executing a Federal search
lied an aggressive Rottweiler dog
warrant, SI
Ishot and
SIRG membqrs recoxpmended that no administrative action be taken
against S4
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative:
Relief Supervisorl

f,-nr 1

r!tonic Communication of Principal
dated 06/18/2008.

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 06/18/2008, members of the Milwaukee Division
edera). search
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT team executed
knocked on
warrant in Racine, Wisconsin. SAl
the door of the residence and announced the presence of
the search team. After a short time with no response from inside
the residence, forced entry was made utilizing a breaching tool.
After the initial entry, a pit bull dog was encountered and moved
to a cage by SWAT team members. As SWAT team members cieaxed the
t3N!ASSIFID

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 4s

UNcLA.SSXFXED

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Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271749—D, 03/23/2009

basement of the residence, they encountered a large Rottweiler
dog, A diversionary device was deployed, however, the dog did
not retreat and advanced on SWAT team members. 7h &w
eventually exited th basement and ran toward SN
I
location. SAl
Iyelled at the dog to stop and the dog
stopped approxima±ely ten feet away. A few seconds later, the
dog advanced toward SAl
I who had turned and retreated to
stairs leading to a porch at the front of the target residence.
As the dog beçran toclimb the stairs toward law enforceme4t
personnel, SAl
I fired five rounds from his Springfie)d
Armory 1911 Professional, .45 gauge pistol instantly kil1ig the
dog.
The Countrywide Humane Society responded to the scene
and removed the dog.
On 01/30/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a fløfl—VO]-1rrr rnmh,following voting members were in
attendance:
¶ Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJI
J Attorney, Criminal Division, tJSDOJ;
Chief Inspector Patrick James Maley, Office of Inspections (01),
INSU; Section Chief (SC) Jill Marie Eulitz, ‘-‘
Section, Counterintelligence ‘Division; A/Sd
Violent Crimes Section. Cimina1 Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (tC)I
IFirearms Training Unit, Training
Division TD: DCI
IDefensive Systems Unit. TD:
DC I
I Practical Applications Unit, TD; UC I
I
I. Special Weapons and Tac”
I
Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
I
Iek,e—Law- t.*&4
7
—SSA-1______
I
1. Evidence Reaopse Team Unit, Laboratory Division; an
SSA
j CR-2, Washington Field Office. tiC
I nspection Management Unit (INU), 01, INSO,
I
anci Management Program Aialyst
p IMU, DI, INSD,
non—voting members, were also in attendamoe.

I

—

Observations and. Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewd the above synopsized incident with
tl-e intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
UNCL2%SSIu

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Re:

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Inspection
297—HQ—A1271749—D, 03/23/2009

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recoxmnendatjons for administrative action if deemed neceseary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
FBI’s deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
reconmendatjon that no administrative action be taken against SA
I as a result of his involveiaent in this shooting incident.

UNCI.SSXFXED

3

 .1’

UNCLASSXFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection prom:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271749—D, 03/23/2009

IiED(s):

Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION

1T NASHINTON, DC
That no adViinistrative action be taken against
SAj
las a result of his involvenient in this
shooting incident.

1b6

b7c

1
Mr. Pistole, Roam 7142
1
1-Mr.i
IUSDOJ
1—Mr.l
I u.,JJ
1
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
(Attention Ms. Eulitz)
1
Mr. I
I Room 3280
1
Mr.I
Quantico
1
Mr.l
IQizantico
1
Mrj
CIRG
1
Mr.
uantico
1
Ms.
oom 7326
1
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr.
1
Mrs.
Room 3043
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—

—

tNcLSSIFt1D

4

 ________on

p
4!

a

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

UNCLSSIFIEID

FEDERALS BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: I

Approved. y:
Drafted Ey:

08/27/2008

AD KevinL. Perkins

lExtension 4—1837

kins Kevin L
j
I C1.emens MichaeJ
4

I

I:lrr

Case ID #: 297—HQ-A1271970--D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
05/08/2008

JJIC,

Synopsis:

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 05/08/2008, involving Special
Agents (SAc) I
I During the
bndl
of a search warrant, SAl
jred two shots and SA
I
I fired one shot at an aggressive pitbull dog. SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against SAc
.1__land I
jas a result of their involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative: Reference Elecjrnri1n
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
05/12/2008.

rmmi,nir-’M-rrn

I

(BC) of
dated

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the
and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

analysis, comments,

Details of the Shooting. Incident
On 05/08/2008, at 6:39 a.m., Agents and task force
officers (TFOs) executed a search warrant at a residence in
Brandywine, Maryland, targeting a cocaine distribution enterprise
operating in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.

tJNCLASSI-FI-ED

 t
tThTLASSIF!ED

To:
Re:

Inspection From: inspection
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 08/27/2008

At 6:00 a.m., on 05/08/2008, SAl
I a
designated Team Leader, conducted a taqtic1 hrifing with
participants. During the briefing, SAl
Ireviewed the
operations order, specifically discussed entry team assignments,
and ensured members of the search team received and understood
their assignments.
At approximately 6:20 a.m.., the operational team
departed the staging area and traveled to stage near the target
residence. Team members approached the residence on foot and
established a tactical formation in front of the house as well as
perimeter security around the house. At 6:39 a.m., SA
I
gave the command to execute the warrant. Be knocked on the door
and announced, “FBI. . . Search Warrant.” Within minutes a female
resident answered the door. The team entered an htn n1p.ri
the residence. While in the kitchen area, SAl_______________
saw a shed that needed to be secured before a detailed search of
the reidence could be safely conducted. SAs I
I
I
I anc
Iproceeded to the rear of the
residence to clear the shed. After clearing the shed, the Agents
discussed the fact that source information indicated a makeshift
firing range may be located on the property or at a nearby
residence belonging to I
which was searched the
previous day with no firing range located. SAl_____ was also
aware of intelligence indicating the targets 0± tne search
warrant investigation were firing their weapons in the rear of a
residence.
I
iid to tie resi4ence to assist with the
SAl
I andi
search while SAs I
Iremained toward the rear
of the hoise where they discovered a gravel road leading into a
wooded area. They began a perimeter sweep of the gravel road or
additional potentially hazardous buildings, and as they walked
into the wooded lot, it became apparent there was enough room in
the back for a small firearms—type range. As the Agents
continued down the road, they heard rustling and the clanking
sound of chains. As they rounded the corner, the Agents observed
a white pitbuil on top of another dog playing in a pit. The
Agents stopped and ithopt warning, the pitbuil looked up and ran
straight toward SAs I
I and I
I The Agents drew their
weappns an as the 4og ot approximately ten to twelve yards from
SAs I
I SI
landi
I fired one shot from his Springfield
Mode]. 1911, .45 caliber pistol. The dog changed course but
continued toward the rrcni- from a different direction. Fearing
for their safety, SAl
I fired one round from his Glock Model
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tThTCLAsStFXD

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Re:

Inspection From:
Inspeption
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 08/27/2008

21, .45 calibe pistol and SAl
Ifired a second shot at the
dog.
The pitbull stopped and retreated back. to the tree line.
It was later determined one of the expended rounds
wounded the dogs front paw. The Prince Georg&s County Humane
Society responded to the scene and removed the injured dog, as
wel]. as three additional pitbuils.
On 08/19/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (XNSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Adriana Vieco, Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ; Laura Gwinn, Trial Attorney, Gang Squad, USDOJ;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr.., CD-.4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC Thomas A. Nunemaker,
Violent Crimes ticn. cr1m1nft1 Investigative Division (CID);
Unit Chief (UC
IT9rr9ms Training Unit, Training
Division (TD); U
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD;
Acting UC I
I Practical Applications Unit, TD;
Acting UCI
p Special Weapons and Tactics
Qperati9n& unit, ritica.i. .Lnciaent Response Group; SSAI_________
I
I Tnq
i4r Tw Unit, Office of General Counsei; an
I çR-2. Washinton Field Office.
SSAI
Management ‘rogram Analysti
I Inspection
Management Unit, 01, INSD, a non-voting member, was also in
attendance.
Observations and Pecommendations o the SXRG

The SXRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
G members unarimoulv aareed that the use of deadly
1
SIP
I was justified and
force by SAS I
J audi
in conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy. This
discussion resulted in the recommendation that no administrative
action be taken against the Agents as a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident,
tThTcLASSIWIED

3

 Il

•

uNcxAssxxED

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—t{Q—A1271970—D, 08/27/2008

Set Iead 1:

(Act.ion)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC
Tht no administrative action be taken against
I andi
SAs I
I as a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.
-

7C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
1
1 Nunmkqr, Room 3280
Mr..
1
Mr3
Quantico
Mr4
1
Quantico
1
Mr-[
O1.’antico
1
Mr.]
I CIRG
1
I oom 7326
Mr I
1-M4
WFO
1
Room 3043
Ml
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tNCLAS8tFIED

4

 PD-204 (Rev. 124-95)

UNITE]) STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to

Repoit o

ud

casemth

297HQ-A127l659-1)

04/10/2009

I

C)fflce

Inspections

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
KANSAS CITY DIVISION
12/17/2008
Chamc*cr

SHOCXI1NG INCIDENT REVIEW

Synopsia:

The Kansas City Division Violent Crimes/Fugitive Task Force initiated a
fugitive investigation to locate and apprehend Terry (I Gordon, Jr., wanted by
Wyandotte County, Kansas police for rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a
child. A. vehicle associated with the subject was located and, on 12/17/2008, agents
and task force officers assembled at the rosidnce ‘Miere the vehicle was parked. The
six law enforcement agents and officers knocked on doors and wimlowa ofthe
residence while calling out to the subject Alter approxImately 30 minutes, task force
personnel forced entry to the residence and encountered an adult female who denied
the subjecVs presence; however the female’s child indicated the subject was biding
upstairs.
Several task force personnel ascended the narrow stairs to a second floor
landing and observed Gordon sitting on the floor of an adjacent bedroom with a
revolver pointed to his head. Task force personnel engaged Gordon in dialogue in an
attempt to disarm him. After noticing his grip on the weapon and demeanor change,
one FBI agent fired two rounds at Gordon almost simultaneously with Gordon
shooting himself in the right temple. A Missouri State Highway Patrol trooper also
fired a single round at Gordon. The subject’s sc1±inflicted wound was fatal. He was
struck m the throat and lower neck by law enforcement gunfire.
DETArLS

On 12/16/2008, the Kansas City Division Violent Crimes/Fugitive Tasic Forte
(VC/FTF) supervisor opened a fhgitivo investigation to locate and apprehend Terry G.
Gordon, Jr., white male, date ofbirth 07/051r977, Who WaS wäntdd1i W’andotte
TIL 11yrties
County, Kansas authorities for felony rape and felony
with a child. The same day, Task Force Officer CFO)I
I a Kansas
this document contju neither recce4gtjene ier conclusions of the rut. It is the property of the PSI
and is loaned to your sgeucy# it and its contents are not to be diatrbutod outside your agency.

6

 _______
_____

297-RQ-A1271659-D

City, Kansas Police Department (KC1CPD) detective who had referred the local warrant to the
VCI1TF and was assigned to the investigation, identified a potential location for the subject in
that city. Personnel assigned to the VCL[TP worked throughout the day in support of another
FBI task force and late that evening agreed to meet nearby the location the next morning in
anticipation of a potential arrest.
On 12117/2008 at approximately frOG asri. other VC/FTF personnel were
heading toward the pro-arrest meeting site, TPOI
Jontactecl the FBI radio operator to
corrfirm the active warrant for Gordon. He again travetecito the suspect location, a two story
wood framed single family residence located at 480 Shawnee Road, Kansas City, Kansas and
observed what he believed was the subjects vehicle parked in the driveway. TFCI
I
on the residence and kept the VC/F Coordinator, FBI Special Agent
I updated on his observations.

I

Before 6:30 am., 54
lrove to thq target location and replaced TPO
liii maintaining surveillance so TF
ould briefother VC/F ersonne at
the meeting site. By tht thue Kansas City, Missouri Police Densrtmeit Detectivesi_____
mdi
I
Ihad arrived at the staging
,J both VC/FTF TFOs, and FBI SAl
location. An additional TFO, Missouri State Highway Patrol Troopel
Iwas
enroute but his arrival was delayed by weather-related road conditions.

I

TFO I
I and
Iand
Londucted a pro-arrest briefing with tFOs I
SAl
1 He circulated booking photographs of Ter±y Gordon from prior arrests, displayed a
b6
copy of an NCIC wanted person printout, described the target residence, indicated the possible
b7C
presence of a female and child in the residence, and indicated vehicles in the driveway were
registered to the female and Gordon. Collectively, the assembled personnel checked their
equipment.
-

Out of concern that neighbors n thA ara might alert Gordon to the law
enforcement presence, at about 7:20 a.m., SAl
Iadioed instructiops to the a,senibled
VCIFTP personnel to move to the residence to effect Gordons arrest. SIJ
klrove from
his surveillance location to the residence and activated his vehicle’s emergency lights, then taking
up a position to the rear 9
f the ngle family, wood frame structure. As the other VC/FTP
personnel arrived, TFOsI
I
Iintia1lv wnt to the rear of thehouse and replaced SAl
who nrnceedcI t° the frpnt TI
look up a position on. the front right of the house, while
TFCI
Lind SAl
Iegan knocking on the
Iwent to the front porch. TFOI
front door and announcing, “police.” Shortly after the team’s arrival at the residence, they were
joined by TFCI
I.
After knocking on the front door and announcing the police presence multiple
times, TFO I
nd others began loudly knocking on all doors and windows of the
residence, announcina. ‘nolice” and calling for Gordon by name. With no response from inside
the residence, TF0I
lobserved a female neighbor entering her vehicle two houses to the
west of the target residence. He approachedThe neiahbçr who confirmed the likelihood of
Gordon’s presence at the residence, which TFOI
Irelated to others on thc arrest team.
SAl

Iheard movement within the houSe and S4
2

iheard noises

 _____ed

1

297—HQ—A1271659—D

corning from the front right. The Agents adyA t1 nlhers of their perceptions. Based upon
information in his possession at the time, SI
bsessed that the trget location was likely
to bel
residence and decided to make forced entry. SAl
1
Leturned to his vehicle,
retdevei battering ram and proceeded to the back door. Prior to utilizing th ram. TFO
I
Lhecked the back door and was able to open it without force. TFOI
oiled
into the house before the law cnforcerpent enthr. jnsfructing that it was the police anci or rdon
to come out. With no response, TPOI
niiounoed that the police were coining in.
Within mopients of the entire arrest team making entry, an adult female, later
identified asi
Iwas observed near abed in the rear of the house, atte tin to conceal
herself between a bed and nearby television set. As TFO
instruct
o stand up
-‘“
which were coiceahd, he observed am e
or iden
as her son,
Iwith her. Whenl
I
‘was fully visible, TF
noticed she was
holding her hand over the child’s mouth. I
Isaid she did’t answer e door as she didn’t know
who they (the police we. She then asked TFOI
I for a display of credentials or
badges. TFOI
Jpointed to his outer garment chest, revealing his KCKPD badge
emblem and opened his jacket revealing further police markings onhis vest. He then proceeded
to display his badge.
When questioned about GordonYs presence in the residenci
I?rovided vague
and deceptive respon T Tnni further questioning and with a search of the tirst floor yielding
no subict, the chuldi
I indicated Gordon was upstairs or “hiding upstairs.” TFO
iii
oq
Iwhether Gordon had a gun, and she indicated he didnot. When
I
asicea a
aid Gordon sold his aun to make bond or pay for a lawyer. 1’rj
conducting a search of 2nd floor, SAl
hsked ThO’
Ito handcuftL..Jto
ehrninate her as a potential threat to the law enforcement personnel..
Prior to moving up the stairs, at least one of the TFOs heard movement from the
second floor of the residence. ‘he arreSt team continuçd to call up the stairs in attempting to
secure Gordon’s surrender. SAl
ed the search of the second floor. He initially surveyed
the upstairs from the lower level, noting closed doors directly in front of the top of the stairs and
to the left of the stairs, with an open door to the right. He announced his observatiçns to the
other ofcers. Still receiving no response from their calls to cordon, SA
Iunbed the
stairs followed byTFOsI
I
IndI
land S4
-

At the top of the stairs, SAIl
Immediately observed Terry Gordon sitting
cross-ieggeI mi the floor, about 10 feet into the bedroom, holding a revolver pointed at his right
temple. SA4J
) moved to the right doorjamb while instructing Gordon to drop his weapon.
SAj
Iwas carrying his issued .45 caliber Springfield p1st
bar CR6 2711,
equipped with an issued TLR.-2 laser sight and tactical light. S
ctivated the laser and
initially aimed the laser indicator on Gordon’s chest but moved it to his chin slier thinking a chest
shot might not fully incapacitateGrn. He also focused on Gordon’s revolver 1
qj
that it was not a toy gun. S
who
as joined at th ton 4the stairs by Trooverl
positioned himself behind the e oorjamb, and TFOI
[lwer
Iwho was to SAl
left.

Gordon was again instructed by SAl
3

Ito drop his gun and responded, “I am

 _______Ironi

297—HQ—A1271659-D

not going to prison for 25 years.” Within seconds of this exchange, SII
Inoticed Gordon
gnmace and move his finger, which had been resting on the trigger guard, to the trigger. He
dronued Jis elbow, which had been upraised, and tightened his grip on the gun, 1eding SA
Ro beijeve Gqdon might be turning the gun toward the law enforcement personneL
I
I noticed the motion of Gordon’s right ann and believed Gordon was about
Similarly, TFC
to shoot. TFOI
I assessed Gordon’s manner as one of defiance, rather than resignation and
4 Gordon was about to turn his weapon on the law enforcement personneL SA
1
arthcrnate
lired two rounds and heard Gordon’s weapon fire as well. A fourth shot, by Trooper
his .40 caliber Glock 22, serial number ICTW4OI, was fired at approximately the
same time.
-

TFOI
-_Lecalled Gordon’s weapon firing first and he saw a spray ofblood
exiting the left side of Gordon’s head. He recalled the law enforcement volley was firedjust after
Gordon’s round.
Gordon slumped backward with his hand still on the pistol which was now lying
on his chest. The law enforcemept personnel observed blood from both a head wound and one
on Gordon’s neck. SAl
bistnicted the others to hold their positions while he continued
to call for Gordon to drop the wea on. With no response, he then closed the distance to disann
and handcuff the ubiect
1 S
took Gordon’s revolver arid laid it on flnnr away from
Gordon and TFOI
to eliminate any further threat SAl
lh cu e
Ithen
moved Gordon to a supine position to facilitate his labored breathing.

TFOI
I immediately radioed the Kansas City Police dispatch, at 7:53
am., and requested a response to the location by additional personnel KCKPD dispatch records
indicated a “shots fired” entry at 7:53 a.m. followed by an “ocer involved shooting” entry one
minute later. Fire unit EMS 10 was dispatched to the scene at 7:54 a.m., arriving about six
minutes later. EMS 10 was enroute with Gordon to the University of Kansas Medical Center
(tJKMC) at 8:21 a.m. and arrived there at 8:26 a.m. A Fire Department Prehospital Care Report
indicated Gordon was supine and unresponsive when EMS arrived. He had a pulse with his
breathing described as “agonaL”
Terry Gordon was pronounced dead shortly after arrival at the TJICMC.
An. autopsy of Terry Gordon was conducted in Topeka, Kansas by
I
M.D. on 12117/2008. Gordon’s death was preliminarily determined to be a suicide. The cause of
death was multiple gunshot wounds (GSWs). Gordon had a contact GSW, entering just forward
and above his right ear and exiting above and slightly behind his left ear. A second round struck
Gordon in the throat, traveled downward and rearward, passing across multiple vertebrae and
through the upper and lower lobes ofhis lung before coming to rest after the jacket and core
separated. A third GSW struck Gordon in the left base ofhis neck passing through flesh from
front to back. This round exited the residence and was not recovered.
The final autopsy report, dated February 13, 2009, found Gordon had: 1) a contact
perforating gunshot of the right temple, 2) a penetrating gunshot of the nçck an chest, 3) a
perforating gunshot of the left base of the neck, 4) a presumptively positive urine drug screen,
and 5) a left frontal subarachnoid cyst (rgatded as astructu?al anomaly of the left frontal lobe of
the brain). Autopsy results yielded a toxicological examination that was negative fur alcohol and
screeneddrugs.
4

 ‘V

*

297—RQ—a1271659-D

Recovered at the scene was a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson model 36 five-shot
revolver, serial number 1307171. Forensic analysis by the Johnson County, Kansas
Criminallatics Laboratory determined the spent round recovered from a roof stud behind the
north wall of the second floor bedroom was fired by the .38 caliber revolver. Forensic analysis of
the expended round recovered from Gordon’s body determined the bulletjacket was fired by SA
1.45 Springfield Amiory pistoL The lead bullet core was determined to be unsuitable
I
tor comparison as it lacked identifiable characteristics.
INSPECTOR OBSERVATIONS:
Issue 1: There was little indicia of flight by subject Terry Gordon, and little
mdicia significant investigative skill cir resources had to be expended in his apprehension,
leading to the concern that the Kansas City VC/FTF was setting a low threshold for fugitive
preliniinary inquiry status.

The fugitive investigation involving Terry Gordon was limited and brieL Gordon
had multiple prior contacts with local law enforcement in the Kansas City area, many ofwhich
involved or were linked to the address where this incident occurred, mkteg it evident that this
was Gordon’s primary residence. In effecl, Gordon was a fugitive in name only as he was
essentially hiding in plain sight In light of the relatively obvious nature ofGordon’s location, the
indicators of flight appeared to consist of standardized fugitive vernacular rather than true
descriptors particular to this subject Amongthe indicators were that thejurisdiction where
Gordon was wanted was close to the border of another state. This statement was accurate but
would also be true ofevery Kansas City, Kansas or Kansas City, Missouri wanted person. The
relative ease by which the VC)FTF located Gordon raised questions about the potential waste of
highly trained task force resources on cases whçe there were few indicators ofsuspected or
actual flight The Criminal Investigative Division has, in the past made clear its intention not to
have Violent Crimes or Fugitive Task Forces become “warrant squads.” Kansas City should
ensure that does not become the case.
Additionally and tied to the foregoiu with the very Ihuited effort recuired to
locate Terry Gordon, it was evident that little thought was gwen to obtaining fbr review his many
prior law enforcement contacts. Had the VCIFTF engaged in such a review, it would have been
apparent that he had prior law enforcement contacts involving the possession or use ofa firearm
Aimed with tins knowledge, the VCIFTP investigators might have engaged in a different course
ofaction to secure his arrest A a ininmium, armed with knowledge ofGordon’s past possession
or use offirearms, TFOI
I would likely have donned his ballistic vest prior to engaging his
colleagues at the Gordoir resroence.
Recommendation 1: That the Kansas CityDivision ensure its VC/FTF is
following documented protocols for adopting fugitive investigations to ensure theirs does not
become a warrant squad.
Recommendation la: That the Kansas City VCfFI ensure thorough fugitive
investigatIon is conducted to ensure a robust knowledge an4 understanding ofthe subjects
capabilities and propensity for a violent encounter.
Issue 2: Adherence to VC(FTF standard peratingprocedures
$

 P0.204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigatkrn

Copy to:

Rcpott of
Dae

SAC David A. Tho
12/19,2008

case in #:

297-HQ-Ai271462-D

Title:

SHOOTiNG INQUIRY
RBPORT OP SHOOTING INCIDBNT
COLUMBIA. DIVISION
11/28/2008

Officc

Columbia

ADMfl1ISThATWB INQUIRY

I

Synopsis:

-

Iwtis shot bvSAI
28,2008 after being caught peeping into SAl
confronted, making a physical contact with SAl
injurywasnotlifethreatening.

InNovember
lesidence window and, when
gun shot

DET41L:
twas athome
I
I Alter hearing her dog, which is locked up in a pen ju outside ot her house,
I
I
barking continuously, she went outside and lel 1he do out of the pen. SA i
Iheard her dog barking and
then returned inside. Few ploments Jater, Si
Iwent back outside with a flash light
growling again, so she audi

witN

On Novemb 25 2)08. at annmximntelv9:15 PM. SAl

Her dog thçeafter led them toes on the side ofher house near a
bud Ms,Jaeard rustling noise in the bushes which
window. Both SAl
appeared to in.4icate a 1age moving object. They immediately went back inside the
house and SAJ
returned outside to the area with her Bureau issued 810 Saner
1 Ms.I
228 9mn handmin
lalso returned with her cellular phone
gave
light SM
I found a man in a dark clothing in the bushes. S
seeralverbalcmmandstocomeoutwithhishandsvisibl
OUtF,G
ouldnotsee 7c
I Atthispoiut,S
continuingtowalktowardSM
enreachedto
themau’shandsandhewasjustafewfeetfromhcr. S
grab the rnau’ hand but ie pulled away, struggling with er. e en lifte4 his hand
up. toward SAl
I Fearing for her life-and danger to her family, SAl
I
fired on round, striking the man in his right buttocks. While this was going on, Ms.
lalled 911 from her cellular phone. She was also able to observe the incident
I
Paz. t is the property of the Paz
contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

hio docunsut contains neither reco’ ,‘tjcns nor conclusions of the
and is loaned to yonr agencyl it end it

 L

297-HQ-a271462 -D

and hear the struggle.
lcontinued t
9
After being shot the man tried to walk away as SJ
coqiniand theman to get down on the ground. He kept walking around. Asslsted by MI
lied
grabbed the man and Irced him down on the ground. While MsJ
h retrieved her handcuffs and placed it on his
control of the man on thç rnami SAl

I

wrists. Atthispoint,S[
Irealizedthemanwasherneighborwh9livedafewhouses
down. The man was later identified asj
ta11,
POll
165 l1,s, residing aiL
I iountarn Ifl, C 29t4’.
Greenville County Sheriffs Office responded to the scene and investigated the
incident, CDC Toni OeiI1 ofthe Colmihia fliviio also arrived at the scene. A voluntary
written statements were provided by SA
land Msl
1 a neighbor
who resides across the street, also provided a written statement regarding his encounter with a
possible trespassing by the same individual that sante evening.
Mrj
I was arrested and taken to the local hospital where he was treated
for his gun shot injury. He was ubsequent1y charged with Peeping Tom, and Assault and
Battery ofa High and Aggravated Nature.
Subsequent investigationjw the (3reqwille Sheriffs Office revealed Mr.
ladniitted to looking into SAJ
jesidence window that evening and having
seen SAl
Iriding her horses an in her car in the past e silsn muted owing 4A
L.as “the lady cop.” In addition, struggle between S[
I
land Mn
I
can be heard on the 911 audio recording.
On December 11, 2008, State of South Camllna Sqioitor, Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit, recommended no criniln1 charges against SAl_______

2

ti
b 7C

 PD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNITED WCATES DEPAnTMPT OP J1STICE

Federal bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

RCPOtOf
Date:

izpl

I

03/il/2009

cn#

297’-HQ-A1270968-D
12/03/2008

Tftle:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
c!ThRILOTTE DIVISION
12/03/2008

c1iajact

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

synopsis:

om Charlotte

b6

This shooting incident was the result of an attempted

arrest of Bank Robbery suapec

I

DETAIlS

Ihereafter
InNovember nft
I
,
had been investigating
referred to as SAl
I a black
I
I hereafter_referred to as I
approxinately 5’B” in
male, date of birth I
0 weighinq about 205-210 lbs, having a. heavy
height
I was a convicted felon and was
muscular build. I
suspected in numerous armed bank robberies, in rWtinn t
ver1 local armed robberies. According to Sal________
I
I appeared much larger and more muscular in person
than be had appeared in the latest North Carolina
Department of Corrections photographs.
On November 7, 2008, a bank robbery occurred at the
Wachovia Bank, 1501 South Cannon Boulevard, Kanriapolis,
North Carolina. During the robbery, the suspect displayed
a silver handgun and forced afl the oöcupants of the bank
to the floor. The suspect was given a package of money,
victim t1ler. Based on the
including a dye pac
investigation by BA
d the Kainaoolis Police
I as a
developed I
Department (KPD), BA
ery. Bãsèd cn the evidence
suspect in this
a State arrest warrant was
developed by
for the November 7, 2008 robbery.
obtained for
-

SAl

lalso learned soon after the warrant was

This doou contains neither rec”e”
tions nor conclusions of the SnX: It is the propexty of the
4
and in loaned to your agencyJ it and its contents are not to ha distributed outside your agency.

 _______Ihad

297-HQ-A1270968-D

I

I had bailed
issued ihati
j a girlfriend of I
lout of jail on a prior robbery warraftt that had already
ben execute by the Stallings, North Carolia, Police
I had been arrested for an armed robbery of a
Department. I
payroll check cashing business where the victim was duct taped.
On November 21, 2008, the Charlot*téMeck1enburg Police
nt Criminal
Department (cMPn), utilizing the
atI
1
Apprehension Team_(VCAT), arreated
McAlpine Ridge
I which is lo
Drive, Apartmentl
was apprehended,
Apartment complex in Charlotte. After
I lived .at f- ‘nvtment
it was_determined that I
land
I Investigators also learned that I
withi
Iprdvieci consent fo
a daughter together. I
I determined that’
search and KPD officers and g. I
had been 1ivin at the apartment. The searching officers found a
bag that contained dye stained currency (believed to be proceeds
of the bank robbery), a 9mm Taurus handgun, and a .45 caliber
Smith and Wesson handgun with red dye located on the weapon
(believed to be the weapon used in the bank tobbery).
Investigators also located numerous rounds of extra amnuanitLon
for the handguns.
arrest, hes’as transported directly
‘ollowing
to
ao na, where he provided a statement to
admitted that he had cqrnmitted the November
BA
robbery and phat he had brought a loaded
7, 2008, Wac cv a B
I tated that he always
.45 caliber handgun into the bank. I
carries his weapon loaded so that people wiU. take him seriously.
lafter the
Iwas also questioned by SAl
I
November 21, 2008f arreet. During her questoning, she admitted
I in staging. a Ford soort
that she assistedI
I had
2008, bank rçbbery. I
anticipation of the No
t
During
rob tIebank.
plpnd
general knowledge that
I i-liM-I
1”always b6
told SAL
this questio
a so indicated that 1
has a gun.”
I slept with a gmb7C
on the night stand and carried the weapon ou1aiè the apartment
even though he was a convicted felon.

Following thç inteiview on November 21, 2008, BA
lof the Concord Police
Department conducted a logical analysis of available information
ihad committed ôthe robberies. BA
to detiine if ,
‘had a tattoo on his
1
I
I realized that
9andL
neck. That tattoo wag consistent with another series of armed
bank_robberies in the Charlotte,_North Carolina, area. In total,
‘committed
Ibelieved that I
SAl
land Detectivel
seven armed bank robberies.
I

I and Detective I

-

SAl

I went back to the jail where I
2

I was

 297-HQ-A1270968-D

being held. in n atteit to gu.estiorJ
Iregarding the other
bank robberies I
I invoked_his right to couissl atfiome
point during the interview.__SAl
advi,sed I
I that the
FBI intended to indicti
tor tne other bank robberies in
I
the near future
On December 2, 2008, SAI
Itravelec3. to the United
States Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the MiddJe District of North
Carolina to meet with Assistant United Stato Attorney_(AUSA)
I
The AUSA agreed to federally &ndict I
lat the
next meeting of the Grand Ji..r’.r in December for the bank
robberies. At the time, SA I
did not :expect’
I would
be able to make the $110,000 bond on the state charges.
On December 3, 2008. ]4etectveI
Icontacted SA
I that I
Ihad made bond and
had been released from jail in Cai?arrua County. SAl
I
immeditelv co
itactéd AUSAI
1
land requested authority to
arrest I
c probable cause for the federal .ban]c
robber![e MtqI
I concurred and authorized SI
I t
arrest I
I for federal bank robbery charges. AUSA I
confirmed this via email at 12:53 PM

I

I and advised SA I

On December 3, 2008, at about the same time AUSAI
had autho;ized a probable cause arrest, SAl
I learned that
Detective I
I had obtained a new State arrest warrant,
authorizing the arrest of I
Ion bank robbery charges in
violation of North Carolina law.
At approximately 1:30 PM, on December
2008.
_Jvia cell phone I
lat
Wackenhut Security,I
Ieuiplqver. to inauzi
re as to wnat
1
time she would get off from work. I
I advised SA
I
I that I
I got off work at 3:00 PM. This contact is
also corroborated via email.
I

.

I contactedL

At he same time. SAl
[contacted Supervisory
Special Agentl
itoadvise his supervisor of the
situation and determine whether it would be easible to sirrveil
un an attempt to locate I
I
I

At approximately 1:30-1:45 PM, SA
Itraveled to
the MciA14ne Rida Apartments. SAl
Izpected to meet
Detectivel
I at the apartment complex. ,SA
I drove to
an area in close_proximity to I
,
th
building where I
I andF
Jhad resided... SAI
scanned the parking lot for the vehicle that.J” krcwI
o
ëhir which was a gold Chewrolet Tahoe.
SAJ
I did not see
I vehicle in the parking lot in fron4 of the apartment
V

3

I

 297-HQ-A1270968-D

building.
821
I then backed his Bureau. vehicle into a
parking space near the fvif ,i*nce of the apartment building
and waited for Detectivd
I
mtching the front of the bt4lding, SN
1
witnessedl
xiting the breeze way of the buildjncz whr 1e
I
had lived and been arrested qn Noveijzer 21, 2008. SAl
I by phone to advise Detective
immediately called Detective I
I
I thati
I,as at the partment complex. SAl
I
also needed to deteamineI
I proximityto the apartment
I was near the intersection of
complex. Detective I
interstate 485 and Independence Blvd., which was approximately 15
minutes from the_McAliine Apartment cotrplx Af.er communicating
Jiost sight of
with Detective
Ivia cell phone, I
I
Ihad been making his way on toot: owards aother
Iwas
set of aparint 1ccated direçt-1r hPhind where SAl
I was overdressed for the
parked.
BA L
I felt thati
weather conditjon at the time, having on a heavy black p-coat
and. a black knit hat, along with blue jeans and boots. BA
4 and was possibly in
Was arnie
I
I was concerned that I
I
the process of çoatanitt,ng another armed robbery. BA 1
also felt that I
Ithen
Isaw him at that time. SAl
drove his Bureau vehicle towards the only_entrance/exit to the
If rom exiting.
apartment complex in an attempt to stop I
Til, 11

While drivina joward the front of the complex, BA.
I drivina te Chevrolet Tahoe that BA
located I
At first, BA I
I knew belonged to I
I thought
that the SEW might not be I
because he saw a handicap
placard hangria from the rear v3.ew mirror. As the vehicle got
closer to SAl
Iwas traveling in
Is Bureau vehicle I
ciivitox consistent with exiting the apartment complex), BA
I tJ’ie driver of te vehic!l and
I
I recognized I
I drove his
startédriving •towardsl
vehicle. SAl
position,
head-on
Bureau vehicle towardi
in
a
vehicle,
)
in an attempt to stopi
Ifrom fleeing.

I

I

I
Iinitially stopped his vehlOle. BA’
I to stop and to
exited his vehicle and. qave conimands for I
turn his ignition off. I
Ewas aware of:SAI______________
idrititv from a previous lengthy interview. •In additiofl, A
I
I
Ihad his FBI badge/shield affixed tohis belt. [
froze, then reached down with h right handaa though he was
n arid
reaching for a weapon. BA I
I then drew
stepped out from behind his car door, order
0 t
off the ignition of his vehicle two separatetmes.
I
I vehicle an4’his vehicle at this
was
between I
Ireached his right band up añd1ãóéd the car in
time. I
4

]b6
lb7C

 297-HQ-A17Q968-D

short distance and
gear. I
I initially went backwards for
then revved his engine and drove his vehicle straight towards SA
I SAl
I
Iheard the tires squeal as he fled on foot
I
towards his left, successfully evading being .hit byl
Ipositoned_himself behind the tail end of a
vehicle. SA[
I vthicl traveling back into
parked vehicle and observed I
the apartment complex at a high rate of speed.
IreAfterl
I fled in.his vehicle, :SAI
only
the
to
directly
drove
entered his Bureau vehicle and
entrance/exit for the apartment complex. The route that BA
took to the only entrance/exit was the most direct route
I
I was fairly certain that he would arrive ix. time
and SAl
I called
to block the exit. At approximately 2:20 PM, SAl
911 and provided the operator with imformatión regarding the
Idescription and current location.
situation_ad also I
1 became aware that there was a possibility that
BA I
drove through the exit of the
I
I fled on foot. SAl
complex and traveled on ICrefeld Drive towards the intersection of
ICrefeld and B. Independence Boulevard.
I reached PJ {ntTsection of Krefeld and
As SAl
I on foot at the base of
B. Independence Boulevard, he saw I
the embankment, about ten feet from the shoulder of B.
felt hewas going to cross
Independence Boulevard. SAl
B. Independence Boulevard, so he positioned himself where he
I in
could drive across B. Independence Boulevard to keepP I
saw BA
sight until backup arrived. At that time, I
i then drove westbound on B.
I and stopped. SAl
I
Independence Boulevard (opposite the norma.l flow of traffic) on
the shoulder and turn lan to Krefe].& Drive, the ent4re time
I he
I As he was driving toward I
keeping an eve on I
in
the
something
for
I
hands
both
witl.
I
could see
digging
bias tãnding so that his
outside pockets of his coat. I
bbserved
right side ws neintiig toward SAl
I SM
something ml
b right band. that wa liaitly lighter in
Ibelieved that the
color than the coat. At that time, SAl
oblect i his right hand was quite ossiblv a firearm. As BA
I turned and
Icontinued to drive towardi
I
began climbin back up the embankment toward. ttlae apartment
I at
side was pointed toward SAl
complex.
land
d his vehicle short of I
this time. BA
as in approximately the ten o’clock
was positioned:where
ithen drew
position from his location and_direction. SAl
I
I At this time SA I
his weapon and pointed it ati
wa e4.the sitting in the front drivers’ seat of his bureau
vehicle, pointing the weapon through the open window, or he had
opened the car door and partially exited the vehicle, but BA

5

h!c

h 7C

 _________Iconducted

297-FIQ-Al270968-D

I

I cannot remember his exact positiçn. SAl
houted
I
m
his
and
quickly
turned
topped
atop,”
at
which
I
upper torso toward SAl________ in an aggressfve manner. At that
a had received on
time, based on all the information BA a
I
I carrying a loaded firearm, his proclivity for violence,
his criminal history, and having seen something previously in his
right harid which he now believed to have befi a firçarm jased on
1 SAl
Ifelti
I
his aggressive, non-compliant hhv4r
was turning to shoot him. SAL
Ithen fired his
issued G].ock .40 caliber handgun at
twice. SAl
I
then looked over his weapon and saw
running over the
crest of the hill.
Icontinued his call with tie 911 oqerator
SAl
I BA
arid advied her that he had just fired shots at’
then drove to the entrance of the apartment complex, but
was unabe to gain entry due to same being a gated community. BA
a vehicle search of a black Chrysler 300
I had not
exiting the apartment complex to make sure that I
secreted himself in the vehicle in an effort to escape. The
search produced negative results. In subseqtent interviews, the
driver and passenger of this vehicle advised an individual
fitting the description of I
Itold them the Feds were after
him and asked them for a ride.
While still in close proximity to the entrance of the
apartment complex, a black female, accomnanéd by a uniformed
1. This black female
MPD police officer, approached SAl
informed BA
i she had found an undetermined amount of dye
stained paper currency in a plastic bag on the ground in front of
I
the apartment buil&ing where’
‘had beeik seen. SAl
took custody of the currency from the witnesé, placed the
currency in his vehicle and permitted the witness to be
interviewed by CM?]) police officers.

I

Responding CM?]) units established a perimeter around
the MoAlpine Ridge Apartments. MPD Detecties established
visual contact on I
I apartment. A CMD canine unit
searched the area I
Jwas last seen with ;negative results.
neihhrhçod canvas was also couducted of apartments along
Iprobable path following the shooting. This canvas
yielded negative results.

A

I
Agents made contact with I
I to determine1
residency at her aparttnt. alpng with obtaining a consent to
Iiqas escorted to the McAJ.pine Ridge
search her apartment. I
Apartments where she eventually save convent to search Ir
apartment and she confirmed thati
I had stayed at her
6

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 ___________Idesoription

________
________

_________

297-HQ-A1209G8 -D

apartment the previous evening and was at her apartment when she
left for work that morning.
Based oni
I consent, the CMPD SWAT Team made
entry and cleared Maiac1il s apartment with ngative results for
I
I The Charlotte Division Evidence Reen1 1
rm CERT)
øonducted a search in the general ra whrI
bas last
seen, along with the area where SAl
Idisoharged his
waon. Twq .40 caliber shell casing were recovered in the area
Iwas positioned when he fired his weapon. ERT
reçcvared ai. oil filter wrench from the woods in the gnra1 arj
of’
‘ position during his_confrontation with SAl
I
I apartment and recovered
RT then conducted a search of I
I
clothing similar in description to the clothing SAl
rerortth I
I was wearing during his_confrontation with SA
I
I that day
ERT also reccvered[
bell phone from
the apartment. A visual inspection of I
clothing by ERT
members found no indication of the presence of blood or damage
ll&i. Adiitionally, an
1
consistent with the impact of a bt
inventory .search was conducted of’
‘Tahoe which yielded
negative results.
-.

I

At 11:30 PM, MPD 911 dispatch received a call that
I had been hiding in another apartment ,in the I
I
Ridge Apartments arid had just fled on foot. Additional searches
were conducted jhich met with negative resul4s. Investigation
determined that I
I had entered this apartment on a ruse and
had held the occupants of the apartment against their will until
law enforcement had left the area.

On 1/26/2009, at approximately 11:15pm, the Cheraw,
Pt1it flqartment responded to reports of a
South Caro1jri (c!1
shooting atl
I, Cheraw, SC. The resident of
that address, I
I advised that I
I who is the
former oyfrien. ot her daughter,I
,
forced his way
IhA
into their home looking forl
stol and
d1
I in L
I bedroom.
as e
if he was sleeping_with his girltrnd.
I Fti-y-uc
and then shot I
I
tin the neck. I
I lay on the floor and duct taped her hands together.
made I
I
I made I
I leave with him and got the keys to a 1999
burgundy Dodge van. They drove away from the residence in that
van.
Subsequent investigation located the Dodge yen nearby
arid a wit4ess advised that they saw n indiv±.uai
in a white Ford Focus ith SC tag
That license plate is egistered to a 20b8 ârd ‘ocus övea iy

7

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 ________thee

297 -HQ-A1270968-D

Holding Corporation, 141 Industrial Park Road, Suite 11
SC and was entered into NCIC. A witness advised that
stated he was a bondsman looking for a fugitive
that vehicle at a nearby vacant house and watched
residence since the afternoon of 1/26/2009.

Greer
a

Cheraw PD provided South CarQlina Taw Enforcement
Division (SLED)_Fugitive Task Force with Dossile cell phone
numbers that I
Iwas using,I_____________ andi
bell
I to track them. During the morning of
phone i
1/27/2009, SLED advised that they were hitti4g a cell tqwer in
the Charlotte, NC, area. Investigation deteçmined that I
waa talking to her family members and advising thetni
I
wanted to see thetr three y
daughter. At approximately
I released
11:30 1M, I
at a Walmart parking 1t in
•Union County, NC.
advised thati
I,as still driving
the stolen ciiShe also
ia in possession of a firearm.
advised that I
I was continuing to commit robberies to
support himself. This kidnapping is being investigated by the
Columbia Division, 7A-cO-31728.
I was arrested without
On this same date, I
incident by the Atlanta police Department.
subsequent search
of the stçlen vehi
cle he was driving yielded a loaded 9 mm
1
handgun. I
Iwas interviewed by FBI Atlanta and gave a full
confession to multiple armed bank robberies and the kidnapping.
Iregarding the
Pn attempt was made tq re-interview I
confrontation with A I
,
through his attorney,
I
this interview.
been positively identified by witnesses as
having committed a series of GNC store robbeies in North
Carolina.
In the GNC robbery in Iexington, NC, the 18 year old
female clerk was raped with a handgun. Invetigation continues
regarding additional robberies linked tol_______

8

]

 (Rev. 05.01.2008)

UN LAS S I!ID

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

03/24/2009

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Inspection
rn
Office o Tn1’i€

I

Contact:

approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
it1e:

Perkins Kevin IcØ’
Clemens Michaelj
Maley Patrick 1auiesç
I

]b2
]b6

Ilrr

297-HQ—A1271285—D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
11/14/2008

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 11/14/2008, involving Special
Agent_(SA)_________ During the execution of an arrest warrant,
SAl
Ishot andkilled an aggressive pit bull dog. SIRG
members recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
lee a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administatjve:

Reference Electronic_Communiction of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
[dated 11/20/2008.

to £-ish--the——-----———
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 11/14/2008, at approximately 9:00 a.m;, members
the Violent Crimes Task Force executed an arrest warrant at a
residence in Chicago where a murder suspect was located.
Te.am Leader I
lknocked on ‘the door of the
residence and announced the presence of law enforcement
personnel. While awaiting a response, law enforcement officers
observed an individual inside the residence running toward the
UNCLASSIFIED

 UNcI.SSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—RQ—A1271285—D, 03/24/2009

stairs. Entry was gained to the house and SAl
iand SAl
walked up the stairs_located approximately four feet inside the
front door. SAl
tordered the subject to stop and control
his dog. A pit bul]. dog, witl
1 teeti bared, charged down the
stairs toward the Agents. SAl
I fired one round irijuring and
slowing the dog’s advance. The dog continued toward the Agents
in an aggressive manner and SAl
Ifired a second round
striking the dog in the head. The fatally wounded dog fell to
the bottom of the stairs. The subject was located and taken into
custody without further incident.

I

Chicago Animal Control was notified and removed the dog
from the residence.
On 01/30/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: F
I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ; I
I, Attorney, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Chief Inspector Patrick James Maley, Office of Inspections (01),
INED;. Section Chief (SC) Jill Marie Eulitz, CD-i. Eurasian
Section, Counterintelligence Division; A/SC I
I
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (UC)!
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division CTh); UC
1, Defensive Systems Unit, TD;
DCI
IL Practical Applications Unit, TD; DCI
I
Special Weapons and Tact4r fliri TThlt..
I
I
cr.tical Incident Response Group; SSAI_______________________
Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSAI
I
I
idne RAgno se Team Unit, Laboratory Division; an
R-2, Was±ed—’Gfee. DC
I
L, Inspecti9n Manaaement Unit (IMU), 01, XNSD,
and Management Program Analysti
I I4U, 01, INSD,
non—voting members, were also in attendance.
Observations and Recomuendations of the SIRS
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
UNCLASSXFXE1

2

b6
b7C

-

——

 444’
UNcIASSIIED

fo:
Re:

Inspection trom:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271285—D, 03/24/2009

SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the FBI’s
deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA b7c
p as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

UNCILASSXFXFJD

3

 ________
_____

D1LASSX?XZD
To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271285—D, 03/24/2009

LEAD(s):
Set Lea4 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
SA I
incident.

Tiat no administrative action be taken against
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting

1b7C

1

—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
—

1
1
1

Mr.j

i)SDOJ

Mr.I
I USDOJ
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
(Attention: Ms. Bulitz)
i Room 3280
Mr.I
1
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
‘uantico
.1
Mr.
,
CIRG
Mr.
1
Quantico
Ms.
Room 7326
1
1
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr.
WFO
1
Mrs.]_________ Room 3043
—
—

,

—

—
—

—

—

—

+4
ASSI?IED
1
UNcI

4

 4

(Rev 05-01-2008)

tJNCIARSSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Attxz:

Al) 2’zny Jo Lyons

Inspection
Office of Insvectioris
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:.
Case ID #:

Title:

08/06/2009

I

Michael S

I

Ilrr

297—HQ--A1272701-D

SHOOTING I1CIDENT
BOGOTA LEGAL ATTACHE

11/29/2008
Synopais:

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident thal occurre€j nn 11 /2/9u1ft8, involving
Assistant Legal Attache (ALAT) I
[ While hiking in a
national park in Bogota, ALATI
I fired ,eleven rounds from his
Glock Model 23, .40 caliber handgun to facilitate the rescue of
himself and other members of his group. SIRG membes rO
mended
9
that no administrative action be taken against AI*AT I
las a
result of his involvement in this incident.
a

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of ALAT
a dated 03/20/2009.

7C

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 11/29/2008, ALAT’
‘- his eight year old
son, and Office Assistant I
Iwer hiking in a remote
location of the Andean Mountains in Colombia approximately twenty
miles from the city of Bogota.

Lnd his party left their vehicle on the one
ALAT I
dirt road within the park at approximately 11:00 a.m., and hiked
until they reached a mountain peak with an altitude of
approximately 12,500 feet.

 3NCXASSXTED

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1272701—D, 08/06/2009

The hikers_bean their return trip to the car about
3:00 pin. ALAT F
I son became sick slowing the group’s
return and darkness set in around 5:30 p.m. The group continued
hiking toward the vehicle when clouds moved in and lowered
visibility to less than ten feet, completely blocking the outline
of the mountains they were using as reference points to guide
them safely to the vehicle.

1 believed he was approximately one mile from
ALATI
the vehicle, but coupled with no visibility due to clouds, no
trail to follow, rocks, water obstacles, cliffs, and darkness,
decided it was too dangerous to continue walking anc4 risking
injury or worsening the situation. The first thought was to
spend the night in the forest and .wait for daylight to continue
to the vehicle. Within a short tjne._the initial onset of
I decided the best course
hypothermia was apparent and ALAT I
of action was to call for help.
Because of the extremely remote location, no cell phone
coverage was available, no people were in the area, and no
flashlight was available. Due to the wet conditions, the ground
cover was soaked_and a fire could not be started. Using a SAT
phone, ALAT I
IcaJled Marine Post One at the United States
Embassy in ogota and advised of his emergency. He also
contacted the United States Military 24/7 watch-standers who in
turn contacted the Director for the Personnel Recovery Center.
A reaueat was made for the hiking party’s location; however, ALAT
I
I left his hand-held GPS device in the vehicle and could not
provide any information. When advised that search personnel
could not locate them because of the remoteness, M,ATI
I
stated he would activate the emergency beacon he had with him
that s registered to the personnel recovery center. ALAT
I
I was unable to locate the emergency beacon within his back
pack.
He was advised the search parties were in the area but
could not locate them.
In order to facilitate rescue, ALAT
I
I fired several rounds at a time so the search teams could
triangulate the sound and locate the group.
The search party arrived and took all hikers to a
vehicle where a rescue medic was present. The medic evaluated
members of the group and determined no hospitalization was
needed.

On 05/28/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-votilg member. The following voting members were in

2

 _________

-

-

-

)

uizcassz’x
To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-4tQ—A1272701—D, 08/06/2009

attendance: I
J Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USD0J;
I Attorney, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Section Chief (St) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson,
Violent Cm
t’riminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (UC)P
Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division CTDI; UCI
Practical Applications Unit,
PT rid
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSA
I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory
Division; S
Special Weapons and Tctics
I
Operations Uni , Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
i Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; and
1
SS.Ai
1 CR—17, Washington Field Office. UCI
I
I Inspection Mapaaement Unit (IMU) 01, INSD, and
Management Program Analyst’
‘IMU, 01, INSD, non
voting members, were also in attendance.

I

.,.

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG

b6

b7C

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
C2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
-

SIRG members unanimously agreed that AIJATI
I took
appropriate steps to ensure the safety of himself and others in
the group.
This discussion resulted in the reçommendtion that
no administrative action be taken against ALATI
las a result
of his involvement in this incident.

tmzcIa.sSIFIzD

3

 “‘C.—.

6

uNcIsSx’x

.

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ-A1272701—D, 08/06/2009

LD (s).:
Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC

That r dministrative action be taken against
AIATl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

b7C

1
1
1

I
1
1
1

—
—
—

—
—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Nr..l
I LJSDOJ
1
Mr
jUSDOJ
Mr. iuuI5On, Room 4825
Mr.’ Johnson, Room 3280

Mr.

I

Quantico

Mr.
1
biantico
1—Mr.I
ICIRG
(Attention:, Mr.I
Mr.
.1
uantico
—

•

•.

1
3.
1
1

—
—
-

—

Msj
Mr4
Mn

MrsT

I

oom 7326

Quantico
IIWWfl

Room 3043

++
VNCI.SSXWIED

4

 ___________

_______

(Rev. 5-01 .2008)

tJNCI
A
2
SSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:

To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection
CI RG
Training
General Counsel

From:

AD Amy Jo Lyons
AD Robert A. Blecksmith
AD Brian D. Lamkin
Valerie Caproni.

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact: I

P4(

Approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

Attn:
Attn:
Atta:
Attn:

03/09/2010

Lyons Amy Jo
Galligan Mar
Hosko Ronal4Y”

[

-

1
b7C

11 rr

297-HQ-A1271970-D

SHOOTING INCIDENTS
WASHINGTON. FIELD OFFICE
03/10/2008 AND 12/16/2008

The Shooting Iheident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed two
shooting incidents that occurred on 03/10/2008 and 12/16/2.008,
involving Special Agent (SAil
I
During the
ex’ii1-i,n of federal search warrants on 03/10/2008,
SA
I fired two rounds from his personally owned Glock Model
21, .45 caliber pistol killing a pit bull that had retreated to a
position under a table in a second floor bedroom. On_12/16/20.08,
during the execution of a federal arrest warrant, SAl
Ifired
seven rounds from his Glock Model 21, killing a pit bull dog
inside the residence from which the fugitive was extracted.
S!RG
rnempers rqcommended no administrative action be taken against
SA I
las a result of his involvement in these shooting
incidents.
Synopsis:

I

,

Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communications of former
WFO Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)l
I dated
03/20/2008 and 12/18/2008.
1 reference report of Inspector
Also
Idated 05/15/2009.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shootings.
t3NLASS IFIED

 ___________
________

_________dvised

_______

UNCL.SSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—I-1Q—A1271970—D,

Inspection
03/09/2010

Details of the 03/10/2008 Shoot.ing Incident
On 03/10/2008, Agents from the Safe Streets Gang Task
Force executed federal search warrants at two locations in the
District of Columbia. The warrants sought evidence in connection
with a College Park, Maryland, homicide investigation.

I

I

Prior to the execution of the search warrants, SAl

I briefed the operations order on the searches. Although
not listed in the operations order, SJ I
Iwas present
for the verbal briefing provided by SAI
the
to
IPrior
execution of the warrants.

h6

SAl
I knocked on the front door and announced
“FBI.” After approximately one to two minutes and after
receiving no response, the front entrance was mechanically
breached using a ram.
Prior to entry into the residence, Agents
heard a dog barking inside the residence. SAl
I
I
Iwas the first to enter the residence and provided
tactical security for thefirst floor.
SAl
Pas the second
search team member to enter and tactically cleared an adjacent
room.
The dog qontinued to bark from, an upstairs location and 3,
lobservéd an .unr.estrained dog at the tqp of thestair.

I
I

The entry/search team proceeded up the ;tairs and SA
lobserved the dog retreat out of sight.
SAl
I advised
team members he would handle the dog to allow other personnel to
safely clear the upstairs rooms.
-

SAl
As
lapproached the room he saw the dog enter.
he entered,_he noticed the dog backed into a corner. According
to SAl_______ the dog began to bark and growl at him in such a
Ifired two rounds
manner that he feared for his safety.
SN
and saw one round impact above the dog’s shoulder but did not see
the other round impact.
e1ieved the dog died
SAl
immediately and he continued to clear the residence.
Upon completion of the search, the scene was turned
[or completion of the shooting
over to SSAI
investigation. ASAC Stephen E. Vogt arrived at the residence
after the search was concluded. As a result of the incident,
ASAC Vogt advised SSAI
Ito instruct Agents on his squad to
implement better plans to deal with dogs by using fire
He
extinguishers or some other means other than lethal force.
also told SSA
to the perimeter during
ito move SA I
not to be involved in
SSA
SA I
entries.
UNLASS I.tD

2

-

 _______On

UNCLASS IFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 03/09/2010

any more dog shootings and, on at

Ist

after this incident, instructed SA

tw additional occasions
o move back in the

line on the entry team.
Following this incident, FO Criminal Division policy
was promulgated requiring all pre-arrest briefings to include
specific instructions for the safe and non—lethal handling of
dogs at locations where the presence of dogs was suspected.
Subsequent to lhe March 2008 incident, SAl
Iwas personally
advised by SSA
Jthat shooting a dog was anieasure of last
resçrt.
tionally, in several discussions at squad meetings,.
1
Addi
SSAI
Idirected squad members regarding the need to develop
appropriate contingency plans for dogs and that the use of deadly
force, even against dogs, had to be within the parameters of the
FBI’s Deadly Force Policy.
WFO Criminal Division policy required a written
Operations Plan (OP) for all field operations to include arrests,
searches, surveillance, and all other coordinated tactical squad
operations.
The written plan was required to be specific in
nature delailing suspect information, personnel assignments, and
security concerns associated with the arrest. The plans we-re to
be approved by the SSA and ASAC and a copy left on file with WFO
Command Tactical Operations Center.
-

Details o the 12/16/2008 Shooting Incident
‘obtained a federal
On 11/21/2008, SAl
arrest warrant forL
n associate of a street
level drug distribution_organization operating in the southeast
I drafted and approved an OP for
SA I
D.C. area.
larrest and forwarded it to ASAC Vogt for review and
approval.
The date of the planned operation was on or about
11/24/2008, and the OP was approved by ASAC Vogt.

12/16/2008, wn a fçderal. indictmnt w returned
Ithe squad
I
I,
landi
SAs
on
I advised SSA I
I
SSA
would attempt to arrest the subject using the 11/24/2008 OP.
arrest.
approved
the
jverbally
I

I

At approximately 10:30 a.nt., on 12/16/2008, SAs I
1
andi
Londucted a pre-arrest briefing; however, they did not
utilize the previously approved OP in the briefing nor was any
other written OP generated. A picture of the subject was shown
to member present for the briefinq,_personnel were made aware of
te.rbally briefed that
Icrirninal history, and SAl
UNCLASSIFIED

3

]b6

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 _______

t.ThTCIASSX’IED

To:
Re:

I

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271970—D,

Inspection
03/09/2010

dogs would likely be present at the residences associated with
I
No plan was discussed regarding how to deal withdogs
should they pose a danger to arrest team members. I
Iwas
not located at the first location; therefore, arrest team
personnel proceeded to a second location frequented by him.
Members of the árrst teap approached the front and
I knocked on the front door and
rear of the residence aryi SAl
announced police.
WhenL
lopened the doorr SAl
lpulled
I who
him from the doorway threshold and gassed him to SAl
Ifired his Glock Model
restrained him.
Seconds later, SAl
21, .45 caliber handgun several times (later determined to be
seven rounds).
According to sI
las he pulled the subject out of
the front door, he observed a pit bull inside the residence
crouched, growling, and showing its teeth. He also saw a
Concerned
stairway leading to the second.floor of the residence.
an attack from the dog was imminent nd seeng the area behind
the dog was clear of individuals, SAl
I fired his_weaøon.
The dog began retreating up thee stairs; however, SAl
Ifèared
a wounded dog roaming through the house would be dangerous so he
The
continued to shoot the’ dog as it retreated up the stairs,.
dog succumbed to its injuries_and collapsed at the base of the
stairs. At that time, SAl
lobserved a female occupant
standing on the far side of the room with a small child, away
from his direct line of fire.
SA I
Iproceeded to the second
floor of the residence where he discoverdd a second child in a
bedroom.
Subsequent to the 12/16/2008 dog shooting incident by
L theWashington Field Office WFO) requested that the
SAl
Inspection Division conduct an administrative inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding this shooting, as well as a series of
dog shootings which occurred during the execution of. arrest and
search warrants.
All of the incidents involved SAl
who was assigned to Squad CR-6.
I
-

Ic.

On 09/09/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incidents. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-voting member.
The following voting methbers were in
attendance: I
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
,
Division, USDOJ; I
I .ttorney, Criminal Division, tJSDOJ;
Chief Inspector Mary E. Galligan, Office of Inspections, INSD;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson,
UNCLAS3X’IED
4

 ASSIPID
4
UNCI

4

To:
Re:

I

Inspection From:297—HQ—A1271970—D,

Inspection
03/09/2010

Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
L Firearms Trining Unit, Training
Chief (UC) I
Division (TDjSSAI
,
Practical Applications
Unit, TD; UCI______________________ pedal Weapons an Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Grou;-UCI
I
I
1 Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSAI
Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Coune1; and SSAj_______
i CR-2, Washington Field Office.
The following non-voting
members were also in attendance:
SC Ellen B. Icochea, Strategic
llnspection
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; UCI
Management Unit (IMU), SAS, INSD; SSAI
I
Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), SAS, INSD; Managemen and Program
Analyst -(MAPA)
I.
1 lAO, SAS, INSD; MAE’AI
I IMU, SAS. TNSD: MAPAI
j lAO, SAS,
INSD; and MAPAI
lIMU, SAS, JNSU.
Observations and. Recommendations

of

the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incidents with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate -the application- of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative. analysis,
observations, and recoinmenda-tions for corrective actions from an
-operational -standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for -administrative action if deemed necessary.
The administrative inquiry, led by Inspector Ronald T.
Hosko, determined SAl
hot and killed six dogs since 2001,
with two additional dogs potentially being shot had a supervisor
not intervened.
Three of the shooting incidents were previously
discussed by the SIRG and determined to be justified.
-

Inspector I
I presented the results of his
administrative inquiry to SIRG members.
Discussions with the
Training Division’s Practical Applications Unit and Firearms
Training Unit, as well as the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group, determined no
current policy exists regarding the handling of dangerous animals
or when deadly force should be used against dogs, outside the
However, techniques have evo-lved which are
Deadly Force Policy.
taught at Quantico to include the use of ballistic shields and
these training doctrines are applied in field offices via 194
tactical instructors;
incidents,

After a lengthy discussion regarding the shooting
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
-

UNCLASSIFtD

5

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 UNCLASS IFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 03/09/2010

force in the Ô3/10/2008, incident was justified and in
It was also determined
conformance with the deadly force policy.
the use of deadly force in the 12/16/2008 incident was justified,
by a majority of the vote.
‘fired his weapon seven
It was noted that SAl
times into a residence occupied by a female and several minor
children to neutralize the perceived threat to his arrest team,
Two metal bullet fragments were located in the vicinity of the
SA
couch cthere the female and two of her children were located.
lexercised questionable judgement in planning this arrest
I
knowing, 1efore his arrival at the target location, a probability
existed both chi.1,dren and dogs would be p.esnt.
-

Discussion revolved around the fact that a deadly force
According to the
threat must exjst before the trigger is pulled.
Practical Applications Unit representalive, New Agent Trainees
are trained to arrest nd cortro1 suspects with hands and voice.
It was also noted thati
I put others at risk by removing the
suspect from the doorway and focusing his attention on the dog.
had the option of neutralizing the
One member opined
threat posed by te cog by closing the door fter he obtained
control of the subject. Members agreed with the concept of
“gathering good intelligence and good planning results in sound
decisions.”
It is entirely foreseeable that anyone entering an
inner city residence occupied by a pit bull would encounter an
animal that barks or growls in an agitated manner, postures
SIRG members
itself in a threatening way, or even attacks.
emphasized that an animal should be neutralized if it is a threat
to individuals on the scene; however, shooting a dog because it
is believed to b.e an impediment to the execution of an arrest or
search warrant is not an acceptable practiceS
Since no written policy currently
FBI or the WFO, directly addressing the use
confronting dogs during the execution of an
warrant, SIRG members adopted the following
the Shooting Incident Review Team:
ECOMENDATION:

exists, either in the.
of force when
arrest or search
recommendations of

That the Training Division develop and
promulgate, in conjunction with the CIRG and
OGC, a policy addressing the use of deadly
force with respect to animals.
UNCLASSIFIED

6

 UNCLASStFThD

To:
Re;

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271970—D,

RECOMMENDATION:

Inspection
03/09/2010

That the Training Division develop training
scenarios to support the new policy.

UNCIA.SSTh’IED

 •

tThTCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271970—D,

Inspection
03/09/2010

LEAD(s)
Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INS PECTION•
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Th1 n dministrative action be taken against
SAI
j as a result of his involvement in these
shooting incidents.

Set read 2:

(.ction)

TRAINING
ATQ(JANTICO.

VA

That the Training Division develop and promulgate, in
conjunction with the CIRG and OGC, a policy addressing the use of
deadly force with respect to animals.
Additionally, training
scenarios should be developed to support the new policy.
Set Lead 3:

(Information Only)

CIRG
AT OUANTICO. VA
For information.
Set Lead 4:

(Information Only)

GENERAL COUNSEL
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

For information.

UNCLASS IFID
8

 UNLRSSIFIED

To:
Re:

1
1
1

—

-

-

Inspection From:
Inspectiofl
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 03/09/2010

Mr. Pistoj.e, Room 7142
Ms. CaDroni, Room 7427
Mr.
I USDOJ

1-Mr

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

—

—

-

-

-

-

IUSDoJ

Mr. naeson, Room 4825
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
Mr.
I Quantico
Mr. I
IQuantico
(Attention:
MrJ
I
Mr,’
Mr
j Quantico
Ms
L Room 6387
Mr.I
IWFO
Mrs.p_______ Room 3043

b6
/

‘4

CSSIEtD

9

C

  

 

2008 I 

Savage?2076

 

 

(Rev. 05-0 -2003)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 11/12/2008

Inspection
CIRG

From:

Inspection
Office of
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

Attn:

I

AD Kevin L. Perkins
AD Robert A. Blecksmith

I

—

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Mic

I

llrr
b2

297-HQ-AI271895-D

b7C

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
01/28/2008

Synopsis:

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
t1,t rivrv r 01/28/2008, invo1vin Soecial
Agents CSAs)l
I andi___________________
it’ir of
During the
rvl search warrant, Darius Hill was
shot by SAsI
land I
I In addition to being struck
multiple times by rounds fired by the Agents, Hill placed his
weapon inside his mouth and fired one round.
SIRG members
recommqnded that no administrative action be taken against SAs
I anal
las a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.
shooting jflitnt

Adninistrative: Reference report of Inspector- in-Charg
Idated 02/18/2008.

i

Enclosure:
Enclosed for CIRG is one copy of the FD-204 Shooting
Incident Report narrative and recommendations re captioned
matter.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

tINCLASSIFIED

Savage-2077

I

 UNCLASSIFXED

•

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271895-D,

Inspection
11/12/2008

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 01/02/2008, the Philadelphia Division received
information that an Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force
determined a computer registered to an address in Perkasie,
Pennsylvania, was engaged in criminal activity relating to child
pornography.
Investigation determined Darius Theodore Hill
resided at the address and was believed to be the individual
communicating with an undercover officer.
SA[
who ws assigned the lead,
obtained a search warrant to seize computers located inside the
suspect’s residence.
He also determined Hill had a felony
criminal record for selling stolen military weapons and also had
a. complaint filed with a local police department for improper
sexual contact with a minor.
On 0/2S/2008, a federal search warrant was authorized
and SAl
I contacted the Fort Washington Resident Agency
(FWRA) for assistance en serving the warrant on 01/28/2008.
At 3:00 p.m., on 01/28/2008, the search team assembled
at the Hilitown Township Police Department (HTPD) for a briefing.
I, four additional FBI Agents, and
Participants included BA
1
one Lieutenant from the HTPD.
SE
1 led a briefing which
included providing copies of the warrant and affidavit, a
description and photograph of Hill, his criminal history, search!
entry team roles and assignments, notification of potential
children in the residence, a description of items to be seized,’
and a contingency plan pn hing the residence, if needed.
During the briefing, sI
Iprovided no written operations
plan for the search warrant nor did he provide
briefing on the FBI’s Deadly Force Policy.
I who
SAl
ar7A
due to a court appearance, received a briefing from
SAl
Iprior to the execution of the search warrant.
The plan was to execute the search warrant while Hill
was at his residence.
Law enforcement personnel conducted driveby surveillances approximately every thirty minutes during the
afternoon in an effort to determine if Hill was home.
6
At 6:00
p.m., information was received that Hill’s computer was online,
indicating he was inside his residence.
The team reconvened at the HTPD where SAl
I
briefed three additional uniformed officers who were assisting
with the search warrant.
The team, consisting of two FBI
UNCLASSXFID
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1b7C

 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
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297-HQ-A1271895-D,

Inspection
ll/l2/20O

vehicles and three marked HTPD 1
cruisers proceeded to the
subject’s residence. At 6:30 p.m., the team arrived at
the
subject’s residence with four Agents and two HTPD officer
s
approaching the front door, one SA and two HTPD officer
s
approaching the side door, and one SA on the northwest corner
of
the house.
As the team approached the front door, they saw Hill
through a window and he motioned the team to go to the side
door.
As the team at the side door made contact with Hill’s
wife and entered the residence, they observed two children in the
kitchen area with her. I
I was advised the FBI had a
search warrant for the residence and when asked where Darius
was,
she indicated she thought he was in the front of the residen
ce.
As the team proceeded to the front of the house, Hill
was heard upstairs. lu-i HTPD officer located at the base
of the
stairs yelled to Hill telling him the police/FBI were serving
a
search warrant and ordered him to come downstairs.
SN________
and the HTPD officer ascended the stairs due to Hill not
responding to the command to come downstairs.
As they arrived on
the upstairs landing, they cleared one bedroom, looked down
the
hallway to their right and observed Hill standing in the master
bedroom doorway with a pistol pointed under hi
s chin.
1
Hill was
threatening to shoot himself and as SAl
began to negotiate
I
with him to put the gun down
1 the HTPD officer returned
downstairs to remove Hill’s wife and children from the residence.

I

?s SAl
Icontinued negotiations with the subject,
SAl
Icame up the stairs to provide backup.
Hill stated,
‘I’ve been through this before.
Im not going back to 1
i1.
4
I
might as well just end it now.”
Throughout SAT
Ififteen
to twenty minute negotiation with Hill, he continued to put
his
weapon inside his mouth and point it under his chin.
SAl
1
continued to give commands to Hill to drop his weapon.
After
several moments of conversation between I
land Hill, he
said, “I’m going to blow my brin cut by this window becaus
e I
don’t want to make a mess.”
gil
I explained to Hill they
were only there to seize his coTrputers and not arrest him.
Hill
became very quiet and began o bank toward the bedroom window
facing the Agents in what SAl
I believed to be a combat
stance. Although Hill was making suicidal comments and pointin
g
his weapon to his head, 7I
believed Hill was preparing
J
for a gun battle with SAl
Jand himself.
j thi- noint,
Hill lowered the weapon from his chin toward SAsl
I and
I causing both Agents to fear for their lives. SAl
1
fired the first round striking Hill in the chest.
Hill was able
UNCLASSIFIED
3

Savage-2079

 tThTCLASSIFXED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271895-D,

Inspection
11/12/2008

to place his weapon in his mouth and fire one round.
Believing
Hill w rf-ii’ping fire, SAl
Ifired one additional round
and SAl
I fired five rounds.

4
Ianc

I approached the
SAsI
kLcked
his weapon away, and began to render first aid.
SN
I
called for a medic who arrived a short time later and pronounced
Hill dead.
It was determined that in addition to the round fired
by Hill, both rounds fired by SAl
Istruck the subject as
well as three of the five rounds fired by SA
On 02/15/2008, the Bucks County Attorney’s Office
declined local prosecution.
On 08/07/2008, a declination of
prosecution was received from the United States Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, regarding the actions of SAn
anal
lin this shooting incident.
On 08/19/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division -(INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance: I
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ;I
lTriai Attorney, Gang Squad, t3SDOJ; h
Section Chief (SC> Robert Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage ii;
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC Thomas A. Nunemaker,
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID);
Unit Chief (UC)
I. Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (TD);
Defensive Systems Unit, TD;
Acting OCt
1 Practical Applications Unit, TD;
Acting oci
I Special Weapons and Tactics
Ooerat
o
1
ns
i Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA[
I
I, Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; an
SSAI
1, CR-2, Washington Field Office.
Management Program Analyst p
I Inspection
Management Unit, 01, INSD, a non—voting mexnlDer, was also in
attendance.

I,

Okservationa and Reco2xmeudations of the SrRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
t3NCLASSIPflD

4

Savage-2080

 UNCLASSXFXD
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271895-D,

Inspection
11/12/2008

operational standpoint C if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4> provide
recorruueadatioris for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAsI
I aridi
Iwas
justified and in conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against either Agent as a result
of their involvement in this shooting incident.
SIRG members thoroughly discussed the fact that the
search warr4nt plan was not converted into a written operations
plan. Additionally, the plan did not require Agents to wear body
armor or marked law enforcement clothing.
Although thorough and
complete, a written plan could have added value by stimulating
thought by the Case Agent that could possibly lead to plan
improvements; allows for an independent review by more
experienced managers; and facilitates a complete and thorough
oral pre-operation brief.
Members noted the Philadelphia
Division policy requiring a written operations plan, including a
Deadly Force Policy brief as well as body armor for all arrests
and search warrants.
Although the Case Agent was aware of the
division’s policy, he considered the Innocent Images National
Initiative search warrant for computers as a low risk search
warrant and decided a written operations plan was not needed.
Although the consequences for violating division policy did not
impact the ultimate outcome, the potential for catastrophic
operational failure and law enforcement injuries was high.
Members opined a simple Bureau-wide documented policy on written
operation plans is needed.
This discussion resulted in adoption
of the I4SD recommendation #la contained in the FD-204 Shooting
Incident Report that the AD, CIRG, in collaboration with
experienced field managers, develop and promulgate to all offices
clear policy regarding the necessity and use of written operation
plans.

t3NCLA.SSIFIED

5

Savage- 2081

 T3NCLASSI’IED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271895-.D,

Inspection
11/12/2008

LFJD(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SAsL
I andi
Jas a result of
their involvement in this shooting incident.
Set Lead 2:

(Action)

AT OIJANTICO. VA
That AD, CIRG, in collaboration with experienced field
managers, develop and promulgate a simple Bureau-wide policy
regarding the use of written operation plans.

b7C

1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
3.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Pistole, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Anderson, Room 4825
Nunemaker, Room 3280
Quantico
[
Quantico
I
Quantico
Mrj
j, CIRG
Ms.I
IRoom 7326
WFO
MrI
Mrs]
a Room 3043

tYNCLASSIPID

6
Savage-2082

 (Rcv. 05-01-2008)

()NCLASSTFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Inspection
Office of Inections
Contact:

I

approved By:

I

——

I I’TI

Perkins Kevin J.
Clemens Michael?1

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297—HQ—A1271748—D

Title:

03/23/2009

Ilrr
D2
C

SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION
07/01/2008

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting inpident that occurred on 07/01/2008, involving Special
Agents(SAs)I

I the planned arrest

I andi
During
I
of members of a violent criminal enterprise
associated with drug trafficking activities, Agents shot and
killed one subject and wounded two others.
SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against the
Agents as a result of their involvement in this shooting
incident.

I

Administrative: Reference report of Chief Inspector
dated 09/17/2008.

I

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 02/19/2008, a Gang/Criminal Enterprise investigation
was initiated by the West Palm Beach Resident Agency (WPBRA).
The investigation, conducted by Agents arid officers of the WPBBA
Safe Streets Task Force, targeted a violent criminal enterprise
UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2083

 ___Ibegan

UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271748—D,

Inspection
03/23/2009

associated with drug trafficking activities in the area of West
Palm Beach.

I

I
b6
ib7L)

4

‘s, Uza.’s,

urported he had “goons with auns, AK—
g pisto s, guns,” who would carry outi

robbery plan of the drug dealer.

I

I

I

06/25/2008,

ully identified asi
of Pompano Beach.
Investigatio
had an extensive drug criminal
history.
S
ared an Operations Plan (0?) for the
proposed arrest of
and his unidentified accomplices while
committing the purported robbery.
At thqt time, there was no
specific intelligence connecting I
Ito a known drug
trafficking organization (DTO) or an rmed robery crew. The
basis for the operation was to ar’-l I
_jand his
unidentified “gangsters’
1 based onl
Irepresentation he had
“AK—47’s, Uzi’s, guns, and big pis
-””
4
°c meetings, four
telephonic and two in—person, with
According to
tUCE.
the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) and other division personnel,
South Florida had experienced an increased frequency of violence
with high-powered weapons, thus the division fe]
nmrled to
address the potential public safety threat from I
land his
unknown accomplices in an expeditious manner.
On

I, date of

I

SWAT Senior Team Leader (STL)L
I
preparing a plan to effect the arrest of
nd his unidentified accQmplices.
SAJ
jSA
I and Detectivel
Imet with WPBPD SWAT Leadership,
discussed the tactical operation, and delineated assignments and
responsibilities for the respective SWAT teams.
It was
determined during the meeting FBI SWAT would be responsible for
the inner perimeter of the arrest location and WPBPD SWAT would
be responsible for the outer perimeter of the arrest location.
On 06/26/2008,

I

UNCLASSIFIED
2

Savage-2084

lb 6

lb

/

lb 7 Li

 _Ifor

____________________________khich
___At

UNCLASSXF’IED
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Inspection
297—HQ—A1271748—D, 03/23/2009

land

In furtherance of the planned operation, STLL
jconducted a site survey of the arrest location.

SA

On 06/27/2008, STL
prepared an FBI SWAT OP
which documented areas of responsibility for both the FBI arid
WPBPD tactical components.
On 06/30/2008, a deti1ed OP brieing was conducted at
the Miami Field Of f
ice with SAl
1
I STLI
land
SSAI
I Additjpnplly.l

I

8:00 p.m., an OP briefing was conducted by STL
Ifor the SWAT team at the WPBPD undercover warehouse.
The Q’ briefing was conducted at the approximate time of the
planned robbery to allow SWAT operators to observe the lighting
conditions at the location as it would potentially appear at the
time of the operation.
The SWAT OP briefing and rehearsals were
conducted for approximately two hours.
As previously discussed,
FBI SWAT would be responsible for activities within the inner
perimeter, and WPBPD SWAT team would be responsible for the outer
perimeter.
During the briefing, STL I
I advised FBI SWAT
operators to be familiar with and to further review the FBI
Deadly Force Policy.

The FBI SWAT Blue Team would take positions on the
rooftops of the North and South buildings in the warehouse
complex, as well as on the rooftop of a one story warehouse
building located west of the warehouse complex.
The FBI SWAT
Gold Team would be responsible for securing the subjects upon
completion of the operation.
The Gold Team would be staged in a
room inside the South building. A decision was made to partially
close the western gate of the warehouse complex and secure it
with a lock and chain to prevent entry by a veicle and reaiiire
the subiects to slip throuah a small pr,enina. I
I
would be provided to
his use in committing the planned robbery.
UNCIASSXYXED
3

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7L

 UNLASStPIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271748—D,

Inspection
03/23/2009

At 5:00 p.m.,. STL I
I ASAC Parlave, and Agents
WPPfl j0 attend an OP hrifirjg.
of the WP?,!A arrived at
During this briefing, SAl
Iprovided
I and Detective I
an overview of the investigation to the Agents of PRRA. WPBPT)
SWAT, WPBPD surveillance, and WPBPD command staff. I
I
UCE were introduced to the Agents and officers to minimize the
potential for misidentification during the operation.

At 8:00 p.m., the FBI SWAT team staged at the WPB?D
garage and were provided an additional briefing qn the SWAT OP,
as well as updated intelligence information.
lagain
5Th
briefed the FBI Deadly Force Policy.
Upon completion o the
briefing, FBI SWAT members proceeded to the WPBPD undercover
warehouse complex.
FBI SWAT was split into two teams, he Gold
Pin rd 1iie Ten
Th Gold Team was comorised of SAsI

Iani

I

I

The Gold Team was divided into four, three operator
arrest teams.
The Gold Team was deployed inside the South
bu.ldina and wou4 respond when directed to secure the subjects.
SAl
Iwas also staged with the Gold Team as a
communication link to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).
Blue Team mnhers deoloved on the South building were

[and I
I WPBPD SWAT
snipers I
nd j
ere deployed on the
rooftop of the South building to cover tne rear rf hø Suth
building overlooking Old Okeechobee Road.
ST!I
land ASAC
Parlave also took positions on. the South building where they
monitored a Remington Ball camera covering the warehouse complex
interior parking lot.
The actions of the subjects as viewed
throuch th Remington Ball camera were not recorded.
Sm
hnd ASAC Parlave monitored the main FBI and WPBPD
operations radio channels, then STL I
eiayed relevant
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information to FBI SWAT operators via the FBI SWAT simplex
channel.
Blue Team SWAT minhr dnlôvd nn the roqf of i-h
North building were SAsI
I andi
I
I Blue Team SWAT members deployed on the roof of
warehouse building west of the warehouse complex were SASI

I

landl

I

I
I

SAsI
landl
Iwere located
in the_TOC_vehicle lqcated in the vicinity of Clare Avenue with
A/SSAj
land SAl
IWPBRA.
WPBPD SWAT operators were staged in two WPBPD vehicles.
One located on Clare Avenue and the other on Frederick Street,
both within close proximity to the warehouse complex. The WPBPD
SWAT Command Staff was located in a WPBPD vehicle located at the
Holiday Inn. Th h4-1p i. occupied by WPPfl rntinI
I
flrntinI
SergeantI
I and
I
Sergeants_________________ WPBPD Command Staff would monitor the
communications being received through a transmitter worn by the
t3CE.
The monitored communications would then be relayed to all
personnel monitoring the WPBPD operations radio channels.
Additionally, approximately 15 unmarked WPBPD units established
stationary surveillance along the anticipated route of I
and his accomplices from the Holiday Inn to the warehouse
complex.
At 10:15 p.m., the Broward County Sheriff’s Off ice
(BCSO) surveillance whieth ]iad been surveillingi
bince
4:40 p.m., reported’
land other subjects were traveling
northbound on Interstate 95 North in
çld Hyundai approaching
West Palm Beach. At 10:17 p.m..i
land his associates
at the Holiday Inn in West Palm Beach, to meet with the
tjpon their arrival at the Holiday Inn, the BCSO
terminated their surveillance.

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Inspection
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At 10:43 p.m., the FBI TOC broadcasted and logged the
vehicle with all four subjects was anticipated to arrive at the
warehouse complex within three nainutes and they were armed wit
long guns. This was relayed to the SWAT team by STLI___________

I

p.m.l

I (‘]dw11. and
t 10:46
exited the vehicle, while I
Femained
inside. They entered the warehouse complex parking lot through a
gate locked with a chain, but the chain had sufficient slack to
allow a person to slip through a small opening.
The order of
I carrvinci a et of bolt cutters and a
entry wasi
I nrrrin
concealed handgun, I
handgun, and
Caldwell carrying a long rifle.
I followed by iL)
Caldwell and I
I walked toward tne coor of the North
building All thrqe were observed entering the parking lot by
both STLI
land ASAC E>arlve. who monitored their
movements. ASAC Parlave and STLL
lobserved the three
subjects enter into the parking lot with what they believed to be
weapons.
tJNcL.sSXFXED

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 tINCLASSIPIED

To:
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297—HQ—A1271748—D, 03/23/2009

At 10:47 p.m., afterL_
land Caidwell got
near the North building door and I
[was halfway from the
gate opening and the North building, ASAC Parlave gave the
execution order to STL Swinerton who then communicated the order
to FBI SWAT Qrtor
The SWAT operators had been advised via
radio by STLI
lall three subjects were armed, inasmuch as
all operators were secreted to prevent silhouetting which also
prevented operators from directly observing the subjects entering
the warehouse complex.

SAl
Istood up from his position on the South
building and in a loud clear voice stated, “FBI, get down.” At
this point, I
Iwas jt 1-hp 1Tcrth hnildinri door an
CaJ.,dwell was several feet behind I
Iwas
25 feet from the same door, which was about halfway between the
gate opening azd the door. All three subjects turned toward the
South bui1diraJ
Idropped to the ground while
Caidwell andi
fran in the direction of the Agents
located on the South building which was also in the dirHon of
the gate opening.
Caidwell andi
Idisobeyed SAl
I
commands and continued to run toward the South building and the
opening in the gate with gunsj.n hand. j4gents believed the noncompliant, armed Caidwell andi
Iwere moving to a
position of tactical advantage and/or presented a grave danger to
the puSlic and other Law enforcement officers.
Eight Agents from
the roof tops of the NoTth nd Souijh buildings discharged their
weapons at Caidwell andi
I and one Agent from the West
I after he exited the
building discharged his weapon at I
warehouse complex and moved toward concealment of a parked truck.
-

-

I
Iwas able to get through the gate opening and
was reachinìg for the passenger side rear door handle of the gold
Hyundai when it pulled away.
Fie then proceeded to move toward
the parked truck wn h succuxpbed to his wounds and collapsed
next to the truck. I
Ireceived numerous bullet wounds,
to include leg wounds, requiring his left leg to be amputated
below the knee.
Caidwell received numerous bullet wounds,
collapsed in the gate opening, and was pronounced dead at the
scene. I
I who dropped to the ground after FBI
commands, was hit withne .223 caliber bullet, likely a
ricochet, that penetrated one leg then lodged in his other leg.
I
I attempted to flee the location, however his vehicle
was struck and disabled by another motorist.
He was then
arrested by the WPBPD SWAT which secured the operation’s outer
perimeter. A total of 56 .223 caliber rounds were fired with no
evidence indicating the subjects discharged their weapons.
FBI
Laboratory ballistic tests determined the 56 shell casings, all
UNCLASSIFIED

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 ________

__________________

___________________

UNCLASSIFIED
To:
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I

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271748—D, 03/23/2009

.223 caliber, wer i-tri to the 11
”’g Agents wn
SA
1(2); siJ
SI’
s1
(3)
1(5); SA
6); SAl
I(10) SAJ
SA(
{4); and
rJ(13’;
1(10);
unknown (3).
Of the bullets)bu!±et ragutents recovered from the
subjects, only one bullet from Caidwell was positively identified
by the FBI Laboratory with an FBI weapon, which belonged to SA

I

At approximately 10:51 p.m., after the location was
secure, the West Palm Beach Fire Department (FD) was notified and
‘,ich mdjca1 assistance to the subjects.I
rn,nccd
I
Jwere transported to Saint Mary’s Medical
Jandi
Center. for further medical treatment.
Caidwell was pronounced
dead at the scene. I
Iwas transported to Saint Mary’s
Medical Center after a traffic accident and later placed into
custody at the West Palm Beach County Jail.
The West Palm Beach State Attorney opined his office
would not review the shooting because it was a federal matter.
On 12/18/2008, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of the Agents involved in
this shooting incident.
01/30/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the a)ove—captioned
shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael S. Clemens,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non—
he following voting members were in attendance:
rf.4counse1 Civil Rights Division,
minal Division, USDOJ; Chief
Inspec
Office of Inspections (01), INSO;
Jil Marie Euli z. CD—i. Eurasian Section,
Counterintelligence Division; A/SC
1
I Violent
rn Qg-i-4ri
Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (tiC)
’-arms Training Unit, Training Division (TD; tiC
1
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD Un
Practical Applications Unit, TD; uci
Weapons and Tactics 0
Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group; SSAgaveLawUnit,
Office
General C
Team Unit
I CR—2, Washington Field Off
Unit (IMU), 01, INSD, and Management
Program Analyst
IMU, 01, INSD, non-voting
were a so in attendance.
members,nspectioMAnaapmnt
Section

I

‘spec’aI

of

erations

tINcLASSIFIED

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Inspection
03/23/2009

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Prior to the discussion of this shooting ipcident
members were provided an overview by Chief Inspectorl_______
inprnhpc

SIRG

After a lengthy discussion of the incident, SIRG
thpt th iie of dd1v forc by SAs

nnnimcni1v ird

andi
I.ias justified and in conformance with the FBI’s
deadly force policy. this discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against any
of the Agents involved in this shooting incident.
SIRG members positively commented on the Miami
Division’s Operations Plan as well as the execution of the plan.

UNCLASSIF’XED

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UNCLASSIFIED

To:
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297—FIQ—A1271748—D,

Inspection
03/23/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTIOt4
AT WASHINGTON.,

QC

PhM- nr dmi,iqtrti- t±iOn be taken aaainst
SAs I

I

)

andi______
their involvement in this shooting inciaenc.

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
:1.
1

—

—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427

Mr.I
I USDOJ
I, USDOJ
Mn
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
(Attention: Ms. Eulitz)
Mr
Room 3280
Quantico
Mr
Mr
flI.’antico
-Mr
fuantico
Mr.
Ms.
IRoom 7326
Mr.
L Quantico
-Mr.
IWFO
Room 3043
Mrs.

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—
-

—

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—

UNCLASSIFIED

l0

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tas a resuit or

7

 _______Ifired

________________

(Rev. 05.01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
?recedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Attn:
Attn:

Kanss City

• From:

AD Jtl JO Lyons
SAC Brian A. Truchon

Inspection
Office of Insoections
Contact:

I

3pproved By:

7..

Drafted By:
Case ID #:

I

Lyons Amy j1
/
Clemens Mic4

I

Title:

10/19/2009

.

D7C

297—HQ—A1271659--D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
KANSAS CITY DIVISION
12/17/2008

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 12/17/2008, involving Special
Agent (SA)
I During the attempted arrest of a
fugitive, SA
two rounds from his Bureau—issued .45
caliber Springfield pistol.
In adition to being struck by one
of the rounds fired by SAl
Ithe subject shot himself in
the right temple.
SIRG members recommended that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
las a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident.
iministrative:
Reference report of Inspector
dated 04/10/2009.

I

1

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 12/16/2008, the Kansas City Division Violent Crimes
Fugitive Task Force (VCFTF) initiated a fugitive investigation to
locate and apprehend Terry G. Gordon, Jr., who was wanted by
local Kansas authorities for rape and aggravated indecent
liberties with a child. Task ,‘orce Officer (TFO) I
UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2093

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 4

UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:
I

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271659—D, 10/19/2009

I a Kansas City, Kansas Police Department (KCKPD)
detective, identified a potential location for the subject.
Personnel assigned tothe VCFTF agreed to meet near the
identified location the next morning in anticipation of Gordon’s
potential arrest.

On 12/17/2008, at approximately 6:00 a.in., as VCFTF
personnel were traveling toward the pre-arrest meeting siter TFO
I
I contacted the FBI radio operator to confirm the active
warrant for Gordon.
He traveled to the suspect location and
observed, what he bçlieyed to be the subject’s vehicle parked in
the driveway.
TFOI
I maintained survei]
lance on the
1
residence and advised the VCFTF Coordinator, SA
of his observations.

I

TFOI
I

SAl

idrove.

to the target location and replaced

Ln maintaining surveillance to allow TFO

Itime to
task force personnel at the
meeting site.
TFO I
onducted a pre-arrest biefing
with TFOI
I as well as FBI SAl
I and [
1
I
I He circulated photographs of Gordon, displayed a
copy of an NCIC wantád person printout, described the target
residence, indicated the possible presence of a female and a
child inside the residence, and indicated vehicles in the
driveway were registered to the female and (Zôrlnn.
7n dditional
TFO, Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooperl
I was en
route but his arrival was delayed by weather-related road
conditions.
Concerned that neighbors in the area mioht_alert Gordon
to the presence of law enforcement personnel, SAl
I radioed
instructions to the assembled pnn to move to the residence b6
to effect Gordon’s arrest.
b7C
SAl
Idrove from his
surveillance location to the residence, activated his vehicle’s
emergency lights, and assumed a position to the rear of the
residence. As oth task force personnel arrived, TFOI
replaced S24
Jat the rear of the residency.
SAl
proceeded to tne tront of the residence and TFOI
lassumed a
position on the front.right of the house, while TFO1
I
and SAl
went to the front porch.
TFOI
Iknocked on
the front door and announced, “police.”
After knocking on the front door and announcing police
presence multiple times, TFOI
I and other personnel began
loudly knocking on all of the doors and windows of the residence,
announcing, TIpolice,Ir and calling for Gordon
After receiving no
response, TEOI
jobsarved a female neighbor entering her
UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED
To:
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Inspection
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vehicle.
He approached the neighbor who confirmed .the likelihood
of Gordon’s presence inside the residence.

I

S4
Iheard movement inside the house and SA
Iheard noises emitting from the front right area of the
residence.
Based upon information in his possession at the time,
Jassessed that the target location was likely o be
SAl
Gordon’s residence and decided to make forced entry.
SAl
I
obtained a battering ram from his vehicle and oroceede to the
back door.
Prior to utilizing the rain, TFQ
Ichecked
the back dqo and was able to open it without force. TFO
I
Iyelled into the house before entering, advising it was
the police and for Gordon to come out. Receiving no response
from inside, TEOI
tannounced police were entering the
residence.
Within moments of the art tm making entry, an
adult female, later identified asl
I was observed near
a bed in the rear of the house, attempting to conceal herself
between a ed an nearby television set. As TFOI
I
jo stand
how her hands, he observed a
instructedi
male child with her. TFOI
bserved the female holding her
hand over the child’s mouth. I
Iadvised she did not answe the
door because she did not know who they were. At that noint. I
requested a display of credentials or badges. TFOI__________
pointed to his outer garment chest which revealed his KCKPD badge
emblem and opened his jacket revealing additional police markings
on his vest.
He then proceeded to display his badge.
When asked if Gordon was present in the residence,I______
provided vague and deceptive responses.
During further
questioning and after a search of the first floor failed to
locate_Gorçlon, the child indicated he was upstairs. TFO
I
asked
hf Gordon had a gun. and she indicatd he id not. To
ensure the safety of law enforcement personnel
Iwas
handcuffed prior to a search of the second floor.

b7

Prior to proceeding upstairs, movement was heard from
the second floor.
The arrest team called up the stairs
attempting to convince Gordon to surrender.
SAl
Iled the
search of the second floor, followed by TFOsI
land I
I
and SAl_________
At the top of the stairs, SAl
jobserved Terry
Gordon sitting on the floor of the edroom holding a revolver
pointed at his right temple. As SAl
Imoved to thç riht
door jamb, he instructed Gordon to drop his weapon.
SAl
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 UNCLASSIFIED

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Inspection From:- Inspection
297—HQ—A1271659—D, 10/19/2009

activated the laser of his pistol and aimed the lr indIcat
or
first on Gordon’s chest and then on his chin. SAl
lagain
instructed Gordon to drop his gun.
Gordon responded, “I am not
going to priôn frr 25 years.” Within seconds of the verbal
exchange, Sl
observed Gordon grimace and move his finger,
which had been resting on the trigger guard, to the trigger.
Gordon drd hi elbow and tightened his grip on the gun,
leading s1
Itobelieve Gordon might be turning the gun
toward law enforcement personnel. TFOI
I also noticed the
motion of Gordon’ right arm and believed Gordon was about to
shoot,
TFOI
I assessed Gordon’s manner as one of defiance
instead of resignation and anticipated Gordop was abut to turn
his weapon on law enforcement personnel. SAl
Ifired two
rounds and also heard Gordon’s weapon fire. A fourth shot was
fired by Trooped
lat approximately the same time.
F

Gordon slumped backward with his hand still on the
pistol lying on his chest.
SAl
linstructed participants to
hold their positions while he continued to call for Gordon to
drop his weapon.
With no response, he proceeded to disarm and
handcuff Gordon.
SAl
Itook Gordon’s revolver, laid it on
the floor, and moved Gordon to a position to facilitate his
labored breathing.
Additional law enforcement personnel were requested as
well as Emergency Medical Services. The subj.ect was transported
to the University of Kansas Medical Center and pronounced dead
shortly after his arrival.
By letter dated 03/16/2009,
IDistrict
Attorney for the Twenty-Ninth Judicia
istrict of Kansas,
documented his investigation into the matter as well as his
determination that no criminal liability existed against any law
enforcement officers involved in the attempt to arrest Terry
Gordon, at which time Gordon committed suicide. On 04/10/2O09,
DOJ Civil Rights Division telephonically advised there was no
cause for a criminal investigation into the shooting incident.
On 09/09/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-voting member.
e following voting members were in
attendance:
J, Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USOJj
JJAttorrey, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Chief Inspectorl
I 0fice of Inspections, INSO;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD—4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson,
UNCLASSIFIED
4

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UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271659—D,

Inspection
10/19/2009

Violent C
‘riminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (tiC
I irmc Trining Unit, Training
ZI
Division (T
Practical Applications
Unit, TD; UI
I Special Weapons an Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; UCI
I
1 Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSAI
I
Law Unit, Office of Geheral Counsel; and SSAI
I C—2, Washington Field Of fice The following non—voti.ng
members were also in attendance:
SC Ellen B. Icochea, Strategic
Analysis Section (SAS), INSD; UCI
I nspection
Management Unit (IMU)., SAS, INSO; SSAI
I
Inspection An.1’iig unit (Tifl
SAS, .INSD; Management and Program
Analyst (MAPA)I
IAU, SAS. IND; NPAL
I
-“-“

I

I

INSD;

lIMO,

TTQr.

rI

1

and MAPAI

-

IMU, SAS,

INSD.

I :AU, SAS,

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Sithsuent to an overview of the incident provided by
Inspectorl
I SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of
deadly force by SAl
1 was justified and in
conformance with the FBI’S deadly force policy.
This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no administrative action be
taken against 524
s a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
The only comment made regarding the incident was the
fact that officers spent one-half hour attempting to obtain entry
into the residence which created a greater risk for them being
injured.
SIRG members unanimously agreed to adopt the following.
observations of the Shooting Inciden1 Review Team which will be
forwarded to the Special Agent in Charge of the Kansas City
Division:
ISSUE #1:

There was little indicia of flight by subject
Terry Gordon, and little indicia significant
investigative skill or resources had to be
ecpended in his apprehension, leading to the
UNCLASSIFIED
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concern that the Kansas City VCFTF was setting a
low thesho1d for fugitive preliminary inquiry
status.

ECOMMEI,DArION #la:

That the Kansas City Division ensure its
VCFTF is following documented protocols
for adopting fugitive investigations to
ensure it does not become a warrant
squad.

RECONDATION #lb:

That the Kansas City VCFTF ensure
thorough fugitive investigation is
conducted to ensure a robust knowledge
and understanding of the subject
s
t
capabilities and propensity for a
violent .encounter.

ISSUE #2:

Adherence to VCP1’F standard operating procedures.
The overall planning for the arrest of the subject
was found to be typical of an FTF where
participants consistently work as a team in a
fairly standard manner.
In the case of the Kansas
City VCFTF, division Executive Management did not
require a formally documented arrest plan for such
daily arrest opportunities by a team with
effective tactical training and known
capabilities. Rather Kansas City employed
standard operating procedures (SOPs) involving a
pre-arrest meeting where the subject’s
description, photograph, and related intelligence
is shared, an approach is developed, and standard
equipment and clothing is used.
Such can
reasonably be utilized in cases involving violent
crimes and fugitive task forces, particularly
where adherence to the SOPs is rigorous.
In this
case, the Kansas City VCFTF followed the SOPs to
effect what should have been a somewhat standard
subj ect apprehension.
One feature changed and affected both the SOP and
the result.
Due to weather and traffIc, TFOI
I
larrived late to the subject’s residence.
I
Rather than meet with othe,r Agents and TFOs at then.
rally point, TrOl
Idrove directly to the
target location to join the rest of his team, who
were already surrounding the residence.
In his
UNCZASSIFtED
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UNCLASSIFIED

To:
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Inspection From:
Inspection
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haste to support his colleagues, TFOI
Ifailed
to wear his body armor.
Nor did he have &tra
magazines, his baton, or OC spray that might have
been employed if less than deadly force was
needed.
The SIP.T noted that at one point during the
attempted arrest of Gordon, all of the VCFTF

members were inside the residence, leaving no law
enforcement perimeter to intercept a fugitive who
could have attempted to flee from his hiding spot.
Again, rigorous adherence to SOPs should prevent a
situation where the law enforcement perimeter
breaks down.
The SIRT also noted if TFOI
Iwas further
delayed, the remaining VCBTF consisted of only
five personnel.
Such a limited force increases
the prospects for success by a fleeing or
resisting subject as well as the physical jeopardy
to those chasing or working to apprehend him.
In
light of limited personnel resources, Kansas City
should consider the use of local, marked police
units as force multipliers and to enhance
identification of the law enforcement team.
ECONDATION #2a:

•

RECONDATION #2b:

That the Kansas City Division review
and, as appropriate, redocument/
repromulgate VCFTF SOPs with respect to
having a minimum number of law

enforcement personnel on each planned
operation and to ensuring a perimeter
around a target location.
That the Kansas City Division review,
and as appropriate, redocument/
repromulgate VCFTF SOPs with respect to
the use of state or local marked units
and personnel to support fugitive
apprehension efforts.

tJNCLSSIFIED

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UNCL.SSIFIED
To:
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Inspection From:
27—HQ—A1271659-D,

Inspection
10/19/2009

LE2D(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

flSPECTION
AT WASE-IINGTON.

DC

That rib aministrative action be taken against
SA
as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

7C

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
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-

—

-

-

—

Mr.

Ms.
Mr.I
Mr.I

Pistole, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427

I risDoJ

I USDOJ
Anderson Room 4825
Johnson, Room 3280
I Quantico
lopantico

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
I crRc
(Attention:
Mr.f
Mr.
Quantico
Ms._________ Room 7326
Mr.
I Quantico
IWFfl
Mr.
Mrs.I
I Room 3043

I

+4
UNCLASSI’XED
*

S

Savage-2100

 __________land

___________

(Rev. 05.01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

08/07/2009

AD Amy J
0 Lyons

InspectlQn
Of ficè of Insontions

I

Contact:

Approved BY/4l/Z Michael S
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

I

Ilrr

297—HQ—A1271462-D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
COLUMBIA DIVISION
11/28/2008

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipcident that occurred on 11/28/2008, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I During a confrontation_with a
peeping torn at her residence while off duty, SAl
Ifired
one round from her Bureau-issued Sig Sauer P228 pistol, injuring
the subject.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative
action be taken against SAl
las a result of her
involvement in this shooting incident.
Adxainistrative:
Agent (SSA)I

Reference report of Supervisory Special
I dated 12/19/2008.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

sL

On 11/28/2008, at approximately 9:15 p.m.,
was at home with her two children and an adult niece.
Hearing
her dog who was locked in a pen outside of her residence barking
continuously, SAl
1went outside to release the dog and
returned ins4.de.
As her dog continued barking and growling,
her niece went outside with a flashlight.
The dog led SAl
Ito bushes on the side of her
house near a window where she and her niece heard a rustling
UNCLASS IFIED

Savage-210 1

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271462-D,

Inspection
08/07/2009

noise.
Both individuals went inside the house and sal__________
returned to the outside area with her handgun where he
discovered a man in dark clothing in the bushes.
SA__________
issued verbal commands for the individual to come out with his
hands viih ver, the subject came out and walked toward
her.
SAl
Icould not see the subjects hands and as he
stepped close to her she reached to grab his hands but he pulled
away and began struggling with her.
Pina fpr her safety, as
well as the safety of hr family, SAl
Ifired one round
striking the ubiect in his right buttock. As he attempted to
walk away, SAl
Icontinued to issue commands for the man
to at nfl th ground.
As he continued walking around the area,
sI
hnd her niece grabbed the subject and forced him to
the ground where he was handcuffed. At this point, SAl_________
recognized the subject as a neighbor who lived a few houses down
the street.
The Greenville County Sheriff
t a Office responded to the
scene and the subject was arrested and transported to a local
hospital for medical treatment for his gun shot wound.
on 12/11/2008, the State of Sout rvrt1in. Solicitor
recommended no criminal charges against SAl
I On
05/18/2009, a declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
regarding the actions of SAl
I
On 05/28/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance:I
I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ;I
[Attorney, Criminal Division, EJSDOJ;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson,
Violent Crimc Stinfl. criminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (DCI
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Divisipn (TD; IJC1
Practical Applications Unit,
TD:_DCI
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSA
I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory
Division; SSAI
I Special Weapons and Tti
Operations Unit, Critical incident Response Group; SSAI
j Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counel; and
‘a
I CR-17, Washington Field Office. ticI________
I Inspection 4ariagement Unit fIND), 01, INSD, and
Management Program Analyst
I IMU, 01, INSD, non
voting members, were also in attendance.
UNCLASS IFIED

2

Savage-2102

 UNCLASSIFIED

TO:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271462—D,

Inspection
08/07/2009

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
•

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) e’.a1uate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and C4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified and in conformance with the
FBIs deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
a result of her involvement in this shooting
incident.

UNCLASSIFIED
‘4

Savage-2103

 UICLA$SIFIEU

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271462—D, 08/07/2009

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

fl3SPECTION
WASHINGTOL

DC

That no adnistrative action be taken against
SA I
I as a result of her involvement in this
shoot ing incident.

D

i7C

1
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

—

-

—
-

-

-

—

—

—

—

-

-

—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1. USDOJ
Mr.J
Mr.I
I USDOJ
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
Mr.
Quantico
Mr. if
‘fl’lantico

Mr.I

(Aterition:
MrJ

I rr

I

lr.i
Quantico

Ms.________ Room 7326
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.__________
Mrs.
I Room 3043

++
UNCLàSStEIED

4
Savage-2104

 _______________1rr

(Rev. 05-OI-200S)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

08/05/2009

AD Amy Jo Lyons

Attn:

Inspection
Office of Tnrtinn

Contact:
Approved

I

I
Michael S

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

)b

297—HQ-A1270968—D

lb 7C

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
12/03/2008

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipcident that occurred on 12/03/2008, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I During the attempted arrest of
a fleeing fugitive, SA j
[ired two rounds from his Bureau—
issued Glock, .40 caliber handgun.
SIRG members_recommended that
no administrative action be taken against SA
s a result
of his involvement in this shooting incident.

I

Administrative: Reference report of Inspector-in-Placej
j dated 03/11/2009.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
.reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
In Jotrrnber 200g. sAl
jJas
investigatingi
a convicted felon who was a
[
suspect in numerous armed bank robberies as well as local armed
robberies.
lb 6
lb/C

On 11/07/2008, a bank robbery occurred at a Wachovia
Bank in Kannapolis, North Carolina.
During the robbery, the
suspect çlisplayed a silver handgun and forced all bank occupants
to the floor.
Investigation by SAl
land the local Police
UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2105

 _________

T.JNCIASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—1-IQ--A1270968—D, 08/05/2009.

Department developedi
las a suspect in the Kánnapolis_bank
robbery and a state arrest warrant was obtained fort
I
On 11/21/2008, I
Iwas arrested in an apartment
complex in Charotte.
Subseauen tol
‘arrest, it was
determined thati
hived at the apartment with him
and provided consent for a search of the residence. Officers
located a bag containing dye-stained currency, a nine millimeter
handgun, a .45 caliber Smith and Wesson handgun with red dye
located on the weapon, and numeriroirns of ammunition for the
handguns.
During his statement,t
ladmitted he committed
the 11/07/2008, bank robbery and advised law enforcement
personnel he always carried his weapon loaded so people would
take him seriously.
When aestioned by SAl
I admitted she
assistedi
tin staoing a Ford Escort in anticipation of the
bank robbery. I
Eadmitted she had ganeral n1øH th&t
iplanned to rob the Wachovia Bank, advisedL
I
ItTalways
has a gun, “and indicated he slept with a gun on the night stand
and carried the weapon outside of the apartment.

I

Followingi
hinterview, si
land a
Concord Police Department Detective realizedi
Ihad a tattoo
on his neck which was consistent with a sr of ained bank
robberies in the Charlotte area.
SPI
Ireturned to the
jail in an attempt to question
I about the CharlotrP rPH
robberies; however, at some point during the interview,I
I
invoked4iis right to counsel. At that time, SAl
I told
Ithe FBI intended to indict him for the other bank
robberies.
On 12/02/2008, SAl
bet with an Assistant United
States Attorney (AUSA) for the Middle District of North Carolina
who agreed to federally indicti
jfor the bank robberies at
the December Grand Jury.
On 12/03/008,

a local detective advised SA
Imade bond and was released from jail.
SA
immeiate!y contacted the AUSA requesting concurrence and
authority to arrestj
I based on probable cause for the
federal bank robberes.
The AUSA authorized SAl
I to
arrest J
or federal bank robbery charges and he also
learned iocai. authorities obtained a new State arrest warrant
authorizing the arrest oft
Ion bank robbery charges.
that

UNCLASSIFIED
2

Savage-2 106

I

 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

I

Inspection From:
27—F1Q—Al270968—D,

Inspection
08/05/2009

At approximately 1:30
.m., si4_______ contacted
girlfriend’s
employçr to oh am her working
hours for the day.
SAl
learnedi
would end her
shift at 3:00 p.m., and at that time he notified his supervisor
of the situation. to determine jt was feasible to surveil
I
an attempt to locatel

1

At approximatçly 1:45 p.m., SAl
Itraveled to the
apartment where I
landi
Uririn 1i arrival,
I resided
and while waiting for a local detective, SAl
I scanned the
parking lo fan
lvehicle identified as a gold Chevrolet
Tahoe.
SAl
Idid not observe the subject
s vehicle in the
t
parking lot in front of the apartment building and backed his
Bureau vehicle into a parking space near the front entrance of
the bu.ilding awaiting the arrival of the detective.
Wh’i1 watching the front of the building, sAl
observedi
lexiting the breeze way of the huildin.
I-Ic
immediately contacted the detective to advise him of I
presence at the apartment complex and determined the detective
was approximav 15 minutes away from his location.
While on
the phone, SAl
I lost sight of I
Iwho had been making
his way oç foot toajd another set of aaartients locted dictly
behind SAl
Iloction.
SAl
Ibelievedi
Isaw
him and due to
Jas
I apparel was concerned that
armed and possb1y in the process of committing another armed
robbery.
idrove his Bureau vehicle toward the only
SAl
entrance/exit to the apartment complex in an attempt to prevent
I
Ifrom exiting. While driving toward the front of the
complex, SJ
Ilocated the subct driving his vehicle
toward the complex exit.
SAl
drove his vehicle toward
the subject vehicle, in a head-on position, in an attempt to stop
Ifrom fleeing.
I

Iiriitially stoppod hi vehiclç and SAl
I
I
exited his vehicle giving commands fort
Ito stop and turn
his ignition off. I
I froze, then reached down with his
right hand as though he was reaching for a weapon. SAl
I
drew his weapon and stepped out from behind hip car door,
orderingl
Ito turn off the ignition.
SAl
Iwas
ed between his vehicle and the subject vehicle when
reached up and placed his car in gear and drove backwards
fo
distnce_before revving his engine nd driving toward
SA
SAl
Iheard t vhi1 tires squeal as he
f 1€ on oo evading being hit b1
Ivehicle.
SAl
I
positioned himself behind the end of a parked vehicle and
UNCLASSIFIED
‘1

Savage-2107

 UNCI
A
1
S S IF lED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270968—D, 08/05/2009

L

I

observed
traveling back into the apartment complex at a
high rate of speed.

I
I

I
I

SAl
Ire-entered his vehicle and drove to the
only entrance/exit of the apartment complex believing he would
arrive in time to block the subject vehicle. At approximately
2:20 p.m., SAl
Icalled 911 and provided information
reqardin he situation as well as the description
ion
1
lncat
of I
’g the possibility existed thati
1
I
rld
on foot, SAl
Idrove through the apartment complex e and
trr1H 1-nard an intersection.
As he reached the intersection,
SAl
Isawl
Ion foot at the base of an embankment
loç roximately ten feet from the shoulder of the road.
SAl
I positioned himself where he could drive across the
street to keepi
un sight until_additional law enforcement
Dersonne1 arrived. I
Jsaw SAl
land stopped. SA
bservedI
Th hnrh hands inside his coat pockets
and later saw something in I
I right hand. Believing the
nhrt ould be a firearm, SA I
Icontinued to drive toward
Iwho turned and began climbing up the embankment toward
the apartment complex with this left side pointed toward SA.
stopped his vehicle, drew his weapon,
I SA
pointed it at
‘and shouted, I
top,’ at which time
topped and quickly turned his upper torso toward Sà
in an aggressiv manner.
Believing that
was
turning to shoot him, .SAI
It ired two r
is
Bureau—issued Glock, .40 caliber handgun.
S
saw
running
over
the
crest
of
the
hill.
I
At 11:30 p.m., local police received, a call that
Ihad been hiding in another apartment in he comoex and

had just

-

foot. Investigation determinedi
Jhad fled °
entered an apartment on a ruse,. and held the
occupants of the apartment against their will until law
from SAl

I

enforcement personnel left the area.

On 01/27/2009,__after being involved in a shooting and

kidnaping incident,I
Iwas arrested without incident by the
Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department.
On 05/28/2009, the SIG mt to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael

S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance:
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ;I
I Attorney, Criminal Division, USD03;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD—4, Counterespionage

1

UNCLASS IFXZD

4

Savage-2108

 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1270968—D,

Inspection
08/05/2009

Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC David J. Johnson,
Violent Crimes Sectiorr, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
Chief (UC)I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Divisiçn {TD; Gd
I Practical Applications Unit, C
Pfl CI
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; SSA
I Evidence ResoQnse Team Unit, Laboratory
I
Division; sSAI
I Special weapons. and Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
I
I
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; and
SSAI
CR-17, Washington Field Office.
ocp__________
I Inspection Manaaement Unit (1MG), CI, INSD, aria
.iriagemenu program Analyst
4 1MG, 01, INSD, non
voting members, were also n attendance.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
FBI’s deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
recommen.ation that no administrative action be taken against SA
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident
*

UNCLASSIFIED

5

Savage-2109

 _________ICIRG

UNCLASSIFIED

-

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—F-IQ—A1270968—IJ,

Inspection
08J05/2009

LEAD (s)
Set Lead. 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SAl
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

b7

1
2:
1

1

—

-

—

-

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms.
Room7427
Mr.!
I USDOJ

Mr.I

FUsDOJ

Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
Mr. Johnson, Room 3280
j Quantico
Nir.I
Mr.
IOuntico
Mr.
Mr.I
(Attention:
I
1
Quantico
Mr.!
1
Room 7326
Ms.!
1
Mr.
Quantico
.1-Mr.
IWFO
Mrs.
1
Room 3043
1
I
1
1
1

-

-

-

—

—

—

—
-

—

++
-

UNCLASSIFIED

6
-

Savage-2110

 05-01-2008)

UçLASSIFXED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF iNVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

AD Kevin L.

Inspection
Office of
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

Attn:

03/19/2009
Perkins

I

Perkins Kevin(/”
Clemens Micha

I

b2

Ilrr

297—HQ—A1271462—D

SHOOTThG INCIDENT
COLUMBIA DIVISION
04/27/2008

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 04/27/2008, involving Special
Agnt (S4)I
I. After being robbed by two individuals,
SAl
Ifired one round from her Bureau—issued Glock, Model 27,
.40 caliber pistol, resulting in the death of one of the
subjects.
SIRG memeis rcommended that no administrative action
be taken against SAl
las a result of her involvement in this
shooting incident.
Ainj1-t4-

Agenti

frie report of Supervisory Senior Resident
I dated 08/18/2008

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRO with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details f the Shooting Incident

I

•On 04/27/2008, at approximately 9:28 p.m., SAl
I
Iwbo is assigned to the Los nge1es Field Office (LAFO).,

was on vacation in Greenville
Carolina.
While standing
outside a cultural center, SA{
land two associatesjere
approached by two armed men.
The subjects demanded SAl
purse as well as the money and wallets of her two assoiates.
One of the subjects fired one round at the ground directly in
JNdLASSIFIED

Savage-21 11

I

bb
h7C

 she

UNCLASSI’IED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271462—D,.

Inspection
03/19/2009

front of the victims.
After obtaining the victims
t property, the
subjects turned nd moved to a vehicle identified as a Honda
lpursuedh bjects and attempted to stop
Passport.
SAl
them.
Using both hands, SAl
Ipointed her pistol at the
subject who entered the passenger side of the vehicle who was
saying something and turned to look at SAl
I According to SA
was able to-see the right side of the subject
s body,
t
but could not see his hands.
Believing the subject was not
complying withher demand to stop as he was turning toward her,
and fearinq he was attempting to gain access to a weapon in his
pocket, SAl
Ifired one round in the direction of the
passenger through the open vehicle window.
SA I
lattempted a
second shot, however_the weapon did not fire when she pulled the
trigger.
As SAl
Iwas attempting to get her weapon to
function, the driver of the subject vehicle drove away from the
area.

SAl

lensured the safety of her associates and

placed a 911 call to local authorities.
She provided the
responding officers with a description of the vehicle, the tag
number, and a description of the subjects.
Investigation revealed Si
lost her FBI badge,
credentials, credit card, handcuffs, and Blackberry, as well as a
personal cell phone, credit cards, and money.
On 04/27/2008, investigation determined SAL
1FBI—
issued cell phone was located in Laurens County; however, the
phone was no longer in operation a short time later.
Law
enforcement aathorities also determined the subject vehicle was

tof
iho resided with I
I
•a ha-.i sal-on epe.ra.tG-r 4-n -a•u•iens-ath&rt-ieso tame a search warrant forl
_d
I residence and hair salon.
Documents were obtain t hô locations_providing cellular
telephone numbers foi
land
I Information also
revealedi
[had lived at several addresses in
landi
North Carolina.
-

On 05/05/2008, the Laureas County Sheriff
s Office
t
discovered a Iadly decomposed body on a remote path in the woods.
The unidentified body appeared to have suffered a gunshot wound
that grazed the arm and entered one side of the torso and exited
the other.
On 05/07/2008, local authorities and Agents of the
Greensboro, North Carolina, Resident Agency located, interviewed,
and arrested
dmitted
I During the interview, p
UNCLASSIFID

2
-

Savage-2112

-________

LL

 UCLASSIIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271462--D,

inspection
03/19/2009

that he took part in the armed robbery of sj_______ placed the
body of his associate, identified as Luis Sanchez Santos, in the
woods in South Carolina; had the vehicle used in the robbery
crushed at an impound lot in North Carolina; and he b’irned SA
lalso
I
Ipurse and i nnnts in North Carolina. I
Ibadge into a ravine and disposed of
advised he threw SI
his weapon on the side of a highway between North and South
Carolina.
j was charged with three counts of armed
I
robbery, one count of possessing a firearm during a violent act,
and one count of pointing a firearm at an individual.
On 11/24/2008, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of_Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SAl
un this
shooting incident.
On 01/30/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
captioned shooting incident.
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-voting member. The following voting members were in
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights
attendance: I
t±nrnv. Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Division, USD0JI
of Inspections (OX),
Chief Inspectorl
INSD; Section Chief (SC) Jill Marie ulitz, CD-i. Eurasian
Section, Counterintelligence Division; A/SC I
I
Violent Ca4rnes Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit
I Pirirms Taining Unit, Training
Chief (UC)l
Dijision (TDi; uci
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD;
I
tICI
I Practical Applications Unit, TD; EJCL
I-Spec i
Wes—a4... T&ct-i-cs -Ope.ra.±ois- Utr
Critical Incident Response Group; SSA[
I
hi.
Tnipive Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSAj
I
lEvidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division; and
UC
j CR—2, Washington Field Office.
SSAI
1
I, inspection Management Unit (IMU), CI, INSD,
and Management Program Analyst
I IMU, 01, INSD,
non—voting members, were also in attendance.

lOffice

-,

•1

Observations and Recommendations of the St.G
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
•

UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-21 13

—

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection Fron:
297—HQ—A1271462—D,

Inspection
03/19/2009

operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recoimaendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recorrmendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
STP
unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
jwas justified and in conformance with the
FBI’s deadly torce policy.
This discussion resulted in the
endation that no administrative action be taken against SA
9
rnnm
a result of her involvement in this shooting incident.

The onJv_observation made by SIRG meinbers pertained to
the fact that SAl
Iweapon was not forwarded to the Weapons
Management Facility for examination to ensure the weapon was
properly functioning.
This observation will be added to a
“lessons learned” document and appropriately disseminated.

UNCLASS IFIED

4

Savage-21 14

 t3CLASS FIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—FIQ—A1271462—D,

Inspection
03/19/2009

LEAD(s)

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. D
SAl
inciaent.

Tht no administrative action be taken against
las a result of her involvement in this shooting

to 6
Ib7C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
-1—-Ms-—CaDroni ;—Ro’om- -7-4-2+
1
Mr. I
1 USDOJ
1
Mr.I J USDOJ
Mr. Anaerson, Room 4825
1
(Attention: Ms. Eulitz)
1
Mr.
Room 3280
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
Oi.antico
1
Mr.J
CIRG
1
Mr
uantico
1
Ms
room 7326
1
Mr
Quantico
1-Mr
WFO
1
Mr
Room 3043
1
—

—

-

—

-

-

-

I

-

-.

-

-

—

.

4+
t3NCLASS I’IED

5

Savage-21 15

  

 

FBI
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

2007

 

 

 

____

C

(Rev. OO4..2oo7)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

.ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Office o_____________
Contact:

Approved By:

12/20/2007

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Extension 4-1837

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Micthae
Rodriguez Micha

Drafted By:

lrr

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271788—D
Title:

SI4OOTIN INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
05/04/2007

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting in_pident that nrcirred on 05/94/2007, involving Special
Agent (SA)l
SA
I
J fired one round from his
Bureau—issued. Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol killing a
severely injured deer he struck with his Bureau vehicle. SIRG
members recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
I a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

Administrative:

I

Reference Electronic Coimnunication (EC) of SA
dated 05/08/2007.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 05/04/2007, at approximately ].l:30 p.m., SAl
I
was returning to his residence after completing an evening
shift in the New .York Field Office (T,WFO). As he was traveling
on a road in Tewksbury Township, tew Jersey, SAl
I struck a
deer attempting to run across the highway. SAl
Ixited his
vehicle and observed the severely injured deer lying
approximately fifteen feet off.of the highway. Recognizing the
animal was in extreme pain and unlikely to survive, SAL
1
fired one round into the deer’s head instantly killing the deer.

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271788—D, 12/20/2007

AI
Itelepboriically contacted local law
enforcement personnel to report the incident. Police Department
personnel advised they would not respond to the scene since the
dead animal was not blocking the roadway and there was no
apparent damage to SAl
lBureau vehicle.
On 12/03/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: I
I Deputy Chief, Gang Squad, Criminal
fliv1rn. United States bepartment of Justice (USDOJ);l
I
I
i Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Michael A. Rodriguez, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections
(01), INSD; Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section.
CD—i, Counteintelligence Division; Unit Chief (UC)l
I
I Defensive Systems Unit, TOO; U1
Indian Country/Special Crimes Unit, Violent Crimes Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;
ractical
Applications Unit, TDD; Acting UCI
I Special
weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group; SSA[
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
IFirearms
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSAI
I
Firearms Training Unit, TDD; and SSAI
I
Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel. SSAI
Management Program Analyst (MPA) I
Inspection Management Unit, 01, INSD, non-voting
members, were also in attendance.
—

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously aareed that no administrative
action should be taken against SA I
I as a result of his
involvement in this_shooting incident. However, members opined
that although SAl
I actions were humane, the shooting of
the injured deer was not within the current deadly force policy.
This matter win be brought to the attention of the Assistant
Director in Charge (ADIC) of the N’O to ensure future compliance
with the deadly force policy.

2

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271788-D, 12/2.0/2007

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Tbt nn jdministrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result oe his involvement in this
shooting incident.

7C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. CaororL, Room 7427
I 11SJ
Mr. I
1
1-Mr.I______ tJSDOJ
1
Mr. Casey, Room 5096
1
Ms. Leonard Room 3999
Quantico
1
Mr. I
(Attçntion: Mr.I
I
1
Mr. I
uantico
I, CIRG
1
Mr.I
-

-

—

1

—

-

-

1

1
1
1

-

—
—

Mr.I
Mr.
Ms.I

Mr&T

uantico
I Quantico
1. Room 7326

Room 3043

.4

3

 i5-2O4lRey. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

.
Copy

•

•

•

to:

Repoil of
Oate

lid
05120/2007

Case H #:

297-HQ-A1271286-1)

Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CINCINNATI DIVISION
04/26/2007

ctiasectet

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

I

Offlcc

Inspection

Gerald Mulato was the subject of a Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization
investigation. On March. 13, 2007, adihinistrative approval was obtain to place Global
Positioning Satellitc (GPS) tracking devices on two of Mulato’s vehicles. On April
26,2007, a team composed of a Technically Trained Agent (TTA), four Agents, and
two Task Force Officers, were in the process of installing a tracicing device on
Mulato’s Mercedes-Benz, which was in the subject’s apartment building parking lot.
The subject emerged from his aparttzent building armed with asetni-automatic pistol.
The HA and a cover Agent retreated from the subject’s vehicletowards.a nearby trash
dumpster forcover, vhiIe the subject pursued them man aggressive manner believing
they were tampering with his car. The subject pointed his weapon directly at the
retreating Agents. Law enforcement commands were made to Mulato by Aeris. As
the subject was closing in on the Agents behind the dumpster, SP4
)ho
was a perimeter/cover Agent, called” “and illuminated Mulato with his
o was 10-12 yards away without
flashlight. Mula pointed his weapon
cover. S
who feared for his life, flred• one round striking the subject in the
abdomen.
e su ject died en route to the hospital.

DETAILS:
•

On November 6, 2006, the Cincinnati Division (CI) initiated a Racketeering
Enterprise Jnvestigation(RBJ) on a possible Mexican Drug Trafflcking’Organization
(92C-CI-76049). On April 19, 2007, information from the REI was used to initiate a
full drug investigation on Mulato (28IC-CI-76576). Mulato’s drug organization was
suspected of being the largest black tar heroin distributor in the Citicinnati, Ohio, area.
Case Ageni
btained approval to install two 01’S tracking devices on
two.of Geraldo Mulato’s vehicles; a Mercedes-Benz and a Chevrolet Caprice. The
installation was scheduled for April 26,. 2007. Prior to the scheduled installation, HA

•

This document contains neither recommendationa nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FEZ
and is loaned to your agnc; it and its contents are not to be distrib,ztad outsida your agency.

6

 297-HQ—A1271286--D

C
1

7C

I

Jand Case AgenQmet to develop a plan. Pre-operational planning included
onducting reconnaissance on similar make and model vehicles to facilitate
deployment of the tracking 4evices on Mutate’s vehicles.
HAl

I

•

On Anri 26,2007 at 4:00 a.m. SADTTAI

I SA I
AF
1, TF(I
nd TFCI
for
an
opemt
iopal
briefing at the McDonalds Restaurant parking lot, Forest Park, Ohio, SA
d
SA
[
led
the briefing. The mission was to install a battery operated OPS tracking evice on two
of
Mutate’s vehicles, starting with Mulato’s Mercedes-Benz. The Mercedes-Benz was
in Mulato’s
apartment complex parking lot, 1995 Wayeross Drive, approximately 40-50 feet
from
building’s entrance. Mulato’s apartment building was three stories. Mulato had a rear,the
level apartment, which was on the opposite side of the building from where the Merce ground
des-Benz
was parked. Mulato did not have a window from his apartment with vision on
the
parkin
g lot
containing the Mercedes-Benz.

I 54

I

Iwas responsible for the actual OPS installation. SAF I would
4
TT
inmiedate proximi cover Agent, and he was positioned near the Mercedes- be
Benz urmgt 4
IS
ould be ppned behind a tra dumnr
approximately 25 feet from the arc es-Benz. SALJ SM
I TFC4
land TFO
F’
Iwould be inside their cars and serve as perimeter surveillance/cover. SA
as
stationed south ofMulato’s apartment parking lot in the adjacent Quail Court par
lot
SA
g
I
Iwas stationed west in the adjacent 2025 Waycross Drive parking; and, TFOs
I
and I
I were in the same car stationed north in a parking lot near the intersection of
Waycross and Seining Drives.

•

•

Everyone on the team, with the exception of SAs I
I andwere wearing
soft body armor. Everyone was casually dressed without any law enforcement identif
ication on
their clothing. Each team member was armed with their service pistol. No teant memb
er ha
covert clothing with the capability to quickly convert to “law enforcement” marked
clothing.

•

At 4:15 a.m., the entire team left the McDonalds. TTAnd SA
andi
Iwere driven into the aiea in SAChevrolet Suburban. At 4:20 a.m., everyoFl
ne
was in position, and the GPS installation team walked from SA vehicló in Quail
Court to
the subject’s Mercedes-Benz.
Shortly after ITA
.1 initiated the OPS’ installation from under the
Mercedes-Benz, a person, later identified asr
Lxited an adjoinina avartieat
building, 1997 Waycross Drive, and went to his car in the same parking lot.
S4__1adioed
the cin1 “clear”, which then required TTAI___Jand his cover team to clear
the area. 7’TA
land SAl
fretreated to the south side of Mulato’ apartment building, and SAI
totally concealed himself behind the trash dumpster. I
kioticed the suspicious iudiviauais
in dark clothing, the OPS installation team, and suspected they were burgla
a car. He
called police using “911” ‘to report the suspicions activity. He then sat in hisrizing
car
for
minutes, drove towards the parking lot area containing the Mercedes-Benz and trashseveral
dumpster,
and then left the lot to go to work.
-

ID? C

-

•

Shortly aftel
I car left the king lot, Officet
IForest Park
Police Department (FPPD), approached S
chicle and requested identification. The
officer was responding to the “911” call at 1995 Waycross Drive parking lot by
approaching
2

•

I

 ________Iwas

2 97-HQ-A127 1286—0

from an adjacent lot, Quail Court, south o
ocation. The officer became suspicious of SAl
and his vehicle ked in Quail Court. S
iscretel’ identified himself, and the officer left
the area. Offi
supervisor, Sergean
plaçnimi on approaching the
Mercede-Ben am no
95 Waycross Drive, but Offlçerl
Ivaived him off. However.
Sergeanti
hnd Office
remained in the area in case they were needed. Sergeand
1
took ui p position north of 1995 Wacro Drive,. which was the same general location as TFOs
land
L and Offlcerljarked Va mile further away.
I

S

At approximately 4:30 a..m., the OPS psta1latipn team resumed their positions.
Within several minutes, Mulato was observed by SAl
ming up the interior apartment
building stairwell towards the front door. SAI
I radioed ‘clear”, which was just prior to
Mulato throwing ape
oar to the apartment building. SAl
beard the slide of Mulato’s
gun being racked. S
bserved Mulato aggressively coming out of the door uohting a silver
handgun in the direction o the Mercedes-Benz. According to SI
ISA1
Isaid, “he’s
2ot a czup,” and SArecalled someone, possibly SI
I calling out “gun.” TTA
Iwas on hisbáók near the Mercedes-Benz and saw Mulato with
I
1; he grabbed his
tech bags and ran past the east side of the dumpster directly towards S
chicle.
-

•

•

•

•

Ljuickly shuffled towards the west
dumpster without turning
S1
his back on the subject for fear of being shot in the back. S
as on the wçst sidq of the
dumpster, and he saw Mulato in the parking lot moving towar
position as SAl
Icame
around the west side of the dumpster. S
saw Mulato with agun
d his arm
extended straight, and pointing the gun in the direction pf SA
I an
SAl
I
curled fhrther behind the dumpster, and both he and SI
Vost sight o u ato who was
advancing quickly on the dumpster.
Mulato was yelling in English to the GP.’j int11atjon team. SAaeard
Mulato say h
1 Enaiib, “you trying to steal my shit:” SA
heard, “you messing with my
shit” and SAl
Iheard, “that’s my car.” SAl
Ieard, “thafs my car, mother flicker,
that’s my fucking car.”
As soon as S1
Iyl c’tve behind the dumpster, he called out “police” or
“FBI” and to “get your h
u “ SAl
Iheard loud voices but was unable to discern what
was said. He did hear SA
“drop it” more than once, but was unsure if it
before
or after the single gun sho.
eard voices yelling, “FBI” and “gun.” S
who
was running towards the dumpster, ear people yelling, but could not make out wha was being
said.
SA
bpproach from his cover position west of the parking lot, then stood up
between two cars 10-12 yards frorp Mu1to. Mulato’s weapon was pointed in the direction of the
Agents behind the dumpster. SA I
hointed his weapon at Mulato, illuminated Mulato with
his flashlight, md 1led out, ligunhi to warn his fellow Agents. Mulato responded by pointing his
weapon at SAL
L who bad no cover between
elf and Mulato. SM
Ifired one
round, hitting Mulato in the stomach, then S
yelled again, “FBI, drop the gun.” lvfulato
fell back against his Mercedes Benz, then slid tot e rOund He kept the gun in his hand until
his buttocks hit the ground, then the gun fell out. SI
irepeated his cornniands several
times until Mulato released the pun. SAl
bnly tired one round due to the first round
imniobilizirig Mulato, and SAL Iwas able to move to a position of cover until Mulato.
dropped the gun.
-

•

3

I

h6
lb 70

 297—HQ-A127 1286—fl

TFO
verc approximately 100 yards north of the
land
Mercedes-Benz. They observed the installation team scrambling and someone, later identified as
Mulato, chasing them. They were too far away to discern if Mulato had a weapon, but they drove
their car to the scene a fast as they could to support the scrambling installation team. En route
to the Mercedes-Benz,j
Llid not hear a gunshot.
I heard one gun shot, buti

1 FPPD, observed through his night vision scope Agents moving
Sergeantl
around the parking lot, then an individual ran from the area of 2025 Waycross Drive towards the
1995 Waycross Drive parking lot. SAF
perimeter cover assigm1ent was in the vicinity o
2025 Waycros Drivç. A second or two later, Sergeani
baw a muzzle flash and heard one
shot. Sergeanti
Itumed on his emergency lights and drove to the scene. A white car with
tinted windows parked near ergeantI
lalso started its engine and rushed towards the scene.
Upon arrival, Sergeani
lirew his weapon thinking the indivij
”lc in thiscar were
1
attempting to engage the FBI. He ordered them to halt, and TFO
I and
I
identified thethselves as FI3L
SAl
Ibegan administering chest compressions to Mulato. Sergeanj
I
.1 local fireman and an apartment building resident,
provided a medic bag. I
assisted with cardio pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and first aid. The subject was transported by
the Forest Park Fire Department and died en mute to the hospitaL

•

The time frame from Mulato exiting his apartment building until being shot was
estimated at approximately 20 seconds. Given the stressful situation, interviewees measured the
time based on their actions, rather than in seconds and minutes. S
Iwas able to shuffle at
4
a quick ra a
ately25 feet, then make several law enforcement commands pri
the
shot. S
able to run approximately 100 feet before hearing the shot. S
as
able to put s car in reverse, realize the installation team was not retreating to his car, an then
get out of his car to run approximately 50 ibet prior to the shot. By the time TFOs I
hnd
I
Iwere able to start their car and drive 100 yards, Mulato was already on the ground
shot. I
I, Mulato’s wife, estimated Mulato had just enough time to walk un th
apartment’s interior steps and into the parking lot before she heard the shot. Sergeani
I
observed Agents movingaround the parking lot, then. someone rim finn the area of 2025
Waycross Drive and, within a second or two, fired one shot. SAl
I placed the time at 20
seconds. Based on the totality ofwitness descriptions, the best estimate of the time frame from
Mulato exiting his apartment building to being shot was approximately 20 seconds.

•

Subsequent investigation determined Mulato recentl.y installed a small
audio/video camera on the corner ofhis apartment building. The audio/video camera was near
the location whçre TT
land SAl
look cover on the south side of the apartment
building due tol
Ilingering in his car in the parking lot, as well as the FPPD officer
approaching Sei
car. Mulato installed the audioMdeo camera due to frequent break-ins of
his multiple vehicles in the parking lot. The camera was targeted on the Mercedes-Benz, and the
monitor was in Mulato’s bedroom.

•

According td
1 Mulato’s wife. Mulato was awaken by a noise
from the monitor and observed individuals on the video monitor. He then jumped out ofbed, got
dressed, grabbed his pistol from under his pillow, and rushed out of the apartmentl
heard
who she thought was Mulato, but she was not certain, saying, “it’s okay man”, then. she heard a
4

•

 .
297—RQ—A1271286—o

single gun shot. During the same interview,F__Iniade a conflicting statement saying she
heard the shot first, then Mulato saying, “it’s okay man”, once or twice. She did not hear
anything else through the audio monitor. The audio/video system did not have the capability to
record.

•

A neighborhood canvas was conducted. ResidenU
ladvised he
walked to the dumpster prior to the shooting and observed someonPil, 2111n talking to
someone in a white vehicle in the adjacent Quail Court parking lot.
Idumped his trash,
and returned to his apartment building, 1997 Waycross Drive, which was attached to Mulato’s
building, 1995 Waycross Drive. As he neared the entrancq tn hi hiiiltlipg, he heard someone
yell, “don’t... stop..FBI!” He then heard a single gun shot4
lobservation
white
vehicle, presumably SAl
Ivehicle, with a person in uniform, presumably Office
adds
credibility tc[
iafement. However, the seven Agents and TFOs who provi ed
statements were all either in or observing the lot which contained t
er, yet not one of
them sa’r
I empty his trash. in the dumpster, to include S
ho was using the
dumpster as cover and concealment.
Another neighbor,1
ladvised he has witnessed Mulat
d his
friends shooting firearms into the air at night on many occasions. Mulato told_____ e shot at
someone trying to break into his vehicles on a previous occasion.
On the same day after the shooting, the FPPD obtained state search warrants for
Mulato’s apartment and his II vehicles in the parking lot. The search warrants’ probable cause
was drug related. The search warrants did not locate drugs or weapons.
Immediately following the shooting incident, the Cincinnati Evidence Response
Team (ERT) processed the crime scene. One .40 caliber shell casing was recovered on the west
side of the parking lot. One bullet projectile was recovered from the victim at the time of the
post mortem examination. The Hamilton County Crim
ad the projectile had
projectile markings similar to test rounds fired from S
0 caliber Glock, but not
suoient for a full identification. The autopsy report dcterrnined the cause of death frominternal
hemorrhaging caused by a gunshot wound to the stomach, which lacerated the right external iliac
artery. Mulato’s toxicology report identified cocaine in his system.

•

•

In summary, subject Mulato brandished a weapon. and was moving towards
Agents in an aggressive manner. Agents called out a variety of law enforcement commands, as b
they moved away from the threat. It was possible, maybe even likely, Mulato never
comprehended the installation tçam dressed in casual clothes were law enforcement.
Nevss Mulato posed an 1mm’
of serious bodily injury to at least SAsI
I
andL..J Additionally, when S
onfronted Mulato to interrupt his threat to the Agents
behind the dumpster, Mulato pointed his weapon at SAl
I SM
‘had no cover e
Mulato arl himself, and Mulato posed an imminent threat of serious bodily injury to SAl
SAl
I announced, “gun”, then found one round. SAl Icontinued to call out iav
entércement commands until Mulato dropped the weapon.

•
5

 ____

-31-2OO)

-

-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attu:

Director’s Office

From:

Inspection
Contact:

pproved By:

4-1837

perkins Kevin(’j’
Clemens

Ilrr

Case ID #: 297—HQ—Aj.271781—D

.

AD Candice H. Will, OPR

[

Drafted By:

Title:

02/05/2008

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEWARK DIVISION
04/05/2007

/ /

1/

O1GIDOJR

LI’

Date2_______
’flI
1
LGIDOJIIES
.

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
Special
a shooting incident that occurred on 04/05/2007.
Weapons
Special
Division
Newark
the
to
Agents (SAs) assigned
and Tactics (SWAT) Team and the Special Operations Group (SOG)
initiatf a surveillance on a group of violent bank robrs.
DurTthe attempted arrest of one of the suspects, 54
I
I fired three rounds froxn his M-4 carbine, killing SA
Bafry Lee ush.
SIRG members recommended that no
las a result
adrâinistrative action be taken against 3I
Perkins
AD
incident.
shooting
this
in
of his involvement
however, chose to addend SIRG’s findings and refer this matter
to OPR for consideration of imposing administrative sanctions.
Reference report of InspectorI
dated
08/01/2007.
j

Adxninistrati’re:

I

I

This communication was prepared to furnish the
Details:
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
Newark Division Agents conducted an investigat.on
for approximately two months into violent bank robberies
Investigation
committed by a gang of Hispanic males.

identified six males who had cothmjtted a series of armed bank
robberies in Central New Jersey and further revealed the
subjects used stolen vehicles while committing the robberies
and were heavily armed with a .380 handgun, AK—47 and SKS—type

•r4

4- / c75 77 /

I

 To:
Re:

Director’s fice From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271781—D, 01/17/2008

assault rifles.
The suspects fired shots while inside the
last three banks being robbed.
On 03/22/2007, the New Jersey Regional Operations
Intelligence Center produced an “Alert” which detailed the
activity of the bank robbery group and provided information
regarding previous bank robberies, suspects with their
photographs, as well as weapons and vehicles used during the
robberies.
The “Alert” was provided to Newark SOG personnel.
Once the subjects were identified by the Newark
Division, a written Operations Order (OP Order) was prepared
and approved to conduct surveillance on the subjects in order
Physical
to develop probable cause for their arrest.
surveillance was initiated on the main subject, identified as
Bsed on the knowledge that the group was
most active on Thursdays and Fridays, physical surveillance
was established during the week of 03/30/2007, and plans
called for the surveillance to continue the Thursday and
Friday of the following week of 04/02/2007. The SWAT team was
involved in a support role to effect an arrest of the subjects
“at the location of the switch car to the stolen car, prior to
’
t
the commission of the next bank robbery.

.

10

h7c
Separate written OP Orders were prepared and
approved for the SWAT Team, the squad, and the SWAT medics,
and the SOG had a written surveiiiace request. The “Overall
Summary of Primary Plan” Section of the auad OP Order
1 arid
specifically stated, “To surveil subject I
others utilizing aerial and ground units in an effort to
develop sufficient probable cause that subjects are attempting
and/or conspiring to commit armed bank robbery. To effect
safe arrest of subjects by tactical units subsequent to
sufficient probable cause and prior to entry into a commercial
’ The contingency section of the OP Order stated, NOTE:
t
bank.
SOG/OR OTHER E RSONNEI (NON-TACTICAL) SaouLp NO ATTEMPT
TO A?1EST SUBJECTS UNLESS IN A LIFE TREATENING SITUATION.”
-

The squad OP Order did not specifically instruct
Agents to wear ballistic vests; however, the SOG supervisor
counseled SOG meiflbers to wear their ballistic vets during
this operation.
Although OP Orders were prepared and approved, the
Newark Division did not hold a joint briefing to include the
SaG, SWAT, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies
involved in the operation.
The SWAT OP Order instructed team members to wear
full tactical gear and indicated the SWAT teams would be split
into two vehicles.
Although the SWAT OP Order did riot include
2

 To:
Re:

Director’s Zfice From:
Inspedtioa
297—HQ—A1271781—D, 01/17/2008

a contingency for the arrest of the subjects if they split
into two vehicles which were not together at the time of the
arrest, the contingency was discussed and practiced in the
early morning hours of 04/05/2007.
The SWAT Team OP Order
also indicated, ‘Newark SWAT will maintain a presence in the
Command Post (CP) with 1 SSA and another SSA in the Tactical
Operations Center (TOC).” It should be noted that on the day
of the incident, no SWAT SSA was in the OP o the TOC.

.

A OP was established at the Franklin Township
Resident Agency (FTRA) in Somerset, New Jersey, and was
staffed by state and. boa], law enforcement officers involved
in the previous bank robbery investigations. The OP was also
rint. the SOG SSA, SSA I
staffe4 by th
I
I S24
I of the Red Bank RA (RBRA); SSA
I
lActing ASAC (A/ASAC)i
KSSRA of
the FTRA), and in the early morning hours, A/ASAC I
I
Idepioyed to the area ot tne
I
I A/ASACI
surveillance as the On-Scene Commander (OSC) prior to the
shooting incident. Newark established a TOO inside a mobile
home located in the parking 1t of the FTRA to relay tactical
I
I (050), SSA I
information to the OP. A/ASACI
Technician
(SWAT Coordinator), and £1ectronic
(ET)
were in a vehicle in the area of the
i
rrest and acted as a mobile OP. A.lthçugh
was the 050 he believed he was C
A/ASAC
cornman er wi
lwho was located in the CP at the
ASACI
FTRA.
Newark Agents conducted physical surveillance as
On
well as cellular phone monitoring of subject
04/04/2007, a physical surveillance was established in the
area of I
I residence from 7:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. on
Due to unusual activity at the residence, as well
04/05/2007.
as I
I cellular phone activity, law enforcement personnel
believed .he group was plapning to commit a robbery on
04/05/20G7, resulting in a SOG team re-establishing physical
surveillance at 5:00 a..m., on 04/05/2007.
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on 04/05/2007, a second
I arrived at the’
subject, identified as’
jexited
residence in a white Acura vehicle, p
landl
the residence, entered the white Acura, and rave1ed to
another residence in New Brunswick, New Jersey, where_they
I then
landi
spoke to an unidentified individual.I
proceeded to another location in New Brunswick where another
i loaded what
subject, identified asi
appeared to be a large bag into ttie rear of the vehicle. The
bag appeared to be one in which skis would normally be
transported and Newark Agents believed the bag contained long
weapons because the group had previously used that type of
3

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s ficé
t
Director
297-HQ—Al271781—D,

Inspection
From:
01/17/2008

weapon during robberies. I
I entered the vehicle
and the three subjects drove to the Bridgewater Commons Mall
where they entered a parking garage and shortly theeafter,
exited the parking structure. The subjects drove to another
area of the mall parking lot near a department store. One of
the subjects approacheda small black Honda and a short time
later left in the black Honda while the remaining two subjects
left the area in the white Acura. Law enforcement personnel
were aware the subjects were known to steal pre-2001 model
Honda vehicles and use them in the commission of the bank
robberies.

.

At 11:00 a.m., a second surveillance team (known as
SOG Team 40) arrived in the area to assist the first SOC Team
(known as SOG Team 30). SA Barry Lee Bush was part of SOC
Team 40.
The SOG teams were communicating on the FBI radio
system, channel H—3, a narrow-band, simplex, (car-to—car)
channel which allowed for a further range of reception. The
SWAT Teams were also communicating on the FBI radio system on
channel A-3, which was also a simplex, but not narrow—band.
The CP was communicating on channel C-i. ETI
I
had earlier verified communications were established, SWAT
radios were properly coded, and ensured each SWAT vehicle had
access to each channel.
The SWAT teams started at the FTRA at approximately
6:30 am., on 04/05/2007.
They briefed at the RA and
rehearsed vehicle stops due to the presence of new operators,
including SAl
I The SWAT teams arrived in the
area of the surveillance at approximately 8:00 a.m., and were
“shadowing” the SOG teams as they surveilled the subjects.
The SWAT teams were to remain close enough to the surveillance
activity to be able to respond and effect the arrest of the
subjects as they were switching vehicles prior to committing a
bank robbery.
The subjects, in two vehicles arrived at a Shop—
Rite store parking lot at approximately 10:40 a.m., and the
Tt
SWAT Team Leader requested permission from the OSC to “take
The SWAT Team Leader was advised
the subjects at that time.
that A/ASAC Turkington was seeking telephonic permission from
According to A/ASAC Turkington, he was
A/ASAC Fuller.
reluctant to effect the arrest of th subjects in the parking
lot due to the number of citizens in the area and his concern
The subject in the black Nonda exited his
for their safety.
vehicle and entered the white Acura which departed the parking
The uspects vehicle
lot and traveled west on Route 22.
stopped at a bagel store located on Route 22 across from a
The
shopping center where a Commerce Bank was located.
subjects were observed standing in front of the bagel store

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watching the bank and membersof the SOG believed the subjects
were casing the Commerce Bank.
A SWAT team remained at the Shop—Rite parking lot
and was instructed to identify a lane to facilitate the arrest
of the subjects when they returned. While attempting to
locate an area to facilitate the arrest, SWAT personnel drove
by the empty black Honda and observed the steering column had
been broken, an indicator the vehicle was stolen.
The subjects drove to the area of the PNC Bank on
Route 22 in Readington Township and began “casing” the PNC
Bank.
The SWAT van was shadowing the SOG team following the
white Acura; however, the SWAT van got stuck in the soft
ground of the median while attempting a u-turn.
The subjects drove back to the Shop—Rite shopping
center where surveillance observed the whit Acura parked next
to the black Honda with both vehicle trunks open, but did not
observe an exchange between the vehicles. Two of the subjects
exited the white Acura, entered the black Honda, and departed
the shopping center.
Both subject vehicles stopped at a
traffic light and the SWAT team again requested permission to
“take them down.” Before receiving a response, the traffic
light turned green and the two subject vehicles proceeded
through the light toward the PNC Bank. The subjects drove
past the PNC Bank, made a u-turn in order to travel eastbound,
pulled into the Arvins Farm and Garden Center, and met in the
parking lot. At that time, the CP requested to take the
subjects down at that location. Realizing a bank robbery was
imminent, A/ASAC Turkington gave SWAT authority to arrest the
subjects.
As the SWAT team began to move toward the ).ocation,
the black Honda proceeded east-bound on Route 22 toward the
PNC Bank.
Prior to te SWAT teams’ arrival at the Arvin Farms
and Garden Center, SAl
linstructed
participants to abort the arrest. The SWAT vans passed by the
location and made u-turns further down the road.

.

The subject in the white Jcura exited his vehicle
and was sitting on the hood of the car talking on his cell
phone.
The black Honda pulled into a parking lot on Route 22
east, almost directly across from the bank. A few minutes
later, the black Honda pulled out of the parking lot onto a
side road that intersected with Route 22 and turned left on
Route 22. As the black Honda traveled westbound on Route 22,
SOG SAl
Iwas behind it ollowed by Senior SWAT team
Leader SAl_________________ Believing_he was not involved in
the arres of the sup)ects, SAl
icontinued past the PNC
I followed the black Honda into the PC
bank while SAl
bank parking lot and pulled his Suburban directly behind the

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black Honda where he and SAI
of the two subjects inside the Honda.

I attempted the arrest

L who was in the CP and believed
SOG SSA I
all SWAT personnel were fully engaged with the black Honda,
asked SOG personnel over radio channel 11—3, “we still have the
white Acura out there, who has the white Acura?
’ SSN
t
1
asked A/ASACI
1 “do you want SOG to take the white
Acura?” According to SSAI
he recalled A/ASAC I
1
responded that the SOG team wa& to “take thç whi
Acüra or
effect the arrest of the white Acura.” SSAI
, over
channel 11—3, advised SOG to “effect the arrest of the white
Acur. OG jias the responsibility for the white Acura.” SA
I
I, the SOG Team Leader, responded and asked SSA
I
hf they wanted the SOG team to “take the white Acura”
and SSAI
iresponded, .“yes.”
Ihe heard an SOG radio
According to A/ASACI
indicating the black Honda was entering the PNC bank par]dng
lot.
Seconds later he heard, I
his right on them”
and “the white Acura is across the street.’
t Believing the
white Acura to be a threat to the SWAT team arresting the
irecailed telling
sublects in the black Honda, A/ASAC I
SSAj
take
it.”
“if
you
can
take
it,
1
The radio traffic directed at the SOG to “take the
subject” occurred ove the frequency utilized exclusively by
the SOG (11-3) an. did not go ove; the SWAT channel (A-3)
According to SSAJ
I he did not recall hearing
the instruction to the SO to take the white car.” One SWAT
team passed the Arvins Farm and Garden Center traveling west
on Route 22, made a u—turn, and pulled into the parking lot of
the garden center to arrest the subject in the white Acura.
The subject, who was standing outside Acura entered the tar,
One SWAT team van pulled into the parking lot in a position
behind the Acura. At the same time, the.second SWAT team
FT I
Suburban pulled directly in front of the
I
I
I was located in a vehicle with SSAj
I
-

I SSAI
According to ETI
Ipositioned his
vehicle to 1ock te street entrance to the PNC bank.
In that
position ETI
I could not see the black subject vehicle;
however, he looked across the Street and saw the white Acura
parked at an angle facing Highway 22 and the Newark Division’s
gray SWAT van enter the area where the white Acura was parked
and loop around to the back. Almost simultaneously, he
observed a blue or black SWAT Suburban driving east on Highway
22 and approaching the white Acura.
Suddenly, a black Impala
passed the SWAT Suburban on the left and turned into the
parking lot where the white Acura was located. As the SWAT
van struck the white Acura, the black Impala pulled up to the
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passenger side of the white Acura at a slight angle and at the
mid-point of the vehicle.
The white SWAT team van buznpèd the suspect vehicle
into the red SWAT team Suburban, trapping the white Acura.
SWAT personnel in the SWAT van were positioned so team members
responsible for the passenger side of the Acura exited through
the side passenger door of the van and team members
responsible for the driver’s side of the subject vehicle
exited from the rear doors of the van.
According to SAl
I he was sitting on a crate
facing the side doors of the van having limited vision through
the windshield.
As SWAT team members were exiting the van,
Team Leader SAl
I who was sitting in the front
passenger seat., leaned out of lhe window and threw a flash
bang over the hood o the van near the driver’s door of the
subject vehicle.
SAl
1, possessing an H—4 rifle,
was the first SWAT member out of the passenger door and was
responsib1 for cçvering the rear passenger window of the
Acura.
SAl
I also in possession of an M—4, was the
and was responsible for
second SWAT member to exit the van
addressing any threat in a 45 degree angle of the SW.T van and
then returnjna his focus on the front passenger area of the
Acura,
SA I
Iwas the third SWAT member to exit, also
in possession f an M-4, and was responsible for breaking the
rear passenger window of the subject vehicle. SA
Ihad
difficulty_breaking the vehicle window resulting in Team
Leader I
lexiting the van and breaking the window of the
vehicle with tlie muzzle of his long gun. As SAl
Ibroke
the vehicle window, the magazine fell from his weapon.

h7C

As the SWAT team exited their vehicle and at
approximately the same time as the flash bang was thrown, a
black Chevrolet Impala, driven by SA Bush, was observed almost
perpendicular to the passenger side of the white Acura.
feet from the black
Iwho was approximately 11
SAl
SN
Impala, observed SA Bash exiting the black Impala.
I
advised radio traffic throughout the day referred to a white
car and a black car without stating the make or model of the
vehicles used by the subjects and he believed SA Bush’s black
SI
Iheard what he
Impala was the second subject car.
believed were two gunshots nH b1ieved SWAT team personnel
)b6
I observed SA Bush pushing
were being fired upon.
SAl
b7C
open the driver’s door with his left hand but could not see
his right hand and also observed a dark object at SA Bush’s
right side.
Focusing on SA Bush’s right side and not his
face, and perceiving a deadly threat combined with his concern
that he and his teammates were exposed to a member of the
Efired one round at SA Bush. The
robbery crew, SAl
expended round struck the window glass of the driver’s door Of
7

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297—HQ—A127178J.—D, 01/17/2008

SA Bush’s vehicle and h4-1-j-ed the window. Believing SA Bush
had returned fire, SAl
Istepped to his right to gain
distance between himself and his target and fired two
additional rounds at SA. Bush. 54
Icontinued to slide to
his right, away from the white Acura toward the rear of the
black Impala.
SA Bush moved to the rear of his vehicle and
fell to the groui
Ctinuing to believe SA Bush was one of
the subjects, SAl
Iyelled commands for SA Bush to et on
the ground.
SA Bush fell to the
j.s SAl
I
moved toward him, he observed SA[
Iwith a shotgun
trained on SA Busp.
ough SA1
1
Altl
Ihad never seen or met
either SA Bush or
I movements and
I based on s I
actions SA I
Iknew he was a member of law enforcement.
According to SAl
I he was wearing an FBI raid jacket and
had been in a perimeter covering position before approaching
the SA Bush’s vehicle.
“

Althouah_impossible to determine which shot struck
and killed SAl
I FBI_Laboraory results concluded the
bullets removed from SAl
body, as well as his vehicle,
were fired from SAl________ weapon.

.

Investigation revealed that SA Bush’s black Impala
was equipped with strobe lights in the headlight and tail
light assemblie.s; however, based on the position of the
switches for the strobe lights, it appeared that only the
strobe lights in the tai1 lights were possi1y activated.
Photographs reelecting the position of the LED switches
immediately following the incident determined the switch for
the front strobe lights was in the “off” position and the
switch for the rear strobe lights was in the “on” position.
No witness observed the activated strobe light on SA Bush’s
vehicle. One of the rounds fired by SAl
passed through
the door of SA Bush’s vehicle
1 entered the dashboard area to
the left of the steering wheel and severed the wiring harness
of the strobe light switches.
SA Bush was dressed in a gray sweatshirt with no
identifying markings indicating he was law enforcement, nor
was he wearing a ballistic vest. SA Bush was the only SOG
member who pulled directly up to the scene of the arrest.
Although other SOG members heard the radio transmission to
effect the arrest of the subject in the white Acura, they
observed SWAT members making the arrest and did not approach
the vehicle.
SOG members supported SWAT by covering the
perimeter.
Witnesses stated they were not aware SA Bush had
been shot but observed him stumble to the rear of his vehicle
and fall to the ground. SA Bush’s weapon was secured in its
holster when he was shot. On scene medical personnel ,provided
8

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immediate medical assistance to SA Bush until a medi-flight
helicopter and local ambulance arrived on the scene.
SA Bush
was transported to the University Medical and Dental of New
Jersey where he was pronounced dead.

I

.

I

On 09/28/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the shooting
incident.
Deputy Assistant Director I1ichael S. Clemens,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non
voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance:
Attornu- flmeii
Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;I_______________
Special Legal Counsel., Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; Section
Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section, CD—i,
unterini-11irr pivision; Acting Assistant Section Chief
I Violent Crimes Section
Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division (PD); UC
I Defensive Systems Unit, TOD; Acting tIC
Intellini, Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit.
CriticaL Incident Response Group; Acting UC I
I
Practical Applications Unit, TDD; DCI
Investigative Law Unit (ILU), Office of General Counsel (OGC);
I
I Assistant General Counsel, ILU, OGC; SSAI
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific n1ui
I iirearms
Section, Laboratory Division; and SSAj
I
Washington Field Office.
Team Leader
of Inspections (01), Inspection Division (INSD) and Management
Program Analyst (MPA)I
llnspection Management
Unit, OX, INSD, non—voting members, were also in attendance.
—

IQffice

b

Observations and. Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the incident with the intent to:
(2) provide the
Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective action from an operational
standpoint (ifany); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recoxnmendations
for administrative action if deened necessary.

(].) evaluate the application of deadly force;

Prior to the discussion of this incident by SIRG
members, Chairman Clemens provided a brief synopsis of the
incident as well as the ubsequent investigation. Team Leader
I a member of the Shooting Incident Review
Team, was also present in the meeting to provide answers
and/or clarification to questions posed by members of the
board regarding the shooting investigation.
General
of the incident elicited questions, comments., and.
by SIRG members. One DOJ representative advised the
shooter (SN
and questioned the
I did
presence of imminent danger. Additionally, he questioned the

discussion
concerns

not see a weapon
9

 P0-204 (Rev. 124-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

I

Report of:
Oats:

UCI

case i

2974JQAl27O95l-I)

Titk

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
BALTIMORE DIVISION
03/22/2007

Chsracses:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

05/24/2007

Officc

IflspectionS

b7E

Subject Michael Teny Smith was a suspect in an armed bahk robbery and
made threats to shoot Capital Hill Police Officers, as well as innocent bystanders, on
Capital Hill, Washington, D.C. As a result, on 03122/2007, Baltimore SWAT served
federal search warrant on the subject’s residence, a third floor apartment, in Suitland, a
Maryland. The team knocked and announced their presence After no reply, the team
executed a forced entry into the one bedroom apartment. After proceeding
approximately 15 feet into the living room, the subject fired three rounds from a
revolver at the Agents. Agents, not in a position of cover, returned lire with four
rounds and exited the apartment. The subject then proceeded to the rear ofthe third
floor apartment and seeing SWAT operators in the rear parking lot, fired two more
rounds at the operators. SWAT operators from the rear parking Jot returned flre.with
four rounds. Neither the Agents or the subject were injured during this exchange
gunfire. A nine hour stand-oxensued in which negotiations were established withofthe
subject who continually indicated he would not be taken alive. After nine hours and
unsuccessful negotiations, CS gas was deployed into the residence in an attempt to
force the subject to exit; this was unsuccessfuL The subject was waiting to ambush the
SWAT entry team at the only point of etrv in the third floor rairnent, the front door.
To enhance SWAT’s tactical advantages
Iwere utilized to
create four portals for limited penetratioIi suw .ue suoject s parnent
in the common
wall with an adjoining apartment. This created a view for operators to cover the
apartment when SWAT entered through the front door to arrest the subject. The
subject moved towards one of the limited penetration portals with his .357 revolver
in
his hand above his waist, out in front of him. A SWAT operator yelled out, “FBI, get
down, but Smith disregarded this command and kept coming toatd the operator.
‘Plc SWAT operator was only protected by the concealment-ofdry wall and he feared
forhis life, so heflredfourro’undsfronihjsMp-5 atthe subjectto elixninatethe
threat.
Smith was struck by three ofthe rounds; two rounds hit Smith in the chest and one
round struck him in the back of the head as he dropped to the floor from the first two
shots.

This document contaiss neither recazmsendatioszs no: conclusions of
the PEX • Xt is the xcrerty of the WEZ
and is loaned to tour agency; it and its cofltnts axe not to )e
distributed outside your agency.

 297—HQ—A1270951—]D

DETAILS:

On January 26,2006, 814
Bank Robbery Coordinator,
Washington Field Office (WFO), initiated a bank ro cry mvestigation (91A-WF-235694)
pertaining to the robbery of the Virginia Commerce Bank, Alexandria, Virginia. The bank was
robbed by a white male wearing a suit, fedor& hat, black gloves, dark colored-trench coat, and
armed with a black semi-automatic gun. Dining the robbery, $89,000.00 was taken.
l- b

On February 27,2007, Capital Bill Tour Gwdc
brovided the
FBI and United States Capital Police (USCP) information on Michael Terry Smith threatening
her over thçir romzitic breakup, as well as her suspicions about Smith being involved in bank
robberies. I
I met Smith on the Internet in June 2006 and began dating him. Smith
subsequently relocated from Henderson, North Carolina to apartment #203, Rena Road, ‘Suitland,
Maryland. During the course of her relationship with Smith, he told her he had been previously
arrested on drug charges, as well as served four years on a federal bank robbery conviction.
During his robberies, he wore suits and was known as the pinstriped bank bandit. In addition,
Smith always had large sums ofmoney and was in possession of a black semi-automatic gun.
I
vas shown a photograph from the robbery ofthe Virginia Commerce Bank January
26,2007. She advised the person in the photograph resembled Smith, particularly theonclothing
and black bag carried by the subject.
On March 6, 20071
1enorte to SA
that Smith’s threats were
escalating. On March 4, 2007, Smith told I
fhe did not kill himself he would spend
most of his time in jail. He said, “I want to go-out,” referring to suicide. He followed with,
“my first thought is to drive up to the (Capital Hill) barricade and take out as many cops as
I can, then kill myself, If not, then somewhere else like Wal-Mart or Target, just to make
national news.”
-

Duringtho’yeekaftetheMarch6,2006intervinz mliconthluedtocflaad
send threatening c-mails tol
I On March 15,2007, SAl______ leametil
reported
1
to the USCP that Smith’s threats towards Capital Hill were increasing in specificity. Smith
planned to give a. note to an innocent bystander on Capital Hill and request this person
the
note to an USCP officer. The note would state, “the person that is banding you this give
letter
unaware of its contents and is in no way involved in what Is about to happen I am qIngis
to
initiate gunfire so that the police will be forced to kill me.” Smith further tolci
I
“I
am going to give them no choice that way my mother can collect the insurance
because it will not be suicide. I want it to be a standofL I want to make sine themoney
is
there. I want everyone to remember that on this day and this year, Michael Smithmedia
was
at
the Capitol and this is where he died.”
-

Based on Smith’s threat, an alert regarding this subject was disseminated
throughout the USCP. The USC? also requested an arrest warrant for Smith from the District
of
Columbia. The arrest warrant was denied, since Smith had not committed a crime at any
ofthe
U. S. Capitol Buildings.
On March 19,2007, based on the hifonnation received froni
I
initiated a Conspiracy to Impede or Injure a Federal Officer investigation (89B-WF-23WFO
5991). SA

2

70

 297—HQ—A1270951—D

[
1

I

Detectivi
IuscP, met with Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)
District
Columbia.
hue
ot
to the lack of probable cause for an arrest warrant, a
J
strategy was developed to search Smith’s apartment and ca for a wçapon, which would then
prMicjte a felon in possession of a weapon charçe. AUSAI
-_Lontacted AUSAI
I
L Greenbçlt Maryland, in regard to obtaining search warrants for Smith’s apartment and
I
vehicle. AUSAI
Ioncurred with the issuance of the search warrants for violation of felon
in possession of a weapon.
On March 20, 2007, search warrants were issued by the United States District
Court, District of Maryland, for Smith’s apartment #203,4403 Rena Road, Sui,tlan& aryland,
I regarding
and his vehicle, a 1987 silver Lincoln Town Car. Due to a statement made byl
I requested a “no knock” search warrant from the
Smith’s possession of a gun, SAl
(3reenbelt USAO. The Oreenbelt USAO deferred the decision on the basis for a “no knock” to
the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia AUSA would not support a “no knock”
warrant, so the warrant was obtained without a “no knock’ provision.
On March 20, 2007, SP
Iprepared an operation plan for the searches and
submitted it for approval. TJ1A nroh1 n1n 1ad Agents from WFO making entry and conducting
the search. WFO AIASAC I
Ireviewed the plan, and based on the tone of Smith’s
threatening e-mails and the fw,ie’nrnii mr vioiênce, denied the plan and indicated SWAT would
serve the warrant. A/ASAC1
lontacted the Baltimore Field Office (BA), as the subject’s
residence was in their territory, and advised BA ASAC Kevin Lewis of the pending operation.
ASAC Lewis ipclicated that BA SWAT would serve the warrant with WFO Agents conducting
I submitted a revised operation plan indicating BA SWAT would
the search. SPJ
conduct the entry and WFO Agents would conduct the search. This plan was approved by
AIASACI_____
Ifor a pre-operational
On March 21 2007, SAl
I met witN
intelligence debrieLl
advised Smith would be agitated lithe police caine to his door. On
the same date, Smith senti
Itwo c-mails making increasing threats, “you completely
ripped my heart from my chest, and destroyed me, and now you want to make things
better, knowing the consequences of fatalities that are going to take place and will be
because of you. I do not care about who will get hurt whether it be co-workers or a cop or
an innocent bystander, or where it will be, this is not my concern. My concern is that I will
make history and never be forgotten.” Smith’s e-mail further advised, “this is my last letter
to you before this happens, see you soon, no wait, you wifi hear about me soon enough, the
end is near.”

1

On the same date at 4:00 p.m., a briefing regarding the execution of only the
search warrant was held at WFO, with representatives from USCP, AU personnel were provided
with a copy ofthe approved operation plan. During this briefing, information was provided
pertaining to the background of the investigation, Smith’s criminal history, a possible “Armed
and Dangerous” status, the deadly force policy, and a. contingency plan to obtain a Maryland state
arrest warrant prior to the search warrants for the recent e-mail threats.
kpoke with SAl
On the same date, SM
Senior Team
Leader. A SWAT, via the telhonn and hEIéfMhhII tegarding the ongoingTnvestiRation. SA
linquired as to why a “no knock” search warrant was not obtained. SAl
ladvised
that an attempt had been made to obtain one; however, the request was denied by the USAO in
3.
-

 ____________

____________

________

297-.HQ--A1270951—D

je Dis1xct of Columbia. A copy of the operation plan was provided to SP[
I SA
I was advised BA SWAT would complete a separate SWAT operation plan to execute
• the search warrant. WFO would conduct the search of Smith’s vehicle and search Smith’s
residence after secured by BA SWAT.

•

During
hoursu same,date, and after reviwhi th recent e-xnails
from Smith, AIASA
d SAl
I telephoned WSA[L
io again request a
“no knock”
e request was denied. AUSM
Jconferred with her
supervisor
who advised “no knock” search warrants were not even issued in
drug cases in the District of Columbia.
On the same date, s4Z
kontacted Detective[
I Prince
George’s County Police (PGCP), iji regard to the escalation oftheyoientireatsL
I
received from Smith. On the evening of the same date, Detective
Jnterviewec
in an attempt to obtain a state arrest warrant for 1
Smith based on th threats. In the eãfl
morning hours of March 22,2007, DetectivU Jü,formed S$
Jthat he was unable
to obtain an arrest warrant, but would only be able to get a summons assue tor Smith pertaining
to the threats.
On the same date, S4
iprepared a written SWAT operation plan for the
execution of a WFO search warrant alike aphi upied by Smith. The operation plan was
forwarded to ASAC Frank Goetz who sent SLl
Jan e-mail approving the plan.
On Thursday, March22, 2007, at approximately 5:00 a.m., the BA personnel
arrived at the Maryland Sate Police (MSP) barracks in the area of Suitland, Maryland to conduct
a pre-operation briefing. The Baltimore Division assembled 20 personnel for the execution of
the warrant. ASAC Goetz was the on-scene commmider dnrin the hihi1 Antrv Th n’i
4
teamoonsj’
PGCP TFOF
Aanct a Um1orxnedFGCP Officer I
FThe RWAT 1r

rtbe BA SWAT team medic. SM I

pdLtI
_hndi

omMSP,whdwas
Jere agents located in the
Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and sAsr
Jwere the Host
Negotiators on scene. WFO Agents and USCP Officers responsible for the search were also age
present.
h
-

WFO case agent, SA1
_Jprovided floorplans, qib” nhyograph copies of
the apartment complex, and a color hotograph of subject Smith. SAl
ibriefbd the written
operation plan and sequence of events, as well as the FJI deadh force policy. The entry team
then conducted a simulated walk-Ibm of the entry. SAl
onducted a briefing of the MSP
medic assigned to the SWAT team. He conducted a “sound-oft” radio check for the TOC and
confirmed the TOC was in place prior to the SWAT deployment to the scene. The TOC was
located in a SWAT Suburban parked just smth of the entrance door of Smith’s apartment
building.

As required by the s.eazch warrant ahd contained in the operation plan, the team
was advised of the “knock and announce” requirement, then wait a reasonable time for Smit
h to
answer the door i
er, SWAT would deploy the battering ram to gain entry into Smith’s
apartment. S
riefed the team and gave instructions if shots were fired, the team would
4

 297-HQ--A1270951-D

fall back to a secure position oh the landing below the apartment door. Noise discipline was
briefed upon the dismount as Smith was considered armed and dangerous due to a prior felony
conviction, as well as his threats to his former girlfriend and USCP Officers.

I

Th rr perimeter team consisted of non-SWAT operators, BA SAd_____
Ian4
I These three Agents had an average oftwo years field experience. They
tooK positions in tile rear of the complex, 40 yards across the parking lot from the rear windows
ofthe subject’s third floor apartment. The apartment complex was high density, containing
numerous rows of three story apartment buildings. The perimeter Agents were positioned behind
vehicles for cover, with approximately 15-20 yards between them.
At 6:05 a.m., the BA SWA
ed on the open air landing outside of
Smith’s third floor apartment door, and S
ormed the knoc1c and announce’ three
times. After the third “knock an4nnnirnçe , w c was approximately 30 seconds from the
initial “knock and announce”, SA
gave the command to deploy the ram. It took two hits
with the ram on the metal door to breach the door. The first four members of the entry team
entered the apartment while continuously identifying themselves as ‘FBI, serving a search
warrant.’ The team moved across the dining room to the kitchen area. The ppn’.iel who
entered the door and. their assignments in order were SM
I(shield), SAl
I(cover long
gun), SAl
I(coinmands long gun), and SAI
‘(team leader), the other four SWAT
operators remained on the landing outside the apartment door.

1D6
C

-

-

Upon entering the apartment, it was completely dark. S
chad on his
ballistic shield light and the light located on his (flock service handgun.
oved into
the livinrnnm wjere he was positioned near the hallway andjust past the ki en wall. At this
point, SM
htopped when he aw a ll4nd protruding from the hallway into the living room
1
bol4izig a large silver revolver. SA Jiad his ballistic shield in his right hand and .40
caliber Glock model 22 handgun in his left hand. Three rounds were fired om thesilver
revolver towards the SWAT team without hitting any SWAT operators. SAJ
I estimated
whçre the ubjecis body was behind the wall in relationship to where the subjeclfs arm was, then
SAl
1 fired forpnnLis from his pistol into the walL The revolye Mrm disappeared
from view, then S4
lordered the entry team to pull back. SAl
cafled out
“shots fired” over the radio.

Ihen

The SWAT team then moved backwards out of Smith’s apartment and down the
stairs to the landing on.the second floor of the apartment building. f)n the 1ding, S.
I
was behind the ballistic shield, SAI J (cover long gun), and S4
-,ibegan to yell up to
the apartment to t to make contact with the subject and determine ifbe was hurt. The three
Agents began rotating one on the shield and one on the long-gun with one man resting.
-

Once the shooting in the apartment occurred, ASAC Goetz requested three WFO
Agents, who were staged several blocks away resnnnEl tn Ihe rear of the bjrildiug and assist the
rear perimeter BA team already in place. SA
U
I a4
responded to the rear,
At Øl0 a.m., therearperirneterBA team called out on the radio that the subject
was attempiingto exit the apartment from his “balcony.” The subject was actually attempting to
exit through the bedroom window. When the perimeter team called out for subject to halt, the
subject swung his aim around towards them as if be had a weapon, and thç entire BA perimeter
5

i70

 297—HQ—A1270951—D

team took cover and lost visual contact. No shots were fired by the subject or the rear perimcter
team at this time.
SAl
.entS’iATSAst
lanctotherearofthe
apartment building. SAl
I with a ballistic shield, led the movement ofthe team toward
the back of the building and was focusing on the balcony, wherefh imter team reported the
subject was 1ast seen. While covering the subjecny, SAl
“bserved a white male
pullout the screen in the subject’s apartment SfiL_.Jiisually identifie’J the ‘ybite male as
Smith, who then immediately fired two shots at the SWAT operators. 54,,
‘returned fire
with two shots from his .45 caliber Glock model 21 pistol, SAF
i who was maintinin
coverwith an M-4 long.gun, fired one shot at the subject SM F
L andi___
maintainl thçir nositioq for approximately five minutes. Then, SA “
I provided cover for
I as they moved perpenm1lrlv ross the nrldng Lot to take up
SAs L.Jandl
1 SAsI
positions next to the perimeter te fliw
IaMI
Iwere secured behind cover
with the rear perimeter team, SAl
Icrawled backwards out ofthe parking lot back toward
the corner ofthe building.
-

SkI
kntf
maintained their position on the second floor
stairs behind the ballistic shield. &&I
to veil up
cond
en.t to try to talk
ft
the subject out of the apartment. Negotiators, SAl
obtained anooval
land S
from ASAC Ooetz to go forward in order to establisn vefoal containment” SAL
I and SA
Iwere inserteil into the stáirwellon the landing belpw the ubject’s apartment at 6:25 am.
Initially, SAl
Iwas the primary negotiator, with SAl
I as the coac
e subject was
on the floor above the two negotiators, with the door partially closed. SAl__- and SA
Irepeatedly made telephone calls to the subject’s two known cellular numbers. Calls to
I
one of the telephone numbers went directly to voice mail. Calls to the second cellular telephone
number were answered by a recording in
e subs
d not be located. From
approximately 6:25 am. to 9:00 s.m., S
and S
mpted to engage the
subject by shouting up the stairwell.
y, e subject was unresponsive to verbal commands
to speak with him. While the negotiators were trying to open dialogue with Smith, Agent
personnel began evacuating the adjoining apartments.
-

-

Once the initial shooting occurred, ASAG Geotz requested assistance from MSP
and POCP. The PGCP request was for an armored vehicle to safely retrieved the Agents on the
rear perimeter. PGCP indicated they could only provide an armored vehicle if they took
entire scene; the POCP offer was declined. The Montgomery County Police (MC?) wereover the
contacted and agreed to assist with an armored personnel carrier. WFO SWAT was also
contacted for additional manpower.
At 8:45 am., the MCP SWAT team arrived with the armored vehicle. The
armored vehicle extracted the Agents on the rear perimeter and replaced them with SWAT
operators.
At 9:00 a.iu., the subject responded to SA
I stating he would speak “face to
face”, and “come on up we’ll talk.” The subject Was adaizlant at this point he was not comixig
out,, but ç negotiators could come in Si’
hiiv1sed Smith the negotiators would
be
able to talk to him face to face for safety reasons. These exchanges with the subject werenot
done
by shouting bank and forth between the subject in his third floor apartment with the negotiators
on the second floor landing. The subject again became unresponsive.
6

6

 297-HQ-A1270951-D

Additionally at 9:00 a.m., the MSP SWAT team arrived and set up a sniper
position in a third floor apartment across the parking lot in the rear ofthe building which
allowed
for a level view through the rear windows in Smith’s apartment The MSP snipers indicated
they
could not get a view ofthe subject in the apartment due to drawn curtains.

SAl
lcçntacted the apartment complex management supervisor
duterinine the layout ofthe apartment building to determine if Smith could get up intotothe attic
or
crawl space and get into another apartment The building engineer indicated from Smith’s
apartment, it was possible to get up into the crawl space of other apartments on that level,
there was no access connecting apartment buildings. After the meeting with the apartmentbut
complex management, the BA SWAT team, with the support of WFO SWAT members, devised
a plan to evacuate residents out through windows of adjoining apartments and down a ladder.
one instance, SWAT operators had to cut a hole through diywail of one apartment to remove In
innocent neighbors out through an adjoining apartment and down a ladder. During this time,
SWAT Agents were placed in the apartments directly across and diagona]Iy from the subject’s
apartment on the third floor to cover Smith’s front door.
At 9:37 a.m., Smith threw his wallet, keys, and a note out his apartment
the landing. The note instructed the Agents to give the keys to his car to his mother anddoor onto
indicated he was ready to die. Negotiators continued a one way dialogue with Smith.
At 9:40 a.m., BA SAC WilliaznD. Chase anived at the scene from an out of town
conference, and he assumed the role of the On-Scene Commander. WFO SAC Jennifer
Love had arrived earlier, however, ASAC Gent remained the On-Scene Commander. Smith
Throughout the next several Sours, BA and MSP SWAT were rotating
operators in and out ofpositions on thq tir-bqlow Smith’s apartment and throughoutSWAT
the
perimeter. Sometime before noon, LtI
MSP, mdi
rators had another
J
operation later that evening and would need to be replaced. S
egan rotating WFO
SWAT operators with the BA operators. The shield team in an apartment diagonally across
the
haIl from Smith’s apartment consisted of six SWAT members rotating every five to ten minutes.
In. this position, the team’s mission was to utilize a ballistic barricade to cover Smith’s apartment
front door, and were ready to address him ifhe exited the apartment

I

Between 9:45 n.m. and
another hostage negotiator, SAl_____
jarrivedinthestairwelL SAIIwasthen
soshecouldassumeher
duties in the Command Post From that point forwa4 SA
remained with SAC Chase,
ASAC Goetz, and the SWAT SSP
I A
sumed the role as the
primary negotiator, and was being coached by SAl
I

kidvised the subject became more responsive, however
continued to hamoer qomniunications. The subject reported he flushed his cell phonedistance
down the
toilet. SM
laid the subject that today wasn’t turning out the way anyone had expected
it to, and the sibject replied, “yeah, you guys messed (WUrd lubstitute) up, you thought this
was going to he easy I like the way it- turned out.”
-

-

At 10:56 n.m., SAC Chase approved the insertion of a “rescue telephone” to
enhance communications with the subject. Due to the fact the BA rescue telephone had been
7

 ________iwas

_______
________

297-HQ-A127o951-D

damaged in a training exercise the previous week and was inoperable, WFO’s rescue telephone
was used. This phone was a different model, which was never used by the BA negotiators. The
telephone was equippd with rnvrt ‘jdio and video surveillance capabilities. The WFO
Electronic Techniciaji
I was newly assigned to support the equipment, and had
not yet been trained on the operation and maintenance of the rescue telephone. The BA
personnel did not know how to operate WFO’s covert microphone. BA negotiators were
accustomed to an on/offbutton to operate the covert audio, whereas the WFO system’s covert
audio operated continuously, unbeknownst to BA, without an on/off button. The negotiators
up the main console in the ‘‘ -rate from the TOC, and uleoloved he auxiliary console toset
the TOC. In the TOC, ETI
I and WFO negotiator SAl
-_perated the equipment.
There was never an attempt, nor capability to record the video feed. Eu
httempted
connect a single haudheld recorder retrieved from an Agent’s car to record the negotiator and to
subject conversations. The video feed was intefligenpe nmvided tp th facticaI nnrprs and was
primarily monitored by the TOC personnel, BA SAsI
ndI
I
At 11:33 a.m.,the rescue telephone was positioned outside of Smith’s door. At
11:45 a.m., Smith reached out and pulled the telephone inside the apartment. SWAT operators
provided 15 feet of cable for the telephone in order to control the subject’s location in the
apartment Sniith immediately niqked in the tplephone receiver and began spealdng with SA
I SA
eparted the stairwell to the NOC in the parking
L anc
lot.

I

S
Ithen appointed SAl
in be the team leder in the NOC. SA
the runaIy nbgotiator on the phone with the subject, and SAl
I WFO’s lead
hostage negotiator, was acting as SM
Ioach. SAl
Ivas serving as the
negotiator’s liaison in the Ton s’i maintained a telephonic log regarding the negotiations over
the rescue telephone. SA I
- I began audio recording
what he thought was the conversation
between SAl
pand the sujiect thrrnigh the auxiliary hostage negotiator console in the TOC
at approximately 11:47 a.m. El)
I had connected the recording device into the
microvhqpe connection on the video monitor, and, unbeknownst to Eli
j or SA
Ithe recording device was only capturing low level apartment noise and not the
negotiators conversation with Smith.
From approximately 1 1-47 a.m. until 1
n iv, Smith spoke continuously with
SAl
I Smith stated he wantedto die. He toldi
Ihe was wearing a suit so he could.
be a good looking corpse. Although the negotiators did not believe Smith based on the totality
the circumstances, mith stated he relprned fire when the cops came in and shot at him. He saidof
his death would bel
I fault. He did not get to go to church to repent his sins.
had thought about taking steeping pills, but he wanted to gc nut in blaze of glory. He stated He
repeatedly he would not go to prison or to a nut house. SAl
I did not feel she was able to
develop a rapport with him; she believed Smith had made up his mind he would be killed during
the banicade situation. The video feed from the rescue telephone showed Smith sitting in a
with his weapon pointed towards the door, waiting for the FBI to enter the apartment. At thischair
point, the NOC decided to end the phone call, which was at 12:45 p.m., to conduct an
assessinçng,
SAl
lewound the audio tape to listen to the recorded conversation bu.t
couldn’t hear anything. kli
I disconnected the recording device from the viewing
monitor and connected the recording device to another port on the remote auxiliary console in the
S

 297—HQ-A1270951-D

TOO, which was later determined to be the covert audio microphone outlet..
At 1:45 p.m., WFO SAbecame the lead negotiator and
d contact
through the rescue telephone with Smith. During this second telephone converinitiate
sation,
advised he had fired two shots when cops etitered the apartment, and he thought he wasSmith
being
robbed. Smith knew he would go to jail for a long time; he thought he would have
to
serve
minimum of ten years. He said tbe rmlv wny for this to end would be forthe police to comea
in
and kill him, as payback td
ifor ending their relationship.
also stated he lb 6
had previously served four and a halfyears in prison, and he wis too old toSmith
go back to prison. lb 7C
Smith wanted the FBI to contact his mother so she could come and get his car
after his death.
Smith said had been in construction for 25 years, and has endured 42 years ofpain,
heart break,
and struggle, and wanted to stop the pain.
At 2:00 p.m., SAC Chase requested a final assessment from S4
I on the
status of negotiations and the likelihood that Smith would surrender. SAl
Jindica
the subject was very fatalistic and was not going to surrender. She indicated Smith was ted that
to corn nit sticide; wanted a violent confrontation with the FBI; and wanted the FBi to not going
kill him.
SA[
lbased her opinion on the following factors: (1) according to thç subject, he took
shower and put on his best suit and indicated be was ready to die; (2) the subject threw out a
car keys and wanted his car to be given to his mother upon his death; and (3) the subjec his
made any demands or requests during the negotiation process, but c n ued finn on thet had not
fact he
wasreadytodieandwantedtheFBlto comeandgethirn. S
consultedwiththe
Behavioral Sciences Unit, Critical incident Response Group (
,who
red with her
assessment that Smith was not comma out ior was he going to surrender. concur
Other negotiators on
scene were in. agreement with SAl
I
In the early afternoon, S
WFO SWAT Senior Team LeaderE
I
BA SWAT SSA1____
an incremental plan with graduated sequence of
events to decrease Smith’s comfort level to the point of surrendering. This four stage plan
developed to resolve the barricade situation inasmuch as the negotiations bad been unsucc was
At any point in this plan, if negotiations became productive the subsequent stages would essful.
be held
in abeyance. The four staaes w8re

.

9

6
lb70
h7E

 _______

297-HQ—127 0951-D

t7E

The entire plan was verbally briefed to SACs Chase and Love; SAC Chase
approved the plan as briefed.

Factors SAC Chase considered in the course of deciding to end the negotiation
phase and begin to apply pressure to Smith to surrender were as follows: (1) escalation
ofthe
situation by Smith; (2) concern that Smith could gain a tactical advantage over the FBI by
initiating his own action to end the standoff; the subject could go on the offensive and burst out
the front door toward Agents, located only 15 feet away, and get off a lucky shot,
as well as fire
out the rear apartment window at the perimeter team; (3) concern regarding public
safety issues,
specifically, that children were returning from school and a school bus of special needs
children
was due to arrive back at the complex soon; (4) the extended displacement of a large number
civilians from the surrounding community; and(S) iiformation provided by a video camera of
located in the rescue telephone showed the subject taking an offensive position with his gun
pointed at the front door anticipating an entry by the FBI.
The following personnel were staged in position•prior to the execution
ofthe four
phase plan. In apsrtment #2flj, diagonally froi Smith’s partmeni wr PA 9IAT S4
WFC) SWAT SASI
land
land MSP Sergeanti
hnd OfflF[J
This teams mission wa to cover inith’s door and assist in providing the rolling
ballistic bunker as cover for the entry team ifPhase Four was implemented.
In apainet 7fl9 M’t1y across nm n’ti’
8 apartment, were BA SWAT S

I

I(shieldl

b6

U 7C

k3ong-gunj
(Team Leader), and___________
conduct an entry and a slow clear of Smith’s apartment if

(long-gun). This team
s mission was to
1
Phase Four was implemented.

In apartfiient #‘04. the anartnwnt wtIt common wall
1with Smiths apartrnAnt
#203. were WFO SWAT SA4
BA SWAT SAil
antll

I

SP OfficeI
Ian4

I

luid M

10

b7E

 297-HQ-j27o951-

b6
7E

The tear gas deployment team was located in the apartment parking lot across
from the rear of SmitJi’s apartment building. The team consisted of all WFO
SWAçF onerats,
SAsI
landi
I as the gas shooters, and a cover team of SAl
I
I
I
Sniper positions were held in the apartment complex across
parking lot from
the rear of Smith’s apartment building. The view ofthe sniper poitions the
th rear bedrnnrn
window and the balcony. Snipers in place were WPO SWAT SAl
jam4

I

Agents were positioned on the stairwell to provide cover in case Smith came
charging out of his aoartment firitw ndto provide support upon the
entrance ofthe cleariiw
team after thel
I The Acrentq were WFO SWAT SASI
I
I; BA WAiA
Ii
landi
andMSP
MeQic Uticeil
I
At 2:49 p.m., SAC Chase gave approval to initiate Phase
ofthe plan and the
utilities to Smith’s apartment wereterminated. Negotiators indicated theOne
shut-off
had no effect upon the subject. Smith stated there was no way he was ever comingof the utilities
out; they
wouldhaveto cnandkiulhwnihhadmpeaeeandyasready
At 3:15 p.m., SAC Chase authorized SWAT to deploy the
tear gas. A grenade
launcher was used to shoot five rounds of gas into the subject’s apartmentCSFaur
the bedroom, and one round into the utility closet offofthe balcony. The plan rounds went into
subject toward the front door. Upon insertion ofthe first two volleys of gas, anwas to move the
eye-ball camera
for enhanced video feed was discretely inserted by a pole through the partially
open
apartment
front door into the living room. However, Smith noticed
era
and
fired
two
shots.
with at least one ittin the evq-ball camera. BA S
MSP Sergeant
I
and NSP Officerl
I, reported Smith
one round through the partially open front
door into the apartment #201 diagonally across the hail containing Agents and
officers who were
behind a ballistic barricade. Two or three minutes late; SAC Chase authorized
four more
canisters ‘of gas to be fired through Smith’s rear patio door. The negotiator continued
talking to
Smith, but he reibsed to come to the door and the gas appeared to have effect
on him. Two
more canisters of gas were then fired into the subject’s bedroom and twonointo
Negotiations continued, then four additional gas canisters were fired into the the patio door.
apartment. A total
of 17 CS gas cazii ters were fired into the apartment; one canister, the eighteenth,
hit an exterior
wall and fell harmlessly to the grouu.
-

II

b7c

 297-HQ--A1270951-D

At 3:30 p.m., Smith was back on the rescue telephone with SAl
I
was
angry about the gas and about the “camera” in his door. The subject was screaming forSmith
the
cops
to come in to Idil him, and he was ready to die. Smith then went from being very agitated
when
the gas was inserted to, as seen from the video feed from the rescue telephone, calmly
sitting in a
chair near the kitchen with a cloth over his face pointing a gun at the front door. He was
not
reacting to the gas and did not show any indication of coming out.
—

At this time, SAC Chase consulted with LW
1 medic and senior
officer on scene for MSP. Lt. [
Istated in his experience as a tactical SWAT medic, ifthe
CS gas had no effect on the subject by now, additional gas would not make a difference due
to
his apparent ability to withstand the effects of the gas and all the windows in the apartm
ent
being
broken, providing for ventilation.ofthe gas.
Based upon the shots fired by Smith, the lack of effect of the gas upon him, and
reports from the TOC that Smith had placed himselfinto an offensive position near
the kitchen,
pointing his gun at the door waiting for a SWAT entry, SAC Chase consulted with operati
onal
partners MSP and MCP, on movina to Phase Three. There wRc
“‘ 1
’’rs to
usetheI’

1

Smith was viewed by FBI Agents through both the partially disable eye.ball
camera and the rescue telephone video feed running, with the revolver in his hand,dfrom
near the
kitchen into the hallway before losing visual contact S
his limited
penetration port hole in the bathroom, saw Smith coming
s in from the hallway into the
bathroom. Smith had his .357 revolver in his hand above his waist, out in front
of him. SA
j’elled out “PB
“ but Smith completely disregarded his comm
and and kept
coming toward him. S
only protected by the concealment of dry wall and he
hislife,sohe
a mmMP-5atthesubjectto eliminatethethreat
four rounds; two rounds hit Smith in the chest and one round caused aSA
deep graze
w
in the back of the head as he droppedto the floor frointhe
ILabor
atory
results matched the two bullets recovered from Smith’s chest with S
capon.
Thereweresevenothe
S
1
A
rAgentsandocersinapartinen
4
ffl
I
who were focused on the ojzer tbxre nnrta holes. No one wi1neA RAI t#204w
_Jfirin
g his
weapon, but MCP Of11cer
J and MSP Oflicerl
[aeard SAL
j b!
call out his law enforcement conijnanct to Smith.
After thai
I the four member entry team in apartment
#202 (SM
tindl
httempted to stage at Smith’s front door behind
the MSE roiling arnca4e. However, the barricade was stuck exiting apartnient #201, so
I
j pushed the barricade tealp aside after bearing shots fired, and his team entered theSA
front
doot using sTziólds. The team entered slowl and cleared the living room, then slowly moved
toward the kitchen and down the hail. S
ed out seeing a male lying
down on the
bathroom floor. S4 jsaw Smith had a. silver revolver in his right hand, andface
he kicked the
12

JF

 297—HQ—A1270 951—])

thc hand. SAl
Jgrabbed Smith’s arms and placed flex cuffs o his wrists.
icleared the back bedzooni ana utility closet. SAl
ci
I then called in
the in es to provide assistaiice to Smith. S1
Jeturned to the bathroom
a
chrome plated .357 magnum revolver with blaci grips on the bathroom floor. S
being
a firearms instructor, put on protective gloves and rendered the gun safe by ej
cc red
shells and three live shells from the handgun. He placed the empty gun back on the floor.
b7
Smith was pulled out of the bathropm and qiaced in the middle of the living-room
floor and was attended to by MSP Medic Officer I
I who pronounced Smith dead.
SA

Immediately following the shooting incident, the BA Evidence Response Team
(ERT), with the assistance of the FBI Laboratory, processed the crime scene. ERT recovered
four shell casings from a .40 caliber weapon in the living room area; five .357 caliber shell
casings in a closet across from the bathroom; three .45 caliber shell casings and one .223
casing in the parking lot to the west ofthe apartment; and four 10mm shell casings in thecaliber
adjacent apartment #204 near a breach hole into the bathroom. In addition, there were three
empty shell casings in a .357 magnum revolver that was in the possession of Smith at the time of
the shooting. Locations of shell casings from any semi-automatic or automatic weapons
consistent with witness accounts of events. Several bullet projectiles were also recoveredwas
in the
apartment. Many of the projectiles were not able to be located or,in some cases, were deemed
inaccessible to search personnel.
The FBI Laboratory sent two processing teams to the scene to conduct detailed
bullet trajectoiy measurements and to conduct advanced digital diagram using a Nikon Total
Station package. According to the Laboratory Team, there were clear shooting positions that
could be identified from the trajectories. These included shooting positions in the living room,
the closet across from the bathroom, from the parking lot west of the apartment, and from the
adjacent apartment into the bathroom. All recovered firearms and projectiles were submitted to
the FBI Laboratory for further analysis and identification.
Interviews ofnon-law enforcement personnel were conducted at the scene
a neighborhood canvas. In summary, there were no non-law enforcement witnesses to the.during
shnn1inc jpcident during the initial search warrant or during the shooting of Smith
by SA
Jater the same day. Several neighbors heard the shots fired and the law enforcemnt
1
commotion outside oftheir apartments. One neighbor and friend oi’
I
reported that recently Smith told him that he was “felling suicidal.”I
Ibvas aware Smith had
a .357 revolver. Thirtherniçre, over the prior weekend, Smith toldi
]that he was going to
make history fod
L Smith’s girlfriend, to remember.
-

The Office ofthe General Counsel (OGC) determined the inadvertent Title did
not require any additional action, either administratively or with the court This was basedIll
on the
clear pattern of facts illustrating the inadvertent nature of the event, coupled with the only person
with standing is deceased.

13

6

 FD-204 (Rev.

l245)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

/

Copyto:

Reportof:
Date:

•

I

Of1ic

Sacramento

aseID#:

297-HQ-AJ.271905-D

Talc:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OP SHOOTING INCIDENT
SACRAMENTO DIVISION, PRESNO RESIDENT AGENCY
03/15/2007

cbact

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

susp
•

t ‘)7/23/2O07

On 03/15/2007, the Fresno Methaxnphetamine Task Force
(FMTF)
as part of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Initiative (HIDTA) Task Force, which consisted of
perepruzel from the California Department of Yustice,
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (cAIj DOJ/BNE), Fresno
Regional Office, United States Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEJ, Fresno Police Department (FPD),
Fresno County Sheriff’ s Department (Peso), California
Highway Patrol (CR?), Merced County Sheriff’s Department
(MCSD), Madera County Sheriff’ s Department (Madera SD)
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), wer
attempting to conduct a buy/bust operation in the parking
lot of a Burger King located at Presno and “Ca Street in
Fresno, California.
The target of this operation was
Hispanic Male, Date of Birth
I
I
Prior to conductina the oneration. a
,-

lh€S
7C

b7D

I T1e

iNL? established a contingency plan to arrest j
upon
his arriv.l in the Burger King parkirir lot
I
I i1ral in the parking lot,I
I
I çn the arrest team proceeded to execute
cne arrest,
I who was the driver complied with the
officers demands, but the passenger bolted and ran towards
-

I

This dacuaezit contains neither reconandatjons nor conclusions of the ThZ. Xt is
the property of the PBX
and is loaned to your agenny it and. it contents are
not to he distxJ.buted outside yir agency.

 ______________

S

297-HQ-A1271905-o

Highway 99 and was pursued by SAl
I During the foot
the Hispanic niale faied to comply with SA I
1
demands to “stop. I SA I
j also noticed that the subject
appeared to ±un with his nan at his waist as though he had a
weapon. when SAl
lobseryM H subject turn towards him
with a silver gun in hand, SAl
I reported firing one shot. lb
Prior to the sub-i eat a disappearance in the brush down the
lb
embankment, SAl
I fired two additional shots. A perimeter
was established and FPD local SWAT and K-9 units were deo1ovd.
The sub-ieot. was laJer identified asi
I
L was arrested and transported to the
University Medical Center (UMC) for medical treatment.
pursuit,

•

•

I

S
1
DETAII
•

•

On 02/26/20071
Icontacted Officerl
land
advised that a subject only Jalown to thel
I was
living in a Fresno, California neighborhood and. was distributing
large quantities of methamphetamine.

I
Ibegan assisting
the FMTF in negotiating_the purchase of narcotics from the
subj eat known as I
I The negotiations were recorded and
resulted in the purchase of 4pproximately 15.2 grams of
methaniphetamine from
Jand two unidentified Hispanic male
subjects I
I nurng this drug buy, the PMTF
surveillance team acquired the vehicle driven byj
I The
vehicle, a gray Ford Focus, was registered to a
I
I Fresno, California.
7D

On 03/15/2007, at approximately 6:11 pm, the HXDTA FMTF
(investigative team) created an operations plan in which I
I
would assist the F!’TF to conduct a buy/bust. The FMT?F consisted
of officers/agents from several tte, local, and federa-i
agencies .nd were listed as follows:

2

 ___________

___

S

297-HQ-A1271905-rj

•

1.

Sergeant I

2.

Officer

3.

Officer

4.

Officer_______________

5.

Of ficerl_____________ FPD

6.

Deputy

7.

Deputyl

8.

SA,I____________

•

I

I

•

I FPD Supervisor

I
Madera CSD

I

I

FCSD

FBI

kr4
Ihad been negot.atina t1e purchase
of three to four ounces of methemphetamine. I
agreed to
I four ounces for a purchase price of 4 .444.
sell
on prior information garnered during thel
I and
the recorded conversations, Officer I
authored a search
J
warrant whi rh
cr1 I-mrd by Honorable Judge Ioff for I
I
I resno, California. I
I andl
arranged to meet in the Burger Icing parking lot located at tne 1
corner of Presno Street and “C” Street in Fresno, California.

At approximately 5:00 pm, Officerl
Ibriefed all
assist ing PMT’ personnel regarding the buy/bust. During the
briefing, an operations qrder was distributed to each member of
the team and TSL
I gave specific assianments for the
buy/bust. The Bust Team consisted of TFSI
I and TFAa
I
I
j The Surveillance Team consisted of
‘JA8 I
I
landi
I Officer
handled I
land would stay with the Surveiflanqe
I
I
Team.
with the exception of Officer F
I who was with the
Ithe remaining FMTF members all wore fully marked tactical
I
gear with the word “POtIICE
’ fully visible on the front and. back
1
of their uniforms.
At approximately 5:45 pm, all assisting FMTF members
were in pc>sition in the parking lot of the Burger King. The
]vehicle ws searched for drugs and/or weapons. None were
I
tound. I
I was ecruipped with an electropic listening device.
While waiting f2L
Jto arrive,I
Ireceived
phone
call frotnI
advised he was on his way. Unaware that he
failed to hang up the phone I
iwas overheard
I

3

.

1b7 D

 __Ispun

_____________

297-HQ-A1271905-B

I

•

•

•

talking to two unknown maleG sayinq that he wanted to rip the
I The two unknown_subjects andi
Iwere overheard saying
that they would ripi
I when they arrived at the Burger King
parking lot.
of what
I immedjelv adv.sed Officer I
he just heard. Officerl
J relayed that information to the
Task Force Sergeant (TFS)
I, the On-Scene_commander. TFS
a advised Officer
Ioff of the
I to remove I
lot and to place p
into the vehicle of Officer I
I
This veiicle was parked adjacent to the Burger King parking lot.
The arrest/surveillance teams were jntructec3 to stay in the
parking lot so FMTF TFAs could arrestL
Lnd any additional
subjects involved in the plai to “rip” I
lof his/her money.
A black Ford Bxplorer, with California li
e
was seen driving through the lot several times.
positively identified the driver of that v
to
Off icezI
IVisible sitting next t.
unidentified Hispanic male
4 later identifie as
I advised all FMTF personnel to
I
i. TPSI
stay in place and the Bust Team would take I
I into custody
upon his arrival to the parking lot. SAj
jwas in the
vehicle with Sergeant I
I an4 was saceçi ifi t1e front
passenger seat. ehind SA I
Iwai Deputyl
I and behind
Sergeant I
I was Officer 1
I
When the black Bxplorer parked, TFS I
Igave the
bust signal and pulled his unmarked task force vehicle directly
behind in order to bumper lock the subjects’ vehicle. As the
arrest team exited the Bust Team vehicle wearing tadtical law
enforcement_clqthing, fully marked with clear “POLICE” insignia,
I immediately complied with the arrest orders and
subject I
was taken into custody without incident. However, the subject
passenger,I
I exited the vehicle and began running_south on
the east side of the Burger King restaurant. SAl
Ibegan a
foot purquit while identifying himself as law enforcement and
ordering I
I to stop. Deutv I
Ibut was
I also ran after I
some distance behind SAl
I

•

.

During the foot pursuit, Detectivd
I parralled
the chase
hi unmarked police vehicle and turned into the path
of subjectF I in a efort to block his path and(iiv ir frri the
pursuit. As Detective I
Ipu.led in froflt oft
I ran
into the side of the police vehicle. Detective I
Ithought
I
Iha,I been knocêd down, but when he exited his vehicle he
realized that
around and kept running eastbound towardB

4

6

ic

b7D

 297-HQ-A1271905-o

Highway 99. It was then Detectiv4
Iheard shots_fired, saw
SAl
Ja distance behind his vehicle, and observed I
jnakina
his way down tiriiicp the bushes. SAl
I and Detective I
1
did not pursuel
I because of the inherent danger. Bqth
obsexvedl
Iwith what appeared to be a shinny gun
hand prior to losir visibility of the subject in the brush. I
Detective I
I vehicle sustained_scatch marks believed to
have come from the weapon carried by I
I

ml

•

SAl

reported seeing

Iclutching the waistband

of his pants with his right hand while runing. I
Iwas
approximately io yards aheac ofSI
I who repeatedly shouted
police’ and “stop.” AfterL b path was cut-off by peteotive
1
‘
I
I vehicle, I
I made eye- contact with SAl
iluring
which time SAl
I reported seeing a silver semautom4tic
handgun in
I hand. The gun was held level to
I torso
and pointed outward in a ready to shoot osition. I Betorei
I

completed his 180 degree turn, toward SA
SAl
I
Iid not take action that
was going to shoot
him. SAl
Istopped_running obt
e shooting stance and
fire. one round all
I After
first round was fired,
I
Idid not complete his 180 turn, but ran around the back of
the undercoyr veh.cle approaching the edge of the emb
Fearing_that I
IqouJ.d. take cover and begin firing at SA
SAl
I then fired two more rounds in succession before
disappeared into the brushes.
believed 4f

•

•

•

I

When the remainipg arrest team members met up with SA
land Off icerl
I they were advised thati
ihad a
gun. a security perimeter was established until additional
ersonne]. arrived and. could initiate a controlled search for
Fresno Police Department SWAT team was activated_at
approximately 7:00 pm, and deployed to find and arrest I
For
safety purposes, all vehicle_traffic was stopped surroundingI the
area. Since the area where I
Iwas last seen was cqver with
dense vegetation,
lice K-9 was used to help find I
1
Pn
I Prior
to the search for I
I. marked police vehicles were used to
provide overhead lighting. Multiple K-9 announcements were given
from both air (cHP helicopter> and grovnd using a ubiic access
system.

Tlzp K-was released in the aea where I

Iwas last

seen by SA I
I an4 Detective I
I. A struggle was heard
and the K—9 and. I
Iwere seen_coming out of the brush and
rolling down the embankment. I
I punched the K- 9 several times,
howevr. th K-9 bit and heidi
b leftbice. Once down the
j?as arrested at apcroxmateiy 10:20 pm and medical
hiil,I
assistance was obtained tori
I injuries.

5

 .
297-HQ-A1271g05-D

.

•

•

•

•

•

•

SAl
I positively identifiecL
un the_emeraqncy
room of the UMC Hospital as the fleeing subject. SAl
I
reported that during the identieication process4
J”winked” at
him leaving him tc b14r that p
palso recognized_him. Fresno
Police Officers I
I andi
twere withi
JwhenI
I
stood from his hospital bed and winked
jiJtziie lai.1uixig.

ati

Two of the eight employees of the Burner ICing witnessed
portions of the incident. The manager,
saw a
I
Hispanic male running fast across the front
Ct tne restaurant
heading toward Highway 99. He then saw a uniformed police
officer chasing the Hispanic male followed by two gunshots.
He
remained inside the restaurant.
The second employee advised she was working inside
Burger King when she heard shouting outside. She heard something
to the effect of “get down, get down,
“stop,” “don’t run,” and
“put your hands up in the air.” She looked out and saw a man
running by the urger King holding something in his hand. She
then saw the police officer chasing him. The employee was not
sure if it was a gun because of how the subject was moving his
arms up and down during the pursuit.

of

I
I
During a search subsequent to the arrest
LI a
silver and black Bersa .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol with
extended magazine was located in the heavy bushes east of the an
embankment. The gun contained one live “fed” .380 caliber round
in the chamber of the gun and nine rounds of the same ammunitioi
in the extended magazine. It was later determined that the
weatoi located at the scene, believed to have be carri1
by
Iwas reported stolen from the residence of I
I
Freeno on 01/16/2007.

No law enforcement or bystanders were injured during
this incident.
There were no issues identified by the SIRT.

•

6

b 7C

 )

S

FD.204 (Rev. 12.1-95)

UNiTED STATES DEI’ARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

.

Copy t0

Repoit of
Date

•

lid
05/0 ,tuu i

ose Inspection

7C

297—HQ—A1271895--D
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHThADELPHIA DIVISION
03/15/2007

.

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

.

.

Synopsis:

On 03/15/2001, the Philadelphia Division
participated in an undercover operation with Philadelphia
Police Department (PPD), Narcotics Field Unit (NFU) as
part of the Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF) initiative.
The operation uti.izedI
I
who had arranged a buylva.uc witn an unicnown male subject
for two ounces o
nd a 9 irim semiautomatic pistol.
)b6
After meeting in
le, the subject and two
others attemnfpd 1-ri i-rip
of $1800. As surveillance b7c
b7
converged oni
lye .c e, all three subjects exited
the vehicle anct r.Lecl in different directions. One subject
fled toward a surveillance team consisting of two FBI
Agents and a PPD Sergeant. As the Agents and Sergeant
approached and identified themselves, the subj ect ignored
their commands to stop, the subject then reached into his
pocket, removing a black cellular telephone. Believing
the cellular telephone was a weapon, an Agent fired a
single round striking the subject in the upper right
chest.
The subject was pronounced dead at the scene.
DETAILS:
On 03/15/2007, the Philadelphia Division’s Squad
3 took part in an undercover buy/walk operation with the
PPD-NFU.
This operation was one in a series of operations
Squad 3, t-he Latin \Tiolent Gang Sad, had routinely
supported since August 2005.
Squad 3 received SSTF
designation in February 2007. This particular operation

hia dconoent oontains neither reco.ndaticna
nor couo3.ueione of the Fair. irt is the property of the rEX
and is loaned to yoU agency; j 4 jt ont
ane not to ha distributed outaii. your agency.

 ____

297—HQ—A12718 95—D
was part of the “Hearts and Min
ds Prog
phase program targeting specific areas ram,” a comprehensive four—
incorporating: 1)intelligence gathering of Philadelphia and
through source
development; 2)undervover buys targe
ting lower-level dealers;
3)execution of search and arrest warr
presence and positive engagement with ants; and 4)visible uniform
targeted area following the enforcem the population of the
ent action. FBI cases were
opened on targets developed throu
gh this program who merited
additional scrutiny.
As part of this initiative, Squad 3 perso
nnel were
+r-. iitJc
with poeril fi
within the PPD—NFIJ. SA
F
J and 514
Iwere apsiqned to york with
i.—N’U Team 2 led by Sergeanti
lentered
J SAj
on duty(EOD)on 03/09/2003 and joine
ci quaci 3 in Yu1y 2006 after
transferring p i-h hilade1phia Divi
sion from the Baltimore
Djvisjo. SAl
j EOD’cI as an Agent on 02/09/1992. She was
assigne’d to tft Philadelphia Division
on 06/03/1992.
0,i 03/15/2007, at approximately 1:00p.m.,
SAsj
I
and[
I aid members of the PPD-NFU attended a
brief
ing by
Sergeant I
at
the PPD-NFU offeite to d.scuss a buy/walk
I
opetation involving one of PPD_NFIIIRF
IPh target of
the
operation was later identified as
I Neither the P?D—
MFU nor the FBI prepared a writt I
en operations plan for this
buy/walk. This was not unusual for
joint Squad 3 and PPD-NFU
operations, especially for what was
risk events such as buy/walks, whic described as relatively low—
h were conducted as offai
four times per day. The Squad 3 supe
I and
ASAC Ronald T. Hosko noted division rvisor, SSAI
polic
y
only
requ
ired
writt
en
operations plans in large arrests/se
es or events with the
potential for generating significantarch
media interest.
divicid

•

•

[

iim

SSAI
Iwas made aware of the operation
SA
j who 1et him a voice mail on 03/15/2007. ASAC byHosko
was
not nocified of this operation prio
r to it’s execution. SA
_I left SSAF
I a voice mail stating she and SA
[
would be working with PPDI
Team 2 on a buy/walk operation.
t
was anticipated a PPD—NFU
would purchase two ounces of
cocaine., a Beretta 9ji mii,innitjc
pistol and b “f onted” an
ounce of cocaine byl
Ihad been told by
the
Beretta 9mm would haye a fully load
ed magazine and one round in
the chamber. I
ibelieved the offer i-n frtjnt an ounce of
cocaine was unusual and he was conc
ernedl_Jwas itjin’yj to
im.
There had been telephojc ccnItact between
I
j and
but this was the first buy I
Ihad made from I
I
---—,

2

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ID 7

D

 297 —HQ—A12718 95—D
The PPD—NFU had been used in the past by ?PD and wasP
deemed reliable and credible by PPD. The $1800 in cash to be
exchanged for the weapon and cocaine would be provided by PPD.
After the verbal briefing, SAl
s4
and
Sergeant I
I departed the PPD—NFU offsite in SA 1
IThureau
vehicle. a Fprd Explorer and drove tq
ni-by KFC Restaurant to
meet I
I Serean1L
Jbriefed
I then searchqd him
while SAsI
landi
I searched the Cl’s vehicle. I
I
was then provided $l8O0in buy money by 5ergeaflt
J Atter
discussing several options for distress signals,1
[agreed to
Put his hands over his head to signal he needed help.__Sergeant
I offred to put an un4rcovr P?D officer with I
I but
I
Ideclined.
I ‘1pcided not to place a recorder
Sergeant I
or transmittiir dyice with I
i due to this being the first
purchase fromi
j and feared the device(s) would be. discovered.

J

•

I
I had instructed I
Ito contact him by cellular
telephone after exiting 1—95 at Allegheny Avenue in Northeast
Philadelphia.
He also agreci to 1i1 his shirt to indicate he
was unarmed before entering
I vehicle.

I

•

•

I departed the KFC Retvrnt enwit in the
Allegheny Avenue exit,_followed by SAl
I SAl
land
Sergeant I
I in SAl
J Bureau vehicle. Three other
unmarked PPD surveji
te were also following. After
exiting at Allegheny
turne on Ielgrade Street where he
pulled over to the cur
up I
I who was flagging down
I
I As pre—planned,
ifted his shirt and expd h4 q
waist, before getting into t e front passenger seat of
vehicle.

I

I

pulled away from the curb and drove around the
block betore paricing at the corner pf Belorde and Clearfield
Streets. Wade exited and reentered’
I vehicle several
times while poeaking on a cellular telephone. Upon reentering
the vehicle,I
Idrove away and proceeded to Cedr and Ann
Streets where subjects i.....
I entered the
J and
rear passenger’s seat of I
I vehicle. I
Iwas peatd
behind I
I and I
i was seated behind I
then drove northbound on Cedar Street and pulled over
ectj/
at the
intersection of Cedar and Clearfield Streets. At this point,
over the PPD radio, Sergept I
] warned all surveillance units
to be alert to indicationsi
[was being robbed. Minutes
later, surveillance units which were parked as close as 100 feet
away observed the subjects striking I
I in the head with
r s also seen placing his hands over hi hea their
fists. I
Believing
1
I was being beaten and robbed, Se-Egeantj______
using the radio instructed the surveillance units to converge on
IvehicJ.e.
I
3

.

.

D

 ___________

2 97—HQ—A12718 95—0
Immediately, Sergeantl
I SAl
I, and SAl
leapt from their vehicle which was parked going the opposite
direction on the other side of the street approximately 100 yards
away fromi
Ivehicle. Although all three brought ballistic
protective vests which identified them as law enforcement, they
•had not donned them prior to exiting the vehicle.

I

•

•

In his statement to the Shooting Review Team (SIRT), SA
‘said, “immediately upon exiting my vehicle I began to veil
‘Police stopi’
I continued to yçil this s I ran towardj
vehicle. As I was moving towardi
Ivehiole_and yelling
‘Police stop’ the irdividua1 who was hittingi
stopped and
stood still next to I
I car. Almost immediately I saw an
individual I believed to be a male on the passenger side of the
vehicle begin to run in my direction on the sidewalk next to the
vehicle.
I began to run across the street in an effort to cut
off the individi.a]. all the time continually yelling ‘stop
police.’ As the individua:I. was running toward the same general
direction as myself, he continued to turn his head back and forth
looking around.
For a brief moment I lost view of the subject
when a vehicle I recall as being either a SUV or a van, red in
color, came between us. As I started around the corner of the
vehicle and anticipated coming face to face with the subject I
had my weapon in a two hand grip and raised it pointing toward
the subject. When I came around the corner of the vehicle I was
about five feet from the subject and I yelled ‘police stop’ and
the individual reached his left hand into the area of his waist
band retrieving a dark object which I believed to be a handgun
then he appeared to thrust his hand in my direction with the
object I believed to be a handgun in his hand. I then fired one
shot at the individual. Immediately after firing at the
individual he fell to the ground to my right and the ‘weapon’
fell from his hand.”.
In her statement to the SIRT si4
Istated,” I
immediately exited through the rear driver’s door of the Explorer
and ran diagonally across the street towards I
I vehicle to
render assistance. A i did o, I saw the two rear—seat
passengers jump from I
Ivehicle and begin to run. The
subj eat wearing the black jacket ran down the sidewalk in our
direction as SA I
a sergeantl
I, and I began shouting,
“Police,. Police, Stop, FBI, Freeze I” The neighborhood was quiet
that afternoon, and I recalled our voices echoing between the
houses on the street. The subject ignod our conunands and
continued to run down the sidewalk. SAl
I was in front of me
as I tried to parallel the subject in an effort to cut him off
further down the street. There was a red Bronco parked across
the street from us and I rap towards the rear of th-is vehicle
sifcè I saw that SAl
I would reach the front of the vehicle.
first. While doing so, I observed the subject reach for his
4

I
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1b7C
/ Li

 297—RQ--A12718 95—0
waist and pull out a black object which I immediately thought was
a handgun. As I came around the rear of the vehicle with my
weapon drawn, I heard a pop and saw the subject was hit in the
chest. He staggered, then feil to the sidewalk. I observed
what
I thought was a weapon laying next to him on the sidewalk.
I
holstered my weapon and while maintaining my eye on the subject,
I knelt down and retrieved the “weapon” from the sidewalk. Only
then did I realize what I thought was a weapon was in fact a
Motorola cell phone.”
In an interview conducted by PPD, Sergeantl
Isaid,
“1 notified our baq)cup officers over the radio and we exited
our
auto. Agent I
j and myself_started hollaring, ‘police,
police,’ as we ran over to I
I auto. As w ran yer the big b6
white male in the front seat was still punching I
land the
two males in the backseat started to exit. The male who was
b7D
in
the rear backseat of the vehicle started running southbound on
Cedar Street using the opposite side of the street. This male
was reaching into his pocket and Agent
isaid, ‘let me see
your hands.’ rLet me see your hands.’ he said it several times.
At this point the male took his hand from his_pocket and I saw a
black object in his hand. I then saw Agen I
I shoot one time
and the male fell to the ground.” Sergeant I
I .went On to
state, “I was just about to shoot the male when Agent
I shot
him. At that time, I thought the male had a black gunI in his
hand.”

•

Immediately fpllowina the shontina. PPD Thyestigators
located and interviewedi
I was leaving
her mother’s house on Cedar Street approximately 25 feet from
where the shooting occurred. Although
Iwas not an
eyewitness to the shooting she providea tne to.uowing statement
to PPD, “I was inside my mother’s house when I heard someone
yell, ‘freeze, police, get down,’ something like that and then I
heard a gunshot.
I went outside my mother’s house to go back to
work and I saw a guy on the ground bleeding in front of 3083
Cedar Street and another white male standing there I guess was a
Police Officer.”
Paramedics from the Philadelphia Fire Department
immediately responded to the scene and determined Kopp was
deceased. The PPD Crime Scene Search Unit also responded to the
scene and conducted a crime scene investigation.
search
of his
pocket
by PPD
of

The male who was shot was later identified as Kopp. A
of Kopp revealed a pocket knife in the front left pocket
pants.
Tie black object Kopp was seen removing from hi
was a Motorola Cellular telephone. I
Iwas ar-rested
nreillance units after a short foot pursuit.

a Walther EB gun. I

5

.

A search.

7C

iwas arrested near the

 2 97—HQ—A127 18 95—D

•

I

I vehic.e.
near Kopp,I

No cocaine or any other weapons were found

Io

I

on or

ro,I

•

•

In an iri-i-r1ew with
I in,icated he and Kopp
had been asked by
Il-n h1p him robi
I He told
investigators that h
nd Koit, were never not in possession
I
of handg nor nv nnrajne.
brought the BE gun to

“scare”

Irefused to be interviewed.

An autopsy performed by the City of Philadelphia’s
Office of the Medical Examiner determined the manner of Jason
Kopp’s death to be Homicide. The cause of Jason Kopp’s
death was
determined to be a gunshot wound to the right upper chest which
was 1 1/2’ from the midline and 12” below the top of the
The bullet entered the right chest and passed backwards, head.
downwards and leftwards through the right lung, through the
aorta, through the spine at the level of the 4th intercostal

space and through the left lung before exiting out from the
left
chest and lodging within the muscles of the left back.

The FBI Laboratory determine4 the bullet recovered from

Kopp’s body was fired from SAl
Model 22, Serial Number EDR782.

1.40 caliber Glock pistol,

•

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6

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 .

FD.204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of [avestfgatiou

Copy to:

SSA I

Report of:
Date:

09/11/2007

I

Ofltcu

Cleveland

297HQA12712292D
SHOOTING INQUIRY REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
cI,EVELND DIVISION
SEPTEBER 4, 20.07

Titio

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
Synopais:

I

This shooting incident was a direct result of a fugitive
investigation, wherein a Safe Streets Task Force {SSPT),
the Mahoning Valley Violent Crimes Task Force, which
operates out of the Youngstown Resident Agency of the
z1nr fliripion, was seeking to locate and apprehend
L who had been charged by the local
authorities with feloniou8 assault.
The underlying ciro -nr’ regarding this offense
were that on July 4, 20071
Ibecame embroiled in an
argument with twç males at a as tation in Youngstown
Ohio. I
ipulled a handgun and, as the males f1edthe
area in their vehicles, he fired numerous rounds at them.
The local authorities requested the Youngstowi.
Resident Agency’s SSTF’s assistance after chargingl
I
for this act and being unsuccessful in. locating him. A.n
88 preliminary investigation was opened on July 9, 2007
based upon this request. Investigation by members of the
SSTP developed information thati
Iwas moving back and
forth from Youngstown, Ohio to various locations in the
state of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, on August 29, 2007 a
federal warrant was issued t Youngsiown, Ohio by United
States Magistrate Judge George S. Limbert chargini
I
with Unlawful Plight to Avoid Prosecution in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1073.
On September 4, 2007 investigators learned that

hi. documant contains nsith.r r.coss.ation. no conclusions of th. War. It is th. pxcp.rty of
and is loan.4 to your g.ncy; it and it. contents ar, pot to b. diatrit.t.d outside your agency.

ha Wax

b6
t70

 .

-

.
I

Iwas

supposedly utilizing a certain cellular telephone.

Based upon. this information, technical tracking of that
cell phone was initiated on September 4, 200’1. At first
1 the
tracking information indicated that the cellular phone was being
utilized in the north central area of Youngstown, in the vicinity
of a municipal park
Wick Park.
This information was developed
at approximately 1:00 p.m on September 4, 2007. Continued
operation of tracking technology essentially isolated the
location of this ce]4uiar rthnn tnI
I. Based upon
this information, SAl
lutilized the available
Task Force pe;sonnl to estaisn a J.oose perimetr on that
location. SAl
land Task Force Officer (TPO)I
Itook
up a position that provided them with visual surveillance of I
1
I
I. At approximately 2:15 p.m surveillance observed a
Toyota Camry leave I
In that it was being
I.
operated by a male whose description was not consistent with
I
I the decision was made to atop the vehicle some distance
from the residence.
(NOTE: I
Iiq one address of a
1 duplex with two address
sidebyside1
I
I.
-

b7C

-

The informaton Droyided by the operator of this
vehicle indicated that]
Iwas very likely in a Toyota Camry
behind I
a.
A plan was formulated wherein a number of Task Force
officer8 would block escape through the rear of the residence to
the street behind (or to the east) of the Ohio resijnre (Elm
Street). The remaining Task Force officers and SAl
I would
approach from the front’ of the residence in an effort to locate
and apprehendE
l This plan had to be communicated to the
Task Force members, who had spread out to estab3ish the
aforementioned perimeter around I
I, via radio and
cellular phone.
Significant radio problems were encountered and
therefore some Task Force members had to be briefed via cellular
phone.

I

At approximately 2:30 p.m SAl
gave an ordqr to
move up and the rsoectLve Task Force unitS moved towards I
I
I
SA I
I arrived first, with TFd________________
was observed in a red or burgundy Toyota Camry behind I
I
Street, with the vehicle parked facing away from the residence.
He appea-red to be talking on a cell phone and both the driver
s
t
window and front passenger_window were open. he clan had teen
for SAl
I
aud TFOI
Ia)ong with TFOBI
I
I to b1pck in the Camry and effect
IardI
cI
the arret.
land TFOI
I arrived at the southeast
side of I
Fior to the other units.
2

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 ____

___

r

.

.

civi]iau witnesses and TFOs confirm that SAl______
orderedi
Jout of the car and identified himself as “ o ice’
.
1
I
iplaced the Camry in reverse and, at a high rate of speed,
awun he vehicle out of its parked position just missing SA
I
j who had exited his vehicle to effect the arrest. The
Camry turped throuah an aproximately 270 degree arc and stopped,
facing SAl
‘then placed the vehicle in drive and
accelerated_sharply at SAl
I who, at this time, fired five
times ati
I
-

The Camry continued on past SAl
I coming to a stop
annroxirtately 30 yards behind him. S1j
[arid TFOs removed
I
L&om the vehicle, provided first aid, called for the EMS
and made appropriate notifications.e was transported to a local
hospital for treatment and surgery.I
Ihad three gunshot
wounds to his left arm (two to the wrist and one to the upper
arm), one gun shot wound to the right forearm and a superficial
wound to his left leg. He would be jnterviewed on September 6,
2007 and claimed that he only heard an order to “get out of the
car, but thought that he was being robbed. He acknowledged that
he threw his car into reverse and floored it; he also
acknqwledae4 that he then put the car in drive and again floored
it. I
Istated that at this point he saw a man, whom he
realized was police, to his left and fFont and at thIs juncture
he heard gunfire and was shot. L
lalso conceded that he was
aware of the fact that the police were looking for him and that a.
9mm handgun found in the Camry was his.
T1e only rounds fired in this shooting were the five

fired by SAl
(or M-4).

I

who utilized his Bureau issued Colt, ?416A1

Bureau issued anutunition was utilized and the weapon
I was qualified on this weapon. SA
functioaed properly. SAl
--

I

.s a member of the Cleveland SWAT team.

The Supervisor of Youngstown, Squad 16, who has
responsibility for the SSTF, was on the scene within minutes and
insured that Cleveland Executive Management was notified. ASAC
Derek M. SiegJ.e responded from Cleveland. FBI ERT personnel and

Youngstown Police Pepartment jointly processed the scene.

3

b6

 (Rev. 06.044007)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Thspection

‘rom:

Attn:

Inspection
Office of Insoections
Contact: I

Approved By:

I

03/05/2008

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Extension 4—1837

?erldns Kevin ZJ

Clemens MichaelL/r

Drafted By:

I

llrr

Case ID It: 297—HQ—A1271906—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
ST. LOUIS DIVISION
05/30/2007

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred On 95/30/2007, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I While he and other law
enforcement personnel attempted to arr. R cmhject wanted on
federal and local criminal charges, SAl
I fired three
rounds from his Bureau—issued Rock River semi—automatic r.f is at
an unaccompanied aggressive K-9 dog.. SIRG members_recommended
that no adxinistraie actionbe tkéñ’agist SAl
las a
result of his involvement in thfs shooting incident.
Administrative:__Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA)I
Idated 06/07/2007.
Details:

This comun{’ati’ón was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 05/30/2007, SA I
I and two
additional Safe Streets Task ‘orce (STF) otticers, met
with
Sergeant I
lof the St. Louis County Police Department,
Community Action Team (CAT), as well as K-B Units. A request was
made for the CAT to utilize marked patrol units to initiate a
traffic stop of

fugitivel

I

Sergean.l-I
‘and his team were fully briefed
te subject*s identity as wel]. as his criminal history.
SAl
ladvised all attendees tha;t the subject would probably
attempt to run from law enforcement personnel. Sergeant
I
re’-Mn

 To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
92
7—I{Q—A1271906—D, 03/05/2008

advised K-9 Units would be utilized if West
attempted to evc1
arrest or injure law enforcement personnel. SergeantI
I
identified one canine as vicious and advised the
particularly effective at neutralizing his targetsdog was
and would not
stop biting until pulled off by his handler.
According to one local participant, all personnel
present in the briefing were instructecr to stay
vehicles if, K-9s were deployed to avoid confusinginside their
the dogs.
Approximately thirty minutes after the briefing
Sergeant p
I team executed the traffic
vehicle coming to a complete stop the subject stop. ?rior to his
jumped out, rolled
down a hill, and fled into a wooded area.
Although previously
instructed to remain in their vehicles, law
officers
exited their vehicles with weapons drawn and enforcement
ran toward the
subject.
As Canine Units searched for the suspect in the
heavily
vegetated area, SA
Ipositioned himself along a creek to
prevent the subject’s esqao thropgh the creek.
As he was
holding his position, SAl
I heard what he believed to be
local officers to the south of his location, and
shouted, “FBI to
your front,” several times.
•

2

During the activity, K-9. Officer
his dog (previously identified as vicious) I approximateI deployed
ly 50 yards
away from the other K—9 Unit with instructions
to
search_çid
apprehend.
Shortly after deploying his dog, Officer
observed the dog alert and start.running.
OfficerI__Icalled
bc
out, li’t. Louis Coun.ty-Police Canine,” and heard
someone respond,
“I,” from the direction in which the dog was
running. Officer
I
Iixmaediately attempted to recall his dog, but
iimnediateiy
heard one gunshot followed by two additional
gunshots. Officer
I
I recailed his dog again and the dog returned to him.
Of ficer[
isubsequently learned that his cai,iri
encountered SAL
un the woods, and advised
I
could have incurred serious injury had he not shot SAl
at the dog.
According to SAl
1 while holding his position in
the vegetated area he could not see other law
enforcement
personnel. However, he observed the police
canine
approach him
in an aggressive manner, crouch, and prepare to
Believing he was in imminent danger of serious lunge at him.
he fired three rounds from his rifle near the physical injury,
dog’s head. As the
rounds struck the ground, the dog returned to
his handler.

2

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271906—D, 03/05/2008

No personal or property damage was incurred
as a result
of the rounds fired by
M

I

On 02/15/2008, the SIRG met to discu
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant ss the above—
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chair Director Michael
ed the meeting and
was a non—vctjna
The following Voting members were in
attendance: I
I Deputy Chief,- Gang Squad, CririnaJ.
jvin United States
Department of Justice (USDOJ);
E
i
I
I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Divi
sion., uvoJ;
Ronald T. Hosko, Inspector, Office of Insp
ectio
(0!), INSD;
Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Sect ns C’fl-1
enCounterintelligence Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Firearms Traininr flni+ Training and Develo I
pment Division (TDD
TT(’ U
JDefensive Systems Unit, TDD; tJCI_______
snaian Country/Special Crimes Uni
Sction, Criminal Investigative Divi
sion; U’____________________
Practical Applications Unit, TDD; Acting UC
Special Weapons and Tactics Operatipns Unit
, Critical Incident
Response Group; SSj
I Firearms
Toolztr1 tjnit,
Scientific Analysis Section., Laboratory
Division; SSAI
i
j ]pveti aH rø Tw t1
qit, Office of General
Counsel; and SSA
J Gangs/Cr
SectionCID. Management Program Analyst (:NPAiminal_Enteprise
)I
I
I nspeetionnagement qr4t, OI,..INSV, a’ nonvotin
g
member, was also in attendance. ‘. .

I

I

—

Oservaticns and Recommendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reiewed the above synopsized incid
ent with
the intent to
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative
analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corre
ctive actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues.;
and
(4) provide
recommendations for administrative action
if deemed necessary,
SIRG memhr nnninwio1u jgreed that the use
of deadly
force by SAI
I, was justified and in
conformance with the FBi’s deadly force polic
resulted in the recommendption that no adm y. This discussion
inistrative action be
taken against SA
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
I

The OGC representative voiced concern regarding
SA
Iputting himself in a dangerous situation
since
participants were advised to stay inside their
vqhicles if
canines were deployed. Additionally, SA
I
I had no
3

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271906—D, 03/05/2008

communication with other law enforcement personnel which resulted
in him having to shout his location several times. This matter
will be discussed with the special Agent in Charge of the
St. Louis Division.

—

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4

4.

 •

.

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271906—D,

Set Xead 1:

Inspection
03/05/2008

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

th nooing incident.

DC

‘‘-inistrative action be taken against
I as a result of his involvement in

7C

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

—
-

—
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—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni., Room 7427
Mr.I
DOJ
MrI
.
USDOJ
Mr. Casey, Room 5096
Ms. I
I Room 3999
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
CIRG
Mr.
uantico
Mr.
Quantico
Ms.
L Room 7326

1-Mr.
1
Mrs
—

IWFO
Room 3043

,

5

 ______________[irr

(Rev. O8.O42OD7)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Date:
Attn:

Inspection
Of ficé of Inspections
Contact:p

Approved By:

02/22/2008

AD Kevin T. Perkins

IExte..nsion 4-1837

Perkins kevin
Clemens Michae1.f’

Drafted By:
Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271659—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
KANSAS .CITY DIVISION

05/11/2007

-

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incent that ocqured on 05/11/2007, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
I During the execution of a Federal
search warrant, S I
[fired one round from his Bureau—issued
Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, injuring an aggressive dog.
SIRG members_recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAj
I as aresult of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Adm.n.stzativo; Reference Electronic Communication (EC) of
Acting Chief Division Counsel (A/CDC)I
I dated
05/16/2007.
Detail: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 05/11/2007, at approximately 11:00 a.rn., members of
the Kansas City Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team executed
a search warrant at a Kansa City residence. As the search team
approached the rear of the residence, they observed a large brown
ahd white dog attached to a heavy chain. The team stopped its
approach, however, the dog turned and raced aggressively toward
team members barking and baring his teeth. Although one Agent
used his shield to deflect the dog’s attack, the dog then
attacked SA
Iin-uring his left hand. SAl
I who
was directly .beflin SA a
I fired one round striking_the dog’s
paw.
The dog immediately ceased its attack on SAl
I

b6

 To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271659—D, 02/22/2008

I

I
day.

The SWAT T@am medic provided immediate assistance to SA
hand at the scene and he was seen by a doctor the same

The dog was removed by local animal control
authorities.
-

On 02/15/2008, the SIRG -met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance:
j Deputy Chief, Gang Squad, Criminal
Division, Un.te states Department of Justice (USDOJ),1
I
I
Ispecial Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Ronald P. Hosko, Inspector, Office of Inspections COT), INSD;
Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section, CD-i.
Counterintelligence Division; Unit Chief (UC) I
I
Firearms Training Unit
, Training and Development Division (TDD
1
UCI
I Defensive Systems Unit, TDD; UC
I
I Indian Country/Special Crimes Un4Violeat crime
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; DC I
Practical Applications Unit, TDD; Acting DCI
Special Weapons and actics Ooerat4.ons Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group; SEA I
L, Firearms
Tooliuarks_Unit,
Scientific Ana.ysis Section, Laboratory Division; SEAl
I
I
I nvestiaativa Law fl’it, Office. of General
counseL; ana A I
I Gangs/Criminal_EnterpriseS
Section, CID.
Management Program Analyst (MPA) I
I
I
I Inspection Management Unit, 01, INSD, a non-voting
member, was also in attendance.
-

I

—

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SRG members unnimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified and in conf9rmance with
the FBI’s deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recampiendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
as a result of his involvement in this Shooting incident.

2

.

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—FIQ—A1271659—D, 02/22/2008

Set Xead 1:

(Action)

NPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
SA
inc.aent.

Tht no administrative action be taken against
as a result of his involvement in this shooting

6
1b70

1
1
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. £Daproni, Room 7427
Mr.
DOJ
1
Mr.I
I USDOJ
1
Mr. Casey. ‘oom 5096
I oom 3999
1
Ms.
1
Mr.
uantico
1
Mr.
uantico
1—Mr.
CIRG
1
Mr.
IQuantico
1
Mr.
I Quantico
1
Ms.
I, Room 7326
1-Mr.
WFO
1— Mrs/
Room 3043
—

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—

—

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—

J

3

 •

FD-204(Rcv, 121.95>

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

S

-a

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copyto
ixcj

O7/if 2007.

Daze;

I

o Inspection

297-HQ-A1271464 -D
SHOOTING INQUIRY

litic
-

REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
DALLAS DIVISION
OS/05/2007

-

ADMINISTRATIVE
e
Syeopds

•

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•
•

.

.

..

.

a

This shooting incident occurred, zhile a. team of.. FBI
Agents, task force off.cers, and Richardson
Department Officers. were attempting, to arrest a ubjct. at
the Wal-Mart Parking lot, 1.521 Cockrell Hill Road
Texas, diring an active; violent kidnaping invespigatjon.
As part of the plan, the subject (a). elivered a. “iróp’
vehicle ‘ to an agreed-upon location fr he purp’os’êf
having ransom money and methamphetamine placed tié.
vehicle to secure the release of the victim. NOne Subject.
parked the “drop vehicle” near surveilhing SAs. A second
suspect vehicle parked parallel to the “drbp vehicle.”
The driver of the “drop v-ehicle” ran when approache by
Ss. The second vehicle sped off. The running subject
subsequently boarded a thin suspeót vehicle as a R-front
passenger. This third vehicle then drove at FBI SAs who
fired at the subject driver. Two SAs discharged ther
weapons. Three shots taken by one SA struck the subject
driver resulting in his dath. he subject passenger was
unharmed. Subsequent investigation led to the arrest of
five involved kidnaping subjects, the seizure .o four
firearms and aTmnunjtjon, and the rescue of the kidnaping.
victim who had been shot twice and 1eaten by subjects..
-

0
•

The shooting was recorded by Wal-Mart parking ot
surveillance cameras. Aik aerial photograph of th parkizig
lot is’ located onpage 69of this rePort.
-

•

?hia 4ocu contaji neither reccendatiozis aor
cOo1usic of the PBX. Zt is the peupert of the
Fax
and is loaned to your agencr, it and ts cone are
not to he distrlhuted outside your agency.

 297-HQ-A12714 64 -D
DETAILS:
On 05/05/2003, just after midnight, the ‘Dallas
switchboard operator received a telephone call from the Division
‘Police Department (DPD) Comtnjnjcatjons Center regarding Dallas.
a
possible kidnaping matter ha
iing taken place in Texas.
4
Information was telephonically forwarded to Dallas PEt
Criminal
Enterorise ((!P’
n, Aatizp Suerv-isory Special
Agent (A/SSA)
I
IA/SS2J
I was told that according to
i.,, a call had been received from a
Spanish-speaking malq, in
Mexico who was reporting that his brothe.r had been
kidnaped.

A/SSAI
I telephonically contacted the DPD
Communications center and spoke to DPD Dispatcherl______________
an Enish and Spanish-speaker, who would translate
tor
ssz.
I
J during, a three-way patdh telehOne connection to
1
I the alleged kidnap victim’ brother in Mexico.
Afte
dropping the three-way coxnection several ti,mes, A/SSj_______
telephoned Dallas FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Blaise Mikulewjcz at approximately 12:30am [05/05/2007), (ASAC)
and
brIefed him on what he knew of the matter at the time,
The
SAC
concurred with A/SSAI
I assessment that the FBI should
begin working this as an active kidnaping matter.
Thq ‘A.cc’
requested he’ be kept, apprised of ‘developmeits.
A/SSAI_______
telephoned Special .gent (SA)I
I of the E
briefed him on the case, and put him on “stand-by”
he. and his Spanish-speaking abUities were needed. ià the evet
A/SSAI
Icontinued to speak to the
and learnçd from her that the kidnap victim’s nameDPD
was I
I Also, the kidnapers were demanding $250,000
I
or they
would kill the victim. A/SSAI
Ithrough ‘the DPD
Dispatche, asked p
I to have the subjects put the
victim on the phone
as a “proof of life.” During one
communication, the subject(s) repeated their demand
or an equivalent amount in drugs. At approximately fbr $250,000
(05/05/2007], the DPD’ Dispatcher reported to A/SSj i : OOam
Ithat
the subject(s) did put the victim,
L, On the phone
with the brother in Meçicr. Th fl’vtche further_translated
for J/SSAI
I that I
said that
I [victim’ s
brother) should pay the money.

•

b

-.

.‘

During one of the three-way conversations,

S.

A/SSA
I learned that the kidnapers had mentioned
Richardson,
Texas (suburb of Da:Llasj. A/SSA I
Icalled the

I

Police Department (RPD) and learned from RPD Sergeant
I
I,
that the RPD had responded to a possible kidnaping/shooting
which
occurred on 05/04/2007. A/ssAI
I spoke to RPD Sergeant
I and learned that the RPI3 was inveeiating a possible

2

7C

 _________lontacted

297-HQ-Al27l464D
kidnaping, bt that the RPD did not know the kidnaping victim’
s
name. A/SSA I
JacIvised that he shared information with
Sergeant I
Iincluding the vctjm’s name and cellular
telephone number. A/SSAI
Ilearned .that the RPD had
responded to a cail where gun.tire had been reported coming
from a
residence, an adult male was seen being forced into a vehicle,
and that another shot was heard coming from within this
vehicle
before it left the area slowly.
Sergeant I
indicated that
more assistance would be needed and A/SSII
loffered to send
• CE Squad personnel to assist in the kidnaping investigation.
At approx.mate1v 2:00am (05/05/2007), A/SSAI
I
again telephoned SAl
I and dispatched him to the RPD. One
other SA and Taskforce Officer (TFO
Iwere also
dispatched to the R?D.
Mikulswicz was called and briefed.
SAC Miku3.ewicz noted that it was his eperience hav’ing
kidnaping and extortion matters that haYing shoLts fired, worked
subjects not covering their faces, and the fact that theythe
drove
away slowly, caused him to believe that the kidnapingS
victim
was
either injured or in great danger.
During_follow-.up telephone calis with R?D Sergeant
I A/SSN
I learned that DEA. possibly had information
regarding the kidnaping but that DE would Ft divulge
the
information to the RPD becaue the RPD did 1
iot hr
1 the proper
clearances., Sergeantl
I provided AfSSN_______ a telephone
number to caU at PEA. IVSSAI
I spoke to a DE SA
learned that DEA. was aware of the kidnaping and that theaxid•
was alive an withjn one mile of the original kidnaping victim
location,
IRichardson, Texas. The exact location of the
vct.m was not determined at this time.
The information •was
charactrized by the DEA. SA as “third hand” which led A1SSA
I
I to believe that DE. or a*h’- government agency
had a
wiretap on a telephone. A/SSM
Iprovided the victimis
Nextel ‘telephone number to DEA. and learned that this
number
uQt the target of a wiretap. The subject(s) we•re using the was
victirns Nextel telephone to communicate demands.

I

•
•

•

.

A/SSA I
I continued to brief ASAC Mikulewjcz
concurred that the kidnaping investigation should continue. who
I continued to call out investigative resources
A/SSAF
include Technically rrjined Agents (TTAS) and on’call Duty to
Agents. A/SSA I
I contacted a Northern District of Tçxas
AUSA at her residence and briefed her on the case.
A/SSA,I
requested emergency authority to establish a “nen reais*’n
traãking order” targeting
T
‘

I

As the investigation progressed, SA I
I comnunicated
to A/SSAF
‘that a money drop might have to be made. A/SEA.
ASAC Nikulewicz to request additIonal Agents be
ctispatched. The ASAC concurred. At approximately 3:30am

3
S

b7;

I,

 297-HQ-A1273..464-D

Imade a request of the Dallas Office
(05/05/20071, A/SSAI
that all C Squad personner be notified by text message arid
instructed to respond to the RPD.
I
At approximately 4:00am (05/05/2007) A/SSAI
ontinue coordinating the
reported to the Dallas FBI Off ice t
in an undercover capacity
investigation. . He inserted TFOI
to act as the kidnaping victim’s cous.n.. This .nsertion was
coordinated with the victim’ s brother in ?4tpcicO WiO told the
I in Texas would
subject (s) that the “vi’-tiVl’ s cousin” (1FO
deal with them. TFO I
L hereafter the Undercover Employee
(t7CE), began speaking directly with the kidnapers via a Nextel
telephone using its “push-to-talk” feature.

•

Ibegan to write an Operational Plan with
X/SS.AI
the assistance of ASAC Mikulewicz. At this point, ASAC
Ito. include being advised
Mikulewicz was briefed by AISSA I
that the UCE’s negotiations had reached apoint where the
subject(s)’ demands were now fixed at $70, 000 in cash and three
pounds of methamphetamine for the elease of the victim. The
TTAs were still attemptug to locate the position of the
Subject (a)’ ceflphone communications through technical means.
At atnroçituately G:OOam (05/05/20071, ASACMikulewjcz
telephonically briefed Special Agent in Charge
and A/SSAI
(SAC) Robert E. Casey, Jr., on the status of the investigation.
The SAC concurred wih the direction and actions taken by-the
investigatori thus far. ASAC Mikulewicz secured $3,000 tom the
Dallas Di(fision’ s safe suâh that a “money drop” package with
weights and transmitter could be constructed in case needed.
As a safety precaution, ASAC Mikulewicz assembled al)..
•SA and non-FBI personnel involved in the operation at the Dailas
FBI Office such that all could see •one and other. Due to the
fast-moving nature of the operation, the .SAC alLowed AJSSA
I
Ito hand write the operations order which the ASAC read
and approved.

•

initiated
At 7: 00gm, .SAC Mikulewicz and a/si4
a briefing of al). parties involved with the exception of two of
the ‘r1s who were occupied with tracking the telephone used by
the subject(s). During the. briefing, members of the RPD brief ëd
the ‘attendees on the background o the case, including that the
subjects should be considered armed and dangerous; that shots had
been fired during the abduction; that the subjects repeatedly
threatened to kill the victim of the kidnaping if the ransom was
not paid ; and that the subjects threatened to kill the UCE if he
missed. the deadlines set by the subjects.
followed with a verbal briefing to ti
A/SSAI
law eaf-ercemeilt coflt.iti9eit where he out)4ned four scenarios which
included: 1) If the operation was successful in identfying a
ésidence where the subject(s)/victim were located, SWAT would be
activated to conduct the entry and rescue of the victim, 2) If
the operation was successful in identifying a residence and the
4

 297-HQ-A1271464 -D
victim was in imminent danger ` f being killed, the ` perati` nal
team c` mprised ` f CE Squad pers` nnel w` uld make the entry t`
rescue the victim, 3) Xf the ` perati` n was successful in l` c’ating
the subject(s)’ vehicle pri` r t` the ‘m` nay dr` p,” a fel` ny
traffic st` p w` uld be c` aducte, and 4) Xf, the ` perati` n was n` t
successful ip l` cating either a residence ` r a vehicle,
neg` tiati` ns with the subject(s) w` uld c` ntinue, ‘a m` ney dr` p
w` uld be arranged, and a fel` ny traffic st` p w` uld be c` nducted
when the subject(s) attempted t` pick up the m` ney.

S

•

SAC Mikujewjcz f` ll` wed with instructi` ns t` th` se
present that if the scenari` s inv` lving ‘traffic st` ps devel` ped,
pers` rnel were n` t t` ’ ‘en.gage in high- speed pursuits. The
tracking device placed in the m` ney dr` p package w` uld be relied
` n t` identify the directi` n ` f travel and the l` cati` n ` f the
subject (a.) /victim. Precise assignments f` r pers` nnel were made
were p` ssible. Due. ` the fluid nature ` f the.multiple-scenari`
` perati` n, precise assignments w` uld be c` ntingent ` n the
p` áiti` t ` f the .te members’ at the time ` f an arrest ` r
taked` wri.
ASAC MiJcu3ewiöz had each member ` f the team identify
themse,lve’s, identify their r` les, and brief back their
‘resp` nsibility within the ,scenari` s. The ASC additi` nally had
each ` f the participants put ` n the cl` thing that they ‘i` uld be
wearing during the ` perati` n. He emphasized that the tea1:-.’’
zembers sh` uld be aware ` f cr` ss-fire issues, c` ver.
safety issues. ASACMikulewicz cited that he was enanring-th,t a
tragic friendly-fire circsace similar t` ` ne where, an S’was
killed in New 3’ersey c` uld n` t bapen.

A/SSA I
ibriefed ‘the 4ttendees ` n the PBI’s Deadly,•
F` rce P` licy and t` ld l` cal ` fficers t` adhere t` thé’ir
respective departmental p` licies.
-

8

At pprbp.te1v 8:Ô0p (05/05/2007.), ASAC Mikulewi’cz,
A/SSAI
I and SAl
Itravld t` gether t` . the area ‘` f
Ledhetter Drive and Laicaster R` ad in Dallas where the TTAs last
rep` rted that the ceflph` ne signal ` f interest had been detected.
Other SAS and ` fficrs depl` yed t` the area as well. After an
appr` mate 40 t` 45 minute search ` f a trailer park area where
the signal ` f intereàt. had been emanating, ASAC Mikulewicz and
A/SSN
I c` llectivelv decided that the “m` ney dx` p” scenari`
w` uld be empl` yed. A/SSM
I directed the ,eams t` m` ve the
Wal-Maxt l` cated, at tnterstate-30 and C` ckrefl Hill R` ad, a
l` cati` n where the subjeqts had t` ld the UCE, that the “mcsney
dr` p” w` uld ` ccur. The address ` f the Hal -Mart was 1521 C` ckrefl
Hill R` ad, Dallas, Texas.
,

At 3:48am (0S’/0/200.73., SAC Hikulewiçz ,tl4ph` nicl.ly
brie-fed SA Casey ` n tbe latest devel` pments,’ t` inc-lude that
neither the subject(s)’ car n` r trailer, had been l` cated. 1s`
brie-fed was that the “m` ney dr` p” scenari` w` uld be implemented.
SAC Casey c` ncurred with .this’ decisi` n. ASAC Mikulewicz
discussed with the SAC that the UE w` uld place the dr` p package
in ` r near the subject(s)’ “m` ney dr` p” vehicle, but n` t in the
5

-

 ______

297-W2-2.127l464-b
trunk given a concern that the tracking signal could be lost.’
The TJE was aware of this. n s would be secreted in the UCE’s
vehicle as protective cover for the UCE. The UCE was to clear
out o the area and a felony traffic stop would be conducted when
vphi-1
the subject(s) attempted to ret4eve the nackge.
(Buick LaCrosse) operated by SAsI
I and I
I
arid the vehicle in which the ASAC, A/SSAI_______ and SA I
I (a:
Chevrolet Suburban) would approach the dop vern.le from trie
rear. The plan briefed to the SAC included a third blocking
b1C
vehicle to approach from the front. This vehicle would be
identified when it was determined which vehicle had, the best
vantage point once the location of the drop vehicle was known.
The remaining vehicles would secure the perimeter. After the
subject(s) were arrested, they would be interv5ewe4 in an attempt
to locate and rescue the victim. The SAC concurred with this
plan.
.

•

The ASC and A/SSA I
I discussed a multiple subject
vehicle qcenario and agreed to stay with the drop vehicle in
hoDes 4 having it eventuafly lead them to the ‘victim. A/SS.
I supervisor of the operation, positioned the vehicle
I
wsr
1Subrban) in which he, the ASAC and SAl
at the
southwest section of the parking jot. A/SSAI
I broadcasted
his location to other units and, directed other units to strategic
areas within he Wal-Mart parking lot area. As units airived,
A/SsAI
I directed thdse units via radio to ensure all
entrance and exit. routes were covered. TTAsI
land I
I
were in the area monitoring for the signal of the?
• s jec
ilular telephone with which the UCE,was inóo’nt4t.
A/SS
directed the 0CE to position his vehicle in an open
parkin9 area to t.he north of the Wal-Mart Store, a distance from
the Wl-Mart building.
.
*

S

At approximately 8;52am [05/05/2007) SAC Casejr cal.led
the ASAC for an update. The operations plan remained mchanged.
The UCE continued his teleJionic communications with the
subject(s) via the “push-to-talk” feature
1 and continually
updated A/SSN
I of the contents of these conversations.
The subject(s) continued to threaten to kill the kidnap victim
end the UCE if the money drop wasn’ t properly made. Other teams
of SAs/offjcers in the area continued to proactively monitor the
activity in the area of the al-Mart parking lot and report
results by radio.
.

-

t approximately 10:34am (05/05/2007), TTAI
I
alerted that the cellular telephone signal of inte.ret was active
near the Ledhetter Drive trailer park and that the signal was
moving. ASAC Mikulewicz immediately called SAC Casey and updated
him. The SAC approved the operation and requested that he be
notified in the event of a change, a money drop, or an arrest.
The TTAs updated operational SAS/officers by radio broadcast. that
tle siject Cs) were “ten minutes out” (ten minutes away3, “they
are in the parking lot” and “they are behind the_Wal-Mart.”
During this time, the UCE communicated to A/SSAI
Itbat the
subject(s) had advised that the “drop vehicle” was a grey
Mitsubishi.
-

6

-

*

b7C

 297-HQ-A3.271464-o
3J.t approximately U:OOam (05/05/20071 TTAI
ladvised
over the Bureau radio that the cellular telephone in contact with
the UC was active behind the Wal4lart and that the TTAs had
observed a suspicious yLcl in the area associatijig with a
Chevrolet Blazer. ‘mi
I next advised that he saw a grey
Mitsubishi with the Blazer and.that both were traveiing
northbound next to the Wal-Mart, apparently together. ASAC
Mikulewicz looked over his right shoulder and saw a grey
Mitsuihi rnroaching• from the right, followed by a Blazer.
made radio broadcapt uodatqs to SA/Officers about
A/SSAI
the aproacI1ing vehicles. A/SSN
Ithacussed with ASAC
Mikulweicz that he thought it was the right opportunity to move
towards the Mitsubishi .to which the ASAC agreed. The Mitsubishi,
a 1994 4-door grey sedan, parked in the same row a. eew [three
or
four]. parking slots away from the vehicle in which the SAc and
A/SSA were parked. The Mitsubishi was blocked to the front by
another parked ciYiljan vehicle. The Blazer pulled up along the
left side of the Mitsubishi, not blocked to the front.

•

•

0

•

•
•

b7C

ASAC Mikulewjcz gave AISSAI
I the authorization to
deploy the arrest plan. A/SSAI
I radioed to the other
operational team .members where the Mitsubishi was and that a
felony car stop on the Mitsubishi would be initiated. A/SSA
I
Ibroadcasted the deploy instruction by saying “eec!1e
execute, execute” over the radio. Unb&cnownst to A/SSAI
not all of the SAsfofficers werç aware of where to go when the I
order was given. A/SSAI
Inext moved his vehicle fron its
parked position, drove a snort distance (three or four pax4ng
àtall widths] and bumped into tie Mitsubishi from the rear..
blocking it in. A/SS?1
hxited his vehicle identified
himself by yelling FEX and by yelling arrest commands in Spanish
and English to the subject driver of the Mitsubishi. ASAC
Mikulewjcz also exited the vehicle and started to back A/SSA
i
tt
1” Mitsubishi, later identified
as Subiect I
I (hereafter Subject
I
I, exited the Mitsubishi and quickly tried to enter
the
passenger door of the adjacent Blazer
1 disregarding arrest
commands being given by A/SSAI
L The subject driver 4 the
Blazer, later identified aç Subject I
I
fhereafte Subject I
quickly spec away, J.eaYing Subject
,
I
I behind.
Subj éct I
next ran easthn
rid tbzough
1
the parking lot fiic4 “ to 7LeJ.Q to I A/SSAI
I?.r2eSt
commands. A/SSA I
I gave chase through tae congested parkjng
lot while ASAC Mikulewjcz initially observed the fleeing Blazer
b6
to determine its_direct4on of flight before 5oining the foot
h7c
pursuit. A/SSAI
I estimated that he was 40 to 50 yards
behind Subjecti__________
S.I
I, .positioned northeast of the location
wher A/SSA I
I and the parked Mitsubishi were, heard TTA
1 1 broa4cast that a “cell phone hit was received from the.
vicnity of two cars cong zuto the Wal-Mart parkuig lot on th
west side of the Wal-Mart building.. SAl
I heard A/SSAI
Srcadct 1’ he kidnaper’s_vehicle was driving
__
1
behindj
I and then SA I
tA/SSA I
Irecafled hearing A
give the orde to “execute, execute, execute.° SA
ew
A/SSA
jwas positioned in. the southwest Corn
of the

•
b

1

I

 297-HQ-Z127l464-D

Wal—Mart parking lot bt could not see him. s1’i.
F
I driver
of the vehicle s
Iwa a passenger in. drve south through
the parking lot. sP I
I saw ?/SSA
bump into the Mitsubishi and also sawI a BlazerI Chevrolet Suburban
drive off.
S I
1
I saw the driver of the Mitsubishi, Subject
i get out of the Mitibishi an4 stat
stbound
through the parking lot in front of
and
SASI
I
SA
I left his rôØtion in the Bureau vehicle and egan
chas
Sibj sot I
i through the parking lot at about a O4g ing
ree
angle to the athof fleeing Subject
S1JF
J.
I oi4d
sçe A/SSAF
Irunning behind Subj sot ‘SA I
j was
ye1lin a3zrest comrnayi tr pbject
Jasw’-’ther agents
believed to be A/SSAI
land sAl
i RAI
-iran from
within a row of parked cars and saw Sbject
[
lattempting
to get into the pger side of ablack Ford
Mustang
“autotncbil. SAl
Iwas yelling “FBI,_.et down” at Subject
I
i who ldvKea airectly at SA F
nt the
I and
Mustang. In his Signed Sworn Statement (555) go
SAl
1 stated
that he was one aisle length awa? (about 15
Mustang began to move west right toward him. eeetr when the
turning and he beIieed the driver intended toThe Mustang was not
stated that he was face to face with the drive;run him down. e
of the Mustang
and tl)at 1e feared for his life.
AS the Mustang drove toward SA
F
I s
I began firing. Certain views
.
event depict the Mustang driving toward SAl of4ie
I
SA
I
I
did
not recaU looking at the sights of his Me-S
, MP-5, 10mm
shoulder weapon) and was deUberately holding [H&K
the muzzle low to
avoid hitting any of the customers in t1e .arki
SSS he further stated that he initially fired ng lot. In his
the intent of -hitting the driver and, although four rounds with
he was not
shooting at the tLres, he reqalled seein a
g
bulle
t strike on one
of the front tires., Further contained
in
555 was that
SAF
__I’
aftr he fired_the first four rounds the
Mustang began •to turiz
south. -SAJ
I feared for the safety of the gents coming in
from his right, as the Mustang was now
in a position to run them
down.
I ran aroun6he rear of the Mi1BtaX1g and continuecY.
SAL
.
to fire his MP- 5. 53W
,I stated that all of his shots were
takei with the intent to hit the driver
[of the Mustang].
I
I stated that he öouId not see clearly through
the driver or
passenger side Mustang .rindows die to the dark
tintin
g. SAF
I
saw a bullet hit the driver side of the Musta
ng
in
the
vicinity
of the as tank near. the rear tire.

F

-

•

I
•

At thi
oint, sA,
SAF
stated in
posed a threat to A/SSA[
hands fxmly on t1i tPP
4 rig
toward him jSS I
IL
A/SSA I
Iwas now in- his

I

Ibeard other gUflfi:re from A/SSA
hi SSS that he believed the Mustang
Jbecause the driver still had both
wheel and was driving directly
SA F
j stopped f.ir&ng because
line of fire.

A/SSA
while chasing Subject
ia
distance of approximate
s through a ongesce parking
lot, noted that Subj so
appeared to be headd toward a
black Ford Mustang. A
saw Subject[
If or
several seconds attempt to enter the passenge
rdoor of a stopped
Mustang. Once SUbj ecti
j got into the Mustang, the car

S

3

:

 297-HQ-A1271464-D

started off at a “a high rate of speed” in a WeSteFly direction.
A/SSi
Iheard gunfr’
SAl
I come into his
line of sight. As AISSAI
emerged from a row qf parked
cars he saw the Muçtang turTlina dowx the parking aisle towards
i
him tA/SSJ4
I. A/SsAI
lestimated the speed of the
Mustang as between 15 and 20 miles per hour. Prom a forward
posit.on not Iirectly in front of the approaching Mutnc
A/SSAI
I saw the right ront passenger, Subject I
I
through the Mustang’s windshield with his hands up. The
Mustang’s driver, identified as Gerardo Torres, aka Gerardo Diaz,
[hereafter Subiect Diaz), had both hands on the steering wheel
and A/SSAI
Irecafled that .Subj eat Iaz was loo)ina directly
at him and turned the l4ustang directly towards A/SSA I
I
tn
his SSS, A/SSAj
Istated that he felt that he (Subject Diaz]
was going to try and rim him over and that he was trying to
kjfl
or injure him by running him over. A/SSAI
I fired three
shots at close range fro&his LA1-15 rifle through the Windshield
striking Subject Diaz three times in the n,oer riah chest,
center chest, and lower abdomen. Subjecti
I was not
inj1xed. No other passengers were in the car. The Mustang
continqed a short distance and bumped into a parked car. A/SsA.
I extracted Subject Diaz through the Mustang’s open
ar.vez’s door and administered first aid. Subjt
died as a
resul; of his injuries from gunfire from A/SSA1
I LR-2.5.
A/SSAI
Ireceied a cut to a hand. It is believed this
occurred during the extraction o Subject Diaz from the Mustang.

E

I

-

I

Contemporaneous with the 0
Ot pursuit of Subject
Subj ecti
I attempted. to -flee the scene
& 1994
Chevrolet S-b Blazer, Texas 1icese’
This was the
vehicle which accompanied Subject
land the grey.
Mitsubishi to- the “money drop” site. This vehicle fled
southbound along the west side of the Wal-Mart Building, turned
1b6
eastbound and cqntinr )iehjn the Wal-Mart at a high rate of
speed. Subject I
Iecame involved in .a three-car
at
the intersectio4 cf Ad1r fl,-4ri and Cockrell Rill.Road. crash
RPD
of ficerp and S1I
I who wee foUowiq Sublect
I
I as he tried to flee, caught up to, Subject I
‘at the
accident scene and arrested him. One loaded, stolen .380 pistol
was found on the street at the accident scene, and one loaded
pistol was founi in the console of the Blazer. There were no 9mm
other occupants in the Blazer at the time of the collision.

1,

•
I

I

iuI

•
After questioning of Subjectl
IDaflas SAs and
local officers were able t 1
cate and rescue the kidnaping
Victiuil
Iwithi a house trailer ad
I
.‘
Dallas, Texas. The victim was found in a bathtub
bound and .hooded. He had been shot twice and beaten. The
victim
“
local hospital by ambulance. Subjacq
I was arrested in the houe trailer. Subj eats I
Lnd I
Jwere arrested tryin9
leave the area 4n a. vehicle. Among other things e-i-zed by to
investigators were one Ruger .357 magnum revolver, one SKS 7.62
caliber rifle, .mmunition [.25, .380.
.357 magnum calibers),
a magazine with 7.62 caliber ammunition, and a machete.
-

On 07/17/2007, Subjects I
S.

9

I

*

*

.‘

 29-HQ-A127l464-D

I andi
J each pled guilty in U.S.
District Court, Northern District of Texas, to one count of
conspiracy to commit kidnaping, one count of 0
kidnaping one count.
of using interstate communication facilities to demand ransom,
and one count of using • carrying, and brandishing a firearm
diring qr in r1a on tr a crime of violence. On 8/07/2007,
Subjectj
Ipled guilty to misprision of a felony.
Subsequent analysis revealed that the R-front tire and
wheel of the Mustang appeared to have been impacted twice by
projectiles. ?BX laboratory determined that specimen Q5, “ Bullet
from inside passenger side front wheel (1B22, E038621244, Item
5)” was fired from Item K-4/ 10mm, ?uto Heckler & Koch rifle,
Model Mp5/lo, Serial Number G8-2726), the HP-S carried by SA
I
‘]he source of the second apparent projectile impact was
not positively determined.
The left-rear passenger side wheel was determined to
have been impacted twice by firearms projectiles. PBX Laboratory
Specimen Q8, “Bullet from drivers side rear rim (LB22, E03862124,
Item 7)” was a jacketed hoUow-point bullet which is consistent
in its remaining observable and measurable physical
characteristics with the .40 caUber, (10mm) family. The
projectile was fired from a barrel rifled with six grooves, 1jtIi
a right hand twist. . T)ie measurable General Rifling
Chaxacteristics (GTcfl fôç this projectile were like those of
the
HP-S carried by SAl
but coiald not be identified as having
J
come 4rom that weapon. !‘rojectiLes from the, HP-S -car4ed’,bysA
jwere not found either inside of the Mustang or its’ d±iver:

taboratory Specimen Q43, “Bullet removed from red Ford
Escort (1B12, E03862115, Item 17)” w Içtermined to have been
fired from the MP5 .carried by SAl
I Specimen Q42, “Bullet
removed from red Ford Escort (1B12,E038621l5, Item 1) similar
in
GRCs to thoseof the SAl
F HP-S but not identified as having
been fired from that weapon. Both of these bullets impacted
the Ib
Ford Escort at “upward” angles suggesting that these tw
9
7C
projectiles ricocheted upward from the pavement prior to strikin
g
the rear bumper and trunk lid of the For,d Escort. The Ford
Escort was diagonally parked forward of the Mustang in the
parking .aisle down which the Mustang was headed at the time
the shooting. Other 3.0mm projectile specimens submitte4 for of
analyses were not posi;{r1
dentified as ha’ing been fired from
the HP-S carried by SA I

S

S

The Dallas County Institute of Forensic Sciences ‘Post
Mortem Examinatin (Autopsy) was conducted on 05/06/2007 for
Subject Diaz. Three rifle projectiles, now idçitified as FBI
Laboratory Specimens Qi, Bullet from “Left Chests Wall #2”
E03862120, Item 2), Q2, Bullet from .“Left bdomina1 Wall (1B1B,
4f1”
(1D16, E03862120, Xteu 1), and Q3, Bullet f-ron “Soft Tissue,..
pelvis #3” (1B18, EQ.3862120, Item 3-), were recovered ad removed
from Subject Dips’s bodv3y Dallas Cowty Deputy Chief Medical
Examinerl
IM.D. No other firearms projectiles
were found in Subject Diaz. AU three of these projectiles
were
identified by the FBI Laboratory as having been’ fired by
Item K3,
223 Remington caliber Roc! River rms rifle, Model LAR-15,

10

 297-I!Q-A1271464-D
Serial Number CM 36332, the rifle carried by A/SSAI
cause of death was attributed to multiple gunsho
t wounds..

The

Zn addition .to the entry wounds caused by Qi,
Q2, and
Q3, the autopsy report notes “Gunshot Wound S ‘.
articulated as, “. . a gunshot wound of entrance of This injury was
forearm, located 4 inches above the wrist and 1-1/4 the left
inches to the
right of midline when the ann is in anatomic posit.on,
entrance wound measures 3/4 inch in greatest dimension. The
Noted
surr’ounding and below this wound are multiple abra
sions and an
exit.defect. This exit defect is present 1 inch above
the wrist
and measures 3 inch in
dimension. Inasmuch as aU three
bullets fixed by A/SSAI
Iwere recovered in areas consistent
with the known position of the shooter
SAL
land the
seated position of Subject Diz, coupled(A/S
with the identified
entry point of “Gunshot Woind “ aing inconsist
ent with the
shooting position of A/ssaI
I it is suggested that the L
forearm gunshot injury identifie
uring autopsy
Wound #5” originated from SAl_____ NP-S. A correas “Gunshot
roiepti1e for this wound wab not ecovered. It’ sponding
is noted that SA
I
I did fire his MP-5 from a position behind the crie
r. From
this position, a projectile fired from SA[
MP-5
1
could
have
caused “Gunèhot Wound #5” which took a patWin an
“elbow
toward
wrist” direction in Subject Diaz’ a L-forearm.

*

b
•

*
•

•
•

I

The autopsy report further noted two “Blunt Force
Injuries” articilated as follows: “The right side
9f stheschest
shows two horizontaLly oriented abrasions that
measu
re ‘_/
inchea.and 1 inch respectively.” Photographs o
these
wounds
were examined extensively as were the correspon
Laboratory Specimen Q149, “Shirt form subject ding damage to pB
GERARDO
(1B18, E03862141, Item 7).” The’ Laoratory foiind. lead.DAZ-RUIz
residues
which are consistent with the passage of a’ bulle
perimeter of the hole in the shirt (Q149) which t around
Corresponded to
the “upper hole” and the 1-1/2 inch abzjffiOnBased
on the
recovery ,of projectiles fired by A/SSA
I
I a stated above,
and absent .any othe
r known ,souzce of force w1.ch would cause
this
type of deposit of lead laterally ,on the shirt
type to Sibject Diaz’s R-cbest area, it is suggand trauma of ‘this
ested that these
“Blunt 5
Force Injuries” could have been caused by proje
ctiles
fired from the NP-S carried by SA F
I Corresponding firearms
projectiles, secondary .projectile or debris capabl
e of causing
thse “Blunt Force Xnjuries werd not identi•fie
d.

A noted on the video recorded account of the
shooting,
the opportunity for, the “Blunt Force Injuries”
eve
been
caused by projectiles fxom the HP- 5 was as
moved from
‘the R-front passenger side toward the rear of
Ustang
and the
Mustang turned to the left causing the passenger
dooz
to
swing
open. In his 555, 53J
J stated thAt he cou34 not see car1y
through tl cIrivr or passenger side Mustang
widows due to the
dark tinting. It is submitted that SN
ifired through the
Mustang’s passenger door opening as the door swung
the left turn. Window glass on the passenger 52.de open during
and the passenger window was up. These shots poss was net broken
“Blunt Force Injuries” grazing subject Diaz twic ibly caused the
e along the R
•
*

11

 __________Jstated

•

297-RQ-A1273.464-D
chest. Regarding SAl
I statement of not being able to see in
through the driver’ s window because of the tint, yet able to see
Subject Diaz’s hands high on the steering wheel when uSject Diaz
drove at A/SSAI
I it is submitted that SAl
I saw this
through an approximate eight inch space caused by the driver’s
window being approximately half way open tdown when SAl
I
stood to the rear-side area of the Mustang. Upon examination,
the driver’ s window was determined to have been approximately
half open at the time of the shooting. The driver’s window was
also dermined to have been broken at some point prior to A/ssA
I
lextracting Subject Diaz from the driver’s seat area of
the Mustang. Neither the FBI Laboratory analyses nor interview
could establish definitively how and when this window was broken.

6

Four separate areas of notable trauma were identified
within the autopsy report as “Pundture Wounds.” All four appear
in the upper chest area and measure 3/B to 3 inch in their
greatet dimension and between 1/4 and
inch in depth. As of
this writing, the source of these trauma points are not known.
No foreign objects were found within these wounds.

•

Xn his 555, A/SSAI
Istated that he saw’through
the windshield that the passenger [Subject I
I had his
hands up. The driver had both hands .high on the steering wheel
and was looking directly at A/SSAI
I As the Mustang
contiziued forward the driver turne4 the Mustang towards A/SsA
I
I and /SSAI
I f4t that lie LSlbiect_Daz) was going.
to try azid un A/SSA I
I over. A/SSA I
Ibelieved :the
driver was clearly trying to IcUl or injure him by running him
over aid that he. was in fear of hi.s lire. A noted on the video
accoun of the shooting, thq Mustana is shown to veer toward
Iprior to A/Sal
A/SSN
firing his LIR-15 at Subject
Diaz. AISSA I
I did not récl1 if the M1stang str.ick him,
but realized the next day that his left knee was sore and that
the Mustang may have hit him.
During interview, Subj ect I
J tR- f.ront passenger
in. the Mustang) stated ate being admonished of his Miranda
Rights, he entered the Mustang and tbat Gerardo (Subject Diaz)
attemoted to drive away in order to escape the area. Subject
I
Ialso advisd that as subject Diaz was driving away, and
as Subjecti
Isaw al-i of the FBI Agents with guns ordering
them to stop, Subject I
Itold Subj.ect D&az to stop or they
(FBI Agents) were going to shoot them. Subject I
I
continued by stating that Subject Diaz nointed te vehicle in-the
direction of an FBI Agent, who subject I
Idescribed as
being tall. w1’ite, and with blonde hair, and continued driving.
A/SSAI
If its this description. In his statement, Sub:ject
that the Mustang was going to hit the FBI Agent
ana tfle FI Agent had to fire his gun to defend himself. Sub ect
I
I further advised that he would have done the same thing
himself had he been in the FEZ Agent’s picn.
.

1

•

.

.

12

b7C

  

 

2007

Savage 

 

 

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

UNCLRSSIFIED

FEDERAL 8UREAU OF INVESTIGATION
precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

06/27/2008

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Inspection
Office of Insoeci
Contact:

I

approved By:

I

Perkins Kevin

Clemens Michaetlild

,

p

Drafted By:

Case ID #:
Title:

[

1)6
b7C

[lrr

297—HQ—A1271286—D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CINCINNATI DIVISION
04/26/2007

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 04/2612007, involving Special
Agent (SAl
I
While participating in the attempted
installati9n of a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) tracking
device, SAl
Ifired one round from his Bureau-issued
Glock Model 27, .40 caliber pistol, killing an individual who was
brandishing a weapon at him.
SIRG members_recommended that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
las a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident.

I

Administrative: Reference report of Chief Inspector
I dated 07/24/2007.
Details:

I

This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

While conducting an investigation into a drug
organization suspected of being the largest black tar heroin
distributor in the Cincinnati, Ohio, area, approval was obtained
to install two GPS tracking devices on two vehicles belonging to
UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2028

 _______

UNCIASS IFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—Al271286—D, 06/27/2008

Gerald Mulato.
Installation of the GPS tracking devices was
scheduled for 04/26/2007.
On 04/26/2007, SAsI
landl
I
led an operational briefing which included three additional
Agents and two Task Force officers (TFOs). Mulato’s Mercedes
Benz was located in the parking lot approximately 40—50 feet from
the building entrance of his apartment complex.
Investigation
revealed Mulato had a rear, ground—level apartment which was
located on the opposite side of the building of the subject
vehicle’s location. Law enforcement personnel also knew MuJ.ato
did riot have a window in his apartment to view the vehicle.
The
plan called for Technically Trained Agent (TTA)I
I
to condupt the GPS installation, with SAl
I serving
as his immediate proximity cover Agent.
SAl
Ljould be
po1n
4
the subject vehicle during the installation while
SAl
I would be positioned approximately 25 feet away
behind a trash dumpster.
SAsI
I and I
as well as TFOs
I
I ahdl
I would be located
inside their vehicles and serve as perimeter surveillance/cover.
At 4:15 a.m., TTA
land SAl
I SAl
Iwere
driven to SAl
Ichevrolet Suburban. At 4:20 a.m., with all
team_members in position, the GPS installation team walked from
Jvehicle to the subject vehicle.
SAl
Shortly after TTAI
I initiated the GPS installation
a person, subsequently identified as I
I exited an
adjoining apartment building and proceeded to his vehicle in the
parking lot where the subject vehicle was locatd.
I
1
radioed the signal “clear,” whch reaiired TThI
Iani his
cover team to clear the area. I
Inoticed the suspicious
individuals wearing dark clothing, aná believing they were
burglarizing a vehicle, called 911 to report suspicious activity
before leaving the area.
In response to the 911 suspicious activity call, an
officer of the Forest Park Police Department (E’PPD) responded,
approached SAl
Ivehicle, and requested identification.
SA
Idiscretely identified himself and the FPPD officer departed;
I
however, he and his Sergeant remained in the area to render
assistance if necessary.
At approximately 4:30 a.m., the installatipn team
resumed their positions. Within several minutes, SN
observed Mulato coming up the interior apartment building 1
UNcLRSSXFXEb

2
Savage-2029

 UNIASSIPIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271286—D, 06/27/2008

stairwell toward the front door.
54
Iradioed “clear,”
seconds prior to MuJ.ato throwing open the door to the apartment
building.
SAL
Iheard Mulato rack the slide of his weapon
and S1
Isaw Mulato aggressively exiting the door pointing a
silver handgun in the djrri-icp of the subject vehicle. At that
moxpent ccording to SPI
I SAL
I said, “he’s got a gun.”
SAl
lalso recalled someone calling out, “gun.” TTAI
I
was on his back near the subject vehicle and observed Mulato with
a pistol. I
Igrabbed his jzech bgs and ran past the east
side of the dumpster toward SAl
[vehicle.

I

SAl
Iquickly proceeded to the west side of the
dumpster without turnin his back fearing Mulato would shoot him
in the back.
SAl
Iwas located on the west side of the
dumpster and ojserve Mulato in the parking lot moving toward his
position as SAl
‘came around the west side of the dumpster.
Seeing ?Iulato with a gun in his hand with his arm extenLded
triqht, and pointing the weapon toward SAsI
I anc
I SA
I curled further behind the dumpster.
Both Agents lost
sight of the
who was advancing quickly toward the
dumpster.
SAl
I heard Mulato yell, “you trying to stel xnv
shit”; SAl
lheard, “you messing with my shit”; and sil
I
heard the subject say, “that’s my car.” SAl
Iieard, “that’s
my car, mother fucker, that’s my ftc-king car.”

As soon as SAl
I had cover behind the dumpster, he
called out “police” or “FBI” and to “get your hands up.” SA
I
Iheard loud_voices but could not determine what was said.
He did hear SAl
Ishout, “drop it” more than once, however,
was unsure if it was before or after he heard the single gun
SAl
heard voices yelling, “FBI” and “gun.” As SA
b7c
I
Iwas running toward the dumpster, he heard yelling but did not
know what was being said.
831
pproached from his cover
position and stood between two cars located approximately ten to
twelve yards from Mulato, who had his weapon poii
td in the
3
direction of the Agents behind the dumpster.
SAl
Ipointed
his weapon at Mulato, illuminated him with his flashlight, and
called out, “gun” to warn other law enforcement perpnn1 ii the
area. Mulato responded by pointing his weapon at SPI
lwho
had no cover between himself and the subject.
SAl
Jfired
one round, hitting Mulato in the stomach and again yelled, FBI,
drop the gun.” Mulato immediately fell backward against his
vehicle and slid toward the ground, maintaining possession of his
weapon until he hit the ground.
-

UNCLASSIFIED

3
Savage-2030

1bC

 tYNCIASSI’ID
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ--A1271286—D,

Inspection
06/27/2008

sz4
4dministered chest compressions to Mulato
while FPPD Sergeant I
Iprovided a medic bag. A local fireman,
a resident in the apartment complex, assisted with cardio
pulmonary resuscitation and first aid. Mulato was transported by
the Forest Park Fire Department and died en route to the
hospital.
-

I

I

On 07/09/2007, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney
1rovideç1 a declination of prosecution regarding
the actions of SA I
I On 12/13/2007, a declination of
prosecution was received from the United States Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, regarding the actions of SA
un this shooting incident.

On 05/13/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division fINSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance: L
I Derutv Chief, Criminal Section,
Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;I
L Chief
Inspector, Office of Inspections (01), INSD; Assistant Section
Chief (ASC) I
I Violent Crimes Section Criminal
Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)
Firearms
Training Unit, TraIning Division TD
Defensive Systems Unit, PD; tiC
Law
Unit, Office of General Counsel; tiC
Practical
Applications Unit, TO; Acting tiC
Special
Weapons anç Pti Oncra1ions tlni ,
Response
Group; SSAI
Toolmar] Tinif. riientific
I, Firearms
ejection, Laboratory Division; and SSAL
I
I CR-2, Washington Field Office.
Inspector I
I, INSD, and Management Program Analyst (MPA)I________
F
1
1 Inspection Management Unit, DI, INSD, non—voting
members, were also in attendance.
-

—

Observations and

Recommendations

of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Directär with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
UNCLASSIFIED

4

Savage-2031

c

:h6

 NCLRSStFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271286--D, 06/27/2008

Prior to the d5seusson of this incident by SIRG
members, Chief Inspector I
Inspector—in—Charge of the
investigation of the shooting incident, provided an overview of
this incident.

1

bC

SIRG members. unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified and in conformance with
the FBI’s deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
I
las a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Members noted the absence of a written operation plan
and emphasized no current policy exists regarding technical
installations.
The SIRG recognized installation team members conducted
a thorough and complete oral briefing prior to the attempted GPS
installation; however, the plan did not include notification to
local law enforcement which could have resulted in officer safety
issues. This matter will be discussed with the Special Agent in
Charge of the Cincinnati Division.

UNCLASSIFIED

S

Savage-2032

 TmcLAsszpxD
To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271286—D, 06/27/2008

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INS PECT ION
TWASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

!b6
b7C

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni Room 7427
Mr
tJSDOJ
Mr
Room 3280
Mr
Quantico
Mr
Quantico
Mr
Poom 7326
Mr.I
I, CIRG

Mr.I

Mr.
1
1-Mr.
1—Mr.
-

IQuantico
I Ouantico
1WFO

Room 3043

++

UNCLASSIFIED

6
Savage-2033

 _____________land

(Rev. 05-01.2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTiGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Data:

Inspection
CIRG

Wrom:

Attn:
Attn:

09/08/2008

AD Kevin L. Perkins.
AD Robert A. Blecksinith

Inspection
Office

of

Tnctons

Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

I

Perkins 1
Kevi
’
Cleniens Mich

I

Ilrr

297-HQ—A1270951--D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
BALTIMORE DIVISION
03/22/2007

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviwed a
shooting incident that occured on 03/22/2007, involving Special
Agents (SAs)l
andi__________________________ During the execution of a federal
search warrant and subsequent nine-hour standoff by the subject,
Michael Terry Smith was hot and killed by Agents.
SIRG members
rrnmn1r! that ro
mini
rMiv rion h tkn gainst SAs

I

shooting incident.

I

bs a result of their involvement in this

Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector-in-Charge
dated
05/24/2007.
I

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 01/26/2006, the Washington Field Office (WFO) Bank
Robbery Coordinator initiated an investigation pertaining to the
fobbery of the Virginia Commerce Bank in Alexandria, Virginia.
The bank was robbed by a white male wearing a suit, fedora hat,
UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2034

I

 •

U1CI.ASI’XED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270951—D, 09/08/2008

black gloves, dark colored trench coat, and was armed with a
black semi—automatic gun.
On 02/27/2007,1
provided information to the FBI and United States Capitol Police
(FJSCP) regarding Michael Terry Smith, who threatened her due to
a
romantic breakup. I
ladvised law enforcement authorities she
believed Smith was involved in bank robberies. According to
I
I she met Smith on the Internet in June 2006, and began
dating him.
During the course of their relationship, Smith told
her he had previously been arrested on drug charges and sçrved
four years on a federal bank robbery conviction. He toldi
I
he wore suits during the bank robberis and ws known as the
pinstriped bank bandit.. AdditionallyL
ladvised Smith
always had large sums of money and possesseda black semiautomatic gun.
On 03/06/2007,1
ladvised WFO SAl___________________
that Smith’s threats were escalating and several days earlier
said that if he did not ki4 himsef, he would spend most of his
time in jail.
According tol
J Smith said, “I want to go
out,” referring to suicide.
He followed that statement with, “my
first thought is to drive up to the (Capitol Hill) barricade and
take out as many cops as I can, then kill myself.
If not, then
somewhere else like Wal-Mart or Target, just to make national
news.”
The following week, Smith continued to r11 .nt1 gnd
threateo e-ails tof
1 On 03/15/2007, SAl__________
learnedl
Ireported to the USCP that Smith’s threats toward
Capitol Hill were increasing in specificity.
Smith planned to
give a note to an innocent bystander on Capitol Hill and ask this
person to give the note to a USC? officer.
The note would state,
“the person that is handing you this letter is unaware of its
contents and is in no way involved in what is about to happen.
I
am going to initiate gunfire so tpat the police will be forced
to
kill me.” Smith also toldi
I “I am going to give them no
choice
that way my mother can collect the insurance money
because it will not be suicide.
1 want to be in a standoff.
I
want to make sure the media is there.
I want everyone to
remember that on this day and this year, Michael Smith was at the
Capitol and this is whre he died.”
-

Based on Smith’s threat, an alert was disseminated
throughout the tJSCP.
The USC? also requested an arrest warrant
fo Smith, however, it was denied.
UNCLASSIFIED
2

Savage-2035

b6
•b70

 UNCLASS IFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection Frora:*
297—HQ—A1270951—D,

Inspection
09/08/2008

On 03/13/2007, based on information provided
byl
I
the WFO initiated a Conspirnv tn Tjnpede or Injur a Pdrai
Officer investigation.
SAl
I and DetectiveL
I rf
the USCP met with Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)
I
Due to the lack of probable cause ror an
in Washington.
arrest warrant, a strategy was developed to search Smith’s
apartment and car for a weapon, which would then_predicate a
felo in noon of a weapon charge. AUSAI
j contacted
AEJSAI
I in Greenbelt, Maryland, regarding obtair’in
search warrants for Smith’s apartment and vehicle. AUSAI
I
concurred with the issuance of the search warrants and on
03/20/2007, search warrants were issued for Smith’s apartment in
Suitland, Maryland, as well as his vehicle which was identified b
as a 1987 Lincoln Town Car.

J

On 03/20/2007, SAl
I prepared an operation plan
for the earch and submitted it for approval.
Discussions with
the WFO Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge (A/ASAC) and
Baltimore ASAC Kevin Lewis, led to the decision that the
Baltimore Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team would serve the
warrant with WFO Agents conducting the search.
Drina a pre-operational intelligence debrief on
03/21/2007,1
ladvised SAl
Ithat Smith would be
agitated if the police caine to his door.
Additionally, Smith
senti
I two e-mails on the same day making increasing
threats.
At 4:00 p.m., on 03/21/2007, a briefing regarding the
execution of the search warrant was held at WFO, with
representatives from the USCE.
All personnel were provided a
óopy of the approved operation plan.
During the briefing,
information was provided pertaining to the background of the
investigation, Smith’s criminal history, a possible “Armed and
t status, the deadly force policy, and a contingency
Dangerous’
plan to obtain a Maryland state arrest warrant prior to the
search warrants for the recent e-mail threats.

I
I

On /2l/2007, SAl
Itelephonically spoke with SA
1 Senior Team Leader of the Baltimore SWAT Team,
and briefed him regarding the investigation.
SAl
Iinquired
as to why a 1
’no knock”, search warrant was not obtained and SA
I explained that an attempt was made to obtain one;
however, the request was denied by the United States Attorney’s
Office in Wasüngton, A copy of the pperation plan was provided
to SPI
Iwho advised SAl
Ithe Baltimore SWAT Team
would complete a separate SWAT operation plan to execute the
UNCLASSIFIED
3

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To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
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search warrant.
The plan called for WE’C personnel to conduct the
search of Smith’s vehicle and residence after being secured by
the Baltimore SWAT Team.
On 03/22/2007, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Baltimore
personnel arrived at the Maryland State Police (MP barracks in
Suitland to conduct a pre-operation briefing.
SAl
I
provided floor plans, C]r ni of the apartment complex and a
photograph of Smith.
SAl
(briefed the written operation
plan and sequence of events, as well as the FBI deadly force
policy.
Tije entry team conducted a simulated walk—thru of the
entry.
SAl
Iconducted a briefing of the MSP medic assigned
to the SWAT Team, a “sound-off” radio check for the Tactical
Operations Center (TOC), and confirmed the TOC, which was located
in a SWAT Suburban parked south of the entrance door of Smith’s
apartment building, was in place prior to the SWAT deployment to
the scene.
The team was advised of the ‘
knock and announce”
T
requirement and that if, after a reasonable time Smith failed to
answer the door, the SWAT team wouid de1oV the battering ram to
gain entry into the apartment.
SAl
Itold team members if
shots were fired, the team would fall back to a secure position
on the landing below the apartment door.
The rear perimeter team consisted of three Baltimore
Division non—SWAT operators with an average of two years field
experience.
They took, positions in the rear of the complex, 40
yards across the parking lot from the rear windows of the
subject’s third floor apartment.
The perimeter Agents were
positioned behind vehicles with approximately fifteen to twenty
yards between them.
At 6:05 a.m., the SWAT team staged on the open air
landing outside of Smith’s third floor apartment door where a
“knock and announc&’ was performed three times. After the third
“knock and announce”, S11
I gave the command to deploy the
ram.
The first four members of the entry team entered the
apartment while continuously identifying themselves as ‘FBI,
serving a search warrant.’
Upon entering the completely dark apartment, SAl_______

switched on his ballistic shield light as well as the light

located on his handgun.
SA[
(moved into the living room and
stopped when he saw a hand, holding a large silver revolver,
protruding from the hallway into the living rnrm
The subject
fired three rounds toward the SWAT team.
SAl
I estimated the
location of the subject’s body behind the wall, and fired four
rounds from his Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol into the wall.
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The arm and revolver disappeared from view and sal
lordered
the entry team to pulLback while he called out “shots fired”
over the radio.
The SWAT team moved out of Smith’s apartment and down
the stairs to the second floor landing of the apartment building.
While on the landinq three Agents yelled up to the third floor
apartment in an attempt to determine if Smith was hurt.
When the shooting began inside the apartment, Baltimore
ASAC Frank Goetz, the on-scene commander during the initial
entry, requested three WFO Agents to respond to the rear of the
building and assist the rear perimeter team already in place.
He
also requested assistance from the Maryland State Police (MSP)
and the Prince George’s County?olice Department (PGCPD). ASAC
Goetz requested that the PGCPD provide an armored vehicle to
safely retrieve the Agents on the rear perimeter. The PGCPD
offered to provide an armored vehicle if they took over the
entire scene, howeverr the offer was declined.
The 4ontgomery
County Police (I’.ICP) wa contacted and agreed to assist with an
armored personnel carrier. A request was also made for
additional resources from the WFO SWAT team.
At 6:10 a.m., the rear perimeter team called out on the
radio that the subject was attempting to exit the apartment from
his balcony.
It was subsequently determined Smith was attempting
to exit through the bedroom window. When the perimeter team
called for the subject to halt, Smith swung his arm around toward
them as if he had a weapon.
The Baltimore perimeter team took
cover and lost visual contact of the suspect.
SA)
Jsent
three SWAT Agents to the rear of the apartment building where
they were focusing on the balcony where the subject was last
seen.
While covering the balcony, SAj
jobserved a h6
white male pull out the screen in the subject’s apartment. SA
b7c
I
‘visually identified the white male as Smith, who then
immediately fired two shots at the SWAT operators.
SAl
I
fired fwn hts from his Glock Model 21, .45 caliber pistol
nd
SAl
Ifired one round frcm hic (,1t Model M-4 carbine.
SA
I ehd I
I maintained their
positions for approximaelv Live trinutes and SAl
Iprovided
cover for SAs I
I andi
I as they moved perpendicularly
across the parking lot to assume positions next to the perimeter
team.
The three Agents located on the second floor apartment
landing maintained their positions behind the ballistic shield.
One Agent continued to yell up to the apartment in an attempt to
UNCLASSIFIED
)

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Inspection
09/08/2008

talk the subject out of the apartment.
Telephone calls were
repeatedly made to two cellular numbers belonging to the subject.
Calls to one number went directly to voice mail while calls to

the second number were answered by a recording indicating the
subscriber could not be located.

At 8:45 a.m:, the MC? SWAT team arrived with the
armored vehicle and retrieved the Agents on the rear perimeter
replacing them with SWAT operators.
At 9:00 a.m., the subject responded to SAL
I
stating he would speak “face to face”, and “come on up, we’ll
talk.” The subject was adamar h
not
coming
out
but the
negotiators could come in.
SPJ
‘advised the subject
negotiators
would not be able to talk to him face to face for
safety reasons resulting in the subject becoming unresponsive.

During this time, the MSP SWAT team arrived and set up
a sniper position in a third floor apartment across the parking
lot in the rear of the building which allowed for a view through
the rear windows of Smith’s apartment.
The MSP snipers advised
they could not get a view of the subject in the apartment because
of closed curtains.
SAl
Jcontacted the apartment complex management
supervisor to determine the layout of the apartment building and
if it was possible for Smith to get into the attic or crawl space
and enter another apartment.
The building engineer indicated
SmIth could get into the crawl space of other apartments on that
level, however, he would not have access to connectiiig apartment
buildings.
Law enforcement officers evacuated residents through
windows of adjoining apartments.
SAT Agents were placed in the
apartments located directly across and diagonally from the
Smith’s apartment on the third floor in order to cover his front
door.
At 9:37 a.m., Smith threw his wallet, keys, and a note
onto the landing.
The note instructed the Agents to give the
keys to his vehicle to his mother and indicated he wasready to
die.
Negotia:ors continued a one-way dialogue with Smith.
Throughout the next several hours, SWAT operators were
rotating in and out of positions and hostage negr
I
I
on the
scene.
According to SAl
the
1
subject became more responsive although distance hampered
communications.
Smith told Agents he had flushed his cell phone
down the toilet.
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297—HQ—A1270951D, 09/08/2008

At 10:56 a.m., Baltimore SAC William Chase approved the
insertion of a “rescue telephon&’ to enhance commUnications with
Smith.
Due to the Baltimore Division rescue telephone being
damaged a week earlier WFO’s rescue phone was used which was
a
different model and had never been used by the Baltimore
negotiators.
The telephone was equipped with covert audio and
video surveillance capabilities.
WFO 1ectronic Technician (ET)
I
Iwas newly assigned to support the equipment and
had not yet been trained on the operation and maintenance of
the
rescue telephone.
At 11:33 a.m., the rescue telephone was
positioned outside of Smith
s apartment door. At 11:45 a.m.,
T
Smith reached out, pulled the telephene inside the apartment,
and
immediately nicked up the telephone receiver and began speaking
°
with SAl
I SAl
I was serving
as the negotiator’s liaison in the TOC and maintained notes and a
“telephone log” reaardipg the negotiations over the resàue
telephone.
SAl
Ibegn audio recording what he thought was
the convrsation between SI
I and Smith thr
ugh the
9
auxiliary hostage negotiator console.
ETI
Ihad connected
the recording device into the microphpne connection on the
video
monitor and neither ET I
br sI
I were aware the
recording device was only capturing low level apartment noie and
not the negotiator’s conversation with Smith.
Smith spoke continuously with sil
Ifor
aooroxitttely one hour and told her he wanted to die.
He told SA
I
I he was wearing a suit so he could be a good looking
corpse.
Smith stated he returned fire when the cops came in and
shot at him, his death would bel
Ifault, he did
not get to go to church to repent his sins, and that he had
thought about taking sleeping pills but he wanted to go out in
a
blaze of glory.
He sttH_rntedly he would not go to prison
or to a nut house.
SAl
Idjd not believe she was able to
develop a rapport with Smith and believed he had made up his
mind
he would be killed during the barricade situation.
The video
feed from the rescue telephone showed Smith sitting in a chair
with his weapon pointed towards the door, waiting for the FBI
to
enter the apartment. At this point, the phone call with Smith
ended and a decision was made to conduct an assessment.
SAl
Irewound the audio tape to 1iste to the
recorded conversation but couldn’t hear anything. ETI
disconnected the recording device from the viewing monitor and
connected the recording device to another port on the remote
auxiliaryconsole in th TOC, which was later determined to be
the covert audio microphone outlet.
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UNCLASSIFIED
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297—HQ—A1270951—D,

Inspection
09/08/2008

I,

I

I

At 1:45 p.m., WFO SI
became the
lead negotiator and initiated contact Smith through the rescue
telephone.
During this conversation, Smith advised he fired two
shots when cops entered the apartment because he thought he was
being robbed.
Smith stated the only way for this to en i1r
fnr th? police to come in and kill
him, as a payback tol________
I for ending their relationship.
Smith also stated he had.
previously served four and a half years in prison, and he was
too
old to go back to prison.
Smith asked the FBI to contact his
mother so she could come and get his car after his death.
At 2:00 p.m., SAC Chase requested a final assessment
from s.4
I on the status of the negotiin nd the
likelihood that Smith would surrender.
SAl
I indicated the
snh was very skeptical and was not going to surrend
er.
SA
lindicated Smith was not going to commit suicide, he wanted
a violent confrontation with the FBI, and wanted the FBI to kill
him.

b6
7C

b7E

At 2:49 p.m., SAC Chase gave approval to initiate Phase
One of the plan and the utilities to Smith’s apartment were
terminated.
Negotiators indicated Phase One did not affect the
subject and Smith stated there was no way he was ever coming out,
they would have to come in and kill him, and he had made peace
and was ready.
At 3:15 p.m., SAC Chase authorized SWAT to deploy the
tear gas.
A grenade launcher was used to shoot five rounds of
gas into Smith’s apartment.
Four rounds went into the bedroom
and one round went into the utility closet off of the balcony.
Upon insertion of the first two volleys of gas, an eye—ball
camera was discretely inserted by a pole through the partially
open apartment front door into the living room.
Smith noticed
the eye—camera and fired two shots.
Seventeen gas canisters were
fired into the apartmeht with no reaction shown by Smith.
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At approdmately 3:30 p.m., Smith, who was angry about
the gas and the lTcameral in his door, was on the telephone with
SA I
I Smith was screaming for the cops to come in and kill
him and he was ready to die.
Smith went from being very agitated
to calmly sitting in a chair near the kitchen with a cloth over
his face pointing a gun at the front door and showing no
indication of coming out.
•
Based upon the shots fired by Smith, the lack of effect
of the gas upon him, and reports that he plced himself into an
offensive position near the kitchen, pointing his gun at the door
waitina for a SWAT entry, I
I

I

Iwere a
hole in the bedroom closet and a hole in the bathroom wall. I

Utilizing the partially disabled eye-ball camera and
the rescue telephone video feed, Agents observed Smith with a
revolver in his hand running from near the kitchen into the
hallway before losing visual contact.
SA
Ithrough his
limited port hole in the bathroom, saw Smith coming toward him
from the hallway.
Smith had hs .357 rvolver in his hand above
his waist in front of him.
SAl
Iyel].ed out, FBI, get
’ but Smith completely disregarded his command and continued
t
down,
toward SAl
I SAl
Iwas only protected by the
concealment of dry wall, and fearing for his life, fired four
rounds from his MP-5.
Two rounds hit Smith in the chest and one
round caused a deep graze wound in the back of Smith’s head as he
dropped to the floor from the first two shots. After ensuring
Smith was secured, SAj
balled the medics to provide
assistance.
Although four Agents fired their weapons durin the
incident, investigation determined only the rounds fired by SA
j struck Smith who died on the scene.
I
On 0S/l0/2008,a declination of prosecution was received
from the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, regarding the actions of the Agents involved in this
shooting incident.

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1

UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

•

Inspection From:
297—HQ--A1270951—D,

inspection
09/0.8/2008

On 08/19/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non-vina rninbr.
Te following voting members were in
attendance: I
Iria1 Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, tJSDOJ; I
Tri.al Attorney, Gang Squad, tJSDOJ;
Section Chief (SC) Robert Anderson, Jr., CD-4, Counterespionage
Section, Counterintelligence Division; SC Thomas A. Nunemaker,
Violent Crimes Section. Criminal investigative Division (CID);
Unit Chief (UC)j
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (TD;
IDefensive Systems Unit, TD6
Acting tic
Ipractical Applications Unit, TD;
Acting tic
I Special Weapons and Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
1
j Investigative Iaw Unit, Office of General Counsel; and
SSAI
I CR-2, Washington Field Office.
Management Program Analyst I
I Inspection
Management Unit, 01, INSD, a non—voting member, was also in
attendance.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with.
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis
1
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations.
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4). provide
recommendations fo administrative action if deemed necessary.
SI} members unanimously acreed that the use of deadly
for by SAsI
an
Iwas justified and in conformance with
the EBIcs deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against the
four Agents as a result of their involvement in this shooting
incident.
The next area bf discussion pertaind to the lack of
FBI policy regarding the use of local and state law enforcement
explosive breching techniques in joint FBI investigations.
The
CIRG representative agreed that standard operating procedures are
needed for these situations; however, emphasized that explosives
are available for use if contact is made with the Hostage Rescue
Team.
Emphasis was placed on the fact that the FBI is not
thoroughly knowledgeable of the capabilities of state and local
UNCLASSIFIED
10

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Inspection From:- Inspection
297—HQ—A1270951—D, .09/08/2008

authorities nor the frequency and types of training received at
the state and local levels.
The CIRG representative advised that
although the current CIRG position is not to use state and local
explosive techniques, SACs have the authority to dictate their
use which occurred during this incident. This discussion led to
the recommendation that the CIRG develop and promulgate policy
regarding the use of local and state SWAT team explosive
breaching techniques on FBI operations.
The last area of discussion by the SIRG centered around
the use of the rescue phone by on—scene personnel.
It was noted
by the Shooting Incident Review Team that the hostage negotiation
component violated standard protocols by not making two audio
tapes of the hostage negotiations from the rescue telephone.
The
rescue telephone console was deployed without any recorders
resulting in the use of a haridheld recorder from an Agent’s
vehicle to attempt to make one recording. The Baltimore rescue
telephone was damaged one week prior to.this incident resulting
in personnel using the WFO rescue telephone during the operation.
The lack of knowledge by on—scene personnel regarding the proper
operation of the telephone led to the missed opportunity of
deploying the covert microphone.
Hostage negotiator from
Baltimore and the WFO were unable to determine how the covert
microphone on the rescue telephone worked resulting in the
technique not being deployed.
It was also noted by SIRG members
that the hostage negotiators did not have the capabilities of
recording the video feed from the rescue phone. This dfscussion
resilted in the recommendation that standard operating procedures
be promulgated to all offices regarding the use and capabilities
of rescue telephones.

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Inspection
09/08/2003

LE2D(s):
Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT 1ASHINGTON,

I

DC

That no administrative action be taken against

SARI

shooting incident.
Set. Iead 2:

I and
las a result b ttieir involvement in this

(Action)

CIRG
AT QUANTICO. VA
That AD, CIRG establish and promulgate policy to all
field offices regarding the use of local and state SWAT team
explosive breaching techniques on FBI operations.
Set Iead 3:

(Action)

.CIRG
AT OUANTICO, VA
That AD, CIRG ensure standard operating procedures are
emphasized and promulgated to all offices regarding the use and
capabilities of rescue telephone equipment.

UNCLASSIFIED

12

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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Inspection From:
297—HQ--A127095].—D,

Inspection
09/08/20O8

Mr. Pisto.le, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
Mr. Nunemaker, Room 3280
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
0 antico
Mr.
CIRG
Ms.
oom 7326
Mr.__________ WFO
Mrs.
Room 3043

UNCLASSIFIED
13

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Rcv. O5-G[-2OU

tJNCIASSIFZED
FEDERAL

Precedence:
To:

BUREAU

iNVESTIGATION

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From

OF

Attn:

AD Kevin L.

03/19/2009
.

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact;

I

Approved By:

I

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Michae1,’

Drafted By:

I

Case ID#:

297-1-IQ-A1271905—D

Title:

Perkins

Ilrr

h2
b
h7C

SHOOTING INCIDENT
SACRAMENTO DIVISION
03115/2007

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 03/15/2007, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I. While_pursuing a fleeing subject in
possession of a handgun
1 SAl
Ifired three rounds from his
Bureau—issued Springfield, Model 1911A1, .45 caliber pistol,
injuring the subjects left thigh.
SIRG members_recommended that
no administrative action be taken against SA
las a result
I
of his involvement in this shooting incident.

I

Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector-in—Elacel________
I dated 07/23/2007.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
etails of the Shooting Incident

I

On 02/26/2007.
contacted_12al law enforcement and advised a subject known only
asi
lwas living in a Fresno, California, neighborhood and

was distributing large quantities of methamphetamine.

I
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I

UNCLASSIFIED

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271905—D, 03/19/2009

In anticipation of a buy/bust operation planned for
03/15/2007. I

I

I

On 03/15/2007, members of the FMTF created an
operations plan
I
which was to take place in a Burger King parking lot. I
I
was equipped with an electronic listening device prior to
receiving a telephone call fromi
ladvising he was on his
[1L he failed t hang up the
way to th t-1gnated location.
phorie,I
Iwas overheard by
taJ.king to two unknown
males saying he wanted to tt
’_________
T
rip
The two unknown
I were overheard saying they would TTripTTI
subjects and’
Jwhen they arrived at the parking lot.

I

Inotified law enforcement personnel of the
iri:Eormation wh.ich was relayed to th On-P’ene Commander.
Instructions were given to remove I
If rom the parking lot
and place him into a law enforcement vehicle.
The arrest!
surveillance teams were_instructed to stay in the parking lot to
effect the arrest of I
land any additional subjects involved
in
the plan to “rip”I
lof his money.
A black Ford Explorer, withl
I identified as the
driver, was observed traveling through the par4na lot several
times before being parked.
Task Force SergeantI
I
gave the bust signal and pulled his unmarked vehicle directly
behind tjie parked Explorer. As the arrest team exited their
vehicle,I
I immediately complied with law enforcement
commands and was taken into custody without incident.
The
vehicle, subsequently identified s
ited and began running with SAl
in roo pursui
identi
imseif as law enforcement
r
and ordered
to
failed to comply. with the
command.
Detective
aralleled the foot chase in
his unrna±ked jolice ye 10 e an
urned into the path of the
subject in an effort to block h3s_oah, As Detectivel
I
pulled in front of the subject,i
Iran into the side ci tue
police vehicle.
Believing the subject had been knocked down,
Detectivel
I exited his vehicle arid realized the subject had
spun around and continued running.
Detective I
jheard shots
.

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fired and observed SAl
escaping through bushes.

Inspection
03/19/2009
Ibehind his vehicle and the subject

According to.SAI
I he saw the subject clutching.
the waistbapd of his pants with his right hand while running.
After I
I escape path was cut off v Detective
I
vehicle, he made eye contact with SAl
saw a
I SA
I
silver semiautomatic handgun pointed outward in a ready—to—shoot
position.
Fearing for his safety, SAl
jstooped running
1
obtained the shooting stance, and fired pn rniind at the subject.
The fleeing subject ran behind Detective’
vehicle
approaching the edge of an embankment.
Fearing the subject would
take cover and fire at law enforcement personnel, SAL
fired
two additional rounds before the subject disappeared into the
bushes.
-----

The Fresno Police Department Special Weapons and
Tactics team, as well as a Police K—9, was activated and deployed
to apprehend the subject.
Following a struggle with the K-9,
subsequently arrested and transported to the University
Medical Center for treatment of numerous lacerations and puncture
wounds on his left arm and a gunshot wound to his outer left mid
thigh.
On 09/16/2008, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department or 5
Tntiçe, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SAl
I in ttis
shooting incident.
01/30/2009, the SIRG met to discuss the above—captioned
shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael S. Clemens,
Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and was a non—
The following voting members were in attendance:
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ;
Attorney, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Chief
Inspector
Office of Inspections (01), INSD;
Section Che
i
erie Euliz. CD—i. uri.ri Section,
Counterintelligence Division; A/Sd
‘Violent
Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (DC)
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Divsion (Tp); UC
I Defensive Systems Unit, TD; DC I
1
I
I
I Practical Applications Unit, TD; UCI
Special Weapons and Tacti.c Ooration nit, Critical Incident
Response Group; SSAI
I, Investigative Law Unit,
Office of General Counsel; SSAI
I Evidence
Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division; and SAI
I
I CR—2, Washington Field Office. UC
I

I

-

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I

 UNCLASSIFIED

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I

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271905--D,

Inspection
03/19/2009

I Inspection Management Unit (IMU)., 01, INSD, and Management
Program Analysti
I IMU, 01, INSD, non—voting
members, were also in attendance.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewd the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1> evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions
from an
operational standpoiit (if any); (3) provide recommendatio
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provid ns
e
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necess
ary.
STP mrnbr ianiinously agreed that the use
of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with
the FBI’s deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken
against SA
I
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

tJNCLASS IFIED
4

Savage-2050

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UNCLSSTFIED

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Inspection From:
297—H.Q—A1271905—D,

Inspection
03/19/2009

LEAD(s):
Set I4ead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTONL DC
SA [
incident.

That po admInistrative action be taken against
I as a result of his involvement in this shootIng

b6

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Mr. Pistole, Room 7142

Ms. CaoronL Room 7427
Mn
I USDOJ
I USDOJ
Mr-I
Mr. Anderson, Room 4825
(At tniHôn
Ms. Eulitz)
Mr.
Room 3280
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
antico
Mr.
CIRG
Mr.
uantico
Ms.
room 7326
Mr.
IQuantico
Mr.
I WFO
Mrs.
Room 3043

j

.4
UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-205 1

 (Rev. 06.04.a001)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

.

Attu:

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

Date:

03/24/2008

AD Kevin L.

1tension

Perkins

4—1837

Perkins KeviWt
Clemens MicI

[

Case ID

#: 297—HQ—A1271895--D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
03/15/2007

I

Synopsis:
The Shooting IncIdent Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
a
shooting incident that occurred on 03/15/2007, involv
ing Special
Agnt (SA)I
I. During, an attempted arrest,
SA [
Jf ired one round from his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22,
.40 caliber pistol, killing a subject who made a
furtive movement
toward his waistband as he was fleeing from the scene
of an
attempted robbery [
SIRG members
I
recomnended that no administrative action be taken agains
t SA
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

I

Zm4nitxatjve:
Reference report of former
Idated 05/07/2007.

Inspectorl_________

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

}b7m

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 03/15/2007, Agents of the Philadelphia Division
participated in an undercover buy/walk operation with
the
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), Narcotics Field
Unit (NFU).
The operation was one in a series of operations routine
ly
supported by Agents assigned to Squad 3, a Safe
Streets Task
Force (SSTF).
As part of the initiative, Squad 3 personnel were
designated to work with specific teams within the
PPD, NFl).
Although no wrtIn orion olan was o;epared
for
the operation, SAsI
landi_I, as well as
members of the PPD—NFIJ, attended a briefing on
03/15/2007, at the

Savage-2052

 __Iwas

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InspectiOn From:
Inspection
297—FIQ—A1271895--D, 03/24/2008

PPD—NFU offsite to discuss
buy/walk ooqration involving a I
I The operation called forl
Ito purchase two ounces
of cocaine, a Beretta 9 millimeter semi-automatic pistol
with a
fully loaded magazine and one round in the chamber,
and be
“fronted an additional ounce of cocaine by a subjec
’
t
t identified
asp
As the briefing concluded, SAl
Itelhonirly
advisec her supervisor of t n n1apci SAd
land
•I met
L
J, as well as Sergeani
1
Sergeant
l1?riefedl
Frid searched him while SAsI
land
I
Isearched his vehicle. I
Ivoiced his concern several
times that-the subject possibly intended to rob him becaus
e it
II
w yri iiniiu1
n.rc’rd-i rq

1-,

nnkrinwn

4 nrii

rii 1

-

making frond
Ilaw enforcement
personnel elected not to use a recorder or transmitting device
.
I
lagreed he would put his hands over his head to signal law
enforcement officers if he needed help and was subsequently
provided $1,800 to make the purchase..
I

Ideparted the aris vehicle followed by SA
L SN
] and Sergeant I
tin one vehij’1.
yiell as
three additional unmarked PPD surveillance units. I
I
proceeded o thq identified meeting area açidoulledto the
curb
to pick up
Iwho was flagging him down.I
lifted his shirt
I
and exposed his waist indicating he was not
a eapon
before getting into the front passenger seat cartvin
k vehicle.
of I
I
I pulled away from the curb and drove around the block
before parking at the corner of elarde and Clearfield
Streets.
While talking on his cell phone,I
lexited and re-enteredi
I
jvehicle several times.
I
Upon his final entry into the
vehicle, I
Idrove away and proceeded to Cedar and Ann Streets
where subjects Jrrn T(rp andi
lentered the rear
passenger seat. I
Idrove away and again pulled over at the
intersection of Cedar and Clearfield Streets. Morpnt 1ter,
surveillance units observed the si
hiri-c 1
1
striking
un the
head with their fists. BelievingL
being beaten and
Iwas
robbed, Sergeants
nstructed •h iirveillance units to
converge on the vehicle to assistl
land arrest the subjects.
-

Sergeant I
exited their vehicle.

I

I si

I and SAl
lircimediately
SAl
egan to veil, “police t
stop,
and continued to yell as he approachedi
Ivehicle. SA
observd Jason Copp run towaFd his çirection on

the
sidewalk nearl
Ivehicle. S4
Iran across the street
in an attempt to block Kopp from leaving the scene while
continuing to yell, “police stop.” SA
Imomentarily lost
sight of Kopp due to a parked vehicle; however, put himsel
f in a

2

Savage-2053

 To:
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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, 03/24/2008

firing nr’cii-jon in anticipation of coming face-to—face with him.
As SAl
Icame around the corner of the vehicle, he was
approximately five feet from Kopp.
SAl
lagain yelled,
“police stop.” Kopp reached into th ara of his waist band
retrieving a dark object which SAl
Ibelieved was a handgun.
While Iolding the dark object, Kopp thrust iis hand in SA
I
i direction. livg he was in imminent danger of death
or serious injury, SAl
If ired one shot killing the subject.
According to SAl
I she was running behind SA
Ind also attempted to cut the subject off from escape.
SA
observed the subject reach for his waist and pull out a
I
I
black object which she immediately believed was a handgun.
She
heard a “pop” and saw the subject was hit in the chest.
According to SAl
I the subject staggered and fell to the
sidewalk,
Seeing what she believed to he a weapon lying on the
sidewalk next to the subject, SA I
Iproceeded to retrieve
the “weapon” and determined the object was a cell phone.

J

According to Sergeant I
I he observed the subject’s
and stated he was preparing to shoot the subject when SA
Ishot him.

ction

I

iiedical personnel immediately responded to the scene
and determined the subject was deceased.
On 08/i2/2OO7, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SA[
this
shooting incident.

un

On 02/15/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD)r chaired the meeting and
was a non-voina membe The following voting members were in
attendance: I
I Deputy Chief, Gang Squad, Criminal
c
Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ);I
I
I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section, CD—i,
Counterintelligence Division; Unit Chief (UC)l________________
Fir’
it, Training and Development Division (TDD);
uci
I, Defensive Systems Unit, TDD; DCI
1
Indian Country/Special Crimes Unit, Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; UCfl
I
Practical Applications Unit, TDD; Acting DC I
I
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group; SSA I
Too
i Firearms
it,
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSA
Investigative Law Unit, Office of Genera
,
—

I

3

Savage-2054

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271895—D,

Inspection
03/24/2008

Counsel; and SSAi
I Gangs/Criminal Enterprise
Section, CID. I
I Inspector, Office of Inspections
(01), INSO, and Management Program Aralyst (MPA)I
I
I Inspection Management Unit, 01, INSD, non—voting
members, were also in attendance.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above ynopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or saeety issues; and (4) provide
reccmmendatjons for administrative action if deemed necessary.
STRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified and in conformance
with the F•BI’s deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in
the_recommendation that no administrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
The discussion of the incident addressed several areas
of concern by SRG rrm}?ers.
Tb first area pertained to the fact
that neither SAl
jnor sI
lutilized any type of
orotecçive body armor during this incident. According to SA
I
I he was not wearing any clothing identifying himself as a
law enforcement officer, nor was he wearing his bullet protective
vest.
The operation was intended to be a buy/walk and he did not
want to wear any identifying clothing which could reveal his
presence in the area.
The discussion resulted in one SIRG member
asking if the Bureau was providing proper equipment to Agents in
the field, i.e., covert protective armor. A TDD representative
advised field offices are provided Electronic Communications
regarding procedures for obtaining this type of equipment and
furthermore, if a request is niade, the equipment is provided.
The SIRG Chairman advised this topic would be included for
discussion at the scheduled conference for all Special Agents in
Charge (SACS>.
The second area of discussion centered around the lack

-of a pre—approved Operations tOPs) plan.
The former SAC of the
Philadelphia Division advised the Shooting Incident Review Team
(SIRT) that although the squad Supervisory Special Agent is
informed of every operation, ‘buy/walk” operations involving
limited risks do not have a written OPs plan since most are PPD—

NFU operations utilizing PPD-NFU cooperating witnesses and funds.

4

Savage-2055

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To:
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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—I-IQ—A1271895—D, 03/24/2008

One TDD representative reiterated that written OPs plans are
required if it is a Bureau operation; however, an oral OPs plan
is acceptable for a non-Bureau operation.
The CIRG
representative emphasized there may not have been sufficient time
for a detailed, approved Os plan.
Several members opined this
operation should not have been considered “low risku since a
loaded gun was part of the operation. These areas of concern
will be discussed with the SAC of the Philadelphia Division.
The last comment made pertained to the shooting
incident report.
The OGC representative noted the report
included unnecessary career board notes.

Savage-2056

 To:
Re:

Inpectior From;
297—HQ—A1271895—D,

Inspection
03/24/2008

LED(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,
Th-

SA I
shooting incident.

I

DC

no administrative action be taken against
as a result of his involvement in this

lb
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—

Mr. Pistole
1 Room 7142
Ms. Caoroni,, Room 7427
Mr. L
IuDoJ
UJSDOJ
Mr.I
Mr. Caseyr Room 5096
Ms.
,
Room 3999
Mr.
,
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
CIRG
antico
Mr.I
Mr.j
Quantico
I
Ms.
Room 7326
Mr.
WFO
Mrs.
Room 3043

I

I,
I

6

Savage-2057

 (Rev. 05.01.2008)

UNCtSSIFtED

FEDERAL BUflEAU OF INVESTiGATION
Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attu:

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Inspection
Office of Inspections
Contact:

Approved By:

I

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Micha.*Ø’

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297—HQ-A1271292-D

08/05/2008

ji4
1
b
6
7C

Title:

I

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CLEVELAND DIVISION
09/04/2007

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 09/04/2007, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
During the attempted arrest of a
j
sub-iect wanted for Unlawful ‘1ight to Avoid Prosecution, SA
j fired five rounds from his Bureau—issued Colt .223 rifle,
resuiting in the injury of the subject.
SIRG memers_recommended
that no administrative action be taken against SAl_______ as a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:

(SSA)

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent

J

dated 09/11/2007.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
k7C

Details of the Shooting Incident

The Mahoning Valley Violent Crimes Task Force was
seeking to locate and apprehendi_______________ a subject charged
with felonious assault by local authorities. The Task Force
requested the assistance of the Youngstown Resident Agency (YRA)
Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF) in locating and apprehending the
subject.
UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2058

 ___________IadI

UNCX.SSXWIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271292—D, 08/05/2008

Investigation by the SSTF revealed I
Iwas moving
back and forth from Youngstown, Ohio to variou
s locations in the
State of Pennsylvania. Subseqnt1v. a federal warrant was
issued on 08/29/2007, chargingl
Iwith Unlawful Flight to
Avoid Prosecution.

On 09/04/2007, investigators learned that’
-_Iwas
supposedly utilizing a particular cellular phone. Technical
tracking of the phone was initiated which subsequently
determined
the phone was located ati
un Youngstown.
SA
I
lutilized available task force personnel to
establish a loose perimeter on the location, while he
and Task
Force Officer (TFO)E
bssumed &position providing them
with visual surveillance of the location.
-

At
location and
indicated to
was probably

approximately 2:15 p.m., a Toyota Camry left the
was eventually stopped.
The operator of the Cainry
law enforcement personnel that the subiect I
I
in a Toyota Camry located behind I

A plan wa formulated and called for a number of TFOs
to block any escape trouah4he rear of the residence
while the
remaining TFOs and SAl
would approach from the front of the
residence. The plan had to be coxnmunicted via radio
and
cellular phone to the Task Force members who had spread
out to
establish the perimeter.

At approximately 2:30 p.m., siJ
linstructed
participants to move u and he units moved toward the
Ohio
Street residence.
SN
land TFOI
larrived first and
observed the subject in a red/burgundy Toyota Cainry behind
the
residence with the vehicle parked facing away from
the
resid
ence.
He appeared to be talking on a cell phone with the drive
r’s
window and front_passenger window of the vehicle open.
The ojan
called for SAI
I and TFOs I
I
Ito
block the Caznry and effect the arrest o4

I

SAl
I and TFOI
larrived at the southeast side
of the residence before other units.
SA I
Iidentified
himself ap law ex?forceinent and ordered the subject
out of the
vehicle. I
Iplaced the Camry in reverse and swung the
vehicle from its parked position at a high rate of speed,
nearly
striking SAl
I
The subject turned the vehicle thrrniqan
anorozimately 270 degree arc and stopped, facing SAL
I
placed the vehicle in drive and quickly accelerat
ed
--

I

I

VNCLASSIFZED

2

Savage-2059

 tJNCL.SStFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271292—D,

Inspection
08/05/2008

toward SAl
I Fearing for his safety, SAl
Jfired five
rounds from his Bureau—issued_Colt .223 rifle. The sub:ject
vehicle continued past SAl
land stopped approximately thirty
yards behind him.
I and the TFOs removedi
SAl
Ifroni the
vehicle, provided first aid, and called for the Emergency Medical
Service. I
Iwas transported to a local hospital where he
underwent surgery and was treated for three gunshot wounds to his
left arm, one gunshot wound to the right forearm, and a
superficial wound to his left leg.
On 10/12/2007, Assistant Mahoning County Prosecutor I
he had reviewed the facts of the shooting with local
authorities and discussed the matter with the Mahoning County
Prosecutor. Mr.j
dvised his office was not going to take
any action regarding SAl
un this matter. On 12/13/2007, a
declination of prosecution was received from the United States
Department of Justicq, Civil Rights Division, regarding the
actions of SAl
this shooting incident.

un

On 05/13/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection ,Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: I
1 Deputy Chief, Criminal Section,
Civil Rights Division, tiSDOJ;I
JChief
Inspector, Office of Inspections (01), INSD; Assistant Section
Chief (ASC) I
I Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)I
I Firearrtjs
Training Unit, Training Division ITD); UC1
I
Defensive Systems Unit, TD; UC I
I Invetigative Law
Unit, Office of General Counsel; UCI
I Practical
Applications Unit, TO; Acting UCI
I Special
Weapons anrj T’t1n OnrMions Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group; SSAI
L Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; and SSAI
I
CR—2, Washington Field Office.
Inspector I
J
I, INSD, and Management Program Analyst (MPA)I
I
I
j Inspection Management Unit, 01, INSO, non-voting
members, were also in attendance.
-

O1servations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
UNCLASSIFXED

3

Savage-2060

I

 tJNcI
A
1
SSXFXED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271292—D,

Inspection
08/05/2008

(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance
with the FBIs deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in
the recommendption t1at no administrative action be taken against
SA I
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident

UNCLZ4.SSIFIED

4
Savage-2061

 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271292—D,

Inspection
08/05/2008

EAD(s):
1
X
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON.

DC

PhM1o administrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

SAl

lb 6
lb 7 C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr
1
(3SDOJ
3.
Mr
Room 3280
1
Mr
Quantico
Mr
1
Quantico
1
cpm 7326
Mr
1
Mr
)CIRG
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr.
1FO
Room 3043
—

-

-

-

—

-

-

—

1 Mrs.I_________
—

44

UNCLASSIFIED

5

Savage- 2062

 _____[rr

‘

(Rcv. OS.O1.2G08)

-

UNCL.SSXFXED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

•Attn:

AD Kevin

08/01/2008

L.

Perkins

Inspection

Office of Inspections
Contact:

Approved By:

I

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Micha

I.

111i7i ftVY

Drafted B:

i

J91T’

Case XD

#:

Title:

S0OTING NCiDENT
DAILS DIVISION
05/05/2007

C

297—HQ—A1271464—D

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incidezt Review Group
(SI.RG) reviewed a
shooting icident that occurred oii
05/05/2007, involv&ng Specia.l
Agent (A I
Ind Acting Supervisory Special
Agent
(A/SSA)I
L During the attempted_arrest of
subiects.involved in a violent k:idnaping,
SAl
I and A/SSA
I fired mult
iple shots f:rom the&r BOreau-issue
d weapons,
resulting in the death of one o
the suspects.
SXRG
members
recommended that no administrative’
action be taken against SA
A/SSN
I as a result of their in(o1veyttent in this
shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference report of Inpe
ctorI
dated 07/23/2007.

I

Details:
This cOmmunication was prepared to
furnish the
analysis, comments’, az)d recommendatio
ns of the SRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
Just after midnight on 05/05/20
07, the Dai:las Division
switchboard received a telephone
ca.ll from the Dallas Police
Department (DPD) regarding a possible
kidoaping matter.
Information regarding the matter was
telephoically forwarded to
•

tThCLASSIFtED

Savage-2063

 ______________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
_______

b

UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271464—D,

Inspection
08/01/2008

A/SSA[
Iwho was advised that according to he DD,
a call had been received from a Spanish-speaking male in Mexico
reporting his brother had been kidflaped.
A/SSAI
Itelephonically contacted the DPD
Communications Center nd spoke to a bilinaua.
dispatcler who
advised she would translate for A/SS
Iduring a three-way
patch telephone call to the alleged kidnap victims brother,l______
I, in Me$co.
A/SSAI
Isubsequently advised
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASf Mi-e Mikulewicz of the
developments in the case.
Both A/SSA I
land ASAC Nikulewicz
agreed that the.FBI should begin working tius as an active
kidnaping matter.

•
•

•

A/SSAI
‘continued speaking with the DD
dispatcher and 1eaned that the kidnap victim
s name wasi________
t
_________land the kidnapr wr demanding $250,000 or
they would

)ciU the victim. A/SSAI
1 through the DPD dispatcher,
asked I
I to have the siib.jects put the victim on the
phone as a “proof of life.” During a subsequent commzrxication,
the subject(s) repeated ther demand for $250,000 or an
equivalent amount in drugs.

Zi- pproximate1y 1:00 a.m.., the dispatcher advised
A/SSAI
Ithat the subject(s) did not put the victim .on the
phone with his brother. The dispatcher further advised that the
victim said that I
1 (victim’s brother) should pay the money.

• I

During one of the three—way conversations, A/SSA
Ilearned that the kidnapers had mentioned Richardson,
Texas, a suburb of Dallas. A/SSAI
bontacted the
Richardson Police Department (RPD) and learned that the
department had responded to a possible kidnapi.ng/shootijig on
05/04/2007. •The RPD advised they were investigating a possible
kidnaping; however, the victim’s name was unknown.
AISSAI

shared his known information with RPD I
I ipcludina
the victim’s name and cellular telephofle number.
A/SSAI_______
learned that the RPD had responded to a call where gnfire h.ad
•

beex) reported coming from a residence, an adult male ws seen
and that another shot was beard
coming from within the subject vehicle before i•t slowly left the
area. Sergeant’
indicated the RPD needed additional
assistance and A/SSA I
lot fered to send FBI personnel to
assist in the kidnaping investigation. Two agents and one Task
Force officer (TFO) were subsequently instructed to respond to
the RPD to provide assistance.
being forced into a vehicle,

UNCLASSIFIED
2

Savage-2064

—

•

 UNCIJ.SSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1273.464—D, 08/01/2008

-ng subequent telephone calls with SereantI
I
A/ssA[
Ilearned that the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) possibly had infozmation regarding the kidnaping; however,
they would not divulge the information to the RPD due to
inadequate clearances by police personnel. A/SSAI
Ispoke
to a DEA Agent and learned the DEA was aware of the kidnaping and
that the victim was alive and within one mile of the original
kidnaping location in Richardson. The DEA SA characterized his
information as “third hand”.
A/SS1I
1 continued to z)otify ASAC 4iku1ewicz and
obtai1 his concurrence that the investigation should continue.
A/ssAI
Ica3.led out additional investigative resources and
contacted a northern District of Texas Assistant United States
attorney and briefed her on the investigation. A/SSAI
I
requested emergency authority to utilize sophisticated
investigative techniques targeting the kidnaping victim’s
telephone.

s?1
I who was assisting the RPD, advised
/SSAI
Ithat a money drop might have to be made. With the
concurrence of ASAC Mikulewicz, all Dallas Divisioi Criminal
Enterprise squad personnel were ir1structe to respond to the RPD.
At approximately 4:00 a.m., A/SSAI
Iresponded to the Da1as
office to continue coordinating the investigation. He inserte a
d
‘O in an Undercover Employee (UCE) capacity to act as the
kidnaping victim’s cousin. This action was coordinated with
the
victim’s-brother in Z1exico who further advised the subject(s)
that the “victim’s cousin” in Texas would deal with them. The
UCE began speaking directly with the kidnapers via a Netel
telephone using its “push-to—talk” feature.

•

A/SSAI
I with the ASAC’s_assistance, proceeded to
write an Operational Plan (OP). A/SSAI
Ibriefed ASAC
tikulewicz including the fact that the UCE’s negotiations had
reached a point where the subject(s)’ demands were now fixed at
$70,000 in cash and three pounds of methamphetamne for the
victim’s release.
I

At approximately 6:00 a.m., ASAC Mikulewicz and A/SSA
I telephonically briefed the SAC who concurred with the
direction of the investigation as well as the actions taken.
ASAC Mikulewicz secured $3,000 from the Dallas Division’s safe to
prepare a “money drop” package with weights and transmitter, if
needed. ASAC Mikulewicz assembled all SA and non—FBI personnel
involved in the operation at the Dallas Office.
Due to the fast—
tJNCISSXFID
3

Savage-2065

.

*

••

 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 08/01/2008

moving nature of the operation, the ASAC allowed A/SSA
I
I to
hand write the operations order which was subsequently read
and
approved by ASAC Mikulewicz.
At 7:00 a.m., ASAC Mikulewicz and A/SSAI_____
initiated a briefing of all personnel involved with the __
exceptiofl
of two Technically Trained Agents (TTAs) who continued
to
the telephone used by the subject(s). During the briefin track
members of the RPD briefed participants on the backgroundg,
of the
case, including the fact the subjects should be considered
armed
and dangerous; shots had been fired during the abduction
of the
victim; the subjects repeatedly threatened to kill
the victim
the ransom was not paid; and the subjects threatened to kill if
the
liCE if he missed the deadlines set by the subjects.
A/SSAI
Ifollowed with a verbal briefing to
participants outlining four scenarios. ASAC 1ikulewicz fuxthe
r
advised the participants if the scenarios involving traff
ic stops
developed, personnel were not to engage in high—speed pursui
The tracking device placed in the “mpney drop” package would ts.
relied on to identify the direction of travel and the locatio be
n of
the subject(s)/victim.
Precise assignments for persone3. were
made where possible; however, due to the flujd natre of
the
multiple-scenario operation, assignmezits were contingent
oz
the
position of team members at the time of arrest or takedo
wn.

ASAC Mikulewicz had team members identify themse
identify their roles, and brief back their respoRsibiiity lves,
the scenarios. Additionally, he had each participant put within
on the
clothing they would be wearing during the operation and
emphasized team members should be aware of cross—fire issues,
cover, and other safety issues.

I

At approximately 8:00 a.m., ASAC Mikulewicz, A/SSA
and SAl
I traveled together to an area in Da,11a,s
wl2ere the TTAslast reported the cellpbone signal of irtere
st had
been detected. Other Agents and officers deployed to the a.rea
as
well and conducted an extensive search of a trailer park
area
where the signal of interest had beel) emanating.

I

ASAC Mikulewicz and A/SSa I
I collectively_decided
the “money drop” scenario would be employed. A/SSAF
directed the teams to move to the Wal—4a’rt located at InterstI
30 and Cockrell Hii.1 Road. This location had been identifiedate
by
the subject(s) as the location of the “money drop.”
UNCLASSIFIED

4

Savage-2066

 I’

U’NCLASSXFIED
To:
Re

1

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 08/01/2008

At 8:48 a.m., ASAC Mikulewicz telephonical:ly briefed
the SAC who concurred with the actions taken. He discussed with
the SAC the fact that the UCE would place the drop packag in or
e
near the subject(s)’ “itoney drop” vehicle, but not in the trunk
due to a concern the tracking signal could be lost. An Agent
wou.ld be concealed inthe UCE’s vehicle as a protective cover.
The UCE was to clear out of the area after the “money drop
’ was
t
made and a felony traffic stop would be conducted when the
subject(s) attempted to retrieve the package.
At approximately 0:34 a.m., a flA alerted that the
cellular telephone signal of interest was active near tje,
trailer
park and that the signal was moving.
The TTAs updated
operational Agents and officers by radio that the subject(s)
were
ten minutes away, they were in the parking lot, and that they
were behind the Wal-Mart. The UCE also advised A/SSAI
the
subject(s) advised the “drop vehicle” was a gray Mitsubishi...j
At approximately 11:00 a.m., a TTA advised via Bureau
radio that the cellular telephone in contact with the (JCE was
active behind the Wal-Mart and that the TTAs observed a
suspicious vhicle n the area associating with a Chevrolet
Blazer. TTAI
Isubsequently advised he saw a gray Mitsubishi
with the Blazer and that both were travel:ing northbound net to
the WalNart. ASAC Mikulewicz looJed over his right shoulder
ry Mitsubishi approaching, followed by a Blazer ard
obsery
.
A/SSAI
Iprovided radio broadcast updtes to participants
rega.rding the approaching vehicles. A/SSI
Idiscussed the
matter with ASAC Mikulewicz and both believed it ras the
right
opportunity to move toward the Mitsubishi wb.ich was parked three
or four parking slots away from thei:r vehicle on the same row.
rhe front of the Mitsubishi was blocked by a civilian vehic1e
and
the Blazer pulled along the left side.
ASAC Miklewicz gave A/SSA I
I authorization to
deploy the arrest plan. A/SSJ
Iradioeçl the operational
team members of the Mitsubishi’s location and further advised
a
felony car stop would be initiated.
He also broadcasted the
deploy instruction by saying, “execute,_e,cecute, execute.” As he
issued the execute instruction, A/SSA[
Iwas unaware th.at a
nurnber of the participants did not know where to go when the
order was given. A/SSAI
Imoved his vehicle from its parked
position, drove a short distance, and bumod into the Mitsub
ishi
from the rear, blocking it in. A/SSAI
lexited his vehicle,
identified himself by.yelling FBI, and yelled arrest commands
in
Spanish and English to the driver of the Mitsubishi.
-

UNCLASSIFIED

Savage-2067

 UNCLASSXE’IED
To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 08/01/2008

ASAC Mikulewicz also exited the vehicle and began providing
backup for A/SSAI
I.
The driver of the Mitsubishi, later
identified asl
1 ignored the arrest
commands, exited the Mitsubishi and attempted to enter the
passenger door of the Blazer. The driver of the Blazer, later
identified as I
I quickly sped away leavir)g
in the parking lot. I
Iran
eastbound through the parking ct rfing to yield to law
enforcementcommands and A/SSI
Igave chase through the
parking lot while ASAC Mikulewicz observed the fleeing lazer to
determine its direction before joining in the foot pursuit.
SA

I

I

who was positioned northeast of A/SSA
Ibroadcast that a “cell phofle
hit” was received from the vicinity of two vehicles coming nto
the Wal-Mart parkinc lot on the west side of the building.
SA
Iheard A/SSAI
I
Jbroadcast that the kidnaper’ehi
was drivi.ng behind him and then rcal.led hearing A/SSAI
give the execute order. sI
Iwas aware A/SSAI
I was
• positioned in the southwest cornr of the rarkirg lot, but could
not see him. As SAl
I and SAl
I drove south
through the parking lot, they observed A/SSIiI
Ibtjmp into
the Mitsubishi and saw the Blazer drive off. SAl
lobserv
the driver of the Mitsubish•i get of out his vehiie a r4h ed
through the parking lot in front of he and Sal
j. Sal
I
exited_his vehicle and joined in the foot chase of the subject.
SAl
I along with other law enforcement personnel continued
to yell arrest commands toF
L
SAl
jobserved
the subject attempting to_enter into the passenger side of a
black Ford Mustaz)g. SAl
FBI. get downnl at
J was yelling, 11
who lookMrct1y at Sal_____ and entered the
I
Mustang. Accorda.ng to SAl
I, he was approx;imately fifteen
feet away when the Mustang began to move toward him. He stated
he was face—to-face with the driver of t Mnang, aod bel:ievi.ig
the driver was going to run him down, sai
jbegan f4rina
rounds from his tIP-5 shoulder weapon. Acorcurg to SAl
j he
dld not recall looking at the sights of his weapon but
deliberately held the muzzle low to avoid hitting any individ
ua.ls
in the parking lot. SAl
ladvised he initially fired four
rounds with the intent ot nittix:lg the driver although he recalled
seeing a buflet strike• one of the front tires othe subject
vehicle. As he fired the first four rounds, SAj
I advised the
Mustang began to turn south.
Knowing other Agents were
approaching the_scene and the Mustang was i a position to run
them down, SAl
Iran to the rear of the Mustang and continued
firing his weapon.

I

1 location,heard TTAE

t3NCI.SSIFI5D

6
Savage- 2068

‘‘‘

h

 tYNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—AJ.271464—D, 08/01/2008

Although he heard other gunfire from A/SSAI
SA
the Mustangposed a threat to A/SSN
I
because the driver still had both hands firmly on the steering
wheel and was driving toward I
I As A/SSAL
I entered
his line of fi.re, SAl
Iceased firing. When A!SSAI
I
emerged from a row of parked ehicles, he noticed the Mustang
turning down the parking aisle toward him. 13e noted the right
front passenger through the windsliield with his hands up. The
driver of the vehicle, later identified as Gerardo Torres aka
Gerardo Diaz, had both hands on the steering wheel and y
looking directly at him.
Fearing for his sa.fety, A/.SSAI
I
fired three shots from his LAR-15 rifle through the windshield of
the vehicle, hitting the driver three times.
The Mustang
conti11
hort distance and bumped into a parked vekicle.
I removed the driver of the vehicle through the open
2?/SSAl
door and administered first aid. The driver died as a result of
injuries sustained f.rom A/SSAI
I gu’nfi.re.
The fleeing Blazer became involved in a three—car crash
and the driver was subsequently arrested by law enforcement
personnel.
Law enforcement personnel located and rescued the
kidnaping victim who was transported to a lbca3. hospital for
treatment of two gunshot wounds as well as other physical
injuries received f.rQm being beaten. Three additional subjects
were arrested and numerous weapons were located in the house
tra.iler.
An autopsy determined the deceased subject was shot
four times, three of which were identified by the Laboratory
Division as having been fired by a .223 Remington caliber Rock
River Arms rifle, Model LAR-iS, which was the weapon utilized hy
A/SS4________ during the incident.

I

On 04/25/2008,1
Division Chief, Public
Integrity
Dallas County istrict Attorney’s Office,
advised SAl
I and A/SSAI
Jwere no-biLled in the case.
On 03/21/2008, a declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of ustjce, Civil Rights Division,
regarding the actions of Sal
land A/SSA I___________
t;6
I
I in this shooting incident.
On 05/13/2008, the SIRG met to discuss he abovecaptioned shooting iz)cident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chai.red the meeting and
UNCLASSIFIED

7

Savage- 2069

 UNCLASSIFIED

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—4Q—Al27l464—D,

Inspection
08/01/2008

was a non—vojineT mpmhr.
T)p following voting members were in
attendance: I
I putv Chief, Crimin1 Section,
Civil Rights vivssaon, UsvOd;I
I Chief
Inspector, Office of Inspections (OX), INSD; Assistant Section
Chief (ASC)I
I Violent crimes Section. Criminal
Investigative Division; Unit Chief CUC
I P
rrms
4
Training Unit, Training Division (TO); UC
I
Defensive Systems Unit, TO; UCI
I Invetigative Law
Unit, Office of General Counse1;Jj
?ractica,l
Applications Unit, TO; Acting (ICI
Ii, Special
Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Criticai Incident Response
Group; SSAI
I Firearms
Too1mar TTn4 ientific
Ari1vis ection, LaboratoryDivision; azd SSAI______________
I CR—2, Washington Field Office. I.nspectorj
I
I 0!, INSO, and Management Program.Analyst (MPA)9
I
I Inspection ianagement Unit, 01, INSO, non-voting
members, were also in attendance.
-

I,

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2> provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions frqm ar
operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Prior to the discussion of this incident by SIRG
members, Xnspectorl
I Inspector-in-Charge of the
shooting ir1vestigati9n orovjLded a detailed overview of the
I explained to the SIRG members that
Inspectorl
incident.
his investigation revealed radio commuri.ication,s among the
field/operational teams were not effectively utilized to keep law
enforcement personnel apprised of develonients or deployment
instructions prior to the “execute”_ordr being given to initiate
the felony car stop.
Inspectoil
Ialso noted SAl
I
intentiona)J.y fired his shoulder weapofl low of his target in an
attempt to avoid hitting customers in.the parking lot area. The
Special Agent in Charge of the Dallas Division ws awkre of the
issued identified by the Shooting ncident ReView Team.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of dad.ly
I and A/SSAI________________
justified and in conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
force by SAl

UNCLASSIFIED

8

Savage-2070

]h C

 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 08/01/2008

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against tbem as a result ci their
involvement in this shooting incident.
*

UNCLASSIFIED

9
Savage-2071

 UNCLASSIFIED
To:
!e:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 08/01/2008

LEID(s)

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INS PECTIO!
T t’IASHINGTON, DC
That no açlministrative actiop be taken against
and A/SSAI
I as a result of thei.r
involvement in this shooting incident..

I

sAl

lb

1

—
-

1
1
1
j

—
-

1
I
1
2.

-

I

-

—

-

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni
1 Room 7427
Mr.
IUSDOJ
Mr.
IRoom 3280
Mr.
I Quantico
Mr.
j Quantico
Mn
[Room 7326
Mr.i
ICIRG
Mr.j
Quantico
Mr3
Quantico

1—Mrj
Mr

I WFO

J

Room 3043

+6

UNCLASSIFIED

10

Savag-2O72

 1.

(Rev. 06-04-2007)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attu:

03/05/2008

AD Kevin L. Perkins

Inspection
Office of

Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:

I

Tnnpntônq

j Extension 4-1837

Perkins :Kevin
Clemens Micha

I

Lirr

Case ID

#: 297—H—A127l788—D

Title:.

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
07/21/2007

.

-

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting iicident that occurred on 07/21/2007, involving Specia
l
Agent (SA) I
I SAl
I fired eight rounds
from his Bureau-authorized, personally owned Glock Model 27, .40
caliber pistol, killing a rattlesnake located on his patio.
SIRG members_recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SA I
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting ing.dent.

I

____ye:

I

Reference Electronic Communication
dated 07/24/2007.

(BC) of SA.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furhish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations •of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
•

Details of the Shooting tncident

On 07/21/2007, SAl
I was at his vacation cottage
in Pennsy1vani whn )vi. wife told him a large rattlesnake
was on
the patio.
SAl
hinsuccessfully attempted to remove the
snake with a long-handled shovel and the snake reDeaedly
attempted to strike at tIeshoveJ. and SAl
I
SA[
Iretreated, drew his pistol, and fired eight
rounds of which five stuck the snake.
SAl
I removed the
dead snake from the patio and notfied he Pennsylvania State
Police of the incideiit.

Savage-2073

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271788—D,

Inspection
03/05/2008

On 02/15/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting indident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member.
The following voting raernbers were in
attendance: I
I Deputy Chief, Gang Squad, Cr
iminal
1
Divisjç, United States Department of Justira (USDOJ);I
I
L Soecal Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, tJSDOJ;
L
9
I Inspector, Office of Inspections (01), INSD;
ecton CnI.et (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section, CD-i,
Counterintelligence Division; Unit Chief (UC4________________
Firm Trinincr Unit, Training and Development Division (TDD);
‘uci
I Defensive Systems Unit, TDD;
I
I
I, Indian Country/Special Crimes Untt. V’n1nr t:rim
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; UCI
Practical Applications Unit, TOO; Acting UCI
1,
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group; SSAI
Firearms
Toolmarics_Unit,
Scientific 1.nlysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSAI
I
I
I, [nvestiaative’Law t3iit, Office of General
Counsel; and SSI
1 Gangs/Criminal_Enterprise
Section, CID.
Management Program Analyst (MPA) I
I
I
I Inspection 4anagement Unit, 01, INSD, a non—votin’g
member, was also in attendance.

9

—

Observations and Recommehdations of the SIRG
.The SIRG revieied the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an’ evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously acreed that no administrative
action should be taken against SAI
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident..

2

Savage-2074

 To;
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ--A1271788—D,

Inspection
03/05/2008

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

nr riminjstrative action be taken
against
a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

las

SAl

b6

k7c

—

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

—

—

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

Mr. Pistoie, Room 7142
Ms. Caoroni, Room 7427

Mr.l
Mr.1

Mr. Casey,
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr4
Mn

losDoJ

VSDOJ
Room 5096
I Room 3999
I Quantico
I Quantico
,
CIRG
uantico
Quantico
Room 7326
jWFO
I Room 3043

++

Savage-2075

  

 

 

FBI
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

2006 .

 

 

ID2G(RY.zz4.9s)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Eureau

I
I

of

4

I

Ic
10/25/2006

____

Da

I

297—IQ-1271462—D

I
I

SHOOTIMG XwQUIRy

I
I
I

oai Inspection

REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT,
COLUMBIA DIVISION;
10/20/2006
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUX.PX
S)uopsi

I
I
I
I

Investigation

I

•

On 10/20/2006, a Columbia Police Officer relayed
source rêportinQ to the CoiUmbia Division that federal
was observed 3j the vicinity of the
fugitive
Colony Apartments
1 Columbia, South Ca.roLin. Two agents
rsnondaçI and confLmed th?t an individual matching
I description was ij the area. The squad
upervisbr and n additiona.L Agent a.so responded_to the
area and the’ co1lectively planned to axrestl
I on the
street ii ront of the hona cçmple. HoweverThen
hras no longer present.
they. returned to the areal
question
Isiter who lived
to
decided
1
Agents
be
in the complex. Two 2gents approached the £ront door
whUe the Supervisor and one agent went to the rea.r of the
apartment. s Agents peered Lnto the open front door,
thr observed the fugitive Lnside the unit. They stepped
inside, identWed themselves as FBI Igents and repeatedly
instructed him to raise his hands. The ubjet raied hs
left hand, but bladed his body and then moved his right
hand near his waistband in a furtive manner. One Agent
fired a single round. from his Glock 22 pistol striking the
sub5ect in the chest. The Agents secured the subject aiid
conducted a security sweep of the unit. They summoned
Emergency Medical Support and applied £irt aid. The
subject was transported via ambulance to Palmetto Richiand
Memorial Hospital and treated for the gunshot wound.
DETAILS:

On 11/23/2004, the Colubia Division initiated a

this doant ccntaus neither recorenhticn, nor conclusions of the PX. Zt is the pzcponty of the rax
eM is loaned to yo agency; it and its contents are not to be dbtbuted outside you: agency.

I

 _____attempted

______________

I
297-HQ-A1271462-D

-

I
violent gang inves
on a local faction of the
4
Blooçis Street Gang I
I jn Januaxy 2006, a multi—
defendant federal indictment was returned in U.S. District Court,
Di.strict of South Carolina, charging several members of the
criminal enterprise with violations of Title 21, bit leaving
other known subjects on the street.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

On 07/18/2006, in a superceding indictment,. Omelcsa
akal
I and 15 others were charged with
as indicted on
violations 0 •itle 21. On 07/21/2006,1
three counts of violat.ig Title 21, USC, Section 841(a) (1) and
841 (b) (1) (C). O 07/2L/2006, foUovijzg the issuance of a
was entered into NCIC as a wanted
warrant for his arrest, I
persona.
I continued beyond the
he investigation of I
date of his idjctment. in the ntervening time, Moaney was the
subject of informant reporting, subject proffers, defendant
debriefings and a Safe Streets Task Force referral to the U.S.
Marshal Service Fugitive Task Force to facilitate his
apprehension. information and inteU4.gence received by the
Coiunibi.a Division indicated /
Iregularly carried and/or
possessed weapons; on at least one occasion, he bad discu.ssed
executing a f.ireboinb attack or a Columbia Police Depaxtment (CPD)
Safe Streets Task Force Off:jcer; and bad made a statement to a
• Colimbia Police Of:icer that he would not retftrn to jail.
On 1O(9A19flfl’. h€wen—:00 pm and 3:30 pm, Columbia
Itelephonically cont4cted Columbia
Police Sergeantl
(EOD 07/14/2002) and
Division Special Agenti
I was near
advised him ‘tt a source just reported I
I
I
i sister’s residepce in he Colony Apartments. S I
had informationi
I sisterl
I also known as
I
I resided at
p tne obny ?pa.rtments
I was engagea in tiial preparation, therefore,
Complex. SAl
i(EOQ
he relayed the ifnrmtiOp to SAI
Icailed Sat.I
Jwho adv&sed/
O1/U/2004). 5I
I
Iwas just seen at I
weariw a sripea
I
landi
shirt and jeans. A short time later, Ss I
drove bureau Vehicles from the Columbia Field Office to the
Colony apartment comp1x in an attempt to corroborate the source
information.
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Upqn ar4ving in the area of the Colony 1partments, Ss
to gain entry to the nearby Columbia
Police Substation o view the cCT coverage of areas within the
colony_Apartment coznolex. The Substation was locked, therefore,
i decided tO drive past the 7000 btOk of
land I
SAs
heLr
Bai ey Street parking area in an attempt to spot
I and

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initial attempt failed to spot the subject. On a second drive
passed the area, Agents sootted an individual fitting the
physical desczlption oft
hearing tIe same clothing the
source had described. Phi indiridçal was standing in the
parking lot in front
IStreet. The person the
Agents observed was also wearing a white baseball cap. The
Agents drove back to the CPD Substation and telephonically
contacted their supervi.sor, SSN
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l(EOD
U/04/l990) and Special geztL
knd SA I
03/12/2000) for backup.. S I
I were
assigned as co-ca’se Agents on the referenced gang nvestigation
by

I was recontacted
SAl
was seen in the axea and was
eans and a white basebaU cap.
&rrived at the CPD Substation and S2
bserved the
where he and SAl
lect. The Agents made a tentative arrest pJ.an pending the
and approval of their Supervisor.
at the CPD

SI
‘arrived kt the CPD Substation
approirnately ten minutes after A I
J The Agents oral.ly
land utilized the
presented the arrest nian t SSAI
sketch to show where/
Ihad been oserved. The plan was for
I in a single unmarked car
all four agents to dhve to,ard I
as though they were potential drug purchasers. They were to
quickly exit the vehicle nri rnrije the Stibect in order to
lapproved the atrest plan,
effect his arrest. ssai
howe’ver, did not noW’ ASAC Maley of the plan to azrestl
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an armed and dangerous federal. fugitive. ARer donning tber
tactical_vests, marked with prominent EBI letters, they drove in
I bureau car to where they had last seen tbç
SN
Tbe drove through the parking lot, but did not see________ The
gents retud to the cPD Substation to discUs other oDtions to
loteI
I he de&sion as niae te op tol
I miaht be
residence and ask where her brotherl
1
located. Icnowing the possibility existed that I
might be in the apartment, the Agents planned an overt approach.
ihe dro’ve a known law enforcement vehicle into the parking lot
I and quickly approach the apartment
outsid
covexing both front and rear of the unit.
t approxiiateiy 5:45 pm, with c1ar 4sibiUty and 60
degree weather, the Agents drove in SN
I bureau vehicle
into the parking lot adj?
e 7Q block apartments within
land I
the Colony complex. SAsI
jproceedçd to the
front of the apaxtment and SSA I
Imoved to
I and S I
cover the back dbor.
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_________

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29;-aQ4j271462—D

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Moment prior to the Agents reaching I
Street, an qnknown mile aDoroaChed the partially open door of the
lwho was inside, of the
apartment and warned I
approaching FBI Agents. I
Itben moved frqm the ]Aingroom
Isister,
area into the kitchen area ot the apartment. I
I was not home at the tinle. Present within the
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apartment rø i
I friend I
itwin one
boyfriendI
I audi
p two year old
land
year old boys, I
was playing DUSt outsz.de the front door
daughter, I
of the apartment when the Agents approached.

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land
Ininedi.ately prior to SAS I
ariving at the frpnt door ofi
I
briefly picked up I
land then put tne bOY bCJC sown.
I
I was .standing behind a cushioned loveseat located directly
acros th f.rnnt room and approximately 2 feet from the f.ront
door. I
Ibead could not be seen behind the loveseat
by an average sized adult enteig the apa.rtment front door as
the top of his head was at least 1.2 inches lower than the back of
the loveseat.

of the apaxtment,
front of
told the

I,

the
Up.”
weapon and ye3]ed, “FBI,
to the
the apartment, moved
wall and then toward the center of the
ched the front door, be also observed
to pith his hand Up. Both Agents
Lple witnesses in addition to ss
who were positioned behind the
of space within the front xocm, SA
lack
the
the room sUghtly, reznaining lUst in front of
1 who
to positioning t.ria.ngylatecl
the entrWa. Their
land
six
to
rom
ft
ten
SAl
was then approdatl’
twelve feet from SN
I
entering

Ikept his bands at his sides and
xnitial:ly,L
then ased his left band to aboUt
at the Agent.s.1
shoail4r height, but kept his right Iand below wa.it level.
staredI then bladed himself toward SAl
I
i’ SAl
out.”
“watch
SA
yelled,
he
observed this movement
I could
I
rstrt
right hand but he observed]
clearly see
Iwas
to mpve lis right a u toward his wist. BerieY&ngl
not
bk oh the triger
dzawin a weaon, S
initial non-compliance
I
of his Glock 22 to a oot

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was observed by ss4
l who was looking into the
residnce through a window in the back of the unit I
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furtive movements were obseFved by the two Agents inside tne
‘apartment and by eS’ewitnessi
I who was seated on the
couch btt.øø SAl
landi
jalso stated
whilel
Iraised liLa left hand in response to the Agents’
commands he later moved his right hand towa,rd his waistband and
lower back.

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Iz response td
I movements in the apartment, SA
Ifired a single round trom his Glock 22, Serial #DDR5O6
use. sttiicingl
the chest.

un

When SAl
1 heard gunfre, be began to forcibly
breach the ack door to t)e unit, but was restrained by SSA
I who feared S I may e exposed to gunfire.
I to the front door of
Instead, SSA I
I dixected SL
the unit while ss
icovered the rear.

1 stated, “you shot me,” and laid down on the
floor, extendl.ng both bands above liLa head. As th Aan€s mnvd
to secure the subject, they noticed a smaU child I
I
•stand&nq a f fpt from wherel
I feU. S2?I
I as the other occupants fled, the apaçtmant Witi)
hand.cRf,fedi
I
the children. S a
ibis name .anI
iaskedl
I
repIied, “I’m the one von axe iooking tor.” To easel
breathijg, S I
I
I removed the handcuffa while S2tL
cafled 91.1 for Emerger.ic’ Hedica]. Sopport (EMS) personnel. The
agents then move4 the funiturq to allow medical. respqnders
I applied emergency fi.rst
access tol
Iad, hLle SA I
aid tc4
p wofind, SAsI
iandl
I clea,red the rest of
the unit.
.

SA L
1retuned to his birea vehicle and
acUvated his emergency l:igbts to alert responding EMS and CPD.
Emergency medical records indicated the receipt of the emergenc.y
call at 5:50 pm, EMS arival at the scene two miites later,
departftre from the scene at 6:01 pm and axil_at the ?a.lmetto
Richlapd Zemozial Hospital at 6:07 pm. SA I
I acco.mpanied
I
I &n the ambulance to the hospital.
heft a
when EJS depa.rted the scene, SSAI
voicemail on ASAC atick Malev’ a cellular telephone advising him
of the shooting. SSAJ
1 then telephonically contacted
SAC Brian Lainkin and advised him of the shooting. SAC Lamki
responded to the scene within ten minUtes ASAC Haley retrieved
hi zneSages, contacted SAC Lamkin and responded to the scene
shortly thereafter.

C

 _____________l(DL)

_________

___________________

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The C?D Crime Scene Unit çe.sDonded to
Glock 22 semi—
St:reet and processed the scene. SAl
and subsequently
automatic pistol was secured by SSA I
turned over to the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) for
baUjstic

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A shooting incident review team incirildinfi Tnstr-rorl
ASC Ronald 7. Hosko (PH). and SSAs I
I
(DII),
I(BF), was
audi
assemb e ixrColumb&a. he shooting review team conducted, iii
coordination with Columbia PoZice representatives, a neigbbohood
canVass. Mn1.jiple witnesses observed FBI personnel approach I
Iwear.ing tactical vests bear&ng FBI lettering.
Witnesses also beard FBI personnel give commands from witbin the
I at the
apartment. Two adults present inside I
of the shooting were also interviewed. Both Lndicated tbat
an unidentLf-ied male tapped on the apaxtment door to warn of the
law erorcement presence just before the Agents arrived. Both
stated that the ‘& personnel wore vests marked with FBT letters
and that the Agents qave the subject repeated commands ii
attempting to secure h&s compZiance. While one of those
witnesses,
obeyed the commnc1 hime1f
putting his head down on the couch the other, I
not onlyl
j failure to comply with ue
Agents’ commands but his furtive movemnt 4th his right band
Icon.frmed for
pior to his being s.hot. Importantly,I
investigative personnel, that ccntrary to erroneous news reports,
wa.s not holding a child at the time he was shot.
Ptrsuant to
Assnrance to Employee
a Shootijg Ijicident,”
sworn st.tements from
trom SAC Patrick

the prov&sions of the FD-927, “Waning and
Requested to Provide iziformation Foilowing
the investigati.ve team took multiple signed
the four personnel involved in the incident
L Haley azd SAC Brian D. Lamkin.

The shooting review team detezmined on 08/08/2006., s
huali-Ued with his Bureau issued lock 22, Serial
He
#DURQb U, shooting a 98 on the Pistol Qtza$fication CoUrse.
is a primary ST team member in Columbia and be successfuUy
completed required trainLng for SW Field Certiication per CZRG
EC to ColOmbia dated 08/31/2006. BPMS indicated SA
attended a basic SWAT inservice in Qr.zaztico from 04/1.9—23/2004.

-

SA I
Iwas an attendee at ‘the 12/15/2005 Columbi.a
AU. Employee Conference wherein the FBI’ s Deadly Force PoLicy and
role of the shooting Incident eview group were discussed.
Durjg his interview, Coiumila AA Patrick J. Maley
advised the planning and execution of I
I arrest was

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in accord with the division’s operational plan po1icy. On
11/04/2004, ASAC Maley documented the operations plan poUcy
which encouraged the use of operations plans as a tool to
maximize preparedness and minimize problems and mistakes. The
policy recognized the challenges of striking a proper balance
between time constraints and the abUity to obtain the desi:red
results. In the po1:ic’, ASAC Maley mapdated the use of
operations plan when a Uxed location wbere a fugitive is Ukely
to be located has beea identified. However, Ln instances where
Agents are cbeck&ng J.ogiàal locations where a transient fugitive
may be located, no operations plan was reqUixed and Agents must
utLljze standard law enforcement tactics. The guidance concluded
by 4Lrecting Agents to discuss fugitive matters with theLr SSA
and/or ASAC. On October 4, 2006, in a meeting wit)) the SS’s,
ASAC Haley reiterated his earUer guidance and acknowledged the
use of operations plans n transient ffgitive matters requLres
flexibility, and ut,iliatioø of SA’ a professional udgement.
‘1he Sate of South Car1in ôlicjtor’ s Office reviewed
lwás usWied in fLring
the case fLie and determined SAl
his weapon as he was in reasonable fear for his own 34fe and tbe
safety of others. Therefore, no criminal charges were filed in
this matter.
leofontents
A.

SIGNED

SWORN STPEMENTS

SA
s,a

I

JL. tñ iUL.L d. U,tI

SAC BRIAN D. L4KI1
B.

COLUNEIA_POLXCE DEPARTMENT INESTXGATZOW
CASE FILE DOCUMENTS

C.

SUBJEcT]
REVIEW OF CASE EILI
FD-65, NCIC INI1ThL SUBMISSION
NCIC RESULTS AN:D IU RESPONSE
FEDERAL INDICTMENT
SEARCH WARRANT APPL.ICATXON

D.

SROOTING S!NE

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SOUTH CAROLA LAW ENFORCEHENT DVXSION
CRIME SCENE PHOTOGRAPHS
EVIDENCE RECOVERED

7

b7A

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_

cRev. u.1gs)

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UNITED STATES DEPRTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copyto:

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Date

02/09/2007

cascm#:

29711QA1271971D

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Offico

Inspection

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CRITIcAI INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP
HOSTAGE RESCUE TEAM
12/06/2006
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
s

On 12/06/2006, the Critical Incident Review
Group -(CIRG), Operations and Training Unit (OTU),
conducted live fire, fire and maneuver training for 13 HRT
Operators and three Helicopter pilots assigned to the
Tactical Helicopter Unit (THU). This Unconventional Iaw
Enforcement Operations (ULBO) training was conducted at
Fort A.P. Hill, Caroline County, Virginia. The training
was designed to prepare HRT Snipers for deployment in
Iraq. At approximately 3:30 P.M. while conducting a
Combat Search and Rescue (CS2R) training scenario,
SSA Gregory J. Rahoi was misidentified as a three
dimensional target by another HRT Sniper and accidently
shot and killed.

On 12/06/2006, diG, OTU conducted live fire,
fire and maneuver training for 13 HRT Operators and three
Helicopter pilots assigned to THU. This ULEO training was
conducted on Range 24 at Fort A.P. Hill, Caroline county,
Virainia. I
I

This doconeut containe naither rec’tjos nor C111n44nS f the snx. Xt is the property of the 5EZ
and is loaned to your agency; it and 5.ts aontents SZS not to be distributed Outside your agency.

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OTtj, the 12/06/2006 trainIng scenarios were necessary to prepare
HRT Operators for deployment to Iraq. The scenarios were
developed using actual experiences of HRP Operators in Iraq and
were reportedly similar to training exercises used by DOD SF
units.
The 12/06/2006 training scenario wa oThnned and
supervised by mbers o the CIRG. oTuSAl
I Training bçmn at
SSA L
I and SSAI
r1ox1uiateiy :00 A.M. Prior to the training, SSAsI
land
I
Iprovided a tactical operation briefing and an administrative
safety briefing to the HRT Operators which included firearm
safety, target awareness, communications and range operations.
Inrovidd•a medical safety
Physician’s Assistant (PA)I
TEU, provided a
Pilot
briefing, and Helicopter
helicopter safety briefing. These were stanaard briefings
provided prior to all OTU training exercises. There were no new
skifl sets or safety procedures introduced to the HRT Operators
during the 12/06/2006 training.

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Range 24 was approximately three miles in length and
approximately 200 yards in width. It consisted of undulating or
variable terrain with various size vegetation such as long grass.
It ran east to west and had an obvious tree line on either side
it’s entire length.
A gravel road ran down the approximate
middle of the range cutting it into north and south sides.
Fields of fire were briefed to the HRT Operators as 180 degrees
forward or tree line to tree line. This was opposed to 360
degrees of coverage used during a real operation. HRT Operators
were instructed not to fire from the helicopters and use fans of
fire when firing live ammunition down range with other HRT
Operators were positioned down range.
Fans of fire were described by HRT. Operators as the
area of responsibility directly in front of the shooter and to
their right and left flanks or 180 degres forward. Fans of fire
would expand and collapse as other operators positioned down
range moved in and out of the shooter’s area of responsibility.
The down range operator would become responsible for the area
directly in front of them. and to their right and left flanks or
180 degrees forward.
-

Two types of targets were used during the training; the
fixed military target known as an Ivan and a FBI target known as
a La Rue. The Ivan was described as a green plastic three
dimensional siThouette of a human upper torso, approximately
three and half feet tall, which was range controlled to pop-up
The Ivans iere
after being knocked down when hit by a bullet.
fixed to the ground and could not b& mcvd.

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The La Rue targets were steel plates, painted red and
white, approximately 18 inches high and 12 inches in width and
fell when. hit by a bullet. La Rue targets were equipped with
motors which allowed the target to automatically stand back up
after being hit. These targets could be moved.

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The fi
rst scenario briefed to all the HRT Operators by
1
OTU ss
andi
linvolved the group breaking up into
three teams of three and one teri of four. A helicopter would
transport each team separately to three different locations on
the range. At each location, team members would exit the
helicopter and move to a fixed position dlearly marked on the
ground by a mannequin. They would engge both pre—positioned
Ivan arid La Rue targets. Once the targets were engaged from the
fixed.position, the team would return to the helicopter,
continuing to engage targets as they appeared before re-l’oarding
the helicopter. The helicopter would then fly to the two other
marked locations whre tI’e drill would be repeated. During each
team’ s run. SSAs I
landi
I followed the team on the ground.
SSAI
Iprovided commands over a hand held radio to the range
control_tower fçr .tpe activation of the pop—up Ivan targets.
r7c
SSAI
lalso had radios which enabled them to
landi
nitM-ø ,,xiti, the URT Operators.
land
SSA I
1, Fort A.P. Hill, P.ange.Technician were in the
The
range control tower remotely activating the Ivan targets.
Range control tower was located approximately a half a mile up
range from the exercise and did not afford the occupants a view
J.so followed the teams on
of the training scenarios.
PAl
the ground in the event of a medical emergency. Not involved in
the scenario but also present on Ranae 24 was Los Angeles Police
Department Photographerl
I
Ater each team had completed the course one time,
SSAsI
landi
Idid an after action briefing reemphasizing
situation awareness, terrain issues, muzzle scope off-set, and
stressed staying focused. The completion of all three drills was
considered the end of one evolution. Each team completed two
evolutions taking approximately 15 to 20 minutes each. This
first scenario took most of the morning and occurred without any
significant or out of the ordinary event.

In the afternoon, a CAR training_scenario was briefed
to all the HRT Operators by SSAI
I andi
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provided the HRT Operators an overhead photograp1 of the portion
of Range 24 where_they would be conducting the exercise.
SSAI
landi
Ibroke the gronp ri1 tm of ix jnd a team
On tm w led by SSN
of sevri..
I and other
I This scenario was a downed helicopter in
by SSAI
Iraq with an HRT Qperator oriboard and the team’s EiS$QTZ was to
rescue the injured HRT Operator.

 ________land

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Separately, each team would be flown by helicopter into
approximately the same area on Range 24 as used in the morning.
At the designated location, team members would exit the
helicopter and live fire, fire and maneuver to the crash site
which was a pre—positioned helicopter frame. The team would
engage both pre—positioned Ivan and LaRue targets as they (HRT
Operators)moved. They would rescue the survivor of the downed
helicopter, and again live fire, fire and maneuver back to the
helicopter rntl h. irlifted out of the area. Team Leaders (TLs)
Iwere given an opportunity to brief their teams
on the CSAR scenario.

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ithey would
The teams were told by SS1&I
landi
be using the same training area as the morning exercises. They
were told same targets in the same locations would be used in
this scenario.
In total, there were two sets of Ivan targets on
both the north and. south side of the gravel road approximately
100 yards apart. A set of La Rue targets were positioned around
the downed helicopter.

I arcI I again followed the teams on the
SSAI
ground with sJ________ providing commands over the radio to the
range control trwv f,-r th activation of tIe pop-up Ivan
targets. SSAI
land I
I remained in the
raqe. conro1 tower remoteLy activating ttie Ivan targets.
PAl
I again followed the teata on the around in the event of
a medical emergency.
Unit Chief I
I URT, Red
Operational Unit arrived on Range 24 and followed on the ground
observing the afternoon.’s training exercises.

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fter the teams had completed the course on time,
SSAs
I and I
I conducted an after action briefing of the
HRT Operator
T a performance and reemphasized safety. The first
afternoon CSAR training scenario ocàurred without any significant
or out of the ordinary event(s).
The HRT Operators were told the last CSAR training
scenario would be identical to the previous scenario simulating
rescuing personnel from a downed helicopter. The group was told
they would be using the same training area and same targets in
the sam locations. The only change was all 13 HRT Operators
would conduct the last training scenario together.

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I to TL
The scenario was briefed by SSAI
I and
o was designated as the overall TL for the scenario.
flnrre into three
TL
divided the group of j
I SAl
teams. Tem 1 was mriz iin if
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Team 2 consisted of SSAI I
I and SAl
I
s Tm Leader, SA I
I SAl
nd SAp_______________________ ream ws SSA Gregory

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I SAl
as Team Leader, SAl
nd SAl
I A BeL1 412
I SAl
I
co-pl..Lot
and
Helicopter pijotect oy p
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SA
by
piloted
Helicopter
407
L
Bell
and
a
,
Iwould be used.
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Iwould
landi
As in the earlier scenarios, SSAI
providing commands
follow the team on the ground with SSAI
over the radio to the range q---” tpwer or the activation of
the pop—up Ivan targets. sSAI
I using another radio, fed
the teams simulated intelligence information. He would
coimnunicate when a certain target(s) were considered out of play
allowing the team member(s) to move forward. He would provide
intelligence concerning simulated enemy movements as the scenario
progressed.
.

Iwould remain in the
I andI
SSAI
tarets.
tvan
the
activating
l
range_contro tower remotely
Iwould
1 would follow the team on the ground and ETC I
PAl
be on the grpnnri in t?le same vicinity observing the trainin.
PhotographerI
I would be on Range 24. He did not see or
photograph the impending shooting incident.
_______

I was briefed by SSI_on the
After TII
scnario. 1e was given a few minutes to devise a tactical plan.
TLI
Ithen briefed his plan to the entire team: Team 1 and
2 would be inserted via Bell 412 Helicopter and Team 3 would be
inserted via Bell 407 Helicopter. The insertion would be near
simultaneous, approximately 200 yards east of the simulated crash
site. Team 2 would be positioned to the north edge of the range,
Team 3 to the south, and Team 1 would be in the center. The
teams were instructed to employ a bounding overwatch method
movement.
Bounding overwatch movement was described as a minimum
of one team providing covering fire while a minimum of one team
moves forward or down range. Once at the crash site, Team 3
would establish a position to the west of the target location,
jhad been briefed there was
the direction from which TLI
enemy movement. Team 2 wourd secure the crash site and prepare
any casualties for movement. Movement back to the helicopters
would be conducted in reverse of the movement to the crash site,
with Team 2 responsible for transporting the casualty via a
litter pack to the helicopter. As the overall Team Leader, TL
I was responsible for command and control of the individual
teams including positioning of the teams. Each individual TL was
responsible for the movement and positiopina q the individual
1would communicate
team members within their o’n team. TL I
I and SSA Rahoi, with a
with the two otxer TLs, SSAI
ad verhal
CotLlbjflatjOflof radio calls, hand and a.m
coznmands.
All of HRT Operators were equipped with either an
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Invisio or Sordin brand radio communication head
These radios allowed all team members to hear TLI
commands.

vt’m.

radio

At approximately 3:30 P.M., Eastern Standard Time, the
plan as described above was executed and continued as planned
until Team 2 had secured the crash site, assessed the casualty’s
condition, and was preparing to return to the he1icortr. A
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tactical timeout was called and Range Technician I
replaced the mannequin as the casualty on the litter. This was.
done to make the training scenario more realistic.
After the casualty was prepared for transport, Team 2
provided four team members to carry the litter back to the
I
heJ.icoot. TK ‘Prn 2 members were identified a SSA i
SAl
I
SAl
L SAl
T14
land
SAl
I
and
I
collapsed toward tEle east to_Drovide cover for those carrying the
litter. SAl
Iwere positioned near a concrete
‘and SN
retaining wall around a set of Ivan targets_approximatplv iqo
Iwere
nd SI
yards east of the crash site. Both SAl
I was
facing east providing nominal cover to the rear. SA I
i left about 20 feet away. The gravel road was on
on SAl
SAl
Iright or north of his position.

1

and
s the litter, four mmbers of Team 2, TL I
I posiiion,
Jand SAl
SAl
moved east passing SAl
Ito reorien their
TLI
I instructed SN
land SAl
position_180 degrees from racing east to facing west. SAl
and SAL
I made this adjustment taking a crouching position
facing west.
In his statement to the Shooting Inciçlent Re4ew Team
(SIRT), SJ
Ito turn
Irecalled being instructed by TLI
from the easte1y direction he was covering and turn to the west
and “pick up the rear.” SAl
Iwas not 100 percent positive of
the verbiage used by il
,,but interpreted it to mean, “turn
around nd cover the rear area.
believed that when TL
SA I
i
I gave him rear security respoqsib ity, there was no one
west of his position down range. SAl
Idid not recall hearing
Team 3 talking on the radio about their movement or see any other
RRT Operators west of his position.
SAl
Irecalled hearing information in a radio
transmission indicating an enemy force was aproaehiria from the
wet. his transmission ws confimed by SSAI
I Since
I believed he and SN
SA I
Iwere the last two HRT
Operators to the rear or west and covering dawn range, he also
believed his field of fire was 180 degrees or the tree line on
his left to tree line On hiá right. SAl
ould see the

6

I

 _______Iposition

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

simulated downed helicopter in plain view. He scanned with his
naked eye left then right and when he scanned back left, he saw
what he believed to be two Ivan targets. The Ivan targets did
not move and appeared to have the same spacing, color and height
of other Ivan targets he had previously engaged.

SAl
lthn viewed what he believed to be an Ivan
target through the Leupold 8x20 TS-30 optical scope on his Colt
M—4, .223 Caliber, 18 inch barrel, Special Purpose Rifle (SPR).
He noted he had an unobstructed view of Ivan targets simiar to
I
the way other Ivan targets on Range 24 were situated. SAl
was looking in a westerly to southwesterly direction with the sun
at tree top level causing significant sun glare. He was not
wearing_surglasses. As SAl
Iacauired the target he yelled to
I, “targets left.” SAl
SAl
jdid not hear SAl
I
respond.
SAF
Ithen fired One shot.
He kept his sight on the target and noticed the target
I saw white socks
did not fall like other Ivan targets. SAl
below the pants and immediately realized he had hit another HRT
Operator. He stood up and heard over the radio, “real world
medical”.
The phrase “real world medical” was used by HRT
Operators as the signal to immediately stop the training exercise
due to some type of medical injury. SAl
heft his weapon where
he was standing and ran toward where SSA Rahoi was laying.

.

I to
SA I
I recalled being instructed by TTI
provide_rear security for the extraction which meant for him and
SP1
Ito turn 180 degrees and provide cover to the West
I
SA’
!did not recall the exact verbiage used by TL I
used when giving this command. At this point, SAl
I
believed his “primary field of fire to be directly ahead. of him
I be.ieved
and to his right arid left flanks.” Although SAl
he had cover responsibility to his left across the gravel road,
he could see members of Team 3 in their positions approximately
140 yards southwest down range of his position so he did not scan
for targets in their direction
I yelling to him, “any
I recalled SAl
SAl
has asking if he saw
targets on the left?” He believed SAl
any targets on the left_remaining to shoot, He replied “no.”
After responding to SA L_.. L mçst immediately, SA I
I
heard the gunshot from SA I
Iposition. Immediately
thereafter, SA I
hTd “real world medical” called on the
radjQ.
Iquickly realized SSA Ralioi had been
Both he and sAl
wounded and immediately ran to SSA Rahoi to render aid.
TI]
his and SA

Ito reorient
‘recalled instructing S?I
from fading east to facing west which

ib7C

 I
I
required them to make a 180 degree adjustment. TL I
I
stated, “I communicated that Team 1 was set, meaning that we were
in a position to provide covering fire (over watch) for Team 3’s
movement (bound) to the east.”

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
l
I
—

I

I
I
1
I
I

.

Meanwhile, Team 3 was still on the north side of the
gravel road approximately 125 yards southwest and down range of
SA)
I Soon thereafter, Team 3 members,
nd SAl
using the bounding over watch
SAl
land SA I
I SAl
method_moved in an easterly direction. This left SSA Rahoi and
SAl
un the position_125 yards southwest and down range of
I SSA Rahoi was cloest jo the gravel
SSAI
I and SAl
road in a kneeling or crouching postion. SAl
Iwas
approximately 10 feet to SSA Rahoi’s_left in a prone position.
Both were in knee high grass. SN
I heard SA Rahoi state,
“We’re going to move back.” SSA Rahoi then_began to stand up
Ipearci a shot and
from his kneeling position. As he did, SAl
Ithen saw
heard SSA 1ahoi state, “real world medical.” SA I
SSA Raboi fall to the ground.
After hearing “real world medical” over the radio, it
was quickly determineçl by a number of the HRT Operators,
1 bad
SSA R.ahoi had been injured. Within secoxds, PAl
istarted an
responded to SSA Rahoi to render aid. PA I
assessment and noted SSA Rahoi was not breathing and had no
pulse.
It was immediately determined he needed to be airlifted
to the nearest medical facility. Within an estimated two minutes
the Bell 412 HelicODtér had laided and SA Rahçi was T).aced on
I also
land SA[_
I SAl
the helicopter.
PAl
co-pilot
BA
boarded with pilot I
I
I
SSA Rahoi was transported ror approximately 10 minutes to ar
Washington Hospital in Fredericksburg, Vi;ainia were he was
exazined and late pronounced dead by Dr. I
I and
Dr.l
I
That evening, SSA Rahoi’s body was transported to the
Medical Examiner’s (ME) Office in Richmond, Virginia. The ME,
Dr.j
j determined SSA Rahoi suffered a gunshot
wound on the ra.ght side of the upper back, approximately 1Th
inches below the top of his head and 7 inches right of the
posterior midline. Bullet fragments passed through the chest
wall breaking three ribs, damaging the upper lobe of the right
lung, caused multiple perforations of the right subclavian artery
and vein as well as a laceration of the ascending aorta.
SSA Rahoi was wearing a Bureau issued ballistic vest at the time
of the shooting incident. The kevlar had been removed and
ceramic “shock” elates had been placed i!i tbe frcnt .nd back of
the vest. The fatal round missed SSA Rahoi’s ballistic vest and
shock plates.
Reportedly, the 5.56 mm round fired from the

 i
SPR would have penetrated the keviar vest, However, the ceramic
shock plate would have stopped the 5.56 mm round.

I

Fort A.P. Hill required a qualified Range Security
Officer CR80) be present during the 12/06/2006 training scenario.
To qualify as an RSO, oTU SSAS jere required to attend an Army
based RSO train.na coure. SSAI
Ias the RSO for this specific
training. SSAsI
lalso took an Army based
I andi
Range Safety Officer training course and were certified as RSOs
at the Fort A. P. Hill. SsAsi
and all the
hc
HRT Operators involved were certified firearms instructors,

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

.

Deputy
A SIRT interview with I
Chief, Operations, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPO) revealed
the LAPD also conducts CSAR type training however, refers to it
as hostage rescue training. They utilize live fire, fire and
maneuver tactics which results in LAPD SWAT Operators firing live
rounds down range with other LAPD SWAT Operators positioned down
range. He opined this type of training is critical for the LAPD
SWAT because of the type of real—life incidents the LAPD SWAT is
called upon on a daily basis, to include high risk warrants in
rural settings and narcotics drops in rural settings.
lalso stated in order to utilize
Deputy Chief’
live fire, fire and maneuver training, the SWAT Lieutenant
submits an approval request to the commanding officer wbo is
normally has the rank of captain. The request must have been
reviewed and received prior approval of an RSO. Further, I
APD
1
records all SWAT Operators’ training and operaticnal performance.
IAssistant
A SIRT interview withi
Chief, Special Operations Division, New York Police Department
(NYPD) revealed because NYPD primarily operates in a irrban
environment it does not conduct CSAR training. However, NYPD
does conduct Sniper Initiated Assalt Trainincr which is similar
I said the NYPWs
to CSAR training. Assistant Chiefi
Fmergency Service Unit (ESU) also uses live fire, fire and
maneuver tactics training which results in ESU members firing
live rounds down range with other ESU members positioned down
range. NYPD uses this training technique in an effort to provide
ESU members with training that simulates events which closely
resemble actual tactical mission environments.
indicated a supervisor is
Assistant Chief I
present and manages all training exercises and approves the
training prior to initiation. A RSO which is provided by the
NYFD’s Firearms Training Unit, is always present to mbnitor the
training and. h the authority to stop the training cycle at any
point. The NYPD maintains a database which docnments training

 I
‘

activities including the topics and training conducted and the
participants in the training.

I
I
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

to.

 FD404 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UN]TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST!CE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Inspection Division

Report of
Date

SSAI
06/Qf 2007

Case ID #:

297HQA1271292—D

Title:

Shooting Inquiry
Report of shooting Incident
Cleveland Division
07/12/2006
Inspection Division

-

Shooting Incident Review Group

I

-

Offlcc

16
b7C

Shooting Inquiry

Synopsis:

-

I. Cleveland Division, assigned to the
Safe Streets Task Force (SSTP), Clev-eland Division, was
involved in a shooting incident on. 07/12/2006 at
approximately 8: 15AM, in Cleveland. Thshootiricr rn-ecj
While attempting toloaate and. arreqt al
who is the subjectof 88A-CV_7l828.
Iwas iant
on charges for aqravated robbery with firearms
specificatjonç. I
h1l
lie dec!rihi
date of bix±hI
L p 4I
I
wanted by the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department for an
armed car jacking and was also wanted by the Ohio .dult
Parole Authority for a parole violation.
Ihad
been paroled after serving part of a senfence ror arug
trafficking, and having a weapon under a disability.
Approximately one week prior to this incident,I
I
had been involved in a high-speed chase with the Cleveland
Police Department, during an incident when the Cleveland
Police. Department had attempted to affect the arrest of
I
I At this time ,
leludad the capture.
fn4p
n by the Cleveland SSTF into the
Through an {T 4
t of!
4
whereabp
I information was received that
I
Iwas in possession of a. maroon vehicle, .td that
he might be st.ying at a hotel located at 18510 Euc-1i4.
Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. On the morning of the incident,
it was determined by the investigating agents that a
vehicle matching the description of the vehicle
I
I

Thia docwiwzzt containe neither recTltione nor conolusione
at the FBI •

It iS the pro9erty o the FBI
and is loaned to your aqenny; it and its contents are not
to be distrjbted outside your egenay.

17C

 _________jas

297-HQ-A1271292-D

was supposedly driving, but not registered to I
I was
parked at the hotel. SAl
L accompanied by Task
Eoroe Officers (TB’Os) I
I Deputy with the CUyalOgs.
County Sheriff
t a Departtuent; I
L Officer with the
Ctyahoga Metropolitan’Hcising Authority ?olice; observed a black
male matching I
Idescription, accompanied by a. white
female, exit a hotel room and enter the maroon vehicle and start
to leave the scene with I
Idriving.
At t
ositioned his vehicle in an attempt to
block
ye icle. TFOsI
I
I and SAl
identified themge1vs as law enforcement officers, and they
ordrcri i-he driver to stop the vehicle and raise his hands.
I initially raised his hands, but the vehicle continued to
move forward at a slqw speed. Iaw enforcement_officers,
including SAl
I continued to ordeiF
Ito stop the
car, palace the !ehicle in park, and exit te veiicle. At that
point,I
Isuddenly sped up, which forced TFOI
I to jump
out of the pat1 f th vehiçl. id as the vehicle headed
directly at SAl
I TF0I
I fired one round all
I

I

k7C

SAl
Ithen fired two rounds ad
L through the front
windshield of the vehicle, while also attempting to remove
hiipelf fvçm the vehicle’s path.. The vehicle, however, did hit
SAl
I in the right leg
At that tine, another TFO, identified asi
I also ,a
Dputy with the Cuyahoga County Shriff ‘s Office, drove into the
parking lot and also attempted to place his vehicle in a blocking
positinn
e exit of the hotel oarkizg lot, in an attempt to
block I
I vehicle. Deputyl
I then exited hs
vehicle and took cover behind the drivert S door, :just asl_________
drCWø i 7FO
land SAJ sped pastSA
I vehicle, and rammed into.
ocking
him to the gçound. This collision is
e
vehicle,
as the air bags deployed.
Neitherl
I

I

Inor his passener
1 v4io was .dentified .s [
I date ‘of birthl
I FBI
J were hit
by any of the rounds fired.
cut slightly by broken
glass from the windshield.

I was taken into custody and a loaded handgun was found
underneath the 4river’ a seat of his vehicle. SAl
l and
Deputyl
Iwere treated at a local hospital and released.
-

rivestigation into this-matter ws conducted jointly by the
Cleveland Office of the FBI and Cleveland Police Department’s
2

I

 _______Iwas

297-HQ-A1271292-D

Homicide Division. I
I was questioned alter the
incident. refued to make a statement, requested an atexrney.
thereafter turned over to local authorities
tor prosecution.

E

I

was interviewed and admitted that she knew
‘was wanted by the authorities and also recognized the
azresting officers as being law enforcement officers. Zn
addition, the owner. of the hotel was interviewed and also
indicated that it was clear to him during the incident that the
investigating agent and officers were clearly identified as
police off iäers.
The iiwestigation of this matter concluded in a manner th.t
exonerated the Cleveland WBI from any criminal exposure.
unclosed is a letter dated 02/20/2007 from the City of Cleveland
indicating that no crime was committed in this matter.

3

 ,.-——

.._p

-.

1

“ (Rev.O.3I-2OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF NVESTIGA11ON
Precedence:

To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

rc-ed By:

I

I

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

Extension 4-1837

Kaiser Kenneth
Clemens Michae..—

Drafted By:

I:lrr

lbh
7C

Case ID #: 297—14Q—A1271970—D
Title:

02/16/2007

SHOOTING INCIDENT
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
07/13/2006

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 07/13/2006, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I Wh4le asisting ib the execution of
an arrest and search warrant, SAl
Ifired one round from h?s
Bureau—issued Glock .40 caliber,. Model 22 pistol killing an
aggressive Akita dog in the back yard of the tatget residence.
SIRG members recommended that no action be taken against SA I
I
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
*

Administatiye:

Reference Electronic Communication (EC)
dated 08/03/2006.

of

SA

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 07/13/2006, SAl

Iwas participating in

the execution of an arrest *and search warrant at a Northeast
residence in Washington, D. C. The subject of the warrant,
I was identified as a signifipnt frfficker of
I
diverted prescription drugs in the area.I
Iwho was
considered “Armed and Dangerous”, had a violent criminal history
including convictions for assau3,t, armed robbery, and attempted
murder.

At approximately 6:00 a.m., the WFO Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Team executed the warrant, with dual entry into
the front arid back döörs of the esidenee. As the SWAT ream
entered the back yard area, they were approached by an aggressive

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—FIQ—A1271970—D, 02/16/2007

Akita dog resulting in SWAT personnel using a small fire
extinguisher to repel the dog.

I

SA I
who was responsible for providing rear
perimeter security, was instructed to come inside the fence into
the back yard where he observed the dog stnding on the steps of
the residence. As the dc?a_moved toward SAl
laggressively
barking and growling, SAl
jkeld his service weapon 5his
right hand pointing downward. The dog moved toward SAl
I
left hand which was holding an ASP. As the dog approached, SA
I
Ijerked his left hand backward to avoid being bitten by the
dog, brought his right hand around in front of his waist, and
fired one shot at the back of the dog’s neck area. The dog
yelped several times and retreated to the side area of the
residence and continued barking. The dog subsequently died.
On 09/21/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting inciderrt. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance:
former Chief Inspector C. Frank Fialiuzzi, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Divisionl
1 Deputy Chief,
Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;I
I
I
I Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; SC James Casey,
Eurasian Section, CD—i, Counterintelligence Division; SC John V.
Gillies, Violen Crimes Sectipn, Criminal Investigative Division;
Unit Chief (UC’1
L Firearms Training Unit, TDD;
I
IC1ief, Defensive Systems Unit, TDD;
DC
Weapons and Tactics Ooerationq
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; DCI
I
•1 Firearms
Operational Skills Unit, TDD; SSA’
Too
ic Analysis Section, Laboratory pivision;
SSA
Washington Field Office; and SSAI
I
Unit, Office of the Genera).
ounse
OGC).
ounsel,
Investigative Law Branch, OGC, an
General
Attorny, Investigative Law Unit,
I
as SA I
,
as we
Management Program Analyst,
I
I and
Inspection anagement unit, urfice of Inspections, Inspection
Division, non-voting members, were also in attendance.
-

-

Obsex-vatjons and Reconuuendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the app1icat.on of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recotinendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issuçs; and (4) provide
recommendations for adinjnistr.ative action if deemed necessary.

2

7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 02/16/2007

SIRG members unanixously agreed that the use of deadly
Iwas justified and in conformance
with the current deadly force policy. Although the operation wa
successfu1, members noted the target residence had not been
cleared, the perimeters were breached before an all clear
notification was received, Agents relinquished the fire
extinausher originally used to deter the aggressive dog, and
SAl
Iwas holding two weapons simultaneously. These
obseations will be discussed with the Assistant Director in
Charge of the Washington Field Office.

force by SAl

3

bc

 To:
Re:

Insoectjon
From: Inspection
297—14Q—A1271970—o, 02/16/2007

LEAD(s)

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTONr DC

I

incident.

That no administrative action be taken against SA
s a result of his involvement in this shooting

h6
]b7C

4

1
1
1
1
1

—
-

—

—.

-

Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
1
Mr.

1 -Mr.I
1
Mr.
1 — Mr.
1
Mr.I
1
Mr.I
1
Mr
1
Mr
1
1-Mr
1
Ms
I
Mr
—

-

—
—
-

—

—

Pistole, Room 7142
Ford, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Clemens, Room 7825
SDOJ
1
I USDOJ
Casey, Room 5096
Gi].].jes Room 3280
Quantico
Quantico
Quaatico
I, Quantico
IQuantico
IWFO
com 7326
Room 7861
-

a

4+

4

 ___land

PD-204 (Rev. 12.1.95)

UNITED STA1S DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
Federal Bureau.oflnvestigaflon

Copy

I

SSA
ll/(ns/zuub

Report oft
Date

Office

Miami

88AMM—108080
SHOOTING INQUIRY;
REPORTING OF SHOOTING INCIDENT;
MI2NI DIVISION;
7/26/OS

Th1e

.?DMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

ciiarcter

This shooting incident was a result
of ‘Armed and Dangerous” fugitive

ppted arrest

DETAILS

I

qn 07/24/2006, at approximately 23:00 hours,
I fire4 several shots at a female acquaintance,

her boyfriend’
1
This
incident took place ati
I, Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida.
Ft. Lauderdale Police Department (FLPD) Detective
Jresponded to the scene and assumed control of the
I
attempted murder investigation.
Detectivel___________
determined that probable cause for I
larrest (attempted

murder) existeçi
description of I

a vehicle description and physical
Iwas proyided tç FLPD fugitive Detective
lwa
j letectivel
d of the violent
nature ot the offense, the fact that
was armed with a
anc

firearm_during the commission of the crime, and to the fact
ihad recently been released from prison.

that I

On Julv, 2006, Detectiv
Ireceived
information thati
Iwas in the area of NW 31st Avenue and NW
19th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
Detectivel
I was a

Task Force Officer (TFO) assigned to the_MiamiDivision’s
Violent Criine Squad (C-iS). etectiveI
,iwas working
with Squad 0—15 Specii Agent I
I oth
investigators were ml
[unmarked police unit when

This d.ocuneut contains neither racoandations nor conclusions of the VBX. t is the property
of the
X and is Loaned to your agency; it and its contents axe ot to
he diatrutsd outside your agency.

‘i

b7c

 88A—MM—108080

Detective j
Inotified FLPD dispatch of this information
concerning I
1PD units res9ond to ithe
J and
area.
ELPO uniform officersl
landi
Irespond’d
to the area and quickly located I
[vehicle, which was further
I
described as a black Chevy Lumiria, Florida license plate I
The suspect vehicle was followed by the patrol cars, who
had not operated their emergency lights and siren, for a short
dista’
I This address was later determined
to bel
Imotner’s residence. A felony traffic sto was inii4ated
during which a single shot was fired atj
Ibv S21
Ifled
in his vehicle_and was pursued by Oficéii
I Otticerl
1
Detectivel
I and Special Agent I
I. In addition, other
marked FLED police units responded to the call for assistance in an
attempt to stop the fleeing vehicle. After strikinq an uninvolved
bystander at NW 20th Street and NW 28th Avenue,L.._ ‘çashed his
vehicle at 2921 NW 23rd Street and fled on foot. I
Iwas pursued
several blocks to 2871 NW 22nd Street where he was taken into custod
by SAl
land other FLED officers after a violent strugg1.j____
was transported to Broward General Hospital for treatment of a
gunshot wound to his upper right arm. I
Iwas initially charged with
attempted felony murder, criminal mischief, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.
On_7/Z8J06, FIJPD Detectiv
I obtained a search
warran.t forl
I Chevy Lumina. The warrant was executed at FLED ‘
Headquarters with Detective I
I FBI Special
I Detective I
Agent I
I and Lead FLED Detectivel
I present.
The items that were recovered and their C rrnnifing locations in
the vehi-cle were documented. Detectivel
lobservations
included the following:
1) Ten (10) .44 caliber bullets.in a plastic case were
found by the inside driver seat. This discovery was consistent with
the belief that the initial shots that I
ifired on 7/24/06 came from
a revolver.
2) Lead fragments were visible on the steering wheel which
were consistent with the round trajectory from the right rear quarçer
panel across to the driver side seat area.
3) The round trajectory was discovered to be consisient
withi
Ibeing inside the vehicle with his right arm and elbow below
chest level when he was shot.

sil
IRemington shotgun, the expended shell and
several unspent shells from the shotgun were sent to the Broward
2

 ____Ihad
________________________________Iwas

88AtvIMl08080
I

Sheriff’s dff ice (BSO) Crime Lab` rat` ry, al` ng with the tw` bullets
rec` vered fr` m the initial scene ` n 7/24/06 and ` ne ` f the .44
caliber r` unds rec` vered fr` m I
ivehicle. These were sent f` r lab
evaluati` n and c` mparis` n.
On 08/08/2006, at appr` ximately 10:15 hQUrS, an ` fficial
sw` rn statement was taken fr` m SAI
I The statemezt was
takri t FLPD Had` uarters and present were I
Iatt` çney, I
I
I
I FBI SAl
I During
land FLPD Detective I
the statement, J
I stated he_had bee4 inf` rmed by Detective
I
a pri` r t` any c` ntact with I
I that I
Iwas wanted f` r
fiarmq r)arges and sh` uld be c` nsidered “Armed and Danger` us.”
SAl
ladded that at the time ` f the traffic st` p he rec` gnized
I
I as the s` le ` ccupant ` f the vehiçile framL the ph` t` Detective
I had previ` usly sh` wn him. SAI
I stated that initially
his b` dy turned inside the vehicle l` ` kina’, l- i-tie ` ther
patr` l units as they were yelling c` mmands. SAl
Id` es n` t____
I actually exited his vehicle. SAl
believe’
I
Istated thatl
was h` lding a white envel` pe in his hind and while the p` lice
I dr` pped his hand ` ut ` f sigl%V
c` mmands were being given ` I
t` his waistband area. SAl
I fearing f` r his life as well as
f` r the life ` f the ` ther ` fficers present, fired ` ne sh` tgun rpund
t` wards I
Iwhilc he was seated in his vehicle. At this p` int,l
I
fled the traffic st` p in his vehicle and the p` lice pursuit was
initiated.
SA I
L during the c` urse ` f his statement, drew a
diagram .which was n` t t` scale, but his rec` llecti` n ` f the initial
traffic st` p wa ` nrtçayed. The diagram appars aqcurate,. acc` rding
t` Detective________ with the excepti` n ` f I
Ivehicle being t` `

far back t` the east in the circular driveway. Placing the vehicle
appr` ximately 10 feet farther west in the circular driveway w` uld beb7e
m` re c` nsistent with the witness ` fficer’s statements, SAl
I
rec` rded visual ` bservati` ns and the. traject` ry ` f the sh` tgun r` und.
This diagram is attached t` this rep` rt as part ` f SAl
I sw` rn
statement.
i.e

On 09/04/2006, Detectivel
l` btained a c` py ` f the
FIPD “Fleeing Vehicle Review” which d` cumented the pursuit ` f I
I
vehicle. This rep` rt sh` wed the pursuit lasted appr` ximately tw` 2)
minutes and 51 seà` nds and reached speeds ` f 50 miles per h` ur in
residential area. During the pursuit, the patr` l ` fficers had their
emergency lights and sirens activated.
` n 09/14/2006, Detective I
lrceived a c` ` v ` f the
BSO firearms anaJ.vsis c` mDleted by Firearms ExaminerI
I
able t` determine that the
3

 _____________Iwhich

88A—MM—108080
‘V

1.

submitted spent shotaun shell was indeed fired froia SAl____________
submitted shotgun. I
also stated that the suiuitted spent
projectiles recoverea trom Ene initial attempted murdceie on
07/24/2006 were similar to the bullets recovered fromi
Ivehicle.
Due to mutilation, an exact match could not be made.

Ireceived a report from
1
On 10/03/2006, Detective
the Broward C9unty State Attorney’s Office, Assistant State ttorney
indicated that Doe was charged with three counts
to include attempted first degree murder, possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, and felony criminal mischief. Furthermore,
L,as advised there woizld be no pending criminal
Detective I
charges filed against FBI Special Agent 1
1

4

 ______________Ilrr

*

q

(Rev. 01—31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

I

—

04/12/2007

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

Attu:

Inspection
Contact:

proved By:

Date:

I

Extension 4-1837,

Kaiser Kenneth
Clemens
Rodriguez Michael

Drafted By:

Case ID jh297—HQ—A1271786-D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
09/29/2006

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 09/2g/2006, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I While executing an arrest
warrant fori
I SA I
I fired one round from her
Bureau—issued Glock, Model 17, pistol at an aggressive pit bull
dog.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative action be
taken against SAl
las a result of her involvement in
this shooting incent.

I

Adied-nisirativ

1cference Electronic Communication (EC) of SA
dated 10/02/2006.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 09/29/2006, SAI
Iparticipated in the
execution of an arrest warrant at a residence in Meriden,
Connecticut. Agents and other law enforcement personnel
approached the front door of the residence and found the door
unlocked. They went to the first floor apartment where they
proceeded to “knock and announce.”. Th subiecs mother granted
entry to the arrest team and confirrnedl
Iwas in the bedroom
located off of the kitchen. Team members nears a dog barking
inside the room and yelled numerous times for the subject to

secure the dog and surrender.

Although I

Inever

acknowledged the presence of law enforcement personnel, at ozie

 ‘I

To:
Re:

inspection
From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271786—D, 04/12/200?

point his pregnant girlfriend exited the room and confirmed the
subject was inside.

forl

Ito

Arrest team members continued to yell
secure the dog and surrender. I
I opened the door enough to
allow the pit bull dog to run into the kitchen and aggressively
advanced toward the law enforcement officers in a threatening
manner. A Neriden Pcxlice Department Officer fired one shot at
the dog who conti,nued to advance toward team members. Believing
she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, SA
land a second local officer each fired one round at the
ciog. The dog was struck and retreated into the bedroom.

I

The subject surrendered moments later and Animal
Control arrived on the scene to take the injured dog for medical
as sistance
On 01/25/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Chief Inspector Michel A. Rodriguez. 9ff ice of
Inspections, Inspection Division;
ITrial
Attorney, Domestic Security Section, urirninai. uivision, USDOJ;
I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
ThDOJ; Section Chief (SC) John V. Gillies, Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Assistant SC Richard W.
Kolimar, Eurasin 5ci1-tôn. CD—, Counterintelligence Division;
Unit Chief (DC) I
IpircarmR Trinincr Unit. Training
and Development Division {TDDI; Dcl
I Defensive
Systems Unit, TDD; UCF
i special Weapons and
Tactics Operations Unit, uritica]. Incident Response Group; DC
I Practical Applications Unit, TDD; SSAI
I
Toolmark it, Scientific Analysis Section,
I Firearms
Laboratory Division; and UCI
I IflVticTatiV T,aw
UniI, Office of the General Counsel (OGC). SSM
I
Management Program Analyst (MPA)I
I and MPA
I Inspection Management Unit, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division, non—voting members, were also
in attendance.

I

I

I
I

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I

Obsrrations and Recondations

of

the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and 4) provide
recommendations for adininisttative action if deemed necessary.

2

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271786—D, 04/12/2007

SIRG members unaniinously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SN_____________________ was justified and in conformance
with the deadly force policy.

7C

3

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To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—HQ--A1271786—D, 04/12/2007

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC

I

snoocirig incident.

‘-inistratIve action be taken against SA
I as a result of her involvement in this

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Clemens, Room 3092
1
Mr. Rodriguez, Room 3204
1
Mr.
I U8DOJ
1
Mr.
ItJSDOJ
1
Mr. Casey, Room 5096
I.
Mr. Gillies, Room 3280
1
Mr.
Quantico.
1
Mr.
Quantjco
1-Mr.
CIRG
1
Mr.
Room 7326
1
Mr.
IQuantico
1
Mr. I
I Quantico
1
Mrs.
Room 7861
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P.204 (Rev. t24-95)

UNLTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

—Rcdera1 Bureau ofJnvcstgation-,

Deputy Assistant Dector
Inspection Divi.sion

Copyo:

-

Shooting Xnoident-02/24/2006
03/01/2006

Report oI
Date:

Qiflee:

New York

297-HQ-Al2Zl788 SUB-D
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTiNG INCID?NT
EW IORK DIVISION
02/24/2006

INSPEC’ION DIVISION.. SHOOTING INQUIRY
Snosi:

I

Members of New York Division, Special Operations S0) ean
#9 involved in adversarial. confljc resulting in shots
fired on captioned date. SO9 was involved i conducting
surveillance i Canarsie. section of Brooklyn, New York
concerning an unreZated investigation during which time.
several subjects conspired to conduct robbery of a
suspected narcotics sales location within the, proximity of
Che,’surveiflance., 50-9 personnel witnessed subjects
involved in-the robbery and from the, location exchange
gunfire at, which time, he, jdentj.fied himø1f nt1 her
takinq fire, from the, subjects. SO-V SA___________
I returned fire in direction of swects. subject
isustained gunshot wounds to ankle and shouldea
I
om weapon yet to be, determined.,

On 02/24/O06, members of the New York Division.
3oint, Terrorism Spcia1 Operations Team #9 comprised of
New York City Police, Depa-tment detectives and FBI Special
Agents were involved in the surveillance of a subject
concerning an on-going terrorism investigation. Six
members of the, team were invo1ved i the, surveillance and
consisted of the followipg:
1.
2.
I

,3•

Detectivel

Team Leader

Detective]

Detectivel________________

This docunont contains noithe ccoiincndaticns ncu conclusions of the PBX • Xt is the pxoporty of the PB!
1
and is loanod to your agcuc it and its contonts ate not to be distributad eutsido ‘ou agenop.

 ______________________

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297-HQ-A1271788 SUB-D
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vehicles,
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De
_
__________
tec
__________
tiv
e
_____
__

1

Special Agent
Special Agent

L
6.

‘Each member of the team was assigned to individual
-

-.

‘Prior to captioned event, the team had not, ascertained
the. location-of the target. subject to be, surveilled and we,s
conducting individual checks of locations in various boroughs of
New York Citv.
Iz the early evening hours of 02/24/2006,’
Detective F
icontacted the. team members via L?B radio
communications and advised that, he. had located the, target subject
in the vicinity of B. 5th’Street and Ave,nue, D in the. Canarsie.
section of roo)çlyn, New-York.’ -The respective. team 3nembers
converged on the. 5
locatio
.
and
n began to’ establish surveiflarice of
a residence, located onE. ‘95th Street between Nolans Lane and
Avenue, D.’ Once the, tean had arrived at the.vicinity they
established a 30 minute rotating “eye.” on the location. ‘ach
member who did’ not,’ havç the, primary surveillance took a position,,
in the, surrounding area to await their turn in the primary
position.
-

-

-

-

•

•

At. approximat1y 8;45p.m., Detective, I
Icontacted the,
team via radio communication and’advised oa suspicious vehicle.
described as a red Volkswagen Jetta in the vicinity of E.96th
Street. Detective, I
I further communicated that two black males
had exited the vehicle.nd-bqgan walking west on Nolans Lane,
towards E.9Sth Street. I
Idescribed the. subjects whQ exited
the. vehic,le,, as a tafl B,’M with his hair in dread locks and
wearing a-jacket with patches .all over. -he, second B/M was
describe4 as shorter and wearing a gray sweatshirt. Various
members of the, team observed the. subjects and, although unsure, if
they were, directly involved in the, surveillance, continued to
relay information concerning their movements.
Subsequent, to th two aforementioned s”jrier’ exiting
of the, vehicle, the, team was alerted by Detective,I
Ithat, the.
Jetta had ,moved to the, .area of Avenuç D
B. 95th St;eet at a
high rate. of speed. At*
this time SAl
iwas in a tatic.
position and was able. to observe the., Jetta jnove. to. the corner of
B. 95th Street and Avenue D wh,il other team members’observed the.
subjects approach a restaurant on the. corner of B. 95th Street
and Avenue D. As the, subjects approached the, location, another
subject, later ientified ad
1, exited the’sore
location. The. subjectsbegan to exchange. gunfire. SAl
I
moved his vehicle into the driveway of the, parking lot across
from’ B. 9Sth Street and identif himself as an FBI Agent while.

5

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-2

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297’-HQ.Al271788 St3B-D

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displaying his iield A
j th4.a time th. subjects turned and..
1
began firing ati
I Sal
Itook upa’defensive
position in his vehicle,and began to return fire, at, the. subjects.

I.

first, engaged a subject. near’the, restaurant,
(which is where the initial shots were, tired from.in his
direction. The. subject was described as an unidentified male,
weang dark pants and a light grey sweatshirt top,
approximately
foot, 7 inches tall and having a thin build. Upon
“returning fire, the,,subject. ran north to
Avenue D, in a Westerly
5
direc,tion on Avenue D. At, iearly the, same time, ,another
unidentified_ma.e, TJM2), wearing darjc ‘pants and a dark top fired
at. SAl
Ifrom the, rear of the. 3etta’which was still parked
across £roui the, restaurant. on E. 95th Street.% I
I returned
fire, in the direction of the Jetta.. Shortly thereafter, the,
Jetta began to slowly roll South on’E. 95th Street and eventually
came, to a stop in a diagonal position when it. struck a parked car
on the, opposite side, of the. street. No subjects exited the
vehicle,.’
-

•
•

.

‘

•
.

,‘,,

•

.

‘

.,

‘subsequent to the, shooting, thre subjets were ‘
arrested by’ the, sO-g team members and I,Iew York City Police,
Department at the scene, of
S’
were, later j6’
(graze.
wound on..leg)
,
J.ater
-identified as
arrested at’ the North
Shore, Univers
,
Long Island,NY, where he, was treated
for gun shot. wounds to the wrist.and shoulder. The wrist wound.
was”described as a “through and through” wound. The shoulder,
wound occurred from a lodged piece shrapnel. Medical authorites
determined that, it. would better to leave, the, shrapnel in the.
shoulder rather than remove, it. Therefore, medical treatment. and
recorde were,
unable, to determine, the type of bullet causing these.
wounds
•,,
‘

•

All personnel izo1ved in the shooting were, interviewed
by New York City L’c$ice Department personnel’ and Federal .Bureu
of Investigation personnel at the NYPD 69th precinct..

4

3
1’

4.

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5

b

‘I

 _____________jirr

____________________________

‘

‘

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‘

(Rev. 01-31.2003)
—

FEDERAL

-

..

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
-

Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Approved By:’

F

-

-1-- I

j-

Date:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

-.

—

*

—

—

05/2372O0’6

AD Charlene B. Thornton
lExtension 4-183

Thoaton’Char1eJB
Cloyd Daniel
Figliuzzi C Fran

Drafted By:

.

.

Case ID #: 29l—HQ-?127i895—D
Title:
-

*

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
03/23/2006

Synopsis:

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 03/23/2006, involving Special
Agent (SA)J
I S
ifired two rounds
‘from his springfield Model 1911, .45 caliber pistol, killing an
.aggressIve pit bull dog. SIRG members reçommndI that no
‘administrative action be taken against SAl
I a a result of
his involvement in this- shooting incident.
-

-

-

Administrative:

Reference E1ecronic Conmtinication •(EC) of

Supervisory Special Agent SSA) I
03122/2006.

Details:

I dated

-

.

-

-

This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis; comments, and recommendations of th SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

p

V

p

F

(I

-

S

•1

 •(-t

.

Inspection
Inspection From:
05/23/2006
,
5—D
2189
A12
297—BQ—

To:
Re:

Detailsof’the-XncidentFBI and Drug Enforcement
On 03/23/2006, Agents of the
ster Police Department ±CPD>
-1
Adthinistration, along with Cheeral arrest warrant onLofficers, were executing a Fedto distribute and possess cocaine.
•who was Wanted for conspiracy
Joe the CPD knocked
At 6:04 a.m, sergeantE
ce
dence and announced the presen
on the door of the spject’s resied to the initial kthck and
of law enforcement. L ]respond the front door, resulting in
but fjled to respond to
announce 1
door. As the entry
lor•dering the breach of-the an aggressive pit
SergeantL
charged by
team breached the door they were ty-as well as the satv
safe
ir
the
bull dog. Fearing for
ç,n. the scene, Sergeanti—
other law enforcement ofioe
round resulting in
J fired one
fired two rounds and SA
residence was made and
the
ry into
severe injury to th dog. Ent the suspect fled through a rear
the premises secured. Althoughsubsequently apprehended by members.
door of the residence, he was
of the perimeter.team.
e the sub:ject was taken
-J onc
According to SAL
ltiple
wounded dog and observed mu
into custody he returned 1o th ing and in severe distress.
cry
gunshot wounds. The dog was all teem members, a decision was
ith
nw
sio
cus
dis
his
on
ed
thing
Bas
the dog down was the humane ’s
made that immediately putting
dog
the
into
jfired one additional round trol responded and
to do. SAE
con
mal
Ani
al.
anim
the
irzg
head, instantiy jctl
residenc.
removed the dog’s body from the
to discuss t)4e above—
On 05/05/2006, the SIRG met
iel
Deputy Assistant Director Dan
captioned shooting incident. n, chaired the meeting and was a
Lee Cloyd, Xnspection Divisio ng voting members were in
owi
non—voting member. The foll C. Fçnk 1
Fialiuzzi Office of
r
ecto
Insp
ef
Chi
attendance:
orney, Civil
n
] Att
io
ct
4
,Inspe
4
1
Inspections, ”
, Domestic
ief
tch
pu
De
I Kevin FavreF
Rights Division, USDOJ;L
—
ision, USD03;
Security Section, Criminal Divnterintelligence Division;L
CD—4, Cou
b7C
tion,
Secon Chief (SC), Tra
rzsnational’mii1 Errprise Sec
SC,
t
tan
),
(UC
ief
Ch
t
I Assis estigative Div
Uni
[.
ision; L
]
L.rInal Inv
elopment Division tTDDI;
Dev
and
g
inin
Tra
t,
Uni
g
inin
E’iWrms Tra
Unit, ‘rDD; Supervisory
-‘ flnive SYstems
UCI__
cial Weapons and
1 Spe
Special Agent (SSAL_
.aez’it Response ,group; SSA
t1ps Unit, Critical Inc
Unit, Scientific Analysis
ks
Toolmr
Firearms
L
Jory
I
Division; SSAL
Section, Laboäf
eral. counJ. -GC); and
Gen
the
of
e
Ci
Of
t,
Uni
Investigative Law
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To:
Re:

•

L

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r’

—,

Inspection prom: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895-D, 05/23/2006

*

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Inspection Management Unitj
Management Program Analyst, ision, a.non-voting member,
on Div
Office of Inspections, Inspecti
.
nce
was also’ in attenda

J

-

•

-

-1•

•,

dations of the SIRG
Observations and Recommen
opsized incideiat with
The 51KG reviewed te abàve—syn
tion of deadly force;
(1) evaluate the applicaive analysis,
the intent, to:
an evaluat
(2 provide the Director xith ns for corrective acions.from an
atio
end
mm
reco
and
ns,
ns
• observatio
; (3 provide recommendatio
e
operational standpoint (if any ty issues; and
vid
.pro
concerning training and/or safeive action if deemed necessary.
recommendations for administrat
curred_that the use of
51KG members unanimously,. con
Jwasiustified.
_iand SAL
deadly force b1 SergeantE_firs
by
d
SAL jwas in
fire
t,
sho
t
Members eihasized that the force, policy; however, the second
conformance with the deadly on to take, was notwithin the
shot, although the humane acti
current deadly force policy.
th& SIRG pertained to
The only observation made byPlan regarding the deadly
rations
language contained in the Ope that any reference to the deadly
ned
opi
bers
Mem
y..
lic
t
po
force
uage mirrored from the curren
on
eral
Gen
force policy should contain lang
ey
approved by the Attorn
deadly force.policy which was wiflbe brought to the attention-of
n.
07/01/2004. This observation
rge of the Philadelphia Divisio
the Acting Special Agent in Cha
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To: ,lnspectiOfl From:
Inspection
Re:29
8
P
05
/23/2006
92L’
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LEAD(s) :

-

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Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INS PEcTZN.

ASHINGrON.

-

ThatnO

amin

trative action be taken against
Jas a resu3-t of his ino1Ve1Tlent in this

sltiflg ncent.

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-

1
1
1.
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Cloyct, RooI 7825
Ms. Mahoney, USDOJ
(Attentiofl
Mz.EZ
1-- Mr.F
_i USDOJ
MrT9g1iUZZi, Room 7837
1

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1

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Nra FavreaU, Room 4042

Mr. Cunningham, Room 3548

(AttentiOfl
Mr. [
Mr. I

Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Ms.
1-Mr.
1
Mrs.

Mr.
Quan ico
QuantiCO

I

LfltiCO

—•

QuantiCO
on 7326
WFO’
_j’ Room 7861

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Copy

01’ Jusii
UNITED STATES DEPAITMENT
Investigation
of
Federal Bureau

to:

Rcpod0t
Datc

*

Omco

ASAC Gregory Alan Fowler
04/U/2006

clucago

285
297_11QA12
’°
21

Case1D

SHOOTXNG INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOPXNG
C1ICAGO PXVISION
APRIL.S, 2006

INCXDSWr

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RDMINSTRATI’ INQUIRY

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April 5,
en occurred on. Wednesday,
at
This shotiniE
IL
chicago,
I
—
executed_an
2006, at’
6:00
I
apprOXJttatelY
at
warrant for
The
6.
,
Anri.
arrest
on
1 Ch3.cagO,
iwas for armed
tori
tstandiflg arrest. warrant
0
arrest, plan and briefing
he
robbery fr9m_NissiSsiPPi. and dangerOUS.’T arrest tea1
rjefiflg.
ias armed
identi.fieU
following a pre_arrast
ocatiofl
5Ubje0t’5
arr.ved at. tne
with
djSCUSSjOflS
‘Ct
After several ainntS in
and
visual
girlfriend and

SAS

cleared
:oom and
their
I’
the front roox and made tChen/difling area. As SAL
a
through
male
blck
bathroom area
a
observed
g area, he
entered the jtchen/diflifl
of the agents. SRI______
direction
the
in
pointing a gun
comnenced firing at the
yelled “Gun I GunL GuM” and rounds at. the subject. SR
a fired five
S2I
threat.
and tired two rounds..
turned to face the. threat being struck by a bullet
fell to the ground after
weaofl.
and droPPed his jjfe_th
reat
right, index finger
zu.s
n
non
with
was:traflSp0rt to the hospital injured in. the shooting.
were.
injuries. No FEZ personnel
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of the FBi
f the FEZ. it is the VrCrY
raconeSndt0nS nor
OU aqerGY.
outsi4O
dstrUtOd
cofltelttS ens nøt tø h
your aqoncy at end its

neither
doCUnet containS

i loaned

to

conC1U$i0

lb/C

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297—HQ—A1271285—D,.
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DTAXLS:
ducted the fugitive
Chicago Division Squad ‘IC-i conitive control file at. the
fug
.a
investi.gation from 88A-CG-Cfl3806, $ Office (CC$O). ‘IC-i
request of the Cook County Sheriff’out—of-division fugitive
o
utjlies the pntrol, file for ail
e coordinator for the Chicag
arrests. SAL
lis the fugitiv
Division.
task fqrce officers
VC—l is comprised of agents and O. SS L
CCS
the
and
from Chicago Police Department
ition to his squad
is the ‘IC—). squad supetisor.__In add Chicago SWPT supevisor and
the
Jis
supervisor duties, SSA
wjth extensive tactical
a former member. ‘IC-i h mnv acents is the Senior STTeam
]
]
training experience. SAL
of experience. SA L._
Membe, with piore than thirty years of Chicago SWAT. SA L
1 areembers
I flI S
reerv
ii-ø rcentiyseiected as
and SA
4
_
years
(5
five
has
members o Chzcago SWAT. 3A[
the
VC-3. is
of tactical team experience as a u
oversee.ng the
and
tng
duc
con
for
e
urc
Division’s primary reso
d
at least 38
cute
exe
‘IC-i
t.
apprehension of violent subjec incident.
aest warrants in 2006 without
determined
cgnducted an invtigat.ion and o, IL.
SA[
cag
Chi
]
iL
ZJwas i,iving at’—
ih
aye bçfore
eillance on tWe locatn
surv
cted
ndu
[co
residing
wa
I
L
that
firmation
Th. rest. Upon receiving conw
I The The
nrDared by SAT
at the address, an arrest plan
C.
a9
qu
plan was approved by Chicago SSALpr
am.
6:00
’
at
cvu
arrest was planned for Wednesday,
d on Wednesday, April
A pre-arrest briefing was conucte
Jin the, vicinity of
5. 2006. at approximately :55aubyAvided a briefing to the.
Chicago, IL. SAL__Jpro
rmation on the
s. The briefing .ncluded infoet
ber
mm
tea
est
arr
location, and
targ
o
tion
subect,’,s criminal history, descripof resistina_est. The
ory
warning regarding previous hist identified L
las armed and
fing
brie
and
plan
written arrest
was attended bS’- eleven- (11)
dangerous. ¶he pre—arrest briefing
itives Task Force. The arrest.ce
members o the ‘IC—I, Violent Fug
nts and one (11 Chicago PoU
Age
team consisted of ten (10) FI
Department Detective.

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assignments were
the arrest team and their
I.

h6
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SA
SA
5A
SA
I

ca’seAgent-EntrY
Approach-ftoflt security
-Entry
Entry
Entry’
Front security
PerilLleter security
• Perizueter security
erjete. security.
Periffleter security
Perimeter securitY

cmmandéafld is th chica9o
Iwas the on—scene
SAl
Member.
Division Senior SWAT Team

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the arrest location at
The entry/arrest team arrivethat
P
I obtained the
I
and
approximately 6:00am. SAs Lqanng•
access to the building
SA
apartmeflt.
assistance of a neighbor in,
•resided in the
obtaining_corroboration that’ apartment had a locked steel
a
ijind SA
inoticed the
SAl
i and’
After
door.
frame
securitY gate and a standard the apartment building, S
I
i gained access to
SAl
I
1 the building.p.enterea
aentStO p
tfl
-alled for
and
arrest.
I
L
iwith the entryafld support.
prtment.’bUimTh to assist SAl
provide
to
building
imoved to the front° the
perimeter of
SAl
took positiOns aiong the
The rmainder of the teambuildifl9.
the multiuflit. apartmaflt
andl_______ knocked on
Shortly after 6:00am; SAS I
the jocked door.
to the agents tnrough asked
hr 10
the door. A female spoke were
‘“ ‘and
the
they
indicated
p
ji
I
SA
minutes1
open the door. After afew door and spoke to tne agentS tnrough
th
‘girlfrin opened the frame
ageflt5 Ofl the perm of
Si
the metal gate. During this
at the windows.
building observed a black male the man indicated he -lived’ in
.tjme
which
at
anoke to th male
mole on his forehead
man had a distjflctivp
1the. The
1
Iat the.Preare8t
of,I
description provided
tF the team
similar tO
memberc
to all
I eventually’.
briefing. RadotraflSS3iotsthe aartmeflt I
and
indicated the subøct was in
SASI—
opened the meta3. gate door for
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t the
ke toE
J spo
Whils2E_]and SAE mo
elieved
heb
t
ve towards wha
jsa a person
front door, SAL
a.
room are
to be the rear of the apaztment/bed
Iand
ed the apartment, with SA
The agents ant
was
gwed
lfn
__
pcd
—i__I
thad. SAs
I_
dI
an
s1_J
] SAto
behind SAL— _JJand near SA
th back_Der’om and
way
r
xie
e
ma
and
m
roo
entered
cleared ‘the front
ining area. As SA EZ g a gun
n/d
che
)cit
a
gh
ou
a
thr
are
zi
roo
bath
ointin
mack
ry’4
GUN
1
gd ‘
the kitchen/dining aea,be_obsendLyel
SL
I
JJa
d
fire
in the drectjo of SAsL- .a
SA
L
at.
]
tre
g the
firint
.
eat.
thr
GUN GUN 1” and commenced 1
th
e
fac
turned to
t the subject. SAL ]riilumixiated by the muzzle
five Fclund
turned he observed a mari
As SALbe sub)ect’s hand. Heer
saw a mm
flash of a gun. SIJZ
fell to the ground aft
t.. L_
• jred two rounds at. thesbiec
finger and dropped
ex
ind
ht
rig
the
being struck by a bullet n his
d
ended, Stewar was also on
his weaponZ When the shooting No E’BI arsonnel were injured
unharmed.
floor’ nearL.
ng
ot.
sho
the
g
rin
du
e4
the kitchen, agents search
As he. lay on the floor in
his
of
ent
ext
ne
e.
rmi
for other weapons and to deteffs
1eft. hand.
ZJ
op I—
dcu
han
the
ced
pla
nts
Age
es.
injuri
right hapd;
his
ff
Q
dcu
ld not han
Due to hisiniurv__agents cou
d to his belt loops.
J.eft hand was hndcuffe
therefore L
]weapop and ensured it. was
L
sI1Z Jrçtrieved
(3 times
]rked_tl slide threethe gun, three
out of his reach. SAL_
was clearing
L
miti]. the slidelocked. AsSA
élledfrfrom_the gun into the.
exp
e.
wer
tion
uni
ed the gun
(3) 9mm rounds of amm
e was )ocked, L. Jplac determined’
was
kitchen sjnk. After ‘the slid
gun
The
-j
zJandI
in the sink away froE seq
óf the apartment
rcW
sea
t
uen
sub
A
.
9mm
to be a Ruge
area. Xxi
nunition in the dining were recovered
recovered a Uve, round of anv
tion
uni
amm
9mm
of le
dining
total, fourteen l4) rounds rou
nd was recovered in the
(1
One
.
ent
rtm
in the
apa
in the
ed
ver
reco
e
wer
nds
rou
13
area, the remaining thirteen.
kitchen sink and in the gun
eat, SA
Zjwas no longer a thr the scene
after ensuring
‘at
ive
eàt.
Det
. A CPD
called for medi,cal assistance jse shots had been ,fired and medical
adv
.to
io
rad
CD
the
personnel
ed
utiliz
the scene. EiergenCy medical
assistance. was •needed at E jjwas treated by paramedics
responded within minutes. extent of his injuries were. such that
inside the apartment. The the building to the ambulance.
he. was eble to w1k 04 of trnsported to St. Bernards Hospital
Records indieateL__1cqas

Z1

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297—HQ—A127L285—D

at approximately 6:30am for treatment, and .ater transported to
Mount Sinai Hospital for surgery.
AI
I took control of I
lafter the shootxng.
SA I
I ensured she was not injured and moved her to the front
livinc! room area.
SA I
I conducted
thorough search of
I forweapons and handcuffed her. I
kas crying and
visibly upset following the shooting. SA a
ithen conducted
a complete search of ‘tlie bedroom and bathroom area, clearingeach
room in a methodical manner. After ensuring thpwr n more
subjects j.n the apartment, SAl
I
I retrieved’
daughter from the bedroom are&. He subsequently removed the
handcuffs fromi
I and allowed her to be with her daughter,
under the constant supervision of FBI or GPD personnel.

I

•

was later removed from the scene and taken to
I
the loca) oracinç for questioning by GPO detectives and FBI
agents. I
Iprovided a statement tcCPD apd FBI personnel.
During her statement she denied knowing I
I had a weapon in
the apartment or knowledge of the outstanding arrest warran
9
At approxImately 6:15am siI
I notified SSA I
and /ASA
ASAC Monroe was the Acting SAC on tne,aay
I
of the hootina. SAl
lalso no1ified Assistant Division
Counsell
I SSAI
I ASAC 4onroe, arid CDC
Krupkowski responded to the scene. A/ASACI
lalso arrived
at the sceie. sho;tly after the shooting SAl
Iretrieved SAs
Iweapons.
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Opon arriving at the scene; SAC Monroe co6rdinated
with senior CPD officia1s regarding the control of the crimej
scene and sibsequent investigation. GPO Deputy Superintendent
6
I
Iwa tht np—scene commander for C?D. Deputy
4
Superintendenti
I informed ASAC Monroe the CPD would
I
relinquish controi o the .investigation to the FBX as all the
parties involved jn the shooting were FBI agents. CPD provi4ed
physical security to the area for the entire day. COG Krupk9wski
advised FBI agents on scene they were not required to provide
statements to the police at that time. COG Krupkowski informed
the agents of the availability of representation from the FBI
Agent’s Association.

I

FBI Chicago ERT conducted an exhaustive search of the
apartment, which included a ballistic trajectory analysis,
recovery of evidence, crime scene photos, crime scene video,
detailed sketches, and evidence 1og. The ERT Sçrçh and
analysis determined seven 7) rounds were fired by SAl
and
Icobined. The trajectory analysis indicateä S?i
a fired

5

 _______Idid

297-HQ-A1271285-D

five 5), .40 caliber, rounds at the 3ri-!t. It is likely SA
I shot and wounded the subject. SN
I fired two rounds,
.45 caliber at t1e subject. :rhe £orensj.c evidence does not
indicate SAl
struck the .subject. A1. the rounds were
accounted for in the physical search by ERT. Bsed uon an
accounting of the recovered 9mm ammunition fromi
Iweapon,
it was determined the subject did not fire his weapon. A copy of
the ERT reporting is included with this report.

I

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T1ie subject was struck in the index finger of his right
hand. The subject received immediate medical attention from LFBX
personnel on the scene. Emergency personnel responded to the
scene and treated the subject within minutes of the shooting As
the injuries were limited to his hand, the subject was instructed
to walk out of the apartment by emergency medical personnel. I The
.subject was transported to St. Bernard’s hospital for treatment
by ambulance. fter treatment in the emergency room, it wasj
determined the subject required surgery and was transported yia
ambulance to Mount Sinai Hospital, by medical personnel. The
subject was operated on by Dr.I
I a plastic and
hand surgeon at Mount Sinai. Accorcing to Dr. I
I Upon
øni-,-in,, the fingertip, the bullet traveled along the inside of
I finger and entered his hand at the web space betweez his
index and middle finger. The bullet fragmented as it traveled
I hand and a portion of the fragments exid his
through I
hand on the top near the middle finger, wrist area. Dr.I______
indicated,it was likely the subject would not regain full us o
his index,finger, but otherwse WR expected to recover fully.
Squad VC-l personnel guardedi
Iduring his medical treatment.
Squad VC—1 Task Force Officer was present in the operating f room
during I
I surgical procedure.__The CCSO took custody of
following his surgery. I
I was subsequently released
from the hospital and was housëa at i CCSO facility.

I

Dr. I
I stated he asked the subject what happened.
The subject told Dr. I
Ithat he had a gun and had been shot
in the hand while holding h3.s hand up near his face. The subject
had other scrapes and scars on his body on pril 3, 2006. The
doctor asked the subject .if those injuries,were from the
shooting. The subject indicated he had other scars and marks
from previous £iqhts an4 Lncidents. Dr.I
I did not find any
other injuries oil
I resulting from the ,shooting.
not mention any other physical complaints related to the
shooting.

Q

Damage to the apartment was confined to the kitchez
area. Specifically, the refrigerator, stove, walis, and back
door were damaged in the shootixg. Several roundS passed thtough

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297—HQ—A127i285-D.

the
the
for
the

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refrigerator, stove, or part.al wail. With permission fron
building owner, ERT removed shell fragments fron3 the walls
ballistic testing. Testing by the, laboratory is ongoing at
time this reportwaspreparect.
-

Chicago Squad CE-9 was assigned tç conduct aQAssaqlt
on a Federar Office (A’O investigation of I
I
I SAl
I is the case agent. Assistant United States Attorney
I
I fo the Northern District of Illinois will pursue
I fr M
1 AFO and related gun, charges.
.charges againi-I
j?S girlfriend, neighbors, landlord,
Interviews
and related persons were conr];iid. esults of those interviews
are included in this report. I
jmedical records were
subpoenaed by ,investigators and are attached to this report

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Chicago Principal iirearms Enstructor (P?I)
contacted regcHng the, firearms training for SAs...
I
I andi
I PFI I
I provided records of firearms scores
for both agents. SAl
nd SA I
Isuccessfully completed
all firearms training for 2005. Both agents demonstrated a high
deçr nf proficiency iz operating their bureau issued weapons.
SAl
I completed M fjrst. quarter qualification for 2006 on
March.30, 2006. SAI
Ihas yet to complete the first quarter
qualification for 2006 due, to a heavy, investigative work load and
operatibnal matters. Copies of the, firearms scores are, attached
to this report.
-

The Shooting Investi,gation Tear (SIT intrviewed all
agents and TFOs on the arrest team. SAsI
landl
I signed
FD—927 WARNING AND ASSURANCE TO EMPLOYEE ‘REQUESTED .‘O R(WIDE
IORMATION FOLLOWING A SHOOTING
Statements wr
I,
‘,SAI
FD-302s were_rep
A/ASAC SSA I
I SSA
1
prepared by summari2
investigative materials.
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2006

 

 

(R.ev. O-31-2OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON
precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Irispectioti

From:

Attu:

Inspection
Contact:

Appro’ved By:

j

AD Kevin L.

05/16/2007
Perkins

Extension 4-1837

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Michael4W

Drafted By:I

jirr

Case ID

#:

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP (CIRG)
HOSTAGE RESCUE TEAM (HRT)
12/06/2006

297—E4Q—A1271971—D
];-)7(’

Synopsis:
The ShootIng Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 12/06/2006, involving Special
Agçnt (,A) I
During a training exercise by the HRT,.
I
SAl
I fired one bound from his Bureau-issued Colt M-4, .223
Caliber, Special Purpose Rifle, killing Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA) Gregory J. Rahoi.
SIRG members recommended that no
administrative action be taken against SP
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector
dated 02/09/2007.

I

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
Since September 2005, HRT Operators have been routinely
imbedded within the Department of Defense (DOD) Special Forces
(SF) units in Iraq to conduct special site exploitations.
On
12/06/2006, in anticipation for deployment to Iraq, the CIRG,
Operations and Training Unit (OTU), öonducted live fire, fire and
maneuver training for thirteen J-{RT Operators and three Helicopter
pilots assigned to the Tactical Helicopter Unit (THU).
The
Unconventional Law Enforcement Operations (ULEO) training was
conducted on Range 24 at Fort A.?. Hill, Virginia.
According to
the OTU, the training scenarios used on 12/06/2006, were
developed using actual experiences of HRT Operators in Iraq and

Savage-i 995

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To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271971—D,

Inspection
05/l6/2007

were reportedly similar to training exercises used by DOD SE’
units.
The training exerq ws ntrnd pd survi 1w
members of th CTRG. oq SS2I
SSAI
I
and SSAI_____
?rioc- to the beginning of the training
exercise, SSAJ
ndl
Iprovided safety briefings which
included helicopter safety, medical emergenciesr firearm safety,
target awareness, communications, and range operations. The
exercise included the use of two types of targets, the fixed
military target known as an Ivan, and an FBI target known as
LaRue.
The Ivan was described as a green plastic threedimensional silhouette of a human upper torso which was
approximately three and one half feet tall, and range controlled
to pop-up after being knocked down when hit by a bullet.
They
were fixed to the ground and could not be moved. The LaRue
targets were steel plates, painted red and white, approximately
eighteen inches high and twelve inches wide and fell when hit by
a bullet. LaRue targets were equipped with motors which allowed
the target to automatically stand back up after being hit and
were movable,
.

Range 24 was approximately three miles long and 200
yards wide.
The range consisted of variable terrain with various
size vegetation and ran east to west with an obvious tree line
the entire length on both sides. A gravel road ran down the
middle of the range cutting it into north and south sides.
Field
of fire was briefed to the HRT Operators as 180 degrees forward
or tree line to tree line which was different than the 360
degrees of coverage used during a real operation. HRT Operators
were specifically advised not to fire from t1e helicopters and to
use fans of fire when firing live ammunition down range when
other HRT Operators were positioned down range.
The first scenario briefed to the HRT Operators
involved the group breaking into three teams of three operators
and one team of four operators with a helicopter transporting
each team separately to three different locations on the range.
At each location, team members would exit the helicopter and move
to a fixed position clearly marked on the ground by a mannequin,
and would engage both pre-positioned Ivan and LaRue targets.
Once the targets were engaged from the fixed position, the team
would return to the helicopter, continuing to engage targets as
they appeared before re—boarding the helicopter. The helicopter
would then fly to the two other marked locations where the drill
would be repeated.
The completion of all three drills was
considered the end of one evolution.
This scenario took most of
the morning and occurred without any significant events.
A second scenario referred to as a Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR) training exercise was briefed and executed in the

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Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271971—D,

Inspection
05/16/2007

afternoon.
The .CSAR ‘training exercise ôalled for two teams of
six and seven.
The scenario was a downed helicopter in Iraq with
an injured HRT Operator still on board and the teams’ mission was
to rescue him.
Each team would be flown sepa.rately by helicopter,
in the approximate same area on Range 24 as was used in the
morning exercise. At the designated location, team members would
exit the helicopter and using live fire, fire and maneuver moving
to the crash site which was a pre-positioned helicopter frame.
The team would engage both Ivan and LaRue targets as they moved,
would rescue the surivor of the downed helicopter, and again
using live fire, fire and maneuver engaging targets move back to
the helicopter and be airlifted out of the area.
The same
targets in the same locations used in the morning exercises were
used.
There were two sets of Ivan targets on both the north and
south sides of the gravel road approximately one hundred yards
apart.
The teams used the north and south side of the gravel
road to move to the crash site. This scenario occurred without
any significant event.
The last scenario was identical to the previous Combat
Search and Rescue exercise. The only change was that all
thirteen HRT Operators would be used. No targels were added,
deltd. nr mnkrri frn’ f-ha final run.
The scenario was briefed to
SSAI
I, who was the designated overall Team
Leader for the exercise. TLI
Idivided the group into three
teams, with Team 1 consisting of three Agents, Team 2 consisting
of four Agents, and Team 3 consisting of five Agents.
The plan devised by TLI
Jwas briefed to the
entire team arid consisted of Teams 1 and 2 being inserted via
Bell Helicopter 412 and Team 3 being inserted via Bell Helicopter
407.
The insertion would be simultaneous, approximately two
hundred yards east of the simulated crash site. Team 2 would be
positioned to the north edge of the range, Team 3 to the south,
and Team 1 would be in the center. The teams were instructed to i-ç!
employ a bounding overwatch method movement which was described
as a minimum of one team providing cover fire while a minimum of
one team moved forward or down range. Once at the crash site,
Team 3 would establish a position to the west of the target
location, the direction from which TLI
Ihad been briefed
there was enemy movement. Team 2 woulc secure the crash site and
prepare any casualties for movement.
ovement back to the
helicopters would be conducted in reverse of the movement to the
crash site, with Team 2 responsible for rmrting the casualty
via a litter back to the helicopter.
TL
responsible
for command and control of the individua.L teams including the
positioning of the teams.
Each individual Team Leader was
responsible for the movement and positioning of the individual
team members within each team. TLI
Iwould communicate with
the two other Team Leaders, SSAI
and
SSA Rahoi, with a
I

Iwas

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combination of ra&io calls, hand and arm signals, and verbal
commands.
At approximately 3:30 p.m., the plan was executd and
continued as planned until Team 2 had secured the crash site,
assessed the casualty’s condition,. and was preparing to return to
the helico
timeout was called and Range
Techniciani
Ireplaced the mannequin as the casualty
on the litter. After the casualty was prepared for transport,
Team 2 provided foni- tam members 1-n ‘rru th litter to the
helicopter.
TLI
I and SAl
I collapsed toward
the east tn nrnviH nrnrr for_those carrying the litter.
SAs
Ipositioned themselves near a
jandi
concrete retaining wall around a set of Ivan targets
approximately one hundred yards east of the crash site.
SAs
I audi
Iwere facing east providing nominal cover to the
rear.
.

I

I

I

the litter, four members of Team 2. TLI
and
joved east passing SAl
SAl
land si
Vs
position,
TLI
I instructed them to adjust their position from facing
east to facing west which required a 180—degree adjustment.
It
was
noted in is statement that SA
1
eca1led being instructed
by TLI
Ito turn from the easterly direction he was covering.
and turn to the west and “pick up the rear.” SAl
las not
absolutely positive of the verbiage used by TLI
Ibut
interpreted his words to mean, rTturn around and cover the rear
When given rear security responsibility by TLI
ISA
Ibelieved there was no individual west of his position down
range.
SA I
irecalled hearing information in a radio
transmission indicating an enemy force was approaching from the
west.
Believing that he and SAl
lwerç the last group to
the rear or west and covering down range, SAl
Ithought his
field of fire was 180 degrees or the tree line on his left to the
tree line on his right.
SAl
Iobsezved the simulated downed
helicopter in plain view.
He scanned with his naked eye left and
then right and when he scanned back left, he saw what he believed
to be two Ivan targets. The Ivan targets did not move and
appeared to have the same spacing and aiahl as other Ivan
targets he had previously engaged.
SAl
Jthen saw what he
believed to be an Ivan target through the optical scope on his
rifle.
He noted he had an unobstructed view of the Ivan targets
in high grass at the top of a berm, similar to jthe way other Ivan
targets on the range were positioned.
SAl
lwho was not
wearing sunglasses, looked in a westerly to southwesterly
direction with the sun at tree top level causing significant sun
glare.
As he acquired_the target he yelled to SAl
I
“targets left.” SAl
I did not hear SAl
I respond and
fired one shot, keeping his sight on the target. He noticed the
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target did nbt fall like the other Ivan targets and immediately
realized he had hit another HRT Operator.
According to sii
I he recalled SA
yel1ing
to him, “any targets on the left.” He bei4eved SA
14as
asking if he saw any taraet ou the left remaining to shoot and
he replied,_“no.” SAL
hater spoke with SA
learned SAL
Ihad stated, “targets left’
t meaning
observed Ivan targets on his left and was calling them ou as
part of the scenario.
Immediately afier_responding to SAl
I
SAl
Iheard the gunshot from SAl
Iposition and
tt
immediately thereafter heard,
real world medical,
called on the
radio.
Both Agents immediately ran to render aid to SSA Rahoi.
According to TLI
I h rca1led only instructing
SAl
Ito adjust his and SAl
Iposition from facing east
to racing west thicth rujred them to make a 180-degree
adjustment.
TLI
Istated, “I communicated that Team 1 was
set, meaning that we were in a position to provide covering fire
(over watch) for Team 3’s movement (bound) to the east.”
Team 3 was still on the north side of the gral road
approximately 125 yards southwest and down range of SAs I
andi
I Three members of the team, using the bounding
overwatch meihod. moved ix an easterly direction leaving SSA
Rahoi and SA
Istill in the m?sition 125 yards
southwest and down range of SSA
‘and SAj
I SSA Rahoi
was closest to the gravel road in a kneeling position.
SA
was approximately ten feet to SSA Rahoi’s left in a oron
position.
Both Agents were in knee high grass.
SAl
1
Iheard SA
Rahoi state, “We’re going to move back.” SSA Rahoi becan to
stand up from his kneeling position and as he did,
heard
S1
a shot and heard SSA Rahoi state, “real world medical,” and saw
SS.A Rahoi fall to the ground.
After SAl
I shot was fired, it was quickly
determined that SSA Rahoi had been wounded. Medical aid was
rendered and it was determined SSA Rahoi required being airlifted
to the nearest medical facility.
SSA Rahoi was immediately
transported by the 412 helicopter to Mary Washington Hospital in
Fredericksburg, where he was pronounced dead.
The Medical Examiner determined SSA Rahoi suffered a
gunshot wound on the right side of the upper back.
Bullet
fragments passed through his chest wall breaking three ribs,
damaging the upper lobe of his right lung, caused multiple
perforations of the right subclavian artery and vein, as well as
a laceration of the ascending aorta.
On 04/13/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael

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S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting member.
The fol1qwin-i vnl-inn’ TnmhrR ‘ere in
attendance:
Chief Inspector I
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I Trial
Attorney, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I. Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
(JSDOJ; Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section, CD—i,
Counterintelligence Division; SC John V. Gillies, Violent Crimes
Section Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)I
I
I
I Firearms T
ing and Deelopznent
Divisio
Defensive Systems Unit,
TDD; U
pecia
eapons and Tactics ODertions
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
I
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; SSAI
I, Inv 4rriir Law
Unit, Office of the General Counsel (OGC); and SSAI
I
I
I Practical Applications Unit, TDD.
SSAI
I
—

and Management Program Analyst (MPA)
I
Inspection Management Unit, Office or Inspections, Inspection
Division, non—voting members, were also in attendance.

[

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) valuate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations

concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

Prior to the discussion of this incident by SIRG
members, Inspector I
Inspector-in—Charge of the
investigation of the shooting incident, provided an in-depth
overview of the positions o all personnel involved in the
training scenario, the appearance of the range where the scenar
io
was taking place, and answered questions posed by SIRG members.
Inspectoii
Jexpressed the opinion that SSA Rahoi’s death was
the result of a tragic training accident resulting from the
misidentification of a target.

1

Inspeãtor I
I opined that although the. same targets
in the same locations were used throughout the dayts training
exercises it was reasonable that SAl
Imisideptified SSA Rahoi
as a target. In an attempt to recreate SAl
view through the
optical scope on his rifle, photographs were taken looking
through the scope at approximately the same time of day as the
actual shooting.
An Ivan target placed 125 yards. away in SSA
Rahoi’s approximate position was photographed.
This photograph
was compared to a photograph taken a few minutes later of a
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mannequin wearing clothing identical to SSA Rahoi
s shirt, vest,
t
and helmet in the same positôn.
comparison of the photographs
indicated looking through SAl
Iscope, the Ivan target and
the mannequin dressed in SSA Rahoi’s clqthin aonpd very
similar. Additionally, SSA Rahoi and SAl
Iwere
positioned side by side on the top of a berm similar to the Ivan
targets.
1
Inspector
Ipointed out all team members had been
briefed on the planned movements of each team.
However, SPI
I
was positioned facing away from the HRT operators as they moved
up and down range and although the HRT operators and RSOs were
equipped with radios there were no communications pointing out
SSA Rahoi’s position down range from SAj
1
1
Inspector
Lioted three• trained Range Safety
Officers (RSO) were present during the training exercise. One
was designated as the RSO for this specific training exercise.
The RSOs were providing information to the Team Leaders
concerning simulated enemy troop movements and which targets were
still in play.
They were not interjecting themselves in the
teamts movements.
1
Inspector
lalso discussed the lack of a written
operations plan for each training exercise.
He advised the OTU
had no standard practice of preparing written operations plans;
however, a risk assessment was provided in this instance due to
the requirements of Fort A. P. Hill. The risk assessment
contained a brief description concerning the training to be
conducted; however, it did not adequately describe the CSAR
scenario in which SA Rahoi was fatally wounded.
It was also
noted by Inspectorl
that all HRT Operators must
successfully complete a five month New Operator Training Course
(NOTS) prior to being selected as a HRT Operator. After the
completion of NOTS, the CIRG, 14RT, does not maintain additional
training records which detail the type and quantity of tactical
training received by individual HRT Operators.
SIRG members began a lengthy discussion of the
incident.
One member asked if this type of training was
appropriate for Agents being deployed to Iraq.
The Special
Weapons and Tactics Unit, TDD, representative advised that the
training was indeed necessary and essential. Other members
emphasized the fact that a proper target must be identified and
not assumed arid that .training dictates that proper target
acquisition must be accomplished before pulling the trigger of a
weapon.
The OGC representative questioned if the position of
the designated aange Safety Officer (RSO) would have been better
if one had been placed with each team as a safety precaution. It

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was also questioned if the presence of more than one RSO should
be mandated during this type of training exercise.
SIRG members also discussed the fact that no medical
:t6
personnel were available to meet the landing helicopter upon
arrival at the hospital.
Once the decision was made to take SSA
Rahoi to Mary Washington Hospital due to its close proximity and
the condition qf SSA Rahoi. call outs were made over the radio by
Contract Pilot I
ladvising anyone tornake
contact with the hospital, advise them of their arrival, and
repeated the
c1 i-cnii rd upon their arrival.
According to SAl
I the helicopter pilot, upon
landing at Mary Washington Hospital’s landing. zone located on the
roof of the parking garage, no medical personnel were there to
meet them.
Personnel on the helicopter carried SSA Rahoi to the
parking garage elevator where they were qreeted by medical
personnel with a stretcher.
The last issue discussed by the SIRG pertained to the
presence of Los Angeles Police Department photographer I
I
I
I Members noted that the presence of a photographer
should have received management approval.
SIRG members also adopted the following five
recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Team:
That
1)
SAC, CIRG ensure clear and proper communications are stressed to
all HRT Operators during training scenarios; 2)
That SAC, CIRG
continue to.provide safety briefings prior to all training
exercises which stress situational awareness, fields of fire and
target acquisition; 3)
That SAC, CIRG require HRT Operators,
when conducting live fire training scenarios, to wear some type
of distinguishing clothing .or markings to further differentiate
targets from HRT Operators during training; 4)
That SAC, CIRG
devlop and deploy a system to document, track, and evaluate all
training received by HRT Operators; and 5)
That SAC, CIRG
institute a policy requiring all live fire training scenarios be
approved by a Unit Chief or higher.

I

At the conclusion of the lengthy discussion, SIRG
Chairman Clemens apked IRG members to vote on the following
question:
“Was SI
Inegligent in his actions of pulling the
trigger of his weapon and if so, was he deserving of any
disciplinary action?” Board members unanimously voted that SA

Iwas not negligent in his actions and recommended that no
administrative action be taken against him as a result of his
involvement in this incident.

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LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION,
AT WASHINGTON,
SAl
incident.

DC

That nq administrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this shooting

Set Lead 2:

(Action)

CIRG
AT OUANTICO, VA
That SAC, CIRG ensure clear and proper cornntunications
are stressed to all HRP Operators during training scenarios.
Set Lead 3:

(Action)’

CI RG
AT QUANTICO. VA
That SAC, CIRG continue to provide safety briefings
prior to all training exercises which stress situational
awareness, fields of fire and target acquisition.
Set Lead 4:

(Action)

CIRG
AT QEJANTICO, VA
That SAC, CIRG require HRT Operators, when conducting
live fire training sdenarios, to. wear some type of distinguishing
clothing or markings to further differentiate targets from HRT
Operators during training.

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_____
_______

To:
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Inspection
Frbm:
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Set Lead 5:

Inspection.
05/16/2007

(Action)

CIRG
AT QUANTICO, VA
track,

That SAC, C±RG develop and deploy a system to document,
and evaluate all training received by HRT Operators.

Set Lead 6:

(Action)

CI RG
AT OUAt1TICO, VA
That SAC, CIRG institute a policy requiring all live
fire training scenarios be approved by a Unit Chief or higher.

1
1

Mr.
Ms.

E>istole,

Room. 7142
Room 7427
I CIRG
1
Mr.I
1
Mr. Clemens, Room 3092
Mr
1
Room 3204
Mr
1
OSDOJ
1-Mr.
DOJ
Mr. Casey, Room 5096
1
1
Mr. 11ip, Room 3280
Mr.
1
Quantico
,
1
Mr.
,
Quantico
1
Mr.
,
CIRG
1
Mr.
uantico
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Ms.
7326
3.
1
Mrs.
Room 7861
—

—

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—

—

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(Rev. 06.04.2007)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Date:
Attn:

Inspection
Office o Tnnctions
Contact:

Approved By:

02/22/2008

AD Kevin I. Perkins

Extension 4—1837

Perkins Kevin
Clemens Michael tt/

Drafted By:
Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271292—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CLEVELAND DIVISION
07/12/2006

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipcident that occured on 07/12/2006, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I. While attempting to execute the
arrest of ugitive
I fired two rounds
I SA I
from his Bureau-issued Gioc)c, Model 22, .40 caliber pistol.
SIRG
•members recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
jas a result of his,involvemerit in this
shooting incident.
Administrative:
(SSA)[

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
1 dated 06/20/2007.

Details:
This commun-ication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

I

On 07/12/2006, sAl
I accompanied by two
Officers (TFOs), attempted to locate and arrest
wpnted for armed car jacking as well as a parole
violation. I
Iwas involved in a high—speed chase with the
Cleveland Police Department the previous week; however, he eluded
capture.
‘Vi W-r’e

Iwin w

Invest.gation condp±d by the Cleveland Safe Streets
Task Force (SSTF) determinedi
Iwas in possession of a
maroon vehicle and identified his possible location as a hotel
located on Euclid Avenue in Cleveland.

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On the morning of 07/12/2006, investigating Agents

I

r4d that a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle

Iwas supposedly driving, was parked at hR hc*pL R
the TFOs observed a subject matchingi____________
description exit a hotel room with a female.
The male entered

the driver’s door of the suspect vehicle an.d the female entered
th
ncir door.
As the subjects were leaving the area,
SA
ositioned is vehicle in an attempt to block the
suspect vehicle.
s
t
S?J
-_land the TFOs identified themselves
as law enforcement officers çxd orderec the driver to stop the
vehicle and raise his hands. I
linitially complied with
law enforcement personnel commands and raised his hands; however,
rh hj ale continued to move forward a
1
eed.
SA
the TFOs continued to order
o stop the car,
place it in park, and exit t
a point,l
I.
suddenly sped up forcing TFO
o jump out of the
path of the .vehicle. As the yehicle haded toward SAl
I
TFOI
Ifired one round ati
I W1ile attempt1ng to
remove himself from the vehicle’s path, SAl
I fired two
rounds at j
before the vehicle struck him in the right
1
leg.
-

TFOI
Idrove into the parking lot and
attempted to place his ye-hide in a blocking position near the
exit of the hotel paking lot.
TFO
lexited his vehicle
and took c7zr }‘4ind th
‘-‘
‘•“-.
‘
ras driving
toward TFOI
land SAl
Isved nast
SA I
15 vehicle and rammed into TFOI
vehicle,
knocking him to the ground. The collision ciisabi.edl_________
vehicle and he was taken into custody.

I

Neitherl
lior his passenger was hit by any of
the rounds fired; however, the passenger of the vehicle was cut
by broken glass from the vehicle
s windshield.
1

SAl

land TFOI

Iwere treated at a local

hospital and released.

L

On 02/15/2008, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division (INSD), chaired the meeting and
was a non—voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance: I
Ioeputy Chief, Gang Squad
1 Criminal
Division United States Department of Justice (USDOJ);L
1
I
Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Inspector, Office of Inspections (01), INSD;
J
Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Sect.on, CD-i.
Counterintelligence Division; Unit Chief (UC)l_______________
Firearms Training Unit, Training and Development Division (TDD);

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UCI

I

Inspection
02/22/2008

Defensive Systems Unit, TDD; UC I
I
Indian Country/Special Crimes tn3t. Vin1rit Crimes
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; tJC’ I
I
Practical Applications Unit,. TDD; Acting DCI
Special Weapons and Tactics Operations Unit, Critical Incident
Response Group; SSAI
rks Un
1
Toolm
it,
1
I ,Fireams
Scipntifir’ An1ysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I
I
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of General
Counsel; and SSAI
I Gangs/Crim3nal_Enterprise
r±’icrn. gID.
Management Program Analyst (MPA) I
I
I
llnspection Management Unit, 01, INSD, a non-voting
member, was also in attendance.

I

—-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning’ training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

The SIRGmembers una’ni!nousJ
y concurred that the use of
1

deadly force by S4

Iwas justified, and in

conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
This discussion
resulted in the recommendation that no administrativeaction be
taken against SAl_________

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Inspection
02/22/2008

LE.D Cs):
Set Iead 1:

(2ction)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no inistrative action be taken against

SN
shooting incident

las a result of his involvement in this

]h6
]b7C

1
1
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Capronj, Room 7427
Mr.j
SDOJ
1
Mr.l________ , USDOJ
1
Mr “zooin 5096
1
Ms I
Room 3999
1
Mn
Quantico
1
Mn
c)uantico
1-Mr
CIRG
1
Mr.
IQuantico
1
Mr. I
I quantico
1
Ms.
oorn7326
1
Mr.
WF
1
Mr
,
Room 3043
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1
cRcv.I.312OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
-

.—

ROUTINE

Date:

-.

—

To:

Inspection

From:

Atta:

Inspection

Contact:

Approved By:

04/12/2007
-

-,-

-

—

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

jtension

4—1837

Kaiser Kenneth

I

flIpmn

p

Drafted By:
Case ID
Title:

#: 297—HQ—A1271788—D
7

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
02/24/2006

Synopsis:

1he Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipcidrit thf- ncurrd cr 02/24/2006, involving Special
Agent (SA)l
I While conducting
surveillance, SAL
Lias involved in an exchange of gunfire
with two subjects involved in a separate gun battle.
SIRG
members reçnmrnncd that no adminitrative action be taken
against SPJ
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
Administrative: Reference report of former Assistant Special
Agent in Charge (ASAC) t4atthew D. Heron, dated 03/01/2006.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details

of

the Shooting Incident

On 02/24/2006, members of the New York Joint Terrorism
Special Operations Team 9, comprised -of New York City Police
Department NYCPD) detectives and New York Field Of fiàe SAs, were
involved in the surveillance of a subject concerning an ongoing
terrorism investigation.

Team members were conducting individual checks o
locations in various boroughs of New York to determine the exact
locati9n of the subiect
In the early evening hours, Detective
(Det.)I
Icontacted team members and advised he haç
located the target subject in the vicinity of East 95th Street
and Avenue D in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn. Team members
proceeded to the identified location and estab1isied surveillance

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of a residence ir the area. A 30—minute rotating “eye” was
established and each team member who did not have the primary,
surveillañce toà) aostfôñitl ésui udThäf
wäi1Tht
the primary position.

•

At app,roximately 8:45 p.m., Det.I
ontacted
team members via radio and advised of asuspicious red Volkswagen
Jetta in the’viciriity of East 96th Street.
Det.F
lso
advised two black males exited the vehicle and were walking west
on Nolans Lane toward East 95th Street. Although law enforcement
personnel were unsure if the two individuals were directly
involved in the surveillance, team members continued to relay
information concerning their movements.
Det.I
lso advised
participants the suspicious vehicle moved to the areaof Avenue D
and East 5th Street at a high rate of speed after the two
subjects exited the vehicle.
SAl
lobserved the Jetta
move to the corner of East p5th Street and Avenue D while other
team members observed the two subjects approach a restaurant on
the corner. As the two subjects approached the location, another
subject, subsequently. identified as I
I exited a store
.and the three exchanged gunfire.

-

•

•

-

-

-

SAl
‘moved his vehicle into the driveway of a
parking lot, identified himself as an FBI Agent, and displayed

•

his sijield. As two of the three subjects turned and began firing
at SAl
I he assumed a defensive position in his vehicle
and returned fire at the subjects resulting in one subject
fleeing on foot. The subject vehicle slowly rolled South on East,
95th Street and struck a parked car;. however, no subjects exited
the vehicle.
Three subjects were arrested at the scene of the
incident, with one having a graze.wound on the leg. A fourth
subject, was arrested at the North Shore UniversityHospital in
•Long Island, where he was treated for gun shot wounds to the•
wrist and shoulder.
Kings County Assistant District Attorneyl
I
advised the District attorney’s Office would not seek to charge.
or indict SAl
I regarding his involvement in the shooting
incident.

•

•

A declination of prosecution dated 05/19/2006, was
issued by the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, regarding the actions of SA
un this shooting

•

incident.
•

-

On 01/25/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired th meeting anclwas a
non-voting member. The following voting members were in
.2

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,1
-

•

—.

To
Re:

Insection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271788—D, 04/12/2007

attendance:- Chief Inspectorl
Inspections, Inspection Division;
‘

—

%..
•

I Office ofTrial

d

-

Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ; Section Chief (SC) John V. Gillies, Violent Cri
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Assistant sd
IEuras.ian Section, CD—i, Counterintelligence Division;
I
Unit Chief (UC)I
J Firearms Training Unit, Training
and. Development Divisjon (TDD’: t)Cl
I Defensive
Systems Unit, TDD; UCI
FSpecial Weapons’and
Tactics Orrhio Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; tiC
I Practical. Applications Unit, TDD; SSAI
J
IFirearms
I
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
‘
Laboratory Division; and UCI
I, Investigative Law
Unit, Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
SSAI
Manaement Program Analyst (MPA)I
j anci MI?A
1
I Inspection Management Unit, otfice of
Inspections, Inspection Division, non—voting members, were also
in attendance.

D)

7C

—

.

I.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
-

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified and in
conformance with the deadly force policy. Members opined that
SN
I should be commended for involving himself in a
dangerous situation to protect innocent civilians. This will be
brought to the attention of the Assistant Director in Charge of
the New York Field Office.
-.

4

3

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Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271788—D, 04/12/2007

LED(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

ItsPEcTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

I

That no admipistrative action be taken against SA
I as a result o his involvement in this
shooting incident.

Mr.
1
1
Ma.
Mr.
1
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
Mr.
1
1
Mr.
I.
Mr.
I
Mr.
Mr.
1
1-Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
Mr.
1
Mrs.
1
+4
—

-

—

—

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

—
-

—

Pistole, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Clemens, Room 3092
,
Room, 3204
j OSDOJ
VSDOJ
Casey, Room 5096
Gill Room 3280
Quantico
Quantico
CIRG
Room 7326
uantico
Quantico
jRoom 7861

4

Savage- 2012

 (Rev. 01-31.2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:

Date:

ROUTINE

04/18/2007

--

To:

Inspection

prom:

Attn:

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

Inspection

cc,ntact:F
Approved By: Kaiser Kenneth
Clemens MichaeI4’ft’
7
Drafted By:

lExtension

4-1837

Iirr

I

Case XD #: 297—HQ—A1271285-D
Title:

I

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
04/05/2006

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 04/05/2006, involving Special
.gents (SAs)I
landi
I During the
execution of an arrest warrant for an Armed Robbery fugitive, SA
fired two rounds from his Glock Model 21 pistol, and SA
five. rounds from his Glock Model 22 pistol, resulting
in an injury to the subject’s finger.
SIRG member_recommended
that no administrative action be taken against SAs I
I and
las a result of their £nvolvexnent. in this shooting incidept.
Administrative:
Reference report, of Assistant Special Agent in’
Charge CASAC) Gregory Alan Fowler, dated 04/24/2006.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shootinq Incident
During the e,xecution o an arrest warrant for an Armed
Robbery fugitive, two Agents fired shots at the armed subject
resulting in an tnjury to his finger.

I

At. the request of the Cook. County Sheriff’s Office, SA

Iconducted an investigation

of a subject wanted for Armed
Robbery_from the State. of Mississippi.
During the investigation,
SAl
Idetermined the subject
[was
living in an apartment located in Chicago.
SAl
Iconducted
surveillance on tle subject’s purported address and upon
confirmingj
Iwas residing at the address, pxepared an arres

Savage- 2013

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Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271285—D, 04/18/2007

plan. The arrest plan was approved and an arrest was planned for
04/05/2006.
rovided a briefing to arrest team members on
SAl
the morning o 04/05/2006, which included information regarding
the subject*s criminal history, descriitio’i of the target
location, and a warning_regardinçd
iprevious 1istory of
resisting arrest. I
was identified by SI1
1
las being
armed and dangerous.
On 04/05/2006, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the
entry/arrest team árrivqd at the subject’s locationand
corroborated that I
1 resided in the, apartment. The Agents
observed the apartment had a locked steel security gate and a
standard frame door.
SAsI
I and
I gained access
to the aoartrnent buildino and reciuestct other Agents
to enter.
SAs[
landi
I
entered the apartment building to provide assistance with the
entry and arrest while SPJ
Iremained in the courtyard area.
The remaining team members took positions along the perimeter of
the building.
-

Shortly after 6:00 a.m., SA
land
Iknocked
on the door of the subject’s residence. A female spoke to the
Agents through the locked door an4 SAL
dvise4 her they were
the “police” and requeted that she open the door. I
I
lidentified asi
igirifriend, opened the frame door
and spoke to law enforcement personnel through the metal gate.
Simultaneously, Agents located on the peçimtr of iih building
observed a black male at the window.
SAl
Ispoke to
the male subject who indicated he resided in I
I The
man had a distinctive m9le on Iis forehead, similar to tfle
description provided of I
t the pre—arrest briefing.
Information was provided by radio to all members of the team that
the suspect was inside the apartment.
ieventuaily opened the metal gate door of the
I
apartment for the Agents. While SA
landi
Italked to
her at the front door, SAl
lobserved someone mov’ toward
what he believed to be the rear of the apartment/bedroom area.
The four Agents entered the apartment, cleared the
front room. and proceeded tothe back bedroom and bathroom area.
As SAl
I entered’ the kitchen/dining area
1 he oIseryd
h1cIç
male pointing a gun in, the direction of SAsI
JandI
I SA
iyelled, “Gun! Gur! Gun!” and fired five rounds at the
I
subject. As SAl
Iturned, he observed a man illujninatd by
th muzzle flash of a gun with a .gun in his hand.
S?j
fired two rounds at the subject causind
Ito fall to the
ground and drop his weapon after being struck by a bullet in his
right index finger.
2

Savage- 2014

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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271285--D, 04/18/2007

After ensuring1
requested medical assistance.

f

I.

was no longer a threat, SAl
emergency medical personnel.

transported him to St. Bernard’s Hospital.
I
I was later
transported to Mount Sinai Hospital for surgery. Althou
gh
dôrnr advised a ful). recovery was expect
ed, they cautioned
I would probably not regain full use of his in4ex finqer.
The Cook County Sheriffs Office assumed custody of
lupon k
I
his release from the hospital.
On 06/08/2006, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of jstic, Cvil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SAsI
landi
this shooting incident.

Jin

On 07/13/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the. above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was
a
non-voting member. The following v9tina members wr J
n
1
attendance:
former Chief Inspectçrl
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
ID01tV chief,
Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I
I
[ Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; Richard A.
McFee.Ly, Section Chief (SC), Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I SSiStaflt
SC, CD—i, Counterintelligence Divisi.on;I
L Unit Chief
(tiC), Firearms Trainina tipit, Training and Development Divisio
n
(TDD) I
I Chief, Defensive Systems Unit, TDD;
I, UC, Special Weapons jnd Trtic OnPrtios
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group;I
[tic,
Onratiori1 Skills Unit, TOD; Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA)
Firearins
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis
,
Section, Laborato;v Division: SSI
I Washington
Field Office; andi
I General Attorney, Investigative
Law_Unit,_Of fipe of tIe General Counsej. (OGC).
andi
I Management Program Analysts, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Divisio
n, non
voting members, were also in attendance.
b6
—

ObservatIons and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions
from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendatio
ns
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necess
ary.

.3
Savage-20 15

I

 I

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•

Inspection prom:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271285—D 04/18/2007

The SIRG rpemhers unapimousy concurred that the use of
deadly force by SAsI
I ancil
Iwas iustified and. in

resulted in the recommendation that no administrative action be
taken against, either Agent as a result of their involvement
in
this shooting incident.

1h

4

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4

4

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Inspection prom:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271285—D, 04/18/2007

LE.AD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action

-

-•

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no admnisrMiVP tinr be taken against
jandI
I as a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.

SAsF

1
1
1
1
1

3.
3.
1
1
-

3.
I

1

—
-

—

-

—
—

—

—
—

—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Clemens, Room.3092
Mr.
I USDOJ
Mr
J, iJSDOJ
Mr.
oom 5046
Mr.
Quantico
Quantico
Mr.
Mr.
Quan.tico
Quantico
Mr
Mr
uantico
(Attention:__Mr.[

Ms.l

1—Mr.I
1
Mrs.[
—

iRoO

i.ii.

IWFO
Room 7861

++

5.
Savage- 2017

 (Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
o:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Wrom:

.

Inspection
Contact:

.pproved By:

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

I

Extension 4—1837

Kaiser Kenneth

I

(]mnc

Drafted By:

I

Attn:

04/24/2007

Jlrr

Case ID

#:

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION
07/26/2006

297—HQ—A1271748—D

7C

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incir3,t l-hi- nrr’rred on 07/26/2006, involving Special
Agent (SAj
I who recently retired from the FBI.
During he attempted arrest of an attempted murder suspect, SA
I fired one round from his personally owned Remington 12
gauge shotgun, injuring the fleeing suspect.
SIRG members
recoinmerded that no administrative action be taken against SA
hs a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:__Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA)
J dated 11/08/2006.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 07/24/2006,1
I was involved in an attempted
murder in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
A vehicle arid physical
description of IIwas provided to Detectivel
I a
fugitive detective in Fort Lauderdale assigied tohe Miami
fL
Division’s Violent Cr
s quad.
Detectivel
!was advised 0
k pifense, the fact that
the violent nature of
Iwas armed
with a firearm, and that jhad recently been released from
prison.
On 07/26/2006, DetectiveI
‘unmarked_oolice vehicle, when

infotmation tha4

Iwas

I

Ian4

SAl

I received

Iwere

in a specific location in the Fort

Savage-20 18

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 To:
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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271748—D, 04/24/2007

Lauderdale area.
Detective
tified the Fort Lauderdale
Police Department dispatcher o
possible location and
requested the assistance of marke police vehicles to respond to
the area. Two uniformed officers responded to the location,
quickly located the subject’s vehicle and began to follow the
vehicle for a distance without operating the vehicle emergency
lights and siren.
As the vehicle stopped at a residence on 25th
Street, later determined to be the subject’s mother’s residence!
the officers initiated a felony traffic stop.
During the raffic stop, S
I fired one round at
the subject who pled in li vhr1e.
The two uniformed officers,
Detective I
I. and SAl
t as well as additional marked
police units, pursued_the fleeing suspect. After striking an
uninvolved citizen,[
Icrashed his vehicle and fled on foot.
Iwas pursued several blocks where he was taken into custody by
I
SAj
j and other Police Department officers after a violent
struggle.

F I was trarsported to the Broward General Hospital for
treatment of a gunshot wound to his upper right arm.
On 10/03/2006, a report was reciy from the Broward
County State Attorney’s Office indicatingi
Iwas charged with
three counts including attempted first degree murder, possession
of a firearm by a convipH f1ô, and felony criminal mischief.
Additionally, Detectivel
las advised no criminal charges
would be filed against SAl
I
On 03/2012007, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SA I
I in this
shooting incident.
On 04/13/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michae)
S. Clemens, Inspecion Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance:
Chief Inspectorl
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;j
I Trial
Attorney, Domeltic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I
I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ; Section Chief (SC) Games Casey, Eurasian Section, CD-i,
Counterintelligence Division; SC John V. Gillies., Violent Crimes
Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (UC)I
I
i Firearms Trinincc Tinli-. Pr.Riing and Development
Divisior (TDD; Uci
I Defensive Systems Unit,
TDD; DCI
I Special Weapons and Tactics ODerations
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSAI
I
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; SSAI
I Investigative Law
—

Savage- 2019

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Re:

I

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271748—D,

Inspection.
04/24/2007

Unit, iffjce of the General Counsel (OGC); and Ai
I
I Practical Applications Unit, TDD. SSA
and Management Program Analyst (MPA)I
I
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, non-voting members, were also in attendance.

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident wich
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observatibns, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an
Operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by former SAl
Iwas justified and in
conformance with bhe FBI’s deadly force policy.
Th only observation made by SIRG members_pertained to
SA j
Jpersona.Lly owned weapon (POW).
SAl
I POW
Remington 70 shotgun used in this incident was not a currently
approved POW.
Miami Division’s FD-418 specif that F
I
POW shotgun had a 14 inch barrel. As SAl
Ihas since
retired, it would be illegal (a felony weapons violation) for him
to possess a shotgun with a barrel length of less than 18 inches
,
without the proper Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
registration and tax stamp. I
[should not have been
permitted to utilize an unauthorized POW shotgun, nor should
it
have been fitted with a 14 inch barrel.
Both of these issues, if
accurately roorted. pose potential problems for both the Miami
Division an
I The Miami Division should inspect retired
SAl
I POW shotgun used in this incident to determine the
actual barrel length.
If the barrel length of th weapon is in
fact 14 inches, Miami should ascertain whether that barrel is
Bureau property.
Miami should further determine whetherI
is in possession of a Bureau owned 14 inch shotgun barrel that heI
may have, or had, insal1ed on this shotgun.
This matter will be
discussed with the Special Agent in Charge of the Miami Division.

3

Savage-2020

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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271748—D, 04/24/2007

LEAD (s)

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

ThJSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

I

Ion

DC

For information due to the retirement of SA
01/03/2007.

I

I

b6
IC

1
1

1
1
1

1

3.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

—

-

—

-

-

—

-

—

—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Clemens, Room 3092
Room 3204
Mr.I
USDOJ
Mr.I
r.1_______ tJSDOJ
Mr. Casey,
oom 5096
Mr. Gillies, Room 3280
Mr.
Quantico
tIr.
Quantico
Mr.
CIRG
Mr.’
uantico
Mr.
Quantico
Ms.
Room 7326
Mrs.I
IRoom 7861

++

4

Savage-2021

 (Rtv.OI.3.2CQ3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTiGATION
Pzecedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Fzo:

Date:
Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

05/30/2007

AD Kevin I. Perkins
Extension 4-1837

Perkins Kevin L
Clemens Michae

I

Ilrr

Case Th t: 297-HQ-A1271462—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
COLU14BIA DIV!SIO
10/20/2006

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/20/2006, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
j rnrnn f-hp arrest of federal
fugitiv4
I fired one round from
J SA I
his Bureau-issues G.Lock, Model 22 pistol, stri3çing the subject in
the chest. S-IRG members recommended that no administrative
action be taken against SAl
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:

dated 01/25/2007.

Reference report of Inspector

[

I

Details: This cotrnunication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the

Shooting Incident

7C

On 11/23/2004, the Columbia Division initiated a
violent gang investigation focusing on a local group of the
Bloods Street Gang. In January 2006, a federal indictment was
returned charging several membeis with violations oe Title 21.
On 07/18/20061
I along with fifteen other
individuals, was also indicted for Title 21 violations.
Investigation revealed.
p regularly carried or possessed
weapons, had previously discussed executing a fi.rebomb attack on
a Police Department Safe Streets Task Force Officer, and made
statements to.a police officer that he would not return to sail.

Savage-2O22

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Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271462—D, 05/30/2007

On 10/20/2006, sAl
I c’f th Co1umbi
Division received information f;om Serqeant I
I of the
Columbia Police Department that I
Iwas reportedly near his
sister’s residence located in the Colony Apartments in ColumbTh.
Due to SAl
linvolvement in trial preparation, he relayed the
information to S F
lwho re—contacted Sergeant
Sergeantl
ladvised the subject was just observed on
IlSreet
n1 described the clothing he was wearing.
SAs
landi____ drove to the 2,ocat5,on to verify the
information provided by sergeant I
I.
Upçn thjr arrival at the identified location, SAs
landI
I attempted to enter the nearby Columbia Police
Department Substation to view CCTV coverage of areas within the
apartment complex. Discovering the substation was locked
0 the
Agents drove to Bailey Street in an attempt to locatej
I
Failing to locate the subject, the Agents decided to drive
through the area a second tjm nd observed an individual fitting
the physical description of I
I The indivit1 ?ho was
wearing the same clothing descibed by Srceant I
I ws
Mnm in
orkng lot in front of I
I sAs
I
I andl
Iproceeded back to the noir cubstation nd
cotacted Suoervisorv St?ecial Agent (SSA)I
I and
SAl
Ifor assistance. SA I
larrjved at
the sjation and SAl
Isketched the spot where.he and SA
I
Isaw the subject. The Agents made a tentative arrest
plan while awaiting the arrival Sand approval of the plan by SSA

I

-

-

-

I

I

thô nhtion and was
ss1
I arrivej
briefed on the arrest plan. SSA I
I approved_the plan
which called for the four Agents to drive towardi
I in a
single unmarked car as though they were potential drug
ourchaers. They would quickly exit the vehicle and surprise
un order to effect his arrest. The Agents, wearing
I
tactical vests marked with prominent FBI letters,_proceeded to
the location of the subject. Unable to locatel
1 the Agents i
proceeded to the police substation to discuss other options
available to assicj+.
1-e location of the subject.
A decision
was made to go tol
js sister’s apartment to determine if she
knew the subject’s location. The Agents drove into the parking
lot of the apartment complex and quickly approached the apartment
covering both the front and rear of the unit.

At approximately 5:45 p.m., SAsJ
land
proceeded to the front of the apartment while SSA I
land
moved to the back of the residence to cover the back
SAl
døc5r.

Moments prior to the Agents reaching the apartment, an
unknown male approached the partially open door of the apartment
2

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Re:

Inspection ‘rom: Inspection
297-HQ—A1271462—D, 05/30/2007

and warned the subject of the approaching Agents. I
Imoved
from the living room area of the apartment into the kitchen,
leaving four individuals, incluino twin one—year old boys,
inside the living room. As SAs I
I and I
I approached
the open door, they
‘
young children playing in front
of the apartment.
told the children to go inside
the apartment and
into the door next to the
subject
observing the subject inside’ theunit atl
his weapon and yelled, “FBI, put
your hands up.
ente’red the apartment and moved
immediately to the right along the front wall arid toward the
center of the room. As SAl
I apprpached jthe front door, he
also observed he subject and instructel
I to put his hands
up. Initiallyl
Iwas noncompliant with the Agents’ commands’
but subsequently raised his left hand, kept his right hand below
waist level, and bladed him’
SAl
I Observing
the subipcts movements, SAl
.led, “watch out.!r SA
I
Iould not clear
right hand but observed
him moving his ri
s waist. Believing I
I was
drawing a weapon,
ired one round from his pistol
striking the subject in the chest

I

*

SAsI
land I
Icleared the unit, SA
lapplied emergency first aid tol
Is wound and
Emergency Medical Support (EMS) was regueste. ENS personnel
arrived minutes later and transported [
I to the Palmetto
Richiand Memorial ilospital where he was treated for his gunshot
wound.
The State of South Caolina_Ocjtor’s Office reviewed
tue case file and determined SAl
Iwas justified in firing

his weapon and advised no criminal charges would be filed in this
matter. By letter dated 05/03/2007, the United States Department
•of Justice, Civil Rights Division, advised a criminal
investigation was not warranted in th.s matter.

On 05/15/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member. The follçwina voting members were in
attendance: Chief Inspectorl
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection 1ivision;I
I Trial
Attorney, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
j, Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,
I
USDOJ; Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section, CD—l,
Counterintelligence Division; SC John v Gillies, Violent Crimes
1 Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (tiC) I
Section
I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training and Development,
Division (POD); UCI
J, Defensive Systems Unit,
TOO; tiC I
f Special Weapons and Tactics Operations
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA I
I
.

3

Savage- 20 24

b6
IC

 To:
Re:

Inspection prom: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271462—D, 05/30/2007

Fireaxrns
Toolmarks Unit Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Div
,
Practical Applications
Unit TOD; SSA
Washington Field Office; and
General AttorlIev, Investiaative Tdaw Unit, Office
of the General Counsel (OGC) I
I Management
Program Analyst, Inspection Management. Unit, ‘Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division, a non—voting member, was also
in attendance.
-

Observations and. aecoxnmenclations of the SIRG
The,SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident, with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrativ action if deemed necessary
The SIRG members unanimously poncurred that the use of
deadly force by SAl____________________ was justified’ and in
conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy. This discussion
resulted in the ;ecornmendaion that no administrative action be
taken against SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

Savage-2025

s

 To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection.
297—HQ—A1271462—D, 05/30/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Leact 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
.T WASHINGTON, DC

That no.adrninistrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shóoting incicient.

1
Mr.
i.
Ms.
I - Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr
1
Mr
1—Mr
I
Mr
-

-

-

Pistole, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Ipnins Room 3092
z, Room 3204
,USDOJ

-

-

-

-

-

Casey, oom 5096
Gillies, Room 3280
, Quantico
,

Quantico

,

CIRG

-

I
I

-

(Attention: Mr.
Mr.I
IQuantico

J. Room 7326
Ms.’
(AtPnticrnf S4
1-Mr.
lWE
1
Mrs
Room 7861

I

—

I

-

++

5

Savage-2026

 __________

FD-204

(Roy. 12-1-95)

TJNETED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Pederal Bureau of Investigation

Copy

to:

I

Reporl of:
Datc

05112/2uu5

CaseID#:

297—HQ—A1270955D

Office CIRG
lb 6
7C’

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
BOSTON DIVISION
MARCH 24, 2005
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

CharaCtCF

Synopsir

I

I

On 03/24/2005, FBI Special Agent fA I
I Boston Division, shot and woundedi
19 an
IclIlr1j
IDate of Birth (DOD) of
arrest in Boston, Massachusetts (MA.). S1
I was the
only shooter during the incident andi
iwas the only
person wounded. According to witnesses, I
eceived
gun shot wounds to the hest and am and was treated at
Boston Medical Center. I
linjuries were not life
threatening and he survived.
DETAThS:
mnjng
Iwas the subject of
I
Boston 1
Di
v
ision bank robbery investigation I
I
J CITIZENS BANK, 435 BROOKLINE AyE, BOSTON, MA;
03/01/2005
91A-BS-95U0) and a local warrant for his
arrest had been obtained from the Roxbury District Court
in Suffolk County (Warrant Number 0502CR00U37) on
03/23/2005, after he had been identified by the Bank
Robbery Task Force (BRF) as the individual_responsible
for that robbery.
During that obbery,I
Ihad
brandished a pistol and threatened to shoot the teller.
—

I
Lzas developed as a suspect following an
episode of the Fox 25 television show, “Massachusetts Most
Wanted.”
An individual called in to that program and
provided information which assisted in identifying
I as the bank robber. The caller warned the police
I
that, I
us your man.. .anci he could have a gun.”
This document contains neither recendatiotis nor conc3.usions of the JBZ. Xt is the pop.rty of the
and is loaned to your aq.acy; it and its contents ar, not to be distributed eutsid. your agacoy.

—-

 ___lassisted

297-HQ-A1270955-D

The caller also stated th’imay currently reside at his
girlfriend’s_residence atl_______________________ Dorchester,
MA. I
Ihad a significant criminal history, including armed
robbery, assault and battery of a police officer, assault with a
dangerous weapon, witness intimidation, and was a suspç in
numerous other jôstOn DivIsion bank robberies. I
I also
known as (aka),l
I Date of Birth (DOB)
Florida, Social Security Account
Iplace of birth:
I was further
Number (SSAN): I
FBI Number’
I
described as a black male, approximately 5’lO” and weighing 280 lb 6
pounds.
lb 7 C
-

I

On 03/23/2005, Det.I
I, Maiden Police
Boston
Police Department
Department (MPD); Det.I
j
(BPD); and Det. I
I Cambridge Police Department
(CPD), obtained an armed roer arrest warrant issued in the
Roxburv District Court of Suffolk County foil
1 SA
Iby writing
Det.I
p and Det.
tne operations plan for the arrest on 03/23/2005. The plan
contained maps of the local area, communications plan, an arrest
photograph ol
land his girlfriend, the identities. and
team assignment ot all of the members participating in the
surveillance/arrest, and descriptive data of the two dwellings
wherel
Imay be located.
The operations plan was reviewed and aooroyed by BRTF
land Actiig
Acting Supervisory Special Agent (A/SSA)L
Jon
Assistant Special Agent In Charge_(A/ASACL
the morning of 03/24/2005. SAl
ibriefed the operations plan
to the participating members on the morning of 03/24/2005, at
approximately 8:30 am.
He read verbatim the DOJ Dqadlv Foce
Policy to all of the participants and advisd t1at I
I was
to be considered Armed and Dangerous. SAl Jalso provided an
overview of I
lextensive criminal history, to include the
1 was previously arrested for assault and
fact that I
battery of a police officer and had attempted to run over several
firemen and a policeman while fleeing the scene of a traffic stop
in 2001.
On 03/24/2005, the BRTF, which included members of the
Massachusetts State Police (MS?), as well as two
CPD, BPD, MPD,
FBI Agents from another squad, attempted to effect the arrest of
I outside one of
I
I The primary plan was to arrest I
If he was positively identified inside
the two known residences.
a residence, both surveillance/arrest teams would converge on the
one location before an entry was made utilizing a tactical teaxa
from either FBI or BPD. The BRTF preferred not to effect the
arrest in a vehicle.
However, it it was necessary and time
2

lb 6
lb

 _________Iresidence.

297-HQ-A1270955-n

permitting, the BRTF planned to request marked units from BPD for
assistance.
Primary communications was ovei FBI Channel A-2.
At about 9:30 am, 12 law enforcement officers and
Agents from the Boston Division of the ‘BI set up two
surveil1ance/art tem in the vicinity of the following
locations:
Jgirlfriend’s_house at I
1)1
floor, Dorchester, MA and 24
I
Inlother’s house at I
Team one, responsible for
1 Mattapan 4A.
I
MPD
consisted of Det.
the residence ati
,
and Lt. I
1 and
tsp in one vehicle; SAl
Det..p
I CPD in a second vehicle; and SAsL
Team two,
I
Iark i
I.n the third vehicle.
responsible for the residence ati
I
p anal
I
consisted of SAsI
un a
in one vehicle; Det.I
I BD and A/SSAI

I

t.

un

a third vehicle. All law
second vehicle, and SAl
enforcement personnel wore badges or vests identifying themselves
as law enforcement officers. The weather was clear and not a
factor.

Both surveillance/arrest teams positioned_themselves
land A/SSA
outsidq of the aforementioned residences. Det. I
ladvised the BPD of the operation while in route to their
I
surveillance/arrest location. For about two hours, SAl
orovideçi surveillance information regarding the activity at the
She observed at least three or four
The Floyd Street residence
individuals enter and exit the house.
had very little surveillance activity. At approximately 11:30
am, SAP
Itransmitted over the radio that a heavy black male
I residence and
resembling I
I had exited thel
climbed into a late model silver Toyota Camry. She asked FBI
Boston radio room to run the license plate in an attempt to
identify the vehicle owner as she called out the vehicles
A ih silver Toyota
direction of movement on Good1e Road.
‘parked on Goodale
hnd A/SSJI
Camry drove past Det.I
Road, both were able to verify that the driver looked like
L
I
This was broadcast over Bureau radio to the other
unit’s involved in the arrest plan. As the vehicle made a left
onto Blue Hill Avenue, the BRTF surveillance_vehicles from the
vicinity of Goodale Road were following
1 As the car
moved toward Floyd Street, A/SSAI_______ transmitted over the
radio that the team should start to position their vehicles to
effect a felony car stop in case that was necessary.

I

I

imomentarily stopped and
Once on Floyd Street,’
then rte a Wide, plow, right hand turn onLo Lucerbne Street.
SAs
Icar
Iwere following direct±y behind I
I aridi

3

I

 ____I

297 -HQ-Al 270955- D

and they were followed by Ltl
I At this
land Det.I
point, mast BRTF members advised the SIRT that they believed
I
Las aware of the vehicle surveillance4
continued on Lucerne Street and made a rj,ciht turn çnto Callender
Street.
As soon as he had made the turn,I
Ipulled his car
+rrt
to the right side rf -h 1.Vad, almost
USi” p
Bureau radio, AIssl
ldireced S?sl
Iandj
Ito cut
cAcI
him off.
witj
I driving, gui.ckly
I and cut ot the travel. Lane Ofl Callender
passed byi
Street, positionina their vehicle some wentv to thirty feet in
front ofl
I
land Det.I
Ir also oased
Lt.I
I and stopped at an ang),e_within reet or I
driver’s side front bumper. Lt. I
advised that he felt SAs
iandI
Ihad left too much room between their vehicle
I
andL
ito escape if he
I, which would aiiowl
desired.
BTRF members jumped out of their vehicles with weapons
drawn and identified themselves by yelling, “Police”, T
FBI”
“hands up, get your hands up.” BRTF members were wearing bullet
proof vests with police and FBI or police badges around their
necks at the time.
initially raised his hands.
It was
necessary for Det.
o shut the door of his own vehicle in
order to move into
approximately two to thre feet n
front of
drivers—sid front fender.. Det.I
I
continueçi to issuç commands for’
o show his hands. He
observedi
‘raise his hands as SAl
lattempted to open
Idriver side car door. He then advised that he saw
I
Ieyes ‘get real big’, and then
Isuddenly
lowered his hands. I
Icar immediately started moving
forward and jumped over the curb and onto the side walk.
Det.
Istated that it was necessary for him to i.umo out qf the
I
way of the vehicle to oreyent from being hit byl___________ car

and pinned between

I

Ivehicle.

I was positioned oji the ungers-side of
cA E
‘‘jehicle attempting to open I
Icar door and
I was approaching from the rear passenger side. SA
Det. I
Iwas wearing his Bureau issued body armor/bullet proof
aved o chain around his
1
vest, holster, and had his badge dispJ
neck at thç time of the incident. sat
advised that
Ivehicl hcan to move while his hands were still
1 his hands.
When the
raised._and_then
Isuddcnlv droroe

car started moving and he sawl
I hands go down toward his
waist, SAl
pwas reaching for a weapon and
ithoughti
fearing for his life, he fired. Other than yelling atl
I
to raise his hands and stop the car, SAl
idoes not recall
saying anything else; however, some BRTF members recall hearing

4

 297-HQ-A1270955-D

I

SAl
lyell, “He’s reaching, he’s reaching.” They then
heard and/or observed aproximatelv six rounds fire from SA
iweapon toward I
Evidence Response Team (ERT) analysis and SAl
Ifired a total of six rounds,
statement indicate that SAl
all fired in quick succession. The fi.rst two rounds were fired
through the front passenger side window, two more were fired
through the rear passenger side wipdow. and the last two were
ladvised that although
fired through the rear window. SAl
js cr whn it began to
he had been moving along sidel
I continued to
move, he was stationary when he fired. SAl
un the driver’s seat.
fire until he could no longer seel
Jcar continued to travel up on the sidewalk and struck
I
a fence and came to a stop.

I
lopened the door and fell out
Det.I
Imoved to the car and reached LnsideI
vehicle and put the transmission in park. I
did you shoot me? I’m not armed.”

I

rrrind.

lasked,

I
“Why

BOston Emergency Medical Services EMS) and BPD were
I throuqh the
immediately notified of the incident by Det.l
BPD radio system and responded within minutes. SA I
I
t.
S Bureau raio.
notjfied the Bostoli Field Offic
rolled ou1 of tile
1after
I hand—cuffedj
I
I
and SAl
vehicle and onto the ground. Bo
til
U
EMS
o
assistance
mdical
Irelldered
Ford Crown
Iwas escorted to A/SSA
arrive. AI
SA
Victoria vehicle_immediately after the shoo ing incident.
lapproached him and asked how he was doing.
I
I and A/SSA I
He was asked if he
SAl
Istated, “I can’t stop shaking.”
He left the
“Yes.”
replied,
he
and
Hospital
wanted to go to the
scene of the incident in an ambulance but then declined
b
hospitalization en route and was taken to the Boston office of
b7C
FBI.
the
.

Interviews of non—law enforcement personnel were
conducted at the scene during the neighborhood canvass conducted
by both the BPD and FBI. In summary, the witnesses, who were
residents in the area, noted hearing the commotion caused by the
operation, but none were direct witnesses to the shooting
In order not to duplicate interviews, the SIRT adopted
incident,
the interviews conducted by BPD and the Boston Division.

Iwas overheard admitting
At the hospital,I
heroin use earlier that morning to an attending nurse by BPD
Officer I
I A hypodermic needle was found among his
5

 297-HQ-A1270955-O

I

belonainas by SAF
Ibelonairgs.
SAs I
lancil
stating words to the eftect,
shot me five times.”

Juring an inventory of
iiade an unsolicited statement to
i of theBoston FBI office
1 my hands were down but they
cnow
7C

The FBI Boston gvidence Response Team, working with the
BPD Evidence Team. Drocessed the incident scene and vehicle
driven byl
All ballistic materials weze sent to the FBI
Laboratory.

I

6

 I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

FD-204 (Roy. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report of
Date:

IIC I
04 /05/2006

j

orncc

Inspection Division
5
lb

CascID#:

297HQ41270919—D

Thie:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
ATLANTA DIVISION
APRIL 04, 2005

daracte

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsb:

This shooting incident occurred while an FBI Agent, two
Georgia State Patrol (GSP) Troopers and a Burke County
Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) Investigator attempted to arrest
John Clifton Manyfield on a Federal Unlawful Flight to
Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) warrant. The UFAP warrant was
obtained pursuant to a Sacramento Police Department
warrant charging Manyfield with murder, attempted murder
and weapons violations. The Medical Examiner determined
£4anyfield died of a gunshot wound to the chest.
DETAILS:

I
I
1
I
I
I

The Atlanta Division’s involvement in this matter was
based on a telephonic fugitive lead out of Sacramento
Division on 03/31/2005, followed by an EC with the same
date.
The lead advised that a fugitive, John Clifton
Manyfield, was in Burke County, Georgia. Manyfleld was
wanted by the Sacramento Police Department for murder,
attempted murder and weapons violations.
Sacramento
rrrirt mmhi
advised that Manyfield was .“
:b7D
furtper advised they had a
IManyfield at a number nxcn came taclc to an address
of 839 Manderson Circle, Hephzibah, Georgia.
:•

A subsequent phoze call from Sacramento to Atlanta
determined Mnvfield was currently at the rsidnc
SAs
land

were en route to the Burke County

This document contains neith recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI

•
It is the property ed the rot
and is loaned to ycar agency; it and it contents are not to be distributed rnitside your agency.

6

 ______

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) to plan an arrest of Nanyfield.
Initially a. verbal plan was devised wherein law enforcement would
establish a rally point near the residence and a call would be
placed to the location directing him to come out. This plan was
telephonically briefed to ASAC Harry Bowen and he concurred.
Prior to arriving at the BCSO the group was notified
teleohonicallv that Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) SA
I was in foot pursuit of a bank robbery suspect
I
approximately a half mile from their current location. SSP.A
I
kiecided to break off from the initial plan and lend
whatever assistance was needed in locating the fleeing bank
robbery suspect. After a four hour search for that suspect met
with negative results, the group proceeded to the BCSO and
briefed Sheriff’s Deputies about fugitive Manyfield. After
speaking with Sheriff’s Deputies it was determined they were
involved in a missing juvenile investigation at the 839
Manderson Circle address and had spoken to some residents at the
location earlier in the day. Upon learning this, the plan was
revised and it was decided the best approach was to conduct a
ruse interview at the house in an attmt to dtermine if
Idirected SAl
Manyfield was at the residence. SSRAI
I
1 fuflit1ye to
to contact Sacramento d
determine if he was at the location. I
determined Manyfield had left the home tor the ni.gnt, rie
investigation was discontinued until the following day.

Itelephonica].ly
On April 1, 2005, SSRAI
contacted ASAC Bowen and advised him of the revised plan and the
same FBI Agents re1uriid to the BCSO in order to facilitate the
Ito
arrest plan.
lonce again directed SAl
SSRAI
contact Sacramento and have the source initiate contact with
Manyfie].d. After numerous_unsuccessful attempts by the source to
leancelled the operation for the
cont ± ?4 vf1e1i. .cRAI
I

I
I
I
I
I

Iwas notified by
On Monday April 4 2005, SAl
i4anyfield
FBI Sacramento that a
Manderson
at
the
839
presently
(Nanyfild_was
and that he
jcontacted SSRAI________ who was on
Circle address.
SAl
Annual Leave, relayèa cne details of his converaaiofl with
I was at
Isince hel
Sacramento and informed SSRAI
least three hours away he culd conact BCSO and let them
lagreed with his plan and
SSAI
initiate the arrest.
a4vsd hia to use whatever resources he needed and to i-nf-erm him
of any significant developments.
2

G

b6
b7C

 Ithen

__

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I

-pther change of plans, FBI SAl
land
land assisting law enforcemei,1 nrc0njiel from
GSP, BCSO, and GBI met at the interectiop of I
ndI
I
roads in Burke County, Georgia. SAl_____ briefed those present
on fugitive John Clifton Manyfield, a vised them that he was
armed and dangerQus. apd passed out wanted bulletins with color
photographs.
SAl
I than informed the teams they would proceed
with the arrest plar devised previously wherein the front entry
team would use a ruse of seeking further information regarding a
report of a missing child from the suspect residence. This front
team consisted of BCSO Investigators I
I
I
aand FBI SAl
IThe rear perimeter team wou.La cover the
rear of the reidence. Two GSP Troopers,l
land
l
I were instructed to set up a “road check” at
Duckhead Road and Allen Road.

F

-‘-

As the two teams of investiqators proceeded toward the
residence, Troopersi
land!
Iwere notified by other
officers that they wanted them to check an oncoming gray Jeep
Cheokee wich was approaching their location. Troopersl
1
and
lapproached the Jeep on foot from the rear. Trooper
lapproached the driver’s side of the oar, d.rivep byi
I
the T
fugitive mother, and Trooper I
s
approached
t1i msenger side occupied by John Clifton Manyfield.
Trooper
the passenger matched the description of the
fugitive and asked him for identification. The opssenger claimed
to have no identification on him. Trooperl______ then asked his
name, at which time Manyfield gaye hi brothers first name and
failed to give a last name. Ms.,l
limmediately realized
something-was wrong and provided Manyfields last name to the
Troopers.

I
I

Trooper
proceeded to the patrol car to
retrieve the photograph of the fugitive. He returned to the
passenger side of the front quarter panel handed Trooper I
I
the photograph anc[infori-ed him the passenger was the murder
suspect. Troopçrl
Jwalked back to the passenger side of the
Trooperl
I drew his weapon and backed up. Trooper
I instructed Manyfield to take off his seatbelt and step out
of thevehicle. Manyfield, who was clearly agitated and nervous,
moved his right hand slowly to unlock the seatbelt. At the same
tini hi left hand moved towards the center console. Trooper
Itn herd Manyfield whisper to the driver ‘just go”. As
Trooper I
Ireached in the window and grabbed Manyfield’s
right arm, Manyfield atjemtte4 to depress the accelerator with
his left hand. Trooperl
I announced “Taser’ and shot
Manyfield with the Taser gun loda-ina he probes in the right midback.
Simultaneously, Trooper I
Ire—holstered his weapon

 ______

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

.

I

I

returned to the driver’s side door, pulled MsJ
lout of the
car and reached into the car to turn off the ignition. Manyfield’
immediately re—started the car and again depressed the
accelerator revving the engine.
It was reported this happened
several times. The Taser was re-activated a second time, after
which Manyfleld grabbed the wire leads and aooareitly
disconnected them from the Tasar. Trooperl
Ithen applied
the Taser directly to Manyfield’s body and pulled the trigger.
Following this “prAc .nnnact” Nanyfield grabbed the Taser in one
hand and Trooperl
heft arm in the other h n
began to
pull Trooperl
hinside the Jeep. As Trooper
reed his
left arm and attempted to pull himself back out o
e vehicle,
both men still had hold of the Taser. Trooper
then
produced his Taser gun at which point he was immediately grabbed
by Ms. I
I and pulled to the back end of the Jeep.
During_this sequence of events, Investigator I
I
Japproached the passenger side of the Jeep.
land SAL
Investigator]
Iwas able to see the Taser had already been
fired and Trooper I
I continued jo be engaged in a struggle
with Manyfield.
otn investigator I
land SN
irew their
weapons and as Manyfield revved the engine,I
Iwent around the
front of the Jeep to try and turn off the ignition. SAl
I
remained in position to the right of Trooper I
As Trooper I
I holstered his Taser and began to move
backtward the driver’s_door he heard the gunshot fired by SA
Iheard the gunshot as he reached into
I Investigator I
the Jeep to turn off the ignition. Trooperj
I was attempting
to pull himself as far back away from Manyfield as he could when
he heard the shot fired by SN
I
Only one round was fired, from outside the passenger
side front window of the Jeep, striking Manyfield in the upper,
inner_quadrant of the right chest above the nipple. At the time
SAl
I fired his weapon, Manyfiçld still had hold of the Taser.
Officers immediately asked for an ambulance. Emergency Medical
Technicians continued life saving measures on Manyfield however,
his pulse stopped prior to arriving at the hospital. The Medical
Examiner determined Manyfield died of a gunshot wound to the
chest.
SAC Jones requested that GBI process the shooting scene
and conduct the investigatiop- AUt tritnesses of the shooting
were interviewed by GB!. SAl
Iweapon, a Glock, model 22,
.40 caliber weapon, serial number DZW441US, was also turned over
to GB! fox forensic testing. SA I
I declined to give a
voluntary statement on advice frd’mnis counse1. A copy of GBI’s

 __

I
h6

297—HQ—A],27 0 919—D

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

b 70

investigation was provided to the FBI and is included in this
report.
The GBI file was presented to District Attorney I
1 Augusj- Thrijcial Circuit, on September 7, 2005, f n
review.
Mr.I
Iconcluded there were no violations of Georgia
criminal law and closed this file, administratively.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

IX.

SIGNED SWORN STATEbT
SAl_____________________

1

SSRAI__________I

2

FD—302s
ASAC HARRY W. BOWEN III
SAC GREGORY JONES
DA
04/07/05 INTERVIEW
DA
05/02/05 INTERVIEW
SA
(GBI)
DOCUMENTING RECEIPT OP FIREARMS TRAINING
& LEGAL TRAINING SIGN IN SHEETS
DOCUMENTING RECEIPT OF SHOOTING SCENE PHOTOS
AND MEDICAL EXAMINERS PHOTOS
DOCUMENTING RECEIPT OF SHOOTING SCENE
VHS VIDEOTAPE

III.

XV.

.9
10

11

INVESTIGATIVE DOCUMENTS
COPY OF WANTED POSTER FOR MANYFIELD
TRAUMA MEDICAL RECORDS OF MANYFIETD
ARREST WARRANT FOR MANYFIELD

V.

8

GEORGIA BUREAU OF ZNVESTIGATICT REPORT
ATTACHEDFOLDER

I
I.
I
I
I
1
I

3
4
S
6
7

12
13
14

ELECTRONIC CONMtThTXCATIONS
SACRAMENTO EC WITH LEAD TO ARREST MANYFIELD
FD—419, REPORT OF.FIREARMS DISCHARGE
EC RE ATLANTA DEADLY FORCE LEGAL INSTRUCTION
EC ENCLOSING DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S REPORT . .

15
16

17
18

1

 _____________Idated
__________________j:

S

‘

(Rev.OI-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON
Precedence:
To:

Date:

RQUPtNE
Attn:

Inspection

B?rom:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

I

I

10/19/2005

AD

Extension 4—187

Cloyd Daniel
Mertz Kimberly

Drafted By:

lrr

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1270955—D
jtle:

BOOTIIG INCIDENT
BOSTON DIVIION
04/29/2005

-

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting inc4derit thpt ôôcurrd o 04/2g/2fl(Th. involving Spcia1
During the
Agents (SAs)I
landi
execution of arrest warrants, SA[
land SA
I fired one
round each from their Bureau-issuea springfield .45 caliber
SIRG members
pistols, killing an aggressive pit bull dog.
recommended that no a&ninistrative action be taken against either
Agent as a result of their involvement in this shooting incident.

I

Administrative:

Reference Electronic Communication of SAl
05/02/2005.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
on 04/29/2005, while serving two arrest warrants, two
members of the Boston Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team
shot and killed an aggressive pit bull dog.
ht the command to
According to SA I
execute the warrant, he exited the SWAT van and assumed position
five in the line of operators. The team leader knocked and
announced the presence of the FBI and the intent to serve a
warrant.
After a period of time, with no response from the
residence, the team leader called for a breaching operator to
effect entry into the residence.

I

 I

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1270955-D, 10/19.12005

As the door opened, a large white pit bull dog
SA
I
immediately rushed towards the breaching operator.
heard a gunshot and believed another_SWAT operator fired at the
dog..
Investigation determinec SN
I fired the first round
into the back neck area of the doq.
The pit bull continued down
the front steps toward SAl
land other SWAT team personnel.
Corcerned or the safety of himself and other team members,
SA I
I fired one round into the dog causing the dog to fall
to the ground.
Law enforcement personnel proceeded into the
residence and effected the arrest of two subjects.
On 07/05/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the aboveDeputy Assistant Director (DAD)
captioned shooting incident.
Andrew R. Bland III, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Chief Inspector Kimbrlv K. Mertz, Office of Inspectioná,
I Special Legal Cou.nsel, Civil
Inspection Division;l
Rights Division, Criminal Section, USDOJ;I
1
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division,
OSDOJ; Charles J. Cunningham, Section Chief (SC), Transnational
Criminal Enterprise Sçction. Criminal Invetigative Division;
Firearms Training
Acting Unit Chief (UCj
Unit. ‘Paining and Deeiopment uivison rbD); UCI_________
I SWAT Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group;
I
UCI
J, CD-6, Counterintelligence Division; UC
Prgrn, TDD; Supervisory
I
I
Special Agent (SSA) I
I Investigative Law Unit,
SA I
Office of the GeneaJ. counsei. (U()
Program Manager, Operational Skills Unit, TOp; SSA I
l Firearms
TooJ.marks Unit, Scientific AxaJ.Psis zec on,
Laboratory Division; and SSAI
I Nas1inaton Field
I
•The only non—voting attendee presentwasl
I Management Program Analyst, Inspection Management Unit,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

—

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
Iancq
Iwas justified and in conformance
force by SAsI
with the deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in a
recommendation that no adminitrativë action be taken against
either Agent as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
2

b
h7c

 ______uaTticn

-

To:
Re:

Inspection
Fràm:
Inspection
297—f4Q-A1270955—D, 1O/19•/2005

LEAD(s):
Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPCTIQi
AT WASHINGTON, PC
ztiinitratiye actii be taken against
I as a result of their
landi
involvement in this shooting incident.

SAsI

bb

b70

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Cloyd, Room 7825
IUSP.T
Ms. I
(Attention:
1
Mr
SDOJ
MS. L”JLLy tcoom 1837
Mr. Manning, Room 1E045
I
(Attention:. Mr.I
Mr. Rooney, Room 3867
(Attention:__Mr. Cunningham)
iQuantico
Mr.F
(Attention:
Mrj
I
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
uantico
Mr.
WFO
Mr.
Quantico

1

Mr.

—
—
—

1
1

1
1

—

1

—

1

—
—

4+

ir.I

(At
Ms.
Mrs

I

MrL
I
Room 7326
Room 7861

3

 t

d

%

I

1 (Rev. 01.31-2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

‘rom:

Date!
Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

11/04/2005

AD Charlene B. ThorntorC._
Extension 4-1837

Cloyd Daniel L
Mertz Kimberly

Iirr

I

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271699--D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
LAS VEGAS DIVISION
05/05/2005

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 05/05/2005, involving Special
Agent (SA)I_________
.
During the execution of a

search warrant, SAl__________ ired one ±ound from his Colt AR—15,
223 caliber carbine killing an aggressive pit bull dog. SXRG
members recoinmen.ded that no administrative action be taken
against SA I
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

I

Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of
I dated 05/12/2005.

SAl

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recoiTmiendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 05/05.12005, during the executiorvof a search
warrant, SAl
Iwas assigned to be the sixth person in the
line of Agents ko enter the residence. As Agents approached the

residence, the door was open. SAl
Ipbserved an
individual, subsequently identified asi
L sit4ng on
the sofa in the front room of the resLdence.__SAl
lordered
of the house at gunpoint.I
I obeyed all
commands issued by the Agents and as he waljced out pf the house,
his pit buLl], dog came outside with hi.m. Asi
Iwas ordered
on the ground, the dog became agitated and began barking an
running around in an aggressive manner. The dog, continually
jumping; barking, and gtowling moved toward supervisory Special
Ageati
lwho was in a position on the east side
of the house. p
Iwas then ordered to get his dog under

I

 _______Iresponded

•

•

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271699—D, 11/04/2005

control or he would be shot.
by asking the
Agents, ‘What am I going to do?” Be also made a comment to the
effect that his dog was not mean and would not bite.
The dog, becoming more aaaresive and refuing to obey
commands, charged toward SAl
I SA I
I fired one
round from his weapon fatally injuring the dog.
On 10/13/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance:
Chief Inspector Kimberl K. Mertz Office of
Inspections, Inspection Div.sion;
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Sec ion,
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Crimina
USDOJ;i
I Assistant Section Cief. Violent
Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division;I
1
Unit Chief (tiC), Firearms Trainina Uni , Training and Development
Division (TDD) nfl
National Firearms Program,
TDD; Acting UCI_____________________ Special Weapons and Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; Acting tic
I
I CD—GA, CouIterintelliaence Iivisjon;
supervisory special Agent (SSA)l
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
lOperational Skills Unit, TDD; SSAI
I
I
I Invest3aative Law Unit. Ofice of the General
Counsel (OGC); and SSAI
I Washington Field
Office. I
I Management Program Analyst,
Inspectibn Nanagement unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, a non—voting member, was also in attendance.
-

—

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SRG member,s unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified and in conformance with the
FBI’s deadly force policy.
Therefore, a recommendation was made
that no administrative action be taken against SAl
as a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

2

c

 __

**.*‘V%

%%.

4

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271699—D,

Inspection
11/04/2005

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC

I

SA
shooting incident.

.
’
4
1strative action be taken against
as a result of his involvement in this

I

1b7C

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Cloyd, Room 7825
1
1
Ms.
rOJ
1—Mr.I
IUSDOiY
—
—

—

—

1

—

1

—

1

—

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

—

—
-

—
—

Ms. Mertz, Room 7837
Mr. Manning, Roop 1R045
(Attention:
Mr.I___________
Mr. Rooney, Room p155
(Attention: Mr. I
I
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
j, Quantico
Mr.
(Attention: Mr.I
I
Room 7:326
Ms.I
Mr.
L WFO
Mrs. j
Room 7861
-

4,

3

.

...s•

 ________

FD-204 (Rcv. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Envestigation

Copy to

I

lid

.

Rcpofl of
Date:

01/19/2006

CaseID#:

297HQ—A].270919—D

Titla

onic

FBI Headquarters

SHOOTING INQtIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
ATLANTA DIVISION
05/05/2005

]bC

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
Synopsis:

;•

•

I

On 05/05/2005, FBI Special Agent fSA)

I

I Atlanta Divi.sion, along with Conyejs. Georoia

I

I andi
Police Department officers I
I
fatally wounded MORGAN CHIGAWA, Date of Birth (DOB)
07/02/1979, during an arrest in a Ramada Inn parking lot
in Conyers, Georgia.
DETAILS:
On 05/02/2005, two black males robbed the
Regions Bank in Phenix City, Alabama, taking in excess of
$10,000 in cash. During the course of the bank robbery
one subject fired one round from a weapon he was carrying.
Th office of origin for this matter wa the Mobi.le Field
Division of the FBI. On the same day, a champagne colored
I associated with
Mazda 626 sedan, Georgia license I
the robbery, was located at the Peachtree Mall in
Columbus, Georgia.
A surveillance was initiated by the Columbus
During the course of
Police Department on the vehicle.
the surveillance two groups of black males, one group of
four and one group of two, were observed in the vicinity
of the vehicle. As both groups moved closer to the Mazda,
Columbus Police officers announced their presence and
ordered the iidividua1s to the ground.
An individual from
the group of two males immediately engaged the officers,
firing three rounds, seriously wounding one of ficer. The

This docunt contains niths rgco..qntion, nor conclusions of th
•

and is loan.d to youx agency

?BI. It is th. property of th. PflX
it and its cont.nts aru not to be diatributad outsid* your agancy.

 _____

_

.
297 —HQ--A127 091 9—D

I
•

twc males fit the description of the subjects responsible for the
Phenix City bank robbery earlier that day. They were
suhsriunt1u it1ntified as Morgan CHIGAWA, DOB 07/02/1979, and
p CHIGAWA was also identified
J DOBI
as the individual who shot tfle Columbus police officer.
The Columbus Resident Agency of the Atlanta Division
and the Columbus Police Department initiated an investigation
into the shooting. As a result of their investigation, leads
were_deve.oped in the Atlanta area as to the possible whereabouts
land CHIGAWA. These leads were the result of interviews
of I
SIJ
Iariçi MIGAT(A.
çf severl family and friends of I
Ion the evening
I
contacted a former girlfriend of I
of 05/03/2005 and obtained a telephone number that had contacted
I determined the
her answering machine earlier that day. SJ
telephone subscriber was a pay telephone in Conyers, Georgia,
located outside of a convenience store.
Icontacted the convenience
On 05/04/2005, SAl
store owner. The oqr recognized CHXGAWA from a photograph
provided by SAP
las a person who came into his establishment
the day before. The owner further described tie charnDagne
kontacted
colored Mazda associated with the subject. SAl
the Conyers Police Department (CPD> and provided photographs and
information regarding the subjects. By this time, both subjects
were wanted on state aggravated assault charges as well as
federal Bank Robbery charges.
On 05/04/2005, at aproximate1v 6:15 p.m., SAl
received a telephone call fromi

I

I

otir1ea Ins
SA I
supervisor, SSAI
I who in turn contacted ASAC Arthur
David Webster. ASAC Webster informed SAC Gregory Jones who
authorized the use of the division’s SWAT team to effect the
subjects’ arrest.
I,

A rally point was established in the vicinity cf th
ndI______
apartment. At approximately 8:30 p.m., SAsI
kDonducted an oral briefing to individuals present to include
I
SAC Jones and ASAC Webster. The SWAT teams remained in place
until approximately 12:30 a.m., when the operation was suspended
by SAC Jones after it was apparent the subjects would not appear
at the apartment.
1
On 05/05/2005, at approximately 6:45 a.m., SAI
received a telephono call from the CE’D advising they had located
Lhe champdg1L uluxd Mazda a1 the Ramada Inn in Conyers,
Ithey had established a
Georgia.
The CPD informed SAP

2

7C

 297—HQ--A1270919—D
surveillance on the vehicle.
SAl
nd the CPD agreed that
the CPD would arrest the subjects in the event the subjects
departed before SAl
jand the Atlanta SWAT team arrived.
contacted his
While enroute to the Ramada Inn SAl
supervisor, SSAI
I, and discussed using tje SWATteam to
conduct the arrest of the subjects. Both SAl
iand SSA
I
I contacted members of Atlanta Division’s squad C—7 and
advised them to meet a a rally point in a parking lot north of
the hotel.
Inotified ASAC Webster, who in turn
SSAI
notified SAC Jones.
SAC_Jones authorized use of the SWAT team to
effect the arrest.
Ithe SWAT Team Leader, was apprized
SAl
of the scenario and notified his team members to meet at the
rally point.
‘arrived at a
At approximately 8:00 a.m., si4
rally point adjacent to the Ramada Inn where he met with members
of the CPD( to include Captaiii
ICaptaini
I
advised SAl
te had spoken with the manager of the hotel who
advised there were no guests registered under the namqs of
‘and
CHIGAWA aridi
Iwith a Georgia identification.
SAl
Captain I
I went back into the hotel office and subsequently
determined an individual by the name of CHIGAWA from Ohio had
registered at the hotel on the evening of 05/04/2005 and was in
room 226.
The manager further advised that CHIGAWA had paid with
cash for one night and that checkout was 12:00 noon. The manager
positively identified CFIIGAWA from the flyer and advised he
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol when he checked in.

•

I requested a key (electronic pass card) to a
SJJ
room so he could view the layout and door structure in
preparation for the arrest. All rooms in the hotel faced
land Captain I
directly out to the parking lot. SN
I
accessed room 106 on the first floor and remained in the room
where they initiated surveillance of t Mzd 626, located
Iremained in contact
in the parkina lot below room 226. SAl
with SSAI______ and other Agents via radio.

•

)

At approximately 8:30 a.m., mephr of Atlanta’s Saud
C—7 beaan arriving at the location. SAsI
I
Imetat
pandSSAI
Iremained 1n the hotel room with
the rally point while SA I
linstructed SAsI
ssM
landi
Captain
I
p
driving a Thyota 4Runner, to position their vehicle approximately
50 yards across the Street from the hotel to act as a blocking
vehicle in the event the subjects attempted to leave via the
north entrance of the Ramada Inn parking lot. Behind their
vh4t1
n “nmarked lue Crown Victoria with CPD Detective
I a’ong with CPD Detective
GM SA I
Blazer at the
Chevrolet
positioned
in
a
were
3

 _____

297—HQ—A1270919—D
•

opops,te end (south) of the parking lot. SM
land_Captain
lcontjnued their survpu1n’e from room 106. SAl
Iwas
in radio contact with ssiJ
ianç FBI SA members of the
oerimete team, while Captinl _Jwas in contact with GBI SA
I
land C?D Detectivej_____ in the Blazer.
I

At approximately 9:00 a.m., members of the At1nt S’{T
hcrjan arriving at the rally point, along with SSAI
I
I the SWAT Cçordinalor, ançl ASAC Webster. An oral briefing
was planned by SSAI
to discuss the arrest
land SAl
scenario.
However, SA I
I reported via radio that subject
CHIGAWA had departed his room prior to the briefing.
tm

I

transmitted on his radio that CHIGAWA had
nd was proceeding down the stairs, and that
SAI
I andi
Iwere moving to block the subject’s vehicle.
SAl
Isjoppeci ilis vehicle in a position to block the 4azda, and
SA I
I exited the vehicle with his weanon drawn just as
CHIGAWA was entering his vehicle. SAl
jpositioned himself
several feet away from CHIGAWA’S vehicle and, according to SA
7 “FBI, FBI.” At that moment, SA
J repeatedly shomtd
J
Iran from room 106 along the first floor
1
land Captain
I
larrived on the driver’s
walkway to CHIGAWA’s vehicle. SAl
side towards the rear of the vehicle simultaneously as CHIGAWA
drove away arid around SAl
1vehicle heading south in the
parking lot.
SAl
depr1-c’ti 5
hi r2m

•

The vehicle traveled approximately 20 yards when it was
driven by GBI SA
struck ir the front driver’ side by the
land S14
ICaptainI
I At this time, SAL
I
were in pursuit on foot. SAl
Ipositioned himself
immediately_adjacent to CHIGAWA’s passenger side front door,
while SAl
lapproached the rear passenger door, with Captain
I
Ipositioned forward of the front passenger side of the
vehicle.
lexited the Blazer and mpvd ti a
GEl SAI
DetectiveI
Jremained
position of cover near a hotel column.
behind the Blazer’s passenger side front door. SAl
Imoved his
vehicle behind CHIGAWA’S vehicle and positioned himself behind
the vehicle’s front driver side door.

I

I captain

I

and flAtPtjve
SA I
I
shouted, “FBI, do not m9ve.” whi’e Captaini
Ishouted, “Put
your hands up.” GBI SAl
Ishouted ievera times for
Ireported telling
CHIGAWA to, “Show your hands.’
1 DetectiveI
CUIGAWA twice to, “Show your hands.” Additionally, he recalled
other law enforcement officials giving similar commands.
SAs I

land

I began issuing verbal commands to CHIGAWA.

Captaini

As they were giving CHIGAWA verbal_commards, SAl________
nd GBI SA I
ladvised they
I Detective

4

i

 ________

297—HQ--A1270919—D
saw CHIGAWA reach in the vicinity of his belt area. At that
moment SAl
announced, “He has a aunt he has a gun.” SA
I Captain I
I
I reported observing_a
I and Detective I
I
weapon in CHIGAWA’s hand. Captaini
land Detectivel
reported the weapon in CHIGAWA’s left hand, SAl
Icould not
recall in which hand cHIAWA_held the weapon. Immediately upon
I and Captain
I letectivel
obserying the weapon, SAl
If ired up,n CHIGAWA.
I
Idid not fire his
GBI SAl
weapon.
SA I
I did not fire his weapon, advising that he
believed if he firri i)js weapon, other agents would be in his
crossfire.
Idid not observe CHIGAWA with a weapon.
SAl

I

7C

lexpended his
During the ensuing shooting, SAl
rounds until his weapon was in the lock back position. He
subsequently announced that he was out of ammunition and
SAl
requested cover as he moved away from the vehicle.
I
subsequently moved to the driver’s side of the Mazda and
“There was a aug.” A revolver was observed by SA
I and GBI SAl
haying under shattered glass on the
floor between the rjver’s door and the seat. A .38 caliber five
shot revolver was recovered by GBI crime scene specialists from
the vehicle between the driver’s side front door and the seat,
under broken glass. The weapon had all five rounds remaining in
the cylinder indicating that CHIGAWA did not fire his weapon
during the shooting incident.
Iwas struck in the
During the shooting event, SAL
thigh with a round that penetrated and exited his leg. GBI
forensics determined_that the round in all probability was fired
by CPD Detectivel
I located on t nnnite side of the
from SAl
across
subject’s vehicle and
I
After the shooting, th 5WT 1nj executed the arrest
larrest occurred on
lwho had exited room 226. I
the stairway landing located immediately south of the room.
Shortly after the shooting, Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
arrived at the scene and began providing medical attention to SA
I
I was subsequently transported to a local hospital
were he was treated and released. The Et4Ss pronounced CHIGAWA
dead at the scae.

of I

•

ibC

•

Immediately following the shooting, ASAC Webster
telephonically advised SAC Jones, who was enroute to the scene,
that shots had been ftrd du;ing the apprehension of the
SAC Jones
subjects, and that SAl
Ihad been shot in the leg.
I to take
arrived moments later and instructed SSAI
Iweapon and magazine. SAC Jones then
possession of SAl
I transported to the Atlanta office by two SAs after
had SA I
the scene was secured.

5

 a
297—HQ—A1270919—D
SAC Jones contacted Acting ASACI
I
instructing him to activate the Divisions Shooting Response Plan
and to notify FBI Headquarters of the shooting.
SAC Jones
remained on the scene coordinating responsibilities between the
FBI, CPD and the GBI.
G8I forensic specialists collected a total of 18
shells: five (5) .40 caliber shell casings in the area where
Detectivel
Iwas positioneç; eiah (8) .45 caliber shell
casings in the vicinity of SAl
I and five (5) .40 caliber

•

shell casings in the area of Captain I

I An autopsy of the

lb/C

deceased indicated the fatal shots in all likelihood came from SA

I

1.45 caliber weapon.

•

•

6

•

 FO-204 (Rev. 12-145)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
PedeiaI Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:
Reporto(

IIPP_______________
02/16/2005

Case ID #:

297HQ—A1271464—D

orn San ntonio Division

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OP SHOOTING INCIDEN’l’
DALLAS DIVISION
JUARY 21, 2005
Chamctee

SynopsI

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
This shooting incident resulted from the Dallas
Division SWAT Team effecting the warrant arrest of a
violent offender alleged to have been involved in 60 armed
atake over robberies of banks and businesses. During the
I was shot once
1 I
arrest, the violent offender
in the shoulder and once in the hip after_attempting to
I was treated
escape arrest using his vehicle. Mr. I
and released from the hospital the same day. No Agents
were injured. The four SWAT Team members who fired their
weapons declined to be interviewed until compelled. t
the time of this report, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
I
has declined to compel the Agents’ statement.I
I
I retained legal counsel and has not been
interviewed.
DETAILS:

Beginning in early 2002, the Dallas Division
initiated an investigation into a group suspected of
multiple robberies within the Dallas and Houston
This group was suspected in over 60 bank and
Divisions.
business robberies. The media dubbed the group the STake
Over Bandits a because of the take over style of robberies
they coemitted.
The typical modus operandi (MO) of the Take Over
Bandies was to steal a car and within 24 to 48 hours
Investigation showed that the subjects
commit a robbery.
carried A-47/SKS tyé assault rifles and emi-autornatic
XC ii the property of the FBI
This doouent contains neither reesndations nor conclimians of the YD.
end is loaned to your agency, it and its contents ax. not to be distributed outside your agency.

6
7C

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297-HQ-A127] 464-0
handguns. The subjects were always covered with masks, dark
.clotbing, gloves and wore ballistic body armor. During the
course of the robberies the subjects physically assaulted
customers, employees and law enforcement officers working in the
bank as security.. Up until November 4, 2004, no witnesses had
seen the subjects without their masks. No prints had.beera
recovered from vehicles, banks or businesses. A 7.62 mu round
was recovered after it had been racked out of one of the assault
rifles during a Dallas bank robbery.
On November 4, 2004, the Take Over Bandits robbed the
Asterican First National Bank, in Richardson, Tekas. The robbery
was a take over style robbery and the subjects used hand guns and
AK-47 type assault rifles. As consistent with their other
robberies, the subjects fled in a stolen car and traveled
approximately two blacks where they had placed another stolen
vehicle as a switch vehicle.
While fleeing in the stolen vehicle, the subjects
encountered an off-duty Richardson police officer who was driving
an unmarked vehicle. As the subjects passed the off-duty
officer, the subjects fired shots from a fully automatic assault
rifle disabling the off-duty officer’s vehicle. The off-duty
officer inunediately reported this incident via police radio.
Thereafter, Richardson police units responded to the area and
were also fired upon multiple times by the subjects using
automatic weapons.
During the ensuing pursuit, one Piano, Texas Police
Department vehicle and five Richardson Police Department vehicles
were disabled by rounds fired from at least one, possibly two,
fully automatic Ax—47 style assault rifles. Rounds were fired by
the subjects from within the get-a—way vehicles as well as from
the ground after leaving the vehicles. Car cameras from
Richardson Police vehicles captured the pursuit and the various
Dozens of spent 7.62mm casings were recovered
shooting events.
by Piano Police Department, Richardson Police Department and FBI
Dallas along the route of the pursuit.
During the pursuit, in an attempt to evade arrest the
subjects carjacked a vehicle and eventually struck another
vehicle. The occupant/victim of the second vehicle was seriously
injured. The occupant/victim was subsequently hospitalized and
underwent surgery to remove a portion of his intestines.
With the first carjacked vehicle disabled, the subjects
attented to carjack a second vehicle with a woman and her baby
we
inside. Upon seeing the baby, one of the subjects stated,
2

_1

 ________

.

.

297-HQ-A 127 1464-0
have a hostage.” The subjects abandoned this effort when they
could not start the vehicle. They then carjacked a third vehicle
and were eventually able to elude police. Throughout this
incident, the subjects continued to fire automatic weapons at
police and drove in a manner which was a threat to all those they
encountered.
During the course of the pursuit and the subsequent
carjackings the subjects removed their masks. ViCtImS of the
carjackings and other witnesses had the opportunity to see the
faces of at least’ two of the subjects. Subsequently, a photo
s one of
line-up was used to identifyl
the subjects.
On November 06, 2004, FBI Dallas held a oress
conference publicizing a photograph ofI
ituçned himself in at the Slaton, Texas
Later that day, [
Police Departmen]_________ was taken into custody and charged
with attented ca.ta.i. murder by the Richardson Police
Department.

I

!Odessa, Texas
search warrant was served ad
Safety.
Public
of
Department
Texas
and
Paso
apartment by FBI El
The search revealed a ballistic vest with “POLICE’ lettering,
samaunition in 7.62 nun and .50 caliber sizes, AK-47 parts, a hand
grenade and a booklet showing how to convert an MC-47 to fully
automatic.
.

L’as indicted in the
On November 10,2004,1
Eastern District of Texas on three counts of.Title 18, Section
2119, Carjacking and three counts of Title 1. Secton 924(c);
I was also
using a firearm in the commission a felony. L
indicted in the Northern District of Texas on one count of Title
18, Section 2113 (a) (a); Bank Robbery and Title 18, Section
In addition,
Iwas indicted by a state grand jury
924(c).
in Collins County, Texas on tour counts of attempted Capital
Murder.

I

On January 15. 2005, FBI Agents interviewed[

On. January 18, 2005, armed with information gleaned
from the inter*iew, the Dallas Division’s Special Operat
Group (SOG) was able to locate and begin surveillance of

I

7C
7D

 .

.

297-HQ-A1271464--D

I
I

I

I During the next three days. Dallas SOG was able to
They learned that
develop a pattern activity forl
INife and tWo children were residing with him in an
1r,—=i-,1 i1
I
I Mesquite, Texas.
FBI Aaets drafted affidavits for
On January 19,
I andL
I on the same day, after
the arrests of
review by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District of Texas the affidavits and complaints were forwarded to
United States Magistrate Judge Don P. Bush for review.

At 9:00 a.m., Friday, January 21, 2005, a briefing was
held in the Dallas FBI office concerning the matter. In
attendance were Special Agent in charge (SAC) Guadalupe_Gonzalez,
(!t+fl(T gtant Special Agent in Charge
(A/ASAC)!
1
I
I ASAC Rick Coward, ASAC Dan Dubre, Chier um.vm.slon
iSS11
Counsel (CDC) Jay Gregory, ADCI
I
Acting Supervisory Special Agent (A/SSA) I
I.
L
During the briefing, a
and SAl
I A
case update was provided by case agent SAl
written SWAT operations plan prepared by Acting SWAT Team Leader
I
Iwas presented to SAc Gonzalez. This plan called for a
dynamic entry intol
Iapartment in Mesquite, Texas.
However, after discussinci
IProPensitY for
violence and the high probability his children and wife would be
I
in the apartment, SAC Gonzalez decided thati
arrest would be effected after he left his vehicle and before he
reached his apartment. It was also decided the arrest would not
]had
be made until a federal arrest warrant forl
Iwas znstruced to
been issued.
Acting SWAT Team Leaden
formulate a tactical Dln which would safely allow the SWAT Team
to arresti
I before he reached his apartment in
Mesquite, Texas.
Iwas designated Acting SWAT Team
SAl
Leader due to the Division’s SWAT Team Leader, SSAL
I
being TIDY out of the Division.
2q05,
At approximately 11:00 a. rn., Friday, Januer’ 1
I
the Dallas SWAT Team lead by Acting SWAT Team Leader I
responded and staged in a parking lot in close proximity to
At this
esquite, Texas.
s apartment con’’
Ielephonically briefed his
time, Acting SWAT Team Leac3rI
assault plan to Acting ASAcI
Iwho vVb11 hrffed SAC
pproved
Gonzalez.
Both SAC Gonzalez and Acting ASACL
the SWAT arrest plan.
-

I

‘

he arrest plan, as explained to Acting ASAC
p back to his
directed SOG to follow I
4

 •

.

.

297-HQ-Al27144-D
apartment complex in Mesquite, Texas. After an arrest warrant
had been obtaiied, and with SWAT Team members in position,
be allowed to park his vehicle at the
apartment complex. Two SWAT vehicles would be used to block the
vehicle from behind. Additional SWAT vehicles and members would
be placed at parking lot exits to further prevent the subject s
possible escape. The arrest team, which consisted of seven SWAT
Team members would be stationed in a van ‘ocated approximately 20
Ihad parked his
yards from the subject’s apartment. Oncel
vehicle, the arrest team would quickly approach the vehicle from
behind to make the arrest of I
Ibef ore he was able to
make his way to his apartment. Additional agents and Task Force
Officers would be stationed around the area as perimeter
security.
SWAT Team members would wear their black FEX SWAT
uniform with “‘BX’ embroidered on the back and front of their
ballistic body armor. Agents assigned outside perimeter would
were FE! Raid. jackets. All Agents would wear ballistic body
armor.

I

I

Jftr vo@iying verbal approval from Acting ASAC
Iverbally_briefed the SWAT Team as to their
I SAl
I then made contact with SOG
SAl
specific picmmsnts.
and it ws deciIed that SOG would continue
Pilot SA I
to control the surveillance of[
luntil he arrived in the
apartment parking lot in Mesquite, Tekas. .At that time, the
surveillance and the cortmiand of the situation would be turned
over to SAl
I Coninuinications would be done via Bureau
radio.
Thereafter, Dallas SOG continued to surveill
I In the early afternoon o Friday. January 21,
I
land Case Ageuti
Acting ASACI
J, Acting SS)J
were advised by SOG that I
I was being observed getting a tire
idiscussed
changed at a local business. Acting ASACI
lat
I the feasibility of making tne arrest oft
with SAl
the tire store or other potential locaticrn nthr than the
Imoving before the
Due to concerns of I
SWAT Team could get into positiOn to safely make the arrest and
the fact that the federal search warrant had not been obtained
this idea was abandoned.
At approximately 2:00 p.m., Friday, January 21, 2005,
I obtained a warrant for the arrest
bad on a acminl4nt, SAI
of I
I charging him with violation of Title 18, Usc,
Section 2119, Car jacking, and Title 18, USC, Section 924 (c) use
of a weapon in the commission of a vio1rnf lonv. A search
I
Iresidencel
warrant fort
I Mesquite, Texas was also obtained.
S

 _____________land

..

*

.

297HQ-A1 27 1464-0
t aroxirnately 2:3q n rn. iry, January 21, 2005,
nd SSAI
Acting ASACI
I drove to Mesquite,
hssumed the role of On Scene
Texas, were Acting ASACI
Crrrnnrq For the arrest of I
.
1cting ASAC
I
was an active Salt Lake Division SWAT Team member from
1
SSAI______
1988 witil 1993 and received specialized SWAT training.
lassl4med the role of On Scene Supervisor. Acting ASAC
I
stationed themselves in a Big Lots
SSAI
I
Department Store approximately 250 yards fromI
apartment in Mesquite, Texas. Stationed along with them were
three Dallas Division Hostage Negotiators, two Electronic
During this time,
Technicians, and Dallas SWAT Team Members.
tjas in constant_telephone ad radio
Acting ASACI
1 components of the
L Actnu SSAj
contact with SN
SWAT Team, specifically, SAI
I and 80G. Via radio, Acting
ASACI
nd the other staeed components could overhear
las he approached his
the surveillance of I
apartment.
-

At approximately 4:45 p.m., Friday, January 2.1, 2005,
radio, SOG advised SWAT and coimnand components thatL
I
Iwas approaching his apartment. Minutes thereafter, as
I
I in his vehicle, entered the partment complex
parking lot the commaid of the situation was turned over to SA
I AsI
“icle approximately 25
lparke’
I via radio, called for
yards away from his apartment SAl
blocking vehicles to move up into position at the entrances of
the aartmez,t complçx carkina lot. One of these vehicles driven
by SA
I and SAl
1 which had been designated to
roceeded to a blocking position
block I
Ivehic3.e
s vehicle. With the blocking
directly behind I
leave the o-ir to execute
vehicle already in position, .5
I
the t,lan.
I SAI
SWNI’ ‘I’rn rn?nh A I
IgI
ISAI
I,SAI
I rp1oyed in
jand sA I
I
I SA
js vehicle
a van parked approximately 25 yards fnm I
i wno naa ceên in the
exited the van. At the gie time. SAl
vehicle breaking out
blocking vehicle rushed toj
I
the passenger side window .n an attempt to distract I
I
SAI
Iconverg-ed on the vehicle from the left side
opening the driver’s door. He was able to place his hands on
1 shoulder in. an attempt to extract him from the vehicle.
During this time, Dallas SWAP Team members, clad in black with
FBI embroidered on the front and back Of the uniforms repeatedly
rerh1lv iant4fied themselves as FBI Agents and called for
Ito exit his vehicle.
I

via

“

I

6

b6

 ________lout

.

.

297-HQ-A1271464--D

I

‘broke away from
Instead of complying,’
SAl
I and accelerated his vehicle forward frosl a parked
h 70
position jumping the curb onto a grass and sidewalk area.
Agents now within two to three feet, on both sides of the
vehicle, in a semi-circle position around the vehicle, stepped
away to avoid being hit as the vehicle continued to accelerate at
a high rt ôf speed. Later, in a Signed Sworn Statement to the
SIRT, SAl
I stated, i released my grip on the subject in fear
--’--’
1
of being hit by the car.” The vehicle veered sharply l
Ixtuue&ate1v therefter, SAl_______
appaent attempt t’
land SAl
SAJ
I SAl
!fired upon the
rh1 t1
Interviews with I
I
I andl
who were in the apartment complex at the time and
eyewitnesses to the shooting incident corroborated these details.
A subsequent Dallas Response Team(EWP) shooting scene
investigation revealed that agette fird a total of 22 rounds.
Twenty of those rounds impactedl
lvehicle. One
round struck a nearby tree and a second round struck a wall in
the subject’s apartment. All 20 rounds_impacted the vehicle on
the driver’s side. One round strucki
in the left shoulder
and a second round struck him in the left hip. I
L vehicle
traveled approximately 30 yards before striking and rri,a thrçugh
I
the brick apartment wall. During a later search of I
vehicle, a 1997 Nissan Altima bearing Texas License Plate I
no weapons were found.
According to the Dallas ERT investigations 20 .223
caliber rounds were fired from Bureau issued Colt M-4A1 Carbines
1
Two .40
carried by SAI
1 SAl
j and SAl
caliber rounds were fired rxom
i.keau issued Olock 22 .40
caliber handgun carried by SA I
I Dr.I
an emergency room doctor, assigned to the Dallas Division SWAT
Team immediately responded providing first aide to I
1
tr WAP Pm members xecuted the
Imaediately ther
I esquite,
search warrant at apartmentl
Iwjfe,
Texas.
The search warrant revealedL
brother and two young children inside the apartmentS
r
4
Invp1
n also revealedi
I
and I
young grandson I
i parked in a vehicle
immeciately adjacent to
vehicle during the
shooting incident.
During suoseguent interviews these witnesses
indicated at the time of arrest they recognized SWAT Team members
as law enforcement and could hear SWAT Team members ordering
of his vehicle.

7

I

lb 6
lb 10

I

 ______________as

.

.

297-HQ-A127 1464-D
ambularice was
1
Immediately after the shooting, an
Iwas
summoned and responded within a few minutes. I
transported to the Baylor Hosnita]. in Dallas, Texas for
treatment.
and 5.4
Iwere
SAl
assigned to accompany I
Ito the nosp.ta1. After
treated and
approximately four ho.{rs,
released. Thereafter, he was taicen to the Grayson County jail in
Denton, Texas.
Interviews wit1the mercency room doctor, Dr.
I
lwas struck once in
lindicatedi
the left shoulder.
The wound was described. as a through and
through wound. I
Iwas also struck in the left hip by a
bullet fragment.
This fragment was not removed. Baylor ospital
officials advised that federal health care privacy laws precluded
them from providingi
Imedical records.

I

The weather at the time of the incident according to
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National
Weather Forecast Office was 74 degrees, 10 miles per hour wind
out of the South, with occasional clouds.
I
Immediately after the incident, Acting ASACI
telephonically contacted SAC Gonzalez who imediately responded
to the scene along with CDC Jay Gregory and took coxtmaud of the
situation.
In route to .the shooting scene, CDC Gregory kept both
the t3nited States Attorneys Office for the Northrn and Eastern
Districts of Texas apprised of the situation. Both were kept
informed due to the arrest and search warrants being issued in
the Eastern District of Texas and the shooting incident occurring
in the Northern District of Texas. Mesquite, Texas Police
Department was contacted by SAC Gonzalez and COO Gregory and it
was agreed that FBI Dallas would be allowed to investigate the
shooting scene.

I

Tedatelv fo1loqing tie shooting incident, SA I
I
Iwere directed by
ISAI
nd S2L
Acting ASACI
ito moved to the ig IOt Department Store
parking lot approximately 250 yards froz the shooting scene. At
that EOint, SAl
awas instructed by Acting ASAC•
o conduct a ammunition count with the shooters. Upon
his arrival, SAC Gonzalez inst with the four SWAT Team members
ascertaining their well being and instructing them to leave the
scene and travel back to the Dallas office. Once at the Dallas
office four SWAT Team members met with CDC GregQry where he
invoked
explained their Constitutional Rights. All four Agents,
the right to speak with an attorney prior to being interviewed.
The four shooters were then allow to leave the office.

8

 F

.

.

297-HQ-A1271464-D
At approximately 11:00 p.m., Friday, January 21, 2005.
Dallas ERT cleared the shooting scene in Mesquite, Texas.
On the möriina of Saturday,. January 22, 2005, CDC
Gregory contacted ssJ_______________ Office of General Counsel
(OGC) and authority was given from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) for emergency legal representation for the fenr Aaents
involved in the shooting. Thereafter, Attorney I
Iwas
retained to represent all four Agents.

7

At approximately 1:00 p.m., Saturday, January 22,2005,
members of the Shooting tncident Review Teem ($IRT)arrived and
met with SAC Gonzalez, Acting ASAC Mjjculewicz, and CDC Gregory
discussed the shooting team’s protocol. It was determined that
the shooter’s weapons were not in the custody of the Dallas
office. The weapons used included four Colt M4A1 carbines and
one Glock 22 .40 caliber handgun. By approximately 6:00 p.m.,
Saturday, Thixuary 22, 2005, all weapons had been recovered from
the Agent shooters and were in the possession of the Dallas
office.
Iwas advised
0i_Weçlnesday, January 26, 2005. lIP j
by Attorney I
I that his clients SAl
I SA I
SA d
land SAl
Jwould not be providing a statement
unless compelled. Contact with Chief Inspector Kimberly Mertz,
Inspection Division and SSAI
I, OQC indicated the DOJ
would not compel the Agents.’ statement at that time.
On Thursday, January 27, 2005,1
I had his
initial appearance in the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman,
Texas. During this hearing Attorneyl
iwas
appointed legal counsel forl
I Repeated attempts to arrange
an interview of I
Iby the SIRT met with negative results.

7

I
I remains charged based on the a complaint
filed in the Eastern District of Texas with three counts of
violation of Title 18, USC, Section 2119, carjacking and three
counts of Title 18, Section 924(c) using a firearm in the
conunission of a felony.
The tJSAO fqr the Northen District of
Texas is çonsiderinct ciargingI
1 with Assault on a Federal
Officer. I
Jremains a fugitive.
On February 10, 2005, Request Coordinatorl
I
JFBI Laboratory, Evidence and Control Unit
(LAfl 050203010) received the weapons and spent casings used in
the shooting incident. The Laboratory will conduct an analysis
to determine how many of the spent casings found at the shooting
scene were fired by each weapon.

9

I

 (Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
precedence:
To:

ROUTINB

Date:

Inspection.

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

Attn:

Al) Charlerie B. Thornton

Itension

I

04/22/2005

4—1837

Thornton Charlene B
Bland Andrew R III

I

Iir

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1270961--D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
BUFFALO DIVISION
02/16/12005

.

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 02/16/2005, involving Specia
l
Agent (.SA)[
I During the execution of a
search warrant, SA F
J fired two rounds from his Bureau—
issued Heckler & Koch, 10 millimeter, L4P-5 carbine, killing
an
aggressive dog.
SIRG members_recommended that no administrative
action be taken against SAl
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

AdministratL’v-e: Referenc Eletronic Ccniimnnipation of Acting
Supervisory Special Agenti
J dated 02/17/2005.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

7C

 t

To:
Re:.

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ—A1270961—D, 04/22/2005

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 02/16/2005, SA I
I, along with
members of the Buffalo Division’s Safe Streets Task Force, were
effecting a searcI M
‘-idence in Buffalo. Upon arriving at
the residence, SAl
land other team members identified
themselves and the purpose of them being on the premises.
Law
enforöement personnel determined the door was open and entry
personnel opened the door where they were confronted by a black
male, later identified as
who attempted to close
the door.
SA[
lentered into the kitchen area o the
residence and instructed the occupant tQ rizø hi hands. The
sub:ject complied with the command and SAl
I proceeded to
clear the remnder of the residence. Two pitbuil—type dogs
confronted SAl
I and one of the dogs immediately crossed
the kitchen area toward him in an aggressive manner. SAF
I
attempted to go around the cog and make entry into the dining
room area; hQwever, the d9g nositined itself to block entry
into
the room and lunged at sAl
I Believing that he, as well
as othertem members were in immediate danger of serious
injury,
SAl
I fired two rounds from his MP-5 killing the dog.

•

On 03/08/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)
Andrew 1. Bland, III, Inspection Division, chaired the meetin
with the fo1lowin yoting members of the SIRG in attendance: g
1 Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division,
Criminal Section, USDOJ;j
IDeputy Chief, Domes
Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Kimberly K. Nertz, tic
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Charles 3. Rooney, Section Chief (SC), 1
Opp’’ “‘7t
Section, Criminal Investigative Division;I
lActing
Unit Chief (DC), Firearms Traininanit, Training and Develo
pment
Division (TDD); UCI
I CD-6A, Counterintelligence
Division; UCI
L National Firearms Program, TDD;
(IC I
I Special Inquiry and General Background
Investigations Unit, AdministraLtive Services Dvision;
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)l
I, Firearms
Toolnmarks Unit. 1
Seie
i
c
ntif Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I Invetiaative Law Unit, Office of the
Genermi. Counsel (OGC); and SSAJ
I, Operational
Skills Unit, TDD.
The two non-voting attendees present were
SSAI
Hostage Rescue Team, Critical Incident
Response roup; andi
1. tlanagement Program
Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.
—

2

iI)i

 To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1270961—o, 04/22/2005

Observations and Recommend.ations of the SIRG
The SXRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,<2)
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
6
standpoint (if any); (3) provide reconnendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommnenda.tions
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

StRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was lustified and
conformance with
deadly force policy. Therefore, a recommendtion wa. made the
that
no administrative action be taken against
SA
result
of his involvement in this shootkig incident.

in

las a

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1270961—D, 04/22/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC
Thpt nt rimin1strative action be
taken against
SAj__________________
as a result of his inyoJ.vement in this
shooting incident
-

3.
Hr. Pistole, Room 7142
3.
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Bland. RoonI 7825
1
Ms4
DOJ
1-Mr.I________
I.
Ms. Merta, Room 7837
1
Ms. Harrison, Röçm 6050
(Attention:
Ms.I
1
Mr. Rooney. Room 5155
1
M
1I Quantico
1
Mr. I
Room 1B045
(Attention:
Mr. I
1
Mr•
I Quantico
—
-

-

-

-

-

—

I

—

—

-

-

3.
1
1
1

-

—
—

Mr.
iQuantico
Mr.
IQuart1-i€-t
(Attention: Mr.l
I
Ms.l
oom 7326
Mr4
Room 7861

+4

4

  

 

FBI 
. Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

2005

 

 

 

_________________________

r
St

.

—,

C

55%

•‘‘

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
S

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Wd’.ROUTINE
To:

•

Inspection

Frc:

Date:08/25’/2Q06—
Attn:

AD Charlene B. Thornton

Inspection

Contact:j
-

Approved By:

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Clemens Micha/J’
Figliuzzi C

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Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271801--D
Title:

SHOOTING XNCIDENT

OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION
05/18/2006
5-

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Synopsis:’. The Shooting Incident Review Group (S!RG) reviewed
a shooting incident that occurred on 05/18/2006, involving’
Special Agent SA) F
I now assigned to the.
New Orleans Division.
While attempting to assist another
individual wh an aeiirpssive pit bull dog belonging to .his
neighbor, SAl
I fired one round from his Glock Model
22 pistol. injuring the pit bull dog.
SIRG membrs recommended
that, no aaministrative action be taken against SA I
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
SSA I

Rrference Electronic Communication of
I dated 05/23/2006.

Details:

This c&nmunication was prepared to furnish the
anlysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the: captioned shooting.

b6

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 05/18/2006,
inside his residence, SA

p.m., while
responded to a
:ified as__________
residence of sA
who was not at his

Upon his arrival, SAl
observed a medium
sized dog pinned under a gap a tne oottom of a wocdn fence
gate at the front of I
Iresidence.. S2 L
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observ
ed
Ipit bull dog, which was located on the
inside of the fence,.biiinn
rewing the pinned dog on
head and shu1der. SAl
Jassumed the pinned dog
belonged to I
I and assisted him in attempting to free
dog from the pit bull. The pit bull dog unsuccessfully
attempted to force itself through a gap between the pat’
the fence several times in an effort to attack I
j I The gate was locked at the handle’ with a padlock;
now&ver, the’ bottom of the’gate was flexible and moved
considerably each time the pit bull lunged against it.

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the
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Knowing that the pit bull dog had previously
attacked individuals and other niinl by forcing its way
through loose fence boards, SA I
‘returned to his
residence. He advised his wife to dial
9ll for assistance and
1
retrieved his Bureau—issued Glock 22 pistol for protection.
upon retu?rnina tq’the I
I residence, SA I observec4
Iattempt.ng ‘to open the
Due
to the known danger ot the pt bull, and believing
did -not
understand how dangerous the dog was, SAl
kautioned
him severe], times not, to open the gate. SA I
Iplaced
• his pistol on the grou d and unsuccessfully attempted to lift
the gate enough for
to pull his dog from beneath the fence.
became more frantic regarding hi doa’ welfare and began
oking over the top of the fence. I
I made several
unsuccessful attempts to 2c44’ h dog by reaching under or
through the gate. As SA I
Iwas pi1ling up on the
fence gate in an attempt to asslst4
ha the retrieval of
his dog,., the-pit bull dog lunged against’the fencç. forced hL
• head through an opening, and attempted to bite SAl_______
_____
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Due to the continued aggressive behavior of the pit
bull dog, SM
Ibelieved the dôq posed an imminent
•threat of ser4ous bodily harm tol
las well as himself.
positioned himself in front, of the gate and
SAl
• fiea one snot, from his pistol. The doa retrated ipto an
area of the back yard while SAl
landi
Ipulled
his dog from under the fence. SA I
shined a
1
-flashlight into the back yard and observed the pit. bull dog
alive and standing.
-

SAl
Ireturned to his• residence, telephoned’
911 a second time, and advised he had discharged his weapon at
the dog.
•
a

•

Officers from the Lawon Police Department and
Animal Coitröl arrived approximately thirty minutes after SA
I
Isecond phone call. The Animal Control Officer.
,

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297—HQ-Al27l80l-D, 08/25/2006

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• attempted to render aid to th& pit bull but could not. gain
access to, the back yard because of te padlocked gate.
Officers left a note for Mr.l
Ito contact, the police upon
•his return home. :,

I

Idog was taken to an animal, hospital ‘for
treatment. The dog’s l.eft front’leg and one ear were
completely chewed off,’ a portion of the dog’s snout was bitten
away, and one eye was hanging from its socket. Due to the
seriousness of the dog’s inuries,[
jrequested that the
dog be euthanized.
‘

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On 05/20/2006,

•

I

Itelephoned the
C)1c1hnm fl44-y Division and requested to speak to SA
I
jsupervisor regarding the incident. I
1
lasked
SSA I
Iwhat action_would be taken regarding SAl
I
shooting his dog, i
iadvised ‘the bullet from SA
I
Iweapon struck his dog -above -the eye •and exited
behind his ear, damaging the soft tissue.’ SSAI
ladvised
I
Io FBI nocedures regarding ,the shooting of an animal.
Although I
Iseemed satisfied with the eçplanation, he’
contacted ‘the I.awton CJüef of Police to pursue a complaint’
•
against. SAl
I
‘

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On 05/22/2006, the Lawton Police Departmentadvised
the Comanche Counti’
ftorney-deciined to pursue any

charges against SAl
taken by him. I

‘‘--

Istatingno improper action was
Iwas issued a criminal citation for

• Ownership of a Dangerous Dog and.SA
criminal citation for Cruelty to Anamal.

-

Iwas is,sued.a
‘

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On 05/23/2006, the La,tn C
ty Prosecutor ad’.ised
4
the Okiahom
‘sion that
I filed a complaint,
against. SA
for shooting his dog.- The City
Pr
se
e was declining any prosecution against.

-

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On 07/13/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the abb-ie—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director’
Michael S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
and was a non—voting member. The following voting members
were in attendance: Chief Inspector C. Frank Figliuzzi,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal pivision,
USDOJ;
I Attorney, Civil Rights Division, IJSDOJ;
Richard A. McFeely, Section chief (SC)’, 0perationa Support
Section, CriminalIzvestigative Division;I
I
Assist-ant SC, CD—i, Counterintelligence Division;
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297—HQ—A1271801—D, 08/25/2006’
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I Unit Chief (tic), Fcrearms Training Unit.
Training and, Development. Division (DD);I
Chief, Defensive Systems Unit, TDD; j
I UC,
,Special Weapons n1 tt-’c ‘tjons Unit, Crita,cai. Incident
Response Group; I
I’UC, Operational Skills Unit,’
TDD; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
i Firearms
Toolmarks U
ysis Sction, Laboratory
D’v
Washington Field Office;,, and
enera
orney, Investigative Law Unit,
Office, of the Genral Counsel (OGC).l
land
I Management Prograth inaiyscs, inspection
iiigeme unit, office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
non—voting members, were also in attendance.
-

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:

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(l evaluate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recoxmendations fo corrective actions from
an operational standpoint if any); 3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4 provide recommendations fox’ administrative action if
deemed necessary.

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SIRG members unanimously agreed’ that the ,.useof deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformancewith the
deadly force policy. The only observation made by the SIRG was the
fact that. SAl
Is actions were commendable; ,,however, he,put
himself in harms way by attempting to free the injured animaL

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LEAD(S):

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(Action)

INSPEcTIO1’I
AT WASHINGTON, DC

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sriooting incident.

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4nin.istrative action be taken against SA
I as a result of his involvement in this
•

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Clemens, Room 7825
pSDOJ
Mr.I
I.
MrI__________ USDOJ
1
Mr. Figiiuz., Room 7837
1
Mr.’
IRoom 5046
1
Mr. MoFeely, Room 3867
1
Mz.
uantico
1
Mr.
uantico
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Mr.
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Mr.
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Mr.
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1-Mr.
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Ms.
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(At encion:
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Mrs.I
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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Pzecedence:
o:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

0/09/2O06

AD Charlene B. Thor!lton
Extension 4—1837

Thornton Chane B
Cloyd Daniel

Drafted By:
Case ID

Title:

#:

297—HQ—A1271802—D

SHOOTING INCIDENT
OMAHA DIVISION

10/26/2005
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
a shooting incident that occurred on 10/26/2005, involving
Special Agent (SAl
I Upon leaving the Omaha
Indian Reservation, 5A1
‘fired tw rounds from his
Bureau—issued .Glock 22, .40 caliber pistol, killing a dog that
had been seriously injured. SIRG members recommended that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
as a result
of his involvement in the shooting incide&.
Administrative:

Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
1 dated
11/02/2005.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, continents, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details

of the Shooting Incident

I

lTas

On 10/26/2005, BA
assisting with pre
trial interviews in a sexual assault matter which occurred on
an Tndipn Reservation.
While traveling to the reservation, SA
I
I observed an injured dog laying on the side of the
road.
Due to time constraints, SAl
Idid not stop and
check on the dog; however, after completing the interviews and
upon his departure from the reservation,_he again observed the
dog on the side of the road. SAl
lexited his Bureau
vehicle to check on the dog, noting its breahina wa,a labored
and the dog could not use its hind legs. SAl
I contacted
the Winnebago Tribal Pclice Department who advised they had
received numerous reports of the injtred animal; however, they

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271802--D, 03/09/2006

were unable to dispatch an officer to the scene. SAl
I
advised th PoliOé Departfnert he ou1d kill the dog if an
animal control officer would respond to remote the carcass.
With the concurrence of the Police Department, and subsequent
contact with the Iaketa Cpunty Sheriff’s Office and a utility
worker nearby, SAl
If ired two rounds into the dog’s
head, killing the injured dog.
On 12/01/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member. The following vqting members were in
attendance:
Former Chief Inspector K.mberlv K. Me;tz, Office
of Inspections, Inspection Division; 4
I Deu+’v
Chief. CivJ. Rights Division, Criminal Section, USDOJ; I
I
I Depuv Chief. Demestic Security Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; I
I Assistant Section Chief
(ASC), Oprf1nna1 rnrrt Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; I
Chief. (DC), Firearms Traini
Unit, Tpaining and Dave opment Division (TDD); UC
L iational Firearms Program, TDD; Acting UC
I
L Special Weapons and Tac
uritical incident Response Group;
ASC,
CD-6, Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA) I
I Firearms
Tooinark Unit. Scientific
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSAI
I
Prooram Manager. Operational Skills Unit, TDD; and SSA I
I
I
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel (OGC). I
I Management Program Analyst,
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,. Inspection
Division, a non—voting member, ias also in attendance.

t.tt

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Observations and 1ecommendationn of th. SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that no administrative
action should be taken against SA I
I as a. result of his
involvement in this shooting incident. However, members opined that
although SAl
lactions were humane, the shooting of the dog
was not within the current deadly fQZe policy. This matter will be
brought to the attention of th& Special Agent in Charge of the Omaha
Division .to ensure future compliance with the deadly force policy.

2

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To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271802—D, 03/09/2006

lEAD(s):

Set I3ead 1:

(etion)

INSPECTION
AT WAShINGTON, DC
nr administrative action be taken against SA

FV

‘as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
I
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr.
oom 7825
1—Ms.I
Iuso
1
Mr.I
1 USDOJ
1
Mr. Manning, RoQm 1B045
(Attention: Mn
1
Mr.[
I Room 3867
1
Mr.
Quantico
.1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Ms.
Room 7326
1
Mr.
(pantico
1
Mrs.
j Room 7861
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 FO2O4 (Rcv.12.J-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Burcau ol Investigation

•

Copy to:
Report of:

IIC I
02/15/2006

CuselO#

297—HQ—A12715].1—D

I

orric Inspection

6

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
HOUSTON DIVISION
11/03/2005

Thie:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Charcter

On 11/03/2005, as part of the Mara Salvatrucha
i1-r’n Divicicwi ececuted
13 (MS—13) initiative,, t
I
“Reverse Home invasion.”I
and Houston Police Department (HPD) undercover employees
(UCEs), five subjects were led to believe a residence in
After
Pasadena, Texas contained 20 kilogrants of cocaine.
f five armed subjects
forcibly entered an unoccupied residence controlled by the
FBI with the intent to steal what they believed was 20
kilograms of cocaine. As pre—positioned Agents approached
the residence one subject pointed his weapon at Aqents.
In response, Agents fired their weapons, killing the
The four remaining subjects attempted to exit
subject.
the residence, firing at least one weapon as they tried to
Agents returned fire, striking and killing a
escape.
One
second ubjet and seriously wounding two others.
subject was unharmed.

Synopsis:

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DEAXLS:

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As part of the Houston Division MS—13 Gang
Initiative, the division was investigating a group
believed to be responsible for a 7/19/2005 armed home
As the subjects were fleeing
invasion in Pasadena, Texas.
the crime in a stolen vehicle, they fired handguns at the
During the subsequent investigation, three
victims.
subjects we’re identified a-s participants in multiple
carjackings, home invasions and other aggravated robberies

This document conts.ins naither r.cotzaandetiona nor conclusions of the E3Z. It is the property of the F5X
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents axe not to be distributed outside your agency.

 .
297—HQ—A127].511—D
in the Houston area.

I

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Isubjects who
later admitted to participating in several aggravated robberies.
Antcnio Ping.
One of the subjects was later identified as
1 (nrtflm-i n *h €
nr of mptinps I
I
I”home invasion”
El c.oro subsequently agreed to the
ot a Houston drug supplier.
plan.
On 10/14/2005, the Houston Division began to implement
an investigative strategy which involved convincing El Gordo and
his associates there were 20 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a
Pasadena, Texas, residence, thereby giving the subjects the
opportunity to conduct a home invasion to steal the cocaine. The
lEl Gordo as a potential buyer
plan called for’
to two Houston Police Department (HPD) undercover employees
(UCEs) posing as drug traffickers attempting to sell the cocaine.
The IJCEs would allow El Gordo to inspect one kilogram of cocaine
itt would be made clear to El Gordo that
at the target residence.
the cocaine would be left in the residence until he returned with
the money to buy the cocaine. Agents would leave 18 kilograms of
sham cocaine along with two kilograms of cocaine hidden in a
closet in the target residence. El Gordo would leave the
residence, return with his associates, and forcibly enter and
attempt to steal the cocaine.

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7D

Once the subjects had entered the residence and taken
possession of the cocaine, they would be arrested. The arrest
team would be hidden. in various locations outside the residence,
which would be equipped with audio and video capabilities for
safety and evidentiary reasons. The residence would be modified
to allow for only one entry/exit point. The entry/exit point
would be equipped with a magnetic lock which could be remotely
activated after lhe subjects had entered the residence. This
would effectively lock the subjects inside.

.

The Houston Division obtained the use of a residence
located ati
IPasadena, Texas, for the operation.
The target residence was an approximately 1000 square foot, five
room, wood framed structure. This vacant residence was owned by
a Houston Police Officer and had been used by the Houston
Division in an almost identical successful operation
approximately one year prior.
Beginning oi 10/31/2005. Houston Division Technically
Trained Aaents (TTAs)I

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 297—HQ—A1271511—D

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On 11/01/2005, Houston Division Electronic Technicians
(ETs) installed two magnetic locks on a wrought iron metal screen
door located at the front of the target residence. The two
magnetic door locks were wired to the CP. This configuration
allowed the metal screen door, once closed., to be locked remotely
from the CP.
Other than the metal screen door, all other
possible exits such as other doors and windows were covered with
plywood.
On 11/01/2005, SAC Roderick L. Beverly, ASAC Dana M.
Gillis, Chief Dj7i.irn (ôiine1 tDC) William C. 1-laman, SWAT
I
Coordinator SSAI
I Acting SSPI
I and Case Agent I
SWAT Tem Leader SAl
I
I
Imet to discuss and approve the written arrest plan
prepared by SAl
I On the same date, Houston received FBIHQ
approval for the use of show drugs in the ope-ration.
Preparations continued at the target residence on
11/02/2005 through the afternoon of 11/03/2005. TTAs and ETs
ensured the cameras, lights, PA and locks were in working order.

The arrest team, made up of members of the Houston Division SWAT
SAC Beverly and ASAC
team, reviewed and rehearsed their mission.
Gillis personally inspected the target residence and surrounding
area.
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on 11/03/2005, a briefing
was held at the FBI Office in Houston, Texas. All those involved
in the operation were present, including command and control
personnel, arrest team members, surveillance teams an HPD
The case
officers who wou1c be providing perimeter security.
agent, SAl
I provided the overall briefing. CDC Haman
provided a briefing on the FBI’S Deadly Force Policy. After the
3

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 __________lonce
______Ifor
___________
___

297—HQ—A1271511—D
initial_br.efing, the arrest team was introduced to the HPD UCEs
and
safety reasons. Soon thereafter, residents near
the target residence were asked to voluntarily evacuate their
homes for the duration of the operation.
By approximately 9:00 p.m. on 11/03/2005, the arrest
team was in olace at the target residence. At approximately 9:02
I
p.m.,I

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inside the target location, El Gordo
was allowed to inspect a kilogram of real cocaine as a prelude to
his purchase of the cocaine. Immediately thereafter, El Gordo
left the target residence and retu-rned to the Jack in the Box.
Surveillance then observed El Gordo and five other subjects get
into two vehicles and beam to drive toward the target residence.
he subjects were
armed with Uzzis and an AR—15 assault rifle. This information
was immediately passed to the arrest team.
Once in front of the target residence, three subjects
exited one vehicle and two exited the second vehicle. The second
vehicle then left the area. The second vehicle was later stopped
by HPD arid the driver was identifjed asi____________ Arrest team
members,, who were still hidden but could see the subjects.,
reported the subjects were armed with four handguns and what
Surveillance observed the
appeared to be an AK—47 assault rifle.
five subjects moving around the front and side yard of the target
residence using hand signals. After approximately ‘three minutes
of surveying the area the subjects quietly approached the front
door.
A subject then kicked in the front door and entered the
residence followed closely by two other subjects armed with hand
guns.
The fourth subject, armed with a handgun, hesitated at the
front door for two seconds then entered the residence. Upon
entering the residence the subjects began shouting in Spanish,
“Don’t move, don’t move.” All four subjects had their weapons
drawn and appeared ready to fire. Arrest team members later
reported hearing shots as the subjects entered the residence.
Once the four subjects were in the target residence, the metal
screen door eventually closed and was remotely locked from the CP
bySAl
I
Immediately after the four subjects entered the
residence, there were discussions in the C? concerning the
possibility that the door had not locked. These conversations
Itook his position
wore overheard by SAl
I SAl
covering the front door ot the residence believing the subjects

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 _______lapproached
_______
________

S

297—HQ—A12715l1--D
had the ability to quickly exit the target residence.
The fifth subject, later identified as El Gordo,
remained in the 4ont vazd of the residence watching the street.
At this point, SAl
I correctly believing the front door was
locked, gave the command, via radio, to execute the arrest plan.
The arrest team, parked in vehicles across the street,
immediately began arriving in the front yard of the residence.
The vehicles were displaying red and blue emergency lights.
Additionally, a siren was inadvertently activated for a split
second. Apparently hearing and. seeing the units arrive, El Gordo
I preraised his handgun toward the street. SAl
positioned in the window of a vacant building approximately 15
feet east of El Gordo, fired two shots from his M—4 rifle. El
In his Signed Sworn
Gordo immediately fell to the ground.
“I feared for my life as well
Statement (SSS), SA I
I stated,
as the lives of my fellow SWAT operators...” Later an HPD Crime
Scene Unit {CSU) search found two 223 caliber cartridge casings
near SAl
Iposition.

ISAI
land SA
in a vehicle with red and blue lights
activate, they observed El Gordo just after he had been shot by
SA I
I All three SAS were not aware El Gordo had been shot.
El Go.rdo was now on his hands and knees, stilt armed with a
tated in
SAl
handgun and moving toward their location.
his SSS, ‘i then saw the subject continue to move in my direction
and push himself up, as if he was going to stand.” All three SAs
shouted commands for El Gordo to stop moving and to drop his
weapon.
El Gordo did not comply and all three SAs fired their
M—4 rifles.
El Gordo was s-truck, which stopped his movement and
eventually killed him. Later, a FIPD CSU_search produced five
land SA
.223 caliber cartridge casings near SAl
I SAl
revealed
autopsy
El
Gordo
an
On
11/04/2005,
Ipositions.
I
ria teen shot four times. El Gordo was struck three times in the
abdomen and once in the right leg.
As SAl

.

.

b6

7C
A review of video tapes from inside the residence
indicated that after entering the target residence, the four
Immediately
subjects found the sham cocaine hidden in a closet.
This noise caused the
thereafter, shots were heard from outside.
four subjects to react by moving toward the front door. One
subject fired his handgun at least twice as he moved toward the
door.
The subjects approached the front door with their weapons
drawn and tried to force the locked front door open.

After the first shots were fired, SAl________________
lused the PA system and began instructing the remaining
You’re under
four subjects, in both English and Spanish, “FBI.

5

 297—HQ—A1271511—D
arrest. Stop shooting.
in.,,

FBI.

Go back to the room where you went

lexited
Upon the command to execute, SAl
the south entrance of the CP and was positioned behind a vehicle
apProximtely 30 feet from the front door of the residence. As
SAl
lapproached his position he heard what he called in his
SSS “two loud booms that I thought were rounds from a long gun.
After the two distinctive booms, I heard_other gunfire coming
Iobserved a subject
from the direction of the house.” SAl
appear in the doorway who attempted to leave the target residence
with a handgun in his right hand.

•

.

SAl
Istated that when he exited the CP he believed
the front door had not locked and the subject could easily exit
the target residence placing his life and the lives of his fellow
I SA
Agents in danger.
Dur,na interviews, SAl
I
SAl
and
SAl
I
I
all pre-positioned in the CP, recalled some discussion in the CP
concerning the door not being locked immediately prior to the
I who was positioned in a
SAl
command to execute.
van near the target location recalled other arrest team members
stating over the radio that the front door had not locked.
Several other Agents stated in their SSSs that they heard over
the radio that the door had been remotely locked. Later
investigation indicated the door had locked.
I fired multiple rounds from his M—4 rifle in
The subject did not
e subject
go down and SAl
was unsure if he had hit h
changed
stepped out of SA I
I view at which time SA
magazines in his weapon.. A few moments later the s
the
reappeared in the doorway. It did not appear to SA
subject was following verbal commands being given to him in
Spanish.
ibeJ-ieved the subject was being told he was
SAp
under arrest and to lay down his weapons.
SAl

.

the direction qf th subject in the doorway.

lobserved the subject on his knees, then down
SAl
on his stomach doing ‘what appeared to be a low crawl position.”
SAl
I stated, “I saw the subject moving his right arm and hand
in a non—compliant fashion as if he were reaching for something.
At this point, since the subject still posed a threat to me and
my team members, I fired again.” A review of the video recording
shows the subject, later identified as Juan Antonio Bautista,
crawl into the front room of the residence were he appeared to
reach for something immediately before he appeare4 to have been
struck in the head by gunfire and killed. An autopsy conducted
on 11/4/2005 revealed Bautista had boon shot ix times. Ho had
received a wound in the top of his head, two in the right arm,

6

h;c

I

 297—HQ—A1271511—D
one in the left chest, one in his upper abdomen, one in his right
thigh, and one in his right calf.
1 approached the target residence in a
SAL
and then positioned himself behind a
est
southw
vehicle from the
vehicle in front of the front door to the target residence.
Immediately prior to assuming his position in front of the target
I did not
Iheard numerous gunshots. SAl
residence, SAl
recognize the reports,_believing the gunshots had not come from
SA I
iwas able to see two subjects in or around
FBI weapons.
in his SSS, “I then saw one
jstated
the doorway.
SA I
subject, armed with a pistol, move from the left side of the
doorway to the right in an obviously non-compliant manner. It
was apparent to me at this point that this subject was not
complying with the commands that I knew were being broadcast
within the house.” He further stated, “I believed the subj:ect
posed an imminent threat of bodily inj-ury to the Agents located
on the side of the house and I fired a single round.” A search
by HPD CSU produced 30 .223 cartridge casings in the area were SA
Ihad positioned themselves.
land SAl
I

•

•

•

iwere positioned at the rear
land SA[
SAl
target residence. Both agents
the
of
rear
g
the
of the CP coverin
heard via radio that five subjects had arrived at the target
residence and at least one was carrying a “long gun.” SA
Ls.tated in his SSS, “Based on my eKperience in the FBI, I
I
know that these type of weapons are capable of sustaining rapid
rates of fiand can penetrate our ballistic vests and shields.”
_Jmoved into position, they heard a
1 and SAL
As SAl
siren, gunshots and an Agent’s voice over the PA system
announcing ‘FBI” and issuing commands to the subjects within the
A short time later they observed one subject
target residence.
come to a back window and break it out with the barrel of his
weapon and point the weapon in their direction. At approximately
the same time, the Agents heard additional gun shots. SA
I stated, “Since the subject posed an obvious, imminent
I
threat to my. life and the lives of the SWAT operators with me, as
well as other law enforcement personnel in the vicinity, I fired
Ifird his Glock 22 .40 caliber
at the subject.” SAl
Ifired his M-4 .223 caliber
pistol.
SAl
semi—automatic
rifle. A HPD CSU search found four .223 caliber cartridge
ihad positioned himself. One
casings in the area were SAL
were SA I
Ihad
found
was
casing
ge
40 caliber cartrid
position himself.
Approximately two minutes after the above described
I using the PA sytm. was ale to direct
gunfire, SAl
I to a
identified asi
latex
ts,
one of the subjec
cellular telephone which had been left in the target residence.

7

:ic

 .
297—HQ—A1271511--o
Using the cellar telephone, SAL
I with the assistance
the remaining three
to
instruct
able
of SAl
was
I
subjects on how to surrender and exit the target residence
safely.
Conversations were conducted in Spanish. After
approximately 45 minutes, two subjects exited the residence and
were arrested.
They were later identified as I
and I
I was seriously wounded and was
unable to leave the residence under his own power. Immediately
after the arrest team secured the target residence, aramedics
I
were .llowed in to administer first aide to I
I and I
I were later transported to nearby
review of medical records from the
hospitals for treatment.
Isuffered a gunshot
Sen Taub Hospital revealed’
wound to the upper left leg. A review of medical records from
Memorial Hermann Hospital indicated I
Isuffered a gun
shot wound in the right chest area.

.

I
•

tlv
4
The HPD CS!] search of the target residence iminedi
after the shooting incident produced the weapons carried byl
I
Iani
I They were described as follows: a Smith and
Wesson .45 caliber semi—automatic pistol; a Smith and Wessori .357
caliber revolver; a Beretta 9 mm semi-automatic pistol; a
Bexetta, 9 mm semi—automatic pistol; and a Norinco 7.62 x 39 mm
The .45 caliber semi—automatic pistol was
semi—automatic rifle.
Houston area burglary. All the weapons
reported stolen in
appeared to have been loaded. The FIPO CS!] search also produced
two 7.62 mm cartridge casings and two .45 caliber cartridge
casings inside the residence indicating four rounds had been
fired from the subjects’ weapons while inside the target
residence.

a

.

Further investigation conducted by HPD CS!] revealed
approximately 18 rounds struck the area of the front door of the
residence. An additional three rounds struck the front of the
target residence near the front window. The estimated_traiectory
of these 21 rounds indicated they were fired from SA I
I and
Approximately three rounds struck the rear
SAl
Ipositions.
of the target residence. The estimated raiectorv of these three
jand SA
rourds indicated they were fired from SAl
I
Ipositions.

•

Ii

Immediately following the shooting incident,
ndI

lana a

On ll/Q3/2OU,I
arre&zed.
transported to the FBI Houston office where they were

.1

t-ht-

8

•

I

h

hri hn nnrncthcd

I

Iwere
Iwere

by

b6
7C

 ___________Itold

.
297—HQ—A1271511—D
10.OOQ.OO when the bag had
pistol and promised to pal
been retrieved.
Iinvcked his riah to
Soon thereafter,I
Ithe 20
remain silent until he spoke to an attorney. L
r1d btother of L
I admitted to SA5 he drove I
brici another individual to a residence but was unaware of
any plans to commit a home invasion.

I

Iwas contacted and interviewed
On 1l/07/2005,I
by Houston Division SAS at ‘the Memorial Hermann Hospital in
Houston, Texas. I
Itold the SAs he believed they had
been set-up by the FBI. No further nformation qoncerning what
I
Iirijcated to
led him to this beli@f w
1 an unknown
1
land
Agents that I
I akal
Hispanic male, had arrnaed the home invasion and they had
Agents he had not fired a
provided the weapons.
weapon during the inciaent.

.

b6
7C

Iwas again Contacted at the
On 11/08/2005,1
rmann Hospital and interviewed by HPD Detectives.
during this taped interview, told HPD Detectives he
believed he was taking 25 pounds of marijuana from the residence.
He also indicated no one was inside the house when they saw
“lights” and heard someone yelling “FBI” and began dropping their
weapons .1
istated, “One of them got scared and broke a
window to try to get out but the window had butglar bars on it...
they (FBI) started shooting when the window was broken.. .he tried
telling them (FBI) not to shoot because they had dropped their
weapons and weren’t armed.”

Memorial H

I

Las contacted at the
On 11/08/2005,1
Hoiston, Texas, and interviewed by BPD
Harris County Thi1
I
Detectives. I
Itold detective
(LNU) had arranged for him aiid three others to steal a bag for
him. j
was told he would be paid $3,Q00 for his
brovided all the weapons for the home il)vasion.
services.
Iran out,
tated during h4s tad interview, “When I
Iwanted and they began receiving
they grabbed the bag that I
gunfire as they headed out... none of them fired their weapons
I never
until they began returning gunfire... he I
imagined that the police were the ones shooting at them... he
pias in the back of the room and began shooting his
I
I still had his
gun, but only shot at the floor.. .he I
gun in his hnd arid he was shot in his leg.” Later in the
Istated, “The police that were outside
interview, I
shooting were FBI. they were wearing their helmets and he could
tell they were FBI.
about a minute after the shooting stopped,
he heard someone saying in a speaker inside the house, ‘Don’t
move.
Don’t niovo. ou aro surrounded. ou cannot
FBI.
escape.”
.

.
.

.

9

.

h6
1b7C

 297 —HQ—A127 1511—D
Interviews of non-law enforcement personnel were
conducted at the scene during the neighboxhood canvass conducted
In summary, ihe witnesses, who
by both the HPD and the SIRT.
were residents in the area, noted hearing the commotion caused by
the operation, but none were direct witnesses to the shooting
incident.

I

On 11/09/2005,1
land

I
Iwere charged in Texas State District
Court with Agg.ravated Robbery and Burglary of a Habitation with
intent to commit crime. All remain in custody pending
indictment. The matter is being presented to the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas. An opinion
has not been rendered.

.

10

.

 r

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

•

FEDERAl. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:
o:

ROUTXNE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Attn:

05/22/2006

AD Ciarlene B. Thqrnton

I

Thornton Chare
Cloyd Daniel 4)4kt
Figliuzzi C Fr1

•

Iirr

I

h2
b7C

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271970--D
Titi,:

SHOOT]NG tNCIDENT
WASHINGTON FIEIID OFFtCE
11/13/2005

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 11/13/2005. invLving
Supervisory Special Agent (.SSA)I
I While
attempting_to locate and arrest two bank robbery suspects,
SSAI
I fired one round from hia Glock Model 22, .40
caliber pistol, injuring an aggressive pit bull dog. SIRG
members recommended_that no administrative action be taken
against SSAI
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

dministzatjve:__Reference Electronic Communication of
SSAF

I

dated 04/10/2006.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analisis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captLoned shooting.

 __________

To:
Re:

Inspection
rrom: Inspection
297-IQ-Al271970—D, 05/22/2006

etails of the Shooting Incident

I

On 11113/2005, at approximately 7:00 p.m., SSA
land other members of his squad briefed an operational
plan to utilize cellular tracking technology in an attempt.to
locate and arrest two bank robbery suspects.
While in the Co1lee Park, Maryland, area, Agents
received a strong signal indicating one of the suspect’s
cellular telephone was nearby. At the same time, SSAI
I
observed two individuals fitting the suspects’ description
walking down a Street. As SSA’
‘passed the individuals,
it appeared they attempted to conceal their fabes and
immediately turned and walked toward a residence. SSAI
I
circled the block and returned to the area where he previously
saw the spbects; however, they could not be located. SSA
Lnstructed other Agents to form a erimeter around the
I
suspect residence as he and SAl
I proceeded to the
rear of the residnce and scaled a four-foot high chain link
fence to take cover behind a shed in the yard. As they
approached tie shed SSAI
‘was charged by a pit bull dog.
SSAI
I fired one round striking the dog in the back.

SSAI
immediately informed the other Agents on
the scene that a shot had been tired resulting in injuries to a
dog who was subsequently treated by a veterinariaii.
On 05/05/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistait Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance:
Chief Inspector C. Frank P9ci1iri4. Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
Attorney,
Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;I
eput Chief,
Domestic Security Sectjon, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Kevin
pn Chief (SC), CD—4, Counterintelligence Divison;
4
“-‘I
r4miri1 Tnterprise
Assistant SC, Transnation
Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
I Unit
Chief (UC), Firearrs Trainina Unit. Training and Development
Division (TDD); DCI
I Defensive Systms Unit,
TDD; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
Special Weapons and Tactics ODeratiqis Unit, critical Incident
Response Group; SSAI
Toolmqrks_tJnip,
I Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSAI
I
I
aative Lw Unit. 0fice of the General
1
I Investi
Counsel (OGC); and SSAI
I Washington Field
Office. I
I Management Program Analyst,
Thspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, a non—voting member, was also in attendance.

I

‘‘“

-

2

b7c

 I’

To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 05/22/2006

Observations aad Becozumendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide ecommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provi.i
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
With the exception of SSAI
Iwho recused himself
from the discussion because of his involvement in this incident,
members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force by SSA
I
Iwas justified and in conformance with the deadly force
policy. This discussion resulted in a recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against SSA I
s a result
of his involvement in this shooting incident.

3.

 _________JQuantiao

¼

To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 05/22/2006

LEAD(s):
Set 1
I
e
ad 1:
•

(Action)

INSPECTION

•

AT ASHTNGTON, DC

That no dministrative action be taken against SSA
a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
D1C
•

1
1
3.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

•

1
1
3.
1
1

4+

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Cloyd, Room 7825
Ms.I
It5D
(Attention: Mr.
i JSDOJ
Mr.a
.Mr. Figliuzzi, Room 7837
Mr. E’avreau, Room 4042
Mr. Cunningham, Room 3548
I
(Attention: Mr I
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.

Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mrs

I

Quantico
Quantico
room 7326
IWFO

Room 7861

4

 ‘4:..-

FD204 (Rev. 123.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy o:

Report oft
Datc

ASAC D. Shepard Rabbinr
ASAC Keith L. Bennett
06/06/2005

Offlc

hoeni.x

297HQ1271898 SUB D
$HOOTING XNQUXRX

Title:

lEPORT OP SHO0TNQ X.NCXDENT

PIIOENIX DIVXS1O1T
06/03/2005

ADgxNrsRTIvE XNQUZRY
Siopsts:

This shooting incident was the result of an attempted
resolution to a stand-of.f by a barricaded subject.
On 05/12/2005,

-

I

Iarived at the Ga.l.lup

Resident Aaenc.v. Phoepi Division, a1egixig that her
husband,I
I then
I bad severely beaten her. I
forced his wjfe iøto a vehicle, drove her from her borne in
t. Defiance, New Mexico to Navajo, New Mexico (NM) where
he threatened to kiJ3. her and contjntzd to beat her. On

05/16/200. an- Indian Cpuntry Domestic Violence case was
opçned oni
I

b7C

Zlso on 05/2/2005,I
Isought and received
a Temporary Protection Order against I
I
rorn the Pama.ly Court of the Navajo Nat3.on Jucbci.a1
Distr1ct of Window Rock, Arizona.

Oz 06/02/2005. at approximately 2140 hours, Sheri.ff

I of the McK.ijiley Courv hcvfc’q
Office, McKinley CoUnty, NM, arrived aI
Gal1ip, NMi an attempt to serve I
Iwitb the
aforementioned Temporary Protective Ordet.
DepUty I

I

againsli]

‘198H.PX.76284. Investigation resulted in a federal criminal complaint
obtained on
05120t2005 for a violation of 18 Usc §1 153, 1201 (Crimes Committed Within Indian Country/Kidnaping).

This docunent contaiis neither recona.endations nor conc1uscne of the Paz. rt i. the property of the PaZ
and is 3.oanod to your agency; it and its contents axe not to be disin11uted outside yOur agency.

 _____Ipowered

_______

i:

-

297-HQ-A1271.899 SUB D

1 learned that I i
hile making inaI4.ries, Deputy I
was at thA residence. I
Iwa sitting q a couch and while
Deputy I
for a pistol,
Iwas talking with I
ignoring Deputy I
Istated, “you’re
Icommands to stop.
not going to take me a)
ive” Deputyl
1
Iqouah cover outside
I to drop the
I then commanded I
the residence. Deputy I
I
weapon and come out of the residence. Soon thereafter,
1
exited the residence it’ the pistol, and entered a pick—up truck
Iwa star1ina the vehicle, a ma.le on
parked nea.2zby. Whild
the scene dvied Deputy I
Ihad plnned a “su.icide
I thati
Iad two
by cop.” I
I departed ttie area and led Deputyl
lateF oinizg McKinley County units, on a vehicle chase. When
I arrived at New Mexico state line at Window Rock, Arizona
I
(AZ), the 1cKin.ley County units ended their pursuit.
As he Mc!ix1ey County units ended their pursuit of
I Officerl
-_lof the Navajo Nation Depa.rtment of Law
forcement (NNDLE) picked-up the pursuit in Window Rock, AZ.
NNDLE Patxo1. Sergeant i
I i her vehicle, soon joined Officer
the pursuit.__Thereafter, Officers)
I
IandL_
joined in. Seraçantl
I learned from her dzspatcher thä1_____
was armed. I
I later brandished the weapon during the pursuit.
The four patroi. cars continued to foUow him to a residence
iocated near mile post 5, rt” 112, rort Defarice, az. Sergeant
I yiho was famiLiar withi
Iknew this to be the residence of
J
I
mother—in-law.
I

un

Route 112 is anorth/soutb road. The residence sits on
a field west of route 112, with the main door facing east. There
a,e tio possible. entry points to the residence. The northern—
most entry point was roped-off.
.

lended
As the pursuit headed north down rout 112,1
the 35 mile-long pursuit by attentpting to turn left ad enter the
southern—most, or first, d.riveway entrance to the property. His
pick—un truc4, however, became, stuck (ist inside the perimeter
fence.. I
Iexjted hls uck vehicle and ran west towards the
residnc
Officer
his vehicle through the poi.nt
where I
parked apnrox.iuately 20 yar4s from t)e
I got stuck
residence. Sergeant I
IOfficr I
I and Off.icerl
b]J.
paxked near the east-side of the residence.
-

I ran towards the residence, Officerl
As I
I
alighted from his vehicle anj sv chase. However, Office4
stopped when he noticed that I
Icould not gain entry into the
residence and instead moved behind a picic—up truck parked
parailel to, and in front of, the house.
2

I

 297-HQ-A1271898 SUB D

Wheni
IWas close to the pick—up, officers saw that
be was holding a pistol to his he’d. Te officers took positions
of cover behind the paxked units. I
Imade several statements
to officers including
he “wanted to en4 it all” and that he
wanted to ‘see FBI AgentJ
began pacing back and
forth, alternately pontng us nangun at h.mself and the
officers while ignoring commands to drop the hazidgun.
At some point during the stand-off,tie Officers moved
their vehicles to gain tactical advafltage by setixig-up the
vehicles up in a nore 11
shion. They were placed with the
vehicle headlights facin
and the entrance of the residence.
E.ffozts to diffuse
agitated state were unsuccessful. Ue
continued to point s andgun at himself and police, pacing back
and forth, alternately moving from behind t)e cover of the parked
pick-up truck and then towards po1ice. He appeaxed agitated and
angry, ye1ling oUt statements such as “Iife sucks,” “I’m going to
k.il1 myself,” “I’m a convicted felon and I’m not ,going back to
‘prison” a.nd “I’m going to shoot at you guys so you’ll have to
kiU me.” i
icalmed—down for short periods of time, but would
also quickLy return to an agitated state. During a few points in
the stand-off with oolice. I
I made requests fr Special agent
(SA) I
I to be present. TbeNNDLE contacted SA
I an requested his presence.
I
lof the Lhoeni Dvisions
SAl
component of ‘the Gallup Resident Agency URA1 arived at the
sgene at approx&znately 2330 hours. SAl
Ihac previous
lad
dealings wit1
J ltbough not an FBI i.nformant,I
provided SA’
‘iiitb information on area crin{nal activity.
addition, sAl
was awa.re of a reqentlv ôbtined feder1
1°f
cimjn,ai coitiplaint against I
I SAI
the Ai,bucrnergue Division’s component of the GRA a.rrived shoitly
1 SI
after $AI
I was the on,l Cetifie Crisis
Negotiato,r in the BRA, having received his certLfication
approimately one month prior to the shooting. 1
upon their
a.rrivai, they observed several WNDL2 patrol vebzcles set-Up in
the front yard of the esidence,_facing more—or—less West, with
tbeLr headights shining oni_____

J

‘

SAS I
and I
1
having contacted Senior
Supervisory Resident Agent (SSRA)I
I the SSRA
responsible for the F. Defiance, A3 axea, and Crisis
4egotiator himself, began employing a mutually agreed upon
strategy aimed at bringing the barricaded situation to a close.
-

withi

SI

I trying

1 began talking
a with guidance from $l
to dtémine the source of hi agitation. SA
3’

 t

[e.

297-HQ-A1271898 SUB D

L...._
SZ1

I1wp by telljnçl
Ieplained tol

I that he should remember his family.

Fhow tough it would be on his children
it ne were to get hurt. nere was a long period of general
con ion back and forth about family and about the reasons
whyl
Ishould not huzt himself. Over time, these conversations
cyclq1 nd recycled covering the same topics. Also during this
tjmej
Jwould sit, stand, walk-around, al.l the while
alteznatel pointing his pistol at himself and the law
twas given
enforcement officers or the scene. At some point,I
a jacket because be stated be was cold.

Iadvanoçci towards the vehicles,
At one point,’
comLng within 15 yards of SAl
Icover vehicle. While
advancng, he contiflued to alternately poiflt his pistol at
himself and the officers and agents. I
I stopp&ng his advance,
stated. that he didn’t care if the officers bad ves ““çause he
told
had ut Teflon on the bzflets.” .t that point, Sl
Ito stop waiving the gun axond and to pt the gun down.
I
I responded that he wanted S
I there and if someone ws
Itben
gong to kiU him that he wanted it to be SN
stated that be wanted to talk with his wife and that if he cou.d
talk witb her, he wôu1 pt the gun down. Duing this time it
was appaRent thaI
IL was getting agitated. ile this was
expressed to SAl
taking pl- SI
Ihis discomfort wit
how close I
I was coming towards them and the ay in which
1 to
wasaiving his pistol at them. Nore commands from SAl
I
I caused a
o eventuaUy back-down. He took a seat close
to the residence By this time, it was approximately 0030 hours,
06/03/2005.
I repose, SA
During I
and SN
I decided to
regroup and review tbei:r strategy. SA
Ic advaqtaae_of
hd
the down-Jjme and checked—in with SSRA
SSRA I
SAs I
I and I
p agreed that becazse nothing had occurred to
chaxge the negotiation approach and because time ws on their
side, they would continue to employ the same strategy and take as
long as was needed to resolve the matter. Also during this
period of time, S
I took advantage of the b’reak to address a
cross-fi:re concern he had with the location of d few of the NDLE
officers positioned on the south—side of the perimeter.
Ihâd settled-down,
Approximately 45 minutes afterl
another wave of negotiations began. rin-irg this period, the balk
I desire to see his
of the_convçrsation centered arondl
wife. I
Iwas making conflicting statements when SI
I tied
to cotivjnc him not to hurt himself. On one oc
4 , when SA
I stated that
I
Itoldi
Itbat he shoul4 ot hurt himself)
“the pain was too great”. Shortly thereafter, however, respondjig

D6
1

 297-HQ-A1271898 SUE D

to the same statement by szI
Istated that Hit was
aga.nst his principles as a Native American to hurt himself
During this period
0
Itried to negotiate an immunity agreement

by tel)4jzg S2
J that if he could sign something that
immunized him trom the events of the evening, he would end the
stand-off immediately. Knpwina that an actual agreement of this
1 agreed that lyinp to
kind was not feasible, SAd
I and’
I about provid,ing sicban agreement was riskS’, because ifi______
I
saw through the lie, there was no way of kz)owin how he woulh
react.
-

Duxing the course of the evening, froz the beginning of
the stand—off, until after the shooting, a n(unber o additional
members of the NNDL arrived. Specifically, they were: Officers
iancd
md Sergean
Ibead o te h7C
tactica). team. These officers paticipated during some stage of
the stand—off in either a relief capacity, or as members of t.be
NNDLE tactical team. Zn addition, an ambu].ance from the Ft.
Defiance Indian Hospital was at the scene.
t_appro.imately_0200 hours,_an oficr from the NNDL.
advised S.sI
i two -j
I and’
I that I
re on the
scene.__pey had offeredt6 talk to I
I SA
lestabUsbed
I and his sons did not t along.
that I
S
therefore,
)
I sons to the equation. They were
opted agai.ist i.ntrodvicing I
placed to the far rea of the scene. Shortly thereater,I
I
entered into the parked pictc—up truck and appeared to lock t.be
doors. Re sat on the passenger sideof the trucc, the side
closest to the pol,ice vehicle perimeter. The time was
approc:imately 0390 hors. Some time passed without cia.Zogue. It
.is believed thati
Ihad fa.l:len asleep in the tzuck.
I and other
thiie things were quiet, Sergeand
members of the NNDLE tactical team e*pressed their concern that
the inpending sunrise would place the officers and agnf i
greater danger becaw ‘- light would expqse them tol
I
Therefore, Sergeant I
Iraised the possibilit’ of send.ng in
dogs, less-than—lethal bean-bag projectiles, or tear g’as, all in
an effort to bring the matter to closure. t1hi.l it was clear
that both the FBI and the NNDIJB had a stake in he outcome of
this matter, because this tand—of-f was the resilt of a local
police mater, tpe NNDL still bad primary jurisdiction. 5$
I
land
Iconvinced the NNDLE to delay escalation of the.
stand—off as it appeared that I
Iwas asleep and nothiig had
occurred to
sitate_escalation Additional cQnsultatzon
between SSRA I
1 ti1ed in the
1 and’
L SAs I
conelusion that it was ncessary to wakel
jso that he did not

S

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a

297-flQ-A1271398 SUB D

have the tactical advantage of be&ng rested whilø fh agents and
jused the
officers were becoming fatigued
Therefore, SAl
air horn in his vehicle to wakej
I

I
1 awoke and opened the_pick-up trzck d9or, again
dmandng to speak to b.is wife. SJ
B to1d
Itbat if be
I
p(it down his gun, he wold_oerspnally a.rrest him and allow I
to call aayoz)e be waflted. I
Ibecame anary and slammed the
I
truck’s door shut. At this moment, SAl
‘°d tbat the
situation wjs hapg&ng for the worse. While I
Iwas in the
pick-Up, SA I
I stepped back to the rear of his Bureau vehicle
and removed from a lock box his B(reau issued AR-15 rfIa. He
loaded and chambered a round into the weapon, a.ñd checked the
weapon’s sites and light. He then took a position standing on
the passenger side of a Navajo po3J.äe vehicle, using the engine
block for cover.
DDroxiate1y 0430 hours, Sergeaul
1infozmed
S3sI
landi
Ithat, because sunrise was 1uutunea)t, hLs
tactic&l team was prepaxing_to deploy a flash bang grenade to
distzact ard disorient i
• and then launch tear gas into t)ie
I
back widow of the pick-uo truck to etract 1
1 Si
requested that SrgeantI
Imaice his plan. the last option
Itj1i (anted to try to taiki
because si
Iiit
Ilet
s1xrendez&ng. sI
I also requested that Sergeantl
him know in advance when his people were going to do anything
tactical so that there would be ample wariing.
I

Before Sergeantl
Is plan coul4b effectuated,
igot ç,ut of the truck and again demanded to speak with his
w..re. SN
tappeared to be under the
IbeUeved thaq
aUuencq of drugs, which he believed to be metlampbetamine.
I had stated that be had_methamphetamine with him and
Earlier, I
I’ belief was furtJier
that be was goiflg to_inaest it.
2 SAl
•soJ.d.ified because I
I demeanor had changed, nd he appeared
to be_desperate and ready for things to end. SAl
Ibelieved
that I
based’ oz his actions and statements, was .trying to
provoke the agents and officers to shoot him.
Ito stop moving
SA
Icousi.stently kept telling I
around, and to stop movina_towaxds ‘them. SI
IiSSl
multiple comma.nds forl
Ito put his gun down. Whilel
1 was
moving aroud, he alternated moving the pistol horn a position of
rest on his .cbest, to 7aving the pistol, to poidt&ng it Ln the
2

Medical records obtained later in the investigatLqn revealed that a urine sample taken fonhile he
was being realed for the gunshot wound, indicated a presence of amphetamine.
6

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4

297-RQ-A1271898 SUB D

I

I

dirçtion of officers and agents. bile walking back and forth,
I would, at times, walk in a northerly ciixection. This placed
the agents and officers in a position of high vunerabUity,
leaving them without sufficient cover.
Jwas becoming
At approximately 0500 hours,l
increasingly fidgety. His breathing could be heard. It was
appa,rent to many that he s5tttation had deteriorated and one
officer ft-nm hq.jnd SAl
I yelled that “something was going to
happen.” I
Ihad then placed himself
Ithen faced SAl
ithen
north, where several officers were most vulnerable. I
moved )js weaon off of his chest and began to tu.rn it toward SA
I SAl
Ibelieved t at he, or one of the other officers,
was going o be hot. SA
I
ad his weapon aimed at’
chest. SAl
left him wh p safe
[believed that
I from his
alternative and, tbeefore, f,ired one round atl
weapon.

I was shot, his pistol feU out his hand.
After I
I then fell face forward to the ground and oHto his stomach.
I
I started to roil over onto his side ançl aooered to be moving
toward his gn which was lying nearby. SAl
Istarted to move
ii toward I
I with his weapon aimed at him, in case he would
have to shoot i
I a second time. At this_time, there was a shot
fired from behind and to the right of SAl
I. It was a bean
bag round_.xed by one of the Nt4DLE officers. The bean—bag
I in the chest, )nock4rzg him back away, from the gun.
strucid
Other ,officers_moved ii on I
.Tbey secured the handguns and
I Paramedics and officers, then began to
handcu,ffedl
administer £i.rst aid. ‘
‘was then immed,iately traxiported to,.
the E’t. Deiace Indian Hospital.
•

Iqas shot.
SsRAI
Iwas immed,iately contacted when I
He departed ‘lagstaff en route to the scene. While en roUte,
SSRAI
Ontated ASAC Rabbiner of the boenig Division to

advise hm of the situation.
process the scene..

rived to
t
Later, BI RT methbers a,z

Once I
Iwas stabLLized at thç hospital, it wa
learned that the round fired by SAl
Ihd pased through
f:ragtflented, and then passed into his stomach. He is
expected to s’urYive.

The piStoI% banime was cocked nd a round was in tbç.cbaniber.
3
7

 —

—.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Inspection

From:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Thornton Char
Cloyd Daniel

03/08/2006

AD Charlene B. Thornton
Extension 4-1837

B
-

Drafted By:
Case ID #: 297—HQ-A1271.480-D
itle;

SHOOTING INCIDENT
DETROIT DIVISION
08/09/2005

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
a shooting incideri3 that ôurd n 08/09/2005, involving
Special Agent ($A)I
I During the execution of
an arrest warrant, SAl
Ifired one round from his Bureau—
issued Glock, Model 22, 4U. m,j.limeter pistol, injuring an
approaching dog who had bitten a Task Force Officer (TFO) on

the scene.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative
action ISe taken against SAl
las a result of his
involvement in the shooting incident.
Athnnistrative: Ieference Electronic Communication of
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) John V. GiJ.lies,
dated 10/17/2005.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and reco±nmendations of the.. SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the- Shooting Incident

On 08/09/2005, members of the County of Macqmb
Enforcement Team (COMET) Violent Crimes Task Force were
attempting to execute an arrest warrant on a subject wanted
for Fraud.
As arrest team members approached the subject, who
was positively identified in front of his residence, he backed
away from law enforcement officers and entered his residence.
A TFO followed the subject and was on the porch when the
subject entered his residence. As the subject entered, a
black dog was released from inside the home and attacked the

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297—FIQ—A1271480—D, 03/08/2006

TFO, biting him twice on the upper leg/buttocks area. As a
result of the dog biting him, the TFO fell to the ground;
however, h pushed the dog away and entered the residence. As
s’I
lapproached the residence 1r
the TFO, the dog
began to growl and bark at him. SAl
Ibegan backing up
wi the dçg rapidly approaching him. Fearing for his safety,
SAl
If ired one shot at the dog striking it in the
shoulder area. The dog was immediately attended to by its
owner and taken to a veterinary hospital for treatment. The
dog’s owner advised law enforcement authorities that the dog
had received home protective security training and was trained
to attack anyone who acted in a threatening manner toward her
or the residence.
On 12/01/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member. The following voting members were in
attendance: Former Chief Inspector Iimberlv K. Metz, Office
of Inspections, Inspection Division; I
I Deputy
Chief. Civ1,1 Rights Division, Criminal Section, USDOJ; I
I Deput Chief Domestic Security Section, Crimina
I
Division, USDOJ;
Assistant Section Chief
(ASC), Opera ion
rt Section, Criminal Investigative
Division;
Unit Chief (t7C), Firearms Training
I
Unit, Training an
eve opment Division (TOD); UC I
1ational
Program,
Firearms
Acting
UCj
TDD;
I
I
I Special Weapons and Tactics Operations tInit,
Critical Incident Response Group; I
I ASC,
• CD—6, Counterintelliqence Division; Supervisory Special Agent
I, Firearms
(SSA) I
Toolniar]cs Unit, Scientific
Analysis Sectidn, Laboratory Division; SSA’__________________
Program Manager, Operational Skills Unit, TDD; and SSAI______
I
I Tn qttaiM1ye Tw Unit, Office of the Genera
I Management Program Analyst,
Counsel (O(C). I
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, ,a non—voting member, was also in attendance.
-

Observations and 1eoommendatioas of the SXG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident wIth
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.

2

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.4.

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.art,

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Prom: Inspection
297—HQ-A127l48O—D, 03/08/2006

SERG
force by SAl
force policy.
administrative
involvement in

xnembes unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
bas justified and in conformance with the deadly
This discussion led to the_recommendation that no
action be taken against SAl
las a resUlt of his
this shooting incident.

3

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Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271480—D, 03/08/2006

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC

I

administrative action be taken against SA
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

b6
b7

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Cloyd, Room 7825
1
Ms. I
JSDOJ
1-Mr.I
1, iJSDOJ
1
Mr. Manning, Rooi 1B045
(Attention: Mr.I
1
Mr I
I ooxn ib1
—

-

-

—

I

—

1

1
1
1
1

1

-

—
—
—

—

Mr

Quantico
Quantico
Quantico
Room 7326
Quantico
Hrs.I_______ Room 7861

Mr
Mr
Ms
Mr

4

 _
___________

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

?rom:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

2pproved By:

04/19/2007

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

Extension 4-1837

Kaiser (enneth W
Clemens Michae

Drafted By;

lrr

Case ID #: 297—IjQ--A1270955-D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
BOSTON DIVISION
09/22/2005

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting iJc5dnt t-hM
on 09/22/2QO5, involving Special
Agent (SA)l
I Turiqg the arrest of a fugitive
attempting to elude arrest, SP4
I fired three rounds from
his Bureau—issued Glock Model 2, .40 caliber pistol, injuring
the subject..
rembers recommended that no action be taken
against SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

Administrative:
Reference repcxrt of Inspector-in—Place
I dated 11/03/2005.

I

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

In August 2005, SAl
Ibegan working
with the Manchester, New Hampshire, Police Department (PD)
regarding the armed robbery of a market. The subject of the
armed robbery used a sawed off shotgun during the robbery and
escaped wilh S17.,000 in

issued forl

A federal arrest warrant was

[n connection with the robbery.

SAl
Interviewed I
lgirlfriendj
about the robbery; however, she denied having any
knowledge despite the fact that a vehicle registered to her, with
a female driver, was seen leaving the robbery. I
Icould not
account for the location of her vehicle nd reported it stolen
after being interviewed by SAl
I

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SAl
linterviewedi
lwho advised
[Jas a crack cocaine user and had been convicted of armed
robbery, as well as the assault of a police officer. She
explained that
to run over police officers with
hj vehicle during his attemDted arrest. I

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contact
execute I

After discuss.ng the situation, a decision was made to
I and advise her they would not attempt to
I

i-hp

I

SSRAI
coordinated efforts to surveil the
meeting betweeni
land
I t the church. Jaw
enforcement officers were going to instructj
Ito
attempt to obtain any information regarding tne .Locatlon or
I Agents and Detectives involved in the matter were
I
instructed to meet at the Quincy PD for a 4:00 p.m. briefing.

SAl

Jsuggested that a surveillance

ofi

apartment be initiated in anticipation of her leading law
enforcement personnel to the subject beforç±h
p.m.,
meeting with his sister. Uooi approval of I
ls:uggestion,
both he and SA
frolunteered to conduct the
surveillance.
SAs I
landi
Ideparted the Bedford Resident
Agency at approximately 11:uu a..m., and arrived in the vicirity
of I
apartment between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. I
I

vehicle could not be located at that time; however, betwoen 2:00
2

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Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—D, 04/19/2007

and 2:30 p.m., SAl
lobserved a white Mercury Marquis entet
the apartment complex. SAl
lobserved a white female,
believed to bel
lenter a ground 1ev
irttnet and
cOflttPd
1f the events. SA
Iconfirmed
thati
Itived in a ground level apartment and i4 was
determined th 1icense plate on the vehicle matched the one
registered

tol

I

Between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m., SAl
lobserved
Ivehicle exit the_apartment complex. He and SAl
I
followed the vehicle asI
I drove through a public park and
nroceedeçl to a shopping_mall at a high rate of speed. SA
observedI
xit her vehicle and enter the mall.
I
Firited the mall between 3:15 and 3:30 p.m., and entered
her vehicle.
SA I
Icopt’tPdL the owner/manaqer of a store
inside the mall and con.firmedl
I had not gotten
tuxedo.

I

I

I

Upon I
I exit from the mall, SAsI
I and
1 continued to follow her and watched as she entered the
parking lot of the xtended Stay Hotel. The Agents drove past
the hotel but could not seel
I vehicle. SAl
immediaty contacted SSA
who was with SA
I at the Quincy D to advise of the latest developments.
I
SAl
Ito the hotel and returned
Idrove SAl
to a parking lot across the street from the hotel, where he was
joined by additional Agents and detectives. The detectives left
the parking lot area, however, stayed in the general vicinity of
the Agents.

sAl
I advised he made contact with. the hotel
manager who verifiedi
Ihad checked into the hotel. She
provided the hotel with an invalid address and a telephone number
that was not current. si.p
Iviewed a video provided by the
manager and confjrmedl
SA
Ichecked into the hotel alone.
Ithen requested the assistance of a second Agent inside the
I
hotel.
After consultation with CDC Frank Davis and Assistant
United States Attorneyl
I a determination was made that
there was not enough probable cause to enter the hotel room in an
effort to locate and àpprehendl
I
SAl
I and SSA
I discussed different scenarios that could be employed tob7C
successfully locate and arrest I
I A decision was made to
keen tie existing team of Agents and detectives at the hotel when
and traveled to her meeting in Quincy. One ground
unit and the Bureau airplane would be utilized to surveil her a
the time of her departure. A second team of Agents and
detectives located in Quincy wquld be responsible for covering
the meeting betwcenl
I andi
Isister. AdditionQily, SA
-

I

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1anned to interview!
lafter the meeting
with!
I hoping to obtain enough information that jcm1
1
produce probable cause to obtain a search warrant for
hotel room.

I

Law enforcement eronne1 at the hotel received
information frcm SAl
Ithat the hotel clerk who rented the
room to!
lobserved her standing at the hotel_eleyator with
an unkn8wn maié. SAJ
lalso reported that!
lobtained
change at the front desk to wash clothes in the basement of the
hotel. SAl
Iproceeded to the laundry room where he observed
one dryer operating containing_clothes belonging to a man and a
woman. Additionally, SAl
Iad previous
” hsrrJ a male voice
1
coming from onq of thç rooms associated with I
I Shortly
thereafter, SA
joontacted SA
land advised him
has enr4nn the driverts side of I
Iwbite
Mercnirv iarquis, with!
lentering the passenger side. SA
decided to effecti
larrest in the
notei parking lot. Qne of the Braintree detectives at the scene
provided SAL
Iwith a walide talkie to allow for
communication with local law enforce!pent nøçsonnel. SAl______
announced over the Bureau radi thati
Iwas leaving the hotel
and an attempt would be made to stop and arrest him in the
parking lot.
kirove his vehicle toward the hotel looking
SAl
for the subject vehicle. Seeing an unusual amount of heavy
traffic as well as pedestrians in the area, SAl
lentered
the parking 1t and stopped his vehicle directly in front of the
hotel lobby. The detectives entered the parking lot, however,
stayed near the entrance. While searching for the subject
vehicle’s location in the parking lot, SAl
Irecalled
heqrina wor1s to the affect, “they’re leaving the parking lot.”
SAl
lbqJeved te information was relayed over the police
radio. As SAl
Iheard the information on the radio, he saw
the subict vehicle traveling toward the parking 1t exit. SA
his vehicle toward the parking lot exit and
blocked the subject vehicle before it entered the street. SA
lalso identified the driver of the vehicle as!
I
I and
observed him looking in his rearview mirror. SAl
lexited
his vehicle and drew his weapon. While walking toward the
subject vehicle, SAl
I,elieved he s;houted, “FBI, stop the
car” or similar words to that affect. SA I
I heard other
voices shouting similar commands for the subject to stop the car.
As SAl
I approached the subject vehicle,l
Iwas
attempting to back his vehicle toward the police van which had
stopped directly behind him. I
heft hand was on the
steering wheel and his right hand and_arm were behind the front
pasenger headrest. According to SAl
Iwas looking
through the rear window but never gave any indication_of
complying with orders to stop the vehicle. SA[
I recalled
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hearing the engine screaming s ifi
Ihad pressed the gas
peçial to th floor. As.sumingl
Iwas attempting to escape,
SAl
I believed he posed an imminent threat of death or
bodily harm to himself, other Agents, and ‘ocal 11w enforcement
personnel.
Having an unobstructed view of I
I SAl
I
fired multiple shots ati
Iwbo continued his escape efforts;
1 seconds later he screaned in pain and turned around in
however
the driver’s seat.
SAl
lapproached the vehicle, opened
the door, and pulled I
I out of the vehicle. I
I fell from
the vehicle onto his back with his stomach area covered in blood.
I
Iwas subsequently handcuffed and an Emergency Medical Team
arrived within minutes and transported him for medical
assistance.
Medical records of the suspect could not be obtained by
the Shooting Incident Review Team and the subject was in an
induced coma during the inquiry. Uowever, subsequent information
was received that the suspect fully recovered from the injuries
he received as a result of the shots fired by SAl
I
No local prosecutive opinion was obtained regarding
this shooting incident; however, on 06/21/2006, a declination of
prosecution was received from the United States Department of
Justice. Civil Rights Division, regarding the actions of SA
un this shooting incident.
I
On 09/21/200:6, the SIRG met tQ discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Nichael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member.
The following voting members were in
attendance:
former Chief Inspect9r C. Frank Fialii
zzi, Office of
1
Inspections, Inspection Divisiorl;I_________________
Chief,
Domestic Security Section, CriminaL L)1V1S1Ofl, uuuJ;j
I
I Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USPOJ; SC James Casey,
Eurasian Section, CD—i, Counterintelligence Division; SC John V.
Gilhies, Violent Crimes Sectioi, Criminal Investigative Division;
Unit Chief (UC)I
IFirearms Training Unit, TDD;
hief, Defensive Systems Unit, TDt;
UCJ
Special Weapons and Tatti Onrstinn
Wnit, Critical Incident Response Group; UCI
I
Operational Skills Unit, TUD; SSAL
a irearms
marks Unit. rAPtfic Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
1
TooJ
SSAI
I
I Washington Field Office; and SSAI
I Investicative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel (OGC) I
Deputy General Counsel,
Investigative Law Branch, OGC, andi
L Gçneral
Attorney, Iivestitiv Lsw flpit, OGC, as well as SSAI
I
I and(
1. Management Program Analyst,
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, non—voting members, were also in attendance.
—

5

lb 7 C

 To:
Re:

Inspection
E’rom:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—o, 04/19/2007
Observations and Recoznmendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
With l-h P5cnenjon of one SIRG representative members
opined that SA
Ireasonable use of deadly force was
justified and in compliance with the deadly force poiicy. The
dissenting voter questioned SAl
j statement of imminent
danger considering no evidence existed that the subject aimed a
weapon at law enforcement personnel.
He emphasized the fact that
the subject was only backing up and questioned whether the shots
fired were to keep the subject from escaping or because imminent
danger to law enforcement personnel existed. Other SIRG members
reiterated the fact thati
Ihad advised Agents that
he previously attempted to run over officers as they attempted to
effect his arrest.
Other issues discussed by the SIRG pertained to
inadequate planning and the lack of utilization of protective
armor by Agents at the scene. SIRG members emphasized the fact
that contingency and risk planning, as well as the Operations
Plan for this incident, was inadequate. Members noted the
operational plan failed to sufficiently document the “Iaw
Enforcement Participants in the Operation,” with regard to the
execution of the plan. SIRG members were also cognizant of the
fact that SAl
ladvised he was not aware of an arrest plan
being prepared since the operation was more of a surveillance
than an arrest.
It was further noted by the SIRG that the
Braintree detectives provided a radio to SAl
i however,
thad no ability to communicate with other surveillance team
members. Members çnined that SM
Imade a unilateral
decision to arrest I
I which wa-s not previously discussed with
team members.

I

The second issue centered around the fact that SA
land SN
Iwere not utilizing their ballistic vests
during the operation.
SAl
ladvised he intended to wear
his vest; however, because of his constant interaction with law
enforcement personnel, he did not have an opportunity to put it
on before the incident.
Tpe last observation mde by the SIR.G was the fact that
although SN
I did not fire his weapon during
the inciden’c, ne was involved in the investigation and should not
have conducted any witness interviews subsequent to the shooting.

6

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1b
b/c

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—NQ—Al27O955—D, 04/19/2007

Additionally, members noted the Braintree Police Department 911
tape indicated a phone call was receive from th Siatj. Police
who advised an individual identified asi
itnessed
some information regarding the incident. utnougn trie
individual’s name and cell phone number were provided, thørF jq
no documented evidence that an interview was conducted of I
These observations will be discussed with the Special
Agent in Charge of the Boston Division.

7

b6
b7

1

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—o,

From:
Inspection
04/19/2007

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INS PECT ION
AT WASHINGTON, DC

I

incident.

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That io administrative action be taken against SAl
I
I, as a result of his involvement in this shooting

Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.

PistOle, Room 7142
Ford, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Clemens., Room 7825
SDOJ
Mr.I

Mr.I
I tJSDOJ
Mr. Casey, Room 5096
Mr.
Room 3280
Mr.
Mr.
Mr4

Mn

Mn
Mn
MsJ
Mrs7

IQuantico
Quantico
jüantico
I Quantico
I, Quantico

WFO
I oom 7326
Room 7861

8

 I
FD-204 (Rev. 124-95)

.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF USTfCE
Federal Bureau of Invesfigadon

Copy to:

Dat
casern:

ASAC LOUIS J. CAPRINO
03/15/2006

Los Angeles

297-HQ41271741D
89B.-LA-242730
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY;
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
LOS ANGELES DIVISION;
09/30/2005
ADMINISTR.TIVE INQUIRY
INTERIM REPORT

synopsis

On 09/30/20O. 5iieal Agents
Ind 14s partner
credential number I
eir
number
credential
I were on u y n
I
I
I
capacity as Los Angeles FBI Special Agents (SAS). The
SAs were assisting the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) in a surveillance when they werç involved in a
shooting incident following an atteiçted robbery and
caracking of their Bureau vehicle.. The background and
facts of the case are as follows:
The LAPD contacte4 FBI Los Angeles at the
beginning of September of 2005 reference numerous armed
robberIes of restaurants in the San Fernando Valley, a
suburb of Los Angeles, California. They requested
technical assistance and personnel in an effort to
identify and apprehend the sub ects. The FBI in Los
Angeles opened a Hobbs Act investigation, file number
192B-LA-242506 as its underlying violation.
T1e subects involved in the robberies had been
targeting a particular area of the San Fernando Valley
which is northeast of the City of Los Angeles. The
robberies bad been taking place most frequently on
Thursday, Friday, and Saturday evenings. The decision
was made to place approximately thirty (30) two person
teams of SAn in surveillance vehicles. Each of these
teams would be responsible for a section of the above
identified area of the valley. The LAPD was providing

rlzis doCunant contain.. neither recoonendations uo conclusions of the FSr. It is the property of the
L” and i. loan.d to your agency; it and its contents an. not to ha distributed eutoid your agency.

 .

.

297-HQ-A1271741-D

teams of their own as well as air units to respond to any
robberies or problems which may occur. Each of these teams
would have two radio channels in addition to coordinating the
different movements of the teams in the field. It should be
noted that this surveillance system had been in use on nine
previous nights during the month of September 2005. The
subjects of the investigation were not involved in any
robberies during those previous nights.

-

I were teamed up
SAs I
I andi
and were responsible for a group of restaurants near the
intersection of Corbin Avenue and Vanowen Street. There were
other teams conducting surveiJ,lance_of etauants adjacent to
I The various
the area being covered by SAs
landl
teams were all in place on 09/29/2005 at approximately 7:30 pm
and were scheduled to stay out in the field until 09/30/20-05
at l2:30 am.
‘were in a 000 rd four door
land I
SASI
Oldsmobile.
‘was in the
1#aB driving and SAl
I
front passenger seat. A few minutes before midnight they had
backed into a driveway of a closed business facing out onto
Corbin Avenue just south of Vanowen Street. As it was a warm
I had the window of the driver’ s door open.
evening., SA I
Both SAs were dressed casually and there were no markings on
the outside of the vehicle which signified it as a law
enforcement vehicle.
At abogt one minute after midnight (now 09/30/2005),
a green and grey 1993 Chevrolet S -10 Blazer pulled up next to
the BA’s vehicle. The vehicle was occupied by four Hispanic
males. The driver of the Blazer, later identified as CEBAR
BALIiESTEROS, exited his vehicle and ixmued4atelv approached the
driver’s side of the BI vehicle where SAl
was seated.
I shirt with his
The subject reached in and grabbed BA I
left hand.
The subject took his 4aht hnd a.nd was reaching
below on SAl
Iheard the sublect
b lçft side. SAl
as SAl
I
state, “Give me your fucking (“money”
could not recall) or I’ll kill yout” BA
was wearing a
bullet proof vest. He could not see a gun or
f at that
moment but said it felt like one or the other was being pushed
against his left side and chest.

SAl
lie left handed and he was trying to access
his weapon as well s making sure the subject did not take it
Iwas able to hear and. observe the actions
from him. SAl
of the subjects and made the decision to stop the imminent
2

 .

S
297-HQ-A1271741-D

threat against their lives. He took his handgun, a Glock 9mm
Model 17, and fired at least three rounds at st.thject
LESTEROS. The rounds struck the subject in his upper left
2
BAI
chest (the subj ect had been leaning down into the car) and. in
both of his hands (wrists).
Subject BALLESTEROS yelled
something and then began running north on Corbin Avenue
towards Vaxiowen Street. He collapsed about 80 feet north of
the scene and died. He had fallen face down in a stall of a
self car wash facility.
Prior to BALLESTEROS. running away, a second subject
had exited the’ subject’s vehicle. This individual had begun
running around to the front (eat side) of the FBI vehicle
towards the direction of the passenger’ side of the car. BA
I
I shot four times through the front windshield of the FBI
vehicle. He struc] the second subject, atT identified as
juveni].d
I, in the right hand. I
immediately ran
north from the area as did the other two subjets who had been
in the vehicle.

SAl
I after accessing his handgun, fired at
least three rounds from inside the vehicle in an effort to
shoot and stoo_BALLESTEROS. None of the rounds struck the
subject. SA[
I following the shooting, drove south from
the area to get out of the fire zone. After confirming SA
I
I was not injured be communicated via the Bureau vehicle
radio what had happened. SAs in nearby units imnediately
responded to their location. The LAPD also reepbnded and set
up a perimeter with the assistance of the FBI, but the other
three subjects were not located at this time. The LAPD
deployed scent dogs and SWAT team members throughout the area
in an effort to locate and apprehefld th remainig subject’s.
At this time none of the three were observed in the area.
A handgun was located approximately fifteen (15)
feet northeast of the subject’s vehicle lying on the sidewalk.
It was a .25 caliber Earetta, Model 950B8. There was no
magazine in the weapon and it was not loaded. The weapon was
later determined to have been stolen from Gautier,
Mississippi.
Contact was made at the nearby hoaoitals when ER
staff advised there was a juvenile namedi
lat a local
ER who had sustained a gunshot wound to his right hand. BAa
and members of the LAPO responded to the hospital and the LAPD
interviewed the subject. I
kdmitted to having been at the
location and that the driver of the vehi’cle was OBSAR

3

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.

297 -HQ-A1271741 —D

I

BALLESTEROS, a 26 year old male.
ialso provided th nm
‘
twç individupls in tie subject vehicle, I
Iaiicul
I both juveniles. The LAPD,
itn cne assistance of the FBI, went to their residence and
both were arrested.

I

The Los Angeles County District Attârney CLADA) has
charged all three juveniles as adults. They have been charged
with two counts each of attempted car jacking with the use of
a firearm, attempted robbery with the use of a firearm, and
Second Degree Robbery. They also are considering charging the
three with “Provactive Murder” which means the death of one of
their co-conspirators. The two FBI agents were the only
witnesses to this crime.
The Los Angeles FBI Agent Involved Shooting (AIS)
team responded to the scene and coordinated an investiative
strategy with the LAPO. The FBI is conducting the
Administrative aspects of this investigation and the LAPJ) and
the Los Angeles County District Attorney is responsible for
the charges brought against the three juveniles. The FBI afld
the LAPD often work together on these shooting investigations
and there is an excellent working relationship.

Upon the arrival of the MS team, both SA8 I
I and
Igave a basic statement which included a description of
the subjects and the direction they fled. The statement they
provided outlined what had happened but with little detail.
Within a few minutes of the incident, Los Angeles chief
Division Counsel (ODC) Luis Flores arrived at the crime scene.
He spoke separately with both of the SAn. Since there was a
fatality, he secure4 permission from PBIHQ and DO t
‘re
interim legal representation from DOJ for both SAl
and SA
I
L Although both DOJ Attorneys were contacted the evening
of the incident, neither of the DOJ Attorney representatives
responded to scene.
Later tht mcrning both attorneys spoke
telephonically with SAs I
landi
I and were advied not
to make a statement unless it was compelled.

I

On 10/12/2005, Assistant Unite4 State Attoriey
(AUSA)I
lof the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s
Office (TJSAO), Central District of California was contacted
reference the shooting incident. She was provided the facts
of the incident as best as could be determined without a
statement from the victims. She advised the USAO saw nothing
in the incident which would lead them Ip filing any type of
criminal charge against either SAl
jor SAl
I

4

 _______

.

.

297-HQ-A1271741-D

On 10/2/2005, an autopsy was conducted on subject
CESAR BAI.
LESTEROS by the os naeles -County Coronçr’s- off ice.
1
This autopsy was attended by SAL
I
I and SAl
I
I. The findings of the coroner indicate that subject
BAIJLESTEROS was struck a total of three times, once in the
upper left chest and once in each hand (wrist). The round
through the subject ‘ a chest went through both of his lungs,
his heart, and. his liver. After this shot he was able to
travel about 80 feet before collapsing and dying. This round
was a 9mm round.
The ?Bt EAP responded to the location to assist SAS
and. I1 Both the FBI vehicle and the subject vehicle
were transported to the FBI Evidence Response Team offaite for
processing.

I

I

The_statements made by the thre subjects, I
I
I anc
iwho sustained a
I do not coincide. I
gunshot to his right hand, admitted to being with BAILESTEROS,
at the crime scene. He was not being
I
I and I
cooperative until he learned that BALLESTEROS had died at the
scene. He then claimed all four them discussed robbing the
vehicle_and that they all agreed that they were goi
na to o
1
land
it.I
Iqave information as to the whereabouts of I
I following being Mirandized by the LPD,
I
state4 that he was with his friends and they were driving down
an unknown street. He said that two
es started
shooting at them for an unknown reason.
advised that
he was with the above group and they were standing outside of
their vehicle. At this time the shooting happened but he has
no idea why they were being shot at by the males.
I

Given the fact that the available witnesses provided
inconsistent statements and with no independent witnesses
other than the victim FBI agents, the LAnA advised statements
from SAsi
Iwill be critical to their
land I
investigation. These statements were obtained on March 13,
2006. This following FBI Los Angeles being notified on
February 24, 2006 that DOJ had declined any prosecution of the
agents and that a compelled statement should be received from
both agents.

5

 .
297 -HQ-A127 1741 -D

In this case th TjflA office has advised they plan
On subpoenaing both SAl
land Ski
ias—v!ctime1witnesses

in their prosecution of the three remaixing subjects.

Their

testimony was originally being requested by the LADA. anywhere
from the first to the middle of December 2005. The subject’s
attorneys have asked for a continuan e until May of 2O0S.
-

6

 _________________IExts0n

.Rcv.Ol.3i.2OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Inspection

From:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attn:

06/01/2005

AD Charlene B. Thornton

Inspection

Contact:

approved By:
Dated By:

4—1837

Thornton Charlen
Bland Andrew P. I

I

Case ID

It: 297—HQ—A1271615-D

Title:

SHOO’t’ING INCIDENT
JACKSON DIVISION
02/28/2005

jlrr

-

Synopsis:
The Shootin Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 02/28/2005. involving
Supe-r-rlru cenior Resident Agent (SSRA) L.
I
SSRAI
I assigned to the Oxford, Mississippi BA, tired five
rounds from his Bureau—issued Glock Model 22, 40 caliber pistol,
killing an aggressive pit bull dog at his residence.
SIRG
members reconunended_that no administrative action be taken
against SSRA I
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of Assistant
Special Agent in Charge William V. Jenkins, dated 03/02/2005.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

2b7c

 (

To:
Pee:

•

Inspection From
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271615--D, 06/01/2005

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

On 02/28/2005, SSRAI

received a

frantic telephone call from his wire wflo advised that a large dog
foairthp i- tjie mouth was attacking their small family dog.

Mrs.t

I also indicated that the dog attempted to get into
their residenáe to bite her.

S5RAI
I responded to his residence and exited his
Bureau vehicle. As he exited the vehicle, SSRAI
Iheard
deep growling inside the garage, and drew his weapon. As he
proceeded toward the garage and yellei he sw a large brown dog
carrying his pet in its mouth. SSRA I
I identified the
attacking dog as a pit bull and observed the dog drop his small
I fired one shot into
dog and began to approa.ch him. SSRAI
the pit bull’s head, however the dog continued to approach him.
He fired four additional shots at the dog’s head before the pit
bull actually fell to the ground and died.
Notification was made to Animal Control and to the
local County Sheriff.

I

On 04/25/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)
Andrew R. Bland, III, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the fol].owing voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, Criminal
Qetutv Chief. Domestic Security
Section, USDOJ;I
Chief
Section, Criminal Division, USDO; I
Inspector, Office of Inspections, tnspection Division;
Charles 3. Rooney, Section Chief (SC), Operational Suooort
Section, Criminal Investigative Division;J
I tJnit
Chief (UC), Firears Training Unit. Tcaining and Development
L National Firearms Program,
Division (TDD); JCI
TDD; Acting SC Linda McKetney, Special Inquiry and General
Background Investigations Unit. Administrative ervices Division;
Supervisory Special Agent (SSAJ
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory DivisiQn;
1
SSA I
1 Investiaative Law Unit Office oi the
Washington
General Counsel (OGC); and SSAI
1,
‘Field Office.
Thç only non—voting attendee preseht was
Inspection
I Management Program Analyst,
anagement unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

1

I

Oserrations and Recommendatio,ns of the SIRL
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;

.2

 •

To:
Re;

Inspection
Inspection Froiu
297—HQ—A1271615—D, 06101/2005

(2) provide the Director with n evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any);. (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for dministratie action if deemed necessary.
SIRS member unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SSRAI
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
deadly force policy. Therefore, a recoxmnendati,on was iade that
las a
no administrative action be taken against SSRA
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

3

 ________IQuantico

To:
Re:

Inspection From
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271615—D, 06/01/2005

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(A.ction)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. DC
That no administrative action be taken aainst
s a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

SSRAI

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Bland, Rooqi 7825
1
SDOJ
Ms.I
1.- Mr.I__________ USDOJ
1
Ms. Metz, Room 7837
1
Mr. Roonev Room 5155
1
I Quantico
1
Mr.
j Quantico
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
FO
L Room 7326
1
Ms.
1
MrsJ
I Room 7861
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OI-i-2OQ3)

FEDERAL EUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence;
To:

ROOTINE

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

I

I

06/01/2005

AD Charlene B. Thornton

Attn:

Inspection

From:

Date:

Extension 4-1837

Thornton Charler1M
Bland Andrew R IjJ

I

Ilrr

Case ID #: 297-HQ—A1271285-D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
03/03/2005

Synopsis:
The Shooting incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting iit,- Mi- Ew.Vrred on 03/03/2005, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I During the execution of an arrest
warrant, SN
Ifjred five rounds from his Bureau—issued
Springfield, Model 1911, 45 caliber pistol, killing an aggressive
pit bull dog.
SIRG meznber recoxnuended that no administrative
action be taken against SAl_______
a result of his involvement
in this shooting incident.
Administrative:
Referene ElecrOnir
Supervisory Spcial Agent (SSA)
03/09/2005.

COtmiiiinicatipfl

(EC) of
dated

Details:
This communication was prepared to furiiish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 ‘1

To:
Re:

Inspection From
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271285—D, 06/01/2005

Details of the Shooting Incident.,
On 03/03/2005, during the execution of multiple arrests
involving gang members/associates, one subject was not located at
his orimarv residence.
Investigation determined that subject
1could possibly be residing at his mother’s
I
residence located in Aurora, Illinois. The Chicago Division
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team was dispatched to the
residence in Aurora, and obtained a_volunary consent to search.
During the course of the search, SIJ
Iwas clearing the
kitchen area when a brown pit bull dog came running towards him
in an aggressive and threatening manner. Fearing for his safety,
SAl
I shot the dog five times, killing .the dog.
The dog’s owner advised Agents that the dog was very
aggressive and was intent on harming SA I
I
On 04/25/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)
Andrew R. Bland, III, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Karla Dobinski, Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, Criminal
Section, tJSDOJ; Bruce Delaplaine, Deputy Chief, Domestic Security
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Kimberly K. Mertz, Chief
Inspector, Office. of Inspections, Iispection Division;
Charles J. Rooney, Section Chief (SC), Operational Support
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; p
j Unit
Chief (CC), Firearms Training Unit, Training an LeveJ.opment
Division (TDD); CC I
I National Firearms Program,
TDD; Acting SC Linda McKetney, Special Inquiry and General
Background Investigations Unit, Administrative Services Division;
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)’
‘-,
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit Sricntifc Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I Investicative Law Unit Office of the
General Counsel (OGC); and SSN
Washington
Field Office. The only non-voting,attendee present was
I
I Management Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

I

Observations ad Recommendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly forcep
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations,, and recommendations for ‘corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recoznniendation
concerning-training and/or safety issue; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed neessary.
2

 F
To:
Re

Inspection From
Inspection
297—HQ-Al271285—D, 06/01/2005

SIRG_mepbers unanimously agreed t’hat the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justifiçd and in conformance with the
deadly force policy.
This discussion resulted in a
recommemçiation that no administrative action be taken againsi
SAl
ias a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
The only observation made by the SIRG members was
wording conta±ned in the C submitted by the Chicago Division.
According to the EC, follow—up interviews were conducted with the
dog’s owner JDU’t not enclosed in the report.
I no
05/31/2005, telephone conversation with ssJ
additional interview was conducted with the dog’s owner.

3

 1

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection Fromf
297—HQ—A1271285—D, O6/1/2OO5

Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no administrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

SAl

1
Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
1
Mr. Bland, Room 7825
1
Ms.I
IYSDOJ
I USDO3
1- Mr.I
1
Ms. Mertz, Room 7837
1
Mr. Prw- Room 5155
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
I Quantico
1
Mr.
J.Quantjco
1-Mr.
FO
1
Ms.
L Room 7326
1
Mrs. I
lRooin 7861
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4

  

 

 

 

2005

 

 

 

 

(Rev. 0644-2007)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

AD Kevin L. Perkins
Extension 4-1837

Kevin L

eniens Michae1,4
Drafted By:

03/26/2008

bG

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Case ID #: 297—HQ—AJ.271511—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
HOUSTON DIVISION
11/03/2005

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewecf a
shooting incident that occurred on 11/03/2005, involving
Supervisory Special Agenti
I (currently assigned
n1-ir flivirn
to the Crimii1 Tnr
‘RTRfll
np1
Agents (SAs) I
I

I

andi
I During the attempted arrest of subjects
believed to be responsible for an armed home invasion, Agents
fired multiple rounds resulting in the death of two subjects and
seriously wounding two others.
SIRG members recommended that no
administrative action be taken against any of the Agents as a
result of their involvement in this shooting incident.
Reference report of former Inspector
dated :02/15/2006.
trative

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
As part of the Houston Division I’ara Salvatrucha—13
(MS—13) Initiative, the division was investigating a group
believed to be responsible for a 07/19/2005, armed home invasion
in Pasadena, Texas. As the subjects were fleeing tle scene of
the home invasion in a stolen vehicle, they fired weapons at the
victims.
During the subsequent investigation, three subjects
were identified as participants in multiple carjackings, home
invasions, and other aggravated robberies in the Houston area.

Savage- 1949

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Inspection
297—HQ—A1271511—D, 03/26/2008

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a
“home invasion” of a Houston drug supplier. One of the subjects,
identified as Jose Antonio Pino, aka El Gordo, agreed to the
plan.

I

On 10/14/2005, the Houston Division began to implement
an investigative strategy which involved convincing Pino and his
associates there were 20 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a
Pasadena residence, giving the subjects the opportunity to
conduct a home invasion to steal the cocaine. I
I
ILntroduce Pino as a potential buyer to two Houston
Police Department (HPD) undercover employees (UCEs) posing as
drug traffickers attempting to sell the cocaine. The UCEs would
allow Pino to inspect one kilogram of cocaine at the target
residence and tell Pino that the cocaine would be left in the
residence until he returned with the money to buy the cocaine.
Agents were to leave eighteen kilograms of sham cocaine, along
with two kilograms of cocaine, hidden in a closet in the target
residence.
Pino would leave the residence, return with his
associates, and forcibly enter and attempt to steal the cocaine.
Once the subjects entered the residence and took possession of
the cocaine, they would be arrested. The plan called for members
of the arrest team to be hidden in various locations outside of
the target residence which would be equipped with audio and video
capabilities. The residence would be modified to allow for only
one entry/exit point which would be equipped with a magnetic lock
which could be remotely activated after the subjects entered the
residence, effectively locking the subjects inside the residence.
The Houston Division obtained the use of a Pasadena
residence for the operation. On 10/31/2005, cameras were
installed in and around the residence and a public address system
was installed inside the house which would allow Agents to give
the subjects commands from the Command Post.
Two infrared
lighting devices were also installed to enhance low light
recording conditions.
On 11/01/2005, two magnetic locks on a wrought iron
metal screen door located at the front of the target residence
were installed. These locks allowed the metal screen door, once
closed, to be locked remotely from the Command Post. All other
possible exits were covered with plywood.
On 11/01/2005, Houston Division Executive Management
(EM), as well as the Chief Division Counsel, Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Coordinator, SWAT Team Leader, two Supervisory
Special Agents, and the Case Agent met to discuss and approve the
written arrest plan. On the same day, the Houston Division

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received FBIHQ approval for the use of show drugs in the
operation.
Preparations continued at the target residence through
the afternoon of 11/03/2005. The arrest team, consisting of
members of the Houston Division SWAT team, reviewed and rehearsed
their mission.
On 11/03/2005, at approximately 5:00 p.m., a briefing
was held in the Houston Division. All personnel involved in the
operation were present, including command and control personnel,
arrest team members, surveillance teams, and HPD officers who
would bç providing perimeter security.
Case Agent I
I
Iprovided the overall briefing, the CDC provided a
briefing on the FBI’s Deadly Force Folicv. and the arrest team
P:
was introduced to the HPD UCEs and I
I A short time later,
residents near the target house were asked to voluntarily
evacuate their homes during the operation.
place,

I

At

arprpximately flfl o.m..

thc rrst

tm w

in

Once
targer iocation,
was a.L.Lowea to inspect a
kilogram of real cocaine as a prelude to his purchase of the
remaining cocaine.
Pino left the target residence and returned
to the restaurant.
Surveillance observed Pino and five other
inside tne

subjects ei’j- 1i.r -chi-1e nd e1r4tr t-,-wri 1-hp

residence. j
Ithe
subjects were armed with tizzis and an AR—iS assault rifle.
information was immediately passed to the arrest team.

This

Once in front of the target residence, three subjects
exited one vehicle and two exited the second vehicle.
The second
vehicle left the area and was subsequently stopped by the HPD.
Arrest team members reported the subjects were armed with four
handguns and what appeared to be an AK-47 assault rifle.
Surveillance observed the five subjects moving around
the front and side yard of the target residence using hand
signals. After surveying the area for approximately three
minutes, the subjects quietly approached the front door. One
subject kicked in the front door and entered the residence
closely followed by two other subjects armed with handguns.
The
fourth subject, also armed with a handgun, entered the residence
and the subjects began shouting in Spanish, “Don’t move, don’t
move.” All four subjects had their weapons drawn and appeared
ready to fire. Arrest team members later reported hearing shots
as the subjects entered the residence. Once the four subjects

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were inside the target residence, the metal screen door
eventually closed and was remotely locked from the Command Post.
Immediately after the four subjects entered the
residence, there were discussions in the Command Post concerning
the possibility that the door had not locked. Hearing the
Command Post discussion, and believing the subjects had the
ability to quickly exit the target residence, SAl
took a position covering th
rcrnt door of the rdsioence.
is ne
approached his position, SA
I heard two loud booms that he
believed were rounds from a long gun. After the two distinctive
booms, he heard other gunfire coming from the direction of the
house.
Observing an armed subject appear n
roorway who
attempted to leave the target residence, s1
If ired multiple
rounds from his M-4 rifle in the direction o the ubject in the
doorway.
The subject did not go down and SAl
Iwas unsure i
he had hit the subject. The subject stepped out of SAl________
view and a few mpments later reappeared in the doorway.
It did
not appear to SAL
Ithe syhi€’1 was following verbal commands
being issued in Spanish. SAl
ladvised he believed the
subject was being told he was under arrest and to lay down his
weapons.
SAl
tobserved the subject on his knees, then down
on his stomach doing what appeared to be a low crawl position.
According to SAl
Ihe saw the subject moving his right arm
and hand in a noncompliant fahion s if he were reaching for
something. At that point, SAl
again fired his weapon.
It
was later determined the subject had been shot six times
including being struck in the head by gunfire and killed.

I

SA I
I approached the target residence in a
vehicle from the southwest and positioned himself behind a
vehicle located in front of the front door of Ih t-rqet
residence.
Prior to assuming his position, SAl
Iheard
numerous gunshots.
He hrved two subjects around the doorway
and according to SAl
I he observed one subject armed with a
pistol move from the left side of the doorway to the right in a
noncompliant manner. Knowing the subject was noncompliant with
commands and believing the subject posed an imminent threat of
bodily injury to the Agents located on the side of the house, SA
I
If ired a single round from his weapon.
SAsI
land’
‘were positioned at the rear of
the Command Post covering the rear of the target residence. Both
Agents heard via radio that five subjects arrived at the
residence with at least one carrying a “long gun.” After hearing
a siren, gunshots, and commands to the subjects, the Agents
observed one subject come to a back window and break it with the
barrel of his weapon and point the weapon in their direction.
Ferina for their safety, as well as the safety of other Agents,
Ifired one round from his GJ.ock, Model 22 pistol and
SAl
SAj
p fired four rounds from his M—4, .223 caliber rifle.

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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271511—D, 03/26/2008

Several minutes after the gunfire, SPI
1
lused the PA system and directed one subject, identified as
Ito a cellular telephone that had ben 1ft in 1e
urget resi’ience.
Uina the cellular hone, SAl
I with

the assistance of SAl
I instructed the remaining
three subjects on how to surrender and exit the residence safely.
Approximately 45 minutes later, two subjects exited the residence

and were arrested. t

Iwas seriously wounded and unable to

leave the residence under his own power.
Immediately after the
arrest team secured the residence
1 paramedics were allowed to
enter to administer first aide tol
‘and I
I
Iwere transported to nea1y nospitais for treatment.
On 34/09/2005.1
I
andj
Iwere charged with Aggravated
Robbery and Burglary of a Habitation with intent to commit a
crime.
On 05/0412007, the United States Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division, advised there was insufficient evidence to
warrant a criminal investigation into this matter.
On 05/15/2007, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting member.
The following vqtina members were in
attendance:
former Chief Inspector
Office
of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Trial
Attornv. !Dornestic Security Section, Criminal Division, tJSDOJ;
1 Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Diision,
I
JSDOJ; Section Chief (SC) James Casey, Eurasian Section, CD—i,
Counterintelligence Division; SC John V. Gillies, Violent Crime
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief (tiC) I
I Firearms Trainin Unit -Training and Development
Divislo
Defensive Systems Unit,
TDD; tiC
eapons and Tactics Operations
pecia
Unit, Critica mci ent Response Group; SSAI__________________
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit. Sr1en1ifir An1ysis Section,
Laboratory Division; SSAI
I Practical Applications•
fln4f._Pflfl
jWashington Field Office; and
I cenerai. pttorney, .Lnvestigative Law Unit, Office
of the General Counsel (OGC).
1 Management
Program Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Ottice of
Inspections, Inspection Division, a non-voting member, was also
in attendance.
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Observations and Recommendations

of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with

the intent to:

(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;

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(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
b6
Prior to the discussion of this incident by SIRG
members, former Inspectorl
Iprovided an overview regarding
the facts of the investigation.
Chairman Clemens provided
several comments emphasizing the fact this was a fluid and
dynamic operation with an adequate operations plan.. Although the
operations. plan was determined adequate, he advised the SIRG that
although not germane to the outcome of the incident, the
probability existed that participants did not discuss the
possibility of the fifth subject staying outside the target
residence since the operations plan called for all five subjects
to be locked down in the target residence.
Chairman Clemens also
noted the interpreter was issuing instructions for the subjects
to come to the front of the residence and as they attempted to
follow the instructions, a number of the Agents on the scene did
not understand the instructions being provided because they were
in Spanish. Members also recognized the fact that the
interpreter issued commands based on a written script and
instructions were not modified with the exchange of gunfire.
Members noted these as contributing factors for plan disruption.

The SWAT Operations Unit representative noted team
members were not sure the door completely locked when the
suspects entered the residence.
During the review of a video of
the incident, SIRG members observed the door open once after the
subjects entered.
The WFO representative advised tactical commands should
be given by experienced personnel and one USDOJ representative
opined participants should respond and react to events as opposed
to scripted instructions.
SIRG members opined operations
planning should include contingency planning, tactical
experience, thorough discussion with the tactical team and the
Command Post, and such information should be made clear to all
participants of the operation. Members emphasized the fact that
Agents firing their weapons through the front door did not speak
Spanish and were unaware the subjects were being directed to come
to the front door.
The SAC of the Houston Division will be
apprised of this observation.
The Firearms Training Unit, TDD, representative
emphasized the subjects were heavily armed, very dangerous, and
well organized.
It was also noted the subjects discharged rounds
before becoming engaged with law enforcement personnel.

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Inspection
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SIRG members_un4nimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by SSA
I nd SAs I
I
land!
lias justified and in conformance
I
with the FBI
s deadly force policy.
T
This discussion resulted in
the recommendation that no administrative action be taken against
any of the Agents as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.
The last observation made by SIRG members pertained to
the fact that. six of the weapons used by FBI personnel contained
unauthorized ammunition.
One H—4 rifle contained PMC .223
axmnunition and five additional M—4s contained Lake City 01 (LCO1)
ammunition, which is not Bureau approved for service use.
This
discussion resulted in the recommendation that the SAC of Houston
Division ensure all magazines are checked to ensure approved
service ammunition is contained in all magazines.

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Inspection
297—HQ—A1271511—D, 03/26/2008

IE1D(s):
Set Iead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
nr’

I

mnSptjyp

rtinn h take

J

Aa
ISAI
Fnd SAl
their invoj.veinent in this shooting incident.

1
1
1
1
2.
1
1
2.
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Clemens, Room 3092
Mr.
,
USDOJ
Mr.
jtJSDOJ
Mr.
5096
Mr. Gillies Room 3280
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
CIRG
1
Mr.
uantico
(Attention: Mr.I
I
1
Mr.
Quantico
I
I, Room 7326
1
Ms. I
(Attention:__Ms.
1-Mr.
WF
Mrs
1
Room 7861
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las a resu

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.OI.3E.2OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

A.ttn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

Date:

I

11/07/2005

AD Charlene B. ThoritQ

I Extension 4—1837

Cloyd Daniel

I

Ilrr

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271898—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHOENIX DIVISION
06/03/2005

Synopsis: .me Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occuried on 06/03/2005, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I During the_attempted resolution to
a stand off by a barricaded subject, SAl
Ifired one roiznd
from his Bureau-issud Colt Model AR—15, .223 gauge rifle,
injuring I
I SIRG members recommended_that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
las a result of
•is involvement in this shooting incident.

Administrative:
(SSAs)
06/08/4vu.

Reference report of Supervisory Specia. Agezit.
land I
I ciated

Details: Thiscommuiicatior was prepared to fuznish the
ana.1ysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
.

b7C

Details of the Shooting Incident

On 05/12/2005,1
lentered the GaUup Resideiit
Agency (GRA) a)rleging her hUsband, I
I had severely
beaten her. According.to the victin), after her husband beather
he forced her into a vehicle and drove her to Navajo, New Mexico,
where he continued the beating and tzreatqned to kill her.
A
Domésti.c Violence case was opened onl
land a federal çrimina.l
complaint was obtained on 05/20/2005, for Crimes Committed WitIjx
ndian Country/Kidnaping. The victim received a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband on 05/12/2005.

I

On 06/02/2005, at approximately 9:40 p.m., Deputy
lof the McKinley County Sheriff’s Office arriv@d at a

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Inspection From:
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• Gallup, New Mexico, address to attempt to serve
Temporary Protective Order.

the

DeputyWhite learned thati
Iwas located_at the
and sitting on a couch. While Deputyl
I was talking
the subject reached_for a pistol ignoring Deputy
commands to stoo.1
Istated, “yoU’re not going to take
me alive.”__Deput1
bought cover outside the residence and
Ito drn eJe weapon ahd come out of the residence.
commandel
I exited the residence ,4th the pistol a.nd
Shortly thereafter,I
entered a pick—up truck parked nearby. Whilel
Iwas statina
the vhic4e, a male individual on the scene advised Deputy I
that I
Iplanned a “sui
cide hy cop.” I
1
Ideparted the area in
the truck and led Deput.1
I who was incd by two McKinley
County units, on a vehicle chase. Upon I
larrival at the New
Mexico state line at Window Rock, Arizona, the McKinley County
units ended their pursuit.__As the McKinley County units ended
their pursuit, Officer I
lof the Navajo Nation Department of
I.aw Enforcement (NNDLE) picked up the pursuit in Window Rock, and
was subsequently joined by additional officers. Law enforcenent
officers learned that I
Iwas armed and brandished his weapon at
law enforcement of fir during the pQrsuit. The patrol cars
continued to follow I
Ito a residence located in Fort Defiance,
arizona, the residence of hIs motber—in-law.
resi

.

-

The pursuit continued north on Route 112 unti).[
I
ended the 35 mile long pursuit by attempting to turn left and
enter the frst driveway entrance to the properlv. tlis truck
became stuck inside the perimeter fence forcing I
Ito exit the
vehicle and run towards the residence foUowed by the pursuit
officers.

Asi
Iran towards the residence
1 Ocerf
lexi-ted
his vehicle and gave chase until he noticed
Icou.J.d not gain
entty into the residence. At that point, Off-icerl
jmoved
behind a parked truck. As other officers sawl
jnó.Li.ng a
pistol in his hand, they_assumed positions of cover behind the
parked police vehicles. I
Imade several statements ncluding
h “wanted to end it all” and that he wanted to “see FBI Agent
I
I” kfter these statements,I
Ibegan pacing back and
forth, alternately pointing his handgun at himself and the
of ficers whle ignoring cornmands to drop the handun.
During the stand off, the officers realigned their
vehicles to gain
tactical advantage, placing the vehicle
headlights facing I
Ian4 the entrance of the residence.
Efforts to diffus&1
lagitated state were unsuccessful. He
continued to point his handgun athimlf as weU. as the
officers, pacing back and forth. I
Icontinued to appear’
agitated and angry yelling statements such as, “Life sucks,” “I’m
goingto kill myself,” “I’m a convicted felon and I’m not going

2

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back to prison,” and “‘i’m ginr t° shoot at you guys so you’ll
have to kill me.” At timesi
Iwould calm down, but would______
quickly return to an aitated state.
During the stand off 4
I
made requestp for SJI
Ito be present. The NNDLE officers
contacted SAl
nd requested he come to the scene.
SAl
I arrived a th scn at anroximately 11:30
p.m., and was followed by SAl
I a certified Crisis
Negotiator from the Albuquerque Division, who arrived a short
time later.
SAsI
I apd I I c9ntacted Supervisory Senior
Resident Ageñt.(SSRA)
Iwho was responsible for the Fort
Defiance, Arizona, area and also a. Crisis Negotiator. The three
Agents agreed upon a strategy aimed at bringing the barricaded
situation to a close.

I with guidance from SA I
SAl
I began talking
withl
Ito deterjuine. the reason for his anger. During the
coiversation, I
I advanced towards the law exforcement vehicles,
coming within 15 yards of S1
Icover, vehicle. He contiw.ed
to alternatlv opint his pistol at himself and law enforcement
personnel. I
Jstated that he did not care if the officers had
“hcause he had put Teflon on the bullets.” At that point,
SAl
I tld I
Ito stop wa,ivil:ig the gun rnnn and to put the
gu down. I
I respon1ed that he wanted SAL
ltkere and if
someone was going to kill him he wanted it to be SA I
I
stated he wanted to talk with his wLfe and th.at if he could talk
,with her, h would put’ the gun down. Becoming uncomfortable with
how close I
Iwas comino_towards them and the way he was waiving
‘his pistol at them, SA I
I issued more commands tol
icausing
him to eventually back down and take a seat close to the
residence.
.Approximately 45 minutes afterl
Isettled down,
another wav f negotiations began. The_discussion centered
a,round I
Jdesire to see his wi.fe.
to
negotiate an immunity agreement by telling AI
Ithat if he
could sign something that immunized him from the events, he would
end the stand off’ immediateLy.
aooroxiitately 2:00 a.m., an NNDLE officer advised
Itha- I
sAsI
land I
I two sons were on the scen nd
offered to talk tol
I After establishing the fact that_____
and his sons did not get along, SAl
lopted against
introducing I
I Sons to the sitUation. A short time later
I
I entered into the parked truck and appeared to lock the
doors. He sat on the passenger side of the truck without any
d4ogue to law eftforcement officers.

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Sergeantl
land other members of the NWDL tactical
team expressed concern that sunrise would place the officers and
Agents in greater danger because the light would expose them to
I The possibility was raised of sending in dogs, less than
lethal bean bag projectiles, or tear gas in an attempt to end the
situation. Althçugh the NDLE had primary jurisdiction, SAs
iand j
Iconvinced the_NNDI2 to delay the escalation of
the stand ot as it appeadI
was asleeo. Subsequent
conversation between SSRZI_____ and SAsI
land
resulted
in the conclusion that it was necessary to wake
he did
not have the tactical advantage of being rested while the Agents
and officers were becoming fatigued.
SAl
lused the air hon
in his Bureau vehicle to wakel
I
-

o ened thç truck door, again demanding to speak to
toldi
his wife. SA
Ithat if he t his gun down, he
woild pexsoa1lv rrest him and a11wI
Ito call anyone he
wanted. SAl
I comments angered I
Icausing him to slam the
truck door shut.
Feeling the situation was going.to worsen, S
stepped to the rear of his. vehicle and removed.his Bureau
I
issued AR-15 rifle from a lock box.
1 loaded and
SN
chambered a round into the weapon, checked the rifle’s sites and
light, and took a position tandLng on the passenger side of a
police vehicle using the engine block for cover.
-

*

4DDroxiately 4:30 a.m., SegeantI
Iinfozmed
SAsI
Ithat because sunrise was imminent, his
land I
tactical team was preparing_to deploy a flash baig grenade to
distract and disorient I
land then aunch tear gas into the
back window oft
truck.
SAl
Irequested that this p1thi
be considered as a last option because he still wanted to attempt
to talk I
unto surrendering.
-

Before the plan could be effected,I
‘exited the
truck and demanded to speak with his wife. S I
Jrecognized
I demeanor had changed and thaH
lRppëared to be
desrerate and ready for things to end. SAl
1a1so believed
I
Ias trying to provoke law enforcement personnel into
shooting him.

SAl
lcontinuauy toldi
J to stop xnovin .rcnpd,
to stop moving towards them, and to put his gun down. I
I
continued to alternately move his pistol from a position on his
chest, to waving the pistol, to pointing it in the directiot of
officers and Agents.
At approximately 5:0Oa.m.,l
Ibecame inéreasingly
fidgety and his breathing could be heard.
It became appareflt to
the officers that the situation had deteriorated_and one officer
somethingwas going to happen”. t
T
yelled that ‘
Ifaced SA
I moved his weapon from his chest and began -to turn it

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toward sAl
I
Believlna ht he, or one of the other officers
was going to be shot, SAl
laimed his gun atj______ chest and
fired one round.
b,istol fell out of his hand andi
I
e1l face
forward to the ground and onto his stomach. I
Istarted to roli
over onto his side an_aonered to be moving toward_his guii which

was lying nearby.

SAl

Ibegan moving towa.rdl
pith his
weapon aimed, when he heard a shot fired .from behind him. The
second rqiind was a bean bag round fired by an NNDLE officer
striking I
un the chest, knocking him away from the gun. I
I
was handcuffed and his handgun was secured.
First aid was
.immiiy provided by paramedics an& law enforcement personnel,

andi

Ias transported to a local hospital for treatment.

On 07/25/2005, a deçlinatiozi of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of_Justice, Civil
Rights ivisior, regarding the actions of SAl
Ln this
shooting incident.
On 10/13/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting member.
The follpwina votina mrnhc
s were in
1
attendance:
I Office of
Chief Inspectorl
Thspections, Inspection Division;l
Deputy Chief,
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, USDOJ;l
I
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ,1
lAssistant Section Chief, Violent
Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Divisioml
I
Unit Chief (UC), F
rP?rm ‘Prininrr flnit, Training and Development
4
Division (TDP) ti4
National Firearms Program,
TDD; Acting UC______________________ Special Weapons and Tactibs
Operations Unit, Critical II)cideyl
esporise croup; Acting UC
I
I CD—6A, Counterintelligence Diysion;
Supervisory Specia.l Agent (SSA) I
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Divisioi;
SSAI
L Operational Skills Unit, TDD; SSAL
I
I
I. Investaativ Taw Unit. Of ice of the General
i Q7l
1
Counsel Jflfl r ‘n
I Washington Field
Office. I
IManagement Program Analyst,
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, a non—voting member, was also ij attendance.

I

J

.

-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-syropsized incident wih
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2> provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an

Savage-1961

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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271898—D, 11/07/2005

operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for adminIstrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by SAl
I was justified and in conformance with
the FBI’s deadly force policy, spericfly commenting and
commending the patience shown by sI
‘throughout the
incident.
The only issue identified by the Shooting Incident
Review Team (SIRT) was the fact that SAl
Ifailed
to utilize his ballistic vest during this operation. SIRG
members concluded that the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the.
Phoenix Division should be advised to remind a1l Agents to
uti.lize ballistic protective undergarments to ensure their
personal sa.fety when involved ii this type of incident.

I

I

Noting that Deputy
arrived ati
Iresidence
alone, SIRG members expressed concern for his cMty knowing that
a.federal criminal complaint was obtained forJ
n 05.120/2005.
SIRG members questioned whether or not Deputyl
I’ cnducted
a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check Lorl
Ito
determine his current crimixal status. A subsequent telephone
conversation with .the Phoenix Division revealed that the federal
criminal complaj.nt obtained on 05/20/2005, was zze entered into
the NCIC by the Phoenix Division nor did Deputy
I make an
NCIC inquiry prior to his attempt to servel
Iwith the
Tenpora.ry Protective Order. Although not a factor in the outcome
of this incident, the SAC of the Phoenix Division will be advised
to remind Phoenix Division personnel of the importance of
entering records into NCIC within the required 24 hour time
frame.

6

Savage-1962

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Inspection
297—F{O—A1271898—D, 11/07/2005

LE2D(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

is PECT ION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

Thpt no ad-tinistrative action be taken aganst
SAl
las a result of his Involvement in this
shooting incident.
b7J

Mr. Pjstole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Cloyd, Room 7825
Ms.J
I USD03
L USD03
Mr I
NsJ
IRoom 7837
Mr. Maming, Roo
(Attention:
Mr.l
I
Mr. Rponey, Room 5155
1
(Attention:
Mr.l
Mr.
1
IQuantico
1
Mr.
IQuantico
1
Mr.
uantico
1
Kr.
F. Quantico
2.
Kr.
ruartico
Attent.ion:
Mr.I
I
1
Ms.
IRoom 7326
1-Mr.
IWFO
Mrs. I
I
1, Room 7862.

.1
• 1
I
I
2.
1
1

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7
D

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I

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Savage-1963

 ____________________

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

?rom:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

pproved By:

I

I

05/19/2006

AD Chariene B. Thornton
Extension 4-1837

Thornton Char
Cloyd Daniel

Ifr
Dr&f ted By:

I

11rr

Case ID #: 297-HQ-A1271741-D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS ANGELES FIEZD OFFICE
09/30/2005

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on /3O/?OO5. involving Special
Agents (SAs)I
Iançl
I. While
conducting surveillance, SAsI
Iwere victims of an
laridi
armed robbery/carjacking attempt by four subjects. Both Agents
fired their weapons, killing one subject and injuring another.
SIRG member r npmencd tht no administrative action be taken
against SAsI
Jandi
las a result of their involvement in
this shooting incident.
Administrative: Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in
Charge Louis J. Caprino, Jr., dated 11/02/2005.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
I

On 09/30/2005, SA5 I
I andi_________
I were assisting the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in
a surveillance pertaining to numerous armed robberies of
restaurants in the San Fernando Valley.
Investigation determined
the robberies were most frequently conducted on Thursday, Friday,
and Saturday evenings. A decision was made to place
approximately thirty two—person teams of Agents in surveillance
vehicles.
The LAPD provided teams as well as air units to
respond to any robberies or problems.
-

Savage- 1964

 __________

To:
•Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741—D, 05/19/2006

sAsi
landi
Iwere responsible for a group of
restaurants near the intersection of Corbin Avene and Vanowen
Street. A few minutes before midnight, SAl
Ibacked the
Bureau vehicle into a driveway of a closed business and lowered
the window on the driver’s door. Minutes later, a green and gray
1993 Chevrolet S-jO Blazer, occupied by four Hispanic males,
pulled up next to the Agents’ vehicle. The driver of the subject
vehicle exited and_aoroached the driver’s side of the Bureau
vehicle wh c I
was seated. The subject reached in and
I shirt with hi 1l 1
grabbed SAL
’pd and took his right
hand and was reaching below on all
heft side. SAl
I
heard the subject stat “
ve me your fucking (“money” or “car”)
4
or I’ll kill you. SAl
Icould not see a weapon but stated it
felt like either a gun or knife was being pushed against his left
side and chest.
As S2I
Iw attmpting to access his weapon without
the subject knowing, SA
Iheard and observed the actions of
the_subiect and made a decision to stop the imminent threat.
SAl
I fired at least three rounds from his Glock, Model 17,
nine millimeter pistol, striking the subject in his upper left
chest and both of his wrists. The suspect yelled and began
running but collapsed approximately eighty feet from the scene
and died.
Prior to the injured suspect running away from the
scene, a second inividual exited the suspect vehicle and ran
towards SAl
hlocation. SAl
If ired four rounds through
the front windshield of the Bureau vehicle, striking the second
subject in the right hand. The injured subject, along with two
additional .pdividuals in the subject vehicle, ran from the
I fired at least three rounds from inside the
scene.
SAl
Bureau vehicle; however, none of the rounds struck the subject.
After confirming that SAl
lwas not injured,
sI
ladvised other law enforcement personnel via radio of the
incident. Agents in nearby vehicles immediately responded to the
location as well as LAPD officers. An unloaded .25 caliber
Baretta handgun was located on the sidewalk approximately fifteen
feet away from the subject vehicle.

I

Investigation determined a juvenile by the name of
was located in a local_emergency room with a gunshot
wound to his right hand.
Duringi
linterview, he admitted to
having been at the location of the shooting and_advised the
driver of the vehicle was Cesar Ballesteros. I
lalso identified
the two additional individuals involved in the incident who were
subsequently arrested.
On 12/19/2005, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil

2

Savage-1965

lb 7

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Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741—D, 05/19/2006

Rights Division, regarding the actions of SAsI
this shooting incident.

land

I

lin

On 05/05/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member.
The follwif“‘y were in
attendance:
Chief Inspectorl
I Office of
I
Inspections, Inspectior
I Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, USDOJA
eputy Chief, Domestic
5
E
Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Kevin Favreau,
Section Chief (SC), CD—4, Counterintelligerióe Division;I
I
I
I Assistant SC, TransnationaJ. Criminal Enterprise Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief (UC),
Fijearms Trainina Unij, Training and Development Division (TDD);
I Defensive Systems Unit, TDD; Supervisory
UCI
Special Agent (SSA) I
I Special Weapons and
ctir’ flrr.tipns Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA
4rt-44r. Analysis
I
L Firearms
Toolml’ riiSection, Laboratory Division; SSA I
I,
Investigative Law Unit Office of the General Counsel__(CGC); and
SSAI
Washington Field Office. I
I
I
I Management Program Analyst, Inspection Management Unit,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, a non-voting member,
—

was also in attendance.

O1,ervations and

Reconunendatians o the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
Cl) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG nrnhrs unanimously conrllrrPri 1-hM 1-hp use of
deadly force by SAsI
landi
i was
justified and in conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
SIRG members made two observations pertaining to the
shooting incident report submitted by the Los Angeles Field
Office.
The first observation pertained to the operations plan
provided to all participants. Members opined that any reference
to the deadly force policy should contain language mirrored from
the current deadly force policy which was approved by the
Attorney General on 07/01/2004.
The second observation made by the SIRG was the fact
that personal background information relating to the Agents

Savage- 1966

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Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741—D, 05/19/2006

involved in the incident was included in the report which was not
germane to the investigation. Members emphasized that this
information is discoverable in the legal realm and should not be
included in future reports. These observations will be discussed
with the Assistant Director in Charge of the Los Angeles Field
Off ice.

4

Savage-1967

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741—D, 05/19/2006

Set Lea4 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON
1 DC
That no adn4nistrative action bç taken against
SAs I
Jas a result of their
Jr and I
involvement in this shooting incident.

to6
ib7C

1
1
1
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. r1cvrL oom 7825
Ms.I
I USrp,T
(Atnl-’itlh* irJ
1
1
Mr.
j, USDOJ
1
Mr.
I Room 7837
1
Mr. Favreau, Room 4042
1
Mr. Cunningham, Room 548
(Attention: Mn
I
1
Quantico
Mr.I
1
Quantico
Mr.I
1
uantico
Mr.I
1
Mr.
,
Quantico
1
Ms.
Room 7326
1-Mr.
WFO
1
Mrs.
I Room 7861
—

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—

Savage-1968

 (Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Atta:

Inspection
Contact:

2pproved By:
Drafted By:

11/04/2005

AD Charlene B. Thornton
Extension 4—1837

Clovd Daniel

jlrr

I

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A127055—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
BOSTON DIVISION
03/24/2005

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 03/24/2005, involving Special
Aaent (SA) I
I During the attempted arrest of
I
I an Armed Bank Robbery fugitive, SA
I
fired six rounds from his Bureau—issued Glock Mode]. 22, .40
caliber pistol injuring the subject.
SIRG members_recommended
that no administrative action be taken against SAl
las a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative: Reference report of Inspector-in—Place I
dated 05/12/2005.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
-

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

I

was the subject of a pending Boston
Division bank robbery investigation after he was identified by
the Bank Robbery Task Force (BRTF) as the individual responsible
for a bank robbery that occurred on 03/01/2005, in the Boston
area. I
Ias developed as a suspect in the bank robbery 7c
following an episode of the television show, “Massachusetts Most
Wanted.” An individu4l called the program and provided
information regardingi
land warned the police that,
us your rnan...and he could have a gun.” The caller
I
also provided information about a possible location of I
I
in Dorchester, Massachusetts.
On 03/23/2005, local police detectives obtained an
armedrobbery arrest warrant for
J SAl

Savage- 1969

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Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—D, 11/04/2005

asi1-pcI te detectives by writing the operations plan for

The operations plan was reviewed and approved
larrest.
by the BRTF Acting Supervisory Special Agent (A/SSA) I
I
s well as Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge
I
(A/ASAC)l
Ion the morning of 03/24/2005.
Following the approval, SAl
Ibriefed the plan to
participating members reading verbatim the Departptent of qustice
Deadly Force Policy to all attendees apd adv4sed I
Iwas to
be considere4 Armed and Dangerous.
SAj
Iprovided an overview
I extensive criminal history, including the fact that
of I
was
previously arrested for assault and battery of a
I
I
police officer and had attempted to run over several firemen and
a policeman while fleeing the scene of a traffic stop in 2001.

I

I

On 03/24/2005, the BRTF which included members of the
Boston Police Department (BPD), the Cambridge Police Department
(CPD), the Maiden Police Department (MPD), the Massachusetts
State Police (MSP), as well as two FBI Agents, attenipted to
effect the arrest of I
I The primary plan was to arrest
I outside ne or tne two known residences frequented by
him.
If I
Iwas positively identified inside a residence,
both surveillance/arrest teams would converge on the location
prior to entry being made utilizing a tactical team from either
the FBI or the BPD.
Law enforcement officers and Boston Dvision Aaerts set
up surveillance/arrest teams in the vicinity ofi___________
girlfriend’s residence as well as his mother’s residence. At
approximately 11:30 a.m., SAl
Iproyided
information from the suvi1lançe team located atl
I
mother’s residence.
SAl
ltransmitted over the radio that a
person resemblingi
lexited the residence and entered a
late modeL silver Toyota çamry. As the subject vehicle passed
Detectiv
1 both
I of the BPD and A/SSAI
verified the driver looked like I
land broadcast the
information to other units involved in the arrest plan.
As the
subject vehicle turned left onto Blue Hill Avenue, the BRTF
surveillance vehic1s follçwed. As the vehicle moved toward
Floyd Street, A/SSAI
transmitted over the radio that the
team should begin positionz.ng their vehicles to effect a felony
car stop if necessary.
Once on Floyd Street, I
momentarily stopped and slowly made a right turn ozto Lucrn
Street.
Two Agents were following directly behind
vehicle followed by a second unmarked police vehicle.
Task Force
members advised they believed[
I was aware of the vehicle
surveillance because he continued down the street and made a
right turn. As soon as he made the turnl
Ipulled his car
to the right 3d of th road,_almost to a stop. A/SSM________
instructed SAs I
I and I
Ito cuti
I off. SAs
Jquickly passedi
land cut off th trv
I andi
lane positioning their vehicle 20—30 feet in front of L
2

Savage-1970

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 __Ifired

To:
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Inspection From.:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—D, 11/04/2005

The unmarked police vehicle also pa,.ssedl
stopped at an angle within feet of I
bumper.

‘vehicle and
Idriver’s side front

The BRTF members exited their vehicles with weapons
drawn, identified themsr
’ “FBI,” “hands
t
” “ “11ing, “Police,
1
up, get yçur hnrLc nn.”I
Ijnitially raise his hands.
DetctiveI
‘ii-,
L continue
commands
fort
Ito show his hands. He observed
Iraise his.
hands as SdAI
lattenipted to open the driyr’s içe door of
I vehicle. ççording to Detectivel
I M- tht
taet real4ig,” andl
point he saw
1
‘eyes 1
I
suddenly lowered his hands. I
Ivehicle immediately
started mçyjja forward and jumped a curb onto the sidewalk.
Detectiv
humped ouj of th opth of the vehicle to avoid
being hit or pinned betweeni
Ivehicle and a parked law
enforcement vehicle.

I

Iwas

I

I
I

SAI
positioned on the passenger side of
I vehicle attempting to open the car door and Detective
Iras approaching the subjqct vehicle from the ;ear
passenger side. According to SAl
Ivehicle
beaan to move while his hands were raiseçl and he çbserved
Isudde1v drot hi hands. As SAl
lobserved the
car movipa andl
Ihands dropping toward his waist, he
1i.r reaching for a weapon.
believed
Fearing for his
safety, SA
six rounds from his weapon. The first
two rounds were fired through the front passenger side window,
two additional shots were fired through the rear passenger side
window, and the last two shots were fired through the rear
window. I
Ivehicle continued to travel on the sidewalk
eventually striking a fence and coming to a stop.
ooened hL vehicle door and fell onto the
ground. etectiveI
hioved to the subject vehicle and
reached inside to put the transmission in park. I
lasked,
“Why did you shoot me? I’m not armed.”

Boston Emergency Medical Services and the BPD were
notified of the incident and immediately responded to the scene.
I
I was transported o a nearby hospital for treatment.
Medical records regardingl
linjuries were not available
for review by the Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT).
The SIRT identified two areas of concern during the
investigation of this shooting incident. The first item noted
tactics employed by the BRTF at the time of p
Istop
contained significant variations from tactics taught by the
Practical Applications Unit, Training and Development Division
(TDD).
It was noted that the BRTF executed a variation of the
standard felony car stop utilizing a blocking vehicle.

Savage-1971

lb7C

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Inspection, From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—D, 11/34/2005

The second obsçrvation made by the SIRT was the fact
that SAl
Ifailed to utilize his ballistic vest
during tflis operation.
On 10/03/2005, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, raardina the actions of SAl
un this
shooting incident. I
jChief of Homicide, Suffolk
County District Attorney’s Office, declined to render a
prosecutive opinion in this matter advising he would prefer to
wait until the outcome of the internal FBI inquiry before
reaching a prosecutive decision in this matter.
On 10/13/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
mnhr were in
non-voting member.
w±nrT
9
The foll
attendance:
Chief Inspector I
IQff ice of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
IDeoutv Chief.
Civil Rights Division,. Criminal Section, USLOJ; I
I
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ;I
p Assistant Section Ciief. Violen
Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division; I
Unit Chief (UC), Firearms Trainina Un.t, Training and Development
Division (TDD) UCI
I National Firearms Program,
TDD; Acting UCL
Special
Weapons and Tactics
I
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; Acting UC
I
I CD-6A, Counterintelligence Division;
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit. Scieniific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I
I Operational Skills Unit, TDD; SSAF
I
I investigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel (OGC); and SSAI
I Washington Field
Office. I
I Management Program Analyst,
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, a non-voting member, was also in attendance.
-

—

Observations aid Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

The SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by SAl
I was justified and in conformance with
the FBI’s deadly force policy.

Savage-1972

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—D, 11/04/2005

In response to the first issue identified by the SIRT,
members of the SIRG discussed training provided and/or received
by Boston Division Agents and task force personnel regarding car
stops. The TDD representative stated that all field offices were
advised by EC dated 10/04/2004, of the Field Tactical Training
Curriculum for Fl 2005 which included the requirement for
defensive tactics and tactical training as required elements of
mandated firearms qualification sessions for SAs.
Noting that
task force officers work on a regular basis with SAs and are
involved in a number of confrontational and arrest situations,
SIRG members recommended that task force personnel train as a
team with squad SAs on a regular basis. Members recognized task
force officers may not receive the same level of in—depth
training as FBI personnel in defensive tactics and tactical
training, particularly in the area of high risk vehicle stops.
-issue identified by the SIRT was the fact that
Ifailed to ut
ze his ballistic vest during
this operation. According to SA
I he was not wearing his
body armor because he arrived on the scene from court and did not
have time to stop to put on his ballistic vest.
SIRG members
concluded that the Special Agent in Charge of the Boston Division
should be advised to remind all Agents to utilize ballistic
protective undergarments to ensure their personal safety when
involved in this type of incident.

SAl

Savage-1973

 ______IRoom7861

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1270955—D, 11/04/2005

LEAD(S):

Set I
ead 1:
1

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASFIINGTQN, DC
nr

SAI
shooting incident.

‘
’
1
ninistrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this

ib 6
)7C

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3.

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-

—
-

-

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr
MsJ
Mr.

Pistole, Room 7142
Caproni, Rooni 7427
Cloyd, oom 7825
1USDOJ
I USDOJ
IRoom 7837
Manning, Roor 1PflA

(Attention: Mr.I
Mr. Rooney, Room
(Attention: Mr.L

-

I

Mr
Mr
Mr

Quantico
Quantico
I Quafltj
Mr.I
Quantico
Mr4________ uantico
(Atuention: Mr.l
1
Ms.
I Roofn i.o
1-Mr.
l,WFo
1-Mr.
-

I

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-

I

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6

Savage- 1974

 ____

I.

(Rev. OI-31-GO3)
1’

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

I

I

04/13/2007

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

Extension 4—1837

Kaiser Kenneth N
Clemens Michae1

I

ilrr

Case ID

#:

itle:
T
l

SHOOTING INCIDENT
ATLANTA DIVISION
04/04/2005

297—HQ—A1270919—D

t7c

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
hooting Jncident that occurred on 04/04/2005, involving Special
Agent (SAj
I During the attemoted arrest of a violent
fugitive attempting to elude arrest, SAl_____ fired one round
from his Bureau-issued Glock, Model 22, .40 caliber pistol,
killing the subjçct. SIRG members recoxmnended that no action be
I as a result of his involvement in this
taken against SAl
shooting incident
-

I

1

Aminative:
Reference report of former inspectorl
I dated 04/05/2006.
Details:
This communication wa prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 03/31/2005, the Atlanta Division received
information regarding the location of a fugitive identified as
John Clifton Manyfield.
The Sacramento Division advised
Manyfield, who was wanted by the Sacramento, California, Police
Department for murder, attempted murder, and weapons violations,
was in Burke County, Georgia.
Sacramento also advised Manyfield
was a known gang member and specific information was provided by
a source that he was located in Hephzibah, Georgia.

SSRAI
land four additional Agents
traveled to the Burke County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) to plan an
arrest of Manyfield.
An initial plan, telephonically briefed and
approved by former ASAC Harry Bowen, called for law enforcement

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personnel to establish a rally point near the subject’s residence
and a call would be placed directing him to come out.
Prior to their arrival at the BCSO, the Agents were
telephori1lu nf4 1hi Georgia Bureau of Investigation
(GBI SAl
Iwas in foot pursuit of a bank
robberysusteçt approximately one half mile from their location.
SSRAI
Idecided to break off from the initial plan and
provide needed assistance in locating the fleeing bank robbery
suspect.
After an unsuccessful four hour search for the bank
robbery suspect, the group continued to the BCSO and briefed BCSO
Deputies about Manyfield.
During the briefing, it was determined
BCSO personnel were involved in a missing juvenile investigation h6
at the same address as Many.field was purported to be located.
b7C
BCSO personnel advised the Atlanta Agents they had spoken to
residents at that location earlier in the day.
Thearrest plan
was revised and a dcision was made to conduct a ruse interview
f Mnyfield was at
at the location in an attempt to determin
the residence.
SSRA I
Idirected SAl
Ito contact
Sacramento and have the sàurce contact Manyfield to determine if
he was at the location.
Information was received stating
Manyfield had left the home for the night and the investigation
was discontinued until the following day.
On 04/01/2005, Atlanta Agents and BCSO personnel
returned to facilitate the arrest.plan.
After numerous
unsuccessful attempts by the Sacramento source to contact the
fugitive, the operation was discontinued for that day and the
weekend.
On 04/04/2005, SAl
Iwas notified by the Sacramento
Division that the source had çontaced Manyfield ad he was
located at the residence.
Jcontacted SSRAI
SAl
land

relayed h dtai $ of his conversation with Sacramento and
informed_________ that he was at least three hours away from the
BCSO.
advised he would contact the BCSO and let them
SA
initiate tne a rest.
SSRA I
I who was on leave, agreed
with SA I
plan and advised him to use whatever resources
were needed and to keep him informed of any significant
developments.

Due to a change in plans, SAd
I andi
I
as well as law enforcement personnel from the Georgia
State Police (GSP), th
and the GBI, met at an intersection

in Burke County. SAl
i briefed the group on Manyfield,
advised them he was armed and dangeroy- rijl distributed wanted

bulletins with color photographs.
SAl
I also advised the
teams they would proceed with the previously dvi.cçd arrest plan
where the front entry team, consisting of S21
land two BCSO
Investigators, would ue a ruse of seeking further information
about the missing child from the Suspect residence.
The rear
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perimeter team was designated to cover the rear f the residence,
and GSP TroopersI
landi
Iwere instructed.
to set up a “road check.”
As the two teams proceeded toward the residence, the
GSP Troopers were notified by other officers to check an oncoming
gray Jeep Cherokee which was approaching the “road check”
Indi
location. Troopersi
lapproached the vehicle on
foot from t rear. with I
lapproaching the driver’s side of
the car and I
approaching the passenger side.
Ph vehic1e
was drLven by th r’iait4ve’s mother, identified asi
I
I
L Trooper I
Inoticed the passenger matched the
description of Manyfield and asked him for identification. When
the passenger claimed to have no identification with him,I
I
asked for his name.
The passenger gave his brother’s first name
and did not provide a last name. I
I immediately realized
something was wrong and provided Manyfield’s last name to the
troopers.

I rt-nrnd to his patrol car to retrieve
1
Trooper
the fugitive’s photograph. I
I returned to the passenger side
r€
front quarter panel of the vehicle, provided Trooper
I
Ithe photograph,and_informed him the passenger was the
murder suspect.
Trooper I
pw1ked bck to the passengep side
of the suspect vehicle as Trooperl
1
Idrew his weapon. I
instructed Manyfield to remove his seatbelt and exit the vehicle.
ManyfieJ.d, who was agitated and nervous, moved his right hand
slowly to remove his seatbelt.
Simultaneously, Trooper I
I
heard anyfield whisper to the driver, “:just go.”. As Trooper
Ireached in the vehicle window and grabbed Manyfield’s
I
mmd to depress the accelerator with
right arm, the suspect
his left hand.
Trooperl
lannounced “taser” and shot
Manyfield with the Taser gun lodging the probes in the right mid—
Trooper I
back.
I rehoistered his weapon, returned to the
driver’s side door, pulled the driver out of the car, reached
into the vehicle and turned the ignition off.
Manyfield
immediately restarted the vehicle and again depressed the
accelerator revving the engine.
The Taser wa reactivated,
however, Manyfield grabb
ire leads and disconnected them
from the Taser.
Trooper
applied the Taser directly to
Manyfield’s body and pil e
•
er.
Manyfield grabbed the
Taser in one hand and Trooper
s left arm in the other hand
attempting to pull him inside the vehicle.
As TrooperL
I
freed his left arm and attempted to free himself from
vehicle, both men were holding the Taser.
As Trooper
1
1
produced his Taser gun, the suspect’s mother grabbed him and
pullec4
to the back end of the vehicle:
I

During the struggle, SAl
land BCSO Investigator
Iaoorqached the passenger side of the Jeep.
Investigator
recbgnized the Taser had been fired and
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observed th nonl-jnuing struggle bTn Manyfield and Trooper
IsAa
‘and investigator’
Idrew tir apons and
as Manyfield again revved the vehicle’s engine,I
Iproceeded
to the drivers side of the Jeep to attempt to turn off the
engine while SAl
remained to the right of Trooperl
I
As Trooper
1
Iholstered his Taser and began to move
toward the driver’s door of the suspect vehj1
heard a
gunshot.
It was determined that as Trooper
1
InôUtinued to
attempt to pull himself away from Manyfield, SA I
Ifired one
round from his weapon into Manyfield’s chest.
Emergency medical
assistance was immediately requested; however, his pulse stopped
prior to arriving at the hospital.
Manyfield was prcnounced dead
of a gunshot wound to the chest by the Medical Examiner.
On 09/07/2005, District Attorneyl
I of the
Augusta Judiçi istrict was provided the GBI file for his
review.
Mr. I
I concluded no violations of the Georgia
criminal law occurred and closed the file administratively.
On 06/13/2006, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department o Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SAl
un this,
shooting incident.

On 09/21/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting mexrJer.
The following vptina inmhers wr n
attendance:
former Chief InspectrI
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I, Deputy Chief,
Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; I
I
I
I Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; SC James Casey
1
Eurasian Section, CD-i, Counterintelligence Division; SC John V.
Gillies, Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
Unit Chief (UC)I
I Firearms Training Unit, TDD;
I fthief, Defensive Systerñs Unit, TDD;
I
UCJ
j, Special Weapons and Tactics Ooeratio
Unit, Critical Incident Response rouo: UCI
Operational Skills Uni.t, TOO; SSAI
I, Firearms
Toolinarks Unit, Scientific Analysis SectIon, Laboratory ivisiçn;
I, Washington Field Office; and SSAI
1
I
I Investicative Law Unit, Of fice of the General
Counsel (OGC). I
I Deputy General Counsel,
Investigative Law Branch, OGC, and I
I Gnera1
I;vesticxativ Law Urit, OGC, as well as SSAI__________
I
I, and p
I Management Program Analyst,
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, non-voting members, were also in attendance.
—

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From:
Inspection
04/13/2007

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG
force by SAL
current deadly
administrative
involvement in

members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly

Iwas justified. and in conformance with the
force policy. Members recommended that no
action be taken again SAl
las a result of his
this shooting &ncident.

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Set Lead 1:

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(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

las

I

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1

Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mrs

DC

That no administrative action be taken against SAl
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

Pistole, Room 7142
Ford, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Clemens, Room 7825
IJSDOJ
I USDOJ
Casey, Room 5096
Gillies Room 3280
Quantico
Quantico
uantico
Quantico
uantico
lwFo
room 7326
Room 7861

4,

6
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I

 _________________I-

(Rev. QI-31-2OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Date:

I

04/16/2007

AD Kenneth W. Kaiser

Extension 4-1837

Kaiser Kenneth
Clemens Michae1

Drafted By:
Case ID
Title:

it: 297-HQ—A1270919—D
SHOOTING INCIDENT
ATLANTA DIVISION

05/05/2005
Syisopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting iitn 1h+ -iirrjd on 05/05/2005, involving Special
Agent CSAj
I While executing a Federal Arrest
Warrant on a bank robbery suspect, SAL
fired eight rounds
from his Springfield, Model 1911 pistol, killing the subject.
SIRG nembers recommended that no action be taken against SA
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
I
Administrative:

Reference report of former Inspector
1
dated 01/19/2006.

I

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 05/02/2005, two black males robbed a bank in
Phenix City, Alabama, with one subject discharging a weapon. On
the same day, a chamoaanç colored Mazda 626 sedan with a Georgia
license plate of
I which was associated with the robbery,
was located at a mall.in Columbus, Georgia.
Surveillance of the subject vehicle was initiated by
the Columbus Police Department (CPD).
During the surveillance,
two groups of black males, consisting of six individuals, were
observed in the vicinity of the vehicle. One group-consisted of
two individuals who fit the description of the subjects
responsible for the Phenix City bank robbery. As the six
subjects moved closer to the vehicle, police officers announced
their presence and ordered all of the subjects on the ground.

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One individual immediately engaged the officers in an exchange of
gun fire, seriously wounding one officer. Th two ubiects were
subseaiient1y identified as Morgan Chigawa andi____________
I and further investigation detemined Chigawa was the
individual who shot the police officer.
Agents of the Atlanta Division, Columbus Resident
Agency (CRA), and personnel from the CPD initiated an
investigation into the shpotina
Information was developed
regarding he loction of I
bnd Chigawa, and it was also
deterntinedl
Iliad placed a phone call from a convenience
store pay phone in Conyers, Georgia.
On 05/04/2005, SAl
Icontacted the convenience
store owner who recognized Chigawa from a photograph provided by
SAl
I The store owner advised Chigawa was in the store the
previous day and described the champagne colored Mazda associated
with the subjects.
At approximately 6:15 a.m., on 05/04/2005, SAl
I
received information that the subjects
to arrive at
tni of I
the apartment of a former girl
lat approximately
8:00 p.m., that evening.
SAl
Inotifled his supervisor and
approval to use the Atlanta Division’s Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Team to. effect the subjects
t arrest was approved
by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC).
-‘ vicinity of the
A rally poinl. w sta
14
target apartment.
SAsI
landi
Londucted an oral
briefing to arrest team members, as well as former Assistant
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur David Webster and SAC
Gregory Jones. The SWAT teams remained in place until
b70
approximately 12:30 a.m.; however, the operation was suspended by
SAC Jones when it became evident the subjects were not going to
appear.

On 05/05/2005, at approximately 6:45 a.m., SA I
I
received a phone call from the CPD advising they had located the
subject vehicle at the Ramada Inn in Conyers,
ie CFD had
established surveillance on the vehicle. SA [
I and the CPD
agreed that the CPI)
arrest the subjects in the event they
departed before SAl
land the SWAT Team arrived.
While enroute to the Ramada Inn, sAl
icontacted
his supervisor and discussed using the SWAT Team to conduct the
arrest of the subjects. Arrest team members were contacted and
told to meet at a rally point in a parking lot north of the
hotel. ASAC Webster was contacted and he again obtained
authority from the SAC to utilize the SWAT Team to effect the
arrest. The SWAT Team Leader was advised of the scenario and
notified his team members to meet at the rally point.
2

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At approximately 8:00 a.m., SAl
larrived at
point
hc met with members of the CPD. Captain’
1
I
‘told SAl
Ihe had spoken with the manager of the hotel
who advised no guest
registered at the hotel under the
names of Chigawa apdl
Iwith a Georgia identification. SA
I
I and Captain
I returned to the hotel office and
subsequently determined an individual by the name of Chigawa from
Ohio had registered at the hotel the prior evening and was in
room 226. The manager advised Chigawa paid cash for the room for
one night and was due to checkout no later than 12:00 noon.
He
also positively identified Chigawa from the flyer and advised the
subject appeared to be under the influence of alcohol when he
checked in.
‘‘

I

SAl
requested a key to a room in order to view the
lavou and door strutiir in preparation for the arrest.
SA
I
I and Captain I
lentered room 106 and remained in the
room to initiate surveillance of the subject vehicle.
Addilional Agents beaan arriving at the rally point
while SAl
I and CaptirI
Irmained inside the hotel room.
SAsI
I ancil
I were instructed to position
their Toyota 4unner approximately fifty yards across the street
from the hotel to act as a blocking vehicle in the event the
subjects attempted to leave through the nnrth entFance of the
hotel parking lot.
CPD Detectivel
kas positioned
behind the 4Rurrner in an unmarker blue Crown Victoria. Georgia
ureu nf Tjwestigation (GBI) SAl
land CPD Detective
I were positioned in a Chevrolet Blazer at the south
end of the parking lot.
At approximately 9:00 a.m.,, members of the SWAT team
began arriving at the rally point where an oral briefing was
planned to d riic the arrest scenario. Before the briefing
occurred, SAl
I reported via radio that Chigawa had departed
his room and was_proceeding down the stairs. Additionally, he
advised that SAsI
landi
Iwere moving to block the
subject’s vehicle.
SA
topped his vehicle blocking the
subject vehicle and SAl
I exited_with his weapon drawn as the
subject entered his vehicle.
SAl
I positioned himself
several feet aw’ f’” the subject vehi e repeatedly shouting,
“FBI, FBI.” SAl
land qaotair
exited room 106 and ran
to the subject vehicle. SAl
larrived on the driver’jc ici
toward the rear of the vehicle as Chigawa drove around SAl
I
vehicle and headed south in the parking lot.
The subject vehicle traveled approximately twenty yards
struck in thç front driyer’s s,i.de by GBI SA
l as well as Captain
SAsI
landL
I were in pursuit on foot. SAl
Ipositioned hirself
adjacent to Chigawa’s passenger side front door while SAl______

when it

wa

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approached the rear passenger door, with Captair
Jpositioned
frrwrr1 of the front passenger side of the vehicle.
GBI SA
1 exited his vehic1 nd rVoved to a position of cover near
a hotel column.
Deteetivel
Ireçained behind the Blazer’s
passenger side front door.
S21
Imoved his vehicle behind the
subject vehicle arid positioned himself behind the vehicle’s front
driver’s side door.

I

SA
I, as well as Captain
Jandi
land
Detectivel
I issued verbal commands to the subject.
SA
I shouted, “FBI, do not move,” while Captain I
houted,
“Put your hands up.” GBI SAl
Ishouted several tim for
Chigawa to, “Show your hands.” According to Detectivel
I, he
also told the subject twice to, “Show your hands.”
Detective
I also recalled hearing other law enforcement personnel
giving similar commands.

I

I

I

As thqv werq shouting çommar4s to the subect, SA
I Captain I
I Detectivel
I and GBI SA I
I
advised they observed Chiqawa rch in the vicinity of his belt
area.
At that moment, SAl
lannounced, ‘
He has a gun, he has
T
a gun.”
Immediately_upon observing th iiject’s weapon, SA
Detective
I, and Captain I
I fired at the subject.

r

During the shooting event, SAl
jwas struck in the
thigh with a round that penetrated and exited his leg.
Emergency
Medical Services (E$j arrived at the scene and provided medical
attention to SAl
Iwho was subsequently transported to a
local hospital where he was treated and released.
The EMS
pronounced Chigawa dead at the scene.
*

I

A .38 caliber five-shot revolver was recovered from the
subject’s vehicle between the driver’s side front door and the
seat.
After the shooting, the SWAT Team executed the arrest of

I

b6
‘7C

On 11/15/2005, District Attorney I
lof the
Rockdale Judicial Circuit advised his office believed the
shooting to be justified andwcm1d nn present the matter to the

Rockdale County Grand Jury. I

Ifurther advised his office

declined to initiate any type of criminal prosecution in the
matter.
on 06/08/2006, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department o Justie, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of SA I
I in this
shooting incident.

On 07/13/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Michael
S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a

4
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non—voting member.
The following voting members were
attendance:
former Chief Irispectpr I
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I__________________ eoutv Chief,
Domestic Security Section, Criminai. livision, U3DO1;I______
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; Richar
McFeely, Section Chief (SC), Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; I
Issistant
SC, CD—l, Counterintelligence Division;i
I Unit Chief
(DC), Firearms Trainina Un.tt, Training and Development Division
(TDD);l
IChief, Defensive Systems Unit, TOD;
IUC, Special Weapons nd Tactics Onera4ons
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group;l
IUC,
ODerpticrn1 1cills Unit, TDD; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
Toolmarks Unit, Scienti4c Analysis
I, Firearms
Section, Laboratory Division; SSA
I Washington
Field Office; andi
General Attorney, Investigative
Law Unit. Of fic.e of t)ie General Counsel (OGC). I
and I
L Management Program Analysts, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, non
voting members, were also in attendance.

.:

fr

7

-

Observations and Recommendations

of

the STRL

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance
with the current deadly force policy. Members_recommended that
no administrative action be taken again SAj
I as a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident.

b6
7

During the discussion, SIRG members made two
observations about the incident that will be discussed with the
SAC of the Atlanta Division. The first observatiqp ortined to
the fact that several of the Agents, including SAl
I were
not utilizing any type of protective vest/body armor which was
not conducive to their personal safety. Members opined that all
Agent personnel assigned to the Atlanta Division, should be
reminded to utilize a ballistic protective undergarment in this
type of situation.
Members also noted that differing instructions were
simultaneously being voiced by law enforcement personnel on the
scene. Members opined that training dictates that one individual
should be the speaker and issue commands.
One SIRG member
S

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297—HQ—A1270919—D, 04/16/2007

emphasized the fact that this was a joint operation with a
vehicle surrounded by law enforcement personnel and that non—FBI
personnel should be provided in-depth instructions on FBI
protocol.

6
Savage- 1986

 ________________las
________room
_______

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Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1270919—D, 04/16/2007

Set 7..ead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
T WASHINGTON.
Th.t

DC

n administrative action be taken against SA

a result of his involvement in this shooting

b6

1
1
1

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Clemens. Rpom 7825

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Mr.l
Mr.J
Mr.L
Mr. McFeely
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
(Attention:
Mrs.
Ms.

1

1
I

Mr.l

—

-

I]5DOJ

USDOJ
IRoom 7837
I Room 5046
Room 3867
Quantico
Quantico
uantico
Quantico
Quantico
1 WFO
IRoom 7326
Ms.I
Rbom i
7861
,

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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

•

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

?rec,edexice:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attu:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

11/03/2005

AD Charlene B. Thornt/

I

Extension 4-1837

Cloyd Daniel Le

I
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

297—MQ—A1271464—D

SHOOTIiIG INCIDENT
DALLAS DIVISION
01/21/2005

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 01/21/2005, involving Agents
of the Dallas Division.
During the arrest of a violent fugitive
attemptin to elude arrest, four Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) Teaia Agents fired multiple rounds from their Bureau-issued
weapons resulting in injury to the subject.
SIRG members
rmmPn(irci Ht

n,

andi
shoot ing incident.

minicrtir .c1-inn

1- i-kn

L:

las a result of their involvement In this

[

Administrative:
Reference report of Inspector
(formerly Inspector—in—Place), dated 02/16/200.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting
Details of the Shooting Incident
The Dallas Division had been investigating a series of
violent take overt’ bank and business robberies for approximately
two years.
Subjects involved in the robberies carried and used
assault rif.les and wore ballistic body armor.
The participants
were known to physically assault customers, employees, and law
enforcement officers working in the banks.
In November 2004, after robbing a bank, the suspects
were involved in a running gun battle with local police officers.
The subjects used automatic weapons during the gun battle and
subsequently attempted to carjack three vehicles.
During their
escape, the subjects drove one of the stolen vehicles into

Savage- 1988

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To:
Re:

I

________________Ibefore

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A127l464—D, 11/03/2005

another vehicle resulting in serious injury to a citizen.
Severa days after the bank robbery, investigation ideptifid
las one of the perpetrators. I
I
was suosequently arrested. and a search of his residence revealed
a ballistic vest, a manual on how to convert a semi—automatic
rifle to fully automatic, and a hand prenc
f)iiri,n
interview]
jidentified[
iandl
las his
accomplices in the bank robbery and subsequept_cariaqkings.
Federal arrest warrants were issued chargingi
nd1
carjacking and using a firearm in the conimission of a
crime of violence.
Based on information obta.ined during the interview with

I the Dallas Division’s Special Oprtinn

rroirn

(SaG)

was

able to locate and begin surveillance of I
I For a
three-day_period, the SOG was able to develop a pattern activity
fori
land learned thati
Iife and two chi1drn were
residing with him in an apartment located in Mesquite, Texas.

On 01/21/2005, at 9:00 a.m, a briefing was held in the
Dallas Division regarding the investigation.
During the
briefing, a case update was provided by Case Agenti
I
A written SWAT operations plan prepared by
Acting SWAT Team Leader (TL)I
I was presented to
the Special Agent in Charge.
The plan called for a dynamic entry
into I
lapartinent in Mesquite; however, after
discussing
Ipropensity for violence and the high
probability tus cniidren and wife would be in the apartment, SAC
Gonzalez decided I
I arrest would be effected after he left
his vehicle and before he reached his aoartrnent. Acting SWAT TL
I
las instructed to formulate
tactical olan which would
safely allow the SWAT Team to arrest
he
reached his apartment..
On 01/21/2005, at approximately 11:00 a.m., the SWAT
Team responded and staged iii a parking lot .n close proximity to
I apartment complex. Acting SWAT TLI_______
telephonically briefed his assault plan to Actinci Assistant
Special Agent in Charge (A/ASAC)I
lwho then
briefed SAC
The SWAT arrest plan was approved by both
Acting ASAcF
land SAC Gonzalez.
The arrest plan directed t1e SOG to followl
lo
his apartment complex.
After an a;rt warant was obtained, and
with SWAT Team members in position,I
Iwould be allowed to
park his.vehicle at the apartment complex.
Two SWAT vehicles
would be used to block the vehicle from behind and additional
SWAT vehicles would be placed at the pari Int its to prevent
any attempted escape by Gavina.
A/ASACI
land
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
1
ieparted Dallas and

2

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 _______[

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Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ—A1271464—D,

Inspection
11/03/2005

proceeded to the Mesquite location where A/ASACI
assumed the role of On Scene Commander for the arrest.

I

At approximatqlv 4:45 n.m.. .he SOG. advised SWAT and
command components thtI
Iwas approaching his
apartment.
Iparked his vehicle approximately 25 yards
As
away from his apartment, SAl
Icailed for blocking vehicles
to move into position at the entrances of the apartment complex
parking lot.
SWAT Team personnel quickly blocked the subject
vehicle into the parking space.
With the blocking vehicle in
position, SAl
Igave the order to execute the arrest plan.
I who was in the blocking vehicle, rushed tol
SAl
I
vehicle breaking he oasenger side window in an attempt to
distract him,
iconverged on the vehicle from the left
SAl
side, opened the driver’s door and placed his hands onl_________
shoulder in an attempt to pull him from the vehicle.
Simultaneously, an arrest team of seven SWAT Team members exited
the SWAT van, verbally identified themselves_as FBI Agents, and
commanded I
Ito exit the vehicle. I
Ibroke away from SA
I
land accelerated his vehicle forward jumping the curb onto a
grass and sidewalk area.
Agents standing on bçth sid of the
vehicle had to step aside to avoid being hit.
vehicle
swerved to the left while continuing to accelerate.
s the
vehicle accelerated, four SWAT Team members_fired at I
I
After traveling approximately 30 .yards,I
vehicle struck
the side of the apartment complex wall.i
Iwas removed from
the vehicle, provided immediate medical treatment for his wounds,
and subsequently transported to a hospitar where he was treated
and released into the custody of law enforcement personnel.
A shooting scene investigation by the Dallas Reonse
Teair revealed AsI
I
and I
I fired numerous rouns from their Bureau—
issued M—4 rifles and SA
I fired two rounds
from his .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol.
A total of 22
rounds were fired of which 20 impacted the subject vehicle on the
drivers. side, one round strucki
un the left shoulder and a
second round struck him in the lett hip.
The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) identified
three areas of concern during the evaluation of this shooting
incident.
The first issue pertained to the fact that no
notification was made to local or state law enforcement agencies
regarding the FBI’s presence in their jurisdiction or the fact
that the FBI was attempting to arrest a violent fugitive; the
four Agents firing their weapons on the day of the incident
maintained custody of their respective wepons until thay
following the shooting incident; and, SA
IBureau
issued Colt M—4 rifle was loaded with .2
cal.iber 62 grain
Remington full metal jacket ammunition.

3
•

Savage-1990

 —.—.._—

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271464—D,

......afl

Inspection
11/03/2005

On 07/15/2005, a declination of prosecution was
received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding the actions of the fnnr Ants
involved in this shooting incident.
Inspector
I was
telephonically advised by the Dallas Division that this matter
was presented to a Dallas County Grand Jury and a No Bill was
returned in June 2005.
On 10/13/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member.
The fOllwincr rr-inrr mmhi wer in
attendance:
Chief Inspectort
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division; I
I Deputy Chief,
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, USDOJ; I
Deputy Chief. Domestic Secuçity Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ;I
I Assistant Section Cef. Violent
Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division;I
I
Unit Chief (DC), Pirrm.g PrinnrT flnjt, Training and Development
Division (TDD)
j National Firearms Program,
TUD; Acting Uci
L Special Weapons and Tactics
Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; Acting tiC
I
I CD—6A, Counerintelliaence ivision;
Supervisory Special. Agent (SSA) I
I Firearms
Too1i rlnit-ntific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I Operational Skills Unit, TDD; SSAI
I
I
L Investative Law Unit. 0fice of the General
Counsel (OGCI; and SSAI
IWashington Field
Office. I
I Management Program Analyst,
Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division, a non—voting member, was also in attendance.
—

Observations and eoomutendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluati.ve analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational sta’ndpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recoinnendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by SAsL
I and
justi.Lied and in conformance with the FBI’s deadly
force policy.
The first observation made by the SIRG pertained to
state and local authorities not receiving notification of the
FBI’s presence in the area.
Although notification is not
4

Savage- 1991

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271464—D,

Inspection
11/03/2005

mandatory, SIRG members found no information that would have
precluded the notification to state or local officials regarding
the FBI’s presence in the area during this operation.
It was
noted that after the shooting incident local authorities were
notified and responded to the scene.
Members opined that the
presence of marked police units and uniformed officers would have
added a higher level of safety and security for the arrest.
The next area of discussion focused on the fact that
the Agents who fired their weapons during the incident maintained
those weapons in their possession until the following day.
SIRG
members unanimously concluded that Dallas Division management
should have ensured the Agents’ weapons were immediately secured
and segregated for forensic review following the shooting
incident and replacement weapons provided to the shooters.
The last area of discussion pertained to the presence
of training ammunition in the weapon utilized by SA_______
Members stated that th Dallas Division SWAT TL or designee
should ensure that all magazines are verified to contain only
service ammunition prior to any operational deployment.
These
matters will be discussed with the SAC of the Dallas Division.

5

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1h6
.

 ______WFO

________
_________

To:
Re:

________

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 11/03/2005

LEAD (s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,
SAs

I

I

DC

That no administrativ ni-ion h

1 as

lancil

in this shodcL.ng incicent.

a result of their irio1vement

6

11-•
1—
1—
1—
1—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Cloyd, Room 7825
Ms.I

Mr

I

I.tTgDOJ
USDOJ

t

MsI
IRoom 7837
1— Mr. Nanning, Roc1BO5
(Attention:
Mr.I
1
Mr. Rooney, Room
(Attention:
Mr. I
1
Mr.
Qua
1
Mr.
Quantico
I
Iflnj-it±co
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
buantico
Mr.

I)

-

I

—

-

-

-

1

-

(Attnnn

1
Ms.
1-Mr.
1
Mrs.
—

—

J4r.I

I

oom 7326
Room 7861

4+

6
Savage-1993

  

 

FBI
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries .

2004

 

 

P0-204 (Rev. 124.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
EederaI Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report oft
Date:

IIPI

10//2uu4

I

Omco CHICAGO

CaseID#:

TUIe:

297—HQ—A1271285—D
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
OCTOBER 10. 2004

Charactcr

•ADI?il$TRATIVE INQUIRY
Synopsis:

This shooting incident occurred on Octçber 10, 2004
outside the residence of Special Agent I
I
1 Chicago, Il1inois. On October
10, 2004, at approximately 12:15 p.m., SAl
I
Ito collect
was on her way to the residence of SN
her m
il whI1 SAl
1
Iwas out of town. The front door
of SA I
apartment building sits in an outdoor
vestibule which is located at the top of several concrete
steps.
While SAl
Iwas standing in the vestibule, she
was approaôhed from behind by a bick male, later
I who grabbed her, told
identified as’
her he was holding her up, that he had a gun, and hit her
on the back of the head with a bljint qbiect.
struggle
I falling
ensued which resulted in SA I
I and’
down the concrete steps andi
Ibiting SAl
1on
the left calf while laying on top ot her right leg, which
held her personally-owned, Bureau-approved_handgun. As
irepositioned himself over SAl
1, she drew her
I
weapon and fired one shot into his chest. AsI
1
fled witnesses called 911. Both the Chicago Police
Department and EMS responded within minutes. I
‘was
chnrt diqtangrom the scene
apprehended in his vehip’
of the shooting. Both I
I were treated
land SI
at Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center.
DETAILS:

On 10/10/2004, at approximately 12:15 p.m., SA

I

I

This document contains neither recommendations nor conelusions of the FEZ • Xt is the property of the FEZ
and i loaned to your agency; it and its contents axa net to he distributed outside your agency,

 .
I wq

lat
to the residence of SAl
Chicago, Illinois to collect her mail
I w out of town on temporary duty. The front
wnui.e &
door of SA I
I apartment building sits in an outdoor
vestibule whic. is located at the top of several concrete steps.
While SAl
Iwas standing in the vestibule, she was approached
from behind by a black male, who was liter ident&fied asi_______
Igrabbed SAl
I
I from behind, told her he
was holding her up, that he had a gun, and then hit her on the
back of the head with a blunt object.

)

I

]b7C

After_tussling for a few seconds on the landing, both
SAl
I arid l
I tumbled don the stairs to the $dewalk.
Ipulled up SAl
After a few seconds of struggle,I
I
pants leg ansi bit er on the left calf, breaking the skin in the
I. whohad her personally-owned, Bureau-approved
process. S?J
weapon (a Glock 27 loaded with .40 caliber ammunition) in a
holster on her right ankle, was fearful that her attacker would
gain control of her weapon and use it against her. As I
1, she managed to draw her
was repositioning himself over SAl
Ichest.
weapon and fire ore round into the left side of I
I commands to
After initially beginning to comply with SA I
I fled to his car and drove away.
get on the ground,I
Both the Chicago Police Department and EMS were
summoned by one of several eyewitnesses, and arrived a few
minutes later. One of the responding officers discovered
1 still ir
a
iaround the corner from site of the shooting
I
af
Iwas
1iiidromat.
sid
the
into
his vehicle, crashed
Iwas then transported
placed under arrest at that time. I
to Advocate Illinois Masonic_Medical Center, where he was treated
SAl
Iwas also transported to Advocate
for a gunshot wound.
Illinois Masonic Medical Center, where she was treated and
released.

FBI Chicago was immediately notified of the shooting,
and notifications WmAde to SAC THOMAS J. KNEIR, ASAC JOSEPH
I CDC .TAM KRUPKOWJSKI, and the
C. WAYS, Sr., A/SSAL
I and
1
Chicago Media Representative. SAS I
espoidd o the scene and prpvided_oeer support to SA
I
I weapon. ASAC WAYS,
Itook custody of SAl
I
J SAl
CDC KRUPKOWKSKI, and A/SSId
lalso responded i-ri i-hp hospital.
lof the
While at the hospital, COO KRUPKOWSKI advised SAl
I
availability of Department of Justice representation. SAl
was also advised o the availability of the Employee Assistance
ladvised CDC KRUPKOWSKI that she was going to
Program.
Si
1 Association (FBIAA) for represexttion
contact the FBI Agents
Icontacted
before making her statement. Attorneyl

L

I

2

-S.

 ___________On

.
SAl

Ion behalf of the

On his way to the hospital, ASAC WAYS directed Chicago
Division Radio Room personnel to notify SIOC of the shooting.
Several hours later, Chief Inspector ROBERT D. GRANT advised ASAC
WAYS that Chicago should complete the shooting investigation.
The crime scene investigation was handled by the
Chicago Police Department. A toy gun, broken in two, was
recovered at the crime scene, along with one .40 caliber shell
casing.

I

has an extensive criminal history,
including numerous ajts an4 convictions for armed robbery and
aggravated assault. I
Iwas most recently released from
jail earlier this year.

I

I

I

accompanied by Attorney
-tober 12, 2004, SAl
I provided a statement to officials of the CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT, the ILLINOIS STATE’S ATTORNEY’S QFFICE, and
the FBI. An FD—927 was read and signed by SAl
Iprior to the
interview. A Signed, Sworn, Statement, reflecting that
interview, was executed by SAl
un the Chicago Office of the
FI the following day.
1’’

I
t
10/14/2004, Assistant State’s Prosecutor
Office of Felony Review, advised that after reviewing
the shootarla inci.ent, his office decided to decline prosecution
against SAl______
All those
Several neighbors witnessed the in
description
contacted provided accounts which matched SA
of the attack and shooting. Furthermore,
as
interviewed by CHICAGO POLICE DEPAR
a oth the day of
ançt the day following the incident,
account is also
consistent with that of SAL
land the eyewitnesses.

The inspection determined that the deadly force
utilized by SAl
Iwas justified and withiV f’ rnilielines as
lattacked SA
set forth in the FBI’s Deadly Force Policy. I
I
I from behind without warning, stated he had a gun, and hit
SAl
I on the back of the bead. Afer both individual fell
down several concrete_steps,I
I who at the time was within
easy access of SAl
b weapon, severly bit her on her leg.
At no t
jn w i feasible for SAl
4
Ito identify herself, or
commançll
Ito stop his attack. It tqas certainly reasonable
I appeared willing to
for SAl
Ito fear fo her life. I
I
stop at nothing in order to assault SAl
3

4

 ________________________

I

FD-204 (ReV. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPAITMENT OF IUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Capy

Rpot ot
Date;

SSA
03/8/2O05

CaselD#:

91A-MM-105404

:6

I

Office;

Miami

SHOOTING INQU:ERY
SHOOTING INCIDENT;

REPORT OF

MIA141 DIVISION;
11/8/04

*

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Cheacter

This shooting incident was a result of the attempted
arrest of a bank robbery subj ect 4
I
DETAILS;

-

I

I

•

I

On 11/8/04, at approximately 11:40 a .m. ,
entered the Sterling Bank located at 1489 North Military
Trail, West Palm Beach, Florida, approaching a teller with
a demand note written on a manila envelope.
The note
demanded she place all the money in the envelope and that
ihad. a gun.

I

After handing the teller the demand

note, I
Ilifted up the front of his shirt exposing a
handaun •ucked in his waistband.
The teller complied with

I demand and provided him with money to include a
I exited the bank, he was observed
“dye pack.’
1 As I
by witnesses qnterinQ
gray Dodge Durango bearing Florida
license plate I
I
Palm BeajJ’
Special Agent (BA) I

(‘rirnf,, esoiif-

i-rsy

(pp)

Iwas

investigating a series of bank robberies occurring in the
West Palm Beach vicinity dating back to August 4, 2004.
It had been determined that the same individual had.

committed these four bank robberies and he was described
as a Hispanic male,

over siX feet tall, who displayed a
A

small silver handgun and utilized a mj envelope.
recent “Crime Stoers
’ tin had idqntified the bank
1
robbery subject as I
BA
I akal

Thia document conteins neithar Lecoeznendations nor ooncusions of the F3X • Zt is the property of the
and is loaned to your ageucj it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

6
7C

 ____

91A-MM-105404

conducted logical investigation and identified two
ormer em
iversaty Dodge, 5455 South Univer t
9rive,
w o poe tiyeiv idahtifedi
n a
bank survei ance p otograph.
SAl
I had received verbal
authorizajon from i-rip United States Attome (ATJcI
I
Ito arrest
I pending a review/search of I
cell phone records.
——

It should be noted that investigation also revealed
that a 2003 Dodge Durango bearing dealer license plate I
I
was reported stolen in July 2003, however, an official report was
not completed until November 2003 with the Broward County
Sheriff’s Office (case number 03-07-020).

I

cm

‘I’!

1/04,

SAl

I learned, from responding SA

I of the bank robbery that had occurred at the

Sterling Bank located at 1489 Military Trail in West Palm Beach,
Florida.
The description of the subiect and his modus operandi
were similar to the subject SAl
I had recently
identified as being responsible or the tour other bank robberies
in West Palm Beach.
5k I
loroceeded to the scene and further
learned from witnesses that the subject had fled the banc in a
gray Dodge Durango bearing Florida license plate I
I
After learning of this information, SAl
I
conducted logical follow up investjticrn
everal addresses
assoaiatsd withI
I When SAl_________ arrived atI
I
I
I West Palm Beach, Florida, she obçerred th flçdge
Durango parked in front of the residence.
Ski
I
contacted her supervisor, SSki
I., along with
PBCRA SAs to respond to her location. Approximately 10 minutes
later, while the PBCRA SAs were enroute to her location, SA
lobserved a Hispanic male fitting the description of
I
I
Fat the Dodge Durango. The jiiir4rii’i1 i-hp entered, the
Durango and departed the area with SAl
] conducting a
lone uving survillance. SkJ
Iwas the first
agent to join Ski
I in the surveillance closely followed
by SAL
I, who was coordinating with PBCSO
dispa€ched via ccl]. phone for deputies to respond to his
location. Eventually two marked PBCSO patrol units and one
unmarked PBCSO unit joined the surveillance.
It was at this time
that the PBCSO units assumed the lead of the surveillance for the
purpose of making a felony vehicular traffic stop on the Durango.
As the Durango approached the intersection of Southern
Boulevard d Haverhill Road, the driver, later identified aS
2

 ________Iwas

__________

91A-MM-105404

I

I

pulled into a shopping plaza parkin lot on the
northeast corner of the intersection. The Durango
flowed
Thto
äñJ ep.
who wefe
in separate vehioles. SAl
jhad pulled into
e a opping
plaza parking lot from a soutnern entry/exit point and asumed a
tactical position near where PBCSO_CorpJ
Ihad
positioned her vehicle. Deutv I
Ibegan giving verbal commands
over
system” for I
I to exit his vehicle while
Capt.
approached the Durango on foot giving verbal demahds.
for
r rer to exit his vehicle.__It was at this time that BA
observed the driver I
I lookipg around as Capt.
approached the Durango. SAl
Iremembered hearing
someone yell “gun” and than observed the Durango backing up at a
high rate of speed. As cpt.I
Jwas approaching the Durango
on footj
Idisregarded tue verbal coumiands being given and
begaz bac]cin up his v-h r1
at a high rate of speed towards
Capt .1
I Capt. I
I fired his department issued shotgun
at the Duraxigo. At this time, SAl
I discharged his Bureau
issued firearm at the Durango in an effort to prevent the Durango
from running over Capt.I
11 sped. in an
I Ph Thivnrrr lbs.
easterly direction towards Corp.l
Iwho was
positioned near the south side_of_the shopping plaza parking lot.
It was at this time that Corp.l
I fired her department
issued Qiock handgun at the Durango. The Durango sped off in an
easterly direction and then made a J turn and again drove back
towards SAl
lagain causing them to fire
land Corpi
their weapons at the Durango. SAl
Iliad related that he
overheard the vehicle engine_revving up as the vehicle izWreased
speed again towards Corp,i
SAl________
i and his location.
then fired once again to protect himself and believed that he was
in imminent danger from the vehicle driven by I
1

-

.

-

The suspect vehicle kept fleeing and drove westerly
along Southern Boulevard on a stretch of road under construction
and not open to the public. Approximately one half mile from the
shopping plaza, the Durango impacted a concrete barrier which
disabled the Durngo.
PBCSO deputies approached the vehicle and
observedI
Ito be injured. PBCSO deputies also observed a
silver pistol in the passenger compartment area that was later
identified to be a “lighter” resembling a toy handgun.
treated at the scene by mergency medical
personnel and transported to the St. Mary-’s Hospital_where it was
determined that the only injuries sustained by
iwere from
the traffic accident d that
fired by Capt.
‘ he rounds
or SA
_J Corp.
I had struck Sanchez.

I

?lorida States’s Attorney Office, chief
3

I

b!c

-

 91A-NM-105404

advised that his office
regarding this incident
law
sustained injuries as a

would nt tn±iate a shooting inquiry
since I
J was
cc_by_ap c.
föcernent officers and had only
direct result of the traffic accident.

On 11/9/04, sAl
lobtained a federal search
warrant and exeeuted te arn oti te Dodge Durango driven
by
Assistina SAl
I in this endeavor was PBCSO
Detective
J It should be noted that were several rounds
that had impacted the vehicle and that several fragments were
• removed from the vehidle as evidence.
On 11/18/04,1
‘was federally indicted for five
counts of bank robbery and one count of Assault on a Federa
l
Officer (AFO).
The civilian witnesses at the scene all gave similar
of the incident, observing that the Durango driven by
I was driving at a high rate of speed in a parking
an attempt to rim down uniform and undercover law enforc lot in
ement
officials and that those officials had no other choice but
to
fire their weapons at the vehicle in an attempt to stop it.
accioiimt

I

It should be noted that eleven Glock .40 caliber
casings were retrieved at the scene along with one shotgun shell
casing.

4

6

 ___________________

(Rev. 01.31-2003)

FEDERAL BUFEAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence;

To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

AD Charlene B. Thornton

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

06/06/2005

Extension 1837

Thornton Char1J11 B
Grant Robert D

Ilrr

I

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271970—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
07/08/2004

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occuired on 07/08/2004, involving Special
Agent (SA)
I During the executicsn of a knock and
announce search warrant, SAl
Ifired one round from a
Remington 12 gauge shotgun, killing an aggressive pit bull dog.
SIRG members_recommended that no administrative action be taken
against BA I
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Administrative:__Reference EJ.ectronic Communication of

SSA

Details:

dated 10/01/2004.

This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the. SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

 It.

To:
Re:

Inspection
From Inspection.
297—HQ--A1271970--D, 06/06/2005
-

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 07/08/2004, members of the WFO Safe Streets Task
Force executed a search warrar)t at a Southeast residence in
Washington, D. C.
Source information arjd investigation determined
the residence belonged tol
I a drug trafficker, who
was also suspected of being involved in several acts of violence
including homicides and assaults with intent to kill.
Prio to the execution of the search warrant, Case Agent
Iconducted a pre-operationa]. briefing.
Inrmation
was provided that there was a strong possibility of firearms
inside the residence as well as the oosibility of an aggressive
and ferocious pit bull dog. SA I
Iwas tasked with carrying a
shotgun for the purpose of engaging the pit bull dog if the need
arose.

I

I

7C

L SAl
I and DetectiveS
I were assignedas part of the eptrv tqam and
designated to secure the residence. As soon as SJ
Ibegan the
“knock and announce”, dogs inside the residence began barking.
Once entry was made into the residence, a large, growling pit bull
dog stood near the entrance and would not allow the law
enforcement officers to proceed into the residence to execute the
search warrant and secure the residence. The owners of the dog,
who were inside the residence, were directed several times to take
control of the dog; however, did not comply. The dog continued to
hinder the entry of the law enforcement officers as well as
rendering them unable to secure the residence. These
circumstances, coupled with the information previoilsly provided
regarding the nosibility of weapons being inside the residence,
caused SA I
Ito believe the team was in inmiinent danger of
serious ph’sicai. injury. As a result, SAl
Ifired one round
from his Remington 12 gauge shotgun, killing the dog.
Law enforcement officers continued through the residence
and secured it without incident.
District of Columbia personnel
assumed control of the dog.
On 11/17/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Former Chief Inspector
Robert D. Grant, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meejdnci with th fiowing voting members of the SIRG
in attendance: L
ISncial Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, L3SDOJ;I
IDeputy Chief, Domestic Security
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; My Harrison, Former Section
Chief (SC), Applicant Processing Section, Administrative Services
Division; Jay C. Manning, SC, CD-6, Counterintelligence Division;
Manuel B. Mora, SC, Qpeational Sunoort Section, Criminal
I Acting Unit Chief (tic),
Investigative Division;
Firearms Training Unit, Training and Development Division (TDD);

b 1

 T`
Re:

I

I-nspecti` n
Fr` m: In’spècti` n
297-HQ—A1271970-D, O6/G6/OO5

I

Acting tic, NaUónal Lirearm’s Pr` gram,’ ‘DD;
Supervis` ry Special Agent (SSA I
I’, Firearms
T` ` )marks tinit. Seinti4d Analysis Sectin, L` rat` ry bIviiOnr
-

I

SSAJ
L Invest±aative Law’ Pnit, pffice .` f the
General C` unsel, (OGC); arid, SS1________________I Washingl` n
Field Of fir.
Thr ` nly n` n-v` t3ng member present was

.L “Management Pr` gram Analyst, Inspecti` n
Managé’ment Unit, Office ` f Inspecti` ns, Inspecti` n Divisi` n.
Observati` n and Rec` nindati` us ` f the SIRG

The SLRG reviewed the ab` veyn` psized incident with te
intent t` :
(.1) evaluate the applicati` n ` f deadly f` ice
(2) pr` vide the Direct` r with an evaluative analysis,
` bservati` ns, and rec` mmendati` ns f` r cQrrectjve aç’i` ns fr` m an
` perati` nal staTidp` int (.if any); (3) pr` vide .reô` mñendati` ns
c` ncernin’g training and/` r safety isues; and (4) pr` vided
rec` mmendati` ns f` r admini’strative acti` r if deemed necessary.
StG menibes unanim` usly agr.eed the tse ` f deadly f` rce
by SAl
Iwas justified and in c` nf` rmance with the deadly
f` rce p` licy. A ret` ntmendati` ft w md thM
c1ministrative
acti` n s’h` u].d be taken, agains.t SN
las a result ` f
his inv` lvextent in this sh` clting incident.

 1
m
_

To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection,
297—HQ—A1271970—D, 06/06/2005

LEAD(s);
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTONI DC

SAI

shooting incident.

1
1

—

tinistrative active be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this

Mr. Pisto1e, Room 7142
Ms. Caoroni. Room 7427

1
Mr.l
IJSDOJ
1-Mr.’
USDOJ
1
Ms. Harrison, Room 6050
1
Mr. Manning, Room 1B045
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-

1
1
1
1
1
2.
I

—

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—

Mr. Mora, Room 5155
Mr.
jQuantico
Mr.
IQuantico
Mr.
iuantico
Ms.
Room 7326
J
Mr.
[‘WFO
Mrs.
7861

+4

.4

1b6

 ___________

_________

FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to;

Inspection Division
Attn:
Shooting Incident Review Group
ASAC Sharrel]. Gene Slone

Report o
Date:

Case ID #:
Title:

Denver

01/04/2005

Oflice:

297-HQ-A1271741-D
MINISTTI INQUIRY;
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
LOS ANGELES DIVISION

AUGUST 5, 2004

INSPECTION DIVISION
SHOOTING INQUIRY
Character:

Synopsis:

On 08/05/2005, SAl
Iwas involved in a
shooting incident a 187 Eapt Olive gtre&, San Bernardino,
California
SAJ
Iwere working on a gang
] and S.I
-

investigation with Detective I
I from the San
Bernardino Police Department (SBPD) and a member of the Riverside
Resident Agency (RRA) Safe Street Task Force (SSTF), when they
heard a police radio dispatch that the SBPD were going to attempt
to arrest a subject involved in a recent shooting.

Details: On 07/31/2004, at approximately 9:30 PM., an Assault
with a Firearm occurred at 176 East 10th Street, San Bernardino,
California.
The SBPD conducted the investigation under case
#2004-29569 and identified Nicholas Gilbert Fimbrez as the
suspect.
Investigation determined that Fimbrez utilized a .40
caliber pistol during the assault and the weapon and subject had
not been located. Although no arrest warrant was issued, an All
Points Bulletin teletype was submitted to area law enforcement
agencies concerning the suspect and weapon. This investigation
determined that Fimbrez was a known gang member, a shooter for a
violent street gang, had a criminal record, and had fled from
police on previous occasions.
On 08/05/2004, at approximately 7:08 PM, the SBPD Dispatch
received an anonymous telephone call stating that Nicholas
Fimbrez was currently at 176 East 10th Street. After this
information was dispatched to fficetS covering that area,
additional officers responded that they would assist, due to
their knowledge of the previous incident and its related
investigation. The SBPD Officers decided to meet at 9th
Streetand Sierra Way for a briefing prior to responding to the
scene and attempting the arrest.
This doctment contains neithar reooaendatjons nor ocneluaions of the nor. It is the proporty of the noX
and. is loaned to your agepcy; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside ur
agenoy.

1

 I

I

land SJ
I SBPD

Iwere

SAl
and s4
were working with Detective
I a
member of the SSTF, conducting Street enforcement actions. Their
normal activities were to suppress gang activities in various
area of San Bernardino. As part of their investigative
responsibilities/strategies in connection with the SSTF they
patrol gang areas in an effort to identify gang activity and make
street level arrests with the intention of identifying and
deve1opin informants which could lead to further/future case
development/initiation, locate and arrest gang members who are
warranted for various charges, and take weapons and drugs off the
street.

SAL

I

riding with Detective
1
I in
police vehicle, and were wearing their
issued ballistic vest with FBI intifiqatiçri ôler1y viihle çn
their outer clothing. Detectivel
land SAl
I
I SAl
had just d].eared an arrest scene in tne 1400 block of North
Genevieve Street when they heard over the SBPD radio that police
units were being dispatched to 176 East 10th Street to attempt
the arrest of the subject involved in a previous shooting at that
address. Due to Detective i
Ibeing in
I and SAl
i SN
the general area they decided to travel to the briefing location
and assist with the possible arrest.

Detectiv1

Uoor

I

I

arrival

I

at the briefing location, sergeant
SBPD, took over the briefing and developed a tactical
plan whic)a was verbally discussed with all officers at the scene.
The plan determined the weapons each officer/agent was to
possess, officer position assignments, how they were to arrive at
those positions, exact potential cross fire/safety issues. A
complete description of Nicholas Gilbert Fimbrez, Hispanic male,
5 ‘11”, 200 pounds, 27 years of age, shaved head with numerous
tattoos, was provided. The officers and SAs then departed the
briefing location and traveled to 176 East 10th Steet. As they
arrived at the location,l
as observed
watering the grass in the front yard. MsJ
I an elderly
female, was later identified as Nicholas Fimbrez’s_qrandmother.
The SBPD attempted to obtain information from MsJ
Ibut she
was undooperative, other th4n providing the telephone number to
the residence. MsJ
Idend ih ct that Nicholas Fimbrez
was in the residence. Sergeant I
)then telephonically
contacted the residence and after approximately two rings a male
answered.
Sergeant
Jidentified himself and attempted, to
no avail, to identi±y tne person wh anwrred the telephone. The
male abruptly hung up. Sergeant
I indicated to one of the
other officers that if the male remained in the residence, it may
turn into a full tactical callout and if so they would maintain
their positions. Sergeant I
Ithen attempted a second
telephone call into the residence and as
telephone was
riragin, a police radio broadcast indicated that a Hispanic male
wearing shorts was coming out the east side of the residence.

I

the

2

 Officerl
Ithen started iving the Hispanic male verbal
commands but the Hispanic male did not comply and returned to the
inside of the residence. The Hispanic male was then observed
quickly looking out a window on the left (east) side of the
residence.
The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department’ s Aviation
Unit, which was on-scene to provide aerial support, then observed
a Hispanic male, fitting the description and later identified as
Nicholas Gilbert Fimbrez, exit the rear (northeast) corner of the
residence, go under some trees then run east and north through
some back yards and over some fences. The Aviation Unit provided
radio broadcast information concerning Pimbrez’s description,
direction of travel, and coordination for the ground pursuit
units.
Numerous officers, who were in foot pursuit of Fimbrez, were
giving verbal commands directing Fimbrez to stop and show his
hands, but to no avail. Numerous officers observed Fimbrez
running with his hands near the waist area of his pants.
Numerous officers were in foot pursuit and closing in on
Pimbrez as he entered the rear yard of 187 East Olive Street by
going over a wire fence. £imbrez then ran north along the west
side of the residence. 824
Iwas also in foot pursuit and
entered the rear yard of l7 East Olive and ran to the southwest
corner (rear) of the residence as Fimbrez ran north along the
west side of the residence with another officer in foot pursuit.
Fimbrez then ran east across the front porch and then south on
the driveway along the east side of the house toward the garage
and backyard area and toward SN
nd other pursuing officer’s
location. Additional officers were also pursuing Fimbrez south
on the driveway. As several officers were near Fimbrez and
giving him ver
rids to stop/sh9w h±SL hands and to no
avail, Officer
released his IC-91
D just as Officer
I came nor h from the rear of the house and physically
confronted Fimbrez. They were face to face and Officerl
I
grabbed Finbrez’ s shoulder and arm in an attempt to take Fiubrez
to the ground. Within seconds of this phys.cal confrontation,
Fimbrez displayed a weapon and shot Officer I
Iwith one round
from a q1oc1
1 Model 23 .40 caliber pistol, serial number BAP249TJS.
Officer I
I wo w knocked to the ground iv th shot, was then
bitten by K-9!
nd Off icerl
I discharged t-hi
I as SAl
weapons strikngFimbrez and_knocking him to the ground. SAl
fired one round and Officer I
J fired one round. Fimbrez, who
was now on the ground, still maintained possession of his
handgun. Officers again attempted to provide verbal conands to
Fimbrez to drop the weapon but 1’imbrez attempted to raise and
point the weapon toward the ofF4rs. Officers, knowing that
Fimbrez had just shot Officer I
land a civilian the previous
week, and fearful for their lives and the safety of others, again
3

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I

 ________kiere

I

discharged their weapons to eliminate thç thre.t. S2
1
Idisaharged two
discharged one additional round. Of ficerl
additiont romid, Off icer
ischarged. one round, and
Officerl
Idiechargeci four rounds, Following the shooting,
an Officer Down/Officer Needs Assistance call was dispatched over
a law enforcement common radio channel.
-

Of fic’er I
Iwas provided with medical attention at
the scene and then transported via poll r’’ to the Loma
nda
University Medical Center by Detectivest
and
land I
other officers. Emergency medical personnel arrived at the scene
and began to administer medical attention to Fimbrez, however, he
was pronàunced dead at the scene.
Iwas carrying hi hmii ictiri (1t’1c Mdel ‘ st”
Officersi
I audi
carryipa thçir department issued H&K US? .45
caliber pistols. SAl
land all officers involved in the
shooting were current on their firearms qualifications at the
time of the shooting.
SAl

c.14hr pistol.

I

I who was the senior
Following the shooting incident, SAl
FBI SA on-scene, telephonicaj.ly contacted his supervisor, SSA
I who then notified Executive Management of the
Los Angeles Division. The SBPD took control of the crime scene
and lead on the shooting investigation, since the initial matter
was a SBPD case and. the attempted arrest was a SBPD operation to
which the FBI Agents were only providing tactical assistance.
During the course of the SBPD investigation, numerous
persons were interviewed and provided statements of what they saw
and heard. Numerous witness saw the foot pursuit, heard verbal
commands being given, and heard shots being discharged, however,
only a limited number could provide relevant information which
could be reduced to a statement.

I

On 08/09/2004, an autopsy on Fimrz wa tanduatd by Dr.
Iwith SBPD Forensic Specialist I
I taking
photographs and collecting evidence, During the autopsy it was
determined that ?imbrez was struck with ten bullets which was
equivalent to the total number of rounds fired by officers during
the incident. The cause of death was determined to be multiple
gunshot wounds and death occurred within minutes of the incident.

I

SAl
EOD 09/22/2002, had prior to the shooting incident,
indicated his intent to resign from the FBI and return to his
previous employnt
a Police Officer with the Escondido Police
Department. SAl
fresigned from the FBI effective 09/10/2004
arid is now employee y the Escondido Police Department.

land I

As previously noted, SASI
4

Iwere working as part

h6
fD

 of a SSTF initiative with the SBPD and. a Memorandum of
Understanding was prepared which established a Gang Impact Team
The mission of the GXT was to address the organized
(GIT).
street gang problem, within and around the city of San
Bernardino, by identifying and targeting the leaders and members
of the various gangs throughout the area. At the time of the
shooting incident there were three case initiatives being worked
by the GIT.
There is no Executive Board for the GIT, however SSA
lof the SBPD
I
I of the RRA and IieutenantI
provide direct oversight of the GIT. One of the case initiations
captioned “8-Ball” was opened in March 2004 to focus on several
small gang groups that existed within the city of San Bernardino.
As of 07/30/2004, this caqe
generated 51 state arrests and
one state conviction. SAl____ the Principal 1elief Supervisor
for the Violent Crimes Squad in the PRA, was assigned as the Case
Agent on the investigation and was allowed to make command
decisions on the street. ss
briefed on a daily
basis concerning the Agents investigative activity. Although
FBI SAs do not have Peace Officer status in the State of
California, they can and. do participate in local arrest when
assistance is requested.
As previously noted., the SBPD was the lead investigative
agency on the criminal matter leading up to the shooting
incident. Although no Operation Order/Arrest Plan was prepared,
a verbal operational rf1na was provided at the staging
location by Sergeantj
Iduring which he identified each
Officer/Agent’s assignment, duties, weapons, and discussed safety
issues. Both SA
I and SAwere aware of the current FBI
peadly Force Policy.

A review of this matter by San Bernardino District
Attorney’s Office, has determined this to be a justified shooting
incident.

5

.

 (Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Attn:

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Thpproved By:.
Drafted By:

DaEd:

ROUTINE

10/27/2004

AD Charlene B. Thornton

I

I

Thorntoharlene B
Grant R
rt D

I

blrr

Case ED #: 297—HQ-A1271786-D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
08/12/2004

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting. incident that occurred on 08/12/2004, involving Special
Agent (SA)L
I Dur.ing the execution of a search
Synopsis:

warrant, SAl
Ishot and killed an aggressive Rottweiler dog.
SIRG members recommended that no action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of
SA I
I dated 08/16/2004.
Details: This communication was, prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 -

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A].271786—D, 1.0/27/2004

Details of the Shooting tncicIe
On 08/12/2004, at approximately 7:45 a.m., FBI Agents
assigned to the Connecticut Computer Crime Tak Force were
executing a search warrant in Bantam, Connecticut. Agents
-approached the front door of the residence and proceeded to
‘knock and announce” several times. After receiving no response,
participants checked the door of the residence and found it
unlocked. Announcing their presence as they entered, Agents
bea.ii.-to- Giea. 1e—Gs4emGe
—øe—to .loa-t-.te—eupae—amd—.
execute the search warrant.

nnouncing his presence several times with no response,
I proceeded to the bottom of the basement steps and
again announç’€i h1 resence. While observing the clutter of the
basement, SAl
Isaw a Rottweiler advance toward him in an
aggressive manner from behind a sheet covering an entrance in the
barnni.
Believing that his life was in immirent danger,
SAl
Ifired four shots at the charging dog. The dog fell
down the steps and died.

SAl

On 10/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Chief Inspector Robert D. Grant,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SER in attendance:
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, tJSDOJ;
I
I Deputy çhif. flrmtir ecurity Section,
1
Criminal Division, USDOJ;I
I Assistant Section
Chief, Operational Support Secti.on, Criminal Investigative
Division; My Harrison, Section Chief, Applicant Processing
Section, Administrative Services Division I
I
Firearms Program, Training Division’
Unit
(TD); I
I UC, CD—6B,_Counterintelligence Division;
I Firearms
Supersory pec.a.L ti.geht (SSAL
Toolmarks Unit Scientific 2’nalysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSA
‘ning Unit, Training
Operational Skills Unit,
Divis o
srearins Training Unit, TD;
TD;
SS
a
xial Firearms Program, TD; and
SSA
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
e two non-voting members present ware
Management Program Inalyst, Inspection
Manacxement Unit. q,ffice of Inspections, Inspection Division; and
I Intern, Leadership Development Institute,
I
Training and Development Division, Quantico.
-

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2

b7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A12717B6—D, 10/27/2004

Observations and Recommeudations o

f1e SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
the intent to:
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and reconunendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of.deadly
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
force by S
deadly force policy. Members_recommended that no administrative
s a ±esult of his involvement
action be taken against SAl
in this incident.

3

6
C

 _______
_________
_______

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271786—D, 10/27/2004

XED(s):
Set Iead 1:.

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
administrative action be taken against—
—eh—i-emet--

incident.

k6
IC

Mr. Pistole; Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Grant, Room 7837
Mat
IUSDOJ
Mr.[
USDOJ
Mr.I______ Room. 5155
1 Room 6050
Ms. Hrrisan
Mr
Quantico
Room 1B045
Mr
(Attention: Mr.
1
Mr.
uantico
1
Mr._________ Quantico
Mr.________ Quan[tico
1.
(Attention: Mrj
I
1—Ms.[
iPpom7326
1
Mrs.]
I Room 7861

1
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3.
1
1
1
1
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 FD-204 (Rev. 124.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of InestIgation

Copy to:

I

Report o
Date

IIC

CsscID#:

297-HQ-A1271966-]D

Office:

FB1 Headquarters

091d8/2004

SIOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
TAMPA DIVISION
AUGUST 19, 2004
Characj5

Synopsis:

.,.
.

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
This shooting incident resulted from an apparent
accidental discharge of a single round from a Colt M4A1
Carbine by an FBI Tampa SWAT Team member while the team
was effecting the arrest ot a violent fugitive wanted by
I was shot once
FBI Boston.
The fugitive, I
in the lower back while being handcuffed in the prone
position.
Mr.[
Isustained serious injuries, underwent
surgery, and suxvived his wounds.
-

DTAtLS:
On Thursday, 8/19/2004, at about 11:00 AM, FBI Tampa
keceiired a call from his squad
SA I
secretary advising that a priority BC was being faxed from
The BC set a lead
the Springfield RA, Boston Division.
for Tampa to locate and arresti_________________I for
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution.

S

.
.

Ireturned to his of ice and reviewed the
SAl
Iwas armed and dangerous
Boston BC which stated thatI
and a flight risk. An arrest warrant had been issued on
12/16/2003, by the Hampden County Superior Court,
Massachusetts, charging__Jwith one felony COmt nf
1
Malicious Destruction of Property over $250.00. I
also had outstanding felony arrest warrants in
Massachusetts fo Failure to Appear to Probation Officer,
Larceny From a Building, and Failure To Stop For Police.
On 1/27/2004, a U.S. District Magistrate in Massachusetts

This documsnt contslns naithar zce
adations nor conclusions of th. WE! • It is tb. pWOp.rty of tha FBI
an4 ii loe.n.4 to yoor ug.ncy; it axiS it. cont.nts ira not to 1,. distrjbutsd outgid. your aancy.

7C

 __

.

297-HQ-A1271966-o

issued an arrest warrant
Prosecution.

forl______ or Unlawful

Flight to Avoid

Iwas wanted for
The BC further stated thati
qiestioning as a prime suspect in the 11/23/2003, murder of
Adolfo Bruno, a “made” membev r’f tbe Genovese crime family. The
I described his various tattoos,
BC included a. photograph ofil
and provided a detailed physical description, including the fact
that he is 6’4” tall and weighs over 200 pounds. The BC cautionçd
tha
Las an “extreme fighter”, known to “avoid
apprehension”, and “believed to be extremely violent and will
engage of ficers”. The EC noted thati
F’ always in
possession of at least one handgun”.

•

•

and grand jury
The EC explained that source info
as staying in
subpoenas of telephone records revealed that
telephone at a residence at
Florida and had been utilizing
I Tampa, Florida. The BC identified the
I
owner ot the residence by name (hereafter referred to as “the
homeowner”). SAL
Itelephçnically spoke with the author of
the Boston EC, a task force officer (TF’O) assigned to the
Sorincfie1d RA. The TFO advised that according to a source,
Imight e driving a rented Cadillac EscaJ.ade.
I

SAl

1 then

advised sal

the

Acting SWAT ream Leader, of the details regarding
land
suggested that a SWAT deployment might become necessary. The
AThFP Team Leader was out of town attending an in-service.
departed the office, accompanied by a
SAl
Hifleborough County Sheriff’s Detective assigned to a Tampa
Division task force, and traveled to the Wood Trail Boulevard
vicinity to look for Cadiflac Escalades. Their search met with
negative results, but investigation at Enterprise Rental
determined that the homeowner had rented an Escalade on August 12
and returned it on.uQust_i.3, 2004. In a phone conversation with
the Boston TFO, SAI
I was told the name of the company where
the homeowner was employed, but not the address.

l±en

•

•

I

I

At about 11:40 AM, Acting SWAT Team leader
I hat a violent
fugitive might be in the area and that SAl
Iwas attempting
to confirm the fugitive’s location. They discussed the fact that
the SWAT Team should be utilized to arrest the fugitive. At
12:15 PM, A$C Eaton called Acting SAC (A/sac) David W. Welker
and left him a message that a SWAT Team deployment might be
needed to arrest a fugitive. Tampa SAC Carl Whitehead was out of
the country on annual leave.

advised ASAC Kevin Ray Eaton and SSA I

•

2

j-

 ___

___________

297 -HQ-A1271966-o

At about 2:00 PM, SAl
1was called by another
y handling the
1
wadirect]
wh,o
ts
police officer in Massachuset
Ilearned that the
I sAl
source who was reortinc oil
sourcel
Ithn called Actinc SWAT Team leader
gi
earlier.
1in
I
nd his detective
SAl
Tampa as recently as that morning.
partner then becan_driving to nearby pool halls and bars in an
attempt to spoti
I

I
At about 2:30 PM, A/SAC Welker, ASAC Eaton, SSAI
jwas on
and SN
I met in ASAC Eaton’s office; Si1
the speaker phone.
They discussed pertinent details. SA
I told ASAC Baton that another SWAT agent was working on
Ithat the plan
an Operations Plan. ASAC Eaton told sI
loutside of or away from the
should focus o arrestincrI
dvised that the SWAT Team was meeting
residence. sAl
at the Hilisborough County Sheriff’s district office near the
fugitive’s suspected location.

•

••

larrived, the SWAT Team entered the
Once SAL
lexplained all known
Sheriff’s Office for a briefing. SAl
information including the recent discovery that a new rental car
was parked at the residence and that an individual matching
I
I description was seen parking the vehicle and walking
toward the residence.

.

lierbally discussed with the
ASAC Eaton and ssL
SWAT Team that the arrest plan would not include going up to or
into the residence to arrest the fugitive. They discussed the

.
•

•

I

I left the
At about 3:00 PM, ASAC Eaton and SSA1
office en route to the Sheriff’s office. As they left the
office, a SWAT Team member handed ASAC Eaton a draft Operations
Plan
SAC Eaton revLewed the draft plan while riding in SSA
I vehicle. The plan called for a “knock and announce”
approach to the residence, and stated that the SAC had authorized
compromise authority and flash bang devices if necessary. ASAC
Eaton scratched out these portions and handwrote changes
consistent with effecting arrest while the subject was
approaching or departing the residence. ASAC Eaton also
scratched out the SAC authorities that had never been requested
nor grarted. ASAC Eaton also edited the plan to indicate that he
and SSAI
1 would be on-scene during the arrest, as oppçsed
the command post being in the office. ASAC Eaton and SSAI______
arrived at the Sheriff’s office at about 33o and awaited the
arrival of remaining SWAT members and SAl
I who was the
case agent and a SWAT team member.

3

b7C

lb 7 D

lb 7 C

 .
297-HQ-A1271966-o

.

.
.

•

•

•

need to pitini the team close enough to the residence to
apprehendi
Ibetween the house and his car. lrrujtively,
they discussed that it might be necessary to leti
heave the
residence and get in his car, then effect the arrest when he
exited the vehicle at another location. Lastly, they discussed
the least desirable alternative of a fçlonv car stop, aided by
marked police units, in the event that F
I became aware that he
was being followed. Acting SWAT Team Leader I
did not
attend this briefing because he remained at the FBI office
attempting to revise the Operations Plan.
I drove past
At about 4:15 PM, ASAC Eaton and SSAI
the target residence two times and around the neighborhood. They
observed that the distance between the front door of the small
townhouse residence and ils as4gned parking spaces was about ten
yards. ASAC Eaton and SSAI
Ireturned to the Sheriff Tg Office
parking lot where the SWA’!’ Team was making final preparations.
They advised the team that it
difficult to get close
enough to the residence to grabi
between the front door and
his vehicle.__Tey advised the SWAT Team that the plan was still
to arreeti
loutside of the residence or at another location.
the
SAl
I and. another SWAT member arrived at Isat
in
Sheriff’s Ofjce and. boarded the SWAT truck. SAl
the front passenger seat. A total of eight SWAT members were
seated in the truck. At approximately 4:45 PM, the SWAT truck
departed the heriff’s 9ff ice a’ong with the car containing ASAC
Ideparted in a separate vehicle to
Eaton and SSAI
IsAl
continue Surveillance. Once in the neighborhood of the target
residence, the SWAT truck parked around the corner in a location
affording an unobstructed view of the front of the house. For
approximately the first 20 minutes, the air conditioning unit in
the rear of the SWAT truck did not operate. According to an
Internet weather website
1 the Tampa temperature at 4:53 PM was 91
degeee. with 61% humidity and no precipa.tion. ASAC Eaton and
SSA I
b6
Iparked their vehicle in a supermarket parking lot in
the vicinity of the residence but without a view of the residence c
or the SWAT truck.
At about 4:55 PM, ASAC Eaton calLed A/SAC Welker and
COC Deanna Day and advised them of the plan and that everyone was
in place._A/SAC WeJ.ker dispatched negotiators to join ASAC Eaton
and SSAI
L (Two negotiators arrived about 6:10 PM). A/SAC
We].ker also requested that someone begin preparing an affidavit
for a search warrant in the event that an entry into the house
became necessary. A/gsA I
Iwho oversees the VMO
Squad, and CDC Day began work on the affidavit.

..
•

4

 _______Itook

.
297-HQ-A1271966-D

I

SA
jfrom his surveillance location observed
small children entering and exiting the house next door, arid
other neighr-ci jving home from work. At approximately 6:00 or
6:15 PM, SA!
Ilearned that the homeowner of the target
residnc might be coming home from work soon. cDC Day advised
Jthat in order to avoid a hostage situation, the
A/SSAI
homeowner should not be permitted to enter his house. The CDC’a
statement was conveyed to SAl
land also to the SWAT members
in the truck.

.

At approximately. 6 :15 PM, ASAC Eaton and SSA I
I
noticed a marked Sheriff’s unit pulling out of the supermarket
parking lot at their location, and moving in the general
direction of the target residence. Thinking that this marked
unit might somehow be involved in the SWAT operation, they moved
their vehicle to a location where they could see the SWAT truck.
The marked unit was not involved in the operation.
At about 6:35 PM, the homeowner arrived in his vehicle
and parked in front of his residence. As he exited his vehicle,
a task force officer identified himself and walked the homeowner
to the back of his vehicle. SM
Iannounced via hand-ield
I might
radio that the homeowner had arrived. Concerned that I
be able to easily view these developments from the front bay
9WAT truck to
window of the house, SAl
lradio F.
move closer. Acting SWAT Team Leader I
linterpreted SA
Iwas in trouble, or that
I
I request to mean that SA[
the fugitive had açoeared. TI)e SWAT truck ul1ed to the front of
Italking to the
the residence.
lobserved Sl
SAl
h’as in the house
The homeowner confirmed that I
homeowner
alone. SAl
Ito determine what was
I radioed SAl
happening. SAl
kesponded that he had acquired the house
keys from the homeowner and obtained consent to enter the house.
SAl
I advised the team to get ready.

•

•

I
•

.

Sal
lapproached the SWAT truck with the house
keys.
SAl
Iraised the back slide-up door of the
truck and observed children in the yard next door. The six SWAT
Tsm en1p i thp ‘‘- if the truck, SAl
I SAl
I SA
I S?J
I siJ
1 and SA I
I exited the truck
through the rear door and took positions of cover behind the
I arrived at the baclç of the truck with the house
truck. SA I
keys. Acting Team Leader
Itook cover behind the fron
wheel of another Bureau vehicle. The SWAT truck driver, SAl
a cover Dosition north of th friik. Ti,o ddit4onal
L we;e
SWAT members, SAl
land SAl
I
SAl
also present, having arrived in separate vehicles.
and SA
Imoved to cover the north side of the rear of the
5

 _______

297 -HQ-A1271966-D

Iran to cover the
land SA [
house, while SAl
back entrance of the house. A total of eleven SWAT Team members
were present, including the case agent SAl
I

I with two negotiators in the
ASAC Eaton and SSI
rear seat, observed thA RWA truck move toward the residence.
1 and
ASAC Eaton heard SAl
Iradio for the SWAT Team
thati
had exited the residence. ASAC Eaton heard SA. I
s
1
on the radio stating that he had obtained the homeowner
consent. He then saw the SWAT team exit the truck and approach
the residence.

I
lb7C

At approximately 6:37 PM, The entry team “stacked up”
behind the SWAT truck and proceededmethodically and slowly
th front door of the residence in he following order; SA
I carryia a shield. SAl
Icarrvina the house
Icarrying
I SAl
I SAl
keys, SAl
I The entry team members were wearing
a shield, and SAl
SWAT gear including body armor, helmets,_and prominent FBI
lwho had been
markings, with the exception of Szj
conducting surveillance of the residence. He wore an undercover
style bullet resistant vest and street clothes.
I reached
At the front door of he reqidence, SAl
land began the process of
around the shield carried by SI
unlocking both the door lnt’k jd deadbolt. During this process,
Jwas observed standing in the
the door pu11d open and
doorway. I
I attempted to close the door and the entry team
1 hots of “FBI,
forced their way into the narrow entrance foyer
Ito get
FBI” were repeated, and commands were given forl
Iturned his back to the team and attempted to run,
down. I
I
but he was forced down to the floor on his stomach. I
struggled to lift himself off the floor while the entry team held
him do!7n.
I shouted a request for handcuffs. anç3. SA
S
Iwas
Iresponded that he would do the handcuffing. I
prone, his arms out to the side and strugglinq to move into a
ight arm,
lhd one foot onF
SAl
push-up_position.
left arm.
SAl
ihad one foot oni

•

SAl
I carried a Bureau issued Colt M4l Carbine
from a sling axound his right shoulder. Just prior to
I recalled moving his right thumb upward in
handcuffing, SA F
a motion to manipulate the selector switch of his M4 to the
“safe” mode. He then let the M4 hang on its sling and. reached
his right hand back to his right side for handcuffs. He staad
the handcuffs in his right hand and kneeled dowq towar I
Six. I
grabbed
with
knee in the 8mall of I
j back.
left wrist with his left hand and started pulling that

•

•

•

6

Ibb

 297-HQ-A1271966-j)

otl

Ikept the_handcuffs
arm to the small
Iback. SAl
heft
in his. right hand. As ne was placing a handcuff onj
wrist, a shot Was heard.

[quickly
sal
lb
Blood emitted fronL
applied direct
completed tlie_handquffing process.
rendered aid to
pressure tol
I wound. While
haised
M4. SAl
L SAl
I
bfEered tr t1e SA
14ft
weapon
and
the
remove
Itt-s
his right
allow sat
sling.
hat SAl
I wrn yas in the
S
_jin an effort
“safe” mode. SA
began speakirtc tot
tpproached with a
to calm him and eep im conscious. SAL
i wound. SA
towel and gloves and applied pressure to I
truck.
SWAT
the
walked
to
and
residence
the
lexited
I

S

At about 6:38 PM, ASAC Eaton and SSAI
I approached
the residence and were told the subject was in custody and that
there had been
accidental discharge. ASAC Eaton went to a
marked Sheriff’s unit and requested the deputy to call EMS. The
EMS dispatcher received the request at 6:39 PM. ASAC Eaton then
called A/SAC Welker who advised that he would respond to the
scene. At about 6:50 PM, asac Eaton asked the deputy why EMS had
not yet arrived. EMS_arrived at the scene at approximately 6:53
PM, and transported I
1o the hospital at about 7:00 PM. The
SWAT Team departed the location to return to the office.

an

•

.

On his way to the scene, A/SAC Welker notified SIOC of
the shooting incident and spoke with various FBIHQ officials,
including Acting AD Donald Thompson, INSD. ASAC Eaton called for
the Tampa ERT to respond to the scene. A Hilisborough County
Sheriff’s Office corporal advised ASAC Eaton that his superiors
the FBI conducting the shooting scene
ha4 approved
investigation.
A/SAC Welker arrived at the scene and had
discussions with senior officials from the Sheriff’s Office who
confirmed that the FBI could process the shooting scene.

of

A/sAc Welker ensured that two SAs responded to the
scene to Obtain a detailed interview of the homeowner, and that
SM
I weapon and clothing, were secured.

Tarma SAs were posted at the hospital to maintain FBI
custody of I
Iwas in critical condition when the SIRT
arrived in Tampa to conduct the shooting inquiry. He had
reportedly lost a large volume of blood and a portion of his
while the SIRT was
small intestine. He underwent
to SAC Carl Whitehead
a
letter
Tampa.
sent
attorney
I
counsel and that no law
by
advising that I
represented
Iwas
The physician
enforcement oLi..icer was to questioni

surgery

•

7

in

i6

 ________nedical ________________J(WAT)
______________I(SWAT)

297-HQ-A1271966-D

1
for

I

responsible
care would not return calls from the SIRT
regardingj
Imedicl condition and records. The head nurse
responsible to4
I care telephonically advised that federal
htht’-e privacy laws precluded discussion or provision of
records.
TABIE OF CONTENTS
A.

S1ED SWORN STATEMENTS
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
9.
10.
11.

.

B.

SAl
I(SWAT)
ASAC Kevin RaY Eaton (SWAT )SAC)
I SWT)
SA[
SAl
I(SWAT)
I(SWAT)
I(SWAT)
S21
(gWL.’’ SSA)
8SI
(Acting SWAT Team Leader)
SA.
JswA, Accidental Discharge)
SA
ASC David Welker (Acting SAC)
*

1.

SA
SSA1

“Homeowner”

4. E
5.

6.
7. j
8.
9.
104

11.1
12.1
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

.

I$WAT)
I(cDC)
I(Deputy Sheriff)

SA1
p (Senior SWAT Team Leader, Medic,
nina. Coorni.nator, Principal Firearms Instructor)
I (Deputy Sheriff)
SAJ
I (hostage negotiator>
SAl
I(hostage negotiator)
iueutv Sheriff)
J(Deputy Sheriff)
I(OSA, 4-Midnight shift, FBI Tampa)
Receipt of an operations Pla from SAl
I
peg.
Receipt of photographs of SAl
FIñ SWAT gear.
Receipt of photographs of SAl
1 blood stained.
Receipt of SAI
I SWAT gloves
p weapon qualification).
(SAl
SAl

Newspaper CliDpings
1.

•

1(Case Agent, SWAT)

SA

FD-302s
2.
3.

C.

I

I

“Handcuffed Suspect Shot by FBI Agent”, The TamDa
8

 ___las

P1)404 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice

Was1inciton.

rLC.

I

Reportof:
Date:

IIPI

CacJD#:

297—flQA1271898D

This:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INQUIRY
PHOENIX DIVISION
TUCSON DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 15, 2004
INSPECTION DIVISION
SHOOTING INQUIRY

Charectei

SynopsLi

09/2-6/2004

Office:

FBIHQ

-

This shooting incident was a result of an attempted
arrest ofi
I A fedral warrant
issued 9/8/2004, in Tucsoi. Arizona. District of Arizona,
was outstanding; charging I
un violation of Title
(1’i(R. Phri-nirg a Federal Law
18, USC, Section 115(
Enforcement_Officer. I
Iwas traveling
witht
‘at the time of the arrest. The Phoenix
Division SWAT Team and Sierra Vista BA Agents had been
coordinating efforts with the Douglas Police Department,
1b6
Cochise County Sheriff’s Department, and the El. S. Border
Patrol to locate and apprehendl
I
DETAILS:
On 9/9fl0fl4. th WT 1riititr1 an .nvestioation
(89B—P--75599) oni
landi____________
a result of an encounter they had with U.S.
Border Patrol Agents CBPA). More specifically, on
8/13/2004 at approximately 8:00pm, Douglas BPAs attempted
to conduct a vehicle stop on a minivan suspected of
smuggling.
The driver, later identified as I
I
I
I, refused to pull over even though marked Border
Patrol units had their emergency lights and sirens
activated.
A the BPA ere attempting to conduct a
vehicle stop, I
I led them to a compound in
Douglas, Arizona, occupied by members of Ranch Rescue
(BR).
The BPAs were aware that members of BR were heavily
armed and generally_hostile to federal law enforcement
AsF
officers.
Iturned into the BR gated
driveway,I
I who was armed with a rifle, was

This document contains neither raooenendatjone nor conolugicne of the PBX - Zt is the property oC the BX
and is loaned to your agency; it end it. contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 )

297—HQ—A1271898—D

observed just inside the gate. I
Igot out of hi. veh1r1e
and began yelling at the BPAs and then began instructing I
I
and the surrounding area to “maintain your position and cover
down on the Agents. The BPAs believed thati
Iwas
ordering I
land other RR members to maintain their tactical
position and prepare to shootat them. Wearing for their lives,
the BPAs sought cover behind their vehicles and called for backup.
from the Border Patrol and Cochise County Sheriff’s. Office-.
Riddle eventually dropped his weapon and adhered to the
instructions of the SPAs, Shortly after officers from Cochise
County Sheriff’s Office and Border Patrol arrived, the situation
was defused without any shots being fired.
P riri

I

“
t
4
ered owner of the niinivan was
l4 one of the leaders of RR, a
paramilitary, anti—government, neo—nazi group which patrols
private property along the U.S./Mexican border in Texas, New
Mexico, Arizçna, and California. RR publicly proclaims to be
“dedicated to defending and preserving the private property
rights of individual citizens.” tts members portray themselves
as law abiding crusaders for private landowners whose properties
are being invaded by undocumented aliens. However, intelligence
reporting revealed that the group is willing to violate criminal
laws and use force or violence to achieve their political and
social goals.
In addition, the group’s actions may be motivated
by racial hatred and anti-government sentiment. According to its
internet site (ranohrescue.com), RR has chapters in Colorado,
Washington, Virginia, Oklahoma, and South Africa. Whereas RR was
founded and headquartered in Texas, the organization constructed
a new headquarters and training facility in Douglas, Arizona.
According to various law enforcement reporting, at its peak,
there wr between 15 and 20 militia members at the RR compound.
us the owner of the Douglas property which RR
considers its headquarters and tactical training center.
-

I

b7C

h7E

On or about 9/10/2004, SSRAI
hpet with ASAC
Roland Mignone to discuss plans to arrest I
I
The issue
was further discussed on Monday, 9/13/2004, with ASAC Nignone,
ASAC Nate Gray, and the SWAT Team leader, SAI
I
rg, it was decided to utilize the SWAT Team to
4
1
During.i1rI m
rretI
I The group 4ided the arrest would not be
2

 297—HQ—A1271898--D

effected at the BR c` mp` und in ` rder t` av` id any type ` f
stand` ff situati` n. Further, the determinati` n was based ` n the
l` cati` n ` f the ranch; p` tential f` rtificati` n ` f the c` mp` und;
the number ` f buildings ` n the pr` perty; iite1ligence suggesting
numer` us weap` ns ip ` ni ` f te buildings ` n the c` mp` und;
statements made byl
I suggesting a pr` pensity f` r
vi` lence; a lack ` certainty as t` h` w many pers` ns may be
present at the ranch;l
priminal hist` ry f` r acts ` f
vi` lence; and availabi.e a.jxernatives with l` wer risks.
Additi` nally, a vehicle st` p was ruled ` ut due t` l
I
hist` ry ` f refusing t` st` p f` r law enf` rcement afa maintaining
weap` ns in his vehicle.
It was c` ncluded that the SWAT Team w` uld be h` used at
the M` tel 6 in D` uglas and immediately resp` nd ` xce they were
n` tified that [
Ihad left the RR c` mp` und. FBI agents
l` cated at the B` rder Patr` l stati` n, were m` nit` ring cameras
` verl` ` king the c` m` ` und. They were t` rep` rt directly t` the
SWAT Team when I
heft the c` mp` und. It was als` decided
during this meeting that a SWAT Team briefing w` uld ` ccur ` n
Tuesday, 9/14/2004, and a full briefing f` r all law enf` rcement
pers` nnel ` n Wednesday, 9/15/2004.

I

On Tuesday,_9/14/2004, at 5:00pm, a SWAT Team briefing
was c` nducted by SAl
I in Ph` enix. AU. SWAT Team ihenibers
were Present at the Ph` pnix riefin` ex` e` t SAs
andi
has
I SAl
une ` niy egent scneciuied f` r duty ` n the tirst day ` the
` perati` n.
SAl
Iwas present f` r the sec` nd briefing
held at the Sierra Vista BA. Als` present at the Ph` enix
briefing was the SWAT Team C` ` rdinat` r, SSAI
land
h` stage neg` tiat` r,I
.L Earlier that day, SAl
I
wr` te the ` perati` r ` rder af1-,r having received specifics fr` m
the case Agent, sAt
I SAl
l` perati` ns ` rder
was general with` ut specific duty assignments as the team members
w` uld vary t` be r` tated in and ` ut ` f D` uglas every càuple days.
SAl
Iwerit ` ver-the ` perati` ns ` rder with the team during
the briefing in Ph` enix. He als` read the Sierra Vista ` perati` n
` rder secti` n which pr` vided subject and case inf` rmati` n.
During this briefina
1 the team was sh` wn ph` t` crrahs 9f the ranch
c` mp` und, I
I and his ass` ciates.
I read the
Deadly F` rce P` licy verbatim t` the team, putting specific
emphasis ` n it because a new revisi` n was just implemented. ASAC
Mign` ne briefed SAC Th` rnt` n ` n 9/13 and 9/14/2004 ` n the ` pti` ns
available t` effect the arrest ` f I
I

(.

I

,

Th ` perati` n schedule included the assignment ` f a
certified SWAT Team EMT with the team while stati` ned in D` uglas.

3

:;c

 d

297—HQ—A1271898—D

I

The two certified SWAT ENTs, SAl
land SAl______________
were riot available for deployment on Wednesday, 9/15/2004.
SA
I advised the team that he would act as thç EMT as he was
a certified EMT in college. However, SAI
Ihas not been
re—certified as an EMT since that time.
On Wednesday, 9/15/2004, at 12:00pm, a second briefing
was conducted at the Sierra Vista RA.
Present at this briefing
were representatives from the Douglas Police Department, Cochise
County Sheriff’s Department, U.S. Border Patrol, Sierra Vista PA
Agents, and all SWAT Team members on the first rotation which
included SAl
I ASAC Mignone presided pyer the hiefing
and SSRAI
I provided a case overview. si1
presented a tactical overview. The briefing covered specifics of
th arrest warrant, to include photographs and criminal_histories
of I
I They were briefed on the fact thatF
bias
considered armed and extremely dangerous; was wanted for
Aspaultin
Fderal Officer; and provided information relating
tol
previous felony convictions. Attendees were also
proviciea tte latest intelligence from the surveillance camera
monu1-nr1rr i-h çompound. More specifically, it was discussed
that I
I and his associates had conducted firearms
training with long guns at the ranch and that it was believed
they were in possession of grenades, weapons, and improvised
explosive devices.
-

Agents were designated from the Sierra Vista RA to
station themselves at the Border Patrol station and provide real
time information regarding the activities observed via the pole
camera monitoring the ranch. These Agents were also directed to
notify ASAC Mignone and the local authorities as soon as.the SWAT
Team executed the rrq1riring thA ftt-nncin and evening of
9/15/2004, SAsI
landi
Iwere monitoring
the camera at the Border Patrol_station. On tour or five
occasions, SAl
lobservedi
Iwalking around_the compound
with a long gun. On at let one n-ion, SAl
lobserved
the long .gun tcl
I This information was
reported directly to the STAT Team.
On 9/15/2004, at approximately 3:00pm, SAl
Ibeld
a briefing with the SWAT Team at the Motel 6 in a room that was
designated the command post. During this briefing, team members
were reminded to keep their ballistic vests and handguns on from
6:00am to 11:00pm each day while on station. These were the
hours Walmart remained opened and intelligence indicated that
this wasi
I usual stop if he left the ranch. Also,
team membèrs were briefed on a plan devised by SAL
Ito be
effected asi
I was seçn le.aving his ranch compound. The
4

}h7c

 ________________
__________________

97—HQ—A1271898--D
2

SWAT Team was assigned as follows:
Teams:

Ir

1n*a- tAT1Tn

SA

t:

(Silver Dodge)

SA

SAt
SAL

station next to Motel 6:

1

(Black Chevy Suburban)

I

est Team, Walmart parking lot; (SWAT VAN)
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA

The arrest plan was dçsicmed to atilize three SWAT
vehicles. The plan would allowl
Ito enter whatever
establishment he went to, set up vuir venicles around his
vehicle, and arrest him after he exited the establishment.

rI

I

I

t approximately 10:12pm, SAl
lobservedi__________
andi
I get into their van and leave the compound.
immediately nçtified tjie command post that the van had left the
I who was af•
comoound.
SAl
“‘nand post, notified SA
Ito get the SWAP team
I who then instructed SA I
together. After the team was assembled, SAl
linstructed
the driver of the SWAT van to proceed to the Safeway parking,
instead of Walmart, as he did not want t to b the only van in
the Walmart lot that time of night.
SAl
I then contacted
the Sierra Vista RA Agents and instructed them to notify ASAC
Mignone the subjects were moving.
According to SRI
I all SWAT team members were in
their pre—designated positions between 10:10pm and 10:25pm, with
the exception of the SWAT van, which was now in the Safeway
parking_lot. A aooroximaely10:25Dn, SAl
Iwas advised
by SAl
land I
Ithati
Ijust pulled into the
Safeway parkina lo and parked within a couple of spaces of the
SAL
I adyised all team members by radio that
land I
Iwere positively identified as they exited
their van and walked into the Safeway store. 321
I then
drove his vehicle to the Safeway lot and positioned it, front
bumper to front bl?rnoer. wihI
I van, to block him from
SAl
driving away.
Ipositioned his vehicle to the south of
I van and the SWAT van, which allowed him to maintain
a clear view of the Safeway entrance. SAl
I then dizgted
-

 __________laid
___________land
_________land
_____

297—HQ—A12718 98—0

SAl
Ito re—position the SWAT van sq the slidixg door on the
oassnaç side was facing away from I
Iran. SA
thj to low the rrst team to exit the van out of
the sight of I
land approach them from behind.
I and
It would also position the arrest team so their weapons would be
directed away from the Safway entrance.

r

At approximately 10:55pm, the two Sierra Vista Agents,
SAs I
landa
p who were stationed at the Border Patrol
station, advised SAl
I that they were observing the SWAT
teams ooition from a safe location near the Walmart. AsSA
Idid not have a direct line of sight to the Safeway
I
entrance. 125 diected .SAI
I to notify the team when
lexited the store and to give the execute
order whri they oasse4 behind the SWAT van. Just prior to
I
I andi
lexiting the store, a silver sport utility
vehicle pulled into the parking space just between the SWAT van
andi
Ivan. The passenger entered the Safeway.

h/C

4t
nro5imte1y ll!lSçlIfl, S
advised over the
radio that I
land
ng
I
e store. As they
proceeded behind the SWPP van.
gave the command to
execute the arrest. A I
I tnrj-e on the eiergency lights
of his vehicle.
SAs
I and
lexited the back
of the van. SAs I
I exited the side of the van
I andi
through the double_cioors. SAl
Iwas the first out he
rear door with SA I
1 directly behind him. SA I
Iweapon
was focused oni
I who was left of I
I SAl
I
yelled, “FBI
Get on the ground now!” SAL
Iyelled, “FBI! FBI!
Get down, get down, get down.”
—

SAl
1 stated that
andi
LLmmediately
started to run for
ositon tol
I van. He
advised that he saw
push the shopping cart away from
him and then turn and launch someth,na to then with his left
hand.
It was later determined that I
lhai an open water
bottle ihat soewd ,,liquid when he turned. SRI
I advised he
thougiit
as making a tactical mçv i-t
iime to go
for a sidearm.
Istated, “I believedl
Iwanted to
1
k
5
shoot us.” SAl
ladvised he knew SAl
lwas covering
therefore turned his attention tol_______ ho was
facing away from him
toward the van. SA
observed
SRI
Ithrew something at him. SRI
I
I duck as
stacea, “I sawl
I reach down with his left hand to his left
hip as if going for a gun from a hçlstçr. I
Iturned to his
left
he did this.” Further, SAl
lexplained, “ knew if
IpuJ.led a un and fired, he would hit SRI
Ipoint
blank killing him.
I thought I might be shot, as well as SR

6

 297—HQ—A1271898-D

land SAl
Iwould be killed.
I but I knew sAt
I left nand went down and he turned, .1 fired one shot.”
l’ecailed he had his red laser sight on the left side of
I rib cage below the armpit. After the shot,I
I
continued to_turn to his left and fell down out of SAi______
SAl
ladvised he believed the immediate threat from
Iwas gone.
I
He then reacquired his sight oat
I and
covered him until S4J
handcuffed him. SAl
land other
1
Agents heardi
Iv11, “tchat did you guys shoot me with, a
rubhr hlieEV’ SAt
Istated that shortly thereafter, SA
tasked him wliat haipened to which he responded, tEl shot.”
I
wnen asiced how many times he responded, “One time.” SAl
I
advised SAl
I “The big guy made a moveme1j like oingor
a gun.
He turned toward us and I shot.” SAt
ladvised that SA
I
1 secured his weapon.
S
on was entered into
evidence at the Phoenix Division.
A
tated he was wearing
his ballistic vest underneath his shirt. His badge was c).ipped
to the front of his shirt.
As
SA I

Within minutes of the shooting, the paramedics and
of the Douglas Police Department arrived at the scene.
Iwas taken by paramedics to the hospital where he underwent
F
surgery to remove the bullet. The Nurse t the University
Medical Center adviped it appeared F
[would survive his
wounds. I
Iwas also transported to the hospital as he
complained of a twisted ankle when he went to the ground during
the arrest. The Douglas Police Department processed the crime
shortly thereafter and took photographs of all SWAT members with
their credential numbers over their faces. This is a normal
procedure in Arizona as it protects the identity of police
off icers.
mh-

A search oft
Ivan revealed one loaded,
silver and black Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe pistol, serial number T
25084, with one magazine parrying .380 caliber ammunition. This
weapon was completely visible in the center console area. There
were seven rounds in the magazine and one round in the chamber.
Also found during the search was one silver Waffenfabrik Mauser
Pistol, 7.63 caliber, serial number 427299. It was located
inside a brown holster which was attached to a black canvas belt.
The black canvas belt contained two pouches. One pouch contained
ten 12 gauge shotgun shells and the other contained four strips
of 7.63mm ammunition. Each strip contained 10 rounds 9
f
ammunition.
It ws determined that neither I
Inor T
had firearms on their person during the arrest.
The weather was clear, temperature was 71.1 °F, wind
speed was 3.5mph traveling east, and visibility was 10 miles.
7

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 _________________
_______________

4,
(Re. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTEGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Dat

Att.n:

10/21/2004

AD Charlene B. Thornton
Extension 1837

Approved By: Thorntci$harlene B
Grant Rrt D
Drafted By:

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271464—D
Title:

b7C

SHOOTING INCIDENT
DALLAS DIVISION
04/21/2004

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 04/21/2004, involving Special
Agent (SA) L
I During a required firearms training
session, SIV1
linadvertently placed his left hand index finer
in front of the barrel of an MP5-10/A_prior to discharging the
weapon. As he fired the weapon, S21
Ishot off the first two
SIRG members recommended that
top_sections of his finger.
SA
be censured, suspended from duty for a period of three
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training for his
neglect in practicing routine firearms safety procedures.
-

Reference Electronic Communication of
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Daniel D. Dubree, dated
05/21/2004.

Administrative:

This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned.sbooting.

Details:

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 10/21/2004

Details of the Shooting tnoiden’t
On 04/21/2004, the Dallas Division was conducting a
firearms qua1ifcations. The
session was entering it’s third day which began with class
instruction and the order of firearms qualification coarses to be
shot that day. Classroom instruction was followed by a defensive
tactics class. At the conclusion of the class, Agents assembled
at the istol range and prepared for qualification.
required session of quarterly

Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI)I
Iprovided
a weapons familiarization overview of the MP5/MJ weapons as well
as the different function between the MP5 nine millimeter and
ten millimeter.
PFII
lalso provided a lecture regarding the
operation of the safety, magazine loading level, bolt action, and
sighting system. The participants completed the qualifying
course without incident.
Upon conclusion of the MP5-/M16 qu1ifipation course,
participants assembled in a group while PFI I
Iprovided an
overview of the next course of fire, which was a combat course.
The course consisted of two Agents firing simultaneously at.
separate targets.

Itook

a-positiop at he right barrel operating
SAl
the MP5 ten millimeter. As PFII
Igave a verbal command,
SAl
Ibegan positioning himself in a kneeling shooting position.
His right knee was on the ‘-“jid with the weapon placed against
his right shoulder. As. SAl
Iwas attempting to get the correct
shooting po1-i’r and sight picture, Instructor Marjorie I
I
observed SAl
Is left hand grasping the weapon’s forearm. He
then suddenly moved iiis left hand index finger over the end of
I
the weapon’s barrel and fired the weapon. Instructor I
recognized SAl
lerror before he fired the weapon, however,
she could not reach him before he discharged the weapon. The
round impacted SAl
lindex finger just above the first
knuckle. Agents on the scene administered immediate first aid
before the arrival of an ambulance.

SAl
at the hospital.

[
1

Ileft hand index finger was partially amputated
—

On 10/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Chief Inspector Robert D. Grant,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, chaired tlie meeting
with th fe,lltiwinn voting members of the SIRG in attendance;
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, O$DOJ;
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
i..rim1nai UiViSJ.Oh, OSDOJI
j, Assistant Section

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 _

___________

£
S

•

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 10/21/2004

Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Inv’estigative
Division; My Harrison, Section Chief, Applicant Processing
Section, Administrative Serv.ces Division;I
I
l-lrral Firearms Program, Tzining Division
Unit çh4f (11(’1
I, UC, CO-B, CounterintelJigence Division;
(TD);L
Firearms
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
marks Unit, Scientjic Analysis section, Iaboratory Division;
1
Too)
I Firearms Trining Unit, Training
SSAI
(TO);
SSAI
I Operational Skills Unit,
Division
-

-.

mns Train—i, ‘WI

‘

National Firearms Program, TO; and
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
e two non—voting members present were
gement Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; and
I intern, Leadership Development Institute,
Training and Development Division, Quantico.
d.ations of the SIRG

Observations and R

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
the intent to:
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actiors from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

[]

did not
SIRG members unanimously agreed that SA
noted
Members
procedures.
adhere to routine firearms safety
safety rules dictate that a firearm should be pointed down range
or in a safe direction at all times and Agents should always be
aware of potential dangers in any direct.j.on the weapon is
pointed. This discussion resulted in a recommendation that
Ibe censured, suspended from duty for a perioc of three
SAl
days, and receive documented remedial firearms training for his
neglect in practicing routine firearms safety procedures.

3

N

h6
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 ________m5155

14

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271464—D, 10/21/2004

LEAD(s):
Set Lead. 1:

(Action)

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE
AT OPR FO. DC
That SAl
Ibe censured and suspended from duty
for a period of three days for his failure to em by routine
firearms safety procedures. Additionally, SA
should receive
remedial firearms training regarding proper handling of firearms
and this training should be properly documented.
Set Lead. 2:

(Action)

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE
ATOPRFODC
That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, include in the SAC’s
copy of the leti-r qf suspension, the need for remedial firearms
training for SAl
Iregarding the proper handling of weapons.
Additionally, the letter should advise that this remedial
training should be properly documented and that a copy of the
documentation should be forwarded to the SIRG Chairman upon
completion.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I.
1
1
1
1

—

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Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Ms. Will, Room 11255B
Mr. Grant, Room 7837
Ms.
1)5003
Mr.
USDOJ
Mr.
Ms. Earrison, Room 6050
Mr. I
l Quantico
Mr. I
I Room 1B045
CAttention:__Mr.I________
Mr.
uantico
I, Quantico
Mx. I
Mrj
I Qua+i
(At’uenii.pn Mn
Ms4
foom 7326
Mr
I Room 7861

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FD.204 (Rrn.

UNITEt) STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTtCE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBIHQ/Inspection Division
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Inspectorj
06/01/2004

R.pottuf;

mi.

•

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}b7C

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT;
RICHMOND DIVISION
05/14/2004;
INSPECTION MATTER
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Chircir:

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ocrc Inspection Division

297—HQ-A1271903—D

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This Administrative Inquiry was initiated subsequent to a
shooting incident which occurred in Richmond Division,
Chesterfield County, Virginia, on 05/14/2004.

Syuop:

DETAILS:
The Richmond Division of the FBI tias conducting
an investigation into the drug trafficking activities of
Glen Joseph Sweeting. The investigation was initiated
after Glen Sweeting was identified through law enforcement
and source information as a major supplier of heroin in
the Richmond, Virginia, area. Probable cause was
cnii-t- rn-rRv nhtr t- 4
established and
ate Title
III coverage oni
Iwhich bçan

oni

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p

I

‘mis inte.uigence was in conjunction with information
received that a relative of Sweeting was recently arrested
with four kilos of cocaine and $400,000 in cash. In
addition, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA’ in Richmond
targeted several associates of Sweeting and held in
cibeyance several arrests so as not ta jeopardize the FBI
investigation. flue to these factors, the dciion was made
to arrest Sweeting, at which time verbal authorization was
obtained from Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)

This oownent contaiua neither reco dtjo, nor onoiusiøs of the PBX. tt is the prGerty of the FIX
and is loaned to your aqencyj it and its ontenta ..re not to be distrfl,uted outsid, your agency.

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lEastern District of Virginia, for violation of
TatJ.e 21, tJS.C., Section 841(a) (1) arid 846. Further, search
warrants were obtained for Sweeting’s residence and the
residences of three close associates.

It was anticipated Sweeting would be arrested following this
meeting, but upon returning to the Richmond area Sweeting stopped
at a residence in Powhatan, Virginia, described as an isolated
rural area.
Surveillance was initiated on the location.
However, information revealed the drug transaction with his
associate would not occur until the next day, May 14, 2004.
At
this point the surveillance was terminated. A plan was then
developed to reinitiate surveillance on Sweeting at the Powhatan
location at 6:00 a.m. on May 14, 2004, and included a plan to
conduct Sweeting’s arrest and related search warrants. A meeting
was scheduled for 5:00 a.m. on May 14, 2004, at the Chesterfield
County Police Department (CCPD) substation to brief participants
on the arrest and search plan.
During the briefing, the Case
Agent, Special Agent (SA)I
I who drafted the arrest
and search plan, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Donald W.
Thompson, Jr., Assistant Special Agent in Charae (ASAC) Robert
Gwaltney and Supervisor’ Special Agent (SSA)I
I all who
reviewed and approved the plan, briefed the participants
regarding the arrest of Sweating and his associate and subsequent
searches.
During the briefing, participants were advise4 Sweeting
should be considered 9rmed and Dangerous.” This statement was
based qn Title III intercepted conversations regarding Sweeti;cr’s
penchant for vio1ence For exantple,I
I

The urvci1lance of Sweeting at the Powbatan location
pproximately 6:00 aim. on May 14, 2004.
Due
to an interruption in ariel coverage, Sweeting’s whereabouts were

wac cstab1jsh€d

2

 I.
I
unknown.
Later that morning, Sweeting’s vehicle was located at
his residence on Queen Elizabeth Avenue, in Chesterfield County,
Virginia, and information from th Title III rvalecI

I
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‘

The initial operation plan was modified to conduct a
traffic stop and arrest Sweeting after he left his residence
prior to approaching the main road. The Special Weapons and
Tactics (SW1T) Team Leader gave specific and detailed
instructions to each SWAT team member. The plan included two
SWAT vehicles to sit parallel on each side of the road with a
ccP-acn unit between them. Another vehicle, occupied by a
SWAT team member, was to set up surveillance on Sweeting and
notify his leaving the residence. After Sweeting passed, this
vehicle was to pull behind Sweeting, and act as a blocking
vehicle, boxing him in, in order for an Agent to call Sweeting
out of his vehicle to be handcuffed and placed under arrest.
Once Sweeting’s vehicle approached the anticipated
arrest location, the CCPD marked unit pulled in front of the
vehicle occupied by Sweeting, activated its lights and siren, and
the two SWAT vehicles pulled along each side of Sweeting’s
vehicle and identified themselves as FBI and issued commands to
place Sweeting under arrest. Sweeting’s vehicle stopped
momentarily, then backed up at a high rate of speed and steered
around the blocking SWAT vehicle, turning 180 degrees, heading in
the direction of his residence. One SWAT vehicle overtook
Sweeting’s vehicle and attempted to cut him of f. Sweeting struck
this SWAT vehicle.
A second SWAT vehicle then engaged Sweeting’s
vehicle on the passenger side, causing both vehicles to become
coupled at the front wheel well. Although forward progress of
Sweeting’s vehicle was impeded, it continued to push forward.
Sweeting’s vehicle then attempted to backup, with the engine
revving and tires spinning.
Interviews of Agents determined if
Sweeting’s vehicle disengaged Agents and other law enforcement
personnel were in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or
death. Additionally, if Sweeting was successful in returning to
his residence, there was the possibility of him retrieving a
weapon and creating a hostage situation.

I
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The vehicle that overtook Sweeting’s vehicle was
occupied by 511
Iwho was located in the passenger
seat.
After sweeting’s vehicle rammed the vehicle occupied by SA
j and its forward progress impeded, Sweeting attempted to back
away.
SAl
Ihad the passengers’ window down and was looking
directly t Seeting, who was yelling and screaming In a state of
rage. SAI
Idid not know what Sweeting was saying, but he CSA

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I was yelling at Sweeting to stop the car. During_this time
the other SWAT team SAs exited their vehicles. SAl
lobserved
another SWAT vehicle alongside the passenger’s_side of Sweeting’s
vehicle and the marked CCPD unit behind. SN
jalso observed
SWAT team members on foot to the left and right of the vehicle he
occpjed. SAj
Ibeijeved Sweeting was attempting to back into
the marked unit to create_enough space arid gain momentum and
continue his escape. SAl
Ibelieved Sweeting’s vehicle was no
longer contained and placed a direct threat of imminent danger of
serious bodily injury or death to himself, the SWAT team members
on foot, and other law enforcement personnel iakinq cover behind
their respective vehicles. At that moment SAl
Ifired one
round from his MP-5, striking Sweating in the chest. Immediately
afterwards, he I
I observed Sweeting lean forward and put the
vehicle in the park gear at which time it stopped moving. The
subject looked at SAl
I and SAl
Icontinued issuing commands
to “let me see your hands,” while continuing to focus his weapon
on te subject. As a SWAT team member approached the vehicle, SA
I
I observed Sweeting convulse and the engine began revving
again. The SWAT team member opened the door, turned the vehicle
off and yelled for a medic. Sweeting was pronounced dead at the
scene.
During the course of the drug investigation of
Sweating, the Richmond Division emDloved Title III I
U-

While the audio does not confirm events in detail, it
does support the facts that Sweeting was initially stopped by the
arrest team, attempted to evade his arrest with the aid of his
vehicle, and did not comply with the instructions of the arrest
teams at the initial stop and subsequent second vehicle stop.

I statement was the fact he was
Noted in SA I
wearing full tactical equipment, to include green jumpsuit,
Bureau issued body armor, ballistic helmet, and safety glasses
rhr h
hi
and was
h1 ii
Wannn

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 _______________________________________________________________________

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297—HQ—A1271903D

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lb 3

 ____

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FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 01’ JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Rciotof:

I

nc
October 21, 2004

I

Office:

Inspection Division

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—

Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOT IJG INCIDENT
RICHMONb DIVISION
MJY 31, 2004

Characict

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shooting incident occurred while an FBI Ageat and a Stafford
County, Virginia Deputy Sheriff attempted to arrest Kelvin Jerrell
Clark based on State of Tennessee arrest warrant charging Jerrell
with bank robbery.
Jerrell was also suspected of involvement in a

ID#

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297RQ—A—1271903—D

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homicide. The Medical Ezaminer has determined that Clark died of a
self—inflicted gunshot wound.
DEThXLS:

The Richmond Divis ion’ s involvement in this matter was based on a
lead from Memphis, dated 05/26/2004 in which Memphis described Clark’s
involvement in a Memphis bank robbery and possible involvement in a
homicide.
Clark was described as armed and dangerous--with whereabouts
unknown.
Richmond’s lead wa to locate a r1-n hbipk Mazda vehicle

and conduct a consent search. Cas Agnt
I shared this
information wit the SCSb attempting to J.oct the vehicle and locate
Clark. I
had prepared and distributed a( rfted flier of Clark.
On 05/31/2004, at approximately 4:00 pm SAl
Ilearned that
the Stafford County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO) haçi stQpped that-Mazda
vehicle and were”et up” at an apartment comDlex where Clprk w
believed to b located. I

çcj was to arrest Clark as he iett the building.
Clark stated
that he had seen police cars in the area and was not leaving.

-.ne

Tiie doinct contajno neither racoamendations nor cuci.usions of the . Th is the property of
and is 3.oand to your agency, it end its contents ere not to be 4istutsd ontsde your agency.

Par

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_____

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At 5:07 pm SAl
Jcontacted the Richmond Division and
reported a arricaded subject situation, with noJ.struction to contact
SSRII
1 or any Division management. SAl
Ihad also confimed that
there were no federal warrants for Clark, just a state arrest warrant.
SAl
land advised SAl
Icontacted SAl
li-n nn i-t
the apartment where Clark was located and meet with SCSO personnel.
SA
I
was later advised that SAl
Iwas in his vehicle with SCSO Deputy[
watching another vehicle associated with Clark.__Marked police cars were removed
from the area to allow SAl
imaintain surveillance in
land Deputyl
S
p urked Bucar. scso intended to place a second ruse telephone
3
call to lure Clark out of the oaxtment and arrest hjm vi a tac1’
1 rationt
7
of the SWAT Team.
While in SAl
car, Deputyl
land SAl
the various situations in which to confront Clark, if Clar.k appeared.

I

At approximately 5:24 pu, prior to a ru i-PlPr1one ca.l, Clark
left the apartment building and entered the vehicle. SAl_______ drove his Bucar
the rear of Clark, blocking him in as cars were parked to each side of Clark.

Ito
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IAl

I

SAl
I exited .the driver side and Deputy
lexited the
passetsj, rushing to_Clark’s car. SAl
I and Déput71
lannounced
thir i
uty I
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Iwas able to see a gun in Clark’ s nand and warned
SAI
SAl
Ian opened the driver door of Clark’s car, ordering him to
how nis flarks. Clark continued to lift his right hand still holding a gun.
I fired one round hitting Clark in the left arm which continued through
and penetrated Clarks’ s upper torso. Accorin to thft Medical Examiner Report,
Clark, just be.fore, or simultaneous with SAl
bot shot himself throigh
he head.
The round exited through the v?hlcie root and was not recovered. The
ause of .death was determined to be Clark’s self-inflicted gun shot wound.

I

SCSO and FBI ERT responded to the scene. SCSO deferred
investigation to the FBI. A neighborhobd canvass was conducted and one
eyewitnss was identified. This witness isl
I whose
tatement is included in this report. The only other eyewitness is Deputy
ihose statements are also included. SA
Leclined to give a voluntay.
• tatement.
FBr ERT collected evidence and proce,ssed the crime, scene. SCSO
ketches were provided to the FBI and included in this report.

I
I
‘I,
I
14

ii

I

 FD.204 (Rtv. 124.95)

UNI’ED STATES DEPARTMENT O JUSTICE
Federal Bureau ot’Ini’estigatlon

Copy to:

o Los Angeles

ASAC HERBERT M. BROWN
08/06/2004

iot ot
Date

297-HQ--C1271741-D
GGF-LA-238202
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY;
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
LOS ,NGELES DIVISION;
JUNE 2, 2004

-

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

synopsis:

I

l agent (SA)I
4
I
qn June 2, 2004, Spr
I
the
Los
to
credential
number’
assigned
I
Angele Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
r1 WT
(FBI), was on duty in his capacity as a Tç
I
SWAT team member. He and his partner, SAl
credential number I
I also assigned to the Los
Angeles FBI SWAT team, were together in a vehicle
surveilling a bank in Buepa Park. California. On this
here involved in a
date both SAl
land SAl
shooting incident at this location. The background of
this case is as follows:

The Los Angeles FBI bank robbery squad was
conducting an investigation, involving a group of
individuals associated with several takeover bank and
business armed robberies. The file number of this oase
is 192C-IA-237071.
A Title III was obtained to monitor

Based on this information, the bank robbery squad
solicited the assistance of the Los Angeles FBI SWAT
tam. The SWAT tear was being asked to intervene and
stop the subjects should they make an attempt to rob

This d.ocrtrant contains neither rsaoendtons nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the
FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

b3

 a

297 -HQ--C12 71741-D

the institution.
The assistance of the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPO) was also obtained. They were being asked to
surveil the main subj eats who were living in the area of South
Centrai Los Angeles. The surveillance of the main subjects by
the LAPD and the bank itself by the FBI SWAT team was
conducted on May 18th, 19th, 21st, 26th, and 28th. Due to a
variety of reasons to inc1ud the robbery crew not being able
to get a vehicle and a weapon(s), no attempt was made to rob
the bank.

On June 2, 2004 at approximately 7:30 am the basc
robbery squad once again asked for the assistance of the FBI
SWAT team and the LAPD. A briefing was conducted at a park
located near the Los Angeles National Bank in Buena Park.
Photographs of some potential subjects and an update as to
what was being stated on the Title XXI was given. It was
reiterated from an earlier briefing that the subjects had
“scouted” out the bank previously. The SWAT team agents were
told the subjects were still attempting to obtain weapons to
rob the bank as wel]. as getting vehicles to use. It was
mentioned the subjects had possibly gotten a .357 Magnum
handgun but were looking for ammunition. The operational plan
for the FBI SWAT team was to set up a perimeter around the
bank. Their primary mission for the SWAT team was to
intervene and prevent any robbery of the bank. Should they be
unable to stop the robbery from taking place, the SWAT team
was to conduct a felony stop on the subject vehicle following
the robberr. They were to then arrest the subjects involved
in the robbery.
The FBI deadly force policy was also
reiterated during this briefing.

I

The different SWAT team members were given their
land SAl_______
assiqntnents on this date. SAl
Iwere working in their capacity as Los Angeles FBI SWAT
j was to. be the dri,rer of oneS of three
team members. BA I
vehicles to be positioned to the north of the bank’s north
side parking lot.
BA I
I was to be in one of the other
I Should the subjects
vehicles also assignedwith SA I
actually rob the bank these SWAT team members were to either
bloôk the subject vehicle from escaping or be the arrest team.
This would depend on the direction the subject vehicle were to
leave the scene.
In addition, the SWAT team had a stationary
white van parked in the north bank parking lot to observe the
inside of the bank should the subj eats rob the institution.
Once BA I
land SAl
I were in their assigned
position, another FBI SWAT tean member arrived. At
2

7C

 297-HQ-C1271741-D

approximately 10:30 am SAl
phis agent to take
I white Ford Explorer
his location while he moved to SA
and took a position in the rear seat. The two of them
discussed what they would do should the robbery take place.
;
Both agents were in possession of an FBI issued M-4 Carbine c
rifle. Their vehicle was to be third in line of the three
SWAT vehicles assigned to block the subject’s vehicle or
arrest the subjects. The other FBI SWAT vel4cles were being
driven by SAl
I and SA I
I respectively.
The •agents on site were monitoring the FBI SWAT Tactical
Operations Command (TOC) which was providing updates via the
tactical radio.
The TOC provided both information from the
Title III conversations as well as the LAPD who were
physically monitoring the actions of the main subjects.
At approximately 11:00 am the TOC advised the
subjects had obtained a weapon and ammunition (possibly one
bullet). Additional information relayed was that the subjects
had all the people and vehicles they felt they needed to
commit the robbery.
Sometime around 11:30 am the TOC stated
the LAPO had observed the subj ecta leaving South Central Los
23ngeles headed in the general diretion of where the bank was
located. The subject’ a bad a total of three vehicles and the
LAPO was going to surveil them.
The plan agreed upon by the FBI and the LAPD was for
the police department to suxveil the subjects until they were
to get close to the vicinity of the bank.
At this point the
surveillance was to be turned over to the FBI surveillance
teams and FBI SWAT vehicles. When the subject vehicles
reached the Knott Avenue exit from the 91 Freeway eastbound,
the LAVD relinquished the surveillance and the FBI took over.
Due to the number of sub:ject vehicles involved, their location
on the road, and the positioning of the FBI vehicles, a felony
vehicle atop could not safely be conducted.
As FBI vehicles were making efforts to try and
reposition themselves for vehicle stops, one of the subject
vehicles drove past the south side of the bank on Orangethorpe
Avenue traveling westbound. It then turned north on Knott
Avenue, drove a few yards, and then made an immediate turn.
into the west exit of the bank’s north parking lot. This
vehicle was a grey .colored Chevrolet Astro van.
The FBI SWAT vehicle which’had been placed in the
lot advised they had a clear visual on the actions of the
subj ect van.
They relayed via the radio that there were four
3

 2 97—HQ-Cl27l74l-

black males in the subject van. They stated the van had
backed into a parking slot on the north side of the bank near
an entrance. The SWAT agents also advised they had observed a
silver colored revolver in the hand of one of the subjects
when he exited the vehicle.
The SWAT agents in the parking lot then observed two
of the subjects enter the bank, followed soon after by one
other individual. The agents were able. to see some of the
actions of the robbers while inside the bank. One of the
subj ect s stayed with the subj eat van during the robbery.

szl

SA I
6
and
followed the other two FBI
SWAT vehicles which had been positioned on the north side of
the bank behind an adjacent building. The three vehicles
drove onto iott Avenue and waited behind the building and out
of the sight of the subject van. It was decided once the
agents in the lot advised the subjects had finished the
robbery and that the van was moving, the three SWAT vehicles
would enter the west exit of the bank lot to block it from
escaping.

I

Th SWAT agents assigned to the parking lot stated
they observed the subjects enter the van. They then reported
the van was traveling westbound towards the west exit of the
bank lot. The three SWAT vehicles drove onto the lot in an
attempt to Lock the sub:) eat van from escaping. The subject
van, upon seeing the SWAT vehicles with their emergency lights
activated, began driving at a high rate of speed in tie
direction of the SPAT vehicles. The first SWAT vehicle being
driven by SAl
I tried to swerve in front of the subj eat van
as it too swerved to avoid being stopped. The two vehicles
collided causing damage to the left front of both vehicles.
This collision caused the subject van to bounce sideways and
strike a parked vehicle in the bank lot. In addition, the
sudden stopping by the first SWAT vehicle caused the second
SWAT vehicle to run into the rear of the first one.
The subject van was able to squeeze between the
first SWAT vehicle an4 the parked vehicle which had just been
struck. The subject van continued forward and began driving
in a northwesterly direction which caused it to drive over a
short wall which was adjacent to an alley which ran behind the
bank’s parking lot. After entering the alley it then struck a
small pickup which had been parked in the alley. The subject
van still continued westbound and struck yet another parked
pickup which had been facing north on Knott Avenue.
4

 _______

297-HQ-C1271741-D

As the subj ect van was attetqntl-rza to escape, BA
a pursuit of the van. SAl
began
I also drove over
I
the short wall and began to follow the subject vehicle. He
observed the subject van strike the two vehicles and then
cdntinue westbound where it collided with a median in the
center of Knott Avenue. The subject van cleared the median
and theii make an immediate turn to the right causing it to
land in the nunber one lane facing north in the southbound
lane. The vehicle apparently sustained enough damage to cause
it to come to a stop after traveling only a few more yards.

I

h

L

I who had been making an effort to catch up
SAl
to the subj act van, was now driving north in the northbound
lanes on Knott Avenue. He planned. on trying to parallel the
vehicle i it cqntinued northbound when it came to a sudden
I attempted to stop immediately but ended up
stop. SA I
just a few feet south of and. almost parallel with the subject
vehicle. The Knott Avenue median was between them.

I

I

I vehicle came to a stop he was
As soon as SA I
able to observe three of the occupants of the van exiting
their vehicle. He saw the passenger in the front Beat begin
to exit, but he could not see his hands. The interior of the
vehicle was clerk and there was a tree which caused enough
SA.
to make it even more difficult to see clearly.
I knew the subjects had assaulted other agents with their
vehicle in an effort to escape. He also knew they had just
ladvised he was in fear
robbed a bank -using a weapon. BA I
for tie life of his partner and himself due to the
circumstances. The ubect continued to exit the van with his
Ivjew. It was at this point BA
hnd hidden from SAl
I shooting through the open window of his vehicle, fired
two rounds in the direction of the subject. He stated just
before he fired he believed he heard other shot(s) but he was
not certain if they were coming.. from the subj eat van or
another location, He believes both of his rounds fniased the
subject and struck the right front of the subj eat’ a van
-

J while sitting in the rear seat of the
SAl
SWAT vehicle, observed the sliding door on the passenger side
Ibrought their vehicle
of the subject van opening as SAl
to a stop. He believed he saw something in one of the hands
of a. subject -who was exiting the van. The item appeared to be
a weapon as it was the approximate size and shape of a
knew the subjects in the van had just
handgun. SA
committed a bank robbery, had assaulted his fellow SWAT team
members with their vehicle, and bad used a weapon during the
5

6

 297-HQ-C1271741-j)

bank robbery.
They appeared to be willing to commit more
violent acts in an effort to escp’oe.. Upon 8eeing what he
believed to be a handgun, SAl
I
Ifelt the life of SAl
and h5rmself were in itmuinent danger so he made the decision to
shoot at the subject. He fired one round through the SWAT
vehicleTs open window and in the direct4on of the subject who
began falling forward just as SAl
Iwas pulling the
trigger of his weapon. The round mised the 9ubj eat and
impacted on the right front fender of the subj cot vhiale. He
did not fire again because after the first round SAl________
coula not determine if the subject still had the weapon. e
also could not see the subject clearly enough to take a safe
shot. Both agents stated the reason they had fired was
because they did not believe they had any other option other
than that of deadly force.

All four of the subjects had fled on foot from their
van and were captured within a few moments by the FBI SWAT
team. A .357 Magnum revolver was located behind the drivers
seat of the sijtbject’s van on the floor. The Buena Park Police
Department respondec to the scene and assisted in perimeter
control. Detective I
I was the on scene commander
for the police department.
The Los Angeles FBI Agent Involved Shooting (AI)
team responded to thç locat4on to conduct the shooting
investigation. Det.I
Ifrom the Buena Park Police
Department was consu1te and agreed to let the FBI conduct
both the bank robbery and shooting investigation. The
department offered their assistance throughout the incident.
The LAPD was present but did not conduct any investigation at
the scene.
The Los Angeles FBI Evidence Response Team also
responded arid conducted the entire crime scene examination.
This included evidence for both the baxik robbery and the
shooting incident. The Los Angeles FBI photography lab, along
with the assistance of the Los Angeles FBI aviation unit from
SOG, took aerial photographs of the crime scene. Interviews
of the victims and witnesses were conducted by Los Angeles FBI
agents.
*

FBI agents conducted an examination of the area to
determine where the rounds that had been fired struck. Two of
them were found to have impacted the subj eat’ s van (on the
front fender and the mirror) and the third struck a parking
sign on the west side of Knott Avenue. Al]. three casings were

6

 ________

297-RQ-C1271741-fl

.

located iii the SWAT Ford cplorer driven by SAF
I No area
hospitals reported any type of injuries being sustained by the
public following the shooting incident.
The FBI EAP responded to the location along with the
Los Angeles Chief Division Counsel. ‘Tone of the subjects were
injured and no FBI agents were harmed during the shootix:ig
incident. Al]. of the parked vehicles struck by the subject
van were unoccupied.
The sübj eats involved in this tiiatter are all
currently in custody. Their weapon was retained as evidence
by the Los Angeles FBI Bank Robbery squad. The Chevrolet
Astro van was determined to have been stolen. The vehiole was
transported from the crime scene and later procesed by
members of the Los Angeles ERT at the Los Angeles FBI
facility.
Following the incident, Assistant United States
land Orange County District Attorney
i were iotp notified. After obtaining the basic
-facts and circumstances concerning the shooting incident, both
the U. S. Attorney’ s office and the Orange County District
declined any cr±minal prosecution of SAI
land SA.

Attorney I

-

F-

7

1b6
D1C

 ______

(Rev. QI-3I2OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attzx;

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

10/27/2005

A) Charlene B. Thor

lExtension 4-1837

pproved By: rtz Kimberly K
Drafted By:

Ilrr

Case ID #: 297HQ—A1271789-D
C

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
NORFOLK DIVISION

06/17/2004
Synopsis:

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 06/17/2004, involving Special
Agent (SA)L
I During the execution of an arrest
warrant, SM
‘fired six rounds from his Bureau—issued
Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol killing two individuals
attempting to elude arrest. SIRG members recommended that no
las a result of
administrative action be taken against SAl
his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference report of former Inspector
dated 07/29/2004.

I

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 06/03/2004, a Task Force Officer (TFO) assigned to
the Norfolk Division’s Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Task
Force advised that a Detective from the Virginia Beach Police

Department (VBPD) requested the FBI’s assistance in locating and
Baxter was
arresting violent fugitive Calvin Alexander Baxter.
for
warrants
with
outstanding
member
a
gang
as
violent
described
murder and other crimes of violence as well as firearms
violations.
A preliminary investigation revealed Baxter’s extensive
criminal history and his propensity for violence. Although not
affiliated with the national Bloods gang, Baxter was a member of
a neighborhood gang identifying themselves as the Bloods.
Members of the local gang wore red to identify themselves and
were involved in an ongoing gang war with another neighborhood

 ________

To:
Re:

Inspection
Frbm: Inspection
297—RQ--A1271789—D, 10/27/2005

gang.
TheVBPD was in possession of eleven outstanding warrants
for Baxter’s arrest for crimes of violence, including discharging
a weapon in an occupied building. A wanted poster disseminated
fo his arrest described Baxter as angry, violent, and probably
armed. Additionally, the VBPD advised-Baxter used a shotgun to
shoot at a rival gang member in a busy commercial area resulting
in return gun fire.
No injuries were incurred as a result of the
gun battle; however, vehicles belonging to bystanders were hit.
Information was obtained by the VBPD that Baxter traded crack
cocaine for weapons and places to stay, as well as using cellular
telephones belonging to others. Investigation verified Baxter
was a drug trafficker, was wanted by the police, and was aware
that he had violent enemies.
Imet with his
On 06/16/2004,
supervisor, SSAI___________________ tn tinde him on the
)I
ladvised SSAI
I
investigation regarding Baxter.
of his plans to locate, apd if possible,_arrest Baxter on
ihad enough
06/17/2004.
lensured si
SSAI
experienced SAS and officers to effect the arrest, a marked unit
would be on scene to assist, and that everyone would be present
at j hrfjg prior to_attempting to locate and arrest Baxter.
Ito continue with his plans to locate
SSN
I told SA I
and arrest Baxter and to keep him advised of any developments in
ladvised the
the investigation. After the meeting, SSAI
ASAC of the plan to attempt to locate and arrest Baxter on the
following day.
Based on office policy, no written Operations Plan was
prepared for this incident. The Norfolk Division did not require
a written Operations Plan for attempts to locate and arrest
fugitives where the facts and circumstances were not sufficiently
defined and were likely to quickly and substantially change
Instead of a written
during at1emots to locate the fugitive.
and experienced
trained
sufficient
lensured
plan, SSAI
personnel were present, as well as the presence of a marked unit
to provide maximum visibility and assistance if needed, and that
the personnel met and orally reviewed general plans and tactics
before leaving the off ice.
h7c
with,
Imet
SAl
6:30
a.m.,
On 06/17/2004, at
briefed, and discussed the investigation and the plans to locate
I. as
landi
and arrest Baxter with SAsI
well as detectives from the Chesapeake Police Department (CPD)
and the VBPD.
An agreement was made that a detective from the
CPD would arrange for a uniformed patrol officer and patrol car
to meet them for a briefing after they assumed positions around
Baxter’s location.
iwould direct the
All partlcLpnt agreed SAl
operation and the first step would be to gather and set up on the

2

 _________‘advised

To:
Re:

I
I
p

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271789—D, 10/27/2005

address ofBaxter’s location to observe the vehicles and activity
at the addrss and brief the uniformed patrol officer. SAs
Iwere asaned to be in one FBI vehicle, SA
landi
Iwere assigned
land CPD Detective I
to a second FBI vehicle, and VBPD Detective I
Iwere assigned to be in an
and Officer I
unmarked VBPD vehicle. They agreed that after everyone was set
up and the patrol officer was briefed, the VBPD participahts
would attempt to contact their source to make a pretext telephone
call to a cellular number listed on the subject apartment records
for the individual renting the apartment to determine her
location as well as the location of Baxter. If the plan was
unsuccessful, a second option was to have Officer White make a
pretext call to the apartment renter’s cell phone. The third
option discussed was the possibility of approaching the apartment
and doing a knock and talk; however, participants were concerned
about the risk of Baxter learning about his impending arrest if
he was not inside the residence at the time of the knock.and
A fiflal decision was made that the participants would
talk.
decide whether to approach the apartment, conduct interviews,
walk away and return on another day, or effect an arrest, based
on their surveillance observations.
all participants if it was
determined Baxter was inside the apartment, he would direct team
members on how to effect the entry and arrest. The Norfolk
Division standard operations required a perimeter team to secure
the residence and an arrest team to knock arid announce and then
1
enter and clear the residence. During the briefiVrT. I
land
advised i i-hv hçi to approach the apartment, SAl
Detective
I would cover the rear of the apartment, and he
would lead the approach and/or entry and arrest team from the
front of the apartment.
All of the participants departed the Norfolk FBI office
together at approximately 7:10 a..m., notifying the office by
radio of their departure to the Fireside Road location. They
arrived at the location appromtPlv tenL minutqs later and were
I set up in the
in position by 7:30 a.m. SAsI
I and
parking lot of another apartment complex across the street where
land
they coul view nrtment #2 at Fireside Road. SAl
Detective I
I set up farther down the Street in another
parking lot with a view of he rear of the aparttent building of
I set up in
I and Officerl
apartment #2, and Detectivel
the parking lot immediately behind the building where the subject
apartment was located.
SA I
I established radio communication with the
other units, determined their locations, determined they had a
view of the rear of the subjcct apartment, nd skod the
detectives to call for the marked unit and reach out for the
3

I

ID7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From.:
297—HQ—A1271789—D, 10/27/2005

-

The detectives completed the
were waiting for the source

source to make the pretext call.
instructions issued by SAl
to call back.

Approximately fifteen minutes after the SAs and_local
I
law enforcement personnel arrived on the scene, Officerl
I arrived in a patrol car and cqntacted Detective
I As Officer’
Imade contact, SAs
Jard SAl
hncl
I observed a gr4y Jeep Cherokee pull into the
parking space in front of apartment #2 and a light skinned male
who appeared to be in is 40s çxit the vehicle and enter the
Iradioed, “clear the net, we’ve got
subject apartment.
SAl
a gray Jeep pulled in front of number 2. The individual in the
iwas
gray Jeep has entered apartment #2.” Officerl
I to
directed to meet with Detectiver
I and Officerl
receive further_informtion and to view a photograph_of Bxter.
I was being briefed, SA
I andi
While Officer
I
saw the same individual exit the apartment accornpanied by a
1 and’
second individual who matched the physical height, weioht
Ihe
general description of Baxter. SAl
Itold SI
Iconfirmed the
believed the second person was Baxter. SAl
I via
individual matched the description of Baxter and SAl
radio, advised other units. “we’ve got subjects coming out, but
they’re movna-” SAl
Iresponded, “let me know what you
radioed, “to move in.”
want to do,I
I and SA
Immediately drove across the
landi
SA
street and into the parking lot where the Jeep was parked, moving
into a position at an angle to the rear of the Jeep, blocking its
exit, As they approached the vehicle and got a better look at
the second black male, both of the Agents were sure it was
Baxter. As the Agents came to a stop, both individuals were
seated inside the Jeep with the light skinned male positioned in
the driver’s seat and the individual believe4 to be Baxter
landi
I
positioned in the front passenger seat. SAsI
exited their vehicle, with guns drawn, shouting FBI and told the
als in the Jeep, “don’t move, get out of the car.” SA
1
individi
Iaproached the driver’s siçie of the subject vehicle and
I
SA I
bpproached the passenger’s side.
SAl
Ipulled into the
land Detective!
parking lot bo the rear passenger side of the other Bureau
lobserved an
Detectivel
vehicle, and exited the vehicle.
individual, believed to be Baxter, in the passenger seat of the
‘Jeep, attempting to flee out of the driver’s side of the vehicle.
houted, “Police, let me see your hands.” He
Detectivel
approachea cne criver’s side of the Jeep with his gun drawn to
prevent Baxter from escaping. SAl
I exited his vehicle and
approached the .passenger side of t 7eo. hi1e identifying
Iunsuccessfully
SAl
himolf ond shouting commands.
attempted to open the passenger side door of the vehicle.

4

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Frm: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271789—D, 10/27/2005

I

I

Officer
ed into the parking lot behind sAl
1
Ipul)
vehicle, observed SA I
Ipulling on the passenger door
handle in an attempt to open the passenger door, exited his
vhic1ø with his weapon drawn, and proceeded to assist Detective
I
Detective’
Ion the dFiver’s side of the Jeep.
I drove to the side of the building and Detective
and Officer I
I
jrano the front to assist the SAs and off iers while
Officerl
Icovered the rear of the apartment.

It appeared Baxter, who was in the front passenger
seat, initially attempted to c;awl out of the open driver’s side
window of the Jeep.
I with his gun drawn,
Detectivel
grabbed Baxter with his free hand in ap attemnt to pull him from
land appeared to
the vehicle. Baxter grabbed Detectivd
tmr1 i pull him into the Jeep.
As Baxter and Detective
holstered
Istruggled through the window, Officer I
his weapon and drew his pepper spray, spraying both sub]ects.
Iwas able
When Officer!
Isprayed Baxter, Detective I
to holster h.s weapon and continued to struggle_with Baxter with
Ifarther inside
Baxter then pulled Detectivel
both hands.
the Jeep’s window.
Throughout the approach and confrontation with Baxter,
Agents and police officers continuously issued commands which
were ignored by both subjects. At some point during the
incident, the Jeep’s engine was started and the Jeep moved
forward.
In order to prevent the subject vehicle from backing
up, SAl
Ireturned to his vehicle and moved into a position
immediately behind the Jeep. The Jeep moved forward, onto and
over the sidewalk, with only the rear wheels in the parking lot.
Although the subject vehicle was blocked from the rear, there was
enough room remaining for the vehicle to move forward, to the
right, or to the left, and drive away. Law enforcement personnel
heard the Jeep’s engine revving, the transmission being engaged,
the tires spinnjnr!- ni pbserved the Jeep moving and/or rocking,
while Detectivel
Iwas still partially inside the vehicle
cipants feared the Jeep
1
engaged in a stfuggi.e wx’ch Baxtqr.__Parti
Istili hanging inside the
would drive away with Detective’
driver’s window and also were aware law enforcement personnel
were in the path of the vehicle.
Icontinuing to
lobserved Detective’
SAl
struggle with Baxter and heard someone yell gun, reaching for a
gun, or something about a gun. SAl________ hearing the comments
about a gun, immediately yelled out to watch for crossfire. A
second after yelling to watch for crossfire, and as Detective
I
Iheard shots
I still wrestled with Baxter, SAt
fired.
Isprayed Daxter a second time with
As Officer I
pepper spray, he heard shots fired, the passenger side window of

5

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271789—D, 10/27/2005

the subject_vehicle shattered, and something hit him in the face.
Itook cover, immediately notified his department,
and requested medical assistance. Additionally, as the shots
were fired, Detectivel
Iwas able to free himself from
Baxter. As Detectivel
Ibacked away from the Jeep, he
observed S11
weapon.
his
lirinc
Off icer

b7C

Fnsuring al]. law enforcement personnel were safe,
participants determined Baxter and the driver of the Jeep were
I
injured and not moving.
It was also detern4ned tht SAl
I who had prior
was the only person who fired a weapon. SAl
training as an Emergency Medical Technician, rendered initial.
care to the subjects prior to the arrival of the Chesapeake
Emergency Medical Services. Both subjects died as a result of
their wounds.
Although no weapons were located inside the subject
vehicle, a security sweep was conducted in apartment #2 where a
bag of crack cocaine in a clear plastic bag was located. During
the subsequent execution of a search warrant of the apartnent,
cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and a nine millimeter Norinco T54
pistol were seized.
The medical examiner advised one bullet struck the
driver of the vehicle in the chest and two bullets struck Baxter
from behind, with one bullet lodging in his hip and the other
lodging in his chest. A fourth bullet was located inside
Baxter’s clothing.
I Commonwealth’s
On 02/28/2005,1
Attorney, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney, City of
Chesapeake, provided a declination of prosecution by the
Commonwealth of Virginia. On 05/06/2005, a declination of
prosecution was received from the United Sta’es Deoartmnt of
jactions
Justice, Civil Rights Division, regarding SAl
in this shooting incident.
On 07/05/2005, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)
Andrew R. Bland III, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and
was a non-voting member. The following voting members of the
SIRG were in attendance: Chief Inspector Kimberly K. Hertz
Office of Inspêctons, Inspection Division;I_______________
Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section,
USDOJ; I
I Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
Criininai Ulvislon., US001; Charles J. Cunningham, Section Chief
(SC), Transnational Criminal Enterprise Section, Criminal
I
igative Division; Acting Unit Chief (UC)l
1
Invest
L Firearms TrpjriinQ Unit, Training and Development D.vision
(TDD); tiC I
L SWAT Operations Unit, Critical
Incident Response Group; Uci
I, CD—6,
6

-j

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297HQA1271i89Dr 10/27/2005

I National
Counterintelligence Division; UC I
I
Firearms Program, TDD; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
jlnvestigative Law Unit, Office of the General
I
Coq.nsel (OGC); SSM
I, Program Manager,
Operational Skills Unit, TDD; SSA 1
I Firearms
intifi nalysis section, Laboratopv Divisiop;
Toolmar}çs tinit.
and SSAI
I Washington ‘ield Office. I
I
Rettbérg, Management Program Analyst, Inspection Management unit,
Office of Inspections., Inspection Division, a non-voting member,
was also in attendance.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions .from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG Chairman voiced concern with the number of law
enforcement officers on the scene and the fact that only one
individual decided the use of deadly force was required.
After a lengthy discussion of this shooting incident, and
although several members voiced concerns that SAl
Imay not
have been prudent in the firing of his weapon, the SIRG
unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force by SAl_______
was justified and in conformance with the FBI
s deadly force
t
policy. This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
las a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident.
Specific concerns addressed by the S!RG members
pertained to the possibility of a crossfire situation, noting the
fact that the Agent was positioned in front of the vehicle and
fired shots which put other law enforcement personnel in danger.
In response to the crossfire issue, the Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit representative opined that the
shootings were safe and reasonable when weighing the totality of
the incident.
The CID representative advised that although the
shooter may have been out of position, he viewed the struggle
inside the vehicle as a life and death situation and took
appEopriate action.
The WFO representative opined that the law
enforcement officers on the scene were clearly marked with
insignia, both subjects were clearly non—compliant, and further
noted that after the first shot was fired Baxter continued to be
non—compliant with law enforcement commands. AJI of these
actions resulted in the use of deadly force by SA

7

h6

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297—NQ—A127r789—o, lO/27/20Q5

Additionally, one TDD member noted that two of. the
officers holstered their weapons and if the situation called for
them to employ deadly force, they may not have had time to gain
access to their weapons.
The second issue discussed related to tactical
irregularities in the pre-planning of the incident. Although one
member believed the operation was adequately covered in a
briefing, the majority of the SIRG noted that absent exigent
circuitistances and in conformance with policy, participants had
time to write a basic Operations Plan and conduct comprehensive
briefings.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that this
operation should have involved the SWAT team, particularly noting
Baxter’s propensity for violence and the essib1e Armed and
Dangerous situation dictated the use of SWAT personnel. This
matter will be discussed with the Special Agent in Charge of the
Norfolk Division.

S

 to
________uar
__________jSDOJ

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From:
297—FIQ—A1271789—D, 10/27/2005

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SA
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
1
1

Nr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Clovd. RoOrp 7825
Ms.
(Attention:
Mr.[
Mr.___________
I
Ms. Mertz, Room ‘1837
1
Mr. Manning, Room 1B045
1
(Attention:
Mr. Giigenti)
Mr. Rooney, Room 38-67
I
(Attention:
Mr. I
I. Quantjco
1
Mr. I
I
(Attention:
Mr. I
Mr. [
1
Quantico
I
1
Mr.
uantico
1-Mr.
I, WFO
Mr.
1
Quantico
Mr.
1
(At ention:
I
Mi.I
Ms.
1
]oom 7326
Mrs
1
I Room 7861
-

-

-

—

I

-

-

-

—

—

—

—

—

—
-

4+

9

 4

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERALI BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Inspection
Training
International Operations

prom:

•

•

..

Da:

IOUTINE

Inspection
Contact:

Attn:

I

10/28/2004

AD Charlene B. Thornton
AD Jares A. Trinka
SAC Thomas V. E’uentes

I

Approved By:
Thontoar-1eneB.
-Grant RNrt D
Drafted By:

Ilrr

I

Case ID

It: 297—BQ—A1272704-D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
BUENOS AIRES LEGAL ATTACHE
03/21/2004

Synopsis:
The shooting Inàident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurrefi on O3I2l/2OO4 involving_former
I AIaATI
I
Assistant Legal Attache (ALAT)I
discharged one round from his Glock Model 27, .40 caliber pistol
SIRG
t two subjects fleeing the scene of an attempted räbbery.
members recommended that no administrative action be taken
against ALATI
‘as a result of hisinvolvement in this
shooting incident
-

Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of
Legal Attache Agustine Rodriguez, dated 04/19/2004.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and, recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 V

..

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1272704—D, 10/28/2004

Details of the Shooting Encidexi
On 03/21/2004, as A3,,ATI

‘was driving his personal

vehicle in Buenos Aires, he observed a motorcycle with two
individuals stopped ahead of him. He observed the passenger of
the motorcycle get off with a’ weapon in his hand, which was
allegedly pointed at the driver of a vehicle.

AIATI
lobserved a robbery in progress and
retrieved_his• pe-rsonal-ly’owned, Bureau approved, Glook’•pistol.
ALATI
ladvised he could not remember if he attempted to open
his vehicle door or if he displayed his weapon and pointed at the
assailants from inside his vehicle.
The suspects becaiqe alerted
and conducted a u-turn in an attempt to flee. As AISAT I
I
also conducted a si—turn in an attempt to pursue the subjects, the
passenger on t1 mntôçcycle fired one shot towards ALAT j
I
vehicle.
ALATI
Ifjred one round from inside his vehicle
before jumping a curb and striking a fence. The subjects fled
the scene and were never located.
Due to damages to his vehicle,
AI,ATI
remained at the scene of the accident until the
1
Provincial. Police arrived. The Argentine Federal ?olice als
responded to the scene of the accident due to AI
ATI__________
1
status as diplomatic personnel.

—

On 10/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Chief Inspector Robert D. Grant,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDO
J;
1
eputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
Criminal Division, USDOJ; I
Kesistant Section
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; My Harrison, Section Chief, Applicant Processing
Section, Administrative Services Division; I
I
Unit Chief (tJC), National Firearms Program, Training Division
(TD);f
I CC, CD—6B,_Counterintelligence Divisioa;
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
I Firearms
Too.marks Unit, Scientifi
c Analysis Section, Laboratory Division,
1
IE’irearms Training Unit, Training
SSAI
Division (TD); SSA I
I Operational Skills Unit,
I
TD;
Firearms Training Unit, TD;
-

-

IlatLonal Firearms Program, TD; and

SSN
SSAI

fOGC). The two non-voting members present were
I Management Program Analyst, Inspec1ion
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; and
Intern, Leadership Development Institute,
Training and Development Division, uantico.
n’1

I

L Investigative Law Unit, Office of the

(‘rnin1

2

b7C

 ‘To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1272704—D, 10/28/2004

Observations and Recommendations of

ie SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application q deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for coiSrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provi,de recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendatiots
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members opined that, basea on the current policy
with the Argentine Government, ALATi
iactions were
appropriate and his use of.deadly force was justified. Members
held a lengthy discussion regarding the current policy regarding
the use and/or carrying of firearms by FBI personnel outside the
United States (US).
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the
Training Division and the Of ice of International 0prations
should jointly review, clarify, and promulgate FBI policy
regarding the carrying of weapons by FBI personne1’ outside the
US.

3

h7

 b

To:
Re:

Inspection From: “Inspection
297—HQ—A1272704—D, 10/28/2004

IED(s):
St tead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
1
AT WASHINGT
ON DC

That no a4ministrative aàtive be taken against former
las -a -esut- •ef- his involvement n-$-h4s

ALAT I
shooting incident.

Set Iead 2:

- —-

b6

(Action)

INTERNATIONAI OPERATIQN
AT WASHINGTON DC
That the Office of International Operations and the
Training Division jointly review, clarify, and expeditiously
promulgate FBI policy regarding FBI personnel carrying weapons
outside the US.
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

—
—

-

—
—

—
—

—

—
—
—

—
—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Grant, Room 7837
DOJ
Ms.I

Mr4
IUSDOJ
j Room 5155
Mr.I
Ms. nJi, Room 6050
Quantico
Mr.l
Mr.
I Room, 1B045
(Attention:
Mr. I
Mr.l
IQuantico
Quantico
Mr.t
fQuanico
Mr.1
I
Mr.I
(Attention:
room 7326.
Ms.
I’4rsl
I. Room 7861

I

4+

4

  

 

 

2004

 

—

.

—

—; fl t—’—’——•t’

(Rev. 01—31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA
TION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

tnspection

From:

Attn:

04/21/2005

AD Charlene B. Thornton

inspection

Contact:I

Approved By:
DraftedBy:

xtension 4—1837

Thornton Charlene B
Bland Andrew R III

I

Case ID

It: 297—HQ—A1271285--D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
10/10/2004

[lrr
)7C

csynopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Grou
p (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipcident that occurred on
10-110/2004, involving Special
Agent (SA)l_______________ SAl
Ifixed one round from her
Bureau-approved, personally-owned
Glock, Model 27 pistol,
striking the subject of an attemp
ted robbery in the left side of
his chest.
SIRG members recommended that no .adm
inistrative
action be taken aginst SA
las a result of her involvement
in this shooting incident.
Administrative.:
Reference report df Assistant Special
Agent in
Charge Qavid Cuthbertson, dated
10/18/2004.
Details:
This communication was prepared to
furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendat
ions of the SIRG with
reference to the capt•ioned shootin
g.

Savage- 1905

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—FIQ—A1271285--D, 04/21/
2005

Details of the Shooting Inciden
t

On 10/lp/2004, at approx
imately 12:15 P.m.r
SAl
iwas on h way to the resi
dence of
SA I
I also assigped tohe Chicago
Division.
SAl
lwa collcting SA I
bail while she was
•out of town.
While SAl
Iwas standing in the vestibule of
SA I
Iapartnent, si-i.e was approached from
behind by a black
male wi-i.o grabbed her, told
her
had a gun, and hit her on the he was holding her up, stated he
back of the head with a blunt
.object.
After struggling for a few
SAl
land her atacker_tumbled dow seconds on the landing, both
n the stairs to the
sidewalk. While SAl
‘continued to struggle with
the sus
on the sidewa’k. th suspec
t bit her on the left calf, bre pect trS
the skin.
aking
SAl
iwho had
approved Glock, Model .27 pis her personally-owned, Bureau—
tol in a holster on her right
and fearing the attacker wou
ankle,
ld
it against her, drew Ier wepon gain control of her weapon and use
as her attacker positioned
himself over her.
SAl
jfired one round into the left
the_subiqct’s chest.
side of
The suspect initia
SAl
Icommancis to get on the ground lly began to comply with
, however, stood, fled to
his car and drove away.

.

The Chicago Police Department
and EmergencyMedical
Staff were summoned by an
eyewitness and arrived moments
later.
-One of the responding officers
discovered the suspect in his
vehicle around the corner from
the site of the attack.
He
crashed the vehicle into the
wall of a laundromat, and was had
inside the vehicle.
still
The suspec
transported to te Advocate_I t was arrested at the scene and
llinois Masonic Medical Center
medical treatment.
for
S2½
jias also transported to the
Medical
Center for treatment or cuts
, scrapes, and a bite wound
and was
subsequently released later
that day.
A dec1inatio-i of prosecution
was received from
United States Department c-f
Justce, Civil Rights Divisio the
n, on
12/08/2004, regarding SAl
ctions
incident.
On 10/13/2004, Assistant Sta in this shooting
t&
I Office of Felony Review, adviseds Prosecutorl
that after reviewing
the shootiiia_inciient, his off
ice
dec
ided
to
decline prosecution
against SAj

I

On 03/08/2005, the SIRG met
to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director (DA
Andrew R Bland, III, Inspection
D)
Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting mem
bers of the SIRG in attendance
:

2

Savage- 1906

 _____

_____

_____

_____

__

To:
Re:

I

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271285--D,

Inspection
04/21/2005

Depitv Ch’F flv-1 Rig
hts Division,
‘.rimina ection, usvuJ;
I
I, Deutv Chief, Domestic
Security Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ;I
Chief Inspector, Office of
I
Inspections, Inspection Div
Charles J. Rooney, Section
ision;
Chief (SC),
Section, Criminal Investigati
ve Divisioni
IActing
Unit Chief (DC), Firearms
Trainin Unit, Training and
Division (TO
Development
CD—GA, Counterintelligence
Di
National Firearms Program,
DC
TDD;
Special Inquiry and General
Bacicground
Inves iga ions nit, Adminis
trt-r
ruir fliyisio
n;
Supervisory Special Agent
tb 6
(SSA)I
Firearms
TOo]Lmrkc fli-rt.
U:) I
itiiç Analysis Section
, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
Ilnvestioptjve Law Unit, Off
General Counsel (OGC); and
ice of the
SSAI
I
Operational
Skills Unite TDD.
The two non-voting attendees pre
sent were
SSA I
HostaQe Rescue Team, Critical
Incident
Response Group; andi
I Management Program
Analyst, Inspection Managem
ent Unit, Office of Insp
ections,
Inspection Division.
—

Observations and Recommen
dations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—
synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application
of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with
an evaluative analysis,
observations,
and recommendations fo± cor
rective actions from an ope
rational
standpoint (if any); (3)
provide recommendations con
cerning
training and/or safety issu
es; and (4) provide recomm
for administrative action
endations
if deemed necessary.
S7 mbers unanimously
agreed that the use of dea
force by SN
dly
Iwas j.zstitied and in conform
ance with the
deadly force policy.
Therefore, a recommendatio
n_was made that
no administrative action
be taken against SAl
her involvement in this sho
I as a result of
oting incident.

3

Savage-1907

b6

 • .:...•

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271285—D,

Inspection
04/21/2005

IE?D(s):
Set Lead 1:

(?ction)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,
SAj
incident.

1
2,
1

1
1

1
3.
1

1
1

—
-

-

-

—

-

-

—

DC

That no administrative action be
taken against
las a resUlt of her invo]veme
nt.in this shooting

Mr. Pisto1e Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Bland, Room 7825
Ms.l
SDOJ
Mr.[
USDOJ
Ms.1_______ oom 7837
Ms. Harrison, Rrrn flfl
(Attention:
Ms.F
Mr.. Rooney, Room 5155

Mr.I

1

puantico

Mr. Manning, oom 1B045
(Attention:
Mn
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
Quntirô
(Ant1ôn
1
1
Ms
room 7326
1-Mr
I Room7861
-

-

-

-

—

I

4+

Savage-1908

••.t•.

••

•

 ,/

4

(Rev. 01.3 1-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA
TION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From.:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

F

.

Kaiser

Extension 4-1837

Kaiser Kenneth

Cl

AD Kenneth

04/11/2007

wj

MihaL1

Drafted By:

Ilrr

Case ID

4: 297—HQ—A1271748—D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
MIAMI DIVISION
11/08/2004

b7C

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Grou
p (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on
11/08/2004, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
I
M-enpting to arrest a
fleeing bank robbery suspect,
SAl
jfired ten rounds from
his Bureau—issued Glock, Model 22,
.40 caliber pistol.
SIRG
members recommended that no adm
inistrative action
against SAl
I as a result of his involvement bein taken
this
shooting incident.
4
A
t
r__f
dm
eren
ii
ce
- report of Supervisory
Special Agent
(SSA) 1

1,

dated 03/28/2005.

Details:
This communication was prepared to
furnish the
analysis, coinntents, and recommendat
ions of the SIRG with
referenceto the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
On 11/08/2004, a Hispanic male ente
red the Sterling
Bank in West Palm Beach, Florida and
,
prov
ided
the teller with a
demand note.
The subject also raised the front
of his shirt
exposing a handgun tucked inside
his waistband.
After the
robbery, the suspect exited the bank
an entered
gray Dodge
C
Durango with a Florida license plat
e of I
I
SA[
the Palm Beach County
Resident Agency (PBCRA) was investi 1°f
gating a series of bank
robberies occurring in the West Palm
Beach vicinity dating back
to August 2004.
Ira all of the robberies, the sub
ject was
described as a Hispanic male fitting
the description of the
11/08/2004 bank robbery suspect.

Savage- 1909

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271748--D, 04/11/2007

Information
dv1ônd. thMrossib1e suspect in
the bank robberies wasl
land it was determined
that the gray Dodge Durango had
been stolen from a car dealership
in Davie, Florida, in 2003.

-

After being advised of the
11/08/2004 bank robbery,
Iconducted
nvestigation at several
arrived at a residence
SAl
I
o ge urango par e in ron of
the residence.
SA
notified her supervisor and oth
er Agents of the
situation and waited for additio
nal AQents to assist her.
While
waiting for assistance, sl1
Iobser’ved a Hispanic male
at the suspect vehicle.
The male subject entered the vehicle and
departed .the area with SAl
Iconducting p lone moving
surveillance as other Agents respo
nded.
SAl
was the firt Agent to- join the
surveillance, closely followedI
by
SAl
who was coordinating with the
Palm Beach County
Sheriff’s Office (PBCSO) dispatch
er via a cell phone.
Within a
short period, the Agents were
joined by marked PBCSO units as
well as one unmarked unit.
The
of the surveillance for the purp local officers assumed the lead
ose of making a felony vehicle
traffic stop.
SA[
addresses
located on

‘

As the subject vehicle_approach
ed the intersection, the
driver, later identifid asi
h pulled into a shopDing
plaza
parking lot followed by two PBCSO
officers.
SAl
lpulled
into the parking lot on the sou
thern entry/exit to the parkin
g
lot and assumed a tactical pos
ition near a third PBCSO officer.
SAl
I bbserved the driver of the suspect vehicle loo
king
around as two of the PBCSO offi
cers positioned their vehicle
s in
atactica). manner behind him.
PBCSO cap-taint
texited his, vehicle with a
shotgun and as he approached the
Durango, gave verbal commands
identifying himself and asking
the driver to exit his vehicle.
Additionally, a PBCSO Deputy
also gave commands over the “n.
system” instructing the subject
to
heard someone yell “gun” and obse exit his vehicle.
sN
rved the suspect vehicle
acJcing
uo at
high rate of speed toward Cap
tai
Both Captain
I.
land SAl
Ifired at the suspect in an attemp
t to
pre

venti
from running over local law enforcem
ent
authorities.
The suspect vehicle sped off in
an
eas
terly
direction toward another PBCSO Cor
poral, who fired her handgun at
the vehicle.
T1e driver of the subject 1
vehicj made a U—turn and
e
drove toward SAl
land Corpora’
I. Fea;ing for
their safety, both SA
[nd Corporal 1
Ifired
multiple rounds at the.I driver of
the approaching vehicle.
As the suspect attempted to flee
on a stretch of road
under construction and not open
to the public, he hit a concret
e
2

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Re:

Inspection
From:
InspectIon
297—HQ—AJ.271748—D, 04/11/2007

barrier disabling the subject veh
icle.
PBCSO officers approached
the vehicle and observed the susp
ect injured.
Officers also
observed a silver pistol in the
passenger compartment which was
later determined to be a ‘
lighter” resembling a handgun.
t

I

Iwas treated at the scene by emergenc
y medical
personnel and subsequently transpo
rted to St. Mary’s Hospital
where it was determined all of
his injuries were sustained as a
result of the traffic acciden
t.
The Florida State Attorney’s Offic
e opined that a
shooting inquiry would not be
initiated since none of the rounds
fired by law enforcement personnel
impacted the suspect4
was subsequently indicted on five
counts of Bank Robbery and one
count of Assault on a Federal Off
icer.
On 12/01/2005, the SIRG met to
discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Dani
el
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting and was a
non—voting member.
The following voting members were
in
attendance:
former Chief Inspectorl
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Divisio
ni
Ieoutv Chief.
Civil Rights Division, Criminal
Section, USDOJ; j
Deputy Chief, Domestic Scurity
I
Section, Criminai L)lvlslon,
USDOJ;I
I Assistant Section Chief (ASC
),
Operational Support Section, Crim
inal Investigative Division;
I
I, Unit Chief (tJC), Firea
I
rms Training Unit, Training I
and
Development Division (TDD); uc4
I National
Firearms Program, TDD; Acting
J1
ISpecial
Weapon nd ‘P.1-c’ (m 1l-ions
Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group; I
I ASC, CD—6, CounterinteJ.licence
Division; Supervisory Special
Agent (SSA)I
Firearnrs
I
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Anal
ysis Section,
Laboratory Division; SSAI
I
Manaar.
Operational Skills Unit, TOD; and
SSAI
Investigative Law Unit, Office
of the General Counsel (OGC).I
I
I Management Program Analyst,
Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Insp
ections, Inspection Division,
a
non-voting member, was also in atten
dance.
—

One of the (JSDOJ representatives
advised additional
information was needed before
discussing the incident.
On
03/09/2006, the Miami Division was
asked to obtain any additional
documents, i.e., diagrams, offi
cer statements, and laboratory
reports regarding each weapon
fired during the incident.
Discussion of this incident was
held in abeyance until additional
information was obtained by the
Miami Division.
On 01/25/2007, after receiving add
itional documents
provided by the Palm Beach County
Sheriff’s Office, the SIRG met
again to fully discuss the inciden
t.
Deputy Assistant Director
3

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__

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[

Inspection
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Inspection
297-HQ—Al271748—D, 04/11/2007

Inspection Division, chaired the meet
ing arid
was a non—voting member.
Th
v-”
rnmb
ers
were
in
attendance:
Chief Tn1rn1_____
Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I___
_______________ Trial
Attorney, Domestic Security Section,
Criminai va.vision, USDO
I Special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division,J;
USDOJ; Section thief (SC> John V. Gil
lies, Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Investigative Divi
sion; Assistant SC Richard W.
Kolimar, Eurasian Section, CD-i,
Counterintelligence Division;
Unit Chief (UC)
Fir
i
Training
and Development ivis
Defensive
Systems Unit, TDD; CC
pecia
eapons and
Tactics Qoerations Unit,
ri ica
t Response
tiC
Practical Applications Unit, TDD; Grorkn
SSA
I
‘irearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientifc Analysis
Section,
iasoraiory Division; and UC
I
Invstiaative Law
Unit, Office of the General Counel
(OGC)
SSA I
Mncimnt Proc7r9 Analyst (MPA)
I
Fnci LA
I Inspection Management Unit
, Oriice of
Inspections, Inspection DivisiOn, nonvoting members, were also
in attendance.
.

—

I

Observations and Recommendations of
the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsi
zed incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of dead
ly force;
(2) provide the Director with an eva
luative analysis,
observations, and recommendations
for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint. (if any);
(3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety
issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative
action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that
the use of deadly
force by SAl
a was justified and in conformance
with the deadly force policy.
This discussion led to the
recommendation that no administrat
ive action
taken against
SA[
las a result of his involvement in bethis
shooting,
incident.

4

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From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271748—D, 04/11/2007

.LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

incident.

1
Mr.
1
Ms.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mrs.
4+
—

-

—

—

—

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

—

—

DC

That rio administrative action be taken
st SA I
I as a result of his involvement in again
this shooting

Pisto].e, Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Clemens, Room 3092
Rooiu 3204
tJSDOJ
DOJ
5096
Gillies, Room 3280
Quantico
Qu.antico
CIRG
Room 7326
antico
uantico
Room 7861

5

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.
—.

—

(Rev. O1-31-20G3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE
StIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROtJTINE

.Inspection

•Froni:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Date:
Attn.:

05/12/2006

AD Charlene B. Thornton

F

I

Thornton

I

(9nwri

flin4c1

Drafted By:

Ilrr

Case ID

#: 297-HQ—A1271741—D

Title;

SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
08/05/2004

-

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) revieweda
shooting incident
nrcnrr€d cm flR/f
lL5/
2004, involving former
Special Agent

(SA)I

I SAl
Ifired two rounds
from his Glock, .40 caliber pis
attempting to elude police and tol, at a subject who was
had shot a police officer.
members recommendd tht no
administrative action be take SIRG
n
against former SAl
ji.s a result of his inv
olvement in. this
shooting incident.
Administrative:

Reference report of Assistant
Special Agent in
Charge Sharreil Gene Slonei .dat
ed 01/104/2005.

Details: This communication was
analysis, comments, and recomm prepared to furnish the
endations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned sho
oting.
Details of the Shooting Inciden
t
SAs
iançII
IwRre. working
a gang investigation with Detecti
ve
I
lof the
Sari Bernardino Police Depa.rtme
nt (SBPD)
who was a member of the
Riverside Resident Agency
f .cjtre1 9’sk Force
5
CRRA) •
(SSTF).
In connection with the SSTF, SAs
jandi
I
along with
I
Detective I
I patrolled gang
gang activity, make street leve areas in an effort to identify
l arrests with the intentio
n
developing informants, arrest
wanted gang members, and take of
weapons and drugs off the street
.
.

Savage- 1914

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Re:

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Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271741—D,

U

Inspection
05112/2006

On 08/05/2004, the
call stating shooting subjec SBPD received an anon inous telephone
t Nicholas Gilbert Fimbre
z was
currently located at 176 Eas
t 10th Street.
The information was
communicated to officers cov
ering the area, with add
officers responding to ass
itional
ist.
The SBPD officers decided
at th Street and Sierra
to meet
Way for a briefing prior
to attempting
the arrest of Finbrez.

As SAsi
lanai
I along with Detectiv
clearing an arrest scene,
Iwere
they heard the SBPD radio eE
broadcast
regarding the location of
Fimbrez.
Due to their presence in
general area, they decided
the
to travel to the briefing
assist with the possible
location and
arrest of the subject.
tipçn their arrival at
the
Ideveloped a tactical plan briefing scene, SBPD Sergeant
which was verbally discussed
with all personnel.
Discussion included the wea
pons each officer
would possess, position assi
gnments, arrival position
potential cross fire/safet
y issues. After a complet s, and
e
of the subject was provid
ed, law enforcement personnel description
the briefing location and
departed
pro
subject was allegedly locate ceeded to the address where the
d.

lb 6
lb 1

As law enforcement
they observed an elderly fem authorities arrived at the residence
ale, later identified as
subject’s grandmother.
the
SBPD officers attempted to
obtain
information from her; howeve
r,
providing the telephone nurabe she was uncooperative, only
r.to the residence.
Sergeant
i telephonically contacted the’
residence and after
approximatly two rings a
mal
himself and attempted to ide e answered. The Sergeant identified
ntify th rPrson on the pho
.rnmediately hung up.
ne, whd
Sergeants
lindicated to one of the
other officers that if the
male remained in the reside
nce, the
situation could turn into
a full tactical callout and
enforcement officers should
law
maintain their positions.
Sergeant
a second
as trie telephone was ‘ringin telephone call to the .residence and
g,
that a Hispanic male wearing a police radio broadcast advised
shorts was coming out of
side of the residence.
the east
Officerl
Ibegan giving the subject
commands; however, the sub
ject was noncoxnpliant and re—verbal
the residence.
entered
The
Aviation Unit
Hispanic male
identified as
the residence

San Bernardino County Sh
eriff’s Department’s
was providing aerial sup
port and observed a
fitting the description of
the subject, and later
I’icholas Gilbert Fimbrez,
exit the rear corner of
and run. Numerous office
rs who pursued Fimbrez and

2

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Inspection
297—RQ—A1271741—D, 05/12/200
6

gave verbal commands direct
ing
observed him running with his him to stop and show his hands,
hands near the waist area
of his
pants.
As law enforcement officers
purued Fimbrez,
continually giving verbal com
mands to st
d show his hands, an
officer released his K—9 just
as Officer
ysically
confronted Fimbrez face-to-f
ace.
Of
fic
er
rab
bed the
suspect’s shoulder and arm in
rn to the
ground and within seconds Fim an attempt o a
brez shot Officer
who was
knocked to the g;ounLnd sub
sequently bitten by the K-9
SA
Officer I
I discharged their weapons striking . Fim
and knocking him to the ground
bre
while he maintained possession z
his handgun.
of
As officers again attempted to
provide verbal
commands to Finibrez to-,drop
the weapon, he attempted to
point the weapon_toward other
raise and
officers.
Knowing Fimbrez had just
shot Officer I
I and knowing he had shot
a civilian the previous
week, law enforcement person
nel fearing for their lives
as wel
as the safety of_others, dischar
ged their weapons to eliminat l
the threat.
e
SAl
dischared one additional
round while local
law enforcement personnel fire
d a total of seven rounds.
Officerl
was provided medidal attention
1
at the sce
and subsequently transported via
police vehicle to the Loma Linne
University Medical Center.
da
Emergency medical personnel arr
ived
at the scene and administered
medical attention to Fiiribre
was pronounced dead at the sce
z who
ne.
sAl
iresigned from the EBI effect
ive 09/10/2004, to
return to his previous employ
ment
a Police Officer with the
Escondido Police Department.

as

By memoiandum dated 02/10/200
5, the San Bernardino
District Attorney’s Office dete
-rmined the shooting to be
justified and took no action
on the matter. A declination
of
prosecution dated 05/03/200
5 was received from the United
Sta
Department of Justice. 4
tes
Civ Rights Division, in Dec
i
ember 2005,
regarding former SN
in this shooting incident.
On 03/08/2006, the SIRG met
jo discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Dan
iel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Divisio
n, chaired the meeting and was
non-voting member. The fol1piirmi
a
rc*inn
mhr were in
attendance:
Chief 1
Inspector
Office of
Inspections, Inspection Div
isio
Deoutv Chief.
Civil Rights Division, Crimin n,I
al Section, TJSDOJ;
Deputy Chief, Domestic Securit
y Sec
USDOJ; Charles J. Cunningham, Sec tion, Criminaj. uivision,
tion Chief (SC),
Tránsnatio
Criminal Enterprise Section,
Criminal Investigative Divisio nal
n;

Jactions

3

Savage-1916

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 2

221

2

22

2

44212%

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

4

4

2%

2%

21
2

I1

To:
Re:

r

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741—D, 05/12/2006

•Tu

I Deve

I

I

Division;L
Unit Chief (UC), Firerm TrMniner Ilnii
Training an
lopment Division (TDD; UcI
National
.Firearms Program, TOD; Uci
SWM ODerations
Unit, Critical Incident Response
Group; SSAI
janager, Operational Skills
Unit
SSAI
I Invesiaative Law Unit Qff ice ,of TDD;
the Genraj. c.ounsei
(OGC); and SS2J
I Washington Field Office.
I
I Management Program Analyst, Inspecti
on
Management Unit, Office of Insp
ections, Inspection Division, a
non-voting member, was also in
attendance. Additionally,
following two observers were pre
thP
sent during thi meetina 1
Deputy General Counsel, OGC; and
UCI_________________
Operational Skills Unit, TDD

I
,

r Manning, CO-6, Counter
intelligence

1

‘-‘“

With the exception oft
I and SSA I
I
I who abstained from. voting, members
opined that
based on the circumstances of
the incident and information
provided n thç shooting report,
the use of deadly force by
Former SN
lappeared to be justified and
in conformance with
the deadly force policy. Members
noted the absence of a Signed
Sworn Statement from the shooter
resigned from the FBI prior to ; however, were aware that he had
a dec
issued by the Department of Justice lination of prosecution being
The totality of the
circumstarrces resulted in a recoiwn.
HMjon that no administrative
action be taken against former SAl
I

Savage-1917

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Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ-A1271741—D,

Inspection
05/12/2006

IaEAD(s):

Set read 1:

(Action)

INS PECTION
AT. WASI1INGTON,

DC

That no administrative actio
n be taken against
former SAl
a
las
resu
lt of his involvement in
this shoofing incictent.

j
Mr.
1
Ms.
1
Mr.
1
Ms.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1 — Mr.
1
Ms.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
Mrs.
—

—

-

—

—

—

—

—

-

-

—

-

—

Pistole,.Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Cloyd, Room 7825
I USDOJ
I, USDOJ
i Room 7837
Cunningham, Room 3548
Manning, Room 1B045
] Quantico
I Quantico
I CIRG
Room 7326
uantico
LWFO
j
Room 7861

Savage-1918

 (Re O1-31-2t])

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIO
N
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

£ireter’s Office
Inspection

FrouL:

Inspection
Contact:

3pproved By:

L__

Attn:

-

OPR
AD Chariene
A/Sd

iO/2S/2005

.

Thornton

Extension 4—837

-

Cloyd Daniel

Drafted By:

Ilrr

Case ID

#:

Title:

SHOOTII’IG INCIDENT
TAMPA D:v1SION
08/19/2004

297—HQ-A1271966—D

Synopsis:
The Shooting lncident Review Group
(SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ircident that occurred on
08/19/2004, involving_Special
Agent (SA)
I During an arrest, SA I
I
accidenalIy disci.arged bis Bureau-is
sued Colt M4A1 Carbine into
the back of a fugitive, resulting in seri
ous injury.
SIRG
members unanimously agreed that SAl
hould be censured,
suspended from duty for a period of thre
e days, and receive
documented remedial firearms trainin
g for his neglect in
practicing routine firearms safety proc
edures.
I

4v4c1-r.ztive:
Reference report of inspector
I dated 10/25/2004.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to
furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations
of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident
At the request of the Boston Divi
sion, Tampa Division
Agents were requested to attempt to loca
te and execute an arrest
warrant for subjectl
lwho was wanted for Unlawful
Flight to Avoid Prosecution.
Information was received advising
I
iwas also wanted for questioning as a prim
e suspect in the
murder of a ember of the Genovese crime
family.
Additionally,
it was notedl
Iwas an rtextreme fighter,” known to
“avoid
apprehension,” and

“believed to be extre
engage police officers,” as well as “alwmely violent and will
ays in possession of at
least one handgun.”

Savage-1919

 To:
Re:

Director’s Office

From:
Insoection
D/5/D

mvstcton determned
]was apparently residIng
on
t
tin TamDa,
_cr
ica,
and ws believed to be
driving a rented Cadillac Esc
alade.
SA I
Iadviseçi the Acting Soecial
eapcns
and Tactics (.P/SWAT) Team Lea
der (TL)(
jof
the
details regardingj
d suggested that a SWAT dep
loyment may
be necessary.
Si1
jdeparted the office, accom
panied by a
Task Force member from the Hil
lsborough Cority Sheriff’s Off
ice,
and traveled to the Wood Trail
Boulevard vicinity to sea
di11ç Escalades.
rch
for
Although the search proved neg
ative, sA
Ideternined the owner of the hou
se had rented an Escalade lb 7
on 08/12/2004 and returned it
on 08/13/2004.
-

At aoDroximatelv 11:40 a.m,
A/SWAT TLI
I
advised ASACI
jand SSAL
Ithat a
violent fugitive might be in
the Tampa area and SA
was
I
attempting to confirm the fugitiv
e’s location.
The discussion
includ d the fact that the
SWAT Team should be utilized
to arrest

I

On the afternoon of 08/19/200
4, SAl
[earned
n
l
1
aced in the Tampa area wit
hin the last three hours.
SAl
ontacted A/SWAT TIl
land advised him of the
latest Inrcmation regarding
i_______

Iwas

Charce

At approximae1y 2:30 p.m., Act
ing Special_Agent in
I, ASAC Eaton, SSAI
I nc1
Imet
the situation with SAl

(A/SAC)I

SAl
speaker phone.
‘via
SAl
ladvised an Operations Plan
was
be,na oreared by another SWAT
Agent. ASAC Eat
SAl
Ithat the plan should focus on arr on to1
estingi
outside of or away from the resi
I
SA
lalso
advised the SWAT Team was mee dence.
ting at the Hilisborough County
Sheriff’s district office near
the fugitive’s suspected loc
ation.
At approximately 3:00 p.m., ASA
C Eaton and SSAI
proceeded to the Sheriff’s Off
I
ice.
As
they
were leaving the
office, a SWAT Team member pro
vided ASAC Eaton with a dra
ft
Operations Plan.
The plan called for a Itknock
and announce”
approach to the residence and
stated that the SAC had auth
orized
compromise authority and fla
sh bang devices, if necessary.
ASAC Eaton scratched through
these portions and handwrote
changes
consistent with effecting. the
arrest while the subject was
approaching or departing the resi
dence. Additionally, ASAC Eato
scratched through the portions
Tlb7c
regarding the SAC authcrizing
compromise authority and the
use of flash bang devices sinc
e
those items were never requested
no; araned.
ASAC Eaton edited
the plan indicating that he and
SSA I
Iwould be on-scene
during the arrest as opposed to
the command post in the
office.

Savage- 1920

 To:
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Director’s Office
From:
Inspection
27—HQ—Al27l966—D, 10/25/2005

During the briefing,
Iprovided attendees all
krcwn infcrma:ion ir.ciding the SPj
recent discovery that a new
rental car was parked at :h rsienc
e and that an ±nthvith2al
matching the description oft
Iwas seen parking th vir1e
and walking toward the residence. ASAC
Eaton and SSAI
I
discussed with attendees the fact
that the arrest plan ou qt
include approaching or entering the resi
dence to arrest I
I
Participants were advised c oostion
the team close enough to
the residence to apprehendi
Ibetween the house and his
vehic’.
Conversely they discussed that it
1
letI
heave the residence and get in his may be necessary to
car and effect the
arrest when he ex
h
vehicle at another location.
Lastly,
ASAC Eaton and SS.
discussed the least desirable
alternative
ony car stop, aided by marked pol
ice units,
in the event
became aware he was being followed.
It should
be noted that
T TLI
Idid
due to his presence in the office atte not attend this briefing
mpting to revise the
Operations Pier,.
At approximately 4:15 p.m
I
drove past the residence and around ., ASAC Eaton and SSAI
the neighborhood where they
observed the distance between the fron
t door of the residence and
its assiaed parking spaces was abo
ut ten yards. ASAC Eaton and
SSA(
Ireturned to the Sheriff’s Office where
the SWAT Team
was making final preparations and
advised it ‘nii1d be difficult
to get close enough to the residen
ce
between the
front door and his vehicle.__They advto grabi
ised the SWAT Team that the
plan was still to arrest
I
loutside of the residence or at
another location.

J

At approzmately 4:45 p.m., eight
members of the SWAT
Team departed the Sheriff’s Office
in the SWA’ truck lcng with
ASAC Eaton and SSAI
un a Bureau
SAl
Ideparted in
a separate vehicle to continue surv car.
eill
anc
e.
Upon arrival in the
neighborhood of the target resi
dence, the SWAT truck parked
around the corner which afforded an
unobstructed view of the
front of the house. ASAC Eaton and
SSA I
barked in a
supermarket parking lot in the vici
nity; however, they were
unable to view the residence or the
SWAT truck.

I

SAl
observed small chil
the house next door to the target resi dren entering and exiting
dence as well as other
neighbors arriving home from work.
Between 6:00 and 6:15 p.m.,
SN
(was advised that the homeown
might be coming home from work and was er of the target residence
advised by the Chief
Division Counsel (CDC) that in ord
er to avoid a hostage
situation, the homeowner should not
be permitted to enter his
house.
This informatiqn was conveyed to
the SWAT members inside
the truck.

3

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Directors Office
297—Q—Al27l966—D,

From:
nspection
ID/25J2005

A: aoprox±ma:ey 6:5 P.m
I
relocated to a position where they ., ASAC Eaton and SS[
could observe the SWAT truck.
The homeowner arrived a: the resi
den
and parked in front of the residen ce a: arcxiza:ey E:35 p.m.
ce. As he exited his vehicle,
a task force officer approached him,
identified himself as law
enforcement, and walked the homeowner
to the back of his vehicle.
Concerned that subject(
(could easily view the developmen
ts
from the front bay window c: the hou
se, SAL
Iradioed for
the SWAT truck to mover c.cser.
Upon hearing the radio message,
A/SWAT TI
Iitercrqted the request to mean SAl
was in trouble or thati
I
Ihad appea
.AT truck pulled
to the front of the residence wher Sl
e
fi observed SA
talking to the homeowner.
SAl
(rad
ioed SA
I
to detenine the status of the ope
ration and was advised
that SAl
(acquired the house keys fr
hoeowner and
obtained consent to enter th hou.
sAl
(then advised
the team to get ready.
SAl
I possessing the house keys,
approached the SWAT truck.
SAl
(raised the back docr of the
truck and observed children in the
yard next door. The remaini
ng
team members located in the rear
of
and took positions of cover behind the truck exited the vehicle
the truck.

I

At approximately 6:37 p.m., the
entry team “stacked up”
behind the SWAT truck and procee
ded to the front door f the
residence.
Upon approaching the fron
unlock both the door 1nck nd deadbo t door, SAl
I began to
lt.
During the process, the
door tulled open and
(was observed standing in the door
way.
(attempted to close the door; how
ever, the entry team forced
:ter way into the foyer shoutin
g,__“FBI, FBI” and issuing
commands forl
Ito get down. I
I turned his back to the
team in an attempt to run resulting
in
him being forced to the
floor on his stomach. F
Iwas struggling to get off of the
fipor whi’e being held down.
SAl
equested handcuffs and
SAl
(responded he would handcutf the sub
ject. f
(was
prone, his arms out to the side and
con
ti
tggie in an
attempt to get in a push—up_pos
ition.
SA
had one foot on
I
I right arm and SAj
Ihad one foot on
left arm.
SAl
(was carrying a Bureau-issued Col
t M4A1
Carbine from a sling around his
right shoulder.
Prior to
handcuff ing(
1 SAl
(recalled moving his right thum
b
upward in a motion to manipulate
the selector switch of his
weapon to the “safe” mode.
He let
and reached his right hand back to the weapon hang on its sling
his right side for handcuffs.
14 h2d the han
dcuffs in his right hand and kne
eled down toward
jwjth his knee in the small of I
I
Iba
ck.
grabbed I
I
I left wrist with his left hand and SAl
started pulling
the arm to th
of I
Iback. As he was placing a
handcuff on
left wrist, a shot was heard.
As blood
flowed from________ back, SAL
I completed the handcuffin
g
process and applied direct presur
e to the wound.
Another Agent

4

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s
t
From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271966—D, 1C/25/2005

on the scene offered to take SAl
removing the weapon and sling from SA
I
the weapon in the “saf&’ mode.

Iweapon, and after
I stated he observed

At approximately 6:38 p.m, ASAC Eaton
and SSA
approached the residence and were adv
ised the subject was .n
custody and that an accidental dischar
ge had occurred. ASAC
Eaton requested Emergency Medical Service
s (EMS) be contacted for
assistance. EMS personnel rrivd on the
scene at approximately
6:53 p.m., and transportedi
Ito the hospital in critical
condition.
Surgery was performed; hnwvr no furt
her
information was received ,regarding
con
diti
on
or
prognosis.

I

I

On 04/19/2005, a declination of prosec
ution was
received from the United States_Dep
artment of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding SAl
lactions in thi
incident.
By letter dated 10/06/2004, State Attorn s shooting
eyj
I
L
j 13th Judicial District, Tampa, Florida, advised no
crimihal
statutes of the State of Florida were vio
lated as a result of SA
discharge.
On 06/02/2005, the SIRG met to discpss the
above—
captioned shooting incident.
Chief Inspectorl
I.
Office of Inspections.. Inspection Div
ision, chaired the meeting
and was a non-voting member.
The following voting members of the
SIRG were in attendance: I
I eputy Chief, Civil
Rights Division, Criminal Section, USD
OJ;
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section
, criminaL uivison, I
USDOJ; Charles J. Rooney, Section Chief
(SC) Operational Support
1
Section, Criminal Investigative Div
isio
n;I
J Unit
Chief (DC), Firearms Training Unit, Tra
inin
g
and
LJev
e.Lo
pme
nt
Division (TDD); tJCI
ISpecial Weapons nd Tacjics
Qoeratiops Unit, CritiDal Incident
Response Group; twI
CD-6A, Counterintelligence Divisio
n; uci
INational Firearms Program, TDD;
SSA
I__________
I Iny.ctiaative Law Upit, Office
of the General Counsel
(OGC); SSA I
I Program Manager, Operational Skills
Unit, TDD; and SSA [
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific Analysis Section, Labora
tory Division.
The two non
voting attendees present were Inspecto
r I
Office of Inspections, Inspection Div
ision; and________
iManagement Program Analyst, Insp
ection anagem nt Unit,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Divisio
n.
-

I

Observations and Recommendations of the
SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synops
ized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly
force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluat
ive analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective acti
ons from an operational

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Inspection
297—HQ—l27l9EE—D, ID/23/2005

standpoint (if any); (3) provide reco
n.endacions concerning
trair.ing and/cr safety issues; and (4)
provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed
necessary.
The use of deadly force in this
evaluated by SIRS members due to the sub incident was not
ject
sustained as a result of an accidn disch ’s injuries being
arge. Members
discussed the possibility that SAl
Idid
not fully engage the
safety on his weapon. While conducting
the investigation,
members of the Shooting Incident Resp
onse
demonstration to show the ease with whic Team were provided a
h the selector switch of
the M4 can be inadvertently moved from “safe
” to “fire.” The
Critical Iricider,t Response Group represe
ntative advised that it
i the user’s responsibility to know and
be in charge of the
selective safety switch of a weapon.
It was also noted by
members that an analysis of the weapon deter
:,ç
mined the weapon
functioned properly.
cussion resulted in the
recommendation that SAl
Ibe censured, suspended from duty
for a period of three days, and receive docu
mented remedial
firearms training for his neglect in pra
cticing routine firearms
safety procedures.
During the lengthy discussion of this
incident, several
observations were made regarding the
actions of the A/SWAT TL,
the independent decision making by par
tici
in deviating from the arrest plan, and thepants in the incident
lack of assertiveness
on the part of Executive Management (EM).
Add
itionally, comments
were made regarding the use of a “canned”
Operations Plan which
contained language that was not included
deadly force policy. Members also obse in the FBI’s current
rved that it may be more
operationally desirable for the SAC
to assign the SWAT TL to
Headquarters City.
Members discussed the fact that
I
was advised by ASAC Eaton during the init A/SWAT TLI
ial meeting regarding
the SWAT operation that he did not want
the SWAT Team approaching
or entering the residence in an attempt
to arrest the fugitive.
ASAC Eaton emphasized to the attendees that
the plan needed to
concentrate on arresting the fugitive
outside or away from the
residence.
Additionally, during his review of
the initial
Operations Plan provided, ASAC Eaton mad
e significant changes
including removing a statement that the
SAC had authorized
additional SWAT techniques such as com
promise authority and flash
bang devices in the event of a hostage
rescue since no authority
had been requested or approved.
During the pre-brief meeting,
ASAC Eaton and SSAI
lierbally reiterated to the SWAT Team
that plans did not include going up to or
into the residence to
arrest the fugitive. ASAC Eaton also
stated that he did not
specifically delegate an execute order
however, it was understood that spottingto a specific individual;
the subject leaving the
residence would serve as a green light
for the SWAT Team to

6

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Directcr Office
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t
297—HQ--Al27l966—D

From:

lC/25/2C5

Inspection

effect’
I arrest. Additionally, although not specifically
conveyed to AWAT Ti
icr zh SWAT Tear, ASAC Eaton
epeoted A/TIJ
Ito OiV€ th “go r” to the SWAT Team
upon hearing from either SAl
Jor SAl
hat the
subject was outside of the residence.
.SAC Eaton then heard a radio transmissio
n by
Icalling for the SWAT Team to move in
because he
obtained consent from the owner to
enter the house and that the
owner confirmedi
Iwas inside the residence alone.
This
transmission led to ASAC Eaton believin
g the fugitive was out of
the residence; however, upon arrivin
g at the development, he
viewed the SWAT Team getting out of
the truck and approaching the
residence.
ASAC Eaton commented to SSAI
Ithat what they were
viewing was not part of the Operationa
l Plan.

SAL

According to. A/SWAT TLI
ISigned Sworn
Statement, during the meeting with EM
reg
the plan was to block the subject’s veh arding the operation,
icle in its parking place
and grab the subject between the vehicle
and the house. He
advised that there may have been disc
ussion of making the arrest
by entering the house, but that was not
the preferred means of
effecting the arrest.
SAl
ladvised that he did not
recall specific directions from any EM per
sonnel regarding
entering the residence.
He also stated normal procedure was
to
attempt to grab a subject outside, then
attempt to call him oi.t,
then enter the premises only as a las
t resort.
SA[
I
further stated that upon being informe
d that the owner of the
house was not to be allowed to enter the
subject’s arrest based on direction pro residence prior to the
vided by the Chief
Division Counsel h h1ied the res
triction complicated the
arrest plan.
SAl
ladvised that
I
would see the owner being detained by polhe was concernedi
were in the area and would shoot at law ice and realize poL.ce
enforcement personnel on
the scene through the window or atte
mpt to escape throuah he
back of the house.
With this edict in iind, SAl
Ifelt
he needed to develop a way to continue
the operation. He
instructed the team members inside
the SWAT truck to develop a
plan for entering the subject residence
in case the plan of
detaining the subiect on the way to
his vehicle had to be
abandoned.
SAl
[ventually instructed the team to
get
reav to qo in the house without contact
ing ASAC Eaton or
SSAI

I

These actiorTs resulted in the observ
ation by SIRG
members that no individual had control
of the situation, the
ASAC’s instructions were not followed,
and some of the
participants were making independent
decisions.
Members also
opined that the ASAC was not suffic
iently assertive with his
instructions and the A/SWAT TI. acted
outside the scope of his

7

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Director’s Office
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271966-D, 10/25/2005

duties.
These connents and concerns wJi be disc
ussed with the
SAC of the Tampa ivision.
SIRG members unanimously agreed
jshould
be censured, suspended from duty for ape that
rio
d
of
hre
e
day
s, and
receive documented remedial firearm trai
s
ning for his neglect in
practicing routine firearms safety
procedures.
7

8

Savage-1926

L

 S

Th:
Re:

Director Office
s
T
27—HQ—Al27l96E—D,

From:
Thspection
ID/2E/2005

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

DIV:sioN

INSPECTION

AT PD

That SAl
Ibe censured and susDended from
duty for a period of three days
for his failure to employ routine
firearms safety procedures.
Additionally, SAl
Ishould
receive remedial firearms trai
ning
firearms and this training should regarding proper handling of
be properly documented.
Set Lead 2:

(Action)

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE
AT OPR FO, DC
That the Adjudication Unit, OPR
, include in the SAC’s
copy of the letter of suspension
, the need for remedial firearm
s
training fcr SAl
Iregarding the proper handling of
weapons.
Additionally, the letter should
advise that this remedial
training should be properly docu
mented and that a copy of the
documentation should be forwarde
d to the SIRG Chairman upon
completion
-

1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

—
-

-

—
-

-

-

—

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Cloyd, Room 7825
Ms. I
SDO.J
Mr. I
I, USDOJ
Room 7837
Mr. Manning, Roo
n lO45
1
(Attention:
Mr.I
Mr. Rooney, Room 5155
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mx.
uantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
uantico
Ms.
7326
Mrs.
1
Room 7861

Ms.

I

4,

9

Savage- 1927

 (Rev. Ot-312OO3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEST
IGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

Frozn:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Appzoved By:

B1 n

07/08/2005

AD Charlene B. Thornton
xtension 1837

ndrew R III

Drafted By:
Case ID

#: 297—HQ—A1271898—D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHOENIX DIVISION
09/15/2004

lrr

ynopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurre
d on 09/15/2004, involving Spe
Agent (SA)
1 During the execution of an arrest cial
warrant, S.
one round from his Bureau-issued
Colt Model
M4LE, 223 caliber carbine inju
ring a subject attempting to
flee.
SIRG members_recommended that
no administrative action be
taken
against SAl
las a result of his involvement
in this shooting
incident.
Adutinistrative:
Reference report of Assistant
Special Agent in
Charge (ASAC) Paul S. White
of the New Haven Division, date
d
09/19/2004.
Details:
This communication was prepared
to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recomm
endations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned sho
oting.

Savage-1928

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Inspection From
Inspection
297-HQ—A127l898--D, 07/08/200
5
Details of the Shoot.ng Inciden
t

On 09/p9/2na4. th Phcpni fliyisiçn
irdtiated an
investigation oni
aridi
I
Both individuals were rnemer
I
s oz the Ranch Rescue, a
paramilitary, anti-government,
nec—nazi group who patrols private
property along the United Sta
tes/
tew Mexico, Arizona, and Califor Mexican border in Texas,
nia.
Law enforcement personnel
were aware of the fact that mem
r
bers of the Ranch Rescue were
heavily armed and hostile tow
ard Federal law enforcement
officers.

The case was initiated as a res
ult of an encounter
between members of the Ranch Res
cue and the United States Bor
Patrol (tJSBP).
der
On 08/13/2004, USE Agents ini
tiated a vehicle
stop involving a minivan susjwtd ? of
mncTrH.ng.
The driver of
the van, later identified as
refu
sed to pull
I
over although marked USBP units
had their emergency lights and
Mrpn.c jvated.
As the USBP Agents attempted the
vehicle stop,.
I
lIed them to a compound in Doug1as
,in
na.
hich was
occupied by members of the Ranc
h Rescjie.
Asi
Iturned
into the Ranch Rescue gated dri
eway,
armed with a
rifle, was observed inside the
gate. 1
exited his
vhic1 and began yelling
at the USBP Agents and instruc
ted
I
land others in the surrounding.
area to, ‘
maintain your
1
position and cover down on the
Agents.” The USBP Agents beli
I
eved
Iwas ordering Ranch Rescue mem
bers to maintain their
tactical position and prepare
to
for their lives, the USBP Agents shoot at the agents. Fearing
sought cover behind their
vehicles and called for backup
from
the tJSBP and the Cochise
County Sheriffs Office.
Before the arrival of assistan
ce,
propped his weapon and adhered
I
to instructions issued by
tne u1? Agents.
As a result of this incident, an
arrest warrant
was issued forj
I
*

I Several meetings were held with Agents of
Sierra Vista RA, the Tucson RA,
th
and Executive.Management to
discuss plans for the arrest od
I In a 09/13/2004
meeting, a decision was made
to utilize the Special Weapons
and
Tactics (SWAT) Team to conduc
t the
Furthermore, it was
decided that the arrest would not arrest.
be effected at the Ranch Rescue
compound in order to avoid a
standoff situation.
A decision was made that the
SWAT Team would locate to
the Motel 6 in Douglas, and imm
ediately respond when they were
notifiedi
Ihad left the compound.
FB Agents monitoring
2

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I

Inspection From
297—HQ—A1271898—D,

Inspection
07/08/2005

th c’omDound were to report
directly to the SWAT Team upon
Ideparture from the compound.
It was also decided
the meeting that a SWAT Team brie
fing would be held on Tuesday, at
09/14/2004, and a full briefing
would be held for all law
enforcement personnel involved in
the situation on 09/15/200
4.

On 09/14/2004, a SWAT Team brie
fing was conducted by
SJ
I Of the four
par
tic
iatino Aaents not
preserrt at the meeting, only
one, SAl
Iwas
scheduled for duty on the firs
t day of the operation. An
operations order was written
which was general in nature
4thout
specific duty assignments as team
rotated in and out after several members would vary and. would be
days.
5kI
Ireviewed the
operations order with .the team
during the Phoenix briefing,
also read the Sierra Vista ope
and
rations order section which
provided subject and case infb
rmation Tm mmers were show
rhMrryrnhg g,f
n
the ranchcomround and
I as well as
I
ssooiates.
SAI
‘also read the recently
revi,sed Deadly Force Policy
to all attendees.
It should also be
noted the operation schedule incl
ude
d
the
assi
gnm
ent of a
certified SWAT Team Emergency
Me
team while stationed in Douglas dical Technician (EMT) with the
.
However, due to the
unvailabi4ty of two certifi
ed
SWAT
EMTs on 09/15/2004.,
SAl
ladvised the team he would
act as the EMT since he was
a ertified EMT while attending
coll
ege
, although not recertified
since that time.
On 09/15/2004, a second briefing
was conducted at
Sierra Vista RA where a case
overview and a tactical overvie the
w
were provided to participants.
The briefing covered specifics
the arrest
-miof
hi-1uding photographs and
the crirriinal
history of L
•1 articipants were advised
I
corsidered armed and extreme
ly dangerous and was wanted for 1was
Assaulting a Federal Officer.
Information was provided reg
arding
I
Iprevious felony convictions and
attendees, were
provided the latest intelligenc
e as a result of the monitoring
the ornoound.
of
Specific information provided
uded the fact
thati
I and his associates had conducincl
ted firearms
training with long guns at the
ranch and it was believed they
were in possession of grenad
es, weapons, and improvised exp
devices.
losive
At approximately 3:00 p.m., SAl
}ield a briefing
with the SWAT Team at the L’otel
6.
Duri
ng
the
brie
fing, team
members were reminded to wear
their ballistic vests and hand
guns
from 6:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m.,
each day while on station.
The
arrest plan w dsicrnd to
utilize three SWAT vehicles, and
would allow I
Ito enter
to, set up AT vehie1e around whatever establishment he went
his vehicle, and effect the
arrest afterl
lexited the establishment.

3

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1b70

lb 6
lb 70

 -*

To:
Re:

—

ts..

—

.a..Lt....j.

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—MQ—A1271898—D, 07/08
/2005

At aooroximatly 10:12
the Command Post was
notified thai
Iwere observed getting into
van and leaving the com I and
a
pound.
iwas also advised of
the information and ihstructe SA I
d another Ag “
together. As the SWAT
the SWAT Team
Team assembled, SAl
linstructed the
driver of the SWAT van to
proceed to the Safeway par
he also contacted ASAC RQ
lan 3. Miqnone of the sub king area and
movement. As I
jects’
iparked in the Safeway par
lot near the position of landi
king
the SWAT van, a positive
identification
was made of both subjects.
SAl
Jdrove his vehicl to the
parking lot and positioned
it, front bumper to front
I
bumper,
I vpn. Ançther Bureau
vehicle was positioned to with
south of I
the
Ivan.
SAl
Las instructed to re
position the SWAT van so
the sliding door on the
passenger side
was facing away from the
subject vehicle to allow
to exit the van out of
the.arrest team
the sight of the subjec
ts and approach
them from behind.
At approximately
the subjects were exiting 11:15 P..r participants were advised
the.store
As
the SWAT van,
cornmard wa aiven. tç exe they proceeded behind
cute the arrest of
tandl
I SAJ
lactivated his vehicle
emergency lights while additio
nal agents exited the
of the van.
back and side
SAl
Iwas thfirst of the
door with SAl
rear
Idirectly behind him.
S.
his
Iha
ed oni
d
J, who was standing to the left of
I
I. SAl
iyelled, “FBI — Get on the
now!” SA
ground
hailed, “FBI!
FBI!
Get down, get down, get
As SAl
down.”
lobserved both pusoects str
ting to run toward
I
Ivan, he sawl
Ipush a shopping cart away
from himself, turned, arid
hunched something toward the
with his left hand.
Agents
SAl
ladvised he believedi
making a tactical_move
Iwas
to buy time ijo ao for
sidearit.
According to SAl
I he observed SAl
Ick asi
threw something at him and
I
also observed I
Ireach down with
his left hand to his lef
t hip as if going for a gun
holster.
from a
Fearing for his safety, as
well
Agents SAl
1
jf ired one shot resulting in as the safety ef othe
an injury tol__
I
Jwas subsequently handcu
ffed and provided immediate _____
attention by paramedics.
medical
iwas transported to the
University Medical Cente I
r where he underwent surger
the bullet.
y to remove

I

I Cochi
investigation was conducte se County Attorney, advised no
d
regarding the shooting inc by the Douglas Police Department
ident, and he had no intent
ion of
initiating an investigation
into the incident.
Therefore, his
office would not provide
a
presented with a case. On prosecutive opinion unless he was
03/02/2005, a declination
prosecution was received
from the United States Dep of
artrnen.t of
Savage-1931

 ___

___

___

___

___

___

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271898—D,

Iz:ispection
07/08/2005

Justice, Civil Rights
Division, regarding
his weapon in this inc
SAl
ident.

I

ldischarge of

On 04/25/2005, the SIR
G met to discuss the
captioned shooting inc
above—
ident.
Deputy Assistant Dir
Andrew R. Bland, III,
ect
or
(DAD)
Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting
with the following vot
ing members of the SIR
G in attendance:
I Pri .Attornv.
civil Rights Division,
Section, USD03, I
Criminal
I flniii-u ‘hf.
Section, Criminal Div
Security
ision,
Inspector, Office of
[Chief
Inspections,.Inspection
Charles J. Rooney, Sec
Div
,;J
tion Chief (SC), Opr.1nn ision;
T iinnOrt
Section, Criminal Invest
k7c
igative Division; I
Chief (UC), Firearms
I Unit
Training Unit, Training
Division (TDD)
and Development
tic I
INational Fir
TDD; Acting SC
ms Program,
1
I Special Inquiry and ear
Background Investigatio
Genera.
ns Unit, Administra
tive Services Division;
Supervisory Special Age
nt (SSA)I
Toolmarks Unit, Scien
I Firearms tific Analysis Section,
SSA
Laboratory Division;
Investigative Law Un
Generai counsei (cXU);
it, Office of the
and’SSAj
F41d Off i.
Iwashington
Thø only non—votin
g attendee present
wasManagement Program An
alyst,
Management Unit, Offic
e of Inspections, Inspec Inspection
tion Division.

usj;1

_)

Observations and Recom
mendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the
above—synopsized incide
the intent to:
nt with
(1) evaluate the applicati
on of. deadly force;
,(2) provide the Director
with an evaluative ana
observations, and rec
lysis,
ommendations for correc
tive actions from an
operational standpoint
(if any); (3) provide
concerning training
recommndations
and/or safety issues;
and (4) provide
recommendations forad
ministrative action if
,deemed necessary.
STR(Z mmhr iinjni
force by cI_______________ mously agre.ed that the use of deadly
justified and in con
the deadly force polic
formance with

y.

Members made several obs
ervations regard
incident in the areas
of pre-brief meeting. attend ing the
presence of certified
ance and the
EMT personnel on the sce
ne.
According to
I Signed Sworn Statement, he
did not attend the Tue SAl
sday Irifina rçgarding
. the potential
arrest of the subjects.
Iprovided no reason for
absence at the first bri SAl
his
efing; however;. he adv
the operational order
ised he reviewed
on his e-mail and knew
hear the final briefi
he would be able to
ng in Sierra Vista.
Members opined
attendance should be ma
ndatory in all pre-briefing
s for

5

Savage-1932

70

 ..

To
Re

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271898—D, 07
/08/2005

participants in SWAT
op
Discussion wit
Operations Unit, Criti erations.
cal Incident Response Gro h the SWAT
up, disclosed
standard operating proced
pre—operational briefing ures call for participants to attend all
s
changes or modifications to ensure personnel are aware of any
to the original operatio
ns plan.

The second obser
absence of certified EMT vation of the SIRG related to the
personnel on the scene.
that current certified
Members cpined
EMT personnel should hav
especially considering
e been mandatory
the subjects’ propensity
These obsérvations will
for violence.
be brought to the atten
Special Agent in charge
tion of the
of the Phoenix Division
to ensure this
type of situation does
not recur.

6

Savage-1933

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271898--D,

Set Lead 1:

Inspection
07/08/2005

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That flQ administrative
action be taken against
las a result of his discha
rge of his weapon in
this shooting incident.

SAl

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1,1
1

—

-

—

-

—

-

—

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

1-Mr.I

1
1

—

—

Ms.

Mrs.

Pistole, •Room 7142
Caproni, Room 7427
Bland, E(oom 7825
IJSDOJ
_L USDOJ
7837
Roonev. Room 5155
Quantico
Quantico
Ouantico
Room 7326
Room 7861

4+

Savage-1934

 C

(Ret. (i-3)-2OO3

FEDERAL BUREAU O
F INVESTIGATION

Precedence:

To:
cm:

Rou::Ns

Date:

Insnection

ILttn:

nspection
Contact:

Approved By:

‘

I
Drafted By:

AD Charlene B. crn
toS’
Extension 4-1837

Daniel ‘e

I

Case ID 4: 297—HQ—
A1271903—D
Title:

Iirr

SHOOTING INCIDENT
R:cHMOND DIVISION
__,,

IC/19/20C5

b7C

‘-

Synopsis: The Shoo
tin
shooting iqcid th g Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
at occurredL on 95/14/
Agent (SA) I
2004, involving Soec a
ial
SA
I
l
If
ired on
Bureau—issued 10 mill
his
imeter MP—5 carbine ki e round
Sweeting
lling Glen Joseph
was identified as a
major supplier of he
Richmond area.
roin
SIRG members_recomm
ended that no administ in the
act±on be taken agai
rative
nst SAl
las a result of his in
this shooting incide
volvement in
nt.

from

who

Ainistrative; Reference report of
dated 05/28/2004
.

Inspector

I

I

Details:
This communicatiota wa
s prepared to furn
analysis, comments,
ish the
and recommendation
s of the SIRG with
reference to the ca
ptioned shooting.
Details

of

the Shooting Incide
nt

Agents of the Richmo
nd Division were co
investigation into th
nducting an
e drug trafficking
Sweeting, who had be
activities of Glen
Jo
en identified as a
major supplier of he seph
in the Richmond, V
irainia, area.
roin

T

I

11

I Additionally, inve
stigation determin
relative of Sweetin
ed a
g had been recently
arrested with four
of cocaine and $400
kilos
,000 in currency.
The Drug Enforceme
(DEA) in Richmond ta
nt Agency
rgeted several asso
ciates of Sweeting
held in abeyance seve
and
ral arrests of thes
e individuals to en
the FBI investigatio
sure
n of Sweeting was
no
the totality of thes
Based on
e circumstances, an t jeopardized.
authorization from th
d
e Assistant United with verbal
States Attorney fro
m the

Savage- 1935

h3

‘—

 To:
Re:

Inspection Erom:
D97-HQ—l27l903—,

:nspecti
:C/1;23C5

Eastern District o
V
Swee:ino for io tio ±rcnia, a decision was made to arrest
n ci Tite 21, Unite
841(a) (i and 846.
d States Code, Secti
Se
on
Sweating’s residence arch warar.ts were also obtained for
as wsll as :ne re
sidences ci three cl
associates.
ose
Investigatio
Richmond area from Newn revealed Sweeting returned to the
York on 03/13/2304
shipment of heroin
and planned to conduc , where he obtained a
t a drug transactio
one of his associat
n with
es
Based on this inform
anticipated Sweeting .
ation, it was
would be arrested
with his associat
following this meeti
ng
e;
he stopped at a residhoever, upon returning to the Richmond
area,
ence in ?owhatan, V
irginia, which was
described as an isola
ted rural area.
Surveillance was in
on the Powbatan resid
itiated
transaction with his ence where it was determined the drug
as
so
ci
ate would not occur
following day, 05/14
un
/20
Upon receipt of this til the
surveillance was termi 04.
information,
initiate surveillanc nated and a plan was developed to re
e
on
Sw
eating at the Powbata
6:00 a.m. on 05/14/20
n location at
would be arrested an 04. A determination was made that Sw
eetin
d related search warra
nts would be effect g
ed.
A meeting was sched
uled for 5:00 a.m.
the chesterfield Co
on 05/14/2004, at
unty Police Departmen
brief participants
on the arrest and sea t (CCWP) substa.tiçn to
briefing, participa
rch plan.
During the
nt
“Armed and Dangero s were advised Sweeting should be co
ns
us due to his known
propensity for viol idered
ence.
Due to an interruptio
n in aeria
surveillance of Sw
eeting at the Powhata l coverage during the
was unknown.
n residence, his lo
Later in the morning
cation
Sweeting’s vehicle
at his residence in
was located
Chesterfield County,
investigation deter
Virginia, and
mi
to conduct the drug ned Sweating would be leaving his resid
transaction with hi
ence
s associate.
In order to
operation plan was mo avoid a barricade situation, the initi
al
Sweating after he de dified to conduct a traffic stop and
parted his residen
arrest
ce and prior to his
approaching the main
roa
(SWAT) Team Leader pro d. The Special Weapons and Tactic
s
each SWAT team memb vided specific and detailed instruc
tions to
er. The plan included
vehicles to set pa
the use of two SW
rallel on each side
AT
of the road with a
marked unit between
CCPD
them. Anothei Burea
SWAT team member, wa
s tasked with establ u vehicle, occupied by a
ishing, surveillance
Sweating and notifyi
ng the two SWAT ve
on
hicles when he left
residence. Addition
hi
al
s
ly
,
th
is vehicle was to pu
Sweeting once he ha
ll behind
d passed and act as
a blocking vehicle.
plan called for Swee
tin
enforcement personnel g to be “boxed in” in order for law The
him and place him un to call him out of his vehicle, hand
der arrest.
cuff

Savage- 1936

 To:
Re;

:nspection Fror:
27HQ—Ai27l302—D,

nspection
:C/1912005

Once Sweatin
:Dcation, the CC?D ma g approached the anticipated &rreso
its lights and siren rked unit pulled in front of him, activat
ed
, nn the two SWAT vehi
side of the suhjec
c.es pulled ang ea
t vehicle.
ch
Th
e SWAT vehicles iden
themselves as FB an
tIfied
d issued commands to
place Sweeting unde
arrest.
Sweeting stopped his
r
vehicle for a mome
up at a high rate of sp
nt, began backing
ee
d
ste
er
ing around
vehicle, and complet
ed a 180 degree turn hethe blocking SWAT
ad
of his residence. On
e of the SWAT vehicles ing in the direction
vehicle in an attem
pt to cut him off resulti overtook Sweeting’s
striking the SWAT ve
ng in Sweeting
hi
Sweating’s vehicle on cle. A second SWAT vehicle engaged
the passenger side ca
become entwined at th
using both vehicles
e
to
progress of Sweating’s front wheel well. Although forward
vehIcle was impeded,
forward.
it continued to push
Sweeting then attempt
ed to bqck_his vehi
engine revving and tir
cle with the
es spinning.
SAl
passenger seat cf the
located in the
vehicle that overtoo
ic the subject_vehi
After Sweating’s vehi
cle.
cl
the passenger side win e rated the Bureau vehicle, SAl
ad
dow
dow
n
an
d
wa
s
looking directly at
Sweta who was ye
1
lling and screaming in
a state of rage.
SAl
Iwhc was yelling for
Sweating to stop th
aware of what Sweatin
e car, was not
g
Duina .his time c.h
team Agents exited th was saying.
er SWAT
eir vehicles.
SAl
vehicle alongside the
lobserved another
SWAT
passenger’s side of
the marked CCPD unit
behind Sweating’s ve the subjeç icie arid
hicl
observed tearp mers
SA
laiso
on foot to the left an e.
vehicle. SAl
d right or nis Burea
Ibelieved Sweeting’s
u
vehicl
contained and placed
a direct threat of im e was no longer
himself as well as the
mi
SWAT team members en nent danger to
enforcement personne
foot and other law
l taking cov hind
their respective
vehicles. With this
in mind, SAl
1 fired one round trom
NP-S striking_Swee
ting in the chest.
Immediately after fir his
the shot, SAl
ing
Iobserved Sweeting lear
vehicle in park.
Sweating looked at SA forward and put the
l
issue the coimuand, “l
Iwho continued to
et
see your hands,” w
focus his weapon on the me
hile contin
sn
As a SWAT team memb uing to
approached the vehicl
lobserved Sweating co er
the vehicle engine be e SN
nvulse and
ga
opened the subject ve n revving again. The SWAT team member
hicle door, turned the
7c
requested a medic.
engine off, and
Sweeting was pronoun
ced dead at the scene
,
t should be noted that
law
enforce
the scene were not aw
are of the presence of ment personnel at
son, who was in the ba
Sweeting’s 4—year ol
ck
the subj act had been sh seat of the subject yehicle, until af d
ter
ot.
-

iwas

On 05/06.12
received from the Un005, a declination of prosecution was
ite
Rights Division, rega d Sta’t Dntment of Justice, Civil
rd
lactions
incident. On 06/16/20 ing SAl
04, this incident was in this shooting
presented to a loca
l

3

Savage- 1937

 __

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

_

c
Re

Ispect:o”
Fror
:-sDect...
29—HQ—tll933—,
49/D3C5
grand _ry aa a No
Tr€
as retrieQ
crarqes b’a fed

no crrnal

On 06/02/2D
caDt.o-1eo shootg ..c05, te SRG ‘net to
z—acert
C”_ef :nsoectcr
Off.ce of :nspecE_ors,
Inspect_or D_v_s_
wsth the follo..ing
votirg memoers of th on, ca.red the meetIng
e SRG - attencance
I
I
rvi_ Ra&ts v_si
Sect_on, 3SDCJ,
on, Cr.zr_nal
I Deity Ch
Section, Criminal D_v
ief, Do’esttc Secur.t
sa
o, tJSDCJ, Cnarles
y
C]-ief (SC>
3 Pooey, Sector
Or-c’r1_Suooo
rt Section,
Djvj.sjon, i
Cri’rirl Investigativ
a Unit Chiez (UC),
e
Training arLd Develop
ment Divisior (TDD
Unit,
Soecial Wea.oons and
;
Tactics Operations U UCI
Response Group; UCI
nit, Critical Incide I
nt
I CD-6A, Counterinte
Division; UCI
lligence
!Na:onal Firearms Prog
Supervisory Specia Ag
ram, TDD;
l
ent (SSA) I
oative LaV Unit, O
:nvti
I
ffice of the General
[
L
Manager, Operationa Counsel (OGC); SSA I
1
l Skills Unit, TD
1
D; and SSA
Firearms
I
To
olm
ark
s
Unit, Scientific A
Section, Laboratory D
nalysis
i’ion. The two nonv
present were 1
oting attendees
Inspector
I. Office of Inspec
Inspection Division
tions
andi
Analyst, Inspection ;
I Management Progrart ,
Management Unit, ot
Inspection Division
ice of Inspections,
.
--

—

Observations and Re
commendations of th
e SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the

above-s
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the appl ynopsized incident with
ication, of deadly
provide the Director
force; (2)
with an evaluative
and recommendation
s for corrective actio analysis, observations,
ns from an operatio
standpoint (if any);
na
training and/or safe (3) provide recommendations concerning l
ty issues; and (4) pr
for administrative ac
ovide recommendati
tion if deemed nece
ons
ssary.
Du-ring the discussio
n of this sh
member_opined his co
ncerns regarding the ooting incident, one
SAl
use of deadly forc
I One DQJ repr
e
the subject intentionaesentative advised that it did not ap by
pear
lly
ram
me
d his vehicle and th
movements were made
at no furtive
by
th
e
su
sp
ec
t.
However, after a le
discussion and emph
ngthy
asi
scene believed if Sw s placed on the fact that personnel
on the
ee
tin
gs
ve
hicle became disenga
SWAT vehicle lives wo
ged from the
uld be in imminerrt
danger cf
injury or death, the
SIRG
-d a unanimous co serious bodily
use of deadly force
nclusion that the
by SA I
kas justified and
with the deadly forc
in conformance
e policy.
This disc
recommendation by
SIRG members that no ussion resulted in a
administrative actio
should be taken agai
n
involvement in this nst SAL
s a result of his
shooting incident.
4

Savage- 1938

7C

,

6

 To
Re:

nspec:ion Frot:
297—H—I2729C3—D,

IflSOCCtOfl
ZO/9/20C5

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

(Action)

S?ECTIO

AT WASHNGTON, DC
SA I
incident.

1

—

1

-

1

-

1
1
1

-

1

-

3.
3.
1
1
3.
1
1.
1

—

-

-

—
—

—

-

-

-

Tha no admLnistrativ
e action be taken ag
ainst
las a result

of his involvement
in this shootino

Mr. Pistole, Room 714
2

Ms. Caproni, Room 742
7

t1r. Cloyd, Room 7825
IUSDOJ
USDOJ
L Room 7837
ir. Manning, Roopi 1B
045
(Attention: Mr.I__
_________
Mr. Rooney, Room 5155
r.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
uantico
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
iantico
Ms.
7326
Mrs.
Room 7861
Ms.
Mr.
Ms.

+4

5

Savage- 1939

c4

—

 __
__
__

(Rev. 01.31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREA
U OF INVESTIGA
TION

Precedence:

To:
From:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection
Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Attn:

03/15/2006

AD Charlene B. Th
ornton

I

Thornton Cha
Cloyd Daniel

Drafted By:

e B
rr

Case ID #: 297—H
Q—A1271741—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDEN
T
LOS ANGELES DIVI
SION
06/0272004

Synopsis:
The Shooting Inci
dent Revie
a shooting incide
nt jhat occurred on w Group (SIRG) reviewed
Spçcial agents
q6/02/2004, invo
(SAs)I
lving
SAl
Lnd I
I fired two shots
an
d
I
SAl
their Bureau—iss
Jfired one shot
ued Colt M—4, A—
fro
m
who robbed a ba
i
Carbines at four
nk.
subjects
SIRG members rec
administrative
ommended that
action be taken
no
against SAs I
a result of thei
landi
r involvement in
las
this shooting in
cident.
Administrative:
Reference report
in Charge Herbert
of Assistant Sp
ecial Agent
M. Brown, dated
07/15/2004.
Details:
This co
‘analysis, comm mmunication wa prepared to fu
ents, and recom
rnish the
men
reference to th
e captioned shoo dations of the SIRG with
ting.
DetaiLs of the
Shooting Incide
nt
The Los Angeles
Fi
el
d Office (LAFO)
squad was conduc
bank robbery
ting an investig
ation involving
individuals asso
a group of
ciated with seve
ral
armed robberies.
Investigation de takeover bank and business
planning a robb
termined the crew
ery of the Los
was
Angeles Nationa
Buena Park, Cal
l Bank located in
ifornia.
The bank robber
y squad solicite
the Special Wea
d the assi
pons and Tactics
(SWAT) Team as w stance of
Angeles Police De
ell
p’artment (LAPD)
.
intervene and st
The SWAT team.w as the Los
op the subjects
as asked to
should they make
rob the bank and
an attempt to
officers of the
LAPD were asked
to surveil

Savage- 1940

 To:
Re:

Inspection From
:
297—HQ—A1271741—D Inspection
, 03/15/2006

the main subjec
ts who were livin
g in the are-a
Los Angeles.
Surveillance by
of South Central
the SWAT Team an
conducted on fiv
d the LAPD was
e occasions, ho
wever, no attempt
rob the bank.
s were made to
On 06
assistance from /02/2004, the bank robbery squad
both entities.
requested
park located, ne
ar the bank where A briefing was conducted at a
subjects and in
photographs of po
ve
tential
Team Agents were stigative updates were provided
. The SWAT
advised the subj
obtain weapons an
ects were attempt
d vehicles to co
operational plan
mmit the bank ro ing to
The
prevent a robber for the SWAT Team was to interv bbery.
y
en
failed to stop th of the bank. Additionally, if e and
felony stop on th e robbery, the SWAT Team was to the team
e subject vehicl
perpetrators.
e and arrest the conduct a
•

SA5I
landi
surveilling the
Iwere together in
ba
a
received informat nk. At approximately’ 11:00 a.m vehicle
ion that the su
., the Agents
ammunition, and
all of the peop bjects had obtained a weapon,
commit the robb
le and vehicles
er
they needed to
subjects leaving y. Additionally, the LAPD ob
se
rved the
So
ut
h
Central Los Angel
heading in the di
es in three vehi
rection ot the
cles
bank.
As effo
vehicles for ve rts were being made to repositio
hi
n the FBI
past and proceede cle stops, one of the subject
ve
d
hicles drove
in
to
th
e
w
est exit of the
parking lot. A
bank
lot advised they SWAT vehicle which was placed in ’s north
had a clear vi
the parking
subject van.
Information was sual on the actions of the
relayed that ther
black males in
e
th
parking slot on e subject van which had been ba were four
the north side
cked into a
of the bank near
SWAT Agents also
th
ad
e entrance.
vi
se
d
th
ey observed a si
revolver in the
lver colored
hand of one of
veiicle.
the subjects when
he exited the
SWAT Agents loca
ted in the park
subjects enter
ing lot observed
th
two
The fourth subj e bank, followed by one other
ect stayed with
in
the van during th dividual.
e robbery.
SAsI
la
nd
i
If
ollowed two addi
vehicles which we
tional SWAT’
behind an adjace re positioned on the north side
nt building. Th
of the bank
the building an
d out of sight of e three vehicles waited behind
was made that on
ce the subjects the subject van. A decision
subject van was
moving, the threefinished the robbery and the
the west exit of
SWAT vehicles
escaping. Agent the bank lot to block the subj would enter
s observed the
ec
suspects enter th ts from
e van which

2

Savage-1941

 To:
Re:

Inspection From
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271741— :
D, 03/15/2006

traveled westbou
nd towards the
three SWAT vehi
cles drove onto west exit of the lot.
The
the subject van
the lot in an at
tempt to block
with emergency from escaping.
lights activated, Upon seeing the SWAT vehicles
at a high rate
the subject van
be-gan driving
The first SWAT of speed in the direction of
th
ve
e
hi
SW
cl
AT vehicles.
e
sw
er
ve
d in front of
the van swerved
the subject van
causing damage to avoid being stopped.
as
The veh’icles ôo
to the left fron
ll
id
caused the subj
t
ed
of
both vehi
The impc
vehicle in the ect van to bounce sideways an cles.
d strike a park
-bank lot.
Additi
ed.
vehicle sudden
ly stopped, it’w onally, as the first SWAT
vehicle.
as rear—ended
by the second SW
AT
The su
first SWAT vehi bject van was able to squeez
wasdriveri in cle and the damaged parked vee between the
a
T)ie van
over a short w northwesterly direction whichhicle.
al
several other vel adjacent o an 1ley where caused it to go
the va
hicles.
SAl
subject van an
Ibegan a pursuit n struck
d
ob
se
of the
rv
ed
th
e vehicle stoi
ser c,i-1er
after hitting
vehicles and a
median in th
SAl
Ivehicle stoppe
d, he observed e street. As soon as
exiting the vehi
three o the oc
He saw the pass
cupants
begin to exit bucle.
enger in the fr
t could not se
ont seat
individuals had
e his hands.
Kno
unable to see th used a weapon while r9bbina th wing the
e bank and
e subject’s hand
as well as his
partner safety s, SAl
s
t
I
fearing for his
open window of
his vehicle in , fired two rounds through th
e
the direction
of the subject.
Simultaneously,
SI
on the passenge
bserved
r
vehicle stopped. side of the subject van op the sliding door
ening
He believed he
hands of a subj
saw something in as the SWAT
ect who was ex
one of the
iting the van.
he believed to
Upon seeing wha
be a handgun,
1b6
t
the SWAT vehicl
if ired one round
e’s open windowSAl
th
ro
ug
who began fallin
h
in thç directio
n of the subjec
g forward just
of his weapon.
t
as
SA
l
Ipul
The rounds fire
subject vehicle.
d by both Agent led the trigger
s impacted the
The four subjec
ts fled on foot
captured within
, howev
a few minutes
by members of th er, were
e SWAT Team.
On 10/13/2004,
the SIRG met to
captioned shootin
discuss the abov
e—
Office of Inspec g incident.
C
tions, Inspectiohief Inspector I
meeting witthe ô1
n Division, ch
1c.rinr vôtinci
aire
attendance: I
members of the d the
Division, USDO
1 Deputy Chief, CSIivRG in
J;l
il Rights
Security Section,
I Deputy qiief, Dom
estic
Assistant Sectio Criminal Division, tJSDO
J;I
n Chief, Opera
tional Support
section, rimin I
a1

3

Savage- 1942

1

 To:
Re

Inspection From
:- Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741
—D, 03/15/2006

Investigative
Division; My H
Processina ,
arrison, Sect
Section, Adm
1
inistrative Servi ion Chief, Apolicant
I
ces
Uni
Training anI.d D t Chief (tiC), National Fir Division;j
e
ev
el
op
m
en
t Division (TDD
CD—6B, Counter
);
in
te
ll
ig
en
ce
Division; SSA
Firearms
Toolm
Laboratory Div arks -Uni
s ec ion,
Training Unit, ision; SSA
Firearms
Unit, TD
Operational, Ski
TDD; SSA
lls
Firearms
and SSA________
National Firear Training Unit,
of the enera. _______________ Investigative ms Program, TDD;
.
Law Unit, Offic
present were___ ounse
________________ The two non—voting members e
Inspection 1ana
_ Management
Division; andl aement .Unit. Of fice of Insp Program Analyst,
ecti
Development In
I Intern, Lead ons, Inspection
stitute, Traini
ership
Quantico.
ng and Develop
ment Division,

I

—

‘

During the init
ial discussion
incident, SIRG
of
deadly force by members_unanimously_aqreed this shooting
that the use
SA
sI
la
conformance w
tias justified and of
ith the deadlyndi
in
force policy.
Further discus
sion
regarding the
incident which identified three areas of co
report.
ncern
were not addres
A requ
information in est was made to the LAFO to sed in the initial
provide additi
onal
was probable ca the following three areas:
us
1)
it appeared ther
e
to
arrest the subj
attempted bank
e
ects prior to
robbery.
the
Members wanted
of the United
to kn
S
the probable ca tates Attorney’s Office (EJSA ow the position
use and the gu
O) with respec
when the arrest
t
idance, if any,
given regardin to
of
th
e,
su
bjects was au
was probable ca
g
thorized; 2) .if
there
allowed to get use to arrest the individual
s, why were th
ey
law enforcemen inside the bank before any
t authorities;
action was take
different surv
n
an
d
by
3) why wer
ei
instead of one, llance teams, one FBI and e two distinctly
on
existed between if a surveillance/communicat e LAPD, utilized
ion problem
th
e
tw
o
teams, were the
with members of
te
am
s
th
“cross assign
e
LA
PD
and th
of the operatio
n, and how was e FBI, who had on—site comm ed”
and
surveillance/a
this effected du
ring the
incident evaluarrest, ad lastly, what was
th
tion of the
surveillance/arr e LAFO’s post—
est situation?
On 11/17/2004
, the SIRG met
the above-captio
to resume discus
ned shooting
si
I
incidentS
Former Chief In on of
spector
chaired the meeI Office of Inspections, In
sp
SIRG in attendanting with the following voti ection Division,
ng membe
Rights Division, ce: I
I Special Couns rs of the
tJSDOJ;
el, Civil
I
Deputy Chief,

4

Savage-1943

7

 To
Re

Inspection From
297-RQ—A1271741—
D,

Inspection
03/15/2006

Domestic Secur
it
Harrison, Form y Section, Criminal Divisio
er Section Chi
ef (SC), App n, USDOJ, My
Section, Admin
licant Processing
is
tr
at
iv
e
Servi
CD—6, Counter
intelligence D ces Divisi-on, Jay C Manni
ng, Sc,
iv
OoerationalSip
port Section, ision, Manuel E Mora, SC,
I
C
rim
in
al
In
vest
I Actina Urit C
TDD,I
hief (UC), Fire igative Division,
I
A
cting tJC, Natio arms Training Unit,
TDD, SSA
nal Firearms
Fi
Scientific Ana
Programr
I rearms
To
ol
m
’y
arks Unit,
si
s
S
ection
I
I Investigativ, Laboratory Division; SS
AI
e Law Unit
Counsel (OGC),
Office of the
and, SSAL
General
Office.
The only non—vo
IWashington_Fi
r6
tin
g
I
m
el
ember present
I Management Prog
wasi_______ d
ram Analyst,
Unit, Office of
Inspecti
Inspections, In
spection Divis on Management
ion.
During this m
eeting of the
from the LAFO
SIRG, copies of
w
an
to each of the ere circulated to members
containing resp e-mail
questions rais
onses
ed.
The LAFO advise
d the SIRG Cha
made an invest
irm
probable cause igative/prosecutorial decisi an that the USAO
on that not en
ex
is
te
d to.war
LAFO wa inst
ructed to cont rant arrest of the subjects ough
inue to monito
.
continue survei
The
r
arrest the su llance of the subjects, an the Title III,
d if, possible
bjects just pri
,
o
Additionally,
there was not r to committing a bank robb
ery.
arrest the su
sufficient prob
bj
probable cause ects prior to their arrival able cause to
subjects poss was not sufficient until it at the bank and
essed the tools,
was known that
the robbery.
weapons, and ve
th
hicles to com e
mit
Severa
brief. The fi l contingencies were discus
rs
the subjects ar t option was to do a felony sed at the SWAT
car stop prior
to attempt to rival at the bank.
to
The second cont
arrest the subj
ingency was
could be done
ects outside of
sa
the bank if it
Just prior to
determined that fely.
the robbery it
se
ve
n
su
bj
was
ects were drivin
were located in
g
time was it po five locations. According five vehicles and
ssible to effe
period of the
ct an arrest duto the LAFO, at no
robbery.
ring the stagin
g
Invest
drive around th igation determined that th
e subjects wer
e bank once p
e to
unexpectedly,
ri
the subjects in or to the robbery.
However,
the parking lo
si
de
th
e van im
t
to the back do through an exit only drivew mediately entered
or of the bank
ay
subject van, it
.
Based on the poand parked next
w
as
sitioning
im
po
ssib
prior to the
subjects ente le for a team to effect an of the
ring the bank.
arrest
a hostage situ
R
ation, the SW
AT operators wer ather than risking
e told to prep
are
—

I

5

Savage-1944

 To:
Re:

Inspection Fr
om
Inspecti
297—HQ—A1271741 :
—D, 03/13/20 on
Q6

to enter th
e ba
otherwise atte nk immediately if an em
er
mpt to stop
parking lot.
the vehicle p gency arose, but
rior to it leav
ing the
Regarding the
use of one FB
one LAPD surv
I
surveillance eillance team, the LAFO ad surveillance team and
team had succ
vised the LAPD
months and si
nce they were essfully surveilled the su
subject vehic
bjects for
familiar with
les, it was
better that th the subjects and
the subjects.
ey continue
tc’
Operations Gro It was also necessary to
have the FBI monitor
up
(S
OG) involved
and vehicles,
.Special
due to the nu
mber of subje
subjects were and to better coordinate
cts
th
advised that in the vicinity of the ba e arrests once the
nk.
there was not
The LAFO also
various enti
a lack of com
ti
had represen es and that all of the par munication between the
ta
was in contin tives at the FBI Tactica ticipating departments
l
uo
team, the FBI us communication with th Operations Center who
e LAPD survei
su
rv
ei
llance team,
llance
air units. A
the FBI SWAT
dditionally,
team, and FBI
the SI-RG was ad
Executive Manag
the operation ement had complete oversi vised that LAFO
ght and contr
s.
ol over
Lastl
that based up y, the LAFO’s post-inciden
on the totali
ty of the circ t analysis determined
of subjects,
the number of
umstances (the
the subjects,
vehicles, the
th
erratic beha number
e
lo
ca
tion of the su
entrance, and
vior of
bject vehicle
to the bank
arrest earlie absent approval from the
r)
(JS
robbery was th , the decision to arrest AO to effect the
e most viable
the subjects
public and law
af
op
enforcement pe tion to ensure the safety ter the
rsonnel.
of the
SIRG members
opined that th
addressed the
e LA
held on the m areas of concern and no fu FO sufficiently
atter.
rther discuss
ion was
Observations
arid Recommen
dations of the
SIRG
The SIRG review
ed the abovethe intent to
synops
:
(1) evaluate
(2) provide the
the applicatio ized incident with
n of deadly fo
D
irector with
observations,
rce;
and recommenda an evaluative analysis,
an operational
tions for co
recommendations standpoint (if any); (3) rrective actions from
provide
concerning
(4) provide re
commendations training and/or safety is
sues; and
deemed necessar
for administr
y.
ative action
if

6

—

Savage-1945

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Fr
Inspection
297—HQ-A127l om:
741-D, 03/1
5/2006

Aga
deadly force in, SIRG_members_unani
mously agreed
with the dea by SAsI
that the use
dly force po tandi
(was justifie
licy.
d and in co of
nformance
i)7C

Savage-1946

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Fr
Inspection
297—HQ—A127] om:
.741-D, 03/1
5/2006

LEAD(s)
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
-

T WASHINGTO
N,

-

DC
That no dd
ñjtrati

SAsL
v tio
be taken ag
land
involvement
a t
in this shooi
I as a result ofinti
ting inciden
eir
t.

L6

1
1
1
I
1
1
1
++

—

-

-

-

—

—

—

Mr. Pistole
,
Ms. Caproni, Room 7142.
Mr. Cloyd, Ro Room 7427
om 7825
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
Quantico
Ms.
Room 7326
Mrs.
[
I Room 7861

8

Savage-1947

  

FBI
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

2003 .

 

 

 

FD2O4 (Rev. 12-1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Iuvestigntion

Copy to:

oce: Oklahoma

Report oft

AIIEI

Date:

0l/0,uyg

CaseiD#:

297-HQ—A1271801—SUB 0

TiUe:

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT;
OKLAI4OMA CITY DIVISION;
l2/O8/200;
INSPECTION MATTER
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Chaxaoter

city

This Administrative Inquiry was initiated subsequent
to a shooting incident which occurred in Marietta,
Oklahoma, on the afternoon of 12/08/2003.

Sopss:

DETAILS:

]bo

On the morning of December 08, 2003, the Mar
I
Oklahoma Police Department CMPD) was contacted byl
I
Ia loril viticni-. who advised thati
I
taka, I
Iwas a convicted felon and
subject of an outstndina warrant issued in California for
a parole violation. I
1-i-a.

I

asl

!

I was

contactinq the MPD with this information

Ih,4 r.nl’lz mi-irihqp.

nietô1

pn

ammunition.

9hie docnnt contains neither recoenendatien. nor oono3.uaiona of the FRX • It is the propexty of the DZ
and is loaned to your agency; i.t and it. contents are not to he dietrihuted outside yau agency.

I

 1

.

.

297-RQ-A1278 01-SUB D

Should law enforcement confront him,I
istated he would not
surrender peacefully but go out in a “blaze of glory.
Based upon this information, I
I
Supervisor (Chief), MPD, conducted an inquiry to confirm the
outstanding warrant.
Thereafter, he telephonically contacted
the Ardmore Resident Agency (RA) to set up a meeting to formulate
a plan to locate and apprehend I
I
Upçn receint of the telephone call from Supervisor
SAl
I Ardmore RA, queried the FBI’ s
Automated Case System regarding I
Iwhich disclosed that
I
had previously been convicted of armed bank robbery. An
NCIC inquiry was then conducted which confirmed that a Federal
warrant, issued to the United States Marshal Service out of the
Central District of California, was outstanQina fo violations of
his Probation.
The inquiry disclosed thatl
!was considered
Armed & Dangerous and had violent tenc3encies.
SAl
then
telephonically contacted I
arole officer in California
who confiçmed the warrant for the probation_violation.
BA
I
Isubsequently contacted SSRL
Ito apprise him
of the information regarding
and that they would later be
traveling to Marietta to meet with

I

I

SAL

land SA[

,

Ardmore RA,

subsequently met with Supervinö1
lái Sheriff Joe
Russell, hove County, at a pre-deternthied service station in,

I

Marietta, OK, to further exchange information ansi develcm a
practical plan. During this ineçti-n hirervsorl
was
apprised by his department that I
Isoni
I who also
lives with his father, had been observed in town and had been
1 for questioning. I
stood
ladvised that he had left
kt home and thati
Iwas last seen in the front living
room watching the video monitor.
FoLlowing this information, SAl

gre-contacted
Lo update him regarding the discussiQn with the local
law enforcement and their progress with locating I
I SBRA
I
ladvised that the agents should consider a tacticai. team in
apprehending I
I should he be located.

Upon receipt of this ‘information and aff conferring
with the other representatives, Supervisor I
I contacted the
.Ardmore Police Department requesting assistance from their
Specia. Wea’oors and Tactical Team (SWAT) to effect the arrest
houdI
_J:)e located. i
iadvised that he was aware
thatL
Iaad made statments in t past that he would not be
taken alive.
Supervisorl
Ifelt it prudent to have a
2

}b?C

 .
297-HQ-A1271801-suE D

tactical team apprehend I
lonce located, to minimize the risk
of danger to other law enorceent officers.
While continuing to confer at the service station
awaiting the arrival of the Ardmore SWAT, a 911 call was received
by the Iove
‘s Office and MPD dispatch from the
resi
whose home is located down the street
fr
The mør11y call was pla” )r
si ence.
I
Lias oitside ofl
ho adv4.A )iitL
hone, inquiring as to
Iqhereabouts. I
xpressed
land that his life was in danger.
that he felt threaten y
Wollowing the emergency call, the officers and agents assembled
at the service station responded to thel
Iresidence along
with other law enforcement officers in the_iimiiediate area. MPD
Isi
off icers were the first to arrive at thel
e.
During their questioning of I
I she observed I
in his
vehicle and idntifi hint to the officers at the scene.
A
broadcast of I
I whereabouts was announced over the radio at
which time a search of the surrounding neighborhood_was initiated
by officers and agents. Shortly thereafter, I
Iwas observed
I
by officers on the Street who commanded him to stop.
ignored their commands and began fleeing in his vehicle at an
increased rate of speed.
I

’ow posed a public threat, SA
1
Believing_that’
I and I
ff.n th447 parate
Ibegan searching for F
I
vehicles.
They subsequently located and observedI
traveling at a high rate of speed, jumping curbs, and traveling
erratically through residences’ yrds.
During this pursuit
through several
rhoods, SAl
Ibecame positioned
directly behind
vehicle which subsequently crashed into
a residence.
SA
exited his bVreau vhi1. nd was
observed b
I ideni4fying
oun y tindersheriff I
himself to
who was attempting to flee.
SAl
Ioçdered
I
to s o an get on the ground several times. I
Ithen
reached for his pistol located in his waistband and attempted to
remove it from his person. SAl
I believing that his life
was now in imminent danger withi
lignoring h
fired one round from his service pistol, striking
in the
left side of the neck at which time
o11apse
o the
ground. As officers reached[_
awas overheard
a
acknowledging that be had sho]______
hying on the b7c
e officers went to securel
I began struggling and was observed to forcefully
ground, I
push his right hand underneath himself as though reaching for
omething.
n officer announcedi
lactions atwhic tim
he was brought unde control and handcuffed.
Thereafter, I
3

I

b6
lb IC

 _______

.
297-HQ..A1271801-suB 1)

was turned over and raised off of the ground. A pistol was
immediately observed lying on the ground in the area of I
I
waist.
The pistol was picked up by an MPD officer and handed to
SAI
Ifor safety.
Following the shooting incident,F
iwas afforded
medical treatment by the ofir on the scene until emergency
medical services arrived. I
Iwas subsequent.y transported by
ambulance to the Mercy Memorial Hospital located in Ardmore, OK,
where he pndrweit medical treatment.
Upon his release from the
hospital,I
Iwas subsequently booked into the Carter County
Detention Center for the outstanding parole violation.
(P)

4

b7C

 ___________

_________

(Rev. O-28-2OOO)

*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Preaedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

Prom:

Inspection
Contact;

Approved By:
Drafted. By:

Attn:

I

06/12/2003

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt

I Extension 1837

Hunt Lynne
Clemens Michae’
..

I

Case ID

#:

Title:

.DNINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
02/24/2003
NEWARK DIVIS!O

Ilrr

297-HQ--A12717B1-D

Synopsis: The Shooting :rncident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ncident that occurFed on 02 24 2003, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I SAl_______ hot and injured a pitbul3.
dog attempting to attack an individual.
SIRG members_recommended
that no administrative action be taken against SAl
las a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative; Reference Electronic Communication of Superrisory
Special Agent (SSA)I
Idated 03/05/2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared tc furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the

captioned shooting.

 a

a

To:
Re

Inspection
From:
297-HQ.-A1271781-fl, 06/12/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 02/24/2003, at approximately 7:40 a.m., Agents
assigned to the Special Operations Group were meeting in a
parking lot to discuss a surveillance operation. As the Agents
were involved in the discussion, they observed a pitbull dog
attempting to attrk
young male who was walking to a nearby
high school.
SAl
I moved towards the male, yelling at the
dog, in an attempt to scare it away. The dog retreated but
quickly returned with another pitbull and began advancing
directly towards the young male victim, growling and snapping its
teeth.
b6

SAl

I again approached the dog attempting to scare
it away, however the dog lunged at the young male’s face and
neck.
SAl
Iran towards the victim, pushed him out of the
way, and p.ace fiimself between the victim and dog. Believing
that_eithr he or the young male was in imminent danger,
531
I fired one round from his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22
.40 caliber handgun striking the dog. The injured pitbull
retreated and collapsed and the second dog fled the scene.
Officials of the Trenton Police Department and the
Bureau of Animal Control responded and removed the dog from the
scene.
On 05/08/2003, the SIRO met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Bunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the metina with the follong voting
members of the SIRG in attendance:
Deputy
chief, CivilRights Division, USDO%T9
Veputy
Chief, Domestic Security Section, Cr.minal Division, USDOJ;
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Glenn Powell, Investigations
Division, Office of Inspector General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens,
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Robert K. Cromwell, Section chief, Applicant Processing Section,
Administrative Services Division; 7pv C’. Mnnina ction Chief,
cD-6, Counterintelli9ence Division;I
I Acting Section
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Divisionl
lunit Chief Operational Skills Unit,
iiTraining Division; SSA[
Toolmarks Unit,
Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, anoratory Division;
SSAI
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel: 8SAI
I Washington Field Office;
and SSA(
Firearms Training Unit, Training

L

J

-

*

2

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Prom:
297-HQ-A1271781-D, 06/12/2003

nspection

Division.
I

The only non-voting member present was
L Management/Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Off ice of Inspections, Inspection Division.
Observations and Reaoxmnendations of the SIRG
The SIR.G reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for àorrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

members unanimously agreed that the actions of
SN
iwere justified and in conformance with the deadly
force policy.
SIRG members recommended that no action be taken
against him as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

3

 __las
_Isix,J

To:
Re;

Inspection
From:
297—HQ-A1271781-D, 06/12/2003

Inspection

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION
AT WASHUTGTON, DC

shooting incident.

ministrative action be taken against
a result of his involvement in this

b7C

1
Mr. Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
1
Mr. Wainstein, Rm. 7427
1
Mrs. Hunt, Rm. 7825
1
Mr. Clemens. Rri. 7837
1
Mr.
USDOJ
1
Ms.
1
Mr. Powell, OIG
1
Mr. Cromwell, Rm. 6012
1
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
1
Mr
IRm. 5155
1
Mr
J, Quantico
1
Mr.
TQuantico
1
Mr.
Rm. 7326
I.
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr.
WFO
1
Rtn. 7861
Mrs.l
,
-

-

-

-

-

I

-

-

-

—
-

-

-

-

-

+4

4

 ___________
___________
__
________

I

(Rev. O8-2.2OOO)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection.

prom:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted

Date:

0.6/12/2a03

Assistant Director
Jynne A. Hunt

I

Extension 1837

Hunt Lymie A
Clemens MichaeL’

By:

Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINI8ThATIVB INQUIRY
SHOOTIIG INCIDENT
01/03/2003
PHOENIX DIVISION

297-HQ-A1271898-D

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 01/03/2003, involving Special
Agent (SA)
During the execution of a search
warrant, SA
shot and inj ured a dog charging toward
BA
who was kneeling on the ground.
SIRG members
reco
e
a no administrative action be taken against
BA
as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of Assistant
Special Agent in Charge Ray P. Churayr dated 01/09/2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

 To:
Re:

Inspection
PreEn:
297-HQ—A1271898-D, 06/12/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 01/03/2003? the Phoenix Division Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Team was conducting a search warrant at a
residence whose residents were purported to be involved in the
theft of computer hard drives from a facility that admiiiistrates
medical records of current and retired United States Military
members.
An investigation determined the residents Ead equipment
to create false identification and wash checks. Additionally,
information was received that the residents were in some way
associated with the Hells Angels motorcycle club, wore weapons
while in the residence, had a long gun taped to the underside of
a coffee table, and were metbamphetamine users.
Surveillance revealed a seven foot high wooden fence
protecting the rear view of the residence and a concrete block
privacy wall protecting much of the front of the residence.
Additionally, the residence was most active, and was most
frequented by visitors in the evening, late night, and early
morning hours.. It was decided that the late morning hours would
be the best time to execute the search warrant.
Upon the initial breach of the residence by SWAT Team
members, they encountered a single female resident attempting to
restrain a mixed breed Shepard dog. The female was non-compliant
and became irate, shouting at the entry team. The dog was
released as the female was placed under physical control and ran
into another area of the residence.
As the female was being removed from the residence, she
advised there was another individual in one of the bedrooms. As
members of the SWAT Team were covering the kitchen and hallway
area leading to the bedroom, SAl
Iwarned SN
I to remain
down on. one knee to enable him to cover SAl
Iback should
the dog reapRear and attack. The dog subsequen1v rappeared and
charged at s?j
,ack and left side. SAl
quickly
fired two rounds at the charging dog, hitting the an.mal in the
shoulder area, causing the dog to veer past SAl
nd
proceed down the hail. The dog returned toward SAl
I
however, verbal commands resulted in the dog retreating into an
empty bedroom.

I

2

,

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Prom:
297-HQ-Al271898-fl, OG/12/2003

Inspection

A male subject was subsequently located in another
bedroom and secured.
The injured, dog remained in the bedroom
until removed by a Phoenix Police Department animal control
officer.
On 05/08/2003, the SIR,G met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the metina with the fclloying voting
members of the SIRG in attendance:
Deputy
Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;1
fbeputy
Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Glenn Powell, Investigations
Division, Office of Inspector General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens,
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Robert K. Cromwell, Section Chief, Applicant Processing Section,
Administrative Services Division; 1yC. Maiming. Sction Chief,
CD-6, Counterintelligence Division;[
I Acting Section
Chief, Operational Suooor Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; I
I. Unit Chief
1 Cerational Skills Unit,
Training Division; SSAI
Toolrnarks Unit,
I Firearms
Scientific Analysis Sectdion, Laboratory Div,ision;
SSAI
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel: SSAI
I Washington Field Office;
and SSAI
Firearms Training Unit, Training
,
Division.__The_only non-voting member present was
p Management/Program nalyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection DivisiO1.

I

I

-

I

lb 7C

Observations and Recommendations of the SThG
The SIRO reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations f or corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any)’; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the actions of
SA
were justified and in conformance with the deadly force
policy.
S
ers recommended that no action be taken
against S
as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

I

I

3

 _

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297-HQ-A1271898-D, 06/12/2003

Inspection

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON. D(
SA I
incident.

That n administrative action be taken against
I as a result of his involvement in this shooting

1
Mr. Gebhardt, Rin. 7142
1
Mr. Wainstein, Rio. 7427
1
Mrs. Hunt, .Rm. 7825
1
Mr. Clemens, Rm. 7837
1
Mr.
b, TJSDOJ
1
MSj
I
Mr. i’oweii, UiG
1
Mr. Cromwell, Rm. 6012
1
Mr. Mazning, Rio. 1B045
1-Mr.
5155
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
1
Mrs.I
-

-

-

-

rantico

uantico
Rio. 7326
Qua,ntico
WFO
I Rio. 7861

++

4

 .

FD-204 (Rcv. 12-15)

.

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Invcztigatlon

J.

Copy to:

Offico:

a. ri

Rcpot of:

Date

07/3 /20 03

CasctDH:

66F-LA234326

Los Angeles
1.

?DMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
LOS ANGELES DIVISION;
05/29/2003
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

cbm

metnbers
On May 29, 2003 at approximatelY 7:00 p . rn.,
buy/bust
a
conduct
of Los Anggles Scuad cE-i prepared to
un West Hollywood,
arrest of 8ubjec

SynapsI

Iwas to meet with a
in tne phrkinq lot of a fast food
I
Jr.u I
Iwas to sell a
‘arl’s
restaurant ca.Liea.
‘-“
of the dxu I4DMA also Iiown as dEcetasyn
c1$fcrnia..

I

Sublect

subject
At about 7:20 p.m. on this same date,
and
vehicle,
his
parked
restaurant,
arrived:at the
su]
The
restaurant.
jinsde the
a
is
which
Avalanche
chevrolet
vehicle was a blacic
,

heavy-duty pickup.
1
by the

“

‘‘

flt. Ztiê Th
This doaorent oontain x.ithex r.ctiCo nor nocn1’i Cf
distr11td C
an4 is Zoanod to your qorcy; it and its coet.nts ax. not to b.

I

 _______ahad

.

.

66P-LA-234326

1

holding five PB! agents drove cowaraa
it from trying to exit.

1a

surveillance van
Jvehicle to block

frickAs the PBX vehicle approached subject I
drove
He
ted.
arres
be
up, he apparently realized he was about to
two
the
and
van
the
around
forward in an attempt to drive
contact.
vehjc1egcpi1jcd with both left front corners making the driver’ a
k
struc
and
d
forwar
I continued driving
Subject L
attempted
], the driver of thestvan,
side door as SAI
SA[
again
to exit the vehicle. The door slanuned back
causing an injury to his left arm.
forward at a high
SubjectL
J continuedAtdriving
1
SAL
time,
this
rate of speed in the pking lot.
his
of
s
tember
the
t
asais
to
cle
vehi
his
in
n
d
had dri’(re forwar
1 vehicle
icollided head on into SAL
SubjecL
squad.
d out.
otale
wa
t
cle,i
vehi
the
to
e
causing such severe damag
d to th
bounce
ecti
subj
by
driven
being
p
pick-u
The large
the
to
nt
adjace
runs
which
right and landed atop a si4ewalk
the
e
insid
been
had
SS?I
1
restaurant’ s building.
d the
iopene
SA[
restaurant suxveilling the drug buy. AS
ed
notic
he
t,
arres
the
in
t
assis
exit door of the restaurant to
lk,
sidewa
the
atop
him,
s
toward
g
comin
icle
]veh
subjectL
in
tec
just
c&n
back
Zl
and at a high rate of speed. SSL
Ivehicle slammed
titfle to avoid beingS injured as subjectj
door.
the
ed
into and destroy
d in an effort
Subject I
_j coaiinued driving forwar who was now on
1
to escape from the scene. SAL
to take
foot and walkiig towards the area where the arreဠwas cle was
vehi
çcts_
aubj
the
where
path
the
in
g
,
place was standin
saw the
now headed. As the vehicle approached hint, SAL him.I
One Of
at
rounds
two
fired
land
subject he knew asi
while
door
ger
the rounds struck the vehicle on the front passen
ect’s
subj
The
e.
damag
no
g
causin
the other missed the vehicle
b7
and then
vehicle continued out of he çing lot, drove west
the
during
harmed
not
]was
north from the area. SA L
subject
incident. At this time it was unknown whether or not
been shot.
n their
Members of Sq.iad CE-i chafed subi
a mile
about
idrove
L
area.
vehicles as he fled from the
.
orhood
l
neighb
entia
resid
a
in
vehicle
his
ned
and then abando
Los
the
and
)
(LAPD
ment
The FBI, the Los Angeles Police Depart
at the
Angeles Sheriffs Department (LASD) set up a perimeterunable to
were
[
t
subjec
ibut
for
ed
search
They
on.
ocati
locate him.
2

 .
66F-LA- 2 3 4 3 2 6

d on May 30, 2003
iwas eventually arreste
Sübj ect I
s by the FBI.
2ngele
own
Los
downt
in
at approximately 3:00 a.m.
t. See 66Finciden
g
shootin
r
anothe
was
there
During the arrest,
stances
circum
and
the
facts
L—234327 and 89B-IA-234329 fo
along with the already
I be
behind this incident. Subject [
charged with several
wi]T
s,
charge
ution
g
distrib
pendin drug
r.
counts of Assault on a Federal Office

D6
7C

The Los Angeles FBI Agent Involved Shooting (AIS) team
responded to the area to conduct an administrative inguixy
the
following the.. incident. The team. conducted interviews of
The
t.
inciden
the
agents involved as well as witnesses to
any
neighborhood, which is all businesses, was canvassed for
nated
coordi
team
AIS
The
.
located
were
none
but
ses
other witnes
the
at
LAPD
the
LASD
and
the
the investigative requirements from
for
reports
any
ted
genera
LASD
the
or
scene. Neither the LAPD
] after providing information as to
this incident. SAl
being
public safety issues concerning the rounds he fired and weapon
His
scene.
the
from
d
release
was
t,
contac
given an
his
used during the incident was retrieved by the AIS prior to
n
of the
weapo
issued
Bureau
r
anothe
ed
departure and he was provid
same make and model.
The Los Angeles FBI Eriderice Response Team (ERT)
responded to the location and processed the scene at the
fired from
restaurant_parking lot. They retrieved shell casings
at the
ce
eviden
of
items
other
as
well
n
as
Iweäpo
SAl
the
of
raphs
photog
took
crime scene. They made sketches qnd
rounds
of
the
One
1
to
SAL
scene to include the injury
rtment
compa
ger
passen
the
inside
located
1was
SI
by
fired
s
driver’
the
on
ard
floorbo
the
on
tehicle
of subjecd
door
side
ger
passen
the
struck
have
to
s
appear
side. The round
and then ricoOheted off the vehicl&s mirror before finally
the
coming to a rest inside the vehicle. Efforts to locate where
found.
be
not
could
round
the
but
made,
were
struck
other round
ensure
Area hospitals were checked with negative results as to
.
anyone
struck
not
had
the random round
Ireceived medical attention two days after
SA[
to miss
the incident, but warn not injurd to the extent he needed
d
receive
t
inciden
this
during
ed
work. No other agents. assault
ent.
treatm
l
any medica

3

.

-

,

 .
66F-Là-234326

DETAXLS i
Th{ cse was predicated upon

I

information

that

of
SAl
I assigned to the Los ngele5 DivisiOn
in a
involved
been
the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI), had
SA
2003.
May
291
pm,
on
7:30
approximate
lY
ghl,
nq incident at
Iwas involved in thiq incident when he was in the process
p
of apprehending drug dealer I

4

 ev. O8.2-2OOO)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Director’s Office
Inspection
Training

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Date:

ROUTINE

I

Attn:

08/l9/200

A/AD Charlene B. Thornton
AD Lynne A. flunt
A/AD Andrew R. Bland III

Extension 1837

Hunt Lynne
Clemens

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

297-HQ-A1271699-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
05/15/2003
LAS VEGAS DIVISION

}b7c

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 05/15/2003, involving Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA) I
I assIcmd tjo the Investigative
SSA I
Iwas attending and
Training Unit, ‘rraining Division.
assjsting in the conduct of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
in-service in Las Vegas, Nevada, when he fired two shots into a
refrigerator located in a casino. SIRG -members made no
recommendat ions regarding this matter due to the matter being
previously referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR).
Adminiptrative:__Reference Electronic Commünic4tion of
SSA I
I° the Las Vegas Division, dated 06/02/2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of th SIRG with reference to the
c.pt ioned shooting
-

 ________________lof

To:
Re:

______

Director’s Office
From:
297—HQ—A1271699—D, 08/19/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
The Training Division, FBIHQ, conducted an in-service for
FBI C?As on Monday, 05/12/2003, through Friday, 05/16/2003, at the
Flamingo Casino and Hotel in Las Vegas
1 Nevada. The in-sefrvice was a
training opportunity for the FBI’s C?As to receive training and
information in the latest trends and techniques regarding
professional accounting.
On Thursday, 05/15/2003, an employee at the Barbary Coast
Casino and Hotel was about to exit the rear door of the kitchen onto
the loading dock area of the hotel when he heard two gun shots. The
employee observed an individual wearing a blue shirt and blue pants
replacing a pistol into a holster on his right hip. The employee
immediately called security to respond to the area. The subject was
observed walking through the kitchen area towards the front of the
kitch.en,
The hotel employee returned to the loading dock area and
observed two bullet holes in the front of a large walk-in
refrigerator located on the loading dock.
Hotel security officers reported that a white male subj.&ct
matching the description of the shooter was observed walking towards
the valet area at the front of the Barbary Coast Casino. The
supervisor for Security responded to the valet area and confronted
the male subject. A security guard arrived, approached the subject,
and handcuffed him for the safety of officers due to the nature of
€he incident. Although compliant, the ubject was reportedly
extremely confused and intoxicated. Uporrpãtting the subject down,
a handgun was discovered on the right hip of the subject as well as
two loaded magazines on his left hip. The subject was escorted to
the security offices where security officers notified the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) who responded to the scene.
Upon arrival of the LVMPD officers, the subjet was identified as

SSAI

I

Officers of the LVNPD cited SSAI
,ith a misdemean9r
of unlawful discharge of a firearm in a_prohibited area and took
possesion of his Glok 21. pistol. SSAI
bias released to Unit
Chief
the Investigative Training Unit.

According to SSA I
I earlier in the afternoon hç
consumed approximately...four beers and subsequently consumed several
additional beers çid a 1ass of Scotch before going to dinner.
During_dinner SS? I
Iconsumed a glass of wine. After dinner,
SSAI
ladvised that his next memory was that of an acquaintance
playing craps at an unknown location and remembered nothing until ie
was in the security office with several unifçrmed people. SSAI

‘

I

2

-4

 To:
Re:

Director’s Office
From:
297—MQ—A1271699—D, 08/19/2003

Inspection

advised that he knew he was being detained and remembered someone
t.elling him that he shot a refrigerator. He recalled being briefly
haidcuf fed and being read his Miranda Warnings as the uniformed
personnel viewed a video of the shooting incident,
SSAI
I
adifised that he had no recollection of how he got to the security
office.

I SSAI
After being released to Unit Chief’
went to his hotel room where he remained until he left Las Vegas.

I

On O8Jl/2OO3, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting_with the_following voting
members of the SIRG in attendance: I
I Deputy
Chief, Civil Rights Division,’ USDQJ,j
Ifleputy Chief,
Domestic Security Settion, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Assistant
Special Agent in Charge Jeff Vasey, Investigatiens Division, Office
of Inspector General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens, chief Inspector,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; Charles D. Elder, Section’
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
Jay C. Manning, Section Chief, CD-6, Counterintelligence Division;
L Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
I
General Counsel;I
I Unit chief. Transfer Unit;
IFirearms
•Administrative Sevices Division; SSAL
Toolmarks Unit. Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
I Firearms .Training Unit, Training Division;
SSA I
I Oierational Skills Unit, Training Division;
SSAI
and. SSAI
1, W h{nc1”rn P41rI pçfj. The two non.
voting members present wre I
Ianc3I
I
Management/Program Analysts, Inspection Management Unit, Office of
]b5
Inspections, Inspection Division..
]b7c’
-

Observations and. Recozzunendations of the SXRG
The SRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident wlth the
intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and

recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint
(if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training and/or
safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations for administrative
action if deemed ncess’ary.
qf SSA I

due

to

Si members held a brief discussion regarding the actions
I however made no recommendations regarding this matter
the matter being previously referred to the OPR.

3

 ITo: .Director’s Office
From:
Re:
297—HQ—A1271699--D, O8/19flOQ3
LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

ATOPR
For information only.
Set Lead 2:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON. D.C..
For information only.
Set Lead 3:
TRAINThTG DIVISION

AT OU2TICO VIRGINIA
For information only.

4

Inspection

 _______

To:
Re:

Director’s Office
From:
297—HQ—A1271699—D, 08/19fl003

1
Mr. Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
1
Mr. Wainstein
1 Rm. 7427
1
Mrs. Thornton, Rm. 7125
1
Mrs. Hunt, Rm. 7825
1
Mr. land, Quantico
1
Mr. Clemens
1 Rm. 7837
1-Mr.I
IUSDOJ
ISDOJ
1
Ms.’
1
Mr. Vasey, OIG
1
Mr. Cromwell, Rm. 6012.
Mr. Lewis)
(Attention:
1
Mr.. Elder, Rm. 5155
1
Mr. Manning, 1km. 1B045
Mr.I
1
I QuantifO
Mr. I
(24.ttion:
1
Qu.antico
Mr.
1
Ms.
,
Rm, 7326
1
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
(Attention:
1
WFO
Mr.I
I
1
Mr&]
Rm. 7851.
1
Mrs.I
I Rm. 7861)
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.

-

-

-

-

I

-

-

-

-

-

-

++

S

Inspection

 PD-204 (Rev. 12-1-93)

tJNJTED STATES DEPA1TMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigalion

Copy to:

ASAC LARRY R. KOHL
07/22/2003

Repott oft
Date:

Offl

DETROIT

297-HQ-A1271480-D
*

SHOOTING INQUIRY;
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
DETROIT DIVISION
May 14, 2003
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY/CIVIL RIGHTS

sa

Captioned matter relates to a shooting incident which was
predicated upon the attempted apprehension of a subject of
an Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAL’)
investigation. While law enforcement personnel were
attempting to arrest the subject, he fled and fired at an
Agent.
The Agent returned fire. Neither the shots fired
by the Agent or subject caused any injury. The subject
then shot himself in the head, causing a fatal injury.

DETAILS:
on 05/13/2003, Eric Carpenter became an FBI
subject based on the anticipation of the initiation of a
UFAP process being issued regarding Carpenter. Carpenter
was wanted on two separate homicide warrants and
implicated in a third homicide, all emanating from
investigations conducted within the city of Detroit by the
DPD.
Carpenter was known to carry two handguns and also
possessed two AK47 assault rifles. On the evening of
05/13/2003, the Wayne County Prosecutors Office requested
Unlawful Flight assistance in locating subject Carpenter
by making tile request to the Metropolitan Violent Crimes
Street Gangs and Alliance F*.tgitiv Task Force.
On 05/14/2003, at approximately 12:00 p.m., a
confidential source advised VCTF members that the subj eat
This dooumeat contains neither r comendatious nor conclusions of the P31. It is the proBerty of the FBI
and is loned. to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside poor agency.

 297-HQ-A1271480-D

was in Detroit driving a Chevrolet Corvette bearing a temporary
North Carolina license certificate. Further, the subject had
been seen within the hour in the vicinity of 3332 Clements
1 Detroit, Michigan.
Street
VTF tinits were dispatched to the area of 3332 Clemezits
in an effort to find the vehicle.

On 05/14/2003, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Carpenter
was observed while driving the Corvette bearing the North
Carolina temporary registration. The vehicle was observed in the
area of Davison and Santa Rosa (which is near the address of 3332
Clements). The vehicle was subsequently lost in traffic.
The vehicle was spotted again at approximately
3:00 p .ni., at which time officers and Agents conducting
surveillance observed the subject driving at a high rate of
speed, again in the Corvette. The subject was followed to a
school where he picked up a young child. Communication between
the surveillance team during this period of time resulted in the
collective concurrence that no attempts would be made to arrest
him while he was near the school or in possession of the child.
At the same time, Carpenter was in the accompaniment of a. black
female passenger, who had gotten out of the Corvette and gone
into the school. When Carpenter departed the school he, in the
company of the female companion and the child, was again followed
but lost in the area of Interstate 96 and Davison. Approximately
10 to 15 minutes later, task force units observed the Corvette in
a McDonalds Restaurant on Livernois near 1-96. After it
dmparted, the Corvette was briefly lost again until the vehicle
was again observed traveling in the vicinity of Dexter and
Davison. The Corvette was followed to the vicinity of
3352 Clements. The adult female and child were observed getting
out of the Corvette and Carpenter was observed first getting out
of the Corvette and then returning to it. After Carpenter
returned to the car, the adult female a1o returned to the
vehicle.

I

I along with task force officers
I, all in separate
land I
vehicles, collectively formulated. a plan to box in the vehicle in
an effort to prevent Carpenter from escaping when the attempted
arrest would be made. The four participants agreed to attempt tob6
effect the arrest of Carpenter after the police vehicles
7C
negotiated down Clemerits
1
and effectively “boxing it” in.
Task Force Officer (TF0)I
love past the Corvette and then
blocked the front of the vehicl in order to prevent caxrte;
from driving forward. 5k I
langled his vehicle also in front
At this time, Ski

2

 297-HQ-A1271480-D

of the passenger side pf the Corvette in an effOrt to further
block the vehicle. SAl
I approached the passenger side of the
Corvette, identified hj elfa law enforcement at least three
times, according to SAl
I statement. Re further issued
commands to Carpenter consistent with arrest_procedures.
Carpenter exited the Corvette and. ran. SAl
I reported that he
informed the others that Carpenter was running. The Corvette,
apparently in gear, rolled forward,_hitting SAl
Icar.
Carpenter ran up a driveway and SAl
Ipursuect, repeatedly
shouting, “Police police, stop, let me see your hands.
11
Carpenter was at the end of the driveway when be
reached his right hand into the waist ban
d t?ullet out
handgun, firing three to four shots at SA
I SAl______
coimnunicated the fact that the gun had been fired at him to the
others and he took cover behind some garbage bags and returned
approximately six rounds at Carpenter.__Neither the shots fired
by Carpenter or the shots fired by SA a
i inflicted any damage
to each other or to other individuals. There were no other
H in the immediate vicinity of the shooting path at the
1
individua)
time. SAl
I lost his sight of Carpenter when Carpenter
disappeared into the backyard adjacent to the driveway. When
1 h
iran to the end of the driveway
ed Carpenter
I
proceeci from a backyard down an alley. S
continued to
issue instructions to Carpenter, telling him to drop his gun. He
observed Carpenter take his handgun, point it to his head and
discharge one shçt to iis own head, thereafter dropping to the
grçund. When SAl
I and other officers approached the subject,
Inoted a hole in the right side of Carpenter’s head.
SAl
Officer a
I secured Carpenter’s handgun and a magazine which
was located underneath Carpenter’s body. Subsequent to the
shooting, notification was made to the FBI office and to
appropriate individuals within the DPD. At the onset of the onscene investigation, SAl
Jturned over his weapon to SAC
Hulon, where it was eventually provided to the DPD for
appropriate testing. A subsequent ballistics examination, as
well as on-scene homicide investigation and autopsy, demonstrated
substantial amounts of evidence that subject Carpenter had taken
his own life. A review of statements provided by numerous other
task force personnel, as well as bystander witnesses, provides
sui?stantl amounts of corroboration to the version provided by
SAl
I as well as other individuals involved in the attempted
arrest.
The inrview stafements of SAL
I TFO I
land
citizen witness I
I are the most pertinent with regard to
the issue of 4ppropriateness of use of force by SAl
p Each
of these individuals represent various facets of eye witness
3

 -

297-HQ-Al27l48 0-1)

statements. A review of information provided by them shows
consistency of observations. The subject initiated fire after
fleeing the_arrest attempt and after being instructed to drop his
gun. SA
I returned fire after he was fired upon.
The crime scene shows casings and bullet hole locations
to be consistent with the statements provided by witnesses.
The Medical Examiner’s office ruled Carpenter’s death a
suicide, noting the soot residue on the scalp az the upward
trajectory of the bullet, from right to left.

4

 PD-2O4(R.v12-1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Ccpyto

RepottoO
Dato

SSAI
06/06/2003

I

orn ST. LOUIS

297-HQ--A127190.6-D
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHoOTING’ INCIDENT
ST. I
OUIS DIVISION
1
MAY 12, 2003
1DMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
s

This shooting incident occurre4 on May 12, 2003, at
approximately 7:10 a-rn. (CST) as a Special Agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), St.. Louis Division,
and two Special Federal fficers (SFOs) assigiled to the
St. Louis Divisions Vio1ex1t c!rimeu Fua&tive Task orce
(VCFTF) attempted to arrest I
I oi a
St. LOuis Coirnty felony warrant for ‘Tafficking -in Drugs
2nd Degree, Unlawful tTse of a Weapon, Resisting Arrest and
‘Possession of a CqntrolJ.ëd Substance. WN.le attemptiig to
arresd
Ihé ruuned his vehicle into a Bureau
vehicle which was. positioned to blocki
iescape-.
After ramming. the ureau vehicle, the ve1±cle diiven by
I
Lac)ced up and then proceeded forward directly
I.
at SAl
In fear of his 1ife and for the safety of
others, SA I
I discharged hi personally
owned Glock Model 22, .40 S&W ca.iber semi-automatic
handgun twice through the &ivrs side window t the
driver of the vehicle. The vehicle proceeded through
several lawns at a high rate of speea and down the sttee’t 11)70
where it navigated a dead end barricade. 2n attethpt was
made to survei. the vehicle by a member of the VCFTF until
rv-ed parked near a Taco Bell Restaurant.
d in the parking lot of the Taco Bell
on oo •
was subsequently arrested without
-further inca. out.
was injured and wa taken to
a hospit1 .wbere he aewent surgery fQr a shattered
elbow and a laceration in the
the right
shoulder blade. As a result ofi
conduct on
May 12, 2003, felony warrants were issucI i,y the Circuit
-

‘hJ.s daoument oontaisw neither rO01UU5fldatiOE3 nor aomoZugions o the 7Z • Xt is the P POXtY of the FE
an is .oaxaa4 to your agenqy) it àn4 it contents are not to be distr12uted outside your aaenoy.

 I.
297-HQ-A127l9o6D

Court of St. I
oui County for Assault First Degree on a Law
1
Enforceutent Officer, Armed Criminal Action and Resisting Arrest.
DETAILS:
By way of background, the St. Louis Division of the FBI
sponsors the St. Louis Violent Crimes Fugitive Task Force
(VCFTF). The purpose of the VCFTF is to locate and arrest
individuals with outstanding warrants for acts of violence. The
VCFTF has a standard arrest protocol that is followed when making
arrests.
On May 12 2
FBI
ecial Agent (SA) I
I
I Detective
s County Police
Department, and Detective
St. Louis Metropolitan
Police Department, were assigne
o
e CFTF. At aporoximatly
6:40 a.m., Detectiyel
I Detective!
luiet
land SN
in the vicinity of
I Paaedpe, Missouri, to discuss
the 1DoThle xe’ji rfI
1 The last known address
forl
Iwa1
I Paedale. Mipsouri. Detective
p
rovided a briefing regardingi
I whicth inrl11ded
name, description, photograph and the fact that I
Iwas
wanted by St. Louis County for outstanding warrants for
Trafficking in Drugs 2nd Degree, Unlawful Use of a Weapon,
Resisting Arrest and Possession of a Controlled Subspance. An
operational plan for the surveillance and arrest of I
I
was developed. The operational plan was consistent with the
arrest protocol on file. The operational plan included wearing
ballistic vests with a patch bearing the word “POLICE” across it.
I

I
SA I
netçtiveI
I initiated surveillance
on the front 1
un two separate vehicle
Detectiv
Ipositioned himself and his vehicle af
Avenue to suryeil th rear exit of the residence. SAl________
and Detective I
o)served a blac3 female later identified as
I exit I
I and head in an easterly
direction across the street. The black female made contact with
a black male sitting in the drivers’ seat of a burgundy Pont1r’
nrfl1 which was backed into the driveway and
parked at I
I.
I After a brif cn rerat1nn the female left the car
and, as if returning td
I passed the vehicles where bc
Detectivel
land SA[
lare parked. After observing the
law enforcement officers, the blank female returned to the
burgundy Pontiac Bonneville and had a second conversation with
the same black male in the driver’s seat. After a sec!ond4rief
conversation, the black female returned to I
I
-

2

 .
297-HQ-A1271906-D

I

IplaçP1
‘“tivel
Ito determine if I
answered the call and. stated that I

telephone call to
lwa present. A female
Iwas not present.

nrPi-Pct

Believipa that i-he laçk male irj. the burgundy Pontiac
Bonneville may bd
I SAl
land Detective I
decided to_anroach the male to determine his iden4f”
Detectiv
itiatd a U-turn and approachedL
1
while SA I
lulled forward to block the driveway at I
I
I As SAl
!po8itioned his vehicle, the
unidentified male in the ciriver’s seat ducked down behind the
dashboard. As SAl
lexited his vehicle, the driver re
appeared and i-htc hiircri;ndy Pontiac Bonneville attentoted to move
forward. SA I
lidentified the driver as I
I SA
I
hirew his weapon. Despit verbal istructions to “Stop, It
the vehicle continued forward. S.
Icontinued to yell
“Stoo. Poljce.11 and attempted to open the driver’s door.
did not comply with the commands and the vehicle
struck SAl
I Bureau vehicle.

I

I

Meanwhile, Detective I
[had exited his vehicle and
atrnroaçthed the Bonneville from the passenger’s side. Detective
Ipointed his weapon, at the driver and yelled “Polic&’ aiId
“Put your hands in the air and exit the
I
.‘
looked directly at Detec±ive I
I then put the vehicle in
reverse, backed up, put the vehicle in drive and turned sharply
to the left. The vehicle pulled forward quickly with dirt
spinning from the tires and the engine running fast. The vehicle
was propMnc dtrectly at SAl
hnd in an attempt to rim
over SN
L
Ei fear of his life and for the safety of
others, SAl
1ischarged his personally owned Clock Model
22, .40 S&W caliber, semi-automatic handgun, serial number
DW336US. t
wice through the driver’s side window atl
1
I
SA________ was able to leap away from the vehicle and avoid
being struck.
The vehicle proceeded through several lawns at a high
rate of speed. The vehicle then_entered the street and proceeded
south on Grief ield. Detectivel
Ijnjtjated nrire1.nce of
h6
the vehic3e afte ensuring the well-being of SAl
lb7C
Iand
The street dead ends with a steel barricade.
Detectivel
.
The vehicle_navigated the barricade and fled the scene.
Detective’
‘attempted to stay in visual_contact with the
vehicle while providing directions to SAl
land Detective
bb-r 4h
I After a short time, Detectivel
venici.è parked in the 6100 block of osedale with
Ion
foot approximately_75 yards ftoni the vehiöle. Detective I
I
observed I
Iremoving articles of clothing and placing

I

3

 _____I

.

.

297-HQ-A1271906_D

them in a trash can located at
ReStaurant, 851 North Skinker.
arrived, and together with Detecti
custody without further incident.
injured and was jnnmM t-1r j-ranv
to BarnesJewish Hospital. I
I underwent surgery for a shattered
elbow and received stitches for a laceration in the general area
of the right shoulder blade.
After the incident, sal
1 telephonically notified
Acting Assistant_Special Agent in Charge (A/ASAC) Thomas B.
Noble. A/A8AC
Iresponded to the scene azidtook possession
of SN
I personally issued Giock 22, .40 S&W caliber semi
automatic handgun. The handgun was placed in a
tranferi-r to Relief Supervisory Special Agent I
I transported the handgun to the St. Louis_County Crime
A/SS?I
Lab where it was test fired and returned to A/S1
I
A/SSA
hen returned the handgun to S.I
I
I The handgun was
a Glock Model 22, .40 S&W caliber semi-automatic pistol, serial
number DWF336US.

I

I

Iwas interyiewed at Barnes-Jewish Hospital by

Agents of 4he FBI. I
Iwas advised of his Miranda Rights.
Istated that he was approached by two armed white males
sil’
.4+-1 t1d lettering while
in spj
sitting in his
vehicle ajI
The two males ordered him from his
vehicle.
IcLLct not recall if the individuals identified
themselves as law eiforcement officers.

Thinking he waq being

robbed, I
ttempted to drive away.
ieard one
of the men order him to “Stop” but he did notI comp.Ly. fe heard
two or three gunshots and w
,i,’1t rwe in the elbow and grazed
by another across the back. I
‘escaped by driving over
some crass and aound the vehicle that was parked in front of
him. I
ladvised that at no time di4 his vehicle make
contact with any other vehicle. F
Ideclined to provide
any further information.
The St. Louis County Police Department conducted an
investigation of the incident and formalized their investigative
report (refer to complaint number 03-0042019). One person who
was interviewec wael
Iwho resides atF
I
Pagedale, MO. I
familiar withi
us
nd
T.FC.Ced the èvents df May 12, 20b3, from her
apartment window.
I was drawn to the window at approximately 7:30 a .m., when
heard e1ling outside.
Upon looking out, she observed
his car and a police detective ordering i
not to move his r. i
istatec5. that the detective had the
word ttpo.1icel on a jacket he was wearixxg.I
It.ted that
4

1
b
6

 .

.

297-EQ-A1271906-D

there was
unmarkec oar h1ork4ng the exit path of I
car.
advised I
I car was not backed into her
driveway,
observed I
car move forward while
the detect.ve was yelling for him to stoo the car and exit it
immediately. A fe
9 1ik
iater,I
Iheard what sqianr
two caxs hitting. I
Jlooked back out and observed I
I
move the vehicle to a position so that it was facing directly at
Th detective took several steps out of the path
the detectivr
of the car. I
Ithen observed the car change direqions qo
that it was again pointed directly at the detective. I
heard tires squealing and the car drove forward at the detective.
The detecjive luipped to his right to avoid the car and while
doing so, I
I observed the detective fire two shots at the
vehicle. I
lobserved the vehicle continue acrn
lawn
and down the street until it was lost from sight. I
Istated
that if the detective had not dumped to the side, he would have
been struck by the car.

I

I
‘was
us the son of
resides at
I Pageale, MO.
us readily familiar w
and his
vehicle.
ladvised that after being awoken by his mother
to get ready eor school, he heard someone yelling outside of his
window. When he looked out, he observe. someone beina ordeFed to
get out of a car.
advised thati
I car
was moving back and forth in the driveway. I
lobserved what
he believed to be a police detective by the car with his gun
drawn.
I stepped away from the window and heard a loud
noise j.ke two cars had collided.” A second or two later,
jheard at least two shots fired from the front of the
house. I
thd not look back out of the window and did not
see who had fired the shots.

I

I

I

L4rne aleo interviewed.
I Pagedale, MO, and. is the
mother of
I I
/ advised that sometime
between 7:00 a.m and 7:15 a.m., on May 12, 2003, she last saw her
son. She was leaving her residence when she observed her son in
a red. vehicle parked in the 1200 block of Grief ield. She spoke
briefly with him arni departed giving him a hug. She walked a
short distance and remembered she had forgotten to give her
mother a message. She turned around and walked back to her
residence. Upon stepping inside, she heard what sounded like
several gunshots nearby. She continued talking with her mother
and thought nothing more of the shots. I
eclined to
provide any further information.
resides at I

wa also interviewed.

5

/

 land

.

.

297-HQ-A1271906-D

I pagedale, MO, with her daughter,
and
Itwo children. Early in the
morning o May 12. 200i. he rereived a nhone a1l from someone
asking fort
ladvised the caller 1b6
that
iwas not flame. snortj.y atter tne phone call and while bc
getting
ready for school, she heard what
sounded iik oi1nc4Iots. She went to the front door and observed
standing in the street. l
I
observed a car drive by her son towards the dead end of the
resides fz I

I

Street.

The crime scene was processed by the St. Louis County
Police Department Crime Scene Unit (OSU). Photographs and
sketches were made. One bullet was recovered from the passenger
front seat of tie Pontiac Bonneville. One bullet was recovered
from I
lat the hospital. Two shell casings were
recovered from the scene. At the rear of the Taco Bell
Restaurant, 851 North Skinker, was located a trash barrel.
Inside the trash barrel were a cell phone, two keys, a pack of
cigarettes and a face plate for a Clarion automobile radio.
The St. Louis County Police Department Crime Lab
assigned Lab Number 099-2003-42019 to phir roort. The Lab
compared the bullet test fired from SN
Jhandgun with the
bullet recovered from the Pontiac Bonneville. The lab stated
that “there are insufficient individual identifiable
characteristics to make a positive idenpifiatiçi.” The Lab
compared the bullet test fired from SA I
I handgun with the
bullet recovered frottf
tat the hospital. The Lab stated
that “there are insufticient indavidual identifiable
characteristics to make a positive identification.” The test
shell casing was compared to the two shell casing recovered from
the scene. The Lab concluded that the recovered shell casings
were “definitely fired” from Si
Ihandgun.
A Missouri Uniform Accident Report number 03-45526
documenting the collision between the vehicle driven by
SN
lBureau assigned vehicle was
camp ieted.

Special Agentt
Iwas interviewed pursuant
to the investigation.
Jis the Prizoal Firearms
]
Instruct9r for the St. Louis Division. 521
ladvised that BA
I
Iwas authorized to carry a personally owned semi
automatic Gb
M
J. 22, .40 S&W caliber pistol, serial number
DWF336US.
S
last qualified on the Pito1
Quálifióations ourse
the Glock serial number DWF336US
on April 15, 2003.
SA
sOOred a. 98 on the PQC.
It was
6

b7C

 .

.

297-HQ-Al27l9Q6-fl

also noted that siJ
I is a certified FBI Firearms
Instructor and was last certified on February 24-28, 2003, at the
FBI Academy.
is a certified Tactical Instructor and
S2’4
Defensive Tactics Instructor and is currently the Tactical
Coordinator and. the Defxasiye_Tactics Coordinator for the
St. Louis Division.
Ilast underwent
SAl
judgmental/decision-making scenario-based firearms training using
Ch Pirearinp Advanced Training System (EATS It) on April 1, 2003.
SA
I has had several years of experience and training
while serving on the SWAT team, St. Louis Division. SAl
I

was afforded deadly force related training as well as other legal
training updates by the St. Louis Division Chief Division Counsel
(CDC) Peter J. Krusing during each firearms session.
On Tuesday,. May 2.3, 2003, Detectives from the St. Louis

Countvolice Department met with Chief Warrant Off icerl
I
I
lof the St. Louis County Prosec1lt
’cr aifntney’s Office.
4
Mn
lrepared warrants charging I
I with Assault
First Degree on a Law Enforcement Officer, Armed Criminal Action
and Resisting Arrest.
The warrants were presented to the
Honorable roseph A. Goeke, Judge, Circuit Court of St. Louis
County who issued the warrants for I
I
On May 22, 2003, Mr.I
1st. LOUis
County Prosecuting Attorney, S1. Louis County Justice Center,
Clayton, Missouri, advised that be did not intend to seek
prosecution against SAl
Iregarding his actions on May 12,
2003.

7

b6
h7C

 ___________I:lrr
___________

_________

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Inspection

From:

Date:

ROUTINE

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

08/18/2003

Extension 1837

Hunt Lynrie A
Clemens Michae1

Drafted By:
CasID #:
Title:

297—HQ--A1271970—D

-

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
04/17/2003
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident tht occurred on 04J17/O03 involving
Special Agents (SAS) L
L Both
I andi
Agents shot and killed a pit bull dog during the execution of a
search warrant.
SIRG members recommendçd that no
administrative action be taken against either SA as a result o
their involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
1 dated
07/18/2003.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 t

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—IQ—A127].97O—D, 08/18/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
on 04/17/2003, members of the Washington Field Office Sfe
Streets Task Force executed a search warrant at a Southeast
Washington, D.C., residence known to be a drug distribution site.
Investigation also determined that the residence was a stash location
for numerous firearms, including long arms.
Several pre—operational briefings were conducted prior to
the execution of the search warrant emphasizing the strong
possibility of firearms on or around the premises which could pose a
threat to the search team. A discussion was also held regarding the
possibility of an aggressive and ferocious pit bull dog being at the
location.
S.4
Iwas tasked with carrying a shotgun for the
purpose of engaging the dog if the need arose.
Members of the entry and search teaxns’arrived at the
search location at approximately 4:00 p.m., and observed the dog
roaming freely in the front yard. As soon as SAl
1’
exited his vehicle, the pit bull charged; however no contact was made
because the dog got caught on top of a fence and fell. As the Agent
pulled his firearm to neutralize the dog, he noticed an individual
roiu the back of the residence towards the search team.
As
31
I focused his attention on the approaching individual, the dog
continued to prohibit the entry team from passing through the front
gate.
SAl
I believing the search team was in ,mminent danger of
serious physical injury, fired once striking the dog.
The gunshot
failed to slow the dog’s attack resulting in both SAsI
land
I
I firing additional rounds, killingS the dog.
Entry team members
secured the residence without further incident and requested that
District of Columbia personnel dispose of the dead animal.
On 08/14/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lyrine A: Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting wiM th f1rwii,n
voting members of the SXRG in attendance:
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJTI__________________
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Assistant .Special Agent in Charge Jeff Vasey,
Investigations Division, Office of Inspector General, USDOJ;
t’.ichaei S. Clemens, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; Charles D. Elder, Section Chief,
Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
Jay C. Manning, Section Chief, CD—6, Counterintelligence
Division;l
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Office of the General Counsei;I
Unit Chief,
,
Transfer Uiiit; Administrative services Division;

L

2

 L

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—1Q—A127l970—D, 08/18/2003

I

Inspection

Firearms
Toolmarks 1nit, Scientific
SSAI
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSAL
Fiearms Training Unit, Training Division; SSA I
Operational Skills Unit, Training Division; and
SSA I
I Wasl4naton Field Office. The two non
voting members orsent werel
land
I Management/Program Analysts, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

I

I

Obser-atious and Recommendations o the SIR.G
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an o,erational standpoint (if any); (3) provide’.
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the actions of
SAsI
Iandl
1 were justified and that no
action should be taken against them as a result of their involvement
in this shooting incident,

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297-41Q—A1271970—D, 08/18/2003

Inspection

ID Cs):
Set tead 1:
INSPECTIOt’1
AT WASHTh’GTONDC
That no adiinistrative action be taken against
SAsI
landi
I as a result of theix
involvement in this shooting incident.
-

1
1
1
1
1

Mr. Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
Mr. Wainstein, P.m. 7427
Mrs. Hunt, Pni. 7825
Mr. Clemens, P.m. 7837
Mr.
USDOJ
1-Ms.I
t$DOJ
1
Mr. Vasey, OIG
-

—

—

-

-

-

1

2.
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

—

—

-

-

—
—

-

—
—

Mr. Cromwell, P.m. 6012
(Attention: Mr.L
I
Mr. Elder, Tim. 5155
Mr. Manning, Pm. 1B045

Mr.
IQuantico
(Atlention: Mr. I
Quantico
Mr.F
Ms.j
P.m. 7326
Mr.’______ Quantico
(Attention:
Mr.[
Mr.I
I WFO
Mrs.
P.m. 7861
Mrs.
1 P.m. 7861)

I

I

4+

4

 __________________

C

(Rer. O828-2OOO)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PrecedEnce:
To:

Attn:

Inspection

From:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:’

10/20/2003

Assistant Director
Steven C. T4cCra’
Extension 1837

McCraw

Clemens Mic’hae)

Iirr

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297—HQ—A1271749-”D

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQI3IRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
09/04/2003
MILWAUKEE DIVISION

b7C
-

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurrec on 09/04/2003, involving
I shot and
I SAl
Special Agent (SA) I
killed an. injured deer that had bean struck by his bureau vehicle.
administrative action be tak.en
SIRG members_recommended that
against SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
hooting incident

no

A.tra±fv’:
SAl
Details:
,

reference

R[ference Electronic ‘Communication of
J,’dated 09/15/2003.

This communication was prepared to furnish the
comments, and recommendations of the’ SIRG with
to the captioned shooting.
.

 __________________
___________________

‘TO:
Re:

From:
Inspection
297—flQ—A1211749—D, 10/20/2003
Details

Inspection

of the Shooting Inident

I
On 09/04/2003, at approximately 9:50a.m., SAl
struck a deer while driving his Bureau vehicle..
Upon striking the
deer, SA I
I immediately stopped and, exited his vél)icle and
observed thç deer attempting to get up as it lay next to the road.
SAl
Inotified the Sawyer County Sheriff’s Department about the
A Sheriff’s Department investigator
accident and the injured deer.
advised SAl
Ithat no county officers were immediately
available to respond to the incident and asked if he could shoot the
liischarged one round from his Bureau-assigned
deer.
SAl
Glock Model 22, 40 dauber pistol, killing the deer.
—

On 10/15/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Assistant Director
Steven C. McCraw, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
I
Criminal Division, t1SDOJ Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Jeff Vasey, Investigations Division, 0f floe oflnspector
General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens, Chief Insoector, Office of
I Assistant
Inspections, Inspecti,on Division; I
Section Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;I
lunit Chief (DC),
Physical Surveillance Unit, Counterintelligence Diviion;
luc. National Firearms Program, Training
I
Division (TD)E;I
luc, Investigative Law Unit,
inc.
Office of the General Counsel (OGt);i_____________________
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;
ProqramManager, Practical Applications (mit, r13;
Toolmarks Unit. Scientific
SSAI
I Firearms
Analysis Section, LaboratOry Division; SSAI
I.
Investigative Law Unit, OGC; aid 58A I
Washington Field Office. The three non-voting members present
iOrationa1 kills Unit, TD;
were SSAI
land
I Management/Program
I
Analysts, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.

•1

-

!.

——

-

Obsezvations and Recommendations- of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(Z) provide the Dircto with an evaluative analysis•,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
reconimendatipns concerning traiaing and/or safety issues; and

2.

6

b7C

 T:
Re:

From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271749—1, 10/20/2003

Inspection

(4) provide recocnmendations for administrative action if
deemed. necessary.
SIRG mezubers unanimously agreed that the actions of

S1I

I were justified and that no action should be ,takén

against him as a result of this shooting incident.

3

 T:
Re
LZ.D

Inspection
297—HQ—A1271749—D,

From:
10/20/2003

Inspe.ction

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INS PECTIN

1 DC
AT WAsBING7ON
Thpt n adm4ustrative action be taken against
S21_____________________ as a resi.ilt of hi involvement in this
‘shooting incideiit.

1 -Mr. Gebhardt, Em. 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Em. 7427
1
Mr. McCraw, Em. 7825
1
Mr. Clemens., Em. 7837
uSDOJ
1
1
Mr.
1
Mr. Vasey, o.w
1
Mr.I
1Km. 5155
Mr. Manning, Em. 1B045
1
(Attention: Nr.I
Quantico
1
Mr.
Ms.
1
IRm. 7326
1
Quantico
Mr
Quantico
1
Mr
QuanticO
1
Mr
WFO
1-Mr
7861.
1
Mrs.
I Em. 7861
MrsJ
1.

b7C

-

-

-

-

—

-

-

—

—

++

4

 ________las

________________lExtension

tJ,.O828.2O

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

E’rom:

Date:
Attn:

Inspection
Coniaot:

08/19/2003

AD LynneA. Hunt
1837

2proved By:
Clemens
Drafted By:

j

Case ID #:

297-HQ—A1271898—D

Title:

Ilrr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
07 /22/2003
PHOENIX DIVISION
b7J

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
a shooting incident that occurred on 07/22/2003. ivolving
Special Agent (SA)I
I SAl
Ishot and
killed a deer that was severely injured by a vehicle.
SIRG ntembers
reconmende4 that no administrative action be taken against
a .result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Reference Electronic Communication (EC) of
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Ray P. Churay, dated
08/04/2003.

Administrative:

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297—TIQ—A1271898—D,

From:

08/19/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 07/22/2003, whi1e on official duty, SAl
I
stopped to reader assistance at the scene of a vehicle—deer
accident.
The deer was alive but off ihe highway, posing no
threat to anyone
s safety.
t
SF1
Idecided to wait for the
arrival of Department of Public Safety (DPS) officers to
handle the injured deer; however, the deer began to drag
SI
I, concerned for the
itself towards the highway.
safety of individuals traveling on the highway, fired two
shots with his Glock Model 22, .40 caliber pistol, killing the
deer.
-

on 08/14/2003, theSIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with
the following votinq members of the SIRG in attendance:
I Deçuty Chief, Civil Rights Division,
I
(JSDOJ; I
I Deputy Chief, Domestic Security
Section, Criminal Division, EJSDOJ; Assistant Special Agent in
Charge Jeff Vasey, Investigations Division, Office of
Inspector General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens, Chief Inspector,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; Charles D. Elder,
Section Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal
D7C
Investigative Division; Jay C
1 Mannina. Section chief, CD-6,
Counterintelligence Division;I
lUnit Chief,
Investiaative Law Un.t, Office of the General Counsel;
I
I Unit Chief, Transfer Unit; Administrative
Services Division; SSAI
L Firearms
Toolmarks
Unit, Scientific Anal sis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSA
Firearms Training Unit, Training
Divisi6n; SSA
0 erational Skills Unit,
Training Division; an
,
Washington Field
Office.
The two non-voting members_present were
andI
I Management/Program
I
Analysts, Inspection Management Unit, Officeof Inspections,
Inspection Division.
-

Observations axd Recoznmezidations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate theapplication of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and

•

2

 •

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—I-IQ—A1271898—D, 08/19/2003

Inspection

(4) provide reconmtendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
S]RG membes unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Lras justified and in compliance with the deadly
force policy and that no administrative action should be taken
against him as a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.

3

 ________
_________

•

..

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—MQ—A1271898-D, 08/19/2003

Inspection

IAD (s):
Set Iead 1:
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Thpi- nr thijnistrative action be taken against

SAl
shooling incident.

las

a result of his involvement in this

b6
1
]biC

-

1
1
1
1.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

-

—

—

—
—

-

—

—

—

-

-

—

-

—

—

Mr. Gebhardt, Rut. 7142
Mr. ainstein, Rm. 7427
Mrs. Hunt, Rm. 7825
Mr. Clemens, Rut. 7837
Mr. I
USDOJ
Ms. I
tJSDOJ
Mr. Vasey, OIG
Mr. Cromwell, Rn. 6012
(Attention:
Mr.l_____
Mr. Elder, But. 5155
Mr. Manniig, Rut. 1B045
Mr. I
I Quantj
(Attention:
1
Mr.
Mr.
Quantico
Ms.
Rut. 7326
Mr.
Quantico
(Attention:
Mr.l_______

Mr.
Mrs.
Mrs.

I

IWFO

Rut.

I

7861

Rut. 7861)

4

 PD-2O4(Rcy 12.1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
rcdoral Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

ASAC HERBERT N. BRO7N

Repod oC

07/24/2003

Datô:

66F-LA-234327

O1&o

Los Aiigeles
I

-

ADMINISTRATIVE INQ1ER;
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
LOS ANGELES DIVISION;
05/30/2003
Chuacct:

Synopstc

•
•

,

ADMINISTRATIVE- INQUIRY
On May 30, 2003 at approximately 3:00 am, member of
Los Angeles Di’isio Squad CE-i were iivolv in thc
apprehension of a drug dealer. subeqtI
I
During the arrest of subeotI
a shooting incidet
occurred involving t)iree members o1 the Squad CE-i. Prior
to thjà incident
1 on lay 29, 2003, another shoot&ng
incident involving another member of auad CE-i happezied
during an effort to apprehend sub:j
ecti

I

The initial shootjng incident of May 29, 2003 played
an integral part in what occuz!red during tbe May 30, 2003

jncident. The facts behind this incident will be provided
prior to outlining what happened on May 30, 2003.
•

•

•

On May 29, 2003 at approxijately 700 p.m., members

of Los Angeles Sa3zad CE-i zreDare to conduct a buy/bust
arrest of subiecti
an West Hollvwôc,d.

This 4ocu2nt contains DOjttZCt reendations nor COnclusiOns of the PZ
It .s the pxcpocty ef the t
and is iene4 to your agency; it ncd its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

11)6

 o

.
66F-LA-234327

agents drove towards
exit.

I

I a surveillance van holding five REX
jvehicle to block it from trying to

!b7C

As the FBI vehicle approached subectl
6ickup, he apparently reaLized he was about to be arrested. He drove
forward in an attempt to drive around the Yan and the two

vehicle cth.1{id, both left front corners making contact.
I continued driig forward and struck the
Subject I
drier’s
side door as SA I
I the driver of the van amntø
to exft the vehicle. The door slajtund back against SA
causing an injury to his left arm.

I

Subject I
Icontiziued dziing forwaxd at a hiah
rate of speed in the parking lot. At this time, SN
had driven forwLrd in 14s vehicle to assist the gmbérq of his
squad. Subjecti
IcoU$ded head on into SAl
Iehicle
causing sere iamce u.ó he vhcle. The large pick-up being
driven by subject I
Ibounced to the right aiid landed atop a
sidewalk which rnps acl:Jacent to the restaurant’s buclding. As
SSAI
lopened the exit door of the restaurant to
assist in the arrest, he noticed subject I
lehicle coming
‘‘-‘ him,
atop the sidewa]Jc, and at a high rate of speed. SSA
Istenoed back just in time to avoid being injured as

subject I

I vehicle slanuned into and destroyed the door.

bonirnu1 *44n c€vwsird in an effort
Subjecti
to escape from the scene. sI
I who tas now on
foot and walking towards the area where the arrest was to take
place, was standing in the path where the subjeqt’ vehcle.was
now headed
As th vehicI passed near him, SAl
Isaw the
subject he knew ael
land fired two rour&ds at him. One of
the rouflds struck the vehicle on the front passenger door while
the other missed the vehicle causing no damage. The ubjects
vehicle contiud out of the parking lot and drove west and then
north from the area • SAl
med during the
‘s not
incident. At this time it was unknown whether or not subject
2

b6
7C

 __________Ireceived

66F-LA- 23 43 27

I

Iliad been shot.

Members of Squad CE-i chgci nihctI
I in their
vehicles as he fled from the area. I
Idrove a few blocks
and tbea:i abandoned his vebicle in a resipential ieighborhood.
The FBI, the Los Angeles Poliôe Department (LAPD) and the Los
Angeles Sher&ff’s Department (tASD) set up a perimeter at the
locatioz:x. The Los Angeles FBI SWAT team also responded ço the
area to assist in the matter. They searched for Subjectl
but were unable to locate him.

Subj ecti
I was eventually arrested on May 30, 2003
at approximately 3:00 a • in. in downtown Los Angeles by the FBI.
During the arrest, there was another shooting incident. See 66PLà-234327 and 89B-LA-23432 for
facts and circumstances
behind this incident. Subjecti
I along with the already
pending drug dealing charges, will be charged with severa,l counts
of Assault on a Federal Officer.

The Los Angeles FBI Agent Involved Shooting (AIS) team
responded to the area to conduct an administrative inquiry
following the incident. The team coñdicted interviews of the
ageats involed as well as witnesses to the incident. The
neighborhood, which is aU businesses, was caxassed for any
other witnesses but none were located. The AIS team coordinated
the investigative requirements from the LRSD and the LAPD at the
scene. Neither th LAPD or the LAS.D generated any reports for
this incident. SAl
I after providing information as to
public safety issues concening the rounds be fired and being
provided an EP contact, was released from the scene. flis weapon
used during the incident was retrieved by the AX& prior to his
departure and he was provided another -Bureau issued weapon of the
same make and model.
The Los Angeles FBI Evidence esponse Team (BRT)
responded to the location and processed the scene at the
reanran nkiñg lot. They retrieved shell casgs fLred rom
hieapon as well a other items of evidence at the
SAk
crime scene. They made sketchøs ne
nh€tographs of the
scene to include thç injury to S?I
I One of the rounds
fired by SI
lyas located -&nside the passenger compartment
of subjecti
Ivehicle on the Eloorboard on the drivers
side. he round appars to have struck the passenger side door
and then ricocheted off the vehicles mirror 1efore Unally
coming to a rest inside the vehicle. Efforts to locate where the
other round struck were made, but the round could not be foUxd.
SA

medical attention two days after
3

]b?C

I

 ___________Wh&.e
______________Ion

66’-La-234 327

the incident, but was not injured to the extent he needed to miss
work. No other agents assaulted during this incident received
any or claimed to require any medical treatment.
Pollow&ng this incident, members o Squad CE-i
conducted further investigation to determine subeatl
Is
location. The squad located an associate of subject I
Iwbo
advised he had a Whi vq registered to him. In adcition, th
associate advised I
bias probably staying at I
Street in Los Angeles, California. The Los geléwi
t am
was asked to respond to this general area while members of Squad
CE-i set up a surveillance at the residence.
It was approximately 2:15 m on May 30 2003 when
surveillance units from Squad C-1 arrived I
I A
white van registered to subject I
as located parked near
thq residnc n flyton vnne. A
rtrillance team made up of
Sal
land SI
I parked in the area to
watch the van which appeared unoccupied. Another surveiUaice
team made up of S2
I also
i and S I
parked near this area.

I

watching the white van,

sal

b7c

land S

I,nt iced a newer SU driving by the residence ati

I
two occasions. The second time it drove v they
decided to foUow it to get a look at the occupant(s). SAl
and S.
foUowed tze Urst surej3.lance team shou1d they
ra fi
c stoD andL would need back up assistance. SA
1
and SA I
I followed the SO’! a short ways and then
rore past the ve.oJ.e’s ieft side to get a look at the driver.
They were able to determine this was not subject I
nd then
continued on to return to their original position to watch the
white van registered to subjecti
I

I and sal
Si
ldec.ided to contixue foUowing
the SUV in ca he occupants were possibly associated with
subject I
I About three blocks from thel
I
address, they decided to conduct a trafUc stop. 2hey acti’ated
theijr emergency lights and the SUT came to a stop near the
southeast corner at the intersection of 4th Street and Alameda
Avenue.
S?1
I and sal
Iwere in the process of
cont4cting the driver of the SUV via the public address (PA>
system of the Bureau vehicle. They were giving the. driver
muands through the PA system. SAl
had exited the Bureau
vehicle ,and was in the process of approaching t-be SU when SA
heard someoneon the Bureau radio communicate that the
-

4

I

 ________

____________
__________

.
66P-LA-234327

Iwas

white vaz belonging to sub:jecd

now moving.

After hvina seenL th dziver qf the .pUV and :tIning
it was not subject
nd S
IszI
had
returned to the area o I
I A approximately
3:00 am they observed the backup lights of the white van
illuminated and the vehicle began backing. It was at this time
they advised the other surveiUance_un.ts at the ocatioq the van
was moving and this is whit SAl
I hear4 a SAl
Iwas
approaoh{n the SUV three blocks awt. SA I
Iried to advise.
SAl
khat was happening but SA
Idid not hea.r his
conununicatiozT.

iD 0

D7C

As the white van was backing up it positioned itself to
turn north on Colyton Avenue. SAl
Idrove north past .!the
van as he and SA
a tried to determine if the driver was
I Ater driving past the white van anc slowing...
sub:jectl
down, SAl
itated he coul4 clearly see the driver who
matched the descintion qf suiect I
I He was now certatn
I SA
this was sub:jectl
I had tzned his vehicle to
the right which made it somewhat perpendicular to the white van.
SA I
I whose passenge.r side window was çpen exposed his
upper torso to subjecti
ad the letters
i S
FBI” clea4y showing on his person.
t
he was_hold&ng
his handgun in his right hand while waving for subject
Ito
stop the white van. He was aLso yelling the words, “FØI stopI
Subject I
Isuddenly turned the van to the left in
the middle of the street and appeared o be ting to make a U-.
turn in the middle of the street. SA I
IaLso began a Utun thinking the subject was attempting to travel south on
Colyton Avenue.
this time when the white van being
driven -by subj
in reverse directly towards.
the pa
‘ccupi’ hi, .A I
for A
I to drive
forwarc
was fly a iew feet frdm
striking the area where SA
was eâted whex SAl
I
was able.to moYe the Bureau vehicle. Tie two vehioles barely
missed colliding in the street.
-

and

SA

Subjecti
bontinued drivnq in reverse at a high
rate of speed nprth on Colyton Avenue. SA I
Iturned hiss.
vehicle to drive orard while pursuing the suect. The two
vehicles reached the intersection of 4th Stteet and Co?.yton
Avenue and tUrned west on 4th Street. Subject I
I was átiU
driving ia:i reverse and was aprQxJntel-y 100 feet from Alameda
Avenue when SAl
the white 4
van. The
I ;c oxe rcnd
round struck the j.et xont corne.r of the ehicles windshield.
.

S

-

 __________________

.
66L’-LA- 234327

I and SAl
SIi
I had exited tbe&r vehLcle as
they were sti3j. in the process of contacting the driver of the
SUV at 4th Street and Alameda Avenue. At this tijue they heard a
gi.nsot(s) around the corner on 4th Street. Both PSI agents had
moved forward to see what was occurring.
Subjectl
‘was still traveling in reverse at a
high rate of speed as he came to Alameda Avenue. At this time he
turned the vehicle to travel pnh nn Alameda Avenue but he cut
the corner to close. Subject I
Jdrove atop the sidewalk and
struck a traffic lightpole on the southeast corner of 4th Street
and Alameda Avenue. As he was abou’ ir “ke the traffic
lightpole, he almost struck both SA4
lani
Iwho each
had to quickly move to avoid being xnjured.
Subect[
lvebiöle., after striking the traffio
lightpole came to a stop. .311
lwçe now on
land SA[_
the passenger side of the white van. Subject
Ixited the
vehicle and began to rim westbound in the intersect.on. S
Iyeled for the subject to stop but he kept on ruining. SA
F
I
Ihad moved out into the intersection and to the roz.t of
1 t this same t.me; SA
the van to begin chasing subject’
I
Ibegan to fire three rounds at subjecti
I SA_______
stoppe and also fired one round at the subject.

I

1b7 C

I once the rounds had been fLred, came
Subject I
to a stop a few yards west of th 4’-ption o 4th {. He
I ani SAl
fell prone onto the ground as
Iwere
to drive to him and place him znder arrest. Subject
Itold the agents he was not injured and had not been
struck by aziy rounds either dgrig the incident on May 29, 2003
or the one on Ma? 30 2003.

I after being taken into custody was
Subjecti
taken to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Detentioft Center (MDC)’. He
refused to make
stateinçnt to azresting agents. As noted
earlier, subject I
Iwifl not only be facing the drug dealing
charges but also several counts of an Assault on a Federal
Officer. See 895-LA-234329 concerning the assault charges.
The Los Angeles FBI AIS team responded to the scene to
conduct an investigation and an administrative inquiry of what
had occurred; The team conducted an interview of the one witness
located at the scere. This tatha d4ver of the SOy that had
I The LAPD responded to the
been stopped by SA
hudi
location and conducted a traffic accient investigaton due to
the traffic Ughtpo).e having been damaged by ih1tI
‘fëhicle. The PB MS tem spoke with Lt.j
lof the

6

)b7C

 66F-.’LA- 234327

LAPD concerzing the sIooting incident. It was decided the LPD
would conduct no further iestigation into the iicident other
than the traffio accident. The LAPD provided perimeter control
while the FBI MS tem finished obtaining information at the
crime scene. They also provided a copy of the accident rcport to
the FBI.
The Taos Angeles ER was asked to respond to the
location to process e’idence atthe site. They retrieved four
(4) shell casings located near or in the intersection, of, 4th
Street and Alameda Avenue, They also located another rouid
loc!ated on’ 4th Street several hundred feet east of Alameda
Avenue. They also lçcatd se’ceral other items at the location
belonging to subject I
I This is to inqiude a broken garage
door opener found near the area where subjecti
I finally
stopped and was apprehended. The Ios Angeles ERT, under the
instruction of the Los Angeles AIS team, also made sketches and
took photographs of the crijne scerze.

Efforts were made to locate where the five rounds tbat16
had been fired.during the incident had struck. Oze round, as
c
noted abcsve, struck the left front corner of bIie subject
vehicle’s windshield,. The other rounds.wre fired in a westerly
direction down 4th Street. This is an older’ “rundown” bzsiness
area where there are mostly large indqstxial type buildings. lhe
area was canvassed but no other roun4s could be definitively
shown o have struck a particular location. Area hospitals were
checked with negati’’e results as to ensure no random rounds had
struck ailyone.

I

Subjecti
lie currently incarcerated at tbe MDC in
Los Ane2.es. there was no handgun assoolated with subject
.oeated at the crime scene.
STone of the FBI aents assaulted during this incident
received azy injuries..
-

7

 _________________________k

.4

66P-LA-234327

DETAILS:

I

SAsI

Th

4q

4
’
ji upon {pfor atfn 1at

and SN
I
asgea co tne ios ngees usoz of the Federal
Btfreau of ncrestigation (FBX), hd been invol.ved in a shooting
incident at approximately 3:00 am on May 30, 2003.. The FBX
agents, •wh&le op official duty, iad been 3n the process of
arresting subectI
jwhen the sIooting noident
occurred.

J

8

h6
b7C

 ?D-204 (Re tZ-1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSCE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

opy to:
0

Report oft
Date:

A.SAC HERBERT M. BROWN
12/20/2003

OaseID#:

66F-LA-235822

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY;
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
LOS ANGELES DIVISION;
OCTOBER 26, 2003

Charectcr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

I

Los nge1es

I

I

“tober 26, 2003, Speil agent (sA)
credential nuirerI
I assigned to the Los
Angeles Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), was off-duty when be was involved in a shooting
incident.
He was carrying his off-duty weapon along with
his FBI badge in a fanny pack.
‘‘

Synopir

Oce

•
At approximately lit 15 am on this date, SAl
I
was in a rental truck parked near a ‘Home Depot° home
center in Marina Del Rey, Califoxnia. He was being
.accompanied by his girlfriend who was parked behind him in
a separate vehicle. The two of them had rented the truck 17C
and planned on moving their belongings to a new residence.
It was SAl
lintention to hire two day laborers
who had gatnere near the home center looking for work to
assist him in moving his furniture.

I

SAl
l,icked out two individuals he intended
to hire indicated to them to get into his rental truck.
Before they coul4 enter the truck twoptber day laborers,
I entered his truck
j and
on the passenger side. I
Itold them both to exit
his vehicle as he did not want to hire them. The three of
them were having a verbal argument, the subj eats speaking
primarily what SAl
resumed was Spanish while the
agent spoke in Bng.Lisn.
Subjecti
Iwas closest to the passenger door
when he grabbed a plastic drinking bottle belonging to BA

This dncumezit contains neither zecozendations nnc eonc.uaicns of the ThE • It is the property o the ThZ
and is 1oned to your agency; it and its cc@tent. are not to e diathibuted outside your agency.

 ___________believed

.

.

6SF-L1—235822

I yeLLing toriI He

exited the vehicle while the aent was till
zo get out of his truck. I
fthen lened
back into the vehicle and, while yelling back at SA I
I
threw the nlIstio bottle at the agent. The bottle did not strike
SAl
Ibut landed on the steering column of the vehicle.

At this time sAl
Iverbally identified himself
as a police officer whil_continully telling both subjects to
get out of his vehicle. I
khen lunged over the lap of
land with his right hand struck the right side of SA
I
Iface. The strike did not have much of an impact
because the agent moved his head. I
Ithen grabbed the
agent’s fanny pack which contained his off-duty weapon. It was
lying on the aazit lap and unattached to his person at the
tim
Jwas able to wrestle the fanny pack away from
I
I who then exited the vehicle. As he was leaving the
vehiclel
Itwice said the word “pistola” tol______
SAl
Itook the keys rcm the yebicle and exited
the driver’ s side door. At this time I
I came around the
front of the truck and once again lunged toward and tried to
strike the agent who avoided the assault by moving out of the
way. He continually told, the subjects he was a police officer
and did not want any trouble from theta.
SAl
Itried to put some space between himself
and the subjects by backing away from them, but they kept trying
to get closer to him. Ee pulled his PB! badge out of his fanny
pack and displayed it to them in hopes it would convince them to
stop.
SA I
Ireachod the area behind his rental truck
and then noticed a third male_approaching him also. This male
was identified asi___________ The three tnaj.es formed a circle
around the agent as he tried to move away from them. While
displaying his PB! badge, he was still yelling for them to back
away from him and that he was a police officer.
his actions were not having an
effect as all three subjects were becoming more aggressive. He
placed his hand on his off-duty weapon which was still in his
fanny pack. The three continued to grab and lunge toward the
agent as he attempted to move away from them. At this time he
decided to pull his weapon out of his fanny pack. He pointed the
weapon at each of the subject’s chests while still yelling for
them to back away and that he was with the police. This caused
the subject’s to back up two or three yards.

2

 _________‘was
_______land ___________ladvised
_______

.

..
66F-IA-235822

LI
I

BA I
Istated he was addressing both I
I and
they continued to circle him. The agent then noticed
Ihad moved to the sidewalk adlacent to the road and was
now four or five yards away from him. I
Ihad picked up a
1
“‘ping cart and was holding it ove his heaç3.. BA
I chest. He
Iturned and pointed his weapon at’
then threw the cart at the agent who was forced to move or the
cart would. have struck him.
‘then moved onto the sidewalk to avoid both
ho still were trying to grab him. He was
still being confronted b31
‘who was yllina at he agent
and attempting to grab him. A this time SAl
lobserved
approximately ten more day laborers walking towards his location.
The agent said be feared if he were to shoot and harm or kill
it could start a riot amongst the crowd of day laborers.
S2

I

I

h6
7c

Iwas now getting more
agitated. e was using hand gestures with his fists. When the
agent tried to move away from the three subjects, they moved into
his path. SAl
I felt he could riot leave his girlfriend in
harm’ s way as she was about twenty-five feet away in her vehicle.
The agent wanted to get far enough away to make a cellular
telephone call to açk for assistance. Considering all of the
above, SAl
Ifelt he had no option left other than to fire
a round in order to disperse the subjects and. the crowd.
BA I
Istated he pointed his weapon to the area
where there was an empty lot and some new construction. He did
not observe anyone that could be harmed if he were to fire a
round in the direction of the construction area. At this time he
fired one round.

I

1i

aftçr th rpund was fired, the three
lcontinued to encircle and
andl
une agent moved into the Home Depot home
center parking lot. At this time a bystander intervened and
hnd took him to the ground aid held him. Once
grabbed’
land
on the ground
I slowly backed away
b,C
from the area. This gave BA,
Itime to telephone for
assistance. The LAPD responded to the scene and all three
subjects were taken into custody and transported from the scene.
All three of them were booked for attempted armed robbery.

subjects,
lunge towarcis him.

1

The ‘BX Los ngeles Agent Involved Shooting .(AIS), team
responded to th
ene to conduct an administrative inquiry of
the shooting incident. The team met witi t dctectiv rom the
LAPD concerning jurisdictional issues. It was determined BA
3

-

 _______

.
66F-LA-2 35822

was off duty at the time he-was assaulted and the
shooting incident occurred. FBI Los 2ngeles advised the LAPO it
would conduct an administrative inquiry separate from the LRPO’a
assault case.
(See administrative matters on cover page B of
this report for details).
I Los 2ngeles conducted a search of the area where BA
I round was directed towards. No one was found to have
been injured and there was no damage to any property located.
Checks of medical facilities following the shooting did not
reveal anyone having been shot or harmed. The round itself was
not found.
Db

I were subsequently released
an
1
by the Lo
.s r Ct
they had not physically
struck BA
ku-as charged with and
Sub:ject I
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and battery. He was
sentenced to five months incarceration and is subject to
deportation from the U.S. to Bi Salvador upon his release.
Subjects

BA I
lild not require any medical attention
following the assault. No one else at the scene was harmed.

4

 .

.

66F-LA-235822

DETAILS:

I
I

case was predicated upon information that SA I
J assigned to the Los ngeles Division of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), had been involved in a shooting
incidnt ap approximately 11:15 a.m. on October 26, 2003.
SA
Iqas off-duty at the tinte of the incident.
‘“-

5

I

IC

 •

(Ky.

08-2S-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date;

ROUTINE
Atim:

Inspection

Front:

Inspection
Contact:

AD Steven C. McCraw
Extension 1837

,/

McCraw Steve’
Clemens Michae$V

Approved By:
Drafted. By:

02/26/2004

I

Ilrr

Case XD

#:

itle:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/03/2003
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

297—HQ—A1271917--D

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/03/2003, involving Special
I
sAl I fired one shot from her Bureau—
Agent (SA)I
issued Sig Satier, Model 228, nine millimeter, pistol at a
charging pit bull dog during the execution of a search warrant.
SIRG membeçs repoznmended that no administrative action be taken
against SA I
I as a result of her involvement .in this shooting
inciden1.
Administrative:__Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated 10/07/2003.
(SSA)I

I

Details:
This communication was prepared .to furxish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 C

To:
e:

From: Inspection
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271917—D, 02/26/2004
Details of the Shooting Incident

As part of an on9oing investigation, Agents of the
San Francisco Division were assisting in the service of
approximately 26 Federal arrest warrants and 29 Federal search
as assigned to assist in the
warrants.
SAl
service of a search warrant at a residence located in
Brentwood, California.
On 10/03/2003, a briefing was conducted at the FBIdirected Command Post. At the conclusion of the overall
briefing, secondary briefings were held with individual teais
where a discussion was held regarding the possible presence of
an aggressive pit bull dog at the Brentwood address.
At approximately 6:05 a.m.., members of the Brentwood
Police Department Special Weapons an Tactics (SWAT) Team
arrived at the Brentwood address,. knocked, announced their
presence and their intention of serving the searchwarrant. An
individual from within the. residence initially refused to open
the door, however, a short time later partially opened it.
SWAT personnel observed a pit bull dog growling inside the
residence, while a resident restrained the dog by holding its
collar. The resident then released I)old of the dog’s collar
resulting in the dog running out the front door towards the
officers: A Brentwood Police Officer fired four shots at the
animal without injuring the dog.

Iheard the
Positioned outside the residence, SAl
pathway
the
‘‘n
chargi
gunfire and turned to see the doa
for
j
concerned
SAj
I
toward herself and si’l
her safety as well as the safety of other law enforcement
personnel on the scene, fired one shot at the dog. Although
not injured, the dog turned and ran away upon hearing the
•gunshot. The dog was eventually controlled by one of the
occupants from inside the home.
.

No personal_injuries or property damage were incurred
Idischarged round.
as a result of SA[
On 02/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Assistant Director
Steven C. McCraw, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with
the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:_______
Security Section, Criminal
I
J Deputy Chief, Domestic
Agent
in Charge Yeff Vasey,
Special
Division, 1jDOJ; Assistant
Genérãl, USDOJ;
of
Inspector
Office
•Investigations Division,
2

 To:
Re:

From:
Inspection
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271917—D, 02/26/2004

Michael 5. Clemens, Chief Inspector; Office of Inspections,
Inspection ivjsjon; Manuel E. Mora, Section Chief, Operational
I
Sunnôt Section, Criminal Investigative Division; I
Acting Sectidn Chief, Applicant Processing Section,
Administrative Services Division[
I Unit Chief (UC),
Division;
Counterintelligence
Counterrpljferptjpri Unit,
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division
SSAI
(TDL SSAI
1 Firearms Training Unit, TD;
IIwQt1cMitrc. Tw tlnjt, Office of the
SSAI
General Counsel (OGC); SSAI
I National Firearms
Program, TD;I
I Program Manager, Operational
Toolmarks Unit,
I Firearms
Skills Unit, TD; SSAI
Laboratory
Scientific Analysis Section,
Division; and
SSAI
IWahinaton Field Office. The only non
IManagement Program
voting member present wasi
Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.

I

—

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
the intent to:
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
5TR( nmbers unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
I was justified and .in conformance with the deadly
force policy. Members recommended that no administrative action
should be taken against her as a result of her involvemen in
this sbootiig incident.

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ--.A1271917—D, 02/26/2004

Set Lead 1:

AT WASHINGTON. DC

-

SAl
incident.

That zo administrative action be taken against
I as a result of her involvement in this shooting

ihb
)JC

•

1
1
1
1

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.

Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
Caproni, Rm. 7427
McCraw, Bitt. 7825
c1mn. Rm 7837
DOJ
1-Mr.I
;JJ!
1
Mr.
1
Mr. Mora, Rm. 5155
1
Mr. Manning,. Bm. 1B045
(Attention: Mr. I
I
I.
Mr.[
I Rio. 6uu
1
Mr.J________ Quarttico
(Attention:
Mr.l
1 -Mr.
,
Quaritico
1
Mr.
Rm. 7326
Mr.
QuantcO
1
(Attention:
Mr. I
1
Quantico
Mn
,
IWFO
1-Mn
1
Mr1___________ Pm. 7861
—

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I

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 ______________pciuad

F
FD-204 (Rev. L2-1.9)

UNIThD STKi’ES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Data:

DAD, .Iispection Division
Attn:
Shooting Incident Rw Grup
Firearms Training Unit
•,
Oca: Denver
SHOOTING INQUIIY
11/14/2003

Case ID :

297-HQ-A1271466-D

TftIe:

SHOOT ING INQUIRY
DENVER DIVISION
10/25/2003

Copy 1o;
•

Report ot

..

*

Charactei

INSPECTION DIVISION
SHOTflTG LNQURY

Synopsis:

•On 10/25/2003, Al
k1aJe’arlway,Denz7è
in a shooting_incident at ‘ii.u
checks of 1oca!t±9 in
spot
conducting
CO.
iwas
SAl
regards to a 52 investigatiOn (Theft of Goveriment
Weapon).
Pzoperty
.

‘

-

-.

block Model 22, 40
Details:
On 08/5/2003, SAl
caliber pistol was tpln oüc or, nis Locked and Thrmed
bureau vêhice. • The weapon was stolen out of SAl
vehicle while w3tching his son’s foota..U. practice at his
high chgo1 which is in the tiot direct route froti the
Ihome. A 52B case, Theft af.
office to s.z.i
•Goverrixnent Property-Weapon was oned in the Denver
3..
Division and: was assigxiëd to

I

.

Xnaddition to the. FBI investigaf:ion, Denver
Police Department (DPI)) developed source information that
w 1n the oossessiori of’
the. -“

Iand[
I
landi
arrived at the meeting location an sav .thël
4 PPD officer, so they f3ed the scene,
lindicated that S
on a hiah peed càase. mel
I
tQlen weapon had been in the car occupiedby
They were not apprehended.
WndL
I
I

I

Approximately, one week prior to the shooting,
Thi.. docunent conta1s neither :.coanandations nor couclUiona of the X. It is the property of the rSI
and is loaned to your agency; it aiid ito contents ax not to be distrbuted outside your aqency.

7C

b7t

I

I

-

 AC

pat.on

297-HQ-Al27.466-D

I appried of the status of
SA I
Iwas keeping SA E
1
land I
DPDe drug investigation as it ertained tol
kalown
to
were
which
addresses
they
and provided pim with several
frequent.
Ihad no involvement with the_jnvetigation.
SAl
prior to 10/17/2003’, when he was contacted by, S
provide details ef items stolen from his. bureau vehicle. The
..,format ion was needed for seach_warraits tiit I’tDTh was going to
landi
Ior possible 1b7(.
be conducting on 10/17/2003 Of’
drug’violation8. tpt conducted arrests of .the two subjects
drug related charges, however, the Gldck was not located.
1iridicated on 10/24/2003, he told. Acting ASAC
land .SA I
I Appicant Coordinator
ass±gned to Squad 3,’ in separate conversations, that he w,as’going
t do sppt checks at sevFal_addresses tbat DPD had developed in
Ionducted spot checks of the
regards, to the base.
identified iccatjd çuring the early evening.of 1O/24/2
SAl

I

Lted he anE( SA
the stolerr weapon.
or the OPR investigat’ion on that Y-’
cific4ty a.. cotti.on
cn bot .recall. wI
I ixi -4-e...had
checks. However, SSAI
I
‘auriR
he
d±d
nor
auiE±’ize
no authority. tc
frentied
p indicated 54
conduct these checks- s.i
aerc if
and
was
shooting
the
before
the spot checks âh tb’e day
he would be avai1ale tp cjo some surveillance on Saturday,’d
I he was unavailable.’ S, I
1
however, SAl
1o1d SA
is the Pincipa1 Firearms Instructor and directly reports’ to” ASAC
RaW. E. Cárballido.
Acting

..1

.

-

CarbaIlido indicated he did not authorize BA
in the’52B case and had no conversations
regarding him conducting spot checks. ASAC Carballido indicated
he had beex. out of the office for the majority of several weeks
prior to the shooting, al.tbDugh he had been in the office the
SSP
four days immediaiely prior to the shooting.
ie
supervises Squad 3 which-’waa responsible for the 573 case.
was out of .the office the week iminedialely preceding the shooting
-I
and he did not authorize or have knowledge of BA I
I, Squad
involyemen.t in the case. Acting SSA F
i intentions to
3, indicated h had no knowledge of SAl
conduct spot checks’on the case.

The

Istated he had no

Acrenti

intentions of conducting spot’ checks in
Iindicated he had cQuyatiOflS
regards to the ase. SA I
I
with Ski
Ion 10/24/2003, wneñ SAl
i asked SAl

knowledge of si

2

 2 97-HQ-A1271466-D

I

to make a phone call to a cable company regarding possible
infOrrntjion one of their installers may have had concerning
Ishowing.off an FBZ Agents gun during the installation of
cable at a Denver. residence. SA
1 said no crime scene
diagrams were prepared by FBI Ev-3.dence Response Team after the
shooting as DPD was handling that part of the investigation.

Iwent into service at 6:45 AM
On lo/25/2Q03, siI
checks at the loctions
spot
ccaiducting
• for the purpo,se of
IobserV5d a
identified by DPD. it approximately 8AM, SAF
Parkway,
E.
vicinity
of
4110
Hale
•green Ford Expedition in the
I
which he be1ieve. to be stolen an4 in the possession of I
hft would come to the site
He.contacted s5A1
SSAI
I indica.td hq war called
.when Iv”
rettrned home.
Ihe
lat approximately’B:2OAM and he told SAl
by SA I
y had jurisdicton.regarding the
needed to contact u
cted Officei
SA
stolen vehicle.
invOlv.d’.33’:tIe stolen weapon
Officer
DPD, at home.
tW.c1e wa .Rt-olerl
that
SA
invet.gtion., He told
I
.: loja- SAl
.aad tlt he was n rob,t.e .to
hive in Strasb’ CO and he had to
was unaware Of ficeV I
dxive a.ppr9ximtely 3. mLe&-Z.o- arde at. hieat-iorr: ‘PPD
uniformed officers were not.,contaced a thiiit by.SAI_______
or Officerl
-

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..•

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t. nnrçximately 9AM and priortO OLce4
arrivingj
lexited a residence and approahe tne
Iwho’ indicated
Icent4cted Officerl
Expedition.
SA!
gi’ie
an exact
did
not
however
he
joc&tion,
he wad close to cne
I told him he was going to effect a stop
location, and SN
balling on the
sAl
I beaz’d Officer I
on the vehicle.
radio fo uniformed off iceS for assistance.
.

kas in a parking lot south of the Expedition
SAl
and dro,ve out of. the parking lot, and had h4.ó vehicle positioned
in the street facing tierth. (See .DPD Crime Scene Diagram on Page
I got into the parked, southbound
‘75 of this .report). I
Street, but did not immediately close
facing Expedil
was ‘now sitting in his bureau Ford
1
the door.
h on Albion Street. Abou one minute
Expedition
I drove his vehicle
closed the door, SAl
J,ater, wi
parked in
vehicles
two
were
There
:ked.
to where
ock
hopin
I
SAL
1e.
front of
at the front bumper of
in, at
was still in the pare e parking
vehicle
Bxpedi...
le wa facing north, in the outbböund
spot’ and SA]
who was not wearing any law
tra-f ic lane
,.rolled down his driver’s side.
enforcement ident:
-

j

1b6

 __________Aft-er

___

297-HQ-A127Ø66-D

I
window to identify himself. According to SAL
I and
poiited a 1andgun through his front windshield at SA I
SAJ
Ijutnped out of the front driver’s side of the bureau
vehicle ve-bally identifying’himself as a police officer. S.
Iws now on foot, ad:jacent to the front driver’s side
bumper of
Ivehicle.

I

•
•

The ‘bureau vehicle bad not been placed ii park’ ñd it
proceeded down the street-where’ it came to rest aainst a brick
Ibecran to driv his vehicle out of the parkin spot
wall.
Iwo juned out. of thee way t avoidbei-ñc_hit.
Ieared foj his life and began shooting aJ
SAL
Tshot six
while the-Expedjtjqn wa pass-ing by him. SAl
i
could
aim
min&ngdiis.
dee
Ibéore
rounds atl
.
vehicle
f1èeing
the
of
e
disenc
the
due
te
to
accura
1ii.’five times-.
not hit, however, the E4edition
drove away from the scene a.t...a’ iigh’;of spea.
hid and, ttuçd tolocat
retrieved the ret
thion, tt wa unuqcessfUI1.in.5ne to two minutes,
uniformed officers
I ret ne&t tcên&.-t.L
__
-arrested later
_____
‘was
cne:.4_
who ‘were responding t& .the
•d-that clay by the ‘Bi
•

•
.

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,.:

[tDPDpebective
the arrest;L
I that. he left his apar.ment to’maice a phone call, and
saw a vehicle pull to a stop izi the stret .in front of him. The
vehicle canie çloser apd a man with a trean look on his face ecited
I stated he was into a lot of things and
the vehicle. I
‘there a:re people’ out to get• hint, .so he was scared and he drove
away.’ Then ha ward gun shots and bullets flying ‘by his head.
.He dezed- having-a gun and firing a gun at an FB .genf.•’

I

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-.

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.

lindicated he
In a second interview with DPD,[
g about
thinkin
After
on.’
cpediti
the
in
e a weapon
4
di4 not ha
he was putting the Expecition in
when
maybe
said
I
I
•..:
I.was
gear, that the Agent may have though he had a gun. I
i identified himself s a law enforcement
unsure if SAl
1 stated he did not have a
officer 4ue to all the noise.. I
gun and did not shoot at the Agent.

•

-

was
Date of Birth I
was
He
thett.
for
vehiJ.e
v
2002
3
i-oí
/
arrested on 1/3j./2001 ana
and
2002
10/03/
on
ous
drags
danger
of
sion
posses
d
for
also. arreste
vehicle
motord
for
arreste
On 10/17/2003, he was
04.113/2003-.
Oil 10/2 /2Oq3. the day o the FBI shooting invblving SA
theft.
ha ds arrted for first degree
I and
at appromate1y 2000 zeurs.
I
an
felony asauit by DD

I

a

‘b6
7’

 ________

297-HQ-Al27l466-D

•

Iwere injure4 at the tiae
/orl
Neither SAl
damage
to the bureau vehicle
was
Tere
of the shootirict_incident.
nd a blue
ExpeditioTj
ford
stolen
the
driven by SAl
1
lexited
SAl
After
Mazda which was parked on the street.
to
caue
it
park,
vehicle
in
the
put
to
his vehicle and failed
1 had visible scrapes. kblue
rest against a retaining wal] t,bicI
I whic1 had been pr&ed on th&
4azda, ) cerise p1ze wyomingl
street had damage to the driver’s sie ear quarter anelwbch
I
iretrieved his veh.cle. SAI
occurred after SAl
with
consi.stent
was
ftontwhiãh
vehicle haddatnage t the
striking the retaining wall and damage to thé left front was.
There was
cotisistent with the. da.itiae to. the blue 4azda.
driven byj
Expedition
Ford
stolen
the
“ex1easive dage to
t the. time rf the shotirIg. The vehicle was fouad abandoned at
16O.,Colorado Boulevard and had been hit by several bullets and
-t1èar window had be.._Q-

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•
There was xicctr.ifl the evidenc collected, or
-Per
wjt)aSSeS to the shooting
is11es
aac
‘gas
there
Attorney,
r]istX.C€
ththe
hée -t a Grau J!lry couveied or. the
b filed against SA
no d1ats
•

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—I’
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S

•

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 (Rev. O8-a8-2aoo)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
Ta:

Date:

Rbt)rINB

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

approved By:
Drafted By:

Attn:

AD Steven C. McCraw

lExtension

I

02/19/2004

1837

Mccraw Stevend/j
Clemens MichaeJ4’

I

J:lrr

Case XD

#.:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE XNQtYIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/01/2003
MINNEAPOI.1S DIVISION

27-HQ-A1271777-O

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident th c:-i-c.i On 10/01/2003. involving
I SAl
Special Agent (SA)I
If ired three
1
shots from his Bureau-issued Glock, Model 23, .40 caliber
semi-automatic handgun, killing a horse that had been hit by a
Bureau vehicle.
SIRG meinbqrs recommended that no administrative
action be taken against SAl
las, a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident.
AdminrMz±r
(SSA) I

€
er’n

I

report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated 12/02/2003.

This communication was prepared to furnish the
Details:
analysis, cotmnents, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting..

 To:
Re:

From: Inspection
Inspection
297-HQ-A12’71777-D, 02/19/2004
Details of the Shooting Xnident

I

On 10/01/2003, SAS 1
1 and
I
were on official Bureau business in South Dakota. As SA I
suddenly
appeared
horse
and
highway,
a
dark
very
a
was driving down
BA I
I immediately applied the
attempted to cross the road.
vehicle brakes; however, hit the horse broadside. The horse hit
the top of the vehicle’s grill, slid along the hood, hit the
windshield, and landed on the ground.
.

After determining_there were no personal injuries as a

result of the impact, 51
I observed the horse laying on its
side in the middle of the road kicking_frantically. Due to the
If ired three rounds into the
serious injuries of the horse, SAl
horse’s head.
The animal was subequently removed from the roadway by
State authorities, as
a citizen possessing the proper equipment.
of the incident.
notified
were
well as the owner of the horse,
On 02/13/2004,. the SIRO met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director
Steven C. McCraw,, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting methbers of the IRG in attendance
I Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
1
Criminal Division, USPOJ; Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Jeff Vasey, Investigations Division, Office of Inspector
General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens, Chief Inspector, Office of
Inspections, Iispection Division; Manuel E. Mora, Section
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
I Acting Section Chief, Applicant
Division;I
Processing Section, Administrative Sexvices Division;
I Unit Chief (130), Counterproliferation Unit,
I
I Firearms
Counterintelligence Division; SSAI
Training Unit, Training Division (TI)); SSAp
I
Firearms Training Unit, TI); SSAI
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel (OGC);
lNatiQnal Firearms Program, ¶ID;
SSAI
Manager, Operational Skills Unit, TI);
Program
I
I
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
SSA I
p Firearms
Analysis Section, Laioratory Division; and
ThG only non
Washington Field Office.
SSAI
-

I Management Program
voting member present wa
Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.

2

1

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1271777-D, 02/1912004
Observations and Reconunéndations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the applicaticn of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director.with an va1uative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recom
mendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.
-

SIRG me
nimously agreed that the use of
deadly force by S
was justified and in conformance with
the deadly force policy. Members recommended that no
administrative action should be taicen against him as a result
of his involvement in this shooting incident.
.

3

b7C

 ______

4

•_•

I

—

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From:
297—HQ-A1271777-D, 02/19/2004

LEAD Cs):
Set Lead 1:
IWSPBCTIO17
AT WASHINGTON. DC

rr mjnistrative action be taken against
I as a result of his involvement in this

That

SAl

shooting incident.

1
1
1
1
1.,1
1
3.
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3.
1
3.

-

-

Mr. Gehardt, Rm. 7142
Ms. Caproni, Rm. 7427
Mr. MaCraw? Rm. 7825
Mr. Clemens, Rm. 7837
]USDOJ
Mr.I
Mr. Vasey, OIG
Mr. Mora, Rm. 5155
Mr. Max3ning, P.m. 1E045
(Attention: Mr.I
I
Mn
IRm. 6050
Mr. i
i Quantico
(Attention:
Mr.I

Mr.

1-Mr.

1

Ir Quaiico
Rm. 7326

Qunt
i
1
co

Mr.
(Attention:

1•- Mr.
1
Mr.I
Mn1]
2.
-

I

Mr.l_________

I Quani.co

lwpo
I

7861

4+

4

  

 

2003

 

 

_________________lExtension

_____________________

4

(Rcv. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Date:
Attn:

05/12/2006

AD Charlene B. Thornton

Inspection

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

4-1837

Thornton Charte .B,

I

IR:lrr

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271292—D
Title:

I

SHOOTING INCIDENT
CLEVELAND DIVISION
12/23/2003

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on
volving Special
Agents (SA5)I
During the
I and
rrI rrf f nh-ipcts
in
e 1 naping of a
L S
fired one round frqm hi
Bureau-issued H & 1< MP-5, 10 in
me er carbine, and SAl
I
fired two rounds from his Bureau-issued Colt Model M—4, .223
gauge carbine.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative
action be taken against either Agent
a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.

as

/

I

Admin,strative: Reference report of former InspectorI
I dated 12/25/2003.

I

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
Details of the Shooting Incident

I

1/3/2003, between 9:00 p.m., arid 9:20 p.m., SA
lof the New York Field Office was telephonically
contacted byl
harnel1 Lester.
Lester
seemed frightened and SA I
jbelieved he had been kidnaped
during an unauthorized narcotic transaction.
At one point Lester
stated “Get the stufftogether, the mans are here.” Lester
indicated that he was being held against his will by five or six
ar d men
a house in Cleveland, Ohio.
Lest r -r1r
SAr
call a male at telephone 1
number
rectify the situation.
An

0
‘f

Savage-1860

 _____

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271292—D, 05/12/2006

At approximately 9:42 m.m.
isroc to
Cleveland Division Duty Agent
Ibegan
I SAl
obtaining subscriber information for the telephone number of
Lester’s original call to SJ
I it was determined the
number belonged to a pre-pay cellular telephone, with no
subscriber •listed.
At approximately 9:58 p.m., Cleveland Division
Supervisory Specia),Aaent (SSA)I
Ispoke to SAl
I
and also called SAl_____________ advised SAl
I that the
telephone number provided by Le
1,-hrcri
‘et
pumbr of Cv&nri Div4ion SAl
I
I
I Based on the information_received from
SSAI
1SAI
Ibeijeved Lester had giveni
I
communication that he needed FBI Cleveland to urgentiy neip him.

I,

SSAI_Icalled SAl
land instructed him to contact
Cleveland Division Technically Trained Agents (TTAs) to obtain
cellular tracking equipment and tq nbf.ii cell tower information
to assist in tracking efforts.
SPI
Ideterinined the cell
phone was “hitting” off of a tower at East 105th and Carnegie
Streets in Cleveland.
SSAI
Ithen contacted Cleveland Division
Executive Management (EM> to advise of the situation.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., Lester called SAl__________
and stated, “the dudes” (suspected kidnapers) would be at East
83rd and Euclid driving a green 4-door Jimmy in 15 minutes (to
collect ransomL W1?ile Cleveland Agents were_discussing a course
of action, SAl
Ireceived a call from SAl
ladvising
Lester would not be in the Jimmy. ASAC John G. Kavanagh was
briefed on the situation and uti1izatLon of the Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) Team was discussed.
Fearing that Lester would be harmed if the occupants of
the subject vehicle escaped, made a ohone call, or failed io
cooperate with law enforcement, SSAI
Irequested that SAl
I
contact SAl
land request that he call Lester and delay the
meeting.
At approximately 10:52 p.m., SAl
Icalled Lester
and advised him Agents needed one and one half hour to get it
(ransom) together.
Lester stated, “you’ll have to tell him.”
SAl
I re eated the information to an unknown male who then
hung u .
SS
contacted Assistant United States Attorney
and briefed him on the situation. AUSA
a i
a house was located, exigent circumstances
existed to make entry into the house without a warrant.
Clqveland Division EN was again briefed on the situation, and
SAl
L, SWAT Team Leader, initiated a call out
to other SWAT Team members.
Two TTAs departed the scene to

2

Savage- 1861

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271292—D, 05/12/2006

initiate the tracking of the signal from the cellular phone used
by Lester.

I

I

Between 11:20 p.m. and 11:O p.m.
C1ey1and Police
Department (CPD) Lieutenant (Lt.)I
land_Detective
Ia hostage negotiator, were contacted.
Lt.I
arrived
at the Command Post at 12:20 a.m.
Between 12:15 a.m and 12:50
a.m, on 12/23/2003, SAl
Imet with fourteen SWAT operators
and briefed t)n’ nn ih 4cts cf the case and disseminated a
photograph of I
ISAI
ladvised SWAT menbers the
operation could take place at a builina 1oction, a residence,
or during a felony vehicle stop oncel
I location was
determined.
Prior to the departure of the SWAT teams, assignments
were made for five vehicles.
The first four vehicles responded
to the east side of r1r
ci where the most recent electronic
cell phone data froml
was being received
1 As the SWAT
teams deployed, information was relayed by SSAI
I advising the
felony vehicle stop plan was the most likely scenario to occur.
The briefing point was a strip shopping mall near East 81st and
Euclid Streets on the east side of Cleveland where all of the
hjc1g w- i-n i-her and a briefing was provided by SAs
landi
Iwith updated information. At
approximately 1:15 a.m., th W’i’ nrrators were advised that the
subject vehicle was to meetl
lassociates, who were
Cleveland Undercover Agents assigned to the drug squad, at the
parking lot of the Rally’s Restaurant located at P1 R1t and
Euclid Streets to exchange drugs and/or money forI
I After
viewing the restaurant parking lot it was determined that subject
containment, as well as precision coo’dination of the five SWAT
vehicles, was of concern along with the fect thi was to be a
felony vehicle stop/box—in situation.
SAl
ladvised the SWAT
operators the plan was to box in the subject vehicle and block
all escape rou.es in and around the restaurant.
During the
assignments Z4
lemphasized the fact that with one SWAT
operator on foot and with the potential of others going on foot
during the execution of the felony vehicle stop, the use of a
vehicle as a weapon posed a great risk to those operators. A
vehicle could be considered a weapon if it started to move toward
the operators on foot,. putting them in a life and death
situation.

TThI
‘advised participants that Lester’s
cellular phone was two to four miles northeast at a 45 degree
angle from the cellular tower at East 105th and Carnegie Streets.
At 12:30 a.m., Lester called SAl
lwho was able
to stal. for another hour by agreeing with Lei-ø’ .ertion
that SAl
I was in Akron, Ohio. When SAl
lasked
Lester how much to bring, Lester replied “three.”
3

-

Savage- 1862

D

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271292—D, 05/12/2006

At 1:00 a.m,, ssal
Icontacted sal
land
advised him the cellular tracking was not working well and the
TTAs needed additin 1-im
At 1:07 and 1:10 a.m., Lester
placed calls to Si”
Jfrom two different telephone numbers.
t1 l
4
Lester adv
itç mqt at Rally’s, East 81st and
Euclid.
4
S2
land ssAl
I discussed the fact that based
on the tenor of the calls, time was running out.
SWAT members
proceeded to the East 81s1- nd uclid area. A basic take down
klan was fomulted by ssil
_jwhich called for SAsJ
land
I
TTb go to Rally’s and when they
sigIted I
ester in the subject vehicle, call for a SWAT takedown.
1
SSAI
jtoJ.d Sal
Ito advise Lester to be in the car
“make sure we need to see his face.” Get vehicle description and
tell him we’re in a black Denali.
—

At 1:42 a.m., Lester called si]
I SAl
I
stated th kidnaoes were “all over Lester” and that he couldn’t
talk.
SA[
I could no longer obtain information or stall
aners ar described the situation as desperate. Lester
1
the kidr
told SAl
Ito meet at Rally’s in fifteen to twenty minutes.
As the events unfolded and it was determined that
Cleveland could not successfully triangulate Lester’s cell phone,
a new meeting/exchange was set for the vicinity of Rally’s on
81st and Euclid Streets.
It was determined that the SWAT team
would box-in the subject vehicle at the meeting site, and once
arrests were made, they would attempt to determine Lester’s
location from the arrested individuals.
At 1:50 a.m., TTAsI
Jobserved a
landi
Jimmy at 90th and Euclid Streets head€ east.boun.
Cellular
tracking equipment also hit on Lester’s cell phone in the area
just prior to the sighting of the subject vehicle.

sal

Ihad placed the SWAT vehicles just as the
subject vehicle was observed and verified in the area of the
meet.
Information was received from several SWAT operators
regarding the location of the subject vehicle and the fact that
the subject vehicle was ii i-hp rreing lot backing into a space
against a brick
AI
lteam assumed control of the
operation and SAl
Igave the order for all SWAT units to
execute the felony vehicle stop plan previously discussed by
c
saying, “Go, Go, Go” over the radio.
SWAT vehicle #1 moved in with blue emergency lights
activated and SWAT vehicle *2, operated by SA
I pulled out
I
and into a “T-bone” position to the subject vhicle
1 stopping
Th criver looked at SAl
short of hitting it.
land began
driving forward.
sil
laccelerated and rammed his Tahoe SUV
into the rear driver’s side door of the subject vehicle.

4

Savage- 1863

6
t7

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271292—D, 05/12/2006

sAl
hxited the second SWAT vehicle and noticed the subject
vehicle facing him. The subject vehicle, attempting to get out,
lurched forward. oickd u oeed, and was turning and headed
towards SN
bserved a bright flash from inside
I SAl
the vehicle, made eye contact with the driver, and fired one shot
..from his Colt M-4 carbine at the driver as th ihicle was coming
towards him. After firing the first shot, SN
iwas moving
backwards and to the side in an attempt to get out of the
vehicle’s path when he immediately fired a second round.
SAsI
I andi 1were assigned to set
up a block or two away from the scene in order to prevent any
escape by the subject vehicle hou1d 1t break free from the
original containment area.
SAl
lobserved the subject
vejr1 scoi
rig the parkinq lot an
1
urning away from
SAl
I vehicle. SAl________ believed a vehicle chase
was about to take place; however, the subject vehicle crashed
between a fence and telephone pole and stopped.
SAl
I
observed the rear driver’s side door of the subject vehicle open
and the rear passenger stick his hand out çf the oçen door
pointing a handgun in their direction.
SAl
Ithen saw a
muzzle flash from the weapon and heard several rounds fired,
causing him to fire one shot from his H & K MP-5 submachine gun
through the windshield of the Bureau vehicle toward the subject
who fired.
SAs on the scene were outside of their vehicles,
repeatedly giving loud verbal commands to the subjects, “FBI,
Police, Hands Up, Oon’t Move.” The subject in the rear seat
exited the subject vehicle and was handcuffed. Agents removed
the subject from the scene, conducted a high—risk search, and
as1
regarding the location of Lester.
SA I
I observed the driker and
ssenger of
the subject vehicle with their hands up.
SAl
L observing
the driver’s hand bloody, conc111t1rl Hipt bqth Front i
passengers had been shot.
SAsI
landi
I
pulled the driver ‘threw th window of the car and proned flim out
on the street.
SA
Iheard other Agents yell to call the
Emergency Medical Service and recalled the qiih-irt n the ground
tell him he had a bullet in his mouth.
approached
SAl
th t4r- ?nd asked about Lester’s location. The driver told
SAl
I that Darnell was in the front passenger seat.
Although SAl
idid not believe the individual in the front
passenger seat was Lester because the passenger looked much
heavier than Lester appeared in a photograph provided during one
of the briefings, the passenger in the subject vehj1 rf4rmed
Lester was occupying the front passenger seat.
SAl__________
approached Lester who appeared to have been shot, aisea n
shirt and discovered whM nqeared to be a bullet wound in
SAl
Lester’s torso.
lattempted to render first aid;
however, Lester died within a few minutes.

Savage- 1864

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271292—D, 05/12/2006

The bullet recovered from Lester’s body was determined
to have been fired from the Cqt, Model M—4, 223 caliber rifle in
the possession of SAl
I

I

On 12/01/2005, a declination of prosecution dated
.05/03/2005, was received from the United States Department of
Justice. Civil Ri
ghts Division. rearding the actions of SAs
1
j and[
this shooting incident.

On 03/08/2006, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director Daniel
Lee Cloyd, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting and was a
non-voting member.
The following voting member were in
attendance:
Chief Inspector I
of
J Office
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
Dermtv
flhif.
F
Civil Rights Division, Criminal Sbciion, ui; I
I
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Charles J. Cunningham, Section Chief (SC),
Transnational
Criminal Enterprise Section, Criminal Investigative Division:
SC Jay C. Manning, CD-6, Counterintelligence Division;
1
I
‘““-I
I Unit Chief (tic), Fir
Training and
Development Division (TDD); UI
National
Firearms Program, TDD; tic I
ISWAT Operations
Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA
I
Proaram Manager, Operational Skills Unit, TDb; SSAI
I
I
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel
(OGC); and SSI
I Washington Field Office.
p Management Program Analyst, Inspection
I
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, a
non—voting member, was also in attendance.
Additionally, 1hc
fol1owiniwo observers were present ‘during this meetina I
Deputy General Counsel, OGC; and UCI__________________
I
Operational Skills Unit, TDD.
‘“

I

]b6

Observations amd Recommendations of the SXRG

b7

The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint- (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members_una;imoulv_concurred that the use of
deadly force by SA
I and!
Iwas justified and in
conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
Members opined
that although a tragic incident, the Agents’ actions were
appropriate.
The SIRG also discussed the fact that this was a

6

Savage- 1865

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271292—D, 05/12/2006

fluid situation and Cleveland management responded appropriately
by utilizing the SWAT Team.
Although no official recommendations were issued, one
member commented regarding Agents positioning themselves in front
.of vehicles and stated training should emphasize this should not
happen unless extreme circumstances exist.
The Operational
Skills Unit, TDD, representative advised members that current
training is conducted to that effect.
Other areas of discussion pertained to the necessity of
law enforcement personnel, ensuring vehicles are immobilized
before approaching them and the fact that contingency plans
should be discussed in pre—briefings including proper “locking
down” of boxed—in vehicles and personnel staying behind cover.

/

7

Savage- 1866

 ________________e

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271292—D, 05/12/2006

IZAD(s):
Set

lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

SAsI

Iandj

DC

involvement in tflis shoot.ng incident.

taIen against
s a result of their

b7C

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
1
1
Ms. Caproni, Room 7427
Mr. Clovd. Room 7825
1
1
Ms.
], USDOJ
1
Mr.
1’ tJSDOJ
1
Mr.
I Room 7837
Mr. cunningnam, Room 3548
1
1
Mr. Manning, Room 1B045
Mr.
1
Quantico
1
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
1
CIRG
1
Ms.
Room 7326
1
Mr.
uantico
1-Mr._______ WFO
1
Room 7861
Mrsl
-

-

—

—

-

—

-

—

-

—

—

—

8

Savage- 1867

 (Rev. 08..28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTRQATON
Precedence:
To:

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

Date:

ROUTINE

Miirit

I

Attn.:

I

06/12/2003

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt
lExtension 1837

i.rnn

1rr
297-HQ-A1271895-D

h6

JDMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
07/03/2002
PHILRDELPHIA DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ncident that occurrd on 07/03/2002, involving Special
Agent (SA
L During the arrest of a drug gang
subject, SA
cover and fearing that he was going
having
no
I
to be run over, fired five shots from his Bureau-issued Colt M16A1
rifle.
SIRG members_recommended that no administrative action be
taken against
as a result of his involvement in this
shooting inciden’r.

N

Administrative:
Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA4
dated 08/27/2002, and submitted to
Inspection Division in April, 2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations. of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

Savage- 1868

 when

To:

Inspection

Re:

297-HQ-AJ.27l895--D,

From:

Inspection

06/12/2003

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 07/03/2002, Agents assigned to the Allentown
Resident Agency, along with members of the FBI led Reading Area
Violent Crime Task Force (RAVcTF) were involved in a shootinq
incident during the arrest of drug gang subject I

I

Task Force merrers had been investigating a volent
drug trafficking gang based in the Reading, Pennsylvania, area.
Information was developed thai
Iwas believed to b a midlevel distributor for a gang who supervised drug distributioz
houses and re-supplied them with crack cocaine. The gang was
also believed to be responsible for several drug related
shootings and homicides,
County and local authorities working
with the task force had executed several search warrantsin
connection with the investigation where drugs, body armor, and
weapons had been recovered.

I

The investigation oi I
Ibegan in
approximately March, 002, when an undercover detective
the
Burks County District Attorney’s_Office had contact withl
and discussions ensued wherel
1 agreed to supply the
detective with whatever drugs were needed. The detective and
met several times resulting in the exchange of money for
cocaine.

SAl

1

On 07/03/2002,
lobtained a Federal
Complaint and Warrant charging I
I with drug violations as
well a possession of a firearm. He developed a plan to arrest
he met with the undercover detective again to receive
payment for previous drugs as well as deliver additional cocaine.
SAl
land Lieutenant (Lt.)I
Iconducted an arrest
briefing with. task force members and other officers assisting in
the arrest where specific assignments were made.
At approximately 3:04 p.m., the undercover detective,
accompanied by a second detective, arrived in their vehicle and
parked in an open area of the parkix lot o the Fairgrounds
Square Mall awaiting the arrival of I
I
At approximately 3:40 p.m.
1
Idrove into the
parking lot area with an unknown fçmale in the asqenger seat of
his vehicle. As planned, Corporal
1
Idrove an
undercover pickup truck into the parking lot and parked it
directly behindi
Ivehicle with the truck’s front bumper a
-

2

Savage- 1869

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297-HQ-A1271895-D,

From:
06/12/2003

Inspection

few feet away -from the rear bumper ofi
Jvehicle.
Corporal
the truck and proceeded towards the malls
stores.
At that time, LtI
Igave the command over the
po’ice rado for the arrest van to move in and execute the arrest
I ± approximately 3:42 p.m., th
ofl
occupied
by Ski
pulled directly in frot of I
Ivehicle with
the complete arrest team exiting.
SAl
lexited the
pasnger side front of the van bringing_his Colt M1BA1 up to his
shoulder while yelling commands tol
1o put his hands up.
vehicle immediately went into reverse and crashed into
th undercçver ick. then accelerated forward towards
SAl
I
SAl
I having no cover and fearing that he was
going to be run ever, fired five shots from his rifle.
The
subject vehicle veered to the left, traveling 25 to 30 yards and
crashed into a large unoccupied delivery truck.

I

I

I

Emergency Medical Services were notified and a Med-evac
helicopter was utilized to transporti
Irom the sceti.e to the
Lehigh_Valley Hospital where it was determined that wounds to one
of
jhands and his chest were non—life threatening.
On 05/08/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the fol1ow.ng voting
members of the SIRG in attendance: I
IDeputy
Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;I
I Deputy
Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USOOJ;
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Glenn Powel.. •Investications
Division, Office of Insectr General, USDOJ;I
I
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Robert IC. Cromwell, Section Chief, Applicant Processing Section,
Administrative Services Division; Jay C. Mannina, Setion Chief,
CD’-E, Counterintelligence Divisionj
lActing Section
Chief, Op4rn1 iinnni-t- Section, Criminal Irivestiga.tive
Division; I
I Unit Chief, Operational Skills Unit,
Training Division; SSA j
j Firearms
Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific_Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel; SSA I
I Washington Field Office;
and SSAI
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division.
The only non-voting meTuber present was
[
I Management/Program Analyst, Inspection
-

-

Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.

3

Savage- 1870

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297-HQ--A1271895-D,

From:
O6/12/QO3

Inspection

Obervatjons and Recouunendations of the SIRG
The SIR.G reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2 provid.ë the Pirectpr with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issue-; nd (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
Iwas justified and in compliance with the
deadly force policy.

force by SAl

4

Savage-1871

 __________Im.

To:
Re:

Inspection
297-HQ-A1271895-D,

LED

(s):

From:
06/12/2003

Inspection

Set Lead 1:
PECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no ad4nistrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1

1
1
1

-

-

-

Mn

in. 7142
7427
Mrs. Hunt, R. 7825
1
Mr
IRn. 7837

Mn

1-Mr
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

-

-

]

-

1

-

1

-

1

-

-

1U5D0J

Ms
IJSDOJ
Mr. Powell, OIG
Mr. Cromwell, Rm. 6012
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
Mr.
m. 5155
1
Mr
Quantico

Mr

Mn
Mn

Quantico

P.m.

7326

Quantico

Mn
WFO
Mr__________ Rm.

7861

+4

5

Savage- 1872

 (Rev. Ol-3-2OO3)

FEDERAL BUREU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Daé

Inspection

Attu:

Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:

10/21/2004

AD Charlene B. Thornton
Extension 1837

Thorn

Charlene B

[

I’

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271801—D
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
OKLAHONA crr oivsio
12/08/2003

h70

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipri- fhf- rr’rrred on 12/08/2003, involving Special
Agent (SA)L,
J During the arrest of a fugitive,
SAl
I fired one round from his Glock Model 22, .40 caliber
pistol, striking the subject in the left side of the neck.
SIRG
members reç.mmmndd that no administrative action be.taken
against SA
I as a result of his discharge of his weapon in
this shooting incident.
However, the ináident was referred to
the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) regarding
comments made to the subject by SZ
lafter the shooting.
Adminiir:

(SSA)I

rcn report of Supervisory Special Agent

I

dated 01/09/2004.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage-1873

 _______

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297—E-IQ—A1271801—D, 10/21/2004

Details of the Shooting Inciderz
On 12/08/2003, the Marietta, Oklahoma, Police
nhon çall regarding the location
Department (PD) rejivri
of convicted felonL
I also known asi
Las the subject of an outstanding
The PD was advisedi
warrant issued in California for parole violation.
Information
was provided that the subject had recently confided that he had
robbed a bank in Ardmore, Oklahoma.
Additionally, the subject
s
t
-wife pete4—he al-se-bbe4

I

-

prior to the couple moving to Oklahoma.

Iqas

The caller acivisedi

becoming increasingly

paranoid, and displaying violent tendencies towards the caller
The caller also stated
s wife.
t
and the subject
Ihad
purchased a pistol and ammunition, installed a surveillance
camera in his hoie.. and jasde statements iegarding plans for the
use of his gun. I
eportedly said if law enforcement
confronted him, he would not surrender peacefully but go out in a
“blaze of glory.”
Based on the information received from the caller, a PD
supervisor conducted an inquiry to confirm the outstanding
warrant.
He also telephonically contacted the Ardmore Resident
Agency (ARA) tO set up a meeting to formulate a plan to locate
and apprehend!

I

I

Investigation by the ARA disclosed!
had
previously been convicted of armed bank robbery and confirmation
was obtained that a federal warrant was oij nng for violation
The inquiry also disclosed I
of probation.
Iwas considered
Armed and Dangerous and had violent tendencies.
SA
lof the ARA met with
IandL
local authorities to exchange additional information and develop
Infopnation was obtained that an individual
a practical plan
who resided withI
Iwas ohrr n town, stopped for
questioning, and advised thatI
Iias last seen in his living
mnitor.
room watching t
After acquiring this
Inptified Supervisory Senior Residezt
information, SAl
c
Iregarding the updated information
Agent (SSRA)I
received from the local authorities as well as their progress
locating the subject.
SSRAI
Isuggested that the Agents
consider a tactical team during the apprehension of the subject.
The ArcImore P was contacted regarding assistance frtm
the SWAT Pm
larrest when he was lDcated.
effect[
While SAsj
andi
I along with the local authorities,
were awaiting ttie arrival of the SWAT Team, a 911 call was

I

2

Savage- 1874

 _______Icollapsed

r
To:
Re:

I

Inspection Front:
297—HQ—A1271801—0
1

Inspection
10/21/2004

received by the Love County •hcts Office frm a resident who
I The caller,I
resided down the street from I
advisedl
Iwas otMd nf the residence inquiring about his

I

Iloçation.I
hdvised the Sherff’s Office he felt
threatened byl
land believed his life was in danger.
Following the 911 call, the local officers and Agents who were
assembled at a gas station, along with additional 1
pl
enforcement officers, responded to the lçcation of I
During the questioning of a female resident, she observed.l
i_ehiQl.e
acne.
A broadcast of
__Jlocation was announced over the radio at
which time a search of the surrounding neighborhood ws init3
ated
1
by the officers and Agents.
Stre “
’rs observedi
4
land
issued a command for him to stop.I
lignored the commands
and began fleeing in his vehicle.

I

I
]b7C

I

ie1ievingI
Iosed a public threat, SAs
andi
Ibegan searching for him in searate vehicles.
They
subsequently located and observed
1
Itraveling at a high rate
of speed, iumping curbs, and traveling erratically through
residential yards.
During the pursuit through several
neighborhoods, SAl
Ibecame positioned directly behind
I
I vehicle wfllcfl subsequently crashed into a residence.
SAl
lexited his vehicle and identifid_himlf tol
Iwho
was attempting to flee.
Several times SAl
lordered I
to stop and get on the ground. I
!reached for and atempte
to remove his pistol located in the waistband of his pants.
Believing that his life was in imminent danger( SAl
Ifired
one routd from his Glock Model 22, .40 caliber PistOl, striking
[.n the left side of the neck.
F
-

to the ground and as officers went to
secure him began struggling and was observed forcefully pushing
his right hand_underneath himself as though reaching for
something. I
Iwas brought under control, handcuft ‘1
afforded medical treatment by officers on the scene. I
lws
transported by ambulance to the Mercy Memorial Hospital in
Ardmore, where he received medical treatment.

I

By letter dated 01/14/2004, District Attorney
1 20th Judicial District, Ardmore, Oklahoma,
advised his office would take no action relative to the shooting
On 05/18/2004, a declination of prosecution was
incident.
received from the (inited States_Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, regarding SA I
Idischarge of hi.s weapon in
this incident.
On 10/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Chief Inspectorl
j

Savage- 1875

1

b/C

 .0•

To;
Re:

Inspection From:
297—I-IQ--A1271801—D,

Inspection
10/21/2004

Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the followina yoting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Deputy Chief Civil Rights Division, tJSDOJ;
Deputy Chief, Domestic Secuity Section,
Criminal Division, USDOJ; I
I Assistant Section.
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; My Harrison, Section Chief, Applicant Processing
Section, Administrative Services Division; I
I
Unit chief (UCL Nationl Firearms Program, Training Division

fi

• I

.

It,,-

1

.

Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I______________
Too1m.rks tlnit. Scientic Analysis section, iao6ratory Division;
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
SSA!
Divisior (9’n ssi
jOperational Skills Unit,
PD: 5Sk1
Firearms Training Unit, TD; SSA
I National Firearms Program, TD; and
SSAI
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel (OGC).
The two non—voting members present were
I Management Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections,. Inspection Division; and
I Intern, Leadership Development Institute,
Training and Development Division, Quantico.

b7c

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident witl
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas .justified and in conformance with the
deadly force policy.
*

Members discussed the fact that subsequent to the
subject being shot, a Police Officer observed SN
Ikneel
down by the subject and ask, “do you know Christ is your personal
savior? Will you take him as your savior?”.
As the subject
stated, “yes”, SAf
Isaid, “praise Jesus,” and walked away
b 7C
frpm th rea. SIRG members opined that the comments made by
Icould have been construed as a violation of the
SAl
subject’s First Amendment rights and unanimously concurred that
the matter should be referted to the OPR to determine if any
violations occurred as a result of SAl
Istatements.

4
Savage 1876

 __________________ministrative
_________uanico

4

To:
Re:

Inspection From: .Inspection
297—HQ--A1271801--D, 10/21/2004

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

(Action)

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC
action be taken against

this s

00

tng .rici ent.

OPR
AT WASHINGTON,
SAl

I
1

DC

at OPR review this matter todetermine if
lactions merit further investigation.

Mr. Pistole, Room 7142
Ms._Caproni, Room 7427
1
Ms.l
I Room 11255B
1
Mr.I
I, Room 7837
SDOJ
1-Msl
MrJ_____________ (JSDOJ
1
1
MrI
Foom 5155
1
MS. Harrison, Room 6050
1
Mr.j
I Quantico
Mr. Manning, Room 13045
1
(Attention:
Mr.I
1
Mr.
Juantico
Mr.
1
Quantico
,
Mr.
1
Mr. I
(At wj.un:
1
Ms.
loom 7326
I Room 7861
1
Mr
—

-

-

-

—
—

-

—

-

I

—
—

—

I

—
-

++

5

Savage- 1877

 r
(Rev. D$-2s20QO)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Attn:

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

approvea By:

04/29/2004

AD Steven C. McCraw

Extension 1837

McCraw

Drafted By:

I

Case XD #:

297—HQ—A1271741—D

Title:

I

Dates

ROUTINE

]lrr
h7C

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENTS
05/29/2003 and 05/30/2003
LOS ANGELES DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
two shooting incidents that occurred on 05/29/2003 and
I
05/30/2003. involving SDeCial Agents (SAs)

Ian

1

I fired two shots from his Glock, Model
On 05/29/2003, SAI
22, .40 caliber pistol, striking the vehicle of a subject
attempting to hit him with the vehicle while_e1udng arrest.
Ifired multiple
On 05/30/2003, SAsI
I an1
same subject who was again attempting to elude arrest.
shca1 Model 23, .40 caliber
If ired one round from his Qlock
SAl
t-hr€
.e
rounds
his Qiock, Model 22, .40
from
ire
pistol; SAl
If
ired one round from his Glock, Model
caliber pistol; and SAl
22, .40 caliber pistol. None of the shots resi4ted in physical
injury.
SIRG memIers recommended that no administrative action be
taken against SAsI
I and
las a result
incidents.
in
these
their
shooting
of
involvement

le

Ac3ministrative: Reference reports of Assistant Special Agent 7C
in Charge (ASAC) Herbert M. Brown, dated 07/31/2003 and
07/17/2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shootings.

Savage- 1878

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741—D, 04/29/2004

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 05/29/2003, Agents of the Los Angeles Division
prepared to conduct -a buy/bust aTrest of
kho was to
sell a large amount of the drua ‘Ecstasy
Jin the
I to meet witijl
I The plan called for I
parking lot of a fast food restaurant and once I
friewed the
drugs, he would then contact the ttbuyer.

I

At approximately 7:20 p.mi
larrived at the
1
”
ant, parked his black Che”tvaJ.anche vehicle, and met
Ireturned to the subjects
linside. The sub’ iL
vehicle where he showed1
bills he identified as being
EcStasy. Agents were observing the transaction while sitting in11
vehicles parked in the restaurant parking lot.

I

I

I

I
I

I

As the van approached the subject vehicle 1
[rove
forward it n ttPp1pt to drive around the van and the two vehicles
collided. I
I continued driving forward and struck the
s side door of the surveillance vehicle as one of the Agents
1
driver
w R ntine tr exit the van. The door slamnied back against
SAl
Icausing an injury to his left arm. L
I
continued driving forward at a high rate of speed in the parking
loj and collided hçad on with another Bureau vehicle driven by
SAl
I causing severe damage tol
Iyehicle.
frehicle bounced to the right and landed on the sidewalk
adacent to the restaurants building. SS
jwho
was inside the restaurant surveilling the drug buy, opened the door
of the restaurant to assist in the arrest. As he opened the door,
he noticedi
I-vehicle coming towards him at a high rate of
speed. SSAI
Istepped back to avoid being injured as
Ivehicle slammed into and destroyed the door.

I
Fontinued driving forward in an effort to
escape.
SAj
who was on foot and walking towards the area
whr th aFs-e w to take place, was standing .n the th of
[vehicle. As the vehicle approached, SAL
aw the
driver and fired two rounds at him. One of the round.s struck the
2

Savage- 1879

 ________________loontinued

To:
Re:

I

________

From:
Inspection
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271741—D, 04/29/2004

vehicle on the front passenger door.l
lcontinued
parking lot and away from the area while Agents pursued
jirove approximately one mile from the scene and
his vehicle in a residential neighborhood. A search of
law enforcement officers failed to locate the subject.

out of the
him.
abandoned
the area by

Following the shooting ipricPnl. uad members conducted
further investigation to determine
ocation. An
acquaintance of the suspect advised
had a white van
registered to him and he was probably staying at a Fifth Street
location in Los Angeles.
The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
Team was requested to respond to the Fifth Street area while squad
members initiated surveillance at the residence.
b1C

0
Members f the surveillance team located a white van
parked
near
the
Fifth
Street
which was registered tot
I
address.
Two Agents parked in a posiion to surveil the white van
while another team parked nearby. While watching the white van,
Agents observed a newer Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) drive by the
residence twice and decided to follow the vehicle to view the
occupants. Both surveillance vehicles_followed the SUV and
de;ermined that the river was not I
I SAsI
and
Ieturned to the ôriairil surveillapce area to
continue watching the van while SASI
land
to follow the SUV.

The SUV was about three blocks from the Fifth Street

address when SA8I

Idecided to conduct a traffic

landl

stop. They activated their emergency lights and the SUV came to a
stop. The driver of the SUV was given aommands through the public
address system and as SAl
lexited the Bureau vehicle to
approach the SUV, SAl
Ihead a rad.o transmission advising
that the white van belonging tol
Iwas moving.
At approximately 3:00 a . m • SAsI
Lidl
I
observed the backup lights of the white van illuminate, the vehicle
began moving backwards and was positioned to turn north on Colyton
Avenue. SAl
s a passenger,
I along with SAl
drove ost the van in an attemot to_determine if the driver was
I
I After passing the van, SAj
Istated he could
clearly see the driver and he matched the description of I
1
SAl
Iturned his vehicle to the right making it somewhat
I ‘yhose senger
perpendicular to the white van.
Iwith the
side window was open, exposed his upper torso toI
letters ‘FBI” clearly showing. Additionally, he was holding his
handgun in his right hand while waving forl
Ito stop the van.
He was also yelling, “FBI stop”!
3

Savage- 1880

 ________land

øt

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From:
297-HQ--A1271741-D, 04/29/2004

I
udden1y turned the van to the left in the
middle of the street and appeared to be attempting a Uturn.

I

SN
lalso began a U-turn; however, the van accelerated in
reverse directly towards thr ssenar side of the Bureau vehicle.
SAl
jto drive forward to avoid the
lyelled for SN
collision.
Icontinued driving in reverse at a high rate of
speed while Xl
turned his vehicle to drive forward during
his pursuit of
Both the subject vehicle and Bureau
vehiric reached the intersection and turned on to 4th Street.
Icontinued driving in reverse and was apDroximately one
hundred feet from Alameda Avenue when sAl
If ired one round
6
at the white van, striking the left front corner of the windshield

I

Iandl
SA8
Iwere attempting to make contact
with the individual in the SUV located at 4th Street and Alameda
Avenue, when they heard the gunshot.
Both Agents moved forward in
Iwas still traveling in
an attempt to see what happened. L
reverse at a high rate of speed when he approached Alameda Avenue.
He turned the vehicle to travel south onto Alameda Avenue; however,
+rre onto the sidewalk and struck a
cut the corner too
traffic lightpole. I
and
Ivan came to a stop and SAsj
Vargas approached the passenger side. I
bxited the vehicle
anc began running into the intersection. I
Iinored
SAl
I comnpnd tstop, resulting in SA
Ieginning a
foot chase.
SAl
If ired three rounds at
SA
stopped and fired one round.
When the shots were fired,I
icame to a stop and
fell prone onto the ground where he was arrested.
On 02/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director
Steven C. McCraw, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
-hø f
wrg voting members of the SIIQG in attendance:h6
I Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, h7C
Criminal Division, USDOJ; Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Jeff Vasey,

I

Inv

4mtt

Diviiop,

Office of Inspector

I Chief Inspector, Office of
General, USDOJ;I
Inspections, Inspection Division; Manuel B. Mora, Section
irnrrt ection, Criminal Investigative
Chief, Opqraticinw1
Division; I
I Acting Section Chief, Applicant
‘ion, Administrative Services Division;
I Unit Chief (UC), (‘r1Interr5rriliferation Unit,
Counterintelligence Division; SSAL
IFirearms
Training Unit, Training Division (TO); SSAI
Firearms Training Unit, TO; SSAI_____________________
Investigative Law Unit., Office or une ener ..ounser’(OGC);
4

Savage- 1881

I

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection
From:
Inspection
27—HQ—A127741—D, 04/29/2004

ssAI

I

National Firearms Program? TD;
Ipgram Manager, Operational Skills Unit, TD;
SSA
Toolmarcs ZYnit, Scientific
Firearms
Analys.s Section, Laboratory Division; and SSA
Wahinatcn Field Qff ice.
The only non-voting member present was
I Management Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Of ficé of Inspections, Inspection Division.

I

-

Observations and Recoumiezidations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

I

SI1 mp,ithp, iinriimcng1v acreed that the ise of deadly
force by SAsI
I
justified and in
a]
with the deadly force policy.
Members recommended
that no administrative action be taken against any Agent involved
in these shooting incidents.

has

conformance

S

Savage- 1882

 ______

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection
From:
297—HQ—A1271741--D, 04/29/2004

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION
DC

AT WASHINGTON

That no administrative action be taken against

I

SAI
las a result of their involvement in the
shooting incidents.

1—Mn
IRm. 7142
1
Ms. Caproni, Rut. 7427
1
Mr. McCraw, Rut. 7825
1
m. 7837
Mr.I
Mr.I
1
I USDOJ
1
Mr. Vasey, QIG
1
Mr. Mona, Rut. 5155
Mr. Manning, Rut. 1B045
1
I
(Attention: Mr.I
1Pm
1
6050
Mr.1
I.
Mr.L
IQuantico
(Attention: Mr.I
1
Mr.
Quaniico
Mr.
I
Rut. 7326
Quantir’t
Mr.
1
(Attntiri
Mr.I
Mr.
1
QUntico
1-Mr.
Iqp
Mrs.
1
Rm. 786].
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

I

-

-

-

-

I

I

-

6
Savage- 1883

1

and

 E
(Rev.Z28_2OOO)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF NVEST1GATION
Precedence:
To:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:
*Case ID #:
Titl:

Date:

Attn:

Inspection

From:

*

ROUTINE

I
-

08/19/2003

AD Lynne A. Hunt
lExtension 1837

Hunt Lvnne”

I
I
297-HQ—A1271480-D

lb 6

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIR’f
SHOOTING INCIDENT
05/14/2003
DETROIT DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
a shooting incident that occurred on 05/14/2003, involving
Special Agent (SA)I
I During the attempted
apprehension of an individual wanted for two homicides, SAl_______
SIRG members_recommended
exchanged gunfire with the subject.
that no administrative action be taken against SAl
las a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent
in Charge Larry R KuhI, dated 07/07/2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1884

 F
To:
Re:

Inspection
297—kQ—A1271480—D,

From:
08/19/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 03/13/2003, Eric Carpenter became an FBI subject
based on the anticipation of the intiation of an Unlawful
Flight to Avoid Prosecution process stemming from two separate
A request was made by the Wayne
homicide warrants in Detroit.
County Prosecutor’s Office for the Metropolitan Violent Crimes
Street Gangs and Alliance Fugitive Task Force to assi.st in
locating the subject.
On 05/14/2003, at approximately 12:00 p.m., a source
advised Task Force members that the subject was in Detroit and
was driving a Chevrolet Corvette bearing a North Carolina
Further information was received that
license certificate.
Carpenter had been seen in the Clements Street area of Detroit
less than one hour before Task Force members were contacted.
Task Force units were dispatched to the area in- an effort to
locate the subject vehicle.
At approximately 1:00 p.m., Carpenter was observed
driving the subject vehicle, however, sight of the vehicle was
The vehicle, driven by Carpenter with a
lost in traffic.
female passenger, was spotted a second time at approximately
Surveillance
3:00 p.m., traveling at a high rate of speed.
team members followed Carpenter to a school where he picked up
A decision was mad that no attempt would be
a young child.
made to arrest Carpenter while he was near the school or in
Surveillance continued, however
possession of the child.
sight of the vehicle was again lost for approximately fifteen
Further surveillance located the vehicle traveling
minutes.
in the vicinity of Dexter and Davison Streets and was fol1oed
The adult female and child
to the Clements Street address.
were observed exiting the vehicle along with Carpenter.
Carpenter immediately returned to the vehicle followed by the
adult female.
.

SAl
I along with task force officers,
formulated a plan to “box in” Carpenter’s vehicle in an effort
to p.revent him from esbaping when the arrest was attempted.
One task force officer drove past the Corvette and blocked the
front of the vehicle in order to prevent Carpenter from
langled his vehicle in front of
driving forward while 84
the passenger side of the vehicle.
lapproached the
SAl
passenger side of the Corvette, identified himself as la.w
enforcement, and issued commands to Carpenter.. The subiect
exited the vehicle and ran up a driveway with SA I

2

Savage- 1885

 ____—

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—kQ--A1271480—D, 08/19/2003

pursuit repeatedly shouting,
your hands.”

Inspection

“Police, police, stop,

let me see

Carpenter was at the end of the driveway when he
reached his right hand into the waist band of his pants and
pulled_out a handgun, firing three to four shots at SAl
I
fired
the
that
otherparticipants
had
subject
kdvisod
SAl
at him and he took cover behind several garbage cans and
Lost sight of Carpenter
SAl
returned fire.
backyard
down an alley.
a
Icontinued
SAl
disappeared into
At that
issuing instructions for Carpenter to drop his gun.
lobserved Carpenter take his handgun, point it
point, SAl
Carpenter dropped to the
to his head and fire one shot.
ground.
A subsequent ballistics examination, an on-scene
homicide investigation and an autopsy, indicated that
The Medical xaminer’s
Carpenter hadtaken his own life.
No other personal
Office ruled Carpenter’s death a suicide.
injuries or property_damage were incurred as a result of the
shots fired by SAl
land Carpenter.
On 08/14/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
Assistant Directot
captioned shooting incident.
chaired the meeting with
Division,
Inspection
Lynne A. aunt,
the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division,
I Deputy Chief, Domestic Securit’
1
USDOJ;
Section, Criminal Division, (JSDOJ; Assistant Special Agent in
Charge Jeff Vasey, Investications Division. fice of
Ichief Inspector,
Inspector General, USDOJ;I
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; Charles D. Elder,
Section Chief, Operational Support Section, CrimJ,ial
Investigative Division; Jay C. 4anning, Section Chief, CD-6,
Counterintelligence Divisiorz;l
I Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
I
I Unit ChtPf. Transr Qnt; Administrative
Toolmarks
Firearms
Services Division; SSAI
Univ Scientific Analysis SectiQn, Laboratory Division;
SSAL
I Firearms Training tinit, Training
Division; SSAI
I Operational Skills Unit,
Washington Field
Training Division; and SSA E
The to non—voting members present were
Office.
1Management/Program
I
landi
Analysts, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.

1

3

Savage- 1886

—

 I

‘To:
Re:

Inspection
297—14Q—A1271480—D,

From
08/19/2003

Inspection

Observations and Reconimendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—syncpsized incident with
(1> evaluate the applic.tiori of deadly force;
the intent to:
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and reconmendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action.if
deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that
lwas justified and in
force by SAl
This
discussion resulted
force
policy.
deadly
that no administrative action be taken against
of his involvement in this shooting incident.

the use of deadly
compliance with the
in the recommendation
a result
SA I

4

Savage- 1887

-

 __________
________

To:
Re:

Inspection
297—HQ—A1271480—D,

From:
03/19/2003

nspecton

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That .no administrative action be taken against
las a. result of his involvement in this
SAl
shooting incident.

1
1

1
1

1.

—

-

—

—

-

P.m.. 7142
P.m. 7427

Mr.
Mr.
Mrs. Hunt,
Mr[

Mn

P.m. 7825
[a. 7837
I, CJSDOJ

IUSDOJ
1-Msj
1
Mr. Vasey, OIG
1
Mr. Cromwell, P.m. 6012
(Attention:
Mr.I
I
1
Mr. Elder, P.m. 5155
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
1
1
Mr. I
IQuant
(AtntiOn:
Mr. I
Quantico
Mr.
P.m. 7326
1
Ms.
Quantico
Mr.
1
Mr.j
(Attention:
IWFO
1—Mr.I
P.m. 7861
Mrs.
1
Pin. 7l)
Mrs.
1
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—

—

-

I

—

—

.

-

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—

++

5.

Savage- 1888

-J

 CRCV. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF iNVESTlGATON
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE
Attu:

inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

1

02/18/2004

AD Steven C. McCraw
Extension 1837

1
McCraw Stevei

L

Ilrr

Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOING INCIDENT
05/12/2003
ST. LOUIS DIVISION

297-HQ-A1271906-D

.

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 05/12/2003, involving
Special Agent (SA>l______________________ SA I
If ired two
shots from his persona.Liy owned, bureau-approved, Glock ?6odel
22, .40 caliber, semi-automat.c handgun, hitting a si.±ject
SIRG members
attempting to injure him with a vehicle.
recommended that no administrative aptiori be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Adzuinistrative
(SSA) I

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
jdated 06/06/2003.

This communication was prepared to furnish the
Details:
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1889

 _________ontinued

To:
Re:

__________________left
_________nd

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271906-D, 02/18/2004

-

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

p

On 05/12/2003, SAl
along with
two members of the Violent Crimes Fugitive Task Force (VCFTF), met
to discuss the possible arrest ofL
I
was wanted by St. Louis County authorities for Trafficking in Drugs
2nd Degree, Unlawful Use of a Weapon, Resisting Arrest, and
Possession of a Controlled Substance.
During the meeting, an
onerational plan was developed for the surveillance and arrest of
-

I

]b7c

SAl
land Detectiv___________ in separate
vehicles,, initiated surveillance on the front of a Griefield
residence in Pagedale, Misspuri. which wp the last known address
for the suspect.
Detectivd
I positioned himself for
surveillance at the rear exit of the residence.

sl

I

land Detactivi
lobserved a black
female, later identified asi
I the subject’s
mother, exit the Griefield address and make contact with a black
male sitting in the driver’s seat of a burgundy çontiac aorevil
le
1
which was backed into the driveway and parked ati
After a brief conversation with the male,
the car and proceeded in the direction of S
Detective
I As she passed the law enforcement officers in their
Ireturned to the burgundy Pontiac and had a
vehiclesrl
second conversation with the black male.
After a brief
conversationi
residence.

returned to the Grief ield

laced a phone call to the residence
Detectivel
to determine if I
Iwas inside. A female answered
the phone and advised thati
jas not present.
e1eving the black male in the burgundy vehicle was
I S.t
land Detectivel
oh
ldecided
the individual to determine his identity. Detective
initiated a U-turn and approached the Grief ield addr
SAl
‘pulled fotward to block the driveway.
As SA
positioned his vehicle, the male in the driver’s seat ohe
Pontiac ducked down behind the dashboard. As sl
hxited
his vehicle, the subject re-appeared an the burgundy vehicle
attempted to move forward.
SAl
lidentified the driver of
I drew his weapon, and issued verbal
the vehicle asl
instructions to “Stop”; however, the vehicle continued forward.
Police”, and attetnotedto
to yell “Stop.

2

Savage-1890

b6
b7C

 To:
Re:

-

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271906-D, 02/18/2004

open the der
s door.
1
Idid not, comply with
ommands and the subect vehicle struc1 his ureau
834
vehicle.
lapproached the Pontiac from the
Detect iv
passengers side, pointed his weapon at the driver and yelled,
“Police
put your hands in the air and exit the vehicle”.
hooked at Detectivel
I put the vehicle in reverse,
backed up, put the vehicle in ±ve and turned,sharply to the left
The vehicle ulled forward quickly and proceeded toward
SAj
In fear of his life as well as the safety of others,
SAl________ ired two shots at the subject through the driver’s
side window of the vehicle.

I

The vehicle proceeded through several lawns at a high
rate of spe.
the street ap
eded south. Knowing
that bot1- R7J
land Detectivel
were not injured,
Detectiv
linitiated surveillance of the vehicle and after a
short period of time, observed it parked on another street.
Detective I
lobservedl
Ion foot approximately 75 yards
from the vehicle removing articles of clothing and placing them in
SAl
a trash can.
land Detectivd
larrived on the scene
lunder arjest without
with Detectivel
land placedL
It was determined thath
further incident.
Iwas injured
and he was immediately transported by ambulance to a hospital where
he underwent surgery for a shattered elbow and received stitches
for a laceration in the area of his right shoulder blade.
by SA L

Subsequent investigation determined that the shots fired
I resulted in the injuries sustained by
I

On 05/22/2003, the St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney
advised that he did not intend to seek prosecution against
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
SAL
incident. A declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, on
10/24/2003, regarding S?1
I actions in this shooting
incident.
-

On 02/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above-

I

t7C

captioned shooting incident.
Assistant Director
Steven C. McCraw, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the followin9 voting meners of the SIRS in attendance:

IDeputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
Criminal Division, TJSDOJ; Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Jeff Vasey, Investigations Division, Of f±ce of Inspector
General, USDOJ;I
I Chief Inspector, Office of
-

3
Savage- 1891

 1”

To
Re:

I

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-Al271906-D 02/18/2004

Inspections, Inspection Division, Manuel E. Mora, Section
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Divisionj
jActing Section Chief, Applicant
Processing Section, Administrative Serv±ces Division;
I Unit Chief (UC), ounterDro1iferatio Unit,
Counterintelligence Division; SS?1
I Firearms
Training Unit, Training Division (TDhSSAI
Firearms Training Unit, TD; SSAI
I
Invstiaat±ve Law Unit. Office ot tne eneraJ. counsei (OGC);
SSAI
National Firearms Program, TD
I?çogram Manager, Operational Skills Unit, TO;
h6
Firearms
Toolrnarks Unit, Scientific
SSAI
AnaI.vsis Section, Laboratory Division; and
SSAI
I Washington Field Office. The only non
voting member present wasj
jManagement Program
Analyst, Inspection Management unit, otrice of Inspections,
Inspection Division.

I

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recom
mendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.
SIRG memer unanrnously agreed that the use of
Iwas justified and in conformance
deadly force by sI
with the deadly force policy. Members recommended that no
administrative action should be taken against him as a result
of his involvement in this shooting incident.

4

Savage- 1892

•1

 4..

4.

-To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271906-D, 02/18/2004

LEAD

(s):

-

Set Lead 1:

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SAl
j as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

h6

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2.
1
2.
1
1
1
1
1
1

I

Mn

m. 7142
Ms. Caproni, Rtn. 7427
Mr. McCraw, Rin. 7825
Mr.
I Rm. 7837
I USDOJ
Mn
Mr. Vasey, OIG
M. Mona, Rm. 5155
=
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
I
(Attention: Mr..I
--MrI
IRrn. 6050
Mn]
IQuantico
(Attention:
Mn]
Quarthico
Rm. 7326
Mr
Quantic
Mr.
Mr.
(Attention:
Quanico
,
Mr.
WFO
Mr.
Rm. 7861
Mrs.
-

-

-

-

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-

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‘•I

I

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-

-

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Savage-1893

 _________________

__________
_________

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2recedence:
To:

Director’s Office
Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

_________-.

Dat:

ROUTINE

A/lkDI

Attn:

I

McCraw Stevenj
Clemens MichaeIE

05/19/2004

I

AD Stven C. McCraw

I

Extension 1837

—

Drafted By:
Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUI.Y
SHOOTING INCIDENT

297—HQ—A1271741—D
rD/c

10/26/2003
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
‘rmr1 -n p/26/2003, involving
a shooting incident h+
Special Agent (SA)I
I SAl
Ifired
one round from his Glock Model 27, .40 caliber, off duty
pistol during an altercation with several individuals in a
parking lot.
SIRG members recommended that SAl
Ibe
censured, suspended from duty for a period of three days, and
receive documented legal training as well as remedial firearms
training for his neglect in practicing routine firearms safety
procedures.
Administrative:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent
in Charge Herbert M. Brown, dated 12/20/2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendaiions of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1894

 _____as

______________

3

To:
Re:

Director’s Office From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271741—D, 05/19/2004
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 10/26/2003, while off duty, SAl
Iwas
in a rental truck parked near a Home Depot store in Marina Del Rey.
accompanied by his girlfriend who was in a second
vehicle parked behind his rental truck. In anticipation of moving
to his new residence, SAl
lintended to hire two day laborers
to assist in the move.

-

SAl

[selected two individuals he intended to hire
-u-4—
enter, two other day laborers, identified asi
land
I
‘entered his truck on the passenger side.
SAl
linscructel
Ito get out of the truck
landi
because he was not going to hire them, resulting in a verbal
altercation that turned physical. I
grabbed a plastic
drinking bottle belonging to SA
exited the vehicle,

I

I

lened back ipto the vehicle, and threw the bottle at him.
SA I
lidentified himself as a po1ice officer while
continually telling the individuals to get out of the vehicle.
.unged over the lap of[_
land strVck SAl_________
the face. I
rabbed forN
Ifanny pack containing
his off duty weapon; however, SN
Iwas able to get the fanny
pack away from[
I who then exited the vehicle.

iremoved the keys from his vehicle and exited
SAl
the driver’s side door. I
Icame around the front of the truck
anc lunged tç’ward SA I
un an attempt to hit him.
SAl
continued to advise the day laborers that he was a laW
1
enforcement officer and did not want any trouble.
ri1h1e attempting to back away from the subjects,
SAl
Idisplayed his FBI badge hoping it would convince the
subjects to top.
As he reached the area behind his rental truck
SAl
‘observed a third subject approaching, subsequently
lb
identified as I
I The three subjects formed a circle
7(7
around SAl
Iwhile he continued to state that he was a law
enforcement officer and told the individuals to back away from him.

With the subjects becoming more aggressive, 514 I
placed his hand on his off duty weapon located in his fanny pack.
The three individuals continued to grab and lunge toward him as he
attempted to move away.
He pointed his weapon at tte chest of the
indivicua!s while simultaneously yelling for tm tn hrl away
continuing to tell them he ws the police.
SAl
Iwas
addressing I
lancil
las they_continued to circle around him.
SAl
Ithen noticed subjecti
Ihad moved to the sidewalk

I

2

Savage- 1895

-j

 To:
Re:

I

Director’s Office
297—HQ—A1271741--D,

From:
Inspection
05/19/2004

and was four or five yards away from him. I
[hen ked up a
large shopping cart and was holding it oy hihead.
SA1
turned apd pointed his weapon atl
Ichest resulting in
Ithrowing the cart at him.

I

-

According to SAl
Iwas getting more
agitated and when he tried to move away, the three subjects moved
into his path.
Conceped for the safety of his girlfriend and

himself, SAl
Ibelieved he had no other alternative than to
fire a round in order to attempt todisperse the crowd.
I
I
r4—A k
ongoing construction, and observing no ona in the line of fire,
discharged one round from his pistol.
.

.,..4-.,

...+.

• •.

6
7C

The indiviçiuals continued to circle around and lunge
towards SAE
las he moved into the Home Depot parking 1t.
A bystander intervened and grabbed subiectl
land held him on
the ground.
Iandj
Subjects I
iow1y backed away from the
area allowing SAl
Lime to telephone for assistance.
The
Los Angeles Police Department responded tc the scene, arrested the
three perpetrators, and transported them from the scene.
of SA

No oersçnal or property damage was incurred as a result
I discharge of his weapon.

I

On 05/12/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director

Michael S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
p Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Secti,on,
Criminal Division, USDOJ; I
I Acting Section
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; My Harrison, Section Chief, Applicant Processing
Section, Administrative Services Division; I
Unit Chief ((JO), CD—SB, Counterintelligence Division;
I irrn Priing Unit, Training Division
UC I
(TD); SSAI
llnvestigative Law Unit,
Office of the GeneralCounsel (OGC); SSAI
National Firearms Program, TD; SSA
I
Operational Skills Unit, TD; and SS
I
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Sciebtific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division.
The two nonvoting members present were
I Management Program
[ndl
Analysts, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.
—

3

Savage- 1896

C

 To:
Re:

Director’s Office
297—HQ--A1271741—D,

From:
Inspection
05/19/2004

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for cofect±ve actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recom
mendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
SIRG members discussed the fact that,. although the
situation was successfully handled, the dischargeof SA I
I
weapon could have incited other individuals in the area.
Additionally, members àpined that SAL
icould have placed
innocent third parties in harms way by discharging his weapon into a
parking lot.
SIRG members reiterated the fact that policy dictates }b6
no warning shots are to be fired.
This discussion resulted in the
recommendation by a majority of SIRG members that SA L
I
should be censured, suspended from duty for three days, and receive
documented legal training as well as remedial firearms training, for
his neglect in practicing routine firearms safety procedures.

4

Savage-1897

 _________

To:
Re:

Directorts Office
297—HQ—A12717.41—D,

LA

(s):

Inspection
From:
05/19/2004

Set Lead 1:
t S OFFICE
DIRECTOR
ATOPR

f

That SA
Ibe censured and’ suspended from
y routine
1
n
duty for a period ot three ctays tor his fai1u
1
—GM
7
2t-4ee1-1-y
I-hiId
receive additional legal training as well as remedial firearms
training regarding proper handling of firearms and this training
should be properly documented.
Set Lead 2:
That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, include in the ADIC’s
copy of the letter of’suspension, the need for leQal training as
well as remedial firearms training for SP
egarding the
proper handling of weapons.
Additionally, the letter should advise
that this training should be properly documented and that a copy of
he documentation should be forwarded to the SIRG Chairman upon
completion.
1
1
1
1
1

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1
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1
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—

—

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Mr.I

:bC

I

Rim. 7142
Ms. Caproni, Rim. 7427
Mr.I
IRm. 7125
Mr. Clemens, Rm. 7837
Mrj
USD03

Ms.I

Ir

Irjsooj

(Attention:
Mr.’
Ms. Harrison, Rim. 6050
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
(Attention: Mr. I
Mr. More, Rim. 5l5
(Attention:
t4r.I
uantico
I
(Attention:
t4rl
Mr.
Quantico
Rim. 7326
Ms.
Mr.
uantico
Mr.
uantico
(Attention:
Mr I

I

I
I

-

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—

—

—

—

—

Mrs.
Mrs.

IP.m.

IRin.

I

I

7861
7861

Savage- 1898

 (Rev. 08-28-2000)

EEDERAL BUREAU OF NVES1iGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date

Inspection

From:

AD Steven C. McCraw

Inspection
Contact:

Abproved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

05/05/2004

[

I

Extension 1837

McCraw SteverA

I

-

297—FtQ-A1271466—D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/25/2003
DENVER DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Re-iew Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting inçi
ijrred on 10/25/2003, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
I While conducting an investigation
regarding the theft of his Glck Model 22, 40 caliber pistol from
his Bureau vehicle, SAl
If ired six rounds at a subject who
was driving a vehicle towards him.
SIRG rqmhrs recommended that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

las

A.dzuinistr.tive:__Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA)
dated 11/25/2003.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

Savage- 1899

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ-M271466—D, 05/05/2004
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/25/2003, sAL
JBureau-issued pistol
was stolen from his .locked and alarmed Bureau vehicle, while
he was
attending his son’s football practice at a high schooL
A Theft of
Government Property—Weapon investigation was opened and assign
ed to
of the Denver Division.
SAl
In addition to the FBI investigation regarding the
stolen weapon, the Denver Police Department (DFD) develo
ped source
information that the weapp w in + session of two
individuals identified asl
I
Information pbtind h i-. n’n
two suspects.
upon cnelr arrlva.L at the arranged meeting location, the two
suspects observed the source talking to a DPD bfficer and
fled the
scene resulting in a high speed chase.
Although the
suspects were not anrhpndpd during the chase, the source advise
d
authorities that SAI
Istolen weapon was in the vehicle.

land

I

Further investigation by the OPD resulted in search
warrants being obtained for the two individuals on drug
related
charges.
On 10/17/2003. th serch warrants were executed by DPD
officers wit} both’
landi
Ibeing arrested, however,
SA I
Istolen weapon was not located.

sl
Jkept SAl
‘advised of the status of
the local drug investigation relating to the suspects, and
provided
him with several addresses whIch they were known to freque
nt.
SAL
conversations.

Iavised that on 10/24/2003, during separate
advised Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge
I
I and SAl
Ithat he was going to
initiate spot checs
veral addresses regarding the
investigation.
SAl
I conducted the
iiing the
early evening on 10/24/2003.
Case Agènt
ladvised
that he had no knowledge of SZ*
‘intention to conduct the
spot checks.
However, dzring a cgyersaon between the two on
10/24/2003, SAl
lasked SAl
Ito make a phone call to a
cable company regarding the posihi1ity of a cable installer
having
information concerning subject I
Ishowing off an FBI Agent’s
gun during the installation of cable at a Denver residence.
a.m.,

ke

On 10/25/2003, SAl
Iwent into service at 645
for the purpose of conducting spot checks at t 14
ons

provided by the DPD.
At approximately 8:00 a.m., SAl
I
observed a green Ford Expedition parked in the vicinity
where he
was conducting a spot cheek.
Believing_te y
1 to be stolen
and in the possession of subjecti
ISAI
Icontacted

2

Savage- 1900

7C

 ___________
__________

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271466—D, 05/05/2004

-

who, according to SI
I indicated he would come to
the site when his
home. According to SS
1 he
wa conted by SAl
Iregarding the situation and advised
SAl
Ito contact tI DPI) nce they had jurisdiqtion raarding
the ston vehicle.
sAl
Icontacted DPD Of fice
I
I
I who was involved in the stolen weapon investigation and
provided hm infnnation regarding the vehicle.
Officerl
I
advised SAl
I that the vehicle was indeed stolen and further
stated he was en route to SJ
Is location. Uniformed DPD
officers were not contacted about the situation.
SSAI

i-b rival of OfficerE
Prior
I SAl_________
observed subjecti
lexit a renr nd aporoach the stolen
vehicle.
—octed Officer’
H@
Iwho indicated he was
close to SAl
I location. SAL
advised Officer
I
Ihe ws aping o effect a stoo on tne vehicle.
sAl
I
heard Officer I
Icali out on the radio for uniformed officer
assistance.

SAl
Idrove out of the parking lot and positioned
his vehicle in the street.
Subjecti
but did not immediately clo -h vehicle door. As
closed
the dçor to h
is vehicle, SAl
1
Idrove his
t e area
wherel
Iwas parked, and hoping to block
vehicle,
stopped his vehicle at the front bumper of the suspect vehicle.
Alhouh t wearing any law enforcement identifying insignia,
SA
to SA

I

rolled down his window to identify himself.
According
Ipointed a handgun through his front
windshield at hIm causing SPI
o jump out of his BuFeau

vehicle verbally identifying himself as a police officer.

I
I
ben to ive his vehicle out of the parking space and toward
SAl
jwho jumped outof the way to avoid being hit by the
susDect veh.cle.
Fearing for his life, SJ
Ibegan shooting
r
a
while the Expedition was passing him.
‘pect drove
away zrom the scene at a high rate of speed.
SAl
Iretrieved
his Bureau vehicle and unsuccessfully attempted to locate the
suspect.
The suspect was arrested later in the day by the FBI and
the DPD.
On 02/13/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
cautioned shooting incident.
Assistant Directo
Steven C. McCraw, Inspection Dirision, chaired the meeting with
the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I
I Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
Criminal Division, JSDOJ; Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Jeff Vasey, investigations Divsio, Office of Inspector
General, USDOJ;l
I Chief Inspector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division; Manuel E. Mora, Section
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Division;I
I Acting SectionChief, Applicant
-Processing Section, Administrative Services Division;
3

Savage- 1901

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To:
Re:

I

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—Al27l4E6-D, 05/05/2004

1, unit Chief (tic), Co11nrn
Unit,
Counterintelligence Division; SS
Firearms
L
Training Unit, Training Division (Tp); SSAI
I
Firearms Training Unit, TD; SSAI
I
Investigative Law Units Office o the General Counsel
(OGC);
SSAI
National Firearms Program, PD;
I
SSAI
rpgram Manager, Operational Skills Unit,
TD; SSA I
I Firearms Toolmarks nit Snintf
Analysis ecrion, aora’tory Division; and SSAI______
______________
Washington ‘lci Office.
The only non-voting member present was
I Management Program Analyst, Inspection
Nanagement Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
—

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewd the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corecti7e actions
from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues;. and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members. unanimously agreed that the use of deadl.y
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
]h6
deadly force policy.
The only observation made by the SIRG was the fact
that SAl
Iwas in the area alone and did not wait for
assistance to arrive.
However, members opined that Denver
Division management had already recognized the situation and
proactively handled the issue.

4

Savage- 1902

 To: Iispection
Froxn:
Inspection
Re:
297—J-iQ—A:271466—D, 05/05/2004
Set Lead I:
INS.PCTI0N
AT WASINGTO,

DC

Th- no dinjnistr.ative action be taken against
SA
las a resu1 of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

b6

I

Mrj
Rm. 7142
Ms. Caproni, Rm. 7427
- Mr. McCraw, Rm. 7825
IRm. 7837
Mr.I
Mrj
L USDOJ
- Mr. Vasey, OIG
Mr. Mora, P.m. 5155
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
(Attention: Mr.
I
1—Mr
6050
2. - MrJ
I Quantjco
(Attention:
Mr.I
I
Mr
I QuanL
1
xn. 7326
Mn
1
Mr[
uantjico
(Atntion;
Mr.I__________
1
Mr.
[. Quancjco
—

1D70

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—
-

-

-

-

I

—

—

—

1—Mr.

1,.. Mrs.

)
9
It

P.m.

786].

4+

Savage- 1903

 _________________l1rr

___________________

.

,‘

I.

3’
4.’

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Inspection

From:

Date: 04/23/2002

ROUTINE

Attzi:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Acting D ‘1tjOtConnor

lExtension

1837

Locke Thomas Bernard

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

297-HQ-A1271S15-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
01/31/2002
JACKSON DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 01/31/2002, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
Ishot and injured an
I SAl
attacking pit bull do dur.ng the execution of a search warrant.
SIRG members_recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
I
incident. ‘
6
)7C
Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Senior Resident Agent
dated
,
02/08/2002.
Details:
This cotmmmication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 To:
Re:

Inspection

From:

Inspection

297-HQ-A1271615-D, 04/23/2002

Details of the Shooting Incident

Iwas present at a briefing
On 01/30/2002, SAl
regarding several search and arrest warrant thM yere to be
Iwas assigned
executed at a local area on 01/31/2002. SAl
to a search warrant team who was responsible for conducting a
search warrant in Vancleave, Mississippi. During the briefing, a
point was made that numerous pit bull dogs were known to’ be
located at the property.
At approximately 6:40 a.m., on 01/31/2002, the team
arrived at the vancleave property and observed several dogs in
the yard.
Two small dogs began to run towards the car and upon
the exit of a Sheriff s Department Deputy and his canine, the
exited his vehicle
dogs turned and began cbasing them. sM
and began running to the front door of the residence. As he ran
Inotjced
up the sidewalk in front of the residence, $I
something in his_peripheral vision running towards the team. As
he turned, SA i
iobsexved a pit bull dog attacking the team
and, believing that team members were in imminent danger of
serious physical injury, fired a two round burst from his MP-5
shoulder weapon.
The animal yelped once, fell to the. ground and
appeared to be mortally wounded.
SA I
land team members entered the home and clears
the residence. Upon completion of the search warrant, SAl_______
exited the residence and returned to the area where the dog was
last seen.
The dog was no longer in the spot where he had fallen
and a search of the area failed to locate him.
On 02/12j2002, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
1 Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
i.puty Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes
.LJ.JLinal Division, USDOJ; William P. O’Hanlon, Section
Chief, Facilities Management Section, Administrative Services
Division; William Q. Doherty, Section chief, Global Section
WS-2, National Security Division; Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section
Chief, Oprtinl guoriorl Section, Criminal Investigative
7C
Division; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit,
Training DiviSion;I
I Th4t Chief. Invstiative
I Unit
Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; I
Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; SSAI
I Wsbington Fi’I4 Office;
.nd SSAI
I Program Manager, Practical Alications
.,

-

2

 ‘I.,

To:
Re:

Inspection
Inspection From:
297-BQ-A1271615-D, 04/23/2002

Training Diyision. The only nonvoting member present was
I Management/Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.

Units.

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SXRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent tO: (1) evaliIte the application of deadlyforce; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
as :iustified and in conformance with
the current deadly force policy. Therefore, a recommendation was
made that no administrative action be taken against SAl
I as
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
force by SAl

a

3

 ii..
S

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-RQ—A1271515-D, 04/23/2002

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C..
That no administrative action be taken against
gas a result of his involvement in this
SAI
shooting incident.
-

1
2

-

-

Mr. Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
Mr. Parkinson, m. 7427
Ms..I
I Rm. 7326)
(1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7625
Ms.
USDOJ
I USDOJ
Mr. I
Mr. Cousins, Rm. 5155
Mr. Doherty, Rtn. 4042
Mr.. O’HanJ.on, Rm. 1B875
I Rn. 3787w
Mr.
L Quantico
Mr.I
Mr.
Quantico
,
I Wip
Mr.
Mrs.________ Rut. 7861
-

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

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7C

 (121311I95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date 12/05/2002

Inspection

From:

Attv.:

Inspection
Contact

Approved By:

Extension 1837

Title:

-

4,jV
Hunt Lynne A/’ ,
Clemens Michae3

Drafted By:
Case XD #:

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt

llrr
297-HQ-A1271971-D

DMINISTRA.TIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
08/02/2002
CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP (CIRG)

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/02/2002 involving
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I
I SSAI
I
discharged his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22, 40 caliber pistol t
a fox that attacked him as he attempted to enter his Bureau
vehicle.
STP.( ‘“rs recommended that no action be taken
against SSAI
a. result of his involvement in this
shooting inchuenc.

las

Adn4iitrptiva:
SSA

I

Refererce Electronic Comrmmication of
dated 08/14/20O2.

I

Details;
This communidation -was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 To:
Re:

Inspection From: .Inspection
297-HQ-A127l971-D, 12/05/2002

Details of -the Shooting Incident
On 08/02/2002, SSAI
twas entering his Bureau
vehicle in lais driveWay when he noticed a fox attacking his left
ankle.
SSN
Ikicked the fox several times, however, it
repeatedly attacked him and. eventuallyhiundr hs car. After
putting his dog inside his residence, 5814
lobserved the
fox biting, grçwlina nç pulling at a fenl. s tile fox again
charged at SSAI
j, he shot the animal in the right flank.
A8 the animal charged at SSA[
ia third time, he fired two
shots into its chest, killing the fox.

•
was rabid.

Animal Control retrieved the fox and determined that it

On 12/03/2002, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting wLth the followina
voting members of the SIRG in attendance: I
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ]
Trial Attorney, Terrorism and Violent Crimes
LJ1U.LUL
Division, USDQJ; Michael S. Clemeps. Chief InsDector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;’
Acting Section
Chief, Applicant Processing Section, Administrative Services
Division; Charles D. Elder, Section Chief, Ooer&tional Suooqrt
Section, CrLrninal Investigative Division; I
I Unit.
Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
I
I, Unit Chief,• Firearms Training Unit, Training
I Program Maaer. Practi
Division; SSAI
Applications Unit, Training Divi1tmri: SA I
I Firearms
Washington Field Office; and. SSRI
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Sti-mn T,hnvatrnv pivision.
The only nonvoting member present wasi
I
Management/Program Analyst, Inspection ManagementUnit, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.

1

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]bc

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intentto: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for

miitrative action if deemed necessary.

2

•

_± _

 L

TO:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspectioii
297—HQ-A127197].-D, 12/05/2002

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of dedly
force by SSA I
I was jiistified and in conformance
with the deay torce policy.
b7 C

-

-

3

 To:
Re:

.

Inspection From-:
Inspection
297—HQ’-’A1271971-D, 12/0512002

LIEAD (s):

-

Set Xead 1-:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
Pht rc nhinistrative action be taken against

SSAI
shooting incident

1
1

-

-

I

as a result of his invdlvement in this

*

Mr. Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
Mr. Wainstein,_Rm. 7427
(1
M
1 Rm. 7326)
Ms4
DOJ
Mr.I
Mr. Ciemens, m. 7837
Mr. E1er. Rm. 5155
I Rm. 6650
Mr. I
14r.I
IRrn. 3787P
Mr.
rQuantico
Mr.
j Quantico
Mr.
[WFO
Rm. 7861
Mrs.I
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1
1
1
1
I
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1
2.
1

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-lb S
lbfc

 4

P0-204 (Rev 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Repodoft

AIXPI

SSA

I
J

Date:

U/04/4vv4

cuom#

297-HQ-A1271507-D

ThOr

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
EL PASO DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 12, 2002

*

Chac(ee

Oce

El Paso Division

DMINI STRATIVE INQUIRY
This shooting incident occurred while Federal Agents
conducted a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) mission in
support of the Union Pacific Railroad Police Department
(UPRRP) and the United States Border Patrol’s (USBP)
operations against railroad robberies and burglaries.
On September 12, 2002, members of the FBI SWAT Team,
United States Customs Service (USCS) Agents, UPRRP, and
USBP were involved in an operation whereby they were
attempting to apprehend train robbers and train wreckers.
(Train wreckers are defined as individuals who attempt to
interdict or interrupt a moving train.) The trains travel
along the United States-Mexico International border in
Sunland Park, New Mexico, contiguous with Colonia Anapra,
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico. The law enforcement
officers were staged within and around the train,
identified as Union Pacific train ILBDA 10, in the
vicinity of the Sunland Park, New Mexico railroad siding,
in anticipation of a tr4iri burglary. Officials front the
Republic of Mexico (ROM) Customs and the Juarez Municipal
Police agreed to provide assistance to the U.S. off icia1
in the apprehension of the train robbers and. train
wreckers by apprehending any Mexican Nationals fleeing
from U.S. officials as they attempted to illegally
re-enter Mexico.
The International border of the U.S. and Mexico in the
Sunland Park, N.M. area is separated by a chain link fence,

This doweent contains neithea ecasaanthtians noa conclusions of the Pal • It is the propexty o the Fal
and ia oanei to ycun agency; it an its contents aze not to be dizta51sted outside your agency.

 F-

approximately 12 feet in height, which is erected completely on
U.S. soil. The area north of the fence is United States territory,
as is the area immediately adjacent to the fence on the south side.
The width of u.s. soil, and the actual International boundary, in
relation to the southern side of the fence varies throughout the
length of the fence.
The actual U.S. -Mexico land boundaries are
marked with flmonumentsu at various point’s along the border. There
are two such monuments in the Sunland Park area, approximately 134
to 2 miles apart. The location where the train wreckers and train
robbers enter the U.S. is approximately 1 mile West of monument
number 2 and 1 mile East of monument ntunber 3, through a large
opening cut through the chain link fence. Immediately south of the
fence at the opening is an arroyo or draw approximately 20 feet
deep, the south bank of which is in Mexico, o monument exists
near the opening in the fence.
This area. is not designated as a
lawful port of entry into the United States by immigration
officials.
In support of the operation, both the FBI El Paso and Albuquerque
numerous USBP personnel, USeS, UPR.RPD personnel and
over 70 law enforcement officers from the ROM participated.
Officers and Agents were prepositioned throughout the area,
including positions on the train cars. Train ILB]A. 10 stretched
approximately one and half miles, with over one hundred cars.
Teams one through six, comprised of FBI El Paso SWAT Team members,
occupied the train cars near the point of the incident. The teams
were spread out ç,n various cars approximately 500 yards apart. SA
I
t who discharged his weapon, was on Team 2.
SWAT teams,

At approximately 8:24 p.m., Train ILBDA 10, heading East on the
Union Pacific Railroad tracks, st9noed at the siding. As the train
was stopping, according to SSA I
Io the UPRRP, seven
unidentified individuals were seen, witn ciz assistance of night
vision goggles (NVG), running from the south side of the arroyo in
single file and illegally crossing into the United States through
the hole in the fence that separates the U.S. and Mexico.
Additional individuals headed toward the fence, some from houses
in Colonia Anapra, ROM and some from within the arroyo itself.
After crossing into the U.S., the individuals approached the
stopped train. Several individuals boarded the train, while others
walked down the length of the train to other train cars.
Additional individuals continued to approach the fence from Mexico.
later
a male,
Almost iuedjI1’Lr ftr th train stooçed,
identified as I
I board th hcn nart
I
of the well of the train car that contained SAs I
land I
known as Team 1 for the
operation. Asi
Iwalked north across the top portion
-

2

1b7c

 V

of the train car he was puT,ld int the well of the train car where
be was apprehended by BA
I Accor&i,ng to the SWAT Log, at
approximately 08:25 p .nt.,
I advised “1 in custody
TeatEk 1.” Imxediately following the arrest, SAsI
and I
Iheard individuals speaking in the Spanish language on
the south side of the train. They also heard rocks striking the
south side of the train.
*

I

As the train stopped, SAsI
I and
I known as Team 2, heard voices originating fãIn the
south side of the train. SAl
awas responsible for operating
I was responsible for radio
the ballistic shield, 1
communications, and BA I
I wap resDonsible for carrying a
shoulder weapon. According to SAl
Istatement, shortly
after the train came to a stop, a male, later identified asi
I
I
I
I a juvenile, boarded the train car. BA I
attempted to apprehend I
‘ while still in his
initial position, however,I
ijumped off th tçain
and ran toward the fence opening. According to SAl
he
instantly jumped off the train, cbased[
I and, took
him to the ground.
According to the SWAT Log, SAS I
and
I and
J advised via radio they were compromised. SAsI
I
I also disembarked from the train. (Note: There was no
iniication from the SWAT Log or any individual’s statements, that
any other party was aware that SA
I an”
were of f the train at this time.) XI
I apprehended
I
I near the fence openin on the north side of the rence.
A struggle ensued, during which
kept his hands
under his chest in order to pre
S
from handcuffing
him. After SAl
in handcuffs, a
Iplaced
second unidentified male
in.
e man led through the
hole in the fence when BA
estured to him.
I

1

I

According to BA I
he saw
I as she disembarked frnm t’h tri
nd pursued a male, later identified
1e .a
toward the hole in the fena. I
as
Igraed I
he approached the fence, bud
Iwas able to escape her hold.
SAL
Iwas able t
dl
aagain on the south side
of the fence. As BA
they slid down
andcuffedl
the north side of t
.
According to the SWAT log, at
approximately 08:26 p.m., S
eported via radio “Got 2” and
at 08:30 p.m. an agent from Team 2 believed to be SAl
I
advised via radio that she bad “one in custody”.
(Note: Ther is
no evidence to suggest anyone other then Team 2 was aware that BA
I was on the South side of the fence at the bottom of the
arroyo at this time. According to the SWAT Log, at approximately
08:28 p.m. the ‘vaiiiano& OE execute order was given to the entire
group.) According to SAl
I a large grou:p of people had
3

6

 I

gathered at the top of the south side of the arroyo at this time.
The group was throwing large rocks, sticks and bricks at SAl
and yelling to’ others to help free subjecti
I The group was
yelling and encouraging others to throw rocks and bricks at ‘La
Migra”, meaning immigration officials. SAl
Iwas struck by
numerous rocks and sticks. As SAl
Iwas attempting to move
lup the north side of the arroyo, she was struck in the
head by a brick that had been thrown by someone in the group on the
south side of the arroyo, causing significant head trauma to SA
1

SAl
tproceeded
I having seen 824
I apprehending
to her location in the arroyo to provide assistance.
SeejLna BA
I
I bleeding profusely and in need of assistance, SA I
f- her location in the arroyo and. attempted to help he! Lzrag
I
Iuo the north side of the arroyo. As SAL
larrived at
location, he was struck in the head by a large rock or
bri.cic ttzrown from the qroup of_individuals atop the south side of
the arroyo.
SAl
Irid SAl
Iproceeded up the arroyo to
the fence. As they moved toward the fence, an unidentified
iniividiia] struck SA
in the back of the head with a club.
SN
Isustained a rraccüre to his skull, in addition to other
injuries, which required emergency surgery and hospitalization.

I

I

SAl
Irecalled at the same time, observing a silhouette of
an inaividual approach the hole in the fence from the Sc?uth side.
When the individual reached the nn,4i in the fence, SAl
I
recognized the individual as SAP
bnd blood was flowing down
his face.
As SAl
I made his way to the north side of the
fence, SAl
instructed him to crouch dow behind the same
bush where he and his detainee,I
were concealed.
Menwhi1eJ
lresisAri cJJ
Iatteitpts to move him. As
SAl
I strualed wihI
a male, later identified as PNU
IJNtJ, a .k . a.
strur
I
j repeatedly on the right
leg with a baseball bat.
Jthen kicked SAl________
repeatedly in the torso, anci tnen riimd str±]qna her with the
baseball bat. During the assault byl
J SAI_
Iwas also
struck in the left orbital region of the face with an unknown
object.
The group at the top of the arroyo continued_throwing
rocks and shouting in Snanih. 524
I reJeasedl
I and
bothi
land1
ithen &wjeu r4 the
I fled. SAl
top of the arroyo and through the fence.
A
suffered
severe injuries to her head and the orbita
er face,
requiring hospitalization and surgery.
BA
also suffered
several additional injuries o hr legs an
orso region. At
approximately 08:30 p.m., SAj_______ adriéd via ra4io._‘
Tam 2
t
cBtnprOIUd.Sed, needs ass-itance. Also a 08:30 p.m., SAl
Ifrom

4

b6

 Team I. advised via radio, “Team 2 needs help.”
At approximately this time, SAl
lstated he saw S14
crawl through the opening in the fence, alpo severely injured and
bleeding profusely from the head.
As SI
Irose to his
knees to communicate with SAl
I escaped
frrim h1 custo4v and an towards tfle fence opening.
Both SA
Iappered to be incancitated.
When BA
‘pd SAl
I
Iregained control of I
they were situated
d4rtt-1v i front of the fence opening..
At this same moment, BA
Iwas struck in the back by a large rock originating from
I
the south side of the fence.

I

lbC

I saw approximately one dozen
After a few seconds, BA I
unidentified people approaching the fence opening from the south
side. ‘the group was yelling in Spanish, and throwing softball-size
rocks and sand at SN
Ibegan kicking BA
BA
in an attempt to escape BA I
J custody.
I
‘was hit in the eyes with sand and in the hand by a rock,
I
thrown by the group.
I yelled repeatedly in
Spanish to the group approaching the fence opening.
-’ F
4
F’his life and that of his incapacitated team members, SAl__________
drew his pistol and aimed it at the group outside the opening in
the ferrne
1
The group continued to throw rocks and sand at BA
I
I Seeing a male about to throw a soft bail size rock at
I aimed his pistol at the man and fired çpe round.
him, BA’
Due to the sand. in his eyes and the low ambient light, SAl,
I
was unable to get a clear sight picture prior to firing and
therefore, was unsure if his round hit the subject. After the shot
rang out, the group immediately fled fro the fence opening to the
south side of the arroyo.
BA I
I sustained injures to his
eyes, back, legs and finger as a result of I
I
kicks and the rocks and sand being thrown by unidentified
individuals.
-

I

As th group of unidentified individuals attempted to return to
Mexico, Mexican officials took custody of several subjects. As
members of the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) evacuated
the injured agents from the area, members of the SWAT Team, agents
from USeS and USBP, and UPRR Police met the Mexican officials on
the U.S. side of the .Anapra Arroyo and took custody of and arrested
at least ten individuals. Four additional subjects were apprehended
by USBP while fleeing Torthward.
In total, 16 individuals were
arreste, including the original two subjects apprehended by SAS
Ian
The crime scene was immediately secured and preserved by the SWAT
team members. Mernbes of the El Paso ERT team searched the area at

5

6
h7C

 daylight. ERT documented, diagramed and photographed the area.
Numerous evidentiary items were recovered including but not limited
to, a houiemadehammer, bolt cutters, rocks wrapped in rags, sticks,
blood staine4 rocks, and other improvised devices/weapons.
Interviews of law enforcement personnel, confidentiaJ informants,
subjects, and media accounts failed to indicate any injuries or
I
prçoertv damage resulting from the gun shot fired by SAl
SAl
I weapon was submitted into evidence and reflected on
the evidence log.
The ERT search was unable to locate either a
shell casing or bullet fragment at the scene.

6

1b6
b7

 ___________

_

.

FD-204 (Rev. 12.4-95)

.

.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP IUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report ot
flate:

liPi__________________
08/29/2002

CasoflU:

27-HQ-A127l921 SUB 0

Title:

S
S

Offlce

San Antonio
b6
1

VICTIM;
SHOOTING INCIDBN’r/ACCIDBNTS C2N SrIAGO, PUERTO RICO
07/26/2002
ADMINISTR.TIVE INQUIRY
S

Ckaracer:

Synopsis:

This shooting incident occurred on 07/26/2002, while FBI
Special Agents were conducting a Special Weapons And
Tactic CWAT) Team, Close Quarter Battle (CQE) training
exercise within the Shoot House range at Camp Santiago,
Salinas, Puerto Rico. The Camp Santiago range was under
the control of the Puerto Rico National Guard.
The Shoot
House utilized for the training exercise was built for and
is used primarily by Cowpa.ny C 3rd Battalion, 7th Special
Forces Group (Airborne) (3/7 SFG), Naval Station Roosevelt
Roads, Puerto Rico. The Shoot House is a covered, open
air, concrete structure with elevated catwalks for
observation.
During the course of training for a two man entry training
exercise involving a rçom ithin tle Shoot House, FBI
Special Agents I
lentered the room after
land
the introduction of a flas
ang device and discharged H&IC
MP-5 weapons at a stationary target trap. The target trap
was partially concealed by a wooden desk. The discharge
of these weapons resulted in the ricochet of several
rounds off the desk top, which also appear to have rn.issed
the target trap and ricocheted off the concrete wall
immediately behind the target trap. One of these rounds
ricocheted upwards toward the catwalk where SAL
observing and struck him in the right eye.
-

Iwas

this docusient coutain neithen recou idatiosa noz conc.1.usion f the rat. Xt is the operty of the rat
and is ..oaned to your agenc; it and its contts are not to e dLstxi,utad outside yo ageziny.

h6

 .
297-HQ-A1271921 SUB 0

DETAI:
1.

THE SHOOT HOUSE, CAMP SANTIAGO:

The Camp Santiago Shoot House is located in a
remote area on the eastern portion of the Camp Santiago National
Guard Base, which is located in the town of Salinas, Puerto Rico.
The structure was built, utilized, and maintained by Company C,
3/7th Special Forces Group, U. S. Army stationed at the Naval
Station Roosevelt RoadS. It has been utilized to practice,
achieve proficiency, and maintain currency in breaching
techniques and. room clearance operations. Construction of the
Shoot HouSe was completed in March to May 2000. It is a concrete
structure with a raised corrugated fiberglass roof supported by
steel columns. On the second level of.the structure a series of
elevated catwalks which are positioned along and above the
interior concrete walls and allow observation into the roofless
interior rooms. The first floor is divided into multiple rooms
utilizing existing concrete walls and plywood dividers stabilized
by 2” X 4” studs.
Company C, 3/7th Special Forces Group (SFG)
(Airborne), tLS. Army, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads completed a
risk assessment of the Shoot House, dated May 5, 1999, for: “Live
Fire Close Quarter Combat (CQC) and Demolitions Breach, Multi
Team, Multi-Entry” training. In addition, the C 3/7th SFG also
cothpleted Standard operating Procedures (SOP) for use of th
Shoot House.
—

2.

SHOOTING SCENE EVIDENCE COLLECTED:

The details of the incident reported in the San

Juan Division post shooting investigation report, dated
07/30/2002, submitted to FBIHQ were generally confirmed by this

SIRG investigation

*

The incident occurred at approximately 11:58
a.m., 07/26/2002, in Room 2 in the interior of the east-southeast
portion of the Shoot House. The San Juan report incorrectly
identified this room as Room 1. The corners of the room were
oriented in the cardinal directions with the entrance to the room
being north.
The northeast and northwest walls were temporary
structures constructed of plywood and measured 8l” in height and
12 in length.
The southeãSt ähd southwest wails were
constructed of concrete and rise 9’S” in height. The southeast

2

 .
297-’HQ-A1271921 SUB ]J

wall was 15.83’ long and the southwest wall was 11.16’ lQng.
These walls are joined in the southern corner by a 8” section of
concrete wall at roughly 45 degree angles. The concrete walls
are topped by catwalks made of plywood and reinforced with 2’ X
4” studs.
The catwalks are enclosed by metal railings which rise
to Waist level. These catwalks extend over the concrete walls
and protrude into the room.
At the time of the incident, the room contained
a targeted bullet trap (13’, w2.2’, h3’) propped in the
southern corner of the room. The trap rested on the floor and
contained a paper subject target pointing a pistol from the
shoulder position. The target contained 4 bullet holes. Three
of the holes were grouped in the right shoulder and the right
hand, where the pistol was located, The fourth hole was located
in the center mass, chest, region.
Approximately 2.83’ in front of the, trap was
positioned an executive style wooden laminate desk (14’, w=2’,
h=2.4’). This desk was placed between the trap and the shooters
and obstructed approximately half the target. The top of the
desk contained two gouges on the western side and one on the
eastern side.
The gouge on the eastern side appeared to have
resulted in a 1arger laminate chip being displaced and
subsequently located at the base of the trap. These gouges
measured approximately 3”, 3.25” and 2.5” respectively. All
gouges were oriented towa,rd the trap. A review of the video tape
recorded of the traini confimed these aquges were the result
of the shooting by SAs I
land I
I

Above the trap, located on the concrete wall
were marks that appeared to be impact marks from rounds. These
marks appeared to investigators to be relatively fresh and showed
striations indicating a ricochet. These marks were consistent
with probable trajectories from the desk top. There were no
rounds found imbedded in the concrete wall. The investigation
was not able to conclusively determine these marks were the
result of the shooting by SAsI
landl
1 The concrete
walls contained numerous marks, the origin of which was
inconclusive.
The SIRQ on-site review of the marks with San
Juan Division SSRAI
i who conducted the initial
post shooting review, confirmed the marks originally identified
in the San Juan review as the probable marks resulting from the
07/26/200.2 shooting.
However, the incident scene had not been
secured after the San Juan review and there was evidence the
3

 .

.

297-HQ-AJ.271921 SOB 13

scene had been contaminated. Specifically, two temporary plywood
walls had been removed and the furniture repositioned within the
Shoot House. No other contaminations were readily identifiable.
The San Juan review identified several .223
bullet casings on the floor which were discarded at the time of
the review since only l0iizn caibr rmnds had been employed on
07/26/2002 by SAsI
andi
I No other FBI shooters had
used the Shoot House that day. Six shell casings for 10 mm
rounds were found on the floor of the room as well as an expended
MK-141 flash-bang diversionary device simulator and spoon. Also
located along the northeastern wall was an empty two drawer
filing cabinet.

I

All evidence collected from the room was
photographed, measured and collected in accordance with FBI
standards for evidence collection. In-addition, the locations of
all items in the room were identified in the scene diagram
prepared during the San Juan review.

In the room adjacent to and located northwest of
the shooting room, one 10mm shell casing was found and similarly
processed and collected.
In the room adjacent to and located southwest of
Room 2 (Room 4), a right sunglass eye lens was recovered during
an immediate sweep of the area after the incident by SWAT Team
personnel attempting to locate SAl
linjured eye. The San
Juan Report incorrectlyidentified these as Room 1. and Room 3.
The location was marked at the time of the recovery and later
photographed and measured. The lens was similarly processed and
collected.

The catwalk above the southwestern wall
contained a dark red stain near the northern most steel upport
cOlumn which was subsequently identified aà Ski
Iblood
from the eye injury. This area had been cleaned after the
incident to prevent injury. This area was photographed during
the San Juan investigation. Also located to the west of this
stain on an adjoining catwalk was a pair of Bolle sunglasses,
missing a riht eye lens, which was later identified belonging to
SAt
I The glasses were recovered during the immediate
sweep of the area after the incident and the location marked for
subsequent measurement and photographing. The glasses were
similarly processed and collected.

I

4

 297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

During the San Juan review it was noted that the
catwalks along both the southwest and southeast walls of Room 2
contained numerous small particles of concrete matter.
Additional evidence collected by San Juan was a
8 mm HG Maxell videotape of the room entry and shooting filmed by
SSRA1
I and the bullet slug that penetrated SA
I
Ieye collected by FBI Philadelphia from the pathology
lab at the Wills Eye Hospital in Philadelph.ia, Pennsylvania
subsequent to its removal. The slug was photographed and
measured during the SIThG investigation.
Subsequent to the shooting, the San Juan
Division conducted a review which resulted in the collection of
the evidence noted above. In addition, a scene reconstruction
was prepared to identify the probable bullet trajectory based
upon available evidence. The SIRG investigation, performed
subsequent to the scene contamination, concluded the bullet
trajectory identified by San Juap. wa th mrt probable path of
the bullets fired by SASI
I A subsequent
landl
graphic depiction of the post-shooting evidence collection sites
was prepared by the Investigative and Prosecutive Graphics Unit,
FBI Laboratory-Division and is made a part of this report.
3.

INCIDENT RECOTSThUCTION

On Thursday, 07/25/2002, members of the FBI San
Juan SWAT Team participated in a firearms training session at the
Isla de Cabras firing range. This training was intended to
prepare the team to conduct a Close Quarter Battle (CQB) live
fire training exercise at the Camp Santiago Shoot House the
following day. The training consisted of firing 2 Personal
Qualification Courses (PQCs) with assigned sidearms and several
‘tnove and. shoot” drills utilizing Heckler and Koch MP-5
submachine guns and assigned sidearms. Transition drills from
the MP-5 to the sidearm were conducted. Additionally, door.
entries were discussed and rehearsed utilizing a mock door frame
and no ammunition. Also, use and deployment of the flash-bang
distraction device was discussed and demonstrated. This training
was conducted without incident.
Based on the physical evidence found and
obtained at the scene, eyewitness accounts and. interviews the
following is what is believed to have occurred on 07/26/2002 at
the Camp Santiago Shoot House:

5

6

 p

.

.

297-HQ-A127192l SUB D

Arrangements for use of the Shoot Iouse were
I and Sergeant
I
I Company C, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces
Group (03/7 SF0), Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.
Majorl
Iwas new to command of the 3/7 SF0, having recently
replaced Major a
I sgt.
Ihad bcen the point
of contact for the FBI San Juan SWAT Team Leader (STL) S2U
I
I
laince aoo;oximately August 2001, subsequent to a meeting
with Ma:jor F
I Warrant Off icexi
land Sgt.
I regarding use of the Shoot House range.
Tflade orior tn 07/2 /2 002 through Maj oi

Sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 am. members
of the ‘BI San Juan SWAT Team arrived at the Camp Santiago Shoot
House.
There was no contact by any member of the FBI SWAT Team
with the Puerto Rico National Guard (P1NG) Range Control to
advise them of the FBI’S use of the Shoot House, Although aware
of the use of the Shoot House, no C3/7..SFG personnel were on site
at the Shoot Rouse on 07/26/2002.
The lack of contact with the PRNG Range Control
was consistent with several prior uses of the Shoo House by the
FBI SWAT Team under the leadership of STLI
I On most
previous occasions 03/7 SF0 personnel were on site either before
and/or during t-he conduct of FBI SWAT Team training at the Shoot
House.
In his interview, 8Th
ladvised he did
not contact PRW Raria c!rol on 07/26/2002 desoite a specific
request by Sgt I
I explained
I that he do so. STLI
that he did not think it was his responsibility to contact PRNG
Range Control.
STLL
lexplained. that by refusing to
notify PRNG Range Control he was ensuring 03/7 SF0 would be
present whenever the FBI utilized the Shoot House, 8Th I
I
unsuccessfully attempted to contact Sgt.l
Iwhen he
discovered bLe was not at the site. After the unsuccessful
attempt, STill
lauthorized the. initiation of training at
the Shoot House. No range flags were hoisted at the site to
identify a live range.
.

After arrival, at approximately 9:00 a.m. the
SWAT Team received detailed talk through” and “walk through”
training related to two and four man room entries and clearing
tecthniques.
This training was led by 8Th
lwho provided
new operators copies of the SWAT Training Manual pertaining to
CQB training. During the “walk through training in the Shoot
House the -importance of shot placement, weapon discipline, safety
and. shot accuracy were emphasized to
ntial for
ricochet dangers. During this training, STLI
I advised

6

 .

•
297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

operators to fully load their MP-5 weapons consisting of 25
rotnxds of 10mm, Full Metal Jacket (FMJ), “ball” type, ammunition.

During his interview, STLI
laclvised he
was aware of the potential dangers associated with ricochet
rounds in the Shoot House but determined the risks were
reasonable and acceptable given his assessment of the critical
need for this type of training.
The SWAT Team utilized MP-5 weapons and lOtmn,
FMJ, ammunition during these and previous training exercises at
the Shoot House. Attached to the weapons were a mixture of
Aimpoint and C-More sights. These sights were calibrated at 25
to 35 yards and in CQB scenarios required compensation in the
form of a two to three inch drop from sight picture to shot
placement. Compensation for the sights during the Shoot House
COB training was verbally emphasized during training.
The interviews conducted by the SIRG determined
training at the shoot House consistently stressed the importance
of accuracy to minimize ricochet. One Operator, N____________
I
I advised he recalled four prior instaices when stooters
nap missed the targets and rounds had struck either the ground or
the concrete waal. There was also one instance reported wherein
a fragment had ricocheted and inflicted a minor injury to another
member of the SWAT Team observing the activity. Additionally,
C3/7 SFG personnel had observed the agents during previous
training exercises miss the target trap and subsequently
chastised them.
In each instance after a miss, the training was
suspended immediately and a discussion ensued to stress the
importance of accuracy. In some instances the training pace was
slowed in order to assist the shooter’s accuracy. The awareness
of potential ricàchet risks and the emphasis on accurate shooting
was consistent with the statements of other SWAT Team members.

After the “walk through.” training xries, a.
detailed safety briefing was also conducted by SAl
j the
designated Safety Officer (SO). This safety briehng
concentrated on identifying the designated ambulance in the event
of an injury, tviT personnel, location of the Aid Bag, and air and
ground MedEvac plans were coordinated and confirmed. The quality
of this briefing and pre-incident coordination was evident in the
excellent post injury response of the San Juan SWAT Team. This
coordination and emergency response was specifically commended by
Colonel Wilson Torres, chief of- Staff, Office of the Adjutant
General, Puerto Rico Nãtiônal Guard.

7

b7C

 297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

I

After the safety briefing conducted by SA
I t anrrôximatlv 1l:3O a.m., Assistant SWAT Team Leader
(ASTL) SAl
I who is also a Certified Firearms

Instructor, provided another safety briefing regarding the use of
live ammunition in the Shoot House and again cautioned the team
about potential ricochet danger. All team members were then
instructed to put on their SWAT gear consisting of helmet, vest
and hearing and eye protection.
A final instruction and demonstration regarding
the use and saf deployment of a flash-bang device was provided
by STLI
I This included demonstration of a live flash
bang device. Afterwards, operators were instructed to leave the
Shoot House so he could prepare the training room. He also
instructed ASTL[
ito pair experienced and inexperienced
operators together for the two man entry exercise.

1c7c;

The room utilized in the Shoot House contained
two newly constructed plywood walls. The ‘BI did not build these
walls and, therefore, it is presumed they were built by C3/7 SPG.
The configuration of this room was not anticipated by the SOP,
which discloses no such room in identifying approved areas of
live fire.
The effect of this new, temporary, room was to place
the only available catwalks Hdown rang&’ of the shooters. The
permanent Shoot Rouse rooms are carefully configured to enable
observers to view from catwalk 1ocation behind the shooters.
The only catwalks available in this ten1poray structure were the
southeast and southwest walls, with the target placed in the
south corner. As a result, use of the available catwalks to view
this temporary room would reasonably be considered to be of an
unacceptable risk, except at the most extreme locations away from
the target.
-

After the operators departed the Shpot House,

J designed, participated and supervised the
arrangement of the roam to be used during the exercise.
STLI

This
included target/trap placement and the placement of an empty
metal file cabinet and an executive style wood desk. The
target/trap was placed in the extreme south corner of the room
opposite the entry doorway. The file cabinet was placed in
proximity to the northeast wall and east corner. The desk was
placed in a position approximately 314H directly in front of the
target/trap. The placement of the desk obscured at least half
the target from view of the shooters.
Although both ASTLI
both Certified Firearms_Instructors
(SWAT Advisor), ASTLI
I and SA)
8

I and SN
I are
S that SSRA
leither participated

r

I

 __I.

297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

in the room arrangement and/or observed the room arrangement
without objection to the placement of objects prior to the
initiation of the first exercise. or was there any apparent
discussion regarding the dangerous location of the available

catwalks.

SSRI
‘was asked by STLI
Ito
videotape the exercise froi a position on the catwalk to be
determined by SsRAI
I The SIRG investigation did not
determine exactly who provided what ipetruotions on the specific
training roles of AST1
land SAl
If or the initial
live fire exercise.
For examples n an FD-302 report, dated
07/29/2002, prepared by STTJ
I pursuant to the San Juan
review he asked SAl
Ito act as the range safety officer in
an ‘over watch” position on the catwalk and further asked ASTL
Ito act as a second ground safety officer with 8Th
This recollection is consistent with SThI
I
SIRG interview, FD-302 reporE datçd 08/20/2002, wherein he
advised he appoihted AsThi
las ground safety officer and BA
.1
twas instructed to maintain a position on the catwalk to
watch for unsafe conditions such as a trip or unsafe movement.
However, according tç a FD-02 reort. dated
08/03/2002, prepared by San Juan SSRAl
Iflh111lant
to an interview of SAl
I he reported that Th j
assigned Range Safety Officer duties to SAl
I
ianci SA I
and left it up to them as to positioning.
BA [_
lapd BA
I
I discussed this and it was agreed that SE1
J would qo
up on the catwalk arid fulfill his duties there while BA I
I
would remain on the ground and observe the entry team from that
vantage point.
In his sub8equent interview conducted by the
SIRG,• reflected in ?D-302 report dated 08/20/2L002. SAl
I
advised he and BA I
Iwere assigned by STI4
I
alternating safety officers and evaluators, whereupoFSI
I
agreed to take a position above the shooting area on the catwalk.
..

.

In FD-302 reports, dated 07/26/2002 and
08/20/2002, ASTI4
advised, SN
made the suggestion
that he should observe the training from the catwalk, while ASTL
I
I should observe the training from the floor.’
Based upon these interviews it is not clear
whether STLI
o maintain a position
I instructed 814
during the exercise on the catwalk; whether this Was a Suggestion
he ttlede and agsd unop
4 or, whether this was an independent
decision of SAl
I subsequently agreed to by ASTLI
1

9

6
o7C

 .
297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

during a reconciliati “ lpir resnective_roles durina t1e
first exercise. STLI
land S1
Iwere
L ASTLI
each interviewed regarding their respective roles, the direötions
they were given an4 the decisions they made that resulted in
placing s?i
I on the catwalk. Each of their interviews
provided results which, taken comparatively, indicaçes their
recollections and perceptions are in conflict. STLI
i in
an FD-302 prepared by him subsequent to the shooting and during
his SIRG interview, indicates that he requested SAl
Ito
take a position on the cawalk. However, in the interviews of SA
Ithey indicate the position of SA
land ASTL I
I
Iduring the exercise was determined through agreement
between them and was not at the direction of 5Th I
I ASTI
ven stated that the suggestion that SAl
rake the
position on the catwalk was 9
riainatqd by SAl
I Therefore,
given the statements of ASTLI
land ‘SAl
I it is
possible_bt not probable that STII
pecificafly assigned
SAl
Jto the catwalk position. It is more probable that STt,
Isuggested someone take a position on the catwalk and
that, acting upon that suggestion and prior practice, ASTL
Imade a joint agreement on their respective
SN
positions.
It also appears in the absence of specific
instructions otherwise that overall range safety wa the
responsibility of STLI
I who, importantly, is not a
Certified Firearms Instructor.
—

t. rwrniimately 11:45 a.m.
ASTL[
selected SAl
iand sii
las the first team to
perform a two man entry exercise using live mmunitiqn. ASTL
selected an experiçnced oqrator (SAl
I and an
inexperienced operator (SAl
1. Both operators wore
complete SWAT gear which included vest, helmet and ear and eye
protection. Both were armed with E&K MP-5 weapons, loaded with
]. 0mm gull Metal Jacket (FM) , “ball” type, ammunition and fully
loaded sidearms.
The sidearms, although available, were not
employed during this exercise.

I

Prior to cor(Imencement of the exercise, SA
Idid not adorn his helmet or protective goggles. He
covered his eyes with Bolle sunglasses, which reportedly had some,
ballistic protecirc
rilities but were not of the quality of
his aoaaJes.
bias challenged in this decision by ASTL
SAl
i After_noticing SAl
twithout his protective
helmet, ASTII
lintructed him to put his helmet on. SA
I explained his concern that ridoähet rounds would come
Irom a trajectory below his position and up from the range area.
-

-

I0

-

 297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

He was concerned having read literature and studies regarding
head wounds where the round was not able to exit due to the

helmet. SAl
Ipreferred a clean exit wound and thereafter
rationalized his helmet presented a liability given the probable
trajectory of any ricochet dangers.

SAl
Ihad high quality, double pane,
protective goggles which were adjusted to his protectiv helmet.
He chose not to remove the goggles when he made the decision not
to wear his helmet.
Instead, he placed the Bolle sunglasses over
his eyes.

SAl
Iwas not wearing either his protective
helmet or his protective goggles at the time of the shooting. He
substituted Bolle sunglasses with some undetermined, but le.sser,
protective capabilities for eye protection. In addition, SSIA
lalso did not wear.a protective.helmet, although he was
I
wearing a protective vest as well as eye and ear protection.
During his SIRO interview, reported in FD-302
dated 08/20/2002 STLL
.
1
ladvised he thought everyone
including safety officers/instructors, had on full protective
gear. He was. not aware SA I
I was not wearing a helmet.
This statement -.±s not consistent with a prior FD-3 02, dated
07/29/2002, prepared by STLI
pu.vsuant to the San Juan
review which states:
“After observing the room to be used for the
training exercise SN
Iwas verbally
asked if he was ready for live exercises to
begin. Upon receiving a thumbs up status
lj the catwalk and a verbal
from SAl
ready frçm TL I
Ion the ground STL
I
I advised SAs I
landi
Ithat
the live fire exercise was ready to begin.

STL[
Ichecked
According to ASTTI
to make sure that everyone was in place pior to giving the
command to begin the exercise. It appears that SThI
I
physically observed a].l personnel prior to commencement of the
exercise and, therefore, should have noticed that Sl
Iwas
wearing neither his helmet nor appropriate eye protection.
At approximately 11:58 a m., all nonparticipants of the SWAT Team were located outside the Shoot
House. The SIRG investjgtiön identified the remaining involved
individuals pes-itioned as follows:
•

11

 .

.

297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

1.
SSR?J
catwalk.

I-

Located above the east corner on the

j- Located above the west corner on the
2. SA
catwalk near the intersection of the southwest concrete
wall and northwest wooden wall.
(This starting
position is different from the starting position
reported in the San Juan review which placed him midway
between the south and west corners.)
3.
SAl
I Located on the ground floor outside
the north entrance to the room along the northwest
wall,
positioned as the #1 man in the stack position
or room entry.
4.
SAl
F Located on the ground floor outside
the north entrance to the room along the northwest
wall.
Positioned as the #2 man in the stack position
for ‘room entry.
I- Located on the ground floor outside
5. ASTLI
the north entrance to the room.

6.
SL[
I- Located on the ground floor outside
the north entrance to the room.
-

After being advised tIat obsezvçrs, safety
and evaluators were ready, ST]1
I informed SA
nd SAl
I
Ithat the live fire exercise was ready to
begin. He provided each with a practice flash bang device and
instructed them to prepare for room entry. Both were asked if
they had any questions and both answered that they did not.
Neither shooter was reminded at this tiie to adjust their point
Ini It compensate for the calibration of their sights.
STL
Ithen informed them that on the count down, as previously
I
enearsed, they were to execute a two man single room live
dynamic entry using the practice flash bang provided.
I r-c

After the_countdown was completed without
incident, SASI
bncl
I executed the two man entry. SA
I
I being the number 2 man, successfully dep.oved the
practice flash bang device he had removed from SAl
h vest
into the room to initiate entry and retreated back to his number
2 position.
Tut prior to the commencing of the live fire
1
drill, SA I
I walked south on the catwalk toward the target
corner to get a better view of the participants as they delivered

12

7C

 .

.

297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

the flash bang device.__Xnmediate1y after the flash bang device
was delivered, SAl
Iturned his head away front the room in
order to proteqt hi fce. and body from the detonation. After
detonation, SA
Iturned back around to evaluate the
participants.

a

Mt the device detonat- J
I entered
the room tothe left side followed by SAI
Iwho entered the
room to the right side. Both began discharging their R&K NP-5
weapons shortly after entering the room. The discharge of the
f1h hg çlevice anç the subsequent discharge of weapons by SAs
I
I andi
here captured on videotape, a copy of which
is enclosed with this report.

I

I

After S)’l
1tleared the doopiay Sm
Imovec3. through the doorway. ASTLI
I had hs
observation momentarily obscured by the movement of STLI
Prior to his view being obstructed, ASTL I
Ibelieved he
witnessed a puff of duetor a 4cochet srike the concrete wall
ahovs te traet lp. When sp.J
I entered the room, SAs
Iliad ceased firing.
I andl

I

Ibelieved he was straddling the wide
SAl
and narrow port-ions oi te catwalk between the south and west
corners near the target end when the shooting began. He recalled
looking into the room at the shooters as they were firing and
heard two or three shots before being struck in the eye by an
object.
The force of the impact spun him around forcing him to
land in a prone position on his stomach. He realized he had been
hit in the right eye, noted the missing right eye piece to his
sunglasses and could feel blood running down his face. He
removed his sunglasses and inspected his head with his fingers
for exit wounds and ultimately concluded the obiect was lodged in
his head. After a few seconds, SAl
Iturned him
over on his back and began to administer first aid.
A review of the videotape indicates SAl
I
fired the first shot. SAl
jthen fired the second and third
shots, both of which appear to have struck the desktop, skipped
the bullet, and probably went outside the target trap. The
videotape does not disclose the target trap
1 thcrrkiy rendering
b6
th sequence of target hits impossible. SAl
then fired
I
the fourth shot, which stuck the desktop, skipped the bullet and
probably went outside the target trap. Additional shots were
fired and are believed to have struck the target.

-

hits.

A review of the target indicates four direct
The desktop indicates three bullet strikes, one from SA
13

 .
297-HQ-A127192J. SUB D

I

sAl

I

land two from
Post shooting evidence
collection recovered a total o seven 10mm casings in the
vicinity of the room.
Six were located within the room and the
seventh was located outside the room adjacent to the northwest
wooden wall. This would indicate the probability of seven shots
fired with three missing the target trap and probably ricochets.
One of these undoubtedly ricoçhAted of the concrete wall behind
the target trap and struck SAl
jn the right eye.
A review of the object removed from SAl__________

eye during surgery, a photo of which is included with. this
report, indioates the object was not a fragment from a bullet or
the concrete wall.
The object removed from his eye was a
partially flattened round, indicating an unfragmented ricochet.
4.

FBI USE 0? THE SHOOT HOUSE. CAMP s.1qTIAGO

The SIRO, after reviewing the initial shooting
incident report by the San Juan Division? determined the inquiry
needed to determine if a risk assessment had been conducted on
-the Shoot House, what standard operating procedures were in
effect for the Shoot House and what the FBI personnel involved in
training at the- facility knew of the risks and operating
procedures and when they knew it.
SHOOT HOUSE LIMITATIONS

An FBI interview was conducted of Colonel
Josefina Cruz, Safety and Operational Health Manager, Puerto Rico
national Guard (PRNG), Camp Santiago, Salinas, Puerto Rico. Col.
Cruz presently serves as the Safety and Occupational Health
Manager at Camp .Santiago and is responsible for accident
prevention, health promotion, and firearm range safety at Camp
Santiago.
Co].. Cruz advised that by a letter dated
06/28/2000, Maj or I
Commanding Officer of Company
C, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (3/7 SYG) requested
the Adjutant General of the PRNG to grant 3/7 SFG a range waiver
to conduct close quarter combat training at the new shoot house
at Camp sa1tiago.
In particular, the 3/7 SFG requested authority
to shoot 9mm frangible ammunition, 9mm sitnunition ammunition,
5.56 frangible ammunition, 5.56 simunition, and 5.56 blue bolt
(plastic) amnumition.
In consideration of that request, Col. Cruz
ordered a trajectory analysis for the ammunition specified.
14

 .
297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

Thereafter, in a letter dated 08/01/2000, PRNG Adjutant General
Emilo Diaz-Colon approved a one-year range waiver for 3/7 SPG,
exclusively, conditioned on the following:

“a. The only ammunition authprized for use is
the 5.56mm sitnunition, 5.56mm plastic, 5.56mm
frangible, 9nmi frangible, and 9mm simunition.
The waiver approval does not provide for use
of standard ball munitions. If standard ball
ammunition is proposed in the future, a
separate safety assessment by TACON-ARDEC
must be conducted and the results of that
assessment provided for analysis by this
Command.”
In addition, the PRNG
s approval letter
3
indicated that all operations conducted at the Shoot House must
be coordinated with the Range Control Office at Camp Santiago.
The Adjutant General of the PRNG renewed the 3/7 SFG’s range
waiver in October 2001 for a second one-year period.
Col. Cruz further advised sometime during
November 2001, -Captain I
lExecutive Officer for
the 3/7 SG, sent an e-mail to the U. S. Army’ s Engineering and
Research Center (ERO) at the Picatimly Arsenal, in New Jer8ey, to
inquire about the safety implications of shooting 5.56 ball
ammuxition inside the shoot house at Camp Santiago. In a
response e-mail to Capt.I
Ithat was copy counted to Col.
Cruz, the ERC advised that a 3100’ feetradius test would be
required prior to the granting of authority to use 5.56 ball
rmmmiton at the shoot house. Further, Col. Cxuz informed Capt.
Ithat the community of Sabana Llama was located
I
approximately 2100’ southeast of the shoot house, well within the
maximum range of the 5.56 ball ammunition. Notwithstanding, Col.
Cruz indicated that a waiver for use of that ammunition could be
granted if the shoot house was appropriately modified to preclude
proeotile escapement on the structure’s southeast side,
According to Col. Cruz, the 3/7 SFG never pursued the matter
further.
Therefore, the use of “ball type” munitions in
the shoot house has not been approved and is specifically
prohibited.
A review of the enclosed Shoot House SOP,
prepared by 3/7 SF, indicates standard “ball type” ammunition is
not approved nor is the placement of furniture permitted to
15

b7C

 .
297-HQA1271921 SUB D

obstruct targets in the shoot house. This SOP further indicates
the permitted target placement areas within each room of the
shoot house and requires users to be equipped with. appropriate
body armor, helmet and eye and ear protection.
It does not
indicate permissible catwalk areas to be utilized for each shoot
house location. Based upon the interviews conducted by SIRG it
may be concluded that FBI personnel had not reviewed nor were
they aware of the Shoot House SOP.
A review of the enclosed Shoot House Risk
Assessment, prepared by 3/7 SF0, indicates the level of risk
associated with the use of the shoot house wider the approved
conditions is “HIGH”.
It is logical to assume use of the shoot
house using ba11 type” munitions; locating furniture to obstruct
targets; not adhering to personal protection requirements; and/or
failing to notify PRNG Range Control, as specified in the SOP,
would elevate rjk to “VERY HIGH” arid o an unacceptable level.
HISTORY OF FBI USE OP THE SHOOT HOUSE
The FBI, with the generous approval of the
Puerto Rico National Guard, has utilized a number or ranges at
Camp Santiago over the years. Some of the ranges and facilities
are used and maiaged almost exclusively by Special Forces Group
personnel. As a result, liaison between the FBI and SF0
personnel is also required. The Shoot House range is such a
facility and the FBI has been permitted to practice there due to
the high quality of the FBI and Special Forces Group
relationship.
The earliest known FBI use of the Shoot House
range was May 2001. This use was coordinated by former SWAT Team
Leader and. Coordinator (sm/c) SAl
In addition
to his duties as the former STL/C during the period 1992 to 2001,
SAl
I also served as the Principal Firearms Instructor
(FF1) for five years, as served as a Firearms Instructor for
twelve years, is a FBI Bomb Technician, Principal Tactical
Instructor, Defensive Tactics Instructor and was a member of the
San Juan Division SWAT team from 1986 until his resignation in
2001.

•

To arrange the use of the Shoot House during a
week long SWAT Training sessioz. a1onqyiith other range
facilities at Camp Santiago, 211
Icoordinated approval
through both the Puerto Rico National Guard and the 3/7 Special
Forces Group (3/7 SF0). The use of the Shoot House was confiritted
by løtter from SAC MARELBN3 M. HUNTER to both the PENS and the
SFG and is documented in FBI files. In addition, PENS advised
16

 .

.

297-HQ-A1271921 SUB 1)

the FBI of the cost of using various range facilities during this
training session which include the cost of using the Shoot House.
In his interview, SAl
ladvised that after
securing PRNG and 3/7 SFG approval he always coordinated with the
Camp Santiago 8-3 Officer who was in charge of all training
exercises conducted on the base. It was.standard practice for the
SWAT Team, when using a range, to stop at Range Control, leave an
FBI radio to facilitate constant communication and obtain a “red
flag” that would be raised at the specific range flag pole
indicating training with live fire scenarios. Range Control
would be informed, via radio, when the range became live and when
it ended, At the conclusion of the exercise, the red flag would
be returned and the FBI radio retrieved upon exit from the base.
This standard practice was employed when the Shoot House was used
for the first and only time under STLI
I

When the FBI used the Shoot Hous in May 2001,

10mm and 9mm “ball type” ammunition was used.
SAl
ladvised
he could not recall whether Range Control knew what specific type
of ammunition was being used at the Shoot House. He further

advised he was never informed by Range Control or Special Forces
personnel th4t 9mm or 10 mm “ball type” ammunition could not be
used,.
—

STLI
bade no attempt to obtain frangible
ammunition for use in the Shoot House, although he was aware it
was more appropriate for that environment. He ensured safety by
deliberately slowing down the exercises. He also ensured that
the observers were situated on the catwalk overlooking the
exercise behind the shooters. He emphasized the need for
deliberation to his team members reiterating at all times to take
as much time as needed to successfully hit the target and bullet
trap.
s.i
Irecalled one occasion during an entry exercise
where an assistant Team Leader placed as an observer situated on
the catwalk, above and behind the entry, felt a ricochet of what
he described as a. piece of metal that grazed his hand.
The Shoot House was utilized on at least three
other occasions.
Specifically, 07/30/01, 10/26/01 and 01/25/02
the Shoot House was used by FBI SWAT Team personnel. Another
training date, 04/26/2002, was scheduled but unused due to the

STLI
h TDY assignment to Pakistan. The SIRT
investigation determined 10mm ‘ball type” ammunition was
regularly employed on each of the prior occasions. It is
probable that sidearms weapons were utilized in transition
scenarios and sp utilized, although the investigation did not
focus on this aspect of the training. Each of these training
17

bES

 297-HQ—A1271921 SUB D

sce.narios were designed, arranged and supervised by STL I

I

R)NGE CONTROL NOTIFICATION

I

It appears from interviews conducted that no
effort was made by FBI SWAT Team leadership to arrazae or rtotd(y
Range Control of the use of the Shoot House after S1
I
took ove as Sm and Coordinator. STLI
I in his
interview, advised he did not think it was his responsibility or
the responsibility of the FBT tn nnHy Range Control. All use
of the Shoot House after STLI
Itook control of the SWAT
Tm wcj arranged exclusively through 3/7 SFG. According to SA
I, by refusing to directly notify Range Control he was
ensuring 3/7 S?G attendance during SWAT Team training at the
Shoot House. In addition, SA I
I subsequently also advised
as follows:
I

I advised he remembered another reason he did not
check in with Range Control prior to using the house. He
recalled he did check in with Range Control on a prior
occasion and they asked him where C 3/7 was. He told them C
3/7 were at the Shoot House which wasn’t true. He did not
want to hay-e to lie for C 3/7 so he refused to check in with
Range Control. He acknowledged his failure to notify Range
Control was a safety issue since no flag was raised
indicating 1i.ve fire at the location. Given the remote
location of the Shoot House, he thought the risk of injury
to a bystander was low.
11

Inasmuch as no 3/7 SFG personnel were in
attendnc at tjie Shoot House on 7/26/2002 and no effort was made
I to notify Range Control or to obtain a ed flac
by STLI
to indicate a live range, it must be concluded that STLI
I
either: (1) did not understand the responsibility to ensure Range
Control was notified; or, (2) deliberately, chose to ignore that
responsibiLity.
Interviews of Range Control personnel indicated
they were not aware of the FBI presence at the Shoot House on.
7/26/2002 or their intended use of the facility. Documentation
in the form of Camp Santiago Range Control Log (enclosed) for
that day and correspondence between 3/7 SFG and PRNO (enclosed)
regarding use of the Shoot House on that date also fail to
reflect an FBI presence or intention to utilize the facility.
SHOOT HOUSE STANDARD OPERAXNG PROCEDURES

18

 denied
that

.
297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

The initial San Jn Divison shooting review
indicated, via interview of Captain’
I 3/7 SF0, that
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) were in effect on 7/26/2002,
which the FBI SWAT Team violated.
The SIRT investigation did confirm numerous FBI
SWAT Team violations of the Shoot House SOP. The investigation
interviewed 19 oecial pents who participated or used to
participate (SAl
I in the San Juan SWAT Team. However,
none acknowledged they were aware of or familiar with the Shoot
House SOP provided by Capt .1
I
In addition, none
acknowledged they were aware of the limitations o ammunition
which prohibited the use of 10mm “ball type” aiiuuunition or the
prohibition against placing furniture to obstruct targets in the
Shoot House.
Although_at_least oneSWkT Team member
(Assistant Team Leaden
p recalled receiving a briefing from
SF0 personnel on one prior occasion regarding the use of the
Shoot House, he did not recall ever receiving a briefing from SF0
personnel on the• limitations or restrictions of the facility. He
was also unaware of the SOP, the limitations of ammunition which
prohibited the use of 10mm “ball type” ammunition or the
prohibition agaj.rist placing furniture to obstruct targets in the
Shoot House.
The majqrity of SWAT Team personnel interviewed
indicated that SF0 personnel were present on most occasions when
the FBI utilized the Shoot House. oftentimes SF0 personnel took
positions on the catwalk and served as safety observers during
SWAT Training when 10mm “ball type” ammunition was utilized. On
no occasion did anyone object to the use of 10mm “ball type”
ammunition in the Shoot House.

I

1 3/7 SF0, in.his interview, dated
MajorL
05/20/2002, pursuant to the SIRO investigation, advised in a
meeting with sThi
Iwhich occurred the week before the
shooting incident and which was also attended by SAl________
I that he specifically aavisec. STL
land Sgt. I
the FBI was not permitted to engage in live fire
exercises at the Shoot House.
I and SA
In thØr interviews, both STLI
they were advised by Majol
I, or anyone
5, that they were not permitted to use the Shoot House for
live fire exercises or that they were not permitted to use 10mm
“bafl type” ammunition. Both denied that they were in-formed in
this meeting with Maj .1
Ithat he spedifically forbid them
19

 ________land

•

.

297-HQ-A1271921 SUB D

from shooting live ammunition.
POST SHOOTING ACTIVITY
According to Lieutenant Colonel DANIEL MANGUM,,
Operations Officer, Puerto Rico National Guard, Camp Santiago,
Salinas, Puerto Rico, the fol1owng occurred after the shooting
incident:

’On 07/26/2002, at approximately 12:10 p.m., the range
1
control office at Camp Santiago received radio notification
from C Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Porces Group (3/7
SFG) that an accidental shooting resulting in a serious
The injured party
injury just occurred at the shoot house.
was transported 1o the helicoptr oad near the camp clinic.
ndI
I assigned to the
II
I
Training, Plans and Operations Division, immediately
responded to the helicopter pad where they met a few men
attired in BDU military clothing. They asked one of the men
the whereabouts of the members of the 3/7 SFG. One of the
men, unidentified, said the SFG personnel were back at the
shoot house where the accidental shooting occurred.
Thereupon, I
ncI
Idrove to the shoot house
six kilometers away where they found a gropo of mep dressed
lasked
similarly to those at the helicopter pad. I
them if anyone from 3/7 SPG was present. The men, who did
not volunteer their identities, replied that no SFG
personnel were pxesent.H
It is unclear who made the initial contact with
Range Control after the shooting incident, but it must be
presumed to have been someone from the FBI SWAT Team since no 3/7
SFG personnel were reportedly present at the scene. STL
I in his interview dated 08/20/2002, advised the
I
following:

“pofloh

zooting, Range Control showed up outside the

house. [
Itold them to call C 3/7 but he is not sure
Iran
they understood him as his Spanish is weak.. .J

into Range Control again and they asked him where C 3/7 was.
advised no C 3/7 personnel were present. H

He

On 7/26/2002, ASAC JOSE PIGUEROA specifically
instructed members of the San Juan SWAT Team, including STL

I

I, not to discuss the shooting until they had provided
Despite
these iistructions, STLI
agreed to meet with Majçr
Colonel CRUZ on 7/29/2002 to discuss the shooting.

statements to the FBI pursuant to a .shooting inquiry.

20

 ________

•

.

297-HQ-.A127192j. SUB I)

He asked SAl
Ito accompany him to this meeting.
When SI
linquired abqut the AAC’s instructions he was
reportedly informed by ST!
3 I
I that permission had been
obtained from ASAC FIGUBROA.
In his interview, dated 08/22/2002, ASAC!
FIGUEROA denied having been asked or giving permission for STL
I
I or any other personnel to meet or discuss the shooting
incident with either Puerto Rico National Guard or Special Forces
Group personnel.
On 7/29/2002, a private meeting was held between
I During that meeting a
STIJ I
1
L SAJ
land Major
discussion ensued regarairig the use of 11
ball type
11 ammunition and
the events of 7/26/2002. A subsequent meeting was held which
also included Col. CRUZ wherein the FBI’S use of the Shoot House
was discussed,
The details of those metinqs are reflected in
the reports. of interview (FD-302s) of STI4
land SAl
I

5.

CONCLUSIONS/INSPECTORS OBSERVATIONS

The events at the Camp Santiago Shoot Rouse on
7/26/2002, which resulted in injury to SAl
Iwere the
result of an accident. No specific individual responsibility for
the acçiden can be attributed. The following decisions and
actions contributed to the accident:
The use of 10mm ‘b1 type° ammunition in a
(1)
Shoot House constructed of concrete results in an inherently high
risk situation for injury resulting from ricochet to any shooter
or bystander.
Use of this ammunition, or any other “ball typ&’
ammunition, is not presently authorized by either the Puerto Rico
National Guard or the Special Forces Group. Leadership of the
SWAT Team was aware of the risks of ricochet and took deliberate
actions to emphasize the importance of accurate shot placement in
the shooting traps and, when necessary, reportedly slowed the
pace of training to accommodate the skills of the shooters.
However, these precautions were not sufficient in this situation.
FBI SWAT Team Leadership did not fully
(2)
consider the risks associated with the use of “ball type
11
ammunition in the Shoot House when the training exercise and
evirøninent were developed. Although efforts were taken to
ensure shooters were pperly attired, shot placement emphasized
and shooter pace matched to skill level, there was little
21

Ib7C

 (Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATtON
Precedence:
To:

Inspection

From:

Date:

ROUTINE

Lnspection

Attn:

i

06/12/2003

Assistant Director
Lymie A. Hunt
I

Contact:I________________ Extension 1837
Approved By:
Drafted By:

Hunt Lyrine
Clemens Michael/

Ilrr

I

Case ID

fl:

Title:

ADMflTISTRATIVE INQUXR
SHOOTING INCIDENT
12/18/2002
DENVER DIVISION

Synopsis:

297-HQ-A1271466-D

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a

shooting incident that occurred on 12/18/2002, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
I SAl
I shot and killed a struggling
deer that had been struck by a venscie.
SIRG members_recommended
that no administrative action be taken against S4
gas a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Administrative: Reference Electronic Communication of Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA)I
Idated 12119/2002..
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

 ___________
___________
_____
____

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297-BQ-A1271466-D, 06/12/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

On 12/1.8/2002, at 11:20 a.m., SAsI
land
Iwere traveling on a highway in Colorado when
they approached a work van occupied by two males who had just
struck and injured a large mule deer buck.
The deer’s rear legs
were broken and it was struggling and thrashing onthe side of
the road.
The driver of the van advised the Agents that the deer
had run into the road in front of his vehicle and he struck the
deer causing damage to the front of his vehicle.
The driver had
unsuccessfully attented to contact law enforcement authorities.
While SAl
lattempted_to contact the Colorado
State Police via his radio, SAl
Idecided to euthanize the
deer due to the fact it was suffering and posed a potential
tht
other motorists if it managed to get into the roadway.
SA I
advised the individuals to return to their van, waited
until there were no other vehicles present and shot the deer in
the chest and head, killing the animal.

SAl
Isuccesseully contacted the State Police who
dispatched a trooper to handle the details of the incident.
On 05/08/2003, the SIRG mt to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the metina with the fol1oing voting
members of the $IRG in attendance:
Deputy
Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
eputy
Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Glenn Powell, Investigations
Division, Office of Inspector General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens,
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Robert K. Cromwell, Section Chief, Applicant Processing Section,
Adztlini8trative Serv-ices Division;. Jy C. Mannin, Section .Chief,
CD-6, Counte±intelligence Division; I
I Acting Section
Chief, Operational Support Sectivn, Criminal Investigative
T1nt (hif
Division;I
Operational Skills Unit,
Training Division; 5824
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel; SSAI
i Washington Field Office;
and SSA
I, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division.
The only non-voting member present was
I Management/Program Analyst, Inspection
UnitOff ice of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

I

2

 ______

a

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297-HQ-A1271466—D, 06/12/2003

Inspection

Obsarvations and Recommendations of the S.tRG

The SIR.G reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
obserratjong, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SAl

SIR.G members nanimous1y agreed that the actions of
Jwere justified and that no action should be taken

against him as a result of this shooting incident.

3

 _________.

a

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297-HQ-A1271466-D, 06/12/2003

Inspection

LEAD Cs):
Set Iead 1:
INSPECTION
AT WaSHINGTON. DC
Th nc administrative action be taken against
SA
as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

I

1
1
2.
1
1

1

3.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

I

Mr. Gebhardt
1 Rm. 7142
Mr. Wainstein, Rm. 7427
rs. Hunt, Ria. 7825
Mr. Clemens
1 Rm. 7837
Mr.
USDOJ
Ms.p
[USDOJ
Mr. Powell, OtG

Mr. Cromwell, Rxn. 6012
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
Mr.
I Rm. 5155
Mr.
1
Quantico
,
1
Mr.
buàntico
2.
Mr.
Rin. 7326
1
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr.
WFO
1
Mrs.]
Rzn. 7861
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

hc

-

-

-

-

]

4

 ________fired

______

PD-204 (Rev. 12-I.P5)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JuSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

I

Rqoxt of
Date:

tIP
12/2o/ou2

CaseIDN

297-HQ-A127128$-D

I

OMce

CHICAGO

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
DECEMBER 3, 2002
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
This shooting incident occurred on December 3, 2002 at the
residence of FBI SoeciJ. Agent (SA)I
I
I Berwyn, 11J3.nois. O. December 3,
2002, at approximately 11:50 pm, N
lwas awakened
by his spouse who was awakened by the barcing of their
doq.
The barking was followed by a loud Crashing noise.
I
ITrabbed his Bureau issued pistol and proceeded
- downstairs to
investigate the noise. Upon arrival at the
‘first landing o the staircase, SAl
Iheard another
loud noise.
SAl
Ishouted out, “FBI, ge your hands
up.”
He repeated the command si’or seven tintes.
Each
time the intruder, JOHN FLABIVE, replied, “NO way. You
gotta be kidding. No fuckin way.
11 When FLAHIVE failed
to comply with SAl
I coimvn’i nl tpok a step
towards the staircase on which S
lwas standing,
SA
one shot throuIa_FLARIVE’ s. torso.
When
FLAIVE fell to the floor, SAl
skecr .b.is spouse,
I
I to call 911. Both the Berwyn police and the EMS
arrived within two minutes of the telephone c1.
lthough he was initially expected to survive t1e
shooting, FLAIIIVE died at MacNeal Hospital on Friday,
tDeceml,er 6, 2002.
DETAIS:

I
Zhis doe

On 12/03/2002, at approximately 11:50 PM, SAl
d his spouse,l
I were sleeping in

unt cceatains neither recozsacndatians nor crjncj.usions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI
and is Zeaned to your aeoaey; it and its eoaatents are not to he diStXibutcd outside your aeriey.

I

 ted,

.

.

thplii the upstairs portion of t1eir residence
at I
I Berwyn, Illinois. I
was first
awaicened by the barking of their dog. The naricing was followed
by a loud banging noise downstairs. I
J awoke SN
who then heard a loud banging noise coming from the ground floor
of the residence.
-‘

SAl
Iretrieved his service weapon (Glock Model
22, .40 caliber pistol) and a flashlight, both of which were
always kept on top of the night stand and proceeded downstairs to
investigate. Unon ar4ving at the first of two landings of the
stairpase, SAl
Iheard another loud banging noise. SAl
I
Wh’s there?” S2I
tien saw an unknown
male entering his living room. SAl
Isaw a white male with
h1tr heir, wearing eyeglasses, and dressed in dark clothes.
SA
I also noticed the intruder was carrying a. knapsack.

I

b 7C

SAl
lidentified himself as an FBI Agent and
began to give a verbal command, “FBI, federal agent, I have a
gun.
Put your hands up.” The intruder reolied. “No way. You
gotta be kidding. No fucking way.” Sj
I repeated the
same command five or six more times. The intruder kept
repeating, “No way. You gotta be kidding. No fucking way.”

I

To prove that he actually possessed a handgun, SAl
took his flashlight and shone the light on his weapon.
Again, FLAHIVE failed to comply and repeated the statement, “No
way.
You gotta be kidding.”

I

I

en FLABIVE took a step towards the staircase on which
Iwas standing, SAl
rired a single shot to the
torso of PLAHIVB.
FLAHIVE feiJ. to tne floor on his stomach.
FLAHIVE then attempted to nipv hi lQft hand towards his
iaistband, at which time SM
Ipointed his weapon and
ylled out, “Let me see your hands.” This tit
PLAHIVE complied
Aith the conilnand.

SAl

SA I
I immediately aked his spouse,l
I to
call 911.
Within two minutes,.the Berwyn police arrived on the
:scene, with the EMS follow.ngclosely behind.
.±he intruder, px’eviously known to the BE1WYN PD ,
Commander on the scene, was identified aJ0HN 1?.. B’LAHIVS, white
male, date of birth 08/27/1964, FBI #492S57KA1.
FLAEIVE was
transportedtv1acNeal Hospital, Berwy*, Illinois, where lie
underwent surgery for his gunshot woun&
-

After the initial surgery, it was believed that FLMIIVE
would survive the shooting.
PLAHIVE underwent another surgery in
the evening of 12/04/2002.
On 12/05/2002, two additiOnal
surgeries were perf-omed as a result of fracturing of tha spleen.
2

lb 6
lb70

 .
On the afternoon of 12/06/2002, the BERWYN PD was notified that
FLAHIVE had died at the hospital. An autopsy report would not be
available from the Cook County Medical Examiner’s Office for
several weeks.
FBI Chicago was immediately notified of the shooting
and notifications were made to SAC THO4AS KNEIR. ASAC VTD
UTHBBRTSON, DC JAMES KRUPKOWSKI, SSAI
ZJERT Team
Leaden
I and the Media Coordinator
I 3L5)
CUTHBERTSON, CDC ICRTJPKOWSKI, and SSA I
Iproceeded to the
scene.

Evidence recovery was conducted jointly between he FBI
ERT and the BERWYN PD. A thorough search of SA I
hiving
room area failed tor produce the round which passed through
FLAHIVE
A fresh indentation was made
the hardwood floor in
the vicinity of where FLAHIVE had been shot. A painstaking check
signs
entry of the round into a nearby sofa produced
negative results.
It was speculated that the round may have
entered the large grill of a heater which was directly in line
with lhe traiectçry of the round.
Forcible entry into the rear
of SAl
Iresidence was evident. No weapon was recovered
from FLAHIVE.

zn

for

of

FLARIVE had a lengthy record containing previous
arrests (SEE ENCLOSURES): obstructing and resisting a police
officer, retail theft, disorderly conduct, controlled substance
possession, domestic battery. axt violation of a. protection
order.
Cotmuandenl
I of the BERWYN PD advised that
JOEN FLAHIVE and his brothers
known as “troublemakers for
many years.
The FLAHIVE family was well-known to the BERWYN PD
and the community for “many years of trouble.”,

were

After initially being declined by the Department of
Justice for representation, on 12/05/2002 SAt
Iwas granted
“Emergency Interim Legal Representation Authorized by the
Denartmeit of Justice” reqmrding the incident. On 12/06/2002, SA
I represented by[
L agreed to provide a
voluntary statement regarding the shooting incident to officials
of the BERWYN PD, the State Attornev’s_Office, and the FBI.
An
FD-927 was read and signed by 54
the interview.

Ipnior to

On 1713/2002, Assistant State
s Attorneyl________
t
Office of Professioial Sthdards, advised that
after reviewing
the shooting incidet, her office decided to decline prosecuton
I
L1sO saw no reason for BERWYN PD to retaiat custody of SAl
I
Iweapon. oh 12/14/2002, the BERWY PDjreleased the weapon
t0SAI
I
‘

1

.

The Inspection determined that the deadly force
utilized by SA
1
p was jusified and within the guidelines
3

—

 .

.

as set forth in the FBIs Deadly Force Policy. When the intruder
ignored commands to show his bands on at least six occasion, and
took a step towards where 3I
I standing, SAl
I felt
that the intruder posed an itmniiient danger of death or serious
physical injury to himself and/or his spouse.
Prior to firing the shot, SAl
lalso gave FLAH
ample verbal warnings to submit to his aucnoritP.
SAl_________
took the additional step of shining the flashlight on his weapon
when the intruder stated, tNo way. You gotta be kidding. No
tucking way.
At no time did the intruder exhibit compliance to
the commands.

I

The Inspection also determined that SAl
Ihad no
safe alternative to the use of deadly force since the intruder
made no effort to flee once he was caught in the burglary act.
In fact
1 the intruder tailed to expose his hands when commanded
to do so on say-era], occasions and took a step towards .where SA
Iwas standing.

-‘4

I

—I.

•

t

4

..‘—
-

 _______

S

PD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNITED STAT&S DEPARTMENT OF JIJSTICE

Bureau of

Federa

vtiptSon

Copyto

Report of:
Date:

IIP
12/05/2002

CaseJD#;

297-HQ—A1271466 SUB D

I

Offlce

NEWARK

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT;
DENVER DIVISION;
11/30/2002;
INSPECTION MATTERS
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIR?
•This inquiry was initiated subsequent to a shooting
incident which occurred in Colorado Springs, Colorado
during the night of 11/30/2002.
DETAILS:

I

At approximately 11:00PM on 11/30/2002, SAl
L EOD; 8/3/1997, Colorado Springs Resident Agency
(RA), Denver Division, was en route to his residerce from
the RA in his personally owned vehicle (POV). SA L

in the RA from approximately 9:00PM to 10:45PM. SA
I
was eastbound in the 4300 block of Austin Bluffs ParKway
and turned left (north) into the entry drive adjacent to a
gas station located in the Grocery Warehouse parking lot,
intent on buying gasoline for his POV.
While turning
saw a man and woman,
later identified ast
I apparently
bnd I
arguing and physically struggling with each other behind a
white Jeep Grand Cherokee. The vehicle was parked in a
position facing north into the oncoming traffic lane of
the parking lot e
ive. As he drove closer tothe
man and woman, S
lowered his driver’s side front
window in an attempt to determine the nature gf th
problem. At that timM the woman yelled toSAI
I “Help
me, hei.p met” SAl
Ithen stopped 1:4s car, got out and
walked t9Wd the man and woman. As SM
I approached,
the man grabbed the woman and fprcri her to the driver’ a
side of the vehicle, out of SA I
sight.
Thin onnea1. rontains neither reccenandations nor ccnousiens of the VBX, Xt is the pz’qpexty of the
JEX
en4 .s 1oort fr. your agencyj it an4 its contents are not to be distributed outsid, your
agency.

}b7C

I

 4

I

297—HQ—A1271466 SUB D

SAl
icontinued to approach the man and woman and
drew his persona.u.y owned, FBI approved Glock 27,.40 caliber
pistol from in his right front pants pocket, chambered a round
and held the pistol close to his side. The man then grabbed the
woman_a;ound the neck, apparently holding her between himself and
SAl
las a shield. SM
I told the man that he was an FBI
Agent and told the man and woman to calm down and tell him wha
was going on, at which time the man demanded proof of SAl_______
identity. SA[
Ithen showed the man his FBI credentials which
seemed to further agitate the man.
jremoved his cellular telephone from his left
side waistband and called 911. He told the dispatcher that he
was an FBI Agent and needed backu’
the Grocery Warehouse. As
he did so, the man advanced on SAl
lwhile still holding. the
woman as a shield and stated, “Shoot me, shoot me.” The man also
told SAl
Ithat he would not be able to shoot the man because
he was holding the woman as a shield. The man and woman advanced
close enough to SAl
Ithat he was forced to back away, hold his
pistol closer to his body and extend his left arm to keep them
away from him.
Witnesses reported seeing the man oull the woman toward
the Jeep at which time, according to P
1
J, the woman said,
“Help me. Don’t let him take me.” SAl
etumed his cellular
telephone to its holder and again advanced toward the man and
woman. Witnesses reported the man then put t wnan into the
Jeep through the driver’s side back door. SAl
lobserved that
the woman was either lying down on the back seat or was sitting
on the passenger side of the back seat, still pleading for help.
SAl
I then tried to stop the man from getting into the vehicle
and driving away, fearing that the wman as being kidnaped or
was the victim of a car jacking. SAl
IphysicaJ.ly engaged the
man while still holding his pistol, again in an attempt to keep
the man from kidnaping the woman.
In a_further attempt to keep 1b:C
the man from fleeing with the woman, SAl
I kicked the man in
the hip which caused the man to stumble into the side of the Jeep
but did not keep him from getting into the Jeep’s driver’s
position. Witnesses recalJ.ed that the man attempted to, or
actually, punched SAl
I before entering the Jeep.
-

SAl
Ithen attempted to stop the man from driving
away by struggling with the man and trying to keep the man from
putting the keys into the ignition. The man then drove forward
and SA I
I backed away to avoid being struck by the passing
vehici
2

 _____

297—HQ—A1271466 SUB D

.

As the Jeep drove away, SAl
bade the decision that
he would be unable to safely and effectively give chase in his
POV. SAl
Ithen made the decision to shoot the man in an
attempt to stop the man from fleeing with the woman, who SAL
believed was in imminent danger o arivous bodily harm or dea
as the victim of a kidnaping. SAl
I reported that at this
point he believed the woman was exhibiting fear and terror based
on th man’s actions.
From a range of between 10 and 25 yards,
SAl
laimed arid fired five rounds at the driver’s position
through the tinted rear window of the Jeep, throuah which he
could see the shape of the driver’s head. SAl
Iould clearly
see that the female victim was not in his line of fire.

b7C

The Jeep then stopped and the mç.n cot out of the
driver’s door and fell to the ground. SAl
I then received a
call on his cellular telephone from the 91). dispatcher. SN
I
told the dispatcher that shots had been fired, ç’ô ‘erson was hit
and he needed an ambulance at his location. SAl
I then gave
th 1phone to a bystander who talked to the 911 dispatcher as
SAl
ladministered first aid to the •injured man.
When officers
Department (CSPD) arrived
pistol to an officer at
a formal statement to a
member, on 12/2/2002 at

of the Colorado orirgs Police
I surrendered his
at the scene, S1i
the officer’s request. SAl
Iprovided
CSPD Detective, in the presence of a SIRT
the CSPD.

The CSPD initiated a 2nd Degree Kidnaping investigation
of this incident.
It should be noted that E
I has a
history of domestic violence—related arrests.
DETAILS OF THE EVENTS OF 11/30/2002 LEADING UP TO THE ABOVE—
DESCRIBED SHOQTING INCIDENT, AS DESCRIBED BY WITNESSES AND IN
POLICE REPORTS:

On the evening of 11/30/2002,1
1
land’
I
Iwere celebrating their 8th wedding anniversary in Colorado
Springs, Colorado. They ate dinner at an Outback Steakhouse
where they conswned approximately four beers.
They then went to
a pool hail and a strip club, consuming approximately one beer
each at these establishments,

I

.

At some point in the evening,I
1 andl
I
lengaged in an araument while riding in their white Jeep
Grand Cherokee whichi
Iwas driving. They stopped at a
Burger Icing restaurant located on Austin Bluffs ?arkway
approximately one—quarter of a mile west of the eventual shooting
scene in the Grocery Warehouse parking lot entry dr,veway.
3

b

6

 4

297—HQ-A1271466 SUB 0

.
I

‘got out of the vehicle to cal]. a friend to pick her up
because she decided she did not want to ride home with
After calling her friend,I
Ibegan walking away
from the Burger King. j
I4id not leave the area, but
instead followed behin]
I who was walking along Austin
Bluffs Parkway toward the Grocery Warehouse. While between the
Burger Kinc and he crocerv Warehouse, a number of witnesses
observedi
Iphysically fighting with each other
IanclI
along the roadway and. in the entry driveway where the shooting
incident evenlu.1u_took place. Additionally, a number of
witnesses sawl______ who was on foot, being chased by the Jeep.

I
I eventually ran from south to north across
Austin Bluffs Parkway andi
i cut her off in the Jeep,
stopping in the entry driveway to the Grocery Warehouse where
their physical confrontatiri continued. Some of the witnesses
passed I
landl
Iwbile they were fighting with each
other and were so concerned with what they oberved tat they
turned around, returning to wherp
landi
Iwere
located, to determine if
needed
assistance.
A
number of
j
these witnesses also observea the shooting incident as described
above.

4

 FD
0
4
4 (Rev. 124-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of favesttgation

Copy to:

Report af

lipi

Date:

11/12/2002

CasolDi:

297—HQ—A1270919D

Title;

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
ATLANTA DIVISION
OCTOBER 23, 2002

Ciertcr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

I

Offlce

TAMPA

This shooting incident occurred as Aaents of the Atlanta
Division attempted to arrest’
! aka, on an
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution CUFAP) warrant
oriairting in the Detroit Division.
In this regard,
I
I had been the subject of a felony complaint charging
turn in Kalamazoo, Michigan, for Assault with Intent to
Murder and Malicious Destruction of Persoral Property.
The Michigan State warrant charging I
I was issued on
09/25/2002.
On 10/02/2002, the Kalamazoo Prosecuting
Attorney requested the UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE for
the Western District of Michigan to isst’ nn flrhlawful
Flight to Avoid Prosecution Warrant forl
Thereafter, the Detroit Division under file numbç RRD-fl
93279, initiated an UFAP.nvestigation to locatel________
As the result of I
Icriminal conduct on 10//uo,
at the time of his attempted arrest by Atlanta Division
Agents, a criminal complaint was filed in the UNITED
PPTC9 fOURT, Northern District of Georgia,
D
STATES 1
charaipgl
L,ith Assault on a Federal Officer in that
I
Idid “attempt to kill an officer/employee of the
United States or any other agency of the United States
Government...”

I

Thie dOCUmOt contairie neither reconeendations nor cocluioas of the WBZ • Xt is the property of the WEX
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be ditribut*d outside year agency.

 _____

297—HQ—A1270919—D

DETAILS:
FBI Agepts

This shooting incident occurred on October 23, 2002, as
c1cin to the Atlanta Division Squad 7 attempted to

arrest I
I aka, who was the subject of a Detroit
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecutiqp (tTF’P) warrant. While
attempting to effect the arrest of I
I on October 23, 2002, at
approximately 11:00 a.m.,I
“raninied” a Bureau vehicle which
was positioned to blocki
lescape, which endangered the
lives of Agents nd. in turn, resulted in two Agents discharging
their weapons ati
Iwho was the operator of a stolen 2000
Chevrolet Tahoe.
Resultantly, i
I a passenger in
the Chevrolet Tahoe suffered
non-life threatening bullet wound
to his left shoulder. j
Imanaged to escape the arrest.

By way of background, on September 25, 2002, the
Kalamazoo, Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AF’PY. 1w piforcement
personnel (detectives) attempted to arresti
I aka, for
Burglary and Theft.
During that arrest,I
lattempted to “run
over”
two detectives with his vehicle and was not apprehended.
Resu1tnt1y, the City of Kalamazoo Prosecuting Attorney charged
I
I with two felonies, Assault with Intent to Commit Murder
and Malicious Destruction of Property.
By letter dated
October 2, 2002, the Kalamazoo prosecuting attorney requested the
United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of
Michigan to issue an Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution Warrant
forl
I Thereafter, the Detroit Division, under Detroit file
number 8A-DE-93279, conducted an UFAP investigation to locate
and arrest I
L Through a Detroit symboled source, a
telephone nwnbeç_of
residence in Atlanta, Georgia, was
developed where I
ossib1y was residing.

I
I

On October 22, 2002, At]anta_Division Squad 7 Acting
Supervisory Special Agent (A/SSA) I
I received a call in
the morning hours from SAl
I of the Detroit
Division.
S1
dvised A/SSAI
kf background information
concerning Detroit’s UFAP investigation and informed A/SSAI
I
that Squad 7 would be receiving a FedEx package, most probably
later that morning, containing an Electronic Communication (EC),
photographs of the fugitive, an arrest warrant and related
affidavit.
Subsequently, A/SSAI
Ireceived that FedEx package
later in the morning of October 22, 2002, and assigned the
inirce1-4r ir ihe aftrnnnrj hours of October 22, 2002, to SA
Iwas provided with all of the
J SAl
rft-1nnntary inrorlu4tion and the possibi1Lty, according to S.A
I thati
Icould be staying at an address located at
p Atlanta, Georgia.
2

 _______

297—HQ—A1270919—o

After receiving this information anä assignment,
‘determined that the address was the RIVERWOOD CLUB
APARTMENTS and discovered the telephone number which was_provided
hs +1 fl4+
land
Thereafter, SASI
rce was not listed.
I
Ialso assigned to Squad 7, conducted a
surveillance at the RIVERW000 CLUB APARTMENTS in the afternoon
hours of October 22, 2002, and located two vehicles, both with
b7C
Michigan plates. These vehicles were identified as a blue Ford
pickup and an Oldsmobile Delta 88. Also parked next to the two
vehicles with Michigan license plates was a 2000 Chevrolet Tahoe,
which displayed an Indiana State license plate. The vehicles were
parked near apartment C-3 of the RIVERWOOD CLUB APARTMENTS. An
NCIC check regarding the Indiana registration did not identify it
as being stolen.

S2l

1 and’
Attempts by SAsI
‘to enlist the
apartment manager to assist in the identification of the out-of—
state cars were not productive. The manager, after being shown
the picture of the UFAP subject, could not identify him as being
a resident of th Rnrtment complex. Notwithstanding, at the
I the manager of the apartment complex
request of SAl
provided the access code to operate an electronic gate to allow
Agents’ access into the apartment complex the next morning.

I

I

In the late afternoon hours of October 22, 2002, SA
Ireturned to the Atlanta office to coordinate a
surveillance for the next mçrnin t the J
I
location. At that time, SAl
lreqested te assistance ot
I Those Agents were
five other Agents to assist him and SAl
SAsI
I andl
I The Agents discussed the details
of the investigation, and decided to meet the next morning at a
PETRO service station at approximately 6:00 a.m. to assimilate a
briefing plan.
On October 23, 2002, at approximately 5:15 a.m., SA
checked the code for the electronic gate at the RIVERWOOD
CLUB APARTMENTS to ensure its operation and, thereafter, drove to
the PETRO service station for the briefing. All of the Agents
involved in the surveillance viewed photographs of the subject,
the arrest warrant and the affidavit for his arrest.
The layout
of the complex was discussed, and the particular apartment in
question, C3, was also highlighted.
Information regarding the
location, make and color of vehicles which displayed the Michigan
plates and the Chevrolet Tahoe with Indiana registration was also
discussed.

I

There were two scenarios discussed at this early
3

b7c

 297—HQ—A1270919—D

morning briefing at the PETRO service station. The first plan
called for the arrest of the subject in apartment 03.
The second
plan called for the subject, should he exit the apartment and get
into a vehicle, to be taken down as the vehicle stopped at the
electronic gate. The second plan, which was subsequently
imtilemented. resqited in the veh4cle occupied by SASI
I
I
I and I
I which waS parked on tne 4est
side of South Bolton Road, to act as a blocking vehicle when the
subjeot departed through the electronic gate exiting the
apartment comniex.. A sennri vhiçle. occuøied by SAs I
I
ndI
I was to be
puJ.i.ion DenJ.nQ tne suoject’s vehicle to block the subject’s
vehicle from te rear.__he Bureau vehicle operated by SAs
I
I andi
I was to be angled to the left side of
the subject
s vehicle to secur the operator’s side. The third
T
Bureau vehicle operated by SAsI
Iwas to position
land I
itself in an offset fashion to the right side and secure the
passenger side of the subject’s vehicle.

I

In the briefing session, the Agents discussed the
various scenarios, the closest trauma center, the use of body
armor, weapons, deadly force, and coimnunications as they had done
many times in the past regarding car stops, arrests, and tactical
operations.
In fact, during the shooting inquiry, Atlanta
Division’s Senior SWAT team leader described the law enforcement
and tactical abilities of the Agents assigned to Squad 7 as being
very high, and further stated the squad was involved in more
high-risk sitations than any other squad in the. Atlanta
Division.
SAl
I the Senior SWAT Team Leader, related
that Squad 7 Agents were frequently involved in situations where
they had to use police officer tactics, knowledge of fireams and
arrest techniaues,_and implementation of arrest plans.
SAl
I
described SAl
I who is presently the Assistant Team Leader
of Atlanta SWAT, as being xentiçna1ly well vered in taqtics
arid arrest situations.
SAl
lopined that SAl_________
abilities are such that SAl
Icould easily be the SenLor SWAT
team leader of the Atlanta Divijin Wirôvr SAl
Irelated
that at the request of theri—SSAI
(he provided
enhanced training to members of Squad 7 on October 28-29, 2000,
regarding entries and advanced shooting techniques; on
February 8, 2001, regarding the use of shields in making arrests,
and on July 10, 2001, regarding tactical operations involving car
stops.
After the Agents had a thorough briefing at the PETRO
service station, they drove to the apartment complex and assumed
1-hir’ ssiqped di*1s
1
As related, one vehicle, operated by SAs
I was located on the west side of South
I and I
4

!bc

o

 297—HQ—A1270919—D

Bolp Rôjd. A second vehicle, operated by SAs I
andi
L assumed a position near a mailbox pickup on the south
side o thp oarkirg lot. The third vehicle, operated by SAs
land
I assumed a position on the north side of the
apartment complex where they could observe persons entering and
exiting I
I

I

The surveillance began at approximately 6:30 a.m. on
October 23, 2002. At approximately :30 a.m., a pretext
teenhen 11
jiade tol____________ which was the apartment
of I
recqived to this pretext
I No answer
telephone call.
Thereafter, SAl
Irequesteçi that all of
the arrest team Agents depart the area whi.e SAl
I “checked a
few more leads.
rtraveled to
land’
’ At this time, SA
T
another location t I-I’s MAPLE CREEK APARTMENTS
. At the MAPLE
1
I photoaranh was ident
CREEK APAaTMENTS,I
tfied as being the
1
subject seen in the company o
I

b7C

Resultantly, the Agents resumed their original
oosition. At approximately lO55 a.m., a person matching
ldminticn s observed on the first/ground floor area
outside of I
I talking on a cell phone. The source who
I was requested to go to the
made contact witt aai
vicinity ofi
I was
land determine if, in fact,I
I The plan called for the
[iii]
staying witf1
source to remove his baseball cap if the man seen talking on the
cell phone closely resembled the UFAP subject.
The source entered the area and quickly removed his
baseball cap providing the signal that a person meeting the
UFAP’s description was at that location. Shortly thereafter, the
subject came out of the area and ya]-ked to the Chpvrolet Tahoe
and entered the operator’s side. I
Icame out behind
the subject and entered the_passenger seat. The Chevrolet Tahoe
with the UFAP driving and[
I as a passenger drove toward the
electronic exit gate. As the electronic gate slowly opened, the b6
Bureau vehicle which was parked across South Bolton Road
bic
activated its visor lights and “wig—wag” lights, and pulled up to b7D

‘A cooperating source approached SAl
I and SAl______________
while they were parked on the west side of Sozth Bolton Road. This somce informed the Agents
Iresided at the MAPLE CREEK APARTMENTS.
thai
While at the MAPLE CREEK APARTMENTS, SPI
Jeamed that the wanted
photograph ol
lclose1y resembled the person who was staying a4
Iwith
-

5

 297—HQ—A1270919--D

the front of the ChçvroIt Taoe in a blocking fashion.
SAsI
limmediately pulled their vehicle to
landi
the back of the Chevrolet Tahoe thus blocking its ability to back
up and/or_change directions. The third Bureau vehicle operated
by SAs I
land
Ipositioned their vehicle to the right
rear of the Chevrolet Tahoe. AJ.1 of the Agents on the arrest
team displayed FBI raid jackets and other FBI insignia clearly
identifying themselves as FBI. Commands were made by Agents for
the occupants of the Chevrolet Tahoe
2 to get out of the vehicle
with their hands up. When the occupants did not comply, attempts
were made 16 shatter the passenger window with the butt of
SAl
IM-4.
At this time, the vehicle started moving
forward, striking the Bureau vehicle that had been positioned as
a blocking vehicle to the frant of te Chevrolet Tahoe. A number
Ifall backward as if he had
of the Agents observed SAl
been shot or hit by the car o was attempting to get out of the
way.
Collaterally, SAl
Is feet were underneath the running
boards of the Chevrolet Tahoe and he had to quickly move out of
the way or jthe 1hae wopld have passed over his feet.
SAs I
I positioned on th, left side f the
I and I
vehicle, discharged their weapons
Jandi
. SASI
3
discharged their Glock model 22 .40 caliber oistols in an attempt
to stop the operator from endangering SAl
land/or other
Agents at the scene. The Agents were hampered by the Chevrolet
Tahoe’s heavily—tinted windows and their inability to see within
the vehicle. After the Chevrolet Tahoe rammed the Bureau
vehicle, it was successful in pushing the Bureau vehicle out of
jto
the way approximately 35 feet backwards, thus allowing[
flee the scene.
Thereafter, the Agents gave chae but they wer unable
Iwas
to apprehendl
I A short time later,’
discovered at a AMOCO service st?
’’ lôccj that one-half mile
4
Ihad a gunshot wound to
from the scene of this incident.’
his left shoulder apd was conveyed to the trauma unit at GRADY
HOSPITAL. I
Ias treated for a gunshot to the left shoulder
and released the same day.
The ATLAMTA POLICE DEPARTMENT (APD) was conducting a
homicide investigation nearby and immediately responded to this

The windows of the Chevrolet Tahoe were darkly tinted making it very c1icult to see
2
within the vehicle.

I

‘.S4I

Iii scharged his Giock Model 22.40 caliber pistol six times, SA

Ifred one shot from his Olock Model 22.40 caliber pistoL
6

b6

ib6

bc

 297—HQ—A1270919—D

incident. The APD completed a number af fnvtigative reports
which i
ncluded interviewing passenger I
1
lat GRADY HOSPITAL.
I
I was also interviewed on the same date by Atlanta Division
Agents.
In b h statements,I
lindicated he was unaware
who he described a relative, was wanted.
n cated that when the FBI attempted to stop him and his
Cousin, I
Ithe FBI Agents identified themselves as FBI
Agents, had weapons drawn anç demanded tie doors be unlocked, and
that bo#h he and his cousin,
raise their hands.
Irelated that as Agents attempted to break out the window
I
ot the vehicle, his cousin looked hii “strangely in the eye” and
put the Tahoe in reverse, then went forward, and rammed the FBI

vehicle.

I

I

Another witness_interviewed by the APD was I
RIVERWOOD CLUB APARTMENTS, 1
INorthwest. I
Iprovided similar information
as I
I had indicated, describing the blocking attempts by the
FBI vehicle, the fact the FBI Agents had FBI “vests” çn_ 9d that
there was absolutely no doubt that they were “feds.” I
I
related the Agents attempted to open the doors, attempted to
break out the window, arid thep the Chevrolet Tahoe rammed the
vehicle in front of it. I
lindicated the Agents had to jump
out of the way, and he believed that_possibly an Agent may have
been hit by the Chevrolet Tahoe. I
jadvised there was no doubt
in his mind that the FBI Agents were in danger.

I who resides ml

The crime scene was processed by the Atlanta Division’s
Emergency Response Team (ERT) in conjunction with APD personnel.
The Atlanta ERT also took photographs and prepared a sketch of
the shooting scene.
The Investigative and Prosecutive Graphics
Unit prepared diagrams of the shooting scene and worked in
conjunction with the Firearms and Toolmarks Unit which undertook
a bailisticfprojectcrv analysis. The weapon discharged by
SAs
Iwill be examined by the Laboratory
landi
Division, Firearms Unit.
4 It should be noted that during the

The Bureau issued weapons of SAL
I andvere never examined by
the SIRT. After this shooting, the weapons were immediately provided to SAl
I
1 an. Atlanta Division Firearms Jnstmctor. SM
I cleared the weapons
and counted the rounds remainins in çach magazine which bad been. contained in the weapons at
the lime of this shooting. In SAL......Jnagazine there remained 10 rounds of ammunition;
in SAl
Iweapon there were 13 rounds f anummition. At the scene, APD Detective
I
Lollected six .40 caliber casings and one .380 cal&ber casing. The weapons,
magazines, live ammunition and casings were then packaged and submitted. into the Atlanta
7

1

b7c

 297—HQ—A1270919—D

I

ballistics/projectory analysis an ‘air gun” (pellet) .24 caliber
Powerline/Airstrike weapon was foupd in the 2000 Chevrolet Tahoe
(see attaflmntst. None of the aents nvo1ved in the attempted
arrest pf I
Ireported seeingl
br his passenger,
in possession of any weapon.

DivisIon’s Evidence Contol Rooms
8

I

 PD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

.
UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of luvestigation

Copylo

Ilepozt oe

lip I
10/23/2002

case ID #

297 -EQ-A1271285-D

riu

I

Offlc.

Chicago

SHOOTINGi INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
MAY 9, 2002
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Syno

This shooting incident occurred on Octçber 9. 2002. during
the execution of an arrest warrant forl
I
FBI Special Agents (SAc) and Federally Deputized Task
Force Officers (TFOs) assigned to the CHICAGO DIVISION
JOINT TASK FORCE ON GANGS participated in this arrest.
In
addition, a uniformed CHICAGO POLICE officer was also
involved in the cmeration. At atIDroxilrtatelv 12;30 a.m. on
October 9, 2002,
STATES on behalf of the iUj.A1j UXU OP iv
The purpose of this call was to confirtnl
(FBI).
I
loeaeion in a third floor apartment located ati
I Chicago, Illinois. This information was
relayed to members of the arrest entry bean already
positioned in the hallway ou-id oI
Iapartment.
b7
After receiving confirmationi
Iwas located within the 7D
anart-nwne
re* entry team members, includira A
1
I TFOI
Ii
I. TFO I
land uniformed CHICAGO POLICE
Officer
door and
) knocked OflL the açartment
announced their_identities. After I
Icid not answer
the door, TFOI
jegan striking the door with a
sledgehammer in attempt to open the door. Afteri_______
struck the door approximately six to eight times, seyeral
shots were fire. )-hrrwgh the door from within the
apartment. TFO I
I was stxuk in the index finger of
his left ha. Aest team members returned fire and
-

removed TFOI
If rota the path of the bullets emanating
from the apartment doorway. At this point in time, the
firing ceased. SAl
I situated on the perimeter

This document contsins neither recoaamendations nor conclusions of the FBX. It is the property of the FBI
and is Leanad to your agency; it and its contents are not to he diatrlhuted ontsid.e your agency.

 .

0
297 -HQ-A12 71285 -D

outside the apartment building, observed several weapons,
including a tech 9 semi-automatic m4dhifle isto1 and a .9
millieter RUGER, being thrown from I
brovided this information to members at the arrest entry
team within the artme4t building. Cozanunication was
established withj
Iwho elected to surrender.

Iaparent window.

I

SA

lb 6
Sb] C

DETAILSi

bias

forl

On 05/07/2002, an arrest warrant
issued by UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE I7UDGE MICHAEL T. MASON,.
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IlLINOIS (NDI). The warrant was issued
after the filing
Iwith violations
a. complaint charging I
of Title 21, United States Code (USC), Section 846, that
Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Siibstane.

of

is

of

I

During the evening of 10/08/2002, members
the JTFG,
including Chicago Division Special Agents and. Task Force Officers
from the CHICAGO PODICK DEPARTMENT were conducting urveillnce
activiieg in an attempt to locate and to apprehendi
I
un or aroun4 the HuViboldt Park area on the west side of
Crilcago.
A vehicid
Iwas believed to have been utilizing,
ho

lb 7 C
lb 7!)

An arrest plan was formulated and all JTFC members partic1pat.ng
dti ]Led verbal briefing given
in the arrest were provided ri th
by the arrest team leader SAl
I SAl
I
r3igqpm4ated information with. the arrest team members concerning
I
Ibackground and also info
rnatinn cnnçerning the location
1
1 Specifically, SAl
of th arrest
unformed eyervone
about I
I criminal history includipa the fact that I
had
numerous drug and weapons arrests.__SN
lalso advised
that he had reason to believe than
was involved in a drug
related_kidnaçing wherein the victim was tortured. Consequently,
SAl
I should be considered
I told everyone that I
armed and dangerous. SAl
lalso provided everyone on the
arrest team with information conee-rming the description of the
-

2

 ..
297-EQ-A1271285-D

Iwas now
apartment building and the actual apartment where I
pobtained this information from sketches
resijng.__SAl
thati
helped prepare and a discrete survey conducted by FBI
SAs of the apartment building. The sketches were circulated
among arrest team members and included such details as the
I apatmnt dooopexied and the specific location
directionl
lalso ave everyone the
of the door knob.
SAl
description of the clothing that1
Iwas wearing earlier in
I SA 1
the day when he was with I
1 also contacted
his Supervisor, SSAI
I to brief him on the
situatiçn and provide him with details of the arrest plan. SSA
I
I subsequently concurred in the execution of the arrest
plan. This inquiry determined that every one of the rrest team
members were told and understood the plan and their specific
assignment.

I

I

1•i

Iwas located witkin eheijrd floor apartment building as
previously described bl
I This information was relayed to
members of the arrest eIltrv team aLready positioned in the
then led the arrest entry team
apartment building. S?i
I apartment.
down a long ha11tv tnward
In addition to the
were
team leader, SN
people
included on
four
other
I
the entry arresiz tam. me fqur other individuals were
I TFOL
I and uniformed C?D Of ficexi
I
J TF(I
1 dqor, entry arrest team members
Just prior to knocking oti
were all placed behind SN_
I, to the right of the dooi,
The layout of the apartment 1uiiding did not allow for any arrest
team members to be to the left of the entry door. The entry
arrest team members then began loudly knocking on the door and
they shouted out their identities. Specifically, the SAs and CPD
n
Th door did
TFOs identified themselves as “PBI and
not open and just as according to the plan, TFO(
Ibegan
striking the door with a sledgehammer within seconds after the
entry arrest team members identified themselves. As TFOJ
I
was striking the door other arrest team members continued to yea.].
out “Police.” TIe door was very sturdy and continued to hold
after TFOL
Istruck it approximately six to eight times. At
this point, numerous shots were fired from inside the apartment
and through the doqr tht rni
“ striking with the
I and I
I as we
sledgehamaer.__SAs I
ifornied CPD
Off jeer
1
limmediately returned fire. TFO
yelled that
an cff{r was hit and down. The officer was 1ate- identified as
OI
I The exchange of gunfire ended within seconds. Entry
arrest team tembers ôontinuèd to yell “Police” and
jreplied
3

}L

 _____

_____

_____

H.

.

.
297—HQ-A1271285-D

to the effect, “I want to give up.” During the entire exchange
‘ entry door was never opened.
of gpnf ire, the
The
I to open the apartment
entry arrest team memheL.118tXUCted I
to open the door; however,
door and come out.
result of being struck earlier
jatmued
”
the door was 1
SA
ntly used the
with the sledgehammer
az
sledgehammer to
opened the door and
was arrested without further mci cut. A o inside the aDartmPnt
and taken into custody was a woman identified as

70

-‘
Iwas itmaëdiately taken to the
TFOI
to
have his gunshot wound treated. Specificaily, ‘rpo
treated for a shattered index, finger on hi left hand.
0
iwas released later that day.
I

I

I

After being advised of and waiving his Miranda Rights,
as interviewed by CHICAGO DIVISION SAs and CPD
Detectives. i
p claimed he thought his apartment was being
aware law enforcement
broken into by home jn’craders and wa
officers were outside his door. I
Istated that he began to
shoot into the hallway of the apartment building in response to
what he thought was a borne invasion- Non-law enforcement
witnesses, specificallys other apartment building residents,
provided statements’ that they heard arrest team members amzounce
law enforcement officers prior to shots being fired
1
thew

from I

I

apartment.

it is the conclusion of the inspector that the use of
‘P3 I n94
deadly force was withifl the Deadly Force Polic
danger element of the policy requires that SASI’
and
Irnust have had knowledge of facts and circumstances that
wOU.Lcl nave caused a reasonable officer to conclude, amid the 1
ry
rapidly evolving secUeX1ce of events at the scene, that
either a) possessed a weapon under circumstances indicating an
intention to use it against the Agents or others, or b) was armed
and running to gain the tactical advantage of cover.
-

I

Icas

imminent

nent

danger element, the !
As to the
TFOs
were fired upon during their attempted arrest of I
after
identifying themselves as law enforcement officers. The SAs and
TFOs repeatedly shouted out their identities and, in addition, a
uniformed CPD officer was present on the entry arrest team. As
ector cannot think of any other
9
was in the this case, the In
instance that satisfieS the “imminent danger” element of the
Deadly Force Policy than to be fired upon by a subject and have
an officer hit and go down as a result of the subject’s gunfire
directed at the rrestiflg law enforcement officers.
4

k 6

b’ic

 .

.

1•

297-RQ-A1271285-D

I

It is also reasonable to conclude that the ITabsence of
1ri’1 element of the Deadly Force Policy is also
4
a safe a]t-1,satisfied. I
Irepeatedly fired shots at arresting officers,
one officer was struck by this gunf ire, and other law enforcement
n-rI covetj
(ivm these
officers were not in a noiton
circumstac CI
I SAL
I TFO I
hnd uniformed
CPD Officerl
lacted in an appropriate manner in attempt to
neutralize the threat, specifically, the gunshots being fired by

b6
!b7

I

The Inspector finds that the attempted arrest of I
was a spontaneous event that did not allow for the preparation of
a standard written operations order. The Inspector also finds
that adequate verbal briefings with all participants were
properly conducted. In addition, the supervisor of the Task
Force, SSAI
I was provided a detailed briefing of the
operations plan telephonically and he subsequently approved the
operations plan. The operations plan included such details as
the potential armed and dangerous nature of the subs ect and also
included detailed drawings and sketches of the location of the
arrest.
In addition, the entry arrest team leader ensured that
every member of the arrest team knew their specific role in the
arrest. The team leader also ensured that all individuals in the
arrest were wearing appropriate body armor. Lastly, adequate
personnel were included in the operations plan to include five
law enforcement officers on the entry arrest team as well as an
additional four law enforcement officers to cover the perimeter
of the apartment building. The fluid nature of this type of
investigation coupled with the need to quickly act on the
information received precluded the formalized recording of the
operations plan.

5

I

  

 

 

FBI
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

2002

 

 

FD-204 (Rev. 24-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Reporrot

inapectorT

Case!D#:

297—HQ-A1271292-SIJB D

Th1e

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CLEVELAND DIVISION
DECEMBER 23, 2002

I

omce

FBIHQ, INS])

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

DARNELL LTPR.I
in this report, j
2a,2002. by FBI Cieve1rid Djv-jsjon hnwr-. I
.

I
I

I

Mjy
I

In

FBI 1Iew York Division uubrmnt1vI

I

I

IaNewYork
investigation.
Although thel
resided
in Cleveland, Ohio, neither ottice was aware of Ihis
activity qn Decmber 22-23. 02, in Cleve)and. Ohio.
until the I
I cçntacted SAl
I
FBI New YorJ Division
0 on December 22, 2002.
The
I was not in the 4on1nny of the subjects
Inor were the
subjects targets of any FBI investigation.

The occupants of the green 1994 GMC Jimmy truck
referenced in this report were positioned finid th
vehicle on December 23, 2004k as follows: I
1 DARNEL
dxiver
L LESTER, front seat passenger; and I
0
I rear seat passenger.
This shooting iicident occurred on December 23, 2002,
at approximately 02:00 a.m. as Special Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Cleveland Division
(CV), in their capacity as members of the Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) Team, attempted to execute a felony car
stop of a green 1994 GMC Jimmy truck (hereafter referred
to as subject vehicle).
The SWAT TEAM members believed
the subject vehicle was being driven by individuals who
This docun.nt contains n.ither recomaendations nor conclusions of the sal. It is th
pxopert’ of the WDZ
and is loausd to sour ag.nc; it and its contents ar not to be distributed outside your
a.ncr.

1
L.

--

-

b6
7C
bID

 __________________land

297-HQ-A1271292-StTE D

kidnaped_____________________________ and who were
threatening to hal
L.f the ransom was not delivered
in a short period of time to a Rally’s restaurant at 81st
and Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. When SWAT Team
observed the subject vehicle in the parking lot of Rally’ s
restaurant and attempted to block its exit from four
sides, the driver of the subject vehicle began to flee the
parking lot by crashing into several of the SWAT vehicles.
In an. effort to now stop the fleeing subject vehicle, a
SWAT vehicle collided with the subieçt vehicle; at which
tiTp
Team member SAl
lexited the vehicle.
SAl
koticed the subject vehicle jockeying around
attempting to flee and then noticed it lurch directly
toward him at an increased speed. SAl
I approximately
five feet from the oncoming vehicle and moving backwards,
fired two shots at the driver of the subject vehicle and
oberved it rnntniip
him out onto East 81st street.
SAl
L a SWAT ‘çeam member aring a SWAT
veñicie occnrnied by team members
I
I observed the subject escaping and
anticipated a chase; however, the subject vehicle crashed
to a stop between a fence and a telephone pole on East
81st Street. The rear driver’s door of the subject vehicle
opened; at which time, a passenger stuck his hand out of
the door holding a handgun and fired several çoimds in tjie
0 of the SW.T vehic ocipied by
Mit4
SAsI
I
I
I and I
I SA
I responded by firing one
shot from his MP-5 through the windshield of the SWAT
vehicle he occupied, at the subject who fired from the
rear seat of the subject vehicle. The subject then moved
from the rear driver’s side to the rear passenger side of
the subject vehicle. Several SWAT team members approached
the subject vehicle, while shouting commands to the
occupants to put their hands up and surrender.. The rear
seat passenger raised his hands but was not holding the
weapon he fired. He exited the subject vehicle, was
restrained, and placed under arrest. The driver of the
subject vehicle was then. extracted from the vehicle,
restrained, and placed under arrest. The driver appeared
to have sustained injury to one hand and his
Tjie
driver was asked for the location of DARNELLI
_I.
The driver advised that DARNBLL was the frontseat
passenger. The suspect who was the rear passenger then
confirmed the front seat passenger was DARNELL. One of
the SWAT team members approached DARNELL, who appeared to
have been shot, lifted DARNELL’s shirt, and noticed he had
been shot in the torso. The SWAT Team member attempted
first aid but PARNEIiL appeared to have died within a few
minutes.
Emergency Medical System personnel arrived on
the scene in approximately 10-15 minutes and confirmed the
passenger, DARNEM IJESTER had expired.

]b7C

b6

DETAThS

b7C

On December 22. 2003. htwt 9:00 pm and 9:20 pm,
Special Agent (SJ1I
FBI, New York Division,
telephone number I
wa telephonically
contacted byl
I DARNELL LESTER from
telephone aumber
I During the calls, LESTER
2

 ___________________________IFB]_CleveLand

________

297-KQ-A1271292-sUB D
seemed frightened, andl
Ibe1iypd TT h hn
kidnaped during ani
I At
one point, LESTER stated “Get the stuff together, the mans
are here.”
LESTER indicated he was being held against his
will by five or six armed men in a house in 1ere1IrH•R
Ohio, (not his house on Cedar)
LPSP toldl
Ito
call a male at telephone nurnbe4
Ito rectify the

situation.

At approximately 9:42 pm, siJ
I spoke to SA
‘V, Duty Agent in the CV Terrorism Command
Post.
BA]
subscriber information for
-‘

telephone nuinberl
land initiated liaison with
Versorrelese
I determined that telephone
numberl
Iwas a pre-pay cellular telephone,
with no subscriber listed (reseller).
-

At approximately 9:58 pm, SuprvisQry Spçcial Agent
(SSA) I
J spoke to BA I
I SSAI
I thi
called SAl
a telephone number I
I BA
I
Irelayed t e informatipn f rpm his previous
conversation with LESTER. BRAI
I advised I
lhat
telephone number I
‘was the cellular telephone
number of FBI CI.eveland Field Office SAl
I who
I
1LESTR in the raet. After learnine thiq.,
SAl
Ih14e’,riI
I
to
I
I SSAI
IcaUed SAl
hnd
instructed him to contact CV Technically Trained_Aets
(TTAs) to get cellular tracking equipment. SSAI
lalso
instructed SAl
1o obtp4r rl tower information to
help tracking ettorts. s74
Idetermined the cell. phone
was “hitting” off a tower at East 105th and Carnegie
streets, Cleve1i, flhic
I
contajted
I TAs(
?ndl
land
LTere en route. SSAI
Icontacted Assis an
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) JOIThT G. KAVANAGR who
immediately proceeded to the FBI Cleveland Field Office.
ASAC KA.VANAGH subsequently notified Special, Agent in
Charge (SAC) GERALD L. MACK and kept him apprized
throughout the investigation.

JD7C

At approximately 10:30 pm, IJESTR 1ldI
I
from cellular telephone number I
I LESTER
stated “the dudes” (suspected kidnappers) would be at East
83rd and Euclid driving
-p 4-door Jimmy in 15 minutes
m
(to collect ransom).
I piet .AI
sjil
un the FBI

Cleveland basement. SASL
IrnI
arrived in the basement.
SSAI
lconsidereç n Rrnergency
car stop of the unknowzi eiihierl-e’ Jimmy.
SAL
received a call from sit
Inotifying sAl
—Ithat
LESTER would not be in the Jimmy. ASAC KAVANAGH was
briefed, and SWAT discussed.

I

At approximately 10:48 pm, SA, at SSAI
request, called SAl
land instructed him to call
i

3

A

I

uomman

b7C
7D

 _____

297-HQ-A1271292-STJB D
Post (CP) was then established at FBI Cleveland Emergency
Operations Center (EOC),
At approximately 10:52 pjn. SAl
icl1ed LESTER
at cellular telephone number I
I SA I
told LESTER we need one and one-half hours to get it
(ransom) tocethçr.
LESTER stated “you’ll have to tel].
him.” I
irepeated the information to an unknown
male who then hung uc. Assistant United tates Attorney
(AUSA)I
i,ias briefed. AUSAI
I

advised SEAl
Ithat if a house was located, exigent
circumstances e,dsted to make a warrant less entry. ASAC
ICAVANAGH arrived at the EOC and was briefed.
SAC MACK was
briefed by ASAC KAVANAGH.
At approximately 11:11 pm, sI
I
cv spejai Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team Leader (TL>
initiated a call out by pager to the CV SWAT Team members.
At approximately 11:47 pm, TTAsI
landi
I
departed to initiate tracking the signal from the cellular
telephone used by LESTER.
SSA I
I and AS4C KAVANAGH hriefri Tj.1
Assistant Team Leadel
lat CP.

I and

At 11:20 pm
11:30 pm, Lieutenant (LT)I
L)eveland Police Department (CPD), Detective
CPD Hostage tTegotiator) were contacted.
LTI
arrived at the FBI Conmiand Post at 12:20 am.
-

I

I

I

Between approximately 12:15 am aid 12:50 am, on
Tuesday, December 23, 2003, S2’I
met with the 14 SWAT
operatàrs who rallied at the FBI Cleveland Field Office
headquarters building and briefed them on the situation.
He briefed the SWAT operators on the fa rived to
date and passed around a photograph of I
I jed on
his experience and information at hand, SN
dvised
the SWAT operation could take place at a buiing
location, possibly a resid— t- during a felony vehicle
stop, once the location of I
Iwas determined. The
SWAT operators geared up in their black SWAT uniforms., .45
caliber sidearms, ballistic vests, and some with HK MP 5
10mm long weapons or Colt M4 223 caliber long weapons.
The three SWAT operators, who had not yet arrived, were
told to meet their colleagues on the street at a

predesignated briefing location.

Prior to the SWAT Teams departure from the office,
the following group assignments were made by SAl_______
Vehicle 1) SWAT Van

-

j,andj

Vehicle 2) SWAT Tahoe

SWAT Team Leader)

1

,

I

I

SAsI
I
-

SAsI

4

I (2Issistant

land I

I

rj

 _______Iwith

297-HQ-A1271292-StYB D
vh-1

wz’r ‘rh,-

-

SAS

I

I

Vehicle 5) SWAT Tahoe
containing the SWAT operators
that did rict rnk th rff{ briqfina. AI
-

I

landi
The first four SWAT vehicles responded to the east
side of Clevelaid wherç the most recent electronic cell
phone data from I
Iwas being received. As the SWAT

vehicles deployed,_updated information was being relayed
to them by SSA I
indicating the felony vehicle stop
plan was the most likely scenario to occur.
The
rally/briefing point was a strip shopping mall near East
81st and Euclid Streets, on the east side of Cleveland.
At this point all of the SWAT vehicles were together
including #5, and a briefing was given by SAS I
land
the updated intelligence received.
At about 1:15 am, the SWAT operators wer
the subject vehicle (green Jimmy) was to meet

I

I

associates, (undercover (UC) FBI Agents from the FBI
Cleveland Field Office Drug Squad driving a black Denali
(SUV), at the parking lot of the Rally’s Restaurant.,
located at East 81st arjd Euclid Streets, to exchange
drugs/and/or money forl
lAtter a rqcennaissance

mision of the Rally’s parking lot by SAsI

I

andi
I it was determined that subj ect containment and
precision coordination of the five SWAT vehicles were
concerns, along with the fact this was to be
a felony vehicle stop/box-in situation in the parking lot.
The following plan was formulated and briefed to all
participants..

I

1) The SWAT Van, vehicle #1, was deployed to the
north side of çuc1i Street. behind the st*ip mail, (SAs
landl
I

2) The SWAT Tahoe,, vehicle #2, was deployed to near
the intersection of Carnec4e Street and st 81st Street,

Iandl

(SAaI

I

I

3) The SWAT Tahoe, vehicle #3, was to be eployed
east of Rally’s off of 82nd Street, however this vehicle
eventually moved forwa.rd to a location near Carnegie and
East 81st near vehicle #2,
arid

I

4) The SWAT Suburban, vehicle #4, was deployed off of
East 82nd and Euclid by the Kentuc]cv Fried Chicken
Rotaurant, (SASI
I and
I

[

p

5) The SWAT Tahoe, vehicle #5, was deployed near
Euclid aji East 81st Streets, (SAS I
I and

:5

1b7L

 297-RQ-A1271292-StJB D
6) The black Denali SUV driven by the UC FBI Agents
was to park in the Rally’s parking lot along East 81st
Street, prior to the subject vehicle arriving;
7) One SWAT Agent, s24
jras assigned a foot
post as the “eye”, across rom ne iêlly’s parking lot, on
the west side of East 81st Street, between Euclid Street
on the north and Carnegie Street on the south;
SAl
Itold the SWAT operators the plan was to box
in the subject vehicle and block all of its escape routes
in and around the Rally’s Restaurant. During the briefing
and deployment assignments, SAi
tated that SAl
told the operators that with one SWAT operator on foot and
with the potential of others going on foot during the
execution of the felony vehicle stops the use of a vehicle
as a weapon poses a great risk to those operators and a
vehicle can be considered a weapon if it starts moving
towards these operators cm
putting them in a life
and death situation. SAl
Istated that weather
conditions were rainy and misty during the evening. The
lighting was from the restaurant’s parking lot lights.
The lighting of the back parking lot where the meet was to
occur was limited.

I

TThI
‘advised that LESTER’s cellular telephone
was two to four miles northeast at a 45 degree angle from
the cellular tower at East 105th and Carnegie.
SWAT
deployed to the general vi
he cell towr. At
12:30 am, LESTER called SA
SAl
Iwas able
to stall for more i
our
y agreeing with LESTER’S
ass tlcp that SA
was in Akron, Ohio. When SA
lasked LESTER how much to bring, LESTER replied
“three.”

I
I

At 100 am, now l2/2/2flfl SAI
Icontacted SA
nd advised SA
he cellular trac]ser was
not working well and the TTAs needed more time.

At 1:07 am to 1:10 am, LESTER called SAl
Ifrom
telephone numbqrl
Ithen teleoione number
I LESTER told SAL
I
I meet at
Rally’s, East 81st and Euclid. SAl
Istalled for
mor-(m. LESTER couldn’t talk müh.
SAl
land
SEAl
Hiscussed the fact that based on tenor of the
calls, time was .running out. SWAT was sent to East 81st
and Euc1ii artake down plan was formuJated by
SSN
cere to go to Rally’s
landi
I
I
in the Yukon ]ena1i and when they siqhted LESTER in the
Jimmy, call for SWAT t’”
SAs F
landl
met SWAT to brief. TT
jbtained rnihsrhør
information for telephohe nwnr
It was a
Sprint cellular telephone, subsci’iDea tj nvi
I
L Cleveland, Ohio. SSAI_____
[
Ito tel]. LESTER to be in the car
1
“make sure we
.need to see his face.” Get vehicle description, and tell
him we’re in a black Denali.
-

At 1:42am, LESTER called Eu

If rom

cellular

h6
Ib7C

1

 297-HQ-A1271292-STJB D
telephone I
I SAl
Istated the
kidnapers were “all over LESTER” and that LESTER couldn’t
talk.
SAl
bould no longer obtain information or
stall LESTER’S kidnapers and described the situation as
desperate.
LESTER told SAl________
meet at Rally’s in
15-20 minutes.
As the events unfolded and it was determined that FBI
Cleveland Field Office was not able to successfully
triangulate LESTER’S cell phone, a new meeting/exchange
was set for the vicinity of the Rally’s on 81st and Euclid
It was determined that Cleveland SWAT would boxstreets.
in the subject vehicle at the meeting site, and once
arrests were made, they would attempt to determine the
whereabouts of LESTER from those arrested.
At 1:50 am, TTA
lobserved a Jimmy
I ani
at 90th and Euclid, east bound on Euclid.. Cellular
tracking equipment hit on LESTER’S cell phone in the area
just prior to this. SJ1
ladvised that within
minutes of their arrival at the cell_tower, he had
Iwho instructed him
received a telephone call from SSL
and his partner to meet up with the SWAT team in the
vicinity of East 81st and Euclid Ave. While en rnnt 1
the location, their machine hit on the signal of I
I
cell phone, which told them the subjects were within the
immediate area of East 81st and Euclid.
They immediately
put that information out over the air. As they headed
b6
toward the Rally’s restaurant, which was the designated
meet location, they believed they observed the green Jimmy C
b7D
in the area of 90th and Euclid Ave.

SAl
Ihad pladed the SWAT team vehicles, just as
the subject vehicle was observed and verified in the area
of the meet. SWAT vehicle *4 reported the subject vehicle
just passed their location. The SWAT operator on foot
reported the subject vehicle is in the parking lot backing
into a space against a brick wall. The UC FBI Denali STJV
reported the same information. ASAC KM?ANAGt allowed SA
I
Ito transition his team from yellow to green and
assume control. ASAC KAV Th,GH stted this decision was
based on the fact that SAl
Fiad “eyes on” the target,
and was in the best position geographically to control
both his team and the assault,.
SAl
gave the order for all SWAT units to
t
execute the felony vehicle stop plan previously discussed
by saying “GO, GO, GO” on the radio.
SWAT vehicle *1 moved in from the north through the
Rally’s “p±cJc-”-’ --ye-way” with its blue emergency lights
flashing.
SN
un vehicle #2, noticed the subject
vehicle was partially backed in,, with the rear bumper in
the position at which the front bump wr1,i have been had
the subject backed in conpletely. sil
bulled out and
into a “T-bone” position to the subject vehicle, stopping
just short of hitting it. The driver 1ork4 at SN
I
and then started to drive forward. 54
I accelerated
and rammed his Tahoe into the rear driver side door.
SA

7

 297-RQ-A1271292-8UB D

I

lexited vehicle #2 and noticed the subject vehicle
was facing him. The subject vehicle was jockeying around
trying to get out.
It lurched forward, Dicked up need,
and was turning and coming towards S1_
SAl
baw
a bright flash inside the vehicle. S]
nade eye
contact with the driver and fired one shot from his Colt
M4 .223 caliber carbine at thç driver as the vehicle was
coming towards him.
SN
Iwas approximately five feet
from the vehicle at that time. After SAL
If ired the
first shot he was moving backwards and to the side trying
to get out of the way of the vehicle. S1
1 fired
another shot immediately after the first shot.
AsI
I driver; I
I front passenger; and
rear passenger in vehicle five had the assignment
ot setting up a block or two away from the scene and act
to prevent the escape çf the subject vehicle should it
break free from the original contanment ares. After
turni’ng on to East 81st Street, SRI
‘saw the
subject vehicje was escaing the parkinq lot and turning
away from SRI
Ivehicle. SAl
Ihought a
vehicle chase was about to ensue; however, the subject’s
crashed between a fence
tilephone pole on East 81st
Street and stopped. SRI
Iobser%red the rear driver’s
side door of the subject vehicle open and the rear
passenger stick his hand. out of the oer door pointing a
handgun in their direction. SN
aw a muzzle flash
fmm t-h weapon and heard several rounds fired.
BA
I
tire& one shot from his H&K NP-S lOnun submachine
sun, through vehicle five’s front windshield, at the rear
passenger who fired front the subject vehicle.

1
I

The BAa on-scene were out of their vehicles, giving
loud verbal commands to the subjects “FBI, POLICE, HANDS
UP, DON’T MOVE”, over and over again. The subject in the
rear seat exited the GMC Jimmy while being covered by SR
‘ndcuffed the rear seat
I SR
subject. BAa
I took the subject away from
Iandk
the scene, conducted a high-risk search, and beqan to aqk
the subject questions regarding the location of I
ISA
ssisted by covering the front seat passenger. BA
lobseved the driver and froit passenger with their
hands up. According to SAl
I “the driver’s hand was
a bloody mess.” SM
Ivisually surmised_tat both
passengers had been shot. SRI
land SR
ul1ed the front seat driver threw the window of
the car, which was the most expedient manner to extract a
threat from a vehicle with a damaged door, and pronad him
out on the street.
Ihrd other Special Agents
SAL_
yell to call the EMS. i
Lecalled the subject on
the ground say to him that he had a bullet in his mouth.

sil
pproached the driver and isked him,
“Whe’e’s DARNIiL?”,l
I The driver
toldi
I that
was in tie tront passenger
seat. SRI
Idid not believe the passenger was
DARNEIjL because the passenger seemed to be muqhricr
than DANELL appeared in a photograph that SAl
saw
during one of the two briefings given by SAl________
S

b7D

 ___________land

297-HQ-A1271292-StYB D

I

However, the passenger in the rear seat of the Jimmy
confirmed that DARNELL wa in
the occupant in the
front passenger seat.
SAl
Isaid the sub:ject was
talking and at no time did they handcuff him, which was
prrilv lecause of the gun shot wound to subject’s hand.
I mnvtw’hed DARNELL, who appeared to have been
SAl
shot.
SAl
Ilifted DARNELL’S shirt and discovered
‘ ‘‘ared to be a bullet wound in DARNELL a torso.
SA
lattempted to administer first id, but DARNELI,
died within a few minutes.
SAl
I asked one of the
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) to determine if
DARNELL had died. The EMT confirmed DARNELL LESTER had

expired.

ASAC KAV.ANAGH, SSAI
land Lieutenant I
larrive
on the scene (81st Street next to the Rally’s parking
lot).

I

I

AAC KAVJNAGH was then briefed by SWAT Team Leader
lwho advised that as the ‘BI SWAT vehicles
approached the subjects’ vehicle with their “police
lights” the subjects attempted to escape arrest by
ramming their vehicle into the arresting SAs’ vehicles.
The subjects were able to break the containment in the_____
Rally’s parking lot and drove their vehicle toward SA I
I
I The rear passenger subject, later identified as
I also attempted to kill the
‘As by
hct’in at the arresting SA8.
SAl
I and SA
I in adherence with FBI Deadly Force Policy, fired
tteir weapons in self-defense at the subjects who posed an
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the
SAS and others.
ASAC KAVAAGH notifjed SAC GERALD L. MACK arid had the
FBI Evidence Repn Team (ERT) placed on stand-by.
SWAT
Coordinator SSRI
Iwas also notified and requested
to report to the FBI Cleveland Fie].d Of ice. EMT
personnel arrived on the scene and verified that LESTER
was deceased_and died of an apparent gunshot wound to his
chest. I
fras transported to the hospital while under
guard. I
I was also taken into custody. SAl________
reported from the_hospital that he seized two cellular
I A subsequent ilieck revealed Ithese
telephones fronil
were the two cellular telephones utilized during “ransom”
discussions with SA[
The crime scene was secured and taped off by
responding Cleveland uniformed police officers. The
Cleveland Police Department’s Homicide Unit led by
Cotumanderl
Iprocessed the i’n nci c-rl]e-cted
T ERT Supervisor SSAI
nr
all
land
SSAJ
larrived on scene anct were assigned as
liaison to assist the Cleveland Police Department’s
Homicide Unit.
Also responding to the crime sce
hat evenirg were
SAC MACK, ASAC GARY KLEIN. Actng CDC
Deputy Chief I
I Special Operations
Division, Cleveland Police Department (CPD).
9

7C

 297-HQ-A1271292-sUB D
At approximately 5:30am, FBI peçtnn1 rej-1wn ir
the FBI Cleveland Field Office.
SAsj
nd
met
with Cleveland Detectives at their office to provide a
sworn statement.
Involved FBI personnel were secured and pursuant to
FBI procedures, advised to report back to the office later
that afternoon to provide statements to FBIHQ, Inspection
Division personnel who were traveling to the FBI Cleveland
Field Office.
SSAI
Isubsequently prepared an affidavit and
arrest warrants wit1 th Tjnjted States Attorney’s Office,
charging
Jwith attempting to kill a
land I
Special Agent of the FBI in violation of Title 18, USC,
Section 1114 and 924(c) (1) (A).
SAl
i Principle Firearms Instructor,
SWAT Team Leader, Cleveland Division, provided the
Cleveland_flivion firearms training records for sAsi
andi________
The CV jCi -nj training records for SAl
I
indicated SAl
us a certified firearms instructor, a
SWAT Team member, and is qualified and authorized to carry
and provide instruction on the following weapons: Giock
model 27, .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol; Glock model
22, .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol; Springfield model
1911, .45 caliber semi-automatic pistoi; Remington mçdel
870 shotgun; H&K model MPS, 9mm automatic rifle; H&K model
MP5, 10mm automatic rifle; and Colt model M4., .223 semi
automatic carbine rifle. The records also indicated
qualification scores on all weapons were current.
The CV fi--m training records for SAl
I
indicated SA I
lie a certified firearms instructor, a
SWAT Team member, and is qualified and authorized, to carry
and provide instruction on the following weapons: Glock
model 22, .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol; Springfield
model 1911, .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol; Remington
model 870 shotgun; N&K model 4P5, 9mm automatic rifle; H&K
model MP5, .10mm automatic rifle; and colt model M4, .223
caliber semi-automatic carbine rifle. The records also
indicated qualification scores on all weapons were
current.
The Cleveland Plain Dealer newspaper printed three
articles related to the shooting death of DARNELL LESTER.
The first article was in the December 24, 2004 edition and
entitled, “FBI Informant killed in shootout after call for
help.”
The second article was in the December 25, 2004
edition and entitled, “Suspect in FBI shooting had been in
jajl.”
The third article was in the February 25, 2004
edition and entitled, “Trio charged with death of FBI
informant during shootout
*

The Cuyahoga County Coroner’s Office, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, listed in its “Coroner’s Verdict” the cause

10

tTC

I

 297-HQ-A1271292-s P
of DARNELL LESTER’S death as “a gunshot wound to the left
chest, during legal intervention, and in a homicidal
nature..” The Coroner’s Report listed the bullet recovered
from LESTER as a small caliber
1 long, jacketed bullet.
The report listed the course and direction of the bullet
recovered from LESTER as left to right, anterior to
posterior and horizontally. The bullet was marked by the
Coroner’ s Office with a “41 “ placed in an envelope and
given to the Coroner’s Office Property Department.

I
I

The CPD Forensic Laboratory performed ballistic test
fire comparisons on the following three weapons involved
in the shooting on December 23, 2003: Bryco handgun,
Jennings Nine model, serial number 1411563, 9mm caliber,
and obtained from the rear compartment of the subject
vehicle on December 23, 2003; H&K rifle, MP5 model, 10mm
serial number 68-929, and obtained from SA
scene December 23, 2003; Springfield handgun,
4’ 1i er, serial number CRG783,
and obtained from SA
ion scene December 23, 2003; Colt rifle, M-4 model,
“ ‘jliber, serial number W326503, and obtained from SA
bn scene December 23, 2003; Glock handgun, .40
caliber, serial number DFV981, and obtained from SN
on scene December 23, 2003.

I

CPD crime scene investigators recovered the following
spent shell casings on the night of December 23, 2.003:
three (3) .223 caliber Remington found in the southwest
driveway apron behind 8108 Euclid Avenue; one (1> Geco 9mm
Luger found in the Street adjacent to 2.023 Eat 81st; one
(.1) Winchester 9mm, and found in the Street adjacent to
2023 East 81st; and one (1) 10mm Auto, found on the frontright passenger area of FBI Cleveland_002 dark blue
Chevrolet Tahoe occupied by SA
n December 23,
2003.
The CPD Forensic Laboratory analysis of the shell
casings recovered from the crime scene on December 23,
2004, indicated the following:
(1)
The two 9mm casings were fired from the
Bryco handgun, Jennings Nine model, serial
number 1411563, 9mm caliber, and obtained from
the rear compartment of the subject vehicle
(2)
The one 10mm easing was fired from the H&K
rifle, MI’S model, 10mm calibçr. serial number
68-929, and obtained from SAl
I on scene
December 23, 2003
The three .223 caliber casings arid the
(3)
bullet recovered by the Coroner’s Office from
the corpse of LESTER, indicates the casings and
the bullet were fired from the Colt rifle, model
M-4, 223 caliber, serial #W326503,obtained from
SAl
Ion scene December 23, 2003.

11

b7

 ‘0213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTiGATION

r
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 03/21/2002

Inspection

From:

Attu:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Title:

onnor

]Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernar

Drafted By: I
Case ID :

Acting D Jo

Ilrr

\

297-HQ-A1270951-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SflOOTING INCIDENT
01/03/2002
BALTIMORE DIVISION

Eynopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (sIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occprred on 01/03/2002, involving Special
Agents (SAs) I
I and I
I Both Agents
fired their weapons during the execution of an arrest in order to
eliminate the threat of two Rottweiler dogs.
SIRG members
recommended tpat np administrative action be takea against
SAs I
I and
I as a result of their involvement in this
incident
Administrative:
SA

Reference Electronic Communication of
j, dated 01/22/2002.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 r

To:
Re:

Inspection From
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951--D, 03/21/2002
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 01/03/2002, sal
Ia member of the
Special Weapons and Tactj.cs (SWAT) Team, wa serving bench
warrants as paçl f
joint investigation with the Department of
Bducation.
SAl
iattended an Operations Plan briefing on
01/02/2002, when information was disseminated that both subjects,
as we].1 as others associated with them, were considered to be
Armed and Dangerous. The individuals were known to carry weapons
and had been charged with numerous robberies with weapons
involved.
The briefing included information that fifteen people
were present in the residence, as well as drugs and several
Rottweiler dogs, during a previous search and arrest.
On the morning cf the planned arrests, SAl
Iwas
assigned as the first member in line to clear the first floor and
basement area of the location. Upon the initial knock and
announce at the front door of the residence, a large Rottweiler
dog, acting in an aggressive manner, peered out the front window
of the residence. Upon entry into the residence, SAl______
proceeded do,,n a hail on the first floor to a bedroom locted at
the front of the house. Upon approaching the bedroom, SAL
was immediately confronted with two large Rottweiler dogs, who
were inside the bedroom. Both dogs moved in an aggressive and
violent manner toward SA
Jresulting in him firing two rounds
at each dog from his Springfield .45 caliber handgun. Both dogs
were struck and momentarily bit at each other. One dog fell to
the floor and appeared to be fatally injured while the second dog
fell to the floor and red to be injured but not
incapacitated. As SAl
lattempted to complete the clearing of
the bedroom, one dog continued biting at the ir ii his
direction.
Fearing the dog would attack, SAl
I fired a fifth
round believ
ing that he fatBly in:) ured the animal. Subsequent
1
to SA I
h shots; SAl
I fired two rounds from his 14-4
automatic rifle, killing both dogs.
On 02/12/2002, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Direptor
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaied the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRS in attendance:
Willie T. Hulon. Chief Insoector, Inspection Division, Office of
Inspections,
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, UStOJ;L
I, Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, criminal Division, USDOJ;
William R. Falls, Section chief, Operational Support Section,
Administrative Services Division; William Q. Doherty, Section
iif, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief, ODerational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; I
I Unit chief,
-

2

 2

*

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 03/21/2002

I

I

I

Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;
Unit
Chief, !nvestiaatve Law Unit, Office of ttie Generai Counsel;
lunit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
Analysis Section, Lab
?M-nrv fl i rw 9
0
I Washington
-

Field Office; and SSAI
Unit, Training Division.

I Practical 1pplications
•Nonvoting members present were
iPhoenix Division;
SSAL
‘Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;
SSA I
and I
1 Management/Program
Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Otice ot Inspections,
Inspection Division.

I

Observations and Reaomendations of the SIR.G.
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with the
intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training
and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
S( mhers_unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAsI
Iaxi1__Iias justified and in conformance with
the deadly force policy.

3

7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ-A1270951-o, 03/21/2002

LIAD Cs):
Set Lead 1
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASINGTOL D.C..

That nq administrative action be taken against
SN
laud SAl
I as a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.
4+

1
2

Mr. Gebhaxdt, Rm. 7142
Mr. Parkinson
_Rm. 7427
1
14s.I
(1
I 1m. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
1
Ms.I
I USDOJ
Mr.I
1
IUSDOJ
1
Mr. Hulon, Rtn. 7837
1
Mr. Cousins, Rm. 5155
1
Mr. Doherty, Rm. 4042
Mr. Falls, Rm. 6646
1
1
Mr.I
I Rm. 3787?
2
1
Mr
iQuantico
(1-vr.i
1
Mr.I
I Quantico
(Attention
Mr.I
I
1-Mr.I
iw’o
1
Mr.
rm. 7861
1
7861
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-

-

-

lb7C

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-

-

-

-

IRm.

4

 r
P0-204 (Rev. t2-I95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy La:

I

Report of
Data:

SSA
08/19/2002

CaseID#:

297-HQ-1271895-D
66F-PH-93364

I

Ofilee:

PHILADELPHIA

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT,
READING, PA.

PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
JULY 3, 20b2
Character

Synopsis

SHOOTING INQUIRY
This shooting incident involved a Special Agent
(SA) of the. FBI assigned to the Philadelphia Division,
Allentown Resident Agency. The incident occurred during
the successful arrest of a drug gang .subject by the FBI
led Reading Area Violent Crime Task Force (1AVCTF)
following a meeting with undercover aetectives. The
incident occurred on July 3, 2002, at approximately 3:40
p m., in the parking lot o the Fairgrounds Square Mall,
Reading, PA.
.

-

DETAILS:
This shoóting incident occurred during the
I a violent drug gang member for
arrest of I
whom the FBI had obtained a Federal Arrest Warrant
charging drug and weapons violations.
At the time of the shooting incident, the SAs
were working on the FBI led Reading Area Violent Crimes

Task Force (RAVCTF) and were assigned to the Allentown
Resident Agency (A) of the Philadelphia Divieion The
RAVCTF is coordinated by SAs of t AA and in addition to
the FBI, is staffed by SAs of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, as well as other county and local
law enforcement agencies. The primary mission of the
RAVCTP is the investigation of violent drug trafficking
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FUX • It is the property of
d is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to he distributed outside your agency.

the

FX

 _________

.

.
66F-PH-93364

1 PA., and the
organizations/gangs in the city of Reading
surrounding Burkes County area.
The City of Reading, PA., is located approximately SO
miles northwest of Philadelphia and 35 miles southwest of the
ARA.

The SAg involved in this shooting incident were acting
as members of the RAVCTF which had been investigating a violent
area. This
,
drug trafficking gang based in the Readixg,
investigation was being conducted as a Safe Streets/Gang case
under FBI fuel
I

!b7A

Investigation prior to the incident developed
I shot during the arrest, was
information that subjecti
believed to be a mid-level distributor for this gang who
supervised drug distribution houses and re-supplied them with
crack cocaine.
The drug gang being investigated was believed
responsible for several drug related shootings and homicides.
County and local authorities working with the RAVCTF had executed
several search warrants in connection with this investigation
where drugs, body armor and weapons had been recovered.
Ibegan
The aspect of the case involving I
in approximately March, 2002, when a female undercover detective
(UCD) from the Burke_County District Attorney’s Office_(BCDAO)
Ihad
land discussions ensued wherel
had contact withi
agreed to supply the UD with whatever drugs she wanted. The
BCDAO informed members of the RAVCTF of this development and that
I
Iwas known to be associated with the violent drug gang
under investigation.

ibE

land during a
The UCD in March, 2002, met witi1
consensuafly recorded meeting received from him one-eighth of an
ounce of powder cocaine with payment to be made at a later date.

b70

Following the initial transaction, a second meeting
between the UD anal
loccurred for the purpose of paying off
the drug debt, as well as receiving additional cocaine. This
transaction took place in the parking lot of the Fairgrounds
Square Mall. I
iprovided the UCD with one bundle of cocaine
consisting of 25 $10 bags and the UCD paid for the cocaine
received in March.
It was agreed that the UcD would payj
I
at a later date for this cocaine. During the cocaine
Idisplayed to the UGD a Eenii-automatic pistol
transaction, I
which he was carrying.
2

 ________

.1

.

.
66F-PH- 93364

I in
On Monday, July 1, 2002, the UCD again metl
the parking lot of the Fairgrounds Square Mall and paid off the
outstanding drug debt and at that time received two bundles of
crack cocaine, with eac bund containing 25 $10 bags. Though
the UCD did not observel
I weapon at this time, he did
mention that he used guns to solve his problems.
The RAVCTP decided to arrest’
‘on July 3, 2002,
during a meeting with the UCD where she would he paying for
cocaine previously received and also would be supplied with
additional cocaine.

b’7C

On July 3, 2002, Case Agent SAl___________________
obtaind a Federal Complaint and Warrant charging___________
I
Iwith violations of Title 21, Section 841(a ij (3 CoUn 8),
Distribution of Cocaine and Title 18, Section 924(c) (1) (A),
Possession of a Firearm During an Illegal Drug Transaction.

1 developed a plan to arrestl
SAl
lwhen he
meets with the UcD for the purpose of collecting an outstanding
drug debt and delivering more cocaine. sri
_Jeve1oped two
arrest scenarios, one of which called for I
I arrest when he
arrived at an apartment bii 1 di na in Kut ztown, ?A., and an
alternate scenario shouldi
Irefuse tç come tc? the apartment.
The alternate arrest scenario planned fort
larrest in the
parking lot of the Fairgrounds Square Mall, wtere he on several
occasions had met the UCO in the past and conducted drug deals.
[ocumented his arrest plans on FBI form PDSN
888, which was oresented to Senior Supervisory Resident Agent
(SSRA) I
I ARA, who in turn approved it and
sent it on to Philadelphia Headquarters City where ASAC Rosanne
Russo also approved the plan.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on July 3, 2002, an arrest
briefing was conducted by SAl
land Lieutenant (1st.)
J(BCDA) in the conference room of the Burks County District
I
Attorney’s Office. Approximately 15 members of the RAVCTP and
other of ficets .z1i t.rp1d be assisting in the arrest attended the
SAl
meeting.
handed out a copy of the FBI arrest plans
and he, along with Lt.I
egan briefing the officers. Most
of those in attendance were familiar with Sylvester Thomas,
having previously been involved in survei
uring the
earlier undercover drug transactions. S
Lt.I_____
during the briefing were assigning various aw en orcement
officers specific. tasks which included surveillance, arrest team
and perimeter responsibilities.

3

b

 ________land
__________

66F- PH- 93364

I which was also
During this briefing by S2I
attended by SAl
tof the ARA, the T3CD had been
1 that he did not want to meet at the Kutztown,
notified by I
PA. apartment complex, but would meet her in the Fairgrounds
Square Mall where they had met several_times in the past. During
L he indicated that he
the UCD’s phone conversation withi
had to be at the Burke County Prison by 4:00 p.m. for what Task
Force members believed to be visiting or putting money on the
prison accounts for members of the drug gang ho are currently
lagreed Co
incarcerated. Also during that conversation, I
supply four additional bundles of crack cocaine to the UCD.
Based on thq information supplied by the Uco, BA
iwent on to brief the arrt teaii on the
Lt.I
second scenario which called for the arrest of I
lat the time
of his meeting with the UCD in the Fairgrounds square Mall.
Itelephonically contacted
Also at this time, SAl
Muhlenberg Township police officers to request that they stand by
in the vicinity of the mall and provide outer perimeter security.

I

The briefing took approximately a half hour and BA
Istressed at tht time both the violent nature of the drug
gang and the fact thati
I had been observed with a weapon
during one of the drug deals and also had made a comment to the
UCO concerning him taking care of his problems with a firearm.
As the arrest team departed the District Attorney’s
Office en route to an iso1ated parking area of the Fairgrounds
I was assigned to be in the arrest van and
Square Mall, SAl
participate in the arrest acting as front cover for the team
which wçuld be in a blocking van and contained not only BA
I
I
I but five other 9ff icers. In addition to SAl
Off iced
Iwould assist with the front cover while
three other officers would make the actual arrest and the last
officer would act as the driver.
Iwas aesined to ride in the Command and
SAl
Ifrom the
nd Off iced
Control vehicle with Lt.I
Reading Police Department. The Command and Control vehicle was
located approximately 60-70 yards away in a slightly elevated
area of the parking lot, allowing for visual observation of the
entire area. SAl
Iwas keeping the surveillance log while Lt.
Jwas giving commands over the police radio and Officer
I was the vehicle driver and also operated the video
I

4

b6

 .
66F-PH-93364

I

recording equipment. The operation was conducted on the Reading
police radio frequency with an FBI radio channel used only to
monitor the transmitter which had been provided to the UCD by SA
1 along with a recording device.
At approximately 3:04 p. rn., the UCD accompanied by a
second female Uco arrived in their vehicle and parked in an open
area of the parking lot, Fairgrounds Square Mall, to await the
arrival of subject I
I
At approximately 3 40 p.m., subj eat
drove in to
the parking lot area in a Chrysler Sebring, b ac
or, with
an unknown female riding in the passenger seat.
parked
next to the UcD’s with his vehicle parked parallel next to the
UCD’s. Both the ucO’s_vehicle and’
I were pointed in the
same direction w±tl-i
idriver’s siçi nt to the UcD’s
passenger side. The female ridipa withi
js later
identified after the incident a
I
At approximately 3:41 p.m., Corporall
I
BCDAO, according to the arrest plan, drove an undercover riokun
truck into the parking lot and parked it directly behind I
I
vehicle with the pickup truck’s front bumper just a few feet away
from the rear bumper of subject’s vehicle. Corporall_________
then exited the pickup truck and walked towards the mall s
stores.
hh pickup truck had been parked blocking the rear
of subjectl
‘vehicle, Lt4
igave the command over the
police radio for the arrest van to move in and execute the
arrest.
SAL

I,

riding in the arrest van, was armed with

his FBI issued Colt M16A1, which had 1?een modified by the FBI to
only fire in semi-automatic mode. SAl
Icarried this weapon

because previous arrests and search warrants involving members of
this drug gang recovered and/or developed 1nFnrmMiyi that
members had access to ballistic vests.
I weapon was
loaded with 28 round of ammunition. He was also carrying his
FBI issued Browning, Model 88 semi-automatic pistol, which he
never drew from his holster. He was wearing an FBI issued
ballistic vest and a RAVCTF jacket with the words “POLICE”
displayed on the back and front and on the left front there was
an embroidered over-sized FBI badge.

At approximately 3:42 p.m., the arrest van pulled
direct) in frnt of Thomas’ vehicle with the arrest team exitiflg
v
1
and SA I
I exiting the passenger’s side front of the van,
5

i

 _______jcle

a.

66F-PH-.93364

1T )is Colt M1GA1 up to his shoulder and yelling commands
br
4
4

to
I to put his hands up. The UCO’ s vehiqle_Immediately
pulls away as the arrest van pulls in to block I
I vehicle.

Ivehicle from
As the arrest yan stopped to bloc1
the front and SAl
land the arrest team are exiting the
vehicle,I
Ivehicle immediately drives in reverse and
crashes into the undercover pickup truck, then accelerates
7C
forward towards SN
1
Asi
I drove directly towards SN________ who at
this point had no cover, SAl
If earing th.t he wa going to
lvehjcle
be run over, fired five shots £rom his rifle. I
veered off to the left, traveling approximately 25-30 yards and
then crashing into a large unoccupied delivery truck. The law
enforcement personnel on the scene then set up a crime scene
Iriotified Sergeant (Sgt.
perimeter and SA I
of the Muhlenberg Township Police Department who was partici
pating as a uniformed officer on perimeter security for this
arrest.
Sgt.I
I then notified Emergency Medical Services
(EMS) and reauested a Med-evac helicopter be on standby pursuant
to SAl
Irequest and then drove down to the site of the
shooting.
ed
Upon_arriving at the shooting scene, SA
Sgt.
which
rifle
M16A1
Colt
over to Sgt.
Ihis
the M16 by removing
secured in his vehicle. Sgt.
the clip which contained 22 live rounds and also removed 1 live
round from the chamber, for a total of 23 unexpended rounds
recovered.
The Med-evac helicopter was subsequently utilized to
transporti
Lrom the scene to the Lehigh Valley Hospital
where it was later determined that his wounds to a hand and chest
were non-life threatening.
bubsequently_took possession of the original
SAl
as well as the original
video tape made by Officerl
consensual recording made by UCDI
I
The initial crime scene investigation was handled by
the Pennsylvania State Police (PS?) who responded immediately to
the crime scene with the FBI vidence Response Team (ERT) playing
a support role in that they were not on scene until approximately
two hours after the shooting.

6

 .

.

6SF-PH- 93364

A search ofi
[rehicle following the shooting
located cocaine, a bulletproof vest, one live .40 caliber round,
but no weapon.
Since the shooting incident, subjecti
accompanied by his attorney, has submitted to several procter
sessions with Agents of the FBI and, to date, has admitted to the
cocaine transactionq with the UCD, as well as the firearms
violations. I
Iliac not been questioned concerning his
attempt to run over SAl
I at the time of his arrest.

7

I

 __________________lExtension

1•

%l2i31fl995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date: 09/06/2002

ROUTINE

Inspection

Froxa:

Atti:

Inspection

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted

By:

Case ID #:
Title:

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt

1837

Perkins Kevin
Hulon Willie

I

Ilrr

297-HQ-A1271900-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
06/H/20a2
PORTLAND DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting ipoident that qccurred on 06/11/2002, involving Special
Agent (SA)I
Idiecharged one round from his
I SA1
Glock Model 23 -pistol into the ground to scare an aggressive dog.
SIRG members_reçommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
ha a result of his involvement in this incident.
•Adzuinistratjve: Reference Electronic Communication. of
Supervisory Special Agent -(SsA) I
I dated bs
06/12/20)2.
b7
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 I

,

r

44

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271900-D, 09/06/2002
Details of the Shooting Incident

I

On 06/11/2002, SAs
land
went to a residence located in Oregon City to interview an
individual regarding an investigation.

I

Upon arrival at the location, the Agents noticed two
houses, along witji other structures, within the confines of the
property.
SAl
I parked his Bureau vehicle in front of one
residence and rang the door blI. After_waiting for several
minutes with no response, SAsI
ialked toward the
landi
storage area/barn and announced their presence. After receiving
no response, the Agents approached a second home where they
encountered two doq owing signs of aggression. One of the
dogs charged at SAl
I and sensing imminent danger, as detailed
in his FD 302, he pulled his weapon and discharged one round into
the ground to scare both dogs. As the dogs backed off, the owner
exited the house and restrained the agressi.ve dog.

There were no personal injuries or property damage
incurred as a result of SAl_]discharging his weapon.
On 07/30/2002, the SIRS met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with i-hp
rmjg voting members of the SIRS in attendance:
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
WiLLie T. Hu].on, Chief Insi5ector, Office of Inspections, Inspection

Division; Ralph Stanley Harris, Section Chief, Personnel Resources
Section, Administrative Services Division; William Q. Doherty,
Section Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
I
I Acting Section fhf fln1 Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; I
Unit
Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office of the enerai counsel7
SSAi
i Firearms
Toolmarks Unit Söientif Ic
Analysis Section, Laboratory Div
Washington Field Office; and SSA
Program Manager,
Practical Applications Unit, Training Division. The two nonvoting
members present were SSAI
land I
Management/Program Analyst, Inspection Managetnent Unit, Office of
Inspections; Inspection Division.
-

h7c

-

Observations and Racomueadations of the SIRS
T-he SIRS reviewed the above-synopsized incident with the
intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and

2

I

 I,
4

To:

Re:

Inspection

Prom:

Inspection

297-HQ-A1271900-D, 09/06/2002

recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training
and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG_metnbrs unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the deadly
force policy.

observation made by SIRS members pertained to the
Th
fact that SAl
If ired a warning shot at the animal, which is not an
accepted practice.
This observation will be .brought to the
attention of the Special Agent in Charge.
7C

3

 4

e
4’

To;
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ—A1271900-]J, 09/06/2002

IxAD(s):

Set head 1:
INSPETIO1T DIVISION
A WASHINGTON, D.C.
Thi ‘o administrative action be taken against
jas a result of his involvement in this shooting

SAl

1
1

Mr. Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
Mr. Wainstein,_Rm. 7427
(1
Mel
1 Rm. 7326)
1
Msj
p usoo
1
Mr. kiu.Lon, Rm. 7837
1
Mr.i
L Rni. 5155
1
Mr. Doherty, Rin. 4042
1
Mr. Harris, Rm. 6650
Mr.i
1
IRm. 3787F
1
Mr.I
iQuantico
1
M4
I Quantico
1-MxI
IWF0
1
Mr.p
pRm. 7861
1
Rm. 7861
-

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7C

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4

 C

(Re,. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF tNVESTIGATION

Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Attn:

I

I

Hunt Lynne A9
Clemens Miohae

Drafted By:

02/14/2003

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt
Extension 1837
b6

Jrr

Case ID #: 297—HQ—A1271895—D

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
06/06/2002
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 0/06/2002, involving
Special Agent I
I Du4ng the execution of a
federal search warrant, 811
Ifired three rounds from his
Glock .40 caliber handgun as hewas attacked by two dogs upon
entry into a subject’s residence. SIRG members recommended
that no administrative action be taken against SAl
las a
result of his involvement in this incident.
Administrative:

Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agentl
[dated 11/27/2002.

Details:

This conmmihication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 ___________

__

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, 02/14/2003
Details of the Shooting Xncident

On 06/06/2002, SAl
Iwas assisting in the
execution of a search warrant of a subject described a a lieutenant
in a heroin distribution organization located in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.

SAl

I

At 6:30 p.m.,
along with five Agents and two
Philadelphia Police Officers surrounded the residence, knocked and
announced their presence and the existence of a search warrant. As
law enforcement personnel approached the front door of the residence,
the sound of large dogs barking emanated from inside. Agents knocked
severaj times on the front door and observed a male, rater identified
asi
l)ook out of an upstairs window. I
L.as advised to come
downstairs and open the front door. After waiting for several minutes
with no response, a decision was made to forcibly enter the residence.
SAl
I using a one-man battering ram, forced
open the front door of the residence and stepped aside. SAl
I
carrying a ballistic shield and with weapon drawn, was the first Agent
to enter he residqnce when he was immediately attacked by two large
dogs.
SAl
I fearing for his safety as well as that of the
entry team, fired three rounds from his handgun wounding one of the
dogs resulting in both dogs retreating. The occupant of the residence
came down to the first floor and placed the dogs into a fenced
backyard.
The Pennsylvania Chapter of the Society of Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was contacted to deal with the wounded dog.
Upon the arrival of the SPCA, the subject requested that his brother
be allowed to take the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. There
were no other physical injuries incurred as a result of this shooting
incident.
On 01/22/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USD0 ,
.Deputy Section Chief, Ter
nrim nd Via1n1- Crimes Section,
1
Criminal Division, USDOJ;I
I Deputy Chief,
Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Assistant
Special Agent in Charge Glenn Powell, Investigations Division,
Office bf Inspector General, USDOJ; Michael S. Clemens, Chief
Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Robert K. Cromwell, Section chief, Applicant Processing

4
v

2

 ______________

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—HQ—A1271895—D, O2/l4/2OO3

Section, Administrative Services Division;I
1
Acting Section Chief, CD-2, Counterintelligence Division;
Itinit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office of
I
the General Counsel;I
I Unit
Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division; sSAI
I Prooram
Practical Applications Unit, Training Division; SSA[
I
Washington Field Office; and SSA I
I Firearms
h
Toolinarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section
1 Laboratory Divisio
b 7C
The two non—voting members present were $SAI___________________
Assistant Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
andl
I Management/Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

-

Obsezvations and Recoxtunendations of the SIRE
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an opeiational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that th use of deadly
force by SAL
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
deadly force policy.

3

I

 •

.

S

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297—flQ—A1271895-D, 02/14/2003

XE)iD(s):
Set Xead 1:

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
‘P1i1-

SAI
shooting incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

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c1ministrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this

Mr. Gebhardt, sin. 7142
Mr. Wainstein, Bin. 7427
Ms.l
I m. 7326
Mrs. Hunt, Rm. 7825
Mr. Clemens, Rm. 7837
Mr.
DOJ
Ms.
L LJSDOJ
Mr. Powell, OIG
Mr. Cromwell, Rni. 6012
Mr.
I Bin. 4042
Quantico
Mr.
Mr.
Quantico
Quantico
Mr.
Mr.
Mrs.
IRin. 7861

4+

4

 -

CWJ3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 09/09/2002

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Coztact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Casa ID #:
Title:

Attn:

Extension 1837

Perkins Kevin
Hulon Willie V4’

I

Assistant Director
Lymze A. Hunt

!h7C

I1XZ
297-HQ-Al27l970-D

ADMINISThATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
05/23/2002
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

Synopsis
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRS) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred. on 05/23/2002, involving Special
Agents (SAs)l
land
landi
If ired multiple rounds
I SAs I
I
and SAl
I fired one round at a pitbull dog who had bitten an
Agent.
SIRS members recommended that no administrative action be
taken against SAsI
landi
las a result of
their involvement in this incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic_Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)j
Idated 06/08/2002.
betai].s:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRS with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 (

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271970-D, 09/09/2002
Details of the Shooting Incident

At approximately 6:30 a.m., on 05/23/2002, Agents of
the WaShington Field Office, in concert with officers of the
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), were preparing to conduct
an authorized search of a residence in Washington, D.C.Upon their arrival at the residence at approximately

7:15 a .m., an MPD Detective pounded on the front door several

times and shouted, “Police, search warrant, police, search
warrant, open the door.” The entry team heard a female voice
saying “I’m coming, I’m coming.” Within a few seconds, the
female opened the door of the residence.
SA
jwas the first to enter,
followed by
jwIlo yelled out “dog, dog, dOg. .“ The
dog ran under SA
[legs, bit his ankle and would not
release his hold. According to SAl
Ihe started to drag the
dog around in order to make the dog release his hold when
began shooting the dog. s SA
SAl
land
SAL
Ii?roceeded to the upstairs portion of the residence,
SA1
I realizing that the animal was a danger,
I and I
fired additional rounds which resulted in the dog’s death at the
scene.
SA
Iwas transported to the hospital where he
received medical treatment as a result of the dog bite.

On 07/30/2002, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Former Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, cha.ired the meeting
t.t4+1 1
’v voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
4
1
I Deputy chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Wi.U.ie T. Hu.lon, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division; Ralph Stanley Harris, Section chief, Personnel Resources
Section, Administrative Services Division; William Q. Doherty,
Setsn CThif 1obal Section - NS-2, national Security Division;
lActing Section chief. Oraticnjl Support Section,
I
Criminal Investigative Division;l
I Unit chief.
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;I
lUnit
Chief. Investiaative T#w Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
SSAI
I Firearms
Toolrnark Unit. Scienti
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSAI
Washington Field Office; and SSAI
I Program Manager,
Practical Applications Unit. Training Divisioi. The two nonvotina
menbers present were SSAI
landi
Management/Program Analyst, I-nspeetion Management Unit,
ic of
Inspections, Inspection Division..

I

1b

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2

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-Q-A127197O-D, 09/09/2002

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRO
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with the
intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadi.y force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, ana
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning training
and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations for

administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIPG members unanimously agvr chat the use of deadly
Iwas justified and in
ndI
conformance with the deadly force policy.
force by SAsI

3

h7c

 __________lQuanticç
______lQutico

4

I.

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271970—D, 09/09/2002

ID Cs):
Set Iead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
2T WASHINON, D.C.

That no adninistrative action be tken against
SAsI
land________
result of their invo1vement in this shooting incident.

1
1

Mr.
Mr.
(1
3.
Ms.I
1
Mr.
1
Mr.l
1
Mr.
1
Mx.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
I.
Mr.
1
Mrs
-.

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-

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-

Gebhardt, Rm. 7142
Wainstein. Rm. 7427
MsJ
IRm. 7326)
IUSDOJ
Thulrrn. Rm. 7837
I Rn. 5155
Doherty, Rm. 4042
rrii. Rm. 6650
IRm 3787F

h6
b7C

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-

Iwo
Rm. 7861
Rm. 7861

+4

4

 FD.2O4-(Rv. 12.1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

•

Copy to:

I

Repottof:
Date:

IIPI
03/08/2002

Casems:

279-HQ-A].270951 Sub D

Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
TIMORE DIVISION
1
BAI

Oflkc

MARCH 1, 2002
Chmctcr.

.

Synopsis:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

This shooting incident occurred on 03/01/2002, at
approximately 6:10 p.m., in Anne Arundel County, Maryland,
while Federal Agents and Anne Arundel County Police
Department (AACPD) Officers atterted to arrest an
individual they belieyed to be an armed and dangerous bank
robbery subiect namedl
I
is described on his Maryland drivers license
I
as a wflate ittãle, 5’8”, 180 lbs., DOB;I
IFBI
number I
I The individual who was shot was not the
sub-i ect and was identified as
I
I
lie described on his Maryana arvers iicense as a
white male, 5’ll, 160 lbs. DOE;
I
DETAILS:

.

On Wednesday, 02/20/2002, at approximately 9:42 a.m.,
a lone, unidentified, white male entered the A].lfirst
Bank, located at 8493 Ft. SmaJJ.wood Road, Pasadena,
Maryland 21122. This bank is insured under the provisions
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This
individual walked up to a bank teller and yelled words to
the effect “Get down on the floor.” The bank teller and
all others in the bank complied and got down. The bank
teller complied with the bank robber’s demands and began
to furui.sh him money from her teller drawer. As the bank
teller gave the money to the bank robber, the bdnk robber
pointed a silver or nickel and black pistol in the
teller’s face.
The bank robber then proceeded to the next
teller and shouted words to the effect “ Give me your
This document contains neither recoendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the progerty of the FEZ
and is loaned to your agencyl it and its contents are net to be distributed outside your agency.

 _______________________

________

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

.
b6
money. You ye got ten seconds or I’ll blow your fuckin brains
1b7C
out.” This teller complied with the robber’s demands and
described seeing a silver semiautomatic pistol pointed at her..
The bank robber grabbed $26,324.00 in U.S. currency and
immediately exited the front door of the bank. Witnesses
described the bank robber as a white male; 5’ 7” to 5’ 10”;
medium to large build; wearing a blue or black ski mask covering
his face, except for cuts for his eyes; a dark green sweatshirt;
black gloves; carrying a silver/nickel and black handgun.
Witnesses saw the bank robber Jump into the passenger seat of a
dark green, Ford, Ranger pickup truck with lettering “Bonded and
insured I
I on the side.
The pickup was later recovered by
the AACPD.

SAl
I of the Annapolis Resident
Agency (ARA), of the Baltimore flivision was assigned as the case
agent for this bank robbery. On 02/20/2002 SA I
I
interviewec
I the owner of the dark green
Ford aanger pickup, and deteimined thatj[
Ihad loaned the
pickup truck to his neighborj
I on the evening of
02/19/2002. 1
Ion the morn[na çf 02/20/2002 could not find
his pickup truck and contactedi
Ito find out where he had
parked the truck. I
Ishowedi
I where he had parked the
vehicle and
1 thv bc±h realized that it
mi,ssing.
I
interviewedi
Ion 02/20/2002, andIIdenied any
involvement in the Allfirst Bank robbery.

•

I

I

Iwas contacted by Detective
“26/2002, SAl
I AACPD, and advised that an jndjvidull who
requested anonymity had called him and told him that
I
mad recently robbed a bank in the Pasadena,
I
Maryland area. The caller also advised that I
Iwas a
crack and heroin addict and had recently gotten out of Jail. The
caller also stated that al
ILAST jvTj t iow (Wt3) was also
involved.

]

obtained a picture of I
SAl
I
and the bank surveillance photographs and showed them to four
different individuals. All four_believed the subject in the bank
surveillance photographs to be I
I
•1
iadvjsed thatl
esaeci .n uue
o
I
I advised sA.
..[ëidence. I
.-.--

I

I

.

Ithat

I

Iliad not wp’1

not home the evenina of 02/19/2002.

2

I

inA ha

I

lb 6
lb 7 C
lb 7 D

 ____________lash _____i(LNU)

_____ladvised

___________

.

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

Or 03/01/2902, at approximately 12 :07 a rn.,
•

i-

I

QJ

“

I
flIwu).

Jhad

Iwent to a bar across from the residence to
ItollI
Ithat he had. committed a felony.
Iaskecl
I whether or not he had robbed a bank?
tçespondecl I
I
Whereuton I
I-se had to turn him1f in
Itold I
Iaid
Itoldi
Ibecame very
house. I
emotional and tearful. F
hilowed’
‘to come ixto
landi

talk and!

I

I

-

I

I

I

While in the houeI

b6

ib7C

Ireceived a telephone call from
Itha.t the
I who told
I
kI was 1ookiig £q hint. I
that
as
ladvised SA I
I
I
I(LNuj w4re leaving une residence, I
I
I and I
d told
1
1h
U-iNU) drove up apd seqmed paranoid, asking what
Itold!
Ito leave and never return.
SA
[
1
I
if he had the
money. I
11
(LN) replied Yes.

Ib7D

I

afterl

On 3/0l/2O02, shortly
from!
Iresidence,l
common area of her home. I

•

I

Ideparted

iproceed to look through the

Ioi th Baltimore City
land Officerl
Police Department each received a call from I
lat approximately
1:45 a.zn. about the pistols and re’oonded to I
I residence.
At approximately_2O7 a.m._Officerl
Iturned the air pistols
over to SA I
ireceived consent to search the
SAl
common area of the basement. He recovered I
I
green NIKE sweatshirt and grey sweatpants
I
(clottiing worn by the bank robber depicted in bank surveillance
videotape).

I

I

SAl

I

I

On 03/01/2,002, at sometime between 8:15 a.m. to 900
l-ecoqnized_he
kLNU) contacted sA11 awl
caller’s voice as
who 5.4
Ihad
orevicrniv rreste
a e
ier.
or an
ladmitted knowing
ut he did
I
not know what kind of trouble
was in. I
denied any involvement in any crimes with
declined to say anything else and stated he would contact SA
j later, possibly with an attorney.

a .m.. ,I

I

•

3

b7C

 t

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

.

Following the
He advised
conversations wil
authority to arr
assiqr4ng the case to
I provided a verbal
faxed a cotv qf an affidavit for the arrest of
I charging him with
Pasden, Maryland, on 02/20/2002.
ithey would have an arrest warrant ror
Isigned later that afternoon.

AtJSA

I

and his

verbal
he was
6

On fli mi /02, at approximately 1:45 p.m. I
I
contacted SA[
land ciiried him thati
I nec’
te1ephonjca1IcontactedI
nd eauested a meting withi
I
I
Js personnel
bskedl
I to bring I
belongings, including items located in the washing machine, to
the meeting becaus h “1iard the FBI was oo]dng for himl* and he
was going to flee. I
lagreed that
Indi
I
Iwould call again at 4:00 p.m., and meet after,
possibly in the Glen Burnie, Maryland area.
,

.

described
I to_SAl
las_sounding
ing and heaving, and an emotional mess. I
Itold
hi grci1cc.n tol
SA
I mother and thçy both
agreed thati
Imay be suicidal. F
Ihad
told them he would not go back to prison. From 02/28/2002
thrçuh
ersati W19 I
1
n
3
I

hyst

,

93/911I2o021I

I

l
1
as

As a result ot those conversations,I
Ifelt
at
was very depressed and heavily using drugs.
a so e t
as depressed because 0/01 wash the
anniversary of
I
ther’s d ath. Fromi
a
discussions with
I
learned that I
felt stronalv that this arrest situation with I
I
I,e.ii,1,R end in some type of miVder/suicide situation.
I toll
Ithati
I did not want to return
to jail and that he was desperate.
SAl
I telephonically contacted AUSA I
J and I
related the conversation he had earlier withI
I AUSA I
acreed on the exigent circumstances and authorized the arrest of
the planned meeting withi
hater that day.
The actual arrest warrant had not yet been signed.

.

SAl
Ithen noke with Acting Superrisory Special
Resident Agent (A/SSRA) I
Iregarding the exigency of
the situation and the need to execute an arrest. SAl
I
4

b6

b

ic

 ______Iwas

__________

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

.
I

noted that AUSAI
Ihad qoncurred with this decision. SA
hat based upon review of an NCIC
Itold AfSSRAI
printout and source information,I
tias believed to be
Armed and Dangerous (A&D), a crack head and heroin addict, and
there was strong evidence that he might flee the area.
A/SSRAI
lagreed to go ahead w.th the rrest. On
03/01/2002 at approximately 2:15 p.m., A/SSRAI
lattempted
to contact Assistant Special Agent in Charge ASAC) PETER BRUST,
however, BRUST was not in the office. A/SSPAI
I
telephonically contacte Acting/Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(A/ASAC)I
md verbally advised him of the situation.
ii.ij the Acting ASAC of the Calverton
On 03/01/2002, ss.
Resident Agency.
SSA
the A/ASAC from 02/18/2002 to
03/01/2002 because ASAC BRUST was out of the Baltimore Division.

I

.

h

I11d A/ASACj______ from
AJSSRAI
nd S?J
on. a sneaker phone.. A/SSRAI
ladvised A/AAC
Ithat SAl
Iwas working on a bank robbery
investigation and a suspect had been developçd. A/SSRAI
I
requested sçyeral agents from the r”frn RA to assist with the
I that he received oral
arrest.
SAl
Eadvised A/ASACI
authorization from the USA’S Office to make a probab1
arrest and that he
completed the affidavit. SA
advised A/ASACI______ that he had conducted a consent searc1 at
the suspect’s residqnce and_two air pistols had been recovered
from the house.
ibelieved that one of the air pistols
SAl
recovered was the s.me pisc6i used in the bank robbery.
the

I

1

I asked A/SSRA
During this conversation, A/ASAC I
an Opera1-irnl Plan (OPS) had been written. A/SSRA
Ito].d ./ASAC I
that
s no written plan.
A/ASACI
J instructed A/SSRA
fax him ar OPS o1n,
as wei.1 as the affidavit. A/ASAC
old A/SSRAI
Ithat
he would send five SAS from
ertori RA to attend the
briefira at th M?.A. A/ASAC
specifically instructed
A/SSRAj
Ito ensure that all the SA artiçipating in the
arrest get a complete briefing. A/SSRA
_jadvised A/ASAC
OPS plan would be prepared and taxed to him.
t7c

hf

A short time later, A/ASAC
ived another call
from A/SSRA
I
I
provided more
details to
SAl
lady sed that i
lould be
talking to
round 4:00 p.m., and there was a good
possi
at
o d lead the FBI tol
I
A/7.SA
It-ht h had not reived te
advise
1
fSSRA
faxed copy o the OPS plan. A/ASACI
iold A/SSRAI
I
that he had verbal approval for the operation, but that fle needed
•

5

 ____________________________landi__________

279—HQ-A1270951 Sub A

him to fax the OPS plan prior to going out.
Lontacted

I

I

and instructed them to attend an arrest briefing at t e
ARA at 3:00 p.m.
52’
‘prepared a hand written information sheet
for distribution to the SAs participating in the
1rllc’-/rest.
The sheet included a photograph of
Ia brief physical description, and a description of
venlc.Les used by him.
SAl
1so prepared a handwritten OPS
plan, and attached the arrest affidavit, and an NCIC report he
received on 02/26/2092. These items, and a copy of the &ffidavit
were given to A/SSRAI
I

I

I
•

sAsi

The arrest was planned to be a static event when
I
met I
I at the Days Inn parking lot.
In order to
Droteot the r1atjonshjp between the FBI andi
I both
I
I SAl
Ithen left
trie building.
Outside the RA, SAl
Iconducted a radio check
with the RA while in his Bureau car. The radio operator advised
he was being heard “5 by 5” on both the FBI radio and hand-held
radio. The radio check was conducted in the private mode.
On 03/01/2002, at approximately 3:00 p.m. an arrest
briefing was conduct
Th briefing was lead by
A/S$RAI

I

1
land Si

briefing were: SAsI

Also oresent at t1Le

I and ARA seretaryI
I The case agent, SA[
Idid not
attend the briefing.
521
Iprovided information during the
briefing via his Nextel telephone, while he was taking car
logistical matters and talking to the cooperating witnessi
I
“

Prior to the briefjna cI
Ireviewed the OPS
plan and 8uaestd to A/ssRAI
Ithat he attach a photograph
of I
I which he greed to do. The OPS plan was passed
around the table but each SA did not receive a copy. A
Ibripfed that the anticipated location where I
land
II
Iwere to meet was the Days Inn, located across from
the Motor Vehicle Administration building, Route 2, Glen Burnie,
Maryland.
(This was approximately 30 to 40 minutes driving time
from the ARA.
The SAs stated they felt they were pressed for
time to complete the briefing and other preparations in order to
be at the motel by 4:00 p.m.)
•

6

b6
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 .

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

As a long time member of the SWAT team, SAl
was experienced in giving tactical briefings,
use the
handwritten ops plan to make the briefing. S
egan
the briefing by thanking the SAs for their assis
provided the background on. the investigation. SA
provided the following information: Based upon the bank
surveillnce photograph and witness descriptions provided by SA.
•1 the bank robber suspect was a white male, 5’B”, wearing
a ski mask, age estimated between mid-20’s and early 30’s, using
a handgun and a stolen pickup truck. I
Ihad been in recent
I and
communication with the suspect, I
• appeared to be in a position to help locate him. I
Iwould be
driving a 1991, green. Ford Ranger pickup truck.
,

.

b
ib 7C

At the time of the briefing, SAl
id not have
Iphysical or clothing description, but obtained it after
the briefing and relayed it to the arresting team by FBI radio.
SAl
I’Xerox” copies of a 1998 arrest photo of the
Iwhich were passed out to every SA. The picture in.
the copies measured approximately 4”
5” or 5” x 7” and was
suitable for identification purposes. I
I was also
characterized as possibly suicidal. The suicidal
characterization was based oni
(mother) and
Liii,ry
I description of I
“ral conversations
he had with him on 03/01/2002.
history
was also oaqd around. The criminal history showed that
Jhad been arrested or assault an4 attempted murder.
SAl
Iold the qroup that I
Ixad stated tel
andi
b(mother) that he would not go back t5
jail.
(The latter statement had been conveyed to SAl
Iby
SA4
learlier in the day.)
SA
d the briefing by telling the
arrest team that
wanted to meeti______
approximately 4:00 p.m. and BA
as setting up the
meeting. The meeting was expected to take place in Glen Burnie,
Maryland.
Staging for the operation would take place at the Days
Inn, across from the Notor Vehicle Administration building, Route
2.
The FBI comammications frequency would be repeater channel
F—3, which covers the southern portion of the ARA territory. The
alternate communications medium was to be Nextel cellular
telephones. No alternate FBI radio fequency was designated.
The situation on the street could
xtetd to be dynamic and
fluid and it was uncertain_whether I
Iwoul n fr’t
meet withi
dvised the SAs that SA I
p S. I
bad
retrieved from
jresidence a sweat shirt and pellet
guns, which were subsequently determined through a review of the
bank robbery tapes, to be similar to the clothing and weapon used
‘

.

7

bE
h7

 279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

by the bank robber.
Iescribed. the behavior of the
sAl
bank robber in the bank, which included waving a gun and using
profanity, arid told the team that he should be considered armed
and dangerous (based upon use of the handgun during the
commission of the bank robbery).

I
•

The possibility of a stationary vehicle arrest was
addressed during. the briefing. Tb n1 w. Tn the event a
I the team would
positive identification was made of’
come in, block his vehicle, and effect the arrest. Specific
duties of arrest team members were not made due to the
uncertainty of the situation. No specific_positive
‘or an SA, was
identification signal, on the part of I
dpianMpd with .the
I
established. No person, includinc(
inal
1
responsibility of positively ideritify
I E’rotoco].
Iwas not
regarding positive ident
4
of I
Idid not brief this detail, he
addressed. Althouh SAl
expected S?4
I would make the positive identification of
land call it out to the arrest team.

h7C

SAl
Itold the group he needed logical
surveillance points covered including north and south of the meet
I
location on both sides of the divided highway. SI
advised that ACPD detectives would be at this location providing
assistance in the operation. Someone asked the description of
I responded that it was
I
I vehicle. sAl
unknown.
Anothez person asked whether he was still armed. SA
‘responded that he did not know but that he should be
considered armed and dangerous due to the nature of the crime
charged.
I
Although there was no formal designation, SAl
assumed the role of team leader. The Principal Relief
Supervisor, SA I
I was present in his role as A/SSRA, since
the ARA supervisor was on leave.

sl
Ix,çk additional copies of the “Xerox”
pictures oft
I and
I called AACPD Detectiv
advised him cney were en route to the operational meeting
7c
location where they would rendezvous with hiuL SAl
I
volunteered to position the arrest team personnel at the meeting
location.
For communication, the SAs and police involved used.
Nextel cellular telnhone. an AACPD handhe].d radio (trunked
system that only SAl
Ipocseced), and a FBI radio set on
simplex frtquii.cy uhrilhI.) D-4. S1
Idirected the arrest
team to keep radio communications to a minimum. During the
•

8

 ___________

279-RQ-Al27095l Sub A

entire operation, significant communication problems on the FBI
radio were encountered. These problems were characterized as
transmissions apparently not being received and team members not
always receiving acknowledgment of their transmissions.
According to the SAS statements it was unusual for so many
transmissions not to be acknowledged.
Th_Calverton RA SAS paired into tb following
Ri
vehicles SN
1
Ltr his vehicle; SAl
J in SA
land IAI
Ivehicle; SAl
I
tin SAl
Ivehicle
until they changed to SAl
[vehicle when he lett to handle a
pejrsonal mattr.
siaried RA vehic)
es;
1
The ARk SAs used their
6
I and
which had an AACPD radio, S[
b7c
in tIeir own vehicles, and later SAl
joined SA
to 11r him ijimunipt. nd Z/SSRN
Two AACPD
ueteccives,
Iand
I were together in an
unmarked AACPD vehicle, a blue Ford Mustang. There were no
marked police vehicles participating in the operation.

I

icalled

•
•

Some time after 3:00 p.m., A/ASAcj
the
Ba].timçre Field Office looking for S.C LYNNE A. HtT. A/ASAC
‘spoke with the SAC Secretary,I
I Ms.I
advised that SAC HUNT was_attending a po’ice_graduation ceremony
in Westminster. A/ASACI
sked Ms.l
if SAC HUNT needed
to approve single arrest oPS plans. Ms.I_____ indicated that SAC
HUNT did not require single arrest plans be approved by her.
I advised that the rrt team departed
A/SSRAI
I stayed behind
the ARA at approximately 3:40 p.m. A/SSRI
to pencil in additional informatm
the OPS plan, have it
typed, and then faxed to A/ASACI
un the Calverton RA for
his review and approval. Thç OPS r3ln utilized during tI’e ar
briefing was faxed to A/ASACI
t 3:40 p .m. A/SSRA I
I
noted that he kept the original OPS plan and made modifications
to it regarding radio call signs and additional information
concerning changes in personnel, rendevous points and vehicles.
He furh nPpd the modified OPS olan was never provided to
A1ASACI
I however, A/ASACI
hater saw a cops of th QPS
plan wiUiI
Ihand written notes on it. A/SSRAI
I
maintained the modified OPS plan in order to forward the original
to the case file.

.

At 3:46 p.m., AIASACI
Feceived a fax from the ARA
that contained an rrst QPS plan and an affidavit for a
complaint. A/ASACI
Ireviewed the OPS plan and saw that the
plan did not have any SAS assigned to stecific duties. He could
not remember if he instructed a/SSRAI
make specific
assignments.

ito

9

 _________Ion
______________L

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

En route to the meeting location, SAl
ealized
that repeater frequency channel F-3 would not woric an started
calling the SAS to switch to the main ARA repeater, channel F-i.
It was determined that channel F-i would not work either and
resorted to simplex channel 0-4, once everyone arrived at the
meeting location. One of the SA’ radio dropped its privacy code
and everyone switched to the clear mode. Everyone had a Nextel
cellular telephone with the exception of the AACPD detectives,
who had another type of cellular telephone. A extel arozp was
not established for the arrest team, however SAl
Ihad
direct connect capability of all SAs on the arrest team. A
communications check was effectively made of aJ.l personnel at the
meeting location, including the AACPD detectives. SAl
I
used a handheld AAcpD radio in his vehicle to communicate with
the AACPD detectives.

•

I

The aoup was having a difficult time communicating
with SA
jn channel D-4 since he was in the Curtis Bay
area aprox1mace.Ly 10 miles away. At the time, SA I
as
covering a
I in anticipatiçr of the meeting with
1
There was a bin between SA1Z
hnd the arrest team, so SA
rand SAL
Itraveled separately towards SAl
I
1flr’tpn in order to better be able to communicate with him.
SA
.ctually traveled to SAl
ilocation.
SAl
‘learned from S?1
I and relayed to
the team, that the meeting would likely take place in the
vicinity of the Sun Valley Shopping Center, Highway 648 and
Mountain Roa. No specific time was provided for the meeting.
siJ
Iwas alone in his vehicle, alongside of A1CPP
whr were in an znrnarked AACPD vehicle.
Detectivesi
land’
SAl
Idireoted SAsI
landI
Ito go to the Sun
Valley Sbooina Center p0 get familiarized with the area.
Detectives I
lalgo relocated to the
I and SAl
shopping center. There werjflcxn{n4i- communication updates
between SAsI
I A/SSRA I
I and the rest of the team.

Sometime around 4 flA r m I
contacted SA. L
Ion
his Nextel and advised that I
had called and would
send his girlfriend to pick-up the duffel bag filled with his
clothes.
Following this conversation,L
ontacted SA
the Nextel phone to ask what was goinq on. ‘
was an associate of I
1
i who SAl
Iliad
arrested for bank robbery a. few years earlier. I
k.ias also
]‘eing involved in the Alifirst bank robbery with
Fiias in contact with
SAl
I believedL
“

•

10

b6
ib7C

 ______Idid

__________________
______________

______

279—HQ-A1270951 Sub A

.
I
I

I

ng” and that he was going
1
be told him “nrihi
land instructed him to call
Ithen callecI
I back in order to convince him to come in person for
his clothes, money, and to say good-bye.
hom

R.

I

Shrn-tiv ftr this conversa
d again arid
advisedl
Iwould meet him.
said he
would be drivell
car by a girlfriend,
advised the
I (LNU), who was
person c2d 1
he night
before I
I (T.NtTl ias described b
as av ng s ort, red
hair.
not divulge the make and model of the
car he would be driving in.

SAl
Jthen contacted S2I
Ivia Nextel
Direct-Connect and advised of the intended location for the
meeting.
SAl
kransmitted the meeting location
information over the FBI radio. For those of the team who did
not acknowledge, e contacted teim via Nextel Direct-Connect. He
advised them thati
1a being driven in a car by a
--y’aded, white female. I
dvised that
I could be wearing a white baseball can, as was his
custom. The make ad mode
the vehiclel
would be
in was unknown. SAl
ws relav4ng inormation he
received from SRI
Ispoke tol
lwhile SRI
n his
Nextel phone.

•

approximately 5:15
5:30 p.m., SRI
Ireported
thatl
Jhad started driving from the Curtis By area, where
hived, to meet his “boss” and ws olaining to then meet with
I who was riding_with
at the 7-fl store. SRI
provided a further description of the pickupi
Iwas
in.
description of the clothes worn byl
I which SR
Irelav-ed to the rest of the team.
(During this general
cime_trme, SAl
Ireceived the following basic description
of I
lwhich he relayed tQ the team by P31 radio: White male,
mid-20’s, 5’ 8” - s’ s”. SRI
iwas talking to the AAC?D
detectives, who were parked next to him, and they heard the
description.)
cAl
Ireported that he was surei1lingI
I
pickup and that I
Lt the 7-fl
Iwas going to meetL
store on Route 648, at the intersection of Marley Neck Boulevard,
in the vicinity of Glen Burnie.
-

I

.

I followed I
I s1
I and SI1
to the First Union Bank located on South Route 2 and_Ordnance
Road, where he met his boss, and picked-up his pay. I
heft
the bank and drove to the 7-il store where he an
had agreed to meet.
Tho other SAs prOceeded. to the area of the
7-11 store.
ii

I
I

 __

____________

.

______

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

At approximately 5:45 P.M.,i
larrived in the area of
the 7-11 store. Ael
I was pulling up to the intersection of
Route 648 and Marley Neck Road, and DreDarinc to mike a left turn
onto Marley Neck Road,I
lobservedi
Ii
Honda, Ciyic being dVn byl
It I
was
sure thati
Iliad seen ,jitt p well. I
Iproceeded
into the 7-11_store parking lot. I
Itried to notify SAl
I
by phone, buti
‘cell phone went dead. I
I
vehicle did not return to the 7-11 store,.

)7C

.

At approximately 5:45 p.m. SAl
Jobservedi
I
drive into the 7-li store parking lot in the Ford Ranger pickup
truck.
SAl
I further observredI
Jexit his vehicle rn
enter the 7-11 store. About 5:50 p.m., SA
I and SAL
observed a late model
1 red vehicle (later identified as a onciac
Grand Am) drive into the 7-11 store parking lot. SAl
Icailed
out over the radio that a red vehiclç had just iifl p to the
7-11 store. and parked next tol
Itruck. SA I
lobserved a
white male wearing a white baseball cap exit the passenger side
front seat of the vehicle and enter the 7-11 store. The white
male who had exited the red vehicle, stayed in the 7-11 store for
two to three minutes and appeared to meet b4efly withl
I
before_exting the 7-fl store and re-entering the red vehicle.
SA I
Icame to the conclusion that the subject had ‘possibly
interacted with
I, as he could clearly observe that hey stoçd
in close proximity to each other within the 7-11 store arid
appeared to have contact.

I

ad gone inside of the 7-fl store in order to use
the phone.
I asked the clerk if he could use the phone. The
clerk told him to use tie nay phone, however, the pay phone was
being used by someone. I
Itold the clerk he needed to call 911
and the clerk allowed him to use the phone.

O

SAd
landF
lindicated that they could see the
red vehicle. From their vntacze point across the street, it
appeared to SAsL
I and I
jas though the white male
6
passenger fit the physical description of I
I SA
I
I advised they made this assessment because the passenger
appeared to be a white male, aDproximately the same height,
weight and aa
I
1 and was wearing a baseball cap,
as wasi
b habit according to the briefing. SAl
I
and SA I
Fould not see the driver of the vehicle, as their
line of sight was obstructed byl
Itruck. They advised S.
I
lof the presence of the vehicle and its occupants, and
requested_he make an attempt to observe the driver. As SAsI
I
Ibegan to move In the direction of the 7-il ctoro, they
andi
hearci on the FBI radio that the subject was in a “red car.”
12

 .

279-HQ-A127095]. Sub A

They observed a red car and its occupants exiting the west
entrance/exit of the 7-11 store parking lot. This vehicle was
driven by a red-haired, white female. Th nssenger was a white
male wearing a white baseball cap. SAl
Ididn’t know who
called out over the radio, but heard instructions to “-Follow the
red car .
.
don’t loose it.”

I
Icalled 911 and spoke with a dispatcher.I
Itold
the 911 dipDatcher he was workina with phe FBI and he was helping
them catch
I told the dispatcher to
notify the FBI and tell them that I
I was a passenge
in a red Honda in the vicinity_of the 7-11 store located at Rob7c
648 and Marley Neck Road. I
I hung-up with the dispatcher,
pickei-um
soda, and waited inside the store. A. minute or two
laterl
[observed several unmarked police vehicles with their
emergency lights flashing and sirens activated. The vehicles
were traveling north on ar1ev Neck RoaiJ
Iwas sure this was
related to the arrest ofi
I
AACPD Detectivel
Ireported that he and Detective
I received a call on channel E çri their Ae19 radio, from
the county dispatcher, that al
I orl
I had called 911

I
•

I

and advised he was working with the psI, and a sject they were
looking fp w driving around a 7-11 store in a small red car.
fletectiv
Jimmediately telephonically called the dispatcher
to obtain more j.nformation. The dispatcher informed him that she
had received a 911 call from a male who said that he was working
for the FBI and “the bad guy.. .the one you’re looking for, just
drove ,by the 7-11 in a red Honda driven by his sister.”
While
as on the telephone with the dispatcher, SA4
I
contacted them over the AA.CPD radio and told them ebe subject was
in a. red car traveling north on 648.
ue tp radio transmission difficulties, A/SSRAI
I
called SJI
I on his Nextel and told him to communicate in the
clear on channel D-4.

Isubsequently advised that the driver wa a
SAl
red-headed white female. Although SN
us certain SAl_____
provided_the team with the description of the red headed female,
SAl
Idid not know whether the information was conveyed over
the Nextel or the FBI radio.
SAsI
1
Ian
Istated in their Siqn
Sworn Statements that they firmly_believed thatI
Iwas
in the red vehicle t which AI
Iwas referring. SA
believed he heard SAl
Ibroadcast over the FBI radio to the
team, “That’s the car.” SAl
Idid not report any positive
•

13

I

 279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

contact withi
lror did he receive any positive confirmation
thati
had been at the 7-11 store.__Howeverthere
was no question in S[
imind that F
was
probably in the red car which had been parked adj acent to I
I
pickup truck at the 7-11 store; that this vehicle was now moving
on Highway 648 northbound; and that it needed to ]e followed.
This conclusion was based on the following i
Ihad reported
thati
1wou1dbe at the 7-11 store, in a vehicle, with
a female with ed hair; a vehicle was observed driven by a female
parked next toj
Jpickup truck at the 7-11 tore; and the
white male got into the passenger side of this vehicle. He did 7C
not remember anyone saying that the white male had a ball cap on.

SAl
lbroadcasted that the red vehicle was exiting
the 7-il store parkinq lot and was turning
9n Marley Neck
Boulevard. SA
lalled SAf
Jand
Ivta the Nextel
and told him to follow the red vehicle. SAl
I said he
advised hem tey did not know who was in the ear. SAl
I
heard Si
Ion the radio say that he did not know if the
passenger was the subject, traninqI
Ibut to just
follow the ca TnamIzch al
Iremained missing from his
parked
,
Si
I retnaiaea_circling the area around the 7--il
store location, waiting foil
Ito return to his vehicle.
SAd
kere temporarily prevented from
landi
following the red vehicle. They were parked in a lot on the
opposite side of the Street and were unable to safely enter the
roadway and negotiate a right turn onto Marley Neck Boulevard.
Upon entering
dway nci rnJcing the turn onto Marley Neck
Boulevard, SAs
homed the lead FBI veh4.cle.
andi
which was ahea o
following the re rh’le. SAl
I
was the driver of
s vehicle and SAl
Iwas his on.y
passenger, positicn in the front passenge seat
TP
,FBI
vehicle, SI
Ivehicle, contained, SAs
landi
I SA
has not in the car as he iad left earlier to attend to a
I
personal commitment.__SAl
Iwas the driver of S?I________
vehicle, and SA [
pwas in the front passenger seat.
SAl
Ibroadeasted that the red vehicle was traveling
north on Marley Neck Boulevard. SAl
Iontinued broadcasting
various reference points including calling out a marked police
patrol car w4ch had mad a traffic stop on Marley Neck
Boulevard. 54
ama up on SA
Jvehicle, which
was behind SAl________ vehicle. Neither vehicle were
broadcasting any radio traffic. SAl
Jhad his emergency
lights activated.

•

14

C

 .

279-HQ-A127095i. Sub A

ladvised that once the red vehicle began
A/SSRAI
moving, he attempted to catch up to the other_vehicles, as he was
further away than the others. Once A/SSRAI
larrived at the
interse(!t if
9 of Route 648 and Marley Neck Boulevard, he saw SA
I
1 a Crown Victoria, in front of hi with his
‘vehicle
lights and sirens on.
issessed from the radio
traffic that the occupants of the subject vehicle were not
pulling over.
SAl
‘broadcasted on the FBI radio that they were
approaching a red light at the intersitinn pf Marley Neck
Boulevard and Ft. Smaflwood Road. sal
khen broadcasted on
the FBI radio, “They are at tiered liait. Do you want us to
initiate a vehicle stophl S?J
Ipaused, waiting for SA
Ito respond.
(SI
I!Ould not remember SA L
I
I
making any radio_tranmisjon after the deprtrnre fropi the 7-11
store.>
When sal
id not respond, SA
j answered,
“Yes, go ahead if you think you can.”

•

A/85R1
ladvised that he heard the request for
instructions on whether r not a traffic stop should be made on
the red vehicle. A/SsRAl
Iadvjsect he could hear traffic
over the radio relating to how the stop was going to be made,
however, he was too far away to have amy visual contact with any
f the agents pursuing the subject vehicle.
The red vehicle_was stopped at the red light, with its
brake lights on.
Ipulled up behind the red vehicle,
Sl
placed the red and blue visor emergency light into the down
position, and turned on the emergency lights. When he turned on
the emergency lights and reached for the siren, the driver of the
red vehicle appeared to respond by releasing the car brakes, as
indicated by the brake 1±
ing off, and iurning right on
the red traffic light. SA
told SAl
Ito turn on the
emergency lights and hit the siren. The FBI vehicle was equipped
with Wig Wag headJ,aht ad a visor strobe which were activated
by SAl
I
have the siren several short blasts. At
Sal
this time the red vehicle turned right on red and accelerated
rapidly.
b6
Immediately after a stop of the vehicle was authorized, b7c
SA E
I driver of the second FBI vehicle, noted the lead FBI
vehicle, driven by Si
p had its emergency tail strobes on
to effect the traffic stop. At approximately the same time, SA
I
Iturned on his emergency lighting system which consisted of
a visor light containing red and blue alternating strobes located
on the passeng side viior, Wig-Wag headlight beams which
alternated right and left, and tail lights that strobe. As the

•

15

)b7c

 279-HQ-A].27o951 Sub A

second FBI vehicle, siI
idid not turn on his siren, nor
could he tell fr
ehind whether or not the lead FBI vehicle,
driven by SAl_______ had its siren operating.

I

After the emerçency lighting systems on both SA
and SAl
Ivehicles were eagaged, the red vehicle
made a right turn agains the light ont Maryland Route 173 and
began to accelerate. SAl
Ibelieved a
time, the red
vehicl&s driver was intending t
then
broadcasted, ‘
He’s
1
“
interpreted this
comment to mean
as on foot and running from
his vehicle. SA
slowed down and started looking into
the woods adjacent to t e ighway.

I

urned right and through the red light at the
SAl
corner, while trying to pul]. up along the drivers side of thern
red vehicle. The ed vehicle was accelerating out of the right
turns SO SAl
Idid the same. Based on cormnunications between
SAl
tvehicle and the lead FBI vehicle., driven by SA
I
via the FBI car radio, all SAs in pursuit of the red
vehicle believed the red vehicle was attemptitig to evade the
stop.

I the driver of the lead FBI vehicle,
SA!
positioned has vehicle along the left side of the red vehicle.
SAl
Ipositioned his FBI vehicle behind and slightly to the
left of the red vehicle. SAl
Ithen attempted to force the
red vehicle off to the Bide of the road in order to effect the
felony traffic stop. At this time it was still light outside,
turning to dusk. SA I
I the passenger in the lead FBI vehicle
driven by SA p
1 made eye ni--i- with the female driver and
motioned her to pull over. SAl
and yelling
for the driver of the red car to puil. over. SN
iwas yelling
“Police.
Pull over.” over and over again through his closed
warkdow. He was not wearing any visible insignias the driver
could have seen while he was in. the car. The female driver of
th rp
i vehicle, then pulled off the road on to the shoulder.
1
SA
SAl
in
front
of
the
red
vehicle.
SAs
Ito
stop
o1d
I
I andi
jvehicle stopped iust ahead of the red vehicle
on the driver’s side. The red vehicle was successfully forced to
the side of the road and brought to a stop without making any
physical contact with it. The location of the stop was Fort
SmaJ.].wood Road, near its intersection with Marley Neck Blvd.

Iwas motioning

Immediately after the stop was made, SAl
lexited
from the front passenger side of the 1ed FT vehic’e and moved
to the front of the red vehicle with his MP5 rifle pointed at
the occupants of the red vehicle. S4
iplaced his car in

•

16

 279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

.

park, shut off the engine, opened the door, grabbed his HP-S
rifle, and ran behind hL car apd over to the red vehicle’s
driver’s side door.
ttempted to open the drivers
S1
door and found it lockea. i-is pounded with his fist on the
driver’s window, and called out, “Ps!
.
.
Open the door.” SA
Iheard several SAs on the passenger’s side yelling, “Show
me your hands.” He did not know who was yelling because he did
not look up and away from the female driver. SAl
Iwas
looking at and concentrating on the female driver, trying to
verbally direct her to open the door and come out of the car,
when he heard a “pop” sound. He did not know exactly how many
seconds transpired between his leaving his car and the “pop”
sound. The female_screamed and opened her door. As she exited
the vehicle, SN
uahed her in the middle of her back, with
the palm of his hand, down on the ground. He instructed her to
put her hands above her head.
.

I

•

SA
bumped out of the passenger side of the lead
FBI vehicle oxiven by SAl
I moving rapidly around the front
of the red vehicle and going to the passenger side of the suspect
vehicle. He could not recall if the occupants were wearing their
seat belts.
sAl
l’’as wearing his soft body armor, and was
not wearing a raid. j:acket. He had his FBI badge affixed on the
right side of his belt and believed the badge was visible. He
was armed with his Hp-S rifle and was focused first on the female
driver. SAl
Ithen directed his attention to the tale
passenger, because he was the most serious threat. S
Iwas
shouting, r Police! Police! Show me your hands!” from the time
he got out of the car to the time he moved around to the
passenger side.
SAl
meyer °‘ iither person in the red
vehicle raise their hands.
Igot to the passenger side
door and tried opening it utilizing his left hand, but the door
was lçcked. At the time he was attempting to open the door.
Iwas next to him, yelling “show me your hands”. SAl
I
arrivçd at the passenger door a few seconds after SAl
I SA
I
Itook a step to the right and made eye contact with the
driver, through the passenger side window. The reason he turned
his attention to the driver was because he did not want the
passenger to make any sudden moves. sI
Jalso knew that SA
tije
I
I was in position to cover the passenger. SAl
I
driver was in a better position to unlock the doors. AI
I
yelled for her to “unlock the door.” SAl
Isaw the driver’s
left hand move towards the door. As SAl
Ias yelling again
to the driver to “unlock the door”, the passenger window
exploded.
SAl
Isaw the passenger move over to the left and
his face was covered with glass and blood. The passenger was
screaming.

M
5

O

17

 279-HQ-a1270951 Sub A

land asked him if he knocked
SAl
l].ooked at SAl
out the window
. I
Idjd not respond. A short time later it
occurred to Al
Riad shot out the window. From
jthat sAl
the time SAl
lexited his vehicle, to the time SAl
I
discharged his_shoulder weapon, only about five seconds had
elapsed. sN
linitially thought the passenger was hit by
glass and that he was not shot.

Immediately following the shooting, SA
lopened the
passenger door and pulled out the passenger putting him face down
on the ground and placing him in handouffs SAl
tated he
never observed any threat thpt would have caused him personally,
to shoot his weapon. SAl
Idid not see the passenger make any
movements prior to being shot, but at th t-in the window
exploded he was watching the driver. SAl
hooked into the
passenger side of the car looking for a possible weapon. The
only thing he saw was some rolled up clothing on the floor. No
other search of the car was made by him.

•

I

SA I
Iwas driving_the FBI vehicle immediately
behin4 th rp venicle, SAF
bias in the passenger seat next
Onc’i gI
I
to SA I
Istopped his vehicle behind the red
vehic),e. SAl
observed SAl
xit from the passenger side
of SAl
Ivehicle with his M4 rifle. SAl
lensured his
vehicle was safely stopped by placing
I-,-nsmissioa in
and engaging the emergency brake. SAl
Ibegan to exit the
h4.1 through the driver’s side door with his M-4 rifle.
As BA
Iturned pomentarily to his left to get out of
r, he
heard N
’ and S
1
I identify himself as the “FBI
identify.ng nimseif as the “Police”. Both SAs were y
the red vehicle’s occupants to “show their hands.” S
could clearly distinguish bçtween the BA’s voices, as
is
from North Carolina, and SAl
ha from Boston.
Thile SA I
I tuxned momentarily to his left to exit
his vehicle, he heard what he perceived to be the sound of a
rifle shot.
BA I
lestimated the time between his stopping
the vehicle and hearing the gunshot was between three and five
seconds.
SAL
Isuspected the shot was fired by one of the
SAs because he knew they were carrying shoulder weapons. Both
ndi
irad their shoulder weapons in positions
SABI
covering the occupants of the red vehicle. SA I
Ifloted blood
in the red vehicle, and observed the white male_inctividual inside
moving around and screaming. According to SA I
I he had an
excellent, unobstructed view of everything in front of him, as
his car was parked to the rear of both vehicles. The sun was
beginning to set, however, there remained mr thau adequate
natural lighting to see clearly. As SA
Jcame out of his

•

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18

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 .

279-HQ-A127o951 Sub A

vehicle he rounded his driver’s door and stood at a slight angle
to the left rear of the subject vehicle looking over the front of
his vehicle’s hood.
After realizing that the subject was injured, SAl
moved to the front of hiq car, between it and the red vehice,
and instructed SAl
Ito call 911 to request the dispatch of a
medic unit to the scene.

I

SAl
Ireturned to his FBI vehicle, proceeded to
make his 11-4 rifle safe, and stowed it in the fOot Well of the
front passenger seat of his FBI vehicle. SA I
Iretrieved one
of his medical bags., and as SAl
iturned around to face the
red vehicle, noticed SAl
ihandcuff jag the white male who had
been in the passenger seat of the red vehicle, and laying him on
the ground on his back and left side.
SAl
lie a Nationally Registered Bmergency Medical
Technician
Paramedic (NREMT-P), which is the highest level of
certification for pre-hospital health care providers.
-

.

SAl
I dialed 911 and advised the operator of the
emergency situation, and of the fact that they needed EMS. SA
Iwas providing medical treatment to the male passenger as
I
SA I
Ispoke to the 911 operator. She asked what was the
nature ot the injuries. He was unable to answer because he did
not know what had happened ta the passenger. SA I
Idid not
know if the passenger had been injured by the car g.Lass
shattering. He thought the SAs may have broken the window and
pulled him out of the car. She agreed to send an ambulance.

I

While SAl
Iwas on the phone with the 911 operator,
Detectivel
1 AACPD, handcuffed the female driver_fm the red
vehicle, while she was laying on. the ground. SAl
Istated he
had no question 4n his mind tbt th n11P laying on the ground
was the subject,I
I SAl
Icontinued to attend to
the female who was crying hysterically. She remained handcuffed
and standing near the trunk of the red car. He tried verbally to
calm her down.
1
Detective
6
Itook control of the female and
removed her from the scene while she remained handcuffed. SA
ireturned to his FBI vehicle and unloaded his MP- rif
and secured it in the car. It was at that time that SAl_______
learned from someone, possibly Sal
Ihat the male passenger
in the red vehicle was noti
I
SA I
hpproached the injured sublect_to assess his
injuries and render care. 3A I
I asked SAl
I what had
happened, in an attempt to determine what type of injury the

•

19

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 ______land

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

individual had sustained. SN
Jresponse to SAl
Iwas
u
shot him in the head. ‘ SA f
Idid not ask any additional
questions at that time, as SA I
Iwas concentrating on
providing the victim with the best possible medical care.

Upon assessing the victim, SAl
Idiscovered he had
a gun shot wound to the right side of his face in the area of his

cheek.
SA I
I determined the victim was capable of breathing
on his own, and was coherent and talking. uring the course of
providing care to the victim, sal
lasked him his name. The
victim advised his name wasi
I SM
Iwas later
advised by one of the SAs on the scene that the victim was indeed
not identical to bank robbery subj ect, I
I SA I
I
did. not recall which SA provided this information, as his focus
was the treatment of the victit. Upon confirmation of the
aforementioned fact, Sal
linstructed.that the victim be
uncuffed.
At approximately 6:08
6:10 p.m., SAl
larrived
at the intersection of Mrley Neck Bqulevard and Ft. Smaliwood
Road, and saw SAs
I
I vehicles stationary on the
side of the road.
Both FBI vehicles had their emergency lights
on.
SAl
Idid not recall whether their sirens were on.
The oasseger side window of the red vehicle was broken. SA
Jdid not recall seeing anything else which caught his
attention in the interiof the vehicle or whether the radio was
on in this vehicle. SA I
ba.w a female “proned. out”
(hands and arms_extended) on the ground adjacent to the driver’ s
door with SAl
Icontrolling her (He was standing
approximately three feet from her right side lookina over her).
She was silent and. appeared frightened. sAl
1 saw a male
laying on his back in the grassy area adjacent to the car and SA
I who had his back towards him, attending and talking to
him.
The male had blood on his face and when SAl
‘asked him
his name, he responded, “(something) I
mr’ained of
I”
not being able to breathe through his nose. S.
Itold him
that it was because he had blood in his nose and advised him to
breathe through his mouth. SAl
Iwas unaware that a shot
had been fired.
-

•

SAL
Isaw SAl
becuring his M-4 rifle
(rendering it safe) and placin it in SAF
I FBI vehicle.
Within moments, Detectives
I SAs I
andl
.1 and
arrived on the scene.
I
Sal
walked back to his vehicle and one of the detectives asked him
whether he wanted them to “start’ an ambulance.
SAl
land SA
I
Jboth told him wyes.i Detective I
I called the AACPD
and requested an ambulance.
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20

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 .

279-HQ-A12709S1 Sub A

I

Sometime after 6:10 p.m., A/SSRAI
Ilocated the
red vehicle approximately 100 yards from the intersection of
Marley Neck Boulevard and Fort Smaliwood Road. He observed the
right jrrrnt meenger window of the subject vehicle was
and SAl
ivr the white male subject beliey ‘i
lalso
I layingp th ground. A/SSRA
observed ACPD Detective I
tt the scene.

I

Ivised that a few minutes after his
A/SSRAI
the scene, I
Ieayi
Ipulled up to the scene also. L
SAl
I
lat the scene and asked if everything was okay. I
asked SAl
iLf they had arrestedi
I SA
I
asked
I to come and look at he ma’i who was lying on the
ground next to the red vehicle. I
I looked at the red vehicle
and knew it was
red aqwn. ‘at he had seen I
in 1aIif the man on ground was
asked I
A
ed SA
I that the man was not
asked
he knew where
hf
I
I
Iou1d be located at this time. I
Itold SA
check ati
Ialrnt’s home.

ariva1

i-

I

I

•

A/SSRAI
Jadvised that he was not aware of the
nature or extent of the individual’s injuries, therefore, he
began to ask_ouesjions of the SAs ojz the sceae. He initially
went to SA
Ltho advised A/SSR2I
Lhat he was calling
A/ASAC LAYTON to dvise him what had happened. He thçn went
over to SAi
hnd sked him what happened. AJSSRAI
I
adyiA that SAl
freplied “I shot him.” A/S1Thl
hsked
SAl
I once more, Wiat happened?, whereupon SAl
I advised
that he ordered the subject to get out of the vefiicie and he was
not compliant. He also noted that the uhect. yas reaching down
into the seat and “I shot him.” A/SSR.I
Ithen asked SA
Lf he was airight, whereupon SA I
I
I did not respond, and
was clearly dejected.
A/SSRAI
ladvised that after he spoke t9 AI
he immediately made notification of the shooting to SAl_________
I
I the Baltimore Division Media Representative.
Shortly thereafter, uniformed officers from AACPD
arrived on the scene. The scene was secured with police tape and
someone called the main Baltimore FBI office. There was no
ntacth during the operation with the FBI dispatcher and A/SSRA
unaware whether anyone was keeping a log.
Sometime between 6:10 and 615 p.m., EMS arrived at the
scene, however they were not advanced life support providers. SA
whether a medic unit had been dispatched, and was

•

21

I

 _Ithat
Istated

_______bserved

279-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

.

advised that one was en route to the scene. SA
Iare of
the victim continued for an additional two to three nanutes,
aftr zhich an Arnie Arundel County Paramedic Unit arrived.
SA
I
I advised them of the patient’s injuries and condition, and
continued to provide care in association with the Anne Arundel
County paramedics until the patient was ultimately transferred to
the care of a Maryland State Police Helicopter Medivac Unit which
transported him to the Maryland Shock Trauma Center.
After the patient was evacuated, Sal
baked sa
I about what had transpired. He advised that the subject had
7
not complied with SAl
land his verbal commands to show his
hands, and had fins-teed reached toward his waist on several
ocasjons.
SA I
Isaid tiis action put him in fçar for iis
life as well as that of SA I
I Acco;ding to SAl
I SA
he could see that SAl
‘has directly in the
subject V line of fire, as tie. SAl
I was positioned in front
I.
of SAL
Therefore, sI
tated he shot the subject in
an attempt to eliminate the threat.

.

I

Asl
land
Iwent into SA
I car.
They went tothe car because it was cold and a
female detective from AACPD started to ask them questions about
what had happened.
They each told her who they were and where
they were from.
sal
Itold the detective they did not want to
be rude, but wanted to wait until their leadership came on the
scene.
She said she understood and walked away.
A/ASAcI
Iwas the first member of FBI management to
arrive at the shooting incident. A/ASAC
three of
the Calverton Agents sitting in a car and he checked on their
well-being and informed them not to make any statements or
discuss this matter with anyone at this time.
A/ASAd
lasked that SAl
Ibrief him as to what
sA
Itold A/ASAC
Ibriefed as follows; Sal
they had been_waiting for a suspect to arrive at a
7-11 store to meet_wih I
I.
A man and woman matching the
description thati
Ihad provided came to the 7-11 store. Based
upon the information that I
0 SAl
ihad provided
Ibelieved
that he bad located the suspect i
1 a red car as the car was
leaving the 7-11 store. Sal
latarted following the car and
eventually got instructions to stop the car. They stopped the
car and they were attempting to effect the arrest of the subjects
and he heard a shot fired. The passenger was hit by a bullet
that SA I
I had fired. They got the subject out of the car and
SAI
Iwas there to give first aid and they called 911.
haonsnd.

•

22

 ________

.

279-RQ-A1270951 Sub A

A/ASAI
acknowledged that
subject.
A/AsAcI

the shooting.

I
AACPD to

SAC RUNT
scene to
involved

Ispoke briefly with SAl

hi

fired his weapon

jinstz,aated SAl

and

I

SAl

tat ne shot the
to speak about

met

I

SAC I1Th1P ived at the scene and was briefed by A/ASAC
A/ASAI
I suggested Co SAC RUNT that they allow the
process the shooting_scene and take the vehicle.
met with CAPTAIN I
I AACPD, who was in charge of the
introduce herself. She then went over to the SAs
and checked on them to make sure they were okay.

SAC RUNT after determining all the facts available at
Chat time, and walking the crime scene, contacted DAD TIOMAS
LOCKE, Inspection Division. She again met with CAPTAIN I
land
they agreed how the crime scene would be procçssed. 1J was
agreed that AACPD would take possession of 59
reaPonl.

.

SAC HUNT then discussed with her media representative a
statement that the FBI would make to the press. A large number
of press had now showed up at the scene.
SAC HUNT then contacted Chief THOMAS SHNON, AACPD, to
touch base with him and to ensure he was comfortable with the
plan that had been developed.

SAC HUNT again met with the SAs involved and

reemphasized the EAP program and to personally assess each SA’s
condition. She advised the SAs they would be interviewed in the
morning and released them from the scene.
APD
the scene and BaThimore ERT Team
Leader, SAl
I coordinated with their crime Ecene
team.
AA.CPD maintained pqinp of all evidence found at the
crime scene, including SAl
Iweapon.

I

AACPI) Detective F

the driver of the red vehicle, provided

written statemert immediately after the
Jetatement to AACPID

shooting 4nc’.i1nt.
In I
Detectiv
I she stated that she and her boyfriend, I
I
I
I were coming from the Marley Station Mall, when they
stopped at the 7-11 store at the end of Marley Neck Boulevard for
a slurpee and a mcnlni-airl dew. She was the driver andi
Iwas
the passenger. I
[went into the 7-li. store and she stayed
in her car.
They iett hhe 7-fl store and drove down Marley Neck
Boulevard to Fort SmaJ.lwood Road. Ac Fort Smaliwood Road she
turned right.
She stated she did not see any cars behind her and
did not hear any police sirens or see any police lights.

•

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 279.-HQ-A1270951 Sub A

After turning onto Fort Smallwood Road 8he saw two men
in a cream colored car beside her car. The men were motioning
her to pull over. They had guns in their hands so she pulled
over.
She then saw the men get out of their car and one came
over to her window yelling put your hands up’. The other man
ran in front of her car and went to th
e oassençr side and
1
pointed his gun at the window towards I
Iface. She could
not remember if she saw anything on the men that identified them
as the police or FBI.
She put the car in park and then heard a gunshot and
the window shattered.
She looked over ati
hnd saw him
holding his face screaming. Prior to hearing the gunshot she
heard the men yelling “put tour hands up”, and she thinks one
said “get out of the card. r
Ihad his seat belt on. She
then opened the door arid two men were yelling for her to get on
the ground and pulled her out of the car to the ground.
I

On 03/02/2002 S Tvnn Thint- c+riged lIP
I the SA. who shot and
Ithat SAl
wounded I
I. on 03/01/2002, was represented by
counsel, and upon the advise of his counsel, would not be giving
a voluntary statement at this time.
-

•

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24

  

2002

Elf:

 

 

(Rev. O82S-2OOO)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEStIGATI ON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

Attn:

CIRG
From:

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt
SAC Stephen R. Wiley

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

02/13/2003

Extension 1837

Hunt L nne

Drafted By:

lrr

Case ID

#: 297—HQ—A127].921—D

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
07/26/2002
SAN JUAN DIVISION

b7C

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting inàident that occurred on 07/26/2002, involving
Special Agents (SAs)I
landl
1
During a Special Weapons and Tactic (SWAT) Team Close Quarter
Sattle (CQB) training exercise, SAsI
LndI
Iwere
firing shots when a bullet ricocheted and seriously injured
SAl
I SIRG members recommended_that rp
administrative action be taken against SA5I
land________
as a result of their involvement in this incident.
However,
SIRG members had numerous observations and issued numerous
recommendations for corrective actions tb prevent reoccurrence
of this type of incident.
Administrative:

I

Reference report of Inspector—in-Place

I dated 08/28/2002.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1807

 __________ntered

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ--Al271921—D,

Inspection
02/13/2003

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 07/26/2002, Agents of the San Juan Division were
conducting a SWAT Team, CQB training exercise within a Shoot House
range at Camp Santiago, Salinas, Puerto Rico.
During the course of training for a two-man entry exercise,
SAsI
land
the room after the
introduction of a flash-bang device and discharged H&K rP-5 weapons at
a stationary target trap.
The discharge of the weapons resulted in
the ricochet of several rounds off of a desk top, which also appeared
to have missed the target trap and ricocheted off the concrete wall
immediately behind the target trap.
One of the rounds ricocheted
upwards toward the catwalk where SAl
Iwas observing
and struck him in the right eye.
-

Sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., members of the
SWAT Team arrived at the Camp Santiago Shoot House.
The team received
detailed “talk through” and “walk through” training related to, two and
four man room entries and clearing techniques. The training was led
by SWAT Team Leader (TI,) SA I
I, who provided new
operators copies of the SWAT Training 4anual pertaining to CQB
training.
During the “walk through” training the importance of shot
placement, weapon discipline, safety and shot accuracy were emphasized
to min1mi the potential -for ricochet dangers.
Daring the training,
TLI
I advised operators to fully load their MP—5 weapons
consisting of 25 rounds of l0xnin Full metal Jacket, “ball” type,
ammunition.
After the “walk through” training exercisesr a detailed
safety briefing was conducted by
I the designated Safety .6
Officer.
The safety briefing concentrated on identifying the
)b7c
designated ambulance in the event of an injury, EMT personnel,
location of the Aid Bag, and air and ground Medvac plans were
coordinated and confirmed.
After the afety briefing conducted by SA l
Assistant SWAT TL SAl
I a Certified Firearms
Instructor, provided a second briefing regarding the use of live
ammunition in the Shoot House and again cautioned partic±pants about
potential ricochet danger. All members were instructed to utilize
their SWAT gear consisting of a helmet and vest as well as hearing and
eye protection.

2

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297—HQ—A1271921—D, 02/13/2003

A final instruction and demonstration regarding the use and
safe deployment of a flash-bang device was provided by TLI
I
Operators_were instructedto leave the Shoot rouse to llow
TL[
Ito prepare the training room. sl
esigned,
participated in, and supervised the arrangement of the room to be used
during the exercise which included target/trap placement and .the
placement of an empty metal file cabinet and an executive style wood
desk.

I

Aaooroxmately 1L45 a.m., sAl
e1ected SAs
las the first team to perform a two-man entry
exercise using live ammunition.
Both Agents wore complete SWAT gear
and were armed with H&K M-5 weapons, loaded with 10mm Full 4etal
Jacket, Hballu type, ammunition and fully loaded sidearms.

landi

b7C

After being advjd thM observers, sfetv oficejs. and
evaluators were ready, SAl
unformed SAsI
land I
I
that the live fire exercise was ready to begin.
He provided each with
a practice flash bang device and instructed them to prepare for room
entry.
Both Agents were asked if they had ay questions and both
responded in a negative manner.
ml
unformed the Agents that
on the count down, as previously rehearsed, they we±e to execute a
two-xçan single room live dynamic entry using the practice flash bang
provided.

I

After the countdown was completed without incident, SAS

landi

lexecuted the two—jnan entry.

Just prior to the

commencing of the live fire drill, SI
iwalked south on the
catwalk toward the target corner to get a better view of the

participants.as they delivered the flash bang device. Immediately
after the flash bang device was delivered, SAl
j turned his head

away from the room in order to protec
detonation.
After the detonation, SA
evaluate the participants.

his

fpre and body from the
Iturned back around to

SAsI
land
lentered the room ai
d beaan
2
discharging their H&K MP—5 weapons. According to SAl
1 he
recalled looking into.the room at the shooters as they were firing and
hea.rd two or three shots before being slruck in the eye by an object.
The force of the impact spun SAl
laround forcing him to land in
a prone position on his stomach. He realized he had been hit in the
right eye, noted the missing right eye piece to his sunglasses and
coild fl h]ood runping down his face. After a few seconds,
SAl
Iturned SAl
Ion his back and began to
administer first aid and was quickly transported to the first aid
station at Camp Santiago.
SAl
Iwas carried down to the
3

Savage- 1809

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 ___________

____

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—Ai271921—D,

Inspection
02/13/2003

evacuation vehicle for transport to the base helicopter pad and
evacuated to the Centro Medico Trauma Center,
On 12/03/2002, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the following
voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, EJSDOJ;1__________________
Trial Attorney, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ;I
I Chief Inspector, Office of

Inspections,

Insoectiori Division;I

j Acting Section

Chief, Applicant Processing Section, Administrative Services
Division; Charles D. Elder, Section Chief, Operational Support
Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
Unit
I
Chief, Investigative La Unit, Office of te
enerai counsel;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; SSA I
iProgram Manager. Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division; SSAI_______________
Washington Field Office; and SSA
IFireas
Toolmarks Un±t, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division.
The only nonvoting member present wasi
Management/Program Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
—

I

Observations and Reoowaendations of the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluatiie analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recoimnendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
SIRG members held a lengthy discussion regarding
this_incident and unanimously concurred that the injury to

SAl
Iwas the result of a myriad of unsafe actions and
inattention to rules and regulations by individuals
participating in the exercise. These actions include, but
are not limited to, no contact by the FBI with the National
Guard regarding the use of the shoot house; no red flag
hoisted indicating that the shoot house was in use; observers
were located in the line of fire; furniture was placed in the
room in direct violation of Standard Operating Procedures
4

Savage- 1810

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(SOPs)_established by the military, as well as the neglec
t of
SAl
Ito utilize appropriate helmet and goggles during
the exercise.
These issues resulted in the issuance of
numerous recommendations by IRG members.
Arrangements for use of the shoot hot1
mr
prior to the day of the incident through 14aorI
and Sergeant I
I of Company C, 3rd Battalion,
7th Special Forces Group.
The Puerto Rico Army National
Guard has responsibility for the ranges at Camp Santiago and
utilize SOPs prepared by the Special Forces Group.
According
to an individual of the Puerto Rico Wational Guard, use of
the shooting house required contact with the National Guard
Range Control.
Once approval is granted for use of a
facility, users are required to get a safety briefing at
Range Control who subequently provide a flag to be displayed
at the range being utilized. Additionally, the entity
utilizing the range would be required to have a person
present at Range Control with radio communication capability
to facilitate communication between Range Control and the
users at the range.

I

Although

TLI

1consulted with the Special

Forces Group regarding the use of the shooting house, proper
coordination with the National Guard was not accomplished.
Therefore, no red flag was hoisted indicating that the shoot
house was in use.
TLI
the arrangement
The arrangement
placement of an
style wood desk.
half the target

esigned, participated and supervised
of the room to be used during the exercise.
included target/trap placement and the
omptymeta). file cabinet and an executive
The placement of the desk obscured at least
from the view of the shooters.

It should be noted that a review of the SOPs for
using the shoot house regarding CQB Safety specifically
address required safety equipment as well as the instruction
that no furniture will be poitioned ihere it may mask an
assaulter.
Additionally, SAl
[admitted that prior to

07/26/2002, he had never seen a copy of the SOPs for the
shoot house nor had he requested information regarina a ris
assessment on the shooting house. According to
SAl
it never occurred to him to do his own risk assessthen.
iie
also advised that the Special Forces Group never advised him
to avoid using furniture to obstruct targets and that the

5

Savage-1811

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Re:

Inspection From:
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297—HQ--A1271921—D, 02/13/2003

prohibition against placing furniture in front of targets
would have ben important information and would have
influenced his decisions regarding the use of the house.
This discussion led to the issuance of three
recommendations for the Critical Incident Response Group
(CIRG).
Members opined that the CIRG should review
established protocols for shoot houses and reiterate to all
offices proper procedures for using shoot houses; conduct an
onsite review of the San Juan SWAT Program and report lessons
learned to all offices to prevent this type of occurrence in
the future; and that the role and responsibility of the.SWAT
Coordinatdr and SWAT Advisor be clarified and documented.
next area of discussion pertained to
j SXRG members discussed the possibility of a candor
issue s well as SAl
ldisobeying a direct order made by
Assistant Special Agent in Charge Jose E. Figueroa.

Til

I

I

According to SAl
Ithe Friday before the shooting
incident, he and SiI
lmet withi
I and
llnitially SAl
ladvised that he asked Major
j.f the FBI could use the range the following Friday.
He
then advised that he couldn’t recall whether he asked about using
the range.
Later in the conversation, SAl
ladvised that he
did recall asking the Major if they could use the range but could
not remember Najor[
Iresponse, if anything. When advised’ by
the_interviewing Agents that Majorl
aid he informed
SAl
Ithat he could use the range but not for live fire,
SAl
Idenied that was the case.
When asked what wa said
regarding the use of the sh9oting house and live fire, SAl
could not recall.
SIRG members recommended that further inquiry o
this incident be conducted by the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) to confirm that this incident occurred as
described by SA[
1
Another issue related to SAl
ldisobeying an order
of ASAC Figueroa. According to ASAC Figueroa, on the afternoon of
the incident, while at the hospital with SA
I he told the
SWAT members present, including SAl
I not to discuss the
shooting until they had provided statements to the Bureau pursua
nt
to shooting inquiry policy.
According to sAl
1 qp the Tuesday ater the
incident, he and SAL
Imet with Major I
land
Colonel Cruz at Camp Santiago to discuss the incident.

6

Savage- 1812

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271921—D, 02/13/2003

According to SAE
I on the Monday after the shooting,
lasked him to accompany him to a meeting at Camp Santiago
because the Camp Safety Officer_wanted to know what happened.
sA1
lexplained to SAl
tthat FBI management wanted to
protect the relationship with the military.

sAt

ASAC Figueroa advised that SPI
Idid not ask him
for authority to talk to Army National Guard or Special Forces
personnel about the shooting.
When confronted with the information
provided by ASAC Figueroa, SAt
Istated that he told ASAC
•Figueroa the Army wanted to talk to him about the shooting and that
the ASAC had given him authority to meet with them.
-

At the conclusion of the interview with SAl
lon
08/20/2002, he was directed to refrain from discussing any of the
matters with anyone_involved until the inquiry was concluded.
Upon
questionina. Si’I
ladmitted he had already talked to
524
labout hçw to respond to questions regarding a meeting
previously held withi
I He acknowledged he was purportedly
taking a break froza the interview to use the restroom.
SAl________
fu;ther admited that he asked to take the break in order to contac
SAl
Ihn hd iust been interviewed by Inspectors_and anted
to advise SA I
Ithat there was an issue with
I

I

6

Additionally, a review of SAl
IFD—302 dated
08/20/2002, identified several areas in which there existed a
perceived lack of candor on his part.
These issues dealt with him
not being told that he should not place furniture in front of a
target, an issue with the safety of using the shooting house, and,
althouQh not intentional, a deceptive response when adised by

Ithat they could use the house as long as he had a copy of
the SO? and a medical evacuation plan. All of these issues in
totality resulted in the recommendation that further inquiry of this
incidnt be conucted by the OPR regarding possible lack of candor
on SAl
L part.as well as his •rieglect in complying with ASAC
Figüeroa’s instruction regarding further discussion of the incident.
The next area of discussion by SIRG members pertained to
the performance of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
1b7C
I
in is role as the SWAT Advisor for the San Juan Division.
SSAI
appointed as the SWAT Advisor on 04/22/2002 by then
SAC Marlene Hunter.

Iwas

On the day of the incident, SSAI
lbserved the SWAT
training conducted at the shooting house.
After the safety
briefing, the order to “gear up” was given.
Both SSAI
land

7

Savage-1813

 To:
Re:

Inspection Front:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271921—D, 02/13/2003

SAl
Iwere positioned on the cat walks above the target room in
order to observe the exercise.
Neither was wearing_aporopriate head
-gear and this was brought to the attention of sAl
lwho elected
not to wear his he.met.
These actions resulted in the belief by
SIRG members •that as the SWAT Advisor, SSAI
Idid not use good
judgement regarding his-safety and well as that of
SAl
1

I

According to SSAI

I

no duties or responsibilities
SSRA
ladvised that he had discussed his role on several occasions
with former SAC Hunter. to clarify what was expected of him and felt
that the expectations -were vague and non—specific.
SSAI
I
advised that since his assignment as SWAT Advisor he was advised by
TIl
I when and what type of training is scheduled.
It was
SSA I
Ibelief that his role with the SWAT Team was not to be
a supervisory role with attendant responsibilities based upon his
review of the MIOG and his communication with the SAC.
This
discussion resu1td in the recommendation that the SAC of CIRG
clarify and document the role and responsibilities of the SWAT
Coordinator and SWAT advisor positions and advise all offices.
nf th SWAT Advisor had been articulated
or documented.

The last issue discussed regarding the incident evolved
around SAl
Idecision not to utilize a Keviar helmet or
appropriate eye protection as required by the SOPs regarding CQB
activities.
-

According to SAl
I he was wearing Bolle sunglasses
at the time of the accident.
He stated that he had purchased high
quality, double pane, goggles but did not elect to wear them at the
session.
Additionally, S1
Iecided to not wear his helmet
because he feared errant rounds traveling up from the shooting area
could be trapped in his helmet and cause additional damage to his
head.
As stated previously, an Agent specifically addressed the
issue of SAl
Inot wearing his kevlar helmet with Mm. Agaiñ’
SAl
Jresponded that in the event of a bullet strike he
preferred if the bullet exited clean without striking the inside of
the helmet and possibly ricocheting back into his head.
This
discussion led to the recommendation that the SAC of the San Juan
Division remind all Special Agents to utilize available protective
gear when appropriate.
This matter will be brought to the attention
of the SAC.

8
Savage- 1814

b7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection From
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271921-D, 02/13/2003

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:

INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no dministrative action be taken against
SAsI
landi
hs a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.
Set Lead 2:
cRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP
AT OUANTICO

VA

That the SAC, CIRG, review established protocol
regarding the use of shoot houses and reiterate this protocol
to all field offices.
Set Lead 3;

CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP
AT OUANTICO, VA
That SAC, CIRG, conduct an onsite review of the San
Juan Division SWAT Program.
Set Lead 4:
CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP
AT OUANTICO
That SAC, CIRG, clarify and document the role and
responsibilities of the SWAT Coordinator and. SWAT Advisor
positions and advise all offices.

9
Savage- 1815

r

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ—A1271921—D,

Inspection
02/13/2003

Set Lead 3:
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AT WASHINGTON,

Q

That AD, OPR, conduct further inquiry of this incident
regarding possible lack of candor on SAl
Ipart as well as
his neglect in complying with ASAC Figueroas insfruction regarding
further discussion of the incident.

1
2

Mr
rn. 7142
Mr
I
7427
(1
Msi_________ Rir. 7326)
1
Mrs. Hunt, L’rn. /25
1
Mr..I
IRm. 7129.
(Attention:
Adjudication Unit)
1
Mn
7837
2.
Ms
USDOJ
1
Mr.
SDOJ
1
Mr. ier, Rrn. 5155
1
Mr
Rm. 6650
1—Mr
,
Rm, 3787F
1
Mr
Quantico
2.
Mr
Quantico
1-Mr
WFO
2.
Mrs
Rm. 7861
—

—

.

—

—

—

—

IRm.

—

-

—

—

-

-

—

I

++

10
Savage- 1816

 (Rev. 08-28.2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection
Training

From:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

1

1

AD Steven C. McCraw
SAC Andrew R. Bland, III
Extension 1837

McCraw Steve1f—

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #;

297-HQ-A1270951-D

Title;

12/04/2003

j:lrr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
03/01/2002
BALTIMORE DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 03/0/2002, involving
Special Agent (SA)I
I While Federal and
local law enforcement officers were attempting to arrest an
individual believed to be an armed and dangerous bank robbery
subject, SAl_____ fired one round from his Bureau-issued M-4,
5.56 millimeter rifle injuring an individual believed to be the
bank robbery subject.
SIRG members recommended_that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
ks a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

.

I

Administrative:

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
03/08/2002.

Idated

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1817

 ___Ihad

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-Al270951-D, 12/04/2003
Details of the Shooting Incident

On Wednesday, 02/20/2002, at approximately 9:42
a.m., a lone, unidentified white male entered the Allfirst Bank
in
Pasadena, Maryland, approached a bank teller and yelled words
to
the effect, “Get down on the floor”. All bank employees complied
with the robber’s commands. As the bank robber displayed a pistol
to one bank teller’s face, she complied with his command to give
money. The bank robber, continuing to display the pistol, moved
to
another teller and shouted words to the effect, “Give me your
money. You’ve got ten seconds or I’ll blow your fuckin’ brains
out”. The second teller also complied with the robber’s demand far
money. After obtaining money from both tellers, the armed robber
exited the front door of the bank. Witnesses observed the robber
get into the passenger seat of a dark aree
i, Ford Ranger, truck
1
with lettering, “Bonded and insuredi
I” on the side. The truck
was subsequently recovered by officers of the Anne Arunde]. County
Police Department (AACPD).

SAl

lof the nnapo1is Resident Agency

(ARA) was assigned as the case Agent for the bank robbery. On
02/20/2002, Si
linterviewed the owner of the truck used by
the bank robber, and was advised that he loaned the truck to his
neighbor on the evening of 02/19/2002.
It was subsequently
determined that someone had removed the truck from its parking
place.

On 02/26/2002, sil
Iwas contacted by a Detective
of the AACPD who advised that he received information that
rpnt1v rrthh a bank in Pasadena.
The
Detective also advised that I
Iwas a crack and heroin
addict who had recently been released from jail.
Information was
also received that an individual known as[
1(last name unknown)
was involved in the bank robbery.

b7C

Based on the illfortnation recçived by SAl
I he
obtained a photograph oi
las well as the bank
surveillance photographs. “1
Ishowed the photographs to
four individuals and all of them believed that the sublect in the
k qin-vci 1 lance photographs was indeed I
1
bar
SAl
lalso received information regarding[
current residence, the fact that he had not wore on O2/Uf2QU2,
and he was not home on the evening of 02/19/2002. Additionally,
A I
Iwas advised that al
1h

•1
2

Savage-1818

 ____________Iwould

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-MQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

sPI

On 03/01/2002, at aproximate1y 12:07 a.m.,
was advised that I
had returned to his room with a
girlfriend.
Information was also received that 1
1
admitted to an acquaintance that he had committed a felony. W1ien
asked if he had robbed a bank.I
1stated, tINo,I
Idid.
I drove the getaway car
. I
11
ubsequent1y received a
phone call and was advised the FBI was looking for him.

I

I

Between 8:15 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., SAl
Ireceived a
phone call frorri
I the_individual previously identified as
being the bank robber. SI
hecocnized the callers voice as7
belonging to an individual known asi
I
who he previously arrested for bank robbery. During his
conversation with SA[
I
Iadrnitted knowingt
Ibut denied any involvement in any crimes with him.
dvised SAl
ltthat he was not going to say anything
else and stated that he would contact SAl
hater, possibly
with an attorney.

SAl
Lontacted an Assistant United States Attorney
(AUSA) and described the events that had taken place. The AUSA
advised an arrest warrant fan
be signed later
that afternoon.
Later that day, sJ
received additional
information from an acquaintance of I
l(hereafter

rpferrpd t,

riirr1

.1

He also advisedi
tad
heard that the FBI was looking for him and he was going to flee.
The source also statedi
Iwas sounding hysterical,
crying and heaving, and was an emotional mess.
It was also

believed thatl

bight be suicidal because he had

previously stated that he would not go back to prison.

SAl
blaced another telephone call to the AUSA
handling the case, conveying the earlier conversation he had with
the source.
The AUSA agreed on the e4gent circumstances and
authorized the arrest of I
lat the planned meeting later

that day.

SAl
Agent (A/SSRA)

I

icontacted Acting Supervisory Special 7
Resident
Iregarding the exigency of the

situation and the need to execute an arrest.

He also advised of

his conversation with the AUSA and the fact t-ht- hqi Irnr-jn review
of an NCIC printout and source information, I
Iwas
believed to be Armed ,and Dangerous, a crack head and heroin addict,
and there was strong evidence that he might flee the area.

3

Savage-1819

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

A/SSRAI
lagreed to go ahead with the arrest and
onttø n-inn tant Special Agent in
Charge (A/ASAC)
I advising him of the situation j’- -‘‘rsted
additional Agents to assist with the arrest. A/ASACL
requested that an Operations Plan be facsimiled to himas wc]1
as
his completed affidavit. A/ASACI
pdvised A/SSRAI
Ithat
he would send five additional Agents to assist and
to attend the
briefing at the ARA. A/SSRAI
Ireceived specific instructions
to ensure that all Agents participting in the operati
on_receyed a
complete briefing. A/SSRAI
lalso advised A/ASACI
Ithat
an Operations Plan would be prepared and forwarded
to him via
facsimile.
A short time later,_A/ASAcI
Ireceived another
telephone call from A/SSRAI
land SA I
Iwho oTovided
additional details regarding the opçration SAl
I advised
that the source would be talking tot
.1 around 4:00 p.rn.,
an that thr ws a good_possibility that he would lead
the Agents
tol
I. A/ASAc
ladvised A/SSR?4
he had
verbal approval for the operation, however, he needed a Ithat
copy of the
Operations Plan facsimiled to him prior to the Agents going
out.
Five Agents were notified and instructed to attend the
3:00 p.m., arrest briefing in the ARA.
Iprepared a
sI
handwritten information sheet for distribution to the Agents
participating in the urvi1lance/arrest. The sheet includ
ed a
photograph of
a brief physical_description, and a
j
description o vehicles used by him. SAl
JaJ.so prepared
handwritten Operations Plan attaching the arrest affidavit as a
well
as an NCZC report regardingi
These documents were
also provided to A/SSRN
I
The arrest was olanned to be a static event when the

I

Jthe plan

called for both individuals to be arrested.
SAl
Ileft the
building and conducted a radio check with the ARA while
in his
Bureau vehicle.

During the arrest brief ma. narticiDants were adviqpr

I

un

Glen Burnie, Maryland.

Also discussed at the briefing was
The olan noted
that in the event a positive identification of
I
l’ias
the possibility of a stationary vehicle arrest.

made, the team would block his vehicle and effect the
arrest.
Specific duties of arrest team members, including the
identification of a specific signal once a positive identif
ication

4

Savage- 1820

3

 t

To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

was made ofl
were not made due to the uncertainty of
the situation. No specific individual was designated the
responsibility of positively identifying the suspect and no formal
designation of a team leader was made. Arrest team merters were
advised that AACPD Detectives would be assisting in the operation.

1

Arrest team members were subsequently notified that the
meeting would likely take place in the vicinity of the Sun Valley
Shopping_Center. At approx.matelv 4:00 o.m.. the source contactd
SAl
Jand advised thati

I

I

SAl

I

Immediately following his rrnvprcM-ic,n with the source
1
l-r’iv3 a phone call froml
lasking what was

going on. I
going home.

SAL

ladvised him that nothing was going on and he was

r’1 1 r1

czJ

Lrr

qrj

j
Intorrnatlon was proviaea
that the driver of the vehicle could bel
lwho was with
jwas described as having
Ithe night bet ore.I
short, red hair. Additionally, information was provided that
lusually wore a white baseball cap.

i

SAl
icontacted sI
I via Nextel
and advised of the intended location for the meeting with
I SA[
1 then transmitted the meeting location
inrormation over the FBI radio. SAl
ladvised participants
that I
Iwas being driven in a car by a possible
redheaded, white female.
.
Between 5:15 and 5:30 p.m., S)E

Ireported that the

L_
________
I
of Glen Burnie.

I

I

I

As he pulled up to thel
Ihe observedj
Honda Civic being driven 1y the subject’s sister. I
SAl

the vicinity

I

Iby phone, however his cell phone went dead.
Ivehicle did not return to the convenience store.

5

Savage-1821

I

in a red

D

C
7D

 n

4
To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

I

Igr-rA

the

I

I At approximately 5:50 p.m.,
SAd
land!
[bserved a late model, red vehicle
(subsequently identifiçd as a Pontiac Grand Am) drive into
the 7-11
store parking lot.
SAl
fradioed that a red vehicle had -lust
I
LDbserved a white male wearing a white baseball cap exit’

SAl

the passenger side front seat of the vehicle and enter the
store.
The subject stayA in
o three minutes and
appeared to meetl
Ibeore exiting the store
and re-entering the red vehicle. SAl
lconçluded that the
subject had possib].yI
Idue to his
observing them in close proximity to each other within the store
and appearing to have had contact.
‘-

-‘

I

I

I

I

SAs
andi
lindicated they could see the red
vehicle and from their vantage point across the street, it appear
ed
as thciuoh the white male passenger fit the physical
description of
According to SAl
I this assumption was made
because the passenger appeared to be a white ma1e approximatel
y
the same height, weight, and age ael
land was wearing a
baseball cap, as was his habit. The Agent could not see tje
driver of the vehicle, however, advised SAl
lof the
presence of the vehicle and its occupants and ‘eauested that he
make an attempt to observe the driver. As SAsI
I and
to move in the direction of the 7-11, they
heard over the radio that the subject was in a “red car”. They
observed a red car arid, its occupants exiting the west entrance/exit
of the store parking lot. The vehicle was driven by a red-haired,
white female. The_passenger was a white male wearing a white
baseball cap. SAl
I heard someone cal]. out over the radio,
“Follow the red car.. .don’t loose it”.

I

tJ

notify the FBI and tell them
Iwas a passenger in a red
Honda located in the vicinity of the 7-11 store at Route 648 and
Marley Nec Road.
Two AACPD Detectives received a call on the
radio tl-iatl
a subject they were looking for was driving around
a 7-11 store in a small red car. One of the detectives immed
iately
phoned the dispatcher to obtain additional information about the
caller. The dispatcher advised that she had received a 911
call
I and “the bad
guy. .the one you’re looking for, just drove by the 7-11 in
a red
-

I

.

6

Savage-1822

 I
To:
Re:

Inspection
From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

Honda driven by his sister.” While the detective was on the phone
with the dispatcher, saI
Icontacted the detectives over the
radio and told them the subject was in a red car traveling north on
648.

SAl
Idid not report any positive cot with th
source nor did he receive positive confirmation thatl
1
had been at the 7-li store. However, SAI
Iwas convinced
thati
Iwas probably in the red car which had been
parked adjacent to the source’s truck at the 7-11 store, that the
vehicle was moving on Highway 648 northbound, and that it needed to
be followed.
SAl
‘advised the red vehicle was exiting the 7-11
store parking 1tand was turnng right op Marly Neck Boulevard.
SA
ndI
I advised s1
Ivia Nextel to
follow the red vehicle. According to 54
I he also advised
they did not know who was in the car.
SAd
landi
Iwere temporarily prevented from
following the red vehicle due to traffic, however, a short time
later_-joined the lead FBI vehicle who was following the red car.
s14
radioed that the subject vehicle was approaching a red
light an moments later advised that the vehicle was at the red
light. He also asked if a vehicle stop should be initiated.
SA
Iresponded, “Yes, go ahead if you think you can
.
11
The subject veic1e ws stopped at the red light with
its brake lights on. SAl
Ipulled up behind the vehicle,
placed the red and blue visor emergency light into the down
position, and activated the merczençy lights. As the emergency
lights were activated and SAl
Ireached for his siren, it
appeared the driver of the vehicle was responding by releasing the
car brakes
t1ning right on the red traffic light. SAl
I
advised SAl
Ito activatp ih Wlg Wag headlights, the visor
strobe and the siren. As SAl
Igave the siren several short
blasts, the red vehicle turned right on red and rapidly
accelerated. Belisying the subject vehicle was attempting to evade
the stop, SAl
lrositioied his vehicle along the left side of
the vehicle while sAl
Ipositioned his vehicebeh±id and
slightly to the left of the subject vehicle. SA
lattempted
to force the red vehicle to the side of the road in order to effect
the traffic stop.
SAl
Imade eye contact with the female driver
of the subject vehicle and motioned for her to pull over. He
yelled, “Police.
Pull over”, several times through his closed
window. The female pulled onto the shoulder of the road.
SAl______
exited from the front passenger side of the lead FBI vehicle and

Savage-1823

 —

I

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

moved to the front of the red vehicle with I’ MP-c -rifle pointe
d
at the occupants of the subject vehicle.
s4
Iretrieved his
MP-5 rifle and ran to the driver’s side door of the subject vehicle
and attempted to open the locked driver’s door. He pounded
on the
driver’s window and called out, “FBI... Open the door”. He
also
heard severl Aaenis on the passenger’s side yelling, “Show me
your
hands”.
SAl
Iwas concentrating on the driver, attempting to
verbally direct her to open the door and exit the vehicle, when he
heard a “pop” sound.
The ternale creamed and opened her door. As
she exited the vehicle, SAl
I using the palm of his hand,
pushed her in the middle of the back down on the ground and
instructed her to put her hands above her head.

SAl
lexited his vehicle and proceeded around the
front of the subject vehicle to the passenger side. slj was
shouting, “Police I
Police! Show me your hands I” from the time he
exited his vehicle until he reajhed the passenger side of the
vehicle. According to SAl
I he never saw either person in the
red vehicle raise their hands. He attempted to open the passenger
side door, however, it walockd. As his attempt to open the door
failed, SA
j heard S?4
I yelling, “show me your hands”.
Imaking contact with the female
?rior o SAl
driver, SAl
Istepped to the right Rni mtie eye contact with her
tIVtl1ah the passenger side window.
sil
Iwas aware that
in position to cover the passenger and believed the
driver_ws in a better position to unlock the vehicle doors.
SAl
lyelled for her to “unlock the door”. As
saw the
driver’ a left hand move towards the door, SA I
Igain yelled to
the driver to unlock the door. As he was yelling fpt± jiriver to
unlock the door, the passenger window exploded. BA!
aw the
passenger move over to the left and his face was covered with glass
and blood.
-

Immediately following the shooting, sil
Lpened the
passenger door, pulled out the passengerput hm face down on the
ground, and placed him in handcuffs.
SAl
I a Wationally
Registered Emergency Medical Technician
Paramedic, provided
medical treatment to the male passenger while awaiting the arrival
of an ambulance. During the course of providing care to the
victim. SAl
I ased him his name. The victim advised his name
was I
Lias advised by one of the Agents on
i
8
I
the_scene that the victim was not identical to bank robbery_subi
ect
I Upon confirmation of this information, SAL
instructed that the victim be uncuf fed.
-

-

8

Savage-1824

 d

i
To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

After the patient was evacuated, SAL
sked
SAl
lwhat had transpired. Accordizg to SAl
[the subject
did not comply with his and
Iverbal commands to show his
SA!
hands ançI had reached toward his waist on several occasions.
SAl______ advised that_these actions put him in fear for his life as
well as that of SAl
I therefore he shot the subject in an
attempt to eliminate the threat.
A declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of Jusice, Civil Rights Division, on
06/11/2003, regarding SAl
j actions in this shooting_incident.
On 07/02/2 002, a grand jury decided not to indict si4
regarding his actions during this shooting incident.

I

I
I

I

On 10/15/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistait Director
Steven C. McCraw, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the 9
followin voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
jDeputy Chief, Domestic Security Section,
Criminal Division, USDOJt Assistant Special Agent in Charge
j Invqptiaat ions Divisio;, Office of Inspector
General, USDOJ; I
I Chief Insoecto, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;j
JAssistant
Section Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;I
lunit Chief (UC),
Physical Surveillance Unit, Counterintelligence Division;
I UC. Natioria]L Firearms Program, Training
Division (TD); I
I IJC. Ttve Law Unit,
Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
I UC.
Firearms Training Unit, Training Din
1
Program Manager, Operational Skills Unit,
;
b7C
SSAI
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
Anafsis Section, Laboratory Division; SSAf
I
I Investigative Law Unit, OGC; and SSA I
Field Office.
The three non-voting members present
were
Was11
SS
ingn
Operational Skills Unit, TD;
I Management/Program
I
Analysts, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.
-

I

-

-

9

Savage- 1825

b6

b7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Prom:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incid
ent with
the intent to
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative 1
analysis
observations, and recommendations for corre
ctive actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3)
provide recom
mendations concerning training and/or safet
y issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administ
rative action if
deemed necessary.
The first area of discssion y the SIRG perta
ined
to the use of deadly force by SAl
Members discussed the
I
fact that the incident involved a high risk
vehicle stop and
that the totality of circumstances surroundi
ng_the incident
resulted in the use of deadly force by
S2
With the
exception of one attendee who stated that after I
reviewing the
information provided, he could not visualize
the presence of
“imminent danger” to law enforcement officers,
members
concurred that the use of deadly force was
justified. The
final_decision by the majority of the SIRG
members was that
justified in his use of deadly force arid that
no
administrative action should be taken again
st him as a result
of his involvement in this shooting incident.
The next area of discussion centered around
the
operations plan, management oversight and train
ing or safety
issues. Members unanimously opined that the
operations plan
as well as management oversight provided
was adequate in this
incident. However, members held a lengthy
discussion
regarding felony car stops.
Areas of discussion included the actual exec
ution of
a felony car stop as being a “high risk”
action.
The
following should be considered when conductin
g a high risk car
stop:
1)
Attempt to make a compliant stop with continge
ncies
in place if the compliant stop fails and
2> Agents should
maximize the use of cover at the initiation
of the stop and
should only leave cover in the most extreme circu
mstances.
SIRG members noted that Agents participating
in the car stop
did not utilize cover electing instead to
run towards the
subject vehicle.
Participants recognized that Agents must
assess each situation and determine the prop
er tactical
response, bearing in mind that safety is para
mount. The
attendee representing the Operational Skill
s Unit of the
Training Division advised S!RG members that
tactical training
is required for Agents (MIOG Part 2, Section
12, 10.8-10.12);

10

Savage- 1826

b6

 4
*

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 12/04/2003

however, felony car stops are not specifically requ
ired as
part of the training. This discussion resulted
in a
recommendation that the Training Division mandate
that felony
car stops are a portipn of required tactical train
ing.
Members also noted that differing instructions were
simultaneously being voiced by Agents on the scene.
Members
opined that training dictates that one individua
l should be
the speaker and issue commands. The Training
Division
representative advised that this is a part of the curre
nt
tactical training.
-

The SIRG opined that through training and the re
enforcement of established tactical principles,
the needless
risk of exposure to injury may be reduced.

ii

Savage-1827

 To:
Re:

Inspection
Prom:
Inspection
297-HQ-Al27Q95l-D, 12/04/2003

LEAD (e):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTOI DC
That rio administrative action be taken against
as a result of his involvement in
SAl
th.s shooting incident.

b6

Set Lead 2:
TRAINING DIVISION
AT OTJANTICO, VIRGINIA
That SAC, Training Division, mandate and implement a
requirement that high risk vehicle stops must be included in required
tactical training consistent with the Manual of Investigative
Operations and Guidelines.

1

Mr.j
IRm. 7142
Msj
1m. 7427
1
Mr. Bland, Quantico
1
Mr. McCraw, Rm. 7825
1
Mr I
1Rp. 7837
1-Mr
JUSDOJ
1-Mr
PIG
1
Mr
jRm. 5155
Mr
Rm. 1B045
(Attention: Mn
1
Mrj
uantico
1
Ms.I
IRm. 7326
1
Mr
Quantico
1
Mxj
Quantico
1
Quantico
Mn

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

I

1

1
1

Mn
Mrs.

Mrs.

Wo
,

,

Rm. 7861

Rm. 7861

12

Savage- 1828

 _____jlrr _____
___________

FEDERAL BUREAU 0F INVESTIGATION

Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 121OS/2002

.

Inspection

Attn:
•

From:

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt

Inspection

Contact:
Approved By:

Hunt Lynne A

Iten5i0n

F’

1837

-

Drafted By:
Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
0/12/2002
EL PASO tIVISION

297-HQ-A1271507-D

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on
involving Special
Agent (SA)
Idischarged one
I SAl
round from his Bureau issued Glock Model 23, 40 caliber pistol at
an individual who was about to throw a large rock at him and who
was part of a large group of individuals that assaulted and
severely wounded two other El Paso Division Agçit.
SIRq members
recommended that no action be taken against SAl
las a
result of his involvement in this shooting inciaent.
(SSA)

I

Reerence report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated 11/08/2002.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1829

 A

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ--A1271507-D, 12/05/2002
Details of the Shooting Incident

on 09/12/2002, members of the FBI Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Team, United States Customs Service, Union Pacific
Railroad Police Department and the United States Border Patrol
were involved in an operation to attempt to apprehend train
robbers and train wreckers.
As part of the operation, off icia1s
from the Republic of Mexico Customs and the Juarez Municipal
Police agreed to provide assistance to law enforcement officials
by apprehending any Mexican Nationals fleeing from U.S. law
enforcement officials as they attempted to illegally re-enter
Mexico.
Officers and Agents were positioned throughout the
area, including positions on the train cars approximately 500
yards apart. At approximately 8:24 p.m., an eastbound train on
the Union Pacific Railroad tracks began stopping and seven
unidentified individuals were seen running from the south side in
single file and illegally crossing into the U.S. through a hole
in the fence separating the U.S. from Mexico.
Additional
individuals were also observed heading toward the fence and after
crossing into the U.S., the individuals approached the stopped
train.
Several individuals boarded the train, while others
walked down the length of the train to other cars.
As the train stopped, an individual boarded the top
part of a train car containing t1ree Ageits.
As the subject
walked across the top portion of the train car, he was pulled
into the well by SAl
land apprehended. As
additional individuals attempted to board the train and Agents
attempted to effect arrests, the individuals as well as two of
the Agents disembarked from the train.
As SAl
isembarked from the train,
she observed and pursued a male toward the hole in the fence.
She grabbed the subject as he approached the fence, however he
escaped her hold.
SAl
lapprehended the subject again on
the south side of the fence and as she handcuffeth c1ipject
they slid down the north side of the aroyo.
SAl
ladvised
that a large group of people had gathered at the top of the south
side of the arroyo and were throwing large rocks, sticks and
bricks at her in an attempt to free the subject in her custody.

SAl
Iwas struck by numerous rocks and sticks and as she was
attempting to move the subject up the north side of the arroyo,

she was struck in thr hA by a brick causing significant_head
trauma.
As SAL
ttempted to reach SAL
land
provide assistance in the arrest, he was struck in he head by a

large rock or brick.

fence,

SA[

-

As both Agents moved the subject toward the

kias struck in the back of the head with a club.

As SAL
traddled a subject he had arrested and
was maintaining a crouching position in order to prevent the
subjects escape and to minimize his profile behind a bush, he
2

Savage- 1830

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271S07-D,

Inspection
12/05/2O0

-

observed the silhouette of an individual and gestured for the
individual to come to his location.
The individual stopped then
fled through the opening in he fce.
Shortly thereafter, while
in the same position, SAl
lobserved the silhouette of
another individual approach the hole in he fence from the South
side and recognized the individual as SAj
Iwho was bleeding
from the face area.

I

Simultaneously, as SAt
struggled with her
subject, she was repeatedly struck with a baseball bat and
severely beaten.
As two of the subjects escaped, SAl
I Ib’C
crwled to te top of the arroyo and through the fence.
As
SAl
Iros
to communicate with SAl
I
the subject in Sri
I custody escaped and ran towards the
fence opening.
As SAl
Iregained cotr rf
ubject
he was struck in the back by a large rock.
SAl
Iobsexved
approximately one dozen individuals approaching the fence opening
who were yelling and throwing rocks and sand.
Fearing or his
life and that of his two incapacitated team members, SAl__________
drew his pistol and aimed in at the group outside the fence
opening.
Observig a male subject preparing to throw a rock at
him, SAl
laimed his pistol at the
and fired one
round. As the shot was fired, the group immediately fled the
fence opening in an attempt
return to Mexico.
Mexican
officials arrested several
the subjects
the injured Agents
evacuated from the scene for medical assistance.
--

man

to

of

as

were

Interviews of individuals on the scene failed to
indicate any injuries or property damage resulting from the shot
fired by SAl
I
On 12/03/2002, the SIRG met
discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the following
voting members of the SIRG in attendancer
L
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; 1
Trial Attorney, ‘errorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
USDOJI
hchief InsDector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;l
I Acting Section
Chief, Applicant Processing Section, Administrative Services
Division; Charles D. Elder, Section Chiefs On f--nn Siinrrt
Section, Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit
rhf. Tnretigative Law Uiit, Office of the
General Counsel;
[ Unit Chief. Firerms Training Unit, Training
Division; SSAI
I Program Mlnaaer. Practicl
Applications Unit, Training Division; SSAI
I
Washington Field Office; and SSAI
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Sction. Laboratorvpivision.
The only nonvoting member present wasl____________________
Management/Program Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
to

Division,

I

-

-

Savage-1831

 _________land

*

To:
Re:

Inspection Prom.:
297-aQ-A1271507-D,

ihspect±on
12/05/2002

Observations and Recoimnendations of the SIRO
The SIRG reviewed the above-svnosized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations fo corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
traiaing and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG Chairperson emphasized to SIRG members that
the focus of the discussion would strictly pertain to the shot
no other issues related to the planning
fired by SA
or actions ot individuals during the incident.
It was explained
to the group that an investigation had been conducted by the
Division FBIHQ, regarding all other
Criminal Investigative 1
aspects of the incident and no further review was appropriate.
ST mmbrs unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
Iwas justified and in conformance
force by SAl
with the deadly force policy.

Savage- 1832

J

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271507-D,

LE2D

(s):

Inspection
12/05/2002

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVrSION
AT WASHINGTON,

D.C.

That no administrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
?4r.
Rm. 7142
1
Mr.l1. 7427
(1
Rm. 7326>
1
Ms
USDOJ
1
Mr
SDOJ
1
Mr.
Rm. 7837
1
Mr. Elder, Rm. 5155
1
Rrn. 6650
Mn
1
Mr.(
Rm. 3787F
1
Mr.
QuanticQ
1
Mr.
,
Quantico
WPr
1-Mr.
1
Mrs.
Rtn. 7861
1
1

.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

+4

Savage-1833

Jb 6
J7C

 (Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection

Asistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt
Extension i&37

Hunt Lynne A
F

Drafted By:
Cae ID #:

06/12/2003

i

Contact:I

Approved By:

Title:

Date:

-

lrr

297-HQ-A1271285-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHDOTING INeDENT
12/03/2002
CI{ICAGO DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (GIRd reviewed a
shooting 1-1t thM crcurrid çn 12/03/2002 involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I s2
hot and killed a
subject who entered his home and was non-compliant when instructed
to surrender.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative
action be taken against SAl
I as a result of his involvement
in this shooting incident.

I

Administrative:

I

Reference report of Inspector-in-Plaoe
dated 12/20/2002.

Details:
This cornmunicat±on was prepared tfurnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the BIRd with reference to the
captioned shooting.

Savage- 1834

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-]D,

From:
06/12/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 12/03/2002, at approximately 11:50 p.m., SAl
and his spouse were asleep in an upstairs bedroom of their
residence when they were awakened by the barking of their dog
and
loud banging noises originaing from the first floor.
SAl
Iretrieved his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22,
.40 caliber pistol and a flashlight and proceeded to a landing
of
the staircase.
As he àbserved an intruder, 1at fied as
John Flahive, in the downstairs living room, SAl
hocused
his flashlight on the intruder and yeled out. “FBI, get your
hands up”.
F].ahjve turned to face SAL
I holding a knapsack
in one hand while his other hand remained out of sight.

SAl
Irepeatea his command to the subject several
ise his hands, but Flahive remained non-compliant.
SAl
Ishined fti flashlight on. his handgun to sho the
subject that he was armed; however, FJ.ahive ignored SA
and took a step towards the staircase where SA
was
standing.
SAl
Iquickly repeated twicehands
up”.
When the subject refused to comply, SAl
If ired one
shot striking Flahive in the torso, causing him to fall on his
stomach.
Flhive mod his left hand toward his stomach
prompting SAl
Lo yell, “Get your hands where I can see
them”.
The suspect complied with SAl
icommand,
tn

Police and Emergency Medical Service were called and
Flahive was transported to a Berwyn, IllInois, hospital where

four surgeries were performed prio’ to his death on 12/06/2002.

On 12/18/2002, the Berwyn Police Department issued a
report outlining a declination of prosecution by the State’s

Attorney.
On 04/21/2003, a dedlination of prosecution was issued
by the United States Department of Justice, civil Rights

Division.

On 05/08/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the above
.captioned shooting incident.
Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the rneetingwith the following voting
members of the SIRG in attendance:
Deputy
Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;l
IDePUtY
Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, UDOJ;
Assistant Special Agent in Chatge Glenn Powefl. Tnicri
Division, Office of Inspector General, USDOJ;I____
______________
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;

L

2
Savage- 1835

I

 a

•

To:
Re:

Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-D,

From:
06/12/2003

Inspection

Robert K. 1
Cromwell Section Chief, Applicant Processing Section,
Administrative Services Division; Jay C. Manning, Section Chief,
CD-6, Cunterinte11igence Division;j
I, Acting Section
Chief, O?erational Suooort ection, Criminal Investigative
Divisioni
lUnit hief Operational Skills Unit,
Training Division; SSAj
Toolmarks Unit,
I Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
ssP
llnvestigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel; SSA I
I Washington Field Office;
and SSAI
L I”irearms Training Unit, Training
Division.
The oy non-voting member present wa
I Management/Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
lb í
-

Observations and Recoxxmendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incideit-with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, -and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG_members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in compliance with the
deadly force policy.

3

Savage- 1836

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-D,

LEAD

Cs):

From:
06/12/2003

Inspection

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION
Ai’ WASflNGTON DC
That no administra.tive action be taken against
SAl
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

3.
1
3.

Mr.
m. 7142
Mr.
Rm.• 7427
Mrs. Hunt, Rm. 7825
3.
Mr
IRl. 7837
1.
Mr
I USDOJ
1
Ms
1-Mr
FiG
1
Mr. Cromwell, Rm. 6012
1
Mr. 1
Manning Rm. 1B045
1
Mr
IRm. 5135
3.
Mr
Quaniico
,
1
Mr
uantico
1
Mr.
Rm. 7326
1
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr.
WFO
1
Mrs
Rm. .7861
-

-

-

._

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4

Savage- 1837

 1
rr
_______

‘

(Rev. 08-28.2000)

FDAL BUREAU OF NVESTGATFON
Precedence:

ROOTINE

To: Inspection
‘rom:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

pproved By:

Date: 05/17/2004
AD Steven C. McCraw

Extension 1837

1cCraw Stever
1
L-

afted y:
Case ID #:
Title:

297—NQ—A1271466-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/30/2002
DENVER DIVISION

Synopsis
The Shooting Ihcident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that ocçurre on 1/30/2O02 involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I
jfired five rounds from his
SAl
personally owned, Bureau approved. clock Model 27, 40 caliber
pistol, injuring an individual believed to be involved in a
kidnaping.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative action be
taken against SAl
j as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

I

ference report of Inspector—in-Place
I dated 12/05/2002.
Details:
This communipation was prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

Savage- 1838

 To:

Re:

Inspection
From:
Inspection
297—HQ—A1271466—D, 05/1’7/2004
Detail of the Shooting Incident

ximately 11:00 o.m., on 11/30/2002,
I assigned to the Colorado. Springs Resident
Agency, was eh route to his residence in his personally owned
vehicle.
Deciding to purchase gas for his vehc1e, SAl
Iturned
into an entry diye adjacent to a gas station.
As he was making
the turn, SA[
lobserved a male and female arguing and physically
struggling with each other behind a parked vehicle.
As he
approached their location, S?1
Ilowered the wifldow of his
vehicle in an attempt to determine the nature of the prob1ert.
The
woman yelled to SA
I “Help me,.help me” SAl
Istopped and
exited his vehicle and approached the individuals,
As he

approached, the male grabbed the female and
her to th’e
driver’s side of a parked vehicle, out of SAl
sight.
SAF
continued to approach the individuals and drew his pistol,
chambered a round and held the pistol close to his side.
The male
subject grabbeçl the emae around the neck and held her between
himself and SAL
I SAj
tated he was an FBI Agent and told
both individuals to calm down and tell h.m what was going on.
male subject demanded proof of SAl
lidentity and when sAl
I
displayed his E’BI credentials,, the subject seemed to become furthet
agitated.
SAl
I removed his cellular te1phone from his
waistband and called 911.
He advised the dispatcher that he was an
FBI Agent and
backup at his location.
The male suspect
advanced on SAl
lwhile still holding th female as a shield and
stted. “Shoot me, shoàt me”. The subject also stated that
SAl
Iwould not be able to shoot him because he was holding the
woman as a shield.
Both individuals advanced closer to SAl
forcing him to back away while holding his pistol closer to nis I
body and extending his left arm to keep the two individuals away
from him.
At that time, according to witnesses on the_scene, the
male pulled the woman toward the parked vehicle.
SI1
Istated

that the female said, “Help me.
Don’t let him take me”.
The male
subject put the
into the vehicle through the driver’s side
back door and SAl
ladvised that the female continued pleeding
for help.
Believing that he wman was being kidnaped or the
victim of a carjacking, SAl
lattempted to stop the male 5
subject
‘from getting into the vehicle by engaging in a physical
altercation.
The spbie eventually entered the driver’s seat of
the vehicle with SAl
ontinuing to struggle with him in an
attempt to prevent him from inserting the keys in the i
anin of
1
the vehicle.
The subject began driving forward and SAl
backed
away to avoid being struck by the vehicle.
Deciding_that he was
unable to give chase in his personal vehicle, SAj
decided to
shoot the subject in an attempt to stop him from fleeing with the
victim.
Seeing the shape of the driver’s head through the tinted
2

Savage- 1839

I

 _______

To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
inspection
297—HQ--Al271466—D, 05/17/2004

rear window of the vehicle,
lainied and fired five rounds at
the driver position.
The vehicle stopped and the male subject
exited the driver’s door and fell to he ground.
In response to a
call from the 911 di•spatcher, s1
ladvised that shots were
fired, one person_was shot, and requested an ambulance at his
location.
ladministered first aid to the suspect until
SAl
assistance arrived.
The subject was transported to a local hospital where he
recovered from a wound to the neck.
.

The Civil Rights Division, United States Department of
Justice, issed a dqclination of prosecution on 10/22/2003,
regarding SAl
lactions in this shooting incident.
On
12/19/2002, a grand jury unanimously decided not to indict SA[
finding that the shooting was justified.
On 05/12/2004, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident,
Deputy Assistant Director
Michael S. Clemens, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
I
flonpcti Security Section,
I
IDeputy
Criminal Division, USDOJ;I
jActing Section
Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; My Harrison, Section Chief, Applicant Processing
Section, Administrative Services Divisioni;l
Unit Chief (tiC), CD—GB, CounterihteJ.ligence Division;
tJCI
I Firrms Trning Uiit, Training Division
(TD); SSAI
I Investig
Office of the General Counsel (OGC
National Firearms Program, TD; SS
Operational Skills Unit, TO; and S
Firearms
Toolinarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,.
T..hrn-f-rrv flivision.
The two non—voting members present were
I
I audi
I Management Program
Analysts, Inspection Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspect ion Divs ion.

I

-

—

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to:
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.

3

Savage- 1840

I

 1.

To: Inspection
From:
Inspection
Re:
297—HQ—A1271466—D, 05/17/2004
After a lengthy discussion, SIR_members unanimously
agreed that the use of deadly force by SAl
Ias justified
and in conformance with the deadly force po1cy.
A
reconendation was made that no administrative action be
taken against him as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

4

Savage- 1841

 To: Inspection
From:
Inspection
Re:
297—HQ—A1271466—D, 05/17/2004
SetLeadi:
INSPECTION
AT WASHiNGT0.

DC

Th n pdministrative action
be taken against
SAl
hs a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

—
—
—

—

-

—

-

-

—

-

-

—

—

I

Mr.
Ms.
Mr. Clemens,

Mr.I
Ms.I

b6

Rm. 7142

IRm. 7427
Rin. 7837
I USDOJ
IJSDOJ

(Attention:
Mr.I
I
Ms. Harrison, Rin. bUDU
Mr. Manning, Rm. 1B045
(Attr: Mr.l___________
Mr.
i.
IRm. 5
(Attention:
Mn
I
Mr. I
IQuantico

I

(Attention:
Mr.l
Mr.j
IQuanco
Ms.l
I Rm. 7326
Quantico
Mr..l
Mr. j
,
Quaqtico
:
Mr.I

4rs.I
Mrs.l

I

m.

Rni.

I

ii

7861

44

5

Savage- 1842

 ___________

_

(Rev. 08-28.2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection
Training

Date:
Attn:

07/21/2003

AD Lynne A. Hunt
Acting AD Andrew R. Bland,

III

From:
Inspec

tion

Contact:
pprored By:

[

Hunt Lynne A

Drafed By:

I

Case ID #:

297—HQ—A1270919—D

Title:

Extension 1837

rr

-

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/23/2002
ATLANTA DIVISION

}b7c
Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that. occurred on l0/232flfl2. involving
Special Agents (SAs)I
I and
Agents discharged their weapons while attempting to arrest a fugitive
resulting in an injury to a passenger in the subjectes vehicle.
SIRG
members recommended th no administrative action be taken
against SASI
as a result of their involvement
lani
in this shooting inident.

I

dxninistrative:

Reference report of Inspector—in-Place
11/12/2002.
dated

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
anaJ.ysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
ref erence to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1843

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297—HQ—A1270919—D,

From:
07/21/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 09/25/2002. during the attempted a.rrest of I
I
Michigan, area on burglary and theft charges,
lattempted to “run ov’ two law enforcement detectives with
his vehicle.
As a result oi
lescape from arrest that day,
and his attempt to injure the law enforcement officers, he was
charged with two felonies, Assault with Intent to Commit Murder and
Maliciou Destrction of Property.
A warrant was issued in Michigan
chargingi
jwith Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution.
n hi Kalamazoo,

I

Investigation conducted by the Detroit Division
v1 a
telephone number of a residence in Atlanta, Georgia, wherel
Iwas
possibly residing.
Further investigation by the t1anta Division
determined that the possible address provided fort
Iwas the
Riverwood Club nartrnents and a survei nf N,p immjate area
conducted by SA
I and
identified
two vehicles with Michigan license plates.
Parked next to the two
vehicles was a 2000 Chevrolet Tahoe displaying an Indiana license
plate.

I

landi
SAsI
Icontacted the manager of the
apartment building and showed hima photoraph oft
I however, .he

could not identify_him as being a resident of the complex.

At the

request of SA I
1 the manager provided the Agents with an access
code to operate an eleetronic gate to allow them access into the
apartment complex the next morning.
In the late afternoon of 10/22/2002, SAl
lreturned to
the Atlanta Division to coordinate a surveillance for the next
morning at the apartment complex
At his request, five
Agents were assigned to assist SAl
land himself with the
surveillance.
The Agents discussed the details of the investigation
and agreed to meet the next morning at 6:00 a.m., to assimilate a
briefing plan.

On 10/23/2002, at approximately 5:15 a.m., SAl
I
checked the code for the electronic gate to the aprtment complex to

I

ensure its operation and proceeded to the briefing site.
All Agents
involved in the surveillance viewed photoaraohs of the subject, the
arrest warrant and the affidavit fort
larrest.
Two scenarios
dIscussed during the briefing, one calling for the arrest of
linside an apartment and the second calling for him to be taken
down as his vehicle stopped at the electronic gate. At the
conclusion of the briefing, the seven Agents proceeded to the
apartment complex and assumed their assigned duties.

•2

Savage- 1844

 To:
Re:

I

:nspecton
From:
297—HQ—A1270919—D, 07/2l/?003

Inspection

After approximately three hours of surveillance and an
unsuccessfpl attempt to contact the apartment I
L4as believed to
occupy, SAl
Ireguested that the Agents depart the area while he
checked a few more lei’ Bsed on information provided by a
Tt
cooperating source, SA
landi
Itraveled to
another location.
Thesource advised that the sister of
j the occupant of the apartment being surveilled,
resided at tbt1ocation.
Qpon their arrival at he residence, a
photograph of I
‘was shown and verification was obtaineq that the
photograph was that of an individual seen in the company of I
I
Once the identification was verified, the Agents resumed their
original positions.
•
h7c
At approximately 10:55 a.m., en individual matching the
description off
was observed on the ground floor area outside
of the apartment talking on a cell phone.
The source who contacted
SAl
Iwas requested to go to the area ad determine if .. in
fact, L
I.’as staying in the apartment.
The plan called for the
source to remove his baseball cap if the man talking, on the cell
phone closely resembled thee
I

The source entered the area and quickly removed his
baseball cap
1 providing the signal that a person meeting I
I
description was at his location.
Shortly’ thereafter, the subject
came out of the area arid walked to the Chevrolet Tahoe and entered
the operator’s side. I
lexited the area behindi
I
and entered the passenger seat of the vehicle. The vehicle proceeded
toward the electronic exit gate. As the gate slowly opened, a Bureau
vehicle parked across south Bolton Road activated its visor and ‘twig—
d rm1i.d nn to he front of the Tahoe in a blocking
2
wag” lights ax
fashion.
SAsI
limmediately pulled their
landi
vehicle to the back of the Tahoe, blocking its ability to back up
and/or_change directions.
The third Bureau vehicl operated by
SAsI
land I
Ipositioned their vehicle to the right rear of
the subject’s vehicle.
Agents on the arrest team, displaying FBI
raid jackets arid other insignia identifying themselves as FBI, issued
commands for the occupants of the vehicle to exit with their hands
When the occupants did not comply, attempts were made to shatter
up.
the passenger window with the butt of an M—4. As the Agents were
attempting to shatter the vehicle window, the vehicle started moving
forward, striking the Bureau vehicle positi9ned as the blocking
vehicle.
Several of the Agents observed SAl
Ifall backward
as if he had be n shot or hit by the car or was attempting to get out
SA
of the way.
feet were underneath the running boards of
the subject’s vehicle, requiring him to quickly move out of the way
or be injured.
SAsI
1andI
Ipositioned on the left side
of the vehicle, discharged their weapons in an attempt to stop the
3

Savage- 1845

 To:
Re:

Inspection
From:
297—HQ--A1270919—D, 07/21/2033

Inspection

as

driver from endangering SAl
las well
othr Agents on the
scene.
As the Bureau vehicle was rammed by the subject
s vehicle, it
t
was pushed approximately 35 feet backwards, allowing the supect to
flee the scene.
However,

The Agents gave
a short time late

h1e to appreheridi________
I the passenger in the

vehicle, was located at a service station aproximately one-half mil
6
from the scene of the incident with a gunshot wrnn i hs left
shoulder.
Medical personnel ;were requested andi
Ias
transported to the trauma unit at Grady Hospital where he was treated
for the gunshot wound and released the same day.
On 03/31/2003, a declination of prosecution was issued by
the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
regarding this shooting incident.

I

I

On 05/08/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting wth the following
voting meithers of the IRG in attendance: I
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;1
Deputy Chief, Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division,
t.3SDOJ; Assistant Special Agent in Charge Glenn Powell,
Investigations Division, Office of Inspector General, USDOJ;
I Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
h7C
Inspection Division; Robert K. Cromwell, Section Chief,
Applicant Processing Section, Administrative Services Division;
Jay C. Manning, Section Chief, CD-6, Counterintelligence
Acting Section Chief, Operational
Division;L
Support Sectian, Criminanvestigative Division;
1 Unit Chief, Operational Skills Unit, Training
Division; SSA I
L Firearms - Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
sSAI
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the
General Counsel; SSAI
1 Washington Field Office;

jFirearms

and SSAI
flivigin

Training Unit, Training

The on’y non—voting member present was
I Management/?rogram Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office
Inspections, Inspection Division.

of

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
(1> evaluate the application of deadly force;
the intent to:
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
4

Savage- 1846

 To:
Re:

inspection
297—HQ--A1270919—D,

From:
07/21/2003

inspection

observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by the gents discharging their weapons was justified and in
compliance with the deadly force policy.
However, several
observations were made by SIRG members regarding the arrest plans
and conduct of the vehicle stop during this incident.
The first observation made by members was the fact that
although the oral operations plan was adequate, the situation called
for optimum planning including a written operations plan.
The SIRG
concluded that Agents involved in the incident had adequate time to
complete a written operations plan with approva1. obtained by Atlanta
Division management.
The second observation pertained to actions taken by the
Agents conducting the car stop and attempted arrest of the subject.
Members noted that the Agents were aware that a large Sports Utility
Vehicle (SfJV) was possibly being utilized by the subject.
Prior
planning for this arrest included utilizing blocking vehicles to
“fence in’
1 the subject vehicle.
Members opined that when time,
planning and vehicle availability permit
1 blocking vehicles should
be larger and heavier than subject vehicles.
Members also noted that the Agents approached the vehicle
which had heavily tinted windows, unnecessarily putting themselves.
in harms way.
SIRG members believed it more prudent to call the
individuals out of th& car rather than rushing towards the vehicle.
The consensus of the SIRG was that training dictates for law
enforcement personnel to get and stay behind cover unless exigent
circumstances occur, thereby, maintaining their safety.
Additionally, one attendee noted fourteen shots were fired Into the
vehicle while Agents had the vehicle surrounded. Although no law
enforcement personnel were injured during the incident, emphasis was
placed on the fact that the Agents should have approached the
subject vehicle from one side without the existence of exigent
circumstances.
The last observation made by the group was the fact that,
although not adversely affecting the outcome of this incident,
multiple Agents were giving commands to the subject.

Savage- 1847

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297—HQ—A1270919—D,

From:
07/21/2003

Inspection

These observations will be brought to the attention of
the SAC to ensure the future safety of all Atlanta Agents.
Additionally, a recoxinendation was made that th Training Division
re—emphasize proper methods for conducting car stops and defensive
tactical training procedures to all SACs.

Savage- 1848

 co

S.

To:
Re:

Inspection
297—!1Q—Al270919—D,

IEZD

(s)

From:
07/21/2003

Inspection

Set I.ead 1:
INSPECTION
AT WASHINGTON,

DC

That no admiñstrative action be taken against
SAsI
landi
las a result of their
involvement in this shooting incident.

b6

Set Lead 2:
TRA IN ING
AT OCJANT ICO, VA
That Acting AD, Training Division, re-emphasize proper
car stop methods as well as defensive tactical training procedures
to all SACs.

1
1
1
1
1
1

—

—

-

—

—

-

Mr.
7142
Mr.
7427
Mrs. Hunt, Ran. 7825
Mr. Bland, Qua.ntico
Mr. I
I Ran. 7837
Mr.
(JSDOJ
Ms.’
IUSDOJ
Mr. Powell, QIG
Mr. Cromwell, Rm. 6012
Mr. Manning, Ran. 1B045
Mr.
jRm. 5155
Mr
J Quantico

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Mr.
Mr.
1
1-Mr.
Mrs
1
-

-

—

-

—

-

.

-

—

-

—

Rm. 7326
Quantico

FO

IRm

7861

++

7

Savage-1849

 ___________
___________
___
_jExtension

.% (12131/19R5)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATiON

Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Date 12/05/2002
Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

1837

Approved By:

Hunt Lynne A/
Clemens Michae1Ø”

I

lirr

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt

297-HQ-A1271971--D

ADMINISTRATIVE UJQIJIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
0.8/02/2002
CRITIAIj INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP (CIRG)

Synopsis:’ The Shooting Incident Review Group CSIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 08/02/20.02, involving
Supervisory Special Agnt (SSA)I
J SS?1_________
discharged his Bureau-issued Glock Model 22 40 caliber
pistol at
a fox that attacked him as he attempted to enter his Bureau
vehicle.
SIRG members recommended that no action be taken
against SSAI
lag a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
Administrative:

Reference Electronic Communication of
08/14/2002.

Details:
This communidation was prepared bo furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1850

 To:
Re:

Inspection From; Inspection
297-HQ-A127l971-D, 12/05/2002
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08/02/2002, SSAI
I.ias entering his Bureau
vehicle in lis driveway when he noticed a fox attacking his left
ar.kle.
SSAI
Ikicked the fox several times, however, it
repeatedly attacked him and eventuallyhid under his car.
After
putting his dog inside his residence, SS.
lobserved the
fox biting, grpwlina
pulling at a fence.
As the fox again
charged at SSA
L he hot tIie animal in the right flank.
As the animal charged at SSAI
I a third time, he fired two
shots into its chest, killing the fox.
was rabid.

Animal Control retrieved the fox and determined that it

On 12/03/2002, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
voting members of the SIRG in attendance: I
I
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, TJSDOJ;f
I
Trial Attorney,
V1n Crimes bection, criminal
Division, USDOa;I
IChief Inspector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division; I
I Acting Section
Chief, Applicant Processing Section, Administrative Services
Division; Charles D. Elder, Section Chief Ooer&tional Suoort
Section, Criminal Investigative 1
Division;
Unit.
Chief. Tnvst.gative Law Unit, Office of the General Couns I,
el;
I
I Unit Chief Fire.rms Training Unit, Training
Division; SSAI
IPrograrn Manager. ?racticl
Applications Unit, Training Diviion: SSAI
I
Washington Field Office; and SSAI
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division.
The only nonvoting member present wasi
I
Management/Program Analyst, :nspection Management..Uuit, Office
of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

2

Savage- 1851

17r

 “I

A
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ--A1271971-D, 12/05/2002

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use o deadly
force by SSAI
j was justified and in conformance
with the deathy torce poiicy.

Savage- 1852

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-’A1271971-D,

Inspection
12/05/2002

LEAD Cs):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
That no admipiscrative action be taken against
SSA[
hs a result of his invãlvement in this
shooting incident.
7

111111111111—

7142
7427
Rm 7326)
70

Savage-1853

 (Rev. 08-28-2000)

-

FEDERALBUREAUOF!NVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Date:
Attn:

Training
Front:

Attn:

Inspection

Contact:

Approved By:

runt

j

02/24/2003

Assistant Director
Lynne A. Hunt
A/ADI_______________________
Extension 1837

Lvnne
j r
1

Drafted By;
Case ID #:
Title:

Ilrr
b6

297—HQ—A1271285—D

b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/09/2002
CHICAGO DIVISION

Synopsis:

I

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 10/09/2002, involving
Special Agents (SAs)I
Lnd
1 Both Agents, as well as Chicago Police
Department (CPD) Of ficerl
I returned fire after a
subject fired shots through a door prior to his° arrest.
SIRG
members recommended that no administrative action be taken against
SAs[
jas a result of their involvement in this
I and[
shooting incident.

I

Reference report of Inspector-in—Place
dated 10/25/2002.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage- 1854

 To:
Re:

:nspection
297—J-IQ--A1271285—D,

From:
02/24/2003

Inspection

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

I

On 05(07/2002, a Federal arrest warrant was issued for
iwho was wanted for Conspiracy td Distribute a
Controlled Substance.
On 10/0812002, members of the Joint Task Force
on Gangs (JTFG), including Chicago Division SAs and Office
rs from the
CPD were 4
co
c
tin__surv
nd
eillance activities in an attempt to locate
and apprehend I
A vehicle that officers believedi
jwas
utilizing was located and stopped.
During the course of the vehicle
stop,I
in locating ana apprenening nim.

lassist

JTFG members

The individual was driven to a location on East 79th
Street in Chicago, where he idstified a third floor apartment as
being the location where I
Iwas residing. An arrest plan was
formulated and all JTFG members participating in the arrest were
provided a detailed verbal briefing given by arrest Team Leader

Si
I
Information was disseminated regardingi
I
background, a description of the clothing worn by him earlier that
day. as well is information concerning the location of the arrest.
SAl
ladvised all participants that I
Ishould be
considered armed and dangerous and then telephonically briefed his
supervisor on the situation and obtained his concurrence regarding
details of the arrest plan.
On ]fllOI202, at approximately 12:30 a.m., a phone call
was placed tel
Iresidence where it was learned that he was in
an apartment on the third floor of the building and preparing
to go
to bed.
This information was relayed to arrest entry team members
positioned inside the apartment building. Arrest team members,
all
na
4
wer
body rmor and law enforcement 1
markinos were led by
SAl
Idown a long hallway towardL
I apartment. Prior to
knpckin.a on th- apartment door, team members were all placed behind
SAl
Ito the right of the door. Participants began loudly
knocking on the.door and shouted their identities as law enforcement
personnel.
Recejvjn no response, and in accrdance with the plan,
Task Force Officer I
began striking the door with a
sledgehammer. As Off icerl
ontinued striking the door,
numerous shots were fired from inside the apartment pnd thrqugh
the
door.
SAsL
IandF
I as well as Office4
I
immediately returned fire.
Task Force Officerl
officer, later identified as Officel

lvelle that an
j was hit and
down. Arrest team members continued to yell nIPolice
andi
replied to the effect,
want to give upir.
Law enforcement

Savage- 1855

I

 __________________

To:
Re:

Inspection
297—HQ—A1271285--D,

From:
02/24/2003

Inspection

I

I

personnel instructed States to open the door and come out.
attempted to open the door; however, the door was jammed.
A
sledgehammer was used to un—jam the door arid States opened the door
and was immediately arrested without further incident.

I

Officer
1
determined to have a shattered index
finger, was transprtcrl to th hospital for treatment.
Investigation
deerm
that SI
Ifired three shots from his H&K MP—5,
SAl
Ifired four shots from his_Springfield Armory .45 caliber
semiautomatic pistol, and Officer[
]fired five shots from his
nine millimeter pistol.

I

I

During interview with
he advised that he began to
shoot into the hallway in response to what he thought was a home
invasion. I
Jadvised that he did not know law enforcement
authorities were outside his door.
Nowever, witnesses provided h
statements that they heard arrest team members ainounce their
7C
presence prior to shot being fired fromi
Iapartment.
On 01/22/2003, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
Assistant Director Lynne A. Hunt,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the following
voting members of the S1RG in attendance:
Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ’9
Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, I
Criminal Division, USDOJ;I
I Deputy Chief,
Domestic Security Section, Criminal Division, tJSDOJ; Assistant
Special Agent in Charge Glenn Powell, Investigations Division,
Office of Inspector General, EJSDOJ;I
I Chief
Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Robert K. Cromwell, Section Chief Applicant Processing Section,
Administrative Services
I
Acting Section Chief, CD—2, Counterintelligence Division;
Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office of
F
the General Counsel.1
Unit Chief. Firearms
Training Unit, Trainin Division; SSAI
I Program
aer 4
1
Man
Pract Applications Unit, Training Division;
r

L

-

--

SSAI

I ashington Field Office; and

SSAI
I Firearms
TooJnarks Unit, Scientific
Analysis Section, Laboratory_Division.
The two non-voting
members present were SSi
I Assistant
Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, and
Management/Program Aralyst, Inspection
Management unit, dffic.e of Inspections, Inspection Division.
—

3

Savage- 1856

b

7

 To:
Re:

Inspection
297—I-iQ—Al271285—D,

From:
02/24/2003

Inspection

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above—synopsized incident with
(1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
the intent to:
(2> provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational standpoint (if any); (3) povide recom
mendations concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4)
provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed
necessary.
SI mmbrs nanmouslv agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA
landi
I as well as that of Officer
1 was justified and in compliance with the deadly force
policy.
Members noted that this was a fast evolving incident that
did not allow for the preparation of a standard written operations
order.
However, a representative from the Training Division advised
that a planning guide booklet is available for Agents which contain
s
framework for immediate planning that can be utilized in this type
of incident.
Additionally, members noted that although not an issue
in this incident, there was no documented evidence that inquiri
es
were made regarding the presence of innocent third parties inside
or
near the residence of the fugitive.
SIRG members recommended that
this question be included in all arrest plans to reduce the chance
s
of injury to innocent third prties and that all offices be remind
ed
to address this issue In arrest planning.
Additionally, members
recommended that the Training Division reiterate policy to all field
division Firearms Instructors regarding shooting into residences
and
vehicles, absent visible subjects, and ensure regi.larly scheduled
firearms training includes dIscussion of this issue.
Chief Division
Counsels and field Firearms Instructors should coordinate any such
training to ensure that the training amplifies and .supports FBI
deadly force policy.
These observations will be discussed with the
Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Division.

4

Savage- 1857

 V

-

To:
Re:

Inspection
297—HQ—Al271283—D,

LEAD

(s):

From:
02/24/2003

Inspoction

Set Lead 1:
IHSPECTION
AT WASHINGT0L

DC

That no administrative ction be taken aajnst
SAsI
landi
las a
result of their involverent in this sflootlng incident.
Set Lead 2:
IN
AT OtJA1’TICO

VA

That AD, Training Division, reiterate policy to all field
division E’ireartns Instructors regarding shooting into residen
ces and
vehicles, absent visible subjects, and ensure regularly schedu
led
firearms training include discussion of this issue.

1

1

—

Mr.(

-

Mr.’__________ Rin. 7427

nt.

7142

I
Mrs Hunt. Rn. 7825
1
Mr.
jRm. 7$37
1
Mr.
IDOJ
1 —Ms.
ItJSDOJ
1
Mr. Powell, DIG
1
Mr. Cromwell, Bra. 6012
1
Mr4
Rni, 4042
1
Msj
Ira. 7326
1
Mr
Quantico
—

—

—

—

-

—

—

-

1

Mr

1
Mr
1—Mr
1
Mrs.l
—

—

Quantico
Quantico
WFO
7861
F

5

Savage- 1858

  

FBI
Shooting Incident Report

4 Summaries

 

 

 

 

 

 

2001

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________

*

•

I

L
*

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 11/15/2001

Inspection

From:

-

Contact:I

Drafted By:

Title:

Al)

Knowlton

Inspection

Approved By:

Case ID

Atta:

:

Bxtension 1837

Loclce Thomas Bernard

1

llrr

\

297-HQ-A1271905-D

DMINISTPA.TIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
08/09/2001
SADRNENTO DIVISION

b6
7c

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Rev
iew Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occ
urred on 08/09/2001, involving
Agent (SA) I
Special
I Believing that a subject
identified in a string
armed robberie was aming a gun
direction during an attemp
in his
ted escape, SAl
If ired one shot
from a Bureau-issued -5
submachine gun hitting the pas
senger
side window of the subject*s
vehicle.
SIRG members_recommended
that no administrative act
ion be taken against
SAl
result of his involvement
las a
in this shooting incident.
AdmiuLstrative: Ref erçnce
report of Supervisory Special
Agent
(SSA)I
dated 08/22/2001.
Details: This communication
was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and reco
mmendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned
shooting.

ot

I

-

 ii

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Ins
297-HQ-A1271905-D, 11 pection
/15/2001
Details of the Shootin
g Incident

On 08/09/20
Crime Task Force (SV 01, members of the FBI-led Stockton Viole
nt
CTF) were working in
Stockton Police De
partment to locate and concert with the
arrest gang member
was identified in a string of arm
robberies, including
ed
one that occurred on We
dnesday, 08/08/2001.
Acting on information
developed, the Stockto
Department was cond
n Police
located in Stockton.ucting surveillance of room 211 of a Motel
6
Police Officers of su Members of the SVCTF relieved Stockton
rveillance of the subje
8:30 a.m., on 08/09/20
ct at approximately
01.
At approxim
his second story roo ately 10:40 a.m., the subject quickly left
m and rapidly entered
Corolla. I
his stolen Toyota
lentered the vehicle be
fore law enforoejnnt
personnel had the op
was attempting to leaportunity to effect his 1
arrest A
I
Stockton Police Deparve the motel parking area, SAl
jand a
tm
ent
Ta
sk
Fo
rce
Offic
The subject sped aro
utd the motel with an er bloakeci .tis escape.
unmarked police vehic
officer following in
an
the drive; si - tT,sle with lights and siren activated. With
Bu
rea
u
ve
hic
le facing the directio
of I
i SAl
n
Ipa
prevent the subject’s rked his car at a copier of the motel to
att
em
pte
d escape. S24
armor and an FBI: raid
I wearing body
jacket, exited the vehic
passenger_dqor with
le and stocd by the
an MP-5 deployed. Th
e subject approached
lbloc]cjn position as if
he was going tcs hit the
vehicle. SAl
job
passenger side of his served the subject lean towards the
car at which time he
in the subject’s ha
nd. As the subject dro observed a dark object
SA
ve past his po
lieved that the subje
ct was pointing a gun insition,
di
i n and was ste
his
adying the gun again
dashboard. Fearing
st_the vehicle
for his safety, SJj
his MP-5, breaking the
If ired one shot from
front passenger wind
driving through a lar
ge chain link fence, ows I
Ico
field for approxim
down a curb intontianued
ate
ly
10
0
yards before bec
dirt. Law enforceme
nt personnel conducted oming stuck in soft
approach to the subje
a. f “-ftyle
ct vehicle at which
time
I surrendered.
Investigation revea
led that the round fir
SAl
ed by
1 went through the passe
nger window
wheel and dashboard
and lodged in the dri , between the steering
of the subject’s arre
ver ‘ s door. At the
time
containing three liv st, a .22 caliber six-shot revolver
e rounds was locate
his vehicle.
d on the passenger se
at of

I

No personal_iniiiries
were incurred as a re
shot fired by SA
sult of the
I
I
2

-j

 I

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ—A1271905-D,
11/15/2001

On U/13/2001, the SIR
G met to discus
captioned shooting inc
ident. Deputy Assistan s the aboveThomas Bernard Locke,
t Director
Inspection Division,
with the following
chaired the meeting
voting members of the
SIR
Willie T. Hulon, Ch
ief Inspector, Inspectio G in attendancet
n Division, Office of
Inspections; Donald J.
Bartnik, Section Chief
Aggç4f-;Rfl-’ p-t
4
, Personnel
-T,
dministrative Services
Div
ision;
I Unit Chief, Asia. Middle Ea
Unit, National Securi
t and Africa
ty Division; I
Firearms Trainiag Un
I
Unit Chief,
it, Training Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr.,
Section Chief, Operatiq
nal Sunrcrh ‘i-4rii.
Criminal
Investigative Division4
Investjgatjve Law Un
Chief,
it, orxi.ce ot the Ge
al Counsel;
I Unit Chief, Firearms ner
Toolinarks Unit,
Scientific 2\nalysis Sec
tion, Laboratory Divisio
SSA
n; and
I, Washinqton Field 1
Oflce Nonvotinc tnemb
present were SSAI
er
I andy
Management/Program na
lyst, Inspection Maxi&ge
I
tnenc unit, uttice
Inspections, Inspectio
of
n Division.
•

I

Itrnit

-

-

Observations and Recozm
ziendations of the SIRG
The STh.Q reviewèd the abo
ve-synopsized incident
the intent to: (1) eva
with.
luate the applicationS
of dea
provide the Director wit
h an evaluative analysis, dly force; (2)
and recommendations for
observations,
corrective actions from
standpoint (if any;
an operational
training and/or safety(3) provide recoxtunendations concerning
issues; and (4) provid
e recommendations
for administrative act
ion if deemed necessary
.

SIRG members unanipous1y
agreed that the use of
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conform deadly
• with the deadly force
ance
policy.
-

3

 A

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
.297—HQ.-A1271905-D, 11/15/
2001

LD Cs):

Set head 1:

INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
pinistrative action be take
n against
a result of his involveme
nt in this

SAE
shooting incident.

1
2

-

-

las

Mr. Pickard, Rm. 7142
Mr. Garcia, Rm. 7116
(1
Mr. Cousins)
Mr. Park-nn- Thij 7427
(1
Ms.j
I Ritz. 7326)
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
Mr. Hulon, Rm. 7837
Mr. Bartnik Rm. 6646
.-

2

-

-

1
1
1

1

-

-

-

I

Mr.I

(Attn:
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
1-Mr.
1
Mn
1
Mrj
-

-

-

Mn

I
I

cuancico

IWFO
JRm. 7861
Thu. 7861

4

 FD-204 (Rev. 12-1.95)
r

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 01? JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:
Report
Date:

of

ASAC Robert 0. Laughlin
07/26/2001

0fflce Newark

caseID:

66F-NK-J.05245

Title:

“Shooting Inquiry”
Report of Shooting Incident, Newark Division
07/13/2001, Administrative Matter

Character

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This inquiry was initiated subsequent to a shooting
incident which occurred in East Orange, New Jrv rhiijng
the afternoon of Friday, July 13, 2001.
SAl
I
I
I (EOD: 07/05/98), accompanied by United States
Customs Service (USCS) SAl
I who is assigned
to a Newark Division Task Force, were investigating a
potential stolen car ring based upon information provid
ed
to the Newark Division by the New Jersey State Police.
Using a pretext of delivering license plates f the
arrtn of a leased Mercedes-Be
nz E430, SAsI
I and
I
tciad arranged to meet the operator in the parking
lot of a Rite Aid Pharmacy located at 543 Central Avenu
e,
East Orange, New Jersey. The purpose of the meeting was
to attempt to interview the vehicle’s operator regarding
the facts and circumstances of the vehicle lease.
The
NJSP had determined that the Drivers’ Licenses used to
effect the lease of the vehicles were fictitious and
the
Newark Division was investigating a Nigerian group
engaged
in similar activities which resulted in vehicles being
fraudulently leased and eventually shipped out of the
United States.
There was no intention to effect either an
arrest or seizure at this meeting. Two other vehicle
s,
leased from the same Ohio dealership were recovered
without incident on Thursday, 07/12/01 and durizg
the
mrnn of Friday, 07/13/
01. Ar4vig first, $Asj
land
for the vehicle operator at the Rite Aid
parking lot,
1t’r’nt-4n o.lrcted by the
driver, later
identified as I
L who arrived accompanied by a
-

This document contains neither recommendations nor
ccnciuions o the WBZ. Zt is the property o the fBX
aa is bared to your aqoncy it and its contents are
not to be distxmted outside your agency.

I7C

 r

66P-NK-1o5245

passenger.

I

Subseqzent to arriviig, the passenger, who has since
I exited the Mercedes-Benz.
ixemained 4n hip veiicle w14th the daivr’s sice front
door open. As SA8J
I
pproached,j
Ibega-u to
flee the cene andi
Jplaced the car in reversetrikine
SAl
Jwith thedàr. Placing the car in forward,l
struck SAl
J who landed on the hood of the c.r Whl.Le holding
on, and thntirlUing to identify himself, S4
Ic3xew his weapon,
firing multile Iiots into the vehicle’s tront windsh
ield. As a
resu].t,I
Iwas struck in fh.a’m and the Mercedes-Benz
crashed into a p.rked ca-r I
Iwas apprehended, following a
struggle, by SAsI
land
I with the assistance of two offduty East Orange police officers.
ben iditjfjed asi

-

During the investigation period, interviews wer
conducted. with SJ
I Police Off icersi
I. and
las well as Rite Aid Pharmacy managerj
I.
I
1
1 all o whom are witnesses to the events leading to
inquiry. As a decision is pending whether or not to preseit this
this
matter to the Essex County, New Jersey Grand Jury, SAl
declined an interview at this time on the advice of counseIhas
l.
Details:
1. SSAj
jprovided a signed sworn
statement on O7/2./ul. ssAI
[stated that h had been
contacted by the NJS? regarding- the fraudulent lease of four
luxury vehicles from an Ohio automobile dealership. In order
to
assist the NJSP and determine whether or not the lessees of these
vehicles were connected to a nigerian group beiicr inrstig’ated
by
the Newark Division fr similar activities, SSAI
lassigned SA
land USCS SAl
I
Jto follow up on the information provided
by the NJSP. Between_Thurs
/01 .and th morning hours of
Friday,. O7/13/01, SA[
Jan
d located and recovered
twcYpf tlae vehicles. J.uring the afternoon of Friday
, 07/13/01 SA
I
I an
larranged to meet with the operator of a third
vehicle using the pretext of delivering the permanent license
plates the vehicle operator was seeking to acquire. SASI
land

attempting to conduct an interview only; no arrest or
seizure was planned.__Subsequent to arriving at the pre-arr
ang’ed
meeting place, SAl
jbecaine invOlvj in
shooting_iicident
after the vehicle operator struck s4
I and SAl
I with the

vehicle.

2.
SAl
I United St
stems Service,
was interviewed and advised that he and S
were assigned an
investigation rega-dng th fraudulent lease o some motor
vehicles. One of the lessees, who was cooperating, assiste
d in
2

h7C

1
L
7C

 F’.

66F-NK-J.05245

the recovery of two vehicles. SAsI
Isubsequently
andI
learned that the dealership where the vehicleb were obtained had
been receiving dalls about pepuaneç.t license plates for one of
the vehicles. SAsI
larrange a meeting with, this
landi
individual on the pretext of delivering tha license plates. It
was their intention to interview the operator about the facts and
circumstances of the lease. No arrest or seizure was planned or
anticipated
iving at a pre-determined meeting site, SAS
I and
I
approached the driver of a Mercedes-Benz E430.
They asked
ey might speak to him, at which time the driver
laced the car in reverse, backing up at high rate of speed. SA
1 s side door. As BAa
jwas struck by the open front dr
I
landl
kcontinued to identify themselves. thç driver
placed the car in drive, eventualJ.v_striking SA I I who landed
on the hood of the vehicle. SAl
then. drew his weapon, firing
from the -hood until t
cedes-Benz crashed into 4wo parked
cars,_restlting
being thrown from the vehicle’ s hood.
SAl
land SA
attempted to subdue the driver, who
was attemtizig to flee. This was evenbuafly accomplished ith
the assistance of two off duty police officer. The passenger in
the Mercedes-Benz fled the scene prior to the shooting incident.
3. Police Officerl
I, East Orange Police
Department, was interviewed and advised that on the afternoon of
07/13/01 he was off duty in front of a supermarket located at the
corner of Cambridge Street and Central Avenue in East Orangç.
I
Iheard between four and five gunshots coming from the
vicinity of the Rite Aid Pharmacy. He immediately took notice of
a black male running f rain the area. He then saw a silver
Merce.es-Bep.z crash into two parked cars in the Rite Aid parking
lot.
saw a white male, wearing a police badge get up
from brie ground between the cars and another law enforcement
officer wrestling with the Mecedes Benz driver. Leaving his
position to offer assistance, I
Inoted that the person
wrestling with the driver_was identifying himself as a law
enforcement officer. I
homed in the effort and with the aid
of another off duty police officer, the suspect was restrained.
4. Police officerl
lEast Orange Police
Department was interviewed and advised that he had been talking
with off 4uty Police Cf ficexi
I Following the
conversation,I
Iwas walking towards his residence on
Cambridge Street in East Orange, approximately one block from the
Rite Aid Pharmacy.
He heard four or five shots and headed back
towar& Cetra1 Avenue, where he thought the shots originated.
I
isaw a b1ak nle on the ground near a vehicle crah
scene in the parking lot of a Rite Aid Phaxmacy.
I
observed two white males attempting to handcuff the suspect.
The
3

6

 66F-NK-105245

suspect continued resisting and it appeared tc
ithat
additional handcuffs would be needed given the suspect’ s size.
5. I
I the operator of the Mfcedes-Benz
involved in the shooting incident was interviewed and advised
that he had spoken withi
I Wagner Lincoln-Mercury
during the morning of 07/13/01 about license plates for a
Mercedes-Benz E430 he had just leased. During the afterpoün of
07/13/01, duing the course of a three way convers;tion.
arrand to meet with I
Irepresentatives (BAd
I and.
I
I in the parking lot of the Rite Aid Pharmacy on Central
Avenue in East Orange, NJ. I
I accompanie
male, parked in the lot, next to the vehicle BA
andi
I
were in. I
Ipassenger, whom h identifies on y by th
first nam1
I ran when SA
lasked him
jandF
I
to step out of the car. I
Iput the car in
reverse in an effort to flee. I
I then places the car in
forward, continuing his attempt to flee t1e scene. I
I
states that both men .(SABI
andi
I are talking to him,
I
but he cn’ t hear them as niWwindows are up. Hearing gunshots,
ducks, losixig control of his car, which crashes.
) falls, as he attempts to run.
I
When “the
agents”
I words> ask him to get on the ground he complies
and is hancutae, but only on one hand, until an ambulance
arrives.
6. I
I manager of the Rite Aid Pharmacy, 543
Central Avenue, East orange, NJ, was interviewed and advised that
she had bestandng in front of the store, conversing with a
customer. I
I was facing that portion of the parking lot
which faced a supermarket across the street. I
Ist,.ajd that
she saw two officers instruct the driver of a Mercedes-Benz to
stop.
The driver was non-compliant and an officer in a blue b6
shirt grabbed the door handle,. The driver placed the car in b7c
reverse, resulting in the officer in the blue shirt being
dragged. Both officers called for the driver to stop but the
driver moved forward, striking the second officer, who landed on
the car’s hood. The. Mercedes-Benz continued moving forward, with
th rnd officer on the car’s hood. As the vehicle moved,
Iheard four or five gunshots. The Mercedes Benz then
I
struck several parked cars, withi
Ithinking the officer on
the hood had been crushed between tne cars. The driver then
exited the Mercedes-Benz, refusing the officers’ directions to
get on the ground. The officers put the driver on the ground,
attempting to place him in handcuffs. The ipect continued to
struggle, With two ast Orange police off 3,pers arriving to
assist.

4

I

1bS
lb IC

 66F-NK-105245

Newark Division Fi]:e Review:

I

SAl
EOD: 07/OS/98 is a tT.S. Army
Veteran, GS-11, who has been assigned to the Newark Division
since comp1etin New Agents’ Training during October, 1998.
SA
jreceived a Meets Expectations rating on his most recent
perormance appraisal and was the
ient of a cash incentive
award during September, 2000. SA
a nob been the subject
of administrative action since his ROD.
-

5

b7r

 PD-204 (Ray. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST!CE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

INSPECTION DIVISION

Repod ofi

Date:

07/26/2001

Case ID #:

297-H-A127151l-D

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
HOUSTON DIVISION

Cboraoter

SHOOTING INCIDENT

Synopsis:

OThcc: HOUSTON

This communication provides the Inspection Division with
the results of Houston Division investigation concerning
captioned matter.
-

Lead Covered-

DETAILS:
1.
This investigation was predicated on a
7/10/2001 telephone call of Deputy A8sistant Director
Thomas B. Locke, Inspection Division and ASAC Brian R.
Loader, Houston Division and information reported in a
Houston FD.-418 dated 7/16/2001 to the Training Division.
The FD-418 reported that during a Houston Division SOG
surveillance on 7/5/01, a team member became a victim of
an attempted car jacking by several individuals, one of
which was carrying a pistol. The surveillance was in
support of an ongoing drug investigation.
Shortly
thereafter, members of the SOG team became involved in
niircii I- f the car jacking suspects,
SA I
I
as a member of this BOG team, confronted four
individuals believed to be the suspects and commanded them
to stop.
Two of these suspects stopped and turned toward
5)1
n an aggressive and threatening manner. BA
ired one round. No one was hit.
The suspects
were not related to the ongoing drug investigation.
2. Appropriate_Houston supervisory
personnel interviewed SAl
Ion 7/24/2001 and
obtained his Signed Sworn Statement (SSS). His 855

was

this docuasut contains neither recornendations nor conclusions of the X. t is the property of the PB!
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distibuted outaida your agency.

 ___________

____

.1

297 -HQ-A1271511-D

largely consistent with information developed independently
during this inquiry. SA I
ladvised that on 7/5/2001, 500
Team 1, which he was a member, was conducting a drug_surveillance
in Houston, Texas. At approximately 1:30 p.m., SAl
I
advised via the Bureau radio several cars had approached his
stationary surveillance position, parked behind his vehicle and
walked toward his car. One of jthese individuals was observed
carrying a pistol.
SAl
I imediately departed the scene,
believing he was the victim of an attempted carjacking. The drug
surveillance ceaed and the 500 team began a light pursuit of
these vehicles and suspects. With 500 Aviation support and HPD
marked units, the suspects were located near an apartment
complex. SA I
ladvised via Bureau radio the suspects had
been driving in a dangerous fa8hian and were seen running from
the scene holding their sides as if to cradle a weapon, so as to
keep it from falling from their waistban- Th urveillance
continued to a school yard area where SAl
lobserved four
black males ru.nning across the school grounds. After his pursuit
in his vehicle ceased, he exited his vehicle, drawing his weapon
and shouted a command “Police, Stop.” Two of the four
individuals torned nd turned in a bladed stance and in a manner
in which SAl
1 considered threatening. Believing the
individuals to be armed, and fearing for his safety, SAl
I
fired one round from his Olock pistol, Model 22. These two
individuals turned and ran. SAE
Idid not continue on a
foot pursuit.
SAl
Jprovidod, a copy of a statement he
provided to the Houston Police Department on 7/5/01.
3.
In an interview on 7/19/2001, SA I
I
I stated on 7/5/2001, he was assigned as a team leader o an
300 component responsible for conducting a surveillance on
subjects of a pepdina druci invetigation. During the
surveillance, SAl
I a 500 team member, advied via
Bureau radio, several biaci males approached hi vehicle from the
rear. on of whom was carrying a hand gun by his side. SA
I
I4mmdifely put his vqhic1 in. gear and departed the
area.
SAl
Jjnstructed SAl
Ito call 911 and inform
the Houston PoIlde Department of tie attempted car jacking. The
drug surveillance terminated and with SOG aircraft assistance, a b 6
b7C
light pursuit of these vehicles and suspects was initiated.
Shortly thereafter, six black males were observed in a school
parking lot where their movements had been continuously_followed
by Soc airqraft. 4s several units approached, SA’sI
I
jpurqued four of these suspects
i and sAl
to a Houston public sctlool ground. SAl
I continued his
pursuit across a grassy field of apprbcimately a hundred yards.
Shortly theeafte-r, SAL
Iheard a single gunshot. The 500
aircraft repeated a broadcast message over the Bureau radio,

I

-

2

 ___________

_______

I

297—HQ-A1271511-D

“shots fired.

I

p was

unaware of who had fired the shot.

4.
In an interview on 7/24/2001, SA I
stated on 7/5/2001, he was part of a surveillance team conducting
a drug surveillance in the northeast area of Houston, Texas.
The
other members of the urreillance tAaql included SAl
I
SAl
I and SAl
I At approximately 1:30
bE
p.m., he was parced at thq intersection of Wippercht and Caplin. b7c
While parked, SA
lobserved three vehicles stop behind
him. Approximately six black males exited the vehicles and
approached SAl
bar from the rear. He observei rn rif
these individuals carrying a pistol. At that point, SAl
I
immediately placed his vehicle in gear and sped away. after
calling 911 and reporting the attempted car jacking, SAl
I
remained in the viciriitv awaiting the arrival of the Houston
Police Officers.
SAl
hater observed three of these
vehicles at an apartment complex. All three of the vehicles were
confirmed stolen. Two pistols were recovered from two of the
vehicles.
Several minutes later, HPD officers ;eoorted .rresting
a black male in the vicinity of a shooting. SAl
f was not
a party to nor witness of this shoqting incident.,.
—

5. Houston Police Department incident report dated
7/5/01 as obtained and s conàistent with the tatement provided
by BA’s I
land I
I One suspect was arrested
on a pending burglary/theft warrant and three stolen vehicles
were recovered.
6. eview of BA I
IHouston Division Personnel
File revealed his EOD 05/05/1975 (Support) and BOD 08/11/1985
(Agent). His FBI employment began as a Photographer assigned to
the New York Division.__After his successful completion of New
Agent Training, SAl
Iwas assigned to the Houston Division.
Effective 07/07/1996, he was assigned to the Special Operations
Group where he currently serves as the principal relief
Supervisor. I
bE
7C

I On 5/29/01, he was reinstated as a Firearms
Instructor and was certified by the Firearms Training Unit during
July, 2001.
SAj
received a “Superior” rating on his 1999
Performance Appxai.sa.i. icepbrt (PAR), an “Exceptional” rating on

3

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 El 1511 -D

1118 2WD PARI and-"Heata EJEF??tlti??" an hil 1W1 PAR.

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

___________
___________
______
____Itension

J.

0213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

prom:

Date: 02/18/2002

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

PD

Knowlton

1837

Locke Thomas Bernar

h6
b7C

Drafted By:
Case ID it:
Title:

297-HQ-A1271285-D

ADMINISTHATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
12/11/2001
CHICAGO DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 12/11/2001, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
SAl
I fired one shot from his
Special Weapons and Tactics (WAT)-issued 45 caliber semi
automatic pistol, severely injuring a charging dog during the
execution of an arrest warrant.
SIRG tneers_recommended that no
administrative action be taken against SN
as a result of
his involvement in this incident.
Administrative:
Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
dated
12/18/2001.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

b6

 •.1

.4
To:
Re;

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-.A1271255-D, 02/18/2002

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 12/11/2001, the Chicago Division was contacted by
the Grand Rapids, Michigan, Resident Agency (GRRj, indicating
that an individual who was wanted for attempted murder by the
Grand Rapids, Michigan, Police Department bad fled the State of
Michigan An Agent of the GRRA advi
‘-information
indicated the subeot, identified asi
was
I
currently residing at I
I in Harvey,
Illinois.

lb6
7C

Based on the information received, members of the
Violent Crime/Fugitive Task Force (VC/FTF) surveilled the
location. A telephone call was made to the residence verifying
that a
Iwas inside the_residçnce. 4embers of the ye/FTP
surrour ih house and SAl
land SAl
1were instructed
by SSA I
I to proceed to the back door of the residence. As
the Agents approached the area, they were ‘
attacked° by a large
1
dog of a German Shepherd-Great Dane mix. Fearing for their
safety, SA
l ired one shot causing the dog to collapse.
The subject was arrested without incident and the
Harvey, Illinois, Police Department, was summoned to the scene
where an ajmal Control Officer terminated the dog s life.

I

On 02/12/2002, the SIRG met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance
Willie T. Hulon, Chief Inspector, Inspection Division, Office of
InspectionsI
1 Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, t3SDOJj
Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism
,
and Violent Crimes Sect.on, criminal Divisiøn, USDOJ;
William R. Falls, Section chief,- Operational Support Section,
Administrative Services Division; William Q. Doherty, Section
Chief, Global Section - NS-2, National security Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section c1i fl-i4jri1 $upport Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training L)ivisiofl;l
I Unit
Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Tçolrnarks Unit. Scientific
Ana.Lysi Section, Laboratory Division; SSAI
, Washington
Field Office; and ssAI
1, racticai AppLications
Unit, Training Division. Nonvoting members present were
Inspector-in-Place I
I Phoenix Division;
SSA F
IPirearms Training Unit, Training Division;
SA I
I and I
Mnagement/Prau
Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Office of tnspections,
Inspection Division.
-

2

 (
To:
Re:

Inspection From
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 02/18/2002
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SXRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issue; and (4Y provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRO members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
deacily force policy.
7

The only observation made by members of the SIRG
pertained to the report submitted by the Chicago Division. It
was noted that the SSA who wrote the report also approved the
report without further review by a member of the Chicago Division
Executive Management. Members opined that official reports
should not contain gratuitous comments such as those made
regarding the dog’ s death. This matter will be brought to the
attention of the Special Agent in Charge.

3

 t

—

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 02/18/2002

LD Cs):
Set Lead. 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASI!INGTON, D.C.
SAj
incid.ent.

1
2

-

-

That nc administrative action be taken against
s a result of his involvement in this shooting

Mr. Garcia, Rut. 7142
Mr. Parkinson, Rut. 7427
(1
Ns. Lammert, Rm. 7326)
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
I USDOJ
Ms.
Mr.r
IusDor
Mr. Hulon, Rm. 7837
Mr. Cousins, Rm. 6155
Mr. Doherty, Rm. 4042
Mr.
6646
Mr.
Rut. 3787?
-

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

.

ntioo

r.
:M
1
1

-

Mr
1
Mr4

I1tn. 7863.
Rut. 7861

4

 ___________________

V

,‘‘(12I31l199S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:
To:

1OUTINE

Date: 02/06/2002

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection

Contact:
Approved By:

j

Locke Thomas Bernar

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

AD r$3’ Knowlton

j Extension 1837
}b6
IL 70

Ilrr
297-HQ-A1270961-D

ADMINISTRATIV INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/14/2001
BUFFALO DIVISION

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that oqcurred on 11/14/2001, involving Special
Agent (SA)
I S2
land a Buffalo Police officer,
shot and killed a pitbull dog who lunged at them while attempting
to effect the arrest of a Federal fugitive. SIRG members
recomnejded that no administrative action be taken against
h6
SN
las a result of his involvement in this incident.
7C
Administrative:

Reference Electronic Communication of
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I______________ dated 11/15/2001.

Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, conulients, and recommendations of the SIRO with
reference to the captioned shooting.

 _____Iproceeded

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1270961-D, 02/06/2002
Details of the Sbotiug Incident

On 11/14/2001, SAl
.1ong with ten
uniformed Buffalo Police Department officers were effectLng the
arrest of a Federal fugitive identified asj
I
Upon approaching the residence of the subject, SAl
and Officer
to the front door. I
appeared in a tront winciow and was asked by law enforcement
personnel to unlock the outsiae storm door and the inside door of
his residence.
Instead of opening the doors as requested,
entered an alcove behind the locked doors through an intçrior
apartment door. Law enforcemçzt of f.cers observed a large
pitbull dog with the subject. I
Iwas ordered to put the dog
inside_the apaztmen’ and oen t rmtF doors to surrender to
SAl ] and Officerl
I As I
lopened the doors, the
barking pitbuil dog lunged from_inside the döoxwav_towards the
law enforcement officers. SN
land Officer I
If ired shots
from their weapons killing the dog.

The subject was arrested and taken into custody by
Buffalo Police officers and the Buffalo Police Dog Control Unit
arrived and removed the dog.
-

On 01/08/2002, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting meithers of the SIRG in attendance:
I
1, Unit Chief, Asia, Middle East and Africa
Unit, National Security Division4
I Unit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training )ivis1On; I
1
Unit Chief, Undercover and sensitive Operations Unit, Operational
SupDort Section. criminal Investigative Division;
I Unit chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office of
the General Counsel; SSAI
I. Program Manager,
Practical._Applications Unit, Training Division; and
SSAI
I Wasiinaton Field Office. The only nonvoting
membè present was SSM
I Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the pplicati o deadly force; (2)
proride the Director with an evaluative analysis, observtis,
and recommendatiois for corrective actions from an operational

2

h7C

 ‘$4

To;
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ-A127091-D, 02/06/2002

standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recorrmendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
IRG tembers unanimously agreed that the use of deadly

force by SAl
force policy.

I was

justified and in conformance with the deadly
lb 5
7C

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1270961-D, 02/06/2002

LID (s):
Sot Isead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISXON
AT WASHINGTON. D.C.
That nç
inia.eric.

1
1
2

administrative action 1e taken against

a result of his involvement in this shooting

Mr. Garcia, P.m. 7142
Mr. Cousins, Rm.. 5155
Mr.I
IRa. 7427
Ms.
(1
1 Rm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, P.m. 7825
1
Mr. !u1on, Rm. 7837
1
Mn
I. P.m. 4042
(Attn:
Mn
1
I QuantLco
Mr.1
1-Mn
WFO
1
1
Mr.
P.m. 7861
1
Mrs___________ P.m. 7861
-

b7C

-

-

-

-

-

-

4

 ________________

FD.204 (Ret, tZ’-1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

iiI

70

liii

Report of:
Date:

12/21/2001

CsclO#:

297-HQ-A1271741 SUB D

Talc:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
11/15/2001

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY/CIVIL RIGHTS,

Synopsis:

Captioned matter relates to a shooting incident
which was substantively predicated upon locating and
attempting’ to detain a subject who was believed to be
responsible for the armed, take-over style robbery of the
Union Bank branch located at 1900 North Grand Avenue,
Santa Ana, California, on 11/15/2001.

Office: Phoenix

DETAILS:
At approximately 10t56 AM on 11/15/2001, a lone
Hispanic male, later identified as I
1, aka
I
I, entered the outer lobby of the Union
Bank, which is situated just inside the main entrance of

the “Food 4 Less” supermarket located at 1900 North Grand
Avenue, Santa Ana, California, and proceeded to jump over
the teller counter,
After landing on the other side of

the counter, I
Irandished a black semiautomatic
handgun, pointed it at the bank tellers and other bank
employees and yelled, “Put the money in the bag and nobody
will be hurtl 1
m sorry, but nobody will be hurti”.
After
acquiring currency totaling $50,779.00 from two tellers,

.

who placed the funds in a brown paper bag, a
i jumped
back over the counter and exited the supermarket.
Witnesses subsequently observed the bank robber depart the
store, proceed north on foot, enter a. blue Toyota Corolla

vehicle possessing California license plate number
I
I and drive away from the immediate area.
This
information, as well as a description of the bank robber,

This doa’.m.nt contains n.jth r.co.z1atjon noz conclusions of tha rax. it is ha property
of the anz
and is loaned to your agency; it and it. cont.a are not to be distribited outsid. your
agency.

1

 297-HQ-A1271741 SUB D

was conveyed to

SAPD patrol officers who responded to the scene

of the bank robbery.

At approximately 11:05 AN, Investigator I
I
OCSD, who is assigned full time to the SARA’s Bank Robbery
Apprehension Team (BRAT) as a task force member, was working in
the SARA when he was notified of the robbery oç th Union Bank by
the SARA’S switchboard operator. tnvestigator I
1 responded to
the site of the bank robbery and was immediately briefed by the
SAP]) officers who were already at the scene. After being
apprised of the circumstances of the bank robbery, Investigator
I
I commenced with his preliminary investigation of the
incident, which included obtaining witness statements, taking
cutody of the surveillance camera fltn, determining if bait
bills were provided to the bank robber, and canvassing the
adient neighborhood for lead information. During Investigator
I
i interview of one of the victimized bank tellers, she
advised that the bank robber had been armed with a weapon and as
a result, she had been in fear for her life.

•

In
midst of conducting this investigation,
I was informed that the bank robber had been
Investigator I
observed entering a. vehicle in the supermarket parking lot and
that the license plate number h hen recorded. After obtaining
this information, Investigator I
I contacted his agency and
requested three additional investigators to assist him with the
raDidly evolving investigation. At this juncture, Investigator
I
was contacted on his Nextel phone by a RAT colleaue,
SAl
1 who was covering a lead relating to the
FBI’s PENTTBO my ticticn n nnnUnctjon with his fefl
pw
1
squadmate, SAl
I After Investigator I
I
provided a brief summa-ry of the ongoing bank robbery
investigation and requested their assistance, both SAs agreed to
rendezvous with hint in the yicinitv th supqxmarke. ‘While
awaiting the arrival of SAsI
I andy
Investigator
I
I met with the thre other OCSD investigators who had
responded to the supermarket to render assistance. He directed
these individuals to travel tol
I Santa Ana,
California, the address which corresponded to the registered
owner of the bank robbery getaway vehicle, and to monitor the
ingress into or egresS out of ths reidence by anyone.
SA I
I and SA I
Isubsequently arrived at
the agreed upon meeting location and were briefed by Investigator
I
a regarding the details of the bank robbery, to include a
subject description; his modus operandi; the fact that he had
been armed and had brandished the weapon; and the
description/license plate number of the getaway vehicle. After

2

c

 ___________

2:9?HI27i741 SUB p

obtaining thj information, both SA then proceeded to ass-let
Investigátorl
1w.it’h continuation of th investig’ion. In the
meantime., the QCSD inv tors’ at the Ain-. Way address
contaóted. Investigator I J aid avd t’t a ta•ie nd female
had departed the residence on. foot and had been detained by a
‘SAPO pàtro-1 off icér,
a .‘óct.9n adj*cent tp the
intersection of McFadden Avenue and couth Su1liva Street in
Santa Ana,.
.1-uvestigatorl
Id.epa.rted ‘the area of ‘thç
supermarket at approximately 12 50 PM, leaving the FBI SAs to
finish .p With a canvass and search of the surrounding
neighborhood, and traveled to the location where the two
individuals, had ‘bè’en-:stopped..’
.

t
.ter 1-us. árriv1
na sbqu e @ery
both det.a2.nees, Investigatol
that tle reg...stered
I
O.W15 .f t.’ p
I and his’
.réhicle, I
wife,. I
I did not. live at the :Adrin. Way address;:
instead, according to the female etainee, who is I
I
sister, they res_ded at an apartmen
l comtlex. locaed on South
1
Lyon Street in Santa Aria.
Although I
Icould rot
recall the peifi.c .addr.ess :shé and-her male companion .ag.ree.d to
accompany Investigator I 1’and the other law enforcement
personnel to the area of the apartment complx in odr to
pinpin
exact location.
At this junct1.re, SASI
I
arid I
Iarrivec at the interview location, were updated. by
1
Investigator
Iwith respect to the new developments, and were
advised of the plan to travel
ih- c
uth Lyon Street area in an
9
effort to locate and question I
regarth.ng his know’ledge of
the bank rObbe-r.
.-

.

.

The PB—I Sis.,. yg. weé: travelii!..togetiiet in a darc ‘bhe
Ford Crown Victoria Bureau vehicle, departea. tir
enroute to
the aatment complex, along witn InvesigatorI
Iwbo was
driviig in his own vehicle, two OCSD investigators, who were
ri4ing together in a single vehicle with
I and her
male co-npaxiion in the back seat, and Off ben
,
who was
trave1in in a marked sPD patrol car
Another OC investig,tor
remained at the Adrin Way address to continue to monitor activity
at tnat 1ocation At approximately 1 15 PM, with the assistance
of
land hiS
the specific domicile for I
__

wifèwas cetermined. to be the Saddleback Park Villas apartment
complex located t
I in Santa Aria
Inasmuch
as. I
exact ñuibèr of thq
I could’ hot
apartrnent ‘hereI
Iresded, Investigatorl
land I
I
requested that- th two F•i SAá conduct a viai Searc of the
parking lot, which was loated in the rêa of the apa.rtñeflt
complek, in order to.- determine df the blue getaway vhicie was
situated .tere-.
The othr three law en’for&nént iehieles thea
3’

 297-HQ-A127174l SUB D

I

parked at a .ooat4on in front of the apartment complex, and
Investictor
lused this opportunity to sit in Officer
Ivehicle and utilize the officer’s Mobile Data Terminal
in an arjJnpt to independently ascertain the apartment number for

I

I

I

.

After determining that the -ehi rii1 -r ccess g?te to the
walled-in parking lot was closed, s1
I
land SAl
parked on the Street outside of parking 1t, dismounted their
vehicle and entered the parking lot area through the unlocked
pedestrian gate. Once inside, the SAs conducted a visual search
of the entire area, to no avail; however, as they walked back
towards the entrance of the parkiflg lot, they obseed a vehicle
entering through the drive-in gate which was similar in
appearance to the blue car they were attempting to locate. The
driver of the vehicle, which also contained a female passenger
and a small child in a car seat, was a Hispanic male who matched
the description of the individual who had committed the bank
robbery earlier that day. As the vehicle drew closer to where
the SAs were standing, they observed that the license plate on
the car was identical to that which had been affixed to the blue
bank robbery getaway vehicle. Certain that they had been seen by
fhe irer of the vehicle, whom they now believed to I
I and having discreetly notified Investigator I
ivia
Nextel phone about locating the subject vehicle, the SAs fully
intended to detain and interview!
I regarding any knowledge
he might possess relative to the bank robbery, as was previously
planned. However, as the SAs continued to walk toward the blue
vehicle, it suddenly stopped at a point approximately 25 feet
away from the SAs, backed up to the gate entrance, drove out of
the parking lot and proceeded away from the apartment complex in
a northbound direction.
In reaction to this elusive maeuve on the part of
the SAs contacted Investigator!
Ivia the Nextel
phone, advised him of the blue vehicle’s sudden departure and ran
to their Bureau vehicle in anticipation of following the subject
vehicle. As the SAS departed the area of the parking lot and
proceeded northbound, they observed that the subject vehicle was
stopped at a red light at an intersection in the distance.
Simultaneously, the three other law enforcement vehicles, led by
the SAPD unit, also departed the area of the apartment complex
and joined in the pursuit of the subject vehicle. When the light
at the intersection turned green, I
Iturned left and
coztinued to travel along at an escaiating rate of speed,
followed closely from behind by the Bureau vehicle, which had not
actLivatd n,r •cjirens or emergency lights and was being driven by
Imaintained
l
I As the pursuit continued, SAl

I

4

b6
Ib7C

 297-HQ-A1271741 SUB B

contact via Nextel radio with investigatorl
I who advised that
while he and the other investigators were currently underway and
attempting to join the pursuit, the SAPD marked unit was rapidly
closing in on their location and would be available to render
assistance in stopping I
Ivehicle.
At this juncture, the SAs noted that the SAPD vehicle
was situated directly behind their vehicle and that Officer
I had activated both its emergency lights and siren.
SAl
Islowed the Bureau vehicle and allowed the SAPD
unit to pass on their left and pull in behind the subject
vehicle. Ag the SAPD vehicle and Bureau vehicle followed in
pursuitj
Ivehicle slowed perceptibly, turned right onto
Grand Avenue and continued northbound along the thoroughfare.
After traveling along brand Avenue for approximately one city
block,i
Isuddenly executed an abrupt right turn on East
2nd Avenue and rapidly exited his vehicle through the driver’s
side door while the vehicle was still moving forward.. The
vehicle, which was still occupied byl
1 wife and son,
collided with the rear of another vehicle whch was parked next
to the curb on the right hand side of the street.
At that same instant, as the SAPD vehicle came to a
stop behind the blue vehicle, I
Ibegan to run eastbound

down East 2nd Avenue, either inadvertently losing or
intentionaJ3y discarding his wallet in the process.
The Bureau

vehicle followed behindi
‘and when it pulled up to his
left side, gal
Iswerve the vehicle to the right in an
effort to cut him off. I
Iran into the Bureau vehicle,
struck the right side of the hood and was deflected towards the
right side of the road, where he resumed his rutinina ir an
easterly direction. Despit th1 ccllision., SAl
Iwas still
unable to view any oat of I
front torso or waistband
ara
Al
Istopped the Bureau vehicle, and both he and
SAl
lexited with their weapons drawn. At this point,
the SAs noted that Officerl
Ihad passei by thi current
position, in pursuit on foot and yelling ati
I to stop and
show his hands. Both SAs also gave chase and repeatedly issued
verbal commandç for I
Ito halt and put his hands in the
air. I
Irefused to comply with these instructiQns and
continued to run with his back to the SAs and Officer
un a
crouched maimer, in which he leaned forward at the waist, glanced
over his right shoulder on occasion, and hid his hands from view
by his pursuers in the midsectiçn of h4s body as if he had
something in his waistband. SAl
ladmitted to expeiencina
high level of anxiety at this point, particularly since I
was not obeying any of the commands to stop and display his
hands; and because a strong likelihood existed that he was the
5

 _______Istopped ________Icrumpled

297-HQ-A1271T41 SUB IJ

bank robber who had brandished a semiautomatic weapon earlier
that day.

h7c

Shortly thereafter,I
Isuddenly stopped, with his
hands still occluded from view
1 nci hgan to raise his hands and
pivot around to the right. Ski
I who was now standing in a
two handed_ehopting position off to thç right and in front of
Off icerl
Icontinued his rotation to
I noted that as I
the right, he had adopted a two-hand shooter’s_grip as if he were
drawing a weapon from his waistband. SAl
Iyelled a warning
to his colleagues that i
Iwas raising his hands and thought
that the subject had a_weapon. Asi
Ihands swept past
the position where SAI
1as standing and continued towards

Officer Bei]J,y, the BA could not see a weapon from his particular
angle and elected to not shoot. At this time, however, SA I
I

heard three to five shots fired from behind him and to his left
and had the impression that Office
a likely did not
have the ‘ame unobstructed view of
hands that
SAl
•
w
ire
Ihad due to his position, a
n at
I
Ii
Ifaced the SAs and Officer
for a second
or two,, seemingly un4eterred and uninjured after a’nng been
fired at, turned his back to them again, placed his hands in his
waistband area and took a couple of steps forward, stating, “Fuck
it I’m not going ou like this-or that.”

]bh

h7c
and repeated his previous motions
1
raising his clenched hands from his lower waistband area and
pivoting arçund to the eight as jf he were going to shoot a
weapon.
SAl_______ who had moved forward a couple of steps and
consequently had a beter anole qf observation than his
colleagues, noted thati
I right ipdex finger was red and
was again unable to detect any objects iz
I hands.
However, as SA I
Iwas making this observation, he heard
another two or three shots from his left rear and ulimatelv
surmised that SAl
I h fired his weapon ati
Ion
this particular occasion.
to the ground after
the last series o-f shots, having been struck a total of four
times djrina th cours of his ncounter with the two SAs and
Of ficeti
I Whilel
Iwas lying in a supine position in
the Street, he was subjcted to a hiah-jgk weapons search by
responding SAPD off icerl
Iwho recovered a silver
cellular phone fromi
Ilaft frort pants pocicet and placed
this item on the street besideL
I No weapon associated
withi
Ihas been recovered to date.

a

Santa .na Fire Department paramedic personnel responded
to the scene of the s4ooting, provided Adult Life Support (ALS)
treatment tol
and transported him to the Western Medical

a

6

 &

297-HQ-A1271741 SOB D

Center, 1001 North Tustin Avenue, Santa Ana. Subsequent
investigation nd eonu1tatiqn with I
Iattend4g
physician, Dr. I
I determined that
Ihad
sustained a gunshot wound to his left index finger; a gunshot
wound to his right hand which entered between his thumb and
forefinger and exited six inches above his wrist; a gunshot wound
to his left side which had entered and exited through his obligue
area; and a gunshot wound to the upper right side of his chest.
Dr4
Further opined that it was highly arn1ik1v tat the one
buiJ.çt which remained deeply imbedded under I
heft
clawicle would ever be removed.

.

On 11/20/2001, although still hospitalized at the
Western Medical Center,I
I agreed to provide a recorded
statement to investigators regarding his knowledge of the
activities on 11/15/2001. flowever, after being advised of his
Miranda rights, he only provided general identification and
background information, stating that although he could remember
inj eating himself with a quantity of heroin that morning, he had
no independent recollection of having been involved in a bank
robbery or a shooting incident.

1

Ispouse,I
I
I and his son,I
who were left behind in his vehicle when the
initial foot chase ensued,_were uninjured. I
ubsequent1y tIE
provided Investigator I
I who had arrived on the scene after
the shooting had occurred, with consent to search her blue 1988
Honda Civic, California license plate numbed
I which had
been driven by her husband before he exited the vehicle at East
t
2nd Street and fled on ç
of this vehicle yielded
I
I including I
Iwhich were stolen during
‘he earlier robbery of the Union Bank on North Grand Avenue. An
additional four bait bills, also associated with. the same
robbery, were recovered fromi
p wallet at the shooting
site.

SAl
Imaintained custody of his weapon until a
replacement weapon was piovided by ADIC Iden, who had traveled to
the SAA from H4guartes City in order to check on the welfare
of SA I
land SAl
in the wake of the shooting
incident. SAl
lspringfield Model 1911 .45 caliber
pistol,_serial number CRG 500, was provided to SAl_____________
LAI
I who examined the weapon and
ciiody of the
weapon to OCSD Lead Forensic specia1ist
Ifor
ballistics comparison purposes.
The shooting incident crime scene was processed,
photographed and diagramed in its entirety by the OCSD’s Forensic

6

1
j
)J(

 297-HQ--A1271741 SUB D

I

.

Science Service Unit. Reports reflecting forensic examinations,
as well as other data, was forwarded upon request to the FBI
Laboratory for review, extrapolation and incorporation into the
final Shooting Incident Report. Evidence collected at the scene
included nine expended cartridge cases and three jacketed
bullets, and it should be noted that forensic analysis determined
that two of tze expended cartridge cases were fired from SA
I weaoon. while the remaining seven cases were fired
trom Ottice
1
handgun.
Investigation conducted immeIately after the shooting
by the three-person interview teams comprised of OcDAO, FBI and
SAP personnel resulted in the interviews of several potential
witnesses; however, of all of the interviews which were
condutted, only one individuall
1adntitted to
actually observing the shooting incident as it took place. The
majority of the other respondents, to include I
I
professed to having only heard gunshots; observing only a limited
aspect of the foot chase sequence; or neither. I
I a
transient who advised that he had been drinking a vodka and
tomato juice mix in a Styrofoam cup at the time of the shooting,
observed some police officers sIoutinqmmandz to stop at a man
who was running away from them. I
Ithen saw the man
suddenly stop, turn around and start. shooting at the police
officers, who returned fire at the man.. I
Lhen observed
the man briefly turn away from the police officers, turn back
toward them and then shoot at them again. The police officers
returned fire once again,, and after taking a couple of steps, the
man fell down in the Street.
Another interviewee,
1
Iwas
standing in front of a business office located adjacent to East
2nd Street and North Grand Avenue when he heard police sirens and
observed a blue vehicle collide with the back of a black vehicle
which was parked on 2nd Street. He theti observed a police
vehicle park behind the blue vehicle, at which time the driver of
the blue vehicle exited his vehicle and ran east on 2nd Street
while being pursued on foot by the police officer. I
I
advised that he heard the po1ic officer yell several times at
the driver as he ran, and whilel
Icould not be absolutely
certain of what the officer was saying, he believed that it was
possibly “Stop!” He lost sight of bath individuals as they ran
east along East 2nd Street, but later heard seven to eight shot
being fired.
Although the above interviews are somewhat limited and
lacking in specific detail, they provide independentcorroboration
of the accounts of the shooting which are enumerated herein.

6
b7C

 FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-PS)

U111TD STATES DEPAETMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

ssii

12/04/2001

1

orn HONOLULU

297-HQ-A1271508-J3
Tiue

SHOOTNO INQUJR.Y
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
HONOLULU DIVISION
10/1212001

cia

ADMENISTRATIVB INQUiRY

sy

Thu uhnntipg incident occurred while Federal Agents attempted to make the arrest of

I

Ion the evening of 10/12/2001.

1b2
lb 7 A

DETAiLS:
Th4ftilowing is a chronology of the events JeAn
IandthediscbargeofaweaponbySA

oil
I

I

attempted arrest

I

Iw a subjf a Honolulu Division OCDET caseJ
1
I
IS11.
onesubjectofthsongonginveutiotjon. Mthe
time ofthe attempted arrest e I had obtained an arrest warrant fo
Ion drug
lb 7 c
arid firearms related charges. The arrest warrant was obtained at approximately 3:04
lb 70
p.m. on 10/1212001. (Bnclosed elsewhere in this report is a more detailed snmrnry of
the subjeces criminaL history and a. photocopy ofhis arrest photo.)

On October 4, 2001, SAbtained search warrants for a residence a.tI

I

This deounerrt contains neither xeccaaendaticns nor conclusions Of the FBI. It i.e the property
of the FBI
and is lOaned to your agency; it and it.e contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 _____

‘H

297-HQ-A1271508-D

I

lAvenue and three storage lockers,l
land I
I at Self
Storage 1 located at 438 Kama1 Street. The three storage lockers were utilized bJ
I The
I
laddress was wherd..Jas currendy, (It should be noted, based on their
investigation, that agents interviewed advised ofljransient nature and frequent moving
from location to locatioa)
-

5, 2001, SA
Isrifrijd a half pound metimphetamine buy/bust
drug deal wrtlj
Idid not show and SAl
hid not execute the search warrants_n
Operatioaa1 PIai was prepared for this drug deal that included S
ci
I .The b 6
Ops Plan had all the appropriatewarnings, Le., FBlDeadlyForcePo cy
e
b7c
admonishments, Le., ideudvinø eotbing and body armor. The Ops Plan also had a ‘Caution
Statement” whichstated: I
lciitninal history indicates his propensity to carry firearms.”

On October 8, 2001, Honolulu Police Department (I ?rThpfjed the FEI that
lwas arrested on $35,000 worth of outstanding state warrants. SAI
.vas advised by SSA
arrest. Two weapons, a shotgun and a Ruger .223 with a collapsible stock, were
l,ti
I
recovered at the time of his arrest. Also recovered was drug paraphernalia, consistent with
manufacturing and processing of crystal methamphetamine, and distribution quantities of
methamphetaznine heroin and cocaine.

I

On October 9, 2001, SAxecut.ed the search warrant at the storage facility
and seized three weapons, drugs and drug paraphernalia. Copies of the search warrant and
receipt ofitems seized were left in the storage lockers.
On October 11, 2a01Qmade bail with $3,500 and got out ofjail at
approximately 9:30 p.m.

On October 12, 2001, SA
btained an arrest warrant, at approximately 3:04
p.m., foir],ased on the September 2,
rug deal and Alcohol Tobacco Firearms (AT)
felon in ion of a weapon charge. S
Id not obtain the warrant earlier because the
AUSA assigned the case v.auted the crime la results of the drup purchased. (The
methampjtetne is still at the HPD crime lab.) Prior to obtaining the warrant on October 127
2001, SAl_iiad concte4 the Department of Public
Intake Services Division, to
determme the status of’
I It was at this time that S
ad thatwas bonded out the
previous evening at approximately 9:30 p.m. It was S
riginal intent to place a hold on
I
Ivith the Department of Public Safety so that whe
to be released it would be to the
custody ofthe FBL
-

On Otnht’r 12 2OO1t approximately 5:20 p.m., SAI’eceived ateleobone
call from thel
11.438 Kamakee Street, Honolaw
F1-+wi
had left vcu ni2il
f to
ty
retumedi__________________
IadvisISA
currently at the storage tactilty. SAQadvlsed SAsI
land
as at
t
the storage facility and they agreed to assist on the arrest. It should be not
at the storage
facility is less than a five-minute drive from the Honolulu FBI office.
I

I

SAsI
pveled to the storage facility to affect the arrest of
1i4
After arriving atthe storagefadilitytheageutslearnedthathad leftwithintbelastflve
2

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 ______

297-HQ-A1271508-jJ

minutes. They also learned thawas upset that his storage locker
been searched. They
obtained a description and the license plate number of the vehicle that
as drivina fron the
confirmed that the vehics registered tol
I
I conducted a record ch
I It was
aeciced that they would search for
at two possible locations
was known to frequent.
This was determined by the location o the previous drug deal an surveillance of a co-subject.
While nroceding to one ofhe locations, the agents suddenly found themselves see.eral vehicles
Afterl
Ivehicle turned, they followed him. A telephone call was
911 in aneffo
btain assistancefromHPDto assistonthcarrest of
911 Operator placed S
n hold. The vent’s vehicle was then directly behind
Ivehicle. The traffic came to a stop at ared light.I
Ivehiclehad cars in
behind
either side of him. The agent’s vehicle was situated on the driver’s side o
ehiole.
in the dri’ers seat with an unknown’
ual. believed to be a female, was hi the
r seat. A decision was made to arrest
t this point. The aaeits got out of the car
and identified themselves as FBI in an effort to affect the arrest. SAl
Iwas in the rear of
ivehicle on the
in front oIl
Vehicle on the driver’s side.
I
Ivehicle
on the back of the car and olcF o stop and
of the
ignoring SN
Iommands. SA
on the window. I
Ivehicle moved forward tor a third time at
while banging on the back window, broke the rear window. S
found it odd thaT’window broke at
en though he was knocking at the be
e
window. Through the back window, S
vised that he saw something shiny in
partially raised ri*t hand. Taking care
hurt any bystanders or the other occupant in
red one shot at
I Ivchicle, SAl
en sped away.
The agents reentered their vehici
The ,exlts then returned to the office where S

to 1ocatewithout
ed over his weapon to SS.4

‘

I

A( flpiej L Dzwilewski,, ASAC’ Tirnhi1v TC Mcrf7 Al
1
AJCEXI
,I Media Coordinator SSAI’
and the KT team
I
were notified of the shooting.

Subsequent to the shooting, several teams ofFBI Agents were fonned for the
.purpose of conducting witness interviews. ERT was alerted to assist with the collection of crime
scene evidence.
On October 12, 2001 at approximately 7:36 p.m., BRT agents arrived at the scene
to collect available evidence. Agents waited for HP]) Officers to temporarily block traffic so that
the scene ofthe hnnthacr quId be examined. The scene was processed by FBI ERT assisted by
NPD Detectivel
I All crime scene evidence was collected by Honolulu FBI ER.T.

On October 12, 2001, HP]) received 911 calls from citizens regarding a shot fired
at the corner of Kapiolani and Atkinson Drive, Honolulu, Hawaii. EPD dispatched an officer
and nothing was found by the responding officer.
On October 12, 2001, at approximately 8:00 p.m.,i
Ivehicle was found
abandoned by Hi’]) and was towed
1 FBI Honolulu was advisedat 11:30 p.m. and ERT ‘was
dispatched to process the vehicle. The vehicle was towed to HP]) for storage in a secure garage
3

b6
IC

 297—HQ--A1271508-D

bay pending the issuance of a Federal Search Warrant for the vehicle.
On October 13, 2001, a federal search warrantwas issued by Federal Magistrate
Kevin S. C. Chaug.
I

On October 14, 2001, the search warrautwas executed on the vehicle
I The vehicle was described as a 1988 blue Chevro1 taurt tnrr (‘inrr belonging to
Hawaii license platd
I and vehicle identification numberl
I FBI
ERT processed the vehicle and collected the evidence.
-

On October 16 200), at approximately 3:05 omi
lcvas arreted ‘without
incident by agents bf the FBI. I
Iwas in the company oil
lidentifiedi_______
as his girlfriend. At the time of his arrest was in the possession ot a lilocIc .40 caliber pistol
and approximately four ounces of crystal methamphetamine.
conseated to an interview.
I
I denied that hehad a weapon the evening of Qctober 12,2001. He claimed the weapon that
was in his possession at the time ofhis arrest was purchased after the shooting incident, but
would not provide any flu-ther details.

I

I

Lonsented to an interviewl
cknow1edged being the
nnger hi
Ivehicle on the evening of lO/12iOO1I
F.Iaimed that she did not know
Iwas in’cknvea mdms and denied that he had a weapon in his possession on fiaeving of
uctober 12,2001.1
stated that she thought the two males who approachec
were either “robbers or car-jaker” The individuals were knocking and banging on thelvehicle
windows but because she and
veçe araui1g, the windows were up and the music was on, she
could not hear what thev we saying.j
Isaw the man’s mouth moving but could not hear
what hwas saying. I
Iwas advised tilat her story conflicted with that oilier mother.
was personally interviewed by FBI Agents,
thctl her daughter
wlvised her that IJiad a weapon arxl that the cops shot at them. I
lecalled telling her
mother that she thought maybe the men whqhoI _Jar were cops, but denied telling her
mother thathad a gun. After a momen4
dvised that she told her mother that after
the shooting incident
ked her, “babe, what would you do ifI had a gun?’
(It should be noted
mokes crystal methainphetainhie).
The three non law enforcement wiriesses, whose statements are enclosed ‘with this
report, are identified as follows:

I

I

dvised that he was on his way to work when he. observed three men exit a
I
light green foui’ ooor car as traffic was stopped. All three ofthese men drew hand guns from
their waist area and approached another oar stopped directly in front of their car. The three men
appro
vehicle and two of them began banging on. the windows one on each side of the
vehicle.
d not hear anything that was said. As traffic began to move the car in front
began to ave away,j.he nin standing behind the vehicle moved with the vehicle banging
on the
car and reqr wmtjowJ
ithen heard a popping sound and saw that the rear window had
shattered. I
hssumed the popping souid Was gun shot but
lithe shot came from
inside the vehicle or from one of three menj
Iheard one shot.
pined that the three
men were undercover law enforcemeht officers.
.

4

 ____
______
_____

297—HQ-A1271508-D

I

I

I
Iwas traveling west bound on Kapiolani Boulevard, by the Honolulu
Convention Center, with her son when she heard a loud pop, which she believed was a gun shot.
Isaw ainanwithagunintheroad. Behind thismanwas agreen sedan stopped inthe road.
I
‘observed a secon
with a gun standing near the sedan. Both ofthese men ot into the
sedan and drove wty.
uld not hear any conversations because the windows in her
vehicle her up,
o y card one shot.

I

I

I Jvas traveling west bound on Kapiolani Boulevard, by the Honolulu
Convention Cnter, with his mom
heard a loud popping sound. ,H,ls mother ‘told him
that site belinved it was a gun. shot
a man approximately 25 yardrahead in the road
holding a hand gun. The windows o
‘ole were up but he could hear
although he could not determine what was eing said, or who was shouting.
chicle
approached the man he tunie4and jan to a green sedan. Next to the green sedan was a second
man also holding a hand gun.I__iemmized the license plate number of the green sedan and
his mother telephoned 911.1
jonly heard one shot.
Arrest Team Statements:

I

lb7A

SIls the case agent for thd

advised that he re
at the facility. SA

a telephone call fron4
sembled art arrest team ot A1

1ortion ol
H

I
eparted the FBI office en route
anii
Iitcility. S
had a copy of the arrest warrant and showed a copy to
appro
p.m. the agents arrived at Self Storagd.. Several
contact SS
as the arrest team
ultimately le on e des
e of
respective roles were. S
search warrant on October 9, 2001,
lockers.
the storage facility when the manager came out from the office.
left approxiniatel five minutes ago. The agents continued a quick search
to confirm that
departed.

I
1 Al
itiiäf I
Iwas
[nd hitnsele
At

-

SA

spoke wi

ager. Themanagersaid thati
Ivas “really pissed”
that the FBI search his lockers,
had
oned the manager as to why they let the FBI
search the lockers. The manager s
that
had seen the search warrant paperwork and was
visibly upset the F
d entered his storage oc ers. The manager also provided a description
ofthe vehicle tha
was driving and
She described the car as a blue IROC
Camaro with Hawan icense plate numbe
.

information

S

of the

dvised SI
Ia call the FBI oce and ge% the reistertd owner
The registered owner was identified asj
IThe agents

e plate.

5

lb
lb7c

 297-HQ-A1271508-D

departed the storage facility. S
tated that they should check out the P
Hotel because
that was where the September 25 amg deal took place. At Hbron Lane, S
id a U-turn
and headed in a wesydirection on Ala Moana Boulevard. At Ala. Moana ou evard and
Atkinson Drive, SAJstopped at the traffic light Approximately three to four veluicl
front ofhis vehicle
, 11iIIi right-hand lane, was a vehicle matching the description oft_____
1
vehicle A positive identification could not be made ofthe vehicle because the license plate was
obstructed. The vehicle also had clark tinted windows. As the blue Camaro turned from Ala
Moana Boulevard onto Atkinson Drive, all the aeat.’ could see the license plate. They identified
the license plate and the vehicle as belonging tol
I

SAl
kiaced a call to 911 to have HPD assist in pulling over
Ivehicle. SA
ladvised that the operator attempted to find an emergency line. The vehicles continued
driving down
n Drive he
ard the Ha
onveution Center and Kapiolani
Boulevard. S
pulled behin
ehicle. S
was still on hold with the 911
Operator. The
erator caine on ag
rmed that an emergency line was stiji
unavailable. S
ted that he told
‘We are going to take him now.” SN
I
pulled next t
on the left-hand side.
as in the second from the 1eft-and line. The
front passeng
of the Bureau vehi
a next to the dtives side door ci
I vehicle. SA
IZIidentifled
the d
the vehicle and it appeared that he had a female passenr in
the front passenger seat. S
pped the vehicle at a slight angle but close enough tol
I
vehicle that Sj
Icould no get out the front passenger side door. The vlndows were up on
both vehicles.
Igot out of the car and approached from he ‘nt °L Ivhiole. SA
out ofthe car, SAl
aw SAl
ddressin
Iad his weapon drawn. As hew
I
Ibrough the window and heard S
g, “FBI, FBI, get Out ofthe car: SAl
I
idei4ified himself as the FBI and instruct
to get out of the car. Aim turned toward
I
land his eyes were “really big.” There was
in front of the car that was stopped at a red
traffic light The suspect vehicle was blocked on all four sides, The stop took p1
approximately 5:48 p.m. The II changed and the traffic in front started to move
oved’
his vehicle fo
stop ed
pulled away again and S
served S
ove
forward with
S
eard three abashing” ss
n the sound o g
cracking as he med to r
er e Bureau vehicle. S
en heard glass break. He then
heard one shot firec and A41u’s vehicle sped away, The agen s reentered their vehicle and
attempted to locati
I
I

.

ttempted to call SA
S
lat a,pprodmnat
p.m. SS[_did
not respond. S
id the Night Clerl4
Ito get SS
n the phone. SAl
talkedtoSS
andadvsedhimthatievatemptec1toarr
ashotwasfired. s
the agents were returning to the office, SP4__lelephoned BPD.
dvised he was with
the FBI and provided his license plate number to detennine if an All o
ulletin (PB’) was
pla
the Bureau vehicle. The HPD dispatcher advised there was no APB. SA
hen returned to the Honolulu FBI office.

SA
sujé&sj

Op October 12, 2001, at approximately 4:30 p.m., S
I1it

advised by
awe” have-to go-make-an arr The arrest was one o SAl
SA
learned from SAjElhatQwas at his storage taality. The

6

I
I

-

I

L

 _____

297RQ-A12715o8-D

a.
b 1

The agents drove directly from the Federal Building to the storage facility. A
woman from the storage facility came out of the offi
Aim had just left. She
provided the
e plate number ofthe vehicle. S
ent inside the storage
area to verify
had left.
S
etumed to the vehicle with S
and
d a decision was
made to drive arouii o cq
the registered owner’s
lelephoned the office
j S4
infoimation on the vehicle. The vehicle was a z-door blue Chevrolet registered tol
I
S
aid, “why don’t we check Cleghom Street.” Cleghom is locad
between Ala. Wai an u o Avenue. As the agents were drivingjoward Cleghorn, SAl
1
stated that he did not believewould be at that location. SPturned around at Hobron
Lane, by the Red Lobster restaurant. They were now heading westbound on Ala Moana
Boulevard. As pproached Atkinson Drive on Ala Moana Boulevard, they stopped at the
traffic light. S
observed ablue vehicle similar to the one they were looking for•
farrig
lane.
vehinle was three to four cars in front of the Bureau vehicle. SA
asked
S
he could see the license plate. S
uld not see the license plate because of
the
e ofthe vehic
e blue colored vehicle turned right onto
en the light chang
Atkinson Drive. S
didentifled the license plate and conrmed
was the
vehicle registered to
that two people were in the vehicle bu
t ap
ehicle had
a. dark tint on the win ows. S
tated they should follow the vehicle. S
telephoned
QI 1 t
9 have the Honolulu Police epartlnent (HP])) assist in pulling ov
I
bould hear the 911 Operator come on and asic, “fire or police emergen
S
aid,
“police emergency” and was put on held. The vehicles continued down Atkinson Drive and
approached Kapiolani. Boulevard.
was
the

as the
ccl from Atkinson
Center, S
vised that jiewaa
his vehicle on e
er’s side ofi
I
r. S
so close to
the passenger side
S
in inside the
said, “FBI,
out ofthe driver’s side S
ot out the rear
enger side and
bad their weapons drawn. SA
as on the front
side ofI I
ye ole knocking on the
ada
went forward several times,
onto the
rear spoiler o
ehicle
apd the
broke.
SAIJ heard one gun shot but did not know who fired the shot I
jiebicle then sped away.
.

Whenlie reentered-the Buteau vehicle SAl
nfo
shot into the vehicle because when the window broke, he saw cithe
7

them that he fired one
eaching for something

 ____

297-HQ-A1271508-o

or mnhin w in his hand.
for
S___Icontacted SS
direc y back to the office. When
weapon.

ye down Kapiolani Boulevard a short distance to look
and advised him ofw
appened.JThi proceeded
y arrived at the office, S
e SS.41
jhis

S
ed that he wore his badge on his belt during the arrest operation.
SA
I had observe
photo from previous preparations invo
e c flçeration
Plans (Ops plans) had been prepared on previous drug deals involving
S
lead these
ps plans. M the briefings, they spoke ofthe possibility of Ahu being anned an ciangerous.
0

7C

Agent who çedJiis wcapo)
at approximately
telephone call from
storag ocker facility

I

the following information. On October 12, 2001,
athisdeskin
bereceiveda
im that subj
currently at his
StreetinHono
seve
locks fromthe
the Case Agent

b6
b7A
,7C
]b7D

On October 8, 2001, SSI
I an’isor of Squad 3, received a call
from he HonoLulu Police Department (HLD) advising thatlJiad been arrested by HPD. SSA
jwas also advisd thai two weapons, chemicals, and other precursors for meth had been
seized at the time ofI
1arrpat. One of these weapons was a sawed-off or mo
otgun.
On October 9, 2001, SAl
hnd other SAS from Squad 3 conducted a search
storage lockers -pursuant to the search warrant issued on October 4, 2001. SA
as not
present for this search but was advised by SAbat drugs and weapons had ecu seized.

On the morning of October 12, 2001, SAIwas advised by SAIZha4
had bonded out ofjail the previous night, ‘Thursday, OctbT1, 2001.1
Iwhereabouts were
unlmoi at the time, and he is known to be very transient in nature At approximately 5:00 DJfl.
S
advised he had received a call frqt caretak
storage facility who stated I
was at e stoTae ftciljtv t tije time. S
ked SA
p assist bjm in locating and
aonrjiendlngI
I SP
[greed and
Sf4
Ito assist theuL SA
ladvised SAl
Ito grab all of his gear and they proceeaea out or he office.
I

I

drove to
facilitytoS
auc[
I
directlyandm e earrest,andS
the back aisles and attempted to run.

tocovertheexit:
ety issues and concerns were eñhásized by

They arrived at the storage facility and reemphasized the arrest plan and stated
that safety was their number one concern. The caretaker of the storage facility came out of her
8

I
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b7D

 _____ua

______

297-EQ-A1271508-o

office and advised sF__Ithat
ad already left. SM
n
h the storage
facility to clear the area and ensure
was not there. The caretak
edLJ was with
another individual and was wRterI when leaving the facility. She had written dawn his
Hawaii license plate number]
I. which she provided along with the vehic1es
description, a blue JXOC Camaro.
SS6I
hthoned in the vehicle plate infbnnation and received conflxmation that
the vehicle was registered to__pith a Kaneqhe a4dress. They decided to attempt to locate
I
I They discussed possible whereabouts foil hnd decided he might be on Cle
treet
in Waikiki, or at the Pagoda Hotel on Rycroft Street in Honqlulu. It was decided that
would
most likely not be on Cleghom Street due to his recent conflicts/disputes with_______ they 6
lb
stopped for a red light at the intersection of Ala. Moana Boulevard and Atkinson Drive, they
b
noticed a blue Camaro stopped four cars in front, in the r right-hand turn lane.
As the blue Camaro moved forward and prior o its tujning righ
Drive, they confiimed the license plate was that otl
I4 S
I SN
I
laud see where he took them. They followed I
Ivehicle.
laid S
HPD to getapoliceçarto assistthemmaffectingthearrest. S
called 911.
to contact SSAI
Ito advise him of the situation.

Atkinson
chow
‘ed

ehic1e turned right from Atkinson Driveapiolani, near the
Convention Center. At this point the agents were ii t b
vehicle, and both vehicles
were in. the second to far left lane. They identific
the river of the vehicle through the
tinted windows and also observed an occupant in e ont passenger seat.
The traffic was stopped as the
approached
1 causing
Avenue
Ivehicle tostor awefl. At this time S
ulled p_____ ehicle, on the left, at a
slight ale.
jtated that he was unaware that SiLJwas cqlating either pulling
next to
lvçhicle or getting out of the Bureau car aild approachi
his vehicle at this
tim
Ivehicle was close enough that SAl
Icould not get a
e
eager door.
SA
ddenly jumped out the driver’F
rid proceeded to the front o
vehicle. As he
exite
e car, he drew his weapon. SAl
Lnstinctively reacted and exit
e ureai yeN
as there was a narrow op
permitted him to get out the rear passenger side. SAl_____
proceeded around in back o
ehicle, taking up a position lathe rear of the vhicle QEl the
passenger side. As he exited the vehicle, he drew his
from his holster. SAl
I
shouted; “FBI, stop the car, you are under arresti” S
an penn’
the rear spoiler’
with his left band as his weapon was in his right hançl.
eard S
shouting “FBI,
FBI, stop the vthidbel” or “FBI, FBI, get out of the vehicle.
e
c began to move i front
of the car and
I vehicle lunged forward and stopped. S
to step away fromi
I
vehicle when the car lunged. SAegan pounding çn thç ower portion ofthe back window
with his left hand, all the time shouting ‘FBI” and teffing
to stop, he was under arrest.
vehicle lunged forward again and stopped. S
abbed hold of the rear spoiler for brnn
with his left hand, and began hitting the lower
the back window with his weapon. I
veljde_h1ged forward for a third time and stopped. While holding on to the spoiler for balance,
SAl
hit the lower part of the back wjndow çne more time. SuddenLy the top part of the
back window shattered. This startled SAl
Ifor a second.

I

}iviseci that he could see light from the inside of the vehicle. He clearly
9

 297 -HQ-A1271508-D

sr1 turned around and facing him from the diiveii seat with his right hand partially rM

Se4
bserved a silver, shiny object in his right hand and was fearfbl for his life. SAl
I
raika ma weapon, focused on the driver and fired one round through the lower portion
& me
back wind
o the vehicle. The vehicle may Shave begun to roll forward as he fired the one
shot. S
dvised that he was careflil not to cause injury to the passenger or any
bystand
ept his muzzle suppressed. He estimated that his weapon was approximately
four to six inches from the rear window when Ii
He could see a bullet hole through the
mtaotlower portion ofthe tinted back window.
ediately sped away at this point. SA
ladvised that he did not fire any more shots out of safety concerns for the surrounding
tramc and bystanders. Ho estimated that it was only 30-40 s
nds from the time he exited SA
Ivehicle to the time his weapon was discharged an
ehicle sped away.
Stj
jeentered the vehicle and together with S
d SAl___Iproceeded
to
on
Iwithoutjs. They then started to head back towar the ofrice. At this time,
S
elepiioned SS
d explained to
had occurred involving the shooting
mci eat When they ha returned to the office, S
ediately surrendered his
personally-owned, Bureau-approved weapon to S

.

I
I

OBSERVATIONS
ISSUES EXAMINED:
In conducting this inquiry, two issues were examined, The first issue was whether
the use of deadly force was justified. The second issue was whether sufficient preplanniug was
undertaken prior to attempting the arrest.
Regarding the deadly force issue, witness statements as vell as interviews of the
Arrest Team Agents and the Agent that fired his weapon, indicated thaj
Idid not
comply with Agent coxtunands to stop and get out ofhis vehicle.j
Lkmwj1 to carry a weapon
capable of inflicting death or serious bodily harm, was observed bySA
)ave something
shiny in his partially raised right hand. At the time of his subsequent arr
had a Glock .40
I
caliber pistol in his possession.
As I?ertains to the preplanniug issue, artam members were either informed or
aware that S1
Ihad obtained an arrest warrant for L_.fr drug and firearm charges and that
I hould be considered
ed and dangerous. Arrest team members were involved in
previous drug deals with
e scheduled buy/bust on October 5, 2001. A previous
written Ops plan stated t at
al history in•
his propensity to cany firearms.”
Arrest team members were aware of a recent arrest o
n which two weapons were taken
from him and a search ofiR tqrage lockers in which weapons were seized. Additionally, the
arrest team was aware of
Icriniinal past and his alleged current involvement with the selling
of crystal methamphetanune.
En route to apprehend
I the Case Agent, SAl
lorally
communicated an aretplau to team members. Later, when the subject was not located at the
storage facility, SAl
kipdated the plan to conduct a folory car stop. S
tempted a 911
call to seek the assistauceofHP1) in affecting the arrest The exact timing o
en
the felony
car stop would take place was vague.
10

1b6
-J

 _______Idisplayed

_______________

1D-2O4 (Ray. 12.-1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

6
Copy to:

Report of
Datc:

Inspector
3945/2oOl

casernt:

297-HQ-A1271285 SUB 0

TitIe

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CHICAGO DIVISION
AUGUST 28, 2001

C?jaractcr:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsl:

This shooting incident occurred while FBI Agents and FBI
Violent Crime Task Force Officers attempted to arrest a
bank robbery subject,I
I on Tuesday morning
August 28, 2001, in Chicago., Illinois.

Offl:
———-

Inspection DiVision
‘‘

.

‘

DETAILS:

I

I

I

I

Black male, DOB
was identitieci as tne perpetrator of two baitic ronoeres at
the same branch of the Charter One Bank at 3250 W. 87th
Street, on the south side of Chicago.
a
chrome-plated handgun at the second robbery. These
robberies occurred on successive Fridays, AuguØt 17 and
24, preceding the shooting on August 28.
Enclosed in this
report is a more detailed summary of the subject’s
background and criminal history.
-

-

On August 17, 2001, the Charter One Bank noted
above was robbed by a lone Black male who stated he had a
gun but did not display one. Upon exiting the bank, he
stated, “Tell President Bush to kiss my ass.” He escaped
on foot with $17,319.72.
The following Friday,
08/24 2001, this same gunman, later identified positively
as
robbed the same branch, this time displaying a
“large, s
“
He vaulted the tellers’ counter
and stole
from the bank’s vault. A bank

ijs document entains neither xecoemend.ticns noc con iisions of the FBI.
It is the property of the SEX
and is loaned to your agency’; it and its cantanta ar, not to be distribut.d outsid. your a.ncy.

 297-HQ-A1271285 SUB D

employee watched
heave the bank in a Ford Expedition with
dealer plates.
Bank employees identified the robber as the same
person who had robbed them the previous week. Bank security
cameras captured
robbing the bank the second time. The
robber again mad
rez&rence to President Bush, telling
employees they could thank Bush for the robbery, and, *Like I
said last time, tell President Bush to kiss my assi”
Investigation at the WbFord dealership, 2601 West
q thati
St.-.
ke.tii.
Expedition used in the robbery for a test drive the morning of
the first robbery. Bank surveillance film was shown to Ford
employees who idetified[
las the customer who took the
Expedition for a test drive. He had proyided identification
his true name with address of his mother I
I
1 Chicago, which was near thç dealership. Physical
surveillance was established at thel
I location that
Friday evening and Saturday
1 August 24 and 25with negative
results. A federl crii4nal complaint and arrest warrant were
also obtained forl
Jon Saturday, August 25. On Sunday an4
Monday, the 26th and 27th of August, case agent I
I
prepared an oPerations plan to approc1t the single family
residence at4
he was there.
land

.

.

arresti

On Monday, August 27, SAl
land others continued
the surveillance at the mother’s house. He fin,alized the arrest
plan and discussed it with his supervisor, SSAI
I
SSAI
Idiscussed it with his ASAC, J.P. Weis, who approved
using
SAs to approach the house and arrest I
I the
following morning, Tuesday, August 28. ASAC Weis mentioned the
plan to SAC Mcchesney on Monday, but did not go into great detail
:as it was seen as a routine .VCTF arrest.

six

I

On Tuesday morning, at approximately 7:00 a..m.,_SA
lend five other SAs approached the resicn t I
I
I They spoke withi
Ian I
lwho
invited them in and told tte SAS that i
Iliad in fact lived
there for a while hut hd not been there since August 17. She
also advised thati
Ihad not been himself lately, acting very
moody and emotionai. ne all9wed t1e SAs to search throughout
her house, including the roomi
I had stayed in and his
personal effects he had left behind.

During this search, SAs found several evidentiary items
and items of lead value on his RossibLe whereabouts. Among these
itejus was a lette; adirssd to I
I at:I
I
I
I, Chicago, IL. I
be her so&s
lidentifiedi
current girlfriend.
rne .as a.Lso±ound receipts for ammunition
2

b6
7C

 _____lobtained

____________At_______lagain

_________________

297-HQ--A1271285 SUB 1)

commonly used in AX-47 assault rifles and 30.06 rifles. Also
observed was an empty soft cover for a long weapon and military
camouflage shirts and a hat similar to the one worn by the
bank robbery suspect during the robberies. The search concluded
at approximately 8:00 a.m.
I

I

this point, SAl
Icontacted his supervisor, SSA
and advised him ot the results of the search and that
he and SAT
Iwere going to dr’tr by ;he girlfriend’s
for. iheErj t’
apartment
L.
permission
approximately 9:00 a.m., SA______ an
frrrn, 1hi hiiltljng manager to look insid iijarkirp aaraa at
I and found the Ford Expedition wh rh I
liad
hooked
taken for a test drive and not returned. SAl
through the windows of the vehicle and saw a black duffel bag
similar to the one used in the bank robberies
1 a camouflage
shirt, along with a hard case for a lpng weapon partially covered
by a blanket, Also observed were two cell phone chargers and a
half bottle of water., which indicated to SAl
Ithat the
vehicle had not been abandoned.

b7C

land told, him
contacted SSAI
about finding the Expedition and requeitd additjional Agents/TFOs
sent his
to respond for a possible arrest. SSAI
1 the Fugitive Task
available SAs and asked SSAI
I o-ovided one SA
Force supervisor, for threç bodies
SSAJ
and two TFOs including TFOI
lalso responded
SSAI
to a staging area one block from the apaltnlPnt bu1ldig, and then
SAJ
briefed the others on what he knew. TFOI
1
I drove into the garage in TFO I
I police vehicle
and blocked the Expedition.
-

1

land

I

Between 9:30 and 9:45 a.m, all Agents/TFOs_walked to
the parking garage at I
I and SA
j where SSA I
backmunrL including arrest
J briefed everyone on I
record and known violent tendences. SAl
lalso passed

around an arrest photo of I
with the subject’s appearance..
hc

I

AI

Fr1

I ensuring everyone’s familiarity
Present for tl’is hi-iefipg were
I SA
lowing law enforosinent personnel: SSAI
SAl
SAl
I andTFOl

ITFJ

1S31

SAl
I S1i

‘SAl

I TFOI
a,

[

I

During this_briefing in the garage of I
land SA I
SSN
Idisoussed with team memiers various
options and scenariqs for arrçting I
I if in fact he was in
the apartment. SSAI
Iadvise tne IRT that it was his
-

3

I

:b7

 297-HQ-A1271285 SUB D

belief that
jhad in al]. likelihood fled the area and simply
parked the xpeaiuion in the enclosed parking garage. However,
Iobse’ratLons about the Expedition’s contents
SM
indicatedi
Imay actually be present.
SSA I
I then made_assignments of ersoizeI,
deploying therFas zo.L.Lov1’S: SAl
Ia
t” ‘‘
the aarge and the stolen Expeáition. TO
an SAl
uildin. A5
Iwere assigned to watch the fr
I
Li
IJ
ssigzied. o
two osition in the alley way behind the apartment buiid
SSA
jandi
lalong with TPO
SAsI
ignated as the entry team. Before dividing
and TFOI
uggested a ruse whereby TFO
who.
is black, would pose as a neighbor of apartment 301 who had
erroneously received a package for that apartment. This ruse was
adopted as the safest, most direct means of acertaininq I
I
presence and effecting his arrest if so. SSAI
Ibelieved
that all personnel had their protective vest on. However, other
SAs stated that everyone with the exception of TPOI
Iwore

I

vests.

-

At approximately lO00 a.m., the entire arrest team got
into position and checked radio communications on both FBI
NexteJ.s and CPD radios. After eyrvne yias confirmed in
position, SSAI__________ gave TFO I
I the thumbs up sign to
knock on the door of apartment 301. TFO I
p had a package in
his hand that he had picked up from the mali. box area in the
lobby.
The other four SAs were lined up along the wall out of
sight of the occupants of 301, all with weapons drawn. TFO
I
I who was casually dressed with slacks and a sport coat,
did not have his gun drawn as he stood with the package. He
rknocked and there came a muffled response followed by a male
asking “What do you want?” TPOI
I said he was a neighbor
with a package for 301. SAl
Irecalls hearing_children’s
voices, which TFOI
lalso heard according to[
las
I signaled to the others with hand signals. After a brie
pause, the door to apartment 301 partially opened. TFOI
placed his foot in the door and told the occupant, 94r.I
I I
have a package for you.” responded, “No, no, I hon
think so. “I
close the door. TFO
I then atte
I
began pushing on the door
I SA]
I and S
and announced they were the pa ice, seeing I
I flow for the
first time.

I

apartment.
T’O
direct pursuit.L

Ithen ran frqm the dooç toward the rear of the
Iwere in
‘and sI
I SSA
parrying a chrome-plated
saw
4

—

 _______Iwas
___________

1
I

I

297-HQ-A1271285 SUB D

handgun as he ran, generally pointing it at the Acrent.FO.
Irnijnde
ier closely fo]3owd by TFOI
I
I
landi
I both heard TFO I
I say, “Nd, you don
want to do that.” Almost contemporaneop with frhs statement,
the Agents heard a single gunsho SSN
I whoha. now
also rounded the
saw TFOI
Ifa].]. face forward away
1 He wI
from him
I with a handgun in both hands turning
from TFOI
I and pointing and firing both guns t him. a4
whilel
Iwas falling ot lunging for cover. SSAI
land
SAl
Wo-rned .fire
timating...the.y. .ea. f
five rounds. They lookd for any avalab1e_cover and decided to
try to round the corner and apprehenl
I
I As SSI
started toward the corner, he saw two hands with a gun in each,
come around the coiner low to -the floor and start tiring again at
him and tie other Agents. Realizing they ha4 no. cover, SS.
and SAl
I then moved to the Olosest available
cover,_which was the doopiav_to tI’e anaTtment-. SS?4
land
SAL
iinstructed SAsI
jto call 911.
lanai

e

—•

then began calling into the apartment
for TFO
o -e enine if he could answer. Hearing no
response, e ca -led out forl
br the children, and. finally
got a response from I
you want?” SSA.
“-wnat
d.c
1
I
who iá tiäined as a IcsEage negotia-to and is -the Di’-n’
Hostage Negotiation Coordinator, began dialogue with I
attempting to get immediate medical care to TFOI_______________
would not allow this and eventually asked to speak to his
girlfriend, I
I u.ring these egot1ations, Chicago FBI and CPD
SWAT arrived and other teiats near apartment 31 were evacuated.
A command post and crisis negotiation center were establiShed in
the building and telephonic contact was established withi
I

1 girlriefld was rougt to the building and
allowed to speak_withL
ion -the phone. .ftez further
negotia-tions,.i
adviSed he would allow FB and CPP personnel
th aprtmnt o arrest him and provide medical care to
to
TFO I
wanted to speak
I First, however.,L
I andi
repc-rter so he could. tell his story. FI Chicago agreed
with
to -allow a reporter two minutes. to speak telepho4llv Vith
agreed
which he did. Following this discussion,I
I
to surrender.
?7c
FBI SWAT in fp.l1 gear wit-h shields entered the
apartment, handcuffed I
I and provided security while
emergency medical personnel -provided care to TFO-!
I TFO
rushed to Northwestern Memorial Hospital ifl critical
condition with a .45 caliber gunshot woid to the left -temple.
I-was taken to the Cook County Hospital where he was treated
I
for four gunshot wounds, the most serious of which entered his
leg and fractured hiS femur. A grazing cheat wound did virtually
5

 __________Ifrom

297-HQ-A1271285 SUB D

no damage.
There were no civilian eyewitnesses to these events,
although three tenants from other apartments called 911 when they
heard the gunshots. These tenants were interviewed bu ncne
could provide any details other than hearing noises, p5ssibly
gunshots.
•

Crime scene evidence was collected primarily by FBI
Th ecure the
aam—4ERT.)--- .me nbe
weapons and turned them over to SAC McChesney, who reached an
agreement to have the Illinois State Crime Lab conduct ballistics
testing on the guns. AU other forensic work, including crime
scene analysis of bullet paths and trajectories, and special
photographic analysis was conduceti by FBI Iiaora-tory Division
personnel under the direction of
the Firearms
Unit.

Cioag .vidence Response

-...

Medical records describin
I initial treatment
and assessment were obtined from the Cook County Hospital.
Although requested, TFbI
imedical records were not
obtained with Northwestern Memoria
osil citing privacy
concerns. On Tuesday, September 4,
Iwas moved from the
Cook County Hospital to the medical ward of the Metropolitan
Correction Center in Chicago.

6

-.

  

2001

Savage-1755

 

 

__Ilrr

__

__

__

__

__

(1213 1/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Date: 02/26/2001
Attn:

AD David R. Know
lton

-ro
m

:
In

sp

ec

tio
n

Contact:
Approved ]3y:

Title:

#:

Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Berna

Drafted By:
Case ID

I
\\

297-HQ=-A1271908-D

ADMINISTRATIVE IN
QUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
01/12/2001
SALT LAKE CITY DIVI
SION

t)7C

Synopsis: The Shoo
ting Incident Revie
w Group (SIRG) rev
shootn incident
iewed a
tht occurred on
01
/12
(SA) I
/2001.
Sp
ec
ial
Agent
an attempted arrest. jf ired two shots at a fleeing subj
ect during
SIR
G
me
mb
ers
rec
administrative ac
ommçnded tht no
tion be taken agai
nst SAl
his involvement in
las a result of
this shooting inci
dent.
Administrative:__
Reference report
of Supervisory Senio
Agenti
r Resident
Idated 01/31/2001.
Details:
This c6mmunication
was prepared to fu
analysis, 1
rnish the
comments and recom
mendations of the SIR
reference to the
G with
captioned shooting.

Savage- 1756

 To:
Re;

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271908-D,

Inspection
02/26/2001

Details of the Sh
ooting Incident
On the afternoon
of Thursday, 01/11
City Police Departm
/2001, a Salt Lake
ent (SLCPD) officer
sponsored Violent
assigned to the FB
Crimes Task Force
I
from a SLCPD Detec
CVcTF), received a re
tive.
qu
est
Th
e request
locate and identif
y an unknown subj asked for FBI assistance to
ect who was respon
ten armed robberie
sible for
s of commercial es
tablishments in th
City area during
e
the past month.
After discussing the Salt Lake
with a supervisor
request
and notifying FBI
Headquarters of th
initiation of the
e
investigation, an
Operations Order
for a surveillance
was prepared
operation that sam
e evening.
The operations pla
n called for law en
personnel to surv
forcement
eil various commerc
ial establishments
robbed by the unknow
previously
n subject as we
ll
Additional law en
forcement personnel as other potential targets.
would aOt as roving
immediately respond
units to
to particular loca
tions where unusua
activity was observe
l
d.
-

The unknown subjec
t’s method of oper
the robberies was
ation-in some of
to steal a vehicle
and use the stolen
to commit the robbe
vehicle
ry.
Following the robbe
return the stolen
ry, the subject wo
vehicle to the vici
uld
nity where it was
stolen.
While conducting su
rveillance that ev
provided surveilla
ening, SLCPD
nce units a list of
ve
from the general ar
ej of rvinii rpbb hicles stolen that day
eries and stolen
recoveries.
Of ficerl
vehicle
I
and SAl
an abandoned stole
n vehicle in -a tow
nhouse parking area I located
Riverside Drive an
ne
d Northwood Avenue
at approximately T0 ar
Surveillance units
0 pm.
set up north and
south
that the unknown rob
bery subject would rç of the vehicle hoping
Acting Supervisory
turn to the vehic1
Special Agent (A/SS
A)
I
an
d
SAl
j
I
Iwere in a Bureau ve
ot the stolen vehi
hicle located north
cle and other SLCPD
units were south
stolen vehicle.
of the
At approximately 8:0
0 p.m.,
to the surveillance
scene and prked SAt
his bureau veLucLe Ireported
adjacent parking lo
in an
t next to sI
Ivhile.
I
I who was a passenger
A/SSA
in SAl
SAl
lvehic].e, provided
Iwith an update on the
surveillance.
Shortly before 9:4
0 p.m., after disc
surveillance units,
ussion aqona th
Idecided to have
place a tire spike A/SSAI
SAl__
under the right fro
nt tire of the sto ____
vehicle.
This action would
len
deflate the tire if
to drive away and wo
someone attempted
uld hopefully preve
nt a high speed pu
the robbery subject
attempted to flee
rsuit if.
in the stolen car.
2

Savage-1757

 •

t

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—H’Q-A1271908-D
,

Inspection
02/26/20?l

As SAl
Ireturned to his Bu
observed an unknown
reau vehicle, SAl
ma
le, whose clothing
was similar to the
an
d physical appe
unk
direction toward the nown robbery subject,_walking in a arance
southern
stolen vohicle.
in the aeä of the
SAl
botified units
actions taking pla
ce via radio.
subject entered the
The unknown
stolen vehicle and
the vehice drove
toward Redwood Road, began to drive away.
As
SAl
Ibegan driving in
knd A/SSA
a
w
es
te
rly ivriqn para
stolen vehicle on
lleling the
the north, side.
vehicle by moving
sJ
Irepositioned his
it to a parking lo
cation across the
exited his vehicle.
street and

I

As the subj
through .the parking ect was driving in a westerly directio
area, surveilla
n
the vehicle.
The subject attempte nce units attempted to stop
d
to back up and turn
vehicle to flee.
He backed the vehi
the
cl
the v
e on a curb and_ab
irIg on foot in the
an
doned
direction of SAl
A/SSA
xited SAl
I
I
vehicle and began to
toward SA
whe he heard
run
SAl
gun. A/SSA
’
t
Ishout ‘
He’s got a
1
bserved SAl
tracking_the s ject.
Iwith his weapon dra
Other law enforceme
wn,
SAl
nt officers heard
Iyell “Stop.” SPJ
lad
vised
identified himself to
the subject -‘-“‘ re that he repeatedly
the subject continu
d him to stop.
ed to flee, SAl
As
the subject succes
I fired two shots. A
sfully eluded capt
fter
ure, a perimter wa
established around
s
the apartment build
in
post was established
. A search of the g and a nearby command
subject.
area failed to loca
te the
-

I

f1rw..nrt

ipvestigation iden
tified the subject
as
kho was subsequentl
SLCPD personnel on
y arrested by FB
01/17/2001, without
I and
incident.

on 02/20/2001, the SIRG met
captioned shooting
to discuss th
in
Deputy Assistant D e aboveThomas Bernard Lock cident.
irector
with flip fn]1wir e, Inspection Division, chaired th
e meeting
voting members of
the SIRG in attend
I
ance:
IChief Insoector, O
fice of Inspectio
Inspection DivisLon:I
ns,
lflcputy Chief,
Division, tJS]JO
Civil Rights
J;I
Terrorism and Vioje
I Trial Attorney,
nt Crimes section,
Donald J. Bartnik,
Criminal Division
, IJSDOJ;
Section Chief, Perso
Administrative Servi
nn
ces Division; Herbe el Assistance Section,
Chief, Operational
rt Cousins, Jr.,
Section
Support Section, Cr
Division; William
iminal Investigativ
e
Do
Q.
he
rty
,
Se
ct
ion chief, Global
Counterintellignce
Section
NS-2, National Se
curity Division;
I Unit Chief. Firearms Tr
Div1SOfl;I
aining Unit, Trai
ning
IUnjt Chief, Inve
Office of the Gene
stigative Law Uni
ral Counsel; SSA
t,
J
Manager, Praccical
I Program
Applications Unit,
Training Division;
and
-

3

Savage-1758

I

 4
To:
Re

Inspection From:
297-HQ--A1271908-D,

Inspection
02/26/2001

SSA

id Of Fin
Nnvrtinci mm
present wee SSA
he-g
and
i
Management/Program 1
I
Analyst Inspection
Management Unit, Of
Inspections, Inspecti
fice of
on Division.

Observations and Rec
Onmi.endations of the
SIG
The SIRG reviewedthe
above-synopsized inc
the intent to: (1) ev
ideit with
aluate the applicatio
n of deadly force;
provide the Director
(2)
with an evaluative an
alysis, observations,
atid recommendations for
corrective actions fro
standpoint (if any);
m an operational
training and/or safety(3)- provide recommendations concerning
issues; and (4) provid
for administrative ac
e recommendations
tion if deemed nece
ssa.
IRG members uniim
ously agreed that the
force by SAl
use of deadly
I was justified and in confor
the deadly ±orce po
mance wit

h

licy.

The oiy observation
made by
that SAl
lexited his vehicle and SIRG members was the fact
left the vehicle runnin
unlocked and unsecured
g,
allowing access to the
his MP-5 shoulder we
vehicle as well as
apon. This matter will
be brought to the
attention of the Spec
ial Agent in Charge of
the Salt Lake City
Division.

Savage-1759

 __
_

14

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Ins
297-HQ-A1271908—D, 02/ pection
26/2001

‘LEAD

Cs):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C
.
That no dmiriistrat
iv.é action be tak
las a result of his involv en against
shooting incident.
ement in this

SAl

1
2

Mr.1

-

1
M
r.
Mr
(1
2
Mr.’
(1
Ms.
I
Mr. Lock
1
Mr.
1-Ms.
-

Rm. 7142
1
R
m. 7116
Rm.S1SS)
rn. 7427
7326)
.w. id25
Rm. 7837
,00J
•

-

-

a.

-

,

-

1-

M
r._
__
_

3.
1
1
1
3.
1
1

-

-

-

-

-

-

(Attn:
Mr.
Mr. Bartnik, im. bi
b
Mr. Doherty, Rm. 404
2
Mr.I
Quantico
Mr4
luantico
Mr4
WF0
Mn
IRm. 7861
Mrs.
Rm. 7861
--

Savage-1760

•

-—

 (12131fl

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA
TION
Precedence:
To:

From:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Acting Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke
Extension 1837

Locke. Thomas ernar

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297-HQ-A127l71-D

Title:

Date: 06/21/2002

Ilrr

ADMINISTRATIVE- INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
07/13/2001
NEWARK DIVISION’

Synopsis:

The Shooting Incident Rev
iew Grout (SIRG) reviewed
a
shooting ipt”idnt th± ô’iird
crn 07/],J2OO1, inv
olving Special
Agent (SA)I
I while hanging onto the
hood of a vehicle driven
by a subject attempting to
elude arrest,
fired five shots into the
vehicle injuring the subjec
t’s arm.
SIRG members_recommended
that no administrative act
ion
against SAl
be taken
las a result of his involvement in this sho
incident.
oting
Administrative:
Reference report of Assis
tant Special Agent in
Chargej
07/
Ida
24/
ted
200
1,
an
r4Communication cj ot supe!rv
isory Special Agent
dated 05/15/2002.
Details:
This communication was pre
pared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and
recommendations of the SIRG
with’
reference to the captioned
shooting.

-

-

Savage-1761

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
1
297
-HQ-A1271781-D

inspection
06/21/2002

Details of the Shooting Inc
ident

ssAI

ihad been contacted by the
New Jersey State Police UTJ
SP) regarding the fraudulen
t lease of
four luxury vehicles from an
Ohio automobile dealership.
order to assist the JSP and
In
determine whether or not the
of the vehicles were connected
lessees
inved by the Newark Div to a Nigerian group being
ision for similar activities,
SSAI
lassigned SAF
land United States Custom
s Service SA
I to follow up on information pro
vided by the NJSP.
The Agents located and recover
ed
two of the vehicles prior to

this shooting incident.

Using a pretext of del
operator of a leased Mercedes-B ivering_license elates to the
Jandl
larranged
to meet the operator of the vehenz, SAsI
icl
East Orange, New Jersey. The pur e in a parking lot in
pose of the meeting was to
attempt to interview the veh
icles operator regarding the
facts
and circumstances of the veh
icle lease.
New Jersey State Police
officers had determined tha
t the driver’s licenses use
d to effect
the lease of the vehicles were
fictitious.
Upon their arrival into the
parking lot, SA
Iwaited for the vehicle opera
I and
tor in the Dre-arranged
• parking area.
ehicle, driven by an individu
al
identified as I
I arrived accompanied by a passen later
who was later determined to bel
ger
I Subsequent to the
arrival of the subject vehicl
e, the passenger
whileL
Iremained inside thç vehicle wit exited the car
h the driver’s side
front door open. As
I qnd I
lapp
roa
ched, [
to flee the scene_andi
began
jplaced the vehicle in rev
erse,
striking SAl
I with the door. Placing the car
in forward
I
lalso struck SAl
who landed on the hood of the ,
vehicle. While holding on toI
the hood of the car, SAl
continually identified him
self as a law enforcement ohice I
however, the subject did not
respond and continued to dri r;
re the
vehicle with the driver’s side
door open.
SN
Idrew his
weapon and fired five shots
int
Four çf the shots entered the o the vehicle’s tront windshield.
front windshield of the sub
vehicle, while the fifth sho
ject’s
t ricocheted off of the veh
icle’s
hood vent.
The driver of the subject
vehicle was struck in tlie
arm and the_Mercedes-Benz cras
hed
int
o
a parked car.
Following a
scruggle,
Iwas apprehended by the Age
nts and two off-duty
police officers.

I

I
Iwas treated at University Hospital, rel
and detained in the county
eased
jail.
A declination of prosecutn
was received from the
United States Department of
Justicer Civil Rights Division,
dated

2

Savage-1762

 ___

TO:
Re:

Inspection From
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271781-D, 06/21/
2002

08/14/2001, regarding
SAl
actions in this shooting
incident.
Subsequent to tie subject’s
trial in the United Sta
District Court, District of
tes
New Jersey, where the sub
ject was
convicted on two counts
Agau1t on a Federal Of
ficer and two
counts of MaiJ, Fraud, SAl
Iprovided a signed sworn
statement
regarding his involvement
in the shooting incident.
On 08/14/2001, the
captioned shooting incident. SIRG met to discuss the aboveDeputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspec
tio
n Division, chaired the mee
with th followiçg voting
ting
members of the SIRG in att
end
anc
e:
IChief InsDctor, Inspection Div
ision, Office of
Inspections;L
Violent Crimes Sqction, Cri IDeputy Section Chief, Terrorism and
minal Division,
OJ;
I Deputy Chief, Civil RightsUSD
Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Section
Chief, Personnel Assistan
ce Section,
Administrative Services Div
ision; William Q. Doherty
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Div , Section
ision;
lunit Chief, Firearms Training
Unit, Training
Division; Herbert Cousins,
Jr., Section Chief, Oprat
ional
Suprt P.eetion. Cririnal
Investigative Division;
b
SSAI
PrQaram Manager. Practical
Applications
Unit, Training Divison;l
I, Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Office
of the General Counsel;
1 Unit chief, Firear
m
Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and
SSAI
I Washington Field Office. The onl
y nonvoting
member present was SSAI
Inspection
I
Management Unit, Office of Ins
pections, Inspection Divisio
n.

I

-

J

-

Observations and Recommen
dations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-syn
opsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate
the application of deadly
provide the Director with
force; (2)
an evaluative analysis, obs
ervations,
and recommendations for correc
tiv
standpoint (if any>; (3) provid e actions from an operational
e recommendations concern
ing
training and/or safety issues
; and (4) prcvide recommend
ations
for administrative action
if deemed necessary.
meniher irnanimouqly
agreed that the use of dea
force by SAl
dly
was
justified and in
conformance wicn tne d.eadj.y
torce policy

Savage-1763,

 4

..

*

To:
Re:

Inspection. From:
297-HQ-A1271781-D,

LFJiD

Cs):

Inspection
06/21/2002

.Set Lead 1:

INSPECTION Dlvi s ION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
That no admijstratjve acti
on be taken against
I, as a result o his involvement in
this
shooting incident.

sJ

1-Mr
11.7142
2-Mr
7427
Ms.I
(1
I Rtn. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, P.m. 7825
1- Mr’
7837
1-Mn
DOJ
1-Mi
IDJ
1
Mr. Doherty, P.m. 4042
1
Mr.
I Quantico
I
1
Mr.
IQutaco
1-Mr.
J
1-Mr.
O
1- Mr.
P.m. 7861
-

-

-

-

-

.

Savage-1f64

 ____I1

____________

(1213tfl 995)

FEDERAL.
Precedence:
To:
From:

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ROUTINE

Inspection

Date: 10/16/2001
1tn:

?D

Knbwlton

Inspection

contactI
2\pproved By:

lExtension 1837

Locke Thomas Beraar

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

297-HQ-A1271511-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
07/05/2001
HOUSTON DIVISION

D1

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Grou
p (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting iicident that occurred on
0710
5/20
01,
involving Special
Agent (SA)I
SAl
I
onf
ronted four
individuals believed to be suspec
ts in a probable carjacking when
two of the individuals stopped and
turned toward him in an
agaressive and threatening manner.
Fearing for his safety,
ired one round from his .40 caliber
Glock, model 22
pistol.
SI.G members_recommended that no
adm
inis
trative action
be taken against SA F
a result of his involvement in
las
this shooting incident.
Administrative:__Referenc

e report of Supervisory Special
Agent
•(SSA)I_________________ dated 07/26/200
1.

Details:
This communication was prepared
to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recomm
endtions of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shootin
g.

Savage- 1765

 Iremained

.4

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271511-D,

Inspection
10/16/2001

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 07/05/2001, members of the Special
Operations Group
(SOG), augmented with aerial support, were
cond
uctin
g a drug
surveillance in northeast Moustori.
At approximately 1:30 p.m.,
SAl
Iwas parked at an intersection when he
observed three vehicles approaching.
The vehicles dro-Pe past
SAl
I vehicle, then stopped. In his driver’s
side
mirror, SAl
lobserved four to six black males exit
the
vehicles and approach. his vehicle.
When the ip.dividuals were
approximately 10 to 12 feet from SAl
Ivçhicle. he
observed one of the males carying
-

a pistol.
SAl
I
immediately placed his vehicle in gear
and sped away from the
area.
SAl
Icontacted Team Leader
_.,and informed him o what had transpir
ed.
SA I
Iwas
instructed to dial 911 and notify the
Houston Police Department
(HPD) of the incident.

SAl
I and members of the drug
including the surveillance_aircraft, attem surveillance team,
pted to locate the
three vehicles.
SA
in the area pending arrival
of HPD marked units. Upon the arrival
of HPD officers,
SAl
ladvised the officers that the SOG surv
eillance units
observed the males drive to an apartmen
t complex at 5500
Collingsworth. When the HPD marked uni
ts approached the
ap.rtment complex, six to eight black
males began running.
SAl
Irove to the apartment complex and obse
rved three red
vehicles, two of which he believed were
the ones he previously
observed near his vehicle.

I

•
SAl
advised via radio that at least
jwo of the fleeing individuals were
wearing red shirts and
holding their sides as if to cradle
a weapon, to keep it from
f ailing out of their waistbands.
Another Agent advised the
fleeing individuals crossed a street
and. were cutting through the
parking lot of another apartment towards
a public school.
SAL
Idrove through the open gates of the
school entrance,
and upon seeing him, four individuals
ran in the opposite
direction.
SAl
Ic1rove his Bureau vehicle to
the southeast
corner of the school building, exited
the vehicle, and proceeded
to a covered concrete walkway.
Viewing the four blackL males
running along the east side of the scho
ol, sI
I shouted,
“Police,_Stop”.
Two of the individuals stopped and faced
SAl
I wjtI their hinds at their sides,
in a bladed stance.
Acording to SAl
I although the two individuals stopped as
commanded, the manner in which they stop
ped was threatening.
Fearing for his safety, SAl
ired one round from his .40
If
caliber Glock, model 22.
All of the subjects scaled a cyclo
ne
fence into a wooded area.
SAL
Ireturned to his vehicle
and departed the school grounds in an atEe
mpt to locate the

2

Savage-1766

I

h6
lb1C

 To:
Re:

Inspection FrOm:
297-HQ-A1271511--D,

Inspection
10/16/2001

subjects.
Several minutes later, SAI
Istated that a black
male wearing a red shirt hopped
over a fence located on the east
side of the
‘“
3 was walking towards the north side
y
of the
school.
SAl
keturned to the s
1
school north parking 1t
and detained the individual until HPD t
assistance arrived.
No injuries were sustained as
a reu1t of th±s shooting
incident.

I
I

On 08/14/2001, the SIRG met to disc
uss the abovecaptioned shooting incident,
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection
Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting mem
bers of the SIRG in attendance:
I Chief Inspector, Inspection Division,
Off
Inspections; I
loeputy Section Chief, Terrorismiceandof
T1i-i+
fl2
tion, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Div
ision, USDOJ;
Donald 3. Bartnik, Section Chief,
Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Divisio
n; william Q. Doherty, Section
rhif
31-lbRl ction
NS-2, National Security Divisio
n;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Trainin
g Unit, Training
DivisiOn; Herbert Cousins, Jr.,
Section Chief, Operational
Support Section, Criminal Investigati
ve Division;
SSAI
Program Manager, Practical Application
s
Unit, Training. Division; I
I,
Uni
t
Chi
ef,
Investigative Law
-

J

Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific Analysis Section, Lab
oratory Division; and
SSAI
iWasington Field Office.
The only nonvoting
member present was SSA.I
Inspection
I
Management Unit, Office of Insp
ections, Inspection Division.

I

I Unit Chief, Firearms

-

Observations and Recommendations
of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the abo
the intent to: (1) evaluate the appve-synopsized incident with
lication of deadly force; (2>
provide the Director with an eva
luative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for correct
ive actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues;
and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deem
ed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed
that the use of deadly
force by SAL
Iwas justified and in conformance
with the deadly force policy.

Savage-1767

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271511-D,

Inspection
10/16/2001

LE)D (s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
That no administrative action be
taken against
las a result of his involvement in
this
shooting incident.

SAl

1
2
2

-

-

-

Mr.
Mr.
(1

Rm.

-

Mr.I

7142
71l
Mr. Cousins)
km
7427

(1
Ms-I
IRm. 7326)
3.
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
1
Mr.
Rm. 7837
1-Mr.
IDOJ
1-Ms.
l,00J
1
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6645
1
Mr. Doherty,
4042
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
IQuantico
1-Mr.
I
1
Mr.J
fW’O
1
7861
-

7C

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mr.I

Rtn.

4

Savage-1768

 (1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

E’rom:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

AD

Knowlton

Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernar

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297-HQ-A1271508-D

Title:

Date: 02/13/2002

Ilrr

Jb6

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/12/2001
HONOLULU DIVISION

Synopsis:

The Shooting Incident Review Grou

p (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred
10/12/2001, involving Special
Agent (SA) I
ISAI
Jfired one shot from his Bureau
approved
-

Glock .40 caliber pistol during
the attempted arrest of
an individual wanted on drug and
firearm related charges.
SIRG
members refiommded that no adm
inistrative action be taken
against N
las a result of his involvement in this shootin
incident
g
-

Administrative:
(SSA)j

Reference report of Supervisory
Special Agent
iated 12/04/2001.

Details:
This communication was prepared
to furnish t±e
analysis, comments, and recomm
endations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned sho
oting.

Savage-1769

 ladvised

4

To:
Re:

Inspection From Inspection
297-HQ-A1271508-D, 02/13/2002
Details of the Shooting Inciden
t

On 10/12/2001, at approcimatelv
S:0
received a telephone call from
I
SAl
ladviiricx h h
received information that an ind
ividual identified asi
currently wanted by the FBI on
I
dru
g and firearm relateci cflarge
was at a storage locker fa$
s,
iliy several blocks_frpm the
Division office space. S
Honolulu
jreqested si’I
I ‘sistance in
locating and aprehn
ditiaI
_j SAl_______________ also
accompanied SASI
land
an etrort to locate and arrest
i__
___
the fugitive.

land

As SAsI
.eparted the office for the
storpg facility, SA I
plained
ljyout of the building.
SA I
I also advised that he and SAl
Iould_aoooach the
subject dire€’t-1, and make the
arr
est
whi
le SAl
hovered the
exit in case I
I attempted to run.

I

Upon their arrival at the tnrge
tiity, SAl
re-emphasized the arrest plan
I
I andi
land stated that
safety was the number one con to SA]
cern. The Agents entered thro
1 ,-r’1crq
uqh a
‘1ctronic door for which SAL
l}iad th ccnnination. I
of the storage facility exitedi
land explained
to SAl
that the ub-ect hd left the
b____ ng prior to their
arrival.
that
was with a second
individual and was “hysterical
” as the two departed the buildin
She provided the Agents with
g.
a Hawaii license plate number
and a
description of the vehicle use
d by the subject.

I

Further investigation determi
ned that the license plate
number provided by
belonged to a
vehicle registered Eo1
Iwith a Karteohe address.- The Age
nts
decided to attempt to loca
tel
Idiscussing several possible
locations of where he may hav
e went. As the Agents stopped
red light at the intersect
for a
ion of Ala Moana Boulevard and
Atkinson
Drive, they saw a blue Camaro
stopped four cars in front of
in the far right turn lane.
them,
As the blue Camaro moved forw
ard and 6
prior to turning right onto Atk
inson Drive, the Agents confirm
the license plate a that of I
ed
A confirmed that the
dri
the vehicle wasl
ver
of
land_determined that
senger wa in the
vehicle with him.
SAl
linstructed SAl
I to followl
place a. call to the Honolulu
land
Pol
ice
Dep
artm
ent
for a police
vehicle to assist in the app
rehension.

I

The Bureau vehicle and the
suspect’s vehicle were in
the second to far left lane
. As both cars stopped due
traffic SAl
1
to
Isuddenly pu.lled to the left at
a
slig
ht
next tc[
angle
l ve1.icle. SAl
Iwas close tç the subject’s vehicle
rendering SAL
lincapable of exiting the pas
door.
SAl
uddenly jumped out of the dri senger side front
ver’s side door of

2

Savage-1770

 •1

4

To:
n.e:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1271508-D, 02/13/2002

the Bureau vehicle and proçede
to the front of
vehicle
with his weapon drawn.
SiI
Ireac
ted and exited the Bureau
veri through a narrow open
ing at the rear passenger door. As
I exited the Bureau car and proc
SAl
vehicle, he drew his weapon and shou eeded to the back of I
I
ted, “FBI, stop the car, you
arer arrestlu SAl
lalso heard SAF
houting qmnarid
forLJ to stop the vehicle. As traffic
bega
n
to move, I
vehicle lunged forward and stopped
several times.
SAl
grabbed the rear spoiler of
I
I
L vehicle for balance and. tor the
second time hit the lower part of
the back window with his
weapon. As he hit the window
a third time, the top part of the
back window of the subjects vehicle
shattered.
SAl
ould
see light from inside the vehicle
and observedi
Iturn around
and face hiip frnrp the driver’s sea
t with his right hand partially
raised.
sA
lobserved a silveF. 2
sh
i
y
i object ml
Iright
hand.
Fearing for his safety, S?
lras
his weapon, focused
o
d fired one round_through the loweed
r portion of the back
win ow into the vehicle.I
rt-iiijned to their office spac limmediately sped away. The Agents
e after an unsuccessful search for

I

I

I

On 01/08/2002, the SIRG met to discuss
the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy
Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection
Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members
of the SIRG in attendance:
Unit chief, Asia, Middle East and Afr
I
ica
Unit, Nationaj. Security Div
isio
n;I
IUn
it
Chie
f,
Firearms Training Unit, Training 1iv
ision;
Unit Chief, Undercover and Sensitiv
I
e Operations Unit, Operation
al
-“‘
rriminai Investigative Division;
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Office of
the General Counsel; SSAI
IProgram Manager,
Practical_Applications Unit, Training
Division; and
SSAj
jWashinton Field Office. The only
nonvoting b7C
member preseni. was SSAI
I Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.
Observations and. Recommendations of the
SThG
The SIRG reviewed the abov
the intent to: (1) evaluate the app e-synopsized incident with
provide the Director with an evalu lication of deadly force; (2>
ative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective
actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues;
and
for administrative aCtion if deemed (4) provide recommendations
necessary.

Savage-1771

r7i

 4

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271508--D, 02/13/200
2
mm1--

forqe by SA I
deadly force policy.

unanimously agreed that the
use of dea
justified and in conformance wit dly
h the

I was

Members of the SIRG made sev
eral observations regarding
this incident including the
fact that the Agents did not
protective armor although
utilize
thi
Members also noted that the s was not a spontaneous arrest.
participating Agents had no vis
identification other than
ible
a belt badge.
The second obse,vation pertai
ned to participants having,
no contingency plan. for
a car stop. Members noted the
Bureau
vehicle pulled close eno
ugh
Agent could not exit and assto the subject’s vehicle that one
ist the other Agents on the sce
Members opined that veh
ne..
icle stops should be used as a
last resort
and discussed the fact tha
t
populated area with many inn this stop took place in a densely
ocent bystanders in the area.
SIRG members noted
kised his weapon as a
club in order the break the that SAl
subject vehicl&s window and
the Agents improperly aba
ndoned the scene of the shootincrthat
was 4lso noted that, due
It
to the positions taken by SA
I
sj__land
Ithey could have been sub
ject to cross fire resulting
serious injury.
in
Based on these observations,
members recommended
that the Agents receive add
itional training in properly
conducting vehicle stops.
These observations will be add
with the Special Agent in
ressed
Charge of the Honolulu Division.

Savage4772

 ..

—

f¾

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ-A1271508-D, 02/13/200
2

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead. 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON. DC.
SAl

1

no administrative action be take
n against
a result of his involvement in
this incident.

las

Mr.[
IRm. 7142
Mr C!ouir. m. Sl5
2 - MrF
J Rni. 7427
(1 - Ms.I
_I Rm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
I.
Mrj_______ Rm. 7837
3.
Mr. J.Joartyj Ptn 40tt2
(Attn:
Mr.l
I
1 - Mr.I
IQuantico
1-Mu
jWFO
3.
Mr.
iRm. 7861
I
Mrsj
j Rm. 7861
1

-

-

-

—

-

S

Savage-1773

 ___Ilrr

*

(I2131/L99

FEDERAL BUREAU OF iNVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Date: 11/l/2O01
Attn:

I

AD DaviAwlton

I Extension

l83’

Locke Thomas Bernar

Drafted By:
Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
08/28/2001
CHIC3.GO DIVISION

297-HQ-A1271285-D

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Revi
ew Group (SIRG) reviewed abh
shooting incident that occurred
on 08/28/2001. irvo1ving
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA
) I
I and Special
Agent (SA)r
oth Agents fired shots inju
I
ring a
subject who shot a Task Force Off
icer (TFO) in the head during
his attempted arrest.
SIRG members recommçridd t.ht no
administrative action be taken
against SSAI
I and
SAl
las a result of their involvement in
thi
s
sho
oting
incident.
Administrative: Reference report
of Inspector
dated 09/05/2001.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared
to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recomme
ndations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned sho
oting.

Savage- 1774

I

-

 4.

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ-A1271285-D,

Inspection
11/19/2001

S

Details of the Shooting Incid
ent
On 08/17/2001, a Charter One
Bank located in Chicago
was robbed by a lone black
male who stated that he had
a gun;
however, never displayed the
weapon during the robbery. On
08/24/2001. thi jme gunman,
later identified as
I
again robbed the Charter One
Bank.
On the
secong occasion, the sub:jec
t displayed a 1árge, silver’
An employee of the bank watche
handgun.
d the subject leave the ares
Ford Expedition with dealer
in a
plates.
F
Ihad taken the Expedition used Investigation revealed that
in the robbery for a test
drive the morning of 08/17/2001,
and
provid
ed his true name and
an address of
Chicago.
I

un

On the evenings of 08/24 and
08/25, physical
surveillance wa established at
the Dauphin Street address,
however,L
Iwas not observed in the area. A
federal criminal
complaint and arrest warrant
were obtained forl
08/25/2001.
I on

I

After preparing an operations_1a
n to approach the
hf
he was there,
nce continued on 08/27/2001.
An arrest plan was
finalized prid annroved using
six SAs to approach the resid
ence
and arresti
the following morning.

IStreet address and arrest I
surveilla

Ion

At approximately 7:00 a.

m., 9fl 08/28/2001, SAl
and five aditional
I
proaçhsd thAI
treet address and
spoke withj
landi
FBoth advised the
Agents tha9
had lived at the address for a
while, but had
not been there since 08/17/2001.
The_occuaits allowed Agents
search the house, including the
to
roomE
had stayed in and the
personal
effects that he had left behind.

I
I

During the search, several items

bossible wIjerea1outs. Among the were located regarding
items found was a
letter addreç to I
I at a South Wabash Strest add
r
lidentifiedi
lasi
Additionally, receipts for ammu
I
assault rifles and 30.06 rifles nition commonly used in AK-47

were located as well as an
soft cover for a long weapon
empty
and military camouflage
shirts and a
hat similar to the one worn
by the bank robbery suspect
in both
Charter One Bank robberies.

Based on the itçms located. $RJ
ladvised his
supervisor that he and SAL
Iwere going to drive by
the South Wabash Street adaress
Expedition. Upon their arrival, to look fo the stolen
SA
I and
btained
permission from the building manag
er to look insi e
garage at the building and locat
king
ed the vehicle. SA
looked

2

Savage-1775

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ-A1271285-D, 11/19/2001

through the windows of the vehicle
and observed a black duffel
bag similar to one used in the
bank robberies, a caniouflage shirt
and a hard casç for a long weapon
which was partially cove
a blanket.
SAl
Jsaw several other items in the veh red by
icle
indicating that it had not been
abandoned.

SAT
‘contacted SSAF
‘advising that he had
located the Expedition and reques
ted additional Agents/TFOs to
respond to his location for a possibl
e arrest. Available SAs weresent to the scene and a request was
made to the Fugitive Task Force
supervisor for an additional three
bodies. Tie Task Prnce
supervisor provided one SA and two
TFOs.
SSAI
lalso
responded to a staging area one bloc
k from the apartment building
and briefed othqr nartirinants on th
information rt’niyed from
SAl
I TFOI
land
SAl
I, drove into
the garage in a police vehicle and
blocked the Expedition.
Between 9:30 and 9:45 a.m., all Age
nt and TWOs walked
to 1h m.king garage on South Waash wh
r
SSAI
land
SA I
I briefed participants on
lack
gro
und
incl
uding
his known violent tendencies and diss
eminated an arrest photograph
of him. During the briefing, both
Agenté discussed various
options and scenarios to effect
if he was in the
apartment.
-

-

larrest

cignments were made by
SSA
lassigned to watch the garaI ge and theIwith SAl
Bxpeditioa;
TFOj
land S?4
assigned to watch the front of
the .bui.Lding, and. three SA5 and oneI
TWO assigned to nositiqns in
the alleyway behind th apartment
buildi g.
SSA[
la].ong
with SAsI
land
and TWOl
I,ere
designated as tne entry te
ploying to the1r
respective assignments, SA
and TFOI_______
suggested a
a
ack officer, would pose as
a neighbor of
possi.
I wh
erroneously receive a pac age inte y housia1
nded for

andOl

I

At approximately 10:00 a.m
proceeded into position and checked ., the entire arrest team
radio communications on both
FBI Nextels and Chicn PoW’
Departmet radio. After everyone
was in position, SSA
I
TFO [
[the signal to
knock on the door of [1
TFO
I
as carrying a
package and the four SAs were line
d up along the wall, out of
sight of tb occupants of the apar
tment, with weapons drawn. As
TFOI
Iknocked there was a muff 1d rrnse
followed by a
male asking tt
What do you want? TWOI
t--iat he was a
neighbor_with a package for the apa
rtment. Al
I and
TFOI
Iheard children’s voices
After a
brief pause, the door was partially in the apartmeIt.
opened and TFOI
Iplaced

ls’

3

Savage- 1776

I

 _________‘and

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ—A1271285-D, 11/19/200
1

his fct- in i-he door and said
, “Mn
i have a pacao for
you.”I
iresponded, “No, p T t
1
in
! th3nk so.”
atternn1-d o close the doo
r TFd
I SSA1
I ai’ia
s4
jegan pushing on the door ann
oun
cing
they
were
the
po.L ice.

I,

I

ran from the door toward the
rear of the
.law enforcement officers in pur
suit.
SSA
ated handgun as he
ran, pointing i..
corne closely
followed by TFOI
I SSA
SAl
Iheard
TFOI
I say, “No, you
T
want to do that. Il Almost
simultaneously with the stateme
nt, the Agents heard a single
gunhnI
who had rounded the corner,
I
TFOI
If all face forward away
handgun in both hands turniw
.th a
and
firing both guns at him, SSA
turned
f ire.
Searching for availabi
to
attemit to rond the corner and app
re
As
SSAI
Istarted toward the corner, he saw two
hands, wit
gun in each, come
rirn
corne low to the floor and beganh a
firing again.
SSAI
land S24
jmoved to the closest
available cove whic
h wv t doorway to the apa
rtment where they
instructed SAs I
land I
Ito cal]. 911.
-

-

calling into the apartment for

if Ie oul answer.

Hea

ring no response,
alled out forl
r!hi1 in the
icr the 1
Lily getting a response from
I
a trained hostage negotiator and
the Chi
Negotiation Coordinator, began dial cago
ogue with
:ain immediat

e medical care for
TFO
ild not allow medical attention
to be
proj
and eventually asked to speak
with his
girlfriend,
was brought to the building and
allowed to
phonicaily. After further
negotiations,
that he would allow FBI and Chicag
Police Departi
o
into the apartment to arrest him
provide medical care to TFO
and
F
I and himself aftqr he spoke
with a reporter. Law enforceme
nt
per
sonnel allowed I
a two minute conversation wit
Ito hav
h a reporter before he surrendered e
FBI Special Weapons and Tactics
.
(SWAT) Team membeL. ir full gear
with shields, entered the apa
rtment, handouffedi
land
providei ietiw.lty wh.
ie emer

qency medical persofmeL prdvided
care
to TFOI
I TFO
Jas transported to the Northw
estern
Memorial Hospital in critic
al con8ition with a .45 caliber
gunshot.
wound to the left tem
ple.

I
Fias transported to the Cook
County Hospital where he was
treated for four gunshot wou
nds.
4

Savage- 1777

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271285-D,

Inspection
11/19/2001

As of 11/15/2001, TFd
had emerged from a coma
and was scheduled to be tran
sferred to the Rehabilitation
institute of Chicago.

I

I

I

A declination of proecution was
received from the
United States Department
.Tiii-4r’
frihI Thwfsion,
Civ
il
dated
09/21/2001, regarding SSAI
land S2I
lactions in
th1 qhr
Incident.
By letter dated 09/
2001, Supervisor
I Felony Review Unit, Office of06/the
State Attorney.
Cook County, Illinois, adv
ised that his office would reco
uitnend
that there be no filing of crim
inal charges in this matter.
On. 11/13/2001, the SIRG met to
discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspecti
on Division, chaired the mee
w4h thR friilripg vot
ting
ing members of the SIRG in atte
nda
nce
I Chief Inspector, Inspection Division, Off :
ice of
Inspections; Donald J. Bartnik
, Section Chief, Personnel
Ai
administrative Services Division;
I Unit Chief, Asia. MiddleEat and Africa
Unit, National Security Div
isio
L Unit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Traininnil
g Division; Herbert Cousins, Jr.,
Section C’Jf- flr-’ jup
port Section, Criminal Investi
gative
Division;I
Uni
T
ative Law Unit,
Office ot tne enera.L Counse
l;
Unit Chief,
Firearms
Toolmarks U
ic
a ysis ection, Laboratory
Division; and SS
Washington Field Of fiep.
Nonvoting mmh-g presen were
SEA I
L and
I Management/Prog±axn imai.ysc, inspection
Management Unit, Office of Insp
ections, Inspection Division.
-

.

I

Observations and Recommendations
of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-syn
opsized incident with the
intent to: (1) evaluate the
application of deadly force;
(2)
provide the Director with an eva
luative analysis, observatio
ns,
and recommendations for cor
rective actions from an operati
onal
standpoint (if any); (3) pro
vide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issu
es; and (4) provide recommend
ations for
administrative action if deem
ed necessary.

,

mmh- irnnim.usly
acreed that th Jzse of deadly
force by SEAl
land SAl
I was justified
and in conformance with the dea
dly force policy.

SIRG members expressed
shooting incident including the several concrna hjt the
fact that IFOI
i the first
law enforcement officer to ente
r the apartment, was not
utilizing
5

Savage- 1778

 d

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 11/19/200
1

a ballitic orqtective und
ergarment. Additionally, members
that SAJ
noted
Iwas wearing personally owned
body armor on the day
of the incident, not a Bur
eau-issued vest.
The second observation made
by SIRG members pertained to
the lack of details contain
ed in the arrest plan including
the
fact that participants were
not overtly identified as law
enforcement officers; no use
the apartment entry and the of SWAT personnel or shields during
use of a dynamic entry knowin
g that
children were present in the
apartment.
Members noted that sr
Iweapon contained fourteen
rounds, however, he bad no extr
a magazines in his possession
the day of the shooting inci
on
dent. Although not critical
final phase of this incident,
in the
this action could prove problem
in future situations.
atic °
Lastly, the SlaG recognized
that SSAI
received no deadly force tra
Ihad
ining in the past year.
These observations will
in Charge of the Chicago Divisio be provided to the Special Agent
n to ensure they do not recur.

6

Savage-1779

 a

•.

-

To:
Re:

Inspection From;
297-HQ-A1271285-D,

Inspection
11/1/2OO1

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:

INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
no

j-e action be taken against
nd SAr
as a result of their
involvement in thiooting incident.

SSAI

Am4

1

1
2

Mn
Rm. 7142
Mn
7116
Mr. Cousins)
(1
2- Mr.I
IRtti. 7427
Ms.
(1
iRm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke. Rni. 785
1
Mr.t
JRm. 7837
1
Mr. BartnhJ, Rim. 6646
1
Mr. 1
Doherty Rm 4fl42
(Atn: Mr.I
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
]Rin. 7861
1
Mrs
Rm. 7861
-

b6

b7C

-

-

-

-

-

Savage-1780

 _____
___Ilrr
________xtension

_____

_____

_____

I.

(12!31/L995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATfON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Date: 11/30/2001
Atta:

AD

Knowlton

From:
Inspec

tion

Contact:
Approved By:

Locke Thomas Bernar

1837

/

Drafted By:

\\

2ase ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
08/31/2001
MW4E DIVISION

297-HQ-A1271748-D

-

h7c

-

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
a
shooting jridnt that occurred n 08/31/2001, involv
ing Special
Agent (sA’
ired four shots from
I SA
a Bureau-issued M4 rifle, injuring a suljectIf involv
ed in a law
enforcement planned attempted hijacking of a tractor
trailer
purported to contain computer parts.
SIRG members_recommended
that no administrative action be taken against SA[
s a
result of his involvement in this shooting incidefz..
Administrative:

I

1

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
dated 09/14/2001.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG
with
reference to tlie captioned shooting.

Savage- 1781

-

 _____

__

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 11/30/2001
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 03/10/2001, the Miami Cargo Thea Task
Force (CTTF)
received information from a
I that he was
approached byl
IflCflT11flg aoout any icnown
robbery
targets of whicn ne icnew.1
ladvised thaI he had two
associates, one identified as I
I who
assist him in conducting armed robberies and were willing to
that he had a fully
automatic AK-47 assault rifle and 1w
nvcmnr rnalia
in which to carry out these crimes.
I that he
might have some work for him in the I near futur
e and subsequently
advised the CTTF of j
inquiry:

I

-

_

biac tie naa icnow.J.eage or a siupment or computer
parts
valued at approximately two million dollars.
The UCO asked
if he was interested in committing an armed
hijacking and it tie
and his associates were capable of doing the
job. I
IrepJ.ied
yes, and continued to explain ih.t ti
i was his type of work
2
which he had done many times.I
lalso advised the UCO that he
had several shirts labeled ,rPRThT and equipment
to execute the
robbery.
The UqO askdI
he was willing to kill the truck
1.-f
driver- to which I
Iresponded, “Don’t worry about the driver,
I’ll take care of him.”
I
t a later
meeting that he would kill
the driver if necessary, however, his
plan was to place the driver in the trunk of
his car.

I

I

Iwho
reiterated his desire to commit the robbery.
I
btate
d
that,
on the evening of the hijacking, he would
drive a Ford Taurus
equipped with a blue flashing police light
, wear a shirt labeled
t arid would be ariied witi a Glock .40 calib
“FBI’
er semi-automatic
pistol. The Uco toldi
hat he would direct him to the
location of the tractor trailer containing the
computer parts
wher
land his associates would commit the armed hijac
king.

I

I

black shirts with white “FBI” lettering, a
tactical holster, a
2

I

Savage-1782

-4

 To:
Re:

Inspection FroilL:
Inspection
297-HQ—A1271748.-]J, 11/30/2001

semi-automatic pistol, ballistic vests
, baseball style caps
labeled “FBI”, a_Military Armament
Corporation, a MA.C-l0 machine
gun pistol whichi
Iclaimed to be fully automatic and an AK-47
assault rifle.

On the same date,

S?L
Jprepardan Operations Plan
to arrest the subjects of the prop
osed hijacking which was
approved by ASAC R.icardo Martinez and
the Assi
stant Director of

the MDPD.

-

I

Ito

finalize the logj
4 ior the armed hijac
king which was planned
for 08/30/2001. 1
tated to them that he was ready and
willing to commit the hijacking.
On 08/30/2001, at approximately 10:3
0 a.m., a briefing
was held by the CTTF to review the
Operation Plan,- which included
background and photographs of the subj
ects, their criminal
histories and propensity for violence,
a description of the
clothing that the individuals may be
wearing and possible weapons
being used, as well as the Bureau’s
Deadly Force Policy.

I

Several Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) members
conducted a site survey of the tarcret
location. identified a an

b 7£

Subseque

nt to placing an empty tractor trailer
at the
warehouse site and holding additional
briefings whch included
FBI and MDPD personnel, the SWAT Team

warehouse park where they assumed positraveled to the commercial
tions on the rooftops of
the east and west buildings, behind
the north wall and at the
entrance to the warehouse. The team
rehe
arrest scenarios encompassing a variety arsed approximately four
of possible situations
that may be encountered.
Included in the rehearsals were the
responsibilities of each tactical memb
er and negotiators as well
as the order of commands and by whom
they would be given. At the
conclusion of the rehearsals, SWAT memb
ers repositioned
themselves at their designated locat
ions.

6

b7 D

tie vicinity o the warehouse.
I
black male, later identified
asi
-

-

-

-

3

[

I and a second

discussed the

Savage- 1783

 was
______land

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 11/30/2001

hijacking with thel
left the area
for approximately fifteen minutes
and returned to the Mobil
station where they displayed the
MAC-19 machine cun ostol, thei
r
“FBI” shirts and other paraphrmia.
I
kftove to
the warehouse location with
I following, where
they identified the location of
the tractor trailer to be
hijacked. The UCO advisedi
Itha
trailer would be asleep in the truc t the driver of the tractor
participate in the hijacking .forf k and that he could not
ear of being recognized by-the
driver.

landi

At approximately 3:15

a. rn.-,I

I

I

and
I traveled
complex, parked the vehicle on the
sou
theast
facility and entered the warehouse
lot approaching
the targçt tractr trailer, which
was idling.
SWAT member
observed(
parrying the MAC-la in his right hand
.
SAl_______
observed the subj ects’ knock on the
truck cab announcing they were
the FBI. As participants received
the word to execute the arrest
plan, a Miami Division negotiator
announced the presence of law
enforcement personnel over a bullho
rn and commanded the subjects
to surrender. Simultaneous with
the announcement, SWAT members
located on the building rooftops
raised over the building’s
parapet, addressing their lanes of
responsibility. As the
su1-iects_iurned in the directio
n of the negotiator’s voice,
SAl
lobservedi
I exposing the muzzle of his weapon
towa
ions of other SWAT membrs. SA
I
I believing
that
as possibly going to fire his weap
on at one of the
ers, fired his shoulder we.pon fou
r times, striking
Both subjects went to the ground arid wr
1)cen into
cus o y.
SWAT medja1 reronne1 responded
provide
medical attention.
later, airlifted to Jackson
Memorial Hospital where he underwen
t two surgical procedures and
was listed in critical condition.

to the warehouse
side of the

tol

o

The MDPD Homicide Unit responded
to the cene and
conducted the shooting investigati
on
members of the Miami Division’s Shoo with the assistance of
ting Response Team.
A declination of prosecutio
United States Department of Justice n was received from the
, Civil Rights Division, dated
11/01/2001, regarding SAl
i actions in this shooting
incident. On 09/19/2001, the Miam
i-Dade Assistant State Attorney
advised that, based on details prov
ided to him by the MDPD about
th, hcni-iig incident, he would
decline any criminal charges on
SAl

I

On 11/13/2001, the SIRG met
captioned shooting incident. Deputy to discuss the aboveAssistant Director
4

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I

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I

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 11/30/2001

Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Chief Inspector, Inspection ivision, Office of
Inspections; Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief.Personne1
Ainci Section. dministrative Services Di’isicn;
I, Unit Chief, Asia, Middle East and Africa
Unit, National Security Division;I
lunit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; Herbert Cousins, Jr.,
Section Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;L
I Unit Chief,
Tnvtiaatiye La’ Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
b7C
Toolmarks Unit,
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; and
SSAI
Iwashington Field Office.
Nonvoting members
present were SSAI
and
i
I
Management/Program ina.Lysu, inycLofI Management Unit, Office of
-

Inspections, Inspection Division.

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemednecessary.
SIRG member unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by sal
I was justified and in
conformance with the deadly torce policy.
SIRG members made several observations about this
shooting incident, the most notable pertaining to the serious
administrative deficiencies exhibited by the Executive Management
of the Miami Division prior to the arrival of the Shooting
Incident Review Team dispatched by FBIHQ.
The first area of concern involved the FBI surrendering
the crime scene to the MDPD due to an agreement made in advanàe
regarding scene processing.
Instructions were issued by the
Special Agent in charge (SAC) for Agents involved in the incident
to pair up with a Miami Shooting Incident Review Team member and
be interviewed by MDPD members.
SIRG members emphasized the fact
that local law enforcement agencies are not familiar with FBI
policies and procedures and that any interviews should have been
conducted in the presence of MDPD members’ as well as BI
personnel.
Conducting joint interviews eliminates the necessity

S

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Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271748-D, ].1/30/2001

for multiple statements.
Members emphasized the need for the
Miami Division to revisit any Memo
randum of Understanding with
local law enforcement to ensure these
issues re immediately
addressed.
It was also noted that the SAC did::not
instct
Agents involved in the incident to
remain in the Division to be
interviewed by the Inspection Division
Shootn Incident Review
Team because he did nOt think it was
necessary for FBIHQ to
dispatch a team to the Miami Division
.
The second area of discussion by the
SIRG revolved
around the lack of documentation of SWAT
personnel qualification
scores as well as the lack of documeii
ted deadly force training.
The Miami Division Principal Firearm
s_Instrctor (PFI) provided
firearms qualification scores for BA
I
or the period of
01/01/2000 through 09/04/2001.
Thv as no official record
of
any qualification scores for SAl
Iregarding the weapon
involved in the shooting.
However, th Snicç SWAT Team Lead
er
produced a document indicating that SA
I qualified (scored
90 or better) with an M—4 during a SWATI
firearms qualification
held 06/10/2001 to 06/13/2001.
SIRG members opined that all
qualification scores should be subm
itted to the PFI for inclusion
into the computer system to ensure the
accuracy and completeness
of official firearms records.
*

lb 7 C
The last documented Annual Mandatory Dead
ly Force
Training occurred during
rpriod.of 07/06/2000
08/03/2000.
Records indicated that SAl
participated in that scheduled
deadly force training; however, SIRG mem
bers noted the absence of
documented SWAT deadly force training.
The Senior SWAT Team
Leader indicated in an interview that
he provided instruction on
deadly force policy during SWAT team
firearms sessions, however,
the training was not documented.
Members opined that the SAC of
the Miami Division must ensure that each
Agent receives the
Annual Mandatory Deadly Force Training
and that this training is
properly documented by the Chief Divi
sion Counsel, as required.

I

-

The Training Jivigin reorentative
noted that the
FD-302 pertaining to SAl
lincluded information, that
the weapon (MC-10) of the injured subj
ect was kicked away.
He
explained to SIRG members that a MACb fires from open bolt and
could have fired if loaded.
These observations will be provided
to the SAC of the
Miami Division to ensure they do not
recur.

6-

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Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 11/30/2001

LEAD Cs):
Set Lead 1:

INSPECTION DIVISION

C

—

AT WASHINGTON, 0. C.
ThM nr dniinstrative action
be taken against
SAj
as a result o his involvement in this
shooting incident.

2

Mr.I
m. 7116
(1
Mr. Cousins)
2
Mr..I
IRm. 7427
(1
Ms.
Rm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 725
I
Mr.I
I R.m.. 7837
2.
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
1
Mr. Doherty, Rm. 4042
(Attn:
Mn
I
1
uantico
Mr.I
1-Mr
I
1-Mn
IWFO
1-Mn
m. 7861
MrsI___________ Rm. 7861
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To;

ROUTINE

DateyN(7(2Co2

Inspection

From:

Attn:

:nspection
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:
-

Acting AD

I

£1’

Excension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernar4/

I

jlrr
297-HQ-A1271480-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
09/03/2001
DETROIT DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting in4dent that occurred on 09/03/2001, involving
Special
Agents (SAs) I
I andi
Each
I
Agent fired one shot at Grover Thomas Crosslin as he leaned
forward in a shooting position with his finger in the trie
r
guard of a Mini 14 pointed in the direction of SAj
Crosslin was killed as a result of the gunshots.
suu memDers
rc’tmmr1ded that no administrative action be taken against SAs
land
I as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

b6

I

I

Administrative:

I

I

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
dated 10/29/2001.

Details;
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Savage-1788

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Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271480-D,

Inspection

05/07/2002

Details of the Shooting Incident
Local and state law enforcement officials had
been
investigating Grover Thomas Crosslin and his
Rainbow Farm
Campground for a lengthy period of time.
Crosslin, a iOfl9 time
advocate of the legalization of marijuana, frequ
ently hosted
weekend “concerts” on the property.
He advertised his farm as an
alternative campground and concert arena.
The investigation culminated in the execution
of a
search warrant in May 2001, arresting Crosslin.
At that time,
Crosslin and his homosexual partner, Rollin
Eugene Rohm, were
charged with multiple drug violations,
Crosslin was specifically
charged with manufacturing marijuana, more than
200 plants;
maintaining a drug house; felony firearms poss
ession during the
commission of a crime; and firearms possessio
n by a felon.
The
initial charges for Rohm included manufacturin
g marijuana, more
than 200 plants; maintaining a drug house and
felony firearms
charges, the last two being dismissed in June
2001.
This
incident also resulted in the removal of Rohm’
s son from the
residence shared by Rohm and Cross].in.
Local prosecutors initiated asset forfeiture
actions
against Rainbow Farm and sought and received
a restraining order
prohibiting Crosslin from hosting any Hfestivalsfl
at the farm.
In violation of the court order, Crosslin
hosted a festival on
08/17 and 08/18/2001.
This incident resulted in Crosslin bein
g
ordered to appear in court on 08/31/2001, to
show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court for viola
ting the
restraining order.
On 08/31/2001, at approximately 12:00 p.m.,
a report
was received by the Cass County Sheriff’s
Office (CCSO) that a
building at the Rainbow Farm was on fire.
As fire, ambulance and
law enforcement personnel began to respond
to the fire, the CCSO
received a telephone call advising that Cros
slin may be setting
up an ambush for the first responders.
The caller advised that
one half hour earlier, Crosslia was seen dress
ed in camouflage
attire, was allegedly armed, and told a neig
hbor to get out of
the area because “there’s going to be troub
le”.
According Co the
caller, Crosslin allegedly stated “They were
n’t going to take
them alive”.
With this knowledge and for personal safety,
units
responded to the area but staged down the
road away from Rainbow
Farm.
Unknown to officers at the time, on 08/29/20
01,
Crosslin had posted a notice on the Rainbow
Farm website that the
Labor Day weekend campout had been called off
due to “bad
government” intervening and closed the campg
round.
During the
preceding 24 hours, Crosslin had also told
a few neighbors not to

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297-HQ-A1271480-D, 05/07/2002

be around over the weekend because “all shit’s
going to break
loose”.
Additionally, reoorts advised that Crosslin cont
acted
individuals on the evening of 08/30/2001, tellin
g them goodbye
and saying that they would probably never see
him again.
At approximately 1:30 p.m., on 08/31/2001,
a helicopter
belonging to WNDU television studio in South
Bend, Indiana, was
flying over Rainbow Farm filming two fires burnin
g on the
property.
Officers in the staging area heard aun fire
and
believed that Crosslin and/or Rohm may be firin
g at the
helicopter.
Officers located a ?NDU ground crew who notif
ied the
helicopter pilot to immediately depart the area.
When the
helicopter landed in South Bend, an examination
of the aircraft
revealed that it had been hit with one bullet
hc.e in the right
side, horizontal stabilizer.
Upon confirmation that the
helicopter had been hit, and in view of the fede
ral jurisdiction
connected with the destruction of aircraft, the
CCSO notified the
St. Joseph, Michigan, Resident Agency (RA) and
requested
assistance from the Michigan State Police (MSP)
.
MSP nronnel responded to the
scene,

as well as
of the St. Joseph RA, to monitor the situation.
SAl
lalso advised Senior Supervisory Resident Agent (SSRA
)
I
I in Grand Rapids of the situation, who in turn
notified Executive Management in Detroit.

SAl

IbIC
On 09/01/2001, the MSP was primarily responsib
le for
maintaining a perimeter around Rainbow Farm with
resources
incjntHnrr
1Ned-wing aircraft and light armored vehi
cles.
SSR
larrived on the scene and was requested to provid
e
assistance to the MSP at the site.
After consultation with
Detroit Executive Management, a decision was made
to put
Detroit Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
s
t
personnel on standby
until additional information could be obtained
regarding FBI
jurisdiction prior to authorizing SWAT deploy
ment.
Consultation
with an Assistant United States Attorney in the
Western District
of Michigan disclosed federal jurisdiction exist
ed for
Destruction of Aircraft charges against Crosslin.

On 09/01/2001, gun shots were heard when an MSP
airplane flew over the Rainbow Farm and simi
lar gun shots were
heard when a civilian, aircraft flew near the area.
Efforts by
MSP personnel to initiate telephonic contact with
Crosslin or
Rohm had proven unsuccessful and loud speake
rs were placed in the
woods near the property in order to speak to Cros
slin.
Crosslin
responded by shooting in the area of the speake
rs.
On the morning of 09/02/2001, Detroit Execut
ive
Management arrived on the scene, and following
discussion

s with

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inspection Prom:
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Inspection
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the MSP District Commander, his SWAT Team
Leaper. SWAT
Coordinator, Chief Division Counsel and
SSRA I
I
SAC John E. Bell, Jr., committed FBI resou
rces
to
assi
st
the MSP.
An agreement was reached that the FBI
would assume control of the
tactical situation at approximately 7:00
a 24-hour period, relieving the MSP who p.rn., on 09/02/2001, for
had been on the scene
since 08/31/2001.
Efforts to establish communication with
Crosslin and Rohm throughout the evening
were unproductive.
An acquaintance of Crosslin’s, who
residence multiple times while law enforcem had been in the
on the scene, agreed to act as an intermed ent authorities were
iary between the
subjects and law enforcement.
The acquaintance again entered the
residence on 09/03/2001, and subsequently
advised law enforcement
personnel that Crosslin and Rohm were
becoming frustrated because
they wanted to talk to “their soni
also advised that both subjects were carrying I The individual
around rifles
inside the residence and that he saw seve
ral boxes of ammunition
in the house.
During the early afternoon of 09/03/2001,
another young
acquaintance of Crosslin’s decided on his
own to go to the farm
and try to talk Crosslin into either giving
up or running away.
As he arrived, he was invited into the
home by Crossj.in and Rohm.
Subsequent to the shooting incident, this
individual also advised
law enforcement personnel that Cross].in
had shown him a wire
inside the residence that was rigged to blow
up or
down.
Crosslin also stated that the yard was mine burn the house
d and he had
done that in preparation of a police stand
off.
Cros
slin also
stated to the acquaintance that he ar
d Rohm would like to take a
1
couple of them (indicating police) with them
.
At approximately 2:30 p.m., one of the
acquaintances,
who had advised that the residence had
no operational phone on
the property, re-entered the residence and
spoke to Crossliri
about accepting a phone from the FBI Co
which Crosslin agreed.
At approximately 3:30 p.m., Crosslin and
one of the
acquaintances departed Crosslin’s resid
ence to go to a neighbor’s
residence to get food and supplies.
Both individuals traveled
down a path passing by. the position of
three Agents.
SA I
I
observed Crosslin carrying a Mini 14
rifle. As SAl
I
retreated from the path as quietly as
possible, gaining the cover
of a tree, both individuals stopped mom
entarily beside the
campsite; however, did not spot the Agen
ts. They proceeded to
the neighbor’s residence where Cros
slin forced his way in,
removing a number of items and walking back
to the farm.

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Inspection
Prom:
nspect±on
297-HQ-A1271480-D, 03/07/2002

At approximately 4:30 p.m., :he acqu
aintance that had
convinced Crosslin to accept the phone from
the
FBI, re-entered
the residence with the phone.
:-e initiated a call from inside
the residence to the negotiation operation
s center and advised
that Crosslin wanted him to talk to the
FBI on his behalf and
tell them that Crosslin wanted to talk
to his son.
Crosslin
refused to talk to the, negotiators direc
tly and indicated that he
would not talk to them until he talked
to his son.
After several
failed attempts to initiate conversation
with Crosslin, the
acquaintance left the residence taking
the telephone with him.
Shortly after 5:00 p.m., Crosslin realized
that when he
and his friend got the coffee maker from
the neighbor’s house, he
forgot to get the coffee pot.
Crosslin asked the friend to
return to the neighbor’s residence for the
pot; however, he
refused telling Crosslin that he was not
sure
of the way and he
was concerned about the trip wires and
buried mines that Crosslin
claimed to have placed along the trails.
agreed to go with the individual to obtain Crosslin eventually
the coffee pot and
advised that upon their return he would walk
him off the
property Approximately halfway back to
his residence, Crosslin
wanted to stop and rest. As they were resti
ng, Crosslin suddenly
said, “Did you hear that?” Crosslin stoo
d up, turned around and
radioed on a handy talkie to Rohm, “Incomin
g.” Crosslin began
walking, stopped briefly, looked in a trash
can in theFoamosite.
then continued walking through the campsite
area.
SA L
observed the movements of Crosslin, reali
zing that if Cross.tsfl I
continued walkirg in the direction he was
going, he would run
into SA I
I SAl
tbserved Crosslin suddenly stop
with a startled look on his face, look
ing directly at
SAt
Iposition.
Crosslin raised the Mini 14 to his
shoulder and leaned forward in a shooting
position with his
finger in the trigger guaçd.__Believin
g that Crosslin was going
to fire at SA I
I SAl
Ibeaan sauezing the trigger on
his M-16. Before he could fire, SA
I
heard two shots and
Crosslin_dropped. SAc I
land L
confirmed to
SAl
jthat each of them fired one shot from
their weapons.
Medics responded to the scene and conf
7C
irmed that the
individual accompanying Crosslin had
not been shot and was not
injured beyond minor scratches.
The Medical Examiner was contacted, arriv
ed on the
scene and pronounced CrossJ.in dead.
It was ubsequently
determined that the shot fired by SA[
Iwas a fatal gunshot
wound to the head and the shot fired by SAl
Ipassed through
a small tree with fragments causing the
other injuries incurred
by Crosslin.

5

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Inspection From:
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inspection
CS/07/20C2

It should also be noted that the
MSP assumed the
sniper/observer positions as well as
perimeter responsibilities
later that evening continuing active
negotiations with Rohm.
However, in a confrontation with the
MSP the following morning,
Rohm was also shot and killed by MSP
snipers.
A declination cf prosecution was
received from the
United States Department of Justice
, Civil Rights Division, dated
12/11/2001, regarding the actions
of the two Agents involved in
the shooting.
Contact with t-.e Prosecuting Atto
rney of Cass
County, Michigan, revealed that his
office would ntt conduct an
independent investigation concerning
the shooting incident nor
would he convene a grand jury to hear
evidence in the matter.
The State of Michigan Attorney Gene
ral’s Office also concurred
with the declination.
By Electronic Communication dated 03/2
5/2002, received
in the Inspection Division on 04/0
2/2002, signed sworn statements
for SAsL
land I
Jwere provided regarding the
incident.

I

On 11/13/2001, the S:RG met to disc
uss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Divi
sion, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of
the
SIRG in attendance:
I
I Chief Inspector, Insp
ection Division, Office 0
fbC
Inspections; Donald J. Bartnik, Sect
ion
Chie
f,
Pers
onne
l
iqtnc’e rinri. dminis
trative Services Division;
I
L Unit Chief, Asia, Middle East and Africa
Unit, national Security Divisio
n;l
1, Unit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Divi
sion; Herbert Cousins, Jr.,
Section Chief, Operatipal Suroort St
ic, Criminal
Investigative Division;!
I Unit Chief,
Invtisative La Unit, Offic
e of the General Counsel;
lUnit Chief, Firearms
Toolrnarks Unit,
carr,r,r Ar1ivJis Section,
Laboratory Division; and
SSAI
L Washington Field Office
nvôtrcx mmb
present were SSAI
Management/Program Analyst, Inspecti I, andl
I
on Management Unit, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

Observations and Recozzunendations
of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsi
zed incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the app
lication of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluat
ive analysis, observations,
and recoinmendations for corrective
actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning
S

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Inspection From:
297-HQAl27l480-D,

:nspection
05/07/2002

training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide recommendations
for adrninis.rative action if deemed nece
ssary.
SIRG members unanimously
rhMn of deadly
forte by SAsI
and I
I
Jas
justified and in conformance with the
deadly force policy
The only observation made regarding this
incident
pertained to the large number of SWAT
personnel within the
Detroit Division hitt:ng below the 90%
qualification level during
firearms training.
The Training Division representative
emphasized the fact that the SWAT mark
smanship standard is 90% on
all courses of fire.
This concern will be addressed with
the
Special Agent in Charge of the Detroit
Division.

7

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Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271480-D,

Inspection
05/07/2002

LE)D (s)
Set Lead 1:

INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
That no admiistrative action be
taken against
SAsI
landj
las a result of
their involvement in this shootin
g incident.

Im.

Mn
7142
Mn
IVtm 7427
(1
Ms.l
iRm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
1
MrJ
Rm. 7837
1
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
1
Mr. Cousins
1
Mr. Doherty Rm. 4042
(Attn:
Mr.
1
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
1-Mr.
0
1
Mr.
Rm. 7861
1
Mrs.
Rm. 7861
1
2

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-

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.FEDIRAL BUREAU OF INVEST
IGATION
Precedence:
To:
From:

ROUTINE

Inspection

,Jate: 08/08/2001
Attn:

AD Davic)R. Knowlton

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

1837

Locke Thomas Berna

Drafted By:
Case ID :
Title:

297-HQ-A1271788-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
05/11/2001
NEW YORK DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Re
view Group (SIRG) review
shooting incident tha
ed a
t occurred on 05/11/200
1.
Special Agent
(SA) I
Fugitive Khalid .Ai2inad Ma Ishot and killed Top Ten Most Wanted
nsoor while

attempting
members recommended tha
SIRG
t no administrative actiohis arrest.
against SAl
n
las
a result of his involvem be taken
shooting incident.
ent in this

I

Administrative:

Reference report of Ins
pector-in-Place
dated 05/24/2001.

I

Details:
This communication was
prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and
recommendations of the
reference to the captio
SIRG with
ned shooting.

Savage-1796

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I

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271788--D,

Inspection
08/08/2001

Details of the Shoo
ting Incident
On 01/02

/2001, the Las Vegas
Divis
warrant for Khalid Ahm
ad Mansoor for Unlawfulion obtained a
Prosecution stemming
Plight To Avoid
from first degree kid
napping and sexual
assault with a dead
ly weapon charges.
On 01/09/2001, Manso
committed carjacking
or
and second degree mu
New Orleans, Louisian
rde
a, as he fled from po r offenses in
at the New Orleans
lice who approached
Inernationa1 Airport.
him
05/10/2001, Mansoor wa
Additionally, on
s captured on video
tap
New Jersey, committin
g an armed robbery of e in Atlantic City,
taking Rolex watches
a jewelry store,
valued between $30
0,000 and $500,000.
After the New Jersey
armed robbery, Agent
Atlantic City, Las Ve
s of
gas, Philadelphia and
Fugitive Task Force
New York, joined by
personnel in New Yo
rk, began an intensiv
manunt for Mmoor.
e
On 05/10/2001, at ap
SA I
proximately 9:45 p.m
f the Atlantic City
.,
Resident Agency receiv
notification that Ma
ed
nsoor had robbed a jew
inside the Taj Mahal
elry store located
Casino in At1anic
City, L’Iew Jersey.
conducting further
After
inv
information to assis estigation, SAl
Ideveloped lead
t in the reconstructio
n of Mansoor’s tra
and out of Atlantic
il in
City on 05/10/2001.
On 05/11/2001, SA
paged a New York Ag
information in an eff
ent to share
orf
r’ryer leads and
Mansoor in New York.
pick up the trail for
szl
Idiscovered the id
cab drivers who were
entities of two
believed to be acqu
ainted with Mansoor.
of the drivers was int
One
erviewed on the ev
ening of 05/10/2 001
advised that he dro
, and
ve Mansoor from Midto
wn New York to Atlan
City earlier that ev
tic
ening.
The cab driver also
with a cell phone num
provided SAt_____
ber for another cab
driver in New York who _
was originally respons
ible for transporting
City; however, was
Mansoor to 3’t]ntic
unable to keç the ao
oontment.
provided this inform
SA I
ation to SAl
Off ice.
lof the New York

I

I

SAl
Ilocated and met with
provided additional
the cab driver who
cellular telephone num
bers including the
telephone number from
which Mansoor had pla
05/10/2001, while att
ced a call on
empting to acqire a
Using the information
tide to Atlantic City.
furnished, SAl
call placed by Manso
traced the earlier
or to the Hampshire Ho
tel and Suites in
Midtown Manhattan.
SAl
I
I met at the Hampshire
Hotel and approached along with SAL
ho
photographs of Mansoor. tel staff with a description and
Manoor and guest record Although hotel employees denied_seeing
s were negativ
that the phone call to e for him, SAsI
land
the cab driver was
placed
2
Sav

age-1797

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspec
297-HQ-A1271788--D, 08/08 tion
/2001

from room 92]. of the hotel
the occupant of room 921 . A determination was also made that
had not cthQcked out of
establishing these fadts,
the hotel.
SAL
Ire-contacted a tew Yor Upon
Police Department Lieute
k
nant who agreed to sen
d additional
officers and Agents from
the HihTntnjity Drug
Trafficking Area
(HIDTA) Task Force to assis
t SA
1 andl
was established in and
I
around the vicipt-r nP the A surveillance
SAs
hotel by
I Lieutenantl
bid additional NyPD
officers who were briefe
d on the investigation.
Further investiga
inside the hotel room; ho tion determined that Mansoor was not
wever, law enforcement
a passport photograph of
per
Mansoor, together with lamsonnel located
equipment, indicative
inating
of possible false identi
fication being
prepared.

I requetA flcnuty United Sta
te8 Marshal (DUSM)
Detective’
Ito assist SAL
loose surveillance at the
Iwith a
hotel until noon (ho
in the eyent that Manso
or was seen in or aroun tel checkout time)
d the
brief ingi
]aqdl
Iregarding the status of hotel. After
investigation, SAl
the
displayed the passport
Mansoor. At approximate
photograph of
ly ;40 a.m., the three
an individual matching Mansoort
officers observed
s description app
Hampshire Hotel on foot
roa
and enter the hotel lobby ch the
.
SAl
I DTJSMI
land Detective I
the individual into the
Ifollowed
front door of the hotel
approached him standing
, and as they
that the individual was at the elevator doors, became convinced
with the individual, the indeed Mansoor. As they made eye contact
y
as law enforcement office also believed that he recognized them
violence and escape, the rs. Aware of Mansoor’s propensity for
officers drew closer to
initiate his arrest.
Mansoor to
SA
l
I announced “Police, we nee
speak to you.” Mamnor
d to
ininediate1y dropped bo
th
waistband and SAl
7C
Igrabbed Mansoor’s rig hands to his
ht hand, arm and
shoulder.
DUSMI
rabbed at 1
Marico left
the struggle escaia
arm and while
ted
tectiveL
attempted to tackle
Mansoor from the waist De
and legs to get him
on the floor. During
the struggle, SAl
his right hand attempting lobsrved Nansoor holdincj a han4gun in
to point it
Dt.JSMI
Faring for the lives of at Detective I
land
the office
his own., SAL
Idrew his pistol and fired rs, as well as
close range causing Manso
three shots at
or to fall to the floor
of his gun.
and lose control
si

SAl
Iequested hotel personnel
emergency medical person
to call
nel and notified
SAl
shooting incident. Manso
f the
or died from his ii’
juries ihile being
transported to a hospita
l.

Savage-1798

 $

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297-HQ-A1271788-D,

Inspection
08/08/2001

A declination of prosec
ution was rec
United States Departm
ent of Justice, Civil Thi eived .from the
ciht- Division,
facsimile on 08/07/200
by
1, regarding S2
shooting incident.
lactions in this
Additionally, by lette
r dated 07/09/2001,
District Attorney for
the
the County of New Yo
rk advised that no
criminal charges would
be filed regarding thi
s matter.
On 07/03/2001, the SIR
G met to discuss the
captioned shooting inc
aboveident.
Deputy Assistant Di
Thomas Bernard Locke
rector
, Inspection Division
, chaired the meeting
with the tollowin9 vo
ting members of the
SIRG in attendance:
I
I Chief Inspector, Inspection
ot Inspecti
Division, Office
ons;1
Trial Attrney,
Terrorism and Violent
Crimes Section, Crimi
nal Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Se
ction Chief, Personnel
Administrative Servi
Assistance Seotion,
ces Division; William
Chief, Global Section
Do
Q.
NS-2, National Securit herty, Section
I
y Division;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Train
ing Unit, Training
Division; Herbert Co
usins, Jr., Section Ch
ief, Operational
Support Sections Cri
minal Investigative Di
vision;
SSAI
I
‘-“1 Applications Un
Division;I
it, Training
I Unit Chief, Iny
Office of the General
estgative Law Unit,
Counsel;I__
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scien______________ Unit Chief,
titic Analysis sectio
Laboratory Division;
n,
and SSAI
Washington Field
Office. Nonvoting me
mbers pesen were
andj
Management/Pogram
Analyst, Inspection
Management unit, orrice
of Inspections, Inspe
ction Division.
-

b7rz

-

Observations and Recom
mendations of the SIR
G
The SIRG reviewed the
above-synopsized inc
the intent to: (1) ev
ident with
aluate the application
provide the Director
of deadly force; (2)
wit
and recommendations for h an evaluative analysis, observations,
corrective actions fro
standpoint (if any);
m an operational
(3)
provide recommendatio
training and/or safety
ns concerning
for administrative ac issues; and (4) provide recommendations
tion if deemed necessa
ry.
SIRG members unanimous
ly agreed that the us
force by SAl
e of deadly
Iwas justified and in
with the deadly force
conformance
policy.

Savage-1799

I

 r

7.

.,

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
297—HQ-A1271788-D,

LEAD

(s):

Inspection
08/08/2001

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
That nn admir4stra
tive action be tak
SAl
en against
jas
a
result of his involv
shooting incident.
ement in this
7C

1.- Mr.
Rm. 7142
1
2
Mr.
7116
(1
Mr. Cousins)
2
Mr.I
IRm. 7427
(1
Ms. I
Rm. 7326)
1
Mr. Lflck. Rm. 72I 5
1
Mr.
IRm. 7827
1-Mr.
[OJ
(Attention:
Mr.I
2.
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 664
6
1
Mr. Doherty, Rm. 404
2
1
Mrj
I Quantico
1
Mr.I
l
i
1
ah
Q
tiqo
(nt
e
1
A
ictt
n:
Mr.I
J
1-Mr.I
1-Mr.
FO
1
Mr.
I Rm. 7861
1
Mrs.
Rm. 7861
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

I

-

-

-

I

-

-

Savage- 1800

 ___ILrr
F:

(i213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN
VESTfGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

Froiu:

Drafted By:
Title:

Attn:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

Case ID

Date: 08/01/2001

#:

&‘d R. Knowlto
n
Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Berna
r

297-HQ-A12.71285-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQtJ
IRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
05/23/2001
CHICAGO DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incide
nt Review Group
hooting icidenC th
(SIRG) reviewed a
at occurred on 05
Agent (SA)I
/23/2001, involvin
g Special
I
SA I
subject making ran
shot and wounded
som demands in a kid
a
napping investigatio
members recommend
ed_that no administ
n. SIRG
rative action be tak
against SA I
en
las a res.ult of his
shooting incident.
involvement in this
Administrative:

Reference report of
Inspector-in-Place
dated 06/14/2001.

Details:
This communiation
was prepared to furn
analysis, comments
ish the
and recommendation
s of the SIRG with
reference to the ca
ptioned shooting.

Savage- 1801

b7C

 ___________

4,

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 08/01/2001
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 05/23/2001, the Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF) of
the Chicago Division çceived information from the Chicago Police
Department (CPD) thati
I, was the victim
of a home invasion/kidnapping and was forcibly removed from the
family’s residence by several unknown subjects. I
Ifather,
a Chicago city employee, received several ransom demand phone
calls demanding that payment for the victim be made in an
unspecified amount of cocaine and/or marijuana. However, during
the afternoon of the same day, the demand for payment changed
from cocaine/marijuana to $150,000 in cash in exchange for the
safe return of the victim.
Following a series of consensually monitored telephone
calls between the subject(s) and the victim’s father,
was made to drop the ransom package in the vicinity oft
Iwhich was known as an area controlled by a street gang
I
known as the Gangster Disciples. Law enforcement authorities
determined that this location did not provide adequate safety and
security and knew that it provided numerous escape routes for the
perpetrator(s) of the kidnapping. At the instruction of law
enforcement personnel, the victim’s father provided the
subject(s) with an appropriate location to drop the ransom
package contained inside a canvass bag. The kidnappers advised
the victim’s father that someone would be sent to the vicinity of
Garfield Boulevard and South Carpenter Street to retrieve the
ransom money.
t. nnrnr9ate1y 10:00 p.m., a vehicle driven by CPD
Officer I
I with the victim’s athr in the fropt
passenger seat and SAc I
land I
I in the
rear seat, arrived at the speciejd location. fhile parked, an
individual, later identified as I
Iwas observed in
the area. After a prearranged signal was given by Officer
I
lacknowledged the signal and approached the
vehicle. The victim’s father alerted law enforcement officers
that F
lappeared to be reaching under his jacket with his
left hand and believed the subject had a gun. Asi
I
approached the vehicle, he ordred the victimis father to drop
the package from the vehicle. I
hpproached the package,
ordered the vehicle to ‘drive off” and attempte4 tn nick up the
package. After traveling several_feet, Officer I
Istopped
the car and SAc I
nd Detectivet
;exited
the vehicle and orderedl
eaan t
Ito halt. I
Un
from the scene while again being orderd to halt.
stopped and turned toward SA I
Iwith his hands underneath
his jacket.
The subject’s actions resulted in SAl
I
firing two rounds from his .45 caliber pistol hittingi
1in
the left hip and wrist.
I stumbled several steps and fell

2

Savage-1802

I

 I
To:
Re:

I

Inspection From:
297-IQ-A].271285-D,

Inspection
08/01/2001

to the pavement.
Upon approaching the subject, SASI
land
lordered him to show his hands to which he did not comply.
The Agents rolled
j over and observed a semi-automatic
pistol in the area ot his mijisection
The subject was handcuffed
and his weapon was removed. I
Iwas transported from the
scene to a local hospital by emergency medical services where
he
was treated for his gunshot wounds.

I

The victim was released unharmed approximately thirty c7C
minutes following the shooting incident.
A declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of Justice,. Civil Rights Division, dated,
07/02/2001, regarding SA I
lactions in this shooting
Incident.
The CPD advised that the Police Department would not
seek filing charges in connection with the shooting incident,
deferring to the Assault on Federal Officer investigation.
The
matter was not referred to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s
Office for consideration.
On. 07/03/2001, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaire.d the meetin
g
with the fol1owin voting members of the SIRG in attendance;
I
I Chief Inspector. Inspection Division, Office
of Inspections;!
Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Division; William Q. Doherty, Section
Chiefs Global Section
NS-2, Tational Security Division;
I
Unit Chief, Fireams Training Unit, Training
Division; Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief, Operational
Support Serthion. Crrninal Investigative Division;
SSAI
IPt’jl Applications Unit, Training
Division;I
L Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Office of the General Counsel;I
1, Unit chief,
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Sqiantific Analv
sis Section,
1
Laboratory Division; and SSA I
I Washington Field
Tnnvritincs mPn*ers present were
Off
SSAI
and I
IManagement/Program Analyst, Inspection
Management Unit, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.

4

b6
ib7

-

-

Observations and Recoiiunendatioxis of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational

Savage-1803

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-O, 08/01/2001

standpoint (if any)
(3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action it deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the usa of deadly
force by SAl
as justified and in conformance
with the deaciiy torce poJ.lcy.
The SIRG made one observation regarding this incident.
All law enforcement officers in the vehicle wore ballistic armor.
However, the victii&s father was not afforded the same protection
despite his position in the front passenger seat of the vehicle.
This matter will be brought to the attention of the Special Agent
in Charge of the Chicago Division.

•Savage-1804

 ___________

______
___________

_

4

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 08/01/2001

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHflGTON, D.C.
Tht- nr imii-rstrative action be taken against

SAl

shooting incident.

as a result of his involvement in this

]b b
7C

-

1
2

-

-

Mr.
Rtn. 7142
Mr.
IRm. 7116
Mr. Cousins)
(1
Mr. I
In. 7427
Ms.I
(1
Riu. 7326)
Mr. Locke
1 Rm. 7825
Rm. 7837
Mr.I
-

2

-

—

1
1
1

-

-

Mr.I

IDOJ

(Attention:
Mr.l________________
1
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
1
Mr. ‘‘‘-‘“ n. 4042
1
Mr.
j Quantico
Ifl,ji.ntr’
Mr.
1
(A-rf--n. Mn
1
Mr._________
1-Mr.
IWF
1
Mr.
Rm. 7861
Mrs
1
Rni. 7861
-

-

-

-

-

-

Savage-1805

  

 

 

 

FBI

Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

 

 

.2000

 

 

 

 

_________

(1213111995)

I
FEDERAL BURE
AU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:
To:
From:

ROUTINE

Date: 01/30/2001

Inspection

Attn:

Inspection

Contact:
Approved By:

Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernarc”

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Tit1e

AD David R. Knowlton

I1rr’\

rb7c

297—HQ-A1271292-O

)DMINISTRATIVR INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/28/2000
CLEVELAND DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Rev
iew Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident tha
t occurrec on 11/28/2000.
Special Agent
(SA)I
shot and killed an attacking
I
Rottieier canine.
SIRG members unanimously agreed tha
t no
administrative actio
n should be taken against SA
l
result of his involvem
las a
ent in this shooting incident.
Reference:
SAl

Ref erencp Electronic Communica
tion of
dated 11/29/2000.

I

Details:
This communication was prepar
ed to furnish the
analysis, comments, and
recommendations of the SIRG wit
h
reference to the captio
ned ghoobing.

 )

I

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ-A1271292-D, 01/30/2001
Details of the Shooting Incident

I

YounctOwn

On 11/28/2000, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Agents
of the
Pcin Agency obtained information
about fugitive

I Subsequent investigation and a sveil1anr
operation determined that the fugitive was located ati
Avenue. An arrest plan was initiated nci
curitv nrimft- was
placed around the residence. As SN_____________
_____________
was attempting to take a position of cover near the
detached
garage of the residence,. he ran into and tripped over
a wire
fence. As SAl
Ifell to the grnirn1 h w iediately7
attacked by a large Rottweiler dog. SAl
Iphysically
defended himself against the animal’s first and second
attacks,
however, on the third attack, SAl
Iwas forced to shoot
the animal.
SAl
I fired four shots with an H & K MPS
killing the dog.
On 01/09/2001, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Dire
ctor
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division., chaired
the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attenda
nce:
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;

I

Trial Attorney, Terrorism and Viol

ent
crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Donald
J. Bartnik,
Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section, Admin
istrative
Services Division; Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief,
Operational Support Section, Criminal Investigative
Division;
William Q. Doherty, Section Chief, Global Countrin
telliaence
Section
NS-2, National Security Division; SSAI_______________
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit Scientific Analysis Section, Labo
ratory
Division;
,
Firearms Training Unit,,
Training ivison
Unit Chief, Investigative
Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSAI
I
Program Nanacer. 1
Pra
,
ica
ct
l Applications Unit, Training Division;
and SSAI
I Washington Field Office. Nonvoting me4ers
present at the meeting included Inspectorl
I
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; SSAI
Inspection Management Unjt (1Mm. Off i of Inspections,
Inspection Division; SSAI
I IMU, Office of
Inspectjons; SAI
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; andi
L Management/Program Analyst, IMIJ,
Office of Inspections, rnspection Division.
-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident
with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2)
2

I

 I
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297—HQ-A1271292-D, 01/30/2001

provide the Director with
an evaluative 1
analysis obser’rations,
and recommendations for cor
rective actions from an operationa
l
standpoint (if any); (3) pro
vide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issu
es; and (4) provide recommendations
administrative action if deem
for
ed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously acreed that
no 4
ad
t
jv
mine
itr
action should be taken aga
inst SN
result of his involvement in
I, as
this shooting incident.

3

a

 _____I,

____________uantico
_____

_____

F

S
To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271292-D, 01/30/2001

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
m
4
4
-i-4-jve action be

4-

SAL

this snootsng incicent.

taken against
as a result of his involvement in
7C

Mr. Pickard, Rm. 7142
Mr. Garcia, Rm. 7116
(1
Mr. Cousiiis, Rm.5155)
Mr. Parkjnnn. Pm
2
1 7427
(1
Ms.
7326)
Mr. Locke, run. i5
1
2-MS4
(1-Mn
1
2

1
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
1
Mr. DoIirty, Rm. 4042
1
MrJ
1
Mr.
I WFO
1
Mr.
Rm. 3787F
1
Mr.
Quatico
I
1-Mr.
1Pm
7861
1-Mt.
Rm. 7861
1-Mrs
Rm. 7861
Ms.
Quantico

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

IRm.

I

-

-

-

j-Mr.I

(Attn1nn

1

-

Nr.I

IDoJ

-

I

Ii

TrI

IRnt.

iis°

4

-

b6
b7C

 _________

(1213111 95)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

.1
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Data: 03/22/2001

Inspection

‘roxa:

Inspection

coatact:I

Approved By:

ADR. Knowlton

Attn:

[)Extension

1837

Locke Thomas BernardK
/

Daf ted By:I

Ilrr

Case ID

4k

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/20/2000
CLEVELAND DIVISION

297-HQ-A1271292-D

\

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SlaG)
reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 11/20/2000.
Special Agent
(SA)I
1 fired four shots at a sub:! Oct who was
approactaing turn 1,ran.shing a weapon. SIRG memb
ers_recoulnended
that
be taken
s a
SAl
result of his involvement in this shooting incid
eL.

no administrative action

I

Administrative:

Details:

against

Reference report of Inspector
[dated 12/06/2000.

This communication was prepared to furnish the

analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRO
with

reference to the captioned shooting.

 &
To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1271292-D, 03/22/2001
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 11/20/2000, a surveillance was initiated at
an
address in Youngstoyi. Ohio, which was a knoyn
prior address for
a subject known as I
had been charged with
two counts of aggravated burglary with a weapo
n and an Unlawful
Flight to Avoid Prosecution preliminary inquiry
was initiated
11/17/2000.
Intelligence inforipation thered by the Fugitive on
Task Force (FTP) indicated that I
Iwas involved in crack
cocaine trafficking and he puichased products
from out-of-state
suppliers.

I
Iwas not located at Ms prior ]çnown
address and the surveillance moved to the resid
I
ence of I
brother. I
Iwas not located at his brother’s residence;
however, further investigation led law enforcement
third residence. An individual located at the residpersonnel to a
ence advised
law enforcement authorities thati
‘and hia girlfriend were
believed to be at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles
(BMV) in
Youngstown.

-

Task Force Officer I
Idrpve to the
BMV building and located the vehicle in
whichi
I was
allegedly being transported. Of ficer[
lacivised other Task
Force personnel of this information v.a racti.o. Add
itional FTP
personnel immediately responded to the BMV area and estab
lished a
•perimeter while surveilling the subject vehicle.

SAl
orallv communicated an arrest plan via radio
which called for SAl
Ito bumper-lock the subject vehicle in
the rear to prevent an escape attempt. Task Force offic
ers were
to drive their three vehicles in front of the subj
ect vehicle to
prevent any escape. The plan called for the arrest effor
t to be
initiated after the subject entered the vehicle
and
would be called out of the vehicle using the felon the subject
y car stop
arrest technique.
I
Iand three other individuals were
observed exiting the BMV building and entering the
subject
vehicle. As the individuals began ertriri he subj
ect vehicle,
the arrest plan was initiated. As
toward
Idrov
the
1
e
subject vehicle, he observed the indiviauai.s sndina
i.n
the
rear
of and coming back out of the vehicle. Due to
land one
other_indi,vidual standing at the rear bumper of
the vehicle,
SA
kould not bumper-lock as planned and drove
fuzther
beyond the desired stopping point for his vehi
cle. Additionally,
a civilian was in a vehicle parked in close prox
imity to the
subject vehicle and a door used to enter/exit
the BMV was within
20 feet of the subject vehicle.
2

 To:
Re

I

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1271292-D,
?312212001

In addition to wearing protective vests and rai4
jackets, law enforcement personnel on the scene yelled
tol_______
to further identify theelves and advise of their intent
to
place him under arrest.[
Ithr
complied with
the orderS given by the officers while I
I ran to the
passenger side of the subect vhicle with a nine millimeter
pistol in h± hind. A
lapproached t’ ff
rra, Officer
4
Ifired one snot at him while
kas running
in the area in front of the subject vehicle1
Iturned
towards the_subect vehicle running along the_nassçnger side back
toward N
Iwith his weapon drawn. S2
I fired four
shots resu.Ltlng lxii
falling to the grount and subsequently
being handcuffed. I
Is weapon fell to the ground next
where he lay wounded. Emergency medical service personnel to
responded to the scene, stabilized the sublect and. transpo
rted
him to Saint Elizabeth Medical Center. I
I was subsequently
transferred to the Akron City Hospital and was released
to the
Iviahoning County Jail on 11/20/2000.

I

A declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
dated
02/14/2001, for the law enforcement officers involved in this
shooting incident.
On 03/14/2001, the SIRO met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meetin
g
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
Kenneth W. Kaiser
1 chief nsnector. Of ice of Inspections,
Inspection Divis1rrI
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ;I
I Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USD03;
Donald j. Bartnujc, Section chief, Personnel Assistance Sectio
n,
Administrative Services Division; William Q. Doherty, Sectio
n
Chief, Global Corn
n11ianr Sçtion
NS-2, National
Security Division;
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Toe1mArk Unit. cientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Divisio
n;
I
lUnit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
flivision;I
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Office ot the Generai. Counsel; SSAI
j Program
Manager, Practica’. Applications Unit, raining Division; and
SS)I
I Washinaton Field 0f ice. Nonvoting members
present were SSAI
I and__________________
Management/Program AnaJ.yst, Inspection Management unit, otrice
of
Inspections, Inspection Division.

I

-

-

3

 k

4

To:
Re:

Inspection Prom: Inspection
297-HQ—A1271292-D, 03/22/2001
Observations and R.ecoimnendations of the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident
with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application
of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from
an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unaniipously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAt
Iwas justified and in conformance
with the deadly force policy.
Representatives of the Training Division advised
SIRG
members that this FTP was the best organized and
trained task
force in the country and applauded the training
efforts of its
members.
SIRG members recognized that law enforcement person
nel
on the scene were drawn into a cross fire situation;
howev
er,
due
to experience and training, adjustments were made
to bring the
situation to a successful conclusion Members opined
that this
experience should be shared with others in law enforc
ement
for
lessons learned.

4

]bb

1b7C

 F
I
S

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297-HQ-A1271292-.D, 03/22/2001

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
XNSPETION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
That no acbninistrative action he
taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in
this
shooting incident.

1
1
2

Mr. Picka.rd, Rm. 7142
Mr. Garcia, Rm. 7116
Mr. Parkinson, Rm. 7427
(1
Ms.l
I Rm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
I.
Mr. ‘— 1
Rm. 7837
1
Ms.
IDOJ
1-Mr.
1
Mr. artnik, Rm. 6646
1
Mr.
IRm. 4042
1
Mr.
jQuantico
I
Mr.
uantico
1-Mr.
I
1-Mr4
IWW)
1
Mr.
Rm. 7861
1
Mrsl_________ Rm. 7861
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Ib7C

-

-

-

-

5

 7
e___
n___
si
___
o___
nI
____

____

___

a.:

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 03/26/2001

Inspection

Attn:

(vid R. Knowlton

From

:

Contact:

Insp

ectio

n

Approved By:
Daf ted By:
Case ID #:

1i tie:

Locke Thomas

1837

Bernard,K

I

Iirr
297-HQ-l270951-D

?DMTh1ISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
12/18/2000
BALTIMORE DIVISION

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Revi
ew Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooina 1nnt ti’M- çccurred
on 12/18/2000.
Special Agent
(SA)I
Ifired one roun
bank robbery suspect, resulting in the d into the left side of a
subject’s death.
SIRG
members reçommeie that no administ
rative action be taken
against SAl
/as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incicient.

Administrative:

Reference Electronic Communication of
Inspector
I dated 12/19/2000.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furni
sh the
analysis, comments, and recommendat
ions of the SIRO with.
reference to the captioned shooting.

L.

b6
h70

 ‘I

.

—

.4

To:
‘Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-.A1270951-D, 03/26/2001
Details of the Shooting Incident

During December 2000, two
and Annapolis, Maryland, were robbedbanks located in Gambrills
by a white male. In the

Gambrilis robbery, the robber threa
tened the bank teller by
stating that he had a gun. Duri
ng the Annapolis bank robbery
the
suspect brandished a weapon whic
h was descr±bed by the bank
teller as a black pistol.
Subsequent investigation
robber of both institutions as Petepositively identified the bank
r Jerome Gebbia, and a federal
arrest warrant was issued for him
on 12/15/2000.
On 12/18/2000, the Annapolis Resident
Agency (ARA),.
Baltimore Division, received a telep
hone call from the Anne
Arundel County Police (AACP) regarding
a suspected bank robber.
According to the AA.CP, the agency
had received an anonymous
telephone call advising that bank robb
ery suspect
Peter Jerome Gebbia was located in
a motel in Grasonvifle,
Maryland. Further investigation deter
mined that Gebbia was
located in a room at the chesapea
ke Motel.

t

‘1rn”.r Senior Rçi
rint

c*a+’

!QP1

well as SAsI
land
I responded to the infomat
ionnd arrived at
the motel at approximately 1:00 p.m.
SAl
Itelephonically
contacted the Queen Anne’s County
Sheriff’s Office for assistance
and requested a canine unit. The canin
e unit was unavailable,
however, four officers of the She
riff’s Office responded as
backup assistance for the arrest.
Add
obàerved a Maryland State Police troop itionally, SSRAI_______
the motel and solicited his assistan er at a restaurant next to
ce.

SSRII
Idiagramed and orally articulatei an
plan to arrest team members. Duri
ng the briefing,
I
provided participants with descrip
N
of the subject. The plan called tive data and two photographs
for
telephone call to Gebbia’ s room and the mote). manager to place a
request that he come to the
(3 front desk. After the phon
e call was made, the manaqr wc11lc
l be
removed from the lobby to ensure citi
zen safety. SAl
land
two detectives would remain in the
lobby and make the arrest as
Gebbia entered, while other. parti
cipants’ would set up a perimeter
to ensure isolation of the arrest.
The first two calls made to Gebbia’ s
unanswered, 1
however thç suspect answered the room were
phone on the third
call. As Gebbia entered the lobby
of
th
mcte
l, arrest team
members confronted him. turing
the confrontation, a sruggle
ensued between the suspect and
SAl
I SA
Ipushed
Gebbia away from him, at which time
Gebbia pu]. e a weapon from
2

 w

I:

S

To:
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 03/26/2001

his waist area.
SA I
Iresponded and fired one round into
the left side of the subject, immediately disabling
him.
spent round was recovered inside the shirt of the subjec The
t.
Upon
examination, it was determined that Gebbia’s weapon was
a pellet
gun which resembled a large caliber, semi-automatic pistol.
Gebbia was pronounced dead at the scene.

r7C

A declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Divisio
n, dated
02/27/2001, regarding SAl
lactions in this shooting
incident. By letter dated 01/31/2001, the Queen Ane’s
County
State’s Attorney advised that his office would recomm
end that
there should be no filing of criminal charges in this
matter.
On 03/14/2001, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the
meetin
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance: g
Kenneth W. Kaiser, Chif Tnsoector. Oif ice of Inspections,
Inspection DivisLon: I
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ;I
IDeputy Section Chief, Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartrijk, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Sectio
n,
Administrative Services Division; William
Q. Doherty, Section
Chief, Global Counterintelligence_Section
NS-2, National
Secuzity Division; F
I Unit chief, Pirearms
Toolmarka Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory
Division;
I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
ulvislon;I
lUnit chief. Xnvestiat4ve Law Unit,
Office of the General Counsel; SSA
I Program
Manager, Practica. Applications Unit, Training Divisio
n; and
SSN
I Washincton Field 0fice
N’t-rnvnt”rwi mrnhprg
present were SSAI
I &LdI_______________
Management/Program Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Oice
of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

b i C.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRS

The SI•RG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2)
provide the Diector with an evaluative analysis, observ
ations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operati
onal
standpoint (if any); (3) provide reconmendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recomm
endations
fox administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRS members unanimçusly agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance
3

 F

To
Re:

Inspection From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1270951—D, 03/26/2001

with the deadly force policy. Attendees acknowledged that senior
management of the Baltimore Division should be credited for the
excellent training and actions of the participating agents.

4

 •0%

If

To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection
297.-HQ-A1270951-D, 03/26/2001

LEAD (a):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AWASHINGTON. D C.
That no administrative action be taken against
SAl
gas a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

2.
Mr. Pickard. Rm. 7142
2.
Mr. Garcia, Thu. 7116
2- Mr. ParkLnson, Rm 7427
P4s.I
(1
fRtn. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Thu. 7825
1
Mr.
Rm. 7837
1-Ms.E
juoJ
1-Mr.[
IDOJ
1
Mr. artniIc Rut. 6646
1
Mr. Doherty Rti. 4042
1
Mr.
Quantico
3.
Mr.
Quantico
2.
Mr.
1-Mr.
IWFO
1 -Mr.l
m. 7861
1
Mrs.l_________ Rut. 7861

7c

-.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5

 .

(12(3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

Inspection Dvis±on
Contact: I

Approved By:

Title:

Thomas Bernard Locke
jExtension 1837

Locke Thomas_Bernar

Drafted By:[
Case ID #:

09/19/2000

Iirr

297-HQ-A1271917-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
08/l/2O00
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) revie
wed a
shooting incident that occurred in the San Franciscç
Divi
sion
on
08/16/2000.
Special Agent (SA)I
Isho
and
t
killed an attacking pit bull dog during tile exec
ution of a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) seareb, warrant.
SIRG members
reqnmmm1d that no administrative action be
taken against
SAI
a result of his involvement in this incident.

las

Reference: Reference Electronic Communication
of Supervisory
Special Agents
08/23/2000.

Idated

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG
with
reference to the captioned shooting.

1
2

-

Mr. Pickard, Rm. 7142
Mr. Garcia, Rm. 7116
(1
Mr. Cousins, Rm.S15S)
Mr.
7427
(1
Ma]
IRin. 7326)
Mr. Lke. R, 7825
Ms.[
I DOJ
Mr. I
(1
-

2

-

-

1
2

-

1
1

Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
Mr. Doherty, Rm. 4042
(A1tn! Mt-. fl”ttrocki)
1
Mn
Quantico
1-Mr.
-

-

-

-

-

-

I

6
]b7C

 ‘p
0

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271917-D, 09/19/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 08116/200g. at approximately 3:00 p.m.,
I of the San Jose Resident Agency
fatally shot an attackiTrT ri* hull dog during the execut (SJRA),
ion of a
DEA search warrant. SAl
Iwas serving as an active member
of the Dim. Heroin Task orce assigned to the SJRA of
the DEA, San
Francisco Division.

SAl

Upon execution of the search warrant, occupants of
the
residence refused to comply with the flEA ‘Knock and
Announce”
protocol and iiiitiated conversation from within the
residence.
The occupants also ignored repeated commands from a
DEA supervisor
to control the barking pit bull dog, which was visible
to task
force Agents from an exterior window.
As a result of the occupants’ refusal to open the
door,
and believing that drug evidence might be destroyed,
Agents forced
open the front door and immediately encountered an
unrestrained
and viciously barking dog.
Bfforts to coptMn
dog with a
ballistic shield were unsuccessful and SAl
Iwho
believed he
and another Agent faced imminent attack, fired one shot
from his
Glock Model 22, 40 caliber pistol hitting the dog.
The dog
briefly halted,_however continued to advance in a thre4te
ning
maimer.
S4
I fired two additional shots, killing the dog.
On 09/12/2000, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Directo
r
Thomas Bernard Locke, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members
of the SIRG
in attendance:l
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, USDO; Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief,
Personnel
Assistance Section, Administrative Services Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr.., Section clii ef. Operational 81iqpo
rt Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;
b,C
Assistant
I
Section Chief, East Asia Section
cua.i. curity
Division;
lTTMj r1li, Firearms Training
Unit,
Training ivision,
Unit Chief, Investigative
Law Unit, Office o t e Genera
ounse].;
I
Fraçtical_AnoJ.icalions Unit, Training Divisibn; ang,
SEAl
¶ Whinaton Field Q.ff ice. The only nonvoting
member present wa
I Management/Program Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inspection uIision.

I

-

bbservatous and Recomzaeudations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident
with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2>
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observ
ations.
2

b7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Diviion
297-HQ-A1271917-D, 09/19/2000

and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
S mmbs unanimously opined that the use of deadly
force by S24
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
deadly force policy. The IRG recomiended that no administrative
action be taken against SN
las a resultof his involvement
in this shooting incident.

3

6

 I

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271g17-D, 09/19/2000

LEAD Cs):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
I

That no administrative action be taken against SA
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
b

4

 4

FD-204 (Rev. 12.1-95)

UI1ITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JuSTICE
Federal Bureau of Itwestigation

Copy to:

Repod oft
Date:

II? I
02/22/2000

CasclD#:

297-HQ-A1271480 SUB D

Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
DETROIT DIVISION
FEBRUARY 1, 2000

I

Office

SA
oic

CIVIL RIGHTS

.

Synopsie

On February 1, 2000, Special Agents (SA) of the
FBI and. Of ficers from the Southgate, Michigan, Police
Department arrested JOHN MELL CAMACHO for his involvement
in an armed bank robbery earlier that day.
During the
arrest procedure, AMAHO refused to comply with audible
commands provided by arresting officers, exhibited the use
of deadly force against the Agent and Officers, and
thereafter was mortally wounded by multiple rounds fired
from the arresting Agent and Of f.çers.
DETAILS:

•

At approximately 4t45 p-.m. on the afternoon of
Tuesday, February 1, 2000, the Standard Federal Bank
located at 13628 Eureka Road, Southgate, Michigan, was
robbed at gunpoint by a lone white male. This ubject
fled the bank with an undetermined amount of cash, entered
an automobile and departed the area. A witness outside of
the bank had observed this subject acting suspiciously
outside of the bank moments before the bank robbery.
The
subjectts actions caused this witness to contin
ue
observation of this subject.
This witness observed the
subject enter the bank, pull a ski mask down over his
face, and immediately following the subject’s departure
from the bank was able to record a license plate and
description of the subject’s vehicle as he fled the area.
The witness provided a description of the subject (as
viewed by the witness without the ski mask in place), the
This docuzcent contains neither rnendations nor conc.usicne
of the PEX. Xt is the property of the PBX
and is loaned to your aqency; it an4 it. contents are
not to be distributed outside your agency.

 _____________land

297-HQ-A1271480 SUB 0

license plate and vehicle description to police officers who
subsequently responded to the bank. The identification of the
license plate set in motion of series of events which were
promptly and effectively addressed by SAg, and led to the
apprehension of the subject responsible for the bank robbery.
iately 4:30
4:45 D,ta. 2/1/00, SAs
I
Iwere dispatched
from the Detroit FBI office to the Standard Federal Bank and
thereafter initiated an investigation of the bank robbery.
During their investigation at the bank, the license plate number
provided by the aforementioned witness was obtained. This
license number was queried through tt-e motor veh{1e records
and determined to be registered tol
I
Thereafter, a driver’s licne inrn4rv on this name determined a
last known_address for Msj
1f I
I
Apartment I
IRverview, !2ic1ugan. This same record indicated
that Ms. I
jas 22 years of age. The Agents departed the
bank and proceeded to the Fort Street address and determined that
address tç be an apartment complex. The Agents made contact with
the apartment complex manager who thereafter provided the Agents
access to a file containing information relative to Ms.I
They determined from a review of this file that Ms.I
Ihad
yet to complete her move into the aoartment complex, had listed a
previous address of I
I Iincoln Park, Michigan; and
had left behind for the file a recent photograph of herself.
.1.

.

SAd

-

tol

land

Iorçceeded
lenter an Juu
matching the description of the getaway vehicle, and which bore
the same plate as was reported t
by a witness at
the bank earlier in the day. Ms
;ed the area in
the car and drove
At this point in the
investigation,
.cally
and upon arrival observed Ms. I

-

I

-

-

-

I

-

and via the car
senior Agent on the same
CoorMnor, and was on the street at this time with SA
Iconducting investigation aciaed With noter
robbery
Upon the directiàn of SAl
ISAsI
land

a

Jcomfronted Ms.I
t the gas station. An interview
ensued followed by a consensua]. search of her automobile.__At
thi iunrthiir of the irnrtigation,
SAsI
homed
landi
SAsI
The search resi1i- in the discovery 1b6
landi
I
of two photographs of a white male who Me.l
lidentified as c
her ex-boyfriend JONATHO MILLER, and a document on which the
name ERNT J. BUROHART had been written several times. Ms.
IidentLfied th alias BURCHART as a name used by the
I
subject. Ms.j
Iwas shown a bank surveillance photograph of

2

 297-HQ-A1271480 SUB D

I

I

the subject responsible for
the Standard Federal Bank robbery
earlier that day.
She believed her ex-boyfriend MILLER
to be
the person depicted in the phot
ograph. She recognized the coat
thø handgun_depicted
in the photograph as those belonging to
I Mel
Ito].d the interviewing SAs that she had
loaned her automobile to her ex-.b
oyfrienci (MILLER) earlier in the
day.
All fçnv
nr Mc!I
,Jdeparted the gas station
‘ed tol
‘‘I
Ms.
barents in the company of I
It was
I
learned at this point that the sub
JONATHNT MII,LER, had been at this ject, using the identity
residence earl
evening.
He had called a cab company from the ier in the
residence earlier
in the evening and thereafter depa
identity of the cab company, mad rted. SAS determined the
e
representative, and determined thatcontact with a company
MILLER had been taken to the
Suburban Motel, 12269 Dix Road
, Southgate, Michigan, where he was
dropped off at room t4.

bic;

Investigating SAs
Motel. Upon arrival, two of thereafter departed for the Suburban
the four SAs interviewed the motel
manager whereupon it was determine
identified himself as BT BTJRC d that an individual who
HART had, checked into room #4.
During the course of this
the motel manager was shown
a photograph depicting Ms.
lex-b
oyfriend, the same
pbooaranh }hich was found in tne
earlier consensual search of
Ms.
I car. The motel manager identified the individual
depicted in this photograph as
the name BRENT UR2WRT to chec the same individual who had used
k into room #4.
Upon arrival at the motel, investigati
ng SA8 observed
light on in room #4.
It was also at this time that investigati a
ng
Agents contacted the Southgate
Police Department to
assistance.
The accumulation of information up to request
that point
allowed the investigating Agen
ts to believe that the bank robbery
subject was in room #4. AU four
Agents and six Soutbgate Police
Officers, in a group setting adjac
opt ions available to them to effe ent to the motel, discussed the
ct the arrest of the bank
robbery subject. Upon consideration
of the available options, it
was agreed that the Agents and Off
effect the arrest of the subject aticers present would attempt to
that time, and do so by
performing a surprise and rapid entry
through the door of room
#4.
The arrest plan was based upon the
element of surprise,
speed, and the tactical use of mult
iple
Agen
ts and Officers to
enter room #4 to apprehend the sub
ject.

.

In the earlier interview of the motel
manager, SAL
3

I

h6
b7C

 a.

297-HQ-A1271480 SU 0

.

obtained a pass key to room #4. Follo
wing specific arrest
procedure assignments made to those
each team member was instru.cted to sAs and officers present,
obta
jackets, and procure appropriate weapo in body armor, raid
members were rrf te pass key w ns. When all arrest team
uti;ized to gan acces to
room #4.
SAl
Officerel
I
nd Off icerl
Iwere
the first in.ividuals to gain acce
ss
to
the
inter
ior
of
room
#4.
The Agent and Officers gave imm
ediat
commands to the subject inside clear e, audible, and simple
the Police and or FBI, and that the ly establishing themselves as
subject was to drop the
fiçearm he Ijad in his hand at the time
of entry. Add
SAl
Iwas wearing body armor which clearly exhi itionally,
bited the
letters FBI, arid the Officers were each
wearing their uniforms.
The subject had his weapon trained on
the law enforcement
officers who bad entered the room. The
subject failed to comply
with the audible commands to drop
his
weapo
n. Interviews of
Agents and Officers present at the
time
of
the
arrest reported
that the subject fired his weapon once
at the law enforcement
off ice-rs who hac establihed
their mrepce at the doorway_to his
motel room. SAl
Officerl
I
I
simultaneously, or nearly simultaneousl I and Off icerl
their respective weapons disabling the y, returned fire from
subject. The arrest team
immediately entered into the room and
restr
ained the subject with
a set of handcuffs. A call for emerge
ncy medical support was
made and within minutes the Southgat
e Fire Department arrived
followed thereafter by Emergency Medical
Technicians. Care for
the crime scene was instituted imm
ediat
ely
scene. None of the arresting SAs or Offic by Agents on the
physical injuries during the course of thisers sustained any
9mm Luger pistol was recovered from the subjarrest. One loaded
ect at the time of
•his arrest.
The initial crime scene examination was cond
ucted by
the Detroit Division Evidence Respo
nse Team, and a secondary
examination was conducted by Laborator
associated with the shooting incident y Division representatives
review team. These
examinations did not recover a 9mm shell
casing or a spent bullet
fired from the handgun in possessio
n of the subject at the time
of his arrest. Proceeds from the bank
subject earlier that day were recovere robbery committed by the
d.
At approximately 11:55 p.m., February 1, 2000,
subject
JOHN NEIL CPNA.CHO died from the mult
iple gunshot wounds received
during his arrest.
4

.

4

 -

FD-20 (Rev. 34.59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENF OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau ot Iuvtigation

cGpyto
Rcportof

iiI

Date:

February 15

Feld’OfllceFile$:

297-HQ-•A1270951-D

Bureau File i:

2000

I

omc Baltimore

‘Title:

SHOOT MG INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCID?NT
BALTIMORE DIVISION
FEBRUARY 3, 2O.ÔQ

hajcter

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

SYnopsis:

This shooting thcident wag tiie result of an
TJniawful Flight to Avoid zos8cution FAP) investigation
reard.ng subject DQAI,P I
WIJAMS, ‘r.., aka Donald
Thémpson (FBI p651 634 WA2).

DETAILS.:
The Maryland JOint V4Olent Cmes Fugitive Task
MJVCFTF) Of the Baltimore ivision became involved
in the WILLIAMS UPAP investicw*irn n fl1/2.1 I2.flflfl at the
request of $ecial Agent (SAJ
I of the
Beckley, WV Resident Agency (RA) ot the Pittsburgh
Division.
On that date, the Beckley RA sent th BaltmOre
MJVOFTF facsimile cçes of the federal Criminal Complaint b70
and Affidavit, and the federa. Warrant for Arrest on file
regarding WThLIAMS.
Tue Complaint and Warrant were signed
and dated 0l/21j200.0 by Unitgd States Magistrate Judge
Mary S. Feinberg, United States District Court, Southern
District of West Virginia charging. WILLIAMS with
viol4tio of Titlø 18, United States Oode, Sectiçn 1073
(Uniawful Flight ot Avo.d Prosecution). 4
WI
I
AMS
LI
’
criminal history reveals that in 1994 he was convicted and
8entenced in West Virginia to two to ten yea-rs’
confinement for Malicious Wounding with use of a firearm
and two years, six months confinement for Wanton
Endangerment involving a firearm, to run conseOutively.
Force

This doctment contains neither recomiendettons nor concLusions of the FU!.
It Is the property of the FBI and is Loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
I’

 297 -HQ-A1270951-D

Baltimore Division also received other supporting
documentation from the Pittsburgh Division regard
ing WILLIAMS, to
include copies of a color photograph, fingerp
rints/palm print,
West Virginia drivers license, and social securit
y card.
The
Pittsburgh Division also forwarded a copy of the
underlying state
warrant for WILLIAMS’ arrest. The state warran
t, dated
01/18/2000, resulted from a Beckley Police Depart
ment, West
Virginia (WV) investigation, Case #2000577,
(NCC 4W16O447826),
for Homicide.
WILLIAMS was also charged with Malicious Wounding,
Kidnaping (two counts) and Aggravated Robbery
on other local
warrants stemming from the same incident on 01/17/
2000 in
Beckley, West Virginia.
The West Virginia state charges were filed because
WILLIAMS’ shot to death a former co-worker and
seriously wounded
that individual’s girlfriend, another former co-wor
ker, on
01/17/2000.
WILLIAMS had bound and gagged each in separate rooms
of their residence prior to shooting them.
Earlier, he had taken
the male at gunpoint to an ATM machine to rob
the couples’ bank
accounts, while leaving the female bound and gagged
at the
residence.
Based upon the above information, WILLIAMS was
designated an “Armed and Dangerous” subject of an FBI
fugitive
investigation, with “Office of Origin” in the Beckle
y, West
Virginia RA of the Pittsburgh Division.

.

FBI investigation revealed that WILLIAMS obtained
transportation on 01/18/2000 to the metropolitan Washi
ngton, D.C.
area. He allegedly stopped at a former acquaintance
’s residence
in Washington, D.C., but was not permitted to
stay.
He then
allegedly traveled to Maryland in order to meet a friend
with
whom he was previously incarcerated at the Hutton
svij.le, WV
Correctional Center (HCC).
Over the next several days, EEl
Baltimore investigation/surveillance in suburban
Maryland
identified individuals who were known associates
of WILLIAMS
during his period of incarceration at the Huttonsville
Correct ional Center.

I
•

On 02/01/2000, FBI Baltimo±e received information
from
FBI Pittsburgh that a Kyattaville, Maryland residen
t called the
Beckley, WV Police Department to determine whethe
r there was a
reward for information 3readina to WILI4AMS’ arres
t. The caller
was an individual namedi
Iwith whom WILLIAMS had
been incarcerated at Hrc. T1at same day, a Baltim
ore FBI Agent
attempted to contact I
un an effort to gain his
cooperation.
However, the FBI Agent was not able to talk to

I

2

 297-HQ-A1270951-D

On 02/02/2000, MJVCFTF members prepared to conduc
t an
investiaation and possibly mair
,-c
I
residence, Apartmentl_______
__________________
j{vattsviJ,le, Maryland
The BItLmore
case agenu,
I
1
I
I gave a verbal briefing to his supervisor and other task
torce members on the fugitiye invçstigatiori
to date. At
approximately 6:1 a.m , SAl
Imade telephonic contact with an
individual at
lapartmant, who cons
into the residence. However, WILLIAMS was ented to an FBI entry
not located.
*

I

.

Later that saçi day an FBI source of unknown
reliability provided SAl
Inform4tjon regarding a possible
lobtained detailed
location for the fugitive. SAl
information from the purc and corroborated
several details.
The source advised SAl
ithat WIllIAMS was residing with a
rLast Name Un1nown ft.NU in Laurel, Maryland. Although
cne source did not know I
I (LNU’s) specific address, the
source krew how to find the location.
The source a’so provide
SAl
ja cellular telephone number I
Iforl
(14W) an4 advised that WILLIAMS was utilizing
that cell phone.
SAl
jinstructed the source to find th4
l(LN)
S
1
U Laurel
apartment and provide him the street address.

The source recontacted SAl
lat
provided a Street number, 9034, for the Laur about 6:30 p.m. and
could not provide a street name. The sour el apartment, but
ce provided SA I
I
accurate directioná to the location, specifica
lly describing the
outside and inside of the basement apartmen
t and the ott-qidp pf
th ‘lyplex apartmnt buildina.
Th source provided SAl
I
(LNU’s) narael
I
and advised that WILLIAMS had
I
stayed withi
For several days. The source described the
‘interior layout of I
Iapartment (g034), including an
interior stairwell 1edina uostairs to
the interior of apartment
903, the residence of I
I The source advised
there had been crack cocaine on the kitch
en table at apartment
903 in the recent past. The source also state
recently indicated he did not have a gun, but d that WILLIAMS
was going to get
one.
The following morning, 02/03/2000,
land three
other Baltimore FBI Agents drove to the locat SAl
ion,_
base
d upon
accurate directions. proviçIed by the source.
SAl
I confirmed
through surveillance thati
apartment in a duplex apartment building ati I was the basement
I
Laurel, Maryland. The location appeared to
square building with six separate apartmen be a garden-style
Facing the front of the buildiig, the entrats in a cul de sac.
nce to the upstairs
apartment, p
1 is on the left the building and
3

1.

 ___

297-HQ-A1270951-D

I

the entrance to the basement apartmen
I is
in the rear left side of the building. t,L
SN
Iecontacted the
source to con1’-m t-1e address by physical
description and
location.
SAl
lalso confirmed with the telephone comnanv jzhe
telephone numbers and subscribers names for
botbi
I

I

At that point, S?[
Idecidet ‘‘ pt to locate
and arrest the subject, WIlLIAMS, at the I
I apartment in
the basement. Approximately 10:15 a,m.
, SAl
telephonically
I
contacted TCFTF sAl
and advised iim of an arrest
I
plan. ssi
boncu-rred arid additional task force member
were deployed to assist in the possible fugit
ive arrest. The
plan called for a perimeter to be establishe
d
around the duplex,
with a five-man entry team atj
A perimeter
team was designated to surveii tne macic yard
frcyr trin1rw
,
area, and side entrance to the upstairs apar tne
tment at
Street.
Th task force personnel staged near the Laur
el address
Jprovided the second briefing in two days çn
WILLIAMS.
sA
Iupdated them on the prev
investigative developments and the surveilla ious day’s
nce/arrest plan. At
this briefing, SAl
1 showed all MJVCFTF personnel a color
photograph of the subject and a hand-draw
n sketch of the
apartment and the cul de sac where the duplex
was
advised that the two reevant apartments were connlocated. He
ected via an
Igave each team member a specific
interior stairwell. SN
assignment during the perimeter surveillance and
arrest plan,
taking into account each apartment. He revie
wed the outstanding
warrants and the subject’s recent violent activ
ity. SAl
“also relayed the soirce information on
rent drug activity at
the subject’s recent statement tha he
wanted to get a gun.
and SA

On 02/03/2000, while the arrest team was stage
d near
teet, I
I
IWILL]ANS was presently insiae urte target I
apartment. At approximately 1t2S AIM., with
the arrest team at
their designated locations, SA[
Igave
with the arrest plan. All task force persothe order to proceed
nnel
Addit.oaally, all personnel displayed the appr wore body armor.
opriate law
enforcement markings, such as badges, police insig
nia, and/or FBI
insignia.
th

errith

Immediately prior to entry, an FBI Agent made
a
telephone cal]. to the apartment in an effort
to
notif
y
WILLI
AMS
of their intentions. However, the answering
machine engaged and
4

IC

 a

297-HQ--A1270951-D

the FBI Agent did not leave a mes
sage. SAl
lknocked at least
three times at the door
tol
announced he
land
was a law enforcement of fiex e-v
.it
wiciL..
His actions
were confirmed by both law enforceme
nt and non-law enforcement
witnesses. There was no respons
e to the 9cnock and announce.”
SAL
Igave the order and a ram was used t forc
e ooen the
door. The arrest team entered
the dimly ).itl
apartment and methodically beg
I
an to clear roOms, using
flashlights to enhance visibility
How
.
ever
,
the
entr
y team was
almost immediately advised by oth
er M3V
had fled upstairs via the interior stai CFTF members that WILLIAMS
rwell to thel
1
Street apartment. The entry team
secured the downstairs
apartment I
leav
ing two
other three went back outI side to the members inside, while the
side entrance to the
upstairs apartment
join
task force members at
I
ito
that location.

.

•

Accordin to I
I who was the babysitter at
WILLIAMS then gained access to the up
1
stairs
apartment ati
Iby knocking on the locked door at
t of the int
erior stairwell between the two aparttne;ts.
I arswered the door because she beli
L
eved thati
1
he downstairq neiQhbo, had knocked.
Ia
white male, was known td
las
Instead, an unknown black male bur her sister-in-law’s brother.
to the front picture window and loost thrçugh the doorway. He ran
ked out, and also ran to the
bedroom in the back ia area of
the apartment. With I
inside the apartment,
I
Iheard task force personnel. knocKing
on the door and opened it. She told
inside the ustirs apartment but thatthem that the black male was
a small child was still
there. I
lexited the apartment as task force personnel
successuiLy coaxed the child out
.
As M3VCFTF members took up pos
uostair apartment and at the side entr itions inside the
ance, an FBI Agent moved
to safety and interviewed
of the fugitive, whom she indicat her. He showed her a picture
ed
positively, the black male who ente was possibly, but not
red from the downstairs
apartment. This information was
relayed ‘ia radio both to the
entry team inside thai
I
lwho had run to his FBI vehicle in Iapartment anc to S.
the cul de sac to
retrieve an MK-141 Mod 0_Mvrq
ionary device, commonly referred
to as a “flash bang.” sM
Ihad decided to retrieve the flash
bang because he heard MJVCFTF per
sonnel ordering WILLIAMS to show
his hands and advising each other that
WILLIAMS was not complying
with their demands. From tIe tim
e he left the downstairs
apartment, it took SAl
Itwo to
item from the padlocked trunk in histhree minutes to zetrieve the
FBI vehicle.

 297-HQ-A1270951-D

.

During an approximate fou
r-to-five minute stand of f
inside the apartment,
WIL
numerous law enforcement LIAMS was ordered to comply with
surrender. However, wII,r commands to show his hands and
ThMS did not comply with any
and warnings.
commands
Instead, he searched the clos
et near the bedroom.
There was no closet doo
r.
A
bed she
curtain.
He continually moved his et served as a closet
hands in and out of different
areas of the closet.
Dur
over and partially cov ing this period, WILLIAMS was often bent
ered by the closet curtain.
items out of the closet
He
. On many occasions, his han was pulling
visible to the entry team
ds
. At no time during this inci were not
WILLIAMS verbally acknow
dent did
ledge the commands or warnings
toward him.
directed
MJVCFTF personnel
movements behind the sheet in position to see WILLIAMS’
all indicated they were con
he was “fishing” or sea
rching for a weapon in the clo cerned that
Because of the open configu
set.
little to no cover or con ration of the apartment, they had
cealment.
the movement of WILLIAMS’
arms and hands, several entr
y teaii’ ‘members thought he was
reaching for a gux or oth
er weapoi. His failure to
•
or acknowledge lawful
demands heightened their con comply with
cerns, as did
their frequent inabil
ity to see his hands.
The first round was fire
Iaprrexiata1y four minutes d by FBI SAl___________________
into the stand off. SAl
told SAl
Ithat he was concerned WILLIAM
S was reaching for a
un and could sho mnr rnii
rlclv thn they cou
ld react.
I
nd FBI SAl
h SA
I were observinçr WILBot
furtive movemept prid 1lking
L.ANS’
about his actions. SAl
one round.
f ired
SAl
Iwho did not have a clear lin
e of sight,
told him to take the sho
If ired the shot,
WILLIAMS appeared moment. After SAl
tarily to go down. However,
reaching into the closet
WIL
, even as tas frc personnel LIAMS kept
him to comply and show his
yelled at
hands. SAl
then discharged his
wpann irnil it emptied
. While SAl__
_ e oaded, FBI SA
I
Istepped in front of hifl’i an ___
I
fired everal roundsI at
WILLIAMS.
It is noted SAsI
md
i
upo
I
n
adv
counsel, have not to date pro
ice of
vided statements for this
inquiry.
WILLIAMS continue’j -n jrc
h in the closet and failed
to comply with commands.
511
Ihad ntered the apartm
moved forward by this point
ent and
. SAl
Iould see WILLIAMS near
the floor, including par
tia
shoulders. WILLIAMS continul views of his 1’ ms, and
his hands. Beliy” t-)at ed to move. S4
Ico
WILLIAMS was searching foruld not see
in the closet, S34
something
Idecided to use the elash bang.
He first
•
6

I

I

 ________I

297-HQ--A1270951.-D

warned the other task force members
and threw the flash bang
toward WILLIAMS. in an effort to diso
rient him and halt his
attempts to reach for a weapon.
After SAl
Ideployed the
that more rounds were immediately fi;e flash bang, it is probable
d. It is toss.ble that
Prince George’s County Deputy Sheriff
ired one
those rounds. 1
However the recollec.ons o tas.c ioIce witn of
esses
at the scene differ on whether more
rounds were f4.red after the
flash bang was deployed or whether Depu
ty Sheriff I
at that time. Upon advise of coun
sel, Deputy SherTffj
has not provided a statement to this
I
inquiry.

I

.

At; that point, wriijIAI1s was lying on the
floor near the
closet.
SAl
Icould see WILLIAMS’ hans. and rjoved forward
after a few seconds to handcuff him.
jnd SAI
SAl
I
in the handcuffing. After WIIJL!AI4S was hand
cuffe
d,
SA
bulled him away from the closet area toward
the living
room.
emergency medical services (EMS) personnel were
summoned and immediate notification was
management, the Laurel Police Departme made to FBI Baltimore
County Police Department (PGCPD). Prinnt, and the Prince George’s
ce George’s County
communications records show telephonic
911 notification of the
incident was made at 11:41 a.m.
At th scene, SI
Isked the shooters to identiy
themsely.
aI
l
I and Deputy Sherif I
Idid
so.
SAl
I and SAl
using Bureau weapons and Bureau
Iere
ammuni$-±qn, whic
h appeared to function properly. Depu
I
Iweapon and amzmmition also appeared to func ty Sheriff
tion
properly. Pending the final forensic
firea
rms
analy
sis,
it is
believed a total of 22 rounds were fiçed.
It
is
belie
ved
that BA
I
fired 16 rounds, Deputy Sheriff
ired one round,
and SAI
p fired five rounds.
According to county Fire/EMS Depm 1na.
personnel were dispatched at 11:47 a.m.
tol
1
Laurel, Maryland.
They arrived approximately 10 to 15 minu
tes
after the incident ndd. Thv decaredW
ILLIAMS to be deceased
at the scene. Dri
Fore
nsic Fellow, the State
I
of Maryland, Office oç th CIief Med
ical
Exam
iner, conducted the
WILLIAMS autopsy. Dr
1
Jadvised
revealed the manner of death was hom that her examination
icide, resulting from five
gunshot wounds to the body of WILLIAMS.
The incident scene was taken over by PGCP
!, which
7

•

I.

 .

297 -HQ-A1270951-D

conducted evidence collection
and forensic analysis.
PGCPD
seized a loaded 30.06 high-p
owered rifle from the bedroom.
The
rifle was found behind the
bedroom door, near a bedroom clos
et.
WILLIAMS was in the living
room, not the bedroom, as he sea
rched
the hallway closet during
the incident. At that point h
approximately four feet away
knew the loaded rifle was kepfrom the rifle. Althoughj
t in the upstairs apartment, tfl.i
inquiry could not determine
s
whether WILLIAMS also knew abo
ut the
rifle.
To datel
ias not been available for FBI
interview.
The PGCPD firearms examinatio
n report indicated that a
total of three semiautomatic
pis
tol
wer
s
e fired by law
enforcement personnel.
The pistols included one .40 cali
ber
Beretta brand, model 96 and
two
The .40 caliber Beretta was assi 9MM, Sig Sauer brand model P228.
gned to Detectiv
fired one time.
s
The 9MM Sig Sauers were assigne
andi
land fired sixteen and five rounds, resp
ective y.
The report also indicated
th-at a five inch concentric patt
ern of
gunpowder residue was noted
on the shorts of Williams around
hole consistent with the pas
a
sage of a bullet in the upper rig
thigh, four inches down from
ht
his waistband. Range testing usin
a Sig Sauer pistol showed thi
g
s pattern could be reproduced at
distance between 20 and 30
a
inches.
Furthermore, one 9MM
cartridge case was found in
the hail closet near the body of
Williams. All other pistol
cartridge casings were located
several feet away in the livi
ng room area where_MJVCFF mem
bers
took up thei.r positions.
An interview of SAl
Tevealed that
about two weeks after the sho
oting incidents ne was told by
SA
I
kiiat he had acciden
effecting the arrest of Wiltally discharged his weapon while
liams.
The Maryland State
indicated that the cause of Medical Examiners autopsy report
death was multiple gunshot wounds.
The report further indicated
a total of five gunshot wounds had
penetrated the body of William
urine revealed traces (unspe s. The drug test of Williams’
cified) of cocaine. The drug
test of
William’s blood was negativ
e.
?GCPD has initiated a
presentation to the local Gran homicide investigation for
d Jury.
In addition, this summary
was provided to PGCPD and to
the Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Section.
No local or federal prosecutive
determinations
has been made at this time.
Still pending are interviews
with law enforcement
personnel who discharged wea
pons, and prosecutive opinions
from
state and federal authoritie
s.

a

I

  

 

 

 

 

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 279-H- 1271301 D

Two interviews ol
the Aunt of I
did not provide any additio
I
nal or conti1cing information
.
confirmed the agent identified_h
She
imself as FBI, and askedi
to lift his shirt. Afterl
I
Iran, she could only see tie
agent from the rear window
of the truck, and saw him pul
l his gun
an4 fire wo shots. The Texaco
mini mart was bucking her view
of I
I She had not seen the weapon oni
I who she knew
only a
Ifour year old son,I
was in her lap c
at the time of the shooting,
andi
Iwas out of the truck.
The first PoLice Officer to arri
ve at the
Officer1
aoted it his report that upon scene, OKCPD
arrival at
the scene at 10:52, STI
limmediately identified himself
an ?BI gent, and stated the
as
wounded subject was a murder sus
wanted out of Texas. SAl
pec
t
lalso told Off ben
Ithe
subject pulled a semi automat
ic pistol out while running awa
and was turning to point it
at him when he shot the subeOt y,
twice. The Officer observed the
subject lying on. the ground
handcuffed. A semi automat
ic pistol was laying on ihe ou .
nd
approximately three feet from
Ithen
secured the scene and facilit the subject. Officenl
ated EKS treatment of the subject
.

Officer
1
IaLso sooke toI
I a store clerk
from tJie Texaco station.
I
advised she saw SAl
I
land
F
J talking, then saw the subject

‘iith both
hands before running out of her qi,h shove SI
i- between the station
and the
adjacent building, a mo
1
Isaw SAl
if ire two
shots, but could no seetel.
the subject when it happened.

Officerl
arrived on the scene at 10:52, I OKCPD, also reported that he
and assisted securing the
well as searching the sub
ject for_additioial weapons prioscene as
r to EMS
transportation of the subject
. I
Ireport indicates he fou
a box of

nd
.22 amtnunitiorz in the subject
’s right front_Doclçet.
Photographs taken of the sce
ne reveal that Officer I
I plac
the box of ammrnütion on. the
ground near the location where ed
subject fell.
the
Witness I
ladvised he was sitting in the
front room of his residence
when he heard two gunshots. He
outside and saw a man standin
went
ground. He saw the fnring g over another man lying on the
man kick an object away from
on the ground. I
Ibelieved this object to be a gun the man
then saw the standing man kne
.
el and handcuff th man on the He
ground while savina “Yçu
didn’t have to pull a gun on me!”
this man saw I
When
Ihe showed him a gold bad
911!” 1
Lan back into his house to cal) ge and said “Call
. 911. He thought
the man was an undercover
Police Officer, and the wounde4
man had
4

 ___

___

___

279-HQ-127l01 D

robbed the Texaco gas statio
n.j
of SI
I arid confirmed this was
handcuffinq the injured suspec
t, and
I
Ipositioa as indicated was
the location I
p fell after being

jwas shown a photograph
the man who he observed
making the statements.
approximately 60 yards from

shot.

Witnes
Jadvised he was sitting in
his house when he ar som
eone yea! FBI!”, and then
heard two
‘ops.”
:- looked out the win
dow to see a man walk app
three steps around the cor
roximately
ner of the ,Texaco station,
and then
collapse.
He then saw a man come and
check the fallen man’s
pulse, and then go to a tele
phone to call for help.

.
I

Witness I
ladvised he and his wife
were eating at Michelle
’s Restaurant across the Str
eet frost the
Texaco station.
He was seated facing the Sou
th window and could
see the Texaco lot where
the shooting bad occurred.
hear any conversation,
He could not
and was not close enough to
dress of either individual_i
describe the
nvolved until he crossed
after the shooting. I
the street
Isaw one man chasing another
lot.
across the
He then saw the man chasing
slow down, pull a pistol,
shoot twice toward the oth
and
er man. He observed the oth
down immediately, and the
er man fall
one chasing go directly to
man. then 9110w his badge
the fallen
to another individual who
was out of
Jviewj
Ithought he heard two sho
ts.
He could not see
i the other man had a
weapon, and did. not see the
toward the officer.
man turn
No other witnesses identi
fied and interviewed in
restaurant, in the neighbo
the
rhood, or at the Texaco
provid information_to sup
sta
port or refute the statementstion could
of the
br SAF
I statement to the Police Of
ficer to first
arrive.

.

A 1CR format video surveilla
nce system was being
utilized by the Texaco sta
tio
system was taken immediately n, and the VCR tape that was in the
this tape reveals date stam after the shooting. A review Qf
ps indicating the tape rec
03/27/2000, to 03/28/200
ording from
0, ending at 2:50 pm. An
interview of
the store manager reveal
ed the system was new, and
employee error
wag probably responsible
for
review of the other ‘ICR tape the missing time on the tape. A
that was place in the rec
the shooting revealed
order after
it
tape depicts some of the begins on March 29th, at 11:18 am.
The
act
SAs who arrived at the sce ions of the Police Officers and FBI
ne after the shooting,
but no foo
of the actual shooting eve
It is apparent from the rev tage
this tape that it was plac nt.
iew of
ed in the VR unit and
started after

5

r

 279-HQ-12710). 0

the FBI requested the tape that
was in the VOP. at the time
shooting.
of the

On 04/11/2000, attending phy
sicians declarçd subject
lwas healthy enough to be
lagreed
interview and provided the foll interviewed.
owing information to 01CC SAl to an
I
land Task Force Officerl
ladmitted
stealing a vehicle in Oklahom
a City with accomplice
and traveling to a rest stop
I
I
whe
re they abandoned the car and
began hitch hiking toward
Shreveport, Louisiana. They wer
picked up by a man known to
e
them only as “Bo”, or “Jimbo”
driving a truck. Bo drove
who
was
them to a small town in Texas,
they continued to try to hitc
whe
re
h hike to Shreveport.
They were
unsuccessful getting a ride
, and later in the day, So,
half brother in the truck,
wit
picked them up again. Bo hire h his
for a local plastering job
d them
,
party with other people at paid them $25.00, and took them to a
Bo’s half brother’s house tha
evening. So
t
ok them to his house, then
9
t
later went
nkin with
town. 1n argument ensued betw
een Bo and
I
Iwhich escalated to Bo threaten
ing to kill
andi
lwrestled a shotgun front So,
I
then I
Istruck
the head with it. They
robbed and hog tied Bo who seemed So in
alive when they stole his
truck. They traveled to Florida to be
they separated, and I
, where
Iias eventually arrested for
in a bar. He spent a month
fighting
returned to Oklahoma City in in the Broward County_iai1 and
the death of Bo in Oklahoma February, 2000. I
Ilearned of
to. He decided not to turn City from people the FBI had talked
himself in, and bought a .22
automatic pistol on the
semi
street.I
bad spent 10 years in
jail, arid did not want to
go
back. After spending the night
his girifriendi
with
confronted by an FBI agention the 29th of Marchi_____________
at the Texaco gas station. I
her son andi
I and
taunt, were in the truck when
the ‘BI agent
spotte

di

I

]b6

When confronted by the FBI aqe
nt,I
Irefused to
confirm his identity. Whe
n
shirt to look for tattoosj the FBI agent tried to lift up his
shoved the agent and began
run away. The gnn that he had begI an
to
to slip from hi waistband,
so he reached for
it as he ran. As soon as he
grabbed the gun,
he was shot by the agent and
fell to the ground.
On 04/11/2000, Sub
Iias arraigned in Federal
Court, District of Oklahoma, jectl
on
cha
rge
s
of Assault of a
Officer with a Deadly Wea
pon, and being a Felon in the Federal
Possession
of a Firearm.

6

.

 L

279-HQ-1271801 D

This report suggests that the following
salient factors
be specifically considered in the decis
ion regarding SAl_____
use of deadly force:
__
Subjectf
Ihas a lengthy criminal record that
includes Assault wzcn a i)eadlv Weaçon,
and he was wanted for
Capitol Murder charges. SAl
very
familiar with his
backgrornd, and had receivea spec.iric
information regarding the
‘rolent &eath ot victim Mesker.

Iwas

when advised by asso
I
looking or him for the murder of 4esk ciates that the FBI was
er, decided to purchase a
pistol rather than turn himself in.

I

I

•

Iwas çiven an opportunity by SAl
Ito
surrender.
ci
Iclearly identified aimself as an FBI
agent,
and gavel
Iclear directions in the Texaco
Ichose not to comply and strenuously shovparking lot.
ed SAl
an
attempt to escape and/or gain a
position of advantage.

un

Asi
lran toward the
station and the ao.jacent motel, he
grabbed a gun that wa’s in his back
have had an excellent_view of this
directly behindi
las he ran.

sace between the Texaco
was reaching, and successfully
waistband. S?l
_jwould
inasmuch as
Iwas

The distance and depth of the pass
ageway between the
two buildings[
kas running to was 1B.5 feet wide
by 29.11
feet long. Re had grabbed the weap
on in his waistband, and was
very near the northeastern corn
er
and a. short distance away from the of the brick Texaco building,
two buil4na’ corxiers at the
southern end of the passageway.
Although SAl
Icould
possibly have eliminated_theporth
eastern corner of the Texaco lb7C
building
forl
Ly adjusting his pursuit
west, hadi
Isuccessfully traversed the passagwav.to the
th two
southern corners of th hnc1ngs
would have given
If ar
superior cover over
Iwho was in an open station lot with
no immediate cover. Sal

sal

•

It is suggested
vis-a--vis the IMMINEN1 DNGE& clause kctions be considered
of the DOJ Deadly Force
Policy and defined in the Manual
of
Inv
estigative Operations
Guidelines (MIOG) Part II, Section
12-2.1. (2) (b), 1. through 1.b:
“1.
Imminent Danger
“immediate” or “instantaneous,” “Imminent” does not mean
but an action is pending.
Thus, a subject may pose an imm
inen
at that very moment pointing a weap t danger even if he/she is not
on at the Agent. For example,
7

70

 279_HQ-127:3t: 0

imminent danger may exist
if Agents have probable cause
believe any of the following:
to
a.
The subject possesses a weapon,
or is attempting to
gain access to a weapon, und
er circumstances indicating
an
intention to use it against
the Agents or others; or
b.
The suJject is arrned and
running to gain the
tactical advantage of cover;
or. . . .“

..

8
•1

—I

 li)-204 (Rec. 12.1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST
ICE
FederaL Bureau of Investigation

copy to:
Roi,urt of:

I

02/03/2000
CoIb1:

OiThe:

Salt Lake City

297HQAl27l898 SUB D
b6

SHOOTING TN4UIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHOENIX DIVISION
JANUARY 13, 2000
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

This shooting incident was the
resilt of an attempted
arrest. of Fugitive

I

On approxmatelv January 6 or 7. 200
fl. Task Force
Coordinat9r SAl
was
by DeputyL
‘a meinoer ot the ugitivnotified
Force. thatl
‘was aoina to initiate a furiif-i,e Task
ro
preliminary inquiry for
wanted for attempted murder on
Iwas
a
used a rock to crack a park ran police officer after he
ger’s skull and had
unsuccçssfullv attempted to Tn
ranger’s firearm.
Deputy I
Rndicated thati
Ihad
a criminal
history involving violence and that
he was a member of
Aryan Brotherhood.
the

I

I

I

•

I

On 7anuary 101 2000,
Inet with a source who si
using heroin and was also doing
was
“speed
of heroin and cocaine.
fixt
ure
The source stal
had a
revolver and always carried the
weapon wtn him in his
ant o in an athletic bag.
The source further
stated
bade the comment that if
they would be forced to kill him. the police approached him

On January 11, 200O Depu
tyl
Icontaced
7C
lAdult Probation Off ice7
I who
advised that I
iwould not go bacic to
prison because
of her knowledge that
aligned himself wit
Aryan Brotherhood, and when hehad
h the
was released from
prison,

thiS document contains
neithir ecomaendations no conclusio
na of tha F81. Xt i..
and is loaned to your aq.ncy;
the property of the
it and
contents Sr. not to be
distxibot.d outsid, your

its

ency.

wax

  

 

$34111". W. 

.ggurs


H. . :nA- - 37>.
.tly did not underst th'i .
only a raw 

 

297—HQ-A1271898 SUB 0

positive identification by rad
io.
Deputy
d the manager to recontact
and explain to
hat the vehicle needed to be
moved out{e
the motel parking area. The manager complied
and againj
lapparently misunderstood and moved his
vehicle
a few parking space and dd
not leave the mqtel aring lot as
instructed. Deputyl
‘then requestei SAl
Jto contact
the manager an4 have the man
ager concacti
Ia third time to
again request that I
imove his vehicle out of the motel
parking lot and onto 24th Driv
the approximately 5-foot tal e, which is immediately adjacent to
l concrete block wall that surroun
the E-Z Inn Motel. This time
ds
lunderstood the
request and began to drive out it appearsi
of the parking lot. Detective
I
Iwho was parked inside the par
kin9 lot
1 called out this
movement on his rad4o and bgan
followingi
1out of the
parking lot. Afterl
Imoved out of view, Agentsl
1nd
I
xited Room .ll and walk
ed in the direction that I
was traveling. Asi
I
lapproa
parking lot, he toooed is veh ched the exit to the motel
icle
and began looking arou
was not known if
It
Jhad observed the surveillance or nd.
if he
was just confeed as to wher
e to park his vehicle. At that
Deputy
time
ia radio the command to irziti
La.te a car
stop. Detective
is vehicle in behind I
and bumped the
I
f
veh
icle. Detectivi
and Lieutenantl
I
Itheri drove their vehicles into the
parking
lot thouh the porthern entranc
e and both stopped their vehicle
behindl
lye
on the passenger side of Detective s
I
Ivehici
accelerated toward the southern
at which time S
exit,
entered the southern exit ani
cnllided
with the front en of
vehicle. 1
Detective
Ithen
drove forward and agan tappe
veh
icle froVi the rear.
SA I
lvehicle was follo
Ivehicle
through the southrn entranc wed by sA I
e. During this time frame, SAs
I
landi
Ihad take up protective positions behi
nd the
corner of a motel room andn then
h6
moved to the rear of Detective
I
ivehicle as the car stop was bein
h7C
g executed. All
members of the task force imm
weapons drawn and were clearly ediately exited their vehicles with
identified by police markings
their clothing.
on

I

I

--

.

.

The task force mem
I
advising that they were FBI/ bers began shouting at i
Dolice ofices and fpr him to
his hands in plain view.
keep
Isawl
I first look
directly at him and then SAà
at the other law enfqrcement
officers surrounding himi
I. At that time,
made a
4

b7C

 297-HQ-A1271898 SUB D

lunging/reaching motion into
the pssenaer area of his
1
veh
icle
j believed

at which time SA

jwas reaching for a
weapon, and shouted wor
ds
During this same time framto the efrect lles going for it”.
his position of
cover and took up a positi e, SAl
on approximately ten feet from
slightly to the rear of the
anc very
driv’ sde doox of I
vehicle.
I
Immediately af tart
I
tha
appeared
t
I
be lupaina °F a weapon, SA
1
tact ive
I
J Deputyl
I and Investigator
pened fire on
SAl
I did not fire as he fe
a was in a
crossfire with the age
nts
the rear of the vehicle and
moved to a vehicle occupi /officers
ed
by
a
civ
ilia
n who was about to back
up his vhicl
the line of fire. Investigator
was ml
J, who
I vehicle, fired two rounds
the front
windshieldL
I
ivehicle and then took up
a position of
cover, SAl
not fire due to a possible cro
situation and assisteIdid
ssfire
d sai
!in protecting the civilian.
SAl
If ired six rounds from his
weapon while Deputyl
fired one rifle slu f mm ki.
shotgun and one roupd of 00
buck
Detective I
I fired two rounds atl
remained
1
I
SA
Dos
a
itipn of cover and was not
to safely fire
a position

heft

to

of

I

ti’
1
o

in

ati

I

.

at

at

I

in

After the shots were fire
Jwas no longer mobile and and, it was determined that
immediate request was mad
tar medical assistance. The Pho
enix Fire Department parame e
were dispatched i-n f-h
dics
]ooting incident at 1:33 p.m
determined thati
. They
as dead at the scene, at whi
Phoenix Police bepartmenb
ch time the
.
agents/officers at tIie sce took over the investigation. All
ne were wearing body armor
exception. of SAsI
with the
landi______

.5

C)!

 ___
____
___
___
____
___
___
___
___

(321UhI995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTiGATION
Preoedeme:
To:

Inspection Division

Prom:

Date: 05/01/2000
Attu:

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:

I

ROUTINE

Wiley D. Thompso

t1
enion

II

1837

Locke Thomas BernarJ

Drafted

By:I________________Ilrr

ease ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRA.TIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
01/14/2000
BALTIMORE DIVISION

297-HQ-A1270951-D

lb 7 C

Synopsis: The Shooting Inciden
t Review Group (SIRG) reviewed
shooting incident that occurre
a
d
in the Baltimore Divisio
01/14/2C)flfl
Wh1ø
çtiia a search warrant,’ Special n on
Agents
(sAs)I
ndI
Ishot and killed a
pit bull dog behaving in an agg
ressive manner.
SIRG members
recommended that no administrat
ive action be taken against eit
Agent as a result of their inv
her
olvement in this incident.
‘erence report of Supervisory
Special Agent
I dated 02/09/2000,.
Details: This communication was
prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recomm
endations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned sho
oting.

lb 6

1
2

Mr. Pickard, Rm. 7142
Mr. Garcia, Rm. 7116
(1
Mr.I
I Rm. 4.944)
2
Mr. Parkincnn. m 7427
(1
Mel
iRm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
2-Ms.I
IOJ
(1-Ns.I
1
Mr. Barth3.K, p.m. I 6646
-

-

-

-

—

-

-

lb ‘IC
1
Mr. Doherty, Rm. 4042
1
Mr.
IQuantico
1-Mr.
3787
In.
1
Mr,
Quantico
1.-Mr
WFO
1-Mr.
]Rm.7861
-

-

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1270951-D, 05/01/200
0
Details of the Shooting Inciden
t

On 01/14/2000, members of the
Baltimore Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) Team and
the Safe Streets Gang Squad
were
executing a search warrant
in conjunction with a joint
investigation with the Baltim
ore City Police Department,
Unit.
Homicide
The search warrant called for
a no-knock entry of
residence in Baltimore whi
ch was believed to be the hea a
dquarters
of’a violent drug organizatio
n.
TTri,
SWT Agents beaan clearing the
residence.
SAc I
andi
I
I entered the basement
and noticed a large chained
pitbull terrier dog acting in
an
aggressive manner, straining
against the chain on it’ s col
The chain appeared to be sec
lar.
ured to an article of furnit
the middle of the basement.
ure in
The Agents initially thought
the chain was short enough to
that
allow them to conduct securin
operations without being in
danger of contact with the dog g
.
Two additional Agents entered the
basement and located
an adult male hiding in the
front area of the basement.
The
subject was non-compliant wit
h commands given to him and
was
subsequently restrained_while
the clearing of the baseme
proceeded. As SA I
I returned to the stairwell, the nt
dog
lunged in an extremely aggress
The chain
uriravej.ed from the furr4ture ive and violent manner.
çid the dog continued toward
s SA
I
I resulting in SAl
Ifiring two rolinds from his
MP-9
shoulder weapon killing the
dog. SA I
lalso fired one round
from his nine millimeter Sig
Sauer semi-automatic pistol
,
striking the animal.
The Bur
and responded to remove the eau of Animal Control was notified
dead dog.

I
I

On 04/11/2000, the SIRG
above- captioned shooting inciden met to discuss the
t. Deputy Assistant DireOtor
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspecti
on Division, chaired the mee
with the following voting mem
ting
bers of the SIRO in atte
ITrial Attorney, Civil Rights Divisio ndance:
n, USDOJ;
DonaLd J. Bartnik, Section Chi
ef, Personnel Assistance Section
Administrative Services Divisio
n; William Q. Doherty, Section ,
Chief. Global Section
NS-2, National Security Divisio
n;
I Unit Chief, Legal Advice and
Training, Legal
Policy, Office of the General
Counsel; SSAI
I
Firearms
Toolma.rks Unit. Scientific Ana
lysis Section,
Laboratory Division; I
I Unit Chief, Asset
Forfeiture Unit, Operational
SuDDort Section. criminal
Investigative Division;
SSAI
Pr.ctical
Applications Unit, Trainin
g Division; and,
Supervisor, Washington Field
I
Office. The oniy non-voting
member
-

-

2

 :
TO:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A127051-D, 05/01/2000

present wasi
I Program and Management Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Insp
ection Division.

Observations and Recommendations
of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synops
ized incident
the intent to (1) evaluat
e the application of deadly for with
ce;
(25 provide the Director with
an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommend
ations for corrective actions from
operational standpoint
an
(if any); (3) provide recommendatio
ns
concerning training and
/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for admini
strative action if deemed necess
ary.
SIRG menibers unanimously acreed tha
t the se of deadly
forOe by SAsI
landi
Iwas justified
and in conformance with the
dea
recommended that no administr dly force policy. The SIRG
SAs as a result of their inv ative action be taken against the
olvement in this shooting incide
nt.

3

 K

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
1
297
-HQ-A1270951-D 05/01/2000

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no athuinistrative action
be taken against SAs
I
las
a result of their
involvement in this shootin
g incident.

4

  

2000

29

 

 

 

__________
___________

_

(I2!31/J9!S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 05/31/2000

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact: I

Approved By:
Drafted By:

)

Wiley D. Thompson III
Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernar

I

I 1 rr

Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
02 / 01/2000
DETROIT DIVISION

297-HQ-A1271480-D
b6

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Detroit Division on
02/01/2000.
Special Agent (SA) I
nd two
members of the Southgate, Michigan, Police Department shot and
killed a bank robbery suspect after being fired upon when
entering a motel room to execute his arrest.
SIRG members
unanimously aared tjiat no administrative action should be taken
against SA I
I.s a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
Reference:
Reference report of Inspector-in-Place_____________
dated 02/11/2000.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

1
2

Mr.
Rm, 7142
Mr.
Rm. 7116
(1
Mr. Cousins, Rm.515S)
2
Mr.I
I Rm. 7427
Ms. I
(1
IRm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 782.5
1
Mr.
[m. 7837
2-Ms.
IDCJ
-

-

—

-

-

1
Mr. Middleton, Rm. 4042
Mr
2
Quantico
Mr
1
Rm. 3787
1-Mr
IWO
1
Rm. 786
Mrs.I
-

-

-

-

-

-

(1-Mr I

2

-

I

Mrj
I DOJ
Mr.I
(1
I
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
-

1

-

Savage- 1730

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ’-A1271480-D, 05/31/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

At approximately 4:45 p.m., on 02/01/2000, the Standard
Federal Bank in Southgate, Michigan, was robbed at gunpoint.
The
lone subject fled the bank with an undetermined amount of cash,
entered an automobile and departed the area. A witness on the
outside of the bank who observed the robbery recorded a license
plate and description of the subject’s vehicle as he fled the
scene.

SAsI

I

lanai

Iwere

dispatched to the bank and initiated a bank robbery
investigation.
Upon receipt of the license tag number, a query
was made through the state motor vehicle ‘ecord and it was
determined that the tag was registeredtol
I Due
to Ms.I
Inot having completed her move to the address
listed in the motor vehicle records, the Agents proceeded to a
previous address .isted for her.
The Agents obtained a
photograph of Ms.i
from her file at the apartment complex
off i
ce andipon their arrival at the residence, observed
1
Ms. I
!enter an automobile matching the description of the
getaway vehicle and which bore the license plate that was
reported by the witness at the bank robbery.
MsI
I
departed the area and went to a gas station.
Based on a
conversation with the Detroit Division’s Bank_Robbery
Coordinator, the two Agents approached Ms.l
lat the gas
station.
During the interview with her, she permitted the A9ents
to sarr)i her vehicle.
Additional Agents joined SAsI
land
I during the vehicle search.
Two tthotographs of a white
male were found in the car who MsI
I identified as her ex
boyfriend Jonathon Miller.
It was also determined that he used
an alias name of Brent J. Burchart.
The Agents had Ms.[
I
review a surveillance photograph obtained from the bank robbery
scene.
MsI
ladvised the Agents that she believed that the
person depicted in the photograph was in fact her ex-boyfriend.
She advised that she recognized the coat and the handgun in the
photograph as belonging to Miller, and also verified that she had
loaned her car to him earlier in the day.
Based on the information gatiered frorq MsI
j the
Agents and Msi
Ireturned to Ms.I
I residence. They
met with Ms.l
jarents and learned that Miller had been
at the residence earflir in the evening, had called a cab company
and departed the residence.
Subsequent conversation with a cab
company representative revealed that Miller had been taken to the
Suburban Motel in Southgate, where he was dropped off at Room #4.

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Agents responded to the Suburban t4otel and determined
that an individual wh6 identified himself as Brent Burchart had
checked into Room #4 of the motel.
The motel manor w chown a
photograph of the subject previously found in Ms.I
I car,
and he verified the photograph as the same person who had checked
into Room 4.
Investigating Agents observed a light on in Room 4 and
contacted the Southgate Police Department for assistance.
The
four Agents and six Southgate Police Officers discussed the
options available to effect the arrest of the suspect.
An
agreement was reached that the law enforcement personnel on the
scene would attempt to effect the arrest of the subject by
performing a surprise and rapid entry through the motel room
door.
A pass key to the motel roam had been received earlier
and following specific assignments being made, the key was
utilized to gain_access to the room.
According to members of the
arrest team, SAl
Iplaced the key in the door knob and pushed
the door quickly open, immediately followed by other officers on
the scene.
Commands of “police” and ‘FBI” were made several
times before members of the entry team yelled “Drop the gun.” A
single gunshot was heard from the room causing law enforcement
personnel to return fire.

The subject was handcuffed, and although injured by
gunfire, was conscious and combative. An ambulance was called
and the subject was placed on a gurney and put into the ambulance
for transporting to a hospital.
The subject subsequently died
and an autopsy confirmed that 14 of the wounds incurred were
inflicted by a shotgun and two wounds were made by a handgun.
Examination of the crime scene verified that the
subject was in possession of a nine millimeter Luger, having one
round in the chamber and several additional rounds in the
magazine.
A declination of prosecution was received from the
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, dated
04/28/2000, for law enforcement personnel involved in this
shooting incident.
On 05/09/2000, the SIR.G met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members of the SIRO
in attendance: I
Ichief Inspector, Office of

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I

I

Inspections, Inspection Divisioni
Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Donald iY. Bartuik, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Division; Charles H. Middleton, Section
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr. Section Chief Onerational S.pport Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief,
Legal Advice and Training
1 Legal Policy, Office of the General
Counsel;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; and, SSAI
Whinairrn Fi1d qff ice.
The only nonvoting member present was I
I
Management/Program Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members held a lengthy discussion of this shooting
incident and unanimouly agreed that the use of deadly force by
SA I
land other law enforcement personnel was justified and
in conformance with the current deadly force policy.
Members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against him as
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Members made several observations and discussed
numerous events that took place during this incident.
The first observation made by the group was the fact
that although briefly discussed during the planning, participants
did not place enough thought into the wall structure of the motel
and the well-being of the individuals located in adjacent rooms.
rembers opined that at a minimum, law enforcement personnel
should have removed all individuals from rooms located on each
side of the subject’s room.
The Training Division representative expressed his
concern that there was not enough communication between Agents on

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the scene and the supervisor at any time during this incident.
Information contained in the administrative inquiry report stated
that all members of the squad were cognizant of the fact that
communication must be maintained with the communications center
and that prior to any arrest scenario the supervisor is to be
notified. However, it appeared that Agents did not follow
through with these requirements during this incident.
Members noted that after the subject’s apprehension, an
arrest team member siw a lonq-barreled handgun on an end table.
He was advised by SAL
I that the gun had been removed from
under the subject and placed on the table for safety reasons
during the apprehension.
SIRG members opined that the action of
placing a loaded firearm on a table approximately three feet away
from a combative, handcuffed prisoner is not conducive to a safe
environment.
The next observation made by the SIRG involved the
firearms qualification records of two Agents involved in the
incident.
The Training Tiri.qirrn rpresentative advised that
records indicated that si’l
had last qualified on an NP-S
shoulder weapon in 1998 and that SA I
Ipossessed a weapon that
he had not shot since 1997.
It was also recognized that
participants in the incident did not utilize shields.
The last observation made by SXRG members pertained to ]b
participants not attending “deadly force” instruction training
sessions.
Although legal instruction training was recently
provided three times by the Chief Division Counsel (COC) of the
Detroit_Division, records indicated that neither SAl
Inor
SAl
I attended any of these sessions. SIRG members
unanimously agreed that all Agents of the Detroit Division should
be reminded of the necessity tO attend mandated deadly force
training and that the CDC ensure that the session includes a
legal refresher on exigent circumstances.
All of the observations made by the SIRG will be
discussed with the Special Agent in Charge of the Detroit
Division.

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LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION EIIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no administrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

SAl

S

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1h6

 _____________lof

_____Ibe

____________________

0213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

,9e: 04/19/2001

Inspection

From:

Attn:

d,4” Knowlton

Inspection

Contact:
Approved By:

I

Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernar

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297-HQ-A1270951-D

Title;

AD

Ilrr
7

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
02/03/2000
BALTIMORE DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred on 02/03/2000.
Special Agents
(SAs)I
land Corporall
I
the Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office shot
and killed a subject wanted for homicide.
SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against
SAI
las a result of his involvement in this incident;
however, a recommendation was made that SA
censured,
suspended from duty for three days, and receive documented
remedial firearms training for his neglect in practicing routine
firearms safety procedures
This recommendation was based on an
accidental discharge of SAl
I weapon during the incident,
not shots fired to incapacitate the subject.

I

Administrative:

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
dated 02/16/2000.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

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Details of the Shooting Incident

The Maryland Joint Violent Crimes Fugitive Task Force
became involved in the Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution case
regarding Donald Lee Williams, Jr.., at the request of the
Beckley, West Virginia (WVA), Resident Agency.
Williams was
wanted for shooting to death a former co-worker and seriously
wounding the co-worker’s girlfriend as well as a second co
worker.
Investigation revealed that Williams obtained
transportation on 01/18/2000, to the Washington, D.C., area..
He
allegedly stopped at a former acquaintance’s residence in
Washington and subsequently traveled to Maryland to meet a friend
with whom he was previously incarcerated in New York.
Surveillance in suburban Maryland identified individuals who were
known associates of Williams during his period of incarceration
in New York.
On 02/01/2000, the Baltimore Division received
information from Pittsburgh stating that a Maryland resident
called the Beckley, WA, Police Department to determine if there
was a reward for information lçading to Williamst arrest.
The
caller was an individual namedi
I with whom Williams
had been incarcerated in New york. A; Agent of the Baltimore
Division attempted to contacti
Io gain his cooperation;
however, contact was never made.
on 02/02/2000, task force members prepared to conduct
an investigation and possibly make an arrest of Williams at the
residence of I
tin Hyattsville, Maryland.
SAl
I the Baltimore case Agent, gave a verbal
briefing to his supervisor and other task force members regrdinQ
the fugitive investigation. At approximately 6:15 a.m., S.P.I
I
made telephonic contact with an individual ati
Iresidence
who consented to an FBI entry into the residence; flowever,
Williams was not located.

I

I

Further investigation revealed that Williams could be
residing with n individual known asi
I later_identified as
I in Laurel, Maryland. A4houoh SAl
kias
provided with only a partial address tori
laccurate
directions to the location, specifically describing the outside
and inside of the basement apartment and the outside of the
duplex apartment building, were qiven.
The individual also
described the interior layout oft
iapartment including
an interior stairwell leading upstairs to the interior of
iresidence.
Information was provided to SA
I that crack cocaine had been on the kitchen table in the

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past and that Williams recently indicated that he did not have a
gun but was going to get one.
On the morning of 02/03/2000, SA I
knd three other
Baltimore Agents drove to the location provided and confirmed the
address_of the apartment by physical description and location.
SAl
lalso çonfirmed the telephone numbers and subscribers
names for botH
I and
I

I

At that point, SAl
Idecided to attempt to locate
and arrest Williams at the basement apartment of I
I
SAl
Itelephonically contacted Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
nd advised him of an arrest plan.
SSAI
I
concurred with the plan and additional task force members were
deployed to assist in the possible arrest of Williams.
SAl
I
provided all task force personnel a briefing on the previous
day’s investigative developments and the surveillance/arrest
plan.
All attendees were shown a photograph of the subject and a
hand-drawn sketch of the apartment and the cul-de-sac where the
duplex apartment was located.
Specific information was provided
regarding the layout of the apartments as well as details about
recent drug activity and the subject
s statement that he wanted
t
to get a gun.
SA I
I gave each team member a specific
assignment during the perimeter surveillance and during the
arrest plan.
On 02/03/2000, confirmation was made that Williams was
inside_the target apartment and at approximately 11:25 a.m.,
SAl
Igave the order to proceed with the arrest plan.
After
failing to contact_Williams via phone to advise of their
intentions. SAl lknocked at least three times on the door of
jand announced that he was a law enforcement
officer serving a warrant.
With no response to the “knock and
announce”, a ram was used to force open the door,
The arrest
team entered the apartment and began clearing rooms.
Task Force
members on the scene advised that Williams fled upstairs via the

interior stairwell to thel

I

The babysitter in I
I heard task force
personnel knocking on the door and opened it.
She advised the
officers that a black male was inside the upstairs apartment but
that a small child was also there,
The babysitter exited the
apartment as task force personnel successfully coaxed the child
out.
As officers took positions inside the upstairs
apartment and at the side entrance, an Agent interviewed the
babysitter.
She was shown a picture of the fugitive whom she
indicated was possibly, but not positively, the black male inside
the apartment.
This information was relayed via radio to members
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of the entry team inside the apartment and to SA[
Iwho had
returned to his vehicle to retrieve a diversionary device due to
the subject’s noncompliance with law enforcement demands.
Williams was ordered to comply with commands to show
his hands and surrender, however, he refused.
Williams searched
a closet near a bedroom, continually moving his hands in and out
of different areas of the closet.
Williams was often bent over
and partially covered by the closet curtain.
The subject
continued pulling items out of the closet and at no time during
the incident did he verbally acknowledge the commands of warning
by law enforcement personnel.
The law enforcement officers viewing Williams’
movements behind the sheet indicated they were concerned that he
was searching for a weapon in the closet.
Due to the open
configuration of the apartment, they had little or no cover and
due to the subject’s lack of compliance with commands, officers
were concerned for their safety.
Due to these safety concerns, SAl
if ired one round
and Williams appeared to momentarily go down.
Williams continued
reaching into the closet and failed to comply with commands to
surrender.
SAJ
Idischarged his weapon_until it emptied.
While SAl
Ireloaded his weapon, SAl
Istepped in front of
him and fired several rounds at Williams.
Williams continued to
serch ir the closet and failed to comply with commands.
SAl
lentered the apartment and moved forward ohiing
Williams moving and unable to see his hands.
SAl
Ibelieved
that Williams was searching for a possible weapon inside the
closet area and decided to use a flash bang in an effort to
disorient him and halt his search attempts.
Subsequent to the deployment of the flash bang, it was
believed that more rounds were immediately fired; however, this
could not be proven.
Wi]4iams wap lying on the floor near the
closet and SAsI
Iproceeded to handcuff him.
landi
After Williams was handcuffed, SAl
Ipulled him away from
the closet area toward the living room.mergency medical
service personnel were summoned and immediate notification of the
shooting was made to pertinent local law enforcement agencies.
Williams was declared deceased at the scene.
A subsequent
autopsy revealed that Williams died from five gunshot wounds to
the body.
During evidence collection, a loaded 30.06 high powered
rifle was seized from behind the bedroom door, near a closet.
Additionally, a firearms examination report indicated that a
total of three semiautomatic pistols were fired by law

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enforcement personnel on the çcene.
It was determined that the
pistols belonged to Detectivel
1SAI
land SN
I
It was subsequently determined that SAl
I
accidentally discharged his weapon while effecting the arrest of
Williams.
The accidental discharge resulted in a non-life
threatening injury to the subject’s right thigh.
After a lengthy review, a declination of prosecution
was received from the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, on 04/02/2001, regarding the actions of law
enforcement personnel involved in the shooting incident.
On 04/10/2001, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I
I Chief Insnector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; I
ITrial Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, USDOJ;I
L Deputy Section Chief,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Division; I
I Unit
Chief, Asia, Middle East and Africa Unit, National Security
Division;I
I, Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks
UnitScientific Analvsip Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I. Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; SSAj
Operational Support Section,
Undercover and sensitive uerations Unit, Criminal Investigative
lDivision;I
lUnit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Of f ice of the General Counsel; SSAI________________ Program
Manager,_Practical Applications Unit, i’raining inviion; and
SSAI
i Washington Field Office.
Nonvoting members
present were SSA I
j, andi
I
Management/Program Analyst, Inspection Management Unit, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to: (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4> provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

5

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SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by law enforcement personnel was justified and in
conformance with the deadly force policy.
a result of the accidental discharge of
L’eapon, members opined that he should be
censured, suspended from duty for three days, and receive
documented remedial firearms training for his neglect in
practicing routine firearms safety procedures.

sAl

6

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04/19/2001

IAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
S OFFICE
1
DIRECTOR
AT OPR
That SAl
I be censured and suspended from
duty for a period of three days for his fai1ue to mp1oy routine
firearms safety procedures. Additionally, SAl
I should
receive remedial firearms training regarding proper handling of
firearms and this training should be properly documented.
Set Lead 2:
That the Adjudication Unit, OPR, include in the SAC
s
1
copy of the letter of suspension, the need for remedial firearms
training for SAl
regarding the proper handling of weapons.
Additionally, the ietter should advise that this remedial
training should be properly documented and that a copy of the
documentation should be forwarded to the SIRG Chairman upon
completion

Mr.
,
Rm. 7142
Mr.
Rm. 7116
(1
Mr.I
I
Mr.I
2
‘
7427
(1
Ms.
I Rm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
1
Mr.
1 Rm. 7837
IpoJ
MsI
1
I
(Atten:
Mr.’
1
Mr..J
JDOJ
1
Mr. Bartnik, Rm, 6646
1
Mr.
4042
1
Mr.
Quantico
(Atten:
Mr.I
I
1
Mr.
j, Quantico
1-Mr.
I
1
Mrj
WFO
1
Mrj
Rm. 7861
1
Mrj
Rm. 7861
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

I

‘.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.

-

-

-

-

Savage-1742

 _________________Ilrr

(12/3’1!195)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection

From:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact: I

Approved By:

08/15/2000

Thomas Bernard Locke

LExtension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernar/’

Drafted By:
Case ID :

297-HQ-A127].801-D
D7C

Title:

?DMIt’IISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
03/29/2000
OKLAHOM7 CITY DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Oklahoma City Division on
03/29/2000.
Special Agent (SA>I
I shot and
seriously wounded a fugitive during an attempted arrest.
SIRG
members recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl______ as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Reference:

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
dated 04/08/2000.

Details:
This communication was prepared Co furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

1
2

-

-

Mr.
Mr.

Rm.

(l-Mr.I
2

-

IRm. 7427
Mr.’
(1
Ms.I
I Rm. 7326)
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
Mr.
,
Rm. 7837
Ms.
,
DOJ
Mr.I
IDOJ
-

1
1
1
1

-

-

-

7142

IRm. 7116
I

1
1

Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
Mn
I Rm. 4042
(Attention:
Mr.I
jRm 3787
1
Nr.I
1
Mn
I Quantico
1-Mr
IWFO
Mr
1
j Quantico
1
Mrs.I
IRm. 7861

7(7

-

-

-

-

-

-

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tetai1s of the Shooting Incident

On 03/29/2000, s4
shot anc. seriously
wounded I
I who was being sought on a Federal
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution warrant out of the Eastern
District of Texas. I
land an accomplice were suspected of
murdering Gerald Lee Mesker who had picked them up while
hitchhiking. I
ihad an extensive criminal history involving
crimes of violence.
After stealing a vehicle in Oklahoma_city and abandoning
it at a rest stop in Texas on 12/29/1999,1
land an accomplice
known a
Iwere picked up by Mesker.
The three
reportedly went to Mesker’s residence. Mesker was subsequently
found dead at his residence with his hands and feet bound behind
his back with electric extension cords.
The cause of death was
determined to be blunt force trauma to the back of the head and
neck. [
Ireporteaiy stole Mesker’s vehicle and
landl
abandoned it in Shreveport, Louisiana.
The two individuals then
purchased Greyhound bus tickets to Pensacola, Florida, and
subsequently proceeded to Miami via bus.
Due to the subject’s extensive criminal history in
Oklahoma City, as well as an Oklahoma address provided byj
when he stayed at the Salvation Army in Pensacola, the Dallas
Division initiated a lead to Oklahoma City which was subsequently
assigned to S
I

I

Through the utilization of a composite sketch provided
by the Dallas Division, SAl
Iwas able to identify[
I as
well as his previous girlfriend
also developed
I
regarding
including an
complex.

information
apartment

locations

requented,

03/28/2000, I
Iprovided
jc’ith a license plate for a truck reportedly associated
SA
with
I Through vehicle identification records, SAl______
located_an address for the truck and on the morning of 03/29/2000,
Iwas surveilling the truck.
SAl
SAl
Inoticed a woman
with a small child driving the truck and followed the vehicle to
the Bel Air Motel in Oklahoma City.
SAl
Iwaited in his
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vehicle across the street from the motel and at 10:53 a.m., he
broadcast a radio request for any Squad 5 Agents to r..espond to
him.
At 10:58 a.m., SAj
radioed for assistanceadvising. he
had shot a subject.
A subsequent interview with the subject’s girlfriend
determined that she,I
I her four year old son and her aunt
pulled into a Texaco station to get gas. A man pulled up next to
the truck, exited his vehicle and icntifi himself as an FBI
6
Agent.__According to the girltriendj
Iwas advised by
SAl
Ito get out of the truck. As[
lexited the truck,
his shirt came up arid she saw a gun in his pants.
When the Agent
toldi
Ito put his hands on the truck,
SAl
and ran.
AsI
Iran away, he was reaching for the gun in his
waistband.
She heard the Agent fire two shots.
The injured
subject was handcuffed and transported for medical attention.
The
subject recovered from his wounds and is currently on trial for
Assault on a Federal Officer.

I

I

On 08/08/2000, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Office of Enspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members of the SIRG
in attendance: I
I, Chief Inspector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;j
[ Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Vic?lent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Division;I
I Unit Chief,
NS-2S, National Security Division, SSAI
I Undercover
and Sensitive Operations Unit, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Divisioni
I Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; SSAI
Toolmarks Unit,
I Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
iprogram Manager, Practical Applications
SSAI
Unit, Training Division; and, SSAI
Washington Field
The only nonvoting member present wasi
Office.
I.
Management/Program Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

Savage-1745

3

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From!
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A127].801--D, 08/15/2000
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.

I

h6
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by SAl
Ias justified and in
conformance wiFh the deadly force policy.
District Attorney
L Seventh District, State of Oklahoma, declined
prosecution of sN
km 04/04/2000. Additionally, by letter
dated 07/10/2000, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, provided a declination of prosecution regarding this
shooting incident.

No observations or issues were voiced by SIRG members
during the discussion of this shooting incident.

Savage-1746
4

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ--A1271801-D, 08/15/2000

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC

Ic) IC

That no adipinistrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

sI

Savage- 1747
5

 ___________
_________IRm.IQuantico
______
__________
________
_________

F

(12/311199.5)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

Front:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact: I
Locke Thomas Bernar

Drafted By:

Ilrr

Case

ID #:

Thomas Bernard Locke

1

Approved By:

Extension 1837

297-HQ-A1271898-D

U :)

ib

Title:

08/14/2000

I

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
01/13/2000
PHOENIX DIVISION

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that: occurred in the Phoenix DivLsion on
01/13/2000.
Special Agent (SA)
I along
with task force members, shot and killed a subject wanted
for attempted murder on a police officer during an attempted
arrest.
SIRG members recommended that no administrative action
be taken against any law enforcement personnel involved in this
shooting incident.

I

I

Reference:

Refrence

I

report of Inspector-in-Place
dated 04/10/2000.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
1
2
2

-

-

-

Mr
Mr
(1-Mr.J

Mn

IRrn.

7142
7116

Im.

I

Im. 7427
IRm. 7326)

(1
Ms.j
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
1
Mr.
Rm. 7837
1-Ms.
DOJ
1
Mr.1
I DOJ
-

-

-

1
1

Mr. Bartn±k, Rm. 6646
Mn
4042
(Attention:
Mrj
1
Mr.I
IRm. 3787
1
Mn
1-Mr.
WFO
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
Rm. 7861
Mrs.I

lb 6

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Savage- 1748

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom;
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271898-D, 08/14/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

I

SAL
was notified in early January
by Deputyl
I a member of the Fugitive Task Force
(FTP), that he was going to initiate a fugitive preliminary
inquiry for subject Donald Dean Compton.
Compton was wanted for
attempted murder on a police officer and had a criminal history
involving violence.
Information also indicated that Conipton was a
member of the Aryan Brotherhood.

land Deputyl

On 01/10/2000, Deput.I

met with a source who stated that Compton was using heroin and was

also doing “speed balls”, a mixture of heroin and cocaine.
The
source advised that Compton possessed a revolver and always
carried the weapon either with him, in his pants, or in an
athletic bag. According to the source, Compton had stated that if
the police approached him, they would have to kill him.

On the evening of 01/11/2000, several members of the FTF
conducted a surveillance at Compton’s ex-girifriend’s residence;
however, Compton was not sited.

I

On 01/12/2000, the source contacted Deputie
land
second time and advised that Compton was driving a
bluish-gray colored Plymouth Colt.
Later that evening, the
Deputies located the vehicle at the E-Z Inn Motel in Phoenix.
After confirming the vehicle identification number as the vehicle
belonging to Compton, Deputy
irequested that the task force
attempt to arrest Compton that evening.
SAl
Idetermined
that it would be more feasible to effect Compton’s arrest in the
early morning hours of 01/13/2000, and to take the time to
formulate a plan for the arrest.

la

I

At approximately 4:30 a.m., on 01/13/2000, task force
members met to formulate an arrest plan.
Information was provided
that Compton’s vehicle had been surveilled the entire evening of
01/12/2000.
Attendees were also briefed about Compton’s criminal
history and the fact that he should be considered armed and
dangerous.
Photographs
Compton were disseminated and
information regarding Compton’s vehicle and license plate was
discussed.

of

Savage-1749
2

I

 _______Iwent

efed

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271898-D, 08/14/2000

The initial arrest plan called for the surveillance of
Compton after he left the motel and for officers to allow him to
arrive at a destination and effect Comptop’s arrest as he was
exiting his vehicle,
at the briefing, SAl
lensured that
all task force members were wearing ballistic vests and that an
adequate number of shoulder weapons was available.
1
Detective
Itook up a surveillance position in the
parking lot of the E-Z Inn Motel with the other units remaining on
the perimeter. As it began to get daylight, Detectivel
I
moved his vehicle to avoid drawing undue attention to himself.
At
approximately 10:00 a.m., Deputie
to the
land
office of the motel to speak with the manager and noticed that
Compton’s vehicle was no longer in the parking lot.
Task Force
members began checking Compton’s associates’ addresses in an
attempt to locate his vehicle.
During this same time, SAsI
land
Iwere returning to the Phoenix Division after
conducting early morning leads.
SAl
I a Training Agent, had
obtained previous permission from his supervisor to assist in
arrests on other squads in order for SAl
I a Probationary
Agent (PA), to obtain appropriate experience during her PA
training period.
SAs I
I andf_____ were given a location to
surveil in an attempt to locate Compton’s vehicle.
Corton’s
vehicle subsequently rturn
o the_motel and all task force
members along with SAs I
andE
I reported to SAl
on the perimeter of the motel for an updated briefing.

I

I

I

Deputiesi
ancj
1
Irecontacted the manager of
the motel and learned that Compton was in Room 118.
Detective
all members of the task force regarding a proposed
felony car stop arrest scenario if Compton left the motel parking
lot again.
mach task force member was given a specific_location
and ziqb assignment during this radio briefing.
si.A
land
kqere given the assignment of physical surveillance of
Compton’s motel room and vehicle from Room 111, which was located
immediately across the parking area from Compton’s room.
In order
to covertly enter Room 111, both Agents removed their ballistic
vests to avoid alerting Compton to law enforcement presence.
Savage-1750
3

 _____lexited

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271898-D, 08/14/2000

At approximately 12:45 p.m., Deputiesl
landi
recontacted the hotel manager requesting that he contact Compton
and advise him that the motel parking lot was to be resurfaced and
request that Compton move his vehicle from it’s current location.
The location that Compton was to park his car was immediately
adjacent to an approximately five foot tall concrete block wall.
According to the plan, this was the location in which Compton’s
vehicle would be stopped and his arrest executed.
The manager
made contact with Compton; however, Compton did not understand the
manager’s instructions correctly and moved his vehicle only a few
spaces_within the parking lot.
This movement was observed by
SAL
land SAl
lwho positively identified Compton while
he moved his vehicle and advised task force members of the
positive identification by radio.

I

Deputyl
Irequested that the motel manager recontact
Compton and explain to him that his vehicle needed to be moved
outside of the motel parking area.
The manager complied with the
request; however, again Compton moved his vehicle a few parking
spaces_but_did not leave the motel parking lot as instructed.
Deput
Ithen requested that SAl
ontact the manager
and have him contact Compton a third time to request that he move
his vehicle out of the motel parking lot and onto 24th Drive.
It
appeared that Compton understood the instructions as he entered
hi vehicle and began to drive out of the parking lot.
Via radio,
Detective I
1 advised other task force members of Compton’s
actions and he began following Compton out of the_parking lot.
After Cornptcn moved out of view, SAsI
land
Room
111 and walked in the direction that Compton was traveling.
As
Compton approached the exit to the motel parking lot, he stoed
his vehicle and began looking around.
At that time Deputy1
I
announced via radio the command to initiate a car stop.
Detective
Ipulled his vehicle in behind Compton’s while Detective
and Lieutenant [
Idrove their vehicles into the
parking lot and stopped behind Compton’s vehicle and to the side
of DetectiveL
Ivehicle.
Comotonaccelerated toward the
southern exit, at which time SAl
lentered the southern exit
and collided with_Compton’s vehicle.
During this time,
sasi
landi
Iook protective positions behind the corner
of a motel room and then moved to the rear of Detectivej_________

Savage-1751
4

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271898-D, 08/14/2000

vehicle as the car stop was executed.
All task force members
immediately exited their vehicles with weapons drawn.
-

Task force members began shouting at Compton advising
they were law enforcement_officers and for him to keep his hands
in plain view.
SAl
isaw Compton look directly at him and
then look at the other.officers surrounding him.
At that time,
Compton made a lunging/reaching motion into the passenger area of
his vehicle.
Believing that Compton was reaching for a weapon,
SAl
Ishouted words to the effect, “He’s going for it”.
Immediately after SAL
Istatement, SAl
I as well as
three task force members opened fire on Compton.

When the gunfire ceased, a determination was made that
Compton was no longer mobile and an immediate request was made for
medical assistance.
Paramedics of the Phoenix Fire Department
determined that Compton was dead at which time the Phoenix Police
Department took over the investigation.

I

I

On 08/08/2000, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the metina with the fol1cwing voting members of the SIRG
in attendance:f
Chief Inspector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division; I
I, Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, tJSDOJ;
Donald J. Bartrxik, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Divisiofl;I
I Unit Chief,
NS-2B, National Security Division, SSA I
L Undercover
and Sensitive Operations Unit, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;l
I Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
IJr., Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; SSAI
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit,
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSAI
I Program Manager, Practical Applications
Unit, Training Division; and, ssal
Washington Field
Office.
The only nonvoting member present was
Management/Program Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

[

Savage- 1752
5

 4

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271898-D, 08/14/2000

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations.
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
During the discussion of this shooting incident, SIRG
members unanimously opined that the use of deadly force by
law enforcement officers was justified and in conformance with the
deadly force policy.
By letter dated 04/26/2000, a declination of
prosecution was issued b
I Special Assistant
County Attorney, Office of the Maricopa County Attorney in
Phoenix, Arizona. Additionally, by letter dated 07/10/2000, the
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, provided a
declination of prosecution regarding this shooting incident.
Observations made by_members of the SIRG was the fact
that neither SAl
hr SAl
I were wearing body armor during
this incident and that no FBI Supervisor was present on the scene
during the arrest of a subject prone to violence.
These
observations will be brought to the attention of the Special Agent
in Charge of the Phoenix Division.

Savage-i 753
6

 I

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297—HQ-A1271898-D, 08/14/2000

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON.

DC

That no administrative action be taken against
las a result ot his involvement in this
shooting incident.

SAl

Savage-i 754
7

 (12131/199:)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 09/13/1999

Inspection Division

Prom:

Attn:

Inspection Dvision
Contact:

Approved By:

WileyD. Thompson III

7
1x
iTh3

Thompson Wiley
Cordier Robert

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

297-HQ-A1271781-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
01/27/1999
NEWARK DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident
shooting incidept that occurred Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
n the Newark Division on
01/27/1999.
SAl
three rounds of rifle slug from I of the New York Division, fired
a Remington 870 shotgun while
attempting to assist local
authorities in the capture of an
escaped Bengal tiger.
SIRG members reCom!pPflC1Pc tht no
adnjnjstratjve action
be taken against sAl
las a result of
his involvement in this shoo
ting incident.
Reference:
Report of Assistant Special Agen
t in Charge (ASAC)
Garey S. Chin, dated 02/2
5/1999.
Details:
This communication was prepared
to furnish the
analysis, comments and recomme
ndations 9
f the SIRG with reference
to the captioned shooting.

1
2

Mr.
m. 7142
Mr.
Rm. 7116
(1
Mr. (ousins, Room 5155)
2
Mr.,I
’’om 7427
1
,—
(1
Ms.
Room
(J- Mr. Cordier, Room 7837 7326)
1
Ms. Ginsburg DOJ
(Attention: I
1
Mr. Biehi, D
1
Mx. orn, Room 6646
-

2

-

-

-

-

-

I

-

-

-

I

Mr. Midleton. Rqom 4042
MrI
(1
j
Mr.
QUax5tico
Mr.
IWFO
Mr.
Room 3787P
Mrs
Room 7861
-

1
1
1
1

-

-

-

4:)

 .4

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781-]J, 09/13/1999
Details of the Shooting Snoident

I

This incident was predicated on a phone call
received
by Donald L. Perusi, the Acting ASAC
(A/ASAC) for the. New Yor,k
C)ffir (jYo), on the
afternoon of 01/27/1999. S2
I
lDf the NYO’s Special Operations Group (SO
Aviati.on fjnit
Located at the Lakehurst, New Jersey
(NJ), Naval Air Station
advised A/ASAC Perusi that he had recei
ved a request from the
Jackson, NJ, Township Police Department (JTPD
) for aerial
assistance in a search for a tiger that
had been sighted roaming
free in the area bordering Six Flags Great
Adventure Safari Theme
Park in NJ. A/ASAC Perusi advised
Si!
Ito provide the
requested aerial assistance to the JTPD
and
to
also request that
a liaison officer from the JTPD ride with
the SOG contingent to
faqilit-M communications between each
agency. He also advised
SA I
Ito notify the Red Bank Resident Agenc
Division, that the New York Division would have y, Newark
an aircraft
working on this matter in the vicinity
of Great Adventure,
A/ASAC Perusi inquired about the availability of
the
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) equipp
ed aircraft and after being
advised that it had not returned from mainte
nance, he instructed
that a helicopter be used until the
FLIR became available.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. • that evening, the
helicopter returned to the Lakehurst facil
ity at the samç time
the FLIR aircraft returne
jntenaflce.
Patrolman I
I
I
I of the JTPD and SA
aircraft and
returned to the search site. S
lao
volunteered to drive to the searc site wit
case ground communication problems were incu a ureau radio in
rred with the
aircraft.
Thig w later determined to be an
excellent decision
because sAl
rovided a vital communications link when the
JTPD radio went out approximately one hour
after their arrival on
site.

54
jias the Pilot in Command (PlC) of the FLIR
aircraft and was assisted by SAl
land
Investigative Specialist-Aviation (ISA)!
un trying
to ascertain the location of the tiger. Groun
very difficult due to the area under observati d observation was
on
combination industrial and residential area inter being a
spersed with
heayv thicket. Almost immediately upon arriv
ing at the site,
ISA!
Iverified the tiger’s location via the
This
infgxnation was relayed to law enforcement officFLIP-.
ers at the
command post on the ground which was bjig
to position the
various ground units at the scene. Ground used
communications
2

 M

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781-D, 09/13/1999

established by the JTPD ceased functioni
ng and an alternate
ground communication link was estab
lished using SAt
Iho
assumed the role of ground coordina
tor with local authorities.
With the tiger’s location being ascertain
ed, the local
authorities attempted to tranquilize
the animal without success
on several occasions. Fearing that
the animal would move into a
nearby heavily populated residentia
l area, the local authorities
decided to euthanize the tiger.
This decision was facilitated
with the onset of fog moving into
this location. A plan was
devised whereby various elements of the
available ground
personnel would flush the tiger out of
the
wooded area toward an
open space where shooters perched atop
woodpiles could fire
toward the animal as he exited the
woods.
SAl
lentered the woods with the team that would
flush the tiger toward the open spac
e. His primary function was
to provide radio communications for
the team and to ensure that
this contingent did not walk into
a crossfire situation with
those “shooters on the woodpiles.”
as provided with
an 870 Remington shotgun with rifle SN
sJ.ug ior his own. protection
by a member àf the Fish and Wildlife Depart
ment who was present.
After one pass throuah he woods,
and while he was standing in an
open space, SAl
Jobserved the tiger
woods directly toward himself and one New to walk out of the
Jersey Sta
Realizing that he had a clear shot
at the animal, SAl
I
sqieezed off one round and the tiger
fell to the ground.
SA________ fired a second and third
round at the tiger which
quickly scampered back into the woods
.
Iwas certain
c
that he hit the tiger with his first and SAl
third rounds.
The FLIR-equipped aircraft located the tiger
in a
stationary position in the woods and
rire
cted
SAl
the
ground personnel toward the tigex’s locat
ion.
bN
I
entered the wooded area as part of the
entry team which would
verify whether the tiger was dead or
alive. With the use of
night vision goggles being utilized by
a fellow FBI Agent, the
tiger was located from a distance. Fear
ing
be alive, a decision was made to fire seve that he might still
tiger to ensure the safety of law enforcem ral shots into the
Inasmuch as he was in a position to fire ent personnel.
at the animal’s spinal
column, SAL
I fired one round of slug into this area of the
tiger with a second weapon, a Remington 1100
which had been
provided to him. At 10:45 p.m., that
evening, it was determined
that the tiger was dead and his remains were
removed from the
woods.
3

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781-]D, 09/13/1999

On 08/03/1999, the SIRG met to discuss
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief the
Inspector Robert
J. Cordier, Office of Inspections, Inspectio
the meeting with the following voting memb n Division, chaired
ers of the SIRG in
attendance; Dana 0. Bieh]., Deputy Sectio
n Chief, Terrorism atd
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division,
I
Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOUSDOJ,1
J; Patrick 3. Foran,
Section Chief, Personnl Assistanoe 1
Sect3
o
, Administrative
Services Division; SAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the Genera
l Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section 1
Chief Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative D±vision;I
I Unit Chief,
Fireartnq Training Unit., Training Division (TD) ;i
I
Unit Chie
I
1 Section
NS-2,
Nati
onal
ruriu Division;
Unit Chief, Firearms
TooJ.rnarks
c
a
is ection, Laboratory Division;
and,
Supervisor, Washington Field Office,
The
only nonvoting member present wasi
I Program and
Management Analyst, Office of Inspections, Insp
ection Division.
-

-

-

Obaervations and. Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the applicati
on of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analy
sis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective
actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recomm
endations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide
recommendations for administrative action
if deemed necessary.
The SIRG members unanimously agreed that the escaped
tiger represented a serious danger to socie
ty in general, and
particularly to the law enforcement authoriti
es attempting his
capture.
The SIRG determined that
luse of deadly
N
force was justified.
From a safety and training perspective, however, it
was
determined that there were inadequate precautio
nary safety
measures employed upon the assignment of personnel
to this
situation.
The SIRO determined that the SAs who responded to
this search scene should have arrived in pose
ssion of the
appropriate weapons which would have provided for
considering the imminent dnger presented by the their welfare
tiger.
The SIRG
believed that SAl
Iparticipation in this event, armed
with only his Glock 27 firearm, was problematic.
His need tO
borrow shotguns from other agencies to provide for
his safety was
4

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A127171.-D, 09/13/1999

evidence of inadequate planniñg and preparation
on his part, and
it raised concerns of management oversight
of this situation once
acquiescing to the request for assistance from the
Jackson
Township Police Department.
For the information of all managers and supervisors
within the NYO, it should be emphasized that
prior
commitment of manpower and resources toward situatioto the
ns whiàh lack
any discernible federal law enforcemert nexus,
there is a need
for the division to obtain FBIHQ approval for
the, commitment of
these resources and expenditure of appropriated
funds toward
these. non-Federal matters. This approval proces
s can be
facilitated through telephone calls to the appropriate
substantive investigative unit at FBIHQ which will
coordi
request with the Office of General Counsel (OGC) to ensurenate the
proper
use of appropriated funds.
To expedite this approval process, the SIRG recommended
that the Administrative Law Unit, OGC, establish
process and
form by which this approval can be expedited, and awhere
appropriate, can be coordinatàd with the Department of
Justice.

5

 p

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781.-D, 09/13/1999

LEAD

Cs):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
t

SAl
shooting incident

ministrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this

Set Lead 2:
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That the Administrative Law Unit, OGC, devise a form
and protocol by which field divisions can expeditiously receive
FBIHQ approval for the commitment of personnel and resources
toward operational situations which lack any federal jurisdiction
but to which local or state law enforcement depaxtments reques
t
FBI involvement and/or resolution.

6

 _________Iir

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Date: 09/17/1999
Attn:

Inspection Df1.rn
Contact:

Approved By:

Wiley D. Thompson III
cion 1837

‘Jhompson Wiley D XZX
Cordier Robert

Drafted By:
Case ID

It:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTIIG ENd DENT
02/17/1999
M.IAM DI’YISION

297-HQ-A1271748-D

Synopsis: The Shpoting Incident Review Goup (S’ER) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Miam Division on
02/17/1999.
Supexvisory Special Agent (SS)I
I
unintentionally discharged his Smith and Wesson Model 1076, while
jn the process of securing ti wpQn at his residence.
SIRG
mtnbers recommended that SSA I
Ibe censured and suspended from
duty for a period of three days. as we1.. as receiv remedial
firearms training.
Reference:
Reference report of Special Agent (sz.)L
1
dated 06/08/1999, and his Electronic. communication to the Office
of Professional Responsibility (OPR). FBThQ, dated 05/24/1999.
Details:
This communication was prepared to uinish the
analysis, cotnmnts and recommendations of the SXRG with reference
to the captioned shooting.
1

2

-

Mr.I
Mr.I

jRm. 7142
I Rin. 7116
Mr. Cousins, Room 51:55)
(1
Mr.I
1 Room 7427
(1 - Ms. I
I Room 7326)
MU
I Rm. 7129
Attention: Adjudication Unit
Mr. Cordier, Room 7837
Ms. Ginsburg, DOJ
(1-.Ms.I______
Mr. Biehi, poi
(1-Nt.D.I
I
Mr. Foran, Room 646
(?ttention: Mr.J_________
-

2

-

1

-

1
2
2
2

-

-

-.

-

2
1
1
1

-

-

Mr. MidçPt4n. oom 4042
(1-Ms.!
I
2uantico
Mr.!
WFO
Mr.!
Mrs_________ Room 7861

 r

To:
Re

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ--A1271748-D, 09/17/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

The underlying substantive investigation was predica
ted
on source information received by the Miami
Division which
resulted in SASI
Jeonducting
r
a preliminary investigation at a Iand
residence located in 4iami,
Florida,
The SAs were accompanied by three representatives from
the Florida Power and Light (FPL) Utility Compa
ny.
Source
information indicated that the residence was being
utilized as a
“Grow Hous&’ to harvest il].ega-l drugs. The FPL
representatives
were conducting a lawful, cursory investigation involv
ing the
theft of power from their company by the resident
at the same
Miami address.
While the foregoing investigators discussed their
initial findings across the street from the resid
nce, an unkno
whit m1 ited from this house and walked toward
SA4_________
andi
I As the white male walked towards them, t1e SAs
identified themselves and the individual immediately
began to
retreat back toward his house. As he did so, he
indicated that
if the SAs did not remove themselves from his proper
ty he would
“sic” his dog on them.
The man opened the gate to a large privacy fence
surrounding the property and a large pit bull dog emerge
d and
instantly charged at the SAs, who were standing near
the front
sidewalk area.
SAl
lattempted to dissuade the dog by
yelling commands; 1iowever, the dog 4
cont
e
d
in to change.
Fearina
for his safety as well as the safety of S?j
I
produced his Bureau-issued handgun and fired. two rounds
at tiae
charging dog.
The dog immediately retreated and the subject re
entered the residence. Subsequent ipr 1atI
revealed that
the dog was hit by one round from s
eapon and died
from the wound.

t

The area was immediately flooded by additional
as well as other law enforcement personnel and a perime FBI SAs,
ter was
established.
The United States t
Attorney Office (USAO),
s
Southern District of Florida, gave oral authorization for
law
enforcement personnel to arrest the occutt of the house
who was
identified asf
I Additional contact
with the USAO resulted in a search warrant being issued
for the
residence which confirmed that the house was being utiliz
ed in
the manufacturing and distribution of controlled substan
ces.
On 0/l4/l999, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inspec
tor
2

I

 To:
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Inspection Division From: Inspection Divi
sion
297-HQ-A1271748-O, 09/17/1999

Robert J. Cordier, Office of Inspectio
ns, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following votin
g members of the SIRG
in attendance:I
ITrial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Divisio
n, USDOJ;
L Trial 1
[1
Attorney Civil Rights Division, US]JOJ;
1 UnLt Chief. Transfer Unit, Administ
rative
Services Division; SSAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the Genera
l Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section ch
-t-4 sryl
Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
lUnit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division
;I
I
Unit Chief, NS-2A Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security
Division; a.nd,I
I Supervisor, Wshinctton Field
Office.
The only nonvoting member present wasi
I
Program and Management nalyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident
with
the intent to (1) evaluate the applicati
on of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative
analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective
actions from an
operational standpoint (if any)
(3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
The SIRG members unanimouly agreed that the use
of
deadly force by
Jwas justified and in
N
conformance with the current deadly force polic
y.
The only observation regarding this
comments by the Training Division representa incident involved
tive who advised that
firearms records indicated that SAl
Ihad
twice with his issued weapon during Fiscal Year only qualified
1998, as opposed
to the required quarterly qualification.
This matter will be
brought to the attention of the SAC of the
Miami Division.

3

6

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division F-om:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 09/17/1999

LEAD Cs);

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION IDIVISION

AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no açlministrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

4

L..

 _____as

I”..”

_________________

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
?recedence:
To:

Inspection Division

From:

Date: 08/17/1999

ROUTINE
Attn:

Wiley D. Thompson III

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted

Extenion 1837

Thompson Wiley P III
Cordier Robert

By:

Case XD #:
Title:

297-HQ-A1271699-D

ADMINISTR2J.TIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
02/17/1999
LAS VEGAS DIVISION

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incidept that occurred in the Las Vegas Division on
02/17/1999.
S
If ired one round from his Bureau
issued Glock Model 22, .40 ca1iber pistol at a known “Armed and
Dangerous” fugitive during his attempted arrest. SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken aga.inst
a result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Synopsis:

I

Report of SuperVisory Special Agent (SSZ)
dated 05/28/1999.

Rfrnqe:

I

I

Details: This communication was prepared to furnLsh the
analysis, comments and recommendations of the SIRG witb reference
to the captioned shooting.

1
2

-

-

-

2
2.
I
2.
I

-

-

Mrj
m. 7142
Mrj
I Rm. 7116
(1 - Mr. CoUsins, Room 5155)
Mr. Thomoson. Im. 7825
Mr. I
IRqom 7427
I Room 7326)
(1 - Ms. I
Mr. Cordier, Room .7837
Ms. Ginsburg, DOJ
(Attention:
Roy Austin)
Mr. Biëhl, DOJ
Mr. Foran, Room 6646

2

1
1
I

-

-

-

Mr. Middleton,_1?oom 4042
I
(1-Mr.I
jQuantico
Mr.

Mr.1

Room 3787F
Mr.I
Mr__________ Room 7863.

I

 To:
Re:

:Enspection Division From: Inspection Divi
sion
297-HQ-A1271699-D, 08/17/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

Special Agent (sA)I
I was assigned to the
Reactive Squad in the Las Vegas Division
.
His
duties consited
of periodically assisting the Crim
a multi-jurisdictional task force inal Apprehension Team (CATS),
com
local off ice.rs from the Las Vegas Metrprised of FBI Agents arid
the North Las Vegas Police Department opolitan Police Department,
and the Henderson Police
Department with fugitive apprehension
1
s.
In the early evening of 02/17/1999,
SAl
Sergeani
iwere conducting a sço snreii1ançe of
the residence of the spouse of local fugit
ive,i
I
I
Iwas wanted for Parole Violation tor Robbery
as well as having outstanding warrants
for the charges of
Burglary and Grand Theft. It shou
ld be noted that the subject’s
National Crime Information Center wanted
persons notice indicated
that he was
escape risk” nd sergeant!
I had been
advised by Cali.fornia authoxities thati
Fhould be
considered “Armed and Dangerous”.

land

Diiring the course of the investigation, informati
on, was
obtained thati
I may be located in an apartment i,n
Las Vegas.
Sergeant I
I who had
ainted hijnsel.f with
the past criminal record of the suviect. acqu
had keen nfak:ing periodic
checks at the Las Vegas residence.I
Iwi:fe. who resLded
at this apartme.izt, had been contacted
6
by Sergeant
ito
enlist her cocpeation in the capture of bet
b70
usbarzd, however,
she declined to assist law enforcem
ent authorities in this
nfanner.

I

I

As s1
and Sergeant I
I were conducting the
‘spot surveillance o the residence, the
subject and his spouse
arrived at the residence whch resulted
in t
zlat ion of an
oral arrest plan. Sergeant I
and S.
drov
e to the
I
north a!j.ey behind this residence wnen they
Vehicle behind them also entering the alley no iced another
1979 Forçl Fairmcnt gray in color, with no . The vehicle was a
license plates. s
Sergeàntl
Ipufled his unmarked vehicle into the parking
area, he noticed the other ‘ebic
was
ing into the paxking
space nex to his. The occupantsleof theback
car were observed to be
a Hisnanip male arid female with several smal
l chldren. Both
I andi
Inoted that the male closely resembled the
fugitive I
s he e.ited
vehicle and walked toward the
reiousiv identi,fied apartTiet the
esidé
nce and entered with
I
Eel1ow’jq shortly ‘after
ot 1ocang hi in the
s.
apartment, I
lalerted SA
Ithati
Ihad exited
2

 ___If

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspectio
n Division’
297-.HQ-A1271699-D, 08/17/1999

through the back door of the re8id
ence and both investigators
began to search for him in the dark
pess to the rear qf this
location. From a 1
distance sAl
Ispottedi
Icrouched
down behind a junk pile, noting
that he was discernable because
of the light-colore
lothinq he was wearing. The investi
gators
decided to approach
roin sepa
attempt to corner him in to his locat rate directions in an
ion.
As SAl
Ihurried arou
apartment çomolex. hç heard what nd to the south side of the
he thought were three gunshots,
as well açl
Iyelling several commands forl
Ito
stop. SAl
Ihelci his position and
darkness on tae south side of the comupon peering into tbe
plex, he suddenly saw
I
Ihurriedly moving out of the darkened
a.Uey in a crouched
position, not wearing his light-co
lore
shir
d
ntinit. to
t,
1
aye
move toward hi.s position. ,ot bein
I hands
because of the darkness, cognizant g. able to seel
. of
reputation and the likelihood of his his armed and dangerous
fearing for his life bcaise of the carrying a weapon, and
three 9unshots which he
previously beard, sz L
I orderedi
I to stop. I
I
ignored these commands and S2.I
I believing he posed an
imminent danger, fired oze zond from
his weapon ad
Iwbo
continued to rn past him and towa
rd the front of his residence.

I

I

heard SA I
)onimands and his gunshot and
he quickly joined with him and
radioed for additional police
assistance. I
‘was subseque
apartment residence, hiding hims ntly located within his
elf_within a closet area.
He
was not injured as a result of
SI
Ishot at him.
-

On 08/03/1999, the
mêt to discuss the above
captioned shooting &ncident. SXRG
Acting cb.ief Inspector Robert J.
Cordier, Office of Inspections,
.meeting with the fol:lowing votin Inspection Division, qhaired the
g
attendance: Dana 0. Die1l, Depu members of the S-RG in
Violent Cr-ijnes Section, Crimina). ty Section Chief, Terrorism an
I
Trial Attorney, Civ1 Rights DiviDivision, USDOJ;I
, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foxa,
Section Chief, Personn1 Asistansion
e SctAon, Aaminist
rative
Services Division; SSAI
I L5ga1
vice and
Txaining, Legal Policy, Office of the
Genera.). Counsel; Ier.bet
Cousins, Jr., Section Chief, Oper
ation
al Support Section,
Crimi.nal Investigative Division;I
IJTflht rhif
Firearms Traiiing Unit-, Txaining
Division (TD) ;I
I
Chief, ZS-2D Unit, Global Section --NS
-2, Nationa.).
Security DiisjoniI
Unjt chief, Firearms ToOlmarks Unift. 5eenti.fie An&i-ysi I,Sect
ion, Laboratory Division;
s
andj
I Supervisor, Washington Field Office. The
3

 I.
To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspectio
n Division’
297-HQ-A1271699-D, 08/17/1999

only non-voting member present wa
Management Analyst, Office of Insp
ectio

I Program and
ns, Inspection Division.

Observations and Recommendations of the
SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsize
d incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the applicati
on
of
dead
ly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evalu
ative
and recommendations for corrective actio analysis, observations,
ns from an operational
standpoint (f any); (3) provide recomme
ndations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and
provide recommendations
(4)
for administrative action if deemed nece
ssary.
ST mmh nmously
agreed that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justLfied and in conformance with
the FBI’s deadly force policy.

‘ihe observations made by members of the
SX1.G pertained
to the use of probationary agents on
CATS. Members comn3ented that the FBI,certain task forces such as
enforcement agencies, iflcurs difficultyas well as other law
in getting expexienced
agents and officers to participate in task
forces and this
results in the use of inexperienced
agen
ts
in
some instances. As
part of +4ie t-h -tion, members note
d
that
neith
er s21
Sergeant I
kztUized ther ballistic protectiv vests. br
Members op&ned that both of ficers
s.bould have treated this
situation as more than a routine surv
eillance. Additiona.lly, the
off.icers should not have separated from
each other during tbeir
approach upon I
Isince a one-on-one scenario is not
conducive to officer safety. SXRG memb
for all task force personnel to be prov ers emphasized the need
ided with basic street
srvi-a.L training, if this had not
alxeady been done.

4

 c
To:
Re:

]nspevtion Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271699-D, 08/17/1999

Set Lead

.:

INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WA$RTNGTOM, D. C.

ThM ne !mnistrativ action
be taken against
s a result of his, involvement in this
shoot.ng .ncdent.

SAl

S

 )
(12t3U1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 09/28/1999

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

Wiley 0. Thompson III

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID :
Title:

ension

TJompson Wi.Iey
Cordier Robert J

1837

I
297-HQ-A1271748-D

ADMThISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
02/26/1999
M.INI DXVISION

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Reriew
Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the
Miami Division on
02/26/1999.
One Supero-isory Special Agent
Agents (SAs) ti-red numerous rounds at a bank(SSA) and five Special
robbery suspect
attempting to evade arrest. SXRG members
recommended that no
administrative action be taken agai.nst any
of the individuals
involved in this shooting incident
Reference: Report of Assistant Special
Agent in Charge
Thomas E. Bush, XIX, dated 05/25/1999.

lb

Details: This commcznication was prepared
to furnish the
analysis, comments and recommendations
of
the
SXRG with reference
to the captioned shooting.

1

-

2

-

2

-

MrJ

Rm. 7142

Mn_________ Rut. 716

(3.
Mr. Cousins, Room 5155)
Mr.
IRom 7427
(1
IRoom 7326)
Ms.1
Mr. Corther, Room 7837
Ms. Gfns”-’-’ nt-J
(3.
Ms.
I
Mr. Biehi, DOJ
-

-

3.
2

-

2

-

2

-

-

-

(1-Mr.I

I

Mr. Foran, oom bbb
(Attentio
Mr. Djckerson

2
1
I
1

-

-

Mr. Middleton,_RoomS 4042
(1-Ms.I
I
Mrj
uaatico
Mr.[
IWFO
Mrdi
I Room 7861

 K

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: xnspectid
n Division
297-}IQ-A1271748-D, 09/28/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

Subsequent to a bank robbery that occurred
on
02/17/1999, bank surveillance phot
ographs were obtained and aired
on a loca:L television station’s
crim
anonymous tip was received identifyi e 8tOPper program. An
ngI
las the
individual depicted i.n these photogra
phs. Based on this tip and,
a fql.liw-nn investigation, a Fede
ral arrest warrant was issued
fort
Ion 02/23/1999.

I

West Palm Beach Resident Agency Case Agentl
I
Iwas contacted by an attorney who put
him in contact with
an individual who indicated tt )‘
possibly be able to
assist in the nnrhendpn ofi
I
Acco
rding to the
source, he andi
I had resided at the same residence in the
past but had remained telephnical1v
i contact with each othex.
The source also advised thati
paranQid
believed his phone was bugged, and didJwas extremely 1
not want to meet with
anyone since he knew he was wanted for bank
robbery.

On 02/26/1999, the source contacted
SJ
I
flutrci: t.iptes to report his telepione
contaat. with Jzhe subject.
SA I
I briefed his supe
rl
and
requested that several Agentsrviso
remain in tne t.esiaent Ikgency on
standby to assist with the possible
rrest of I
I 2?.t
approximately 7:00 p.m., SAl
ldvised ne source hot
to
contact him again unless he could estab
lish a personal meeting
withi
I He then alerted his supervisor of his actions
an told his fe.llow SAs to standdown
for the evening.
At approximately 7.:iS p.m., while en route
to his
residence, SI
Iw qed by the sour
ce
who
state
d that he
had been advised byl
Ito gq
in West Pa1i Beach, Florida, and to to the Publix Shopping Center
cáll hirn from a pay phone.
SAF
Icontacted the SAs original:ly briefed on the
matter
and wtio had remained on standby earl
ier
these SAs and his Supervisor to meet him that evening. He advised
located near the shopping center to deve at a Mobi:ie Gas Station
lop an arrest plan should
th meetinq occur between the soxrce
and the.subject.
SAl
I also notified the Palm Beac
about the situation and requested that h County Sheriff’s Office
thçy reápond to the area
for back-up purposes.

SAl

flron the arrival of the arrest team
members,

ladvised them of the location of the possible
meeting
and also advised them that the subject
was arnned and dangerous.
He provided photographs otl
land a descriptiQn of the
2

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 09/28fl99

vehicle thatl
iwas believed to be operating. The six
Agents orally developed a plan for the subjec
t’s arrest. It was
later determined that this oral plan was
misund
erstood by several
of the Agents involved in the shooting
inciden
t.
Three of the
Agents stated that the arrest was to take
place outside a nearby
McDona.d’s Restaurant, while three others believe
d that the
arrest should occur within the restaurant.
At approximately 9:00 p.m. after waiting for
1
for a considerable period, the source unexpectedly
departe
d the
McDonald’s Restaurant and was observed using a nearby
pay phone.
Shortly thereafter, the source wal
ilitary Trail and
entered a green Nissan Maxima. Sip.
had a view of
the vehicle, identified the driver as
other units of the identification and advised theiHe advised the
to foUow the
sub:iect’s vehicle.

;,

I

Two Agents fol:lowed the individuals as they procee
ded
north on Military Trail and.subsequently turned
Bay Apartment Complex where the source was known into the Cotton
they arrived at the source’s reSidence, the sourceto reside. As
vehicle and the subject proceeded through the complexited the
apparent to the qents that the subject was aware ex. It became
of their
surveillance. I
legan to drive erratically as the Agents
followed him into a rectangular shaped parking area
apartment complex. The subject’s vehicle proceeded within the
parking area and stopped. Two other Agents stoppe around the
in a position hhinc the subject’s vehicle and tookd their vehicle
positions of
cover. SAl
I who was driving his vehicle with
SA
las a passenger, stopped his vehicle in a
pos,.tion which blocked the forward progress of the
subject’s
vehicle.

Both SAs!
lanaI
lexited their BUreau
vehicle, hôutina vzbal commands to the subject wen
they
obserijRI
lointing a handqun, first at, SAl
land then
at S1j
L After SAl
houted t.hatj
I had a
gun, both Agents fired thezr wennr
th bject. The subject
reversed his vehiclq toward SAsI
I and
I
I which prompted ss
round of buckshot from his shotgun fron his positaoIto fire one
n on the
passenger side of the subject’s vehicle.
from his posi,tion of coyer behind a tree, N
a’so r.rea one rouna at
the subject. I
Iauic4v gtopnd his vehicle and started
forward toward SAsI
landi
I. As he procee
them, both SAe fired the&r handguns. As he sObeçtded towards
sped out of
the parking area, he drove directly at SAl
Iwho fired an
3

c

 ________________i

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 09/28/1999

additional

round at the
apartment complex.

subject.I

Isped out of

the

Following a brief search for the
results, the Agents returned to the scene subject with negative
of the shooting and
secured the area for the local Sheriff’s Offic
e.
It was subsequently learned that the subj
ect had been
apprehended on 03/01/1999, by members of the
West Palm Beach
Police Department, following a shooting incid
ent with that

agency.

This incident was origial-ly discussed by the SRG
on
08/03/1999, with the following members prese
nt: Acting Chief
Inspector Robert J. Cordier, Office of Insp
ections, :tnspeotion
Di’vision; Dana 0. Biehi, Deputy Section Chie
f, Terrnm nd
‘Yiolent Crimes Section, Criminal DiYision,
USDOJ; I
Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran,
Section Chief, 1
Personng
‘pn, Administrative
Services Division; ssAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Pol.icy, Office of the Genera
l Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Ch’
al Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;
firearms Training Unit, Training D.vzsion
Unit Chief WS-’2D tJnt Global Section
NS-2, National Security
Division;
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks
Unt
.c
a ys.s ection, Laboratory Division; and,
Supervisor, W
hinaton E9Id Of fce. The only
9
non-votzng member present was
Management Analyst, Of floe of 1nspect.ons, J.nsp Program and
ection Division.

I

-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the appl:ication of
deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative
analysis,
observations; and recommendations for corrective
actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recotnm
andations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and
(4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if
deemed necessary.
The SIRG members nanimously agreed that the
use of
deadly force by all of the SAs involved in this
incident was
justified and in conformance with the current
deadly force
pol.icy.
4

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:. Xnsp
ection Division
297-HQ-A1271748-D, 09/28/1999

SIRG members expreèsed certain
reservations about the
lack of a written operationa
l plan, noting that the oral
discussion of the arrest scen
ario resulted in certain conf
among several of the Agen
ts involved. STRG members note usion
d
the oral briefing did not prov
ide fo any alternative arrethat
scenario if it were not to occu
st
McDonald’s Restaurant. The SIRGr within/near the aforementioned
also raised certain issues
regarding the failure of any
of the involved SAn or SSA to
telephonical-ly alert executive
management of the Miami Div
as to their possible arrest
of a violent sub:ject that even ision
The SIRO members decided to
ing.
tabl
recommendations of the SAC, Miame this matter until the
L, could be obtained regarding
this shooting incident.
On 09/14/1999, the
regarding this incident. ActiSI.RG held final djscussions
ng Chief Inspector
Robert J. Cordier, Office of Insp
chaired the meeting with the fo]j. ections, Inspection Division,
owing voting members of the
in attendance: I
S!RG
ITr
ial.Attozney, Terrorism and
Violent (!rini ‘ion,
Crminal Division, USD
[
I ria1 Attorney, Cicfi1 Righ OJ;.
ts Division, USDOJ;
1
IUnt Chiefs Transfer Unit, Adminis
trative
Services DiVision; SSAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Pol.cy, Office
of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chie
f, Operational Support Section,
Crminal. Investigative Div•ision
;I
I Unit cthif.
Firearms Training Unit, Training
Div
isio
n;l
Unit Chief, S-2A Unit, Global
I
S-2, National Security
Division; and,I___________ Section
__ Siperviscr, shincton Field
Office. The only nonvoting mem
Program and Management Analyst, ber present was [
Off ice of Inspections, Iflspeôtion
Division.
-

Based upon the review of an BC dated
O/2SI1999 wlerein
the SAC, Miami advised that
I
regarding.poper notificatio he had cotznsled SSAI
n procedures and the necessity for
written and comprehensive oper
ation
scenarios within the division, the s plans for all arrest
pertinent issues had been approp StRG Board determined that al;l
riately raised and resolved. As
such, the Board confirmed its prev
ious decision that the
foregoing shooting was an appr
opria
te employment of the FBI’s
deadly force policy by all Agen
ts involved in this incident.

S

 )1

TO:

ReV:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ—A1271748-D, 09/28/3.999

LRAD (s):
Set Iead 3.:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHNGTONI DC
rpK4.

1flcdent.

1b7c

‘
n
4
istrative action be taken against

Ic

I

•

wpll

q

rand
I as a result o their ito1vemerit in this shooting

 ______________I

1D4O4(Ty. 12.1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMJ!NT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigalion

Copyto:

XIP
J AXlP
Marcfl 2, :L999

Dtq:

CaseEDEi

I

Office:

New York

297-HQ-2l27i781 SUB D
SHOOTING INCIDENT
2/28/99
NEW’ARK DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synpsis:

cbpobing’ occurred during the arrest of I
I
I
I a forty-two year old maze who oerated Mark I
Video Productions tzçm his hçme,I
1 New
r4ueord, New Jersey. I
Iwas the subject of an
Innocent Inlages Task Force assigned to the Newark
Division Franklin Township Resident Agency (FTRA),
1
located in Somerset, New Jersey. Members of the arxest
tean included four Special Agents of the Newark Division,
one investigator from the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s
Of ficè, one Sergeant and one DeCectie from the Somerset
County Prosecutor’s Office and two officers from the
Bridgewater Police Department.
Thc

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By way of background, Special Agent (SA)I
I acting i an undercover capacity, logged onto
Jnijjt Online asl
I (herein referred too as
I
L a 14 year old girl from New Jersey. lhi.1ê in the
“barely legal 1
N” chat robm, an indrMii1. iii5r
the screen name
iniiated eht withj
subsequent.ly identi.
indicated an
interest in meeting
for the purpose of engaging in
oi1 activieies.
uring subsequent chat sessions,
I
Iciescrjbed in detail what’he intended to do tiatincr
that he had a black Ford van with a fold down bed. I
sent pictures qf th9 black Fordvan and of himse3f which
showed him holding hi nnj. During these sessions,
I
lagreed to nieetl
bit Sjinday 2/28/98, 11:00 am at
the Bridgewater Sports Arena (BSA), Bridgewater, New

-.

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Thia do ut contafrs nelthet reccrocndatIccs nor conclusions of the FBI. it is the
prpety of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; iteM its cctcnts are not to be distrihted ,tsi ypur agency.

 _______I’ehic1e.

4

V

297-HQ-A127:L78. SUB D

Jersey.
In anticipation of the 2/28/99 meeting witIl
Land
arrest of I
ISAI
Iprepared an operation order, in the
form of an electronic communication (BC), dated 2/25/99.
This BC
was reviewed and anxoved by Supervisory Senior Resident
Agent
(SSRA)I
J FT.RA, and Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) GARPY S. CaIN, of the Nwrk Djvisjoh. AU participants
in. the anticipated arrest of I
Iwere present during a 9:00am
briefing on 2/28/99 at the ?TRA. A copy of the 2/25/98 BC
was
provided to each participating rn.ember of the arrest team and
individual assignthents in con:junction with the execution of the
arrest plan were_discussed. Members of the arrest team receive
d
photographs o
land his .vhicle, a black conversion van.
At aproimately 10: :1<5 a .m., the arrsC team arrived at
the BSA and assumed positions in their vehicles as discussed
during the 9:00 a.m. briefing. Xc was raining on this day with
intermittent periods of drizzle and heavy rain, At approximatel
y
11:35 a.m., a van fitting the description of the vehiclel
I
indicated he would be driving, entered the one-way drive entrance
to the BSA. SAl
I notified the fh 11rritS by radio that
the van was approaching the BSA. Asi
Ivehicle approached
vehicles with arrest team members moved in to block
vehicle from escape. A vehicle driven by SAl
I
ith SAl
las nassenger, was placed
perpen
ci in front of I
Sergeant
Ivehicle
(Sgt.)
v h3.cle he was driving
with Detective Det.
as passenger, behind SA
I
Ivehicle,
e. A vehicle driven by
Investigator (Xxiv.)
with no passenger, was
positioned to the dr.vers si e re
vehicle. SA
I driving with SA
s passenger, positioned
•his vehicle to the passenger side rear

inv.I
I exited hs vehiie and approached
Iat the dive.’s side window. XnvI
idisplayed

his Middlesex County
Qffic badge, worn on a chain
around his neck. Xxiv.’
1onfjrmed the driver was
I who ha both hands on the steering wheel and was loqkin
out the wixdshie1d toward the right side of the vehicle. 11w. g
Iknocked on the window and opened the driver’s door,
placing onç foot on tie running boar4 of th vehicle. lxiv.
Isaidl
Igrabêd the gear
J, at which time I
shift as I
Welled “put it in park; put it in park.”
jvehicle .luñed backwards, theii forward. The fOrcäd
motion orced the driver’s door to close as Xxiv. I
Ifeil
off the running board and away from the vehicle. While this was
-

2

 •

297-HQ-IU.271781 SUB D

occurring, other membrs of the aFest te exited the4x_vehicles
to take assigned positions aroundi
Ivehicle. SJ
I

I

exited
).e and posit5oned_himself at th rear drivçr’s
side a
vehicle. SAl
Jat
I observed Xnv.I
‘ ‘‘s sx
}rehicle and hear Xnv
I tell
to put the car in park. SAL
ialso
Up,
heard a
show me your hands,’ The pavement
wa wet. anal
fre.hicle had_difticulty in gaining traction,
caasincr the tires to spin. Asi
Ivehicle lunged backwards,
S2I
ihad to move out of the way to avoid being hit by the
vehicle.

positione&herse.J.f to the rear passenger
side of
e xcle. Upon exiting her vehicle-on the
passenger s e, A
ant to the passenger side rear, then
moved up the side o
to determine if there were
passengers. The ijn ows o
were sl-ightly tinted
with shades and it was raizung.
ide gained
traction and moved forward rapidly, SA
bad to iump
backwa*d to keep from being hit by the
vehicle.
Knowing that SAl
Iwas in front of
vehicle, SA
Iwas concerned that I
Ivehicle was going to hit and
.

kiul

I

SAl
lexited her vehicle which was parked in
front of I
[vehicle by approxmateiy two vehicle lengths
perpezidicular and angled, facing the SA. SAl
I wearing
her bullet proof vest with FBX displayed on the uer lef chest
area, moved around the front of the vehicle as SAl
I exited
On th najsenger side.
In accordance with her assignment, SA
I
lintended to m
assenger side window of
I
Ivehicle. As SA
nn he front of her
d
vehicle, she observed Xxiv.
atl
j drivers side
window and heard Xxiv.
issue commands to
to exit
the vehicle and
efiisal to do so. Due to
defiance of mv.
conunands, SA
continied
around the front towards t a passen r
a o
er vehicle in
anticipation of going to assist Xxiv.
This placd SA
J in front of and not at tbe passenger jp wixdow of
L
SAL
IWaS in fzont oft_______ vehicle,
• between the center of the ehic.e and the pasener side of the
vehicle. While mo’G-ing into- this positio.n,
hser’ed
SAl
las he went behindi
ivehicle. SAl
Iheard
vehicle rying. to get traction on the wec paveme&t and
I
observel
Jvehicle lunge b
s. SAI
Iwas
concêr±ad that the yehicle it SA
LOSU siflt of
when he went behindi
Ivehic-e.
vehicle then moved
forward rapidly after again trying to get tractLon on the wet
3

6

 297-KQ-A1271781 SUB 1)

pavement.__SAl
lobserved distance between. Ixivi
and
vehicle, which was the result of the vehicle’s rapid
forward mot.on causing the driver’s side door to close as mv.
I
JeU off the riinning board of the 1
vehicle I
I
vehicle xuoVeç
SAl
‘‘ rapidly in the direction of
I
Fearing thati
Ivehicle InjV have iust backed up and hit SA
I
lefiance of Inv.I
_j commands and the
vehicle now coming at her, SAl
Idrew her eapon. flii.1e
drawing her weapon from her holster, SM
Imoved backwards
and to the left side o
Ivehicle to get out of the way as
she believed her :Life was in i1mninent dangr and the vehicle
was
gona to hit her. Asi
I vhicle moved rapidly toward her,
SAl
I took aim at I
bihn she viewed through the
windshield and fired a shot. I
Ivehicle quickly veered
left caiising S
]shot to &mpact the passengers side
window and exit the drivers side window. As a result,. both
front
wndows were shattered. The vehicle continued into a jug handle
turn in the roadway. This jug handle turn provided the means
of
escape for[
rehicle.

J

I
i vehicle exited the driveway to the BSA, making
a right turn onto Frontier Road, and headed west. ontie
is a dead end’at the western_most end and parallels Route r Road
22.
The arrest team pursuec1
I vehicle.. The first vehic.e out
of the BSA park.ng lpt was
vehicle driven by Sgt.I______ With
Dat. I
I Sgt .1
Jasked over thi radio who fired the
shot; however, no one answered him. Sgt.I
lacti
red police light on the dasbbwp of h4s vehicle
vehicle ws being driven by AI
an S.
J with SAs
I
las passengers. sZI
Rürned right out of the ESA
parking lot and headed west behind Sgt.I
) vehicle.
.

t the end of Frontier Road,l
I turned his vehicle
aroupd and 1eaded back east towards the veh.cle being driven
by
Sgt.l
I sgt.l
ladvised that whex
Ivebicle
passed him in the opposit direction,I
I raised both of his
hand’ni_shook his head as &f he was asking what was going
on.
Sgt .1
Iturned his vehicle around and started to foUo
which was tavel1ing east ata high rate of
speed.
Real&zing tha
coming east after turning
around at the dead end, S24.
turned left through the median
from the west bound lane ix
to the qast bound lane to partially
1
blocki
Ivehicle.
_Jtravefliag west in the east
bOund lane, observ I
Ivhiclç in front of he
attempting to locd
ioitiozed he,r
I vehicle.
vehicle to also.partiaUy block
the path of I
vehicle.
4

I

 ______Iwas

297-HQ-A1271731 SUB D

I

Travelling at a iigIi rate o snd.I
l’jrhir!1e did not slow
doand went around the SAl
land SAl
jvehicle’s. SA
I
hotified the Bridgewter__Police by radio of Lthe situation
and gave a description o
Ivehicle, 4cense plate, and
direction of travel[_
Iyhià1e continued eastbound to the
end of Frontier Road. I
Ibegan to turn left at the end of
frontier Road so that he
oing east on Route 22 in the L 6
westbound lanes. However
turned sharply to the;
right and went ‘west on Route 22.
vehicle continued for
a short distance on Route 22 the
t onto R9ute 287
1
igl
North. After trave.Uing about one-hal.f_milei
Ivehicle
puUed over to the right houlder. I
lpnt his hands outside
*1 i4i’
window. Sgt.I
Ivehicle pulled next t-n
Ivehicle while in the right travel lane. Det.I
I
got out çfaIJ
Jve)i’cle as Sgt.L
lpuUed the car in
front of I
Iveic1e to block him in and prevend
rom
going forward. Sgt.[_
Iaçt out of his ve1icle and a19n9 with
DetJ
I orderedi
lout of his vehicle. I
Igot out
of his vehicle, was searched, and handcuffed by other
members of
the arrest team who had arrived at the scene.
placed
in a Bridgewater Police Department vehicle and taken
to
Bridgewater Police fleadquareers, where he was subseguently
processed and interviewed.
a

*

Details:
The fo1loing represents the investigation conduc
the FBX relat.jve to the sbootng incident occuxrin at the ted by
Bridgewater Snorts arena on 2/28/99:

5

 Ffl.2G4 (Rcv 2.I.9)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTI
CE
Federal Bureau of Invcstigaon

I

Assistant Director, Inspection Divi
sion
Incident Review Group (SIRG)
Shooting
SS2’
1(5521
orn Salt Lake City
03/26/1999

Copytq:

Rcportof.
Dt

I

CacID

...

Title:

•

66F.SUaASO45E
89B-SU-50443
SHOOTI.NQ INQUIRY;
REPORT OF SHQOTNG. IN(IDENT;
SALT LAKE CI’TY DIVISION
3/8/1999

Characer

ADMISTRATIVE INQURY

Snopss

AFO
To rep
/KF0ort to
Review Group
on 3/8/1999,
surveillance

the Znspection, Division, Shooting
Incident
(SIRO), a shooting incident which took
place
in Salt Lake City, Utah, during a
to apprehend a bank robbery suspect.
—

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p

—

As reported in referenced SC dated
3/10/1999, on
the evening of 3/8/1999, poU
ce officers and FBI Special
an members of he Violent Crines
Task Force
(VCTF),
Agen
ts, set up surveil.lance on a residence located at
3:204
South 40Q West. Salt Lake pity
, Utah, where bank robbery
I
I had been_observed. A federal
arrest warrant had been issued
for[
bn 3/5/1.999.’
sub
ject
,
While agezts and_officers were
etabl-ishing a Deimetr
arounçi subjecti
(esidenca I
L
were reportedi fired”out Of Jthe’
bask
door
of
a
resid
‘shotsence directly to the north of I
Ilocation. These
shots were al.lgedly fired at
Detectives I
land
I Salt Lake City Police Department (SIC
PD),
who were assigned to the rear
perimeter of the target
I location. It
was also reported that numerous roun
ds were
fi-ri nit’ rf t fwn*
door of this residence at SA
I 91, and Denartment of Corr
ections
DQC) Agent
Agen
Iwas stpi-k t-wjce,
once in the head and onceI in theti
chest. Agen
I was
a protective vest and a keviar hçlm t I
et and 1is only
inju
ry
was
a
bruis
e to his chest.
wearing
Lelmét
def
lected the shot.to h:is head. No Antl
other law enforcement

I

dac.wcnt contains neither •reco
udaticns nor cQnclusiuns or the
‘XbL.r
FET. It is the pro?czty or the
and is loaned to your agency
FE
: it and its contOntS arc not to
o diet .Utcd Outzida your agency
.

 I
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of fices were injured in this incident. SAl
land Agent
Iwere the only law enforcement officers to return fire at
the subjects in the residence. No
injured.
Subjects I
I andi
taken into
custody. There is p aotrent connection betweeni
land the
other two subjects.
laid not shoot at any law enforcement
I
Tu)bg, ASAC James ‘. Jarboe, and SSA
CMO squad suparvisor;
scene subsequent to the shooting incident and responded to the
directed the
investigation. The Salt Lake City Division Eviden
ce Response
Team (ERr) conducted searches of pertinent locations.
In a telephone conversation between ASC Jarboe and
Chief Inspector Mershon, on 3/9/1999, Chief Inspector
Mershon
concurred with the Salt Lake City Division’s reques
shooting iriquiry under the di:rection of SAC Tubbs t to conduct a
. Therefore,
the Salt Lake city Division conducted a shooting inquiry
per the
Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines
and the
(M):0G)
Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures (MAOP)
regarding thi.s matter. On 3/10/1999, the Salt Lake City
Division
initiated a shooting inquiry into thi.s matter.
On 3/16/1.999, the Salt Lake City Division forwarded to
the Firearms Training Unit (flU), Training Division,
the
necessary FD-418s as requi.red per MIOG.

sal
I1T. ‘zas interviewed regarding this
matter on 3/11/1.999. SAl
Iwas the case agent on the ban3.<
robbery
in whio
Iwas suspected of robbing the
banks. sal
I
that on 3/5/1:999, he obtained a federal
arrest warrant for I
and on 3/8/1999, he prepared an “Arrest
Plan Form” detailing an arrest scenario for the apprehension
of
I this arrest plan was approved by ASAC Jarboe
L
and SSA
I
I SAl
I stated that te scnario outlined in the arrest
plan was not successful in thatl
laid not want to meet with
his girlfriend, for fear of being arrested.I
According to SA I
I even thougH
lwou2.d not meet
his
girifriezd. he did continue to keep in telephonic contacwith
with
t
her. SAl
Istated that a trap and trace reu1t in
identifying tne location of the telephone whichi
uti.liing to keep in contact with his girlfriend.
SAl
I
stated that he• and Deputy US. Marshal I
L with SSA
called out members of the VCTF and set up a
cm th location identfied by the
trap and trace
During the survei’llance of this location,
)
I.
Iwas pos.tiveiy identified as being present in
which was two houses to the south of a commercial a brick house
business on 400
2

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]b

 I
I
West.

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According to SIJ
the positive identification of
made br SIi
‘and Aenti
lwho had an eye on the
house occupied by I
I SA
that
Istat
he
ed
I
Icalled the other perimeter officers/agents and Deputy
back to a
briefing noi t in a parking_lot off of 1300
South. Xxi addition
to SAl_________ d lentI
I who were in the same vehicle,
Detectives
d
Ihad an eye on the rear of the house
occupied byl
I sa
ed that while at the briefing
point, he and the otheIr agenIstat
ts/officers heard gunf&re then heard
someone on the Bureau radio say that shot
s had been
I
tated that he and the other officers/agent fired. SA
s responded to
nethelocatiofl_of the_shoot.tng on_400j_
_________________
SAl
nd Agenti
Iiere interviewed sepayately,
however, both provided informat.on that
was similar and
corroborative. Accorcing to
land
Agent
N
Iboth
were sitting in Agent I
rown Chevrolet Bl.azerkeeping an
eye on a brick house inwhich they posi
tively identifiedj
I
This brick house was located two houses
commerqial business on 400 West. While to the south of a
watching this house, S
land Agenti
Iheard two gunsh
were fired from
.the rear of the .subject’s location.
SAl
Ibroadcast on the
Buteau radio that shots had been fired
. Subsequently, both SA
I
land Agenti
heard gunfire and saw muzzle flashes
coming f-rom the yel:low/white house that
was jy nt.tii of the
subject’s location. Both Sal
land
Iquickly
realized that they were being shot at byZigentl
an unknown individual in
the yellow/white house. Agent I
Iquic
exited the vehicle
from the driver’s seat and began returning kly
fr raking cover
behind the left front of his vehicle.
vehicle from the passenger seat and tookSAlcover_ Iexited the
hehipd the rear of
the vehicle behind the iqht rear wheel.
511
j also retUned
fire at the f:
the white/yellow house. agent________
called out to SA
1
he had been hit in the chest-.
that he had been hit in the head.
left their position behind Agent
retreated to a position of cover, at a
to the east of their location,
(be1iev thM’
he fired a total of two, and possibly threeSAl
ounas. Agent I
1
jelivs that he fi.red approximatel
y thirteen (13) rounds.
Agend
Ibeliee that qpprox-ima1elv fifteen (15)
rounds were fired at them. s4
land
xited
their vehicle so quickly that they did not Agn
have
the
time
necessary to take a hand held radio with them
them from communicating with the other agen which prevented
ts/officers.

3

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S
was interviewed and he stated that he
and t
o icers were th fjot.
to reach the location
of
and igentI
I sAl
Ihad
with a.m an was able to provide information a hand held radio
to the other
aaents/offjcers fIhnhlt ih sjtnatinr and the condition
of SA
land Agent
and the two SLCPD officers
SAI
6
‘
I
arranged for Agept
jjo be tansported from the scene and t.-’
a hospital.
SA
I and the two SLCPD officers
briefed SICPD SWAT Team members on the location
from
shots were being fLred. Thereafter, the SLCPD SWAT where the
Team assumed
tactical conrol Qf the situation. At approx-imate
ly
7:00 a.m.,,
on 3/9/1999, I
land the two subjects that occupied the house
nect tct
I were taken into custody and transported to the FBI
Office.

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4.lso interviewed during

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SSAI

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iSA.I

t-h4 gh*’ncr

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were:

SA
SAL
I all of the ?BX, and
United States Marshals Service (USMS). Detectives
land
Iwere interviewed by the SLCPD. AU of these
indiriduaLs provided similar and corroborative information.
The FBI’S Evidence Response Team (ERT), responded to
the location of the shooting incident and cond.zcted the
necessary
and relevant searches in support of the AFO/KFO investigatidn
.

I

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Subsequent investigation by the VCTF, determ

I

ined that
I who was present in the brick house during the shooting
incident, was pot invqlved in shooting at SAl
I Agen9
and Detectied
Inc1

I The investigatiçrn d rmincI rpat
two indi,vidua11
lanai____________
I
I were present in the white/yellow house trom wnere ne
Qhots were being fired.
On 3/17/1999, I
Iwas indicted by a Fedetal
Grand 7ury for violating Title 18, United States Code
Section
1114 (3)
Protection of officers and employees of the United
States, and Section 922(p) (5)
113.egal al:ien in possession of a
handgun. I
being held inde.initely on a
us
material witness warrant.
-

-

SAC’S COMMENTS:

SAC Tubbs has thoroughly reYiewed the facts and
circumstances surrounding the shooting incident which
occurred on
3/8/1999. The members of the Salt Iake City Division’s
VCTF had
a written arrest plan for the apprehension off___
______
______
____
which had been reviewed and approved by ASAC Jarboe and
SSA

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6

 66F-SU-A50456

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I This written plan was verbally modified upon ccHh
information obtained fi-rrni
tn nr1 tvce which placed
!
lat a
residence located at’
I Salt Lake City, Utah.
A federal arrest warrant was issued forl
Jon 3/S/1999. The
mmbrs c,f th JC!P!? that were present
at or near the location of
I at the time of the shooting, were lawfully
present. The members of the VCTP did nothin
g to provoke the
actions of tjhe s4bj eats in the residence next
to the residence
occupied by!
I, he members of the VCTL were frPd nnn
without_warn.ng or notice by!
I SAl
land
Agenti
I responded appropriately when they discharged theLr
weapons in an attempt to eliminate the threa
t aga.i.nst their l.ives
and the lives of others. In this incid
ent, there is no issUe of
questionable judgement by SAl
br Agent I
lunder the
deadly force policy. Sal
I and Agent!
lacted
courageously and should be commended for their
quick act.ion and
bravery during this incident.

1
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I’
I

.

S

 FD.204 (Rev. 2..i.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARM NT OF JUSTICE
Federal flureau of Investigation

Copyto

ADIC, WPO
SAC-A ELLEN B. KNOWLTON

Repoof:

Date:

May 26, 3.999

CaseJDØ

66F-WP-214969

Office: WASI4INGTON FIELD

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
WASHINGTON FX.ELD OFFICE
MARCH 17, 1999
Character

ADMINXSTRATIIE INQUIRY

Synop!s:

DETAIL:
On /2G/9
was assigned 88AWF-212473. 1
captioned,
HOMICIDE/MURDER 3. WHLLs1 xu’w; W:l..
assigned to the Squad C-b Joint Fugitive
(JFTF) Baker Tem which is headed by MPD
I
Ihad a lengthy criminal history
included charges for weapons, drugs,_assault, ep1o
sives,
robbery and murdr of fenes. SN
lalsO had
information that I
Imay have been involved in a car
deaber shooting as wel.3. as shooting at MPD and Montg
omery
County Police Department officers. SAL
I conducted
numerous surveillances and turn-up operations from
June,
1998 to March 14, 1999 in an effort to loct and
apprehendl
I During this period, SAl
I nrovidd’
oral briefings and handed out photographs withL
I
criminal history to members of the Bake.r Team as
well as
to representatives of the Montgomery County Police
Department (MCPD) Repeat Off endrs -Unit with which
he was
worJing cooperatively to locatel
I Thzrinq the
course of his fugitive 1
investigation SAl
Iadtsed he
generally kept the Baltimore DiYision apprised of
his
efforts.

•

Th*s doeuent co
•

.

ems ,ioLthez recazendatiow xo co unions o the X. Xe
La the popety o the raz si is 1oaea to
coneenta ae
be disti)ed outside your eoncy.

your agency ft and

 A

S

On 3/14/l99 MCPD

S

On
a

On 3/17/1999 SIt
land DUSKI_______________
conducted investigation at the apartment corn
lex which resu].ted
in obtainir a noitive 4enti.fication of
and an
associate l
I by two neighbors. SA
subsequently arranged for a maintenance man at
complex to perform a maintenance check at both the apartment
the Breezewood
Court Apartment and a close by apartment occupied
by al
who had been making ilumerous telephone
*‘rl
The tainteianc mar positively identified
!
s being
located ml
Iapartment at that time.

•

•

I

.Based on the above two identifications nd
iet
circumstances, SAl
lied a team which entered!
I
apartment and .determined no one was present. Afte
r
chec
king
out
three leads Which wee obtained from the caller
locat
I
ed
in
the
apartment, Si
Ireinstituted_surveillance ati
I
apartment. Shortly thereafter, I
was observed injthe
parking lot drivin a Lqray OldsmobUe]
sedan. SAl
Kdriver)
and DUSK I
followed’
I out of the
parking. lot at which timel
Ireali.zed he was being
SAl
ct-ivated his emergency equipment and pursued[ ““for approxmatèly twenty miles. Ko effective com
municat.on
method, other than two cellular telephones, ecist
ed
pursuit. The pursuit began in Prince George’s Cou during the
nty, proceeded
onto the Capital Beltway (495W and ended
Montaoç)ery County.
v
During the pursuit, both S.
d DUSMI
ladvised that
lf.ired at them. 1’wo witnesses were locat
ed
at
the
Wooduoor Plaa Shopping Center which coioborate to some
4gree
that I
I fired at SAl
land DUSK I
also
drove on two occasions agains the flow o1 trattic
in an effort
tc iid his pursuers.
After approximately fifteen minutes,
brrived at the intersection of Knowles Avenue and
Parkwood Drive, Kensington, Maryland. To elude captu
re,
turned left on the left side of a school bus, struc the
k
right
side of the sch
truck the right f,rt rf a Volvo
being driven by
witI SI
by, then passed the Volvo.
ed that I
fired one roup wh-4
he b
struci
this time, SN
Idecided to
force
had just shot at him, he believed
have shot
2

0

1

 and -for the first time, he had a clear shot
. SAl
three
rounds struck the Oldsmobile without inuringI
thçn pul
jnd struck a telephone pole which disabled’ his I
vehicle.i
(was then arrested without further incident.
The crash into the telephone pole caused smoke
and a small fire
in the engine compartment of the Oldsmobile.
After the arrest SA
I
I heard crying soinds in the rear of the vehicle and
discovered two young children in the passezaer eompa
rtment.
While removing both children to safety, SAl
Jut
his thumb
which required surgery.

I

•

Interviews of the principal witnesses
following information:

I

I - school bus driver
approximately tour (4) gunshots.
I

•

I

provided the
-

heard

I - school bus attendant - saw I
luse
his left hand to steer and had a dark object in his
right hand in a raised position.
1

1- olvo driver - FBI interview: stated
she saw SAl
xtend his leg out of the driver’s
side door and point a pistol at the gray sedan, heard
one gunshot, then heard several more shots. Believes
she heard more thaz three (3) gunshots. FICPD
statement: saw SAl
J put his leg out of car and
raise a gun which seamed o be po5nted t her but wa,s
actually pointed at gray car. $AI
I fired more
‘t.han twice and she put her head down.
Nine other witnesses recalled hearing from two to five
gunshots with the majority hearing from three to four.
1

A crime scene examination conducted by the Montg
County Police Department located two shell casings from SA omery
I
Iweapon, one at the intersection of Knbwles Ayenue an4
Parkwood Dri’ve and the other on the bottom area of ?AI
I
vehicle windshield. No shell casings fromL
weapo
n
were
[
located.
Details of this incident are reported as delineated in
the table of contents.

S

3

  

 

 

FBI

Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

1999

 

 

 

 

S

I

FD-2O4(Re. 12-1-95)

.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OL JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Iiwestigation

Cpyto:

States Attorney Jonathan C. Benedict
1061 Main St., Bridgeport, CT. 06604

Report of:
Date:

IIP
10/1/199
297-HQ-A1271786-JJ

Tifie:

.

Charaoter:

Synop:

f

Offcc:

FBIHQ

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
BRIDGEPORT RESIDENT AGENCY
OCTOBER 6, 1999
ADMINISTPATIVE INQUIRY
This shooting incident was a result of an attempted
a-rrest of HECTOR COLON. A federal warrant issued
January
28, 1998, in White Plains, New York, Southern
District of
New York, was outstanding; charging Colon in violati
on
Title 18, USC, Section 1959, Interstate Transportatio of
n in
Aide of Racketeering-Murder. The Connecticut
Violent
Crimes Fugitive Task Force (CVCFTF),, under the auspic
the New Haven Division had been coordinating efforts es of
the New York Division to locate and apprehend Colon. with
lb 7 C

.

DETAILS: As early as April, 1999, information was
obtained indicating that Hector Colon might be frequenting
locations within th 1’Tew Haven Division’s territoç
v.
SA
I initiated contact with SSRAI
I.
J
1
the New York Division, to coordinate efforts
to locate and apprehend Colon.
Several attempts to
conduct surveillance of Colon, o his w4fe, were made with
limited results. On 09/28/99 SAl
Idisplayed an
identification order (1.0.) to a source who recognized
Colon as someone known to the source as ‘Jose”. The
following day, 09/29/99, the source observed hlJoseu with
a
black .38 six-shot revolver. Thereafter, the source
provided information that establish the basis to conduc
surveillance on potential locations frequented by Colon.t a

This document contajs nejthe recomeej)datjona
nor conclusions o the ?3X. Zt is the pruperty e the FX
and is loaned to your agency; it and
its toOtents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 _____________IFEI
__

__

F

.

297
-HQ--A1271
786_D

onday at ternçon, 10 O4 99 ssAL
‘met with Ss
I, andp
Trpr. Pacrlik and other
taslç frn-’c iembers to disc I Det.
ents in the colon case.
SSAI
linstructed SAs
ancj
lo prepare
an operational plan utilizing
an F
orm (rrest Plan Form).
They were to conduct a
surveillance to corroborate the source
information and determine the
formulate an arrest plan and whereabouts of Colon in order to
888 was used to document the affect an arrest of Colon. The FO-.
plans for the surveillance.
On Tuesday, 10/05/99, at
conducted at the Bridgeport Police 6:30 a.m. a briefing was
individuals assigned to participate Department for all the
in that day’s surei1ance
activity.
?ren t the meeting were SAsI
II
L and
I
I Deti
I DUSMI
DetJ
I
I
Det.I
I
Trpr.I
I Det.,
aiet. j
I and Of fr. p
I
All of these individuals atndiç1
the briefing the following day
with tle exception of Of fr.[
Jwhowas replaced by Of fr.I
I
I
Ion that day. Each a6tendee was
given a copy of the I .0.
and a photograph of Colon.
They were briefed on the fact that
Colon was considered armed and
dangerous; he was extremely
surveillance Conscious; and provided
emphasize that Colon was considered specific information to
exbremely dangerous.
Thereafter, a surveillance was conducted
until noon at which time
it was terminated.
The participants
Bridgeport Police Department at 9:00 were instructed to be at the
a.m. the next morning to be
briefed on that days surveillance
plans.

I

-

•

On Wednesday, 10/06/99, at 9:00 a.m,
they tecnvened,
some cautianry statements were
reiterated for the
Of fr.J
Iwho had not attended the day before. benefit of
The primary
purpose was to ensure everyone knew
their assignments. The plan
was to have two stationary surveillance
locations and two roving
vehicles.
The teams were assigned as follows:
Teams:
Rcying:
SAJ
Def9
72 Maple Street
Det.I
Of fr.i

Det.I
*

•

JFBI
I-BpD

I-NP])

I—BPD
replaced Of fr.________

2

(TB’ Member)

(TB’ Member)
(non-TB’ Member)
(non-TB’ Member)
(non-TF Member)
(non-TB’ Member)

 __

.

297-HQ-A1271786_D

I

.

1491 Central Arenue
Det.J
IBP])
DIISMg
_JUSM
SAl________________

(non-TF Member)
(TF Member)
(TF Member)

Rovinci
Trprj
Det.l

CTF Member)
(TF Member)

ISF
I-Bpfl

At approximately 10:20 a.tn. the units were n their
assigned_ocations. At approximately 10:45 a.m.
DUSMI
land
SAl
lobserve an individual, thought to be Colon, exit l4l
Can
Avenue and depart the area in a blue Honda Prelude.
SA
radioed a description of the clothing worn by the
i.nclivi ual, believed to be Colon, and a vehicle description.
At
aPproximately 11:02 a.m. an i.ndri&iaL wearing clothing fitting
the description reported by SAl
I was sighted or fact a 72
Maple Street. At approximately 11:15 a.m. Detectivel
I
relays over the radio that the person believed to be Colon had
a
gun. Shortly thereafter, Det.I
ualifies that statement
advising they can
t be certain..
1
(Nte: a copy of the
surveillance video tape depicting what the officers saw is
included with this report. There are four segments wherein a
black object, on the waist of the subject, is visible.)
Thereafter, the source is visited by Colon. Upon Colo&s
departure; the source advised that the subject left the location
in a blue., two door, Honda,
During this time frame, Deti
Ihad been sent into
the Tower II apartment building to get the iay-oub and to locate
apartment #213.
She was in the building at the time of the
shooting incident, The surveillance team now believed they had a
positive identification of the subject based on eight of tIe team.
rnembers observation ai4 corooratian by the source. SAl______
contacted SAsJ
land I
land proposed attempting an arrest
should the subject return and par]ç adacçnt to them as before and
they concurred. At 12:25 p.m. SAl
ladvises that thç subiec
has returned to 1491 Central Avenue.
SAl
nd DUSMI_______
had formulated a plan, in the interim, and attempted the arrest.
At 12:32 p.m. SAl
adioed that shots had been fired and
someone was down.

SA I
lexited the right side of the van utilizing
the left hinged door.
In order to do this he had switched his
weapon to his weaic hand (right hand). He was wearing body armor
with his identification visibly suspended from a chain around his
neck. He had his weapon drawn front the time he
fh van
until after the subject was down and he and DUSMI_________
•

3

 297-HQ-Aj271786-D

.
I

proceeded to handcuff him. He had waited to exit the van until
after the subject cleared his vehicle. Upon exiting the van, he
commanded “‘B). tpp’ and other words he could not specifically
recall.
SAl
I stated that Colon moved his left hand quickly
toward his waist area in a grabbing motion, which caused SA
Jto fire one shot at the subject. SAl
Istated the
subject pivoted and ran in front of the van in the direction of
Central Avenue_cauing him to temporarily loose sight of the
subject.
SA
Istabed he moved forward and re-established
vtsual contact with the subject. He stated the subject was about
a car length away moving toward_Central Avenue with his upper
torso twisted back toward SAJ
tated the
SAl
subjects left aria was cocked, with his elbow ben and his left
hand in the area of his waist, not visible to SAL
lat that
time.
Further,_te subject’s left arm/elbow was moving back and
forth.
SAl
tated he saw the subject’s left arm and body
tense which caused him to believe the subject had a aim ihis
waistband and that he was reaching for the gun. SAl
Istated
he then dropped low and fired two rounds at. the subject using his
left hand. The subject moved
entral Avenue a little
further, then turned tow
and raised both of his
hands over his head. SA
.s a ed he tcid. the subject to
stop and get down at that time.
.

.

.
—

Dt3SM[
I stated that upon exiting the rear of the
van he heard the warning given by SAI
I and at least two
shots, more than likely three shots. DUSMI
I stated he did
not see who fired the shots or if anyone had been hit, because he
was still behind the van, ae brifly looked around the right
side of the van and saw SAl
land the subject moving_toward
the front of the van, with the subject in frOnt of SAl
I He
then went to the left rear corner (drivers side) and looked
around before moving up the left side of the van. DUSrI
I
stated at that time he saw the subject umoving toward the street.
He then ran up the left. side of the van toward the subject
ordering 4
police get down” The subject looked at him and then
t
‘
dropped to the pavement spreading himself out, face down. O11M
I
istated he held him down in that position while SAl_______
handcuffed the subject. DUSMI
then began a search for
weapons or çontrabnd. DUEM I
ladvised that, in the
interim. SAl
Ihad radioeçi th
thers that shots were fired.
DUSM I
arrived on the .scene and
I stated that Det .1
assisted him in rolling the subject over oi±o hi5 1ack in order
to continue the search. That is whez. DUSMI
Inoticed blood
on hi hands and then told SAL
Ito call for paramedics.

4

6
—

 __

.

DIJSMI
Istated he was also in body armor with his
badge displayeä on a edain around his
neck. Further, that he had
lus weapon drawn from the time of
exiting
the van until kneeling
to handcuff the subject. Within
minutes the remainder of the
surveillance team arrived on scene,
was taken to the hospital where he as did the paramedics. Colon
underwent
Unsuccessfully and was pronounced dead at 2:17surgery
p.m.
Members of the surveillance team
observed one cell phone and two pagers on and the paramedics
the subject’s waist
immediately after the shooting. As a
was determined that one bullet entered result of the autopsy it
the ubj acts body from the
rear approximately three inches to the
left of
exited the front of the torso at center sternum.the spine and
The coroner
stated

.

this indicated an upward angle of travel from entry
to
exit. No weapon was recovered from the crime
scene. With the
concurrence of SAC rdichael J. Wolf, the crime scene
was turned
over to the Bridgeport Police Department for
processing with
assistance from the New Haven BELT and the State
Crime Laboratory.
The Bridgepnvt- Prl.çe Department took custody
of all evidence, to
include SAl
Iweapon. All subsequent laboratory
examinations and analysis are being done at the
request of the
Bridgeport Police Department through the State
Crime Laboratory.
The police, assisted by FBI personnel,
a
neighborhood search for potential witnesses to theconducted
shooting
incident, All identified individuals representing
to have
information concerning the shooting incident were
interviewed
either by them and/or subsequently by members
of the SIRT.
The
Lacey Manufacturing Corporation was having
a picnic in the lot
adjacent to 1491 Central Avenue at the time of the,
shooting which
resulted in identifying several civilian witnesses
to
the event.
As would be expected, their attention was drawn
after
hearing
a
shot or loud noise coming from the parking
lot. The day was
clear and in the 60’s at the time of the
shooting incident.

5*
•

 ________________jirr

_____________

_____

________
______
________

(12/31/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence.
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 03/28/2000

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

a4,
Inspection 4
Contact:

I Extension

I

.I\pproved 3
I
y
:

Wiley 0. Thompson
1837

Locke Thomas Bernar

Drafted By:

\\

Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/08/19:99
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

297—HQ-A1271970-o

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review
shooting incident that occurred in the Group (SIRG) reviewed a
Washington ?ield Office on
11/08/1999.
Special Agent (SAl
j discharged
his FBI issued shotgun to kill
a severely injured deer.
SIR&
members recommended that no administrativ
e action be taken
against SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shoot irig incident.
rence report of Supervisory Special Agent
12/20/1999.

Idated

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish
the
analysis, comments, and recommendations
of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

1
2

Mr.
,
Rm. 7142
Mr.
Rm. 7116
(1
Mr
ins, Rm.515)
2-Mr
.7427
(1
S
Rm. 7326)
1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
2
Ms. Gin. hm-rT mr.r
(1-Msl_______
2
Mr. Bielji
(1-Mr.l
1
1
Mr.
lam. 6646
-

1
2

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

I

1

1
1
1

-

-

-

-

Mr.
Mr.
C1-MrJ

Mr.l
Mr.I_______
Nr.I
Mrsj

Rm. 4042
untico
Quantico
Pm. 3787
Pm.

7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ--A1271970-D, 03/28/2000
3etai1s of the Shooting Incident

On 11/08/1999, at approximately 9:10 p.m., after
completing his shift and en route to his residence,
SAJ
Iobserve fwn h’dvidua1s in the center
grass meaian or Route 610.
SAl
I thinking there might be
an accident or some type of altercation, stopped his bureau
vehicle and activated his emergency lights.
SAl
lexited his vehicle and was approached by
the individuals in the median who advised him that a deer had
been struck by a vehicle and was laying in the center of the
median.
Based on the fact that the large “eight point” buck was
violently struggling to regain it’s footing and the heavy volume
of traffic in the area, SAl
[believed that the deer posed
an imminent danger to t1e public safety if it was allowed to
stray into traffic.
SAl
Icontacted the Stafford County
Sheriff’s office, however, due to his concern that the deer would
regain it’s footing or struggle into tr&-ff ic, he believed his
only safe alternative was to euthanize the deer.
Once SAl
Idecided to kill the deer, he directed
an off duty Prince William County Officer to stop eastbound
traffic. After addressing all safety concerns, SAl_________
illuminated the deer with a weapon mounted flashlight and fired
one slug round into the rear of the deer’s skull. After
observing the deer move, he fired a second round of buck shot
into the deer’s head, successfully killing the deer.
On 02/08/2000, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Beruard Locke, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meetjn with the following voting members of the SIRG
in attendance:
Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violen
ion,
rinu.nal Division, tJSDOJ;
Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
i
iam R. Pa s, Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Administrative Services Division; Charles H. Middleton, Section
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief. Or.i’iHnnm1 9ipport. Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;/
I, Unit Chief,
Legal Ad
Legal Policy, Office of the General
Counsel;
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit,
Sci
n, Laboratory Division;
SSA
arms Training Unit, Training
Division; SSA
Practical pplications Unit,
Training Division; and, SSA
Washington Field
Office.
Two nonvoting members present were Unit Chief
-

-

2

 4

To:
Re:

I

Inspection. Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271970-T3, 03/28/2000

IPr-tr,1 Amtjlications Unit, Training
Division, and I
I Management/Program Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members briefly discussed this shooting incident
and unanimously agreed that SAl
I actions were in
accordance with the current deadly force policy. Members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ--A1271970-fl, 03/28/2000

LE?D (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no administrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

SAl

4

6
;7

 _______

___________
__________

(12131/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 05/15/2000

Inspection Division

From:

Wiley 13. Thompson III

Attn:

Inspection Division
contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

J Extension

1837

.

Locke Thomas Bernard

I

6

IJ.rr
297-HQ-A1271970-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/16/1999
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SlaG) reviewed a.
shooting incident that occurred in the Washington Field Office on
10/16/1999.
Special Agent (SA>I
If ired three
rounds frdm his Bureau issued weapon, killing an injured deer.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that no administrative action
should be taken against SAl
las a result of his involvement
in this shootiriq incident.
Reference:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Leslie G. Wiser, Jr., dated 03/16/2000.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

1
2

-

Mr.!
IRm, 7142
Mr.1
km. 7116
Mr. Cousips, Rm.5155)
(1
Im, 7427
Mr,I
Ms. I
(1
iRm. 7326)
Mr. Locke. Rr. 7825
Mr.J
f.m. 7837
-

2

-

-

1
1

-

-

2

flrTh.T

Ms.

Mr.
(1
Mr. Bieli
Mrj
(1
Mr. BarfnlK,
-

2

-

-

1

-

1rn.

I
I
5b46

Mr. Middleton, Rm, 4042
1
2
M
Quaritico
1-M
Rm.3787
tFO
1-M
Mrs.
1
Rm. 7861
-

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271970-D, 05/15/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 10/16/1999, S24
land his wife
attended a party at a residence in Stafford, Virgini.
While
driving to their residence in Spotsylvania, SA I
I observed a
vehicle on the side of the road with its hazard lights flashing.
As SAl
lapproached the vehicle, the vehicle left the scene
and SAl
iobserved an injured deer on the side of the road.
A&the deer was attempting to regain its footing, SAl
I
determined that the animal posed an immediate danger to the
traffic on the road.
Due to this fact, and the absence of any
nearby pedestrians, vehicles, or dwellings, SAl
if ired one
round from his Bureau issued Sig Sauer P-228 nine millimeter
pistol into the deer’s neck as well as two additional shots into
the animal’s chest.
The deer died a short time later.
on 05/09/2000, the SIRO met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members of the SIRG
in attendance:
Kenneth W. Kaiser Chief Inspector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;
1
ITrial Attorney,
nrigm
3liolent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Division; Charles H. Middleton, Section
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
Unit Chief,
Legal Advice and Training, Legal ioiicy, urrice o the General
Counsel;I
Toolmarks Unit:6
lunit Chief, Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
I
L Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; and, SSA.I
IWashington Field Office.
The only nonvoting member present wasl
I
Management/Program Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

J,

-

Observations and Recommendat ions of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
2

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A127197Q-D, 05/15/2000

SIRG members briefly discussed this incident and
unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force by SA(
Iwas
justified and in conformance with the current deadly torce
policy.
Members recommended that no administrative action be
taken against him as a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271970—D, 05/15/2000

LEAD

(s)

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

sal

That

n

shooting incident.

.ç1ministraeive action be taken against
i as a result of his involvement in this

4

 _________IRm.

(12131/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence;
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 04/07/2000

Inspection Division

From:

Wiley 0. Thompson II

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:

lExtension 1837

Leeks Thomas Bernar

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297-HQ-A1271285-D

Title:

I R: lrr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

SHOOTING INCIDENT
12/04/1999
CHICAGO DIVISION
Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Chicago Division on
12/04/1999.
Special Agent (SA)1
Ishot and killed
an unleashed charging pitbull dog during the execution of a
gang/drug-related search warrant.
SIRG members unanimously
ag1 1-h1- no administrative action should be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
incident.
Reference

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated 12/14/1999.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis. comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting

1
2

-

-

Mr.
Mr.

Rm. 7142
Rm. 7116
(1
Mr. Cousins, Rm.S155)
Mr.
‘7427
Ms.
Rm. 7326)
(1
Mr. Locke, Rm. 7825
Ms. Ginsburg, DOJ
•

-

2

-

-

1
2

2
1

-

-

(1-Ms.I

-

-

Mr. Biel’,
1
(I -Nr.I
Mr.

TV1

kLm.

I

646

I

Mi. Middleton, Rm. 4042
Mr,I
‘luantico
I)
Mr.I
(1
Mr4
uantico
1
Mn
1
3787
1-Mr4
IWFO
1
Mrsl
1 Rm. 7861
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

-

 Ia

To:
Re:

_________[n

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 04/07/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 12/04/1999, Agents of the Rockford Resident Agency
(RA), along with Drug Enforcement Administration and local
officers attached to the Metro Narcotics Unit., were executing a
gang/drug-related search warrant at a residence in Rockford,
Illinois.
During the execution of the warrant, a pitbu].l dog
repeatedly charged the officers resulting in SAl
ifiring
two rounds from a Remington 870 shotgun, killing the dog.

It should be noted that a completed, approved
operations plan contained information regarding the presence of
dogs at the residence.
Participants had discussed the use of
pepper spray to discourage the dogs from attacking. However, due
to the inclement weather, a decision was made that a pepper
fogger would be used by the entry team for use inside the house
and that SAj
1 would use his shotgun loaded with 00 buck to
protect the entry team while outside the house.
The search team arrived at the residence and executed
the search warrant at approicimately 6:50 p.m. The front Qf the
residence was well-lit with flood lights and according to ne
Agent on the scene, a dog charged him as he exited his van.
The
Agent attempted to subdue the dog by swinging his flashlight.
As they approached the house, SA[
iherd dogs
barking and observed two dogs charge him. AI
I charged
toward the dogs to place himself between the dogs and bhe entry
team.
Both dogs were identified as pitbulls yith r’n being
chained and one not chained. According to SAL
I he
pointed his shotgun at the dog and attempted to scare the dog by
yelling loudly.
The do initially backed off a few feet but
continued to face SA
an aggressive manner.
Within a
short period, the dog charged again with sAl
Isuccessfully
making the dog retreat for a second time by yelling.
The dog
continued to bark and growl and_subseciient1y charged at
SA
I believing that the dog
third time.
SAI
was going to bite him, fired two shots. The first round hit the
dog in the face and the second round entered the chest.
The dog
was removed from the scene by members of the Animal Control
Center.
On 02/08/2000, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Of fic c.t Inspections, lnspecion Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members of the SIRG

2

 ______ITrial

TO:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 04/07/2000

I

in attendance:
ITrial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent (r-nw $cntjon, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
William R. Falls, Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Administrative Services Division; Charles H. Middleton, Section
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division,j
L Unit Chief,
Legal Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General
Counsel;
Toolmarks Unit,
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
SSN
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
DiVision;I
I Practical Applications Unit,
Training Division; and, SSAI
j Washington Field
Office.
Two nonvoting members present were Unit Chief
IPractical Aoplications Unit, Training
Division, ani
j, Management/Program Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

I

Observations nd Recommendations of the SIRG
The SXRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by s? I
Iwas justified and in conformance with the
current deadly force policy.
Members recommended_that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
las a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident.

3

 To:
Re;

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271285-D, 04/07/2000

LEID Cs):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no apinistrative action be taken against

SAl
shooting incident..

las a result of his involvement in this

4

 ___________

_____

__________
___________
_________
______
_

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date; 10/26/1999

Inspection Division

Front:

Attn:

Wiley D. Thompson III

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted

Title:

jaatn 1837

Thompson Wiley 1) II
Cordier Robert,

By:I

Case ID #:

I

ROUTINE

rr
297—HQ-A1270914-D

IDMINISRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
08/13/1999
AIiBtJQUERQUE DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Albuquerque Division on
08/13/1999.
Special Agents (SAs)I
land
Ireturned gimf ire after a bank robbery suspect
fired shots at them inside of an apartment.
SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against
these SAs as a result of their involvement in this shooting
incident.
Reference:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent .n Charge
William Lueckenhoff, dated 08/27/1999.
Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, cormnents, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

1
2

-

?m. 7142

Mr.j

Mn
(1
Mr.I

I Rm. 7116

Mr. Cousins, RnL5l55)
Im 7427
(.
Ms.]
IRm. 7326)
Mr. Cordaer, Rm. 7837
Ms. Ginsbpra. DPJ
-

2

-

-

2.
2
2
2

-

(1-Ms.I____

-

-

flfl.T
Mr. Biehl
(1- Mr.I
Mr. Foran, Rm. 6646
(Attention:
Mn

I

2
1
1

1

-

-

Mr. Midd]Eleton._Rin. 4042
(1 - Ms. I
uantico
Mr.I
WFO
Mr.L

Mrs7_________

Rm. 7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
27-HQ-Al270914-D, 10/26/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

Albuquerque Division’s Violent Crimes and Major
Offenders Squad bad been investigating a series of
bank
occurring in the Albuquerque area. rhese robberies had robberies
been
committed, for the most part, by a lone, unidentified
male who
implied to victims that he possessed a firearm.
Evidence had
also been developed indicating an accomplice or accomplices
assisted him outside of these banks with his getaway.
It
also determined that in two of the robberies, the subjec was
t was
assisted by another unidentified accomplice inside the
victim
banks.
The local media and Albuquerque Police Department (APt))
personnel had dubbed the unidentified bank robber as
‘Robin the
Hood.” This was a reference to the robber’s politeness
and his
usual apology to victims where he attempted to excuse
his actions
by advising that the proceeds from the robbery were to help
poor,
hungry kids.
fliring the two days prior to the shooting incident,
anc
Iwere developing independent information
indicating that an individual identified as
J was
possibly identical with te bank rpbber. Iiirormation was
developed indicating thati
Iwas en route to the
St. Louis, 1
Missouri area.
It had also been determined that
I had not been at his Albuquerque residence since

I

(J/iU/3J9’99.

(Wi 9
Q8/13/19
9
, SAs E
4
lanc
I after ensuring
that
(was not at his residence. initiatec a pre-arranged
interview withi
linside the
apartment.
During the interviewl
(positively identified
[n a number of bank surveillance photographs as “Robin
the Hood”. I

I

I

__

thati

I

bossessed firearms and that he was a heavy drug
user, using crack, heroin, cocaine and marijuana. While
the
interview was being conducted, all three of the individuals
heard
a vehicle parking at the residence.
looked outside and
advised the Agents that I
Ihad arrived,
quickly
walked behind the apartment, leaving the engine o
is vehicle
runninc. and entered the apartment’s back door.
SAs I
land
Igathered their paterils a{id went into the bedroo
m to
attempt to be outside of I
lviipn should he enter the
apartinent.
Immediately after entering the apartment,p
I
initinted gunfire by booting into the apartment bedroo
m wnere
the Agents had concealed themselves.
2

 ___________Trial

r
4
*

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ--A1270914-D, 1O/26/:L999

According to SAL
I. sI
I had entered the
bedroom, and orio to his’l
1-he bedroom, he
I
observed I
liii a discussion with
after he entered
the rear entrance of the apartment. SA_______ observed her
gesturing with her head to the part f 1e aoartrent where the
Agents had relocated. At that point, SAl
lobserved a
stainless steel revolver_being pointed at him around the ‘open
door frame. As SA I
i deflected the weapon away from his
body, a round discharged. He also observed rounds entering
through the wall dividing the bedroom from the kitchen.
Both Agents returned fire, firing their weapons
through an inteinr wall of the apartment. mmdiatçly after
I had ‘fired shots, SAl
I
I and SA
1
Ibarely
missed shootingi
Iwith a single gunshot, when she suddenly
appeared around the open bedroom door frame from the area of the
apartment where the subject had been firing.
Based on radio calls for assistance by the Agents on
the scene, law enforcement personnel from the Albuquerque
Division, as well as the APD responded to the scene. I
was arrested approximately two and one half hours later, as he
tried to escape from a nearby apartment where he had hid from
responding Special Weapons and Tactics Teams and other law
enforcement officers.

1

On 09/14/1999, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inspector
Robert 3. Cordier, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members of the SIRG
in attendance: I
I Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USD03;
I Unt Chief, Transfer Unit, Administrative
Services Division; SSAI
L Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr.., Section C1f (-rjii Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division.1
lUnit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;l________________
Unit Chief, NS-2A Unit, Global Section
N-2, National Security
Division; and, I
I Supervisor, Wshinoton Field
Office.
The only nonvoting member present was I
Program and Management Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

3

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1270914—D, 10/26/1999
Observations and Recouuuendations of the SflG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members
agreed that the use of deadly
Lias justified and in
force by As I
-ndI
conformance with the cupnt d1y force policy.
SIRG members
unanimously agreed that I
Irepeated gunfire constituted a

direct threat upon their lives,
provided adequate
justification for their employment of deadly force throughout
this instance.

4

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A12709l4-D, 10/26/1999

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1
INSPECTION DIVISION (INSD)
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Thpi- nr dmi trtiv ritiôn e taken against
SAs
an4__________________ as a result of their
involvement in this shooting incicient

-J

C,

5

 FD-204 (Rcv 124.93)

UNiTED STATES DE?ARTMENT OF SUST1CE

Federal Bureau of invctIgat1ou

Copy to:

ASAC SUSAN R. CHAINER
April 5, 1999

Date:

CamK:

GGF-LA-218119
66F-LA-218119

de:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

orncc Los Angeles Field Office

SHOOTING INCIDENT;

LOS .ANGELES DIVISION
MARCH 29, 1999
Coaracter

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

SyncpsLs

On March 29, 1999, Special Agents ofthe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
assigned to the Los Angeles Division responded to a call for assistance from FØeral Agents
with the pefense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS). DCIS Federal Agent
I
lani
Iwere survelllin a residence in Studio City. California where
I
they had source information that federal flxgitiv4
[‘as currently
located. Subjecd
I bad a federal warrant issueclirom the District otAnzona charging
him with False Identification Cards, Falsely Pretending to be an employee ofthe United States,
Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Access evices. l4il Fraud, Wire Fraud, and
False Statements in Application for a Pâsport. Subject I
Ihad a criminal history which
included receiving stolen property, carrying a concealed weapon, resisting arrest, forgery, and
burglary.

On March 29, 1999, at approximately 5:04 pm, DCIS agenj
rising a
hand held FBI radio which he was issued white working on an FBI task force, contacted Los
Angeles FBI radio control. He requested assistance in the arrest of a fbgitive “ASAP” from FBI
agents who were in the area ofMoorpark and Coldwater Canyon in Studio City, California. He
also asked FBI control to contact the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to respond to the
area for backup. Special Agent (SKI
Idv1sed control he wouidie
responding as did Special Agents
Ian4
lho
were in a two man unit. Both SAl
hnd the two man unit were fifteen to twenty minutes
away from agenti
locatIon when he first called for assistance. The area was still in
daylight, the weather was clear, and there were no wind conditions.
rat. xc

This doc’et contains neither reoc endationa nor c neusions of the
is the property of the FBI and i. loaned to
yonr agency, it and its ccncnt3 are not to te distriue4 ontaido your agency.

 6.

specific location
When SAl
rrivedLat the intrsection h
e was in the
dvised.S
where he could find the DCJS agent. Agezi
to
S
market.
a
next
to
parking
lot
northwesr..fthe intersection in a
to
Aae
drqve
ktHe
par
see AgenIJvho was near a vehicle in the
Iha never me
vehicl!ijtiiwo of them began discussing subjeaL____,.J SAl
with
of FBI
a
couple
e
worked
AgenL_...._.._.jrior to this incident. H
using an
been
as an FBI agent since he had
squads and at tins time he thought Agen
FBI radio.

a fugitive who
‘that subjec
Ldvised SA
Agentl
He
also told SA
agent.
was wanted for mail fraud, false identification and impersonating a
wents
wjio would be arriving soon, towatch
the wanted him, along with the other F1T
I
Iwas now located. He added when
1
the rear of an apartment where he believed subject
ist him it making contact with the
1
LAPEl units he had requested arrive4.. he would have them as
Ihad a black Jeep
Ihat subject I
1
subject at the apartment. He told Si
Cherokee that was now parked about thirty feet north of where they were now parked.
Iplan, SAl
I
While the two of them were discussing Ageni
the alley behind the
noticed a white male wearing a T-shirt and slacks wal
tting in his vehicle in
apartment. The male yac wa1kg towards them as S
driver’s dobr in the
Iwas crouched down by SA
the parking lot. Aentl
parking lot. Agenti
L4 not initially see the mate and had observed an LAPD patrol unit
drive by their location. Agenti
Inotifled FBI control tocontact the LAP]) oflicers and
give his exact location.
If the
iaskd Agend
Once he was finished on the radio,SM
could be
it
dvis
Agend
first
At
subject.
his
male walking towards them was
SA
old
closer,
Ag
feet
few
walked
a
had
male
but he was not certain. Once the
he
at
w
Agen
ksked
SM
We.
Ithat it was definitely
I
as going to arrest the subject or wait for backup.
wanted to do. He asked if Agent
going
to arrest him now. He stood up and started
was
buddenly stated he
Ageni
which is where the subject appeared to be
Cherokee
walking to the rear ofthe black Jeep
walking.

limniediately exited his vehicle and began approaching theJeep
SAl
was not aware if any other FBI units or LAPD units were in the
I{
Cherokee from the south.
tad decided tpnooroach the subject he realized he needed
Since
parking lot yet.
Agenil
oing towards the driver’s side
Ageni
observed
He
had
delay.
without
him
to as.sist
I also drew his handgun as ‘he
rear of the Jeep with his handgun already drawn. spJ
moved to a position of cover behind a vehicle’s engine block which was parked adjacent to and
.veapon was a personally owned Bureau approved 4O
just south ofthe Jeep. SAJ
Caliber.seml-automatio, Glock Model Z’l, serial number CNF655.

2

 ________

.
Iwas able to observe the subject who had already opened the door of
811
the Seep and was standing outside in the “V” of the door ofthe vehicle. Through the glass àf the
passenger side window he could see the subject’s head down to his rpidue1viçarea. At this time
Iwith his Weapon
he was about five to ten yards from the subject. lie could see Agcnt[
pointed at subject I
jwbile he was standing to the rear ofthe Jeep’s driver’s side.
,Jcould hear Agent
Once he was in position behind the corr v$iirle Sli
land advise hun he was under
I
I identil3,r himself as a federal agent to subject I
Iepeat this more than once. He observed subject
arrest. He recalls hearing AgentL
lputjiis hands up to the height of his shoulders, and thetnT th down to his
I
10 show him his
lyelling for subject I
waistline. SAL
Iheard AReni
hands. He also observed Agend__kpeakIng on his hand held radio and asking for. FBI
control to have the LAPD units respond to assist them.
Iturn his head in his direction and
Iwas able to see subject I
SAl
tad on a pair of sunglsses but they were down on the
look towards him. Subject
!,elled at the subject to
icould see his eyes. SM
brIdge of his nose and SAl
get his hands up. When he did not respond, he yelled that he was with the police and that he
wanted hitnto put up his hands. Rather than comply with his commands, the subject placed his
efleved the male might
right hand into his right front pocket area. At this point, SAl
Ito put up his hands.
be going for some type ofweapon. He continued to yell at subjeed
empty.
was
it
see
lould
hand
his
and
SAl
removed
The subject

Ihen lean into the interior of his vehIcle
bserved subjecti
at
this time.the subject may again be
believed
He
and reach towards the center console area.
his side and once again they were
his
to
hands
reaching for a weapon. The male then returned
door, and locked It. SA
the
shut
seat,
driver’s
cmntv. The subject then sat down in the
and attempt to open the locked
door
side
the
jgo to
jould see Agen[
drivel’s
I
ct[
Igivingsubje
Iconuuands but again the subject
door. He could hear Agentl
was non-compliant.

s/I

lounded on the
With his weapon still pointed at the sulject, SAl
open the
yelled
at
subje
hand
and
ofthe
his
left
passenger side windoi,r
Iqep with
SA
ofhis
pants.
pocket
front
right
his
into
hand
I
Iplaced
his
right
locked door. Subject
When
the
weapon.
type
of
some
for
was.reaching
lonce again thought the subject
I
I
subject removed his hand the male had an open pack of óigarettes in his hand. Subjecl
may
the
subject
I
believed
S/I
again
ar4y
pocket
then placed his left hand in his left
Is hand came into view it appeared to be holding
be going for a weapon. When subject I
a lighter.

3

 kad now moved into a
SAl
Inoticed at this time that AgeJ
position directly in front of the black 3eep. He also realized at thisilme the 3eep was now
I
running. His immediate concern was the subjct drivmnn forward and striking Agenti
Ipounded on the passenger side window
who was in the vehicle’s path. Once again SAl
and yelled to the subject that ifhe drove forward he would shoot. He repeated this command
once again as lopd as be could to ensure the subject could hear him. He also confirmed at this
time that Agent
Ivas still in the vehicle’s pathway.
A LAPD officer had come along side the passenger side ofthe vehicle next to
lo take a
lie had a baton and told SAl
SAl
I position. He told S/I
step back. At this time the LAPD officer struck the passenger side wiadowcausing a portion of
it to break out.

blinked for a moment. He then observed
the glass broke, sil
ing wheel. The vehicle then
1
subjeci
Itake his righi hatd and nra the vejilcle’s stee
Iknew was still in the path ofthe
proceeded f9rward toWards Agent L__. Mio Aj
danger çf death or s;rious
imminent
an
loosed
subjecti
vehicle. SAl
believed
I
Hid
weapon.
S4
deadly
vehicle
as
a
the
using
physical injury to Agend
by
I.
disable
to
He
shoot
force.
did
not
ofdeadly
the
use
alternatives
to
not feel there were any safe
the moving vehicle or to prevent the escape ofthe subjct. His intent was to stop the threat
posed by the subject driving the vehicle towahis Agenti
I
Ifired two shots in rapid succession at the subject. Immediately
after the second shot, the vehicle caine to a momentary jialt and then immediately accelerated at
heft the parking lot area
a high rate of speed north through thealley. Aj ubinctI
standing outside of his vehicle.
was
lvho
Agenti
towards the alley he sped towards DCIS
[chicle approached. The
sbiectI
as
The vehicle had its drive?s side door open
causing it to slam shut. As
Ivehicle
subjecta vehicle stiick the open door of Ageni
Agen4
striking
missed
lwho had
narrowly
aubjeci
Ivehicle continued north it
struck.
avoid
being
to throw himselfup against his own vehicle to

SAl

twenty-five
Subjecti
I then led FBI and APD units 9fl an approximately
who
were
bad
I
SAsI
minute pursuit through the Los Angeles area.
the
the
pursuit,
During
subject.
pursuit
ofthe
witnesses to the shooting, were involved in the
him.
of
who
were
in
pursuit
units
LAP])
strike
subject on two separate occasions attempted to
LAPD
unoccupied
!ntoau
Ieçp
the
he
rammed
when
bventually was stopped
Subject I
unit which was parked at.the end ofan alley way in a storage facility.
Subject I
Ivas taken into custody at this point and medical aid was
ended. Paramedics arrived at the scene within a few
pursuit
requested at the site where the
Jaitial first aid and then transported
provided
subjecti
minutes of being called. They
California
for further medical care. It was
Nuys,
Van
in
Hospital
Presbyterian
him to Valley
determined the subject received a through and through bullet WoUttd itt his tight aim, just above
his elbow in his hunerus bone. The second roundwas foundin the vehicle pillar nest to thd
passenger side window. All rounds fired were accounted for following the incident.
4

 __________

.
,ihIectl
I

number 14
Angeles County.

Ec further identified ai

land
numbers.
I He uses several dates ofbirth and social security
His FBI
1 He was found to also have a no bail warrant for felony forgeiy in Los

lvere injured during the incident. In
br Agentb
NeIther SAl
addition, no one else was injured to include all law enfbrcement personnel and citizens.
It was determined the vehicle beIng driven by subject
theft of the vehicle was reported on Januazy 4, 1999.

I

Ivas stolen.

The

The Los Angeles FBI Agent Involved Shooting Team and the.LAPD North
Hollywood Shooting Team both responded to the scene. A joint investigation was conducted.
Neighorhood investigations were conducted at the shooting scene, along with
witness interviews.
Photographs were taken ofthe crime scene area by the Los Angeles FBI
photographers as well as the Los Angeles FBI Evidence Response Team (EaT).
The LAPI) furnished the FBI their written reports regarding the shooting incident
and the pursuit which followed.

I

Recovered at the shooting scene were to expended shçll casings from SA
tin pended rounds, one of
Iveapon. Recovered from the subject’s vebiçI
subject
struck
which appears to have been. the one which
I
I
On April 5, 1999, a Federal Complaint was tiled against subject’
charging him with one count of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 111, Assaulting a Federal Officer.
bad been incarcerated at the Los Angeles County University of
Subject I
us medical
Southern Ca1ifonia Medical Jll Ward. His patient file number wa4
were obtained
records
medical
subpoenaed
The
records were subpoenaed as of April 5, 1999.
prosecution
of subject
the
pendihg
Angeles
Los
on Anril 12 1999. They will be maintained at
charge.
Officer
(AFO)
Federal
nccming the Assault on a
I

Ivas released from the Los Angeles County USC Medical
Subjecti
He is currently in the custody ofthe U.S. Marshals pending
1999.
7,
Center’s Jail ward on. April
charge.
his prosecution for the AFO

5

 (121311199$)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Date: 09/22/1999
Attn:

Wiley D. Thompson III

Inspection DLvision
Contact:

Approved By:

Thompson Wiley P
Cordier Robert iT

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

297-RQ-A1271908-D

itle:

-rs7

ADMINIS’JRAIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING ZNCXDBT
0G/03/199
SALT LAKE CITY DXVXSXON

Synopsis: The Shooting ncident Review Group (SI.RG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurxe in th Salt tke City Division on
06/03/1999.
Special Agent (SA)
wired one round -rom
his Bureau-issued Remington Model 870 shotgun at a charging dog.
SflG members_recommended that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
las a result of his involvement i this shooting
i.ncident.
The discharge of his weapon was determined to be
appropriate and justi<fied, and in conformance with the FBI’s
deadly force policy.

I

Referene

Rôrt o Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
Jdated 06/28/1999.

Details: This commun.cation was prepared to fuznish the
analys, comments, and recommndations of the SXRG with
ret!erence to the captioned shooting.

1
2
2

-

-

Mr4
Im. 7142
MX4
IRni. 7fl6
(1- Mr. CousinC, Room S1SS)
Mr.I
‘ pom 7427
MsJ
(1
I, Room 7326)
Mr. Cordier, Room 7837
Ms. Oir
Ms
(1
Mr. Bieh
Mr. D
(1
Mr. Foran,
(Attention: Mr.
-

1
2

-

-

2

-

2

-

-

Mr. Midclleton,_Room 4042
(1.,- Ms.I
I
1anico
1 - MrI
1-MrJ
IFo
3.
Mr
I Room 7861
2

-

-

 p

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 09/22/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

In the late afternoon of 06/03/1999, members of the
Salt Lake City Division’s Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF> and
police officers of the Salt Lake City metropolitan area were
engaged in search and apprehension attempts of subjects who were
being sought in connection with the shooting of a poUce officer
from the Murray City (Utah> Police Department who had
been investigating allegations of a forgery at a local bank.
Information wa developed that the subject of the
shooting,I
J who was apprehended at the rear of a
local restaurant on the afternoon of 06/03/1999, had been
accompanied by an unknown female when he engaged in the shooting
of the aforementioned police officer. The information also
indicated that the female may be located at a specific duplex
residence in Salt Lake City.
A briefing was held to provide avajiable information to
involved law enforcement personnel on the tflP. ii. flPrjfleter was
established at the target residence and S?J
I along
with other law enforcement officers, was tasked with securing the
rear and the south side areas of this residence. s
i.nvestigators enteted the rear yard of this duplex residence, a
lape canipe exited a rear door and charged in the di:rectiofl of
I srJ
SAl
IdLscharged his BUreau-issued shotgun in the
The
di:rection of the canine, stri.king the ground near the dog.
dog retreated to the residence and no longer posed a threat to
investigative personnel.

I

On 09/14/1.999, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inspector
Robert J. Cordier, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting membe.rs of the SIRG
in attendance: I
i Trial tor.ney, Terorisiu and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I
Irial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
I Ur$t Chief. Transfer Unit, Admipistrative
services Division; 3$AI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division
I Unit Chief,
I
Firearms Training Unit, Training Divisionj
Unit Chief
1 NS-2A Unit. Global Sçction
NS-2, National Security
Division; and, I
iSupervisor, Washington Field
Off ice.
The only nonvoting member present wasi
I
Program and Management Analyet, Of Li cé of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

-

2

 I

To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 09/22/1999
Observations and Recommendations o the SXRG

The SIR reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis
1
1 and recommendations for corrective actions from an
observations
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations,
concerning training and/or safety &ssues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative atioxi if deemed necessary.
The SIRO metnbers unanimously agreed that the use of
deadly force by S
Iwas justi.fied and in conformance
with tIe FBI’s deadly force policy.

3

 _____las

To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom:
Znspectd.on Division
297-IQ-A12719o8-D O9/22/I999

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:
XSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHTNGTON, DC
That. p0 aaministrative action be taken against
a result of his involvement in this shootinç
6
b 70

4

 .

.

PD-204 (Rev. [2-1-95)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FederaJ Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Reprntof
Dale:

ASAC Kevin L, Perkins
June 22, 199.9

CaseID#:

66P-PH-86520

Thie:

SHOO’’ING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
JUNE 4, 1999

Characier;

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shooting incident involved a Special Agent (5A) of
the FEI assigned to the Philadelphia Division. The
incident occurred during the successful appreiension of a
wanted federal fugitive by members of Philadelphia
Division Squad 2.

Offite:

Philadelphia

DETAILS:

I

This shooting incident came about when FBI SAs,
acting in a surveillance role, came in contact with
I a known violent fugitive with a history
of using high speed chases as a mode of escape.
The FBI SAs involved in this incident were all
assigned to the Philadelphia Division’s Violent
Traffickers Project (VTP), Squad 2.
The VTP is tasked
with developing investigations focusing on the communities
most violent drug trafficking organizations.

Iwas originally known to the VTP
I
as a subject of an OCDETF matter (245F-PH-81831). This
particular OCDETF investigation_was divided between FBI
and ATF contingents with I
If ailing under the ATF
portion of the case.
As a result of the intelligence base developed
This docupent contains neither recosmendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It Is the
your agency; it and its contentS are no to be distributed outside your agency.

prDperty

csl the FBI and Is Loaned to

 _________

.

.

by the VTP, information was obtained on 6/2/99 concerning the
whereabouts of I
I described as a black male, date
of birth
Iwas believed to be ajanted
1 FBII
fugitive.
The initial information received noted thati
I
boasted he was wanted by the feds” and that he had no intention
of being captured. I
Itolci associates that with his prior
felony convictions he would most likely receive a life sentence
should he ever be caught.
The intelligence information indicated thati
Ihad
been recently known to frequent the 4600 block of Westminster
Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Acting upon the information,
members of the VT? began to conduct various records checks bp
determine the validity of the Intelligence.
It was detezmined
thati
F.ias indeed a federal fugitive wanted by ATF based
upon an arrest i-i-t- issued in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. I
Iwas charged in a complaint with being a
felon in n ciLofl of a firearm. Criminal record checks
revealec
Ihad an extensive arrest record for drug
distribution, aggravated assault, murder, and carryinq a firearth
without a license.
Ihad
The record checks also noted that I
twice been convicted on felony drug charges within the city of
Philadelphia.
The criminal checks were confirmed with both the
U.S. Marshals Setvice and ATF.
The ATF case Agent was identified
and contact was established.
The ATF case Agent confirmed that the warrant was
active and that ATF was seekingi
a Re noted that a
December 1998, attempted car stop of I
Iby the Philadelphia
Police Department resulted li-I
uccessfully avoiding
capture following a high speed car chase through the streets of
west Philadelphia. The ATF SA also warned that I
Iwas
wanted for felon in possession of a firearm and thati
Iwas
known to carry a gun.

I

On 6/3/99 Supervisory Special Agept

I Squad 2-VTP SSA, was briefed by SAl

(SSA)I

I

regarding the_information concerningi
I SSAI
I
directed SAT
Ito develop and prepare an operations plan for
the arrest of I
I
:,

I

On 6/4/99 at approximately 1:O0 p.m. SAl
Irecelved
additional information that indicatedj
Ihad just been seen
entering. a residecein be 4600 block of Westminster Avenue.
SA.
ILearned thati
Ihad driven to the area in a late_model
red Pontiac Grand Am with New Jersey license plates.
SAl____
immediately notified both SSAI
nd the ATF case Agent of
the sighting.
The ATF case Agent told Sal
Ithat he was on
leave but would attempt to respond to the location. With the
ability of ATF to respond in a timely manner in question, SSA
Idecided Squad 2-VTP should prepare for and make the
arrest.
2

TC

 .

.

SSAI
Igathered members of Squad 2-VTP for a
briefing.__Utilizing the operations plan prepared the previous
day SAL
Ibriefed members of the squad.
Each person present
rrnv r the operations plan which included a color
was provided
photograph of!_________ At the conclusion of the briefing,
members of the squad departed the office in route to the 4600
block of Westminster Avenue.

I

SSAJ
land SAl
Iwere the first to arrive in the
vicinity of 4OO Westminster. Upon arriving in the area they
immediately observed a red late model Pontiac Grand Am with New
Jersey license plates. The subject vehicle was parked_facing
east on the south side of Westminster Avenue.. SSA1
I
broadcasted the information over the Bureau radio to 9
thr
resooidino units.
A aecçnd Bureau car containing SAsI_______
I
Iwas second to arrive in the area.
SSA
Jdirected them not to pass the Grand Am and to tke a
surveillanc position east of the subject vehicle.
SSAI_________
and SAl
Itook a surveillance position approximately one biock
to the west of the subject’s vehicle.

I

Immediately upon initiating the surveillance SAI
contacted the ATF case Agent by cell phone.
The AT? Agent:
advised he was approximately five blocks from the surveillance
location and had approximately six TF SAs in route to the scene.
Upon receiving this information SSN
etermined that upon
AT”s arrival the FBI would assqrne an outer perimeter position
and ATF would effect the arrest of I
While speaking to the ATF Agent on. the cell ohone. SA
lobserved ai1r1 VTP nembers, Detectivel
land
Narcotics Agent I
iarrive on the scene and circle the
block while attempting to obtain a surveillance position.

E

As SAl
Iwas completing his conversation with the ATF
case Agent, FBI SA!
Iradioed that he observedi
lexit a
residence on Westminster Avenue and move toward the red Grand Am
as if to enter the vehicle. With this information, and based
upon the subjects history of high speed chases, SSAI
icrave
the order to execute the arrest.
SSAi
Idirected SAl
Ito
move his vehicle into a blocking position tthe çear of the
subjects vehicle.
He further directed SAs I
lanai
Ito
block the subject’s vehicle from the front.

SAl
limmediately moved his vehicle toward the red
Grand Am stopping at the left rear of the car in a blocking
position.
At this poiat,
was already in the driver’s
seat of the Grand Am.
SAl_____ o ed that the Grand Am’s reverse
lights were on.
The Grand Am was positioned between two other
leqallv parked vehicles. Having brought his vehicle to a stop,
SA[
lexited his vehicle, drew his 9mm semi-automatic pistol,
moved to the left of his car, and shouted several times “FBI,
3

 ________joar

.
hands up.
looked directly at SI_____ through the open
driver’s side window but did not comply with lus commands.
Instead, the Grand Am quickly accelerate forwrd out
f the
9
parking spot.
As he_entered the
ving lane!
I went
straight toward SAsI
positioned their
land
vehicle in such a way as to b oc
escape route to the
east. I
I mde an hard left urn o avoid the blocking
vehicle. I
continued his hard left turn and, with tires
screeching, cirove his vehicle across Westminster Avenue (a two
lane street) and onto the sidewalk. He continued driving the car
on tjie sidewalk passing between a utility pole and a hçdae.
SA
I continued to shout “FBI, stop the car, hands up”. I
cori1nued around the utility pole until he was facing southwest I
and, with the oar’s tires still screeching, drove off the
sidewalk back_cnpo the sreet arid accelerated directly toward SA
I r1ngj
scira to run over him, aimed
I sI
I
his pistol ati
and
fired.
passed by
J
on its driver’s side missing him by one or wo feet,

I

I
I

_____

I

After passing SAl
Ivehicle glanced off
another car parked at the curb on Westminster Avenue and
continued onto the sidewalk until finally colliding with a
building.
The impact of the collision was such that I
I
car bounced backwards before it came to a stop.. Although the car
had stopped, the engine was still racing. At this oin
A
ran tç the passenger side of I
Icar while SAsI
anci
lapproached from the drivers side.
1mmediately
SSAI
raaioed the office, reported the shooting and requested medical
assistance.
Within moments, other SAs, both PI and ATF, as well
as the Philadelphia Police began to arrive on the scene.

I
I was transported to the Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania (HUP) via Philadelphia Fire/Rescue
ambulance where he was treated for a bullet wound to the upper
left portion of his back. Following treatment of the wound,
I
I was released from HUP and immediately detained based upon
his fugitive status.

4

•

 12I3f!L9)
1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 01/12/2O00

inspection Division

From:

Wiley D. Thompson Ifl

rnspeccion
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

Attn:

Extension 1837

Thompsoz) Wiley D 1111
Cordier Robert J

I

I

rr

297-HQ-A1273.984-D

DMflISTRATXE XMQTJXRf
SHOOTIG IJCDB1IT
06/19/ .999
TRAINING DIVISXQN

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Tramniiig Division on
06/19/1999.
Supervisory Special Agent {SSA)l
I
f-i.red three shots from his Bsreaii-issued Glocic Model 22 pistol
injuring a dog which threatened him and his wife wh<le outside
their residence in Virginia. SIRG members opined that the zse of
deadly force by SSAI
Iwas appropriate ana in conformazce
with the deadly force policy. The SRG xecommended that no
administrative action be taken aainst SSPJ
las a result
of his involvement in this shooting incident.
Reference:. Referezice report of
09/01/1999.

Idated

Details: This communication was ppared to fisznish the
anysis, comments, and recommendations of the SXRG wit1
reference to the captioned shoot&ng.

1
2
2

-

-

1
2

-

1

-

-

Mr.I
1 Rm. 7142
Mr,L
IRm. 7116
(1 - Mn
Rm. 4944)
Mn
.
7427
I Rm. 7326)
(1 - Ms.I
Mr. Cordier, Rrn. 7837
Ms. Ginsbu.rq, DOJ
(1-Mr.I________
Mr. Falls, Rm. 6646

1
1

-

:j

-

1

-

2.

-

Mr. Middleton, Rm. 4042
uazktico
Mr.I
Mr4
_j km. 3787
rwFg
Mr.1
Mrsi________
-

 1

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271984-D, 01/12/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 06/16/1999, at pproximate1y 8:30 p!m.,
SSA1
iheard his wife screaming for help fxom
the garage area of their home located in_Frederic)çsburg,
Vi.rginia. Upon’hearing the screams, SSAI
Iretrieved his
weapon arid exited the house into the garage area. His wife
advised that a vicious dog had attempted to attack her and
SSAI
Iproceeded to the area where the dog was last seen.
Upoz seeing wo dogs, SSN
lyel:led and çn Op ipmediately
ran from the area. The second dog noticed SSA1
land
turned towrd him qow1ing and began moving toward him at a fast
pace. SsAI
I fi-red his weapon three times and the. dog fell
to the ground.. The dog subsequently got up and retreated into

the woods.

ontacted the police who responded to the
SSAI
residence to take a report of the incident.
On U/04/1999, the SERG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inpector
Robert J. Cordier, Office of tnspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the foUowing voting meers of the SIRG

in attendance:I
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Diviion, USDOJ; WiU.iam R. Fal.ls, Section Chief, Operational
Support Section, Administrative Services Division;
Charles H. Middleton, Section Chief. Global Sectiçn - NS’-2,
Iational Secrity Division; SSAI
I Legal Advice
and Trainin, Legal Pol:icy, Off:ce of the General Counsel;
I
I Unit chief, Firearms - Tooljnaks Unit,
Sczentitic Analysis Section, abortory Division;I
I
1 Unit Chiaf, asset Forfeiture Unit, Operational Suppozt
I
ecton, Criminal nvestigati’e Di’isionl
I Unit
Chief, Fiearms Training Unit, Training Division; and,j________
SUpervsor, Washinaton Field Qfice. The only non-voting
I
member present wasL
I Program and Man.agement
Analyst, Office of tnspectons, inspection Division.
Observations nd Recommendations of the.SIRG

The SI.RG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evalunte the application of deadly force;
(2 provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recomiendations for coreçtive actions erorn an

2

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Xnspection. Division
297-HQ-A1271984-D, Ol/I2/2OOO

operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning trainixig and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIG members unanimously agreed that te use of deadly
force by SSAL
jwas justified.

3

 To:
Re:

]nspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271984-D, O./12/2OOO

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC

ssal

Tht

n€’

shooting incident.

rm
n
4
jstrative action be taken against
las a result of his &nvolvement in this

4

-

 _______observed

.

FD.204 (Rev. 12.1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

cow to:

Date:

ASAC Kenneth W. Kaiser
July 23, 1999

Cas]D#:

66F-IP-A84352

‘flUe:

SHOOTING INQUIf.Y
REPORT OF SHOOTflG INCIDENT
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JUIIY 12, 1999

Clzaracter

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Report of

SynopsIs:

Sal

Omee: Indianapolis

On Ju3y 12, 1999, at approximately 12:15 p.m.,
I Indianapolis Division, was involved in a

shooting incident that occurred in a parking garage near
20 North Pennsylvania Street, Indianapolis Zndiana
While
rrg in downtown In4ianapolis on official business, SA
4
heard shots in near proximity to his vehicle. SA
an individual apparently fleeing the scene
Ct the shooting, after which SAl
mmediately gave
chase, foflçwini f-he individual into a nearby parking
garage.
SA[
jobserved the individual point a weapon
at him, and he then identified himself as a police
officer, and ordered the individual to drop the weapon.
The ndividu1 turtled away and then again pointed the
weapon at SAj
I after whih SAl j fired one shot,
striking the inçzvidual in. the upper iet leg.
The
individual was shortly thereafter taken into custody. The
individual’s wound was not life threatening, and be ba.s
been charged locally with Attempted Murder, Cri.minaJ.
Recklessness and Theft, and federally with Assaulting a
Federal Officer.

DETAILS:
At approximately 12:15 p.m. on July 12, 1999,
Loss Prevention Officerl
I employed by the
Parisian department store located at East Washington and
This docuent contains neither feecoinenfattons nor conctuslons of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your ocnoy; it and Its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 ______Isubsequent].y

.

.

66F-I?-A84352

Meridian Streets, Indinanolis. Xndiapa, àbserved an individual,
later determined to bej
Johnston
Iplacing a pair of TM
and Murphy” shoes in a bag, and then attempt to leave the store
w.thout paying for them. Security personnel at Parisian
attempted to lock the doors to preventi
Ideparture, but he
broke through the doors and began running northbound on MeridIan
Street. He was confronted outside the store by Loss Prevention
Officer I
land a scuffle ensued with both falling to the
ground.
drew a weapon, according to Marin,
and fixed several shots at him, striking him onç 4n t)p upper
I began to
left shoulder. I
disengaged himself frctnI
walk or run away, and then turned back_toward’
firing one
more shot. This shot struck passerbyl
itn the
leg.. At approximately the same time, SAl
J who was
traveling in his FBI vehicle, westbound on Washington Street, a
one-way westbound street, heard several qunshots and saw an
individual latex determined to bel
I runnng from the
vicinity of the shots fired. At least s.x witnesses observed the
scuffle and subsequent shooting of I
laud his
Ibyl
attetupteçl eae into a nearby parking garage. Most stated they
observedi
Icarrying a pair of shoes and what appeared to be
a gun tucked under one of his arms.
These witnessçs also
observed an individual they later learned to be SAl
I
exit his car and follow the escapingi
jinto a nearby
parking garage. No witnesses awJh shooting inside the parking
garage, although some heard SAj
lysil at the escaping I
to Stop”
Upon voluntary interview, S2I
I advised that at
approximately 12:1S p.m., on Monday July 1.2, 1999, he was
traveling westbound on East Washington Street stopped in traffic
between Pennsylvania and Meridian Streets. He heard what he
believed to be two or three gunshots, which immediately focused
his attention. He observed several people diving for cover with
the appearance that those individuals were being threatened. He
then observed a young, medium built, black male hurriedly
crossing Washington Street in the middle of the block, past
parked vehicles. This indivdua1, according tol
I was moving
rapidly aw’ fvTh the area of what he believed was the shooting
scene, audi
Ifurther stated he believed this individual was
involved in that shooting. SAl
ladvised that he did notice
the individual carrying somethz.ng tightly to his chest, although
he did not see a weapon at this point. SAl
limmediately
placed the Bureau vçhicl in park, obtained his Bureau weapon,
and gave chase. Sal
If ollowed the individual no;thçtd in
an alley located beteei Penylvania ad Meridian Streets. SA
ol1owed the individual, who was til1 dãxing several
I
items iii his arms, into a parking garage entrance. As he
2

 _______Idenied

.

V.

66F-XP-A84352

approached the doorway entrance, he observed this individual
crouched near a corner of that parking garage facility
approximately io yards from his position. At this time, the
individual began placing the items he
€ryina on th ground.
The individual turned and looked at SAl
]
immediately observed a weanon in his hand? and that the weapon
was pointed at him. SN
ladvised that he instantaneously
stated, “Police. Drop thc4un.” The individual did not drop the
gun, turned away from Sal
land then began to turn and leave
his crouchd oosLtion, again pointin the weapon directly at SA
I
I siq
I fired one round at the individual, which he
believed hit him, because the individual stopVacLan dropped to
one knee, still holding on to the weapon. Sal
Jagai.n ordered
the indiy41 to drop the gun, which the individual did, after
which Sal
lorderedlim to s11.de th weapon away from him.
Again, the subDect complied. Sal
lapproached the individual,
did a cursory pat down search, and noticed that in fact the
individual had been shot in the upper left leg. SAl
lyelled
to witnesses and a garage attendant to notify the police and send
an aifLbulance. One arrived shortly thereft jnd a police
officer placedi
tin handcuffs. sal
Ithen returned to
his vehicle to move it nearer the shooting scene and radioed the
Indianapolis Office advising them of the incident. Xndian.apolis
personnel then responded to the scene.

sal_______

Iwas interviewed by Indianapolis Police
I
Department officers and voluntariay waied his right to remain
silent.)
122 page statement is largely incoherent and
contradictory. He states that he was shopping in the Parisian
department store, and as he left, two men jumped on him as he
left the building. He alleges the individuals that jumped him
were attempting to rob him and that they fired several shots at
him. I
I stated that it was after these individuals began to
shoot at him, that he fixed a shot at them, believing they were
going to kill him. He advised he then tried to escape the scene
in an attempt to locate his vehicle and leave. He advised as he
left the scene he heard several more shots
1 including some fired
by individuals in a van coming down the street. As he turned
into the parking lot where his “ride” was located, a guy stepped
around the corner, “pulled out his arm but he said drop it,” “drop
it,” “drop it.” He stated SAl
Ishot him at least two times,
after which Sal
came up to him and said, “Give me ht you
cfot man, give me what you got,” implying that he believed that SA
attempting to rob him.
shoplifting any
items from the Parisian department store.
Investigation by FBI Indianapolis ERT personnel and IPO
off icers revealed no other shell.s recovered from any.weapon, other
3

 66F-IP-A84352

.

thanl
1.4° caliber semi-automatic pistol, and no other
witnesses observed any other individuals carrying or firing
weapons during the initial scuffle.

sal
igun was recovered and determined to have one
mgazine., BRT’s crime
round chambered and eight rounds ir
scene search and examinat4on of siI
Iweapon determined that
he fired only one round. I
Iweapon was recovered at the
scene and was determined 1o nave o’ne round in the chamber and one
round in the magazine.
I

On Tuly 16, 1999, Marion County, Indiana Prosecutor
ladyised that his office would not empanel a Grand
Jury investigation into* the police action shooting, inasmuch as
it was apparent that ai_______ actions in shooting I
1ere
justified.
On July 14, l999L
has charged on a Complaint
issued out of the Southern D.stict of Indiana with Assau1tiig a
edera1 Officer. I
I continues to be held in the Marion
county Jail on these charges.
-

4

 PD.204 (Rev. 12.4.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Tuvesfigation

Copy to:

Reprtof:
Date:

IIPI
August 2,

CaseIDfl:

297-HQ--A1271908-D

Tt1e:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
SALT LA.KE CITY DIVISION
JULY 15, 199

Charecier:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsit:

This shooting incident was a result of the
escape by Foster from the Promontory Correctional Facility
and two subsequent bank robberies at First Security Bank
of Murray, 4730 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
the Zions Bank at 4500 South 845 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on July 8, 1999.

1999

I

Indianapolis

DETAILS:
On the morning of July 8, 1999, Poster walked
away from a work release progr&m at the Promontory
Correctional Facility. An arrest warrant was issued by
the State of Utah the next day.
Between the hours of 9:00
a.m. and 11:00 a,m., a white 1998 Lincoln was stolen in
Murray, Utah.
At approximately 12:10 p.m. a lone white
male entered the First Security Bank of Murray, Utah,
displayed a handgun and robbed the bank.
Upon entering
the bank, the robber said, ‘Everybody down. This is a
robbery.’
The robber then exited the bank and fled in a
stolen vehicle, which was recovered later in the day.
Total loss to the bank was $11,850.
The bank surveillance
cameras were activated du-ring the robbery.
Later that day
the Zions Bank in Salt Lake City was robbed by a lone
white male who entered the bank and stated he had a gun.
Although a gun was not shown, he kept his hand in his
pocket and indicated that he had a gun.
Total loss to the
bank in this robbery was $7,480.
Physical description and
modus operandi were similar in both robberies.
Stanley
This docuent contains neither recocrrrndatlons nor concLUsions of the FBI. It is
the property of the FBI and is Loaned to
your agency; it and Its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 .

297-HQ-A1271908-D

Foster was later identified through a photo spread by the victim
teller in the First Security Bank of Murray robbery where
the
weapon was displayed.
Fosters name had come up through a
Department of Corrections source who identified Foster as
performing the robbery.
On 07/15/1999, the FBI Violent Crime Task Force (VCTF)
was working a separate fugitive case in addition to the Stanley
Foster investigation.
The VCTF was surveilling a location where
a fugitive was believed to be residing
r11 in thc day. t-h
VCTF had developed information through
that indicated that Foster was using drugs and frequented gay
bars in Salt Lake City.
Specifically, he had been in a bar
called “Bricks’ the night before. Additionally, a possible
vehicle for Foster had been determined.

I

At approximately 9:00 p.m., the surveillance on the
other fugitive investigation was terminated due to the fact that
the VCTF believed they had been compromised. All surveillance
personnel returned to a staging area near the surveillance scene.
At that time volunteers wçre ask4 to stay tç assist on the
Foster investigation. SA
jthen provided a briefing to the
individuals who were stain about Foster. Present at t4iis
briefing were SM
L
I SAl
I
p and Deputy U. S. Marshal (DUSM)I
i SAl
I
detailed that Foster was a prison ecapee who had been identified
in at least one bank robbery. Additionally, SAl
Irélayed
that a weapon had been displayed in one robbery and Foster should
be considered Armed and Dangerous. I
I showed both the bank
robbery surveillance photo and an arrest photo of Foster.
The
briefing started about 9:15 p.m. and lasted approximately 10 to
15 minutes.
The personnel involved in the briefing departed with
the objective of locating Foster’s vehicle and possibly making
contact with “ricks” management to determine whether Foster
frequented there in the past.

I

.

SAl
Iearted the briefing location to begin
spot checks.
Jdrove past “Brick&’ and spotted an
SAl
indivjdu1 he believed to be Foster next to a pickup truck.
SA
Jturned around and made a seqond oass by the vehicle to
oDcain tne license plate number.
SAl
Icalied the plate
number into the FBI office fçv a li1se check
The license
plate came back negative andi
Itnade a third pass by
11 and observed the same individual.
“Bricks
SA[
Inotified
th cthc- rveillance units by radio that this might be Foster.
SAl
Ithen proceeded down the street from “Bricks” where he
2

:6

J b?C

 ________land

.

______

297.-HQ-A1271908-o

observed Police Of ficexi
who was makin issuing a
ticket to an individual. At this point s
exited his
vehicle and began talking to Police Officer
He advised
that several Agents would be responding to the “Bricks Bar” to
arrest an Armed an4 Danaerois bank robbery suspect and prison
escapee.__While SAI
land
Iwas out of his car, OUSMI
SAl
I arrived at sricJcs.” DUSMI
I had attempted to
contact
I via the radio on two occasions, but received no
response.

)

At this point, DUSMI
lwho was designated the task
force coordinator, believed that there were good circumstances to
effect the arrest.
DTJSM I
Jassessed the fact that there were
few bystanders, the area was well lit, and Foster was out of his
vehicle.
Other considerations were the fact that he had been
unable to raise other task force members via the radio and the
concern that the sub ect might have recognized or “made” law
enforcement passes by “Bricks Bar” and flee.
DUSM I
I parked their vehicles sauth
land S?1
of the subjeqt’s vehic.e and began walking towards him.
DUSM
SJ
approached Foster from the back of the
veflicies that were parked facing “Bricks.” As they approached,
Foster opened his driver’s side door, possibly with hi left
hand.
the passenger
DUSMI
ltook a position of rriside rear whesi ot Foster’s truck.
SAl
Iwent to a position
of cover at the back of the vehicle parked north of Foster’s
truck.
DUSMI
Idrew his weapon, pointed it at Foster, and
yelled, “Police.
Get your hands up.” SAl
lalso drew his
weapon, ‘pointed it at Foster, arid yelled, “FBI.
Get your hands
up.”
Foster looked at SAl
land pu hi hnds in the air.
As Foster was looking at N
icommanded Foster
I SA
to “go down on the ground.”__Foster, withou receiving a command, ]
turned away from DUSMI
land SI
At this point,
Foster’s back was facing SAl
land DUSMI
I Foster
then, slowly and_deliberately, lowered his right hand toward his
waist.
Both SAl
I began yelling, “Get your
J and DUSMI
hands up.” This ciomrnrn5 was repeated at least three times. At
this point DUSM I
Irepositioned hintself toward the driver’s’
side of the rear of Foster’s pickup truck in order to obtain a
better angle from which to fire on Foster if necessary. IJUSM
lwas concerned about possible_anqies of fire and possible
stray shots or 4cochets. OUSMI
Ibelieved at this time that
Foster was not responding normaiiy to Law enforcement commnds
Foster was standing next t-- hLc open vehicle door and DUSM

.

believed that he and SAl
Iwere in imminent danger from a
clear potential_threat posed y the furtive movement of Foster’s
hand.
]hen fired two rounds from his handgun and
SAl
3

 297-HQ-A1271908-o

struck Foster twice, once in the wrist and once in the left chest
area.
Emergency Medical Services responded to the scene and
attempted to revive Foster. Foster was transported to a hospital
and pronounced DOA.

•

.

Non-law enforcement witn’__intviews at the scene
verify the statement given by DTJsMI
heiative to the
attempted arrest and shooting of Foster. Autopsy results also
indicate that Foster’s posture was probably moderately bent at
the time of the bullet’s entry. A crime scene search at the
shooting scene produced the following items.
In Foster’s left
hand was a plastic baggie filled with a white powder. This
substance was field tested and found to be cocaine.
Additionally, inside Foster’s pickup truck were eight syringes
filled with an unknown liquid. These syringes have been sent to
the State of Utah Labs for testing. Once SSAI
Squad
Supervisor) arrived on the scene, he coordinated with the Salt
Lake City Police_Department relative to the collection of
evidence.
SSAI
I also located SAl
land DUSMI
Ito
assess their situation and to separate them from the others at
the shootixg scene. Additionally, he brought a second weapon to
SAl
I whose weapon was provided to the Salt Lake City
Police Department for ballistic testing. Upon the arrival of
ASAC James Jarboe, J. Stephen Tidwell, and SAC David Tubbs, the
crime scene investigation was coordinated with Salt Lake City
officials on the scene. Appropriate Employee Assistpnc Proram
(EAP) counseling was provided to SN
land DUSM
J

4

  

1999

Savage-1687

 

 

___________
_________
____________

(12131/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Date: 09/20/1999
Attu:

Inspection Division
contact: I

Approved By:

Wiley D. Tb

pson III

1837

I
4ji

Thompson Wiley D iii

Drafted By:I_______________ 11. r
Case ID #:
Title:

)b 6

297-HQ-A1271781-D

ADMTISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
02/28/1.999
NBIIARK DIVISION

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Newark Divis,ion on
02/28/1999.
Special Agent (SA)I
Ifired one
round from her Glock pistol, Model 27, 40 caLiber Smith and.
Wesson, at a subject during an attempted arrest.
SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against
SAl
p as a result of her involvement in this shooting
incident.
Reference:

I

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place (XIP)
I dated 03/26/1-999.

Details:

This communication was prepared to ffrnish the
analysis, conmeñts, and recommendations of the SXRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Mr. I
Mr. I
(1

Rm. 7142
Rm. 7116
rtii
Room 515S)
2
Mn
I Rcom 74.27
Ms.I
(1
IRoom 7326)
I.
Mr.
pRoom 7837
IDOJ
2-Ms.!
I
(1-Ms.!
LflOJ
2-Mn
I
(1-Mn
2
Mr. Foran, Room 6646
(Attention: Mr4
I
1

2

-

-

-

-

2

-

Mr.

I

(1-Ms.I

1
1
2.

-

Mr.I
Mr4
Mr

I

Room 4042

[uantico
IWFO

Room 7861

-

b6

-

Savage- 1688

 0

r

TO:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ—A1271781-D, 09/20/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

SAl
I acting in an undercover
capacity for the INNOCENT IMAGES Task Forces logged onto America
Onl.ine as a 14 year old girl from New. Jersey. While in the chat
room, an indiviçin1 uig the screen name of I
linitiated a
chat with her. I
lwho later identified himself as
I indicated an interest in meeting the 14-year old
for the pi.rpose of engagnri n xual activities. During
subsequent chat sessions[
Idescribed in detii1 ereyits that
would take place between the female and himself. I
I agreed
to meet the 14-year old female on Sunday 02/28/1999, at the
Bridgewater Sports rena (B$A).
In anticipation of the meetn with the subject, as
well as to prepare for his arrest, SAl
Iprepared an
operation order which was approved by a supervisor and an
Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Newark Division. On
02/28/1999, a meeting was held with all participants of the
proposed arrest and individual assignments were made in
conjunction with the execution of the arrest.
At appro,dmately 10:15 a.m., the arrest team açrived at
the BSA and assumed positions in their vehicles. I
larrived,
entering the one-way drive rztrance, at the proposed meeting place
driving a van fitting the description that he had previously
provided. SAl
lnoti:fied tile other pnits by radio that the
van was approaching the BS. A
frehicle approached the
SEA, vehicles with arrest tm mmh mrr in to block hs
f,m
np
I with
bb
SAl
s a passenger, drore her Bureau vehicle
7C
toward I
land positioned it perpendicularly in front of his
vehicle. Other arrest participants placed their vehicles in
designated areas in an attempt to block any escape route.
Znvestigator I
I who was alone in I&s
vehicle, exited and approached the subject at the driver’s side
window of the van. I
isplayed his Middlesex County
P.rosecutor’s Office badge tcf
I who had both hands an the
steering wheel and was lookng out the windsheld toward the right
side of the vehicle.
riocked on the
Investigatori
window and opened the driver’s doqr. piacing one fçot on the
running board of the vehicle.
Asi
Isaidl
grabbed the gear shift while he was being told to put it in park,
put it in park.” I
Ivehicle lunged backwards, then forward.
The forward rpotion forced the driver’s door to close and
Investigatorl
fell off the running board and away from
2

Savage- 1689

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781-D, 09/20/1999

the vehicle. As this was happening, other members of the arrest
team exited
take positions around the subject’s
vehicle. S
erved the actions between
the subject an
nves iga or
had to move out of the
way to avoid being hit by the su jects vehicle.
lpositioned herself to the rear passenger side
of I
Ivehic.e. Upon exiting her vehicle on the passenger
side, S,,A I
Jwent to the passenger side rear and moved up the
side o
Frehicle to determine if there were any passengers
inside. As I
Irehicle gained traction and moved forward
rapidly, SJ
had to :jump backward to keep f.rom being hit by
the side ot the vehicle. Kpowina tht SAl
Iias in front
of the subject’s vehicle, S1
Ijas concerred that I
I
vehicle was going to hit and kiU $. I
I
As the arrest participants watched the movement of the
subject’s van, and knowing the positions of the law enforcement
personnel around the subject, SAl
Idrew her weapon as she
was moving from the van’s path. Believing that the roidlv
moving vehicle was going to hit her, she took aim at I
I and
fired a shot through the vehicle’s passenger side w&now. he
subject’s ve1ii1evered left and around the b1ockade of cars
before hm.
I continued toward a jug handle turn in the
roadway which provided a means of escape.

lexited the driveway to the BSA rfla)ing a right
I
tun onto Frontier Road, with the arrest team in pursuit. As he
eached the dead end of the road I
Ituzned his vehicle
around and headed back towards an arrest team member’s vehicle.
ReaIizina tiat he subiect was cnii.ng in ther direction,
I andi
SAsI
osjtjoned their vehicles in an attempt
to block the subject’s vehicle as it approached. Traveling at a
high rate of speed,l
L’ehicle went around the Agents’
yehicles continuing eastbound. After traveling approximately
one-half miaej
IpuUed his vehicle over to the right
shoulder of the road ending his escape attemot. Azrest team
personnel blocked the vehicle and orderel
Ito e<it the van.
The subject was searched and handcuffed and taken to the
Bxidgewater PoI4ce eadquarters where he was processed and
interviewed.
.

I

cG

On 09/14/1999, the SIRG met to discuss the
ahore-cattiened slooting incident. Acting Chief 1nsector
I Office of Inspections, Inspectiofl Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting menbers of the SZRG
3

Savage- 1690

 V

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781-D, 09/20/1999

L

iTrial

in attendance:
Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent Crimes Seçt1on, Crimiiiäl Division, USD03;
Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USD03;
Unit Chief. Transfer Unit, Administrative
Services Division; SSA I
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy
1 Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chef Ooerational Support Section,
Imi4s- ‘hc
Criminal Investigative Division;I
Firearms Training Unit, .Training Division;j
Unit Chief, S-2A Unit, Global Section
S-2, National SecIty
Division; and,j
ISupervisor, Washington Field
Office.
The only nonvoting metnier present wasi
P.rogram and Management Analyst,. Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.

I

.

I

-

Observations and Recommendations of the IRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
obsrvtions, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Based on their review of this ncident, SrRG members

unpiimrnilv aared tht the use of deadly force by
SAl
Iwas justified and in conformance with the

deadly force policy.

Several obsrvtions were made by SrRG members
regarding this arrest situation. The first observation pertained
to the di.ff.iculty of employing ‘ehicle stops.
Members opined
that vehicle stops are usually difficult and in Ch&s particular
incident, the positioning of the Bureau vehicles did not preclude
the subject’s escape.
The SIRG recommended that the Special Agent in Charge
(SAC), newark, ensure that felony vehicle stops be emphasized
within the freainz txaining curriculum for the division.
Xn
particular, it was suggested that this flJIOCBNT.IMAGES
investigative team receive specific training together in this
discipline to pro’-ide for thei;r effective engagement in this
technique should similar circumstances arise in future arrest
situations. Members agreed that although acceptable, the arrest
plan did not assign specific duties for the law enforcement

4
Savage-1691

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781-D, 09/20/1999

indjvidual on the scene.
1 the plan did not address
in addition
potential contingencies such as the subject
s noncompliance or an
1
eventual vehicle pursuit. Emphasis was placed on the fact that
there is always a need for contingency planning in the event that
the proposed arrest plan does not materialize due to unforeseen
circumstances.
It was further noted that no investigative
personnel xemined at the scene of the shooting to preserve that
location or to verify that no personal injuries had been
sustained to arrest team members.
The final criticism made about this incident pertained
to the contents of the shooting report. Members noted that this
report contained information that was not pertinent for the
SIRO’s review, speci.f-icafly an entire Group I Undercover
Operation proposal for the Newark Division’s NOCENT IMAGES
initiative.
SIRG members noted that the Inclusion of these
documents into shooting reports could result in their being
subject to discovery f these &ncidents move to the prosecutive
realm.
It was determined that this issue wou1d be addressed with
the SAC, Newark, and that it would be also addressed in the
future training of tIPs regarding shooting inoident
investigations.

S

Savage- 1692

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Xnspection Division
297-HQ-A1271781-D, 09/20/1999

IAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
!NSECTIØN.DtVIStON
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no adn4nistrative action be taken against
a result of her invblvement in th.Ls
shoot.ing 3.nc1cien.

6

Savage- 1693

 .

_________I,

_________
_____
__

(1213U1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTK3ATION
Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Date: 09/20/1999

Inspection Division

From:

Attu:

Wiley D. Thompson XXI

lnspection D”-n

Case XD

t:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
03/08/1999
$ALT LAKE CITY DIVISION

•

297-HQ-A1271908-D

Synopsis: The Shooting Xncideit Review group (SXRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Salt Lake City Division on
03/08/1999. During a suveil1ay t the 1ccHnn cf a suspected
bank robber, Special Agent (SA) I
fired his
weapon in response to shots being tre trom unlc.nown individuals.
SAl
Iwas accompanied by anotizer officer who had been bit
twice by gunfire. SIRG members recommended that no
aduinistrative action be taken against SAl
las a result of
his involvement in this shooting incident. His discharge of his
weapon was determined, to be appropriate and :justified, and in
ccnformance with the FBrs 4adly force policy.

I

Referenc: Roort of Sunøvisory Special Agents (SSAs)I
panc1
hated 03/26/1999.

I

Details: Ths communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned siooting.
1 - Mr.j
jRm.. 7142
2-Mn
7116
Mr. Cousins, Room 51S5)
(2.
2
Mn
IRoom 7427
(3. - MS. L
L Room 7326)
I - Mr
IRoom 7837
2-Msl
Lno
(1 - M I
2-Mr.I
IDOJ
(1- Mr.F
I
2 - Kr. Foran, Room G46
(Attention
Mr.I
-

2

Mr.I________ Room 4042
(3. —•‘
I
3. - Mr..
uantico
-

1-Mr.
3. - Mrs

I7FO
Room 7861

I

Savage- 1694

/

 It

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 09/20/1999
petails of the Shooting Incident

On the evening of 03/08/1999, police officers and FBI
SAs, assigned to the Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF), set up
surveillance on a residence in Salt Lake City, where bank robbe
subiect,I
I had been observed. SA
I
I and Department of Corrections Agent
maintained a location where they could v
nt o the
hduse while Detectives
1
land
of the
Salt Lake City Police Department (SLCPD) were located at the rear
of the residence.
According to 514
I
I while sitting in Agenti
car, he heard two g.th shots whie1 sounded as if they came from
the rear of the residence. He broadcast “shots fired’s over the
Bureau rad-’
then saw four to five muzzle flashes to his
cked down in the car, quickly real-izing that
1
IA
right. SAL
he arid Agent I
Iwere being fired on.
SA
4exited the vehicle from the passenger side
while AgentF
bxitd from the driver’s side. As he was
exiting the ehicle, SAl
aw three or four muz1e flashes
coming from a house lust north of the residence under
sirveil-1ance. As SAl
I .ran from the vehicle, he fi%r’ed one
shot in the direction of themuzzle flashes and took a position
at the rear of the vehicle behind the right rear wheel. Agent
I
l’ias also ret1Inh1 re in the_direction of ti-ze muzzle
flashes. Neither slj
br Agenti
ossessed a hand held
radio which resulted in other officers losing radio contact with
them when they exited the vehicle.
Agent I
Iyeed that he had been hit which
sL_lunderstoo to mean that he had been shot. Thinking
that Agent J
Iwas seriously injured, SAl
Ireached into
I
Ivehicle and grabbed the Bureau radio mi•lce and_broadcast
that they were under hea’y fire and nødJielp. SA I
Iheard
a bullet hit something and saw Agenti
Igo down again.
Istated that he had been hit in thejiead. It was
I
subsequently determined that Agenti
bras struck twice, once
in the head and once in the chest. is he)jnet deflected the shot
to his head and due to the fact that he was wearing a protective
‘rest, his only injury was a bruise to his chest.
I left their positions behind
SAl
I and AgentL
the vehicle and retreated to a position of cover at a warehouse
to the east of their location
Shortly 1
theeafter another FBI
SA and two SLCPD of-ficers came to assist SAl
land Agent

2

Savage-1695

7c

 ________.s
_______________Trial

To:
Re:
I

I

•
•

I

I

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQAl2719O8-D, 09/20/1999

I wounds were checked and he was subsequently
transported from the scene in the back seat of a police vehicle.
A subsequent investigation determined that subject
I who was present in the brick house originally being
surveilled, was not involved in shooting at the law enforcement
officers on the scene: Two individuals
1 identified as
andi_____________________
present
I
in the house trçm wherethe shots were being fired.
Iwas indicted by a Federal Grand Jury and
being held indefinitely ozi a material witness
warrant.
On 09/14/1999, the SIRG met to discuss the
ooting incident. Acting Chief Inspector
L office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the folowing voting members of the SIRG
in attendance:
Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
ITrial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOZr;
I Unjt Cb
Unit, Administrative
Services Division; SSAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section hef. Ooératiopal Support Section,.
Criminal InstigatiQ’e Division;I
I Unit Chief.
Fi:rearms Training Unit, Training Division; I
I
Unit Chief, NS-2A Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security
Division; and,i
I Supervisor, Wshington Field
Office. 1’he only nonvoting member present wad
Program and Management Analyst., Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative ana1yis,
observations, aid recommendations for corrective actions f:rom an
operational standpoint (if any), (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues, and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
he SXRG members unanimously a9reed that the use of
deadly force by SAl
Iwas justified apd in
conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.

3

Savage-1696

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 09/2O/L999

IAD (s):
Set Zead 1:
TtTSPECTIO DWISION
A WaSHINGTON, DC
That no adminiçtrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his ino1vement in this
shooting incident.
b6
1b70

-

4

Savage- 1697

 __________________

___________
___________
__________
______________
___________
_
____

S

(t2I3!I99S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF lNVESTGATION

Precedence:

To:

ROUTINE

Date: 09/21/1999

Inspection Division

From:

Inspection Driq,,n
Contact:

Approved By:

Case ID :

Wiley D. Thompson III
Extension 1837

Thomoson Wiley D I)I

I

Drafted ByL

Title:

Attn:

297-HQ-A1271970-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

SHOOTING INCIDENT
03/17/1999
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
•shooting incident that occi.ftred in Kensincton, Maryland, on
03/17/1999. Special Agent (SA) I
ired three
rounds from his Sig Sauer P220 pistol at a fugitive who attempted.
to evade being captured by shooting at agents during a 20 mile
chase which ended with his arrest. SIRG members_recommended tbat
no administrative action be taken against SN
s a result
of his invo1vemnt izi this shooting ircident. His discharge of
his weapon was determined to be appropriate and justified, and in
conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
Reference: Ieport of WFO Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
Ellen B. Knowlton, dated 05/26/1999.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments and recommendations of the SIRG with reference
to the captioned shooting.
I
3

Mr4
m. 7142
Mr.I________ Rm. 7116
(1 - Mr. Cousins, m. 5155)
MrJRm. .5012)
(1
2
MrJ
IRm 7427
(I. - Ms.I
I Rm. 7326)
Mr.
3.
IRm. 7837
2
Ms.
I DOJ
I
(1-Ms.I
IDOJ
2-Mr.[
I
(1- Mr.I

2

-

Mr. Foran, Rm. 6646

2

-

(3.-Mr.I
Mn

(1-Ms-I

1

-

Mr4

1-Mr4

1

-

r4r4

-

Savage- 1698

ki, Rm.. 4042

Jiintico
WFO
, Rm. 7861

6
b 77

 _____ISAI
_____had

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271970-D, 09/21/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 06/26/1998, siJ
Iwas assigned an
investigation pertaining tel
kho was wanted for
Uri1wfii1 1ight to Avoid Prosecution for an armed murder.
SAl
Iwas a member of the WFO’s Joint Fugitive Task Force
(JFTF) which was headed by Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
Sergeant I

a lengthy criminal history including
charges nvolviza weaqons, drugs, assault, explosives, robbery,

I had information thati
and murder.
SAl
Imay have been
involved in the shooting of a car dealer, as wel.l as shooting at
MPfl
Mpntgomery County Police Department (MCPD) officers.
I conducted numerous survei.llances and “turn-Up”
operations .from June 1998 to 03/14/1999, in an effort to locate
and apprehend the subecj. Throughout his fugitive
investigation, SAl
Ikept his fellow Cask force members
apprised of his information regardingl
land he had passed
ou Dhotoçraphs of this fugitive as they became available to him.
laiso maintained appropriate lfiaison with the Baltimore
SAl
Office of the PBI and_representatives of the MCPD who were also
actively looking for I
I
-

On 03/14/1999, MCPQexecute4 a search warrant on the
apartment of an ass.ociate nfl
lwhich led to the issuance
of an arrest warrant
Ifor drug possession. On
hrrestedl
Ln the District of
(!nlnmbi (DC).
I

1
for

_______

I

SUrveillance began on the apartment ofi
Ion
03/16/1999, with no success. On 03J1711999. SAl
and
I
Deputy United States_MarshaL (DUSM)L
iducted an
hpatnt mp1ex which resute in a
investigation ati
positje identi4catjon of
nd an associate identified as
larranged for a maintenanç m pt the
apatment complex to perform a maintenance check oni
I
as well as a close-by apartmext occupied by
I who had been making numerous telephone calls to the
[
Iapartment. The tnaintenance worker positively ident’ified
1
las being located in
lapartment and advised that the
subject was hiding in the bathroom.
-

2

Savage- 1699

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271970-D, 09/21/2.999

At aDcrodmately 12:00 noon, SAl
Icalled
Sit
I and asked her to mobilize all_available task
force members and alerted her to advise Sergeanti
Inot to use
MPD radio because I
Ihad a police scanner in the apartment.
SAl
lalso called on his Bureau radio for any units in the
area and received a respcin fom SAl
I who_oositioned
herself at the front oft
partmene complex. SAl
‘and
DUSMI
istayed at the side of the complex and at
atproximately_12OS p.m., individuals fitting the description of
I
Iard I
I exited the building and departed the area.
SAl
Ihad rçrnMng task force members check several known
locations where’
imay have gone but without success. Not
being able to surfac
lat
e locations,
SAL
balled off the search
members returned to the
however, returned to thel
Iapartment
established a surveillance with the assistance of SA

I

I

hr-t1y thereafter,I
Iwas observed in the parking
lot ofl
Ipartment building, driving a gray Oldsmobile. The
vehicle uade a U-turn and drove out of the complex with SAl
1
I following.__Realizing that I
and DUSt4
Ihad made
lalled 911 and reported that
their suFvei1lance, DUSII
Iza engaging in a high-speed effort to elude capture.
aile th tqFO radio dispatcher and advised of the
S2I
situation. SA I
Jwas advised that the U.S. Park Police
helicopter would caiJ. them to assist. within a few moments, the
helicopter called and DUSMI
dvised them otheir tatus.
As they wçre leaving the apartment complex behind I
I
SAl
lactivated hs siren and wig-wag headlights, and the
blue flashing lights inside his Bureau vehicle, all of which
[.gnored.

I
lbegan crivina çrratically in an attmpt to
jand DUSMI
elude SRJ
I fi±ing three or four shots at
them during the pursuit. I
Icrossed the center median and
drove against the tra.ffic twice durinq the pursuit, which
conti.nued on the Capitol Beltway with I
lexiting at Route
193. I
I arrived at the intersection of Knowles Avenue and
Parkwood Drive in Kensingtozz, Maryland.__Severa vehicles were
stopped at this intersection causin I
I to slow down.
SAl
vehicle at this
lattempted to tra
intersectzon however
imm iately turned left on
Par]wood Drive.
wound up esrrinfr tj the left side of a
Volvo sedan while SA
and DUSM
Iparalleled him on
the opposite side of t is same vehicle. I
I fixed across the
Volvo sedan at S
Jeaw the
Ivehicle whereupon SA I
3

Savage- 1700

 ________Ihit
________Irear

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A127±970-D, 09/21/1999

driver of this sedan bqnd down on the front seat of her vehicle.
Believing that[
Iliad shot the driver of the Volvo, and
relizinq that he had a clear shot for the first time
1
SAj
I fired thiee rounds at the ibiect. one of which
shattered
windshield. I
Iwas seen to crouch
down in the vehicle at this point as it crashed into a utility
iDole, cusing flames to euat frcrn this automobile. Observing
this pole, S21
lexited_ther
land DUSMI
vehicle and they immediately extricated a now groggy
through the passenger door, upon which he was handcuffed and
arrested. SAl
Itherz heard several cries from inside the
vehicle and upon checking therein, he located two young children
who were not previously noticed in the vehicle. SAl
IpuUed
both children from the burning vehicle. He severely injured his
thumb upon cutting the one child out of its infant car seat to
avoid the flames which consumed I
Ivehicle.

[

On 09/14/1999, the SZRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inspector
I Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
Chaired the meein with the following voting members of the SRG
in attendance: I
I Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Divisiorz, USDOJ;
I Unit Chief, Transfer Unit, Admiistrative
I Legal Advice and
Services Diision; SSAL
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
TTfl4P C’h’.
Criminal Investigative Division;I
Firearms Training Unit, Training Divisioni
Unit Chief, NS-2 Unit-. lc,bl fteccion
NaionaJ. eoftity
Division; and,I
I Supervisor, Washington Field
Office.
The only nonvoting member present wasl
Program and Management Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.

I

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
•
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations fo’ corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
4

Savage-1701

LD 0
(.

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division prom:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271970-D, 09/21/1999

The SIRG mcrnhq irnnimôucjiy agreed that the use of
deadly force by SAl
Ias justified and in
confor9ance witI- the óurrent deadly force policy. Members opined,
that 511
lactions were most commendable, noting that his
actions not only prevented the escape of a dangerous fugitive,
but that he also risked serious injury upon his successful
ef forts to free the children from the flaming automobile.
SIRG members also addressed two additional issues. The
first pertained to the need for a standard general operations
plan by which WFO’s various task forces should operate in the
absence of a case-specific operational plan for each arrest
situation. It was determined that the Violent Crimes Section,
Criminal Investigative Division, should discuss this issue
directly with the Criminal SAC at WFO to ensure that appropriate
planning and safeguards were built into the numerous potentially
violent arrest situations in•which this diviion’s task forces
engage.
Ic was further decided that the Chief Division Counsel
in the WFO would be contacted to ensure that these task forces
were provided additional legal training in the area of thjrd
party search warrants to preclude any future concerns in this
regard. The Off ice of General Counsel’s representati’’e to the
SIG agreed to address this issue with WFO.

S

Savage-1702

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom:
Inspection Division
09/21/1999

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
flJSPECTIOI’7 DIVISION

AT WASHINCTON,_DC
That no acministrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

Sal

Set Lead 2:
Jb7C

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE OTVTSIN
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That n appropriate of-icial of the Violent Crimes
Section contact the Criminal SAC, WFO, and ensure that standard
genera). operations plans are crafted for employment where exigen
circumstances preclude the drafting of case-specific operations
plans by WFO Task Forces which are frequently engaged in h.igh
risk arrest situations.

6

Savage- 1703

 ________IRm.

_________I,

• (I2J3Ifl99S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date: 09/22/1999

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

Attn:

1iley 0. Thompson III

rn
4
Inspection 1)’Lr

From:

Contact:
Approved Dy:

-

37

Thomoon Wiley

-

I
Draf tad By:

[

Case ID #:

297-HQ-A1271741-D

Title:

.rr
lb 70

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

SHOOTING INCIDENT
03/29/1999
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Los Angeles Diviion on
03/29/1999.
Special Agent (SA)L
I fired two
rounds from his Bureau-approved .40 Caliber semi-automatic, Glock
Model 27 pistol, injuring a subject who attempted to evade amest
by menacingly driving his vehicle at a Federal Agent.
members determined that the use of deadly ore by SA I
1 was
It
iustified• and in conformance with the deadly force policy.
was_recommenaed that no administrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in tbis shooting
incident.
-

Reference: Reference repor of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) Susan R. chainer, dated o4/1S/l999.
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations f the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Details:

m. 7142
Mr.
Mr.
7116
Mr. Cousins, Room 5155)
(1
loom 7427
2
Mr. I
Ms.I
IRoom 7326)
(1
Mri
corn 7837
1
MS.I
2
D0J
MI
(:1.
2-Mr.’
IDOJ
(1-Mr.I
I
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

2

Mr. FOran, Room 6646
(1-Mr.j
Mr,L
IRoora 4042
2
(1MI
üàntico
1
Mr.
jWFO
1-Mr.
Room 7861
Mrs
1
-

-

-

*

-

Savage- 1704

L

lb 6
b70

 ________While

4

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271741-D, 09/22/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 03/29/1999, SAs assigned to the Los Angeles Division
responded to a call for assistance from Agents of the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service (DCI). OCIS Agents were
surveilling a residence in Studio City, California, where they
had source informatj that a feder3._fugitive, identified as
I was located. I
I
had a federal warrant
issued from the District of Arizona charging him with numerous
vi,ri 1t4nq
SAsI
I and
I
(alerted the division’s radio operator tbat they
would respond to assist the DCIS Agents.

I

Th

Agent to arrive at the scene was
Iwho was advised by DCIS Agent’
I
that he and the other PBX Agents would be assigned to watch the
rear of an apartment where it was believed the subject was
located.
Fc

the two Agents were discussing the arrest plan,
king
1
SAl
I saw a white ma).e wearing a T-shirt and stacks wa)
in the alley behind the apartment towards them.
SAl
lasked
Agent I
hf the male walking towards_them was his subject. As
this individual came closer, .Aaentl
ILdentified the male as
his fugitive and advised SN
I that he wa rnr to arrest
him before additional backup units arrived. S21
j walked to
the rear oabla Jeep Cherokee into whichi
fras about to
enter.
SAl
lexited his vehicle and began approaching the
Jeep from another direction with his personal),y owned and Bureau
approved .40 caliber semi-automatic, Glock Model 27, weapon
drawn.
*

SAl
bbservd the s(iblect_‘tho had opened the
driver’s side door of the Jeep as SA I
lidentified himself as
a Federal Agent and ordered hs compLiance. The sub:ject put his
hands up to the height of his sou1ders and subsauent.y placed
them down to his waistline.
Iheard SA[
I vçll for
SAl
the subject to show his hands and also observed K1
Ispeaking
on his hand held radio asking for the FBI Office to have
additional police units respond to assist.

sAl
Isaw ±e subject turn bis head toward him and
look as he advisedi
Ito get his hands up. The subject did
not respond to the command and SAl
Iadvised the subject that
Rather
he was with the police and he should put his hands up.
Icommands, the subject placed his
than comply with SAl
2

Savage- 1705

 ________

I

To:
Re:

Inspection DivisIon From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271741-D, 09/22/1999

right hand into his right f.ront pocket area. SAl
Ibelieved
that the subject was reaching for some type of weapon and
continued to tell the subject to put his hands in the air. I
I
eventually removed his hand from his pocket area and leaned into
the interior of his vehicle. He then reached towards th center
console area and returned his hands to his sided
Isuddenly
sat down in the_driver’s seat of the Jeep, shut the door and
locked it. SAl
Iwent to the driver’s side of the Jeep
attempting to open the door and giving verbal commands tol
I
who continued to be noncompliant and remained somewhat stoic and
seated therein.
-

I
With his weapon pointed at th subject, 5$pounded on the passenger side window of the Jeep yelling at I
I
I placed his right hand into the
Co open the locked door. I
right front pocket of his pants_retieving a cigarette and a
lighter. At that point, SAl
Inoticed that Agenti
Ihad
moved into a position directly in front of the Jeep and also
realized that the Jeep was running. Concned that tip subject
would drive forward and strike Agend
I S)J
I pounded on
the passenger side wndow and yelled to the subject that i.f he
I
Idrove forward he would shoot. A Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) Officer arrived on the scene and with h..s baton
smashed the Jeep’s rear passenger window in an attempt to reach
I
I In response to this actioni
Lnmediately placed the
vehicle in gear, and fully cognizant that SAl
has standing
immediately in front of him, aoclerated_the vehic.e forwird in an
effort to espate. Fearing for 571
If ired
Ilife, SAl
two shots ati
Ithrough the passenger side windows however,
I
Icontinued his escape without striking S2’I
I He crashed
into the driver’s side door of another DCIS Agent as he
successfully eluded investigators at this location..
I
I thereafter led the FBI and LAPD units on a
pursuit lasting aprox-imately 25 minutes,_attempting svera1 times
to strike uflits who were in pursuit. I
Iwas eventually
arrested when he rammed his Jeep into an unoccupied LAPD unit
parked at the end of an alley near a storage faclity. I
Iwas C
taken into custody and provided initial Inedica.l treatment at the
scene. He was ubsequently transported to the Valley Presbyterian
Hospital in Van Nuys where it was deternined that he had received
a through ar thrtiici bullet wound in his right arm from the shot
firedbySAl
I
On 09/14/199, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inspector
3
Savage-1706

 TO:
Re:

I

I

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271741—D, 09/22/1999

I Office of tnspecti.ons, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the folaowing voting members Qf the SIRG
1 Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
in attendance: I
Violent Crimes Secjon, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
ITrial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
J Unit Chief. Transfer Unit, Administrative
Services Division; SSA I
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section C4ef, ODeratiorlal Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief.
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;I
I
Unit Chief, NS-2i TTnt. (41ôh 9ection
NS-2, 1ational Security
Division; and, I
I Supervisor, Washington wield
Office. The only nonvoting member present was I
Program and Management Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection.
Division.
-

Observations and. RecomrLendations o the SIRG
The SXRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with the
intent to () evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for coxrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SRG members unanimously agreed that the
of deadly
I was justified and in conformance with the
force by SAl
FBI’s deadly force policy.

4

Savage-1707

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspectioz Division
297-HQ--A1271741-D 09/22/1999

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
XNSPCTIO DIVISION
-

AT WASHINGTON, DC

That no administrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

5

Savage-1708

b7C

 ___________
__________
____________

‘

(1213111995).

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date: 09/23/1999

ROUTINE
Attn:

Inspection Division

From:

Wiley D. Thompson III

Inspection Division
Contact: I

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:

JExte

Thompson Wiley

‘

1:1

I

r

297-HQ-A1271895-D

t6

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
06/04/1999
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

Title:

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
Division on
shooting incident that occurred “
I fired seven
Special Agent (SA) I
06/04/1999.
rounds from his nine millimeter semi-automatic pistol, injuring a
SIRG members_recommended
fugitive attempting to evade arrest.
las a
that no administrative action be taken against SN
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
The
discharge of his weapon was determined to be appropriate and
justified, and in conformance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
Report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Reference:
Kevin L. Perkins, dated 07/09/1999.

Details:

This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Rm. 7142
l4rj
Mr..l_________ Rm. 7116
Mr. Cousir4s, Room 5155)
(1
nçm 7427
2
Mr.I
(1 - Ms.I
IRoom 7326)
1 - Mr.
IRoom 7837
100
2-Ms.
I
(1
2
Mr.I
I LQU
Mr.I
I
(1
2 - Mr. Foran, Room
I.
2

-

2

-

-

-

-

Mn___________ Room 4042
Ms.I
(1
puantico
MrJ
Mr.
IWFO
Room 7861
Mn
—

1
1
1

-

-

-

—

(Attention:

Mrj_________

Savage- 1709

 _____

I

To:
Re:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271895--D, 09/23/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

I a member of the Philadelphia
SAl
received
Division’s Violent Traffickers Project (VTP)
information oz 06/02/1999. copcerning the location of a subject
I and the fact that he was believed
identified as I
Iboasted to associates that he
to be a wanted fugitive. I
wag wanted by the feds” and that he had no intention of being
Ihad been
captured. Information also indicated thati
recently known to frequent Westminster Avenue in Philadelphia.
Acting upon the information, members of the VTP began to conduct
various records checks to determine the_validity of the
Iwas a federal
It was determined thati
intelligence.
fugitive, wanted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) based on an arrest warrant issued in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. A BAT? Acent confirmed that the warrant was
I was wanted for the possession of
active and. advised that’
Iqas known to
a firearm by a convicted felon and thati
carry a gun.

ib

On 06/04/1999, at approximately 1:00 o.m..
Ihad just
Ireceived information indicating thatL
been seen entçrin a residence on Westminster Avenue. After
learning that I
I had driven to the area in a late-model, red
I
Pontiac Grand Am with New Jersey license plates, SPJ
immediately notified his supervisor and the BATF case Agent of
the sighting. After being advised by the BATF Agent that he was
I
on leave but would attempt to respond to the location, SAl
supervisor decided the VTP Squad should prepare for and make the
I
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)l
arrest.
gathered members of the VTP Squad for a briefing regarding the
operations plan and they were provided a photograph of the
subject. At the conclusion of the meeting, members of the squad
departed the office en route to Westminster Avenue.

SAI

land SAl
SSAI
lwere the first to arrive in the
vicinity of the location. They immediately observed a red, latemodel Pontiac Grand Am with New Jersey license plates parked
dvised other responding units of this
facing east. SSAJ
information via lus Bureau radio and directed a second car
arriving in the area to take a surveillance position east of the
subject vehicle.

I

Izmnediately upon initiating the surveillance of
lagain contacted the BATF case Agent
and he advised that he was approximately five blocks from the
surveillance location anc. that si,x other BATF Agents were en
dvised participants that upon
route to the scene.
SSAI

I vehicle, SM

2

Savage-1710

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271895-D, 09/23/1999

the arrival of the BATF Agents, the FBI would assume an outer
perimeter position and the BATF would effect the arrest of
linasmuch as he was the subject of a BATF-led
I
investigation.
As SAl
Icompleted his conversation with the BATF
1exit a
case Agent, another SA radioed that he observed I
residence on Westminster Avenue and move toward the red Grand Am
as if he was going to enter the vehicle. With this information,
1
and based on the subject’s history of high-speed chases
SSAI
SSPJ
I
gave the order to execute the arrest.
Ito move his vehicle into a blocking position to
directed SAl
the rear of the subject’s vehicle and directed two other SAs to
block the subject’s vehicle from the front.
-

limmediately moved his vehicle toward the
Sal
subject’s vehicle, stopping at the left rear of the car in a
Iwas already_in the
blocking position. He noted that I
lexited his
driver’s seat and the reverse lights were on. S
vehicle, drew his nine millimeter semi-automatic pistol, moved to
the left of his car, and shouted_several times, FBI, hands up.”
lthrough the open driver’s side
ILooked directly at SAl
I
window but did not comply with the commands. The subject’s
vehicle quickly accelerated forward put of the parking space. As
Idrove directly toward
he entered thç driving lane,I
‘made a hard left turn to avoid
SAs I
Iandl
their attempt to block his escape, driving his vehicle across
Westminster Avenue and onto the sidewalk. He continued driving
his car on the sidewalk, passing between a utility pole and a
hedge.
S?I
I continued to shout “FBI, stop the car, hands up.”
1continued around the utility pole until he was facing
I
southwest arid drove off the sidewalk back into the middle of the
Iwho was still
street where he accelerated directly at SAl
I fearing for his safety,
standing in that location. SAl
aimed his pistol at the subject and fired seven shots as
par sped past him
I

I

Ivehicle glanced off
After passing SAl
another car parked at the curb and continued onto the sidewalk
where he collided into a building. The impact of the collision
Icar bounced backwards before it came to a
was such that I
Iwas transported to the University of Pennsylvania
stop. I
Hospital where he was treated for a bullet wound to the upper
Following treatment for this wound,
Thft otion of his back.
I was immediately detained based upon his fugitive status.
On 09/14/1999, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inspector

3

Savage-1711

6

 TO:

Re:

I

I

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271895--D, 09/23/1999

p Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
cnairect tte meeting with the following voting members of the SIRG
in attendance: I
I Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, UDOJ;
ITrial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
lUnit Chief, Transfer Unit, Administrative
services uivison; SAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Ch.ef. Oierational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Divieion;I
IUnit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;I
I
Unit Chief, NS-2A Tlivit. CUth1 section
NS-2, National Security
Division; and,I
I Supervisor, Wghinaton Fiald
Office.
The only nonvoting member present wasi
I
Program and Management Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

Observatiors and Recoumendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with’
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of
deadly force by SN
Iwas justified and in conformance
with the FBI’S deadly force policy.

Savage-1712

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271895-D, 09/23/1999

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC

That no admiVistrative action be taken against
as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

S?1__________________

Savage-1713

 ________

•

____

_______
_____

(l2/31fl99S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date; 09/24/1999

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:

¶ritle:

__—

Extensio

7

Thompson Wiley

Ilrr

Drafted By:
‘Case ID It:

Wiley D. Thompson III

297-HQ-A1271510-D

+

lb S
1b70

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

SHOOTING INCIDENT
07/12/1999
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SRG) xeviewed a
shooting incident that occurre4 in the Tndiana1is Division on
07/12/1999.
Special Agent (SA)I
If ired one round
from his Smith and Wesson, ten mil1meter pistol, injuring a
subject who was pointing a gun at him as he was attempting to
evade arrest.
Subseque)nt investigation determned that the
subject had shot nd inued two other individuals prior to hs
encounter with SAL
JSIRG members determined that the use of
deadly force by SAl
jias justified and in conformance with
the deadly force poii..cy.
It was recommended that no
administrative action be taken against SAl
s a xesult of
his involvement in this shooting incident.
Reference: Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Kenneth W. Kaiser, dated 07/23/1999.
Details: This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.
-

Mr.
m. 7142
Mr.
Rm. 7116
Mr. Cousirs, Room 5155)
(3.
Mr.I
IRoom 7427
2
joom 7326)
Ms. I
(1
Mr.
1
ioom 1837
Ms.
2
IDOJ
(1-r’is.i
I
IDOY
2-Mr.I
(1—Nr.I
I

‘1
2

-

2

-

-

-

-

Mr.L

2

-

-

-

-

Mr. Fo an
(1
Mr

1.
1
1

-

-

(1
Mr.
Mr.
Mrs

-

iviq

Room 6646
I
oorn 4042

I

Savage-1714

uantico
WFO
Room 7261

lbS

lb 70

 ________Iwas

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271510-D, 09/24/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 07/12/1999, whi1e on official duty in his Bureau
vehicle, SAl
Iwas traveling westbound on East
Washington .StJct ii Indianapolis, when he heard several
gunshots. SN
lobserved several individuals running for
cover near an intersection at the location of a major shopping
mall. He observed a young Black male, later identified as
I running from the vicinity. Believing thati
I
was fleeing from the scene of a crime, SAl
limmediately began
a foot pursuit, chasingi
Ithrough an alley into a nearby
parking garage.

I

I

Upon entering the parking garage, sI
lobserved
down approximately ten yards from him. He
observedi
Iplacing several items on the ground, and as the
subj ect turned and saw SA I
I he was holdin9 a weapon in his
hand. I
Ipointed the weapon at SN
Iiho stated,
“Police,_drop the gun.” The subject did not comply with
SA I
ommands, turned away from him and then began to turn
his body toward SAl
I leaving his crouched position again
pointing his weapon in the direction of the Agent. SAl
I
fired one round ati
L hittixg him in the upper left leg.
Commands were repeated to I
Iadvising him to drop the gun
and he did so by placing the gun on the concrete f1oor. After
obevin_ST4
brder to slide the weapon away from hi.m,
SAl
lapproached the subject conducted a cursory pat down for
other_weapons and noticed thati
Ihad been shot in the 1eg.
SAl
ladvised witnesses and a garage attendant to notify the
police and send for an ambulance, which arrived approximately two•
minxtes Later.
handcuffed and subsequently charged
by local authorities with attempted murder, criminal reck1essnes.
and theft, and by Federal authorities with Assaulting a Federa1
Of ficer.
-,-whpd

A subseguent investigation determined that the subject
had shoplifted a pai.r of shoes and as he attmDted to leave the
store, he was confronted by store employees.I
I fired
several shots at Loss Preventioi Officer I
jwho suffered.
a gunshot wound in the upper left shoulder. After d.sengaging
hirnse3$ frohe off icer
I begaz:z to walk away, turned back
towardi
I and fired another shot which struck a passerby in
the leg.
On 09/14/1999, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident. Acting Chief Inspector
2

Savage-1715

 To:
Re:

I

inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271510-D, 09/24/1999

I

L
I

Office of Inspections, Xnspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members of the SXRG
in attendance: I
I Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
L Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Tnit, Administrative
1
6
I Un-t Chif. T-nfr T
h7C
Services Division; SSAI
ILegal Advice and
Training, Legal PoliOy, Office of the General Counsel;
Herbert Cousins, Jr., Section Ch
al Support Section,
Criminal Znvestigative Division;
Pirearms Training Unit, Training Divis.on;
Unit Chief, NS-2A Unit, Global Section
TS-2, at.ona Security
Division; and, I
I Supervisor, Washington Pield
Office.
The only nonvoting member present was I
I
program and Management Analyst, Office of Thspections, Inspection
Iivision.
-

Observations and Recozumendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Dixector with an evaluative azialysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions f:rotn an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concrnjng training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
xecommridations for administrative action i.f deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously commended the actions of
Iagreeing that his use of deadly force was justified and
in conrormance with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
SAL

Savage- 1716

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division Frotn
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271510-D, 09/24/1999

LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASIflNGTON,_DC
That no admziistrative action be taken against
SA I
s a result of his irvo1vemeiit in this
shooting incident.

4

Savage-1717

 (1213111995)
d

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

Date: 06/14/2000

ROUTINE

Wiley D. Thoson III

Attn:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division

From:

lExtension

Centaat:I
Approved By:

Locke Thomas Bernar

By:I

Ilrr

Drafted

Case tD #:

1837

Jb6
)7C

297-HQ-A1271908-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
07/15/1999
SALT LA1C CITY DIVISION

Title:

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group C SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurre4 in the Salt Lake City Division on
07/15/1999.
Special Agent (SAL
[shot and killed a
noncompliant suspected bank robber during an attempted
apprehension.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that rio
s a
administrative action should be taken against SAl
shooting
incident.
his
this
in
involvement
of
result

Reference:

I

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
I dated 08/03/1999.

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

Rm. 7142
Mr.
hm 7116
Mr.
Mr.L
(1
i Rm.5155)
Mr.’____________
2
zin. 7427
(1 Mal_________ Rm. 7326)
Mr. Locke, Rm.
1
1
Mr.I
I Rm. 7837
LDpJ
2-Ms.I
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(l-Ms.l

2-Mn

IDOJ

(1-Mr.I
I
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
1
1
Mr. Middleton, Rm. 4042
1
Mr
,
Rm. 3787
WFO
1-Mn
1
“antico
Mn
1
Mri
I Rm. 7861
-

-

-

-

-

I
Savage- 1718

)b 6

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297—HQ--A1271908-D, 06/14/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

On 07/08/1999, Stan Lee foster walked away from a work
release program at the Promontory Correctional Facility, resulting
in an arrest warrant being issued the following day by the State
of Utah.
On the day of his escape, two banks in the
Salt Lake City area were robbed by a lone white male subject.
SAl
‘received information from a
confidential informant that Stan Foster committed at least one of
The informant advised
thS bank rbberies on 07/08/1999.
SA
that Foster was armed and routinely carried a weapon.
SA
received information from a Murray Police
Department Detective that a teller at the First Security Bank of
Murray had positively identified Foster from a photo spread as the
bank robber.
-

Subsequent information revealed that Foster was using
drugs and frequented gay bars in the Salt Lake City area.
Specific information had been received that Foster had been in a
bar called “Bricks” the previous night and also identified a
vehicle that Foster may be using.
On 07/15/1999, the FBI Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF)
was working an unrelated fugitive case in addition to the Foster
investigation. At approximately 9:00 p.m., surveillance on the
unrelated fugitive investigation was terminated due to the fact
that members of the VCTP believed they had been compromised.
Surveillance personnel returned to a staging area near the
surveillance scene and volunteers were requested to stay to
assist on the Foster investigation.
hrovided the
sil
volunteers a briefing regarding Foster detailing that the subject
was a prison qr’r who had been identified in at least one bank
robbery.
SAl
advised that Foster had displayed a weapon
in one robbery and that VCTF members should consider him “Armed
and Dangerous.”
Bank robbery surveillance photographs and arrest
photographs of Foster were shown to the VCTP members.

I

At the conclusion of the briefing, personnel departed
with the objective of locating Foster’s vehicle and possibly
2

Savage-1719

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 06/14/2000

making contact with the “Bricks” bar management to determine if
Foster had patronized the bar.

SAl
Ideparted the briefing location and
as he drove past “Bricks”, spotted an individual he believed to
be Foster next to a pickup truck. As he passed the bar a second
time, SAL
lobtained the license plate number of the truck
and called for a license check. Receiving a negative response on
the license plate, I
Idrove by the bar a third time
observing the same individual, He radioed other surveillance
units and advised that the subject in the area of the bar might
be Foster.
Upon the arrival of SAl
I and Deputy United States
Marshal (DUSMI
lat the scene, a determination was
made that the individual was indeed Foster and his arrest should
This determination was based on the fact that there
be effected.
were few bystanders, the area was well lit, and Foster was out of
his vehicle. Additionally, a concern existed that Foster may
have recognized the law enforcement officials and would attempt
to flee.
DUSM I
land SAl
I parked their vehicles south
of the subject’s vehicle and began approaching Foster. As they
approached, Foster opened his driver’s side door. DUSM I
1
took a position of cover near the passenger side rear wheel of
Foster’s truck while SAj
I took cover at the back of a
vehicle parked north of the subject’s truck. DUS!4
I drew
his weapon, pointed_it at Foster, and yelled, “Police.
Get your
hands up.” SAl
p drew his weapon, pointed it at Foster, arid
yelled, “FBI.
Get your hands up.” Foste
1 looked at SAl
I
and put his hands in the air. SPJ
lalso commanded Foster
to “go down on the ground.” Foster turned away from both
officers with his back facing them.
Foster slowly and
rate1y lowered his right hand toward his waist.
1
d.1ihe
DUSM
SAl
Iyelled
at
Foster
to,
“Get
your
hands
up.”
and
Both officers repeated the command at least three times, however,

3

Savage- 1720

 __________________IJ3eputy
______________lUnit
___________________LTnit

S

S

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 06/14/2000

Foster ignored all commands.__Believing that he and DUSMI
fired two rounds from his
were in imminent danger, SAj
handgun.
Emergency Medical Services were requested and attempted
He was transported to a local
to revive Foster at the scene.
where
was
pronounced
hospital
he
dead on arrival.
vral witnesses to the incident verified the actiDns
I commenting that the law
of SAl
land DUSMI
enforcement officers had no other alternative but to shoot i1ue to
the noncompliance of the subject to law enforcement commands.
Declinations of prosecution were received from the
Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office and the USDOJ, Civil
Rights Division, by letters dated 11/26/1999 and 03/13/2000,
respectively.

I

On 06/13/2000, the SIRG met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division,
chaired the meeting with the following voting members of the SIRG
in attendance: I
I Chief Inspector, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
ITrial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief, Personnel Assietance Section,
Administrative Service Division; Charles H. Middleton, Section
NS-3, National Security Division;
Chief, East Asia Section
Chief, Undercover Safeguard Unit,
mrf- Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
Chief, Legal Advice and Training, Legal
Po.Licy, ottice or the General Counsel; Supervisory Special Agent
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
(SSA) I
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; SSN
I
Program Manager, Practical Applications Unit:, Training Division;
and, SSA I
I Washington Field Office. The only
——

-

-

-

4

Savage-1721

I

6

b7C

 To:
1.e:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 06/14/2000

nonvoting member present wal
I
Management/Program Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection

Division.

k7C

Observations and Recoimitendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members thoroughly discussed this shooting
incident_and unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force by
Iwas justified and in conformance with the current
SAl
Members recommended that no administrative
deadly force policy.
action be taken against him as a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident.

5

Savage- 1722

 S

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271908-D, 06/14/2000

LEAD (s):
Set Lead I:
flSPECTIQN DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON. DC

SAl
incident.

That no administrative action be taken against
jas a result of his involvement in this shooting

6

Savage- 1723

 ______
__________
__________

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 04/28/2000

Inspection Division

From:

Attu:

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:
Drafted By:

Wiley D. Thompson III

1

Extension 1837

Locke Thomas Bernar,/

i

Ilrx

Case ID

It:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT

297-HQ-A1271786-D
6

10/06/1999

NEW HAVEN DIVISION
Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the New Haven Division on
10/06/1999.
Special Agent (SA)I
Ishot arid killed
a fugitive who was wanted for Interstate Transportation in Aide
of Racketerring-Murder.
SIRG members unanimously
that no
administrative action should be taken against SA[
las a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
PfPrence report of Inspector-in-Place
Idated 10/20/1999.

I

Details:
This communication was prepared to furnish the
analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with
reference to the captioned shooting.

b6

7C

1
2

-

-

IRm.

Mr.
Mr.

Mr. I
(1
Mr.I
Ms. I
(1
IRm. 7326)
MrL Locke, Rm. 7825
IDOJ
Msj
(1
Mr. Bartnik, Rm. 6646
-

2

-

-

1

2

1

-

-

7142
Im. 7116
Rm. 4944)
m
7427

1
1
1
1

1

1

-

-

-

-

-

Mr.I

Mr.j
Mr.!
Mr.

L

Mr.L

Rm. 4042
,
Quantico
m. 3787
_j Quantico

rwPo

Mrs]_________ Rm.

Savage- 1724

7861

 To;
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297—HQ-A1271786-D, 04/28/2000
Details of the Shooting Incident

A Federal warrant was issued on 01/28/1999, in the
Southern District of New York, charging Hector Colon zith
Interstate Transportation in Aide of Racketeering-Murder.
The
Connecticut Violent Crimes Fugitive Task Force (CVCFTF), under
the auspices of the New Haven Division, had been coordinating
efforts with the New York Division to locate and apprehend Colon.
On 09/28/1999, SAl
1 displayed an
identification order (10) to a source who recognized Colon as
someone known as “Jose”. On 09/29/1999, the source observed
“Jose” with a black .38 six-shot revolver and subsequently
provided information that established the basis to conduct a
surveillance on potential locations frequented by Co.on.

I

fln

1fl/fl4/19C9,

Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
I met with SAs as well as other task force
members to discuss the developments in the Colon case.
SSAI
linstructed the SAs to prepare an operational plan.
The task force members were instructed to conduct a surveillance
to corroborate the source information and determine the location
of Colon in order to formulate an arrest plan and affect his
arrest.
-

On 10/05/1999, a briefing was conducted at the
Bridgeport Police Department for all the individuals assigned to
participate in that day’s surveillance activity.
Each individual
attending the briefing was provided with a copy of the 10 and a
photograph of the subject.
They were advised that the subject
was considered armed and dangerous; he was extremely surveillance
conscious; and provided specific information to emphasize that
Colon was considered extremely dangerous.
A surveillance was
conducted until 12:00 p.m., at which time it was terminated for
the day.
On 10/06/1999, members reconvened at the Bridgeport
Police Department where statements were reiterated for the
benefit of one officer who had not attended the briefing the
previous day.
At approximately 10:20 a.m., the units were in
their assigned locations, and at approximately 10:45 a.m., SA
nd Deputy United States Marshal (DUSM)
I
I observed an individual, thought to be Colon,
exit a Central Avenue address and depart the area in a blue Honda
Prelude.
SAl
Iradioed a description of the clothing worn by
the individual as well as a vehicle description.
A radio
transmission indicated that the individual believed to be Colon
had been seen and it was believed that he was in posses
sion of a
2

Savage-1725

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271786-D, 04/28/2000

gun.
During this time, the source was visited by Colon and upon
his departure, the source advised that Colon left the location in
a blue
1 two door, Honda.
The surveillance team, believing they had a positive
identification of the sub:ject, discussed attempting an arrest
should the subject return and park adjacent to them as he had
before.
At 12:25 p.m., SAl
ladvised tht the ub:iect had
returneçl to the Central Avenue location.
SM
land DUSM
I
Idecided to attempt the arrest.
SAl
kaited to exit
the van until the subject cleared his vehicle.
Upon exiting the

van, SAI
Icommanded “FBI, stop” and other words that he
could not recall. According to SAl
I the subject moved his
left hand quickly toward his waist area in a grabbing motion,
causing SAl
Ito fire one shot.
The subject pivoted and ran
in front of the van toward Central Avenue, causing I
Ito
temporarily lose sight of him. As the Agent reestablished visual
I the subject was about a car length away
contact withl
moyina towrd Central Avenue with his upper torso twisted toward
SAl
I The subject’s left arm was cocked, with his elbow
bent and his left hand in the area of his waist, not visible to
I
SAl
The subiect’s left arm/elbow was moving back and
forth and SAl
1’bserved the subject’s left arm and body
tense causing him to believe the subject had a gun in his
waistband and that he was reaching for the gun.
At that point,
1fired two additional’rounds at the subject.
SPAColon
moyPri t-nwjrd Central Avenue a little further, then turne4 toward
SAl
land raised both of his hands over his head.
1
advised the subject to stop and get down.
DUSMI
lexited
the van, ran towards the subject, and issued the command of
“police, get down”.
The subject looked at DUSM I
land
dropped to the pavement spreading himself face down.
The subject
was handcuffed and searched for weapons or contraband while still
1rm on the pavement.
Based on a radio transmission from
SN
I additional units had arrived on the scene and assisted bb
in rolling the subject onto his back in order to complete the
search.
Law enforcement officers noticed blood and called
paramedics.
Paramedics transported the subject to the hospital
where he underwent surgery; however, Colon was pronounced dead at
2:17 p.m.
Members of the surveillance team and the paramedics
observed a cell phone and two pagers on the subject’s waist
immediately after the shooting.
No weapon was recovered from the
crime scene.

An autopsy determined that one bullet entered the
subject’s body from the rear, approximately three inches to the
left of the spine and exited the front of the torso at center
sternum.
3

Savage-1726

 •1

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271786D, 04/28/2000

On 04/11/2000, the SIRG met to discuss the
above-captioned shooting incident.
Deputy Assistant Director
Thomas Bernard Locke, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting
with the following voting members of the SIRG in attendance:
I
L Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Donald J. Bartnik, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Administrative Services Division; William Q. Doherty, Section
Chief. Global Secjon
NS-2, National Security Division;
I
I Unit Chief, Legal Advic and Training. Igal
Policy, Ottice of the General Counsel; SSA I
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Divisioni
Unit Chief, Asset
Forfeiture Unit, OperationaL support section, Criminal
Investigative Division; SSAI
I Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division; and, I
I
Supervisor, Washington Field Office.
The only non-voting member
present was I
I Program and Management Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2) provide the Director with an evaluative analysis,
observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an
operational standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations
concerning training and/or safety issues; and (4) provide
recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary.
During the discussion of this shooting incident, SIRO
members unanimously opined that the use of deadly force by
S21
was justified and in conformance with the
deadly force policy.
By leter dated 12127/1999, a declination
of prosecution was issued byl
‘State’s
Attorney, Office of the State’s Attorney, Bridgeport,
Connecticut.
Additionally, by letter dated 03/02/2000, the U.S.
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Div
ision._nrovided a
1
declination of prosecution regarding SAI
I shooting
incident.
The only observation made re9arding the shooting
incident pertained to the fact that SAL
Icreated a one-onone arrest situation when he exited the van alone, leaving DUSM
I
I inside the van,
Members emphasized that this action was
not conducive to the Agent’s safety.

4

Savage-1727

-

 •

_

To:
Re:

Inspection Division Froni:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271786-D, 04/28/2000

LEAD

(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That no adnjinistrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
7C

5

Savage-1728

  

 

FBI

Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

1998

 

 

 

________s

(12131!W95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence
To:

From:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division
Inspection

Date: 05/06/1999

Attn:

Wiley XL Thompson,

p4.-..,

contact:j

Approved By;

III

1837

Thompson Wi),e2/1 III
Lusby Thom%

Drafted By:I______________
Case ID 4k
Title:

297-HQ-A1271788-fl

lDMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/16/98
NEW YORK DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurrr
fhp Tcw york D.vision on
3
11/16/98.
Special Agent (SA) I
Ishot and injured a
pit bull dog who was attacking a ten year old child and his
Rottweiler.
G recomrzended that no administrative action
1
The SIR
be taken against SA
a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident,
Details: Reference report of Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
Carson J. Dunbar, Jr., dated 1/5/99.
This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to. the
captioned shooting.

1
2
2
1
1
1
1

*

-

-

-

-

Mr..
Mr.
(1
Mr.
(1
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Rm. 7142
I Rm. 7116
Mr. Richardon, Rm. 5155)
I
Iii. 7427
Ms..I
I Rm. 7326)
Thompson, Rm. 7825 (Eric.)
Lusby, Rm. 7825
Biehl, DOJ
Foran, Rm. 6646

-

-

1
1
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

Mr
Mr,
Mn
MrL
MrsI

ton, Rm. 4042
j Rm. 3787F
IWantico
IRm. 7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From: Inspection
297-HQ-A1271738--D, 05/06/1999

DivisiOn

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 11/16/98; sAsi
landi
were conducting an investigation in rooklyn. After contacting.
an individual regarding the investigation, both agents exited an
apartment building and entered a Bureau vehicle thatws parked
across the street.
SAl
Isaw a woman standing with a pit
bull on a leash with a collar. He also noticed a young male
walking a Rottwejler on a leash with a collar.
The young male
walked past t rnt hull and stopped further down the block. At
that time, sAl
I saw the pit bull get out of his collar and
run toward the child. The pit bull jumped up in an extremely
aggressive manner and pinned the child against a brick wall and
the two dogs began to fight. At that point, SAl
Jexited
his Bureau vehicle and proceeded towrd the child and the dogs.
In an attempt to stop the attack, SAl
Isprayed both dogs
several times with a can of pepper spray. Neither dog was
affected by the pepper spray and continued to fight while SA
I ordered the owner f the pit bull to get her dog under
control; however, the owner refused. SAl
Iturned his
attention back to the dogs and saw the child attempting to
control the pit bull by hitting it with a leash. As the pit bull
knocked the child to the ground and began attacking him, the
Rottweiler attempted to aid his owner. This caused the pit bull
to again attack the Rottweiler. C9ncerned that the pit bull was
controlling the attack and ferina fo the safety of himself and
others watching the event, SAL
drew his pistol and fired
one round into the upper chest areaöf the pit bull. Upon being
shot, the pit bull immediately ceased the attack and retreated
toward the front of an apartment building. SAl
Ithen
convinced the owner of the pit bull to leash the dog and return
him to the sidewalk area.

I

I

A determination was made that
1 although he was in good
condition, the young male had incurred wounds to hi,s hands and
was taken to the hospital by his mother.
On 3/9/99, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Thomas Iusby,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the following
voting members of the SIRG in attendance: Dana D. Biehi, Deputy
Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section chief, Personnel
Ass.stance Section. Administrative Services Division;
SSAI
I Legal Advice and Training, Legal Policy,
Office of the General Counsel; hornas W. Richardson, Sectio
Chief, Administrative Section, Criminal Xnvestigative Division;
2

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271788-D, 05/06/1999

I

Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division (TO); Charles H. Middleton, Section Chief Global
Section
NS-2, National Security 0
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks
Section, Laboratory Division; and,
Supervisor,
ff ice. The only non-voting menibpresent was
Program and Management nalyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Observations and Recoimendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (I) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
T1 mcbers unanimously concurred that
SA I
I use of deadly force was justified and in
conformance with the current deadly force policy. This resulted
in the recommendation that no administrative action be taken
against SA
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting ihciaenc.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DISION
AT WASHIIGTON, D. C,
SAj

That nç ac3ininistrative action be taken against,
a result of his involvement in this incident.

las

++

3

 FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigatton

Copy 10:
Reportol:

iiI

I

o

I4ttle Rock

Date:

November 30,

CaseriD#:

66F-HQ-19157-28

Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT;
MEMPHIS DIVISION;
NOVEMBER 6, 1998;

Character:

PDMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

During March 1998, the cities of Memphis and
Nashville, Tennessee, began to experience a series of bank
robberies. By September 1998, it became apparent to the
Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF) in Nashville that the
robberies were being perpetrated by the same individuals
since the modus operandi (MO) was very similar in all the
incidents.
Prior to September, six banks in Memphis and
two banks in Nashville had been robbed.
The MO involved
two black males driving to the banks, usually in a vehicle
which was stolen within 24 hours prior to the robberies.
The subjects wore ski masks and flannel shirts and were
armed with handguns. One subject entered the banks and
the other acted as the getaway driver. The VCTF decided
to initiate fixed surveillances at two area banks, both of
which were located near the SunTrust Bank, 4604 Charlotte
Avenue, which had been robbed in July and August 1998.
A
surveillance/arrest plan was prepared prior to the
operation.
These surveillances were conducted over
several dys in late September but were discontinued.
On
October 15, 1998, the same SunTrust Bank was once again
robbed.
During two of the three SunTrust robberies, the
subject fired shots into the ceiling and briefly took a
bank guard hostage during the October robbery.
In
addition, on some occasions the subjects assaulted
employees and customers.

1998

Due to the continuing pattern of robberies and
escalating violence during the incidents, the Nashville
This docirnertt conta(ns neither reccernendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI
and
your agency; it and it contents are nor to be distributed outside your agency.

Is

Loaned

to

 6SF— HQ- 19157-28

I

I

I
I

and Memphis VCTFs began another series of surveillances
on
October 19, 1998,
Unlike the September surveillances in
Nashville, these surveillances involved officers from the
Nashville Metropolitan Police Department (NMPD) as well as
members of the VCTF.
Again, a surveillance/arrest plan was
prepared prior to the operation.
At approximately 8:30 a.m. on
Friday, November 6, 1998, a morning briefing was held at the
Pep
Boys parking lot, located in the general area in which the
surveillances were to take place. This briefing was led by Task
Force Officer
I who provided pertinent information
and made assignments for the surveillances.
It wc
th hrifing tht the previous day NMPD Of ficerl________________
I was working at NationsBank, 6616 Charlotte Avenue, as a
security guard.
Officerl
I reported seeing two suspicious
black males drive through the parking lot in a gold automobile.
The briefing ended at approximately 8:4S a.m. and team members
were dispatched to their respective locations.
The surveillance
was scheduled to terminate around 11:00 a.rn. since the previous
robberies were before this time.
Eleven law enforcement officers participated in the
surveillances on November 6. Two are FBI Agents not
to
the VCTF (Special Agents [SAsJ I
and I
I
c9nntid VCTF members (Tennessee Highway
I.
Patrol Oticer I
I and NMPD Off icerl__________
I. The remaining seven are assiqned to the NMPD’s
Armed Robberr Division (Detectives I
land
I eant I
and
I
Officerl
I. It is not-ed that eaqh FBI SA s a
member of the Memphis Division’s SWAT Team and SAl
us a
Bureau Firearms Instructor.
One of the banks under surveillance on November 6 was
the NationsBank noted above. SAsI
lanai
Iwere in
a Bureau vehc1e located in a parking lot just east of the bank.
SAF
Iwas the driver.
Each SA was equipped with a bullet
proof vest, a handcau and an MP-5 submachine gun (10 millimeter).
Detective
in his NMPD car in the parking lot near
the FBI vehicle.
He was armed with a .40 caliber Glock pistol.
Detective I
Iwas parked behind the McDonald’s, located
immediately to the west of the bank. Be had a .40 caliber Glock
pistol and also had a shotgun in his car.
In addition to these
SAs and detectives who were participating in the NationsBank
surveillance, an off-duty NMPD officer,j________________
_____
w wcmr1ing as a security officer inside
the bank,
Officer
also arned with a .40 caliber Glock pistol.
It is
noted that 1
Officer
I was aware of the series of robberies

.-

2

 _Idid

6E-F..HQ-l9l5728

in Memphis and. ‘Tashville and was specifically aware of the
surveillance outside the bank that morning.
At just before 10:00 a.m., members of the NationsBank
surveillance team observed a blue Oldsmobile with a broken rear
vent window pull into the bank parking lot and pass between the
bank and the FBI vehicle located just to the east. A check of
the license plate by the surveillance team revealed that the
vehicle was one of the stolen airs team nimbers had been briefed
about earlier that morning. sM
Idetermined the driver

was a black male. The Oldsmobile took a circuitous route through
an adjacent parking lot and eventually reentered the bank parking
lot from Charlotte Avenue. The vehicle pulled up directly in
front of the bank and faced toward the front door. A black male
wearing a ski mask and flannel shirt was observed exiting the
passenger door of the cr and running into the bank. SA
Detective)
lalso noticed that the man was
carrying a handgun.
Tius subject wa 1tr idntified as Raymond
Augustine Hawkins. At this point SAl
land Detective
I
Inotified the other units that a bank robbery was in
progress.
As noted above, Officer
1
Iwas inside the bank.
He saw Hawkins run into the bank through the front door. He
observed him with a gun in his- left hand. As he was moving away
from a. desk to confront Hawkins, he tripped and fell on his back
facing the front door. While Off icer[
Iwas still on the
ground, Hawkins grabbed the frOnt of his shirt,_placed the gun to
his chest/shoulder area, and fired.
Officerl
who drew
his own weapon as he was falling, then shot Iawk.ans three times
in the ches area.
The subject ran back toward the front door
and Of ficerl
thinking he might reach the parking lot and
I
hurt someone else, fired at him again. Hawkins ran out of the
bank and SAl
lobserved him collapse “like a sack of
bricks” on the aicway leading to the front door. As the car
windows were up in the Bureau vehicle, neither SAl
mar
SAl
iheard tI’e gunshots inside the bank.
However
1
Detective
hear the gunshots.
I

When Hawkins collapsed in front of the bank, Detective
I who had already taken cover behind a light pole,

turned his attention toward the driver of the Oldsmobile. As the
car was backing away from the bank, Detectivel
i left his
position of cover and moved toward the vehicle., shouting “po1ice,
police, freeze, show me your hands, police.
1 It is noted that
several witnesses heard the detective giving similar commands.
The driver continued to back up, ducked down in his seat and
raised up. DetectiveJ
I who .heard the gunshots inside
3

 ________Icar.

_______frehicle

_______________

_______

E GF-HQ- 19157-28

the bank and knew of the escalating violence in the previous
robberies, believed the driver had a weapon and was going to
shoot him as he raised up. He therefore fired one round_through
the driver’s window at the subject, later identified asi
I
1 The Oldsnpbile was then moving forward toward
[again shouted “polices but
McDonald’s.
Detectivel
linstead of stopping, ducked back down inside the vehicle.
I
He then fired seve;al more shots into the ear. He also noticed
the FBI car behind
and heard one of the SAs fire
a shot.
]h

I

I

After SAl
1 saw Hawkins fall down in front of
icar backing up. He saw Detective
the bank, he dbservedl
unning to intercept the vehicle and heard him issue a
series ot commands to the driver, He then saw the car go slowly
forward toward McDonald’s with the detective still chasing it,
t- t-hi point
PT veh4cle movecl ntflosition directly behind
I”twisting in his seat’
SL
I obsez-vedl
and felt he was doing something ‘out of’the ordinary.” He heard
gunfire and knew_Detective I
Iwas shooting at the driver.
He also thoughtL
Iwas shooting at the detective from the way
he was twisting in his seat. Thact that I
Icar was
moving slowly made him think!
Ias trying to shoot the
detective rather thap get away. sI
I also realized that
1’.r xposed to the
Detective I
I had no cover and wa
opened the
driver.
With both cars still moving, SAL
passenger door and placed his MP-5 submachine gun between the
door ost and the door.
In order to protect Detective
I
he fired a. two- shot burst from the MP-5 at I
bar stopped
throug
window of the Oldsmobile. I
and SA
saw SAL
land DetetiveI
I
br in his Vhiele.
se
No weapOi was found onl
SA
en ran to Hawkins, who was lying face down with a
Ee
gun in is and.
He pushed the gun away and handcuffed him.
noted that. other oficers were by thn on the scene ana were
joutside the bank.
caring for Officerl
1nor Detective I
Neither SAl
1 fired their
weapons during the incident. SAl
leir1d in the
drive’s seatof the FBI vehicle anti.i. 9eu.t.ing out to secure
I upon learning
following the shooting. Detectivel
tha
he robbery was occurring, drove his vehicle to a point on
the west side of the bank where he could observe the parking lot
in front of the bank. He placed his hci-cnin over the door of his
car but did not shoot since Detective I
I was in his line
of fire.

4

-

 66F-HQ-19157--28

During an interview at the jail,
1
Istaed he did
participate in the bank robbery with Hawkins. I
ladvised he
I
I stayed up all night before the robbery smoking crack
cocaine and drinking gin.
Upon hearing the shots inside the
bank, he ‘freaked out and did not know what he did inside the
car. As he was driving the getaway car away from the bank, he
recalled being shot at through the windows of his vehicle and
being arrested after his car came to a Stop.
Officer I
‘was hospitalized with .one gunshot wound
to the shoulder from a .22 caliber revolver. He was released
aftr a siort sty in the hospital and is expected to make a full
recovery.I
Iwas also hospitalized for a short time with a
gunshot wound to the face. The bullet was removed and ballistics
tests revealed that he was shot by a .40 caliber rather than a
.10 millimeter projectile.
Hawkins was pronounced dead at the
scene.

Both Hawkins andi
Ihave lengthy criminal histories,
including crimes of violence.
For example, in 198’? Hawkins was
sentenced to 15 years confinement for Robbery With a Deadly
Weapon. I
I was convicted of Aggravated Assault and Carrying a
Deadly Weapon in 1985.

I

kas initially arrested on local charges

pertaining to the NationsBank robbery.
On November 12, 1998, a
federal complaint was filed and an arrest wariant was issued by
U.S. Magistrate udge William J. Haynes, Jr., Middle District of
1 Nashville, Tenflessee, charging
Tennessee
Iwith banlc
robbery.
the VCTF.

The bank robbery investigation is being conducted by

The shooting incident is being handled at the local
level by Detective I
lot the NMPD’s Homicide Division.,
Memphis Division Acting Supervisory Special Agenti
notified FBIHQ of the shooting incident shortly after it
occurred.
On November 6, 1998, the FBI’s Inspection Division
assembled and dispatched a Shooting Incident Review Team under
the direction of inspector-in-Placel
lot the

Little Rock Division.
DETAILS:

5

I

 _________

FD-204 (Rev,, 12.1.95)

—0

-.-—-.TJNITED.ATES-DEPARTMENT..
Federal Bureau of Investigation

-

-

Copy to

Reportof:

I

IIPI

OctoJer 25, 1998

oiice

Las Vegas

casc1o

66-19157-38

‘flUe

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHOENIX DIVISION
JULY 4, 1998

Characters

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopis:

On 7/4/98, FBI agents and officers from tie.
Phoenix Police Department. PPD> who were assigned to the
Phoenix Fugitive Task Force (PFTF) shot, and killed William
John SershoIl, DOB 2/17/67, while, they were. attempting to
arrest him.
Sershon wa being sought, on a warrant.
charging him with inurde and burglary.
The. warrart was
issued on 7/1/98 in Flagstaff, Ari,zona for a homicide
which occurred in connection with a 6/23/98 carjacking
which was being jointly investigated by the FBI’s
lagstaff Resident Agency (RA) and the, 1agstaff Police.
Department.
Sershon, who had a. lengthy criminal record
going back to 1986, was also being sought on felony drug
and weapons charges brought by Phoeni,c Police Department
PPD).

*

I

The, ?PD had recently attempted to arrest
Sershon, but, he had eluded them and fled to an apartment
complex where he broke into an apartment and hid. When
the female, occupant of the apartment, returned home,
Sershon assaulted her at gun point, then fled the
apartment and left, the. area in a highjacked vehicle. 0
6/23/98, Serphon and an accomplice/girlfriend,
I highacked a motor home belonging to Melvin
Dean R.adtke, in the, vicinity of Flagstaff
1 Arizona. Radtke
eithex was pushed or jpd from the vehicle and was run
over by the vehicle and killed.

I

Iturned herself in and on

7/2/98 was

‘jhls docuTlent contains neither ,reccmienclatf ohs nor cociusIon of the FBI, it
is the property of the FBI arxi is loaned to
Your O9ency; t end its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 66-19157.38

debriefed by FBI agents ana police, officers. I
ladvised
that, Sershon would return to Phoenix over the weekend. She also
advised that Sershon was armed with a .357 aonum revolvr and a
fully automatic AK-47 style assault rifle. I
1so
advised that Sershon told her that he would not, be taken alive
and would not, be sent back to prison. She lso advised that,
Sershorz would shoot it, out, with anyone who attempted to arrest,
him.
Interviewing agents and officers noted that it. was believed
that, a Smith and Wesson Model 686 ,357 magnum was taken from the
cariackinc victim. All of the information provided by
Iwas provided to members of the PFTF who had been
asked to assist in the, location and apprehension of Sershon.

I

Q

I and
members of the PFTF were, able, to trace, a telephone number. The
number came back to a Glendale, A4zona_trailer park.
Initially,
three, members of the PFTF PD Lt.J________ and Detectives I
I
I
I andi
I responded to the trailer park. At
some tLme after 4:30 AM, they saw an i.ndvidual they believeç1 tn
be, Sershon. They were joipd by P’RT
I andi
I
I and PPD Detectiv
PFTF
persopnel
b.ocked
I
off the, front ‘entrance, to the. trai’ier park and called the,
Glendale. Police, Department (GPD) and requested that, marked units
respond to the scene. Additional FBI agents were also requested
to respond.

I

Q

At approximately 5:45 AM, while, PF personnel were,
finalizing an arrest plan and preparing to set up, Sershon was
observed exiting the trailer where he was staying and getting
j.nto a blue 1998 Pontiac, SunUre. He,was observed carrying a
black bag which was about, the size of a shaving kit. I
I
I who was staying at, the, trailer, later advised that Sershon
was carrying a .357 magnum revolver next to the bag., Sershon
drove through the trailer park and, as he was approaching the
front entrance, was cut off by vehicles driven by ?FTF ersonnel.
Vehicils criven by FBI Sal
I and PPD Det,.
I (accompanied by FBI SA
I blocke
I
outerom the front; a vehicle, driven by PPD Det.
Sershon from the rear. Sershon attempted 0
escape by rapidly making a U-turn to his right. He ran into a
nearby trailer. He quickly backed up and attempted to ram
through a fence, that marked the, perimeter of the trailer park.
His vehicle, was unable to penetrate the fencç and came to rest, as
it, struck a storage shed on bhe other side, of the fence.
Several of the PFTF. personnel approached Sershon’s
2

I

 _________I.

- 4’..

66-19157-38
- ¶. -

vehicle. The FTF members we-e all wearing clothing that
identified them as law enforcement personnel. Several shouted
surrender commands.
In response to the, surrender commands,
Sershon stated that he would not be taken alive and crouched down
as if to reach into the floorboard area of his vehicle. PFTF
members also heard Sershon make a statement,to the effect, that if
they did not kill him, hewould kill himself. When PPD Det.
I
lobserved Sershon come up with a weapon in his hand, he
fired his GJ.ock .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol. FBI SA
jfired-his Heckler and Koch MP-.5 10mm carbine and FBI SA
his Colt M-4 Al .223 caliber carbine. Several
rounds struck Sershon, who was pronounced dead at. the, scene, by
Glendale Emergency Response personnel.
Glendale PD and Phoenix PD responded
to the scene, along
with Phoenix FBI personnel including Acting SAC Mark Bullock and
ASAC Ray Churay Glendale, PD conducted the crime spene, assisted
by FBI Evidence Response Team Coordinator
A Smith and
Wesson Model 686, .357 magnum, Serial #AYY9803, was xecovered
form the, passenger compartment of Sershons vehicle,. The, weapon’s
serial number was run through NCIC and determined to be stolen
from Melvin Dean Radtke, thevictim of the 6/23/98
caracJcing/hom,icide, that, Sershon was charged with.

‘

-

Q

-

—

I

The, Inspection Division assembled and dispatchd
Shooting Incident Review Team under the, direction of IIPj
jof the, Las Ve9as Division.

‘V

-

,

3

‘

‘C

,

I

 __________

(t2I3Ut99$)

INVESTIGATION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF

Date:

ROUTXN

precedence:

Inspection DViS10fl

To;

prom:

aiffS/98

Thomas J. Coyle

.ttn:

XnspCCtiOfl i
Contact: I

1837

Coyle ThK
Lusby The na’

Approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID 4:
Title:

661915’

NMINISTRATI’ INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCtDET
8/22/98
BALT3MORE DIVISIOM

jnid
shot
advise o a shootifl9
Agent
peoiai
8/22/98,.
DiViSion o
of his residence.
in th jCifl1tY
and killed a rabid raccoon
jdated 9/3/98
s4
of
report
RefereflO
DetailS
analYsi8i
prepared tO furnish the
Review
This commUfliCat0n1 is
Incdeflt.
of the Shooting
hooting.
comments, and recomt.ePdati0’5 tha capi0fl 8
reference to
Group (SIRG) with

To

1
I
2
3.
.3

1
2

-

-

-

-

IRm. 7142
Mr.’
(Enc4
Mr. Coyle, Rm. 7825
7116
m.
Mr. I
s155)
Mr. MarqUise, RoOfl
(1
Mr.?pran, Roam 6646
Room 7427
Mr.!
Room 7326
(1
7326)
RoOm
I
I
q
Ms
(3.
Mr. Lusby, Room 782S
RoOla 7837
Mr. I
USD03
Ginsburq,
Ms.

(1Mr.I

,1

QuantiCO

Mr.I

1
-

1

1
-

Mr.I

t4ri,

Room 4094
rFO
I Room 3787F
Room 786I

Nri__________
Mrs

,

 __

____

L’
To:
Re:

m:
Inspect.on Da.vas3.on Fro
8
99
8/,
l,/1
66-19157-03,

Inspect.on Th.visiozi

ing Xncideut
Details of the Shoot
e on 8/22/9a,
i&s at. his residenc
“]
Washington
SAEZ
. L_
—A
or,
gno
nei
his
ed
___ exited his
when he, notic
his back yard. ‘‘A__
o
int
g
rin
a
sta
e,
fic
‘ield Of
that. he. ha
by SA
ed
vis
s
ad
wa
and
e
L_
nc
SA
ide
res
entering
back yard an then
raccoon traversing his
yard.
observed
dda , SAS[jandEl
the front
Noting that, it. was mi
to
.
ard en,.xpute
h SA
oug
thr
er
ed to
gg
sta
on
tt
co
__
rac
the
SJL
ildren were playing.
S
ile
wh
yard where several ch
rd
going to the, front. ya
delay the, raccoon from
Ma__land, Animal
e, Arundel County,
Ann
to
ll
ca
ne,
pho
a
placed
SA____ was advised
g tle. phone, call,
rin
Du
.
ers
fic
Of
ol
ntr
r on duty in the,
Co
animal control office
, he, would.
that thexe was only one
period of time, before
ed
nd
te
a,x
be.
uld
wo
county and it.
jresidence..
b able, to respond to SN
.n a
to trap the, raccoon
d
pte
tem
Jat
EZ
d
SA
an
SAEZ_‘j
with neighborhood
comLng into contact.
attempts, the
box to prevent. it from
After several failed
ls.
ma
ani
ic,
est
dom
ents followed the,
children or
sive.. Whi3,e, the, Ag
res
agg
re,
mo
e,
am
bec
raccoon
the. Anima3, Control
ced another call to
pla
r
bo
igh
ne
the, raccoon
a
,
on
co
rac
When containment. of
u).
res
e,
tiv
ga
, raccoon
Officers with ne
Jand Watt, forced the
s
S.4
,
ble
ssi
po
im
coon by
proved to be
and killed the. rac
_
___
sa_
.
on
ati
loc
e,
l.
saf
to
into a
S nine millimeter is
his
m
fro
s
nd
rou
r
fou
g
in
tir
Police
d the, Anne, Arundel
immediatel,y contacte
ty and the.
patcher of h.s identi
dis
,
the
ed
vis
ad
and
police would be
tepartment
was advised that, no
e
.
ll.
ca
,
the
of
e,
purpos
ort. would be taken
idence and that. no rep
res
his
to
ed
tch
pa
dis
n in a box
carcass of the, raccoo
.
The, Agents placed the
r for rabies testing
Animal Control Cente
on
the
co
to
rac
it
,
d
the
ere
t,
liv
tha
de
and
vised
was subsequently ad
The. altimo’e Divjsion
.
us
vir
ies
was infected with the, rab
ve,
met, to discuss the. abo Thomas
On 10/14/98, the. SIRG
tor
rec
Di
tant.
ent.. Deputy Assis
captioned shoetin 5,ncid

J

.

SA[E1

2

I

 t

To:
Re:

Inspection D.vision From:
66-19157-03, 11/18/1998

Inspection Division

Lusby, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the
following voting members of the SIRG in attendance: Mark J.
Mershon, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division;I
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section,
Criminal Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief,
Personnel Administration and Benefits Section, Personnel,
Division;
Legal Advice and Training, Legal
Policy, Off ice of the, General Counsel; Richax’d.A. Marguise,
Section,Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal
Investigative Division; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Training Unit, Training Division (TD ;/
Unit.
Chief, NS.2B, National Security Division;j
JUnit,
Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and, I
I Supervisor, Washington
Field Office.
The, two non-voting members present were,I_________
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Office, of General
Counsel, and
1 Inspection 3nalyst, Office, of
Inspections, Inspection Division.

ssN

I

-.

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG
Th SIRG re.viewed the, above synopsized incident with
the intent, to (1 e,valuate the application of deadly force;
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint if any); 3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, 4) provide, recommendations
for administratiye action if deemed necessary.

I

SIRG members unanimously concurred that thi hôôtinci
incident involved an intentional discharge of SAl_______________
j, weapon.
There, were, no issues related to this incident and
SIRG members_unnimously concurred that no action should be
taken7:’
against, S3
las a result of his involvement, in this shooting
incident.

3

 ___________

To:

From:
InspectiOn DiviSiOn

R

66-1.91S7’0’

inspe0’°

l1/8/J998

Set ead .1:

against
actiOfl be. taken
in this
That no admifliStrate
involVeme
his
as a result f
S2’J
) S
I
8
h
ootiflg incident.

.0

4

 0

FD.204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

0
STATES DEPARTNTOTI
Federal Bureau of nvestLgation

Copy to;

Repcrtof:
Date.

ASAC Michael E. Varnum
November 6, 1998

CasclD#:

62A-PH-84476

TWe

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
PHILADELPHIA, PA
SEPTEMBER 1, 1998

Character:

SHOOTING INCIDENT

omce

Philadelphia

Summary of shooting incident on 9/l/at. Walt. Whitman
to the arr t. of

Syçopsis:

rt—

—---

“-‘‘--

landi____
—P

-

a

DETAILS:

I
I

On 2/12/97, Camden County Parks Police Officer
shot while in his patrol vehicle as he
responctea to rne sound of gunfire. on Fremont, Street at
Camden, New Jersey (NJ).
Subsequent. investigation by the
it-r Prosecutor’s Of fice (CCPO) detrmiried tha
I also knçwn as (aka)
ancti
isriot. Officerl
la they riea trom tne

D/C

I

scene of the attempted obberv ançl murder_of Carlos
Rosario in Camden, NJ. I
iwere indicted
land I
by a Camden County Grand Jury in the shooting andi
Iwas
i1
arrested by county authorities. i
mMedto
being prnt z the scene when I
Ishot
Officerl________ An Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution
(UFAP) warrant was subsequently obtained in the District
of New Jersey and an investigation initiated by the SJRA
to locate and a.iestI
Iwas profiled
tw-ice on “America’s Most Wanted’ .nd wa Camden County’s

most wanted fugitive.

This doctznent contains neither recomendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is Loaned
to
your agency; it and its contents are riot to be distributed outside your agency.

 ___ndI

62A-PH- 84476

_turing
to 5/23/98, the SJRA
initiated several investigations rela
Tho’ãThé
9
sf’rmed
bank robberies committed at the CoreStates Bank, Woodlynne, NJ,
the Commerce Bank, Cherry Hill, NJ and the Commerce, Bank,
Moorsetown, NJ. The suspects, believed to be Hispanic males,
Wore, ski masks, gloves, and what appeared to beL bulletproof vests
during the_robberies. Thv
jd aitOmatic asault type
weapons. I
landi
Iwere
landl
identified as the primary suspects in the CoreStates Bank. robbery
and it, is believed they are responsible for the other two
robberies.
-

—

A review of the New Jesev Crimiral History records for

land

Ireflect numerous

arrests and charges relating to homicide, aggravated assault,
possession of firearms and drug possession and distribution.
Both
Iwere convicted in separate
felony homicide matters. Xn addition to th charges relating to
the shooting ofCamden County Parks Off icer
I
Iwas convicted for carrying a, prohthited weapon an
possession of a weapon. Further, he has numerous aggravated
assault, and homicide arrests. Clearly, the, propensity for
violence by these subjects, to include significant armed
hostility directed at law enforcement, officers by I
I
I has been well documented.
During August 1998, a confidential source, who was
willing to provide, information regarding the whereabouts of
I
Iw developed through law enforcement contacts

Ii

bySAl

Initial information provided by the, source regardingi
background and famiv members was accprate. The, source, was
directed to contactI
Jo develoD further
information regarding the location of I
I

I

1 information obtained durine debrief ings of
Baseç3 urrr
the, source, SAL__Ileax’ned that,I
J was attempting

to identify a target, for a

six figure

I

I

roery.

l

I

Iii.

‘I
,

2

I

6

 ______________________
___________
___
__Iwho

0
62A-PH-84476
Further.I

IDlanned to accomp4nv[
1%1s1

p—.

j.

Rodriguez stated that
he, had access to several fully automatic shoulder weapons to
include an AK-47 and body armor.
On ft/25/c U\F tffd an operations plan to
arrest I
1 SAL
landi
landi
I
engaged in extensive coordination and planning with Phi.Lacieiph
ia
Divisior Management, the. SJRA, SWAT, SOG, NJSP and the CHPD. The
operations plan detaileçh 1itilzation of FB
WAT to effect
the apprehension of thI
Ibrothers and
I On the
morning of 8/27/98, SAl
Ilearned from the source that the
armored car robbery was postponed byj
I
On 8/30198:1

-

I

I Pursuant to this information, s1J
evised his
operat ions plan and coordinated with the, participating entities
to’effect. the, arrest.

I

Within moments SWAT Team LeaderI
gave, the
command to arrest the subjects. The tow truck and pzckup truck
being utilized as blocking vehicles by SWAT as well as a cube van
containing a SWAT arrest, team began their approach to block the
subject vehicle and effect the, arrest. The subjects who had
already become, suspicious of the lack of activity ir the rest
area parking lot and lack of traffic on the NJTP 9
bserved the
vehicles moving toward them and again ordered thel
Ito move.
As the subject vehicle begar to accelerate, south along the front
of the rest area, the, cube, van swerved to the left, to block its
edt. At about the, same moment, SA
was
driving north in the SWM pickup passed the cube van and struck
the subject vehicle on the left side and drove, it up on the
3

I

-

—

 62A-PH-84476
-

•

--—sidewalkof—the_rstarea. As he rr1 1
n’nvr
SSA
SAs
I and
kedt’h
cube van. The subject vehicle passed the cube van at that time.
and all three SWAT members reported seeing a rifle being raised
by one of the subjects in the rear of the vehicle. Each member
fired once at the subjects inside the vehicle as the vehicle
moved south .away from them.
The subject vehicle accelerated and coninued south 0
the, sidewalk in front, of the rest area building. I
jth subject vehicle off of the sidewalk it was momentarily
I
traveling at a high ratç of sneed directly
nnthcr WM’
vehicle ocçuDied by SAsI
lanai
I SAs
Ihad taken up a position at a small parking
I
j andl
island which was located adjacent to the southern ed of tlje rest
area building. As the vehicle sped toward them, SAl
I
reported that he heard someone yell’”gun.” SAl
specifically
I
recalled seeing a gun in the rear of the subject vehicle.
Accordingly, SAsI
konsidering the speeding
I and I
vehicle moving in their direction and the weapon observed in the
back seat fired their weapons at the. subjects. SAl
I
recalled firing twice before his 10 millimeter pistol jammed and
he was forced to clear the weapon. SAl
Ireported that he
fired approximately three two-round bursts from his t1P-5 at the
subject seated in the rear on the, driver’s side.
-

As the subject vehicle reached the curve at the. south
end of the. rest, area building, it, slowed down to make, the corner
leading to the rear employee parking lot. At that, monient the
subject vehicle was struck by the, SWAT tow truck driven by SA
I
I The tow truck hit the, subject vehicle, on the right
rear side and literally drove over the trunk of the. car, crushing
the left, rear quarter oanel. The col4sion completely disabled
the subject vehicle. I
jwho was in the front
passenger seat exited the vehicle and ran to thc 5de entrance. of
thq. rest are building. Both SAsI
Ireported that
I and I
as I
I reached the. entrance they obse
d him reaching for
a weapon holstered on his right, side. SA
reported that he
fired three shots ati
fired his
land
warn hnt could not recall how many times he fired.
I
Iwas hit, in his right hip and fell to the grduna.
I

I

Additionally, as the subject vehic3,e came, to a halt as
a result of the collision with the tow truck, SAl
iho was
positioned at the south corner of the rest area service
observed a’subject in the back seat holding a weapon.
subsequently fired one hot from ‘his M-4 carbine
passexjqer. TIere were zw further shots tired and

lanai

isurrendered without further
4

 ________ilac1rhia

__

________

0
62A-?H-84476
The,NJSCrimepeneReort,’ dated 9/1/98, reflects
that a total of 31 shots were fire duiñth hbting’incident.—
All ,31 shots were fired by six members
Division SWAT involved in the arrest of
ndl
I
I The NJ.P “(‘Yi nje
I
land [
ort” further
reflects that SSAI________ SAsI
land______ ach fired one
shot, from the area of the cube van. Twenty-seven shot
fired from the area around the vehicle oçriirnc3 by SASJ
land
I and a single shot, was fired by SAl
If rem the entrance
area to the garage, at the south end of the rest area building.
An acçountinq of th 27 shots fired from positcn
occupied by SAsI
Iaçd Stoije woula indicate that SAl
I
fized six shots while SAl
If ired 21 shots during the shooting
incident.
This reconciliation is based upon th NJSP “Crime
Scene, Report,” the statements obtained from SAsI
I andi
I
and the, FD-,302 report, prepared by SA I
lacknowledging
receipt. of the weapons and ammunition from each Agent. that fired
a weapon during 4
the, shooting incident.
NAME

SSAI

WEAPON

JColt.
M-16A2

SA

I

SAl
1
SA

I

.223

1

.223

1

Smith & Wessori
1076

.10

6

Heckler & Koch
MP5

.10

1

Colt.
M4A1

.223

Heckler & Koch
MPS

.10

Heckler & Koch
I M4A1

SAl

I

NUMBER OF
ROUND(S) FIRED

CALIBER

.

1
21

As a result of the shots fired by the above. Agents,
ustained a graze wound to his left, tiih and
eceived two wounds to his right, hip.’ I
I4as treated at the Coooer 4edical Center, Camden,
NJ and released immediately. I
Jwas treated at the
West, Jersey Hospital
1 Voorhees, NJ and also released immediately.
NJSPj
received a cut on her neck by
flyi-ng g-iass when a window in the rest area aS blown out duiing
the shooting.
Sh was subsequently treated at, the Garden State
5

 ‘0

0

62A-?H-64476
—

Hospztal, We
No FBI personnel sustained any injuries.

released.

Dr. I
I West Jersey Hospital, removed a
metal fragment from the right, hip of L
—J The metal
fragment was subsequently given to sAl
Iiho later
provided the fragment to the NJSP for forensic examination.
On 9/l/98 a complaint was filed n U.S. Diqtrict
Cot, District of New Jersey, charging thel
Ibrothers
ani
lot violation of Title. iS, Section 922G,’ for felony
possession of a weapon.
-

Details of this incident will be reported as delineated
in the Table of Contents.

6

 (12/3U1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF iNVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection ivision

From:

Date: 06/03/1999
Attn:

Wiley D. Thompson, III

1
4
Inspection Dr
Contact: I

Approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

I

Extension 1837

Thompson Wiley D III
Lusby Thomas
Mershon Mark J

I

Irr
297—UQ-A127lS99-D

ZDMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
9/13/98
LAS VEGAS DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that occurred in the Las Vegas Division on
9/13/98, during the arrest of
fiiai1i.r
Believing that his
life and the life of Sergeant!
I of the T Vcc,
Mrrrjtan Pølice Department in jeopardy, SA
I
four shots at a subject located in a t.Leeang
vehicle.
Members of the ST c9mmended that no administrative
action be taken against SAf
a result of his involvement
in this shooting incident.

las

Details:

I

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
Idated 9/30/98.

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.

1
Mr.
2-Mr.
(1
1
Mr.
3.
Mr.
2
Mr.
(1
2
Mr.!
(1
1
Mr.
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

IRm. 7142
)Rm. 7116
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
Thompson, Room 7825
Lusby, Room 7825
Forjii. rm E46
Mn
Room 6313)
Rqom 7427
Ms.!________ Room 7326)
Mershon, Koom 7837

Mr. Biehi, USDOJ
Ms. Gins]wra. TT.DOJ
(1-M’-.I
I
1
ruántico
Mn
1-Mr
FO
1
Mr
‘oom 4147
I Room 3787F
1
Mr.
1
Mrs.
Room 781
1
2

‘

-

-

-

-

 _________

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ—A1271699—JD, 06/03/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

I

On 9/12/98 at approximately 4:30 p.m., SSAI
telephonically contacted by Sergeant [

Iwas

Vas Metropolitan Police Department. Sergeant
I assigned to the Las Vegas Safe Streets Task Force,
aiso iaiown as the Criminal Apprehension Teams (CATS), advised
that the CATS were in the process of responding to a possible
location of a fugitive for which they had a warrant.
th L

of

Pursuant to informa—icrn n Hrc1 hr jn informant, a
possible location of fugitivel
Iwas determined to
be an apartment located at Extended Stay America in
Las Vegas,
Intelligence Information also indicated that I
1
may be associating with other individuals who were suspected in
ongoing robbery investigations.
At approximately 12:57 a.m., 9/13/98, CATS members
observe4
xit an_atartment. According to a plan, three
team members confronted I
I notified him of their identity,
and placed him in custody. Thrçughout the arrest, the subject
continued to resist and called out for help from othet’
individuals located inside the apartment.
Several subjects
exited the aortment and one of them, later identified asj
I
I approached the arrest team in a threatening
manner. I
Iwas ordered back into the apartment, however,
exited moments later. Based on his actions, coupled with the
fact thati
iwas believed to be associ
rjth sub:jects
involved in robberies, sAl
onfronted
tin an attempt
.to determine_his identity.
Limmediate y ran from the area
[
with SA
Jin pursuit.
Sergeariti

1

According to SAE
Iwhen he locatedj
j the
subject was seated in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with the
driveis dcmrn open. As SAJ
Ieached inside the vehicle to
detain
the aubjec
remark to the effect that “I’m
J
going to sho& you”. SA
Istepped bacJwards, drew his
.weapon and orderedt
Jout of the vehicle. At that time, the
vehicle_suddenly bac}ced up causing the open door to knock
SAl
to the ground. sergeant I
I who had just
arrived at the vehicle, was also knocked down by the force of the
open door and the left front tire of the vehicle ran over his
legs. As the vehicle continued backing to the highway, the
subject stopped the vehicle, revved its eiaine and ece1erated
the car forward directly .towards Sergeant I
IwhO ws
laying in the driveway. Sergeant I
fired two shots at
I
the vehicle as it approached and 2q
ffired four shots from
2
“-‘-‘-

.

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271699-D, 06/03/1999

his location.
The vehicle continued to the rear of the complex
and exited the area from another driveway.

I

On 1/6/99, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
Chief Inspector Mark J. Mershon, Inspection
Division, chaired the meeting with the following voting members
of the SIRG in attendance: Dana D. Bieh]., Deputy Section Chief,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Jim U. Oliver, Trial Attorney, civil ights Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ;I
[Unit Chief. Trer Unit,
Administrative Services Division; SSAI
I Legal
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Richard A. Marquise, Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
ITJnt (h4tf.
Firearms rraining Unit, Training Division (TD); I
I
I3nit Chief. NS-2D Unit. Gloal Section
NS-2, National
Security Division;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
and, j
Supervisor, Washington Field Office.
The
only non-voting member present wad
I Inspection
Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Observations and Recoxrstendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force in this shooting incident by SAL
Ias justified
and in conformance with the current deadly force policy. This
discussion resulted in the recommendation that no administrative
action be taken against SAl
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.
The only observation made by the SIRG members evolved
around the fact that this shooting incident and follow-up report
involved an administrative inquiry. Members opined that
interviews of the individuals involved should have been conducted
by FBI personnel.
SIRG members recommended that Executive
Management and the Chief Divis-ion Counsel readdress established
protocol with officials of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
3

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271699-D, 06/03/1999

Department to ensure that FBI interests are covered during
shooting incident investigations. This issue will be addressed
in a letter to the Special Agent in Charge of the Las Vegas
Division.
XE2D():
Set Iead 1
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, 0. C.
-dministrative action be taken against
SAl
s a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

4

 D-2O4 (R.v. 12-1-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigaffon

Copy to:

iiI

Data:

March 27,

caselD#:

66F—HQ—19157—11

I

1998

om

Buffalo Field Office

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CLEVELA.ND DIVISION
MARCH 4, 1998

.

Cbaraotar

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This gatinri incident was_4the rsult of an
investigation of
landi
1 two suspected armored car robbers operating in the
Cleveland, Ohio area.

I

J

I

I

landi
jwere identified in 1995 by the
Cleveland Division as suspects in three (3) armored car
robberies occurring in Cleveland, Ohio in 1993, 1994 and
1995.
The Cleveland Division developed information that
these robberies involved unprovoked shootings and the use
of ballistic vests and armor-piercing ammunition by the
subjects.
In 1995 the Cleveland Division SOG began
periodic surveillances and spot checks of both subjects.
On February 12, 1998, the SOG located the
subjects together casing a Brinks armored car route.
Based upon information developed from the surveillances,
the Cleveland Division believed that the subjects were in
the planning stage of another armored car robbery.
SAC
HARP i1---1ar’ted the SOG to begin daily surveillances of
botIJ
In addition, SAC HARP, along with 6
othe1r_LLeyeiand D1v151.Ofl
and SWAT Team
k:c
SAl
I began nightly meetings to discuss the
activities o the subjects and
arrest plan.

lanai______

.

management
a possible

Leader

During the two weeks prior to March 4, 1998, the
SOG was augmented by the Violent Crimes and Major
Offenders (VCMO) Squad and members of the Cleveland SWAT
tMs doctaent

your agency;

contains neither reconniendetions nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is
contents are not to be distrThuted outside your agency.

ft and its

Loaned to

 ________frid

I,

.
I

I

I

I

I

Team.
In addition, Title III coverage was planned. A specific
operational plan was not documented at this juncture because the
subjects continued to use their personally-owned vehicles and
their history reflected they used stolen vehicles for the
robberies, and because no specific target location for the
robbery or a switch site for vehicles had been identified. In
conjunction with these briefings, Assistant U. S. Attorneyj
Tas briefed and he developed a checklist of events which,
wnen atisfied, wçnild apunt to probable cause for the Agents to
arrestl
PndI______ From February 23, 1998 on, •SWAT Team
Leader I
boniuoted daily briefings with SWAT members at
their staging area regarding conducting a high risk car stop.
The briefings also included discussions on the use of deadly
force and crossfire situations.

I

At approximately 9:00 A.M. on March 4, 19981
land
I were observed departingi
1.’idence ml
I
personally—owned Chevrolet van,
I
I were surveilled
to an apartment complex on Cleveland’s Southwest side. The
ub-iritj departed the apartment complex n separate vehicles with
hriving a Ford minivan which was determined to be stolen.
SAC HARP was advised of this information and dispatched ASAC
ALLEN to the area.
The subjects were then surveifled to a gas_station
where they were observed transferring baqqage from
Ivan to
I
SOG observedi
Itolen van.
landi
Itravel to a Kmart arkinq lot wherel
Iparks his vehicle and departs with
the stolen van.
SAC HARP was advised of this
intortion anç departed the office for the scene.
Sometime
later I
Istolen van was observed in the parking lot at the
Star Bank, one of several locations identified as potential
armored car robbery sites due to previous surveillance. At this
point SA I
]contacted the Brinks .Armored Car Company and had
the Brink’s armored car intercepted in order to prevent it from
making its usual stop at the bank. An operational plan had been
discussed earlier whereby the Brinks armored car servicing the
potential robbery site would be diverted by Bureau Agents thus
m&king the subjects abort the robbery and return to the switch
vehicle where their guard would be at its lowest. Agents on the
scene believed that at this point enough probable cause had been
developed to arrest the subjects for the attempted armored car
robbery.

un

The shooting incident occurred when the Cleveland SWAT
Team effected a felony car stop at approximately 11:30 A.N. on
March 4, 1998 as!
jeturned to the switch site in
landl
the K-mart parking lot..
lexited the stolen van andi_____
bgan to turn the van around as if to exit the parking lot. A
the same time, three (3) SWAT vehicles simultaneously approached
and blocked it from exiting the parking lot.
Speci.flcauly, a SWAT sedan approached from the driver’s side and
2

)

77

 .
I

rammed that door.
The second SWAT vehIcle, a Suburban,
approached from the passenger side of the stolen van and rammed
the Oassnger’s door. The thir SWAT veIiole, a van, blocked
Ivehicle from the rear. I
1 van was facing a chainlink fence whiqh nclose one side of the parking lot. I
L who
had just exite4
Jvan, was quickly apprehended near his
vehicle.
SWAT Acnt edtd heir vehicles and identified
themselves tol
Iwas non-compliant and irtunediately
put his van in reverse and rammed the SWAT van blocking his rear.
He th wi Pprward -at an angle, ramming the SWAT vehicle to his
left. I
as reversing his van again when SA
I who
was located at the front passencer_side of I
vehicle,
I
fired a shot at
I SAl
I who had taken up a
position behin4I
jvan, stated that he also fired into the
rear window of I
ran as it was adcleratincf towrds him in
reverse çor th second time. SAsI
landi
Istated they
fired ati
Iwhen he accelerated forward for t1e second time.
SA
Ivan
I was located to the rear driver’s side of L
and b
lwas located on the driver’s side ofl_______ van
near the front. Each Agent stated be fired in order to protect

himself and/or other Agents.

.

I
Ivan broke through the chain link fence and
caine to rest a few feet 1rnn,
1?rick wall. The van traveled
approximately 100 feet. I
twa-s orderd out of the van and
placed under arrest by SWAT Agents and SAl
buffered
multiple gunshot wounds to the face, arms, and shoulder. He was
transported to the emergency room of the Metro Health Medical
Center, Cleveland, Ohio by Cleveland Emergency Medical Services.
He is recovering from his wounds.
-

SAC HAIP, who had taken up a position with other Agents
a few blocks from the K-mart_Darking lot, was monitoring the
situation.
He arrived asi
placed under arrest and
L
1
immediately made appropriate notifications
or directed Agent
personnel to do so.
The Cleveland Police Department, Homicide
Unit, was notified and processed the scene.
Search warrant were executed for all vehicles and the
residences ofi
I The searches recovered a large
landi
amount of weapons, ammunition, maps, detailed surveillance notes,
disguises and clothing.
Bothi
k,ere charged with one count each
I anU
of Conspiracy to Obstruct Commerce by Robbery, Attempted Bank
Robbery, and Using and/or Carrying Firearms during a Crime of
Violence.

3

 66—HQ—19157—11
Details:
ISSUE NUMBER ONE:

USE OF DEADLY FORCE

The issue of the use of deadly force was specifically
during the shooting inquiry involving I
I
I an armored oar robbery suspect. A review of the
sulstantive investigation, interviews of all participants, and
other facts obtained during the shooting inquiry were analyzed in
order to determine if the use of deadly force was justified. The
current deadly force policy, as set forth in the Electronic
Reference Library, Manual of Investigative Operations and
Guidelines, was. used to determine deadly force justification.
D7C
Thi n

I

This shooting inquiry determined that the issue of deadly
force was discussed by SWAT Teiu Leader SAl
Iwith all SWAT
team personnel on a daily basis beginning 2/23198 until the
shooting on 3/4/98.
In addition, as stated previously, CDC
rovided records indicating that all SAs in the
6
Cleveland Division were provided copies of the New Deadly Force
Policy and had discussed the issue of deadly force in November,
1997, at a mandatory legal training session given to all
Cleveland SAs.
The Cleveland Division SWAT team wa called oui bccinning
2/23/98 after the Cleveland SOG observedI
I and I
basing
armored oar routes and possible locations for a switch car.
Briefings were given to the SWAT team every morning at a staging
area on the West side of Cleveland.
The SWAT briefings included review çfthe ]eadly Force
Policy and conducting yhic1 stops.__SAl
Iwas very familiar
with the activities oft
land
I having participated in
nightly meetings with SAC HARP and other management staff
involved in the investigation. These briefings included
information that the subjects were well armed with AI-47 assault
rifles, with armor—piercing aimnunition, and Sig Sauer semi
automatic 9MM Model 226 pistols and used ballistic vests.
They
had fired weapons unprovoked in two (2) of the three (3) armored
car robberies they were suspected of committing, wounding a
Brinks’ employee.
In addition, SAl
pecifically advised
the SWAT personnel that if the driver of the subj ect’s vehicle
tried to ram his way out of containment or attempted to use his
vehicle as a weapon, the immediate use of deadly force was
justified.

I

.

During all briefings, Cleveland management ensured that the
SOG, the VCMO Squad, and SWAT personnel involved in the operation
4

 •

were aware of the violent nature of the subjects, the potential
for them to be non—compliant, and DJ policy regarding the use of
deadly force.
During interviews, the SWAT team stated they knew
of the subjects’ violent natures, their use of dangerous Weapons,
and the potential for use of deadly force. The Agents felt
comfortable with the briefings. They were given all available
intelligence, and it was updated on a daily basis. All SWAT
personnel interviewed stated they were briefed in the use of
deadly force.
Based upon the information that the subjects would be using
a stolen van, SA
eveloped four (4) possible arrest
scenarios.
These will be discussed in detail in Issue Number
Two: Adequacy of Planning.
Scenario number four was the preferred option and the one
actually used.
This plan involved allowing the subjects to go to
the robbery site and have FBI Agents intercept the Brinks’ truck,
and then arrest the subjects when they returned to the switch car
location.

.

On the morning of /4/98, the subjects are observed by the
SOq iitj ng at I
esidence.
The subjects leave together
ml
I van and. are surveiUed to an apartment coinplex.I
I
departs alone in his van andl
us obperved departing in a
vehicle not previously known to the SOG. I
Ilicense plate
was run thp-trh CIC and the vehicle is determined to be stolen.
I
ThndI
kre then surveilled. to a gas station where they
transfer baggage froiul
Istolen van. They
Ivan td
depart the gas station separately and are observed a short time
latr arriving at the K-mart parki
na lot at 3250 W. 65th Street.
1
I
I parks his van and then joins
in the stolen van and
j
they depart.
SAC
ched ASAC ALLEN to the scene after being
advised that
andl
I were together, ASAC ALLEN drove to
a lot at 65th and Clark, appro,cimately 2 to 3 blocks from the Kmart parking lot.
ASAC ALLEN and othiv C!lpveland_management
staff monitored the sutveillance of I
I andl
I from this
location and kept SAC HZaP advj of the_sub-jects’ activities.
When SAC KARP was advised that I
I and L
Iwere together in a
stolen van, he realized that enough probable cause existed to
arrest the subjects,
He immediately proceeded to the area where
ASAC ALLEN was located and proceeded to monitor the situation
waiting for an opportune time to effect the arrest.

.

During the surveillance of I
L after they
land I
departed the K—mart parking lot, the SOG lost contact with the
subjects for
period of time.
SOG found the subjects in the
parking lot of the Star Bank.
In keeping with the plan discqssed
at the nightly briefings, Agents intercepted the Brinks’ truck at
its stop prior to the Star Bank and diverted it to a safe
,

5

 _____________IanI1____
____ ______Ithen
______[and

location.
The operational plan in effect was to arrest the
subjects at the switch site in the K-mart parking lot. It was
apparent from all interviews conducted with both SOG and SWAT
personnel that everyone knew and understood the plan.
After waiting a short period of time,
heft
I
the Star Bank parking lot and were observed re-tracing the
Brinks’ truck route,
After apparently realizing the Brinks’ truck
was nowhere to be found, they returned to the K—mart parking lot.
The SWAT team had already traveled to the K-mart parking lot and
set up at the rear of the K—mart building to effect the arrests
of the subjects.
The SWAT Team Leader was concerned that the
subjects would make the surveillance and therefor h M a
heightened sate of readiness. He instructed SAl
ito
accompany SAl
I in the SWAT sedan; locate themselves in the
parking lot, and approach the subjects from an angle opposite the
other two (2) SWAT vehicles. The SWAT Team Leader also advised
all swAT personnel not to assume that there ware only two (2)
subjects in the van since SOG had lost sight of the vehicle for a
period of time.
As the subjects’ van approached the K-mart parking lot, SOG
called out that SWAT had control. SAl
radioed that the
subjects were coming into the parking lot. TE1e other SWAT
vehicles, with the SWAT Suburban in the lead, came around from
th hck nP the building
‘aited on the side of the building.
sal
Iradioed thati
Iwas out of the van arid the SWAT
vehicles moved in.

.

andi

to park.

I
Iwas walking to his van
I turned his van to the left, either to turn around or

The sublects’ van was facing a chain-link fence.
SA
H n th SWaT sedan rammedI
S
Ivan at
the driver’s door.
SA l
xited the SWAT sedan and
immediately took I
unto custody. SA[
I drivLng the SWAT
Suburban with sas
inside, rammed
the front passencer side of the subiects’ van. The SWAT vane
by SAl
I fl(i
with SAsI
linside, blocked the subjects’ van at the rar
I
1
identified himself and gave commands not to move td
I A
number of the SWAT agents were identifying themselves and giving
to “freeze,” “stop,” or 1
’hands up.” I
Jwas
immediately nonoompliant, threw the_van into reverse and struck
the SWAT van, narrowly missing SAs[
I an
I
Jthen went forward, striking the SWAT sedan.
reversed the van• aapin and started backwar4s. At this point, SAs
If ired. szj
I stated h
tlred one shot at I
E1ead. Sal
stated he fired two :
I
(2) to three (3) rounds at the driver. SAl
stated he
fired two (2) shots into the
win.ow of the van.
BA
I
Istáted that black curtains hung across the side and
rear of the van preventing him from seeing the driver; however,

I

•

1h SWAT vehicles approached,

I

-

•

6

 ________Ivan,

•

he firedat a position where he knew the driver was, in order to
stop him.

I

It appears that SA
ctions are within the deadly
force policy inasmuch as he fired to stop a threat ft h4
and not to disable a motor vehicle. Although SA1
I
advises in his statement that he fir-’’ i,tr
osition where he
believed the driver was located, SAl
Ibasis of
knowledge for his belief is supportable inasmuch he knew there
was a driver of the van located in the driver’s seat ..because the
vehicle was presently moving towards him and because the SWAT
members at the scene were issuing commands to the drivers
location.
I

then went forward with the van, narrowly missing SA
as he went by him. SAl
I fired at him. SAs
I
Ianc4
I also continued firing at the
subject of the van.
at this point, iumped the 6—
inch ourbset parking stop aiwent through the chain-link fence.
The van appeared to slide to the side, coming to a stop in front
of a brick wall.
SAl
lordered a cease fire believing that
I
Ihad been disabled and that bullets might ricochet off the
brick wall behind the van and into the public street. All Agents
advised they fired because the van was coming at them or other
Agents and they were in fear of their lives, or feared for the
lives of their fellow SWAT team members.
A review of the statemeits of all arrest team personnel
indicates that SAl
lappears to have fired firt.
followed almost instantly by As I
land I
The passage of time from when
as given the command to put
his hands up and freeze until his van caine to a Stop fl front of
the brick wall cannot be exactly determined but is estimated at
only a matter of seconds.

I

I

.

I

was then ordered to put his hands out of the van
window.
The Agents exhibited extreme caution in approaching the
van •
Some Agents had cçmcrn tat there may be another suspect
in the rear of th vn.I
Iwas taken out of the van and
handcuff ed.I
Ivan was cautiously cleared. I
Ihad
received a number of non—fatal wounds. He was wearing a
bulletproof vest and had a fully-loaded Sig Sauer Model 226, 9 MM
semi—automatic pistol on his person. Agents cleared the van and
observed a blue gym bag in the van containing a 12-gauge shotgun
(streeteweeper style), a fully-loaded Glock 9 NM pistol in a
shoulder holster with two (2) extra magazines, an AK—47 semi
automatic rifle with a sawed-off stock, two magazines for an AX—
47 taped together, a fully-loaded Glock 45 caliber pistol, a
fully loaded Glock 45 caliber magazine, a barrel-drum magazine,
blue bulietpoof ve,
can of mace, and handcuffs. Also
located in the back of the van was a 12 gauge shotgun, a fullyloaded AK—47 with two magazines, a Sig Sauer 9 NM pistol with two
7

 ________Iwas

•

_______If

magazines, a blue plastic bag with a Sylvester Stallone full—head
rubber mask, and a black duffle bag containing a double magazine
for an AK—47 rifle, a loaded barrel drum magazine, binoculars,
and various clothing and masks.

land
All Agents participating in the arrests of I
I
were wearing Bureau—issued tactical body armor SWAT vests with a
shock plate inset which displayed FBI on front and back.
This investigation determined Ithati
Idid not fire any
weapons in his possession. There is no physical evidence that
any of his weapons were fired.
Analyses of this incident leads to the conclusion that the
Agent& decision fire their weapons was precipitated by the
actions of
land was justified under the Deadly Force
Policy.
FBI Deadly Force Policy allows Agents to use deadly force
when they “have probable cause to believe that the subject of
such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical
injury to the Agents or another person. MIOG, Part II, 122.1(fl (
The series qf evenljs rapidly unfolding beginning with
SN
Iconunands tol
Ito surrender, create the probable
cause prerequisite under the Deadly Force Policy. When I
I
failed to comply with the Agents’ instructions and reversed the
van directly into the location of the Agents behind him, the
Agents exercised remarkable self restraint v not firing at that
point. I
ho also
Ithen drove forward toward 571
showed admirable self control in continuing to attempt to gain
ompliance through the use of verbal warncis. It wasi’t
I
vrcd toward the position of SA’sI__________
until the van
I
land
or the second time that these Agents fired,
and it wasn’t until the van accelerated towards SA I
I for
the second time that he fired. The actions oft
I in driving
his vehicle toward the Agents, provides the necessary probable
cause to
when examined alone, and certainly when_combined
with the information the arrest team ad regarding I
I and
yiolent activities at previous robberies.
I
-

.

fire

The Agents were also in compliance with the section of the
Deadly
Policy concerning verbal warnings as is evidenced in
the sicped sworn statements of the SWAT members who advised
repeatedly ordered to submit to the authority of the
Agents.
MIOG, Part II, 12—2.1(1) (c) addresses verbal warnings by
dictating VERBAL WARNIGs
IF FEASIBLE, and if to do so would
not increase the danger to the Agent or others, a verbal warning
to submit to the authority of the Agent shall be given_prior to
of deadly
the
Agents continued to give I
!verbal
commands to surrendr until they belivéd to do so would place
them in greater danger.

Force

-

use

•

force.”

8

 •

No warning shots were fired and no one shot in an attempt to
disablel
Ivan. AU of the rounds discharged were fired in
an atteIh i.u ibp the driver from ramming the Agents at the
scene.
In this regard, the Agents are also in compliance with
the Deadly Force Policy sections on the use of warning shots and
vehicles,
NIOG, Part II, 12-2.1(l)(d) states “WARNING SHOTS
No
warning shots are to be fired by Agents.”, and (e) states
“VEHICLES — Weapons may not be fired solely to disable moving
vehicles.
Weapons may be fired at the driver or other occupant
of a moving vehicle only when the Agents have probable cause to
believe that the subject poses an imminent danger of death or
serious physical injury to the Agents or others, and the use of
deadly force does not create a danger to the public that
outweighs the likely benefits of its use.”
—

.

.

Finally, the agents were in compliance withthe Deadly Force
Policy when they continued to fire for a very short time as the
subject dro’e thru the chain-link fence because the subject
remained imminently dangerous during that time.
In this regard,
the subject was not considered a fleeing felon. As used in the
Deadly Force Policy, the concept of ‘imminent’ “does not mean
‘immediate’ or ‘instantaneous,’ but that an action is pending.”
This elastic concept is defined by the circumstances, in this
case the shooting inquiry disclosed no information to show that
I
Iwas any less of a threat as he drove towards the chain
link fence than he was seconds before. As the agents had a
reasonable belief that the subject posed an imminent danger to
them as he reversed his van into the agents position in an
attempt to inflict death or serious physical injury, the imminent
danger continued while the subject continued to maneuver his
vehicle and ended up driving through the chain-lihk fence. This
fact situation is closely analogou to Deadly Force Policy
Scenario #2, in which it should be noted that the ‘Discussion”
portion of the scenario states that “Agents would not be required
.to permit the suspects to escape from the vicinity of a violent
confrontation in which they have just attempted to inflict death
or serious physical injury on the Agents.”
The absence of a safe alternative to the use of deadly force
is, in addition to the presence of imminent danger, a
precondition to the use of deadly force. The 12/01/1995
Instructional Outline states that response to commands,
availability of cover, and time constraints are among the
relevant factors to consider when making a “safe alternative”
determination.
In this fact situation, the subject was non—
compliant to the commands of the agents. Further, the agents
were not safely behind cover that would protect them from the
subject’s vehicle; if the subject had rammed the SWAT van and the
SWAT sedan that the agents wre hind, he easily could have
pushed it into them with sufficient force to kill or srious1y
injure them.
Finally, the agents were under serious time
constraints to assess the nature and imminence of the threat
9

 .

.

posed by the subject’s vehicle given the short distance that the
subject needed to drive to strike the agents.

10

 P1)404 (Rev. 124.95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF’ JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:
-

ID, Mr. Thomas Coyle, Room 7129, Attn:
Springfield Divisi9n

I

I

SIRG; FTU;

Rtporto

hA

1)ate:

April 17,

CacID#;

66F-SI-49500

Title:

SHOOTING flTQUIRY;
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCrOENT;
SPRXNGFTELD DIVISION;
MZRCE 14, 1998;
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INQUIR

Synops!s

This shooting incident occurred during the executive of a
•

1998

ornec:

Kansas City

federal search and seizurê warrant by the Springfield,

Division,’ Carbondale R Safe Streets Task Force, on
3/14/98, atl________________________ Coip, Illinois.

]h7C

DETAtLS
On 3/12/98, SAl
L Springfield
Division, Carbondale RA, obtained a federal search warrant for
the residence oi[
I COIP,
Illinois.
This searci warrant was tor cracK cocaine, O.S.
currency, and àther drug related materials in violation of Title
21, USC, Sections 841(a) (1) an4 846. The warrant was signed by
U.S. Magistrate Judge Phi:1.ip M. Frazier on 3/12/98 at 2:02 pm in
Benton, Illinois.
The warrant also ‘allowed a search at any time
in the day or night and that the Magistrate Judge was satisfied
that there was probable cause such that a no-anioUnced entry
shou.d be authorized.
A second search warrant was issued in this matter for
the residence of I
I

Colp, Illinois. No unusual incidents occued during the
execution of this waxrant on 3/14/98.

-

Iconducted a
On 3/14/98, at 4:30 am, SsRAI
briefing at the Carbondale RA with the members of the search
This document co in r.eithe zecce fatiozzs r ccic1usions of the PL. Zt is t)is propezey of the tZ ac1 is 3cane4 to
a9cncy It s its coten.s are cct to
aistzSte ouside your’ agenc’.

 ________I

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team. That meeting was a general meeting regarding the cse and
the planned searches for the morning. At approximately S:OO am,
the officers and agents broke into two separate groups baped on
ents wh9 were
their target search.
Colp,I.llinois,
to conduct the
.uded SSRA
moved into
cial Federal
ISA
I and
SF01
available a packet
SF01
1 .t
Doctor Springs Drive.
of information regarding the
This packet included a copy of tl cch warrant, hand drawn map
of the residence, photographs of I
I criminal history of
I photograph oI
1 a copy of the
affidavit in support of the search warrant, and an assignment
sheet.__Detailed discussions were conducted regarding the fact
thati
Iwas known to keep a gun in his bedroom. Detailed
Pntv ‘lans were discussed and assignments were made by SRA
I ba on the experience level of the officers and agents.
SSRAI
lensured that two officers or agents were assigned to
each room of the dwelling to be searched. He also planned to
have uniformed offjcers present from the local sheriff’s office
outside with an additional agent.
-,

I

The residence to be searched was a single floor framed
dwel.ling with the f.ront door on the south side. Immediately
inside’ this door, towards the north, was a room used as a bedrooM
with a second bedroom further to the n&th. To the right of the
entry door into the residence was a livizig room and to the north
of the living room was a kitchen. There were closets and a
I
bathroom at the extremenoth end of the residence. SSRAI
ensured that two officers or agents were assigned to each of the
rooms and affixed the of ficers or agents’ initials to the sketch
of the floor plan, ensuring that aU personnel kz)ew the
assignments of, themselves and other officeks searching the
residence.
After conducting this briefing, the search teams staged
rn4 raid jackets were aonned.
at tW Carterville PD where
e entry team at
Iie
SO
Williamson County
Deputyl
nsured that he
the Cartervj3.ie PD. At that time, ss
was aware of his role in this matter.
t approximately 6OO am, the search team arrLvc at
the residence and the front door was forced open by S2? I
using a ram. Thereafter, officers, announcing poUce anct i,
began entry into the premises.

is the first officer through the door,
Officer
These two officers proceeded to the
followed by office
back bedroom and €prr ehe partially ajar door open. Upon
Iwas moving in an easterl’ direction
entering the röôm,I
towards the side kitchen door, holding a .22 caliber silver
2

h6

 _________Ihandgun in his hand. Officer I
1 yelled gun and
dropped tç hi4cnees along side the bed. oust inside the back
bedroom. I
iand fixed one round.
laimed at OWce1
This rotnd was retrieved from the bed mattress adaçent to where
Officer
fired
Iwas couched. At this time, Officer I
four roünas ac• I
I who was near the doorway to the kitchen
from the north bedroom. Off icpr I
I who entered the rear
’hjnd OfficerI
.be1.E.trn 1
I fired four rounds in the direction
I At this point, SsRAL
of I
Iwas in the 1ivizci room,
approaching the entrance to the kithn, and observed I
backing from the bedroom into the kitchen with his gun in h.s
were
right hand and a magazine in his left hand.
yelling at I
Idid not
Ito drop the gun’and get down. I
obey the command and as he was backing into the kitchen, turned
toward the area ssAI
Iwas in. At this point, SSRAI_______
1 wacj
t- to the right
4
fired o cun atl
1 Officer
of SSRAI
land fired one shot ati
Ifell to the
II
floor and his gun slid away on the floor further into the
kitchen.
Iwap hancuffed. SAl
At this point, I
applied pressure to the wound in I
I stomach with a sock he
obtained from ins.ide the residence.
An ambulance was called, which transportedl
Herrin Hospital located approximately six miles away.

I

Ito the

At the time of the shooting, SAl
Iwas in the
first bedroom, immeditelv ins.de the exterior door that was
forced open. Officezi
Iliad not entered the house at the
window on the south
time of the shooting and took cover
side of the front of the house. Deti
jobservd a male in
a bed immediately to th left in the first room entered and
ordered that individual not to move. SAJ
land sL
took the individual in the first bedroomno ustody, who was
later identified as I
lblac male, date of birth
6/10/60.
It was determined that I
Iwas wanted by the
Department of Corrections, Division of Community Correction,
Wisconsin, fbr parole violation based on an inderlying conviction
for sexual assault on a child in the first degree.
land
Other officers at the scene included SJ
I who maintained a position
Williamson County SO Deputy’
outside the residence throughout the incident.

I apd
Ater the incident, Officers I
‘were administere a breathalyser y $gt. I
hf
SSRAI
the Carbondale PD. The results indicated a blood alcohol content
f .00 fö2 each. The weapons and magazines of all shooters were
surrendered to the Zflinois State Police, Division of Forensic
3

 ______igned

.
Services, who conducted the c4me scene investigation under Crime
Scene Investigator I
I

Iwas using a 10 mm Smith & Wesson, model
SSRJ’J
1076, SN T11C9929, which had eight rounds in the magazine and one
in the chamber of Federal 311P ammunition after the shooting. The
weapon was functional and loaded with FBI ammunition.
Of fice4
Idisoharged his .40 calibe.r Glock, model
23, SN BBU97OUS.
It was loaded with six rounds in the magazine
and one in the chamber with Federal Hydra-shok ammUnition after
the shooting:
I3-scharged h.s 9 mm Sig Saier,model
Officérl
P229, SN AE21664. The weapon contained eight rounds in the
magazine and. one in the chamber of Winchester Black Talon
ammunition after the shooting.

Officerl
Idischarged
:40 caliber Smith &
Wesson, model SW4OF, SN PAM8073. The weapon had 14 rounds in the
magazine and one in the chamber of Winchester Black Talon
ammunition after the shooting.
The State PoLLce Laboratory recovered cartridge casings
and bullets consistent with the abore-mentioned shots except that
two rotnds fired from the rear bedroom exited a back window in a
north-easterly direction_apd were not recovered. Also, one
round, which entered I
I left front abdomen area and rested in
his lower pelvis near a nerve, was not removed by medical
personnel. A bullet was removed from the upper buttock region of
I
Iwhich entered from his left side. That cartridge was
matched to the weapon of Officerl
red one round.
1
I who fi
The .22 caliber çartricke recovered rxom the mattress, adjacent
to where Off icerj
Ihad crouched, was matched to the weapon
in possession of j
has a .22 long
I The weapon used by
xifle caliber Jennings pistol, model J22, SN 1010769, which
contained a inagaz&ne and six cartridges with one round partia11y
seated in the chamber. in etra magazine was fo(rnd behind the
stove in the.kitchen, containing six cartridges. this weapon
aorazt1y jammed after I
If ired tbe first round at Of:ficer
I. Upoi test firing at the State Police Laboratory, the
I
weapon again jammed after fring the initial chambered round.

I

a consent to releasehis medical records
at Herrin Hospital. A review of those records indicated that an
initial drug abuse screen was positive for cocaine above the
linearity of the measuring device, which was 5,000 nanograms per
milliliter. The blood chemistry report indicated 217.7
mi1.1igrats per deciUter ethanol cQntent. These results indicate
I had excessive amotS f alcohol and coca&ne in his system
at the time he reported to the hospital.
4

 _____lindica
_____ladmit
ted
ted

I
isuffered from three gunshot wounds. The first
entered his left upper arm, entering the outer side above the
elbow and exiting above the tricep. The second entered the left
abdomen and remained i,n the iliac wing. The third entered the
left hip, struck bony matter and redirected to the buttock area
from where it was removed.
1fu11y recovered from these
I
injuries.
The bullet rqrnovd froml
Iuttock was fired from
the weapon used y sr”
Xt appeaçs that. one of the
J
bullets fired by SF0 I
nt throughl
I upper left arm
and continued out the rear window of the’rescience. It also
aooears that the bullet remaining in I
Ihip was fired by SSRA
I
IAlj. other bullets recovered from the walls had no traces
of blood on them.
Interview c’fj
I reported that prior to his weapon
discharging at the_off.cers, he obser-ed raid iackets indicating
police and FBI. I
tated his weapon went .ff by accident as
he was trying to get tfle gun oit of his hand.
to
using alcohol and cocaine prior to this incident.

I

•

It is noted that immediately after the shooting of

the began making statements that the officers did not

identify themselves.
Interviews of seera.l of the officers
disclosed that there was an announcement of heir identity iipon
entxy into the premises., Interview of
that he
observed FBI and po3ice markings on the accets of the officers
prior to the discharge of his weapon at the officers. There was
ample light from the rising sun nd ciar weather. A television
was on in the back bedroom where J
was shot, providing
additionat lighting. Interviews oi tne officers indicated
suffiqient ]4ghting to conduct their operation. Interview of
I
lindicated there was sufficient Ught for him to observe
police and FBI on the raid iackets.
On 3/18/98,1
iwas indicted by a federal grand jUry
sitting in East St. Lo(is, Illinois, in an eight count indictment
charging him with distribution of crack cocaine, use of a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime, attempted murder, ap ault on
a federal officer. counts one, two and three charge
I with
distribution of crack cocaine on 3/3/98, 3/6/98 and 3/1.1/98,
respectfully. Count four chargesi
i with using and carrying a
firearm during a drq traffickiig crime on 3/1.1/98. Counts five
and six charge I
Iwith attempted murder for f&r&ng a gun at
agents who were executing a federal search warrant aLt I
I
residence on 3/14/98. Counts seven and, eight charg
I with
assaulting federal agents for firiig a gun at them during the
search warrant execution on 3/14/98. All of the violations took
place ati
,
Coip, Illinois.

5

.

 I
(12t3t1t993)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Date:

Attn:

Thomas J. Coyle

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:

Title:

Extension 1837

Coyle Tho
Lusby Tom
Mershon Ma

Drafted By:
Case XP #:

06/22/98

r
66-19157-3

ADMINISTRArIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/1/98
BALTIMORE. DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Baltimore
Diyi.sion during an àttemntedarret of an. armed and dangerous
bank robber.
Jshot and wounded a small mixed
s1
breed-dog who was with a German Shepherd that had lunged at
members of the arrest team.
Details:

I

Reference report of SuperVisory Special Age_nt (SSA)
dated 5Jul98.

I

This communicaUon s prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Reviei
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2
1
2
1
1
3.
1

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Mr.
Rm. 7142
Mr. czoy.Le, Rm. 7825 (Enc.)
Mr.I
I Rtn. 7116 (Enc.)Mr. Marguise, Room 5155)
(1
Pnnm 6646
Mr.
Mr.I
IRoom 7427
(1
Ms.!________ Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr. Mershon, Room 7837
Mr. Biehi USD03
Mr.
Room 4147
03
,

-

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-

1
1
1

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Mr.I

Mr.L,
Mrsj
‘

[

QtjC

IRoom 7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-3, 06/22/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
The Balt&more Division was conducting an iniestigation
regarding the armed robbery of the State Employees Credit Union
of Maryland located in College Park. Investigation revealeçI that
employed by the Credit Union, 4entfied as I
arra
vel
landi
I rob
was on duty. A consensual phone call was
made to
esi ence during the evening hours of 5/1/98,
verifying
a
e was at his residence.
An arrest plan was formulated under the supervision of
assistant Special Agent in Charce (ASAC) Donald J. Batnik and
Supervisory Specia!. Agent (SSA)
I Of the
Maryland Metropolitan Office at Calvertön, to affect the arrest
ofi
I A]-:l participants responded to 3704 Springdale Avenue
in Baltimore to execute the arrest of the subject. Shortly after
10:00 p.m.
1 arrest team participants approached the SpringdaJ.e
Avenue address and observed the front door open. As Agents
assumed positions around the residence as well as the front door,
a large German Shepherd appeared at the front door in an attack
mode and lunged at them. Fearing that the arresting Agents were
in imminent danger of serious -bodi:ly 1nuzy, SN
fi:red one round from his Bureau issued Sig Sauer, ModeL P226,
n&ne millimeter pistol, insuring a second, smaller miceQ. breed
dog that was with the German Shepherd. The dog was struck in the
right foreleg which was treated and the dog recovered from the
wound. No other injuries were sustained as a result of this
shooting incident.
-

Althoigh not taken into custody during the shpoting
incident,j
Isubsequently surrendered to Agents of the
Baltimore Division.

I

On 6/15/98, the SRG met to dscuss the above captioned
shooting incident. Chief Inspector Mark J. Mershon, Office of
Inspections, Xnsection Division, chaired the meetinq with the
following voting members of the SIRG n attendance: I
I
ITria). Attorney, Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel Adinistratior
1
and Benefits Section, Administrative Services Division; Dana D. b
Biehi, Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism
irn
Section, Criminal Division, USDO3; SSAI
iI4egal
Advice and Training, Lga1 Policy, Office of the General Counsel,
Richard A. Marqu-ise, Section Chief. OneratiOnal Suonot Section,
Criminal Investigative Divisionl
unit Chief,
-

2

I

 To:
Re:

tnspectior Division From:
66-19157-3, 06/22/198

Inspcction Division

NS-2D Unit, Global Section - NS-2, National Security Division;
I Unit Ciief. Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division {TD); and, I
upervisor, Washinctox Field
Office. The only non-voting member present was)
I
I
linspection Analyst, Office of Inspecttons, Inspection
Division.
I

•

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; <2)
provide th Director with an e.ra.luative analysis, observations,

and recofrmendatjons for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action f deemed necssary.

SflG members unanimously conctrred that this incident
involved an intentional discharge of SM
I weapoz and that
the use of deadly force was in conformance with the current
deadly force poljcy. Membes recommended that no action be taken
against SAj
Ias.a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident.

SetXeadl:

•.

flSPECT!ON DIISTON
AT W?SSXNGTON, D._C.

I

a-no Went.

That no admini.strative action be taken against SAl
jäs a result of his involvement in this shooting

:3

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 FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

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UNIThD STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to;

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Date;

SSRAI__________________
June 15, 1998

CaselD#:

EEF—StJ-A48789

ThIe:

SHOOTING-INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTXNG INQUIRY
SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION
MAY 6, 1998

Chancrer

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Re3OrtOf

o

Salt Lake City

This shooting incident was the result of a
prelimina inquiry (P1) fugitive investigation regarding
subject I
I
The Salt Lake City Division Violent Crimes Task
Foçce (VCTF) became involved in the fugitive investigation
of L
I on March 06, 1998: based upon a
request for assistance from the Utah Department of
Corrections (UDOc). UDOC requested assistance under th
provisions Of the Unlawful Flight statue. UDOC had
obtained a state felony warrant charging subject with
Absconding Parole Supervision and Failure to Complete
Community Correctional Center Program. Subject’s
incarceraliOn was for theft and his criminal record
reflects an extensive arrest record including Assault on a
Peace Officer charge where he was shot by a Salt Lake
County Sheriff’s Deputy on July 14, 1994. According to
UDOC, subject was a known gang member affiliated with the.
Aryan Brotherhood and Skinheads.
Initial information
provided by UDOC was insufficient to immediately obtain a
UFAC warrant; therefore, a P1 was initiated.

On April 30 198. local authoriti made an
arrest ofi
at L
I Salt Lake
City, Utah and at this same location, a single gun shot
was fired by an unknown person.
Subsqint ocal
investigation determined that subject I
Iwas the
This ocweent contana neitbe recc,m,endatjong nor conc1ujons of the FBI. IC ii the property of the PSZ and is loaned to
your agency; it anf Lts contents aze not to be distributed outside your agency.

 _________

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66F-SU—A4 8789

individual responsible for firing the gun shot. As a result of
this incident and the specific request of the UDOC, efforts to
locate the subject were intensified by the Salt Lake City VCTF.
VCTF Superiieoxj
Ihad a squad meeting on May 01,
1998, with the entire squad, including local, state and federal
officers assigned to th VCTF, during which the baçkround and
known violence of I
Iwas fully discussed. SAI
instructed that the investigation concerning
lbs conducted
utilizing two six-member teams made up of VC1’ personnel and that
protective body armor was to be worn drina ny contacts made in
an effort to locate this subject.
SSN
Ibriefed A1SAC
BRJUDFORO on this invest±gatiàn and provided him updates on the
investigation between May 01, 1998 and May 06, 1998. Numerous
leads were developed concerning subject’s location which were
investigated without locating subject or developing sufficient
information to indicate out-of-state flight to obtain the UAC
warrant.

-

On May 01, 1998,1
Itold the VCTF that
Iwas staying in Magna, Utah and was in possession of a

tirearm

VCTF members tha
(April 30, 1998) with

interviewed in Magna, Utah and told

‘was at her r qi6nr’ th ni,rht

hcfre

ave the
VTF the names and addresses of
both in Magna, as associates of
was
interviewed and advised_she had no
or a couple of
days but indicatedi
Iwas with
orL
in West Valley City, Utah.
hat7
a so a a e
Iwas
not in a very *stable state o mm
Jadvised she
I
had not seeni
Ifor about one week, but tiad heard he was with
Ion
The address given f on
I
[_
I Wçst Valley Cijy, Utah was investigated
with negative results
I in Macpa, Utah, stated that
I
she had heard I
L’as with
land staying at the
residence of I
in West Valley City, Utah.
also saict
Imay e staymn at the residence of i
I
also in West Valley City, Utah. I
itdld the VCTF
that she had giver
I andy
i rae from her
residence to an unknown address n
ea )cnown as the Avenues
in Salt Lake City.
lsawf
Iwith a handgun and be
sem.d very unstable.
believed that I
Iwas with
I
cteoc1ate of
J
L-iad called hii
I stated thai
landi
early that morning, approximately_2:00 A.M., askingj
Ito
get some clothes together forl
iso he could get out or town.
jwas very
Idid not do that because he felt that I
unstable.
•

.

2

6

7

 ______lindicated

I.
I
On May 02, 19981
Istated that’
Iwas
with her in Layton, Utah, in possession of a nine-millimeter
handgun. I
Isaid she would call back with a location, but
did not.

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‘In1ay 06. 1cQR=j
Istated that her sister,
I and I
Ihad slept at her house on April 01. and
02, 1998, but had not seen them since that time. I
j
called from the residence of I
I pdvisjnc thati
I
was in her residence ].pcated ati
I,
Layton, Utah. I
aicI
[W asleep in a ,aci berOOm of
her trailer when she left at approximately 12:30 p.m. andi
I
had a “silver colored handgun.”
that her
sixteen year old son was in her trailer with another four year
old child.
Following this receipt of positive information
concerning subject’s location on May 6, 1998, VCTF personnel met
with Ogden Resident Agency and the Ogden Violent Crime Task
Force, northern Utah rim±nal pprehension Team (UCAT) personnel
along with LAYTON POLICE DEPARTMENT officers, during which all
personnel were briefed on the subject’s background, to include
the April 3:0, 199.8., shooting information. The decision was made
at that time to request LAYTON POLICE DEPARTMENT SWAT for
assistance.
A plan was formulated for a perimeter to be
established around the trailer by two, three man teams, and then
occupants of nearby trailers would be evacuated to a safe
location away from the scene.
Following this evacuation, contact
would be made with the subject, and he would be told to come out
of the trailer and submit to arrest. The Agents and task force
officers were appropriately dressed in either raid jackets with
the words “POLICE” clearly written on the front and back or in
ballistic vests which clearly identified them as either police
officers or FBI Agents.
Several of the ballistic vests had the
letters “FBI” in large black print on the front of the vest. All
on-scene personnel were wearing body armor. As the two teams of
three members each were moving to their predetermined locations
on opposite sides of the trailer, the subject appeared in the
doorway, and looked in the direction of
tm 1rted
northwest of his trailer. VCTF Off icerl
Iyelled
commands to the subject that “This is the police, step out and
put your hands in the air.” The subject quickly disappeared back
into the trailer, then immediately reappeared with a pistol in
his left hand, and fired at the team members as they were
continuing to position themselves, The subject then quickly
ducked back into the trailer and within seconds reappeared with
the gun still n hi hand, ani rr4nf-4d it directly at VCTF
Officer I
If ired one slug round from
I VCTF Officer I
•

.

 66F-SU-A48789

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his shotgun, and the subject appeared to fall back into the
trailer.
Simultaneous to this, the southeast side perimeter team
arriving at their location, observed the subject’s movements,
and heard VCTF Officer I
Ishouts to the subj:ect. VCT’
Officerl
d Special Agent (SA)L
Iboth observed
subject with a handgun pointed in the direction of the northwest
perimeter team, and observe him fire
hos in t tioii
of the other team.
Both VCTF Officer I
If ired
land SAl
one round each. and the subject ducked back into his trailer.
VCTF Officer I
sired one round from his AR 15, 9 millimeter
rifle, and SAj
If ired one round of 00 buck frsm a Remington
870 shotgun.
Within moments, the subject threw a handgun ou of
the doorway which landed on the driveway in fzont of the trailer,
and then he walked out of the trailer.
The subject did ot
cOmply with commands given to him to submit to arrest., an4 for
the next 40 plus minutes yelled obscenities aM acted in an
irrational fashion all the time refusing to comply with verbal
commands from various officers and SAs who,attempted to convince
him to lie on the ground and submit to arrest. Of ficer and SAS
who were closest to him at various times during this time perod
attempted uf’xsuccessfully to convince him to comply.
The subjet
continually moved around the area in front of hs trailer,
walking around and standing close to the handgun on the drive
way.
During the times that he stood close to and
he
handgun, he made numerous movements with his body and hnd as
though he were going to pick up the handgun. VCTF SAL
I a
member of the northwest perimeter team, took up a position where
he had a clear view of the subject, observed his movements, and
overhea 4
p yells at the various law enforcement personnel.
VCT’
lobserved the subject make several squatting motions
with his hands
ed to the handgun as though he were going to
pick it up.
S
ecame concerned for the safety of everyone
involved in this incident should the subject di4 pick up the
handgun, and, as the subject made one of his movements in the
direction of the handgun, he fired one slug round from a
Remington 870 shotgun.
This round hit the
it to
spin around on the pavement. The subject reacted by jumping back
from the weapon at this
however, did not give up or comply
with continued verbal commands. After an additional 10 to 15
minutes, the LAYTON POLICE EPARTMENT SWAT Team arrived on the
scene, and, as they were approaching the trailer from the north
side, the accompanying police dog barked.
The dogs bark
immediately gained the subjects attention, and, as the SWAT Team
approached utilizing a protective shield, the subject asked them
not to sic the dog on him. He immediately complied with commands
to lie on the ground, and was placed under arrest.
was

tjwo

over

sAl

weaot

time;

causing

 I
I
No law enforcement personnel or other civilians were
wounded in this incident.

I

Subject I
jas transported to the University of
Utah Medical Center where he received medical attention for his
gunshot wound.
He was treated and then taken to jail.

us

I

Name:
Sex:
Race:
Height:
Weight:
DOB:
SSAN:
FBI Number:

I
I

I
I
I
I
I.
I
I
I
I
I
I

described as follows:

I

I

:‘ia .L5

White
6’ OH
180 pounds

Salt Lake City Acting SAC GREGORY D. MEACHAN, Acting
ASAC JOHN S. BRAD’ORO and SSAI
limmediately
responded to the scene upon notification of the incident at
approximately 5:15 p.m. on May 6, 1998. Acting SAC MEACH
directei that the Salt Lake City Division EAP Counselorl
I
Ireport to the scene.
On May 7, 1998, subjectl
Iwas formally charged by
complaint in U.S. District Court, District of Utah, Salt Lake
City, Utah,
with Attempted Homicide of a Federal Agent (Title
18, U.S. Code Section 1114) and Possession of a Firearm by a
Restricted Person, (Title 18, U.S. Cçde Secçions 922 (g)and
924(a) (2)
On May 13, 1998, subjectl
Iwas indicted by a
Federal Grand Jury, District of Utah, charging him with Attempted
Homicide of a Federal Agent, Title 18, USC, Section 1114; Use of
a Firearm during the course of a Felony, Title 18, USC, Section
924(c); Assaulting or impeding Federal Officers, Title 18, USC,
Section lii; and Restricted Person in Possession of a Firearm,
Title 18, USC, Sections 922(g) and 924(a)(2).
Subject remains
incarcerated.
.

I

Special Agents, SAl
each fire one r un

I and sal__________
ci rng this shooting incident.
Two task force
Salt Lake City Police
Department and
a
a e County Sheriff’s Office,
each fired one round during this shooting incident.
The weapons
and type of round fired are:
‘P

SA

I

] Remington

870 Shotgun
5

slug

 ___

I
I
SAJ____________________ Remington 870
Shotgun

I
•

I

I

Det.ective
Detective

Colt AR-iS, 9mm
Remington 870 Shotgun

I.
I,
I
I

slug

SAl
Ln4_______ were usina Bureau weapons and Bureau
ammp- ?ll of which functioned properly.
Detectives I
andi
eapons and ammunition functioned properly.
SAl_____
is a member of the Salt Lake City Enhanced SWAT
Team and a
Firearms Instructor.

Deputy__________ Davis County Sheriff’s Office
processed the evid.ence collected at the scene and recove
red one
9mm Hydroshock which was embedded in the storage
shed.
Preliminary test indicated the presence of blood.
Subject
I
I T-shirt was examined and indicated the bullet entered
from the rear and exited the front.
Further testing and
examinations in process.

ARMED 2.1D DANGEROUS

I

00 Buck
hydroshock

 (L2131I19

•

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
---•

precedence:

•

VL?;4U..Jf.,

.

Fron:

Inspection
Contact:

Extension 1837

Coyle
Lusby

Approved By;

-

]:lrr

Drafted Dy:
Case ID #:
Title:

Date:O9/U/98

Thomas J. Coy:I.e

Attn:

Inspection Division

To:

.uLttL

ROUTINE

66-19157—41

ADMINISTRATIVE IMQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/10/98
RICHMOND DIVISION
-

•

involving Special
Synopsis: To advise of a shooting incident ng the execution of
Duri
ion.
Diis
Agents (SAs) of the Richmond
—pndL
,.rch d arrest warrants, SA
—‘
ctog.
bull
pit
Jshot and killed a

[

Special Agent inCharge
Detajlø: Reference report of Assistant
(ASAC) William R. Falls, dated 6/5/98.
sh the analysis,
This communication is prepared to furni ent Review
Incid
ting
Shoo
the
of
ions
comments, and recommendat
shooting.
Group (SXRG) with reference, to the captioned

Rm. 7142
7825 (Enc.)
7116

2.
Mr.
Mr.
1
2-

1Mr.
2
(1
1- Mr.
2- Mr.
(1
2- Ms.
(1

7427
7326)

1
1
I.
2.
1

-

-

-

Mr.

T

Quantico
(WFO
I Qntico
JRoom 3787F
_JRoom 7861.-

,

Mr.f
,

Mr.
MrsL
1’

Mr.

-Ii

 r-rr

—

r

To:
Re:

-.—1
Inspection nivi—

‘rom:
Inspection Division
8
199
11/
09/
41,
5766-191

ing Incident
Details of the Shoot
the Drug
for assistance from. tion of an
iga
Based on a request
est
inv
of the
tion (DEA) in the
Enforcement Administra shooting of a DEA informant, agentson
the
nt
ing
ide
shooting inc
incident involv
2nd
ame involved in a
Richmond Division bec n with the investigation, the Richmm
tio
Tea
5/10/90. In connec ecial Weapons-and Tactical (SWAT)
rrants. During
deployed Sp
rch and arrest wa incident
sea
of
ion
cut
n
exe
isio
the
Div
shooting
members for
were involved in a
this exercise, two BAa of a pit bull dog.
resulting in the death
nt, SWAT Team
of the search warra
ion
cut
exe
the
nce. As the
g
ide
rin
res
Du
of a
ure two occupants
sec
ll dog
to
bu
d
pte
em
pit
att
a
s
ent
t,
Ag
second subjec
the
g
ffin
ing
est
dcu
arr
han
re
at the
agents we
subject’s charged
to
ds
man
com
al
voc
l
belonging to one of the
nçrmade severa
ow
the
on
the
d
han
gh
a
hou
Alt
ed
jplac
agents.
[
tion
ec
SA
as
dir
l,e
ma
in the
control ,the ani
dog iuuec. 5rward the dog to
the
,
him
ff
dcu
han
n
to
upo
subject
were forced to fire
t harn
of two SAs. The agents The dog was incapacitated withou
ed.
ack
att
ng
bei
rt
preve
subjects.
to the agents or the
t approximately
n deternined tha h 16 of the
tio
iga
est
inv
nt
que
bse
Su
SAs wit
at the dog by the two
17 rounds were fired with the animal.
rounds making contact
abcve captioned
met to cliscuss, the
On 8/11/98, the SIP.Gsistant Director Thomas Lusby,
uty As
ollowing
shooting incident. Dep
d the meeting
ire
cha
n,
isio
Div
n
Inspectio
SXRG in attendance:
,
voting members of the Sectiøn, Criminal Division,’
b 7:
,
t
hts
Sec
Rig
mes
vil
Cri
Ci
y,
t
,_.Attorne
and Violen
rism
rro
Te
,
ey,
ief
Ch
orn
Att
n
ran, Sectio
L
J Trial
e
DOJ; Patrick J. Fo
Crimiñäl Division, US nafld Ben.fjts Section, Administrativ
ti9
and
tra
e
nis
vic
mi
Ad
]Legal
Personnel Ad
d A.
SS2L
al Counsel; Richar
er
Services Division;
the
of
e
fic
Of
nal
mi
y,
Cri
lic
Po
n,
gal
tio
Le
Sec
Training,
nerational Support ief, Firearms
—imit Ch
Marguise, Section Chie
jYnit
Investigative Division Di.visOn 4
Iw-j-_
’ion,
ng
ecu
ini
alyaza
,Training Unit, Tra
Unit, Scientific An or, Wshington
rJcp
lma
Too
ms
ear
vis
Fir
Chief,
—] Super
and, L
Laboratory Division;
flbS present wereL ety an
me
g
tin
-vo
non
Field Office. The twoer, Law Enforcement Training for Saf
Program Manag
-

•

-

-

2
‘S
4

4

•

.4.
•

c

 V

—

To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division Prom:
661915741, 09/11/1998

Inspection DiviSiOfl

1 Trainifl9 DivisiOflt and
snrvival, practical AppliCat0xs Unit
I’.na
lySt, office of InspeCtiofl
Inap
eCtiofl
I

b7C

Inspection piVisi.cJh.

SIRG
observationS and RecODXfleUdat0 of the
ynopsized incident with
5
The SIRG reviewed the above
appl
icati
on of deadly force; (2)
the
,the intent to (1) evaluate
analysis, bSeat0,
provide the Director with an evaluative
from.an operational
actio
ns
corre
ctive
and recornmendati0 for
reco
efld
atio COnC
standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recOt1lZflefldato
prov
ide
(4)
and,
issue
s
training and/or safety
nece
ssary
.
for adudnistratj’Ie action if deemed
o,ncurred that the use of
SIRG meAbrS’una10’15’Y
deadly force by SA
current deadly force policy.
uStif2ed and in accordance w,.th the
members pertail1ed to
The orlv_observation made by SIRG
state
men
t. ccordifl9 to
igned, gworn
a comment in SAl
the doorway and
of
front
in
posi
tiOfl
1 the dog was in a Iyi’9
him
prevent
tO
dog
the
head of
he fired a final round into the
by SA
shot
final
the
that
opin
ed
fiirtzher suffering. Members
have been
coul
d
auth
oriti
es
[Was not necessarY jnce other 1
I
emp
hasiz
ed to
be
jssUeWil
called to handle the situation. This
the SAC of the gichutond DiViSiOfl.

Set iead 1:
CTIONDI!S10i

---t-ive action

That no

involvement lfl cnishootifl9 jC.c1eflt.
t.

3

i

 .-....,...

FD2O4 (tct2-i95)

-

-

OF JVSTICE
VN1TED STATES DEPARTMENT
InvestIgation
o
flnreau
Federal

Copy to:

DivisiOn
Assistant Director, Inspection
omc:

SAC Sheri A. Farrar
June 14, 1998

Cincinnati

2
6SF-CI-684
‘fldc

Character

Syop

I

CINCINNATI DIVISION;
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
ACCIDENTIL DISCUARGE;
6/10/98
,ADMINISTRATX’ INQUIRY

bC

jsharge
hootiflg jncideflt - accidental
This 5
SWAT
member
four
a
as
6/10/98
a
occurred at 3:45 p.m. on
’
1
arrest of a
team was effecting the
SubeCtI
coca.fl
reverse drug transaction.
purchase of 5 kilogramS ot
the
had iust completed the
in a ytel room when
not
did
from a jZ
the arrest.’
SWAT team entered to makedirections to “freeze
5 but nstead
away
immediately comply with
ed and began to slide
leaned or fell back on
team member tO
Urst
the
from special Agent (SA)
exerted pressure with his
enter the room,
•
a ositi0fl in which he
IaocidefltY
left hand to move
SII
could gain control of
hand and the
right
his
jscharged hi weapon w iO
received a gunshot
bullet struci4
Wound to his ett arm.

I

-

LS:

cincinnati Divj5iofl, Columbus
In July, 1997, the
the je5tigati0fl of an I
I
Resident Agency (eRA) began
traf joking ring captioned1
’ mar
1
internat
2867770.
LM0r0; Case
II
I
received
predcatd çu infoiatiOfl
was
jvstigati0a
This
had
which
investigation
from a New Haven Dij9iOUsubjectS as buyers. In the fall of
Ohio
two
the
identified
ecc meidatLon nor
This docUment contains neLth5r
yoUr 5900CYt

coc1usiOtlS

of the PSI.

be distributed OUCUi
ft end its coflteflt5 are not to

1aX ajd £s loaned Co
Zt is the pro5rtY of the

yo’.i aetO

 _________
______Iwas

ii

a Miami Division investigation had also identified subject
of the Miami
üther-—--—-.—.
case.
arrested by CRA in May, 1998.
I
tnvei piIi rn from Miami identified addition4l subi eats I
I
IDelawa Ohio (CRA terr,tory), I
I BriarcLitt Manor, ew
aicf
I Jçron. Ohio. I
York, andi
lall of whom were primary customers of a
aa originally from QTi
nd
historically the majority ot tfle transactions betweenL
Between 1994
‘iiyrc in the Columbus, Ohio area.
the subjects
snri 1997. thI
I P
I The 1arest
ercentage of the marijuana was sold tot__________________ and
Iwho then distributed the marijuana to points throughout
onlo.
1997.

I
I

I

un a series

1
In April, 1998, Miami Division’s
of consensually recorded telephone conversations with the above
ladvised he
listed subjects. During these conversationsi

I

By EC dated 6/2/98, Miami Division requested Cincinnati
Division to assist with arranging four separate reverse
undercover operations to sell 500 pounds of marijuana to
-f’ cocaine
I
J 500 pounds of marijuana and
nd 400 pounds
ITh0-20 kilograms of cocaine tot
withdrew
plan,
of
the
tol
Iwho, prior to the finalization
his request. SAC, Cincinnati approved the CRA to assist Miami
with this request contingent upon review and approval of specific
detailed plans of how each reverse would be conducted.

to

By BC dated 6/5/98, Senior Supervisory Resident Agent
I subniitted a draft Operations Plan to
(SSRA)I
Assistant Special Agent ii Charge (ASAC) Henry B. Ragle, III for
review and approval detailing how each reverse would be carried
meeting
out.
On 6/8/98, the Operations Plan was discussed at
WT Team Leader
wh{ih in uded Cincinnati SAC, ASAC
_Jand I
and SWAT Team members SAsI
I who is the
pervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
Cincinnati Th-a,rr Pwrn-m (norç1inator, and Technically Trained
Icontingent upon certain
Agent (TTh)I
changes and additions to the plan, the overall plan was orally
approved by the SAC.

a

j

minor

Ohio

on

Itraveled to Columbus,

The Miami Aaentsl

6/8/98 and

2

I

f,

 ________________________
____________Iwas
___________________________Ishortly

______________

_______________

1

On /10/98. arranaements were made fort.

amount
sampled the cocaine an put a sma
to take with him to test. At that time
as i
ad still not completely committed to purchasing any
cocaine, a vising that, he had jitourchased cocaine in Cleveland
I tht ie would
and didnt really need anymore. I
Iwas under
test the cocaine and get back to thel
constant surveillance from the time he left his residence for the
1:00 p.m. meeting until he returned to the hotel at approximately
3:40 p.m. to complete the transaction.

I

I departure from the hotel following
1
After
Iwas again
the 1:OP p.m. meeting
1 the plan to arrest I
reviewçd and the SWAT Team members who were to participate in the
arrest I
I

before 3:30 p.m.
and advise tht- h wni:d purchase fives kilograms of cocaine for
jLmmediately left his residence and, under
$110,000. I
surveillance, returned to the Hampton Inn.
room carrying a duffel bag. He handed t e ag to
I
o o
wno was standing at the foot of th hd s he was directe
Look the money out of the
in accordance with the plan. As I
bag,I
lexatnined the five bricks of cocaine. He
indicated he wanted to take the cocaine out in the saie baa lie
I
had carried into the hotel as it had his name on 4.t. I
Iqho
emptied the money from the bag and returned it tol
packed the cocaine into the bag. As h lned the bag, the
I the first of the four
arrest team entered the room with SAl
SWAT members to enter.
(The aforementioned activities were all
monitored and recorded by video equipment in the adjacent hotel
room. The recorder was turned off as soon as the SWAT Team
entered the hotel room, however the video camera continued Co run
enabling personnel in the adjacent room to monitor the arrest.)
The first three SWAT Team members to enter the room did so with
their weapons drawn. The SWAT Team ann9unced “FEI and
hid not
instructed to “freeze. I
immediately comply and backed up to the bed, lanina pr falling
lwho was
back on it and beginning to slide away fr9m AI
sI
Las exerting
attempting to gain control of
Iriaht shoulder to
pressure with hits left hand oni
laccidentally
Itoward Mm, SAl
forcefully pull I
dischaTd hi waion which was in his right hand. The bullet
the left arm.
strucki

un

3

r:

 0
One of the SWAT Team members who is a certified
Emergency MedcàrTeçhnician—(EMT)...began.rendering immediate
medical attention tol
land an ambulance waêimñêdiately—-—--—.summoned. He was transported to Riverside Hospital where he
underwent surgery to remove the bullet and was subsequently
listed in stable condition.
The Dublin Police Department responded to the scene and
the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation was
summoned to conduct the crime scene investigationAt tiat time,
br any
neither agency expressed a desire to interview SAL
of the other SWAT personnel..
-

On the morning of 6/11/98, after being advisedby the
Iwas coherent and could
chief trauma team doctor thatL
Iwas advised of his rights utilizing
be interviewedi
an ‘Interrogation; Advise of Rights” form. He refused to sign
the form or orally waive his rights. He expressed his desire to
talk with an attorney therefore no interview was conducted.

I
‘initial appearance took place on 6/11/98
in the hospital at which time he was charged on a criminal
complaint charging him with one count of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute. He was subsequently discharged from
the hospital that afternoon and placed in the Franklin County
Jail. At a detention hearing on 6/16/98, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Norah M. King ordered that he be held without bond.
At the request of the Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, several follow.up interviews were conducted.
These interviews did not reveal additional information concerning
the shooting incident.

4

 FD-204

124-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FedezaI Bureau of Investigation

Coyto

Rqodof

ASAC SUSAN R. CHAINER
July 22., 1998

omcc Los Angeles Field Office

66F’LA—215349

Chafacet

ADMINISTRATXVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS 2NGELES DIVISION
7/ 3198
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

On July 3, 1998, Special Agents (SAs) assigned to the
Santa Aria Resident AgenOy of the Los Angeles Division of the FBI,

and a Sheriff’ s Deputy from the Orange County Sheriff’ s
Department (OCSD), were assigned to conduct a “stakeout” at three
banks in Orange County, California, The FBI and the OCSD had
formed a bank robbery task force called B,R.A.T. (Bank iobbery
Apprehension Team) to conduct investigations of bank robberies in
Orange County.
I

I

On July 3, 1998, at approximately 8:00 am, SAl
I assigned to B.R.A.T. held a briefing in San Clemente
(alifrni tiøncied by SAsI

1
I

md Det.I
I OCSD. During the
briefing-, SAl
Ifurnished the bank robber’s description, the
available bank surveillance photographs of the robber and his
clothing attire, normally a suit arid tie. ihich earned him the
nickname of “accountant bandit.” SAl
unformed the involved
personnel that the robber should be considered armed and
dangerous.
This was due to the nature of the offense arid the
fact that the robber in the ps-t had carried a chrome colored
handgun in his waistband
sAj
imade surveillance assignments
for personnel at three Union Banks which were identified in his
ariratonal plan and approved by Supervisory Special Agent

This document ec4tai eieh.r r.ou.natios nor
ueLcio o the PSI. tt ii the pzp.rty of the P8 end ii leened to
your eg.ncy: it en Ito oont,n. irs not to be dietrilmt*4 eutoid4 your agenoy.

 SAl________ operational plan was to have three two man
teams staked out at three Th,irn Banks either at or near San
Iwere to be set
Clemente, Califorina. SAl
land Det,l
up at the Union Bank located at 810 Avienda Pico in San Clemente.
All three of the banks had been robbed by the same robber on
prior occasions.

I

land Det.l
At approximately 9:00 am, SAl
commenced their surveilance_of Union Bank. It had previously
been determined that SAl
Iwould be insiçie the bank to observe
customers. He maintained contact with Det.I
j, who was
observing the bank fçnm a vehicle west of the building, through a
SAl
Ihad also notified personnel at the
hand held radio.
b7
bank of his presence. Several of the bank employees knew the
description of the robber, as he had robbed that Union Bank
branch three prior times.
Ithat a
At about 11:55 am, a bank employee told SAl
person matching the description of the robber was standing in the
customer serviçe linq. A moment later, the bank manager lo
I
signaled to SAL
Ithe ihtJia inside the bank. SAl
jthe subject may be in the
immediately notified Det. I
bank.
SAl
I.ias not certain if the person in the bank was
the same as the serial robber they were looking to arrest. He
watched as the person walked up to a teller window carrying a
small briefcase. At this time, he observed the teller take a
In
large bundle of U.S. currency and place it on the counter.
addition, a closer look at the persQrl coninced him this was the
Ibelieved he had just
robber they were searching for. SAl
witnessed a bank robbery and he also believed the robber was in
fact the accountant bandit.
IDbserved the
As the robber turned to leave, SAl
briefcase 3,n one of his hands and a large bundle of cash in the
Idecided this would be the safest time to
other.
SAl
apprehend th robhe since both of his hands were occupied and
knew Det.l
Iwould be there momentairily.
I drew his hand gun and pointed it at the
S2I
robber.
SAF
I weapon was a personally owned Bureau approved
.45 Caliber semi—automatic, Sig Sauer Model P220, serial number
G218365. He told the robber he was with the FBI and that he was
Ihad positioned himself so his weapon was
SAl
under arrest.
away from any bank employees or
and
pointed at the robber

2

 customers.

SAl
lused his left hand in an attempt to guide
the robber to the ground. Initially the robber complied, but
then suddenly stoo4tio. The robber dropped the cash and the
briefcase while SAl
Icontinued to try to control him with his
left hand.
Ittempteçl to Dull he robber outside the bank
S?1
to get assistance from Det.l
Iwho he knew to be coming
towards the bank. As the two of them approached the exit door,
the robber broke free from SAl
I grasp and turned away from
him.
The robber_placed both of his hands near his waist and out
l
of sight of SAl
The rober then began to quickly turn
around towards him.
,eijeved the robber had retricvrl a
s?1
weapon and was about to make an attempt to kill him. SAl_______
fired one round towards the robber who was approximately 7 to 1
feet from him.
The round missed the robber and struck the
deposit/withdrawal counter inside the bank.
After the shot, the rqbher can back towards the center
of the lobby. At that point SAl
Iwas able to see that the
robber did not have a weapon in his hands. He ran to the robber
and once again attempted to control him with his left hand while
still holding his weapon in his right hand. As the two of them
struggled, the robber once again bent over reaching for something
on his person. This time he stood up holding what appeared to be
a small cannister, later determined to be pepper spray. The
robber began spraying SAl______ face to include his eyes. SA
Ibegan experiencing a burning sensation in his eyes. He
I
once again felt threatened as he believed he may become
disoriented and the robber would have an opportunity to take his
gun and either shoot him or others.
hegan to strike the robber with his right hand
sAl
while still holding his weapon. He struck the robber three or
four times in the area of the robber’s head. During the entire
in the face with
time, the robber continued to spray SA[
pepper spray. Using his left hand, SAl_____ was finally able to
get the robber to the exit door where they were met by Det.
I
I The three of them exited the bank and fell on the
ground near the front of the bank’s door.
Once_outside the bank, the robber continued to struggle
with both SAl
land Deti___________ Within a few moments
assistance arrived from OCSD patrol units in the area. The
robber ws handcuffed and paramedics were requested. The
paramedics arrived at the scene within a few minutes of being
called.
They provided the robber initial first aid and then
transported him in custody to the Mission Hospital Regional
Medical Center for further medical care. The robber sustained
injuries to his head following the struggle.

3

 ___
____________________

&

The robbF was identified as[
using the alias oft
j He was found to be on
parole in the State of California.

I

SAl
bnd Det.I
lalso received abrasions
from the struggle.
They both were treated and released from
Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center in Mission Viejo,
California.
OCSD Homicide-Officer Involved Shooting Team and the
Los Angeles Agent Involved Shooting Team responded to the scene.
A joint investigation was conducted.
Neighborhood investigations were conducted at the
shooting scene, along with witness interviews.
Photographs were taken of the crime scene area by both
the FBI and OCSD.
OCSD conducted the crime scene investigation.
OCSD furnished the FBI their written reports regarding
the shooting incident.
Recovered at the scene was a replica of a chrome
colored semi-automatic handgun which was determined to be a BB
gun. Also recovered was the canister of pepper spray, along with

Ibriefcase.

the recovered bank money andi

On July ].S, 1998, a true bill indictment was returned
Iwith
by Federal Grand Jury, Los Angeles charging I
violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2113 (a.) and lii; Bank
Robbery and Assaulting a Federal Officer, respectively.

I

us

currently incarcerated in the
Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Los Angeles, California,
pending further trial.

—

F—

DETAILS:

I

This case is predicated upon information that SAl
I assigned to the Santa Ana Resident Agency of the Los
Angeles Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
had been involved in a shooting incident at approximately 1l:55
I
am, July 3, 1998, during the apprehension of I
Iiho had just committed a bank robbery at a Union Bank
in San Clemente, California.

4

I

 ___________

‘“

(12J3U199)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROOTI

Date: 11/23/98

Inspection Division

From:

Attu:

Inspection Dyjj
Contact:

Approved By:

Title:

Extension 1837

Coyle The s
LusbyTh a

Drafted By:
Case ID #:

Thomas J. Coy].e

:lrr
66-19157-22

IDMINISTRTIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDEHT
2/4/98
lNCHORAGE DIVISION

Synopsis: To advise of a shootinq incident in the Pnchorage
Divijn on 2/4/98, involving SA
Iwho shot an
injured moose in an effort to kill it.
Details:

I

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
dated 6/16/98.

1

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

lb 6

I
1
2

Mr.1
iRm. 7142
Mr. Coyle, Rm. 7825 (Enc.)
Mr. I
I, Rm. 7116
(1
Mr. .Marquise, Room 51S5)
1-Mr. Foa
m6646
3-Mr
7427
(1
Mr.
Room 7326)
(1
Ms.
oem 7326)
1
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
J.
Mr. Mershon, Room 7837
2
Ms. Ginsino tTjDQ3
-

-

-

—

-

-

-

-

(1-Mr,I

I

1- Mr.
1- Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mrs

I,FOQuantico
I Room 4094
Room 3787F
Room 7861

 ______dvised

I:

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-22, 11/23/1998
Details

of

Inspection Division

the Shooting Incident

On 2/4/98, SAl
larrived on the scenç nf
an accident where a motorist had collided with a moose.
SAL
was driving his personally owned vehicle on a paved, four lane,
divided highway, with a 20 foot wide ditch separating the north
and southbound lanes of traffic with moderate but sporadic
traffic.
It was dark with no street lights and the temperature
was approximately 32 degrees with wet and icy roads.

The vehicle in front of SAJ

I

Ibegan brakinq raDidly

and. came to an almost complete stop in the roadway.
SA I
I
slowed his vehicle to a near stop. After a few seconds, tne
vhire pulled into the right lane and continued southbound.
SA
Isaw a large moose lying in the southbound passing lane.

The animal’s midsection was bloody and it appeared to have been

hit by a car that had stopped about 90 feet further down the
road.

s2J
Istopped his vehicle approximately 25 feet from
the moose with his emergenml f1hers activated to alert
approaching motorists. SAl_____ did not have a phone in his
possession nor did he have emergency flares or equipment. He
exited his vehicle to assess the situation, identify and aid

possible victims and to find a way to notify the appropriate
emergency agencies.

Another motorist had stopped at the_victim driver’s car

door to ensure the safety of everyone and SAl
I approached the
moose.
He noted that although the moose was severely injured, it
was still alive and conscious. The animal’s midsection was
bloody and its right back leg was badly broken. Suddenly, the
moose began moving its lçft 1e and rocking back and forth in an

attempt to stand. As SAl
land another individual approached,
the moose became agitated and increased its efforts to stand.

In the interest of public safety, S?1
Ifelt
compelled to dispatch the animal before anyone was injured.
the other bystander of his identity and
requested that he return to his vehicle. The motorist.advised
that he would leave the scene and attempt to notify the Anchorage
Police Department.

Sal
Idetermined the safest course of act-ion would
be to approach the right side of the moos a4 and fire
several shots into the animal’s right eye socket.
SA
f ired
four rounds from his FBI issued Sig Saner P228 nine millimeter
2

I

 ________________I,

To;
Re;

Inspection Division From:
66-l917-22, 11/23/1998

Inspection Division

pistol into the animal’s right eye socket. After waiting
approximately 30 seconds o veri
fy that the animal was
1
immobilized and dying, SAl
Ihoistered his weapon and
proceeded to the victim driver’s vehicle. He determined that the
driver of the vehicle was not injured.
Another motorist stopped at the scene and advised that
he was an Emeçcencv Trauma Technician and offered his help. At
that time
1 SAl__Inoticed that the moose was moving around and
struggling to stand again. SAl
Ireturned td the moose and
after ensuring that all bystanders were out of the line of fire,
fired four additional rounds into the moose’s left eye socket.
Th mos began struggling to move its head and forebody causing
SAj
Ito fire four additional rounds into the moose’s
forehead,
After several seconds, the moose’s breathing became
shallow and sporadic. Although not dead, the moose made no
further attempts to stand.
Once it was apparet thal the moose no longer posed a
danger to anyone’s safety, 814
Ihoistered his weapon and
began to flag down passing motorists in an attempt to locate
someone with a cellular phone.
A motorist stopped and SAl
lused his phone to
report the accident. Within a few minutes, an Anchorage Police
Department squad car arrived and checked the condition of the
moose.
The officer advised SAj
that another unit would
arrive and probably shoot the animaL one last time with a shotgun
slug.
Upon the arrival of the second squad car, an officer
approached the moose and fired a single shotgun slug into the
moose’s head.
On 10/14/98, the SIRG met to discuss the above
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Thomas
Lusby, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the
following voting menbers of the SIRG in attendance:
Mark J.
Mershon, Chief Inspeotor, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division;
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section,
Criminal Uiv1s1ofl, US3JQJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief,
Personnel Administration and Benefits Section, Personnel
Division; SSAi
I Legal Advice and Training, Legal
Policy, Office of the General Counsel; Richard A. Marquise,
Section Chief, Operatioral Sunnort Section, Criminal
Investigative Division; I
I Unit Chief. Firearts
Training Unit, Training Division (Tn)
ITTt
Chief, NS-2B, Nationalecurity Division
Unit
Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific ?nalysis Section,
-

3

 _______las

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—3.9157-22, ll/23/i98

Inspection Division

I

I

Laboratory Division; and,I
Supervisor, Washington
Field OffLce.
I
The two flon-voting members present were’
lUnit Chief, :tnyestictive Law Unit, Office of General

Counsel, andi
I Inspection Ixialyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division,
Observations and Recommendations of the SX1G

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that thiB shooting
incidenj involved an intentional discharge of SA I
Iweapon.
The only issue discussed by SIRG members was the
fact that SAl
Ihould have realized that a nine millimeter
pistol would not kill a moose and that he should have resolved
the matter by contacting animal control to secure the moose.
This matter will be discussed with the SAC. Members unanimously
concurred that no administrative action should be taken against
a result of his involvement in this shooting
Incident.

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION

AT WASHINGTOL D. C.
SA
shooting

Pht nr administrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this

4

-

  

 

1998

 

 

 

 

_____.

(12131/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Da.te:

Inspection Division

?rom:

I

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact:

06/23/98

I

j Extension 1837

Approved By:, I
Lusby Thom
Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:
Title:

Ilrr
66-19157-11

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/4/98
CLEVELD DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident involving agents of
the Cleveland Division during a felony car stop of two suspected
armored car robbers..
Details:

I

.Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
Idated 3/27/98.

I

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
b6
b7C
-

1
2

-

-

Rm. 7142
Mr.
m. 7825 (Enc.)
Mr.
Rm. 7116 (Enc.)
Mr. Marguise Room 5155)
(1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646
Mr.
I Room 7427
Ms.[
(1
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr.
Room 7837
Mr.
IYSDOJ
I ‘oom 4147
Mr.

1
1
1

-

-

Mr.
Mr
Mr4

J

I

-

1
2

-

-

1

1
1
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

-

Ms.
(1

-

?ISJ

IUSDQJ
I

Savage- 1642

I

I Quantico
Q

Room 7861

 tc
To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-].1 06/23/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
Th

inc5dent was a result of an investigation
I two suspected
armored car robbers operating in the Cleveland; Ohio area.
These in.djvjdua].s were identified in 1995 as suspects in three
armored car robberies. Information was developed that these
robberies involved unprovoked shootings and’ the use of ballistic
vests and armor-piercing ammunition. The Cleveland Division
conducted periodic surveillances and spot checks of both subjects
beginning in 1995.
Of

I

f-irwT

lanai

On 2/12/98, the Special Operations Group (500) located
both subjects togther easing a Brinks armored car route. Based
upon information developed from the surveillances, it was
believed that the subjects were in the planning stage of another
armored car robbery. Executive Management of the Cleveland
Division instructed the SOG to begin daily surveillance of both
individuals. Additionally, Cleveland Division management and a
Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) Team Leader began nightly
meetings to discuss the activities of the subjects and a possible
arrest plan.

I

At approximately 9:00 a.m., on 3/4/98, the s’ubj sets
were observed departing I
I personally
1 residence in[
owned Chevrolet van. Both subjects were surveilled to an
apartment complex on the southwest side of Cleveland. The
subiecs departed the apartment complex in separate vehicles with
Idriving a Ford minivan which was determined to be stolen.
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Van A. Harp was notified of this
information and dispatched Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Louis Frederick Allen to the area.

The subjects were surveilled to a ç station where
they were observed transferring baggage fromi
[ran to
I
Jstolen van. The_subiects were observed traveling to a
K-Maçt oar4ng lot where I
Iparked his vehicle and departed
withi
un the stolen van.
Istolen van was later
c’
observed in the parking lot at the Star Bank which was one of
several locations identified as potential armored car robbery
sites based on previous surveillance. SAl
I
contacted the Brinks Armored Car Company and had the armored car
intercepted in order’to prevent it from making its usual stop at
the bank. An operational plan had been discussed whereby the
Brinks armored car servicing the potential robbery site would be,
diverted by agents, making the subjects abort the robbery and
return to the switch vehicle where their guard would be at its

2

Savage- 1643

 ___IandL

V

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-3:1 06/23/1998

Inspection Division

lowest. Agents on the scene believed that at this point enough
probable cause existed to arrest the subjects for the attempted
armored car robbery.
At approximately 1130_a.rnL., tile CJve1and SWAT Team
effected a felony car stop
I andi
I returned to the
swtch site in the IC—Mart parking lot. I Iexited the stolen
van andi
I began to turn the van around as if to exit the
parking lot. Three SWAT vehicles simultaneously approached
I
I vehicle from both sides and the rear blocking it from
exiting the parking lot.I
I who had exitedl
Ivan, was
quickly apprehended near his own vehicle. SWAT agents exited
their vehicles and identified themselves toI
Frho was non
compliant and immediately put his van in reverse and rammed, the
SWAT van blocking his rear. He then went forward at an angle,
ramming the S
t. He was reversing his van
again when s
who was located at the front
pass
ehicle, fired at the subject.
SA
who had taken up a position behind the
subjects van, also fired into the rear window of the van as it
was accelerating tOward him in reverse for the second time.
SAsj
Istated that they
fired at
lhen he accelerated forward for the second time
in order to prctect themselves and other agents.

asl

F

I
Ivan broke through the chain link fence and
came to rest a few feet from a brick wall. He was ordered out of
the van and placed under arrest by agents on the scene. Agents
discovered that the subject was wearing a bulletproof vest, and
carrying
fully-loaded Sig Sauer Model 226, nine millimeter
semi-automatic pistol. Agents clearing the van observed a blue
gym bag which contained a 12-gauge shotgun, a fully loaded Glock
nine millimeter pistol with two extra magazines, an AK 47 semi
automatic rifle’ with a sawed-off stock, two magazines
an AK
47 taped together, a fully loaded Glock 45 caliber pistol, a
fully loaded Glock 45 caliber magazine, a barre
l-drum nagazine, a
1
bulletproof vest, a can
and handcuffs. I
I suffered
multiple gunshot wounds to the face, arm and shoulder. He was
transported to the emergency room of the Metro Health Medical
Center in Cleveland by emergency medical services and is
recovering from his wounds.

a

for

of mace

above

I

On 6/15/98, the SIRG met to discuss the
captioned
shooting incident.
Chief Inspectorl
1Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the
fol1owing voting members
the SIRG in attendance:
1
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division,

of

r

3

Savage- 1644

 To:
Re:

F

I
I

Inspection Division From:
6E—19157-]1 06/23/1998

Inspection Division

USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel Admint±it’
and Pnef its Section, Administrative Services Division;
I
Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism, and Violent Crimep
5ection, Criminal Division, usDoj; ssAJ
1 Legal
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Richard A. Marqu±se, Section Chif OnitAôii1 unport Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief,
TTr4
-‘obal Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
lunit ç!hf. Nrrm Training Unit, Training
Division (3); and,I
Isupervisor, Washington Field
ü it-’
The only non-voting member present was
I
llnspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division

I

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to <1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that this incident
involved the intentional discharge of the weapons of the four
agents who fired.
Members also unanimously concurred that the
use of deadly force in this incident was justified and in
conformance with the current deadly force policy. This
discussion resulted in the recortunendation that no administrative
action be taken against any employee involved in this shooting
incident.
All members opined that, although not written, the
Cleveland Division had developed extensive plans regarding the
arrest of the subjects prior to the incident.
Cons.ideration was
given to the fact that the subjects were known to use vests as
well as armor piercing ammunition. Attendees commended the
division for its outstanding coordination among al). entities at
the scene and also voiced the opinion that this task force could
be used as a model for other Bureau offices.
In particular, one
member defined the task force as Moing the job right
3 and
ensuring that ‘everything was covered.
11
A short dicussion ensued regarding two issues raised
by attendees. The first was the fact that an agent shot through

Savage- 1645

 ‘a
lb

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:

Inspection Division

66-19157-11 06/23/1998

a curtained window in the van. Members discussed the fact that
although the agent shot through the window, he knew no passengers
were in the vehicle, therefore, third party injuries were not a
concern in this instance.
The second issue related to the fact that, although
thoroughly coordinated between the Cleveland Division and FBIHQ,
and based on a previous agreement between the FBt and. the
Cleveland Police Department, members of the Police Department had
conducted interviews after the incident. Although.this is
acceptable, members <pined that SAC Harp may want to consider
having an SA present when police are conducting interviews since
the use of joint statements is preferable.

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

1

That no administrative action be taken against SAs
Iandb

snoocing inciaent.

las a result of their involvement in this

5

Savage- 1646

 (213U199S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

From:

I

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact.:

06/22/98

1

Ex

837

Approved By:
‘7

Drafted By:

[

Case ID #:

66-193.57-52

Title:

jlrr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIR
SHOOTING INCZDENT
3/14/98
SPRINGFZELD DIVISION

Synopsis: To advise of a shooting incident in the Springfield
Division ‘during the execut,on of a federal search and seizure
warraxt. Supervisory Senior Resident Agent (SSRA)I
.1
I tired one shot injuring the subject.
Details: Reference report of Inspector-in-Placel
dated 4/15/98.

iRm. P7142
Mr
m. 7825 (Ehc.)
I Rm. 7U6 (Eric.)
‘2 - MrJ
Mr. Marqiise, RoOm 5155)
1 - Mr. ‘orn, Room 6646
Mr. F
2
room 7427
(1 - MS • I
I Room 7326)
1
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr,’
2.
oom 7837
DOJ
1.Mr1
j Ioom 42.47
3.
Mr1
I. USDO
2 - MsJ
(1-Ms.f____

1
MxI
1-Md
1
Mrs.

I,IqFOQuantico

-

-

L

Room 7862.
IL 3

IL 7

-

-

-

Savage- 1647

I

I’

This comznuniôation is prepaced to fu2znish the analysis,
comments, and recommendati.ons of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (St.RG) with xeference to the captioned shooting.

-

I

 ______

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-52, 06/22/198

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 3/12/98, sAl
I of the Carbondale
Resident Agency (RA), Springfield D.vision, obtained a federal
search warrant for the residence of I
un Coip,
Illinois. The search. warrant was for crac1 cocaine, United
States currency, and other drug related materials.
On 3/14/98, at 4:30 a.m., SSRAI
I
conducted a briefing at the Carbondale RA with members o1 the
search team regarding the case and the planned searches for the
morning. At approximately 5:00 a.m., the officers and agents
brolçe into two groups based on their target search. The
individuals responsible for conducting the search of the
I
residence went into ssRAI
loffice where he povided a
packet of information regarding the search. The packet included
a copy of the search warrant, hand drawn map of the residence,
photographs of the subject as wel]. as his criminal history, a
photograph of the residence, a copy of the affidavit supporting
the search warrant, and an assignment sheet. Detailed
discussions were conducted regarding the fact that I
Iwas
known to keep a gun in his bedroom. Additioziafly, the group
discussed in detail entry plans and assignments were made by SSR
Ibased on the experience level of the officers and agents
I
present.
-

At approximately 6:00 a .m., the search team arrived at
the residexce and the front door was forced open by SA I
I
lusing a ram. Officers, announcing police and FBI,
I
began entry into the premises.
Sergeant I
kas the first officer
through the door, followed by Special Federal Officer I
I
p These officers proceeded to the back bedroom and forced
the partially ajar door open. Upon entering the room, the
subject was moving in an easterly direction towards the side
kitchen door, holding a .22 caliber silver I
Ihandgun in
his hand. Officer
lied gun and dropped to his knees
along side of the
.
imed at Officer I
land fired
one round which was subseouen lv retrieved from the bed mattress
adjacent to where Of-ficrI
Iwas crouched. OfficerI
I
fired four rounds at the subject who was near te doorway to the
kitchen from the north bedroom. Officer
I who had entered
the rear bedroom_behind Officerl
L tired four rounds in the
direction of p
‘was in the living
I At this point, SSRAI
room and approaching the entrance to the kitchen. He observed
-

2

Savage-1648

:6
7C

 TO:

Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
66-191S7-52, 06/22/1998

Inspection Division

the subject backing fom the bedroom into the kitchen with his
gun in his right hnnd a magazine in his left hand. Off içers
were yelling ati
1o drop the gun and get down but I
Idid
not obey the command. As he was ackina into the kitchen, I
turned t
he area where SSRAI
I was located. resu1tng
in SS
firing on
Off icerl
who
wa irj
e rig t of Ss
iso fired one shot at I
I
Ifell to the floor, and his gun slid away on the floor
further into the kitchen.

I
I was then handcuffed and SN
Iapplied
pressure to the wound in his stomach with a sock obtained from
the residence. An ambulance was called and transported the
subject to the Herrin Hospital. I
huffered from three
gunshot wounds identified as one in his left upper arm, the left
abdomen and the left hip. The subject fully recovered from these
injuries.

After the shooting incident, all individuals firing
cheir weapons were administered a breathalyser by a ritmber of the
Cabonda1e Police Department. he weapons and magazines of all
shooters were surrendered to the Illinois State Police, Division
of Forensic Services, who conducted the crime scene
investigation.
It ws subsequently determined that the weapon used by
was a .22 long rif,le cal:iber Jennings pistol, which
contained a magazine and six cartridges with one roi.d partially
seated in the chamber. An extra magazine was found behind the
•
stove in the kitchen which_contained six cartridges. The weapon
apparently jammed after I
If ired the first round at Officer
I
I

I

-

On 6/1-5/98, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident. Chief Inspector I
10ff ice of
Inspections, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the
following voting members of the SZRG in attendance: I
I
I
L Trial Attorney, Civi.). Rights Section, Crinnai Division,
USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel Administration
Rprzef its Section, Adrnnistrative Services Division;I
I
I
Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism and Viclnt Crimes
Section, Criminal pivision, USDOJ; ssI
JLegal
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office ot the GeneraJ. €.ounsel;
Richard A. Marquise, Section Chi,f. nn nr
port Section,
1
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I, Unit Chief,
2fl TTnf. loba1 Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Units Training

I

I

-

3

Savage- 1649

-

 1

To:
Re:

Tnspection Division From:
66-19157-52, .06/22/1998

Inspection Division

ision (TD); and, I
1 Supervisor, ?jashinaton Field
Of finn.
The only non-voting member present wasi
I
I
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recomntendtions concerning
t:raining and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that this iprf
involved an i4tentional discharge of the weapons of SSRiI_________
other law enforcement participants. Members
also unanimously concurred that the use of deadly force was in
conformance with the cIrrent deadly force ol.icy and that no
action shou1d be taken against SSRAI
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.
h70

Set Lead
NSPECTIO bIVISION
AT WASHINGTON. D. C
Tht

n, .riri1i.nistrative

__________

_

shooting incident.

a result

action be takei against SSRA
his involvement in this

of

4

Savage- 1650

 (12f3U1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 09/17/98

Inspection Division

From:

Attu:

[

Inspection D1ritn
Contact:

I

Approved By:
-

—

Extension 1837

I

Lusby Tflos
7

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

66-19157-44

Title:

I

-

ILrr
lb

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/6/98
SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION

lb

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident involving two agents.
of the Salt Lake City Division during an attempt to effect the

arrest of I

Details:
(SSRA) I

a known fugitive.

Reference reDort of Supervisory Senior Resident Agent
Idated 6/15/98.

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

3.
1
2

-

IRm. 7142

Mr,

Mn

m. 7825 (Eric.)
Mn1
I. Rm. 7116
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
(1
Mr. ‘oran Room 6646
Mr. p
I Room 7427
Ms. I
(1
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 825
Mr.I
J.,. USDOJ
Mi I
(1
-

1
2

-

1

1
1

1
1

-

-

-

Mn

Mr.I

Mr.j
Mr.
Mrs.1

-

1
2

-

-

(1-Mr.I

L

Quantico
qFo

iantico

I

Room 3787F
Room 7861
lb C

-

2

I,

I

Savage- 1651

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-44, 09/17/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident

The Salt La-Ice City Division Violent Crimes Task Force
(VCTF) became involved in this investigation on 3/6/98, based on
a request for assistance from the Utah Department of Corrections
(UDOC).
Authorities of the UDOC requested assistance under the
provisions of the Unlawful Flight statute. The UDOC had obtained
a state felony warrant charging the subject with Absconding
Parole Supervision and Failure to Complete Community Correctional
Center Program. The subject’s original incarceration was for
theft; however, his criminal record reflected an extensive arrest
record including assault on a peace officer where he was shot by
a Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Deputy on 7/14/94. The subject was
a known gang member affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood and
Skinheads.
On 4/30/98, local authorities arrestedi
in
Salt Lake City. During this arrest, a single gun shot was fired
by an unknown pçrson. A subsecuent local investigation
determined thati
Iwas the individual
responsible for firing the gun shot. As a result of this
incident and he specific request from the UDOC, efforts to
locate
Iwere intensified by the VCTF.
On 5/1/98, VCTF
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
Ihad a squad
meeting which included local, state and federal officers assicmed
to the task force.
The background and )nownyiolence of I
I
was discussed during thiqmeetizg. SSAI
linstructed that the
investigation concerning I
Ibe conducted utilizing two sixmember teams consisting of VCTF personnel and that protective
body armor was to be worn during any contacts made in an effort
to locate the subject.
L

On 5/1/98, information was developed thati
‘was
staying in Magna, Utah, and that he was in possessipn of a
firearm.
Information was also received thad
Ibad been in
the area with a female companion on 4/30/98, and that he appeared
not to be in a very stabIe stat of mind. Another individual
stated that she haç senI
Iwith a handgun.
Information was
also gathered thati
Ihad called an acquaintance asking for
some clothes so he could get out of town.
Information was received on 5/6/98, thatl
I was in
a residence located in Layton, sleeping in a back bedroom of a
trailer arid that he was in possession of a “silver colored
handgun”.
It was reported that a 16 year old and a four year old
were also occupants of the trailer.
2

Savage-1652

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-44, 09/17/1998

Inspection Division

Following receipt of this information, personnel of the
VCTF, the Ogden Resident Agency (Ra), the Ogden VCTF, Northern
Utah Criminal Apprehension Team and Layton Police Department
(LPD) met and were briefed on the subject’s background, including
information about the 4/30/98 shooting.
A decision was made during the meeting to request the
LPD SWAT Team for assistance. A plan was formulated for a
perimeter to be established around the trailer by two three-man
teams, and occupants of nearby trailers would be evacuated to a
safe location away from the scene.
As members of the two teams were moving to their
predetermined locations on opposite sides of the trailer, the
subject appeared in the doorway, and looked in the direction of
the team located northwest of the trailer. Task Force Officer
I
ye1led commands to the subject TM
This is the police,
step out and put your hands in the air.” The subject quickly
disappeared back into the trailer, immediately reappeared with a
pistol in his left hand, and fired at the team members. The
subject quickly ducked back into the trailer and within seconds
reappeared with the un still in his hand
1 and pointed it
directly at Officeri
Ifired one slug round
I Officer I
from his shotgun, and the subject appeared to fall back into the.
trailer.
Simultaneously, the southeast side perimeter team was
arriving at their location, observed the subject’s movements, and
heard Off icerl
Ishouts to the subject. VCTF Officer
‘and SAl
I
tired one round each and the
subject ducked back into his trailer. Within moments, the
subject threw a handgun out of doorway landing on the driveway in
front of the trailer and exited the trailer with his hands in the
air. Although officers could see that the subject was bleeding,
he would not comply with commands given to him to submit to
arrest and for the next 40 minutes yelled obscenities and acted
in an irrational fashion. He continued to fail to comply with
verbal commands from various officers and agents attempting to
convince hits to lie on the ground and submit to arrest. The
subject continually moved around the area in front of his
trailer, walking around and standing close to the handgun on the
driveway. He made numerous movements with his b
dv and hands as
9
though he was going to retrieve the handgun.
SAl
I
who observed the subject’s movements and overheard the subject’s
yells at the various law enforcement officers became concerned
for the safety of everyone involved in this incident. As the
subject madq one of his movements in the direction of the
I fired one slug round from a Remington 870
handgun, SA I
shotgun. The round hit the weapon causing it to spin around on
3

Savage-1653

L

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-44, 09/17/1998

Inspection Division

the pavement. The subject reacted by jumping back from the
weapon, however, did not give up or comply with any verbal
commands. The LPD SWAT Team arrived on the scene and as they
were approaching the trailer a police dog barked. The dog’s bark
immediately gained the subject’s attention, and as the SWAT Team
was approaching the trailer the subject asked them not to use the
dog and immediately complied with commands to lie on the ground
and was placed under arrest.

I

Iwas transported to the University of Utah
Medical Center where he received medical attention for his
gunshot wound.
On 8/11/98, the SIRO met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Thomas Lusby,
Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the following
voting members of the SIRG in attendance: I
I Trial
trni.y, Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; I
I
Trial Attorney, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section,
L.
Criminal Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief,
Personnel AdTninistratiçn and Benefits Section, Administrative
Services Division; SSAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel; Richard A.
Marquise, Section chief
1 Onerational Support Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;1
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Training Unit, Training Division (TD); L
I Unit
Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and, L
ISupervisor, Washington
Field 9ff ice. The two non-voting members present were I
I
I
Program Manager, Law Enforcement Training for Safety and
Survival, Practical Applications Unit, Training Division, and
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections,
Inspect ion Division.
-

-

ObservationB and Reconxmezidations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
A lengthy discussion ensued regarding the use of deadly
force by the agents involved in this shooting incident. Members
4

Savage- 1654

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-191S7-44, 09/17/1998

Inspection Division

unanimously concurred that the use of deadly force in th{
I
incident was justified and that shots fired by
I
I as wel). as the task force officers were in conformance
with the current deadly force pQlicv. However
1 members
I
Participants
questioned the shot taken by SAL
discussed the fact that although the current deadly force policy
specifically addresses warning shots and the disabling of
vehicles, it does not technically address the disabling of
weapons. The OGC representative verified that the “imminent
dangerw aspect continued to be in place during this entire
incident when the subject was attempting to gain access to his
weapon Additionally, based on the subject’s previous history
and his actions that day, he had the intent to use the weapon if
access was gainçd. Mqnbers emphasized the fact that the
discharge of SAl
lweapon was not intended to neutralize the
subject and
0 therefore, could technically be considered a
violation of the current deadly force policy. This resulted in
the recommendation that SAF
Ibe censured for his
lack of good judgment in attempting to neutralize the subject’s
weapon instead of the subject. Members opined that he should
have considered potential injuries to third parties before
shçotin at the subject’s weapon and unanimously agreed that
SAl
I should receive remedial training regarding the current
deadly force policy.
Although no recommendations were made, members made the
following observations about the shooting incident: 1) the
arrest plan contained deficiencies allowing a “cross fir&
situation which could have resulted in officer safety issues as
well as potential dang- 1- the public and that this could have
been eliminated it SAl
Iliad advised that he was going to fire
a shot; 2) there was no management, direction or control provided
on the scene due to the failure of the acting supervisor to
advise office management of the situation until after the
shooting incident; and, 3) the acting supervisor failed to
provide proper leadership. Additionally, members noted the fact
that the acting supervisor deployed SWAT Teams without the
required notification, concurrence and onsite presence of an SAC
or ASAC. Based on thi discussion. the SAC will be advised to
ensure that Acting SSAI
lie provided guidance
regarding the duties of a supervisor.

S

Savage- 1655

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-44, 09/17/1998

Inspection Division

LED(s):
Set Xead 1:
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AT WASHINGTON, D

C.

That SAl
ibe censure
r his lack of
judgment in attempting to neutralize the sub
t’s weapon rather
than the subject.
Further, SAhould be advised that his
shooting at the subject’s weapon could be considered a technical
violation of the current deadly force policy.__The SAC’s copy of
the letter of censure should state that SAl
Imust receive indepth remedial training regarding the current deadly force
policy.
Set Lead 2:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, P. C.
That no adnjinistrative action be t
I as a result of his par i
shooting incident.

6

Savage- 1656

against SA
pation in thia

 _____________om
__
__

:

9S
ij (Z2t31Il9

-

*

STIGATION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE

Inspection Irisioa
Contact: L_

From:

Approved By:

#:

-

Extension 1837

.

-

Lusby Thomas

‘

zJlrr

Drafted By:
Case ID

Z1

Attn:

Inspection Division

To:

Date: O/15/98—

‘‘

ROUTIMB

Precedence:

•.

66-19157-1O
-

Title:
-

UIRY
PDMINISTRATIVE INQ
.
NT
IDE
INC
G
TIN
SKOO
6/1O/98
CINCINNATI DIVISION

‘

‘

.
•

e of Special Agent
accidental discharg
an
of
e
vis
ad
:
To
sis
Sauer pistol, model
‘Synop
nine millimeter Sig
(SA)I
P226..
Charge Sheri A.
of Special Agent in
ort
rep
ce
en
fer
Re
Details:
Farrar, dated 7/16/98.
h the analysis,
is prepared to furnis
nt Review
This communica6ion
ide
nc
g’I
of the Shootin
ns
tio
nda
me
om
rec
g.
comments, and
oned shootin
reference to the capti
Group (SIRG) with
.

•

4

-b6

b7Q

]Rm. 7142
1 - Mr.[
.ni. 7825 (Enc.)
.2. - Mr.
7116
.
Mr
2
-j Rm.
Room 5155)
e,
uis
arg
M
Mr.
(1
•
6646
3. - Mr. foran, Room
7427
Mr.
2
Room 7326)
_
s.f
M
(1
7825
1 - Mr.’ Lusb , Room
.J
r
M
2—
•

-

,1
11 3.
3.
-

-

4

Quantico
FO
JQuantico
3787F
] Room
j Room 7861

]

Mr
Mr
Mr
Mr.
Mrs

-

*

2

-

Ms - L_
(1. — Mr.

‘

-—1 USDOJ

J

•__

-

-

-

Savage-157.

-‘

‘

..

......
..
-....

.

‘

 __
__
__

-,

:
-—.-

To:
Re:

i-’-———
Inspection Divis

From:
Inspection Division 98
/19
/15
66-19157-1Q, 09

.

4.

ooting Incident
Details of the Sh
., SAE
proximately 3:45 p.m four member
On 6/10/98, at ap
a
as
rm
ea
fir
s
rest
charged hi
accidenta1ly dis
was effecting the ar
E
Speciã! Weapons andTactics (SWAT) •Team nsaction. • This_________
tra
ing a reverse drug
of a” subject follow resulted in the personal injury of E
e
accidental discharg
investigation.
a subject in th
1
began the
Cincinnati Division cking ring.
In
Ix July 1997, the
ffi
tra
l marijuana
na
io
at
rn
te
in
an
of
,investigation of
engaged in a series
the Miami Division conversations. Based on
8?
len199
pri
‘A
cons sually recorded telephone
Miami Division
thes& activities, thet with arranging four
m
fro
d
ine
ga
on
assis
informati
Cincinnati Division of the Cincinnati
C
requested that the
SA
e
Th
.
ns
operatio
and approval
reverse undercover
ngent upon review
nti
co
st
ue
req
the
operation would be ed to
Division approved
itt
d plans of how each
of specific detaile copy of the Operations Plan was subm
l
t
va
af
pro
dr
A
ap
.
and
ted
iew
rev
conduc
ngent on
ion management for
the Cincinnati Divis eration would be carried out. Conti all plan
the plan, the over
detailing how each op
ges and additions to
certain minor chan by the SAC.
d
was orally approve
,

*

-

hotel’ following
parture from the
After the subject’s de to arrest the subject was again
rest.
ng, the plan
the 1:00 p.m., meeti Team memiiers participating in the ar was
ed
S
olv
the
inv
e
and
on
ed
ery
review
Jto ensure ev
did a walk threug4
uld take place.
wo
st
re
ar
familiar with how ene
‘‘2

-

-

Savage-4 658

.

 4

4

To:
Re:

•
•
•

From:
Inspection Division 98
/19
/15
09
,
2.0
66—19157-

Inspection

as
der was turned off
to enter.
eo
am
vid
Te
the
AT
r
SW
ve
we
the
ho
of
room,
member
t room
am entered the hotel
soon as the SWAT Te run enabling personnel in the adjacen the
to
d
an
I”
ed
nu
“FB
d
nti
unce
camera co
The SWAT Team anno
bject did not
su
e
to monitor the arrest.
Th
”.
ze
ee
“fr
to
d
te
uc
str
in
_leaning or falling
subject was
backed up to the be L_ iwho was
and
ply
com
y
tel
dia
iuuue
m SA
n to slide away fro S1t_
]was exerting
back on. it and bega
As
.
him
of
ol
ntr
co
in
ga
shoulder to
to
i
r
ng
attempti
the subject’s
on
nd
ha
ft
le
s
ccidentally
pressure with hi
ct toward him, SAE tne left arm.
bje
su
the
ll
pu
ly
uled
forc
g the subject .n
arg
chef
dis
his weapon strikin
Emergency
who was a certified
.A SWAT Team member ring immediate medical attention to
began rende
Th subject was,.
Medical Technician
ance was summoned.
bul
am
an
and
ct
derwnt surgery to
bje
un
the su
ital where h&
sp
Ho
de
rsi
ve
Ri
d in stable
transported to
s subsequently liste
wa
and
t
lle
bu
the
remove
condition.
re summonàd to
gative agencies we
sti
ve
in
te
sta
and
Local
ne investigation.
conduct the crime sce
bject was
6/11/98, after the su doctors, he
of
ng
rni
mo
the
On
to the
interviewed accordingused to sign the form
ref
coherent and could be
ct
bje
su
e
Th
an
rights:
sire totalk with
was advised.of his
s expressing hs de .
was
ht
t
ec
rig
bj
s
hi
su
ive
e
Th
wa
ly
or oral
nducted
no interview was co l that afternoon and
attorney therefore
ita
sp
ho
the
r
m
fro
ed
subsequently discharg n County Jail.
kli
placed in the Fran
captioned
discuss the above
to
t
me
G
SIR
the
omas Lusby,
On 8/11/98,
ssistant Director Th
A
y
put
De
.
th
nt
f11owng
de
shooting inci
ed the .meeting
air
ch
Trial
,
ion
vis
Di
on
Inspecti
attendance: L
in
RG
SX
the
of
voting members
-

• aVage-_165g

•

.

,•

 &

I

—

..:..

---

To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-10, 09/15/1998

InspectonDiision
-

Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division, USDOJL.
I
Trial Attorney, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section,
Criminal Division, USOOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Seàtion Chief,
‘ersonne1 Administrati9n and ‘Benefits Section, Administrative
Services Division; ssAI
I Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel; Richard A.
Marguise, Section Chief- Orriona1 Support Section, Criminal
I Jnit Chief, Firearths
Investigative Divisionl
Training Unit, Training Division (TD);I
I Unit
Toolmark TThif. fc!intLfic Analysis Section,
Chief, Firearms
Laboratory Division; and,I
I Supervisor, whlic,t-t-rn
I
ield Qffice. The two non-voting members present were I
I
I Program Manager, Law Enforcement Training for Safety and
Survival, Practical Applications Unit, Training Division, and
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections,
I
Inspection Division.
Attorney,

I

-

-

*

‘

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director ‘with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or afety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

The oziiy iss’ue discussed by SIRG members involving SA
I regarded the fact that during thee arrest of I
I
he began to reach for the subject with his .left hand,
holding his weapon in his right hand. Metubers reiterated the
fact that proper training dictates that weapons should be secured
Participants unanimously
prior to physicalv han4ling subjects.
I violated a second safety rule by having
concurred that SAl
hi f4pger inside the trigger guard. Members opined.that SA
I disregarded both of these rules which resulted in the
s weapon. This discussion.’resulted in
1
accidental discharge of hi
Ibe censured and
the recommendation that s?1
suspended from duty for a period of three days.
stJ.1

The last issu in this shoQting incident involved the
weapon being used by SAL
I According to his,
lwas carrying his Lee Baer 45
signed sworn statement, SAl
caliber pistol, which is a Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) exclusive
program” weapon which non-HRT SAs have no authority to carry.
The TD representative, advised that since the TD is the sole
4

,

Savage-1660
&

a

lb h

lb 7 C’

 •1

—

I

-

To:
Re:

—

I

-

—

—

InspeCti0 DiviSiOa From:
66_19157_10,09/15/1998

Ipecti0flD18i0fl

--

-

general agent
weapons used by the management.
approving authoritY for
will be handled by TD
populations this issue

Seteadl

I

pFCE 0? PROF

O ROLTT

_je censuxed and
That
fi1ure o
three days to his
duty for a period of
firearm safety procedUres.
-

A

uspended from,
ol w proper

-4

A

5

Savage-1661

 ________________I1

_________________Itieapon

__________

(12f3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 11/23/98

Inspection Division

B’rom:

Inspection pivision
Contact:I

Approved By:

I

I

Attn:

J

I
Extension 1837

-,

Lusby Thong

Draf ted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

7C

66-19157-26

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/3/98
LOS ANGELES DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Los Angeles
Division on 7/3/98, involving an intentional discharge of Special
Agent ()
during the arrest of a bank
robber.
Details:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) Susan R. Chainer, dated 7/29/98.
This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

-

-

-

Mr,I

Rm. 7142
Mr.
IRm. 7825 (Enc.)
I Rm. 7116
Mr.h
(1
Mr.I
I Room 5155)
Mr. Poran. Roon 6646
bjom 7427
Mr.I____
Mr.
(1
Room 7326)
(1
Room 7326)
Mr. Lusbv. qom 1825
Mr.I
IRoom 7837
Ms.I
I USDOJ
(1-Mr.I____
-

1
3

-

-

1
Mr.
1-Mr.
Mr.
1
1
Mr.
Mrs.
1
-

-

-

-

,

-

1
1
2

-

-

-

Savage- 1662

Quantico
WFO
Room 4094
Room 3787F
Room 7861
,

 To:
Re:

Inspection Divjsion From:
66—19157-26, 11/23/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 7/3/98, SAs assigned to the Santa Ana Resident

Agency and a Sheriff’s Deputy from the Orange County Sheriff’s
Department (OCSD) were assigned to conduct a “stakeout” at three
banks in the Orange County area. These individuals were assigned
to the Bank Robbery Apprehension Team (BRAT) Task Force to
conduct investigations of bank robberies in Orange County.

I

I
I

jh

At approximately 8:00 a.m., on 7/3/98, SAl
I
I held a briefing in San C1emerjt- with other agents and local
officers. During the briefing, SAj
I furnished a description
of the bank robber, the available banK thirveillance photographs
of the robber and his clothing attire, normally a suit and tie.
T14s t-tir earned him the nickname of “accountant bandit”.
SAl
unformed the participants of the meeting that the robber
shouin ie considered armed and dangerous due to the nature of the
offense and the fact that the robber had preyiniily carried a
chrome colored handgun in his waistband.
jmade
SAl
surveillance assignments for personnel at three Union Banks which
were identified in his operatiqnl r1.n
ppproved by
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
I The plan called
for three two-man team. ql-kd out at three banks in the
San C].emente area.
SA I
I were to
I and Detective I
be located at the Union Bank located at 810 Avienda Pico in
Sari Clemente.
It should be noted that all three banks involved
in the “stakeout” had been robbed by the same robber on prior
occasions.
approximately 9:00 a.m., SAl
land Detective
Ibegan their surveillance pf th bank.
A previous
determination had been made that SAl
I would be inside the
hpnk to o1serve customers. He maintained contact with Detective
Iwho was observing the bank from a vehicle west of the
buildina usinç a hand held radio. Bank employees were notified
of SAl
bresence and several employees knew the description
of the robber.

A bank employee advised SAl
lat approximately 11:55
a.m., that a person matching the description of the robber was
standing in the customer service_line. Moments later, the bank
manager a]n cqna1ed to SAl
Ithat the subject was inside the
SAl
bank.
limniediately notified Detectivg
J that the
subject was possiblyin the bank.
I

I

Since SAl
Iwas not certain if the person in the
bank was the same individual as the serial robber they were
2

Savage-1663

 ______Idrew

V

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-26, 11/23/1998

Inspection Division

anticipating to arrest, he watched as the person walked up to a
teller window carrying a small briefcase.
He observed the teller
take a large bundle of money and place it on the counter.
Additionally, a closer look at the person convincçd him that this
was the robber they were searching for. si’I
Ibelieved that
he had just witnessed a bank robbery and he also believed that
the robber was the “accountant bandit”.
As the robber turned to leave, SAl
lobserved the
briefcase in one of his bands and a large bundle of cash in the
other.
SAl
Idecided this would be the safest time to
apprehend the subject since both of his hands were occupied and
he knew Detect ive_________ would be there momentarily.
his personally owned Bureau approved .45
caliber semi-automatic, Sig Sauer Model P220, arid pointed it at
the robber. He told th -rhhç that he was with the FBI and that
he was under arrest.. sri
Ihad positioned himself so his
weapon was pointeçl at te robber and away from any bank employees
or customers.
SAl
lused his left hand in an attempt to guide
th rohb’i to the ground.
Initially the robber complied with
SAl
Icommands then suddenly stood uo
The robber dropped
the cash and the briefcase while SAl
Icontinued to try to
control him with his left hand.

jattempted to pull the robber outside the bank
SAl
get assistance from Detective I
Iwho he knew to be
coming towards the bank. As the two of them approached the exit
door, the robber broke free from 571
hrasp and turned away
Th rqhber placed both of his hands near his waist and
from him.
out of SAl
Isight. The rnhhr then began to quickly turn
around towards SA I
I SA I
I believing the robber had
retrieved a weapon and was going to attempt to kill him, fired
one round towards the robber who was approximately seven to 10
feet from him. The round missed the robber and struck the
deposit/withdrawal counter inside the bank.
to

After the shot. the robber ran back towards the center
of the lobby and SAl
Iwas able to see that the robber did not
have a weapon in his hands. He ran to the robber and again
attempted to control him with his left hand while still holding
his weapon in his right hand. As they struggled, the robber bent
over reaching for something. When he stood, he was holding what
appeared to be a small canister, later_determined to be pepper
spray. The robber began spraying SAl
If ace including his
eyes. Feeling threatened arid believing that he may become
disoriented giving the robber an opportunity to take his gun and
3

Savage- 1664

 _________________I,

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-26, 11/23/1998

Inspection Division

either shoot him or others, SAl
ibegan striking the robber
with his right hand while still holding his weapon. He struck
the robber three or four times in the 1iead. During the entire
time, the robber continued to spray SAl
un the face with the
pepper spray. Using his left hand, SAl
Iwas finally able to
et the rol?ber to the exit door where they met Detective
I
I The three of them exited the bank and fell on the
ground near the front of the bank’s door.
Once outide the bank, the robber continued to struggle
with both SAl
land Detectivel
I Within a few
moments, additional assistance arrived from the OCSD patrol unitJc6
in the area.
The subject was handcuffed and paramedics were
requested.
They provided the robber initial first aid and
transported him in custody to the Mission Hospital Regional
Medical Center for firthr medical care where he was treated for

head injuries.

sAl

land Detectivel

lso received

abrasions from the struggle and were treat ec. ana released from
the Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center.

Subsequent to the shooting incident, a replica of a
chrome colored semi-automatic handgun which was determined to be
a BB gun was recovered along with the canister of pepper spray,
the recovered bank money and the subject’s briefcase.

On 10/14/98, the SIRG met to discuss the above
captioned shooting incident. Deputy Assistant Director Thomas
Lusby, Inspection Division, chaired the meeting with the
following voting members of the SIRG in attendance: I
I
IChief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division;I
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section,
Criminal Division, USD03; Patrick 3. Foran, Section Chief,
irt 9efits Section,
Personnel
Personnel
Division; SSAI
I Legal Advice and Training, Legal.
Policy, Office ot the General Counsel; Richard A. Marguise,
Section Chief, Operational Suort Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;I
IJjJ Chief. Firerps
Training Unit, Training Division (TD);
I Unit
Chief, NS-2B, National Security Division;
Unit
Chief, Firearms
‘i ic Analysis Section,
Toolmar’ tT,4fLaboratory Division; and, I
Supervisor, Wainaton
Field Office.
The two non-voting members present werel
I
I Unit Chief. Investigative Law Unit, Office of General
Counsel, andi
llnspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

I

I

4

Savage- 1665

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-26, 11/23/1998

Inspection Division

Obserrations and Recommendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members held a lengthy discussion regarding this
shooting incident. All members agreed that the use of deadly
force was justified and in conformance with the current deadly
force policy.
The first comment made by a SIRG member was the fact
that this ‘stakeout
M called for two-man teams; however,
technically this incident involved a one man stakeout at the
bank. Operational, training and safety issues relating to this
incident included the fact that the participants had a non
existent operational plan, had vague or no communication with
each other and that S[
twj-ently had no backup. Members
also noted that although sit
Ibelieved the subject to be
armed, he was in the bank alone with no assistance.
Additionally, members discussed the fact that SAl
meyer
attempted to neutralize the subject when he had many reasons to
do so, and questioned why he shot towards a counter where people
were located. These issues will be brought to the attention of
the Assistant Director in Charge of the Los Angeles Division.
Observations made by the SIRG included the fact that
there was very little management control provided in construction
of the uproposedfl operational pian; there was no supervisor on
the scene or management oversight provided; and, that bank
employees and bank use:çs were unnecessarily subjected to danger.
Members agreed that SAl
Ishould not have confronted the
subject inside the bank and emphasized that he shOuld have waited
until the suspect exited the bank before the confrontation began.
Standard operating procedures dictate that you either get the
subject before entering the bank or wait until the subject leavej
the bank to take actioi’
Thi4 H t’ii
ion resulted in the
recommendation that SA I
receive a letter of
censure for his lack of judgement in confronting the subject
inside the bank.
SIRG members noted that pistol whipping with a cocked
weapon with a floating muzzle in the air puts people in jeopardy.
5

Savage-1666

1

 To
Re:

Inspection Division From
66-19157-26, 11/23/1998

Inspection Division

The $IRG unanimously agreed that under this circumstance, the
weapon should either be used or holstered.

6

Savage- 1667

 p.

To:
Re

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-26, 11/23/1998

Inspection Division

IsE?D(g):
Set Lead 1:
QFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

That SA I
Ibe censured for his poor
judgement in confronting the subject inside the bank which

resulted in an escalation of violence putting individuals inside

the bank in unnecessary jeopardy.

7

Savage- 1668

bC

 Ici

F

(121311199$)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

F

Precedence:
To:

Date: 3/4/99

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Inspection Division
Contact:

Approved By:

Luaby

Thomas Lusby

Attn:

}

Extension 1837

omaj
7C

Drafted

By:I

Case ID :
Title:

rr
297-HQ-.A1271898-D

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDBNT

7/4/98
PHOENIX DIVISION

Synopsis: To advise of a shooting incident in the Phoenix
Division on 7/4/98.
FBI Agents and officers from the Phoenix
Po1ia Department (PPD), assigned to the Phoenix Fugitive Task
Force (PFTF), shot and killed William John Sershon during an
attempted arrest.
Details: Reference report of Assistant. Special Agent ii’i Charge
Walter B. Stowe, Jr., dated 10/29/98.
This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
coulments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

2.
2

-

MrJ
Mn
(1
Mr.
(1
Mn
(1
Mr.
Mr .
Mr.I
Ms.I
(1

-

2

-

-

3

-

3.

-

-

-

3.
2

-

-

m. 7142w
I Rm. 7116
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
Foran, Room 646
Mr. I
I Room 6313)
I Room 7427
Joom 7326)
145.1
Lusby, Room 7825
I Room 7837
Rispo3
1USDOJ
Mr. I
I

Mr
2.
1 Quantico
FO
1-Mr
Mr
1
I Room 4147
Room 3787P
1
Mr.
Mrs.j__________ Room 7861 Jb7c
3.
-

*

-

Savage- 1669

 ‘4

To:
Re:

on Division
Inspection Division From: Inspecti
297-HQ--A1271898--D, 03/04/1999
t
Details of the Shooting Inciden

the PFTF shot, and
On. 7/4/98, agents and officers from
rant for murder and
war
a
on
ht
killed a.subject who was being soug 7/1/98, for a homicide which
on
ed
burglary. The warrant was issu
acking. The subject, William
occurred in connection with a car-j on felony drug and weapons
ht
John Sershon, was also being soug
charges brought by the PPD.
to arrest ershon;
The PPD had recently attempted
to an apartment complex
however, he had eluded them and fled
. When the female
hid
and
where he broke into an apartment
Sershon assaulted her at
e,
hom
d
rne
retu
occupant of the apartment
area in a ighiacked
the
left
gun point, fled the apartment and
accomplicek
le
fema
a
and
‘vhcie. On 6/23/9, Sershon
ng to Melvin Dean
ngi
belo
e
hom
r
moto
a
ked
highac
Radtke was either
ona.
Ariz
ff,
Radtke inThe vicinity of Flagsta
was run over by the vehicle
pushed or jumped from the vehicle and
and killed.
was
7turned herself in on 7/2/98, and that
ised
adv
She
.
cers
debriefed by agents aM police offi r the weekend and also advised
Sershon. would return to Phoenix ove
ver and a fully
that he was armed with a .357 magnum
iso stated
e.
rifl
automáti AK-’47 style assault
e and
a
ld not
that Sershon had told her that he wou rding to
Acco
would not be sent back to prison.
t
o a
axvone who attempts
Sershon. would shoot it out with
to
ed
vid
pro
s
]wa
him. All information provided byL d to assist in the, location
members of the PFTF who had been aske
and apprehension of Sershon.

L

*

_
_

to trace a telephone number.
members of the task force were able
i
ona trailer park.
Ariz
The number came back to a Glendale, identified as LieutenantL
J
bers
mem
e
,—ThiJ4ally, three tak forc
of the PPD,
—

]
]and
land Detectjves1
atter 4:iu.m., th
time
Zxne
k.
r
par
ile
tra
the
to
nded
respo
eved to be Serçhon. The
officers saw an individual they beli ed by FBI SAsL
three officers wee_ subsequently join
]as well as PPD DetectiL 1
andl—
t entrance to the
Task force personnel blocked th fron rtment and
L
Depa
ice
Pol
dale
Glen
bra.e-’park and called the
the scene. Additional FBI
requested that marked units respond to
nd.
Agents were also requested to respo

I—

2

Savage- 1670

bi

 Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297—HQ-A1271898-tJ, O3fO4/l999
e PFTF personnel were
At approximately 5:45 a.tn., whil
set up, Sershon was
to
ing
par
pre
finalizing an arrest plan and
e he was staying and getting
observed exiting the trailer wher
observed arrying a black bag
into a blue 1998 Pontiac. He was
who was
ing kit.
shav
a
which was about te size of
ying a
carr
was
hon
Sers
ised that
staying at. the trailer, later adv
th
gh
throu
e
drov
hon
Sers
bag.
.357 magnum revolver next to the
was
e,
anc
entr
t’
ing the fron
trailer park and as he was approachforce personnel
7h4c?q
task
en
by
driv
ice
veh
cut off by
,ZTand PPD DetectiveL
driven by FBI
blocked the
SAL
FBI
by
who was accompanied
icle driven by PPD
veh
a
and
t
fron
subeot’s cane route from the
rear.
jblocked the subiect from the
DetctiveL
to his
urn
U-t
a
ing
mak
rapidly
Sershon attempted to escape by
quickly
hon
Sers
ler.
trai
by
near
right; however, he ran into a
marked
that
ce
fen
a
gh
to ram throu
reversed the car and attempted
to
le
unab
was
icle
veh
His
k.
the perimeter of the trailer par
shed
age
stor
a
ck
rest as it stru
penetrate the fence and came to
on the other side of the fence.
were wearing
Several of the PFTF personnel, who
ent personnel,
rcem
enfo
law
clothing that identified them as
Several of them shouted
.
approached the subject’s vehicle
hon stated that he would not b
surrender commands; however, Sers if to reach into the floorboard
taken alive and crquched down as
rd
e personnel members also hea
area of his vehicle. The task forc
kill
not
did
tber
f
i
1
that
ct
effe
Sershon make a statement to the
1observed
When DetectiveL
him, he would kill himself.
his Glock .40
d
fire
he
,
hand
Sershon come up with a weapon in his
jflrecl his.Colt M-4 Al.
SAL
caliber semi-automatic pistol.
Sershon, who was
äk
Several rounds stru
.223 caliber carbine.
cy Response
rgen
Eme
dale
Glen
pronounced dead at the scene by
personnel.
ucted the c
The Glendale Police Department cond
rdinator
Coo
onse Team
scene assisted by FBI Evidence Resp .357 magnum, was recovered
el 686,
EZ ] A Smith and Wesson Mod
The
of the ubj eat’s vehicle.
from the passenger compartment
e
Crim
al
ion
Nat
the
gh
ofweapon’s serial number was run throu
to be stolen from the victim
d
mine
deter
and
ter
Cen
tion
rma
Info
h.
wit
d
rge
cha
was
Sershon
the 6/23/98, carjacking/homicide that
cuss the above captioned
On 1/6/99, the SXRG met, t
Inspection
Chief Inspecto
shooting incident.
members
ing
V
owing
Division, chaired the meet
Chief,
tion
Sec
ty
Depu
of the SIRG in attendance:
OJ;
USD
n,
isio
Div
inal
ri
,
t.on
Sec
Terrorism and Violent Crimes
To:
Re:

J

-3

Savage- 1671

 T` :
Re:

I

Inspecti` n Divisi` n Fr` m:
Inspecti` n Divisi` n
297-H-A1271898-D, 03/04/1999

IT2ial Att` rney. Civi
ights Secti` n, Criminal
USDOJ; I
Unit Chief. Transfer Unit,
Administrative Services Divisi` n; SSA I
I Legal
Divisi` n,

Advice and Training,.Legal P` licy, Office ` f the General C` unsel;
Richard A. Marguise, Secti` n Chief. Operati` nal Supp` rt Secti` n,

Criminal Investigative Divisi` n;I

I
-

I TTnit Chief.

Training Unit, Training Divisi` n (TD) I
I Unit Chief, NS-2D Unit, Gl` bal Secti` n
NS-2, Nati` nal
Security Divisi` n;I
Unit Chief, Firearms
T` ` lrk Unit. Sentizic AnaJ.ysis secti` n, Lab` rat` ry Divisi` n;
P..mcj

-

J

-

and,I
I Supervis` r, Washingt` n Field Office. The
` nly n` n-v` ting member present wasi
I Inspecti` n
Analyst, Office ` f Inspecti` ns, Inspecti` n Divisi` n.
Observati` ns and Rec` mmendati` ns ` f the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the ab` ve syn` psized incident with
the intent t` (1) evaluate the applicati` n ` f deadly f` rce; (2>
pr` vide the Direct` r with an evaluative analysis,’ ` bservati` ns,
and rec` mmendati` ns f` r c` riective acti` ns fr` m an ` perati` nal
,standp` int (if any>;. (3) pr` vide rec` mmendati` ns c` ncerning
training and/` r safety issues and, (4) pr` vide rec` mmendati` ns
f` r adniinistrative acti` n if deemed necessary.

I

SIRG members unanim` usly c` ncurred that this sh` ` ting
an intenti` nal discharae çf the weap` ns ` f SAs
Ipnt3I
I as well as PPD
Members als` unanim` usly c` ncurred

inint inrc1vr

Officer
that the use ` r aea` .iy r` rce by these law enf` rcement ` fficers
was justified and in c` mpliance with the current deadly f` rce
p` licy.
This resulted in the rec` mmendati` n that n`
.

administrative acti` n be taken against any` ne inv` lved in this
sh` ` ting incident
-

The first issue discussed by the SIRG pertained t` the
absence ` f a written arrest plan in this incident. H` wever, al].
members c` ncurred that the absence ` f a th` r` ugh written arrès
plan was a n` n-issue due t` the fluid m` vements ` f the situati` n.
‘-r issue discussed by the SIRG was the fact
that SAl
dvised in his written statement that he
knew he fired at least seven r` unds due t` c` unting seven shell
casings ` n the gr` und. SA I
rurther advised that he. was
n` t certain if the magazine in his weap` n had been l` aded with 25

` r 30 r` unds because an` ther agent l` aded the weap` n f` r him.

Members ` f the SIRG unanim` usly c` ncurred that, all SAs sh` uld
4

Savage- 1672

6

 :

.r*

•,.

TO:
Re;

.

Inspection Divisi
on From:
Inspection Divisi
297-HQ-Al271898-D
on
, 03/04/1999
always know basic
their possession information such as the amount of
during any situat
ion. This issue ammunition in.
in any recommend
ati
representative ad on since the Firearms Training did not result
vised that his un
nit
it would handle U
this matter.
*

*

SetLeadi:
*

INSPECTION DIVIST
Qi

AT WASH!NGTOL D.
C,.
Thit nri djinistr
ative action be
SAS(
takji against
Jand[
thear i.nvo.wemea
j as a result of
.n this shooting
incidnt.
-

*
-

*

a

-

-

—

I
—

•**

*

*
-

-

£
*

Savage- 1673W

*

 ___________
__________

(12I31JI93)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

Thomas Lusby

Inspection Dvision
Contact: I

Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

1n1837

Lusbv Thoma

L

J lrr
b7

297HQ-A127l895-D

ADMINISTRATIVE ILQUXRY
SHOOTD1G XNCIDEMT
9/1/98
PRILDELPHIA DIVISION

Synopsis: The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a
shooting incident that, occurred in the Philadelphia Division on
9/1/98.
Agents shot and wounded two subjects involved in a
planned armored car robbery.
Members of the ‘Shooting Incident
Review Group (SIRG) recommended that, no administrative action be
taken against any Agents involved in this incident.
Details:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Michael E. Varnum, dated 11/6/98.
This communication is prepared to furnish the’analysis,

1 and recommendations of the SXRG wit1 reference to the
comments
captioned shooting.

Mr.j
IRm. 7142
I Rm. 7fl6
Mr.I
Mr. Marguise, Room 5155)
(3.
2
Mr. Foran, Room 646
Mr. I
(1
j Room 6313)
Fom 7427’
2 Mr.I
Ms. I
j. Room 7326)
(1
1
Mr. Lusby, Room 825
3.
Mr.j
I, Room 7837
hg]QJ
3.
Mr.I
I USpOJ
2
Ms
(1-Mr.I
I
3.

2

-

-

-

1

1- Mn
1- Mn
Mr.
Mr.

I

-

-

-

-

Savage- 1674

Quantico
IWO
oom 4147
Room 3787F
Room 7861 b7
b

 _________________

_________
________

q

k

-

-

To:
Re:

-

--

— —

tnspection Division From: Xnspection Division
297-HQ-A1271895-D, 05/25/1999

-

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

I

On. 2/12/97, Camden County Park Police Officer
was shot while in his patrol vehicle as he responded to
the sound of gunfire on Fremont Stret in Camden, New Jersey. A
land
subsequent investigation_determined that I
I
I shot Officerl
I as they fled from the scene of the
attempted robbery and murder of Carlos Rosario. Both subjects
b6
were indicted by a Camden County Grand Jury andi
I was
subsequently arrested by county authorities. e admitted to
being present at the scene when Officerl
twas shot by
I
I An Unlawful. Flight to. Avoid Pxoseoution
warrant was obtained in the District of New Jersey. and an
I who
investigation was initiated to locate and arresti
was profiled twice on “America’s Most Wantd”.

I

j

-

prom 7/19/97 to 5/23/98, the South Jersey Resident
Agency (SJRA) initiated several investigations relating to a
series of armed bank robberies committed in New Jersey. The
suspects in th bank robberies were believed to be Hispanic and
wore ski masks, gloves, and what appeared to be bulletproof vests
during the_robberies. They also carried automatic assault type
I were
land I
weapons. I
I and I
identified as the primary suspecti in one bank robbery and it was
believed that they wre also responsible for the two other
robberies.
I

1

A review of the NeW Jeçsev Crimipal History records for
I reflected numerous
I andl
arrests and charges relating to homicide, aggravated assault,
possession of fieartqc nd -‘jg possession and distribution.
I were convicted in separate felony
landl
homicide matters and I
I had been convicted for
carrying a prohibited weapon and possession of a weapon, as well
as having numerous aggravated assault and homicide arrests.
I anal

2

Savage-1675

,

b6

 ToIàsctionDivisionFrom:IhspectionDivision
1 05/25/1999
297-HQ-A1271895-D
Re:

—-—

-

—

I
h7c
b7D

u

y au oma ic s ou

armor.

er weapons,

he had access to several
inc uding an AK-47 and body
1

On ftI25/8.

SAl

ldrafted an ooerations plan to

I andi
arresti
I andl
I The plan
detailed the utilization of a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
However, on the morning oft’

Team to.effect_th apprehension.

8/27/981

postponed byl

I

ladvised SAl

that. the robbery had been

I

L Based on this information, SAl
revised his operations plan and coordinated with the
participating entities to effect the arrest.

1
7C

b7D

I,

Within moments, SWAT Team Leaden

gave the

command to arrest th subjects. The tow truck and pickup truck
being utilized as blocking vehicles by the SWAT as well as a cube

van containing a SWAT arrest team began their approach to block

the subject vehicle and effect the arrest. The subjects, who had
become suspicious of the lack of activity in the rest area
parking lot, and lack of traffic on th New Jersey Turnpike,

3
Savage-1676

 ________land’
_______lexited
__________lwho

To:
Re:

3-

-

-

--

-

—

--:

-

—,

——

Inspection Division From: Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271895-D, 05/25/1999

observed the vehicles moving toward them and again ordered
to move. As the subject vehicle began Co accelerate south along
the front of the rest area, the cube vn qwrvd tç’ the left to
block its exit.
Simultaneously, SAl
Iwho was
driving north in the SWAT pickup passed the cube van and struck
the subject vehicle-on the left side and drove it upo the
sidewalk of the rest area.
As the co1liion occqvrr
Special Aqerit
land___________
(SSA
I and SA
the cube van. The subject vehicle passed the var
at that time and all three SWAT members reported seeing a rifle
being raised by one of the subjects in the rear of the vehicle.
Each of the SWAT members fired once at the subjects inside the
vehicle and the vehiqie moved away from them.
The subject vehicle accelerated and continid ‘it on
the sidewalk in front of the rest area building. Asl
trove
the vehicle off of the sidewalk, it was momentarily traveling at
a hicth rate of speed drect1v at anothr SWAT vehicle occupied by
SAsI
land I
I Both SAs had taken a
position at a small parking island which was located adjacent to
the southern er nf t-h -rest area building As the vehicle sped
Ireporeed that he heard someone yel]. “gun”.
toWard_them, SN
frecafled seeing a gun in the rear of the subject
SAj
vehicJ.e.
Seeing the speeding vehicle moving in their direction
and the weapon observed in the back seat, the agents fired their
I reç’-l 1
SAl
firing twice before
weapons at the subj ects
his 10 millimeter pistol jammed and SAl
ladvised that he
fired approximately three two-round bursts from his NP-S at the
subject seated in the rear on the. drivers side.
-

The subject vehicle slowed when reaching a curve at the
south end of the rest: area building in order to make the corner
leading to the rear employee parking lot. At that moment, the
suJ?iect_vehicLe was struck by th SWAT tow truck driven by
SAl
I The tow truck hit the vehicle on the right rear
side and drove over the trunk of the car, crushing the left
cuarter oajiel, completely disabling the subject vehicle. I
I
was in th front passenger seat exited the vehicle
and ran to th de entrance of the rest area building. SAs
j reached the entrance
iadvised that asl
they obsexyd him reaiina or a weapon oistered on his right
I andi
side. SAsI
If ired their weapons hitting p
in his right hip causing him to fall to the ground.

4-

Savage- 1677

I

]b7c

 To:
Re:

297-HQ-A1271895-D, 05/25/1999

As the subject vehicle came to a halt due to the
I observed a•
collision with the tow truck, SWAT Team Leaderj
subject in the back seat holding a weapon.
SAl
If ired one
at the passenger. At this point,
shot from his M-4 carjne
I
Isurrendered without further
landi
incident.
-‘

I
As a result of the shots fired,L
I
sustained a graze wound to his left thigh andi
received two wounds to his right hip. Both subjects were treated
at local hospitals and released.

I

On 1/6/99, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
I Inspection
shooting incident. Chief Inspectorl
Division, chaired the meetia with the fqlowing voting members
of the SIRG in attendance: I
I Deputy Section Chief,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USD03;
Section, Criminal
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
D,1,vision, USLK3J;(
I Unit Chief. TransfLer Unit,
Administrative Services Division; SSA
I Legal
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Oftice or tne enera.L Counsel;
ichard A. Marquise, Section Chif. 0Derationl Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
J Unit Chief,
I
Firearmq Training Unit, Training Division (TD) A
I Unit Chief, NS-2D Unit, Global Section NS-2, National
Security Division;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Tool pvk TTni1. 5jentific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
and,’I
I Supervisor, Washington Field Office. Th
only non-voting member present wasi
I Inspection
Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRG
The SXRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;, (2)
provide the. Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for adn4nistrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force in this shooting .ncident by all law enforcement
personnel was justified and in conformance with the current
This decision was based on the subjects’
deadly force policy.
proven propensity for violence and the fact, that they were armed.
5

Savage- 1678

 __________________________________________

1

To:

Re:

—

—

_.d—

—

Inspection DivisiOn
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271895-D, 05/25/1999

This discussion resulted in the recommendation that no
administrative action be taken against any law enforcement
personnel involved in this shooting incident.
The second issue discussed by SIRG members evolved
Areas of cozIcern to
around the profoundly flawed arrest plan.
members were the choice of locat3,on.. coitainment of the subjects,
field of fire, and the fact that I
[,as in the car and no
consideration was given to third parties involved in this
Members discussed the fact that the subjects could
incident.
have been alerted to the situation earlier due to the lack of
activity at the rest stop, the types of vehicles located in the
area and the absence of turnpike traffic.

Set Lead

1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON

[

1

SSAI

incident.

D.

That no administrative actnn
las well as SAs

h 1kn ciaint

I

land
las a result of their involvement in this shooting

6
Savage- 1679

 •

(1213111993)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

To:

Date:

ROUTINE

Precedence:

Inspection Division

From:

Inspection
Contact:

Approved By:

I

Title:

I

Extension 1837

Lusby Thoma”

Drafted By: I
Case ID #:

Thomas Lusby

Attu:

I

03/15/1999

jlrr
297-HQ-A1271747-D
IL 6
D7C

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/6/98
MEMPHIS DIVISION

Synopsis:
The Shooting Incident Review Group CS!RG) reviewed a
shooting incident in the Memphis Division on 11/6/98, where one
subject was killed and another wounded during an attempted bank
robbery.
Believing that his life and the lives of ot’
participants in the incident could be jeopardized, SAl_________
I fired shots at the driver of the vehicle.
Members o
the SIRG rcniunn1d that no administrative action be taken
against SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
Details:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
William C. Temple dated 11/30/98

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with reference to the
captioned shooting.
1
2

-

Mr.
km. 7142
Mr.
IRm. 7116
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
(1
Mr. Poran, Room 6646
Mr[
(2.
Uoom 6313)
Mr.I
‘‘-jom 7427
(1
Ms.]
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr4
I Room 7837
-

2

-

-

2

-

1
Mr.
1-Mr.
I.
Mr.
Mr.
1
-

-

-

1

-

Mral

-

2.
1

1

2

-

-

Mr.L
Ms.1
(1

Mr.l

DOJ
I USDOJ

I

Savage- 1680

j,

Quantico

7FO
L Room 4147
IROOm 3787?
IRoom 786IL6

 4

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
Inspection Division
297-HQ-A1271747-D, 03/15/1999
Details of the Shooting Incident

During the month of March 1998, a series of bank
robberies began to occur in the Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee,
areas. By 9/98, it became apparent to the Nashville Violent
Crimes Task Force (VCTF) that the robberies were being
perpetrated by the same individuals since the bank robberies
involved similar methods of operation. Prior to 9/98, six banks
in the Memphis area and two banks in Nashville had been robbed.
Each robbery involved two black males driving to the banka,
usually in a vehicle which was stolen within 24 hours prior to
the robberies. The subjects wore ski masks and flannel shirts
and were armed with handguns. One subject entered the banks and
the other acted as the getaway driver.
The Nashville VCTF decided to initiate fixed
surveillances at two area banks, both of which were located near
the SunTrust Bank. The SunTrust Bank had been robbed in July and
August. A surveillance/arrest plan was prepared prior to the
operation and the surveillances were conducted over several days
in late September and then discontinued. On 10/15/98, the
SunTrust Bank was robbed again. During two of the three
robberies, the subject fired shots into the ceiling and briefly
took a bank guard hostage during the October robbery.
Additionally, on some occasions the subjects assaulted employees
and customers.
Due to the continuing pattern of robberies and the
escalating violence during the incidents, the Nashville and
Memphis VCTFa began another series of surveillances on 10/19/98.
These surveillances involved officers from the Nashville
Metropolitan Police Department (NNPD) as well as members of the
VCTF.
On 11/6/98, a nrning briefing was held at the Pep Boys
parking lot, located in the general area in which the
surveillances were to take nlce. The briefing was led by Task
Force Officerl
I who provided pertinent information
and made assignments for the surveillances. It was noted during
the briefing that on the previous day an NMPD Officer was working
at NationsBank as a security guard which was located in the
general area.
The officer reported seeing two suspicious black
males drive through the parking lot in a gold automobile.
The
briefing ended at approximately 8 45 a. m., and team members were
dispatched to their respective locations. The surveillance was
scheduled to terminate at approximately 11:00 a .m., since the
previous robberies occurred before this time.
2

Savage- 1681

kic

 ________

4

To:
Re:

I

I

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271747-D, 03/15/1999

Eleven law enforcement officers participated in the
surveillances. Two of the participants were FBI Agents not
assigned to the VCTF. One of the banks under surveillance was
the NationsBank who had reportedly nhrired t:h :ird
individuals the previous day. sAsi
I
ndl
Vere ii a Bureau vehicle iocate in a parking Ió east
Iwas driving the car and each of them
or tne tank. SAl
were equipped with a bullet Droof vest, a handgun and an MP-5
I who was armed with 7(
submachine gun. Detective I
a .40 caliber Glock pistol, was in his NMPD car in the parking
lot near the FBI vehicle. Additional armed law enforcement
personnel were also in the nearby vicinity. Additionally, an
armed, off-duty NMPD officer was working as a security officer
inside the bank. The officer was aware of the series of
robberies in Memphis and Nashville and was also aware of tlie
surveillance outside the bank.
At approximately 10:00 a.m., members of the NationsBank
surveillance team observed a blue Oldsmobile with a broken rear
vent window pull into the bank parking lot and pass between the
bank and the FBI vehicle located to the east. A check of the
license plates revealed that the vehicle was stolen. Team
members had been briefed on this specific vehicle earlier in the
morning.
Officers determined that the driver of the vehicle was
a black male.
The driver of the car drove through an adjacent
parking lot and eventually reentered the bank parking lot from
Charlotte Avenue. The vehicle stopped directly in front of the
bank and faced toward the front door. A black male wearing a ski
mask and flannel shirt was observed e4tina the assenger door of
the car and running into the bank. SAl
land Detective
I noticed that the individual enteringthe bank,
subsequently identified as Ravmonçl Augustine Hawkins, was
I and Detectivi
SAl
carrying a handgun.
I
notified the other units in the area that a bank robbery was in

progress.

I

I who was the security guard ineide the
Off iced
bank, saw Hawkins run into the bank through the front door and
observed him with a gun in his left hand. As he was moving away
from a desk to confront the subject, he tritoed an1 fell on his
back facing the front door. While Of ficezi
Iwas still on
the floor, Hawkins grabbed the front of his shirt._].aced the gun
I who drew
to his chest/shoulder area, and fired. Officerl
his weapon as he was falling, shot Hawkins three times in the
chest area.
The subject ran toward the front door. Officer
I, thinking that the subject might reach the parking lot
and hurt someone else, fired another shot at the subject.
3

Savage- 1682

 _________land

4

To:
1e:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271747-D, 03/15/1999

I

Hawkins continued to run out of the bank arid s.i
observed him collapse on the walkway leading to the front door.
When Hawkins collapsed in front of the bank, Detective
l
I who had heard the gunshots and taken cover behind a
light poi.e, turned his attention toward the driver of the car.
I
1
As the car was backing away from the bank, Detective
left his position of cover and moved toward the vehicle, shouting
The driver
“police, police, freeze, show me your hands, police”.
continued to back up, ducked down in his seat and raised up.
Based on his knowledge of shots being fired inside the bank and
the fact that previ9u robberis had a history of escalating
violence, Detective I
Ibelieved that the driver had a
weapon and was going to shoot him. He fired one round through
fh
-4tri-’ I.riw
w at the subject, who was later identified as
1
I
I After the shot was fired by Detective
Ithe vehicle was moving forward toward a McDonald’s.
I
Jagain shouted “police” but instead of
Detective
pucrK’d back down inside the vehicle.
Detective
stopping,)
irired several more shots into the car while noticing
I
an FBI car behind I
frehicle and heard one of the SAs fire a
shot.
Based on these events, sil
Ihad moved into a
position_directly behind the subject’s car.
SAl
I
observed
I”twisting in the seat” and felt he was doing
something “out of the ordinary”. He heard gunfire and knew that
I was shooting at the driver. He also thought
Detective I
that the subject was shooting at the detective. Realizing that
Ihad no cover and was totally exposed to the
Detectivd
I
driver, and with both cars continuing to move, SAl
opened the passenger door and placed his MP—5 submachine gun
between the door post and the door. He fired a two-shot burst
from his MP-5 at thesubject through the reatw1ndrw cf the
su1eet’s vehicle.
a car stoed and 54
Isaw
securirij
Detective I
I No weapon.
was found on the subject or in his vehicle. At that time,
Iran to the first subject who had xited the ank and
Sal
S?4
was lying face down with a gun in his hand.
Ipushed
the gun away and handcuffed Hawkins.
Iwas hospitalized with one gunshot wound
Officerl
Iwas also hospitalized with a gunshot
to the shoulder. I
wound to the face. Hawkins was pronounced dead at the scene of
the attempted bank robbery.

4

Savage- 1683

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271747-D, 03/15/1999

On 1/6/99, the SIRG met tq d tiss th abqve captioned
I Inspection
shooting incident. Chief Inspector I
Division, chaired the meeting with the following voting members
IDeputy Section Chief,
of the SIRG in attendance:l
Terrcrim and yiolent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section, Criminal
I
‘ Unit Chief, Transfer Unit,
Division, USDOJ;’
I Legal
Administrative Services Division; SSAI
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Richard A. Marquise, Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
I Unit Chief,
Criminal Investigative Divisioni
I
Fireartnp Training Unit, Training Division (TD); I
I
N-2fl
TTniI.
(lqal
National.
NS-2,
Section
Unit
Chiel
j
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Security Division;I
Toolmarks Unit. Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
The
I Supervisor, Wahincitc,n Field Of fipe.
and,I
I Inspection
only non-voting member present wasi
na1yst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Observations and Recoxmnendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
bias
deadly force in this shooting incident by SN
justified and in conformance with the current deadly force
hJ
t no
4
policy. This discussion resulted in the TecoTrnendation th
I as a
administrative action be taken against SAl
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
The only other issue discussed by the SIRG members
evolved around the fact that a lack of coordination and
communication between the Nashville VCTF and Memphis Division
Executive Management (EM) existed. Specifically, this lack of
communication resulted in the formulation of an inadequate arrest
plan. Although the Special Agent in charge (SAC) and the ASAC
knew of the Memphis and Nashville bank robberies and were
specifically aware of surveillances being conducted in Memphis,
neither knew of the Nashville surveillances which began in
October 1998. According to the SAC, he knew nothing of the
S

Savage-1684

 ‘1

To:
Re:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division I?rom:
297-HQ-A1271747-D, 03/15/1999

surveillances in Nashville until he was informed by another
Supervisory Special Agent of the shooting incident. SAC Locke
advised that the Memphis Division has a policy which requires an
operational plan when a high probability of danger exists in an
upcoming arrest or search. He also advised that, subsequent to
the shooting incident, be reviewed the 10/15/98 Nashville arrest
plan and emphasized that he never would have approved the plan
due to its lack of detail.

1 advised that he
Acting SSRA (A/SSRA)I
assumed supervisory responsibility of the Nashville R on
10/5/98, and assumed that the former SSRA had discussed the
arrest plan formed in September with EM. Based on this
assumption, he did not believe it necessary to send the October
plan which he viewçd as a
Fi update to the plan fortnulate4 in
1
I alec, advised that former SSRAI
September. A/SSRAI
I
approved the September plan and advised him that he woi.u.a. speai
“ 4
-’-e SAC and/or the ASAC about it. Additionally, A/SSRA
btated that he occasionally briefed ASAC Robert M. Burnham
6
about the bank robbery surveillances in Nashville and recalled
b7C
that he mentioned the surveillances at a 10/6/98, supervisor’s
Since no
conference in the presence of the SAC and the ASAC.
comments were forthcoming during the meeting, he assumed that he
1
had approval. During an October management retreat
lagain spoke with ASAC Burnham about the
A/SSRA.I
surveillances and the ASAC advised him to coordinate with the
Memphis SWAT team leader since SWAT members were being used in
the Memphis suxvèillànces.
‘•

I

-

The discussion was concluded with the unanimous
agreement that the arrest plan for the Nashville incident was
inadequate and that a lack of communication existed between the
participants and the EM of the Memphis Division. However,
members also opined that the SAC of the Memphis Division
recognized the problem and had taken steps to ensure that this
type of incident does not recur in the future.

6

Savage- 1685

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division
Inspection Division From:
297-HQ-A1271747-D, 03/15/1999

LEAD(S):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, 0. C.
That no a&pinistrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this
SAl
shooting incident.

7

Savage- 1686

 p

PD.204 (Roy. 124-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report of:

CaselD#:

lip

I

June

‘,

iii

I

.ynoPsis:

Las Vegas

66-19157-38
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPOPT OF SEOOTING INCIDENT
PHOENIX DIVISION
MAY 19, 1997

Chyrcter:

Office:

-

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
On 5/19/97, FBI agents and officers from the
Phoenix Police Department (PPD) ana the Arizona Depar1.ment
of Public Safety (DPS) who were assigned to the Phpenix
Fugitive Task ‘orce (FTF) shot and killed Todd William
Staskal while they were attempting to effect his arrest on
Federal Bank Robbery charcres. Staskal had been charged
along with an accomplice,
frith the
violation of 18 U.S.C., Section 2113 (a) and 924 (c) in
connection with the 4/18/97 robbery of the Bank of
America, 5065 East Elliot Road, Phoenix, Arizona.!
was captured following the 4/18/97 robbery. Staskal, who I
escaped, was believed to have committed three robe
s ot
4/19/97 and thought to be involved in as many as twelve
bank robberies in the Phoenix area.
-.

While Staskal was attempting to elude
authorities afte
h 4/18/97 ropbery, he kidnapped one of
his girl friends,
I She later told the
Phoenix case agent,!
Ithat Staskal told her
that he was iot arirjg back to p4son and t’ould not be
taken alive.!
a1so told SAl
!that Staskal was
aried with a 9 mm pistol. During the robberies of 4/19/97
bank surveillance photos reflect that Staskal did display
a weapon.
Following the three robberies on 4/19/97,
Staskal was believed to have left the Phoenix area.
SAl
bought the assistance of the
Fugitive Task force to assist him in locating and
This docuient contains neither recceinendations nor concWsions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI arxl is Loaned to
your agency; it and its contents arc not to be distributed outside your
agency.

 66-19157-38

apprehending Staskal.
On 5/16/97, one of the FTP members,
Phoenix Police Officer i
i
tnformation that
the fifteen-year-old daughter
I who is identified
as Staskal’s wife or ir1 friend, was back in the Phoenix area.
Subsequently,I
dvised that Staskal had called her
and her Caller 1.0. indicated the call originated locally.

I

flff4erI

[locatedL

Idaughter,

Iwho told him that Staskal was in the area and
gave him addesses where Staskal might be staying.
jalso
I
toldj
Ithat Staskal was always armed and that he carried a
weapon in a fanny pack and pnthr be)aind his back. This
information was confirmed byl
jboyfriend who also advised

that Staskal had said be would not be taken alive. Staskal had
said that he would either force the tolice to kill him or kill
himself rather than be captured.I
Ias also told that
Staskal was attempting to obtain an automatic weapon and had
discussed the possibility of attempting to break his accomplice,
:jail.

of

On 5/19/97, while spot checking one of the residences,

FT? members observed a stolen white Mercury Sable that Staska].
was supposedly driving. Shortly after the Sable was observed, an
individual fitting Staskal’s description came out of t1’e
residence and got into the vehicJ.e.
It was observed, that the
individual was wearing a fanny pack. This information was
provided via radio comtaunication
the other task force members.

to

A moving surveillance was instituted during which
several task force
were able to get a clear look at the
driver of the white Sable and confirm that it was, in fact,

members

Staskal.

As the surveillance proceeded, Staskal turned into the
parking lot of
shopping center at 75th Avenue and Bell Road in
Glendale, a suburb of Phoenix. Several
the FTP members later
commented that they believed that Staskal was looking for a bank
to rob.

a

of

When Staskal exited the shopping center parking lot, he
turned east on Ben Road heading toward downtown Phoenix
At
that time, a decision was made to effect a non-compliant felony
car stop which the FTP members referred to as a “street ‘ump.”
It should be noted that all FTP members interviewed advised that
they trained extensively on this type of car stop.
•

.

factors

to

Several,
led to the decision
effect the çar
stop at that particular time. First, it was apparent to the FTP

2

 6619167-38

members that Staskal was armed since
he was observed wearing a
fanny pack that the intelligence desc
ribed as always containing a
weapon.
Second the FTF members believed that Staskal
1
was
looking for a bank to rob. Third, he
made an eastbound turn
which was toward downtown Phoenix which
was an even more
populated area than they were in. Four
tb, at the time the
decision was made, all che FTP vehicles
were in the immediate
Vicinity and configured in a way so that
Staskal’s vehicle was
nearly surrounded.
Finally, the risk of the surveillance being
detected increased as it continued which would
allow Staskal to
prepare for a violent confrontation that
the intelligence
predicted.

•

Near the intersection of 67th Avenue and Bell Road,
Stska1’e vhc-!le and the FIT vehicles
were stopped a red light.
Phoenix P. 0.., the senior FTF member_on the
scene, gave the commazd to effec
e arrest. Lt.I
land
Phoenix P. D Officer I
had Staskal’s vehicle bloced
at the passenger side, Arizona DPS Off icer(
Iwas
directly in front f askal’s vehicle and the
vehicles of FBI
agents I
I andi
were behind civilian
vehicles directly to the rear and to theI
left
Several of the FTF members exited their vehi of Staskal.
cles with guns drawn
and surrounded Staskai.s vehicle. All witn
esses interviewed, law
enforcement and civilian alike, reported seein
g clear markings
reflecting the law enforcement status of the
FTP members. All
witnesses close to the incident also state
d that they heard voice
commands to the effect, “Police, put your
hands up,” shouted
repeatedly.
This is consistent with the statements of the FTP
members who attempted to effect the arres
t of Staskal.
All of the FTF members surrounding Staskal’s vehi
cle
gave similar accounts of what transpired
next. All relae’c.that
Staskal raised his hands., then looked around
as if surveying the
situation.
Staskal then dropped his hands, placed hs vehi
cle in
reverse, rammed into the Toyota Land Crui
ser behind him and
lurched forward until he struck a pick
up truck traveling
westbound at the intersection of 67th Avenu
e and Bell Road. The
witnessing FTF members all stated that
at some point during this
brief sequence of events, Staskal’s hands
went out of view and it
appeared that he was reaching for the fanny
pack he was observed
wearing. The fanny pack was subseque
ntly determined to contain a
fully loaded Wyoming Arms 10 mm semi-automa
tic pistol.

•

FBI agents
IandI
Iwho had positioned
themselves at the driver’s side of Stas
kal’ vehicle near the
front door, fired 17 rounds between_them six
,
fromi
ig
Sauer Modal 226 and eleven from
Ismith and Wesson .40
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3

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caliber. Arizona DPS Officer I
Zlwho remained
positioned near the driver’s side door of his vehicle which
was
in front of 1
Staskal’s fired one round of rifle slug from a
Remiigton Model 870 shotgun. Staskal was struck by four
.40
caliber rounds in the left side of the chest and abdomen
and by
the rifle slug in the left thigh. He was pulled from
his vehicle
unconscious after the vehicle collided with the truck and
was
described by the off ices .at the scene as apparently dead.
Staskal was taken from the scene by paramedics to J.
C. Lincoln
Hospital where he was officially pronounced dead.
Officers from the Glendale P. 0. arrived at the scene
and conducted the immediate investigation under the directi
on of
Sgt.I_____________ Detectiv
Vas assigned the case.
A crime scene search was conducted and all pertinent evidence
was
secured.
Witnesses including non-FBI FTF members were
interviewed.
A check was conducted of all weapons carried by FTF
members to determine which weapons were fired. All weapons which
were fired were secured by the Glendale P. 0.

1

.

Phoenix SAC Bruce Gebhardt responded to the scene.
SSA
The Inspection
Division assembled and dispatched a Shooting Incident Review Team
under the direction of iiI
I of the Las Vegas
Division.

I notified FBIRQ of the incident.

4

 FD-204 (Rev. 33sg)

.

UNITED STATES DEPAITh4ENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Repoxtof;

lIP

Date:

June 17, 1997

FicIdorneeJj1j

E6-HQ-1915712

Bureatz Fit N:

.

I

Office:

a1tjmore

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
DALLAS DIVISION
MAY 22, 1997

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shooting incident was a result of a bank
robbery occurring at Fidelity Bank, 7215 Skiliman, Dallas,
Texas on May 22, 1997.
At approximately 3:13 p.m. on 5/22/1997,
a
white male suspect, approximately 40-SQ years old, S’lW’
6’, entered the Fidelity Bank, 7215 Skiliman, Dallas,
Texas.
The white male has been subsecpent1y identified as
DARRELL CLEO HOLMES.
HOLMES was dressed in business
attire, leading bank employees to believe he was a
commercial vendor making a late deposit. Therefore, they
buzzed HOLMES into the bank lobby. Once he entered the
bank, HOLMES positioned himself with his back to the bank
cameras and put on a hat and sunglasses. At 3:14 p.nv.,
HOLMES approached the victim teller and displayed a large
black frame pistpl. After demanding money, the teller
gave HOLMES $2,200.00, which included two electronic
tracking system (ETS) devices. At 3:14 p.m., HOLMES exited
the bank with the money and the activated tracking
devices.
Once the tracking devices were activated, the
signals were picked up by a DPD helicopter. DPD marked
units responded and followed HOLMES in the direction of
I635 westbound. Prior to entering onto 1-635, HOLMES
stopped and threw one tracking device into a dumpster.
At approximately 3:15 p.m., FBI Dallas was

This doeument contains neither reco møndations nor conclusiona of the Pat.
It is the property of the Pat and is loaned to
your agency it and its contents are not to be dstzThuted
outside your agency.

 6 -HQ-1915’1-12

telephonically advised of the Fidelity Bank robbery, includ
ing
the robber’s description, armed status and presence
of ETS
tracking devices.
Special Agents (SA) assicnied to the Violent
Crime CVC) squad responded. SA I
andI
Idetarted the office iii SAl
j
IFBI vehicle.
SA
I
land SAl
individually departed in
I
their assigned FBI vehicles.
All Dallas Division VC squad members have received
Joint training with DPD yith the ET tracking system
utilized in
area bank robberies.
SAl
us
the Dallas FBI division’s
bank robbery coordinator. SAl
IFBI vehicle is equipped
with an ETS receiver and he has received specialized
training in
its utilization.
The VC squad members’ vehicles are all equipped
with Dallas Police Department (DPD) radios.

si[
mvrrus bank robbery at the same
Iecalled
branch two weeks earlier. SA(
Istated he recalled the
previous robbery was conducted by a subject matching the
5/22/1997, robbery subject’s description. He specifically
recalled the first robber also being armed with a large-frame
black pistol.
All three FBI vehicles proceeded northbound on US Route
75 toward the Fidelity bank location. While in route, DPD radio
transmissions indicated that the ETS signal wa in the vicinity
of US Route 76 and Interstate 635 (1-635).
SAl
lETS
tracking receiver began picking up the signal. DPD units,
including a DPD helicopter, advised that the signal was westbound
on 1-635. All three FBI vehicles proceeded onto westbound 1-635
from US Route 75.

•

Based on the ETS signal, the initial DPJJ units and DPD
helicopter made the assessment that the ETS device was in
a
westbound vehicle that appeared to be a burgundy two-door Buick.
At this time, no law exforcement vehicles, including the
three
FBI vehicles, were operating emergency equipment (emergency
lights and sirens).
The initial DPD marked unit broadcast its
intenticn to commence a felony traffic stop on the Buick.
SA
that he was following a DPD unit in the High
Occupancy Vehicle lane and had activated his vehicle’s emergency
equipment.
At that time , the initial DPD officer announced, via
car radio, that the Buick was exiting 1-635 onto a one way
frontage road that paralleled the freeway. The frontage road
serves as an access to exiting vehicles and is a two-lane road
going one-way.
The exit was for Marsh Lane and Webbs Chapel
Road.
Several DPD units continued behind the Buick onto the
frontage road;
Those DPD units commenced a traffic stop and the

2

 4.

.

66-HQ-19j.57_12

Buick stopped on the frontage road.
The freeway is separated from the frontage road by a
grassy median, approximately 15 yards wide. The first DD unit
stopped directly behind the Buick, slightly offset, in a felony
traffic stop position. The second DPD unit stopped behind the
first. The third DPD unit had not exited onto the frontage road
and pulled onto the grassy median at a position that was toward
the rear of the Buick.
As the traffic stop was initiated, the
FBI vehicles pulled onto the shoulder of 1-635 parallel to the
frontage road.
Sal
istopped his vehicle on the shoulder
of 1-635, approximately 3/4 of a car length ahead of the Buick.
The second’BI vehicle driven by Sal
i stopped behind SA
vehicle parallel to, arid directly across the median b’L
trom the Buick. SA
I-iiled onto the grassy median at a
slight angle behind SA
‘vehicle, next to the third DPD
unit. The FBI vehicles were positioned in a line, across from
the Buick, facing the same direction, at a distance ranging from
25-35 yards.
As the FBI vehicles were stopping, the SAs observed a
white male, later identified as DARRELL CLEO HOLMES, exit the
Buick.
Simultaneously, the first DPD officer exited his vehicle
and took cover behind his vehicl&s door. The second DPD officer
had established herself at the right rear of the first DPID
vehicle with her weapon drawn. HOLMES displayed a black pistol
in his right hand, waving it around while gesturing with his left
hand.
There was a verbal exchange between HOLMES and the first
DPD officer. The DPD off icera heard HOLMES screaming, “I’m going
to kill you.”

SAsI
xited their vehicle, drawing
landi
their weapon. and tónk up positions of cover behind their
vehicle.
SAl
Istated he took a position of cover at the
rear of the driver’s side of the vehicle.
Sal
Istated she
assumed a position 9
f cove behind the open, right front
passenger door. sal
Istated he exited his vehicle, drew his
weapon and assumed a position çf cover at the rear of the
driver’s side of his vehicle. SAl
[tated he exited his
vehicle, drew his weapon, and assumed a position of cover at the
front of the driver’s side of his vehicle.
All FBI SAs stated that they were aware that shouting
took place between HOLMES and the DPD officers, but, due to the
numerous sirens and freeway traffic noise, the words were
unintelligible. All four FBI SAs were aware that HOLMES was
waving what appeared to be a black semi-automatic pistol, in his
right hand. HOLMES took several steps toward the first DPD
3

 .

EE-HQ-19157-12

vehicle and pointed the pistol at the tirst DPI)
officer, At this
point, the first DPI) officer ducked down behind
the door of his
vehicle. Each LA stated that from their individual
points of
view it appeared that the first DPI) officer had
been shot or gone
down.
Then, believing that the first DPI) officer had been shot,
the SAs and other DPI) officers began firing on HOLMES.
S1J
istated he believed he had observed a puff
of smoke come from the barrel of HOLMES’ weapon as HOLMES
pointed
After hearing SAT
land others fire, LA
‘stated he fired twice at HOLMES.

I

SAE

‘stated she believed she observed something

come off the baçrl oi HOLMES’ weapon at the same time
she heard
a gun shot.
LA I
I fearing for the DPI) officers in HOLMES

line of fire, shot twice at HOLMES. She stated that
it appeared
HOLMES was moving toward his vehicle for cover and
she fired once
more.
SAl
Istated that from his position of cover he saw
HOLMES thrust his pistol towar the DPI) officer. At the same
time, it appered to s2j
hat the first DPI) officer had
been hit. SAl
Istated be fired once at HOLMES. Upon
observing HOLMES go to a itna posit ion on the ground in the
doorway of his vehicle, SAl
ired two additional rounds,

I

fearing for the DPI) of fice±a.

I

I

SAI
stated that, upon exiting his vehicle, he
observed HOLMES point his pistol towar4 th frst DPI) officers
and it appeared the pistol jer3ed. SA
saw the first DPI)
officer appear to go down.
stated he feared fhis
own life and the lives of the responcing DPI) officer.
SIj
fired once at HOLMES.
It appeared to LA!
lthat
HOLM
mr1
toward his vehicle in an attempt to gain cover.
SA
jfired two more times at HOLMES.

After being f’ired upon, HOLMES lumped to the grouid
with his upper torso leaning onto the driver’s side floor
board.
DPI) officers cautiously approached HOLMES and determined
no
fuither threat existed. Once HOLMES was disabled, and the
approaching DPI) officers appeared tq be in co;trol, t
holstered their weapons and both SM
I and SAl
advised FBI Dallas of the shooting incident via their vehicle
radios.
Emergency aid was called for HOLMES. As HOLMES was
being secured, agents observed that the weapon being utilize
d by
HOLMES appeared to be a BE gun. The gun had been removed
from
HOLMES’ hand by a DPI) officer and placed on the pavem
ent.
It was
observed by the LAs that HOLMES experienced numerous wounds
to

I

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 66 -HQ -19157-12

his legs and buttocks area. He was bleeding
from these areas in
addition to his head.
His eyes were open and staring, with a
gray paleness to hs skin. A private ambulance
company arrived
shortly after the incident and began treatment on
HOLMES.
Following the arrival of a Dallas Fire Department
Paramedic unit,
HOLMES was transported to a close-by hospital where
he was
pronounced dead.

.

SAl
iretrieved evidence tape from his vehicle and
he and the other SAS marked the location of their
shell casings
for evidence.
The SAs seprfA hrn 1rand agreed not to
talk among themselves. ssAI
larrived and took
control of the scene and separated all of the SAs.
Acting SAC
JAMES F. ADAMS arrived and toook command of the scene
and ensred
the well-being of each SA, Wth th aitajice of gjI
Chief Division Counsel SSAI
I and ASAC HOWRD B.
I
I Acting SAC ADAMS coordinated the crime scene investigation
with DPD officials. on the scene. weapons were taken
from al]. of
the SAs by SSAJ
Following consultation between Acting SAC
J
ADAMS and DPD off icjils., the SA& pistols were provided
to DPD
investigators for forensics testing.
Administrative leave was
offered to each SA and replacement weapons were provided
by SA
I
I Dallas FBI Principal Firearms Instructor.
The crime
scene was handled jointly by the FBI Dallas Evidence Response
Team and the DPD Physical Evidence Section.

 ____

FD.204 (Rev. 3-59)

I

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bareau of Investigation

I
I

lIP I
April 10,

Reportof
Date:

I
1997

o1c

FBIHQ

Field Office File N:

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R

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ThireauFjle#:

66-HQ-1915767
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
SACRNENTO FIELD OFFICE
JUARY 29, 1997

TWe:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Character;

Synopsis:

This shooting incident was precipitated as a resul of
t
a fugitive investigation to locate PETER SCOT
T RICHARDS, who was
charged with armed robbery in an indictment
issued on November 7,
1996, by the state of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawai
i.

On January 28, 1997, Honolulu Police Department (HPD)
contacted the South Lake Tahoe Police Department
(SLTPD) and
requested SLTPD’S assistance in locating and appreh
ending
RICHARDS who was believed to be in South Lake
Tahoe, California.
The H?D advised that if located, they would
extradite RICHARDS.
On January 28., 1997, at approximaelv 5t30 o.m.
off icers located RICHARDS, his gi4 friendi
I and their four children ati
[South
Lake

_____

I

___

Tahoe.

RICHARDS refused to surrenaer an barr1c

acLe_flimseif
and family in the residence. RICHARDS later
allowedi
land
the children to leave the residence and apparently
in the

confusion of the movement of his family, he escaped
undetected.

During the early mprning hours of January 29, 1997,
members of the SLTPD Special Enforcement Team entered
the
residence.
Although RICHARDS was not located, officers found
explosives, black powder, ammunition, military handbo
oks on
weapons and explosives, an SCS assault rifle,
axz Ml carbine
rifle, a Ruga-r carbine rifle, a sawed-off .22 calib
military daggers, bayonets, knives, radio receive er rifle,
r, gas mask,
loaded rifle magazines, black powder detona
tion cord, and other
military and survival equipment.
This dovument contains neither rcccrrendatio
nor conclusions o the FSZ, It is the property o the rat and
is loaned to
your agency; it and it contents are
not to be distributee cutsida your agency.

 _____

_____

_

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Shortly after noon on January 29, 1997, SAF
who was assigned as the sole Agent in the South Lake
Tahoe, California Resident Agency (SLTRA), received a telepho
ne
call from the SLTPD informing him of the fugitive investigation
.
He was requested to provide assistance in determining whethe
r
RICHARDS was involved with violation rf Wal law involv
ing
utilitia or terrorist activities.
Sal
Iresponded to the
SLTPD, viewed the seized evidence, and prepared to assist SLTPD
detectives in locating RICHARDS.

I

SAl
land several detectives were preparing to
depart the SLTPD to conduct interviews when they learned that
RIcHARDS’ stepfather had telephoned to inform the Police that
RICHARDS had teleohonçd his mother and given her instructions
to
meet him.
SA
homed four SLTPD detectives and
estb1ihe surveiJ.Iance along the main road in South Lake Tahoe.
SAt
I who wa aceomoanied in his Eureau Ford Bronco by
SLTPD Detective I
Ilearned that other SLTPD
detectives had locacea ciaiw Mother operating her Mazda
pick
up on the main r
ad in tcw. A surveillance of the vehicle was
9
established withi
n one vehicle. two SLTPD
bndl
detectives in a second vehicj.e ano. i.ii1’D Detective
I
in a third vehicle.
Each of these investigators observed a
passenger in the Mazda pick-up, but could not positively identif
y
the passenger as the subject. While continuing with a movin
g
surveillance, investigators felt they had been identified by the
occupants of the Mazda pick-up and a SLTPD investigator called
for a marked police unit to make a traffic stop.
Prior to the

arrival of the marked units, the Mazda pick-ut slowed to a stop
in the traffic lane of a two lane road.
SJ
)topped
behind the Mazda pick-up, he and Detectivel
Jexited the
Bureau vehicle, and began to approach the Mazda pick-up.
Upon
observing a struggle and hearing loud voices from the Mazda
pick
up, they retreated tq I-hp -ryer of the bureau vehicle
. Detective
Ithen joined Sal
I
land Detective
RICHARDS
suddenly exited the passenger side o
a pic -up and
pointed a .25 caliber pistol towards
andi_________
Investigation established that RICHARDS fired at least once,
striking the front drivers side window of
Sal
Ivehicle.
Seeing only RICHARDS’ head and the han whic1was noitna
the .25
caliber pistol pointed towards him anc4
ired
If
four rounds from his MP-5 rifle. One of SAl
lrtmupds
fatally struck RICHARDS in the head. Detectivel
If ied
nine rounds from his .45 caliber pistol and Detectiv
two rounds from his .45 caliber pistol. RICHARDS, who was If ired
wearing a protective vest, was shot five times including;
#1 head
wound (9mm); #2 left forearm (no bullet recovered);
#3 right
buttock (.45 caliber); #4 right buttock (.45 Caliber); and
#5
right calf (no bullet recovered).
2

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A physical examination of RICHARDS after the shooting
resulted in the location of a .22 caliber pistol and four
loaded
magazines in his pants pocket, in addition to the .25
caliber
pistol he held.
RICHARDS was wearing a protective vest and there
was evidence that one bullet was stopped by the protect
ive vest.
A search of the Mazda pick-up revealed a spent.25
caliber casing on the window of the Mazda (laboratory
confirmed
this casing was fired by RICHARD’S .25 pistol), a 12
gauge
shotgun loaded with five rounds and 11 rounds on the
gun strap, a
fully loaded and charged SKS 7.62 X39 assault rifle, and
additional ammunition for those weapons.
Subsequent investigation established that RICHARDS, who
was suffering_from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS),
had toldi
land his mother that he was going to die and that
he would take a police officer with him. RICHARDS’
mother
confirmed that on January 29, 1997, while driving with
RICHARDS,
they observed SAl
land the SLTPD Detectives and that
RICHARDS knew they were law enforcement. Knowing that
RICHARDS
was going to create an armed confrontation, she chose
a place to
stop which would not endanger innocent third parties.
Prior to
RICHARDS exiting the Mazda pick-up his mother struggled
with him
in an attempt to keep him from exiting with the pistol.
He told
her ‘I’rn dead, I won’t go to jail,” prior to exiting
.
SA’
‘was armed with his Bureau approved
personally owned Sig Sauer, Model 226, 9mm pistol and a Bureau
issued Heckler and Koch (H&K) MP-5 (9mm) single fire shOuld
er
weapon and was wearing his Bureau issued protective vest.
SA
p
P fired four rounds from the H&K MP-5.
He used Bureau
issued Hydro-Shock ammunition and the weapon functio
ned properly.
Subsequent to the shooting, SA I
Isurrendered both
weapons to SIJTPD Officers at their request. He qoke
by
telephone with his supervisor in Sacramento, SSAI
I
and advised him of the circumstance of the shooting. A
shooting
inquiry team comprised of investigators from the SLTPD,
the El
Dorado County District Attorney’s Office, and the El Dorado
County Sheriff’s Department responded to the scene.
Inves’’ were to take taped recorded statements
i-ectivesI
hndl
lw’ ‘‘estc3 t-h me from SA
After conferring with SSAI
Iconsented
I SAl
to tne interview.
He also allowed a blood sample to be taken for
blood/alcohol_content, (the laboratory results revealed no
alcohol
Jfl SA
I blood).
Fwrn

During he cours of thiq shooting investigation,
members of the SIRT and SAl
Ireviewed the typed transcript
of the statement he provided to local investigators.
A decision
was to be made by the FBI Shooting Incident Review
Team (SIRT)

 I,
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whether SAl
hould stand on his recorded statement,
incorporate it as part of a signed sworn statemept.. qr provide a
seoarat signed sworn statement. After both IIPL
land SA
Iconf erred with the SacamentoField Office’s Division
I
Counsel, SA I
I SAl
Ltated that his preference
was to provide a statement which chronicled the events in a more
logical sequence than which the transcript related.
S?1
I
stated that. the facts contained in his interview with local
investigators and in his signed statement were consistent.
Divisional Counsell
in concurrence with SAl
I

Iwas

preference.

On February 6, 1997
,rri- wrrant was issued by the
County of El florado, charging
Iwith being an
accessory in RICHARD’S fugitive scatus.
it as also determined
that she had outstanding arrest warrants being held by the El
Dorado Sheriff’s Department since 9/22/92 for Failure to Appear,
Battery, Resisting Arrest, and for refusing to leave land upon
lawful owner/agent’s request.
In a letter dated 3/20/97 and addressed to the Chief of
Police, SLTPD, the El Dorado County Sheriff’s Department, and the
El Dorado County District Attorney’s Office, the task force of
local investigators assigned to the shooting inquiry made the
following conclusions as a result of the inquiry:
“Based on the investigatj 1f 1 the opiniq ‘ lhe
Protocol Task ‘rn i-lat netectjvd
I Detectivel
land
Special Agent
Ifired their weapons at PETER SCOTT RICHARDS
JR., only after being fired upon and in defense of their lives.
It is our further opinion that the officers involved acted
without negligence and did not commit any crime as described in
the Penal Code for the state of California.”

I

 FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

TJITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 3USTJCE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

*

Report of:
Date:

January 21, 1997

Case ID #:

62A-ME-51032

Title:

SHQOTING INCIDENT,
SAl
ThNtThRY 2, 1997,
MEMPHIS DIVISION

Character:
Synopsis:

SSA-I

Office:

MEMPHIS

ICTIM;

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
rn-rrimjoteJ.y 12:55 p.m., on January 2, l997 BA
I and Task Force Officer (TFO) Sgt.I
HELBY
COUN’rY SHERIFF’ S OFFICE conducted a spot
j
checJ ati
I Memphis, Tennessee, as a result
of information provided by a Confidential Informant (ci)
that an individual living at this residence,l
I
I was a member of the Gangster Disciple street gang
and was dHng in stolen vehicles. When SN
and TFOI
I passed the I
Iaddress they
noticed a red:Volvo 940 Ti±rno in une ui.i.)eway.
A check
of the license on the Volvo witJi NCTC detertiined the
Vt-Hrr, was listed as stolen.
SlJ
land TFO
I1i-A iwvillance on the Volvo and contacted
SAJ____________________ who is the case agent on an on
going Group II UCO being worked jointly by the Memphis
Division_and Memphis Police Department Auto Theft Unit.
SAl
land members of the Group II UCO were aTrised of
M

the Volvo’s location and were en route toj

,-

During the time s’I
)and TFOI
rirst saw
the Volvo in the driveway and initiated surveillance on
the Volvo, approximately 20 minutes had passed due to a
computer problem in running the Volvo’s license plate and
obtaining a response that the vehicle was stolen.
Sometime during this 20 minute time frame a whit
Chevrolet Caprice had pulled into the driveway behind the

This doinnent contains neIther recoo,nendations nor conctusions of the FBI. It Is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 62A-ME-51032

I

Volvo and was 1ocatd int position when SA
[nitiated surveillance on the
land TFCI
stolen Volvo. Approximately 30 minutes after
surveillance was initiated and prior to arrival of the
Group II UCO personnel, SAL_
land TF1
I
observed two male blacks exit I
iwith one
individual getting in the Volvo and the other getting in
the Caprice.

When it became evident the two individuals were starting
es in preparation to leave I
1
th two vehicJ
SAl
Imoved his bureau vehicle immediately behind
the Caprice which would block its exit from the driveway
and also block the Volvo’s exit from the driveway. The
driver of the Volvo immediately exited that vehicle and
ran to the bac of the restnr fciIloed in close
pursuit by TFOI
I SA
Iwas out of his
bureau vehicle and identified himselt verbally to the
driver of the Caprice and had his Remington 870 shotgun
in1 hr3
T)ie driver of the Caprice failed to heed
SAl
Icommands and SA
Ithen moved
to a position adjacent to the driver side of the Caprice,
all the while identifying himself and commanding the
driver to exit the Caprice. The Caprice driver continued
to jockey the car forward and backw4rd in an attempt to
exit the location.
soon as the Caprice driver was
able to clear the back end of the Volvo, he rapidly
accelerated and made a sharp turn, which had the side of
the Caprice heading directly toward SAl
I
SA
I
If ired one round of double 00 buck at the
dvvr in ai attempt to keep the driver from striking SA
Iwith the vehicle. Immediately following SA
discharge of the shotgun, the direction of
the vehicle changed and the driver struck a utility pole
and then departed the area at a high rate of speed. No
evidence was obtained at the crime scene to indicate the
driver had been struck by any of the shotgun pellets.
Investigation subsequent to the shooting
attempted to identify the driver of the vehicle. The
individual to whom the license on the Caprice was
registered was contacted and stated that the license had
been on an old Caprice he had owned and had totaled in a
wreck. That particular Caprice had been forfeited to a
salvage yard since the owner could not afford to pay the
towing fee or repair the vehicle. çoct with the
salvage yard indicated that the vehicle had been turned
Over to a scrap yard and it was unknown if the license
2

 62A-ME-51032

plate was on the vehicle when it was transferred to the
scrap yard.
Contact with the scrap yard indicated that
the vehicle the license plate belonged to had been
crushed and sold for scrap. The scrap yard did not know
if the vehicle did nor did not have a license plate on it
when it was crushed.

Iwas

interviewed by
The owner o4
MPD off icezs concerning the identity of the two individuals who
had exited the house and attetnpted to leave in the Volvo and b6
Caprice. No information of value regarding the identity of
either individual was obtained.
-p
DETAILS:

3

 ________lot

_______Iwas

r
F02Q4 CRv. 12-1.95)

UNITED STATES DEPART1EENT OF JUSTICE
Federal 1ureau of Investigation

Copyto:

AD,

Reportcf
Date:

Febluary

INSU,

ROOM 7129, ATTN:

IIPI

SIRG;
Office:

FTU
Kansas City

ii,

66—19].57-23
66F-KC 77832

Casern#:

TiUe

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT,
KANSAS CITY DIVISION;
1/30/97;
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER
SHOOTING INQUIRY

Character

Synops

I

)
I

On 1/30/97, while conducting a reverse undercover
operation (RUO), an attempted narcotics sale between a
reliable Kansas City Diyision (KOD)l
I
and subject, Tn-rh
Riley,
resuitea in cne attempted homicide of I
Iby Riley nd
Rileys death from an SA involved shooting. At
approximately 5:53pm, Riley arrived ati
motel room
to supposedly conclude a narcotics purchase. Kansas City
SAs and local officers were in an adjacen
el room
ready to arrest Riley. Upon entering
1 room,
Riley immediately drew a revolver and s o
the
chest with, the bullet exiting his s1Qulder.
to the floor, whereupon Riley fired a second i
Ini4sing him.
Prior to this second shot, SA
the KCD arrest team had unlocked his in erior
door and natiated through two closed doors to gain ent
in ol
Iroom. After Riley’s second shot m±ssed,I____
began to get up causing Riley to move
and
.

attempt a third shot.

At this point, SAl

hallenged

the subject and fired four rounds from his .45 Sig Sauer
into Rilev’ upper torso.
Upon being hit by the first of
Irnirng, Riley fired his weapon a third time
SAl
striking I
superficial1y in the left hand.
The

i

entire episode lasted only eleven (11) seconds and was

captured on rC’Pv ‘rjdeotape. Riley was pronounced dead at
the scene.
transported to the hospital,
treated, discharged on 1/31/97, and is recovering from his
wounds.
Two other individuals, I
land
This dournnt contains rieither recoesnendations nor conclusions of the rat. tt is the property o(
the PB and is loaned to
your agency; it arid its contents are not to be distributed utaide your agency.

 _________Ihat
_________land

_________has
__________

.

____

.

66-191S7—23

I

I were arrested by officers of the Kansas
City, Missouri Police Department and FBI GAs.
been
charged by the state with felony murder while
has had
his federal parole revoked.
*

F-

DETAILS:
ib7D

PLANNINGW XCUTION
This operation emanated from information obtained by
Riley was attempting to sell forfeited assets of his
father and step-mother, in connection with an insurance fraud
conviction.
Riley had several consensually recorded
On 1/22/97,F
rVversat1ons between the period of 1/17-22/97.
Iwas confronted by Riley unexpectedly at a gas
I
Kansas City, and Riley advised that his contact had $100.000
invest in the purchase of cocaine. Riley requested that
find out from his guy in Chicago how much cocaine he could get
for $70,000.
Riley could not sell the previously discussed
bronze statue and grand piano at that time because he was under
subpoena to testjf at a Federal Grand Jury concerning the
forfeiture order issued on 1/6/97.

station in

to

I
I

As the topic of conversation changed from insurance
fraud to cocaine trafficking during the period of 1/22-30/97, the
KCD began the process of evaluating the feasibility and
desirability of utilizing the RUO which occurred on 1/30/97,
iry, ten (10) consensually
1
hrn
For the purposes of
monitored conversations between I
land Riley from 1/17-30/97
were reviewed,
They revealed no hostility between the two, and
nothing in the conversaciQn incated a likely violent act
occurring by Riley towardl
I Prior investigation of Riley }h7
h7D
bad determined he had the financial means to purchase a large
quantity of cocaine.

On 1/28/97, an EC was prepared by SAl
I
which outlined the background of the investigation, including a
synopsis of pertinent recorded conversations, and requested
approval to conduct a RUO against Riley. The scenario described
delivery of a measured amount of cocaine to Riley in a hotel
room.
Once this delivery was made, Riley would be arrested
immediately.
2

 .
E6-19157-23

I

This BC articulated the controlled actions which were
taken concerning the security of the cocaine and safety of
land all participants. An adjacent room in the hotel was
secured for th Agents and. police pFfinr tn
located.
This
plan was discussed with Supervisoil
LASAc JQsaph S.
Bross, and SAC David M. Tubbs in a meeting held on 1/28/97.
Several changes were made to enhance this operation, and an
arrest plan was drafted and approved on 1/30/97.
Qn 1/3.0/97, at approximately 10:00 a.m., a briefing was
held for all personnel involved in this operation.
During this
meeting, all personnel were given a copy of the arrest plan to
review, and the operation was orally discussed.
The division
articulated the dangers inherent in this operation, to include
that Riley was considered Armed and Dangerous, that charges were
pending against him for stabbing a bail bondsman, and he was
known to own two handguns.
All personnel were advised of their roles in the
operation, to include surveillance of Riley prior to arriving at
the hotel, outside arrest teams, if needed, and interior arrest
and evidence teams.
Specific assignments were given to agents
assigned to the arrest and evidence teams, to include the
installation and monitoring of the CCTV, which was installed to
record this IWO.
Assignments were again discussed at the hotel
prior to the RUC taking place.
Safety issues were thoroughly addressed for[
land
agent personnel, and all arrest team Agents were wearing
protective body armot. The security of the drugs invo1ed in
t.his RUO was also addressed through CCTV coverage. A separate
evidence team was assigned to the adjacent hotel room.. Adequate
lighting to observe the number of subjects was accomplished by
the hotel exterior lighting and twilight.
Management oversight and control was established and
maintained throughout the planning and execution of this
operation, through discussions with the SAC, ASAC, SSA’s, and
Case Agents.
The formulation, review, and approval of the arrest
plan by the ASAC on 1/28-30/97, and the presence of two SSA’s at
the scene of the RUO further established the division’s command
and control.

3

 _______Ihad

________On

r

.

.

66-19157-23

PA!I ION
1/22/7, Riley unexpectedly contacted1
Jto ask
Jou1d sell cocaine to a friend of his.I
Iwas the
Iof Riley and had a long social relationship with him.
I was aware that Riley was_invo’ved in a variety of criminal
activities, including drugs.
on numerous occasions
informed Riley that he had a guy in Chicago who could supply
cocaine.
Some of Riley’s known associates were’ significant drug’17:
traffickers in the Kansas City area.
if

I

Iwas

In the substantive fraud investigation
1
first utilized to obtain evidence ot
1’
other&
involvement in the insurance fraud. I
changed when
it became evident that Riley was interested in buying drugs. The
RUO was developed in response to Riley’s desire to traffic in
cocaine and in the belief that he might be cooperative if
confronted with a potential five kilo drug charge.

Ioie

During the period 1/17-30/97,1
Irecorded numerous
conversations_with Riley and negotiated the RUO with Riley.
On
1/30/97,1
poke telephonically, and met with Riley at Motel
6 earlier in the day to make the final arrangements for the RUO.
During the first meeting at the motel, a CCTV recording was
attempted, but the taçe malfunctioned. However, a voice recording
was obtained. I
land Riley searched each other& bodies for
weapons and the SAs at the scene observed no indication of Riley
taking the actions he t
ok in the subsequent meeting later that
9
evening.
Riley advisedi
Itbat he would return in
approximately 40 minutes, but after one hourj
IDaged Riley
and asked where he was.
Riley stated he would return by 5:00
hj did’ not arrive at that time, Riley was again
p.m. and
paged byl
land stated he would be there by 6:15 p.m. A
review ot trie consensual telephone recordings provided no hints
of Riley’s violepi inti,I-j, and in two of those conversations,-,,
,
1
Riley requested
o travel to his own home to deliver the
cocaine.
At 5:53 p.m., Riley arrivedat the irptei.
Th vidr
did successfully operate and recordel
I
lactions. I
allowed Riley to enter Room 231, they sriooc nands, and Riley drew
a gun and began to fire at
I (See still photos of 8mm video
Tab V 1-13).

4

 _______

.

..
66-19157-23

I
Lias taken to the north Kansas City Hospital and
treated for a gunshot wound.
It was determined that this gunshot
entered the left upper chest and exited the left shoulder.
He
was also slightly wounded in the left hand.
released
Iwas
I
from the hospital on 2/1/97.
CTEO

OF SAf]

sI

I
I

Prior to the shooting,
Iwas involved in the J
preplanning and preparation for the RUO and arrest of subject
D
Riley.
On the morning of the shooting, 1/30/97, at 10:00AM, SA
httendd
pre-operation briefing in the SAC’s conference
room.
SAl
gäs assigned as the arrest team leader and would
be positioned in the motel room adjoining the room occupied by
I During the briefing, all personnel were advised of the
arrest plan and their assignments.
At approximately 12:30PM, SAl
larrived at the
motel room where he, the other_BuAaepts and police officers were
to stage.
Subject Riley andj
tiad talke on the telephone
and made arrangements to meet about 3:00PM ml
I motel room
where the drug deal would be completed. I
had five kilos of
cocaine which the FBI furnished. This was iii his room to show to
subject Riley.
Prior to the 3:00PM_meçting and during their wait,
Officer
Jsimu1ated entry into
f and S21
I
room and discussed_tme plan at length wit1 him. When the arrest
was to occur, I
Iwas told to dive over the bed and get
against the wall whn hehçard the arrest team coming through the
door.
In the eventi
Jfelt threatened or had a problem, he
was told to call out, ‘Mickey Mbuse”, and throw his hat into the
air. I
Ias instructed that he was not to let anyone except
subject Riley into his room and that if more than one person came
to his room he was not to let them in.I
Iwas instructed to
go to the bathroom and get down and that an Agent would go in
with him for protection. Also during this time, SN
I
rehearsed opening the doors tot
Iroom and repeatedly
practiced turxj-h th locking knob from the locked to the open
poition.
S.I
and Off
discussed the plan for
entry into I
room; S
would be the first through
the doorway in the event of trouble or to affect the arrest of
subject Riley.

5

 0
66-19157-23

The Technically Trained Agents (TTAs) had Diaced a
concealed closed circuit television camera ml
Iroom with
a monitor in the Agents’ room.
It was checked repeatedly because
of an earlier malfunction during this investigation.
Onç of the
TTAs would be listening to the conversations ml
Iroom
through a headset and SAl
Iwould rely on listening for
audible sounds both through the wall and around the door frame.

The surveillance team provided all the involved
personnel with updates as to the subject’s location and shortly
before 3:00PM, the surveillance_tem reported that the subject
was arriving at the motel.
Iw.s told that the subject was
on his way to the room .nd SA
Jclose and lock
Ihadi
the adjoining door.
SAl
Ithen positioned himself in front
of this door inprearahon oi: making an entry if needed.
This
meeting between I
nd the subject lasted only nine minutes
and was without incident:. I
tcas debriefed and they
anticipated that the subject would return later in the afternoon
with the money for the cocaine.
Following this meeting, the surveillance team observed
the subject pick up two other white males and they went to
Applebee’s Restaurant near the motel. SAl
Ihad a heightened
sense of awareness now that subject Riley was not alone and it
was getting later in the day.
The subject and his two associates
left the restaurant and headed for the motel around 6:00PM in
Riley’s Lincoln Town Car.
The surveillance team advised that
subject Riley was the only one getting out of the car at the
motel and that he was carrying a bag.
It was interpreted as
possibly containing the money for the cocaine deal.
SAl_______
had told I
Inot to lock his door to the adjoining room uriti
he (sA[
I definitely told him how many subjects were coming.
SN
I knew that subject Riley had seen the five kilos of
cocaine in I
I room earlier that afternoon and that
was not armed.
After SAl
Ilearned tijat subject Riley was
approaching the room alone, he told I
Ito ‘button up’ meaning
to lock his door. I
jthen closed the door and tapped twice
to let SAL
[know the lock was on. SAl
jtook his
poition .t the door, which was the door to tne adjoining room.
SAl
Iheard a knock, some noise of movements inside the room
and then heard a gunshot. SAl
limmediately unlocked the
door and drew his weapon as he entered
troom. His first
observation was seeing subject Riley holding a gun in his right
hand and pointing it in the direction of movement which was
either on the bed or on the floor between the two beds. A haze
of something in the air further confirmed to SAl
I that a

6

 ______Ireceived

.

.

6—19157-23

weapon had just been fired. S?1
Iyelled, rfreeze)t but the
subject did ot rsrid nd ccntnued to point his weapon in the
direction of I
] SAL
Looc aim and fired one round.
The subject turned toward SAl
Idth his weapon still in his
hand and
jfired three additional rounds and the subject
fell to the rJ.oor and against the ‘qall net to the door which SA
I
Ihad just entered. After SAl
Idetermined that the
subject was no lncer
threat, he holstered his wqaoon and
1 then
assisted Ofticer[
I
Ii” handcuffing the subject. I
during this time, had gotten up from the floor and was yelling
that he had been shot.
Within moments, SAl
Idetermined that the situation
was under control and he walked out onjo the wallçway.in front of
the motel room where he was met by SSAI
I
I SAl
re] eased his weapon, a Bureau issued .45 Sig Sauer, to SSA I
I
and was then driven Co the Kansas City FBI Office.
SA I
Iwas
wearing his protective vest during this RUO.
OF,
In preparation for the proposed arrestj
lattended
a briefing in the FBI conference room on 1/30/97 regarding a
reverse_undercover operation involving Riley and the arrest of
Riley.
a written arrest plan and reviewed the
plan.

I

Iwas

In the written arrest plan,
originally
assigned to the outside arrest team and Detectivei
iwas
originally scheduled to be part of the inside arrest team. After
the typed arrest plan was prepared, a change was made regarding
I
Iposition.
t radio had the same freguency as the
Kansas City, Missouri Tactical Unit which was assigned to cover
the outs’
rimeter, soj
Iwas moved to the outsidç arresj
tea
was moved to the inside arrest team. Bothi
i
and
were fully briefed and aware of their new roles prior
to t a s ooting iiin
1news4anmpt was to be the
I
second man intcl
lzo arrest Riley
Iroom behind SI
once the drug deal had been consummated.
Whi1
heard a knock at’
and SA
enter
drawn.
subject because
then fall
at

““tion in the room next to
‘door. He then
the door conn’
behind
shoot
his hands.
7

on

 _______oom

.

.

66-19157-23

top of Riley who was lying on his back and placed hisone hand on
the subject’s hands
-_-d hi rwn gun with the other pointing
1
at the subject.
IandL
Ithen rolled the subject onto
SAl
his stomach and handcuffed hIm. Asi
hooked at the subject’s
face, the subject “gurgled from his mouth. I
Ibelieves the
subject died at that moment.

During the operation, I
Iwore a protective vest and
had in his possession two weapons,
a .40 caliber semi-automatic

pistol and a .38 caliber revolver which he carried in an ank
holster.
A check of both weapons following the incident
indicated that the weapons had not recently been fired.
OTHER PARTICIPMTS LOCATED IN ROOM: 230

I

Located in Room 230, the room adjoining I
I room
were ten law enforcement officers assigned as members of the
inside arrest and evidence team.
tncuded in the ten were two
technically trained agents, SAsI
I The inside
IandL
arrest team consisted of the team leader SAl
I Patrolman
Inn DetectivI
I SAl
I The evidence team
consisted of SAsI
bndi
lof IRS/CID.
iand SAl
SAl
Iwas also present.
Statements are consistent Chat a
detai..J.ed briefing was held at 10:00 AM in the FBI Office’s
conference room on 1/30/97 regarding a reverse undercover
operation involving Joseph Riley and the arrest of subject Riley.
Written arrest plans were also received and reviewed.
-

In compliance with the arrest plan, the participants
were all in place in Room 230 at the Mnh1
by 1:00 PM on
1/30/97.
To provide protection for
231 was wired
with closed circuit television. Although there had been no
previous indication thatl
Iwould be harmed, his safety was
paramount.
At approximately 3:00 PM an initial meeting was held
between I
room. Riley was shown the
land Riley in
kilos ot cocaine ‘byl
It
was
agreed
that Riley would
[
return later in the aI:tarnoon with the money to purchase the
cocaine.
Shortly before 6:00 PM, the participants in Room 230
learrix1 th subject had returned to the motel and was on his way
to I
Irooni.
The participants were aware of the entrance of
Riley into I
I room either through the monitoring of the
closed circuit telev.sion in zoom 230 or by listening at the door
which connected withi
ticipants
Iroom. Several of
heard the knock atl
oor which prompted’
Ito open
the door for Riley to enter Room 231. While watching the closed
circuit monitor, five of the participants specifically stated
8

 ____leer

_______land

.
66-19157-23

they observed Riley enter I
Iroom and Dull a cçncealed
weapon from his waistband firing one shot atl
I Three
participants were not watching the closed circuit monitor, but
statements reflect they heard the knock ati
Iioor and then
heard one shot.
Shortly after the shot was fired atL
Iby Riley,
participants’ statements reflect an awareness that the door
connecting Room 230 with I
Iroom was being opened by the
arrest team, with an additional several shots being fired
immediately thereafter. Two of tJi ricipants specifically
stated they heard four shots.
Irjd
S?4
lobserved SA
Patrolman I
Imake entry into the adjoining room o
then heard someone shout, ‘freeze,” followed by several more

shots.

Following the shots, SAl
I and Detectivi
I
observed sub-i ect Riley lying in the doorway of the adjoining
rooms.
SA.l
frr handcuffs in order to secure
lhear4
the subject andj
ipiace the handcuffs on
lobservedi
Riley.

I

All members of the arrest team wore badges and tactical
vests which were clearly marked with “FBI”. Other than SA

I no other participants from Room 230 fired their weapons.
SURVEILLANCE

The ansas City SOG team was assigned to conduct
physical surveillance of Riley. Ten Special Agents and, a Bureau
aircraft were assigned to this surveillance.
This surveillance began at 8:15 a.m. on 1/30/97, at the
residence of Riley, 7408 West 99th Street, Overland Park, Kansas.
Riley was driving a silver 1986 Lincoln Town Car bearing Texas
license plate JYP-96H. After traveling to his ko olace of
employment, Webb Communications, Riley picked ull
at his residence in Kansas City.
For the next two hours they
rode together and met an unknown black female for a short time
a diner in Kansas City.
droppedl
bft at a McDonald’s Restaurant
and met
the first time at the Motel 6 from 2:33 p.m.
until 2:2 p.m.
After this meeting, Riley returned to McDonald’s
to pick up________

9

I

 ________Iremained

.

.

66-19157-23

After drinking beer at a local bar, Riley andk
picked upi
I in Kansas City. They picked up a
white bag (later determined to contain food items) and all
traveled to the Motel 6, where Riley was observed entering Room
231.
ema±ned in Riley’s Lincoln Town
1andI
Car.

1

ARREST OF SUBJECTS D PROSECUTIVE STATUS.
Following the shooting, an investigation was initiated
by the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department’s Homicide Unit of
a dead body which was the result of the discharge of a firearm by
an agent of the FBI.
The victim was identified in the
invest
rrvt as Joseph Riley.
Following an examination
by Dr4
f the Jackson County Medical Examiner’s
Off ice,, Riley was transported to the Truman Medical Center Morgue
by Funeral Director’s Service.
The two individuals who remained in cnh-’nt 1i1v’c r
outside the motel,l
land
were arrested by officers of the Kansas City, Missouri Police
Department (KCMOPD.).

I

I

On 1/31/971
IPlatte County Prosecutor,
Platte County, Missouri filed a criminal complaint against
Jalleging a violation of Section 565.021 of the Missouri
Revised statutes (Mo. Rev. Stat,), i.e. felony murder in the
second degree.
A conviction for violation of this statute
subjects the offender to a wide range of penalties which consist
of 10 years to life imprisonment.
See e.g. Section 558.011, Mo.
Rev. Stat.
Thereafter, on the same day, an arrest warrant was
issued and executed while
in the custody of the
Kansas City, Missouri Police Department on a “20 hour hold” for
his involvement in the 1/30/97 incident. Bond forl
has
been set at $500,000.

I

Subsequent contact withi
I Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Platte County, Missouri has determined that
a Platte County Grand Jury is scheduled to review this entire
incident, to include SAl
lactions, on 2/26-27/97.
Information is still being gathered by the District_Attorney’s
Office in preparation of possible indictments of I
land
According tol
I
L the possibility of any criminal
charges being filed against SAl
remote.

lie

10

I

 .

.

66-19157-23

us

I
a convicted felon who is
currently on unsupervised federal prQbation fo
he illegal
distribution of cocaine. Based upon I
involvement ifl
the 1/30/97 shooting incident,I
I Probation Officer,
United States Probation and Parole, Western Distrnt nf Mnuri,
requested and obtained an arrest warrant revoking’
I
parole.
The arrest warrant was predicated ant
Ivio1ating
the terms of his probation by associating with jfldjvj,1R1.q
engaged in a criminal act and with a convicted felon,l

I

I

The requested arrest warrant was issued by the
Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge, Western
Distrint rf Missouri on 1/31/97, and immediately executed as
as at the United States Probation Office waiting to
report his involvement in the 1/30/97 incident tcl
Ihis
Probation Officer.
CRIME SCE INVESTIGATION

On the evening of 1/30/97. due t
9 the oossile state
felony murder charges aga±nst
I the Kansas
City, Missouri Police Department KuNuD) processed and collected
evidence from Room 231 as well as from a 1986 Lincoln Town Car,
license LTYP-96H (Texas), utilized by Riley and accomplices parked
in the motel lot.

lanai

apparent bullet hole was observed in the curtain,
window, and exterior screen on the south wall of Room 231. (Photo
The hole in the window is large, possibly indicating a
6).
tumbling bullet (Photo 30).
.Tn extensive search of the motel
parking lot, pool area, and surrounding areas was conducted via
visual observation and metal detectors with negative results. A
review of the surveillance video within Room 231. reveals that
this damage was likely caused by sublect_Joseph Riley’s first
fired round.
un the upper chest at
This first shot stjruckl
an oblique angle and exited front
I upper left arm and
continued in a southerly direction.
A spent bullet was also recovered on the floor along
the west wall just north of the southern most bed (Photos 8, 12,
33).
Firearms Examiner (FE) I
Kansas City, Missouri
Police Department (KCMOP)
advised a preliminary examination of
the bullet is consistent with those from Rileys .38 Colt. A
review of the surveillance video indicates this bullet to likely
be Riley’á second fired round.

1].

 •

.

66-19157-23

The surveillance video also shows that upon being
struck by SAl
Ifirst fired round, Riley fired his
weapon a third time in a downward, and generally, a southwesterly
direction.
This bullet was not located during the initial crime
scene search.
However, on 1/31/97, the following day, a. further
search was conducted by KCMOPD for the third bullet.
It was
6
located in the interior of a box s,r±n nattress along the soutl*7C
wall of Room 231 (Photo 32).
FE I
hdvised this fired
bullet is also consistent with those from Riley’s .38 Colt.
A .38 Colt, six shot revolver, Serial Number 126374 was
found lying on the floor east of the northern bed. (Photo 4).
Three (3) spent casings head stamped “RP 38 S&W’ and three (3)
live bullets head stamped “RP 38 s&w” were in the cylinder.
(Photo 9)
The following .45 spent shell casings were located in
various locations in Room 231:
One (1) shell casing head stamped “RP 45 Auto” located
under the northeast corner of the southern mQst bed (Photo 7).
One (1) shell casing head stamped “RP 45 Auto” located
under the east end of the northern most bed (No photo).
One (1) shell casing head stamped “RP 45 Auto” located
on the bathroom floor (Photo 5).
One (1) shell casing head stamped “RP 45 Auto’ behind
the bathroom toilet (Photo 13).

I

A spent bullet and copper jacket were collected from
beneath Riley’s shirt. (Photo 11). Three (3) additional spent
bullets were removed from Riley’s body during the autopsy. FE
Iadvispr
four (4) spent bullets were consistent with
those from SAl
iweapon (Photos 23-25).
Apparent gunshot wound8 were observed by crime scene
technicians and reported in the following areas of subject
Riley’s body:
Two on the back, below the right shoulder.
pit.

Two on the left side of the chest beneath the right arm

12

 .

.

6619157-23

Subsequent review of autopsy photos reveals first onscene examination of Riley’s body by crime scene technicians was
in error.
Entry wound is also located on right side below
armpit. One wound on chest is an exit wound (Photos 16-22).
Examination of the 1986 Lincoln Town Car, pursuant to a
search warrant, revealed nothing apparently related to the
shooting (Photos 14, 15).
WEAPONS INVOLVED

During the shooting of I
the subsequent shooting of Riley by SA
weapons were discharged:

‘by Joseph S. Riley and
the following

Joseph S. Riley’s weapon:
.38 Colt, six—shot revolver, Serial #12637, with RP .38
Smith and Wesson ammunition.
b6

SAl

iweapon:

.45 Sig Sauer pistol, P220, Serial #G181620 with RP .45
auto Remington, 230 grain ammunition. A seven round magazine was
utilized in SAl
Iweapon.
Investigation by Kansas City, Missouri Police
Department (KCMOPD) and FBI revealed the following number of
spent casings and live rounds located at the crime scene:
Three (3) spent casings head stamped “RP 38 S&W’ and
three (3) live rounds head stamped “RP 38 S&W’ were located in
the cylinder of Joseph S. Riley’s revolver.
(See KCMOPD cylinder
diagram in their Physical Evidence/Property Inventory Report
#97-010890)
*

Subject Joseph S. Riley’s weapon was found lying on the
floor of Room 231, east of the northern most bed. The barrel was
pointing east.
Four (4) spent casings head stamped 4
’RP 45, Auto”
located within Room 231,

13

)1C

 .
66-19157-23

Following the shooting, SAl
Iweapon was examined
and found to contain one (1) .45 round in the chamber and three
(3)
.45 live rounds in the seven (7) round magazine. These four
(4) rounds in addition to the four (4) .45 shell casings found in
Room 231 total eight (8) rounds.
Riley’s weapon, unfired cartricr
shell casings
are being maintained by the KCMOPD. SAl
Iweapon was test
fired by KCMOPD and returned to him the next day.
FIREARMS TRAZNINØ

Following is the firearms training schedule conducted
by the Kansas City Division, Headquarters City, calendar year
1996:
6/3-5/96
7/22-23/96

8/1/96
9/9-10/96
9/26-27/96
10/21-22/96
10/28-29/96

I

Review of FD-40 Field Firearms Training Record for SA
irevealed that he qualified in a Pistol
Qualification Course (PQd) five times during calendar year 1996.
SAl
kttended firearms on the following days and attained
the following scores:
6/5/96

(94)

7/29/96

10/30/96

(98/100)

(96/98)

us

S?I
a current member of the Kansas City SWAT
Team.
His scores obtained on 7/29/96 and 10/30/96, represent
SWAT qualifications.
14

 .

.

66 -19157 -23

MEDIA COVERAGE
Local television stations covered the above described
shooting during the evenings of 1/30-31/97.
The major city
newspaper, THE KANSAS CITYSTAR, published articles on the
mornings of ]/3I/g7 and 2/1/97
A review of all media coverage revealed generally
positive comments with no issues raised and overall factual
reporting.

15

 FD-204 (Rcv. 33-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

I

Date:

Inspectorl________
October 24, 1997

FeId Office Fit N:
Dureao File N:

FB IHQ
66-19157-53

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

INOUIRY OBSERVATIONS

Repvrt of:

ouce:WFO

The Newark Division VC/FTF was alerted to subject
Michael Byrd’s whereabouts approximately one week prior to
the incident by a source who believed Byrd to be wanted.
A preliminary inquiry initiated at that time revealed he
had been previously arrested for murder and later captured
by police in West Virginia.
Byrd was extradited to New
Subsequently, he failed to
Jersey and set free on bond.
On the morning
appear and an arrest warrant was issued.
of January 30, 1997, the Newark VC/FTF planned to locate
and arrest Michael Byrd.
SA

I

I

SAl_____ EOD 3/7/88., was assigned in San Antonio
from 6/88
9/90 where he worked on a Violent Crimes and
the surveillance squad.
In 1990, he was transferred to
the Newark Division where he worked exclusively on Violent
5
Crimes cases.
He is a certified Firearms Instructor,
7C
Tactical Instructor and member of Newark’s SWAT Team,
serving as assistant team leader.
Prior to his FBI
service, SAl
ppent five years with INS as a Border
Patrol Agent.
He is Principal Relief Supervisor for Squad
C-i and the Coordinator of the VC/FTF.
-

Per normal routine, the VC/FTF on days they were
planning arrests, met in the FBI garage to set out the
This document contains neither ecooinendatons nor conclusions of the FDL. t is the property of the PBZ and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 ,land

________nd

.1

I

I

general plans for the morning, on 1/30/97, SA
placed the arrest of Michael Byrd second on the squa ‘‘
agenda.
After the first arrest caine up negative, SAl
briefed the squad on Michael Byrd snd the fact. that they
would first attempt to contacti
I
I fo information as to his location. At her
residence, an elderly mani
I answered
the door and identified Byrd asi
I

I

was staying in Elizabeth, New Jersey, advising that he
probably would be armed.
iitiated plans for a tactical entry, ]
naming SAl
ltp ni’r th redence with a
protective shield and SAl
Ito follow with an
MP-5.
The reinain4er of the entry team consisted of SAc

I

nd

I

EC’D Detçctives

I NPD Detective I

IEeex County

Department of Public Service (ECDPS) Sergeant I
andi
lus Marshal’s Service.

Apprmtely one block from Byrd’s suspected
location, SAl
rovided a final briefing.
The Task
Force roceeed to the residence where Detectivç Contreras
and SAl
Ifollowed SAsI
land I
lup the
front steps wherel
Radio
rang ehe doorbell.
traffic indicated someone on the top floor was trying to
throw a bag out of the back window and a short time later,
jump out of the window. A woman answered the door
indicating Byrd was in the upstairs apartment. The four
climbed the stairs, SAl
lannounced their presence
and subsequently kicked in the door.
SAd
I
Ibegan clearing the apartment, proceeding down
the hail shouting commands for any residents to come out.
A man and woman came opt
rmr indicatig Byrd was
in the back room.
ntered the
SAsI
incH
back bedroom where they began a systematic search.
SA
I
I checked under the bed onc and
Iheard him
say he needed to do so again.
SAl
I who was in the
closet, heard SAl
say “let me see your hands.” He
shouted this for 10-15 seconds at which time an individual
(Byrd) jumped up from under the bed, holding his left hand
up and out in front of him.
SAl
I could not see the
right hand because his body was bladed away from him,
1-’-.c waistband.
}however it appj-A
For about 1530 seconds SAsI
Ishouted for
andi
Byrd to show his other hand. Byrd did not comply.
He
then spun his body around to face SAl
I
S2I
I
stated he heard two “pops” which he thought came from a
small caliber weapon, and then a puff of smoke about two
feet in front of Byrd at waist height.
SN
I began to
fire his weapon, emptying it..
He holstered the pistol
after he saw Byrd slump against the wall and because he
saw that SAs I
JandI
leach had Byrd covered.

I

]hC

 I

Following the shooting, sil
ibegan attending
to necessary issues such as notifying outside individuals
of the results, calling for Elizabeth Police assistance,
EMS assistance and th FBI vidence Response Team.
Shortly afterward, SAl
Ibeame aware of the other
Agents who had fired their weapons, xamely SASJ
land NPD DetectiveI i
SAl
Idid
not recall during the incident that any of those
individuals had fired.
SAf

I

SAl
lEOn 2/5/90, has served in the
Newark Division on the Applicant Squad and in his present
assignment on the Violent Crimes Squad for approximately
seven years.
He is a certified Firearms Instructor and a
member of the SWAT Team, where he serves as a sniper.
On January 30, 1997, Squad C-i was preparing to
conduct several arrests and as was normal procedure
personnel met in the FBI garaqe at approximately 5:00 a.m.
SAl
Iecalled that SAl
Ibriefly provided the
identities of the fugitives to be worked that day.
The
first was an armed robbery fugitive and the second case
was to be Michael Byrd, wanted by New Jersey authorities
f or homicide:
Following a unsuccessful attempt at locating the
first fuqitive squad’ members remained at this location
where SAl__lprovided more in depth detail about Michael
Byrd.
Discussion dealt with how to approach the residence
in Montclair, Ne Jr’v wjiere Byrd might be located.
At
this location SAl
Iwas assigned to cover the rear
of the house.
This search also was negative so Agents and
local officers u’oved to a staging area in Elizabeth, NJ,
near another locatirn thnnaht- n h wh.r vr w .9taying
based on informatio
I
Again, discussions abqf- hrm, f-’- pproach this residence
were formulated and Si
‘were to
land SAl
enter the door first, utilizing body bunker arid a MP-5
shoulder weapon, immediately followed by SAl
I and ECPO

I arrived at the address at
SAl
approximately 7:00 a.m. and when perimeter Agents and
officers were in place, e and SAl
lapproached the
door.
rang the bell and at just about
OfficeTl
J
that time, SAl
Jheard a radio transmission
indicating individuals had appeared at the upper window.
A woman answered the door indicating Byrd was located
upstairs. At that time, another radio transmission
indicated smnn w kicking the screen out of the upper
I knocked and announced atjh
window.
SAl
upstairs door and after one to two minutes, SAl________

S

 kicked in the door. Both SAsI
Ibegan
janci
to clear the rooms beginning i.iH-h thQ kitchen and living
room, which were empty.
Iccas repeatedly
SAl
calling to the occupants “FBI come out with your hands
up.” A man (not Byrd) and woman exited from the inner
rooms and weie handcuffed in th living roop by other
members of the arrest team.
ntinued to
SAl
call out commands to come out.
rwas using the
body bunker and SAl
Iwas directly in back of him.
They cleared the bathroom and a closet and the decision
was made to enter the back right bedroom.
I
S2I
cleared the bedroom closet while 321
I advised he
would look under the right side Of the bed.
Seeing
nothing, he proceeded to the left side at which time he
backed away from the bed shouting repeatedly “let me see
your hands.” The subject stood up hrirntlv.gising the
I right
mattress/box spring to thrust to SA
side.
He moved to his left and stood shoulder to shoulder
The
with SA[
Iwith his MP-5 trained on Byrd.
subject stood in a bladed position with his right hand
located near his mid-thigh area, His left hand was
positioned in a defensive stance at approximate chest
height.
belief that Byrd had a
It was SAl
weapon in his pants. He also appeared to be scanning the
room quickly with his eyes. Byrd did not comply with the
Agents’ commands to show his hands during about a 25-30
second time period. At this time, Byrd made a quick,
threatening move in which he spun to face the two Agents
Iheard a
Simultaneous to this, SA I
directly.
“pop” coming from Byrd which he thought was a gunshot and
He indicated he
at this point he began firing his MP-5.
didn’t recall how many rounds he fired but he does
remember shooting two round bursts until he observed the
subject failing to the ground.

I stated he believed Byrd possessed a
SAl
weapon and as such, he was in fear for his life during the
entire encounter.
SAl

I

7C

SA
I EOD 9/8/91, has had investigative
assignments in the Applicant, Civil Rights, White Col-±ar
Crime, Interstate Theft and as of 1/6/97, the VC/F’TF
areas.
He is a Firearms and Tactical Instructor and a
member of the SWAT Team where he serves as Team Leader.
Previous to the FBI, he served four years in the US Army
Infantry.
At approximately 445 a.m., on 1/30/97, Task
Force members gathered in the FBI garage for a briefing on
This
the first scheduled arrest attempt for that day.
effort proving unsuccessful, Task Force members were then
briefed on the Michael Byrd case and proceeded to the

 k

Montclair, NJI

residence, informing
armed.

I

I

tl

jthat Byrd was probably

The Task force regrouped outside the
or a briefing on the next move. SA
Iwas assigned to carry the shield and together with
BA I
I who was_carrying the MP-5, would enter the
apartment first. SAl
Iwas the team leader.
At aizproximately 6:30 a.m.. SAsI
land
hand Detective I
Iclimbed the outside
stairs of the residence while otier meulbers of the TF took
up other assigned positions. s.il
Iknocked at the door
and a woman answered stating that Byrd was in the upstairs
apartment. At about the same time, one of the TF members
saw someone appear at an upstairs window, where Byrd was
supposedly staying.
When the four Agents/officer reached the second
floor, SAl
lannounceci their presence and
contemporaneously, another Agent; observed an individual
try and remove a screen front an upper window. For qeveral
minutes he continued knocking and at some point, SAl
I
ordered that the door be kicked open. SAl
I
accomplished this task.
ntered the apartment
SAI
I andl
and began to methodically clear the rooms,_beginning with
the living room. At the same time, SAl
Iwas calling
for any occupants to come out. A male individual
eventually came out and was handcuffed. SAl
jbecame
aware that there was a woman in the apartment and he
called out to her to come out as well. She exited the
back left bedroom and was handcuffed.

I to clear the rest
SAl
I instructed SAl
of the space as Byrd tas still thought to be present. SAs
I
landi
Iwith the assistance at one point of
I cleared the bathroom, closet, a
Detectjvel
bedroom on the right and a back left bedroom which was
illuminated and appeared empty.
*

I

SAL
Iinstruced them to clear the back right
bedroom at this point. SAl
Jent.ered the room behind
the shield while SA
remained in the hallway. BA
i.irected BA
to enter and proceed tp the
right while BA I
iwent to the left.
SAl_______
looked under the bed with his flashlight and saw no one.
SAl
Icleared the closet and left the room to
thoroughly clear the right bedroom. SAL
lentered the

 room while sAl
Ibegan to look under the left side of
the bed. At this time, he saw an individual and jumped
back shouting that Byrd was there. He called repeatedly
to Byrd to come out .and show his hands. There were four
Aents/Offjcers (SAc I
land Det.
I
1 in the room positioned around the room at this
point. Byrd emerged, first in a kneeling position with
the mattress on top of him and his body bladed so the
right side was not visible but his left hand was directly
outstretched. He quickly moved to an upright position,
throwing the mattress to the left side and moving back
towards the corner, His body wa. Rtill Iladed so his
right side wasn’t visible but SAl
Icould tell that
his right hand was in his sweatpants. We ordered him to
remove his hand but Byrd did not comply. SA
ibegan
firing his weapon at Byrd when the latter quickly swung
his body around toward him. He emptied his weapon and
reloaded, however, the shooting had stopped by that time
as Byrd was sliding down against the wall. SAl
I
stayed
the room until emergency personnel arrived at
the scene.

in

SA

I

I

SAF
IEOD 10/29/95, was assigned to the
Applicant/Civil Rights Squad upon reporting to Newark from
New Agents Class and spent approximately five months
there.
He has been on the VC/FTF since 7/96.
Prior
experience includes three years as a police officer.
On the morning of 1/30/97, the Task Force met in
the Bureau garage as was the usual pattern prior to
attempting a.serjeg of arrests.
riefd everyçne
SAk
on the first subject and the approxxmate 16 TF members
took up assigned posts at th first location. Because the
fugitive was not present, SAl
I gathered TF members
together for a second briefing regarding Michael Byrd.
The next locati in Montclair, NJ, ws that of Byrd’s

girlfriend.

I
I

SAl

land Investigator I

were assigned to approach the front door while otfle
members for
t9
nPTimeter around the house. Nçwark PC
Iwere to follow SAL
land SAl
landl__________
to the door
n 1rly man let us in the house whereland SAl
with other personnel present

jalong

conducted a protective sweep.

I

Once the residence was secure, SA I

apartment.
I

I exited the
I Prior to

I

departing, gAl
‘again Drovided instruction regarding
assignments. SAd
Lere to enter the
land I
location first, closely followed by SA
land

ih7C

 1
Investigator
wej to follow.
SAl

1

SA

I

When t’hz tm

I and

Detective

I

I

rthr1 th taaina oint,

I

I The TF then proceeded to the
location where the above individuals climbed the steps of
the residence.
S)j
bbserved the curtains move in
an upstairs window after the doorbell was rung and heard
over the radio that a side window was open. At this
point, a woman came to the door and indicated Byrd was in
the upstairs apartment.

I

Iwent up
The Agent “‘ 1’TrstIgatorI
SA
the stairs where SAl
Iannounced their presence.
I
Iwas among the individuals who followed lhe four up
the Stairs.
During the several moments that SAl
I
was announcing the presence of law enforcement, I heard
rdicating someone was opening a back h
another
window.
On SIJ
lorder, the door was forced and SA
I
]participated with other Agents in. clearing the
hymn
1 and
SAl
bbgerved SAsI
I
Iyelling commands for th o urans to come out
and after a couple of minutes, SAl
Ibserved an
individual coming from the back.
This person wasn’t
totally cooperative, however, he was brought under control
and searched. Next a woman amq down th hail and was
handcuffed and questioned by SA I
I

I continued to clear the
land’
SAd
SA
apartment eventually reaching the back right bedroom.
hd Investigatoil
Iwere behind them and SA
I

Istated he used a ct trning off the hallway to

land
provide himself cover,
Iheard SA
SAl
Iwent
lyelling “let me see your hands 1” SA
I
to the door and observed Byrd in a defensive position with
his ri t and near his waistband. He was bladed away and
SAs
was unable to actually see his right hand.
ou ad for Byrd to show hIs hidden hand, however!
d not do so. He scanned the room looking at each
y
individual in turn. Byrd then rnde a very q.iick turning
nd I heard
movethent towards SAs
I and
three shots.
Ibelieved Byrd had ired at the
SAl
Agents and began firing back.
It didn’t appear that Byrd
Iin$cated he thought he w
was falling but SAl
being hit.
lestimated he fired seven
n all, SAl
heft the
rounds.
When the shooting ceasedr SAl
room and the apartment to await further instructions.

‘-

 INQUIRY OBSERVATION/RECOMMELWATION

Each of the SAc interviewed by the Inspection
Team were cooperative and eager to recount individual
reco1lections of the January 3O,1997, shooting incident,
those recollections are in substantial conformance with
one another, although all statements contain what could be
termed understandable differences in terms of the amount
of detail each was able to summon regarding each aspect of
that morning’s events,
In the seminal portion of the
day’s events, however, all four Agents could readily
explain the reasons they believed their use of deadly
force was justified and necessary and each one recounted
the details of their use of it in substantially the same
way.
it is recommended that this inquiry be closed
with no further action.

 ____

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JVSTICE
Federal BCrèau of investigation

Copy to:

sszF

orcoi.
Date:

March 10,

1997

I

Offlee:

FedOfficeFjteff:

66F—MP—46872

This:

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT;
MINNEAPOLIS DIVISION,
1/31/97

Cbaraerer

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

Synopsis:

MINNEAPOLIS

Bureau Fuel:

-

66F-MP-46872

OTHER

Subject of 91A-MP-46869 involved in FBI shooting incident
on 1/31/97, following subject’s robbing of CHANHASSEN
BANK, Chanhassen, Minnesota, hostage taking, and firing
upon officers in pursuit.

DETAILS:

I

I

On 1/31/97. at approximately 7:35 p.m., subjectl
I
19].A-MP-46869) entered the CHANHASSEN BANK,
600 West 78th Street, Chanhassen, Minnesota, displayed a
handgun, made oral demands for money, and ordered
employees and customers into a back room within the bank.
After taking control of the bank, subject ordered the
bank manager at gunpoint to remove money from numerous
teller stations and provided a green plastic newspaper
bag for seceting the monies.
Subject then took as a
hostage onel
Iwhite female, dob
I and departed the scene in her vehicle with I
as driver.
Due to the
and a call
initiation
Department
identified

I

timely acivaion of the bank’s alarm system
p1acd byl
Ito the 911 operator at the
of the robbery, Chaska, Minnesota, Police
and Carver County Sheriff’ Office personnel
the vehicle and in-itiated surveillance.

This document contains neither recoirsandations nor conclusiofls of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents ae not to be distributed outside your aqency.

 ______________bnd_____Iwas

--

•
I

During the surveillance, hostagel
lexecuted a 180
degree turn o the vphicle. As the vehicle came to a
stop, subject
lexited, fired two shots il the
dirction of tne police vehicles, and fled on foot with
Itoward a wooded area.
able to free herself
arter a short distance and. ws rescued by responding law
enforcement. Subject I
If led into a wooded area
adjacent to several housing developments in the vicinity
of Rice Marsh Lake, Chanhassen, Minnesota.
Law enforcement agencies throughout the area responded to
the scene, to include Minneapolis Division SAC Roger H.
Wheeler, Assistant Special Agent in Charae Michael J.
Waidner, Violent Crimes Supervisor I
I and

variou SA oersornwl.
Leaden

t-p

include Minneapolis SWAT Team
other SWAT Team members. An

FBI hostage negotiator was present as well.

A command post was established at Rosemount Engineering
Company on Highway S in Chanhassen, Minnesota, and a
search was instituted for the subject. With the
assistance of a Minnesota State Patrol helicopter and
tactical teams of the FBI, the Minnesota State Patrol and
the Eden Prairie, Minnesota, Police Department, the
subject was located and surrounded in a wooded area
adjacent to Rice Marsh Lake.
FBI SWAT personnel were briefed by the SWAT Team Leader
and the FBI policy on deadly force was reiterated.
A single exchange of gunfire occurred during the next
several hours which did not involve FBI personnel and
which resulted in no injuries to the subject or to law
enforcement.
When, at approximately 11:10 p.m., the subject began a
verbal exchanae with ofjcers, ASAC WALDNER dispatched
SAl
Ia hostage negotiatorf to the scene
wifh Carver County Sheriff’s Officer Deputy
I a
Bureau-trained negotiator, in support. During this
verbal exchange, the subject repeatedly refused to
surrender and stated officers would have to “come and get
me.

la merriber of
the Minneapolis Division SWAT Team on perimeter, observed
th subject walking from thq woode4 area into the
residential development. SZ1
Icould clearly view the
subject’s silver handgun as he walked.
S?1
iordered
the subject to freeze and drop his weapon. After
pausing, the subject dropped to his knees and then into a
prone position, still holding his handgun.
N
I
At approximately 11:40 p.m., SAF

2

 .
I

.

moved toward the subject with SA
land
I fellow SWAT ‘I’eam members, in support.
re sUoJt cnen stoc4 and egan walkih into the
residential area.
SAl
lagain ordered the subject to
drop his weapon, at which time he responded, “Fuck you,
come and get me.” As the subject moved throu the
clearing toward the residential area, SAl
iprepared
to shoot but refrained from doing so due Co concerns for
the safety of persons inside neaçbv houqs. A foot chase
ensued with SA5I
lanai
Ifl pursuit.
They were jointed. shortly there±ter by Eden
Pxairie
Police Off icerl
After turning from a
I
series of resjtentjaj. streets into a cul de sac, the
subject paused in front of a driveway pn the left side of
the street, raised his handgun to shoulder level, and
turned toward the SAs and officer, who had taken
stationary positions at the entrance of the cul de sac.
SAsI
gain ordered the subject to freeze
land!
and when he did not comply, they and the Eden Prairie
Police Officer discharged their weapons with SA
I
firing first and SAl
firing several second
thereafter.
The subject fell to the ground behind a snow
bank along the driveway’s edge, was apprehended,
handcuffed and his weapon, a Taurus Model P-22 pistol,

was retrieved and rendered safe.

A wound was identified in the subject’s lower left wrist

for which he was immediately transported to the Hennepin
County Medical Center for treatment.

Inasmuch as the Minneapolis Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) was to process the initial two
shooting scenes, it was agreed that BCA would do the FBI
scene as well.
The 10mm MP-S weapons of S21
iridi
iwere taken
into custody by the SWAT Team leader and subsequently
provided to BCA for examinatiop
Pt.m rounds had been
dicharged from each. Off icerj
Ihed fired four
rounds from a 12-gauge shotgun.

Subject I
iwas interviewed on 2/3/97, wherein he
admitted to the bank robbery, stating it was his
intention.t.r h “lçilled by the police during the
robbery.” I
Ihas been charged with three counts of
bank robbery; Title 18, USC, Section 2113(a), Cd), e; one
count of Use of a Firearm, Title 18, USC, Section
924(c) (1); and state charges as follows: Attempted
Murder in the First Degree (six counts); Second Degree
Assault (four counts); Terroristic Threats (one Count);
Kidnapping (one count).
3

 SAC COMMENTS JND OBSERVATIONS:

I

On the evening of 1anuary 31, 1997, I was onscene at the
victim bank and the command post during the sequence of events
which is recorded herein.
It is important to recall that this
incident started late on a Friday evening at approximately 7:30
PM, and was concluded within four hours. All local police
departments, sheriffs’ departments and state agencies, both the
Minnesota State Patrol and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension, cooperated entirely with each other and with the
FBI in all aspects of this investigation. There was never a hint
of anyone attempting to take control beyond their jurisdictions
or abilities.
Carver County Sheriff Allen J. Wallin and I were
at the Command Post at the time the subject of the bank robbery
investigation was apprehended.
There was complete cooperation
lb 6
between the two agencies in dealing with all the investigative
aaenis invlrd,
In addition, I would like to note that SA
head of the Minneapolis SWAT Team, took control
as the on-scene Tactical Leader, through his demeanor and
expertise, and provided guidance and assistance to each of the
three Tactical Teams or partial teams that arrived and were
utilized throughout the evening. Those three teams were from the
Eden Prairie Police Department, Minnesota State Patrol, as well
as the Minneapolis FBI Swat Team.
From the beginning, this bank
robbery, hostage taking, manhunt was extremely fast moving with
little or no time to plan and prepare.
It simply was four hours
of rapid fire reaction to various situations.

I

At the conclusion It was decided by the ranking member of
each agency on-scene that the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA) would conduct the shooting scene investigation and review,
except as it specifically related to each involved agency, such
as interviewing of personnel. The reason for this was simple.
The bureau of Criminal Apprehension conducts reviews within the
state of Minnesota for all state and local agencies so that an
independent review is provided.
This is the first time they had
been involved with the FBI in the metro area, They are extremely
well equipped and professional in everything they do. There were
three separate shooting scenes, only one of which involved FBI
personnel.
Only one item of minor contention came out of BCA
conducting their shooting review. Their standard operating
procedure is to obtain blood and urine samples from involved
officers.
I advised them early on that the involved FBI Agents
had already been released from the area and sent home and these
Agents would not be providing blood and urine samples to them.
have agreed to meet with Nicholas V. O’Hara, Superintendent, BCA,
(former Minneapolis SAC), to discuss this in more detail in the
upcoming weeks.
While we did provide the involved weapons to
them for review at a later date, we did not, as the other
agenciesdo as a matter of routine, turn weapons ovë to them
inmediately.
-

Being forwarded as part of this report are three video
tapes.
The first video is a “Home Video Shot” by a neighbor,
4

 .

..

which contains footage of the officers involved in the shooting
and involved in the subsequent investigation, milling around
outside this neighbor’s home after the actual incident and
provides, in my opinion, no information of value.
The second video captioned, “Total Footage W/Time Code,” is
a video prepared by the RCA of the three various shooting scenes,
in support of the still photography that was done. This video
was prepared after the fact and provides usefulness to the viewer
in developing references as to distances involved
1 etc.
The third video captioned, “MSP Fur Tape,’ is approximately
one and one-half hours of film taken from the ‘Minnesota State
Patrol (MSP) helicopter, which was instrumental in locating and
keeping the’ suspect under observation through the use of heatsensitive equipment.
In addition, it is an audio tape which
records some of the conversation between the air and ground units
and in a more limited way, ground to ground units.
This video
actually records the location of the subject, the one and onehalf hours that he was holed up in the woods, and the subsequent
foot chase through the neighborhood. (Using the Zulu time in the
lower right corner, the foot chase begins at approximately 0605.)
In reviewing our report and the RCA report, it is noted
there are minor inconsistencies as to time, number of shots
fired, etc., between the various witnesses, both law enforcement
and non-law enforcement. This is to be expected and was not of a
substantial nature.
I think it
a]o important for the reader to understand
that prior to SAl
Idispatching the first half of the
Minneapolis Swat Team to their assignments, he met with them,
reviewed the facts with them, gave theta their assignments, and
reviewed with theta the Bureau’s Standard Rules of Engagement,
which is customary.
It is noted during a review of the’ report
that a number of other SWAT Team members were not present during
this discussion and did not receive any instructions or Rules of
Engagement.
These SWAT Team members were never dispatched to the
scene.
In reviewing this report, the one item that stands out most
in my mind, beyond the obvious cooperation among everyone, was
the remarkable restraint employed by all the officers involved.
This subject had robbed a bank, taken a hostage, threatened the
hostage, and fired shots at two police officers within the first
fifteen minutes of thj incident. Subsequently, he was again
located and fired shots at or around police officers.
In
listening to the audio comments on the MSP Fur Tape, one local
officer comments numerous Limes that he can see the subject.
This officer never fires his gun. Once the subject breaks free
from his hiding place ad begins his run to escape, a number of
police officers, including FBI Agents, could have shot at the
sulr3ect.
None of them did until there was no alternative left.
5

 r

.

.

In discussion with the involved Agents
after the incident
occurred. both of them indicated that
becaus
e
of their training
by S?j
in paxticular, they are keenly aware that they
J
are
responsible for each and every shot fired.
They have been well
trained in knowing when to shoot,
but more importantly, when to
shoot safely.
It is unfortunate that two of the shots taken
did
enter an occupied residence however,
it is clear to me that the
Agents and Officers involved had no choice
but to shoot at th
time they did.
All things considered, the subject is in custod
y with a
minor 1
injury he confessed to his crimes and his desire
to commit
suicide by cop, no law enforcement officers
or civilians were
injured and minimal property damage occurred,
I believe this
incident was resolved in the most effective
and efficient manner
possible.

6

  

 

FBI

Sheeting Incident Report
Summaries

1997

 

 

 

.

FD-204 (Rev. 12±95)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

SSRA I
October 23,

CaseIDN:

66F-OM-44387

Thie:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
OM2JHA DIVISION
OCTOBER 3, 1997

Cluracter

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shooting incident occurred during a
buy-bust drug scenario in Aida, Nebraska, on the night of
10/3/97.

1997

I

Office:

Omaha

lb

The investigation into the drug activities of
Mario H. Velez (281C-ON-43272) w.s opened 11/4/96 and
assigned to SAl
I Omaha Division, North
Platte Resident Agency. According to the opening
communication, Velez had long been believed to be the main
source of methamphetamine in Lexington and North Platte,
Nebraska. Veiez was described as a Mexican citizen
currently ivinn Lexington, but moving from hotel to
hotel.
SAl
Ihad recently developed a source who
advised that veiez routinely imported mi4ti-pound
quantities of niethamphetamine, cocaine and marijuana from
Mexico to Nebraska, via Garden City, Kansas. Source
believed velez was clearing about 15,O0O/week in profit.
Velez’ criminal history record and contact with
INS at Omaha, Nebraska, showed the following criminal
history for Velez. He was arrested by the INS and
deported in 1980.
He was subsequently arrested by the
North Platte Police Department in 1989 on a charge of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute.. This charge was later dismissed.
He was
convicted on a felony drug charge pursuant to a 1990
arrest.
He was sentenced on three different counts for
periods ranging from one to three years and five to ten
This document contains neither reconaeendations nor conclusions of the
FBI, It. is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agencyr It and it contents are not to be distrisuted outside your agency.

 ________

.
years.
He was arrested for deportation by INS in 1991 while
in
custody and a detainer was placed on him at that time.
He was
paroled in May, 1993, and then subsequently deported
by INS in
June, 1993.
He was arrested again by INS in January, 1994, and
in February, 1994, his parole status was revoked.
He was paroled
again in January, 1995, and pursuant to an INS detaine
r from his
January, 1994. arrest was deported at that time.

I

Based on tije abov source information and Velez’
criminal history, SAL
Idiscussed this case with SAj
i Grand Island Resident Agency, who advised he had a good
undercover police officer to deal with Velez.

I

During Noyamber 1996. two drua nurohase
made from
Veiez.
On 11/8/96,1
IGrand
Island Police DeparEment undercover officexi
I
who purchased one ounce of methamphetamine (although
when
tested,
jje mibtance proved to be amphetamine). On
11/21/96, officer
again acting in an undercover capacity, purchased one
ounce of methamphetamine from Velez in Lexington.
In Decembçr 1996, Velez abruptly moved from Nebraska to
Kansas.
SAl
I source advised that Velez fled because he
believed a warrant had been issued for his arrest. At
about the
time he left Nebraska. VelzI

his suspicions bout I
jauch too non
I

I olaiminat

I Piring another
Velez again advised of
hi wntr i hur +.

did not returi to Nebraska until September 1997.

I

I

Velez

On 9/24/97, the source advised SN
moved back to Nebraska and wanted to reestab.ush_c Ithat Velez had
ontact with
1 on 9/26-197, Velez delivered to off icerl
1 again
acting undercover as
samples of cocaine and heroin. Velez
agreed to deliver to
7 ounces of black tar heroin and 35
ounces of cocaine.
$
andi
I along with other
members of the Tn-City Federal Drug Task Force
(TCTF), began
planning a scenario intended to result in a buy-bust
arrest of
Velez on Friday 10/3/97.
The arrest scenario developed for 10/3/97 was
cooperative effort by the members of the TCTF, which was a
headquartered in the federal building in Grand Island,
Nebraska.,
All law enforcement agencies that were to partici
pate in the
2

 _________land

.
attempted arrest of Velez, including the FBI, are
members of the
task force.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOtI) which sets
forth the policies and procedures of the TTF was most
recently
signed by the ten participating agencies (except the
Immigration
and Naturalization Service) in late 1996 and early
1997.
The
mission of this task force is to “identify, investigate
and
prepare for prosecution cases against major drug traffick
ing
organizations that affeàt central Nebraska.” Although
the FBI is
an active participant in the task force, it has
no supervisory
authority over the participating officers. The MOU clearly
states that each participating agency will continue
to supervise
its officers and that officers “will adhere to all policie
s and
procedures of their parent agency,”
One of the TCTF’s first steps in preparing for Velez
3
arrest was to rent, on 9/29/97, a small single-family
home in
Alda, Nebraska, about five miles from Grand Island.
Renting this
home provided the task force with complete control over
the
arrest scene and ensured it was at least a reasonable distanc
e
from other structures.
Also on 9/29197, SAl
Itried to contact Omaha ASAC
Thomas W. Richardson. ASAC Richardson was not in, so
SA______
left a message that he needed approval for both aviatio
n support
and technical coverage of the arrest of Velêz.
ASAC Richardson supervises the Omaha Division pilots
and the primary ter)inr’.]]v iine agent (TTA). A.SAC
Richardson
contacted pilot SAl
land TTF
directed them to be available to assist S
las necessary.
ASAC Richardson .hen contacted Omaha SSAs I
land
I
I and advised them that an operational plan would
need to be developed for the arrest.
SSAI
Ihas administrative responsibility for the
North Platte and Grand Island RAs and is the rating
official for
SAs assigned there.
As fr
rse supervision in the RAS is
concerned, however, SSA I
I oversees investigations only in
those programs which are supervised off of his squa4 n
i.e.., VCMO, Domestic Terrorism and Applicants. SSA
I
I the
Omaha Division OC/Drug program coordinator, is responsible
for
day-to-day supervision of drug investigations in those
RAs.
On 9/30/97, SAl
Idictated over the phone to Omaha
an operational plan for the anticipated arrest of Velez.
The
two-page plan, prepared on a form developed for use within
the
Omaha Division, anticipated the arrest would occur at 9:30pm
on
10/3/97 at the house rented earlier by the task force.
The plan
3

ih

 noted that the FBI’s Deadly Force Policy would be follow
ed, body
armor and law enforcement identification would be worn
and that
arresting officers would be using agency-issued handguns
and
shotguns.
The planned .rrest seam nr!1ncji seven law enforcement
officers, including SAsI
andl
I The plan was typed in
Omaha and reviewed by both SSAI
land ASAC Richardson.
ASAC Richardson signed off on the plan 10/1/9 and
advised later
7
during i,ntrview that ift aeared sufficient. He
did request
that

SAl

I, be available in case Spanish

language assistance was necessary. Although this
plan was typed
up and approved, it was never returned to
SAl
land was not
later used as briefing material for the arrest. The inform
ation
contained in the plan, however, was provided to those
taking part
in the arrest. and was used to formulate the final arrest
order.
At the same time he dictated the arrest plan,
also dictated an operational plan for a search of Velez’ SAl_________
drug
stash house.
It was nticioaJed that during the course of his
dealings with officerl
bn 10/3/97, Velez would lead
surveillance units to his drug storage location. The
search was
to be conducted immediately following the arrest of Valez.
This
plan was also approved by ASAC Richardson.
On 10/1/97, Omaha TTAsI
I andl
I
traveled to Alda to install electronic monitoring equipm
ent in
the house to support the arrest. They installed in the
living
room a wireless RF camera and a hard-wire microphone which
both
recorded on a VCR secreted inside the house. Camera contro
ls, a
monitor and listening equipment were also set up so the
arrest
team outside could monitor what was going on inside the
house.
One member of the arrest team,. Analysti
I received
instruction from TTAI
Ion how to operate the monitoring
equipment.
This monitoring equipment was later installed by the
arrest team in the sleeper area of a truck which was parked
beside thern house.
The TTAs also installed a TAGRA in the house
to serve as a back-up voice recording device. This electro
nic
monitoring equipment al]. functioned properly during the
arrest.
The first briefing to prepare task force members for
the 10/3/97 arrest was held 10/1/97 at the task force office
in
Grand Island.
At least seven of the ii agents/officers who would
make up the final arrest team attended this meeting. As
determined by interview, those known to have attended are:

sAl
I (Ca8e agent, but not on the
arrest team)
FBISAI________________
Police Officer I
FBI

4

 _______Iwas

___________
___________
_____________

.
Grand Island, NE, Pn1
nwrtTnn1
Intelligence Analyst
HIDTA
Police Officerl
I
Grand Islani,
‘oi.ce
Po1ice Officerl___________________
Grand Island, NE, Police Department
Deputyl
I
Adams County, NE, Sheriffs Office
Deputy[
I
Hall County, NE, Sheriff’s Office
Those members of the arrest team who did not attend on
10/1/97 are:
Police Officer F
I
Grand Island, NE, Police Department
Police Officerl
I
Grand Island, NE, Police Department

SAl

Intpal Revenue Servie
Deputyl
I
Hall County, NE, Sheriff’s Office
-

According to the interview of SAl
I during this
meeting “the goals were discussed, the manpower needed, how they
-h
1
would appr
how they would provide a logical story
related tot
Ibeing in town, putting together a surveillance
team, as_well as an arrest team, and the goals for each team.”
Deputy I
I during his interview, explained that during this
meeting attendees were provided background on the case and
an
outline of the basic arrest plan. Officer I
Isaid this
meeting was held to discuss preliminary arrest and surveillance
plans.
They discussed how many officers they would need and how
the operation would be played out.
A final briefing was held on Thursday 10/2/97 at about
3:00pm at the task force office. This meeting was_attended by
afl 11 members of the arrest team, as well as SAl
land other
members of the surveillance teams. According to interviews with
the attendees, this 10/2/97 briefing was more detailed than the
one the day before.
SAT
]advised the meeting covered the layout of the
residence and how the arrest was to take place.
Code words were
developed to be used by officer
‘‘n he viewed the drugs
and when the arrest was to occur.
to say “That’s a lot
of shit” when he viewed the drugs and “Bingo” when the deal was
5

 1

done.
SAJ
ladvised all present at that meeting that Velez
had been in possession of a weapon when he was arrested
in 1990.
Velez had not previously been considered armed and danger
ous, so
this was emphasized to the arrest team. The attendees were
advised to have access to their weapons and wear ballistic
garments.
Among the othrs attending this meeting, Officer I
advised that individual assignments were listed on a
board along
with a diagram of the house.
Photographs of Velez were provide4,
as were photographs of vehicles he may be driving.
Officer I
I
confirmed that SAl
all those present that Velez
might be armed..
Off joel
Jreca11ed that he was warned
Velez might be armed and to wear his bulletproof vest. Office
r
I
I according to her interview, said she believed “the
operation was very well planned and everyone involved knew
exactly what their role was to be.
There were no supervisory special agents from th FBI
present at either the 10/2 or 10/3 brief incs.
ssal
Iwas
on annual leave both those days. SSAI
Iwas in Omaha until
the evening of 10/3 when he trave1ed to Philadelphia, PA,
Knowing both supervisor wr ttnavai
lable, ASAC Richardson made
himself available to l
las the point of contact for the
night of the arrest.
The final arrest plan, developed at this briefing, was
as follows:
Undercover Officer I
Iwould be inside the house
meeting with Velez.
The arrest team would be waiting in two
locations outside the house.

I

Thre
eopJ.e, OfficerL
I Deputy
and
Analyst I
would be in the sleeper cab o
tractor parked immediately adjacent to the house.
had
claimed to Velez that he was an over-the-road true er, so it was
natural for the truck to be there. I
I job was to tilt
and pan the camera as necessary, monitor the conversations going
on in the house and notify everyone when the arrest signal was
given.
He was not to leave the cab durina he arrest. When the
signal to arrest was given, Officerl
Iwas to leave the
truck ax?d cover the northwest corner of the house.
Deputy
Iwas to immediately cover the southeast corner of the
house.
The remaining seven members of the arrest tem would be
in a van parked a short distance from the house. When
I
I
6

 gave the signal that he had seen the drugs,
the van was to move
close to the house. When the arrest
signal was civen the________
occupants were to exit the vehicle.
(andj
Officers!
I
were to immediately move to the vehicle
in which Velez had
arrived and secure any persons who might be
inside.
If there
were none
1 Off icerl
Iwas to cover the northwes corner of
the house and Officerj
Ithe southwest. nfcerI
Iwas
to

hold the screen dooropen so that Deputyl
jcould kick open
the front door. Once the door
was open, the remaining arrest
team members, sAl
I IRS SAL
I arjd Deputy were to
effect the arrest of Velez. SAl
Iwas appointed arrest team
leader.
team.

Case agent SA I
Iwas not a member of the arrest
He was to be the surveillance team leade
r and to oversee

the search of Velez’ drug stash house.

At 8:00am on Friday 10/3197, 1
Officer
Itried to
contact Veiez by telephone. I
Ispoke to a female who
instructed him to call back between 2:30
and 3:00pm. I
I made
his call at about 3:00pm and was told
to call back at 5;OOpm.
Wheni
balled at 5:00pm he spoke with Vç] whp agreed to
meeti
lat the Alda house at 9:00pm.
SAl
Imade a
telephone call to ASAC Richardson and advi
sed him the drugs had
been ordered.
The arrest team was in place when Velez arriv
ed at
9:00pm.
Velez entered the house, observed the $50,00
uflashn
.0
money Officerl
Ishowed him, then said he did not have the
drugs.
He said he would get them and be back in
about three
hours.
Surveillance units, led by SAl
L allowe4 Velez to
a location in Sutton, Nebraska.
When Velez left I
Ito retur
to Alda, SA
I and other surveillance units remained behind n
to search that location after the arres
t.
Velez returned to Alda just_before midnight.
The
arrest team was already in place.
I
Ile.t Velez inside.
Velez looked around the house, then went
back to his car and
retrieved a white plastic sack.. When
he entered the house the
second t±me.Vlez paused to lock the door,
setting the deadbolt.
Officerl
Jsaw Velez lock the door and commented on it,
intending to notify the arrest team that
the door had been
locked.
Analyst I
I said later that the monitoring crew in
the truck notified the officers waiting
in the van that the door
7

 .
was
the
who
the

locked.

Officerl

Iiikewise

confirmed that the team in
Of ficer
was in the van, advised during interview that “everyone in I
van knew Velez had locked the door.”
van was notified that the door was locked.

I

Officer L
observed the drugs brought by Velez and
exclaimed, “That’s a lot of shit.” As planned, the arrest team
van moved close to the front door.
raid “Bingo,” and the
arrest began.
As the arrest team came out pf thç van, Officerl
pulled the screen door open and Deputyl
began to kick at the
door. The door would not give way.
When interviewed,1
Isaid he kicked_the door abqut.
five times before injuring his leg. IS SW
later said I
I
kicked the door f iv
r six times. SAl
thought it was six
or seven tims. I
eventually gave up and SAL i began
kicking.
S
‘.
he kicked the door but could not open it
until Off icpr
jassisted. The exact number of tim AI
and Off icerj
[]icked the door is unknown. Officer I
later said, nowever, that SAF
Jkicked it “a few times,” s1e
kicked it “a couple times,” then they kicked it together “about
two or three times” before it finally opened. Others on the
arrest team confirmed that the front door failed to yield to
the
initial barrage of kicks. Almost simultaneously with the openin
g
of the door, shots were heard coming from inside the house.
Off icerl
I during his interview, said he gave
signal to arrest and waited for the officers to enter. While the
and velez were sitting on the couch, he heard the first kick he
at
the door. He looked at the door and saw it give
little bit”
after the second kick. He got up, hoping to move closer to
the
door. I
looked at Velez and saw that he had pulled a gun
and was pointing it at th &,rn. Thinking Velez was goipa to

‘“a

shoot through the doorl

Isaid “No, don’t do that.”

began moving toward the bedroom keeping his eye on Velez.I
Velez
caught up to
just outside the bedroom door, grabbed him by
the shirt co
Ii his left hand and said, “No, it’s you.”
Velez pushed
ugh the bedroom doorway, bringing the gun
up Co his face.
grabbed the barrel of the gun with his
left hand, pushing e ez toward the bedrm
[
I
stated Velez kept pulling the ouIl out of I
Ihand and
pointing it at his head.
pushed Velez up against the
wall, then reached into his waistband for his service revolver.
He raised his weapon and shot Velez once in the back. When Velez
did not drop the weapon and fall down,I
ishot him again.
Velez fell to the floor and
Jran from the house just as the
-

8

b6

 eard

door opened.
Officer I
Idescription of his struggle with Velez
was confirmed during interviews of arrest team members.
Officer
I
I as the front door was being kicked, looked through the front
window of the house and observed Velez looking at the front
door.
On the fourth or fifth kick, I
hooked again and saw Velez and
I
together in the bedroom door. Velez had his left arm
across I
lohest and appeared to be pushing him back into
the bedroom. Officer I
lexplained that while the doorkicking was going on. h looked in a window on the west side of
the house and saw
I an Velez in the bedroom doorway “going
backwards.’ Officer
j looked in a window on the north side
of the house and observed Velez move in a “hurried state” toward
the west side of the house. As he moved to the northwest corner
of the house,
“wrestling noises” coming from
inside.
Not one of those interviewed after this incident,
according to reports prepared, stated that the arrest team
members announced themse1r s law enforcement as they tried to
enter the house. Deputy
laid state that as
ntçred the
house, he yelled ‘Police.
In addition, Officer I
state, during his confrontation with Velez, that tie wasIdid
“a cop.”

[

I

Officers entered the house and found Velez on the floor
in the bedroom. His legs were underneath im apd he was
partially in the closet. Deputiesi
landi
Iwere the first to
reach Velez and they tried to pull him flafn the floor.
Deputy
[tated that Velez was still alive and said, “Help me, I’m
Uying,” but already had brown and reddish foam coming from his
nose and mouth.
Paramedics were called immediately. When they arrived,
they declared Velez dead and did not remove his body from
the
house.
SA
Itelephoned siF
I a few minutes after the
shooting.
S
I inunediately called ASAC Richardson and
advised him that a shooting had occurred. ASAC Richardson
immediately notified SAC George H. Andrew.

9

 lD-2O4 (Rev. 12-1-95)

1JNITED SrATES DEPA.RTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau o InvesligatLon

-

Copy to:

ASU, Personnel Division

Report of:
I)ate:

SSA
December 1,

CazeID#:

62A—HQ—980037
62A—BH--46384

Tiac:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/21/1997
BIRMINGHAM DIVISION

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

On 10/21/1997, Special Agents (SAs) and Police
Officers of the Birmingham Division Violent
Crimes/Fugitive Task Force were attempting to serve an
arrest warrant uponi
ItI____________________
Birmingham, Alabama, when I
I observing the SAs and
Officers, fired shots from his resi ?It 1h
rrpi,t rffi1ia1s.
Two SAS, SA I
I and SA
No SAs were injured,
Ireturned fire.
andi
j who was also uninjured, surrendered.

I

I

1997

I

Office:

BIRMINGHAM

Enclosed for the Bureau are the memoranda that
have been prepared regarding this matter.
—P

-

DETAILS:
On 10/21/97, at approximately 6:00 a.nt.,
Birmingham Division FBI Agents and members of the
b
Birmingham Division Violent Crime/Fugitive Task Force
(VCFTF) were attempting to execute an arrest warrant on
I
lat F
L. Birmingham,
Alabama.
All members of the VCFTF were wearing their body
armor wh “FBI clearly marked on the front of the armor.
Additionally, the team had a local uniform officer,
Patro1man
I Birmingham Police Department,
wearing his official police uniform, body armor, and his
marked Police patrol car parked in front of the residence.
This document contains neither recosmendatjocis nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and
is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to he distributed outside your agency.

 4

4

All members of the arrest team had been briefed
on 10/20/97
regarding the arrest plan, and were re—briefed at approximate
ly
5:45 a.m. or1o/2i/g7.
I rjtten arrest plan was prepared by
VCFTF mexnbex
I Case Agent of the a.rest under ureau
file 88C—BH—46143
-

As the arrest

I A
SA
I
1
IVCE1? member Russell Steqn. Jef erson Ccunty, Alabama
Sheriffs Department; VCFTF member I
I 11iTh1hpu,
Alabama Police Department; and VCFTF meinberi
I
Jefferson County, Alabama Sheriffs Department, were attempting
to
execute their arrest plan,I
fired gunshots at the
I
arrest team.
The shots were fired from a window on the left—hand
side of the ,residence.
SAs I
Jandi
ireturned fire
as all team members sought cover.
SAj
fired two shots
from a Bireau MP—5, on which he was fully gualif led, and SA
I
I fired two shots from his Bureau issued 10mm Smith and
Wesson odel 1076.
From a. postiori of cover, VCFTF member
I
lutilized a vehicle PA system to call the occupant of the
building outside. f
lexited the residence unarmed and
was placed under arrest. No one was injured in the exchange of
gunfire

[

I

FSAI

““

The residence was searched, and inside of a bedroom, a
Baretta 9MN semi—automatic handgun was found which was jammed
with a live round preventing further firing without first
clearing the jam.
Four 9MM casings were on the bedroom floor.
Also located were an AK-47 style weapon and an UZI style weapon.
stated to Investigators from the Jefferson County,
Alabama Sheriffs Office that he had fired at the VCFTF members,
but he did so not realizing that they were law enforcement
officers.

I

INCIC record indicates previous arrests
for Assault, Possession of Dangerous_Drugs, and carrying a
firearm without a valid permit.
Ihas been charged by the
I
State of Alabama with attempted murder of law enforcement
officials, and he has been indicted for Assault of a Federal
Officer in the Northern District of Alabama, on October 29, 1997.

2

 (12/3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

ronz:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact;

,1

Approved By:

Lusby Thom
Mershon

Drafted By:

f

Case ID #:

66-19157-34

Title:

I

I

1 Extension

V

06/26/98

1837

ILrr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
12/16/97
NEW YORK DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident involving agents of
the New York Office and a New York City Police Department (NYCPD)
Detective who shot at a charging pitbull dog during an arrest
situation.
Details:
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Joseph Billy, Jr., dated 2/6/98.
This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, ard recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

6

1
1
2

-

-

I Rm 7142
Mr.J
Mr.
m. 7825 (Eric..)
Mr.
Rm. 7116 (Enc.)
Mr. Marguise, Rm. 5155)
(1
Mr. Foran. Rm
1 6646
I m. 7427
Mr.
(1
Ms.
Rm. 7326>
Mr. Lusb
- t.m. ‘7825
1
Mr. Mershon, Rm, 7837
Mr. Bieh1 TJSDOJ
Mr.I
1 Rm. 4147
-

1
2
1
1
1
1

-

-

I

-

-

-

-

2

-

Ms. Ginsburg,_USDOJ

(1

Mr.
1
1-Mr.
1
Ms.
-

-

-

Ms.I

I

Quantico
Rm. 7861

 To:
Re

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-34, 06/26/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
This shooting incident was a result of an ongoing
investigation into a series of related bank robberies that
occurred in Westchester County, New York.

f

I

Beginning in October 1997, a series of armed bank
robberies occurred and were believed to have been committed by
a
gang of approximately four to seven individuals who used
similar
mthrr I
robbery.
Investigation revealed the identity of
las a member and prime suspect in the robberies.
Jwas also identified as the supplier of the weapons used in
the robberies which were allegedv_stolen from military bases in
the southeastern United States. j
]was described as vey
dangerous, carrying a Tec 9 pistol in a shoulder holster, and had
a pitbull dog that he often walked in his neihborhood.
Based on this information,, agents obtained an arrest
warrant forl
tin November_1997. The initial strategy called
for an informant to drawl
a public place where he
could be more easily apprehended; however, due to the difficulty
in maintaining steady contact
withi
I1u5 plan never came
to

unto

fruition.

Due to numerous complications in the original plan, a
determination was made to use a New York FBI Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) team to conduct a tactical entry either inside or
outside
The date for the SWAT entry and arrest was slated for
12/18/97; however, his suspected involveMent in a bank robbery on
12/15/97, created the need for an expeditious arrest.
Surveillance commenced in the vicinity of the subjects apartment
from 7:00 a..m., to 11:00 p.m.., each day with the knowledge that
once
Iwas physically located a 24-hour coverage would
begin.

/

On the evenincT of 12/16/97, a surveillance team led by
NYCPD Detective L
Ireported that an individual
fitting the descriotion_of i
Iwas walking a pitbull dog on
Park Avenue neart
apartment building. Detectivel
I

notified surveillance personnel that he had a possible suspect
and was exiting his vehicle to get a closer look. An agent and
another detective sitting in another vehicle resoondd that they
would exit their vehicle and cover Detectivet
I AS they
proceeded south on Park Avenue, they observed the subject on the
corner of Park Avenue and 158th Street. Although directed by
2

S

 k

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From
66-19157-4, 06/26/1998

Inspection Division

Ito

I

Detectivel
turn around, they did not for fear of giving
away the surveillance. After crossing to the east side of Park
Avenue, the subject became suspicious after glancing at a parked
surveillance vehicle and then directly at the law enforcement
of fi e
ing that the surveillance was no longer covert,
SA
broadcast on the radio that the subject was
de mi. e
t h’
‘out to confront her and
Detective
Asi
Iproceeded to walk directly
toward SA
and Detectivel
I they drew their weapons and
ordered him to stop. j
[fiiled to stop when hearing the
verh1 commands and botn iMTstigators attempted to grab him.

Iresisted, turned and fled.

witil

I

land

A foot chase ensued
the pitbull racing
through the sidewalks that connected an adjac
apartment
building.
Other surveillance_teams joined SA
and Detective
Ln the pursuit of I
iho had droppe the dog’s leash
and was running ahead of the animal. I
Iproceeded to run
through a playground area and entered a 16 story apartment
building containing 128 amily-sie apartments. He closed the
door before any of the investigators could apprehend him leaving
the pitbull on the outside.
Additional surveillance team members assumed positions
in and around the area, covering both the rear and front
entrances to the building. The subject could be observed through
a small window in the door.

7

Detective I
who was located in the rear of the
buildinq was joined by SAs[
I
land I
I Commands were shouted tori_______ to come out with
negatv rjlts.
The pitbull continued to scratch on the door
untill
lopened the door and pulled the dog inside. Within
seconds, the door
nd
second time and a woman was pushed
out, apparently byl
I The investigatozs yelled to the woman
to get out of the way and she complied.
Seconds later, the rear
door opend acin and the pitbull exited and charged directly
toward SAl
land Detective I
J Fearing attack by the
dog, both investigators fired their weapons at the pitbull.
The
dog did not stop charging and continued to advance toward
Detectivd
I
hnd SAl
They, along with SAl
I
continued to fire until the dog was killed.

[

I

fled into the apartment building where he eluded
capture fr several hours. He was arrested inside the building
by NYCPD Emergency Service Unit personnel several hours later.
3

 4

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From;
66-19157-34, 06/26/1998

Inspection Division

Iapartment

During a protective search od
and a
subsequent search, several weapons were recovered as well as
bulletproof vests and camouflage clothing. A crime scene search
was conducted by the NYCPD Crime Scene Unit, which restricted
access to the area for several hours. AU. shell casings fired by
FBI personnel were found. However, the NYCPD Crime Scene Unit
did not locate any of the shell casings from Detective
I
weapon.
This remains a topic of discussion between FBT, New
York, and the NYCPD, but will not be pursued by the SIRG.
.

J

On 6/15/98, the SIRG met to discusB the above captioned
shooting incidertt.
Chief Inspectox
Iffice of
Inspections, Inspection Division, chaired the meetinc with the
following voting members of the SIRG in attendance: I
I
I UiJOd;I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division,
Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel Administration
and Benefits Section, Administrative Services Division; Dana D.
Biehi, Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; SSAI
I Ii9al
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Richard A. Marguise, Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
iunit Chief,
NS-20 Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
I
I Unit hif. irrm Training Unit, Training
Division (TO); and,I
Supervisor, Washington Field
Office.
The only non-voting member present was I
I
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

I

Observations and Reconunendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any; (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force by the participants in this incident was justified
and in concurrence with the current deadly force policy.
This
resulted in the recommendation that no administrative aation be
taken against any agent involved in the shooting incident.

4

 ____land

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-l9157-34, 06/26/1998

Inspection Division

Members voiced concern about the number of rounds fired
during the incident.
Attendees unanimously concurred that
although the use of deadly force was justified, the use of 35
shots seemed to be extreme. Members opined that the law
enforcement personnel did not consider third party injuries nor
the possibility of ricochets which could result in potential
injury to others.
The absence of a shooting scene diagram
contributed to the concerns.
The last part of the discussion pertained to
information contained in the shooting report. Members noted that
crime scene sketches were not made a part of the report and that
the name of a Cooperating Witness was included in the report.
These issues will be communicated to New York Division
management.
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON. D. C..
That no ad

I

rtir nticr} be taken against SAs

involvement in this shooting incident.

5

jas a result of their

 _____

.

.

P0-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

UN]rED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Inspection Division (SIRG)
Training Division (FTtI)

Rcpogot
Date:

SSAI
January 20, 1998

CaseD#:

6F-NO.-62717
GE-HQ-19157

Thie:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
NEW ORLEANS DIVISION
DECEMBER 22, 1997

Charaetu:

ADMINISTRJ.TIVE INQUIRY

Sopsis:

1

o

New Orleans

On December 22, 1997, the New Orleans Division SWAT Team
executed a federal drug search warrant at I
I
I
I New Orleaçs. LnniirniR. This residence was known
to e occupied byL
I (281F-NO-62284) and
several other individuals. I
1
I
I cpnfirawd y investigation and
observation, disclosed thatl
I and other were
distributing large quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine,
and marijuana from this location.
On December 12, 1997, a federal search warrant was
obtained from U.S. Magistrate Alma L. Chasez, Eastern
District of Louisiana. Verbal authority was obtained from
AUA I
Ion Dcembqr 19, 1997, for the arrest
of I
I his brother
and a third subj ect at the
residence.
Due to information that residents at the house had been
observed with weapons, the number of persons at the
residence, and the complexity of the floor plan, SAC New
Orleans authorized utilization of SWAT to effect entry and
to secure the residence.
On December 18, 1997, a written drug search plan axd SWAT
Opaions Order were provided to
1 reviewed, and approved
by New Orleans SAC Charles Mathews and ASAC George H.
Burttratn.

This doetrnst contains neithez’ recosmendationa tor oiont
of the PX. £t is the pxety ci th
your agencyj iz and it oontsits axe not to be diatzbutcd
ouCide your ageney.

rax

ona is 1cane to

 ____

.

.

On December 19, 2.997 SWAT members used a regularly scheduled
SWAT training day to rehearse the entry of this residence.
On December 22,
briefed by t-.h
Team Leader

I

1997, all participating rersonriel we’e verbally
-t’mrnpder, SSAI
land SWAT

-c’rø

At approximately 6:30 a.m., on December 22, 1997, the New Orleans
SWAT Team entered the residence. Immediately after the entry, a
male subject was apprehended in possession of a weapon as he’
attempted to flee the residence.
Upon entry, SWAT observed several weapons including shotguns in
plain view.
While clearing a rear bedroom, after tnakincr reoeate
announcements of identity and purpose, SWAT member I
observed what he cqnsidered a furtive, threatening movement in a
side bathroom.
SA
If jred one round from a Sig Sauer
228 at the threat.
SWAT members subsequently forcibly removed
two occupants from behind a shower curtain in the bathroom. No
injury was sustained by FBI or civilian personnel. A total of
nine (9) persons were detained at the residence and five (5)
weapons seized. Drugs, records, and drug paraphernalia were also
seized.

I

Per division policy, SAC Mathews and ASAC Burttram were present
at the scene during the deployment of the SWAT personnel.
New Orleans Evidence Response Team responded to the residence and
collected evidence regarding the discharge.

-CDETAILS:
In September, 1997, the New Orleans Division received information
from the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Department regarding their
interception of one hundred pounds of marijuana being driven front
Houston, Texas to New Orleans, Louisiana. A drucr investigation
was opened and assigned to SAsI

land I

I

1

I

Iprovided information that subject
land. ottiers were involved in transferring one hwtdru
pounds of marijuana a week in addition to distributing crystal
methamphetamine and cocaine.

A federal search warrant was applied for on December 22, 1997,
forl
residéncë 1ocate. ati
I
New Orleans.
I
—

2

J

]h 7

 .
residence.

Verh1

States Attorney I

his brotherf

.
iifhrfr

I and a

js obtained from Acietjnt TTc’i
the arrest of
third subject.

J for

1

I

On December 18, 1997, SAC authority was obtain
ed to use SWAT to
enter and secure the residence. The decision
to use SWAT was
based on the following factors: (1) at least nine
people could be
in the residence; (2.) there were methamphetam
ine users who,
because of the drug’s stimulant properties, could be
confrontational; (3) the size and complexity of the
floor plan;
and (4) information was received that at least two
weapons were
in the residence.
On December 19, 1997 the SWAT Team used their month
ly trainin
day to prepare for the search. SWAT Team Leader
SAl__
gave each SWAT member a copy of the Operations Order. ________
The SWAT
Team viewed a video tape pf the residenne taken
c t-c’ rnirvey
at
that w onducted by
SI
I aflj

I

The New Orleans SWAT Team is divided into two teams,
the Blue
Team and the c]ç Team. The Blue Team was made up of Team
Leader
SAl
IBlue Buxiker Team One: SAsI
IandF
I
IB-Lue Blinker rp rrwo: SAsI
I
l
1
f and SAl
Breachx. me iue meas mission was to
I
enter and secure the first floor of the residence.

The Gold Team was made up of Tm T.Rl1 91
I Gold Bunker
Team One: SAs I
lanai
and Gold Bunker Team
J
Two: SAsj
II
IaiicI____________
I
rThe Gold Team’s mission was to secure the breach
points and to enter and secure the second floor of the residen
ce.
The SWAT Team practiced entering and securiicr the residence usincr
floor rln thM- w trn,i
,rriir1
I
I acfl SWAT Team member
gave a brief-back in which they discussed their role and
position
,-

*

On Monday, December 22, 1997, at 5:00 a.m, a briefing was
held
in the field office conference room. Present at this_meeting
were SAC Mathews, ASAC Burttram, the SWAT Team, SSAI______
members of the Drug Squad participating in the perimeter and
search, three Agents from other squads to assist in the
perimeter, one New Orleans police Department (NOPD) Detective,
and two Deputies from the St. Bernad Parish Sheriff’s
Department.
(Hostage Negotiator SAl
Iwas briefed
after this meeting.)
At the briefing, there was an ovez,riew of th investigation
during wb±ch the presence of weapons at the residence was
mentioned in addition to the presence of one dog. The deadly
3

 0

.•

force policy was reviewed and perimeter assignments were made.
All piei- were told to wear their body armor.
SWAT Team
I4eader I
I gave am overview of the SWAT operation.
The briefing adjourned at 5:30 a .iu. The SWAT Team suited up and
conducted an equipment check. All search participants lined up
in their vehicles at approximately 6:15 a.m., outside of the
Office parking garage. After waiting for more daylight, the
group caravanned over to the residence, arriving at approximately
6:30 a.rn.
After securing the back perimeter with two Agents and one NOPD
Officer, the SWAT Team lined u along the brick wall to the left
of the residence.
made a call to the residence and
sAl
ordered that the door e opened. When the door was not opened
after 30 seconds, it was breached by

N
8

I

As the Gold Team guarded the front of the residence, the Blue
Team entered Bedroom Number One
(See drawing following this
section.)
Blue Team Leaden
Iaxmounced that the FI was
executinc_a federal search warrant. In this room, SAsI
andi
Iobserved a shotgun.

I

The Blue Team then entered the kitchen and living room area.
There were two unarmed male subj eats and one German Shepard in
this area. SAl
lordered one of the subjects to place the dog
outside.
SAl
Ithen hand-cuffed both subjects. SAl
Ithen
armounced hi name and purpose and ordered anyone else present in
the residence to come out. A female subject came out from
Bedroom Number Two.
Blue Bunker Team One cleared the hail bathroom as Blue Bunker
Team Two cleaned Bedroom Nutrer Two.
In Bedroom Number Two, SA
I
Jobserved a shotgun laying in the floor, next to the
bed.
After reconvening in the hallway, Blue Bunker Team One
entered Bedroom Number Three as Blue Bunker Team Two entered
Bedroom Number Four.
A Blue Bunker Team Two entered Bedroom Number Frnir. AI
I
carried an MP5, in addition to his pistol.
SAl
Icarnied
the Bunker, in addition to his pistol. The room was dark.
The
drapes were closed and the wall switch did not work. There were
numerous pieces of clothing and bedding on the floor.
After clearing the corners of the room, SAl
to the center and looked into the adjoining bathroom.

I

returned
There was

no door to the bathroom, but rather draperies hanging as a
partition.__SAl
Iwas standing to the left of SAJ
I
SI
I perceived a figure with a handgun behind the
drapes.
Ured çne 9 millimeter round with his Bureau-issued
Sig Sauer 228. SAl
hives
Ibelieved his and SAl
were in danger.
4

 ______then

.
After firing one round, S3J
lasked SAL
Iwhat
happened to which SAl
a vised he saw movement in the
athrpom.
SAS I
entered the bedroom,
SA
I
I advised that he had peen a fioue with a gun in the
bathroom.
tod SAl
SAl
Ito holster his isto
and instructed SAl
Ito search the 1athrootn. SAl_________
found two unarmed ceiiaIes hiding in the bathtub. They admitted
to hearing SAl
Iannounpements but were too scared to come
out of hiding.
SAl
I instructed the Blue Team to re-sweep
the first floor as the Gold Team secured the upstairs, where
there were three additional adults and one child.
A the time the SWAT Team was entering the residence, two
subjects escaped out the back.
This fact was known by several of
the SWAT Team members, but not by sA[
It is noted
that one of the subjects who attempted to escape was caught by
the Qo Officer at the rear perimeter. This subject was armed
with a handgun.
The other subject escaped. After the house was
secured the SWAT Team did a neighborhood sweep to search for the
missing subject.
This search was negative. The SWAT Team
returned to the office and held a critique session. The
residence was searched pursuant to the federal warrant.
After securing the residence, SAC Mathews and ASAC Burttram were
notified of the shooting. The ER.T was notified and requested to
take photographs, draw appropriate sketches, and retrieve the
bullet from the wall. io injury was sustained. A total of nine
persons were detained at the residence. Two of the subjects were
arrested.
Five weapons were seized in addition to drugs and drug
paraphernalia.

5

 P13-204 (Rev. 3-3.59)

UNITED STATES DEPAITMENT OF JUSUCE
FedeaL Bureau of tavestigation

Copy to:

Report of:
Dale:

ASAC SUSAN R. CHAINER
SeptemJer 17, 1997

FieldOfftcePjtt:
Bureau Pile N:

66F—LA209833

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY;
SHcOTING INCILENT;
IOS ANGELES DIVISION
8/2a77

Character

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

offic

lios Angeles FiJ.d Off ice

On August. 29, 1997, SAl
land SAF
I as’igned tq the Los An’eles Fi&Ld Q’ffice o the’ Feder.1
Bureau of Investigation (FBI>, were on duty and conducting
seôurity backgrouid investigation in the 600 block of N. Roxbury
Drive, Rverly Hills, CalifornIa.

Synopsia:

I

pOximate)y 2:40 p.m., after_completing their
neighborhood investigation,, SAsI
Iwére rturning to
land I
the Buieau vehi’le parked north bound in front of 61 N. Ro’xbury.
At that time, both SAs observed •a Hispanic male, approximately 25
years pf age, 5’ tall, walking south on the sidewalk owards
them’.
When the SAs were approximately seven fee frqm the
passenget’ door, th Hispanic male wa1kéd past them and was to
their er;
At that point, the Hispaiic male yelled and demanded
t1ieir wallets.
As. ther both tuned around, the Hipanic male
heid, a ‘blac,k colored small semI-utomatic pistol. The robber
demanded the SAs’ wallets and other property and tated that he
would blow off their heads if they failed to comply. Th.ougIout
‘the entire robbery, the rsbber continually pointed his weapon at
the SAs and threatened that he wouid kill tietn. During the
robery 1
incident both SAs eventually gave up their wallets.
A
I
lalso surrendeied th ureàu car keys anc3 his gold chain
neck1ac.
The robber after looking 4t the neôkIace threw it
towards the front of. the Bureau vehicle.
During the ihcident, both SAs contihuallr talked’ to the
robber in an effort to calm him down.
Both rnved 1owiy ia
different directions frOm the robber.
SAnoved tOwd the
This ctoument contains neitt ecoenenctaticns no onclusion of the F?X. t is the prcpez’ty of the £t esid is loaned to
your agency, it aiid ice conteota are not to ‘b4 d.istrihuced outsida your agency.

 V

I

rear passenger side of the Bureau vehicle, while SAl
Islowly
moved around the fronç of the Bureau vehicle. The roter
generally followed SAl
J The robber would continually swing
his weapon back and forthbtween the two SAs and continued to
threaten and demand their property. While SAl
Islowly moved
around the front of th
eau. vehicle, the robber demanded SA
Ifanny pack.
SAl____ carried his Bureau issued 9 mm Sip
L
Sauer in his fanny pack and did not want to give it up. SAl
I
continued backing up moving around the Bureau vehicle until he
was near the front driver’s door. The robber followed SAl
I
and moved tc the front fender, driver’s side.
The robber again
jf anny pack which was worn on SAl
demanded SAl
Jright
hip.
At that time, neither SA believed that the_robber knew that
they were federal law enforcement officers. SAl
realized
that once the robber got his fanny pack which held his weapon,
the_robber would know that they were law enforcement officers.
SA
believed that the robber would shoot him. At that point,
SA_____ who was in fear for his life, drew his Bureau issued
weapon when the robber’s attention was momentarily diverted.
SA
lidentif led himself as the FBI and when the robber turned
with his weapon in his hand, SAI
If ired one round at the
robber.

If ired his weapon, the robbr
Immediately after SAl
turned and ran north on N. Roxbu
five, Apparently, SAl
I
had missed.
weapons in hand, pursued
Both SAl
I and SA
the robber. After a short chase, tne robber disappeared. o
additional rounds were fired. There were no apparent injuries.
Both SAs returned to the area of the Bureau vehicle
and, with citizen assistance, a limited search by citizen’s
vehicle was conducted, the 911 operator was contacted, as well as
the BHPD and the Los Angeles, FBI Office.
Officers from the Beverly Hills Police Department
responded and conducted a robbery investigation.
The Los Angeles FBI Off ices Agent Involved Shooting
Team responded to the scene.
A neighborhood investigation was conducted in the
vicinity of 614 N. Roxbury, Beverly Hills, California and the
area where the robber disappeared.

A crime scene investigation was conducted which
included a sketch of the area and securing photographs of the
shooting area.
BHPD provided their report under number 9707980.
Los Angeles FBI ía conducting an AFQ investigation in
conjunction with a robbery investigation by BHPD.

2

 DETAILS

I

This case is predicated upon information that BA
lassigned to the Los 2S.ngeles Field Office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been involved in a
shooting incident, when he became a victim during a street armed
robbery while on official duty, at approximately 2:40 p.m.,
8/29/97, in Beverly Hills, California.

3

 __________________[was

FD204 (Rev. -3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investa&n

Copy to:

Repotof
Date:

SSAI
June

FiektOfficeFde#:
Bureau File I

•66F19157-3

Thie:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
BALTIMORE DIVISION
JUNE 6, 1997

Character;

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shooting incident involved a Special Agent (SA) of
the FBI assigned to the Baltimore DiVision, Wilmington
Resident Agency (RA).
The incident occurred during the
successful apprehension of a wanted felon by members of
the Delaware Joint Violent Crime Fugitive Task Force
(VCFTF).

20,

1997

Offlc:

Baltimore

DETAILS:
Baltimore file number 88A—BA--9117 wag
itiatpd
based upon a warrant for the arrest oft
a
white male, date of birth
wanted
by Delaware authorities for 1st Degree Robbery, Possession
of Narcotics and 2nd Degree Forgery.
He was also wanted
for several other misdemeanor offenses charged by multiple
municipalities within the State of Delaware. Thi
investigation was conducted by the FBI led VCFTF.

.

I
Iwas arrested by VCFTF members on
3/5/97 at I
I Wilmiwton, Delaware, the
residence of his parents. I
Junsuccessfully
attempted to flee from the rear ot tne house during the
arrest.
Having posted bond,I
Iwas released
following this arrest. He then failed to appear for his

This dcctinent contains neither reccemendatlcns nor conclusIons of the FBI. It Is the property of the FBI end
Is loaned to
your agency; ft and its contents are not to be distribted outside your agency.

 court date thus again causing a warrant to be issued for his
arrest, and the reinitiation of a UFAP—PI.
Officer I
I the Delaware Department of
Corrections, Probation and parole Division representative to the
VCFTF, originally arrestedi
Upon learning of
Ion 3/5/97.
his failure to appear, Officer I
lonce again began to develop
leads in an effort to locate and apprehend I
I
On 6/6/97, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Officerl_________
and FBI SAl
Iset out in a Bureau car to follow
up on leads in an effort to ].ocatel
I Earlier in the
week Officer I
I obtained earch warçants for the
I
Street address as well as forl
Ihimseif.

.

At approximately 1:15 p.m. Officerl
land SA
jand attempted to
pasti
determine if anyone was home. Unable to do so, Oficerl
I
made a pretext call to the residence. The call was answerect by a
woman who Officerl
At
Ibelieved to be the sub:5ect’s mother.
this point, Officer I
ontacted the Wilmington Police
Department via police radio and requested backup assistance prior
to approaching the residence. The police dispatcher advised that
no units were available to assist at that time.
Officer I
[then decided to attempt
land SAl
an interview of I
Iparents. They left their Bureau car
and approached fne resiQende. Officer I
Itoo]c up a position
at the front door of the hqiise whii directing SAl
Ito
the rear.
As noted above, I
Ihad previously been arrested
while a’temrtipg to escape through tI’e rear of this residence.
Jidentified himself to!
Officerl
Ifather and was
invited iito the residence. officerl
Ithen advised SA
radio to come to the front of the house where he
then joined Officerl
Ijnside.
SAl

land Officerl
Isearched the residence
to
locate
they
failed
interviewed
him.
land
I
parents for additional information of lead value.
parents said that they had not seen their son in over
a weeJ.
During their last contact,
Itold his parents he
J
would not turn himself in to authorities.
The parents also said
that
She
Ihad been seen with a female_of Asian decent.
was known only tol
I They also noted
Jparents as I
ldrove a careen Ford Explorer type_vehicle. Completing
thati
the interview, SAl
land Officer I
I left the
for

residence,

.

Upon returning to the Bureau car both diiz’cc
possible leads to fol),nwin thr effort to lacatel
1
jthen departed in the Bureau car
Officerl
land SAl
2

6

 __________Ion

•

with OfficerI

__________

rivinq.

Several minutes after leaving the reidence and while
still driving in the general vicinity, Officer)
I provided SA
Iwith a photocraph oft
Ihd
I
I Off ice- I
previously told Si
Ithat he had arrestedi
Ion
3/5/97 and thati
Iwas both a drug user and was mentally
ill.
At approximately 1:40 p.m., while driving in the same
vicinity, Officer Cronin observed a white male pedestrian who he
believed wasi
Jnoticed. a green Chevrolet
I SAl
Blazer driven by a whjt female parked at the curb facing the
Bureau car with its passenger door open. I
Iwas walking
toward the vehicle as if he were going to enter the Blazer on the
passenger side.

I

t the point Officer
had positively identified
Ih had driyn. riasl the Biazer.
Without commenting to
SA
Officer I
Iimediately attempted turn the
Bueau car around, however te residential street was not wide
enough.
Instead, Officer I
istopped the Bureau car at a
diagonal angle behind the Blazer.

I

.

It appeared to Officer I
to enter the right front passenge
thought it necessary to apprehend
the Blazer so as to avoid a c

Ithati

Iwas going

the parked Blazer.
He
before be got into

se
en OfficerL
If irst
the sidew
was approximately 35 feet
from the Blazer
Officer
imme iately exited the Bureau
car, approachedf
I shouted
Iname and said

saw

“your under arrest”.

I

I

It

ensued audi

the open passenger door of the Blazer.

pulling Officer

I

At the time he exited the vehicle Officer

Iwas wearing a_ballistic vest with his badge displayed on
the front.
Off icèr I
lattempted to physically restrain

I

A struggle

Ifell into the front seat of the Blazer
Iwith him.

Ishouted “go, go, go’ to the driver of the
Blazer.
orriceri
Ishouted “stop police, stop police”.
The
driver t1en began to accelerate with the lower half of Officer
Ibody hanging out of the vehicle with his feet dragging
on the ground.
Officerl
Isaid that as the vehicle
accelerated e tried tq pull himself inside to stop the driver.

He held onto j
If or fear that if he fell onto the pavement
he would be run over by the Blazer’s rear wheels. Officer
said he was in great fear for his life and the most importdrrt
thing to him at that point was to stop the vehicle.

I
•

Whn °rj

1s

I exited the Bureau car to pursue

jaiso e5cited the vehicle taking a path
3

 around the rear of the Bureau car and moving toward the driver’s
side of the Blazer.
SAl
I who was wearing his n
ballistic es with FBI placards displayed, saw Officer I
I
and
egin to struggle in the grassy area next to the
sici a
n in the Blazer’s open passenger doorway.
SA
got within three or four feet of the driver’s side door
0
e B azer and saw the female driver looking frantically from
side to side.
SAl
Ishouted some type of command to the
driver but, cannot remember what he said. Wit.nesse at the scene
said that sAl
Stop FBI’.
0
Ishouted ‘
SAl
Isaid
that at this point he heard screaming from inside the vehicle.
The driver then floored” the vehicle and accelerated away from
the curb.
lb

As the Blazer began to move away SAI
Icould
hear Officer I
Iyelling “stop police
0 stop police, stop the
car”.. As the Blzer moyed away SAl
hooked to where he
believed Officer I
Iwoi4d be standing and he was not there.
Instead, from SAl
Iposition, he could see under the
Blazer and saw two legs from approximately the knees down
flailing around and being dragged down the street.
SAl
I
realized this was Off icer
I and that he was either hanging
on to or stuck in the vehicle.

.
I

sAl
Jbelieved Officerl
Iwas in serious
danger.
Four years earlie-, while employed with the New Jersey
State Police, SAl
Iwas dragged by a vehicle in a similar
maflner for approximately 150 feet before crashing into a building
and suffering injuries.
SAl
Isaid he feared for Officer
j life in that he was in the immediate threat of being run
over by the rear wheels of the Blazer should he have broken free.
As the vehicle accelerated SAl
limmediately
began a foot chase.
In a signed sworn statement SAl
I
said “I knew at that point that I had to make the Blazer stop to
save (Off icer)I
Jlife. The only way I was going to stop
the Blazer was by shooting the driver.’
SAl
I drew his Bureau issued sig Sauer P—226 and
fired three shots at the driver of the vehicle.
SAl
I
remembered seeing the rear window glass in the Blazer shatter.
He noted that his focus was on the driver of the vehicle. He
said he knew that he shot three times but does not remember
hearing the rounds fire.
Immediately following the third shot
the vehicle came to a stop. At this point SAl
Ebelieved
he had shot the driver.
While approaching the car SAl
‘saw Officer
up and
Ifrom the car and put him on
the ground.
SA
.mmediately approached the drivers side
of the car and saw that the female driver had not been shot.
SA

removel

•

4

 I

I
I

ground.

k,rdered her out of the vehicle and placed her on the
No physical injuries were incurred as a result of SA
firing his weapon.

Upon securing botH
land the driver Officer
Icontacted the Wilmington Police Department via police
radio, notified them of the shooting incident and requested
assistance.
Officerl
lalso used his cellular telephone to
contact the Wilmington R) and notify them of the incident.

Officer I
Ispoke with Acting SSRA I
land
advised him of the situation. Acting SsRlF
iimmediately
notified SAC Knowlton of the incident and advised that no one had
been hit by the rounds fired. Acting SSRA[
Ithen went to
the scene.
SAC Knowlton, upon learning of the incident, activated
the Baltimore Division Evidence Response Team and directed that
three Supervisory Special Agents depart for the. Wilmington RA in
order to conduct the shooting inquiry. SAC Knowlton also briefed
the Baltimore Division EAP Coordinator as to the situation.. SAC
Knowlton then departed Baltimore for the Wilmington RA where he
made contact with SA [
I and personally supervised the
shooting inquiry.

.

5

 ______________

r

_______

‘—

(12I31fl99)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATLON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Pate:

7/16/97

I

Attu:

Inspection Division
Contact:

Extension 1837
Ic;

Approved By:
---—.---

Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:
Title;

lrr

66-19157-66

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDEMT
3/1/97
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Columbia_____
Div±ipn on 3/19/97.
In an effort to locate and apprehend I
I
who was wanted for Unlawful Plight to Avoid
Prosecutjon - SrmIl
qiiiH
4rf- Tharee in New Haven,
Connecticut, sN_____________________ shot and killed a dog
acting in an aggressive manner.
Details:

I

Reference report of Supervisory Senior Reeident Agent
I dated 5/28/97.

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2
1

2

-

-

-

Mr.
Mr.

I
1
I

Mr.

(1-Mr.I
-

-

-

-

-

Mr.

-

Mr.
(1
Mr4
Mr.j
Ms.
Mr
Mr

-

1
1
1
1
1

Room 7142
1
Room 7825 (Ericlosure)i
Room 7116
1
I Room 5155)
1
1
I Room 6646
IRrnm 7427
Room 7326)
ROqm 7825
J Room 7837

Ms.I
I

I

I UDOJ

, Room 4147
USUOJ

-

-

-

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mrs.
Mr.[1

6
k7C

I Room 3787F
Quantico
Baltimore
Quantj.co
Room 7

 /

To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom:
66—19167-66, 07/16/1997

Inspection

DiVi8iOfl

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

On 3/19/97, at approximately 7:50 a.m., three FBI
Special Agents (SAs) and three Fairfield C
1
irntv hviff
9
Deputies attempted to locate and’ apprehend I
b.t the
tri1pr ome of I
un Ridgeway, South Carolina.
Iwas an uArmed and Dangerous fugLtive who had a previous
arrest for assault with intent to kill.

I

Iwas

not located at the trailer home oft
however, during the arrest procedure, SAl____________________
encountered a mixed breed terrier dog that advanced on him,
bakina and snarling, attempting to bite SAl
.eg.
SN
I who judged that he did not have sutticient time to
remove his pepper spray which was attached to his protective
armor, fired three shots, hitting the dog twice. The dog died
from the gunshot wounds.

I

On 7/9/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; Francis A. Gallagher, Chief
Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; Peggy Kuo,
Acting Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDQJ; Dana P. Biehl,
Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section,
Criminal Division, USDOJ,l
I Supervisory Special
Agent (SSA), Legal Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of
the General Counsel; Richard A. Marquise, Section Chief,
_9perational Suocort Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
Unit Chief
otion
NS
2, National Security Division;
Firearms Training Unit, Training ivislon;
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit. Scientific Analysis
Section, Laboratory Division;I
I Unit Chief,
Transfer Unit, Personnel Division; and, I
I
Supervisor, 1timô flv1i4c. The two non-voting members
present were I
I Program Manager, Law Enforcement
Training for Safety and_Survival, Practical Applications Unit,
Training Division; andi
I Inspection Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inspecti.on Divison.
-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SI—RG reviewed the abve yEiopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
2

b6

 _______

/

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-66, 07/15/1997

Inspection Division

provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recomñendatjons for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that th actions of
rere appropriate and that the use of deadly force was in
SAl
accordance with the current deadly force policy. TherefQre, it
was recommended that no action be taken against SAl
las a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
One SIRG
member voiced the opinion that pepper spray is a better weapon to
use for. animals since bullets are not always effective. The
member also noted that
1 although not viable in this particular
incident, the use of fire extinguishers is another alternative to
use on charging animals. This observation resulted in the
recommendation that the Training Division discuss and consider
viable options to be used by SAs during incidents involving
charging animals.
These comments and applicable procedures
should be made known to all SAs.
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
9iit ,

against SAl
in this shooting incident,

mistratjve action be taken
a result of his involvement

las

Set Lead 2:
That the Training Division discuss and
consider viable options that can be used by SAc involved in
incidents with charging animals and make comments and applicable
procedures known to all SAs.
+4

3

ih7i;

 ________Room
_________‘Room

_______________

_________

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUT INE

Date:

Inspection Division

Prom:

Inspection

Attn:

D”’

I

Contact;

Extension

1837

L

pproved By:
Drafted By:

5/29/97

r

Lusby Thoiii4
in

Case ID

It:

Title:

2
D
3
MINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/12/97
NEW ORIiE2NS DIVISION

66—1915733
17 C

Synopsis:

To advise of a shooting incident in the New Orleans
In an effort to locate and apprehend I
I a fugitive from the Dallas Division fox
1
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution, N
shot and
killed a dog acting in an aggressive man1it.
Diviirn rrn Ii/w

f--1

Iand[

I

port of Supervisory Special Agentsl
iated 4/3/97.

This communication is prepared to fumish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
1
Mr.
2
Mr.I
(1
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr
1-Ms
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

7142
7825 (Enclosure)
j Room 7116
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
Foran, Room 6646
1. Room 7427
Mn
IRoom 7159)
Lusby, Room 7825
j USDOJ
corn 4147
USD0J

1
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mrs

I

Room 3787F
Quantico
Room 7861

I

I

 __lapproached

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-33, 5/29/1997

Details

I

of the

Inspection Division

Shooting

Incident

On 3/12/97, SAl
laccompanied by New Orleans
Police Department (NOPO) detectives and members of the FBI/NOPD
Fugitive Task Force (FTF), responded to an adçiress in New
Orleans, in an effort to locate and apprehendi__________________
Ihad. been arrested by NOPD officers on 3/7/97,
at this same location for drugs and weapons violations.
SA
f and other FTF members from the FBI established
an outer-perimeter around the residence while NOPD officers
knocked and gained entrance into the residence. After being
ad icri y the detectives that the residence was secure,
BA
the side entrance of the residence to enter
an
etermine if the si.Ibj sot had been located. As he was
attempting to enter the residence, a German short-haired dog
suddenly appeared at the door and confronted SAI
I The dog
was growling andct in an aggressive manner and then lunged
at SAl
fiischarged seven rounds from his service
I SAl
pistol causing the death of the dog.
On 5/14/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance: Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; Albert N. Moskôwitz, Deputy Chief,
Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
1 Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
James M. Maddock, Inspector-Deputy General Counsel, Legal Advice
and Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section,
Personnel Division; Richard A. Marquise, Section Chief,
ODerational Suonort Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
I
ltJnit Chief NS-2D Unit, Global Section
NB2, National SecurIty Division;
1
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Training Unit, Training Division;
J Unit Chief,
Firearms
Toolmarks UnitL Scier±iticAn1ysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and, I
ISupervisor, Washington
Field Office.
The only non-voting member present wasi
I
I
_I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

-

Observations and Recommendations

of

the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) e’raluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
2

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-33, 5/29/1997

Inspection Division

and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the actions of
kere appropriate and that the use of deadly force was in
accordance with the current deadly force policy.
SIRG members
had no observations or issues regarding this shooting incident.

SAl

LE2JJ(s):
)

Set Lead 1:
against SA I
shooting incident.

Tiat no administrative action be taken
I as a result of his involvement in this

3

-

 .

FD-204 (Rev. 12-1-95)

.

UNITED STATES DEPART1’4ENT OF JUSTICE
Federat Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

PD,

Report of:

AIXPI_______

INSJJ, ROOM 7129, ATTN:

SIRG; FTEJ
Office:

HOUSTON

June 9, 1997

Dare:
CaseIDf:

66-19157-19

Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT,
HOUSTON DIVISION;
5/15/97;
ADMINISTR.TIVE MATTER
SHOOTING INQUIRY

Charcjer

Synopsis:

J

lb 6
7C

On May 15, 1997, at approximately 11t40 a.ra. the
International Bank of Commerce (IBC), ng1eton, Texas, was
robed at cruxrnoint by three black males, later icentified
i
I
I andi
robbery
this
of
operandi
modus
The
I akal
I
was similar to a pending May 7, 1997, armed robbery of the
Community State Bank (CSB), Baling, Texas which was
land I
assigned to BA!
fled from Ing1eton, Texas, subsequent io the IBC robbery,
I was
but I
Ithe brother of subjectl
apprehended by the Angleton Police Department (APD).
isuiDsqquently confessed to the rábbery and implicated
landi
las the other two robbery
ladvised that
purina this confession’
subjects,
Iwere armed and
4
Ianc
his brotherl
Local authorities obtained arrest tarrants for
dangerous.
I
land I
acrgravated robbery far subjects [
Ithen agreed to cooperate with law
Iback to
enforcement by luring his brother I
I
Angleton, Texas, o pick him up believing thati
had been successful in eluding law enforcement. Loca1
6
authorities planned an arrest scenario utilizing a SWAT
:b7c
team consisting of various local law enforcement. BA
Iwas not involved in the planning or execution of
this arest scenario
1 but was in the general area awaiting

iso that he might participate in a
the arrest of I
future, interview regarding the unsolved bank robbery
assigned to him. sij
Ihad been previously

This docunent contains neither reconoier,dations not concLusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is Loaned to
your agency; It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 ________
__________

.

.

G6-19157-19

I

directed by Acting Supervisory Se
d nt A ent (A/SSRA),
Texas City Resident Agency (TCRA)
not to
participate in tze local act jLon whic
ed
and understood. [
and
onta.cted his ro er
arranged for a rendezvous in a deserted area on County Road 49
(CR49) near the intersections of State Highway 288 (5288) and
Business Route 288 (R288) in ngleton, Braoria County, Texas.
lb
During this conversation I
Ithat he was
Iwarnedi
bringincj his “Uzi” and would use it against law en±orcement as
well as
if this was a. setup. A1 aoorcximately U: 00
p.m., 5/15/97, an individual identified byl
las his
brother I
Iwas drivi.g a vehicle identified byl__________
as his brother’s I
vehicle, was observed traveling in
the predetermined pickup area which previously had be___________
surrounded by the aforementioned local SWAT team. SA
was a. oassenaer in an unmarked API) unit drvr1 by API Officer
I
Iihich was also occupied byl
lwho was
riding in the rear seat. Shots were fired at the subject’s
vehicle by the local SWAT team. SAl
[aeard the shots
while observing a series of flashes. Sub.eouentlv. law
enforcement radio traffic overheard by s2l
lconfirmed
this action and that the subject was fleeing the area. The exact
location of the subject vehicle was unclear to SAl
Jand
Officer I
however, by chance, the subiect vehicle quickly
entered a nor
ound lane of B288 which sj
J vehicle
was occupying.
SAl
I suddenly found his vehicle adjacent
to the subject vehicle believing it had just engaged in a
firefight with the aforementioned SWAT team. he UNSUB driver of
the suspect vehicle began to purposely brake his vehicle in an
apparent effort to get sil
Ivehicle to pull up adjacent
to it thus exposing SAl
I vehicle to a. feared broadside
attack of automatic weapon fire. During this braking action,
prone in the backseat, stating that his
ro er,
was about to shoot. Concurrent with this
activity, the driver’s side window of the suspect vehicle lowered
approximately three inches causing SAl
Ito believe that
the driver was about to shoot. SAl
tthen fire4 his
Istruck the
weapon 14 times.
Eleven rounds fired by SAl
subj ect vehicle in the general area of the c5river’ s side without
striking the intended target. The remaining three rounds, which
were not recovered, are presumed to have striken the pavement or
embankment in the vicinity of the vehicle. Subsequently, the
subiect vehiel stonped arj f-ha. pccupant, later identified as
brothers’ uncle, emerged from the
I
L the I
supt vehicle and was placed under aest for the local
equivalent of Obstruøtion of Justice. I
Ihas ,nce
admitted he had forenowi4dge that I
I and
went to Angleton, Texas, with the
I aka
2

 .

.

66-19157-19

intent to rob a banic:.
as arrested following
On 5/20/97,L
1 and has
a chase and violent shootout with local authorities
since admited to six bank robberies spanning five Texas
counties. I
iwas the primary subject in the 5/15/97 bank
robbery at the IBC, the crime from which this shooting incident
developed and occurred during the late evening hours on 5/15/97.
In total, three adult subjects and one juvenile have been
arrested on armed bank robbery charges.
DETAILS:
Background
On May15, 1997, at approximately 11:51 a.m. the
ngelton Police Department (APD) was notified that two black
males had. entered the International Bank of Commerce (lEe), 200
East Mulberry Street, 23ng1eton, Brazoria County, Texas, and
robbed it.
One black male, who was armed with a .38 caliber
revolver, walked up to the teller line and placed a white
envelope on the counter and ordered the teller to place all the
money into a plastic bag which he had handed to her. This black
male then vaulted the counter and physically took the first
teller to a second teller’s space and took the money from that
The suspect then jumped over the new accounts
teller’s drawer.
teller’s desk and he and the other black male, who was waiting in
the foyer area, ran from the bank.
During the early afternoon of May 15, 1997, SJJ
Iwas in the office of the Texas City Resident Agency
I
(TCRA), Houston Division when he was informçd that a bank robbery
Ivolunteered to assist
had just occurred at the lEe. SAl
in interviews at the IBC and then left the ‘CRA in his Bureau
In his vehicle wq.s hi Bureau issued body
assigned vehicle.
1
I observed SA I
Upon arrival at the IBC, SA I
armor.
I TCRA, iiide the bank conducting an interview on one of
I
I then entered the bank and began an
SA1
the tellers.
inter-v-jew of another teller while personnel from the APD and the
Brazoria County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) were processing the crime
scene.
While law enforcement was at the IBC conducting logical
investigation, the APD received a al1 from a resident of the
AgltQn, razQria
Tanglewood Apartments, 1210 N. CIigg
County, Texas, and stated that a black male was in the apartment
complex and was acting suspiciously in trying to obtain money in
3

I

 __________Ihad

_________land

_______[

______________________

.
66-19157-19

order to get a taxi to take him to Houston. Subsequently,
officers of the API) located this black male and esoored h1ta the
offices of the API).
The black male was identified asi
I
I who yoluntarily confessed that he, his brother
land another black male known to him only as
I arove trom tiouston to 1n leton, Texas in a red and grey
ed that he
Mustang to commit a bank robbery.
t inside the
stood in the lobby area of the IBC while
further
bank and hl -h tellers up at gunpoint,
stated thatL
Ihad the money olaced in a p astic ag and they
lalso stated that
both lef running from the bank.I
ran to the red Mustang driven by his brotber,I______
]b
w lie he,I
If led the area on foot.

I

]-)7C

I anc
szi
lwere finishing their
respective interviews at tfle .i.ic when a detective of the API)
informed them that the API) may have apprehended one of the
suspects of the IBC bank robbery and that the APD was going to
transport the IBC bank tellers to the API) station in an effort to
liecided to go the
positively identify the suspects. SAl
API) station given that if this suspect was involved in the IEC
robbery, he may be able to shed some information regarding an
unsolved bankrobbery assigned to SPJ
I
[Learned
Upon arrival at the API) station. S?I
he had
that the suspect in cusjodv was namdI
Ij
and.
I ai assacijate I
identified his brotber,I
also identified
s those who robbed the IBC. I
las having a weapon who usr 11 hirfnq the commission of
outside to
the bank robbery while his brother
drive the getaway car.

I

I

I

Iremained

lobserved the District Attorney and the
SAl
Assistant Ditricit Attorney Brazori. County, processing arrest
A decision was made by
warranjs forl
zhat this investigation was to be
A/SSRAj

handled iocaj.ly and. tnat the FBI would not participate in any

I

arrest plan or arret until Federal Process was obtained. A/SSRA
jadvised sAI
I that he was not to participate in
any arre5tpan and/or arrest relating to this bank robbery which
SA
j ackno1edged as understood.

Tnitial Arrest Plan By Local Authorities:
During the time frame that the conversations between SA
Iwere transpiring,_memrs Gf the
A/SSRN
PDack to the
APD and the BCSO agreed on a plan to lure I
indicated. iis willingness
Augleton area given that
4

 ________land

__________Iwas

________

.

.

.

6-19157-19

to fully cooperate with law enforcement,
not
aware of the particulars of this plan but wanted to remain on the
1’frf o glean any information
periphery of this activity jfl
from a potential interview of I
irelative to the unsolved
May 7, 1997, bank robbery assigned to him.
Execution

of

Arrest Plan:

At about dusk, a tactical unit made up of Officers from
the API), the C].ute Police Department CCPD), and the BCSO left the
API) station to take up their respective positions at a remote
location on CR. 49 in support of the aforementioned arrest plan.
I
The plan entailed I
aging his brother,I
When I
Iwould inform him
Ireturned the pagej
that he was successful in eluding law enforcement, that he was
secreted by an abandoned concrete plant on CR 49 and that he
twas invited by API) to
needed a ride from th’j
ride with API) Officer I
I in an unmarked API) imit to
transpnrtl
Jto a Chevron station located near CR 49
where I
L.ioi1d make this contact from a pay telephone
Jagreed that, short of the
bank.
land OficerI
I
[their role in the arrest
pretext ca.u. to ie made b
scenario would he administrative, ano. that they were not to be
involved in the arrest or other overt actions relating to the
arrest.
Upop arrival t the Chevron service station, Officer
1etermined that the pay phones at the
s4
station would ot accept incoming calls. A decision was made to
lets
luse the celli4ar telephoe assigned to BA
land. at
:51 p.m., I
I paged his brotherl
limmediately returned I
J page. After
related to his brothçr that he 1ad eluded police and
lapparently agreed to
ne was waiting to be piokeç u. I
pick up his brother. whnI
j ended this call, he advised
jtold him that he,
Officer
nd SA
Izhatl
I was bringing his “Uzi” and that if tis was a setup,
he was going to shoot law enforcement as well asi
Ihad access to
I
Iwas asked if his brotherl
I
these types of weapons and if he would use them, to whibI
I
ianswered in th fF4rative. This information was then
broadcast by Officerl
lover the radio to all law enforcement Tb7
personnel involved in the arrest scenario.

I

Nothing transpired for approximately one and on h1f
hours when it was decided by th API) On-site Command that
I nd inquire as
Ineeded to recontact his brother,l
jand SAl________ drove north
to his location. As Officerl

I

5

I

i
]‘

 .

.

66—19157-19

on B288 with
ver our
then stated to Office
four door sedan was
driving it.
station,

a

si

1
Officer

I

toward the aforementioned chevron
dan ca into
I
I
and si
Itha the si1ve
vehicle and that I
kas

land

Ithen drove their
S?I
vehicle southbound on B288, ahead
and
the
the suspect silver four door sedan. As Officer I
I vehicle b
was driving past CR49, Off ben
lobserved in his
mirror the silver four door sedan exit 3288 and proceed down CR49
which he immediately broadcast to law enforcment. Members of a
local SWATteam who were charged with effecting the arrest of
Iwere secreted along CR49. The silver four door sedan
proceeded eastbound on CR49 and turned and came back in a
westbound direction. The vehicle then slowed in front of the
abandoned concrete business and then proceeded to drive back and
forth on CR49.

of

in

same diection of
rear view

Action by Local SWAT Team
The local SWAT team, secreted on CR49, had received
orders from their, command, that if the suspect vehicle did not
comply with commands to stop, an attempt should be made to
incapacitate the vehicle by shooting the tires and engine block.
A component of the local SWAT team was charged with. taking the
occupants of the suspect vehicle into custody as the vehicle
entered the parking lot of an abandoned concrete plant. Other
members of the local SWAT team, to include officers of the Clute
Police Department (CPD), were ordered if the initial assault
failed and the suspect vehicle attempted to flee the scene, they
were to attempt to disable the vehicle with gunfire, aiming at
the engine block and/or tires, thus preventing the suspect
vehicle from reentering 3288. As the vehicle proceeded eastbound
on CR49, the local SWAT team was further instructed by radio
that, if the vehicle did not stop at the aforementioned parking
lot, stun grenades would be tossed towards the vehicle and that
it should be disabled if it attempted to flee. Subsequently,
three CPD officers of the SWAT team observed a flash and
explosion whIle the suspect vehicle accelerated rapidly westward
heading towards the CPD SWAT components positidn. Thee law
enforcement officers of the CPD fired on the suspect vehicle in
an unsuccessful attempt to disable it. The vehicle immediately
fled the scene westward on CR49.
Ivehicle was parkc1 11
Officer I
racing
northbound, south of cR49, when gunfire was heard in the vicinity
of CR49.
Subsequently, it was broadcast over the radio that
6

 .
66-19157-19

shots had been fired and the vehicle was fleeing the scene.
Officeri
Ithen began driving northbound on B288 in an effort
to identify the direction of
pf the suspect vehicle for
the arrest team. As officerl
I vehicle approached the point
where CR49 joined B288, the suspect vehicle entered B288 from
CR49 at a high rate of speed.

the
As both vehicles proceeded
suspect vehicle which was just ahead o
I vphic1
becjan a series of braking actions. SAl
I Off ice,I________
engaged
and
I believed that the suspect vehic Hr
in a firefight with local law enforcement. Sal
If urther
believed that the suspect vehicle knew it was being pursued by
law enforcement and that the braking action of the suspect
vehicle was anfort to position the suspect vehicle broadside
to SAl
J vehicle. The intent of this positioning was to
maximize damage from gunfie to 54
land the other
occupants of his vçhiol. I
I who was ecreted in the
rear seat, told sAl
Ithat his brother
landi
was about to shoot.
Action by

I
I

SAfI

At this point, SAl
I fired his Bureau issued Sig
Sauer 228 at the driver’s side of the suspect vehicle. The
susDect vehicle traveled approximately 100 feet from the time SA
I ired his first round until the suspect yehicl caine to
a compJ.ete stop.
SAl
I then exited Officerl
I
vehicle and took up a defensive position behind this vehicle,
rritrn he had no additional ammunition nor body armor.
Officer
lexited the drivers side of his veI4cle and trained his
weapon on the suspect vehicle. Sergeant I
I B5!SO. wh
was positioned on the median directly north of Officer I
vehicle, had exited his vehicle and had his weapon also traine
on the uspect vehicle. Subsequently, upon commands from Officer
a act drivr exited the vehicle and was placed under
arrest. SAl
[.mmediately contacted his superior and
informed her that he had just been involved in a shooting
incident.
There were no injuries.
Search Incident to the Shooting
As noted above, inasmuch as the APD and BCSO had a
local bank robbery investigation, the evidence collection
components of the APD and the BCSO took the lead and processed
e crime scene on B288. All tjt as collected during the late
evënin and early morning hours of May 15
16, 1997, with the
exception of S4
Sauer
is in the possession
P228,
Sig
I
-

7

 .

.

6E—19157-19

of those local law enforcement agencies.
2n inspection of the crime scene by responding FBI
personnel as well as a review of the crime scene sketcShes and
photographs taken by the AI’D/BcSQ, copies of which are in the
possession of the FBI, identify the location of fourteen spent
9mm casings in close proximity to the vehicle occupied by SA
I
I It is noted that the crime scene photographs depict
fifteçnmarkera.
Fourteen of these markers identify the location
of SAj
spent .9mm careridges while the fifteenth
i1) identifies th location of the decal
“Eighty”, knocked from the suspect vehicle due to the impact of
6
one of SA I
trounds.

7

Physical observation of the suspect vehicle revealed
twelve visible points of bullet entry.
It is possible, but
unlikely, that more than one round entred through the same point
of entry.
Eleven of the twelve points of bullet entry are
consistent with the trajectory of shots fired from the direction
Qf th vehicle SN
Iwas riding in. The twelfth point of
bullet entry appeared to be a shot fired from a position
perpendicular to the suspect vehicle which was located in the
front quarter panel close to the front left tire. This twelfth
point of entry most probably occurred during the local SWP
engagement on CR49.
V

Due to the fact that the vehiples were moving as the
shooting took place, investigators were unable to determine the
exact impact location of any errant shots.
It was apparent to
investigators that the bullets fired which missed the subject
vehicle would have most likely impacted the concrete and dirt
embankment, or the ground in front of the embankment
Because of
the worn condition and pitting and weathering of the .imbankment,
investigators could not determine with certainty if chips in the
concrete were caused by round impact or natural causes.
Vehicle Damage
During this shooting incident, the followina vphicle
was damaged by the local SWAT team and/or SA
I

I

I

A 1990 p1dsmoble Eighty. Eight Royale Brougham, Texas
temporary licencel
1 Tii1- I f cation Number (VIN)
I VehiIon May 8, 1997.
Ipurchased byl
Physical observation of the above vehicle revealed
twêlve visIble points of bulet entry. Eleven of the twelve
points of bullet entry are consistent with the trajectory of
8

V

 .
66-19157-19

shots fired front the direction of the vehicle Sri
Iwas
riding in.
The twelfth point of bullet entry appeared to be a
shot tired perpendicular to the automobile consistent with the
original local SWAT engagement.
(see E-5 through B—B).
Wpon Involved:
During this shooting incident, SAl
the following weapon:

Iiischarged

1 Serial #E178055.. with
.9mm Sig Sauer, Model P228
Federal Premium brand, .9mm Luger 147 grain Hyro-5hok jacketed
hollow point ammunition. Magazine capacity of thirteen rounds.
Crime scene investigation by the APD, BCSO and the FBI
located fourteen fired 9mm riias or 288 in close proximity to
the vehicle occupied by SAl
I(See E-3 through E-6). A
distance of approximately 90 feet separated the first .9mm shell
casing (identified by marker #1) and the last. .9mm shell casing
(identified by marker #15).
Following the shooting, SAl
1 weapon was
empty.
SAl
ladvised that he fired fourteen rounds at the
suspect vehicle, thirteen from the clip and one already chambered
in his weapon.
Media Co.rerage:
A review of all local media outlets failed to surface
any information relative to this shooting incident.

4twJnal

aly of

On May 20, 1997,1
IBraZOria County
District Attorney advised that there would be no Grand Jury
invest igation or any criminal charges filed against SAl
or any of the other officers involved in this shooting
Training:

SAl
us fully aware of the Bureau policy
relative to the importance and use of protective body armor and
the importance and need frn’ hr’1irn rnnmunitiou. This awareness
vtd his role to APD
was demd whn sL
Officer I
jreçontirming A
I and Officel
Irole, i.e. that SN
[iould not participate in
any arrest or related overt action toUils arrest. Subsequently,
9

I

 ______lunmarked

..
66-19157-19

SAl

I

left his protective body armor and backup ammunition
in his Bureau vehic1t whh was parked at the APD station and
departed in Officer
unit.

SAI

iquaiified at firearms as recently as

March 24, 1997, and is not delinquent in any scheduled firearms
training.

10

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division Erom:
66-19157-38, 03/06/1998

Inspection Division

SIRG members unanimously concurred that this incident
involved the intentional discharge of all weapons fired by law
enforcement personnel. Additionally, members agreed that the useS
of deadly force was justified and within the scope of the current
deadly force policy.
Two observations made by Chairman Lusby involved the
actions of task force members during the car stop. The first
observation was the fact that participants left Staskal an avenue
of escape by not_having blocked hi car n a1 sides.
Secondly,
SAsI
I andi
Iplaced theutselves
1 and Officer I
in a precarious position since the subject could have opened fire.
through the vehicle win.Iows resulting in injury and a potential
“cross firew event. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that the Practical Applications Unit of the
Training Division review current car blocking procedures and
determine if they adequately address “cross fire” issues.
LE?D (s):
Set Xead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, DC
That n mijüstrative action be taken against
SAsI
I as a result of their
I andi
involvement in this shooting incident.

1

Set Lead 2:
TRAINING DIVISION
AT OU)NTICO

That the PracticaI”Applications Unit review current car
blocking procedures to d tertnine if they adequately address
“cross fire” issues.
4+

5

Savage- 1605

 __________uantico

___jJSDOJ

I’ll

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTflE

Date: 9/12/97

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact:

I

Approved By:
-

Title:

I

jExtension 1837

I

Lusby T1/

Drafted By: j
Case ID #:

I

Flrr
66-19157-12

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/22/97
DALLAS DIVISION

Synopsis: To advise of a shooting incident in the Dallas
Division on 5/22/97, during the apprehension of a bank robbery
suspect.
Details:
Reference report of Inspector-in-Placej
dated 6/4/97.
This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
lb 6

lb 7

Mr.I
I Room 7142
1
Mr4
IRoom 7825 (Enclosure)1
Mn
L Room 7116
1
(1
Mr.l_________ Room 3634)
1
1
Mr. Foran, Room 646
1
i. Room 7427
2
Mr. I
Msl
(1
JRoom 7326)
1
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
1
Mr. I
1 Room 4147
1- Ms.
(15)

1
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mn
Mn
Mn

Mn
Mr

-

-

-

-

Savage- 1606

Room 3787F
FO

IOuntico

IR00W

7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-12, 09/12/97
Details

Inspection Division

of the Shooting Incident

At approximately 3:13 p.m., on 5/22/97, a subjct
entered the Fidelity Bank in Dallas, Texas. The subject, who was
later identified as Darrell Cleo Holmes, was dressed in business
attire, leading bank en1oyees to believe that he was a
commercial vendor making a late deposit. Holmes was buzzed into
the bank lobby and once he entered the bank, he positioned
himself with his back to the bank cameras and put on a hat and
sunglasses. Holmes approached a teller and displayed a large
black frame pistol and demanded money. The teller gave Holmes
$2,200 which included two electronic tracking system (ETS)
devices.
The subject exited the bank with the money and the
activated ETS devices.
Once the devices were activated, the signals were
picked up by a Dallas Police Department (DPD) helicopter. DPD
marked units responded and followed the subject in the direction
of Interstate 635 (1-635) westbound. Prior to entering 1-635,
Holmes stopped and threw one tracking device into a dumpster.
At approximately 3:15 p.m., the Dallas Division was
telephonically advised of the bank robbery. Dallas was advised
of the robber’s description, the fact that he was armed and that
the tracking devices were included in the money package given to
the robber.
Four Special Agents (SAs) assigned to the yiolen
Crimes (V( squad responded to the bank robbery. SAl______
I Da1ag Division’s bank robbery coordinator and SA
Iregnondpd in one vehicle and SAsI
1.
I
landi
I
Iresponded in their respective Bureau
cars. Each member of the VC squad had previously received joint
training with the DPD with the ETS tracking system utilized in
area bank robberies. SAl
bureau vehicle was equipped
with an ETS receiver and he had received specialized training in
its utilization. Additionally, each VC squad members’ vehicle
was equipped with DPD radios.

L

The three FBI vehicles proceeded northbound on U.S.
Route 75 toward the bank robbery location. While enroute, IWO
radio transmissions indicated that the 575 siarial was in the
vicinity of US. Route 75 and 1-635.
SAl
I STS tracking
receiver began picking up the signal. IWO units, including a IWO
helicopter, advised that the signal was westbound on 1-635 and
the three Bureau vehicles proceeded in that direction.
2

Savage-1607

 _

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-12, 09/12/97

Inspection Division

Based on the ETS signal, the DPD units and helicopter
assessed that the ETS device was in a wetbounc3 vehicle that
appeared to be a burgundy two-door Buick. At this point., no law
enforcement vehicles were operating emergency equipment. The
initial DPD marked unit broadcast its intentiq1 to commence a
felony traffic stop on the Buick. SAl
tated that he was
following a DPD unit in the High Occupancy Vehicle lane and had
activated his vehicle’s emergency equipment. At that time, the
DPD officer announced, via car radio, that the Buick was exiting
1-635 onto a one way frontage road that paralleled the freeway.
The two-lane road served as an access to exiting vehicles.
Several tt’D units continued behind the Buick onto the frontage
road and commenced a traffic stop at which time the Buick stopped
on the road.
The freeway was separated from the frontage road by a
grassy median, approximately 15 yards wide. The first DPD
stopped directly behind the Buick, slightly offset. The second
DPD unit stopped behind the first and the third unit who had not
exited on the frontage road pulled onto the grassy median at a
position that was toward the rear of the Buick. As the traffic
stop was initiated, the FBI vehicles pulled onto the shoulder of
1-635 parallel to•the frontage road. SAl
istopped his
vehicle on the shoulder of 1-635, approximately three fourths of
a car length ahead of th Buick. Th second vehicle driven by SA
I vehicle. SAL
stopped behind SA I
I nliJ.led
onto the grassy median at a slight angle behind SAl
I
vehicle, next to the third DPD unit.
As the FBI vehicles were stopping, the SAs observed a
white male, later identified as the subject Holmes, exit the
Buick. Simultaneously, the first DPD officer exited his vehicle
and took cover behind his vehicle door. The second DPD officer
had established herself at the right rear of the first DPD
vehicle with her weapon drawn. Holmes displayed a black pistol
in his right hand, waving it around while gesturing with his left
hand. There was a verbal exchange between Holmes and one DPD
officer. The DPD officers heard Holmes screaming, ‘Tm going to
kill you”.
SAsI
lexited their vehicle, drawing
landi
thir weaorn and tàok positions of cover behind their vehicle.
SAl
-Istated that he took a positior of cçver at the rear
of the driver’s side of the vehicle while SAl
Istated that
she assumed a position of cover behind the open, right front
passenger door. SAl
Istated that he exited his vehicle,
3

Savage- 1608

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-1.2, 09/12/97

Inspection Division

drew his weapon and assumed a position of cover at the front of
the driver’s side of his vehicle.
All of the SAs at the scene stated that they were aware
that shouting took place between Holmes and the DPD officer;
however, due to the numerous sirens and freeway traffic noise,
the words were unintelligible. The SAs were aware that Holmes
was waving what appeared to be a black semi-automatic pistol in
his right hand. Holmes took several steps toward the first DPD
vehicle and pointed the pistol at the first DPD officer. The DPD
officer ducked down behind the door of his vehicle. According to
the SAs at the scene, it appeared that the officer had been shot
or gone down. Believing that the officer had been shot, the SA8
and other DPD officers began firing at the subject.
SA I
Istated that he believed that he saw a
puff of smoke come from the barrel of the subject’s weapon and
after hearing SA[
nd others fire, he fired twice at the
subject.

I

According to SAl
she believed that she observed
something come off the barrel of Holmes’ weapon at the same time
she heard a. gun shot. Fearing for the DPD officers in Holmes’
line of fire, she shot twice at the subject. SA[
lalso
stated that it appeared that Holmes was moving toward nis vehicle
for cover and she then fired once more.
SAl
ladvised that from his position of cover, he
saw Holmes thrust his pistol toward the DPD officer. At the same
time, it appered to SAI
Ithat the first DPD officer had
been hit. SAl
If ired once at the subject. Upon observing
Holmes go to a sitting position on the ground in the doqrway of
his vehicle and fearing for the DPD officers, SAl
lEired two
additional rounds.

SAl
Istated that upon exiting his vehicle he
observed Holmes point his pistol toward
DPD officer and
it appeared that the pistol jerked.
SAL
Isaw the DPD
officer appear to go down aid fvir
g for his life as well as the
1
ii f, nf the DPD officer, SAl
if ired once at Holmes. SA
I
I stated that it appeared that Holmes turned toward his
vehicle in an attempt to gain cover and at that point SAl
I
fired two additional rounds at the subject.
After being fired upon, Holmes slumped to the ground
with his upper torso leaning onto the driver’s side floor board.
Off icers approached Holmes and determined that no further threat

4

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°

 a

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-12, 09/12/97

Inspection Division

existed. Once Holmes was disabled and the DPD officer appeared
to h in pntro the çAs holstered their weapons and SAs
I
I and I
I advised the Dallas Division of the
shooting incident via radio. Emergency aid was called. As
Holmes was being secured, the SA8 observed that the weapon being
utilized by Holmes appeared to be a BB guii. The gun had been
removed from the subject’s hand by a DPD officer and placed on
the pavement.

‘

According to the SAs present, Holmes received numerous
wounds to his legs and buttocks area and was also bleeding from
the head. A private ambulance company arrived shortly after the
incident and began treatment on Holmes. A Dallas Fire Department
Paramedic Unit also responded and transported Holmes to a closeby hospital where he was pronounced dead.
An autopsy report listed the cause of death of Darrell
Cleo Holmes as multiple gunshot wounds.
A subsequent grand jury report dated 7/22/97, returned
a “no bilr for all law enforcement personnel involved in this
shooting incident. Additionally, on 5/23/97, a representative
from the Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
declined prosecution in this matter.

V

On 8/12/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident. The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance: Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Denutv Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; I
I, Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Peronnel Administration and
Benef it Section, Personnel Division;
1
1
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), Legal Advice_and_Training, Legal
Policy, Office of the General Counsel; i
p Acting
n+4r mMjons Unit, Criminal
Unit Chief, Undercover r”
b7c
Investigative Division;1
Iuiait Chief, NS-2D
Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division; I
I
I
i, Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division
(TD) ;I
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit,
Scienific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; and, I
1
I
L Supervisor, Wshinaton Field Of ice. The two non-voting
members present were I
I Program Manager, Law
Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival, Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division; andi
I
Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

5

Savage- 1610

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-12, 09/12/97

Inspection Division

Observations and Recommendations of the SXRL3
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
At the beginning of discussion of this incident, SIRG
members viewed a news media tape provided by the Dallas Division
regarding this incident. SIRG members unanimously concurred that
the use of deadly force by the SAs involved in this shooting
incident was justified and in accordance with the current deadly
force policy.
The only issue regarding planning in this incident
involved the fact that participants waited too long to take
action. The Training Division (TO) representative opined that it
was gratuitous that the subject had a BB gun and that he wanted
to be killed by police.
Observations made by the group included the fact that
the line-up of the SAs vehicles were in the most exposed position
and that one SA was hiding behind a door which resulted in
concealment at best. The SIRG representative from the TD,
Practical Applications Unit advised that the unit is reviewing
the current car stop package.
The second observation made by SIRG members dealt with
the fact that no SAs were utilizing their ballistic protective
undergarments noting that the agents had time to prepare for the
situation. Emphasis was placed on the fact that each of the SAs
were members of the ye task force and should have not only had
their protective vests accessible, but should also have taken the
time to put them on. The TO representative added that an
initiative is underway to obtain completely concealable
protective armor. Additionally, the TD representative advised
that mental, as well as shooting incident, preparation is
currently being taught during training class.
SIRO members
discussed the fact that the SAC, Dallas Division, had recognized
that the SAs neglected to use protective armor and emphasized the
danger that the sAs had put themselves in by not utilizing their
vests. Although no administrative action was recommended by
members of the SIRS, this discussion resulted in the
6

Savage-1611

 To
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-12, 09/12/97

Inspection Division

recommendation that the SAC, Dallas, re-emphasize to the SAs the
importance of utilizing protective body armor.

Set Lead 1:

:a:: Dallas re-e
I

asize to SAsI
!TndI

the importance of utilizing their ballistic protective
undergarments.

7

Savage- 1612

I

 UI’

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date: 9/10/97

Inspection Division

From:

Inspection -Division
Contact: I

Approved By:

L

Title:

]

I
Extension 1837

Lusby

Drafted By:r
Case ID #:

I

Attu:

Ilrr
b6
1

66-19157-3

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
6/6/97
BALTIMORE DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Baltimore
Division, Wilmington, Delaware, Resident Agency (WDRA).
Special
Agent (SA) I
Ifired three shots at the driver
of a moving vehicle during the arrest of a wanted felon.
Details:

I

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated 6/30/97.

I

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1-Mn_____
Roora7l42
1
Mr
Room 7825 (Enclosure)1
2
Mr
Room 7116
Mn
I Room 3634)
(1
1
1
Mr.
Room 6646
1
2
Mr.
Roo 7427
s.
(1
Room 7326>
1
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
1
MrI
I Room 4147
3.
Ms.
ILJSDOJ
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mr.I

Mr.j

Mr.I

Mr.[

Mrs

-

-

-

-

Savage-1613

Room 3787F
iuantico
)b
1WF0
b7

L

Quantico
Room 7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157-3, 09/10/97

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting lncident
The Baltimore Division opened a cape based upon an
arrest warrant for sub:jectI
I who was wanted by
Delaware authorities for First Degree Robbery
1 Eo8session of
Narcotics and Second Degree Robbery. L
Jwas also wanted
for several misdqmearior offenses within tne stafe. The
investigation of I
Iwas conducted by the Delaware Joint
Violent Crime Fugitive Task Force (VC?rF) which was led by the
Bureau.

I

iwas arrested by VCFTF members on 3/5/97, in
Wilmingn Hvq posted bond, he was released following this
arrest. I
Ifailed to appear for his court date causing a
warrant to be issued for his arrest, and the reinitiation of an
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution Preliminary Inquiry.
I

On 6/6/97, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Officer
I the Delaware Department of Corrections, Pr
Parole Division representative to the VCFTF, and S
began to follow leads in an effort to locate
Search
warrants had been obtained by Officer
ier t at week
for a Delaware address as well as for
himself.
approximately 1:15 p. in., Officer I
land SA
past the Delaware address to determine if anyone
was in the home. Unable to determine if anyone was in the home,
Officer I
Itnade a call to the residence which was answered by
a female believed to be the subject’s mother. Officexi________
contacted the Wilmington Police Department via police radio and
requested backup assistance prior to approaching the residence;
however, the police dispatcher advised that no units ware
available to assist at that time.
Officerl
land SAl
Idecided to attempt to
interviçwl
Iparents. As they approached the residence,
Off icer
ltook a position at the front door of the house
while directing SN
Ito the rear. This action was taken
due to the fact that
1 had previously_attemDted to escape
through the rear of tzu.s resid’ence. Off icer
lidentified
himself to the fathqr.and was invited into the residence. I
I
advised SAl
I via radio to come to the front of the house
where he joined Officerl______ inside.

The residence was searched, however, the subject was
not located. During the interview, I
I parents advised
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Inspection Division From:
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that they had not seen theiç son in over a week. They did advise
that the last time they saw I
I he had stated that he
would noJ trnrn himelf in to authorities. According to the
parents,I
Iliad been seen with a
e of Asian descent
known to them as I
ove a green Ford
I They advised that
Explorer type vehicle.
Upon completion of the interview, I
land I
discussed possible leads to follow in their attempt to locate the
subject.
eveial minutes after leaving the rsidence with
Officer I
1riving the Bureau vehicle, S
Iwas
urovided
photograph of the subject.I
lalso advised SA
I that he had previously arrested I
land that the
subject was both a drug user and mentally ill.
At approximately 1:40 p.m., while driving in the
vicinity, Officer I
lobserved a white male pedestrian who he
believed to bel
[ SAl
inoticed a green Chevrolet
Blazer driven by a white female parked at the curb acing the
Bureau car with its passenger door open. I
Iwas walking
toward the vehicle as if he were going to enter the Blazer on the
passenger side.
By the zinte Of ficçrl
Ihad positively identified
the pedestrian as’
I he had driven past the Blazer.
Without commenting to si
limmediately turned the
car around, however the residei3tial sreet was not wide enough to
accommodate the turn. Officer I
Istopped the Bureau vehicle
at a diagonal angle behind the Blazer.

It appeared to officerl
Ithati
Iwas going
to enter the right front passenger seat of the parked Blazer and
he thought it necessary to apprehend the subject before he
entere the Blazer in order to avoid a car chse. When
1 Officer b7
I
!first saw the subject on the sidewalki
Iwas
approximately 35 feet from the Blazer. Off icfI
r
immediately exited the Bureau car, approached I
shouted
his name and said uyoulrr
.ttempted
prrest.” Officerj
to physically restrain I
I at the ooei passenger door of
the Blazer. A struggle ensued and I
fell jp1 fh
_J
seat of the Blazer pulling Off icerl
wi h him. I
shouted “go, go, go” to the driver L. I..Lit lazer and Officer
I
bhouted “stop police, stop police.” The driver began to
accelerate with the lower half of Officer F
Ibody hanging
out of the vehicle with his feet dragging on the ground. Officer
I
Iadvjsed that as the vehicle accelerated, Ije tried tp pull
himself inside to stop the driver. He held onto
for
3

Savage-1615

 ________Istarid
________

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-3, 09/10/97

Inspection Division

fear that if he fell onto the pavement he would be run over by
the Blazer’s rear wheels.

I

I

At the same time th ff
xited the Bureau
car to pursue the subject, SAl
lexited the vehicle taking
a path around the rear of the car anct moving toward the driver’s
‘-Jie Blazer.
SAl
Isaw Officerl
land
I begin to struggle in the grassy area next to the
idwa1k jnd in the Blazer’s open passenger doorway.
SA
I got within three or four feet of the driver’s side door bE.
of the Blazer and saw the female driver looking from side to
]bC
side.
SAl
Ishouted a command to the driver later
m1nPr1 by witnesses to be Stop FBI.”
At that point
1 SA
Iheard screaming from inside the vehicle and the driver
‘floored the vehicle and accelerated away from the curb.
As the glazer began to move away, sl
Iheard
t-nr nt-lice, stop the car.”
Iyellitex
Of ficerl
As the
Blazer moved away SAl
Isaw two legsifrom approximately
th knc c-n flailing around and being dragged_down the street.
SAl
Irealized that this was Off icerl
bnd that he
was either hanging on or stuck in the vehicle.

SAl
I believing that 9ff icer I
Iwas in
serious danger, began a foot chase. SAl
ladvised that he
knew th he had to make the Blazer stop in order to save Officer
I
Ilife and be determined that the only way to accomplish
this was to shoot the driver of the Blazer. SA I
Idrew
his Bureau issued Sig Sauer P-226 and fired three shots at the
driver of the vehicle. ImmrMM-e1v f9llowing the third shot, the
vehicle came to a stop. SAl
Ibelieved that he had shot
the driver.

isaw Officer
up and remove[
from
the
car
and put him on
I
tne ground.
SAl
lapproacheci the driver’s side of the car
and saw that the female driver had not been shot, ordered her out
of the vehicle and placed her on the ground.
While approaching the car, SAl

With both subjects secured, the Wilmington, Delaware,
RA as well as local authorities were contacted and notified of
the shooting incident.

4

Savage-1616

 To:
e:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-3, 09/10/97

Inspection Division

On 8/12/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident. The following votingmembers of the SIRG were
in attendance: Chairman, Thomas Lusbv, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division;l
1Tria1 Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, !JSDOJ;
Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Pesomie1 Administratiçn and
Benefit Section, Personnel DivisionA
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), Legal Advice and Training, Legal
Policy, Office of the General Counsel;’
‘Acting
Unit Chief, Undercover
r’tions Unit, Criminal
Investigative Division]
I, Unit Chief, -?fl
UnHi. (tqpa1 Section
MS-2, National Security Division;1
I
ITnit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division
(TO) ;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Toolmaks Unit,
Anaiysis Section, Laboratory Division; and,I
I Supervisor, Wshinaton Field Office. The two non-voting
members present were I
I Program Manager, Law
Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival, Practical
Applications Unit, Training Division; andl
I
Inspection Analyst, Office of Inápections, Inspection Division.

J

I

-

-

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRQ reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
During the discussion of this shooting incident, SIRG
mepbers unaniiiously concurred that the use of deadly force by
SAl
Iwas justified and in accordance with the current
deadly force policy. This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against SA
las a result of his involvement in this shooting
I
incident.
Two issues were raised by SIRG members during the
discussion of this incident. The first issue related to the fact
that the actions of Of ficerl
tresulted in SAl
I
hvina to use deadly force. Additionally, it was noted that
I
lactions were contrary to the instructions issued to task
force members. The second issue involved the lack of sufficient
personnel present during the execution of the search warrant.
5

Savage- 1617

7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-3, 09/10/97

Inspection Division

Members emphasized the fact that one person can not cover a back

or a front
position.
Baltimore,
procedures

of a location without being praced in a vulnerable
SIRG memberà unanimously concurred that SAC,
recognized these areas of concern and had implemented
to ensure that this situation does not recur.

Set Lead 1:
flTSPBCTIQN IVISIQ

6v£I;//

AT WASHINGTON, 0. C.

That no administrative action be taken
against BA!
las a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident.

6

Savage- 1618

IL

 ___________

_____

(1213111993)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

r

Inpection Division
Contaat:

Approved By:

11/24/97

Extension 1837

[

Lusby Thomas

Iirr

Drafted By:I
Case ID #:

Title:

66-19157—26

lb 6
lb 7 C

2\DMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
8/29/97
LOS P.NGELES DIVISION

Synopsis:

I

To advise of a shooting incident in the Los Anqeles
when Special Agents (SAs)I
I andj
Iwere confronted by an armed robber.

Thr44

Details:
Reference report of Assistant Special
Susan R. 1
Chainer dated 9/17/97.

Agent

I

in Charge

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

MrJ
Mr I•

Room 7142
1
1
’
m 7825 (Enclosure) 1
Mr.I
I Room 7116
1
rir. ivarqdise, Room 5155)
(2.
2
Mr..I
IRoom 7129
Adjudication Unit)
(1
1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646
2
Mr. [
IRqorn 7427
Ms. I
(1
I Room 7326)
1
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
1
Mr4
Room 7837
1
Mr4
oom 4147
2-MrJ
DOJ
(1-Ms.I
-

-

-

-

Mr.I

Mr.
Mrs.

IFOQuantico
I

Room 7861

-

lOb

-

lOlL

-

-

-

-

-

-

I

Savage- 1619

 U

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19167-26, 11/24/1997

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 8/29/97, SAsI
I andi
I
were on duty and conducting a security backg’ound investigation
on North Roxbury Drive in Beverly Hills, Califoriia. At
approximately 2:40 p.m., after completing thei- neighborhood
investigation, the agents were returning to their Bureau vehicle
parked north bound in front of 614 North Roxbury Drive. both SAs
observed a Hispanic male walking south on the sidewalk towards
them. When the SAs were approximately seven feet from the
passenger door of their vehicle, the subject walked past them and
was to their rear. At that point, the subject yelled and
dmanded their wallets. As they turned around, the subject was
holding a black colored small semi-automatic pistol.
The robber
demanded the agents’ wallets and other property and stated that
he would blow off their heads if they did not comply.
Throughout
the robbery, the subject continually pointed his weapon and
threatened to kill them. Both SAs gave up their wallets, and
SAl
lalso surrendered the Bureau car keys and his gold chain
necklace.
-

I

During the incident, SAs I
I andl
Ita].ked to the
robber in an effort to calm him as both agçnts moved slowly in
different directions from the subject.
SAl
moved_toward the
rear passenger side of the Bureau vehicle while SAl
Islowly
moved around the front of the vehicle. The robber continually
swung his weapon back and forth between the two agents and______
continued to threatenand demand their property. While SAl
I
slowly moved around the front of the vehicle, the robber demanded
his fanny pack which qorit-Mned his Bureau issued nine millimeter
Sig Sauer pistol.
SAl
I knowing that his weapon was inside
the fanny pack, continued backing up moving around the Bureau
vehicle until he was near the front driver’s door. The robber
followed SAl
land moved to the front fender of the driver’s
side of the vehicle and again demanded his fanny pack. At that
time, neither SA believed that the robber_knew they were federal
law enforcement officers. However, AI
I realized that once
the robber got his fanny pack which held his_weao9n, he would
know they were law enforcement officers. siI__Ibelieved that
once the robber became’of aware of this that he would shoot him.
At that point, SAl
,
who was in fear for his life, drew his
rnçn when the robbers attention, was momentarily diverted.
SA
lidentified himself as the FBI and when the robber turned
with his weapon in his hand, SAp
p fired one round at the
subj ect.

2

Savage- 1620

L

:

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-26, 11/24/1997

Inspection Division

The robber turned and ran north on North Roxbury Drive
and both agents pursued him. After a short chase, the robber
disappeared and no additional rounds were fired.

SAl

I

1

According to
statement, as he and si4
were
returning to the vicinity
Bureau vehicle, a citizqn
driving by stopped his vehicle and talked to SAl
Igot
I SM
into the vehicle and left.
After_SAj
Ihad left, another
citizen stopped and offered Slj
I tne ilse of his cellular phone
which was used to talk to the 911 operator who was already on the
line with the owner of the phone.

SAl

I

statement advised that as he and S4
I were
walking back to the area of the Bureau vehicle, a passing
motorist stopped and stated that he would driv SAl
xound to
look for the suspect; however, he would not give up his car.
Neither agent recalled advising the motorist that they needed his
car.
It should be noted that in the motorists statement, he
advised an individual who later identified himself as an FBI
agent stoppedhis car by holding up his hand.
The motorist
stated that he believed that was the person who said upBI, we
need your car’.
laccepted the motorist’s offer since the
SAl
robber had taken the keys to the Bureau vehicle. After several
minutes, SAl
[ea1ized that if he confronted the robber, the
motorist could be in danger; therefore, he called off the search.
At the point of SAl
return to the scene of the incident, a
Beverly Hills police officer had arrived and notification was
made to the Los Angeles Division regarding the shooting incident.
On 11/12/97,. the SXRG met to discuss the above
captioned shooting incident.
The following voting members of the
SIRG were in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy
Assistant Director, Inspection Division; Francis A. Gallagher,
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section, criminal
Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section’Chief, Per8onxe1
Administration and Benefits Section, Personnel Division; I
I Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel; Richard A.
Marguise, Section Chief, Operational Support Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief, NS-2D
UnIt. ],obal Section
NS-2, National Security Divisioni
I
h 70
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division
(TD);
andi
I Supervisor, Washington Field Office.
The only non-voting member present was I
I
Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

3

Savage-1621

 TO:
Re:

Inspection. Division prom;
66—19157-26, 11/24/1997

Inspection Division

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred thai- i-hi shooting
incident involved an intentional discharge of SAj
Iweapon
and the shooting was- in conformance with the current aeadly force
policy.
The only issue raised by the group was the fact that
placed a citizen at risk and exposed the FBI to possible
extensive civil liability had any injuries been i
This
d.
discussion resulted in the recommendation that S
eceive a
letter of censure for using poor judgement in conunan eering a
citizen’s vehicle and placing him in a precarious situation.
S2

LAD(s)s

Set Lead 1:
OFFICE OF .I’ROFESSIO’ThL RESPONSIBILITY

]bjC

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.
That SAl
Ireceive a letter of censure for
his use è poor judgement in placing a citizen at risk and
exposing the FBI to possible extensive civil liability.
Set Lead 2:
‘.“-‘

SA

dministrative action be taken against
las a result of his involvement in this

-

4

Savage- 1622

 ________________

(12(3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

Prom:

]

,.

Approved By:

I

Title:

Extension 1837

—

Tusby

Drafted By:I
Case ID #:

I

Attn.:

Inspection Division
Contact: I

03/04/98

Ilrr
66-19157-36

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTiNG INCIDENT
10 / 3197
OMAHA DIVISION

b
lb fC

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Omaha Division
during a buy-bust drug scenario in Alda, Nebraska, on the night
of 10/3/97.
This incident resulted in the death of subject
Mario H. Velez who was shot by Undercover Police Officer
lot the Grand Island, Nebraska, Police
Department.

I

Details:
I

Reference report of Supervisory Senior Resident Agent
jdated 11/14/97.

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1-Mr
Rrn. 7142
Mr.
1
I Rin. 7825 (Enc..)
I Rm. 7116 (Enc.)
2
Mr.
Mu
I Room 5155)
(1
1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646
MrJ
2
‘ om 7427
I Room 7326)
Ms.I
(1
I
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
jRoom 7837
Mr
1
Mr
2.
FSDbJ
• “oom 4147
Mr
1
2-Mr
IUSDOJ
Ms. I
(1
I
-

-

-

1
Mr.I
Fuantico
1
Mr. I
I Room 378 7F
1-Mr.j
1
Mr4
I Quantico
1
Mrs_________ Room 7861
-

-

-

-

-

lb 6
:lb7C

-

-

-

-

-

-

Savage- 1623

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-36, 03/04/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
The investigation into the drug activ{
Mric
Velez was opened on 11/4/96, and assigned to SAl
in the North Platte Resident Agency (NPRA). Velez had long been
believed to be the main source of metkamphetamine in Lexington
and North Platte, Nebraska. SA
I developed a source who
advised that Velez routinely imported multi-pound quantities of
methamphetamines, cocaine and marijuana from Mexico to Nebraska
via Garden City, Kansas.
.

Based on information provided by SAl
I source and
a review of Velez’ crimiial history, SAI
I discussed the case
with sL
bf the Grand Island Resident Agency.
SAl
ladvised that he had a good undercover police officer to
deal with Velez.
During Novemzer 1996. two drug purchases were made from
Velez, on 11/8/96, SN
bource introuced Velez to GranLd
Island Police Department Undercover Officer I
I
who purchased one ounce of methamphetamine. Although the drug
was tested and determined to be amphetamine, on 11/21/96, Officer
Ipurchased one ounce of methamphetamine from Velez.
I
n December 1996, Velez moved from Nebraska to Kansas.
SAl
Isource advised that Velez fled because he believed
that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. At approximately
the same tim he lejEt Nebraska, Velez expressed concern to the
source abouti
nd asked the source to provide additional
information about p
and how the source met him. During
another conversation between the source arid Vele in June 1997,
Velez again spoke of his suspicions about I
I claiming that
he wanted to buy too rtpich too soon. Velez also claimed that 4
’a
cop” had told him thati
Iwas a police officer. Velez did not
return to Nebraska until September 1997.
On 9/24/97, the source advised SAP
I that Velez had,
:7
moved back to Nebraska and wanted to reestablish contact with
I On 9/26/97, Velez delivered samples of cocaine and
heroin to Officer I
1and also agreed to deliver 17 ounces of
black tar heroin and 35 ounces of cocaine.
SAd
land
1 along with other members of the Tn-City Federal Drug
Task Force (TCTF), began planning a scenario intended to result
in a buy-bust arrest of Velez on 10/3/97. All law enforcement
agencies participating in the planned arrest of Velez, including
the FBI Agents, were members of the task force.
2

Savage- 1624

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-36, 03/04/1998

Inspection Division

One of the first steps taken in preparing for the
arrest of Velez was to rent a small single-family home in Alda,
Nebraska. This home would provide the task force with complete
control over the arrest scene and ensured it was
le
distance from other structures. Additionally, SA
contacted the Omaha Division to obtain approval for ot aviation
support and technical coverage during the arrest of Velez. ASAC
Thomas W. Richardson arranged for this requested support and also
advised two supervisors in the Omaha Division that an operational
plan was needed for the arrest.
operational and arrest plan was developed by
S
or the anticipated arrest of Velez. On 10/1/97? Omaha
personne traveled to Alda to install electronic monitoring
equipment, including audio and video, in the house to be used
during the arrest.
On 10/3/97, at 8:00 a.m., Officerl
Itried to
contact Velez by phone and was instructed to call back between
2:30 and 3:00 p.m. Officerl
balled at approximately 3:00
p.m., and was advised t9 callt 5:00 p.m. During the 5:00 p.m.
telephone calL_OffLcerl
Ispoke with Velez who agreed to
meet Officerl
lat the house in A].da at 9:00 p.m.
SAl
subsequently telephoned ASAC Richardson and advised that the
drugs had been ordered.
The arrest team was in place when Velez arrived at 9:00
p.m. Ve1e ntptt the house, observed the $50,000 “flash” money
in Officer I
Ipossession, and said. he did not have the
drugs but he would get them and be back in approximately three
hours.
Surveillance units followed Velez to a location in
Sutton, Nebraska and remained at that location when Velez
departed the area. The plan was to search the location after
Velez’ arrest. Velez returned to Alda just before midnight.
With the arrest team in place,I
Ilet Velez inside the house.
Velez looked around the house and went back to his car and
retrieved a white plastic sack. Upon entering the house a second
time, Velez paused to lock the door, setting the deac1bo].t.
Off iceij
lobserved Velez lock the door and commented on it,
intending to notify the arrest team that the door had been
locked.
Of ficerl
lobserved the drugs possessed by Velez
and commented, “That’s. a lot of shit”. As planned, the arrest
team van moved close to the front door. At that point,
3

Savage- 1625

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-36, 03/04/1998

Inspection Division

Off icerE
Isaid “Bingo”, and the arrest began.
It should be
noted that these were prrrneçi code words by the arrest team
to indicate when Officerl
Iriewed the drugs and when the
deal was completed.
As the arrest team exited the van Officer I
I
pulled the screen door open and Deputy I
began to kick at the
door; however, the door would not give. Several arrest team
members kicked the door with negative results. Subsequently two
team members kicked the door simultaneously and as the door was
opening, shots were heard coming from inside the house.

I

I

According to OfficerL
1 once he gave the aignal to
arrest and waited for the officers to enter, he and Velz were
sitting on the couch when he heard the first kick at the door.
He looked at the door and saw it give ua little bit” after the
second Jdck.1e got up, hoping to move closer to the door.
Off icerl
hooked at Velez and saw that he had pulled a gun
and was pointing it at the door. Thinking Velez was going to
hont through the door,I
Isaid “No, don’t do that.” Officer
I began moving toward the be3room keeping his eye on Velez.
Vei.ez caught up to officerl
Jjust outside the bedroom door,
grabbed him by the shirt collar with 14s left hand and said, “No,
it’s you”. Velez pushed Off icer
Ithrough the bedroom
doorway, bringing the gun up to his face. Officer I
jgrabbed
the barrel of the gun with his left hand while pushing Velez
toward the bedroom closet. According to Officer I
I Velez
kept pulling_the gun out of his hand and pointing it at his head.
Officerl
Ipushed Velez up against the wall and reached into
his waistband for his service revolver. He raised his weapon and
shot Velez once in the back. When Velez did not drop the weapon
arid fall down, Off icerl
Ishot him again. Velez fell to the
floor and Officer I
Iran from the house just as the door
opened.
Officers entered the house and found Velez on the
bedroom floor. His legs were underneath him and he was partially
in the closet. According to two Deputies present, Velez was
still alive and said, “Help me,. I’m dying”. Velez had brown and
reddish foam coming from his nose and mouth. Officers on the
scene immediately requested paramedics. Upon the arrival of the
paramedics, Velez was declared dead.
On 2/11/98, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident. The following voting members of the SIRO were
in attendance: Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy Assistant

4

Savage-1626

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-36, 03/04/1998

Inspection Division

I

Director, Inspection Division;
Acting Chief
Insoector. Of fic of Inspections, Inspection Division;
I
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel
Adminitratiop and Benefit8 Section, Personnel Division;
L Deputy Section Chief, Tqrrorism and Violent Crimes
I
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; SSAI
L Legal
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office ot ttie General Counsel;
Richard A. Marguise, Section Chief, Operational Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief..
NS-2D TTn
.obal Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
I
IThit Lhif. Pirearmp Training Unit, Training
Division (TD) ; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;.
and, I
I Supervisor, Washington Field Off iee
The two
non-voting members present consisted of I
I Program
Manager, Law Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival,
Practical Applications Unit, Training Division, and
I
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.
-

-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Although this shooting incident did not involve any
shots fired by FBI personnel, the SIRG reviewed the incident
since this was an FBI controlled task force.
Prior to discussing
this incident, SIRG members viewed a video tape provided by the
The discussion began with a unanimous decision
Omaha Division.
by the SIRG members that the use of deadly force was justified in
The video tape contained the drug transaction
this incident.
taking place; however, a prearranged plan had directed that the
video camera be turned off once the transaction was completed.
According to the statement of the individual operating the
camera, the mission of the video equipment was to capture the
drug transaction for court prosecution.

Two observations made by the members related to the
video equipment being turned off before the completion of the
5

Savage-1627

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-36, 03/04/1998

Inspection Division

incident and the fact that the undercover officer had a can of
beer on the table during the operation.
This discussion resulted
in a recommendation for the Criminal Investigative Division
regarding procedures for the use of video taping during buy-bust
arrests.
The SIRG Chairman will address the use of alcohol
during operations with the Special Agent in Charge of the Omaha
Division.
The last issue addressed by SIRG members pertained to
safety.
The most serious safety issue was the fact that the
subject was allowed to enter the house and lock the door.
SIRG
members unanimously concurred that the undercover officer should
have manipulated the situation to preclude this from occurring.
It was also recognized that although the arrest plan was good,
operational control was neglected.
Participants should have been
in possession of a battering ram to ensure quick entry into the
residence. Additionally, new agents were assigned to the task
force without proper training.
The last safety issue discussed
was the fact that participants allowed the drugs and abuy money’
in the same room.
This will also be brought to the attention of
the SAC.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, P. C.
That no administrative action be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in this shooting
incident.
Set Lead 2:
R!MINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, P. C.
That the Criminal Investigative Division, define and
publish guidelines regarding proper protocol for buy—bust
situations, in particularly addressing the issue of utilizing
video equipment, when the equipment should be operational and
define at what point the equipment should be shut down.
S

Savage- 1628

 ____I

I

(1213 111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF LNVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Dater

Inspection Division

Frotu:

Attn:

I

Inspection Division
contact:

Approved By:

LusiDy Thom
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

I

04/20/98

1
Extension 1837

r
urn

66-19157-4
70

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/21/97
BIRMINGHAM DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Birmingham
Division while agents were attempting to serve an arrest warrant
fort
I who was wanted for burglary charges in
Birmingham.
r)4 1

Refenae report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
dated 12/1/97.

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

b7Q
1
1
2

-

-

-

I

Mr.
Rm. 7142
IT?nj. 7825 (Enc.)
Mr.
Mr.
7116 (Enc.)
iir. Marquise, Room 5155)
(1
Mr Foran. Rcra 6646
I Rçom 7427
Mn
(1
MS.j
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr.
!Room 7837
Mr.j
IJSDOJ
Mr.I
I Room 4147
Mr. I
Ms.______
(1
-

1
2

-

-

1
1
2.
1
1

-

-

-

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.j

Mr.I

Mrs.

-

1
1
1
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

Savage- 1629

uantico
I Room 3787F
IWFO
I Quantico
Room 7861

 ___lexited
__land

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157-4, 04/20/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 10/21/97. at approximately 6:00 a.m., Birmingham
Division Agents and members of the Division’s Violent Crime!
Fugitive Tqsk Frn- (V(TF) were atttnotina to xecute an arrest
warrant oni
I at I
I in Birmingham.
All members of the Task Force were wearing body armor with “FBI”

clearly marked on the front. A local uniform officer was also
with the Task Force and was wearing his official police uniform,
body armor, and his marked police patrol car which was parked in
front of the subject’s residence.

As the arrest team members were attempting to execute
the arrest plan, the subject fired gunshots at the tam from a
window on th left-hand sid of the residence.
SAd
I
I rçturned fire as all team
members souçiht cov
If ired two shots from a Bureau
SAl
MP—5 and SAl
ifired two shots from his Bureau issued 10
millimeter Smith and Wesson, Model 1076.
From a position of
cover, a Task Force member utilized a vehicle public address

system to cal). the occupant of the residence outside. I
I
the residence unarmed and was placed under arrest.
No inj.uries were encountered in the exchange of gunfire.
The residence was searched and a Baretta 9 millimeter
semi-automatic handgun was found inside of a bedroom.
The
handgun was jammed with a live round preventing furthef firing
until the jam was cleared. One AX-47 style weapon and an UZI
style weapon were also located in the residence. I
1 stated
that he had fired at the Task Force members; however, he did not
reaaize that’ they were law enforcement officers.
On 2/11/98, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thoms Lnbv. Dnutv Aistant
Director, Inspection Division;[
I Acting Chief
Inneotor. Off ir of Inspections, Inspection Division;
I
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel
Administratiox. and Benefits Section, Personnel Division;
I
I Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism and Violet Crimes
Section, Criminal Division, tJSDOJ; sszi
I Legal
Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;
Richard A. Marquise, Section Chiçf. Operational SuPport Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief,
NS-20 Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
-

2

Savage-1630

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-4, 04/20/1998

Inspection. Division
*

I fTnit- (ThiP. 1rm Training Unit, Training
Division (TD),I
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
and,I
I Supervisor, Washington Field Office. The two
non-voting members present consisted of I
I Program
Manager, Law Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival,
Practic1 riions Unit, Training Division, and
I
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections,
;.
Inspect ion Division.
-

Observatiàns and Recommendations of the SIR
The SIG reviewed the a)ove synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that this incident
involved an Intentional discharge of the weapons of SAsI_________
audi
I Additionally, a unanimous decision was reached
that the use of deadly force was justified in this incident.
This resulted in a recommendation that no administrative action
h /c
be taken against SAs I
land I
The majority of the SIRG agreed that the planning of
this arrest was sufficient although sloppy. Participants never
considered that this arrest could be dangerous, there was no
indication in. the plan of where each participant should be
located and participants neglected to ensure that someone was
covering the back of he residence.
The SIR Chairman addressed one additional area of
concern involving one SA interviewing another. Chairman Lusby
emphasized that the desirous protocol is to have, at a minimum,
an SSA present during the interview. Additionally, the
Birmingham Division failed to submit signed sworn statements by
the agents who discharged their firearms during this incident.
Chairman Lusby advised that this concern will be communicated to
the Birmingham Division management.

3

Savage-1631

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-4, 04/20/1998

Inspection Division

LEAD(s):
Set Lead. 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION
Ai’ WASHINGTON

I

ID. C

Tht no administrative action be taken against SAs
Jandi
las a result of their
rnvo!vement in this s1ootirig incident.

4

Savage- 1632

 _____________________

(12/31/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

From:

Inspection rivision
Contact: I

Approved By:

I

Attn:

j

I
Extension 1837
6

I

b7C

Lusby Thoma
Drafted By:

I

Case ID #:

66-19157-31

Title:

3/12/98

Ilrr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SIOOTING INCIDENT
1/30/97
NEWARK DIVISION

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Newark
Division on 1/30/97, resulting in the death of fugitive Michael
Byrd.

I

flii1.

Pfi.rn.e report of Inspector-in-Place (lip)
dated 2/20/97, and subsequent report from lIP
[sated 10/31/97.

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SlaG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

Mr.
1
IRom 7142
Mr.
room 7825 (Enclosure)1
Mr.
L Room 7116
1
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
(1
1 Room 6646
Mr. FQran
1
Mr. I
2
iom 7427
Ms. I
(1
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusbv. Roqm 7825
I Room 7837
7- MrJ
1
Mr4
Foom 4147
IJOJ
2-Mr.I
1
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

Mr.I

Mr.I
Mrs.

-

-

-

-

-

-

(1-Ms.1

I

Savage- 1633

Quantico
‘
I1FO
Room 7861

 To;
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-31, 03/12/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On the morning of 1/30/97, members of the Newark
Division’s Violent Crime Fugitive Task Force (VC/FTF), comprised
of FBI Agents and Task Force officers, along with two other
agents of the Newark Division and two detectives of the Roseland,
New Jersey Police Department, attempted to arrest Michael Byrd.
Byrd was wanted on a bench warrant issued by the Superior Court
of Essex County New Jersey, for failure to appear to stand trial
for murder.
Acting on a tip received from an anonymous caller,
information was developed that Byrd drove a vehicle registered toib6
b7c
I
who lived at I
hisi
Montclair, New Jersey. Based on interviews and a consent search D
of the premise. a trminatinri w niad tht Pvrt w ni
that location. I
I
IJ.eacling uwestigators to a
residence in Elizabeth, New Jersey,I
p

I

I Agents corroborated the address, through subscriber
information for the telephone numbe4
I as
I Elizabeth, New Jersey. I
brovided
directions to the address.
Upon arrival at the residence, agents and officers
surrounded the building while an entry team attempted to gain
access by ringing doorbells for apartments on both the first and
second floors. During the initial attempt to gain access to the
building, agents posted outside the residence reported unusual
activity in the second floor apartment, including the turning on
and off of lights, opening and closing of windows, and an
occupant attempting to push a bag through a screen that was
forced out from within.
Agents were admitted to the building by a first floor
tenant who was shown a photograph of Byrd and confirmed his
presence in the second floor apartment. They proceeded to the
second floor apartment, where they knocked and announced their
presence. The agents received no response to their repeated
demands to open the door and subseq.iently forcibly entered the
apartment. Upon entry, two occupants were ordered out of a rear
bedroom. These two individuals gave an indication to the
officers present that Byrd was in the apartment.

2

Savage- 1634

I

 To:
Re

Inspection Division Frorn
66-19157-31, 03/12/1998

Inspection Division

Agents began to slowly and methodically clear the
apartment, calling out to Byrd to show himself and to come out.
They discovered the subject hiding under a bed in a rear bedroom
and ordered him to come out. Byrd suddenly jumped up, knocking
the mattress and box spring off the frame and moved to a far
corner of the room, assuming a position that concealed his right
hand. After repeated commands had been given by the agents to
show his hands, Byrd whirled toward the agents in a threatening
manner. Almost simultaneously, two shots were fired which caused
agents to believe that Byrd had fired a weapon at them. Four
agents and one Newark Police Detective fired a volley of rounds
at Byrd, killing him instantly.
The Newark Division released a press statement, based
upon initial reports from the scene, indicating that Byrd had
fired two shots at the agents who returned fire. However, it was
subsequently determined that Byrd was unarmed. Based upon this
fact and the number of rounds fired, the Civil Rights Division,
United States Department of Justice, in consultation with FBI
Headquarters, the United States Attorney, District of New Jersey,
and the Union County Prosecutor’s Office, ordered that a criminal
Civil Rights
Color of Law investigation be initiated.
-

On 2/12/97, an anonymous letter was forwarded by the
Inspection Division to the Inspection Team in Newark. This
letter alleged that Newark Division employees and management had
engaged in a pattern of improper conduct in reporting and
handling information pertaining to the shooting incident and in
the operation of the VC/FTF. As a result of this letter, the
criminal investigation was expanded to specifically address the
alleged misconduct.
The administrative inquiry into the shooting death of
Michael Byrd initially began on 1/31/97. However, the inquiry
was preempted the saule day by the initiation of a civil rights
investigation opened by the Department of Justice. The
Department of Justice review as wel]. as an investigation
conducted by the Union County District Attorney’s Office,
resulted in subsequent declinations of criminal prosecution for
all agents and the police officer who fired their weapons during
this incident. Subsequent signed sworn statements were provided
in September 1997, by the agents involved in the shooting.
These
statements were provided after completion of the criminal
investigation and the resuming of the administrative inquiry.

3

Savage- 1635

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-31, 03/12/1998

):nspection Djjgj
0

On 11/12/97, the SIRS met to discuss the above
captioned shooting incident. The foflowing voting members of the
SIRG were in attendance: Chairman, Thomas Luhv, nriifAssistant Director, Inspection ojvision4
I
Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I
I
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personiel
Administraiori and Benefits Section, Personnel Division;I
1
I
1 Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel; Richard A.
Marguise, Section Chief. Onerational Suoot Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief, NS-2D
bC
NS-2, National Security Divisionl______
Unit, Globe]. Section
I
I
Unit Chief, Firearms lraining Unit, Training Division
I Supervisor, Washington Field 9ff ice.
(TD); and, I
The only non-voting, member present was I
I
Inspection naiyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

Observations and Recoxmnendations of the SIRG
The SIRS reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for cor:ective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recottuuendaUons
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Before the discussion of this shooting incident, SIRS
member I
I recused herself from the discussion of
this incident. Ms.I
I voiced her opinion that her presence
may be considered a conflict of interest since she was serving as
the Chief Division Counsel in the Newark Division at the time of
this shooting_incident. Based on comments from other SIRS
members, Ms. I
I stayed through the discussion of the
b7c
incident with the knowledge that she would participate in the
discussion; however, would not vote on any recommended action.
SIRS members held a lengthy discussion regarding this
shooting incident and’ unanimously concurred that all law
enforcement per8Oflflel intentionally discharged their weapons
during this incident. Members further concurred that the use of
deadly force by law enforcement personnel was justified.

4

Savage- 1636

 _________las

4

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-31, 03/12/1998

Inspection Division

recommendation was made by the Shooting Incident Response Team
that the management of the squad could benefit by the creation of
a coordinator position to supervise the day-to-day activities of
the task force.
The last observation made by SIRG members was the
inaccurate information provided in the initial phase of the
investigation which required a criminal investigation. As noted
in the report, the initial statement to the press issued by the
Newark Division stated that Byrd fired one and possibly two shots
at the Agents. However, subsequent investigation determined that
the subject was not armed and did not fire any shots. A more
prudent course of action would have been for the Newark Division
to confirm the incident with the press but provide no details
until the crime scene investigation had been concluded. After a
thorough review of this shooting incident, SIRG members
recommended that no administrative action be taken against any
individual involved in this shooting incident.
It should also be noted in this communication that the
allegations of improper conduct by Newark Division employees and
management was investigated by the shooting response team. Based
on a review of the statements of agents and other investigators
present at the shooting incident, physical evidence obtained as
well as statements provided by personnel of the Newark Division
who participated in the investigation, the allegations were
unsupported by fact and without merit.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1.:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, 0. C.

p
shooting

That no administrative action be taken against SA8
land
a result of their involvement in this

S

Savage- 1637

 _____
__________
_____

(12!31l195)

•

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Preaedewe:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection

From:

Date:

03/05/1998

Attn:

Inspection Division
Office of Inspections
Contact: I

Approved By:
Drafted By:

I

Lusby Thonä/

[

Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
12/22/97
NEW ORLEANS DIVISION

66-19157-33

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident involving Special
Agent (SA)I
I SAl
If ired his weapon during the
execution of a federal drug search warrant at a New Orleans
residence.

I

Details:

Ref ernc report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
dated 1/22/98.

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

-

-

-

Room. P7142
Mr.E
1
Mn
Mr4
Ioom 7825 (Enclosure)1
Mn
Mr.j
Room 7116
1 -Mr
(1
Ivia±quise, Room 5155)
1
Mr
Mr. Foran, Room 6646
1
Mr
Mr.I
1 Rqoin 7427
(1
Mg.I
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 782S
Mr.I
I Room 7837
JSDOT.
Mn
I Rpom 4147
Mr.I
Mr..l
ITTDOJ
Ms.
Ii.
-

1
2

-

-

juantico

-

I Room 3787F

-

FO

-

-

•

IOiantico
Room 7861

-

1
1
1
1
2

-

-

-

-

-

-

Savage- 1638

b

7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection From:
Inspection Division
66—19157-33, 03/05/1998

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 12/22/97, the New Orleans Division Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) Team executed a Frv1 tlrnci ‘ch warrant
which was obtained on 12/12/97, at
in New
Orleans.
The residence was known to be ocupied by
I
I
I along with several other individuals, who were
confirmed to be distributing large qiantities of cocaine,
methamphetamine, and marijuana from the location. Verbal
authority was obtained from an Aii-nr United States_Attorney
on 12/19/97, for the arrest of L
L his brotherl
land a
third subject at the residence.

I

Authorization to use the SWAT Team to effect entry and
to secure the residence was granted by Special Agent in Charge
(SAC) Charles Matthews. This authorization was given due to
information that the residents of the house had been observed
with weapons, the number of persons at the residence, and the
complexity of the floor plan. SWAT Team members used a regularly
scheduled training day to rehearse the entry of the residence on
12/19/97, and all participating personnel were verbally briefed
by the on-scene commander and the SWAT Team Leader on 12/22/97.
At approximately 6:30 a.m., on 12/22/97, the SWAT Team
entered the residence and immediately apprehended an armed
subject as he attempted to flee the residence. SWAT members
observed several weapons including shotguns in plain view. While
attempting to clear a dark rear bedroom, and after clearing the
corners of the room, SAl
Ireturned to the center and
looked into the adjoining bathroom. There was no door to the
bathroom, but rather draperies hanging as a partition. Sal_____
perceived a figure with a handgun behind the drapes and fired one
round with his Bureau-issued Sig Sauer 228. After the round was
fired another team member asked SAl
lwhat happened and he
advised that he saw movement in the bathroom. Subsequently, SWAT
members removed two unarmed female occupants hiding in the
bathtub.
The two individuals admitted that they heard the
announcements by the law enforcement officers; however, they were
too scared to come out of hiding.
No injuries were sustained as a result of SAl
firing his weapon.

I

On 2/11/98, the SIRG met to discuss the above
captioned shooting incident. The following voting members of the
SIRG were in attendance: Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy
Assistant Director, Inspection Divisionl
I
Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Divisioni
I Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Section,
Criminal Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief,

2

Savage- 1639

 To:
Re:

Inspection From;
Inspection Division
66-19157-33, 03/05/1998

Personnel Adminjstrptjoz and Benefits Section, Personnel
Division;I
I Deputy Section Chief, Terrorsm and
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; SSAI
I
I Legal Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office
of the
General Counsel; Richard A. Marguise, Section Chief,_Oerationa1
Suptort Section, Criminal Investigative Division;I
I
.1
I Unit Chief, NS-2D Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National
Security Division; I
I TTniti flhicf. P’itearms Training
Unit, Training Division (TD);I
I Unit Chief,
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific nalysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and, I
I Supervisor, Washington
Field Office. The two non-voting members present consiated of
I
J Program Manager, Law Enforcement Training for
1
Safety and Survival, Practical Applications Unit, Training
Division, andi
I Inspection nalyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force;
(2>
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the use of
deadly force in thisshooting incident was justified. The only
observation made by the members was the fact that SAC Matthews
recognized the need for additional training for SWAT Team members
in the identification and recognition of a proper target in dimly
lit, indoor circumstances. This mandatorytraining was set to be
completed within 60 days of this shooting incident.
LEAD (s)

Set Lead 1:
INSPECTION DIVISION

/

AT WASHINGTON,
That no administrative action be taken against
s4
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.
.4.

3
Savage- 1640

-

  

1997

 

 

(L2i31fl35)

FEDEJiAj BUHEu OF INVESi1GjrnON
Precedence:

ROUTj

Date:

IflSpectjo DjVjj

To:
Erom;

Attn:

5/28/97

L

Inspection

COntact:

1837
6

Approved By:
Drafted

7

L

ZJ1rr’

Case ID

I:

Title:

ADMINISTpTpJE INQUIRy
SROOTx INCIDENT
1/29/97
SACRANTO DIVI8IQ

66-19157-67

Synopsj To advise of a shooting incident in the Sacramento
:
5
ivj on 1/29/97.
3
D
j
Peter Scott Richar
armed robbery, was shot and killed by SA[
_jana
South Lake Tahoe Police Department (SLTPD) detectives during an
attempted arrest.

Details: Reference report of Inspector...jflplace
dated 4/10/97.

[

1

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRO) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

-

-

-

1
oom 7142
Nr.L
Mr4
[m 7825 (Enclosure) i
j Room 7116
MrJ
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
‘7J,.)
(1
oran 6646
Mr.F0
0
1 Pçp 7427
Mr.L
(1
Mr.L
Room 7159)
MrLusbyom 7825
Mrj
], USDOJ
Mn
IRoom 4147
Ms[
_jsDoJ

-

-

-

1
2

-

-

-

3.
1
1

3.

-

-

Savage-i 577

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-67, 5/28/1997

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 1/28/97, Honolulu Police Department
(HPD) officials
contacted the SLTPI3 and requested thei
r
assis
tance
in locating
and apprehending Peter Scott Richards
who was believed to be in
South Lake Tahoe, California. Rich
ards
robbery in an indictment issued on 11/7 was charged with armed
/96, by the State of
Hawaii and the HPD advised that if locat
ed, they would extradite
the subject.
At approximately 5:30
on 112R/g7 rfi$ij5
located Richards, his girl
friendi
I and
their four children in South LakeThan
oe. Richards refused to
surrender and barricaded himself and
the family in the residence.
The subject subsequentlr allowed his
girl friend and the four
children to leave the residence and appa
of the movement of his family, Richards rently in the confusion
escaped undetected.
During the early morning hour
the SLTPD special Enforcement Team enters of 1/29/97, members of
ed the residence.
Although Richards was not located, offi
cers found explosives,
black powder, ammunition, military hand
books on weapons and
explosives, an 8KB assault rifle, an Ml
carbine rifle, a Rugar
carbine rifle, a sawed-off .22 caliber
rifle
, military daggers,
bayonets knives, radio receiver, gas
1
mask
,
loaded rifle
magazines, black powder detonation cord
, and other military and
survival equipment.
At approximately 12:00 noon on 1/29/97,
saE
I who was assigned as the only agent in the South Lake
Tafloe Resident Agency, received a telep
hone call from th SLTPD
informing him of the fugitive investiga
tion.
st
Iwas
requested to provide assistance in deter
mini
ng
whether Richards
was involved with vio1aticmnf Wereral
law involving militia or
terrorist activities. SA
Iresp
onde
d to the SLTPD, viewed
the seized evidence, and prepared to
assist the SLTPD detectives
in locating the subject.
-

SAt
land several detectives were preparing
to
depart the Police Department to cqnd
uct interviews when they
learned that Richards’I
Jiad telephoned to inform the
police that Richards had te1ephrnA h
5 mother and give
n her
instructions to meet him.
S?4
Ii oined four detectives and
esth91w surveillance along the main
road in South Lake Tahoe.
SAl
I accompanied by Detective[
jof the SLTPD,
learned that other detectives had locat
ed aichard& mother
2

Savage-1578

lb 7 D

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157-67, 5/28/:L997

Inspection Division

operating her Mazda pick-up on the main road in
town. A
suzveillançe of the mothj_rhh-le was estab
lished with
SAl
land Detective!
un a Bureau vehicle, two other
detectives in a second vehicle and Detective!
jin a
third vehicle.
Each participant observed a passenger in the
Mazda pick-up; however, the passenger could not
be positively
identified as Richards. While continuing with
a moving
surveillance, investigators felt that they had been
identified by
the occupants in the truck and a SLTPD investiga
tor called for a
marked police unit to make a traffic stop.
Prior to the arrival
of the marked unit, the pick-u
d to a stop in the traffic
lane of a two lane
stopped behind the pick-up
and he and Detectiv
exited the Bureau vehicle and began
to approach the truc . Upon observing a strug
gle and hearing
loud voices from the pick-no. thy retreatetn th
cover of the
Bureau vehicle. Detective
ljoined SAl
land Detective
I Richards suddenly exited the passenger side of tip
picic-up ad ointd a .25 caliber pistol towards
SAL
nd
Detectivel
I Investigation revealed that Richards fired
at least once, striking the front drivers side window
of the
Bureau vehicle.
Seeing only Richards’ head and the hand which
was holding he oistql pointed towards him and Dete
ctive
F
I BA!
jf ired four rqunds from his MP-5 rifle.
One
of the rounds rarea by BA]
Ifatally struck Richards in the
head. Detective I
[fired nine rounds from his .45 caliber
pistol and Detective E
Jfired two rounds from his .45 caliber
pistol.
Richards, who was wearing a protective vest, was
shot
five times including one wound to the head; one
to the left
forearm, two wounds in the right buttock and one wound to
the
right calf.
A physical examination of Richards after

shooting
resulted in the location of a .22 caliber pistol andthefour
loaded
magazines

in his pants pocket in addition to the .25 caliber
pistol that he held. Richards was wearing a prote
ctive vest and
evidence indicated that one bullet was stopped by
the vest.

A search of the pick-up revealed a spent .25 caliber
casing on the window of the truck, a 12 gauge shotgu
n loaded with
five rounds and 11 rounds on the gun strap, a fully
loaded and
charged SICS 7.62 X39 assault rifle, and additiona
l ammunition for
those

weapons.

Subsequent investigation determined that Richards,
who
was suffering from Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome, had told
his girl friend and his mother that he was going
to die and that
he would take a police officer with him. Richards’
mother
3

Savage- 1579

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-67, 5/28/1997

Inspection Division

confirmed that on 1/29/97, while driving with
Richards, they
observed. SA F
land the SLTPD detectives and that Richards
knew they were law enforcement authorities.
Knowing that
Richards was going to create an armed conf
rontation, she chose a
place to stop which would not endanger inno
cent third parties.
Prior to exiting the truck, Richards and his
when she attempted to keep him from exiting mother struggled
the vehicle with the
pistol.
Richards told her “I’m dead, I won’t go to
jail”, prior
to exiting the truck.
1t should be noted that subsequent to the
shooting,
SAl
both weapons to SLTPD officers at their
request.
SAl
ispoke with his supervisor in Sacramento by
telephone and advised him of the circumsta
nces of the shooting.
A shooting inquiry team comprised of investiga
tors from the
SLTPD, the El Dorado County District Atto
rney’s Office, and the
31 Dorado County Sheriff’s Department responded
to the scene.
nvetgafp
Japed recorded statements from
DetectivesL
land
land requested the same from
SAl
I After conferring with his supervisor, SAl
1
consented to the interview. He also allowed
a blood sample to be
taken for blood/alcohol content.
‘-‘-‘-‘‘

In a letter dated 3/20/97, addressed
Police, SLTI’D, the El Dorado County Sheriff’s to the Chief of
Department, and the
El Dorado County District Attorney’s Office,
the task force of
local investigators assigned to the shooting inqu
iry concluded
that SA[
jand the officers involved in the shooting fired
their weapons at Richards only after being
fired upon and in
defense of their lives.
Further, the officers involved acted
without negligence and did not commit any
crime as described in
the Penal Code for the State of California.
on 5/14/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above
captioned
shooting incident. The following voting memb
ers
of
the
SIRG
were
in attendance: Chairman, Thom T.uglw flrii4-, 4
74
s
tan
e
t
Director, Inspection Division; I
Deputy Chief,
Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;I
Trial Attorney,
I
Terrorism and Violent Crimes section, Crim
inal Division, USDOJ;
I Inspector-Deputy General Counsel, Legal Advice
aria Training, Legal Policy, Office of the
General Counsel;
Patrick J. Forari, Section Chief, Personnel
Assistance Section,
Personnel Division; Richard A. Marguise,
Sect
ion Chief,
Onerticrn1 iwrf- Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;
I Unit Chief NS-2D Unit, Global Section NS
2, National Security oivision;j
Junit Chief, Firearms

I

-

I

-

4

Savage- 1580

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-67, 5/28/1997

Inspection Division

Training Unit, Training Division;
Unit Chief,
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit
i
a ysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and,
Supervisor, ashinato;
Field Of fice. The only non-voting me er present wasi________
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-

I

Observations and Reconunendations of the SIRG

b

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

SIRG members unanimously concurred that the actions of
SAl
land other law enforcement personnel involved in the
shooting incident were appropriate and that the use of deadly
force was in accordance with the current deadly force policy.
The only issue discussed by SIRQ members regarding this
shooting incident involved the lack of response taken by the
Sacramento Division management. Members voiced concern that any
office management would allow an SA involved in a shooting
incident, especially one resulting in a death, to be left alone
to fend for himself. Members also noted that management ‘s
inappropriate response. to the situation resulted in• SA
I
being interviewe. by loca’. authorities; local authorities taking
possession of SAl
I weapon; and lastly, he was given a
blood test, all without benefit of management oversight.
SIRG
members recognized that Sacramento’s decision to wait until the
next morning to provide on-scene response was based on the travel
time to South Lake Tahoe. However, members unanimously agreed
that this incident required immediate on-scene Bureau assistance
and that Sacramento management should have immediately dispatched
someone to the scene of the shooting. As a result of this
discussion, the Special Agent in Charge of the Sacramento
Division has been advised that the lack of adherence to proper rb7C
procedures placed SAl
un a position not deserved.

5
Savage-1581

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-67, 5/28/1997

Inspection Division

LEAD(S):
Set Lead 1:
Tht n
against SAJ
this shooting incident.

ministrative action be taken
a a result of his involvement in

6

Savage- 1582

 ________IRoom

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BLJREMJ OF INVESTIGA11ON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

Prom:

Attn:

Inspection 0vision
Contact: I

approved By:
Drafted By:

William 0. Gore

J

Extension 1837

Gore Wi11iam)tb
I.usby Thoma

F

4/10/97

6
rL) 7 C

rr

Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/30/97
Kl.NSAS CITY DIVISION

66-19157-23

Synopsis: To advise of a shooting incident on 1/30/97, in the
Kansas City Division. During a Reverse Undercover Operation
CR00) to gather evidence o dma violations. 9tecial Aant (Ac
shot and killed a subject
t-r
j

1

Details: Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
dated 2/19/97.

I

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

-

1

-

2
2

1
1
1

-

-

-

-

Mn
Mr. cor
Mn
(1
Mr.
(1
Mr.
(1

IRoom 7142
ooi 7825 (Enclosure)
Room 7116

‘jarquise, Room 5155)
I Room 6012
Mr. Foran
1 Room 6646)
I
I Room 7427
Mr. F
IRoom 7159)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr.j
IRoom 7837
Mr.
j Room 4147
-

1
1
1

-

Mr.
Mr.
Mrs.

1

-

-

Savage- 1583

I

DOJ
WFO

!h7C

7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-23, 4/10/97
Details

of

Inspection Division

the Shoot:mg Incident

On 1/30/97, .whi].e conducting a RUO. an attemote
narcotics sale between I
land
subiect Joseph S. Riley, resulted in the ttemoted homiciçIe of
Riley. Based on this event., SAl
If ired
tour rounds from his .45 Sig Sauer into the upper torso of Riley
resulting in Riley’s death.
At approximately 5:53 p. rn., Joseph Riley arrived at
motel room to supposedly conclude a narcotics purchase.
Kansas City SAs and lçcal officers were in an a4acent motel room
waiting to arrest Riley. Upon entering I
I iotel room,
Riley immediately drew a revolver and shot I
un the chest
ic
with the bullet exiting his shoulder. I
ell to the floor
r
and Riley fired a secoid time, missingi
I Prior to Riley’s
second shot, SAl
lof the arrest team unlocked his interior
door and negotiated through two closed doors to gain_en4y into
After Riley’s second shot missed, I
Ibegan to
get up causing Riley to move backwards and attempt a third shot.
At that point, SAl
Ichallenged the subject and fired four
ronds into Riley’s upper torso. Upon being hit by the first of
SAl
‘rounds, Riley fired his weapon a third time striking
un the left hand.

I

I

Riley was pronounced dead at the scene and[
transported to a hospital, treated, and discharged on

Iwas

i/.31/7.

Based on n 1ectronic communication dated 3/11/97,
Inspector-in-Plac
j advised that on 2/27/97, the Platte
County Grand Jury at Kansas City, Missouri, returned a No True
Bill absolving SAl
lof any criminal responsibility in the
shooting death of Joseph M. Riley.
On 3/27/97, the SIRG discussed the above captioned
shooting incident. The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; I
I CIief
!nspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; I
I
I Inspector-Deputy General Counsel, Legal Advicr rnr
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel;I
I
Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Division, USD03; Patrick J. Foran, Section
Chief, Personnel Assistance Section, Personnel Division; Richard
A. Marquise, Section Chief, Operational Support Section, Crimina1
Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief, NS-20
Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division; and,
-

2

Savage-1584

7C

 _______

4-

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-23, 4/10/97

Inspection Division

Supervisor, Washington Field Office. George M.
Alznauer, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Richmond
Division also attended this meeting of the IRG. The only non
voting member present wasi
I Inspection Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inpection iivisson.
Observations and Reconinendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.

After viewing a video tape of this shooting incident,
the first item of discussion by SIRG members involved the use of
deadly force.
All members agreed that the use of deadly force in
this incident was justified and in accordance with the current
deadly force policy.
All comments by the SIRG regarding training and safety
issues were positive. Members recognized and commended the
Kansas City Division for its operational plan and procedures
noting that both were addressed in an outstanding manner.
Members also noted that the operational plan was rehearsed and
that proper management oversight was provided on the scene.
Lastly, SIRG members commended the actions of SAl
uring
this incident.
LEAD(S):

lb 6
b70
1

Set Lead 1:

That no dministrative action be taken
against SAl________________ s
result of his involvement in this
incident.

3

Savage- 1585

 _______

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESIIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Attn:

Inspection Division

Prom:

4/16/97

I

Inspection Tcn
Contact:

1teion

1837

Approved By:
Tho’
Drafted

I].rr

By:I

Case ID #:

66-19157-43
lb7C

Title:

DMINISTRITIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/31/97
MINNEAPOLIS DIVISION

Synapsis:
To advise of a shooting incident in the Minneapolis
Division on 1/31/97. A subject was shot and injured by Special
Agents after robbthg a bank, taking a hostage, and exchanging gun
fire with law enforcement authorities prior to his arrest.
T4[lS:

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
Idated 3/10/97.

I

I

1

This cornmunication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

Mr.
Rootr 7142
1
Mr
Room 7825. (Enclosure) 1
Mr
Room 7116
1
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
(1
1
1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646
2
Mr.
oc 7427
(1
Room 7159)
1-Mr.
m 825
1.
Mr.
Room 7837
1
Mr.
ooin 4147
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mr. I
Mr. I
Mrj
Mrs

-

-

-

.

-

-

Savage-1586

oom 3787F
Quantico
b
p
Room 7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From;
66-19157-43, 4/15/1997

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

I

I

° 1/31/97, at approximately 7:35 p.m.
lentered the Chanhassen Bank in Channassen,
Minnesota, displayed a handgun, made oral demands. for money, and
ordered employees and customers into a back room within the bank.
-

After taking control of the bank, the subject ordered
the bank manager at gunpoint to remove money from numerous teller
stations and provided a green plastic newspaper bag to hold the
money. The subject then took a female hostage and departed the
scene in the victim’s vehicle with the victim driving.
Due to the timely activation of the bank’s alarm system
and a call placed by the hostage to the 911 operator at the
initiation of the robbery, Chaska, Minnesota, Police Department
and Carver County Sheriff’s Office personnel identified the
vehicle and initiated -surveillance.
During the surveillance, the hostage executed a 180
deqree turn o the vehicle. As the vehicle came to a stop,
lexited, fired two shots in the.direction of the
I
police vehicles, and fled on foot, with the hostage, toward a
wooded area. After a short distance, the hostage was able to
free herself and was rescued by responding law enforcement
officials. The subject fled into a wooded area adjacent to
several housing developments.
Law enforcement agencies throughout the area had
responded to the scene, including the Minneapolis Divisions
Special Agent in Charge, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
a violent crimes supervisor and other SA personnel. Also
responding to the scene was the Minneapolis Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) Team leader and other SWAT Team members as well as
an FBI hostage negotiator.
-

A command post was established and. a search was
instituted for the subject. With the assistance of a Minnesota
State Patrol helicopter, and tactical teams of the PB!, the
Minnesota State Patrol and the Eden Prairie Police Department,
the subject was located and surrounded in a wooded area adjacent
to Rice Marsh Lake.
FBI SWAT personnel were briefed by the SWAT Team Leader
and the FBI policy on.deadly force was reiterated.

2.

Savage- 1587

b6
ic

 ______

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From;
66—19157-43, 4/16/1997

Inspection Division

A single exchange of gunfire occurred during the next
several hours which did not involve Bureau personnel nor. injuries
to the subject or law enforcement officers.
At approximately 11:10 p.m., the subject began a verbal
exchange with officers and. a hostage negotiator was dispatched to
the scene.
The subject repeatedly refused to surrender and
stated that officers would have to “come and get me.”
At approximately 11:40 p.m., SN___________ a member of.
the Minneapolis Division SWAT Team on perimeter, observed the
subject walking from H?e wooded area into the residential
development. SAl
Iclçarlv yiewed the subject’s silver
handgun as he walked. SAl
lordered the subject to freeze and
to drop his weapon. After pausing, the subject dropped to his
knees and then into a prone position, still holding the handgun.
SAl
moved toward the subject with two other SWAT team
members.
The subject stood and began walking into the
residentiaJarea. 521
lagain ordered the subject to drop his.
weapon and the subject responded with obscenities telling the SAs
to come and get’ him. As the subi ect moved through the clearing
toward the residential area, S[
Iprepared to shoot; however,
refrained from doing so due to concerns for the safety of persons
insd riear1y homes. A foot chase ensued with SAsI
I
andl
un pursuit. They were joined by an Eden Prairie
Police Officer. After turning from a series of residential
streets into a cul de sac, the subject paused in front of a
driveway, raised his handgun to shoulder level and turned toward
the SAs and officer who had taken_stat4.onapr oostions at the
entrance of the cul de sac.
SASI
land
I again ordered
the subject to freeze and when he did not cottly, they and the
police oficer on the scene discharged their weapons with
SAl
Ifiring first and SAl
If iring several seconds
thereafter. A subsequent determination was made that SAsI
It:
andi
If ired two rounds each and the police officer on the
scene fired four rounds from a 12-gauge shotgun.
The subject
fell to the ground behind a snow bank along the driveway’s edge
and was apprehended, handcuffed and his weapon was retrieved and
rendered safe.
A wound was identified in the subject’s lower left

wrist for which he was immediately transported to the Hennepin
County Medical Center for treatment.

The subject was interviewed on 2/3/97, and he admitted
to the bank robbery, stating it was his intention to be “killed
by the police during the robbery”.
3

Savage-1588

7C

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-43, 4/16/1997

Inspection Division

On 4/8/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident. The foLlowing voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance: Chairman, Thomas Lush’,’. Deiutv Assisant
Director, Inspection Division; I
Ichijf
Insoectqr, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I
I Inspector-Deputy General Counsel, Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel; Patrick J.
Foran, Section Chief, Personnel Assistance Section, Personnel
Division; Richard A. Marquise, Section 1{f- fl
tcin1 nrlort
Section, Criminal Investigative Division
I
1 Global Section
Unit Chief. N.-2D tTnit
NS-2, National Security
Division;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit,
Training Division;
I, Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
and,I
I Supervisor, Washington Field Office. The
only non-voting member present wasi
I Inspection
Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evalk.tate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously concurred that the actions of
the SA8 throughout this incident were appropriate and that the
use of deadly force was in accordance with the current deadly
force policy.
One member opined that based on the actions of the
subject, deadly force could have been initiated earlier in the
incident; however, all members agreed that a judgement call was
made by the SA and that call netted positive results.
Two additional observations made during the discussion
was the fact that small inconsistencies existed in individual
statements made during the incident. Members concurred that the
inconsistencies were minor and were a result of each individual
telling what they observed in a different way. The second
observation made by the SIRG was the fact that area residents who
were interviewed after the incident stated that “a couple of
hours” passed before law enforcement authorities canvassed to
ensure that no injuries were sustained by individuals residing in
4

Savage-1589

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Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-43, 4/16/1997

Inspection Division

the area.
Members agreed that SAC Minneapolis, should be aware
of these statements to ensure that this does not recur.

IED(s):
Set Lead 1:

That no administrative action be taken
against SAS,J
s a result of
their invol emen i.ri i.nls snoo TandI
ing incictent.

5

Savage- 1590

 oom

(12/.31l195)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAIION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Attu:

Inspection Dvision
Contact:

1ppraved By:

Title:

William ID. Gore
Extension 1837

Gore Wi1liam)
Lusby Thoma

Drafted By:
Case ID #:.

4 / 9 / 97

Date:

Irr7J1JV
66-13157-28

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDE’TT
1/2/97
MEMPHIS DIVISION

Synopsis: To advise of a shooting incident on 1/2/97, in the
Memphis Division during the attempted ajcrest of n unknown
subject driving an automobile toward S?1
I
Details:

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated
1/21/97.
I

I

I

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

-

2

-

2

-

I

Mr.
Mr.

Mn

(1
Mr.I
(1
Mr .1
(1
Mr.
M.i
Mn

-

-

-

1
1
1

-

-

I Room 7142
?.oom 7825 (Enclosure)
I. Room 7116
Mr. Mrquise, Room 5155)
IRoom 6012
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
1 Room 7427
Mr.I
Room 7159)
Lusby, Room 825
Room 7837
4147

1
1
1

—

-

-

M4
DOJ
M4
WFO
Mr]_________ Room 7861

Savage-1591

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
6-19l57-28, 4/9/97

Inspection Division

Details of tbe Shooting Incident
1

I

approximately 12:55 p.m., on l/?/97. SAl
I
land Task Force Officer (TFO) SgtI
lof
the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office, conducted a spot check of a
Memphis, Tennessee, address as a result of information provided
by a Confidential Informant (CI).
The !T rortej1 that an
individual living at the residence, I
I was a member of
the Gangster Disciple t- ng and was deaJ
ing in stolen
1
vehicles.
When SAl
land TFOI
Ipassed the address
they noticed a. red Volvo 940 Turbo in the driveway.
A check of
the license on the VoLvp with NCIç determined that the Volvo was
listed as stolen.
s1
land TFOI
linitiated
surveillance on the Volvo and contacted SAl
I,
the case agent on a current Group II Undercover Operation (UCO)
being worked jointly by the Memphis Division_and the Memphis
Police Department Auto Theft Uflit.
SA
Jand members of the
UCO were apprised of the Volvots location and were enroute to the
address.
-

During the time SAF
land TFCj_______
observed the Volvo in the driveway and initiatedäurveillance,
approximately 20 minutes had passed due to a computer problem in
running the Volvo
s license plate and obtaining a response that
1
the vehicle was stolen. During this 20 minute time lapse? a
white Chevrolet Caprice pulled into the
rw hehjnd the Volvo
and was located in that position when SAl
land TFO

I

I initiated surveillance on the stolen Volvo. Approximately
30 minutes after surveillance was initiated an rn
arriva1 o other law enforcement personnel, SAl
I and
TFO I
I observed two black males exit the residence with one
individual getting into the Volvo and the other entering the
Caprice.

When it became evident that the two individials were
starting the two vehicles in preparation to leave, SAl
I
moved his bureau vehicle behind the Caprice blocking the exit of
either car from the driveway. The driver of the Volvo
immediately exited the vehicle and ran to the bank of the
b7c
residence followed closely by TFOI
I sl___________ exited
his bureau vehicle, identified himself verbally to the driver of
thq Cacrice anSI had his Remington 870 shotgun in his hands.
I’ commands were ignored by the driver; therefore,
SAl
Imoved to a position adjacent to the driver’s side
of the Caprice, continuing to identify himself and commanding the
driver to exit the vehicle.
The subject continued to jockey the
Caprice forward and backward in an attempt to exit the location.
2

Savage- 1592

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-28, 4/9/97

Inspection Division

As soon as he was able to clear the back end of the Volvo, the
subject rapidly accelerated and made a sharp tpvn whirh ir the
side of the CaDce heading directly toward SAl
I At
that point, SN
jfired one round of double 00 buck at
the driver.
Immediately following the discharge of the shotgun,
the direction of the vehicle changed and the driver struck a
utility pole and subsequently departed the area at a high rate of
speed. No evidence was obtained at the crime scene indicating
that the driver was struck by any of the shotgun pellets.
Subsequent investigation attempted to identify the
driver of the vehicle.
The individual to whom the license on the
Caprice was registered was contacted and stated that the license
had been on an old Caprice that he had previously owned and had
totaled in an accident.
The wrecked Caprice was forfeited to a
salvage yard because the owner could not afford to pay the towing
fee or repair the vehicle.
Contact with the salvage yard
indicated that the vehicle had been turned over to a scrap yard
and it was unknown if the license plate was on the vehicle when
it was transferred to the scrap yard. A determination was made
that the scrap yard had crushed the vehicle and sold it for
scrap; however, it was unknown if the license plate had been on
the vehicle at the time it was crushed.

The owner of the residence was interv’-iewed regarding
the identity of the two individuals who had exited the house and
departed in the Volvo and the Caprice. No information of value
regarding the subject& identities was obtained.

I

I

I

On 3/27/97, the SIRG discussed the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thorns Lu.sbv. Denntv Assiptant
Director, Inspection Division;I
I CkPf
Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division; I
I
I Inspector-Deputy General Counsel, Legal Advice and
Train;ng, Legal Policy, Off joe of the General Counsel;1
I
I Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ; Patrick J. Foran, Section
Chief, Personnel Assistance Section, Personnel Division; Richard
1pport Section, Criminal
A. Marquise, Section Ch
L Unit Chief, NS-2D
Investigative Division;’
Tinli-.
NS-2, National Security Division; and,
I Supervisor, Washington Field Office.
George M.
Alznauer, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Richmond
Division also attended this meeting of the SIRG.
The only non
voting member present was I
I Inspection Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

3

Savage- 1593

7C

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-28, 4/9/97

Inspection Division

Obsergtions and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
f or administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreøt-l
incident
involved an intentional discharge of SAl____________ weapon and
that his use of deadly force was in accordance with the current
deadly force policy.
Attendees had no training or safety issues regarding
this incident noting that it involved rapidly developing
circumstances.
LEAD(s)
Set Lead 1:
That no ajnistratjve action be taken
against SAk
a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident.

4

Savage-1594

 _____JSDOJ

(12(3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
Tq:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

From:

Attla:

Inspection DriMôn
Contact:

[

Approved By:

[

I

J Extension

1837

Lusby Thö-

Drafted By:

[

Case ID #:

S6-l9157-9

Title:

I

8/1/97

jir4M’

3DMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/16/97
HOUSTON DIVISION

lb 7

Synopsis:
To advise that SA I
I of the Houston
Division fired his weapon during the attempted apprehension of a
subject who had robbed a. banic in the Houston area.
Details:

I

Refeence report of Assistant Inspector-in-Place
I dated 6/9/97.

I

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, arid recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1

2

Room 7142
1
Room 7825 (Enclosure)1

-

-

-

Mr.

Mr.________ Room 7116
Mr. Marguise, Room 5155)
(1
Room 6646
Mr.I
,
I r’rrni 7427
Mr.I
(1
MsI
Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr.I
Loom 7837
I, USDOJ
Ms4
,
Room 4147
Mn
Mn
-

1
2

-

-

1
1
1
1
2.

-

-

-

1
1
1

-

-

Mr

Mr
Mr
Mr
1
Mrs.

J

Room 3787F
Quantico
Baltimore
Quantico
Room 7861

I

lb 7

Savage- 1595

 ____land

To:
Re:

Inspection Division Front:
66—19157-19, 08/01/97

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 5/15/97, the International Bank of Commerce (IBC)
in Ang1eton,Texas, was robbed at cunioint by three black males
who were later identified asi
I
I and [
I The modus operandi of this robbery
was similar to a 5/7/97, armed robbery of the Commur4tv State
sank in Boljng, Texas, whiqh had been asined to SAl_________
I
I fled from 2ng1eton
sutsequent to the lEG robbery; however, I
iwas
apprehended by the ngleton Police Depatment (APD).
to the robbery and implicatedi
land I
las the other tio robbery subjects. Dunn this________
I
nf#içn,l
bdvised that his brother
dl
I
armed and dangerous.
Local authorities obtained
arrest warrants for aggravated robbery for the twoS subjects who
eluded capture. I
Isubsequently aqreed to cooperate with
law enforcement by luring his brothenl
Iback to Angleton to
pick him up believing thatI__Jhad been successful in eluding
law enforcement officers. Local authorities planned an arrest
scenario utilizing a Special Weapons and Tactic (SWAT) team
consisting of various local law enforcement authorities.

I

Wh informed of the bank robbery at the IBC,
volunteered to assist in interviews at the bank and
SAl
1et his of4ce in his Bureau vehicle. Upon arrival at the bank,
SA I
I observed SAl
I inide the bnk conducting
an interview with one of the tellers. SAl
lentered the
bank and began an interview of another teller while local law
enforcement personnel were processing the crime scene.

The agents were completing their respective interviews
at the bank when an APD detective informed them that one of the bc
suspects in the bank robbery may have been apprehended. The
detective advised that the APD was going to transport the bank
tellers to the pqlic sta4on in an effort to positively identify
the suspect.
SAl
Idecided to go to the police station in
the event that the suspect being held by the APD was involved in.
the IBC robbery and may also be able to provide information
regarding the unsolved bank robbery assigned to him.
While at the station, SAl
I learned that the
suspect being held in custody was about to give a video taped
confession regarding the IEC robbery.

2

Savage- 1596

 a

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157-19, 08/01/97

Inspection Division

SAl
Isubsequently telephoned Acting Supervisory
Senior Resident Agent (A/SSRA) I
Ito discuss the
similarities of the EBC robbery and other unsolved bank robberies
Irf-1 to federally pr.osecute
in the area. A/SSRL
I
I She tasked SAl
I his brotherl______
I CO
contact Assistant United States Attorney I
ISoutheni
Distric; of Texs. for a orosecutive opinion. Neither A/SSRA
I
I nor SAl
I was successful in contacting Mr.
lAt this point, a determination was made that this would
I
be a local case and the FBI would not participate in any plan or
arrest. Although not a pariir1t ‘n the planning or execution
of the arrest scenario
1 JiJ
‘was in the general area
awaiting the arrest of I
iso that he could participate in
an interview regarding his unsolved bank robbery.

I

Iwas

asked to ride with Officerl
I
Jto a Chevron station
where he would make a telephone call to lure his brother to the
area.
SAl
Iverified with Officerl
Ithat he was not
to be involved in the arresi or other overt action relating tç
the arrest.
Officer I
Iconcurred with SAJ
I
statement which resulted in SAl
heaving his Bureau
c’I r-ked at the APD.
Also in the parked vehicle was SA
Iprotective body armor and extra 9 mm magazines for
his Sig Sauer 228 which was in his possession.

sAl
landi

Ito transporti

Icontacted his brother and arranged for a
I
rendezvous in a deserted area on County Road 4 near the
intersections of State Highway 288 and_Business Rn” 88 in
2ngleton.
During their conversation,I
Jwarnedl
I that he
was bringiacr Mc Uzi” and would use it against law enforcement
as well asi
Ii this was a setup.
At approximately 11:00 p.m_I or 5/15/97. n individual
identified byl
s his brother, I
I was driving
a vehicle that was also identified as belonging tol
I
The vehicle was observed traveling in the prdetertnined pickup
area which was surrounded by the local SWAT team.
Subsequently,
shqts were f4red at the subjects vehicle by the local SWAT team.
SAl
Iheard the shots while observing a series of flashes
and overheard law enforcement radio traffic confirming this
information and the.fact that the subject was fleeing the area.
Thç exact lqcation of the subiect vehicle was not clear to
I and. OfficerF
SAl
I However, by chance, the subject
vehicle quickly entered a northbound lane o the s.me road
occupied by the car being driven by Officerfl
Iwith SA
land I
F
I as passengers. SAl
I suddenly
3

Savage-1597

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157—19, 08/01/97

Inspection Division

found their vehicle adjacent to the subject vehicle believing
that it hd just engaged in a. firefight with the local SWAT team.
The driver of the suspect vehicle began to purposely brake his
vehicle in an apparent effort to get the police vehicle to pull
up adjacent to it.
This action could have provicji tH
opportunity to expose the vehicle occupied by SAl
Ito a
broadsi tt-r,k rf automatic weapon fire. During the braking
action, I
Iwas lying prone in the backseat, stating that
his brotherl
Iwas about to shoot. At the same time I
I
made the statement, the driver’s side window of the suspect
vehicle lowered approximately three inches causing SAl
I
to believe that the driver was about to shoot. SAl
I
fired his weapon 14 times. Eleven rounds fired by SAl
I
struck the subject vehicle in the general area of the driver’s
side without striking the intended target. The remaining three
rounds, which were not recovered, were presumed to have struck
the pavement or embankment in the vicinity of the vehicle.
The subjeqt vhic1p
rrl
the_occupant, who was
later identified as I
I th
Ibrother&
uncle, emerged from the suspect vehicle and was placed under
arrest for the local equivalent of Obstruction of Justice.

I

Iuhsquenv admitted th.t he had knowledge
janci
Jwent to Angleton
with the intent to rob a bank. I
has subsequently
arrested on 5/20/97, following a chase and violent shootout with
local authorities and admitted to six bank robberies.

thati

landi

On 7/9/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deutv Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; I
I c1ief
Inspector, Office of Inspections, Inspection Divis.on:I
Acting Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;I______________
Deputy Section Chief, Terv,rirn
‘7
lpi,t crimes Section,
Criminal Division, USDOJ;I
Jsupervisoxy Special
Agent (SSA), Legal Advice and Training, Legal Policy, Office of
the General Counsel; Richard A. Marquise, Section Chief,
Ori-1rn1 Thnrrij Section, Criminal Investigative Division;
b6
I Unit Chie. NS-2D Unit. Global Sqction NS 7
2, National Security Division
ISSA,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;(
I
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolma-ks Unit. ScientiticAnaiysis
‘
Section, Laboratory Division;l
Chief,
Transfer Unit, Personnel Division; and,I
I
Supervisor, Baltimore Division. The two non-voting members
-

-

4

Savage-1598

Ib7C

 ___________

________

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157-19, 08/01/97

Inspection Division

present were I
I Program Manager, Law Enforcement
Training for Safety an4 Survival. Practical Applications Unit,
Training Division; andi
I Inspection Analyst,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members held a lengthy discussion regarding this
shooting incident. The consensus of SIRG members was that the
use of deadly force by SN
Iwas justified since the
“imminent danger” status was met.
The first observation made by SIRG members was the fact
that SAl
Iwas not properly prepared due to the fact that
his protective armor and extra ammunition were left in his car
parked at the Police Department. Members noted that SAl
I
was to be on the periphery of a tactical operation involving
weapons and that he should have possessed both his body armor and
additioial_ammuniion. However, members also emphasized the fact
that SA[
Iprobably exercised less diligent safety
precautions due to instructions provided by management that he
was not to participate in the platining or the actual arrest.
Based on a consensus of the group, this discussion resulted in
the_recommerdation that no administrative action be taken against -7D
SAj
I due to mitigating factors surrounding the incident.

L

itionally, members noted that
Jwas plated in circumstances probably not
appropriate. All rtembers concurred that it would have been
advisable to placej
Jfurther away from the scene of the
incident.

I

SIRG members noted that gji
I was put in a
precarious situation by being provided less than adequate
instructions by management. Members also questioned the fact
that management decided that this was to be a local arrest rather
than a joint Federal/local action.
S

Savage- 1599

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division prom:
6619157l9r 08/01/97

Inspection Division

IL?aD(S):
Set Xead I.:
INSPECTION DIVISION
AT WASHINGTON, D.

-

Ph rio ministrativ
against SAL
las a result
this shooting incident.

otion be taken

ot his involvement in
b7C

6
Savage- 1600

 (1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

Inspection D________
Contact:

Approved By:

3/6/98

I
I

Extension 1837

I
Lusby Tho1n47

I lrr

Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:

66-19157-38

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/19/97
PHOENIX DIVISION

b6
/C

Synopsia: To advise of a shooting incident in the Phoenix
Division on 5/19/97.
While trying to effect the arrest of Todd
William Staskal on Federal bank robbery charges, the subject was
shot and killed by members of the Phoenix Fugitive Task Force.

I

Details:
Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
I.. dated 6/15/97.

I

I.

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

1
1
2

-

-

Mrj

Mr.

Mr4
(1
Mrj
I Quantico
(1
iractica1 Applications IYnit)
Mr. Foran. Raop 6646
-

2

-

Room 7142
1
oom 7825 (Enclosure)l
Room 7116
1
Mr. Mrmise, Room 5155)

-

-

Mr4

Mr4

Mr

-

-

Mr.I

Quantico
Room 7861
b6

-

1
2

I

IWFO

ib 7C

IRoom 7427

Ms. I
(1
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Roni 7825
1
Mr. [
1
joom 4147
2-Mr.I
IDOJ
-

-

-

(1-Ms.I_____

Savage- 1601

 __________Ilocated

To:
Re

Inspection Division From
66-19157-38, 03/06/1998

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 5/19/97, FBI Agents and officers front the Phoenix
Police Department and the Arizona Department of Public Safety
were attempting to effect the arrest of Todd William Staskal on
Federal banc robbrv chrac
Staskal was charged along with an
accomplice,j
I in connection with the 4/18/97,
robbery of the Bank of uerica in Phoenix. I
Iwas captured
following the robbery; however, Staskal escaped arrest by law
enforcement authorities. While attempting to elude authorities,
Staskal kidnaped one of his girl friends,I
later told the Phoenix case agent that Staskal told her that he
was not going back to prison and would not be taken alive. She
also advised that Staskal was armed with a 9 millimeter pistol.
SAl
I the case agent, sought the
assistance of the Fugitive Task Force to assist in locating and
apprehending Staskal. On 5/16/97, one of the task forge memers
dv1ed information that the 15 year old daughter of I
I
I
I identified
1rV rife or girl friend, was back in
the Phoenix area. I
lalso advised that Staskal had
called her and her Caller I.D. indicated that the call originated
locally
-

I

I

I

‘who advised that Staskal was in the rea and
provided addresses where he may be staying. I
lalso advised•
that Staskal was always armed and that he carried a weapon in a
fanny pack and another behind his back. This information was
confirmed byl
Iboyfriend who also advised that Staskal had
said he would not be taken alive. Staskal had also said that he
would either force the polLce to kLll him or kill himself rather
than be captured. Off icer
Iwas also told that Staskal was
attempting to obtain an automatic weapon and had d4scusse4 the
‘
possibility of attempting to break his accomplice,1
out of°
I
jail.
-

On 5/19Li, while checking one of the residences
furnished by I
I task force members observed a stolen white
Mercury Sable that Staskal was supposedly driving. Shortly after
observing the car, an individual matching the description of
Staska). came out of the residence and entered the vehicle.
Participants also noted that the individual was wearing a fanny
pack and this inforrriation was relayed to other task force members
via radio communication.

2

Savage- 1602

 ____________land

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-38, 03/06/1998

Inspection Division

A moving surveillance was instituted and several task
force members were able to get a clear look at the driver of
the
vehicle and confirmed that it was Staskal.
As the surveillance proceeded, Staskal turned into the
parking lot of a shopping center in Glendale, Arizona. Upon
exiting the shopping center parking lot, Staskal turned east on
Bell Road heading toward downtown Phoenix. A decision was made
to effect a non-compliant felony car stop.
Additionally, members felt it necessary to effect the
car stop at that time for several reasons. They felt that
Staskal was armed since he was observed wearing a fanny pack that
the intelligence described as always containing a weapon; the
task force members believed that Staskal was looking for a bank
to rob; the subject made an eastbound turn toward downtown
Phoenix which was more populated than the area they were located;
all of the task force vehicles were in the immediate vicinity and
configured in a way that would nearly, surround Staskal’s vehicle;
and, the risk of the surveillance being detected increased as it
continued allowing time for Staskal to prepare for a violent
confrontation that the intelligence predicted.
Near the intersection of 67th Avenue and Bell Road,
Staskal’s vehicle and the tsk force vehicles were stopped at a
red light. Lt. I
I of the Phoenix Police Department who
was the senior task force member on the scene, gave the command
to effect the arrest.. i.
t1
1
Ivehicle had Staskal’s vehicle
blocked at the passenger side, a Department of Public Safety
Officer was directly i.
ont- of thphject’s vehicle apd the
vehicles of FBI agents
I
Iwere
behind civilian vehicles directly to the rear and. to the left of
Staskal. Several of the task force members exited their vehicles
with guns drawn and surrounded Staskal’s vehicle.
Staskal raised his hands and looked around as if
surveying the situation. He then dropped his hands, placed his
vehicle in reverse, rammed into a vehicle behind him and lurched
forward until he struck a truck traveling westbound. According
to the task force members, at some point during this sequence of
events, Staskal’s hands went out of view and it appeared that he
was reaching for the fanny pack that they had observed him
wearing.
.

I

I

7C

FBI SAs
and
I who had positioned
themselves at the driver’s side of Saskal’s tr,h4a near the
front door, fired a total of 17 rounds. SAj
jfired six

3

Savage- 1603

 To
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-38, 03/06/1998

Inspection Division

rounds from his Sig Sauer Model 226 and SAl
kired ii rounds
from his Smith and Wesson 40 cal.ber. Department of Public
Safety Officer I
I who remained positioned near
the driver’s side door of his vehicle, fired one round of rifle
slug from a Remington Model 870 shotgun. Staska]. was struck by
four .40 caliber rounds in the left side of the chest and abdomen
and once in the left thigh by the rifle slug. He was pulled from.
his vehicle unconscious after the vehicle collided with the truck
and was described at the scene as apparently dead. Staskal was
taken from the scene by paramedics to the J.C. Lincoln Hospital
where he was officially pronounced dead.
Investigation determined that all law enforcement and
civilian witnesses reported seeing clear markings reflecting the
law enforcement status of the task force members. Witnesses also
verified that they heard voice commands to the effect, “Police,
put your hands up
’, shouted repeatedly to Staskal.
3
On 11/12/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above
captioned shooting incident. The following voting members of the
SIRG were in attendance; Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy
Assistant Director, Inspection Division; Francis A. Gallaghq.
(hiof T11r.f or, Office of Inspections, Inspection Divisio
n_____
I Trial 0
Attorney Civil Rights Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; Patrick 3. Foran, Section Chief, Personiel
Adminitration and Benefits Section, Personnel Division;
I
I
I Supervisory Special Agent (S&A), Legal Advice and
Training, Legal Policy, Office of the General Counsel; Richard A.
Marquise, Section Chief Operational Support Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief, NS-2D
1 Global Section
Unit
-2, National Security Division
I
I Unt Chief. Firrms Training Unit, Training Division ic
and, I
I Supervisor, Washington Field Of ice.
LTJ.J);
The only non-voting member present wasi
I
Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

Observations and Reconinendatious of the SXRG
The SXRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any)
(3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
4

Savage- 1604

  

 

FBI
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries 

1996

 

 

 

4.

P0-204 (Rev. l2-1-9

UN]a’ED &FATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Jnvestigation

Copy to

Report of

United States Attorney, Western District of Washington
Skamania County Prosecuting Attorney

SSAI
October 30, 1996

I

oi

Seattle

9A—SE77050
66F—19157—50
Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
SEATTLE DIVISION
OCTOBER 20, 1996

Chsracter:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shooting incident was the result of an investigation
into extortion, bomiz threat, and Hobbs Act violations which
occurred at the Bonneville Look and Dam, North Shore
Visitor Center, North Bonneville, Washington on Sunday,
October 20, 1996. Bonneville Lock and Dam is operated by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Washington state
side of the Bonneville Look and Dam is located on Federal
property in Skamania County. The Federal Government and
Slcaiaania County have concurrent jurisdiction over criminal
matters occurring on the Washington state side of the
Bonneville Lock and Dam. At approximately 4:00 pm, three
tourists at the Dam turned over to a visitor center Ranger
a small tape cassette player that they found in the
telephone booth adjacent to the visitor center building.
This tape cassette player had a handwritten note taped to
it that read, 5
Play m&. The message on the tape was a
male Voice stating, among other things, that there was a
bomb in the building and threatening to blow up the Dam.
The message further stated, “I w’ant fifteen thousand
dollars, two semi-automatic nine millimeter Uzis and I want
a car with a female officer, unarmed and unwired.,.. You
follow us, she dies. Like I said, I find a wire or an
armed weapon on her, she will die and then the dam will
blow.
Y° got two hours my friends. The FBI was notied
at approximat-el-y 5:00 pm and SN
I
Vancouver, Washington Resident Agency, rspon4ed to t1e
scene, arriving at approximately 6:30 pm.
SAl
I
uniformed Oregon State Police Trooper
and
,

This document contains neither reconsnendatjoi’is nor conclusions of the FBI.
It Is the property of the FBI end is oansd to
your agency; it end its contents are not to be distrib.ted outside your agency.

 ________

.
Others listened to the extortion tape. At approximately 6:45 pm,
while exiting the visitor center (which was closed) tQ examine the
llthone booth where the tape cassette was found, SAl
nd
iwere confronted by an assailant (later identified as
I
NATHANIEL WAyNE ENRIKY MIMGAN). MILLIG7N pointed a silverbarreled rifle at SAl
Ifrom a distance of about seven yards.
The rifle, outfitted with a scope, resembled a Ruger, Mini 14,
Semi—automatic weapon (later identified as a Huger .22 caliber
rifle).
The rifle was in MILLIGAN’s right hand held against his
waist.
In his left hand, which he held up in the air, was what
appeared to be a portable police radio or police scanner (this
object was later identified as a Bearcat police scanner).
MILLIGAN asked w1r hi money was and stated be bad the bomb,
MILLIGAN iold SA I
Ithat he hac. been watching them the whole
time.
[and TrooperL
backed into the visitor
SAl
center, under thëpretext of obtapn the demanded items. )eaving
MILLIGAN outside in the dark.
Jand Trooperl
I
SAl
alerted employees that there was a man outside with a rifle and a
Dam employee_called 911 to request assistance for the FBI.
Trooperl
I watched the front entrance for MIILIGAN and also
radioed his dispatch for assistance. Skaiaania County_Sheriff’s
Units apd Washington State Patrol began to respond. I
I
,
Chief of Security at the Dam, led SA I
I down one
leve1d out the back door, accidentally locking himself out.
SA
I
Imoved around the area east of the visitor center to his
Bureau automobile without seeing MH
LIGAN. He obtained his Bureau
3
shotgun and put on his protective vest and FBI baseball cap. He
observed police cars responding to the front gate, which was
locked.
He called 911 by cellular phone to report his location,
howevçr. the police cars left the area before he could contact
them. I
Iwalked around the area east of the visitor center
rinqe of
and was confronted by MILMG2N at gun point, at
about fif1en to twenty yards. MILLIGAN ordered I
Ito drop
his gun. I
1 told iiiic that he was not armed. MILLIGAN
then ordered him “Go tell them to get. the cars out of here.
Hurry. Move.”
ntered the visitor center front dopr,
fo
SA
ported his encounter with MILLIGAN.
SA
and rooper
exited the visitor center in an
effort to locate and iso a e MIILIGAN on the grounds.
SA I
1
spotted MILLIGAN near the fish viewncr bu.lding which is east of
the visitor center.
SAl
Iworked their way towards
Jandi
that building.
h viewing building
9
MILLIGAN moved around Ih fi
where he spotted and orally challengedi
lat gun point at a
distance of about thirty-six yards
MILLIGAN repeatedly ordered
I
Ito put down his weapon and come out from his position of
concealment.
SA I
Iheard MThIIGAN’s voice and moved along
th TAr4j- side of the fish viewing building towards the voice.
SA
I
Iheard Trooped
Isay that he was putting down his
weapon.
land
siq
Ibelieved that MILLIGAM had disarmed I
that the Trooper was in imminent danger. MILLGAN sotte A
I shadow and orally challenged him.
SA I
I moved away
from the building attempting to see MILLIGAN and was confronted by
2

 ______Irendered

________

.

•

MIIjLIGAN from a distance of about nine yards. MILLIGAN was
holding the rifle with both hands, with the barrel pointed
directly at SAl
I Fearing that he would be shot, SA
I
fired one 00 Buck round from his shotgun, tri1H MIILIOA in the
torso area,
When MflLIG did not fall, SL
I immediately
fired a second round, a rifled slug. The second round also struck
MILI,.tGAN in the torso area. MILLIGAII fell down and stated,
did you shoot me? I’m a manic depressive. There isn’t a bomb.
I
Ihandcuffed MILLIG2N and SAl
I called Skamania County
911 to notify them of the shooting and requested immediate medical
emergency service.
MILLIGT’s rifle safe, ejecting
one live round from the chamber. The weapon was then observed to
be a Ruger .22 caliber rifle with a loaded magazine.
Three
ambulance services and a Life Flight helicopter responded to the
scene and provided on—scene trauma care. MXLLIGAN was identified
by a responding Skamania County sheriff’s Deputy, and acknowledged
his identity.
MILLIGAN died at the scene.
SAC Seattle was
notified and shooting Inquiry initiated. MILLIGAN’s mother in
Montana and father in Portland, Oregon, were located and notified
of his death,
security sweeps at the Dam and at NILLIGAN’s
residence revealed no actual bomb material.
Investigation
revealed that MILLIGAN, age 19, was a convicted sex offender and
child molester, released from juvenile detention in February 1996.
He had been residing alone in a loaned tent and trailer less than
a mile east of the Dam. A search of this tent and trailer located
paper, duct tape, and audio—cassettes consistent with the tape
cassette player and note left inside the telephone booth at the
visitor center.
The rifle and the scanner in MILLIGAN’s
possession wr detein to belong to an Oregon resident,.1
I
I
Ihad Illowed MIILIGAN to temporarily stay
in a small travel trailer that I
Ihad borrowed from a third
party.
The rifle and scanner had been left in this trailer and
were used by MILLIGAN without I
knowledge or permission.
The extortion demand cassette tape was later played for two of
MILLIGAN’s parole counselors, who positively identified the voice
as MILLIGANs.
MILLIGAN left a recorded telephone message on the
probation counselor’s voice mail at 1:42 pm, on October 20, 1996,
in which he talked about havinga .22 caliber weapon and
ammunition.
A copy of pertinent 911 recordings was obtained fromib
Skainania County, transcribed, and is consistent with witness
reports.
Autopsy revealed MILLIGAN’s death was caused by loss of
blood from two shotgun wounds. Direction and pattern of wounds
corroborate SAl
Istatement as to the position of MII,LIGAN
when shot.
The Medical Examiner, Dr.I
I advised that
wound paths would not be inconsistent with MILLIGAN holding an
object or objects in his hands and that the wound path of the
right index finger and hand would not be inconsistent with a wound
that would occur if NILLIGAN was holding a weapon toward the
direction from where the shot came, with his index finger extended
around the trigger.
—P—
3

 _______ard

_________g±en

.

FD-204 (Rev, l2195)

.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 0F JUSTiCE
Federal Bureau of investigation

SIRG; FTU

Copyn;

AD,

Rcporrof:
Date;

AXIPI

CaseID#:

66-19157-19
89B-’HO-4 64 07

This;

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT,
HOUSTON DIVISION.;
10/21/96;
ADMINISTRATIVE MaTTER

Chatatter;

SHOOTING INQUIRY

Synopsis:

INSD,

ROOM 7129, ATTN;

November 15,

I

Offwe:

HOUSTON

1G

ggc. whfl r.rnning a surveillance of
drug subject,I
I a Houston SOG team
consisting of five SAs followed the subject to a local
restaurant where he remained for approximately 2 3 hours,
primarily drinking at the bar. At approximately 8:45 pm,
Iwas observed by one SA to fire twice into the
I
opened restaurant door and then to proceed into the
It was
restaurant where several more shots were fired.
Ihad shot and killed restaurant
later learned thati
SOC team members were
patron, Raul Florea Comacho.
alerted to the shooting and began moving towards the
departed the restaurant and began
restaurant.
walking easte4y towards an adjacent bowling alley parking
lot.
L in
One of the SOC team members, SAl
the interim, had positioned himself in the parking 1t of
a Diamond Shamrock Service Station east of the restaurant
and north of the bowling alley. While traversing the
parking lot, Orosco was challenged by an armed security
striking him on
guard and immediately fired upo
exited his vehicle
a bullet pouch on his belt. sa
nd his open driver
wearing body armor arid took cover b
ho returned
side door. I
Ithen fired
once in the left
fire with five rounds, strikin
eririg accounts
leg above the knee. The
I SA
fired at Sal
reardng how many shots
owever, only four shell
Idescribes “several ,
I
casings were found in the viciniry t-r’ ipclude the shots
SA I
fired at the security guard.
I also struck and
On October 21

This docurner.t contains neither reconr3endat.ons not conciueios

of the sat.

It is tbe property of the I’SI ar.d i leaiied to

yells agency t and it contentS are not to be distributed outside your a3ency.

 ___
_________

66-l9157-l9

damaged two parked vehicles behindl
las the subject moved in
a west to east direction.
Subject fled to an adjacent street
where he was found unconscious between two residences.
[
I
was arrested by the Houston Police Department (HPD)
and
transported to the hospital.
Inasmuch as the HPD had a homicide
and an aggravated assault investigation to conduct
contemporaneous with Houston’s shooting inquiry, the HPD handled
the immediate crime scene searches and maintains 11 evidence
in
these investigations.
Subject was treated at the hospital for a
through and through flesh wc.und to his left leg and was released
to the custody of the HPD.
Subject has been charged by the
Harris Count” District Attorney with murder and aggravated
assault.
On October 23, 1996,1
Iwas charged with
violation of Title 18, Usc Section l11(aHl; (b) via a signed
complaint by U.S. Magistrate Judge Calvin Botley.

Surveillance
On October 21, 1996, an SOG ‘red team” consisting of
I
I
I JJ
SAl
I and SAl
negan a .3:UU pm to 11:00 m shift.
They were assigned to conduct
surveillance of I
residing ati
I
I
Houston, Texas.
Surveillance was initiated at approximately 4:00
pm and at approximately 5:30 pm the team members observed I
I
leave his residence and ultimately arrive at the Ostioneria
Michoacan Restaurant at 50 Aldine-Bender Road at. approximately
6:25 m.
This restaurant is within a short walking distance from
Iresidence, hoiever, he drove his black Ford Mustang,
Texas licensel
I and parked directly in front of the
restaurant
(See E-1 and E-2 for relative locations of subject’s
residence, restaurant, and sa positions upon subject’s arrival at
restaurant).
team ]di-

I

I,...

.1

spent almost 2 34 hours in the restaurant,
primarily arinicing at une bar, according to witnesses and other
information.
At the time of his eventual arrival at the hospital
following the shooting,I
Iwould register a .263 blood
alcohol level, almost three times the level of legal intoxication
in the State of Tex.
2

 _____________________
w
1
as

.

.
EG-19157 -19

designated as having the
‘eye” on the restaurant door. He accomplished this by parking
his bucar 204 feet west of the restaurant door so that his line
of sight was parallel to the front facade of the strip center
containing the restaurant. SAl
Ifrom his_location could
not see into the restaurant but could monitor j
looming and
going (See E-7 and E—8 for SAl
Iview).

I

I

At approximately 8:45 pm,I
lexited the restaurant
carrying a black object in his right hand and walked to his
vehicle.
After a moment at the Mustang he returned to the
restaurant with a handoup which s
Iviewed through
binoculars.
SAl
Iradjoed the entire team that I
flied
a gun nd was re-entering the restaurant. After a few seconds,
lexited the restaurant and fired two rounds into the lock
and frame of the opened restaurant door, shattering its glass.
With the door open]
Iwould have been firing in the general
direction of SPi
Icontinued to radio these
SA
I
events to the team membe;s as
Ire-entered the restaurant.
According to SAl
J he heard 4 or 5 more shots fired inside
th vjtaurant.
He likewise reported this to team members.
Iwas then observed leaving the restaurant and walking
easterly towards the bowling alley parking lot and his residence.
Actions of SA

I

I

I

kook a position at a
Prior to the shooting, SAL
Shell Service Station near the southwest corner of Aldine-Bender
o that
1
and 1-45 North.
ion the radi
Upon hearing from SAl
had a gun and was firing inside the restaurant, SAl
I
drove east on Aldine-Bender, past the restaurant, axd parked at a
Diamond Shamrock Service Station one-half bloc) east 9
f the
restaurant and north of the bowling alley.
lobserved a
SAl
crowd of by-standers moving towards the front of the restaurant
and then udden1y ain rnning away towards he bowling alley.
SAl
I whom he recognized from arlier
Ithen
I
observations, walking in his general direction. SAL
observed that I
was carrying a handgun and was walking in a
SA
west to east direction through the bowling alley parking lot.
ithn observedi
jfire his handgun at a security guard.
SAl
lexited his vehicle and took cover behind his drivers
fired
siã door.
Ireturned fire
‘severa1 rounds” In sNiEii5.AI
(estimated at four) from a distance of 77 feet but was unaware of
whether he hiti
las the subject continued to travel easterly
through the parkinq lot and towards his r idenc (S E-9
through E-16)
Ire-entered his vehicle and drove in
SM
.

3

h6

 .

.

66-19157.-19

I

Idirection hoping to cut—off his escape (See signed
statements of SAs and E—45 through E-49 for movem
ents of all SAs
following announcement of shots fired by
SAl
I
was later found lying wounded between two
houses on Coach Road.
Statement

I
1 advised he was working as a
security guard in the bowling alley parkin
g lot on Aldine—Bender
on October 21, 1S.
He was in the west area of the parking lOt
talking to bowling alley customers when he heard
two loud noises.
He originally thought the noises were comin
g from the alley way
behind some businesses in a strip center to the northw
est and
adjoining the bowling alley parking lot. He went toward
s the
alley area to investigate the noise when severa person
l
s came
running from the strip center and into the bowlin alley parkin
g
g
lot.
As people saw him, they shouted that a crazy man had a gun
at the Mexican restaurant (Ostioneria Michoacan, 50 Aldine
Bender).
They also indicated that the man had shot someone in.
the restaurant.
As the crowd turned south and ran towads the
bowling alley Torres noticed that a Hispanic male was runnin
g
behind them and had a black semi-automatiC pistol in his hand.
This man moved away from the crowd at this point and started east
in the bowling alley parking lot in what would be a direct line
towards what would be Coach Road once he reached the east
boundary of the bowling alley parking lOt.
Realizing the Hispanic male with a gun was a suspect,
drew his revolver, )-ie desçzribed as a .38 caliber
with the brand ‘RG” stamped on it.
cocked his revolver
I
and ordered the sub-iect to “freez&. The IHispanic male
immediately shot ad
land hit him in his speed loader bullet
pouch located on his left hip. I
ifld not tire his weapon or
attempt to fire his weapon. He ran behind some vehicles movin
g
east in the parking lot parallel to and south of the movements of
the subject.
ladvised that he is unsure of how many times
the subject fired at him, but he believes, he saw the subject fire
his weapon at an individual in the Diamond Shamrock Service
Station in the northeast corner of the bowling alley parking lot.;.
I
J advised that he later learned that the man in the parking
lot who was firing a weapon back at the subject from behind his
own vehicle was an FBI Agent. He knew that the FBI Agent fired
his weapon at the subject several times but was unsure of the
number of times the FBI Agent fired.
p advised the FBI car
was pointed in a southeast direction. i He stated that the FBI
Agent quit tiring his weapon at some point when the subject was
directly south of the FBI Agent.
Inoticed at this point
I

I

4

 __________________________

.

.
66-19157-19

injured.
that the subject was dragging one leg, as i he had been
on
houses
the
in
eared
disapp
The subject eot rupning east and
ncy
emerge
with
s
vehicle
l
severa
saw
Ithen
Coach Road. I
ting to
lights and men with PBI agency identifier jackets attemp
Road
Wagon
and
Coach
of
on
secti
inter
locate the subject near the
(See B—SO for movements of security guard).

lactions in the
Three other witnesses tol
detained and
1
,
tified
iden
were
g
lot
parkin
g
alley
bowlin
HPD statements of
the
of
A review
interviewed by HPD officers.

I

jandi

ge of
etermsnect that none of the statements addressed the exchan
were
ses
witnes
These
I
land SAI
gunfire betweeni
e any information
recontacted by Houston but none could provid

i advised, however, that at first
regarding the_exchange. i
and
Iwas shooting in a southwesterly direction
he believedi
te
opposi
the
in
g
shootin
began
and
s
degree
then turned almost 180

L
I

I

direction. During Houston’s
were found and interviewed, I

It iring

investigation four other witnesses

I

landl

his
their observations

weapon at
of I

Only
.

Ii:iring

dvised seeing SA

Qitnesses were consistent
weapon first.

I
in

his

Jan
Following the shooting between SAl
Coach Road
a.Lon
houses
the
Ia search was conducted of
1
SAl
While
.
fleeing
ed
observ
where the subject was
l
patro
HPD
g
arrivin
was explaining the sequence of events to
the houses.
units on Coach Road h -hRPrved some movement between
ent and
movem
Iproceeded to inspect the
An HPD officer and SAL
unit
ioning
condit
air
an
g on his back behind
(lyin
foundi
for location).
adjacent to 110 Coach Road (See E-5, E-39, E-40,
emergency
He was placed under arrest by HPD and removed by
Hospital.
Taub
Ben
to
him
medical technicians who transported

Stementspf9

lat Ben
An attempt was made to interviewl
obvious
his
Given
g.
shootin
Taub Hospital immediately after the
]., 1900)
y
Januar
date
s
(birth
answer
sical
intoxication and nonsen
the interview was terminated.
ew of I
On October 22, 1996, a video taped intervi
interview of
of
n
latio
trans
was conducted in Spanish by HPD (See
S

I

 ________las

•

•
66-19157-19

I

I. During this interview, I
ladmitted shooting inside
tfle restaurant, however, he claims not to remember killing the
restaurant patron or firing at the security guard.
He recalls
being shot in the parking lot east of the restaurant but claims
not to know by whom.
Subject claims that when provoked to this
level of anger he loses control of himself.
Attending physician described the gunshot wound to
a lateral or horizontal wound tract.
It travelec
3
either from the medial to lateral or vice versa direction and was
a through and through wound.
Both entrance and exit. wounds were
approximately 2” above the left knee to the frontal aspect away
from the arterial paths. According to the doctor, this is
commonly called a flesh wound and would not be considered
immediately life threatening. No powder burns were in
’’ and
4
in the doctor’s opinion the injury was consistent with I
having been injured by a gunshot from several yards away. The
physician could not determine the entry or exit wound and could
not determine the caliber of projectile causing the injury.

I

I

wr nhr vi

Fdera1 (rand Jury

subpoena.

I

I
Searches Incident to the Shooting:
As noted above, inasmuch as the HPD had a homicide and
aggravated assault investigation contemporaneous to the FBI’s
shooting inquiry, the HPD Evidence Team took the lead and
processed both crime scenes in the restaurant and in the parking
lot.
All evidence collected on the night of October 21, 1996 was
taken by the EPO for their cases. Relevant photographs were
taken by Houston’s Evidence Response Team (ERT),
On October 22, 1996, in an ttempt to account for
missing shell casings from SAl
Iweapon, a daylight search
w m1e of the parking lot area and along the route driven by SA
I following the shootina.
It was surmised that inasmuch as
three shell casings from SAl
Iweapon were found in the
windshield wiper well of his bucar, additional shell casings may
have been lying on his hood and were subsequently thrown of f in
his pursuit of
This search was negative.

I

Also on October 22, 1996 the facade of the AMP Houston
6

-

I

 ________
________

.

.
66-19157-19

Bowling Lanes was searched for possible bullet impacts. A bullet
hole was found in a boarded-up area on the west end of the
bowling alley and a spent bullet was found inside (See E4l
through E-44)
This bullet was processed, diagramed, and turned
over to HPD.
Ballistics report from HPD is pending.
.

On October_22, 1996, in a continuing attempt to locate
I
Iweapon, the front fenders of S?I
casings from SAl
bucar were removed.
A .9mm casing was found at the bottom of
each side fender (See E-35 through E-38). These were also turned
over to HPD. -Houston surmises these casings fell through weep
holes” located at either end of the windshield wiper well.
Searches were conducted of the areas behind the soots
I
were SAJ
Iidentifjed as his first and last shot ael
bullet
for
negative
was
search
This
and
8-12
8-14).
IEee
I
strikes.
Vehicles Damaged:
Thur4ng the shooting between SA
the following vehicles were

amage

y

____

I

A 1986 gray Chevrolet Blazer S-1O, Texas license
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)F
flingwooci, Texas
registered to I
7733,9.

I,

Above vehicle suffered a bullet strike through the
driver’s side window, glancing of f the inside windshield, and
imbedding in the passenger side vertical windshield frame
approximately 12t up from the vehicle hood (See E-21 throug1
E-24)
A 1996 blue Dodge Ram 1500 Pickup, Texas license
I registered tol___________________
IHouston, Texas 77076,

I. VINI

I

Above vehicle suffered a strike to the driver’s side
door panel, near center, approximately 2 34” below the window.
impact resulted in a shattered driver’s side window (See E-17
through E-20).
A search by HPD’s and FBI’s Evidence Response Team
failed to find any other bullet impacts on vehicles located in
No citizens have come forward subsequent to the
the parking lot.
7

b
]b7C

 •
6-19157-19

shooting to identify vehicle damage.
vehicles when damaged.

No persons were in the

Weapons Involved:
During the shooting between SAl
I the following weapons were discharged:

I

land

weapon:
.40 GJ.ock, Model 22, Serial tAYL729US, with .40 Smith
and Wesson, jacketed hollow point ammunition,
manufactured by Federal. Magazine capacity of 15
rounds.
SA

I

iweapon:
.9mm Sig Sauer 2226, Serial #U445016, with Federal
Premium brand, .9mm Luger 147 grain Hydra-Shok jacketed
hollow point ammunition. Magazine capacity of 15
rounds.

Investigation by HPD and FBI revealed the following
number of spent casings and live rounds located at the two crime
scenes:
Restaurant:
2 fired .40 S&W casings on sidewalk near the entrance.
S fired .40 S&W casings inside the restaurant.
1 unfired .40 S&W cartridge inside the restaurant.
Parking Lot:
2 unfired .40 S&W cartridges (See E-27 and E-28).
4 fired .40 S&W casings (See E-29 through E—32)
3 .9mm Federal shell casings in SAl
windshield wiper well (See E-33 and E-34).

Ibucar

2 .9mm Federal shell casings found in bucar fenders
(See E-35 through E-38).
Subject!
Iweapon was found at the extreme
east side of the parking lot opposite the entrance to Coach Road
(See E-1).
The slide was in the lock back position and contained
8

 .

.

66-19157-19

I

an empty 15 round magazine (See
E-25). Search of the area
accounted for 14 spent shell casings
and dropped live rounds from
Iweapon.
Following the shooting, SAl
Iweapon was found to
contain one (1) .9mm round in the
chamber and eight(8) .9mm
cartridges in the 15 round magazine.
These
addition to the five (5) .9mm shell_casirgs nine (9) rounds in
found on and in SA
I
Ibucar total 14 rounds.
SAl
ladvise
d he cannot
recall exactly how many shots he
fired and is unsure as to
whether he “topped-off’ his magazine.
A fired bullet was found by HPD in the parkin
g lot
approximately 54’ north of the north curb
of the bowling alley
(No photo available, see the diagram in
IIPD report #l38220796N
for location)
Ballistics report from HPD is pending.
.

I
Iweapon, unfired cartridges, and shell casings
are being maintained by the HPD.
SAl
Iweapon was test
fired by HPD and returned to him the next
day.
ininq/p1anng
Two requests were drafted for SOG assistance on Octobe
r
9, 1996 fo onanir surveillance of the
main cae subict and his
associate, J
In the SOG request oni
I(LNU).
I (L), it
was noted that he was known to carry
a firearm. Updated
information regardingi
Iwas paBsed to the SOG as it was
obtained by the substantive drug squad. Survei
llance tem
integrity was maintained in that the same team
that surveilled
I
Iduring a controlled narcotics purchase on Septem
ber 30,
1996 was also used in the planned surveillance
of October 21,
1996.
Adequate meetings and face-to-face discussions were Ield
between drug SAs and SOG members. The
pertinent ASAC was briefed
on th orning of the shooting regard
ing planned surveillance of

‘-

Houston SOG utilizes a team leader concept with one SA
directing the surveillance activities of the team
SAs. The SOG
supervisor contacts substantive squad supervisors on
at least a
weekly basis to determine SOG needs and requirements.
During the evening of October 21, 1996, emergency
procedures regarding 911 notification were carried
out and the
division Crisis Response Plan enacted to includ
e on-scene
oversight by the SAC, two ASACS, Chief Divisio Couns
n
el, ERT,
etc.
9

 ___________________

.

.

S6-19l57-j9

Protective body armor was utilized by all SOG team
members an’ all i-earn members qualify at firearms on a routine
basis.
SAl
1 qualified at firearms as recently as October 8,
199S and advised that once the shooting began “his training took
over” and was automatic.
Prosecutive Status
Subject,
is currently being held
without bond and h s oeen cnargea b the Harris County District
s Office with murder and aggravated assault.
3
Attorney
On October 23, 19%, a federal criminal complaint_was
signed by U.S. Magistrate Judge Calvin Botley charging
1
with violation of Title 18, USC Section 111(a) (1); (b),
assaulting a federal officer.

10

ib6

 90-204 (Rev. 12-1.95)

UNifE!) STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of InvestIgation

Copy to;

1pottor
Date;

ASAC RICHARD A. MRQUISE
November 21, 1996

CaseID#;

62A—ME-50779
SHQOTING INCIDENT.
SAl
October 26, 1996,
MEMPHIS DIVISION

Chcur

SYOOpSIS:

ocrwc:

MEMPHIS

I

2DMINISTRATIVB INQUIRY

-

At approximately 10:00 PM, 10/26/96, the FBI was advised
that I
I a fugitive wanted for murder
from the State of Virginia, hadbeen in telephonic
contact with his niother in Oklahoma from a teleohope
registered in Lakeland, TN. SN
detàrmjned that the Tennessee BUreau ot Investigation
(TBI) was also attempting to locate and arresti
I
for a murder_committed in Nashville, TN, in October,
1996, and I
I ws on the TBI’ s Top Ten Most Wanted
Fugitives list. SAl
Iloctated. other. Special
Agents who either lived in the area or had worked with
him earlier in the evening on the arrest of several bank
robbers,. and met the TBI and the Shelby County Sheriff’s
Department (scsD) in Lakeland, TN, to formulate an arrest
plan.
After initially going to another steel salvage
yard, Sheriff’s Deputies directed them to Surplus Steel
in Lakeland. There are 3 main buildings located at
Surplus Steel, and the consensus of the Agents was that
I
I if there, was located in the trailer at the rear
of the compound. Attempts were made for between 10 and
20 minutes, utilizing a public address system in
vehicles, to caill
br any other resident of the
compound out of one ot the 3 buildings. Np one
responded. EffOrts to contact the telephone number t
Surplus Steel did not result in anyone answering the
telephone.
Based on observing lights coming from one of

I

document contajoa neither re
nidat.jote nor eonc1u ions of the P01.
It is the property of the FBI end ic loaned to
your agency; it and ita Contenta are riot. to b distributed outside your
agency.

ThLS

 I

62A-ME-50779

land’

I

the buildings, sAj
along with TBI
Agentsl
Imoved in an attempt
I (ASAC) and
secure this outbuilding. As the 4 Agents moved to
secure the first outbuilding, they noticed a young male
in the building, in his 20s, who appeared to resemble the
subject: As Agents attempted to direct him to surrender,
he flipoed onto his stomach and hid his hands. SA
.ttempted to talk this inaividual into
I
I made a
surrendering and to show his hands. When I
move with his hands from under the pillow and turned
toward the direction where the Agents were, SAl
I
fired approximately two rounds from his MP-5, and SA
I
irea two rounds from a shotgun, and ASACL I
1
Prior to the
tired two rounds from his shotgun.
I
I who had ducked below the
shooting ending, SA I
glass in the door, fired 4 more rounds through the door
I At that point they
in the direction oft
Ihad
determined thati
Ihad been hit and SAl
wounds to his fce aug dar which were later determined to
be from .ÔO buckshot, possibly from a ricocheting round.
It was also determined that
tgun had not been
fired; however, an examination of the weapon indicated
that a live round with an indented primer was under the
hammer.
The gun was located in the’cabin on the floor
after he was sub.ued and arrested by FBI Agents.
Aithoughi
Iwas transported to the Regional Medical
Center in Memphis, he recovered from his wounds and was
transoorted to Nashville on charges of murder. SA
Ihas recovered from his wounds. None of the
I
were injured. The
on the.
other Agents
U. S. Attorney for the Western_District of Tennessee is
]for assaulting a
considering, prosecution of I
federal officer.

to

or officers

DETAILS:

scene

 (12/31/1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 1NVES11GATION
Precedence:
To:

Date:

ROUTINS

From:

Inspection Division
Contact:

1pproved By:

William 0. Gore

?ttu:

Inspection Division

3/6/97

JB

ision 1837

Gore Wilhia
Lusby Thoma

hki

Iirr

Drafted By:
Case ID

#:

Title:

.ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/28/96
NEW ORIiENS DIVISION

66-19157-33

To advise of a shooting incident on 10/28/96, in the
Synopsis:
Paul Douglas Harnum, an armed and
New Orleans Division.
dangerous fugitive who was wanted for Interstate Flight to Avoid
Prosecution on charges of rape in the first degree, assault in
the first and second degree, reckless endangerment, and false
imprisonment, was shot and killed during an attempted arrest.
Tii1

:

Reference report of Inspector-in-Place

I

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRO) with reference to the captioned shooting.
b
D7C

1
1
2

-

-

Mr.I
Mr.

Mr.I
(1
Mrj
(1
(1
Mr.
(1
(1
Mr.
Mr.

-

3

-

3

-

-

-

1
1

-

I Room 7142
Gore. Room 7129 (Enclosure)
1, Room 7116
Mr. Marquise, Room 5155)
I, Room 6012
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
Mr. Carter, Room 6050)
7427
Room 7159)
Room 7326)
Mr.
25
0-rn
Lusb
Room 4147

1
1
1

-

-

-

jooj
Ms.I
Room 3787?
Mr.I
Mr.______ Quantico

FO
Mrs.________ Room 7861

1-Mr.1
1

-

 To;
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-33, 3/6/97

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

‘‘--‘-6, Supervisory Senior Resident Agent (SSRA)
I received a phone call regarding fugitive Paul
Douglas I{arnum.
Information indicated th.t Harnum waq possibly
in the Shreveport, Louisiana, area.
Icontacted a
SSRAI
Dallas Office SA requesting additional information about the
subject. A Dallas agent advised that Harnum had been traveling
through the Dallas Division the past few days and that they had
been tracking his cellular telephone in an effort to locate him.
It was learned that Harnum had traveled to Denver and other East
and Midwest locations before traveling to Dallas on 10/25/96,
Tyler, Texas, on 10/26/96, and was believed t, be in the
Shreveport area.
‘

r’kpund information regarding Harnum was provided to
I by the Dallas agent. Four agents were paged and b!
The Shreveport
requested to meet SSRAI
jat the office.
Police Department, Bossier City Police Department, and the
Louisiana State Police were notified of the possibility of
Investigation determined that
Harnums presence in the area.
Harnuni was in the Shreveport area and agents were dispatched to
began a search for vehicles matching the description of possible
vehicles being used by the subject. The vehicle description
included a Ford F-350 pickup that was alternately described as
having a camper shell or a factory constructed camper compartment
possibly bearing New Hampshire license plate CFA-254; however,
information was also developed that Harnum may have obtained a
Within several hours, agents identified two
different vehicle.
possible sites where Harnum might be located. One possible
identified site was the Shreveport/Bçss±er City 1COI. Campground
Iprovided a
located in southwest Shreveport. SA
photograph of Harnuin to.the manager of the campground who felt
that the photograph resembled an individual who had checked into
the campground in a recreational vehicle (RV) the previous
evening and was lodged at a site on the campgrounds. Another
witness indicated that the photograph did not resemble the
individual lodged at the campground; however, she was certain
e
1
that the individual at .the campground was accompanied by a fema)
in the RV.
Based on additional information provided by SA I
I
t. fh
I
çund, SSRA I
regarding the individual
I to maintain a discreet
instructed SAs I
I and I
surveillance of the campground property.

sS1AI

2

 ______Ihe
______Iwere

To:
Re;

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-33, 3/6/97

Inspection Division

Dm-lna the surveillance_of the campgrounds,
Ito travel to his home and
I asked SI
change into clothing that would make it appear that he was a
manual laborer at the RV par. At this point, SSRA 1
formulated a three-part strategy. First, an operationai Speciai.
Investigations Unit van containing a “jump out squad” of six
ofici would be sent into the north end of the RV park.
Idisguised as a manual laborer, was deployed to a
SAl
surveillanqe position at the entrance/exit of the park.
SAl
Iwas instructed to only participate in this
surveillance function and not to become operational during any
arrest strategy.
This instruction was given because SAl________
was unable to wear his protective vest in the manual laborer
role.
BA!
Fgas instructed to take a portable radio in the
event that communication other than the established signals was
necessary. He was advised to adequately hide the radio from
view.
SSRAI

At approximately 4:00 a.m., surveillance was instituted
on the motor home parked at site E—6 at the KOA Campground. An
FBI “spotter” van was parked two spaces from the subject anda
Shreveport Police Department (SPU) “jump van” with four Special
Response Team (SRP) officers and a driver was located five spaces
away.
SAl
was on foot as a lookout1t and BA I
land
Sgt.
parked across from the campground, Otfler FBI and
SPD personnel were stationed at various points as part of an
outer perimeter.
At approximately 7:00 a.m., Harnum exited the motor
home to walk a dog.
He re-entered the motor home, exited again,
and walked toward the KOA showers. As Harnum approached the
“jump van” four SRT officers exited the van and attempted to
arrest him. Harnum ignored their commands and pulled a .380 Colt
semi-automatic pistol from a “fanny pack”. Harnum ran between
various camper sites and headed south and east towards a fence
that formed the border of the campground with SRT members in
b6
7S
pursuit.

I

BA!
‘heard the radio traffic
and Sgt. [
advising that Harnum was out of the motor home, however, there
was no response from radio queries_from the “spotter” van to the
“jump van”. At that
I drove his car it(, fc
SAl
,
I
campground and stopped near the southeast corner. SAl
ejtëd the driver side o the vehic]
nd Sgt.I
lexited the
passenge hide..
As iIarnum continued running towards SAL_______
and Sgt.
raised his .380 Colt and pointed it at them.
3

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-33, 3/6/97

Inspection Division

J tired

f±t, striking a parked blue chevrolet’s
ired striking a parked RV and SRT member
I
Ifired striking another parked Ky,
Jfired a
SAl
second hot striking Harnum. The bullet entered behind Harnunt’
s
right ear and exited his left brow, ultimately lodging in a
parked trailer,
Harnum died immediately and fell face forward to
the ground, dropping his weapon.
bumpi.

AI

A fire department rescue unit was requested and
officers were called to preserve and process the scene. The
female traveling with Harnutn was removed from the motor home,
interviewed, and released. It was determined that the female was
a prostitute that had been picked up by Harnum at a rest area in
Liberty City, Texas. After purchasing sqme crack cocaine ,n
Kilgore, Texas, Harnum drove himself andi
tin the
motor home to Shreveport.
On 1/16/97, the SIRG met. to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas t,usby, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division,j
I Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, criminal Division, USDOJ;
Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal
AciVice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel; J. C.
Carter, Section Chief, Personnel Management Section, Personnel
Division; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel
Administration and Benefit Section, Personnel Division; Richard
A. Marquise, Section Chef. 0neration1 hflport Section, Criminal.,
Investigative Division,I
I Unit Chief, 1S-2D
UnH
(1ba1 Section
NS-2, National Security Division;I
I
lUnit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;
I
1 Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit.
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; and, I
I
I
ISupervisor. WashinatonFie1d Office. The only non-voting
attendee wad
I Inspection Analyst, OffIce of
Inspections, Inspection Division.

I

-

-

Observations and Recotnnendations of the 81KG
The 51KG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadJ.y force;
(2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide rcinendations concerning
trainin and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
4

 TO:
Re:

Inspection Division From
66-19157-33, 3/6/97

Inspection Division

SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force in this shooting incident was justified.

I

The second topic discussed by SIRG members related to
training and safety issues in this incident. Members noted the
fact that agents who were assigned only to surveillance duties
ran to the area of fire and conflict. The SIRG iterated the fact
that participants were at risk due to their lack of protective
armor and the subject’s known propensity for violence.
Partinhir1y noted was the fact that SASI
Ia-nd
lid not utilize protective body armor during this
incident.
Members also noted that managerial oversight was lax
in this area due to the lack of protective armor use. The SIRG
members particularly noted the fact that SAl
I, who was
posing in an undercover capacity, did not possess a firearm, did
not utilize protective body armor, and although he had possession
of a radio he had shut it off. Members emphasized the fact that
should not have been present without equipment
SAL
critical for his defense.
SIRG members recommended that all SAs
involved in this incident receive a letter of censure for their
neglect of protective armor use.
Based on electronic communication dated 11/4/96, from
the New Orleans Division to Inspector-in-Place Imfeld, FBIHQ was
advised that agents in the New Orleans Division had been apprised
of the Bureau requirements regarding the use of body armor in
all
arrest or high risk situations.

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
That the Administrative Summary Unit (ASU),
(PDL forward l&±v of iir tp SP
janl_____
FEor their neglect of utilizing protective body aatior
during
s shooting incident.
Personnel Division.

1

4+

5

 ________limmediately
_____

FD-204 (Rcv, 12-195)

1JNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal l3ureau of Investigation

•

Copy to:

Denver Division

Rortof:
Dato:

liP
December 5,

CaseIDff:

66-19157-13

This:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
DENVER DIVISION
NOVEMBER 6, 1996

Charaeter

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER

Synopsis:

Based upon information provided by a cr ibi
on 11/6/96,
Iwas observed and audio recorded
completing a felonious narcotics transaction by FBI
Special Agents (SAs), Officers from the Aurora Police
Department (APD), and members of the Metro Gang Task
Force, Aurora/Denver, Colorado. I
iwas permitted to
re-enter his vehicle before an attempt was made to arrest
him.
Wheni
Is vehicle was blocked in its parking
space by a police surveillance van, and clearly identified
police and FBI officials attempted to place him under
arrest,I
Ibegan to aggressively maneuver his
vehicle without regard for the safety of the law
enforcement officials who surrounded the vehicle and
ignored their orers for him to surrender,
I
vehicle, while moving rearward, collided in the police
surveillance van after forcing a clearly identified police
officer to flee from his location b tween the two
vehicles.
Following the collision,
accelerated forward leaving approximately eight feet of D7C
skid marks while the vehicle was surrounded on its right.
left, and rear by law enforcement personnel and parked
vehicles, and an apartment building and a tree at its
front.
Simultaneously, 14 rounds were discharged from the
weapons of Officerl
I(f our rounds), Officer

•

I

1996

I

ames:

WFO
b7c

cOoratina wii-sg and his attorney,

I
duisesst contains neither taco randations nor conclusions of the FBI
It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its cOntentS are not to be dtstribtited outside your agency.

 _____Icontacted

________

66-19157-13

i(seven
I(three rounds), and S?I
caucinr non-life threatening injuries to
ubsequently complied with orders to
extend his hands outside the drivers door of the vehicle
Iwas
at which time he was subdued and arrested.I
found to be have had a Glock, Model G23 Semiautomatic
Pistol, Serial Number AWX1OS, with a fully loaded
magazine, within his reach in the passenger compartment of
the vehicle.

I

roundsi

I

.

1 as well
1 video, and other evidence
Photographic
as the results of witness interviews, sketches, and
official records, were reviewed to reconstrtct t-h
tat
seauence of eventq leading to the arrest oft
I Aurora, Colorado, on 11/6/96, at
approximately 3:00 p.m., and this shooting inquiry.

•

F

I

According to the report of Detective
Denver Police Department (DPD), dated 11/8/96,
ntinr “Denver Police Department Narcotics Burau.”
I date of birthi______________________________
I
Denver, Colorado, was arres’ed by the DPD on 5/20/96 at
his residence during the execution of a search warrant and
the subsequent recovery of 157.3 grams of a contlled
On October 14, 1996,1
substance and two weapons.
I District Attorney, Drug Court, Depver. Colorado,
I
to
invited the_DPD, through the Attorney f on
interviewl
Iregarding dr.ig trafficking within the
I and his attorney cme to te
Denver, Colorado, area. I
Ireported to Detectivel
DPD on 10/22/96 wherel
I
I hr tciv
nron kn,-’wn I-n hm I
that
rovided

I

I

J

•

I Apartment Number
Aurora, Colorado. I
unformed Detectivel
I
had made 25 to 30 deliveries, every two week, for over one
iprovided
and thati______ always carried a mm. I
substantial information regarding I
j” in th presence
un order
of his attorney, to ensure the arrestöf I
to receive favorable consideration by the Drug Court,
An agreement
Denver, Colorado, upon_his own sentencing.
was reached wher(
twould call the DPD upon his next
contact with

year

•

Detectiv_________
On 1/4
DPD, to reportl
I had contacted him and wanted to make
a delivery.
A decision was made to arrange for the
transaction to take place
11/6/96.
DetectiveL
Imade arrangements
Ito work with
-

on

fonl

II

 66-19157-13

Officer’

•

I
•

a

I Narcotics Unit
1 APD. A
lenhçne
conversation took place between Officer I
I andi
I on
11/5/96 and a meeting was arranged for 11/6/96, during the
morning. Arrangements were made to purchase nine ounces
of cocaine and two ounces of methamphetamnine from
I
on 11/6/96. I
Icontacted Officerl
lat
approximat1v ioöo a.m. on 11/6/96, and provided details
concerning I
I that he previously provided to Detective t6
lincluding a history of prior deliveries,
c.escriptive data, an 4-nf’-mjtion regarding weapons and
vehicles_utilized byl
I Immediately thereafter,
Officer I
land SAl
IFBI, Denver Division,
traveled to I
j Aurora, Colorado, where
they video taped and diagramed_the building and
neighborhood described byl
1 A briefing was scheduled
for 12:30 p.m.. with the Metro Gang Task Force; buy money
was obtained; and arrest and surveillance team assignments
were discussed and made.
Between 12:00 p.m. and 12:30
p m the Metro Gang Task Force briefing began and
assignments were given. Appropriate management and other
officials from within the FBI and the APD were notified
and/or were present in the briefing as follows:
Notified
ASAC LYDIA C.

PUGH,

ASAC KEITH A.

DEVINCENTIS, Acting SAC, Denver Division

FBI, Deaver Division

?reent
SSA

I

I

814

SAF

I

SAl

I

I

Lieutenant
Department (APD)
Off icerl

APD

Officer

IAPD

I

Off icer

j

Investigtoz

a

Sergeant

Aurora Police

I

lAPI’

Officer

APD

III

APD

 66-19157-13

Officer

I

I

APt)

Officerl

Officer
Police

Glendale Colorado
.

Officer
Investigator
Colorado Sher

a

DPD

ce

s

SAl

IColorado Bureau of

Investigation (CBI)

•

•

.

Arapaho County

The surveillance video made at T
I
Street was shown and diagrams of the area were utilized to
make assignments and responsibilities clear. Vehicle
descriptions and descriptive information regarding I
I
were also provided.
P1ais “ed assignment of an
undercover officer to coven
Jand establishment of
audio and video surveillance to provide effective coverage
of the drug buy and arrest. A subsequent meeting wp
arranaed with the undercover officer
1 Investigatorl
I APD, to arrange a system of codes to address
safety isues and emergency changes. Uniformed Officers
I
APD, were given assignments to
land I
ensure an immediate uniform presence on the scene at the
aoronriate t5me.
Other assignments, made by Sergeant
I
I Apt), were as follows:
Arrest Team

I

Officer

.

Officer I

I

I

Officer

I

SAl

VideO Surveillance

SAl

Icsi

Eguit)ment Operation

SAl

I
IV

(Monitoring)

 66-19157-13

Officer

I

I

SSA
All other law enforcement personnel were given
surveillance and backup assignments.
TtRjteiy afr thç briefing Officersi
I
jiet withi
andi
lear Mississippi anr tTr1a
Streets in Aurora, Colorado, where thy searchedi
I
vehicle and person.
Thereaftei. I
I w
quipped with a
wireless transmitter. Officer I
was also
equipped with a wireless transm.tter,

By 1:00 p.m. all law enforcement personnel were
at their respective assignments and the Arrest Team was
positioned to the west oft
un an
unmarked police surveillance van. An arrest plan had been
discussed and approved.
Other ersonne1 were assigned to
monitor routes into the area of F
I in
anticipation of the arrival oft
I

.

.

.

Shortly after 3:00 p.m. Office4
I by
police radio, notified the undercover, arrest,
surveillance, and monitoring teams that he had observed a
late model, black, Chevrolet, pickup park in the north lot
next tol
I and a Hispanic male exited the
vehicle and entered the apartment building by the north
door.
The veIjc1e was Barked facing south toward the
north wall of I
I in the third parking
space from the east side of the apartment building.
One
vehici
as parked in the first parking space (left of
I
vehicle; the second space was empty; and a
vehicle was parked in the fourth space, on the right side
of I
I pickup truck. The curb in front of the
vehicles was approximately seven inches high and
surrounded a rock/plant bed that uniformly extended 97
inches outward from the north and east walls of the
apartment building (see the attached diagram marked
Exhibit A).
A tree with a trunk thickness of
approximately six inches was growing between the northeast
corner of the apartment building ansi the veh.cle parked in
first parking space (to he left çf I
Ivehicle). A
stairway to the right oft
Ivehicle extended outward
from the north wall of the apartment building to within 33
inches of the curb where other vehicles were parked.

,

S

Within minutes of Officerl
V

Inotification,

 66-19157-13

and after the aforementioned Hispanic male
was observed to
enter the singl doorway on the north wall
of(
Street, Officer I
I from inside Apartment 103, by I
wireless remote transmitter, advised the susp
I
had arrived and was entering the front door ect I
of Apartment
103.
A drug transaction was completed during whichl
I
purchased 7
ouns of a substance believed to be powered
cocaine frorni
Ifor $4,850.00, paid for with marked
TT
per currency. Upon completing the transaction
I
Ideparted from the apartment building through the
same door of fjcerl
I and surveillance team members had
seen him use to enter the apartment building.
All
nrtiripating law enforcement officers were
notified that
I
completed thç dru tranaction and was leavi
ng
the building.
Sergeanti
jrelated this
information directly to the Arrest ‘ream_siqnali
ng the
Arrest: Team to initiate the arrest of
The Arrest
I”
Team moved the browa ooli,ce surveillance van
into position
directly behind I
Ivehicle as soon as I
I entered
his vehicle.
The driver’s side of the oolic ijrveillance
van was parallel to the rear bumper of
I
Iblack
Chevrolet
The two vehicles were separated by
approximately five feet and four inches (set
the attached
diagram marked Exhibit B). Officer
Iw firiving
the o]4ce surveillance van while Oft icersi
I and
I
land Si
loccupied the cargo area of the
vehicle.
.

As soon as the police surveillance van came
to a
stop, per the pre-discussed. ax-rest plan, Off
icer
I
exited the drivers side doOr of the police
surveillance
van with his weapon drawn and placed hims
elf between the
police surveillance van and the rear bumper
of E
vehicle.
Officer!
Iwas first to exit the cargo doors
on the right side of the police surveillance
He
moved to his left to take a position at the van.
left front of
th ‘ce surVeilla
nce v ôvrig the right side of
I
I pickup. Officer!
jas second to exit the
cargo doors o th riqht side of the police
surveillance
van.
Officer!
Imoved to his right to take a
position at the left rear of the police_su
rveillance van 0/C
to cover the_right, driver’s side,
oft
I pickup

truck.

I

SAl

was last to exit from the carg

o doors on
the right slOe oi the pOlice surveillance
van.
He moved
to his right to take a position to the left
of Officer
tin the area of the left rear of the police
surveillance van. Movement by all Arrest Team_
Members
began simultaneously. Officersj
landi
I and SA
VI

 S

66-19157-13

.
I

]each repeatedly said in loud voices en route to and
once established in their respective positions, “police,”
“stop,” “put your hands up,” and “freeze.” Each Arrest
Team member was wearing a dark blue police raid jacket
with the words “POLICE” stenciled across the front in
large white letters. Each Arrest Team Nembe
d his
weapon drawn and pointed in the direction of
vehicle.

•

I

•

•

•

•

I

Off irsr’J
Iandj
and SA
observed
Jlook to his right and rearward, and
to his left and rearward, at the approaching law
enforcement officers as qrders iere being given to him to
surrender.
Iplace his left hand on the
SAl
Isawl
steerinp wh1 nd reach downward with his right hand.
Off ben
Isaw the bac up lights oni
Ivehicle
come on and Officenl
immediately began to move to
safety asi
Ivehic e egan moving_rearward toward
the police surveillance van. Officenl
imoved to his
right into the sights of the weapon possessed by Off içer
I
lwho raised his weri to llow Officer I
Ito
move to safety.
OfficrI
I moved forward on the
right side of I
I vehicle as the vehicle collided
into the police surveillance van and immediately
accelerated forward with enough force to leave
approximately eight feet of rubber tire acceleration marks
on the pavement. At the time of impact against the police
surveillance van OficenI
Iwas at the front of the
right side door oft
j and began to move forward
with the as the made a sharp turn to the left exposing
the flatL surface
the rJ
ght front tire to Officer
1
I
I Of ficerl
jbegan firing at the flat,
treaded portion of the right front tire, expending a total
of four rounds in rapid succession, while cbntinuing to
move forward with the
vehicle.
Simultaneously, Off ice1
Idiecharged the first of
three rapidly fired rounds into the cab or in the
direction of the cab of the pickup occupied byl
I SA
I
I who was stationed to the left of Officer I
I
upon observing the aggressive actions of I
land the
vehicle J
was operating, and upon hearing the first
shot or snots, began firing seven rapidly expended rounds
into the driver’s_side door, window, and frame 9
f the
operated byl
I The right front ol
I bounced
approximately 12 inches above the elevation of the rest of
the as the right front tire of the vehicle climbed over
the curb while rapidly moving forward and in a
southeasterly direction. The vehicle stopped abruptly

I

I

I

VII

 __________Ijacket

.

66-19157-13

with aforementioned tree near the center of its front
bumper and rocked backward. As the vehicle came to rest,
with its front tires inside the rock/plant bed, rounds
were being expended and the passenger side glass in
A flash of
Ivehicle was observed to shatter.
F
debris from the adjacent brick wall was observed as what
appeared to be a round impacted against it (visible in the
surveillance video recording of the incident).
I
Officersi

Iwas being ordered out of the veh:
japproached Off ic
IandL

Iaht and Office:
position from OfficerL
approached the positions of SAj
land Office:
irelled ne nad been shot
from their lefti

I

followed instructions to opened the driver’s door.
remained on the drever’s seat until assisting officers
pulled him from the vehicle and placed him in the prone
Each
position on the ground where handcuffs were applied.
Arrest Team member thereafter removed himself to a secure
area in anticipation of requests from_management and
I Sergeant
Lieutenant I
invigative personnel.
land SSAI
Iook charge of the scene ensuring
appropriate medical assistance was summoned and the scene
was properly secured.
Ivehicle
Examination of I
and the surrounding area disclosed five rounds penetrated
the driver’s side window of the vehcl from tije left rear
area (one bullet jacket from within
was
weapon) (see
confirmed to have been fired form S
one p which exited
the illustration marked Exhibit C),
the passenger compartment. One round penetrated the frame
33 inches behind the driver’s side window and nine inches
The round passed through the
from the top of the cab.
passenger compartment, exited through the top front of the
passenger side window, and impacted against the brick,
Two rounds impacted
north wall of the apartment building.
in the outer door frame above the driver’s side window.
An additional four rounds mpacted against the right front
tire and rim of I
Ivehicle and two additional
rounds impacted against the north wall of I
Street, one into the brick portion and one into the
aluminum_siding portion (confirmed to have been fired from
SA I
lieapon by the FBI Laboratory). Fourteen impact
points were identified and fourteen spent shell casings
were recovered from the scene.

.

b6

.

The locat.ons of Evidentiary Items 20 through
VIII

v:

 GE-19157-13

•

23, 40 mm Federal casings, as
noted in the APD evidence
sketch (see illustration mar
ked Exhibit 0>, are consisten
t
with the witness statements and
a review of the an arrest
scene video tape, that indica
te Off icerf
bias
initially located between the
surveillance van and the rea driver’s ide of the tolice
r bumper oil
vehicle.
I
Aad, that Officerl
Imoved
I
Iehicle began to move rearwar to his right as
d and took a
position along the right side
of
the
I
Irehicle
where hçfired foçr rounds int
o its rigflt tront tire,
Officer I
.h6
Iweapon was
semiautomatic pistol that eje a Baretta .40 Caliber
cts spent shell casings to
the right.
The location of Items One thro
ugh Seven, 10 mm
shell casings, on the APD Cri
me Scene Sketch (see
illustration mar1ced Exhibit
DII, are conqistent with the
statements of SAl
I Officer I
and Officer I
that SAl
Iwas standing to
the left rear of the survei1br
nr vn wen he fired sev
en
rounds into or at the ab oil
SA
Model 1076 semi automatic pisIvehicle.
tol ejects spent
shell casinqs to the right and
rea
r
of
the
oter.
All
of SAl
I 10 mm shell casings came to ressho
t in an. area
at or north and east of the
right rear corner of the
police surveillance van.
The iocation of Items Eight
through Ten, .40
Caliber S & W shell casing
. are eçnsistert witlj the
statements made by Officer
land SAl
I
Officerl
I that
as firing fim a positio
n at. tre left
rear of the surveillance van
.
Officer I
jweapon, a
Glock Model 23, .40 Caliber
,
shell casings from its right semiautomatic pistol, ejects
side.
These three shell
ca&ings were found in the
proximity of the left rear
tire
of the police surveillance
van.
Reviews of the photorahs
and sketches
depicting injuries sustain
ed byl
reflected four wound areas
to his upper torso and. rig
ht
lower arm.
There was a large grazing
type of wound at the
front of the left shoulder
joi
The direction of thi
elongated injury was consist nt.
ent with a round penetrati s
the drivers side window
ng
of the vehicle from an area
to the
rear and left of the vehicle
.
An entrance wound appeared
just below the left
armpit on the left upper tors
o. What appeared to be an
Ix

•

 __________iehicle.

66-19l57l3

exit wound as located near mid chest, to
the right of the
left nipple.
The latter two visible wounds were both
elongated and are consistent with a bul
let
the left rear, traveling through the torso striking from
from left to
right,
This is also consistent with a round enter
ing the
driver’s side window from a position in.
the area of the
left rear of the vehicle. The absence of
iijury to the
left arm in this area suggests the
I
Imay have had
his left arm raised, possibly on the stee
ring wheel,, at
the time of the injuries. 2n entry wou
nd was also located
on the right forearm (no exit detec
ted).

•

Review of an arrest scene video tape, mad
e by
the shooting incident, depicts a Hispanic SA
ma.Le .Leaving a dark colored, Chevrolet
,
parked next to what appears to be a Dats pickup that is
un pickup.
The
Datsun pickup is narked in the first park
ing space from
the east side of I
I facing south toward
the north wall of the building.
The Hispanic male is
observed to enter and exit
Th
L
Hispanic male, later identified
asi
I
is observed entering a dark colored Chev
rolet
Simultaneously, the police surveillance vn .
’ved
7
h
being driven toward and. stopping
behindi
I
vehicle.
The video disclosed what appeared to
be the
driver of the polide surveillance van
through the front driver’s door (Off le,vina the vehicle
Iwho was
momentarily_located between ‘the policicerl
e surveillance van
andi
Ivehicle. A second indiv
the left front area of the police surv idual appears in
eillance van
(Officer I
I as the first individual moves to
the
riaht side of I
Ivehicle.
Simultaneously
I
Irehicle began to mqve rrwad.
It also
appeared the first inr1ivin1
Imoved forward on
the right side fI
Lrehicle (tow
front) as the moved rearward and struck ard the right
the police
surveillance van. Asi
Iveh
moved toward the
icle
surveillance van, there appeared to
be
wearing a dark jacket marked POLICE, a white male
” with the back of
the jacket toward the video camera,
moving into an area
near the left rear of
Alth
could not positiëIy identify the figur ough SA
e, the
position of the mirp is consisten
t with the position
described for SAl
Iby witnesses
the position of she’ll casings expe and is consistent with
nded from his weapon.
The balance of the video recording
is consistent with
details set forth above.

I

•

I

iduring

x

 66-19157-13

a

I

I

through his attorney refused to be
interviewed by the FBI.

I

jzas charged in a six count Federal
Grand Jury Indictment? on 11/8/96, with violations of the
Federal Narcotics Statue and Assault on a Federal Officer.
He was also charged with violation of Section 18-2-101,
State of Colorado Criminal Code, Criminal Attempt to
Commit First Degree Assault, and Sections 18-18-204 and
205, Distribution of Controlled Substance, Schedule II, on
11/6/96.
Details:

.

a

XI

 ____Ihad

FD-204 (Rev. 124-95)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Fe1eraI Bureau of InvestigaUon

Copy to:

Reportof:
Veto:

iip[
December 11, 1996

CaseIDff:

66F-19157-15

Title:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
DETROIT DIVISION
NOVEMBER 20, 1996

I

orne

Training

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SynopsLs:

This shooting incident was the result of an
investigation by the Detroit Division of a
$1.3 million
robbery of a Michigan National Bank (MNB van
)
on the night
of 11/13/9.6, in Dearborn, Michigan.
On 11/13/96, at approximately 10:53
Dearborn Police reaponded to a 913. call that p.m.,
a ?4NB guard
had been shot at a branch of MNB on Michig
an avenue in
West flrhrnn
Upon their arrival, police obse:çvedl
I
I
‘black male, date of birthi
I
stand
ing
next to a r v-an, over the body of
a male
identified as 26 year-old bank guard MATT victim (later
HEW ANTHONY
GIRTJDIN).
GIR7RDIN_appeared to have a single gunshot
wound to the head. I
told police at the scene that
he was the driver ot th MNB vqn and that
GIRARDIN was his
partner and passenger.
Jtold police that he and
I
GIRARDIN had left the main pick-up cente
r with
approximately $1 million, and that this
bank was their
first drop off.
Itated that only GIRARDIN was
armed inasmuch as
only been on
three monLths and had not received clearancethe job for
to carry a
firearm.. I
Istated that he had pulled the van up
parallel tothe AT!1 entrance with the
passenger’s side of
the van being the closest.I
tated that as he and
his partner opened the doors to exit the van
he heard a
single gunshot, and he observed a black
male on the
passenger’s side of the van holding a small
handgun.
Dearborn Police subsequently determ±ned
that $1.3 million

-

This ocureent contains neither
recoexeenfaejon nor conalusions of the ?Bt.
your agency; it and ita cofltents
are net to be diatributad oteide

It ia the prnerty of the ISI enct &a 1oaect
to

your agency.

 had been taken during the robbery/murder, Several witnesses saw
a dark colored Ford pickup driving through the bank iarking lot,
as well as briefly parked behind the bank van. I
Iwas
subsequently interviewed at the police station and related
substantially the same account as he had at the scene with a few
additions.
on 11/19/96, Dearborn Police took the videotape from
the ATM to the Michigan State Police for enhancement o the vi4eo
image.
This tape showed numerous inconsistencies with
I
stateinçnts as to what actually occurred, The videotape snowect
second individual at the rear of the
Ibriefly talkjnr tt
1ank van, as well ael
Ipuiiing something out of the
passenger side of the van. Dearborn Police subsequently
detrmind from the autopsy that GIRARDIN died from a pointblank, single gunshot wound to the head, and that the shot was
fired from the left, or driver’s side of the van. The bank van
had numerous blood spatters in it, a slug was found on the floor
of the driver’s side, and a .32 caliber cartridge case was found
under the victim’s body. A state search warrant was obtained and
-h home oft
executed
hnd i i-Its. During the
search, I
Icousin, COMMITT
Ifather stated that I
ROWSON, III, wast
Ibest friend. A vehicle registration
search determined that ROWSON owned a maroon Ford Ranger pickup
truck.

I

On 11/15/96, I
Ifather,l
I, was
When
interviewed and admitted to o
.32 caliber handgun.
asked to produce the handgun,
t to the bedroom and
found that the gun was missing.
had several loose rounds
of .32 caliber ammunition which e prov ded to police. One of
the .32 caliber cartridges had been ejected from this gun
sometime in the past.
This cartridge was subsequently compared
to the cartridge case found under GIRARDIN’s body and determined
to have similar ejection marks.
Local charges for firat degree murder, felony murder,
and possession cf
rirearm during commission of a felony were
filed againsti
land ROWSON on 11/15/96 and 11/17/96,
respectively.

I

On the morning of 11/19796, Detroit rqceived
teleohnn tip regarding an associate of ROWSON, t
I
I who allegedly received money from QWSOIj and purchased a
Dtrn4f- Rnecial Operations Group (SOG) conducted a
car tor him.
surveillance of I
I resienrø. i- ‘jiclude following two
individuals in a Cadillac fromt
-esidence in Detroit to
the Knights Inn on Dequindre Avenue, Warren, Michigan.
It was
2

,

 Ito

_____

_____

____

determined through investigation at the Knights Tnn that ROWSON
had previously stayed there; hwever, he was no lonaer
staying at
the motel.
FBI Agents subsequently confrontedi
land
obtained a consent to search his reidence
°‘i the evening of
11/19/96.
Subsequent to the search,l
lwa_intezvewed at
the Detroit FBI Office. During this interview,L
admitted
that ROWSON had adv him that he (ROWSON) an1
referring
tol_______
had been involved in the robbery on
11/13/96. 1
urther advised that ROWSON had given him some
money from the robbery to purchase a car for him.
I
advised that he purchased a 1983 çhevrolep Caprice tor ROWSc5N
with the money ROWSON gave him.
I
I also admitted that he
had rented a room or ROWSOIT at the Knights Inn on Saturday
evening, 11/16/96. I
Istated that ROWSON was in possession
of a 9mm pistol, and he had also seen ROWSOJ with a small
semiautomatic pistol.
ROWSON toldi
Ithat the small
semiautomatic pistol bad been given Co him by his father.
had seen ROWSON in possession of an Eddie Bauer bag
wnlcri appeared to be full.

__

]b

On the morning of 11/20/96, sAl
I Acting
Supervisor of Squad C-4, briefed SAC JOSEPH D. MARTINOLICH, JR.
regarding the status of the investigation and the activities
which occurred on 11/19/96. SAC MARTINOLICH and
TfThT D.
STAPLTON had received periodic briefings from SAl
I Squad C-4 and the case agent on this investigation, and SA
I
Iregarding the progress of the investigation since the
robbery/murder on 11/13/96. Although ASAC STAPLETON is currently
the Administrative ASAC, he was responsible for the Violent Crime
and Major Offenders (VCMO) program for approximately six years in
the Detroit Division and had been involved in this case due to
the current VCMO ASAC, JOHN E. BELL, JR., being temporarily out
of the Division on special assignment.

I

After briefing SAC MARTINOLICH. SAk
Irequested the
assigrment of four additional agents to assist
in conducting a
neighborhood investigation within a five-mile radius around the
Knights Inn. Acting ASAC! RAY P. CH!]RAY guh1-1v
aiied SAs
Land
conduct the neighborhood investigation.
After being briefed at the Detroit Office regarding this
assignment and providing these agents with a photograph and
physical description of ROWSON, and the fact that he was
considered armed and dangerous, the agents left the office at
approximately 9:30 a. m., en route to the Knights Inn, to conduct
the neighborhood investigation.

3

j

 _____

_____

_____

___

At approximately_103Q a.m. on 11/20/
96, SAF
received a call from!
gho advised that ROWSON had
attempted to call him three times on
the evening of 11/19/96.
I
brovided a telephone number from the caller
ID on his
residence telephone.
Investigation determined that the teJephone
number from which ROWSON was attempting
to contact I
Iwas at
the Red Roof Inn, 26300 Dequindre
Avenue, Warren, Michigan.
This
motel is located across the street from
the Knights Inn.

I

Upon learning of the aforementioned caller ID
information, SAl
Icontacted Squad C-9 (SOG) and requested a
surveillance_around the Red Roof
Intl in an f fort to locate
ROWSON.
S2 I
I also contaced SAl
land instructed her to
CiVI
9S I
j and I
Ito meet s i
lat a i-rin mal] r the Red Roof Inn.
SA
Jthen
briefed SSAI
Supervisor othe Vioienn Lrime
1
Task Porce (VCTF), who subsequently sent
SAl
I
MIcHIGA SThT 9’PflnpERj
and DETROIT POLICE
1
OFEICERI
Ito the vicinity of the Red Roof Inn.
(TROOPERL
land OFFICER I
lare assigned to the DptrnU
VCTF).
Upon A I
larrival at the staging area, SAl
land
he advised the agents and officers of the
of the Red Roof Inn as a possible locatio recent identification
n for ROWSON.
Pesent
during this brief ing were SAsI

I

I

LI(’I

I

I
TROOPER I
I SA
Iwas advised by SA
team leader for the Isu team
and a Detroit SWAT team member, that
the SOG had established an outer perimeter
around the Red Roof
Inn.
I

SAl
isent SAs I
landi
I to interview
the manager of the Red Roof Inn in an
effort to determine if
ROWSON was staying there. The manager advise
d that he had not
seen ROWSON, and a review of motel recorç1
deteim
ined that nobodv
had registered under 1
ROWSON name.
s
SAs I
and
I
I
also obtained computerized telephone record
s from the motel in
effort to identify the calls that ROWSON
alleged-ly made to
As a result of this investigation, it
was determined
that all but six rooms at the Red Roof Inn
could be eliminated as
possible locations in which ROWSON was a tenant.
Included in the
six rooms which were still in question was
Room 248.

At approximately 11:45 a.m., a possible look alike
to
ROWSON was interviewed at a nearby Internatio
nal House of
Pancakes but was determined not to be
ROWSON.
4

 lsubsequently instructed nine (9) agents and
SAl
police officers to return to the initial staging area to develop
This plan called
a plan
ing the sfx remining rooms.
Ito obtain housekeeping attire
for SAs
ani
fro
Roof Inn n orçier to pose as housekeeping personnel.
Iwould knock on the various doors and
ndl
SAs
identify themselves as housekeeping personnel in an effort to
lure the occupants to the door where they could be positively
If nobody responded to their knock, they would
identified.
utilize a pass key, given to them by the Red Root Inn management,
in an effort to open the room door to identify any occupants.
joulc3 h eight_additional
landi
Assisting SA’sl
I SAl
I
agents arid police officers including SAl
this
with
doncurred
Iwbo
discussed this plan with SAI
I who
Iliad also been in contact with SAI
approach.
SAl
was in the office awaiting approval of the federal arrest warrant
for ROWSON, regarding the developments at the Red Roof Inn and
the plan to identify the occupants of the six rooms..

las advised
Prior to implementing this plan, SAl
I had stopped a pizza
that an SOG team member, SAl
delivery person who had been observed by the SOG departing the
nt-if’ption occurred at approximately 1:25
This
Red Rood Inn.
I The pizza delivery driver
p.m. according to SA I
positively identified ROWSON as the occupant of Room 248, and
further indicated that another individual was also in the room.
The pizza delivery person provided a general description to
include clothing being worn by both these individuals,
Ieveioped an
Based on this information. SAl
alternate plan which called for six (6) FBI agents, including
himself, and two (2) Task Force officers to approach Room 248 in
an effort to effect_ROWSOWs arrest. Based on previous
kas aware that the room to the south of
investigation, SAl
Room 248 was empty and that on the other side of Room 248 was a
Istated that his concern at
In his interview, SN
breezeway.
this point was that ROWSON would emerge from the room, armed, and
attempt to injure or kill innocent parties or agents who were
Ib7C
outside the motel room.

I at approximately 1:40 p.m. he
According to SAl
arrived at the Red Roof Inn with his arrest team, cOnsisting of
I and
SAs I
I The team proceeded to
land POLICE OFFICER I
TROOPERI
the second floor balcony of the Red Roof Inn via the south
stairwell and continued to walk in a single file line down the
jstated that he had briefed
balcony towards Room 248. SAl
the SOC, via the Bureau radio, prior to initiating this plan.
5

 ___
__

SAl
Istated in his interview that the SOG was
utilizing channel AS, and Squad C-4
was utilizing channel A
However, the interview of the SOG
team leader, S4
disclosed that the SOG was utilizing
A7 and Squad c-4 was
utilizing AS.
SA
Iwas aware of the piza delivçry
identification, via radio communication
from SAl
I and hebO
relayed this information to his surv
eillance team and advised
them to maintain their perimeter
position,
SA F
Istated
hat h was not totally aware
of the arrest plan details.
SA
iid not advise the Detroit Office of
I
the pizza delivery
persons identification of RQWSON o
his new plan to effect
ROWSON arrest; however, SAl
s
1
lelie
ved that SA
I who
was in the office, was monitori
ng the radio traffic.
SAl
1lan called for an attempt to use a pass key
to gain entrance into the room. While
en route to Room 248 from
the south stairwell, the arrest team
encountered a motel employee
who provided a pass key.
If the pass key plan failed, the agents
planned to knock and announce their prese
nce.
During the approach to Room 248, SAl
Inoted that
the curtains were open and the rooms
empty for the two or three
rooms to the south of Room 24:8.
Based on interviews of the
agents and officers directly Involved
, upon
agents assumed a crouched position in orde reaching IZoom 248 the
r to avoid being seen
thruh th window o Room 248 in which
the curtains were drawn.
SAsl
landi
Iset up on the north side of the door to Room
248 along with OFFXCERI
I At the nortI side of the dc,n, the
agents and OFFICER
joined by
I an
SOG team member. Azter the pizza deliv SAl
ery identification, SA
Ihad. proceeded directly to the Red Roof Inn, park
I
ed hi
sureau car in the west side parking lot,
second floor breezeway next to Room 248, ran up the stairs to the
and peered around the
corner, wherf’ 1’ ‘seived the rres
t team approaching from the
south.
SAs I
nd
Jpositioned themselves on the south
side f i-he c
oor nearest the door, nrI f-n 1-he south of
9
anc{ I
wee SARI
land
and TROOPER
SAs
I and
were crouched beneath the window
to Room 248, and SA
who was
vest, was positioned to the south of not wearing a bullet proof
Room 248.

J

I

I

Once thq agents and officers were in posi
tion, SA I
I
signaled S
to attempt to utilize
This
attempt was unsuccessful because the doorthe pass key.
was apparently dead
bolted.
SAl
Ithen initiated the backup plan, knocking and
announcing law enforcement presence and
ordering ROWSO o emerge
from the room with his hands up. Accord
ing to SAl
I he
6

 _________

knocked and announced, T.
the door, police open the door,
FBI, open the door.” SAL
tated that be banged on the door
several times and may have said, uOpen the door or it’s coming
down.”

,

I

According to SAJ
I approximately five to ten
seconds after announcing tieir presence, the door to Room 248
opened and a black male, subsequently dentifie asi
I
I
I exited in a crouched position. I
Jiad a wild look on
his faLce and his eyes were wide. Asi
Iifted the room, SA
canned him in a
to dehermine if he had a weapon.
SA
yelled for
t down on the ground. As
SA
took contro o
SN
I moved towards the
doorway in an effort to observe other individuals in the room.

At this point, sAt
bard three or four gunshots being fired
from within the room.
sAJ
)as unable to observe anybody in
the room, and he thought he gunshots were coming from the back
of t]e room or possibly from the bathroom area. SAj
Istated
he fired five or six rounds from his Sig Sauer, Model P-228, 9mm
semiautomatic pistol, in an effort to suppress the fire that was
coming from the room.

Acãording to SAl
the observed the door to
Room 248 open andi
Istanding at the corner of the oor at
the south èide.
SAl
Ipointed h.s istq1 ati
land
ordered him to get his hands u .
SA
Ithen opened the door
all the way, observed
hands up, and at the same time did
a quick cursory
e room. While having his weapon and
vision focused on
he observed in his peripheral vision
movement at the bathroom doot.
trvding to SAl
I he
pointed his weapon away from
itoward the bathroom door, at
which time he observed a subject standing at the bathroom door
who had assumed a shooting position.
Simultaneously, he saw a
muzzle flash
from what appeared to be a semiautomatic
pistol.
SAl
Istated that he believed he heard three or four
rounds go off, and he felt something go past his thigh aad
fragments hit his leg. He thought he had been shot.
SN
I
stepped back from the doorway, and at this point all the other
agents had taken cover.
comi1q

From a position of cover on the north
of the
doorway, SAl
lassumed a low_vosition a
ssumed a
high_position, according to SAj
SA
tated he heard
SAl
If ire a quick burst and then he (SA
began firing
towards the area of the bathroom. SA
state that he fired
in this direction because this was the area where he 1t’ “ the
individual who had assumed the shooting position.
SAl
stated that when he first saw this individual, he had come trom

[

I

7

 the bathroom

Alth
u
9
gh he did not see him return to the
Idid a quick scan of the room prior to firing.
SA I
tated he fired approximately eight rounds. After
firing, SAi
leturned to a position of cover, dropped his
magazine and reloaded a fresh magazine. Altinurñi h still had
ammunition remaining in the old magazine, SAl
Istated he did
not want to fire to the lock-back osi ‘on. After reloading, SA
Itook a low position and S
ook a high position
behind cover on the north sid
ocr.
SAl
btated he
looked behind him and saw s
ith a weapon aimed at
door.
During this time, SA
recalls discussions and
concerns about potential cross ire. The agents were also
concerned that the subject would make a run toward the door.

bathroom._SAI

I

After SA
land the other agents backed away from
the door, SAl______ radioed the aaents in the Red Roof Inn area
that shots had been fired.
SAl
lso radioed the Detroit
Field Office that shots had been fired and requested assistance
from the Warren Police Departmept (PD) (1:47 p.m. according to
Warren PD incident report).
SAl
Irequested additional
support and iack-ui, as well as emergency medical service
Support.
SA I
Ispoke to SAC MARTINOLICH, who was en route to
the scene with. ASAC STAPLETON, regarding the status of the scene.
He advised SAC MARTINOLICH that he had requested emergency
medical service, SWAT personnel, and Evidence Response Team
personnel to the scene.
the time of the shooting, SAsI
land
were retiirning to the motel office to obtain
for use in the original
plan.
SAs
re not aware of t1e new
arrest plan.
fired, SAl
Jinstructed
the motel manager to notify the Warren PD.
After the initial volley fired by ROWSON and tie
agents’ return fire, the agents backed away from the doorway with
the door remaining open. The agents and officer who had been on
the north side of the door took a position along the concrete
wall in the breezeway. The agents and trooper who had been on
the south side of the door beneath the window retreated to the
south.
From that point forward, there was no noise or response
to the agents’ commands for ROWSON to exit the room.
The door
remained open during the ensuing standoff. The agents maintained
cover of the doorway and attempted to oall ROWSON out of the
room.

8

 Numerous attempts were made to contact ROWSON
by
hostage negotiators with negative results
. After consultation
with hostage negotiators, SAC MARTXNOLICH
relatives of ROWSON to be brought to the arranged for several
scene in the event that
these individuals were needed in the
negotiations.
Attempts to
make contact with ROWSON in the room included
telephone, voice
commands, bullhorn with the telephone, and
bullhorn without a
telephone. Efforts were also made to ensure
not climb into the rafter area of the motel that ROWSON could
and come out into
another room.
Eventually, ROWSOWe mother was brought to the
scene and provided with a bullhorn in an
effort to talk ROWSON
out of the motel room..
These efforts were terminated after
receiving no response from ROWSON.
Finally, at approximately 4 p.m., a
Police dog handler sent in a dog to determine Michigan State
if ROWSON was still
alive in the room.
The dog’s response upon entering and exiting
the room indicated that there was not a
live moving person in the
room.
Thereafter, the SWAT team entered the room and
found
ROWSON apparently dead in the bathroom.
ROWSON was slumped
against the tub with a semiautomatic pistol
position) resting on his chest underneath his(in the cocked
hand, but not in
his hand.
emergency medical team entered and confirmed that
ROWSON was deceased. At that point, the crime
scene was secured.
According to the autopsy report of the
Medical Examiner, it was determined that ROWSON Macomb County
died of two
gunshot wounds to the head. There was an entry
wound under
ROWSON’ chin in which the bullet exited through
It
was later determined by FBI Laboratory examiners the nose.
examination of the crime scene, that this bullet who conducted an
the ceiling of the bathroom, continuing through traveled through
the roof of the
motel.
This bullet could not be located. ROWSON also
had a
gunshot wound which entered the right temple
area and exited the
left head area.
Bullet fragments, presumably from this wound,
were recovered from the bathroom wall, and
were identified by the
FBI Laboratory as having been fired from ROWSON’s
The
medical examiner certified the death as a suicide.pistol.
lb 7 C
The FBI Laboratory examinations of the scene, as well
as bullets, bullet fragments, and cartridge
cases recovered from
the scne, deternined that ROWSON fired six
(6) shots, and SAs
I
I fired seven (7) shots each. One bullet fired by
ROWSON passed through the open doorway of Room
second floor balcony wall, and struck a parked 248, through the
car in the parking
lot., This bullet could not be found.

10

j

 __

SAC MARTINOT.,ICH was interviewed and advised that on
11/20/96, at approximately 1:10 p.m., he was in the office on the
25th floor speaking with SAl
Iregarding the status of the
investigation.
He had earlier decided to reassign six agents to
the investigation, which included two agents to handle other
reactive crime matters_Which might occur during the day. During
this briefing, SAl
ladvised SAC MARTINOLICH that the
investigation had focused on the Red Roof Inn where ROWSON had
possibly frequented or made telephone calls from.
SAC
MARTINQLICH was not advised that the investigation Co locate
ROWSON at the Red Roof Inn had narrowed to Room 248 based on an
identification made by a pizza delivery man, or that an attempt
to make entry and arrest ROWSON was eminent..
SAC MARTINOLICH
stated that he is not normally notified of all arrests. He is
notified prior to any high—profile arrests where there is a high
propensity for violence. A few minutes later, a radio dispatch
on
PEI Handi-Talkie, which was in the C-4 squad area, alerted
SA I
lof the shooting at the Red Roof urn.
SAl
br one of
the squad agents immediately advised SAC MRTINOLJcR.
SAC MARTINOLICH immediately initiated the Detroit
Division’s Crisis Management Plan, contacted the Chief Division
Counsel to initiate the Agent Involved Shooting Plan
1 and
proceeded immediately with A2AC STAPLETON to the scene. While en
rrmt SAC MARTINOLICH received updates from the scene from SA
I
Iwho was instructed-to seal the perimeter at the scene.
SAC MARTINOLICH also initiated a call-out of the Detroit
Division’s SWAT team and hostage negotiators.

I

I
I

Upon arrival at the scene, SAC MARTINOLICH directed
SWAT personnel to review and expand upon the inner perimeter
surrounding the motel, and he secured two motel rooms to be
as a command post.
SAC MARTINOLICH instructed SSA
ko enhance the inner perimeter, and once the inner
perimeter wa secured, tothen further secure the secondary
perimeter at the scene. A briefing was held with the Warren
Deputy Police Chief who had arrived at the scene, and an
emergency assault plan was developed with the hostage
negotiators, SWAT team leader, Deputy Chief, and ASAC.
SAC
rr
MARTINOLICH also toured the key areas of-the scene, providing
directions to agents and other personnel involved in the
invesçigation.
SAC MARTINOLICH, once at the scene, removed SA
Itrom active participation in the crii.
Later, while at
the scene, SC MARTINOLICH spoke with SAl
Jregarding the
incident.
521
Iwas instructed to leave the scene due SA
Icurrently operating as an undercover agent in another
investigation.
Both agents were later provided assistance
through the Employee Assistance Program.
9

 __________Ifor

_________Quantico
___________

Mr. Gore

9/6/96

D. R. Knowlton
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/3/96
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION
Reference report of Assistant Spcia1 Agent in Charge
(ASAC) William C. Tein].e, dated 7/15/96.
POSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG.) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMNENDATION:
That Personnel Division (PD), Administrative
1,mir TTjt
(ASU) forward a letter of censure to SA I
The
his violation of the deadly force policy.
letter of cnsure should include pointed language regarding SA
I failure to wait for additional assistance or
I
attempting the arrest on another day.

66—19157—25
1
Mr.I
I Room 7142
1
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (nlosure)
I Room 7116
Mr.,i
2
(1- Mr. I
1 5129)
2
Mr. I
I Room 6012
(1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
(1 — Mr. Carter, Room 6050)
3
Mr. Shapiv
7427
(1
Room 7159)
Mr.I
(1
, Room 7326)
Mr.I
I
Mr._Knowlton, Room 7825
1
Mn
I, Room 4042
Mr. Bieb]., DOJ
1
1
Ms. Ginsburg, DOJ
LRR:lrr (16)
—
—

—

-

1
1
1

—
—

I

Mr
Mr.

Mrs.

WM]’O

I Room 7837

—

—

Ib7C

—
—

—

—

—

-

(CONTINUED

—

OVER)

 Memorandum from D. R. Knowlton to Mr. Gore
Re: Adminjstratiye Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/3/96
Little Rock Division
DETAILS;
On 8/20/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above-caption
ed
shooting incident.
The following voting iembers of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Chief Inspector David R. Knowlton, Office
of Inspections, Inspection Division;
Dana P. Biehi, Deputy Section
Chief, Terrorism and Violent crimes Sectio
n, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Jessica A. Ginsburg, Acting Deputy
chief, Criminal Section,
Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; Jeremiah W. Doyle,
Jr., Section
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division; Patrick
J. Foran, $ection Chief, Peronnel Administratio
p and Benefit
Section, Personnel Divisiori;I
Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Trainin lunit
g Section, Office
of the General Counsel;I
i Unit Chief, Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division; J. C. Carter, Sectio
n Chief. Personnel
Management Section, Personnel Divisio
n;!
I Unit
Chief, Budget Unit, Operatioxal Su’ort section
, criminaL
Investigative Division; and, I
I Supervisor, FO.
voting attendees were: William D. Gore, Assista
nt Director,
Inspection Division; I
InsDector, Office of
I
Inspections, Inspection Division;!
Immigration afl4
International Investications. u. s. Immigration J
and Naturalization
Service; and,!
Inspection Analyst., Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

J

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On 7/3/96, SAsI
land!
I
were iflvolved in a search for fugitive!
Inear
Shell
Knob, Missouri.
This search was in response to a lea. furnished by
the Milwaukee Division to Little Rock dated 5/29/9
6.
On 7/2/96, SAl
jtraveied to Berryville, Arknas.
to cover an “America ‘Most Wênted” lead regard
ing fugitive I
I
Based on the lead, SAl
Iwnt t Langley’s Floor Covering in
Berryville.
He determined that!
Ihad done work for this company
and was scheduled to perform work for a compe
titor in Missouri the
folowin gay. I
Iwalked into Lang-ley’s Floor Covering while
SA
Iwas at the business.
SAl
jwas unarmed at the time
and the owner of te omnanv took!
i into the back of the
business out of SAl
Isight. SA I
.ia1ked outside and
got the license tag number from I
Ivan. He went to his Bureau
vehicle and armd himself with hs Bureau issued
Sig Sauer P-228
pistol.
A short time ater I
heft the businss. qot into his
van and drove of f.
SAl
I loosely followed
1a14 decide
not to attempt an arrest at that time. Accord I
ing to SAl________
2

 Memorandum from
D. R. Know
Re:
Administrative Inquir lton to Mr. Gore
y
Shooting Incident
7/3/96
Little Rock Division
the arrest was no
t
wa carçied a.s “Ar attempted at that time because he knew thati
med and Dangerous”,
he was alone and did not kno I
if I
Iwas armed
w
+.ht particular ti
e. tie owner of the
business_ased SA
l
Ino
t to arresti
SAl
lat his_business, and
welt that
the following morni he had good information where I
Iwoulci be
ng and knew that he cou
ld obpin anoropriate
assistance to make
the arrest at that time.
SA I
telephonically conta
I
cted SAl
covered leads in the
Iho had previously
cas
e • SAs
‘and Edenfield decided they
would drive to Sh
çll_Kpob, itcniri. ]ne
following morning to
attempt to arrest
I
jmade appropriate conta
within the Little Ro I, SAl
cts
ck and. Kansas City Divisio
for traveling to
ns to obtain approval
Missouri.

Each SA dro
early morning hours ve his Bureau vehicle to Shell Knob during the
of 7/3/96, and arrived pri
or to 6:30 a.m. A
surveillance began
of a business known as To
tally Home, which was
the business where
Rowe was supposed to work tha
approximately 8:00
t day. At
a.ut., a femal nm1
parking lot of the
ipulled into the
business.
SAl
I spoke with her and
determined thaI
I ws a contract employee
.
requested that!
SA
I pagd
I with instructions that if
called back she wa
s to have him come to the bus
iness at
approximately 10:00
a.m.

I

SAl
I andi
advised that!
I spoke with
who
Iwas supposed to be
working at a ob site in
Viola, Missouri, loc
ated approxiniatel
ye miles south of Shell
Knob.
The_Agents, accompan
ied by Hr.
however,I
to Viola,
Iwas not at the ob site.
SA
job site while SA
rem
ained at the
l
laccompanied Mr.
business location on
o
a second
the south side of Shel
.
t 8:59 a.m.,
kssistant walked into the sho
wropm which was occupied
other employees and
by
customers, while sAl
office.
was in an inner
I
Mr.
int
o
the
showroom to meet
assistant and they
left through the front doo
to the front door
r. S
went
of
driver’s seat of his the husinss and bserved
Si
n
the
van
.
Mr.
I
Icame bac inside and stated
that they needed to o
to he business
north location
cartet_tpDe.
SAl
Ifoilowed their vehicles and to get
SAl
called
Ion the Bu
as soon as possible reau radio and told him to get to his location
. As SAl
Iwas narked ;pproximately 500
yards away from the
business location, sal
Jadvised that he
was enroute to this
location but was blocked
by trucks.

3

 red
___

___

__

Memorandum from D.
R. Knowlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/3/96
Little Rock Division
SN
Iretrieved his Remington 870 sho
tgun from the trunk,
placed it in the_vehicle
seat beside him and continued
his
observation oft
land two additional individuals at
the business.
SAl
job
the location, arove cion served the individuals preparing to leave
a hill to the business, and blo
exit of the van. I
cked the
I assistant was in the passenger_se
at_and
Iwas standing outside the
business talking to Mr.I__
Sal
___
___
heft his vehicle with hs sho
tgun and announced to
he was With the FBI.
fran across he highway into a
I
heavily wooded area beh
ind another business. SAL
him for a short
Ihased
me and then returned to his Bur
eau_vehicle. He
contacted SA
dio and advised thati
into_twoo s.
Ihad fled
dro
ve his car to the area where
sawl
he
lenter the woo s an walked
into the woods for
approximately 150 to 200
arrived on the scene and yards but never sighted I
I SAl
I
walked into
I
I They discussed the situ the woods to join SA
ati
on
and decided to split up to
search fort
I The search lasted for approx
imately five minutes
when they met on a nea
rby road. At that time, they obs
pickup truck coming tow
erved a
ard them from the northwest and
also saw a
man, believed to bel
I standing in the roa
the truck.
He was waiving his arms, apparen d directly in front çf
tly in an attempt to
stop the vehicle.
The driver went aroundl
I and did not stop.
and looked at the Agents and
ran back into the woods.
The SAs drove their veh
icles to the area thati
woods.
I entered the
SAL
Jstayed in this_area while
1
back_to_the main highwa
lPro ded
y where I
I initially entered the woocee
SA I
ds.
Irove to a house located across
the highway and asked
the oôcupant to contact
the Barry County Sheriff’s Office
assistance.
for
the woods next to the house and
walked approximately 200
yards carrying his shotgun. He
saw a
movement and observed
I
I approximately 40 to 60 feet away. I
turned and wqlked rapidly
I
toward a copvenience store and
SA
Ifoilowed him. •WhnI
Irelized that hç was being
pursued, he began runnin
g. SAl
jannounced that he was with
the FBI and advisedj
stop
Ito
.
[iad
e a gHeht turn around
I
some of the undergrowth
in the woods and as sat
same turn he lost sig
Lnad
ht of I
land could not hear anythina. e the
Realizing that he was in
fired one round of Federala potential ambush situation, Sal_________
00 buck from the shoulder positio
the thicket that he tho
n into
ught could be the potential
ambush site.
According to SAl
I the shot was not a warning shot as he
4

 Memoranduu frarn D’. R. I(nowlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/3/96
Little Rock Division
was attempting to neutralize the subject who he perceived to be
lying in wait for an ambush.

I

I

After taking the shot, S2J
bbserved
coming
up a slight_ravine about 30 to 40 feet on the other side or the
thicket. I
I ran across the highway to a convenience store and
unsuccessfully attempted to steal two vehicles then ran to the
front of the convenience store and entered a Chevrolet pickup with
a boat in tow.
As the truck sped off, sj
Iwas running and
was approximately 20 feet behind. He observed the head of a small
child coming up in the cab through the rear cab window.
He also
saw a man run out of the store and jump on the rear bumper of the
truck.
The man managed to crawl into the bed and moya foçward to
the cab,, reached_through the rear window and grabbedl
Iby the
throat or head. I
btruggled. with the man and slowly came to a
stop shortly before entering the highway. The man ul1ed the child
out of the cab through the rear window and SA I
Jordered
zut of the truck. I
I
as placed under arrest and turned
over to the custody of the Barry County Sheriff’s Office.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
The first item discussed by SIRG members about this
incident was the fact that it was an intentional discharge on thei’
part of SAI___________ Members pointed out that the “imminent
danger” element contained in the deadly force policy was not
present durizmg this incident; therefore, the use of deadly force by
SA
Iwas not justified. Members recommended that
SA I
Ibe given a letter of censure for his violation of the
deadly force policy.
The second issue dIscussed involved the safety of SAs
during this incident, Members unanimously agreed that there was no
urnev in resting the subject on that particular day and that
SAl
Icould have waited for backup or could have obtained
assistance from local law enforcement authorities in the area. The
discussion centered on the fact that the area was unknown to the
SAc involved and that solo arrests place law enforcement officers
5

 Memorandum from U. R. Knowlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/3f6
Little Rock Division
in great jeopardy.
It. was also noted by SIRG members that a
request was made for an agent in the Joplin, Missouri R1’ to assist;
however, the office was too busy with applicant and other matters
to lend assistance. Members reiterated the fact that since the
location of I
Iwas known
1 the arrest could have been attempted on
another day or at a minimum, SA
should have waited for
other law enforcement personnel to arrive f on the scene.

6

 FD-204 Rcv. 12.1.95)

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Iiivestigation

Copy to:

Repotaf
Date:

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otice:

Chicago

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
BUFFALO DIVISION
AUGUST 15, 1996
Character:

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66-191576

•

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IIP
September 24, 1996

Synopsis:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

This shooting incident was a result
of an
investigation of a suspected bank
robber and his
accomplice wife who were suspected
of committing bank
robberies in the Syracuse, New York
, area. The Syracuse
RA out of the Albany Division had
advised the Rochester
RA, Buffalo Division that the
suspects were casing banks
in the Henrietta, New York
area, which is a southern
suburb of Rochester.
Over a period of years, the Syracuse
RA had
developed information that the
subjects were the prime
suspects in a number of bank robb
eries. The
investigation involved up to nine
bank robberies going
back over a five year perio
d.
The bank robberies committed by PE’rER
SEN had
become progressively more violent
with subject PETERSEN,
utilizing and firing a weapon on
several occasions and
using military smoke grenades
to effect his escape on at
least two occasions.
For several days prior to August 15,
1996, the
Buffalo Office, Rochester RA,
in close coordination with
the Albany Office, Syracuse
RA, had surveilled the
subjects in the area of Henrietta
, New York. The Buffalo
SWAT team had been called out
on four separate occasions

Thie d
Taent cOnteinO nethe
rocoendatjcaie nor conclu5ioni of
th. POX, Zt Ia the property ot th. FOt and Ia lomi,t4
your aenoy: it and ita
to
cootents are not to t,e dietri5,,tid
otsde ur agency

.

 S
1
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in preparation for an anticipate
d arrest of the subject PETERSEN
prior to his attempting another
bank robbery.
SurveillaT} iir
itS
1
i
r
4
te
r
d making the arrest
of his wife and accomplice I
I
who
I
would be in a separate vehicle, some distance
from
the victim bank, and in two-w
ay radio contact with PETERSEN.
At approximately 10:00 AM to 10:30 AM
August 15, 1996,
SSRI
I Rochester RA, received a call from the Syracu
se RP
alerting him that surveillance
units were following the subjects
and they apeared to be traveling
back to Rochester’s territory.
SSRAI
Inotified ASAC WOOLLEY, as SAC WOLINGER was in
San
Diego for the Republican Nati
onal Convention, and the SWAT and
surveillance teams were alerted and
briefed with the updated
information.
The SWAT Team practiced felony car stops while
surveillance units monitored the subj
ect’s activities throughout
the day.
Preferable locations for making the felony car stop
were identified and numerous brief
ings were held to plan the
arrest provide intelligence, and give
1
instructions to all
participants.

PETERSEN and hi wife had been under observati
on for
several days by the Rochester and Syracu
se surveillance teams and
5fia1y observed throughout the day of
August 15, 1996,
preparing to rob a ban in the vicin
ity. These observations
included seeing him place a stole
n switch vehicle in a parking
lot, changing license plates, dress
ing up in preparation for a
robbery to include seeing him put
on a bullet proof vest and a
two way radio which he was known
to have previously utilized.
By
monitoring his movements and observing
his activities, enough
probable cause was developed to arres
t the subjects for attempted
bank robbery.
The shooting incident occurred when the Buff
alo SWAT team
effected a felony car stop at aproxima
teIy 4:30 PM and attetnpted
to arrest subject RONALD ERIC PETER
SEN while he was parked in a
stolen van.
Upon being ccnfronted by the SWAT Agents, PETERSEN
was non-compliant. After what was desc
ribed as approximately one
to one and a half minutes, during which
he was observed looking
around, claiming he couldn’t hear the comm
ands and lowering his
hands after continuously being direc
ted to keep them up, PETERSEN
suddenly chose to rapidly accelerate
his vehicle directly at
several Agents positioned in front of the
van. This caused the
Agents to direct their fire at PETERSEN
in order to protect
themselves and/or their fellow Agents. The
statements obtained,
unanimously recounted that the shoo
ting began almost
instantaneously with the sudden movement of
the van and that all
the Agents began firing within moments
of each other so that it
was indistinguishable as to who fired
first.
2

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66-191576

PETERSENS van lunged
forward 10—is feet, the
turned sharply, ma
n suddenly
kin
traveled approximate g almost a 90 degree right turn. The van
ly 75 yards when it
striking a brick
came to rest upon
wall of a building.
van was travelin
It was estimated that the
g at 30-40 mph whe
n it hit the building.
Approximately 87
did not fire any to 89 hts were fired by the Agents.
PETERSEN
dead on the scene,of his weapons. Subject PETERSEN was pronou
nced
the
cau
se
of
death was later determ
multiple gun sho
ined to be
t wounds.
The following
shooting and the wea is a list of Special Agents involved in the
pons and number and typ
fired:
e of rounds they
SA

Remington 870 Shotgun
14” barrel
H&IC, MP-S 10 mm.
Sig Sauer 228 9 win.
Sig Sauer 226 9 mm.
Sig Sausi- 226 9 mm.
Sig Sauer 9 mm.
H&K, MP—5 9 mm.
Sig Sauer 228 9 mm.
H&K, MP-5 10 mm.
Sig Sauer 228 9 mm.
Remington 870 shotgun
14” barrel
H&K, MP-5 10 mm.
Sig Sauer 226

SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA

p.
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Total rounds fired
9 mm.
10 mm.
.00 buck

Remington 870 shotgun
14” barrel (.00 buck)
Sig Sauer 228 9 mm.
87-89

2 gas ferret
rounds
No rounds
3 rounds
1 round
6 rounds
14 rounds
23 rounds
11-13 rounds
6 rounds
5 rounds
No rounds
12 rounds
2 rounds
4 rounds
No rounds

(does iot include 2 gas rou
nds)

65-67 rounds
18
rounds
4
rounds

All personnel utiliz
ed Bureau issued ammu
weapons functioned
nition and all
properly. All personnel
their respective
wer
e
qu
alified with
we
Buffalo SWAT Team, apons. All personnel were members of the
alternate SWAT team mem
instructors.
bers, or firearms

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66-191576

The ASAC was on the scene and immediately
made
appropriate notifications. Local law
also contacted as the New York State enftrcement entities were
Police processed the scene
and the Monroe County Sheriff’s
Department, New York, Bomb Squad
responded when eo1nv rvies were
located in the van.
PETERSEN’s wife,J
arrested by surveillance
Iwas
personnel at anotner ..ocaua.on withou
t incident. Her subsequent
interview confirmed that PETERSEN
was abit to ob a bank and was
involved in several previous robb
eries. I
lalso noted that
PETERSEN was committed to resisting
if confronted by law
enforcement.
Search warrants were executed for all the
vehicles,
PETERSEN’S residence and storage
unit.
Searches recovered a
cache of weapons and explosives, as well
as notebooks, maps,
]h!c
masks, license plates, and clothing
linking PETERSEN to previous
robberies.

I
Iwas arrested on one count of conspiracy to
commit bank robbery. Pursuant to Rule 40
deferred to t1aeNorthern District of New prosecution will be
York (Syracuse> from the
Western District of New York
(Rochester).

4

 _____
_____
_____
_____
_____
___
___
_
_____
_____

4

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES11GATION
ROUTTNE

Precedence:

TO:

Date:

Inspection Division

rOm:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact:

I

1pproved By:
Drafted By:

10/21/1996

William B. Gore
1
E
xtension 1837

Gore Wi11iaji(
Lusby Thoma’

I

IErr

Case ID

#:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
9/6/96
NBWRX DIVISION

66-19157-31

‘o dvi.e of a shooting incident involving SAl
ISA!
who is assigned to the Washington Fie.Lct
shot and killed a dog while on vacation in New Jersey.

I
Office,
Detailp

(SSIA)I

I

Ref erencie retsrt c Supexvisory Senior Resident Agel
I dated 9/18/96.

This communication is prepared to furiiish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Inciden
t Review
Group (SlaG) with reference to the captioned shootin
g.
On 10/9/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting mebers of the SIRG were
in attendance
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; Dana B. Biehl, Deputy
Section
1

-

1

-

2

-

Mr.!
I Room 7142
Mr. Gore. RooJ 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr.J
I Room 7116
(1
Mr.!
I Room 4340)
Mr.!
IRoom 6012
(1
ran, Room 6646)
(1
Mr. I
I Room 6050)
Mr.!
IRoom 7427
(1
room 7159)
Mr.1
(1
Mr.J_________ Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr. Knowlton,. Room 7825
Mr.
Room 4147
[
-

3

-

-

3

-

-

1
1
1

-

1
Mr. Biehi, DOJ
1
Ms. Ginsburg, DOIJ
1
Mr.j
i Room 3787F
1
Mr.
j Quantico
1-Mr
I?O
1
Mr .
786].
-

-

-

-

-

IRoom

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-31, 10/21/1996

Inspection Division

Chief, Terrorism and Violent
Crimes Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ; Jssjca A. Ginsburg
, Acting Deputy Chief, Criminal
Section, Civil Rights Division
, USDOJ,I
I Unit
Chief, Investigative Law Unit
, Legal Advice and Training Section,
Office of the General Counsel;
J. C.
Personnel 11anagement Section, Person Carter, Section Chief,
nel Division; Patrick J.
,Foran, Section Chief, Pers
onnel_Administration and Benefit
Section, Personnel Divisioni
I Unit Chief, Policy
Planning and Ana1vjs Unit
, Criminal Investigative Division;
L Unit Chie
Global Section
1’TS2, National Security Divi
sion;
1 Firearms
1f
Training Unit, Training Divi
sion;
Unit Chief,
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scienti ic
ion,
Laboratory Division; and,
I
I Supervisor, WhFnato
Field Office.
The two non-voting attendees
were:
SSAL
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division;
Office of Inspections.andi________________ Inspection Analyst,
-

-

I

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

At approximately 10:45
j and.
his wife returned from the Depart a.m, on 9/6/96, si4
ment of Motor Vehicles in
Lakewood, ew Ji-.ey, to a fami
ly home located.al
I
I SAl
Itook his dog for a walk in the backyard. The
dog was on a leash and upon
entering the backyard sl
iheard
the neighbor’ s two Rottweil
er dogs began barking and saw them run
from the side of the neighborts
house. The larger Rottweiler was
running towards the fence
between the properties, ran up a
woodpile next to the fence,
jumped hc fpe, and charged.
snarling_nd baring his teeth
at SAL
I and his dog.
SAl
Idrew his Bureau Sig Sauer P226 from his fanny
pack
hoister and fired three rounds
at the Rottweiler. The dog
staggered about 30 feet and died
.
Appropriate local authoriti
responded to the scene of the shoo es were contacted and
ting, as did members of the Red
Bank Resident Agency. All witn
esses were interviewed and the
scene was photographed. The
deceased Rottweiler was removed to
the Jersey Shore Animal Hosp
ital.
Observations and Recotmueudations of the SIRG
•
The SIR reviewed the above synopsized
incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate
t pplicaion of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evalu
and recommendations for corrective ative analysis, observations,
actions from

an operational

2

 4.

To:
R:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-31, LO/21/1996

Inspection Division

standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG unanimously agreed that this shooting incident
involved an intentional discharge of SAl
1 weapon and that
the use of deadly force was justified.
LE2\D(s):
b6

Set Lead 1:
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
That no administrative action be taken
against SAl___________ as a result of this shooting incident.
44

3

 _I1rr

(l2!31!195)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES11GAT(ON
Precedence:
TO:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Date:

Attn.:

Inspection D4’
Contact:

I

2pproved By

1/21/97.

William 0. Gore

jExtension 1837

Gore Wi1li
Lusb Thom
r
1

Drafted By:
Case ID

11:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
9/16/96
NEWARK DIVISION

66-19157-31

Synopsis: To advise of a shooting inciden
t on 9/16/96, in the
Newark Division.
SAl
If ired two rounds striking a dog
that he believed to be an immediate threat
to inflict serious
bddily injury.
Details:

I

I

Reference report of Supervisoxy Special Agent
dated 10/31/96.

I

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the ana1ys
is
comments, and recommendations of the Shooti
ng Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the caption
ed shooting.
lb 6

1

-

-

2

-

3

-

1

Mn
Room 7142
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr.I
I Room 7116
Mv
(1
Iarquise, Room 5155)
Mr.
Room 6012
(1
Mr. .koran, Room 6646)
(1
ter, Room 6050)
Mr.
Room 7427
(1
Mr.
room 7159)
(I
Mr.
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr.I
IRoom 4147

I

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3

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1
1

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1-Ms.
DOJ
1
Mr.
Room 3787F
1
Mr._______ , Quantico
1-Mr.
WET)
1
Mrs.
Room 7861
-

-

-

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-31, 1/21/37

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Inciden
t
SAl
I was a member of an arrest team assigned to
assist in the execution
of an arrest warrant in Jersey City
, New
Jersey on 9/16/96.
The arrest was part of OPB
1
RTIO
1
N NORIOCK”, a
multi-state undercover truc
k hijacking case involving 85
subjects.
SAl___ along with several task force
members, was
assigned to cover the rear
of the Courtesy Truck Stop loca
ted on
Duncan Avenue in Jersey City
. After exitin their vehicle and
proceeding to th
pf the building, SA
and his partner,
Detective
I of the Port Authority Police of New
and New Jersey, were_confront
York
ed by two large dogs. 0
f the
dogs lunged at SAl
1 When the dog lunged at him, S1___
fired
two rounds from his Bure
au issued Smith and Wesson 10mm sem
i
automatic pistol strikin
g the dog at least once. The dog yelp
ed,
spun around and ran out
of sigh
subsequently located and advi t. The owner of the dog was
sed that the dog did not die nor was
medical attention provided
to the animal as a result of being
shot by SA

I

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On 1/16/97, the SIRG met to discuss
the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the
SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thom
Director, Inspection Division as Lusby, Deputy Assistant
; I
I Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I
Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Lega
l
Acivice and Training Section,
Office of the General Counsel; J.
Carter, Section Chief, Pers
C.
onnel Management Section, Personnel
Division; Patrick J. Foran,
Section Chief, Personnel
Administration and Benefit Sect
ion, Personnel Division; Richard
A. Marguise, Sction Chie
f. Operational Support Section, Crim
inal
Investigative Div
1
ision;
l, Unit Chief, NS-20
Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Divisicn;l
I
L
‘ef, Firearms Training Unit, Train
ing Division;
1
I Unit Chief, Firea
Toolmarks Unt.
Scientific Analysis Section, Labo rms
ratory Division; and,l
I
1, Supervcr Whnn ie1d Offic
e. The only non-voting
attendee
Inspections, Inspection Division Inspection Analyst, Office of
.
-

-

wasi

I

I

Observation2 and Recqmmendations
of the SIRE
The SIRG reviewed the above syno
psized iicident with
the intent to (1) evaluate
the application of deadly force;
(2)
2

 __________

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From
66-19157-31, 1/21/97

Inspection Division

provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (If any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations

for administrative action if deemed necessary.

S R4rtembers unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by SA
only observation made by the
Iwas justified.
SIRG involved the fact that SA
fired two rounds from his
weapon; however, only one round hit the lunging animal,. Members
noted that the second round was not located or documented in the
shooting report, nor did the on-scene personnel ascertain if any
persons were injured as a result of this shooting incidentS
The
SI
ecornrnended that no administrative action be taken against
SA
as a result of this shooting incident.

Set Lead
4

against SAl
shooting in

That no administrative action be taken

las a result of his involvement in this
nt.

+4

3

 ____Ithe

FD2O4 (Rev 3-3-S9)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT (YE JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

•

a
Copy to

Rcporto1

.

IIP_____________________
April 18, 1996

Fe1d Offlcc File 1

Offlce

BureaU

FBIHQ
File L

66F—HQ—l9 157—37

SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION
MARCH 22, 1996
Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopeis:

I

February of 1994,1
lwhite/male, DOE
I was arrested in a Landsclale Resident Agen
cy (LRA) case
involving the sale

of 1,900 pounds of marijuana.
convicted and is facing a long sentence.

He was

In January of 19961

I

I

I
name JONATHAN H. CRAMER came
u as having access to multi kilograms
of cocaine.
SA[
I
named the case Agent.

Iwas

On 1/30/961
with
CRAMER at his (CRAMER’S) office in Phila
delphia and discussed the
purchasing of cocaine from CRAMER.
CRAMER discussed his sources
and indicated that he had access to
kilograms of cocaine.

I met

•

on 2/13/96,1
Itelephone conversation
to CRAi4R.
CRAMER stated he would wait
tori
coiie up with
the money before he would contact his
source ror che cocaine.

Ito

I

On 2/14/96,F
Imeeting with CRAMER at
his (CRAMER’s) home in Philadelphia.
CRAMER appeared to be
smoking marijuana and stated he was not
clear on how much a kilo
of cocaine sold for, since he hadn’t
bought one in two years.
Istated that his sources would put someone
on a train with
the money to make the purchase.
They discussed going to a hotel
room to make the deal.
CRAMER exhibited a GLOCK pistol and

This doct.mnt contains neither recomendations
nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is tónd to
your agency; it arei its contents are not to be dstribt
ted outside your agency.

bfD

 stated that he just obtained it, for his protection.
They
discussed charging $30,000 for one kilo of cocaine.
They then
discused doiig the deal in CRAMER’s home, rather then in a
hotel.I
Isuggested doing it in the food court at the 30th
Street station in PhiladelphiaCRA!ER wanted to do it in a
hotel room.
They decided that I
Iwould take his money man
from the train station to a hotel, and he would then go to
CRAMER’s house with the money.
After checking out the quality of
the cocaine, a price would be arrived at, and they would split
the difference between the $30,000 and the sale price.
asked CRAMER (who had continued smoking marijuana duringI this I
time) to get “straightened out so you’re not too confused here
movin’ 11
around. I
iwould advise CRANER when they would do the
deal.
On 3111/96.1

I

I

with CER
in his I
lear. The aetaii.s were woricea out or the Friday
/1I6 drug buy to be conductd in a lotel
room.
CRAMER asked
Inumerous questions abouti
learlier_arrest and why he
is out.
CRAMER indicated a lack of trust ml
nd told him
that he carries a gun during drug transactions.
During the week of 3/11—15/96, various meetings were held
to plan the 3/15/96 buy/bust operation. They culminated in a
written plan dated 3/13/96.
This plan called forl
Ito
contact C
d advise him that the $30,000 had arrived.
CRAMER and
would then meet on 3/15/96 at 1:00PM and discuss
the transaction.
The conversation_would be recorded, and they
would be under surveillance. I
Iwould be instructed not to
travel in any vehicle provided by CRAMER or anyone else.
I
I
would tell CRAMER that the money was at the 30th Street train
station, and they had to take the cocaine there.
CRAMER was to
be further told that the courier’s time was limited in that he
had to board a train at 4:05PM en—route to Washington, D.C.
The
SA assigned to the money would not leave the public area of the
train station for any reason.
The subject, who was considered
Armed and Dangerous, was to be arrested after the transaction was
consummated.
Due to the absence of SSR4
I, this
plan was sent by SA I
I the acting SSRA, to ASAC
BERNARD At TOLBERT for approval.
ASAC TOLBERT instructed
SAl
Ithat the train station was a public place, and,
therefore, he did not want the buy/bust to occur there.
The
arrest was to take place in a hotel room. It was decided that
SA CHARLES L. REED would play the role of the drug purchaser and
would carry the $30,000 of show money to the meet. I
Iwas
advised to set up a meeting with CRAMER for early afternoon on
3/15/96 to be held in a room in the Holiday Inn.
He did so, and
it was set for 1:00PM.

 un

I

•

On 3/15/96, CRAMER calledi
mid-morning and stated
that lie had a kilogram of cocaine to sell but not until 4:00PM.
Jsaid that was too late in the day, and the deal was going
to fail.
At noon, CRAMER called back and said he had another
seller named I
I apd tjy agreed to )11t ouiide the MULBERRY
RESTAURANT at 1:30PM. I
ladvised SA I
I of this change.
In addition t
0 SA REED, eight other SAs participated ip±his
1
meet. L
land SA REED drove to the meeting spot in I
I
car.
SA REED got in the back seat and CRAMER in the front.
SA REED showd C!JMER the money, which was in the same briefcase
utilized by I
in the 3/11/96 meet.
At this point, CRAMER
directed
drive to GARGOYLES RESTAURANT.
During the
course of this meet,j
jbelieved he spotted surveillance and
1
told his associate, 1
E The deal then went from a kilo to
only an ounce of cocaine.
During the negotiations, CRAMER told
SA REED, “I could rip you of f very easily.’
SA REED later stated
that he believed CRAMER was carrying a gun.
SA REED declined the
offer to bu.y less then a kilo and the deal terminated.
On the
way back to the assembly point, CRAMER called I
lip and
offered to sell half a kilo of cocaine. I
as instructed by
SA REED to say no, that SA REED had to catch his train, and he
would get back with him.
At the assembly point, I
instructed to call CRAMER back to keep him interested in future
deals.
When CRAMER got on the line,l
Iturned over the phone
to SA REED.
CRAMER stated that he had a kilo to sell and that he
was at the train station.
CRAMER then asked where he andi
I
were.
SA REED handed the phone tel
lwho said they would meet
at the train station’s McDONALD’S.
No meet was attempted.
On 3/17/96j
Imade an unrecorded cal]. to CRAMER and
told him that the reason they had not met at McDONALD’S was that
was nervous.
ient on to say that he had to drive
all the way home to Virginia.
During 3/18—19/96, a series of meetings took place
concerning how to proceed ne’ct in this case.
SSRAI
Idecided
that more information needed to be gained as to CRAMER’s cocaine
sources,
It was decided there would be a lunch meeting with
CRAMER.
The purpose of the meeting was to gather intelligence
prior to deciding whether to proceed with the case or refer the
investigation.
At the meeting CRAMER was to be instructed not to
carry a gun to any future meetings.
Along with the CW, SA REED
would attend the meeting in order to develo a direct
relationship with CRAMER and ease the
out.i
Iwas
instructed to set up a lunch meeting wi
ER,
The lunch date
was set for noon on Friday.
On_3/22/96, SAL
1 SA REED, and SAl
met with I
land went over the purpose of the meeting.
A
transmitter was placed on SA REED and I
I The same briefcase

—3—

0

I

 _____

____

a,
that had been used byl
bn 3/11/96 and SA REED on 3/15/96 was
given to SA REED with a NAGRA tape
recorder concealed inside.
It
was decided that instead of lunch they
would hold the meeting in
a quiet spot to ensure a good recording
and, for the same reason,
SA REED would sit in the back seat with
the briefcase sitting
upon the drive shaft hump.
The parking lot of the COMFORT INN
was chosen.
At this point,I
1 with SA REED as a passenger,
left in his car to pick up CRAMER.
SAsI
land
followed them.

CRAMER was picked up by[
lat 2nd and Vine Streets in
Philadelphia.
SA REED moved to the rear right passenger seat
and
CRAMER got into the front passenger seat.
thefl
procee
ded
to he oredesignated parking lot at the COMF
ORT INN. SASI
I
andi
Ifollowed them and parked behind the hotel out of
eye sight, and attempted to monitor the
conversations taking
place ml
1 car
CRAMER asked about the purpose of this
meeting.
Wheni
lattempted to answer, CRAMER cut him off and
said to SA REED, “Maybe you ought to speak
for yourself this
time.” SA REED replied’ that they were surp
rised
showed up at the train station at the last meet. when CRAMER
CRAMER then
asked a series of questions regarding SA REED
’S cover story.
SA REED admitted he did not have a Virginia drive
r’s license butone from Pennsylvania.
CRAMER then revealed his reason for
suspicion by stating tt it th ‘I15/96 meet
ing, “the first
thing. that happened is L
njckna’ne) and I was supposed
to meet and then all the sudden somebody who
I’ve never met
before (SA REED) is now in the back of the car.
And you’re
telling me you have to go to Virginia.
You don’t have a Virginia
license and you’re not on the train to get to Virg
inia.
Doesn’t
sound to me like your going to_Virginia.” SA
REED countered
with, “But you have to trustL
I CRAMER replied, “I don’t
have any reason to...at this point.
I haven’t seen him with any
product.
I’ve never seen him with any money.” CRAMER then
asked
to “frisk” SA REED to see if he was wearing
a “WIRE.” This
conversation took place in the very first part of
the meeting,
and then the talk turned to drugs.
They started talking about a
future deal and then CRAMER asked to go somewhere
in order to
check each other for “wires.”
He asked SA REED if he had ever
been arrested.
SA REED replied no, CRAMER seemed surprised that
SA REED had not been involved as a subject
in the case in which
jwas arrested. CRAMER then inquired as to the owners
hip of
tflebfief case and(
Itold him that it was SA REED’s case.
CRAMER apparently recognizing the case from
the 3/15/96 meet,
said to SA REED, “And there is not money in
it this time?”
Both
SA REED replied “NO.” CRAMER responded with
,
“So
why
are you bringing a case? I mean it strikes
me as a little
bit.. .“
CRAMER then asked SA REED to open the case.
SA REED
replied that he would.
Shortly thereafter, while

I

I

‘-4—

C

 apparently opening the case, S4 REED announced his intention to
lexited his vehicle, and the
At this point, I
arrest CRER.
um.
y
rved
gun fight occurred, unobse
Iheard over SA REED’s transmitter SA REED’s
SAl
arrest announcement but tijought that S REED was joking until he
Iresponded to the
SAI
I
heard the gun shots.
of his car.
rear
the
s
toward
Iwalking
scene where they sawl
and
CRAMER
REED
SA
other.”
each
shot
“they
Istated that
F
were rushed to hospitals where they were pronounced
dead.
A
What led SA REED to attempt the arrest is unknown.
is
it
and
CRAMER,
of
waist
the
from
holster was recovered
possible that CRAMER reached for his weapon a .40 caliber CLOCK
The
Model 27 pistol with his right hand (CRAMER’s dominant hand).
movement
this
of
vision
REED’S
SA
ed
obscur
have
front seat would
On the recording SA REED is heard shouting, “Hold it
by CRAMER.
ed
Get your hand (singular) upi” Based upon the record
Hold it!
not
was
CRAMER
that
nt
appare
is
it
REED,
SA
of
commands
SA REED warned CRAMER one last time before the gun
compliant.
fight.
The gun fight lasted approximately three seconds, and in
that time, SA REED fired all five rounds from his .38 caliber
of the
SMITH and WESSON Model 60 revolver, and CRAMER fired three
of
n
duratio
short
the
to
Due
pistol.
ten rounds he had in his
drawn.
been
had
weapons
both
that
likely
seems
it
fight,
the gun
vehicle
SA REED’s clip—on holster was found on the floor of the
was
REED
SA
where
unknown
is
It
seat.
behind the driver’s
It is
It is unknown who fired first.
carrying his weapon.
NAGRA
a
from
ent
udgem
that
technically impossible to make
recording.
Based on witness accounts, a crime scene sketch and
following
photographs, and an autopsy report and photographs, the
was
firing
CRAMER
ted.
reconstruction of the events is sugges
between
from a low crouch in the front passenger seat, possibly
was
He
CRAMER.
hit
bullets
Four
seats.
front
the
the gap in
arm,
left
upper
the
and
er
struck in the top of the left should
the
with
ng
or
blocki
g
reachin
been
have
he
may
which indicates
One was a split
Two bullets struck CRAMER in the head.
arm.
the
bullet which made two distinct wounds on the right side of
the
of
crown
front
the
of
middle
the
in
struck
other
The
head.
ory
traject
downward
The bullets struck CRAMER in a
head.
indicating that sA REED was firing from a slightly higher
position.

—5—

.

 •

•

SA REED appears to have moved from his earlier position,
in the rear seat directly behind CRAMER, to the driver’s side,
possibly to get a better view of CRAMER.
He was found lying
across the back seat with his left leg raised in a defensive
position.
SA REED was struck by three bullets.
One bullet
struck SA REED in the left thigh, ecited the thigh and entered
his abdomen.
One bullet entered the left side of the abdomen and
lodged in his spine.
One bullet entered the left side of the
abdomen and passed through the heart. The bullets struck SA REED
in an upward trajectory, indicating that CRAMER had been firing
from a slightly lower position.

Both weapons were fired between one and two feet from
entry of the bullets into the bodies.
Both weapons were found,
side by side, on the passenger side rear floor.

•

—6—

 ___________

Mr. Gore

9/3/96

D. R. Knowlton
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/2/9 6
TAMPA DIVISION
Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA)
dated 7/16/96.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analys
is,
comments, and recommendations of the shooting
Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the caption
ed shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:

1

That no administrative action be taken
as a result of this shooting

66—l9157—d
1 — Mr.I
Ioom 7142
1
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
2
Mr.’
I Room 7116
(1— Mr.j
1 5129)
2 — Mr. I
I Room 6012
(1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
(1 — Mr. Caster, Room 6050)
3
Mr.I
‘-7427
(1
Mr.I
IRoom 7159)
(1 — Nr.
I Room 7326)
1
Mr. Knowlton, Room 7825
1 - Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1
Mr. Biehi, DOJ
1
Ms. Ginsburg, DOJ
tR:1rr (16)
-

—

-

1
1
1

-

-

Mr
Mr
Mrs.

Quantico
IIM?O
Room 7837

—

—

—

-

—

-

(CONTINUED

-

OVER)

 ___

___

__

Memorandum from 0. R. Kno
wlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/9 6
Tampa Division
DETAILS:
On 8/20/96, the SIRG met to disc
uss the above—captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of
the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Chief Inspector David R.
Knowlton, Office
of Inspections, Inspection
Division; Dana D. Biehi, Deputy
Chief, Terrorism and Violent
Section
Crimes Section, Criminal Divisio
USDOJ; Jessica A. Ginsbu
rg, Acting Deputy Chief, Criminal Secn,
tion,
Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
Chief, Global Section — NS-2 Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section
,
J. Foran, Section Chief, Per National Security Diiision; Patrick
onnel Administratiop and Ben
efit
Section Personnel Djvision;I
1
I Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Leaa
l Advice and Training Section,
of the General counse
Office
l;!
lunit Chief, Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division; .
c. carter, ection Chief. 1
Perso
n
el
Management Section, Person
r
nel Division; I
Unit
Chief, Budget Unit, 0perati
I
oial Sunnort Section, Criminal
Investigative Division7 and
,
I Supervisor, WMFO. Non—
voting attendees were
•
ore
ssistant Director,
Inspection Division;
or, Office of
Inspections, Inspection ivis
ion
Immigration and
Internationa mv tiaatin. IT.
S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service; and,!
lmns
pection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Divisio
n.
Synopsis of the Shooting Inciden
t

I
I

At approximately 3:15 p.m
., on
ItravelGd to the Zack Street New 7/2/96, SSAI
s (ZSN) to purchase personal
items after a day-long sup
ervisors meeting,
I observed Freddie Lee Williams arguin While in ZSN, SSA
g with the clerk over
change due to him from a twen
ty dollar bill. Williams and
SSAI
had a short verbal exchange and
Williams asked!
“Why are you ii my face?”
I
SSA
1advised Williams to stop
causing trouble, go get a pol I
ice officer, and settle the disp
ute.
Williams departed the store
telling the clerk he would get his
money and the clerk would
be sOrry.

I

After approximately 30 second
s, Williams reappeared at
the front door with a rev
olver held about waist high.
He firqd one
round which struck SSAI
un the right leg.
SSA I
his Bureau approved .357
Idrew
Smith and Wesson revolver and fiie
d two
.38 rounds at Williams.
One of the rounds struck Williams
left chest area and he imm
in the
ediately slumped to the ground.
Medical
personnel, Tampa Police Depa
rtment Officers and Deputy
United
States 4arshals responded from
the courthouse across the stre
et.
2

 Memorandum from D. R. Knowlto
n to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/6
Tampa Division
The Tampa Special Agent in Char
ge and the Assistant Special Agent
in Charge were on the scene with
in 10 minutes of the shooting.

I

SSA
Lias taken to the hospital, treated for his
gunshot wound to the leg, and relea
sed on 7/3/96. Medical tests
show that SSA I
was struck by a bullet which penetrate
d the
fleshy part of his right leg, but
did not injure joint capsules or
enter the abdominal cavity. Will
iams was admitted to Tampa General
Hospital and died on 7/8/96, of com
plications from the gunshot
wound.
Williams was struck in the left chest
area by a projectile
which struck and broke his collarbon
e, traveled downward through
the upper lobe of his left lung
and stopped just under the skin of
his lower left back.
The second round discharged from
SSAf
Iweapon was located across the street in a gut
ter.
Freddie Lee Williams was interviewed
by the FBI prior to
his death.
He claimed to have been cheated out of $580
.00 in
winning lottery tickets held by
the clerk at ZSN.
Williams
admitted that he was carrying a
concealed weapon despite the fact
b6
that he was a convicted felon.
He further admitted being angry
b.c
after the clerk kept his lottery tick
ets and was returning to the
ZSN with a gun to obtain his mon
ey or his lottery tickets.
However, WilliaTn adviseçl that he had
no recollection of his verbal
dispute with SSA
his firing ati
L
I
I non
shooting him.
W1nSS tp the incidept. confipe
d that Freddie
Williams shot SSAL
nd that SSAI
returned fire only
after being shot.
It should be noted that the Florida State
Attorney
declined prosecution in this case
advising that SSAI
luse
of deadly force was justified unde
r Florida law.
Observations and Recoimnendations of the
SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized
incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the appl
ication of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative
analysis., observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions
from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide
recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and,
(4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed nece
ssary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that
th shooting
incident involved an intentional
discharge of SSAI
I weapon
and that the shooting was consisten
t with the deadly force policy
and justified..
3

 Memoranduxn from 0. R. Knowlton to Mr.
Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Tampa Division
The only observation made by SIRG members
pertained to
tqtment about his kicking the subject’s
gun.
According to SSAI
I as he shot Williams, the subject fell
back approximately two feet from where
he was standing and landed
on his back.
The gun, which had previously been in the subj
ect’s
right hand landed approximately three
inches from his opened hand.
SSA
Williams with his weapon not knowing if he had
been hit.
aw Williams’ face and observed his open eyes
and movemen in is hands. At that point,
Ikicked the
gun away from the subject’s hand and walked SSAI
towards his head.
While SIRG members fully concurred that
SSAI
I followed proper
procedures throughout this incident,, a comm
ent was made that the
subject’s weapon should have been secure
d and not kicked.

SSAI

4

 __________1ffiCC
I
40 (Rev. 3-3-59>
rD-2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST
ICE
Federal Bureau of Inv&igation

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

Asst InSpector
July 12, 1996

FieldOfflcePj!eff:

66F-l9157-21

Bureau FUe N:

INDI?NAPOLIS

SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OP SHOOTING INCIDEN
T,
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JULY 2, 1996
Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shOoting incident was
the result of an investigatio
of two fugitives who
n
had escaped from the custody
of an Alabama
Deputy Sheriff on 5/2
0/1996. An investigation had
been opened on the
disappearance of David
who was in the United James Graham Nichols, a British Army officer
States for two weeks of traini
ng, and who had
been reported missing
foll
owing his rental of a Hertz Ren
Denver, Colorado.
tal Car in
The sho
7/2/1996, as Special Age oting occurred at approximately 1:15 PM on
nts .nd other state ançi local law
enforctement
attempted to arresti
I
one
of
the
fugitives.
lexited .a pickup truck followi
ng a felony vehicle stop.
railed to apply with äom
I
I
mands to halt or stop, and
three rounds were
fired at him as he atte
mpted to evade capture by fle
eing into a
heavily wooded area adja
cent to where the truck stopped
ecaped capture for
. I
I
approximately one hour when a can
ine iit lçcated
him in these woods.

I

On 6/27/1996,
advised that a Ford Tau the Indianapolis Office of the FBI was
rus automobile rented by the Her
in Denver, Colorado, had
tz Corporation
been located
Indiana.
An inventory search of thi in a lake near Terre Haute,
s vehicle revealed item
belonging to David James
Graham Nichols, a Major in the Bris
Forces.
tish Armed
Information was also
had stopped a truck from whic developed that the Terre Haute Police
h.
two individuals fled, and lef
extensive items of an evid
t behind
entiary nature. Included in
the items in
this truck were the passpo
rt and many personal effect
s of David James

lhis document contains neither recoav
endatiorms

nor concitajons of the FBI
It is the property oC the FBI
your agency; it and ita Ooflteflts are
and is loaned to
not to beditributed outid your
egenoy.

 r
then positively identified as being one of the individ
uals they
had just spoken with at the salvage yard.
At this time, SSAI
as en route to the
Terre Haute Resident Agency to meet at a staging area at th
Indiana State Police Post, to brief the Indiana State Police
and
the Vico County Sheriff’s Office on the latest development
s. SSA
was advised that a positive identification of subject
been made.
SSAI
Ithen requested that the SAC
deploy the SWAT Team to the area for possible assault
on the
trailer where both subjects had been located.
/also made arrangements for the Bureau airplan
ssN
to conduct an aerial surveillance of the area, for the Indian e
a
State Police to provide a helicopter, and for the Vigo County
Sheriff’s Office to provide a canine unit in the event a search
would be necessary.
As all these plans were being put into motion, and as the
SAC, ASAC, and SWAT Team were en route to the staging area
at the
Indiana State Police Post, SAl
the Bureau
I
pilot circling the area, radioed to all units that three
individuals were leaving the salvage yard/trailer area, entering
a pickup truck, and departing the area.
This action by one or more fl the subjects caused an
immediate change in plans, and ssi.l
Jbtained all
information about units available to respond, and access roads to
and from the general area of the trailer and salvage yard.
At approximately 1:15 PM, SSAI
Idecided to execute a
felony car stop on the pickup truck driven by an individual known
to be a bovhqod friend of subject I
I Based pn observations
by SAl
I it was believed th iihict
Iwas a passeer
in this truck. Accordingly, SSAI
na SAl
I
took the lead in fol],pwina this truck and in’
“py car
stop, with Detective I
Jand Corporall
Ifrom
the Marion County Sheriff’s Office immediately behind them,
followed by SAs
1
Ian______________ Also at the
scene was an inctiana state o1ioe vehicle wtiicii had. just passed
the truck from the opposite direction. This TnMn ttç Police
vehicle was pccupied by Indiana State Trooper I
I and
the Chief Deputy of the Vigo County, Indiana
Lsheri
J
ff’s Office. As the driver of the truck pulled the truck to
the side of this narrow rural road, the passenger jumped out of
the truck and immediately began running toward the cover of
wocds.
This individual was immediately identified as subject
I
I and ordered tç h1f nd stop, with both police and FBI
being narpr
Ifailed to heed thesemmand, and
Corporal I
I fired one round at subject I
followed by SA i
i frina two rounds at subject
All three rounds missed I
I and he was able to
3

 _________

4

escape into the woods for approximately one hour.
Subject
was later captured following a canine unit locating hi
attacking him.
No weapons were found on the person of
the time of his arrest.

at

SAl
Ifired two rounds from the personally
owned Sig Sauer P228 Bureau approved weapon assigned to SSA
I
I SAl
ihad left his Bureau assigned weapon,
a Sig Sauer P22 6, by mistake in the Indianapolis Office of the
FBI in his rush to get to the site and deliver updated
photographs of both subjects and clive an undercover vehicle
for possible use there.
Corporall
I fired one round from a
Glock .40 millimeter weapon, which is the weapon assigned to him
by the Marion County Sheriff’s Office.

Iwas on the scene at the shooting and in charge
SSAI
pending the arrival of SAC Alford and ASAC Ratliff. ASAC Ratliff
arrived within five minutes of the shooting, while SAC Alford
arrived approçirnately one-half hour later. Following the
shooting, SSAL
I
It-ok possession of the weapon SAl
had fired.
s
hater turned this weapon over to ASAC
Ratliff, who, in turn, turned it over to SAC Alford.
SAC Alford
maintained this weapon in his Bureau vehicle until the next day,
when he turned it into SAl
I, the Principal
Firearms Instructor for the Indianapolis Division.
Subject I
‘evaded capture on
7/2/1996, but was arrested without incident on the next day,
7/3/1996, by the Indiana State Police and Vigo County Sheriff’s
Office, who received a tip from the driver of the pickup truck in
which subiec,tI
Ihad been riding the previous day, that
subject I
Iwas sleeping in the back of a salvage vehicle at
the salvage yard.
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Confinement (UFAC)
charges had been filed against those subjects, and were the basis
for the arrest, coupled with the local warrants filed in Alabama.
Federal kidnapping and/or murder charges will be filed ethe
Indiana or NW Mexico, where it is believed that subject I
andi
Ikilled British officer flavid James Graham Nichols.
-

I

It is noted that subject I
I following his capture on
7/2/1996, confessed to not only the escape from the Alabama State
Prison, the commandeering of a truck, and flight to New Mexico,
but alo to the kidnapping and murdr of British officer Nichols.
ladvised that he and I
Ihad fled to New Mexico, had
run out of money, and nearly out of gas in the truck that they
had stolen,
They decided to wait at a rest stop north of
Albuquerque, and to rob the next person who came into the rest
stop.
Although two vehicles came into the rest stop ahead of
British officer Nichols, these vehicles did not stop. When
Nichols entered the rest area, he got out of his vehicle, went to
the trunk, opened the trunk and was getting something out of it
when subjects
1
p approached him with one of the
landl
4

C

 nine millimeters stolen from the Alabama Deputy Sheriff,
and
robbed him at gunpoint. They then threw him into the trunk
of
the vehicle, drove around for awhile before coming back
to the
rest area, and then took Nichols out of the trunk. They 1ad him
walk a short distance into some woods where, according tol
hen fired one round intQ the baclç of Nichols’ head.
Atter ic ole fell on the ground, I
If ired one additional
round between Nichols’ eyes.
Ithen drug Nichols’ body a
I
short distance and triçd to bury him by covering him up with
rock
ubject1
Itentatively has agreed to testify against
I
I and is asking for leniency in not having the death
penalty sought against him if he does testify and locates the
body of Major Nichols for the FBI. This matter is being
discussed between the United States Attorney’s Office in New
Mexico and Indianapolis.

5*

I

 ____

____

•

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT C)? JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy tc

Repoet of:

ie1dOfttceFiJaI:
.fl

•
Character:

[

Inspector
February b,

i’

Oce

FBIHQ

6619157—1O
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
CINCINNATI DIVISION
JANUAIY 18, 1996
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

This shooting incident was a result
of an investigation
of a multi—faceted investigation
invo
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution lving bank robberies and an
(tIFAP) wrrant forl___________
his associate I
I The shooting incident
occurred at 9:49 a.m. on 1/18
/96, as Special Agents and Safe Streets
Task F(2rcP miithr rf the
Cincinnati Division attempted to arrest
I He left the residence ati
Columbus Ohio. and entered a van
1
I
parked in the back yard near a
garage. I
Ifailed to comply with commands to surr
ender, and
moved from the driver’s seat
toward the back of the van. He was
observed in a shooting positio
n and arorox4mately 46 shots were fired
result ing in the minor woundin
g of

•

I

I

•

During December, 1995, I
I andi___________
Iwere identified as prime suspec
ts in the 1
“BOMROB major bank
’
robbery investigation, Major Case
#124. This investigation involved
the robbery of 18 banks located
in seven midwestern states.
In these
bank robberies, the robbers left
behind improvised explosive devices
and frequently deployed a mil
itary smoke grenade to cover their
escape. I
I andi
Iwere both Federal fugitives based on UFA.P
warrants in the Atlanta Division
.
By teletype dated 1/5/95, FBIHQ
notiç±ed aI4 offices of the sign
ificance of this investigation and
thatL
landi
Iwere possible suspects.
It also set forth
information regarding their pos
sible involvment tdth white sUrê.ay
and m-ilitia groups and that they
were armed and dangerous.

This docuunt contacns ieither recomendattons
nor concLusions of the FBZ. It is the property of the FBI ard is
loaned to
your agency; it sr Its contents are not to be
distrihuted outside your agency.

 The Atlanta Division also sent a teletype
to these
ices dated lfS/95, advising
that both individuals should be
sidered armed and extremely dang
erous. The teletype provided the
lowing cautions: Vowed Not To
Be Taken Alive; Utilizes Body
or; Uses Police Scanners and
Knows Federal and Police Frequencies;
l.i.Zes Inert Rand Grenades as Booby
Traps; survivalist; White
remacist; Skin Head Associate; Anti
-Government; Anti-Military;
i-Law Enforcement.
All available bac3cground relative to their
ntities and aliases was provided
.

•

•

•

On 1/15/96, information
vci’ivd by th Cincinnati
iSion leading to the location of
I
Iwas identified
surveillance units and he attempted
to elude FBI Agents resulting
a foot chase.
He ultimately surrendered and was arrested.
Me was
.ed with a weapon at the time
of his
perate and. assist the FBI in locat arest. He agreed to
ing I
I The Cincinnati SWAT
nt traveled to India
napo’is. Indiana. on anuary 16 and 17, in
.er to locate and arrest I
was attempting to locate
Ithough an involved network utilizingI
I
paging devices, however,
meet never occurred January 16,
or 17.
On January 17, at approximately 8:00
p.m., the
‘estigation in Indianapolis was disco
ntinued and Agents weçe
patched to Columbus, Ohio. This
was based on informationi
I
svided indicating that he had a “safe
house” in Columbus, Ohio. He
,vided a consent to search and advi
sed that I
Iwas the only
er person with a key to this “safe
house.” Agents and Safe
:eets Task Force (SSTF) members
in Columbus, Ohio, located the
;idence and determined that there were
lights on and it WS
zupied by a lone white male. Addition
al information from I
I
.1 investigation by the surveillance
units determined that there was
‘strong likelihood I
I was in the residence.
Members of the SSTF and others maintaine
d surveillance
oughout the night.
All SWAT Team members went to the Columbus RA
I held a briefing upon their arrival
after midnight on the evening
1/17/96.
SWAT Team leaders personally surveille
d the residence
formulated a plan and provided detai
led instructions including
adly force policy while Agents were
in attendance. They met again
a following morning at 6:00 a.m.
and ware updated relative to the
tuation and again went over the plan
f or the arrest.
Throughout this planning, SAC TMEOCORE
JACKSON and
AC HENRY E. RAGLE, 111, were aware
of the progress and providing
structions as needed.
Due to the propensity for violence and
tetia1 fqr explosives in the resid
ence, the decision had been made
at I
Iwould not be arrested in the residence
. The plan
guired that I
be arrested as he departed the residence to
ter the van parked in the rear of
the residence. The detailed plan
t forth individual roles and respo
neib±1itj for all arrest team
mbers with the primary objective of arres
ting(
Iaft he
.tered his van- which ãs facing an
alley south o tne residence.
—2—

 Agents would block the exits

•

•

•

•

•

east
position themselves at the back of and west and other Agents wcl.lld
resid
Ifrom
returning to the residence. Tile follo ence to preventi
wing morning the arrest teams
were in place at 7:00 a .m. The
SAC and ASAC traveled from
Cincinnati, Ohio, to be on the scen
e.
At approximately 9:45 a.m
—Jexited the residence
and slowly proceeded to the van.
Ihad a view of the
SAl
backyard and provided radi 4
ictions to arreçt team members
detailing the movemeris cif
L After
lentered the van,
SWAT Team Leader, SAl
ordered the Agents in the front of
the residence to move in to prev
ent the subject from re-entering the
residence.
When those Agents were in place, he ordered all
units to
move in to effect the arrest. Four
vehicles entered from the east
and four vehicles entered from the
west.
Several Agents immediately
exited the vehicles, took a posi
tion of cover, and ordered I
Ito
raise his hands and come out of the
van. Several Agents noted the
subject begin to comply and raise his
his hands downward and rolled from the hands, however, abruptly move
drivers seat into the middle
of the van.
As he reappeared, Agents observed a weapon in his
hands.
Immediately thereafter, seven FBI Agen
t ‘and SST? members fired into
the van. This burst of approxim
ately 46 rounds lasted less than ten
seconds and ceased with no more shot
s being fired during the
incident.
Agents again commandedi
Ito exit the vehicle and he
reappeared with his hands up. He was bleed
ing from the face and
complied with the commands to place
his hands and then extend himself
through the driver’s side window.
Deputy U. S. Marshall
I
approatthedj
Jnd placed him in handcuffs. He was pulled to the
ground and searched without further_in
cident. A .22 caliber Beretta.
handgun was found on the person of
I
I at the time of his arrest.

I

I

The following personnel fired their weapons:
•

sAl

I-

1.
fired four rounds of buckshot
from a 12-gauge Remington shotgun, model
870 magnum.
2.
SAl
j- fired three rounds of “00
Buck” shotshell from a 12-gauge Remington
shotgun.
3.
SA
Luger Sig Sauer pistol, model P226.

4.
SAl
from a 9mm Luger 1
•

I

-

fired two rounds from a 9mm

fired approximately 11 rounds
suDiuacni.ne guil, model MP5—A3.

I

5.
SAl
fired 15 rounds from a .223
Remington caliber Colt rifle, model
M—16A1.
6.
DUSM/TFOI
I- fired six rounds from a .45
auto caliber Sig Sauer pist1, model P220,

—3—

•

 7.

TFOI

fl H & K, model Ml’ 5

-

SF.

I-

fired approximately five founds

All personnel used law enforcement—
issued ammunition.
.boratory examination determined
all weapons functione
ly.
AU. had qualified with their re.1r*iye wnrn d
within the
hree months with the exception of
BA I
I BA I
Jis a
ied firearms instructor, sniper instr
uctor, primary sniper for
nd had won a Silver medal in the 1995
Ohio Police Olympics for
ipation in the M—16 combat cour
se.

•

The SAC and ASAC immediately came to the
arrest scene.
ulance was called for
Agents maintained a state of
I
I
did a search of the Pan tinaing addi
tional weapons, however,
:d no other suspects. They then
turned their attention to a
of the residence. I
iad indicated there were explosives
bathtub, however, subsequently change
d that statement. The
us Bomb Squad was contacted, howev
er, awaited a clearing search
Cincinnati SWAT team which was conducted with
out incident.
us weapons, seven grenades and 13 pipe
bombs were located in
sidence.
The white van bearing Iowa licenseE
Iwas examined
nt to a search warrant on 1/20/96. Amon
g evidence obtained
ne pipe bomb, one hand grenade (both expl
oded by the Columbus
Department for safety precautions), one
9mm Luger Taurus
T99AF model, one .380 auto caliber Bersa pisto
l, model 383—A,
.e .223 Remington SGW carbine, model XM15
A1.
FBI Laboratory
.ation determined all were loaded and func
tioned normally when
in the Laboratory.
All had been fired since last cleaned.
.,

I

Irefused to be interviewed by the FRI. He did ma)ce
ts to the media denying he fired any shot
Investiatiofl_at
s.
:ene and the FBI Laboratory failed to estab
lish that I
I
a weapon.
One witness who resided in the upstairs resid
ence at
‘inhard Avenue, alleged that excessive force
was utilized during
rrest.
Subsequent interviews of two witnesses determine that
d
legations were unfounded. None of the
21. Agents pn the scene
ted there was any resistance during the arres
t ofi
I
• has not alleged any brutality.

I

•

Jas charged with assault of a Federal officer on
6 anci is currently incarcerated with
out bond. The UFAP warrant
smissed 1/19/96.

—4—

•

 (Rev. 34.59

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Yrn’tstigation

Copy

Report of

Ficd Oce Fite I:
EureauFileK
Thc:

Chrzctcr

liP

I

FBIHQ

66—HQ—19157—65
SHOOTING INQUIRY,
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT,
LAS VEGAS DIVISION,
3 / 21/96
ADMINISTRaTIVE MATTERS

-

SlIOOTING INQUIRY

Syuop

sii:
This 3/21/96 shootinci incident occurred
during
planned
arrest of FBI subjecti
I for whom a federal arrest
warrant had been isued by
the U.S. District Court, District of
Nevada, the previous day.
The arrest was to take place following an
undercover purchase of drug
s (the fifth such purchase in a series)
orchestrated by an undercov
er police officer participating in this
Weed and Seed Task Forc
e initiative. Plans for the arrest of subj
ect
I
kere essentially finalized durin
g, the evninq of 3/20/96, and
were the subject of
a thorough briefing of all personnel on the
morning of 3/2lf9..
Agents and officers deployed at the scene
of the
planned arrest, the CAST
AWAY’S CASINO parking lot, Las Vegas, Neva
da,
for the anticipated
11:00 AM arrest.

Folloiing the arrival of subject
I
I the completed
purchase of cocaine by
the undercover officer and the signal give
for the arrest of subj
n
ect i
IFEX Aaets and police officers
converged in an attem
ni to block I
Ivehicle and effect his
arrest.
Subject I
Ithen executed an extremely dangerous and
aggressjv driving
maneuver, in the process striking both bloc
Vh1,es
1
king
and FBI Agenij
knocking him to the ground.
I
Icontinued, driving, directly
into FBI Agenij
sending him careening
I
the ve1jcIc.’ct windshielacross the ecaninr vhjc1e’s hood and smashing
d before SAl
IJiq able to roll off
during I
Fapid
s vehicle sped through
the CASTAWAY’S C’AIN acceleration. Asi
O naking lot, three ni Agents
and two police
‘rs fired ati
Iwho was crou
leff.ected his escape onto Deca ched in the driver’s seat, As
tur Boulevard, both marked and
unmarked units of the
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPA
RTMENT

I

This docurerit contain
s neither reco(flfldations nor
concLuons of the FBI. Lt is the property of the
Your aoncy; t ar its conten
FBL ar is Loaned to
ts are not to te distributed outside
your agerey.

 y

(Lvz’IPD)

vehicle.
day.

and FBI vehicles gave pursui
t and attempted to locate I
eluded capture for the balance of that

on 3/22/96, I
Iattorney,I
I surrendered
the custody of the t7.. MASHAL’s
i1
SE?VT
C
Las Vegas.
Following negotiations with]
Iattorney,,I
iVeicle was
recovered, impounded, and proces
sed by the LVMPD.
Ireceived
medical treatment for “cuts
J
on his back and right hand
and a cut on
his left proximal elbow”. MedIc
al records forl
Ireveal that he
suffered “several scratches
and superficial puncture wounds
back” and that “palpable bucksh
posterior
ot is felt in the skin”.
Further,
xperienced a “small puncture
wound over the right thenar
eminence (fleshy area below
the thumb) and tenderness in the
muscle group”.
thenar
Regarding the elbow wound, a
“full range of motion of
the elbow” and “no evidence
of joint involvement” were noted.
was given an antibiotic and
recommended to seek follow-up care.
During the planning and
attemptedarrest of subject
I
IASAC WALTER B. STOWE
was
acting
in place of SAC BOBBY L.
SILLER, who was out of the
division.. ASAC ST0WE approved a
presentation of the arrest
verbal
plan. The written arrest tlar,
by SSA I
approved
I sets forth the author
ity to arrest I
I
I details
Iviolent history and past attemp
t to flee during a prior
arrest, and sets forth
a thorough plan with_indiyidual
assignments for the
and team
anticipated arrest ofi
I The plan, and an
all—hands meeting on the
zhQrning of the planned arrest,
the FBI Deadly Force
emphasized
Policy and the requirement for
personnel to wear approp
participating
riate body armor and identif
ication.
Participating personnel
were so equipped, and issued verbal
identification and. comm
ands during the attempt to arrest

I

Ito

I

Interview arid ballistics
examination determined that SA
L
‘fired three rounds of
service apmunition from his Bureau
authorized pistol,
following SAl
Ibeing struck and knocked t
ground byl
9 hc
krehicle.
Following the shooting incident,
was treated by
SAl
paramedics at the scehe, determ
ined to have only
Superficial Injuries,
and released.
Ballistics examination determ
ined that SAl
one round of service
‘fired
ammunition from his Bureau-authrj
after hjving been
zed
pistol
struck directly by subject
I
Ivehicie..
SA
unaware
fleld firing for f- that he fired a round, believing that he with
of hitting a police van.
incident, SAj
Following the shooting
iwas
taken to a medical facility compl
multiple abraiQns
aining of
and lower back pain. Medical
that SA I
records indicate
I indicated he dug out
metallic fragments from
areas in
right thigh.
He was determined to have multip three
abrasions on his
le
upper extremities and puncture
thigh.
wounds in his right
He was issued medication
for pain, inflammation and possib
‘flfecti then release
0
le
d.
2

L

I

 _______

Interview and ballistics
examination determined tha
t SA
fifteen
authorized Colt A-irounds of ervice aiiinunjtjon from his Bureau—
A3 afterj
scaping vehicle struck SA
I
landsAl
I

I

Investigation determined
that LVMPD Sergeant
fired two shotgun rou
nds (00 buck) and that
LVNPD Offic
ired ten rounds of
9mm ammunition from his
pistol.

-

Crime scene
shell casings and num examination resulted in the recovery of spent
erous bullet fragments.
Crime scene examina.tion
and follow—up invest
igation determined tha
t a round of undetermined
origin struck a telepho
ne line elevated on a
the street from the
telephone pole across
CASTAWAY’S CASINO, disrupt
ing telephone service
in the rea.
so, one round, dete
rmined to have been fired
Officer I
by LVI!LPD
Istruck the rear right
quarter panel of NORTH LAS
VEGAS POLICE DEARTM
ENT (NLVPD) surveillanc
e van parked in the àas
parking lot, intende
ino
d to act as a backup
blobking vehicle.
Ballistics examination
of
details numerous
recovered vehicle
1
impact rounds of both
Known and undetermined orig
inS
Witnessing agents,
officers and civilians inte
Two officers and
rviewed.
one agent did not fire
their weapons due to the
that they did not
fact
have a clear, unobstructe
d line of fire.

I

3*

 FD-2t4

(Rev.

3-3-59)

.

tiNflED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Fedcral Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Reportof:

Datc:

IIPI
March 14,

1996

I

Office:

HEADQUARTERS

Field Office File ñ:

Bureau File#:
Title:

Character:

66H-HQ-l9157--24
SHOOTING INQUIRY
RPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
E.TOXVILLE DIVISION
MARCH 6, 1996
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

I

I

.

Approximately one month before this shooting incident,
the Chattanooga Safe Streets Task Force consisting of four Special
Agents, five local police officers and one Deputy U. S. Marshal,
beaanworking on the apprehension oij
Ia Parole Violator.
Ian armed and dangerous fugitive, had previously served 17 years
for bank robbery and was now wanted for numerous local armed
robberies and aggravated assaults.
On March 6, 1996, at about 1215 p.m., Task Force
Of ticers spotted a U.-flaul truck at a residence in Soddy Daisy,
Tennessee. knQwn, through informant information, to be frequented
by
istep-daughter and step-son drove off in the U-Haul
truck at about 1:00 p.m. and the Task Force established a
surveillance.
The truck crossed into Georgia on 1-75 and at about
2:30 p.m. parked in the “Flying J Truck Stop south of Rossville,
Georgia.
Four Agents from theRosville Resident Agency joined the
surveillance.
In hopes that I
Iwould meet the truck, an_arrest
plan was developed that focused on blocking and arrestingi
Jin the
1
parking lot.
All the participants continued the surveillance in
their assigned locations.
At 62O p.m. a red 1986 Oldsmobile Calais with two
occupants pulled into the space next to the U-Haul truck.
The
Oldsmobile was facing east and was parked driver door to driver door
with the truck.

This document contSins neither recommendationS nor conclusions
o the ?21. tt is the property o the FBZ and, is loaned to
your agency; it ar.d its Contents ass flot to be distributed
outside your sgency.

 land Task Force Off
drove by the Oldsmobile
and
posi
tively identified
as
driver.
e
At that point the signal was give
n to execute the arrest
plan.

I

I

The blocking vehicles began movin
g into position.
SA
Ipulled his vehcl iLn front of I
(vehicle and ejr He
leveled his shotgun ni-I
I identified himself and advisedl
Ihe
was under arrest. I
limmediately began backing up in an easte
rly
direction at a high rate of
speed. He swung the car around, shifted
into forward gear, and acce
lerated northward out the parking lot.
At
this point, however, he po±e
d two ‘BI vehicles coming at him,
cutting off his escape.
sAt
Ihad begun running east towa
(car. I
quickly braked and shifted into reverse and rds
backed
fsshtailing and sliding in a wide
arc, finally ending up backing west
directly towards SAl

I

SAI
(asserted that he feared for his life.
He
thought he would be pinned again
st the tJ-Haul truck. Me was also
aware that the Agents behind
him were in danger. He could not shoot
the driver because the car
sat so low his view was obstructed.
Further, he did not know what
ipassenger was. As the car’s
right rear brushed against him,
he discharged his shotgun into the
right rear tire, in a last effor
t to stop the vehicle.
The car did
stop and then shifting into forw
ard gear accelerated in a
southeasterly direction.
It was bumped twice by one of the Task
Force vehicles, spun complete
ly around and ended up heading south.
A
laccelerated south, SA I
I the threat now
diminished, moved towards him takin
g aim with his shotgun.
On two
occasions, a few seconds apart, he had
a
shot
but
refra
inçd
_from
firing because he did n-’i ‘‘ to
endanger bystanders and
I was no
longer a threat to him.
a
Idid
pole island and headed north again 180 degree turn around a light
for the parking lot exitT-T
rammed twice by the vehicle drive
n by Deputy U. S. Marshall_____
and finally fo;ced to a stop again
___
st a curb. I
land his wite,
I were pulled from the vehicle and
arrested. A 9mm
pistol was found on the vehicle’s
floorboard and a semi-automatic
rifle in the trunk.

I

I

At the neZt_Federal Grand Jury convened
in the Northern
District of Georgiaj
Jwil]. be indicted for AFO and Felon in
Possession of Firearm.
The United States Attorney is also
considering charging him as an Armed
Career Criminal.

.

A review of criminal history records for
I
I
disclosed that he has a criminal histo
ry
datin
g
to
Janu
ary 8, l972,
with convictions for burglary, larce
ny, armed robbery and bank
robbery.
There are currently outstanding warrants for
parole
violation, aggravated robbery, aggr
avated assault a.d five counts of
armed robbery.
There are warrants for ag9ravated robbery and
oarjacking outstanding off______
______

 Memorandum fromi
n.e: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

Ito Mr. Gore

As I
iwas running toward the woods, the driver and
female passenger in the truck were removed from the vehicle,
handcuffed and searched. An infant baby was also taken from the
truck and secured in a safe location. A canine unit was
immediately called in, along with a Sta, Po1ic helicopter, to
conduct an aerial and gf1Irw
4 rch fotL
I After
approximately one hour,L
Iwas found hiding under_leaves and
bushes.
Detectives and SAs responded and arrestedL
Iwithout
incident.
Fol1ow.ng the arrest of I
I attention was turned to
subject F
I who was believed to be hiding in the trailer. A
decision was made to tighten the perimeter around the trailer and
request FBIHQ approval for the insertion of CS gas. After approval
was given for the insertion of gas, 10 canisters of gas were
inserted into the trailer by the Indiana State Police.
Atroximately one hour later, the trailer was cleared, however,
I
Iwas not located. A ground search was conducted until dark
when SAC Alford called off the search due to the threat posed to
SAs and detectives on the scene. I
I was found sleeping in
the back seat of a salvage vehicle on the morning of 7/3/96, and 6
was arrested without incident.
7C
Observations and Recotwnerkitions of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the’
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendatio
ns for
administrative action if deemed necessary.

The first issue discussed by the SIRG involved the
application of deadly force used by SAl
bin this shooting
incident.
SIRG members held a lengthy discussion regarding this
issue. The OGC representative presented the facts of this case as
it relates to the current FBI deadly force policy. According to
oGç. although the subject was fleeing from the arrest site,
SAl
Iliad no on.the-scene sighting of a weapon arid,
therefore, had insufficient information to establish that he was in
fact armed at that time. A DOJ representative opined that
in this
particular situation probable cause was justified, howev
er, the
“imminent danger” definition was not met. Conversely, other
SIRG
members initially believed that the use of deadly force was

6

Savage-1536

 p

Memorandum froi4
Re: Administra.ive inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

Ito

Mr. Gore

justified in this shooting. This decision was made based on the
fact that the subjects had recently overpowered a correct
ional
officer taking three weapons, had kidnapped and in all likelih
ood
murdered a British Army officer. The subjects’ propen
sity for
violence in the past was also considered.
It was also noted by
SIRG members that the subjects were considered armed and extrem
ely
dangerous and that this information had been repeated severa
l times
during briefings.
Additionally, it was noted that the SAC, Indianapolis,

and the Assistant Inspector-in-Place (who is also an attorney)
reached different conclusions on the correct use of deadly force
after reviewing the same set of facts now before the SIRG. The
confusion in interpretation and practical application of
the deadly
force policy by the Agent, AIX?, SAC, and members of the
SIRG was

readily apparent.

Discussion also centered around scenarios provided in a
training package on the new deadly force policy dated
11/1/95.
Members opined that the creation of additional scenarios
to include
this type of incident could be beneficial to agent person
nel in the
future.
The final consensus of the SIRG members was that the
dr1r F rrce policy was violate
d in this incident although SA
Ibelieved that the use of deadly force was reasonable. As
a result of this discussion, SIRG members recommended that
additional scenarios be added or that current scenarios be
finetuned to assure compliance with the deadly force policy.
Discussion included the fact that scenarios cannot specifically
address each shooting incident. This discussion resulted
in the
members recommending that the Director be advised of the
findings
of the SIRG, and of the recommendation that the OGC implem
ent a
review of the deadly force policy to ensure proper interpr
etation
of the policy.
-

I

Although no formal recommendations were made regarding
training or safety issues, several observations were
made by SIRG
attendees. The first observation concerned the use of
better
communication to formulate an arrest plan and to implement
a felony
vehicle step. Members concurred that a better plan
could have been
formulated to ensure a more successful stop of the vehicle
.
Members believed that the supervisor should have had more
compl
ete
dialogue with all participants involved in the inciden
t. The TD
attendee also commented on his concern for the lack
of attention
provided to the crime scene. As indicated in the shootin
there were several recollections of the number of rounds g report,
fired by
individuals at the scene. The total number of
rounds ranged from
-

7

Savage- 1537

 4

.

p

Memorandum fronT
Re:
Administrative Incuiry

Ito

Mr. Gore

Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

one to four.

6
7C

However, a search of the area resulted in the

recovery of two shell casings from one weapon and no casings from
the

second weapon.
Information provided indicated that the felony
car stop took place on a gravel road with an area of very long
grass and weeds and was surrounded by a heavily wooded area, none
of which was conducive for retrieving shell casings. Although
photographs were taken of the scene, there were no sketches or
notations on the photographs, which limited their value to the
SIRG.
Another observation made by SIRG members involv
request made to FBIHQ for approval to use Cs gas. Membersed the

unanimously agreed that telephone contact with PBIHQ in this
situation was unnecessary and certainly not required. Members
reiterated the fact that the decision to use gas is a decision that
is made by the SAC.

‘4

The last observation made by the 51KG resulted in the
opinion that the use of deadly force was most likely reason
able in
this incident, however, outside the deadly force policy. The
TO
representative emphasized that the surveillance of the subjects
could have been continued until additional assistance arrived
the scene and that the car stop was implemented with minimum on
resources available.
Thq last recommendation of the SIRG pertained to
SAl
I neglect, to be properly armed. As noted in the
report, SAl
heft his Bureau assigned weapon in the
Indianapolis Office by mistake. SAl
Isworfl statement
indicated that his weazon was in a fanny pack which he left under
thL mail lçt on his desk. Members considered the fact that
SAl
Ihad recently graduated from the Academyy however, noted
that he violated two of the FBI’S most basic firearms policies,
i.e., SAs must be armed or have immediate access to a firearm
al]. times when on official duty unless good judgment dictates at
otherwise, and each SA is personally responsible for the securit
y
of weapons under his/her control. 51KG members recommended that
SAF
Ibe given a letter of censure for his violation of the
deadly force policy and his failure to be appropriately armed.
It
was also recommended that he be given additional training
in
the
FBI deadly force policy.

8

Savage- 1538

 Memorandum fromI
Re: AdministratLve Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

ADDENDUM:

o Mr. Gore dated 9/17/96

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGCi 10/2
9/96 AAA:tdi

On 8/20/96, the SIRG met to discuss the
above—captioned
shooting incident, and differing view
were reached concerning
s
whether the use of deadly force in that
compliance with the FBI’s current polic instance was in
y. There was also a
failure to reach a consensus opinion
in the field office: the
Assistant Inspector who directed the
investigation indicated in
the Observation Section of the report
that the use of deadly
force was justified; the SAC took the
opposite position.
As a
result, recommendations were made by
the SIRG that the Office of
the General Counsel (OGC) revisit
the policy and the current
training package in an effort to elim
inate the confusion that has
developed concerning the use of dead
ly force against a fleeing
felon.
For the record, it is our view that the dead
ly force
policy was violated in the Indianapo
lis incident because of the
failure to establish “imminent dang
er” to the Agents or others:
(1) there was no on-the—scene or recen
t
was armed; (2) the facts indicate that evidence that the sub ect
the subject was fleeing
into a wooded area to escape capture
rather than seeking the
tactical advantage of cover; and (3)
given the presence of
several vehicles available to the
Agents during the time the
subject was fleeing, a safer alternative
was available to them
than using deadly force.
Neverthe1es, because of the difficulties
being
experienced in interpreting the polic
y and the training package,
we are submitting to the SIRG, via
this addendum, a proposed
revision to a portion of the training
package which we hope Wi].].
more clearly illustrate the paramete
rs of the policy as it
applies to the fleeing fugitive. We
have focused our attention
on issues found to be troublesome
in the Indianapolis case:
(1) Can a fleeing fugitive be presumed to
be armed and
dangerous based on past history, or is cont
emporaneous,
On-the—scene evidence of a weapon required?
(2) Must the fugitive be fleeing to a spec
ific position
of cover, or is the fact that cover
of some type is
available sufficient.

9

Savage- 1539

 ____

____

(12t3Il995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA1ION
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

Fran:

Attn:

Inspection Dvision
Contact: I

/I
ppraed By: I
JV
Lusty Thoma
XI

Drafted By:

j

I

5/30/97

I

j Extension 1837
]b 6

Jirr

Case ID

#:

Title:

DMINISTRATIV flQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
8/15/96
BUFFALO DIVISION

66-19157-6

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident on 8/15/96, invo
lving
agents of the Buffalo Division.
This incident resulted in the
death of a suspected bank robber.

Details:
Reference report of Inspector-in-Place
dated 9/24/96.

I

This communication is prepared to furnish the analy
sis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooti
ng Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the capti
oned shooting.

1
1
2
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mn
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

E)

7142
Room 7835 (Enclosure)
,
Room 7116
-

Room 7129

-_Adludication Unit)
1 Rqom 5991
1_
I Quantico
Foraxi, Room 6646
I
I Room 7427
Mr. I
I Room 7159)
Lusby. Room 7825
j, Room 7837
4147

1— Mr.I
1— MsI
1- Mn

1- Mr
1— Mr.
Mrs.

-

Savage-i 540

IDOJ
DOJ
oom 3787F
Quantico

Room 7861

 To:
Re:

Inspection DivisIon Prom:
66-19157-6, 5/30/1997

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident

This shooting incident was a result of an investiga
tion
of a suspected bank robber and his acco
1ice wife who were
suspected of committing bank robberies in
the Syracuse, New York,
area. The Syracuse Resident Agency (SRA)
had developed
information that these two individuals were
prim suspects in a
number of bank robberies committed over a five
year period.
It
was also known that the bank robberies comm
itted by the subject,
Ronald Eric Petersen, had become progressively
more violent.
Petersen had utilized and fired a weapon on
several occasions and
used military smoke grenades to effect his
escape on at least two
occasions.
The Albany Division had advised agen
ZA that the suspects were casing banks in the ts in the Rochester
Henrietta, New York
area.
For several days prior to the shooting incid
ent on
8/15/96, agents of the Rochester RA, in coor
dination with the
Syracuse RA., had surreilled the subjects in
the Henrietta area.
The Buffalo Special Weapons and Tactics (SWA
T) Team had been
called out on four occasions in preparation
for an anticipated
arrest of Petersen prior to his attempting anot
her bank robbery.
Surveillance units ini-ri mking the arres
t of Petersen’s
wife and accomplice,l
I who would be in ançt-hv irp1iic1e
some distance from the bank.
It was also known thati
4ould
be in two-way radio contact with Ronald Pete
rsen.
On 8/15/96, at approximatelv 1O:OQ a.m., Superviso
ry
Senior Resident Agent (ss1A)I
of the Rochester RA
received a call from the SRA alerting him that
surv
were following the subjects. According to Syracu eillance units
se agents, it
appeared that the subjects were traveling
into Rochester’s
territory.
Due to the absence of SAC Wolf inger, SSRA I
I
notified ASAC Virgil D. Woolley, Jr., of the
situation. The SWAT
and surveillance teams were alerted and brief
ed with the updated
information.
Throughout the day, the SWAT Team practiced felon
y
car stops while surveillance units monitored
the
activities. Preferable locations for making the subjects’
were identified and numerous briefings were held felony car stop
arrest, provide intelligence, and give instructio to plan the
ns to all
participants.
Petersen and his wife were observed for several
days by
the Rochester and Syracuse surveillance teams
and were
specifically observed throughout the day on 8/15
/96, preparing to
rob a bank in the vicinity.
Petersen was seen placing a stolen
switch vehicle in a parking lot, changing licen
se plates,
2

Savage- 1541

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-6, 5/30/1997

Inspection Division

dressing up in preparation for a robbery includ
ing the fact that
he put on a bullet proof vest and possessed
a two-way radio. By
monitoring Peterse&s movements and activities
, enough probable
cause was developed to arrest Petersen and
his
wife for attempted
bank robbery.
The Buffalo SWAT Team effected a felony car stop at
approximately 4:30 p.m., and attempted to arres
t Petersen while
he was parked in a stolen van. Upon being confro
nted by SWAT
agents, Petersen was non-compliant and for a period
of one to two
minutes Petersen was observed looking around, claimi
ng
he could
not hear the commands and lowering his hands after
contin
uously
being directed to keep them up, Petersen suddenly
rapidly accelerate his vehicle directly at severa chose to
l agents
positioned in the front of the van. This caused the agents
to
direct their fire at Petersen in order to protect themse
lves and
their fellow agents. According to all statements,
began almost instantaneously with the sudden movem the shooting
of the van
and since all agents were firing within moments of ent
each other it
was unknown who fired first.
Petersen’s van lunged forward 10 to 15 feet, suddenly
turned sharply, and made almost a 90 degree right
turn. The van
traveled approximately 75 yards before hitting a brick
wall of a
building and stopping. Approximately 87 to 89 shots
were
fired
by agents; however, the subj eat did not fire any
of his weapons.
Petersen was pronounced dead on the scene. Subsequently
, the
cause of death was determined to be multiple gun shot
wounds.
whn w on the scene, made appropriate
The
notifications. I
Iwas arrested by surveillance
personnel in another location and charged with one
count of
conspiracy to commit bank robbery. During an intervi
ew, I
confirmed that Petersen was going to rob a bank and
also
stated
that he was involved in several previous robberies.
I
I
further noted that Petersen was committed to resis
ting
if
confronted by law enforcement.

Search warrants were executed for all of the subject’s
vehicles, his residence and storage unit. Searches
recovered a
cache of weapons and explosives, as well as notebooks,
maps,
masks, license plates, and clothing linking Petersen
to
previous
robberies.

3

Savage-1542

I

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom:
66-19157-6, 5/30/1997

Inspection Division

This shooting incident was scheduled
for discussion by
SIRG members at its 10/8/96, meet
ing. Due to information needed
by the SIRG and not contained
in the original shooting report, a
limited discussion of this shoo
ting incident was held.
SIRG members noted the fact that all shot
s fired were
intentional discharges by the SAs
and members unanimously
concurred that the use of deadly
force was justified in this
incident.
Training and safety issues discussed at
the 10/8/96,
meeting included the following
facts:
SWAT
1)
Team
members
should have worn SWAT gear to ensu
re that the subject knew who
controlled the situation; 2) the abse
nce of command and control
at the scene resulted in confusio
n to SAs; 3) the creation of a
crossfire in a felony, vehicle stop
after numerous practice
scenarios to avoid this situation;
standard protocol for
4)
felony car stops was not adhered
to; 5) containment of the
subject’s vehicle was discussed but
choice of weapons used in the incid not accomplished; 6) the
ent
lack of coordination between the arre was questionable; 7) the
st and SOG teams; and, 8)
the abandonment of the arrest plan
without exigent circumstances
contributed to confusion and left
an escape route for the
subject’s vehicle. Members also note
d that at least one SA was
not advised of the arrest plan and
therefore disregarded
instruct ions.
Based on a request of the SIRG Chairman
, further
interview of ASAC Vircil D. W9olley,
Jr., and enior Sut>ervisqry
Resident Agent I
Iwas conducted byl
I to
clarify issues relating to the arre
st plan and information
provided to the participants abou
t the arrest plan.
The SIRG met again on 10/25/96
shooting incident. The following votin , to further discuss this
g members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division;
I
I Deputy Section
Chief, Terrorism
i
V1r-ln- Crimes Section,
Criminal Division,
USDOJ; I
Acting Deputy Chief, Criminal
Section, Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ;I
I Unit
Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Lega
l Ad±ce and Training Section,
Office of the General Counsel; J.
C. 1
Carter Section Chief,
Personnel Management Section, Pers
onnel Division; Patrick J.
Foran, Section Chief, Persori1
nt-jion and Benefit
Section, Personnel Division;[
lUnit 1
Chief Policy
Planning and Analysis Unit, Criminal
Investigative Division;
4

Savage-1543

*

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division Prom:
66-19157-6, 5/30/1997

I4,

Inspection Division

I

Unit Chief NS-2D Unit, Global Sec
tion
NS
Nat.onai Security 1
Division;
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Training Unit, Training
Divisio
I, Unit Chief,
Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, cipn;I
ntfi’ nflysis Section
,
Laboratory Division; and, I
I Supervisor,
Field Office.
The two non-voting attendees were
: SSAI
I
I
I Firearms
Toolmarks Unit. Scientific Analysi
s Section,
Laboratory Division; and
i
I Inspection Analyst,
Office of Inspections.
-

-

-

Members again began discussion of
this shooting
incident and again reiterated
the fact that “command and control
”’
were two elements missing in
this incident. The SIRG Chairman
advised that additional info
rma
discussion of this incident arid tion was needed to conclude
advised that specific information
would be obtained from Buffalo
and this incident would be
discussed at a December SIRG mee
ting.
By electronic communication date
d 11/4/96, the SIRG
Chairman specifically addressed
four areas that required
clarification by the Buffalo Div
ision. The first issue
specifically addressed by the
SIRG
Chairmap tc th Buffalo
fliv4’rrn ,as:
(1) Were ASAC Woolley, SSRI
nd SSA
I
I armed and wearing protective
vests? Buffalo responded
that the thee individuals were
armed and that ASAC Woo,lev and
SsRAF
Iwere wearing protective vests;
however, SSAJ
I
admitted that he was not wearing
his protective armor. SSA
that all participants had been dire
cted by
the ASAC on several occasions
to wear their protective vests and
further, that he had reminded and
directed the SAs involved in
this incident to wear their vests.
Tie original shooting report
also indicated that SA
c
laridi
Idid
not utilize protective armor.
This infQrmation resu1tc iri the
recommendation b’ SIRG nlem
bsr that RAI
I
SAl
land sa I
Ireceive letters of
cehsure ror not wearing protect
ive vests.
The second question per
the ASAC in Rochester after not tained to the arrival time of
ification was made that the
subject was under surveillance
and was believed to be headed from
Syracuse to Rochester.
Based on the Buffalo Division’s resp
onse,
there was no delay in the arri
val
Once notification
was made to the ASAC, an immediat of the ASAC.
e departure was made for
Rochester.
The third issue requiri
previous issue discussed involv ng clarification was the
ing the lack of “control and

5

Savage-1544

bh

 To:
Re

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-6, 5/30/1997

Inspection Division

command”.
Based on a thorough
it was apparent that the ASAC response by the Buffalo Division,
was intimately involved in the
decision making and the plan
ning of this arrest and assumed
appropriate command, control
and operational oversight of the
situation upon his on-scene
arriva]..
The last question pertained to the
use of alternate
SWAT members in the arrest
of Petersen. The SIRG Chairman asked
why alternate members were
utilized in the arrest and asked
Buffalo to define the level
of training provided to the
alternates.
The Buffalo Division indicated that
in an effort to
have available two six-man team
s, and with the absence of three
full-time SWAT members, they util
ized two First Office Agents
(FOAs). One FOA had prior militar
y experience and both SAs had
trained at monthly SWAT trainin
g sessions for six months with the
permanent SWAT Team members.
member of the division’s SWAT The third alternate was a full-time
Team but had not attended basic
SWAT training at the time of
the shooting incident.
Observations and Reconinendations of
the SIEG
The SIRG reviewed the
the intent to (1) evaluate the above synopsized incident with
app
provide the Director with an eva lication of deadly force; (2)
and recommendations for correct luative analysis, observations,
ive actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provid
recommendations concerning
e
training and/or safety issues
and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deem
ed necessary.
The SIRG met again on 12/30/96,
to finish discussion of
this incident. As previously
men
lengthy discussions on this sho tioned, members had several
oting incident. The first issue
discussed involved the felony
car stop attempted by the SWAT
team.
As noted by SIRG members, conside
rable emphasis was placed
on avoiding potential crossfi
re during the planning atges for
the felony car stop.
However,
I had
positioned himself on the righ SAL
t side ot tfie subject’s van and
SWAT agents and perimeter per
sonnel were unaware of his location.
Discussion also centrI arou
nd the fact that although not part
of the plan, SAl
Iwas attempting to assist the arrest
team.
Members noted that it appeare
d there was confusion about the
arrest plan to all participan
ts except SWAT team members which
ultimately resulted in partici
pation of other individuals not
fully aware of the plan.

6

Savage- 1545

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From;
66-19157-6, 5/30/1997

Inspection Division

The second issue related to the adequacy of planning in
this incident.
Members reiterated the fact that an absence of
command and control at the scene resulted in confusion to SAs.
It was noted that SAl
Jwas not aware of the arrest plan and
did not know that this was intended to bç
SW1’ team arrest.
SIRG members recognized the fact that SAl
lactions could
have created crossfire problems; however, it was also recognized
that his actions saved the day since he was credited with firing
the shots that killed the subject. The following areas were
identified by SIRG members as problems with the adequacy of
planning:
1)
containment of the subject’s vehicle was
discussed, however, never accomplished since the right flank was
left open; 2)
the felony car stop video was not adhered to and a
suggestion was made by SIRG members that all SACs and Principal
Firearms Instructors be reminded to view the film regarding car
stops made after the Miami shooting; 3)
a definite lack of
coordination existed between the SOG and arrest teams;
4)
although a single command structure was practiced during
training exercises, this structure was not adhered to on sight;
and, 5)
a proper perimeter was not established to initiate a
felony car stop.
The Special Agent in Charge of the Buffalo
Division is being advised of these issues for an in-depth review
to ensure they do not recur.
Members discussed the number of rounds fired during the
incident and noted the lack of fire discipline by the SAs
involved. Members recommended that the Training Division,
incorporate appropriate training regarding fire discipline in
connection with mandated quarterly firearms training.
The next issue involved the weapons used by
participants initiating the car stop. Members noted the fact
that no SWAT team member had slugs to use and that few shoulder
weapons were available.
A short discussion was held regarding the continual
problems with communications. A statement was made by
participants that difficulty existed in radio communications.
Specifically mentioned was the fact that two divisions were
involved in the incident and there was only one common compatible
channel with the Buffalo car-to-car channel having limited range
and capabilities. This resulted in the recommendation of the
SIRG that the Information Resources Division (IRD) determine the
problem with the Buffalo car-to-car channel capabilities.

7

Savage-1546

cL

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-6, 5/30/1997

Inspection Division

LEAD(s):

/

Set Lead 1:

That the Adjudication Unit, Office
Professional Responsibililv forward letters of
SSA
land SA
I SAL
for their neglect in utiliz
protective v
s during
—incident.
‘“

::
7

Set Lead 2:
That the Training Division, Firearms Training
Unit, remind all SACs and Principal Firearms Instructors to view
the film regarding car stops
de after the Miami shooting.

7Y
Set Lead 3:
That the Training Division incorporate
appropriate training regarding fire discipline in connection with
mandated quarterly firearms inin.

Set Lead 4:

That IRD determine the problem with the
Buffalo car-to-car channel capabilities. Upon resolution of the
communication problem, 11W should follow-up information with the
Buffalo Division and advise all fiffices.

8

Savage- 1547

 .

I.

Electronic Communication (BC)
RE:

IBUFFALO

DIVISION
SUOOTING INCIDENT

ADDENDUM:

from ID to ID, dated 5/30/97.

I

OFFICE OP PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (OPR)
ADJUDICATION UNIT (AU) JEMtds, 8113197
SUMMARY OP ALLEGATIONS

This inquiry was predicated on a shooting incident
which occurred in the Buffalo Division durina the arrest of a
suspected bank robber on 8/15/96.
SSAI
I fld SA
in the attempted arrest of the
subject without the protection of their body armor.
PERSONNEL HISTORY

I

I

I

I

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The details of the events leading to the shooting
incident and the activities of the Agents involved, are outlined
in BC from ID to ID, 5/30/97, and in the three volume Shooting
Incident report from FBIUQ to ID Attn: SIRG, dated 9/24/96.
The
allegation that SAl
I was not wearing his body armor
at the time of the arrest was unfounded.
ID forwarded a no
action letter, dated 8/7/97, to SAC, Buffalo.
SIRG

9

Savage-1548

7C

 I

(1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES11GA11ON
ecedenae:
o:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

Frcu:

Attu:

Inspection Di ri i
Contact:

f

approved By;

1/9/97

William D. Gore
lExtension 1837

Gore Willia/
Lusby Thoma
s
1

Drafted By:

I

[

J1*U

Case ID

4:

Title:

2.DMINI8TRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING flCIDENT
10/20/96
SEATTLE DIVISION

66-19157-50
lb 6
D

/0

ro advise of a shooting incident involving SAl_______
f the Vancouver, Washington, Resident Agency.
SA I
bot and fatally wounded a subject involved in
extortion, bomb threat, and Hobbs Act violations.
T)tiTh:

I

Rfrnçe report of Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA)
I dated 10/30/96.

This connunication is prepared to furnish the analys
is,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Inciden
t Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned
shooting.

1
1
2

-

Mr.I
iRooni 7142
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
11r. I
IRoom 7116
(1
Mr. Owens, Room 3823)
Mr.i
I Room 6çL2
(1
Mr. I
I, Room 7903)
Mr.i
I Room. 7427
(1
1
Mr.
IRoom 7159)
Mr.I
(1
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr.I
I, Room 7837
Mr. Blitzer, Room 5223
-

3

-

1-Mr.
1
Ms.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.I
1
Mrs.I
-

-

-

IOJ
DOJ
J uantico
,

P

I, 1oom 7861

-

3

-

6
lb 70

-

1
1

-

Savage- 1549

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-50, 1/9/97

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident

I

At approximately 4:00 g.m., on Sunday, 10/20/96, three
tourists at the Bonneville Lock and Dam, North Shore Visitor
Center, in North Bonneville, Washington, provided a small tape
cassette player to a visitor center Ranger. The cassette player
was found in a telephone booth adjacent to the visitor center
building. A handwritten note stating “play met’ was taped to
the
cassette player.
The message on the tape was a male voice
stating, among other things, that there was a bomb in the
building and threatening to blow up the Dam. The message further
stated, ‘I want fifteen thousand dollars, two semi-automa
tic nine
millimeter Uzis and I want a car with a female officer, unarm
ed
and unwired.. .You follow us, she dies. Like I said, I find
a
wire or an armed weapon on her, she will die and then the dam
will blow. .You got two hours my friends.tt The FBI was notifie
d
at approximately 5:00 p. rn.’, and SAl
responded
to the scene at
1 aooroximately 6 :30 p.m. SA I
Oregon State
Police Trooper I
I and others listened to the extortion
tape. At approximately 6:45 p.m., while exiting the closed
visitor center to exatqine the telephone bo
th whre the tape
9
cassette was found, 521
nd Trooperl
Iwere confronted
by an assailant. The assailant was later identified as Nathan
iel
Wayne Enrickv Milligan. Milligan pointed a silver-barrele
d rifle
at SAJ
If rom a distance of approximately seven yards. The
rifle, which was outfitted with a scope, resembled a Ruger,
Mini
14, semi-automatic weapon, however, was later identified as a
Ruger .22 caliber rifle. The rifle was in Milliqan’s right hand
held against his waist. In his left hand, which he held in the
air, was what appeared to be a portable police radio or scanne
r.
This object was subsequently identified as a Bearcat police
scanner. Milligan asked where his money wa
stated that he
had the bomb. ‘Milligan also advised SAl
Ithat he had been
watching them since their arrival
TTrAi the pretext of
obtaining the demanded items, SAl
land Trooperl
Lacked
i,-it-t t’hj viçito’r nter,
leaving the subject outside in the dark.
I andl
lerted employees that a man was outside with
rifle and a. Dam employee called 911 to request assistance for
SAl
I

Trooperl
Iwatched the front entrance for the
sub:j eat and radioed his dispatch for assistance. Skamania County
Sheriff’s Unit and the Washington State Patro1 rrOned.
I
I
I
J Chief of Security at the Dam, led SAl
Idown one
Thvel and out the back door, accidentally locking himself out.
Imoved around the area east of the visitor center to
SAl
2

Savage- 1550

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-.5O, 1/9/97

Inspection Division

his Bureau vehicle and obtained his Bureau
protective vest and his FBI baseball cap.
police cars responding to the locked front
cellular phone to report his location, but
area before he could contact them.

I

I

shotqun_and put on his
SAl
I observed
gate and called 911 by
the police left the

Jwa1ked around the area east of the
I
visitor center and was confronted by Miliigan at aun
point from a
distance of 15 to 20 yards. Mi1lian
to drop his
orderedi
gun and Mill±aai advised that he was not armed. Millig
an then
ordered I
io “Go te11 them to get the cars out of here.
Hurry. Move.” I
I followed by SAl
I entered the
visitor cente- front ç.oor, and reporte4 his encounter with
Milligan.
SAl
I and Trooped
I exited the yisitor cnter
in an effort to locate and isolate the subject.
SAl
I
spotted Milligan near the fish viewirr hi41Hng which
is east of
the visitor center and he and Troopeti
Iworked their way
towards the building. Mifligan moved arj’nn te buildin
g where
he spotted and orally challenged Trooped
at gun point from
I
aoorocimately 36 yards away. Milligan repeatedly ordere
d Troope
I to put down his weapon and come out from his position of r
concealment.
SAl
Iheard Milligan’s voice and moved along
the west side of the building towards the sound of
his voice.
SAl
I also eard Tooper I
I say that he was putting down
his weapon. SAl
Ibelieved that the subject had disarmed
land that the trooper was in imminent danger. At that
point, Milligan spotted SAl
I shadow and orally challenged
him.
SN
Imovéd away from the building attempting to see
Milligan and was confronted by him from a distance of
about nine
yards. Milligan was holding his rifle with both hands
with the
barrel pointed directly at SAl
I Fearing that he would be
shot, SAl
if ired one 00 Buck round from his shotgun,
stiikina 1
M
l
ligan
i in the torso area. When Milligan did not fall,
SAl
Iimmèdiately fired a second round, which was a rifle
7Q
slug, again striking Milligan in the torso area. Milligan
fell
downand stated, TTWhy did you shoot me? I’m a manic depres
sive.
There isn’t a bomb.”’
*

Trooperl
Ihandcuffed the subject and SA
I
called Skamania County 911 to notify them of the shooting
and
requested immediate medical emergency service. The subjec
t’s
weapon, which contained a loaded magazine, was rendered
safe by
Trooperl
Jwho ejected one live round from the chamber,
Milligan was identified by a responding Skamania County
Sheriff’s
Deputy. Ambulance and helicopter medical personnel respon
ded and
provided trauma care; however, Milligan died at the scene.
3

Savage-1551

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157-50, 1/9/97

Inspection Division
-

Security sweeps at the Darn and at Milligan’s residence
revealed no actual botnb material. Materials located at
Milliganre residence included paper, duct tape, and audiocassettes consistent with the tape cassette player and note left
inside the telephone booth at the visitor center.
The extortion
demand cassette tape was subsequently played for two of the
subjectts parole counselors, who positively identif
ied the voice
as Milligan’s.
Mi11ian had also left a recorded telephone
message on a probation counselorts voice mail at 1:42 p.m.’ on
10/20/96, advising that he had a .22 caliber weapon and
ammunition.
Further investigation revealed that Milligan was a
convicted sex offender and child molester who was released from
juvenile detention in February 1996.

I
I

I

On 12/30/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above
captioned shooting incident.
The following voting members of the
SIRG were in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy
Assistant Pirector, Inspedt±on Division;I_________________
(Thief Tpector, Office of Inspections, Inspection
I Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;I
I, Acting
Deputy Chief, Crimin]. Section, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal
Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
Robert M. Blitzer, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism Operations
Section, NS-7, National Security Division; Charles L. Owens,
Section Chief, Financial Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative

Division;I

Division;I
lunit Chief, Employee Assistance
Unit, Personnel_Administration and Benefits Section, Personnel
Division;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit,
Training iision; and, L
1 Supervisor,_Washington
Field Office.
The only non-voting attendee wasi
I
I Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, Inspection
Division.
-.

Observations

amI

Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) ev.luate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations,
and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any).; (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
SIRG members unanimously agreed that the use of deadly
force by 814
Iwas justified. Members noted the fact that

4

Savage-1552

I

 To:
Re:

tnspection Division From:
66-19157-50, 1/9/97

Inspection Division

SAl
actions were appropriate and that the use of two
shots in this shooting incide”rranted. The’ SIRG
commented on the fact that SAl
Iwas appropriately armed and
in control of the situation. The only obsei-vation made by the
SIRG involved the submission of SAE
Iweapon for
examination. The Training Divisioh representative indicated that
weapons should be submitted for examination only when information
is needed for forensic purposes.
‘-

LEAD(s):
1
D
6
lb 7 C

Set tread 1:

ministtive action be taken
against SAl________________ as a ru)t of his involvement in
this shooting incwent.
++

5

Savage-i 553

 ____

___

F

(12/3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAflON
Precedence:
TO:

ROUTINE

Inspection Division

From:

Attu:

Inspection 14”
Contact:

2pproved By:

I

Date:

1/21/97

William 1). Gore

j

Extension 1837

Gore William
Lueby Thoma

Drafted By:

I

Case ID

#:

66-19157-19

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/21/96
HOUSTON DIVISION

iD
lb C

Synopsis:
To advise of a shooting incident on 10/2
1/96,
involving Special_Agent (SA)I
lof the Houston
Division.
SAl
shot and wounded a subject who had
fired
inside a restaurant killing one perso
n and had also fired at SA
tai1

I

frence report of Assistant Inspector-in-Place
_jdated 11/15/96.

I

I

This communication is prepared to furni
sh the 1
analysis
comments, and recommendations of the
Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the
captioned shooting.

-

1
2

-

-

Mr.I
I Room 7142
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr.I
I Room 7116
(1
Mr14rquise, Room 5155)
Mr.I
IRoom 6012
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
(1
(1
Mr. Carter, Room 6050)
Mr.[
IRoom 7427
Mr. I
(1
room 7159)
(1
Mr. I
I Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 7825
Mr.f
Room 4147
-

3

-

-

1- Ms.
IDOJ
lb
1- Mr.
Room 3787P
1b7C
Mr.
J, Quantico
Mr.__________
Mrs
Room 7861

j

-

3

-

-

-

1
1

-

Savage-1554

 F

-

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-19, 1/21/97
Details

of

Inspection Division

the Shooting Incident

On 10/21/96, while conducting a surveillance of
drug
subject I
I a Houston Special Operations Group
(SOG) team consisting of five agents followed the subj
ect to a
local restaurant where he remained for approximatel
y two and one
half hours. At approximately 8:45 p.m.[
xited the
restaurant carrying a black object in. his right
hand and walked
to his vehicle. After a moment at his vehicle,
he returned to
the restaurant with a handgun. I
I actions were viewed
through binocu1as by SAl
lwho was one of the
SOG members.
SAl
Iradioed the information to the entire
SOG team. After a few seconds, the subject
exited the restaurant
and fired two rounds into the lock and fratpe of th
opened
restaurant door, shattering its glass.
SAl
Icontinued to
radio events toteam members as
I re-entered the restaurant
and SAl
Iheard four or five more shots fired inside the
restaurant.
SOG members were alerted to the shooting and began
moving towards the restaurant. I
I departed the restaurant
and began walking
“‘-rds an adjacent bowling alley
parking lot.
SAl
Ihad positioned himself in the
parking lot of a Diamond Shamrock Service Station
east of the
restaurant and north of the bowling alley. While
passing through
the parking lot,I
Iwas challenged by an armed security
guard.
The subject immediately fired upon the guard strik
ing him
on a bullet pouch on his belt.
SAl
I who was wearing body
armor, exiled_hisyehicle and yrk
‘-“Trr behind his open driver
side door. I
If ired at Sl
Itho returned fire with five
rounds, striking the subject once in the left
leg above the knee.
The subject fled to an adjacent street
where he was
found unconscious between two residences,
I
Iwas arrested by
the Houston Police Department (HPD) and transporte
d to the
hospital where he was treated for a wound to his
left le and
subsequently released into the custody of the
HPD.
Iwas
charged by the Harris County District Attorney withI
murde
r
and
aggravated assault.
On 1/16/97, the SIRG met to discuss the
shooting incident. The following voting members above captione C)
of the SIRG wer
in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusbv. Deoutv Assistant
Director, Inspection Division;I
1,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Trial Attorney,
Division, USDOJ;
I
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal
Advice and Training Section, Office of the Genera
l Counsel; 3. C.
Carter, Section Chief, Personnel Management Sect
ion, Personnel
2

Savage- 1555

 To:
Re:

I

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-19, 1/21/97

Inspection Division

Division; Patrick J. Foran,
Section 1
Chief Personnel
Administration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division; Richard
A. Marguise, Section Chief. Operation
al Sutport Section, Criminal
Investigative Divisionl
I Unit Chief, TS-2D
Unit. GJ,obal Section
NS-2, National Security Division;I_____
I Unit Ch.ef, Firearms Training Unit, Train
ing Division;
I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit.
Scientific Analysis Section, Laborator
y Diviáion; and, I
I
I
I, Superyisor. Washinaton
Office. The only non-voting
?ield
attendee wasi
I Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Obserrations and Recomnthtions of the
SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incid
ent with
the intent to (1) evaluate the applicati
on of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative
and recommendations for corrective actio analysis, observations,
ns
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recomme from an operational
ndations concerning
training and/or safety issues and,
(4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed
necessary.
SIRG members_unanimously concurred that
the use of
deadly force by SL
un this incident was justified.
Members noted that SAL
Ihad a reasonable belief that the
subject posed an imminent danger of death
or serious physical
injury to him and to other persons,
the subject would flee if
possible, and the subject had left the
scene of a violent crime.
Members commended the actions of SAl
1an
d agreed that if he
had not incapacitated the subject more
injuries would most likely
have occurred during this incident. Add
itionally, SIRG members
noted that each SOG team member was wear
ing protective body armor
and unanimously agreed that the SOG team
should be commended for
being prepared for this event.
L1AD(s):
Set Lead

I

That no administrative action be taken
against any employee as a result of thei
r involvement in this
shooting incident.

3

Savage- 1556

6

 ____
____
____

____

,

A

(1231/ 1995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAI1ON
Precedence:
O:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

Rrom:

Attn:

Inspection Division
Contact:

2pproved By:

Title:

William D. Gore

I

Extension 1837

Gore Willia
-_Lusby Thom

Drafted By:
Case ID #:

3/31/97

Jrr
66-19157-28

.DMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/26/96
MEMPHIS DIVISIOII

SynapSis:
To adv4se of a shooting incidnt
on 10/26/96, in the
Memphis Division.
a
fugitive wanted for
murder from the State ot Virginia,
was shot and injured by agents
during an attempted arrest.
Details: Reference report of Ass
istant Special Agent-in-Charge
Richard A. Marquise, dated 11/2
1/96.
This communication is prepared to furni
sh the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the
Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the
captioned shooting.

1
1
2
3

-

-

-

-

Mr. I
I Room 7142
Mr. Gore, Roam 7825 (Enclosure)
Mn
I Room 7116
Mv
(1
Marguise, Room 5155)
Mr.I
[, Room 6012
(1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
Mr
(1
(ter, Room 6050)
Mr.I
I Room 7427
(1
Mr.
IRoom 7159)
(1
Mr.I
I Room 7326)
Mr Thiby. çm 7825
Mn
I Room 7837
Mr. Dillard, Room 4042

1-Ms.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
-

-

-

-

3

-

-

-

1
1
1

-

-

-

Savage- 1557

1D0J

Room 3787F
L Quantico
1FO

 To
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66—19157-28, 3/31/1997

Inspection Division

Details of the Shooting Incident
On 10/26/96, at aroroximatelv iOOO ttn.,
the FBI
received information that I
I a fugitive
wanted for murder from the State of
Virginia, had been in
telephonic contact with his mother
in Oki
nformation was
provided that the teleph
was located in
Lakeland, Tennessee. S
e ermined that the
Tennessee Bureau pf Tnveigation (TBI)
was
also
attempting to
locate and arresti
Jfor a murder committed in Nashville
in
October of 1996.
Iwas also on the TBI ‘S Top Ten Most
Wanted Fugitives list.

SAE

Ilocated five additional agents and met
the
TEl and the Shelby County Sheriff’s
Department (SCSD) to
formulate an arrest plan.

I

One of the TEl agents at the meeting indic
ated that
Imay be located at an address believed
to be Surplus
Steel. Upon arriving at the location
provided by TBI, it was
determined that Surplus Steel was appr
oximately three miles away
from their location. Participants trave
led to the appropriate
location aid the SCSD deputies closed
the highway which fronted
the business. The location consisted of
three buildings,
including a 1
tr
.
er_loc
aiJ
ated to the rear. FBI and TBI agents
believed that if I
Iwas at the location, he would probably
be in the trailer.
For a period of 10 to 20 minutes,
S21
land other•
individuals attempted to call individua
ls out on the public
address system located in the law enfo
rcement vehicles. Law
enforcement officials received no respo
nse from inside any of the
buildings or the trailer. Additionally,
attempts to get someone
to answer the telephone met with negative
results.

sal

I plan,

formulated in conjunction with TBI
officials, was to send FBI and TBI Agen
ts to the back of the
property to monitor activities in the
trailer as the other two
buildings were cleared. After it was
appa
located in the first building, attention rent that no one was
was turned to the second
building.
Because of lights coming through the wind
ow, it became
obvious that someone was probably in the
building.
Each of the agents who moved to clear
the building was
armed with a shotgun or an MP-.5. •I
Imov
ed to the center
of the building and both he and Sal
lobs
erve
d
an individual
laying on a cot in the building. Afte
r calling in to the subject
2

Savage-1558

b6

 To:
Re:

L
.

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-28, 3/31/1997

Inspection Division

and announcinc their identity
and the fact that if he wasl
I he was to be arrested and was prdrd
i.o put his
hands up. As this information
was
If lipped
onto his stomach, hiding his hand announced,I
s under a pillow by his head.
As the agents continued to talk
to him for several minutes, the
subject made a motion toward them
1 bringing his hands from und
er.
thb oillqw. As the subject mad
q these movejnents, FBI SAs
-landi
land TBI ASACI
I fired rounds from
their weapons resulting inF
I
bein
g
wou
nded. At that
point, they determined that I
Ihad
been
hit
and that
SAl
Ihad been wounded by a ricochet shot
gun
pellet to the
face and ear.
A determination was
gun,
which was located in the cabin on also made that I
the floor, had not been fired;
however, an examination of the
weapon indicated that a live round
with an indented primer was unde
r the hammer.

I
iwas arrested and trap.sported to
the Regional
Medical Center in Memphis.
SAl
trea
Iwas
ted
and released
for a superficial wound to his
Lace.
This shooting incident was planned
for discussion at
the 1/16/97, SIRG meeting; how
ever, due to time constraints
discussion was delayed until the
SIRG met on 1/28/97.
On 1/28/97, the SIRG convened at
Quantico to discuss
the above captioned shooting inciden
t. The following voting
members of the SIRG were in atte
ndance: Chairnn. Thomas Lusbv.
Deputy Assistant Director, Inspecti
on Division;I
1
Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
Violeijt Crimes Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ;j
Law Unit, Legal Advice and Trainin I Unit Chief, Investigative
g Section, Office of the
General Counsel; J. C. Carter,
Section Chief, Personnel
Management Section, Personnel Div
ision; Steven W. Dillard,
Section Chief, Global Section
NS-2, tTational Security Division;
Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief,
Per
Benefit Section, Personnel Divisio sonnel Administration and
n; Richard A. Marguise, Section
Chief, Operational Suçort Section
, Criminal Investigative
Division;I
I Unit Chief. Firearms Training Uni
t,
Training Division;L
;L
L Unit Chief, Fiearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Ana
lysis Section, Laboratory Division;
and,I
J Supervisor, Washington Field Office.
-

-

Observations and Recouimendatiaus
of the SXRG

The SIRG reviewed the above
the intent to (1) evaluate the applicasynopsized incident with
provide the Director with an evaluat tion of deadly force; (2)
ive analysis, observations,
3

Savage-1559

*

 To
Re:

Inspection. Division From:
66-19157-28, 3/31/1997

Inspection Division

and recommendations for correct
ive actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provid
e recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues
and,
for administrative action if deem (4) provide recommendations
ed necessary.
SIRG members unanimou
involved intentional discharges sly agreed that this incident
of weapons of all participants
who fired. Additionally, mem
bers concurred that the use of
deadly force was in accordanc
e with the current deadly force
policy. Members noted that the
subject posed a danger to SAs and
off icers, verbal warning was giv
en to the subject and the subject
made movements as if he were
getting a weapon from under a
pillow.
Additionally, the SIRG commended SAt
I for his
actions prior to and during this
shooting incident.
Par
ticularly
noted was his discipline and the
fact that he asserted strong
leadership and control of the
situ
thorough arrest plan was prepared, ation. Members noted that a
discussed and adhered to by
the participants. All members
con
I should
be commended for his actions. Th curred that SN
e SIRG also commented on the
fact that all participants util
ized protective body armor in
accordance with Bureau policy.
LB2D(s):
Set head 1:
That no administrative action be take
n
against any employee as a result
of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

4

Savage- 1560

b;L;

 4

(W3111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE
STIGAtiON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Date:

Inspection Division

From:

Attu:

Inspection D4vision
Contact: I

l½pprav’ed By:

William 0. Gore

j Extension 1837

Gore Wi 1 llab
(
Lusby Thoma

Drafted By-:

[

Case ID #:

66-19157-13

Title:

4/8/97

jir4

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIR
Y
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/6/96
DENVER DIVISION

Synopsis: To advise
of a shooting incident
in the Denver
Division on 11/6/96,
during an attempted arr
est of a subject who
was observed and audio
recorded completing a
transact ion.
narcotics
Details: Reference rep
ort of Inspector-in-P
lace
dated 12/5/96.

I

I

This communic
comments, and recomme ation is prepared to furnish the analysis,
nda
Group (SIRG) with refere tions of the Shooting Incident Review
nce to the captioned
shooting.

1
1
2

-

-

-

Mr.I
IRoom 7142
Mr. Gore, Room 7825
(Enclosure)
Mr.j
I Room 7116
(1
Mr. Marquise, Room
5155)
Mr.I
I, Room 6012
(1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
Mr. .Crter, Room
(1
6050)
Mr.j
I. Ror 7427
(1
Mr.1
Room 7159)
(1
Mr..I
i, Room 7326)
Mr. jisbv. Rom 7825
Mr.I
I, Room 7837
Mr. Dillard, Room 4042
-

3

-

1
Ms.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
-

-

-

IDoj

IRoom

3787F
Quantico
FO

]b 7 C

-

-

3

-

-

-

1
1
1

-

-

-

Savage- 1561

.4

 t

To:
?.e:

Inspection Division Fro
m:
66-19157-13, 4/8/1997

Inspection Division

Details of the Sbooting Inc
ident
Based upon information
provided by a czd{h]
oonerat,ing witness
and his attorney, on
11/6/96,1
I
was
observed and audio record
I
ed completing a te.Lon
narcotics transaction
ious
by FBI agents, Aurora Po
lice Department
(APO) officers, and member
s of the Metro Gang Task
Force.
per
an attempt was made to arr mitted to re-enter his vehicle before
surveillance van came to est him. As son a the nplice
his parking space, Offic a stoD. blockinal
lescape from
erl
lexited the driver’s
aide door of the police su
and placed himself between rveillance van with his weapon drawn
the police surveL1lance
rear bumper of I
van nd the
Ive
hicie. Of ficerl
the cargo doors on the
lexited
right side of the police
first and moved to his lef
surveillance van
t
to
tak
e a position at the lef
of the police surveillan
t front
cç van coverina he right
subject’s truck.. Officerl
side of the
Iwas sec
van and moved to his rig
ht to take a position atond to exit the
t•h rr1ii’ surve
the left rear of
illance yan to cover t1e
driver’s side of
and AI
Iwas last to
surveillance van.
SAl
Imoved to his right to exit the
in the rea of the left
rar of the surveillance take a position
van. Officers
I
land I
land SAl
I wearing police raid jac
the words “Police” stenc
kets with
weapon drawn and pointed iled across the front and each 1aving his
repeatedly said in loud in the direction of
Irehicle,
voices, “police”, “stop”
, “put your hands
up”,
and “freeze”.

I
1:6

ob
rearward at the approachi served looking to his right, left and
ng law enforcement_offic
were being given to him
ers as orders
to surrender. I
placing his left hand on
Iwa
s observed
the steering wheel and
with his right hand. The
rea
ching downward
back up lights came on
vehicle and Officer [
m
i
limmediately began to move
as the sub)ect began mo
to safety
ving rearward toward
the police
surveillance van. While
collided into the van for moving backward,l
I vehicle
cing I
Ito flee from his locati
between the vehicles. .1
on
limmediately accelerate
while surrounded on the rig
d forward
ht,
lef
t
and rear by law enforcem
personnel, parked vehicles
ent
, an apartment building
his front.
and a tree at
M the time of im
pact with the
Officerl
Iwas at the front of the surveillance vehicle,
right side door of the
pick up and began to move
forward with the acce
lerating vehicle.
2

Savage-1562

A

 ______

______

______

______

______

______

_

To:
Re:

Inspection Division Fro
66-19157-13, 4/8/1997 m:

Inspection Division

As the truck made a sh
left the f1t surface
the right front tire arp turn to the 1
of
was expo
l
flat, treaded portion sed. Of ficerl
Ibegan firing
of
the
rig
ht
I
front tire. Offic
Idiacharged thr
the subject’ vehicle. ee rounds in the direction of the cab er
of
While observing
I
1 SA
ibegan firing seven routhe aggressive actions of
side door, window, and
nds into the driver
’s
frame of I
Ivehicle.
Iyeiiea that he had bee
n
followed instructio
ns to qrn th driver’s shot and subsequently
was subdued and arre
door at which
ste
buffered non-life thr time he
injuries receiving fou d. I
eaten
lower arm. Law enfor r wound areas to his upper torso and rig ing
cement officials too
k charge of the sceneht
ensuring appropriate
me
dic
al
ass
ist
an
ce
was obtained and the
scene was properly sec
I was found to have had
Glock, Model G23 sem ured. I
a
magazine within his iautomatic pistol with a fully loaded
reach in the passenger
vehicle.
compartment of the

I

Fourteen impact point
s were iden
spent shell casings we
re recovered from thetified and fourteen
scene.
On 1/28/97,
the above captioned shthe SIRG convened at Quantico to discuss
ooting incident. Th
members of the SIRG
e following voting
were in attendance:
Deputy Assistant Di
Ch
airman, Thomas Lusby
rec
,
Trial Attorney, Terro tor, Inspection Division;I
rism and Violent Cri
I
mes Section, Crim
Division, USDOJ;I
inal
1
Un
it Chief, Investiga
Law Unit, Legal Advic
tive
General Counsel; J. C.e and Training Section, Office of the
Ca
rte
r,
Se
cti
on Chief
Management Section, Pe
rsonnel Division; Stev , Personnel
Section Chief, Glob
en W. Dillard,
al Section
NS-2, National Secu
Patrick J. Foran, Se
rity Division;.
cti
Benefit Section, Perso on Chief, Personnel Administration and
nn
el Division; Richard A.
Chief, Oprationa1
Marquise, Section
Sul3port Section, Crim
inal Investigative
Division;
1
1 TTnit C’hipf.
Pirearms Training Un
Training Division;’
it,
I Unit Chief, Firearm
Toolmarks Unit, Scie
s
ntific Analysis Secti
on Laboratory Divis
and,I
ion;
I Supervisor, Washington ,Field
Office.
-

-

Observations and Reco
_tirltions of the
SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the
above syno
the intent to (1) ev
aluate the applicatio psized inident with

n of deadly force;
provide the Director
and recommendations with an evaluative analysis, observatio (2)
ns,
for corrective actions
from an operational
3

Savage-1563

A

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division
66-19157-13, 4/8/19 From;
97

Inspection Division

standpoint (if an
training and/or y); (3) provide recommendations conc
sa
erning
and (4)
for administrative fety issues 0
action if deemed ne provide recommendations
cessary.
SIRG members unanim
ously concurred that
an intentional di
this involved
sc
participants. Me harge of weapons by law enforceme
nt
mbers also concurr
ed that the use
force was justifi
of deadly
ed and within th
e current deadly
guidelines.
force policy
The SIRG
have violated the recognized the fact that Officer
deadly force polic
Iwould
the vehicle; howe
y by shooting atI th
ver, members noted
e
tir
e of
within the realm of
that his actions we
re not
discussion by the
SIRG.
Members agreed that
although not very
operational plan,
specifi
pr
adequate for the ci ocedures and tactics were in plac c, an
e
plan resulted in thrcumstances surrounding this incide and
nt. This
e confinement of th
e subject.
The only safety iss
ue discus
Off icerl
Iplacing himself in sed by the SIRG regarded
grave danger by
himself between the
al
SIRG members iterate surveillance van and the subject’s igning
vehicle.
d
th
e
fa
ct
th
at ev
one must continue
to factor in human en with the best planning,
may abandon cover
and put themselves nature, i.e., individuals
in harms way.
Lastly,
Denver Division’s the SIRG members discussed the review
cr
of the
desire to have this isis management plan. Members ex
pr
es
pl
sed a
an
pr
ov
id
ed
to all offices for
personal review an
d planning.
their

LEAD(S):
Set Lead 1:

against SAj
shooting incident.

That, no administra
tive
tion be taken
I as a re ult of his ac
involvement in th
is

4,

4

Savage-1564

 (1213111995)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE
SIIGA11ON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE
Date:

Inspection Division

From:

Attn:

William 0. Gore

Inspection Division
Conta,t:

I

I

pproved By: 4e
William p
‘
Lusby Thoma7

I

Drafted By:

Case ID #:
Title:

4/3/97

Extension 1837

jirr

66-19157-15

ADMINISTRATIVE INQ
UIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/20/96
DEI’ROIT DIVISION

b CC

Synopsis: To advis
e of a shooting inc
Detroit Division
ident on 11/20/96
during an attempted
, in the
in connection with
arrest of a subject
wanted
Bank armored secu a $1.3 million robbery of a Michigan
National
rity car.
Reference repo
Idated 12/11/96. rt of Inspector-in-Placej___________

I

This comm
comments, and recom unication is prepared to furnish the
analysis,
mendations of the Sh
Group (SIRG) with
reference to the ca ooting Incident Review
ptioned shooting.

1
1
2

-

-

Mr.I
I Room 7142
Mr. Gore. Room 7825
(Enclosure)
Mr.!
1, Room 7116
(2.
Mr. Marquise Room
5155)
Mn
I Room 6012
(3.
Mr. Foran, Room 664
6)
(1
Cer, Room 6050)
Mr.
oom 7129
Mr.
7427
(1
Mr.
Room 7159)
(1
Mr.
Room 7326)
Mr. Lusby, Room 782
5
Mr.I
I Room 783
Mr. Diliard, Room 404 7
2
-

3

-

1-Ms
Mr
1
Mr
1-Mr
2.

-

-

-

-

-

1
1
1

-

-

-

-

Room 3787F

-

-

1
3

Iooj

Savage-1565

,

Quantico

4FO

lb.
lb

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division
66-19157-15, 4/3/19 From:
97

Details

of

Inspection Division

the Shooting Incide
nt

On 11/13
Police responded /96, at approximately 10:53 p.m., De
arborn
guard had been sh to a 911 call that a Michigan Natio
ot at a branch of
na
the MN’B in West De l Bank (MNB)
arrival, police
arborn. Up
MNB van, over th observedi
standing next to on
I
e body 0± the bank
a
guard who appeared
single gunshot wo
und to the head.
to have a

I

I

van and that the advised police that he was the driver
deceased bank guard
passenger. F
was his partner an of the MNB
d
la
dv
ise
d that he an
main pick-up cent
er with approximate d his partner had left the
that this bank wa
ly one million do
s
llars, and
his partner was armtheir fist drrp off. I
Istated that only
ed
sin
ce
I
I ha
three months and
ha4 not received, cl d only been on the :job for
According tol
eara
Ihe pulled the van nce to carry a firearm.
entrçe with th
parallel to the ATM
e passenge
I
ladvised that he an r’s side of the van being the closes
d his partner open
t.
the van and he he
ed the doors
ard
the passenger’s sid a single gunshot and observed a bl to exit
Police subsequent e of the van holding a small handgu ack male on
ly
n. Dearborn
during the robbery/ determined that $1.3 million had be
murder.
en taken
On 11/14
ATM to the Michiga /96, Dearborn Police took the videot
n
ape from the
The tape showed nu State Police for enhancemçnt of th
merous inconsisten
image.
statements as to what
cies withi
Iprevious
çt
ua
l1
y
ha
pp
en
videotape showed I
ed du
Ibriefly talkLna to ring the robbery.
The
the rear of the ba
second individual
nk van, as well as
i
of the passenger sid
Jpulling something at
e
of
th
out
e
va
n.
Po
that the bank guard
lice subsequently de
to the head, and th died from a point-blank, single guns termined
the driver’s side ofat the shot was fired from the left hot wound
which
the van. A .32 ca
found under the vi
liber cartridge case was
ctim’s body.
was
Subsequent investiga
search warrant being
tion lead to a
ob
ta
in
ed
an
d
executed at the hom
and his parents.
e of I
During the search
I
I
regarding Committ , information was gathered from
Rowson, III, who wa
best friend and al
si
so his cousin. A
I
determined that Ro
ve
wson owned a maroo hicle registration search
n Ford Ranger pickup
truck.
On 11/15/96,1
admitted to cwnina
Iw
.32 caliber handgun.as interviewed and
the handgunj
When asked to produ
ce
missing. He had se Iwent to the bedroom and found that
veral loose rounds
the gun was
of .32 caliber ammu
nition
2

Savage-1566

bE

 ________________________

_

1

To:
Re:

Inspection Div
ision From:
66-19157-15, 4/
3/1997

Inspection Div
ision

which was prov
ided to the po
lic
cartridges ha
d been ejected fro e. One of the 32 caliber
m his gun some
The cartridge
time in the past
was compared to
.
the cartridge ca
deceased bank
se found under
guard’s body an
the
d determined to ha
marks.
ve similar ejec
tion
Lo

cal
and possessiop ofcharges for first degree murder,
a tirearm durin
felony murder,
filed
g the co

againsti
respectively.

I

I

mmission of a fe
and Rowson on
lony we
11/15/96 and 11
/18/96,

On the morning of
11/19/96, the
received a tele
Detroit Division
phone tip regard
ing an associ
name of the as
ate of Rowson.
sociate was
The
I
received money
from Rowson and
I and he had allegedly
purchased a car
Special Operatio
for him.
ns Group
Detroit
G) conducted a
I residence_includ(BO
surveillance of
in
g
following two in
Cadillac fromj
dividuals in a
Iresidence in Det
Warren, Michiga
roit to the Knigh
n.
It
wa
ts Inn in
s
determined that
previously stay
although Rowson
ed at the Knigh
had
ts Inn, he was no
motel.
longer at the

SAs subs
consent to c-t-h equently confronted I
land obtained a
hIS residence
on the evening
the search
of 11/19/96.
,L_
Iwaq interview
After
ed at the Det
the inerviw, I
ro
it Office.
Idmitted that
During
be andi
Rowson had advise
I referring teL
d him that
the robbery on
I had been involved in
11/13/96.1
given him some mo
ney from the ro Ifurther advised that Rowson had
bbery to purcha
I
ladvised that he
se a car for him
purchased a 1983
.
Rowson. I
Chevrolet Capric
ladmitted that
e for
he rented a roo
Knights Inn on
m for 9
Saturday evening,
Rows at th
n
Rowson possesse
11/16/96.
According tol_
d a 9mm pistol
_______
and he had ‘]cn
small semiautom
n Rowson with
atic pistol.
Rowson told I
a
semiautomatic
pistol was given
Ithat the small
to him by his fa
ther.
On the morning of
b
11/20/96, SAl
Acting Superviso
r
I
status of the in of Squad 0-4, briefed the SAC
regarding the
vestigation and
the activities
occurred on 11/1
tht had
9/96.
A
fte
r
br
iefing the SAC,
requested the as
signment of fo
ur additional SA SAl______
conducting a ne
s to assist in
ighborhood inve
stigation within
around the Knigh
a five-mile radi
ts Inn.
Four agents we
us
neighborhood inve
re assigned to co
stigation.
nduct the
After being brie
Office regardin
fed at the Detro
g this assignmen
it
t and being prov
physical descrip
ided a photogra
tion of Rowson,
ph and
and advised of th
e fact that he
was
3

Savage- 1567

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-15, 4/3/1997

Inspection Division

considered armed and dangerous, the agents left the office at
approximately 9:30 a.m., enroute to the Knights Inn, to conduct
the investigation.
At approxipatlv iq :30 a.m., on 11/20/96, SA I
I
received a call fromi
Iwho advised that Rowson had
attempted to call him three times on the evening of 11/19/96.
jprovided a telephone number from the caller ID on his
residence telephone.
Investigation determinçd that the phone
number from which Rowson was calling I
Jwas located at the
Red Roof Inn in Warren, Michigan, which is located across the
Street from the Knights Inn.
Upon learning this information, SAl
Icontacted the
SOG squad and requested a surveillance around the Red Roof Inn in
an effort to locate Rowson.
After calling the SOG s9”SM
lrequested four additional agents to meet SAl
1 Red Roof Inn.
lalso
lat a d--rir m11 rIr H
SAl
I
briefed SSAI
I, supervisor of the Violent Crime
Task Force.
SSA1
ubseguently sent one additional agent

and two task force members to the viciniy of the Red Roof Inn.
Upon his arrival at the staging area, SAl
bnd SA
I
advised the other agents and officers of the possibil.ty of
Rowson being at the Red Roof Inn.
SAl
Iwas also notified by
the SOG team leader, SA[
L that the SOG had
established an outer perimeter around the Red Roof Inn.

Two SAs were sent to interview the manager of the Red
Roof Inn to determine if Rowson was staying in the motel.
According to the manager, he had not seen Rowson and a review of
motel records determined that no individual had registered under
the name of Rowson. The agents obtained computerized telephone
records from the motel in an effort to identify the calls that
Rowson allegedly made toL
I A determination was made that
all but six rooms in the motel could be eliminated as possible
locations in which Rowson could be the tenant.

-

At approximately 11:45 a.m., a possible look alike to
Rowson was interviewed at a nearby International House of
Pancakes; however, a determination was made that it was not
Rowson.
SAl
Iinàtructed nine agents and police officers to
return to the initial staging area to develop a plan for checking
the six remaining rooms.
The plan called for SAsI
I and
I

Ito obtain housekeeping attire from the motel in order
to pose as housekeeping personnel. The SAs would knock on the
4

Savage-1568

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-15, 4/3/1997

Inspection Division

various doors and identify themselves as housekeeping personnel
in an effort to lure the occupants to the door for a positive
identification.
If there was no response to the knock, the plan
was to utilize a pass key, provided by the motel management, in
an effort to open tje roçnt door to identify any occupants. The
plan called for SAl
iand seven additional agents and police
ofir’vq_to assist SAs I
J and I
in this task.
SAl
Idscusse this plan with Al
team
I Ithe
leader.
S?1
I had also been in contact with SAl______ who was
in the office awaiting approval of the federal arrest wafrant for
Rowson, regarding the developments at the Red Roof Inn and the
plan to identify the occupants of the six rooms.
Prior to the implementation of the plan, SAl
Iwas
advised that an SOG team member had stopped a pizza delivery
person who was observed by the SOC departing the Red Roof Inn.
The pizza delivery driver positively identified Rowson as the
occupant of Room 248 and also advised that another individual was
in the room. He provided a general description of the
individuals in the room as well as providing a. description of the
clothes being worn by these individuals.
Based on the information provided by the delivery
person, SA
1developed an alternate plan that called for six
agents, and two task force officers to approach Room 248 in an
effort to effect Rowson’s arrest.
Previous investigation had
determined that the room to the south of Room 248 was empty and
that on the other side of Room 248 was a breezeway.

larrived at

At approximately 1:40 p.m., SAl
the Red
Roof Inn with the arrest team consisting of six SAs including
himself and two task force members. The team proceeded to the
second floor balcony of the motel and continued to walk in a
siale f1e line down the balcony towards Room 248. According to
SAl
I he briefed the SOC, via the Bureau radio, prior to
initiating this plan.
SA I
1was aware of the pizza deivrv
identification, via radio communication from SAl
I and he
relayed this information to his surveillance team and advised
thqm to maiptain their perimeter position. According to
SAl
I he was not totally aware of the arrest plan details.
It was further determined that 871
Idid not advise the
Detroit Office of the pizza delivery person’s identification of
Rowsorl nr hs new plan to effect the arrest of Rowson. According
to SAl
i he believed that SAl
Iwas monitoring the radio
traffic in the office.
S

Savage-1569

Jb h

 To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
66-19157-15, 4/3/1997

Inspection Division

SAl
Iplan called for an attempt to use a pass key
to gain entrance into the room. While enroute to Room 248, the
arrest team encountered a motel employee who provided a pass key.
It had been decided that if the pass key plan failed, the agents
would knock and announce their presence.
During the approach to Room 248, SAl
Inoted that
the curtains were open and the rooms empty for the two or three
rooms to the south of Room 248. Upon reaching Room 248, the
agents assumed a crouche nri1jon in ordr to avoid being seen)
7
through the window.
I and I
SAs I
j set up on the north
side of the çkor 1orz with Off icerl
land were subsequently
joined by SAl
Ian SOG team member.
After the pizza delivery identification, SAl
I had
proceeded to the Red Roof Inn whre he obsqrved thq arrest team
approaching from the south. SAs I
land I
I positioned
themselves on the south side of the door.
At the poip.t of everyone assuming their position,
SAl
isignaled SAl
Ito attempt to utilize the pass key.
The attempt was unsuccessfi’l hor’U the door was apparently dead
bolted. At that point, SA I
I initiated the backup plan,
knocking and announcing law enforcement presence and ordering
RoWson to exit the room with his hands up. According to
SAl
I he knocked and announced, “FI3T trJ1 the door, police
open the door, FBI, open the door”. SAl
I stated that he
banged on the door several times and may have said, “Open the
door or it’ s coming down”.
According to sil
I approximately five to ten
seconds after announcing their presence, the door to Room 248
opened and a black male witjh
wi]ri 1tr cj-i his face who was
subsequently 4dntifi,ed asi
I ecited ii a crouched
position.
SAl
Istated that at the timel
Ibegan exiting
the partially opened door of the room, he opened the door all the,
way and quickly sc.nnd te room. He observed movemen; at th
bathroom door.
SAl
Ipointed his weapon away from I
I
toward the bathroom door at which time he observed a subject
standing at the bathroom door who had assumed a shooting
position. At that time, he saw a muzzle flash coming from what
appeared to be a semiautomatic pistol.
SAF
Istepped back
from the doorway and all agents took cover.
According to SAf
at the time of I
exit
from the room, he scanned 1
I in a effor1 to determine if he
had a weapon.
SAl
Ito get down on the
lyelled fort
6

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Xnspection Division

ground and asi
Itook control of I
L SA I
‘moved
towards the doorway in an effort 1o observe other individuals
in
the room. At that time, S21
Ibeard three or four gunshots
being fired from within the room. He was unable to observe
anyone in the room and thought that the gunshots were coming from
the back of the room or possibly the bathroom area. According to
SA I
I he fired five or six rounds from his 9 mm semiautomatic
pistol in an effort to suppress the fire that was coming from the
room.
SAl
I who had assumed a high position, stated that he
heard SAl
If ire a quick burst andth’’ ‘ began firing
towards the area of the bathroom. SAl
ladvised that he
fired in that direction because it was tne area where he last saw
the individual who had assumed the shooting position.
After SA I
land other agents backed away from the
Iradioed the aençs in the Red Roof Inn area that
shots had been fired.
SAl
lalso radioed the office that
shots had been fired and reqi tA assistance from the Warren
Police Department (WPD).
SAl
Irequested additional support
and back up as well as emergency medical service support.
door,

SAl

SAE__laiso spoke to SAC Joseph 0. Martinolich, Jr.,
whç was çnroute to the scene with ASAC John 0. Stapleton.
SAl
ladvised SAC Martinolich that he had requested emergency
medical service, SWAT personnel, and Evidence Response Team
personnel to the scene.

I

Jt the time of the shooting, SAsI
land
I were returning to the motel office to obtain
housekeeping uniforms and a pass key for use in the original
arrest plan.
It should be noted that these two agents were never
inormed o the alternate arrest plan. Upon hearing shots fired,
SAl
linstructed the motel manager to notify the WPD.
After the initial shots fired by Rowson and the agents’
return fire, the agents backed away from the doorway with the
door remaining open. The agents and officer who had been on the
north side of the door took a position along the concrete wall in
the breezeway. The agents and trooper who had been on the south
side of the door beneath the window retreated to the south.
From•
that point forward, there was no noise or response to the agents’
commands for Rowson to exit the room. The motel room door
remained open while the agents maintained cover of the doorway
and attempted to call Rowson out of the room.
Numerous attempts were made to contact Rowson by
hostage negotiators with negative results. After consultation
7

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Inspection Division

with hostage negotiators, SAC Martinolich arranged for severa
l of
Rowson’s relatives to be brought to the scene in the event that
they were needed in the negotiations.
Attempts to make contact
with Rowson in the room included telephone, voice commands,
bullhorn with the telephone, and bullhorn without a telephone.
Efforts to talk Rowson out of the motel room were terminated
after receiving no response.
At approximately 4:00 p.m., a Michigan State Police dog
handler sent in a dog to determine if Rowson was alive in the
room.
The dog’s response upon entering and exiting the room
indicated that there was not a live moving person in the room.
Subsequently, the SWAT teain entered the room and found Rowson
apparently dead in the bathroom.
Rowson was slumped against the
tub with a semiautomatic pistol in the cocked position resting on
his chest underneath his hand. An emergency medical team entered
and confirmed that Rowson was deceased and the crime scene was
secured.
According to the autopsy report of the Macomb County
Medical Examiner, it was determined that Rowson died of two
gunshot wounds to the head.
The medical examiner certified the
death as a suicide.
On 1/16/97, the SIRG met to discuss the above captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman, Thom T,iiw. fl.miity Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; I
ii, Trial Attorney,
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal
Acivice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel; J. C.
Carter, Section Chief, Personnel Management Section, Personnel
Division; Patrick J. Foran, Section Chief, Personnel
Administration and Benefit Section, Personnel Division; Richard
A. Marguise, Section Chif 0
t”f,,n1 iiport Section, Criminal
Investigative Division;I
I Unit Chief, IS-2D
Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;I
I
lUnit Chief, Firearms Training Unit. Training Division;
Toolmarks Unit,
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; and,I
I
I Superyir. Wahincitrrn Field Office.
The only non-voting
attendee was’
Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

8

Savage- 1572

lb

lb 7

 _____

_

To:
Re:

Inspection Division From:
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Inspection Division

Observations and Recomnendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with
the intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2)
provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations
1
and recommendations for corrective actions from am operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations
for administrative action if deemed necessary.
Discussion of this shooting by the SIRG concluded that
the incident involved the intentional discharge of weapons by law
enforcement personnel and that the use of deadly force was
justified and within the current deadly force policy guidelines.
SIRG members made several obserations regarding the
lack of basic actions by personnel involved in the incident.
These actions included the lack of notification to local
authorities, failure to share information between the arrest team
members, no clear operational or arrest plan, lack of management
oversight on the scene and, the neglect of one SA to utilize
protective armor as well as other participants not wearing raid
jackets to identify themselves as law enforcement officers.
One
representative concluded that if this incident had been a
practice session, it would have been considered a failure.
Members noted that the local authorities were notified subsequent
to the shooting incident.
Although numerous issues were
idçntified. this diçcussion resulted in a recommendation that
SAl
Ibe censured for his neglect in utilizing
protective body armor.
Further discussion of this shooting incident was held
by the SIRG on 1/28/97.
The following voting members of the SIRG
were in attendance:
Chairman, Thomas Lusby, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division;I
ITrial Attorney,
Terrcrim ri VicThit Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;
I
lUnit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal
Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel; J. C.
Carter, Section Chief, Personnel Management Section, Personnel
Division; Steven W. Dillard, Section Chief, Global Section
NS
2, National Security Division; Patrick 3. Foran, Section Chief,
Personnel Administration and Benefit Section, Personnel Division;
Richard A. Marguise, Section Chiçf. Oreration1 Support Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;l
I Unit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; I
I, Unit
Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific 2\nalysIs Section,
-

-

9

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Laboratory Division; and,
Field Office.

Inspection Division

I

I

Supervisor, Washington
lb

-.

Piacel
investigation.

was made to the SIRG by Inspector-in- b

Iwho conducted the shooting

SIRG members reiterated that adequacy of planning was
lacking in this event.
Particularly noted by the members was the•
fact that although the SAC and the ASAC were briefed about the
possibility of the subject being at one location, they were not
advised when a positive identification of the subject was made by
the pizza delivery employee. Also noted by the SIRG were the
following facts:
1) one first office agent wore no protective
armor, 2) FBI identification was not visible, 3) one SOG member
who joined the team had no idea of the arrest plan, and, 4) no
contingency plan was made to use the SOG in this situation.
Members also discussed the fact that ASAC Stapleton
•advised that the SAC is not notified of all arrests being made;

however, he is advised when a high profile case is involved or a
propensity for violence exists. Additionally, attendees
discussed the fact that policy dictates that if a propensity for
violence exists the SAC should be on the scene or designate a
management official to be present. Members noted the fact that
no direction was provided on-scene, an acting supervisor was in
control of the on-scene incident, and that no evacuation was made.
until shots had been fired. Discussion focused on the fact that
although this incident did not involve a Safe Streets Task Force,
individuals making arrests that are potentially dangerous on a
routine basis become complacent and neglect to notify office
management.
SIRG members unanimously opined that although these
instances occur, armored car robberies should always be
considered dangerous and not routine.
The SIRG emphasized that
the SAC should ensure that the necessity for adequate planning
when conducting arrests is emphasized to all personnel.
Further,
SAC Detroit should, when appropriate, ensure local law
enforcement is notified prior to arrests being made.
Members
also agreed that in the future management should invoke a
management crisis plan at an early stage during high profile,
possibly violent instances.

10

Savage- 1574

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Inspection Division

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
Tht no administrative action be taken
against SAsI
kndI
las a result of
their involvement in this shooting inciden
1b7C

Set Lead 2:

That the Administrative Summary Unit, Office
of ?rfnna1 1ppi’isibility forward a letter of censure to
SA I
Lor1s neglect to use protective body armor
during this incide
.’’
4
Set Lead 3:

That SAC, Detroit, be advised of the
necessity for adequate planning when conducting arrests,
particularly when violent offenders are involved; reemphasize the
use of ballistic body armor and raid jackets by FBI agents
conducting arrests; the need for notification to local
authorities, when appropriate, prior to making arrests; and, the
need for management to invoke a management crisis plan earlier in
high profile possibly violent situaZ

11

Savage-1575

  

 

 

1996

 

_______
_____
__________
__

Mr. Gore

4/16/96

W. D. Thompson, III
b6

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/18/96
CINCINNATI DIVISION

2/8/96.

Reference report of

1

Thspectorl

jdated

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish, the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
1ECOMNNDATIONS:
(1)
That no administrative action be taken
against any Special Agent (SA) involved in this shooting
incident.

b?C

66—19157—in

I

Mr.
Room 7142
Mr. Gore. Ropm 7129 (Enclosure)
—
MrJ
Room 7116
—
MrJ
Room 6012
(1 — Mr.
Room 6050)
(1 — Mr.
4997)
Inborn
(1 — M-.,
6646)
1 — Mrsi
hoom 5829
3. - Mr. Thompson. Room 7129
.3 — Mr4
IRoom 7427
(1 ‘—
IRoom 7159)
(1 — Mr I
I RoOm 7326)
1 — Mr.
7825
tRR:1rr
1

1
1
4

—

-

i—Ms.I

1

-

IDOJ

Mr. Doyle, Room 4042

10J

I

1 — Mr.J
1 — Ms4
I. — Mr4
1-Mrt
1 — Mrsj

Quantico
om 3849
Room 3787?
,

IR00m

(CONTThUED

Savage-1500

-

7837

OVER)

 Memoranduiit from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/18/96
Cincinnati Division

-

(2)
That the Information Resources Division (IRD)
contact the Cincinnati Division to determine the problem that
existed with radio communication between the ground personnel and
the aircraft.
Upon resolution of the communication problem, IRD
should follow—up information with the Cincinnati Division and
advise all field offices.

(3) That the Training Division (TD) encourage additional
training for Safe Streets Task Forces and non Swat SAs as well as
other Task Force participants.

(4) That the TD send a reminder to all offices that
qualification is necessary for M—16 use.

S
7C

DETAILS:
On 3/12/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above—captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman Wiley D. Thompson, III,. Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; Chief InspecorI
1
Office of Inspections, Inspection Divis5on:I
I Trial
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; I
I Deputy
Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; 3. C. Carter, Section Chief, Personnel Management
2

Savage- 1501

4

 4.

Memorandum from W. I). Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/18/96
Cincinnati Division
Section, Personnel Division; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section Chief,
Global Section
NS—2, National Security Division; Patrick J.
Foran, Section Chief, Personnel Administration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training
Unit, Training Divislon;I
I Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Training Section, Office
of the General Counsel;’
L Unit chief. Health Car
Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative Division; I
I Unit
1 Firearms
Chief
Toolmarks Unit, Scienific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and,I
I Supervisor, WNFO.
NOzv
voting attendees consisted of I
U.S.
I.,
Marshals Service fUSMS), Enforcement Division, Arlington, Virginia;
[
_j Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, and
I
I Computer Specialist, Information Resources Division
(IRD).
A presentatiop reaardinci thin shpoting incident was
provided by Inspectozi
I Since this shooting
inquiry was a joint investigation with the USMS, erie representative
from the USMS was also present.
-

-

Synopsis of the Shootinci Incident

I

This shooting incident was a result of an investigation
involving bank robberies and ax Unlawful F1iht t Avoid
Prosecution. (UFAP wrrant forl
land his associate
I The shooting incident occurred on 1/18/96, as
SAs and Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF members o the Cincinnati
-c4-I
Division attempt 1-t-.
I The subject left
his residence ati
01 and entered a
Cola-ii nh
c
I 1
van parked in the back yard near a garage. I
failed to comply
with commands to surrender, and moved from the driver’s seat toward
the back of the van. The subject was observed in a shooting
h
position and apprp’
4 ‘+1 y 46 shots were fired resulting in the

I

minor wounding of
I

I

I

In December 1995,E
iandl
I
Iwere identified as prime suspects in the “B ROB” major
bank robbery investigation. This investigation involved the
robbery of 18 banks located in seven midwestern states.
In these
robberies, the robbers left behind improvised explosive devices and
freq4entlv 4eplçived
inlitary smoke grenade to cover their escape.
Both I
landl
I were Federal fugitives based on UFAP
warrants in the Atlanta Division. By teletype dated 1/5/95, FBIRQ
notified all ofice cf the significance of this investigation and
thatl
land I
I were possible suspects. The teletype also
contained information regarding their possible involvement with
3

Savage-1502

 1

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/18/96
Cincinnati Division
white supremacy and militia groups and that they should be
considered armed and dangerous. An Atlanta Division teletype dated
1/5/95, also advised that both individuals should be considered
armed and extremely dangerous. The te.letype provided the following
cautions: Vowed not to be taken alive; utilizes body armor; uses
police scanners and knows federal and police frequencies; utilizes
inert hand grenades as booby traps, survivalist, white supremacist,
skin head associate, anti—Government, anti-military, and anti—law
enforcement.
•

lb 7C

On 1/15/96, information wa rctvd by th Cincinnati
Division leading to the location of I
i was
identified by surveillance units and he attempted to elude FBI SAs
resulting in a foot chase. He ultimately surrendered and was
arrested and was found to be armed with a weapon at the time of his
arrt.. He agreed to cooperate and assist the FBI in locating
I
1 The Cincinnati Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team
traveled to Indianapolis, Injliana. on 1116 ançt 1/17/96, in an
attemut to locate and arresti
I attempted to locate
Ithrough an involved networic utii.izing paging devices,
I
however, the meet never occurred.
On January 17, 1996, the investigation in Indianapolis
was discontinued and SAs were dispatched t
l’?us, Ohio. This
move was based on information provided byl
Jindicating that
he had a “safe hçuse” Ic Columbus. He provided a consent to search
and advised thati
Iwas the only other person with a key to
this “safe house.” SAS and ssT’ members located the residence and
determined that lights were on and the residence was occupied by a
lone white male.
Information fromi
land investigation by the
surveillance units determined that there was a strong possibility
that I
Iwas inside the residence.

Members of the SSTF and others maintained a surveillance
throughout the night. All SWAT Team members went to the Columbus
Resident Agency and held a briefing upon their arrival after
midnight on the evening of 1/17/96.. SWAT Team leaders surveillad
the residence and formulated a plan and provided detailed
instructions including deadly force policy while FBI SAs were in
attendance.
They met again the following morning and were updated
regarding the situation and again went over the plan for arrest.
Throughout the planning, SAC Jackson and ASAC Ragle were
aware of th progress and provided instructions as needed. Due to
the propensity for violence and the potential for explosives in the
residence, the decision was made that
iould not be arrested

4
t

Savage-1503

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/18/96
Cincinnati Division
inside the residence. The plan required that he be arrested as he
departed the residence to enter the van parked in the rear of the
residence. The detailed arrest plan specified individual roles and
responsibilities for a1 arret team members with the primary
objective of arrestingi
kfter he entered his van which was
facing an alley south of the residence. SAs were to block the east
ana west exits and other SAs would position themselves at the back
of the residence to prevent the subject from returning to the
residence. The following morning the arrest teams were in place at
7:00 a.m. The SAC and ASAC traveled from Cincinnati to be on the
scene.

:

At approximately 9:45 a.m.
lexited the residence
and slowly proceeded to the van. SA I
I had a view of the
backyard and provided radio instructions to other arret team
members detailing the movements of the subject. After I
I
entered the van, SA
I ordered the SAs in the front of
the residence to more in to prevent the subject rom re—entering
the residence. When those SAs were in place, SAl
I ordered all
units to move in to effect the arrest. Four vehicles entered from
the east and four entered from the west. Several Agents
immedia
v exited the vehicles, took a position of cover, and
I to raise his hands and come out of the van • Several
ordered
Agents noted that the subject begin to comply and raise his hands 7
however, he abruptly moved his hands downward and rolled from the
driver’s seat into the middle of the van. As he reappeared, Agents
observed a weapon in his hands.
Immediately, seven FBI Agents and
SSTF members fired into the van. The burst of approximately 46
rounds lasted less than ten seconds. Agents again commanded
I
I
to exit the vehicle and he reappeared with his hands up.
He wa
bleeding from the face and complied with commands to place his
hands and e4end hiine1f tirough the j1river side window. Deputy
U.S. Marsha.l
I approachel
&5
land placed him in
handcuffs.
Iwas pulled to the ground and searched without 7C
further incident. I
had, in his possession, a .22 caliber
Beretta handgun at the time of his arrest.
The SAC and ASAC immediately_reported to the arrest scene
and an ambulance was called for I
I A search of the van was
conducted with additional weapons nein found; however, no other
suspects were_locaed.
Subsequently, a search of the residence was
conducted. I
I had indicated there were explosives in the
bathtub, however, changed that statement.
The Columbus Bomb Squad
was contacted and awaited a clearing search by the Cincinnati SWAT
team which was conducted without incident. Numerous weapons, seven
grenades and 13 pipe bombs were located in the residence.
5

Savage- 1504

.

 r
J.

Memorandum from W. 1). Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/18/96
Cincinnati Division
The white van bearing Iowa 1icens
Jwas examined
subsequent to a search warrant on 1/20/96. Among evidence obtained
was one pipe bomb, one •hand grenade, (both exploded by the Columbus
Police Department for safety precautions), a .22 caliber Beretta
handgun on his person, one 9mm tuger Taurus pistol, OflS .380
automatic caliber Bersa pistol, one .223 Remington SOW carbine,
model XM15A1.
The FBI Laboratory examination determined that all
were loaded and functioned normally when tested in the Laboratory.
Additionally, all had been fired since the weapons were last
cleaned.

*

•

Observations and Reccxmmendations of the. SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action jf deemed necessary.

*

Members of the SIRG unanimously agreed that deadly force
was justified in this shooting incident and that the planning of
the incident was more than adequate.
The group recognized that the
surveillance and arrest was fast moving, SAs and Task Force members
involved in the incident had been working on the situation for
three days, body armor was used due to the knowledge that the
subject would possibly be heavily armed, numerous briefings were
held with SAs to emphasize the danger involved with the situation,
and that the incident basically went according to the arrest plan.
It was also noted that proper verbal warnings were made ‘to the
subject prior to shots being fired. This resulted in the
recommendation that no administrative action be taken against any
Bureau personnel involved in this shooting incident.

According to SAC Theodore Jackson, he arrived in Columbus
at approximately 7:45 a.m., on the morning of January 18, 1996.
After receiving a briefing from ASAC Ragle, SAC Jackson was taken
to the arrest site. After driving by the residence, SAC Jackson
and ASAC Ragle attempted to contact the Bureau plane on the radio;
however, were unable to do so. In order to make contact with the
airplane, a return trip to the office was attempted to get a hand—
held radio to assist in communicating with the plane.

6

Savage- 1505

 r
Memorandum from W. D. Thampson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/18/96
Cincinnati Division
Based on ASAC Ragle’s statem’
- 1
4
a and C! J1cr
stopped to confer with SWAT Team Leaden
]and 524
this time, recontact with the Bureau plane was attempted..
SA
succeeded in contacting the plane which was overhead. An attJia
was made to return to the office to obtain_additional hand-held
radios, when radio traffic indicated thatI
lwas exiting the
residence which precluded the acquisition of additional radios.

I

I

I

Based on these statements, SIRG members recommended that
the IRD contact the Cincinnati Division, determine the problem with
radio communications between ground units and the aircraft, resolve

the problem in order to eliminate any recurrence and advise all
offices of the results. One SIRG member stated that the least
expensive resolution to this problem may involve the use of planes
with repeaters installed.

A lengthy discussiQn was held regarding the use of tibody
bunkers” by participants in this incident. One member emphasized
that “body bunkers” are not only for SWAT personnel and that all
SAS should be trained to use bunkers. According to one SIRG
member, continuous training for body bunkers is necessary and is
not available to SAs who are not SWAT Team participants.
Therefore, the SIRG recommended that the TD encourage additional
training regarding body bunker use to SSTF members, non-SWAT Team
SAs as well as other task force participants.
The last issue resulting in. a recommendation involved the
use of an 16—16 Rifle by one SA during this shooting incident.
Members noted that according to the SA’s statement, he last
qualified with this weapon in August 1995. Therefore, the
recommendation was made- that all SAs be reminded that qualification
is necessary for 16—16 use.
following:

Additional observations made by the SIRS included the

One participant possessed a weapon with five shots.
Members unanimously agreed that this participant was under-armed
and should have been more heavily armed. Additionally, it was
noted that some SA participants in this incident did not know what
ammunition was in the magazine.
The second observation by the SIRG involved the “boxing

in” of the subject’s vehicle during this incident. The TD
representative advised that the van was not effectively “boxed in”

and could have been driven out by the subject.

Additionally, one

7
•

-

Savage-1506

-

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inguiry
Shooting Incident
1/18/96
Cincinnati Division
member added that perhaps an attempt could have been made to
disable the vehicle to draw the subjectoutside of the van such as
flattening the tire.
SIRG members also observed that at the time of arrest,
several SAc and SSPF members gave oral instructions to the subject.
All members concurred that the responsibility to designate a
“spokesman” to order the subject to surrender should have bean
included in the planning.

*

The last observation of the SIRG was the inappropriate
language used by one participant at the time of the arrest. It
should be noted that this issue has been previously discussed
during SIRG meetings, and the TD representative advised that the
language issue will be addressed during Principal Firearms
Instructors training.

8

Savage- 1507

 Mr. Gore

I

6/13/96

I
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/6/96
KNOXVILLE DIVISION

],.-‘-

7’-,

I

Reference report of Inspector-in-Placer
3/13/96.

I

I dated

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RfnNMPNna’rTOw!
(-) That SAC, Knoxville orally admonish
SN
for his violation of the deadly force policy.
However, Sj
kshould be advised of his use of good
judgement for abstaining from shooting into the vehicle due to
the presence of an unidentified passenger.

66—19157—94
Mr.[
1
I Room 7142
3.
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
1 - Mr4
joom 7116
1
1
Mr.
Quantico
1
4
Mr.I
I Room 6012
Mr.
(1
Room 6050)
(1 —
IRoom 4997)
(1
Mr. oran, Room 6646)
1 Room 7129
1 — Mr. Thn1rnuM1
3
Mr.’
‘Room 7427
(3. — Mr.
Room 7159)
(3. — Mr. I
Room 7326)
1
MrJ
Room 7825
1—MrI_______ 003
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
2.
LRR:lrr (20)
—

-

-

—

—

1-MrJ
1 — Mn
2.
Ms.
1
Mr. I
1
Mr.
1
Mrs.]

I, Quantico
Division
Room 3787F
L BA Division
Room 7837

—

—

-

L

I

-

—

D

—

—

—

(CONTINUED

Savage-1508

—

OVER)

IC

 Memorandum from I
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/6/96
Knoxville Division

Ito Mr • Gore

(2)
That SAC, Knoxville, ensure tht the Cief Division
Counsel of the Knoxville Division provides SAl
Iwith a review
of the deadly force policy, and that this additional training is
documented.

(3)
That the Training Division (TD), develop training
scenarios for proper vehicle blocks, including instructions on
action to take if a vehicle block fails, and disseminate copies of
the scenarios to all offices for training purposes.

DETAILS:
On 5/7/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above—captioned
shooting incident.
The followiia voting members qf the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chief Inspectori
I Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;l
Trial
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;I
Deputy
Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
Division, USD03; J. C. Carter, Section Chief, Personnel Management
Section, Personnel Division; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section Chief,
Global Section — NS-2, National Security Division; Patrick J.
Foran, Section Chief
1 Personnel Administration and Benefit Section,.
Personnel Division; I
I SA, Firearms Training
Unit, Training Divislon;I
1 Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, tegai Advice an Training Section, Office
of the General Counsel;I
Chief. Health Care
Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative Division;l
1. Unit
Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and,I
I Supervisor, Baltimore
Division.
Non—voting attendees consistea og
I
General Counsel’s Office, U.S. Marshal Service (USNSi
p
General Counsel’s Oftice;I
I
inspection Analyst, Office of InsPectionsj_________________

mit

-

2

Savage- 1509

 Memorandum froml
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/6/96
Knoxville Division

Ito Mr. Gore

Writer-Editor, Firearms Training Unit, andp
Specialist, Information Resources Division.

Icomputer
lb 7

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On 3/6/96, at approximately 12:15 p.m., Task Force (TF)
officers spotted a U-Haul truck at a residence in Soddy Daisy, TN.
Information obtained from an informant indicated that this
residence was frequented byL
Ia parole violator_being
sought by members of the Chattanooga Safe Streets TF. I
1 an
armed and dangerous fugitive, had previously served 17 years for
bank robbery and was now wanted for numerous local armed robberies
and aggravated assaults.
-

tep—daughter and step—son drove off in the truck
I
at approximately 1:00 p.m., and the TF officers established a
surveillance.
The truck crossed into Georgia and at approximately
2:30 p.m., parked in the parking lot of the “Flying J Truck Stop”
south of Rossville, GA.
Four Special Agents (SAS) from the
Rossyille_Resident Agency (RA) joined the surveillance. Hoping
that I
kould meet the truck, an arrest plan was developed that
focused on blocking and arrestingi
In the parking lot.
At 6:20 p.m., a red Oldsmobile with two occupants pulled
into the space next to the U-Haul truck.
The Oldsmobile was facing
east and was parked driver door to driver 4go with the truck.
SAj
‘drove by the
land TF Office

Oldsmobile and positively identified
Jas the driver. Once
the identification was,made, the signal was given to execute the
arrest plan.
The blocking vehicles began moving into position.
SAl
Ipulled his vehicle in front oI
‘vehicle and
exited. M eve1ed his shotgun ati
Iideçtified himself and
advisedL
I that he was under arrest. I
limmediately began
backing up in an easterly direction at a high rate of speed. He
swung the car around, shifted into forward gear, and accelerated
northward out of the parking lot. At that pointi
Isaw tWo FBI
vehicles coming at him, cutting off his escape. SA I
Ihad
started running east towards’
I car. (
Iguickly braked and
shifted into reverse and backed fishtailing and slidina ip a wide
arc, ending up backing west directly towards SAl
I
SA I
ihought that he would be pinned against the UHaul truck and feared for his life as well as the SAs behind him,
3

Savage-1510

 Memorandum fromi
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/6/96
Knoxville Division

Ito Mr. Gore

lb 7
SAl
icould not shoot the driver because the car sat low and
Ad14nn1ly, he did not know the
his view was obstructed.
identity of the passengçr ml
As the car’s right rear
j car.
brushed against him, SAl
icharged his shotgun into the
right rear tire in a final effort to stop the vehicle.
The car
stopped and then shifting into forward gear accelerated in a
southeasterly direction..
The car was bumped twice by one of the PP
vehicles, spun completely around and subsequently headed south.

I

Asi i accelerated, sil
‘moved_towards him taking
aim with his shotgun. On two occasions, SA1
Ihad a shot but
refrained from firing because he did not want to endanger
bvs4nders and at that point I
Iwas no longer a threat to him.
Jcompleted a 180 degree turn around a light_pole island and
again headed north for the parking lot exit. I
Iwas rammed twice
Pn1 finally
by a vehicle driven by Deputy U.S. Marshall
forcqd to a stop against a curb. I
his
wife,I
I
I and

I were pulled from the vehicle and arrested. A 9 mm pistol was.
found on the vehicle’s floorboard and a semi-automatic rifle in the
trunk.

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
lb 7 C

The first observation made by the SIRG members was the
unanimous conclusion that SAj
Jviolated the deadly force
policy by attempting to disable a vehicle by shooting the tire.
However, members felt that the violation was mitigated by factors
ui4aue to this particular shooting incident. Members opined that
si
I who was in fear of his life as well as other SAs and PP
members, took the only action that he be)ieved_could possibly stop
the vehicle. Further, the SIRG noted SAl
I use of good
judgement in not shooting the driver considering the fact that an

unknown, possibly innocent victim occupied the vehicle.__This
discussion resulted in the recommendation that SA I
Ibe orally
admonished for his violation of the deadly force policy while
taking into account his good judgement for abstaining from
Additionally, the SIRG recommended that the
additional gunshots.
4

Savage-151 1

 -a

Memorandum from I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/6/96
Knoxville Division

Ito

Mr. Gore

deadly force policy be reiterated to SAl
understanding of the policy.

Jto ensure his

The second issue discussed by the SIRG involved training
issues relating to this incident. Members noted that although an
arrest plan was developed, the subject’s car was not properly
blocked.
Therefore, SIRG members recommended that the TO develop
training scenarios for vehicle blocks and ensure dissemination to
all offices.
Although not part of a formal recommendation, SIRG
members noted that protective body armor was not utilized by all
SAc involved in this incident.

5

Savage-1512

 _________
____________
_________
____________
__________

Mr. Gore

6/24/96

I

I
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/21/96
LAS VEGAS DIVISION

Reference report of Inspector—in-Place
dated 4/12/96.

I

I

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1)
That po administrativ acion be taken
against Special Agents (SAs)I
lanai
as a result of their involvement in this shooting incident.

66—191

7

—6 S

Mn
I Room 7142
Mr. Gore, Rooi 7129 (Enclosure)
Mn
I Room 7116
Mi
Quantico
I
L Rooi 6012
MzI
(1
Mr4
oom 6050)
(1
MrJ
I Room 4997)
(1
Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
1
Mr. Thompson Room 7129
3
Mr,E
7427
(1
Mr.
joom 7159)
Mr.
(1
_JRoom 7326)
1
7825
Mr.I
LRR: lrr’
1
1
1
1
4

—

—

—

-

-

—

—

—

lP

-

—

1 —Mr.j
I DOJ
1
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1-Mr
03
1
Mr
Quantico
Ms
1
oom 3849
1
Mr
Room 3787?
Mr
BA Division
1
Room 7837
—

-

-

—

Mrs.I

—

-

—

-

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1513

-

OVER)

I

 A

fromi

Memorandum
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/21/96
Las Vegas Division

o Mr. Gore

(2)
That the Administrative Summary Unit (ASU),
Personnel Division (PD) prepare and forward a letter of censure to
SI
ias a result of his inyolvemçnt in this shooting
incident. The letter should advise SAL
Ithat he is being
decertified as a firearms instructor and is being prohibited from
the Special Weapons and Tactical (SWAT) program pending the results
of further review by the PD. Additionally, the PD should review
the previous shooting incident involvin SAl
las well as the
one he witn
During the incident
ng
involving S
continued a shooting
SR
demonstration after SA
seriously wounded himself and two
spectators were slightly woun e
Thereafter, in consultation with
the SAC, Las Vegas, determine if a fitness for duty examination is
needed.

(3)
That the Assistant Director (AD), Training Division
(TD) decertify SAl
las a firearms instructor and remove
him from the SWAT program pending the outcome of PD’s review of SA
I
linvolvement
previous shooting incidents and discussions
with SAC, Las Vegas.

in

(4)
That the TD prepare and disseminate car blocking
procedures including the fact that these procedures should be
addressed during operations planning.

(5)
That the AD, Inspection Division (INSD), provide
instructions to all personnel responsible for the completion of
shooting incident reports regarding the need for detailed
information regarding field of fire during initial shooting
inquiries.

2
Savage- 1514

 Memorandum from I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/21/96
Las Vegas Division

Ito

Mr. Core

DETAILS: On 5/7/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting incident. The following voting members of the SXRG were
I flf ice of
in attendance:
Chief Inspectori_
Inspections, Inspection Division; I
I Trial
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;I
L Deputy
Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; J. C. Carter, Section Chief, Personnel Management
Section, Personnel Division; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section Chief,
Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division; Patrick J.
Foran, Section Chief. Personnel Administration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division; I
I S, Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division;I
L Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Training Section, Office
of the General counsel;I
I Unit Chief, Health Care
Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative Division;I
I Unit
Chief, Firearms
Toolmarcs Unit. Scientific Analysis Section,
Laboratory Division; and,I
Supervisor, Baltimore
Division.
Non—voting attendees consisted of I
I
Gnera Counsel’s Office, U.S. Marshal Service (USMS:I
I
IUSMS, General Counsel’s Off ice;j
I
Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspectiáns,[
Writer—Editor, Firearms Training Unit, andi
I Computer
Specialist, Information Resources Division.

bZ

-

—

I

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

I

Qn

3/21/96, during a planned arrest of FBI subectI
I Las Vegas Division SAs were involved in a shooting
incident.
The shooting incident occurred asi
jattempted to
flee the area to avoid his arrest.

I

A federal arrest warrant had been issued forl
iby the
U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, on 3/20/96.
Plans called
for the arrest of the subject following an undercover purchase of
drugs.
This drug purchase was tie fifth purchase in a series which
had been orchestrated by an undercover police officer particiatina
in the Weed and Seed Task Force initiative. Arrest plans fort
were essentially finalized during the evening of 3/20/96, and were
the subject of a thorough briefing of all personnel involved in the
arrest on the morning of 3/21/96.
SAs and officers deployed at the
scene of the planned- arrest, the Castaway’s Casino parking lot, Las
Vegas, Nevada, for the anticipated 11:00 a.m., arrest.

I

Following the arrival oft
I the completed purchase of
cocaine by the undercover officer and the signal given forl
I
3

Savage-i 515

 ______Ireceived

Memorandum fromi
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/21/96
Las Vegas Division

Ito Mr. Core

arrest, FBI SAs and police officers converged in an attempt to

block the subject’s vehicle and effect his arrest.
At that point,
lexecuted an extremely dangerous and aggressive driving
I
maieuver in whiph he struck both blocking vehicles and FBI
SA
I who was knocked to the ground. I
Iontinued,
driving directly into SAl
I sending him careening
across the escaping vehicle’s hood and smashing the vehicle’s
windshield before SAl
lws able to roll off duringi
I
rapid acceleration.
As I
I vehicle sped through the Castaway
Casino parking 1t, three FBI SAs and two police_officers fired at
I
iwho was crouched in the driver’s seat. Asi
lattempted
his escape onto Decatur Boulevard, both marked and unmarked units
of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and the FBI
gave pursuit and attempted to locate the subject’s vehicle. I
I
successfully eluded capture for that day.

I

On 3/22/96J

lattorney, surrendered

I into the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Las Vegas.
Following negotiations with I
Ivehicle was recovered,

impounded, and processed by the LVNPD.
medical
treatment for “cuts on his back and right hand and a cut on his
left proximal elbow”. Medical records for I
Jreveal that he
suffered “several scratches and superficial puncture wounds
posterior back” and that “palpable buckshot is felt in the skin”.
Further,I
lexperienced a “small puncture wound over the right
thenar eminence (fleshy area below the thumb) and tenderness in the
thenar muscle group”.
Regarding the elbow wound, a “full range of
motion of the elbow” and “no evidence of joint involvement” were
noted. I
Iwas given an antibiotic and recommended to seek
follow—up care.
During the planning and attempted arrest of subject,
Assistant Special Agent-in-charge (ASAC) Walter B. Stowe was acting
in place of Special Agent-in-charge Bobby L. Sil].er, who was out
the division.
ASAC Stowe approved a verbal presentation of the of
arrest plan.
The written arrest olan which was atrnxoved by
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
I sets forth the
authority to arrestj_______ details of I
Iviolent history and
past attempt to flee during a prior arrest.
Additionally, the
written plan included a thorough plan with individual and team
assignments for the anticipated arrest of the subject.
The plan,
and an all-hands meeting on the morning of the planned arrest,
emphasized the Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy and the
requirement for partidipating personnel to wear appropriate body
armor and identification.
Participating personnel were equipped
4

Savage-1516

 ____________

Memorandum from’
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/21/ 96
Las Vegas Division

I to Mr. Gore

with both body armor and identification, and issued verbl
identification and commands during the attempt to arrest

I

I

Interviews and ballistics examinations determined that
SAf
If ired three rounds of service ammunition from his Bureau
authoried pistol after being struck and knocked to the ground by
Ivehicle.
After the shooting incident, SPI
iwas treated
by paramedics at the scene, determined to have only superficial
injuries, and released.

]b (

Ballistics examinations determined that SAI
1 fired
one round of service ammunition from his Bureau authorized pistol
after being struck byl
sI
Ivehicle.
‘was unaware that
he fired a round, believip that he withheld firing for fear of
hitting a police van.
SAl
Iwas transported to a medical
facility complaining of multiple abrasions and lower back pain.
Medical records indicate that SAl
lindicated he dug out
metallic fragments from three areas in his right thigh.
He was
determined to have multiple abrasions op his uoner extremities and
puncture wounds in his right thigh.
SN
kas issued
medication for pain, inflammation and possible infection, and
released.
Tntçrview and ballistics examinations determined that
If ired 15 rounds of service ammunition from his Bureau
authqrizd Cnlt A—15 A3 afterl
lescaping vehicle struck SAc
LnjiI
i It was also determined that LVMPD Sergeantp
wired wo shotgun rounds (00 buck) and that LVMPD Officer
If ired 10 rounds of 9 mm ammunition from his pistol.

sil
I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for.
administrative action if deemed necessary.
The first issue discussed by the SIRG
application of deadly force by persons involved
incident.
Members unanimously agreed that SAl
of deadly force was 5ustjfied n this shootin
discussion ensued regarding SAl

5

Savage-1517

related to the
in this shooting
luse
ncident.
A lengthy
firing his weapon.

I

 ______

Memorandum fromi

Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/21/96
Las Vegas Division

Ito

Mr. Gore

I

Members noted that SA
assignment involved the blocking of
the subject’s vei1e in order to prevent his escaping the scene.
However, when SAl
lattempted to block the subject’s vehicle,
the subject reverd his vehicle and then started forward directly
towards SAl
Iwas struck by the vehicle, rolled
I SAL
across the hood and struck the windshield.
He then rolled of f of
thç hood arid onto the pavement.
Although his weapon was drawn,
SAl
Isaw a North Las Vegas Police Department van in the
background and did not fire for fear of hitting the van or some of

i-he cene.
the other officers
Subsequent ballistic examinations
determined that sAl
Idid fire his weapon although he does not
recall firing the shot. Based on the shooting_incident report,
SIRG members were unable to determine if SAl
I shot was an
intentional shooting.__SIRG members unanimously agreed that if the
shot fired by SAl
Iwas intentional, the use of deadly force
was certainly justified. As a result, the TP reciriinended that no
administrative action be taken against SASI
landi
I

I

I

The last issue regarding the use of deadly force
pertained to the shots fired by SAl
I Members agreed
that SAl
hots were intentional and that deadly force was
also justified. However, members were concerned about tile tvte of
weapon as well as the selection of ammunition used by SAl______
Although_approval had been issued by the FBI Gunvault for the use
of I
Icolt AR—iS A3 .223 caliber rifle with a 16 inch barrel,
SIRG members agreed that this weapon was not appropriate for use in
an urbap, populated deyeloomqnt. According to SAl
I SSA
I was aware that I
Iwas going to b______ with this
particular weapon because SSA I
uring the pre—
I asked
arrest briefing if Bureau approval had been received to use the
Upon hearing that Bureu aoooval had been issued SSA
Ivoiced no objections tol
lusing the weapon. Members
noted that the weapon selection should have been included in the
planning of the arrest.
Furthsr dispussion by SIRG members related
to the ammunition used b’ S’J
Iloaded his weapon
I SAl
with 20 FBI issued Winchester .223 caliber rounds on top and left a
combination of approximately eight 55 grain U.S. miliary issue ball
and tracer rounds on the bottom.
According to SAl
Ithe
military rounds which were interlaced with tracer rounds in a belt
had previously been issued by an FBI Principal Firearms Instructor
for training purposes. All SIRG participants acknowledged that the
tracer rounds are not FBI approved or issued. Members were
concerned about the use of the ammunition especially taking into
consideration that SA[
us a certified FBI Firearms Instructor
and a SWAT team member. Members also discussed the number of shots
fired by SAL
Iduring this incident. Ballistics examinations

6

Savage- 1518

 Memorandum frax4
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/21/96
Las Vegas Division

Ito

Mr. Gore

If

revealed that SAl
ired 15 rounds of ammunition from his
weapon_within approximately four seconds. SIRG members opined that
SA I
Icould not have obtained proper target acquisition by
firing 15 rounds within four seconds. As a result of this
discussion, SIRG members recommended that SAl
Ireceive a letter
of censure for using non-Bureau approved or issued ammunition and
for the manner in which the rounds were fired. The SIRG further
recommended that te PD review the previous shooting incident
involving SAl
las well as the one he witnessed involving
SAl
I Thereafter, in consultation with the SAC,
Las Vegas, determine if a fitness for duty_examination is needed.
Additionally, members recommended that SAl
Iba decertified as a
firearms instructor and be prohibited from SWAT team participation
until the ASU review is completed.
Members discussed the fact that the field of fire was not
detailed in the shooting incident report.
The SIRG recommended
that the AD, INSD, ensure instructions are issued requiring that
in-depth detail is captured during initial shooting inquiries
regarding the field of fire.
All SIRG members agreed that the arrest and operations
plan for the incident were adequate.
SIRG members noted that the
blocking of the subject’s vehicle could have been improved, and
recommended that the PD prepare and disseminate car blocking
procedures including the fact that these procedures should be
addressed during operations planning.
The SIRG also noted the
absence of a contingency plan for a car chase if one was needed and
the fact that regular traffic was not controlled during the
incident.
Although not a part of any recommendation, members
discussed the fact that al]. officers participating in this type of
situation should be properly identified.
Specifically noted was
the fact that SAL
iwas dressed in black attire wth hi FBI
badge on the left side of his belt. According to SAl
I the
badge was visible when he was standing; however, more easily
recognizable clothing indicating that he was a law enforcement

officer was not used.

7

Savage- 1519

bEi

 ______
___________
__________
________

Mr. Gore

6/14/96

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/22/96
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

j

I

Reference report of Inspector—in-Place (IIP)I
dated 4/22/96.

I

PURPOSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments., and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1)
That no administrative action be taken
against any employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

Room 7142
m 7129 (Eric.)
—
Room 7116 (Enc.)
—
oom 6012
(1
.
Room 6050)
(1
Mr.
Room 4997)
(1 — Mr. Foran, Room 6646)
1 — Ms.t
I Room 5829
1 — Mr. Thompson, Room 7129
3 — Mr.
427
(1
r.
oora 7159)
(1
Room 7326)
1 - Mr.
,
CIRG (Enc.)
3. — Mr.
Room 7825
1—Mr.
DOJ
1 — Mr.
oom 4147
LRR:lrr
1
I
4

—

Mr
M

1-Mr.
OJ
1 - Mr.
Quantico
1 - Mr. wnite!d, Rn 1B224

1-Mr.L
1

—

IWMyo

Mrsj__________ Room 7837

—

—

—

Savage- 1520

lb

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96
Philadelphia Division
(2)
That the Undercover Sensitive Operations Unit
(USOU), Criminal Investigative Division (CID), and the Undercover
Safeguard Unit (FJSU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG),
carefully review this shooting incident for its training value.
Following a review of this incident, it is recommended that any
“lessons learned” be disseminated to all undercover coordinators
and incorporated into the training curriculum for Undercover Agents
(UCAs), and new SSAs.

(3)
That the Information Resources Division (IRD)
conduct a fieldwide survey of the availability and serviceability
of concealed recording devices currently used by all field
divisions; review the results of this survey, and thereafter take
any action necessary to ensure that UCAs are equipped with the best
available recording equipment.

DETAILS:
On 6/11/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting incident. The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman Wiley D. Thompson, 11. Deøutv Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; Chief InspecorI
I
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I Deputy
Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal
Division, USDOJ; J. C. Cartr. citin rhif Personnel Management
Section, Personnel Division;j
unit Chief,_NS—2D
Unit, Global Section
NS—2, National Security Division;
I
J Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training and
Administration Section, Training Division; F
Unit
Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Training Section,
Office of the General Counsel; Donald B. Whitehead, Section Chief.
Special Protects Section, Laboratory Division; and,
L
Supervisor, WMFO.
Non—voting attendees consisted ol_______________
omputer Specialist, Information Resources Division;

I,

I

I

—

2

Savage-1521

I

 ______Isuggested

______

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/9 6
Philadelphia Division

I

I

I

I

Xrspection Analyst, Office of Inspections; andi
I FBI Ronors Intern, Office of Inspections.
$ynoDsis of the Shooting Incident

I

This shooting incident resulted in the tragic death of
SA Charles L. Reed by Jonathan M. Cramer.
Cramer had been
introduced to SA Reed (acting in an undercover capacity) by

I

1

on 1/3o/96,j
met with Jonathan M. Cramer at Cramer’s
office in Philadelphia an
iscussed the purchasing of cocaine.
During the recorded conversation, Cramer discussed his sources and
indicated that he had access to kilograms of cocaine.
on 2/13/96,1
t1Prhpne conversation
to Cramer who stated that he would wait for
to obtain the
needed money before he made contact with his source for the
cocaine.
On 2/14/96,1
I
meeting at Cramer’s home in Philadelphia. Cramer appeared to be
smoking marijuana and stated he did not know the price of a kilo of
cocaine since he hadn’t bought one in two years.
dvised
that his sources would have someone on a train with the money to
make the purchase. I
bnd Cramer discussed going to a hotel
room to make the deal. During this meeting, Cramer exhibited a
Glock pistol and stated that he had just obtained it for his
protection. They discussed the price of $30,000 for one kilo of
cocaine and also di”j doing the deal in Cramer’s house rather
than a hotel room.
that the deal be made in the
food court at the 30th Street station in Philadelphia; however,
Cramer wanted to complet? 1-he veal in a hotel room. At that point,
a decision was made thati
Iwould take his money man from the
train station to a hotel and then go to Cramer’s house with the
money.
It was further agreed that after checking the quality of

J

3

Savage- 1522

1h
lb7D

 ______

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96
Philadelphia Division
the cocaine, a price would be determined and they would split the
difference between the $30,000 and the sale price.I
tasked
Cramer, who had continued smoking marijuana throughout the meeting,
to get “straightened out so you’re not too confused 1r mpvin’
b
around.” This meeting ended with the agreement that I
Iwould
biD
advise Cramer when the deal would be completed.
An

I

/11/

I

I

mc1

‘rmi-

in hiJ

Ir

I

Irecorded the meeting. It was agreed that the drug buy would
take place oi_3/15/96, in a hotel room.
During this meeting,
Cramer asked I
Inumerous questions about his earlier arrest and
why he was out of jail. Cramer indicated a lack of trust in
and told him that he carries a gun during drug transactions. HG
stated “I’m worried about somebody being a cop... .1 carry a gun.
So somebody tries to jump me (UI) they get shot.”
Various meetings were held in the IRA during the week of
3/11—15/96, to plan the buy/bust operation scheduled for 3/15/96.
The meetings_culminated in a written plan dated 3/13/96. The plan
called fort
Ito contact Cramer and advise him that the $30,000
had arrivd. The plan further called for a meeting between Cramer
andi
Ion 3/15/96, at 1:00 p.m., to discuss the transaction. It
was planned that the 3/15/96 conversation would be recorded and a
surveillance would be_conducted. A decision was also made that
Agents were to advise I
inot to travel in any vehicle provided
by Cramer or anyone else. I
ould advise Cramer that the mone
6
was at the 30th Street train s a ion and they had to take the
cocaine to that location. Cramer was also to be advised that the rj
courier’s time was limited because he had to board a train at 4:05
p.m., enroute to Washington, DC.
The SA assigned to the money was
not to leave the public area of the train station for any reason.
Cramer, who was considered armed and dangerous, was to be arrested
after the transaction was consummated.
Due to the absepce of Supervisory Senior Resident Agent
(SSRA) J
I the acting SSRA,
I SAl
forwarded the plan to ASAC Bernard A. Tolbert for approval.
ASAC Tolbert instructed sI
Ithat he did not want
the buy/bust to occur in the train station since it was a public
place. At this point, it was decided that the arrest was to ta)ce
place in a hotel room. BA Charles t. Reed would play the role of
the drug purchaser and carry the $30,000 of show money to the
meeting. I
Jwas instructed to set a meeting with Cramer for
4

Savage- 1523

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96
Philadelphia Division
early afternoon on 3/15/96, in a room at the Holiday Inn.
meeting was set byl
[for 1:00 p.m. on that date.

b-5
D

The

In mid-morning of 3/15/96, Cramer called’
knd stated
that he had a kilogram of cocaine to sell, but it would not be sold
until 4:00 p.m. I
kc3vised Cramer that 4:00 p.m., was too late
in the day nd thç deal was going to fail. At noon, Cramer
recontactedI
land said that he (Cramer) had another seller
naiuel_______ and they acreed 1o meet outri th Mii1berr
Restaurant at 1:30 p.m. I
ladvised BA I
I the case
Agent, of this change.
It should be noted that in_addition to BA
Reed, eight other SAc participated in this meet. I
land BA Reed
drove to the meeting spot ml
Icar. Upon arrival, BA Reed
moved to the back seat and Cramer sat in the front. SA Reed showed
Crameç the money, which was contained in the same briefcase that
I
Ihad used in his 3/11/96, meeting with Cramer. At this point,
Ito diye to Gargoyles Restaurant. During the
Cramer directedi
course of this meet, I
jan associate of Cramer’s, be]4eved
that he spotted survei.u.ance and told his other associate,I
I
The deal then went from a kilo to only an. ounce of cocaine.
During
the negotiations, Cramer told SA Reed, “I could rip you off very
easily”.
BA Reed declined the offer to buy less than a kilo and
the de1 trinated. On the way back to the assembly poit Crmer
calledi
land offered to sell half a kilo of cocaine. I
Iwas
instructed by BA Reed to say no, that BA Reed had to catch his
train, and he would get back with him. At the assembly point,
instructed t9 call Cramer in order to keep him jnrøcta
in future deals. WbenL
contacted Cramer on the phone,l
turned the phone over to SA need. Cramer advised BA Reed that he
had a kilo to sell and that he was at the train station.
Cramer
asked where BA Reed andi
kere located. SA Reed turned the
phone over tol
Iqho said they would meet at the train station’s
‘n
McDonalds; however, no meet was attempted.
Although not recorded, on 3/17/96,1
Itelephonically
contacted Cramer and told him that the reason they had not met at
McDonalds was because “Chuck” was nervous. I
Ifurther advised
Cramer that he had to drive “Chuck” all the way home to Virginia.
During the days of 3/18—19/96, a series of meetings were
held at the LRA to determine how to proceed with the case.
SSRA
Jdecided that additional information was needed regarding
I
s cocaine sources. A decision was made to hold a lunch
1
Cramer
meeting with Cramer. The purpose of this meeting was to gather
intelligence prior to making a decision whether to proceed with the
5

Savage-1524

 ________I.

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96

Philadelphia Division
case or refer it to another agency.

The plan included the fact

that Cramer would be instructed not to carry a gun to any future

meetings. Additionally, a decision was made that SA Reed would
attend the meeting with I
un an attempt to
’p a direct
1
relationhio_wilh Cramer and subsequently ease I
lout of the
picture..l
Jwas instructed to set a lunch meeting with Cramer
on Friday, 3/22/96, at noon.
On 3/22/96, SAsI
bet with
I Reed andl
to review the purpose of the meeting. A transmitter was
plced or SA Reed ancd
I The same briefcase that had been used
byl
Ion 3/11/96, and again by SA Reed on 3/15/96, was given to
SA Reed with a NAGRA tape recorder concealed inside.
A decision
was made to hold the meeting in a quiet spot instead of having
lunch, to ensure a good recording.
For this same reason, a
decision was made that SA Reed would sit in the back seat with the
briefcase sitting on the drive shaft hump.
The parking lot of the
Comfort Inn was chosen as the meeting place. At this point.I
I
and SA Reed ]ft in I
Icar to pick up Cramer with SASI
andi________ following.

I

Upon their arrival at 2nd and Vine Streets in
Philadelphia to pick up Cramer, SA Reed moved to the rear right
passenger seat and Cramer sat in the front passenger seat.
iroceede to the oredeØgnated Comfort Inn parking lot.
SAc
landi
I
Jfollowed them and parked behind the hotel
out of eye sight while attempting to monitor the conversations
taking place ml
Icar.

I

Cramer asked about the purpose of the meeting. When
lattempted to answer, Cramer cut him off and said to SA Reed,
“maybe you ought to speak for yourself this time”. SA Reed
responded that they were surprised when he (Cramer) showed up at
the train station at the last meet.
Cramer then asked a series of
questions regarding SA Reed’s cover story. SA Reed admitted to
Cramer that he did not have a Virginia driver’s license; however,
he had one from Pennsylvania. At that point, Cramer revealed his
reason for suspicion by stating tat during the ?/15/96, meeting,
“the first thing that happened iI
frickname) and I was
supposed to meet and then all of the sudden somebody who Vve never
met before (SA Reed) is now in the back of the car. And you’re
telling me you have to go to Virginia. You don’t have a Virginia
license and you’re not on the train to get to Virginia. Doesn’t
sound to me like you’re going to Vrginia”.
SA Reed countered
with, “But you have to trusti
I Cramer replied, “I don
t have
1

•

-

6

Savage-1525

I

 ___hooked

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96
Philadelphia Division
any reason to.. . at this point.
I haven’t seen him with any
product.
I’ve never seen him with any money”.
Cramer then asked
to “frisk” SA Reed to see if he was wearing a “wire”. This
conversation took place in the first part of the meeting, and then
the talk turned to drugs.
The conversation included talk about a
future deal and at that point Cramer asked to go somewhere in order
to check each other for “wires”. Cramer asked SA Reed if he had
ever been arrested and SA Reed replied no.
Cramer seemed surprised
that SA Reed had not been involved as a subject in the case in
whichi
Iwas arrested. Cramer asked who owned the briefcase and
that it belonged to SA Reed.
Cramer, apparently
recognizing the case from the 3/15/96, meeting said t
9 SA Reed,
“And there is not money in it this time?” Both I
land Reed
responded “no”.
Cramer responded with, “so why are you bringing a
case? I mean it, it strikes me as a little bit...” Cramer then
asked SA Reed to open the case and SA Reed replied that he would.
Shortly thereafter, while apparently opening the case,. SA Reed
announced his intention to arrest Cramer.

tol

Istateinent,

According
he heard SA Reed opening
the briefcase and then heard SA Reed say to Cramer that he was
under arrest. F
1 “pop, pop, pop”, at which time be
!hrd
exited the vehicle.
inside the vehicle and observed
Cramer slumped in the front seat bleeding and SA Reed slumped in
the back seat.
SA I
iheard, over SA Reed’s transmitter, SA Reed’s
arrest announcement but touaht t1at SReed was jcking until he
heard the gun shots. SAs I
I andi
I responded to the
scene where they sawl
Iwalking towards the rear of his car.
“they shot each other”. SA Reed and Cramer were
rushed to hospitals where they were pronounced dead.
The reason for SA Reed attempting the arrest of Cramer
is
unknown. A holster was recovered from Cramer’s waist and it
is
possible that Cramer reached for his weapon, a .40 caliber
Glock
Model 27 pistol with his right hand which was Cramer’s domin
ant
hand. The front seat would have obscured SA Reed’s vision
of this
movement by Cramer. The recording revealed that SA Reed was
heard
shouting, “Hold itL Hold itI
Get your hand up!” Based on the
recorded commands of SA Reed, it is apparent that Cramer was
not
compliant and SA Reed warned Cramer one last time before the
gun
battle.
The gun fight lasted approximately three seconds with
7

Savage- 1526

0

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96
Philadelphia Division
SA Reed firing all five rounds from his .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson Model 60 revolver, and Cramer firing three of the ten rounds
in his pistol. BA Reed’s clip-on holster was located on the floor
of the vehicle behind the driver’s seat.
It is unknown where SA
Reed was carrying his weapon and who fired first.
Cramer was struck by four bullets in the following areas:
top of the left shoulder, the upper left arm, and two bullets in
the head.
SA Reed was struck by three bullets, one entering the
left thigh, exiting the thigh and entering his abdomen, one
entering the left side of the abdomen lodging in the spine, and one
entering the left side of the abdomen passing through the heart.
Both weapons were found, side by side, on the passenger side rear
floor.
0bervations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recoituaen1ations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.

The SIRG concluded that SA Reed made the ultimate
sacrifice while using deadly force in accordance with current
policy and procedures. His application of deadly force was done so
in a heroic fashion and resulted in the death of his adversary.
None of the recommendations or observations which follow in this
memorandum are meant in anyway to degrade the memory of SA Reed who
gave his life upholding his sworn oath as an SA of the FBI. His
actions that fateful day were recognized by all members of the SIRG
to have upheld the highest traditions of the FBI and his demise
saddens each of the SIRG members.
From an operational standpoint, the SIRG noted that this.
incident culminated following numerous telephone calls and plans
discussed with Agents, supervisors, ASAC Tolbert and SAC Reutter.
Issues and observations in this regard were determined to best be
addressed as training/safety issues.
The SIRG recognized that “hindsight is 20/20”. Following
such incidents, it is the duty of the SIRG to review the facts as
presented and provide the Director with recommendations concerning
8

Savage-1527

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Xnquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/9 6
Philadelphia Division
training and/or safety issues.
After individually reviewing the
voluminous report and thereafter discussing it in some detail, the
SIRG noted that certain “danger signals” were emitted prior to this
tragic event. While each of these danger signals may not have been
significant individually, the cumulative effect of them y have
indicated that chances of the successful culmination of a drug
purchase could have been somewhat diminished.
Specific danger signals noted by the SIRG in the report
included the following:
(1)

(2)

There are numerous references to the subject being
armed, including his own statement indicating his
willingness to shoot if confronted.

I

bcnew and SA Reed suspected that Cramer was

Cramer was aknown. heavy drug user, who was
described byl
las financially desperate, jumpy,
nervous and suspicious.

(3)

(4,)

armed.

[

dmitted that he never saw the subject sell
anything and did not trust him.

(5)

Cramer stated that he could easily “rip of f” the
UCA.

(6)

Cramer was very aggressive questioning SA Reed about
his cover story.

(7)

Cramer toldi
Ithat he was nervous about the
sudden appearance of someone he had never met.

(8)

Cramer specifically questioned I
knd the tJCA
about the briefcase containing the recording device.

The historical knowledge of Cramer as known by the
Philadelphia Division, coupled with Cramer’s own statements, is
indicative of a subject whose motives and actions should be
considered carefully.
The SIRG noted that SA Reed had not been certified as a
UCA, nor was he required to be in this instance.
The SIRG noted
that SA Reed was an experienced Agent, however, his ability to
9

Savage-1528

-

I ID

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson,
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96
Philadelphia Division
function in a
What is known
avail himself
strategies to

III, to Mr. Gore

role which he had no specialized training is unknown.
is that he had apparently not had the opportunity to
of UCA training which offers valuable lessons and
counter potential critical incidents.

The SIRG further observed that SA Reed did not possess
false identification that could have allayed some of the suspicions
of Cramer, nor did he possess indications of his train travel.
Lastly, it was noted that a prearranged code word for imminent
danger was not agreed upon by the participants prior to the meeting
of 3/22/96.
Based on the above observations, the SIRG concluded and
recommended that the administrative report prepared in this matter,
including the transcripts of tlie recordings made, be carefully
reviewed by the USOtJ, CID, and the USU, CIR, for its training
value.
Following a review of this matter, it is recommended that
any “lessons learned” be disseminated to all undercover
coordinators and thereafter incorporated in the training curriculum
of UCAs, as well as new SSAs.
The SXRG unanimously agreed that if
this recommendation is approved, the USOU and the UStJ should
present the findings bearing in mind the sensitivity of this
matter.
The SIRG concluded that no FBI employees’ actions were
the direct cause or could be construed to have been a causal factor
in the tragic death of SA Charles L. Reed.
The SIRG also noted
that the Coroner’s toxicology report of Cramer found him to have
been under the influence of opiates at the time of his death which
could. have influenced his behavior beyond the possible control of
SA Reed.

The last issue discussed by the group resulting in a
recommendation of the SIRG pertained to the equipment currently
available for use in these types of situations. The Hartman
briefcase, used to conceal the NAGRA recorder, is a distinctive
looking brown cloth briefcase which had been used in the
Philadelphia Division for at least 15 years.
The velcro strip
designed to hold the lid in place covering the concealed
compartment was no longer functioning.
An inch wide trip of
silver duct tape was used to hold the concealed compartment closed.
Cramer requested that SA Reed show him the inside of the brief case
which eventually led to the arrest attempt and the fatal gun
2.0

Savage- 1529

 _______

Memorandum from W. i). Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/22/96
Philadelphia Division

battle. Members unanimously agreed that the brief case should have
been in a condition to be shown.
This discussion resulted in the
recommendation that the IRD conduct a fieldwide survey to determine
the serviceability of concealed recording devices currently in use.
The IRD should review the results of this survey and thereafter
take any action necessary to ensure that UCAs are equipped with the
best available recording equipment.

*11

Savage-1530

-.

 I

‘4.

*

Mr. Gore

I

9/17/96

I
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/2/96
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
Reference report of Assistant Inspector-in-Place (All?)
dated 7/12/96.

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1)
That the Director be advised of the
findings of the SIRG relating to this shooting incident, and of
the confusion that currently exists in interpretation and
practical application of the new deadly force policy.

66-1917_1
1 - Mr.j
IRoqm 7142
1
Mr. Gores Room 7129 (Enclosure)
2
Mr. I
I Room 7116
(1- Mr.I
]5129)
2
Mn
Room 6012
(1 - Mr. ‘rnn Room 6646)
(]. - Mn
Room 6050)
3 - Mr.
I, ±oom 7427
(1 - Mr.
IRoom 7159)
(1
MrJ
I Room 7326)
1 - MrI
‘Toom 7825
1 - Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1 - Mr.L
‘“
1 - Ms.
1D0J
-

-

1
1
1

-

-

MrL

Quantico
WMFO
Room 7837

Mrj
Mn

-

-

.

DRK:lrr (16)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Savage-1531

 4

Memorandum from I
e: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

I to Mr. Gore
10

That the OGC review the deadly force policy and the
(2)
accompanying text and scenarios to determine if there are any
circumstances when the policy would permit: the use of deadly force
against a subject fleeing for cover in cases where there is no
contemporaneous evidence of a weapon and where the subject is not
fleeing fromthe vicinity of a violent confrontation.

(3)
That the 0CC create commentary or a scenario as
guidance to Special Agents (S1.s) in applying the parameters of the
imminent danger” standard in cases where previously armed and
dangerous individuals are encountered but no on-the-scene sighting
of a weapon occurs. Guidance should also be provided in
articulating the types of on-the-scene evidence that would support
a finding of “imminent danger.”

C

1h7 C

(4)
That the Administrative Summary Unit (ASU),
jvision (PD), forward a. letter of censure to SAl
his violation of the deadly force policy aña ais
failure to be appropriately armed.
Pn1

2

Savage-1532

I

 Memorandum from I

Re:

Ito Mr. Gore

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

(5)
That the SAC, Indianapolis, be instructed to have
the Chief Division Counsel provide SA I
I refresher training
regarding the FBI deadly force policy.

DETAILS: On 8/20/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting incident. The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance: Chaixman, Chief Inspectorl
I Office
of Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I Deputy Section
Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ;I
lActing Deputy Chief, Criminal Section,
Civil ights Division, tISDOJ; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division; Patrick
J. Foran, Section Chief, Pernnel Adniinistratiqn and Benefit
Section, Personnel Division;I
I Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Training Section, Office
of the General Counsel; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division; J. C. Carter, Section Chief, Personnel
Management Section, Personnel Division; I
I Unit
Chief, Budget Unit, Operatiopal Sunoort Section, Criminal
Investigative Division; and,f
I Supervisor, WMFO. Non
voting attendees were:__William D. Gore, Assistant Director,
Inspection Division; I
I Tnrqtor, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division;I
I Immigration and
International Investigations, U. S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service; andi
I Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, Inspection Division.
-

-

Syntsis of the Shooting Incident

On 6/28/96, the Indianapolis Division Special Agent in
Charge (SAC) Wayne R. Alford convened a meeting of all personnel
who had been involved in responding to the recovery of a Ford
Taurus automobile in a lake near Terre Haute, Indiana, on the
evening of 6/27/96. As a result of an inventory search conducted

of the recovered vehicle, a determination was made that the vehicle
had been rented by David James Graham Nichols, a Major in the
British Armed Forces, who had been in the U.S. for two training
sessions in New Mexico and Texas. It also appeared from items

Savage-1533

 nwere
_Fnad

_

Memorandum frot4
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

Ito Mr. Gore

recovered from the vehicle, that Nichols had probably been
kidnapped arid possibly murdered, and that his attackers had taken
his vehicle.
Based on items found in the recovered vehicle, as
well as a subsequent vehicle, it was believed that one or both of
the subjects responsible for Nichols’ abduction and possible murder
were escapees of an Alabama State Prison.
During this meeting, SAC Alford, Assistant Special Agent
in Charge (ASAC) Floyd W. Ratlif. Jr.. Suoerviory Special Agent
(SSA),
I and SAl
I orovided
additional detailq concerning subjects I
land
I They had escaped by overpowering an Alabama
Deputy Sheriff who was transoorting both individuals from the jail
to the courthouse. ss
kdvised that the subjects had
overpowered the Deputy, taken two nine millimeter semi-automatic
weapons, the Deputy’s 12 gauge_shotgun, as well as the Deputy’s
uniform and police vehicle. I
I andl
Ithen commandeered
a truck by stopping it with the police vehicle and uniform, and
apparently drove the truck to New Mexico. Inf
rinationas provided
9
during the briefing that apparently[
Ihad
landi
encountered Nichols somewhere in New Mexico and had somehow
obtained his passport, British currency, clothing, suitcase, and
other personal effects.
-

During the weekend of 6/29-6/30/96, additional
ijhjects was developed by ssI
land
Iwas told by an Alabama County Sheriff that
been incarcerated on murder charges relating to his
execution-style murder of an informant. Furtr infoWtion
provided to Ssii
I involved the fact that I
Ihad told
other inmates that he would escape from custody, vowed not to be
taken alive, and that he would shoot it out with police, if
necessary.

inormation about Ih
i SSAI
SN

This information was provided to all SA8 and detectives
assigned to this matter in a 7/1/96, briefing in the Indianapolis
Division.
The information was also provided to those who were not
orssen at the briefing but assisted in the pursuit an4 arrest of
7/2/96.
In addit±on to these briefings, SSAI
lalso
provided on-scene briefings on 7/2/96.
Information had been developed indicating thati
still likely in the Terre Haute area and were
possibly hiding in a salvage yard located near Farmersburg,
Indiana.
On. the morning of 7/2/96, SASI
landL
l
I acting in an undercover capacity, went into the

Savage-1534

land

I

 __Iconducted

_

Memorandum from I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/96
Indianapolis Division

Ito

Mr. Gore

salvage yard and 9bserrr -t.z individuals who they believed were
subjeatsi
landi
I Eventually the two individuals
engaged in a conversation with the SA8 ciit lvage auto parts.
Based on this meeting, SAd
land I
I made a probable
identification of both subjects.
ubsauçnt review of updated
photographs of the subjects by SAJ
landi
Idtened rb
that these individuals were in fact the subjects. SSAI______ who
was enroute to the Terre Haute Reident Agency, was also notified
of the identification of I
I Additionally, the
lantI
Special Weapons and Tactic (SWAT)_Team was activated for deployment
to the Terre Haute area. SSAI
I provided all intelligence data
to law enforcement officers assembled to participate in the search
and arrest of both. subjects.

I

A plan was being devised to establish a secure perimeter
around the salvage yard and trailer, and to have the SWAT Team make
an assault on the area in order to locate arid apprehend both
subjects. This plan was eliminated at approximately ic n.m.
an aeriat surveit].ance, when Bureau pilot SAl__________
I another white male and a white female
I observedi
enerina
pickup truck and leaving the salvage yard/trailer area.
SAl
lradioed this information to all units. In response to
the information provided by SAl
Iinstructed three
I SSAI
units to begin moving closer into the area where the vehicle was
heading. Within minutes, three FBI vehicles were following the
truck and a State Police unmarked vehicle was approaching the truck
from the opposite direction. The State Police vehicle attempted to
stop the suspect vehicle, however, the drver o the truk went
arounri te police car.
Subsequently, SSAI
I and SA I
I
a felony vehicle stop with lights andsiren
activated.
Shortly thereafter, the driver of the truck pulled the
truck to the side of the gravel road and as the truck was coming to
a stop, the passenger jumped from the truck and. began running
toward a heav
1v wooed area. The passenger was immediately
1
identified asi
land was ordered to halt.
As the halt order was given, a Marion County Sheriff’s
Office Corporal fired one round from his service we
Shortly thereafter, SAl
Ifired two ro
as e
ran from the truck to the cover of the woods.
as not hit
by the gunfire and eluded capture for approximately_one hour.
It
should be noted that the weapon fired by S[
I was the
personally owned weapon of SSAI
I In the rush of getting to
th Terre Hute Resident Agency and the State Police staging area,
SAl_________ had left his weapon on his desk in the Indianapolis
Division office space.
S

Savage- 1535

  

 

 

FBI 
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

1995

 

 

_____
_______
____

Mr.

Gore

4/3/96

W. 0. Thompson, III
ADNINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDEW1
11/1795
DALLAS DIVISION
Reference report of Special Agent (SA)
dated 12/14/95.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Inciden
t Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shootin
g.
PE(rr.

‘
a
1
t no administrative action be taken against
a result of his involvement in this
shdotng inciaenc.

66—19157—1 2
1
j Room 7142
1
Mr. sore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
1
Mr.l
Room 7116
4
Mr.I
Room 6012
(1
Mr.
Room 6050)
(1
Mr.
jRoom 4997)
(1
Mr.
Room 6646)
1
Mr.
FRooiu 7129
3 —
IRri 7427
(1
Mr4
IRoom 7159)
(1
Mr.J
I Room 7326)
1
Mr.
Room 7825
1-Ms.______ DOJ
1
Mr4
t Room 4042
Pic.hl
1
OJ
1
Mn
I Quantico
IjRR: lrf(2u.)

Mr.l

—

—

—

1
1
1
1

—
—
-

—

Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mrs.

boom 3849
$ Room 3787F
WMFO
Room 7837

—

,

—
—

—

7

—

—

—

—
—

—

(CONTINUED

-

OVER)

 Memorandim from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Athinistratiye Inquiry
Shooting Incident
11/1/95
Dallas Division
DETAILS:
On 2/13/96, the SIRG met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting incident.
The following voting members of the SIRG were
in attendance:
Chairman Wiley D. Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant
Director, Inspection Division; Chief Inspector David
R. Knowlton,
Office of Inspections, Inspection Divisio
n; I
I
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDcIT; Dana 0. Biehi,
Deputy
Section Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section,
Criminal
Division, USDOJ; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr.., Section Chief
1 Global
Section
NS—2, National Security Division;F
lUnit
Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;
I
I
I
lUnit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and
Traininci Section. Office of the General Counsel;
I
i Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; and, I
I
St1, WMFO.
Non—voting attendees consisted of I
I
j Inspection Analyst, Office of Inspections, and]
I
I Writer—Editor, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division.
—

-

I

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On 11/1/95, SAl
laccidentally struck a deer
with his Bureau vehicle. SAl
I was returning from Tyler,
Texas, while on official business. While heading south
bound on a
farm road, tyo deerran from the woods in front of SAl
I
vehicle.
tias. unable to stop before one deer was struck
SAl
in the hind legs, causing damage to his vehicle. SAl
Inoted
that the deer’s hind legs were both broken; however, the
deer was
struggling to run.

I

Noting that the deer was in pain and due to the risk that
the deer could struggle_onto the road and jeopard
ize the safety of
other drivers, SA
hotified the Nacogdoches County Sheriff’s
Office (NCSo) to dispatch a Texas Department of Public
Safety (DI’S)
Trooper, and requested that a Texas game warden be contac
ted for
authorization to shoot the injured deer. Radio author
ization
from
ih wr
o was received by SAl
9
Ito shoot the injured deer. SA
Ifired two shots from his Bureau authorized Sig Sauer P220
into tue deer’s head.
The deer carcass was collected by the NCSO
and an accident report was prepared by a DI’S Trooper.

2

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
11/ 1/95
Dallas Division
bservations and Recommendations of the S1111
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2),
provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
Members of the SIRG noted that. SAl
Roo]c all of the
necessary steps to resolve this incident. The SIRG unanimously
agreed that SA F
I should be commended for his thorough actions,
alertness, appropriate handling and resolution of this incident.

3

 ______was

.

FD-2CJ4 (Rev. 3-3.59)

.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Iiureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Reponof:
Date:

SAl

Pie!dOfflccFi1#:

66-HQ-19157

Tit’e:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION
AUGUST 18, 1995

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

ynopns:

On May 2, 1995, a local warrant was obtained by the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections oni
scape,
It was determined prior to May 2, 1995,
in
violation of his release conditions concenung an 18 year
sentence
for drug violations.
The U.S.
Marshal’s
Metropolitan Task Force (Task Force>, a formal task force
composed of various members of both the local and Federal
law enforcement communities, was attempting to locate and
arrestj
Jbased on the outstanding warrant.
Since its
inception, the Task Force has successfully effected over
2,000 fugitive arrests.

September 11, 1995
gjfl

I

35

Office:

OKLIOMA CITY

BurcauFile#:

ç
1
]K

On August 17, 1995, based upon source information provided

by Special Agent çSA)I
I members of the Task
Force and S4
Ifou1ated an arrest plan to arrestj
I
with the aig

or Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD)
marked Patrol Units.
During the early morning hours on
August 18,
1995, OCPD marked Patrol Units driven by
uniformed officers attempted a traffic stop pursuanto the
formulated arrest plan on the vehicle driven byl
I
Irefused to stop and the OCPD units with sirens and
I
lights in operation remained in pursuit of I
Ithrough a
residential area. Shortly thereafteri
Jin attempting
to turn the corner at Southwest 36th and Goff hit an
B.-’

fliia document contains neither reco

endatiooa nor conc]uBions o the FBI.

It is the pxoperty of the FBI and is loaned to

your agency; it and its contents are not to
be diattibuted outside your egency.

 .
66-HQ.-l9157 Sub 35

I

Unoccupied pickup truck parked in the drivew
ay of 344].
Southwest 36th.I
pxited the vehicle and fled on foot
into the residential area. I
Iran along the chair link
fence at the residern r,f 41 .ihwt Eth where
SAl
and IDenqty Sheriff
a passenger in SA
I
I
Ivehicle, observed a weapon in his I
hand as he jumped the fence into the backyrd I right
of the
residence.
In pursuit in an attem t to reventi
prom
entering an occupied residenc
drove his vehicle
through_the ence an4 observed
ire is weapon towards
SA I
landi
I (See s
em 5 representing a .40
caliber spent casing.)
S
wearing his ballistic
garment and raid jacket, exited his vehicle and lerte
d all
pursuing law enforcement personnel to
armed and
I
dangerous status by yellin
Ihad a gun.I
had then
jumped another fence headin towards the front yard of
an
occupIed residence.
SA
with his 9mm Sig Sauer,
returned fjr wth
ots at
I who was in full
view of SAl______ a
as going around the corner of
the house.
(see sketc i ems 7 8, nd 9 reuresentina sunt
casings from the 9mm.) OCPD Off icerl
Ias
in the front yard and al
Jrounded the corner of the
hoiit aMna
ftiper
Iobservecf
ppearing to crouch
to the grounci. Ottice4
heard someçne_veil
‘gun” from the backyard or tne resiance and asi
Jwas
crouching to the ground
fired two shots from
his 9mm Glock ati
J believing was attempting to
shoot ati
Ifrom the croucted position.
(See
sketch items 2 and 3 represeptincx pent casings from the
9mm.)
It was then determinedi
had been hit by gunfire
and an ambulance was called to tne scene wherel
Ivas
subsequently transported to Southwest Medical Center for
treatment. In addition to pwc OCP1 marked Patrol Units and
SM
nd Deputy Sheriffi_______ there were six other law
enforcement off ices of he TaSJ ‘crce that were involv
ed
in the pursuit of I
un order to affect arrest. All
witness
accounts
concerning the
attempted stop
and
subsequent pursuit and shooting incident are consistent.

I

Oklahoma City Police Department established a crime scene
perimeter to include the entire yard area of 3441 Southwest
36th.
Both Special Agent in Charge BOB A. RICKS and
Assistant Special Agent in Charge JAMES SOONER were promptly
on the scene.
A crime scene investigation was conducted jointly by the
OCPD and the FBI Evidence Response Team (ERT) with
SAl

B—2

I

 ______Iwas

___________

_____

.
66—FIQ-19157 Sub 35

I

I

the lead Agent of the ERT.

During the crime

scene investigation, one spent cartridge from a .40 caliber
jound was recovered in the area where SA I
Jobs erved
)f ire his weapon, (See sketch item 5.)
I
Three spent

I

cavtrdges of 9mm rounds were found in the area where
SA
If ired his weapon (See sketch items 7, 8, and 9.) and

two spent cartridges of 9mm rOunds were found in the area
h6
where OCPD Officer
I fired his weapon, (See
7(1
sketch items 2 and •) A .40 caliber
Ruger semi-automatic
pistol was also recovered in the area where subjecti
I
fell after being shot.
(See sketch item 1G.)
The .40
caliber Ruger was found with live rounds jamming the slide
action portion of the handgun.
(See photo of sketch item
16.)
One spent 9mm round we
oirnd in a trash can at the
corner of the residence wher
shot.
SA
went to Southwest Medical Center and
retrieve
clothing and another projectile beleved
to be a 9mm.
determined from Doctorl
I the
attending physician in he emergency room,L
ustained
an entry and exit wound to the left forearm, an entry wound
to the left side of the rib cage and an entry wound in the

right buttocks.

I

I

Per letter, dated September 15. 1995,
District Attorney, Oklahoma County, completed his review of
this incident and found sAl
lactions proper and
justifiable. I
Ihas declined any prosecution of SAj
and Off icel____________
this matter.

The fence of the residence at 3443. Southwest 36th was a four
foot chain link fence approximately 12 years old in average
to poor condition.__The opening created in the fence section
downed by SN
Ivehicle sustained minimal damage. The
wincr t in the backyard was bent due to being hit
by SA
Investigation revealed no pets were harmed
during the pursuit, contrary to what was initially reported
by the traffic report.
It should be noted, APO case is pending against
1
it is anticipated that he will also be charged
possession of a handgun by a felon.
-

C-

land
with

I

IC

 _____I,

t

Mr. Gore

11/9/95

W. 1). Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
8/3/95
BUFFALO DIVISION
Reference r port of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
SAl
incident.

That no adverse action be talcen against
s a result of his involvement in this shooting

bc

—

1
2.

4

IRoom 7142
Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
1
Mr.
I Room 7116
Mn
Rdom 6012
1
Mr.

— Mr.
—
—

,

(1
(1
(1

1
3
1
1
1
1
1

—
—

—
—

Mr.
Mr.

Room 6050)
Room 4997)
Mr..
oom 6645)
Mr.I
,
Rooiu 7129
Mr.[
Inr 7427
(1 — Mr.
room 7427)
(]. — Mr.
Room 7326)
Mr. Knowlton., Room 7825
Ms. Dobinsici, DOJ
Mr. I
I Room 4042
Mr. Biehi, DOJ
Mr.
Quantico
—

—

2. — Ms
1
Mr
1-Mr
1 — Mrs.
-

froom 3849
,
Room 3787F
WM’O
Room 7837

,

—

LRR:lrr (20)

(CONTINUED

-

OVER)

 ________fretnajned

r

______________

y

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/3/95
Buffalo Division
PETAII:
On 9/29/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
Chief Inspector David R. Knowlton, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division.; Karla Dobinski, Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ; Edward R. Leary, Sectiqn
Management Section, Personnel Division; I
Unit
Chief, Global SectiOn
N5—2, National security Lfl.vision; Van A.
flarp, Section Chief, Personnel Administration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division; Dana D. Biehi, Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USD03; I
I
Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;i________
JU1it Chief flea
Care Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative
I
ulvision;
Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Le al ci
raining ection, Office of the General Counsel;
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
na ysis Section. Laboratory Divisioni
I SUpeiSOt,
NFO; andi__________________ Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, met to discuss the above-captioned shooting incident.
—

-

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

and
of Buffalo.

early afternoon on 8/3/95, SAs

Iwre on juty in a Bureau qar o the east side
Since SAl
Iwas a new SA, SAl
[lad taken him to

this area in order to familiarize him with the section of Buffalo
in which most of the Division’s Violent Crimes Career Criminal Task
Force’s gang related investigations take place. While in the
vicinity of Gitteret Street and Sycamore Avenue, the SAs overheard a
partial Buffalo Police Department (BPD) radio call which indicated
that officers had “him” trapped in the yards on Gittere_Street.
When this radio transmission was heard by the SAs, SA
IbeJ.ieved
that the BPO officers had a criminal suspect trapped in a yard.
Knowing that BPD ordinarily c4v ha two or three cars patrolling a
precinct at any given time, SAl__1cIecided to respond to the area
in order to render assistance to the BPD, if needed.

I

The SAs learned from BPD officers on the scene that the
subject of the radio call was not a person. The officers advised
that the subject was an adult Rottweiler dog that had bitten a
child an4 w -r the alley acting in an aggressive manner. SAs Jt
land
at the scene of the incident while an
attempt was made to capture the dog.
Unsuccessful attempts to capture the dog resulted in the
Buffalo Dog Control Officers deciding to destroy it.
Officers
fired approximately four shots, and at least one and maybe more,
2

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/3/95
Buffalo Division
struck the dog; however, the dog was not subdued and escaped from
the alley.
The dog rn and evnt-u?i11y ended up in an alley on
Sycamore Avenue.
SAs I
land
I followed the BPD officers to
this location in order to lend any necessary assistance.
As they arrived at the scene, the SAs exited the Bureau
vehicle and took a position at the rear of the vehicle
approximately 12 to 15 feet from a BPD precinct car in the alley.
Raised voices could be heard from within the alley; however,
neither SA was In a position to observe the ongoing activity in the
alley.
SAl
Ialso heard the sound of at least one gun shot from
the alley.
Both. SAs heard someOne shout a warning imiediate1y
before they observed the dog charge from the alley.
A large crowd of seotatprs had assembled on the north
side of the street behind SAJ
I As the dog exited the alley it
headed directly for sAj
land as the dog came within two to 10
feet of him, SAl
Ifired a series of six shots at the dog. The
last shot is bçlieved to have struck the dog in the head as it was
approaching SAl
I
Su)sequent to the shooting, SAl
loverhead an
individual talking with BPD officers claiming ownerhip of the! dog.
The individual claiming to own the dog was familiar to SAl
las
he was a suspect in a recent shotgun shooting incident in the area.
As BPD officers explained to the indi.vidua1 that he needed to
discuss the matter at the precinct house, he immediately disavowed
ownership of the dog.
The dog was removed from the scene by dog
control officers.
Observations and Recoaendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to Cl) evaluate the application àf deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for6
administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG unanimously concurred that SAl
I
decision to employ deadly force in this incident was proper and in
accordance with FBI policy. Additionally, members çacoimtjended that
no administrative action should be taken against SAl
las a
result of his involvement in this shooting incident.
3

 ______

)2O4 (Rev. 3-3-S9)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jeffersontown Police Department
Jeffersontown, Kentucky

Cyt

poztof:

October 5, 1995
FicIdOfflcPUo#:
ureauPileI;

I

Offl

CJIS Division

66F—LS—63736 (Pending)
66F—LS—63736 (Pending)
SHOOTING INQUIRY
REPORT OF SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995

Charactct

INISTRATIVE MATTER

On 9/20/95, ROGER A. FEIN, an FBI fugitive, was
involved in a shoot-out with FBI Special Agents (SAG) from the
IJeffersontown
Louisville Division and Police Officerl
Police Department, Jeffersontown, Kentucky. Police Officer I
was critically wounded and remains hospitalized in seripu
wP.Tw
land
conditn
‘-eased. FEIN was shot by Off icerl
FBI SAj
I The preliminary findings of the Coroner,
which the Coroner released to the media, indicate that FEIN died
as a result of a self—inflicted gun-shot wound to the head,
through the ear. Nonetheless, the bullet wounds delivered by
Iwere probably mortal. The official
Officer
I and SN
medical/autonsv rports are not completed. T1e_medical reports
]will be
for Officer
are not completed. Off icerl
interviewed when health conditions permit.

Synopais:

I

On 9/16/95, the television series merica’s Most
Wanted’ aired a show featuring FBI fugitive FEIN. The following
Monday, 9/18/95, a Cooperating Witness (CW) who’s idntitv_is
I
known to the FBI, contacted the FBI and spoke to SAl
lof the Leincrtn Rident Agency (LRA), FBI Louisville
Linterviewed the OW and showed
Division (TJD).
SAl
I1TiSed
photographs of FEIN to the CW. On 9/19/95. SAl
I
Supervisory Senior Resident Agent (SSRA)F
Iknew
SSRA1
CW.•
the
by
FBI LD, of the information provided
of FEIN based upon revious FBI investigation of FEIN in the I4A
onduoted a éhénsive review of the
territory.
SSRA
cted the area believed to be
information and p ysic
ssigned an SA to discreetly
FEIN’s residence.
SSRA

This ctrnt cOnten$ neither recoetnendatioris nor conctusions of the FBX. It La the property of the FBI arri La loaned to
your agency; it ar its contents are net to be distribeted outside your agency.

I

 ___

.
survéil the area and telepho
nically advised Assistant Special
Agent in charge (ASAC) THQMAS W.
MIlLER of the information
provided by the ew.
SSRAI
Irn-mT14-jd a plan to positively
identify and appre1enci FEIN.
sSRAI
Ireguested authority to
utilize an FBI aircraft in the
surveil
lance
of FEIN and ASAC
MILI,ER authorized the
aircraft’s
1,ER offered
1
assistance for the surveillance, use. ASAC N11
but sSR2J
Idecljned the
offer since eight (8) Agents
to conduct the surveillance. ware already available and assigned
SSRAI
Iconducted a conference on 9/19/95 with
the
Agents participating j the
the CW returned to the IA surveillance of FEIN. Additionally,
to
who would conduct the surveil further brief and assist the Agents
lance of FEIN the following mornin
g.

I

On the morning of
a pre—arranged location for /2O/95, the surveillance team met at
final briefings. The teaii was made
upofs5
ISAJ
ISAI
I
I A
IsAl
ISAI
SAl
I, and SAl

I

Based upon SSR1
Iknowledge of the territory and
Visit near FEIN’s residence
the previous day, surveillance points
were identified and assigned.
These locations were confirmed the
morning of 9/20/95.

I

I

i’ed
.ue ience ear.uer
than usual that morning.
SSTAJ
dispatched the surveillance
team to their pre’-determined
surveillance points hoping to
see and surveil FEIN as FEIN
departed his residence.

I

Within a hrt riod of time,
SAl
Ireceived a
land observed a vehicle earlier
uescr1be by the CW as norma
surveill nce of this vehicle lly operated by FEIN. A moving
commenced as instructed by SSRA
The vehicle being surveifled had
tinted windows. The
tinted windows and poor weathe
r conditions prevented any team
member from seeing inside the
cab of the vehicle. A
determination could not be made
if there was a male driving or Ib
more than one person in the
vehicle.
A license plate number
hitch was obtained and a computerpartially blocked by a bumper
check was requested fron the
FBI LD.
This check determined that the
plate did not match the
vehicle.

I

The FBI vehicle driven by SAl
had enhanced radio
capability and
equipped with a ce’lular telephone.
SSRA
I therefore instructed BA I
Ito coordinate the FBI
surveillance with the Kentucky
State Police (KSP).
SAl
I

II

 .
observed an antenna on the vehicle under surveillance,
and_assumed
that FEIN was equipped with a police radio scanner.
SA I
I
coordinated most communications with the KS? using
a celiular
telephone.
At a point in the surveillance it appeared that the
subject was not ivo1ved in the routine activity
described by the
CW.
SSRAI
Itherefore decided to stop the vehicle and
instructed SAl
Ito request a KS? marked car to assist in the
stop of the vehicle.,
The use of a marked KS? vehicle
expected to reduce a potential violent confrontation was
jithFZpI.
The request for such assistance was coordinated
by SAl
J
coordination was frustrated by the fact that tie surveillance The
moved from one KS? Post area to another requiring
renewed
explanations and communications further delaying the
KS?
assistance.
SA I
I a former KSP Trooper c]early informed the
KS? of the situation in prncn
s
9
SAl
kescribed FEIN as
armed and dangerous. SAl
Iclearly indicated the unknown
aspects of the surveillance, on two occasions,
although
effectively coordinating the requests for KS?
assistance,
SAl
Iwas indiscreet in conversation with the KS?. These
indiscretjons had no impact on this incident.
-

After approximately forty-five minutes of attempting
to
coordinate the KS? assistance, the surveillance
moved into
Jeff ersontown, Kentucky, This area is on
the cusp between a
rural area and a more populated city center.
The KS? dispatcher
coordinated communications with the Jeffersontpwn_P9lice
Department who’s officer, Police Officer
I responded to
the FBI_surve11ance team’s request for I
assistance. Police
Officer
Icame upon the surveillance from .the opposite
direction and. made a U—turn to join in the
surveillance. The
surveillance team believed that this obvious
traffic maneuver
tipped FEIN to the surveillance of him.
Police Officer
Ipulled the police car next to
land sI
_Jooving vehicle. Through an open window
Police fficE informed of the situatior. Police
SAl

Oft icerj
ffered assistance and SSRAI
Irdered the
vehicle stopped, The surveillance at the time
was moving slowly
past the Jeffersontown Police Department approaching
an
intersection.
Police Officerf

lattempted to stop

FEIN’s vehicle
with the use of flashing lights and
police siren. FEIN’s vehicle
Continued moving into the intersection of Watterson
Trail and
Talonsviile Road, Jeffersontown, Kentucky. After
passing
through
the intersection, FEIN bolted from the vehicle
he was driving.
This vehicle continued moving
¶he vehicle came to a stop at a
curb apptoximately one hundred feet down the
roadway.

In

 FIN was firing a .9mm pistol while exiting
te
Vehicle
Th
combat position, FEIN fired upon Off iOer
as
Officer
Iwas still seated in the police car. FEIN fired I at
Officer
Ithrough te win4sheild of the police car striking
Officer
I Off iqer
Lras wearing a ballistic protective
vest.
qffie- I
lexited the po1ic y- and returned fire.
Officer I
hit FEN. SAl
I who’s vehicle was
adjacene to OficerI________police
car shouted at FEIN and. then
S sh
t FEIN SA I
9
I proabiy shot twice and strucic FIN twice.
SA I
I shots are believed to have brought FEIN clown
to the
ground.
Officer I
iwas popiticrned at the rear of the police
car, bent over the trunk.
S1
Ipovided immed.ate
assistance arid encouragement to Officer
I
I SSRAI
I
approached FEII and positively identified
FEIN
from
tattoo’s
on
FEIN’s body.
SAl
jcrawled to and cleared the vehicle FEI!
had been driving.
SSIAl
1ccounted for the safety of all
FBI Special Agents and personnel
at the scene. SSRAI
Iook
charge of the scene and coordinated
the crime scene investigation
with the Jeffersontown Police Department
officials on the scene.
SSRA I
I telephonically contacted
FBI LD and advised
ASAC MILLE1 of the shooting incident.
Members of the FBI LD
staff, including ASAC MILLER, responded.
immediately to the scene.

Ishots

the

Details:

Iv

 I
PD—2O4 (Rev. 3-3—S9)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
Fedea1 Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

13

—

Bureau (Attn:

Chief Inspector Knowlton, Rm. 7825)

I

SSA
Oct .u,

oiuJas Vegas

PieIdOffipfl 11: 62A—LV—26865
Drean Pile #:
62A—LV-26865
Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
SA CUI
LEN MICH2EL BUTLER
3
DECEASEI);
REGINA ANN BUTLER
DECEASED;
RUSSElL C. TERESI
DECEASED;
10/1/95, LAS VEGAS DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
-

-

-

Châractei:

SynopsIs: During the course of this investigation,

it was determined that
SA Cullen Michael Butler bad divorced Regina Ann Butler
approximately ten and one—half years ago. Under the conditions
of the divorce, SA Butler was required to pay alimony, child
support for his two infant cthildren, insurance and health
premiums for the children, that Regina Ann Butler would keep
possession of the house until such time that either Regina Ann
• Butler remarried, or when their youngest child graduated from
High School, or turned eighteen years of age. Additionally,
Regina Ann Butler would receive a siqnifiàant portion (estimated
at approximately 31*)of SA Butler’s retirement/pension.
SA Butler had been making plans to retire from the
Bureau in either December, 1993, or January, 1996. During the
two previous weeks prior to this incident, SA Butler had
discussed his retirement with other agents in the Las Vegas
Division who also were planning on retiring. At no time during
these discussions with other agents did SA Butler threaten to do
bodily harm to his ex-wife.
On Sunday, October 1, 1995, SA Butler had been watching
NFL football games on television arid drinking beer. SA Butler
had previous contact with his ex-wife, Regina Ann Butler, during
the week,- and on Saturday, September 30, 1995, concerning making
a change in his pension or financing in the fórm&r family house,
rrently in Regi-na 2xm Butler’s possession. SA ButXr dôtãctéd
Regina Ann Butler and wanted hr to either sell the house so that
he could receive the $27,000.00 owed to him through the sale, or

This deexnent contains neither recownendations nvr conclusions of the FBI. It to tile property of the FBI eid is loed to
yuj. agency; It wd its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 not to receive a significant portion
of his pension when he
retired. Regina Ann Butler was a school teacher
at Clark High
School D.nd Would be receiving her own pension
she retired.
when
Also, Russell C. Teresi bad been living in Regina
Ann Butler’s
house for over eight and one—half years. Regina
Ann Butler and
Teresi had no plans to marry, because if they did,
the house
would have had to have been søld and she would have
lost her
.claim to her ex-husband’s retirement enefits. Regina
Ann Butler
was requested to contact her divorce attorney
to see if a change
• could be made in either the house or pension arrangements
, thus
allowing BA Butler to receive additional funds when he
retired.
BA Butler contacted Regina Ann Butler several
times during the
weekend, trying to obtain an answer.
BA Butler became more upset as the day went on, to the
point that he told his current wife]
fi he would take
care of the matter himself. I
lattempted to calm SA
Butler, but a confrontation ensued and he locked her
in the
backyard of their residence. BA Butler then drove away. I
I
I
I then ca3.led I
Ia Bureau employee, and I
1
husband,I
I to drive her to Regina Ann Butler’s house. BA
Butler was seen by I
‘inside of Regina Ann Butler’s
house, in the entrance way, yelling at Regina Ann and
Russell
Teresi. After short perJod of tie,
I
and I
I exited thd
Ivehicie and walked toward the
house. While they were walking toward the house, BA Butler
drew
his Bureau issued Big P228. several individuals yelled that
he
i6
had a gun.
Within a few seconds of drawing his weapon, BA Butler ib’c
began shooting his ex-wife, Regina Ann Butler and Russell C.
Teresi. Both died at the scene.
BA Butler turned tol
I and indicated that he
was going to the desert -to kill himself. BA Butler left Regina
Ann Butler’s house in his personally ownedvehicle, that
he had
originally driven to the house, Within one hour of the shooting,
BA Butler’s body was found by a security 9ff icer outside
of the
Spanish Hills housing development. BA Butler had driven to the
end of Tropicana Avenue, exited his vehicle and fired ohe
round
from his Bureau issued Sig Saner P228 into his right temple.
The
Bureau weapon was found next to the body.
LVND and Clark County Coroner’s Office investigated
both crime scenes and conducted a complete investigation
in this
matter. Photographs were taken by the LVMPD. Interviews were
Conducted by the I.,VNPD. Copies of all reports have been tuned
over to the Las Vegas Division. Photographs are being retained
in the
Vegas Division in 1A exhibits.
LV.MI’D and Clark County Coroner’s Office have listed
this matter as a double homicide and suicide, Their cases
are
closed reardg this matter.

 _____immediately

FD—204 (Rcv. 3-3.5)

uNrrEr) STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy
Rcpori of:
DaLe:

PicIdOF,IcI
Rureau File N:

SAC WlILIAM C. MEGARY
September 7, 1995

Offlce

WMFO

66F—WF—199822

I

Ch*cteicr:

SA[
SHOOTING INCIDENT.,
WASHINGTON, D.C.;
JUNE 22, 1995;
00: WNFO
Administrative Inquiry

Syuopis:

On 6/22/95, captioned Special Agent currently assigned to
Squad C—16, Washington Metropolitan Field Office (WMFO) was
conducting a routine surveillance in the vicinity of the Bastside
Nightclub located_adjacent to WMFO on Half Street, S.W., Washington,
D.C.
With SAl
Ion surveillance was Metropolitan Police
, D. C. (N?D) Detective I
1
currently assigned to the 0-16 Safe Streets Task Force.
Initial
surveillance was from the arpqe area of WMFc)
At ao
oximateiy,,
9
0300 hours on 6/22/95, SAl
land Detectivel
I (in a Bureau
car) moved their surveillance location to the East side of R Street,
SW., Washington, D.C. facing Half Street, S.W. As the two sat in
the Bureau vehicle observing vehicles leaving the Eastside Club, a
vehicle was observed movIng slowly down Ra1f Street, s.w. When the
vehicle was at Half and “R” Street, S.W.. aDDroximately 2-3 car
lengths from SA I
land Detectivel
I they observed a black
male running along side f this veiicle fi4nc into the passengers
sxde of the vehicle.
SA
Jexited their
and Detectivel
vehicle at which time SA
identified himself and
proceeded down the west side of Malt Street, S.W. in pursuit of the
black male who continued down the east side of Halt Street._$.W.
travelling in a northerly direction. The subject and SAL
I
approached the_dumpster located between “R” and “5” Streets, SW. t
which time SAl
lobserved a gin in the subject’s hand.
SAl_____
again identified himself and discharged his Bureau issued ScT Saueç
P220 .45 caliber semi—automatic pistol ight (8)_times.
SAl
J
proceeded to reload his pistol at which time SAj
bserved that

0

This doctzoent contains neither reco
j the property of the FBI and is Loaned to
j
gf t) FBI.
your aGency; It and its contents are not to be distributed oJtsde your aenty.

 sAl

1

the subject was limping and no longer carrying the weapon.
ordered the captioned subj et to get ini
The subject çOmD lied and
he was subsecruent1, handcuffed by SAl
nd Detective I
I
fired no shots during the incident.

Detectivel__________
I
(1)

I

I—juvenile, was struck by one
round in the left ankle and was transported by D.C. ambulance to
D.C. General Hospital for a non-life threatening injury. Neither SA
r Det. I
Iwere injured during the incident.

During ttle shooting incident the vehicle that was being
shot into byl
Iproceeded northbound on Half Street, S .W.,
Washington, D.C.
As the vehicle crçssed Potomac Avenue, S.W. it
crashed into the wooded area located on the corner of Half Street and
Potomac Avenue, S.W., Washington., DC. The vehicle then proceeded to
catch fire and burn in the wooded area. A black male identified as
Montey Fullard was dead on the scene from multiple gunshot wounds.
The second occupant of the vehicle,I
jwas uninjured.
A Smith & Wesson .357 with a six inch barrel was
recovered adjacent to the dumpster located between R & S Streets
7
S.W.
The weapon contained six spent shell casings.
The subject is described as follows:

I

I

Sex:

Male

Race:

Black

Complexion:

Medium

DOB:
SSAN:

I

Address;
follows:

I
I

IWDC

The decedent (driver) can be further described as
Rane:

Montey Fitzgerald Fullard

Sex:

Male

Race:

Black

Complexion:
DOB:

Medium

3/22/66
2

 SSAN: 579—90—6237

follows:

The passenger of vehicle can be further described as

Name:
Sex:

I

Race:

I

Male
Black

DOB:[___

SSMI:
Address

9

I

3-*

 ___h1ap Ext.
__________I

___________

_

V

I

•1

(O3/31/s)
‘C

FEDERAL BUREIW OF INVES11GA11ON
Precedence:
To:

ROUTINE

Director

Date:
Attn:

06/26/1995

Assistant Director William J.
Esposito, Criminal Investigative
Division
Personal Attention
-

From:

Newark
c-i

Contact:

9270

I

Approved By:

Drafted By:
File Number(s):

Title:

66-HQ-19157
66—4609 SUB 1

SHOOTING INCIDENT;
6/14/95;
NEWARK DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:
During the period of 6/20
23/95, an Administrative
Inquiry was conducted by the Newark Division into a shooting
incident involving SAl
I on 6/14/95.
-

Reference: Newark telcall of ASAC R. Stanley Harris to Section
Chief Robert S. Conforti, 6/14/95, NeWark teletype to Bureau,
6/15/95, and an FD—418 from Newark to the Training Division,
FBIHQ, 6/16/95.
Enclosures:
Enclosed is the original and eight copies of a selfexplanatory report of the results of the investigation of
captioned matter.

Details: Captioned shooting incident occurred ati
I
Avenue, Newar). New Jersey. on J}lne 14,1995, and involved Newark
Spec ial Agenti
I firing one round from his Bureau
issued Smith and Wesson 10 mm. semi—automatic pistol and striking
a dog in the left chest/shoulder area when the dog was attempting
t
attack him during the execution of an arrest warrant.
3 Bureau

(End.

9)

1-Section Chief Robert S. Conforti
1-Newark
RF/lap
(4)
1

 3

(3/31/9s)

FEDERAL BUREAU
To; Director Froiti:
Newark
Re: 66—HQ—19157, 06/23/1995

OF INVESTIGAI1ON

Prior to SA I
idisoharging his weapon, he
previously administered three bursts of CAP STUN directly into
the dog
s face which temporarily immobilized the dog. However,
t
after a shortperiod of time, the dog again attempted to attack
SAL__________ at which time, he fired one round and almost
instantly killed th dog. There were no injuries to any other
person caused by the round, and it was later retri&ved from the
dog by a local veterinarian.
SAC, Newark recommends that no further investigation is
necessary, and no administrative action be taken in this matter.

2

 D-2O4 (Rev. 3-3-59)

‘UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Invesfigation

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

Inspector David R. I<nowlton

August 4, 1995

FleldOfficeFile#:

Office:

BureaiFi1eff:

66—19157—98

SHOOTING INQUIRY
FBI TRAINING ACADEMY
QU2TIC0, VIRGINIA
7/7/95

Thic:

Character:

Synopsis:

On 7/7/95, 23 members of the 47 Special Agents
(SA) trainees comprising New Agents Class (NAC) 95—12
participated in their second live fire training session
under the cu
ctirrn nf th Prinir1 PirParms Instructor
(PFI), SSAI
assisted in
SSAI
his instruction f th class b Fire
t
SSAI
and Mf
1
SSA?

I

Iwas

I

•

I

The instructors and the class initially met in
the morning in the Gun Cleaning Room and ‘then moved to
the Range Classroom for instruction on sight alignment,
trigger pull, and presentation of the weapon.
Presentation of the weapon is described as the four
positions in the movement of the weapon from the holster
to the firing position. During the classroom
instruction, lasting approximately 45 minutes, SSA
I demonstrated these technique utilizing a red—
handled Sig’/Sauer Model 226 with a working trigger as an
instructional aid.
ssij_________ stated that he preferred
using the red-handled pistol rather than his empty
service weapon because the audience feels more
comfortable knowing that the weapon is deactivated and
that he knows there is flO chance for an accidental
discharge.
SSAI
I when not using the red-handled
pistol for instructional purposes., maintained it in his
holster.
He did not have his duty weapon, a Sig/Saue.r

This docunent ccntSjns neither recoasnendations nor conclusions of the FBI. it is the property of
the FBI and is loançd to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distrib.ited outside your agency.

 __________

S
Model 228 with him in the classroom or at the range that
day, but bad it secured in the Firearms Training Unit
(FTU) trailer near the range.

I

Upon completion of the classroom phase, the
cla nvd to Range l for the live fire phase.
SS.
las the PFI, supervised the firearms instruction
trom the tower while the other instructors walked the
line.
Between the courses of fire, SSA I
heft the
tower and instructed the class about trigger pull and the
presentation of the weapon using his red-handled pistol.
Upon the completion of their last course of
fire, the instructors visually inspected each trainee’s
weapon to ensure that each weapon was safe and secure.
The class was then instructed to proceed to the Gun
Cleaning Room to clean their weapons.

SSAI
I advised that he then proceeded to
the FTU trailer to drop off his instructionl materi
and to wjtch to his service revolver. Mr.
I
I Firearms Instructor, who was as
g SSA
I
I with NAC 95-12, advised he
returned to
thç F’PTJ tri]her following the mo
ruction.
Mn
Idesk is next to SSA
and he
observed SS4
jswitch guns, put h s red-handled
pistol away nd put his service pistol in his holster.
SSAI
ladvised his weapon was loaded with bali.
ammunition because he had tested a target system the
previous day using ball ammunition. Both SSAJ
I
and Mr.F
heft for the Gun Cleaning Room a few
minutes later.
At approximately 11:45 a.m., the MAC 95—12
BA trainees arrived in the Gpn Cleaniig Room and began
cleaning their weapons.
SSA1
I who had also
arrived, noticed that several of the MAC 95-12 members
were in the larger part of the Gun Cleaning Room and,
since he knew a second much larger class was on their
way, moved these trainees to the smaller portion of the
room.
NAC 95—10 consisting of 45 BA trainees arrived in
the Gun Cleaning Room and began to clean weapons.
During the cleaning process, SSAI
I
advised that it was his duty as the PFI to walk around
among the students, offer advice and provide
encouragement.
SSAI
I although unable to recall
specifically which students were involved in conversation
with him, felt it beneficial to review the weapon
presentation concept with them.
Idvised
SSAI
that, thinking. he had his red-hand-led pistol in his
holster, drew the pistol and in a continuous motion, took
2

 •

•

•

a firing position and pulled the trigger. He advise
d
that he initially could not believe that the gun had
discharged and did riot realize that it was a live weapo
n
until he heard the shot.
Immediately after the
discharge, he recognl.zed the tritium night sight
configuration on the gun as belonging to his service
pistol, the Sig/Sauer 228 and not the red-handled
Siq/Sauer 226 because he did not look at the weapon
before he drew it from the holster. He advised he
was
not consciously aiming at anything because he was
making
an instructional point.
SSA I
t advised that he
entered the Gun Cleaning Room at approximately 11:50
a.m.
and was on his way to the Firearms Insruc±çrs locker

room next to the indoor range. As SSN
lapproached
the middle table of the 3 tables located in the smalle
r
portion of the room, he noticed a Sig/Sauer 228 being
held in a two—handed, fully extended position, aimed
head
high, back towad the center of the Gun cleaning Room.
He observed SsAI
hroviding instruction to several
students and within an instant of viewing the gun,
heard
the discharge, felt the concussion and saw the discha
vapor. At the time of discharge, it was being aimed rge
lower than its previous head high position.

I

4

.Jr

SA Trainee
a former
police officer, and trained firearms instructor, was
cleaning his weapon on the first table from the wall,
the post office side of the Gmi (!1i,h,c Room, facing on
the
res
oom. SSA Traineel
ladvised that
SSA
was walking among tfle students and later
stoo
ween and slightly behind his and SA Trainee
position. Be noticed SSA t
ILiad his
weapon out of the holster, was extending the weapo
n in
both hands and pointing the weapon toward the other side
of the room.
He also noticed that the weapon was not red
handled but had black qrips, a speckled finishe
d and was
the same gun sSAI
normally carried. He continued
J
to clean his weapon and heard a qusbot. He heard
a gun
hit the floor and saw SsW
Irun toward the center
of the room.
He looked down and saw SSAf
Iweapon
on the floor, and the magazine loaded with ball
ammunition, had popped out of the pistol.
SA Trainee
ladvised he was
cleaning his weapon a
e cleaning table most near the
post office wall and was across the table and facing
SSA
I
Iwhc,m he observed demonstrate moving the weapon
from a position close to the body to ai ôuttretched
arm
position.
This demonstratiOn resulted in SSAI
I
pointing the weapon at SA 1
Trainee
-Iright shoulder.
3

17C

 ______

He observed SSAE
Idemonstrating t1iis motion more
than once and then move the weapon in an outstretched arm
position. He then saw the W5DOfl disarge and saw the
muzzle flash. He advised SSAI
Idropped the weapon
to the floor and ran to offer assistance to an injured
trainee.
SA Traineel
dvised that while
cleaning his weapon, he heard the sound of a gunshot. He
squatted down and saw a female behind him was shot.
Thi1 1-l sguattinq. he saw a gun bounce at
SSA
I
Ifeet. SSAI
[was observed to run to the
female victim. then I?ack to his gun lying on th floe
SA Trainee!
ladvised he observed SSAI_________
carefully picJ up his gun, discharge the magazine,
discharge the shell and holster the gun.
The projectile from SSAp
Iweapon
traveled approximately 31 f€ an ih. (19 Cleaning
Ioom and struck SA Trained
tin the left
upper hip area, having passed through her belt, and then
exiting her left hip area. The projectile then traveled
approximately 7 feet and struck SA Trainee!
in the right back area lodging in his abdomen.
SSAI
ladvised that after the gunshot, he
ran around the cleaning tables to render assistance to
the injured SA trainees. When he determined that
assistance was being given to them, he advised that he
reached for his weapon to secure it but determined it was
not in his holster. He returned to where he had been
standing at the time of the gunshot and noticed his
weapon on the floor. He has no recollection of how the
weapon ended up on the floor but retrieved it, cleared it
and took the weapon to the gun vault to secure it.

•

a gunsmith/instructor advised
that he was in the Gun Vault when he heard a gunshot in
the Gun Cleaning Room. while other employees in the Gun
Vault ran across to the Guij Cleaning Room, he remained at
the door.
He observed SSAI
I come out of the Gun
Cleaning Room carryi;cr a SialSauer 228 pistol and a
loaded magazirje. Mr.I
lopened the door to the Gun
Vault and SSAI
ientered and stated, “I’ve got to
isolate this thIig,” and placed the pistol in Gun Bin
#22.
He was about to place the magazine in there also
but stated, “can’t keep ammo with the gi,” and began
unloading the magazine. ?Ir.F
Jtook the bullets,
approximately 12, from SSAI
I and placed them in
the blue container fo live ammunition near the hallway
49or.
SSAF
Iplaced the unloaded magazine in Bin
#22 with the pistol and took Red Tag #22 with him and
4

I

 went back to the Gun Cleaning Room. SSAF
later took the pistol and magazine from Bin
#22 and left
the red tag.
SSA I
I advised she entered the Gun
Cleaning Room_and obseçved SSAF
Itanding by
himself, sSAI
ladvised SSAI
Ithat he was the
one who had fred the shot and that it was
a stupid
mistake, SSAI
I advised her that he had assumed
that he still had the 1
red—harjr ‘
’
tol that he had used
4
earlier in the morning.
SSA I
lunloaded the two
magiOc he was carrying and gave
all the bullets to
SSA I
I She t)n want ±p the Gun Vault and took
possession of SSAI
Ipistol and empty magazine
located in Gun Bin #22.
She turned the pistol, empty
magazjm’
bullets from his two extra magazines to Unit
Chief

I

•

•

SA Traineesi
land I
Iwere immediately
assisted by FBI Academy personnel, including those
with
particular traiping in emergency medical response.
SSA
I
I a firearms instructor who is also a
nationally registered paramedic, upon hearing that
someone had been shot in the Gun C1ening Room
immediately_responded. SSA
Jat first went to SA
Trainee
I and, after determining_that she did not
have a maj or wound went to SA Traineel
I who he
determined ws aoina n to shock and needed advanc
e life
support.
SAl
ladministered high-flow oxvaen to SA
Trainee I
land started an IV
hfm
SSAI_______
started a second XV on SA Traineet
placed mast
Irnd
trousers on him to maintain s much blood as possib
le in
the upper torso. SA Traineel
Iwas transported via
U.S. Park Police helicopter to the Washingtoh
Hospital
Center for treatment.
SA Trainee’
‘was transported via the FBI
Academy ambulance to Potomac Hospital for treatm
ent
her injuries were not considered to be life threate since
ning.
Assistant United States Attorney I
I Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, I
L
Virginia, declined prosecution in this matter since
fatality occurred; and there was no evidence develo no
ped
indicating that there was any criminal intent on the
part
of SSAI__________

SSAI
Iliad been assigned to the FBI
Academy as a firearms instructor since 6/28/92.
His
annual performance appraisal s-igned 11/5/93, docum
ents
that he committed a safety violation regarding
a round
5

 having been fired downrange by a student he was
instructing while another student was downrange repairing
a target.
This was described by the team leader as “the
most serious he had observed while at the Academy.” Re
was rated Superior in this particular element on this
appraisal.
His annual performance_appraisal signed
4/14/94, documents that “SSA
Ishould place
emphasis on following established protocols maintained by
FTU (ie. . .the gun vault incident in which he left a
loaded weapon which was found by a gunsmith).” He was
rated Superior in this critical element on this
appraisal.
SSAI
Iroutinely employed a red-handled
weapon during his instruction. Other firearm instructors
both used and avoid using red—handles.
SC PLEDGER, former Unit Chief of the Firearms
Training Unit advised there is no written policy
Concerning red—handled weapons, although their use is
encouraged when addressing a group/class of students.
No formal documentation was available
concerning the firearms being carried in the FBI Academy
prior to that published in a 4/27/95 memorandum. It was
understood that the policy prior to this memo allowed for
firearms instructors and KRT members to carry loaded
weapons within the Academy with common sense dictating
that they would not normally carry loaded ieapons into.
instructional areas of the Academy. The 4/27/ 95
memorandum requires these personnel to carry loaded
weapons in the Academy and was in response to security
concerns arising in the wake of the OKEOMB matter.
It was found that SSA I
I was carrying 9mm
ammunition used for training purposes rather than the
ammunition required for duty purposes when this accident
occurred.
The Assistant Director, Training Division, was
tasked with documenting the emergency response that took
place following this incident. Documentation provided
reflects that there was not a significant delay in
transporting SAl
I by helicopter to a trauma center.
The U.S. Park Police helicopter pilots advised that the
navigational coordinates they were initially given were
inaccurate.
This resulted in a 2- to 4—minute delay in
transportation.

6

.

 .

F
(Rev, 3-3-59)

.

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 3USTICE
Federal Baireau of Investigation

CGpyt:

I

Report of:
Date:

SSA
August 1, 1995

Office:

FiId Offic File K:

66F—SD—55796

Bureau$iIcl66E_HQ_19157 Sub 46

Title:

SHOOPfl’TG INCIDENT
SAN

SA DIEGO

ULVJ.L’JL’4

7/10/95
Chercter:

ADMIHISTRATIVE INQUIRY

synopsis:

This incmy was predicated upon information
reported by SAJ
Ito the San Diego Division, at
approximately 7:48 p.m., 7/10/95, that he had just shot a
bank robbery suspect and his dog.

b6

us

sJI
assigned to Squad 6, a
VMO squad, and is assigned to work bank robberies and
other federal violations in the VCMO program. In a signed
sworn statement he provided the following information:
On July 10, 1995, SAl
Irecieved three
complaint forms rom the complaint rnt
identified asi
SA
Iadvjsed that he knew that the BIRDIEGS BANDIT
was the suspect in twelve bank robberies in the Division,
had displayed a weapon in two robberies, and had taken
hostages at two bank robberies. The complainants
provided information that the bank robber’s photorah i-n
the newspaper that day was an individual named
That the person in the bank robbery photographs drove a
Nissan pickup truck and that the suspect was a customer
at the Holiday Wine Cellar in Escondido, California, who
frequented the WThe Cellar often between 5:00 p.m. and
7:00 p.m.

This docusent contains neither reccAtmendativxls nor conctusions of the FBI. It
your agency; it and its ontents ere not to be diztriixited outside your agency.

is the property of the FBI arI is Loaned to

 ________IBureau

.
SAl
Iwent to the Wine Cellar in hopes of
obtaining the store video surveillance film for later
viewing in attempts to identify the BIRDLEGS BANDIT.
Subsequent to interviewing employees at the Wine Cellar
and while still in the area he observed a isson truck in
the parking lot that resembled the truck described by
witnesses that was driven by the suspect. He observed
the suspect in the Wine Cellar and called for backup from
his Bureau car. He then observed the suspect exit the
store and_apnroached him in order to further identify
him.
SAl
I identified himself as an SA with the FBI
and displayed his credentials_to the suspect. During the
course of conversation SAl
s car
t
I obtained suspect
keys. The suspect, upon learning that a backup was
eroute, became uncooperative
0 entered his truck using a
snare kçy, started the vehicle, and drçve ou, bumping SA
Isurveilled
car in the process. SAl
the suspect to the suspect’s residence, at the same time
attempting to get a backup by using the Bureau radio and
cellular telephone. He followed the suspect into
suspect’s driveway arid attempted to continue his
interview to stall for time. The suspect became
intimidating and a shoving match ensued with the suspect
stating “Your going to have to kill me!” The suspect
ordered his dog to “Sic him MAX sirj h4m!” When the dog
If jred one shot
was within one foot of sI
1 SAl
which disabled the dog. The suspect the hit SAl
I in
the face with either his fist or a bunt object. SA
I, wa dazed but could fesl the. upect advancing.
I
At this point SAl
I drew his weapon again and shot the
suspect one time. SAl_____ then got one handcuff on the
suspects_wrist. The suspect continsd to struggle_with
SA I
land they slid down to a fence where SAl
1 was
able to get the other handcuff on the suspect. Then with
the assistance of a neighbor, attempts were made to
render first aid to the suspect who had been wounded in
the chin and neck.

I

7Jil

ltjg transported to the hospital by SA
I for treatment of a swollen and
bruised face subsequent to brisfing appropriate law
‘roement personnel at the crime scene.
I was transported to the hospital by ambulance.
Review of the evidence collected, crime scene
photographs and sketches, interviews with eployees at
the Holiday Wi-ne Center, interyiw nf the neighbors and
other investigators support SAl
I statement. The
weapon he used on’7/lO/95 was his Bueau issue SIG SAUER,
P226, serial number U447161.
—C
DETAILa:
2

 •

FD2Q4 (R.v. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of
estgaion

Copy to

Report of:

ASAC JERRY I). THORNTON
August 25, 1995

dOFiIel
BwauFdcI:
t

62A’LA—187790

Title:

oee

Los Angeles

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
7 / 24j95

arcter’

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synous:

On July 24, 1995., Special Agents (SM) asigne4 to the
Santa Ana Resident Agency of the Los Angeles ‘Office of the FBI,
and a deputy from the Orange County Sheriff’s Of fice (OCSO),
Santa Ana
1 California, were assigned to participate in a
surveillance at the residence of KEVIN DUANE ARNOLD.
ARNOLD WS
a federal fugitive wanted for Bank Robbery in violation Of Title
18, United States Code, Section 2113 (a), from the Southern
District of California, San Diego, California.

At ApproKimately 9:30 a.m., 7124/95, Senior SuperViGory
Resi4ent Agent (SSRA)I
land SAl
I
both assigned to the Santa Ma Resident Agency conp3w”
briefing attended by S2I
I SAl
I and OCSO Deputy I
I During the briefing, the fact
that ARNOLD was wanted for a San Diego Bank Robbery waé
discussed, as well as the fact that SAl
Iwas going tç obtain
a federal arrest warrant on that day from a United States
Magistrate Judge, charging ARNOLD with 11 additjn
robberies committed in the Orange County area. 5k
a also
going to obtain a federal search warrant for ARNOLD a V ide and
residencç, located at 21592 Cabrosa. Mission Vieo,_California.
ISAI
ito
I instructed SAL
I and Deputyl
cohauct the surveillance at ARNOLD’S residence, in an effort to
locate him pending the issuance of the additional federal arrest
warrant and the search warrants. During the briefing, ARNOLD’s
background as a former police officer, who had been involved in

I

Thu

docit contefr neither recormendatuons rr orLusicr of the Fig. It ii the property of the FBI vd :
Load to
ft and ita cciit.nts ata not to he distributed outsIde you eney.

your’ Igency;

 ______Iwanted.

r

•

.

62A—L.—18779Q
several departmemt shootings was discussed, as well as the fact
that during some of the bank robl,eries ARNOLD claimed to have a
weapon.
ARNOLD was to be considered Armed and Dangerous. All
participants in the surveillance had conducted prior
surveillances of ARNOLD at his residence and were aware of what
he looked like, the vehicle
drove, and the fact that ARNOLD
iQd Witsinafl, children, consequently, beth SSRA
I
I and SA
)OLD to Ø ested away from his
residence, to insure the safety of ARNOLD’S wife and children.

I

At approximately 12:30 p.m., SAl
I and Deputy
I sA
I commenced their fixed surveillance at ARNOLD’S residence in
Mission Viejo. At approximately_1:30 pa. there was movement at
ARNO].D’s residence.
Both SAl
I and sAt I drove by
ARNOLD’ s home to investigate that movement • As they passed the

house, both observed ARNOLD at the door. SA!
Istated that
within seconds he heard over the two-way radio from Deputy I
1
that ARNOLD had probably observed them, as ARNOID came out into
the street and !.zatehej them drive away. Within the next several
minutes, Deputyl
I reported that ARNOLD had returned to his
house, that he exited_his house, and that he drove away in his
blue vehicle.
SAl
istated that after a brief period of
serhinrj for ARNOLD, he Used his cellular telephone to contact
Ski
I who was obtaining the additional arrest warrant and the
search warrants.
btatød that be was instructed by SA
SAl
Ito arrest ARNOLD, if he was located • He was further
I
instructed to attempt to arrest ARNOLD prior to him entering his
home.
Several minutes later, SA. I
lobserved ARNOLD driving
his vehicle (a 1994 blue two-door, Ford Escort, California
License 3GTZ579) in the paricing lot at Portola Plza._27690
Margarita Parkway,
SA I
I reported
0,

that inf:
radio.

his two-way
at 1h
5k
lof
unformed Ski
• At that point, Ski
s regarding ARNOLD’s arrest. He also
rn1çs away
Lt he was approximately 3
During this period of time, ARNOLD observed SA
I and bagan
yelling at him and pointing his finger at him in an animated
fashion.

At that point, AIjNOLD mcved his vehicle into a parking
stopped his vehicle to the front of
space and stopped.
SAl
ARNOLD’s vehicle, but not quite perpendicular to it,
approximately 20 - 25 feet away. ARNOLD exited his vehicle while
aking an aggressive stance by the front
yelling at 5k
driver’s door.
SA
exited his ..vehicle, drew his weapon and
2

 ___nd

•
62A—LA—187790
Pointed it a
fender.
SA
Up”.
ARNOLD rep
to obey any of 5k

while moving to the driver—side front
then yelled, “Stop, police, put your hands
“
‘s get this over with”. ARNOLD refused
commands and continued to yell in a
belligerent manner. ARNOLD also made the statement, “No, we are
going to handle this right now”.

SA I
Ithen arrived on the scene and observed ARNOLD
yelling and pointing his finger t SA I
I who was
approximately 30 Eeet away. SAl
stopped his vehicle
somewhat perpendicular to ARNOLD’S vehicle, . — 3 feet frm wheçe
ARNOLD 1
was standing by the front door of his vehicle. 5k I
I
observed ARNOLD briefly glance at him, bt APMC?LD immediately
returned his attention to SAL
Ithen exited his
SAl
vehicle, drew his weapon, described as
•4 caliber, Sig Sauer
Semi—automatic, Model P22Q_bearing. serial Number G218355 and
pointed it at ARNOLD.
ski
ithen yelled, ‘FELL KEVIN, YOU
are under arrestt Get down on the pavement”. Those cowman4s
were repeated several times, but ARNOLD complalv d3sregarded
them. At that point, ARNOLD glanced toward S1
Iand yelled,
“Puck rOU!
I am not going to do it”.
ARNOLD then attacked SA
Iwho was approximately 25 — 30 feet away. Prior to
F
reaching Skj
I GA I
I beard ARNQLD yell, “Toil my wife I

love hex”.

ARNOLD then reached Ski
I who was then located between
his vehicle and ARNOLD’s vehicle in a vacant parking slat to the
front of ARNOLD’S vehicle,. At that point, a fight ensued between
land ARNOLD.
I who followed_ARNOLD, immediately
Ski
SAk
5oxned in the fight.
iinitially bad
land 5k F
BotSAI
their weapons in their hands, xaaking fighting difficult. ARNOLD
made repeated attempts to obtain control of their weapons, but to
no avail.
Throughout the fight, ARNOLD continually refused to
obey the SAs commands to surrender and submit to arrest. At
one point, ARNOLD turned his back to the SM and made a motion of
reaching into the front of his riants,, g jf he was drawing a
weapon.
Both 5k
Bk I
I stated that they were
prepared to shoot ARNOLD at that time, but when he turned around
he had no weapon in his hand. Frequently, throughout the fight,
ARNOLD yelled, “Shoot me, Shoot met” and “You are going to have
to kill me”. As the fight continued, it moved hack toward the
front door area of ARNOLD’s vehicle. One time during this
period, ARNOLD opened his driver’s door, reached in and grabbed
for something between the front seat and back rest. Both SAs
again believed that ARNOLD was reaching for a weapon and. ware
prepared to fire. However, once again, ARNOLD turned with empty
hands.
The fight then continued. Both SM believed that they
were fighting for their lives.
3

 62k—La—187790

Iwas able to
kt one point during this period, SAL
radio to call
two-way
refly return to his vehicle and use his
to assist
returned
Ithen
sI
foç Deutj
I assistance.
ran back to
and
Ski
I Shortly thereafter, ARILD broke free
front
the
off
keys
car
his vehicle. He ‘umped in, grabbed his
By that
st aud inserted the key into the ignition.
4 reached in
time, SAl
ihad run to the driver’s side window
with his left hand and arm over the top of the steering whssl in
an effort to remove the car keys from the ignition. However,ks
ARNOLD was able to start his yøhtlç and began backing up.
Iwas un’ib1 tq extract his
the vehicle began to move, Ski
Ibelieved that
left ar from the steering wheel area. Ski
trapped inside
was
it
or
ARNOLD,
by
beirg
his arm was eithçr
held
of
movement
rearward
the vtlu.ôle.
Ski
hias dragged by the
5k
speed
a
at
feet
40
3D
ARNOLD’s vehicle for approxiteV
life,
I fearing for his
ithought was very fast. ski
was
which
hand
right
reached into the front seat area w-ith his
SA
chest.
ARNOLD’S
into
round
one
holdinct his weapon and fired
footing
his
regained
I
I left arm was immediately freed. He
over
an stepped away from ARNOLD’S vehicle. ARNOLD then slumped
“revving”
a
made
engine
the
but
area,
toward the passenger seat
sound and moved forwards. ARNOLD’S vehicle stopped upon
the
collision with a 1995 Acura which was parked in a slot to
vehicle.
front of ARNOLD’s
-

-

nd Medix
ARNOLD was removed from his vehicle by Ski
from the
Paramedics
scene.
the
ambulance personnel who were at
and
scene
Orange County ?ire Department responded to the
Mission
administered first aid prior to transporting ARNOLD to declared
was
ARNOLD
chest.
the
to
wound
Hospital with a gunshot
Viejo,
dead shortly after arriving at Mission Hospital, Mission
California.
Neither SAl_____ nor SAT
injury.

Isustained any

serious

the Los
OCSO Homicide—Officer involved Shooting Team and
l
cens.
the
ta
responded
Team
Shooting
Angeles Agent Involved
joint investigation was oopducted.
Neighborhood investigations were conducted at the
shooting scene, along with witness interviews.
Photographs were taken Of the criae scene ar.a by both

the FBI and OCSO.

4

b

 1.

I
62A—LA—187790
OCSO conducted the crime scene investigation, accompanied

by FBI personnel.
I

I

lnotitiea NOLD’s wit e,I
of his death, when he resisted arrest on the charge of

federal ban)c robbery.

ARNOLD’s vehicle was impounded by OCSO as part of the
crime scene investigation, but was searched for items that were
named in a federal search warrant by the FBI.

‘IOn 7/25f95, OCSO
Coroner’s office conducted an autopsy
On AKNOLD.
The FBI witnessed the autopsy.
-

OSCO and the Coroner’s Office furnished the FBI their
written reports regardIng the ehooting incident.

DETAILS:
I

this case is uredicated UDOn jnforatjOn that Ski
I
I and SA
assigned to the Santa Ana
Re$ident 1gency of the Los Angeles Otflce of the Federal Bureau
Of Investigation (FBI), had been involved in a shooting incident
at approximately 2:00 p. m., July 24 1995, during the attempted
apprehension of KEVIN DUANE ARNOLD, who was wanted for Federal
Bank Robbery.

J

5

 _____Imaae

P0-204 (Rev. 3.3.59)

UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of rnvestigatioxi

Copy b:

I

SSAI

Report of:
Date:

August 21, 1995

Field Office Pile #:

Office:

62A—LV—2 6245

LAS VEGAS

BUtCSU File if:

SHOOTING INCXDEMT
May 12, 1995
Las Vegas Division
ic
Character:

Administrative Inquiry

Synopsis:

Executive Director, Nationa]. Independent
Bank Equipment and Systems Association (NIBESA), Park
Ridge, Illinois souoht he assistance of Special Agent
(SA)
I New York FBI in arranging for a
demonstration of the various types of bullet resistant
glass during their annual cor”t-pn in Las Vegas,
Nevada, May 11-12, 1995.
SAl
I who has assisted the
NTP.P.R f ii rst demonstrations, identified SAl
1
ILas Vegas FBI Principal Firearms Instructor,
whn iou1d be able to arrange for the demonstration.
SA
lobtained New York FBI management authorization
(documented) for the FBI to participate in the
demonstration.

I

I
I

I

SAl
ladvised the demonstration plan would
include a Jurning demonstration of the safes, and a
firearms demonstration involving the shooting at the
bullet resistant glass. The last event would be a
shooting demonstration in which metal targets would be
engaged, similar to demonstrations he witnessed in the
past.
M

telephonic contact with SA
and dicused ‘iith the him shooting at the
bullet resistant glass; she insit he was no asked Co

I

participate in any other demonstrations, specifically
B-i
This docuimant contajna nejither raco
your agency; it and its cofltents are

datious nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is 3.oaned to
b djstrjlzuted otteide your agency.

 shooting bullets at any safes or ATM machines.
Ms..T
Imade the necessary arrangements for the
shipment
the safes, ATMs and resistant glass to Las
Vegas for the demonstration, and arranged for the one-day
insurance policy for the demonstration.

of

SAL
I arranged with the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) to utilize the
police shooting.range on May 12, 1995, arranged for the
use of Bureau weapons and ammunition to be used during
the demonstration, and coordinated the delivery of the
safes, ATMs and resistant glass by the Lomanto Exhibit
Services. SA I
j chose to use his personally owned
hii,’p.ii rnToved 30-06 rifle during the demonstration.
SA
I also provided the rifle ammunition which
included military armor piercing rounds, and commercial
30-06 ammunition manufactured by Eldorado Cartridge
Company located in Boulder City, Nevada. The commercial
ammunition was all copper 180 grain Barnes flXO bullets.

I

On the morning of May 12, 1995, SAl
arrived at the firearms range, and met with SAl_____ The
safes, ATMs and alasq ha
dy been set up at the
direction of SAl
ad marked off an area
I S
approximately 7 feet from t e target area using tape

stretched between two speakers which had been placed on

opposite sides of the range.

SAl
lused a wireless speaker to direct the
mechanics of the safe burning demonstration. There were
between 100 and 150_spectators. After the burn
demonstration, SAl idirected the spectators behind the
tape area.
SA!
irepeated to the spectators comments
by SAp
I

I

I

It was a decision made soley by SAF
Ito
include in the firearms demonstration shots fired at the
safes.
SA
Ipositioned himself 40 to 50 feet in
front of the safe located near the middle of the target
line.
SAI
If ired two rounds of armor piercing
ammunition in rapid succession at the safe. SA
lapproached the safe to exam the bullet impact
areas, and SAl
I who had heard some noise from he
spectator area, walked over to the crowd.
I
SAi
observed thatL
Ihad suffered a small
crescent shaped wound to his shin area.
First aid was
andi
linsisted he was all right. SA
ladvised it was common for individuals to
receive minor splash back wounds.
At this time, neither

SAl

B-2

Inor

SAl

I

 __________

realized a econd suecator had received a wound. SA
Jand Sal
Imoved the spectators to the back
of the range area, approximately 60 years from th 1rcr1line and continued with the demonstration. SAl
then fired one of the all copper bullets at the target.
The bullet or a lg fragment ricochetted back and
s4ucik A I
un the right anterior lower thigh.
SAl
Iwas transported to University Medical
Center for treatment.

I

SAL

I

land SAl

I

lof the Las Vegas

FBI Office were present to observe the demonstration.
SA
I asked if they would assist in competing the
demonstration by firing rounds at the bullet resistant

glass.__The demonstration was concluded by SN
SAl
Iwithout any further incidents.

nd

It was subsequently learned that Ms.I
I
of Farmers Branch Texas had_sustained a ricochet

wound to her neck.

Bothi

land J

I received

treatment_t the Lake Meaci. aospital, Las Vegas, Nevada.
Ms.I
Iwas advised at the hospital that a piece of
metal was still in her neck, but the piece would work its
way out. Ms.
confirmed the piece did eventually
come out.

jaf Marquette, Michigan sijffr an
Mr.[
injury to his lower left calf muscle, Mr.I
I received
medical treatment at the Lake Mead Hospital; he also was
informed the fragment was still in his leg.
Mr.I
I
subsequently sought medical treatment at the Marquetle
General Hospital on May 22, 1995, and has been attended
by a physician since that time. The fragment remains in
his leg, and he continues to suffer pain. Mr.l
I
advised he has not sought legal advise on the matter,
however, made it known he felt compensation was due hita
for the hardships suffered as a result of the bullet
wound.
A video taping of the event taken by NIBESA was of
poor quality, and did not record the shooting event which
resulted in the wounds suffered by Agent
Ms.

Mr._____

B-3

h6

 PD-204 (Rev. 34-59)

66—19157—3
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FederI Bureau of Iuvestigatoa

•

Copy to:

Report 01:
Dale:

IIPI_________________________

July 6, 1995

Pield OfficePfle 0:

•

•

•

Office:

FBIHQ

BureauFile I:

66—19157—3

Tifle:

SHOOPING INCIDENT
BALTIMORE DIVISION
MAY 29, 1995

Character:

ADMINISPRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopaic:

In 1/95, in sepate incidents, two Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD) officers were shot and wounded in
unprovoked attacks while on duty in fuli uniform. Based
on a request from the MPD, WMFO Squad 0-21, the Cold Case
Squad, a task force, initiated an ITAR-MURDER
investigation
In 4/95, Prince George’s County Police Department (PGCPD)
Officer JEFFREY NOVABILSKI was shot and killed in an
unprovoked attack as be sat in full uniform in his pati51
car.
Officer NOVABILSKI’S service weapon, ‘i’
was taken by his assailant. Two days later I
I
was arrested by PGCPD and charged with this murder.
I
On 5/18/95,1
bet with PGCPD detectives and
provided information regarding her association with RALPH
MCLEAN.
She said that for the past year she had a
relationship with MCLEAN during which time he had physically
and sexually assaulted her. An_arrest warrant was issued
for RALPH MCLEAN for assault. I
I furnished information
which linked MCLEAN to the assaults on the NPD officers and
to the murder of PGCPD officer NOVABILSKI.
On 5/25/95, technical_surveillance was initiated via
Cellular One andi
Ion the cellular telephone
utilized by MCLEAN. ar1y that çyøinq. agents from Squad

TIis docu,ent containo neither reoc ix5atona nor concLuaona of the FRI. it fa the property of the FBI and Ia toaned to
your aBency; it and ita colitenta .rc not to be dietributad outilde your agency.

.

 __Ithat

66—19157—3

C—21 and the WMFO SOG met in Northern Virginia to distribute
descriptive data about MCLEAN and to set forth a plan of action
should MCLEAN be located. Surveillance was discontinued that
night in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and. resumed at 5:00 a.m. the
next morning, on 5/26/95, Cellular One provided information
obtained by noting the cal]. sites being utilized by MCLEAN’S cell
phone that he was traveling south towards Richmond.
On 5/27/95, an arrest warrant was issued in the
District of Columbia for RALPH MCLEAN for the assault pn a MPD
officer. During that day, MCLEAN responded to page byl
land
in the ensuing conversation indicated that he thought she was
cooperating with law enforcement authorities. That night the MPD
assaults ‘iere profiled on “America’s Most Wanted” but MCLEAN’S
name was not mentioned. The following evening, 5/28/95, a
television reporter related that an arrest warrant had been
issued for RALPH MCLEAN for shooting the MPD officers and there
was an outstanding PGCPD arrest warrant for the same individual
which identified MCLEAN’S girlfriend as cooperating,

I

.

During the afternoon of 5/28/95, technical coverage
indicated that MCLEAN was headed back north towards the
Washihgton, D.C., area. Late that afternoon, a PGC?D detective
notified a Squad C-22. Agent and advised that MCLEAN had contacted
land wanted to meet her thatevening. SOG, C-21. Agents and
t.gents from the Technical Services Squad then met at the
pringfield Mall in Northern Virgiiiia. The case agents then
explained to the participants that MCLEAN was to meet his
girlfriend at a shopping mall, not yet identified and they
planned to try to arrest him in an open area en route to the
m.etin.
Tf th4 ti
-1
wniilri
i-r. “e the
]MCLEAN’S
location. He was to be surveil1d to a safe area to make the
arrest.
If he was stationary for the night, SWAT would be
activated. If a felony car stop was required, the SOC would
handle it.
-

During that evening, the PGCPD detective wit
advised that a meeting was planned by MCLEAN with
for Ih
Tyson’s Corner Mall.
That was later changed by MCLEAN and I
for the Beltway Plaza Mall in Greonbelt, Maryland. About a week
earlier, I
I had told MCLEAN that she had a friend i; the
Greenbelt area and that would be a good place to meet. I
iwas
being operate4 solely by the PGCPD detectives and conversations
between I
land MCLEAN were being relayed by those detectives
to C-21 Agents.
At about 6:00 p.m., C-21 SSA
notified Southern Maryland Metropolitan
MCLEAN was back in the area but that it was not
2

 66—19157—3
anticipated at that time they would be in PG County. At
10:40 p.m., I
1 again contacted L
land advised that the
meeting place had changed to the Beltway Plaza Mail in SMNRT.
territory,

e

I

I

WMFO Agents had arrived in the Greerbe1t qrea at about
10:00 p.m. Throughout the evening MCLEAN and!
Ihad continued
conversations, At about 11:30 p.m., in response to a. page,
MCLEAN contacted I
I who indicated that she had not seen MCLEAN
in the parking_area of the Beltway Plaza Mall. At that time
MCLEAN toldL
I that he wou)
d meet
1
at the SheU Gas Station
nearby. sAl
land SA
both
assigned to WMF0 BOG, moved their vehicies to a paricing lot in
th Greenbe1 Middle School, where they could observe the Shell
cas €M1n.
Between 1O:30 pm. and 12:40 a.m., 5/29/95, two
Ivans had numerous activations regardinq MCLEAN’S use
pf hi c t1ii1— nhnn
hmverJ
I wne activations did,
however, indicate that MCLEAN was in ‘the area of Greenbelt Middle
School.
This information was broadcast to all units.
At about 12:40 a.m., Off icerl
I Greenbelt
City Police Department (GCPD), was notified by a fellow officer
of suspicious vehicles in the area of Greenbelt Road and
Kerilworth Avepue.
In patrolling the area, Officer
I observed
SA I
Ivehicle in t1 arkina lqt of the middle school.
Initially, he drove past SA I
bar to obtain

I

I

registration information. He turned aroun
the n;rking lot
returning to the area of SA I
Jexited his
I s
vehicle, identified himself to_Ofqcer I
Iby displaying his flI
credentials and asked Officer I
Jto leave the area and inform
other GCPD units of law enforcement presence in the area
condicting a surveillance. within about 10 minutes rf flff4r’v
I departing the area, RALPH MCLEAN approached BA I
vehi1. rrom the operator’s side and fired 16 shots at BA
Iwith a M—11.

I

Upon hearing the automatic weapon fire, SZI
I who
was positioned in a surveillance van, called for assistance,
exited the van and observed MCLEAN running around the corner.
behind the Greenbelt Middle school. MI’D Officer!_______________
who had been hiding in shrubbery across the street in the
vicinity of the Shell Station, also saw MCLEAN fleeing. He
broadcast the direction of MCLEAN’S flight. MCLEAN attempted to

make his escape from the area of the school through a wooded area
to get to his vehicle which was parked in an apartment complex
nearby. This route was blocked by responding law enforcement
officers who had quickly set up a perimeter. MCLEAN then fled
west several hundred yards to the Beltway Plaza Mall Parking lot.
During this tIme, he rnade a diversionary 9-i-I call and advised
3

a

 66—19157—3
emergency personnel that the assailant of the police officer
drove away from the area in a black Maxima.

•

An FBI Agent from the SMMRA spotted MCLEAN moving from
concrete pillar to concrete pillar in the parking area of the
Beltway Plaza near the Caldor Store and requested assistance via
the Bureau radio.
The responding police officers and FBI Agents
were fired upon by MCLEAN who had now moved to a place of hiding
behind the wheels of a box trailer parked on the Caldor loading
dock. ‘FBi Agents and PGCPD officers returned fire. A total of
43 rounds were fired, 31 by three PGCPD officers and 12 by three
FBI Agents. After receiving numerous non-fatal bullet wounds
MCLEAN took his own life by shooting himself with the 9mm Beretta
taken from Officer NOVABILSI<I.

•

follows:

Six law enforcement officers fired their weapons as
Weppoji

•

Caliber

I

j (FBI)

R&I( MP5
SN 62—332171

I

I

S&W 1076
SN THC9BOS

I

(FBI)

1(FBI)
(PGCPD)

9mm

Estimated
Rounds Shot
8
3

SigSauer P228
SN B118555

9mm

1

Beretta 92?
SN BER0762683

9mm

15

Beretta 2?
SN BER048960Z

9mm

Beretta 92?
SN BER004799Z

9mm

b

I

I

(‘r’D)

5

Iwás

SA
armed with a 10mm Smith and Wesson,
Model 1Q76 pistol which was still holstered, and a 9mm H&K MP—5
submachine gun which was not fired. He was wearing his ballistic
vest at the time of the shooting.
Details of this incident will be reported as delineated
in the table of contents.

4

0

 FD-O4 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Iuvc1gation

Copy

to:

Date:

ASSOCIATE SAC SHEILA W. MORAN Office:
AUGUST 10, 1995

Pe1d Office zile

62A—PH—77715

Report of

PHILADELPHIA

SHOOTING INCIDENT
PHXLàDELPMIA DIVISION
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
JUNE 1, 1995
Ctarcter:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

A preliminary inquiry was initiated on 5/16/95, on GLENN
THOMAS, aka Glenn Gram, Keith Graham, Keith Th2maS, Jahil
Aggravated Assault. The ca
Thomas, Shawn Thomas; UFAP
by the Philadelphia Count
furnished
information
on
was based.
It was opened and assigned to
District Attorney’s office.
Ia member of the Philadelphia Office’s Fugiti’
Task Force.
—

I

A review of this case showed that there were two “failure
The
Bench Warrants outstanding against GLENN THOMAS.
appear”
to
of
charges
original
first was issued on 2/27/95, and involved
of
the
violation
of
counts
two
and
Property
Theft, Receiving Stolen
Uniform Firearms Act. The second warrant, issued 3/31/95, involved
original charges of Aggravated Assault (against twç Philadelphia
Housing Authority Off iöørs); Recklessly Endangering Another Person;
Resisting Arrest; and two counts of violation of the Uniform
Additional charges iodged against GLENN THOMAS
Firearms Act.
involved a 12/8/94 arrest for, among other violations, Firearm Not
To Be Carried Without A License, in the furisdiction of the Upper
Darby Township (Pennsylvania) Police Department.
Clearly, GLENN THOMAS was known to have a history of
criminal behavior which included significant armed
violent
hostility directed at law enforcement officers.

wd Is (oared to
ThJ docuent conta1r neither r.ccmendatio nor ccncti*1o* of the FBI. It Is the prccerty of the FI
agency.
outside
your
distrIbuted
yo(Jr .ency; it and tt contents are not to 1*

 __________
________

62A—PH—77715
On 6/1/95, SAl
Ireceived perishable, ‘
real time’
4
4
information that GLENN THOMAS was located on Tackawanna Street in
the Whitehall Housing Projects in Northeast Philadelphia.
This
information came from a former source of the Philadelphia Office
who had been closed a few months prior.
The source was in a
position ‘to know the whereabouts of THOMAS because he would see him
periodically in the Whitehall Projects.
On at least three other
occasions, the source had been in contact with SA
regarding THOMAS’ location.
When this last telephone call was received on 6/1/95, SA
Iwas able to respond.
He immediately requested fellow
members of the Task ‘orce to assist him in apprehending THOMA$. He
was successful in obtaining the assistance of six Agents/Officers.
All six, located at several locations around the city, began to
converge on the Wh
hree of the Task Force
members, notably SAc
nd Detective
c.
I wer delayed by eavy a
I
‘
I and Detectives
and
oc S rom
I arrived at the housing project some
GLENN THOMAS’ reported location.
Since there were four armed law
enforcement officers present and the circumstances were exigent and
very fluid, a judgment was made that an arrest could be madc
without waiting for the three Task Force members.

I

I

I

Prior to the arrival of SA I
1nd
I Detective
Idrove through the Tackawanna Street area because the source
had indicated THOMAS had an AK-47 automatic weapon in his
automobile, a white Thunderbird.
The arrest plan was conceived and agreed upon by SA
and the Task FOrce members on scene. They would approach
THOMAS and while doing so., utilize their vehicles and existing
buildings to contain THOMAS as best they could should he attempt to
flee. They planned to approach THOMAS and place their four Bureau
cars in such a way as to block his egress.. Since all the
participants were driving individual cars, it was decided that
Detectivel
y to THOMAS’
Iwould I
followed
by SA L
md Detective
I sergeant
I

I

L

Shortly after 4:30 p.m., Task Force members located
THOMAS, precisely where the source had earlier indiqated subject
would be found.
SAl
xited their
bnd Detective I
vehicles a short distance from a group of Black males sitting on a
pipe fence.
These Black males
1 to include subject GLENN THOMAS,
recognized the Task Force members as law enforcement and began
fleeing the area.
It appears either Detective I
br SA
I
I or both, mmediate’ly identified themselves by yelling
Police.”
They began to pursue THOMAS in a northerly
“Stop
-

2

.

 ____land

62A—PH--77715

I

direction along TackawannaStrqet. LEN1PHOMAS was observed by SA
I anal
Ito have a handgun in his
land Detectives I
waistband.
AU. three Task Force members observed THOMAS as he
started to remove the weapon from his waistband. SN
Wired
one shot, fatally wounding THOMAS. THOMAS did not fire his weapon.
Detective eraeantl
hid not_participate in the foot
pursuit because SA
petectivel
Ihad exited their
vehicles and initiated a chase of THOMAS prior toj
heaving
his automobile.
jexited his automobile and had
Detective I
taken a few steps to %oin the chase at which time THOMAS was shot.
One law enforcement officer
attempt to apprehend THOMAS:
NANE

SA I

WEAPON

I

Sig Saner
Model P220
Semi Auto
matic Pistol

fired his weapon

in the

CMJIER

NUMBER OF
ROUNDS SHOT

.45

1

As a result of the shot fired by the law enforcement
officer, GLENN THOMAS sustained a fatal gunshot wound to his head.

The Philadelphia Medical Exaiiner’s report indicates a
large proectile base and small bullet fragnients were recovered
from the body.
Details of this incident will be reported as delineated
in the Table of Contents.

-

3

 FD-204 ev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DE1ARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Jiivesdgation

Copy to:

•

Repott of:
Date:

SAl
June

Field Office FiJe #:
Breau File W:

66F—WF—198503

Title:

.
Character:

2/,

IQOL’.Lf

19b

I

Office:

WMFO

1

INL.wEwr,
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA;
MARCH 20, 1995
00: WMFO
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

.

.

On March 20, 1995, at approximately 12:45 p.m., a bank
robbery occurred at the George Mason ?anJc, 4005 Wilson Boulevard,
Arlington, Virginia. WMFO agents responded to the bank robbery and a
joint investigation was initiated with the Arlington County Police
Department.
Witnesses advised that a lone male presented a robbery
note to the bank teller and demanded money. The subject claimed to
have a gun.
The subject was given bank funds in the amoint of
$7,140.68 which he placed into a duffle bag and fled the bank.
Witnesses to the robbery described the subject as a black
male, late twenties to early thirties, heavy set with a small
mustache.
The subject was described as being between 5’9” and 6’l”
tall and weighing. between 250 and 300 lbs. He is further described

as wearing dark plastic sunglasses, baseball cap, a blue Vaist length
jacket and blue jeans.
He was carrying a blue duffJ.e or tote bag
over his shoulder.

At approximately 1:30 p.m., an officer of the Defense
Protective Service (DPS) on duty at the Pentagon (approximately four
miles from the bank robbery) observed an individual who fit the
description of the bank robber. The subject was fatigued and sweaty
and asked for directions to the closest metrobus stop.
The officer
furnished the subject with directions to the
tru stop.
The DPS
officer radioed the. DPS dispatcher and advised that a man fittg the

ThIs docunent contains neither reccmnendations nor conclusions of the FBI. ft is the property of the FBI ard is Loaned to
your aBency; it and Its contents are not to be distribited outside your agency.

 description of the bank robber was headed towards the Pentagon
metrobus stop.
Shortly thereafter, uniformed DPS officers in marked
police vehicles approached the subject and ordered him to
stop.
The
subject drew a handgun from his waistband and fled on foot
through
the Pentagon’s south parking lot toward Eads Street and the
interstate 395 overpass (1-395).
Special Agent (SA) [
I was conducting a
separate investigation at the pentagon when the subject was observed.
I
Ihad previously parked his bureau car in a secured parking lot
at the Naval Army Annex. I
Isecured his service ‘eapon and his
briefcase in the trunk of his Bureau vehicle. I
‘was dressed in
soft street clothes and felt the possibility of an accidental
exposure of his service weapon within the Pentagon confines might
cause undue coicern to the workers and to the security force
within
the Pentagon. L
Jand DPS investigator1
ravel1ed to
the Pentagon ml
I unmarked government vehicle.

•

•

I

Numerous uniformed DI’S officers along with’______
Iresponded to Eads Street and the 1-395 overpass.
Upon seeing
the responding officers, the subject turned and pointed his
weapon
directly at them.
Four DI’S officers fired upon the subject at this
time.
The subject turned and ran up the 1—395 ex mn nd
continued fleeing across 1-395. The DI’S_officers andl
Ipursued
the subject on foot. When Investigatorl
ot ‘to the top of the I—
395 exit ramp, he became faicsu4 and motioned tt’ 1-’ rvf-ier officers
to continue their pursuit. I
lacknowledged tol
Ithat he was
physically okay and then gave his service weapon ‘to
I

•

•

I

ontinued pursuing the subject
realized the subject was increasing his lead.
SA
vehicle that was getting onto 1-395 from highway
identified himself as an FBI Agent to the driver and r
vehicle in order to continue pursuing the subject.

—395 but
ed a
is

The subject crossed completely over I—395 and ran through
the ground level parking garage towards the Double Tree Hotel.
The
subject was constantly pursued by DI’S officers. I
‘drove the
commandeered vehicle to the rear of the Double Tree Hotel. The
subject emerged from the parking garage area of the Double Tree
Hotel
and attempted to run past F
I identified himself and
ordered the subject to stop. The subject pointed his weapon directly
atj
I who was approximately twenty feet away from the
subject, fired two rounds from
ervice weapon.
I
The subject continued to run approximately one half block
and stopped in a rasy area xiea Eads Street.
The subject had his
back towards I
I A DI’S marked cruiser with two unifbtmed
2

 •

officers was approximately ninety feet in front of the subject.
The
subject again poirit hq weapon at the uniformed 1M’ Off joers.
Both
D?S officers and I
fired upon the subj ect. I
Iwas
approximately one hundred and twenty feet from the subject at this
time.
The subject immediately fell to the ground and lost
consciousness.
He never regained conscious and died on March 21,
1995 at 11:47 p.m.
(See exhibit #50)

•

Autopsy reports revealed the subject had been shot twice,
once in the left rear shoulder and the second wound was a through and
through wound to the subject’s neck (spine).

•

Arlington County Police Department’s (ACPD) mobile crime
unit located some bloody body tissue on a parked vehicle
approximately fifteen feet in front of the subject and a spent bullet
on Eads Street approximately forty feet in front of the subject.
The
FBI Laboratory, DNA Analysis Unit determined the DNA from the bloody
body tissue and the bNA obtained from blood traces on the spent
bullet was consistent with the subject’s DNA. (See exhibit #52)
The FBI Laboratory, Firearins-Toolmarks Unit determined
the spent bullet found on Eads Street had been fired from
I
I
service weapon.
Additionally, the bullet recovered from file
subjct’s lft rear shoulder was also determined to have been fired
fromi
Iservice weapon.
The FBI Laboratory results, Autopsy report and witness
statements indicatd
Isixth shot, from approximately one
hundred and twenty feet, was the round responsible for the through
arid j±rough wound to the subject’s neck. wo witnesses I
I and
Istated the subject appeared to be suffering from a wound when he
I
arrived at the grasy area near Eads Street.
Indicating one of the
two rounds fired byl
I from approximately twenty feet, was
responsible_for the wound to the subject’s left rear shoulder.
Aithoughi
If ired upon the subject with the same weapon at Beds
Street and 1-395 overpass, there is no physical evidence or w.tness
statements indicating one of his rounds hit the subject.
The subject was identified as James Harry Alexander,
black male, Dob 9/4/66, FBI #192875EA6 and was wanted by the
Washington, D.C. Police Department for burglary. Although
Alexander’s Stallard Arms 9mm pistol was determined to be operable by
the FBI Laboratory, he never fired any rounds. Investigation
determined Alexander was not responsible for the robbery at the
George Mason Bank on this date.
The majority of this shooting incident ws recorded on
video tape by the DPS at the Pentagon.
Two photographs were
produced from the video, arid are included in this report, showing
Alexander pointing his weapon at the responding officers. The
original video is in the possession of WMFO and can be Inade available
upon request. (See hbit #51)
3

 •

On March 27 1995 ssZF
I FBIHQ Emp1oye
Assistance Unit and SAl
1MFO Employee Assistance
Coordinator, conducted a critical incident stress debriefing with
I
land all of the DPS officers involved in captioned incident.

•

4*

 Mr. Gore

7/24/95

D. R. Knowlton
ADM!NTSTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
4/28/95
CLEVELAND DIVISION
ferenc report of Senior Supervisory Resident Agent
Idated 5/8/95.

I

PURPOSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SThG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
REçoMMENnTTON: Tht no administrative action be taken against
SAL
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1.
1

—

Mr.I

—

Mr

IRoom

7142
[Room 7125 (Enclosure)
j, Room 7116
1—Mn
I DiF..fl 6012
3
Mr
I rpm 6050)
( i—
L Room 4997)
( 1— Mn
1—
Room 7125
,
IRônm 7427
2
Mr.
I Room 7326)
( 1— Mr.j
1 - Mr. Knowlton. Room 7825
1 — Mr.I_______ I Room 5012
1 — Mr.1
&m 4042
1 — Mr. I
I Quantico
1
Mr. 1
Eoom 3117
A—Mr.I
I WMFO
U— Mrs._________ Room 78-37

Mr4

—

Mr.

—

—

LRR:lrr

(CONTINUED

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from D. R. Knowlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/28/95
Cleveland Division

-

—

DILS On 7/18/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman David R.
Knowlton, Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
lflspection—-Division; -Robert S.-Cenforbi- -Section- Ghief, V-iolent
Crimes and Major Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; Edward R. Leary, Sction Chief. Personpel Management
Section, Personne]. Division;I
IUiut Chief,
NS—ZD Unit, Global Section
NS—2, National Security Division;
I. Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training and
I
Administration Section, Training Division4
I Unit
Chief, Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit, Public
Corruption and Civil Richts Section, Criminal Investigative
Division;I
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Legal Advice and training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
and I
I Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
-

Synopsis of the Shootinc Incident

I

I along with members of -the
On April 28, 1995, SA. I
Mahoning Valley Violent Crimes/Fugitive Task Force (MVVCJFTF),
were conducting a fugitive investigation concerning I
I
I At approximately 1:30 p.m., members of the MVVC/PTF
.i.i. ace a security perimeter a’’”
residence at I
I
Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio. As SAl
and Officer I
I
approached the rçsidenc from the rear, -they noticed a large dog
in the yard. SAl
lobserved a wire fence that the dog was

I

behind. On the soutfleat corner of the residence was a detached
vehicle garage which SAl
lutilized for cover and
concealment. As SA I
ppoached the fron northeast corner
)clrew his
of the garage, he was attacked by the dog. SAl
service 10mm pistol and shot the attacking dog twice in the front
facial area. The dog was immediately incapacitated. SA [
I
directly advised the MVVC/FTF members that he had shot the dog
and that everything was okay. Thereafter, the MVVC/FTF searched
the residence forJ
Jwith negative results. After the
search, SA I
j immediately contacted the Youngstown Resident
Agency to report the incident.
Observations and Recsendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
docun-td by the report dated 5/8/95. revealed that proper
procedures were followed by SAl
Iduring this shooting
(CONTINUED
2

-

OVER)

 .4

Memorandum from 0. R. Knowlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Athjnistratjve Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/28/95
Cleveland Division
incident. Approprite off iqials as well as the owner of the dog
were notified by SJ

I

After a thorough review of the facts regarding this
incident, it is the opinion of the SIRG that no administrative
action should be taken against N
s a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

3

 _____

Fr2G4 (Roy, 3.3.5)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Invtlgation

Copy to:

Report of:
Dato:

SSAI__________________

Ofke

66—RQ—19157 Sub 35

BoreauFileN:

February 28, 1995

icdOfficFz1cf:

OKLAHOMA CITY

SHOOTING INCIDENT
OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION
FEBRUARY 1, 1995

Charactert

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

At 10:15 a.m.,, January 31, 1995, a then—unidentified white
male, who was later identified as subject DAVID P. MILEWSKI
(deceased), robbed COMMERCIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN. The
subject, according to victim tellers, entered the bank,
brandishing what was described as a silver or chrome .25
caliber automatic. TJie tellers, who were interviewed by FI
, including SA I
I provided information
indicating the subject appeared to be under a great deal of
stress, being very nervous and scared. He was demanding and
ordered tellers to get down on the floor.
Subsequent
investigation revealed the subject bad made his get-away in
vehicle described as a white Cadillac.
On the morning of February 1, 1995, infoption was received
from Oklahoma Cpuntv Sheriff’s Dettutvl
I to the
effect that he, I

I

identified as DAVID MILEWSKI, had robbed COM!{ERCIAL
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN, on Jnuarv 31, 1995.
This
1 according to Deput1
identification
I was,
in part, made because of the bank surveillance photograph
disDiaved on television. subsequent to this robbery.
B

This docutnt contains neither recorTaendatlcrts
your agency; It and Its contents are not to be

nor cousions

of tbe ai.

it is the property of the FB and IS Loaned to

distrbjted outside your agency.

6)6
6)7 C
‘

 __________________________________IMILEWSKI

FD—2 04
Synopsis (continued):

was currently
residing at a residence located at 2501 South 102nd Street,
Oklahoma city, Oklahoma, and the white Cadillac used in the
robbery was parked in the garage of this residence.
The
informant further learned from the wife that the sübj act had
a history of armed robberies. DepV”
after having been furnished to SAl
I was
then shared with other FBI Agents, including SA I
I
I
I
FBI Agents, accompanied by Oklahoma city Police
Department
(OCPD)
officers,
thereafter
initiated
a
surveillance of the residence believed to be occupied by
subject MILEWSKZ. Surveillance Agents thereafter observed
MILEWSKI exit the residence and go to a Corvette parked in
front of the residence on two occasions, noting that
MILEWSKI met the general physical description of the bank
robber.
By this time, MILEWSKI had een identified as
having an arrest record, and efforts were being made to
obtain an arrest photograph of NILEWSKI for the purpose of
displaying to victim tellers, in an effort to obtain a
positive identification.
While efforts were being made to obtain this photograph for
the positive identification, the garage door to the
residence opened, and MILEWSKI was observed leaving the
residence in the white Cadillac.
FBI Agents, with OCPD
officers, after following MILEWSKI for a short period of
time, attempted to pull him over, utilizing emergency lights
and siren.
MILEWSKI continued to drive on a side street,
accelerating, at which time it became obvious he was
attempting to flee.
Following a 20-minute, high-speed chase, during which
attempts to forcibly stop MILEWSKI failed, he was blocked
in a car stop by Bureau Agents and OPD officers. The stop
was
effected with the vehicle driven by SA CHONY
immediately in front of MILEWSKI’s Cadillac. This Stop was
effected as the subject was proceeding west on Highway 152,
toward the populated community of Mustang, Oklahoma, after
subject had attempted to go the wrong way on streets, while
being pursued at speed in excess of 90 mph.
After the
vehicle was stopped, SAl
lexited his vehicle and did
not immediately observe the ubject in the white cadillac.
B-i

 _Iwas
_______land

I
FD—204
Synopsis (continued):

I

SlJ
at this point, thought the subject may have
exited the Cadillac, however, he did not see the subject on
foot, nor did he observe reaction of other Agents or o1ice
officers indicating the subject was on foot.
SAl
I
thereafter approached the subject vehicle with his .10 mm
Smith and Wesson handgun drawn.
As he approached the
chiver s side of the Cadillac, he observed N ,EWSK ivina
on the front seat, with his arms stretched out. SAl
thereafter tapped on the windshield and ordered MILEWSKI out
of his vehicle. At this point, he observed MILEWSKX with

a gun in his r
a, anç hø .9s beginning to move the
gun toward SA
SA I
Ithen fired three times
through the win s
d still noticed NILEWSKI coming up
with the gun.
SA
then fired what he believed to be
three more times.
BA
then observed blood in the
vicinity of MXLEWSKI’s head, as Z.1flEWSKI slumped in the
front seat of the vehicle.
thereafter removed from the immediate scene
of the shooting. SAC BOB RICKS, who had been attempting to
catch up with the chase, arrived at the shooting scene,

where he took cçmxnand of the shooting investigation arid
removed SA
other involved Agents from the scene.
A crime scene investation was therafter conducted, under
the direction of SAl
I Subject NILEWSI<I W5
removed by Medical Examiner personnel from the vehicle,
after being declared dead.
During the crime scene
investigation, seven spent catridges from a .10 mm
automatic were recovered outside the Cadillac. Two spent
.25 caliber automatic cartridges were also found inside the
vehicle, along with a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol,
located next to MILEWSKI’S body.
Also recovered at the
scene was a total of $4,492.00 cash, including bait money
identified as having been taken during the robbery of
COMMERCIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN the previous day.
The medical examination of DAVID PAUL NILEWSKI, deceased,
was conducted by I
I M.D., a medical examiner
employed by the state of 0]clahoma.
Following the full

autopsy, the Medical Examiner advised there was a wound to

the chin which appeared to be self-inflicted but was not
fatal. There was also a contact wound to the right temple,
with a .25 caliber bullet lodged in the head. This Wound,
according to the Medical Examin, was fatal and self—
B-2

I
]b 6

L:

 FD—204
Synopsis (continued):
inflicted, In addition, there were two .10 mm wounds to the
head, one to the right hand, and one to the left forearm.
The pathologist ruled the cause of death as a gunshot wound
to the head, and the manner of death wps ruled as a suicide.
All of the rounds fired by SAl
Iwere recovered in the
autopsy or in a search of the interior of the vehicle.
—P—

B-3

 _____ws

D-2O4 (Rcv. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTTCE
Federal Ikweau of nvesgaUon

CopY to:

Shooting Incident Review Group
Criminal Investigative Division

kcpoit o(
D*t

SSA
Mar&,

Of&c:

Fic!d 0fce.Fiic

62A—KC—7457 1

Bureau P1k 1:

[

KANSAS CITY

SHOOTING INCIDENT;
/4 / / )
KANSAS CITY DIVISION
Chnictsr

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

I

I

T}is
w inifjated following the
shootjci of!
Iwhite male, dobi
I
by S
i. I
7
Ion 2/27/95 at Springfield, Missouri.
I was wanted for the armed robbery of a St. Louis,
Missouri bank and t r-acking and kidnapping of three
females on 2/24/95. I
lalso raped one of the females
and stole her vehicle which was used to facilitate two
Springfield,_Missouri bank robberies on 2/27/95.
Aithoughi
Idid not display a weapon during the two
Springfield, Missouri bank_robberies, he did threaten to
kill the victim tellers. Fwas confronted bySA
I alone, in the parking lot of the RE$T IThN COURT

MOTEL located in Springfield,_Missouri at approimately
6:10 pm on 2/27/95. After I
I refused to coml with
or I nstructions and maqe movements towards SAl
I SA
ired one round ati
Ithen fled on foot
If
and ran around the motel while continuing to t n toward
Iwho fired an additional seven round
L
I
I
Ithen stopped and submitted to arrest.
shot
one time in the left calf.

I

I

During the
was taken frinn AI
SASI
and SSRA

inauirv.

a igned sworn statement
I

fl—4

I

ti

Signed sworn

I

by

This &cuoent ctains neither recoomendetions nor concLuslone of the FBh It is the
property of the FBt eed Is Loaned to
your agency; it and Its contents are not to be distrfbted outside your e9ecy.

 ______

________________

b

62A—KC--74571

I

I

I

statements were also taken from SAs
Ian
Interviews were coIW.ucted.
witiesses located at th motel. A crime scene
investigation was conducted by representatives o’ the
SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT.
-F
ib 6
7C

1.
On Friay, 2/24/95 at aroximatiy 4:30
pm,I
I white male, dobj
I entered
the HEARTLAND SAVINGS BANK, St. Louis, Missouri,
displayed a large handgun to the assistant manager and
threatened to kill everyone in te ban. Attr. obtaining
the contents of two cash drwers,I
Ideparted the bank.
Upon levina the bank, a dye pack exploded and, as a
j dropped the money and departed on foOt.
result,
2.
Following the unsuccessful robbery of the
HEARTLAND SAVINGS BAN( I
lconfronted three women at
the Keiner Plaza parking garage, St. Louis, Missouri, and
forced the three women to drive him to Pontoon Beach,
Illinois in a green Mercury Tracer station wagon which
belonged to one of the three women. He orderect the three
women out of the car in Pontoon Beach, Illinois and raped
one of the three women.
3•
On 2/27/95 at approximately 10:40 am, the
GREAT SOUTHERN SAVINGS BANK, Springfield, Missouri., was
robb
uoing a demand note. The note demanded
that
e given U.S. currency in specified
dnomina ions and if the tellçr di not compiy,I_____
would kill the taller.__Afterj
Ideparted the bank, the
dye pack exploded. I
I dropped the money and fed the
scene in what witnesses described as a jade colãpd
station wagon.
Surveillance photographs of I
I were
taken at the bank.
4.

At approximately 12:00 noon on 2/27/95,
2000
East Xearney Street. prinqfield, Missouri. Information
illustrated on I
I reqistratic,n car4 identified I
car as a Mercury Tracer.
I checked into room 36, REST HAVEN COURT MOTEL,

5,
On 2/27/95 at 3:30 pm, the FIRST CITY____
NATIONAL BANIC, Springfield, MIssouri, was robbed by I
I
again using. a demand note. The demand note instructed
the victim teller to give I
pecified denominations of
2

I

 ______Idepar€d

62A—KC—74573.

I

I

U.S. currency, indicated that
a gun, and that if
the victim teller did not compi
would kiliber.
The demand note was written on. a C SC belonging:to
has identified a
çwner o the
green Mercury Tracer station wagon.
the
bank in possession of $2,160 in U.S. currency and-fled
the scepe in a green station wagon.. A surveillance video
tape oft
I was taken at the bank.
6. At approximately 6:00 pm, SAl_________
l1ocated the green Mercury Tracer station wagon in

the parking lot of the REST HAVEN COURT MOTEL, 2000 East
Kearney Street, Springfield, Missçuri. At approximately
6:l0 pm (dusk) and prior to the arrival of back-up
special agent personnel,
‘eft his motel room and
began walking towards SA
I
7.
sAl
I knowing that: a)
was a
fugitive wanted for the armed robbery
e
TLMID
SAVINGS BMK, St. Louis, Missouri;_b)
carj acked and
kidnapped three women; a) thad
I ro e both the GREAT
SOUTHERN SAVINGS_BANK and the FIRST CITY NATXONM4 BANK
during which!
Ithreatened to kill the victim tellers
through information written on dçand notes thati
j
provided to the victim toIlers; d) thati
amed,
dangerous and mentally unstable.;_and e) thati
1
Iwas a
danger to the community, SAl
decided to effect the
I
arrest of I
I

I

I

8.
Afterl
refused to comply with SA
oral instructions to surrender hif and after
made furtive movements towards SAl
L
-4 which led
S4
Ito believe that e was 1
in imminent danger, SA
laimed his pistol ati
I upper left thigh nd
fired ope roqnd.
then turned and ran. As.SA
pursuec3l
I SA
red approximately seye
additional times a
in order to prevent!
obtaining a tactica) adntag by obtaining cover Ifrom
which
would have afforded!
Ithe t”mtvt-f-jinity to kill SAl
and to preventj
ally stopped
1
I escape. I_ I fr
running and submitted to arrest.
Iwas dressed in
I
regular fitting jeans and a white short—sleeved t-shi
rt.
9.
SAl
lused his Bureau issued pistol., a
Sig Sauer P228 (14 round capacity), serial number
Bl77l6. and 147 grain, 9mm hydra—shock amunt
tion to
shooti
I.
Subseciuent inspection of I
Ipistol
revealed that one live round was chambered and five
live
rounds remained in the magazine.
3

I

 __

______Ireported

_________

62A—KC—74571

I

10.
Per the Incidental Report of Officerl
I
SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT,
1 the crime scene investigation, it appeared that
rerriir
SAl
If ired his pistol ati
I two times hi
northeasterly direction near the green Mercury acer
station wagon.
One ullet strck
Dodge Ra extended—
cab truck ieroing the rear passenger side and the other
uliet struck the downspout of a rain guttr affixed to
the northwest corner of the east wing building. Due to
the height of these two bullets,I
flid not
believe that these two bullets struck!
I One shell
casing was recoiro
the green Mercury Tracer
station wagon. I
kurther believed that SAl
I
may have fired twice while pursuing
lion•g the north
side of the east wing building
The rirst indication
tha
I had been struck by a bullet was blood found on
two leaves located approximately 30 feet from the
northeat corner of the east wing building.. I
I
followed the blood in a southeast diredtiOn througn a
parking lot located on the east side of the east wing
building.
The parking lot and east wing .bui)ing are
separated by a service road to the west of the parking
lot and a section of grass to the west of tie
road
that the blood became more
prevalent and l4ie blood spatter increased as the distance
grew
SA I
I fired two more times in the vicinity of a
white Ford truck which was parked in the parking lot
located just east of the serv ce road. Two shell caeings
were recovered from the vicinity of the white Ford truck
Two additional shots were fired from a location on or
near -the service road
Two shell casings were recovered
from -the Cèrvjce road. Two. bullet holes were found on
the north face of the motel service building located just
south and slightly el- r-f i-h,east wing building
It
t
‘was not privy to SA
? noted that!
I statement when he attempted to determinè what
happened at the scene.

I

-

I

II.
Property $aki own to date a a result
of shots being fired by A. I
Iincludes,:. a) one bullet
hole in the downspout of a tam gittet, b) one bullet
hole which pierced the rear passenger side of a Dodge Ram
extended-cab truck., and a.) two bullets holes on the north
face of the motel service building. The Dodqe Ram
extended-cab truck, bearing Missouri license I
L was
determined to be registered to
I Creighton Missouri.

4

 62A—KC—7457j.
12.
Dr..L
I Springfield,
Misouj, advised that bsed upon his examinatiofl-.of
I
Ileg wound, the bullet entered the posterior
portion of the calf of the left leg below the ke and to
the inside of the leg. The exit wound appeared ‘a be on
the interior, or front, portion of the left leg—below the
knee and to the inside of the leg. The exit wound was
slightly higher than the entrance wound and the bullet
moved to the right from entrance to exit.

Iwas

I

13.
On 2/28/95,
charged by a federal
complaint in the Western. District of Missouri,
Springfield, Missouri, with two counts of bank robbery.
14. At 4:56 pm on 2/28/95, a search was
conducted pursuant to a federal search warrant of the
passenger compartment 9f the green Mercury Tracer station
wagon utilized byl
Ito facilitate the robberies of the
GREAT SOUTHERN SAVINGS BANK and the FIRST CITY NATIONAL
BARK. •A black plastic ARS brand prop gun was found under
the driver’s seat of the station wagon.
15.
On 3/1/95, ASAC JOSEPH S. ROSS met with
Greene County, Missouri District Attorney I
who advised that upon receipt of the SPRINGFIELD,
MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT’S Report of Izvesticratipn he
would render a prosecutive opinion. Mr. I
I
received a copy of the SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI POLICE
DEPARTMENT’S report on 3/8/95. He has no standing grand
jjry to hear these type of matters. Mr.. I
Iwill
prOvide the FBI with written confirmation of his
prosecutive opinion
16.
On 3/1/9S, five shell casings, one bullet,
one metal jacket from a bullet, lead fra ents from a
bullet, gunshot residue kit
SA
gunshot
resi
gunshot residue kit
SA
ix 9mm bullets, one Sig Sauer P228
pistol (serial number B177136), and magazines wets
forwarded by a representative of the SPRINGFIELD.,
MISSOURI POLICE. DEPARTMENT to the MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY
PATROL, Criminal Laboratory Division, for analysis.
On
I Criminalist, MISSOURI STATE
HIGHWAY PATROL,. advised that: a) the pistol functioned
normally, b) one expended bullet was identified as having
been fired from 5?
jSig Saner P228, c) one
expended bullet jacket was identified as being fired from
-

—

-

—

5

I

 ______Ifurther

b

62A—KC—74571

SAL
ig Sauer P228, and d) five expened cartridge
cases were identified as beina fired froi SAl
I Sig
Sauer P228.
On 3/10/95,1
I CriminaJ.ist, Trace
Evidence,_advised that -the gunshot_residue testonducted
on SZJ
Iwas inconclusive.
stated that
gunhot residue was not indicated on tests conducted on

SASI

landi

I

1Hc

6

 Ithat

FD-204 (9.ev. 3-3-59)

UN1TET) STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy o:

•

Reportof:

ADIC W. LANE CROCKER, JR.
June 2, 1995

Pic1dOflceFls#:
But
iioN:

66F—WF198346
WMFO 66F—WF—198346
SNOOPING INCIDENT
SA SRUCE EUGENE SCHULZ (DECEASED),
MARCH 8, 1995;
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE

Title:

Character

I

.

I

WMFO

ADMINISTRATIVB INQUIRY

1

Synopsis:

•

Ornce:

On March 8, 1995]
the Wife of SA BRUCE
EUGENE SCHULZ, got up at approximtelv 6:15 a.m , as she routinely
did, and got ready to go to work. I
iwalked to a bathroom,
which is lprated d-i.cnt tn th nrnd floor master bedroom of the
residence,I
Washington, D.C.
As
Fa1ked to the bathroom, she noticed that SA SCHULZ was
already up; that he was nervously pacing around; and that he was
dressed only in his undershorts.
It did not appear tel
I
that SA SCHULZ had begun preparing to go to work.

I

At approximately 6:42 a.m., whilel
Iwas in the
bathroom, she heard a gunshot and then ran to the mater bedroom.
Idid not see SA SCHULZ in the bedroom, and she ran out of
lfle second floor foyer, where she found SA SCHULZ laying on the
floor.
More specifically, SA SCHULZ was laying on his back with his
arms outstretched, perpendicular to his body. It appeared to I
I
SA SCHULZ had a single gunshot wound to the let side of
his head.
In addition, a black revolver was laying on the floor near
SA SCHULZ’ extended left arm.
tJpon finding SA SCHULZ,!
kminediately
telephoned the METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT (MPD) Emergency
9 call was recorded at 6:43 a.ni.
Th. c
Services Unit (1Yfl.
ESU
personnel told!
wrap the wound.
MPD and Emergency
Medical Technicians arrived at 6:47 a.m. and rendered further mdil
assistanc to SA SCHULZ.
SA SCHULZ was subsequently taken to the

Ito

This docueeht ContainS neither r’econnendation nor conclusions of the FBI.

it is the property of the FBI and is ‘oaned to

your agoncy; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 nd

4.

S

S

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY HOSPIPAL GWUH) Emergency Room (ER).
MFO agents arrived at both the SCHULZ residence and the GWUH ER at
approximately 6:55 a.m.
At 6:59 a.m., SA SCHULZ was pronounced dead.
•It appeared that the cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the
left side of his head.
The crime scene was secured and processed by the MFO
Evidence Resronse Team and the MPD Mobile Crime Unit
Rinp
due to the sensitive nature of SA SCHULZ’ work
assignments,I
Iwas asked to consent to a search of the
residence.
After obtaining consent, W1FO agents searched the
residence and found nothing unusual that would be relevant to the
administrative inquiry.

•

•

•

•

•
•

Copies of documents pertaining to the collection and
analysis of evidence recovered at the residence, MPD investigative
reports and medical reports were obtained by WMFO,
Interviews of
ISA SCHULZ’ associates at WMFO and SA SCHULZ’ personal
I
acquaintances, portrayed a troubledagent.
It appears that SA SCHULZ
had extensive debts and poor money management skills.
On numerous
occasions, SA SCHULZ told his wife that he was not adequately
prepared for a new work assignment, which he had been given.
More
specifically, SA SCHULZ had concerns about his added responsibilities
and sophisticated equipment, with which he was to familiarize
himself.
SA SCHULZ told[
I that he was a carpenter not an
engineer.
SA $CHULZ’ squad associates described him as troubled due
to self—imposed pressure, new job expectations and poor investments
in the real estate market.
SA SCHULZ told his colleagues that he was
afraid of being terminated from the FBI
1 if it was determined that he
could not do his job, that he was eriously in debt and that he was a
poor money manager.
SA SCHULZ’ friends also mentioned that he had
made poor investments in the real estate market and that he was
fearful of impending legal action against him by tenants of one of
his rental properties.
Referenced HQ investigation, although still pending, has
determined that several major improprieties concerning SA SCHULZ have
been identified.
The investigation had proceeded with polygraph
examinations of other individuals involved, leaving only SA SCHULZ to
be xamined.
SA SCHULZ according to squad associates, was aware that
the other polygraphs had been completed and he was the remaining
examineë. This investigation to date is of such scope that complete
restitution is to be made by the estate of SA BRUCE EUGE’TE SCHULZ.
Credit reports showed that SA SCHULZ had depleted a joint
savings account, which he had with his wife.
SA SCHULZ also had
taken out a substantial car loan and. a significant first mortgage on
rental property.
In addition, a first mortgage and an owner held
2

 .4

second trust note had also been obtained by SA
SCHULZ for another
property he and his wife were refurbishing.
•

•

I

The black revolver recovered from next to SA SCHULZ
was
identified as his Bureau issued SMITH arid WESSON,
Model 13—3,
.38/.357 Magnum revolver, bearing serial numbe
r ACE 3034.
The
projectile which was recovered from SA SCKULZ’
body was identified as
/7 1
c bullet.
Furthermore, the bullet removed by Dr.
Iduring the autopsy was identified as having been fired
from SA SCHULZ’ service revolver.

•

•

.

.

3*

 Mr.
J

Gore

7/24/95

R. .KtoWLiOfl

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/10/95
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

I

erence report of Supervisory Special Agenti
dated 1/18/95.
PuRpOgI:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
coxnments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECON4n1I’rnN!
‘Vh1- po administrative action be taken against
SAf
a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

Mr.
IRoom 7142
Mr.
Room 7125 (Enclosure)
Mr.
Room 7116
—
Mr.
Room 6012
Ifloqi 6050)
( 1— Mr.
Room 4997)
( 1—Mr.’!
1— Mr.
j Room 7125
2
Mr.I
Iopm 7427
IRoom 7326)
( 1— Mr.I
1
Mr. Know1ton Room 7825
1 — NT. I
I Room 5012
1- Mr.j
o5m 4042
1 — Mr .
J, Quantico
1 — Mr.j
I Room 3117
—
I WM1O
Mr.[
Room 7837
1—Mrs1
;lrr
1
1.
1
3

—

—

—

—

—

I

(CONTINUED

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from 13. R. Knowlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/28/95
Cleveland Division

I

DETAIlS:
On 7/18/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman David R.
Knowlton, Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; .Robert- S.—GonfotiF-Section Chief, V-iolent
Crimes and Major Offenders Section, Criminal ‘Investigative
Division; Edward R. Leary, Section Chief. Personnel Management
Section, Personnel Division;I
lunit Chief,
NS—2D Unit. çlobal Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Traininq’ and
Am1nistration Section, Training Division;I
lUnit
Chief, Undercover and Sensitive Operations unit, LUDL1C
Corruptiop
ir1 Terh+q !ection, Criminal Investigative
Division;!
I Unit Chief, Investigative aw Unit,
Legal Advice and, Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
anal
I Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the above—
oaptioneci snooting incident.
—

Synopsis of the Shoot.jntT Incident
On 1/10/95, SAI________ along with other members of
the Safe Streets Fugitive TasJc Force (FTF) participated in the
execution of a city pf Phi1adelDhj search warrant at a residence
located ati
I Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
This search. warrant was being executed in an attempt to locate
and apprehend
Ifor which
local warrant existed for
the robbery ot a onecic casning agency.I
Iwas also wanted for
questioning by the FBI for the robbery of the Sun Federal Credit
Unit.

J

As they approached the residence at approximately 6:50
am on the above date, they could hear dogs barking inside. After
unsuccessful attempts to get someone from the inside tr
door, entry was obtained by using a battering rant. SA I
along with three other members of the eight member entry team,
were assigned to clear the first floor while the other four were
assigned to the second. Upon reaching the second floor, the teamh
encountered a Pitbull dog. A short while later the first floor
team encountered a dog in the kitchen area. Unknown at the time,
there was a rear stairway which led from the kitchen to the
upstairs hallway.
There was only one dog and it had gone front
the upstairs to the kitchen via that stairway.

I

The owner of the dog, who had been located in one of
(CONTINUED
2

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from D. R. Knowlton to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/28/95
Cleveland Division

-—

I

the second floor bedrooms, was ordered to secure the dog. As he
approached the dog from the upstairs hallway, the dog charged SA
Jand another meinber of .t-he -downstai.r-s- team- who- were in
the kitchen.
SAl
If ired two shots from his personally
owned, Bureau approved 45 Cal. pistol and killed the dog.
Observations and 1eccnnmendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the report dated 1/18/95. revealed that proper
procedures were followed by SA
I during this shooting
incident.

After a thorough review of the facts regarding this
incident, it is the opinion of the SIRG that no administrative
action should be taken against SAl
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

3

7
7:

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/29/95
Baltimore Division
The SIRG considered the stronrj
‘pts made by
Baltimore SAC McNaUy and Baltimore SSAI
Iregarding this
investigation being conducted by WMFO with a police department in
Maryland without a continuous dialogue occurrinc witi the Baltimore
Division.
Just prior to this incident, SSAI
Iwas notified
at 10:40 pa that an arrest was being planned in his territory by
MF0 without input from Baltimore Division SAs.
As documented in
the report, WEFO personnel had arrived in the Greenbelt, MD, area
at approximately 10:00 pm having ben directed there at
approximately 9:30 pm.
Meither SSAI_________ or the reporting
Baltimore SAc were provided with a photo of the suspect as had the
WMFO Agents, although SSAI
Jwas provided with a description
which was relayed by radio to the altimore Agents.
The SIRG recognized that WMFO deployed components from an
operational squad, a makeup SOG Squad (including an Agent on TDY
assignment to Quantico), technical resources, WMFO detectives, and..
PGCPD detectives in an extraordinary effort to arrest McLean.
This
deployment didjt inc),ude a Supervisory Special Agent.
The SIRG
noted that SSAI
I”remained in the MF0 te act as thecoimiianp
post.” It was obvious to the SIRG that SS
Iwas extremely
busy providing briefings to SAC Megary, staying in telephonic
contact with PGCPD detectives with the source, and directing the
aforementioned components. chen it c’as obvious that delovmçnt was
necessary into Maryland, SSAI
Idid notify SSAI
I
throuch the Baltimore Division switchboard.
The SIRG noted that in
Jetatement that the Baltimore Division was called as a
SSAI
“courtesy” and was not being requested to provide assistance.
“WMFO was prepared to provide all necessary manpower for this
investigation.” SSAI
Idid subsequently leave WEFO to provide
on-scene direction at approximately 12:15
12:30 am.
While
enroute, SSAI
called hLm and. told him he needed to come up
with an operational plan.
SSAL
Idid not arrive on the scene
until after SA Christian was murdered.
-

After thoroughly discussing the above, Acting Chief
inspectorl
lalso advised the other members of the SXRG that
SAC McNally had orally advised him that he and WMFO ADIC Crocker
were working on a plan to ensure that both WMFO and Baltimore SAc
were again apprised of the necessity of keeping each other informed
of investigations that cross territorial boundaries and emphasizing
that enforcement actions such as search warrants or arrests are the

responsibility df the management officials in whose territory the

activity takes place except for exigent circumstances.
(CONTINUED
7

Savage- 1452

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from N. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Core
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident,
5/29/95
Baltimore Division
In summary, the SIRG concluded that no FBI employee
should be subjected to administrative action as a result of their
involvement in this matter.
The SIRG recommended that the SAC
Baltimore and the ADIC FQ continue to pursue and implement a
workable solution for operational procedures involving matters that
cross territorial boundaries.
Lastly, the SIRG arrived at the
recommendation that the ADIC, WMFO, should review its, operational
procedures regarding command post situations, including the need
for onsite ranking management presence and oversight as events
dictate.

8

Savage- 1453

 10/3/95

Mr. Gore
W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
6/1/95
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

Reference report of Associate Special Agent in Charge
(A-SAC), Sheila W. Moran, dated 8/10/95.
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
PURPOSE:
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
Th no administrative action be taken against
BCr1AMflhTfl
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
1
4

—
-

IRoom 7142
1
M2
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
p Room 7116
4
Mr
Mr.
IRoom 6012
Mr. Leary, Room 6050)
(1
(1 — Mr.i
I Room 4997)
(1
Mr. Harp, Room 6646)
Mr. Thompson, Room 7129
1nmi 7427
Mr.I
(1
IRoom 7326)
Mn
Mr.l
IRooni 7825
Mr. Qv1e, Room 4042
I flflT
Mr.[
(1—Msl

1
1

—
-

9—

Room
L NMFO

Mr.
Mr.
Mrs.

I

I

3787F

Room 7837

—

—

1

-

2

—

—

1,
1
2
1
1

—
—
—

—
—

Mr.I

Ms..I

LRR:lrr (19)

I

Füantico

LRoom 3849

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1454

I.

—

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Core
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/1/95
Philadelphia Division
That the Office of General Counsel address and
(2)
clarify with all Chief Division Counsels (CDC5) under what specific
circumstances, during administrative inquiries, individuals would
be compelled to make statements.

I

On 8/30/95, the SIRG, consisting of chairman Wiley 0.
DETAILS:
ThomDson, In, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
lActing Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section chief, Global
Section — NS-2, National Security Division; Van A. Harp, Section
Chief, Personnel Administration and Benefit Section, Personnel
Division;[
i Trial Attorney, Terrorism and Violent
Crimes Section. Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
(USDOJ) ,i
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division’T)
I Unit ChLeL, H tmce pd Unit,

Criminal nvesigaive uivision;
Unit Chief,
Train ng Section, Office
Investigative Law Unit,
Unit Chief, Firearms of the General Counsel;
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
andi
I Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the above—
!b6
captioned shooting incident.
SynoDsis of the Sbootincj Incident

A preliminary inquiry was initiated on 5/16/95, on “Glenn
Thomas, aka Glenn Gram, Keith Graham, Keith Thomas, Jahlil Thomas,
Shawn Thomas; Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) —
Aggravated Assault.” The case was based on information furnished
by the Philadelphia County District Attorney’s Office.
It was
opened and assigned to SA
Iwho is a member of the
Philadelphia Office’s Fugitive Task Force.
Review of the case indicated two “failure to appear”
bench warrants outstanding against the subject.
The first, issued
on 2/27/95, involved original charges of theft, receiving stolen
property, and two counts of violation of the Uniform Firearms Act.
(CONTINUED

2

Savage- 1455

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson? III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/1/95
Philadelphia Division

The second warrant, issued 3/31/95, involved original charges of
aggravated assault (against two Philadelphia Housing Authority

Officers), recklessly endangering another person, resisting arrest,
and two counts of violation of the Uniform Firearms Act.
Additional charges lodged against Glenn Thomas involved a 12/8/94,
arrest for firearm not to be carried without a license and other
violations, in the jurisdiction of the Upper Darby Township Police
Department.

Ireceived “real time” information
On 6/1/95, SAl
by a former source of the Philadelphia Division who had been closed
several months earlier, that Thomas was present at the Whitehall
Housing projects. Additional information provided by the source
indicated that Glenn Thomas was wearing a black tee shirt, green
shorts, sneakers, was armed with a handgun, and was currently at
The.
Tackawanna and Fillmore Streets with three other black males.
source was in a position to know the location of Thomas because he
saw him periodically in the Whitehall Projects. This source had
icr other SAs in the Philadelphia Division
also supplied SAl
with reliable information on at least three previous occasions
resulting in arrests and/or convictions.
SA I
kas able to respond upon receipt of the
6/1/95, phone call from the source. He immediately requested
members of the Task Force to assist him in apprehending the
subject. He obtained the assistance of six SAs and/or officers.
The six participants, located at several locations around the city,
began to converge on the Whitehall location; however, three Task
Force members were delayed by heavy traffic. The four other
members, including SA a
arrived at the project some blocks
from the reported location of the subject.
Since there were four
armed law enforcement officers onsite and the circumstances were
critical and very fluid, a judgement was made that an arrest could
be accomplished without waiting for the three delayed Task Force
members.

Prior to the arrival of SAl
I two Task Force
Detectives drove through the Tackawanna Street area because the
source indicated that Thomas had an AK—47 automatic weapon in his
white Thunderbird automobile. Attempts to locate the Thunderbird
were unsuccessful. An arrest plan was conceived and agreed upon
by SAl
I and the onsite Task Force members. The plan was to
approach Thomas and while doing so, utilize their vehicles and
existing buildings to contain Thomas, as well, as possible, should
(CONTINUED - OVER)
3

Savage- 1456

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr. core
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/1/95
Philadelphia Division
The members planned to approach Thomas and
he attempt to flee.
place their four Bureau cars in such a way as to block his exit.
Each Task Force member was driving a car and it was decided that
1would lead the way to Thoias’ location, that
Detective I
AI
Iwould be second, then sergeanti
1and Detective
respectively, would follow.
Glenn Thomas was located shortly after 4:30 pm, by Task
Force meinbes in the exact place previously identified by the
]exited their vehicles a
source. SAl
I and Detective I
short distance from a group of black males sitting on a pipe fence.
The black males, including Glenn Thomas, recognized the Task Force
members as law enforcement off icer and beqan fleeing the ara
I and/or Detectivd
According to statements, either SAl
Police.” The
immediately identified themselves by yelling “Stop
pursuit of Thomas began in a northerly direction along Tackawanna
I advised that as he was chasing Glenn Thomas he
SAL
Street.
saw his ‘tee shirt raise up on the left side exposing a handgun
which was silver and black. He distinctly recognized this to bç
the grip of a handgun and yelled “he’s got a gun.” SAl
Isaw
the subject grip the weapon with his left hand, adjust the grip,
and begin to draw the weapon from his waist. Upon seeing the
si41ect arip the weapon and begin to draw it from his waist,
SAL
If ired one shot, inflicting a fatal gunshot wound to the
back of the subject’s head.
—

Detective
of the Major Crimes Fugitive Task Force,
began pursuing Glenn Thomas and,
advised that he and SA
saw the subject lift his tee shirt
while running, Detective
br gun from his waist band
with his left hand and dra
Detective
that Glenn Thomas
with his right hand.
then started to turn bTck towards SA
with the gun and,
was raising hls weapon, he heard one gunshot
while Detective I
and saw Glenn Thomas fall to the ground.
The silver colored
handgun that Glenn Thomas had drawn from his waistband fell to the
ground next to him.

I

I

also a member of the Fugitive
Detective
Task Force, and on the scene of this incident, advised that as he
exited his car, he saw a black male running north on Tackawanna
Street. This individual was wearing clothing matching the
previously described clothing that the subject was wearing.. While
station wagon parked between him and the
in the street, and iith
subject, Detective I
Isaw SA I
I and Detective l
I
(CONTINUED

4

Savage- 1457

-

OVER)

I

 __________he

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/1/95
Philadelphia Division

L

Detective
subject.
ladvised that he beard SA
yell, “Stop, Police” and saw the subject had run past the
station wagon and in one motion, reached down with his left hand
and was pulling up his shirt and began to pull a gun from his waist
with his right hand as he was turning ioward his right. As the
Iheard a shot, saw the
subject was drawing the gun, Detective I
subject fail to the sidewalk and in the process the subject’s gun
dropped to the ground.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the.

intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force: (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational

standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning

training and/or safety, issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
Based en a review of the above—captioned shooting
incident as documented by the report dated 8/10/95, member of the
SIRG unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force by SA I

was justified. It was further de_rminedhat no administrative
I for his involvement in b
action should be taken against SA I
this shooting incident. The SIRG unanimously agreed that deadly b7
force is justified when a fleeing felon, who is drawing a weapon,
is running with his/her back to the law enforcement officer.
Members noted that the subject was known to be armed and dangerous,
a stop warning was issued by law enforcement officers on the scene,
and that the officers had no responsibility to wait for the subject
to turn around or draw his weapon before taking proactive action.

The second phase of the discussion centered around the

training and/or safety issues, as well as the adequacy of planning
related to this incident. SIRG members acknowledged that although

there may not have been a sit down planning situation for the
arrest of Glenn Thomas, and that the planning of the arrest may
have lacked some dimensions, it was adequate and reasonable under
the circumstances. Members agreed that a thorough working
relationship between Federal and state law enforcement officers
must be developed due to the large number of Task Forces throughout
the country and that Task Force officers should train with Bureau
The Training Division representative advised that the 1995
SAs.
(CONTINT3ED

-

5

Savage- 1458

-

OVER)

 b

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Administrative Inquiry
Re:
Shoot ing Incident
6/1/95
Philadelphia Division

and subsequent budgets had street survival training for Task Forc&
officers budgeted; however, due to the large volume of new SAs
being trained, no resources are available for Task Force training
for the next several years.

I

1

The remaining issue involved the statement of SA
advising that the FBI compelled him to provide his statement
The Office of General Counsel
regarding this shooting incident,
member advised that employees are not compelled to give statements
Under these
during the course of an administrative inquiry.
It was
circumstances, a request for a voluntary statement is made.
further noted that if a statement is compelled, an Advice of Rights
Form should have been provided and the individual should be
Office of General Counsel agreed to address all CDCs
immunized.
regarding the matter of compelled statements and voluntary
statements.
It should be noted that during the initial discussion of
this shooting incident there was no representative from the Civil
However, due to several questions
Rights Division, USDOJ present.
brought up by SXRG members, a telephone call was made to the
Philadelphia Division and this incident was discussed a second
Before the second discussion of this incident, the DOJ’
time.
representative had arrived; however, elected to remove himself from
the discussion and recommendations due to the pending civil rights
matter that was initiated by the 1303 following this incident,

6

Savage- 1459

 _______
___________

Mr. Gore

Thompson,

W. D.

11/8/95
III

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
6/22/95
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE (WMFO)
Reference report of Special Agent (SA)
dated 9/7/95.

I

I
b6

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Sheeting Incident Review
Group (SXRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

RCO*!ENDATION:

That no adverse action be taken against

8)4
incident.

1
1.
1
4

las a result of his involvement in this shooting

I

I

Mr.
Room 7142
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr.fl
IRoom 7116
Mr.I
,
Room 6012
(2.
Mr.I
1 Room 6050)
(1
Mr. L
IRoom 4997)
(1
Mr. Harp, ocm 6646)
1
Mr. Thompson, Room 7129
3
Mr. I
I Room 7427
(1
room 7427)
ir.l
(1
Mr.l
L Room 7326)
2.
Mr.
I Room 7825
1—Ms.
IDOJ
1
Mr. uoy.i.e, ‘cobm 4042
1-Mr.
1
Mr.
Quantico
—

-

-

—
—

1
1
1

—
—
—
—

Ms.
Mr.
Mr.

oom 3849
Room 3787F
I WNFO
Room 7837
,

Mrs.

I

—
—

—

-

—

--

-

—

—

lb 7 C

—

-

—

LRR:lrr (20)

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1460

-

OVER).

lb 7

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/22/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office

DETAILS:
on 9/29/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley 0.
Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
Chief Inspectorl
Iff ice of Inspections,
Inspction Division; I
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, USD03; Edward R. Leary, Sectiç (hf. Prnnr1
Management Section, Personnel Division;I
I Unit
Chief, Global Section
NS—2, National Security Division; Van A.
Harp, Section chief Personnel Ad4nistration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division;
I Deputy Section Chif. Thrrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;L
I
Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; I
I
I
I Unit thi f 11 i-h rv- Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative
Division;
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Legal Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
I
I Unit Chief, Firearms — Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
r!i-inn.. Tbn
iry Division;I
Analysis
ISupervisor,
WMFO; and I
I Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, met to discuss the above-captioned shooting incident.
-

—

I

-

Svnosis of the Shootinu Incident
On 6/22/95, SAl
I currently assigned to Squad
C-16, WMFO, was conducting a routine surveillance in the vicinity
of the Eastside Nightclub located adjacent to the WMFO on Half
Street, Southwest (SW), Washincton, D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department (NPD) Detective L
I currently a4 qned to.
the Squad C—16 Safe Streets Theic Force accompanied SAl
Ion this
surveillance. The initial surveillance began a1 the garage area of
the WMFo; however, at approximately 3:00 am, SAl
and Detective
I
hoved their surveillance location to the East side of “R’
Street, SW, facing Half Street. As they sat in the Bureau vehicle
observing vehicles leaving the Eastside Club, a vehicle was
observed moving slowly down Half Street. When the vehicle was at
Half and “ “ Streets, approçimat1v tNo to three car lengths from
them, SA
and Detective j
lobserved a black male running
along si e o
vehicle firing into the passenger’s side of the
vehicle.
SA
nd Detective I
lexited their vehicle at
which time SA
immediately identified himself and proceeded
down the west side of Half Street, in pursuit of the black male who
continued down the east ide qf Half Street travelling in a
northerly direction.
SAl
Ishouted “Stop_P1ice! Drop the gun!”
two or three times and at that same time SAl
I !iould hear
gunshots.
The sub ect then turned toward SA I
I anc[ he cpuld see
that the subject had the handgun pointed at him. SA I
I
discharged his Bureau, issued Sig Sauer P220 .45 caliber semi1;;7’
automatic pistol eight times. SAl
Iproceeded to reload his
2

Savage- 1461

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/22/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
pistol when he 9
hsr’ed the subject limping and no longer carrying
the weapon. SAl
lordered the subject to ge dowa. The subject
mn1id qnd was subsequently handcuffed by SAl
land Detective
I The juvenile subject was struck by one round in the
left ankle and was transported by DC ambulance to DC General
Hospital for a non—life threatening injury. A Smith and Wesson
.357 with a six inch barrel was recovered adjacent to the dumpster
located between “R” and “s” streets, containing six spent shell
casings.
The vehicle that was being shot into by the juvenile
subject proceeded northbound on Half Street. As the vehicle
crossed Potomac Avenue, it crashed into the wooded area located on
the corner of Half Street and Potomac Avenue, SW. The vehicle
proceeded to catch fire and burn. A black male, identified as
Montey Fullard, was dead on the scene from multiple gunshot wounds.
A second occupant of the vehicle was uninjured.
Observations and Recossendattons of the SIRG
The SXRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, arid
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/er safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
The_SIG unanimously concurred that the use of deadly
force by SAl
Iwas justified and in accordance with Bureau
policy. However, according to records provided in the initial
report, SAl
Iliad not officially qualified with his Bureau
approved weapon since 10/14/94. SIRG members were concerned with
this lack of routine qualifying; howe
0 provided updated
qualifying records indicating that SA
last qualified with his
Bureau issued Sig Sauer P220 semi automatic pistol on 3/10/95.

3

Savage- 1462

 Mr. Gore

11/3/95

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT

7/7/95
TRAINING DIVISION

I dated

Reference report of Inspectorl

8/4/95.

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1)
That the Training Division (TD) adopt a
uniform Bureau-wide policy regarding the utilization of redhandled weapons, and ensure all Principal Firearms Instructors
çPFIs) are promptly apprised of the policy.

1
1
1
4

Mr.I

I

Room.7142
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr.
I Room 7116
Mr. I
I Room 6012
(1
Mr. Ieary, Room 6050)
(1
ASU, Room 4997)
(1
Mr. Harp, Room 6646)
1
Mr. Thompson, Room 7129
2
Mr.!
I Room 7427
(1
Mn
I Room 7326)
1
Mr.I
I ROO 7825
3.
Mr. flr,vi Room 4042
lTht-ir
2—Mr.!
(1—Mel
j
1
Mr.[
Quantico
1
Ms.1
Room 3849
LRR:lrr (20)
—

—

—

Mr.
Mr.
Mrs.

Room 3787F
IWMFO
Room 7837

—

—

—

—

-

—

)7C

—

—

—

—

—

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1463

—

OVER)

 Memorandum ‘from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore

Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/7/95
Training Division

(2)
That in the event red—handled utilization is
continued, the TD should consider completely coloring the weapon in
a highly visible color.

(3)
That the TD consider developing a mechanism to
document and evaluate, with appropriate sanctions, firearms safety
violations. Furthermore, it is recommended that this mechanism
employ a method to accommodate an agency—wide review for trend
considerations.
-

(4)

That the TI) review the policy as articulated by

memorandum dated 4/27/95, regarding firearms instructors visibly

carrying loaded firearms throughout the FBI Academy to determine
if

the policy should be modified.

(CONTINUED

2

Savage- 1464

—

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/7/95
Training Division
(5)
That the TD review the emergency response to this
incident to determine if improvements can be made in emergency
response capabilities.

*
(6)
That the Administrative Summary Unit (ASU),
Personnel Division (PD) prepare and forward a4etter of censur
e to
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I
Ifor his inattention
to tardd jirearm safety procedures. This letter should advise
SSA I
I that he is being decertified as a firearms instructor
for the rinajnder of his Bureau career.
Additional penalties for
SSAI
Jshould be determined by ASU, PD, based on east
precedents, taking into consideration that SSAI
I was
involved in two prior safety infractions not involving injury.
b7

(7)
That the PD remove SS
approved firearms instructors.

I

from the

(CONTINUED
3

Savage- 1465

list of

-

OVER)

 Memorandum froiu.W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/7/95
Training Division
(8)
That the PD, Employee Assistance Unit, ensure that
any impairments with respect to SSAI
Icarrying his weapon
are resolved before he returns to an investigative assignment.

I

DETAILS:
On 8/30/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
I Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section Chief, Global
Section
NS—2, National Security Division; Van A. Harp, Section
Chief, ?eçscnnl Ad nitVation and Benefit Section, Personnel
Division:I
i Attorney, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ;
I Trial Attorney, J-rrn-’ sin nd violent Crimes
Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ
I Unit Chief,
Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; 1
I Unit
Chief, Health Care Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative Division;
1 Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, Legal
Advice and Trainj.ng Section, Office of th General Counsel;
J Unit Chief, Firearms
Tqolmarks Unit. cientifio
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division; and I
I
Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the above-captioned shooting
incident.
—

I

I
I

—

,

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On 7/7/95, 23 members of New Agents Class 95—12
participated in hir
r!cnld liv tire training session under the
direction of SSA________________
The class initially met in the morning in the Gun
Cleaning Room (GOR) and then moved to the Range Classroom for
instruction on sight alignment, trigger pull, and presentation of
the weapon.
Presentation of the weapon is described as the four
positions in the movement of the weapon from the holster to the
firing position.
During the claserociw instruction, SSAI
I
(CONTINUED

4

Savage- 1466

-

OVER)

 emorand from W. D. Thompson, III, to Hr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/7/95
Training Division

I

demonstrated these techniques utilizing a red-handled Sig/Sauer
Mcdl 26 with a working trigger as an instructional aid.
SSA

tated that he preferred using the. red-handled pistol
rather than an empty service weapon because the audience feels more
comfortable knowing that the weapon is deactivated and he also
knows that there is no chance for an accidental discharge. •When
not 14nrT f-h red—handled pistol for instructional purposes,
lb
SSAI
I maintained it in his holster. He did not have his
duty weapon, a Sig/Sauer Hodel 228 with him in the classroom or at
the range that day, however, had it secured in the Firearms
Training Unit (FTU) trailer near the range.
When the class moved to the range for the live fire
isupervised the firearms instruction from the
tower while other instructors walked the line.
Between the courses
of fire, SSAI
I left the tower and instructed the class about
trigger pull and the presentation of the weapon using his red—
handled pistol. As the last course of fire was completed, the
instructors visually inspected each trainee’ s weapon to ensure that
each weapon was safe and secure. The class was instructed to
proceed to the GCR to clean their weapons.
phase,

SSAI

SSA I
I advised that he proceeded to the FTU trailer
to drop off instructional inaterialq and to switch to his service
pistol.
ccording to SSAI
I his weapon was loaded with ball
ammunition because he had tested a target,system the previous day
using this ammunition.
the trainees began cleaning their weapons,
larrivea in the GDR and noticed several of the NAC
SSAI
membts were in the larger part of the GCR. He was aware that a
second larger class was on their way to the GCR, and moved his
group of trainees to the smaller portion of the room. SSAI
advised that as the primary instructor, it was his duty to walk
among the students and offer advice and provide encouragement
during the gun cleaning process. While walking ar,arnd nd
conversing with three -or four of the students, SSAI
Ifelt it
would be beneficial for him to review the weapon presentation
concept with them.
Thinking that he had his red—handled pistol in
his holster, he drew the pistol and in a continuous_motion, took a
firing position and pulled the trigger. SSAI
dvised that
he initially could not believe that the gun had discharged and did
not realize that it was a live weapon until he heard the shot.
Immediately after the discharge, he recognized the tritium night
(CONTINUED
5

Savage- 1467

-

OVER)

I
b7C

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/7/95
Training Division
sight configuration on the gun as beionaincr tç his service pistol
and not the red—handled weapon. SSAI
ladvised that he did
not look at the weapon before he drew it front the holster and was
not consciously aiming at anything because he was making an
instructional point.
The projectile from SSAI
I weapon traveled
anroximtely 31 feet across the GCR and. struc3c SA Trainee I
I
I in the left upper hip area, having passed through her
belt, and then exited her left hip area. The projectile then
traveled approximately seven feat and struck SA Trainee
I
un the right back area lodging in his abdomen.
I

I
I

‘

ssAI
I advised that after the gunshot, he ran
around the cleaning tables to render assistance to the injured SA
trainees. After determining that assistance was being provided, he
reached for his weapon to secUre it; however, determined it was not
in his holster.
As he returned to tite area where the weapon
discharged, he noticed his weapon on the floor. SSAI
Ihad
no recollection of how the weapon ended up on the floor but
retrieved it, cleared it, and took the weapon to the gun vault to
secure it.
a gunsmith/instructor advised that he
I
was in the Gun Vault when he heard a gunshot in the GCR. While
other employees ran to the GcRafter hearing the shot, he remained
at the door of the GUfl Vault. He observed SSAI
-_Icome out of
the GR carrying a Sig/Sauer 228 pistol arid a loaded maaazine
Mn
the door to the Gun Vault and SSAI________
entered and stated, “I’ve got to isolate this thing,” and placed
the pistol in a gun bin. Ha was about to place the magazine in ths”
bin but stated, “can’t_keçp annuo with the gun,” and begaq unloadiig
the magazine. Mr. I
I took about 12 bullets from SSA I
I
and placed them in the blue container for live ammunition near the
hallway door.

,

P1,servations and Recoimnendations of the SXRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) .provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
(CONTINUED
OVER)
—

6

Savage- 1468

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/7/95

Training Division
Based on a review of the above—captioned shooting
incident as documented by the report dated 5/4/95, SIRG members
agreed that the TI) should review the policy regarding the use of
red-handled weapons. This review should determine if modifications
are needed, and should ‘include input from Field Firearms
Instructors.
Suggestions made by the SIRG ranged from the
requirement that red—handled weapons be colored completely in a
highly visible color to requiring the use of. red-handled weapons at
all times by PFIs. Members concurred that the TD should adopt a
uniform Bureau-wide policy regarding the use of these weapons.
This resulted in recommendations one and two.
The SIRG noted that SSAI
Iliad committed two other
safety violations while assigned as a Firearms Instructor at the
FBI Academy. In 1993, SAI
1T,1 ipvolved in an uniArm’1
discharge by aix SA with whom SA
j was working. SA I
I
and the SA were ahead, of the firing iine and roughly parallel to
another SA in an adj acent lane who had been cleared to go forward
to repair a target when the discharge occurred. All weapons were
pointed in a safe diection an no injurias resulted.
The 1994
incident involved SAl
Itemporary storage of a loaded weapon
inside the Gun Vault, an area where loaded weapons are prohibited.
These violations were documented ili two consecutive annual
performance appraisals. While these safety viola’eions were
noted by the Firearms Training Unit, the SIRG observed that there
currently was not a system .n place to document and evaluate
firearms safety violations committed by instructors to determine if
a Firearms Instructor should be retained. ‘This observation
resulted in the third recommendation being made.

I

The SIRG recommended a review by the TI) of the current
policy that Firearms Instructors carry loaded firearms throughout
the FBI Academy to determine if the policy should be modified.
Discussion centered around the fact that the Academy is in an open
area that could be susceptible to a terrorist or other violent
attack.
It is accessible to individuals other than the FBI, and it
does not have the stringent security measures that most Federal
agencies maintain. Therefore, a determination was made that SAS
visibly carrying weapons in the Academy would provide a more secure
environment for individuals on the grounds.
The TI) representative
advised that some steps have already been taken to ensure that this
situation does not recur.
For instance, no active weapons are
allowed in the gun cleaning area and lock boxes are available for
Storing weapons before entering prohibited areas.
(CONTINUED
OVER)
-

7

Savage- 1469

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/7/95
Training Division
Members of he SIRG discussed the emergency response
provided by FBI Academy personnel immediately following this
shooting incident. The group noted that both SA trainees were
immediately assisted by FBI Academy personnel, including those with
various levels of training in emergency medical response. SIRt
members recognized the life saving medical care provided onsite by
FBI Academy personnel.
However, a recommendation was made that the
TD review the emergency response to this incident to determine if
improvements can be made.
SIRG members unaniaou1v aaçeed that administrative
action was mandatory for SSAI
las a result of his lapse in
judgment resulting in violation of routine weapons safety protocol.
Members reiterated the fact that protocol requires that an
individual never point a weapon at something if there is n intent
to shoot.
It was also noted by the SIRG that SSAI
Iwas
involved in two prior safety infractions resulting in oral
reprimands, documentation on his Performance Appraisal Reports, and
lower performance ratings. The group was divided as to the
severity of the action to be taken. Several members believed that
a letter of censure and decertificatjon as a Firearms Instructor
would be amp.e punishment while others believed that more severe
action, including suspension without pay, should be taken.
Therefore, a recommendation was made that ASU, PD, determine the
severity of the punishment for SSAI
Ibased on past Drecednt
in similar cases.
The SIRG unanimously agreed that SSA I
I
should be permanently decertified as an FBI Firearms Instructor. b
lb 7 C

The last item for discussion relating to this shooting
incident was the matter of SSAI
his
I fitness to ca
weapon. The majority of the members concurred that SSA
I
should be allowed to continue to carry his firearm. However, it
was decided that the PD, Employee Asitnci Unit, must ensure that
any impairments with respect to SSAI
harrying his weapon
are resolved prior to his return to an investigative assignment.

8

Savage- 1470

 ___________Ishould

9/12/95.
Draft Report from W. E. Thompson, III to Mr. Gore dated
g
Trainin
7/7/95
t
Inciden
ng
Shooti
Re:
Administrative
Division

Inquiry

ADDENDtYM:

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC).

10/5/95, AAA:aaa

The purpose of this addendum is to set forth a view
made in this
which dissents, in part, from the recommendations
erable
consid
After
g.
meetin
5
8/30/9
its
at
case by the SIRG
ing at
t
occurr
inciden
an
discussion of the shooting inquiry into
sions,
of
r
conclu
numbe
a
made
SIRG
the
the FBI Academy on 7/7/95,
that
ntal,
accide
was
g
shootin
the
that
ing:
including the follow
ning firearms
certain procedural changes are çniird concer
subject in this
the
L
SSA
safety at the Academy, that
some type of
and
e
censur
of
r
lette
a
inquiry should receive
and that SSA
ASU,
by
administrative sanction to be determined
in any
tor
instruc
s
firearm
no longer be a
these
with
fully
s
concur
OGC
The
capacity with the FBI.
go far enough
recommendations, but does not believe that they
lity.
liabi
to
re
exnosu
especially in view of potential
In addition, at the request of the writer, the group
n:
that
condered._but did not recommend, a further sanctio
n,
either
weapo
his
carry
to
ity
author
the
denied
SSAL
under
n
that,
opinio
my
is
It
basis.
ent
perman
or
on a temporary
to
sibility
respon
FBI’s
the circumstances presented here, the
d
allowe
be
not
should
Agent
this
that
exercise due care requires
n
based
is
opinio
This
duty.
ial
offic
on
while
n
to carry a weapo
(1) the Agent was the subject of two
on the following rationale:
violations, one in 1993 and
safety
previous and recent firearms
serious enough to result in
were
which
of
both
the other in 1994,
nature of the firearms
the,
oral reprimands and lowered PARs; (2)
pulled the trigger
ely
purpos
discharge, i.e., after the Agent
, is so egregious
Aqents
other
two
at
d
pointe
while his weapon was
ably
that it seriously undermines the confidence that can reason
the
for
but
(3)
and
be placed in his judgment in the future:
of the
extraordinary emergency medical response, at least one
s
wound
the
from
died
have
could
g
shootin
victims of the
inflicted.

ZJbe

Idid not intend to harm
It is noted that Mr.L
er, in situations as
liowey
.
matter
this
in
s
victim
the
of
either
s
t
the FBI
that
t
pruden
is
aggravated as this shàoting, it
of his
Agent
this
to
relieve
ative
prerog
its
management exercise
usly
previo
the
of
light
in
true
lly
especia
is
This
n.
weapo
observe
documented instances of carelessness and failure to
another
has
Agent
this
that
event
In the
safety precautions.
ingly
exceed
be
will
it
others,
to
injury
ing
mishap involv
taken.
difficult to explain why a more cautious approach was not
facts.
the
on
sib1e
in.efen
be
A lawsuit in such. an event would
9

Savage-1471

 _____Naffonaec.__

______

Draft Report from W. E. Thompson, III to Mr. Gore dated 9/12/95.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry Shooting Incident 7/7/95 Training
Division
Office of the General Counsel

(Cent.) Addendum:
AAA: aaa

(0CC),

9/22/95.

It is recognized that if this recommendation is
approved, .it will have a substantial effect on this Agent’s
career as an FBI Agent. While such an action will limit the type
of work this agent will be able to perform, we do riot believe
that denial of weapons carriage will, as a matter of law, require
that an Agent be removed from the 1811 series. Whether we wish to
nofl—amed agent on the
tolerate a situation in which we have
If he were left’ori the
rolls is entirely a matter of policy.
rolls as an x agent, we do not believe that this agent would be
entitled to availability pay because he would not be a law
enforcement officer within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 5545a

Ibe permanently relieved of his
Recommendations: That SAl
arid al]. prior Bureau approval
any
that
and
Bureau issued weapon
for him to. carry a personally owned weapon be rescinded.

1PPPaVEDm
‘“

‘

into. Re.
tnspecon
lalioralocy

Cn.iC
ciintisinlo.
Seivs.__

Tr_._.—
OfficeofEEO
Affairs

_—

Cng,Aaiis_
____ ersoL
Depuredo__‘Gen.Counsel
4Af
If this recomñiendaLLon is approved, tpe Personnel
Division should review the range of alternatives which it has
available including allowing him to retain his’1811 status,
withoutavailability pay, in the FBI; reioval from the 1811 series
and placement in another position within, the FBI; removal from
the rolls of the FBI; and if appropriate woric to outplace him to
another agency which has 1811 investigators who do not carry
firearms.

APPROyE,J.

—.

Ciii. Jus. into.
Servs.
r’t
vance

LaaMalory —OCeoIEE0
Affais
,.

—.

--—-----_

info. Aes.
—

4 us

—

10

Savage- 1472

 _____________Imade
_________land

Re:

Shooting Inquiry Report, BI Training Academy,
Quantico, Virginia, 7/7/95;
Memorandun from W. E. Tho1pson III to Mr. Gore dated
9/12/95; (draft)
Addendum, Office of the General Counsel (OGC.) dated
9/22/95;
Shooting Incident Review Group Meeting, 9/29/95. t

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

ppDuM

IJinber. SIP. 10/4/95

ssJ

The purpose of this adderrdum is to (1) memorialize my
concerns about the tone and accuracy of SSAI
I
addendum, endorsed by the OGO, and () to plaoe certain .ssues in
proper context.

I

I
In aracrap two of the OC addendum, sS?J
refers to sAl
Ibeing the “suject of two previous and
recent safety violation&’. . -. In his memorandum to Acting c1ief
Inspectorl
I dated 7/24/95, (tab #66, Shooting
Trn,4,-r
nr), former Training Division (PD) Assitant_!irector
the following comments about SAl
I
safety record

I

“

by

993

in

Øjcjeflt

mnvo3.

Arçnt with Who

-

ten. jona]. discharge
ikiiq.

SA

the Agent were ahead of the firing line
and roughly parallel to another Agent in an adjacent
lane. who had been cleared to go forward to repair a
target when the discharge occurred.. AU weapons were
pointed in a safe direction ad no iniqries resulted.
The 1994 incident involved SN
I te1iioxary
storacre of a loaded eao inside the Gun Vau±. an
area where loaded weapons are prohibited. SAl
was orally reprimanded for both incidents which were
also (1) documented, (2) noted on his Performance
Appraisal Reports (?At)., and (3) resulted in lower
ratings on both PARS.”
tates
Regarding the accident on 7/7/95, SSAL
I”pinzposelv pulled the trigger while his weapon
that SM
was pointed at two other Agents”.... The unqualified use of the
a.intentigna]4y pulled
word “purposely
11 suggests that Ski
the trigger on what he knew to be a loaded weapon which, by
logical extension, ].so suggests that he intentiqnallv s)ot the
I pulled
two in)ured students. 1hile it is clear that SA I
the trigger on his pistol, it is equally clear that he thoucrIt
the pistol was the same, inert, ‘re handled” trannq weapon he
had been carrying and. using earliez. To suggest otherwise is
preposterous.

Savage- 1473

I

 V

SSAI
Ifurther states that SAl
I”is now
receiving professional counseling fo an emotional disorcier Which
he suffers, in part, as a result of the shooting jnctnt.”

I

I goes on to state in paragraph three that SA___________
“may not only be accident prone, but mentally unstable as
well”....
These remarks are inf1aunatory, totally unwarranted.,
and. are
supportable by fact, particularly the deliberate and.

unfounded implication that he “suffers” from a “disorder” which
predates the accident.

SAl
us neither “accident prone” nor “mentally
Re has had one accident - the unintentional discharge
unstable”,
I mental
of his weapon on 7/7/95. References to SAl

stability are inappropriate and indefensible. The draconian
lare, therefore, based. o a
sanctions proposed by SSA I
demonstrably flawed. premise.

The FBI offers and encouraces counseling and peer
support for employ “ have suffered some form of trauma, such
Ivoluntarily’ attended a Post critical
as a shooting.
SAl
employees who have been
Incident SemInar, as do virtually
involved in a shootinq incident. Re has also received tremendous
support from the Employee Assistance Unit, co-workers, and the
students with whom he has worked, including the two students he
unintentionally iniured. Absolutely nothing can or should be
Iparticipatian in this excellent program,
inferred by SA I
the foundation of which is empathy, trust, and conidentia1itv,
While SAl
I credibility as an instructor has
been indisputably compromised by this accident, his effectiveness
as a Special Agent qf the FB has not. Foqier Assisant Director
I this way: “SAl
Ihas an
PXLIP describes SA I
extraordinary work ethic.” His “hard work and devot.on to duty lbb
D
continue to serve the TD with distinctin.” “Ris investigative
his
assignment
to
before
TD
were
and supervisory accomplishments
recognised with five incentive awards,” “Ris tireless efforts,
versatility, and. competence as an instructor merited Exceptional
ratings for all critical elements on’ his latest ?Ar, and. numerous
letters of thanks and commendation.”

The recommendations of the SXR, n my oiion,
I accident
appropriately address the. seriousness of SAi
recognizing his significant and continuing
while
contributions to the FBI.

Savage- 1474

 Mr. Gore

8/24/95

W. D. Thompson, III

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/10/95
SAN DIEGO DIVISION
“e report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
dated 8/1/95.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis
1
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
That no adverse action be taken against Special
RECOMMENDATION:
Agent (SA) I
I as a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

I

Mr.
IRoom 7142
Mr. Gore. oom 7125 (Enclosure)
Mr.
Room 7116
Mr.
Room 6012
( 2. Mr. Leary, Room 6050)
( 1
Mr.I
IRoom 4997)
1— Mr. Thompon, oom 1125
2
I Rsm 7427
Mr.I
)4r1
( 1
I Room 7326)
1
Mr.I
IRoom 7825
1—Mr.I
I DOJ
1
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1-Mr4
pOJ
3.
Mr1
I, Quantico
1
Mr4
oom 3117
1
1
1
3

—

—

—

—

1

—

—

Mr.I

I

Room 3787?
IWMFO
I Room 7837

Mr.I

Mrs.I1

1

—

—

—

—

]hC

-

-

—

LRR:lrr (18)

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1475

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from N. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/10/95
San Diego Division

I

DETAILS:
Th,wn

On 8/17/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
flO11ty Assistant Director,
TYT
Inspection Division;
I Açtina Chief Insnctor. Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division;I
I1puty Chief, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Jeremiah W.
Doyle, Jr., Section Chief, Global Section
NS—2, National Security
Division; Van A. Harp, Section Chief
1
‘inistration and
Benefit Section, Personnel Division; I
I Deputy Section
Chief ‘rrrnr4
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJj
lUnit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
b6
—

Division; I
1. Unit Chief, Undercover and Sensitive
Operations Unit, Public Corruptipand Civil Ricifli Section,
Criminal Investigative Division;I
.1 Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Lecral Advice and !!raining Section, Office
of the General counsel; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms —
Taomar1c T1n4t- ct1entific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
andl
I Supervisor, NPO, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.

Svnoosis of the Sbootina Incident
On 7/10/95. sAl
Ireceived three complaint
forms regarding tI
I later identified asi
I
I
I SA I
I knew that the bandit was the suspect in
twelve bank robberies in the Division, had displayed a weapon in
two of the robberies, and had taken hostages at two bank robberies.
The complainants provided information that the bank robber’s_____
ohotçgraph in the newspaper that day was an individual namedi
I
I
I that the subject drove a Nissan pickup truck, and that he was
a customer at ‘the Holiday Wine Cellar in Escondido, California. It
was reported that the suspect frequented the Wine Cellar between
5:00 pm and 7:00 pm.

SAT
Iwent to the Wine Cellar hoping tç obtain the
store video eiir’iflance film for reviewing to try and identify the
I
I After interviewing employees at the Wine Cellar,.
while still in the area, SAl
I observed tile suspect exit ‘the :6
stV aflrl approached him in order to further identify him.
Ski
lidentified himself as an FBI 5k and displayed his
credentials to the suspect and during the course of conversation,
he obtained the suspect’s car keys. However, upon learning that a
backup was enroute, the suspect became uncooperative, entered his
truck using a spare key, started his vehicle, and drove out,
bumping the Bureau vehicle in the process.

(CONTINUED
2

Savage- 1476

-

OVER)

7C

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/10/95
San Diego Division

SAl
Isurveilled the suspect to his residence while
simultaneously attempting to obtain a backup using his radio and a
cellular phone. He followed the suspect into his driveway and
attempted to continue his interview, stalling for time, hoping that
his backup would arrive. The suspect became intimidating and a
shoving match ensued_with the suspect statira “Yotj’re going to have
to kill mel” SAl
I told the suspect, “N’4
I I don’t want to
kill you, I ‘ust want to talk to you.” The suspect then ordered
lb
his dog to “Sic him M. sic himl” As the dog approached and was
t:7c
within one foot of S I
I he fired one shot disabling the dog,
decocked his w’wn and placed it back in the holster. The
suspect hit SAL
the face with either his fist or a blunt
object. SA[
Iwas dazed, however, lie felt the suspect
advancing. He drew his weapon, pointed the weapon at the suspect’s
chest, and shot the suspect one time ensuring innocent civilians
would not be endangered by an uncontrplled çound. As a struggle
ensued between he and the suspect, sI
Iwas able to get one
handcuff on the suspect’s wrist. Both of them slid down to a fence
where the other handcuff was placed on the suspect. With the
assistance of a neighbor, attempts were made by SAL
Ito render
first aid to the suspect who had been wounded in the chin and neck.

un

Interviews with employees at the Holiday Wine Cellar
nqiahbor, and other investigators, support the statements of
S?I
I SN
Iwas transported to a hospital by another SA for
treatment of a swollen and bruised face, and the suspect was
transported to the hospital via ambulance.
Obsy.tIo’is
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
Members of the SIRG unanimously concurred with the use of
deadly force in this_shot-jng incident and agreed that the deadly
force employed by SAl
Iwas within the FBI’s deadly force
poicv. The SXRG concluded that appropriate steps were used by
SAl
I in obtaining additional assistance and agreed that his
actions that day were exemplary. It
er recommended that
no adverse action be taken against SA
as a result of his
involvement in this incident.
3

Savage- 1477

b6

 mom

__

F

___________

I

Mr. Gore

1/22/96

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/24/95
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
Reference report of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) Jerry D. Thornton, dated 8/25/95.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1)

That no administrative action be taken

against any FBI employee as a result of their involvement in this

shooting

1

1

1
4

2.
3

—
—
—

—
—

incident.

Mr.I
IRoom 7142
Mr. Core. Roo 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr. L
7116
Mr.
IRoom 6012
(1 — iir.
Room 6050)
(1 — Mr.
4997)
(1 — Mr. Harp, Room 6646)

1
1

—
—

Ms.
Mr.

joom 3849
Room 3787?

I

1-Mr.
1 — Mrs.

IWMFO
Room 7837
b6
7

Mr. Thompso, Room 7129
Mr.I
IRoom 7427
(1-Mr.
poEt 7427)
(1r.
Room 7326)
Mr. I
IRoom 7825
--

1
I.

—

Ms.I

-

Mr. Doyle, Room 4042

1
2.

—

3.

—

Mr.I
Mr..I

LRR:lrr (20)

11203

IDOJ
I, Quantico
(CONTINUED

Savage- 1478

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/24/95
Los Angeles Division
(2)
That SAC, Los Angeles, during scheduled firearms
training, reiterate to all SAs the importance of utilizing body
protective armor.

DETAII:
on 9/29/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant D&rector, Inspection Division;
Chief Inspectozi______
‘“çfice of Inspections,
Inspection Division; I
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, USDOJ; Edward R. Leary, Section Chief, Personnel
Management Section, Personnel Division; I
J Unit
Chief, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division; Van A.
Harp, Section Chief, Personnel Administration and Benefit Sectio
n,
Personnel Division; I
I Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal 1
Division USDOJ; I
I
Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; I
1
I
I Unit Chief Healt
Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative
Division;
Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
ra 11 ng Section, Office of the General Counsel;
Unit Chief, Firearms
Poo1mrkg qnit, Scientific
Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;I
i, Supervisor,
WMFO; and
Inspection Analyst, Office of
I
Inspectioais, met to ctlscuss the above-captioned shooting inciden
t.
-

—

—

7

SvnoDsis of the Shooting Incident
On 7/24/95, Special Agents (SAs) assigned to the Santa
Ana Resident Agency (SARA), Los Angeles Division, and a deputy
from
the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (OCSO), were assigned to
participate in a surveillance at the residence of Kevin Duane
Arnold.
Arnold was a federal fugitive wanted for Bank Robbery from
San Diego, California.
A briefing was condqoted by Supervisory Senior Resident
Agent (SSRA
I and Ski
During the
briefing, the fact that Arnold was wanted for a Sarj DleaQ
bank
robbery was discussed, as well as the fact that
was going
SAl
-to obtain a federal arrest warrant on that day from a United States
Magistrate Judge, charging the subject with 11 additon4
bank
robberies committed in the Orange County area.
SA I
I was going
to obtain a federal search warrant for Arnold’s vehicle and

)

2

Savage- 1479

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/24/95
Los Angeles Division
residence.
j and Deputyl
sAd
Iwere instructed to
conduct the surveillance at Arnold’s residence in an effort to
locate him pending the issuance of the additional federal arrest
warrant and the search warrants. The briefing included information
about Arnold’s background as a former police officer who had been
involved in several shootings as well as the fact that during some
of the bank robberies Arnold claimed to have a weapon. Arnold was
to be considered armed and dangerous. All meeting participants
were aware of Arnold’s appearance, his personal vehicle, and the
fact thp he was married with small children. SSRAI
land
SAL
Iwanted Arnold arrested away from his residence to ensure
the safety of his wife and children.

I

I

I

I

I

SAs
and Deputy
commenced
surveillance of Arnold’s residence in Mission Vieo, California, at
approximately 12:30 p.m. Movement w
otiçad at the residence at
approximately 1 • 30 p in., and SAsI______ andi
kirove by the
residence to determine what was taking place. As they passed the
house, Arnold was observed at the door. SAl
IqdviseçI that
within seconds he heard over the radio from Deputy I
I that
Arnold had probably observed them and that Arnold came out into the
‘ø’ and watched them drive
away. Within several minutes, Deputy
I reported that Arnold had returned to his house exited his
house, and drove away in his blue vehicle. SAl
btated tbat
after a brief period of searching for Arnold, he contacted SAl
via cellular telephone
SI
Iwas in the process of obainin
the additional arrest warrant and the search warrants. SAl______
stated that SAl
linstructed that Arnold was to be arrested i
he was located.
Instructions were given to attempt to arrest
Arnold prior to his entry into his home.
-

Several minutes later, SA[
lobserved Arnold driving
his 1994 blue two—door, For1 Escort in the parking lot at Portola
Plaza in Mission Viqio.
Ireportec...iis ipformation to
AI
land Deputy I
SA I
land rçuested SA I
I assistance at
the shopping center. SAl
Iwas advised of the instructions
regarding Arnold’s arrest, i.e., that he be arrested if located and
that the arrest_shoild be completed prior to Arnold’s entry into
his home.
SAL
ladvised that he was aDnroxi.mately 30 seconds
away from tI)e narkiiq lot. Prior to SA I
I arrival, Arnold
observed SAl
land began yelling and pointing his finger at him
in an animated fashion.
Arnold_moved his vehicle into a parking space and
stopped.
SAl
Istopped his vehicle to the front of Arnoldts
approximately 20 to 25 feet away. Arnold exited his vehicle while
3

Savage- 1480

I

 ived

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/24/95
Los Angeles Division

sAl

yelling at
landook an aggressive stance by the front
driver’s door. SA I
I exited his vehicle, drew his weapon, and
pointed i at Arnold while moving to the driver-side front fender.
SAl
Iyeiled, “Stop, Police, put your hands up”. Arnold
repi fd ‘T4’ s get this over with”. Arnold refused to obey
SM
bommands, continued to yell in a belligerent maimer,
and made the statement, “No, we are going to handle this right
now”.
-

Jb7C

on the scepe and observed Arnold yelling
and pointing his finger at SAl
I He stopped his yehicl one
to three feet away from where Arnold was standing. SAl
lexited
his vehicle, drew his .45 Caliber, S14 Sauer Semi-automatic, Model
P220 weapon, and yelled, “FBI! Kevin, you are under arrest! Get
down on the pavement”. Those commands were repeated several times.
and were
-rded by Arnold. At that point, Arnold glanced
towaI SAl
‘making a derogatory statement and attacked
SAl
Iwho was approximately 25 to 30 feet away. Prior to
reaching Ski
ieard Arnold yell, “Tefl my wife I
I SA
love her”.

land a

Arnold_thçn rachd A[
fight ensued between
the two.
SAs I
I andi
I initially had their weapons in their
bands, making fighting difficult. Arnold made repeated attempts to
obtain control of the SAs’ weapons, however, did not succeed.
Throughout the fight, Arnold continually refused to obey the
commands given by the Agents to surrender and submit to arrest. At
one point, Arnold turned his back to the SAs and made a motion of
reaching into the front of his pants, as if he was drawing a
weapon. Both SAs stated that they were prepared to shoot the
subject at that time; however, when he turned around he had no
weapon in his hand.
Frequently throughout the fight, Arnold
yelled, “Shoot me, Shoot me!” and “You are going to have to kill
me”.
The fight gradually moved toward the front of Arnold’ s
vehicle.
During this period, Arnold opened the driver’s door of
his vehicle, reached in and grabbed for something between the front
seat and back rest.
Both Agents believed that Arnold was reaching j.
for a weapon and were prepared to shoot. However, Arnold turned iwith empty hands.
At one point as the fight continued, SA
fras able to
return to his vehicle and radio for Deputyl
assistance. He
then returned to further assist SAl
I Subsequently, Arnold
broke free and ran back to his vehicle. He jumped in, grabbed his
car keys off the front qassenger seat, and inserted the key into
the ignition. SAl
jtan to the driver’s side window, reached in
4

Savage- 1481

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr.
Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/24/95
Los Angeles Division

Gore

with his left hand and arm over the top of the steering wheel in an
effort to remove the car keys from the ignition. The subject was
able to start his vehicle and began backing up. As the vehicle
began to move, SAl
Ir nrb1e to extract his left arm from the
steering wheel area.
SAl
Ibelieved that his arm was either
be4nti h1.d by Arnold, or it was trapped inside the vehicle.
SAl
Iwas dragged by the movement of Arnold’ s vehicle for
approximately 30 to 40 feet at a fast speed. SAl
I fearing for
his life, reached into the front seat area with his right hand
which was oldina iis weapon and fired one round into Arnold’s
chest.
Ski
I left arm was immediately freed. He regained his
footing and stepped away from the vehicle. Arnold slumped over
toward the passenger seat area, but the engine made a “revving”
sound and moved forward. The subject’s vehicle stopped when it
collided with an automobile parked to the front of Arnold’s
vehicle Arnold was removed from his vehicle by si[
land Medix
ambulance personnel who were at the scene. Paramedics from the
Orange County Fire Department responded to the scene and
administered first aid prior to transporting Arnold to Mission
Hospital with a gunshot wound to the chest. Arnold was declared
dead shortly after arriving at the hospital.
Observations and Recmendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
Members of the SIRG unanimously agreed that the use of
deadly force was justified in this shooting incident for several
reasons.
The subject involved in this incident was known to be
dangerous; both SAs gave verbal commands and identified themselves
as law enforcement officers resulting in the subject becoming
aggressive and advising that he would not surrender; the subject
was moving aggressively towards the SAs resulting in a struggle
while attempting to disarm the SA8; and, the subject zade aestures
insinuating that he was going to obtain a weapon. Ski
larm
was inside the car and he was unable to remove it and felt that his
life was in danger throughout this incident.
5

Savage-1482

-

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/24/95
Los Angeles Division
However, the SIRG had several observations regarding
safety issues related to this shooting incident. The first
observation involved the use of alternative methods of control that
could be used by SAc during high risk arrests. One SIRG member
advised that the possession, if available, of pepper spray or an
ASP baton may have bean beneficial to the SAn. The next issue
involved the lack of body armor used by the SAs. Members agreed
that emphasis should have been placed on the use of body armor
during the planning of this incident taking into consideration the
subject’s prior history.
Members of the SIRG noted three issues relating to this
incident that pertain to training and should have been realized by
the participating SAc. The subject’s vehicle should have been
boxed in to avoid any movement by the ‘subject, SAc should not
involve themselves in hand to hand combat when only one hand is
available, and an SA should not participate in a struggle with a
firearm which can result in an accidental discharge and the chance
of injury.
A lengthy discussion was held during the meeting
regarding adequate on—the—scene personnel. One SIRG member noted
that the Los Angeles Division advised that six SAs and one local
officer were available to assist in the execution of the arrest and
search warrants once they were obtained. However, prior to
obtaining the warrants, the SSRA elected to only send two SAc and
the local officer to locate and surveil the subject with orders
that if the subject was located and knew he was being surveifled,
he should be arrested if an attempt was made to flee. The SIRG
member opined that the surveillance was a potentially dangerous
situation, especially taking into consideration the arrest orders,
6
and felt that the SSRA did not assian a4equate personnel to the
surveillance. Chief Inspectorl
lalso identified other
issues requiring additional information from the Los Angeles
Division.
It was the unanimous opinion of the SIRG members to
further discuss this shooting incident at the SIRG meeting
following receipt of the Los Angeles Division’s response to these
issues,
On 9/29/95, a teletye was sent to the Los Angeles
Division from Chief Inspector
I requesting that they respond
to the following issues

a

(1)
Identify the date that the Federal arrest warrant
was issued by the Southern District of California and when the
Los Angeles Division was aware of its existence,
6

Savage- 1483

 b

Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson,

Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/24/95
Los Angeles Division

III, to Mr. Gore

Identify the steps taken to locate and apprehend the
(2)
subject upon learning of the Federal warrant,
(3)
The original report indicated that the SSRA, four
SAs, and one local law enforcement officer were briefed regarding
this matter with instructions that “if the subject appeared to be
leaving the area or identified the fact that he was being
surveilled, he should be stopped and arrested on the San Diego
Division bank robbery warrant.” With the knowledge of these facts,
Los Angeles Division was requested to determine why more personnel
were not assigned to clearly demonstrate superiority of manpower in
a potentially dangerous situation, why the SAs assigned
surveillance were using readily identifiable law enforcement-type
vehicles, and to identify the plan to effect the arrest.
Lastly, a request was made that the Los Angeles Division
determine why the decision was made to arrest the subject on that
particular day if an arrest had previously been delayed for
operational and/or tactical reasons.
The Los Angeles Division responded to these issues by
communication dated 10/11/95, which resulted in further discussions
by the SIRG members on 11/3/95. Based on the facts presented by
the Los Angeles Division, the SIRG recommended that no
administrative action be taken against employees involved in this
shooting incident. However, SIRG members reiterated that the
circumstances surrounding this incident indicated that this
incident should have been considered more than a surveillance.
Members felt that the planning was insufficient and that additional
manpower was mandated.

7

Savage- 1484

 _______IRoom

__________

Mr. Gore

11/30/95

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
8/18/95
OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION
I

6

ference report of Special Agent (SA)l
I
Idated 9/11/95, telephone conversation with Assistant
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) James F. Boqner on 9/25/95. an
airtel from ASAC Bogrier to Chief Inspector
I
dated 9/27/95.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECQNNENDATIONS:
(1)
That no adverse action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
1
4

—

—
—

—

I Room 7142
wwm 7129 (Enclosure)
j Room 7116
Mr.I
[àom 6012
(1
Mr.
I Room 6050)
(2.
Mr.
4997)
(2.
Mr. Harp, oom 6646)
Mr. ThOmnsnrL, Room 7129
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.)

-

—
—

1
3

—

—

Mr.j

(1
(1
1-Mr
Ms
2.

--

-

iw.

-

Mr.

-

LRR:lrr (20)

-

1—
1—
1•1—

Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
Mr.
OJ
Mr
I Quantico,
Ms .
oo]n 3849
MrJ
I, Room 3787i
Mn
I WMFO
Mrs.
7Room 7837

I Rooiq 7427

IRoom 7427)

j Room 7326)
Room 7825
DOJ
(CONTINUED

—

OVER)

Savage- 1485

A

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/18/95
Oklahoma City Division
(2)
That the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and
Criminal Investigative Division (CID) expeditiously research the
issues related to the Is participation in local task forces.
A
policy decision shouli be communicated to each Field Division as
soon as possible defining individual SAs’ liability regarding
effecting these types of arrests without state or local peace
officer status unless an Unlawful Flight To Avoid Prosecution
(UFAP) preliminary inquiry is opened under Safe Streets Task Force.
guidelines.

DETAILS:
on 9/29/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thompson, III, petutv Assistant niçector, Inspection Division:
Chief Inspectorl
Iqif ice of Inspections,
Inspection Division;I
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
Division, USD03; Edward R. Leary, Section Chief, Personnel
Management Section, Personnel Divisian;I
I Unit
Chief, Global Section - NS-2, national Security Division; Van A.
Harp, Section Chief, Personnel Administration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division;i
iDeputy Section chief. Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJi_____________
Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;I________
I
‘Unit Chief Health Care Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative
Division
Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
Analysis ection. Lahorator Division
i Supervisor,
WMFO; andi
I Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, met to discuss the above—captioned shooting incident.
—

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
A local warrant was obtained by the Oklahoma Department
of Corrections oni
Ifor Escape on 5/2/95.
It had
been determined that j
as in violation of his release
conditions concerning an r year sentence for drug violations.
The
U.S. Marshals Metropolitan Task Force, a formal task force composed
of various members of both the local and federal law enforcement
communities, was attempting to locate and arrest the subject on the
outstanding warrant.
2,

Savage- 1486

 _________rIii
______Ihad

Memorandum from w. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/18/95
Oklahoma City Division
fln R/1/5, based on source information pr
vided_to
9
I members of the Task Force and SAl
SA I
I
formulated a plan to arrest I
I This plan included the use of
Oklahoma city Police Department (OCPD) marked patrol units.
During
the early morning hours of 8/18/95, OCPD marked Patrol Units
attempted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven byl
I
This
traffic stop was in acóordance with the previously formulated
arrest plan.
The subject refused to stop and the OPD units
pursued I
I attempted to
Ithrough a residential area
As I
turn the corner at Southwest 36th ant tnff. he hit an unopçunied
pickup truck parked in a driveway at
1
I I
exited the vehicle and fled on foot 1nt.t t)e residential area.
As
an along a chain link fence, SAL
I an4 Deputy Sheriff
frehicle, observed a
I a passenger in SA 1
*

weapon in the subject’s right hand. The subject then jumped the
fence into the backyard of a residence.
tn an attept to prevent
the sub:ject from entering an occupied res)dence, Sal
Idrove his
vehicle thçonah the fence. At this time,I
ILfired his weapon
towards SA I
land Deputy Sheriff I
lexited his
I
I
vehicle and alerted all pursuing law entorcement personnel that
a gun. I
Ihad jumped another fnce hading towards
the front yard of an occupied_residence. Asi
Iwas going around
the corner of the house, SA I
fired three shots at the subject
with his 9mm Sig auev
OCPD Off icerl
Iwas in the
front yard and as [
Irrrnnded the cgrner of the house in the
direction of Off icFI
lappeared to crouch to the
ground.
Officer
Ihad heard someone yell “gun” from the
backyard and as the subjqct wa crouching to the ground, Officer
I
Ibelieved that I
I’’ n*Ing to shoot at him from
the crouched position.
I fird two shots from his
Officer I
9mm Glock.
It was then determined thati
)zad been hit by
gunfire and an ambulance was called to the scene. The subject was
transported to the Southwest Medical Center for treatment of a non—
life threatening wound.

I

L

Oklahoma County District Attorney,
completed his review of tl
is shooting incident, and by letter dated
1
9/15/95, fonn1 SA I
lactions proper arid zstifiable. District
i.il L_jdeclined prosecution of Sal
land Officer
this matter.
frhø iiir”iirnj at the SIRG meeting on 9/29/95,
Prior
Chief Inspectorl
I identified additional information
needed to ensure a complete review of this shooting incident.
Specifically, Oklahoma City Division was asked to address the
following issues:
1)
the initiation of a UFAP preliminary inquiry

3

Savage-1487

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/18/95
Oklahoma City Division
(P1), 2) the status of FBI SAs as Peace Officers in the State of
Oklahoma and, 3) the existence of a memorandum of understanding for
Task Force participation.
Oklahoma city advised that no P1 was initiated in this
case.
Based on source information provided to SAl
I the
subject was be4eved o be going to a residence in Oklahoma City on
8/17—18/95.
SAl
Ihad a confidential and reliable informant who
ha demansrated reliability numerous times in the past.
SAl
I role was only providing information to Deputy I
I who
was assigned to the fugitive matter and was hfore, unaware
whether or not a P1 had been initiated.
SAl
Iwas not a
partic
member of the fugitive task force.
He accompanied
Deputy
the purpose of providing “real time” information
re
whereabouts based on information provided by
SA
n orinant on 8/17/95.
As the investigatior deve],oped
in o a car pursuit and eventual shooting incident, SAl
I
believed that he was acting within the scope of his duties, i.e, he
was present to provide “real time” informant information, he was
present to protect the informnt’ identity, and he had information
causing him to believe thati
Iwas in violation of a Federal
Firearms Statute (Felon in ‘ossession of a Firearm).
SAs of the FBI do not have peace officer status in the
State of Oklahoma.
One 5k in the Oklahoma City Division, who is a
full—time participant in the MFTF, is cross—deputized as an OCSO
Deputy Sheriff.
Except for this full-time participant, no other
SAc routinely participate in the Task Force.
An FBI SA in Oklahoma
is authorized to effect arrests for violation of federal law,
however, arrests for state/local violations can only be
accomplished by a citizen’s arrest.
ASAC Bogner advised that the Metro Fugitive Task Force is
not a formally funded Safe Streets Task Force.
It was initiated in
1992, under the direction of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).
The
FBI proposed that a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) be
signed by all participants; however, the USMS and the OCPD have
never executed the MOU.
The MOU would include the FBI, USMS, OCSO,
OCPD, the Cleveland County Sheriff’s Office, and the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
4

Savage- 1488

lb 7

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/18/95
Oklahoma City Division
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
It was the unanimous decision of the SIRG that the use of
deadly force in this shootna incident was justified, and that no
action be taken against SAl
las a result of this
shooting incident. However, the subject of effecting arrests on
non Safe Streets Task Farces was discussed. Members agreed that
unless a UFAP preliminary inquiry has been initiated under
guidelines established for Safe Streets Task Forces, the FBI should
not be making arrests absent having state or local peace officer
status. The SIRG recommended that the 0CC and CID expeditiously
research and provide written policy regarding FBI liability in
effecting such arrests.

5

Savage- 1489

 r

Mr. Gore

W. 1). ThompsOn,

11/30/95
III

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
9/20/95
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
Reference report of Special Agent (SA)
idated 10/5/95.

I

[

I.

PURPOSE:
This meuorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
coitments, and recoimnendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shootinq.

sAl___
incident.

Mr.I

That no adverse action be taken against
result of his involvement in this shooting

jas a

IRoom 7142
Mr. Gore. Room 7129 (Enclosure)
1
Mr
Room 7116
—
Mn
1, oom 6012
(1 — Mr.I
Room 6050)
(1 — Mr-I
IRoom 4997)
(1
Mr. Harp, Room 6646)
1 — Mr.
,
Room 7129
3
Mr.
7427
(1 —
om 7427)
(1
Room 7326)
1
Mr.
oorn 7825
1-Ms.
DOJ
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1
1
1
1
4

—

—

1-Mn

)OJ

I, Quantico

Mn

1
1 — Msj
1
MrI
1-MrL
1-Mr
—

jom 3849
Room 3787F

I

—

I

—

Room 7837

bb
b7c

—

—

—

LRR:lrr (20)

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1490

—

OVER)

 _______________lunit

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson,
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
9/20/95
Louisville Division

______

III, to Mr. Gore

That SAC, Louisville, during scheduled firearms
(2)
training, reiterate to all SAs the importance of utilizing body
protective armor.

DETAILS:
On 11/3/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thompson, III, eoutv Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
Chief Inspectorl
I fliçe of Inspections,
Inspection Division;l
Trial Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, USDxr; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section Chief,
Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division; Van A. Harp,
Section Chief, Personnel_Administration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division;I
ITria]. Attornv. ‘perrpi-i,m rn2d
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJI_
Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; I
ief. Wa1th flire Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative
I
I Uni
Division;
Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Legal Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
Analysis Section, Laboratory Divisioni
Supervisor,
WMFO; andi
Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, met to discuss the above—captioned shooting incident.
—

—

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
Roger A. Fein, an FBI fugitive, was involy fn
out with Louisville Division SAs and Police Officerl
Iof
the Jeffersontown Police Department (JPD) on 9/20/95.
Officer
critically wounded during this hootinçr incident.
ALthough_Roger A. Fein was shot by Office4
land FBI SAl
I
I
Iwith probable mortal shots, the coroner’s preliminary
findings indicate- that Fein died as a result of a self—inflicted
gunshot wound to the head.
On 9/16/95, Ainericats.Most Wanted” aired a show
featuring FBI fugitive Fein.
On Monday, 9/18/95, a cooperating
Witness (CW), known to the FBI, contacted SAl
I of the
Lexington Resident Agency (LRA),_Louisville Division.
The CW was
subsequently interviewed by SAl
I and was shown photographs
Fein.

of

2

Savage-1491

 ________

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson,
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident’
9/20/95
Louisville Division

III, to Mr. Gore

On 9/19/95, sAl
Inotified Supervisory Senior
Resident Agent (SSRA
Jof the information provided
by the CW.
Ilcnew of Fein based on previous FBI
SSRA1
investigations in the LRA territory, and therefore, conducted a
comprehensive review of the information and physical)
v insneqted
1
the area believed to be the residence of Fein.
SSRAI
I
assigned. an BA to discreetly surveil the area and then notitied
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Thomas W. Miller about the
information provided by the CW.
Iformulated a plan to
SSRA[
positively identify and apprehend Fein and then requested authority
to utili3e an FBI aircraft in the surveillance which was approved
by ASAC Miller.
Additional assistance was offered for the
surveillance by ASAC Miller, however, was declined by SSRAF
since eight SAs wer
le and assigned to conduct the
surveillance.
SS
held a conference with all partici
pating SAs involved in the surveillance and the OW returned to the
LRR to brief and assist the SAc conducting the surveillance of
Fein.

I

Final briefings were held with the surveillance team on
the morning of 9/20/95.
Surveillance points were identified,
assigned, and confirmed at this meeting.
dimiid
Through communications with the OW, it
the surveillance team that Pein’ s girlfriend,__________________
departed the residence earlier than usual on ne mornznq or
9/20/95.
The surveillance team was dispatched to their respective
pre-determined surveillance points anticipating seeing and
surveij.inq Fein as he departed his residence.
Within a short
period of time, BA I
1 received a telephone call from the cw
and observed a vehicle described by the eN as normally being
operated by Fein.
A moving surveillance of this vehicle began
based on instructions issued by SSRAI

1

The surveilled vehicle had tinted windows, and combined
with the poor weather conditions, surveillance team members could
not see inside the cab of the vehicle. At this point, the driver
of the vehicle was unknown and it was also unknown if the vehicle 1b6
contained any passengers.
A license plate number was obtained and
a computer check completed by the Louisv5,lle Division determined
that the license plate did not match the vehicle.
BA I
Ibureau vehicle had enhanced radio capability
and was equipped with a cellular telephone.
With this knowledge,
SSRAI
Iinstructed SAl
Ito coordinate_the FBI surveillance
with the Kentucky State Police (KS?).
BA I
I observed an antenna
3

Savage- 1492

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident.
9/20/95
Louisville Division
on the vehicle under surveillance and assumed that the subject was
equipped with a olce radio scanner.
Using the cellular
telephone, SAl
Icoordinated most of the communications with the
KS?.
At one point during the surveillance, it appeared that 7c
Fein was not fçl€’t.rinrr the routine activity described by the CW.
Therefor, SSAI
Idecided to stop the vehicle and instructed
SAl
Ito request a KS? marked vehicle to assist in the vehicle
stop.
The use of a marked KS? vehicle was expected to reduce a
potential violent confrontation with the subject.
The request for assistance was frustrated by the fact
that the surveillance was moving from one KS? Post area to another
and this required renewed explanations and communications further
delaying KS? assistance.
SAl
I a former KS? Trooper, informed.
the KS? of the situation and advised that the subject was armed and

dangerous.

After approximately 45 minutes of attempting coordination
with the KS?, the surveillance moved into Jeffersontown, Kentucky.
The area involved was between a rural area and a more populated
c4.ty center. The KS? disp
tcher_cioerdinated communications with
1
the JP and Police Officerl
esponded to the FBI’S
request for assistanc&. 0ficer I
Icame upon the surveillance
from the opposite direction and made a U—turn to join in the
surveillance.
The surveillance team believed that this traffic
maneuver by Officexi
Itipped Fein to the surveillance.

Office I
Ipulled the police car next to the moving
bureau vehicle of SAl
L Through an open_window,
I and I
jwas advised of the situation. Officerl
Officerl
loffered
assistance and SSRAI
lordered the vehicle stopped. At this
time, the surveillanc& was slowly moving past the JPD and was
approaching an intersection.
lattemptea to stop Fain’s vehicle with the
Officerk
use of flashing lights and police siren.
The subject’s vehicle
continued moving into the intersection of Watterson Trail and
Talonsville Road in Jeffersontown. After passing through the
intersection, Fein bolted from the vehicle while the vehicle
continued moving.
‘the vehicle came to a stop at a curb
approximately one hundred feet down the roadway. As Fein exited
the vehicle, he was firing a .9mm_pistol.
While in a combat
position, Fein fired on Office4
through the windshield of the
.

.4

Savage-1493

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
9/20/95
Louisville Division

I

I

nolic car as the officer was seated in the police car.
Officer
lexited the police car and returned fire hitting Fein.
SAl
I whose vehicle was adjacent to Officer
Ipo1ic car.
shouted at Fein and then fired shots.
It is believed that SAl
I
fired two shots and ti-uck the subject both times taSking him to the
ground.
Off iceil
Iwas positioned at the rear of the police car
bent over te trunk.
Iiaiueciate asistance was provided to 0fficer
lapproache5i Fein nd positively
IbY sAl
1 sSRAI__-identified him from tattoos orj h4 hry.
S1
Jrawled to and

cleared ?ejn’s vehicle. ssiI
laccounted for the safety of
all FBI SAs and personnel at the scene, took charge and coordinated
the crime scene, and telephonically advised ASAC Miller of the
shooting incident.
Louisville Division staff, including
ASAC Miller, immediately responded to the scene.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the

intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
The SIRG unanimously concurred that this was an
intentional shooting and that the use of deadly force was
warranted, and no administrative action should be taken against any
SA involved in this shooting incident.
SIRG members agreed that
the Louisville Division’s planning was more than adequate with the
use of eight SAg. However, the group made the observation that
although the incident initially involved only surveillance of the
subject, of the eight SAs participating in the surveillance, only
-nr bullet proof armor.
four were
At least one SA recalled
that SSRAI
Ihad instructed all personnel to wear their body
armor on the day of this shooting incident.
Therefore, the SIRG
recommended that all SAs be reminded of the importance of wearing,—
body armor during these situations.
It was noted by the SIRG that media coverage of this
shooting incident cast the FBI in an unfavorable position and that
there seemed to be some misunderstanding by police officials
regarding FBI procedures following shooting incidents. Although
these situations were diplomatically handled by Special Agent in
5

Savage- 1494

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson,
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
9/20/95
Louisville Division

III, to Mr. Gore

Charge (SAC) Vernon 0; Kohl, the SIRG identified other issues
relating to this shooting incident and also discussed ideas
expressed by SAC Kohl.
SIRG members discussed the use of improper
dialogue used by one SA, the upgrading of protective body armor
used by SAs, the need ftr equipment to identify FBI vehicles during
felony stops thereby eliminating the need for local marked police
cruisers, and that emphasis be placed on all SAs being fully
trained and familiar with conducting felony stops.
Although noformal reconuneridations were issued by the
SIRG regarding these issues, the Training Division (TO)
representative advised that the language issue will be addressed
during Principal Firearms Instructors training. The TO will also
research the issue of upgrading body armor currently being used by
the FBI including the use of some type of FBI identification.
SIRG members had a lengthy discussion about the need for
some type of Bureau vehicle identification for use during this type
of incident.
Suggestions included having additional lights on
vehicles as well as some type of slap-on door decal that can be
easily applied during emergency situations.
However, one 003
representative who is a former prosecutor, emphasized that the
presence of local marked police vehicles seems to assist in
prosecutions and tends to avoid some problems associated with
felony car stops.

6

Savage- 1495

 _______
__________
_________

F

Mr. Gore

1/23/96

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCI DENT
10/1/95
IAS VEGAS DIVISION

Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
dated 10/6/95.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Sbcloting Incident Review
Group (SING) with reference to the captioned sheeting.
RECOMMENDATION:

None.

For information only.

b6
b7c
66—19157—65
1
Mr.I
I Room 7142
1
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr4
Room 7116
L oo 6012
4
Mr.]
(1
Mr.
Room 6050)
,
(1
Mr.
I Room 4997)
(1
Mr. Harp, Room 6646)
1
Mr. Thompson, Room 7129
3
I Roo 7427
Mr.I
(1
Mr.
IRoom 7427)
Mr.
(1
I, Room 7326)
1
Mr4
Room 7825
1
Ms.I
I DOJ
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1
1-Mr.
0J
I Quantico
1
Mr.
1

—

1— Ms

—

Mr

I

—

-

I

Room 3849
t, Room 3787F
WMFO
,
Room 7837

Mr
1
Mrs.

I

—

—

-

-

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

LRR:lrr (20)

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1496

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson,
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
10/1/95
Las Vegas Division

III, to Mr. Gore

DETAILS:
On 11/3/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thampson, III, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division
Chief Inspectorl
10ff iç of Inspections,
Inspection Djvjsjon;I
‘Trial Attorney, Civil
Rights Division, USDOJ; Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Section Chief,
Global Section
NS—2, National Security Division; Van A. Harp,
Section Chief, Personnel_Administration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Divisioni
I Trial Attorney, Terrorism and
1)
Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJI
I
Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;I
I
I
Unit Chief, Health Care Fraud Unit, criminal Investigative
Divisioni
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Lecal Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
Poo1irk tTt, Scientific
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Analysis ion. Laboratory Division; I
Isupervisor,
WMFO; andi
I Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, met to discuss the above—captioned shooting incident..
-

—

-

Synopsis of the Shootina Incident
On Sunday, 10/1/95, while off duty, SA Cullen Michael
Butler became hostile with his current wife,I
I who is
a Computer Specialist for the Las Vegas Division.
The hostility
with the current wife stemmed over finances with his former wife.
SA Butler and his former wife, Regina Ann Butler, divorced in 1985.
after almost 17. years of marriage.
Through divorce proceedings,
Regina Butler received one half of SA Butler’s benefits, including
his pension.
SA Butler was contemplating retirement in December
1995, or January 1996.
As a result of the divorce, Regina Butler
retained the residence because of two small children now aged 15
and 23 •
SA Butler was to receive approximately $27,000.00 from the
sale of the house if she remarried or when the youngest daughter
graduated from high school. Although the daughter is now aged 15,
and not due to graduate from high school for three years, SA Butler
had been contacting his ex—wife to either receive the money for his
share of the house or not allow her to receive one half of his
pension.
Regina Ann Butler had been living with Russell C. Teresi
at the residence but did not marry because Mrs. Butler would be
required to sell the house.
On 10/1/95, SA. Butler locked his current wife in the
backyard, advised he would take care of the problem, and left home
in his personally owned vehicle. I
Icontacted a
2

Savage-1497

6

 p

Memorandum from W. 0, Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
10/1/95
Las Vegas Division
neighbor who is an FBI co—worker to obtain a ride to the former
wif& s residence.
The neighbor’ s husband drove the three to the
residence.
Upon arrival, they found SA Butler inside the doorway r
of the house arguing with his former wife and Russell Teresi.
her two companions exited the vehicle and
approached the house to talk SA Butler into returning home.
When
the three were approximately 25 feet away, SA Butler drew his
service weapon, a Sig P226.
Several individuals yelled that he had
a gun •
At approximately 7:10 p. in., SA Butler fired approximately
eight rounds from the gun at Regina Butler and Russell Teresi.
Initial indications from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department revealed that Regina Butler was shot five times and
Russell Teresj was shot twice.
Both individuals were pronounced
dead at the scene.
After the shooting, SA Butler made comments tol
I
I and her companions.
The only comment that they could recall
was that SA Butler said he was going to the desert to kill himself.
SA Butler walked down the street approximately 10 yards and entered
his vehicle.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., a security guard for the
Spanish Hills housing development discovered the body of SA Butler
laying outside the complex.
SA Butler had fired one shot from his
service weapon into his right temple and was pronounced dead at the
scene.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SrRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
All members of the SIRG agreed that no indication of a
problem was foreseen and therefore, no opportunity for Employee
Assistance Program intervention was available.
SA Butler was
considered to be a successful SA with no indication of a problem.
The SIRG had no recommendations regarding this incident.

3

Savage- 1498

L

  

 

1995

 

 

 

 

7/25/95

Mr. Gore

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SI00TING INCIDENT
2/1/95
OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION

I

Refrence report of Supervisory Special Agent
2/28/95.

Idated

I

is

PORPOSE:
This memorandum
prepared to furnish the analysis,
coaiunents, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident eview
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECO)qMENIWIIOH: That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

1—Mr.’
2.
Mr
1
Mr

LRoom7l42
Room 7125 (Enclosure)
Room 7116
I Room 6012
Mn
3
( 1— Mr. Learv. Roo 6050)
I Room 4997)
( 1— Mr. I
1— Mr. Thomzsoji, Room 7125
I Room 7427
2
Mr.I
I Room 7326)
( 1— Mn
1
Mr.I
IRooia 7825
1
Mr. Coufanti, Room 5012
1
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1
Mr. I
I, Quantico
1
Room 3117
Mr.i
Mn
WMFO
1
Mr. I
Ir Room 7837
:lrr (17)
—

‘‘

—
—

—

—
-

-

—
—
-

—

(CONTINUED

Savage-1415

—

OVER)

 V

IO

I

Memorandum front
Re: Administrative inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/1/95
Oklahoma City Division
nR’PATTB:

I
-

-—

I

Mr • Gore

I

I

On 7/18/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman
lActing Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,

Inspection Divis-ion. Robert S. .Conforti, Section chieL, Violent
Crimes and Major Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; Edward R. Leary, Sctien Chief. Personijel Management
Section, Personnel Division;I
IUnit Chief,
—fl T1n41
(1oba1 Section
NS—2, National Scurity Division;
L Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training and
Administration Section, Training Division;I
I Unit
Chief, Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit, Public
Corruptic
ection, Criminal Investigative
Division;
Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Leg
aining ection, Office of the General Counsel;
and
Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the above—
captione S 00 ng incident.

7C

—

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On January 31, 1995, an unidentified white male, who
was later identified as David P. Milewski, robbed Commercial
Federal Savings and Loan. The subject, according to victim
tellers, entered the bank, .brandishing what was described as a
silver or chrome .25 caliber automatic. The tellers provided
information indicating the subject appeared to be under a great
deal of stress, being very nervous and scared. lhe was demanding
and ordered tellers to get down on the floor. A subsequent
investigation revealed that the subject made his get-away in a
vehicle described as a white Cadillac.
On the morning of February 1, 1995, information was
received from an Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Deputy that he had
been contacted by an informant who had spoken to the bank
robber’s I
I The individual revealed that I
I
a
lidentified as David Milewski, had robbed Commercial
Federal Savings and Loan, on 1/31/95. This identification,
according to the informant, was made because of bank surveillance
hotoarahs dislayed on television .ftr th bank robbery.
Ifurther advised the I
I that Mileweki had

visited

I

____

I

IKi1ewsJc. was aurrentiy resiaing at
a residence located at 2501 South 102nd street, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, and the white Cadillac used in the robbery was parked
(CONTINUED
2

Savage-1416

-

OVER)

:hJC
b 7D

I

 ______lexited

Memorandum from I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/1/95
Oklahoma City Division
--

—

Ito Mr. Gore

in the garage of this residence. Additionally, it was learned.
that the subject had a history of armed robberies. FBI Agents
and -Oklahoma-City. Po-lice Department- (OCPD) officers_initiated a
surveillance of the residence believed to be occupied by the
subject. Agents observed Milewski exit the residence and go to a
Corvette parked in front of the residence on two occasions,
noting that the subject met the general physical description of
the bank robber.
While efforts were being made to obtain an arrest
photograph of Milewski to display to victim tellers for a
positive identification, the garage door to the residence opened
and the subject was observed leaving the residence in the white
Cadillac. After following the subject for a short period of
time, FBI Agents, along with OCPD officers, attempted to pull
subject over, utilizing emergency lights and siren. The subject
then attempted to flee by accelerating.
Following a 20-minute, high-speed chase, during which
attempts to forcibly stop Mileweki failed, he was blocked in a
car stop by Bureau Agents and OCPD officers. The stop was
effected with the vehicle driven by 514
I immediately in
front of subject’s Cadillac. The stop was eiected as the
subject was proceeding west on Highway 152, toward the populated
community of Mustang, Oklahoma, after the subject had attempted
to go the wrong way on streets while being pursued at a speed in
of 90 miles per hour. After the vehicle was stopped, SA
his vehicle and did not immediately observe the
subject in the white Cadillac. He thought the subject may have
exited the Cadillac although he did not see he subject on foot
no’ i 4 i nt-her Agent’s reaction indicate the subject was on foot.
SAl
lapproached the subject vehicle with his .10 mm Smith
and Wesson handgun drawn. As he approached the driver’s side of
the Cadillac, he observed M
wski lying on the front seat, with
his arms stretched out. SA
Jtapped on the windshield and
ordered the subject out of his vehicle. At that point, SAl_____
observed Milewski with a gun in his right hand, and he was
p S?j
beginning to move the gun toward SA
I fired
three times through the windshield and stiii noticed the subject
Ithen fired what he believed to
coming up with the gun. SAl
be three additional times. SAl
Ithen observed blood in the
vicinity of the subject’s head as the subject slumped in the
front seat of the vehicle.

(CONTINUED
3

Savage-1417

-

OVER)

 Memorandum fro

Re:

--

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting :tncident
2/1/95
Oklahoma City Division

I

to Mr. Gore

A medical examination of the deceased subject by
IM. D., revealed a wound to the
Medical Examiner’
The
chin which--appeared to. be selfinflictad _but not latai •
subject had a contact wound to the right temple, with a .25
caliber bullet lodged in the head that the Medical Examiner ruled
as fatal and self-inflicted. Additionally, there were two .10mm
wounds to the head, one to the right hand, and one o the left
forearm. The pathologist ruled the cause of death as a gunshot
wound to the head, and the manner of death was ruled as a
suicide. All of the rounds fired by SA
twere recovered in
the autopsy or in a search of the interior of the vehicle.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRC

The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the report dated 2/28/95, revealed that proper
uring this shooting
procedures were followed by SAl
incident.
After a thorough review of the facts regarding this

incident, it is the opinion of the SIRG that no administrative
action should be taken against SAl
las a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

4

Savage- 1418

 __________

*

Mr. Gore

7/26/95

L

I
k

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
2/27/95
KANSAS CITY DIVISION

I

Reference report of SSAj
3/13/95.

dated

JRPOSE
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting incident.
REcOIUIENDATIONS:
1.
That no adverse action be taken against
employees in this matter.

1 —är.I
I
1
Mr. Gore
(Enclosure)
1—Mr.[
3 — Mr.I____________
(1 — Mr.
I
(1—Mr.
3-Mr.I
-

a

(1

—

Mr. Larv’I

(1—Mr.I

JTP:tp

(17)

1

any FBI

1 —Mr.I
(1 - •
1—Mr.p
I
1— Mr. Doyle
1
Mr. Ccrnferti
1-Mr
Mr

I

I

—

Mr

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1419

-

OVER)

 Ito

Memorandum fro4

Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/27/95
Kansas City Division

Mr • Gore

2.
That the Assistant Director, Training Division, and the
Office of General Counsel implement changes to the Manual of
Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) specifically
addressing FBI policy regarding shooting to neutralize subjects.

3.
That SAC, Kansas City, reiterate current FBI
instructional policy regarding the incapacitation of subjects
through wounding, at scheduled firearms training.

xiaTT

I

I

On 7/18/95, the SIRG, consisting of ChairmanF
L Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; Robert S. Conforti, Section Chief, Violent
crimes and Major offenders Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; Edward R. Leary, Section Chief. Personnel Management
Section, Personnel Division;I
I Unit Chief,
NS—2D Unit. qiobal Section
NS—2, Mational Security Division;
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit. Training and
Administration Section, Training Division;I
I Unit
Chief, Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit, Public
Corruption and Civil Rights Section, criminal Investigative
Division;I
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Legal Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
and,
i Supervisor, Washington Metropolitan Field
Office; met to discuss the above—captioned shooting incident.
-

Svncsis of the shoot jnq_Incident
On 2/24/95, I
I committed an armed bank
robbery, utilizing a handgun. The same day, he used a handgun to
commit an armed carjacking, during which three females were
kidnapped, one of whom was raped byl
1 On 2/27/95, he
(CONTINUED
2

Savage- 1420

-

OVER)

I

 Memorandum from I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/27/95
Kansas City Division

I to Mr. Gore

committed two additional bank robberies, threatening to kill the
bank tellers if they did not comply with his demands for money.
I

I

On 2/27/95, subsequent to the bank robberie SAl
I
I observed a vehicle that had been utilized byl____ during
the 2/27/95 bank robberies
1 parked at a motel. Re placed the
vehicle under surveillance and called for back-up. Prior to the
arrival of back—up cznti
I exited a motel room and walked
directly towards S
I vehicle. SAl
Iconcluded thM
Ihad detected the surveilli’r!P and decided to arrest I
Ito
prevent his escape. Be1ievinrI
Ito be armed and extremely
dangerous, and aware of I
t in several violent
Iinv
felonies in the immediate past, 5?.
ed his vehicle, drew
his weapon, identified_himself, advis
that he was under
arçest= ad commandedl
en advanced towards
Ito freeze.
thigh, in an
I who fired one shot, aiming a
SAl
attempt to disable, but not ki].l,I_____ The shot missed, and
Iran, rep-rlly turTipa toyard SAl
I from positions of
I
I AI
cover. As SAl
I chased I
I fired an additional
seven rounds, one of which struclçl
in the lower_leg. I
I
surrendered to sAL
fter SA I
cornered I
Jtrying to
reach into his vehicle.
-

Observations and Recoasendations of the SI

sil

I

The
‘pund that
kecision to employ deadly
fcrcq againstl
Iias proper and in accordance with FBI policy.
Jwas known to have committed several violent felonies in the
immediate past
1 was believed tq be armed, and began to advance
towards AI
when SN
ladvised him he was under arrest,
Further, I
a ernted o escap. behaving in a manner while
being chased by SAl
I that SAl
I assessed as threatening.
The SIRG found that SAl
becision to try and
incapacitate the subject by shooting him in the leg was in
violation of FBI procedure; however, this issue is not
specifically addressed in the 1410G. 5?. I
by not initially
aiming at “center of mass” incirisd the possibility of a missed
shot, which did occur. SAl
I failure to hit the subject
with the first shot necessitated an additional seven shots being
fire4 during the subsequent foot chase, possibly exposing 5?.
jand others to a dangerous situation.

J

I

The

firearms

training given has in the past, and
(CONTINUED - OVER)
3

Savage- 1421

 Memorandum from
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/27/95
Kansas City Division

Ito

Mr. Gore

currently continues to teach FBI Agents to shoot at “center of
mass” or “for the most effective area”.
However, the SIRG
determined that these instructions are not addressed in the MIOG
or the Legal Handbook for Special Agents.
It was the opinion of
the SIRG that the instructional policy should be included in the
MIOG.

4

Savage- 1422

 Dee. Dir.___________

Memorandum

aiief of

Staff______________

Off.ofGe.
CeL__
Asst. Dfr.:

0

Cria. trw._________
C.’IS_____________

Fn&e__

Info.

To

-

rem

Mr. Gore

DateS

8/22/95

W. D. Thompson, III

Subject

Res.________

Insp.___________
Lab._______
)atiaaL Sec.______
Pe4s1eL____________
training__________
Dff.ofEEA____
Off. of Pabtic

& Cong. Affs.
Drector’s Office

ADMfltSTRJTIVB INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/8/5
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE
Reference report of ADIC W. Lane Crocker, Jr.., dated

5/26/95.

PURPOSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECONNKNJWI!IONS:
(1) tthe. Inspectj.on and Personnel
Divisions prompti
solve on
ssions an
ree upon

APPROVES’
Deputy D(ueclor
3.
1
3.
3

Mx.

Gnl
Gum. Jus. Info.
Servs.
Fae
(en.CoiniseI

Info. Re&

Trnfnfng
Inspecfion
Ofceof EEO
Looy
Allaks_____
IaonSec..__.__OfficeoIPubl&
PetsoeI____

7142
7125 (Enclosure)
I Room 7116
Mr. I
I Room 6012
Mr. Leary, Room 6050)
( 1
( 1 Mr4
I Room 4997)
1— Mr. Thompson, Room 7125
I Rôciin 7427
2
Mr.I
MrJ
1
I Room 7326)
(
1
Nr4
,om 7825
1-Mr4
or
1
Mr. uovie Room 4042
1—Mr4
1 — Mr.1________ Quantico
1 - Mr.I
11oom 3117
ftpLRR:1r1. cj
—

—

—

Mr.
Mr.

1
1
3.

-

Mr.j
Mr4

—

MrsJ

—

Room 3787F

9
ITATh

j

Room 7837

—

—

—

—

—

-

(CONTINUED

—

OVER)

Savage- 1423

-J

 ________

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/8/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
(2)
That the Training and Personnel Divisions
incorporate and emphasize EAP training during inservices for new
support and Special Agent supervisors.

PPROVED

Ciim

cam. Jus. Info.

Sen’s.
Fiosice
tector
DputyDirecoc____ejLGounseL

IflfQ.Re3
Trainkig
Inspection
Oltice of EEC
1aboafoy
Affsirs
NionatSec..
OfiiceofPublic&
Pmsormei_____ Go.Altaks_

DEfAIIS: On 8/17/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley 0.
Thomison, III, Denuty Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
I Açtiricf Chif Tn ±nr, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; I
I Deputy Chief, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Jeremiah W.
Doyle, Jr., Section Chief, Global Section — NS—2, National Security
Division; Van A. Harp, Section Chief, Personnel Administration and
Benef it Section, Personnel Division; I
I Deputy Section
Chief, Terrorism an4 Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division,
USDOJ;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit,. Training
Division; I
I Unit Chief, Undercover and Sensitive
• Operations Unit, Public Corruption and Civil Rights Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; I
I Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Training Sedtion, Office
of the General Counsel;I
I Unit Chief, Firearms —
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
arid I
I Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
SvnoDsis of the Shootina Incident
On 3/8/95, the wife of SA Bruce Eugene Schulz awoke at
approximately 6:15 am, and walked to a bathroom loati riacent to
th siond f] rnr
cnn f the residence at I
I
IWashington, D.C. As she walked to
the bathroom, she noticed that SA Schulz was awake and nervously
pacing around.

I

At approximately 6:42 am, whilsi
was in the____
bathroom, she heard a gunshot and ran into the master bedroom. I
I
I
I did not see SA Schulz in the bedroom, and she ran out of the
second floor foyer, where she found SA Schulz laying on his back on
(CONTINUED - OVER)
2

Savage-1424

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/8/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
the floor with his arms outstretched, perpendicular to his body.
It appeared that SB Schulz had a single gunshot wound to the left
side of his head.
Additionally, a black revolver was laying on the
floor near SA Schulz’ extended left arm. I
ILmmediately
telephoned the Metropolitan Police_Department (MPD) Emergency
Services Unit. After advisingi
Ito wrap the wound, HP])
and Emergency Medical Technicians arrived at 6:47 am and rendered
further medical assistance. SB Schulz was subsequently transported
to the George Washington University Hospital Emergency Room
(GWUHER) and cNFO agents arrived at the residence and the emergency
room at approximately 6:55 am. SB Schulz was pronounced dead at
6:59 am from what appeared to be a single gunshot wound to the left
side of his head.

I

I

Th7iP1c!ø

The crime scene was secured and processed by th
4.1-.-. 1rrl’% 1K..$ I
1

Pcnnric

..-...

—. ......,

.....

WTrPO

.......
........

Iwas asked to consent to a search of the residence. After
the consent was obtained, ?MFO agents searched the residence and
found nothing unusual that is relevant to this administrative
inquiry.

Interviews of I
land WMFO personnel, as well as
personal associates portrayed a troubled agent. It appears that SB
Schulz had extensive debts and poor money management skins. On
numerous occasions, SA Schulz told his wife that he was not
adequately prepared for new wor]v assignments given to him, and he
had concerns about his added responsibilities and sophisticated
equipment with which he had to become familiar. Squad associates
described SB Schulz as troubled due to self-imposed pressure, new
ob expectations and poor investments in the real estate market.
lie had also indicated to his colleagues that he was afraid of being
terminated from the FBI if it was determined that he could not do
his iob, that he was seriously in debt and that he was a poor money
manager.
SB Schulz’ friends mentioned that he has made poor
investments in the real estate market and that he was fearful of
impending legal action against him by tenants of one of his rental

He was aware
that polygraph examinations of other individuals involved were
completed and his was the only pending polygraph.
(CONTINUED
3

Savage-1425

-

OVER)

7C
b7

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/8/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
Credit reports showed that SA Schulz had depleted a joint
savings account that he had with his wife. He had taken out. a
substantial car loan and a significant first mortgage on a rental
property. Additionally, a first mortgage and an owner held second.
trust note had been obtained by SA Schulz for another property
being refurbished by he and his wife.
The black revolver recovered near SA Schulz was
identified as his Bureau issued Smith and Wesson, Model 13-3,
.381.357 Magnum revolver, bearing serial number ACE 3034. The
prod otile which was recovered from SA Schulz’ body was identified
as a .38/.357 lead bullet. Further, the bullet removed during the
autopsy was identified as having been fired from SA Schulz’ service
revolver.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.

The first recommendation made was done so after the
chairman noted the Inspection Division and Personnel Division were
working on policy changes which would require notification to
employees at the initiation of an OPR inquiry of the EAP services
available to them. The second formal recommendation made was done
so after it was determined by the SIRG that EAP training could be
beneficial to all new support and SA supervisors. Such training is
not being routinely done at this time.
It was further observed that it’ s uncertain whether
formal EAP intervention would have prevented the suicide. That
will never be known. However, in addition to the aforementioned
recommendations, the SIRG concluded that SACs and ASACs should
heighten their sensitivity awareness regarding the needs of
employees who are notified that they are the subject of an OPR
investigation and they should ensure that EAP availability
continues to be emphasized at annual conferences.

4

Savage-1426

 ____

4

Mr. Gore

I

7/31/95

I

———

—

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SkiOOTING INCIDENT
3/15/95
EL PASO DIVISION

]7c

I

Reference report of Supervisory Special Aqentj
J, dated 4/14/95.

I

PU1POSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
çOU1!ENflA’EtONS:
(1)
That no administrative action be taken
against any FBI employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident; however, that SAl
1be reminded
of the importance of wearing body armor during the execution of
an arrest.

3.
Mr. F
I Room 7142
1
Mr. Gore, Room 7125 (Enclosure)
1—Mr.
IRoom7fl6
—
Room 6012
( 1— Mr. ],eary, Room 6050)
( 1— Mr.j
IRoom 4997)
1— Mr. Thomon, .coom 1125
2
Mr.i
Room 7427
IRooiu 7326)
( 1— Mr.I
1
Mr.i
i Room 7825
3.
Mr. Conforti, Room 5012
1
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
-

—

3

—

—
—

—

1
3.

1

—
—

—

Mr.
Mr.

Mrsl
:lrr (17)

Quantico

I &oom 3117

IwMo
i Room 7837
(CONTINUED

Savage- 1427

-

OVER)

 4

Ito Mr.

Memorandum fronl
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/15/95
El Paso Division

I

Gore

I

On 7/18/95, the SI1G, consisting of Chairmani
lActing chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; obert. S..Conforti,...Seation. Chief, Violent
Crimes and Major Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; Edward R. Leary, Section Chief. Personpel Management
Section, Personnel Division
lUnit Chief,
NS—2D Unit. çilobal Section
NS—2, National Security Division;
Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training and
Administration Section, Training Division;
I Unit
chief, Undercover and Sensitive Operations unit, Pubiic
Corruption and Civil Rights Section, Criminal Investigative
lUnit chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Division;’
Legl Advice and training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
andi
I Supervisor, MFO, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.
DEThDIS:

-

I

.

Synopsis of the Shootinc Incident
On March 14, 1995, Special Agents (SAc) of Squad 3,
El Paso Division were briefed on current data collected regarding
the potential whereabouts of I
federal
fugitive from Norfolk wanted for unlawful Flight to Avoid
Prosecution for Capital Murder and Attempted Capital Murder.
During the briefing, Agents were advised of I
I history of
violence and were warned that I
Iwas considered armed and
dangerous; a flight risk; and SAc were not to take any chances
during a confrontation with thesubject.
On March 15, 1995,
several SAc of the El Paso Division were q.ssianed to conduct
surveillance of a business location whereL
bras suspected
to patronize.
During the surveillance, the subject was observed
by Agents talking on the_telephone outside the Circle—K
Convenience Store.
SA I
I parked the Bureau yehic1 adjacent
to the store and the telephone booth. After SAl
I radioed
their location to other Agents in t ara AI
bud
I
Idecided to approach I
lat the telephone
booth.
When they opened the car doors, the subject ran across
Stanton Street o
vada Street in an easterly direction.
SA
Ste FBI” and the subject_was chaseçL
SA
yel1ed
ed
the
nickname
Ikne
As
SAl
I
I
1
I
ye.u.ed at
the subject turned towarti the SA5 and at the
same time
fell in the middle of Stanton treat
SA
thought tbatl
jhad shot SAl_____ and she
(CONTINUED - OVER)

2

Savage-1428

 4

Memorandum from I
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/15/95
El Paso Division

Re:

-

Ito Mr. Gore

immediately drew her wecn firing one shot at the subj eat while
running toward him.
SAl
Is shot did not hit
I
I who continued running—and_was seen_by Agents .climbing a
fence leading to California Street.

-—

El Paso Police Department (EPPD) officers subsequently
an a dumpster on California Street. The subject

locatecI
was arrested and transported to the El Paso County Detention
Center by the EPPD.

I

hh
b7O

Acents were assigned to search the scene where SA
Idisoharged her weapon and attempt to locate the
empty cartridge and a point of impact; however, neither item was

found.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above-captioned shooting incident
and weighed the facts given with the FBI’s deadly force policy.
The SIRG considered the fact that the subject was wanted for

capital murder and attempted capi.al murder and had a history of
violence. Also considered was SAl
I sworn
b6
statement that “I thoughtl
I shot SA [_ laiid I
biC
immediately drew my weapon firing one shot 1
while
1
running toward him.” Her_assessment was made after I
I
tuçned towards her nd SAl
Ifell in the middle of the street.
SM
I firing at the subject at this point was
determined to be within the deadly force policy by all the
members of the SIRG.
It was the opinion of the SIRG that no
administrative action should be taken against any FBI employee as
a result of their involvement in this shooting incident.
However, the SIRG recommended that the SAC, El Paso Division,
reiterate the importance of wearing protective clothinq during an
arrest situation.

3

Savage- 1429

 _________
__________

4

Mr. Gore

8/22/95

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INcIDENT
3/20/95
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE (WMFO)
Reference report of Special Agent (SA)
dated 6/27/95.

7C

POR!OSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION: That the Administrative Summary Unit (ASU),
Personnel Ojyis ion (PD), take appropriate administrative action
against SAl
for violating FBI policy regarding carrying a
firearm.
tiie ASU is requested to fully consider SAl
I
commendable actions in this matter when weighing the facts with
past precedents on determining appropriate administrative action.

1
1
1
3

—
—
—
—

1—
2

—

1

—

Mr. I
Room 7142
t
Mr. Gorej Room 7125 (Enclosure)
Mr.j
Room 7116
Mr. I
Room 6012
( 1 - Mr. Learv. Roqm 6050)
( 1 — Mr. [
I Room 4997)
Mr. Thompson, Room 7125
Mr.I
I 1nrm 747
Mr.1
IRoem 7326)
( 1
Mr.
room 7825
-

1—
1—

Mr.L

IRoom
[wMFo

Mr.l

3787F

Mrs.j_________ Room 7837

-

—

1—Mr.I

ID0J

2. — Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
l—Mr.J
IDOJ
1
Mr. [
_J Quantico
1—Mr.I
I Room3lll
LRR:lrr (18)
-

(CONTIiUZD

Savage- 1430

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from W.. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/20/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
On 8/17/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
TTT. fl’ty Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
I
I Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Thspeotions,
Inspection Division;l
I Deputy Chief, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Jeremish W.
Doyle, Jr, Section Chief, Global Section
NS—2, National Security
Division; Van A. Harp, Section Chief Personnel Administration and
Benefit Section, Personnel Division;
I Deputy Section
ii
4
Chief, 9vnv
M Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division,
USDoj;I
I Uni+ chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; I
I Unit Chief, Undercover and Sensitive
Operations Unit, Public Corruption and civil Rights Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; I
I Unit chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Training Section, Office
of the General Counsel; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
TOom1 TTn41- cientific Analysis Section, Laboratory
Division;
andi
i Supervisor, QMFO, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.

Thomscn.

—

I

-

Synopsis of the Shootinctlnaident
On 3/20/95, at approximately 12:45 p.m., a bank robbery
occurred at the George Mason Bank, 4005 Wilson Boulevard,
Arlington, Virginia.
WMFO agents responded to the bank robbery and
a joint investigation •was initiated with the Arlington County
Police Department.
Witnesses advised that a lone black male in his
late twenties or early thirties, heavy set with a small mustache,
5’g” to 6’l” tall, weighing between 250 and 300 pounds presented a
robbery note to the bank teller and demanded money.
The subject
claimed to have a gun. The subject was given bank funds in the
amount of $7,140.68 which he placed into a duffle bag and fled the
bank. The subj ect was described as wearing dark plastic
sunglasses, baseball cap, a blue waist length jacket and blue
jeans. He was carrying a blue duffle or tote bag over his
shoulder.
-

At approximately 1:30 pm, an officer of the Defense
Protective Service (DPS) on duty at the Pentagon (approximately
four miles from the bank robbery) observed an individual who fit

the description of the bank robber. The subj eat was fatigued and
sweaty and asked for directions to the closest metrobus stop. The
officer furnished the subject with directions to the metrobus stop
and then radioed the DPS dispatcher and advised that a man fitting
(CONTINUED
OVER)
-

2

Savage- 1431

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/20/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
the description of the bank robber was headed towards the Pentagon
metrobus stop.
Shortly thereafter, uniformed DI’S officers in marked
b6
police vehicles approached the subject and ordered him to stop.
The subject drew a handgun from his waistband and fled on foot
through the Pentagon’s south parking lot towards Eads Street and
the interstate 395 overpass (1—395).

I

SAl
was conducting a separate
investigation at the Pentagon when the subject was observed.
SA
I had parked his bureau car in a secured parking lot at the
Naval Army Annex and had secured his service weapon and briefcase
in the trunk of the car.
He was dressed in soft street clothes and
felt the possibility of an accidental exposure of his service
weapon within the Pentagon confines might cause undue concern to
the workers and to the security force within the Pentagon.
SA
I
nd DI’S Investigator
I traveled to the Pentagon
in

lunmarked government vehicle. Numerous_uniformed DI’S
land SAF
Iresponded to
Eads Street and the 1—395 overpass. Upon seeing the responding
off icers, the subject turned and pointed his weapon directly at
them. Four DI’S Officers fired upon the subject. The subject
turned and ran up the 1-395 exij ramo apd continued fleeing across
1—395. The DI’S Officers and sid
Ipursued the subject on
foot. when Investigator I
Igot to the top of the 1—395 exit
ramp, he became fatiguei nd jotioned to the other_officers to
continue their pursuit.
Itbat he
lacknowledged to SAl
was physically okay and tnen gave his service weapon to SAL
officers along with Investigatorl

SAl
‘continued pursuing the subject across 1-395
but realized the subject’s lead was increasing. SAl
Istopped
a vehicle that was getting onto 1-395 from highway 110. He
identified himself as an FBI Agent and requested the driver’s
vehicle in order to continue pursuing the subject. The subject
crossed over 1-3 95 and ran through the ground level parking garage
toward the Double Tree Hotel. SAl
Idrove the commandeered
vehicle to the rear of the Hotel and the subject emerged from the
parJcinq garage area and attempted to run past BA F
I BA
I
I identified himself and ordered the subject to stop. The
subject pointed his weapon directly at SAl
lwho was
approximately 20 føt away and SAl
I fired two rounds from
Investigators_______ service weapon.
(CONTINUED

3

Savage- 1432

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry

Shooting Incident
3/20/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office

The subject continued to run approximately one half block
and stopped. in a arssy area near Eads Street with this back
towards SAl
I A DPS marked cruiser with two uniformed
officers was approximately 90 feet in front of the subj eat who
again pointed his weapon at the uniformed officers. OPS officers
and SAl
tired upon the subject who immediately fell to the
ground and lost consciousness. The subject never regained
Consciousness and died on March 21, 1995, at 11:47 pm.
Autopsy reports revealed that the subject had been shot
twice, once in the left rear shoulder and the second wound was a
through and through wound to the subject’ s neck (spine).
The FBI Laboratory, Firearms-Toolmarks Unit, determined
the spent bullet found on Eads Street had been fired from I
I
service weapon. Additionally, the bullet recovered from the
subject’s left rear shoulder was also determined to have been fired
from the same weapon.
FBI Laboratory results, the autopsy report,
and witness statements indicate that SAF
Isjxth shot, from
approximately 120 feet, was the round responsible for the wound to
the subject’s neck.
Two witnesses stated the--subject appeared to
be suffering from a wound when he arrived at the grassy area near
Eads Street.

The subject’s Stallard. Arms 9mm pistol was determined to
be operable by the FBI Laboratory; however, he never fired any
rounds.
Investigation also revealed that the deceased subject was
not responsible for the robbery at the George Mason Bank on
3/20/95.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent tq (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
Members of the SIRG unanimously concurred with the use of
deadly force in tI4s shooting incident and commended the heroism
displayed by SAl
I However, the group recognized the fact 7c
(CONTINUED
4

Savage-1433

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/20/95
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
that S

Iviolated Bureau rules and placed himself in

Unnecessary danger by not carrying or having immediate access to
his

firearm.
In addition to the action taken by ASU, PD, as a
result of this memorandum, SAl
khould be reminded that FBI
SAs are expected to carry or have immediate access to
their
firearms at all times while on duty.

5

Savage-1434

 Mr. Gore

8/24/95

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/2/9 5
LAS VEGAS DIVISION
Referemce report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
I dated 5/15/95.

I

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
CO
A 0
:
Agent (SA)
shooting mci en

1
1
1
3

—
—
-

—

That no adverse action be taken against Special
as a result of his involvement in this

Mr.L

•‘Room 7142
Mr. Gore, Room 7125 (Enclosure)
Mrj
Room 7116
Mr.I
I Room 6012
1
Hr. Larv. Ra 6050)
Mr.I
( 1
IRoom 4997)
Mr Thomtspn, Room 7i25
L T?nnin 7&?7
MrJ
1
Mr. I
IRoom 7326)
MrI
IRoom 7825

Mr[
JRoom 3787F
I WM’0
MrJ
Mrs________ Room 7837

—

—

1—
2

—

1

—

—

1
1

—
-

Mr.I

1-Mr.j

1
Mr4
1
Mr. I
LRR:lrr (18)
-

—

I DOJ

Mr. Doyle. oom 4042

OJ

_J Quantico

I,

Room 3117

(CONTINUED

Savage-1435

-

OVER)

;

6

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/2/95
Las Vegas Division

(2)
That the Training Division and the Office of General
Counsel implement changes to the Manual of Investigative Operations
and Guidelines (MIOG) specifically addressing FBI policy regarding
the disabling of moving vehicles with the use of firearms.

(3)
That SAC, Las Vegas, during scheduled firearms
training, advise all SAs that experience has demonstrated that the
use of firearms to disable moving vehicles is either unsuccessful
or results in an uncontrolled risk to the safety of the officers or
others.

I

DETAILS:
On 8/17/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
I Açi€ina Chf Inør+rn- Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division;[
IDeputy Chief, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Jeremiah W.
Doyle, Jr., Section Chief, Global Section
NS—2, National Security
Division; Van A. Harp, Section Chief, Personnel Administration and
Benefit Section, Personnel Division; I
I Deputy Section
Chief, Terrorism and Violent crimes Section, Criminal Division,
I ITni
USDOJ; I
hief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division;I
Unit Chief, Undercover and Sensitive
Operations Unit, Public Corruption and Civil Rights Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; I
I. Unit chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Leal Advice and SPraining Section, Office
of the General Counsel; I
I Unit Chief, Firearms
Toomarks Unit. Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
I Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting incident.
-

-

anaL

(CONTINUED
2

Savage- 1436

-

OVER)

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore

Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/2/95
Las Vegas Division

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
on 12/15/94, SAl
linitiated a joint
investigation with the Office of Special Investigations (OS!), U.S.
Air Force (USAF), Neflis Air Force Base (NAFB), T Vne
into the alleged drug trafficking activities of I
amemIzer of the USAF assigned to NAPB. on 7/25/94, I
Ihad been
curt martialed based on a civilian drug arrest and sentenced to 18
months custody, a bad conduct discharge, and a reduction in rank.
OS! SAl
I advised SA L
Ithati
I who at
the time was incarcerated in the military jail on the base, had
offered to sell controlled substances to a civilian prisoner lodged
at the Federal Correction Institution located on NAPB. I
I

The

I

ttorney’s Office in Las Vegas had declined

prosecution of I

tat the on—set due to the_minimal amounts of
I It was decided
that I
Iwould be prosecuted by the miltarv_authorities. Two
controlled drug purchases were made from[__iprior to his arrest
on 5/2/95.
contollec substances being distributed byl

Th third

which time I

Iwould.

irn11ri
be

i-iici

ntii-rh

w

in h# ii Iw the

Fat

arrested by OS! Agents.

OS! SA I
Ibriefed four_other 051 Agents on the
investigation and planned arrest of I
1 The car wash at the NAFB

was selectqd as the site for the controlled purchase of the drugs
andi
ubsequent arrest. The car wash was selected to provide
macimuzu cover for the SAc and was believed to be the most optimum

site for the arrest.

,-•.

SAl
hdvised all present that he did not want any
hostage type situation, nor shooting. Based on his prior arrest
for an unregistered firearm I
J
statement that I
Iliad a weapon, it was believed that I
Fwould
be armed. SA I
pecifical1y advised that there was to be no
pursuit of I
ion or off the base. He advised that, if necessary,
icould be arrested at a later date.
I

OS! Agents were to surveil the transaction and broadcast
(CONTINUED

3

Savage- 1437

-

OVER)

 _____

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, IX!, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/2/95
Las Vegas Division
the activity over the radio. When the arVest siarjal was_broadcast,
lweret
OS! SAs were to effect the arrest, and SAl
JaM SAl

tol

I

The prisoner was taken to the car wash and the
surveillance was initiated. Shortly after noon on 5/2/95, J
Iwas
observed driving his vehicle up to the car wash. The 051 Agents on
surveillance broadcast the transaction and the arrest signal was
broadca& fer completion of the transaction. OS! Agents drove
towardsL
‘pd exited their vehicle. Before the arrest could be
effected, I
I sped from the area at a high rate of speed and
exited the NAFB.
SA I
I with SAl
I
I.n the vehicle, followed I
at a safe distance while brbaacasin on the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department (LVNPD) frequency their location,_direction_çf
travel, a
request for assistance to arresti
I SAl
Ilost
Si lit of
near Charleston Boulevard and Oliver Street.
SA
dvised that they were in the generl ares of I
I
Ce. While driving on Oliver Street, SA
lobserved
vehicle stopped_on Del Alma Street, facing south towards
01 iver Street. Si
I drove towards the vehicle and parked at an
angle in front of I
Ivebicle.
SAl
I exited the Bureau vehicle and took up a
position, w4-) ‘
s weapon drai -acent to the driver’s side
4
window of I
I vehicle. SAl
lexited the vehicle, wein
drawn, and took up a position in front of the vehicle. SAl
I
then realized that I
Iveh4.cle hid stalled and thtI
Jwas
attempting to restart it. SAl
I could sea one of I
I hands
on the steering wheel and the other attempting to restart the car.

SA I
I who was wearing a protective vest with “FBI” on k
the front, identified himself and ordered I
Lo raise his bnai b?C
I was able to restart_the vehicle and drove_directly at SA
I SA
and SAl
Idid not know if SAl
Iliad been
struck by the vehicle; however, he spun out of the way and fired
one round from his Bureau weapon at the left rear tire of I
I
vehicle which was speeding out of the area.

landi

SAsI
Ireturned to the Bureau vehicle and
attempted
loçatel
I While driving east on Olive Street, they
observed I
Ivehicle partially in a driveway at I
with the driver’s side door open..I
Icould not be located.
(CONTINUED
OVER)

to

-

4
Savage- 1438

1

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/2/95
Las Vegas Division
VMP1LOfficerg arrived on the scene and assisted in the
search eon
Iwhc was arrested a short time later in a parking
lot of an apartment cqmplex near his residence.

7c

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
he majority of the SIRQ members concurred that
SAl
ecisicn to employ deadly force againsti
has proper
and in accordance with FBI policy. i
iwas believed to be armed
and fled in his vehicle behaving in a manner that SN
lassessed
as threatening.

The SIRG found that SAl
laecision to disable the
subject’s vehicle by shooting at the tire was in violation of FBI
procedure.
Experience has demonstrated that the use of firearms to
disable moving vehicles is either unsuccessful or results in an
uncontrolled risk to the safety of the officers or others.
Therefore, the consensus opinion of the SIRG was that the SkC, Las
Vegas should reiterate the current policy and reasons for that
policy to afl SAs in the division. The SIRG found that the MIOG
does not specifically address the issue of disabling moving
vehicles with firearm, resulting in recommendation number two
being made.

5

Savage- 1439

 Mr. Gore

11/14/95

W. D. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/12/95
LAS VEGAS DIVISION
Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
8/28/95.

I

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1)
That the Office of General Counsel (OGC)
determine the ethicality of an SA participating in a
demonstration of a particular manufacturers product and if this
is a violation of ethical responsibilities.

i—Mr.I

IRoom7l42
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure>
Room 7116
—
Mr.1
Nr.
—
I Room 6012
(1
Room 6050)
I
(1 — Mr. I
IRoom 4997)
(1 - Mr. Harp, Room 6646)
1 — Mr.
Room 7129
3 — Mr. I
7427
(1 — Mr.
ooin 7427)
(1 — Mr. I
Room 7326)
1 — Mr.I
I Room 7825
3.
L D0J
Ms.I
1 — Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1 - Mr.I
IDOJ
1 — Mr.1
IQuantico
LRR:lrr (20)
1
1
4

—

1
3.
1
1

—
—

—
—

Ms.
IRoom 3849
Mr.
J, Room 3787?
Nr4
IWMFO
Mrs
_
9
_________
’ Room 7837

—

-

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1440

—

OVER)

 4

Memorandum from w. o. Thompson, III,
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/12/95
Las Vegas Division

to

Mr. Gore

(2)

That the Administrative Summary Unit (ASU),
(Pn prepare and forward a letter of
censure to
SN
jfor his violation of standard firearm safety
precures, as neglect to obtain concurrence from the Special
Agent in Charge regarding his participation in this demonstration,
and his use of ertreme1y poor judgement for continuing the
demonstraj9p after tjhe first injury occurred. This letter should
advise SAl
Ithat he is being decertifled as a firearms
Perrnn1

Th4,-r

instructor. Aacutlonal penalties for SAl
determined by ASU, PD, based on past precelents.

Ishould be

(3)
That the Training Division remove SAj
the list of approved firearms instructors.

1 from

(4)at the ASU. PtJ.repare and forward a letter of
SAl
I FBI, New York, for his failure to
provide appropriate safety oversight during this shooting incident.

censure to

lb 10

DETAILS:
On 9/29/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley D.
Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
ar9ii of Inspections,
Chief Inspectorl__________________
Inspection Division; I
I Deputy Chief, Civil Rights
2

Savage- 1441

6
7

 ___________

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/12/95
Las Vegas Division
Division, USD03; Edward R. Leary, Section Chief, Personnel
Management Section, Personnel Division; I
I Unit
Chief, Global Section
NS—2, National Security Division; Van A.
Harp, Section chief, Personnel Adiinistration and Benefit Section,
Personnel Division;I
I Deputy Section Chief, Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section, Criminal Division, USDOJ;[
I
Unit C’zief, Firearms Training Unit
1 Training Division;I________
Unit Chief
1 health Carq Fraud Unit, Criminal Investigative
I
Division; I
fi Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Legal Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
I
L Unit Chief, Firearms
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific
AnalysisSection, Laboratorr Division;I
I Supervisor,
WMFO; andi
Inspection Analyst, Office of
Inspections, met to discuss the above—captioned shooting incident.
-

—

Synopsis of the Shootina Incident

I

SA I
INew York Division, was contacted
by Ms.I
J Executive Director, National Independent Bank
Equipment and Systems Association (NIBESA), Park Ridge, Illinois,
requesting assistance in arranging for a demonstration of the
various types of bullet resistant glass during their annual
convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, being held on May 11-12, 1995.
SA
I who had assisted the NIBSA in past demonstrations,
identified SN
kf the Las Vegas Division a the
appropriate employee to arrange for the demonstration.
SAl
aware that SAF
Iwas the Principal Firearms Instructor
(PFI) in the Las Vegas Division.
obtained proper
SAl
management authorization from the New York Division for the FBI td
participate in the demonstration.

Iwas

sAl
Jadvised that the demonstration plan would include
a burning of the safes, and a firearms demonstration involving the
shooting at the bullet resistant glass.
The last event would be a
shooting demonstration using metal targets, similar to
demonstrations he had witnessed in the past.
C) 7

SAl
I was contacted by M5L
bnd a discussion
was held between
1 the two about shootinu at the bullet resistant
glass.
Ms
I insists that SAl
not asked to
participate in any other demonstrations, specifically shooting
bullets at any safes or Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs).

Iwas

.1

Arrangements were made by SA I
i to utifize the
police shooting range an 5/12/95.
Arrangements were also made for
the use of Bureau weapons and ammunition to be used during the
3

Savage- 1442

 4

Memorandum from W. 0. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inpairy
Shooting Incident
5/12/95
Las Vegas Division
demonstration, and he coordinated the delivery of the safes, ATHS,
and resistant glass by the Lomanto Exhibit Services.
SAl
I
chose to use his personally owned Bureau approved 30-06 rifle
during the demonstration. He also provided the rifle ammunition
which included military style armor piercing rounds and coiumercial
30-06 ammunition manufactured by Eldorado Cartridge Company in
Boulder City, Nevada.
This commercial ammunition was all copper
180 grain Barnes “X” bullets.
On the morning of_5/1/95, SAl
I met with SAE
at the firearms range.
SA I
Ihad arranged for the safes, ATMs,
and the glass to be set up and he had marked off an area
approximately 77 feet from the target area using tape stretched
betjween_two speakers.
With between 100 and 150 spectators present,
SA I
Idirected the mechanics of the safe_burning demonstration..
Once this demonstration was completed, SAI
Iirected the

I

spectators behind the taped area.

SAl
Idecided to include a demonstration of shots
being fired at the safes as part of his presentation.
SAI
Ipositioned himself 40 to 50 feet in front of the safe
located near the middle of the target line and fired two rounds of
armor piercing ammunition at the safe. SN
huroached
the safe to examine the bullet impact areas, and SAl
I who had
herd nqise from the spectator area, walked in that direction.
SAl
Isaw that one spectator had suffered a small crescent shaped
wound to the shin area.
First aid was administered and the
spectator insisted that he was okay. SAl
ladvised the
group that it was common for individuals to receive minor splash
back wounds. At that time, neither SA realized that a second
spectator ha4 also received a wound. The spectators were then
moved to the back of the range area being used, approximately 60
b7
y;rds from th target line and the demonstration continued.
fired one of the all copper bullets at the
target and the bullet, or a large fraqmenl of the bullet,
ricochetted back and struc3ç AI
un the right anterior
lower thigh.
SA
I was transported to the University
Medical Center fo treatment.
SAsI
bndl
Lcere also present during
this demonstration.
SA I
lasked if they would assist in
completing the demonstration by firing rounds at the bullet
resistant glass.
SAsi
land I
Iconcluded the demonstration
with no further incidents.

4

Savage- 1443

 Memorandum from W. . Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/12/95
Las Vegas Division
Another spectator, it was later learned, had sustained a.
ricochet wound to the neck.
Both spectators received medical
treatment at the Lake Mead Hospital in Las Vegas.
The second
spectator was advised by hospital staff that a piece of metal was
in her neck; however, that the piece would work its way out. The
spectator later confirmed that the metal piece did eventually work
its way out.
It was also later learned that the first spectator
suffered an injury to his lower left calf muscle.
ffi received
medical treatment at the Lake Mead Hospital and was advised that
the fragment was still in his leg.
On 5/22/95, he sought medical
treatment at the Marquette General Hospital and has been attended
by a physician since that time.
The fragment remains in his leg
and he continues to suffer pain.
He also advised that he has not
sought legal advice; however, feels that compensation is due him
for the hardships he has suffered as a result of the bullet wound.
Observations and Recommendations of the SXR(
The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observati9ns, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any); (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
Members of the SIRG agreed that this incident was an
intentional discharge resulting in unintentional injury.
However,
three major observations were surfaced by the SIRG regarding this
incident.
The first observation involved the purpose and planning
of the demonstration itself.
SIRG members did not understand how
the demonstration served a “law enforcement
11 purpose and questioned
the ethical responsibility of an 5k participating in a
manufacturer’s demonstration of a product.
Therefore, SIRG members
asked for a legal opinion regarding SAl
I participation
in this demonstration.

The second observation of the SIRG pertained to
Lack of proper SAC notification of the
demonstration, his extreme use of poor judgemen in continuing the
presentation upon learning of the first spectator injury, and the
fact that proper safety precautions were not adhered to by either

SAl

5

Savage- 1444

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/12/95
Las Vegas Division
SA
sAl

I

“-

the incident.

Additionally, the ammunition used by

[was not Bureau approved.

Basd on a statement of SSAI____________________
SAl
ladvised him on 5/11/95, that be would be shooting at
buLLet proof glass at the LVMPD rric on i/1?/95, and that the bank
would be providing the glass.
SAl
meyer advised his
supervisor that this was to be a demonstration of any sort, or that
any spectators would be present.
Further, SAl
‘neglected
to provide his supervisor with any written documentation relating
to the demonstration, nor was the supervisor informed that an SA
from the New’ York Division would also be present during the
demonstration.
Based on the information provided to him and the
knowledge that SAl
Iwas the PFI for the Las Vegas Division
and frequently tested ammunition, weapons, or various training
methods, no SAC approval was sought.
The SIRG also noted that had
SAC approval been sought, injuries may have been prevented.
Additionally, SIRG members stressed that SAl
I extreme
use of poor judgement heavily impacted the health and well being of
the spectators, and to resume shooting at the ATMs after learning
of the first injury was “cavalier.” The group emphasized the need
for medical personnel to be on—site during these types of
demonstrations.
Taking into consideration each of the above
violations and the use of extremely poor judgement by SA
Ithe SIRG concurred with the SAC’s recommendation that
he be removed as the Las Vegas Division’s PFI.
Further, members
unanimously agreed that 524
I be decertified as a PFI and,
at a minimum, be provided with a letter of censure.
The last observation and recommendation of the SIRG
involved SAl
lof the New York Division.
Members
noted that SAL
Jsought and received proper SAC approval for his.
participation in this_demonstration.
A concern existed among the
group regarding SAl
I neglect of taking action after learning
of the first spectator injury.
Therefore, the SIRG recommended
that SAL
Ibe given a letter of censure for his failure to
provide appropriate safety oversight during this incident.

6

Savage- 1445

Jh

7C

 ____________Reference
___________

4,

10/3/95

Hr. Gore
W. 0. Thompson, III
ADMINISTRaTIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTThG INCIDENT
5/29/95
LTXMORE DIVISION

report

t) I C

of Inspector—in—Place (lIP)

dated 7/6/95.

I

This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
PURPOSE:
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
That no 4dministrative action be taken
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1)
against any employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

IRoom7l42
l—Mr.I
1
Mr. Gore, Room 7129 (Enclosure)
Mr4
1
I Room 7116
6012
3
Mr.j
Room
,
( 1 tir. Leary, Room 6050)
I Room 4997)
( 1 Mr. I
Mr. Thompson, Room 7129
1
Iôm 74L27
2
MrJ
Room 7326)
3.
Nr4
1 — Mr.I
room /825
I 003
Mr.L
1
Mr. Doyle, Room 4042
1
03
1-Mr.I
Quantico
1 - Mr.L
Room 3117
3. — Mr. I
—
—

1
1
1

—
—
-

Room 3787F
WNFO
j Room 7837.

Mr.I

Mr.l

Mrs9

—

—

lb IC

—

—

—

-

—

LRR:lrr C18)

(CONTINtEED

Savage- 1446

-

OVER)

 4

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Xnquiry
Shooting Incident
5/29/95
Baltimore Division
That the ADIC, Washington Metropolitan Field Office
(2)
(WMFO) and the SAC, Baltimore Division, continue to pursue and
promptly implement a workable solution for operational procedures
involving territorial strategies.

(3)
That WMFO management review its operational
procedures regarding command post operations including the need for
ranking management presence and oversight as the event dictates.

On 8/17/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman Wiley I).
DETAILS:
Thompson, III, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division;
I
I Aqtincr Chief InsDector Office of Inspections,
IDeputy Chief, Civil
Inspection Division; I
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Jeremiah W.
Doyle, Jr., Section Chief, Global Section - NS—2, National Security
1 Personnel Administration and
Division; Van A. Harp, Section Chief
Benefit Section, Personnel Division;I
I Deputy Section
Chief, Terrorism and Violent crimes Section,. criminal Division,
I Unit ciief, Firearms Training Unit, Training
USDOJ;I
lUnit Chief, Undercover and Sensitive
Division; I
Operations Unit, PuJlic Corruption and civil Rights Section,
Criminal Investigative Division
i Unit Chief,
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Advice and Training Section, Office
I Unit Chief, Firearms —
of the General Counsell
Toolmarks Unit, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division;
and I
I Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting incident.

(CO&TINUED

2

Savage- 1447

—

OVER)

 I.

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, III, to Mr. Gore
Administrative Inquiry
Re:
Shooting Incident
5/29/95
Baltimore Divisidn
Synopsis of the Shootinc Incident
Based ona request from the Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD), Washington Metropolitan Field Office (MFO),
Squad C—21 (the Cold Case Squad), initiated an Interstate
Transportation in Aid of Racketeering (ITAR) -Murder investigation.
This request was based on two incidents that occurred in January
1995, where MPD officers were shot and wounded in unprovoked
attacks while on duty in full uniform.
In April 1995, a Prince George’s County Police Department
(PGcPD) officer was shot and killed in an unprovoked attack as he
During this incident, the
sat in full uniform in his patrol car.
officer’s service weapon, a 9mm Beretta, was taken by the
Two days later a subject was arrested by the PGCPD and
assailant.
charged with this matter.

On 5/18/951
imet with PGCPD detectives and
provided information regarding her association with a subject named
She indicated that for the past year she had a
Ralph Mclean.
relationship with the subject during which time he had physically
Based on this inforqation. an arrçst
and sexually assaulted her.
warrant was issued for Ralph McIean for assault. I
lalso
furnished information which linked Ralph McLean to the assaults on
the MPD officers as well as the murder of the PGCPD officer.
Special Agents (SAs) of the WMFO initiated technical
Early that evening, SAs of
surveillance of McLean on 5/25/95.
Squad C—21 and Special Operations Group (SOG) personnel met to
distribute descriptive data about McLean and to establish a plan of
Surveillance was discontinued that
action if McLean was located.
Information was
night and resumed in the early morning of 5/26/95.
1b6
obtained irdicating that McLean was traveling south towards
Richmond, Virginia.
An arrest warrant was issued in the District of Columbia
for McLean on 5/27/95, for the assault n n NPD officer.
During
the day, McLean responded to a page by I
I and during the
conversation he indicated that he thought she was cooperating with
law enforcement authorities. The MPD assaults were profiled on

“America’s Most Wanted” on the same night t however, McLean’s name
was not mentioned. Subsequently, on the evening of 5/28/95, a
television repoter related that an arrest warrant had been issued
for McLean for shooting the MPD officers and that there was an
(CONTINUED - OVER)
3

Savage- 1448

 ______land

Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, XII, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/29/95
Baltimore Division
outstanding PGC?D arrest warrant for the same individual that
identified MoZean’s girlfriend as cooperating.
Technical coverage during the afternoon of 5/28/95,
indicated that McLean was headed north towards the District of
A PGCPD detective also notified a C—1 nmd SA
Columbia area.
land
that afternoon and advised that McLean had contactedi
Based on this information, SOG,
wanted to meet her that evening.
Squad C—21 SAs, and Technical Services Squad SAs held a meeting and
were advised that McLean was to meet his girlfriend at a shopping

mall, and they anticipated trying to arrest him in an open area
If this did not work, plans
while he was enroute to the meeting.
were made to attempt to pinpoint McLean’s location, surveil him to
a safe area, and make the arrest. Plans included the ftht that if
McLean was determined to be stationary for the night, the SWAT
would be activated and if a felony car stop was required, the SOG
would handle that part.

J

During the evening, the PGCPD detective witl

advised that a meeting was planned between McLean and[
lat a
Virginia mall. The meeting area was later changed to the Beltway

Plaza Mall in Greenbelt, Maryland.

I had

-

previously advised

ib IC

McLean that she had a friend in the Greenbelt are nd that would
It should be noted thati
be a good place to meet.
Iwas being
operated solely by PGCPD detectives and all conversations between

McLean were being relayed to the SAs by those detectives.

At approximately 6:00 pm an SA of C-21 notified the
Southern Maryland Metropolitan Resident Agency (SML1RA) that McLean
was in the area but that it was not anticipated that anything would
occur in PG County. The SNMRA was advised at approximately 10:40
pm, that the meeting place had changed and that the Beltway Plaza
Mall, the SMMRA’ s territory, would be used for the meeting. WMFO
SAs arrived in the Greenbelt area at approximately 10:00 pm.

I

Throughout the evening, McLean andi
I continued
conversations and at approximately 11:30 pm, in response tol
I She advised him that she had not
page, McLean contacted I
sean im in the parking area of the mall and McLean then advised
Ithat he would meet her at the Shell Gas Station in the area.
Based on this information, SOG SAs William Christian andl__________
Imoved thir vehicles to a parking lot at the Greene1t
Udj.e school in order to observe the gas station. Between 10:30
pm and 12:40 am, surveillance indicated numerous activations of
(CONTINUED
4

Savage- 1449

-

OVER)

I

 Memorandum from W. D. Thompson, In, to Mr. Gore
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/29/95
Baltimore Division
McLean’s cellular phone although the conversations were not long
enough to pinpoint hisS location. However, it was determined that
McLean was in the area of the Greenbelt Middle School and this
information was broadcast to all units.
An officer of the Greerzbelt City Police Department (GCPD)
notified a fellow officer at approximately 12:40 am, of suspicious
vehicles in the area of Greenbelt Road and Kenilworth Avenue.
While patrolling the area, the GCPD officer observed SA Christian’s
vehicle in the parking lot of the school. The officer drove past
SA Christian’s vehicle to obtain registration information, turned
around in the parking lot, and returned to the area of
SA Christian exited his vehicle,
SA Christian’s vehicle.
identified himself as an FBI SA, and asked the GCPD officer to
leave the area and requested that other marked units be requested
to keep clear of this area due to law enforcement presence
conducting surveillance. Approximately 10 minutes after the
off icer departed the area, Ralph McIean approached SA Christian’s
vehicle from the operator’s side and fired 16 shots with an K—li,
killing SA Christian. SA Christian was armed with a 10mm Smith and
Wesson, Model 1076 pistol which was still holstered, and a 9mm H&X]
NP-S submachine gun which was not fired. He was wearing his
ballistic vest at the time of the shooting.
While positioned in a surveillance van, SAl
‘heard
the automatic weapon fire, called for assistance, exited the van,
and observed McLean running around the corner behind the school.
An MPD officer who was hiding in shrubbery across the street in the
vicinity of the Shell Station, also saw McLean fleeing and
broadcast the direction of McLean’s travel. McLean attempted to
escape from the area of the school through a wooded area to get to
his vehicle which was parked in an apartment camplex nearby. The
route was blocked by law enforcement officers who had quickly set
up a perimeter. McLean fled west several hundred yards to the
During this time, McLean made a
Beltway Plaza Mall parking lot.
diversionary 911 call and advised emergency personnel that the
assailant of the police officer drove away from the area in a black

Maxima.

An SNMRA SA saw McLean moving from one concrete pillar to
another in the p4rkinq area of the plaza near a Caldor’s Store and,
by Bureau radio, requested assistance. McLean, who was hiding
behind the wheel’s of a box trailer parked on the Caldor loading
dock, fired on the responding police officers and SAc and they
(CONTINUED
5

Savage- 1450

-

OVER)

 III, to Mr. Gore

l4eiuoranduin from W. D. Thompson,
Re:

Administrative Inquiry

Shooting Incident
5/29/95
Baltimore Division
returned fire.
A total of 43 rounds were fired, 31 by three PGCPD
After receiving numerous non—fatal
officers and 12 by three SAc.
bullet wounds, cLean took his own life by shooting himself with
the 9mm Beretta taken. from the PGCI’D officer who was killed in
April 1995.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIEG

The SIRG reviewed the above synopsized incident with the
intent to (1) evaluate the application of deadly force; (2) provide
the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and
recommendations for corrective actions from an operational
standpoint (if any>; (3) provide recommendations concerning
training and/or safety issues and, (4) provide recommendations for
administrative action if deemed necessary.
The S,IRG concluded that rio FBI employees’ actions
contributed to or in any way could be construed to have been a
causal factor in the tragic death of SA William Christian, Jr.
The
predisposition of his killer was well documented.
Unfortunately,
his last law enforcement victim was SA Christian whom he chose to
cowardly ambush as he did his other law enforcement victims.
The events that immediately transpired following the
shooting of SA Christian were found to be logical and appropriate
given the circumstances faced by the law enforcement officers.
The
SIRG concluded that the three SAc who fired a total of 12 rounds
either at the subject or at a disoriented police dog did so in
compliance with the FBI
s deadly force policy.
1
The SIRG concluded
that no administrative action was warranted for those three SAs and
accordingly, none is recommended.
As documented in the report, the hunt for the subject
Ralph McLean was intense, and highly technical equipment was used
The Washington, D.C., MPD and, the PGCPD both
in tracking him.
wanted McLean captured for assaults/killings of their own officers.
The SIRG recognized the inherent problems in command and control of
joint operations with local law enforcement agencies.
Compounding
the inherent problems was the PGCPD’s refusal to allow the FBI
direct access to the source being used to lure the subject into the
area.
The SIRG also noted that the Baltimore Division has
responsibility for relations with the PGCPD and clearly has
responsibility !f or any FBI enforcement actions occurring in its
territory.
(CONTINUED
OVER)
-

6

Savage-1451

 FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
Federal Hurean of Investigation

Copy to:

I

Report
Date:

tIP
March 3, 1994

I

Field OfficePUe 0:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
JANUARY 31, 1994

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

I

I

FBIHQ

Bureau PU. 0:

Title:

Synopsis:

0111cc:

66—19157—21

I anl
1 were suspects in 15
bank robberies which had been committed in the
Indianapolis metropolitan area.
In nine of those
robberies, two black males had entered the victim bank,
and in the other six of those robberies, only one black
b6
male had entered the victim bank.
In all of the
bc
robberies, handguns had been displayed and ski masks had
been worn by the robbers.
One or more stolen GENERAL
MOTORS cars had been used in each of the 15 bank
robberies.
Iwere known to have lengthy
Both
lanc
criminal records, including violent action against law
enforcement officers.
For example, on 11/30/93,
kas stopped for questioning by Indianapolis
Police, and attempted to ram a responding police vehicle
with the vehicle he was driving. He fled on foot and was
eventually arrested after rest[incr t.r1th two police
officers.
During January, 1994j
Iwas stopped by an
IndiAnrris Police Officer.
Police reports revealed
that I
I struck the officer in the head and body, then
drove away dragging the officer_alonqside[
Ivehicle.
While dragging the off icer,I
Igrabbed a gun from the
seat of his car and temporarily escaped.

This docuuent contains neither recaurerdatfcns nor conchstons of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI end i Loaned to
your aensy; It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

I—

 66—19157—21

I

The Indianapolis FBI conceived a plan of action to
acquje ufficient probable cause to charge and arrest
ndI
Ifor one or more of the 15 bank
robberieb e.i.ieve to have been committed by them or for
any future crimes they may be found to have perpetrated.
Notice and general concepts of the plan were provided on
1/26/94 to representatives of the Indianapolis banking
community, during a meeting hosted by the SAC and other
agents at the Indianapolis FBI Office.
Details of the
plan were discussed and formulated on 1/28/94 at a
b6
meeting of representatives of the FBI, INDIANA STATE
b7c
POLICE, INDIANAPOLIS POLICE, and MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, which occurred at the INDIANA STATE POLICE Post
52 in Indianapolis.
The FBI was documented as the lead agency, and Case
Agent/SWAT Leader I
resented a written
Operations Order/Warning Order to SAC WAYNE R. ALFORD.
The plan was approved by SAC ALFORD, and on 1/31/94, a
briefing for involved personnel took place at the
INDIANAPOLIS STATE POLICE Post 52.
This was an “ad hoc”
group and not subject to formal memorandum of
understanding.
Copies of the Operations Order/Warning
Order were given to participants.
Th staied puroose was
to conduct a physical surveillance of I
land I
“to develop additional probable cause so as to be able to
federally charge one or both suspects with a past or
future armed robbery and gun violation.”

I

The plan specified that a bank robbery would be prevented
if at all possible and if a specific bank were known to
have been targeted for robbery, but that vehicle thefts
would not be immediately interdicted unless accompanied
by physical assault upon a person/victim.
• The planned surveillances were to be conducted from 10:00
a.m. to 3:00 p.m., 1/31/94 through 2/4/94, by two ground
teams, supported by INDIANA STATE POLICE and FBI
aircraft.
Ground Team “A” was led by FBI SAl
nd was assigned coverage of WARD an primary
I
responsibility for an
(s).
Ground Team
by FBI
was assigned
1
Zee
After an 8:00 a.m. briefing, 1/31/94, the surveillance
was initiated by the following personnel:

2

bC

 ___________
___________
____J
____à-pilot/Observer

66—19157—21
Team “A”

SA

IFBI

SA___________

JFBI

SAl__________________________

Corporall

I, MCSO

Detective
Detective Sergeant
LieutenntI

1MCSO

Officerl

I IPD

l ISP

I

ISP

Team “B”
SAE
Ski

I

FBI

Officexi____________________

TP

Master Trooper/Irivestigatorl
First SeaeantI
J IsP
Sergeant
IPD
Sergeant
.
ISP
Detective Sergeant I

I
I

ISP

ISP

ISP Aircraft

I

Master Trooper/Investiqator
Observer
Sergeanti__________________

ISP, Pilot

FBI Aircraft

5k

Pilot

SA

By agreement of the air crews, the ISP plane was assigned
to provide air support from the initiation of
surveillance until 1:00 p.m., and the FBI plane from 1:00
p.m. until termination.
The FBI aircraft and crew,
although airborne at 1:00 p.m., 1/31/94, did not take
part in the surveillance.

I

The surveillance was initiated at approximately 10:00
a.in., 1/31/94; however, it was_determined shortly after
10:00 .m. thati
Iweretogether at
I andy
Iresidence. Thus, Team “A” and Team “B” joined at
the latter location.
Loose ground surveillance, augmented by intense air
surveillance, revealed tha
Iconducted,
landi
together, some apparently personal errands during the
3

 66—19157—21
morning of 1/31/94. However, later in the mornin
g,
men were observed in a stolen, gold 1986 Oldsmobile, both
hereafter referred to as the Gold Olds.
Prom 11:35 a.m. until 12:19 p.m.A
Jandi
observed, in the Gold Olds, to pass by eight differe Iwere
nt
banks, the last of which was the UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS
BANK, 6714 Rockvil].e Road, the ultimate robbery target.
At 12:39 p.m.,I
landi
]entered the parking lot
of BEN DAVIS HIGH scHOOL, and there were observed
stealing a blue 1985 Olds Cutlass, hereafter referre
d to
b6
as the Blue Olds.
b7C
At approximately this point, SZ
joined the
surveillance.
He had been Workina in
IndianaooLis
Office, but upon hearing oft
landi
activities,_departed the of’ice because he believed I
Jwere going to commit a robbery.
andi

I

p.m.,i

At approximately 12:45
landi
jpiacea
the Gold Olds in a residential area about three—tenths of
a mile north of the UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, with the
hood up, emergency flashers on, and the engine running.
At or about 12:46 p.m.,t
Ian4
Idrove through
the parking lot of the UNION FED’ERAL SAVINGS BANK in the
Blue Olds, however continued to drive to the rear of a
nearby KROGER FOOD STORE, where one of them exited the
vehicle briefly.

F

It should be noted that, at this point in time, the
involved )raw enforcement personnel believed
thati
lintended to commit a robbery, but none was
certain as to the location of the robbery--the KROGER
FOOD STORE, UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, or some other
bank which had been studied on 1/31/94.

land

The majority of the ground personnel took positions
near
the Gold Olds at Daisy Lane and Heather Drive, and a
smaller contingent remained in the area of the UNION
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK.
The engine of the Gold Olds was
turned off, and ignition wires were pulled from its
engine by ISP Off 1
ic
_
____
ex
____

I

jdeparted the area of the KROGER FOOD
andi
STORE ana then drove through the residential area
adjacent to the UNIO DA
1 SAVINGS BANK.
At or about
1:07 p.m. ,[ I and I
I entered and robbed the
4

b6

b70

 ___________hoved
_____Ishifted

66—19157—21
UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK by display of handguns,

completing same in about one minute.

The fact of the armed robbery was communicated to all of
the law enforcement personnel by radio, and within a very
short period of timel
I as
las driver, andi
passenger, arrived in tfle glue Olds at the location of
the Gold Olds.

I
I

Both I
Iecited the glue Olds, moved to or
landi
toward the GoLa Gigs, azdi
iwas observed by
numerous officers to be carrying a handgun. Numerous
Aaents/Officers began to converge upon I
I and
identified themselves verbally and by wearing
of raid jackets with respective law enforcement agency
loaos bo1cly displayed, and ordered bothi
j and
Ito submit to arrest througp phrases such as
“get down,” “freeze,” etc .
landi
I ignored
“‘
in the
the commands and reentered tne ij.ue
front seat, with I
las driver andl
las
passenger.

h70

ISP Of ficerl______ had driven his unmarked police vehicle
to a position beflind the Blue Olds
4 nci exit
jto
vehiclq witI his shotgun,orderingI
lanai
stop.
the_vehicle to reverse gear an
backed toward Officer I
I
I at which time Officerl
fired one round of 4t4 shot from his shogun into the
right rear tire of the Blue Olds. I
Ishifted the Blue
Olds into a forward gear, began spinning the tires on the
icy road, and drove of f the road into a yard.
While the subjects continued their escape attempt, SAS
(9mm) and

lanq
L
Irespectively, fired NP-5
12-gauge shotqun (rifled slug> ati
lanai

I

While SA
werç firinq at the passenger
land I
side of the vehicle, ISP Officer I
I fired several
shots from his 9mm Beretta at the left rear tire of the
Blue Olds. ISP Officer I
Ithen drove from the east
and collided with the Blue Olds in an effort to stop the
vehicle.

During this period of timel
Isustained all of his
wounds. While the Blue Olds remained in the grass of the
yard at Daisy Lane and Heather Drive,I
xited or was
pushed from the Blue Olds and was taken into custody.
into the driver’s seat and continued his
flight, and ISP Of
Iran along the left side

ficerL

5

b6
b7C

 ____Iwas
_______lalso

______

66—19157—21

Ion

of the Blue Olds, iumped oven
the ground, arid
continued firing his 9mm Beretta into the driver’s side
area of the vehicle until his weapon was empty.
able to push ISP Offi
vehicle to
the side and reenter Daisy
began to
move east on Daisy Lane, SA
red a second
rifled slua through_the rear win ow o the Blue Olds at
S(
lso fired additional rounds from his
MP-5 at the rear of the Blue Olds.
As the Blue Olds proceeded east on Daisy Lane, ISP
Of ficer
fired three 9mm rounds at the rear
of the vehicle.
After the Blue Olds had traveled about one-half block
east on Daisy Lane from Heather Drive, ISP Officeni
drove west on Daisy Lane, directly at the Blue Olds,
causing the Blue Olds to veer right or south and through
a yard. At that point, ISP Officer I
I fired three
9mm rounds at the driver’s side of the vehicle. These
were the last shots fired. A short vehicle and foot
pursuit ensued and resulted in!
larrest.

I

A .38-caliber revolver, all of the money taken in the
robbery, as well as a .380 Walther semiauto pistol were
recovereç at th ene of the original altercation with
landi
I
The .38-caliber revolver was found
on
Iperson, and the .380 Waither was apparently
dropped byl
Jat or after the point at which he
reentered the Blue Olds.

I

Six law enforcement officers tired thei weapons in their

efforts to apprehend I
Name

I

Weapon

j(ISP)
12G/Shotgun
(Heather Drive/Daisy Lane)

I

I

(FBI)
12G/Shotgun
(Heather Drive/Daisy Lane)
(FBI)

H&K MP5/SF

(Meatner Drive/Daisy Lane)

I

I as follows:

lanai

I(ISP)
Berett
(Heather Drive/Daisy Lane)

Estimated

Caliber

Rounds Shot

#4 shot

1

Rifled Slug

2

147/HP 9mm

18-2 0

9mm

15-16

b6
D
C
7

6

-

__J

 66—19157—21
(ISP)
[ (Heather jDriv
e/Daisy

Beretta
Lane)

9mm

3

Beretta
(Daisy Lane/Bauman Avenue)

9mm

3

Estimated total rounds fired:
(ISP)
(FBI)
(FBI)
(ISP)

Shotgun
Shotgun
H&K MP5/SF
Beretta

Total Rounds:

1 - #4 Shot
2 - Rifled Slug
18-20 — 9mm 147/HP
21-22 - 9mm
b6
b70

42—45

As a result of the shots fired by law
enfo
officers, the following wounds were infli rcement
cted:
-

-

gunshot wound to right eye;
gunshot wound to left upper back, whic
h exited
the left upper chest;
gunshot wound to left wrist/forearm area.
-

gunshot
gunshot
gunshot
gunshot

wound
wound
wound
wound

to
to
to
to

mid-upper right arm;
left, upper back;
left shoulder area;
left hand.

o rounds were recovered intact from
their bodies.

I J

Throughout the week of 1/31-2/4/94,
and F
were receiving a variety of medical
care, surgically and
otherwise, at WISHARD NENORIAL HOSP
ITAL, Indianapolis,
Indiana.
Both
andi
iwere charged in authorized
Federa complaints with violations of Title
18, U. S.
Code, Sections 2113 and 924(c), for the
1/31
/94
bank
robbery and use of weapons in the com
mission of same.
Both declined interview.
Details of this incident will be repo
rted as delineated
in the table of contents.

7

 ___
_

Memorandum

Dep. Dir.__________
Wd.IWIit

PP
r

To

Date

r

From

Subject

Mr.[

:

6/27/94
L)J

b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/16/94
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

:

ADD Erw.______
Asst. Dir.:
Adn.Serw.___
crim.liw._____

Ident.___

Lab._____
LegaEC&n._________
Tech. Servs._____
Trainfng_
ca. AffsOft.
Off.ofEED
—
Off. Ltatscn&
tnt. Affs._______
Off. of PbLic Atfs._
Tetqicne Ju._______
Director’s Offië_

Refer at±jached report of Inspector-in
-Place
I dated 4/14/94 (received 5/4/94).
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysi
s,
comments, and recommendations of the Shoo
ting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the capti
oned shooting.
RECO4MENDA’rXoN:
That no administrative action be taken against
any .FBI employee as a result of this shooting
incident.

1
1
3

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
Mr. Lea
(1
1
Mr.
1—Mr.
onson
TJG:tg (14)
—

-

-

—

—

-

‘Ii

Mr.
(1—
Mr.
Mr
Mr
Quantico
Mr
WMFO
Mr
Quantico
(Cont nued
Over)
-

h6
b7C

  

.r

. .
?t 's ..


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  



 

 

PD204 (Rv. 34-59)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Invstigalion

copy to:

Zc:

°

YjcdOfflceFLof:
Th1e:

SSA J. F
April ,

Ofcc:
1994

CLEVELAND

62A—CV—50901
SHOOTING INCTDEWP TNOLVING

SAF

NO INJURY
4/1/94
CLEVELAND DIVISION

b6

ADMINISTRATION INQUIRY

s4
lof the Cleveland Division of the FBI
was involved in a Bureau automobile accident
when struck
brookside by a deer.
On April 1, 1994, SAl
Jhad met an informant at the
latter’s residence to debrief him while takin
g him to
lunch. Subsequent to the debriefing at a local
food
vendor, SA F
Jand his informant were returning to the
informant’s residence to drop him off befo
re proceeding
back to the office. While driving along
Ohio
State Rt.
322 atapproximately 12:30 p.m. in the
afternoon, SA
isaw a deer running across the field
only moments before it impacted the drive along the road
r’s side of his
car causing damage to the rer door pane
l
and shattering
the window glass. SAl
aintained control of the
vehicle and brought it to a complete stop
of the road. He then doubled back to the on the shoulder
point on the
road that the deer had run into the car
and observed the
deer lying in the ditch on the side of
the road, badly
wounded.
Fearing that the deer would somehow strug
gle
back into the road and jeopardize the safet
y of other
drivers and concerned_abqut the pain and
suffering the
animal was in, SAT
leleoted to dispatch the deer
with one shot fromThis service pistol
to the deer’s head.
There wre no witnesses to the 1
inc
d
nt
i cither than SA
Jinformant. Thereafter, SAl
Joontacted the

This docwie

nt centains neither reciuendatens
mr coictusfans of the FBI. It is
your agency; It and Its centents ar. not to be
dIstributed outside your agency.

B

the proçerty of the FBI ard is loaned to

b6
b7c

 local police department and the Cleveland PBI office to
report the incident. A deputy sheriff for Geauga County
arrived on the scene, filed a report and arranged for the
Ohio State Highway Department to pic3c up and dispose of
the deer’s body.

drove the informant to the informant’s
residence and then returned to the office.

2*.

b6

b7C

  

4-4 
a. 
?9



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 
as it. .
I





 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vr? 

3   
 It at 0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



A

 

 

F3).I

cRr

-I742)

Eqat ot
Ie:

ASAC RICHARD C. STAVER
August 10, 1994

P116 Of8ce F1eI

62A-CV514 65

Once:

CLEVELAND

5nt FieI

erofre:
The criminal investigation which
initiated the
pursuit, and ultimately tpe
July 29, 1994 shooting incident, is
entitled [
CHAR
PARMA HEIHTS9HIO; 7/9/94; TER ONE BANI(, 6555 PEARL ROAD,.
BR(A); 00: CV”, file num
51378. [
lie also a suspect in eight other bank ber 91A—CV—
robberies in
the Cleveland, Ohio area.

b7C

ie time of the shootina in{riit
on July 29, 1994.
date of birth:
1,
FBI
C
J
#:F
seen charged with bank robb
Section 213.3(a), United State ery, in violation of TftLe 18,
s
United States Magistrate Judg Code, and a warrant was issued by
e Patricia A. Hemann on July 12,
1994.

Tna

Participating in the
Jwere
members of the Cleveland/cuyahog apprehension of F
a
nty Fugitive Task Force
(FTP’), which included Federal RurCou
is çf Investigation (P11
Special Aciønlf s[
SA
F
j- sergeant I
JCleveland Police
nr
—1.Iprr.ment; and Deputy
t
Sher
TCuyahoga County
Sheriff’s Office; as well asiff-I
Pi sIn -rlory Spec
ial Agent (SSA)
jand FBI SAT
I Acting
nvestigative
‘—.iuormation as to the speditic
whereabouts of[
at
approximately 12:01 a.m.Qzi Jnlv
‘0
S94 the
r, under the onscene supervision of ssI
1
J attempted to apprehen
latE
Jouth Euclid, Ohio. Upon meeting d
near
the scene, a p’an was develope
d and specific assignments were
made. All personnel
protective_vests and raid
jackets. F
I
I wer assigned to
search the house and SSA
Van
j covered the
outside. The arrestinqteam.f
ter announcin tnemselves, enter
the house.,jn search of I
ed
I Upon searching a bedroom,
I observedj
Jump4ng out of,a first floo
r window
r.pihg on foot. Sergeant
attem
pted
I
to
pursue
_Jth
rough the open window and
I
accidentally discharged his
shotgun. As[
Jescaped on foot through the
backyard, FBI

J

B—i

Thu docu oootacz Ddther recommj,daiio
ni or c clulcas of the FBL h lithe
preny of th. FBI
aod is Ioancd io your ajeocy li id its
contents ire noc 106. dig,bu
ted outsd. your agey.

b7C.

-

 Agents and law enforcement-person
nel pusuedhim. SAT
while running across Suffolk Stree
t, tripped on the curb while
attempting to holster his weap
on
and
accidentally discharged two
rounds prom his Sig Sauer 9MM
pistol. As the pursuit continued,
I was running in very low light condito
n- through.
s and over-fences. At one poin
t, SAl
Iwas behind
nd observed him pause by a fen
ce
hold
ing
-what a sa d
o
a weapon. F
ishouted “FBI” and wlie
not s op
shot one rçrnn
cm his S&W 10MM pistol.
‘umped a er
a fence and I
pursued_himnd tackled him to -the
ground. E
I stronci1y resisted andT__]ras immediately
assisted by SAl
Jand the
was handcuffed and transported other members of the FrF. I
to the Cuyahoqa County Jail.- Tiiere
were no injuries as a result of
the
apparent property damage. No weap four discharges and no_______
on was found on

or near

2—2

[

J

h

/

 D—2O4

3—3—59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Cops’ to:

Report of:
Date:

ASAC ANTHONY A. BETZ
September 7, 1994

Office:

Field Office Pile N:

66F—BA—84396

Bureau Pile

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
BALTIMORE DIVISION/SMMRA
SEPTEMBER 2, 1994

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

BALTIMORE
66A—BA—84396

Sycopsis:

This administrative inauiy was initiated upon rece
ipt
of information from SAE
Jon 9/2/94 at approximately
1:30 PM, wherein SA[
Jtated that during an arrest of a
sub:ject believed tob armed and_dangerous, she fired two rounds
from her FBI issued weapon.
sA[
ned to Sane Streets
j assig
Squad in the Southern Maryland !etropolita
n Resident Agency
(SMMRA) and a member of the arresting party, was
chasing a wanted
subject on foot whçn she observed the subject
reaching into his
pants.
SA I
J thinking that the subject was reaching for a
gun and wasäWout to turn and fire, fired two roun
ds at the
subject.
Both rounds missed the subject as both the agent and
subject were running over uneven terrain. The
subject was
thereafter arrested after a brief foot chas
e.
-C—

This docunent contains neither recoaniendatf
ot nor ccncltsfons of the FBI. It fs the pnep.rty of the
FBI and Is loaned to
your agency; It and its contents are not to be distrib
uted outside your agency.

L_

 66F—BA—8439 6
DETAILS:

The Baltimore Division, in the Southern Maryland
Metropolitan Resident Agency, had been conducting a o±t
investigation with the Prince George’s County Police Department
under 92D-BA—76761 entitled Violent Drug Gangs in the Southern
Maryland Metropolitan Territory; IThR - VIOLENT CRIMEI 00 BA,
code named operation HORNET. The focus of this investigation was
to bring pressure on open air on crack markets being operated in
Prince George’s County, Maryland in an attempt to gather
intelligence about drug trafficking in the Suburban Counties
boarding Washington, DC.
On August 25, 1994 a federal search warrant was served
at a Prince George’s County residence under that investigatiqn.
seeking cocaine and firearms. A sub:ject later identified as I
I
I
I fled the scene on foot. Previous informant
information had reflected thati
J was always armed with a small
caliber pistol and that he would hide it in his wastbqnd or
crotch. Informant information also reflected thati
Ihad been
involved in a drive by shooting in Prince George’s County_several
weeks prior to the search. BA I
etermined that I
iwas
wanted on drug trafficking charges in the state of Virginia, and
initiated a preliminary inquiry under the Unlawful Flight to
Avoid Prosecution category.
h6
On September 2, 1994 SAl
a Maryland State
Police Sergeant and two other Special Agents stopped a vehicle in
which they believed[
Iwas riding. While the
subject was bein questioned, be broke and ran with the agents in
pursuit. As
running into a heavily wooded area BA
reaching into his pant and beLieving that
I
I observe
he was about to turn and fire a handgun, BA!
I fired two
nine millimeter rounds at I
I from her FBI issued weapon. OTT
was not hit, continued running for a short distance and was
apprehended by other agents.

I

incident.

The following interviews were conducted regarding this

 ______________j,

FD-204 ov. 3-3-Sw)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Repotof:
Date

SSA I
October U, 1994

FicldOfflccFjl,l:

66F—HQ—71227

I

Offlce:

MThMI

flursauFdcI:

SHOOTING INCIDENT

9/9/94

MI2MI DIVISION
b7C
hsractcr:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

On September 9, 1994, at approximately 5:35 PM,
during an arrest attempt by the Miami Division’s Violent
Crimes/Fugitive Tsk Force, the subject of the arrest,
ARLIX FUENTES, a white male, date of birth 1/21/58, was
shot and killed. Law enforcement officers involved in
the shooting incident were FBI SAL
I Metro
Dade Police Department (MDPD) Detective I
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (DLE) SAl________
Iii lia1eah Police Department (HPD) Detectivel
I
who is not a member of the Fugitive Task
Force, was present to assist in identifying the subject
whom he had previously arrested.

-

FUENTES, who was a federal fugitive charged with
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Confinement (UFAC), escaped from
a Dade county Florida prison on 4/8/94 were he was
serving a life sentence for attempting to kill a Florida
Highway Patrolman.
Anticipating contact with FUENTES, members of
the Fugitive Task Force followed FUENTES’ girlfriend
Ion
I a white female, date of birth I
9/8/94 with negative results. On 9/9/94 at approximately
5:30 PM, she was followed to an area near the
intersection of Southwest 62 Avenue and 15 Street, Miami
where subject FUENTES was observed entering the passenger

This docxinent contains neither recoamendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and Is Loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are ot to be distributed outside your agenoy.

 I
AC CONMENTS:
SAC, Miami has reviewed all facts and circumsta

nces
surrcnrndiig this shooting incident and
has concludecLthat SA

I discharge Jactions

were justified. The fact that SAl
d his weapon was necessary inasmuch as he was protecting
his own life, as well as the lives of other law enforcement
officers on the scene.
b7C
SAC, Miami reconimends no further action.

I

 FD—204 (Rev. 33_59>

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy

to:

Report of:
Date:

SSA I
october 28, 1994

Office:

Fe1dOfIicePj1e#:

66F—HQ—19157 SUB 48H

BureauFfle#:

title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
SAN JUAN DIVISION
8/31/94

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Syaopsis:

SAN JUAN
66F—HQ—19157
b7C

During the momma hours 9f 8/16/94, San Juan
Special Agent (SA) I
i was the victim of an
attempted robbery at his residence.
SA E
j was the
San Juan’s “Golden Trash” investigation (272A-SJ30700) into several major money laundering organizations
operating in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean.
The first
phase of the takedown of this case was carried out on
8/16/94.
Investigation established that S[
I was at
his residence in Dorado, Puerto Rico, preparing to 1eav
for work at the FBI qff I c.s.
M- anrn-nvmate1y 7:30 a.m.)
notified s4
SAl
Jthat he had
encountered problems with starting his Bucar, which was
parked on the street in front of his residence. He
opened the hood to look at the engine and determine what.:
the problem might be. After opening the hood and
deciding to wait for one of the .gçal sqcurity guards to
give him a battery juinpstart, SAl
Iheaded back
toward his house and sat in the porch area.
While he was
sitting down, he was accosted by a masked man pointing a
revolver at him.
The gunman ha rrJ-’ed riding a
bicycle.
The gunman ordered SAl
I to open the house.
si[
unarmed and fearing tnat once inside the house
t11 uuu.n would kill him, told the gunman that he did
live there, however, he was staying at the residence

This docunent contains neither reccmneaxlations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It Is
your agency; it and its contents are riot to be dlstr1uted
outside your agency.

b6
b7C

the property of the FBI and is Loaned to

-J

 s
________Ithen
_________oe

66F—HQ—19157 SUB 48H

while visiting the island. The gunman asked if there was
Icould get
someone else in the house and if SA
at there was
jresponde
inside, to which SAl
nobody there, he could not open the house, and the house
was alarmed and the alarm would go off it he or the
SAj______ advised the subject
gunman attempted to enter.
that the residence was occupied by a lady, who had
probably gone to the grocery store. The gunman then
decided thj’1- *høv would both wait for her to arrive. He
jtoward the far end of the porch which
ordered SAl
is located on one side of the residence and where they
would not be visible from the street. The gunman held SA
Ithere foT anml-o?cimately one and one-half hours
I
during which SAL
I noticed a large tattoo of a woman
on one of the gunman’s calves and that he had a second
The mask
large frame revolver tucked under his shirt.
worn by the gunman was of a gray color and from a
sweatshirt-like material sewn at the top and with two
The mask extended below the
holes cut for the eyes.
attempted to conceal his
apparently
he
and
chin,
gunman’s
real voice by biting on a piece of the mask as he spoke.
The gunman seemed very cautiop and kept more than an
kt all times. He also kept
ari’s distance from SAl
Iseated while he stood most of the time.
SAl
After approximatçlv one and one—half hours of
there were money arid
waiting, while he asked SAl
I to
jewelry inside the house, the gunman ordered SAL
SA
told
soundedand_
alarm
the
open the door, even if
tid not
Ithat if the alarm souiided and SAL
I
walked to
silence it, he would kill SAl
I SAl
that
enough
close
came
gunman
th front door, whereby the
Iwas able to shove the arm with the gun up and
SAl
away from himself. As he did so, the gunman fired one
shot into the air. S
Iwas able to get inside the
house and close the door behind him, proceeding then to
get his Bureaiwenn1 and return to the front door. As
he did so, SAl
Iwas yelling at the gunman and
toward the area where the
windows
the
through
looking
SA
aunmanad been but he saw no trace of the gunman.
opened the front door expecting that the
gupman woii].d have fled he area. As he opened the door,
S1J
Isaw that the gunman was standing on the same
spot where he had left him and saw that the gunman was
Jattempted to
raising his revolver toward him. SAl
r.n&t he raised
back away from the door at the same
his weapon and fired several shots at the gunman. SA
not recall if the gunman fired any shots at

b

hf

2

b1C

 on

a

66F-HQ-19157 SUB 48H
this point.
ired approximately two shots from
SAl
inside his residence before the gunman start
ed to back
away and two more shots outside but direc
tly in front of
his doorway.
SAl
Ithen lost sight of the gunman.
He retrieved another pistol magazine from
inside the
residence before pursuing the gunman.
SAl
Isaw the
gunman again after running past three houses
adjacent to
his own to the edge of a golf course.
The gunman, riding
his bicycle, turned around and fired at SA
I
I SA
fire, firing approximately -four rounds.
The gunman continued on his bicycle through
the golf
course until he was able to exit through a
hole in the
perimeter fence leading to a street and disap
pearing from
view.

If

Upon receiving notification of the incident
described above, the Criminal Assistant Spec
ial Agent in
Charge, the Acting Supervisory Special Agent
and the
Reactive Squad agents responded to the residence
.
Liaison was initiated with the Police of Puerto
Rico
(POPR) at the scene and potential witnesses were
located.
Several neighbors and golf players reported hear
ing shots
and seeing the cyclist leaving the area. A neighb
orhood
investigation conducted near the area where the subj
ect
exited the golf course into the adjacent neighborhood
of
MameyaJ. developed information that a man ridin
g a bicycle
had been seen in the area at the time in question. This
man was known to have a large tattoo on one of his
calves
and had been arrested previously by POPR for burg
lary.
Neighbors identified this individual by a stree
t name of
Fottic
P’ Local POPR officers located a police
er from the area who knew of an individual named
Further inquiries located the suspect’ s
residence where the family was interviewed and
consent to
search the suspect’s room was obtained. A
gray sweat
pant was located, which had been cut around
the mid-thigh
area with a section missing, that would fit
the
description of the material used to make the
gunman’s

J

I

mask.
The suspect was located at his grandpar
a ew blociks away where several items of cloth ents’ home
ing fitting
SA
of the clothing worn by the gunman
were located after consent to search was obta
ined.
SA
Iviewed a tattoo on the suspect’s left calf which
he identified as the same as that seen
on the gunman. A
short distance away, SAs located a minor
who had loaned
his bicycle to the suspect the previous
night.
The
bicycle was located and it fit the one desc
ribed by SA
detail.
POPR took possession of the bicycle.
3

DLC

b7C

 ___________tin

—

4

66F—HQ—19157 SUB 4811

I

The facts of this matter were related to AUSA
who instructed that, given the
IZ
1 recent UCA work,
circumstances and S21
investigation should continue.
The POPR and local DA determined that they had
enough information and material evidence to hold the
He
subject until a lineup could be conducted on 9/1/94.
The
was held overnight at the Bayamon Detention Center.
subject had been released from jail approximately 17 days
prior where he was serving time for armed robbery.
Preliminary record checks indicate no federal criminal
record; however, several arrests and convictions locally
for armed robbery, threats and weapons violations were
found.
Several latent prints were lifted at the scene
and will be analyzed to determine if they belong to the
subject.
The subject
matter. While at the
attempted to convince
consent to search the
POPR.

has refused to cooperate in this
grandparents’ residence, he
the grandparents not to grant
residence before he was removed by

On 9/2/94, a criminal complaint was filed
rjas charged with violation
against subject.j
On the same date,
of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1l.

an arrest warrant was issued fort

I

On 9/1/94, agents of the POPR, Criminal
Investiaati.on Corps (CIC), Bayamon, Puerto Rico, charged
the Tribunal Superior de Puerto, San Juan,
He was charged with violating four separate
Puerto Rico.
I The
laws related to the assault of SAl
I into the custody of
local magistrate remande
.‘I
piarshals and held him on $80,000.00 bond.
was then incarcerated in the Bayamon Judicial

Jail.

I

kas arrested by agents of
On 9/6/94,
U.S. Magistrate ARENAS, San Juan, Puerto Rico,
the FBI.
ordered that he be detained without bond until his
scheduled 9/20/94 preliminary hearing.

4

b6
b7C

 66F—HQ-19157 SUB 48H
Subsmit to the arest and indictnent of
slibjectE
Jhas stated that it is
SAT
possible suJject is not the one who assaulted him. As
a
result, AUSA I
j stated on 10/25/94 that he
will contact the local prosecutor to determine if
subject
pleads out in local court, the federal charges will
be
dropped.

5

 FD-204 (Rcv. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigatf on
-

Copyto:

ASU, PERSONNEL DIVISION

Report oC
Date:

SSAI_______________________

Office:

62—A—DL—7 1228

Bureau File I:

December 22,

Field Ornce File!:

I
Character:

1994

DALLAS

SHOOTING INCIDENT INVOLVING

j

b6

SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DALLAS DIVISION
12/10/94

b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

SAj
dog.

This inquiry concerns a discharge of a firearm by
jwhen he was confronted by a charging rottweiler

Enclosed for the Bureau is the documentation that
has been prepared regarding this matter.

-

SAC, Dallas determined, based upon policy and the
details of the circumstances regarding this shooting
incident that SAF
iwas justified in firing his Bureau
issued pistol at the charging dog.

This document contains neither ;ecmnendatlons nor concLusions of the FBI.
It is the property of the FBI a,x :s Loaned to
your agency; it ar its contents are not to be distrituted outside
your agency

.

 _____

DETAILS:

On the night of Saturday, December 10, 1994, S1’
was babysitting his children and the children of a neighbor dt
the residence of his estranged wife.
Upon the return of SA
fitie residence to return to his own
he
residence.
Iwas walking to his perSqflal vqhicle, he
As SAl
jfired z
was charg. by a neighbor’s rottweiler dog.
.I
the charging dog one time, striking the dog in the front chest
and causing the dog to run away.

I

Immediately after the shooting of the dog occurred, SA
the Dallas Office of the Federal Bureau of
.nvesigation (FBI) and asked tne office per’onn i..o contac SSA
This wa immediately
notify him of the incident.
accomplished.
jsubmitted a memorandum
On December 11, 1994, SAl
to the SAC, Dallas, detailing the shooting incident.
On December 14, 1994,[
j the owner of the
He
jwas interviewed.
rotteiler dog that was shot by SAl
confirmed that on the night. of Deceber 10, 1994, his dog was
loose in the neighborhood arid had been shot in the front left
]advised that he had the dog examined by a
chest.
v-erinariafl on the same night that he was ot and the
veterinarian confirmed that the dog had been shot in the front
left chest with the exit wound just behind the dog’s left
shoulder.
Interviews conducted of the neighborhood residents on
E.ecember 14, 1994, December 15, 1994, and December 20, 1994
cetermined that no one actually witnessed the actual shooting,
but several persons advised that they had seen the rottweiler dog
jrunning loose in the neighborhood Ofl the night of
ofj
December 10, 1994.
On December 14, 1994, an interview of F
determined that she had seen the rottweiler do on ti’e night of
December 10, 1994, in the immediate area of’
residence.
Even though she did not witness the actual shooting,
she saw the dog immediately prior to the shooting in an area
where it could hj” c-rf nt mqrsons leaving from the front of
Jresidence.
the residence ofi

I

1994, an interview was conducted with
On December 20
neighb
ofE’
or
j She. advised that she had
a
previously seen!
I rottweiler dog chase a young boy and
it is her opinion that the dog would hava caused bodily harm to
the boy had the dog not hooked its dragging chain around an
object.
jwas
Therefore, based on the fact that SAl
confronted by a charging rottweiler dog, placing him in fear of

b6
bc

 grievous bodily harm, he was justified in drawing his Bureau
issued pistol and firing one time at the dog, striking the dog
and_causing the dog to run away, thus eliminating the threat to
SAl_____

b6
b7C

 FBI
Shooting Incident Report
Summaries

1994

 

 

 

 

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 •

maneuver,. Ski
jt.: totcycle, “npdged” it
Iul
with his vehicle hnd the &Qtopy’clüt’ tell to the gund
Both

BAa had expected the subject to reáaih on the gound; however, as

•

they exited their vehicles, he began to run east on the curb
along Center Point Drive,; Wj’ien SkI
Iyelled “FBI, halt or
I’ll shoot”, the subject turned towards him and although BA
I
rqould not clearly see the subject’s. bands, he believed
“they äoqeared to be reaching !f or something in the bag”. BA
I
ired one shot from his 9mm sig Sauer pistol ;d missed.
1
SAl
Ihad now jo[ned in t)e soot chase and lthough he does
not recall seeinq SN
j he hqard thq .ccnmnand and the shot
but did not know who. had fired
Ski
Ivan down Center Point
Drive and yelled forthe àubject to stop and fired two dhots from
his 9mm Big Sauer pistol ichich mièsed the subject. As the
sub’iect continued to run along Center Point prive, Sc SAl_____
I
I attexted to drive in fropt of bin arM lbók ala qScapç
but he dodged aroundi
Ive1iic.e.ind continued his flight.

•

BOG BA
ationed nearby on
Frederick_Street whefl e ear4 S
give the arrest .cotnnd.
As BA I
1rave onto tente Point into the westbound lane, he
observed the chase and heard the fl&. Beçàuse of the traffic
median, SAj
oUid.ñOt1lockt1iesubjéct. SkI
I
stopped his vehidle, pulled h Bureau issue Remington 870
shotgun from the :roof mount aid exited his vehicle.

I

I

tàrr.after the subject snut enni
anded him to
1
halt but the stibject conefuned to run
0 BA]
Ithen fired one
BA
round of 00-buck
and the subject immediately dropped to the
ground. The subject was ,not woanded and was immediately taken
into custody. When questionèd at the scene, the subj ect,
subsequently identified iá.I
I anted that he did not
have the money but then denied Involninent in the extortion and
refused to answer any additional questions.

Upon SAC PARSON’s arrival at tj qceñe, he dgtermined
that although shot had bee fi’red there were no injuries and
one suM ect was in cuêtody. $C PARSQNS ordered the Lop neles
Shooting Team to be dispatched to the Moreno Valley Mall to
process the crime scene. The photographá and other information
initially obtained by he 1,n An4çles Office Shooting Than were
subsequently turned over to the Shooting Iflcident Review Team
from PBIHQ.
.

I

•

Additional investigation conducted by the Los Angeles
Division resulted iti the çelease Of I
land the arreçt
of I
j(brother 6?]
I.
and
All four
[,
suojects were charged with Violation of Title 18, U.S. Code
Section 1951-Conspiracy to Obstruct and or Delay Interstate
Commerce by Means of Extortion.

I

4

 •
•
F’

L

A review of
for the four
subjects disclosed that j
ihas a çrimina]. histo
dating to 7/24/93, regarding drug violationsi
Ih no prior criminal history; and[
I, has a criminal history dating to /8f88, for
firearms violations.

..

.

5

I

 Mr.T

I

Date

7/24/95

B; R;Knowlton
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/2 1/94
NEW YORK DIVISION
Reference report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated 1/6/95.

I

I

I

PURPOSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
conunents, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
O1flA’PTflI-

rP)lat no administrative action be taken against
SAl
las a result of his involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1

—

2

-

1
3

-

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

I
L

( i—1

Mr.
Mr.
1— Mr.
( 1—
1- Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
Mr.
i,-Mr.
Mrs.
-

-

-

—

*

-

-

RR:1rr (17)

iRoom 7142
oom 7125 (Enclosure)
I
,rnt7427
Room 7326)
Room 7116
Room 6012
m 6050)
Room 4997)
Room 7125
Room 7825
Room 5012
oom 4042
Quantico
Room 3117
0
Room 7837

I

(CONTINUED

OVER)

b6
:b7c

 S
*

Memorandum from D. R. Knowlton to
Re:
Administrative InJairy
Shooting Incident
11/21/94
New York Division

Mr.I

I

DETAIlS:
On 7/18/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman David R.
Knowlton, Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Unit Chief,
Inspection Division; I
Iñvèstigatifë IaW Uifit, Legal Advice and Training -Sect-io Office
of the General counsel;I
lunit Chief, Undercover
and Sensitive Operations Unit, Public Corruption and Civil Rights
Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Robert S. Conforti,
Section Chief, Violent Crime and Major Offenders Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; John Danna, Supervisory Special
Agent, Washington Metropolitan Field Off ice;I
Unit Chief, NS—2—D, Global Section, National Security Division;
I Unit Chief, Quantico Firearms Training Unit,
Training Division, and Edward R.. Leary, Section Chief, Personnel
Management Section, Personnel Division, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting.
-

Synopsis of the Shootinq Incident
On November 21, 1994, sl
I who was
scheduled to work a 2:00 pm to 10:00 pin shift at the FBI Office
While on the
in Manhattan, boarded a subway train to Manhattan.
train, he observed a passenger walking from the rear area of the
car to the front area of the car displaying a sheathed long knife
on his right hip.
The passenger was muttering to himself,
holding the handle of the cnife in plain view, and continually
pacing back and forth.
Idecided action needed to be
SAl
taken fearing that the passenger_might injure him or other
passengers on the car.
Istood, walked one or two steps
SAl
away from the subject, drew his weapon, and pivoted to face the
The
passenger and advised that he was a police officer.
i-i to draw the knife from the_sheath and charged
passenger
towards SAl_______ Fearing for his life, SAl
I fired one shot
at the subject causing the subject to fall to the floor, face
down, while losing .control of the knife.
On arrival at the first
Manhattan stop, SA[
irequested that another passenger notify
the conductor and subsequently asked the conductor to notify the
Transit Police and Emergency Medical Services. The Transit
Police arrived and took cusodv of be subject.
All witnesses
bC
interviewed corroborated. SAJ
laccount of the events.

b7C

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the report dated 1/6/95, revealed that proper
procedures were followed by SAL
Iduring this shooting
2

b6
b7C

-

 1-

Memorandum from D. R. KnOwlton to Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
11/21/94
New York Division

f

I fired his weapon while fearing for his life
incident.
SA
as well as other passengers on the subway car.

a

h6fodgh revi7 of the “facts regarding this
Xfter
incident, it is the opinion of the SIRG that no administrative
action should be taken against SAl
las a result, of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

3

 F0404 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division,
Shooting Incident Review Group

Repottof:
Date:

SSAJ______________________
April 14, 1995

Office:

Field Office File I:

67E—HQ—957 077

Bureau FUel:

EL PASO
67E—HQ—957077

Title:

EL PASO DIVISION SHOOTING INCIDENT 3/15/95
b6

b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopia:

DETAILS:
During the arrest otl
71 i
H
Texas, Special Agent (SA)I
jais—
charged her weapon, on Mrcn i, a99.
me roilowing is
a summary of events surrounding this incident:
On March 14, 1995, SA
ibriefed the agents
of Squad 3, El Paso Division, on current data collected
regarding the potential whereabouts oft
land
agnt wçre brieçed oni
Jhistory of violence.
SAl
land SAI
[briefed these agents
tha
I was wanted for capital Murder and Attempted
Capital Murder from the sate of Virginia. All agents
were warned thatt
Iwas considered armed and dan
gerous; a flight risk; and agents were not to take any
chances during a confrontation withi
I Several b 6
agents of the El Paso Division of thá FBI were assigned b C
to conduct surveillance of a business location where
I
l,as susoctd tn nirrni
1.5, 1995.
SAd
I and______
Iwere members of the surveillance team in the
I
morning hours of March 15, 1995.
-

This doctrient contaffis neither reconntendatj nor conci.sfons
of the FBt. It Is the property of the FI ar Is Loaned to
your agency; It ar,d Its contents are not to be dlstrlb.zted outside
your agency.

B—I

 __Iescap
ecl
____

__

67E—HQ—957 077

At

nrnriTh+P1’7

on vth 1, 1995, SAd
Jreceived a message
Iandl
up money from a WESTERN UNIN.
2310 N. Mesa Street, El Paso, Texas at 8:47 am.
was last reported to be walking south on Mesa Stat.
Al). four agents left their original surveillance site and
rnrpde
of 231 1’I
-treet. SAc
ian
located
lat a telephone
located on
e cor
d Stanton Streets.
When SAS I
land
parked their vehicle,
I started t
on evqti teet. SASF
andi
I gave chase. SAl
jyelled fox’
stoD. at which time he turned toward the
agents. SAF
I fell n th i
ç1d1e of the street and SA
1
thou
ghti
E
I shot SA[
SA
inmediately drew her weapon ana fired one
I
shot at’
Iwhjle rianninc toward hiVi.
SAl
I
‘‘

jth SAl

b7C

Itoward

..urvugn a ta1dential area
ana ne clearea several tall chain link fences. Within a
short period, EL PASO POLICE DEPARTMENT (EPPLizas ron—

tacted
oca e
by SA

assistance in the apprehension of
as located and arrested bsr zpp in a dumpster
treet. I
bias not impacted
shot and no other point of. impact
oca e •
o weapon could be located for
in the vicinity of his arrest and chase.

I

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SAC El Paso recommends no action against, S?
If or discharge of her weapon. At the time of
larrest, all agents were warned that
was armed and dangerous with the potential for I a hostile1
arrest. Additionally, no injuries were sustained during
this incident.

I

I

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4

fl)-204 (Rev. 3-3-Sj

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Ccy to:

Report of
)ate:
dOfficeEUeI:
flUc:

SAl

66F—SJ-19157 Sub 48

L

s
1/17/94

tctcr

Syaopsii:

I

February 17, 1994

Office:

SAN JUAN

ButeauFilcl:

66F—SJ—19157

i-VICTIM;

SHOOTING INCIDENT-AFO
b6

On Jnnav 7,

1994, at approximately 8:30pm, SA
b70
I, was the victim of an attempted
robbery.
SAl
Ihad completed making a call from a
public phone near a shopping center in Guay
nabo, Puerto
Rico, when he noticed a car approaching him
slowly with
its lights off.
SAj
Icontinued walking towards his
vehicle when the front seat passenger of thes
uspicious
car announced “this is a robbery.” SAl
Irea
cted by
drawing his bureau issued pistol, a Smit
h & Wesson 10mm,
model 1076, and fired at the assailan
t who had by now
exited his vehicle. SM
fired at the assai]4nt who
I
reacted by attempting to flee in the veh
icle.
SAl
I
continued to shoot at the suspect as
he attempted to
flee, in a vehicle sal__Jidenti
fied as a dark colored
Datsun.
SAl
I fearing that the assailan
immediately drove to his residence and ts might return.
called SSA I
las well as the Police of Puerto Rico
I
Later that same evening POPR Officers atte (POPR).
mpted to stop
a vehicle (Datsun) traveling at a high
rate of speed.
The vehicle engaged the police in a
high speed chase, but
was eventually stopped. The POPR
Officers found three
subjects in the vehicle, two of whic
h were injured.
One
suffered a gunshot wound to the jaw, the
other was shot
in his left hand. The vehicle also had
5 or 6 bullet

This doaznent contains neither reccnsendatlons nor
conctuslons of the FBI. It Is the property
of the FBI arz Is
your agency; It arid Its contents are
not to be distributed outsid, your agy.

Loied to

 andi

____

___
____

____

____

__

I

holes on the passenger side.
arrested and idntifjed as [

All three subject were

An interview of subject I
attmniti .y4t-b pegative results.

I was
An interview of
I
I however, resulted in a confession,
wherein he implicated himself and the others in the
robbery attempt. Subject
is a minor and
was not interviewed.

b6

b7c

Interviews were obtained of the POPR Officers
involved in the Felony car stop and subsequent arrest of
the subjects. Immediately following the incident, SSA
kiotified the SAC as well as the ASAC, who
was out of the Division but nevertheless called and
appised of the qituation.
At the request of the SAC,
SSAI
I Duty Agent of the SIOC, FBIHQ, was
called and apprised of the facts known at the time
immediately following the incident.
A crime scene was conducted at the parking lot where
the incident occurred, and six (6) FEDERAL 10mm shell
casings were recovered. A bullet trajectory analysis was
conducted on 1/29/94 of the vehicle involved with the
assistance of the Laboratory Section, FBIHQ. All
physical evidence obtained by the FBI has been
appropriately handled and/or forwarded to the FBI

Laboratory for examination.
Phriiir’ti 17

IOQA

I

land
iwere indicted by a Federal

Grand Jury in San Juan, Puerto Rico, for Assault on a
Federal Officer (AFO), Title 18 USC 111 (a) & 114.
I
jis a minor and was not indicted at this
time. However, it is anticipated that[
twill be
indicted once his status as an adult is determined by the
Court.

I

b

I

Onqanuary 19, 1994, SSAI
jcontacted SSAI
Incident/Peer Support Program Manager,
Behavioral Sciences Unit, FBI Academy, to advise him of
the inc4dent and seek additional guidance relatina_
toA
Jneed
result of this incident.
SSAE
J
scheduled SAl
Ito attend the next critical incident
Seminar during the week of April 11, 1994.

2

I

L

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_________had

________

FD—204 (Rev 3—3—59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTTCE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Date:

SSA
February :3,

Field Office File N:

62A—AQ—46502

Report of:

Office:

ALBUQUERQUE

1994
Bureau File N:

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIR
SHOOTING INCIDENT
ALBUQUERQUE DIVISION
JANUARY 26, 1994
Character:

Synopsis:

-

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
At approximately 6:00 p.m., dusk, on January 26, 1994, SA
Albuquercue Division, went to the
I
residence oft____________________________ NW,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, in order to concflict an interview
SA
in coniunction with a bank robbery investigation.
an
up
set
to
residence
the
previously called
As he approached the
appointment for the interview.
house, he noticed a “Beware of Dog” sign on the front
door of the residence, but did not notice any dog in the
After knocking, a dog began
vicinity of the residence.
run
barking.
lnot.ced the dog rise and begantheto dog
SAl
Istepped away from
SAt
toward him barking.
and drew his service pistol and shot the dog once in the
head when he was within striking distance.

Interview of the dog’s owner revealed that the dog is
usually tethered; however, on the date of this incident,
he had let the dog out after feeding him, without
The resident of the house where sAj
chaining him.
was to conduct his interview, the grandmother of the dog
owner, advised that she ran through the house to let the
agent in when she heard the dog barking.

I

lassisted the dog owner in getting veterinary
SAl
care of the injured canine.
.-C

This docurient contains neither recoenndations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
it and Its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

your agency;

b7C

  

 

 

 1
.. 
.fg,  
1 . 1 

 

 

 

 

 

. 'Jug

 

 

 

 

1994

 

 

 

______1MFO

Deg. Dir.___________
ftDt Ada.___________
MD Lrw.____________
Aast. Dir.:

Memorandum

Adn.SerVS._____

Mr.L

To

I

Frow

I

Date

3/25/94

I
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/17/94
SAN JUAN DIVISION

Subject

I

I

Reference attached report of
dated 2/17/94.

Crjm.InV.________
Ident.___
Info.ht._________
Insp.____________
Inteti.____
Lab.________
LegaL Ccxi.________
Tech. Serve._____
Training__________
Cerig. AfEs. Dtf._
Off. of EEfl_________
Off. Liaison &
tnt. Affa._________
Off. of Pth1c AttS._
Tetçftone Ii._______
Director’s Offide_

I

s4

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECONNENDATION:
That no administrative action be
any FBI employee as a result of this incident.

taken

against

Enclosure
2.
1
3

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(3.
(1
3.
Mr.
I—Mr.
TJG:tjg
—

I
1—Mr.’
(Attu:
1-Mr.
1
Mr.__________
1
Mr.
jQuantico
1—Mr.
1
Mr.
I Quantico
(Continued
Over>

Mr.1

—
—

—

Mr.

Zeary)

—

—

-

—

onson
(14)

-

-

Savage- 1355

I

 front I

Memorándun
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/17/94
San Juan Division

Ito •I

I

DETAILS:
On 3/17/94, the SIRG, consisting of Chairmani
I Criminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant Director
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Responsibility,
Inspection Division; Assistant Section Chief I
clohal Sçtion, National Security Division; Unit Chief I
Ioition C1assification Unit, Personnel Division;
Unit chisel
I Investigative aw Unit, Legal
Counsel Division; Unit Chief I
L FirearmçTrainin
Unit. Trainiig Division; and Supervisory Special Agenti________
met to discuss the above—captioned shooting.

I

I

Svnoosis of the Shootinq Incident

I

At approximately 8:30 p.m., on 1/17/94, SA I
Ihad just completed making a call from a public phone
located outside a shopping center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico.__1s
be was returning to his personally—owned automobile, SAi
I
noticed a suspicious—looking car with three occupants slowly
approaching him. As the car came even with him, the occupant of
the front passenger seat stated to SAl
I tThis is a robbery.’
T
The subject then exited the vehicle. SAl
Idrew his Smith &
Wesson 10mm, model 1076, and fired at tfie subject.
The subject
then got back into the vçhicle and the vehicle and its three
occupants sped away.
SAl
Icontinued to fire shots at the }b
i7
vehicle as it fled.

Ireported the incident to officials of the
SAl
San Juan Division as well as to the local police. A short time
later, SA[
twas öontaoted by the Police of Puerto Rico, who
advised that they had arrested three indivic3.u1s in
car fitting
the description of the vehicle described by S4
I as having
been used in the attempted robbery.
SAl
lidentified the
vehicle as the one which approached him near the shopping center.
Two of the subjects have been indicted by a Federal grand jury in

San Juan, Puerto Rico, for Assault on a Federal Officer (Title
18, USC, Sections 111(a) and 114.
One of those subjects admitted
that at the time of the attempted robbery they had a handgun;
however, they subsequently discarded that weapon after the failed
robbery attempt.
It is anticipated that the third subject will
be indicted once his status as an adult is determined by the
court
*

(Continued
2

Savage- 1356

-

Over)

I

 ,

.It_

•

I

Memorandum fromj
to Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/17/94
San Juan Division

I

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
daijd2/]7/94, revealed that proper_procedures were followed by
SAl
Iduring this incident.
SAl
ifired his weapon after
an attempted robbery in which at least one suspect had a. weapon.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage-1357

 _

Dep. DTr.__________
ADD Mn.____
ADD trw.______
Asst. Dtr.:
Ac*n.Sers.__________
Crfm. mv.
tdent.___
Info.t._________

Memorandum

Froe

I

Date

3/25/94

I

j

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/26/94
ALBUQUERQUE DIVISION

Subject

I

I

Mr.L

To

Reference attached report of
dated 2/3/94.

ILL.____
Lab._____
LegaL Ca.,,.________
Tech. Servs._____
Trainirg___________
Cong. Affs. Ott.
Off.cfO
—
Off. Uas &
tnt. Affs.________
Off. of ptbtic Atts.
Telephone Re._______
Director’s Dftice__

lb IC

SSAI

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:

That no administrative action 3e taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this incident.

Enclosure
1
1
3

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
Mr. Iearv
(1—Mr.I
1—Mr.I
I
I — Mr. Johnson
TJG:tjg
(14)

1—Mr.’

—

(
h
1
”

—

_I

Miç.I

I

—

-

I

Mr.’_________
2.
Mr.
Quanticoh7
1-Mr.[
MFO
Mr. 1
1
1 QUantico
(Continued
Over)
-

—

-

Savage- 1358

 Memorandum fromL
Ito Mr.I_________
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/26/94
Albuquerque Division

I
I

On 3/17/94, the SrRG, consisting of ChairmanL
I
I Criminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant Director

TmrT:

Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Reponsibi1itv.
Inspection Division; Assistant Section Chief I
global Sçtion, National Security Division; Unit Chief I
IPosition Classification Unit, Personnel Division;
Unit Chief I
I Investigative Law Unit, Legal
Counsel Division; Unit Chief I
I Firearms Trainin
Unit. Trainin Division; and Supervisory Special Agent I
I,. Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to
discuss the above—captioned shooting.

b6

Synopsis of the Shooting Incide
fln 1(26/94., SAl
Iwent to the residence
ofi
order to interviewl
Iregarding a recent
bank robbery.
Imother had reportedIr attempted to exchange
some burnt currency for new currency, which raised suspicion as
to whether or no the mpney could have been burnt by an exploding
dye pack. As SAl
Ineared the residence, he noticed a
‘Beware of the Dog” sign on the front door; however, he did not
se a dog. When he knocked on the door, a dog began to bark and
ran towards him. SAl
rew his weapon, and the dog
continued to approach. When the dog was approximately two feet
,
SA I
I fired one shot at the dog, which hit the animal
in the head.
The dog then turned and ran away.

un

The dog’s owner, l
I then came out of the
Itoo]c the dog for veterinary treatment.
SAl
lapparently fired his weapon believing that the dog was
about to attack him.

hose.

Hç and SA[

b7L’

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated_2/3194, revealed that proper pçedues were followed by
SAl
Iduring this incident. SA I
I fired his weapon

believing that his life was in danger because of the dog which
was coming toward him.
(Continued
2

Savage-1359

—

Over)

 4

I.

froml

Memorandum
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/26/94
Albuquerque Division

Ito Mr.I

I

After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage- 1360

 ___________

_________

Memorandum

to

0
I

Mr.’

Date

3/25/94

From

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/31/94
INDThNAPOMS DIVISION

Subject

Reference

attached

report

Dep. Dir.___________
D Ackn.___________
PIJOIrw._____
Asst. Dtr.:
Adn.Servs.___________
Cnn. mv.
Ident.___
mnfo.FWnt._________
IIisp.____________
rntet L.______________
lab._____________
LegaFC.n.________
Tech. Serve._______
Tranirag______
Ccrg. Affs. off.
Off.ofEEO
—
Off. Uaison &
Tnt. Affs._________
Of f. of PitLic Atfe.
TeLexie Ran._______
Ofrector’s Offfca

7

of

Inspector-in-Place

dated 3/3/94.

I
PURPOSE:

This memorandum

comments,

and

Group

is

(SIRG) with

reference

RECONNENDATION:
That
any FBI employee as a

no

to furnish the analysis,
the Shooting Incident Review
the captioned shooting.

prepared

of

recommendations
to

acministrative

result

of

action

this incident.

be taken against

enclosure
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
3—Mr.
(1—
(1—Mr.
1-Mr.
1-Mr.
TJG:tg
(14)
—

1

—

.

Mr.I______
(Attn:

1
1
3.
3.
1

1

Mr.

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Mr.
Mr.

Quantico

WMFO
rantico

(Continued

Savage-1361

-

Over)

b7C

 ______Ito

I
Memorandum from
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/31/94
Indianapolis Division

Mr

DTArçS:
On 3/17/94, the SIRG, consisting of Chairmani
I
I Criminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant Director
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Reflfl1’41bflitv
Inspection Division; Assistant Section Chief I
IGlobal Section, National Security Division; Unit Chief I
I
I
IPosition Classification Unit, Personnel Division;
Unit Chief I
i Investicative Law Unit, Legal
Counsel Division; UnitChiefi
IFirearins Training
3Tni i. Pml ni n,g Division; and Supervisory Special Agent
I
I
I
I, Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to
discuss the above—captioned shooting.
I

Synoosis of the Shooting Incident
On 1/31/94, Agents of the Indianapolis Division, along
with state and local police, were involved in the surveillance of
two bank robbery subjects who were believed to be responsible for
at least [5 bank rob1eriq in th Indianpo1is area.
The two
stibjects,l
land I
I caine under suspicion
after a bank received some cash which had been sprayed with a
“dye pack” and this discolored money was traced to one of the
subjects. A plan t.rj formll
ybich called for a one—week
surveillance of I
land I
I The Agents and police
officers who were to participate in the surveillance were briefed
and given an operations plan prior to the initiatiop of t?le
surveillance.
On 1/31/94, the surveillance began. I
nd
Iwere seen driving a gold Oldsmobile which had been
I
reported stolen.
Shortly thereafter, they were seen stealing a
second car, a dark blue Oldsmobile, from a high school parking
lot.
Their general modus operandi during previous robberies had
been to use stolen cars, with one being parked near the
ra
nd used as a “switch” car after the robbery.
Whenl
land
seen parking the gold Oldsmobile along the side of
a road near several banks, it. was believed that they were about
to commit a robbery.
They were then seen driving the blue
Oldsmobile to the Union Federal Savings Bank.
At this point,
several Agents and officers_stationed_themselves near the gold
Olds4obi.e. be1iev.ng thati
landl
1 Would return there.
I
landi
Irobbed the Union Fede±a1 Savings Bank, fled in
the blue Oldsmobile, and returned to where the gold Oldsmobile
was parked. They exited the blue Oldsmobile and headed for the
gold Oldsmobile. At that time, Agents and officers yelled at the
(Continued
2

Savage-1362

—

Over)

a,ri
/c

 J.

,.

I

Me1uorandi. from I
Ito Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/31/94
Indianapolis Division

I

I
b6
lb C

two to freeze and identified themselves as law enforcement
officers.
The two subjects got back into the blue Oldsmobile and
attempted to flee.
During this time, the two tried to use their
vejci
rrpn au hkc
tI,ari +hw’ officers and Agents.
SAs
I andi
‘both fired shots at the
subjects as the subjects were backing up their vehicle towards
the Agents. The subjects eventually ran off the road and
collided with a surveillance vehicle.
Both subjects were injured
by the gunfire; however, both survived their injuries.
They were
transported to a hospital and were both subsequently charged with
bank robbery.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRS

The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated_3/3/94, revealed that proper procedures were followed by
SAl__1and SN
I Both fired their weapons in order to
protect their own lives, as well as the lives of their fellow
officers and the civilian public.
After a. thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRS
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage- 1363

 _______

___________

___

______
___________

________

Memorandum
Q

To

Mr.I

:

I

From

Subject

I

Date

I

3/25/94
b7

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
2/1/94
LOS ANGELES DIVISION

:

PDD trw.______
Asst. Dir.:
AdServs.___
Crfi.Irw.___________
tdent.___
Info.Mgnt._________
Irp.___________
Inteti._____________
L_______
Legal Coul.________
Tech. Serva._______
Trainirm
Cong. Affs. Ott.
Off.ofEEO
—
Off. Liaisai &
Int. Affs._________
Off. of PLbtlc AftS.
TeteFIwale Pm.________
Director’s Office

Reference attached report of ASAC Jerry Dale Thornton,
dated 2/11/94.
PIJRPOSE:

This memorandum is prepared ‘to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

RECOMMENDATION: That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this incident.

Enclosure
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
Mr. Leary)
(1—Mr..I
l-Mr.I______
1
Mr. Johnson
TJG:tg
(14)
1

1
3

I

-

—

—

—

—

I

1
1
1
1
1

—

Mr.I______
(Attn: Mi.I

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
uanti.co
Mr.
MFO
Mr.
Quantico
(Continued
Over)
—

Savage- 1364

lb 7

 I

Memorandum from
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/1/94
Los Angeles Division

I

Ito

Mr .1

1

DETAILS: On 3/17/94, the SIRG, consisting of 1
Chairman
I Criminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant Director
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Resonsibi1itV.
Inspection Division; Assistant Section Chief I
Global Section, National Security Division; Unit Chief I
I Position Classification Unit, Personnel Division;
Unit Chief I
Investicative Law Unit, Legal
Counsel Division; Unit Chief I
I, Firearm Prainirg
Unit, Training Division; and Supervisory Special Agenti
I
Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to
discuss the above-captioned shooting.

I
lb 6

.

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
At approximately 7:30 on the morning ofI1/4- several

Aant of the Los An eles Division, including SSAI_______

SA
orinulate a plan for
effecting the arrest of
a Federal fugitive
wanted for murd
,
an preliminary assignments
were made by SA
Surveillance was then set up
in the ar
apartment. The plan called for the
arrest 0
benever he departed the residence. Around
9:30 a.m., I
I exited the apartment fora brief amount of
time, then went back inside. At that time,
a assignments
were issued, which called for the arrest of
the next
time he exited the apartment. A short time later,
again came outside.
en given,
The command to arrest him was
and Agents approachedL
Iw1i1e identifying themselves and
ordering him to stop. j
began to fl.ee in a southerly
-nr toward where SSAI
dir
bnd SAl
Iwere located.
SAl
Ibegan to pursu
5Y? foot, as lie ran throu h
back yards and jumped ofer severai. block fences.
also set off in pursuit.
‘‘ int,
was
jumping over a fence, SSA
I sw
op and turn
back towards SAl
I at that point thought that
I ssTl
I was going to fire at SAl
I then
I SSA I
fired two shots ati
jfrom his Bureau shotgun.
continued to flee and evaded the Agents. I
lwás arrestea
later that morning with the assistance of a Los Angeles Police
Department canine unit.

I

(Continued
2

Savage- 1365

—

Over)

lb 6

 Memorandum from
to
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/1/94
Los Angeles Division

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 2)11/94, revealed that proper prçcedureswre followed by
SAl
during this incident.
Jfired his weapon
SAL
reasonably believing that the life of SAl
Iwas in danger.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above-captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage- 1366

 __________

___________

_

_____

_____

.1’

Memorandum

To

From

‘

4

I

I

I

i

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
1/13/94
JACKSON DIVISION

subject

3/25/94

Date

Asst. Dir.:
r.___
Crim.Inv._________
Int.______________
kifo.Ht._________
Irp._____
InteL L._____________
Lab._______
LegaL Coin.________
Tech. Servs._____
Training
Cong. Affs. Off.
Off.ofEEO
—
Off.Llaison&
tnt. Afls._________
Off. of Ptbtic Afis._
Teteihme Rm._______
Director’a Office

7

—

Reference attached report of Inspector—in--Place
dated 2/22/94.

I________________

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
coTaments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this shooting incident.

Enclosure

(1
Mr. Leary)
(1
Mr. j
Mr. i
2.
Mr. Johnson
1
TJG:tjg
(14)
-

-

I

1
1
1
3.

I

Mr.
Mr.
Quantico
Mt.
WNFO
Mr.
Quantico
(Continued
Over)
—

Savage- 1367

6

 —v

Memorandum fromi
Ito
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/13/94
Jackson Division

Mr.I

I

DETAIlS:
On 3/17/94, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman I
I Criminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant Director
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Rest,onsibilitv.
Inspection Division; Assistant Section Chief I
I
G1rh cction, National Security Division; Unit Chief
1
I
I
I Position Classification Unit, Personnel Divii[on;
Unit Chief I
I Investiaative Lw Unit, Legal
Counsel Division; Unit Chief I
I Firearms Training
TTnit
g Division; and Supervisory Special Agent
1
Prnir
I

I

I

I, Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to
discuss the above—captioned shooting.

I

Svrio,sis of the Shooting Incident

I

On 1/13/94, the Jackson Division learned of a
kidnapping incident involving three members of the I
ami1y.
I
I his wife I
I and his daughterl
Iwere
taken hostage inside their residence on the evening of 1/12/9 4 by
a subject later identified as Kenneth Fay Neal.
Neal demanded
that the family pay him S750.000 or he would killl
I On
the morning of 1/13/94, I
I made the necessary telephone
calls to have $750,000 wired to his bank account in Jackson.
Neal took I
un one of the family’s cars, while
ient in another car o the bank to oic]ç up
land
the money. Neal kept in phone contact withj_________________
using the cellular phones in both cars.
While I
I and1
Iwere in the bank picking
up the cash, bank officials questioned why such a large amount of
cash was needed. I
Itold them that her husband had been
kidnapped and she needed the money for a ransom payment.
The
bank officials then contacted the Jackson Division.
Jackson
immediately sent Agents to -the bank.
Arranqeinents_were made to
have an Agent ride in the back floor of Mrs.I
I car when
she went to deliver the ransom. Neal contacted Mrs. I
ivia
the cellular phone and instructed her where to meet him tç
deliver the ransom. The payment was made, and I
land
I
Iwere instructed to return home and wait for Mr..I
I
relase.
drove around for approximately 3 0—45 minutes with
Nr.I
Istill in the car. He then stopped, made a telephone
call, and proceeded to the parking lot of a local convenience

ea1

(Continued
2

Savage- 1368

-

Over)

I

 Memorandum from
1
‘to Md
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
1/13/94
Jackson Division

I

store.
A woman was waiting for him there in another car.
Neal
exited his vehicle, placed the bags of money in the other car,
and started to get in the car with the woman.
Agents who had
been following Neal yelled at Neal to freeze, and identified
themselves as FBI Agents.
Neal started to run, then stopped and
from his waistband.
He fired one shot at SA
who was approximately seven feet away.
The shot
in see
At
at point SSAI
I SAl
I
and SA
all fired at Neal.
Neal fell to the
ground and died at that location. The woman in the car who was
not injured was identified as Neal’s sister.
She was unaware of
the kidnapping and had merely responded to Neal’s request that
she pick him up at the convenience store.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
lb

The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as lbc
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated_2/22/94, revealed that prçoer iocedures were followed by
SSA[
and SA
Iduring this incident.
L 54
All
fired their weapons in order to protect their own life as well as
the lives of their fellow Agents and the civilian public.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

.3

Savage- 1369

 ______________________

V

Dep. Dir.__________
ADO Ada.____
ADO 1nv______
Aset. Dir.:
Ada.Servs.________
Crfm.I,w._________
Ident._____________
tnfoJ________
hp._____
InteLl.__________

Memorandum
0

Lth,_______________

To

I

Mr.L

:

Date

Legal cz.________
Tec.sers.____
Trainir
Cong. Affs. Off._
Off. of EEO________
Off. Lielam &
mt. Affs.________
Off, of PIbtic Affs._

6/27/94

I

Froe

TeL41one Ia.________

Subject

:

Of rector’s Oftce_

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/28/94
OMAHA DIVISION
Piføa-nc ttached reports of

SSRAI

land

[dated 4/4/95 and 5/11/94.

SSAT

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this shooting incident.

1—Mr.
Mr.
3
Mr.
(1
Mr. Leary)
(1
Mr.I
1
Mr.I
I
Mr. ionnsdn
1
TJG:tjg (14)

1—Mr.I

=

—

—

—

—
—

I
(1
Mn
1
Mr.
Mr.__________
MrJ
uantico
WMFO
Mr-I
Quantico
Mr.1
(Continued
Over)

I

1
1
1
1
1

—
—
-

-

I

—

Savage- 1370

I

]bi

-

 ______hrouqh

I

Memorandum from
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3 / 28 / 94
Omaha Division

Ito

I

I

On 6/14/94, the SIRG, consisting of ciiairmanL
I
Criminal Investigative Division; Section Chief Edward R.
Leary, Personnel Management Section, Personnel Division; Unit
Chiefi
I Office of Professional
‘ility, Inspection Division; Unit Chief I
I
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
Unit Chief I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
7C
Division; and Supervisory Special Agenti
I
Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the abovecaptioned shooting.
DETAILS:
I

I

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On the morning of 3/28/94, Agents of the Omaha Division
were conducting a surveillance oft
I a suspect in
a series of Omaha area bank robberies who also was named in a
local arrest warrant. An anonymous tip had provided I
I
identity as the robber, and indicated that he was ab9ut to commit
another bank robbery. Agents set up surveillance of I
1
residence at apprpeimatç1y 6:30 a.m. on 3/28/94. A few minutes
before 9:00 am.,I
lexited his residence and ot into his
vehicle. At this time, SAsI
ndI
who were_together in a Bureau vehicle, pulled their vehicle
1 vehicle and blocked it in the parking place. SA
behin4l
I
lapproached the driver’s side o flti’ car, and SAl
I
approached the passenger’s side. SAl
lidentified himself and
ordered I
tout of the vehicle. I
Idid not comply, and SA
Jleaned over the hood of the car to look at
I
the windshield, as the side windows were tinted
ar color.
Istarted to move his vehicle forward, over a curb and onto
I
the rass while SAl
Iwas leaning over the hood. Believing
tha
to run over SAf
I SA
if ired one
shot at
ued to m9veward, ani SAl
fell of f the hood of
ar. SA[
bach
land SAl
fired one more shot a
however, ne tied the area in his
vehicle.
The surveillance o I
Icontinued by other Agents,
and he was arrested during a vehicle stop a short time later.

(Continued
2

Savage-1371

-

Over)

I

 Memorandum from I
Ito Mr.
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/28/94
Omaha Division

I

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIEG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
revealed that proper procedures were followed_by the_individuals
involved in this shooting incident. SAs[
land I
apparently fired their weapons believing that their own lives
were in danger.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage-1372

 I

Dep. Dir.__________

0

Memorandum

PPO my.______
Asst. Dir.:
A&Servs.__
CrDe.Iiw.__________

Edent._____________
tnfoJit._________

hp._____

Intati.___________

To

Mr.I

3/17/94

6/27/94

Date

I

From

Subject

I

I.th.________________
I.egat Cai.________
Tech. Servs._____
TrainTm
ccr MIs. Off.
Off, of EED________
Off. Liafsczi &
kit. Affs.________
Off. of Pibtic Affs.
TeLeth Rio.
—
Director’s Office

6

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
2/20/ 94
LAS VEGAS DIVISION

Reference attached report of ASAC Thomas M. Kuker dated

PURPOSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
1
3

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.____________
(1 — Mr. Leary)
(1 — Mr.
Mr.
1
on n
1—Mr.
TJG:tjg (14)
—

1—Mr.1

—

—

—

1
1
1

—

I

(1—•1
Mr.
Mr._____________

I

Mr__________
ntico
1WMFO
1-Mn
1
Mn
IQuantico
jonihued
Over)
-

—

—

Savage-1373

6
h]

 Memorandum from I
Re:

I

]to

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/20/94
Las Vegas Division

I

DETAILS:
on 6/14/94, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman[
Icrirninal Investigative Division; Section Chief dward R.
Leary Personnel Management Section, Personnel Division; Unit
Chief
1, Office of Professional
Responsibility, Inspection Division; Unit Chief I
I
Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
I nvPtiaative
I
Unit Chief I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training
Division; and Supervisory Special Agenti_____________________
Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting.
I

I

Law

Synonsis of the Shootina Incident

During the late night hours of 2/19/94, Agents of the
Reno Resident Agency, Las Vegas Division, were called to assist
with the resolution of an incident on the Pallon Paiute Shoshone
Indian Reservation, in which one individual was believed to have
been murdered.
Since the murder had occurred on an Indian
Reservation, the FBI assumed lead agency control of the
investigation. When Agents arrived at the scene, at
approximately midnight on 2/19/94, Tribal Police and the local
Sheriff’s Department were already present.
SSRA I
was briefed on the situation and learned that William Taft Vannoy
was inside his residence at 1330 Agency Road, and tbt Varoy was
believed to have shot Martin George. Vannoy’ s wife, I
I
I
I had safely fled from the house, and told the police that
William Vannoy had been drinking alcohol and was armed with
several weapons.
Agents and local law enforcement officers formed a
h
perimeter around the residence
Attempts were made throughout
pnr
ef 2/20/94 to encourage Vannoy
the night
early morning
to surrender.
Several tilnes,I
i1ed shots from inside the
residence. At approximately 6:45 a • rn , I
I appeared at a
window and startq&firina shotq at the law enforcement personnel.
At this time SA I
Ifired one shot
his M-16.
Although SAl
lindicated that he did not actually see Vannoy,
he could see the muzzle flash simultaneous with the sound of the
shots being fired from the residence.
Sometime after this shot
was fired, a fire started inside the residence.
The fire
department was called, to extinguish the fire.
During the

and

*

It

from

(Continued

2

Savage-1374

-

Over)

I

 S.

Memorandum froml
I to Mr.F
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/20/94
Las Vegas Division

I

lb C

subsequent crime scene investigation, the bodies of Vannoy and
George were found inside the house.
Vannoy had apparently shot
George the previous evening, and then shot himself after starting
the fire.
There was no indication that either Vannoy or George
were hit by the round fired by SA_______
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The review of the above—captioned shooting incident, as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 3/17/94, revealed the proper procedures yiere ol1owed by
the individuals involved in this incident.
SN
If ired at
William Vannoy after Vannoy bad fired several shots at the law
enforcement officers present.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage- 1375

 ____

_______________
_______

Memorandum

£

AA
Asst. Dir.:__
Crmirw._________
Ident._____________
Info.I4git._________
Znsp._____

inteLl.__________

To

I

From

Subject

:

I

Mr.f

:

Date

6/27/94

I
PflMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
4/6/94
BOSTON DIVISION

Legal Cii.________
Teds. Servs._____
Trainir.
corg. Al fs. Of f._
Off. of EEO________
Off. Ltescn &
mt. Ails.________
Off, of PubLc Affs._
TeLre Ian._______
Director’s Olflce

Reference attached report of ASAC Dennis M.
O’Caflaghan, dated 4/20/94.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this shooting incident.

1
1

—
-

Mr.
Mr.

i—Mr.I
I
(1—Mr.j
1-Mr
1 — Mr
1 — Mr

uantico
WMFO
1-Mr.
iuntico
(Continued - Over)
1-Mr

1 — Mr. Johnson
TJG:tg (14)

I

Savage- 1376

 Memorandum fromi
jo Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident

I

I

4/6/94

Boston Division
DETATL:
On 6/14/94, the SIRG, consisting of Chairmanl
icriminal Investigative Division; Section Chief Edward R.
Leary -ii1 Miil- 9ection, Personnel Division; Unit
Chief
I, office of Profesqional
Responsibility, Inspection Division; Unit Chief I
I
I
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
Unit Chief I
I Firearms Tinincf Unit. Praininc
Division; and Supervisory Special Agent I
I
Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the above-

I

-

captioned shooting.

SYnopsis of the Shooting Incident
On 4/6/94, Agents of the Providence Resident Agent,
Boston Division, were involved in the surveillance of subjects
who were believed to be responsible for at least five recent bank
robberies in the Providence area.
Information provided by a
source had identified these subjects as possibly being
responsible for the robberies; however, the source had no direct
knowledge of their involvement. For this reason, a task force
had been formed, including the FBI, Providence Police Department,
Cranston Police Department, Pawtucket Police Department, and the
Rhode Island State Police. As most of the robberies had occurred
on either a Monday or Tuesday, the task force regularly checked
the residences of the subjects on those days. On 4/6/94, a

Providence Police Department officer observed the four subjects

in a Nissan Pathfinder, the tags of which did not match the
vehicle. This information was passed to the FBI, and a meeting
of the task force was called. During the task force meeting,
word was received that the Dexter Credit Union had been robbed by
four males. Members of the task force were dispatched to the
residences of the four subject- tn se if thqv would return to
one of those locations. As SAl
I alona witji
Previdnrç Police Department Officers’
landl
1
I
I approached the residence of subject
they
J
saw the Nissan Pathfinder enter the parking lot. They followed
the Pathfinder until it parked.
SAl
Irequested backup,
then Darked his Bureau vehicle at an angle behind the Pathfinder.
xited their vehicle and
I
land I
ordered the subjects out of the Pathfinder.
The Pathfinder then
backed up around I
Ivehicle, narrowly missing the police
officers.
The officers fired shots at the Pathfinder. At this
(Continued
2

Savage-1377

-

Over)

I

 J

,.

Memorandum from’
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/6/94
Boston Division

It Mn

I

Int
point, SAS I
Ihad entered the
parking lot.
struck the
intentionally
S?4
I
Pathfinder with his vehicle, which brought the Pathfinder to a
stop. A gun was observed in the hand of one subject, and this
fact was relayed to the other officers and Agents. SAl_________
fired four_shots at the Pathfinder. When the Pathfinder stopped,’
subjecti
lexited and fled the area on foot. He was
apprehended a short time later. The other three subjects were
arrested on the spot.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 4/20/94, revealed that proper procedures were follpwP by
the individuals involved in this shooting incident.
SN
fired shots at the subjects in order to protect himself and other
law enforcement officers from armed subjects.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above-captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage-i 378

1

 Dir.__________
b Adn.____

Memorandum

,c 11w.
Asst. Dir.:
Adn.Servs._____
Crm. IrW._________
Ident.____________

0

Info.t4gnt._______

Irp.

lntetU___________

Nr.I

To

I

From

I

Date

I
7

Reference attached report of

5/16/94

Training

C. AffsOtL_
Off. of EEC________
Off. Liatsom &
mt. Affs._______
Off. of PiAMc Afts.
TcLeØime Rm.______
Of rector’s Off ice_

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/15/94
MThMI DIVISION

Subject

LegaL Cw._______
Tech. Serva.______

9/6/94

SSAI

dated

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION: That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this shooting incident.

Mr.
1
1-Mr.
3
Mr.
(1 - Mr. Leary)
(1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
ore
66F—HQ—69500
TJG:tjg (14)
-

1—

I
Mr.I
(l—Mr.I

1—
1—
1—
1—

Mr.
Mr.________
antico
Mr.f
WMFO
Mr
______
1
Mr
ntico
Over)
(Continued

—

—

-

I

—

Savage- 1379

b6

 Early

I
Memorandum from’
Ito
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/15/94
Miami Division

I
I

I

DETAILS

I

i

Mr. I

on 8/30/94, the SIRG, consisting of Acting Chairman
I Office of Professional Responsibility,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edward R. Leary, Personnel
Manaamnt S
tin, Personnel Division; Acting Section Chief
I Violent Crimes and Major qf tøiCriminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief I
Global Section, National Security Division; Unit Chief L
J

fl

4
r
earms Training Unit, Training Division; SSA1__II EmPloYment Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
and sSAI
I, Washington Metropolitan Field
Office, met to discuss the above-captioned shooting.
Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

I

I

on the morning of 5/15/94, SSAI
I
freceived a telephone call from his daughter, who stated
that as she was returning in her vehicle to the family home, she
observed a person lying in the driveway of the house.
She
assimd this person was attempting to steal her father’s car.
SSAI
iquickly got out of bed, dressed, armed himself with
his personally—owned revolver, and went to the front door.
He
called out to an individual who was inside his (ssAI____________
vehicle. ThLs individi.al ecited the vehicle and began firing
shots as
with one of the sh
ts striking SSA
9
un the left foot. SSAI
Ifired two shots in
return, and took cover behind a retaining wall in his front yard.
The subject fled, got into a car rH-h
other subjects, and
drove away from the scenes SSAI
Iwas transported to a
local hospital and treated for the gunshot wound to his foot.
1b
b IL
On 5/20/94,1
Iwas arçested for
attempted theft and the shooting of SSA.J
I and is being
charged locally. On 5/23/94, two additional subjects in the get
away vehicle were arrested and charged with auto theft.

“r

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 5/16/94, revealed that proper procedures were followed by
(Continued

-

2

Savage- 1380

-

Over)

 1

Memorandum from I
to Mr.
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/15/94
Miami Division

I

I

SsAI
Iduring this shooting incident, ssiil
Ifired 6
his weapon after he had been fired at, and hit, by his assailant. b
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the opinion of the SIRG that no administrative
action should be taken against any FBI employee as a result of
their involvement in the above—captioned shooting incident.

3

Savage-1381

 ________
____________

Ceo. Dir.__________
OAda.____
ACO Trw.______
Asst. Dir.:

0

Memorandum

Adn.Ser’#s._____
Crim.Irw._____
Ident._______________

Irisp.____________
InteLL.___________

Lab._______

To

Mr.I

:

I

From

Subject :

I

Date

LegaL Can;________
Tech. Sers._____

9/6/94

Trainng__________

Ca’q. Affs. Ott.
Off.afiEO
—
Off. Lieisai &
mt. Affs.________
Off. of PthticAffs._
reteicne Rei._______
Director’s Office

1
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/18/94
HOUSTON DIVISION
Reference attached

7/5/94.

report of

SSAI________________

dated

PURPOSES
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1)
The SIRG concurs with the recommendation
of SAC, Houston, that SAl
Ibe given a letter of
censure from SAC, Houston, citing his lack of profess ional
responsibility in not being forthright and candid following the
accidental discharge; be suspended for five (5) calendar days
without pay; be placed on six (6) months probation; and be
removed from serving as a firearms instructor.

1

—

:

Mr

1-Mr

1
Mr. Gore
62A—HO—39876
TJG:tg (14)
-

Mr.
(3
Mr
Mr
Mr
Mr

Mr.

—

i!JLL.l

Quantico
MFO
uantico
(Continued - Over)

Savage- 1382

b7C

 Memorandum from I
I to Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/18/94
Houston Division
TIø TRt c--ntii- with the recommendation of SAC,
(2)
Houston, that SAl
Ie given a letter of censure
from SAC, Houston, citing his lack of responsibility in promptly
ensuring that a higher level of authority was made aware of the
shooting incident in a more timely manner.

(3)
TJ TRZ rnntnar With the recommendation of SAC,
Houston, that SAl
Ibe orally reprimanded for
failure to dutifully notify a higher levl of authority once the
pertinent information was provided by SAl
I

(4)
The SIRG concurs with the recommendation of SAC,
HOuston, that SAl
Ibe orally reprimanded for
failure to dutifully notify a higher level of authority once the
information was provided by SAl
I

b6
D 70

DETAILS:

I

I

on 8/30/94, the SIRG, consisting of Acting Chairman
I Office of Professional Responsibility,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edward R. Leary, Personnel
Manaaement Sectiop, Personnel Division; Acting Section Chief
I Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Section,
Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief L
I
Global Section, National Security Division; Unit Chief I
I
I Firearms Training Unit, Training Division; SSA I
I, Employment Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
I
(Continued
2

Savage- 1383

-

Over)

 Memorandum from I
Ito Nr.
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/18/94
Houston Division

I

I

and SSAI
I. Washington Metropolitan Field
Office, met to discuss the above-captioned shooting.
Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

• I

I rçceived
On 5/18/94, SAl
information from a source thati__________________ a fugitive, was
currently at a local blood bank, seiiing nis ioàd.
SAl
I
requested the assistance of SAl
I and the two left
in a Bureau vehicle for the blood bank. As the two approached
th biqod bank, they saw an individual meeting the description of
ia1king outside. They followed him for a few blocks, then
stopped him under th ruse of questioning him aoiat a bnk
robbery. A’ter efçectively stopping-I
ttempted
1 SAP
to restrain I
I but he broke free. SAl
Ireturned to
his Bureau vehicle, and SAl
Iwas given a ride by a private
citizen to
Ivebicle. Both Agents then pursued p
I vehicle. When
ween some houses, 1
I
Ifollowed on oc .
went along tie west side
and!
of the house, and[
Iwent a ong
e east side. I
indicated that he heard what sounded like a crnnchnt. t,ut wnei he
got to the back of the house he saw only Al
I
asked I
hf he had fired a shot, jndI
Jresponded by
indicating_tht maybe the man who gavel
Ia ride fired the
shot. I
leluded arrest at this time, but was apprehended
later that afternoon.

I

ibG

Following presp reoring hat a sl
ot rqas fired during7c
1
the attempt to apirehendI
I SAsI
land I
I were
questioned by sSAP
.ndicated that he heard
whit sounded like a shot fired, but he did not fire his weapon.
SAl
lindic±d th he ton. tjiought he heard a shot, but
he did not fire.I
I were later interviewed by
landi
ASAC William Tucker, and both denied that they had fired their
weapon. When an official inquiry was opened to deteriine whether
a shot had been fired, SA I
ladmitted that he had
experienceçl an acqidental discharge while_scaling a fence in
pursuit ofi
p gun went into the
I The bullet from SAP
wall of a neighboring house.

(Continued
3

Savage- 1384

-

Over)

 Memorandum from I
I to
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/18/94
Houston Division

Mr.I

I

Observations and 1ecommendatjons of the SIRG
During review of the above—captioned shooting incident
as documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the
SXRG, dated 7/5/94, the SIRG expressed concern over the failure

of SAl

Ito report the accidental discharge he experienced.
I
lalso failed to advise higher authorities of

When they became aware of the accidental discharge, SAsI

I

I and[
the incident.

After a thorough review of the facts regarding this
incident, the SIRG_concuVred with the recommendations of SAC,
Houston, that SAl
Ireceive a letter of censure, five days
suspension without pay, six months probatori an1 be removed from
serving as a firearms intructor; that SAl
Ireceive a letter
of censure; and that SAsI
ach receive oral
ndI
reprimands.

4

Savage- 1385

 _____
_______

a

S

Dep. Dir._________
ADD Adii.__________
ADD mv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adu.Secvs.______
Crim.Irw._______
Ident.____________
InfoJit
Irep.____
Intelt.___
Lth._______________
Lega’ Cixi,._______
Tecil..Ser?s._
Trainir_________
Co, Affs. Oft._
Off. of EEO________

Memorandum

To

I

MrJ

:

Oste

9/6/94

a,

Off. Liajs&
mt. Affs.______
Off. of PiLic MIs.

From

Subject

Teteçhae Rni.______
Director’s Otflce_

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/18/94
BIRMINGHAM DIVISION

Reference attached reports of ASAC James P. Carlile
dated 7/28/94, and 8/26/94.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.

RECOMMENDATIONs:
That no administrative action be taken
(1)
against any FBI employee as a result of this shooting incident.

Mr.
1-Mr.
3-Mr.
(1
Mr. Leary)
(1
Mr.I
1—Mr.I____________
1
Mr. Gore
66F—BH--43054
TJG:tjg (14>
I.

-

-

-

-

1-Mr.I___
Mr.
(1
1
Mr.
:1.
Mr.

J

—

—
—

1
Mr.
1-Mr
Mr
1
-

—

Quantico
WMFO
,
uantico
on inuèd
Over)
—

Savage- 1386

1b•

 Memorandum fromi
Ito MrI
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/18/94
Birmingham Division

I
6

(2)
hat the Training Division address the tactics
employed by the Birmingham Division during this incident, the
deficiency in firearms training by sAl
I and the
failure of arresting personnel to wear )zody armor.

(3)
That SAC Birmingham reinforce to Agents in the
Birmingham Division the importance of wearing body armor during
an arrest situation.

DETAILS:

On 8/30/94, the SIRG, consisting of Acting Chairman
I Office of Professional Responsibility,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edward R. Leary, Personnel
Manaaement Sectipn, Personnel Division; Acting Section Chief
I
1. Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Section.
Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chie
e1rK1 cection,
Wational Security Division; Unit Chief I
I
L Pirearms Training Unit, Training Division; SSAI
I
I Employment Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel;
and SSAI
I, Washington Metropolitan Field
Office, met to discuss the above-captioned shooting.

I

!I; 6
7

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On. 7/18/94, Agents of the Birmingham Division became
aware that Gary Chris Grjffjh. a federal fucTitive. was Dossibly
located in their territory. j
Griffith, a plan was set in mction to locate turn.
Grirritn
t a 1ocptjonear Wheeler Dam in
1
Lawrence County, Alabama.
SAsI
landi
went to this location in a Bureau vehicle. Captain[
I

I

I

(Continued
2

Savage- 1387

—

Over)

 V

Ihemorandnm from I

Re:

ho

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/18/94
Birmingham Division

Mrj______

and Lieutenant1
lot the Albama Bureau of Investigation
(ABI) went in their vehicle. A uniformed Alabama State Police
officer who was familiar with Griffith conducted a “drive-by” of
Griffith’s location to confirm that he was in fact present.
When
they were certain that Griffith was there, th’ RT nd
AqentS
BI
went to the location to arrest Griffith.
SAs I
I and I
arrived at the scene and attempted_tolock Griffith’s_vehicle
with their Bureau car.
1
Captain
land Lieutenaritl
arrived at about the same time. As SAl
xited his vehicle
and walked_toward Griffith’s vehicle, Griffith attempted to run
over SAl
I Griffith. at that point, also began firing a
weapon at SAl
SA I
1
Ifell tq the ground, but was not
wounded.
SA I
Captain
I
I
I and Lieutenantl
lall tired
at Griffith, striking him several times.
SAj
1en got up and
fired his shotgun at Griffith. Griffith was pronounced dead at
the scene.
SAs I
I as well as the other officers,
land I
fired their weapons at Griffith after Griffith fired.
All were
attempting to protect their own lives as well as the lives of
their fellow officers.
bervations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the reports of the administrative inquiry furnished
to the SIRG, dated 7/28/94 and 8/26/94, revealed that proper
procedure was followed regarding the use of deadly force by
Birmingham Agents.
Tie SIRG expressed concern, however, over the
tactics employed during the execution of this arrest.
The SIRG
also was concerned over the deficiency in firearms training by
SAl
land the failure of arresting personnel to wear body
armor when entering into a known arrest situation.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the opinion of the SIRG that no administrative
action should be taken against any FBI employee as a result of
this shooting incident. The SIRG recommends, however, that the
Training Division addres the tactics issue, as well as the

firearms training of SAl
I and the failure of arresting
personnel to wear body armor. It is also recommended that SAC
Birmingham reinforce the importance of wearing body armor when
effecting an arrest.
3

Savage- 1388

 _____________

Mr.I

To

I

I

From

2/15/95

Date

I
ADINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
4/1/94
CLEVELAND DIVISION

Subject

Reference Clevçland report of Supervisory Special Agent
I dated 4/28/94, one copy of which is
attp.ched to the original.

(SSA)L

PURPOSE:
This nemorandmu is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECoKNDION:
The SING çeccrrnrnend that no action be taken
against Special Agent (SA) I
I as a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.

Enclosure
1
1
3

—
—
—

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
(1

1

Mr. Leary)
Mr.I
1—Mr.I
I
1
Mr. Gore_____
—

—

-

(1—Mr.I

I

1
1
1
3.
1
1

—

Mr.
(1—
Mr. Confo
Mr. Doyle

—

Mr.I

—

—

—
—
-

Mr.
Mr. I
SING File

b6
b7C
.

I tMFO

Quantico

uantico

66—HQ—19157—SUB 11

DEA;de (17)

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1389

-

OVER)

 Memorandum froini
Re: Administrative inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/1/94
Cleveland Shooting

€

I

Ito Mr. I

I

DE’PATL:
On 1/2O/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman
Robert S. Conforti, Section Chief, Violent Crimes and Major
Offenders Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief
j Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; Section chief Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Global Section,
National Security DivisiiT1 T t.tnr in qhargel
I

Inspection Division; SSAI
I Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division; and ssA a
IWashington
Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the above—captioned
shooting.

SvnoDsis of
SA I

the Shooting Incident
I met an informant at his residence

on 4/1/94 and was taking him to lunch in order to debrief him.
While driving along Ohio State Road 322 the informant noticed a
deer running perpendicular to the car. The informant shouted

out, but at that point the deer had already run into the vehicle
imnacting_the rear door panel and shattering the window glass.
SAl
Iindicated in his statement that he had seen the deer
only moments before it ran into the car door. SAl_______
maintained control of the vehicle and brought it to a complete
stop on the shoulder of the road.
After determining that he and the informant had not
been injured, SAl
poubled back to where he had seen the
deer enter a ditch. Both SA I
land the informant agreed the
animal was in pain,, and could possibly struggle Jack to the road
and jeopardize the safety of another driver. SAL
lelected
to put the animal down with one shot from his service revolver to
the animal’s head.

I immuuediatej.y reported the accident to the
SA I
local police and the Cleveland FBI office. A report was filed by
the Geauga County deputy sheriff. As well, arrangements were
made with the Ohio State Highway Department to dispose of the
deer’s body.

(CONTINUED
2

Savage-1390

-

OVER)

 Memorandum fromi
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/1/94
Cleveland Shooting

I

to Mr.]

Observations and Reco.endations

I

--

The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the Cleveland Division report furnished to the
SIRG, dated 4/9/4. rçvealed that proper procedures were
followed by SAl
I
After a thorough review of ali the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of the iuem1e2s of the SXRG
that no administrative action be taken against SA I
hs a
result of his involvement in the above-captioned shooting
incident.

3

Savage-1391

 xr.j

I

I

2/27/95

I
ADMINI$TRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
8/31/94
SAN JUAN DIVISION

(SSA)l
attacnect.

h

Rference San Tuan report of Supervisory Special Agent
I dated 10/28/94, one copy of which is

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
Tl.at no administrajve action be taken against
REOOMENflAfI!ION:
Special Agent (SA) I
las a result of his
involvement in this. shooting incident.

Enclosure
1
1
3

Mr.
Mr.
—
Mr._____________
(1—Mr. Lea )
(1 — Mr.
1
Mr.
ore____
1—Mr.
(1-Mr.E
—

1

—

1
1

—

—

—

I

66—HQ—19157—SUB 48
DEA:dea (17)

—

Mr.
(1—
Mr. Confor
Mr. Doyle

1—Mr.I

I

1

p!FO

I

Quantico
1. - Mr.
1— Mr.j
Iuantico
1 — SIR .1J.e
(CONTINUED

Savage- 1392

-

OVER)

 S

Memorandum froin[
Re:- Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/31/94
San Juan Division

I

to Mrj

1b6

On 1/20/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman
RAThS:
Robert S. Conforti, Section Chief, Violent Crimes and Major
Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief
I
J Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; Section Chief Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Global Section,
National Security Division; Inspector—in—chargeL
I
Inspection Division; SSAI
1 Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division; and SSA I
I Washington
Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting.
Synopsis of the Shootim Incident
erienced trouble with his Bucar
the office and

SA
on the morning of 8/31/94.

-

that he had
informed his supervisor,
experienced car trouble.
o ait and have one of
eci a
the security guards jumpstart his car. While waiting for a
c’4dd to take a run around
security guard to pass by,I
the golf course. During the run I
I was always in eye contact
with his residence and Bucar • At 8:00 a.m. , I
Icompleted his
run and decided to cool down by sitting outside on his patio.
Iheard a noise, similar to someone walking on the grass,
I
As
turned around to see who it was, but did not see anyone.
Iturned back around someone suddenly came from around the
I
patio wall an ojnted a qun at his bead. The Unsub, later
un Spanish to shut
identified asi
I told’
up and be quiet. I
1con-inued talking in Spanish
stating, “do what I say or I will kill you.”
lb
According to I
I carried a stainless
steel, six inch, large caliber revolver pointed at his head. As
well, d
‘had a • 357 revolver tucked away in 14s
Ito open the
Jasked L
waistline.
During -this time, I
door to the house, buti
I indicated the alarm was on, the
house was not his, and he did not know the code/combination.
Iquestioned Suarez
They remained on the patio where I
regarding who resided at the residence, alarm system,
coe/coanb4nation, and if there were any valuables in the house.
I advised I
SA [
1 that he did not know the code, was a
guest at the reiiien. but expected the lady of the house to
return shortly. I
1ecided to wait until the “lady” of•
the house returned.
-

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1393
2

-

OVER)

 Memorandum fromi
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/31/94
San Juan Division

Ito Mrj

I

I
Ito bring his bicycle from the
I orderedl
front yard to the patio area
Me remained behind the patio
Walls, and kept his gun pointed at I
Irnoved the
I while I
bike
SAl
Idescribed the bicycle as a used white mountain
bike.
Around 9 pi1 or 9:10
rn., after waiting approximately
an hour
h1f,I
Idecided rpt to wpit ny longer and
asked SAl
1o open the front door. I
Itold I
that if the alarm went off, and he did iiot deactivate it, be
would kill him. As he opened the door,I
Jfelt
I
I standing right behind him. I
teed back and
stuck his left shoulder into the midection of I
j body
Me then used his left arpt and shedI
Flet arm into
the air. At this poant,I
heard one shot fired from the
Unsub’s weapon. I
Iran inside and locked the door.

pAl
Iretrieved his service ;evolver and shouted to
I that he was coning outside. As I
I osnsd thQ do
completely and stepped outside, he unepectediy saw I
standing in front of the door.
Isaw him raise nis arm
holding the firearm. SA I
Istepped back and fired two or
four times.

I

I
heft running, whileT
Iclosed the door
and obtained a qon15 rntp1 magazine
Jetiaflti fq the
front door, but I
I was no longer in sight I
I saw
thati
Ibicycle was missing. p
I]cnew the Unsub had
left the area down the street_towards an open area of the
residential neighborhooL p
i believes, however he is not
sure, that he may have shot once, while in froit of t1e neighbors
yard, as the Unsub was turning the corner. AsP
Ihimseif
turned the corner at the end of the street, he saw the Unsub
riding his bicycle towards one of the first palm trees in the
area. The Unsub stopped his bicycle and fired one shot at
I stated he took cover near a concrete electrical
pole and returned fire. I
I fired several shots at the tlnsub,
until he thought he bad run out of ammunition.

I

I
lobserved the Unsub pedal his bicycle towards the
back qf ths ridential area leading towards the fence line and
bill. I
keturned back to his residence and obtained his
shotgun, however the Police of Puerto Rico arrived and took
charge of the incident. I
p advised that he contacted the San
Juan Field Office to advise the office of the incident.

I

isequently, SAl

lidentified the tatco on
Ileg as the one ha had seen on his assailant’s leg.
(COMTXNUED

Savage-1394
3

-

OVER)

‘j
.

ic

 I
Memorandum froiul
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
10/31/94
San Juan Division

I

ito

Mr.I________

‘was ar:çested. subsequent to the arrest and indictment
of I
L SAl
Ihad stated that it is possible the
subject is not the one who assaulted him. As a result, Assistant
United States Attorney I
Istated on 10/25/94, that he
would contact the local prosecutor to determine if the subject
plead out in local court, the federal charges would be dropped.
observations and Reco.aendatjons

of

the SIRG

The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as

documented by San Juan report, dated 10/28/94, and furnished to

he STQ, revealed that proper procedures were followed by SA
I
Iduring this shooting incident.
SAl
life had been
threatened several times by theL
When the
opportunity finally presented itself, SA I
p attempted to
neutralize the situation by using his service revolver.
After a thorough review of ail the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of the members of the SIRG
that no administrative action be taken against S2
s a
result of his involvement in the above—captioned shootLng
incident.

4

Savage-1395

 ____

I

Mr

[

10/21/94
lb 7 C

1
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
9/2/94
BALTIMORE DIVISION

Reference attached report of Assistant Special Agent in

Charge Anthony A. Betz, dated 9/9/94.

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDAXON:

That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

b6
b7C

Mr.I
Mr.
Mr.

I

1

Mr. Gore
I
1—Mr.I
(1-Mr.J
I
Mr. Conrorci

I

—

1
1
1
DEA:dea (15)

-

—
-

—

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.
Quantico
(CNTINUED

Savage- 1396

-

OVER)

 V

Memorandum froTi
Ito
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/94
Baltimore Division

I

I
6

DETAILS:
on 10/14/94, the SIRG, consisting of chairman
Robert S. Conforti, Section Chief, Violent Crimes and Ma:ior
Offenders Section. Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief
I Global Section, National Security Division;
I
Unit Chief
I Investigative Lw Unit, office of
the General counse.L; supervisory Special Agenti_________________
I Washinqton Metropolitan Field Office; and Special Agent (SA
J
I
1, Firearms Training Unit, Training Division;
met to discuss the above—captioned shooting.

SvnoDsis of the Shooting Incident
On 9/2/94, SA I
I two other Special Agents and a
Maryland State Police sergeant (Sgt.) assigned to the Southern
Maryland Metropolitan Resident Agency, and all participants in
OPERATION HOENET (High Output Residential Narcotic Enforcement
Team), were involved in a felony car stop. Two subjects were
inside th vehic], One of these individuals was believed to be
I
I who was wanted on drug trafficking charges
in Virginia. The subjects were removed from the vehicle and
positioned sprad—pagle against their vehicle. The individual
be’ieved to bel jj.ias given a urory net dLown for weapns b
I and L
SA
I questioned[
‘As SASI
SAl
lindicated a “crotch” search should be conduqtd on the
subject since previous informant information indicated I
laiways’
armed himself with a small calibre handgun which he concealed in
his waistband or crotch area. At this point, tie n1Tiect bolted
I and sgt.I
into the woods with SAc
1 in pursuit.
I
loalled for the subject to stop.
Si
Ad
Iran in the woods he kept his hands held out in front of
him. SA I
I stated I
I hands did not swing at his sides,
but were positioned in front of him, out of her line of sight.
Fearing that I
Iwas reaching for a. gun and would “wheel around”
I rs]jj fort
on them, SA I
Ito stop or she would shoot.
While_running, SA L
I fired one shot. The subject stumbled,
IM d not believe she hit I
but I
I.
A second_shot was fired
I apmately two seconds later. I
by SAl
Idisappeared
into a thicket. L_J was observed by SA L
I as he
exited the thicket into a clearing. [
lcontinuçd—qie chase.
Icommandedl
Iwas_becoming tired, S?l
Sensinqt
Ito stop.
Subsequently, I
Iwas ordered onto the ground and handcuffed by

SAl

I

(CONTINUED

Savage-1397

—

OVER)

 Memorandum from I
ito Mr.I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/2/94
Baltimore Division

I

All officers and agents displayed their badges, which
hung around their necks from chains. Their weapons were
displayed and all wore Ballistic Protective Undergarments. As
the subjects exited their vehicle the officers and agents
police.r
t
identified themselves as I
Observations and Recomniendations of the SIRC
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 9!O(94, revealed that proper procedure were followed by
SA I
Iduring this shooting incident. SAl
1 fired shots
at the subject believing that her life and the life of other law
enforcement officers were in danger.
After a through review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of the members of the SIRG
that no administrative action be ta)en against any FBI employee
as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned shooting
incident.

3

Savage- 1398

 __________
______

Dep. Dir.___________
ADD kim.___________
ADD trw.______
Imsst. Df:
klm.Servs._________

Memorandum

Crimn.Inv.__________
Ldent.___________
[nfo.Kgnt.________
Irep.
IntelL.____________
—

I.th._______

Mr.I

To

I

From

Subject

Dete

2/27/9 5

I

Training__________
Cceg. Affs. tiff.
Off.ofEEO
—
Off. Liajscn &
Hit. Affs._______
tiff. ef PthLc Affs._

Teteçhame RL_______

Director’s Off ce___

ADMINISPRAIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
SA(
1
9/9/94
MIAMI DIVISION

:

LegaL CoLr.________

Tech. Servs._______

Refre 1ami report of Supervisory Special Agent
I, dated 10/10/94, one copy of which is
attached to the original.

(S$A)I

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECONNENDMION:
The SIRG concurs with the recommendation of the
Special Agent in Charge (AC. Miami that kO action be taken
against Special Agent (SAl
I as a result of his
involvement in this shooting incident.
h

Enclosure
I
1
3

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
Mr. Leary)
(1
Mr.I
1—Mr.I
I
1
Mr. Gore
(1—Mr.j
—

—

—

-

-

—

—

-

-

-

66—HQ—19157--SUB 29
DEA:dea (16)

1-Mr.
(1— r.
)
I
Mr. Con o
1
Mr. Doyle
1
Mr4
jWMFO
2.
Mr4
, Quantico
1
Mr4
IQuantico
SIGF1J.e
1

I

—

(CONTINUED -OVER)

Savage- 1399

 Memorandum froid
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
SA Paul 3. Russell
9/9/94
Miami Division

I

L

ito

I

*

]--

DETArr.s:
On 1/20/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman
Robert S. Conforti, Section Chief, Violent Crime and Major
Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief
I Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; Section Chief Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., Global Section,
National Security Division; Inspector in Charge I
I
Inspection Division; SSAI
I Firearms Training
Unit, Training Division; and SSAI
I Washington
Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting.

Synopsis of the Shootincr Incident
On 9/9/94, at approximately 5:35 p.m., during an arrest
attempt, the subject of the arrest, Arlix Fuentes, was shot and
killed.
Fuentes, who was on the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement’s (FDLE) Ten Most Wanted List, was armed with and
believed to have fired one time from a Colt .45 caliber Gold Cup
pistol loaded with a magazine containing 6 cartridges.
During a surveillance on Funetes’ girlfriend, and after
she had picked up Fuentes, it was decided tht a felony car stop
would be made.
Deputy United States Märh1I
blocked the street with his vehicle.
SAl
Iwho was
armed with his personally owned 12 gauge, Remington 870 shotgun
arid a 9MM Sig Sauer semi-automatic pistol, Model 228, rammed his
vehicle into the back of the subject’s vehicle as the car stop
was made •
SAl
I indicated he saw both occupants inside the
vehicle move forward and back during the impact. After the
impact,I
1 saw Fuentes again bend forward and move toward
the door.
As I
I stepped outside of his vehicle he leaned
over the roof of the car with his Sig Sauer 2—220 .45 pointed at

the subject’s vehicle. Althouqhl
I heard shouts of “gun,
gun, he’s got a gun”, he did not fire his weapon becay 1
lw
officers would have been caught in the crossfire.
SAl
I
stated he had racked his shotgun and felt the safety with his
finger as he exited his vehicle, He beard omeone yen “police,
don’t move. He has a gun” from his left. On his right he heard
“police, police.
He’s got a gun. Gun, gun, gun.” SAl
1
heard two or three shots while the officers were shouting
“police, police”.
He did not know where the gunshots originated,

(CONTINUED -OVER)

Savage- 1400
2

 Memorandum from I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
SAl
I
9/9/94
Miami Division

I to

Mr.

I

I

but from the sound thought they caine from the right passenger
side of the Toyota.
Feain his life and the lives of the other
officers were in danqer,I
I aimed the shotgun and fired one
round, which hit the subject in the head.

16
C

SAl
I D’DLE, was carrying an FDLE issued
9MM Beretta. when he approached the subject’s vehicle from the
right rear side. I
lobserved Fuentes sitting in the right

front assener seat. p
p indicated that Detective (Det.)
I Metro-Dade Police Department, andi
I
I
IRialeab Police Department, were located to his right,
approaching the vehicle from the right side. I
aid
“police” was yelled several times. He heard someone say, “ffe’g
got a gun,”_followed by the discharge of firearms, from unknown
persons. I
Ifired nwrd P’nptes, approached the right side
of the vehicle with Det.I
I and saw that the subject was
neutralized. He observed what appeared to be an automatic pistol
on the ground.

I

At the same time, Det.I
I who was carrying a•
9MM Beretta, approached the right side o the subiect’s vehicle,
while yelling “police, police, police.” I
lopened the
passenger side door afld observed Fuentes holding a semi-automatic
stainless steel or silver pistol. This was pointed at Fuentes’
chest with Fuentes’ hands on the trigger. L
lordered
Fuentes to drop tI’e weaoon.ut instead uentes cocked the weapon
and pointed it ml
Idireotion. I
Iwas not clear
on how many rounds he fired, but thought it may have been three
and Fuentes one round. L
jjndjcated he was a little
confused since he was bitten by a K-9 as this was occurring.
I
I stated he believed that Fuentes’ female companion had
shot him by mistake, while trying to shoot I
I As be
pointed his gun at Fuentes’ girlfriend she was being dragged out
of the car by some of the other officers.

I

I

stated he ancl
lapproached the subject’s
vehicle from the rear passenger side. While approaching the
vehicle, a car came from their left side and hit the Toyota,
which momentarily_d.stracted him, but he continued approaching
the vehicle. I
Istated the subject moved from a leaning
forward position to asitting position, which he believed was due
to the impact from the collision.
He observed the passenger
holding a large Smith & Wesson pistol in his riqht hand and saw
the left hand come up toward the weapon. I
Ithought Fuentes
may have been attempting to take the safety off of the gun.

(CONTINUED -OVER)

Savage- 1401
3

 Memorandum franil
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident

SAl

9/ /9 4
Miami Division

Ito Mr.

I

I

I

During this time I
Iwas yelling “Policia, Policia.”
As soon
as he saw the gun, he screaiue “ann” eyeral times, while using
his left hand to try and move I
lt of the line of fire
since he was closer to the car than I
I. I
continued
trying to move’
lout of the way, saw the gun being turned
toward them, and fearing_he or his associate were going to be
shot, opened fire. I
I said he saw Fuentes’ weapon recoil in

his hands.
After the shooting stopped,J
Iran to the back of
the Toyota, and looked around fearing that there was more than
one person ghôt.
As he was picking up the radio soinetbin
flashed byl
I which is when the K-9 biti
kias
carrying a clock model 19 during this shooting incident.

SAC OMHXNTS
SAC, Miami has reviewed r
11 fc± tegarding this
incident and has concluded that SZJ
lactions were
justified since he was protecting his life and the lives of other
officers on the scene.
SAC, Miami recommends no further action.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIR(

The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the Miami report, dated 10/10/94, and furnished to
the SIRG revealed that proper procedures were followed by SA
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, the SIRG concurred with the SAC, Miami’s_recommendation
that no administrative action be taken against SAL
I as a
result of his involvement in the above—captioned shooting
incident.

Savage-1402
4

 Mr. Gore

I

7/26/95

I
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
10/13/94
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
4eference report of Inspector—in—Place
dated 12/7/94.

I

RPOSE: This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
REVOflThIoN: That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

1
I.
1
3

—

Mr.I

—

Mr. cnr Room 7125 (Enclosure)

I Room 7142

Mn
I Room 7116
Nr.I
4 Room 6012
1— Mr. Leary, Room 6050)
( 1— Mr. I
I Room 4997)
1— Mr.l
i, Room 7125
2 — Mn
‘427
— wv-I
IRoom 7326)
1 — Mrj
I Room 7825
1 — Mr. Conforti, Room 5012
1 - Mr. Doyle.
oom 4042
1— Mr4________ Quantico
1 — Mr.1
oom 3117
TMT0
-Mr.LT
(V— Mrs.I
I Room 7837
1RR1rr (17)
—

—

-

(CONTINUED

-

OVER)

Savage- 1403

A

 V

Memorandum from I
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
10/13/94
Los Angeles Division

Ito Mr. Gore

I

nwPAmq!

On 7/18/95, the SIRG, consisting of ChairmanL
Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division; Robert S. Conforti, Section Chief, Violent
Crimes and Major Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; Edward R. Leary, Sçption Chief. Personnel Management
Section, Personnel Division;I
I Unit Chief,
NS—20 Unit. loba1 Section
NS—2, National Security Division;
I
I Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, Training and
Administration Section, Training Divisien;I
I Unit
Chief, Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit, Pu1ic
Corruption and Civil Rights Section, Criminal Investigative
Division;I
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit,
Legal Advice and Training Section, Office of the General Counsel;
and I
I Supervisor, WMFO, met to discuss the above—

I

I

-

captioned shooting incident.

Sviwvsis of the Shootinu Incident
On 10/12/94,L
jthe 22 year old son of
wealthy businesswoman, Mrs.
I was abducted from his
Riverside, California, residence by unknown individuals.
Approximately 11 hours later, !4rs.I
Ireceived a telephone
cal]. from her son and he stated that he was being held for a
$300,000 ransom. MrsI
Icontacted the Riverside Resident
Agency (RIVRA) and a kidnapping investigation was initiated.
Investigation confirmed that the victim had been
abducted from his residence and the victim, in a 10/12/94
telephone call to him mother, relayed the kidnappers’ demands for
a $300,000 ransom and told her that she would be contacted again
at her residence that evening at 10:00 p.m.
After the Lo Angeles Office’s kidnapping plan was
Iwas instructed by Special Agents (SAs) to
tell the 10:00 p.m., caller that she was attempting to obtain the
money and to cal). back tile next day. At approximately 10:00 p.m.
on 10/12/94, Mrs.I
Ireceived a telephone call from an
unidentified male who told her that the ransom should be paid the
next day and that she would be contacted with instructions
between noon and 1:00 p.m. on 10/13/94.
It was subsequently
determined that the call had been made from the victims cellular
telephone from somewhere near the Ontario Airport.
activated, Mrs.I

On the morning of 10/13/94, ASAC Iden arrived at the
(CONTINUED
OVER)
-

2

Savage- 1404

 F

Memorandum frorl
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
10/13/94
Los Angeles Division

I to

Mr • Gore

RIVRA and met with SSRAL
I and SOG SSA I
to devise a tentative operational plan.

I

At approximately 12:25 p.m., on 10/13/94, the victim
telephoned his mother regarding the ransom money and he was told
to call back in an hour. At approximately 1:15 p.m., the victim
called and relayed the kidnappers’ instructions for the mother to
take the money to a specific outside pay phone located at the
Moreno Valley Shopping Center between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m., that
evening and await a call for additional instructions. SAC
Parsons arrived at the RIVRA to assume on—scene command at
approximately 6:00 p.m., and a final operational plan was drawn
up.
Surveillance coverage of the public telephone at the
Moreno Valley Mali was furnished by four S0 teams, consisting of
24 SAs operating approximately 20 vehicles, with air support. A
drop package containing $300,000 in marked, anL
I
I
I It was recognized that due
to the shopping center’s layout, the access to freeways, as well
as the semi—rural setting, it might prove difficult to follow the
package and the subject, if the drop occurred at the shopping
center. Accordingly, SAC Parsons instructed that the SOG should
follow the subject, but that he should be apprehended if there
was the slightest chance that he might elude them. SAC Parsons
also made it clear that the decision whether to follow or arrest
the subject would be made by SOG SSAI
I SAC Parsons
stressed to SSAI
I that if he had any doubt as to the SOG’s
ability to follow thin subject out of the area without losing
him, that the subject should be stopped.
S4 I
I was hidden in the rear seat
area of MrsJ
Ivehicle and was instructed to radio
information to the SOG units after she spoke with the kidnappers.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., MrsJ
Jarrived at the mall and
received a telephone call at the av telephone. Upon returning
to the vehicle, she informed SAL
ithat the subject told
her that she was to give the money to a man on a motorcycle
wearing a white helmet, that he would come up to her for the
ransom.
She told the subject on the phone that the motorcyclist
should go o the ‘Da.senger side of the car because 1-J atrn was
heavy.
SAl
‘radioed the SOG units that Mrs.I
Iwas
to meet the subject on the motorcycle at the Great Western Bank.
(CONTINUED

3

Savage- 1405

-

OVER)

IF

6
b7C

 -I

Memorandum fromi
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
10/13/94
Los Angeles Division

I to Mr. Gore

Mrs.I
Jexited the vehicle, after problems with her
seatbelt, walked around to open the passenger door, determined
the passenger door was still locked, returned to the driver’s
side, picked up her car keys anSI began to open the passenger side
door. Apparently Mrs.j
I movements made the motorcyclist
suspicious and he drove from the parking area without making
direct contact with her.
sAt
Ibegan moving toward the bank and
drove into the shopping center parking lot. As he drove past, he
observed the inctrrcvjist within several feet of the driver’s
side of MrsI
‘vehicle and thought he was talking to her.
When SA I
lobserved the motorcyclist adjust a bag on his
shoulder, he radioed “He’s got the bag. Are we going to take
him?” SSAI
Iresponded that the subject should be arrested to
prevent him from leaving the scene.

I

I

As the motorcyclist exited the mall, be stopped at a
red traffic signal at Center Point Drive. SAl
ulled iLn
9
J
behind the motorcycle. SAL
irequested that SA[
I
drive in front and block the motorcycle
ct1ting onto center
Point Drive.
As SAl
Idid this, sAl
I pulled behind
the motorcycle, “nudged” it with his vehicle and the motorcyclist
fell to the ground. As the SAs exited their vehicles, the
subj eat began to run east. when sAi
ayelled “FBI, halt or
I’ll shaoj”, the subject turned towards him arid although SA
I’could not clearly see the subject’s hands”, he believed
“they anqeared to be reaching for something in the bag”.
SA
If ired one shot from his 9mm Sig Sauer pistol and missed.
SAl
homed in the foot chase and although does not recall
seeing SA I
I he heard tIe command and the shot but did not
know who had fired.
SAl
Iran down Center Point Drive and
yelled for the subject to stop and fired two shots from his 9mm
si yer pistol which missed the subject. Additionally, SA I
I
Iattempted to drive in front of the subject and block his
escape; however, he dodged around the SA’s vehicle and continued
his flight.
SA________________ was stationed on Frederick Street
when he heard SSA i
Igive the arrest command. As SA L
I
entered Center Point, he observed the chase and heard t]e shots.
Since he could not block the subject due to traffic, SAl
I
stopped his vehicle, pulled his Bureau issued Remington 870
shotgun from the roof mount and exited his vehicle.
SAl________
(CONflNTJED
4

Savage- 1406

-

OVER)

 Memorandum fromi
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
10/13/94
Los Angeles Division

Ito

Mr. Gore

ran after the sub eat anti -cmipandcd him to halt, but the subject
continued to run.
SA I
If ired one round of 00-buck and the
subj eat dropped to the ground. The subject was not wounded and
was immediately taken into custody.
Orvajopi endat4ons,

o

he SIRG

The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the report dated 12/7/94, revealed that proper
procedures were followed during this shooting incident.
After a thorough review of the facts regarding this
incident, it is the opinion of the SIRG that no administrative
action should be taken against any FBI employee as a result of
their involvement in this shooting incident.

5

Savage- 1407

 ______
__________
_________
_________
___________
_

Mr. Gore

7/21/95

I

I

b6
)

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
11/22/94
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE

7:S

Reference attached report of SAC William C. Megary,
dated 3/7/95.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis
0
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting incident.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of their involvement in this
shooting incident.

I
1—Mr.’
1
Mr. Gore
Mr.
3
Mr.
(1
Mr. Leary)
(1—Mr.I
1
Mr.
2
Mr.

1-Mr.I

-

-

1

-

—

—

—

—

I

—

(1—Mr.I

JTP:tp

(17)

I

-

—

—

1
Mr. Conrorti
1
Mr. Doyle
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
Mr.
1
jMrs._____
—

I

Savage- 1408

b

 Memorandum fromi
Ito Mr. Gore
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
11/22/94
Washington Metropolitan Field Office

I

DETAILS:

I

On 7/19/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman
Acting Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections,
Inspection Division;
Robert S. Conforti, Section Chief, Violent
Crimes and Major Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative
Division;
Edward R. Leary ection Chief. Persone1 Management
Section, Personnel Division; I
Chief,
NS—2D Unit, Global Section
NS-2, National Security Division;
nit Chief, Firearms Traininq Unit. Trainina ancj
Administration Section, Training Division; I
I
Unit Chief, Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit, Public
Corruption and Civil Rights Section, Criminal Investigative
Division; I
I Unit Chief, Investigative Law
Unit, Legal Aç1vi-e nd Training Section, Office of the General
Counsel;
and
ISupervisor, WMFO;
met to discuss
the above-captioned shooting incident.

I

lunit

-

I

,

SvnoDsis of the Shooting Incident
On 11/22/94, BENNIE LEE LAWSON entered the Metropolitan
Police Department (MPD) Headquarters building and walked to the
office of the cold homicide case task force, which is comprised
of MPD detectives and WNFO Agents.
LAWSON entered the office
behind a MPD Cooperating Witness (CW) and the CW’s friend.
He
proceeded to a partitioned—off, smaller area of the office, where
two WMFO Agents and MPD Sergeant HENRY DALY were engaged in
conversation.
Lawson then proceeded to pull a fully automatic
pistol and begin firing, fatally shooting Sergeant DALY, who was
seated at a desk, and A MTCITARL JORt )4TTLER, who was standing in
front of the desk.
SAl
I who was seated nearby
on a couch, then enqageci LAWSON in a fire fight.
After
critically wounding SAl
I LAWSON went to another part of the
office and engaged SA MARTHA DIXON MARTINEZ in a fire fight.
SA
MARTINEZ shot Lawson twice, in the thigh, and was herself
disabled by shots in the right arm and chest, causing her to drop
her weapon.
LAWSON, whose weapon had been disabled by SA
MARTINEZ’ gunfire, then recovered SA MARTINEZ’ weapon and fatally
wounded her with it, before fatally shooting himself.
The CW was not injured, and the CW’s friend was treated
and released for a minor gunshotjund prom LAWSON’S weapon.
Investigation determined that SAl
If ired 12 times, that SA
MARTINEZ fired eight or nine times, and that LAWSON fired
approximately 20 rounds.
Neither SA MILLER nor Sergeant Daly
fired their weapons.
2

Savage-1409

I

 Memorandum from I
I to Mr. Gore
Re
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
11/22194
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated /7/95, revealed that proper procedir wexe followed by SA
I
Iduring this shooting incident.
SAl
If ired shots at a
subject who was inflicting deadly force against fellow Agents an4
police officers,_and who was attempting to inflict deadly force
against SAl
I
After a thorough review of the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of the members of the SIRG
that no administrative actin be taken against any FBI employee as
a result of their involvement in the above—captioned shooting
incident.

3

Savage-1410

 _____________

To

____________las

Mr.I

:

I

From

I

Date

2/13/95

I
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
12110/94
DALLAS DIVISION

subject

Reference report by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
jdated, 12/22/94, o which one copy is attached.

I

PUR0SE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, an recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
Special Agent (SA)
a result of his involvement in
this shooting incident.

I

Enclosure
1
1
3

-

—
—

1—Mr.l__________

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1

-

Mr. Leary

(1—Mr.I
1—Mr.I_________
1
Mr. Gore
-

(1

—

Mr.I________

11)6

(1—Mr.]
:7-— Mr. Conforti
1— Mr. Doyle
1— Mi
17MPG
Quantico
Nr.I
uantico
Mr.]
SXR File

66—HQ—19157—SUB 12
DEA:dea (17)

(CONTINUED

Savage- 1411

-

OVER)

 __

L

Memorandum from I
1to Mn
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
12/10/94
Dallas Division

,

Re:

I

I

DTAILs
On 1/20/95, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman
Robert S. Confortj, Section Chief, Violent Crimes and Major
Offenders Section, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief
L Investigative Law Unit, Office of the General
Counsel; Section Chief Jeremiah W. Doyle, Jr., qiobal Section
1
National Securit Division; Inspector in Charge I
I
Inspection Division; sSAI
I Firarme Training
Unit, Training Division; and SSA1
I Washington
Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the above-captioned
shooting.
Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On ‘12/10/94, SAl
I shot a RottweiJ.er dog in
front of his former residence after the dog charged at him.
SAl
I who is separated from his wifel
I was
babysitting their two children. Upon arrival of his wife ad her
companion, the wife mentioned how they had been confronted by a
Rottweiler, which was loose, and had been roaming the
neighborhood.
The dog had cirarged at the women as they exited
from their vehicle and approached the residence.

4

When SA
I departed the residence, he heard a dog
snarling.
The animal, hijeighed approximately 75 pounds, was
40 to 50 feet away froml
L The Rottweiler continued to bark
and growl as it approached SAl
I At this point, SA L
lwas
approximately 40 feet away from the residence.
It was too tar to
run back. ±oward. the residence_an&.S
Icould not enter zis
vehile itiee itWa Iockd and the keis wrq ±nside his pocket.
Without warning, the dog charged at SAl
I Fearing that the
would bite and—was_capable—of—in-flicting—serious-injnry_.or..
possibly death, SAl
Idrew 1is Bureai issued Smith & Wesson
1OMM, and from a distance of 20 to 30 feet fired one shot into
the dog’s chest.
-

The local police department was conta
Upon
arriving at the scene, the officer requested SA
surrender
his service revolver. The officer indicated SA
could
possibly face criminal charges for discharging a weapon within
the city limits, as well as being libel for the animal’s
veterinary bills.
A senior officer arrived at the scene and indicated
SAl
Ihad a right to protect himself from the animal if it
were in fact attacking him.

SA

loverheard a neighbor comment that he hoped the

animal had been shot and killed since it roamed freely throughout
the neighborhood.
(CONTINUED
2

Savage-1412

-

OVER)

 ____
__

F,

Memorandum fronil
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
12/10/94
Dallas Division

I

to Mr.I

I

FBI Dallas was advised that the 180 grain projectile
struck the dog in the chest and exited the shoulder.
The dog
survived this incident.
Obervatzons and Recommendations of the SXRG
The review of the above-’captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administratLve inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated_12/22/94, revealed that proper procedures were followed by
SAl
i during this shooting incident. Fearing that the
Rottweiler would attack and inflict serious injury, SAl
I
fired one shot into the animal’s chest.
After a thorcugh review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of tue meiners of the SIRG
that no administrative action be taken against SAl
I as a
result of his involvement in the above—captioned shooting
incident.

3

Savage-1413

b6

 i-1t4 (Rev. 3—3—59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:
Report

1

Date:

SSAI
April 6,

Field Office File N:

62A R}I—42577

ThIe:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
RICHMOND DIVISION
MARCH 26, 1993

Cbaracter:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

o(:

Synopsis:

1993

OffIce:

RICHMOND

Bureau File N:

Administrative inquiry initiated based upon a
shooting incident which ocçmrr at aoroximate1y
DC
us a 32
SAL
12:15 p.m. on 3/26/93.
FBI
year old Special Agent who entered on duty with the
on
n
Divisio
ond
Richm
the
to
d
She reporte
4/4/88.
8/23/92, and has been assigned to Squad 3 (Drugs,
Organized Crime, and Violent Crimes), since her arrival.
lanai_______
fln Pi-idv morning, 3/26/93, Rihmond SAsI
(VSP)
POLICE
STATE
VIRGINIA
by
panied
I
accom
L
Richmond FBI
Trooper I
I (a member of the
Fugitive Task Force), travelled to the Fort Lee United
States Army Military Reservation at Petersburg, Va. The
above personnel met with priminal Investiqative Division
ihad been
I SAl
(CID) Investigator (Inv.)J
ment
Govern
on
a
Crime
a
ion
working with InvJ
Murder for Hire case
Reservation (CGR)
In the process of working this case, the
(70A R1-I.-4256).
principal subject was arrested and incarcerated on
The potentiat victim had been
unrelated charges.
I While in the
nd Inv.i
interviewed by SAl
, SAl_______
gation
investi
CGR
the
process of completing
provided
ation
inform
the
in
es
istenci
incons
some
noticed
name
the
Isource, an individual using
by Inv.i
es, b6
inquiri
NCIC
riate
approp
g
I
I After makin
b7C
SAl
ldetermined that an individual by the name of
Jersey
iwas wanted by New
-

This docirnent contains neither recin,x1at1ons nor concLusions of the FBI. It Is the property of the FBI and is Loaned to
your ageney; ft and its contents are not to be dfstrlbq.,ted outside your aBency.

 _________fthat

I

. The
authorities for multiple counts of drug violations
ine
determ
to
was
uarters
Headq
purpose of meeting at CID
fact
in
he
if
and
_
_____
tity
_____
iden
of[___
true
the
was wanted by New Jersey authorities, to effect his Force,
A ember of the Richmond Fugitive Task
arrest.
Icould execute a state warrant and have the
r
Troope I
It is noted
subject held for New Jersey authorities.
relative
issued
been
had
t
t
fuI
warran
T1n]w
Fligh
th1mv.
ent,
agreem
us
previo
Per
tol
J
the
on
e
offic
CID
Icalled his source into the
Jexplained to subject
SAL
morn4naof 3/26/3.
information ad been received indicating
iwanted by
that he could possibly bd
of state
tions
viola
ous
numer
New Jersey authorities for
CID
the
in
nel
the
oerson
ri
1asm
L
drug laws.
lr?d that
Office that he was not[
jthat after
J
J1a
there was some mistake. SAl
he was
that
ined
determ
was
it
if
fingerprint comparisons,
be
would
not the subject wanted from New Jersey, he
ting
J after fingerprin
allowed to go free. Trooper
ts,
rprin
finge
his
Uiat
ination
determ
the subject, made a
compared with the known prints of L_
t,
indicatçithat the two were identical. At this poin
Inv.L
CID
r
anothe
I and
Trooper I
of
commenced a pat 4ôwn_j prraratjçn for a strip search
area
the
from
eated
Iretr
jandi
the subject, SAsL
obscure
of the fingerprinting table to partially
done tp allow
was
This
tion.
parti
a
behind
lves
themse
1
Inv.L
.
search
the subject privacy for the strip
I
t,I
poin
this
At
time.
left the room at this
arrest.
became violent, abusive, and viaorously resisted
a
onto
ed
Iclimb
A struggle ensued during whichj
onto
d
climbe
again,
rose
,
floor
desk, was pulled to the
the desk, and attempted to climb over a portable
to get at
to enp jhe arresting personnel and
pa
the
that
zing
reali
IandL
1
SA
I SAsI
not been
had
sly
obviou
and
t,
arres
subject was resisting
tion to
parti
strip searched, moved around from behind the
le,
scuff
the
During
1
assist in the securing of[
was
camera
the
,
floor
the
to
d
the partition was knocke
broken and numerous items of office equipment were strewn
bE
Jwas holding the
about the office. Trooper[
b7C
him.
subdue
to
t
suIiect’s leg in an attemp
BA l
1 with handcuffs, attempted to secure the
subject’s one wrist. Both individuals weçe thrçwn clear
I who at
by the subject and he proceeded toward SAL
it at
d
pointe
n,
weapo
ce
servi
her
drawn
this point had
As the struggle
the subect. and ordered him to stop.
[manae to escapthe aras of SAs
ensued.[
I ftrd Inv.L
1
rl
I Troope
proceeded toward SALJ asking her repeatedlyco shoot
2

bC

 e
him, because if he were returned to New Jersey
izing that
authorities, he would be killed anyway. Real
ent
rcem
enfo
law
the subject had escaped from all
e
becam
she
her,
toward
g
eedin
personnel and was proc
the
of
y
safet
concerned fp- brpersonal safety and the
an
had
ect
subj
this
SA[
Irealized that
•others.
asingly
extensive crimifl record and ra.s becoming incre
her,
grab
to
were
She believed that if L
violent.
r
eithe
on
it
use
and
he would wrestle her weapon from her
this
t
.__A
iuiel
perso
ent
rcem
enfo
r
herself or the othe law
point, after repeated commands to stop, BA______
discharged her nine millimeter Sig Sauer Mo e P226?
Serial Number U36785l Afterfiring her weapon, SAL
Jimmediately dropped to the
observed that .subject
shot.
fl9or. c1utching his hest as though he had been
hit and
been
not
had
1
L
SAL
I later realized a that
e.
offic
the
of
rear
the
in
desk
k
struc
t
bulle
that the
Agents
The
d.
roun
No one was injured or struck by this
] who had just
and another CID inv.,I
the weapon,
of
arge
disch
the
after
room
the
entered
cuffs and leg
hand
subdued the subject, placing him in
orted to the
tran
i
ediat
imm
h
9
was
The subject
irons.
I
JAI.
CITY
inia,
rg,
Virg
rsbu
Pete
]five feet seven
is a black, male, date of birthL
erL
Numb
FBI
He has
inches, 140 pounds.
1
lt with a
ihas prior arre.sts for burglary, assau
L
lt, and
assau
deadly weapon, disorderly conduct, sexual
the
on
icted
conv
failure to appear. He had been
disorderly conduct charge, the remaining counts were
In regard to the charges resulting in the
dismissed.
lwas wanted by the SUPERIOR COURT,
3/26/93 arrest,L
charges.
Gloucester County, Newrersey, for multiple drug
t;
three
tmen
indic
t
coun
seven
a
in
d
charge
been
He had
counts of possession, possession with intent to
tical
distribute, and distribution of cocaine, three iden
v.
3,
32/9
nirac
On
p-nn
a,
and
juan
mari
rding
counts rega
I b
Assistant United States AttorneyL
V. o-ailZy b7c
Eastern District of Virg”
authorized the arrest of[
On
assaulting a Federal officer and resisting arrest.
ICT
DISTR
S
STATE
D
UNITE
3/30/93, a complaint was riled in
a
lting
th
assau
7wi
g[_
rgin
COURT, Richmond, cha
Federal officer and cri?lle on Government reservation
I
assault on VSP Trooper [

1

__1

Ifor

-

DETAILS:

3

1

 PZ2O4 (Rev. 3-3-59)

ICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST
tion
stiga
Inve
of
au
Federal Bure

Copy to:

ssL

Reporl o
Date:

March 22, 1993

Field Office F

62A—DE—69434

Title:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT

Office:

Bureau Pile 0:

b6
h7c
b7D

DETROIT DIVISION
3/2/93

Charactet

Synopsis:

DETROIT

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

luzat
ladvised SAL
On 3/1/93L
1id
who
ict
“crack” add
7was an
L_
in the Detroit area and was
ies
ber
rob
k
ban
r
committed fou
Z MOTEL, Warren, Michigan.
known to have stayed at the SUE
icar as a 1980 Dodge
This source also described
e
or, bearing Michigan licens
,p,plomat, primer gray in col
L
7displayed a
land SEZ
On 3/2/39, sL
HIGAN NATIONAL
MIC
the
at
s
photo spread to victim teller rn, Mi. one of wh9m_
bo
BANK, 3461 S. Telegrah_Dear
SAsL
Z1
s the robber.
Ja
dL
fie
nti
positiveiy ide
OF
T
FIRS
the
at
y
ber
rob
a
and[_Jthen responded to
d and 1—94, St. Clair
AMERICA BANK, East Nine Mile R?
Zjand
SAsL
,Shores, Mi. where they met
Agency.
ent
sid
b6
,Re
ens
em
]from thNt,çl
57c
and
SAL
I tim teller at tne
I,ater tnat arieoon, SAL
displayed a photo spead to aic East Nine Mile l3oad.
K,
COLONIAl, CENTRAL SAVINGS BAN
vely identified[__las
siti
po
also
Warren, Mi. and she
to the SUEZ MOTEL__Warren,
the robber. SAC__ltraveled
1was
manager thatL
tel
mo
Mi. and determined from the
few
av
om but had driven w
currently renting
I radioed
rriva SAl
S
to
minutes prior
1 and
sL_
SA
J met with SAL
this information to SA
and
tel,
mo
the
]proceeded to

C

L

FBI and Is Loaned to
lusions of the FBI. It is the property of the
s
ThiS docueent contains neither recaunendatfon nor conc
ibuted outside your agency.
your agency; it and Its contents are nor to be distr

 __)was
_Ipositioned
_____
_____

jthen telephoned SSA
devised an arrest plan. SAL
When
jwho approveçthe rrest plan.
1
SAL
land
SAl
Ireturned tàthe motel, be
L
1
exited his car. L
1s
attempted to arresti
for the
driving
began
and
gear
in
car
however, put the
to hve a “wild”H’-’ ‘.“
motel exit.
When SAS I
facto both SAL_......J and[
exit as
Jwere unabIéto ilook the motel
andL
lems
SA
prob
_
1
radio
and
-rj.usly planned due to traffic
1
dL
ordere
and
ecit
the
himself at
speed
ased
incre
,L
escape
to
to stop. In his panic
, SA
1 At the last second
and headed straight at SAL
one
fired
ly
aneous
simult
and
lilnuped out of thesway
SA
,
fired
he
shot toward the driver’ side door. As killed, another
afraid that either he would be
pedestrian would be
Agëtwould be killed or an innocent
the phase to
killed. Pursuing Agents discontinued whenL
lspeed
prevent injury to innocent bystanders
l
severa
h
throug
raced
he
and
exceeded 100 miles per hour
red lights.

b6

b7c

1qLndI
1
Four witnesses confirmed that SAs[__
Fcar.
chedL
fhsv
aD,roa
s
identified themselve
landt
It was the opinion oft
hit by
ièing
ot
y
jeopard
in
1was
Jthat SAL
ch
approa
b76
jsaw the Agents
car. L
t
inciden
g
shootin
the
car but he did notitress
[
claimed the
because his view was obscurred. I
car was
the
bar,
Agents were never in front of[
the
n,
opinio
fzis
in
never driven toward the Agents and assault the Agents.
to
driver of the car was not trying
evening when he returned
]was arrested later that
In a sj.qned statement given to SAs
to the motel
following his arrest,
1 anZ
attempt to arrest him
FBI’S
the
stated that during
yell “FBI” but he did
earlier that day, he heard someone
tp the motel as he
way
entry
not see anyone around the
b6
I
1 andL 1
P1 ti .When he was interviewed by SAs
b7
down
run
and
ecane
to
iwas asked why he attempted
I
ded
lrespon
day.I
the
in
er
arresting officers earli
mi h wapted someone
that his life was not worth living
Ivehicle
to shoot and kill him. A search of L
weapon which
a
dislose
to
failed
subseg3ent to his arrest
1
from
SAI_______
hole
t
bulle
a
or
carried
lallegedly
I
weapon.
ifor
arrest[
A criminal complaint and warrant to2113 (a) and ill (a)
n
Sectio
USC
18
Title
of
violation
jy United States
(1) (b) was issued to SAl
District of
Eastern
CARLSON,
A.
Magistrate THOMAS
Michigan on 3/3/93.
2

 __________

not
currently represented by counsel and is
ews.
intervi
available for additional
shooting was
It is the opinion of Detroit’s PFI that the
.
policy
Bureau
justified and within
EDM, Detroit , Michian
On 4/19/93 AUSL
I with
chargingl
complaint
l
advised that the origina
was
111
Usc
18,
Assault of a Federal Officer (APO), Title
an
in
charged
iwas subsequently
dismissed.I
Title 18,
information withhree counts of Bank Robbery,
.b6
USC 2113 (a) and (d).

b7 C

DETAILS:
uent to a
This investigation wa hiitiated subseq 3/2/93.
On
shooting incident involving SAl

1

3

 PDJ.4 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Jnvestigation

Copy to:

/

SSAI

Date:

April 23, 1993

PlcldOfficcFIle#:

SD 66—19157 SUB 46

I

SHOOTING INCIDENT
APRIL 16, 1993

O1cc:

SAN DIEGO

1
6
b70

Character:

Synopsis:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

1

On 4)16/93, at approximately 12:45 A.M., SAl
who was returning to his residence from
conducting an investigation in support of San Diego Case
(166E—SD—51058), was stopped by a group of individuals
who appeared to need assistance.

I

lvisuaily observed these indiviauals damage a
SA
vehicle directly in front of his, and then atemot to
“carjack” his vehicle. One sulject struck SAl
vehicle with a pool cue stick in an attempt to break the
jaccelerated through the area but
window.
SAl
continued to observe this group assaulting the next
This vehicle was also damaged with a blunt
vehicle.
object.

I

Icontacted the Police Emergency Operator “911”
to report_this violence but the connection
attempted
and
SA I
was “cut—off”.
I stopped his vehicle, and
attempted to thwart this violence by stating in a loud,
Three
clear voice, “police—stop—put_your hands up”.
I who was standing near
subjects ran towards SAl
The
his vehicle and had his Bureau issued weapon drawn.
his
right
had
and
approach
to
continued
first subject
lthought that these
SAl
hand in his waist band.
men were armed with semi-automatic pistols and that they
were going to begin shooting at him.

SAl

this doctrnt contains neither recomcndations nor concLusions of the FBI. It Is the
your agcy; it and Its contents are not to be distrtbted outside your agenoy.

b7

/

property of the FBI and is Loaned to
•1

 s away,
Whn the first subject wa approximately 25 yard
shot
the
but
ect,
subj
the
at
shot
a
SAj
1 fired
was not
___J
missed. The magazine in the weapon of SAL
again,
fire
to
d
mpte
Jatte
properly seated and SAL
d to
inue
cont
ects
subj
the
While
sful.
but was unsuçces
ine
magaz
the
ed
linstinctively tapp
approach,— SAl
, two
slide
the
sing
relea
and recharged the weapon. While
n.
weapo
the
from
d
arge
disch
ely
rounds were immediat
the subjects
Again, no injuries resulted. At this point
retreated.
provided
successfully contacted the police and
SAL
other
by
ted
bora
corro
was
descriptive information, which
SA
.
hour
the
in
with
made
were
ts
witnesçs, and arres
his
to
ent
I immediately reported the incid
L
Unit of the
supervisor and cooperated fully with the Gang
ment.
San Diego Police Depart
—C

2

b ‘C

 _____On

P0-204 (R.ev. 3.-3.59)

TJNUED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Report of:

SSA L
July 23, 1993

Office:

Field Office FUel:

66—4609 SUB

Bureau P11.1:

Thie:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
MA.Y 20, 1993
NEWARK DIVISION

1

66—HQ—19157 SUB 31

1)6
b7C
Character:

Synopais:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

May 20, 1993, Newark Special Agent (SA)f________
9amn caliber pistol
if ired one round from a Sig Sauer
1
injured andL
was
one
at fugitiveL
] No
by
tated
precipi
was
event
This
.
vehicle
fled in a stolen
the following:
the
ihad six (6) outstanding warrants from
RT
DEPA
E
POLIC
NEWARK
and
E
OFFIC
IFF’S
SHER
ESSEX COUNTY
Stolen
of
sion
MENT, for charges of Assault and Posses
Property. As a result, a Preliminary Inquiry (P1)
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) investigation
zn May 16, 1993.
was opened on[

I

iwas
On May 20, 1993, SAL_]ascertained thatL
driving a black Ford Mustang, with tinted windows, New
1 which was a stoleq ‘rh4gle.,_
Jersey Licensel
I SA
gations to locate I
investi
While conducting
S
spotted a vehicle answering this description.
in his Bureau car, fol1owd the.,vehicle and confirme it
Jwas allegedly dri’ing.
wa the stolen automobile[
continued to follow
and
nce
assista
for
radioed
SAl
1
to a slow stop for
came
vehicle
The subject
the vehicle.
and Broad
Street
Fulton
at
cated
a traffic laht_lo
Idrove up directly behind the vehicle and
SAL
Street.
radioed his position.

1)6
b7C

property of the FBI and is Loaned to
This document contains neither recorenendatirais nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

 r

NK 66—4609 SUB 1

decided to contact and arrest
having
was completely familiar
SA
in
cooperation
obta
successfully
previously
the
attempt
to
ded
SA
apprehending his brother.
previously
had
tha
arrest because he was aware
want
been involved in chases with the po ice and did not
Newar)C
to cause a high speed pursuit in the downtown

area.

drawn and
lexited his vehicle with his weapon
SAl
subject
of
occupant
concealed y nis leg from the
aveling in reverse
The subject vehicle be
vehicle.
ed out of the
at an angle towards SAl______ SA
rought his
vehicle’s way and yelled “stop”!
the driver’s
into
shot
one
fired
and
level
pistol to arm
After he fired, the vehicle abruptly
stopped coming at him and_accelerated forward, turning
jwas successful in his
left on Fulton Street.
escape attempt.

side window.

J

On May 21, 1993, a crim4nal complaint was filed and
]for Assault on
an arrest warrant issued forl
a Federal Officer.

2

 F
PD-204 av. 3449)

.

.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Jiwestigadon

Copy to:

Date:

ASAC BRIAN P. CARROLL
June 14, 1993

ScidOfflceFfleN:

88A—TP—21667

Report of:

Title:

Office:

KANSAS CITY

ThieauPflcf:

ADMINISTEATIVE INQUIRY
SH9OTING INCIDENT INVOLVING
SAL
KANSAS CITY DIVISION
MAY 21, 1993
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Syflopais:

and state and
On 5/21/93, Special Agents of the FBI
to arrest
pted
attem
cers
offi
ent
county law enforcem
b7c
JONES
ouri.
Miss
,
WILLIAM DALE JONES in Jefferson city
t to Avoid
was the subject of an Unlawful Fligh
Florida, on
ndo,
Orla
in
d
issue
Prosecution warrant
utilized his
JONES
st,
During this attempted arre
1/4/91
in so
and
st
arre
d
avoi
to
pickup truck in an attempt
i who
doing he drove directly at SAL
unty
e’Co
Co.L
The
cle.
was standing outside his Bureau vehi
bad
rm,
unifo
in
both
Sheriff and his first deputy,
his attempt to drive
unsuccessfully ordered JONES to stop
shots at JONES’
from a parking lot and fired severa
]saw the
SAL
vehicle in order to disable it.
withheld fire
bu
ons
weap
r
thei
sheriff and deputy firing
his Bureau
ed
ramm
from his own weapon until afr JON
g hit by
bein
r
Afte
J
car in the attempt to hit SJ
ing
fear
sL
car,
ZJ
the driver’s side door of his
fire
ed
open
,
again
him
hit
to
pt
attem
that JONES would
ately
oxim
appr
,
1076
el
with his Smith and Wesson 10mm, Mod
t
shor
a
stop
a
to
came
JONES’ vehicle
five times
have received a
distance away and JONES was observed to
wound on
this
JONES expired from
wound to his head
mined
deter
/93,
5/24
on
An autopsy performed
5/22/9 3 •
head
the
to
d
roun
one
with
hit
that JONES had been
mined it to be
Ballistics examination of this round deter to be made.
able
n
atio
tific
a 1O with no further iden

it is the property of
Thf a docunent contains neither recoetnendations nor concLusions of the F31.
.
agency
your
outside
your agency; it arx Its contents are not to be distributed

the FBt ar is Loaned to

 .
. After
]was the only shooter utilizing a 10mm
was
JONES
that
fact
the
to
being alerted on 5/20/93,
agents
area,
ouri
Miss
,
City
rson
Jeffe
in
believed to be
City
rson
Jeffe
assigned to the three—man RA located in
on was
mati
infor
l
tiona
addi
As
alerted local authorities.
21St,
the
on
ida,
Flor
pa,
Tam
in
FBI
the
received from
ject’s arrest with
plans were formulated to facilitate sub
unc3.er the
Team
SWAT
City
as
the assistance of the Kans
1
and SSRAL
sutervisjon of ASAC WILLIAM H. GENTRY
1
at
ent
oym
depl
SWAT
1 Physical surveillance and
L
g the evening of
a possible location for the subject durin to locate
ed
5/20 and early morning of 5/r21/93i fail
_Jand SWAT personnel
ASAC GENTRY, SSRAL
subject.
a half hours from
left Jefferson City, which is three and
lance. Jefferson
Kansas City after this all niqht_surveil
cted spot checks
ndu
Jco
city personnel, including SAL
These
JONES.
for
ions
locat
during the day of possible
ved
belie
up truck
spot checks resulted in locating a pick
nd
arou
ence
resid
to be operated by JONES at his mother’s
scale
full—
a
uct
cond
to
3:30 p.m. on 5/21/93. Unable
in and out of
surveillance of this vehicle, it was
located at the
observation until such time as it was
rson City,
d.
Jeffe
levar
Rr2u
JUNGLE BAR, 10q9_Misso’uri
ZLw on the
[
and
1
SAs L
Missouri.
I
iff L
scene and assisted by Cole County Sher
Lt.
and
1
I—
1 Chief Deputy Sheriff
I—
SAL
rol.
1 Missouri Highway Pat
dent Agency
Resi
City
rson
Jeffe
the
in
ained
1em
cene
on-s
the
to facilitate communications with
scanner
Concern that JONES had a police
participants.
fficers
bc
and
negated use of the county radio systemfnrø- SA
7
there
did not have FBI communications;
had
who
I.
[
iff
Sher
with
was in telephonic contact
from a garage
visual observation of subject’s vehicle
h7c
JONES left
When
BAR.
across the street from the JUNGLE
L
,
truck
up
pick
the bar and entered his
on, made by SA
telephonically relayed this observati
eeded to enter
proc
riff, who in turn
J to the she
ts surrounding
Even
lot.
the
his vehicle and drive into
On 6/2/93, Cole County
the shooting then followed.
the use of deadly
Prosecutor ruled that lii this instance
lished and allowed
estab
rs
mete
para
force falls within the
under both federal and state law.

SAL

p
DETAILS:

2

L

 FD-204 (Rev. 3-3.59)

UNiTED ATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Office:

Cleveland

Report of
Date:

ASAC RICHARD C. STAVER
17, 1993

Field Office File I:

62A—CV—49382

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
E
CLEVELAND/CUYAMOGA FUGITIVE TASK FORC
JUNE 3, 1993

character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsis:

On June 3, 1993 Special Agent (SAj
th Fudaral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Deputy
}of the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s
th Cleveland/Cuyahoga
Department, both members
]while
i
shot
e,
Forc
Fugitive Task
him.
on
t
in the process of effecting an arres

June

Bureau File K:

lof

I

cif

ined June 1,
iwas wanted on a state warrant obta
aggravated
for
1993 by t4e Akron, Ohio Police Department
robbery
bank
a
of
ect
subj
us also a
robbery. [
(1),
B
UNSU
led
entit
sion
Divi
case in the Cleveland
BANK
NAL
NATIO
FIRST
ii
I
00:
/93;
5/24
OHIO;
N,
OF OHIO, 727 NORTH MAIN STREET, AK1O
347.
V—49
91A-C
r
CV”, Cleveland file numbe

I

b6
b7c

an effort
On June 3, 1993_Fugitive Task Force members, inplan was
The
.
plan
a
tuted
insti
to apprehend
Inear a car dealership in Cleveland,
to apprehend
Itook a different route than
Ohio. However,
arresting agents and
rvea
obse
anticipated and also
chase occurred, which
e
ehicl
snee
hiçrh
A
officers.
crosØnq a center line and
resulted in Mr.L
]vehicle then
striking another vrehicle. SAL
Mr.
collided with

L

1

property of the FBI aid Is loaned to
This docuiient contains neither recoimtendatlons nor concLusIons of the FBI. It fa the
agency.
ur
outside
uted
distrib
be
your agency; It arid Its contents are not to

 __

____

____

upn by
exited his vehicle and was fired SAl
gun.
hand
9mm
with
d
ra.
w o was arme
1 at I
returned fire, as did Deputy L
h6
hot wounds.
guns
fatal
ireceived eight non- fired shots at law
b7c
had
he
Jadmitted that
was
ized
util
on
enforcement officers and that the weap
his.

SAl

-

RUC

-

2

 d___________
e
____n
________________
_____
____________Iwer
_____

_____

.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-S9)

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

55

1

Office:

Repotof:
Dew:

June

FeId Office File li;

62A—DE—70096

Title:

SHOOTING INCIDENT
DETROIT DIVISION
5/25/93

Chartcter

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

16,

1993

DETROIT

BUJeIU File I:

Synopsis:

]received source

On 5/25/93, SAl

JULIUS
information as to the location of
matter.
BIGOS, a fugitive in a UFAP - Escape
weapon.
no
had
BIGGS
The source advised that
Force
Task
e
Fugitiv
ce
Allian
the
Personnel of
was
and the DPD were notified and BIGGS
front
located, with two other males, on the
Pryor,
9331
at
ce
residen
porch of the
Pursuant to the arrest
Detroit, Michigan.
Agents,
plan, at approximately 6:00 p.m., FBI
Deputy
County
Wayne
DPD Officers and a
arrest
Sheriff proceeçlnd to the residence to
Iar
As SAsI
BIGGS.
-

Deputy Sherfl

b6

b7c

I

exiting their vehicles,
BIGGS walkea_through he front door into the
one of
asked[
house.
had a
S
JULIU
if
porch,
the
n
the individuals_o
7 said, “No.” The door was
weapon andl
locked and the Agents and officers knocked
Jkicked
and identified themselves. I
.
pursuit
hot
in
were
they
as
door
the
in
]discovered stairs
Entry was made. I

J

leading to a second level, saw a door at the
top of the stairs move slightly and an

FBI and Is Loaned to
This docuint contains neither recoirmendations nor concLusions of the FBI. It Is the property of the
your agency; it and Its contents are not to be di strlb4ted outside your agency.

 .
Isaid,
individual behind the door. L
tEo
come
him
told
He
S?”
JULIU
you,
“Is that
you,
k
“Puc
ed,
out and the iridividua
d up the
I ‘m not coming out.”
saw a gun
and
BIGGS
t
arres
stairs to

pointed down the steps from the door.
]saw a muzzle flash, heaa noise and
fell bapkwards4own the steps. L
ihad been shot and fired one
thoughtL
round with his personally owned, Bureau
07,
approved, S&W p516-1. &erial number TEH33
shot
her
anot
I advised
up the steps. I
came from the top of the stairs and, after
nd
seeing the subject peek back and forth arou
ds
roun
the corner, he returned two more
s
toward the tp of the steps. The three shot
ect.
subj
the
hit
not
1
did
L
fired by SA
They then backed off and began to assist two
females out of the residence. A single shot
was
was heard from the upstairs area. BIGGS room
,
airs
upst
an
in
floor
the
on
found lying
his
near
near a bed. A pool of blood was
the
head ançl a blua.,steel .357 magnum was on
ons
cti
es[
liev
Jbe
floor. L
s
prevented BIGGS from firing additional shot
of
rt
repo
The
out.
set
DPD report
at him.
the Wayne County Medical Examiner stated that
BIGGS’ death was caused by a contact
gunshot (.357) wound of the head and the
manner of death was a suicide. No other
gunshot wounds were identified in the Wayne
County Medical Examiner Report.

b6
h7c

b6
7C

DETAILS:
nt to a
The investigation was initiated subseque
5/25/93, at
on
1
shooting incident involving SAL

9331 Pryor, Detroit, Michigan.

2

 FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

SS?J
June 22,

Report oft
Dale:

1994

I

NEW YORK
Burenu File N:

Field Office File #:

SHOOTING INQUIRY
6/12/94
NEW YORK

h6
b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

character:

when siJ__________
Investigation at New York was initiated
isor to advise
superv
his
ted
contac
I telephonically
been involved.
had
he
which
in
t
inciden
g
her of a shootin
at a pit
round
one
He reported that he had discharged
sat in his
he
while
him
at
d
bull which had been release
as the
injured
personally owned vehicle. No qne had been
slight
ed
Jsuffer
result of the shooting, but SAl
two
injuries as the result of a physicaT attack by
d upon
release
being
dog
the
to
prior
just
individuals,
him.

Syuopsls:

I

of SA
Investigation reveals no wrongdoing on the part

Iwas

I

interviewed, a
In conducting this inquiry, SAl
reviewed, SA
was
copy of the New Brunswick Police Report
scene of
the
and
examined
car and clothing w ere
sworn
a
ed
iprovid
SAl
.
visited
was
the altercation
taped
audio
an
and
signed statement to FBI investigators
local
with
ated
cooper
He
interview to the local police.
mug
a
from
rs
attacke
his
of
one
police in identifying
for
This individual was arrested by local police
shot.
second
A
4.
6/15/9
aggravated assault on Wednesday
police are
subject has not yet been identified, but local
name.
nick
his
trying to learn his identity through

1

the property of the FBI and Is Loaned to
This docterent contains neither recorrrnendations nor concLusions of the FBI. It Is
agency.
your
outside
to
distributed
be
your agency; it and Its contents are not

 Details:
1.

I

Signed Sworn Statement of SAJ

I

On Suday, June 12, 1994 at approximately 8:45 am SA
Iwent to a public park near his home to play
He played approximately six games of
basketball.
basketball before he decided to take a break.
During one of the gaines he encountered a dispute over a
penalty which seemed to enrage two members of another
team, and one of them said, “We can settle this another
way.”

1

took a break, he sat on the side of the
When sp[
As he got up to
basketball court for a short time.
leave, one of the two players from the earlier game
The second
approached him and threw a basketball at him.
two or
threw
and
over
came
game
er
player from the earli
Other players from the
if ace.
three punches at SAL
lassistance and while they held
game came to SA[
was
the two at bay, X[
I retreated to his car. As he “Get
doing so, he heard the man who had punched him yell,
the dog. “

j arrived at his car, and was seated sin
Soon after SAL
the driver’s seat, he heard a load noise at the driver’
door window and the window broke onto his head and upper
The man who had punched him reached into the oar,
body.
The other
opened the door and let the dog into the oar.
SA
car.
the
of
side
ger’s
passen
man was standing on the
ger’s
passen
the
on
was
which
gun
his
for
ed
preach
lexited the vehicle
SAL
side floor in his gym bag.
SA
left foot.
his
at
d
grabbe
with his gun as the dog
one
rged
discha
and
dog,
the
n
at
weapo
his
ipointed
L
off.
ran
The dog and the assailants
round at the dog.
SAL_sought witnesses to the events and then
telephoned the New Brunswick, NJ, police department using
Police responded
a public telephone at t,he. tLE)cing lot.
Police
the
to
pent
SA
report.
and took a
I
Headquarters and was interviewed by a detective to whom
He further
he gave a audio recorded statement.
This was the
shot..
mug
a
t
from
subjec
one
tified
iden
subject who punched him and who was in control of the
dog.

2

h6
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 ____
________

2.

Fd

—

302 of

ss1

1

and sSAl_________

I

I

SSAI
land ssi
lobserved the damage to SAl
They
personal vehicle within seven hours of the event.
additionally viewed a bloodied T-shirt and a damaged
basketball shoe consistent with the altercation which SA

Jhi dpqribed. They additionally visited the scene
with SAl
Jand verified the existence of the site and
a layout consistent with SAl

I5tatemt.

3.

I

Police Report

The_initial police report of P.O.
I is consistent with the statement provided by SA
The police report notes that only one cartridge
was recovered at the scene, and the weapon had twelve
P.O.
round in the magazine and one in the chamber.
Ihad problems identifying witnesses at the scene.
Some people there said they saw the victim I
I and
someone else arguing, but could not say what happened.
There is a supplemental report prepared by Det.I________

I

swornI

This statement is also

nt with SA

ssemb1ed the
signed statement.
Det.I
photo spread which identified the subect,I________

3

b6

 Mr.[

F

1

11/8/93

1
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/17/93
BALTIMORE DIVISION

ra, dated
Reference attached report of ASAC Arturo Rive
8/5/9 3
analysis,
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the
PURPOSE:
Review
ent
Incid
ng
comments and recommendations of the Shooti
ting.
shoo
oned
capti
the
to
ence
Group (SIRG) with refer
against
That no administrative action be taken
RECOMMENDATION:
ent.
incid
this
of
t
any FBI employee as a resul

b6
b7 C

Enclosure
1
Mr.
1-Mr.
Mr.
1
1-Mr.
3
Mr.__________
(1
Mr. Leary)
—

-

-

-

1- Mr.5
TJG:tjg (15)

Mr. Johnson
1
1-Mr.J____________
Mr.[
(Attn:
Mr. Wa1h
3.
—

I

-

1-Mr.I

1
1
1

—
-

-

Quantico
Nr4________ WMFO
Mr.L__ Quantico

Mr.I

(Continued

—

Over)

 Memorandum from L
Shooting Incident
Re:

1 to

•

[

I

Administrative Inquiry
7/17/93
Baltimore Division

an
On 9/30/93, the SIRG, consisting of Acting Chairm
DETAILS:
ty,
nsibili
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Respo
personnel
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edward R. Leary,
Section
n;
Divisio
es
Servic
e
istrativ
Management Section, Admin
Division;
Chief Nich9las J. Walsh, Global Section, Intelligence Legal
Unit,
Law
gative
Iivesti
Unit Chief I
1FirearmS
Counsel Division; and Unit Chief I
the above—
s
discus
to
met
n,
Divisio
g
Training Unit, Trainin
captioned shooting.

J

b6

b7i.

Svnosis of the Shootina Incident

On 7/17/93, Agents of the Southern Maryland
were involved
Metropolitan Resident Agency, Baltimore Division,
wanted for
was
who
I
in executing a plan to arrest[
land.
_Mary
Countv
s
’
George
drug-related homicides in Prince
located
Iwas
that
I
ed
indicat
which
ped
develo
was
Information
ent
apartm
the
of
llance
Survei
at an apartment in Silver Springs.
known
were
female
a
and
male
er
Anoth
confirmed this information.
The other male was
to be in the apartment with
who was also wanted on murder
identified as[
charges in Prince George’s county.

J

I

I

team saw
At approximately 12:30 p.m., the surveillance
that
d
believe
and
ent,
apartm
someone close the drapes in the
d to
planne
They
leave.
to
ing
prepar
nd the others were
their
into
get
1s he and the others attempted to
arresti
the
The tpree subjects and a pit bull terrier exited
vehicle.
as
I
l,ed
identif
(later
apartment, and [
I the female
Iwas
1 and the dog got into a White Chevy Ceo. I

land SA I
standing at the hatchback. SA I
d himself as
entifie
SAl
exited the surveillance yehicle.
the area on
fled
1
to
top.
1
di
an FBI Agent and ordere
b6
s
driver’
the
I approached
I SA
foot, followed by SA
b7c
d
ordere
he
As
car.
the
landl_____ inside
window and sawl
of the
them not to move, and the pit bull exited the rear window
1iumPed
SAl
vehicle and approached him in a menacing manner.
that
At
ed.
follow
dog
onto the roof of the vehicle, and the
dog in the
point, SA[_If ired one shot at the dog, stri]çing the
of f the
got
Ithen
SAl
The dog fled the area.
hindquarters.
(Continued

2

—

Over)

 3.

to MrJ
Memorandum from
Re:
Shooting Incent
Administrative Inquiry
7/17/93
Baltimore Division

I

Ito

come out of the car. Both were
car and toldi
jandi
jwas arrested by SAl____ and
arrsted without incident.
away.
distance
SSAI_______________ a short
lapparentiy fired his weapon at the dog,
bel.ieving that the dog was about to attack him.

SAl

b6
b7C

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

I

The review of the above—captioned shooting incident, as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
8/5/93, revealed that proper_procedures were followed by SA
I fired his weapon as he
Iduring this incident. SAl
believed the pit bull terrier was about to attack him.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident 3

3

j

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FD-204 (Rev. 34-59)

VNTTED SIAItS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report of:

SSAI
August 24,

1993

Field Office File 0:

6 2A—DN—4 6616

Title:

SAl
SHOOTING INCIDENT
DENVER DIVISION
8/12/93

I

Office:

DENVER

Bureau File g

I

b6

b7C

MINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Cherecter:

Synopsb:

I

I

At approximately 11:00 a.m., 8/12/93, SA I
ied by District
1
I Denver Divion accomtar
Iwent to the
Attorney’s Investigator I
residence of I
Wellington, Colorado. The purpose of croinci to the
I
residence was to serve a summons on’
demanding his presence in U. S. District Court, Amarillo,
Texas, at 9:30 a.m., 8/13/93. The residence is in a
rural area with the ne
t nfh lome approximately one—
mile
away. As SAl
half
land Investiclatorl
drove un to th front of the residence,I
wife,I_______________ was in the front yard watering
plants. Before either individual could exit the vehicle,
I dropped the hose and ran into the
residence. SAl
lexited the vehicle and posted
a copy of the summons on the split rail fence directly in
front of the front door of the residence inasmuch as
personal service of the summons did not seem possible
Ithen
based onE
lactions. SAl
took three Polaroid photographs of the front of the
residence and the posted summons and went to the front
door and rang the b11 and knoc)ced on the door. No one.
responded and as SAl
I started_walking back to
the vehicle operated by Investigatorf
I three dogs
ran from the back of the house and began barking and
growling in an aggressive and threatening manner towards

This docunt contains neither recomendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It Is the property of the FBI er is loaned
your agency; ft erd its centents are not to be distrIbuted outside your agency.

to

 I

I

Whethe does did not respond to verbal
four rounds from
commands to stop, SAL
If ired believe
s he hit
He
dog.
lead
his .357 revolver at the
ran back
and
d
stoppe
dog
the
and
times
two
or
one
dog
the
dogs.
two
other
the
behind thrasidence ccompanied by
were
dogs
The
scene.
the
left
Ithen
md I
seen in the back yard of the house with the most
aggressive dog limping. Sheriff Deputies responded to
the scene and decided not to request a Dog Warden to go
to the residencçhecause of possible altercations with
I. The circumstances of
Mr. and/or Mrs. I
shoot4ng of the dog as relayed by Investigator
Iwere the same as the version of SAl_____________

b6
b7C

-p
DETAILS:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paae No.

I

Signed, sworn statement of SAl
I Denver Division, aatea
August 13, 1993, and executed August 20, 1993

I

F

3

TTnmri tment of Investigator

8th Judicial District,
State of Colorado
Insert of Principal Legal Advisor

JDenver Division

11
-

b7C

13

2

-

--

 _
_______
_______
____
___________
___________
____

Memorandum

I

To

From

1

Date

2/28/94

Ccr. Affs. Off.
Off. of EEO_____
Off. Llaism &
mt. Affs._____
Off. of PthtiAff
Teteçime .
Director’s ofTEi

Mr.i

:

L

Subject

Asst. Dir.:
Adn.Servs.
criui.lrw.___
tdent.___
tnfo.*
tnsp._________
IntelL._________
Lth.____
LegaL Cr.n.

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
9/10/93
NEWARK DIVISION

:

—

Jdated

Reference attached report of SSAJ
9/20/93.

analysis,
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the
PURPOSE:
t Review
Inciden
ng
Shooti
the
of
ns
endatio
comments, and recomm
g.
shootin
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned

b7c

against
That no administrative action be taken
RECOMMENDATION:
t.
any FBI employee as a result of this inciden

Enclosure
1-Mr.
Mr.
1
3-Mr.
Mr. Larv
(1
(1
Mr.1
Mr. I
I
1
Mr. Johnson
TJG:tjg (14)
—

—
-

-

-

1-Mr.J_____
( :tn: Mn
Mr.
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
WMFO
Mr.
I Quantico
Mr.
Over)
(Continued
-

I

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mn
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
9/10/93
Newark Division

b6
b7C

ran E. Michael
On 2/3/94, the SIRG, consisting of Chai
DETAILS:
Kahoe, Criminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief! , Inspection
onsibility
] Office of Professional Resp
rd.
Global Section
i11a
W
Division; Section Chief Stephen
f
Chie
Unit
Intelligence Division;
; unit Chief
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Counsel Division
ing Division; and
Train
,
Unit
] Firears Training
L
Washington
Supervisory Special AgentI
e-captioned
abov
the
Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss
shooting.

I

t

1

-

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

J

assigned
On the evening of 9/10/93, SAL
t
visi
to
,
D.C.
ton,
hing
to the Newark Division, arrived in Was
ther
dmo
gran
her
of
ence
resid
with is young daughter a the
iwas carrying packages from
As SAl
(Mrs.[
g
Jresidence, he heard the sound of youn
his vehicle to Mrs.[
ing,
play
were
ren
child
the
He fiEbeljeved
girls screaming.
that someone was being
but when the screams got louder he thought
ms and saw
He ran in the direction of the screa
hurt or attacked.
on top
dog
large
a
with
alk,
a young girl, face down on the sidew
act
distr
to
Iyelled at the dog, and tried
SAL
of her.
the
acted
distr
y
tuall
even
He
its attention away from the child.
dog
The
dog.
the
from
away
dog long enough to pull the child
h and
1 He attempted to fire his Smit
then lunged at sAl
safety
the
took
He
Wesson 9mm at the dog, but the safety was on.
The
dog.
the
at
shot
one
fired
off and, as the dog lunged again,
b6
then
dog
The
nd.
grou
the
in
ded
shot missed the dog and embed
b7C
turned and ran away.

1.

ter,
7then returned his weapon to its hols
SAE
the
d
calle
He then
and carried the little girl to her home.
The next morning, he
ce.
ulan
amb
an
and
e
Polic
ton,
D.C.
hing
Was
.
arge
disch
the
notified the Newark Division of

(Continued
2

-

Over)

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
9/10/93
Newark Division

I
b6
b C:

bservatjons and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 9/20/93, revealed that proper prqcedures_were followed by
Ifired his weapon
SAl
Iduring this incident.
SAl
fearing for his own life and to protect the life of a child which
was being attacked by a dog.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

 ‘LINJTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

SALT LAKE CITY

Repodof:
Date:

ASAC MYRON FULLER
January 4, 1994

Office:

Fietd Office File I:

62A—SU—4 1044

Bureau Pile I:

flUe:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT;
SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION;
12/22/93

Character:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY

Synopsia:

On 12/22/93, at approximately noon, near M9mtezuma Creek,
I
Utah, on the NAVAJO INDIAN RESERVATION, SA I
a
making
while
2,
6/15/8
EOD
I
date of birth I
I
SAl
felony FBI arrest, was attacked by two dogs.
fired one round from his Bureau issued SIG SAUER P226 at
subject dog described as a thirty pound black and gray
Subject dog had attacked him and was
multi—breed female.
The distance
in the process_of repeating the attack.
three feet.
than
less
was
dog
and the
between SAJ
the melee.
in
injured
were
dog
the
nor
r
Neithe SAL
jwas backed up on aforementioned arrest (of
1 by two Navajo Criminal Investigators
hnii I
I and SAN JUAN COUNTY
I
nced law
Refere
I
SHERI
DEPUTY 1
Creek Resident
Montezuma
the
at
met
nel
person
ement
enforc
Agency at approximately 11:00 a.m. on date of incident to
The officers departed the RA and
plan the arrest.
arrived at the scene of the arrest (shooting incident) at
approximately 12:00 noon. The two Navajo Police Officers
were stationed in a back—up response mode approximately
100 yards from the scene of the shooting and were not in
Deputy_Sheriff
nsiton to observe the shooting.
Iie
from_SAl
feet
15
g
about
standin
Iwas
I
landi
f fire
observed the two dogs run towards SAl
one round at the black and gray dog.
S?j

.

-C
Loaned to
this doctmnt contains neither recomnendations nor concLusions of the FBI. It Ia the property of the FBI and s
outside
your
agenoy.
distributed
your agency; ft and Its contents are not to be

 _________ssigned
_____

_____

1
This case is predicated upon information that SAl
been
had
FBI
the
of
Office
City
Lake
to the Salt
nvi,i1y 12;OO Noon, On
involved in a shooting incident at ar
Iwho is under
12/22/93, during the apprehension of I
lt with a
&ssau
—
ation
Reserv
Indian
an
on
investigation for Crime
Deadly Weapon.

2

b7c

 ___

a

Mr.

I

I

6/4/93

Chairxaan, SIRG
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/4/93
CHICAGO DIVISION
Reference attached report of
dated 3/17/93.

b6
b7C

SSAL

This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
PURPOSE:
comments and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this shooting incident.

Enclosure
1
1
1
1

—
-

-

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

1

-

Mr. Johnson

l—Mr.l

I

(Att____
1
Mr. Walsh
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
1
WMFO
1-Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
1
—

‘-

-

EMK\TJG:tjg (15)

(Continued

-

Over)

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/4/93
Chicago Division

I

I

DETAILS:
On 5/6/93, the SIRG, consisting of Chairman E. Michael
Kahoe, Criminal Investigative Division; Supervisory Special Agent
I
I Inspection Division (Alternate); Section Chief
Nicholas J. Walsh. Global Section, intelligence Division; Unit
Chief I
I Investigative Law Unit, Legal Counsel
Division; Unit Chief I
I Firearms Training Unit,
Trainina Oiv4sion; and Supervisory Special Agent I
I
I
I, Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met to
discuss the above—captioned shooting.
Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

-

On 3/4/93, as SAl
Iwas driving his Bureau
car from his residence to the Chicago office, he noticed a male
motioning for him to stop and help him. When SAl
lexited
his vehicle, the man I
I indicated that he needed
help in trying to rescue a young girl who was being attacked by
1se
two Rotweiller dogs. [
Itried to get the dog
the girl by swinging jumper cables at them, and SAl
Itried
to frighten the dogs away. After repeated attempts to get the
dogs to release the qirl, the dogs turned av from her and began
left side
I When the dog on SAl
circling SAl.
made an aggressive move toward him, he fired one shot from his
Sig Sauer P228 which struck the dog in the upper left part of its
body.
Both dogs immediately fled the area. The dog which SA
Ishot was later found dead a few blocks from the site of
the shooting.
Local police officers, who were called to the
scene, located the second dog. A police officer shot and killed
the second dog after that animal made a menacing move toward him.
The young girl was taken to a hospital where she received
treatment for her injuries and was reported to be in good
condition.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident, as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 3/17/93, determined that proper_procedures were followed
during this shooting incident.
SAl
If ired his weapon in

(Continued
2

b6
b7C

—

Over)

b6
b7C

 MemQrandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/4/93
Chicago Division

•1

I

h6
b7C

an attempt to protect both himself and others nearby from further
attack by two animals which had already attacked one individual.
After a thorough review of all the facts concerning
this incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the
SIRG that no administrative action be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of this shooting incident.

3

 U.S. Department of Justice

SQ

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535
January25, 2011
MR. CHARLES SAVAGE
THE NEW YORK TIMES
1627 I STREET NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, DC 20006

Subject: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORTS
COMPLETED JANUARY 1, 1993 TO THE PRESENT.
FOIPA No. 1139615- 001
Dear Mr. Savage:
The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5,
United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure,
with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was
inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked
below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:
Section 552

Section 552a

LJ(b)(1)

fl(b)(7)(A)

D(d)(5)

Li(b)(2)

Ll(b)(7)(B)

LJ(j)(2)

Li(b)(3)_____________________

(b)(7)(C)

LJ(k)(1)

E1(b)(7)(D)

LJ(k)(2)

LJ(b)(7)(E)

IEJ(k)(3)

LJ(b)(7)(F)

LJ(k)(4)

E1(b)(4)

E1(b)(8)

Ei(k)(5)

Li(b)(5)

Li(b)(9)

Ll(k)(6)

(b)(6)
3 pages were reviewed and 3 pages are being released.
Li

Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other
Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
Li
Li

referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this
information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the
Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice,1425 New York Ave., NW,
Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days
from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly
marked “Freedom of Information Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your
request so that it may be easily identified.
Li The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of
your request was
the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other
individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown,

 when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s).
Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).
If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be
reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.
See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division
Enclosure(s)
This is an interim release consisting of a 1993 Shooting Incident Review Team Report that was not
included in your original FOIPA#1 139615 release. Please be advised that additional documents are currently being
processed and will be released to you upon completion of our review process. Your patience is appreciated.

 EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLES, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552
(b)(l)

national defense or foreign
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to he kept secret in the interest of
order:
Executive
such
to
classified
properly
fact
in
are
policy and (B)

(b)(2)

related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3)

requires that the
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A)
for
criteria
particular
establishes
(B)
or
issue,
on
discretion
no
leave
to
as
manner
such
a
in
matters be withheld from the public
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b>(4)

trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5)

an agency in litigation
inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than
with the agency:

(b)(6)

invasion of personal privacy;
personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted

(b)(7)

of such law enforcement
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes. hut only to the extent that the production
13 ) would deprive a person
proceedings,
enforcement
with
(
interfere
to
expected
be
reasonably
be
records or information ( A ) could
unwarranted invasion of personal
an
constitute
to
expected
reasonably
could
be
C
adjudication,
impartial
an
or
trial
fair
)
(
a
right
to
a
of
local, or foreign agency or
privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State,
or information compiled
record
of
case
the
in
and,
basis,
confidential
on
a
information
which
furnished
institution
authority or any private
national security
lawful
a
conducting
agency
an
by
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or
for law
procedures
and
techniques
disclose
would
E
source,
confidential
( )
intelligence in\estigation, information furnished by a
if such
prosecutions
or
s
investigation
enforcement
law
for
guidelines
disclose
would
,
or
prosecutions
or
s
enforcement investigation
life or
the
endanger
to
expected
he
reasonably
could
F
law,
or ( )
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the
physical safety of any individual:

(b)(8)

or for the use of an agency responsible for
contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of
or
institutions;
financial
the regulation or supervision of

(b)(9)

geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLES, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5)

information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2)

to prevent, control, or reduce
material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts
criminals;
apprehend
or
crime

(k)( 1)

national defense or foreign
information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the
policy, for example. information involving intelligence sources or methods:

(k)(2)

of a right, benefit or
in
investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result loss
that his/her identity
promise
a
to
pursuant
information
privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished
would be held in confidence:

(k)(3)

or any other individual pursuant
material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States
3056:
Section
Code.
to the authority of Title 18. United States

(k)(4)

required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records:

(k)(5)

(k)(6)

(k)(7)

Federal ciilian
investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability. eligibility, or qualifications for
who furnished
person
the
of
identity
the
reveal
would
which
of
disclosure
employment or for access to classified information, the
confidence:
held
in
be
would
identity
er
h
1
his
that
promise
a
to
information pursuant
in Federal Government service the
testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion
release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

reveal the identity of the person
material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would
who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
Ffl l/DOi

 ______

___

1

6/4/93

Chairman, SIRG
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
2/24/93
BIRMINGHAM DIVISION
Reference attached report of ASAC James F. Carlile,
dated 3/10/93.
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
PURPOSE:
comments and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
That no administrative action be taken against
RECOMMENDATION:
It is
any FBI employee as a result of this incident.
jbe provided remedial firearms
recommended, however, that SA
training.

lIm 7

Enclosure
1-Mr.
1-Mr.
1 — Mr.
Mr.
1
3-Mr.

(1

I

—

1-Mr.
lMr.____________
(Attn:
Mr. Walsh
—
Mr.!
1 —
WMFO
1 1 —

I

Mr.I

—

Nr.1

(1 - Mr..I
Nr.________

EMX\TJG:tjg (15)

I

Mr.!
Mr.[,
Mr.1

Quantico
IQuantico

(Continued

Savage- 1320

-

Over)

 ________Iwas

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/24/93
Birmingham Division

I

I

1
On 5/6/93, the SIRG, consisting of Chairmanf
DETAIlS:
Agent
Special
supervisory
Division;
Investigative
Criminal
I
I
I Inspection Division (Alternate); Section, Chief
1
Nichoas 3. Walsh. clobalL Section, Intellig’ence Division; Unit
Chief
I Investigative Law Unit, Legal Counsel
I, Firearms Tra1nin Upit,
Division; Unit chief I
I
Agent I
Special
Training Division; and Supervisory
to
met
Office,
Field
Metropolitan
Washington
1
discuss the above—captioned shooting.
SvnoDsis of the Shooting Incident

[

On 2/24/93, Agents of the Birmingham Division along
with local police and representatives of the U.S. Customs Service
were involved in resolving a hostage situation in Romewood,
I bad come to Alabama from
The hostage I
Alabama,
Mih1in fr- the nurnn of buying uomobj1es from subjects
apparently
land
land I
of the
ome
as
automobiles,
of
sale
ne
fraudulent
in
invoivea
lup at
titles appeared to have been altered. Upon_pickingi
where
apartment
to
I
I
the local airport, be was transported
in
superiors
his
to
talk
to
allowed
t.qas
I
up.
he was tied
Michigan, and was instructed to tell them that the sale of the
automobiles was fine, and they should send the money for the cars
down to Alabama.
By he u

a pretext call, it was determined that

In following through with
their plan, Birmingham Agents, local police and the U.S. Customs
Agents were waiting in the parking lot of the apartment.
S entered[
Immediately following the pçt,all
both jpmied froi the
land
apartment. At that moment, I
snnd—story balcony to the parking lot below. SSAI_________
Iwbo was assigned to remain in the parking lot watching the
I
apartment, saw the subjects jump and ordered them to halt.
I who apparently injurj1 h4 foqt as a result of iumping,
I
Icontinued to flee, and when
stae&apd was apprehended.L
I identified himself as an FBI Agent and ordered him to
SSN
Jmade a motion as if hø re retrieving a weapon from
stop, I
I but
tl
I
the waistband_of his pants. SSI
fire
not
Idid
SSAI
running.
missed. I
Icontinued

ml

I apartment.

(Continued
2

Savage- 1321

-

Over>

C

 ______Isbot

__

I

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.
Re:

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
2/24/93
Birmingham Division

Ihad y-iui -h-ough the doorway of
additional shots, asj
Ifeared tiat firing again
ssI
another apartment building.
apprehended
might place other residents in danger.
were
subjects
Both
Orleans.
Mew
several days later in
subsequently indicted on Hobbs Act-Bxtortion charges.
ired his weapon ecause e
It appears that SSAI
I
believed he was about to be fired upon by the subjecti
However, it is noted that two individuals who were_interv.ewed as
I
a part of this inquiry indicated they believed SSA
It is
to
and
did
hiti_______
intend
not
hiçih
fired
onally
intenti
bhot lodged in the roof of the
further noted that SSAI
apartment building, approximately 26 feet off the ground.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident, as
documented by the administrative jym1 41-sr furnished to the SIRG,
Iwas justified in the
dated 3/10/93, determined that ssL
firing of his weapon in that it appeared the subj ect was in the
process of drawing a weapon. The SIRG is somewhat concerned,
going so far over the head of the
however, about SSA
subject.
After a thorough review of all the facts concerning
this incident it ws the unanimous opinion of all members of the
pe afforded remedial firearms training.
SIRG that SSAj

3

Savage- 1322

-

  

 

1993

323

 

 

 

4

L

4

Mr.I

I

6/4/93

Chairman, SIRG
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/2/93
DETRO-IT DIVISION

4/19/93.

Reference attached report of SSA

I

I

is prepared

dated

PURPOSE: This memorandum
to furnish the
comments and recommendations of the Shooting
Incident Review
Group (SXRG) with reference to the captioned
shooting.

analysis,

RECOMMENDA’UXON:
That no administrative action e taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this shootin
g incident.
b6

Enclosure
r.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1
(1

1
1
1
3
1

1 — Mr. Johnson
1—Mr..I
I
(Attn: Mr.
.1.- Mr. Walsh

—
—

Mr.

Mr.I

Larv

—

EMI(/TJG:tg (15)

I

I

Mr.F
ci-)1
Mr.I
—

1
1

—
—

Mr.L

Mr._____

I

I Quantico
,

(Continued

Savage- 1324

WMFO

uan±co
-

Over)

 -

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG,
to MrJ
Re:
Administrative Inquiry

1

-

Shooting Incident
3/2/93
Detroit Division

DETAILS:

On 5/6/93, the SIR, consisting of Chairman I
I
Tnvestigative Division; Supervisory Special Agen
t
L
llnspection Division (Alternate); Section Chief
Nicholas J. Walsh, G1oba) Section, Intelligen
ce Division; Unit
Ohief
I tnvesticratiye Law Unit, Legal Counsel
Division; Unit Chiefi
I Firearms 9’rhvhirr Tlnit,
Trainina Division; and Supervisory Spec
ial Agent I
I
Washington Metropolitan Field Offic
e,
met
to
discuss the above—captioned shooting.

I

Synopsis of the Shootina Incident

L

-

On 3/1/93, a Detroit source provided infor
mation that
)was responsible for several recent bank robberies
in
the Metropolitan Detroit area. The sour
ce also indicated that
I
Iwas a “crack” addict, was most likely armed,
and often
stayed. at the Suez Motel in Warren,
Michigan.__SA I
and SAl
displayed a photo o
employees of the victim banks, who identified Ito some of the
I
I as the
robø
thouh at he time there was rio Federal arres
t warrant
for I
I SAs[
I arid I
I had probable cause to arrest him
as a resu1 of flie identification by the
bank employees. SAc
I
land I
I along wii-b o+hfr Agents from the Detroit offic
e,
devised a plan to arresl-L
the Suez Motel. On 3/3/93, a
Federal arrest warrant for I
I was issued by the U.S. District
Court, Eastern District of Michigan.

I

On 3/2/93, the Agents went to the Suez Motel
to await
larrival. AsI
tu1led into the parking lot and
exited his car, SAS I
ttempted to arrest him.
I and I
I
I got back into his car and tried to flee.
Other Agents
‘tried to pull their cars into a posi
tion which would block
I
lescT 1jt they were unable to do so because of
traffic. SAL
I ‘n4-1fied himself as an FBI Agen
t and ordered
I
Ito stop. I
’qwever, continued in his vehicle, which
11
was headed toward SAl
I At the last minute, S
jumped
out of the way of I
Is vehicle and fired a
om
is
Smith and Wesson 9 mm at the driver’s door
. 5k
believed
that his life, as well as the lives of the
other gen
bystanders, were in danger. A chase
ensued; however,
escaped.
I

(Continued

2

Savage-1325

-

Over)

I

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.
Re: Administrative Inquiry

Shooting Incident
3/2/93
Detroit Division

I

Later that evening,I
1retprned tç the Suez Motel
where he was arrested without incident.
I
[was charged with
Banic Robbery and Assault on a Federal Offic
er (AFO); however, the
AFO charges were later dropped.

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident
as
documented by the administrative inquiry furni
shed to the SIRG,
dated 4/19/93, determined that pror orpcedur
es ‘cfere followed
during this shooting incident.
fired his weapon in an
SAl
I
attempt to protect his own life and the lives
of other Agents and
bystanders.
After a thorough review of all th facts concerning
this incident, it was the unanimous opinion
of all members of the
SIRG that no administrative action be taken
against any FBI
employee as a result of this shooting incid
ent.

3

Savage-i 326

 Mr.I

I

6/4/93

Chairman, SIRG
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
3/26/93
RICHMOND DIVISION
Reference attached report of
dated 4/8/93.
PURPOSE:
This ineiuorandum is prepared to furnish the
analysis,
comments and recommendations of the Shooti
ng Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to capti
oned shooting.
RECONMENDATto:
That no administrative action be taJcen against
any FBI employee as a result of this shoo
ting incident.

Enclosure
I
1
1

-

—

—

3

—

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
(1Lea

1-

1
Mr. Johnson
1-Mr.I
I
(Attn: NrJ
Mr. Walsh
-Mr.I
I
1
Mr.
1-Mr.[
jWMFo
1
Mr. 1
[intico
-

-

-

IQuantico

-

—

EMc/TJG:tjg

(15)

I

(Continued

Savage- 1327

-

Over)

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG,
to Mr.
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident

I

I

3/26/93

Richmond Division
DETAILS:
On 5/6/9, the SIR, consisting of Chairm
anl
I
I Criininl investigative
Division; Suprvisory Special Agent
I
llnspection Division (Alternate); Section Chie
f
Nicholas J. Walsh. clobal Section, Intelligen
ce Division; Unit
Chief I
I Tnvstiaatiye Law Unit, Legal Counsel
Division; Unit ChjTI
I Firearms ‘T’ainincr tjnit,
Traininc Divipion; and Supervisory Special
Agent I
I
I
i. Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met
to
discuss the above—captioned shooting.

Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

I

During the period prior to 3/26/93, SAl__
__________
Ihas been involved in an investigation of
a
Crime
on a
Government Reservation
Murder for Mire matter along with the
Army CItY at Fort J.ee. Virainia. nd the
Virginia State Police.
A
CItY source, namedi
had provided information which
I
led to the arrest of the subj act of the
Murder for wire mqtter.
However, during the course of the inve
stigation, SAl
I
believed that soe inconsistencies existed
regarding statements
made byl
I s4
iran an NCIC check oni
I
and found that one
wanted in Neyz Jrsftv
Iwas
for failure to appear regarding several drug
charges.
SAL
I
believed that I
landi
Iwere
the
same individual.
—

SAJ
I along with SAl
I of the
Richmond Division, went to Fort Lee, along
with a Vinia State
Trooper. At Fort Lee, the CID investigators
d I
I
un, indieatng that they needed to as1jcalle
himome
questions. I
I appçared,_where he met SAl
Ian the
others.
SA I
laskedl
I if he were indeed
I
Iwho was wanted by New Jesav a.thorities. I
I5eni.e
d
that he was this individual.
1
SA[
Jadvised that they could
clear the matter up easily by taking his
fingerprints. I
I
agreed to have his prints taken. A compa
rison of the
fingerprints indicated thati
Iwas, in fact,I

L

I

I

(Continued
2

Savage- 1328

—

Over)

b6
7C

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
3/26/93
Richmond Division

I

Re:

After admitting his true identityJ
lasked them
not to seid him back to New Jersey, as
he feared for his life.
SAsI
lanai
Imoved behind a partition so that the male
officers could strip searchi
Ibefore taking him into
custody. A scuf1e ensued andi
[tried to escape. SAs
Icaiu fvci t-ound the partition and assisted in
attempting to subdue I
I sAl
Idrew her Sig Sauer 9mm

weapon and poii

t ati
Ilunged at her, at
which time SAl
Ifired one shot. The shot inissedi
I
however, he fell to the floor at the soun
d of the gunshot and was
then overpowered and handcuffed.
Observations arid Recommendations of the SIRG

The review of the above—captioned shoo

ting incident, as
documented by the administrative inqu
iry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 4/8/93, determined that propçr
rççedures were followed
during this shooting incident.
SAl
fired her weapon
believing that her life, as well as the I
lives of her fellow law
enforcement officers, were in danger.
After a thorough review of all, the facts conc
erning
this incident, it was the unanimous opinion
SIRG that no administrative action be taken of all members of the
against any FBI
employee as a result of this shooting
incident.

3

Savage4329

 “

Mr.

1

8/11/93

Chairman, SIRG
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
6/15/93
SPRINGFIELD )IVIS ION

I

I

Reterence attached
dated 6/28/93.

report

of Special

Agenti

I

PURPOSE:

This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analys
is,
comments, and reconunendations of the Shooting
Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned
shooting.
RECOMNENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this inciden
t.

bb
7C

Enclosure
1 -Mr.
1-Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
-

-

2.
Mr. Johnson
i—Mr.I
(Attn: Mr.
1
Mr. Walsh
-

-

ED-Mr.
I
Mr.

uantico

-

1-Mr.
1
Mr.L
-

EMI(/TJG:tjg (15)

I

j

(Continued

Savage- 1330

IWMFO
Quantico
-

Over)

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to
Mr.l
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/15/93
Springfield Division

I

I

DETAILS:
On 7/21/93, the SIRG, consisting of Chairm
anl
ICriminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assi
stant Director
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professio
nal Responsibility,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edwar
d R. Leary, Personnel
Management Section, Administrative Serv
ices Division; Section
Chief Ticho1as J. Walsh, Global Sect
ion, Intelligence Division;
Unit Chief
nvesticative Law Unit, Leg.a].
I
Counsel Division; Special Agentl
I, Firearms
Training Unit, Training Division; and Supe
rvisory Special Agent
1, Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met
to discuss the above—captioned shoo
ting.
Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On 6/15/93, members of the Springfield vCqPF were
’
9
in
l
ve
v
d in the olanped arrest of two drug
deale
rs,
I
and[
liii Cairo, Illinois.
The VCDTF is composed
of officers of the Illinois State Polic
e, SAs of the Federal
Public Housing Drug Task Force (und
er the supervision of the
Cairo, Illinois, Police Department),
and SAs of the Springfield
Division.
The SSRA of the Carbondale Resident Agenc
y is the
coordinator of the VCDTF.

I

The arrest plan called for the arrest of’
Ind
las they returned to Cairo from Chicago where
they had
picked up crack cocaine.
The two were to be arrested

I

I

as they
exited the Interstate Highway pass
ing through Cairo.
The
exit
was in an open area with no J,uil
dings, which would prevent the
subjects from endangering the publ
ic if they fled.
The vehicle
stop did not occur at th rii-.
Jj cr was stolDoed by
Housing Tak Force SAsI
hndl
louiside
Iresidep.ce.
As the subjects got out of the car, I
fled on foot.
SA
Ifired th;ee warning shots into the air
in an effort to get
stop. I
Iwas later arrested by
VCDTF members approximately 200 yard
s away.
SAl
I fired the warning shots before any FBI
personnel had arrived at the scene.
He was advised by the FBI
SSRA that FBI policy prohibited the
use of warning shots, which
he said he understood. He was also advi
sed that the Cairo Police
Department policy prohibited the use
of warning shots, unless
(Continued

2

Savage-1331

-

Over)

I

I

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to
Re:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/15/93
Springfield Division

Mr.I

I
ih7c

deadly force was_appropriate. The Cair ?oJ.ice
o
Department
disciplined SAj
susending hiitt without pay for five
Iby
working days.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incid
ent as
documented by the administrative inquiry furni
shed to the SIRG,
dated 6/28/93, revealed that a non—FBI memb
er of a joint task
force under the oversight of the FBI inap
propriately discharged
his weapon by firing a warning shot.
The task force member was
advised that this is against FBI polic
y, as well as against the
policy of the local police departme
nt. He was subsequently
disciplined by his own department.
After a thorough review of all the facts rega
rding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of
all members of the SIRG
that no administrativ action should be
taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvem
ent in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage-1332

 ______iintico

Mr.I____

I

8/11/93

Chairman, SIRG
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUI1Y
SHOOTING INCIDENT
4/16/93
SAN DIEGO DIVISION

1
r
hed report of Supervisory Special Agent
dated 4/23/93.
PtJRPOSE: This memorandim is prep
ared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of
the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to capti
oned shooting.

RECONMENDATION:
That no administrative action be ta3cen against
any PI employee as a result of this
incident.

Enclosure
1. — Mr.
1—Mr.

1-Mr.
Mr.

1

b 7Q
1
1

—

—

Mr.
Mr.
(At

Mr. Walsh

I

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
EMK/TJG:tjg (15)

(Continued

Savage- 1333

Quantico
I WMFO
-

Over)

 r

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/16/93
San Diego Division

I

I

.

ThWPTT,:

On 7/21/93, the SIRG, consisting çf chairmani
ICrimina2. Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant
Director
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Resp
onsibility,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edward
R. Leary, Personnel

Management Section, Administrative Services Divi
sion, Section
Chief Nicbqlas 3. Walsh. Clob1 Section, intel
ligence Division;
Unit Chief I
I nvøtfaative Law Ur4t, Legal
Counsel Division; Special Agent I
I, Firearms
Tiniria TTn4i. P1inng Divi
sion; and Supervisory Special Agent
I, Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met
to discuss the above—captioned shooting.
Sirnopsis of the Shootinc Incident

I

On 4/16/93, at approximately 12:45 a.m., SAl

I

Iwas returning to his residence after conducting

investigation in connection with a case he was assig
ned targeting
street gangs in the San Diego area. As he drove
toward his
residence, he noticed a group of individua
ls
who were attempting to flag down the car in in the road ahead
front of him. As
this car slowed, the individuals approached
the car and began to
hit the car with their hands and other objects. The drive
r of
this car sped away. As SAl
I approached the individuals, he
tried ztç drive around them. Howev
er, one individual struck at SA
I
I vehicle with a pool cue. SAl
on ahead and
watched the car behind him pass through where trove
the
indiv
iduals
were standing. They also assaulted the third car.
SAl
1
called the police from his car phone and turne
his car around,
d
shining the hsalights. at the individuals. As they
approached
him, SAl
I got out of his car and drew his 9mm, Big Sauer
P—226, and identified himself as a law enforc
ement officer. The
individuals continued toward him, and one put
his hand tn his
belt as if he were drawing a weapon. At that
time, SAl
I
fired one shot. As he tried to fire a second and
third
shot
,
the
weapon jammed. He hit the bottom of the magazine
slide to the rear, at which time the weapon immedand pulled the
iately
discharged two more rounds. The subjects ran
down a nearby
embankment and SAl
Icalled the police a second time. He
then returned to his residence to await the arriv
al of the
police.

(Continued
2

Savage- 1334

-

Over)

I

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
4/16/93
San Diego Division

Re:

I

I

After the police arrived and tookhis statement,
SAl
j was asked to attempt to identify the subjects from a
number oUindividuals_the San Diego Police had
apprehended near
the scene.
SAl
j,ositively identified four individuals.
sAj
lindicated that he fired his weapon because
he fully believed that at least one subject was
armed and about
to draw a weapon.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting

incident as
documented by the administrative inguiry furnish
ed to the SIRG,
dated_4)23/93, revealed that proper procedures

were followed by
SAl
uring this incident. SAj
his weapon
Ifired
after he had fully identified himsol as an
‘BI Agent, and when
he believed that at least one subject was about
to pull a weapon
from his waistband.

After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all memb
ers of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken
against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the
above—captioned
shooting incident.

:3

Savage- 1335

,

 _____
_____
_____
_____
____
____
_____
_____
_____
___

Mr.

I

I

841,1 /93
lb 70

Chairman, SIRG

-

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/21/93
(ANSAS CITY DIVISION

•
•

Reference attached report of ASAC Brian P. Carroll,
dated 6/14/93.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analys
is,
comments and recommendations of the Shooti
ng Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to captioned
shooting.
RCONENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken
any FBI employee as a result of this inciden
t.

against

Enclosure
1

I
1
1
1

—

—
—

—
—

Mr.

-

Mr.
Mr.
Mr. Leary)
(1—Mr.f
I
(3.

—

3.
Mr. Johnson
1— Mr.I
(Attn: Mr.
- Mr.
Walsh

Mr.
Mr.

—

EMK/TJG:tg (15)

I

1
1
1

-

1

-

-

Mr.
Mr4
Mrj
Mr.L

7C

jQuantico

_J

WMFO

I Quantico

(Continued

Savage- 1336

I
I

-

Over)

 4

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.

Re:

I

I

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/21/93
Kansas City Division

j

DETAIL:
On 7/21/93, the SIRG, consisting gf Chairman I
I Criminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant Director
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Respo
nsibility,
Inspection Division; Section chief Edward R. Leary,
Personnel

Management Section, Administrative Services
Division; Section
Chief Nicholas J. Walsh. Globl Section, Intellig
ence Division;
Unit Chief I
I Investigative Law Unit, Leg.al
Counsel Division; Special Agerit[
Firearms
Trainina Unit, Training Division; and Supervisory I,
Special Agent
1 Washington Metropolitan Field Office, met
to discuss the above-captioned shooting.
Synozsis of the Shooting Incident

On 5/20/93, Agents of the Jefferson City, Missou
ri,
Resident Agency learned that William Dale Jones,
a fugitive from
Florida, was possibly in Jefferson City. Agents
conducted
surveillance at a trailer occupied by Jones’ brothe
r and at
Jones’ mother’s residence. A white pickup
truck, believed to
belong to Jones, was spotted outside the trailer.
Because of
Jones’ reputation for carrying weapons and his escape
from arrest
in the past, the assistance of the Kansas City
SWAT Team was
requested.
By the time the SWAT Team arrived late that night,
however, the pickup truck was no longer at the traile
r.
The SWAT
Team was sent back to Kansas City early on
the morning of
5/21/93, after conducting surveillance of the traile
r during the
night.

F

Later that afternoon, the pickup truck was spotted
at
the residence of Jones’ mother. Surveillance was establi
shed on
the mother’s residence. At approximately 3:50 p.m.
Tnn nm
out of the residence arid departed in the
truck. SAl
I

followed Jones, but later lost him.
The truck was then
located in the parking lot of a local bar
sistance was
requested fron local law enforcement.
SA1
Ipunctured the
tire of Jones’ truck in case Jones should try
to flee the area

before additional officers arrived. By this time, the
local
sheriff and a nii4-v ‘ad arrived and were at a locatio
n across
the street; sAl
Iwas approximately a block away. Jones
exited the bar and got into his truck. The sheri
ff and
approached the truck and told Jones to come out. Jones deputy
began
(Continued
2

Savage-1337

-

Over)

b7

 •

4%

.

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/21/93
Kansas City Division

I

backing his truck toward SAl
Ivehicle, striking the
vehicle and SAl
I The sheriff_and deputy fired at the
truck. After being struck, SAl
If ired his 10 mm, Smith and
Wesson Model 1076, at Jones five times. Jones was struck
and
slumped over the steering wheel. He was removed from
the truck
and afforded medical attention at the scene. Jones was
transported to the hospital where he died.
-

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to
the SIRG,
daed 6/14/93? revealed that proper_procedures were follow
ed by
SAl
I during -this incident. SAl______ fired his weapon after
Jones assaulted him with his vehicle.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all memb
ers of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against
any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the abovecaptioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage-i 338

 Mr.I

I

8/11/93

Chairman, SIRG
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
6/3/93
CLEVEIAND DIVISION
Reference attached report of ASAC Richard C. Stayer
,
dated 6/17/93.
PORPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooti
ng Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned
shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this inciden
t.

Enclosure
1—Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
Mr.
(I.

1-Mr.

1
Mr. Johnson
l-Mr.I
1
(Attn: Mr. I
I
Mr. Walsh
1
Mr.
I
1
Mr.
IQuantico
1-Mr.______ MFO
1
Mr.
antico

EMK/TJG:tg (15)

(Continued

-

—

-

-

1

-

—

-

Mr. Leary)

—

-

Savage- 1339

-

Over)

b6
70

 a.

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to
:Re: Administrative Inquiry

Shooting Incident
6/3/93
Cleveland Division

I

flR’I.TT.:

L

I

On 7/21/93, the SIRG, consisting of Chairmanl

I Criminal Investigative Division; Deputy Assistant Director

Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Responsibility,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Bdward R. Leery, Personnel
Management Section, Administrative Services Division; Section
Chief Nich9las J. Walsh. Globa’ Section, Intelligence Divisio
n;
Unit Chief I
I-icrativ Law Uni4, Legal
Counsel Division; Special Agent I
L Firearms
Traininq Unit, Training Division; and Supervisory Special Agent
I
L Washington Metropolitan Field Of fice, met
to discuss the above—captioned shooting.
Synopsis of the Shc,otincr Incident

On 6/3/93, members of the Cleveland Fugitive Task Force
received information indicating that I
I a
fugitive wanted for bank robbery in Akron, Ohio, was possibly
locate in Clevland. Task Force members effected a plan to
arrest I
Inear a car dealership in Clevelan& where,
accordinq to source information, he was going to pick up a car.
I
Ipicked up an Audi at the dealership and, while leaving,
he observed Task Force members following him. A high-speed chase
ensued, endin whei
1 ran into another vehicle. At that
time, SAl
I and Deiitv I
I Cuyahoga
County Sheriff’s Office, approached I
Ivehicle. They saw
I
I hands, in whicJ h Ii1d a black weapon,_exit the
driver’s window.
Both Sl
land Deputyl
Ifired at
I
1, striking him several times. I
1 was transported
to the hospital where he recovered from his wounds.

I
us charged with bank robbery, assault on a
Federal officer, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG

The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated 6/17 /3, revealed that proper procedures were followed by
SAl
Iduring this incident.
SAl
I fired his weapon
(Continued
2

Savage-i 340

-

Over)

I
It,

 Memorandum from Chairzian, SIRG,
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
6/3/93
Cleveland Division

I

ho

to Mr4

I

lexit

sawl
his vehicle holding a weapon. SA
Ihad reason to believe that his own life was in danger.

a

After
thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that
administrative action should be taken aqai.nst
FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

no

any

3

Savage- 1341

 Mn

I

11/8/93

I
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
8/12/93
DENVER DIVISION
Reference attached report of
dated 8/24/93.

I

SSAI

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments and recxrnunendations of the Shooting Incident Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shooting.
RECOTh1ENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as aresuit of this incident.

Enclosure
3.
Mr.
1—Mr.
1—Mr.
1—Mr.
3—Mr._________
(1 — Mr. earv
(1—Mr.I
1
Mr. I
I
—

-

TLTG:tjg (15)

I7

Mr. Johnson
1
1-Mr.
(Atn:
1—Mr.Walsh
1—Mr.
I
1
Mr.
jQuantico
1-Mr.
Icfl4FO
1
Mr.
-

—

IQuantico

-

(Continued

Savage-1342

-

Over)

 •4)

Memorandum
Re:

tromi

Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/12/93
Denver Division

I to Mr.I

1

DETAILS: On 9/30/93, the SIRG, consisting of Acting
Chairman
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Responsibili
ty,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edward R. Leary, Person
nel
Management Section, Administrative Services Divisio
n; Section
Chief Njch1 .T. Wlh. c1obl Section, Intelligence
Division;
Unit Chief I
ITlvastiaative Law tTit, Legal
I
Counsel Division; and Unit Chiel___________
_____ Firearms
Training Unit, Training Division, met to discuss the above—
captioned shooting.
Synopsis of the Shooting Incident

I

I

I

On 8/12/93, BA’
lanaL
investigator from the Disprict Attorney’s Office, drove io I an
the
residence of I
I in order to serve a summons on I
I
Iwas one of several subjects in a Fraud By Wire/M
ail
Fraud
investigation. I
Iresidence is located in a rural area
outside Wellington,_Colorado. As SAI_
landi
I
approached thai
iresidence, they saw Mrs. I
loutside
watering some plants. When she saw S[
land
I she
dropped her garden hose and ran into the residence. BAI
laffixed the summons to a split rail fence in front of
the residence, then went to the front door and
rang the doorbell.
No one answered the door and SA
could hear no noise
I
inside the house. As he turned to go acic to the vehicle
, he
noticed three dogs approaching him from the rear of
the
house.
Th
tnç was growli
ng and acting in an aggressive manner.
BA
j tried to get the dogs
away from him, but they kept
approaching him. He then fired four rounds from his
.357
revolver at the dogs, injuring the led doe. The dogs then
ran
back toward the house, after which SAl
andi
departed.

I

I

SAl
If ired his weapon believing that his life
was in danger because of the attacking dogs.

(Continued
2

Savage- 1343

-

Over)

 ‘4-

Memorandum from I
Re; Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
8/12/93
Denver Division

Ito

Mr. [

I

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident, as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to the SIRG,
dated. 8/24/93. revealed that proper procçdures were followed
by
SZ4
kuring this incident. SAl
ired his
weapon after he believed that he was about to be attacked by
dogs.
After a thorough review of all the facts regarding this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement in the above—captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage-1344

 Mr.I

I

1
I

11/8/93

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
5/20/93
NEWARK DIVISION
Reference attached report of SSA[
dated 7/23/93.

]

I

PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
conments and reoomtaendations of the. Shooting Incid
ent Review
Group (SIRO) with reference to the captioned
shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That SAI
I be counselled by SAC
E.
Newark regarding the potential danger he posed
to himself and
others by attetnpting to arrest the subject before
backup Agents
arrived on the scene.

Enclosure
1
1
1
1

— Mr.
— Mr.
— Mr.
- Mr.

—

1
Mr. Johnson
1—Mr.I_______
(Attn:
Mr. I
Mr. Walsh
Mr.
I
Mr.
Quantico
Mr.
L WNFO
Mr.
Quantico

I

TJG:tjg (3.5)

I

(Continued

Savage- 1345

—

Over)

I

 Memorandum froml
Ito Mr.
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/20/93
Newark Division

I

DETAILS:
On 9/30/93, the SIRG, consisting of Acting Chairman
Joseph C. Johnson, Office of Professional Responsibility,
Inspection Division; Section Chief Edward R. Leary, Person
nel
Management Section, Administrative Services Divisio
n; Section
Chief Nich9las J. Walsh. cloba.1. Section, Intelligence Divisio
n;
Unit Chief I
.1 Izvestiaative Iiaw Unit, Legal
Counsel Division; and Unit Chief I
I Firearms
Training Unit, Training Division, met todiscuss the
above—
captioned shooting.
Synopsis of the Shooting Incident
On 5/20/fl
I received information from
a source regardingi
Iwho was wanted on six charges of
Assault arid Possession of Stolen Property. The Newar Divisio
k
n
had also initiated an Unwfu1 Flight to Avoid Prosecution
investicfation rcrrdinaI
I mel
iprovided SAl
Iwith
L
tolen automobile wich
1
Iwas driving, and advid c an area df Newark wherej
1
was frequently located. SA I
I checked the license number of
the automobile and confirmed that the vehicle was stolen.
While
driving his Bireau car in the area the source mentio
ned, SAl_____
locatedi
Idriving the car. He radioed for assistance and
puled ais vehicle up behindi
Ivehiole at a stop light.
was aware thati
Ihad previously fled to avoid arrest
an4z wanting to cause a high-speed chase through
Newark,
SA
decided to arrest I
lwhile stopped at the light.
SAl
fiexfted his vehicle and approached the driver’s window
of
I
Iveiaicle. As he did this,i
ioac]ed his vehicle in the
direction of SA
I Believing that I
Iwas trying to run him
over, SAl
If ird oshot from his 9mm Sig Sauer into the
driver’s win4w. I
Ithen put the car in gear and sped
forward. SA I
Ireturned to his vehicle and pursued I
I but
he was lost on the freeway. Investigation later resulte
d in the
recovery of the carl
tias driving, buti
Iwas not located.
-

sI

danger, as j

]fired his weapon believing that his life was in
Jtteinpted to run him over with a vehicle.

(Continued

2

Savage- 1346

-

Over)

7D

 Memorandum from I
Ito
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
5/20/93
Newark Division

•

I

Observations and Recommendations of the IRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnish
ed to the SIRG,
ted 7/23/93, revealed that proper procedures
1
da
were followed by
SN
Jregarding his decisipn to uiilize deadj.y force. The
SIRG, however, questioned AI
Iudgment in deciding to
attempt an arres oi
_jbefore assisting Agents could arrive
on the scene. 374
Icision to go ahead with the arrest
alone put his life, as wel]. as the lives of others,
in potential
danger.
After a thorough review of all the facts_regarding this
incident, it was the opinion of the SIRG that
571
counselled by SAC Newark regarding the appreciation I be
of protecting
his own life and the lives of bystanders.

3

Savage-1347

 ___
________
_

0

Memorandum

Dea. Dir.___________

-

To

From

I

:

Mr. I

:

Mrj

I

I

I

I

Date

I

2/28/94

I

sst. Dir.:
Aân...___
Cr1 m.Inv.__________
dent.____
1nfo.it
1p._____
InteLL.______________
Lab.________________
Legal Cc*ri._________
Tech. Serve._____
Trarning___________
ccrG. Affs. Off._
Ofl.ofEtO______
Mfs.________
Off. of PdLic Atts._

I

TeLeae n;_______

Subject :

Director’s Office

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
7/28/93
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE

—

Reference attached reports of ASAC Richard N. Rogers,
dated 8/23/93 and 9/15/93.
PURPOSE:
This memorandum is prepared to furnish the analysis,
comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Inciden
t Review
Group (SIRG) with reference to the captioned shootin
g.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken against
any FBI employee as a result of this shooting inciden
t.
The SIRG
recommends, however, that the Administrative Summ
ary Unit,
Personnel Division, revit.r i-hp factors leading up
to this
shooting incident and SAl
Ipossible lack of candor during
the questions by local police following the shooting
incident.

Enclosure
1-Mr.
1—Mr.
3
Mr.
(3.
Mr. Lear
(3. - Mr.
1-Mr.
2.
Mr.
o neon
TJG:tg (14)
—

—

-

1-Mr.
(Atn:
r.
1
Mr. Dillard
1
Mr.
1
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr
,WMFO
1
Mrl
Quantico
b5
(ConUnue
Over)
c
—

—

-

-

-

Savage- 1348

 .1

Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to Mr.I
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/28/93
Washington Metropolitan Field Office

I

DEPArpS:
On 2/3/94, the SIRO, consisting of Chairmani
I cri1na1 Investigative Division; Unit Chief
I
I
I
I, Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection
Division; Section Chief Stephen W, flii (nh1 Sctio
n
Intelligence Division; Unit Chief I
I
Tn4-ir
Unit, Legal Counsel Division; Unit Chief
i-ininc Tinit. 9’Mring Division; and
Firearm
Supervisory Special Agent
I, Washington
Metropolitan Field Office, met to discuss the above-caption
ed
shooting.

J

-

Svnosis of the ShootincT Incident
From 8:00
11:00 p.m., on the evening of 7/27/93,
SAl
lattended a private dinner party at the Bar J
Restaurant in Woodbridge, Virginia. While there, he
met several
work associates and friends who were also invited
to the dinner,
and struck up a conversation with I
whom he had
not previously known. At approximately 11:00 p.m.,I
SAl
I
asked I
I if she would like to accompany him to the Down
Under Bar in Occoquan.
She agreed, and they both left the Bar J
Restaurant in their own vehicles. They spent approx
imately the
next two hours talking and playing checkers at the Down
Under
Bar.
SAl
I indicated that he had approximately two beers
while at the Down Under and that he had two beers and
a glass of
wine at the Bar J Restaurant.
-

While

Iwere at the Down Under,l

approached them and engaged_in cqnversation with them.

I

not known to eitherj
lor[
I rrior to this
night.
At approximately 1:30 a.m., on 7/28/93,1
land
heft the Down Under. I
igot into her vehicle, and SA
I
Istood by the driver’s window talking with her for
a few
minutes. While he stood there, he was approached from the
rear
byl
I A confrontation ensued, andi
I knocked SA
I
Jto the ground and began to hit him. SAl
jidentified
himself as an FBI Agent, andi
lithen bgan groping SAl
I in
an effort to locate him weapon. SAl
Igrabbed his weapon and
fired two shots, one of which strucki
jin the hip. I
indicated that he feared for his life, believing that
would
have shot him if he had managed to take control of thei
-

(Continued
2

Savage-i 349

-

Over)

I

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
7/28/93
Washing-ton Metropolitan Field Office

I

weapon. The local police were called and respon
ded to the scene.
The Prince William County Commonwealth Attorney
advised_ttat he
would decline prosecution against both I
land SAl
I
regarding this_incident; however, both indicated
that they
believed SAl
Iwas being less than candid with them during
their interviews of him.
SAl
yindicated that he identified_himself as an FBI
Agent prior to firing his weapon; however,I
lindicated that
not identify himself as an Agent.
Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above—captioned shooting incident as
documented by the administrative inquiry furnished to
the SIRG
revealed that proper procedures were followed by SAl
i
regarding the deadly force policy. SAl
Ifired his weapon
believing that his own life was in danger. The SIRG
is
concerned, however, over the events which led to this shootin
incident. The SIRG recommends that the Administrative Summ g
ary
Unit review SA L
Iconduct prior to the shooting incident, as
well as the allegation of his possible lack of candor
during the
investigation conducted by local law enforcement.

3

Savage- 1350

 Memorandum

Dea. Dtr.___________
DbAdn.
DD tflV.______
Aset. Dir.:
—

Ac*n.Servs._________
Crimjnv.___________

Ident._____
lnfojf9nt.._____
Insp.______________

Mr.

To

Froi

:

Mr.F

Subject

:

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY
SHOOTING INCIDENT
12/22/93
SALT LARE CITY DIVISION

1/7/94

Lab._____

I

Date

2/28/94

I

Lega’ Uou._____
Teck.Servs._____
Trairnr.
u. Affs. on.
Off. of EEO________
aff. Liaisi &
tnt. Affs.._________
Off. of PthLIc Atfs._
Teleione li._______
Director’s Office

Reference attached report of ASAC Myron
R. Fuller dated

-

PURPOSE:
This rnemoranduin is prepared to furnish the analy
sis,
columents, and recommendations of the
Shooting Incident Review
Group (SXRG) with reference to the capti
oned shooting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That no administrative action be taken
any FBI employee as a result of this incid
ent.

b7C

Enclosure
1
1
3

—

Mr.

—

Mr.

—

I

-

Mr

(1—Mr.I

l—TIr.I

-

Leary)

1
Mr. Johnson
TJG:tg (14)
—

l-Mr.I
(Attn:
1
Mr. Dillard
1—Mr.
1
Mr.
Quantico
1-Mr.____
,WNFO
I.
Mr.I______
antico
(Continue
Over)

Mr.I

Mr.

(1

against

I

—

—

—

Savage-1351

I

 Memorandum fromChairman, SIRG, to
Nr.l
Re: Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
12/22/93
Salt Lake City Division

I

I

DETML:

I

On 2/3/94, the SIRG, consisting of Chairiuanl

Icriminal Investigative Division; Unit Chief)
Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection
Division; Section Chief Stephen W Dilla
rd, Global Section

1

I

Intelligence Division; Unit Chief
I
Investigative Law Unit, Legal Counsel
Division; unit thief

I Firearm Trainina UnitS Traiqing Division; and
Supervisory Special Agent’
I, Washington
Metropolitan Field Office, met to discu
ss the above—captioned
shooting.
-.

Synopsis of the Shootinc Incident
On 12/22/93, SAl
invçlved in the
nlanning and execution of the arrest ofIwas
subject I
I
bias wanted on cI).arges of assault with a dead
ly
weap
on,
in
that he had attacked his brother with
a knife on the Navajo
Indian Reservation. I
I met with a local Deputy Sheriff and two
criminal investicators from the Nava
jo Reservation to plan the
arrest of
I When the four got to the reser
vation, the two
Navajo criminal_investigators remained appr
oxipte1v 300 feet
away fromi
Iresidence, in order to observd
lit he
should attempt to flee. sAt
I and the deputy approached the
residence and began speaking with a woman
who was standing
ri*1tij.
While they spoke, a yellow and white dog bit at
SA
i leg. Because of the boots he was wear
not penetrate his skin. He brushed the dog ing, the bite did
away, and as he did,
a black and gray dog lunged at SAl
and attempted to bite his
1
arm.__The dog only bit SAl
lsJ.eeve. The dog then lunged at
SAl
Ia second time. At this point, SAl
P226 and fired one round at the dog. The dog I drew his Sig Sauer
was not hit, and
both dogs ran away. Following this,
I
Icajue
out of a nea±by
residence and surrendered.
)

Observations and Recommendations of the SIRG
The review of the above-captioned shooting incid
ent as
documented by the administrative inquiry
furnished to the SIRG,
dated 1/7/94, revealed that proper_proce
dures were followed by SA
this incident. SAl
fired his weapon to protect
himself from the dog which was attempting to
attack him.
(Continued
2

Savage-1352

-

Over)

7C

 Memorandum from Chairman, SIRG, to
Mn
1e:
Administrative Inquiry
Shooting Incident
12/22/93
Salt Lake City Division

I
7C

After a thorough review of all the facts regarding
this
incident, it was the unanimous opinion of
all members of the SIRG
that no administrative action should
be taken against any FBI
employee as a result of their involvement
in the above-captioned
shooting incident.

3

Savage-1353

 U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington. DC. 20535
December20, 2010
MR. CHARLES SAVAGE
THE NEW YORK TIMES
1627 I STREET NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, DC 20006

Subject: SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORTS
COMPLETED JANUARY 1, 1993 TO THE PRESENT.
FOIPA No. 1139615- 000
Dear Mr. Savage:
The enclosed document was received under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United
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SUBSECT IONS OF TITLE 5. UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552
b>t I)

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of national defense oi foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

>bb2

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>b)(3)

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the
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withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(ft

trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or contidentiab

(b)(5)

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with the agency;

b6

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(bX7)

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of' such law enforcement
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(
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physical safety of any individual:

(b)(8>

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>b)(9)

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(d)(5)

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(j2)

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ik( I )

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policy, for example, information involving intelltgence sources or methods:

(k)(2)

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privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his'her identity
ssould be held in confidence:

I

(K)>3

kt>$t
i

of

the national defense or foreign

material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States
to the authority of Title IS, United States Code, Section 3056:

or any

other indis dual

pursuant

required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records:
ins e'tig itors matei iai Lompi Ud soUls fot Ow pui po. of dLtLi miii in suitani its LI ,ihi I
UI qu if i tication toi Frdti ci is i art
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who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would he held in confidence.
FBI GUi

.

.

.

Shooting Database R
eview
An Overview of FBI4
nvoIved
Shooting Incidents Fro
m 1993-2009

S

I

Federal Bureau of In
vestigation
Inspection DMsion
September 2010

.

Table of Contents
I. Introducfj

.

2

IL Methodology
4

III. FBI Deadly Force
Policy
8
IV. Generaj StaIJs
10

S
V. Intentional Shooting
Incidents

24

S

VI. Animai Shooting
lnciden
44

VII. Unintentfonaj
Dlschargea
58

I
VUL Factoiris

76

.

o

o

I

I. introduction
The intent of this report is to inf
orm and educate the reader concernin
g a 17year history of shooting incide
nts impacting the Federal Bu
reau of Investigation (FBI).
In accordance with Department
of Justice (DOJ) policy, all discha
rges of a firearm by a
DOJ employee outside of traini
ng, or the discharge of a firearm
by anyone during the
course of DOJ-related offictal
business must be reported. Sin
ce 1993, the Inspection
Division (INSD) has been the
entity within the FBI responsib
le for the overall manage
ment of FBi related shooting inc
idents. When a shooting incide
nt was reported, execu
tive management of 1NSO, wo
rking with the executive manag
ement of the dMsion or
field office where the incident
occurred, determined whether
a Shooting Incident Re
view Team (SIRT) was deploy
ed. Typically, the decision to
deploy a SIRT was based
on the impact of the results of
the incident When a S1RT did
not deploy, the responsi
bility for conducting and docum
enting the shooting inquiry wa
s delegated to the field.
The role of the SIRT was to
ensure an objective, thorough,
and factual inquiry
was conducted and documented.
In addition, the SIRT, when
appropriate, made rec
ommendations.
Once a shooting incident rep

ort was complete, and declin
ations of local and fed
eral prosecution against FBI Sp
ecial Agents had been issued
, the fads of the shooting
incident were presented to the
Shooting Incident Review Group
(S1RG). The S1RG
was composed of representatives
from 1NSD, the National Securi
ty Branch, the Crimi
nal Investigative Division, the
Training Division, the Critical
incident Response Group,
the Office of General Counsel,
the Department of Justice, and
other knowledgeable
persons as needed. The SIR
G typically met three to four tim
es per year to review mul
tiple shooting incidents, ass
ess whether the actions of the
shooters compiled with the
FBI Deadly Force Policy, and
to identify and address other
areas of concern (most
commonly those related to
command, control and commu
nications, planning, training,
andlor equipment).

I

A significant amount of information from shooting incident reports was captured,
but the analysis that follows was limited by the reporting. Consequently, if certain data
was not originally captured, it was not included in this report
The shooting incident database will continue to be utilized to facilitate the anatysis of shooting infonatIon invoMng FBI personnel and operations and to assist in

a

a

identifying and publishing lessons learned.

I

4

.

II. Methodology
The end result of each shooting inquiry, whether the inquiry was conducted by a
SIRT or delegated to the division was a shooting incident report This report con
tained interviews of the people Involved, results of forensic examinations, details of the
use of weapons and equipment, and, often times, observations and findings of the in
vestigative team. Shooting incident reports captured a significant amount of informa
tion regarding FBI-involved shootings. These reports were the source of all shooting
incident information found in this analysis.
In 2009, 1NSD developed a database which was populated with historical data
contained in shooting incident reports and where additional information from future
shooting incidents could be captured. The shooting incident database was design
ed to
capture data from all types of shooting incidents. All shooting incident reports from
January 1993 through December 2009 were reviewed and pertinent information from
each incident was entered into the database. During the review period, there were
493
separate shooting incidents for which a separate record was created in the
database.
The shooting incidents were reported by field offices, various FBIHQ divisio
ns, and
Legate. These incidents were categorized into three incident t)pes Intenti
onal
Shootings, Animal Shootings, or Unintentional Discharges (UD).
A single shooting incident can involve more than one incident type. For in
stance, a shooting incident could involve a Special Agent discharging firearm
a
at a
subject who poses an imminent threat, and at the subjects aggressive dog.
In this
shooting incident, both the intentional discharge at the subject and shots
at the animal
would be counted as separate shooting incident types. Four shooting
incidents in
volved two different shooting incident types. These four shooting inciden
ts are briefly
described below
An Agent was attacked by an aggressive dog and then attacked
by the

41,

a
owner, a subject in a series of bank robberies. The Agent discharged his
firearm at both threats (animal and intentional incident types).
o

During a violent confrontation with a subject involving Agents and law en
forcement officers (liOs), Agents fired at the subject and at an attacldng
dog (animal and intentional incident types).

o Agents fired upon a violent subject As the Agents moved forward to secure
the fallen subject, an Agent had an unintentional discharge (Jntentlonal and
unintentional incident types).
o AsAgentsandLEOsonaFugitiveTaskForceattemptedtotakeasubject
into custody, an Agent and a LEO each had an unintentional discharge.
Mother Agent fired upon the subject he believed posed a threat
(unintentional and intentional incident types).
The analysis of the data must be reviewed In light of several caveats:
o

The data was not always complete. The historical shooting incident reports
did not always include all information to complete all relevant fields in the
database.

o

Some shooting incidents involving FBI personnel were not the subject of
INSD revew procedures, including:

o

Employee suicides by firearm

o

Incidents where Agents engaged in clearly illegal conduct that
was the subject of criminal investigation by other law enforce
ment agencies

The analysis presented is as accurate as the data available. For this reason
,
although INW Is confident the information that follows presents a reason
ably accurate
representation of 17 years of shooting incidents, readers should be
cautious in at
tempting to draw conclusions based solely on the analysis of data
provided.

.

Part I
Analysis Of Shooting Incidents

Part! provides the reader with an overview of
the universe of FBI shooting mci
dents during the 17-year review period. The
reader is reminded the data presented in
this section was based on the data available with
in the shooting incident reports.

I

o

lV General Statistics
Shooting Incident Types 1993-2
009
Two terms are used to refer to sho
otings in this report shooting incide
nts and
incident types. A shooting incide
nt is any single occwience in which
firearms were dis
charged. Incident types are catego
ries applied to actions vithin a sho
oting Incident
Incident types are described below
.
From 1993 to 2009,493 shooting
incidents occurred during which FBI
Special
Agents (SAs), FBI Employees,
FBI Task Force Officers (TFOs
), and Other Law En
forcement Officers (LEOs) workin
g with the FBi discharged their
weapons for nontraining purposes. For the purpos
e of analysis, shooting incident typ
es were catego
rized as an Intentional Shooting
, an Animal Shooting, or an Unint
entional Discharge.
The definitions for each incident
type follows:
Intentional Shootinos entailed

instances where a shooter delibe
rately
and intentionally discharged a
weapon; typically these occurred
during
a hostile encounter or an ope
ration invoMng adversarial action.
Animal Shootinas were those ins
tances where weapons were dis
charged to: stop dangerous or
aggressive animals; euthanize
seriously
injured animals that posed a con
tinuing threat or serious hazard
; or hu
manety end an animal's suffering
, typically when law enforcement
ac
tion inflicted grievous injury to
that animal.
Unintentional Dlscharces were ina
dvertent or accidental discharge
s of
one or more rounds without
the intent of the shooter.
An incident type was assigned
based on the type of shooting
that occurred dur
ing a shooting incident A sin
gle shooting incident could inc
lude multiple incident
types. For instance, a shooting
incident which involved multip
le Agents firing upon a

violent subject posing an imminent threat would have been counted as one intentional
shooting incident. However, if one of the Agents also fired at an attacking dog, the sin
gle shooting incident counted as both one intentional shooting incident type and one
animal shooting incident type. During the review period, four shooting incidents oc
curred in which more than one shooting incident type occurred. Each shooting incident
type was counted. resulting in 497 shooting incident types analyzed.
Of the 497 shooting incident types, there were 188 (38%) Intentional Shootings,
93 (19%) Animal Shootings, and 216 (43%) Unintentional Discharges. The following
chart, Figure 4.1, reflects the breakdown of the incidents by type.
Figure 4.1 Breakdown of Incident Types

Unintentional Discharges ac
counted for the greatest proportion of the

Figure 4.la Deliberate Shootings

three incident types (43%). Howeve.,
when Animal and Intentional incident
types are combined (representing all inci
dents in which a weapon was purposely
discharged), the largest proportion of
shootings involved the deliberate dis
charge of a firearm (57%), Figure 4.la.
11

Shooting Incidents by Calendar Year Compared to
the 17-Year Average
Figure 4.2 illustrates the total number of shooting incid
ents per calendar year
compared to the average number of shooting incidents,
493, over the 17-year period.
The average number of all shooting incidents per year
was 29.0, depicted by the red
line.
Figure 4.2 Shooting Incidents by Calendar Year
50
45

Annu Tot

C
0

3?

35

30

E
Z

Average

25

iA
\J.::./\
30

3.
20
15

_____ _________i_
years:

Shooting incidents with more than one incident
type occurred in the following

1994

-

1995

-

-

2000

-

intentional and unintentional incident types
intentional and animal incident types
intentional and animal incident types
intentional and unintentional incident types

12

Shooting Incidents by Field Office
There were 493 shooting incidents during the
17-year review period. Field of
fices reported 451 (91.5%) shooting incidents.
FBI Headquarter divisions and Legats
accounted for 42 (8.5%) shooting incidents.
Figure 43 reflects the range of shooting
incidents occurring in the 56 field offices,
represented by the two Letter identifier of the
affected field office.
Figure 4.3

Shooting Incidents by Field Office

33

CG,NY,

2029

a
BA, CV, DE, DL, HO,
LV, MM, Ntc, PX, SF, SU

10 19
-

2

11

6-9

AQ. AT, BK, CE, GO, DN, EP, XC,
ME, MP, NH, NO, OC, RH, SC, SJ, TP

1-5

AL, AN, BF, BS, CI, HN, IP, JK, JN, KX,
LR, LS,
MO, MW, NF, OM, PD, PG. SA, SD, SE,, SI,
SL
0

I

I

5

10

17

I
15

20

Number of Field Offices

Every field office reported at least one shooting
incident between 1993-2009.
Twenty-three of the 56 (41%) field offices
reported five or fewer events over the 17year review period.

25

.
Table 41 displays the actual number of shooting incidents for each field office
during the 17-year review period.
Table 4.1 Shooting Incidents by Field Office

Los Angeles
Washington FIeld
Chicago
New York
PhIladelphia
Cleveland
Phoenix
Newark
BaltImore
Detroit
Dallas
Houston
Salt Lake CIty

S

I

MIami

Las Vegas
San FrancIsco
Denver
San Juan
BIrmingham
Kansas CIty
Oklahoma City
Atlanta
Columbia
ElPaso
New Haven
New Orleans

Sacramento
Albuquerque

33

Charlotte
Memphis
MinneapolIs
Richmond
Tampa
Buffalo
IndIanapolis
Omaha
Boston
Jackson
Little ROCk
Mltwaukee
PIttsburgh
SanDlego
Seethe
Spdngfleld
StLouIs

24
22
21
21
15
15
14
13
13
13
12
12
11
10
10
9
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7

CIncinnati

LouisvIlle
San AntonIo
Anchorage
Honolulu
Knoxville
Portland
Albany

6

o 14.

8
6
8
8
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
I

JacksonvIlle

I

MobIle
Norfolk

I
I

FBIILEO Shooters Involved in All Shooting Incidents
Figure 44 illustrates the number of FBI Employees and LEO shooters for all In
tentional Shootings, Animal Shootings, and Unintentional Discharges. There
were 689
shooters in four separate categories.
Figure 4.4 FBI/LEO Shooters Involved n AN Shooting Incidents

FBI-TFOs

Other FBi
Employees
16 (3%)

--__.....

o
o

Special Agents: FBI Special Agents, including supervisory or managerial personnel.
Other LEOs: all other LEOs (local, county, state, and federal) not identified as
TFOs.

o

FBI-TFOs: all LEOs designated in the shooting incident report as an FBI TFO.
Other FBI Employees: all non-Agent employees of the FBI (e.g, Laboratory Techni
cians, New Agent Trainees, and Law Enforcement Specialists/FBI Police Office
rs).

__

__

__

__

_____

Age and Time in Service of Shooters in Shooting Incidents

Age was availab!e for 472 of the 689 (68.5%) FBI and LEO shooters. Figure 45
reflects the number of FBI/LEO shooters by age group at the time of the shooting.
Figure 4.5 Age of FBI/LEO Shooters
140
130

120
ioo

109

80
60

61
45

Z

33

20
0

2

25 and
Under

26-30

31-35

36-40

41-45

46-50

51-55

Age

56 and
Over

Time in Service was available for 508 of 689 (73.7%) FBI and LEO shooters.
Figure 4.6 reflects the Time in Service of the shooters. Shooters with ten or fewer
years in service accounted for 57.7% of the 508 shooters.
Figure 4.6 Time in Service of FBI/LEO Shooters
160
140
120
U)

100
0

0

80

5and
Under

6-10

11-15

16-20

Years in Service
16

21-25

2640

31 and Over

_________________________________________

Environment and Location of Shooting Incidents
Shooting incidents were categorized by the type of environment in which the
shooter discharged hisTher weapon (i.e., inside or outside) and then by the location. Of
the 493 shooting incidents, there were 5 in which shooters discharged their weapons in
two different environments, resulting in 498 environments. Of those in which location
data was available, 202 incidents (40.6%) occurred inside and 288 incidents (57.8%)
occurred outside (data was not available for eight shooting incidents). Figure 4.7 re
fiects the number of shooting incidents by location occurring in an inside environment.
Figure 4.7 tnside Environment--Shooting Incidents by Location

Large Open Space
Firing Rang.

i

12

Motor Vhicle

15

Hotel

15

I

1
j

24E1

Training Facility

IT

OMcWBusineu
Residence
0

44]

,

o[

1o

I

10

20

30

40

I
50

60

70

80

90

100

Number of Incidente

o

Large Open SDace: indoor parking garages, warehouses, indoor shopping malls,
aircraft hangers, etc.

o

Firing Range: includes law enforcement, military, and commercial ranges.
Motor Vehicle: shooters inside a vehicle discharging a weapon either inside the ye-

o

hide or at a target outside the vehicle.
o

Hotel; an establishment providing temporary lodging for a fee.

o

Training Facility: any indoor law enforcement, military or commercial training facility,
except indoor firing ranges.
17

o

Office/Business: includes all commercial and government facilities
where employ
ees work or customers visit.

o

Residence: single and multi-family homes, apartments, condominiums
, and trailer
homes.

Figure 4.8, reflects the number of incidents by location occurring in
an outside
environment.
Fgure 4.8 Outside Environment--Shooting Incidents by Locati
on
.

o

-

:.

Training Facility
-

Commercialilndustrlal

'

I

Natural Terrain

I.

Firing Rang.

-

i

-

I

Residence

o

t:d

'r

:

(t'

StreetlParking Lot
:"

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Number of Incidents

S

Training Facditv: any outdoor law enforcement, military or commercial
training facil
ity, but not outdoor firing ranges.
.

o

Commercial/Industrial: most large, outdoor commercial faciliti
es and areas such as
rail yards, power stations, lumber yards.

o

Natural Terrain: wooded areas, rural and farm land, and mount
ainous areas.
Firing Range: includes law enforcement, military, and commercial
ranges.
Residence: the perimeter or yard immediately outside or in the vicinit
y of a resi
dence.

o
o
o

StreetlParking Lot: includes public space where vehicles routinely
are driven or
parked.
18.

S

Operational Status of Shooters in Shooting Incidents
Figure 4.9 depicts the number of shooters by their operational status at the time
of a shooting. Of 689 FBI and LEO shooters, 67 (9.7%) were not officiaNy on duty

when the incident occurred.
Figure 4.9 Operationai Status of FBI/LEO Shooters

700

[

Non-Operabonal

Firearms Traming

Operatcnai

600
500
400
q

300
200
100
0

o
o

1

85

66

51

Not On Duty

On Duty

Not On duty: time outside of planned or recorded work hours,
On duty; planned or recorded work hours.

o

Operational: any planned activity in which the shooter was acting in support of an
investigation while on duty.

o

Firearms Training: any qualification shoots or firearms training conducted at either
an official FBI facility or any other firearms training site.

o

Non-Operational; any unplanned situation in which the shooter was not acting in
support of an investigation, either while on or off duty.

It should be noted law enforcement officers and TFOs are not required to report
unintentional discharges when not in FBI space or on an FBI operation.

19

Deaths and Injuries Resulting from Shooting Incidents
Figure 4.10 depicts the number of deaths and injuries from all shooting incidents
(Further information regarding the "Others" category is provided in the Intentional mci
dent Shootings section). Although all deaths were caused by a firearm, injuries were
caused by a mix of firearms and non-gunshot related actions (e.g., animals, blunt ob

jects, or vehicles).
Figure 4.10 Deaths and Injuries Resulting from Shooting Incidents

Subjects

Agents!LEOs

20

Others

.

.

.

Part II
Analysis by Incident Types

Part It is meant to provide the reader a mo
re precise analysis of shootings by
incident type during the 17-year review per
iod. In Part II, each section addresses only
that infomiatlon pertinent to the respective
incident type: Intentional, Animal, or Unin
tentional Discharge. The emphasis thro
ughout Part Ills on FBI Special Agents. It has
been noted when this Is not the case The
reader is reminded the analysis presented
in these sections was based on the data
available within the shooting incident reports
.

I

I

V. Intentional Shooting Incidents
Intentional Shooting Incidents by Calendar Year Compared to the 17 Year
Average
Intentional Shooting Incidents were defined as instances where a shooter delib
erately and 9ntentionally" discharged a weapon; typically these occurred during a hos
tile encounter or an operation invoMng adversarial action.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the number of Intentional Shooting Incidents per calendar
year, compared to the average number of Intentional Shooting Incidents over the 17year period. The average number of Intentional Shooting Incidents per year was 11.1,
depicted by the red line in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Intentional Shooting Incidents by Calendar Year

:

I

S 2O
C

Mnu

To

Av.rag.-

I

'

0
U
C

15
12.

'

5

1

ii

,

f.

Y \'

0

24

--.'-

f

-

9oio

intentional Shooting Incidents by Field Office

There were 188 Intentional Shooting Incidents during the 17-year review
period.
Forty-nine field offices reported 184 (97.9%) Intentional Shooting Inciden
ts. FBI Head
quarters divisions and Legats accounted for 4 of the 188 (2.1%) shootin
g incidents.
Figure 5.2 reflects the range of Intentional Shooting Incidents by field
office. repre

sented by the two letter identifier.
Figure 5 2 Intentional Shooting Incidents by Field Office

17

11

BA, CG, CV, CE, DL,
LV, MM, PX, SJ

6-9

BH, HO, KC, NK,
oc,su,w

AQ, AT, BF, BS, CI, CO, ON, EP, IP, LR,
ME, NH, NO, NY, OM, RH, SC, SD, SI, TP

2-3

I

CE, HN, JK, JN, KX, LS
MO, MP, NF, SE, SL

i

0

5

20

I
11

10

15

20

Number of Field Offices

Thirty-eight of the 56 (67.8%) field offices had five or less Intentional
Shooting
Incidents reported over the 17-year review period.

25

Table 5.1 displays the actual number
of Intentional Shooting Incidents for eac
h
field office during the 17-year review
period.
Table 5.1 Intentional f

PhiladelphIa
Detroit
Baltimore
ChICagO
Cleveland
MiamI
Dallas
Las Vegas
Phoenix
San Juan
Kansas City
Newark
Washington Field
BIrmingham
Houston
Oklahoma City
Salt Lake City
Manta
Boston
ColumbIa
Denver
IndianapolIs
Memphis
New York

11
9
8

8
8
8
6
8
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Sacramento
Albuquerque
Buffalo
CincInnati
El Paso
Little Rock
New Haven
New Orleans
Omaha
San DIego
Springfield
Tampa
Chartotle
Honolulu
JacksonvIlle
Jackson
Knoxville
Louisville
Mobile
MInneapolis
Norfolk
Seattle
St Louis

3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I
I
I
I

Shooters Involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents
Figure 5.3 depicts the titles of all shooters for all Intentional

Shooting Incidents.
During the 188 Intentional shootings, 269 Special Agen
ts, 77 LEOs, 73 subjects, 17
TFOs, and I Other FBI 1
Employee fired a weapon.
Figure 5.3 Shooters nvoIved in Intentional Shooting
Incidents

Other LEOs
77 (18%)

Subjects
73 (17%)

FBI-TFOs
17 (4%)
Other FBI
Employees
I

o
o
o
o
o

Special Agents: FBI Special Agents, including superviso
ry or managerial personnef.
Other LEOs: all other LEOs (local, county, state, and fede
ral) not identified as
TFOs.
Subjects: subject of the investigation or subject of the intenti
onal use of force.
FBI-TFOs: all LEOs designated in the shooting incident
report as an FBI TFO.
Other FBI Employees: all non-Agent employees of the
FBI (e.g., Laboratory Techni
cians, New Agent Trainees, and Law Enforcement Specia
lists/FBI Police Officers).

'One FB employee, a sn,afl arms technician, was involv
ed in an Intentional Shooting Incident.
This individual fired a handgun at a metal locker
out of curiosity as to what damage would result.
27

Age and Time in Service of Agents Involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents
Age was available for 193 of the 269(71.7%) Agent shooters. Figure 5.4 de
picts the number of Agents by age group at the time of the shooting.
Figure 5.4 Age of FBI Agents Involved in intentional Shooting Incidents
70

60
50
o40
0

CI,

F:!
25 and
Under

26-30

3148

36-40

41-45

46-50

51-55

56 and
Over

Age

Time in Service was available for 233 of 269 (86.6%) Agent shooters. Figure
5.5 depicts the Agents' Time in Service at the time of the shooting.
Figure 5.5 Time in Service of FBI Agents Involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents
80
I

70
60
50
(I,

I

40
30
20
10

a

ii

H
5 and
Under

6-10

I

--

--

--

2
11-15
16-20
Years in Srvlc.

28

21-25

2640

31 and Over

____

________________________

__

___
___
____
___
___
____
__
_
__

__
__

__
_

Intentional Shooting Incidents by Tim
e of Day
Time of day was availab
le for all Intentional Shootin
g Incidents.

Figure 56 de
picts the frequency of occ
urrence of Intentional sho
otings by time of day.

Figure 5.6 intentional Shooting incidents
by Time of Day
12:01 AM 4:00 AM

--.

H

I

...

4:01 AM
8:01 AM

8:00 AM
-

12:00 PM

12:01 PM -4:00 PM
4:01 PM 8:00 PM
-

8:01 PM

-

jj_

_.JL
L._J.
.[
..-

..

I.....
I

-

-

12:00 AM
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Number of Incidents

Intentional Shooting Incidents by Day
of the Week
Day of the week was ava
ilable for all Intentional Sho
oting Incidents. Figure 5.7
depicts the frequency of occ
urrence of Intentional shootin
gs by day of the week.

Figure 5.7 intentional Shooting Incidents
by Day of the Week
45 T

35

.

39

C

.g

35

30

C)

25!
20:

z

22

15
loi--12

54--

A
Sunday

1
1
Monday

.1
Tuesday

1

1

1

Wednesday Thursday

29

1

1

Friday

Saturday

____

________

___________

__

______

Intentional Shooting Incidents by Month of the Year
Month of the year was available for all Intentional Shooting Incidents. Figure
5.8 depicts the frequency of occurrence of Intentional Shootings by month of the year.
Figure 5.8 IntentonaI Shooting Incidents by Month of the Year
30

25
24
21
0
C

o

15

21

-L-.-.
--

14
10

--

10
--

5.

, I,

_11_

8

kl

--.

I

--

--

--

L1

-- I

--

--

h

K
/ , / I/
4

.

30

--:

o

-

SWAT vs. Non-SWAT Agents Involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents
In Figure 5.9 Agent shooters involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents were
categorized based on whether they were SWAT/HRT Operators, Non-SWAT Agents,
or Not Specified at the time of the incident.
Figure 5.9 SWAT vs Non-SWAT Agents Involved in Intentional Shoottrig Incidents

Non-SWAT

Not Speced

.

88(33%)

88(3%)

o

SWAT/HRT: any Agent who was an active member of an FBI SWAT team or HRT,
but not necessarily involved in a SWAT or HRT operation at the time of the Inten
tional Shooting.

o

Non-SWAT Agents: any Agent not assigned to SWAT or HRT at the time of the In
tentional Shooting.

o

Not Specified: Agents about whom there was insufficient information in the shooting
incident report to make a determination.

Number of SWAT Operations
Based on the data available in the shooting incident reports, there were at least
31 of 188 (16.5%) Intentional Shooting Incidents which occurred during SWAT opera
2
tions.

This number should be understood to be a minimum number since it was riot explicit in every
2
shooting incident report whether the incident involved a SWAT team.
31

EnvirOnment and Location for Intentional Shooting
Incidents
Data for six of 188 Intentional Shooting Incidents were
not available. In five
shooting incidents, Agents and LEOs discharged
their weapons in two different envi
ronments. There were 187 known locations and
environments. Three Intentional
Shooting Incidents occurred on a firing range and
resulted in unintentional injuries.
Figure 5.10 depicts the number of Intentional Shoo
ting Incidents by location oc
cumng in an inside environment.
Fgu.e 510 Inside ErMroeiment--ntenUonal Shoo

ting Incidents by Location

Motor VhIcIo

Large Op..r Space

S

Firing Rango

OMce1Buain

S

0

2

4

6

$

10

12

14

15

18

20

Numbr of incidents

o
o
o
o
o

o

Motor Vehicle: shooters inside a vehicle disch
arging a weapon either inside the yehide or at a target outside the vehicle.
Larae Ocen Soace: indoor parking garages,
warehouses, indoor shopping malls,
aircraft hangers, etc.
Firma Ranoe: includes law enforcement,
military, and commercial ranges.
Hotel: an establishment providing temporary
lodging for a fee.
Office/Business: includes all commercial
and government facilities where employ
ees work or customers visit.
Residence: single and multi-family homes, apar
tments, condominiums, and trailer
homes.

a
ing in an outside
Figure 5.11 depicts the number of incidents by location occurr

4

environment.
ts by Location
Figure 5.11 OutsIde Envlronment--4ntenhlonal Shooting Inciden
4
Firing Rang.

clslllndusbtal
I

Natural Terrain

Raldnc

Sb'ealfParklng Lot

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Number of Incidents

rcial ranges.
Firma Ranae: includes law enforcement, military, and comme
es and areas such as
o cpmmerclaulndustriaL most large, outdoor commercial faciliti
cad yards, power stations, lumber yards.
ainous areas.
o Natural Terrain: wooded areas, rural and farm land, and mount
in the vicinity of a resi
o Residence: the perimeter or yard immediately outside or

o

dence.
a

ly are driven or
Street/Pailcina Lot indudes public space where vehicles routine
parked.

Operational Status of Agents Involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents
Of the 269 Agents involved in an Intentional Shooting Incident, 15 (5.6%) were
not on duty at the time of the incident. Figure 5.12 depicts the on duty type of activity
of the remaining 254 (94.4%) Agents at the time of the shooting incident.
Figure 5.12 Operational Status of On Duty Agents Involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents
120

100

80

60

40

20

0
Non-SWAT Agents

SWAT1HRT

Not Specified

o

Operational: any planned activity in which the shooter was acting in support of an
investigation while on duty.

o

Non-Operational: any unplanned situation in which the shooter was not acting in
support of an investigation, either while on or off duty.

o

Firearms Training: any qualification shoots or firearms training conducted at either
an official FBI facility or any other firearms training site.

34

Type of Violation in Which Intentional Shooting incidents Occurred
Sufficient data was available in 172 Intentional Shooting Incidents to identif the
y
underlying nature of the crime or FBI classification under investigation when the
shoot
ing occurred. In some instances, the subjects in the database were subjects of FBI in
vestigations. In these situations, the FBI classification was captured. In other situa
tions, for instance, when an Agent was assaulted or robbed, the nature of the crime
(i.e.. assault or robbery) was captured.
For those incidents in which there were multiple crimes or violations, only the
primary crime or violation was counted. For instance, regardless of the reason
why

a

subject had become a fugitive (drugs, bank robbery, etc.) the primary reason Agents
were searching for the subject was because the subject was a fugitive from justice
.
Figure 5.13 depicts the types of violations resulting in Intentional Shooting Inci
dents. Each incident in which an Agent or LEO discharged their weapon counted
as
one incident even if more than one officer fired their weapons.
Figure 5.13 Type of Violations in Intentional Shooting Incidents

Fugitive
46(27%)

Major
TheftlRobb.ry
53(31%)

Crimes Against
Children
1(1%)

35

i

Kidnapping
11(6%)

\_stic
Terrorism
1(1%)

Weapons
Violations
1(0%)

Lighting Conditions During Intentional Shooting Incidents

Lighting conditions were captured based on the recollection of 190 of 269
(706%) Agent shooters involved in Intentional Shooting Incidents. Figure 5.14 reflects
the lighting conditions per shooter at the time Agents discharged their weapons. No
Agents discharged their weapons in more than one type of lighting condition.
Figure 514 Lighting Conditions During Intentional Shooting Incidents

Dark
19(10%)
-

Poor
8(4%)

:4-

o
o

Good: daylight, good artificial light, interior natural light, and flashlights.
Dark: lighting at night or in a darkened room in which little or no additional light
sources were available.

o

Poor: backlight or silhouette, dawn/dusk, and limited or poor artificial light.

Of the 163 shooters reporting good lighting conditions, 12(7.4%) shooters re
ported using a handheld flashlight or light mounted on their weapon.

36

Deaths and Injuries Resulting from Intentional Shooting incidents
Figure 5.15 illustrates the deaths and injuries resulting from Intentional Shooting
Incidents.
Figure 5.15 Deaths and
80

Injuries Resulting from Intentional Shooting Incidents
S Deaths

70

ilnjunes
60
50
40
30
20
10

+
I

0
Agents

Other LEOs

Subjects

3

Others

The four incidents in the "Others" category are described as follows:
o

o
o

o

During a kidnapping investigation, an Agent fired his/her weapon into a vehicle
as it
was driven towards the Agent. The kidnap victim was in the vehicle and was struck
and killed by the Agent's gunfire.
A cooperator was shot and injured by a subject who attempted to rob the cooper
a
tor during a controlled drug purchase in support of an FBi investigation.
During the surveillance of a violent subject, another individual was mistakenly ideri
tified as the subject. When Agents moved in to arrest the individual believed to
be
the subject, one Agent observed the individual make a furtive movement and,
be
lieving the individual was reaching for a weapon, fired, injuring the individual.
When a violent subject attempted to use a vehicle as a weapon to evade arrest by
Agents, an Agent fired at the subject, injuring another passenger in the vehicle.
37

____

Figure 5.16 reflects the cause of death or injury to Agents resulting from Inten
tional Shooting Incidents.
Figure 5.16 Causes of Agent Deaths and injuries Resulting from Intentional Shooting lncdents
16w-

o Deaths

14

'Injuries
12

10
8
6'
4
2

0
By Subject

By Self

ByAgentILEO

The Intentional Shooting Incidents in which 25 Agents were killed or injured are
described below:
o

Six Agents were killed: Two as a result of blue-on-blue incidents and four as a re
suit of subject action.

o

Ten Agents were injured by gunfire: Three as a result of blue-on-blue incidents and
seven as a result of subject action.

o

Eight Agents were injured by vehicles and/or blunt objects.

o

One Agent accidently caused a self-inflicted injury when the Agent failed to hold an
MP5 correctly when firing the weapon during training.

38

S

Force Policy
In Accordance with FBI Dadly
Not
nts
ide
Inc
ing
oot
Sh
nal
ntio
Inte
nt shooters
iew, there were 269 Special Age
Over the 17-year period of this rev
were found
ts. Of the 269 Agents, five (1.9%)
iden
Inc
g
otin
Sho
nal
ntio
Inte
in
ed
olv
inv
the FBI Deadly
r weapons not in accordance with
thei
ged
har
disc
e
hav
to
G
SIR
the
by
dents are described beiow
Force Policy. The five shooting inci
orcement
pon at Agents and other law enf
A subject who had already fired his wea
orce
his front yard as Agents and law enf
personnel was walking erratically around
ents
The subject repeatedly made movem
ment officers established a perimeter.
on the ground close to the subject One
towards the weapon which was lying
e be
at the weapon to increase the distanc
Agent, using a shotgun, fired one slug
tween the weapon and the subject

o

ons.
had become aggressive in their acti
ch
whi
b
mo
a
by
ded
oun
surr
was
nt
An Age
nd into the air as a warning shot
rou
one
d
fire
nt
Age
the
ty,
safe
his
for
Fearing

o

There were no injuries.
ieving
when he lost sight of the subject. Bel
An Agent was chasing a fleeing fugitive
hes,
the Agent as he approached some bus
the subject was lying in wait to ambush
hes. The fugitive was apprehended un
the Agent fired his shotgun into the bus

o

harmed.
to stop a vehicle carrying
a passenger identified as one of the
,
stop
a
to
e
cam
icle
veh
the
As
es.
itiv
two fug
fired
s a nearby wooded area. An Agent
ard
tow
ran
and
icle
veh
the
ed
exit
es
fugitiv

officers attempted
o Several Agents and law enforcement

at the fugitive. There were no injuries.
o

e
at an object No other persons wer
While intoxicated, an Agent fired his weapon
involved.

et

(

.
Summaries of Intentional Shooting Incidents Involving Sp.claI Agents
The following summaries invoMng Special Agents were taken from the 17-year
period. Summaries of incidents were chosen to provide examples of the varied situa
tions under which Intentional Shootings have occurred.
Felony Car Stoa
o A Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF) obtained a local arrest warrant for a bank rob
ber who had brandished a pistol and threatened to shoot a teller during a robbery.
A written operations plan was prepared and approved, which did not include a con
tingency plan for a felony car stop. The subject had a criminal history which in
cluded violence and an attempt to use a vehicle as a weapon against firemen and a
police officer while fleeing a traffic stop. The plan was for two Agents and four
TFOs to arrest the subject outside of one of two residences the subject was known
to frequent Surveillance teams were established on both locations. The subject
was observed exiting one of the residences and entering a vehicle. The arrest
team began to formulate a plan via radio to conduct a felony car stop. The sub
jed's dnving pattern indicated to the surveillance team they had been identified.
When the subject pulled the car to the side of the road, the order was given for the
arrest team to execute a car stop. The arrest team exited their vehicles and or
dered the subject to raise his hands. Initially the subject compiled but, as a TFO
approached the driver's side door, the subject lowered his hands and began to
drive onto the curb. Another TFO had to quickly move to avoid being hit. As the
vehicle continued to drive onto the sidewalk, members of the arrest team observed
the subject lower his hands to his waist area. Believing he was reaching for a gun,
one Agent fired six rounds from a Glock Model 22 towards the subject, strildng him
several times. The vehicle hit a fence and stopped. The subject was transported to
a hospital for gunshot wounds and survived. No other persons were injured.
At Home
An FBi Agent was preparing to depart for a SWAT operation from his home in the
early pre-dawn hours. The Agent carried two gear bags from the residence, one of
which contained FBI credentials and a bureau-issued Springfield pistol, and placed
them next to the bureau vehicle which was parked in the garage. Leaving the roll
upgaragedoorpartialtyopen, theAgentwenttoretiieveadrugdetsction dogfrom
the backyard. As the Agent neared the backyard he observed a picktip truck, with
at least two indMduals in it, make a U-turn in the cul-de-sac adjacent to the home
and drive back past the home. The Agent watched the truck closely as the home of

..

ent returned to the garage mo
Ag
the
As
ed.
riz
gla
bur
ly
ent
a neighbor had been rec
Agent drew his
les inside the garage. The
ma
ee
thr
ed
ter
oun
enc
he
r,
ments late
nted the sub
Sauer P229 pistol and confro
Sig
ned
-ow
ally
son
per
,
ved
bureau-appro
eet
ck which was waiting on the str
tru
the
ard
tow
ran
ts
jec
sub
Agent
jects. Two of the
physical altercation with the
ef
bri
a
in
ed
olv
inv
e
am
bec
ng
while the third male
with the Agent in pursuit GM
ck
tru
g
itin
wa
the
s
ard
tow
The third male then ran
reached Into the cab on the
ent
Ag
the
ck,
tru
the
t
exi
to
ts
commands to the subjec
e driver put the
the keys from the ignition. Th
ove
rem
to
t
mp
atte
an
in
e
sid
dnve?s
g he would
ent while accelerating. Fearin
Ag
the
ard
tow
d
ere
ste
and
r
truck into gea
n, striking
six rounds in rapid successio
d
fire
ent
Ag
the
d,
ure
inj
sly
be killed or seriou
as the
es, and both driver side tires,
tim
ee
thr
e
gat
tail
the
e,
onc
nor
the rear window
shots. The Agent sustained mi
the
by
d
ure
inj
s
wa
one
No
truck fled the area.
rehended several days later.
app
re
we
ts
jec
sub
e
Th
e.
ggl
injures during the stru
Search Warrant
rrant on the
executed a federal search wa
nel
son
per
ent
em
orc
enf
law
Agents and
ercover
g child pornography with an und
din
tra
n
bee
had
o
wh
t
jec
sub
residence of a
bal
al plan was prepared, but a ver
ion
rat
ope
n
itte
wr
No
cer.
offi
law enforcement
team
before execution. The search
rtly
sho
n
tio
sta
ice
pol
al
loc
a
brief was held at
y and had served federal prison
tor
his
nal
mi
cri
a
had
t
jec
sub
was advised that the
As they approached the resi
ns.
apo
we
y
itar
mil
len
sto
of
e
time for the illegal sal
r by an adult male believed to
doo
e
sid
the
s
ard
tow
ned
tio
mo
dence, the team was
jects wife and
residence, they met with the sub
the
ng
eri
ent
on
Up
t.
jec
sub
the
be
stairs, the
not be found. Upon climbing the
ld
cou
t
jec
sub
the
but
en,
ldr
chi
two
n a hallway in
subject, who was standing dow
the
h
wit
t
tac
con
de
ma
m
tea
search
officers re
nted under his chin. One of the
poi
tol
pis
a
h
wit
m,
roo
bed
r
ste
the ma
covered the
m the residence as two Agents
fro
en
ldr
chi
two
and
e
wif
the
moved
apon.
negotiate with him to drop his we
to
an
beg
and
ns
apo
we
ir
the
h
subject wit
s main
roximately 15-20 minutes, Agent
app
ted
las
ich
wh
n,
atio
oti
neg
During the
to
ile trying to convince the subject
wh
le
sib
pos
as
ch
mu
as
nt
kne
tained concea
position of the gun between his
the
g
vin
mo
t
kep
t
jec
sub
e
Th
n.
drop his weapo
k to prison
mented that he would not go bac
mouth and chin. He repeatedly com
ing their
mit 'suicide by cop." After explain
and the Agents didn't want him to com
subjecrs de
rch warrant for the computers, the
sea
a
y
onl
e
cut
exe
to
s
wa
e
pos
pur
. The Agents
et and moved doser to a window
qui
e
am
bec
He
d.
nge
cha
r
ano
me
point. The
position himself closer to an egress
to
ing
try
s
wa
t
jec
sub
the
ted
suspec
s perhis body moved to what the Agent
and
d
nge
cha
n
apo
we
his
on
p
gri
subject's

4

ceived as a combat stance. The subject then moved the weapon away from his
head towards the Agents. The Agents, fearing for their lives, fired on the subject
The subject quickly moved his weapon to his mouth and fired a round. The Agents,
hearing this shot, believed the subject was shooting at them and fired again. The
two Agents fired a total of seven rounds. The subject died as a result of the
wounds he inflicted on himself and by the Agents.

S

Robbed at Gunooint
An Agent parked his/her Bucar a block away from his/her residence after work
The Agent secured the vehicle and began walking towards his/her residence carry
ing an MP5 in a case. Two unknown males were walking slowly towards the Agent
These males appeared to be displaying gang paraphernalia, which the Agent rec
ognized from working gang violations in the area. The males slowed their pace as
the Agent approached and physically stopped him as they passed. One of the
males pointed a semi-automatic pistol at the Agent and demanded money. The
Agent placed the bags on the ground and held his/her hands in front to show com
pliance. The Agent slowly reached for his/her wallet and handed it to the male
holding the gun. The wallet did not contain any items identifying the Agent as a law
enforcement officer. One male picked up the case with the MP5 while the other
started checking the Agenrs pockets while keeping the gun pointed at the Agent
The Agent was carrying a Glock Model 23 in a hip holster concealed under a
jacket Fearing the males would soon discover h&she was an FBi Agent and shoot
him/her, the Agent drew the pistol and fired approximately six rounds at the male
holding the gun, who fell backwards. The Agent turned towards the second male
and fired three shots. The second male fell to the ground. The Agent then turned
back towards the first male, who had the gun. The male was running down the
street The Agent moved Into the street and commanded the subject to stop. The
subject abruptly stopped and turned towards the Agent The Agent believing the
subject was still armed and was turning to fire at the Agent, fired two rounds at a
distance of approximately 25 yards. The subject fell to the ground. The Agent
looked around for the second subject, but could not see him. The Agent sought the
protection of cover by running to the opposite side of the street and crouching be
hind a vehicle. From behind the vehicle, the Agent continued to scan the street but
could not see either subject The Agent reloaded his/her weapon and contacted
the field office. A short time later, police officers responded and secured the scene.
Both subjects were taken to the hospital for gunshot wounds.

Vi. Animal Shooting incidents
Animal Shooting Incidents by Calendar Year
Compared to the 17-Year Average
Animal Shooting Incidents were defined as thos
e instances where weapons
were discharged to: stop dangerous or aggressiv
e animals; euthanize seriously in
jured animals that posed a continuing threat or
serious hazard; or humanely end an
animal's suffering, typically when law enforcem
ent action inflicted grievous injury to
that animal.

o

Figure 6.1 illustrates the number of Animal Shoo
ting Incidents per calendar year
compared to the average number of Animal Shoo
ting Incidents over the 17-year pe
hod. The average number of Animal Shooting
Incidents per year was 5.5, depicted by
the red line.
Figure 6.1 Animal Shooting Incidents by Calendar
Year
10

:

-.

2

'

-

_--

i
0

-

-

.

-.
i':

Z

-

-

-

-

______________ __
44

_____

Animal Shooting Incidents by Field Office
There were 93 Animal Shooting Incidents during the 17-year review
period.
Thirty-five field offices reported 90 (96.8%) Animal Shooting Inciden
ts. FBI Headquar
ter divisions accounted for 3 of 93 (3.2%) shooting incidents. Figure
6.2 depicts the
range of Animal Shooting Incidents by field office, represented by the
two letter identi
fier of the field office.
Figure 6.2 Animal Shoottng lncdents by Field Office

lOorMore

7-9

44

BAINK,NY,PH

2-3

AG, BF, CV, DL, ON, JN, LA, MW, NH, NO PX, OC, SF,_SU]
14

4

1

1

AN, BS. CO. DE, KG. LV, MM, MP, OM, PD, RN, SA, SO, SI,
SL

i

0

I
2

4

6

8

I
10

Number of Field Offices

35

12

14

16

Table 8.1 displays the actual number of Animal Shooting Incidents for each field
office during the 17-year review period.
Table 8.1 Animal Shooting Incidents by Field Office

S

I

Washlnaton Field

12

Phoenix

2

ChIcago
BaltImore

7
8

Salt Lake City

2

Newark
New York
PhiladelphIa
Buffalo
Cleveland
Dallas
Denver
MI)waukes
Oklahoma City
San Francisco
Aibuquerque
Jadcson
L.os Angeles
NewHaven
New Orleans

6
5
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2

Anchomqe
Boston

I
I
I
1
I
I
1
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Columbia
DetroIt
Kansas Clty
Las Vegas
Miami
MinneapolIs
Omaha
Portland

RIchmond
San Antonio
San Diego
SprIngfield
St.Louls

S

All Animal Types
i
encountered in Animal Shooting mc
als
anim
of
es
typ
the
icts
dep
6.2
le
Tab
s.
animal fired upon by Agents and LEO
of
es
typ
the
lists
left
the
on
mn
colu
dents. The
of the type of arnal. The animals
ber
l
num
tota
the
icts
dep
t
righ
the
on
The column
were not necessarily injured or killed.

Table 6.2 Animal Types

Animal

Dog
Deer

Fox
Horse
Moose

Raccoon
Skunk
Snake
Total

Total
85
9
I
I
I
1
I
I
101

ks (two or more) in seven sepa
Aggressive dogs have been encountered in pac
rate shooting incidents.

a

4

Shooters Involved in Animal Shooting Incidents
Figure 6.3 depicts the status of all shooters for all Animal Shooting Incidents.
During the 93 Animal shootings, 99 Special Agents. 9 LEOs, and 3 TFOs fired a
weapon.
Figire 6.3 Shooters Involved in Animal Shooting Incidents
Other LEOs
9(8%)

FBI -TFOs
3(30

Special Agents
99(89%)

o
o

Special Agents: FBI Special Agents, including supervisory or managerial personnel.
Other LEOs: all other LEOs (local, county, state, and federal) not identified as
TFOs.

o

FBI-TFOs: all LEOs designated in the shooting incident report as an FBI TFC.

48

__

Age and Time in Service of FBI Agents Involved in Animal Shooting Incidents
Age was available for 83 of the 99 (83.8%) Agent shooters. Figure 6.4 depicts
the number of Agents by age group at the time of the shooting.
Figure 6.4 Age of FBI Agents Involved in Animal Shooting Incidents
30

.

28

21

25
0
0

.c 20

C,,
'I

0

15

E
10

13

S

6

a

0

25 and
Under

26-30

31-35

36-40

41-45

46-50

51-55

Age

Time in Service was available for 89 of the 99 (89.9%) Agent shooters. Figure
6.5 depicts the Agents' Time in Service at the time of the shooting.
Figure 6.5 Time ri Service of FBI Agents Involved in Animal Shooting Incidents
35

30 f--
1
$25
0

15

F--i

10
5

0

0--
5 and Under

6-10

11-15

16-20

Years in Service
49

21-25

26-30

Animal Shooting Incidents by Day of the Week
Day of the week was available for all Animal Shooting Incidents. Figure 6.6
depicts the frequency of occurrence of all Animal shootings by day of the week.
Figure 6.6 Animal Shooting Incidents by Day of the Week
25

20

20

I

8

A,

0
Sunday

Monday

Tuesday Wednesday Thursday

Friday

Saturday

Animal Shooting Incidents by Month of the Year
Month of the year was available for all Animal Shooting Incidents. Figure 61
depicts the frequency of occurrence of all Animal shootings by month of the year.
Figure 6.7 Animal Shooting Incidents by Month of the Year
14
13

12

1
8

:zhrbrFbHrfrr
-- _,--,

I --
50

0'

4

SWAT vs. Non-SWAT Agents Involved
in Animal Shooting Incidents
In Figure 6.8, Agent shooters involved
in Animal Shooting Incidents were cate
gorized based on whether they were SWA
T/HRT Operators, Non-SWAT Agents, or
Not Specified.
Figure 6.8 SWAT vs. Non-SWAT Agen
ts Involved in Animal Shooting Incidents

Not Specified
35(35%)

o

Non-SWAT Agents: any Agent not assi
gned to SWAT or HRT at the time of the in
cident.

o

Not Specified: Agents about whom ther
e was insufficient information in the shootin
g
incident report to make a determination.

o

SWAT/HRT: all Agents who were active
members of an FBI SWAT team or HRT,
but not necessarily involved in a SWAT
or HRT operation at the time of the inciden
t.

Number of SWAT Operations
3ased on the data available in the sho
oting incident reports, there were at least
4 of 93 (4.3%) Animal Shooting Inciden
ts which occurred during SWAT 1
operations.

This number should be understood to
1
be a minimum number since it was not expilcit in ever
shooting incident report whether the incident
y
involved a SWAT team.
5I

Environment and Location for Animal Shooting Incidents
Environment and location information was available for 92 of 93 (98.9%) Animal
Shooting Incidents. Figure 6.9 depicts the Environment (inside and outside) and Loca
tion for Animal Shooting incidents for all animal types.
Figure 6.9 Environment and Location of Anima' Shooting incidents
80
Natural Terrain

70

Residence

-

StreetlParking Lot

60

19

50
40

E

30
34

z
20
28

10
11
0

inside

Outside

Inside Environment
o

Residence: single and multi-family homes, apartments, condominiums, and
trailer homes.

Outside Environment
a
a

Natural Terrain: wooded areas, rural and farm land, and mountainous areas.
Residence: the perimeter or yard immediately outside or in the vicinity of a
residence.

Operational Status for Agents Involved in Animal Shooting Incidents
Of the 99 Agents involved in an Animal Shooting Incident. 18 (18.2%) were not
on duty at the time of the incident. Figure 6.10 depicts the on duty type of activity of

)

the remaining 81(82.6%) Agents at the time of the shooting.
Figure 6.10 Operational Status of On Duty Agents involved in Animal Shooting Incidents

)

40
Non-ponal
35

Operational

j

30
25
20
15

-

10
5

(

0
Non-SWAT Agents

SWATIHRT

Not Specified

o

Operational: any planned activity in which the shooter was acting in support of an
investigation while on duty.

o

Non-Operational: any unplanned situation in which the shooter was not acting in
support of an investigation, either while on or off duty.

Injuries Resulting from Animal Shooting Incidents
Of the 111 FBI and LEO shooters involved in Animal Shooting Incidents, seven
shooters received injuries: One LEO and five Agents were injured by animal attacks
and one Agent received a gunshot injury when another LEO fired at the attacking dog.
There were no deaths of shooters resulting from Animal incidents.

53

C

Type of Violation in Which Animal Shooting Incidents
Occurred
Sufficient data were available in 58 Animal Shooting Incid
ents to identify the un
derlying nature of the crime or FBI classification under inve
stigation when the shooting
occurred. For those incidents in which there were mult
iple crimes or violations, only
the primary crime or violation was counted. For instance,
regardless of the reason why
a subject had become a fugitive (drugs, bank robbery, etc.)
the primary reason Agents
were searching for the subject was because the subj
ect was a fugitive from justice.
Figure 6.11 depicts the types of violations resulting in Anim
al Shooting mci
dents. Each incident in which an Agent or LEO discharge
d their weapon counted as
one incident even if more than one Agent/LEO fired their
weapons.
Figure 6.11 Type of Viotations in Anima1 Shooting riciden
ts

D
Major
TheftlRobbery
8(14%)
Fugitiv..
6(11%)

3
GangslCriminai
Enterprise
31(55%)

Kidnapping
2(3%)
-

3
Weapons VioIaon]
1 (2%)

54

\

CAC
2(4%)

--_-__

Assault
1(2%)

CI Invesgaon
1(2%)

Involving Special Agents
Summaries of Animal Shooting Incidents
ts were taken from the 17-year pe
The following summaries involving FBI Agen
to provide examples of the varied situations
rod. Summaries of incidents were chosen
under which Animal Shootings have occurred.
an individual requesting assis
While driving to work, an Agent was stopped by
g girl was being attacked by two
tance. The individual advised the Agent a youn
rescue the girl, but the dogs
dogs. The Agent and the indMdual attempted to
Agent drew hislher weapon and
quickly turned on and attacked the Agent. The
chest. The two dogs retreated; the
fired one round, striking one of the dogs in the
injured dog died a short distance away.

o

T team breached the door to the
During the execution of an arrest warrant, a SWA
d the door and rushed towards the
target location. Immediately, a large dog exite
into the dog's back from hislher
breacher. Another SWAT Agent fired one round
towards Agents in the entry
Springfield Model 191 1. The dog continued to rush
d into the dog. The dog fell to the
stack, resulting in another Agent firing one roun
nnel after the completion of the
ground and was euthanized by animal control perso

o

mission.
re of a tiger which had es
An Agent was asked to assist in the location and captu
had been made to tranquilize the
caped from a local theme park. Several attempts
e its way to a more populated
tiger, without success. Fearing the tiger would mak
it was late evening and
area the decision was made to kill the animal. Because
ard Looking Infra-Red (FLIR)
foggy, an FBI helicopter with the capability of Forw
was for the Agent, in communi
was used to guide the Agent to the tiger. The plan
tiger towards a location where
cation with the helicopter and others, to flush the
ed a clearing and observed
shooters would euthanize the animal. The Agent enter
Agent's location. The Agent
the tiger enter the same clearing, moving towards the
the tiger ran back into the sur
fired three slugs from a shotgun, hitting the tiger, but
n goggles, the Agent located
rounding wooded area. Through the use of night visio
y and, for officer safety, the
the tiger in the wooded area. The tiger was stationar
Agent fired another slug, killing the tiger.

o

o

trying to assist an injured deer
An Agent stopped to assist two motorists who were
local sheriff's office and a
lying in the median of the road. The Agent contacted the
ty arrived, the deer attempted
deputy was dispatched to the scene. Before the depu
55

4

*

o

o

)

to move into lanes of traffic. Fearing the deer would cause an accident, the Agent,
with the assistance of an off-duty police officer, stopped traffic. Ensuring the area
was safe, the Agent fired two shots from a shotgun, killing the deer. A short time
later, the deputy arrived and coordinated the removal of the deer.
A Task Force assembled to execute a search warrant on a single family residence
in a drug investigation. An Agent and several Task Force Officers, including two
uniformed officers, entered the residence and began to conduct a protective sweep
to secure the site. A TFO approached a bedroom door and after discovering the
door was locked yelled, "Police." The Agent approached the door and, fearing the
subject was locked in the bedroom destroying evidence or arming himself, kicked at
the door. The door opened and the Agent was immediately attacked by a large
dog. The Agent tried to fend off the aggressive dog as the TFO, standing several
feet away, fired one round from his 9 mm pistol, striking the dog. The dog contin
ued to attack the Agent The TFO quickly fired three more rounds, striking the dog
in the chest and back. The dog continued to attack the Agent A second TFO
moved towards the dog and fired one round from his .45 caliber pistol. The round
struck the dog in the chest, killing the animal. The Agent continued into the bed
room where the subject was located and secured. The Agent then realized he/she
had been shot in the foot.
During the execution of a search and arrest warrant at a residence in a drug investi
gation, two Agents and a police officer were tasked with providing perimeter secu
rity. Shortly after arriving at the residence and taking their positions on the perime
ter, an aggressive dog approached the group. The dog growled and moved to
wards the perimeter team. One Agent, fearing the dog was going to attack, fired
two rounds from his/her Glock Model 23. The officer fired one round. The dog was
struck, but ran off and was not located.
An Agent was waiting in a car in front of a friend's residence. The friend exited the
residence, with two other individuals, leading a small dog on a leash. The Agent
observed a large dog down the street rapidly approaching the friend's small dog.
The large dog began behaving aggressively towards the small dog and appeared to
the Agent to become more aggravated as the friend and two other individuals at
tempted to fend off the larger dog. Fearing the large dog was a threat and would
attack, the Agent fired two rounds from his/her GIOCk Model 22, striking the dog.
The injured animal was removed from the scene by local animal control authorities.

56

)

______

0

VII. Unintentional Discharges
Unintentional Discharges by Calendar Year Compared to the 17-Year Average
Unintentional Discharges were defined as inadvertent or accidental discharges
of one or more rounds without the intent of the shooter.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the number of Unintentional Discharges per calendar year
compared to the average number of Unintentional Discharges over the 17-year period.
The average number of Unintentional Discharges per year was 12.6, depicted by the

red line in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 Unintentional Discharges by Calendar Year

S

25

I-

--Annual To

Avr.

j

20

S

S
U

15

0
I

0

E

10

\

7Nl\NVY\

5

0

)
58

)

A Note on Unintentional Discharges
risk of harm. Considering Spe
Any UD is unacceptable and poses a significant
there exists many "opportunities
cial Agents routinely handle and unholster weapons,
year in perspective, the opportu
for UDs. To put the annual average of 12.6 UDs per
indudes, but is not limited to, the
nity for a UD needs to be considered. Opportunity
Using a quantifiable event
number of times Agents handle an unhoistered weapon.
d occur. The Pistol Qualification
defines the opportunities available in which a UD coul
on for all Agents, provides a
Course (PQC), the authorized firearms qualification sessi
their weapons. Agents must pass
known example during which Agents must unholster
holsters four times per PQC. For
the PQC four times annually. Pistols are drawn from
pistols alone should have been
2009, with an approximate Agent population of 13,360,
ber does not account for the
drawn a minimum of 213,760 times. This minimum num
ial Agents drew pistols or caradditional times throughout any given year in which Spec
ing, search warrant opera
ned long guns, including: enhanced SWAT and HRT train
tions, arrests, and cleaning of firearms.
4

the very broad calcula
No (JO is acceptable, but when placed into the context of
ively very few.
tions above, the numbers of UDs within the FBI were relat

59

Unintentional Discharges by Field Office
There were 216 Unintentional Discharges during the 17-year review period.
Fifty-one field offices reported 181 UDs. FBI Headquarters divisions accounted for 34
of 216 (15.6%) shooting incidents. Figure 7.2 depicts the range of UDs by field office,
represented by the two letter identifier of the affected field office.
Figure 7.2 Unintentional Discharges by Field Office

10 or More

7-9

S
o0
0
C

54

0
I..

.0

E

z
34

1.2

0

5

15
10
Number of Field Offices

)

)
60
)

20

25

Table 7.1 displays the actual number of Unintentional Discharges for each field
office during the 17-year review period.
Table 7.1 Unintentional Discharges by Field Office

FIELD OFFICE

FiELD OFFICE
Los Angeles
New York

14

New Orleans

3

13

3

Houston
Chicago
Phoenix
San Francisco
Washington Field
Philadelphia
Sail Lake City
Charlotte
Cleveland
El Paso
Atlanta
Birmingham

8
7

San Juan
Seattle
Albuquerque

2

7

Indianapolls
Kansas City

2

7

Little Rock

2

6

Louisville

2

6

Miami

2

5

Omaha

2

5

Richmond

5
4

San Antorno

2
2

San Diego

2

4

St Louis

2

Dallas

4

Albany

Minneapolis

4

Pittsburgh

4

Sacramento

4

Tampa

4

Columbia

3

Denver

3

Detroit
Las Vegas
Memphis

3

Newark
New Haven

3
3

Anchorage
Baltimore
Cincinnati
Honolulu
Jackson
Knoxville
Milwaukee
Oklahoma City
Portland
Springfield

I
1

7

3
3

61

e

3
2

I

4

I
I
I
1
I

I
1
I
1

4

Shooters Involved in Unintentional Discharges
Figure 7.3 depicts the status of all shooters for all UDs. During the 216 UDs,
194 Special Agents. 15 FBI Employees, 5 LEOs, and 2 TFOs fired a weapo
n.
Figure 7,3 Shooters Involved in Unintentiona' Discharges

Other FBI
Employees

Other LEOs
5(2%)

15 (7%)
,

I

/

2(1%)

Special Agents
194(90%)

)

o
)

o

Special Agents: FBI Special Agents. including supervisory or managerial person
nel.
Other FBI Employees: all non-Agent employees of the FBI (e.g., Technicians, New
Agent Trainees, and Law Enforcement Specialists).

o

Other LEOs: all other LEOs (local, county, state, and federal) not identified as
TFOs.

o

FBI-TFOs: all LEGs designated in the shooting incident report as an FBI TFO.

)

62

______

______

___
______

Age and Time in Service of Agents Involved in Unintentional Discharges
Age was available for 158 of 194 (81.4%) Agents involved in UDs. Figure 7.4
depicts the number of Agents by age group at the time of the UD.
Figure 7.4 Age of Agents Involved in Unintentional Discharges
40y
38

?

35

33

30
0

29

25

25
19

I

10

-____________

11

si;
0

0

25 and
Under

26-30

41-45

36-40

31-35

46-50

51-55

56 and
Over

Age

Time in

Service was available for 172 of 194 (88.7%) Agents involved in UDs.

Figure 7.5 depicts the Agents' Time in Service.
Figure 7.5 Time in Service of Agents Involved in Unintentional Discharges
60

F--

50

I

0
0
(I)

40
30

H.___

.4-.

0

20

e
z

t-- I 1
1i

-

10
0

5 and Under

6-10

16-20

11-15

Years in Service

63

21-25

2640

31 and Over

'1

Unintentional Discharges by Day of the Week
Day of the week was available for all UDs. Figure 7.6 depicts
the frequency of
occurrence of all UDs by day of the week.
Figure 76 Unntentional Discharges by Day of the Week
60

50
C',
C

51

o

40

o

30

C)

L..

43
32

26

20
10
0

43

I
Sunday

Monday

Tuesday

113A

A

A

A

Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

Unintentional Discharges by Month of the Year
Month of the year was available for all UDs. Figure 7.7 depicts the
frequency of
occurrence of all UDs by month of the year.
Figure 7.7 Unintenbonal Discharges by Month of the Year

)

30
.3 25
24

0

23

20

)

0
-

0

15

-

-

20

18

--
1
F

--

--

--

--

15

--
--

--

--

-

5.
0

--

(.1,

--'--/,,,,
'

C3

64

Q.,
4
+0

__

__

.
Environment and Location for Unintentional Discharges
Environment and location information was available for all UDs. Figure 7.8 de
picts the number of UDs by location occurring in an inside environment.
Figure 7.8 Inside Environment--Unintentional Discharges by Location
Large Open Space

-4J

Hotel
Firing Range
Motor Vehicle

----

--

Training Facility

I
I
I
I

101

ii

I

I

I 14j
I

a

4J

1

OfflcelBusiness
Residence
1

0

510

2025

I

3035

I
Z

45

Number of incidents
o

Large Ooen

Soace: indoor parking garages, warehouses, indoor shopping malls,

aircraft hangers, etc.
o

Hotel: an establishment providing temporary lodging for a fee.

o

Firing Range: includes law enforcement, military, and commercial ranges.

o

Motor Vehicle: shooters inside a vehicle discharging a weapon either inside the ve
hicle or at a target outside the vehicle.

o

Training Facility: any indoor law enforcement, military or commercial training facility,
except indoor firing ranges.

o

Office/Business: includes all commercial and government facilities where employ
ees work or customers visit.

o

Residence: single and multi-family homes, apartments, condominiums, and trailer
homes.
65

4

.
.
Figure 7.9 depicts the number of UOs by location occurring in an outside environment
Figure 7.9 Outside Environment--Unintentional Discharges by Location

o

Training Facility

Commercialllndustrial

Residence

Natural Terrain

StreetiParking Lot

Firing Range

0

5

10

20

15

25

30

35

40

45

Number of Incidents

o

Training Facility: any outdoor law enforcement, military or commercial training facil
ity, but not outdoor firing ranges.

o

Commercialllndustriai: most large, outdoor commercial facilities and areas such as
rail yards, power stations, lumber yards.

o

Residence: the perimeter or yard immediately outside or in the vicinity of a resi
dence.

o
o

Natural Terrain: wooded areas, rural and farm land, and mountainous areas.
Street/Parking Lot: includes public space where vehicles routinely are driven or
parked.

o

Firing Range: includes law enforcement, military, and commercial ranges.

)

66
)

j

Causes of Special Agent Unintentional Discharges
For the purpose of analysis, four categories were developed to capture the un

derlying cause of UIDs. Figure 7.10 depicts the causes of UDs for Agents only. The
chart further distinguishes between long guns (rifles, carbines, and shotguns) and
handguns (revolvers and pistols).
Figure 7.10 Causes of Unintentiona' Dtscharges
80
70
60

'Breaking Down Firearm
No Conscious Decision to Pull Trigger
Pulled Trigger Believing Gun Was Unloaded
S Situational

H

'I

50

C
0
C

40

0

37
30

E

z

20
(
10
0
Handguns

Long Guns

4

Breaking Down Firearm: The shooter was intending to break down the firearm and
did not intend to fire a live round (to include cleaning and safely storing the weapon).
o No Conscious Decision to Pull Trigger: The shooter did not recall pulling the trigger

o

or could not explain how the weapon fired a live round.
o Pulled Trigger Believing Gun was Unloaded: Similar to Breaking Down Firearm,
but for situations other than specifically doing so with the intention to disassemble the
weapon (e.g., dry-firing).
o

Situational: When some sort of outside stimulus caused the shooter to fire the

weapon (e.g., hit by a vehicle).

67

Unintentional Discharges by Handgun Types
In 1997, the FBI began an enterprise-wide transition to pistols manufactured
by
Glock. Figure 7.11 illustrates how the proportion of UDs involving Glock
pistols has
changed over time.
Figure 7.11 Unintentional Discharges--Glocks vs. All Other Handg
uns
16
4'.o
14

--

;th'-..

12

g

10

.,

7

8

-.
.'.--

o

._o._,..

yr..

...
.

'

8

,

FL

-

7
&

--

:.-_*'

...

..

.

-

-

.;:.

2

.

..

--

.

.

--

:r

..

..

3:
2

o

o

A comparison to the Agent population helps put the above
data into context. In
1994, the Agent population was approximately 9,780, the lowest
number of Agents
throughout the 17-year review period. There were ten UDs with
handguns in 1994. In
2008, the Agent population was approximately 12,850, the highes
t number of Agents
with the exception of 2009. There were ten UDs with hand
guns in 2008. Between
1994 and 2008, there was a population increase of approximately
31.4%. The propor
tion of UDs to Agent population in 1994 was 0.1% compared
to 0.07% in 2008. As the
Agent population has increased over time, UDs as a propor
tion of the population has
decreased, despite the introduction of the Glock pistol.

)

68
)

)

Figure 7.12 illustrates the comparison of the causes of UDs between Glock pis
tols and all other handguns.

J

Figure 7.12 Causes of Unintentional Diseharges--Glocks vs. All Other Handguns
50

'Breaking Down Firearm
45

No Conscious Decision to Pull Trigger
Pulled Trigger Believing Gun Was Unloaded
'Situational

40
35
C
0

30
-,

C
0
0

2
z

E

I

20
17

10

i
5
0'

:z
Glocks

o

Other Handguns

Breaking Down Firearm: The shooter was intending to break down the firearm and

did not intend to fire a live round (to include cleaning and safely storing the weapon).
o

No Conscious Decision to Pull Trigger: The shooter did not recall pulling the trigger

or could riot explain how the weapon fired a live round.
o

Pulled Trigger Believing Gun was Unloaded: Similar to Breaking Down Firearm,

but for situations other than specifically doing so with the intention to disassemble the
weapon (e.g., dry-firing).
o

Situational: When some sort of outside stimulus caused the shooter to fire the

weapon (e.g., hit by a vehicle).

69

c

SWAT vs. Non-SWAT Agents Involved in Unintentional Discharges
In Figure 7.13. Agent shooters involved in UDs were categorized based on
whether they were SWAT/HRT Operators, Non-SWAT Agents, or Not Specified.
Figure 7.1 3 SWAT vs. Non-SWAT Agents nvo[ved in UnintentionaL

Discharges

Not Spectfied

46(24%)
Non-SWAT
Agents
103 (53

SWATIHRT
45(23%)

:

)

o

Non-SWAT Agents: any Agent not assigned to SWAT or HRT at the time of the in
cident.

o

Not Specified: Agents about whom there was insufficient information in the shooting
incident report to make a determination.

o

SWAT /HRT: all Agents who were active members of an FBI SWAT team or HRT,
but not necessarily involved in a SWAT or HRT operation at the time of the incident.

)

In 2009, approximately nine percent of all Agents were SWAT operators, ac
cording to the SWAT Operations Unit (SOU). The demands of firearms training were
much greater for SWAT and HRT operators than for Non-SWAT Agents. FBI SWAT
teams conducted firearms training twice monthly until 2009, when the requirement was
increased to three times per month. Additionally. SWAT teams were often deployed in
field offices to handle a variety of operations, including arrests. protection details, and
support for undercover operations. This increased the amount of time spent handling,

70

)

ore,
breaking down, and training with a firearm over that of a Non-SWAT Agent. Theref
UD
any conclusions drawn about the probability of a SWAT or HRT operator having a
compared to a Non-SWAT Agent needs to consider these facts.
Figure 7.14 illustrates the comparison of the causes of UDs between SWAT!
chart de
HRT operators, Non-SWAT Agents, and Not Specified. The left side of the
illus
picts the causes of UDs for all Agents. The three groupings of bars inside the box
trate how the data for all Agents relates to the three personnel groups.

)

iJ

Figure 7.14 Causes of Unintentional Discharges--SWAT vs. Non-SWAT
70
Breaking Down Firearm
ONo Conscious Decision to Pull Trigger
60
(]Pulled Trigger Believing Gun Was Unloaded
Situational
50
In
Q
.

C.,

40

'4-

0
I

0
.0

30
(

z

20
10
0

Breaking Down Firearm: The shooter was intending to break down the firearm and
n).
did not intend to fire a live round (to include cleaning and safely storing the weapo
trigger
o No Conscious Decision to Pull Trigger: The shooter did not recall pulling the
o

or could not explain how the weapon fired a live round.
,
o Pulled Trigger Believing Gun was Unloaded: Similar to Breaking Down Firearm
the
but for situations other than specifically doing so with the intention to disassemble
weapon (e.g., dry-firing).
o

Situational: When some sort of outside stimulus caused the shooter to fire the

weapon (e.g., hit by a vehicle).
71

Duty and Operational Status for FBI Agents Involved in Unintentional
Discharges
Of the 194 Special Agents involved in a UD, 33(17.0%) were not on duty at the
time of the incident. Figure 7.15 depicts the on duty type of activity of the remaining
161 (83.0%) Agents at the time of the shooting incident.
Figure 7.15 Operational Status of On Duty Agents Involved in Unintentional Discharges
120

[

Firearms Tralning

Non-Operational

Operational

100

80
17

)

.

60
21
40

t

-:
29.

)
20

43
10

0
Non-SWAT Agents

)

SWATIHRT

18
Not Specified

o

Firearms Training; any qualification shoots or firearms training conducted at either
an official FBI facility or any other firearms training site.

o

Operational: any planned activity in which the shooter was acting in support of an
investigation while on-duty.

o

Non-Operational: any unplanned situation in which the shooter was not acting in
support of an investigation, either while on or off duty.

72

Injuries Caused by All Unintentional Discharges
Of the 216 UDs, 46 (21 3%) UDs resulted in an injury. The majority of these in
juries were self-inflicted. Three subjects were injured by Agent UDs, which is not
shown in the chart below. Figure 7i6 illustrates the injuries to Agents, LEOs, and
Other FBI Employees caused by UDs. No deaths were attributed to UDs.
Ftgure 7.16 Injuries Caused by Unintentional Discharges
40
B Injured By Another AgenVLEO B Self-inflicted Injury
35

4

30
a,
C
0
a,

E

z

25
20
15
10
5
0
All FBI Agents

Other FBI Employees

73

Other LEOs

Summaries of Unintentional Discharges Involving Special Agents
The following summaries involving Special Agents were taken from the 17-year
period. Summaries of incidents were chosen to provide examples of the varied situa
tions in which UDs have occurred.
Following a firearms qualification, an Agent decided to clean his/her Glock pistol at
home. The Agent loaded the weapon, but engaged other Agents in conversation
before leaving the range. The Agent then decided to clean the weapon at the
range. Forgetting the weapon had been reloaded, the Agent pointed the weapon in
a gun clearing barrel and pulled the trigger, discharging one round. No injuries
were reported.
o

During a felony car stop, an Agent exited a Bucar and gave verbal commands to
the subject driver. Ignoring commands, the subject drove the vehicle towards the
Agent. The Agent quickly moved to avoid being hit by the subject vehicle, but
struck his/her extended gun arm on the door causing one round to be discharged
into the subject's vehicle. No injuries were reported.

o

Following the completion of a pistol qualification shoot, an Agent inserted a loaded
magazine into his/her Glock pistol, but did not charge the weapon. Firearms train
ing continued with the shotgun. After training was completed, the Agent retrieved
his/her pistol. Forgetting he/she had earlier inserted a loaded magazine, the Agent
pulled the slide and saw an empty chamber. The Agent released the slide forward,
pointed the weapon down, and pulled the trigger, discharging one round. No inju
ries were reported.

o

During the arrest of a fleeing subject, a pursuing Agent attempted to holster his/her
pistol with one hand as he/she simultaneously reached for the subject with the
other. As the Agent gripped the subject with one hand, the Agent's other hand
tightened on the pistol, discharging one round. No injuries were reported.

o

During a SWAT operation, SWAT Agents attempted to tear down a fence to gain
entry to the target location. An Agent held an MP5 in his/her right hand with the
safety disengaged, while using his/her left hand to pull down the fence. The
Agent's right hand contracted and one round was discharged into the foot of a
nearby Agent. The Agent was not aware he had discharged a round until it was
discovered one round was missing from the magazine of the weapon after the op
eration.
74

I

re a SWAT arrest. The Agent
An Agent checked into a hotel room the night befo
checks on two long guns and two
practiced dry-firing drills and completed function
ded hislher Sig Sauer pistol
pistols. Prior to retiring for the night, the Agent reloa
bed, the Agent picked up the
and placed it on the night stand. Before climbing into
ed, aimed at the mirror in the
Sig Sauer pistol and, forgetting the weapon was load
discharged one round into the
room to conduct more dry-firing drills. The weapon
mirror. No injuries were reported.
of a Domestic Terrorism in
While driving his/her Bucar to assist in the surveillance
ed weapon was in the brief
vestigation, an Agent realized his/her personally-own
, the Agent opened the briefcase on the passenger seat. While continuing to drive
pistol in the waistband of his/
case, removed the pistol and attempted to place the
tband, the weapon dis
her pants. As he/she maneuvered the pistol into the wais
charged one round into the hip area of the Agent.

o

with a trigger guard for the
An Agent was preparing to secure his/her Glock pistol
ied to the front of the trigger.
evening. The locking bar of the trigger guard was appl
l discharged one
As the Agent attempted to tighten the trigger guard, the pisto
ying the guard because
round. The Agent did not unload the weapon before appl
on usable if an emergency
he/she believed it would take too long to make the weap
arose. No injuries were reported.

o

o

o

ed to begin disas
While conducting surveillance on a residence, an Agent decid
azine, but slid the maga
sembling his/her Glock pistol. The Agent ejected the mag
d then re-entered the
zine back into the weapon when the subject suddenly exite
sembling the pistol,
residence. The Agent turned his/her attention back to disas
d the trigger to re
and, believing the magazine had already been removed, pulle
the windshield and into
move the slide. The weapon discharged one round through
a concrete structure. No injuries were reported.
ol students. As
An Agent was providing a presentation on the FBI to middle scho
t held a Smith and
part of the presentation on weapons used by the FBI, the Agen
ceiling. In order to
Wesson Model 13-3 aloft with the barrel pointed towards the
trigger, discharging
demonstrate the rotation of the cylinder, the Agent pulled the
re the presen
one round into the ceiling. The Agent had emptied the weapon befo
ies were reported.
tation, but unintentionally left one round in the cylinder. No injur

75

4

4

VIII. Factoids

Of the 188 Intentional Shooting Incidents, 73 (38.8%) incidents involved more than
one Special Agent/LEO shooter. Forty-four of these 73 (60.3%) Intentional Shoot
ing Incidents involved only multiple Special Agents firing weapons (no other LEO
shooters).
o

In five of the 188 (2.7%) Intentional Shooting incidents, more than one subject dis
charged a weapon at law enforcement personnel.

o

Of the 367 Special Agents who discharged a firearm in an Intentional or Animal
Shooting Incident, 72 (19.6%) Special Agents reported making use of cover and/or
concealment while firing their weapons.

o

Of the 188 Intentional Shooting Incidents, there was an exchange of gunfire be
tween Special Agent/LEO shooters and subjects in 58 (30.9%) incidents.

o

Of the 367 Special Agents who discharged a firearm in an Intentional or Animal
Shooting Incident, five (1.4%) were carrying a ballistic shield at the time of the inci
dent.

o

Of the 188 intentional Shooting Incidents, ten cooperators (Confidential Human
Sources) and seven Undercover Employees (UCEs) were known to have been pre
sent at the scene in 14 (7.4%) separate shooting incidents.

o

Of the 188 Intentional Shooting Incidents, 29(15.4%) were identified as SWAT op
erations and three (1.6%) were identified as HRT missions. Two of these shooting
incidents involved both FBI SWAT and HRT operating on the same mission.

o

The typical penalty received by Special Agents for an Unintentional Discharge: let
ter of censure, three days suspension, and remedial firearms training.

76