EMBARGOED UNTIL 6/28/12 @ 5:00 AM

PROPOSED ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES
JIM JORDAN AND MIKE POMPEO

 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
I.
The First Victim of War is Truth: The administration
misled the public about the events in Benghazi
Officials at the State Department, including Secretary Clinton, learned
almost in real time that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. With
the presidential election just 56 days away, rather than tell the American
people the truth and increase the risk of losing an election, the
administration told one story privately and a different story publicly.
They publicly blamed the deaths on a video-inspired protest they knew
had never occurred.
II.
Last Clear Chance: Security in Benghazi was woefully
inadequate and Secretary Clinton failed to lead
The State Department has many posts but Libya and Benghazi were
different. After Qhaddafi, the U.S. knew that we could not count on host
nation security in a country where militias held significant power. The
American people expect that when the government sends our
representatives into such dangerous places they receive adequate
protection. Secretary Clinton paid special attention to Libya. She sent
Ambassador Stevens there. Yet, in August 2012, she missed the last,
clear chance to protect her people.
III.
Failure of Will: America did not move heaven
and earth to rescue our people
The American people expect their government to make every effort to
help those we put in harm’s way when they find themselves in trouble.
The U.S. military never sent assets to help rescue those fighting in
Benghazi and never made it into Libya with personnel during the attack.
And, contrary to the administration’s claim that it could not have landed
in Benghazi in time to help, the administration never directed men or
machines into Benghazi.

i

 IV.
Justice Denied: The administration broke its
promise to bring the terrorists to justice
After the attacks, President Obama promised “justice will be done.”
There is no doubt our nation can make good on that commitment. Yet,
almost four years later, only one of the terrorists has been captured and
brought to the United States to face criminal charges. Even that terrorist
will not receive the full measure of justice after the administration chose
not to seek the death penalty. The American people are owed an
explanation.
V.
Unanswered Questions: The administration did not
cooperate with the investigation
Despite its claims, we saw no evidence that the administration held a
sincere interest in helping the Committee find the truth about Benghazi.
There is a time for politics and a time to set politics aside. A national
tragedy is one of those times when as a nation we should join together to
find the truth. That did not happen here. So while the investigation
uncovered new information, we nonetheless end the Committee’s
investigation without many of the facts, especially those involving the
President and the White House, we were chartered to obtain.

ii

 INTRODUCTION
Yet tonight, we take comfort in knowing
that the tide of war is receding.
Barack Obama
President of the United States 1
The writer F. Scott Fitzgerald once observed, “Show me a hero and I will
write you a tragedy.” The September 11, 2012 Benghazi attack showed
America not one but many heroes—among them Ambassador
Christopher Stevens, Tyrone Woods, Sean Smith, and Glen Doherty. The
story of Benghazi is their tragic story—which ultimately is the story of
four deaths that never should have happened. America owes its people—
especially those that work to advance our interests and the interests of
freedom around the world—its utmost protection. We failed those
Americans in Benghazi.
This is not only the tragic story of two men who died trying to bring
freedom to the people of a foreign nation and two others who died trying
to save them. It is also the story of a State Department seemingly more
concerned with politics and Secretary Clinton’s legacy than with
protecting its people in Benghazi. It is the story of how the best military
in the world never reached Benghazi with men or machines, leaving
fellow Americans to fight, and die, alone. And it is the story of an
administration so focused on the next election that it lost sight of its duty
to tell the American people the truth about what had happened that night.
For the men on the ground in Benghazi, the terrorist attack began at 9:42
p.m. and the threat continued for hours until the planes carrying them and
the bodies of the four murdered Americans left Benghazi. For the
terrorists the attack was also continuous. It was a plan executed in
multiple phases that began at the State facility. It continued when the
terrorists ambushed the Americans en route to the Annex. The attack
continued with multiple assaults on the Annex culminating with deadly
mortar fire. According to the Department of Justice, the mission was

1

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in
Afghanistan (June 22, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan.

1

 willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated—a coordinated assault
aimed at killing or kidnapping America’s ambassador. 2
Those in Washington decided that once the initial attack at the State
compound had ended and our men moved to the Annex, the enemy had
retreated as well. For those fighting for their lives in Benghazi that night,
however, it was one long battle for survival. But the terrorists did not
retreat. This view from Washington that the fight had ended is a lapse in
judgment that may well haunt our nation for years to come. At the same
time Secretary Clinton appears to have concluded that the attack was
over, the men on the ground knew better. 3 In the end, two men died from
smoke inhalation at the State Department’s compound during an initial
attack involving dozens of extremists. Two more died from mortar fire at
the end of a continuous, hours-long siege by approximately a hundred
heavily armed and highly trained fighters at the CIA Annex.
Yet, beyond those basic facts other important questions required
answers:
•

Why were diplomats stationed in Benghazi in the
first place and, more importantly, why did they stay
as it became more and more dangerous?

•

Why did the State Department ignore multiple
requests for help from the team in Benghazi, leaving
them to fend for themselves in a facility that was no
match for a well-organized assault?

2

See United States v. Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah, No. 14-CR-00141
(D.D.C filed Oct. 14, 2014), Indictment at 6, (hereafter “Khatallah Indictment”).

3

During her testimony before the Committee Secretary Clinton testified, “We
knew that the attack was over. We knew that our diplomatic security team had
to evacuate from the compound to the CIA annex, and we were in a frantic
search to find Ambassador Stevens.” Hearing 4 Before the Select Committee on
the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, 114th Cong.
(2015) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State) (emphasis added).
Secretary Clinton’s certainty about the attack contrasts with the view of those on
the ground, where one of our men described the situation after arriving at the
Annex, “everybody takes a position to support what we have in store, which we
don't know what it is at this point. We are not sure. We don't know if the fight
is over or if it is going to be longer.” Transcript of Deposition of DS Agent #3
before Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 164
(emphasis added) (on file with the Committee).

2

 •

Why did the U.S. military do almost nothing to help
and why did it take them so long to arrive in Libya
and never prepare assets to arrive in Benghazi?

•

Why did the administration mislead the American
people about the nature and cause of the attack?

•

Why, now almost four years later, has only one of
the dozens of terrorists who murdered four of our
countrymen faced American justice?

Our Democrat committee colleagues suggest all questions about
Benghazi have already been asked and answered by earlier congressional
investigations and the State Department’s Accountability Review Board.
While we recognize the contributions some of those other investigations
made to our understanding of Benghazi, the questions above and other
questions remained, both in our minds and in the minds of many
Americans.
We had a duty to seek the entire truth. If we learned nothing new, we
would be the first to admit it—and the time and resources devoted would
have amounted to a small price to pay to close this chapter once and for
all. Yet, our confidence grew that there was more to be learned even as
the administration stonewalled at virtually every turn. Our confidence
grew even more with each new revelation including the revelation of
Secretary Clinton’s unprecedented and exclusive use of a private e-mail
account and server.
Unfortunately, the administration’s efforts to impede the investigation
succeeded, at least in part. The White House in particular left large holes
in the investigation by denying the Committee access to documents and
witnesses—often hiding behind vague notions of “important and
longstanding institutional interests of the Executive Branch.” 4 And so the
Committee ended its work without having spoken to anyone in the White
House Situation Room that night. Nor did we receive all email
communication between White House staffers concerning the attack—all
off limits to Congress according to White House lawyers. Compounding
the problem, the White House refused to identify any of the documents it
4

Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel, to Rep. Trey Gowdy,
Chairman, Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist
Attack in Benghazi (“the Committee”) (Jan. 23, 2015) (on file with the
Committee).

3

 had withheld. If the administration had a sincere interest in cooperating
with the Committee’s investigation, as it stated repeatedly, we saw no
real evidence of it.
And so we leave the Committee much the same way we joined it—
knowing that Congress and the American people did not get every
relevant fact from this administration. Nevertheless, we did learn more.
Much more.
Most significantly, the administration consistently blamed flawed
information from the U.S. Intelligence Community, primarily the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), for its public misstatements about
Benghazi—with the President, Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, and
others blaming a video-inspired protest that had never taken place in
Benghazi. 5 But flawed intelligence is no excuse for officials who knew
better, and we now know that key leaders did. Secretary Clinton in
particular learned quickly that Benghazi amounted to an organized
terrorist attack, not a spontaneous demonstration turned violent. Yet,
Secretary Clinton and the administration told one story privately—that
Benghazi was a terrorist attack—and told another story publicly—
blaming a video-inspired protest. The misleading public statements led
concerned State Department staffers to describe Ambassador Rice as “off
the reservation” and another to add the “[White House was] very worried
about the politics.” 6 A national tragedy, however, is not a time for
politics; it is a time to set politics aside and do one’s duty.
We also learned that by September 11, 2012 the security situation in
Benghazi had deteriorated significantly. Months before the attack one
State Department diplomatic security agent viewed the situation as a
“suicide mission” where “there was a very good chance that everyone
was going to die.” 7 Yet, the facility remained open—even as other
5

For example, the report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence concluded that “Ambassador Rice’s September 16 public statements
about the existence of a protest, as well as some of the underlying intelligence
reports, proved to be inaccurate.” See INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 1112, 2012 (report by Chm. Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger,
Members, H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intel.) (Comm. Print 2014).
6

E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, State Dep’t, Near
Eastern Affairs Bureau to various (Sept. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05580618).
7

Transcript of Interview of DS Agent #10 at 22 (on file with the Committee).

4

 countries and organizations departed. And yet no one could give a
satisfactory explanation for why the State Department remained. While
we may never know for certain exactly why the State Department left
Benghazi open in the face of such dangerous conditions, the most
plausible answer is troubling. Secretary Clinton pushed for the U.S. to
intervene in Libya, which at the time represented one of her signature
achievements. To leave Benghazi would have been viewed as her failure
and prompted unwelcome scrutiny of her choices. But when faced with a
dire situation in Libya, Secretary Clinton had an obligation to act. And
she had a clear chance to do so in August 2012 when presented with the
facts in a memo from Assistant Secretary Beth Jones that painted a bleak
picture of conditions in Libya. Yet, she failed to lead.
Finally, we learned troubling new details about the government’s
military response to the attack. Until now the administration has led us to
believe the military did not have assets—men or machines—close
enough or ready enough to arrive in Benghazi in time to save lives. As
one earlier committee put it, “given their location and readiness status it
was not possible to dispatch armed aircraft before survivors left
Benghazi.” 8 The first asset to arrive in Libya—a Marine “FAST”
platoon—did not arrive until nearly 24 hours after the attack began. What
is troubling is that the administration never set in motion a plan to go to
Benghazi in the first place. It is one thing to try and fail; it is yet another
not to try at all. In the end, the administration did not move heaven and
earth to help our people in Benghazi, as Americans would expect. The
contrast between the heroic actions taken in Benghazi and the inaction in
Washington—highlights the failure.
In 2011, the President boasted that “[w]ithout putting a single U.S.
service member on the ground, we achieved our objectives [in Libya.]” 9
With parts of Libya now terrorist safe havens, it is difficult not to look
back on that claim and the claim “the tide of war was receding” as little
more than wishful thinking. The same wishful thinking may have also
influenced decisions the administration made in Libya and set the
background against which four Americans died. Yet, wishes are no
8

Staff of H. Armed Services Comm., 113th Cong., Majority Interim Report:
Benghazi Investigation Update (Comm. Print 2014) at 19.

9

See Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by
the President on the Death of Muammar Qaddafi (Oct. 20, 2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/20/remarks-presidentdeath-muammar-qaddafi.

5

 match for facts—nor the basis for a sound foreign policy. The facts
remain and the tide of war goes in and out. And it was still rising in
Libya in September 2012 as Secretary Clinton and the President stood
idle.
What follows are the views of two members of this Committee. We
choose to add these additional views not to question the Committee’s full
report. Rather, we write separately to highlight those facts and
conclusions uncovered by our investigation that we consider most
important to a full understanding of the tragedy that is Benghazi.
I.
THE FIRST CASUALTY OF WAR IS TRUTH: HOW THE
ADMINISTRATION MISLED THE PUBLIC ABOUT
THE BENGHAZI ATTACK
Was it because of a protest? Or was it because of guys out for a walk
one night and decided they would go kill some Americans?
What difference at this point does it make?
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State 10
It began the night of September 11, 2012 and continued for nearly two
weeks after. The administration made statements about Benghazi that led
the public to believe the attack began spontaneously as a protest over an
anti-Islamic video circulating on the Internet. It was, they said, the same
video that had sparked demonstrations in Cairo earlier that day. The first
statement came from Secretary Clinton. More would follow, from the
President, from Ambassador Rice, and from others. Each seemed to
blame the murders on a video and a protest.
Yet, in truth, no protest had occurred in Benghazi that night. And even
today no clear link between the video and the attack exists. In fact, in the
10

Benghazi: The Attacks and the Lessons Learned Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. at 28 (2013) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Sec’y of State), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1301/23/se.01.html).
Oddly, even well after the fact Secretary Clinton continues the false narrative by
leaving out of her answer any reference to it having been a planned terrorist
attack.
The statement that begins this section—the first casualty of war is truth—is
typically attributed to the late California Senator Hiram Johnson (1866-1945),
albeit in a slightly different form.

6

 criminal indictment against Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah (hereafter
“Abu Khatallah”)—the only person prosecuted thus far for taking part in
the attack—the government does not mention the video or a protest.
Rather, it blames the attack on revenge for U.S. intelligence collection
efforts in the area—a far different explanation than America received in
the immediate aftermath of the attack. 11
Did the administration mislead the public because it worried a terrorist
attack might affect the upcoming election? Or did it simply rely on
flawed and changing information from the U.S. Intelligence Community
as the administration has maintained? Some critics may say the question
alone is evidence of the Committee’s alleged partisan agenda. Others
may defend the misstatements as little more than election-year “spin”—
something for which the public might fault both parties.
For her part, Secretary Clinton simply dismissed the issue—“at this
point, what difference does it make?”—in her now famous exchange
with Senator Johnson. Yet, the truth is always important. It is especially
so during times when we as a nation must face a crisis—and mourn
one—together and to learn from it. Instead of sharing that truth, the
administration concealed it. And in doing so it misled the American
people for political gain. When that happens, whether by Republicans or
Democrats, it does, should, and always will make a difference.
A.
56 Days
The terrorist attack in Benghazi came during a critical time for the
President. He faced an increasingly difficult re-election bid as polls
showed his lead over Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney
narrowing. The President had few clear successes to highlight from his
first term and the economy had yet to recover fully. The political
landscape left little room for error—or bad news.
If one bright spot existed in the President’s record, nearly four years in
office had passed without a significant terrorist incident at home or
abroad and killing Osama bin Laden represented an important
accomplishment—one the President and his team trumpeted often. 12 As
11

See Khatallah Indictment at 6.

12

For example, just 5 days before the attack, the President in his nationallytelevised speech said the following about the war on terror:

7

 Vice President Biden put it just days before the attack, “Osama bin
Laden is dead, and General Motors is alive.” It was a powerful political
argument, but the tide of war continued to roll in.
September 11, 2012 threatened to take the President’s national security
argument away. The Romney campaign and others seized on the attack
as evidence of a failed policy and criticized the administration’s seeming
refusal to call the attackers terrorists. To many, Benghazi represented a
potential October surprise that could impact the President’s re-election
bid. 13 As one publication put it, “with the American Presidential election
only two months away, the murder of four American diplomats could be
a game changer so far as Mr. Obama’s re-election prospects are
concerned.” 14
The President had a political problem. And his advisors saw it
immediately. In fact, the election entered the discussion before the attack
even ended. Sometime before 10:35 p.m. on the night of September 11,
2012, Victoria Nuland, the State Department’s spokesperson, sent an
email to two other high level Clinton aides, Jacob Sullivan and Phillipe
Reines:

In a world of new threats and new challenges, you can choose
leadership that has been tested and proven. Four years ago I
promised to end the war in Iraq. We did.. I promised to
refocus on the terrorists who actually attacked us on 9/11, and
we have. We’ve blunted the Taliban’s momentum in
Afghanistan, and in 2014, our longest war will be over. A new
tower rises above the New York skyline, al-Qaida is on the
path to defeat, and Osama bin Laden is dead.
President Barack Obama, Speech to Democratic National Convention (Sept. 6,
2012) (emphasis added), http://www.npr.org/2012/ 09/06/ 160713941/transcriptpresident-obamas-convention-speech).
13

See, e.g., Craig Unger, GOP’s October Surprise? Source reveals “Jimmy
Carter Strategy” to make Obama Seem weak on defense in campaign’s final
month, Salon (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/01/gops_october
_surprise/.
14

Con Coughlin, The murder of the US ambassador to Libya is a wake-up call
for Obama, THE TELEGRAPH, (Sept. 12, 2012).

8

 This is what Ben [Rhodes] was talking about.
“I’m outraged by the attacks on American diplomatic
missions in Libya and Egypt and by the death of an
American consulate worker in Benghazi. It’s disgraceful
that the Obama Administration’s first response was not
to condemn attacks on our diplomatic missions, but to
sympathize with those who waged the attacks. – Mitt
Romney” 15
The “Ben” in Nuland’s email was Benjamin Rhodes, the White House
National Security Council’s Deputy National Security Adviser for
Strategic Communications and one of the President’s top aides. The
“this” was the accompanying “Tweet” issued from the Romney
campaign attacking the administration’s handling of the situation. In
short, the national security crisis turned into a political problem almost
immediately.
And so on this highly charged political stage—just 56 days before the
presidential election—events forced the administration to make a choice
about what to tell the American people: Tell the truth that heavily armed
terrorists had killed one American and possibly kidnapped a second—
and increase the risk of losing the election. Say we do not know what
happened. Or blame a video-inspired protest by tying Benghazi to what
had occurred earlier in the day in Cairo. The administration chose the
third, a statement with the least factual support but that would help the
most politically. 16
While the attack loomed largest, and most immediately, for the President
and his reelection bid, he was not alone in having a choice to make—or
with something to lose. Secretary Clinton would have seen her reputation

15

E-mail from Victoria Nuland, State Dep’t Spokesperson, to Jacob Sullivan,
State Dep’t Deputy Chief of Staff and Phillipe Reines, State Dep’t Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Communications (Sept. 11, 2012) (emphasis added) (on
file with the Committee, C05412104).

16

When asked on the night of the attack whether he knew “of any connection
between what had occurred in Cairo and what had occurred in Benghazi,”
Rhodes testified, “I did not, other than the fact that both events took place in
proximity to one another.” See Transcript of Interview of Benjamin Rhodes,
Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, White House
National Security Council at 13 (Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with the Committee).

9

 and legacy—and possibly 2016 election prospects—tied to what had just
occurred in Benghazi as well.
Secretary Clinton was the administration’s chief proponent of U.S. Libya
policy and pushed for the President to join the NATO coalition to topple
Qhaddafi. According to then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who
opposed intervention, others who pushed to intervene—including
Ambassador Rice and Ben Rhodes—are the same people who later
worked to mislead the public about the attack. 17
While that effort succeeded and Qhaddafi is gone, most now agree that
the Libya intervention failed, in large part because of inadequate
planning for a post-Qhaddafi Libya. As former Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates said later, the administration was “playing it by ear” after
Qhaddafi’s fall. 18 So instead of a burgeoning democracy growing from
the Arab Spring, we now have a terrorist safe haven growing in its place.
Secretary Clinton rarely mentions Libya now. Yet, early on her advisors
pointed to Qhaddafi’s ouster and her role as a historic foreign policy
success. In August 2011, Secretary Clinton’s Deputy Chief of Staff and
Director of Policy Jacob Sullivan described her role as no less than the
“leadership/ownership/stewardship of this country’s Libya policy from
start to finish” and that she was “instrumental in securing the
authorization, building the coalition, and tightening the noose around
Qadhafi and his regime.” 19
Secretary Clinton’s longtime friend and advisor Sidney Blumenthal
described the success in even loftier terms:
First, brava! This is a historic moment and you will be
credited for realizing it.
When Qaddafi himself is finally removed, you should of
course make a public statement before the cameras
wherever you are, even in the driveway of your vacation

17

ROBERT F. GATES, DUTY 518 (2014).

18

Nancy A. Youssef, Hillary’s Libya Post-War Plan was “Play It by Ear,”
Gates Says, (Oct. 20, 2015, 8:00 p.m.), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles
/2015/10/ 20/hillary-s-libya-post-war-plan-was-play-it-by-ear-gates-says.html.

19

E-mail from Jacob Sullivan to Cheryl Mills, State Dep’t Chief of Staff (Aug.
21, 2011) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075905).

10

 house. You must go on camera. You must establish
yourself in the historical record at this moment.
The most important phrase is: “successful strategy.”
***
Then you can say whatever on future policy—but only
after asserting the historic success and explaining the
reasons why.
This is a very big moment historically and for you.
History will tell your part in it. You are vindicated. But
don’t wait, help Clio now. 20
It is too soon to know how Clio—the goddess of history—will ultimately
treat Secretary Clinton’s push to intervene in Libya. What we do know is
that when given a chance to tell the truth to the American people, she did
the opposite. It began at 10:08 p.m. in Washington on the night of the
murders—before the attack had even ended.
B.
Out of the Fog: Telling One Story Privately
and Another Story Publicly
Some blame the “fog of war” for the administration’s misstatements
about Benghazi. While it is true officials in Washington did not have all
the facts, the President, Secretary Clinton, and other senior leaders had
enough information to conclude almost immediately that Benghazi and
Cairo were very different. Benghazi was a terrorist attack and Cairo a
large protest that had been publicized in advance on social media and
that the State Department prepared for and expected. 21
The information the President, Secretary Clinton, and other senior
leaders had included detailed information about the sophisticated nature
of the attack, the weapons used, the complexity of the attack, and the
hours-long duration of the siege that spanned two locations. For example,
20

E-mail from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary Rodham Clinton (Aug. 22, 2011)
(emphasis added) (as we now know and as Secretary Gates has pointed, out the
day after Qhaddafi fell called for far more planning than “whatever”) (on file
with the Committee, BLU-094).
21

See Transcript of Press Conference, Statement of Victoria Nuland, State Dep’t
Spokesperson (Sept. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05394583).

11

 one State Department official was told that night by a witness in
Benghazi that the attackers who fired the mortar launcher had significant
training and were “not just persons off the street lobbing in mortars.” 22
Significantly, the information known in Washington included reports
from a number of eye witnesses on the ground in Benghazi—often in
near real time—who remained in almost constant contact with officials in
Washington during the attack. None of those eye witnesses mentioned a
protest or the video.
One of those witnesses saw the attack begin in real time while watching
the Benghazi compound’s security monitors inside the facility’s tactical
operations center. Up to that point, no protests had occurred and all was
calm. When asked later about whether a protest had occurred, he said,
“No. There was nothing out there up until, well, up until there was. I had
been out of the gate at 8:30 that night. We had had personnel leaving the
compound, and they drove away from our compound and didn't report
anything, and I spoke with them subsequently, there was nothing out
there.” 23 That same witness updated officials in Washington every 15 to
30 minutes throughout the night—giving the State Department virtually a
front row seat to the attack. 24
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, Gregory Hicks, who was in
Tripoli at the time of the attack, spoke to Ambassador Stevens last. As
terrorists swarmed the Benghazi compound, Ambassador Stevens
managed to call Hicks and said, simply, “Greg, we are under attack.” 25
No mention of a protest. No mention of the video. Hicks relayed this
same information to Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs

22

Transcript of Interview of Charlene Lamb, Assistant Sec’y of State for
Diplomatic Security for International Programs at 46-47 (Jan. 7, 2016).
23

Transcript of Deposition of DS Agent #3 before House Comm. on Oversight
and Government Reform at 231 (Oct. 8, 2013) (on file with the Committee).
24

Id. at 165. At approximately 4:38 p.m. the State Dep’t Operations Center
appears to have set up a direct line to Benghazi. See E-mail to Jacob Sullivan,
Cheryl Mills, and Secretary Clinton’s Executive Assistant (Sept. 11, 2012) (on
file with the Committee, C05561866).
25

Transcript of Interview of Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of Mission in
Libya before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform at 18 (Apr. 11,
2013).

12

 (“NEA”) Beth Jones 26 and also spoke to Secretary Clinton and other top
State Department officials that night. 27 When asked later whether he
would have expected Ambassador Stevens and the security officers in
Benghazi to report a protest if it had occurred, Hicks said:
Absolutely, I mean, we’re talking about both security
officers who know their trade, even though they are
brand new, and one of the finest political officers in the
history of the Foreign Service. You know, for there to
have been a demonstration on Chris Stevens’ front
door and him not to have reported it is unbelievable.
And secondly, if he had reported it, he would have been
out the back door within minutes of any demonstration
appearing anywhere near that facility. And there was a
back gate to the facility, and, you know, it worked. 28
Days later, one member of the State Department’s Diplomatic Security
Command Center on duty the night of the attack was asked by a
colleague whether a protest had been reported prior to the attack. His
response left little doubt: “Zip, nothing nada.” 29 That same person in a
“Terrorism Event Notification” emailed out the morning of September
12, 2012 described the event just as clearly: “It was a full on attack

26

Transcript of Interview of Beth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs before House Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform at
38-39 (July 11, 2013) (“He said . . . Greg Hicks has called. Ambassador Stevens
is in Benghazi. He called and said, ‘We’re under attack.’”).

27

See Dep’t of State, Watch Log, Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012) (showing
call at 7:05 p.m. between Hicks and Secretary Clinton, Deputy Secretary
Thomas Nides, Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary Wendy
Sherman, Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director Jacob
Sullivan, Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, and Acting Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones (on file with the Committee, C05872462).
28

Transcript of Interview of Gregory Hicks before H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform at 81-82 (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee).
29

E-mail from DS Agent #30 to DS Agent (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05390678).

13

 against our compound in Benghazi.” 30 Again, no mention of a protest.
No mention of the video.
All of the information coming into the State Department that night and in
the days that followed from the witnesses pointed to a terrorist attack.
There is no evidence that any of the accounts blamed a video-inspired
protest or, in fact, any protest at all. Moreover, this attack did not occur
in a vacuum. Rather, it came toward the end—not the beginning—of a
long list of terrorist and other violence aimed at the U.S. and other
interests in Libya and Benghazi—a history of violence well known to
senior State Department officials.
Officials also recognized very quickly the differences between what had
occurred in Cairo in response to the video and what occurred in
Benghazi. As one official put it the night of the attack, “We can confirm
that our office in Benghazi, Libya has been attacked by a group of
militants [and] [i]n Cairo, we can confirm that Egyptian police have now
removed the demonstrators. . . .” 31 That line between Benghazi and
Cairo, however, would soon be blurred and then erased completely.
Notwithstanding clear evidence of a terrorist attack in Benghazi,
Secretary Clinton began to connect Cairo and Benghazi in the public’s
mind almost immediately even as she and others admitted privately the
two were unrelated. It began at 10:08 p.m. on the night of the attack—
before the attack had even ended—with Secretary Clinton’s statement
condemning the attack. Other statements would follow as well that week.
As shown in the following timeline of administration statements, the
administration told two different stories, one publicly that connected the
attack to the video and protests in Cairo and another privately that
recognized it was a terrorist attack.

30

E-mail from DS Agent #30 to various (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05389586)
31

E-mail from Victoria Nuland, State Dep’t Spokesperson to Jacob Sullivan,
Patrick Kennedy, Patrick Ventrell, Bernadette Meehan, National Security
Council, Assistant Press Secretary (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
SCB000471).

14

 C.
Public vs. Private Timeline
9/11—Public Statements
Secretary Clinton’s 10:08 p.m. Statement on the Attack in Benghazi:
“I condemn in the strongest terms the attack on our mission in Benghazi
today. * * * Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a
response to inflammatory material posted on the Internet.” 32
9/11—Private Statements
Secretary Clinton’s Call Sheet for call with President of Libya
Mohammed al Magariaf at 6:49 p.m.:
Under heading Purpose of Call” notes that “Secretary should
urge Mr. Magariaf to respond urgently to the attack against the
U.S. Mission Benghazi, and security threats against U.S.
Embassy Tripoli.” No mention of a protest or video. 33
Summary of Call between Secretary Clinton and President
Magariaf:
“[O]ur diplomatic mission was attacked[.] . . . [T]here is a gun
battle ongoing, which I understand Ansar as-Sharia [sic] is
claiming responsibility for.” 34 No mention of protest or video.
Secretary Clinton’s E-mail to daughter at 11:23 p.m.:
“Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al Quedalike [sic] group[.]” 35

32

Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Statement on the
Attack
in
Benghazi
(Sept.
11,
2012),
http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197628.htm).

33

See The Secretary’s Call Sheet for Libyan General National Congress
President Mohammed al Magariaf (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05580497).
34

Notes of Secretary Clinton’s Call with Mohammed al Magariaf (Sept. 11,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05561906).

35

E-mail from Hillary Rodham Clinton to “Diane Reynolds” (Sept. 11, 2012)
(on file with the Committee, C05794191).

15

 9/12—Public Statements
Secretary Clinton’s Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in
Benghazi, Libya morning of September 12, 2012:
“We are working to determine the precise motivations and methods of
those who carried out this assault. Some have sought to justify this
vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place at our Embassy in
Cairo yesterday, as a response to inflammatory material posted on the
internet.” 36
9/12—Private Statements
Summary of Discussion between Acting Assistant Secretary
Beth Jones and Libyan Ambassador Aujali at 9:45 a.m.:
“I told him that the group that conducted the attacks—Ansar Al
Sharia—is affiliated with Islamic extremists.” 37
Jacob Sullivan in e-mail to embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan:
“There was not really violence in Egypt [and] “we are not
saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over inflammatory
videos.’” 38
Secretary Clinton’s Statements to Egyptian Prime Minister
Kandil at 3:04 p.m.:
“We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with the
film. It was a planned attack – not a protest. . . . Based on the
information we saw today we believe the group that claimed
responsibility for this was affiliated with al Qaeda.” 39

36

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks on the Deaths of American
Personnel
in
Benghazi,
Libya
(Sept.
12,
2012),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197654.htm).
37

See E-mail to Victoria Nuland, Deputy Secretary William Burns, Wendy
Sherman, Jacob Sullivan, Patrick Kennedy, Cheryl Mills, and others (Sept. 12,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05391027).
38

E-mail from Jacob Sullivan to Benjamin Rhodes and others (Sept.12, 2012)
(emphasis added) (on file with the Committee, SCB0066195).
39

Notes of Secretary Clinton’s Call with Egyptian Prime Minister Hesham
Kandil (Sept. 11, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee,
C05561911).

16

 Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy to congressional staff
briefing:
When asked whether “this [was] an attack under the cover of a
protest” Kennedy said, “No the attack was a direct breaching
attack.” More to the point, he was then asked whether “we
believe [this was] coordinated with [the] Cairo [protests] to
which Kennedy responded, “Attack in Cairo was a
demonstration. There were no weapons shown or used. A few
cans of spray paint.” 40
9/13—Public Statements
Secretary Clinton’s Morocco Remarks:
“I also want to take a moment to address the video circulating on the
Internet that has led to these protests in a number of countries. * * *
To us, to me personally, this video is disgusting and reprehensible. It
appears to have a deeply cynical purpose: to denigrate a great religion
and to provoke rage. But as I said yesterday, there is no justification,
none at all, for responding to this video with violence. * * *
Violence, we believe, has no place in religion and is no way to honor
religion. Islam, like other religions, respects the fundamental dignity of
human beings, and it is a violation of that fundamental dignity to wage
attacks on innocents. As long as there are those who are willing to shed
blood and take innocent life in the name of God, the world will never
know a true and lasting peace. It is especially wrong for violence to be
directed against diplomatic missions. . . .
***
I wanted to begin with this statement, because, as our Moroccan friends
and all of you know, this has been a difficult week at the State
Department. I very much appreciate, Minister, the condolences your
government expressed to our Embassy in Rabat. And even though that

40

E-mail from Joy E. Drucker to various (Sept. 13, 2012) (forwarding notes
from call between Patrick Kennedy and congressional staff that began at 6:30
p.m. September 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05580110).

17

 tragedy happened far away in Benghazi, we found a reminder of the
deep bounds that connect Morocco to the United States.” 41
9/13—Private Statements
Summary of call between State Department Deputy Secretary
Thomas Nides and Egyptian ambassador to U.S.:
“Nides said he understood the difference between the targeted
attack in Libya and the way the protest escalated in Egypt.” 42
9/14—Public Statements
White House Spokesman Jay Carney during press conference
answering question about Benghazi:
“We have no information to suggest that it was a preplanned attack. The
unrest we’ve seen around the region has been in reaction to a video that
Muslims, many Muslims find offensive. And while the violence is
reprehensible and unjustified, it is not a reaction to the 9/11 anniversary
that we know of, or to U.S. policy.” 43
E-mail from White House Advisor Benjamin Rhodes:
Under heading “Goals” he wrote “To underscore that these protests are
rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy[.]” 44
Return of remains ceremony statement to father of Tyrone Woods
recorded in diary:

41

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at Opening Plenary of the
United States–Morocco Strategic Dialogue Washington, D.C. Wednesday,
September 13, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/
2012/09/197711.htm.
42

E-mail from State Dep’t Operations Officer to State Dep’t Official (Sept. 13,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05562242).
43

Transcript of White House Press Conference, Jay Carney, White House
Spokesperson (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/09/14/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-9142012).
44

E-mail, Benjamin Rhodes to David Plouffe, White House Political Advisor,
Jay Carney, White House Spokesperson, Erin Pelton, aide to Amb. Susan Rice,
and others (Sept. 14, 2012 at 8:09 p.m.) (on file with the Committee,
C05415285).

18

 "I gave Hillary a hug and shook her hand, and she said we are going to
have the filmmaker arrested who was responsible for the death of my
son." 45
Return of remains ceremony statement to mother of Sean Smith:
“We were nose-to-nose at the coffin ceremony. She told me it was the
fault of the video. I said ‘are you sure?’ She says ‘yes, that’s what it was
. . . it was the video.’” 46
9/14—Private Statements
E-mail from State Department press officer in embassy in
Tripoli, Libya:
“Colleagues, I mentioned to Andy this morning, and want to
share with all of you, our view at Embassy Tripoli that we must
be cautious in our local messaging with regard to the
inflammatory film trailer, adapting it to Libyan conditions. . . .
Relatively few [Facebook comments and tweets] have even
mentioned the inflammatory video. So if we post messaging
about the video specifically, we may draw unwanted attention to
it. And it is becoming increasingly clear that the series of
events in Benghazi was much more terrorist attack than a
protest which escalated into violence. It is our opinion that in
our messaging, we want to distinguish, not conflate, the events
in other countries with this well-planned attack by militant
extremists. I have discussed this with Charge Hicks and he
shares PAS’s view.” 47

45

See Fox News Insider, Father of Benghazi Victim Reveals Journal Entry
Documenting Meeting With Hillary, YOUTUBE (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMx0huMabos.
46

See Fox Business, Benghazi Victim’s Mom: Hillary Needs to Tell Me the
Truth! (Mar. 10, 2016) (available here http://www.foxbusiness.com/
features/2016/03/10/benghazi-victims-mom-hillary-needs-to-tell-me-truth.html).
47

E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to Senior Advisor for
Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, NEA-Libya Desk,
Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of Libya Mission, and others (Sept. 14, 2012
at 6:43 p.m.) (on file with the Committee, C05396788).

19

 9/15—Public Statements
President’s Weekly Address titled “Carrying on the Work of Our
Fallen Heroes” muddles Benghazi and protests in other countries:
“This tragic attack takes place at a time of turmoil and protest in many
different countries. I have made it clear that the United States has a
profound respect for people of all faiths. We stand for religious freedom.
And we reject the denigration of any religion – including Islam.” 48
9/15—Private Statements
Secretary Clinton’s call with Prime Minister-Elect of Libya:
Makes no mention of either a protest or the video. 49
9/16—Public Statements
Ambassador Rice on Fox News With Chris Wallace
“But we don't see at this point signs this was a coordinated plan,
premeditated attack.” 50
9/16—Private Statements
Excerpt from Embassy Tripoli Media Report September 16,
2012
“[T]here is evidence that suggests that the second confrontation
at the UM mission’s safe house could not have happened without
insider knowledge or some degree of organization. This goes
against statements that the attacks were not carried out by a
single group but by an angry multitude protesting[.]” 51
48

Barack Obama, President of the United States, Weekly Address: Carrying on
the
Work
of
Our
Fallen
Heroes
(Sept.
15,
2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/15/weekly-addresscarrying-work-our-fallen-heroes.
49

E-mail from State Dep’t officer to S_CallNotes (Sept. 15, 2012) (notes of call
between Secretary Clinton and Libyan Prime Minister-elect Abu Shagur) (on
file with the Committee, C05561908).
50

Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice on Fox News Sunday with Chris
Wallace (Sept. 16, 2012).
51

E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to Senior Advisor for
Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, Senior Libyan Desk
Officer, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, and others (Sept. 16, 2012) (attacking

20

 9/17—Public Statements
Excerpt from State Department Daily Press Briefing:
“Ambassador Rice, in her comments on every network over the
weekend, was very clear, very precise, about what our initial assessment
of what happened is. . . . I don’t have anything to give you beyond
that.” 52
9/17—Private Statements
Excerpt from e-mail discussion between members of NEA press
office about what to say about attack:
NEA Press Officer Suggested the following language:
“The currently available information suggests the
demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the
protests of the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct
assault[.]”
Senior Libya Desk Officer, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau
responding to suggested language:
“I really hope this was revised. I don’t think we should go on
the record on this.” 53
9/18—Public Statements
Excerpt from White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay
Carney:
. . . I would point you to what Ambassador Rice said and others have said
about what we know thus far about the video and its influence on the
protests that occurred in Cairo, in Benghazi and elsewhere.”

Tripoli Media Report for Sept. 16, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05396830).
52

State Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing – September 17, 2012, Victoria
Nuland, State Dep’t Spokesperson, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb
/2012/09/197821.htm.

53

See E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA to
Spokesperson, NEA, Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA, Deputy Director, Office
of Maghreb Affairs, NEA (Sept 17, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).

21

 9/18—Private Statements
Deputy Director of CIA Michael Morell in written statement to
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
“The critically important point is that the analysts considered this
a terrorist attack from the very beginning.” 54
E-mail exchange between State Department security officers
commenting on news article titled “White House sees no sign
Libya attack premeditated”:
DS Agent #30: “Can you believe this?”
DS Agent: “Was there any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to
the attack?”
DS Agent #30: “Zip, nothing nada” 55
9/19—Public Statements
From “ALDAC”—a worldwide cable—from Secretary Clinton to all
U.S. Embassies drafted by Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan:
“Since September 11, 2012, there have been widespread protests and
violence against U.S. and some other diplomatic posts across the Muslim
world. The proximate cause of the violence was the release by
individuals in the United States of the video trailer for a film that many
Muslims find offensive. Diplomatic compounds have been breached in
several countries including Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. In
Benghazi, Libya four U.S. personnel were killed in the violence[.]” 56
The administration, including Secretary Clinton, knew that Benghazi was
a terrorist attack—from witness accounts, from their understanding of the
history of violence in Benghazi, and from the nature of the well-planned,

54

Michael Morell, Former Acting Director and Deputy Director of the CIA,
Written Statement for the Record before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intel.
(April 2, 2014).

55

E-mail from DS Agent #30 to DS Agent (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05389586).
56

E-mail from Sullivan Assistant to various (attaching “Immediate ALDAC for
transmission” drafted by J Sullivan 9/19/2012 noting approval by “S: The
Secretary”) (Sept. 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0052811) (emphasis
added).

22

 complex attack. Yet, they led the public to believe the video and a protest
were to blame in Benghazi.
9/20—Public Statements
Excerpt from interview of the President on Univision Town Hall:
In response to the question, “We have reports that the White House said
today that the attacks in Libya were a terrorist attack. Do you have
information indicating that it was Iran, or al Qaeda was behind
organizing the protests?” the President answered, “[W]e’re still doing an
investigation[.] . . . What we do know is that the natural protests that
arose because of the outrage over the video were used as an excuse by
extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S. interests[.]” 57
Secretary Clinton has since blamed her statements on changing
information received from U.S. intelligence reports. She and others have
claimed that the 10:08 p.m. statement was not meant to ascribe a motive
to the attack. Yet, Sullivan knew the morning of September 12th—based
on the press release from the embassy in Kabul—that people had heard it
exactly that way. Moreover, whether or not the intelligence information
changed, Secretary Clinton’s public and private statements remained
unchanged—publicly tying Benghazi and Cairo together and privately
recognizing the violence in Benghazi was a terrorist attack with nothing
to do with a protest or video.
Moreover, to the extent any intelligence analysis incorrectly reported on
a protest or a video in connection with Benghazi, Secretary Clinton and
other State officials, who knew better, simply ignored them. As just one
example, in her conversation September 15, 2012 with the president of
Libya, Secretary Clinton made no mention of anything in the CIA talking
points that administration officials later claimed were the best assessment
available at the time, and those talking points made no mention of a
video in connection with Benghazi. In short, Secretary Clinton and the
administration knew better than to rely on flawed intelligence reports.
Intelligence assessments may have changed. News reports may have
changed. But the eye witness accounts remained same—and not one said
a protest had occurred. Yet, once Secretary Clinton and Ben Rhodes set
the message, the truth became an afterthought.
57

Press Release, Remarks by the President at Univision Town Hall with Jorge
Ramos
and
Maria
Elena
Salinas
(Sept.
20,
2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/20/remarks-presidentunivision-town-hall-jorge-ramos-and-maria-elena-salina (emphasis added).

23

 D.
Ambassador Rice Faces the Nation
On September 16, 2012, Ambassador Susan Rice appeared on five
Sunday talk shows and blamed Benghazi on the video. She took the
brunt of the criticism for doing so when it finally became public that no
protest had occurred. It is now clear, however, that connecting the video
to Benghazi started far sooner. It began with Secretary Clinton’s 10:08
p.m. statement the night of the attack. Rice compounded the deception.
While Secretary Clinton and others blurred the line between Cairo and
Benghazi, Ambassador Rice erased it completely.
Ambassador Rice now claims that she did not blame the video for what
occurred in Benghazi. The plain wording of what she said, however,
refutes her testimony to the Committee. She also claims that she simply
relied on the flawed CIA talking points. But even a casual reading of
those talking points shows that she went far beyond what the CIA
prepared—in a way that helped the President politically.
The original draft of the CIA talking points included key information that
would have at a minimum pointed to the possibility of a planned terrorist
attack. For example, the initial draft referred to knowing that “Islamic
extremists with ties to al-Qa’ida” had taken part in the attack, that “there
had been at least five other attacks” previously, and that they could not
rule out that “individuals had previously surveilled the U.S. facilities.” 58
By the final draft, however, officials had stripped out all of that and other
information. It then read simply:
The currently available information suggests that the
demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired
by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved
into a direct assault against the U.S. diplomatic post and
subsequently its annex. There are indications that
extremists participated in the violent demonstrations.
This assessment may change as additional information is
collected and analyzed and currently available
information continues to be evaluated.
58

See Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/
Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf.

24

 The investigation is ongoing, and the U.S. Government
is working w/ Libyan authorities to help bring to justice
those responsible for the deaths of U.S. citizens. 59
The talking points in their final form make no mention of the video.
Nevertheless, and with no discernable basis for doing so, Ambassador
Rice drew that inaccurate connection. On Meet the Press she said
“putting together the best information we have available to us today our
current assessment is that what happened in Benghazi was in fact
initially a spontaneous reaction to what had just transpired hours before
in Cairo, almost a copycat of – of the demonstrations against our facility
in Cairo, which were prompted, of course, by the video.” 60
The statement Rice made was false. The “best information” available at
the time—from the witnesses on the ground—pointed directly to a preplanned, complex terrorist attack. Many within the State Department
came to that conclusion quickly as well. For example, a Senior Advisor
for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, “My
opinion, that night, was simply that this was a terrorist attack.” 61
Likewise, Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones testified that “there
was discussion about was it a demonstration, was it an attack? And I
knew very well that the Embassy [in Tripoli] believed it to be an attack.
I believed it to be an attack.” 62
No one—and certainly not the CIA or the broader U.S. Intelligence
Community—had described Benghazi as a copycat of Cairo. In fact,
knowing what they knew at the time it is hard to imagine how the two
events could have been more different. On the very night of the attack,
Ambassador Rice herself received an e-mail that described the Cairo
protests as “2000 protestors in total. 20 got to the top of the wall, 10 got
inside the perimeter – they tore down the flag and sprayed graffiti inside

59

Id.

60

Transcript of Interview, Amb. Susan Rice on Meet the Press (Sept. 16, 2012).

61

Transcript of Interview of Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near
Eastern Affairs Bureau at 89 (July 29, 2015) (on file with the Committee).

62

Transcript of Interview of Acting Assistant Sec’y of State NEA Beth Jones
before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform at 138-139 (July 11,
2013) (on file with the Committee).

25

 the compound. They went after employee cars as well.” 63 No one used or
showed a weapon in Cairo and no American was hurt. In short, Benghazi
was not “almost a copycat” of what occurred in Cairo and Ambassador
Rice knew it.
Ambassador Rice’s “copycat” claim was particularly troubling in light of
the fact that the President said virtually the opposite just days earlier. In
an interview with Steve Kroft of 60 Minutes on September 12, 2012 he
was asked, “This has been described as a mob action, but there are
reports that they were very heavily armed with grenades. That doesn’t
sound like your normal demonstration.” 64 To which the President
responded, “As I said, we’re still investigating exactly what happened. I
don’t want to jump the gun on this. But you’re right that this is not a
situation that was exactly the same as what happened in Egypt, and my
suspicion is, is that there are folks involved in this who were looking to
target Americans from the start.” 65 It is troubling that this portion of the
President’s answer was deleted from the show that aired on September
23, 2012 and was not made public until just days before the election.
Similarly, on CNN’s State of the Union Ambassador Rice, almost
indignant, insisted “[f]irst of all, let’s be clear about what transpired here.
What happened this week in Cairo, in Benghazi, in many parts of the
region
. . . was a result – a direct result of a heinous and offensive
video that was widely disseminated.” 66 Again, nowhere in the talking
points did the U.S. Intelligence Community blame the video for what
occurred in Benghazi let alone describe it as a “direct result” of the
video. When confronted with this, Ambassador Rice seemed to deny the
meaning of the very words she used, claiming that she did not “intend[]
to include[] Benghazi in that statement[.]” 67

63

E-mail from a State Dep’t Senior Policy Advisor to Amb. Susan Rice and
others (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05390691).
64

Internal Transcript, Interview of the President by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes at 2
(Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05527907).
65

Id.

66

Transcript of Interview, Amb. Susan Rice on CNN State of the Union (Sept.
16, 2012).
67

Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice at 102 (February 2, 2016), (on file
with the Committee).

26

 Nor did Ambassador Rice—or anyone else from the administration—tell
the full story. In fact, they only told the half that helped politically. For
example, the administration claimed publicly there was no “actionable
intelligence” prior to the attack—suggesting the attack was
spontaneous. 68 However, it failed to disclose that at the time significant
gaps existed in U.S. intelligence collection in Libya that made it virtually
impossible to have picked up such warnings in the first place. It also
failed to highlight the casing incident that had
occurred the morning of the attack just outside the Benghazi
compound. 69 The administration also failed to disclose the long history
of terrorist violence in Benghazi—information that would have placed
the Benghazi attack into its proper context.
Nor did Ambassador Rice show any sincere interest in finding all of the
facts—or as she put it—the best information available before going on
the Sunday talk shows. In fact, her preparation session the day before,
which included Benjamin Rhodes and White House political adviser
David Plouffe—appeared to spend very little time on Benghazi at all. 70
On Monday, September 17, 2012, some State Department officials
reacted with shock to Ambassador Rice’s claims. Specifically, the
Department’s NEA Bureau press department—the experts on Libya—
reacted with disbelief. The discussion began with NEA’s Senior Libyan
Desk Officer reacting to draft press guidance that quoted the CIA talking
points by saying, “I really hope this was revised. I don’t think we should
go on the record on this.” 71 This led to the Deputy Director, Office of
68

See US ‘had no actionable intelligence’ over Benghazi attack, THE
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africa
andindianocean/libya/9597738/US-had-no-actionable-intelligence-overBenghazi-attack.html.
69

See E-mail from Assistant Regional Security Officer (Sept. 11, 2012) (“We
received word from our local guards that this morning they observed a member
of the police force assigned to the [Benghazi] Mission at a construction site
across the street from our main gate taking pictures of our compound. I briefed
the [Ambassador.]) (on file with the Committee, C05271656).
70

See Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice at 39 (February 2, 2016)
(Rice testified “I don’t recall us talking about the CIA talking points” and “we
didn’t talk about Benghazi, in fact, on the phone call, as I remember”) (on file
with the Committee).
71

E-mail from Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA to NEA Press Officer (Sept 17,
2012) (on file with the Committee: Doc# C05580617).

27

 Maghreb Affairs, NEA saying, “Not sure we want to be so
definitive[,]” 72 which led to the following e-mail exchange:
NEA Spokesperson:
The horse has left the barn on this, don’t you think? Rice
was on FIVE Sunday Morning shows yesterday saying
this. Tough to walk back.
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA:
[Nuland] planned on walking it back just a bit, though.
Senior Libyan Desk Officer, NEA:
I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA:
Yup. Luckily there’s enough in her language to fudge
exactly what she said/meant.
NEA Spokesperson:
Off the reservation on five networks!
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA:
[White House] very worried about the politics. This was
all their doing. 73
Although these individuals may not have seen the CIA talking points
prior to Rice’s appearances, they did know what had occurred in
Benghazi based on their vantage point that night. 74
The exchange also highlights another important issue. Toward the end of
the exchange the NEA Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications
72

Id.

73

E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA to
Spokesperson, NEA, Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA, Deputy Director, Office
of Maghreb Affairs, NEA (Sept 17, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).
74

See, e.g., Transcript of Interview of Senior Advisor for Strategic
Communications, NEA at 89 (“Q: So let me make sure I’m clear. So your
opinion on the night of the attack, when you were at the State Department, your
opinion was that it was a terrorist attack? A: Correct.”) (on file with the
Committee).

28

 describes it as “luck” that Ambassador Rice had said enough to “fudge”
what she meant. A national crisis is no time to fudge the truth; it is a time
to find it and to tell it. But what we found here is just the opposite. And
for those who appear to have known the truth—such as Secretary
Clinton—the American people waited in vain for them to correct
Ambassador Rice’s misleading public statements.
Possibly most troubling is the evidence suggesting the State Department
may have changed its public statements to match Rice’s claims.
Specifically, on September 17, 2012, a State Department Press Officer in
the NEA Bureau circulated a document entitled “NEA Press Guidance
Libya: Update on Investigation on Attack in Benghazi,” 75 a document
intended as guidance for public comments about the attack. In the
original draft it said that “we have not seen any signs that the attack . . .
in Benghazi was other than premeditated or coordinated.” In a later
draft, however, “other than premeditated or coordinated” morphed into
“other than spontaneous.” The document produced by the State
Department to the Committee still contained the insertion (in bold) and
deletions (in bold strikethrough) under the heading “Key Points”:
We will continue to wait for the findings of the ongoing
FBI investigation before reaching a final conclusion, but
at this preliminary stage, time, we have not yet seen any
signs that the attack on our consulate in Benghazi was
other
than
spontaneous.
premeditated.
or
coordinated. 76
No one asked about it could explain the change. The change—from the
truth to a known false statement—is troubling.
Secretary Clinton and others in the State Department clearly knew the
truth about Benghazi almost immediately. Yet they only shared that
information with others privately, including with Secretary Clinton’s
daughter. Publicly they told a very different story—one in line with Ben
Rhodes’s instruction to blame the video and not a failure of the
President’s policy. In doing so, the President and Secretary Clinton put
politics ahead of the truth. The four victims deserved better. And the
American people deserved better.
75

See E-mail from NEA press officer to Bernadette Meehan and others (Sept.
17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578291).
76

Id.

29

 II.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
In August 2012, however, it did not take an expert to see that the State
Department facility in Benghazi should have been closed if additional
security was not to be provided. The location and the risk demanded
Secretary Clinton’s attention. The Benghazi facility was wholly unique
and there is no evidence that Secretary Clinton asked her experts—let
alone Ambassador Stevens who she personally chose for the position—
the hard questions. The robust host-nation security forces that the United
States takes for granted in other countries did not exist in Libya. Rather,
competing militias—some friendly, some not—filled the vacuum left by
40-plus years of Qhaddafi’s rule. And escalating violence against the
U.S. compound and others in Libya—230 incidents since June 2011
alone—made a terrorist attack all but inevitable. These were the facts
known in August 2012. And in August 2012 Secretary Clinton had the
last, clear chance to provide adequate protection or, failing that, to close
the facility and pull our people out. She did neither.
A.
The “wild east”: Post-Qhaddafi Benghazi
I told him that this was a suicide mission; that there was a very good
chance that everybody here was going to die; that there was absolutely
no ability here to prevent an attack whatever. *** [H]he
said, “everybody back here in D.C. knows that people are
going to die in Benghazi, and nobody cares and nobody
is going to care until somebody does die.”
State Diplomatic Security Agent #10 77
According to the Diplomatic security agent quoted above, he had this
exchange with the State Department’s desk officer for diplomatic
security in the region that covered Libya, shortly after he arrived in
Benghazi on temporary assignment as the regional security officer. The
conversation did not occur days before the attack. It did not occur a
month before the attack. Rather, he gave the warning nearly nine months

77

Transcript of Interview of DS Agent #10 at 22-23 (April 2, 2015) (recounting
conversation with DS Agent #25 who was the desk officer for diplomatic
security in the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau).

30

 before September 11, 2012 shortly after he arrived in Benghazi. Nor was
his the only warning.
In June 2012, a second Benghazi security official reported on the
“increase in extremist activity” in Benghazi and described his “fear that
we have passed a threshold where we will see more targeting, attacks,
and incidents involving western [sic] targets.” 78 The official also listed a
series of very recent attacks and noted that a source had warned of a
“group attack” on an American facility. 79 He specifically mentioned
“[t]argeting [and] attacks by extremist groups particularly in the eastern
portion of Libya[.]” 80 These warnings contained troubling information
about possible terrorists trying to learn information about U.S.
facilities. 81
The list of incidents in Benghazi that were reported back to Washington
was long. And it told a compelling story of a city on the brink. To
anyone aware of the conditions, it was not a matter of “if” but rather
“when” a terrorist attack on the U.S. compound would occur. The list ran
the gamut from minor to major incidents, including a rocket attack on the
British ambassador’s convoy that prompted withdrawal of British
personnel from the city. The incidents included:
•

April 10, 2012 explosive device hits U.N. convoy in Benghazi 82

•

May 22, 2012 rocket propelled grenade attack on the
International Red Cross facility, which included a warning that
“Americans would be targeted next” 83

•

June 6, 2012 attack on U.S. mission in Benghazi 84

78

E-mail from DS Agent #24 to DS Agent #25 (June 14, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05388987).
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id. (“LES bodyguard assigned to the Ambassador’s Protection Detail informed
the RSO that he was asked about specific security questions concerning the
embassy by an individual that he believed was an extremist.”).
82

E-mail from Diplomatic Security Agent 16 to DS-IP-NEA (Apr. 10, 2012) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0048085).
83
E-mail from OpsNewsTicker to NEWS-Libya (May 22, 2012, 9:06 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05392368).

31

 •

June 18, 2012 armed attackers storm Tunisian Consulate 85

•

June 11, 2012 rocket attack on the British ambassador 86

•

July 27, 2012 attempted bomb attack on Tibesti Hotel in
Benghazi, the hotel used by the State Department during
Revolution 87

•

July 31, 2012 seven Iranian-citizen International Committee of
the Red Crescent workers abducted 88

•

August 20, 2012 small bomb thrown at Egyptian diplomat’s
vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate 89

Without this background one could, in theory, jump to the mistaken
conclusion that the terrorist attack in Benghazi and the protests in Cairo
were connected in time and in cause. But the State Department and the
NEA Bureau in particular knew this history all too well. For those
people, it was against this backdrop that they quickly saw Benghazi for
what it was: a terrorist attack, not a protest.
Nor did this escalation in violence escape the notice of American policy
makers or the U.S. Intelligence Community. Intelligence analysts
84

E-mail from Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep’t of State, to John C. Stevens, U.S.
Ambas-sador to Libya, Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya,
William V. Roe-buck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 6, 2012, 4:49 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05393187).
85

See Mohamed al-Tommy and Hadeel al-Shalchi, Gunmen Attack Tunisian
Consulate
in
Benghazi,
Reuters
(Jun.
18,
2012,
19:03),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-gunmen-tunisiaidUSBRE85H1V620120618
86

Memo from Regional Director, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, Diplomatic
Security at 44 (June 15, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048161).

87

See Blast and Jailbreak Rock Libya's Benghazi, AlJazeera (Aug. 1, 2012)
(available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/08/201281818 48269
995.html).
88

Iran Red Crescent Team 'Kidnapped' in Libya, AlJazeera (Jul. 31, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/07/201273120552473238.html.

89

See Steven Sotloff, The Bomb Attacks in Libya: Are Gaddafi Loyalists Behind
Them?, Time (Aug. 24, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/08/24/the-bombattacks-in-libya-are-gaddafi-loyalists-behind-them/.

32

 produced numerous reports on the growing terrorist threat centered in
Benghazi—yet the State Department did nothing. Again, why? And so
even though the security problems in Benghazi appear to have been well
known to State Department officials at the time, no one acted in any
meaningful way to protect the Benghazi facility let alone to get the
people out. The question remained: Why?
Although the agent’s warning quoted at the section heading could not
have been clearer, it was ignored even as the situation in Benghazi went
from bad to worse. The situation became so grave that it prompted one
State Department official to dub Benghazi the “wild east.” Sadly, the
humor foreshadowed the horror to come as he made this statement in an
e-mail sent to Ambassador Stevens just hours before his death. 90
Some blame the deplorable security conditions in Benghazi on the
facility’s “made up” State Department designation. To them, the fact the
Department labeled the facility “temporary” excused shortcomings in the
compound’s physical security. A “temporary” designation enabled the
facility to skirt a host of written internal security requirements that
applied to more permanent locations. We also learned it was an
improvised designation not used at any of the State Department’s other
275 facilities around the world. 91 The requirements this designation
avoided cover everything from setbacks to perimeter wall heights to
razor wire placement. Standards that, had the State Department complied
with them, would have given the Benghazi staff a fighting chance that
night.
In trying to excuse the security conditions in Benghazi, some have
argued that it would have been impossible to comply with the State
Department’s internal requirements in Benghazi. That may be true, but it
is also irrelevant. The suggestion that a facility’s label should dictate
whether men and women have adequate security of course makes no
sense.
It makes no sense because it ignores a critical requirement applicable to
all facilities regardless of whether it will stand for a day, a year, or a
90
E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to Amb. Christopher
Stevens (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee).
91

This is the number of facilities identified by Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security Gregory Starr in his testimony before the Committee in
2014. Transcript of Hearing 1 H. Sel. Comm. on Benghazi Testimony of
Gregory Starr at 97 (Sept. 17, 2014).

33

 decade. The facility’s label did not trump commonsense. Nor did it blind
officials to the deadly attack that to trained professionals appears to have
been all but inevitable, as the security agent quoted above observed
months before. In other words, the State Department cannot hide behind
its regulations. It had an obligation to act yet did far too little to secure
the facility. The question, again, was why?
The same question came from the former Ambassador to Yemen, who
the day after the attack observed:
People are bound to ask how we can send unarmed
civilian diplomats to conduct [U.S. government]
business into a region with no local security forces to
rely on, only a handful of lightly armed [diplomatic
security] agents serving as close protection team, and a
couple dozen local militiamen of questionable pedigree
with AK-47’s providing perimeter security. 92
It was a question that the ambassador himself could not even answer: “I
would suggest that we begin to think now of how we explain/justify our
presence in these non-permissive environments. 93 To most Americans,
the time to think about justifying a presence in Benghazi and other
dangerous places should have come before, not after, Americans have
died.
So the question remained, what was so important in Benghazi that it
meant risking the lives of Americans in what many appeared to view as a
suicide mission? It is true that American diplomats cannot hide inside
bunkers. That we can never eliminate all risk in diplomacy. That
Benghazi was the seat of the revolution and home to important antiregime leaders. And that the United States was not alone in seeing a good
reason to be there, as other Western countries had done the same. Yet,
other Western countries left and the U.S. stayed. So while all this may be
true, it still begs the essential question: Why Benghazi? The answer that
best fits is politics.

92

E-mail from former ambassador to Yemen to Beth Jones, Acting Assistant
Secretary for NEA (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05391021).
93

Id.

34

 B.
Putting Politics Ahead of People: Failing to Close
the Benghazi Compound
It remains unclear why a State Department presence in Benghazi was so
important. What is clear, however, is keeping a facility open there was
important to Secretary Clinton. In addition, on this matter, many
questions remain and much classified information was withheld from the
Committee.
In his interview with Secretary Clinton prior to confirmation as
ambassador to Libya, Secretary Clinton told Ambassador Stevens that
she hoped that Benghazi would become a permanent post. In late July
2012, Ambassador Stevens discussed the issue with his Deputy Chief of
Mission Gregory Hicks. According to Mr. Hicks, during their discussion
Ambassador Stevens said that Secretary Clinton might travel to Libya
again, possibly in October, 94 and that Stevens wanted to have a
“deliverable” for her trip. That “deliverable” was to make the mission in
Benghazi permanent.
No matter how important a presence in Benghazi was—to Secretary
Clinton, to the State Department, to the United States—it should have
become very clear that the risks of staying without more security
outweighed any possible benefit.
On August 17, 2012, Secretary Clinton received a document titled
“Information Memo for the Secretary.” The memo did not pull punches.
Under the somewhat benign heading “Uptick in Violence, Primarily in
Eastern Libya” it said, “Since May, there has been a spike in violent
incidents, including bombings, abductions, assassinations, and carjackings.” 95 The memo, from Acting Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs Beth Jones, is quoted at length here:

94

Transcript of Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of Mission
Embassy Libya, before H. Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight at 15
(April 11, 2013).
95

Information Memo for the Secretary from Acting Assistant Secretary Beth
Jones, NEA (Aug. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05390124).

35

 •

“While unpredictable security conditions restrict the
movement of U.S. government personnel, they have not
limited our assistance work.” 96

•

“The attachment lists the major events, which include a June
6 bombing at the U.S. Mission in Benghazi and an August 6
attempted car-jacking of embassy personnel in Tripoli.” 97

•

“Recently, foreign residents of Benghazi have expressed
concern about the risks of living and working there.” 98

•

“In response to five attacks since May, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) withdrew its personnel
from Benghazi and Misrata in early August[.] The ICRC
country director believes international organizations in Libya
have underestimated the recent rise in violence out of a
shared sense of optimism.” 99

•

“The variety of the violence points to the overall lack of
effective security institutions, particularly in the east.” 100

•

“The distance from the already weak central security
services, feelings of marginalization from the central
government, and a history of lslamist extremism in some
eastern towns all seem to contribute to a permissive
environment where disparate motivations for violence have
found fertile ground in which to germinate. The national
Supreme Security Council - a post-revolutionary coalition of
militia elements cobbled into a single force and designed to
provide interim security in Benghazi - has had limited
success as a stabilizing force.” 101

•

“The government seems largely unable to gather intelligence
in advance of attacks and central security services appear

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

36

 intimidated by the local militias, in some cases tacitly ceding
their authority. Some actors see the weak response from the
government and feel they can act with increasing impunity.
The sense of lawlessness encourages spoilers, predators, and
other disruptive players to escalate their actions.” 102
•

“Benghazi was once palpably safer than Tripoli [but] . . .
lawlessness is increasing. . . . Despite the urgency, however,
the government’s response is likely to continue to be hesitant
and tentative[.]” 103

•

“Despite the worrisome aspects of this increase in violence,
there is no coordinated organization behind the incidents. . . .
Nonetheless, the likelihood of more widespread violence is
strong if Libya’s political leaders are unable to demobalize
[sic] militias and strengthen the government’s security
institutions.” 104

Despite the colorless bureaucratic language, the Beth Jones memo
nevertheless painted a harrowing picture of conditions in the eastern part
of Libya where Benghazi is located. Many of the words truly jump at the
reader— “urgency,” “lawlessness,” “unpredictable,” “lack of effective
security,” “limited success,” “widespread violence,” “act with increasing
impunity.” The list of specific incidents attached to the memo brought
that picture into even starker relief.
When Secretary Clinton was asked about the Beth Jones memo during
her Committee interview she deflected, “Well, I think that, again, there
was no recommendation based on any of the assessments, not from our
State Department experts, not from the intelligence community, that we
should abandon either Benghazi or Tripoli.” 105
In the beginning and possibly into the summer of 2012, the situation in
Benghazi may have represented one that called out for State Department
102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Transcript of Hearing 4 before the Select Committee on the Events
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (hereafter referred to as “the
Committee”), 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y
of State).

37

 security experts or the Intelligence Community to speak up. But by
August 17, 2012, it had become a situation that now demanded
leadership by the Secretary of State herself—leadership that did not sit
back and wait for a recommendation.
Just as she had shown—in the words of Jacob Sullivan—
“leadership/ownership/ stewardship” on the decision to go into Libya, it
was now time for her to show that same leadership and upgrade the
facility or get our people out—even if it meant criticism from those who
opposed the intervention in the first place. She had the last, clear chance
to order an immediate closure of the Benghazi facility yet did nothing,
and four Americans died.
During her testimony before the Committee, Secretary Clinton almost
scolded the Republican members:
You know, I would imagine I've thought more about
what happened than all of you put together. I've lost
more sleep than all of you put together. I have been
racking my brain about what more could have been done
or should have been done. 106
For one that had spent so much time thinking about what happened, it
seems that the answer should have been obvious.
III.
MILITARY RESPONSE: COULD WE
HAVE DONE MORE?
I just say, do it. Take the hill.
They take the hill.
Leon Panetta
Secretary of Defense 107
The U.S. military never reached Benghazi. Not only did it not get to
Benghazi, it did not get to Libya during the 7-plus hours of the ongoing
106

Transcript of Hearing 4 before the Select Committee on the Events
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (hereafter referred to as “the
Committee”), 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y
of State).
107

Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Defense at 57 (Jan. 8,
2016).

38

 attack. The only support unit that did arrive in Tripoli—the Marine
“Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team” or “FAST” team—was anything
but fast, and arrived in Libya nearly 24 hours after the attack had begun
and 16-plus hours after the attack ended. In fact, it did not take off until
almost 12 hours after the attack ended. Why? Although a Department of
Defense drone circled overhead in Benghazi during much of the attack,
the military never sent an armed drone that could possibly have changed
the course of events during the hours-long siege, especially as terrorists
pounded the Annex with mortar fire. An armed drone never came. Why?
Like many Americans, the picture we saw of what happened in Benghazi
clashed with our experience and expectations. The brave men and
women who serve this country are the greatest fighting force on earth
with a capability second to none. We as Americans have grown to expect
these men and women to do the near impossible. And time and again
they not only meet our expectations, they surpass them. In fact, we saw
examples of exactly that heroism on the ground in Benghazi that night.
Our brave soldiers were ready, willing, and able to fight for their fellow
countrymen but leaders in Washington held them back. If they had been
given the chance they would have, we have no doubt, as Secretary
Panetta said, “taken that hill.”
In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary of Defense Panetta said
that at about 6:00 p.m. on September 11th after meeting with the
President, he ordered three assets to deploy: one Marine Fleet AntiTerrorism Support Team or “FAST” team, one Commanders In Extremis
Force or “CIF,” and one hostage rescue team based in the United States.
He was clear: “My orders were to deploy those forces, period.” 108
After his meeting with the President, which lasted less than 30 minutes,
Secretary Panetta had no further contact with the President that night. 109
None. It is hard to accept that the Commander in Chief and the Secretary
of Defense had no further contact during the entire unfolding crisis.
Possibly just as startling is that Secretary Panetta and Secretary Clinton
did not speak at all 110 and Secretary Clinton did not speak to the
108

Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Defense at 24 (Jan. 8,
2016).
109

Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Defense at 42 (Jan. 8,
2016).
110

Id. at 48.

39

 President until approximately 10:30 p.m., over six hours after the
terrorist attack began and approximately five hours after a U.S.
ambassador went missing. 111 Secretary Clinton spoke to CIA Director
David Petraeus at approximately 5:38 p.m. but not again that night. 112
The meeting (denoted “M”) and calls (denoted “C”), or lack thereof,
between the four principals—President Obama, Secretary Clinton,
Secretary Panetta, and Director Petraeus—looked like this: 113

We cannot help but contrast the picture painted by the above with the all
hands on deck depicted in the now-famous photo of the President,
Secretary Clinton, Defense Secretary Gates, Director of National
Intelligence Clapper, and other officials huddled in the Situation Room
during the Osama bin Laden raid. Benghazi should have merited the
same level of attention and urgency.
Until now, the public has been told that the military could not have
reached Benghazi in time to help—either with jet planes, armed drones,
or personnel. Had we seen aircraft in the air flying toward Benghazi—
flying toward the sound of gunfire as the military often says—only to be
recalled mid-flight after hearing that the Americans had left Benghazi
111

See Dep’t of State, Watch Log, Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05872462).
112

Id.

113

All times Eastern.

40

 safely, we may have been willing to accept that explanation. But the
fighter planes and armed drones never left the ground. And, as the chart
below shows, the transport planes carrying the FAST, CIF, and hostage
rescue team did not leave until hours after the attack was over.
The attack began at 9:42 p.m. in Benghazi, 3:42 p.m. in Washington. It
does not appear that Secretary Panetta heard about the attack until
sometime after 4:32 p.m. when the National Military Command Center
was notified and he did not discuss the matter with the President until
approximately 5:00 p.m. From 3:42 p.m. until approximately 10:00 a.m.
the next day—nearly 18 hours—no manned U.S. military plane flew on a
mission toward Libya. When the first plane did take off with a Marine
FAST platoon it did not take off until hours after the attack ended and
flew to an intermediate country. The timeline of significant events
compared to when the military assets took off and arrived included the
following: 114

114

All times shown are Eastern time, which is 6 hours behind local time in
Benghazi.

41

 We are now convinced, contrary to the administration’s public claim that
the military did not have time to get to Benghazi, that the administration
never launched men or machines to help directly in the fight. That is very
different from what we have been told to date. And the evidence is
compelling.
For example, FAST platoons, as of September 2012, were typically used
to reinforce embassy security and operated from a fixed location within
an embassy. FAST platoons did not deploy with their own vehicles, so
they were dependent on other means for ground mobility. In other words,

42

 the FAST team was not sent to help in the fight at the CIA Annex. The
question then became what was sent. And the answer appears to be
nothing. None of the three assets that Secretary Panetta ordered to deploy
were intended to join the fight against terrorists at the Annex.
An asset that could have made a difference would have been armed
drones. And as the Committee learned, it would have been relatively fast
and easy to arm a drone. To date, however, the Committee has not
received a detailed inventory of all armed drone assets available that
night from the Department of Defense. While we understand that
because of time and distance armed drones may not have arrived in time
that does not alter the fact that we did not try.
The military has failed to provide a clear, specific inventory of every
armed aircraft—whether manned or unmanned—that could have flown
to Benghazi during the 7-plus hours from the beginning of the attack to
the mortar rounds hitting the CIA Annex. Instead, the military has
insisted that the Committee simply accept the word of senior military
officers, some without firsthand knowledge of the events, as an adequate
substitute for actual eye witnesses.
One of the clearest examples of the Department of Defense’s attempt to
impede the investigation involved one of its legislative affairs officers,
Stephen C. Hedger. Mr. Hedger, appearing to work hand-in-hand with
the minority members, wrote a stinging letter to the Committee attacking
it on multiple fronts—attacks that quickly found their way into a
Democrat press release. The letter even went so far as to imply that the
Committee’s investigative requests had somehow impaired our national
defense.
The most troubling aspect of the letter was the criticism that the
Committee had asked for witnesses that “seem unnecessary even for a
comprehensive investigation[.]” While it is rare for the subject of an
investigation to decide which witnesses are relevant, the Department of
Defense felt otherwise. One of the supposedly “unnecessary” witnesses
was known to the Committee only as “John from Iowa”—the pseudonym
he used when he called into a talk show to discuss the attack. He had
operated the video and other sensors on a Predator drone that circled over
Benghazi the night of the attack. Given his bird’s eye view, the
Committee believed he could provide valuable insight into what the
Department of Defense knew and therefore could have, and possibly
should have, done to help that night.
Mr. Hedger responded to the request with what bordered on sarcasm—
describing the Committee’s request as one “to interview an individual

43

 identified as ‘John from Iowa’ who described himself as a Remotely
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) camera operator on a talk radio show, where he
described what he allegedly saw in the video feed from the night of the
attack.” In short, Mr. Hedger made the request sound like the Committee
was chasing crackpots. To drive the point home he then added, “The
Department has expended significant resources to locate anyone who
might match the description of this person, to no avail.” 115
As it turns out, Mr. Hedger’s claim was completely false according to
information eventually provided by the witness himself, who the
Department of Defense eventually produced. Mr. Hedger’s false and
misleading claim, was one of the more troubling examples of the
Department of Defense’s failure to cooperate fully, although not the only
one.
What has also emerged is a picture of the State Department eating up
valuable time by insisting that certain elements of the U.S. military
respond to Libya in civilian clothes and that it not use vehicles with
United States markings. Both restrictions appear to have been
concessions to the Libyan government that did not want an identifiable
U.S. military presence on the streets of Libya. We will never know
exactly how long these conditions delayed the military response but that
they were even a part of the discussion is troubling.
And at the same time the State Department appeared to waste time on
what our soldiers would wear, it also appeared to waste time and focus
on the YouTube video that the administration would later blame, falsely,
for the attack. It has emerged that during an emergency call at 7:30 p.m.
on the night of the attack involving Secretary Clinton and other highlevel officials from the Department of Defense, State Department, and
CIA that a full five of the eleven action items from the meeting related to
the video.116
One such item had Secretary Panetta calling Pastor Terry Jones to ask
him to take down the video. At this critical moment, with lives at risk in
Benghazi and military assets sitting idle, it is difficult to imagine a worse
115

Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Dep’t of Defense, Office of Legislative
Affairs to the Hon. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Sel. Comm. on the Events
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (Apr. 28, 2016) (on file with
the Committee).
116

See E-mail from State Dep’t Operations to various (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05562037).

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 use of the Defense Secretary’s time than to call Pastor Jones about a
video having nothing to do with the attack. Rather than diverting the
Secretary of Defense’s attention, every effort should have been made to
marshal assets that could have gone to Benghazi.
We cannot say whether the military could have saved lives in Benghazi.
We can say with certainty that our nation’s leaders did not move heaven
and earth to send military help with the urgency that those Americans
deserved. We will never know if a more vigorous, comprehensive, and
urgent response could have saved lives.
IV.
JUSTICE DENIED
We will not waver in our commitment to see that
justice is done for this terrible act. And make
no mistake, justice will be done.
Barack Obama
President of the United States 117
The President made this promise the day after the attack. Secretary
Clinton did much the same. In January 2015, White House Counsel W.
Neil Eggleston said something very similar in a letter to the Committee
where he claimed “[t]he Administration’s focus since the attacks has
been . . . an unwavering commitment to bring to justice those responsible
for harming Americans[.]” 118 The words of the President and his lawyer
were resolute and they were strong. But in the end they were just that,
words.
Almost four years have passed since four Americans were killed by
radical Islamic terrorists in Benghazi. As of the writing of this report,
only one man—Ahmed Abu Khatallah—has been indicted and brought
to the United States to face charges. 119 To the Committee’s knowledge,
117

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Deaths of U.S.
Embassy Staff in Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya.
118

Letter from W. Neil Eggleston to Hon. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Sel.
Comm. on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (Jan.
23, 2015) (on file with the Committee).

119

It is worth noting that Abu Khatallah’s capture demonstrated the capacity of
the United States to execute a complex mission in a hostile place to bring a
terrorist to justice. It is equally certain that the Obama administration’s decision

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 no others have been taken into U.S. custody, let alone arrested and
prosecuted. Secretary Clinton said, almost two years after the murders,
“there’s a lot we don’t know about what happened in Benghazi.” That
may be true, but the United States does know the identity of many of the
attackers. Yet, the resources devoted to bring them to justice have proven
inadequate.
President Obama also claimed that Khattallah “will now face the full
weight of the American justice system.” To us, that means facing the full
measure of punishment for killing four Americans. Yet, the
administration has chosen—for reasons it refused to provide Congress—
not to seek the death penalty in this case.
And so as we near the fourth anniversary of the attack, the American
people, at a minimum, are owed an explanation for the administration’s
failure to bring more of those responsible to justice.
V.
NOTES ON THE INVESTIGATION
For the past two years the Committee pressed for full and complete
answers to the important questions left in Benghazi’s wake. The
American people—and especially the families of the victims and those
injured—deserved nothing less.
We approached the investigation believing facts were nonpartisan. We
knew some hoped the investigation would expose Secretary Clinton and
President Obama for serious wrongdoing. Still others hoped, and in fact
decided, that the investigation would find nothing—and they did their
best to tarnish the Committee’s reputation in case something damaging
did emerge. But we suspected the vast majority of Americans simply
wanted the truth, whatever it may look like, to come out in full.
We had hoped that Democrats on the Committee would join this effort as
full partners and that the administration would cooperate with our work.
to treat Abu Khatallah and other terrorists as ordinary criminals—affording them
the full panoply of legal protections available under U.S. law—has made it
harder to capture Abu Khatallah’s co-conspirators. That is because the decision
denies our Intelligence Community the time and tools necessary to develop facts
that might help to apprehend the others responsible. That may, in turn, explain,
why dozens and dozens of Abu Khatallah’s co-conspirators remain at large.

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 That Republicans and Democrats would feel the weight of history, and
the loss of four fellow Americans, and set aside partisan differences in
favor of a joint search for the truth. If that had happened, it would not
have been without precedent as we saw during the 9/11 Commission
investigation. Yet, Minority Leader Pelosi set the tone early, even before
the first witness was sworn in, and made clear that a truly bipartisan
effort would never happen:
Our nation deserves better than yet another deeply
partisan and political review. It is disappointing that
Republicans blocked a proposal offered by Democrats
on the House floor today to ensure that this committee is
truly bipartisan and fair – a proposal that would have
allowed Democrats a real and equal voice on the
committee, including on the issuance of subpoenas, the
manner in which witnesses would be questioned and
deposed, and the specific protocols governing how
documents and other information would be obtained,
used, and potentially released by the committee.
It is clear that House Republicans will do anything to
divert attention away from their failed leadership and donothing record. As they work to feed the most
conspiracy-obsessed elements of their base, millions of
Americans are languishing thanks to Republicans’
refusal to act on the urgent business before our nation:
renewing emergency unemployment insurance, raising
the minimum wage, and creating jobs. 120
It bears mentioning that the Democrats on the Committee could have
asked for witnesses or documents but in the end asked for one witness
and a handful of documents. In other words, we offered them the “real
and equal voice on the committee” that Minority Leader Pelosi
demanded, but they fell silent when it came time to do the work.
The Democrats on the Committee did not, however, fall completely
silent. When they were not attacking the Republicans, they paid lip
service to the notion of a bipartisan investigation. Ranking Member
Cummings called for just that type of investigation during the first
120

Nancy Pelosi, House Democratic Leader, Pelosi Statement on House Vote on
Select Committee on Benghazi (May 8, 2014), http://www.democraticleader.gov
/newsroom/pelosi-statement-house-vote-select-committee-benghazi/.

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 hearing, invoking the same slogan that Minority Leader Pelosi used and,
of course, that President Obama had used before her: “Too often over the
past two years, the congressional investigation into what happened in
Benghazi has devolved into unseemly partisanship. We are better than
that.” In fact, we are better. But in the end they were just words.
The Democrats on the committee, showed little interest in seeking the
truth and routinely turned the investigation into political theater. We had
hoped for more from members that included two former criminal
prosecutors. Instead, the Democrats and their staff spent the bulk of their
time trying to discredit the Republican-led committee and leveling
baseless personal attacks. The attacks were often ugly, always without
merit, and unfailingly partisan and did nothing to advance the cause of
finding the full and complete truth about Benghazi.
VI.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the administration’s efforts to impede the investigation
succeeded, but only in part. The minority members’ and their staff’s
efforts to impede the investigation succeeded also, but again only in part.
And although we answered many questions, we could not do so
completely. What we did find was a tragic failure of leadership—in the
run up to the attack and the night of—and an administration that, so
blinded by politics and its desire to win an election, disregarded a basic
duty of government: Tell the people the truth. And for those reasons
Benghazi is, and always will be, an American tragedy.

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