DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY GOHHAHDER. DESTROYER SOUADRON P30 351 BOX11IO. FPO AE 09334-0002 I A CENTINU11 5330 Bar 28 Feb 16 1. a. RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS Unclassified upon removal of enclosure To: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Subj: COMMAND IWESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO INCIDENT IN THE VICINITY OF FARSI ISLAND INVOLVING TWO RIVERINE COW BOATS 802 RCB 805} ON OR ABOUT 12 JANUARY 2016 Ref: WVCENT Appointing Order to of 13 Jan 16 COMUSN vc VCENT Appointing Order to of 21 Jan 16 COMISNAVOENT Extension Approval to of 7 Feb 16' Encl: Final Investigation Report 1- Reference directed that I lead a comprehensive investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident in the vicinity of Farsi Island involving two Riverine Command Boats [nos 302 and RCB 305), on or about 12 January 2016. References and supplemented reference and presented additional matters and factors to be addressed as well as provided additional time to complete the investigation. Enclosure (1) is the required report. 2. The investigation reviewed execution and compliance with the programs, plans. and procedures in effect within 0.3. FIFTH Fleet on or about 12 January 2016. The Investigation Team conducted site visits. program and instruction reviews, panel discussions. and interviews. During the course of the investigation, the Team received outstanding support from all organizations involved. REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO INCIDENT IN THE VICINITY OF EARSI ISLAND INVOLVING TWO RIVERINE COMMAND BOATS (RCB 802 AND RCB 805) ON OR ABOUT 12 JANUARY 2016 28 FEBRUARY 2 0 1 6 List of Table of Contents Acronyms Executive Summary Chapter I Introduction A. B. 0 Chapter . Deployment Training Cycle . Deployment Training Cycle . Deployment Training Cycle . Deployment Training Cycle Scope of Investigation Methodology Organization II Coastal Riverine Squadron Three Readiness .Maritime Expeditionary Force and Riverine Force Merge to Form Coastal Riverine Force . Detachment Yorktown Moves From Yorktown to San Diego . Detachment Yorktown?s Disestablishment .Pre?Deployment Training Responsibilities - Individual Training Unit Level Training 1 Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment (ULTRA) I Final Evaluation Problem (PEP) .Operation Center's Training .Training Cycle Wrap?Up . Deployment Training vs Deployment Missions Chapter - Coastal Riverine Squadron Three Deployment EL Coastal Riverine Squadron Three's Assumption of Duties and Coastal Riverine Operations C.Staff and Subordinate Perspectives E.The RCB Re?location to Kuwait F.Northern Arabian Gulf Operations G.Transit Planning from Kuwait to Bahrain Chapter Events of 11-13 January 2016 A.The Mission B.The Preparation C.The RCB Crews D.Procedural Compliance E.Getting Underway F.The Crew Observes Farsi Island G.RCB 802 Engine Casualty H.1ranian Interaction I.M0vement to Farsi Island 11.Release and Recovery K.Search and Rescue In Iranian Interrogators Chapter A. C. Chapter A. B. .Opinions .Opinions .Opinions . Opinions . Opinions on . Opinions on Code of Conduct Code of Conduct, Implementing Guidance and Applicability Across the Range of Seizure and Farsi Island Detention . Specific Code of Conduct Articles and Guidance Pertinent to Farsi Island Incident on 12 January 2016 Code of Conduct Training VI - Opinions and Recommendations Opinions on Pre?Deployment Readiness Opinions on CRS-3 Deployment . Opinions on Events of 11?13 January 2016~ RCB 802 RCB 805 Transit From Kuwait to Bahrain . Opinions on The Iranian Interactions on Responses on The Code of Conduct on Surrender on Interrogations and Other Statements in Detention Innocence v. apologies ROB 802 Boat Captain's Conduct .Recommendations Accountability . Recommendations Immediate . Recommendations Training and Readiness .Recommendations Policies, Programs, and Procedures .Recommendations Lessons Learned . Special Recognition APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX List of Enclosures List of References Comprehensive Timeline Training Code of Conduct Comparative Analysis Investigation Team AD ADCON AMD AOR ASM ATO AWC BMF C2PC C3F C5F CART CCDR CENTCOM CIN CNETC CNO CO COGENT COI COMNECC COMNECCPAC COMPACFLT COMPTUEX CONDPS CONPLAN CONUS COP CRATE CRF CRS CTF CTG CTU CTO CTT CTU CWC LIST OF ACRONYMS Material, Maintenance, and Management After Action Review Active Component Active Duty Administrative Control Activity Manning Document Area of Operations Advanced Skills Management Antiterrorism/Force Protection Antiterrorism Officer Army Watercraft Boat Maintenance Facility Command and Control Personal Computer Commander, THIRD Fleet Commander, FIFTH Fleet Commanders Assessment of Readiness and Training Combatant Commander U.S. Central Command Course Identification Number Commander, Naval Education and Training Command Chief of Naval Operations Commanding Officer Common Geospatial Navigation Toolkit Course of Instruction Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Pacific Commander, Pacific Fleet Composite Training Unit Exercise Concept of Operations Contingency Plan Continental United States Common Operational Picture Commanders Readiness Assessment and Training Evaluation Coastal Riverine Force Coastal Riverine Squadron Commander, Task Force Commander, Task Group Commander, Task Unit Command Training Officer Command Training Team Commander Task Unit Composite Warfare Commander 6 DAGR DRRS ECG ECS EDG EO EOD EOF ESR EST ETG ETJ EXW FATS FDNF FEP FTN IEX IRN ISIC JQR KNB LRTP MID MOC MOCWO MOE MOP MSO MSG-R MSEL NAVCENT NAVEDTRA NCC NDP NEC NECC NECCPAC NECE NIEX NMCB Defense Advanced GPS Receiver Department of Defense Department of the Navy Defense Readiness Reporting System Defense Readiness Reporting System?Navy Exercise Control Group Expeditionary Combat Skills Event Drill Guide Enabling Objective Explosive Ordnance Disposal Escalation of Force Emergency Surge Ready Embarked Security Team Expeditionary Training Group Electronic Training Jacket Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic/Pacific Expeditionary Warfare Firearms Training System Forward Deployed Naval Forces Final Evaluation Problem Force Tracking Number Integrated Exercise Republic of Iran Navy Immediate Superior in Command Job Qualification Requirement Kuwait Naval Base Long?Range Training Plan Maritime Interception Operations Maritime Operations Center Maritime Operations Center Watch Officer Measure of Effectiveness Measure of Performance Maritime Security Operations Maritime Security Operations Ready Master Scenario Event List U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Navy Education and Training Navy Component Commander Naval Doctrine Publication Navy Enlisted Classification Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Pacific Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise NECC Integrated Exercise Assessment Naval Mobile Construction Battalion NMET NMETL NMT NOBC NSA OPNAV OPTEMPO ORM OSC OSC PBFT PDB PERSTEMPO PESTONI PMAP POM POSREP PQS PTDO RAC RCB RCRP RFF RFS RFM ROE SERE SOF SOP SRTP TAD TEU T-FOM TO TDC TRAMAN TSC TTGL TTGP TTP Navy Mission Essential Task Navy Mission Essential Task List Navy Military Training Navy Officer Billet Code Naval Support Activity Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Operating Tempo Operational Risk Management On?Scene Commander Operational Stress Control Planning Board for Training Post Deployment Brief Personnel Tempo Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Network, Infrastructure Protective Measures Assessment Protocol Plan of Action and Milestones Pre?Overseas Movement/Projected Operating Memorandum Position Report Personnel Qualification Standards Prepare to Deploy Order Risk Assessment Code Riverine Command Boat Readiness and Cost Reporting Program Request for Forces Request for Service Ready for Mobilization Remain in Place/Turnover of Authority Rules of Engagement Required Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Special Operations Forces Standard Operating Procedures Short-Range Training Plan Temporary Additional Duty Training and Evaluation Unit Training Figure of Merit Training Officer Tactical Operations Center Training Manual Theater Security Cooperation Tactical Training Group Atlantic Tactical Training Group Pacific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 8 UAS Unmanned Aerial System UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UTC Unit Identification Code ULT Unit Level Training ULTRA Unit Level Training and Readiness Assessment USCGC U.S. Coast Guard Cutter USFF United States Fleet Forces Command WEBSKED Web Enabled Scheduling System 9 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) Island. USCGC MONOMOY notified that the RCBS appeared to be inside Iranian territorial seas. (U) The RC8 crews did not identify the land mass as Farsi Island and were unaware that they had entered Iranian territorial seas. Deepite entering both Saudi Arabian and Iranian territorial seas, RC8 802 and 805 were exercising their right of innocent passage in accordance with customary international law. While conducting innocent passage, RC8 802 developed indications of loss of lube oil pressure in the starboard engine {1 of 2). This occurred at 1611, roughly 1.5 nautical miles south of Farsi Island. As a precautionary measure, the RC8 802 Boat Coxswain went ?all?stop" on both engines. RC8 802 remained dead-in?the water and began troubleshooting the engine casualty; RC8 805 remained nearby. Between five to fifteen minutes later, the RC8 crewmembers visually sighted two small boats coming towards them from Farsi Island. (U) RC8 805 provided a status update to the Bahrain Tactical Operations Center and advised that they were in the middle of an interaction with two Iranian small boats. RC8 805 attempted to make contact with the small boats via VHF radio communications, but was ultimately unsuccessful. (U) As the Iranian small boats approached, the Iranians uncovered their crew mounted weapons and pointed them at the RCBs. As the RC8 802 Boat Captain was not aware of their location in Iranian water or the overall threat environment, he initially believed that the small boats were fishing vessels that meant no ill?intent. While some 802 and 805 crewmembers had manned their crew mounted weapons, the RC8 802 Boat Captain ordered that they back off their weapons so they did not seem intimidating. (U) The RC8 802 Boat Coxswain repaired 802?s engine. RC8 802 attempted to come up in speed and the two Iranian boats maneuvered in front of the RC8, ?racked their weapons,? and pointed and crew mounted weapons at RC8 802's crew. The RC8 802 Boat Captain ordered the RC8 802 Boat Coxswain to accelerate through the Iranian vessels. The 802 Boat Coxswain disregarded this order and refused to accelerate through the Iranians. The Iranian boats surrounded RCB 802 and continued to point .50 caliber guns and AK-47 machine guns at the RC8 crews. ll The RC8 802 Boat Captain ordered the RC8 gunners to step away from the weapon mounts. The 802 Boat Captain attempted to verbally establish communications with the Iranians, but none of the Iranians spoke English well. The RCB 802 Boat Captain believed that the Iranians were retrieving a translator from Farsi Island. This did not occur. Moments later, two additional Iranian boats came from Farsi Island with upward of fifteen additional armed crewmembers. They aggressively approached the two RCBs. The Iranians motioned for the RC8 crewmembers to step away from their weapons and for RC8 805 to come alongside and ?nest? with RC8 802. (U) At 1700, the Maritime Operations Center logged, reporting 2 Iranian vessels are attempting to push to an unknown island with weapons trained." This was the last transmission from the RCBs. (U) Once RC8 805 was alongside RC8 802, the Iranians boarded, removed the 0.8. flag, replaced it with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy flag, and instructed both RC8 crews to board and assemble on the aft part of RC8 802 with their hands behind their heads. The Iranians searched the RC8 crewmembers, confiscated their possessions, blindfolded them, and tied their hands together with pieces of ripped Iranian flags. With the Iranians onboard, the two RCBs {driven by U.S. crewmembers whose blindfolds were temporarily removed] were directed to Farsi Island. Upon arrival at Farsi Island, the crewmembers, still blindfolded, were escorted to a holding area and then escorted to a carpeted room where the Iranians removed their blindfolds and freed their hands. EU) Throughout the evening, the Iranians began interrogating each crewmember in a separate room, while the other crewmembers were able to sleep and eat. Because all communication had been lost with the RCBs, at 1810 the 0.5. FIFTH Fleet Maritime Operations Center began search and rescue operations, and directing USS ANZIO and USCGC MONOMOY into Iranian territorial seas. The MOC directed airborne assets {to include USAF 8-1, 15, USN E-2, and aircraft) to begin airborne search and rescue inside Iranian territorial seas and overhead Farsi Island. A USN E-2 from the USS HARRY S. TRUMAN established communications with the Iranians, and a 0.8. positively identified the two RCBs pier side at Farsi Island. 12 Communications were eventually established with the Iranians who advised that the crewmembers were in Iranian custody. Later that evening, the RC8 802 Boat Captain established communications with USS ANZIO and reiterated that the crewmembers were safe. The Iranians requested that USS ANZIO leave Iranian territorial seas and allow higher authorities to work out the release. Communications from USS ANZIO to the Iranians continued in an attempt to establish the time for release of the crews. On the morning of 13 January 2016, USS ANZIO was notified that the crewmembers would be released at 1200. (U) Prior to their release, an Iranian video crew interviewed the RC8 802 Boat Captain. The Iranians demanded that he recite words to the effect that ?we were sorry that we entered into Iranian territorial waters and that we were treated well" as a condition for the crewmembers' release. After multiple attempts and coaxing by the Iranians, the RC8 802 Boat Captain ultimately recited the words as demanded. The RCB crewmembers were then blindfolded and escorted single file (hands on each other?s shoulders} to the piers where the RCBs were located and boarded the boats. Their blindfolds were taken off, which revealed both RCBs ransacked and equipment wires cut. The RCBs got underway from the Farsi Island pier and proceeded to meet USS ANZIO under escort by four armed Iranian Patrol Boats. At 1255, RCB 802 and 805 left Iranian territorial seas and came alongside USS ANZIO. (U) On 13 January 2016, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command appointed the Investigating Officer to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the incident surrounding the events that led to the seizure of the two RCBs and their crewmembers. On 21 January 2016, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command directed the Investigating Officer to investigate additional factors that related to training, readiness, and the applicable command and control at the time of the incident. The investigative efforts were organized into four main areas, with Chapters addressing how this occurred and Chapter IV addressing what occurred: I Investigation Scope and Methodology. (Chapter I) i The RC8 Crew Readiness that led to the 2015 deployment for Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE. (Chapter II) 13 I The deployment of Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE, starting in July 2015 and leading up to ll January 2016. (Chapter 0 The sequence of events to include the timeframe when the mission was ordered by CTF-56 on 11 January 2016 to the transit preparation, transit on 12 January 2016, and the seizure, detention, and subsequent release on 13 January 2016. {Chapter IV) I Analysis of the Code of Conduct and the RC3 crewmembers' rights and obligations while in Iranian detention. (Chapter - Specific opinions as to the adequacy of applicable NECC, CRF, and CSF programs, policies and procedures as applied to this incident. This includes accountability recommendations, other issues identified during the course of the investigation, and lessons learned. (Chapter VI) Opinions and Recommendations (U) This incident was caused by series of mistakes that culminated in the seizure of RCB 802 and RCB 805. These mistakes included, but were not limited to: inadequate manning; insufficient basic, advanced and sustainment training; poor communication up and down the chain of command; ineffective maintenance procedures; lack of navigational experience and oversight; and poor leadership and judgment. Where appropriate, this Command Investigation recommends that Commander, FIFTH Fleet take appropriate administrative action against certain personnel. Many personnel have left the FIFTH Fleet operational chain of command. Accordingly, this Command Investigation should be forwarded to the appropriate Commander{s} who have jurisdiction over these personnel for appropriate action. 14 CHAPTER I INTRODUCT ION I.A. Scope of Investigation II: On 13 January 2016. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command directed a comprehensive investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident in the vicinity of Farsi Island involving two Riverine Command Boats (RCB 802 and RCB 805), on 12 January 2016. Commander, 0.8. Naval Forces Central Command also directed on 21 January 2016. that the report include, but not be limited to.r the following potential contributing factors: a.Crew pre-deployment and sustainment training and readiness .Weapons posture training and posture .Tactics, techniques and procedures .Mission planning and approval . Intelligence briefs .Higher headquarters oversight . Mission execution .Communications plan .Contingency planning .Information flow between RCB's and higher headquarters .Guidance from higher headquarters r??wk?l-H-ZTLQI-hmil?o? Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Reintegration Process Materials. The crewmembers were debriefed in the reintegration process. During one of the interviews by the Investigating Officer, a crewmember stated that she took videos using her smartphone of portions of the Iranian interaction. She stated that she relinquished the smartphone to the reintegration team In an effort to gather, record, and analyze all relevant information, the Investigating Officer formally requested the videos and any debriefing materials from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. To date, the JPRA has not provided any requested materials. Legal Issues Identified, but Beyond the Scope of the Investigation. The investigation focused on the contributing factors (as outlined in reference that led to the Farsi Island incident. However, the investigation revealed several complex and wideeranging legal issues, such as, but not limited to: the legal status and rights of the RC8 crewmembers while in Iranian detentionL and application of international human rights law; (2) the corresponding legal status and reSponsibilities of the Iranians; and (3) the legal status of some Iranians who were not in uniform during the initial encounter. This JRGMAN was not the appropriate medium to provide the thorough and coordinated interagency analysis that these important legal issues require and it was not necessary to resolve these issues to fully examine the contributing factors as directed by reference I.B. Methodology (U) The Investigation Team consisted of three investigators and 21 support personnel. The Team consisted of a Chapter of the JAGMAN discusses the Code of Conduct and uses the terms ?detainee? and ?detention? in order to remain consistent with terminology in Department of Defense Instruction 1300.21 {Code of Conduct Policy). Use of those terms in Chapter should not be construed as a finding or opinion on the legal status of the RC8 crewmembers under international law. 1? (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) ONE and TWO Commodores and staffs. This dialogue continued throughout the investigation. I.B.6. (U) The Investigating Officer briefed interim findings and observations with Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet on 29 January 2016 to ensure that was fully prepared to operate with current tasking in theater. Based on that conversation, Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet mandated that conduct an Operational Training and Readiness stand down to provide an internal assessment of training. This stand down addressed Code of Conduct, FIFTH Fleet area of operations specific guidance and intent messages, and included a peer review to assess command and control and watch station setup. I.B.T. The Reintegration Process and Additional Factors Bearing on Crewmember Accounts/Interviews. Chapter Iv is the focus of this Investigation. It provides Findings of Fact concerning the transit, eventual interaction with Iranian forces, and detention of the RC8 crews. The Findings of Fact are based largely upon statements and interviews of the ten RCB crewmembers conducted during this investigation. Although generally consistent, RCB crewmember accounts at times diverged, and even appeared disjointed or contradictory on key points or timelines. This may be due to various factors: I (U) First, for over two weeks following their recovery, the RC8 crewmembers underwent a series of debriefings during a formal reintegration process as required by various Department of Defense and implementing regulations. As required by these regulations, the Investigation Team could not access the crewmembers for interviews. Following the reintegration process, the crewmembers were interviewed by the Investigating Officer from 27?31 January 2016. i (U) Second, some of the reintegration debriefings were conducted in group settings in which crewmembers collectively recounted their experiences to reintegration team members. This may have had some bearing on subsequent individual recounts during subsequent interviews by the Investigating Officer. Also, as part of the reintegration process, crewmembers were allowed to view footage and media reports concerning the incident to prepare them for the potential publicity upon returning home. 19 (U) Lastly, this JAGMAN utilized logbooks, documents, and data from the navigation system and other sources to corroborate, reconcile, or highlight potential discrepancies in the accounts. I.B.8. RCB Crewmember Statements and Interview Methodology. Each crewmember was afforded an opportunity to make a preliminary written statement recounting the incident. This allowed crewmembers to tell his or her unabridged story in his or her own words. Next, the Investigating Officer conducted follow?on interviews with individual crewmembers in San Diego, CA, a summary of which follows each preliminary statement. Each crewmember was provided the opportunity to review his or her statement and interview summary, and the opportunity to make corrections, clarifications, or additions. 20 BAKHUEROEHHD RCB Navigable Waterways: RIVERINE (BROWN WATER) NAVIGATION ?Brown water" will be defined as the inland waters that are typically non-tidal, but where the water level can rise and fall the same as in tidal areas and harbor/ports. The following are the major types of Brown Water environments CRF units will operate: 0 Type I. Consists of minor rivers, usually not navigable by medium or deep draft craft, but are too deep to be forded without difficulty. These waterways are generally considered to be obstacles as opposed to lines of communications. Type II. Consists of one or more major rivers with branches of numerous smaller streams, canals, or paddles that permit operational use of watercraft. These waterways may present serious obstacles, but are useful as a line of communications. 0 Type Consists of several major waterways in addition to an extensive network of small rivers, canals, or irrigation ditches. The environment accommodates all sizes of watercraft from small craft to amphibious craft and other support vessels, including medium or deep-draft craft. COASTAL (GREEN NAVIGATION ?Green water? is defined as the coastal zone including the beaches, estuaries, the adjacent harbor and bays, and the offshore waters, usually out to the edge of the continental shelf. 0 COASTAL WATER) NAVIGATION ?Blue water? is defined as territorial seas {within twelve nautical miles of shore} and Economic Exclusion Zones (out to 200 nautical miles) around foreign nations. Common Geospatial Navigation Toolkit (COGENT) COGENT is an electronic toolkit to support safe navigation by providing a soft real?time graphical display of ownship position and surrounding area. COGENT also provides an integrated, layered tool set to support various mission areas in harmony with the primary navigation operations. 21 RCB Overview 1 Stabilized Gun Mount 1 Remote Operated Stabilized Small Arms Mount can support any of the below 4 Fixed Gun Mounts MK 19 (40mm grenade] M2 (.50 cal) Mk4 4 GAU- 7 M240 {7.62mm) M249 SAW {5.56mm} Characteristic RCB Hull Type Ballistic protection: T?zmm Length 53ft Beam 12.5 ft 3H 6mm 7 Passengers 15 Win Diesels Yes edVVeterJets Ten Speed: full 30 knots - cruise load Range 250nm FuelCepechy S??ga?ens Combat Lead 51,000 lbs. Treier Weight 1?.000 lbs. Bow DoortRemp Yes Weapons Haunts! H2 Gnu-17 I M240 Fewer 110t115"220 Requirements (220 Preferred} (7.62mm mini?gun) (on top of pilot houseIu" ?ltd? I .- ?it?r (ROSAM) I I gist": Hm?mnhapuu.?gm [5355 - Huimuk Figure 1.1 22 53? Pertinent Organizations COMMANDER TASK FORCE FWE SIX .d at" ?x by? egg? wt" $5.1 m; 56.2 cm 55.3 cm 5M :15 55.5 crr. 56.? as 56(wk-um I Turn!- Yarn-4 Turn? Tum!- I Tum 11 .lann 12 i I Turn 13 I Turn 1.4 I (U) Figure 1.2 NAVC NT NECC I EST OPCON 380WJSC coonn CR5 3 FF TAGON (Elmira:l Battle Space) I - in UAE and KNB KuwaIt CTU 56.7.1 CTU 56.7.2 CTU 56.7.4 CTU 56.7.3 Jebel Ali Fujairah Bahrain Kuwait Figure 1.3 23 CTG 56.7 Span of Control I Far-st Island JaZIrat Harqus {Saudi Island: Ralual Randazmus Paint: Onglnal PM (Pian at Intended Movement: ActualecI-c . .. 12nm Temtonal Willem 'l 1 1 I :1 Figure 1.4 24 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) CHAPTER I I COASTAL RIVERINE SQUADRON THREE READINESS Findings of Fact II.A. Maritime Expeditionary Security Force and Riverine Force Merge to Form the Coastal Riverine Force II.A.1. (U) In January 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations established Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to provide combat?ready expeditionary forces to Numbered Fleet Commanders and Combatant Commanders. [Ref II.A.2. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command?s Maritime Expeditionary Security Force was comprised of Maritime Expeditionary Security Groups. [Encl (155)] II.A.3. (U) Maritime Expeditionary Security Groups were divided into Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadrons that conducted missions focused on High Value Asset (EVA) defense and security of designated maritime infrastructure. [Encl (155)] II.A.4. (U) Maritime Expeditionary Squadron THREE was the only squadron located on the west coast. [Encl (155)] II.A.5. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command's Riverine Force was composed of Riverine Group ONE that was divided into Riverine Squadrons that conducted missions focused on brown water operations including inland waters that are typically non? tidal such as inland waterways, rivers, estuaries and deltas. [Encl (155)] II.A.6. All three Riverine Squadrons were homeported in the Hampton Roads, Virginia area. [Encl 155] II.A.7. In late 2011, as a part of the Navy's Program Objective Memorandum Efficiency Review, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command began executing a phased plan to realign and merge Maritime Expeditionary Squadrons and Riverine Squadrons. [Encl {106)} II.A.8. (U) The Chief of Naval Operations ordered these organizational change actions due to the Program Objective Memorandum cut of forces due to budget reductions. [Encl (108)] 28 PreeMerger . E55 2 RIVGRU Hill-mil LEU- HERON 3 1 RNROH 1 Sum I:in ram 4 UH- "636? 3 Talia-II UNCLASSIFIED (U) Figure 2.1, Pro-Merger Organization of Active Component Squadrons II.A.9. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command formed the Coastal Riverine Force on 1 October 2012 by merging the Maritime Expeditionary Force and Riverine Force. [Encls (93), (155)] II.A.10. (U) The Coastal Riverine Force mission statement is to ?Defend designated high value assets against a determined enemy and, when ordered, conduct offensive combat operations throughout the challenging green water and brown water environment." [Encl (155)] II.A.11. The merger established Coastal Riverine Groups ONE and the immediate superiors in command for the Coastal Riverine Squadrons. [Encl [155)] II.A.12. (U) Maritime Expeditionary Group ONE, located in San Diego, CA, was renamed Coastal Riverine Group ONE. [Encl (155)] II.A.13. (U) In June 2012, Maritime Expeditionary Group TWO and Riverine Group ONE (Hampton Roads, VA) were merged to form Coastal Riverine Group TWO. [Encl (155}] II.A.14. Three Coastal Eiverine Squadrons were established under Coastal Riverine Group ONE and Coastal Riverine Group TWO. [Encls {106), (155)] 29 Coastal Riverine Force Merger MESS 1 MESG 2 RIVGRU 1 ?un- l'lihmuu?l In:th IHERUHS IBERDNZ Mmmw? ham memmd um.cu.i 3 CR6 1 one 2 Sin Oil]- Forum?! CREE ill-I lino from CR5 4 WI Cali 5 Cornpr San lino Company Company San UNCLASSIFIED Figure 2.2, MErger Flow of Active Component Squadrons II.A.15. (U) On 2 January 2013r Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron THREE {San Diego) merged with Riverine Squadron THREE {Yorktown} to form Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE headquartered in San Diego with detachments in San Diego and Yorktown. [Encl (106)] II.A.16. (U) including Detachment Yorktown {Delta Company)r deployed in December 2013 to the FIFTH Fleet Area of Operations. [Encls (62), II.A.17. (U) Within Detachment Yorktown {Delta Company) was the only detachment that was manned, trained, equipped and certified to conduct Riverine missions, including RCB operations, on deployment. [Encls II.B. Detachment Yorktown Moves from Yorktown to San Diego 30 11.B.l. (U) Detachment Yorktown?s billets, resources and equipment were scheduled to transfer from Detachment Yorktown and join the rest of in San Diego in September 2014. [Encls {106), 11.3.2. (U) In April 2014, Detachment Yorktown?s billets {vice personnel) were transferred to in San Diego, six months ahead of schedule. [Encls (106)] 11.3.3. (U) While Detachment Yorktown was deployed on their 2014 deployment to the FIFTH Fleet Area of Operations, received new Sailors into the Delta Company billets in San Diego. [Encl Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE CHGI ill-IDin CR5 3 A Company 5M Dion Company in Dial:- Company Cornpr 5! lib-IF 10W UNCLASSIFIED (U) Figure 2.3, Coastal Riverina Squadron THREE Organization 11.8.4. (U) While Detachment Yorktown was deployed, the incoming Delta Company Sailors received limited Riverine training in San Diego. [Encl 11.8.5. In July 2014, Delta Company returned from deployment and began to transfer personnel, resources and equipment from Delta Company in Yorktown to San Diego. [Encls (106)] 11.8.6. (U) Out of approximately 100 personnel, only 18 people from CRS-3 Delta Company received Permanent Change of Station orders to in San Diego. [Encls (106)] 31 (U) Of those 18 personnel, only six had experience or qualifications on RCBs as of July 2014; four of whom were crewmembers of RCB 802 and RCB 805. [Encls (13), II.C. Detachment Yorktown?s Disastablishment II.C.1. (U) Detachment Yorktown unit identification code was disestablished2 on 30 September 2014. [Ref Encis {108), II.C.2. The disestablishment did not constitute a ?homeport shift"3 for Detachment Yorktown. [Ref II.C.3. Effective 1 October 2014, reductions removed one Coastal Riverine Company {143 billets] and 40 Headquarters billets from each Coastal Riverine Squadron. [Encls (72), (164), (155)] II.C.4. Although the Company and corresponding billets were removed, the actual personnel remained. [Encls 2 When a unit is disestablished, the reassignment of personnel is conducted through the normal detailing process outlined in reference ti}, Article 1306-101. 3 Homeport shifts are governed by reference Article 1320-322. Members assigned to the command with greater than 12 months remaining onboard at the time of the homeport shift promulgation message travel with the command to the new homeport. 32 Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE MESS 1 RIVGRU 1 CR5 1 CHE 1 Hal-Fall Sill Sill Dill: CR53 I)in vm in Ohio Sill Gill 8 A Company A Company 5H D'lp Dilln one 1 $1 ?2 g- Comfy-n! CE:Comp-In}! Lori-puny 5" Hi" fun EDI. ACompuw in Dunn mg? as 3 Company 5-H Dina I. Company Company San Dill: Tom UNCL-S. SSIFIED (U) Figure 2.4, Coastal Rivorine Squadron THREE Evolution Jan 2013 - Oct 2014 II.C.5. (U) With the reduction of a Company, yet retention of personnel, manning became meaning 97% of the personnel assigned were the specified rating and paygrade of his or her billet. [Encl II.C.6. (U) With the reduction of a Company, manning became 104% meaning the total number of personnel exceeded the number of billets, or ?over?manned? by [Encl (U) While those personnel were of the appropriate rate for the billet, many did not possess the required qualifications. [Encl 33 II.C.B. (U) Navy Expeditionary Combat Command recommended to both Coastal Riverine Groups to mitigate the manning issue with on?the?job training, schools and the pre?deployment training cycle in order to achieve the desired qualifications. [Encl II.C.9. (U) in conjunction with Coastal Riverine Group ONE, attempted to gain additional personnel into recently filled billets due to training and qualification requirements. [Encls (103)] II.C.10. (U) In August 2014, both Coastal Riverine Groups submitted a joint request, endorsed by Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, for Priority Three Manning4 for specific rates. [Encls (72), (103)] II.C.11. (U) In April 2015, U.S. Fleet Forces Command denied this request on the grounds that Priority Three Manning was given to commands that better aligned with the Commander?s Fleet priority missions. [Encls (72), (105)] II.C.12. (U) Navy Expeditionary Combat Command noted in Program Objective Memorandum and that deployable staffs and units lacked the force structure to execute the Required Operational Capabilities in the Projected Operational Environments and lacked the force structure to perform day?to? day operational, administrative, financial and training requirements. [Ref Encls (165), (166)] II.C.13. (U) This 25% reduction in Coastal Riverine Squadron capacity was not matched by any reduction of Combatant Commander requirements. [Encl (165)] (U) Priority Three Manning: Activities which require special manning consideration for a set period of time in order to execute a specific mission. Priority Three designations will be utilized by the Manning Control Authorities (U.S. Fleet Forces) to aid in detailing prioritization. 1000.16L 24 Jun 2015) 34 (U) Combatant Commander Requirements have increased5 while Navy Expeditionary Combat Command forces have decreased since 2006. [Encls (165), (166)] II.C.15. (U) Navy Expeditionary Combat Command previously identified that current training plans do not support emerging requirements for the force. [Encls (165), (166)] (U) Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and POMHIB Strategies both identified that their forces are unable to meet Combatant Commander requirements. [Encls (165), (166)] ll.C.17. (U) Concurrently, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command identified that training plans did not support emerging requirements for the force. [Encls (165), (166)] II.C.18. (U) After the Fleet Manpower Document6 took effect on 12 June 20l5, fit/fill changed from 92%/94% to 77%f94% where it remained until deployed in August 2015. [Encls (211)] II.C.19. (U) The loss of billets over several POM cycles degraded the ability to properly manage operational and administrative support to deployable forces. [Encl (l66)) II.D. Pre-Deployment Training Responsibilities Il.D.l. (U) Both Coastal Riverine Groups are responsible for developing and training the Coastal Riverine Squadrons for deployment. [Refs Encl II.D.2. (U) Both Coastal Riverine Groups use the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Training Readiness Manual, to 5 (U) Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE supported the following Combatant Commanders on their Ru ust 2015 - Januar 2016 de lo ment: (U) Fleet Manpower Document (FMD): Displays quantitative and qualitative manpower positions of a sea duty activity or a sea duty activity with shore duty componentls) that are operationally dependent upon one another and include operational units other than ships or squadrons. Positions are predicted on a required operational capabilities statement under a projected operational environment, specified operational profile, computed workload and established doctrinal constraints. [Ref 35 implement the Fleet Response Plan, which manages force generation through a sustainable cycle of maintenance, training and operations. [Ref II.D.3. (U) The Fleet Response Training Plan, derived from the Fleet Response Plan, is a structured cycle designed to accomplish individual and unit level skills required to perform primary required Operational capabilities. [Ref 11.0.4. (U) Individual units' Fleet Response Training Plans consist of four phases: Maintenance, Basic, Advanced and Sustainment. [Ref II.D.5. (U) Within a Coastal Riverine Group, the organic Training and Evaluation Units (TEU) provide unit level training and assessment with the assistance of Coastal Riverine Squadron Command Training Teams. [Ref II.D.6. (U) Each Coastal Riverine Group contains its own respective Training and Evaluation Unit. [Ref Encls (84), E93}l II.D.7. (U) In preparation for the 2014-2015 Fleet Readiness Training Plan, Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit unsuccessfully tried to recruit/add Riverine personnel to its training unit. [Encls (72), (84), II.D.8. (U) Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit was undermanned from the beginning to the end of the training cycle. On 1 July 2014, Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit manning snapshot reported of 76%f90% and by 1 January 2015, fell to [Encl II.D.9. (U) Because of the above circumstances, Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit sent three Sailors through the Riverine schools pipeline; however, none of the Riverine schools teach RCB operations. [Encls (21), (84), (93), II.D.1U. (U) The Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit Officer in Charge requested support from the Coastal Riverine Group TWO Training and Evaluation Unit in 36 training RCB crews during the Basic phase. However, Coastal Riverine Group TWO Training and Evaluation Unit no longer trained and certified RC3 [Ends we. II.D.11. (U) Despite the future addition of the Mk VI Patrol Boat and the lack of REE?specific training opportunities, CRS-3 was still required to operate RCBs on its 2015 deployment to the FIFTH Fleet Area of Operations. [Encls (84), (93), (148)] II.E. Deployment Training Cycle: Individual Training II.E.1. (U) entered the Basic Phase of their training cycle on or about September 2014. [Encls (62), (220)] II.E.2. (U) The Basic Phase is comprised of Individual Skills, Unit Level Training, Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment, and a Final Evaluation Problem. [Ref II.E.3. (U) Individual skills training is the focus of the beginning of the training cycle. [Ref Encl II.E.4. (U) From September through December 2014, supported real?world mission tasking from Commander, THIRD Fleet, interrupting and impacting the ability to conduct individual skills training. [Encls (62), (93), (220)] II.E.5. (U) Until January 2015, conducted training without RCBs because there were not any RCBs assigned to CBS-3. [Encls (62). II.E.6. (U) From 5 to 23 January 2015, Safe Boats International provided RCB training through the use of contracted instructors; however, the course involved only training on maintenance and basic operations and not tactics. [Encls (11), (13), (21), (39) (221)] II.E.7. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain did not participate in the Safe Boats International training because he was attending Riverine Combat Skills school from 5 January through 6 February 2015. [Encls (T), (247)] 37 II.E.8. (U) Three other crewmembers did not participate in the Safe Boats International training because they were assigned other duties at the time. [Encls (5), (8), II.F. Deployment Training Cycle: Unit Level Training II.F.1. (U) During the Basic Phase, Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit provided seven weeks of Unit Level Training to each respective Company. [Encls (90), (222), (223)] II.F.2. (U) Charlie Company (including some crewmembers of RC8 802 and ROS 805) began Unit Level Training on 2 February 15 and completed Unit Level Training on 20 March 15. [Encls (84), II.F.3. (U) Each individual is required to be qualified in his or her respective prior to beginning Unit Level Training. [Ref {fl} II.F.4. (U) None of the RC8 802 or ROB 805 crewmembers were qualified in their respective prior to beginning Unit Level Training. However, seven of them received interim qualification letters from the Commanding Officer. [Encls II.F.5. (U) The Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit did not possess a written training plan specific to ROB operations. [Encls (21), (39), (56), (222}r (223)] II.F.6. (U) The Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit relied on the individuals they were training to support the RC3 training plan. [Encls II.F.7. (U) It did not appear to RCB 802 or RCB 805 crewmembers that there was a comprehensive plan for assessing the RC8 crews. [Encls (11)r II.F.8. During Unit Level Training, the crewmembers received approximately two hours of familiarization training on the Common Geospatial Navigation Toolkit (COGENT). (Encls (223)] 38 II.F.9. (U) During Unit Level Training, the RC8 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers did not train on RCBs, but instead trained on 34? foot Patrol Boats. [Encls (100), II.F.10. None of the RC8 802 and RC8 805 crews trained as a whole crew during the Unit Level Training phase. [Encls (224)? (226)] II.F.11. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain did not participate in Unit Level Training with the other RCB 802 or RCE 805 crewmembers because he was attending the Riverine Unit Level Leader Course. [Encls (247)] II.F.12. Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit provided ten training days of REE?specific training to BEE 802 and RC8 805 crewmembers from 30 March 2015 through 10 April 2015 using actual RCBs. [Encls (39) (84), (90), (100)] II.F.13. This training consisted of navigation (short and long range}, reconnaissance, unmanned aerial systems operations, reaction to contact, high value asset escort, and towing training and drills. [Encls II.F.14. (U) Due to incomplete training records, it is unclear how many of the R08 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers participated in the RCB?specific Unit Level Training. [Encls II.F.15. (U) The Coastal Riverine Force Navigation Policy delineates the differences between Riverine (brown water) and Coastal {green and blue water} Navigation, but does not specifically define the term ?long range.? [Ref II.F.16. (U) green water consists of beaches, estuaries, harbors, bays, and offshore waters out to the continental shelf, while blue water is Territorial Seas and out to 200 nautical miles. [Ref II.G. Deployment Training Cycle: Unit Level Training 39 11.6.1. (U) CRS-3 conducted Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment from 2? Apr 15 through 1 May 15 using RCBs. [Encls (84)r (90)]r (228)] II.G.2. (U) Eight of the ten crewmembers from RC8 802 and RCB 805 participated in Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment. [Encl (200)] 11.G.3. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain only participated as an ?observer? in Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment. [Encls (200)] 11.6.4. (0) Six of the ten RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers were on the same RC8 crew during the Unit Level Training and Readiness Assessment. [Encl (200)] 11.G.5. (U) The only long range navigation drill that the RC8 802 and R08 805 crew participated in was a four hour (approximately 50 nautical miles) round trip voyage from San Diego to Mission Bay. [Enols (12), (84), (90). (228)] II.G.6. (U) For the long-range navigation drill, the crew had to plan the mission and conduct the chart work to prepare for execution as specified in the Coastal Riverine Force Navigation Policy. [Ref Encls (6), (229)] 11.6.7. (U) Updated and signed charts were aboard the RCBs for the long range navigation drill during Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment. [Encl II.G.8. (U) Common Geospatial Navigation Toolkit was used for the long range navigation drill during Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment. [Encls (6), 11.6.9. (U) Seven of the RC8 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers participated in a single underway live fire exercise during Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment from RCBs. [Encls (7), (230)} 7 (U) Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment (ULTRA): Training and Evaluation Units (TEU) validate a unit?s operational capability and certify the Squadron Command Training Team through a performance-based evaluation of readiness in each required capability. During ULTRA, a unit will be assessed in all core, common, and unique capability areas. [Ref 40 II.H. Deployment Training Cycle: The Final Evaluation Problem (FEB) *3 11.8.1. (U) conducted the Final Evaluation Problem from 11?15 May 2015. [Encls (84), II.H.2. (U) A Final Evaluation Problem consists of similar evolutions found within the Unit Level and Training Assessment. [Encls (84), II.H.3. (U) satisfactorily completed the Final Evaluation Problem on 15 May 2015. [Encls (84), (90), (131)] 11.8.4. (U) However, due to inconsistent ROB 802 and RCB 805 crewmember statements and lack of documentation of the Final Evaluation Problem it is unclear what, if anything, the RCB 802 and RC8 805 crewmembers participated in during the Final Evaluation Problem. [Encls (39), (75), (84), (90), (100)r (228)] 11.8.5. (U) By the end of the Training Cycle, six RC8 802 and RC8 805 crewmembers, and twelve other members interviewed commented that the RC8 crews were only able to rely on themselves for training and not Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit. [Encls (6), (7), (9), (15), (21), (39), (45). (56). (61). (65). (75). (76). (80). (100)] II.I. Operation Center Training (U) During the Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment, was assessed on Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and Maritime Operations Center processes. [Encls (20), (35), (228)] 3 (U) Final Evaluation Problem (FEP): A scenario-driven, performance?based evaluation of the unit's ability to demonstrate tactical proficiency and warfare readiness. The FEP marks completion of the Basic Phase. [Ref 9 (U) A Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is setup for missions to provide continuous operational control and to maintain a central location for administrative, logistical, operational, and tactical command and control. All Tactical Operations Centers report to a Maritime Operations Center (M00). The Tactical Operations Centers work for the Maritime Operations Center. They have the same function. [Ref Encl 41 11.1.2. (U) Both the M00 Watch Officer and MOC Watch Supervisor on watch on 12 January 2016 participated in the Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment. [Encls II.I.3. The Unit Level Training and Readiness Assessment is the first time the Headquarters Element's Maritime Operations is integrated with the Companies? operations. [Encl 11.1.4. (U) During Basic Phase training cycle, the Tactical and Maritime Operations Center received little to no formal training. [Encls I11.I.5. HQ Element successfully completed its Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Integrated Exercise on 15 June 2015 and was assessed by the Expeditionary Training Group to be ?at standards.? [Encl (131)] II.J. Training Cycle Wrap-Up When operating RCBs through the training cycle, the RCBs were typically manned with six or seven crewmembers, and the Coastal Riverine Force Training Instruction specifies seven crewmembers. Previous deployment experience cited using seven or eight crewmembers. [Ref Encls (6), (9). {l3}r (200)] 11.J.2. (0) At no time throughout the training cycle was the Remote Operated Small Arms Mount (ROSAM) weapon system employed in a live fire exercises. [Encls (84), (221)r (223}, (227}, {228}. (230)] 11.J.3 Based on training records provided by Coastal Riverine Group ONE and CRS-3 Training Departments, there are numerous discrepancies between the individual training records and RCB 802 and RCB 805 crew statementsm. [Encls 11.J.4. For example, RCB 802 Boat Captain received a ?Riverine Command Boat Captain" designation letter from the 3 Commanding Officer, but the training record does not reflect the corresponding qualifications. [Encl (247)] For a full examination of the qualifications of RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers, see Appendix D. 42 II.J.5. RC8 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader received a ?Riverine Command Boat Coxswain" and a ?Tactical Craft Patrol Leader" designation letters, but the training record does not reflect the corresponding qualifications. [Encl {243)} II.J.6. (U) The Coastal Riverine Force is required by Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to use Advanced Skills Management program to track all individual qualifications, certifications, and licenses. [Ref [cl] II.J.7. Coastal Riverine Group Training Departments are required to identify the applicable qualifications for watch team positions and ensure that those watch team positions are current in the Advanced Skills Management program. [Refs [fl] II.J.8. (U) Within Advanced Skills Management, watch team positions are referred to as ?Qualified Professional Technician? and contain all the qualifications, certifications, licenses, and required schools; individuals must be assigned a in Advanced Skills Management in order to track their progress. [Ref II.J.9. (U) Some crewmembers of RC8 802 and RCB 805 were assigned ?Riverine? others were assigned ?Riverine Command Boat? and others were assigned ?Tactical Craft Operations" [Encls II.J.10. Per reference and the Advanced Skills Management program, ?Tactical Craft Operations" qualifications applied to force protection and security operations, while it is unclear whether ?Riverine? or ?Riverine Command Boat" job qualification requirements applied to RCB [Ref Encls Several crewmembers of RCB 802 and RC8 805 had completed the individual Personnel Qualification Standards or Job Qualification Requirements for their but their training records did not reflect them as Qualified Professional Technicians in these [Encls {241)- (250)] 43 II.J.12. (U) On 13 July 2015, the following personnel passed a Coastal Riverine Group ONE ?Rules of Engagement/Law of Armed Conflict Exam:" RC8 802 Boat Captain, RCB 802 Coxswain, RCB 802 Engineer, RC8 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Gunner and RCB 805 Gunner Coastal Riverine Group ONE did not provide test results for the following people: RCB 802 Gunner RC8 802 Gunner RC8 805 Coxswain, and RCB 805 Engineer. [Encls (251}? (256}] II.J.13. (U) Successful completion of the exam reflected that RC8 802 Boat Captain, RCB 802 Coxswain, RC8 802 Engineer, RCB 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Gunner and RCB 805 Gunner #2 all understood: [Encls Under the Standing Rules of Engagement you are always authorized to defend your unit and other 0.8. forces in the vicinity. I When determining hostile intent, you should consider the degree of opportunity available to the potential threat to cause harm, the weapon's capability of the potential threat, and your perceived intent of the potential threat to cause harm. II.K. Deployment Training vs. Deployment Missions II.K.1. On 15 July 2015, Coastal Riverine Group ONE recommended'CRS?3 for deployment certification to Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Pacific. [Encl (131)] II.K.2. The certification recommendation message outlined had completed training and has satisfactorily completed an assessment of the requirements in 0.3. Fleet Forces approved Navy Mission Essential Task List capabilities. [Encl (131)] II.K.3. On 16 July 2015, Coastal Riverine Group ONE issued a Deployment Order to to deploy in support of operations in the FOURTH, FIFTH, and SIXTH Fleet Areas of Operation. [Encl (130)] 11.8.4. On 18 July 2015, Commander Task Force FIVE SIX 56} sent a Ere-deployment Order. [Encl (142)] 44 II.K.5. (U) The mission statement in the pre?deployment order, was to provide Command and Control, protect High Value Assets (HVA), provide Sustained security for designated maritime infrastructure: improving stability and security within U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Area of Operations. [Encl (142)] II.K.6. (U) On 6 August 2015, Commander, THIRD Fleet sent the deployment certification message. [Encl (133)] II.K.7. (U) The message certified for deployment in the following capability/mission areas: [Encl (133)] Battlespace Awareness I Building Partnerships Standards Force Application Joint Logistics Net?Centric Protection II.K.8. (U) There were multiple views within and Coastal Riverine Group ONE leadership as to the exact training requirements and how to prepare for deployment. [Encls (23), (84), {933] II.K.9. The deployment certification message does not reflect the mission sets described in the Force Tracking Numbers. [Encls (130), {133), {142}, II.K.10. (U) The Force Tracking Numbers were interpreted differently by Coastal Riverine Group ONE, CBS-3, and [Encls (23), (62), [130), {142), II.K.11. (U) The number of personnel Coastal Riverine Group ONE ordered to deploy with and the numbers in the Force Tracking Numbers did not agree. [Encls {130), 45 CHAPTER I I I COASTAL RIVERINE SQUADRON THREE DEPLOYMENT (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) upon arrival in theater per the Coastal Riverine Group ONE Deployment Certification message. [Encls (47), (67), (131)] (U) did not provide theater specific indoctrination or training validation for [Encls (8), (U) On l7 August 2015, the Crews of RC8 802 and 805 arrived in Bahrain to join Commander Task Unit 56.7.4 56.7.4). [Encl (U) The RCB 802 and RCB 805 boat crews conducted no FIFTH Fleet specific indoctrination or training despite missing [Encl (U) On 18 August 2015, the day after their arrival in theater, the RC8 802 and 805 boat crews were tasked to conduct a ?high value asset" escort mission in Bahrain without an acclimatization period. Normally the crew would get a period of time to make the adjustment to the climate and new environment [Encls (0) During the escort, a crewmember from RCB 805 succumbed to a heat casualty, in which his core temperature reached 103 degrees. [Encls (U) Throughout deployment in the FIFTH Fleet Area of Operations, did not conduct sustainment training. [Encls (6), (45): (75), {80)r (U) Throughout CRS-B's deployment in the FIFTH Fleet Area of Operations, did not fire any weapons from the RCEs. [Encls (7), (13), and Coastal Riverine Operations (U) reports to Commander, 0.8. Naval Central Command operationally and is comprised of various expeditionary combat forces including explosive ordnance disposal, naval is Commander Naval Expeditionary Combat Forces Central. coordinates missions of Navy Expeditionary Forces to include Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Mobile Dive and Salvage, Seabees, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, Coastal Riverine Forces, _and Combat Camera. [Ref 49 coastal warfare, Seabees, Expeditionary Logistics Support Forces, and Coastal Riverines. [Encl (194)] Coastal Riverines comprise approximately 75% of the operational forces that fall under [Encl (U) Only one member of the staff had prior operational experience with Coastal Riverine units. [Encls Due to minimal Coastal Riverine experience on staff, relied on the expertise of CBS-3 to provide guidance on Coastal Riverine operations. [Encls (23), On 12 March 2013, Commander, U.S. Navy Central Command published the Combined Task Force 56 Operational Tasking Riverine Command Boat (OPTASK message. [Encl (152)] RCB establishes procedures and Guidance for the conduct of RCB operations in the Naval Forces Central Command area of responsibility. [Encl (152)] Staff and Subordinate Perspectives (U) Multiple officers within the Maritime Operations Center believed that the command climate was poor. [Encls (U) The Commodore conducted a command climate survey in December 2015. One officer stated that, ?across the board, the officers hated the command and their jobs.? [Encls C.3. (U) As a result of the survey, the Commodore and Chief Staff Officer held a meeting with the officers to discuss the results. [Encls (U) In the opinion of the Maritime Operations Center Director, the discussion was neither productive nor consistent with feedback from prior command climate surveys. [Encl 50 The CTF-S6 Chief Staff Officer acknowledged that, prior to the survey, he was ?a dictator in nature to them.? [Encl The Commodore stated that many of the Commanding Officers he receives from the Coastal Riverine Squadrons are not ?hot runners" within the Surface Warfare Officer community. [Encl In the opinion of certain staff members, the Commodore treated the CBS-3 Commanding Officer more like a Department Head than a Task Group Commander. [Encl The CTF-56 Commodore believed that the CRS-3 Commanding Officer was ?overly cautious? and operated in a ?We can't do that" manner. [Encl (U) On numerous occasions, the Commander voiced concerns to the Commodore about the employment of the RCB, with the Commander eventually conceding to the Commodore's position. [Encl (O) In the opinion of the Commodore, the 56.? Commander was unable to articulate his concerns and would operate more on emotion than logic. [Encl (U) The Commander chose a Junior Officer with no operational experience to be his liaison officer With Staff. [Encls The responsibility of the Liaison Naval Officer at the staff is to work closely with the Operations Officer and provide subject matter expertise on the CRF capabilities and limitations. [Encl (U) The LNO felt that he was not properly utilized as a liaison officer. [Encl (U) On Kuwait Naval Base, the personnel were worn out. One crewmember stated, ?we were getting extended and we were tired of continuously going on missions." [Encl Morale from the perspective of the crew relocating to Kuwait was hurting due to sailors losing out on financial 51 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (U) The Commodore thought that blue water operations were the future of Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. [Encl (U) The Commodore believed that the Commander was not utilizing the RCBs in a manner for which they were designed. [Encl (U) In order to support the presence operations, proposed that relocate RCB 701, RCB 802 and RCB 805 from Bahrain to Kuwait Naval Base. [Encl [162)] (U) The CTG-56.7 Commander initially pushed back on the plan to relocate 3 RCBs to Kuwait because he believed the RCBs were not made for blue water operations. [Encl The RCB Relocation to Kuwait (U) The Chief Staff Officer highlighted to the CTFH56 Maritime Operation Center Director that, ?doctrinally,? the RCBs could conduct the transit from Kuwait to Bahrain. [Ref Encl (U) The Commander expressed his concerns with to the Chief Staff Officer with respect to weather and fuel for the transit from Bahrain to Kuwait. [Enol (U) The Commander stated he was not comfortable with any course of action discussion that had the RCBs transiting open waters, but that did not mean they were not capable of making the transit to Kuwait. [Encl (U) Additionally, the Commander was ?concerned? that there was not a proper Boat Maintenance Facility in Kuwait. Although there is a maintenance facility in Kuwait, it was not properly manned to support the additional RCBs. [Encl (U) The use of Army Watercraft was the Commander's preferred method for long range movement of the RCBs from Bahrain to Kuwait due to weather and crew endurance. [Encls (45), (61), 53 (U) and arranged for transport of RCBs by Army Watercraft. This transport was to take place on 11 12 October 2015. [Encls (47), (61), (67), (162)] (U) The Commander, with the knowledge of the Chief Staff Officer, authorized the premature pull of RC8 T01 from maintenance so it would not miss the Army Watercraft's transit to Kuwait. [Encls (15), (47), (61), On 12 October 2015, control of R08 ?3?01, RCB 802 and R08 805 shifted from the Bahrain Naval Base Officer?in?Charge to the Kuwait Naval Base Officer?in?Charge 56.7.3). [Encls (45), (162}, (209)] (U) The Kuwait Naval Base Officer?in?Charge had no prior Coastal Riverine, RCB, or surface warfare experience, and did not read the Operational Tasking RCB message. [Encls (23), (81): (152}, (210)] (U) According to the statement provided by the 56.? Executive Officer, the leadership did not set the Sailors up in Kuwait for success. [Encl (0) After the arrival of RCB 701, RCB 802 and RCB 805, the Kuwait Naval Base Officer?in?Charge?s responsibilities and scope of mission increased from historically one mission per quarter to frequent presence operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf. He received no additional training or guidance beyond the one day seminar led by the Commander. [Encls (61), (80), (162), (210)] (U) Kuwait Naval Base did not have a Boat Maintenance Facility that was manned for the three additional RCBs. [Encls (15), (61). (0) Kuwait Naval Base only had one Sailor responsible for the ROB boat maintenance, which included all the preventative and corrective maintenance during the time the boats were in Kuwait. [Encl (U) The Boat Maintenance Facility in Bahrain was supported by seven Sailors; however, the Boat Maintenance Facility in Kuwait was manned with only the three RCB crews (ROB 54 701, R08 802, and RCB 805) and one additional Sailor. [Encls (61), (U) The RCB crews did not have all of the items required for maintenance of the craft when the RCBs arrived in Kuwait, to include the Pack?up?Kit (PUK). A PUK contains spare parts. [Encls (15), (U) In Bahrain, there were two CONEX boxes full of spare RCB parts, which were requested by the Bahrain Officer-in- Charge to be shipped to Kuwait. The request was originally denied by CRS chain of command. [Encl (U) However, on approximately 9 January 2016, eighty? nine days after the R085 left Bahrain, the spare RCB parts were shipped to Kuwait Naval Base. [Encl Northern Arabian Gulf Presence Operations (U) From October 2015 to January 2015, RCB 701, RCB 802 and RCB 805 conducted long range patrols of approximately 110 nautical miles round trip (50?60 nautical miles from Kuwait Naval Base). [Encls (12), These patrols typically lasted two to six hours. [Encls As the RC8 802 and RCB 805 boat crews continued to operate from Kuwait Naval Base, they ceased conducting required patrol briefs that would lay out the Mission Brief, Safety and Rules of Engagement. [Encls (10), The primary maintenance systems and SKED) used by RCB personnel for tracking, scheduling and ordering parts were not available at Kuwait Naval Base and instead remained in Bahrain. [Encls (45), (U) Completion of preventive and corrective maintenance and tracking of that maintenance was a challenge due to the geographic separation of systems and personnel. [Encls (15), (U) An administrative review covering thirteen weeks of maintenance reports, 2 November 2016 through 24 January 2016, 55 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) to the Arabian Gulf for an operation that was scheduled to take place on 8 January 2016?. [Encl (161)] On or about 6 January 2016, the Coastal Command Boat suffered an engine casualty making it unable to support the upcoming mission. [Encls (21), (U) On I January 2016, the Chief Staff Officer directed the Staff to work with Staff on the feasibility of moving RCBs from Kuwait Naval Base back to Bahrain in order to substitute for the Coastal Command Boat. [Encl (U) The Chief Staff Officer spoke with the FIFTH Fleet Future Operations Director about the engineering problems of the CCB and discussed the possibility of utilizing the RCBs to conduct the mission the following week on 15 January 2016. [Encls (117)] Both the Operations Officer and Maritime Operations Center Director recommended postponement of the operation until the Coastal Command Boat was repaired. [Encl - At the time the plan for the RCBs was proposed, the Chief Staff Officer stated that he was unaware that two RCBs were not mission-capable and the other ROB was partially mission capable due to maintenance issues. [Encl The CTF-56 Chief Staff Officer chairs a weekly {Planning Board for Maintenance) meeting that goes over all maintenance issues. [Encl The Chief Staff Officer said in his statement am able to attend once a month. I was not aware of how conducted maintenance. However, the casualty reports CTG-56.7 provided never indicated that they could not (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) Officer would refuse to take ?no? for an answer. [Encls (U) On 11 January 2016, during the Operations and Intelligence Brief, the Commander was verbally tasked by the Commodore to relocate the RCBs located in Kuwait back to Bahrain. [Encl (0) Later in the day of 11 January 2016, the Commander presented a quad slide to the Commodore for the RCB transit from Kuwait Naval Base to Bahrain. [Encl (123)] (U) The Commander expressed concerns about the transit to the Commodore, specifically addressing sea state and refueling. [Encls (4T), (U) The GTE-56 Commodore replied that the RCB crews had proven themselves capable of conducting blue water operations over the past months and they were certified to conduct this transit. [Encls {61, 67)] (U) No crewmember of RCB 802 or RCB 805 had ever conducted a transit of this length before. [Encls (U) In the Commodore?s opinion, ?navigation is navigation," and that the RCBs should be able to make the transit between Kuwait and Bahrain. [Encls (67), 111.6.23. (U) After the fact, the Commodore described the transit to the Investigating Officer as ?no big deal" and that the RCBs could make the transit with force protection and communications. [Encl Neither surface nor air over watch was arranged for the RCB transit. [Encls (47), (U) However, the Commodore approved the transit of 2 RCBs from Kuwait Naval Base to Bahrain in order to substitute the operational support that was to be previously provided by the Coastal Command Boat. [Encl 59 CHAPTER IV EVENTS OF 11?13 JANUARY 2016 Findings of Fact IV.A. The Mission IV.A.1. (U) On 11 January 2016, the Coastal Riverine Squadron Three Commanding Officer (CO) served as Commander Task Group (CTG) 56.? located in Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates. [Encl 1V.A.2. On the afternoon of 11 January 2016, the Commander Task Force (CTF) 56 Commodore directed to plan for an approximate 250 nautical mile transit of two Riverine Command Boats from Kuwait Naval Base to Bahrain. [Encls IV.A.3. In the late afternoon of 11 January 2016, the CTG- 56.7 Commander directed the RC3 802 Boat Captain to execute the plan for an early morning transit of two RCBs from Kuwait Naval Base to Bahrain on 12 January 2016. [Encls (7), (23), IV.A.4. According to the plan, once in Bahrain, the two RCBs would support a follow?on operation in the Central Arabian Gulf on or about 15 January 2016. [Encls IV.A.5. (U) According to the governing operational capability instruction, OPNAVINST 3501.363B for RCEs, the RCB has ?limited? capability to navigate under all conditions of geographic location, weather and visibility.? [Ref IV.A.6. However, no one currently assigned within had ever conducted a transit of this length before onboard an ace. [Encls (11), IV.A.7. (U) The RCB crewmembers received word of the planned transit though various means in the late afternoon/early evening of 11 January 2016. [Encls (11), IV.A.8. (0) Individuals throughout both and voiced their concerns, or heard others voice their concerns {to include the Force Navigator), about this nearly 250 nautical For discussion on the training and certification of see Chapter 61 mile transit to their respective leadership.M (77). [Encls was. The Commodore believed that the RCBs could make the transit based upon Commander, FIFTH Fleet Operational Tasking message for RCBs provided that there were adequate force protection measures and communications in place. [Encls (67), (152)] IV.A.10. (U) The Commodore believed that ?navigation is navigation? whether the transit for the RC8 was short or long because the RCBs had conducted long range patrols in the Northern Arabian Gulf for over two months. [EnclS (U) The Commander expressed his concerns to the Commodore about transiting the two RCBs from Kuwait to Bahrain; however, the Commodore responded that he did not know why this was a concern ?because the RC8 is a boat and a boat floats.? [Encls (62), IV.A.12. (U) Despite his concerns, the Commander said the Kuwait to Bahrain transit was supportable.n [Encls (23), (62). {673] IV.A.13. (U) At approximately 1600 on 11 January 2016, the RC8 802 Boat Captain received the order to execute the plan. [Encl {71] IV.A.14. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain stated his concerns to the Commander but the RCB 802 Boat Captain told the CTG- 56.7 Commander that ?the mission was still possible and my sailors and I could accomplish it?. [Encl IV.A.15. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain was concerned that there were no boat trailers to pull the RCBs out of the water if they required maintenance, that they were going to be operating at the farthest range that the crews had ever taken these boats, and that they had never conducted a refueling at sea after sunset. [Encl For further discussion on the planning of the 12 January 2016 transit, see Chapter For further Findings of Fact regarding the relationship between the CTF-56 Commodore and Coastal Riverine Squadron-3 Commanding Officer, see Chapter 111. 62 IU.A.16. After receiving the order to execute the plan from Commander, the RC8 802 Boat Captain went aboard an Army Watercraft that was pier side at Kuwait Naval Base and requested a Plan of Intended Movement navigational track down to Bahrain. [Encls IV.A.17. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain approached Army personnel because the Army Watercraft crew routinely used a proven track that took the Army Watercraft from Kuwait Naval Base to Bahrain and the Commander was comfortable knowing it was a proven track. [Encls (7), IV.A.18. The RCB 802 Boat Captain received the coordinate ?waypoints? {latitudes and longitudes) via email from the Army and entered the waypoints into the Common Geospatial Navigation Toolkit (COGENT) laptop to develop a visual PIM track; see Figure 4.1. [Encls (7), IV.A.19. (U) COGENT is the primary means of navigation for an RC8. [Ref Encls (7), Intended PIM to Rendezvous Points U?m?h layogqi. 24hung. IMVIW Its-wwmt- . .. all Figure 4.1, PIM Track received from Army Watercraft 63 IV.A.20. The actual PIM track received from the Army was not part of the Concept of Operations (CONGPS) ?quad slide" that was briefed to the Commodore, but the Army PIM track was ?agreed? to by the Task Unit Officer?in?Chargew at Kuwait Naval Base on 11 January 2016. [Encls IV.A.21. At the direction of the Operations Officer in Jebel Ali, the RC8 802 Boat Captain created a ?quad slide" (see Figure 4.2) generally describing how the two RCBs would transit from Kuwait Naval Base to Bahrain. The quad slide presented a ?track?; however, that track was not the PIM track taken from the army Watercraft but was instead a straight line from Kuwait Naval Base to Bahrain. [Encls (7), (163)] 5 Ws ?9 3 WHO: omens RCBI m1. 305) I WHAT Transit from to [253 WHEN: maul: ETD MC WHERE: inan sun to contul Ar:th Gurl' uilng AWE: pm-phnm? muting WHY: tDBahrIinlor 7: . mrcin . . its $925 ft. Tan'xparaltra HEEILSCI. Sues nit-stir nr?r; 5mm 3-241 street 1.735 Personnef Thus-Hm um: tap on fun! moo: RCBI Film 1115: RCBI RDV Wltl'l 1350: RCBI 'Il?l [Iqu with USCGC [tn-lung mptor on Inna; NO 2: IHGIE 1145: comphh I?mz?CBilnwiltBASREc Commu 1] Prl'n-Irj' BIB: 150.0 2] Primary um a: mu: Bruno-banana an ?m 5' 1 Figure 4.2, RC3 Quad Slide for Transit from Kuwait to Bahrain Cm: (LS. Fatwa Email No! Approvw 0? IV.A.22. The ?quad slide? depicts the following discrepancies: a} The PIM track depicted is not the actual PIM The Kuwait Naval Base Task Unit Officer-in-Charge served as the Commander Task Unit [Encl 64 track Farsi Island is not shown The wrong RCB is listed 1 of the 10 crewmembers is incorrect It lists a Patrol Coastal ship as well as a Coast Guard ship f) It lists both 225NM and 259NM as the transit distance [Encls (T), (62), (DEC-CT IV.A.23. (U) A quad slide traditionally provides the Commander who is briefed a one slide general overview of the Mission. Following the ?quad slide? should be an accompanying Patrol Brief which, at a minimum, provides the Commander operational, navigation, and operational risk management information in the five paragraph format: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Command (SMEAC). [Ref IV.A.24. (U) According to Operations Officer, CTF-56 did not require a ?quad slide? for this mission. Commodore and Commander both saw the quad slide. [Encls IV.A.25. (0) During the evening of ll January 2016, the CTG-56.T Commander emailed the Commodore the baseline ?quad slide?, which depicted the incorrect navigation ?waypoints? for the RCB's movement to Bahrain and a planned departure time of 0800L on 12 January 2016. [Encls (62), (112), [163)] IV.A.26. The RCB Boat Captains, Commander, Executive Officer, Battle Watch Captain, and the Chief Staff Officer were not aware of the PIM track in relation to Farsi Island. [Encls (47), (77), (78), IV.A.27. PIM approval was delegated down to the Kuwait Task Unit Officer?in~Charge at Kuwait Naval Base. [Ref Encls (62), IV.A.28. (U) The Kuwait Task Unit Officer?in?Charge was a Naval Aviator and had limited surface navigation experience. He stated he was ?not familiar with ocean navigation and would have to defer any of their staff} questions? to the RC3 802 Boat Captain. [Encls (80), IV.A.29. (U) Operations Officer forwarded the PIM track to Maritime Operations Center Director. [Encl (122)] 65 IV.A.30. The Kuwait Task Unit Officer?in-Charge briefly reviewed the PIM track on however, the RC8 805 Boat Captain, the Commander, the Maritime Operations Center Watch Officer, and the CTF-56 Battle Watch Captain never reviewed the PIM track on either an electronic or paper navigational chart. [Encls IV.A.31. As a Surface Warfare Officer, the RC8 802 Boat Captain was trained and qualified to plot the PIM coordinates on a paper navigational chart. [Encls IV.A.32. Although required by CORIVFORINST 3530.1, the RCB 802 Boat Captain never looked at or plotted the PIM coordinates on a paper navigational chart nor did he fill in an approved PIM sheet. [Ref Encl IV.A.33. In the almost three years since being assigned to the RC8 805 Boat Captain only had a total of two hours of training on the COGENT system. [Encl IV.A.34. The RCE 802 Boat Captain did not believe he had sufficient training in the COGENT system either. [Encl 1V.A.35. The 808 802 Boat Captain stated he had only received limited training, much of which he had arranged for himself when a COGENT representative had visited prior to deployment. [Encl IU.A.36. The RCB 802 Boat Captain did not believe he or the RC8 crews had received enough training in COGENT, but felt comfortable that they had enough knowledge to make basic use the system. [Encl The RCB 805 Boat Captain never entered the PIM track into Ros 805?s COGENT. [Ref Encls IU.A.38. Although required by CORIVFORINST 3530.1, the RC8 805 Boat Captain did not have a hard copy of the PIM track onboard his RCB. [Encl IV.A.39. The RCB 805 Boat Captain did not plot a PIM track on a paper navigational chart. [Encls (191)] 66 IV.R.40. (U) COGENT was not up to date; the latest Notice to Mariners update available for COGENT was 52/15; however, the COGENT update on RCB 802's COGENT laptop was 44f15. (Encl (102)] IV.R.41. (U) CORIVFORINST 3530.1 requires that Coastal Riverine Force team members (Patrol Leader, Boat Captain, Coxswain) to take a navigation ?Rules of the Road? exam every quarter consisting of fifty questions with a minimum passing score of 90 percent. [Ref IV.A.42. (U) The Patrol Leader/RC8 805 Boat Captain failed his most recent navigation ?Rules of the Road? exam and had not taken an exam since February 2015. [Encls (124)] IV.A.43. (U) Based on the qualification and training documentation provided to the inspection team by the Coastal Riverine Group, the RC8 802 Boat Captain had never taken a navigation ?Rules of the Road" exam while stationed at Coastal Riverine Squadron Three [Encl (124)] IV.A.44. (U) The RCB 805 Coxswain failed his most recent navigation ?Rules of the Road? exam and had not taken an exam since February 2015. [Encl (124)] IU.R.45. (U) The RCB 802 Coxswain failed his most recent navigation ?Rules of the Road" exam and had not taken an exam since February 2015. [Encl (124)] IV.A.46. (U) Although required by 3120.32, the RC8 802 and 805 Boat Captains never looked at a paper navigational chart prior to getting underway on 12 January 2016. (Ref Encls (7), IV.R.47. (U) The Commander never looked at an actual chart or the he just saw the numbers associated with the PIM on a spreadsheet. [Encl IV.R.48. (U) Although required by the Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE standing orders, the RC8 802 and 805 crews failed to correct all charts and mark all hazards to navigation. [Ref Encls (7), (102)] IV.A.49. (U) The RCB 805 Boat Captain stated that he was assigned as the Patrol Leader and thought he was in charge of the patrol; however, the Commander thought the 802 Boat 67 Captain was in charge of the patrol because he was a commissioned officer. [Encls IV.A.50. (U) The Commander stated that there is a ?Patrol Leader? qualification that is associated with the gray boats and there is also a ?Patrol Officer? qualification, which is a Riverine qualification. The Commander stated he ?never had time" to qualify anyone for that qualification. [Encl IV.A.51. (U) The Commander went on to state: ?to my understanding? RCB 802 was an officer ?and he would be the one in charge of the mission?. [Encl IV.A.52. The RCB 805 Boat Captain stated he was the Patrol Leader but stated: ?It?s a little more complex with me and him 802 Boat Captain) because he is a LT {Lieutenant} so there's times when I?ll defer to him? for navigation. [Encl IV.A.53. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain stated: ?Basically he (RCB 805 Boat Captain} was ?acting? as the Patrol Leader, and told me I was going to execute what I had planned. I was Lead Boat, not the Patrol Lead. [Encl IV.A.54. (U) As depicted in Figure 4.1, the planned PIM track left Kuwait Naval Base on a easterly COurSe into the Arabian Gulf and then turned southeasterly, which would have taken the RCBs around the northeast side of Farsi Island,m outside the island?s territorial seas, and then on south to Bahrain. [Encls (219)] The United States recognizes that Farsi Island is Iranian territory. See ?Maritime Claims Reference Manual", available at Pursuant to customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an ?island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide." [Article 121). The United States recognizes Iran's claim that Farsi Island enjoys a territorial sea, which may be up to 12 nautical miles measured from Farsi Island's baseline {hrticle The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low?water line along the coast as marked on a largee scale charts officially recognized by the Coastal State (Article Additionally, the United States has not ratified see ?Law of the Sea Convention,? available at 68 IV.A.55. (U) Due to RC8 limited fuel capacity, plan required that while proceeding south along PIM, the RCBs would rendezvous with 0.3. Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) MONOMOY to conduct an underway refueling. [Encls (7), (11), (23), (67), (80), (111)] IV.A.56. (U) The Commander expressed concern to the Commodore that a vessel to assist the RCBs if required {referred to as an ?overwatch? ship) had not been assigned to respond in the event of a ?catastrophic RC8 casualty? and that he preferred to have another vessel assigned to mitigate the risk of an open ocean transit but would execute the mission regardless. [Encls (62), (67), (112)] (U) The Commodore's response was that the USCGC MONOMOY (the refueling ship) would respond in such event. [Encl (120)] IV.A.58. (U) Ultimately, CTFH56 never followed through with coordination with respect to assigning an overwatch ship or aircraft for the additionally, the Chief Staff Officer stated it was not required. [Encls (47), IV.B. The Preparation 10.8.1. (U) At the time the order came in to plan for the nearly 250 nautical mile transit, three RCBs were located at Kuwait Naval Base; RCEs 701, 802 and 805. [Encls (11), (202)] 18.8.2. (U) RC8 701 was not mission capable due to a faulty shaft seal. [Encls (7), (11), (13), (14), (62), (202)] IV.B.3. (U) RCB 802 was not mission capable due to a faulty raw water pump flange on her starboard engine. [Encls (13), (82). (202)] 18.8.4. (U) RC8 805 was partially mission capable due to her kickstand being out of commission. [Encls (7), (13) (14), (62). (202)] IV.B.5. [Encl (62), (152)] IV.B.6. Because two were not mission capable, one RCB had to be repaired so that two RCBs could make the transit. [Encls (6), (82), (152)] 69 IV.B.7. In order to transit on 12 January 2016, parts from one RCB had to be ?cannibalized? to use as replacement parts for RCB 802, specifically a water pump bracket/flange (see Figure 4.3). [Encls (11), (118), (119), {136), (135)] IV.B.8. Cannibalization is a process by which a part is removed from one piece of equipment and installed on another in order to make the other operational. Cannibalization is generally prohibited by various Navy instructions unless approved by the appropriate authority. [Ref I . .9 l, N-i? '?um Flange on RCB 802. Figure 4.3, R03 302 Raw Water Pump Brackethlange (Picture taken after 12 (U) JAN 16) IV.B.9. The N43 maintenance personnel verbally received permission from Coastal Riverine Group Two N43 office to cannibalize RCB 701 in order to repair RES 802. [Encls (62): (136)] IV.B.10. sent a Cannibalization request email to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command N43 and received a verbal approval back from them. [Encl {653] IV.B.11. When cannibalizing the part from RCB 701, a civilian contractor for RCB maintenance at Kuwait Naval Base 70 discovered that the raw water pump flange on RCB 802 had been modified by someone in the past and that improper corrective maintenance had been performed. [Encls (118], (119)] IV.B.12. The raw water pump flange on RCB 802 did not have a correct bolt installed. [Encls {118), (119)] IV.B.13. (U) The hole on the raw water pump bracket/flange was drilled larger so that a bolt that was on hand could be used. [Encls {118}, (119)] RCB 802 Picture This bolt is not an authorized Original Equipment Manufacturer replacementpart and was a modi?ed for this application. (U) Figure d.d, Incorrect Bolt holding Flange on RES 802 (Picture taken after 12 Jan 16) IV.B.14. (U) A Departure From Specification was not submitted for the incorrect bolt or unapproved modification. [Encl IV.B.15. (U) Specifications are engineering requirements such as material, dimensional clearances, and physical arrangements, by which ship components are installed, tested and maintained. [Ref 71 IV.E.16. A Departure From Specification is a lack of compliance with an authoritative document plan, procedure, or instruction. [Ref There was no Quality Assurance program in place for corrective maintenance at [Encls IV.E.18. ROB crewmembers, in conjunction with the contractor, worked late into the night of 11 January 2016 and in the morning of 12 January 16 to prepare and repair the two RCBs for a nearly 250 nautical mile transit in open ocean. [Encls (12), {118), {119}] IU.B.19. Pursuant to Coastal River Force Instruction 4590.1B, the Task Unit Commander is required to monitor the RCB crews to ensure they receive the proper amount of rest; in this case it was the Kuwait Task Unit Officer?in?Charge. [Ref IV.B.20. For a boat greater than 40 feet and traveling in seas less than 4 feet high for a period of 10 hours, crewmembers require 8 hours of rest. [Ref IV.B.21. The RCB 805 Boat Captaianatrol Leader did not sleep the night before the 12 January 2016 transit. [Encl IV.B.22. - In the evening of 11 January 2016, released a Fragmentary Order via Naval message to deploy two RCBs to Bahrain no later than 13 January 2016. [Encl (134)] IV.B.23. The Night Orders for 11 January 2016 made no mention of the transit the morning of 12 January 2016. [Encl {202)} IV.B.24. On 12 January 2016, the Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet directed via his Daily Intentions and Order Message, to maintain three RCBs and associated crews at Kuwait Naval Base to support presence operations. [Encl (143)] IV.B.25. Although an email was sent by the CTF-56 Current Operations Officer to the Fleet Watch Officer at Naval Forces Central Command requesting for NAVCENT to add the move of the RCBs from KNB to Bahrain to the 13 January 2016 Daily Intention and Orders Message, the move would have already occurred when the message was released. The request was never placed in the message. [Encls {114}, {143}] 72 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) IU.C.5. (U) The R08 802 Boat Captain was designated in writing as a Boat Captain. [Encl (7), (247)] IV.C.6. (U) In accordance With 3534.1, the RC8 Coxswain is responsible to the Boat Captain for the safe navigation of the RC8 and the direction of crewmembers. [Ref {d3} IV.D. Procedures or Requirements Not Followed Prior to Getting Underwax IV.D.1. (U) Preeoperational checklists for RCB 805 were not logged in the Deck Log as completed as required by CORIVFORINST 4590.13. [Encl (169)] IV.D.2. (U) The RCB 802 and RCB 805 Boat Captains did not conduct a Patrol Brief prior to getting underway as required by CORIVFORINST 4590.18. [Ref Encls {11) IV.D.3. (U) The RCB 802 and 805 Boat Captains did not verify each waypoint for accuracy. [Ref Encls IV.D.4. (U) RC8 805 did not have the RIM track loaded in COGENT when they got underway from Kuwait on 12 January 2016. [Encls (102)] IV.D.5. RC8 805 did not have an approved PIM track in the Electronic Charting System on 12 January 2016 as required by CORIVFORINST 3530.1 [Ref Encl (102)] IV.D.6. R08 802 and RCB 805 did not have magnetic deviation cards cnboard as required by CORIVFORINST 3530.1. [Ref Encl IV.D.7. (U) RCB 802's and RCB 805?s Defense Advance GPS Receivers were not loaded with as required by NECFCINT 3530.1. [Ref Encls IV.D.8. (U) Both RCB Boat Captains were unaware that the Defense Advance GPS Receiver was required to be loaded with [Ref Encls 74 IV.D.9. (0) Crew serve weapons were not mounted in accordance with the Commander?s Standing Orders (only 2 of 5 weapons mounted). [Ref Encls (7), (11), IV.D.10. (U) On 12 January 2016, there were no Deck Log entries recorded after 0930L onboard RCB 802 as required by CORIVFORINST 4590.18. [Encl (168)] IVQE. Getting Underway IU.E.1. (U) At approximately 0600L 12 January 2016, RCB 802 was launched from a trailer in order to operationally test the repairs conducted on the raw water pump. [Encls (6), (11), IV.E.2. (0) Upon starting up RCB 802, it was identified that the crew did not tighten the oil cap and over?pressurization blew the cap off, spraying oil throughout the engine compartment. After cleaning and placing the cap back on, RCB 802 was assessed to be mechanically sound. [Encls IV.E.3. (0) On the morning of 12 January 2016, RCB 805 was already in the water and pier-side at Kuwait Naval Base. [Encls IV.E.4. (U) The RCBs did not get underway at 0800L as briefed per the ?quad slide", they provided to the Commander due to the inability to establish satellite communications. [Encls (7), (13), (163)] According to the Operational Tasking Communication message, all RCBs are required to have working satellite communications (Radio Telephone) with prior to a patrol. [Encl (153)] (U) A Coastal Riverine Force craft becomes ?not mission capable? when mitigation measures cannot be effectively employed to communicate via marine band and Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite Radio Telephone with the Patrol Leader and the mission?designated Tactical Operations Center Watch/Maritime Operations Center Watch Officer. [Ref Commander Standing Orders fail to mention the communication requirements for two?boat operations; the Standing Orders only mention single boat operations. [Ref (ill 75 IV.E.8. (U) At RCB 805 achieved satisfactory satellite communications via Radio Telephone with the Tactical Operations Center in Bahrain. [Encl {169)} IV.E.9. (U) Between 1141L and 1145Lr RCB 805 lost satellite communications via Radio Telephone with the Tactical Operations Center in Bahrain. [Encls (169), (171)] 1145L, RCB 802 obtained satisfactory High Frequency radio communications with the Tactical Operations Center in Kuwait, but had unsatisfactory satellite communications via Radio Telephone with Kuwait as required by Operational Taskinq RCB message. [Encls (152), {153), 1v.s.11._a1: 1145L, RCB 805 had both unsatisfactory High Frequency Radio Telephone and unsatisfactory satellite communications via Radio Telephone as required by Operational Tasking RCB message. [Encls (152), {153), (177)] IV.E.12. At 1148L, COGENT data shows both RCBs underway and Omaking way. At this time, winds were out of the Northwest at less than 10 knots and, seas from the Northwest at 0?1 feet. [Encl (158)] T6 RCB 802 LEAVING KUWAIT NAVAL BASE Figure 4.5, COGENT Data Showing RCBs Underway from Kuwait IV.E.13. Between 1148L and 1150L, the Commander gave RCB 802 and RCB 805 permission to get underway. [Encl IV.E.14. (U) Due to missing or conflicting Deck Log entries and statements, it is unclear whether this permission to get underway is strictly for communication operational testing or for the actual mission. [Encls (171}, IV.E.15. (U) Several crew statements state RCB 802 and RCB 805 got underway approximately 1200L to exit the Kuwait Naval Base basin to test communications. [Encls (7), [158)] IV.E.16. (U) The underway times are approximated because both CTG-56.T and Maritime Operations Center Logs provide conflicting underway times. [Encls (173}, (171)] IV.E.17. (U) The RCB 802 and RCB 805 Deck Logs do not provide an underway time. [Encls (168], (169)] 77 IV.E.18. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain stated he decided to get underway and test satellite communications (Radio Telephone} further out to sea and away from the shore due to the satellite ?Look Angle" while in port pier side; in addition, he stated that he also tested the Iridium satellite telephones. Both tested unsatisfactorily. [Enols (7), (118}, (119)] satellite communications with an Iridium phone does not meet mission communication requirements. [Encls {152}, (153}] IV.E.20. (U) Between 1148L and 1235L, RCB 802 and RC8 805 continued to troubleshoot High Frequency and satellite communications while underway in the vicinity of Kuwait Naval Base. [Encls (7), (158), (159}, (177)] IV.E.21. At 1232L, both RCBs deviated from PIN and proceeded southeast without satellite communications required by Operational Tasking Communications and RCB. [Encls (152}. {153}. (158}, (159)] RCBS OUTSIDE KUWAIT NAVAL BASE um rots: 441- . gnome: q? h?qln?rh Figure 4.6, R035 802 and 805 Underway Heading Southeast 78 IV.E.22. At no point after 1232L, did RCB 802 and RCB 805 follow the approved PIM track. [Encls [201, ACTUAL TRACK VS PIM TRACK ?fag-fqruiag Figure 4.7, Actual Track (Red) PIM Track (Orange) IV.E.23. Because RCB 802 and RCB 805 were underway late, the Patrol Leader/RC8 805 Boat Captain supported taking a different heading to the next leg of PIM. [Encl IV.E.24. At 1235L, both RCB 802 and RC8 805 are logged as turning back towards Kuwait Naval Base to trouble shoot communications issues; but they didn't. [Encl {171)} IV.E.25. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain stated that, after talking with the Commander multiple times via Iridium satellite phone, he was told that if the RCBs cOuld not get requisite communications, the RCBs were to return to base. [Encl IV.E.26. (U) At 1240L, already 8 minutes on the southeasterly course, the RCB 802 Boat Captain had a successful Iridium satellite telephone call to Commander and told the Commander that the RCBs could still make the rendezvous point at 1615L. [Encls 79 IV.E.27. (U) At approximately 1240L, the Commander gave permission for the RCB 802 Boat Captain to proceed on the mission. [Encl IV.E.28. (0) Approximately 10 minutes prior to this decision, a Video Telephone Conference was held between Commodore and OTC-56.7 Commander. [Encls IV.E.29. During this VTC, concerns were raised by Commander regarding the status of communication capabilities of the RCBs. However, Commodore raised a greater concern for forthcoming inclement weather if delayed, and decided to proceed as planned. [Encl IV.E.30. It was noted after this decision that CTG-56.7 Commander was visibly upset with the decision. [Encl The RCB 802 Boat Captain stated that the (ETC- 56.7 Commander was going to allow RCB 802 and 805 to transit from Kuwait to Bahrain with only an Iridium satellite telephone?. [Encls (152), (153)] IV.E.32. Approximately 15 minutes into the transit, RCB 805 came up on satellite communication via Radio Telephone with the Tactical Operations Center in Bahrain. [Encl IV.E.33. RC8 802 never established satisfactory secure satellite communications via Radio Telephone with the Maritime Operations Center in Bahrain; however, RCB 805 did. See Table 4.1. [Encls This Undumy status Appmral Import 111141115 Input WI. 11:15 Underway WA 1240 Underway from GIG 5E . ~15 nil-L: iutl: transit Underway Approval to continue Unnuryptad - Dun Hut Ila-at linden llaquimnta Table 4.1, RCB Communication status prior to mission commencement 80 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) IV.E.40. According to the RCB 805 Deck Log, at the top and bottom of every hour until 1600L, RCB 805 passed position reports to the Tactical Operations Center in Bahrain. [Encl [169)] IV.E.41. (U) A Tactical Operations Center is setup for missions to provide continuous operational control and to maintain a central location for administrative, logistical, operational and tactical, command and control. [Ref IV.E.42. (U) RCB 802 and RCB 805 failed to make latitude and longitude logbook entries and RCB 802 recorded no position reports as required by CORIVFORINST 3530.1. [Ref Encls [168), (169)] IV.E.43. At 1441L on 12 January 2016, the Kuwait Tactical Operations Center ?closed down" because the Bahrain Tactical Operations Center assumed control of the RCBs. [Encl IV.E.44. Despite this, the Bahrain Tactical Operations Center Deck Log never acknowledged that it assumed control of the two RCBs. [Encl (174)] IV.E.45. Between approximately 1413 and 1435, USCGC MONOMOY changed the rendezvous position with the RCBs due to time constraints against day light. [Encl {159), [173), (174), (176}. (181)] IV.E.46. Between 1202L and 1600L, RCB 805 made nine position reports, not along PIM, to the Commander Task Unit 56.7.4 Tactical Operations Center located in Bahrain. [Encl (169)] IV.E.47. (0) Between 1202L and 1600L, the RC8 802 Deck Log does not reflect any position reports made to the Tactical Operations Center located in Bahrain. [Encl (168)] IV.E.48. Only four of the nine RCB position reports from RCB 805 were passed from the Tactical Operations Center in Bahrain to the Maritime Operations Center in Bahrain, and only six of nine position reports were passed from the Tactical Operations Center in Bahrain to the Maritime Operations Center in Jebel Ali. [Encls (171), {174), 82 IV.E.49. All Tactical Operations Centersm report to a Maritime Operations Center. The Tactical Operations Centers work for the Maritime Operations Center. They have the same function. [Encl (178)] CTG 56.7 Command and Control Kna? NAVCENT CTF 56 Bahn?nMDC OPCGN I I Egg?; I CTG 55.? LNG CTG 56.7 JebelAli moo CTU 551.1 CTU 56.7.2 CTU 56.7.3 CTU 55.7.4 Jebel Ali TOG. FujairahTOC KuwaitTOC BahrainTOC us. Mara: For?: Clonal Firs: 0mm Forwam. BI My son Approve-o CU SSFFIED Figure n.9, Command and Control for IU.E.50. At no time did the Maritime Operations Center in Bahrain or the Maritime or Tactical Operations Centers in Jebel Ali, UAE plot PIM or position reports on either an electronic or paper navigational chart. [Encls IV.E.51. (U) The Maritime and Tactical Operations Centers in Jebel Ali did not have Global Command and Control System?Joint that would have displayed territorial seas overlays. [Encls {623] A Tactical Operations Center is setup for missions to provide continuous operational control and to maintain a central location for administrative, logistical, operational and tactical, command and control. [Ref 83 IV.E.52. (U) The Maritime and Tactical Operations Centers in Jebel Ali had no territorial sea overlays in Agile Client and was unaware of the RCBs position in relation to either Saudi Arabian or Iranian territorial seas. [Encls IV.E.53. (U) Agile Client is a navigational software application. [Encl (195)] IV.E.54. (U) The Maritime Operations Center in Bahrain was unaware of the RCBs position in relation to either Saudi Arabian or Iranian territorial seas. [Encls IV.E.55. (U) At no time did the Maritime Operations Center plot PIM or position reports on either an electronic or paper navigation chart. [Encls IV.E.56. The CTF-56 Maritime Operations Center does not utilize Global Command and Control System-Joint [Encl (U) At approximately 1527L, RCB 802 and RCB 805 entered Saudi territorial seas and exercised the right of innocent passage under customary international law.M [Ref Encl (158}, (159)] (UJ Pursuant to customary international law as reflected in UNCLOS, ships of all States, whether coastal or land?locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. (Art. For purpose of this transit. passage meant navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility. 84 RCB 802 AND 805 ENTERING SAUDI TERRITORIAL WATERS (1527L"hhum,, '1 - . . - RCB 802 TRACK IS RED RCB 805 TRACK IS ORANGE up" . -. 1 (U) Figure 4.10Ir RCB 802 and 8&5 Enter Saudi Territorial Seas IV.E.58. Both RCB Beat Captains were unaware? they entered Saudi Arabian territorial seas. [Encls IV.E.59. (U) At approximately 1537L RCB 802 and RCB 805 exited Saudi Hrabian territorial seas. [Encls (158}, (159)] Knewledgelintent is not a prerequisite for a ship to exercise the right of innocent passage. (Art. 19, 85 RCB 802 AND 805 LEAVING SAUDI TERRITORIAL WATERS (1537L) -- -- {Tam an. In". ix: ?3 RCB 802 TRACK IS RED RCB 805 TRACK IS ORANGE DASHEDGRAY LINEIS TERRIT 1 w-wcwen; .H .. _.cl - an -. Figure 4.11, RCE 802 and 305 Enter Saudi Territorial Seas IV.E.6D. (U) In accordance with customary international law, the RCB 802 and RCB 805 transit through Saudi Arabian territorial seas was innocent as well as continuous and expeditious.3 [Ref IV.E.61. COGENT data shows that at approximately 1546C RCB 805 entered Iranian territorial seas surrounding Farsi Island, exercising the right of innocent passage under customary international law?. [Encls [158), (159)] Pursuant to customary international law as reflected in UNCLOS, passage was innocent because it was not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 19, Iran requires prior permission for warshipsfsubmarinesJr nuclear?powered ships and any ship carrying nuclear or other dangerous or noxious substances to exercise innocent passage. The United States does not recognize this claim. ?Maritime Claims Reference Manual", available at Under customary international law, a warship is a ?ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the 86 RCB 802 AND 805 ENTERING IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS ?21? *5 a - RCEI 802 TRACK IS RED - RCB 805 TRACK I5 ORANGE GRAY DASH LINE REPRESENTS IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS w: (U) Figure 4.12, ROE 302 and 805 Enter Iranian TTW (COGENT) IV.E.62. While both RCB 802 and RCB 805 had the right under customary international law to exercise innocent passage in government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate serviCe list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline. (Art. 29, While the RC8 is not a warship, it is a vessel entitled to sovereign immunity because it is owned and operated by a Chief of Naval Operations ?Vessel Sovereign Immunity and Crew List State . Policy," of 10 November 2005. IV.E.63. Both RCB Boat Captains, the Bahrain Tactical Operations Center, the Jeb Ali Tactical Operations Center, the Jeb Ali Maritime Operations Center, and the Maritime Operations Center were unaware that the two RCBs entered Iranian territorial seas. [Encls {11) (171}, (174)] IV.E.64. Additionally, The Common Tactical Picture-Maritime manager was unable to monitor RCB movement and positions, ?due to conducting a scheduled daily GCCS reboot.? [Encl The Common Tactical Picture? Maritime manager is defined as a position assigned by FIFTH Fleet Commander who is responsible for maintaining an accurate Common Operating Picture and current status of hostile, neutral, and friendly tracks/forces that includes data input directly and indirectly from organic and non?organic sensors. [Encl (149)] IV.E.66. (U) The passage of RCB 802 and RCB 805 through Iranian territorial seas was innocent because there was no threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of Iran.26 [Ref IV.F. The Crew Observes Farsi Island IU.F.1. (U) Between approximately 1530L and 1630L, crewmembers from RCBs 802 and 805 visually observed objects or land masses to their port side. [Encls IV.F.2. (U) Crewmembers speculated as to whether these were Saudi Islands, rocks, or oil platforms. [Encls IV.F.3. (U) At this time, none of the crew believed that any of the masses were an Iranian island. [Encls Additionally, passage was innocent because RCB 802 and RCB 805 did not exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; did not collect information to the prejudice of the Iran; did not conduct any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the Iran; did not launch, land or take on board any aircraft/military device; did not conduct any act of willful and serious pollution contrary; did not conduct any fishing activities; did not carry out research or survey activities; did not conduct any activity aimed at interfering with any System of communication or any other facilities or installations of Iran; and did not conduct any activity not having a direct bearing on passage. {Art. 19, 88 IV.F.4. (U) At this point, the RC8 802 Boat Captain knew they were in foreign territorial seas; however, he was unaware of which nation. [Encl IV.F.5. (U) Eventually, RCB 802 and RCB 805 passed an island to their port side, with a fire burning on it. This island was Farsi Island. [Encls (I), (9) (14) {158}, (159)] IV.F.6. (U) Crewmember assessments of the distances range from 3-8 nautical miles away. [Encls 7-6-5-4-3 NM Rings an 6951 ?shim 1 on: 0.0'Re1 i seem: murm- - 041mm,! kt 35mii'1i fit it it (U) Figure 4.13, Crew Observed Farsi Island Estimated Distance (U) Both RCB 802 and RCB 805 crews utilized their CDGENT navigation systems. The system displayed Farsi Island as a small purple dot; however, neither RCB crew was able to determine it was an island because neither crew zoomed in to determine what the purple dot was. [Encls (9), IV.F.8. (U) Had any crewmember zoomed into the purple dot, they would have discovered the purple dot was Farsi Island (Iran). [Encl (159)] 89 FARSI ISLAND ZOOMED OUT [k fu-u-n un?t-r- nun,- Ufa--. ,l?l '1 I I i ISLAND I I. IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATER LINE .1 2 WATER LINE . {UJFigure 4.14 COGENT Zoomed Out - Displaying Purple Dot FARSI ISLAND ZOOMED IN II (D) Figure 4.15, COGENT Zoomad In - Purple Dot Showing Farsi Island 90 IV.F.9. (U) No crewmembers on either RC8 utilized a paper navigational chart in order to plot their exact location or to identify the island they had seen, even though the charts were available on the RCBs. [Encls (9), (13), (191)] IV.F.10. (U) RCB 802 and RC8 805 never logged observing the island in the respective Deck Logs. [Encls (168): (169)] IV.F.11. (0) At no point did either RCB contact any Tactical or Maritime Operations Center to report sighting Farsi Island. [Encls (168), (169), (171), (176)] IV.F.12. (U) RC8 802?s Engineer searched for and found the island on a ?chart' application on his personal smartphone; the application displayed a ?long Arabic name? and no other information about the island. [Encl IV.F.13. (U) Crew statements indicate RCB 802 and RCB 805 would need to go around the island to meet USCGC MONOMOY at the amended rendezvous location. [Encls (6), IV.F.14. (U) RCB 802's Coxswain and Boat Captain discussed whether the RCBs should double back and loop around the north side of Farsi Island or continue southwest of Farsi Island and loop back up around the south side of the island. [Encls (6), IV.F.15. (U) RCB 802?s Boat Captain made the decision to continue south as he was concerned about making the rendezvous point before dark. Accordingly, the RC8 802 Coxswain altered his course to port while continuing to the south of the island. [Encls (6)r (7), (159)] IV.F.16. (U) At this point, no crewmember was aware the island was Farsi Island or that it was Iranian. [Encls IV.G. RCB 802 Sustains Engine Casualty IV.G.1. (U) Between 1600L and 16151.r RC8 802?s engines dropped in speed because the starboard engine sustained a dangerous loss in oil pressure. [Encls (6), (ll)r (13), (14), (168)] 91 TIMES RCB 802 AND 805 GO DIW .. m. .H. [1:41:41 3" -. RCB 802 TRACK IS RED - RCB 805 TRACK IS ORANGE Figure 4.16, RCBs 302 and 805 Go Dead in the Water IU.G.2. (U) COGENT data shows that the RCBs 802 and 805 went dead?in?the-water at 1612L and 1613L respectively. At this time, winds were out of the Northwest at 8?13 knotsr seas from the Northwest at 1?3 feet, and currents from the North at 0.6 knots. [Encl (158}, (159}] IV.G.3. (U) RCB 802's Coxswain notified his Boat Captain that he was coming down in speed and that they needed to come to a stop in order to both avoid the engine overheating and to troubleshoot the problem. [Encls IV.G.4. (U) Although RCB 802's crew might have troubleshot while still proceeding along on one engine {at approximately 10 knots), the Coxswain made the decision to shut down both engines as he assessed that it would too difficult to work in the engine compartment while moving. [Encls (7), 92 IV.G.5. Unknown to the RCB 802 Coxswainm, RC8 Engineering Operational Casualty Control procedures provide that for ?Loss of Oil Pressure or Low Oil Pressure,? the R08 is to maneuver to a safe location/launch site using the unaffected engine. [Ref Encl IV.G.6. (U) RCB 802 radioed to RC8 805 that RCB 802 sustained an engineering casualty and was shutting down both engines; RCB 805 dropped in speed and came along RCB 802?s port side.m3 [Encls (12), IV.G.7. (U) The R08 805 Engineer recounted that he reported to the Bahrain Tactical Operations Center via satellite communications that R08 802 suffered an engine casualty at 1632L, approximately 20 minutes after RCB 802 went dead in the water. [Encl IV.G.8. (0) At the time R08 802 went dead in the water, crewmembers assessed Farsi Island was approximately was 3-5 nautical miles away. [Encls (5), 18.0.9. (0) COGENT data shows the RCBs were approximately 1.6 nautical miles from Farsi Island when RCB 802 went dead in the water. [Encl (189)] IV.G.10. Under 0.8. Navy Regulations 0918: ?To the extent possible which the situation demands, the senior officer present shall be prepared for action and shall guard against surprise attack. With the means at his or her disposal, he or she shall put into effect such measures as are necessary to minimize the possibility? of the undetected approach of hostile air,r surface, or submarine forces." [Raf IV.G.11. At this point, neither Boat Captain gave any direction to gunners to put their protective gear (kits) on, to (0) The RCB 802 Coxswain asserted in his interview with the Investigating Officer that there was not a Standard Operating Procedure for responding to this type of engine casualty. [Encl (61] (0) One of ROE 805's gunners recounted that 808 805 took up ?rear guard.? [Encl 93 stand lookout, or to man weapons for Force Protection?. [Encls IV.G.12. (U) RCB 802?s Engineer came up from below deck, opened the engine compartment, and noticed oil had surged out behind the raw water pump. [Encls IV.G.13J (U) The bolt that held the pump assembly to the engine block had come loose and the assembly had either partially or totally come off. The 11 January 2016 repairs, which included cannibalization, use of the incorrect bolt, and drilling a bigger bore to accommodate the bolt, had failed. [Encls (6), IV.G.14. The R08 802 Coxswain left his seat and the cockpit and went back to the engine compartment because he felt he was the most qualified and experienced engineer. [Encls (6), IV.G.15. The RCB 802 Boat Captain acquiesced to the Coxswain leaving his chair. [Encls IU.G.16. The RC8 802 Coxswain and RC8 802 Engineer began making repairs to the pump assembly; other crewmembers assisted by obtaining tools. [Encls The RCB 802 Coxswain estimated the repair would take 20 minutes. [Encl IV.H. Iranian Interaction IU.H.1. Approximately 5 to 15 minutes after RES 802 went dead in the water, crewmembers from both RCBs observed two small boats approaching from Farsi Island. Between 1600 and this time, the direction of currents shifted and started coming from the South, pushing both RCBs Farsi Island. [Encls (5), to) The RC8 802 Coxswain stated during his interview that at this point, the crews were ?relaxed? in their Force Protection. [Encl 94 IV.H.2. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain first observed the small boats about 2 nautical miles away and initially ?did not suspect any ill intent from the boats.? [Encl IV.H.3. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain later observed weapons on the boats between 800?1000 yards, and at the point ?still thought these were Saudi Island [sic], so [he] didn't know who these [the small boats] were.? [Encl IU.H.4. (U) The RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader first observed the small boats about 142 miles approaching ?at speed" and ?close and fast" from their harbor. [Encl IV.H.5. (U) The RC8 805 Gunner first observed the small boats about 1 nautical mile away and that they were moving ?fast.? [Encl IV.H.6. (0) One of RCB 802's Gunners initially thought the boats were ?fishing vessels? and R08 805?s Coxswain thought they were ?just people on the boats, nothing in my mind said they were Iranian or anyone like that or military, just normal boats." [Encls (5), IV.H.T. (U) RCB 805 crewmember accounts conflict on whether gunners manned their weapons mounts when RCB 802 first went dead in the water, when crewmembers first noticed boats approaching from the island, or when those boats from the island finally neared the RCBs. [Encls (8), (10), IV.H.8. (U) The RCB 805 Engineer recounted that upon seeing the boats, they had ?kitted up," and that the two RCB 805 gunners headed topside and he observed military aged males on the boats. [Encl IV.H.9. (U) However, RCB 805 Gunner #2 was below deck resting and heard the Boat Captain/Patrol Leader order the gunners to jump topside and man their weapons because boats were approaching. [Encl IV.H.10. (0) RES 805 Gunner #2 went topside and manned the starboard crew?served weapon, RCB 805 Gunner #1 was manning the port side weapon and saw two boats ?within 100 yards" and ?within their warning zone." [Encls (10), 95 IU.H.11. As the boats approached, several RCB crewmembers observed that each boat had a covered crew served weapon on the bow. [Encls (8). {141] IU.H.12. As the boats neared to approximately 300 yards, several crewmembers observed the Iranians on the small boats remove the covers from their crew served weapons and train/point the weapons at the RCBs. [Encls IV.H.13. Prior to this deployment, the Coastal Riverine Group ONE Group Judge Advocate briefed both the RCB 802 and RCB 805 Boat Captains on their obligation to defend their unit. The below figure is an excerpt of what was briefed to both Boat Captains regarding the ?Threat Triangle". [Encl (182)] IV.H.14. Under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, Member States hold the inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack. [Ref 1V.H.15. (U) RCB 805?s Gunner #1 came topside and started ?prepping? his weapon and was ?standing by" it in case he had to use it. [Encl IV.H.16. (U) The RCB 802's Gunner #2 stated that he loaded his weapon {.50 caliber machine gun) when the boats were 100?300 yards away. [Encl IV.H.17. (U) The RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader stated that both ?systems? on his boat were? both weapons held the higheport position. [Encl IV.H.18. (U) For this mission, the RCBs were not equipped with functioning nonelethal response capabilities, such as horns, long?range acoustic device, or flares; or if equipped, crewmembers did not employ them. [Encls IV-H-19- 96 i- I??l commencing the mission and getting underway without means of collecting visual information, RC8 802 and 805 violated Naval Forces Central Command's Operational Tasking Visual Information directive?. [Encl (150)] IV.H.21. (U) as the boats approached, the RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader attempted to reach the approaching boats via handheld marine band radio (MARBAND) on channel l6, but at no point did either RC8 establish radio communications with the approaching boats. [Encls IV.H.22. The RC8 802 Boat Captain attempted to communicate with the incoming boats, but did not indicate whether these included attempts by radio. [Encl IV.H.23. As the Iranians approached, the RC8 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader did not know the mechanical/operational status of RC8 802 nor was he able to raise RC8 802?s Boat Captain on the radio and ?[the] craft were just far enough apart to communicate verbally.? [Encl IV.H.24. At approximately 500 yards out, the 808 802 Boat Captain, who had moved back near the engine compartment with the Coxswain, ordered the RC8 802 gunners to back off their weapons so they did not seem intimidating. [Encls IV.H.25. Likewise, as R08 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader observed RC8 802 and the incoming Iranian boats, he ordered RC8 RC8 805 Gunner #2 recounted taking video footage of the interaction with a personal cellphone, which was relinquished to the reintegration team. The Investigating Officer requested that footage from the JPRA, and to date, has not received it. [Encl {10] OPTASK Visual Information states, ?811 CSF units will maintain video and still cameras in a ready status to capture events of interest because an event of significance could occur at any time." [Encl (151)] OPTASK Visual Information states, ?All units shall Collect visual and audio media, day and night, on all events meeting CCIR and PIR criteria, disasters, accidents, other incidentsm? Additionally, it states, ?Unit unable to comply with [collection of information] will notify the applicable CTF via voice or chat and will provide specific shortfalls and mitigation plan to the CTF. [Encl (151)] 97 805?s Gunners to not go to ?because he believed that the Iranians had a ?jump? on them and did not want to escalate the situation. [Encls IV.H.26. (U) As the two small boats neared, RCB crewmembers began to observe a blue flag flying on at least one of the boats. [Encls IV.H.27. (U) Some of the crewmembers eventually identified the flag as Iranian or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.B [Encl . '(U) Figure 4.17, - Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Flag and Iranian Flag IV.H.28. (U) As the Iranian boats approached, the RC8 805 Coxswain recalled maneuvering RCB 805, ?naturally I'm shadowing them [the Iranians], trying to get in between them [the Iranian] and the broken boat I was trying to get between I couldn?t do it, I couldn't stay between both." [Encls {123] IV.H.29. However, the RC8 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader's account does not indicate whether he directed or gave guidance to the RCB to maneuver into a defensive position in support of RCB 802. [Encl IV.H.30. (U) The Iranian boats approached within 100 yards or less of the RCBs. [Encl Crewmembers' accounts vary, but RCB 805 Coxswain stated that he was below deck when he first observed the flag, at which he point he looked up the flag in the Reconnaissance Guide and identified it as Iranian, at which he notified RCB 805 Gunner #1 that it was ?Iranian.? [Encl {121] 98 IV.H.31. (U) According to most accounts, one of the boats had two Iranians on board, while the other boat had only one Iranian onboard. [Encls (10), IV.H.32. (U) Concerning the boat with one Iranian, crewmembers observed the Iranian ?frantically? shifting between driving the boat, manning a weapon, and talking on a radio. [Encl (10), {143] IV.H.33. (U) All the Iranians were armed with AK-47s. [Encls IV.H.34. (U) At this point, then, RCB crewmembers had clearly observed a crew-served weapon on the bow of each of the small boats as well as an on each of the three Iranians. [Encls (8). IV.H.35. (U) As a coastal State, Iran ?may take necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent?? [Ref IV.H.36. (U) Here, the Iranian boats were close enough that multiple RCB crewmembers attempted to communicate to the Iranians that they had broken down and that they were attempting repairs so they could leave. One of RCB 805?s Gunners stated that ?we were yelling at them, telling our boat was broken." RCB 802 Boat Captain yelled ?hey, I'm sorry, this was an accident, we didn't mean to be here, our boat broke down, we?re just trying to continue to Bahrain."? [Encls (7), (U) At this point, the RC3 802 Boat Captain attempted to explain to the Iranians that his stopping was incidental to his mechanical issues and he was attempting to transit through (U) Iran also has the right ?to take necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions" to which it authorized a ship to enter its internal waters and may temporarily suspend the innocent passage of foreign ships, without discrimination, specific areas of its territorial seas if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security and ?shall take effect only after having been duly published.? (Art. 30, UNCLOS (emphasis added)) (U) Under customary international law, ?Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flagwithout serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance (Art. 98, UNCLOS) 99 territorial seas to Bahrain, both actions were in accordance with the right of innocent passage under customary international law. At no point did the RC8 802 Boat Captain request assistance. [Ref Encls IV.H.38. Under customary international law,% Iran was not permitted to hamper the innocent passage of the two RCBs. [Ref (r31 IU.H.39. RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader also observed RCB 802 Boat Captain attempting to communicate with the Iranian boat closest to RCB 802 by holding up a wrench and pointing at the engine compartment. [Encl IV.H.40. EU) At some point, RC8 802?s Boat Captain also requested the Iranians for a translator. The RCB 802 Boat Captain left the cockpit, came back to the engine compartment, and told the Coxswain to hurry. [Encls (6), (U) Although RCB 802?s weapons remained in? the two gunners stood at their weapons stations believing they were ?ready to react accordingly as needed." [Encl IVA-1.42. (U) RCB 805's weapons remained in? [Encls IU.R.43. (U) At some point, RCB 802 Gunner #1 attempted to load his weapon but complied with Iranian direction to stop loading ammo. [Encl IV.H.44. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement were in effect. [Ref IV.H.45. Under the Standing Rules of Engagement, ?Unit Commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise self?defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.? Unless the unit commander directs otherwise, ?military members may exercise individual self? ?The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea except in accordance with this Convention. [T]he coastal State shall not: impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State (Art. 24, 100 defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent?." The RCB 802 Boat Captain ordered his RCB gunners to step away from their crew?served weapons to deescalate? the situation; the gunners stepped away from their weapons as directed by the Boat Captain.? [Encls Ref on] IV.H.46. (U) The RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader also Ordered his RCB gunners to step away from their weapons. [Encl IV.H.47. (U) Prior to this deployment, the Coastal Riverine Group ONE Group Judge Advocate briefed both the RCB 802 and RCB 805 Boat Captains on their obligation to defend their unit. The below figures are excerpts of what was briefed to both Boat Captains regarding the Standing Rules of Engagement and Self? Defense: [Encl (182)] Per the CJCSI 3121.01E, a hostile act is ?an attack or other use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property;? a hestiie intent is ?the threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.? As a principle of self?defense, de?escalation applies, ?When time and circumstances permit, the forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions." [Ref {emphasis added}] The RCE 802 Boat Captain informed the investigating officer, didn?t want to shoot Iranians," in Iranian territorial seas. [Encl 101 What You Must Understand ul 5 3 About Your ROE Who am authorizedto defend? Aiways defend your unit and other US forces in the vicinity.r Exercise individual self-defense unless otherwise directed us Citizens US commercial assets'iTI Non-UStorces Foreign Nationals If you don ?t knowthe answerto this question i Lil 5 GIG-J Mildll??y (U) Figure 4.18, ERG-1 Group Judge Advocate Brief Types Of Self Defense 5 - individual Serf-DefensevUniess otherwise directed, members have the inherent night of self-defense in response to a HAJi-ii exercise unit self-defense Unit Sgit Qgtense - Unit commanders have the and obligation to - Nationai Self Qefense - Defense of the US, US forces, US persons {and their property) and US commercial assets from - Coilectwe seltdetense - Defense of designated non?US forces, designated foreign nationals and their property against Not always authorized. Must request as supplemental ROE. UHCUI 53 Cl Gt (U) Figure 4.19, ORG-1 Group JUdge Advocate Brief 102 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4 (A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) Hostile IntEnt arms; - Not eiweys eesyio detennine Someone points a ri?e or pisioi at you A boat doesnf siop after warning shots are fired Someone runs at you with a knife Suicide bomber approaching you Person or vehioie has an ?snack fails to stop when warned reports are key in determining intent Uh?: Lr? 5-5 no: . -. Baldwin (U) Figure 4.20, Group Judge Advocate Brif IV.H.51. (U) Meanwhile, RCB's 802 Coxswain completed the repairs to RCB 802?s engine, replenished the oil, left the engine compartment, and reassumed the Coxswain seat. IV.H.52. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain directed the Coxswain to accelerate as he sat into his chair. [Encls (6), IV.H.53. (U) RCB 802 throttled up in speed and proceeded forward at which point the Coxswain saw that the Iranians were ?racking? their weapons, pointing their weapons at the RCBs, and squeezing their triggers. [Encl IV.H.54. (U) RC8 802?s Coxswain told RCB 805's Boat CaptainXPatrol Leader ?we are good." [Encl IV.H.55. (U) RCB 802's Boat Captain also gave direction to RCB 805 to ?go, go, go? via radio. [Encl {123] 18.8.56. RC8 805 came up in speed and proceeded forward expecting RCB 802 follow. [Encls IV.H.57. (U) COGENT data shows both RCBs came up briefly in speed to between 5.8 and 6.8 knots at 1628L. [Encl (159)] 104 RCBS GAINING SPEED RCB 802 IS AT 6.9 KTS AT 1628!. RCB 802 TRACK IS RED - RCB 805 TRACK IS ORANGE Figure 4.21, RCEs Gaining Speed IV.H.58. (U) As RCB 802 attempted to come up in speed and the two Iranian boats maneuvered in front of the RCB, racked their weapons, and pointed and crew served weapons at the RCB 802?s crew?. [Encls m, IV.H.59. (U) The RCB 802 Coxswain saw multiple Iranians pointing AK-47 assault rifles at the RCB Gunner and explained to the investigating officer: ?mI tell [the RC8 802 Boat Captain] that we are not moving. [The RCB 802 Boat Captain] said that we just got to go and if they shoot through us then whatever. I am having this dumb conversation with him about how I am not going to drive. I am not going to get [the RC3 Gunner] killed. There was nothing While the RCB is not a warship, it is a sovereign immune vessel. Custowarv international law provides insight in that a coastal State may require a warship to leave its territorial seas immediately if the warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State. (Art. 30, UNCLOS) 105 important to me that moving my boat in an effort to attempt to get out of that situation in which I didn't think we were because I felt that we had lost from the beginning, that it wasn't ok for me to let [the RCB 802 Gunner] get shot.? [Encl IV.H.60. (U) When the RCB 802 Coxswain refused to accelerate forward, the Boat Captain decided not to engage the Iranian forces and instead, decided to ?continue deescalating and try and talk [his] way out." [Encl IV.H.61. Under U.S. Navy Regulations, the RCB 802 Boat Captain as the senior officer present, was responsible for the safety and security of both RCBs and was to direct the course to be steered and the disposition to be employed by the RCBs. [Ref m] IV.H.62. At this point, the RCE 802 Boat Captain described his next actions as both a ?surrender? and a ?capture.?? ?So at that point and time if I had decided to start a firefight, I know a lot of my guys would be dead. We might have all been dead at that point in time. I didn?t want to start a war with Iran either. That was also on my mind. I didn't want to start a war that would get people killed. My thought at the end of the day was that misunderstanding. And that, I guess this was a gamble on my part. I don?t want to say gamble because that?s not exactly the right word, but in allowing us to be captured - that was my decision and my decision alone, that was not [the RC3 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader], that was not any of my guys' decision, that my decision and my decision alone only. I made the gamble that they were not going to kill us. I made the gamble that they're not going to Tehran and parade us around like prisoners of war. Because they want this nuke deal to go through. I thought ok, what's the commander?s intent here, the highest commander's intent, the Commander in Chief would not want me to start a war over a mistake, over a misunderstanding." [Encl (Til For a full analysis on the Code of Conduct, see Chapter V. 106 IV.H.63. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain stated that the above was the calculus ?literally going through [his] head at the time this was going down." [Encl IV.H.64. (0) RC8 805 received direction from RCB 802 to ?stop, stop, stop" via radio. [Encl IV.H.65. The RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader, noticed that RCB 802 had not followed, and ordered RCB 805 Coxswain to come down and reversed RC8 805?s course to point to RCB 802. [Enol IV.H.66. At this point, a third, larger Iranian boat had appeared with anywhere from 6?12 more Iranian males armed with [Encls (13), IV.H.67. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain emerged from the cockpit and attempted to speak English with the Iranians. The Iranians pointed to Farsi Island and said, ?other boat, English, coming." [Encl 18.8.68. The RCB 802 Boat Captain unsuccessfully attempted to communicate with the Iranian via Marine Band VHF radio as well as deck?to?deck verbal and gestures. [Encls {Tl-{141] (U) Eventually a fourth Iranian vessel traveled out from Farsi Island increasing the number of armed Iranians. [Encls IV.H.T0. (U) The RC8 802 Boat Captain ordered the RC8 gunners to step away from weapon mounts and assume a de?escalatory posture. [Encls (U) RCB 805 Engineer made a final ?spot report" at 1645L via satellite communications to the Bahrain Tactical Operations Center: {Ends (11). (13:1 107 IV.H.72. The Iranians ordered? both RCB crews to nest the RCBs together.? [Encls (5), (10), {143] IV.H.73. (U) While nested, one of RCB 802's gunners recalls hearing the RC3 802 Boat Captain instructing his crew to ?do what they tell us." [Encl IV.H.74. (U) The Iranians ordered the RCB 805 crewmembers onto RCB 802?. [Encls (7), (12), IV.H.75. (U) The RCB 805 crewmembers left their weapons on the RC8 when transferring to RCB 802. [Encl IV.H.76. (U) The Iranians ordered RCB crewmembers to remove their body armor, kneel on deck, and place their hands behind their heads. [Encls (T), IV.H.77. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain ordered his crew to comply. [Encl IV.H.78. (U) The RCB is a State vessel entitled to sovereign immunity. Under customary international law, all vessels owned or operated by a State, and used for the time being only on government noncommercial service are entitled to sovereign immunity. A sovereign immune vessel is immune from arrest or search, whether in national or international waters.46 [Encl {154)} IV.H.79. (U) The Iranians came on board? the sovereign immune vessels and took video and pictures of the crewmembers while kneeling and without body armor. [Encls (5), witness statements conflict on whether this was through broken English, gestures, andfor a combination of both. Prior to detainment, emergency destruction was not ordered nor did it occur. [Ref Encl '6 RC8 802 Gunner stated that RC8 802 crew was ordered onto RCE 805. The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (nwe 1?14w3, ed. July 200?, Chapter II. Although the RC3 802 Boat Captain was not a Commanding Officer, U.S. Navy Regulations 0828 illustrates that ?The commanding o?fioer shaLl not permit a ship under his or her command to be searched on any pretense whatsoever by any person representing a foreign state, nor permit any of the personnel within the confines of his or her command to be removed from the command by any such person, so long as he or she has the capacity to repel such an act." 108 IV.H.80. (U) The Iranians continued to point weapons at the kneeling crewmembers. [Encls IV.H.81. (U) While on their knees, the crewmembers were searched and then some were blindfolded and their hands bound by the Iranians. [Encls (10). IV.H.82. While kneeling and bound, as RCB 802 Gunner #1 was complying with the Iranians? orders, the RCB 802 Gunner #2 activated the emergency position indicating radio beacon [distress signal], which the Iranians saw and confiscated. [Encls IV.H.83. (U) Once on board the sovereign immune vessels, the Iranians searched and seized the vessels, searched the crewmembers, and tore down the American flag, replacing it with the flag of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. [Encls IV.H.84. (U) At some point during the boarding, the RCB 802 Boat Captain ?identified [himself] as the officer" and the RCB 805 Boat Captain identified himself as the other Boat Captain. [Encls IV.H.85. The Iranians forced by gunpoint the RC8 802 Coxswain and the RC3 805 Engineer to drive their respective RCBs towards Farsi Island. [Encls IV.H.86. At approximately 1713L at 1.6 nautical miles from Farsi Island, both RCBs began transiting towards Farsi Island. [Encl [158)] The RCBs were escorted by the feur Iranian vessels. [Encls IV.I. Movement to Farsi Island (U) COGENT data shows both RCBs arrived at Farsi Island and cut power at approximately 1753. [Encl (159)] 109 RCB 802 TRACK IS RED RCB 805 TRACK IS ORANGE GPS INPUT AT 1442?. 4- I, -a :11 - R83 805 LAST DAGR RCBS 802 AND 805 MOORED AT FARSI ISLAND I i \ll RCB 802 PIERSIDE 14482 - RCB 802 LAST DAGR GPS INPUT AT 14532 IV.I.5. (U) They would spend the reminder of the night in this IV.I.6. (U) There were armed guards outside the room at various times. [Encls (8), IV.I.7. (U) The crewmembers' blindfolds and bindings were removed once inside the room. [Encls (5), (6), (8), IV.I.8. (U) The room contained a camera, a TV, a telephone, pillows, and a carpet. [Encl (5), (8), (9), (13), IU.I.9. (U) Shortly thereafter, the detainers provided the crewmembers with snacks (fruit) and water. [Encls IV.I.10. (U) The captors filmed the crewmembers eating. [Encls IV.I.11. (U) The designated RCB Patrol Leader encouraged the crewmembers to eat, though being filmed, because he was not sure when their next opportunity to would be. [Encl INITIAL GROUP INTERROGATIDNS IU.I.12. (U) Two men entered the room approximately an hour later, one in a military uniform and one in a suit. [Encls (13), IV.I.13. (U) The man in uniform appeared to be a military officer and the man in the suit, who spoke English, appeared to be his translator or possibly an intelligence officer. [Encls (8) IV.I.14. (U) These men asked who was in charge and RCB 802's Boat Captain replied that he was. [Encls (9), IV.I.15. (U) The men began interrogating RCB 802's Boat Captain, asking what they (the RCBs) were doing, where they were coming (U) This is the room depicted in video footage of the crew members that appeared in the media. [Encls (11), (239)] (U) One crewmember recounts that the Iranians had been filming everything since they had first encountered the RCBs. [Encls (6), (239)] 111 from, and where the ?mothership? was. [Encls IV.I.16. RCB 802?s Boat Captain repeatedly responded there was no ?mothership? and that they were simply transiting from Kuwait to Bahrain. [Encls IV.I.17. (U) The interrogators did not believe these answers and were convinced the RCBs were on a secret mission from a ?mothership.? [Encls (6). (9), IU.I.18. RCB 802's Boat Captain and fellow crewmembers recounted that RCB 802's Boat Captain managed to evade most questions, the ones he answered were common knowledge, and he did not really give the interrogators anything. IV.I.19. Eventually the interrogators departed the room. [Encls IV.I.20. (U) During this initial round of interrogation, the interrogators only Spoke to RCB 802's Boat Captain, or focused primarily on him, as he was the only officer. [Encls (8), (12), IV.I.21. At some point thereafter, however. two men returned to the and interrogated the group with similar questions what are you doing out here? where are you going? where is your mothership?). [Encls (6), (8), (13), (14)]50 IV.I.22. (U) The Patrol Leader later recounted that these were two different men, an ?obese? officer and armed civilian, and that the ?obese? officer remained in charge for the duration of detention. [Encl IV.I.23. (U) Several of the crewmembers reiterated that they were transiting from Kuwait to Bahrain and there was no mothership. [Encl At some point during this group interrogation, several witnesses heard aircraft fly overhead, assuming them to be U.S. aircraft. [Encls 112 IV.I.24. The captors responded that they did not believe the RCBs were capable of that and that they could not make it that far. [Encl IV.I.25. RCB crewmembers laughed in front of the captors and stated, ?yeah I wish you could tell my people that because we told them these boats can't do that" or words to that effect. [Encl IV.I.26. The interrogators also asked for the crewmembers' name, rank, serial number, date of birth, and position on the boat. [Encls IV.I.27. Some crewmembers provided their name, rank, and serial numbers, while others provided date of birth and position on the boat. [Encls IV.I.28. At some point during these group interrogations, RCB 802's Boat Captain told the interrogators that the crewmembers were only required to provide name, rank, and service number, and that any other information offered was ?conditional? or ?of their own free will." [Encls DINNER IU.I.29. (U) Later that night, the Iranian captors brought the RC8 crews dinner. [Encls IV.I.30. The RCB Patrol Leader again instructed the crews to eat, as he was not sure when they could eat again. [Encl (U) The detainers began filming them eating, RCB 802?s Boat Captain instructed the detainers to stop that, so they did. [Encls {Tl-(93. IV.I.32. (U) RCB 802?s Boat Captain also recommended the RC3 crewmembers to not eat while being filmed but also not to deprive themselves of food and water. [Encl IV.I.33. (U) Several RCB crewmembers were reluctant to eat, but eventually began eating the food. [Encls 113 IV.I.34. (U) The Iranian man secretly attempted to film again, but RCB 802's Boat Captain again demanded the man stop, which he did. [Encls (6), (9), (11), IU.I.35. (U) The Iranians ultimately managed to capture some footage of the crewmembers eating. [Encls (239)] IV.I.36. (U) Shortly after dinner, the Iranians escorted RCB 802 Boat Captain and RCB 805 Boat Captain out to the R085 in order to establish bridge-to?bridge communications with the USS ANZIO. [Encls (7), INDIVIDUAL INTERRDGATIONS IV.I.37. (U) Shortly after dinner, the detainers brought the crewmembers some blankets so they could lie down. [Encl IV.I.38. (U) Several crewmembers managed to sleep, if only intermittently. [Encls IV.I.39. (U) A few hours later, detainers entered the room and started pulling individual crewmembers out for individual interrogations in another room. [Encls (5), (6), IV.I.40. (U) One crewmember recounted specifically that it was two very official looking men wearing gray suits and pistols (holstered) who entered the room. [Encl IV.I.41. (U) All crewmembers were individually interrogated except RCB 802?s Gunner RC8 805's Engineer, and RCB 805?s Gunner [Encl (9), IU.I.Q2. (U) The ?obese? officer from earlier in the evening may have been present during individual interrogations. [Encl IV.I.43. (U) Interrogations of the first few crewmembers lasted approximately 45*60 minutes apiece, but got progressively shorter, the last one lasting approximately 15?20 minutes. [Encl IV.I.44. (U) While individual interrogations were transpiring, crewmembers remaining? exchanged information about the interrogations amongst themselves, but were eventually told to remain quiet by one of the detainers. [Encls (5), 114 IV.I.45. During individual interrogations, the interrogators asked the RC8 crewmembers a variety of questions. [Encls IV.I.46. (U) Questions varied by interrogation, but included such things as where the RCBs came from and where they were going; where the ?mothership? was; what the mission was; military bases and medical facilities in the region and their commanding officers; about the location of U.S. and coalition ships, including the aircraft carrier; the radar and other technical capabilities; about specific items the captors found on the RCBs and in crewmembers' personal effects passports, laptops); about why the boats entered Iranian personal information about education and background; and about crewmembers' specific positions on the boat. [Encls IV.I.47. Crewmember response strategies were mixed and their responses varied.?r? [Encls IU.I.48. Some RCB crewmembers responded to honestly to some questions while lying or playing stupid in response to other questions to others: I a. For example, RCB 802's Engineer recounts that he provided his name and position on the boat, but lied? [Encl b. RC8 802?s Gunner #2 recounts that he ?played stupid.? [Encl It would be impracticable to detail all of the questions and answers in this report. The RCB crew statements, enclosures through Provide greater detail on what types of questions each was asked and what their responses and response strategies were. Further, as noted in Chapter I [or the Executive summary], prior to this JAGMAN investigation, the RCE crew members underwent several SERE and counter-intelligence debriefings during i .woo. w' rec vo While interrogations and responses are an aspect of this JAGMAN, they are not its focus, and therefore the intent here is to provide a general discussion of the interrogation that occurred. 115 c. RCB 802's Coxswain recounts that he responded to some questions by saying he was not aware and avoiding the questions. [Encl IV.I.49. In general, when interrogated, RCB 802's Boat Captain mostly lied or stated he didn't know and feigned cooperation in response to the majority of questions. [Encl IV.I.50. However, it is clear that some if not all crewmembers provided at least some information to interrogators beyond name, rank, service number, and date of birth: a. For example, RCB 805's Coxswain provided that the RCB's approximate top speed and that the RCBs conducted ?presence? missions. [Encl IV.I.51. (U) Furthermore, interrogators demonstrated knowledge of certain information that suggested another crewmember may have provided that information during a prior interrogation: a. For example, when an interrogator asked RCB 802?s Engineer about the number of RCEs in the ACE, RCE 802's Engineer replied just two, but the interrogator responded that he knew a third, RCB 701 specifically, was in Kuwait. The interrogator also knew what type of engines were on the RCBs, and RCB 802's Engineer believed another crewmember may previously disclosed that information to the interrogators. [Encl b. RCB 802?s Coxswain interrogator demonstrated detailed knowledge about the RCBS and that he knew RCB 802's Coxswain?s specific position on the RCB, and that RCB 802's Coxswain's RCB was lead boat during the transit. [Encl c. RCB 805?s Coxswain stated during his interrogation that the RCBs conduct ?presence? operations, to which the interrogators responded ?ah, [Encl IV.I.52. Some crewmembers declined to admit any culpability when asked about entry into Iranian TTW. [Encl (6), a. RCB 802?s Engineer recounts that he provided answers that would not admit they had. [Encl 116 b. RCE 802's Coxswain recounted that he kept telling the Iranians that he did not believe that these were their waters, and he refused to say anything that would make it seem like their entry was on purpose or an accident because he did not know this it (Farsi) was an Iranian island or that they had entered Iranian waters. [Encl c. RCE 805?s Gunner #2 recounted that the Iranians kept telling the RC3 crews that that they purposely went into Iranian territorial waters, but RCB 805 Gunner #2 did not know where the territorial waters were. [Encl d. RCE 805's Boat Captain recounted that he lied or deflected and at no point did he take responsibility for entering Iranian territorial seas. [Encl IV.I.53. RCB 802?s Boat Captain requested and was allowed to sit in on RCB 805?s Gunner #2?3 interrogation, but then then after 5 minutes the captors changed their mind and removed RCB 802's Boat Captain from the interrogation room. [Encl IV.I.54. Individual interrogations lasted through the night, the final one, RCB 805's Gunner concluding the morning of 12 January. {Encls IV.I.55. The Iranians searched the RCBs and the crew?s personal effects, confiscating, examining, and exploiting such things as cell phones, SIM cards, laptops, passports, and identification cards. [Encls IV.I.56. Some crewmembers stated they were only asked and only provided name, rank, and service number. [Encl IV.I.57. Some crewmembers provided passwords to their personal phones and laptops. [Encl IV.I.58. Multiple crewmembers recount aggressive behavior by interrogators such as an interrogator slapping his hand down on the table, spinning a crewmember?s chair around, or threatening to take a crewmember to Iran for lying. [Encls IV.I.59. At least one crewmember presented his military identification card to the interrogator. [Encl ll? IV.I.60. Several of the RC8 crewmembers recounted that they thought about the Code of Conduct while in captivity. a. For example, RCB 802 Engineer felt that it applied ?a little" and thought about how he would answer questions and about he might lie when interrogated. [Encl b. RCB 802 Gunner #2 thought about escape, how he would be treated, and wanted to make sure he didn't tell them anything valuable; although he did not think of himself as a prisoner of war because the conditions were too nice. [Encl c. RCB 805 Gunner #2 recalled the SERE NKO training when interrogated. [Encl d. RC8 805 Coxswain recalled his SERE training when thinking about how he would respond to questions, and knew he wasn't going to tell them any specific information about the boats. [Encl e. RCB 802 Boat Captain recounted that the Code of Conduct played in his mind when he was interrogated. [Encl f. RCB 805 Engineer states that he and the RCB crewmembers didn't get into a mindset? until the Iranians nested the boats, and then he started noticing key things and increasing situational awareness what people were wearing; location of guard tower}. [Encl IU.I.61. Other crewmembers did not think about the Code of Conduct or thought it did not apply to their situation, at least initially: a. RCB 802 Gunner #1 recounted that he didn't really think it applied because the captors were Iranian and the 0.8. is not at war with Iran. [Encl b. RCB 802 Gunner #2 stated that he didn't even think about it. [Encl IV.I.62. (U) Several crewmember recalled very little of their Code of Conduct training. [Encl 118 IV.I.63. (U) Some of the RC8 members refused to eat the food that the captors provided. [Encls (8), IV.I.64. (U) Some members attempted to gather situational awareness by counting steps and scanning their surroundings. [Encls {143] IV.I.65. (U) RCB 805?s Gunner the only female RCE crewmember, was interrogated on film. [Encls (7), (10) IV.I.66. (U) RCE 805?s Gunner #2 was only asked if the RC3 crews had been treated well, to which the response was, ?yes.? [Encls (239)] IV.I.67. (U) One interrogator sarcastically thanked RCB 805's Coxswain for not cooperating. [Encl BREAKFAST, NEWS CREW, RELEASE IV.I.68. (U) On the morning of their release, the RCB crews were provided breakfast, after which they were told by the Iranians that they would be released if they continued to cooperate. [Encl IV.I.69. (U) The Iranians flew in a TV camera crew by helicopter, which several of the RCB crewmembers heard. [Encls IV.I.T0. (U) Around this same time, a detainer {who appeared to be an Iranian military officer) entered the room and instructed the crewmembers that they would be released, but would need to provide an interview for an Iranian news crew. [Encls IV.I.71. (U) The detainer told the crewmembers they needed to eat and act happy in order to be released. [Encls (6), (8), (13), IV.I.72. (U) The Iranians brought the camera crew, which appeared to be a news crew, to the room where the RC3 crewmembers were held. [Encls (5), (T), 119 The Iranians placed food and drink in front of the crewmembers, staging the scene, telling them to act happy and eat and drink. [Encls (5), (7), IV.I.74. (U) At some point, RCB 802 Boat Captain instructed the RC8 crews to do what the Iranians said so they could be released and that the RCB crewmembers could later disavow the statements and explain the Iranians made them say it. [Encl IV.I.75. (U) RCB 802 Boat Captain reasoned to himself that the Iranians had not lied or misled them yet, and would keep their word and let them go; he wanted the most expeditious way off the island; and the longer they remained on the island, the more opportunity existed for things to go wrong. [Encl (U) Unbeknownst to RCE 802 Boat Captain, by this time the 0.8. government had successfully negotiated for their unconditional release. [Encl IV.I.77. (U) The RCB crewmembers ate and acted happy as instructed, and the Iranians proceeded to film. [Encl (7), RCB 802's Boat Captain?s Apology IV.I.78. (U) Then the Iranian film crew repositioned itself over to RCB 802?s Boat Captain specifically. [Encl (U) The Iranian interviewer gave RCB 802 Boat Captain a script or prepared statement and instructed him what to say. [Encls (5). IV.I.80. (U) The major told RCB 802 Boat Captain that he had to apologize and to say ?we went into Iranian waters, it was our fault, and Iran treated us with great hospitality" or words to that effect. [Encls IV.I.81. (U) Through several iterations, RCB 802 Boat Captain gave his proposed responses to the major. [Encls (7), (8), (10). IV.I.82. (U) Each time RCB 802 Boat Captain reworded his responses, the Iranian major was not satisfied and told RCB 802 Boat Captain he was not answering correctly and needed to give 120 the desired responses otherwise the film crew would not film and the crewmembers would not be released. [Encls (7), (10), {143] IV.I.83. (U) The Iranian detainers told RCB 802 Boat Captain that they would not release the crewmembers until RC8 802 Boat Captain said exactly what the detainers wanted, that RC8 802 Boat Captain needed to cooperate and say what they wanted in order to leave. [Encls IV.I.84. (U) RCB crewmember accounts vary on whether RCB 802 Boat Captain was ?coached,? ?instructed,? or ?made? to say certain things. [Encls (6), IV.I.85. The camera crews then turned the cameras on and filmed while RCB 802 Boat Captain was interrogated and gave the desired responses. [Encls (I), IV.I.86. (0) During this videotaped interrogation, when asked about ?penetrating? Iranian territorial waters, RCB 802 Boat Captain stated, ?It was a mistake that was our fault, and we apologize for our was a misunderstanding, we did not mean to go into Iranian territorial seas.? [Encl (239)] (U) When asked if his GPS showed or tracked that they had penetrated Iranian territorial waters (or questioning to that effect) RCB 802 Boat Captain stated believe so.? [Encl [239)] IV.I.88. When asked how the Iranian boats ?captured' the RCBs, RC8 802 Boat Captain stated, ?The Iranian patrol boat came out when we were having engine issues and had weapons drawn, so we tried to talk to them until more boats came out and took us in.? [Encl (239)] IV.I.89. When asked about treatment of the RCEs crews by the Iranian captors, RCB 802 Boat Captain stated, ?The Iranian behavior was fantastic while we were here. We thank you very much for your hospitality and your assistance" and ?there were no problems?. [Encl (239)] IV.I.90. When asked about where the RCBs were going, RC8 802 Boat Captain stated from Kuwait to Bahrain. [Encls (239)] 121 IV.I.91. (U) RCB 802 Boat Captain said these because he wanted to get the RC8 crews out of Iranian captivity and he did not believe the Iranians had the best history of captivity. [Encl IV.I.92. Immediately or shortly after saying these things, the RCB crews were escorted to their boats and released. [Encls IV.I.93. (0) RC8 802 Boat Captain believes he tried his best not to say what he said but was ultimately was forced to. [Encl {Tl} IV.I.94. (U) RCB 802 Boat Captain said that he did not know if at some point the Iranians would start hitting him; he said he did not have reason to believe they would, but also did not have reasons to think they would not either. [Encl IV.I.95. RCB 802 Boat Captain was not personally threatened in captivity, but he believed RCB 802 Coxswain was; RCB 802 Boat Captain was not sure if any of the other RCB crewmembers were threatened. [Encl IV.I.96. During captivity, RCB 802 Boat Captain also utilized a strategy of being nice to the guards so that they might hesitate before shooting him if they thought to. [Encl IV.I.97. There were no weapons pointed at or near RCB 802 Boat Captain at the time. [Encl IV.I.98. At least one crewmember recounted that he would have made the statement that RCB 802 Boat Captain did and that RCB 802 Boat Captain did what he had to do to get the boat crews out of there, and that if it was anybody else in charge, the crews might not be here today unharmed. [Encl IV.J. Release and Recovery IU.J.1 At 0008L on 13 January 2016, USS ANZIO received radio transmission from Iranians that all crewmembers were safe. [Encl (180)] 122 IV.J.2 (U) Rt 0110L, USS ANZIO once again received radio transmission from Iranians that all crewmembers were safe. [Encl (180)] IV.J.3. (U) On the morning of 13 January 2016, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy personnel set the room with food and water. [Encls (13) IV.J.4. (0) Soon after the room was set with food and water, a news crew entered. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy officer provided the RC3 officer with a script and he recited the statement while on camera. [Encls IV.J.5. (0) RC8 crewmembers were advised that they would be released if cooperated. [Encls (2), IV.J.6. (U) Upon completion of RCB 802 Boat Captain's on?camera statement, all RCB crewmembers were blindfolded and escorted to the RCBs. [Encls IV.J.7. (U) When crewmembers arrived at the RCBs, both RC8 802 and RC8 805 were started and got underway with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy personnel aboard. [Encls (7), IU.J.8. (U) At 0924L, USS ANZIO established communications with RCBs via VHF radio. [Encls (234), IV.J.9. (U) At approximately 1150L, RCBs 802 and 805 departed Farsi Island. [Encl (160)] IV.J.10. (U) After approximately two nautical miles, two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy vessels approached the RCBs and disembarked the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy personnel that were on the RCBs. [Encls (6), (10), IV.J.11. (U) Three Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy patrol boats and one Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy helicopter escorted the RCBs out from Farsi Island. [Encls (6), (8), IU.J.12 (0) At 1255L, RCB 802 and RCB 805 exited Iranian territorial seas. [Encl (160)] 123 RCBS LEAVING IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS 53am I 3 .ii't??fi Exit Iranian Territorial Seas at1255L fa?? ?v'E-l'lj: 14?; v- NOTE: DASHED GRAY LINE l5 FF m4 it! a $55Figure 4.23, exiting Iranian Territorial Seas IU.J.13. (U) Between 1301L and 1303L on 13 January 2016, RCBs 802 and 805 tied alongside USS ANZIO. [Encls (30), (234)] IV.J.14. (U) Between 131TL and 1345L on 13 January 2016r crews from RCBs 802 and 805 embarked USS ANZIO and completed initial medical screening. [Encl (30), (234), (185)] IV.J.15. (U) Between 1345L and 1457L, RCB crews were transferred to USS HARRY TRUMAN from USS ANZIO via helicopters. [Encls (30), (185)] IV.J.16. (U) Between 1400L and 1457L, RCB crews were transferred to USS HARRY TRUMAN from USS ANZIO via helicopters. [Encl IU.J.17. (U) At 1438L, all RCB crewmembers landed on USS HARRY TRUMAN. [Encl (185)] 124 IV.J.18. (U) At 1720L, Carrier Onboard Delivery aircraft departed USS HARRY TRUMAN en route to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. [Encl (185)] IV.J.19. (U) At approximately 1747L, all RCB crewmembers landed in Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and at the reintegration center. [Encls (31), (115)] IV.K. Search and Rescue? IV.K.1. (0) At an unknown time, the Maritime Operations Center provided USCGC MONOMOY with a position report of RC8 802 and RCB 805 chat.? chat is electronic communication between two units that the other within FIFTH Fleet could not uscsc nonono?r plotted this position on a navigational chart and determined that RCB 802 and RCB 805 had deviated from their plan of intended movement track. [Encls (181}, (218)] IV.K.2. (U) USCGC MOMOMOY asked the Maritime Operations Center whether the RCEs were taking a different track as she was expecting the RCBs to round the North of Farsi Island instead of coming south. The CTG-56.7 Maritime Operations Center responded that they were unable to confirm because, ?[they] did not have a chart [at the Maritime Operations Center] to figure out the trackline they are taking." [Encls (181), (218)] IV.K.3. At 1620L, the Maritime Operations Center provided the Maritime Operations Center with a position report of the neither Operations Center plotted these positions. [Encls (35), {1?131 IV.K.4. (U) At 1632L, approximately 19 minutes after RC8 802 went dead?in?the?water, the CTU 56.7.4 Tactical Operations Center?s log recorded receiving a message from the RCBS that Iranians were training Condition 1 weapons on them. This was EU) This timeline is a compilation of statements and watch logs from individuals and commands that had either a direct or peripheral involvement with the Search and Rescue of the crews from RC8 802 and RCB 805. This timeline does not analyze the actions of FIFTH Fleet assets and is instead, a timeline that highlights the time between when RC8 802 and RCB 805 contacted the Tactical Operations Center and Commander, 0.8. FIFTH Fleet is notified. 125 the earliest received log entry that indicated an interaction with the Iranians. [Encls (158}, (159), {168), {169}, (171}, (173); (174}; (176), (177}, (180), {181), {184), IV.K.5. (U) At an unknown time, the Maritime Operations Center relayed to USCGC MONOMOY that the RCBs were having an ?interaction? with the Iranians. USCGC MONOMOY plotted the last known position report and informed the CTG-56.7 Maritime Operations Center via that both RCBs were inside Iranian territorial seas. [Encls (181)] IV.K.6. (U) The Maritime Operations Center only responded with, ?Rgr? and took no action. [Encls (35), {181), (218)] IV.K.7. At 1643L, the Maritime Operations Center logged the position report of the RCBs. [Encl 176)] IV.K.8. (U) At 1700L, the Maritime Operations Center logged, reporting 2 Iranian vessels are attempting to push RCB's to unknown island with weapons trained. Vessels are attempting to make contact with RCB using interpreter." [Encl (171)] IV.K.9. At an unknown time, the Maritime Operations Center Watch Officer called the Battle Watch Captain about the RCEs in the vicinity of Farsi Island. The Battlewatch Captain called the Tactical Operations Center and indicated that ?the Iranians were in Condition 1 and they did not have communication with the [Encl IV.K.IO. The Maritime Operations center did not have an electronic or paper navigational chart on which to plot the last known location of the RCBs. [Encl [78}1 IV.K.11. At an unknown time, the Battlewatch Captain notified the Commodore. [Encl IV.K.12. Between 1710L and 1715L, the Maritime Operations Center notified the FIFTH Fleet Battlewatch Captain of an interaction between the RCBS and the Iranians. [Encls {171}; (184)] 126 IU.K.13. (U) At an unknown time, the Commodore contacted Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet to notify him that two RCBs were in Iranian territorial seas. [Encl IV.K.14. (U) At approximately 1729L, the Maritime Operations Center notified the FIFTH Fleet Battlewatch that they are having intermittent communications with the RCBs. [Encl IV.K.15. (U) At 1740L, the Maritime Operations Center logged, is meeting with RC8, RC8 is at Farsi Island. No comms with RC8 [Encl (170)] IV.K.16. (U) At approximately 1745L, Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet called the FIFTH Fleet Maritime Operations Center Director to inquire about RC8 802 and RC8 805. [Encl IV.K.17. (U) At approximately 18151.Jr directed USS ANZIO to make best speed towards Farsi Island, remaining outside of Iranian territorial seas. (Encl IV.K.18. (U) At approximately directed USS ANZIO to form a Surface Action Group with HMS DEFENDER and USCGC MONDMOY. [Encl _At 1835L, Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet authorized HARRY TRUMAN Strike Group Commander) to enter Farsi Island territorial seas to conduct a search and rescue mission. [Encls (31), (184)] Between 13351. and 2154L, U.S. FIFTH Fleet assets conducted search and rescue operations in Iranian territorial seas and airspace for RES 802 and RCB 805. [Encls (184), (187)] 12? (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(A) CHAPTER CODE OF CONDUCT Findings of Fact V.A. Code of Conduct, Implementing Guidance, and Applicability Across the Range of Captivity and Farsi Island Detention? V.A.1. The Code of Conduct was established in 1955 by Executive Order (E0) 10631 {as variously amended) to provide standards of behavior for members of the Armed Forces in combat and captivity. [Refs V.A.2. All members of the 0.8. Armed Forces are expected to adhere to the standards embodied in the Code of Conduct while in combat or captivity. [Refs V.A.3. The Code of Conduct consists of six Articles that set forth standards, expectations, and obligations on matters including escape, surrender, capture, questioning in captivity, resistance, and keeping faith. [Refs is], V.A.4. (U) The Code of Conduct is further implemented by the Department of Defense primarily in Instruction 1300.21, which provides additional ?explanatory material" on each of the six Articles, and guidance on the Code of Conduct's applicability in various captivity, isolation, and detention situations. [Refs V.A.5. DOD Instruction 1300.21 is primarily a training and education instruction providing guidance for training members of the Armed Forces in support of the Code of Conduct but also contains substantive guidance on the Code of Conduct and its application. [Ref [ti] V.A.6. (0) By its terms, the Code of Conduct provides standards for members while ?in combat or captivity," and some of the six Code of Conduct Articles {such as Article specifically apply to ?prisoner of war? situations.? [Ref Appendix contains a comparative summary of the guidance in Instruction 1300.21 and the Level A Code of Conduct Training discussed in this chapter. That appendix was prepared to aide this discussion and is not intended to be used as a source of Code of Conduct guidance. Portions of Appendix are For Official Use Only E0 10631 does not further define the terms ?combat? or ?captivity.? [Reflsl] 131 V.A.7. Instruction 1300.21 provides that, ?Although designed for evasion and prisoner of war situations, the spirit and intent of the are applicable to Service members subjected to other hostile detention, and such Service members should conduct themselves consistently in a manner that avoids discrediting themselves and their country." {emphasis added} [Ref [t1] V.A.8. Enclosure 2 of Instruction 1300.21 provides Code of Conduct ?guidance in support of the for conduct of U.S. military personnel detained by hostile forces.? However, the instruction does not define the term ?hostile forces.? [Ref [t3] V.A.9. (U) Enclosure 2 restates each of the six Code of Conduct Articles and provides ?explanatory material? for each article. [Ref [ti] U.A.10. Enclosure 3 of the instruction provides guidance for for conduct of U.S. military personnel ?in governmental detention or hostage situations during operations other than Ear.? [emphasis added) [Ref V.A.ll. (U) More specifically, enclosure 3 provides ?special instructions" for ?the complex circumstances of detention that are not incident to armed conflict with a foreign power governmental detention and terrorist captivity as a result of operations other than warl.? [Ref [ti] (U) Enclosure 3 further explains [Ref [emphasis added)]: a. military personnel, because of their employment in a wide range of circumstances throughout the world, participate in operations other than war that can result in detention by unfriendly governments or captivity by terrorist groups. The guidance in this enclosure [enclosure 3] helps U.S. military personnel survive those situations with honor.? b. ?The Code of Conduct is a moral guide designed to assist military personnel in combat or being held as POWs to live up to the ideals in the policy. The guidance in this enclosure [enclosure 3] assists U.S. military personnel who find themselves isolated from U.S. control in operations other than war, or in a situation not related specifically to the Code of Conduct." 132 c. (U) ?This policy [enclosure 3] on the conduct of U.S. military personnel isolated from U.S. control applies at all times. U.S. military personnel finding themselves isolated from U.S. control are required to do everything in their power to survive with honor." V.A.13. (U) Enclosure 3 of the Instruction does not restate all of the Articles of the Code of Conduct, nor does it explicitly state that all of the Articles and ?explanatory material? from enclosure 2 apply to all detention or captivity scenarios covered by enclosure 3; rather, enclosure 3 states that it is ?exactly the same as the Code of Conduct in some [Ref [emphasis added)] V.A.ld. (U) As an example, concerning escape, enclosure 2 discusses Article and explains that POWs must be prepared to take advantage of escape opportunities whenever they arise, whereas enclosure 3 states that escape attempts from (non?POW} governmental detention are not recommended except under unique or life threatening circumstances as a last resort. [Ref (emphasis added}] V.A.15. Code of Conduct trainings% reiterate that although designed for evasion and prisoner of war situations, the spirit and intent of the Code of Conduct apply to Service members subjected to isolation at all times across the range of military operations and in any captivity scenario and that the Code of Conduct describes the moral obligations of U.S. Service members across the range of potential military operations and spectrum of captivity. [Encls {236}, (237) (emphasis added)] V.A.16. Level A Code of Conduct training and Moderate Risk of Isolation training lay out three basic captivity environments, and the Level A Code of Conduct Training explains: The two Code of Conduct trainings discussed primarily in this chapter are level A Code of Conduct? training [herein after ?Level A Code of Conduct training"] and U.S. Central Command Moderate Risk of Isolation Theater Preparation Brief [hereinafter ?Moderate Risk of Isolation training"]. Enclosures [236} and contain excerpts {screenshots} from these trainings. Both are online trainings. The Level A Code of Conduct training is discussed because it was a pre?deployment training requirement that all 10 RCE crowmembers completed as discussed below. The Moderate Risk of Isolation training is also a pre?deployment training requirement and may be completed online or by briefer as discussed below. 133 basic understanding of the three captivity environments is essential in determining where an individual falls within the Spectrum of captivity. It is imperative that US service members utilize situational awareness in order to determine where they are within the spectrum in order to determine what actions to take in a given situation. The service member held captive must determine who has them, what they want and what they are willing to do to meet their goals. The answers to these questions affect the captive?s strategy to resist." [Encls {236), {emphasis added}] v.a.17. The three basic captivity environments are: Prisoner of War Peacetime Governmental DetentiOn and Hostage Detention [Encls (236), V.A.18. The Level A Code of Conduct training defines ?Peacetime Governmental Detention" specifically as: situation where a US service member is detained by the Armed Forces or national agencies of a foreign government for the purpose of exploitation. Detention by the foreign government can be either legal or illegal based on the manner and circumstances surrounding the detention of the US service member. For example, if while in a foreign nation a US service member violates a law of that nation, then the foreign gOvernment can legally detain the individual. However, if the US service member does not violate a specific national law or policy, or the foreign government commits an illegal act in order 11) detain the service member, then tins US service member's detention. can. be viewed as illegal." [Encl (236) (emphasis added)] Concerning Peacetime Governmental Detention, the Moderate Risk of Isolation training provides: ?Currently USCENTCOM is; not involved jJi open hostilities with another government which would provide POW protections guaranteed under the Geneva conventions. However, PGD is a possibility in the USCENTCOM .AOR. For example, US personnel have been detained in Iran and Pakistan by governmental forces. But the most likely captivity scenario in the AOR is being held captive by terrorists which would create a hostage detention scenario.? [Encl (237) {emphasis added}] V.A.20. (U) Several of the RCB crewmembers stated they did not believe the U.S. is at war with Iran or that they were prisoners of war. [Encls 134 V.A.21. (U) The 0.5. is not in a declared war or armed conflict with Iran. [Encl V.A.22. The 0.8. Government does not have regular diplomatic relations with Iran, having broken those relations in 1980 after revolutionary Iranian students seized the 0.5. Embassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage. [Encl (207)] V.A.23. (U) The 0.8. has long?standing concerns over Iran's nuclear program, sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights record. [Encl (207)] V.A.24. (U) The 0.8. has built an unprecedented international sanctions regime to hold Iran responsible for failing to meet its international obligations. [Encl (263)] V.A.25. (U) 0.5. Central Command?s posture is that the relationship with Iran will remain a challenging one and reflects concern about Iran?s ?unhelpful behavior in a number of areas.? [Encl (208)] V.A.26. 0.8. Central Command priorities and strategies vis- a?vis Iran include countering malign Iranian influence, while reducing and mitigating against the negative impacts of surrogates and proxies; maintaining credible general and specific deterrent capability and capacity to counter Iran: and countering chronic instability, disenfranchised populations, and weak regional governments that provide an environment for Iran and its allies to aggressively undermine U.S. regional goals. [Encl (208)] V.A.27. 0.5. Naval Forces Central Command maintains the same posture towards Iran. [Encl [264)] V.A.28. For governmental detentions covered by enclosure 3 of Instruction 1300.21, the instruction uses the following terminology: ?detainees,? ?detainers,? and ?detention.?5 [Ref (tH Compare the Instruction 1300.21 headers at paragraph E3.10 {?detention? by ?government? as ?detainee?J, with E3.ll {?captivity? by ?terrorists? as ?hostage?). Paragraphs E3.10 et seq. also use the term ?detainer.? NOTE: Any reference to RCB crewmembers as ?detainees? and ?detention? is strictly for purposes of Code of Conduct discussion for consistency with the Instruction?s terminology. The use of these terms for Code of Conduct purposes should not be construed as a finding of fact or opinion on whether RCB crewmembers were detainees {or held some other legal 135 V.A.29. Instruction 1300.21 was last issued 8 January 2001. [Ref (t}l V.B. Specific Code of Conduct Articles and Guidance Pertinent to Farsi Island Incident on 12 January 2016 Surrender v. Capture V.B.1. Article II of the Code of Conduct provides, will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.? [Ref V.B.2. (U) ?Surrender? must be distinguished from ?capture.? [Ref V.B.3. (U) For Code of Conduct purposes, defines ?surrender? as ?the willful act of members of the Armed Forces turning themselves over to enemy forces when not required by utmost necessity or extremity.? [Ref V.B.4. (U) Members may never surrender voluntarily; surrender is always dishonorable and never allowed. [Ref V.B.5. (U) Even when isolated and no longer able to inflict casualties on the enemy or otherwise defend themselves, it is a member's duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly force. [Ref V.B.6. (U) When there is no chance for meaningful resistance, evasion is impossible, and further fighting would lead to their death with no significant loss to the enemy, members of the Armed Forces should view themselves as ?captured? against their will versus a circumstance that is seen as voluntarily ?surrendering.'? [Ref [ti]H (U) Capture is dictated by the futility of the situation and overwhelming enemy [Ref status} or the Iranians were detainers {or held some other legal status) under any other body of domestic or international law, policy, or regulation. CENTCOM MRI training has a different definition of capture: ?capture may occur after you exhaust all reasonable means of resistance or you are overwhelmed and the alternatives are a meaningless death, seriously bodily injury, or actions hindering the achievement of the United States' strategic objectives.? [Encl {emphasis added]] 136 V.B.8. Under those circumstances, capture is not dishonorable. [Ref [ti] V.B.9. (U) For governmental detention in operations other than war, enclosure 3 to the instruction does not specifically discuss surrender,w but instead provides the following guidance: ?Lost, isolated or captive Service members must be prepared to assess the dangers associated with being taken into captivity by local authorities. Their assessment of the dangers should dictate what efforts should be taken and what measure of force may be required to avoid capture, resist apprehension, and resist cooperation once captured.? [Ref Enclosure 3 of 000 Instruction 1300.21 reminds members that they should not forget that they have an inherent right of self?defense. [Ref V.B.ll Code of Conduct trainings also reiterate that Service Members have the right of self?defense. [Encls (236], Statements, Apologies, Propaganda Videos V.B.12. Article of the Code of Conduct provides: ?When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.? [Ref [sJ] For non?armed conflict governmental detentions, Instruction 1300.21 provides extensive supplemental guidance on statements, confessions, and propaganda videos during other?than war governmental detention.Fm [Refs {ti} V.B.14. (U) Since the detainers' goals may be maximum political exploitation, detained personnel must be extremely cautious of their captors in everything they say and do. [Ref The only use of the term ?surrender? in enclosure 3 is in the context of surrendering passports. [Ref (emphasis added]] Code of Conduct training also provides guidance on these topics for peacetime governmental detention scenarios. [Encls {236), [237]] 137 v.8.15. (U) In addition to asking for a U.S. representative, detainees should provide name, rank, service number, date of birth, and the innocent circumstances leading to their detention. [Ref {emphasis added}] (U) Further discussions should be limited to health and welfare matters, conditions of fellow detainees, and going home. [Ref Detainers may try to exploit members by having them sign confessions, make video or audio tapes, or pose for pictures that could support the detainers? goals or embarrass the U.S. or other Coalition nations. [Encl (236)] v.3.18. Detainers may seek a confession or statement to accuse members of violations of international or local sovereign laws. [Encl (236)] v.s.19. (U) Members should make every effort to avoid providing propaganda for the detaining government. [Ref V.B.20. Members must make every attempt to resist the detainers? efforts by avoiding, degrading, or minimizing the value of the propaganda. [Encl [236)] V.B.21. Members must remember they have done nothing wrong and continue to assert their innocence and request to be released. [Encl (236)] V.B.22. If a member is forced to make a statement or sign documents, the member must provide as little information as possible and then continue to resist to the utmost of his or her ability. [Ref (emphasis added}] V.B.23. (U) If a member writes or signs anything, such action should be measured against how it reflects on the United States and the individual as a member of the military, or how it could be misused by the detainers to further the detainers' ends. [Ref {ti} V.B.24. The member?s goal should be to identify, avoid, or stop the detainers? attempts at propaganda. [Encl [236]] V.B.25. If forced, the member should limit the information disclosed and degrade the propaganda value of the 138 statement appearing forced, looking unhappy, showing evidence of abuse). [Encl (236)] V.B.26. Any special favor, benefit, or release must be without strings that would compromise the member?s honor or discredit the member or the United States. [Encl [236)] V.B.27. Detainees are not likely to earn their release by cooperation. [Ref V.B.28. (U) Instead, release may be gained by the military member doing his or her best to resist exploitation, thereby reducing his or her value to a detainer, and thus prompting a hostile government to negotiate seriously with the 0.8. Government. [Ref [ti] V.B.29. Being videotaped, photographed, or recorded, however, may have benefits. It may provide proof of life, clues to location, information about the member?s health and welfare, and the conditions of captivity. After carefully assessing the risk of exploitation, the member may make short, generic written, oral, or videotaped statements that provide this type of information to those working for the member's release or recovery. [Encl (236)] V.B.30. (U) Detainees should accept release, unless doing so requires them to compromise their honor or cause damage to the U.S. Government or its allies. [Ref (emphasis added}] v.s.31. However, offers of release in exchange for information, apologies, signed statements, or confessions need to be resisted. [Encls (236}. {237) [emphasis added)] v.c. Code of Conduct TrainingL,U.S. Central Command Theater Requirements, and RCB 302/805 Crewmember Compliance General Code of Conduct Training Framework (U) All members of the Armed Forces liable to capture must be provided with specific training and instruction in the Code of Conduct. [Ref V.C.2. EU) Members at risk of capture must receive Code of Conduct training commensurate with that risk. [Ref 139 V.C.3. (U) Combatant Commanders are responsible for designating the required level of Code of Conduct training {Level A, B, or C) that personnel operating in the Central Command area of operation must have prior to deployment. [Refs V.C.4. Combatant Commanders must precisely identify and communicate theater Code of Conduct training requirements to the Services.? [Refs V.C.5. (U) The Services,?52 then, must train their personnel to the Combatant Commander's required level prior to deployment. [Refs it}r (ull V.C.6. The respective Code of Conduct training levels are [Refs it]; Level A Level Level Minimum level of Minimum level of Minimum level of understanding for all understanding for understanding for members of the Armed Military Service Military Service Forces, to be imparted members whose military members whose military during entry training jobs, specialties, or jobs, specialties, or of all personnel. assignments entail assignments entail a moderate risk of significant or high capture and risk of capture and exploitation.63 exploitation.M Combatant Commanders must also determine Code of Conduct continuation training requirements for personnel operating in the area of responsibility. [tl] For the Navy?s baseline Code of Conduct requirements, look to U.S. Navy Regulations Article 1141 and Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1000.9A. Commanding officers are responsible for instruction of their military personnel in the Code of Conduct, which shall be included in the command?s general military training program. Commanding officers shall also ensure a copy of the Code of Conduct is conspicuously posted and readily accessible in command spaces. [Refs As a minimum, the following categories of personnel shall receive Level training at least once in their careers: members of ground combat units, security forces for high threat targets, and anyone in the immediate vicinity of the Forward Edge of Battle Area or the Forward Line of Troops. [Ref This group of personnel should not be limited to those whose position, rank, seniority, or exposure to Top Secret or higher classified information makes them vulnerable to greater-than-average exploitation efforts by a captor. As a minimum the following categories of personnel shall receive formal Level training at least once in their careers: combat aircrews, special operations forces Navy special warfare combat swimmers and Special Boat Units, Army Special Forces and Rangers, Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance units, Air Force Special Tactics teams, and operations units} and military attaches. [Ref 140 V.C.7. (U) Code of Conduct training requirements should be identified not only for wartime requirements, but also for areas considered high risk due to terrorist activities and areas with likely potential for detention by foreign governments for purposes of exploitation. [Ref {emphasis added}] V.C.8. Combatant Commanders must also determine who is considered at high?risk?of?capture and exploitation and require personnel to receive Code of Conduct training commensurate with that risk prior to deployment. [Ref V.C.9. DOD guidance provides that during war and operations other than war, personnel operating beyond the forward line of troops aviators, SOF, long-range reconnaissance patrol members} are clearly in more danger than others of becoming prisoners of war. [Ref (emphasis added)] V.C.10. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reiterates that the Services must ensure deploying units and individuals meet CENTCOM theater training requirements. [Refs V.C.11. (U) CENTCOM also reiterates that commanders (of ships, units, or elements) are ultimately responsible for training their units on the Code of Conduct. [Encl (151)] V.C.12. (U) Service Components in turn, are responsible for verifying that all individuals have completed theater training requirements. [Encl (151)] V.C.13. (U) CENTCOM's pre?deployment training requirements are defined by fragmentary order or message and periodically updated. [Refs Encl (151)] V.C.14. At all pertinent times {currently and at time of Costal Riverine Squadron THREE's deployment), CENTCOM required that all personnel operating in the CENTCOM AOR complete, at minimum, Code of Conduct Level A training. [Refs Encl (151)] U.S. Central Command Regulation 525?33 of 14 February 2014 was in effect when Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE deployed to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. It was reissued on 17 November 2015, roughly halfway through the deployment. The prior version and current version are substantively similar in those areas pertinent to this investigation discussion unless otherwise noted. [Refs 141 V.C.15. (U) As one option, the Level A training may be satisfied online via Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) and Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) distance learning. [Refs Encl (236)] (U) At all pertinent times the online Code of Conduct Level A training was level A Code of Conduct".% [Encl [236)] V.C.17. (U) All ten RCB 802 and 805 crewmembers completed the minimum Level A training online via NKOfNavy e?Learning, most in May or June 2015, shortly prior to deployment and less than nine months prior to the Farsi Island incident. [Encls V.C.18. (U) Coastal Riverine Groups ONE and TWO require, as a pre?deployment training objective, Level (Bravo) Code of Conduct training. [Ref (pp. J?l2, V.C.19. (U) Training jackets reflect that some, but not all, of the RCB crewmembers also completed Level Code of Conduct Training. [Encls V.C.20. (U) Crewmembers stated that they did not receive any Code of Conduct training during the deployment. [Encls Heightened Code of Conduct Requirements for Higher-Risk Personnel V.C.21. (U) Per U.S. Central Command regulation, Component Commanders U.S. FIFTH Fleet) must ensure their forces have been properly categorized into a risk of isolation and capture category. [Ref V.C.22. (U) At the time of the Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE's deployment, the two risk-ofeisolation categories were ?moderate? man? and ?high? mam.? [Ref no] (UXKFOUO) The content of the training is UnclassifiedfFor Official Use Only. The course content includes narrations, key references, interactive exercises, and knowledge checks {quizzes}. The interactive exercises focus on captivity in a ground?based scenario Afghanistan or Iraq) and the characters are primarily Army personnel. The content is not specifically tailored to naval personnel or at sea scenarios. [Encl (236)] (U) Under the current CENTCOM Regulation 525-33, MRI categorized personnel include ?those who depart secured locations andfor have a reasonable risk of direct contact with hostile forces, or who reside at a secure location but maintain HEI. They may also be individuals employed in a combat or combat support role but not employed forward of the Examples may include 142 V.C.23. (U) The current version of CENTCOM Regulation 525?33, reissued on 17 November 2015, added a third category, ?low? (LRI), for which there are no additional atdrisk briefing requirements. [Refs V.C.24. The initial risk of isolation categorization should be indicated in all requests for forces [Refs V.C.25. (U) In addition to Code of Conduct training, personnel classified as MRI or HRI must participate in at?risk briefings available online or conducted by a certified live-briefer. [Refs {wll V.C.26. (U) Component Commanders must also establish a routine evaluation process to ensure current and future deployed personnel are properly categorized. [Refs V.C.27. Training records indicate that the RCE crewmembers completed an briefing, although they do not indicate whether it was completed online or by a certified briefer. [Encl [265)] V.C.28. (U) There is no indication that GTE-56, CTG-56.7, or ever reevaluated or recommended that the ROS crews be designated as High Risk of Isolation (HRI) or complete a HRI briefing, even after the RCBs were relocated from Bahrain to Kuwait and began conducting operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf. [Encls (80), security forces, patient care and medical transport teams, mobility aircrew, and personnel aboard naval vessels." [Ref Under the current CENTCOM Regulation 525-33, HRI personnel ?typically serve outside of secured locations where there is significant risk of direct contact with hostile forces with limited direct support or forward of the FEBAXFLOT. HRI may also include personnel whose duties make them particularly vulnerable to isolation or exploitation by hostile forces or unfriendly governments, or those who would normally be categorized as MRI but have access to HEI. Examples of HRI categorized personnel include aircrew members including rotary wing, fighter, bomber, and certain reconnaissance units; Special Forces, or units operating in small groups or as advisory teams embedded with host nation or other national governmental organizations." [Ref [wJ (emphasis added}] 143 CHAPTER VI OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Opinions VI.A. PreeDeployment Readiness (U) The 2012 re?alignment of Coastal Riverine Forces due to budget constraints and organizational changes {emerging technology and capability) while maintaining a deployment cycle created a cascading negative effect on Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE's disestablishment from Yorktown and their subsequent Fleet Response Training Plan for the 2015 deployment. (11.8.6), (11.3.7), (II.C.1J, (II.C.2), V1.A.2. The ?disestablishment? change} vice ?homeport shift? of personnel caused a negative effect {fit/fill} on the proper manning of (11.0.1), (11.C.2), (11.0.18)] V1.A.3. The disestablishment of CBS-3 plus the removal of one company of billets {142) created a false indication of adequate manning to Higher Headquarters on the fit/fill of from the beginning of its training cycle and continuing through the 2015?2016 deployment. (11.A.15), (11.C.18), {11.K.1l)] VI.A.4. The 2014 disestablishment of Yorktown Detachment Company?) exacerbated the lack of Coastal Riverine experience within and Coastal Riverine Group ONE, while Coastal Riverine Force missions increased. (11.8.3), (11.8.7): (11.0.1), (11.0.2), 11.C.12), VI.A.5. There were not enough properly trained personnel assigned to Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training Evaluation Unit to adequately train and assess the crewmembers of RCB 802 and 805. VI.A.6. (U) The training program was ineffective for RCB operations, including operations in the FIFTH Fleet AOR. V1.A.7. During the individual skills training period, operational commitments prohibited crewmembers from R08 802 and 805 from attending the required schools necessary to begin the unit training phase. (11.E.3), 145 VI.A.8. (U) Coastal Riverine Group ONE and failed to provide adequate navigation training for the crews of RCB 802 and 805 to meet basic requirements and skills for effective navigation, to include operations in the FIFTH Fleet area of operations. VI.A.9. RC3 802 and 805 crewmembers were not prepared to execute the full spectrum of missions expected by (II.G.5), (111.6.3}; VI.A.10. The Kuwait Detachment Officer-in-Charge (CTU- 56.7.3} was not prepared for the additional missions and presence operations assigned under his cognizance. VI.A.11. (U) There is not an effective process for training the Headquarters Element to command and control Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE blue water and green water operations. (11.6.5), VI.A.12. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command lacked specific schools similar to riverine brown water operations schools. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command did not reealign its training pipeline to match the Coastal Riverine Force's new mission set following the disestablishment and merger of CBS-3. (II.A.3), [II.C.l5lr VI.A.13. In part due to late deployment message, lacked adequate time to fully assess, train to, and prepare for the full scope of its mission requirements within the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility. VI.A.14. CRS-3 failed to respond to deployment message. Therefore, mistakenly assumed that was prepared to execute all missions assigned. (II.K.2), 146 VI.A.15. lacked a properly functioning Training Department which resulted in poor oversight over RCB 802 and 805?s training qualifications. This was highlighted by the failure to detect numerous training deficiencies within the crews of RCB 802 and 805, to include the RC8 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader?s failure of his most recent navigation ?Rules of the Road? test. (II.F.4). (II.F.14). (IV.A.41), VI.A.16. The Commanding Officer?s Interim Qualification letters issued to crewmembers of RC8 802 and 805 were driven by Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment (ULTRA) and Final Evaluation Problem requirements and did not reflect the crewmembers? true competencies. (II.F.6), VI.A.17. (U) The use of Interim Qualification letters in the training cycle led Sailors to assume that each had earned final qualification on his or her watch station by satisfactorily completing the training cycle. (II.F.6), VI.R.18. Commander, U.S. THIRD Fleet?s standard for deployment certification of did not adequately meet all the operational requirements for the RC8 platform and associated crews in the FIFTH Fleet area of operations. (II.K.7), (II.K.9), VI.A.19. FIFTH did not communicate all of its real?time operational requirements of the RC8 platform and crew to the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. (II.K.4), VI.A.20. FIFTH Fleet/CTF?56 did not fully understand the true capabilities and limitations of both the RC8 platform and its crewmembers vis?a?vis envisioned operations within the FIFTH Fleet area of operations. VI.B. ORE-3 Deployment VI.B.1. was not fully manned to meet FIFTH Fleet Force Tracking Number requirements. VI.B.2. Due to competing and overlapping combatant command requirements. the process failed to prepare the RC3 802 147 and 805 crews for acclimation to FIFTH Fleet operations. VI.B.3. CTF-56 and CTG-56.7 failed to acclimate the RC3 802 and 805 crews to FIFTH Fleet operations. VI.B.4. (U) CTG-56.7 lacks the ability to perform appropriate oversight due to excessive span of control given the size and geographic dispersion of its operational requirements. VI.B.5. (U) lack of a sustainment training plan inhibited its ability to assess proficiency levels during deployment. VI.B.6. (U) and subordinate units' (including RCB 802 and 805 crewmembers} failure to oversee and conduct sustainment training resulted in readiness degradation over the course of the deployment. was unable to effectively monitor the readiness of the RCB crews due in part to the lack of Coastal Riverine experience on staff and an ineffective liaison officer, a Junior Officer who failed to provide forceful back-up for his Commander. VI.E.8. CTF-56 fostered a command climate of ?can?t say no.? VI.B.9. (U) The Maritime Operations Center/Maritime Headquarters construct was ineffective and created a disconnect between operations and material readiness that contributed to a breakdown in communication in the preparation for the two transit from Kuwait to Bahrain. VI.B.10. (U) The physical location of the Commander in Jebel Ali hampered effective communications with the Commander in Bahrain. (U) Both and lacked a sense of ownership over the RCB crews. This lack of ownership trickled 14s down to the most junior Sailor and manifested itself in the poor execution of the RCB crews? assigned duties. VI.B.12. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain in his capacity as RCB Officer?in?Charge failed to conduct required Patrol Briefs, demonstrating his lack of ownership and further exacerbating a climate of indifference and apathy. VI.B.13. (U) While there was an approved concept of operations at the operational level for the repositioning of the two RCBs from Bahrain to Kuwait, there was never any execution level planning to support the desired end state of three functioning RCBs in Kuwait to support presence operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf. VI.B.14. (U) Although designated as an Officer?in?Charge by the Commanding Officer, the Kuwait Detachment Officer?in? Charge was not trained nor qualified to approve navigational charts, oversee presence operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf, or handle the increased operational tempo and maintenance of three RCBS. VI.B.15. (U) The Kuwait Detachment Officer-in-Charge, the CTG- 56.? Commander, and the Commodore did not fully understand the material condition of the RCBs while in Kuwait. VI.B.16. The Kuwait Detachment Officer-in-Charge, CTG-56.7 and did not provide oversight, poorly adhered to EN management practices, and failed to provide a Pack?Up?Kit in Kuwait until 6 January 2016, resulting in the poor material condition of the RCBs and additional workload for the RC5 crews. VI.B.17. (U) Commodore had a false perception of RCB blue water capability by the mere fact that they were conducting presence operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf from October 2015 to January 2016. This perception created a false sense of capability that resulted in the 12 January 2016 R03 transit from Kuwait to Bahrain occurring without a concept of operations (CONOPS). 149 VI.C. Events of 11-13 January 2016: The RCB Transit From Kuwait to Bahrain The Commander should have been more intimately familiar with the mission preparations and briefings since this was the longest transit of an RCB for (IV.A.25), (IV.A.35): (IV.A.37, (IV.H.46): VI.C.2. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain, serving as the RC8 Officer?in?Charge, failed in his responsibility to conduct a proper Mission and Patrol Brief to the crews of RES 802 and RCB 805. VI.C.3. (U) failed to properly plan for any surface and/or air overwatch in support of the longest transit of an RCB for DRE-3. (IU.A.30), VI.C.4. failed to provide sufficient notice to thoroughly plan for the transit before execution of the longest transit of an RCB for CRS-B. (IV.A.3), (IV.A.21): {Iv.a.30), (IV.B.22), VI.C.5. (U) The CTF-SE Commodore should have been more intimately familiar with the mission preparations and briefings since this was the longest transit of an RCB for {Iv.a.14)r {Iv.a.15}, {Iv.a.20:, {Iv.a.26), {Iv.a.28}, {Iv.a.56), (IV.A.58), {Iv.s.10), (Iv.s.12), {Iv.s.13), (Iv.e.20}, VI.C.6. As CTF-56 transitioned to blue water operations, the Commodore failed to establish Maritime and Tactical Operations Centers that could support over?the?horizon command and control. (IV.E.14), (IV.E.48J, VI.C.7. RC8 802 and RCB 805 should never have been materially cleared to get underway on 12 January 2016. (IV.B.17), {Iv.s.18}r (IV.E.10), 150 VI.C.8. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain authorized a maintenance action that was a departure from specifications without proper approval. (IV.B.7), VI.C.9. The RCB 802 and 805 Boat Captains failed to meet required navigational standards in order to accomplish the longest transit of an RCB for placing their boats and their crews at risk. (IV.A.52), VI.C.10. (U) The Commander failed to ascertain communication status of the RCBs prior to granting permission for the longest transit of an RCB for placing its boats and its crews at risk. Based upon this investigation and the complexity of events, it is apparent that administrative log?keeping is unsatisfactory within the Maritime Operations Center, the RCBs, and all Maritime and Tactical Operations Centers within (IV.K.7), VI.C.12. The RCB 802 Boat Captain did not understand the communication requirements for an RCB patrol. VI.C.13. No Maritime Operations and Tactical Operations Centers under and had situational awareness of the RCBs during the longest transit of an RCB for (IV.E.16), (TU.E.46), (IU.E.48), VI.C.14. The Commander failed to exercise sufficient oversight and direction throughout the longest transit of an RCB for (IV.A.22), (IV.A.3OJ, (IV.E.TJ, 151 VI.C.15. (U) The and Commanders failed to exercise sufficient oversight and direction throughout the RC3 transit. (IV.B.19), (IV.D.2), VI.C.16. (U) The RCB 802 and 805 Boat Captains knowingly and blindly deviated from the Plan of Intended Movement (PIM) track without approval, planning or due regard for safe navigation, placing their boats and their crews at risk. (Iv.a.30}, (IV.E.22), VI.C.17. The RCB 802 and 805 Boat Captains knowingly did not order an adequate force posture for transit through the Central Arabian Gulf. VI.C.18. (U) The Commander failed to set the proper Force Protection mindset of the R08 802 and 805 Boat Captains when he described the longest transit of an RCB for CBS-3, which was through the Central Arabian Gulf, as ?just an admin move." (IV.A.9), (IV.D.9), (IV.E.34), (10.8.37)] VI.C.19. The RCB 802 Boat Captain failed to order his crew to set their weapons to? upon getting underway because he believed this transit was merely an ?admin move." VI.C.20. Had the Maritime Operations Center, Maritime Operations Center, or either Tactical Operations Center had any situational awareness of RCB 802 and RCB 805, they would have been able to prevent the entry of both RCBs into Iranian territorial seas. (IV.E.16) VI.C.21. The previous departure from specification maintenance actions performed both by the 11 January 2016 maintenance team and by previous maintenance teams on RCB 802?s salt water pump flange aesembly directly caused RCB 802?s engine failure on 12 January 2016. (IU.B.7), (10.8.11)? VI.C.22. The absence of a quality assurance program at the Kuwait Naval Base Boat Maintenance Facility directly contributed to poor maintenance practices. 152 VI.C.23. The RC8 802 Coxswain did not understand the requisite procedures to take during an engineering casualty. VI.D. The Iranian Interactions Prior to 802's engine casualty, RC8 802 and 805 traversed, although unknowingly, Iranian territorial seas in a continuous and expeditious manner to reach its rendezvous point with USCGC MONOMOY. While the crews of RC8 802 and RC8 805 unknowingly entered Iranian territorial seas and were unaware that they were exercising the right of innocent passage under customary international law, the right of innocent passage does not require knowledge or intent for the passage to be innocent. (18.8.66)] 81.0.2. (U) RC8 802 stopped in Iranian territorial seas due to an engine casualty. RC8 802's stoppage was due to distress within the meaning of innocent passage and did not violate Iranian sovereignty. {18.8.66}, (IV.G.17), 81.8.3. The crews were not prepared to conduct Visual Information reporting. (IV)li.10), VI.D.4. RC8 805 had the right under innocent passage to stop in Iranian territorial seas to render assistance to RC8 802 upon its engine casualty. RC8 805's stoppage was in accordance with customary international law because it stopped in the event that RC8 802 requested assistance. FF (18.6.1), IV.G.13), 81.0.5. RC8 802 and RC8 805 never requested assistance from the Iranians. The crews of both RC8 802 and RC8 805 attempted to explain to the Iranian vessels that RC8 802 had engine trouble through both verbal communication and physical gestures. It is unclear whether the Iranians understood that RC8 802 was actually in distress within the meaning of customary international law. Therefore, the Iranian vessels did not violate the legal duty to render assistance to vessels in distress. (IV.H.39), V1.0.6. (U) When RC8 802 attempted to drive away from Farsi Island and out of Iranian territorial seas, the Iranians prevented RC8 802 from exercising its right of innocent passage. Upon the RC8 802 Coxswain?s repair of RC8 802's engine, the RC8 802 Boat Captain attempted to accelerate away from Farsi Island 153 and out of Iranian territorial seas to continue its passage. The Iranian vessels blocked RCE 802?s path, preventing its ability to continuously and expeditiously continue its passage in violation of customary international law. (IV.H.38), VI.D.7. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter and international law, Iran has the inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack. At no point during the encounter between the RCBs and the Iranian vessels did the RCBs engage in an armed attack. VI.D.8. (U) Iran is permitted under customary international law to take necessary steps in its own territorial seas to prevent non?innocent passage. Had the RCBs failed to comply with the Iran?s laws or regulations (no findings of fact illustrate that this occurred), then the Iranians had the right under customary international law to require the RCBs to leave their territorial seas immediately. As such, the Iranian blocking of R08 802?s exercise of innocent passage was a violation of international law. VI.D.9. RCB 802 and RCB 805 did not collect visual information as required by Operational Task Visual Information. If the ROB crews had collected visual information while in Iranian territorial seas (they did not), then such an act could be considered non~innocent because any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal nation would be inconsistent with the right of innocent passage. VI.D.10. (U) Although not warships, RCB 802 and RCB 805 are sovereign immune vessels entitled to sovereign immunity because they are state owned and operated, and used solely on government non?commercial service. As such, they are immune from arrest or search, even when operating within the territorial seas of another coastal State. Accordingly, the Iranians search and seizure of RCB 802 and 805, their crews, and their possessions was a violation of sovereign immunity under customary international law. (U) The failure to establish clear command and control weakened the ability of the RCBs to fight as a collective unit. The Commander failed to establish a command and control structure that both RCB Boat Captains and their crews could understand and execute. Because the command and control 154 structure was unclear, both the RC8 802 Boat Captain and the RCB 805 Boat Captain failed to command or control the RCBs as a single unit to respond to a threat. (IV.G.11), (U) The Iranians closed the ?threat triangle" by displaying the capability, opportunity, and intent to commit either a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent. {Iva-58}r (U) The Iranians demonstrated hostile intent to the crews of RCB 802 and RC8 805. (Iv.n.45}, VI.D.14. In accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SHOE), both RCB Boat Captains' limited their respective crews? right of individual self?defense when they directed their crews to stand down from their weapons. (IV.H.25), (IV. VI.D.15. The Commander as a unit commander failed to ensure that the crews of RCB 802 and RCB 805 understood and were trained on when and how to use force in self?defense. (IV.H.69), UI.D.16. Throughout this investigation, it was readily apparent that both RCB crews lacked a clear command and control structure which bred confusion at a critical moment. (IV.A.49), NOTE: Because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement does not define ?unit commander,? the below opinions are developed on my belief that during the acss' interaction with the Iranians, the RC8 802 Boat Captain, as the senior officer present in accordance with 0.8. Navy Regulations, was the ?unit commander? of both RCBs as they operated as a unit together. While the RC8 802 Boat Captain was the unit commander of the collective RCBs as one unit, the RC8 805 Boat Captain was the unit commander for onLy RC8 805. VI.D.17. The RCB 802 Boat Captain failed as a unit commander to ensure that the crew of RCE 802 understood and was trained on 155 when and how to use force in self-defense. (IV.C.3), VI.D.18. (U) The RC8 805 Boat Captain failed as a unit commander to ensure that the crew of RC8 805 understood and was trained on when and how to use force in self-defense. 81.0.19. The RC8 805 Boat Captain failed in his obligation to exercise unit self?defense when he failed to take appropriate action to defend RC8 805 when the Iranian vessels demonstrated hostile intent. Based upon the RC8 805 Boat Captain?s statement and the statements of his crew, the Iranian's use of force against RC8 805 was imminent. (IV.H.43), VI.D.20. The RC8 802 8oat Captain failed in his obligation to exercise unit self-defense when he failed to take appropriate action to defend RC8 802 and RC8 805 when the Iranian vessels demonstrated hostile intent. Based upon the RC8 802 Boat Captain?s statement and the statements of his crew, the Iranian?s use of force against RC8 802 and RC8 805 was imminent. (IV.H.62), VI.D.21. The Commodore failed to ensure that his subordinate Commanders understood and trained to Commander, 0.8. FIFTH Fleet?s 17 December 2015 message as directed. CTF-56 emailed the message to all subordinate Commanders and requested confirmation of receipt. The lack of engagement by the CTF-56 Commodore with his subordinate Commanders on this vital guidance fell far short of the direction by the FIFTH Fleet Commander. The failure of the Commander to ensure that the crews of RC8 802 and RC8 805 received and understood the guidance and intent provided by Commander, 0.8. FIFTH Fleet on 17 December 2015 directly affected the manner in which the crews responded to the Iranians? demonstration of hostile intent. The Commander should have briefed and discussed this message with the crews of RC8 802 and 805, and trained to the message as directed. 156 VI.D.23. Had Commander, 0.8. FIFTH Fleet's 17 December 2015 message been discussed with both crews and had they trained accordingly to it, the crews' individual and collective response to the Iranians' demonstration of hostile intent may have been different. VI.D.24. Both RC8 Boat Captains? direction to their respective crews to walk away from their weapons was not a de? escalatory measure within the meaning of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). De? escalation is a principle that affords an individual engaging in a hostile act or demonstrating hostile intent to be warned, given the opportunity to withdraw, or cease threatening actions. (IV.H.44), (IV.H.45), VI.D.25. As the senior officer present, the RC8 802 Boat Captain violated 0.3. Navy Regulation 0918 by failing to take appropriate action to prepare RC8 802 and RC8 805 against surprise attack when he did not order the posting of gunners on each RC8 when RC8 802?s engine suffered a casualty. The RC8s were located in unknown territorial seas approximately 1.5 nautical miles away from an unknown and possibly inhabited island. While the RC8 802 Coxswain began to repair the engine, the RC8 802 Boat Captain failed to order his gunners to take station for force protection and failed to direct RC8 805 to take any kind of position to protect the dead~in?the water RC8. The RC8 Boat Captain was passive and unaware of the threat environment when the situation demanded vigilance and a heightened sense of threat awareness. Accordingly, the RC8 802 Boat Captain failed to utilize the means at his disposal and failed to put into effect any measure that would have minimized the possibility of the undetected approach of the Iranians. VI.D.26. (U) The RC8 802 Boat Captain lawfully ordered the RC8 802 Coxswain to accelerate through the Iranian vessels. VI.D.27. (U) The RC8 802 Coxswain disobeyed a lawful order of a superior commissioned officer when he refused to obey the RC8 802 Boat Captain's order to accelerate RC8 802 through the Iranian vessels that were attempting to block RC8 802. (IV.H.52), 157 VI.D.28. (U) When the RC8 802 Coxswain refused to obey his lawful order, the RC8 802 Boat Captain acquiesced to the Coxswain?s refusal. Instead of taking action to defend his unit and his sovereign immune vessel, the RC8 802 Boat Captain knowingly surrenderedw both RC8 802 and RC8 805 to the Iranian vessels. (IV.H.T2), VI.D.29. Although briefly, the RC8 802 Coxswain took control of RC8 802 without authority. (IV.H.59), VI.E. Responses VI.E.1. If the Maritime Operations Centers had utilized territorial seas overlays on AGILE CLIENT, then they would have been able to recognize that both RC8 802 and RC8 805 entered Iranian territorial seas at 1546. (IV.E.54J, 81.8.2. If had plotted positional reports, then they would have been able to recognize that both RC8 802 and RC8 805 had entered Iranian territorial seas. (IV.E.4T). (18.8.48), VI.E.3. If USCGC MONOMOY had provided its assessment that RC8 802 and RC8 805 were in Iranian territorial seas over ?open chat? instead of ?whisper chat,? then higher headquarters may have been notified earlier and been able to take appropriate response actions. VI.E.4. (U) If RC8 805 had reported RC8 802 being dead?in?the? water immediately, then higher headquarters would have been notified earlier and been able to take appropriate response actions. The Investigating Officer's use of ?surrender? should not be confused with its use regarding the Code of Conduct. For purposes of this opinion, the Investigating Officer utilized ?surrender? in an operational context. Joint Publication 1-02, ?000 Dictionary of Military and associated Terms," dated 8 November 2010 as amended through 15 October 2015, fails to provide a definition for surrender. Accordingly, the Investigating Officer utilized Merriam-Webster's Dictionary for surrender A ?to yield to the power, control, or possession of another upon compulsion or demand.? 158 VI.E.5. (U) If the Tactical Operations Center had immediately acted upon the RC8 805 communication that they were experiencing an interaction with the Iranians, then higher headquarters would have been notified earlier and been able to take appropriate response actions. VI.F. CODE OF CONDUCT VI.F.1. (U) Although designed for evasion and prisoner of war (POW) situations, the spirit and intent of the Code of Conduct applied to the RC3 crewmembers during their detention by Iranian forces. VI.F.2. The RCB crews were bound to conduct themselves consistent with the Code of Conduct and in a manner that avoided discrediting themselves and the 0.5. government. VI.F.3. (U) Because the 0.8. is not in an armed conflict with Iran, the detention scenario in this case was most analogous to that covered by the ?special instructions? in enclosure 3 of Instruction 1300.21. The instruction lacks clarity, stating variously that enclosure 3 applies to ?governmental operations other than war? or ?Military Operations Other Than War or ?in a situation not related Specifically to the Code of Conduct.? VI.F.4. In terms of the ?captivity environments? described in Level A Code of Conduct training and Moderate Risk of Isolation training, the most accurate description is a ?Peacetime Governmental Detention? UI.F.5. (0) For purposes of this Code of Conduct discussion, the RC3 crewmembers were ?detainees,? the Iranians were ?detainers,? and the scenario was ?detention.?m 'm Compare the 000 Instruction 1300.21 headers at paragraph ?3.10 (?detention? by ?government? as ?detainee?}, with E3.11 {"captivity? by ?terrorists? as ?hostage?}. Paragraphs 33.10 et seq. also use the term ?detainer.? NOTE: The use of the terms ?detainee? and ?detention? here is strictly for purposes of the Code of Conduct discussion to remain consistent with the terminology in Instruction 1300.21. The use of these terms here should not be construed as an opinion on whether the RC3 crewmembers were detainees and the Iranians detainers {or held some other legal status) under any other body of domestic or international law, policy, or regulation. 159 VI.G. Surrender (U) As indicated in an opinion and above, the RCB 802 Boat Captain surrendered both RCBs. Yet Instruction 1300.21 is unclear on how the Code of Conduct and related guidance in enclosure 2 on ?surrender? applies to non? armed conflict scenarios. Instead, enclosure 3 of the Instruction provides that ?Lost, isolated or captive Service members must be prepared to assess the dangers associated with being taken into captivity by local authorities. Their assessment of the dangers should dictate what efforts should be taken and what measure of force may be required to avoid capture, resist apprehension, and resist cooperation once captured.? For operations other than war, my opinion is that enclosure 3 of the Instruction lacks any guidance on the issue of the guidance in enclosure 2 of the Instruction does not apply to the RC8 Boat Captain's surrender. [Encl VI.H. Interrogations and Other Statements in Detention (U) While detained, consistent with the Code of Conduct, guidance, and training, crewmembers employed a variety of resistance strategies, including efforts to provide their Iranian detainers with as little information as possible, and an especially honorable act by RCB 805?s Gunner #2 to activate an emergency beacon even after being bound and guarded at gunpoint. (IV.I.28), VI.H.2. (U) However, crewmembers, at times, provided the Iranian {detainers} with some information beyond what the Code of Conduct permits for this detention scenario. For example, some crewmembers provided information concerning the RCB's approximate speed and provided their specific positions on the boat. (IV.I.47), VI.H.3. While in detention, consistent with the Code of Conduct, crewmembers repeatedly asserted to the Iranians the innocent circumstances of their entry into Iranian territorial The only use of the term ?surrender? in enclosure 3 is in the context of surrendering passports. [Ref 160 seas, both prior to and during detention. Crewmembers did not waiver in their assertions despite disbelief from the Iranians. VI.H.4. When the Iranians did not believe the RCBs could travel from Kuwait to Bahrain, RCB crewmembers laughed and stated, ?yeah I wish you could tell my people that because we told them these boats can?t do that.? While crewmembers may have believed this statement was a source of camaraderie under difficult circumstances, Code of Conduct guidance and training caution against these types of statements because they can be misused as propaganda. This statement displayed a lack of trust and confidence in the chain of command. Additionally, the crewmembers stated that periodically they were being filmed, which increased risk the statement could be used as propaganda. {V.B.l6l; VI.I. Assertions of Innocence v. Apologies VI.I.1. (U) Crewmembers told the Iranians that their entry into territorial seas was unintentional and an ?accident.? Statements like these did not amount to apologies, which would otherwise be contrary to the Code of Conduct. Rather, crewmembers were explaining the innocent cirCumstances of their entry into territorial seas. (IV.H.36), VI.I.2. (U) Crewmembers lacked an understanding of the right of innocent passage until after their release. Had the crew been armed with a full understanding of this right under international law, they could have used this knowledge as a source of strength and a tool of resistance in their responses under duress and interrogation. VI.J. RCB 302 Boat Captain?s Conduct (U) At some point during the first few hours of detention, the RC3 802 Boat Captain directed the Iranian detainers not to film the detainees while eating. This was honorable and consistent with the Code of Conduct. VI.J.2. (U) Also consistent with the Code of Conduct, the RC8 802 Boat Captain instructed the Iranians that his crew were only 161 required to provide name, rank, and service number, and that any other information offered was ?conditional? or ?of their own free will.? The RCB 802 Boat Captain set a tone of resistance in front of the crews and Iranians. VI.J.3. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain?s formal apology (?we apologize for our mistake" and ?that was our fault") on Farsi Island, regardless whether it was filmed, was clearly inconsistent with the Code of Conduct, training, and guidance.?m Though the RC8 802 Boat Captain initially resisted by not saying what the detainers had scripted or demanded, he eventually succumbed and made a formal apology. VI.J.4. (U) The RCB 802 Boat Captain's apology on camera in front of an Iranian ?news crew? was inconsistent with the Code of Conduct, guidance, and training. VI.J.5. The RCB 802 Boat Captain provided an apology in exchange for release, which is inconsistent with the Code of Conduct, training, and guidance. Crewmembers indicated that, while still on the RCEs during the initial interaction with the Iranians, the Boat Captain andfor other crewmembers may have said they were sorry when explaining their circumstances. In the opinion of the Investigating Officer, any apologies during the initial interaction on the RCBS, prior to the Iranians boarding, was not inconsistent with the Code of Conduct, guidance, or training. First, the RCB crewmembers were not detainees or clearly isolated at this point, so application of the Code of Conduct at this point is a bit murky. More important, thOugh, under the totality of the circumstances of the initial encounter, saying sorry as part of an initial explanation of the presence in Iranian territorial waters and an attempt to diffuse a hostile situation is very distinct from the formal apology made in detention on film. 162 Recommendations VI.K. Accountability VI.K.1. (U) I recommend Commander, 0.5. FIFTH Fleet take appropriate administrative action against the Commodore for his lack of oversight and judgment in the preparation and execution of his duties with respect to the incident on 12 January 2016. VI.K.2. I recommend Commander, 0.8. FIFTH Fleet take appropriate administrative action against the Chief Staff Officer for his lack of oversight and forceful backup to both his subordinates and his Commodore. VI.K.3. (U) I recommend a copy of this Command Investigation be forwarded to the Commanderis} who has jurisdiction over the Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE Commanding Officer for appropriate action due to his overall poor execution of his duties in command of CRS-3. His lack of involvement and lack of intrusive leadership created an environment of poor training, maintenance, and operational standards. VI.K.4. (U) I recommend a copy of this Command Investigation be forwarded to the Commanderts) who has jurisdiction over the Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE Executive Officer for his overall poor execution of his duties as Executive Officer of His lack of involvement and lack of intrusive leadership created an environment of poor training, maintenance, and operational standards. VI.K.5. I recommend a copy of this Command Investigation be forwarded to the Commanderts) who has jurisdiction over the Kuwait Officer?in?Charge for appropriate action for his lack of oversight, his lack of judgment, and his overall lack of competency as an Officer?in?Charge. UI.K.6. (U) The U.S. Navy Regulations dictate clear responsibilities for and expectations of officers. In U.S. Navy Regulations 0918, there is no distinction between the expectations of an Ensign or that of an Admiral, if they are the senior officer present. However, in formulating my recommendation, I have taken into account the RCB 802 Boat Captain?s rank and fleet experience. He was placed in a difficult position, albeit one in which his own actions placed him and nine other sailors in danger. His deployment to the FIFTH Fleet area of operations lacked any form of oversight and 163 he lacked basic mentorship and development from his entire chain of command. Left to his own devices, he emulated the poor leadership traits he witnessed first?hand within his own chain of command. I recommend that a copy of this Command Investigation be forwarded to the Commander{s) who has jurisdiction over the RC8 802 Boat Captain for appropriate action. VI.K.7. The RC8 805 Boat Captain/Patrol leader failed to meet the expected standards of a Boat Captain and Patrol Leader. From pre?underway mission preparations to the navigation of his RC8, the RC8 805 Boat Captain/Patrol leader failed to exhibit the leadership inherent in his position. He failed to maneuver his RC8 in defense of RC8 802 and failed his obligation to exercise unit self?defense. I recommend a copy of this Command Investigation be forwarded to the Commander(s} who has jurisdiction over the RC8 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader for appropriate action. VI.K.8. (U) The RC8 802 Coxswain's disobeying of his Boat Captain's order while confronting a force that had demonstrated hostile intent and effectively seizing control of the vessel strikes at the heart of our Navy?s culture. In the face of adversity, the RC8 802 Coxswain seized control of RC8 802 from his superior commissioned officer. The authority to control a vessel can never be in dispute nor can it be challenged. As such, I recommend that a copy of this investigation be forwarded to the RC8 802 Coxswain's chain of command for appropriate action. VI.L. Immediate Recommendations UI.L.1 To be effective in green and blue water operations, specifically in the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility, I recommended an immediate operational training and readiness stand down to ensure that Coastal Riverine Forces are fully prepared, trained, and ready to operate in the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility. VI.L.2 (U) Before conducting any green or blue water operations, I recommend conduct a Navigation stand down for all Mk VI, RC8 and CCB Crewmembers, including training on FIFTH Fleet area of operations charts, equipment validation, electronic chart training and practical, ?cockpit? resource management to ensure back?up of navigation is well understood by all crewmembers. 164 VI.L.3. I recommend the CTF-56 Commodore conduct a Navigation ?Check?Ride" on all deploying units once they arrive in theater. I recommend this ?Check-Ride? be a required turnover item during Remain in Place/Transfer of Authority UI.L.4. I recommend that immediately initiate live?fire weapons training for all personnel that will be responsible for operating or carrying a weapon. VI.L.5. I recommend that CTF-56 draft, and provide to Commander, FIFTH Fleet for approval, an Operational Tasking Coastal Riverine Operations to supersede current OPTASK RC3 and account for overwatch requirements for any operations in green and blue water. This OPTASK update should include MK VI operations as well. VI.L.6. I recommend that draft, and provide to Commander, FIFTH Fleet for approval, an Operational Tasking ?Coastal Riverine Overwatch in Green and Blue Water" so that definitions, capabilities, limitations, and requirements by supporting CTF Commanders are understood. I reCommend that an independent assessment team immediately conduct a command climate workshop for the staff in order to identify and fix organizational concerns, communication barriers, and how to best manage the excessive span of control for given current administrative and operational requirements. VI.L.8. I recommend that immediately conduct a review and implement standardization policies and procedures for each Maritime and Tactical Operation Center under its control. VI.M. Training and Readiness Recommendations I recommend that Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet require CTF-56 to publish deployment orders for incoming units no less than six months in advance, and update with serialized modifications as required. VI.M.2. I recommend forwarding this command investigation to Naval Expeditionary Combat Command for a deep-dive review into Navigation requirements, training, procedures, and standards as it pertains to green and blue water operations. VI.M.3. I recommend forwarding this command investigation to Naval Expeditionary Combat Command for a deep?dive review and 165 readiness kill chain assessment specifically for Coastal Riverine Force platforms. VI.M.4. (U) I recommend forwarding this command investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to evaluate the curriculum of the Riverine schools pipeline in order to modify the curriculum to encompass Coastal Riverine operations (support to Maritime Component Commanders) vice exclusively brown water operations (support to Land Component Commanders}. VI.M.5. (U) I recommend forwarding this investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to implement an Expeditionary Warfare indoctrination and leadership course for all Officers detailed to the Coastal Riverine Force to attend before reporting aboard Coastal Riverine Squadrons. VI.M.6. (U) I recommend forwarding this investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to explore the development of a career track tailored specifically for the competitive selection and detailing of Post?Department Head Surface Warfare Officers to Officer?in?Charge billets at the Coastal Riverine Squadrons. VI.M.7. (U) I recommend forwarding this investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to explore scenario training options specific to the Coastal Riverine Force maritime operating environment, similar to Judgment?Based Engagement Training for ground forces or Full Mission ?Cockpit? Simulators for surface forces. VI.M.8. (U) I recommend that CTF-56 update and maintain their Collaboration?at?Sea webpage with all applicable orders, directives, guidance, and area specific information in order to ensure that forces have ready access to all documents while in homeport. VI.M.9. (U) I recommend that develop an indoctrination and assessment period during that establishes the foundation of policies and procedures for the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility. VI.M.1D. (U) I recommend that establish a formal feedback mechanism to the Coastal Riverine Groups, via Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, in order to effectively integrate the most current mission requirements into the training cycle. VI.M.11. I recommend that publish quarterly or semi? annual briefs/messages to the entire Coastal Riverine Force with 166 updates on Commander?s Intent, FIFTH Fleet Operations, and a future operations outlook. VI.N. Policies, Programs, and Procedures (U) I recommend an update to the 0.8. Navy Regulations. Current U.S. Navy Regulation 0828 speaks directly to the responsibilities of a Commanding Officer to his or her ship. Specifically, it requires that a Commanding Officer never permit his or her ship to be searched or any ships personnel to be removed so long as the capacity to repel such an act exists. As the Navy continues to develop increasing numbers of sovereign immune platforms (many of these with sizeable crews} to be operated by individuals who do not hold command, the Navy Regulations must adapt in order to require these individuals places in positions of trust and responsibility to protect both his or her vessel and crew. VI.N.2. I recommend an update to the Code of Conduct to reflect the modern operational environment.? VI.N.3. (U) I recommend an update to Instruction 1300.21 to reflect the modern operational environment. Enclosure in particular should be revised to provide clarity and guidance for captivity/detentions that are neither during armed conflict nor military operations other than war, particularly on the issues of surrender, capture, and evasion. VI.N.4. (U) I recommend that the Department of the Navy promulgate an instruction with guidance specifically tailored to maritime operations and captivity/detention scenarios at sea. VI.N.5. (U) I recommend that Navy Expeditionary Combat Command require the Coastal Riverine boat crews complete in-person Search, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) school, making them worldwide deployable. VI.N.6. I recommend a revision of the online SERE 100.1-SERE level A Code of Conduct to include Code of Conduct guidance for maritime operations, particularly if the Department of the Navy intends to rely on this as an Option for Code of Conduct training. Similar recommendations to revise the Code of Conduct were made and implemented following the USS PUEBLO court of inquiry to clarify its applicability to other captivity/detention scenarios. See COMUSPACFLT FOURTH ENDORSEMENT 5830 00100081 of 10 Jun 69. 167 VI.N.7. (U) I recommend the revision of U.S. Central Command Moderate Risk of Isolation training to include a discussion of at?sea isolation, captivity, and detention scenarios to reflect current maritime operations. Additional guidance on evasion in non?wartime interactions with unfriendly or hostile governments should be added.M VI.N.8. (U) I recommend that Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet designate Coastal Riverine boat crews who will conduct green water or blue water operations in the Central Command area of operations as ?High Risk of Isolation? and require those crews complete High Risk of Isolation training prior to deployment. VI.N.9. (U) I recommend that Commander, 0.8. FIFTH Fleet require subordinate Task Forces to conduct periodic risk?of?isolation briefings. VI.N.10. EU) I recommend the revision of Code of Conduct trainings and Instruction 1300.21 to employ consistent terminology for non?wartime detention scenarios. The trainings and instructions utilize various terminologies, such as ?Peacetime governmental detention,? ?detention during operations other than war,? ?hostile detention,? ?detention by a hostile government.? Instruction 1300.21 alternates between the terms ?detention? and ?captivity?. VI.N.11. I recommend the revision of Article 1140 of the U.S. Navy Regulations, which concerns ?capture? by an ?enemy?, to reflect modern detention scenarios. One slide in the Moderate Risk of Isolation training suggests that, during a peacetime governmental detention scenario in an ?unfriendly country,? ?isolated? sailors should not resist or use force. The slide depicts Iran as an example. This slide fails to provide any additional guidance for at-sca Scenarios involving sovereign immune vessels and self? defense and evasion. 168 (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 U.S. Code § 130b; (b)(6)