BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Representative Ted Lieu
Representative Walter Jones
Senator Jeff Merkley

State Senator John Howe
Zephyr Teachout

Michael Wager

Free Speech For People
Campaign for Accountability

v. MUR No.
House Majority PAC

Congressional Leadership Fund

Senate Majority PAC

Senate Leadership Fund

American Alliance PAC

Bold Agenda PAC

Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc.


Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc.
New York Wins PAC
COMPLAINT

1. This complaint is ?led under 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(1) and 11 C.F.R.
111.4, seeking an immediate investigation and enforcement action against
political committees for violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
The respondent political committees, known popularly as ?super have
knowingly accepted contributions that exceed the limits of 52 U.S.C. 30116.

2. Under FECA, contributions to political committees are subject to dollar

limits. For political committees that are not the authorized committees of

candidates or political parties, the applicable limit is $5,000 per contributor per

year. 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C); 11 C.F.R. This contribution limit
?appl[ies] to contributions made to political committees making independent
expenditures.? 11 C.F.R. A political committee may not knowingly accept
any contribution in Violation of that limit. 52 U.S.C. 30116(f).

3. Respondents have knowingly accepted and continue to knowingly
accept contributions that exceed the $5,000 per contributor limit, in some cases by
over a hundredfold.

4. In March 2010, the US. Court of Appeals for the DC. Circuit found
the limit in 30116(a)(1)(C) to be unconstitutional as applied to SpeechNow.org, an
unincorporated nonpro?t association that promised to make only independent
expenditures, and its contributors. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (DC. Cir.
2010) (en banc). In so doing, the DC. Circuit extended Citizens United v. FEC, 558
US. 310 (2010), which concerned a spender-based ban on independent expenditures,
to the entirely different context of dollar limits on contributions.

5. The Department of Justice chose not to seek Supreme Court review of
the decision, in large part on the theory that ?the particularly limited nature of
SpeechNow?s contribution and expenditure practices means that the court of
appeals? decision will affect only a small subset of federally regulated contributions.?
Letter from Att?y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Sen. Harry Reid (June 16, 2010),
The Supreme Court has never considered the question.

6. Time has proven the Attorney General?s prediction wrong. SpeechNow

did not ?affect only a small subset of federally regulated contributions.? Rather, it

birthed the ?super through Which wealthy contributors make unlimited
contributions to political committees that spend the money on behalf of candidates
and parties, thus evading the dollar limits on contributions given directly to
candidates and parties. Since the Court of Appeals? decision in SpeechNow, as set
forth in more detail below, the number of super PACs has exploded, as has the size
of contributions to them and their in?uence in federal races, giving rise to a
Widespread perception of quid pro quo corruption.

7. In July 2010, the FEC issued Advisory Opinion No. 2010-11

 

(Commonsense Ten) (July 22, 2010), http:/l 1.usa.gov/298r8dg, to a political
committee that later became respondent Senate Majority PAC. The FEC opined
that the political committee?s ?planned course of action, which involves soliciting
and accepting unlimited contributions from individuals, political committees,
corporations, and labor organizations for the purpose of making independent
expenditures . . . complies With the Act.? Id. at 2. In light of this advisory opinion
and 52 U.S.C. 30108(c)(2), complainants do not ask the FEC to seek civil penalties
or other sanctions for past conduct, but rather only declaratory and/or injunctive
relief against future acceptance of excessive contributions.

8. The Court of Appeals for the DC. Circuit has not yet revisited
SpeechNow. In these proceedings, however, the FEC is not bound by the DC.
Circuit?s ruling, as the FEC itself has recognized. In arguing against injunctive

relief in SpeechNow, the FEC noted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel

precludes it from enforcing contribution limits against the plaintiffs who brought

the SpeechNow litigation. The FEC emphasized, however, that despite the
SpeechNow ruling, it can still enforce contribution limits in cases brought
by or against other parties outside the DC. Circuit. See FEC Br. in Partial Opp. to
Pls.? Mot. for Entry of Judgment 4-8, May 28, 2010, ECF No. 7?7, SpeechNow.org v.
FEC, No. 08-248 (D.D.C. 2010), This proceeding involves
at least two complainants (John Howe and Michael Wager) and at least one
respondent located in circuits that have not yet ruled on the issues
presented by SpeechNow. Moreover, an administrative agency need not acquiesce in
a court of appeals ruling even in the same circuit as long as the agency is
?embarked on a rational litigation program designed to secure a reasonably prompt
national resolution of the question in dispute.? Samuel Estreicher Richard L.
Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 99 Yale L.J. 831,
832 (1990). In these proceedings, complainants ask the FEC to reconsider, in light
of later experience, its previous decision to acquiesce to SpeechNow.
COMPLAINANTS

9. Ted Lieu, 415 Cannon House Of?ce Building, Washington, DC 20515,
is a United States Representative from California?s 33rd District and a Democrat.
In his 2014 election campaign, he was targeted by spending from two super PACs,
American Alliance and Bold Agenda PAC. American Alliance spent $506,407 in his
race (including an attack ad falsely linking him to a terrorist group), of which
$500,000 came from a single donor. See FEC, American Alliance, Independent

expenditures: 2013-2014, FEC, American Alliance,

Receipts, http:/l (all last visited June 29, 2016); Paul Blumenthal,
These Super PACs Spent Big A3 Elections Neared, But Kept Donors Secret Until
Now, HuffPost Politics (Dec. 6, 2014), http://huffto/lwbeJLx.

10. As a Member of Congress, Representative Lieu is interested in
upholding federal campaign ?nance law. Furthermore, Representative Lieu is
running for re-election in 2016, and faces the strong risk that unregulated super
PAC contributions will again be used in an attempt to in?uence federal elections in
which he is a candidate. If the FEC does not faithfully enforce 30116, he will be
open to attack, particularly during critical time periods just before the election, in
broadcast advertising campaigns mounted by groups created to evade the
contribution limits imposed by Congress.

11. Walter Jones, 2333 Rayburn House Of?ce Building, Washington, DC
20515, is a United States Representative from North Carolina?s 3rd District and a
Republican. In his 2014 election campaign, he was targeted by spending from a
super PAC called Ending Spending Action Fund (now known as which
spent $381,354 opposing him and $353,252 supporting his then-opponent. See FEC,
Ending Spending Action Fund, Independent Expenditures: 2013-2014,

(last visited June 29, 2016).

 

12. As a Member of Congress, Representative Jones is interested in
upholding federal campaign ?nance law. Furthermore, Representative Jones is
running for re-election in 2016, and faces the strong risk that unregulated super

PAC contributions will again be used in an attempt to in?uence federal elections in

which he is a candidate. If the FEC does not faithfully enforce 30116, he will be
open to attack, particularly during critical time periods just before the election, in
broadcast advertising campaigns mounted by groups created to evade the
contribution limits imposed by Congress.

13. Jeff Merkley, PO. Box 14172, Portland, OR 97293, is a United States
Senator from Oregon and a Democrat. In his 2014 election campaign, he was
targeted by spending from a super PAC called Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc.,
which spent $1,020,016 opposing him. See FEC, Freedom Partners Action Fund,
Inc., Independent expenditures: 2013-2014, (last visited
June 30, 2016).

14. As a Senator, Senator Merkley is interested in upholding federal
campaign ?nance law. Furthermore, Senator Merkley expects to run for re-election
in 2020, and faces the strong risk that unregulated super PAC contributions will
again be used in an attempt to in?uence federal elections in which he is a
candidate. If the FEC does not faithfully enforce 30116, he will be open to attack,
particularly during critical time periods just before the election, in broadcast
advertising campaigns mounted by groups created to evade the contribution limits
imposed by Congress.

15. John Howe, PO. Box 172, Red Wing, MN 55066, is a Republican
candidate for United States Congress from Minnesota?s 2nd District, and a former
Minnesota State Senator. The primary election is scheduled for August 9, 2016.

House Majority PAC, a super PAC which supports Democrats and opposes

Republicans in Congressional races, has already reserved $2,415,794 of television
time in the Minneapolis media market. House Majority PAC, House Majority PAC

Adds Over $5.2 Million in Airtime (May 17, 2016),

ac-adds-

 

 

over-52-million-in-airtime. House Majority PAC states that the purpose of its media
campaign, in Minneapolis and elsewhere, is to ?hold House GOP candidates
accountable in every corner of the country.? I bid.

16. Mr. Howe faces the strong risk that unregulated super PAC
contributions will be used in an attempt to in?uence federal elections in which he is
a candidate. If the FEC does not faithfully enforce 30116, he will be open to
attack, particularly during critical time periods just before the election, in broadcast
advertising campaigns mounted by groups created to evade the contribution limits
imposed by Congress.

17. Zephyr Teachout, c/o Zephyr Teachout for Congress, PO. Box 491,
Rosendale, NY 12472, is the Democratic candidate for United States Congress from
New York?s 19th District. This district has been identi?ed by outside observers as a
highly competitive race. See, Kevin B. Sanders, A Congressional Barnburner

Brews in New York 19, Observer (June 17, 2016), 

 


18. In the 2016 Republican primary race for New York?s 19th District, a
super PAC called New York Wins PAC Spent over $594,000. See FEC, New York

Wins PAC, Independent expenditures: 2015-2016, (last

 

visited June 29, 2016). Reportedly, according to the director and founder of New
York Wins PAC, this super PAC will also spend money on independent
expenditures in the general election. See James Nani, Updated: New pro-Faso super
PAC enters race for Y-19, bankrolled by single multi-millionaire, The Fray (May

17, 2016), 

 

enters-race-for-nv- 

 

19. Ms. Teachout faces the strong risk that unregulated super PAC
contributions will be used in an attempt to in?uence federal elections in which she
is a candidate. If the FEC does not faithfully enforce 30116, she Will be open to
attack, particularly during critical time periods just before the election, in broadcast
advertising campaigns mounted by groups created to evade the contribution limits
imposed by Congress.

20. Michael Wager, c/o Citizens for Michael Wager, PO. Box 1044, Solon,
OH 44139, is the Democratic candidate for United States Congress from Ohio?s 14th
District. In 2014, he ran for this seat against the incumbent Representative, and he
was targeted by spending from a super PAC called Defending Main Street
SuperPAC Inc. In the 2014 election cycle, Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc.
spent $82,000 opposing his candidacy, and $39,550 supporting the candidacy of his
then-opponent, Representative David Joyce. See FEC, Defending Main Street

SuperPAC Inc., Independent expenditures: 2013-2014, 

 

(last visited June 29, 2016). In 2016, Mr. Wager is again running against

Representative Joyce. So far, Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc. has spent over

$243,000 supporting the candidacy of Representative Joyce. See FEC, Defending
Main Street SuperPAC Inc., Independent expenditures: 2015-2016,
(last visited June 29, 2016).

21. Mr. Wager faces the strong risk that unregulated super PAC
contributions will again be used in an attempt to in?uence federal elections in
which he is a candidate. If the FEC does not faithfully enforce 30116, he will be
open to attack, particularly during critical time periods just before the election, in
broadcast advertising campaigns mounted by groups created to evade the
contribution limits imposed by Congress.

22. Free Speech For People, 1340 Centre St., Suite 209, Newton, MA
02459, is a national non-partisan, non-pro?t 501(c)(3) organization that works to
restore republican democracy to the people, including through legal advocacy
concerning the law of campaign ?nance. Free Speech For People?s thousands of
supporters around the country engage in education and non-partisan advocacy to
encourage and support effective government of, by, and for the American people.

23. Campaign for Accountability, 1201 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 300,
Washington, DC 20036, is a national non-partisan project of the Hopewell Fund, a
non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Campaign for Accountability uses research,
litigation and communications to expose misconduct and malfeasance in public life.
Millions of Americans? lives are negatively impacted by decisions made behind the
doors of corporate boardrooms, government of?ces, and shadowy nonprofit groups.

Campaign for Accountability works to bring transparency to government and

corporate actors and to reform the campaign finance system to eliminate the
corruption that ?ows from unlimited spending.

RESPONDENTS

 

24. House Majority PAC COO-495028), 700 13th Street NW, Suite
600, Washington, DC 20005, is an independent expenditure-only committee (super
PAC) established on April 6, 2011.1 House Majority PAC, Statement of Organization
(Apr. 6, 2011), House Majority PAC states as its goal
?helping Democrats Win seats in the House.? House Majority PAC, Our Story,
1'7me 9n (last Visited July 3, 2016). House Majority PAC made
independent expenditures for or against over 140 candidates in the 2012 and 2014
election cycles, and has already made independent expenditures for or against four
candidates in the 2016 cycle. See FEC, House Majority PAC, Independent
expenditures: 2015-2016, http:/l 1.usa.gov/28RfVJ 8; House Majority PAC,

Independent expenditures: 2013-2014, House Majority

 

PAC, Independent expenditures: 2011-2012, (all last

 

Visited June 29, 2016). In the 2016 election cycle, House Majority PAC has reserved
nearly $19 million of television time so far. House Majority PAC, House Majority
PAC Adds Over $5.2 Million in Airtime (May 17, 2016),


over-52-million-in-airtime.

 

1 By referring to this and other respondents as an ?independent expenditure-only
committee,? complainants do not con?rm or concede that the respondent?s
expenditures are in fact truly independent, but only that the respondent has thus
registered With the FEC.

10

25. Congressional Leadership Fund 000504530), 1747 
Avenue NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20006, is an independent expenditure-only
committee (super PAC) established on October 21, 2011. Congressional Leadership
Fund, Statement of Organization (Oct. 21, 2011), 
Congressional Leadership Fund ?is a super PAC exclusively dedicated to protecting
and strengthening the Republican Majority in the House of Representatives.?
Congressional Leadership Fund, About,
(last visited July 3, 2016). In the
2012 and 2014 election cycles, Congressional Leadership Fund made independent
expenditures for or against 39 candidates, and in the 2016 cycle so far, has made
independent expenditures supporting one candidate. See FEC, Congressional
Leadership Fund, Independent expenditures: 2015-2016, 
Congressional Leadership Fund, Independent expenditures: 2013-2014,

Congressional Leadership Fund, Independent

 

expenditures: 2011-2012, (all last visited June 29, 2016).

 

26. Senate Majority PAC 000484642) (formerly known as Majority
PAC, and before that as Commonsense Ten), 700 13th Street NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005, is an independent expenditure-only committee (super PAC)
established on June 11, 2010. Senate Majority PAC, Statement of Organization

(June 11, 2010), Senate Majority PAC was established to

 

Win Senate races for Democratic candidates. Senate Majority PAC, Our Mission,

(last visited June 29, 2016). Senate Majority

11

PAC made expenditures for or against 42 candidates in the 2012 and 2014 election
cycles, and so far has made independent expenditures supporting 11 candidates in
the 2016 cycle. See FEC, Senate Majority PAC, Independent expenditures: 2015-
2016, http:/l Senate Majority PAC, Independent expenditures:

2013-2014, Senate Majority PAC, Independent

 

expenditures: 2011-2012, (all last Visited June 29, 2016).
Reportedly, in the 2014 election cycle, Senate Majority PAC funded 1 out of every 20
television ads in Senate races across the country. Carrie Levine Dave Levinthal,
This Super PAC was Behind 1 Out of Every 20 Senate Ads, Time (Nov. 3, 2014),



 

27. Senate Leadership Fund 000571703), 45 North Hill Drive, Suite
100, Warrenton, VA 20186, is an independent expenditure-only committee (super
PAC) established on January 20, 2015. Senate Leadership Fund, Statement of

Organization (Jan. 20, 2015), Senate Leadership Fund

 

asserts that it ?has one goal: to protect and expand the Republican Senate Majority.?

Senate Leadership Fund, About, (last

 

visited June 29, 2016) (emphasis in original). In the 2016 election cycle (its ?rst), so
far Senate Leadership Fund has made independent expenditures for or against two
candidates. See FEC, Senate Leadership Fund, Independent expenditures: 2015?
2016, (last Visited June 29, 2016). On June 28, 2016,
Senate Leadership Fund announced that it had reserved $38.6 million in fall cable

and broadcast advertising time. Senate Leadership Fund, Senate Leadership Fund

12

Announces Nearly $40 Million in First Round of Fall TVReservations (June 28,

2016), 

 

 

 



28. American Alliance PAC C00567016), PO. Box 1706,
Alexandria, VA 22313, is an independent expenditure-only committee (super PAC)
established on August 8, 2014. American Alliance PAC, Statement of Organization

(Aug. 8, 2014), American Alliance PAC is ?devoted to

 

helping elect candidates from across the nation that stand to protect its founding
principles: an open and free economic market and a more limited federal

government.? American Alliance PAC, About, 

 

(last visited June 29, 2016). In the 2014 election cycle, American Alliance PAC made
independent expenditures of $107,051 opposing complainant Representative Ted
Lieu and $399,362 supporting his then-opponent. FEC, American Alliance,

Independent expenditures: 2013-2014, (last Visited June

 

29,2016)

29. Bold Agenda PAC 000569426), PO. Box 1173, Santa Rosa, CA
95402, is an independent expenditure-only committee (super PAC) established on
October 8, 2014. Bold Agenda PAC, Statement of Organization (Oct. 8, 2014),
mpL/LusagOV/28Nuon. Bold Agenda PAC proposes ?achievable? steps that
would strengthen our economy, our individual liberty, and our national security?
and that ?the Republican Party should rally to adopt them.? Bold Agenda PAC,

About, (last visited June 29, 2016). In the 2014

 

13

election cycle, Bold Agenda PAC made independent expenditures of $256,485
supporting complainant Representative Ted Lieu's then-opponent. FEC, Bold

Agenda PAC, Independent expenditures: 2013?2014, (last

 

visited June 29, 2016).

30. Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc. 000540203), 325 7th
Street, NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20004, is an independent expenditure-only
committee (super PAC) established on December 18, 2012. Defending Main Street
SuperPAC Inc., Statement of Organization (Dec. 18, 2012),
In the 2014 election cycle, Defending Main Street
SuperPAC Inc. made independent expenditures for or against 20 candidates, and in
the 2016 election cycle so far, Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc. has made
independent expenditures for or against six candidates. FEC, Defending Main
Street SuperPAC Inc., Independent expenditures: 2015?2016,

Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc., Independent

 

expenditures: 2013?2014, (all last visited June 29, 2016).

 

31. (300489856) (formerly known as Ending Spending
Action Fund, and before that as Ending Spending Fund), 610 South Boulevard,
Tampa, FL 33606, is an independent expenditure-only committee (super PAC)

established on October 5, 2010. Statement of Organization (Oct. 5, 2010),

 

supports candidates ?Who favor enhancing
?ee enterprise, reducing the size of government, and balancing our nation?s

budget.? (last visited June 29, 2016). In the 2014

 

14

election cycle, made independent expenditures for or against 16
candidates, and in the 2016 election cycle, so far has made independent
expenditures for or against three candidates. FEC, Independent

expenditures: 2015-2016, Independent

 

expenditures: 2013-2015, (all last visited June 29, 2016).

 

32. Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. 0005647 65), 2300 Wilson
Boulevard, Suite 500, Arlington, VA 22201, is an independent expenditure-only
committee (super PAC) established on June 13, 2014. Freedom Partners Action

Fund, Inc., Statement of Organization (June 13, 2014), 

 

Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. supports candidates ?who believe in freedom,
who will empower entrepreneurs over special interests to expand opportunities,
create strong communities, and give everyone the best shot at a better life? as well
as candidates ?who promote free markets and a free society.? Freedom Partners

Action Fund, Inc., Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc., About,

 

(all last Visited June 29, 2016). In the 2014 election cycle,

 

Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc., made independent expenditures for or against
21 candidates. FEC, Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc., Independent expenditures:
2013-2014, (last Visited June 30, 2016). In the 2016
election cycle so far, Freedom Partners Action Fund has made independent
expenditures against ?ve candidates, and in support of one candidate. FEC,
Freedom Partners Action Fund, Independent expenditures: 2015-2016,

(last visited June 29, 2016).

15

33. New York Wins PAC 000603365), 150 Lake Street, Elmira, NY
14901, is an independent expenditure-only committee (super PAC) established on
January 11, 2016. New York Wins PAC, Statement of Organization (Jan. 11, 2016),
gov/28R7WkH. Reportedly, the principal race on which it is focusing in
2016 is supporting Republican candidate John Faso in his race for New York?s 19th
Congressional District. See Nani, supra. In the 2016 election cycle so far, New York
Wins PAC has made independent expenditures of over $594,000 against Mr. Faso?s
opponent in the Republican primary. See FEC, New York Wins PAC, Independent
expenditures: 2015-2016, (last visited June 29, 2016).

BACKGROUND

Before SpeechNow

34. In Buckley U. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that limits on
contributions were justi?ed by the public interest in ?limit[ing] the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual ?nancial contributions,?
and that almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
?nancial contributions.? 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). And as the Court
explained, ?a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may
contribute to a . . . political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor?s ability to engage in free communicationjust two months after Buckley, Congress amended FECA to

include, among other provisions, annual limits on contributions to political

16

committees other than the authorized committees of candidates or political parties.
See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,

112(2), 90 Stat. 475, 486-87 (May 11, 1976). That provision remains substantially
the same today. See 52 U.S.C.A. 30116(a)(1)(C) (2016).

36. In 1976, in the very ?rst proposed regulations to implement
FECA, the FEC proposed a provision specifying that this limit ?also appl[ies] to
contributions to committees making independent expenditures.? FEC, Federal
Election Campaign Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,572, 21,585 (May 24, 1976) (codi?ed at 11
C.F.R. 110.1(d) (1976)). Over several revisions, the FEC has preserved this
provision in substantially the same form as it reads today, see 110 C.F.R. 110.1(n)
(2016), noting over the years that no public commenters had ever objected. See FEC,
Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421, 449 (Jan. 3, 2003)
(?The Commission received no comments on this section?); FEC, Contribution and
Expenditure Limitations and Prohibitions; Contributions by Persons and
Multicandidate Political Committees, 52 Fed. Reg. 760, 764 (Jan. 9, 1987) (?None of
the public comments received addressed this provision?).

Developments since SpeechNow

37. In SpeechNow, the DC. Circuit opined that ?contributions to groups
that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the
appearance of corruption.? 599 F.3d at 694. This departed from both Buckley and
Citizens United, and improperly subjected contribution limits to the higher level of
scrutiny that the Supreme Court currently applies to independent expenditures. See

Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens

17

United, and SpeechNow, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 389, 474-76 (2015). As de?ned by the
Supreme Court, ?an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the
electorate.? Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. However, contribution is not
?speech presented to the electorate.? A contribution is money given to a coordinating
body.? Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand ?Corruption? to
Mean, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2014). Moreover, as set forth below, the DC. Circuit?s
pronouncement that contributions to independent expenditure groups ?cannot
corrupt or create the appearance of corruption? has proven empirically wrong.

38. Since SpeechNow, and contrary to Attorney General Holder?s
prediction, the number of super PACs has exploded, as has the size of contributions
to them and their in?uence in federal races. In the 2016 cycle, there are over 2,400
organized federal super PACs. See FEC, Committees (search result for super PACs

active 2015-16), (last Visited June 24, 2016). As of April

 

2016, over 40% of federal super PAC contributions had come from just 50 funders
and their families. Matea Gold Anu Narayanswamy, The new Gilded Age: Close to
half of all super-PAC money comes from 50 donors, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 2016,
1. By late June 2016, federal super PACs had reported total
receipts of over $755 million and total independent expenditures of over $405
million. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs,

(last updated June 24, 2016).

 

39. While much of the national media coverage of super PACs focuses on

presidential elections, super PACs are increasingly dominant in the funding of

18

congressional elections. See Gold Narayanswamy, supra (noting that ?[w]ealthy
patrons also are turning their attention to congressional races? and that already
?more than two dozen super PACs each backing a single House or Senate candidate
have emerged,? but that ?[t]he biggest surge of cash is likely to come this fall, when
millionaires and billionaires aligned with both parties fully engage in the fights for
control of the White House and Congress?). By late March 2016, outside groups
(super PACs and political nonprofits such as 501(c)(4) organizations) from both the
Democratic and Republican parties had already Spent a combined $34.1 million on
races for seats in the House and Senate?85% more than the $18.4 million that had
been spent by the same time in the 2012 elections. Bill Allison, With GOP in
Disarray, Super-PACs Target Congress, Bloomberg Politics (Mar. 22, 2016),

http://bloombg/ 1pxhuo7 .

 

Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption Through Super PACs

40. Recent public opinion surveys reveal widespread perceptions of
corruption in the federal government:

In a February 2016 Rasmussen Reports survey, 61% of likely voters
agreed that most members of Congress were ?willing to sell their vote for
either cash or a campaign contribution,? with the same percentage
believing it likely that their own representative had done the same.
Rasmussen Reports, Congressional Performance: Voters Still Say Congress
is For Sale (Feb. 22, 2016), 
public?content/politics/mood of 

 

In a September 2015 Gallup survey, 75% of respondents agreed that
corruption was widespread in government, up from 66% in 2009. Gallup,
75% in US. See Widespread Government Corruption (Sept. 19, 2015),


corrup tion.aspx.

 

 

19

41.

In an April 2012 Pew Research Center survey, 54% of respondents
described the United States government as ?mostly corrupt.? Pew
Research Ctr. for the People the Press, Growing Gap in Favorable
Views of Federal, State Governments (Apr. 26, 2012), 


In a 2011 Center for Competitive Politics/Cooperative Congressional
Election Study survey, 59.2% of respondents agreed that a contribution of
$5,000 or more could exert a corrupting in?uence on a candidate for
Congress. See Jason M. Farrell Nima Veiseh, Public Perception and the
?Appearance of Corruption? in Campaign Finance 78, Ctr. for Competitive
Politics (Dec. 16, 2011), 
content/uploads/2012/ 1 


 

 

In particular, public opinion demonstrates an appearance of corruption

speci?cally attributable to large super PAC contributions:

In an October 2012 Democracy Corps/Public Campaign Action Fund
survey, 59% of voters in 54 competitive congressional districts agreed that
?[W]hen someone gives 1 million dollars to a super PAC, they want
something big in return from the candidates they are trying to elect.? Stan
Greenberg et al., In Congressional Battleground, Voters Intensely
Concerned About Money in Politics 4, Democracy Corps (Oct. 1, 2012),

93012.v4.pdf.

In an April 2012 Brennan Center for Justice survey focusing specifically
on super PACs, 69% of respondents (74% of Republicans, 73% of
Democrats) agreed that ?new rules that let corporations, unions and
people give unlimited money to Super PACs will lead to corruption.? 73%
of respondents (75% of Republicans, 78% of Democrats) agreed that ?there
would be less corruption if there were limits on how much could be given
to Super 68% of respondents (71% of Democrats, 71% of
Republicans) agreed that ?a company that spent $100,000 to help elect a

 

2 394 of 974 respondents responded that any contribution could exert a corrupting
in?uence; 183 respondents specified dollar thresholds between $1 and $5,000. See
id. The report?s summary notes that, of the 438 respondents who specified a
particular dollar threshold (as opposed to any contribution) for a corrupting
in?uence, the median response was $10,000, a level that 65% of those who speci?ed
a particular threshold (and, implicitly, 100% of those who believe that any
contribution is corrupting) agreed exerts a corrupting in?uencemember of Congress could successfully pressure him or her to change a
vote on a proposed law.? Brennan Ctr. for Justice, National Survey: Super
PAC's, Corruption, and Democracy (Apr. 24, 2012),
acs-
corruption-and-democracy (summary and appendix).

 

 

In a March 2012 ABC News/Washington Post survey, 69% of respondents
stated that super PACs should be illegal. Damla Ergun, Seven in 10
Would Send Super PACs Packing, ABC News (Mar. 13, 2012),
10-would-send-
super-pacs-packingl; Wash. Post, Washington News Poll (Mar.
10, 2012), 
postabcpoll 031012.html (question 33). A similar survey that asked the
same question just in North Carolina, the home state of complainant
Walter Jones, yielded nearly identical results. See Elon Univ., Elon Poll 6
(Apr. 27, 2012), 

0427 IZHPollMethodologvp df.

 

 

 

 

 

42. Even assuming that a super PAC does not ?coordinate? its campaign
strategy with a supported candidate, a contributor is free to discuss both the ?quid?
and the ?quo? with the candidate. See Alschuler, supra, 67 Fla. L. Rev. at 475.
Interviews with former Members of Congress, recent congressional candidates,
campaign and legislative staff, and political operatives suggest how such quid pro
quo agreements could occur. See Daniel B. Tokaji Renata E.B. Strause, The New
Soft Money (2014), 
As one campaign
operative explained: ?So the Member calls and says ?Hey, I know you?re maxed out 
and I can?t take any more money from you but there?s this other group. I?m not
allowed to coordinate with them, but can I have someone call you?? Id. at 68. The

same conversation could then proceed to discuss legislative matters, including an

21

agreement to take some official action in exchange for the donor?s contributions to
the ?other group,? the super PAC.3

43. The availability of quid pro quo transactions through super PAC
contributions creates a potential for corruption, and an appearance of corruption
that is confirmed by the public. For this reason, enforcing the contribution limits of
52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C) against super PACs is justified by the interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.

FACTS

44. As set forth below, respondents have accepted multiple contributions
that exceed $5,000 per person per year and, on information and belief, will continue
to do so. While all such excessive contributions Violate 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C)
and this complaint recites only select very large contributions.4
House Majority PAC

45. On June 30, 2015, House Majority PAC accepted a $500,000
contribution from S. Donald Sussman of North Haven, ME, the Founder and
Chairman of Paloma Partners. House Majority PAC, FEC Form 3X, July 31 Mid-

Year Report, July 31, 2015, at 456, 

 

46. On September 3, 2015, House Majority PAC accepted a $500,000

contribution from S. Donald Sussman of North Haven, ME, the Founder and

 

3 As might be expected, the various interviewees for The New Soft Money described
different personal and office practices regarding conversations with donors,
interactions with super PACs and other outside spending groups. Also as might be
expected, the authors noted that their interviews ?reveal[ed] no direct evidence of
quid pro quo corruption.? Id. at 5.

4 Because the respondents differ in the timing, size, and structuring of
contributions, the selection criteria for these examples vary 

22

Chairman of Paloma Partners. House Majority PAC, FEC Form 3X, January 31
Year-End Report, Jan. 29, 2016, at 256, 

47. On December 28, 2015, House Majority PAC accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Fred Eychaner of Chicago, IL, the President of Newsweb

Corporation. Id. at 3551, 

 

48. On December 29, 2015, House Majority PAC accepted a $500,000
contribution from S. Donald Sussman of North Haven, ME, the Founder and

Chairman of Paloma Partners. Id. at 2680, 

 

49. On January 7, 2016, House Majority PAC accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from James Simons of New York, NY, the President of Euclidean
Capital. House Majority PAC, FEC Form 3X, February Report, Feb. 19,

2016, at 20, 

 

50. On February 18, 2016, House Majority PAC accepted a $500,000
contribution from Bernard Schwartz of New York, NY, the Chairman and CEO of
BLS Investments. House Majority PAC, FEC Form 3X, March Report, Mar.

18, 2016, at 34, 

 

Congressional Leadership Fund

51. On October 3, 2014, Congressional Leadership Fund accepted a
$5,000,000 contribution from Sheldon Adelson of Las Vegas, NV, the Chairman of
Las Vegas Sands. Congressional Leadership Fund, FEC Form 3X, Pre-General

Election Report, Oct. 23, 2014, at 6, 

 

52. On July 1, 2014, Congressional Leadership Fund accepted a $1,000,000

contribution from Chevron (Corporation), of Concord, CA. Congressional Leadership

23

Fund, FEC Form 3X, October 15 Quarterly Report, Oct. 15, 2014, at 6,
my? 1.usa.gov/29900QX.

53. On March 31, 2016, Congressional Leadership Fund accepted a
$1,000,000 contribution from Chevron (Corporation), of Concord, CA. Congressional
Leadership Fund, FEC Form 3X, April 15 Quarterly Report, Apr. 15, 2016, at 7,



 

Senate Majority PAC

 

54. On June 8, 2012, Senate Majority PAC (then known as Majority PAC)
accepted a $300,000 contribution from Vitreo-Retinal Consultants of the Palm

Beaches, of West Palm Beach, FL. Majority PAC, FEC Form 3X, July 15 Quarterly

 

Report, July 13, 2012, at 14, 

55. On October 16, 2012, Senate Majority PAC (then known as Majority
PAC) accepted a $300,000 contribution from Vitreo-Retinal Consultants of the Palm
Beaches, of West Palm Beach, FL. Majority PAC, FEC Form 3X, Pre-G'eneral

Election Report, Oct. 25, 2012, at 14, 

 

56. On August 28, 2015, Senate Majority PAC accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from George Marcus of Palo Alto, CA, the Chairman of Marcus 
Millichap Company. Senate Majority PAC, FEC Form 3X, January 31 Year-End
Report, Jan. 29, 2016, at 261, 

57. On December 28, 2015, Senate Majority PAC accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Fred Eychaner of Chicago, IL, the President of Newsweb

Corporation. Ibid.

24

Senate Leadership Fund

58. On April 30, 2015, Senate Leadership Fund accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Robert McNair of Houston, TX, the Chairman of Houston Texans.
Senate Leadership Fund, FEC Form 3X, July 31 Mid-Year Report, July 31, 20152015, Senate Leadership Fund accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Bernard Marcus of Atlanta, GA, the Chairman of the Marcus

Foundation. Id. at 8, 

 

60. On May 20, 2015, Senate Leadership Fund accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Paul Singer of New York, NY, the Founder and CEO of Elliott

Management Group. Id. at 10, http:/l 1.usa.gov/295Uqu.

 

61. On August 27, 2015, Senate Leadership Fund accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Warren Stephens of Little Rock, AR, the Chairman, President,
and CEO of Stephens Inc. Senate Leadership Fund, FEC Form 3X, January 31
Year-End Report, Dec. 31, 2015, at 9, 

62. On September 28, 2015, Senate Leadership Fund accepted a
$1,000,000 contribution from Chevron (Corporation), of ConcordOctober 9, 2015, Senate Leadership Fund accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Petrodome Energy, of Houston, TX. Id. at 12,



 

25

64. On December 8, 2015, Senate Leadership Fund accepted a $1,000,000
contribution from Access Industries, of New York, NY. Id. at 14,
http:/l 

American Alliance

65. On October 22, 2014, American Alliance accepted a $500,000
contribution from Sheldon Adelson of Las Vegas, NV, the Chairman of Las Vegas
Sands. American Alliance, FEC Form 3X, Post?General Election Report, Dec. 1,
2014, at 6, 

Bold Agenda PAC

66. On October 14, 2014, Bold Agenda PAC accepted a contribution of
$110,000 from Americans for Shared Prosperity.6 Bold Agenda PAC, FEC Form 3X,

Pre-General Election Report, Oct. 18, 2014, at 6, 

 

67. On October 15, 2014, Bold Agenda PAC accepted a contribution of
$145,000 from Americans for Shared Prosperity. Id.
68. On October 16, 2014, Bold Agenda PAC accepted a contribution of

$250,000 from John Jordan of Healdsburg, CA, the CEO of Jordan Winery. Bold

 

5 The FEC Form 3X lists the $500,000 contributor as ?Sheldon Adelstein.? Id. This
appears to be a scrivener?s error.

6 Americans for Shared Prosperity is a 501(c)(4) organization. Americans for Shared
Prosperity, Form .990, 2014, Foundation Ctr. (Jan. 21, 2016),
20150
7 990091111 Reportedly, Americans for Shared Prosperity is actually headed by
California Winery owner John Jordan. See Maggie Haberman, Outside GOP group
targets women, Politico (Sept. 23, 2014),

women-focused-ads-l11168.html.

 

 

 

26

Agenda PAC, FEC Form 3X, Post-General Election Report, Dec. 2, 2014, at 6,



 

Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc,

 

69. On February 22, 2016, Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc. accepted
a contribution of $200,000 from Robert Ziff of New York, NY, an investment banker
at Ziff Brothers Investments. Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc., FEC Form 3X,
March Report, March 8, 2016, at 6, 

70. On February 26, 2016, Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc. accepted
a contribution of $250,000 from LIUNA Building America of Washington, DC, itself
a super PAC C00568964May 17, 2016, Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc. accepted a
contribution of $200,000 from Sean Parker of Washington, DC, a self-employed
entrepreneur. Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc., FEC Form 3X, June 

Report, June 9, 2016, at 6, 

 



72. On April 16, 2015, accepted a contribution of $500,000 from
Paul Singer of New York, NY, the Founder and CEO of Elliott Management Group.
FEC Form 3X, July 31 Mid-Year Report, July 31, 2015, at. 6,



 

 

7 LIUNA Building America itself is primarily funded by contributions substantially
exceeding $5,000 per year from the Laborers' Political League Education Fund, of
Washington, DC and the Laborers? Political League Great Lakes Region, of Chicago,
IL. See FEC, LI UNA Building America, Receipts, (last
visited June 29, 2016).

27

73. On August 4, 2015, accepted a contribution of $850,000 from
Marlene Ricketts of Omaha, NE, a retiree. FEC Form 3X, January 31

Year-End Report, May 4, 2016, at 7, 

 

74. On December 11, 2015, accepted a contribution of $500,000
from Paul Singer of New York, NY, the Founder and CEO of Elliott Management
Group. Ibid.

75. On December 30, 2015, accepted a contribution of $500,000
from Kenneth Griffin of Chicago, IL, the Founder and CEO of Citadel, LLC. Id. at 6,



 

Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc.

 

76. On September 8, 2014, Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. accepted a
contribution of $2,500,000 from Robert Mercer of East Setauket, NY, the of
Renaissance Technologies. Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc., FEC Form 3X,
October 15 Quarterly Report, Oct. 15, 2014, at 19, 

77. On October 17, 2014, Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. accepted a
contribution of $3,000,000 from Charles G. Koch 1997 Trust, attributed to the
Chairman of the Board and CEO of Koch Industries, Inc., of Wichita, KS. Freedom
Partners Action Fund, Inc., FEC Form 3X, Post-General Election Report, Dec. 4,
2014, at 20, 

78. On May 13, 2016, Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. accepted a
contribution of $2,000,000 from Diane Hendricks of Afton, WI, the Chairperson of
Hendricks Holding Co., Inc. Freedom Partners Action Fund, FEC Form 3X, June

Report, June 20, 2016, at 7, 

 

28

79. On May 13, 2016, Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. accepted a
contribution of $2,000,000 from Mountaire Corporation of Little RockMay 24, 2016, Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. accepted a
contribution of $1,000,000 from Richard B. Gilliam of Keswick, VA, a manager at

Cumberland Development. Id. at 7, 

 

81. On May 24, 2016, Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. accepted a
contribution of $3,000,000 from Charles Koch of Wichita, KS, the Chairman of the

Board and CEO of Koch Industries, Inc. Id. at 8, 

 

New York Wins PAC

 

82. On January 29, 2016, New York Wins PAC accepted a contribution of
$500,000 from Robert Mercer of Setauket, NY, a ?nancial consultant at
Renaissance Technologies. New York Wins PAC, FEC Form 3X, April Quarterly
Report, Apr. 11, 2016, at 6, 

83. On May 13, 2016, New York Wins PAC accepted a contribution of
$500,000 from Paul Singer of New York, NY, the Founder and CEO of Elliott
Management Group. New York Wins PAC, FEC Form 3X, Pre-Primary Election

Report, June 16, 2016, at 6, 

 

 

8 The FEC Form 3X describes Mr. Gilliam as a ?manager? at Cumberland
Development. He is apparently the President, Chairman, and CEO. See Bloomberg,
Company Overview of Cumberland Resources Corporation, Executive Profile,
Richard Gilliam, http://bloombg/29ekde (last visited July 4, 2016).

 

29

VIOLATIONS

84. Under FECA and FEC regulations, no person may make contributions
to a political committee (other than a candidate or party committee), including a
committee that only makes so-called independent expenditures, exceeding $5,000
per calendar year. 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C); 11 C.F.R. 

85. Under FECA, no political committee may knowingly accept any
contribution in violation of the limits of 30116. 52 U.S.C. 30116(f). The
?knowingly? standard ??does not require knowledge that one is violating the law, but
merely requires an intent to act.?? FEC v. Malenick, 310 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237 n.9
(D.D.C. 2004) (quoting FEC v. John A. Dramesi for Congress Comm, 640 F. Supp.
985, 987 (D.N.J. 1986)), rev?d in other part on reconsideration, No. Civ. A. 02-1237,
2005 WL 588222 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2005)).

Count I

86. As set forth above, respondent House Majority PAC has violated 52
U.S.C. 30116(i) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially exceed the
$5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly disclosed these
excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52 U.S.C. 301666).



87. As set forth above, respondent Congressional Leadership Fund has
violated 52 U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially
exceed the $5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly
disclosed these excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52

U.S.C. 301666).

30

Count 

88. As set forth above, respondent Senate Majority PAC has violated 52
U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially exceed the
$5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly disclosed these
excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52 U.S.C. 30166(f).

Count IV

89. As set forth above, respondent Senate Leadership Fund has violated 52
U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially exceed the
$5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly disclosed these
excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52 U.S.C. 30166(f).

Count 

90. As set forth above, respondent American Alliance has violated 52
U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting a contribution that substantially exceeds the $5,000
limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly disclosed this excess
contribution, this Violation was ?knowing? under 52 U.S.C. 30166(f).

MEI

91. As set forth above, respondent Bold Agenda PAC has violated 52
U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially exceed the
$5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly disclosed these
excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52 U.S.C. 30166(f).

Count VII

92. As set forth above, respondent Defending Main Street SuperPAC Inc.

has violated 52 U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that

31

substantially exceed the $5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent
plainly disclosed these excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under
52 U.S.C. 30166(f).

Count 

93. As set forth above, respondent has violated 52 U.S.C.
30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially exceed the $5,000
limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly disclosed these excess
contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52 U.S.C. 30166(f).

Count IX

94. As set forth above, respondent Freedom Partners Action Fund, Inc. has
violated 52 U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially
exceed the $5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly
disclosed these excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52
U.S.C. 30166(f).

Count 

95. As set forth above, respondent New York Wins PAC has violated 52
U.S.C. 30116(f) by accepting multiple contributions that substantially exceed the
$5,000 limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C). As respondent plainly disclosed these
excess contributions, these violations were ?knowing? under 52 U.S.C. 30166(f).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

96. Based on the above-described acceptance of contributions that exceed
the limits set forth in 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C), the FEC should conduct an

immediate investigation under 52 U.S.C. 30109, should determine that

32

respondents have violated and, Without prospective relief, will continue to violate 52
U.S.C. 30116(f), and should seek declaratory and/or injunctive relief against

future acceptance of excessive contributions.

Respectfully submitted,


Counsel of record

Scott Greytak

John C. Bonifaz

Free Speech For People

1340 Centre St. #209

Newton, MA 02459

(617) 244-0234

rfeiQ@freespeechforpeople.org

Anne Weismann

Campaign for Accountability

1201 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036

(202) 780-57 50


1W- 

?adrence H. Tribe

Of Counsel
Hauser Hall 420
Harvard University*
Cambridge, MA 02138

(617) 495-1 6?7

f'f- 

Albert W. Alschuler
Of Counsel

220 Tuttle Road

Cumberland, ME 04021
(207) 829-3963

9 

u" .
Ambassador (ret.) Norman Elsen

33

Of Counsel
2022 Columbia Rd. NW, #214
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 462-2903

i" WM

Richard lSa?fnter
Of Counsel

Mondale Hall, Office 318
University of Minnesota Law School*
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
(612) 626-9707

Counsel for complainants

*University affiliation noted for identification purposes only.

Complaint to FEC on behalf of Representative Ted Lieu et al.

34