



“The dedication, the discipline, that I developed as a professional ballet dancer, apply here at the shipyard. It’s that same work ethic.”

**FREEDOM, SHAPED BY HELEN GAULT**

From professional ballet dancer to Apprentice at Newport News Shipbuilding.

[Read the story and watch a video](#)

**Who We Are**

**About HII**

Huntington Ingalls Industries is America's largest military shipbuilding company and a provider of manufacturing, engineering and management services to the nuclear energy, oil and gas markets. For more than a century, HII's Newport News and Ingalls shipbuilding divisions in Virginia and Mississippi have built more ships in more ship classes than any other U.S. naval shipbuilder. Headquartered in Newport News, Virginia, HII employs nearly 35,000 people operating both domestically and internationally.



[Download the video \(mp4\)](#)

**HII Facts at a Glance**

- Builder of the most complex ships in the world for more than 130 years at Newport News, and 78 years at Ingalls.
- Sole builder of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, the world's largest warships, and one of two builders constructing nuclear-powered submarines
- Exclusive provider of refueling services for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, at the forefront of new ship technologies, specialized manufacturing capabilities and nuclear facility management
- Largest industrial employer in Virginia and Mississippi, and an employer in Louisiana.
- Largest supplier of U.S. Navy surface combatants—has built more than 70 percent of Navy fleet of warships.
- Builder-of-record for 35 DDG 51 class Aegis guided missile destroyers.
- Builder of record for the LHA 6 class large-deck amphibious ships and prime builder of the Navy's newest fleet of the San Antonio (LPD 17) class amphibious assault ships.
- Provides a wide variety of products and services to the commercial energy industry and other government customers, including the Department of Energy
- Unrivalled experience in modular engineering and construction with innovative new solutions for upstream, midstream and downstream energy infrastructure.
- Employs approximately 5,000 engineers and designers.

**Who We Are**

[About Us](#)

[Company Values](#)

[Our Businesses](#)

[Senior Executive Team](#)

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[Our Name](#)

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**Huntington Ingalls Industries Facts**  
[Download and print](#)

**Ingalls Shipbuilding Facts**  
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**Newport News Shipbuilding Facts**  
[Download and print](#)

For more information, contact: Christie Miller  
757-375-9564  
Christie.Miller@hii-co.com

## Building a Giant: *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78)

- About 5,000 American shipbuilders are participating in the building of aircraft carrier *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78).
- At completion, *Ford* will weigh nearly 100,000 tons—as much as 400 Statues of Liberty.
- 200,000 gallons of Haze Gray paint cover CVN 78—enough to give the White House 350 coats of paint.
- *Ford* has been called a “floating city,” holding 4,660 personnel and 75 aircraft
- The carrier has a 5-acre flight deck
- *Ford* produces 400,000 gallons of fresh water per day
- The ship produces 15,000 meals a day
- *Ford* can reach speeds in excess of 30+ knots



## Powering the Future

CVN 78 is the first aircraft carrier to make a significant leap to electrical power, replacing many legacy steam-powered systems and preparing the ship for future technologies.

- The new electrical distribution system increases electrical capacity by 250 percent.
- An Electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), similar to the system that powers many of today's roller coasters, replaces steam catapults, enabling a smoother launch for the airwing of the future.
- Ten million feet of electrical cable is installed on *Ford*, enough cable to span the distance from Washington, DC to Albuquerque, NM.
- Four million feet of fiber optic cable is installed on *Ford*, the length of more than 7,200 Washington Monuments stacked on top of each other.




## Designed for Efficiency

---

CVN 78 is the most efficient aircraft carrier ever designed, reducing necessary maintenance by 30 percent.

- The ship's design enables the Navy to operate the ship with less manpower, saving the Navy more than \$4 billion over the ship's 50-year life.
- 9,900 tons of air conditioning reduces maintenance caused by humidity and reduces required manning in hot spaces.
- About 44,000 high-efficiency fluorescent T-8 light bulbs will be used, which produce more light and last nearly twice as long.



## Future Readiness

---

- CVN 78 is a flexible platform, ready to meet the operational needs of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- CVN 78 is capable of generating 25 percent more sorties (flight missions) per day than *Nimitz*-class carriers.
- CVN 78 is designed with flexible infrastructure to quickly adapt interior spaces for new missions.
- The island is smaller and farther aft than the *Nimitz*-class, increasing space for flight deck operations and aircraft maintenance.
- Software-controlled advanced arresting gear increases the ability to recover smaller aircraft with reduced wear.

# strengthening national defense

We work with Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding developing a network of advocates to support a strong U.S. Navy aircraft carrier program and dynamic defense industrial base.



OUR WORK

- ▶ Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base Coalition
- American Council on Education
- Archery Trade Association
- Business for Social Responsibility (BSR)
- Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
- Children's National Medical Center
- Degree Men
- Insurance Company
- Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance
- Mexico City
- Novartis
- Rocky Mountain Institute
- The Advisory Board Company
- The National Women's Law Center
- Thomas Jefferson Foundation
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- U.S. Army Reserve
- Weight Watchers

## Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base Coalition

For more than 70 years U.S. Navy aircraft carriers have been the backbone of United States presence throughout the world and have proven their critical importance time and again in combat, humanitarian relief and peacetime operations. It is essential that the United States maintain an 11 carrier fleet to ensure military readiness, protect our national security and enable the nation to respond in any region of the world that may require the projection of our military strength and national resolve.

Powell Tate works with Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding to illustrate for Congress, the media and the public the importance of the U.S. Navy's aircraft construction and maintenance program to national defense and to a strong defense industrial base.

On behalf of Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding, Powell Tate administers a coalition of more than 400 businesses from 43 states that provide parts and services for the construction and maintenance of aircraft carriers. Members of the coalition in their overlapping roles as constituents, local business owners and taxpayers help members of Congress and the media understand the impact of Congressional support for the carrier construction and maintenance program on local businesses, employees and communities.

Powell Tate also supports social media outreach and engagement that promotes the vital role of aircraft carriers and the unique engineering and design innovations of the U.S. Navy's newest class carrier, Gerald R. Ford.



Visit <http://www.acibc.org>



# PT insights

**FEB 24** To Start a Conversation with Congress, Bring The Issue To Their Doorstep

GREG MCCARTHY



Amphibious Warship Forum - Feb. 11, 2014

Capturing the attention of Members of Congress and Washington media is always difficult. Which is why on February 11, Powell Tale brought the importance of U.S. Navy amphibious warships directly to Congress and the media with a forum held in the Cannon Caucus Room of the U.S. House of Representatives.

The event highlighted the value of amphibious warships to national defense and the importance of funding for the continued construction of these ships. Representatives of the U.S. Marine Corps and Members of Congress spoke on the importance of a strong U.S. Navy amphibious warship construction program to national defense and the industrial base, while suppliers provided demonstrations and displays of the parts and products they manufacture for amphibious warships.

Amphibious warships are vital to the mission of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marines, making it possible for Sailors and Marines to respond swiftly in times of crisis, from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But continued reductions in the U.S. defense budget threaten manufacturers across the U.S. that provide parts and products for all types of military ships, vehicles and aircraft.

The forum, "Preserving the U.S. Navy's Most Capable Warship," also served as the inaugural event of the Amphibious Warship Industrial Base Coalition (AWIBC), a new grassroots supplier organization established and administered by Powell Tale on behalf of our client, Huntington Ingalls Industries, the U.S. Navy's premier shipbuilder.

More than 110 people were in attendance including the Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, several Members of Congress, Congressional staff, media and defense analysts. The event secured significant media coverage and achieved the client's goal of engaging Members of Congress and Congressional staff in a conversation about Congressional funding for the program.

View photos from the event here: <http://bit.ly/1dG1PFE>

View the video that Powell Tale compiled for the forum here: (Credit and thank you for video footage: Smithsonian Networks' Mighty Ships, Huntington Ingalls Industries and the United States Navy)



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| JUL   10 | JUN   10 | MAY   10 |
| APR   10 |          |          |






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# AIRCRAFT CARRIERS


★ ★ ★ BY THE NUMBERS ★ ★ ★



# 11

## TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

America's ability to project its power overseas, respond to threats and provide humanitarian relief around the globe is embodied by its fleet of 11 aircraft carriers. But only a portion of these ships are available to be stationed at strategic points across the world at any time.



# 4

Aircraft Carriers on station or at sea at any time

# 7

Aircraft Carriers in training, in maintenance, two available to surge immediately

# 70%

of the Earth's surface is covered by water.

# 80%

of the world's population lives near the ocean.

# 90%

of all international trade travels by sea





March 17, 2016

Dear Member of Congress:

"You could easily justify 14, 15 carriers if you just look at global demand," stated Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson last fall.

Military posturing by Russia, expansion of China in the Pacific, global terrorism, the resurgence of the Taliban, and threats to international shipping are just a few of the most recent examples of why America needs a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier Fleet to be where it matters, when it matters, with the power and capabilities that matter. The Aircraft Carrier Fleet is the cornerstone of both U.S. defense and diplomatic policy and allows for the free flow of international trade.

Companies across our nation supply the parts, steel, motors, wiring, and technology to help build and maintain aircraft carriers so the brave men and women who serve on them always have an unfair advantage against our adversaries.

Maintaining this advantage, it requires building the most advanced ships in the world and overhauling current ships in the fleet to keep them at the tip of the spear for 50 years. This year, the first ship in the new generation of aircraft carriers, *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78), is scheduled to go to sea. This event ushers in a new era of warships with the most advanced capabilities built to defeat the threats of today and for the next 50 years.

On behalf of the Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base Coalition and the workers employed in your district who help to build and maintain these great ships, we respectfully request you:

- Support the President's Fiscal Year 2017 budget request for \$1,292 million for the second ship of the *Gerald R. Ford*-class, *John F. Kennedy* (CVN 79), and \$1,371 million in Advance Procurement funding for the third ship in the class, *Enterprise* (CVN 80).
- Support the batch buy of materials for *Enterprise* (CVN 80) and CVN 81. Batch buying materials in 2017 could save taxpayers nearly \$400 - \$500 million over the course of construction. Support \$263 million in first year Advance Procurement funding for CVN 81 to ensure materials are purchased at the least expensive price possible.
- Request \$20 million additional Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding be added to *Enterprise's* (CVN 80) Total Ship Integration project to reduce future carrier acquisition cost through expanded Design for Affordability efforts.
- Support the President's Fiscal Year 2017 budget request for \$1,743 million for the mid-life modernization of USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) and \$249 million in Advance Procurement funding for the mid-life modernization of USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74), a process also known as refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH). Please also support providing the U.S. Navy authorization for the RCOH for each of the remaining ships of the *Nimitz*-class and authorization to enter into incrementally funded RCOH contracts for that work.
- Support the U.S. Navy in maintaining a fleet of at least eleven aircraft carriers. "We're an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier world. The demand signal is not likely to go down any time soon," declared Rear Adm. Thomas Moore, Program Executive Officer for Aircraft Carriers, on October 2012.

Thank you for your time and consideration, and please do not hesitate to contact us through the coalition at (202) 585-2149.

Sincerely,

Rick Giannini  
Chair, ACIBC  
President and CEO  
Milwaukee Valve Company

Darrell Grow  
Vice-Chair, ACIBC  
Chief Operating Officer  
Ammcon Corporation







To All Navy Leaguers:

Sign our "America's Strength" Letter to Congress

The Navy League is proud to announce the launch of a new, intensive, two-year campaign - "America's Strength: Investing in the Navy-Marine Corps Team."

On Thursday, March 26, we're delivering an open letter to Congress asking for increased funding for the Navy-Marine Corps team. Sign your name to show you support the sea services: <http://www.americas-strength.com/>. We also encourage you to share this request with family, friends, shipmates and colleagues who support a strong U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team. A PDF copy of the letter can be found [here](#).

The Navy League's "America's Strength" advertising and grassroots campaign will raise awareness of the strain on the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team and the potentially disastrous consequences for national defense, business and commerce, and on our nation's ability to provide aid to victims of natural disasters, if current budgetary trends continue.

The Navy League's "America's Strength" campaign is supported by a broad and diverse coalition of individuals and organizations who share the belief that a strong U.S. Navy is vital to the nation's defense, economy and to America's leadership in the world. We are hosting a major press conference on March 26 in Washington, D.C., to announce the campaign.

The campaign will include think tank reports, advertisements, op-eds, letters to the editor and grassroots engagement with Congress. At the Navy League convention in Tampa, we will run a workshop on the campaign and present your council with a media kit, best practices and other materials for effectively running this campaign at the council level.

You will find more information on the campaign website.



## America's Strength

The United States Department of the Navy is underfunded and overextended, placing our national defense, our Sailors and Marines, and the stability of the global economy at risk. Congress must provide a significant investment in the Department of the

[AMERICAS-STRENGTH.COM](http://AMERICAS-STRENGTH.COM)



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THE OFFICIAL CREDIT UNION SERVING NAVY LEAGUE MEMBERS

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# INVESTING IN THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM







The Navy League's America's Strength campaign is a comprehensive and integrated two-year advertising, media and grassroots campaign.

### Goals:

- Raise awareness of the vital importance of the Navy-Marine Corps team to the nation's defense, economy and leadership in the world
- Illustrate how the underfunding and overextension of our naval forces are placing our national defense and global economic stability at risk
- Support congressional allies in efforts to provide the full funding the Department of the Navy needs for ships and aircraft, personnel, maintenance, training and operations
- Increase the appropriation in Fiscal Year 2017 by Congress for the Department of the Navy



# The Navy-Marine Corps Team Needs Help

Since 2001, the size of the Navy and Marine Corps has steadily been reduced, while their missions and operations have increased. In the past 18 months, Sailors and Marines have been called upon to:

- Protect container ships from harassment and seizure by Iranian naval forces
- Conduct around the clock combat operations against ISIL in Syria and Iraq
- Face down Russian aggression in the Black Sea; and
- Deliver disaster relief to victims of the earthquake in Nepal.

**The combination of increased daily operations and responding to crisis after crisis, along with delayed maintenance and failure to modernize equipment from a lack of funding, is crippling the Navy and Marine Corps.**





# Demand for the Navy-Marine Corps Team Support is Exceeding Supply

## Strain on Navy Resources Will Cause Mideast Carrier Gap



The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and the guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG) 60 sail in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations supporting Operation Inherent Resolve. (U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Anna Van Nuys)

Jun 09, 2015 | by Dianna Cahn

NORFOLK -- A year after Navy aircraft carriers launched an ongoing U.S. air assault against Islamic State fighters in Iraq and Syria, the Navy plans to pull its carrier presence from the Middle East this fall for as long as two months.

That gap -- between when the current carrier leaves the Arabian Gulf and its replacement arrives -- is part of the Navy's effort to regroup after years of what officials say was an unsustainable pace of operations that has worn down resources.



# This is the Navy League's Mission



"GIVE HEARTY SUPPORT TO THE  
POLICIES WHICH THE NAVY LEAGUE  
IS FOUNDED TO FURTHER"

— PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT



We do this through a variety of education programs that remind our fellow citizens that the United States is a maritime nation whose national economic and security interests are inextricably tied to the freedom of the seas.





# Comprehensive Campaign

- Supplier/Grassroots
- Congressional Engagement
- Think-Tank/Policy
- Expert Support
- Advocacy
- Advertising
- Integrated
- Each element coordinated
- Increase reach
- Force multipliers



# Media

**NavyTimes**  
A GANNETT COMPANY

## Top Naval pilots, congressmen rally to protect aviation budget

By James K. Sanborn, Staff writer 3:23 p.m. EDT June 5, 2015



(Photo: MC3 Karl Anderson/Navy)

f 2    t 19    in 4    1    e

The Marine Corps' top aviator took to Capitol Hill plea to protect funding he called critical to the service's ability to maintain and modernize its tax aircraft fleet, which is still reeling from the effects massive 2013 budget cuts.

Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, the deputy commandant for Marine aviation, said scant budgets, delayed depot maintenance and the looming possibility of another round of across-the-board spending cuts known as sequestration make it difficult to man, maintain and deploy aircraft in anticipation of global crises.

The service is now 19 percent below its minimum acceptable number of operational aircraft.

"We will go when the balloon goes up, it is just making it harder and harder every day," Davis said.

**Daily Press**

SERVING THE VIRGINIA PENINSULA SINCE 1858

## Coalition Warns of 'Death Spiral' for Strained U.S. Fleet



By Hugh Lessig  
The Daily Press  
November 13, 2014

In a blunt letter to Congress, nearly 100 retired Navy and Marine Corps leaders on Wednesday warned of dire consequences to the U.S. fleet unless Congress pumps



# Advertising



**GOOD NEWS FOR  
SOMALI PIRATES:  
OUR NAVY IS  
STRETCHED  
TOO THIN.**

America asks its Navy to respond to a growing number of crises around the world. Yet, we've been underfunding our fleet for years.

Not only has it shrunk by 30 ships, it's falling behind on new technology and weapons systems. With 80% of the world's trade conducted by sea, including 60% of America's imports and exports, we can't afford a weakened U.S. Navy. Tell Congress you support increasing funding now. Waiting only makes us that much more vulnerable.

DON'T LET THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM BE CUT SHORT.



**AS THE CHINESE AND  
RUSSIAN NAVIES GROW,  
CAN WE AFFORD TO  
LET OURS SHRINK?**

Being a superpower isn't just about national pride. Our security depends on a strong and modern U.S. Navy.

But after 13 years of war and a decade of insufficient funding for the growing number of mission requiring sea and aircraft-based power, our Navy needs new ships and significant maintenance. The plans are in place, but the funding isn't. Tell Congress we can't wait any longer for a next-generation Navy.

DON'T LET THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM BE CUT SHORT.



**WHEN THE NEXT  
VICTIMS CALL FOR  
HELP, WOULD YOU  
MIND IF WE PUT  
THEM ON HOLD?**

Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.  
The earthquake and tsunami in Japan...

When allies are hit hard by natural disasters, our Navy's speed and flexibility save lives and strengthen ties. Yet despite all we ask this vital force to do, we have been underfunding it for years. Our fleet needs more ships, better weaponry and next generation technology. Tell Congress you support more funding now. It really is a life-or-death emergency.

DON'T LET THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM BE CUT SHORT.





## Partnering with Others

Critical to the success of the campaign will be engaging influential voices to tell the story of the U.S. Navy's vital importance.



# How You Can Be Involved

- Write an op-ed or letter to the editor
- Write, call, or brief your Member of Congress
- Place a customized ad in your regional paper
- Brief a community organization
- Lead a tour of a local industry facility
- Talk to EVERYONE about this!!



# Support Has Started Already



“A Lack of Vision May Cost Us Dearly....”

-Sheila McNeill



# The Downey Patriot

“Current Funding Levels do not meet the Navy’s Needs”

-Gail Williams



Arrive ready to learn. Graduate ready to lead.

For more information, visit [www.ccsa.edu](http://www.ccsa.edu) or call 912-279-5701



## How We Will Support You

- Promotion of the local council
- HQ will help write any speeches, op-eds, or letters to the editor
- Full support for industry tours
- HQ will pay for council advertisements in local media
- Council thanked with Navy Leaguer articles and eligibility for Council Awards





INVESTING IN THE NAVY-  
MARINE CORPS TEAM

# Questions?





## AMERICA'S STRENGTH CAMPAIGN: NAVY-MARINE CORPS AVIATION FORUM

The [Navy League of the United States](#) invites you to attend a congressional forum that will examine the value and importance of U.S. Navy-Marine Corps aviation to the nation and the strain caused by sustained deployments, delayed maintenance and uncertainty in funding.

### WHEN:

Wednesday, June 3, 2015 ([add to your calendar](#))

8:30 – 11:00 a.m.

- 8:30 a.m. – Complimentary Continental Breakfast & Displays
- 9:30 a.m. – Speaker Program

### WHERE:

Cannon Caucus Room ([map](#))

Cannon House of Representatives Office Building  
New Jersey and Independence Avenues, SE  
Washington, D.C.

### CONFIRMED SPEAKERS:

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Hudson’s Center for American Seapower aims to promote public dialogue on ebbing U.S. maritime power where today there is no such dialogue. The Center will offer intellectual arguments and detailed policy recommendations for a robust U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and a more effective U.S. Coast Guard as well as shipbuilding industrial base. The U.S. is by geography, commerce, security, and tradition a maritime nation. But Americans have become accustomed to the benefits of dominant seapower and are at risk of forgetting the national security consequences that accompany America’s continued decline in seapower.

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- Develop alternate maritime strategies.

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PANEL DISCUSSION

**At What Risk? The Causes and Impact of the Aircraft Carrier Gap in the Persian Gulf**

The U.S. Navy **announced** that it will be unable to maintain an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf. This fall due to increased demand, a strain on sailors and ships, and a decreased budget.

**This aircraft carrier gap is both a symbol and a symptom of deeper problems with the U.S. Navy.**

Please join us for a discussion of the causes and implications of this decision.

**PANEL**

**VADM Peter Daly, USN (Ret.)**  
Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Naval Institute

**ADM Mark Fitzgerald, USN (Ret.)**  
Former commander of  
U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa

**Dr. Robert Farley**  
Patterson School of Diplomacy  
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# PT insights

## JUL 21 3 Tips for Amplifying an Industry Issue

GREG MCCARTHY

This year the U.S. Navy announced that it soon would be unable to maintain an aircraft carrier presence in the increasingly volatile Persian Gulf due to increased demand, a strain on sailors and ships and a decreased budget. To bring this critical national security gap to the forefront of the conversation about overall defense strategy, Powell Tate's defense team and the America's Strength Campaign hosted a panel discussion for a packed room of representatives from the media, military, defense industry, think tanks, and congressional staff.



Bryan McGrath of the Hudson Institute and founding managing director of The Ferrybridge Group moderated the dynamic conversation between three panelists: Retired Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, former commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa; Retired Vice Admiral Peter Daly, CEO of the U.S. Naval Institute; and Dr. Robert Farley, Professor at the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.

Three key strategies contributed to the success of this panel discussion, and can be used to amplify issues across all industries and subject areas:

1. **Enlist subject matter experts with varying perspectives.** Each panelist came to the conversation from a well-informed yet different personal experience, which ensured that blanket statements were challenged and the issue was explored in depth.
2. **Make the subject accessible to the media, and in turn, a national audience.** The complexities of defense spending and the appropriations process, combined with the intricacies of aircraft carrier shipbuilding and maintenance, can be hard to digest. Through the use of personal stories and strong anecdotal evidence, the experts were able to make a complicated situation approachable. Panelists stayed in the room after the discussion ended as well to give the media one-on-one access for additional context.
3. **Continue the conversation beyond the event.** Live updates on Twitter ensured that members of the media and defense industry who were unable to attend the event received key takeaways in real time.

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## Retired admiral calls for US to beef up Navy

By Wyatt Olson

Stars and Stripes

Published: July 28, 2015



To meet global security demands, the U.S. Navy likely needs 325-350 ships, or 50-75 more than current levels, said the former head of U.S. Pacific Command.

"As our Navy gets a little bit smaller, we're facing increasing challenges for funding to get a smaller number of ships to a larger number of ports to demonstrate our readiness and partnership and our presence to all those countries in the Indo-Pacific region," retired Adm. Timothy J. Keating told reporters Tuesday during a conference call sponsored by the Navy League's America's Strength campaign and facilitated by Powell Tate, a public relations agency assisting in the campaign.

The Navy has 273 deployable battle force ships, according to its website.

Keating headed PACOM from 2007-09 and is now on the board of advisers for defense contractor Camber Corporation.

Keating and Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst with American Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, made the case that underfunding and overextending the Navy will have a direct impact on U.S. consumers, aside from national and international security.

The Navy is the de facto high-seas police force protecting vast shipments of food, clothing and electronics equipment made overseas and delivered by container ship to the U.S.

"If there isn't a cop there on the street to patrol the beat, then people start to get into trouble," Eaglen said. "It's no different on the high sea; the Navy and Marines and Coast Guard being there to help



Adm. Timothy J. Keating speaks to flight and maintenance crew members at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii in 2007 when he was commander of U.S. Pacific Command. To meet global security demands, the U.S. Navy likely needs 325-350 more ships, or 50-75 more than current levels, said Keating, who is now retired and serves on the board of advisers for defense contractor Camber Corporation.

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#### Admiral: Navy must adapt in order to retain sailors

Recruiting and retaining top talent in today's multifaceted Navy, especially in an increasingly competitive labor market, has been a challenge for its top brass and led to new "talent management initiatives" rolled out recently by Navy Secretary Ray Mabus.



#### Navy admiral urges joint Southeast Asia patrols of South China Sea

The commander of the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet called on Southeast Asian nations to form a combined maritime force to patrol areas of the South China Sea where territorial tensions flare with China.





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## Retired Admirals: Carrier Force Demand Exceeds Supply

By RICHARD R. BURGESS, Managing Editor

WASHINGTON — The Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers (CVNs) is in constant demand and faces increasing challenges in having the "bench strength to meet the requirements of combatant commanders," experts said during a July 7 forum.

"Carrier demand has exceeded supply for many years," said retired VADM Peter Daly, chief executive officer of the U.S. Naval Institute, speaking to an audience at a Washington seminar sponsored by the Navy League's America's Strength campaign and moderated by Bryan McGrath of the Hudson Institute. Also speaking were retired ADM Mark Fitzgerald, and Dr. Robert Farley of the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.

The Navy, obligated by law to field a force of 11 CVNs, is authorized by Congress to operate only 10 carriers until the next CVN, *Gerald Ford*, is commissioned in 2016.

Daly noted that the Navy has been run hard for the last 15 years and with the budget constraints of recent years has reduced its ability to surge carrier strike groups from five deployed and two in 30-day surge readiness to about half of that capability.

"Post 9/11, the Navy entered a semi-permanent [period of] surge," he said. "This was consumption. Now we need to recapitalize. The Navy has to reconstitute in stride."

Daly warned that with constrained resources "we've gotten to the point where we have to run the race a little differently" and that there is a "realization that we've got to step down enough for maintenance and modernization."



He defended the cost of a forward-deployed naval force, noting that it needs to be compared to the cost of a land-based footprint.

Fitzgerald, former commander, Naval Forces Europe/Africa, pointed out some advantages of deployed carrier strike groups.

"The first thing an aircraft carrier does is bring power for the president to control a crisis," Fitzgerald said.

"Two, it allows you to operate without caveat," he said, pointing out that the only airpower that struck at the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria for the first 54 days of Operation Inherent Resolve was carrier-based, free from the need for foreign basing permission.

"Third, an aircraft carrier brings with it a lot more than a ship with jets," he said, noting the command and control, electronic warfare, self-defense and strike capabilities of the carrier strike group. "It gives you a lot of options in the way that you can operate much more effectively than you can in single ships or smaller ships. Fourth, it provides persistence."



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Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis operates in the Pacific Ocean during an exercise with other naval vessels operating in the U.S. 7th Fleet area, Feb. 12, 2009. (DoD/Released)

## Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict

*Seth Cropsey, Bryan McGrath, & Timothy A. Walton*

*Sharpening the Spear* addresses the question of whether it is worthwhile to continue to build large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVN), given their considerable cost and mounting Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threats to sea-based operations. The report concludes that the emerging threat environment increases the need for aircraft carriers, and that none of the alternatives to the CVN offer an equal or better capability and capacity across the range of military options from peacetime presence through major



power war.

The following report surveys the history of the carrier and its embarked air wing, a history marked by wide swings in public and defense elite opinions as to the utility of the carrier. The authors note the consistency of the criticisms against the carrier over time, and the operational imperatives that consistently overcame them. The study continues with a discussion of the role of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the Joint Force, which evaluates how CSGs support U.S. strategy and how they might be employed in key scenarios. The section concludes with a detailed effects chain analysis designed to examine the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the CSG.

These vulnerabilities track closely with many of the criticisms levied against the CVN, and serve as the basis for a series of recommendations on how to improve the CSG as a system to mitigate the mounting risks while ensuring CSG support for future warfighting needs. The study concludes with an analysis of some of the alternatives to the CVN and an assessment of the number of carriers necessary to support national strategy.

The report's authors are available for media interviews. To arrange an interview, please contact [Carolyn Stewart](#).

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**Seth Cropsey**

*Director, Center for  
American Seapower*



**Bryan McGrath**

*Deputy Director, Center for  
American Seapower*

**Timothy A. Walton**

A large aircraft carrier is shown from a high-angle perspective, moving through the ocean. The ship's deck is visible, with several crew members and a white F-35 fighter jet on the flight deck. The ship's superstructure, including radar masts and antennas, is prominent on the left side. The sky is clear and blue, and the water is a deep blue with some white wake from the ship.

Hudson Institute

# Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict

*Seth Cropsey, Bryan G. McGrath, and  
Timothy A. Walton*

*October 2015  
Policy Study*

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# I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Furthermore, we would like to thank Mr. Bryan Clark, Dr. Frank Hoffman, and Dr. Jerry Hendrix for their careful review of this work.

Lastly, we would like to thank Kathleen A. Brown and the staff of the Hudson Institute for their assiduous editing and production of this report.

The views of this report are the authors' alone, along with any potential errors.

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## II. PREFACE

This study grew out of a January 2015 debate on the future of the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Sponsored by the Naval Academy Museum, two debaters took to the stage for ninety minutes before an audience of several hundred curious onlookers gathered at the U.S. Naval Academy's stately Mahan Hall, where they debated the topic and took questions from the audience.<sup>1</sup>

This unique forum raised interesting arguments on both sides of the issue, and there was a good deal of post-event consensus that the debate represented a healthy public airing of important positions worthy of deeper consideration. This study is an attempt at that deeper consideration.

In the pages that follow, this study addresses the question of whether it is worthwhile to continue to build large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVN), given their considerable cost and mounting Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threats to sea-based operations. Our conclusion is that the emerging threat environment actually increases the need for aircraft carriers, and that none of the alternatives to the CVN offer an equal or better capability and capacity across the range of military options from peacetime presence through major power war.

We arrive at these conclusions first, by surveying the history of the carrier and its embarked air wing, a history marked by wide swings in public and defense elite opinions as to

the utility of the carrier. We note the consistency of the criticisms against the carrier over time, and the operational imperatives that consistently overcame them. Next, we move to a discussion of the role of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the Joint Force, which evaluates how CSGs support U.S. strategy and assesses how CSGs might be employed in key scenarios. To close this section, we perform a detailed effects chain analysis designed to examine the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the CSG.

These vulnerabilities track closely with many of the criticisms levied against the CVN, and serve as the basis for a series of recommendations on how to improve the CSG as a system to mitigate the mounting risks while ensuring CSG support for future warfighting needs.

The study concludes with an analysis of some of the alternatives to the CVN and an assessment of the number of carriers necessary to support national strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> Study co-author Bryan McGrath took the pro-carrier position, and Dr. Jerry Hendrix of the Center for a New American Security argued against. The report's cover image of an artist's concept of CVN 78 is drawn from the U.S. Navy (050708-D-8455H-001).

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## III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Key Study Conclusions

This study advances three key conclusions:

- The Joint Force requires sea-based air power to conduct strike, air warfare, and surveillance. Sea-based air power provides classic naval functions (sea control and power projection) and serves as a key enabler of other Joint Force components necessary for victory in high-end conflict. This demand is growing.
- The Carrier Strike Group (CSG), with the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at its core, remains the most effective and efficient means of providing these capabilities across the range of military options.
- In order to provide these required capabilities, the Navy must pursue a series of conceptual, capability, and capacity improvements to the CVN, the Carrier Air Wing (CVW), and the CSG.

### BACKGROUND

The nation continues to require the power and flexibility of highly mobile, sea-based air power. Sea-based air power, provided by the large-deck aircraft carrier, plays a crucial role in establishing superiority over portions of the ocean in order to use that control to execute other operational tasks, or to deny the use of that sea-space to an adversary. The carrier provides critical strike, air warfare, and surveillance capabilities that other elements of

the Joint Force would face difficulty providing—especially against a peer or near-peer threat.

The encompassing CSG combat system of mutually supporting carriers, aircraft, surface combatants, submarines, and logistics ships contributes a unique combination of organic mobility, endurance, and versatility to a Combatant Commander and the nation. Modern threats are evolving that jeopardize

the effectiveness of this combat system in the most demanding wartime scenarios, which in turn impacts the effectiveness of the Joint Force. This report details how the Navy and the nation can respond to those threats.

The CSG plays a key role in providing presence, deterrence, and warfighting capabilities where the nation's interests lie. Since the 1930s, the CSG has been an effective mechanism for both power projection and sea control, and the CSG has participated in nearly all types of naval operations. Recently, the CSG's power, flexibility, and utility have been on display in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. This report concludes that the current demand will increase as Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threats and sea control threats increase. However, serious concerns regarding the wisdom of procuring additional large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have been raised. Many of these concerns mirror similar concerns raised immediately after World War II, before the Vietnam War, and in the 1970s. In general these concerns center on the ship's cost and operational vulnerability.

Even though all of the components of the Joint Force face increased risk in the evolving threat environment, the aircraft carrier is

examined especially closely, due largely to its cost and doubts about its effectiveness in high-end conflict. At an acquisition cost of approximately \$12.9 billion, including its design cost, USS *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78), the first ship of its class, will cost nearly 18% more in constant year dollars than the cost of the final *Nimitz* Class ship, the USS *George H.W. Bush* (CVN 77).<sup>2</sup> However, this unit cost does not capture the capability improvements and significant cost saving aspects of its design. Due to reduced operations, maintenance and personnel costs, the *Ford* Class's total lifecycle cost is projected to be \$4 billion less than the *Nimitz* Class per ship. Despite that economic value, the initial acquisition cost leads some to question the ship's return on investment. Such criticism overlooks questionable executive decisions made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense that influenced costs and performance. In particular in 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Navy to incorporate all envisioned technologies and ship feature enhancements originally planned for integration over three ships into a single ship (CVN 78), which inserted considerable cost and schedule risk to the program in its infancy.<sup>3</sup> Although the subsequent *John F. Kennedy* (CVN 79) is

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<sup>2</sup> "Aircraft Carrier Construction: *John F Kennedy* (CVN 79)," Report to Congress, Department of Defense, March 2013, 17.

<sup>3</sup> A thorough summary of CVN 78 Class cost issues, including authoritative criticisms and Navy and shipbuilder responses thereto, is available in the Congressional Research Service Report RS20643 of 12 June 2015 "Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress" by Ronald O'Rourke.



expected to cost less than \$11.5 billion in constant year dollars, iteratively reducing cost through effective program management must continue to be a priority for the Navy.<sup>4</sup>

Second, critics of the CVN point to the opportunity cost of spending so much money on a single ship, claiming that there are not only more efficient and economical methods of spending that money, but that doing so would be operationally effective across the entire fleet architecture. Although improving the performance of other elements of the Joint Force should be vigorously pursued, this analysis suggests existing and future requirements will demand a significant capacity of survivable naval aviation, and large-deck aircraft carriers provide the most efficient means of supplying it. As the capability of non-carrier components of the Joint Force changes and as threats evolve, periodic examination of the role and number of carriers in U.S. fleet design should take place. Existing analysis suggests an enduring requirement for carrier-provided aviation.

Finally, there are those who believe that the very cost of the CVN (and the number of sailors required to operate it and its air wing) will create in the minds of senior decision-makers the likelihood that such an investment of dollars and people is simply too valuable to

risk in combat.<sup>5</sup> Although the loss of a CVN would be a significant blow to the United States in conflict, war against a peer or near-peer threat like China would likely involve the loss of numerous units and thousands of military personnel. Throughout history, the United States has employed military force despite significant risks and military losses to achieve its national interests. Given its significant military history over the past few decades, using capital intensive assets in missions both large and small, there is little reason to think that future decision-makers will become more risk averse.

Independent of cost considerations, concerns regarding the operational vulnerability of the carrier are mounting. As adversaries continue to advance the capability to target and attack the aircraft carrier and other surface forces at greater ranges, the current historically modest range of the carrier's striking force places it well-within the effective range of these modern A2/AD weapons and sensors. If then, the carrier is out-ranged by adversary systems, the risks of employing its air wing may outweigh the benefits conferred by its capabilities, and the wisdom of continuing to acquire them may be dubious.

The CSG faces major constraints and vulnerabilities that reduce its campaign utility

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<sup>4</sup> "Aircraft Carrier Construction: *John F Kennedy* (CVN 79)," Report to Congress, Department of Defense, March 2013, 17.

<sup>5</sup> Jerry Hendrix. "The U.S. Navy Needs to Radically Reassess How It Projects Power," *National Review*, April 23, 2015.

to the Joint Force in high-threat scenarios. Although this analysis identifies a number of carrier weaknesses and vulnerabilities, many of these same weaknesses and vulnerabilities apply to other elements of the Joint Force—especially land-based systems. Nonetheless, assessment of current and projected scenarios portend a growing demand for the sea-based aviation that carriers provide.

In order to ensure the Joint Force is prepared to deter and defeat aggression, major changes to the CSG are needed. The Navy must develop new concepts and capabilities for the employment of CSGs in a systemic manner, and this study makes recommendations as to how to improve the elements of that system to face current and future challenges.<sup>6</sup>

## EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

The Navy needs to examine new operational concepts for the employment of the carrier as part of a system. New operational concepts will allow the Navy and Joint Force to more effectively use existing systems and to develop new capabilities to meet emerging threats.

- **Power Pulse:** The Navy should adopt new operational concepts for CSGs that

seek to pulse combat power, instead of providing steady-state support.

- **Integrated Multi-CSG Operations:** The Navy should develop doctrine, and exercise as possible, the capability to conduct fully integrated multiple carrier CSG operations that maximize the full potential of carrier airpower, rather than conducting single or aggregated CSG operations.
- **Renew CSG Emphasis on Sea Control:** Although not an operational concept, the Navy should critically examine the burgeoning future requirements for sea control and adequately adjust its programmatic portfolio to meet those threats.
- **Develop Single Naval Battle:** Consistent with the aims of Single Naval Battle, Navy/Marine Corps integration to achieve operational objectives should improve, especially the employment of Marine Corps aviation and amphibious forces to address sea control requirements.
- **Distributed Basing Dynamics:** The Navy, along with the other services, should develop the capability to operate from fixed and mobile advanced and intermediate staging bases.

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<sup>6</sup> Some of these efforts must be to restore proficiencies in capabilities and concepts that have atrophied since the end of the Cold War, while other efforts must be to develop new capabilities and concepts necessary to counter new threats.

- **Air Force-Navy Theater Strike:** The Air Force and the Navy should continue to develop concepts and capabilities for using complementary capabilities (such as pairing Air Force bombers with Navy carrier fighter wings) to conduct integrated operations, including strike, against mature A2/AD threats.

## CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENTS

To fully address emerging gaps in high-end conflict, the development of new concepts must be complemented by the development of new capabilities. These capabilities can be categorized as improvements to the carrier itself, carrier air wing, other ships in a CSG, and carrier infrastructure and supplies.

- **The Aircraft Carrier:** As technology (such as friendly and enemy weapons and aircraft platform design changes), concepts, and requirements change, the role of carriers and the appropriate design should be periodically examined. In the near term, the ability of CSGs to operate with extensive Emissions Controls (EMCON) should improve. Additionally, improvements to the carrier's passive and active systems and measures that frustrate detection and provide protection should continue, these include decoys, jammers, the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) program, and potentially lasers and high-powered microwaves.

Lastly, improving the recoverability (operating in a degraded condition) of a carrier in spite of damage to its flight decks or damage associated with electronic warfare should improve.

- **Carrier Air Wing:** The Navy should address the existing and projected capability gaps in the carrier air wing. In general, this requires the Navy to increase air wing striking range, develop sea control aircraft, and develop new weapons. Lastly, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress should critically evaluate the naval aviation portfolio, including potential portfolio trades between land-based, permissive environment aircraft and sea-based, contested environment aircraft.
- **Other Ships in the CSG:** Significant weaknesses in the combat and logistical capability of cruisers, destroyers, and the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) should be addressed. The organic ISR ability of surface combatants should improve. Additionally, the Navy should rapidly develop, test, and deploy a Vertical Launch System (VLS) reload capability. The current CLF is too small and vulnerable for contested operations in the vast Pacific. The Navy needs additional, more resilient, and potentially differently designed CLF and supporting logistics ships and infrastructure.

- **Industrial Infrastructure and Suppliers:**

The Navy should carefully examine the industrial base involved in the construction of carriers, their accompanying ships, and aircraft. Moreover, the Navy should improve efforts to protect key component fabrication and shipyard centers during heightened states of tension or conflict.

In summary, this analysis validates the ongoing Joint Force requirement for naval aviation provided by aircraft carriers, and concludes that the large-deck, nuclear powered carrier is the most combat effective and cost-efficient means of providing it.

Implementing the aforementioned recommendations will be necessary to improve the combat potential of CSGs and the entire Joint Force in view of mounting threats designed to undercut the effectiveness of the CSG. Some of these changes will be disruptive to existing plans, programs, and paradigms; however, the alternative is a rapidly weakening force that incurs greater operational risk not only for itself but also for other components of the Joint Force. Only by altering course can the Navy ensure that the CSG's contribution to the Joint Force remains relevant to the nation's needs and future warfighting requirements.




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This Thursday: @HudsonInstitute's Carrier Report by @sethcropsey @ConsWahoo @timothyawalton [bit.ly/1FSmvzd](https://bit.ly/1FSmvzd)

“The emerging threat environment actually increases the need for aircraft carriers. . . . None of the alternatives to the CVN offer an equal or better capability and capacity across the range of military options from peacetime presence through major war power.”

—“Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict,” Hudson Institute



7



2



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Congress and building schools for babies. People building stands to defend their beloved parasite.  
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**Key Points**

- The perceived value of the large-deck carrier has significantly fluctuated throughout its history.
- The perceived value of the large-deck carrier is currently largely declining in light of A2/AD threats and cost considerations.
- New concepts and capabilities could "bend the curve" upward against A2/AD threats.

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7



3



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👤 TimothyAWalton and Hudson Institute





# AIRCRAFT CARRIERS



Image: AFP



Last week the Hudson Institute released its study, "[Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict](#)." The report concluded that: "For all its cost and vulnerabilities, the aircraft carrier and its strike group are the best option for the threats facing the U.S."

[Click here](#) to watch the Hudson Institute's presentation of the report, and [read the Navy Times coverage](#) for more information on the unique capabilities of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.

*us navy, aircraft carriers, Platforms Matter, Presence Matters, aircraft, hudson Institute, Nations Strength, Freedoms Force*

POSTED ON OCTOBER 12, 2015 - 8:58AM

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## DEATH SPIRAL:

### The Dangers of Not Funding the U.S. Navy Ship and Submarine Building and Maintenance Programs

**WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21**

8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

*Breakfast will be served*

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# DEATH SPIRAL: The Dangers of Not Funding the U.S. Navy Ship and Submarine Building and Maintenance Programs

America's Strength – Please join us for a forum examining the dangerous situation the United States is facing by a submarine and shipbuilding program that is underfunded and overextended. Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA-04) House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee...

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**Bryan McGrath** @ConsWahoo · Nov 3



Make sure you Tweet tomorrow's SASC hearing on Roles and Missions. I make the Seapower argument.

**U.S. Navy** @USNavy

LIVE 2P ET. HASC hearing on "Aircraft Carrier – Presence & Surge Limitations. Expanding Power Projection Options" - [1.usa.gov/1H2JCY0](https://1.usa.gov/1H2JCY0)





## Revisiting the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

**Date:** Thursday, November 5, 2015.

**Time:** 09:30 AM

**Location:** Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building



## Disability Access

Individuals who plan on attending this hearing and require an auxiliary aid or service should contact the Committee at 202-224-3871 at least 3 business days in advance to make arrangements.

## Agenda

To receive testimony on revisiting the roles and missions of the armed forces.

## Witnesses



**WeberShandwickDEF** @WSGlobalDef · Nov 4

Congress considers the carrier 'gap' at hearing [bit.ly/1GLIskY](https://bit.ly/1GLIskY) via [@defense\\_news](#) [@CavasShips](#)





**WeberShandwickDEF** @WSGlobalDef · Nov 4

#USNavy: 1/2 carrier fleet in maintenance, 1/2 strained to meet demands [bit.ly/1QcaUxq](https://bit.ly/1QcaUxq) @USNINews @maeday22



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**America's Strength** @USNavyStrength · Nov 6

America's great aircraft carrier crisis: lots of demand, not enough ships  
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Experts alarmed at 'strains' on

@aircraftcarrier fleet [bit.ly/1kkWyyR](https://bit.ly/1kkWyyR) via  
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## Deploying Beyond Their Means: The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps at a Tipping Point

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Registration for this event is now closed. If you are interested in attending, please contact Stella Gardner at [sgardner@americas-strength.com](mailto:sgardner@americas-strength.com).

Please join us for the release of a new study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and Navy League America's Strength campaign.

The report examines the dangerous and unsustainable levels of stress on the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team due to a fundamental mismatch between the demands placed on them and the size of the force.

Please contact Stella Gardner at [sgardner@americas-strength.com](mailto:sgardner@americas-strength.com) with questions.

### CONFIRMED SPEAKERS:

**Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA-04)**

*Chair, House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee*

**Representative Joe Courtney (D-CT-02)**

*Ranking member of Seapower & Projection Subcommittee and co-chair of the Congressional Shipbuilding Caucus*

**Representative Derek Kilmer (D-WA-06)**

*Member of the House Appropriations Committee*

**Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris, USN (Ret.)**

*Former Vice Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

**Commander Bryan Clark, USN (Ret.)**

*Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA)*





CSBA

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# DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS

## AMERICA'S NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AT A TIPPING POINT

BRYAN CLARK  
JESSE SLOMAN

## INTRODUCTION: NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE

Today the Navy and Marine Corps are facing a fundamental choice: maintain current levels of forward presence and risk breaking the force or reduce presence and restore readiness through adequate training, maintenance, and time at home. This choice is driven by the supply of ready naval forces being too small to meet the demand from Combatant Commanders, as adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense. To close the gap, the Department of Defense (DoD) will need to grow the fleet and force, base more ships overseas, or pay to maintain a higher operating tempo.

Global navies are a common attribute of nations with economic and security interests in multiple regions outside their own. The Spanish, Dutch, and British empires all included fleets able to protect their shipping lanes; transport troops to far flung colonies and holdings; and threaten the territories and commerce of their enemies. The United States followed suit as it became a global economic and military power during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, starting with its Navy's first deployment against Barbary pirates in 1802 and continuing through the voyage of President Theodore Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet" in 1907.

A global fleet, however, did not necessarily mean global *presence*. Through the 19<sup>th</sup> century the U.S. Navy episodically deployed overseas in response to threats or to send a message to its friends and enemies. Because of its economic interests, the United States stationed ships, Sailors, and Marines in a small number of important overseas ports, such as the South China and Yangtze River patrols in Asia. Generally, these forward forces consisted of small ships with capabilities suited to peacetime maritime security and diplomatic missions. The bulk of the Navy, and all its capital ships, remained based in the United States and only deployed when needed.<sup>1</sup> Samuel Huntington characterized this era as the "Continental Era" of U.S. national power.<sup>2</sup>

Near the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this homeland-focused posture began to evolve as the United States consolidated control over the territory between its coasts and navalists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated for a much more proactive posture overseas. This marked the beginning of the American "Oceanic Era" in Huntington's framework.<sup>3</sup> More frequent overseas deployments and the complete transition to coal-powered ships led the Navy during this era to develop a series of overseas facilities where its ships could resupply and refuel. Deployments, however, were still episodic (except in wartime) and forces based overseas remained tailored to peacetime operations.<sup>4</sup>

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1 Peter M. Swartz, *Sea Changes: Transforming US Navy Deployment Strategy, 1775–2002* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, July 31, 2002).

2 Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," *USNI Proceedings*, May 1954.

3 This evolution is described in much more detail in Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Work, *A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007).

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 44–58.



The expeditionary nature of U.S. overseas deployments changed permanently with World War II. During the war U.S. naval forces deployed worldwide to carry troops and supplies to every theater, protect Allied sea lanes, and eventually deny the use of the seas to Axis powers, particularly Japan. To sustain the effort, the Navy established a network of overseas bases, repair facilities, and refueling stations as well as processes for maintaining deployed forces overseas.

After four years of continuous overseas presence during the war, American leaders planned for some U.S. naval forces to remain deployed as a crisis response force for ground troops and civilians supporting reconstruction in Asia and Europe. These ships, Sailors, and Marines also helped restore the ability of America's allies and former enemies to protect their seaborne commerce and coastlines. At the time, the Navy's intent was not necessarily to maintain a global overseas presence.

## Fleet size and continuous naval presence

Even as the United States brought most of its forces home and turned to domestic concerns, the Soviet Union emerged as a global geopolitical foe and, later, an existential threat. Deterring Soviet aggression against American allies added a new rationale for the United States to continuously maintain ground, air, and naval forces around the world. The Navy's part of this effort was demonstrating it could sustain the flow of reinforcements to Europe during a conflict with the Soviet Union and punish Soviet aggression with strikes launched from aircraft carriers in the Northern Atlantic, Eastern Mediterranean, and Western Pacific. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) James D. Watkins eventually codified this approach publically in his 1986 maritime strategy.<sup>5</sup>

This approach to deterrence created the need for three "hubs" of naval presence in the Mediterranean, Eastern Atlantic, and Western Pacific. Each hub was centered on a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) consisting of an aircraft carrier (CV) and its cruiser and destroyer escorts and an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consisting of three to four amphibious ships and associated landing craft. U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) joined CVBGs starting in the early 1980s to protect CVs from the growing number of quiet Soviet submarines carrying anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), such as the *Oscar*-class guided missile submarine (SSGN) and *Akula*-class SSNs.

In 1981, the incoming President and Secretary of the Navy proposed the nation pursue a 600-ship fleet. This overall fleet size reflected, in part, the political objective of showing American strength to the Soviet Union, but it also reflected the fleet size needed to sustain three hubs of continuous overseas presence.<sup>6</sup> The 600-ship requirement marked the first time fleet size requirements were derived in large part from plans for the continuous deployment of naval forces. Previous fleet size requirements were based on factors such as the number of ships maintained by potential enemies, treaty limitations, budgets, or the number of support vessels or escorts needed for each capital ship.

The explicit intent to maintain deployed presence also highlighted the value of forward-based forces. Although forces based in the Continental United States (CONUS) and those homeported overseas conduct maintenance and training between deployments, forward forces have shorter transit times and can maintain a higher operational tempo. This enables a forward-based ship to maintain the same level of operational presence as two or more CONUS-based ships.


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5 James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *USNI Proceedings*, January 1982, pp. 2–16.

6 Rudy Abramson, "Reagan Renews Vow for 600-Ship Navy: 'Way to Prevent War Is to Be Prepared for It,' He Tells Academy Class," *Los Angeles Times*, May 23, 1985.

The United States took advantage of forward-basing during the Cold War and U.S. naval forces were eventually homeported in Japan, the Philippines, Bahrain, Spain, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom, Iceland, and Norway, among other countries. While forward basing had been a feature of the U.S. Navy since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a significant difference in the Cold War was that front-line capital ships and aircraft were stationed overseas rather than remaining safely ensconced in CONUS. There were both strategic and operational advantages to this. Strategically, basing warfighting forces forward reduced American response time, showing the Soviets that aggression may be promptly defeated or that punishment would be swift. Further, forward-based forces helped demonstrate American resolve to allies and partners concerned by the oceans separating them from the United States. Operationally, forward-based forces provide more forward presence, or enable the same presence to be maintained by a smaller overall fleet.

FIGURE 1: COLD WAR (CIRCA 1980) U.S. OVERSEAS NAVAL BASES<sup>7</sup>



At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the U.S. Navy could have returned to its pre-war models and deployed episodically while maintaining most of the fleet at home. Instead, it sustained continuous overseas naval presence into the 1990s and beyond. Initially this posture reflected the need for stability in the face of the Soviet Union's uneven and sometimes chaotic dissolution over several years. But the United States maintained continuous overseas naval presence even after this process completed and NATO began to expand into former Warsaw Pact nations through the 1990s. Forward naval presence had gone from being an element of a specific national strategy in World War II and the Cold War to being a fundamental avenue through which the United States exerted its power.

Maritime strategies in the 1990s codified this approach, as the 1986 strategy had done for the competition with the Soviets. In "From the Sea" and "Forward... From the Sea" the Department of the Navy described strategic concepts for using forward naval forces to respond to crises, deter

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<sup>7</sup> Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200–2000* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 98–101.

aggression, and maintain freedom of the seas against an undefined set of potential state and non-state adversaries.<sup>8</sup>

These concepts emphasized characteristics of naval forces that make them well suited to address a less structured security environment in which multiple smaller-scale actors could impact U.S. interests, as opposed to the large monolithic threat posed by the Soviet Union. For example, naval forces can operate forward for extended periods without having to secure diplomatic clearances, install expensive fixed infrastructure, or generate a potentially disruptive “footprint” on foreign soil. Further, their mobility enables them to shift from one theater to another and rapidly aggregate or disaggregate depending on the location, size, and type of operation intended.

The use of forward deployed naval forces to not only address threats, but also advance U.S. interests, was emphasized in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* in 2007. CS21, as the strategy was abbreviated, asserted “The ability to sustain operations in international waters far from our shores constitutes a distinct advantage for the United States—a Western Hemisphere nation separated from many of its strategic interests by vast oceans.”<sup>9</sup> Further, the strategy tied naval presence to protection of the global economic system, given the preponderance of U.S. military power at the time and America’s central role in global financial and commercial markets.

The newest maritime strategy, *Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, continues to highlight forward presence as a central part of the naval value proposition.<sup>10</sup> Like previous strategies and strategic concepts, it argues that forward naval forces enable deterrence, rapid crisis response, partner training, and maritime security. Notably, the new strategy names specific competitors such as China, Russia, and Iran as reasons for maintaining forward presence in relevant regions around the world-- the first time since the Cold War a naval strategy explicitly identified the need to deter and, if necessary, defeat specific potential adversaries.

The evolution of naval strategy and concepts from advocating a regional fleet to a global navy to a globally present navy reflected the expanding influence and reach of the United States. However, the fleet’s size did not necessarily follow suit. The Navy reached a post-World War II peak in size during the 1980s, when the first maritime strategy to tie presence to ship count was promulgated. As will be highlighted in the next section, the fleet has been shrinking ever since—despite the fact every subsequent strategy document continued to assert the value and need for forward presence.

## TODAY’S READINESS CHALLENGE

The Navy’s battle force is currently composed of about 272 ships. However, only a portion of the fleet is available for operational use at any given time. Vessels adhere to a cycle that rotates them and their crews through maintenance, training, and deployment periods. Historically, the Navy has planned for its ships to execute cycles consisting of a single 6 to 7 month deployment in a 24 to 32 month period.<sup>11</sup>

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8 Sean O’Keefe, Frank Kelso, and Carl Mundy, *From the Sea* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 1992), available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/fromsea/fromsea.txt>; and John Dalton, Jeremy Boorda, and Carl Mundy, *Forward... From the Sea* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 1994), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/navy/b014.pdf>.

9 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), p. 21.

10 Joseph Dunford, Jonathan Greenert, and Paul Zunkunft, *Forward, Engaged Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 2015), p. 9.

11 *Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence with a Smaller Fleet* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, March 2015), p. 9.

The Navy and Marine Corps deploy in response to requests from regional Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) that are approved by the Secretary of Defense as part of the Global Force Management process. There is a natural tension between COCOMs, who want to maximize the number of naval assets they have to employ, and naval force planners, who must balance the requests of all the COCOMs with the need to give crews and ships time to carry out maintenance, upgrade systems, and conduct training.

The last two decades have been busy ones for the Navy. Between 1998 and 2014, the number of ships deployed overseas remained roughly constant at 100. The fleet, however, shrank by about 20 percent. As a result, each ship is working harder to maintain the same level of presence. For example, the share of underway ships that were deployed rather than training near their home ports rose from 62 percent in 1998 to a high of 86 percent in 2009 before declining to approximately 74 percent in 2015, as shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2: NAVY SHIPS DEPLOYED AND UNDERWAY 1998–2014<sup>12</sup>




Figure 2 also shows that the percentage of time each ship spent at sea went up over the last decade, since the size of the fleet went down and the number of ships underway rose or stayed the same. For example, operating tempo (OPTEMPO), a measurement of the time a ship spends at sea, increased by eight percent throughout the fleet between 2001 and 2009 and grew by 18 percent for surface combatants.<sup>13</sup>

Excessive OPTEMPO affects naval readiness in a number of ways, but most significantly by reducing the time available for maintenance. And when critical tasks are deferred long enough, the consequences can be severe. In 2011 and 2012, the flagship of Expeditionary Strike Group 8,

12 Data from CSBA analysis and from Danil Whiteneck, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Schwartz, *The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 2010).

13 Rear Admiral Joseph F. Campbell, "Readiness and Sustainment of the Navy's Surface Fleet," Hearing before the of the House Armed Services Committee, Readiness Subcommittee, March 25, 2009.



the USS *Essex*, had to severely curtail its role in one major Pacific exercise and cancel its participation in another due to mechanical problems caused by skipping maintenance to satisfy operational requirements.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, after being ordered to respond to the 2010 Haitian earthquake just one month following a seven-month deployment, the amphibious landing ship USS *Bataan* suffered a double failure of its evaporators and was forced to delay rescue operations in order to take on 40,000 gallons of water from a nearby supply ship.<sup>15</sup>

The extended OPTEMPO of the last few years—combined with interrupted work at Navy shipyards caused by sequestration resulting from the Budget Control Act (BCA)—has resulted in a backlog of deferred maintenance for the nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) fleet. The backlog culminated in late 2015 with a Persian Gulf “carrier gap” between the departure of the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* and the arrival of the USS *Harry S Truman*. A second carrier gap will occur in the Pacific in 2016 and gaps will reoccur intermittently in both theaters until 2021, when the USS *Gerald R. Ford* becomes operationally available.<sup>16</sup> The experience of the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* illustrates how delaying repairs can play havoc with future requirements planning: two back-to-back deployments in 2012 and 2013 took so large a toll on the vessel’s material condition that its subsequent maintenance period lasted 23 months—a full 65 percent longer than was originally planned for.<sup>17</sup>

The “heel-to-toe” deployment schedule necessary to service today’s high presence levels has also exacerbated the impact of the BCA budget caps on surge capacity. Normally, the Navy and Marine Corps can surge three carrier strike groups (CSGs) and three amphibious ready groups (ARGs) forward within 60 days in the event of crisis. This is possible because groups that recently returned from deployment are maintained ready for several months through continued operations and training, and groups preparing for deployment are ready several weeks before they depart. With the above maintenance problems and less readiness funding, groups largely shutdown when they return from deployment and groups preparing to deploy are ready just in time to leave. As a result, the Navy and Marine Corps are now only able to surge one CSG and one ARG.<sup>18</sup>

**The impacts of a high OPTEMPO have been felt just as severely by crews.** As deployments get longer, Sailors have seen their time at home shortened. Between 2012 and 2014, the USS *John C. Stennis* was deployed for 15 of 24 months. One Sailor remarked that “we have missed two Thanksgivings, Christmases, New Year’s and many other holidays. ...After the past two years, I have realized that I am not cut out for this work.”<sup>19</sup>

A 2014 survey of over 5,000 Sailors by Navy officers Guy Snodgrass and Ben Kohlman found that 49.8 percent of enlisted personnel and 65.5 percent of officers thought the current OPTEMPO

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14 Matthew M. Burke, “USS *Essex* unable to fulfill mission for 2nd time in seven months,” *Stars and Stripes*, February 1, 2012.

15 Bill Cook, “Unrep ships critical platforms for Haitian relief,” *Sealift*, March 2010; and “USS *Bataan* (LHD 5) Cruise Book: 2009 Deployment,” available at <http://www.navysite.de/cruisebooks/lhd5-09/index.html>.

16 Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Half the Carrier Fleet Tied Up In Maintenance, Other 5 Strained To Meet Demands,” *USNI News*, November 4, 2015, available at <http://news.usni.org/2015/11/04/navy-half-the-carrier-fleet-tied-up-in-maintenance-other-5-strained-to-meet-demands>.

17 Ryan T. Tewell, “Assessing the U.S. Aircraft Carrier Gap in the Gulf,” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, October 5, 2015, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-the-u.s.-aircraft-carrier-gap-in-the-gulf>.


18 Megan Eckstein, “CNO Greenert: Navy Could Fix Readiness Shortfall by 2020 if Sequestration is Avoided,” *USNI News*, March 10, 2015, available at <http://news.usni.org/2015/03/10/cno-greenert-navy-could-fix-readiness-shortfall-by-2020-if-sequestration-is-avoided>; Jonathan W. Greenert, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense on FY 2016 Department of the Navy Posture, March 4, 2015.

19 Sam Fellman, “8-Month Deployments Become the ‘New Norm,’” *Navy Times*, December 2, 2013.

was too high.<sup>20</sup> This can hinder the Navy's efforts to retain talented people who may have employment options outside military service; Navy analysis estimates that longer and more frequent deployments can negatively impact reenlistment rates by between 1.3 and 1.9 percent.<sup>21</sup> The Navy also determined that Sailors have a strong preference for more predictable deployment cycles and Navy leaders have repeatedly cited the extension of deployments mid-cruise as adversely impacting morale and retention.<sup>22</sup>

To address these challenges, the Navy is implementing a new readiness cycle called the Optimized-Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP) for CVNs, guided missile destroyers (DDGs), and guided missile cruisers (CGs)<sup>23</sup>. Figure 3 depicts the new O-FRP cycle and, for comparison, the cycle that will continue to be used by amphibious ships.

FIGURE 3: O-FRP AND AMPHIBIOUS SHIP READINESS CYCLES



20 "2014 Survey Report," *2014 Navy Retention Study*, September 1, 2014, p. 23, available at <http://www.dodretention.org/>.

21 *Preserving the Navy's Forward Presence with a Smaller Fleet*, p. 11.

22 David Larter, "CNO Warns Budget Cuts Will Hurt Morale, Readiness," *Navy Times*, January 28, 2015.

23 The previous FRP cycle included a single 7-month deployment in a 32-month cycle.

The goal of O-FRP is to bring predictability to the readiness cycle and limit deployments to a maximum period of eight months. In addition, O-FRP seeks to align the deployment cycles of carriers and the large surface combatants that make up their battle groups so that the combined carrier battle group (CVG) can form for training earlier in the pre-deployment work-up period. A key component of O-FRP is a 15-month sustainment period following a deployment. During sustainment, ships, aircraft, and their crews are intended to maintain their combat certifications and remain ready to deploy as part of a possible surge force.<sup>24</sup>

Initially the O-FRP is only being applied to carriers and large surface combatants. Amphibious ships, small surface combatants such as Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and submarines have different readiness cycles. The Navy intends to expand the O-FRP model to amphibious ships in the next several years, but other classes of ships and Marines will prepare for, conduct, and recover from deployment on different schedules.

## THE LOOMING PRESENCE CRISIS

The central force structure challenge facing the Navy and Marine Corps today is that demand for naval forces exceeds the supply they can sustainably deliver. Both services have been maintaining a higher level of presence than they typically plan for by extending deployments, deploying more than once per readiness cycle, and basing more ships overseas. The impacts of this approach are degraded material condition and reduced morale and, counterintuitively, reduced presence or gaps when ships and crews are unable to deploy on time.

The O-FRP, when implemented, will better enable some naval forces to complete training and maintenance between deployments. However, it will also reduce the presence they can deliver overseas because it shifts from today's eight-month (or more) deployment in a 32-month cycle for carriers and surface combatants to a single eight-month deployment in a 36-month cycle. This means each ship goes from spending about 25 percent of its time deployed to about 22 percent of its time deployed. Sustaining today's presence as O-FRP is implemented, and potentially expanded to amphibious ships, will require that ships deploy for longer than eight months or deploy a second time during their 15-month sustainment period. This would begin to put the fleet back into the situation it faces today.

### A shrinking fleet

Another factor reducing the supply of deployable forces is the shrinking fleet. As shown in Figure 2, the Navy's battle force (ships able to conduct or directly support combat operations) drew down from 333 ships in 1998 to 271 ships in 2015. This resulted from a combination of construction rates that fell by about half in the early 2000s and a high rate of retirements to reduce costs for manning and modernizing older frigates and CGs. The fleet is anticipated to grow slowly over the next several years as retirements taper off and increased construction starting in the late 2000s begins to deliver hulls to the fleet.

It is unlikely, however, that the Navy will be able to significantly grow the fleet. Its current shipbuilding plan requires \$5 to \$7 billion more per year than the historical average over the last 30 years. The Navy may be compelled to revise this plan to meet fiscal constraints. Over the next three decades, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculated that the Navy's FY2016 shipbuilding plan will require over \$552 billion (in constant 2015 dollars) worth of ship

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
24 Megan Eckstein, "Admirals: Fleet Readiness Plan Could Leave Carrier Gaps, Overwhelm Shipyards," *USNI News*, September 9, 2016, available at <http://news.usni.org/2015/09/09/admirals-fleet-readiness-plan-could-leave-carrier-gaps-overwhelm-shipyards>; and Bill Gortney, "Predictability and Adaptability: West 2014," Power Point Presentation, United States Fleet Forces, February 12, 2014, available at <http://www.afcea.org/events/west/14/documents/WEST2014PresentationFinalGortney.pdf>.

purchases. If the plan is executed as written, the average cost of new-ship construction will be approximately \$18.4 billion per year. The plan would be 32 percent more expensive than the Navy's historical average annual shipbuilding budgets.<sup>25</sup>

In order to assess the Navy's capacity to sustain forward presence under different levels of shipbuilding funding, this study examines the Navy's FY2016 \$18.4 billion shipbuilding plan and three alternative plans averaging \$13 billion, \$11.5 billion, and \$10 billion per year. Under the current shipbuilding plan, the Navy expects the battle fleet to reach a high of 321 ships in 2028 before declining to 305 ships by 2045. All three of the alternative plans would result in a fleet of fewer than 300 ships. Notably, none of the shipbuilding plans (including the Navy's own plan) would enable the Navy to sustain the global presence it maintains today.

Figure 4 illustrates the cost of the Navy's proposed plan compared to the alternative plans and Table 1 describes the battle force inventory associated with each plan.

FIGURE 4: NAVY AND ALTERNATIVE SHIPBUILDING PLANS



<sup>25</sup> *An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, October 2015), p. 3.



TABLE 1: BATTLE FORCE INVENTORY ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SHIPBUILDING PLAN

	Current Plan			\$13 Billion Alternative			\$11.5 Billion Alternative			\$10 Billion Alternative		
	2020	2030	2040	2020	2030	2040	2020	2030	2040	2020	2030	2040
<b>Carriers</b>	11	11	10	11	11	10	11	11	10	11	11	9
<b>Large Surface Combatants</b>	95	95	85	95	85	59	95	82	56	95	80	50
<b>Attack Submarines</b>	51	42	47	51	37	33	51	35	31	51	32	28
<b>Amphibious Ships</b>	33	36	33	33	36	31	33	36	28	33	33	24
<b>Small Surface Combatants</b>	33	52	56	33	27	28	33	25	23	32	23	20
<b>Total Battle Force</b>	304	312	302	304	274	224	304	267	210	303	257	191

### The impact of forward basing

Figure 2 shows the Navy grew the number and percentage of ships based overseas in the Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDFN) to increase forward presence. Today FDFN ships, aircraft, Sailors, and Marines provide about one quarter of overseas naval presence and the Navy plans to expand its FDFN contingent to a third of forward presence in 2024.<sup>26</sup> In the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility (AOR), much of Seventh Fleet's requirements are met by forces homeported or operating in Japan, Guam, and Singapore. Sixth Fleet, supporting U.S. European Command, includes four FDFN DDGs based in Rota, Spain.<sup>27</sup> And in U.S. Central Command, 10 Patrol Coastal (PC) and four Mine Countermeasures (MCM) ships are homeported in Bahrain.<sup>28</sup>

Forward-based forces are able to provide more presence than those based in CONUS for several reasons:

- They either do not have to transit to and from their operating areas or have a much shorter transit time than their CONUS-based counterparts.
- They do not undergo deep maintenance periods such as overhauls. When an overhaul is due, the ship or aircraft is swapped out with a new platform. The crew generally swaps out as well and remains forward with the new ship.
- They do not conduct extensive retraining between operational periods. Because they operate so often, forward based ship and aircraft crews are often able to maintain a higher level of proficiency than their CONUS-based counterparts.

As a result of these factors, FDFN forces execute a different rotational readiness cycle than CONUS-based forces. The FDFN cycle is depicted in Figure 5. While FDFN forces are often described as being fully deployed (i.e., each unit provides a "1.0" presence), they are only operationally available about two-thirds of the time. This is much more than CONUS-based forces, but not the same as having a fully operational unit available for tasking all the time. The calculations in this report will assume a FDFN ship is "present" only 67 percent of the time, to ensure these forces can conduct the maintenance and training needed between operational periods.

<sup>26</sup> *Preserving the Navy's Forward Presence With a Smaller Fleet*, p. 19.

<sup>27</sup> Megan Eckstein, "Navy Creates New Ballistic Missile and Air Defense Task Force for Europe," *USNI News*, July 27, 2015, available at <http://news.usni.org/2015/07/27/navy-creates-new-ballistic-missile-defense-air-defense-task-force-for-europe>.

<sup>28</sup> Of note, PCs are not counted as part of the Navy battle force. See "Document: Mabus Notification to Congress on New Navy 'Battle Force' Tally," *USNI News*, March 11, 2014, available at <http://news.usni.org/2014/03/11/document-mabus-notification-congress-new-navy-battle-force-tally>.

## ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA)

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA's analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation.

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## Deploying Beyond Their Means: America's Navy and Marine Corps at a Tipping Point Media Coverage Report

- [Report: Strain on sailors, fleet reaches tipping point](#), *Navy Times*, November 18, 2015
- [Bryan Clark: Navy's 'shrink or swim' dilemma](#), *Federal News Radio*, November 19, 2015
- [More Ships Can't Save Overworked Navy; Basing Ships Abroad Can: CSBA](#), *Breaking Defense*, November 18, 2015
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# THE NAVY LEAGUER

## Fly-In Brings NL Concerns to Congress

By PETER ATKINSON  
Deputy Editor, Seapower magazine

WASHINGTON — Navy Leaguers from around the country “flew in” to Capitol Hill Dec. 3 for a series of meetings and briefings with members of Congress from their respective regions to stress the need for their support of the U.S. sea services.

The broad-based presentations focused on the sea services’ role as the first line of defense for the nation; Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and maritime trade priorities; the Navy League’s America’s Strength Campaign to ensure sea service funding needs are met; and budgetary concerns. Specific points included support for a 308-ship Navy, a fleet of no less than 38 amphibious ships and a Marine Corps end-strength of at least 184,000 troops, full funding for Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutter procurement and a new polar icebreaker, enforcing Cargo Preference and the Jones Act as well as increasing the Maritime Security Program, and ending sequestration and re-establishing budget process order.

Split into more than two-dozen teams, 76 Navy League representatives fanned out among the legislative office buildings to make 217 presentations to senators, representatives or their staffs during the Anchors Aweigh Fly-In. Despite several mid-morning interruptions as House members were called to chambers for votes involving the “Advancing Care for Exceptional Kids Act of 2015” and “North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2015,” members of Congress were welcoming and receptive to the presentations.

“You get a mixed audience because one we spoke to was a former Marine [U.S. Rep Todd Young, R-Ind.] and is all onboard with everything,” said Tom Baker with the Great Lakes-Wisconsin/Illinois Fly-In team. “And then some of the other ones, which is really why we’re here, freely admitted that they weren’t familiar with this or they weren’t familiar with that.”

“They were also very interested in local stuff, Sea Cadets, programs for young people back in their districts,” added National Director Bobby Ferguson, who was on the



Photo Courtesy of Harry Boyd

U.S. Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio (left), receives a briefing by Liberty Region Navy League members Daisy Gallagher and Harry Boyd at her office on Capitol Hill during the Navy League Fly-In on Dec. 3.

team with Baker. “STEM [science, technology, engineering and math], that rings a bell with them, as it does with everyone.” In addition to their meeting with Young, Baker and Ferguson’s team was scheduled to meet with members and staff from the offices of Rep. Sean Duffy, R-Wis.; Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis.; Gwen Moore, D-Wis.; and Rep. Darin LaHood, R-Ill., son of former Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood.

The lingering threat of sequestration, the disruptions posed by continuing resolutions and related budgetary issues struck a particular chord during the presentations.

“I visited [members from] both parties, and they were all in agreement that whatever good intentions were there for sequestration, the outcomes have not been positive, especially when you look at long-term cost growth in programs,” said retired Navy RADM Thomas A. Cropper, a Navy League national director from the Pacific Central Region who also is president of the California State University Maritime Academy.

*Continued on page 3*

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# President's Message

Dear Navy Leaguers,

We in this country have been given a great gift, at great cost, handed down to us from the men and women who have made personal sacrifices by wearing the cloth of our nation. As a member of this organization, I know that you are as thankful for their sacrifices as I am.

December has been anything but quiet. We successfully refinanced our headquarters building at 2300 Wilson Boulevard in Arlington, Va., on Dec. 1. The refinancing allowed us to re-organize, and simplify our debt. The new loan replaces a 5.5 percent first mortgage and an 8.5 percent second mortgage with a consolidated single mortgage at 4.9 percent. I'm also pleased to report that the building is 100 percent occupied, further providing for financial stability. Over the next 10 years we will see more than \$22 million in net profit from the building.

On Dec. 4-5, we held the Winter Board of Directors meeting at the Conference Center at the Maritime Institute in Linthicum, Md. The balanced operating budget was approved for 2016, the first balanced budget this millennium, as was a new membership category — a \$25 e-membership, and a new membership dues structure that will be implemented in early 2016. Our second Anchors Aweigh Fly-In saw 75 Navy Leaguers briefing 213 congressional offices preceded the two-day meeting, and you can read more about how Navy Leaguers stormed Capitol Hill in this issue of the "Navy Leaguer."

A great deal was accomplished at this board meeting to set a solid course for the organization for 2016 and beyond. Your National Vice Presidents also were able to get a great deal done in their various committee meetings, including Communications, Legislative Affairs, Information Technology, Merchant Marine Affairs, Membership and Marketing, Foundation, Development, Investment, Naval Sea Cadet Corps Board and Foundation, Interna-

tional, and Budget and Finance.

As we bring 2015 to a close, I am looking forward in the New Year to provide new opportunities for new beginnings. We've all been working hard to provide for a more solid Navy League — and to making our future even more secure. With the 2015 building and budget plans accomplished, we are taking necessary steps to bring about a solution for the Online Community (OLC), Membership and Finance processes to be more automated and timely. After more than a year of difficulties and setbacks with our software system, we will be implementing new systems and processes to provide more capability to our staff and our members.

Both staff and the Charleston Council have been busy making preparations for the June 2016 National Convention in Charleston, S.C. I know you'll want to begin making your own plans to join us to enjoy their southern hospitality. And while you're at it, mark your calendars to join us at these future convention sites: Milwaukee, Wis., in 2017 and Portland, Ore., in 2018.

Due to ever-increasing cuts in the defense budget, our armed forces are being continually underfunded and overextended. As a result, our sea services leaders are being made to make difficult decisions on meeting demands on our resources. In a new report commissioned by the Navy League's America's Strength campaign, Bryan Clark and Jesse Sloman of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments say the Navy and Marine Corps are approaching a point at which the fleet cannot meet the demand for forces and may have to reduce presence abroad, leaving interests and allies vulnerable.

The report, "Deploying Beyond Their Means: America's Navy and Marine Corps at a Tipping Point," was released during a press conference on Capitol Hill Nov. 18 to wide media attention. This report, <http://navyleague.org/americas-strength/> is yet another important tool for Navy



Leaguers to use in the field when educating local leaders and lawmakers on the potential crisis this nation faces if we continue on this current funding path. At the press conference, Rep. Joe Courtney, D-Conn., noted how important the America's Strength campaign has been in keeping the issue of underfunding and overextension in front of members of Congress and credited the Navy League's campaign for having an impact on getting critical legislation passed.

America's Strength has been gaining momentum around the Washington, D.C., beltway, but we, at the grassroots level must take the campaign's message to the rest of America. Each and every Navy Leaguer is a constituent, and when bringing your message to your lawmakers, you are being heard. In fact, Navy Leaguers sending messages to our Congress makes a huge difference, as you are the VOTERS. We owe that to the members of our military and their families.

My best wishes to you all for a joyous holiday season, and a happy, healthy and prosperous New Year.

All the Best,

Skip Witunski  
National President





# The Downey Patriot

## Letter to the Editor: Navy, Marines at a tipping point

Staff Report November 18, 2015

Dear Editor:

The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team is in trouble.

After years of being overworked and underfunded, our U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team is threatened with worn out warships and crewmembers needed to man them.

A new study from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) finds that strain on ships and Sailors is reaching a tipping point, as they are continuously called upon to respond to crisis, rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific, and counter the increasing threat of Islamic State militants.

But a broken Navy is a problem for more than just our national defense.

If the U.S. Navy is unable to protect global commerce, it could have a significant impact on the cost and availability of consumer goods from retailers ranging from Amazon to Wal-Mart, and all companies that rely on international maritime shipping to get products into the hands of consumers.

We are asking too much of our ships, Sailors and Marines, and are not providing enough support.

A larger and fully sustained fleet is needed to:

- Protect sea-lanes for the free flow of commerce that is vital for the global economy;
- Keep our enemies and adversaries in check;

- Support our diplomatic efforts around the globe and;
- Delivery of medical supplies, food and water when natural disaster strikes.

We cannot allow the erosion of the Navy-Marine Corps team to continue.

Without a significant investment by Congress and the Administration in the Navy's future, we are placing our national defense, our leadership in the world, the strength of our economy and the health of the global economy at great risk.

We must insist on an investment by Congress in the Navy-Marine Corps team before it is too late.

**Hector Ramos**  
**Downey**



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## **Legislative Update**

### **ACIBC Action Days**

March 16, 2016

**Roger West & Peter Courtney**  
Directors, Legislative Affairs  
HII Government & Customer Relations



## Looking Back at 2015



- Overall, the FORD-class and RCOH programs were well supported
  - Some reductions to specific GFE programs
- Some key NDAA language provisions in the FY16 NDAA
  - CVN 79 (and later) cost cap “target” reduced by \$100M; waivable by SECNAV
  - Requires report on alternative aircraft carriers
  - Requires report on benefits of EOQ authority for CVN 80/81
- Both SASC and HASC held dedicated hearings on aircraft carrier programs and requirements in the fall

## Looking Ahead in FY17



- Despite the Navy budget being somewhat of a bill-payer, shipbuilding accounts were generally well-funded
  - CVN 79 – FY17 and FY18 includes final two years of procurement funding.
  - CVN 80 – FY17 includes AP and then procurement funding for the balance of the FYDP
  - CVN 81 – FY21 includes the first year of AP funding
  - CVN RCOH – FYDP shows full funding for CVN 73 RCOH and for CVN 74 RCOH (in FY20 and FY21)
- Congress is working on an extremely accelerated schedule
  - Both chambers eager to get to an upcoming recess period after a very hectic February and March
- The committees will likely finish their work early on defense bills
  - Topline budget framework established last year
  - But - little chance for any floor action on bills prior to the Presidential election
  - Continuing resolution in October a near certainty

## Our Key “Asks” for 2016



- Support the President’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget request for \$1,292 million for the second ship of the *Gerald R. Ford*-class, *John F. Kennedy* (CVN 79), and \$1,371 million in advance procurement funding for the third ship in the class, *Enterprise* (CVN 80).
- Support the batch buy of materials for *Enterprise* (CVN 80) and CVN 81. Batch buying materials in 2017 could save taxpayers nearly \$400 - \$500 million over the course of construction. Request \$263 million in first year advance procurement funding for CVN 81 to ensure materials are purchased at the least expensive price possible.
- Request \$20 million additional Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding be added to *Enterprise*’s (CVN 80) Total Ship Integration project to reduce future carrier acquisition cost through expanded Design for Affordability efforts (in addition to \$21.6 million in PB).
- Support the President’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget request for \$1,743 million for the mid-life modernization of USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) and \$249 million in advance procurement funding for the mid-life modernization of USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74), a process also known as refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH). Also request providing the U.S. Navy authorization for the RCOH for each of the remaining ships of the Nimitz-class and authorization to enter into incrementally funded RCOH contracts for that work.
- Support the U.S. Navy in maintaining a fleet of at least eleven aircraft carriers.

# Your Congressional Meetings

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**Thanks**

**Explain**

**Ask**

**Invite**

**Follow-up**



A large aircraft carrier is shown from a high-angle perspective, moving through the ocean. The deck is active with several personnel and a white F-35 fighter jet. The ship's superstructure is visible on the left side. The sky is clear and blue.

Hudson Institute

# Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict

*Seth Cropsey, Bryan G. McGrath, and  
Timothy A. Walton*

*October 2015  
Policy Study*

The logo for the Hudson Institute, consisting of a white square with a black border containing the letters 'HI' in a stylized, bold, serif font.

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Hudson's Center for American Seapower aims to promote public dialogue on ebbing U.S. maritime power and offer detailed policy recommendations for a robust U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, more effective U.S. Coast Guard, and strong shipbuilding industrial base.

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The views of this report are the authors' alone, along with any potential errors.

## **NAVY LEAGUE STATEMENT**

**July 2016**

Like many nonprofit organizations, the Navy League relies on its corporate members to help fund a variety of activities that support the mission of advocacy and education. This includes sponsorships for events like the Washington, D.C., Navy Birthday Ball, programming at Sea-Air-Space, our annual STEM Expo and our Special Topic Breakfast series, and programs such as America's Strength. Sea-Air-Space is the Navy League's primary source of revenue, with other sources being advertising in Seapower magazine, corporate member dues and dues from individual members. Corporate dues, contributions and sponsorships was 18.8 percent of total revenue for the Navy League in 2015.

The Navy League has only worked with CSBA on reports, but we have hosted and will host events with speakers from the Hudson Institute and the U.S. Naval Institute. Regarding the report used for the America's Strength campaign, the Navy League paid CSBA \$75,000. Both CSBA and the Navy League agreed at the outset that CSBA would retain editorial control from the beginning of the investigation through publication. The Navy League produces a biennial Maritime Policy Report, written by our volunteer Maritime Policy Committee that makes strategic recommendations for all the sea services. The Navy League makes policy recommendations based on high-level analysis by its Maritime Policy Committee and its staff, but cannot go into the same level of detailed policy analysis that think tanks can offer. The Navy League, which is primarily a sea service support and advocacy organization with a headquarters staff of 23, does not have the manpower or resources to produce the level of analysis and detail that CSBA can provide.

Think tanks like CSBA provide academic and professional research, analysis and expertise not available within most organizations like the Navy League — for example, neither the Air Force Association nor the Association of the United States Army, which have staffs much larger than the Navy League and are our peer organizations, are able to produce analysis reports with a similar level of detail to what CSBA was able to provide. For the report funded by the Navy League, CSBA was able to dedicate two writers, with the support of an entire team to perform research this project. The Navy League also appreciates the third-party validation that comes from using an independent research organization to provide analysis; the Navy League asked CSBA to investigate the Navy League's belief that the Navy-Marine Corps team is overextended and underfunded, based on information from what our more than 240 councils hear in the field, discussions with military retirees, and the monitoring of congressional testimony, publicly-available CRS, GAO and Navy reports.



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July 2016

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