ire Huntington lngalls Industries Huntington 5" Ingalls :5 Industries HurdSlu? Done Right Stock: 1.75.49 Trace' l-Z-ti' Higr.? 173.1E Low: 18% Employees Investor Relations Search across sites The dedication, the discipline, that I developed as a professional ballet dancer, apply here at the shipyard. It's that same work ethic. o- FREEDOM, SHAPED BY HELEN GAULT From professional balletdancer to Apprentice at Newport News Shipbuilding. Read the story andwatchavideo Who We Are About Who We Are Huntington ingails Industries is America's largest military shipbuilding company and a provider of About Us manufacturing. engineering and management services to the nuclear energy. oil and gas markets. For more than a century. Hii's Newport News anti lngalls shipbuilding diVIsiohs in Comp?? llamas ngnia and Mississippi have built more ships in more ship classes than any other US. naval GU, Businesses shipbuilder. Headquartered in Newport News. Virginia. employs nearly 35.000 people Senior Executive Team operating both domestically and internationally. Board of Directors Ethics 8. Compliance Commitments Our Name Where We Are Tougher Than Steel Contact Us Huntington lngalls Industries Facts Download and print Ingalls Shipbuilding Facts Download and print Download the video Newport News Shipbuilding Facts Download and print Facts at a Glance Builder of the most complex ships in the world for more than 130 years at Newport News and TB years at ingalls. Sole builder of US. Navy aircraft carriers. the world's largest warships. and one oftwo builders constructing nuclear-powered submarines, Exclusive provider of refueling services for nuclear?powered aircraft carriers. at the forefront of new ship technologies. specialized manufacturing capabilities and nuclear facility management 1. Largest industrial employer in Virginia and Mississippi. and an employer in Louisiana. Largest supplier or' LLS Navy sunace combatants?has built more than 70 percent of Navy fleet of warships. Builder-of?record for 35 DDG 51 class Aegis gumed missile destroyers. Builder of record for the LHA I3 class large?deck amphibious ships and prime builder of the Navy's newest .fleet ofthe San Antonio class amphibious assault ships L. Provides a wide variety of products and services to the commercial energy industry and other government customers. including the Department of Energy Unrlvalled experience in modular engineering and construction with innovative new solutions for upstream. midstream and energy infrastructure. Employ-s approximately 5.000 engineers and designers. Huntington lggallfries For more information, contact: Christie Miller Building a Giant: Gerald R. Ford 78] I About 5,000 American shipbuiiders are participating in the building of aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford 73}. I At completion, Ford will weigh nearly 100,000 tons?as much as 400 Statues of Liberty. I 200,000 gallons of Haze Gray paint cover CVN TB?enough to give the White House 350 coats of paint. I Ford has been called a "floating city,? holding 4,060 personnel and ?5 aircraft I The carrier has a S-acre flight deck I Ford produces 400,000 gallons of fresh water per day I The ship produces 15,000 meals a day I Ford can reach speeds in excess of 30+ knots Powering the Future CVN 7'8 is the first aircraft carrier to make a significant leap to electrical power, replacing many legacy steam-powered systems and preparing the ship for future technologies. I The new electrical distribution system increases electrical capacity by 250 percent. I An Electromagnetic aircraft launch system similar to the system that powers many of today?s roller coasters, replaces steam catapults, enabling a smoother launch for the airwing of the future. I Ten million feet of electrical cable is installed on Ford, enough cable to span the distance from Washington, DC to Albuquerque, NM. I Four million feet of fiber optic cable is installed on Ford, the length of more than 7,200 Washington Monuments stacked on top of each other. Oct. 11, 2013 Huntington Ingalls Industries- Fact Sheet/Page 2 ‡•‹‰‡† ˆ‘” ˆˆ‹…‹‡…› CVN 78 is the most efficient aircraft carrier ever designed, reducing necessary maintenance by 30 percent. x The ship’s design enables the Navy to operate the ship with less manpower, saving the Navy more than $4 billion over the ship’s 50Ͳyear life. x 9,900 tons of air conditioning reduces maintenance caused by humidity and reduces required manning in hot spaces. x About 44,000 highͲefficiency fluorescent TͲ8 light bulbs will be used, which produce more light and last nearly twice as long. —–—”‡ ‡ƒ†‹‡•• x CVN 78 is a flexible platform, ready to meet the operational needs of the 21st century. x CVN 78 is capable of generating 25 percent more sorties (flight missions) per day than NimitzͲclass carriers. x CVN 78 is designed with flexible infrastructure to quickly adapt interior spaces for new missions. x The island is smaller and farther aft than the NimitzͲclass, increasing space for flight deck operations and aircraft maintenance. x SoftwareͲcontrolled advanced arresting gear increases the ability to recover smaller aircraft with reduced wear. 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News newest clasecarrier Gerald Ft ?ning- nanon defen . Ilattes-91*. ac ibc . erg I powell . tate ABOUT us WHAT WE no WORK INSIGHTS I 1: I To 37.111171 Conversa?irwn with Bring The - To The-i: Donrsiep GREG MCCARTHY v. WISHIP "Ln-l .. I I If 7.1.. - I, HI..le 1E . . .. . DECI15 11.. .I..--I .-I--: r. lax-mall mu; m. 15 15 ?5 DECIH NDVIM SEPIM AUGIH MAXIM NOVIZIK .3 . I Juw: ..N APRITE FEBITZ Hu- n- allva--I..n- In lump ?15- Grub-Ir tum-ea - .aru ?efx-rv I, Jran, . ?4:35? 11:79? I c- WeberShandwickDEF Sep 22 Our graphics team does outstanding work on behalf of our clients @PTInsights LQJWeberShandwick AIRMAN El: AI I rizussu. emu-3 5.1m etamml grams-2n" palms 3-5-1 inst;- rim Mn Id at my mum. i . ?.me . 11 Da\ Deploying i On Station i AIS'eaTraining\ i In Port Tr'aining\ .. I .. Amt-Hm. .5: :mi'ur-J It) may: r: Iii. ?(new Flu-'01 gar-15.. warlord in Hut-:11 :m-il urn-Inch: yrlir? ru'nm'ld THE: glanc- IE IIE Hum Aircraft Carriers [ll] statmn [If at sea at any tlme wiemm hilmafl Banims Heavy Maimnance Heady Carrier Valuing maintenance. available In surge Heavy Maintenan'ca' Ready Carrier im [i i313 ?u 0% 4m- [All of the Earih?s surfase of the world?s 01 all is mvered hy water. lives near 1hr: ocean. trade Imvels by sea ƒ”…Š ͳ͹ǡ ʹͲͳ͸ ‡ƒ” ‡„‡” ‘ˆ ‘‰”‡••ǣ Dz ‘— …‘—Ž† ‡ƒ•‹Ž› Œ—•–‹ˆ› ͳͶǡ ͳͷ …ƒ””‹‡”• ‹ˆ ›‘— Œ—•– Ž‘‘ ƒ– ‰Ž‘„ƒŽ †‡ƒ†ǡdz •–ƒ–‡† Š‹‡ˆ ‘ˆ ƒ˜ƒŽ ’‡”ƒ–‹‘• †‹”ƒŽ ‘Š ‹…Šƒ”†•‘ Žƒ•– ˆƒŽŽǤ ‹Ž‹–ƒ”› ’‘•–—”‹‰ „› —••‹ƒǡ ‡š’ƒ•‹‘ ‘ˆ Š‹ƒ ‹ –Š‡ ƒ…‹ˆ‹…ǡ ‰Ž‘„ƒŽ –‡””‘”‹•ǡ –Š‡ ”‡•—”‰‡…‡ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ƒŽ‹„ƒǡ ƒ† –Š”‡ƒ–• –‘ ‹Ž‹–ƒ”› ’‘•–—”‹‰ „› —••‹ƒǡ ‡š’ƒ•‹‘ ‘ˆ Š‹ƒ ‹ –Š‡ ƒ…‹ˆ‹…ǡ ‰Ž‘„ƒŽ –‡””‘”‹•ǡ –Š‡ ”‡•—”‰‡…‡ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ƒŽ‹„ƒǡ ƒ† –Š”‡ƒ–• ›’ ‰ › ’ ‰ ‰ –‘ ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ •Š‹’’‹‰ ƒ”‡ Œ—•– ƒ ˆ‡™ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‘•– ”‡…‡– ‡šƒ’Ž‡• ‘ˆ ™Š› ‡”‹…ƒ ‡‡†• ƒ Ǥ Ǥ ƒ˜› ‹”…”ƒˆ– ƒ””‹‡” Ž‡‡– –‘ „‡ ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ •Š‹’’‹‰ ƒ”‡ Œ—•– ƒ ˆ‡™ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‘•– ”‡…‡– ‡šƒ’Ž‡• ‘ˆ ™Š› ‡”‹…ƒ ‡‡†• ƒ Ǥ Ǥ ƒ˜› ‹”…”ƒˆ– ƒ””‹‡” Ž‡‡– –‘ „‡ ’’ ‰ Œ ’ › ™Š‡”‡ ‹– ƒ––‡”•ǡ ™Š‡ ‹– ƒ––‡”•ǡ ™‹–Š –Š‡ ’‘™‡” ƒ† …ƒ’ƒ„‹Ž‹–‹‡• –Šƒ– ƒ––‡”Ǥ Š‡ ‹”…”ƒˆ– ƒ””‹‡” Ž‡‡– ‹• –Š‡ …‘”‡”•–‘‡ ‘ˆ ™Š‡”‡ ‹– ƒ––‡”•ǡ ™Š‡ ‹– ƒ––‡”•ǡ ™‹–Š –Š‡ ’‘™‡” ƒ† …ƒ’ƒ„‹Ž‹–‹‡• –Šƒ– ƒ––‡”Ǥ Š‡ „‘–Š Ǥ Ǥ †‡ˆ‡•‡ ƒ† †‹’Ž‘ƒ–‹… ’‘Ž‹…› ƒ† ƒŽŽ‘™• ˆ‘” –Š‡ ˆ”‡‡ ˆŽ‘™ ‘ˆ ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ –”ƒ†‡Ǥ ‘’ƒ‹‡• ƒ…”‘•• ‘—” ƒ–‹‘ •—’’Ž› –Š‡ ’ƒ”–•ǡ •–‡‡Žǡ ‘–‘”•ǡ ™‹”‹‰ǡ ƒ† –‡…Š‘Ž‘‰› –‘ Š‡Ž’ „—‹Ž† ƒ† ƒ‹–ƒ‹ ƒ‹”…”ƒˆ– …ƒ””‹‡”• •‘ –Š‡ „”ƒ˜‡ ‡ ƒ† ™‘‡ ™Š‘ •‡”˜‡ ‘ –Š‡ ƒŽ™ƒ›• Šƒ˜‡ ƒ —ˆƒ‹” ƒ†˜ƒ–ƒ‰‡ ƒ‰ƒ‹•– ‘—” ƒ†˜‡”•ƒ”‹‡•Ǥ ƒ‹–ƒ‹‹‰ –Š‹• ƒ†˜ƒ–ƒ‰‡ǡ ‹– ”‡“—‹”‡• „—‹Ž†‹‰ –Š‡ ‘•– ƒ†˜ƒ…‡† •Š‹’• ‹ –Š‡ ™‘”Ž† ƒ† ‘˜‡”Šƒ—Ž‹‰ …—””‡– •Š‹’• ‹ –Š‡ ˆŽ‡‡– –‘ ‡‡’ –Š‡ ƒ– –Š‡ –‹’ ‘ˆ –Š‡ •’‡ƒ” ˆ‘” ͷͲ ›‡ƒ”•Ǥ Š‹• ›‡ƒ”ǡ –Š‡ ˆ‹”•– •Š‹’ ‹ –Š‡ ‡™ ‰‡‡”ƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ ƒ‹”…”ƒˆ– …ƒ””‹‡”•ǡ Gerald R. Ford ȋ ͹ͺȌǡ ‹• •…Š‡†—Ž‡† –‘ ‰‘ –‘ •‡ƒǤ Š‹• ‡˜‡– —•Š‡”• ‹ ƒ ‡™ ‡”ƒ ‘ˆ ™ƒ”•Š‹’• ™‹–Š –Š‡ ‘•– ƒ†˜ƒ…‡† …ƒ’ƒ„‹Ž‹–‹‡• „—‹Ž– –‘ †‡ˆ‡ƒ– –Š‡ –Š”‡ƒ–• ‘ˆ –‘†ƒ› ƒ† ˆ‘” –Š‡ ‡š– ͷͲ ›‡ƒ”•Ǥ  „‡ŠƒŽˆ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‹”…”ƒˆ– ƒ””‹‡” †—•–”‹ƒŽ ƒ•‡ ‘ƒŽ‹–‹‘ ƒ† –Š‡ ™‘”‡”• ‡’Ž‘›‡† ‹ ›‘—” †‹•–”‹…– ™Š‘ Š‡Ž’ –‘ „—‹Ž† ƒ† ƒ‹–ƒ‹ –Š‡•‡ ‰”‡ƒ– •Š‹’•ǡ ™‡ ”‡•’‡…–ˆ—ŽŽ› ”‡“—‡•– ›‘—ǣ x —’’‘”– –Š‡ ”‡•‹†‡–ǯ• ‹•…ƒŽ ‡ƒ” ʹͲͳ͹ „—†‰‡– ”‡“—‡•– ˆ‘” ̈́ͳǡʹͻʹ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ˆ‘” –Š‡ •‡…‘† •Š‹’ ‘ˆ –Š‡ Gerald —’’‘”– –Š‡ ”‡•‹†‡–ǯ• ‹•…ƒŽ ‡ƒ” ʹͲͳ͹ „—†‰‡– ”‡“—‡•– ˆ‘” ̈́ͳǡʹͻʹ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ˆ‘” –Š‡ •‡…‘† •Š‹’ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ’’ ‰ “ ǡ ’ Gerald R. FordǦ…Žƒ••ǡ John FordǦ…Žƒ••ǡ JJohn F. Kennedyy ȋȋ ͹ͻȌǡ ƒ† ̈́ͳǡ͵͹ͳ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ †˜ƒ…‡ ”‘…—”‡‡– ˆ—†‹‰ ˆ‘” –Š‡ –Š‹”† •Š‹’ ‹ –Š‡ …Žƒ••ǡ Enterprise ȋ ͺͲȌǤ –Š‡ …Žƒ••ǡ Enterprise ȋ ͺͲȌ x —’’‘”– –Š‡ „ƒ–…Š „—› ‘ˆ ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ• ˆ‘” Enterprise ȋ ͺͲȌ ƒ† ͺͳǤ ƒ–…Š „—›‹‰ ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ• ‹ ʹͲͳ͹ …‘—Ž† •ƒ˜‡ –ƒš’ƒ›‡”• ‡ƒ”Ž› ̈́ͶͲͲ Ǧ ̈́ͷͲͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ …‘—”•‡ ‘ˆ …‘•–”—…–‹‘Ǥ —’’‘”– ̈́ʹ͸͵ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ ˆ‹”•– ›‡ƒ” †˜ƒ…‡ ”‘…—”‡‡– ˆ—†‹‰ ˆ‘” ͺͳ –‘ ‡•—”‡ ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ• ƒ”‡ ’—”…Šƒ•‡† ƒ– –Š‡ Ž‡ƒ•– ‡š’‡•‹˜‡ ’”‹…‡ ’‘••‹„Ž‡Ǥ x ‡“—‡•– ̈́ʹͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ƒ††‹–‹‘ƒŽ ‡•‡ƒ”…Šǡ ‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–ǡ ‡•– ƒ† ˜ƒŽ—ƒ–‹‘ ȋ Ƭ Ȍ ˆ—†‹‰ „‡ ƒ††‡† –‘ Enterpriseǯ• ȋ ͺͲȌ ‘–ƒŽ Š‹’ –‡‰”ƒ–‹‘ ’”‘Œ‡…– –‘ ”‡†—…‡ ˆ—–—”‡ …ƒ””‹‡” ƒ…“—‹•‹–‹‘ …‘•– –Š”‘—‰Š ‡š’ƒ†‡† ‡•‹‰ ˆ‘” ˆˆ‘”†ƒ„‹Ž‹–› ‡ˆˆ‘”–•Ǥ x —’’‘”– –Š‡ ”‡•‹†‡–ǯ• ‹•…ƒŽ ‡ƒ” ʹͲͳ͹ „—†‰‡– ”‡“—‡•– ˆ‘” ̈́ͳǡ͹Ͷ͵ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ˆ‘” –Š‡ ‹†ǦŽ‹ˆ‡ ‘†‡”‹œƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ George Washington ȋ ͹͵Ȍ ƒ† ̈́ʹͶͻ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ †˜ƒ…‡ ”‘…—”‡‡– ˆ—†‹‰ ˆ‘” –Š‡ ‹†ǦŽ‹ˆ‡ ‘†‡”‹œƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ John C. Stennis ȋ ͹ͶȌǡ ƒ ’”‘…‡•• ƒŽ•‘ ‘™ ƒ• ”‡ˆ—‡Ž‹‰ ƒ† …‘’Ž‡š ‘˜‡”Šƒ—Ž ȋ ȌǤ Ž‡ƒ•‡ ƒŽ•‘ •—’’‘”– ’”‘˜‹†‹‰ –Š‡ Ǥ Ǥ ƒ˜› ƒ—–Š‘”‹œƒ–‹‘ ˆ‘” –Š‡ ˆ‘” ‡ƒ…Š ‘ˆ –Š‡ ”‡ƒ‹‹‰ •Š‹’• ‘ˆ –Š‡ NimitzǦ…Žƒ•• ƒ† ƒ—–Š‘”‹œƒ–‹‘ –‘ ‡–‡” ‹–‘ ‹…”‡‡–ƒŽŽ› ˆ—†‡† …‘–”ƒ…–• ˆ‘” –Šƒ– ™‘”Ǥ x —’’‘”– –Š‡ Ǥ Ǥ ƒ˜› ‹ ƒ‹–ƒ‹‹‰ ƒ ˆŽ‡‡– ‘ˆ ƒ– Ž‡ƒ•– ‡Ž‡˜‡ ƒ‹”…”ƒˆ– …ƒ””‹‡”•Ǥ Dz ‡ǯ”‡ ƒ ͳͳǦ…ƒ””‹‡” ƒ˜› ‹ ƒ ͳͷǦ …ƒ””‹‡” ™‘”Ž†Ǥ Š‡ †‡ƒ† •‹‰ƒŽ ‹• ‘– Ž‹‡Ž› –‘ ‰‘ †‘™ ƒ› –‹‡ •‘‘ǡdz †‡…Žƒ”‡† ‡ƒ” †Ǥ Š‘ƒ• ‘‘”‡ǡ ”‘‰”ƒ š‡…—–‹˜‡ ˆˆ‹…‡” ˆ‘” ‹”…”ƒˆ– ƒ””‹‡”•ǡ ‘ …–‘„‡” ʹͲͳʹǤ Šƒ ›‘— ˆ‘” ›‘—” –‹‡ ƒ† …‘•‹†‡”ƒ–‹‘ǡ ƒ† ’Ž‡ƒ•‡ †‘ ‘– Š‡•‹–ƒ–‡ –‘ …‘–ƒ…– —• –Š”‘—‰Š –Š‡ …‘ƒŽ‹–‹‘ ƒ– ȋʹͲʹȌ ͷͺͷǦʹͳͶͻǤ ‹…‡”‡Ž›ǡ ‹… ‹ƒ‹‹ ƒ””‡ŽŽ ”‘™ Šƒ‹”ǡ ‹…‡Ǧ Šƒ‹”ǡ ”‡•‹†‡– ƒ† Š‹‡ˆ ’‡”ƒ–‹‰ ˆˆ‹…‡” ‹Ž™ƒ—‡‡ ƒŽ˜‡ ‘’ƒ› …‘ ‘”’‘”ƒ–‹‘ Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association - MEBA Harsh To All Navy Leaguers: Sign our "America's Strength" Letter to Congress The Navy League is proud to announce the launch of a new. intensive. two?year campaign - "America's Strength: Investing in the Navy?Marine Corps Team." On Thursday. March 25. we're delivering an open letter to Congress asking for increased funding for the Navy-Marine Corps team- Sign your name to show you support the sea services: http'ininmv americas? We also encourage you to share this request with family. friends. shipmates and colleagues who support a strong US. Navy?Marine Corps team. A PDF copy of the letter can be found here. The Navy League's "America's Strength" advertising and grassroots campaign will raise awareness of the strain on the US. Navy-Marine Corps team and the potentially disastrous consequences for national defense. business and commerce. and on our nation's ability to provide aid to victims of natural disasters, if current budgetary trends continue- The Navy League's "America's Strength" campaign is supported by a broad and diverse coalition of individuals and organizations who share the belief that a strong US. Navy is vital to the nation's defense. economy and to America's leadership in the world- We are hosting a major press conference on March 26 in Washington. DC. to announce the campaign- The campaign will include think tank reports, advertisements, op-eds, letters to the editor and grassroots engagement with Congress. At the Navy League convention in Tampa. we will run a workshop on the campaign and present your council with a media Kit. best practices and other materials for effectively running this campaign at the council level. YOU Will ?nd MUTE information on the campaign America's Strength The United States Department of the Navy is underfunded and overextended. placing our national defense. our Sailors and Marines. and the stability of l\ the global economy at risk. Congress must provide a signi?cant investment in the Department ofthe '1 Loading About Us Membership Corporate Affairs Programs & Support Meetings & Events Communications Corporate Members Corporate Gold Members • Accenture Federal Systems • DRS Technologies, Inc. • L-3 Communications • American Maritime Partnership • Ernst & Young • Leidos • BAE Systems • Fluor Corporation • Lockheed Martin Corp • The Boeing Company • GE Marine • Northrop Grumman Corp • Booz-Allen Hamilton • General Atomics • Penfed • CACI • General Dynamics Corp • Raytheon Company • Clarion Events • Honeywell • Rockwell Collins • Cobham • Hewlett Packard Enterprise • Textron Systems • Curtiss-Wright • Huntington Ingalls Industries Corporate Members 901D, LLC Cubic Global Defense Navy Federal Credit Union Access Intelligence LLC / Defense Daily Dell, Inc. Oceaneering Advanced Technologies AECOM Deloitte Federal Orbit International Corporation Aerojet Rocketdyne, Inc. 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Products IXI Technology TE Connectivity CFM International, Inc. Jeppesen, Inc. Telephonics Corporation Chesterfield Special Cylinders Ltd Johnson Controls Federal Systems Thales Cincinnati Financial Corp. Kongsberg Defence Themis Computer The Cohen Group Matson Navigation Company Ultra Electronics, Ltd. Concurrent Technologies Corporation MBDA Missile Systems USAA Connected WorkPlace Solutions (CWPS) Mercury Computer Systems UTC Aerospace Systems Crowley Maritime Corp MTU America, Inc. Vigor Shipbuilding Corp VSE Corporation Wyle Business Associate Members Atlas North America GET Engineering Corporation Parker Aerospace Legislative Affairs Av-DEC hisdeSAT Projects Unlimited Aviall Services Inc Indra Safe Boats International Ayres Composite Panels USA LLC Infinity Fuel Cell and Hydrogen, Inc. Sauer Compressors USA, Inc. BecTech, Inc. L-3 MariPro Schaefer Electronics Inc. Bramer Group Liquid Robotics Taber Extrusions, LLC Burdeshaw Associates Ltd. Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association Teledyne Brown Engineering Cornet Technology, Inc. Meggitt Defense Systems ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems GmbH Crystal Group Inc. The Metamorphosis Group Transportation Institute Daisy Data Displays, Inc. Military by Owner Advertising, Inc. Twin Disc Decision Lens MilSOFT Yazilim Teknolojileri A.S. WBB Delta Resources, Inc. MSI-Defence Systems, Ltd. W.F. Harris Lighting Expal Octex Labs Z Microsystems, Inc. Fairlead Integrated Power and Controls O'Neil and Associates Zeiders Enterprises FLIR Systems, Inc. OSI Maritime Systems Zodiac of North America Germane Systems Owl Computing Technologies Nonprofit and Government Agency Members Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University British Naval Staff C5 Technologies Embassy of Australia Embassy of Canada LMI National Defense Industrial Association National Shipbuilding Research Program Riverside Research Shipbuilders Council of America Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University TECRO-Defense Mission Official Partner Affiliate Sponsor U.S. Navy Corporate Gold Members U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Coast Guard ABOUT US MEETINGS & EVENTS Connect with us for current sea MEMBERSHIP COMMUNICATIONS service discussions and activities. - Online Community LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS CORPORATE AFFAIRS Site Map PROGRAMS & SUPPORT Contact Us U.S.-flag Merchant Marine All Content © 2014-2016 Navy League of the United States 2300 Wilson Boulevard Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22201-5424 Affiliate Sponsor STRENGTH INVESTING IN THE NAVY- ANavyLeague Campaign The Navy League’s America’s Strength campaign is a comprehensive and integrated two-year advertising, media and grassroots campaign. Goals: p y p • Raise awareness of the vital importance of the Navy-Marine Corps team to the nation’s defense, economy and leadership in the world • Illustrate how the underfunding g and overextension of our naval forces are placing our national defense and global economic stability at risk • Support congressional allies in efforts to provide the full funding the Department of the Navy needs for ships and aircraft, personnel, maintenance, training and operations • Increase the appropriation in Fiscal Year 2017 by Congress for the pp p Department of the Navy The Navy-Marine Corps Team Needs Help Since 2001, the size of the Navy and Marine Corps has steadily been reduced, while their missions and operations have increased. In the past 18 months, Sailors and Marines have been called upon to: • • • • Protect container ships from harassment and seizure by Iranian naval forces Conduct around the clock combat operations against ISIL in Syria and Iraq Face down Russian aggression in the Black Sea; and Deliver disaster relief to victims of the earthquake in Nepal. The combination of increased daily operations and responding to crisis after crisis, along with delayed maintenance and failure to modernize equipment from a lack of funding, is crippling the Navy and Marine Corps. "nme msailn Max:me Nuys} MOBIDTSiby??maCal'm U.S. drassa?t replace arrives?- #1 -. HEARTY SUPPORT To THE we do this through a POLICIES WHlCi?l THE NAVY LEAGUE variety of education is. FOUNDED TO programs that remind our fellow citizens that the United States is a maritime nation whose national economic and security interests are inextricably tied to the freedom of the seas. ROOSEVELT Comprehensive Campaign • Supplier/Grassroots • Congressional Engagement • Think-Tank/Policy • Expert Support • Advocacy • Advertising • Integrated • Each element coordinated • Increase reach • Force multipliers Top Naval pilots, congressmen rally to protect aviation budget By James K. Sanbom, Staff writer in f2 4 .1 The Marine Corps' top avrator look to Capitol Hill plea to protect funding he called critical to the servrce's ability to maintain and modernize tax. aircraft ?eet which is Still reeling from the effects- rnassnre 2013 budget cuts. Lt Gen .Jon Davrs. the deputy commandant for Marine aviation. said scant oudgets delay ed depot maintenance and the looming of another round 01' across?rhe-board spending cuts known as sequestrai make it dilTrcuit to man maintain and deploy aircraft in anticipation or global crises. The service is now 19 percent Detour.r its minimum acceptable number of operationa aircraft "We will go when the balloon goes up. It is lust mat-ring it harder and harder every day." Davrs said Coalition Warns of ?Death Spiral' for Strained U.S. Fleet . . Br Hugh Lessig Tire Dnii'y Press November 13, 201.} [n a blunt letter to C?otLittlest;~ nearly mo retired Navy and Marine Corps iondei?e on Wednesday warned of dire consequences to the ITS. ?eet uuiess Congress 13111an Advertising NEWS II 5? PIRATE: America ask: it: Navy turnspudln number at crises around the worl?l'm mutant!ng mil-act My? not-Ml 'ha' b} "lama" n-mm-Hm an!" - - . m1 walk-no .3: new mm undumdumnh. 3? moment. it In? ?own" 1mer m. II ?My. HII {vulva-nan Vanna: any minim cm Being a superpower isn't just am: national pride. 0m security depends on a many and modern Hui-mu t: yuan nl Mr :11! :1 dinau?lum ?rth: numb-Er 11' Nil-"H The adamant in Lia-r: ut :lle nI'l. 'ell {rang-r? um gun hur my hung.? lam mil-granule? Mam. L10. CUT SHORT. STRENGTH 13f ?u .1 WE I'll'l' THEM ll? Typhoon. H?i?yin in thin f'hilippim 11w umhquakomnl law In lap-En.? llalur'r lil Inn-d h, unity-l aha-tumour a wand and Ila?mull: saw llw-I and an ura- 31 IN t?ll'aHE? cannula! LETTHE INE En FPS TEAM- BE CUT SHEET. STRE GT Partnering with Others Critical to the success of the campaign will be engaging influential voices to tell the story of the U.S. Navy’s vital importance. How You Can Be Involved • Write an op-ed or letter to the editor • Write, call, or brief your Member of Congress • Place a customized ad in your regional paper • Brief a community organization • Lead a tour of a local industry facility • Talk to EVERYONE about this!! Support Has Started Already Lack. of Vision May Cost Us couso mummy? -Sheila McNeill ?51191913133112? ?attint "Current Funding Levels do not meet the Navy?s Needs? GI UT MP (in; his amp In. :i?irrsaz ?G'ai Williams Arrive reach:r to learn. Graduate ready to lead. How We Will Support You • Promotion of the local council • HQ will help write any speeches, op-eds, or letters to the editor • Full support for industry tours • HQ will pay for council advertisements in local media • Council thanked with Navy Leaguer articles and eligibility for Council Awards STRENGTH A Navg League Campaign INVESTING IN THE NAVY- MARINE CORPS TEAM Questions? ?51 '3 a b. Cut-h Congressional Letter Advertising Statement on SU-Year Shipbuilding Plan Aviation Forum Moderator Remarks Carrier Gap - 6 Critical Issues AM STR GTH WSW ?9 Navy-Marine Corps Team STRENGTH CAMPAIGN: NAVY-MARINE CORPS AVIATION FORUM The Navy League of the United States invites you to attend a congressional forum that will examine the value and importance of U.S. Navy?Marine Corps aviation to the nation and the strain caused by sustained deployment; delayed maintenance and uncertaintyin funding. WHEN: WHERE: Wednesday, June 3, 2015 {add to your calendar} Cannon Caucus Room {magi 8:30 a.m. Cannon House of Representatives Of?ce Building New Jersey and Independence Avenues, SE Washington, D.C. I 8:35 a.m. Complimentary Continental Breakfast 8; Displays I 9:30 a.m. Speaker Program CONFIRMED SPEAKERS: RADM. Mike Man azi r, U.S. Navy, Director; Air Warfare (DPNAV N98) LtGen Jon M. Davis, LLS. Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Aviation CDR Bryan Clark, U.S. Navy Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Representative Randy Forbes Chairman-J House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Represen tative Joe Courtney Ranking Member, House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Representative Duncan Hunter Representative Rick Larsen Representative Scott Peters Representative Rob Wittman Representative Ander Crenshavur Research Experts Events Topics & Policy Centers About Support Search research, experts, topics, or events Search Centerr for American Seapower Hudson’s Center for American Seapower aims to promote public dialogue on ebbing U.S. maritime power where today there is no such dialogue. The Center will offer intellectual arguments and detailed policy recommendations for a robust U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and a more effective U.S. Coast Guard as well as shipbuilding industrial base. The U.S. is by geography, commerce, security, and tradition a maritime nation. But Americans have become accustomed to the benefits of dominant seapower and are at risk of forgetting the national security consequences that accompany America’s continued decline in seapower. Among other key areas of focus, the Center will: - Examine the connection between America’s superpower status and global responsibilities and its seapower; - Illustrate the U.S.’s indispensable role in promoting today’s international order; - Draw on historical and current events to highlight the national security consequences for the U.S. of its eroding seapower; - Detail and evaluate the rise of competing local and potential global maritime competitors; - Explain the growing dependence of U.S. and allied economies on seaborne commerce; and, - Develop alternate maritime strategies. To address these issues, the Center will hold in-house conferences, and workshops. It will publish monographs, journal articles, and such other activities anchored in the work of distinguished naval experts and historians that articulate the intimate link between seapower and national power. The Center will be a non-partisan effort with a bi-partisan advisory board. The preservation of dominant seapower affects all Americans. Unlbia to How macs? ?flew onme. . YOU ARE INVITED THURSDAY. JULY 9. 2015 8:00 AM 8:00 AM - 9:30 AM BREAKFAST 733 TENTH STREET. NW 8:30 AM TO 9130 AM 5TH FLOOR AUDITORIUM mscussmn WASHINGTON. DC 20001 Al Whit lint? Th. Causes and Impact of mu lel'llf Gap In ma Par-tan Gull The ?iaVy announced ma! tn: UEth mainlann an alrc'a? ca"rer -n tne Persan Gu? Hus faH due to Increased demand a $11.11 on sa?ors and ships and a du'easw budge! aircran camergap ts bum a and a pcwerm mnme 5 Navy F?ltase _om us '09 a aI-scussion at me causes and 0! H115 decision PANEL MODERATOR VADM Pour Daly. USN (Rot) Bryan mama Chief Of?cer Naval Inslnule Hudson ADM Mark Fitzgerald, USN (Ran) RSVP HERE Former commander 01' LI 5 Forces Europe-Africa ADD TO YOUR OUTLOOK CALENDAR Dr. Rohen Farley Patterson 3: heel or Diplomat CON TAG and Internallonal Comme'ce Unwemry at Kentuckv "Iv. ?nun?.an Tat: I Strategic Communications 8: Public A?iirs PT Insights powell tate ABOUT us WHAT we no wlnSIghtS JUL 3 Tips for Amplifying an Industry Issue 2 GREG MCCARTHY Huh wui announced Hm: 5-1-th be;- unable Iii-rIHI-Ili? .m ili'f'mf?. carrier In? 'wr-insrl-z- PerSaan EL- Inn a 1" . Ear-L? a='i 3N .4 Hui-35": To bring this rmiionm ?manna.- gap to the tum-mm; :31 nonversauon about ma?a? dirk-11w jimmy F?L'rwell i me 4. rfIEIEt?rSf: team and the Aim-Hun Strength Campaign lame-.1 .3 panel Io? Lunch?'1 mom n! my agenian-r'ea irixm Pit?tji-?L IREHEE: thins Links 3111': trm' ?-1uH - 1.1. E-Nysir'l Mir? 1mm '11 mt: lmmum 4nd low-mm} Hamming a! lln- i'ii'clup Inuduumtd ilm alvni'ilnlu Iinlwermhriri Ihrm?: gumi?Jratb Rained Nimiml I'vizilin' i iurmm [Olm'idiltit'i u! Naval F..lirnin't ?Ii'lffE' Admiral Pvtur ?ah; I i u! "w 9-4 Naval IriF-Mlih? and 1 1r Hilly-ll Farley Punk-Wm)! 4 "Iv I Iuwcmw ui him} all urn) litterrmli-err ir-y :5 f? Enll?! subject manor oxpens with varying perspectives. i- 1- wt 3-5; I. r- Arum-'4 - a. Lye-.E 11?5'12'73' art-Li Ina r?n- . i 5-HT wan: :32: hm! :?rn I ILJ I3: :9 il'l? II I'-Sim-:A?w Continue the canversation beyond the event mu:- m: lwim-I In." nl zip: Inf-dig; :m-j deft?WEE Indu-sfn who were. unable In attend 11 It? raven! iminm?d k-L-w In mal HIHP News Sports Travel Military Life Opinion Classifieds Rewards Bingo Mutineda Suite Weather Shem EmINe-wslettets MohiIeApps tea-oi: Home Retired admiral calls for US to beef up Navy Eta.r Wyatt Olson Stars and Stripes Published July 2'8. EMS it To meet global security demands, the US. Navy likely needs 325?350 ships, or 50?75 more than current levels, said the former head of U.S. Paci?c Command. me: ?As our Navy.r gets a little bit smaller, we?re facing increasing challenges for funding to get a smaller number of ships to a larger number of ports to demonstrate our readiness and partnership and our presence to all those oatmtries in the Indo? Paci?c region," retired Adm. J. Keating Mm. Tummy J. Keatlng spealts to lligtll and told reporters Tuesday during a conferenoe call mm?m?e 31 Him NT sponsored by the Navy Leag??s mating Force Base in Hawaii to he was commander Of US. PHONE Comma-rd. TO Strength campaign and facilitated by Powell Tate, meet global security demands. the us. Navy a public relations agency assisting in the ?Heir 325-350 more ENDS. or 50-?5 . more than wrrent tevets. said Keahng, who ts campalgn? now retired and serves on the board of be The Navy has 2:73 deployable battle force ships, g?tgl?j?ms?e Contact? Cam according to its website. comm rem r-HoTo Keating headed PACOM from zoos?o9 and is now on the board of advisers for defense contractor . Admiral: Navy must Camber Corporation. adapt in order to retain sailors Recruiting and retaining top talent in tcdas?s multifaceted Keating and Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst with American Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, made the case that ?Small? 1? ail. I use re 2151.0ng competitive and overestending the Navy Will labor market. has been a challenge tor its top brass a and t0 management . . . . . 1 rolled out recently ln- New Secretary Raj: Habits. from national and mternanonal security. The Navy is the de facto high?seas police force Navy adnnral? urges protecting vast shipments of food, clothing and 30"? electronics equipment made overseas and Asia 311015 of delivered by container ship to the US. i .- 5011 China Sea The mutnunder ot the US. 1 Hart's "Ill Fleet called on If there 1sn a cop there on the street to patrol the Southeast :?tsim nations to beat then people Start to get into trouble Eaglen term a combined ttlqulli?lc? [one to patrol areas of i the South China Sea Where Ienilorial tensions said. ?It?s no different on the high sea; the Navy Hm, Ch,? and Marines and Coast Guard being there to help About Seapower Subscribe Digital Edition Advertising Posted: July 7, 2015 2:22 PM Retired Admirals: Carrier Force Demand Exceeds Supply By RICHARD R. BURGESS, Managing Editor WASHINGTON — The Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers (CVNs) is in constant demand and faces increasing challenges in having the “bench strength to meet the requirements of combatant commanders,” experts said during a July 7 forum. ““Carrier Carrier demand has exceeded supply for many years,” said retired VADM Peter Daly, chief executive officer of the U.S. Naval Institute, speaking to an audience at a Washington seminar sponsored by the Navy League’s America’s Strength campaign and moderated by Bryan McGrath of the Hudson Institute. Also speaking were retired ADM Mark Fitzgerald, and Dr. Robert Farley of the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. The Navy, obligated by law to field a force of 11 CVNs, is authorized by Congress to operate only 10 carriers until the next CVN, Gerald Ford, is commissioned in 2016. Daly noted that the Navy has been run hard for the last 15 years and with the budget constraints of recent years has reduced its ability to surge carrier strike groups from five deployed and two in 30-day surge readiness to about half of that capability. “Post 9/11, the Navy entered a semi-permanent [period of] surge,” he said. “This was consumption. Now we need to recapitalize. The Navy has to reconstitute in stride.” Daly warned that with constrained resources “we’ve gotten to the point where we have to run the race a little differently” and that there is a “realization that we’ve got to step down enough for maintenance and modernization.” He defended the cost of a forward-deployed naval force, noting that it needs to be compared to the cost of a land-based footprint. Fitzgerald, former commander, Naval Forces Europe/Africa, pointed out some advantages of deployed carrier strike groups. “The first thing an aircraft carrier does is bring power for the president to control a crisis,” Fitzgerald said. “Two, it allows you to operate without caveat,” he said, pointing out that the only airpower that struck at the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria for the first 54 days of Operation Inherent Resolve was carrier-based, free from the need for foreign basing permission. “Third, an aircraft carrier brings with it a lot more than a ship with jets,” he said, noting the command and control, electronic warfare, self-defense and strike capabilities of the carrier strike group. “It gives you a lot of options in the way that you can operate much more effectively than you can in single ships or smaller ships. Fourth, it provides persistence.” Join The Navy League :ef?f?i?ienvti . . RE?I'Ifegaigiji Hudson Events 1 1'1 10KB: SharpeningtneSpearwl_ Randy_Fort:es, sethcropsey, timothyawaiton, RonaldOReurke, e: e: Hudson Events Oct '1 1'1 10f8: Hudson Institute unveils its report on the future of the aircraft carrier bit MeGrath 2-. our CW4 i5 be pasted at f; wehsite later tedav, Ill-m Il'ml'ltmr THE SPEAK Th1? L'Arr'lnl. Ilu- and I Bryan MeGrath Cit-i232" 5 .IeranentirIizll -g:Jscettshieman Yes Jerry. The frequency.r with 1which veu matte veur argument is impressive. Jamenls Messages frem:@CensWahee sineezz?' 4' natienalinterest My CDHEEQUE says mt SD TESL SHDUIU America Smaller Aircraft Carriers? Even theagh smaller carriers wealel be less expensive the decline in eapalailitv would he signi?tant. - . - Research Experts Events About Support -F II Hudson Institute TDDICS Poltcy Centers .-. -. -- - - -. . 1- t. of: JOLIE . :11 itJ'c? dot-3151:; Uillr. new} resists. C'l?Pi?iliiI't; in the 1.1.5 7th FE?ii :Ith Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High? End Con?ict I . H'oltrm Sharpening the Spear addresses the question of whether it is to continue to build large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVN), given their considerable cost and mounting Anti-Access/Area Denial threats to sea-based operations. The report concludes that the emerging threat environment increases the need for aircraft carriers, and that none of the alternatives to the CVN offer an equal or better capability and capaucitj.r across the range of military options from peacetime presence through major ?W'Ell?. The following report surveys the history of the carrier and its embarked air wing, a history marked by wide swings in public and defense elite opinions as to the utility of the carrier. The authors note the consistency of the criticisms against the carrier over time, and the operational imperatives that consistently overcame them. The study continues with a discussion of the role of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the Joint Force, which evaluates how CSGs support U.S. strategy and how they might be employed in key scenarios. The section concludes with a detailed effects chain analysis designed to examine the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the CSG. These vuhierabilities track closely with many of the criticisms levied against the CVN, and serve as the basis for a series of recommendations on how to improve the CSG as a system to mitigate the Inotmting risks while ensuring CSG support for future war?ghting needs. The study concludes with an analysis of some of the alternatives to the CVN and an assessment of the number of carriers necessary to support national strategy. The report?s authors are available for media interviews. To arrange an interview, please contact Carolyn Stewart. E1 View PDF Seth Cropsey Bryan McGrath Nina?. 1 . -.L: Timothy A. Walton Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict Seth Cropsey, Bryan G. McGrath, and Timothy A. Walton October 2015 Policy Study Hudson Institute is an independent research organization promoting new ideas for the advancement of global security, prosperity, and freedom. Hudson’s Center for American Seapower aims to promote public dialogue on ebbing U.S. maritime power and offer detailed policy recommendations for a robust U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, more effective U.S. Coast Guard, and strong shipbuilding industrial base. About the Authors Dr. Seth Cropsey is the Director of the Center for American Seapower. Bryan G. McGrath is the Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower and the Managing Director of the Ferrybridge Group. Timothy A. Walton is a principal of the Alios Consulting Group. WK 6WUHHW 1 : 6L[WK )ORRU :DVKLQJWRQ ' & ‡ 3 www.hudson.org/policycenters/25-center-for-american-seapower ‹ +XGVRQ ,QVWLWXWH ,QF $OO ULJKWV UHVHUYHG TABLE OF CONTENTS I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2 II. PREFACE 3 III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRCRAFT: HISTORY AND CONTROVERSY V. VI. VII. VIII. 11 World War II 13 Post-World War II and Korea 15 Vietnam 19 The Cold War 21 Post-Cold War 23 Contemporary Operations 26 Summary 27 THE ROLE OF THE CARRIER STRIKE GROUP IN THE JOINT FORCE 29 U.S. Strategy 29 Relevant Scenarios 30 Assessment of the Future Force 32 Carrier Strike Group Effects Chain Analysis 35 IMPROVING THE CARRIER STRIKE GROUP AS A SYSTEM 51 Carrier Strike Group Concepts of Employment 51 Novel Carrier Strike Group Capabilities 63 FLEET DESIGN OPTIONS 81 The Current Fleet 82 Alternative Fleet Designs 85 HOW MANY CARRIERS DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED AND WHY? 91 Is a Two-Hub Navy Sufficient? 95 How Many Carriers are Required for a Three-Hub Navy? 98 IX. CONCLUSION 101 X. LIST OF ACRONYMS 103 I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7KH UHVHDUFK DQG DQDO\VLV SUHVHQWHG LQ WKLV UHSRUW ZDV LQIRUPHG E\ YDOXDEOH UHVHDUFK UHVHDUFK FRQVXOWDWLRQV ZLWK SHUVRQQHO IURP WKH 1DY\ LQGXVWU\ DQG WKLQN WDQNV FRQVXOWDWLRQV ZLWK SHUVRQQHO IURP WKH 1DY\ LQGXVWU\ DQG WKLQN WDQNV ,Q SDUWLFXODU ZH ZRXOG OLNH WR WKDQN %RHLQJ +XQWLQJWRQ ,QJDOOV ,QGXVWULHV /RFNKHHG 0DUWLQ 0LOLWDU\ 6HDOLIW &RPPDQG WKH 1DWLRQDO 6WHHO DQG 6KLSEXLOGLQJ &RPSDQ\ 1DYDO +LVWRU\ DQG +HULWDJH &RPPDQG 1RUWKURS *UXPPDQ 231$9 1 $LU :DUIDUH DQG 3URJUDP ([HFXWLYH 2IILFH IRU &DUULHUV )XUWKHUPRUH ZH ZRXOG OLNH WR WKDQN 0U %U\DQ &ODUN 'U )UDQN +RIIPDQ DQG 'U -HUU\ +HQGUL[ IRU WKHLU FDUHIXO UHYLHZ RI WKLV ZRUN /DVWO\ ZH ZRXOG OLNH WR WKDQN .DWKOHHQ $ %URZQ DQG WKH VWDII RI WKH +XGVRQ ,QVWLWXWH IRU WKHLU DVVLGXRXV HGLWLQJ DQG SURGXFWLRQ RI WKLV UHSRUW 7KH YLHZV RI WKLV UHSRUW DUH WKH DXWKRUV¶ DORQH DORQJ ZLWK DQ\ SRWHQWLDO HUURUV Ϯ II. PREFACE This study grew out of a January 2015 debate on the future of the large, nuclearpowered aircraft carrier. 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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Key Study Conclusions This study advances three key conclusions: x The Joint Force requires sea-based air power to conduct strike, air warfare, and surveillance. Sea-based air power provides classic naval functions (sea control and power projection) and serves as a key enabler of other Joint Force components necessary for victory in high-end conflict. This demand is growing. x The Carrier Strike Group (CSG), with the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at its core, remains the most effective and efficient means of providing these capabilities across the range of military options. x In order to provide these required capabilities, the Navy must pursue a series of conceptual, capability, and capacity improvements to the CVN, the Carrier Air Wing (CVW), and the CSG. <'ZKhE 7KH QDWLRQ FRQWLQXHV WR UHTXLUH WKH SRZHU DQG WKH -RLQW )RUFH ZRXOG IDFH GLIILFXOW\ IOH[LELOLW\ RI KLJKO\ PRELOH VHD EDVHG DLU SURYLGLQJ²HVSHFLDOO\ DJDLQVW D SHHU RU QHDU SRZHU 6HD EDVHG DLU SRZHU SURYLGHG E\ WKH SHHU WKUHDW ODUJH GHFN DLUFUDIW FDUULHU SOD\V D FUXFLDO UROH LQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ VXSHULRULW\ RYHU SRUWLRQV RI WKH RFHDQ LQ RUGHU WR XVH WKDW FRQWURO WR H[HFXWH RWKHU RSHUDWLRQDO WDVNV RU WR GHQ\ WKH XVH RI WKDW VHD VSDFH WR DQ DGYHUVDU\ 7KH FDUULHU SURYLGHV FULWLFDO VWULNH DLU ZDUIDUH DQG VXUYHLOODQFH FDSDELOLWLHV WKDW RWKHU HOHPHQWV RI 7KH HQFRPSDVVLQJ &6* FRPEDW V\VWHP RI PXWXDOO\ VXSSRUWLQJ FDUULHUV DLUFUDIW VXUIDFH FRPEDWDQWV VXEPDULQHV DQG ORJLVWLFV VKLSV FRQWULEXWHV D XQLTXH FRPELQDWLRQ RI RUJDQLF PRELOLW\ HQGXUDQFH DQG YHUVDWLOLW\ WR D &RPEDWDQW &RPPDQGHU DQG WKH QDWLRQ 0RGHUQ WKUHDWV DUH HYROYLQJ WKDW MHRSDUGL]H ϱ WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKLV FRPEDW V\VWHP LQ WKH H[DPLQHG HVSHFLDOO\ FORVHO\ GXH ODUJHO\ WR LWV PRVW GHPDQGLQJ ZDUWLPH VFHQDULRV ZKLFK LQ FRVW DQG GRXEWV DERXW LWV HIIHFWLYHQHVV LQ WXUQ LPSDFWV WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH -RLQW KLJK HQG FRQIOLFW $W DQ DFTXLVLWLRQ FRVW RI )RUFH 7KLV UHSRUW GHWDLOV KRZ WKH 1DY\ DQG DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ELOOLRQ LQFOXGLQJ LWV WKH QDWLRQ FDQ UHVSRQG WR WKRVH WKUHDWV GHVLJQ FRVW 866 Gerald R. 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YouTUbe Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint 0 Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Force, and High On October 8th. Hudson released the report at an event in the Rayburn House Of?ce Building- Congressman J- Randy Forbes gave keynote remarks on the View on web WeberShandwickDEF . timotnyawalton: I hope SharpeningtheSpear report encourages discussion about structure of Joint Force as a whole .9. i1 a essr'irvasiri x; Aircraft Carriers Same: This Thursday: Carrier Report by Seth: repsey ?The emerging threat environment actually increa?cs the need fur aircraft . . . Name of alternatives 1hr: CVN offer an equal or better capability and capacity across the range. of military options from peacetime presence through maior war power.? 1hr: Spam: The. Carrier, Join! force, and Hrgh-End Institute -.-..- on w; .. I :an . --.-, Iv.? 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'RCDefense Get 14 The Carrier, the Joint Force, High-End Con?ict via ?gigsethcropsey sif;tC0nsWahoo 4;};1timothyawalton 432? if; Viewsummaw ants Fl MES-sages nce:2015?09?1? unti 12 youtu .oerUtiJaawads?r Watcn tne .Q?Huosonmstitute aircran carrier event trom yesterday. YouTUbe Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint 0 Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Force, and High On October 8th. Hudson released the report at an event in the Rayburn House Of?ce Building- Congressman J- Randy Forbes gave keynote remarks on the View on web WeberShandwickDEF . timotnyawalton: I hope SharpeningtheSpear report encourages discussion about structure of Joint Force as a whole .9. i1 Amerita?s Navy Ln E-Z-IEG Grealev launchE-i ham [he I'hgh: (Jed. Cr" :he .wcra?? camer Her-3. 5 human Mm; Cam?ers USS Then-Dore PI: cue-ell .2 - entem 3rd Flt-e! :n final than of deployment Aircraft Carrier! 5 ?55 Them" . IDepart57th Fleet A I A and Enter53rdFleet: Image: AFP Airtra? Earlier; Lust: quqest 3? :-ea Laat wer the Hudsan Insiitute released its .. - - report concluded that: 'For all its cost and vulnerabilities, the aircra? carrier and its strike graup are the best option for the threats facing the - ?f to warm the Hudson lnszitute'? presentation of {he repntt. am v' more infommion on the unique capabilities carriers. lira. rm WeberShandwickDEF $1.66 ossl?ef Cum You're Invited: October 21 Forum on Navy shipbuiiding. RSVP here: bitlys'i Of2p37 hosted by You are invited: DEATH SPIRAL: The Dangers of Not Funding the U.S. Navy Ship and Submarine Building and Maintenance Programs WEDNESDAY. OCTOBER 21 CANNON CAUCUS ROOM 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM Cannon House Office Buiiding Breakwa Ml! be sened Washington, D.C. ADQ TO caggum - i; DEATH SPIRAL: The Dangers of Not Funding the US. Navy Ship and Submarine Building and Maintenance Programs America's Strength Please join us for a forum examining the dangerous situation the United States is facing by a submarine and shipbuilding program that is underfunded and overextended- Chairman Rand},r Forbes House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee-.. Shared by a people: Amphibious Warships Please sign in to see these I ?f 3 Reply "3 Retweet Favorite America's Strength Please sign in to see these Reply Favorite Patrick C. Morrissey Please sign into see these 1 i. Reply 3' Favorite Amphibious Warships Please sign in to see these - 'i ?f 3 Reply Favorite WeberShandwickDEF Please sign in to see these 4 3 .s Reply Favorite chris banner Please sign in to see these Reply Retweet Favorite Aircraft Carriers Please sign in to see these f? 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Expanding Power Projection Options" - Home .- .- Revisiting the Roles and Missions of Disability Access Indmdualswne plan on attending this neanng and recluse an auxlriary aid or SDDUEU contact me Committee a! 202-224-331 at least 3 business days ?1 advance make arrangements Date: Thursday November 5 2015 Tune: 09 30 AM Location: 9.00m Duh-sen Senate Of?ce Eurrding Armed Services Conunifrec SD 4350 Open in New Window Agenda To receive testimony on revisiting the roles and missions of the armed forces. Witnesses WeberShandwickDEF Hex-'4 Congress considers the carrier ?gap' at hearing via ?defenseJews 7 CavasShips WeberShandwickDEF 3. SIZEIeC-alflet' Hm- 4 rUSNavy: 11?2 carrier ?eet in maintenance, ?2 strained to meet demands bittyf?thaqu USNlNews maeday22 Iv n97: 1 America?s Strength .- . -. America's grsat aircraft carrier crisis: lats afdamarid. nat anaugh ships bit i miss flaw-atria; "ants Massages Weher?handwicHDEF -- Hang-cs USNavy struggles ta meat commitments 10 AircraftCarriers TheNatilntarest DavaMajumdar WeberShandwickDEF Experts alarmed at 'strains? on aircraftcarrier fleet via thehill kristma_wong America's Strength Congressional Letter | Advertising | Statement on 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan | Aviation Forum Moderator Remarks Carrier Gap - 6 Critical Issues | Show Our Strength Tour | Facility Tours You are invited: Deploying Beyond Their Means: RSVP The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps at a Tipping Point WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18th RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 10:30 AM - 11:30 AM Room 2226 ADD TO CALENDAR >> Washington, D.C. MAP >> Please join us for the release of a new study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and Navy League America's Strength campaign. The report examines the dangerous and unsustainable levels of stress on the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team due to a fundamental mismatch between the demands placed on them and the size of the force. Please contact Stella Gardner at sgardner@americas-strength.com with questions. CONFIRMED SPEAKERS: Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA-04) Chair, House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Representative Joe Courtney (D-CT-02) Ranking member of Seapower & Projection Subcommittee and co-chair of the Congressional Shipbuilding Caucus Representative Derek Kilmer (D-WA-06) Member of the House Appropriations Committee Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris, USN (Ret.) Former Vice Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff Commander Bryan Clark, USN (Ret.) Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) http://americas-strength.com/csba-report.asp[7/13/2016 12:42:59 PM] Registration for this event is now closed. If you are interested in attending, please contact Stella Gardner at sgardner@americasstrength.com. 0359. m9. m?mammwn gm wcamgw??, >20 Oomvm mm<>z Oran?A er?>z INTRODUCTION: NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE Today the Navy and Marine Corps are facing a fundamental choice: maintain current levels of forward presence and risk breaking the force or reduce presence and restore readiness through adequate training, maintenance, and time at home. This choice is driven by the supply of ready naval forces being too small to meet the demand from Combatant Commanders, as adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense. To close the gap, the Department of Defense (DoD) will need to grow the fleet and force, base more ships overseas, or pay to maintain a higher operating tempo. Global navies are a common attribute of nations with economic and security interests in multiple regions outside their own. The Spanish, Dutch, and British empires all included fleets able to protect their shipping lanes; transport troops to far flung colonies and holdings; and threaten the territories and commerce of their enemies. The United States followed suit as it became a global economic and military power during the 19th century, starting with its Navy’s first deployment against Barbary pirates in 1802 and continuing through the voyage of President Theodore Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” in 1907. A global fleet, however, did not necessarily mean global presence. Through the 19th century the U.S. Navy episodically deployed overseas in response to threats or to send a message to its friends and enemies. Because of its economic interests, the United States stationed ships, Sailors, and Marines in a small number of important overseas ports, such as the South China and Yangtze River patrols in Asia. Generally, these forward forces consisted of small ships with capabilities suited to peacetime maritime security and diplomatic missions. The bulk of the Navy, and all its capital ships, remained based in the United States and only deployed when needed.1 Samuel Huntington characterized this era as the “Continental Era” of U.S. national power. 2 Near the end of the 19th century, this homeland-focused posture began to evolve as the United States consolidated control over the territory between its coasts and navalists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated for a much more proactive posture overseas. This marked the beginning of the American “Oceanic Era” in Huntington’s framework.3 More frequent overseas deployments and the complete transition to coal-powered ships led the Navy during this era to develop a series of overseas facilities where its ships could resupply and refuel. Deployments, however, were still episodic (except in wartime) and forces based overseas remained tailored to peacetime operations.4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 Peter M. Swartz, Sea Changes: Transforming US Navy Deployment Strategy, 1775–2002 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, July 31, 2002). 2 Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” USNI Proceedings, May 1954. 3 This evolution is described in much more detail in Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Work, A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007). 4 Ibid., pp. 44–58. 2 CSBA DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS The expeditionary nature of U.S. overseas deployments changed permanently with World War II. During the war U.S. naval forces deployed worldwide to carry troops and supplies to every theater, protect Allied sea lanes, and eventually deny the use of the seas to Axis powers, particularly Japan. To sustain the effort, the Navy established a network of overseas bases, repair facilities, and refueling stations as well as processes for maintaining deployed forces overseas. After four years of continuous overseas presence during the war, American leaders planned for some U.S. naval forces to remain deployed as a crisis response force for ground troops and civilians supporting reconstruction in Asia and Europe. These ships, Sailors, and Marines also helped restore the ability of America’s allies and former enemies to protect their seaborne commerce and coastlines. At the time, the Navy’s intent was not necessarily to maintain a global overseas presence. Fleet size and continuous naval presence Even as the United States brought most of its forces home and turned to domestic concerns, the Soviet Union emerged as a global geopolitical foe and, later, an existential threat. Deterring Soviet aggression against American allies added a new rationale for the United States to continuously maintain ground, air, and naval forces around the world. The Navy’s part of this effort was demonstrating it could sustain the flow of reinforcements to Europe during a conflict with the Soviet Union and punish Soviet aggression with strikes launched from aircraft carriers in the Northern Atlantic, Eastern Mediterranean, and Western Pacific. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) James D. Watkins eventually codified this approach publically in his 1986 maritime strategy. 5 This approach to deterrence created the need for three “hubs” of naval presence in the Mediterranean, Eastern Atlantic, and Western Pacific. Each hub was centered on a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) consisting of an aircraft carrier (CV) and its cruiser and destroyer escorts and an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consisting of three to four amphibious ships and associated landing craft. U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) joined CVBGs starting in the early 1980s to protect CVs from the growing number of quiet Soviet submarines carrying anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), such as the Oscar-class guided missile submarine (SSGN) and Akula-class SSNs. In 1981, the incoming President and Secretary of the Navy proposed the nation pursue a 600-ship fleet. This overall fleet size reflected, in part, the political objective of showing American strength to the Soviet Union, but it also reflected the fleet size needed to sustain three hubs of continuous overseas presence.6 The 600-ship requirement marked the first time fleet size requirements were derived in large part from plans for the continuous deployment of naval forces. Previous fleet size requirements were based on factors such as the number of ships maintained by potential enemies, treaty limitations, budgets, or the number of support vessels or escorts needed for each capital ship. The explicit intent to maintain deployed presence also highlighted the value of forward-based forces. Although forces based in the Continental United States (CONUS) and those homeported overseas conduct maintenance and training between deployments, forward forces have shorter transit times and can maintain a higher operational tempo. This enables a forward-based ship to maintain the same level of operational presence as two or more CONUS-based ships. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," USNI Proceedings, January 1982, pp. 2–16. 6 Rudy Abramson, "Reagan Renews Vow for 600-Ship Navy: 'Way to Prevent War Is to Be Prepared for It,' He Tells Academy Class," Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1985. www.csbaonline.org The United States took advantage of forward-basing during the Cold War and U.S. naval forces were eventually homeported in Japan, the Philippines, Bahrain, Spain, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom, Iceland, and Norway, among other countries. While forward basing had been a feature of the U.S. Navy since the 19th century, a significant difference in the Cold War was that front-line capital ships and aircraft were stationed overseas rather than remaining safely ensconced in CONUS. There were both strategic and operational advantages to this. Strategically, basing warfighting forces forward reduced American response time, showing the Soviets that aggression may be promptly defeated or that punishment would be swift. Further, forward-based forces helped demonstrate American resolve to allies and partners concerned by the oceans separating them from the United States. Operationally, forward-based forces provide more forward presence, or enable the same presence to be maintained by a smaller overall fleet. FIGURE 1: COLD WAR (CIRCA 1980) U.S. OVERSEAS NAVAL BASES7 At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the U.S. Navy could have returned to its pre-war models and deployed episodically while maintaining most of the fleet at home. Instead, it sustained continuous overseas naval presence into the 1990s and beyond. Initially this posture reflected the need for stability in the face of the Soviet Union’s uneven and sometimes chaotic dissolution over several years. But the United States maintained continuous overseas naval presence even after this process completed and NATO began to expand into former Warsaw Pact nations through the 1990s. Forward naval presence had gone from being an element of a specific national strategy in World War II and the Cold War to being a fundamental avenue through which the United States exerted its power. Maritime strategies in the 1990s codified this approach, as the 1986 strategy had done for the competition with the Soviets. In “From the Sea” and “Forward… From the Sea” the Department of the Navy described strategic concepts for using forward naval forces to respond to crises, deter -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7 Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200–2000 (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 98–101. 3 4 CSBA DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS aggression, and maintain freedom of the seas against an undefined set of potential state and nonstate adversaries.8 These concepts emphasized characteristics of naval forces that make them well suited to address a less structured security environment in which multiple smaller-scale actors could impact U.S. interests, as opposed to the large monolithic threat posed by the Soviet Union. For example, naval forces can operate forward for extended periods without having to secure diplomatic clearances, install expensive fixed infrastructure, or generate a potentially disruptive “footprint” on foreign soil. Further, their mobility enables them to shift from one theater to another and rapidly aggregate or disaggregate depending on the location, size, and type of operation intended. The use of forward deployed naval forces to not only address threats, but also advance U.S. interests, was emphasized in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in 2007. CS21, as the strategy was abbreviated, asserted “The ability to sustain operations in international waters far from our shores constitutes a distinct advantage for the United States—a Western Hemisphere nation separated from many of its strategic interests by vast oceans.” 9 Further, the strategy tied naval presence to protection of the global economic system, given the preponderance of U.S. military power at the time and America’s central role in global financial and commercial markets. The newest maritime strategy, Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, continues to highlight forward presence as a central part of the naval value proposition.10 Like previous strategies and strategic concepts, it argues that forward naval forces enable deterrence, rapid crisis response, partner training, and maritime security. Notably, the new strategy names specific competitors such as China, Russia, and Iran as reasons for maintaining forward presence in relevant regions around the world-- the first time since the Cold War a naval strategy explicitly identified the need to deter and, if necessary, defeat specific potential adversaries. The evolution of naval strategy and concepts from advocating a regional fleet to a global navy to a globally present navy reflected the expanding influence and reach of the United States. However, the fleet’s size did not necessarily follow suit. The Navy reached a post-World War II peak in size during the 1980s, when the first maritime strategy to tie presence to ship count was promulgated. As will be highlighted in the next section, the fleet has been shrinking ever since–despite the fact every subsequent strategy document continued to assert the value and need for forward presence. TODAY’S READINESS CHALLENGE The Navy’s battle force is currently composed of about 272 ships. However, only a portion of the fleet is available for operational use at any given time. Vessels adhere to a cycle that rotates them and their crews through maintenance, training, and deployment periods. Historically, the Navy has planned for its ships to execute cycles consisting of a single 6 to 7 month deployment in a 24 to 32 month period. 11 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8 Sean O’Keefe, Frank Kelso, and Carl Mundy, From the Sea (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 1992), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/fromsea/fromsea.txt; and John Dalton, Jeremy Boorda, and Carl Mundy, Forward… From the Sea (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 1994), available at http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/navy/b014.pdf. 9 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), p. 21. 10 Joseph Dunford, Jonathan Greenert, and Paul Zunkunft, Forward, Engaged Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 2015), p. 9. 11 Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence with a Smaller Fleet (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, March 2015), p. 9. www.csbaonline.org The Navy and Marine Corps deploy in response to requests from regional Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) that are approved by the Secretary of Defense as part of the Global Force Management process. There is a natural tension between COCOMs, who want to maximize the number of naval assets they have to employ, and naval force planners, who must balance the requests of all the COCOMs with the need to give crews and ships time to carry out maintenance, upgrade systems, and conduct training. The last two decades have been busy ones for the Navy. Between 1998 and 2014, the number of ships deployed overseas remained roughly constant at 100. The fleet, however, shrank by about 20 percent. As a result, each ship is working harder to maintain the same level of presence. For example, the share of underway ships that were deployed rather than training near their home ports rose from 62 percent in 1998 to a high of 86 percent in 2009 before declining to approximately 74 percent in 2015, as shown in Figure 2. FIGURE 2: NAVY SHIPS DEPLOYED AND UNDERWAY 1998–2014 12 9;6 966 8;6 999 # # 89 C 8666 8668 ) " ( " # "* + 866: 866< 866> $ ' " 8676 8678 867: ) " ( " # + Figure 2 also shows that the percentage of time each ship spent at sea went up over the last decade, since the size of the fleet went down and the number of ships underway rose or stayed the same. For example, operating tempo (OPTEMPO), a measurement of the time a ship spends at sea, increased by eight percent throughout the fleet between 2001 and 2009 and grew by 18 percent for surface combatants.13 Excessive OPTEMPO affects naval readiness in a number of ways, but most significantly by reducing the time available for maintenance. And when critical tasks are deferred long enough, the consequences can be severe. In 2011 and 2012, the flagship of Expeditionary Strike Group 8, -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12 Data from CSBA analysis and from Danil Whiteneck, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Schwartz, The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 2010). 13 Rear Admiral Joseph F. Campbell, “Readiness and Sustainment of the Navy’s Surface Fleet,” Hearing before the of the House Armed Services Committee, Readiness Subcommittee, March 25, 2009. 5 6 CSBA DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS the USS Essex, had to severely curtail its role in one major Pacific exercise and cancel its participation in another due to mechanical problems caused by skipping maintenance to satisfy operational requirements.14 Similarly, after being ordered to respond to the 2010 Haitian earthquake just one month following a seven-month deployment, the amphibious landing ship USS Bataan suffered a double failure of its evaporators and was forced to delay rescue operations in order to take on 40,000 gallons of water from a nearby supply ship. 15 The extended OPTEMPO of the last few years—combined with interrupted work at Navy shipyards caused by sequestration resulting from the Budget Control Act (BCA)—has resulted in a backlog of deferred maintenance for the nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) fleet. The backlog culminated in late 2015 with a Persian Gulf “carrier gap” between the departure of the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the arrival of the USS Harry S Truman. A second carrier gap will occur in the Pacific in 2016 and gaps will reoccur intermittently in both theaters until 2021, when the USS Gerald R. Ford becomes operationally available.16 The experience of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower illustrates how delaying repairs can play havoc with future requirements planning: two back-to-back deployments in 2012 and 2013 took so large a toll on the vessel’s material condition that its subsequent maintenance period lasted 23 months—a full 65 percent longer than was originally planned for.17 The “heel-to-toe” deployment schedule necessary to service today’s high presence levels has also exacerbated the impact of the BCA budget caps on surge capacity. Normally, the Navy and Marine Corps can surge three carrier strike groups (CSGs) and three amphibious ready groups (ARGs) forward within 60 days in the event of crisis. This is possible because groups that recently returned from deployment are maintained ready for several months through continued operations and training, and groups preparing for deployment are ready several weeks before they depart. With the above maintenance problems and less readiness funding, groups largely shutdown when they return from deployment and groups preparing to deploy are ready just in time to leave. As a result, the Navy and Marine Corps are now only able to surge one CSG and one ARG.18 The impacts of a high OPTEMPO have been felt just as severely by crews. As deployments get longer, Sailors have seen their time at home shortened. Between 2012 and 2014, the USS John C. Stennis was deployed for 15 of 24 months. One Sailor remarked that “we have missed two Thanksgivings, Christmases, New Year’s and many other holidays. …After the past two years, I have realized that I am not cut out for this work.” 19 A 2014 survey of over 5,000 Sailors by Navy officers Guy Snodgrass and Ben Kohlman found that 49.8 percent of enlisted personnel and 65.5 percent of officers thought the current OPTEMPO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14 Matthew M. Burke, “USS Essex unable to fulfill mission for 2nd time in seven months,” Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2012. 15 Bill Cook, “Unrep ships critical platforms for Haitian relief,” Sealift, March 2010; and "USS Bataan (LHD 5) Cruise Book: 2009 Deployment," available at http://www.navysite.de/cruisebooks/lhd5-09/index.html. 16 Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Half the Carrier Fleet Tied Up In Maintenance, Other 5 Strained To Meet Demands,” USNI News, November 4, 2015, available at http://news.usni.org/2015/11/04/navy-half-the-carrier-fleet-tied-up-inmaintenance-other-5-strained-to-meet-demands. 17 Ryan T. Tewell, “Assessing the U.S. Aircraft Carrier Gap in the Gulf,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 5, 2015, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-the-u.s.-aircraftcarrier-gap-in-the-gulf. 18 Megan Eckstein, "CNO Greenert: Navy Could Fix Readiness Shortfall by 2020 if Sequestration is Avoided," USNI News, March 10, 2015, available at http://news.usni.org/2015/03/10/cno-greenert-navy-could-fix-readinessshortfall-by-2020-if-sequestration-is-avoided; Jonathan W. Greenert, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense on FY 2016 Department of the Navy Posture, March 4, 2015. 19 Sam Fellman, “8-Month Deployments Become the ‘New Norm',” Navy Times, December 2, 2013. www.csbaonline.org was too high.20 This can hinder the Navy’s efforts to retain talented people who may have employment options outside military service; Navy analysis estimates that longer and more frequent deployments can negatively impact reenlistment rates by between 1.3 and 1.9 percent.21 The Navy also determined that Sailors have a strong preference for more predictable deployment cycles and Navy leaders have repeatedly cited the extension of deployments mid-cruise as adversely impacting morale and retention.22 To address these challenges, the Navy is implementing a new readiness cycle called the Optimized-Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP) for CVNs, guided missile destroyers (DDGs), and guided missile cruisers (CGs)23. Figure 3 depicts the new O-FRP cycle and, for comparison, the cycle that will continue to be used by amphibious ships. FIGURE 3: O-FRP AND AMPHIBIOUS SHIP READINESS CYCLES "" "# 0 (" " . % , $ # # 19< #2 + $ $ (#$ $ $ 3 # " $ " $ " % $ * " (# # 18= $ #2 + $ (#$ $ # " $ # " $ " $ " -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------20 “2014 Survey Report,” 2014 Navy Retention Study, September 1, 2014, p. 23, available at http://www.dodretention.org/. 21 Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence with a Smaller Fleet, p. 11. 22 David Larter, “CNO Warns Budget Cuts Will Hurt Morale, Readiness,” Navy Times, January 28, 2015. 23 The previous FRP cycle included a single 7-month deployment in a 32-month cycle. 7 8 CSBA DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS The goal of O-FRP is to bring predictability to the readiness cycle and limit deployments to a maximum period of eight months. In addition, O-FRP seeks to align the deployment cycles of carriers and the large surface combatants that make up their battle groups so that the combined carrier battle group (CVG) can form for training earlier in the pre-deployment work-up period. A key component of O-FRP is a 15-month sustainment period following a deployment. During sustainment, ships, aircraft, and their crews are intended to maintain their combat certifications and remain ready to deploy as part of a possible surge force. 24 Initially the O-FRP is only being applied to carriers and large surface combatants. Amphibious ships, small surface combatants such as Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and submarines have different readiness cycles. The Navy intends to expand the O-FRP model to amphibious ships in the next several years, but other classes of ships and Marines will prepare for, conduct, and recover from deployment on different schedules. THE LOOMING PRESENCE CRISIS The central force structure challenge facing the Navy and Marine Corps today is that demand for naval forces exceeds the supply they can sustainably deliver. Both services have been maintaining a higher level of presence than they typically plan for by extending deployments, deploying more than once per readiness cycle, and basing more ships overseas. The impacts of this approach are degraded material condition and reduced morale and, counterintuitively, reduced presence or gaps when ships and crews are unable to deploy on time. The O-FRP, when implemented, will better enable some naval forces to complete training and maintenance between deployments. However, it will also reduce the presence they can deliver overseas because it shifts from today’s eight-month (or more) deployment in a 32-month cycle for carriers and surface combatants to a single eight-month deployment in a 36-month cycle. This means each ship goes from spending about 25 percent of its time deployed to about 22 percent of its time deployed. Sustaining today’s presence as O-FRP is implemented, and potentially expanded to amphibious ships, will require that ships deploy for longer than eight months or deploy a second time during their 15-month sustainment period. This would begin to put the fleet back into the situation it faces today. A shrinking fleet Another factor reducing the supply of deployable forces is the shrinking fleet. As shown in Figure 2, the Navy’s battle force (ships able to conduct or directly support combat operations) drew down from 333 ships in 1998 to 271 ships in 2015. This resulted from a combination of construction rates that fell by about half in the early 2000s and a high rate of retirements to reduce costs for manning and modernizing older frigates and CGs. The fleet is anticipated to grow slowly over the next several years as retirements taper off and increased construction starting in the late 2000s begins to deliver hulls to the fleet. It is unlikely, however, that the Navy will be able to significantly grow the fleet. Its current shipbuilding plan requires $5 to$7 billion more per year than the historical average over the last 30 years. The Navy may be compelled to revise this plan to meet fiscal constraints. Over the next three decades, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculated that the Navy’s FY2016 shipbuilding plan will require over $552 billion (in constant 2015 dollars) worth of ship -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24 Megan Eckstein, “Admirals: Fleet Readiness Plan Could Leave Carrier Gaps, Overwhelm Shipyards,” USNI News, September 9, 2016, available at http://news.usni.org/2015/09/09/admirals-fleet-readiness-plan-could-leavecarrier-gaps-overwhelm-shipyards; and Bill Gortney, “Predictability and Adaptability: West 2014,” Power Point Presentation, United States Fleet Forces, February 12, 2014, available at http://www.afcea.org/events/west/14/documents/WEST2014PresentationFinalGortney.pdf. www.csbaonline.org purchases. If the plan is executed as written, the average cost of new-ship construction will be approximately $18.4 billion per year. The plan would be 32 percent more expensive than the Navy’s historical average annual shipbuilding budgets. 25 In order to assess the Navy’s capacity to sustain forward presence under different levels of shipbuilding funding, this study examines the Navy’s FY2016 $18.4 billion shipbuilding plan and three alternative plans averaging $13 billion, $11.5 billion, and $10 billion per year. Under the current shipbuilding plan, the Navy expects the battle fleet to reach a high of 321 ships in 2028 before declining to 305 ships by 2045. All three of the alternative plans would result in a fleet of fewer than 300 ships. Notably, none of the shipbuilding plans (including the Navy’s own plan) would enable the Navy to sustain the global presence it maintains today. Figure 4 illustrates the cost of the Navy’s proposed plan compared to the alternative plans and Table 1 describes the battle force inventory associated with each plan. FIGURE 4: NAVY AND ALTERNATIVE SHIPBUILDING PLANS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------25 An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, October 2015), p. 3. 9 10 CSBA DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS TABLE 1: BATTLE FORCE INVENTORY ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SHIPBUILDING PLAN T he impact of forward basing Figure 2 shows the Navy grew the number and percentage of ships based overseas in the Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) to increase forward presence. Today FDNF ships, aircraft, Sailors, and Marines provide about one quarter of overseas naval presence and the Navy plans to expand its FDNF contingent to a third of forward presence in 2024.26 In the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility (AOR), much of Seventh Fleet’s requirements are met by forces homeported or operating in Japan, Guam, and Singapore. Sixth Fleet, supporting U.S. European Command, includes four FDNF DDGs based in Rota, Spain.27 And in U.S. Central Command, 10 Patrol Coastal (PC) and four Mine Countermeasures (MCM) ships are homeported in Bahrain. 28 Forward-based forces are able to provide more presence than those based in CONUS for several reasons: • • • They either do not have to transit to and from their operating areas or have a much shorter transit time than their CONUS-based counterparts. They do not undergo deep maintenance periods such as overhauls. When an overhaul is due, the ship or aircraft is swapped out with a new platform. The crew generally swaps out as well and remains forward with the new ship. They do not conduct extensive retraining between operational periods. Because they operate so often, forward based ship and aircraft crews are often able to maintain a higher level of proficiency than their CONUS-based counterparts. As a result of these factors, FDNF forces execute a different rotational readiness cycle than CONUS-based forces. The FDNF cycle is depicted in Figure 5. While FDNF forces are often described as being fully deployed (i.e., each unit provides a “1.0” presence), they are only operationally available about two-thirds of the time. This is much more than CONUS-based forces, but not the same as having a fully operational unit available for tasking all the time. The calculations in this report will assume a FDNF ship is “present” only 67 percent of the time, to ensure these forces can conduct the maintenance and training needed between operational periods. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------26 Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence With a Smaller Fleet, p. 19. 27 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Creates New Ballistic Missile and Air Defense Task Force for Europe,” USNI News, July 27, 2015, available at http://news.usni.org/2015/07/27/navy-creates-new-ballistic-missile-defense-air-defense-taskforce-for-europe. 28 Of note, PCs are not counted as part of the Navy battle force. See "Document: Mabus Notification to Congress on New Navy ‘Battle Force’ Tally," USNI News, March 11, 2014, available at http://news.usni.org/2014/03/11/documentmabus-notification-congress-new-navy-battle-force-tally. www.csbaonline.org A BOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Bryan Clark is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Mr. Clark was special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and director of his Commander’s Action Group, where he led development of Navy strategy and implemented new initiatives in electromagnetic spectrum operations, undersea warfare, expeditionary operations, and personnel and readiness management. Mr. Clark served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004 to 2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. His areas of emphasis were modeling and simulation, strategic planning, and institutional reform and governance. Prior to retiring from the Navy in 2007, Mr. Clark was an enlisted and officer submariner, serving in afloat and ashore submarine operational and training assignments, including tours as chief engineer and operations officer at the Navy’s nuclear power training unit. Mr. Clark holds an M.S. in national security studies from the National War College and a B.S. in chemistry and philosophy from the University of Idaho. He is the recipient of the Department of the Navy Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit. Jesse Sloman is a Research Assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to joining CSBA in 2015, Mr. Sloman worked for the Council on Foreign Relations and served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. He holds a B.A. in political science from Tufts University and is a recipient of the Marine Corps Association’s MajGen Michael E. Ennis Award for Literary Excellence. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 25 26 CSBA DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS The authors would like to thank the CSBA staff for their assistance with this report. Special thanks go to Kamilla Gunzinger for her production assistance and expert editing. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the responsibility of the authors. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 166? Street, NW. Suite 900 Washington. DC 20006 Tel. 202-331?7990 - Fax 202-331-8019 Deploying y g Beyond y Their Means: America’s Navy p at a Tipping pp g Point and Marine Corps Media Coverage Report x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Report: Strain on sailors, fleet reaches tipping point, Navy Times, November 18, 2015 Bryan Clark: Navy’s ‘shrink or swim’ dilemma, Federal News Radio, November 19, 2015 More Ships Can’t Save Overworked Navy; Basing Ships Abroad Can: CSBA, Breaking Defense, November 18, 2015 Report: Corps could struggle to meet future missions, Marine Corps Times, November 19, 2015 Report: Navy needs massive annual spending on shipbuilding, Stars and Stripes, November 18, 2015 Unsustainable Pace of Naval Deployments Stirs Concerns, National Defense Magazine, November 18, 2015 Analysts: Presence Demands, Maintenance Deferment Threaten Navy, Marine Corps Readiness, Seapower Magazine, November 18, 2015 Two USN Carriers in Japan?, Defense News, November 18, 2015 Second Forward Deployed Aircraft Carrier In Pacific Could Help Navy Meet Readiness Needs, Study Says, Defense Daily, November 18, 2015 Deploying Beyond Their Means: The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps at a Tipping Point, National Interest, November 18, 2015 CSBA: U.S. Navy Must Choose Between Presence, Readiness, Aviation Week, November 18, 2015 Report: Navy and Marine Corps Strained to Breaking Point; Second Forward Carrier in the Pacific Could Help, USNI News, November 19, 2015 Report: Overworked Navy at a tipping point, Daily Press, November 27, 2015 Think tank calls for second US carrier in Japan, Nikkei Asian Review, November 27, 2015 Low-power warning, Daily Press, December 2, 2015 Search Twitter - #AmericasStrength "There is a big need for these [U.S. Navy] ships and their capabilities - now." @RepDerekKilmer #AmericasStrength @NavyLeagueUS @CSBA_ View details ? Nov 18 SEAPOWER Team @SeapowerMag Team Seapower is covering this event as well. Anxious to hear the findings of the @CSBA_ report. #AmericasStrength twitter.com/navyleagueus/s... View details ? Nov 2 Navy League @navyleaguehr #cnv78date #bestcommissiomingever #americasstrength View details ? Oct 13 America's Strength @USNavyStrength Happy 240th birthday to the @USNavy! #AmericasStrength #240NavyBday pic.twitter.com/5ZccAxRKXL View photo ? Load older Tweets Back to top ? Turn images off https://mobile.twitter.com/hashtag/AmericasStrength?src=hash[7/13/2016 12:32:43 PM] VOLUME 5, ISSUE 4 Winter 2015 NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES www.navyleague.org ǻËr ŗ əɳ ĵr µȕrNJ Fly-In Brings NL Concerns to Congress By PETER ATKINSON Deputy Editor, Seapower magazine WASHINGTON — Navy Leaguers from around the counWU\ ³ÀHZ LQ´ WR &DSLWRO +LOO 'HF IRU D VHULHV RI PHHWLQJV DQG EULH¿QJV ZLWK PHPEHUV RI &RQJUHVV IURP WKHLU UHVSHFtive regions to stress the need for their support of the U.S. sea services. The broad-based presentations focused on the sea serYLFHV¶ UROH DV WKH ¿UVW OLQH RI GHIHQVH IRU WKH QDWLRQ 1DY\ 0DULQH &RUSV &RDVW *XDUG DQG PDULWLPH WUDGH SULRULWLHV the Navy League’s America’s Strength Campaign to ensure VHD VHUYLFH IXQGLQJ QHHGV DUH PHW DQG EXGJHWDU\ FRQFHUQV 6SHFL¿F SRLQWV LQFOXGHG VXSSRUW IRU D VKLS 1DY\ D ÀHHW RI QR OHVV WKDQ DPSKLELRXV VKLSV DQG D 0DULQH &RUSV HQG VWUHQJWK RI DW OHDVW WURRSV IXOO IXQGLQJ for Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutter procurement and a new polar icebreaker, enforcing Cargo Preference and the Jones Act as well as increasing the Maritime Security Program, and ending sequestration and re-establishing budget process order. Split into more than two-dozen teams, 76 Navy League UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV IDQQHG RXW DPRQJ WKH OHJLVODWLYH RI¿FH buildings to make 217 presentations to senators, representatives or their staffs during the Anchors Aweigh Fly-In. 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