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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
C ATHLEEN C OLVIN , individually and as
parent and next friend of minors C.A.C.
and L.A.C., heirs-at-law and beneficiaries
of the estate of M ARIE C OLVIN , and
JUSTINE ARAYA-COLVIN, heir-at-law and
beneficiary of the estate of MARIE COLVIN,
c/o Center for Justice & Accountability,
One Hallidie Plaza, Suite 406,
San Francisco, CA 94102

Civil No. __________________
Complaint For
Extrajudicial Killing,
28 U.S.C. § 1605A

Plaintiffs,
v.
S YRIAN ARAB R EPUBLIC ,
c/o Foreign Minister Walid al-Mualem
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kafar Soussa, Damascus, Syria
Defendant.

COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Cathleen Colvin and Justine Araya-Colvin allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1.

On February 22, 2012, Marie Colvin, an American reporter hailed by

many of her peers as the greatest war correspondent of her generation, was assassinated
by Syrian government agents as she reported on the suffering of civilians in Homs,
Syria—a city beseiged by Syrian military forces.

Acting in concert and with

premeditation, Syrian officials deliberately killed Marie Colvin by launching a targeted
rocket attack against a makeshift broadcast studio in the Baba Amr neighborhood of

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Homs where Colvin and other civilian journalists were residing and reporting on the
siege.
2.

The rocket attack was the object of a conspiracy formed by senior

members of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (the “Assad regime”) to
surveil, target, and ultimately kill civilian journalists in order to silence local and
international media as part of its effort to crush political opposition.
3.

At the time of the attack, the Baba Amr neighborhood of Homs was the

epicenter of opposition groups that sought to oust President Bashar al-Assad and end four
decades of autocratic rule by the Assad family. Beginning on or around February 4,
2012, Syrian military and intelligence forces launched a scorched-earth campaign against
Baba Amr, laying siege to the neighborhood and subjecting the civilian population to
systematic artillery and sniper fire.
4.

As part of the siege of Baba Amr, the Assad regime hunted down

journalists and media activists who sought to expose these atrocities to the world.
Dubbed a “YouTube revolution,” the Syrian uprising against the Assad regime spread
nationwide through online, social-media networks. After the Assad regime restricted
foreign press, Syrian “citizen journalists” 1 shared amateur videos through Skype,
YouTube, and Facebook, becoming a wellspring for the global media.
5.

Baba Amr was at the center of this citizen journalism.

During the

February 2012 siege of Baba Amr, a local poet and media activist known as Khaled Abu
Salah2 and a group of citizen journalists set up the Baba Amr Media Center (“Media
1

The term “citizen journalists” refers to private individuals who are not media professionals, but who
gather and report information using cell phones, personal computers, and online social media, and
disseminate news to local or foreign media outlets.
2

“Khaled Abu Salah” is the popular pseudonym of Adnan al-Hamid.

2

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Center”), a makeshift broadcast studio at a secret location in the ground-floor apartment
of a three-story house. Those reporting from the Media Center were non-combatant
civilians who operated independently from the armed rebel groups fighting against the
Assad regime. They did not participate in hostilities. Instead, they produced video blogs
to expose the Assad regime’s deliberate attacks on civilians. They also hosted foreign
journalists seeking to report on the ongoing siege of Baba Amr. Marie Colvin was one of
the most prominent of these foreign journalists.
6.

In February 2012, Colvin traveled to Baba Amr with British photographer

Paul Conroy and Syrian translator Wael al-Omar on assignment for the British newspaper
The Sunday Times. They slept in the back room of the apartment housing the Media
Center and were eventually joined by a group of French and Spanish journalists.
7.

Throughout February 2012, the Assad regime received tips from

intelligence sources in Lebanon that Colvin and other foreign journalists were traveling to
Syria through Lebanon and reporting from the Baba Amr Media Center. Acting on these
tips, senior members of the Assad regime formed a plan to intercept the journalists’
communications, track their movement to locate the Media Center, and kill the journalists
with artillery fire.
8.

This plan was formulated at the highest levels of the Syrian government

by members of the Central Crisis Management Cell, a special war cabinet created by
President Bashar al-Assad to oversee the crackdown on the democratic opposition. These
members included, among others, MAHER

AL-ASSAD,

brother of President Bashar al-

Assad and commander of the elite 4th Armored Division of the Syrian Army, and MAJOR
GENERAL ALI MAMLUK, Head of the General Intelligence Directorate. The plan was

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implemented by the Homs Military-Security Committee, which oversaw military and
intelligence operations in Homs, under the command of BRIGADIER GENERAL RAFIQ
SHAHADAH. The plan was executed by Syrian military forces under the command of
MAJOR GENERAL ISSAM ZAHREDDINE of the Syrian Republican Guard, LIEUTENANT
COLONEL MUHAMMAD KENAN GHALIYA of the Syrian Special Forces, and other officers
of the Syrian army. These government forces acted in concert with a paramilitary death
squad known as the “shabiha” (Arabic for “ghosts”). Members of the shabiha operated
as clandestine agents of the Assad regime under the supervision of Maher al-Assad.
9.

The plan to attack the Media Center culminated on February 21, 2012.

That night, Marie Colvin made audio broadcasts via satellite dish to CNN, BBC News,
and Channel 4 from inside the Media Center. “There are rockets, shells, tank shells, antiaircraft being fired in parallel lines into the city,” she told CNN’s Anderson Cooper.
“The Syrian Army is simply shelling a city of cold, starving civilians.” 3

Syrian

intelligence forces intercepted Colvin’s broadcast signal and traced it to a location inside
Baba Amr.
10.

That same night, an Assad regime informant tipped off the leadership of

the Homs Military-Security Committee that foreign journalists were present at the Media
Center and revealed the precise location. Acting on the tip, General Shahadah, as Chief
of the Homs Military-Security Committee, and Khaled al-Fares, a shabiha militia leader,
contacted the office of Maher al-Assad to share the tip and form a plan of action. General
Shahadah subsequently met with Lt. Col. Ghaliya of the Syrian Special Forces, and other
military and intelligence officials, to debrief the informant. Officials spent the rest of the

3

Video: Marie Colvin’s Last Call to CNN, CNN (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:25 AM),
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/22/video-journalist-syrias-government-lies/.

4

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night working to verify the location of Colvin and the other journalists.

General

Shahadah determined that the informant’s description of the Media Center matched the
location of Colvin’s intercepted satellite broadcast signal. General Shahadah, Major
General Zahreddine, Lt. Col. Ghaliya, and others prepared to conduct a premeditated
artillery attack against the civilian Media Center.
11.

The next morning, on February 22, 2012, Syrian artillery units around

Homs deliberately launched salvos of rockets and mortars directly at the Media Center.
Using a targeting method called “bracketing,” multiple rockets were launched to either
side of the Media Center, drawing closer with each round. Scrambling in panic, Media
Center activists and journalists began to evacuate the three-story house.
12.

As Colvin and French photographer Rémi Ochlik rushed together into the

front foyer of the Media Center, a rocket slammed into the ground directly outside the
front door of the house. The blast killed Colvin and Ochlik. It also shattered a wooden
door leading to the main room of the Media Center. Shrapnel and debris from the
explosion struck Colvin’s colleagues Paul Conroy and Wael al-Omar, and the French
reporter Edith Bouvier, who were still inside the Media Center, causing them severe
injuries.
13.

Survivors from the initial volleys of rocket fire ran into the street in front

of the Media Center.

There, an aerial surveillance aircraft operated by Syrian

government forces circled overhead. The Syrian artillery units adjusted their targets
away from the Media Center and began firing shells into the street, targeting survivors
and emergency responders. Although seriously injured, Paul Conroy, Wael al-Omar, and
Edith Bouvier survived the attack.

5

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14.

There were no lawful military targets in the vicinity of the Media Center at

the time of the attack on February 22, 2012. No armed rebels were present in or around
the Media Center. The occupants targeted by the Assad regime were unarmed civilians.
15.

Plaintiffs bring this action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the
extrajudicial killing of Marie Colvin.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
16.

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ action and

personal jurisdiction over Defendant the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330 and 1605A, which provide for jurisdiction over all civil actions for personal
injury or death of a national of the United States caused by acts of extrajudicial killing
carried out by state sponsors of terrorism and their officials, employees, and agents.
17.

Plaintiffs have afforded the Syrian Arab Republic a reasonable

opportunity to arbitrate the claims in this action as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a).
Plaintiffs have made an offer to arbitrate in accordance with accepted international rules
of arbitration contemporaneous with this Complaint.
18.

Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4).
THE PARTIES
Plaintiffs

19.

Plaintiff CATHLEEN COLVIN is the sister of MARIE COLVIN and a United

States citizen. She brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children, C.A.C. and L.A.C., who are heirs-at-law and beneficiaries of the estate of Marie
Colvin pursuant to Marie Colvin’s last will and testament.

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20.

Plaintiff JUSTINE ARAYA-COLVIN is the niece of Marie Colvin and a

United States citizen. She brings this action on her own behalf as an heir-at-law and
beneficiary of the estate of Marie Colvin pursuant to Marie Colvin’s last will and
testament.
21.

Marie Colvin was a citizen of the United States, born in New York City

on January 12, 1956. At the time of her death, on February 22, 2012, Colvin was a
resident of London, England. In her 25 years writing for the British newspaper The
Sunday Times, Colvin became renowned for her victim-centered dispatches from the war
zones of the world. Marie Colvin’s award-winning career as a war reporter extended
from the 1987 siege of Basra in the Iran-Iraq war to the 2012 siege of Baba Amr in the
Syrian civil war. She worked with relentless courage to expose crimes against humanity,
human rights abuses, and the ravages of war around the world, including in East Timor,
where her reporting was credited with averting a massacre of refugees, and in Sri Lanka,
where a grenade blinded her in one eye. After covering wars in Chechnya, the Balkans,
Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Libya, Colvin described the 2012 bombardment of Homs, Syria
as the worst conflict zone she had ever seen.4
Defendant
22.

Defendant the SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (“Syria”) is governed by a single

party under the control of President Bashar al-Assad, Secretary of the Regional Branch of
the Arab Socialist Baath Party (“Baath Party”). Since December 29, 1979, Syria has
been designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the United States, in accordance with the
Export Administration Act of 1979. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,956 (May 21, 1980). Moreover,

4

Video: Marie Colvin’s Last Call to CNN, CNN (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:25 AM),
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/22/video-journalist-syrias-government-lies/.

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since August 17, 2011, the United States has subjected Syria to sanctions due to “the
Government of Syria’s continuing escalation of violence against the people of Syria.”
Exec. Order No. 13,582, Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting
Certain Transactions with Respect to Syria, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209 (Aug. 22, 2011).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
23.

Syria has been governed by the dictatorial rule of the Assad family since

1971, when a military coup brought Hafez al-Assad to power as President and Secretary
of the Baath Party. Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Hafez al-Assad, as President
and Secretary of the Baath Party in 2000.
24.

In the four decades of the Assad family’s rule, the Baath Party has

dominated all aspects of political, economic, and social life in Syria. The Assad family
has ensured loyalty and control through two pillars of support: (1) the “mukhabarat,” a
feared network of intelligence agencies 5 modeled after the secret police of the former
Soviet bloc, and (2) the Syrian military (collectively, the “Syrian military and intelligence
forces”). The Syrian military and intelligence forces have routinely surveilled, tortured,
and summarily executed perceived opponents of the Assad regime.
II. THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION OF 2011 AND THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR IN HOMS
25.

In early 2011, a wave of protests known as the “Arab Spring” swept the

Middle East, demanding democratic and economic reforms. Beginning in mid-March
2011, largely peaceful protests inspired by the Arab Spring took place across Syria in

5

The Syrian mukhabarat includes four independent intelligence agencies: the General Intelligence
Directorate, Military Intelligence Directorate, Air Force Intelligence Directorate, and Political Security
Directorate.

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response to the torture of 15 schoolboys arrested for writing anti-government graffiti in
the southern city of Deraa.
26.

The Assad regime responded with a violent crackdown on protests. In late

March 2011, the regime adopted a nationwide strategy to crush the democratic
opposition, using the Syrian military and intelligence forces and militias loyal to the
Assad family, known as the shabiha. This strategy was overseen by a central war cabinet
and by regional security committees that coordinated military, intelligence, and militia
operations in each of Syria’s 14 provinces.
27.

On or around March 27, 2011, President Bashar al-Assad established the

Central Crisis Management Cell (“CCMC”), an inter-agency war cabinet that oversaw all
intelligence and military operations against the opposition. The CCMC sat at the apex of
a complex state-security apparatus composed of conventional armed forces as well as
Syria’s secret police, the mukhabarat. This apparatus was responsible for protecting the
Assad family from political opponents, ensuring Baath Party loyalty, and conducting
intelligence operations, which included the support of terrorist organizations such as
Hezbollah. The members of the CCMC included, among others, the Minister and Deputy
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, and the heads of the four intelligence
agencies, as well as Maher al-Assad, the President’s brother and commander of the elite
4th Division of the Syrian army. From its office in Damascus, Syria’s capital, the CCMC
received daily reports on the operations of Syrian military and intelligence forces around
the country. The CCMC submitted plans for President Bashar al-Assad’s approval and
disseminated orders through the National Security Bureau, a senior office tasked with
coordinating the four intelligence agencies.

9

CCMC orders were also disseminated

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through a network of regional committees that oversaw the security crackdown in each of
Syria’s 14 provinces.
28.

Under the CCMC, the Assad regime engaged in the widespread and

systematic repression of dissent throughout 2011. Military, intelligence, and shabiha
forces fired on unarmed demonstrators. According to the United Nations Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, regime forces killed
an estimated 3,500 civilians between March 2011 and November 2011. 6 Across the
country, regime forces launched raids against suspected political opponents, detaining
tens of thousands of Syrians in a system of prisons operated by the mukhabarat. As of
May 2016, an estimated 60,000 Syrians have died in detention, succumbing to torture,
disease, and malnutrition.7
29.

The regime’s security crackdown triggered an armed uprising, as

thousands of Syrians defected from the military and took up arms to defend the
democratic opposition. In late 2011 and early 2012, the regime launched a massive
military operation in Homs, Syria’s third largest city, laying siege to defectors and
civilians in opposition-held neighborhoods including Baba Amr. (Discussed below in
Section III).
30.

As the violence escalated, the regime waged a violent crackdown on local

and foreign journalists. It also targeted everyday Syrian nationals who used the tools of
online social media—cell phones, YouTube, Facebook, and satellite television—to

6

U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1.
7

Tom Perry, Monitor: 60,000 have died in Syrian government jails during war, Reuters, May 22, 2016
6:02am EDT, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-detainees-idUSKCN0YD084.

10

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expose attacks on civilians and to call for humanitarian aid. This media crackdown,
formulated at the highest levels of the Syrian government by members of the CCMC, led
directly to the assassination of Marie Colvin. (Discussed below in Section IV).
III. THE SIEGE OF BABA AMR: FEBRUARY 2012
31.

Homs was the first Syrian city to be subjected to siege warfare by the

Assad regime. The city became an epicenter of the opposition movement following a
massacre of protestors in Clock Square in April 2011. Through summer and fall of 2011,
local celebrities—including soccer stars and actresses—led festive protests in Homs with
thousands singing and dancing. Homs was strategically located along Syria’s central
highway, and the regime was determined to keep its grip on the city. The regime placed
checkpoints between neighborhoods, fired on demonstrations, and arrested thousands.
32.

In response, defectors from the Syrian army joined with local volunteers to

defend opposition neighborhoods from attack. In November 2011, a group of officers
who had defected from the Syrian army entered Baba Amr, a district in southwest Homs.
They announced the formation of the al-Farouq Battalion, a rebel group affiliated with
the Free Syrian Army, a national network of moderate, pro-democracy rebels (“FSA
rebels”). Composed of several hundred army deserters and volunteers, equipped only
with small arms, the FSA rebels launched raids against government checkpoints in Baba
Amr. In late November 2011, the FSA rebels expelled Assad regime forces from Baba
Amr, established a defensive perimeter around the neighborhood, and declared it a
“liberated zone.” The protracted and intense violence between FSA rebels and Assad
regime forces in Homs in November 2011 marked the beginning of a civil war in Syria.

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33.

The FSA rebels and Assad regime forces were locked in a standoff in

Baba Amr between November 2011 and late January 2012. Arab League observers
attempted to negotiate a cease-fire in Homs, but failed and withdrew on January 28,
2012. After their withdrawal, the Assad regime launched an intense siege of Baba Amr,
encircling the neighborhood with infantry, tanks, and heavy artillery from the 11th and
18th Divisions of the Syrian army.
34.

The siege of Baba Amr was overseen by the Homs Military-Security

Committee, under the command of Brigadier General Rafiq Shahadah of the Military
Intelligence Directorate. Brigadier General Shahadah was tasked with coordinating joint
operations between the Homs branches of the intelligence agencies and units of the
Syrian army deployed to Homs. Under Shahadah’s command, regular units from the
11th and 18th Divisions were reinforced by elite units from the Republican Guard, 4th
Division, and Special Forces.

These units conducted joint intelligence and military

operations under a chain of command that ran through the Homs Military-Security
Committee up to the CCMC and the offices of President Bashar al-Assad and his brother,
Maher al-Assad.
35.

In addition to overseeing joint operations of the Syrian military and

intelligence forces, the Homs Military-Security Committee coordinated the operations of
the shabiha death squads. According to United States government officials, “[s]ince the
beginning of the unrest in Syria, the [s]habiha have operated as a direct action arm of the

12

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Government of Syria and its security services, with [s]habiha units providing support to
units from designated security services.”8
36.

President Bashar al-Assad’s brother, Maher al-Assad, directed and funded

shabiha death squad activities in Homs through Khaled al-Fares, a shabiha leader who
served as an auxiliary member of the Homs Military-Security Committee alongside
Brigadier General Shahadah. Al-Fares reported directly to Maher al-Assad through the
Security Section of the 4th Division.
37.

In February 2012 these military, intelligence, and shabiha forces carried

out widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population of Baba Amr under
the direction of the CCMC and the Homs Military-Security Committee. They spread
terror throughout the population of Baba Amr to demoralize the opposition movement
and compel rebels to surrender. To accomplish this, Syrian military and intelligence
forces in Homs used indiscriminate artillery shelling and sniper fire against a densely
populated urban area. The civilian residents of Baba Amr were denied food, medical
care, and electricity by the surrounding regime forces. Forced to smuggle essential
supplies across the siege lines, civilians who were caught by regime forces were
subjected to mass detention and torture. Others were massacred by shabiha death squads.
38.

The regime’s protracted artillery campaign began on or around the

morning of February 4, 2012, when artillery units of the Syrian army opened fire on Baba
Amr with heavy field guns, rocket launchers, mortars, and tanks. Between February 4,
2012, and February 28, 2012, regime forces systematically shelled Baba Amr each day
from dawn to dusk, sweeping artillery fire in a wave across the neighborhood.
8

Special Briefing, U.S. Dep’t of State, Senior Administration Officials on Terrorist Designations of the alNusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qaida in Iraq (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201797.htm.

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39.

Assad regime forces deliberately shelled civilian targets in the center of

Baba Amr, instead of directing artillery fire at the rebel positions on the perimeter of the
neighborhood. Assad regime forces were aware they were shelling civilians: military and
security forces selected targets using intelligence reports, aerial surveillance aircraft, and
forward observers.
40.

On February 16, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution

66/253 A, condemning “the continued widespread and systematic violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force
against civilians, arbitrary executions, the killing and persecution of protestors, human
rights defenders and journalists, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances,
interference with access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment,
including against children.”9
41.

That same day, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the

Syrian government’s violent repression: “We see neighborhoods shelled indiscriminately.
Hospitals used as torture centers. Children as young as 10 years old jailed and abused.
We see almost certain crimes against humanity.”10
42.

The siege of Baba Amr became a symbol of the violence of the Assad

regime and the resistance of the Syrian democratic opposition. As such, it drew the
attention of journalists around the world, who sought to cross the siege lines and cover

9

G.A. Res. 66/253, ¶ 2 (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/253.
10

Rick Gladstone, General Assembly Votes to Condemn Syrian Leader, N.Y. Times (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/middleeast/secretary-general-ban-ki-moon-castigates-syriaahead-of-general-assembly-vote.html?_r=0 (quoting Sec’y Gen. Ban Ki-moon).

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the battle for what many dubbed the “capital of the revolution.”11 The Assad regime
considered these journalists enemies.
IV. THE CONSPIRACY TO ASSASSINATE JOURNALISTS
43.

Silencing journalists was central to the Assad regime’s strategy to crush

political opposition. President Bashar al-Assad made it clear from early on that Syrian
and foreign journalists who reported on protests and regime violence would be
considered enemies of the Syrian state. On March 30, 2011, President Bashar al-Assad
addressed the Syrian Parliament, asserting that Syria was “facing a great conspiracy
whose tentacles extend to some nearby countries and far-away countries, with some
inside the country.”12 This conspiracy, he claimed, was supported by “media groups”
inside Syria: “they want us to surrender through waging on us a virtual war using the
media and the internet.”13
44.

Beginning in the spring of 2011, the Assad regime attempted to impose a

media blackout to cover up the regime’s crackdown on political opposition. The regime
severely restricted freedom of speech and the press, placing tight controls on foreign
media’s access to conflict zones in Syria and terrorizing, abusing, or killing local
professional and citizen journalists.14

11

Homs: Syrian revolution's fallen 'capital’, BBC, Dec. 9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-15625642.
12

Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), President al-Assad Delivers Speech at People’s Assembly, March
30, 2011,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110402044717/http://www.sana.sy/print.html?sid=339278&newlang=ara
(Arabic);
https://web.archive.org/web/20110406012411/http://www.sana.sy/print.html?sid=339334&newlang=eng
(English).
13

Id.

14

See U.S. Dep’t of State, Syria 2013 Human Rights Report,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220588.pdf.

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45.

This crackdown escalated. On or around August 6, 2011, the National

Security Bureau, acting under the direction of the CCMC, issued instructions to the
mukhabarat and regional Security Committees to launch joint military and intelligence
campaigns against “those who tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media and
international organizations,” and other wanted persons. 15 Over the following weeks,
instructions to target media critics of the Assad regime were disseminated to intelligence
branches around the country. Over the following months, Syrian intelligence forces
distributed wanted lists to checkpoints around Homs and other areas calling for the arrest
of foreign journalists and Syrian activists accused of speaking to foreign media. The
intelligence forces offered rewards for the capture of any foreign journalist found in
Syria.
46.

Pursuant to this policy, numerous Syrian journalists and media activists

were subjected to violent persecution. On August 25, 2011, Ali Ferzat, a celebrated
political cartoonist, was abducted in Damascus and tortured by Syrian government forces,
then released with a warning not to satirize President Assad. 16 On October 2, 2011,
another Syrian political cartoonist, Akram Raslan, was arrested by Syrian intelligence
forces; he has since disappeared and is reported to have died under torture. 17 On
November 20, 2011, Ferzat Jarban, a freelance cameraman, was arrested by Syrian
intelligence forces in the town of al-Qasir outside of Homs, after filming demonstrations;
15

Memorandum No. BLA/8/AQ, from National Security Bureau of the Baath Arab Socialist Party, Syrian
Arab Region – Regional Command, to Comrade Secretary of the Baath Party in the Governorates of Hama,
Rif Damashq, Deir Al Zour, Homs, Idlib, and Daraa, August 6, 2011. A copy is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
16

See Press Statement, U.S. Dep’t of State, Syria: Attack on Ali Farzat and Persecution of Activists (Aug.
25, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/171056.htm.
17

See Well-known Syrian cartoonist died in detention after being tortured, Reporters Without Borders
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://en.rsf.org/syria-well-known-syrian-cartoonist-died-22-09-2015,48382.html.

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the next morning, his body was found in the street by residents, his eyes gouged out.18
On February 16, 2012, less than a week before the killing of Marie Colvin, Syrian Air
Force Intelligence raided the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression in
Damascus; prominent human rights lawyer and journalist Mazen Darwish and other staff
members were arbitrarily detained and tortured by members of Air Force Intelligence and
the 4th Division.19
A. Surveillance Campaign and Attempted Killings in Homs
47.

The attack on Marie Colvin and the Media Center was carried out as part

of the Assad regime’s policy of targeting media critics. In or around January 2012,
members of the CCMC and the Homs Military-Security Committee overseeing the
crackdown in Homs formed a common criminal plan to surveil and kill members of the
Media Center and the foreign journalists they hosted.
48.

On or around January 5, 2012, senior members of the CCMC—including

Deputy Defense Minister Assef Shawkat, Minister of Interior Muhammad al-Shaar, and
Major General Ali Mamluk—met with a diplomatic mission from the Arab League that
was monitoring the situation in Homs. During their discussions, these Syrian officials
accused Khaled Abu Salah and all journalists associated with the Media Center of being
terrorists collaborating with the United States, France, and Israel, and demanded to know
if—and where—the Arab League monitors had met with them. The Syrian officials
18

See United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Director-general
condemns murder of Syrian cameraman Ferzat Jarban and urges respect for freedom of expression and
fundamental rights (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/singleview/news/director_general_condemns_murder_of_syrian_cameraman_ferzat_jarban_and_urges_respect_f
or_freedom_of_expression_and_fundamental_human_rights/; Committee to Protect Journalists, Syrian
cameraman killed; last seen being arrested, November 21, 2011 2:11 PM ET, https://cpj.org/x/46d5.
19

See Mazen Darwish, Hussein Gharir, and Hani Zaitani, Freedom of Expression Advocates, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/16/mazen-darwish-hussein-gharirand-hani-zaitani-freedom-expression-advocates.

17

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denounced the Washington Post and New York Times as “terrorist newspapers.” They
accused foreign journalists of being intelligence agents working for the United States and
Israel and demanded to know if there were foreign journalists in Baba Amr. These
journalists were a threat, they claimed, because they suspected that foreign journalists in
Libya had been spies responsible for the NATO intervention against Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Deputy Defense Minister Assef Shawkat told the Arab
League monitors that members of the media were his main obstacle. He could destroy
Baba Amr in ten minutes, he explained, if there were no cameras.
49.

In January and February of 2012, Major General Ali Mamluk, Director of

the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, received intelligence reports from sources in
Lebanon that foreign journalists, including teams from CNN, the BBC, and The Sunday
Times, were arriving at Beirut International Airport and being smuggled across the
Lebanese border into Homs. Major General Ali Mamluk forwarded this information to
Brigadier General Rafiq Shahadah, Chief of the Homs Military-Security Committee.
General Shahadah instructed the intelligence branches in Homs to track down the foreign
journalists, using electronic surveillance and local informants.
50.

Under the command of Brigadier General Muhammad Zamrini, the

Computer and Signals Section of Military Intelligence Branch 261 used signal
interception devices to monitor satellite dish and cell phone communications and trace
journalists’ locations.

These locations were shared with Syrian artillery units, who

attempted repeatedly to fire artillery at the broadcast locations of the Media Center
activists and foreign journalists.

18

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51.

On one such occasion, on or around February 5, 2012, Khaled Abu Salah,

co-founder of the Media Center, was reporting on civilian casualties at an improvised
field hospital in Baba Amr. While standing outside the hospital, Abu Salah received a
call on his mobile phone from a reporter from Al-Jazeera. Minutes later, Syrian forces
shelled the location where Abu Salah took the call. The shrapnel and shock wave from
the shells killed two civilian activists who had been tallying casualties and injured Abu
Salah in his arm and torso.
52.

In or around mid-February 2012, Major General Ali Mamluk and

Brigadier General Rafiq Shahadah received new intelligence reports that multiple teams
of foreign journalists were planning to enter Baba Amr. General Shahadah ordered
Syrian armed forces to intensify shelling of suspected smuggler’s routes in an attempt to
kill the journalists.
B. February 22, 2012: The Extrajudicial Killing of Marie Colvin
53.

On or around February 15, 2012, Marie Colvin, British photographer Paul

Conroy, and their Syrian interpreter Wael al-Omar arrived in Homs on assignment for
The Sunday Times. Colvin was determined to cover the siege of Baba Amr after seeing
video footage from the Media Center showing the regime’s indiscriminate shelling of
civilians. Throughout January 2012, Paul Conroy had spent time in Beirut trying to
connect with activists who could help the journalists cross the Lebanese border into
Syria. Upon information and belief, The Sunday Times tried without success to obtain a
Syrian entry visa. In any case, Colvin and Conroy feared that it would be unsafe to
embed with the Syrian government on an official press tour. They were aware that Gilles
Jacquier, a French journalist, had been killed by mortar fire in Homs on January 11,

19

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2012, while under escort by Syrian security forces. Two Swiss journalists who were with
Jacquier at the time accused the Syrian government of leading Jacquier into an ambush. 20
Colvin and Conroy had also been warned by sources that the Lebanese government had
intercepted Syrian military radio traffic authorizing the killing of any foreign journalists
found in Homs.
54.

On February 15th, Colvin and Conroy were guided by activists across the

Syrian border. They traveled to Homs with their fixer and interpreter, Wael al-Omar,
using backroads and a three-kilometer long tunnel. As they approached the city, they
could hear the rumble of high-explosive shells. They eventually arrived under cover of
night at the makeshift Media Center in Baba Amr. It was in a small apartment building,
tucked away in a narrow street where the surrounding buildings offered cover from
incoming shells. At the Media Center, Colvin, Conroy, and al-Omar met with a team of
journalists from CNN who had been staying with Khaled Abu Salah and the other citizen
journalists. They relied on the Media Center’s portable satellite dish to communicate
over Skype. It was the only means of communication. Colvin feared that a satellite
phone could easily be intercepted, and the portable BGAN satellite transmitters she and
Conroy had brought with them had been intermittently jammed.
55.

Colvin remained at the Baba Amr Media Center for two days with Conroy

and al-Omar, as the neighborhood took heavy shelling. During their stay, they repeatedly
observed snipers on the roofs of the nearby Al-Baath University shooting at civilians who
came into their sights. On February 17th, Colvin and her team heard rumors that Syrian
infantry were preparing to launch a ground assault on the neighborhood. As a result, they

20

Rebecca Seales, Syrian government blamed for journalist’s death, The Sunday Times (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article861722.ece.

20

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and the CNN team escaped from Homs that night and returned to the Syrian-Lebanese
border, where Colvin issued a report to The Sunday Times via satellite phone.
56.

On February 19, 2012, The Sunday Times published her scathing account

of the siege of Baba Amr. Assad regime forces had encircled the district with a trench,
she wrote, letting virtually no one in or out. Syrian artillery pounded the cramped district
of 28,000 residents indiscriminately, while cold and hungry civilians huddled in what she
called a “widow’s basement”: “Crammed amid makeshift beds and scattered belongings
are frightened women and children trapped in the horror of Homs, the Syrian city shaken
by two weeks of relentless bombardment.”21
57.

Assad regime officials were monitoring the news.

When General

Shahadah learned that The Sunday Times and CNN teams had escaped the siege and filed
reports, he ordered intelligence forces in Homs to intensify efforts to recruit informants
and tighten the noose around any journalist reporting from Homs.
58.

On February 20th, Colvin, Conroy, and al-Omar decided to return to

Homs. Colvin felt that the fate of Baba Amr’s civilians needed to be told. They returned
to Baba Amr that night via the same back roads and tunnel.
59.

The next day, on February 21, 2012, they decided that the shelling was too

intense for them to leave the Media Center. Citizen journalists visited the Media Center
throughout the day, bringing them information and video footage. That morning, Rami
al-Sayyad, a citizen journalist in Baba Amr, was killed by an artillery shell while running
to the aid of a family that had just been struck by artillery fire.

21

Marie Colvin, Final dispatch from Homs, the battered city, The Sunday Times (Feb. 19, 2012),
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/public/news/article874796.ece.

21

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60.

That evening, Marie Colvin and Paul Conroy decided they should try to

escape from the beseiged city the next day. They feared they might not survive another
day of shelling, and could not wait until Sunday to file their story. While the Media
Center still had a functioning satellite dish, they decided that evening to expose the
regime’s continuing attacks on civilians by broadcasting live interviews on BBC News,
Channel 4, and CNN via Skype. Colvin reported to the BBC that Assad regime forces
were “shelling with impunity, with merciless disregard for civilians” 22

It was “a

complete and utter lie that they’re only going after terrorists,” she told CNN’s Anderson
Cooper. “The Syrian Army is simply shelling a city of cold, starving civilians.”23
61.

Shortly after Colvin’s broadcasts, another team of European journalists

arrived at the Media Center: Édith Bouvier from the French newspaper Le Figaro, Javier
Espinosa from the Spanish newspaper El Mundo, and French freelance photographers
Rémi Ochlik and William Daniels.
62.

Meanwhile, Syrian intelligence forces were closing in. Marie Colvin’s

broadcast signals had been intercepted by the Computer and Signals Section of Branch
261 of the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate. Agents of Branch 261 analyzed the
intercepted signals to determine the location of the Media Center.
63.

That same night, a female informant inside Baba Amr contacted Khaled

al-Fares, a shabiha death squad leader who played a leading intelligence-gathering role
for the Homs Military-Security Committee. The informant told al-Fares that foreign
journalists were present at the Media Center and she revealed its location. Al-Fares
22

Homs: Syrian revolution’s fallen ‘capital’, BBC News (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-15625642.
23

Video: Marie Colvin’s Last Call to CNN, CNN (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:25 AM),
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/22/video-journalist-syrias-government-lies/.

22

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formed an action plan with General Ghassan Belal, Maher al-Assad’s Security Chief, and
Brigadier General Rafiq Shahadah, Chief of the Homs Military-Security Committee. AlFares then transported the informant to the Military Operations Center at the Homs
Military Academy.
64.

There, during the early morning hours of February 22, 2012, General

Shahadah convened a meeting to debrief the informant. Present at the meeting were local
intelligence officials and military officers from the Repubican Guard, Special Forces, and
other units of the Syrian army. The informant was shown aerial footage and maps of
Homs. She identified the precise location of the Media Center and the foreign journalists.
After the meeting, the Computer and Signals Section of Branch 261 of the Syrian
Military Intelligence Directorate informed General Shahadah that the informant’s account
matched the location of broadcast signals they had intercepted earlier that night.
65.

With Marie Colvin’s location now confirmed, General Shahadah prepared

to launch an artillery attack on the Media Center with Major General Issam Zahreddine of
the Syrian Republican Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Kenan Muhammad Ghaliya of the
Syrian Special Forces, and other Syrian military officers.
66.

Later on the morning of February 22, 2012, Marie Colvin and

photographer Paul Conroy awoke in the back room of the Media Center where they had
been staying. They began to pack their gear and prepared for their last day in the
besieged neighborhood, before attempting to escape Baba Amr through the tunnels.
67.

Suddenly, the shriek of an incoming rocket pierced the air. An explosion

shook the three-story house. Syrian artillery units positioned around the city began
launching salvos of rockets and mortars directly at the Media Center, in a targeting

23

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pattern known as “bracketing.” The first rockets fell several meters out from both sides
of the Media Center. Then another salvo of rockets shrieked through the air, followed by
explosions on either side, several meters closer. Each salvo drew closer to the Media
Center, hemming it in. The journalists and activists rushed to evacuate.
68.

Marie Colvin and French photographer Rémi Ochlik ran together into the

front foyer of the Media Center. As they were about to reach the exit, a rocket crashed
into the doorway. The blast killed Colvin and Ochlik and sent a shock wave into the
main room of the Media Center, blowing off a door. Conroy, al-Omar, and Bouvier, who
were still sheltered inside the Media Center, were struck by shrapnel and debris, causing
them severe injuries.
69.

While some within the Media Center were able to escape and make it out

into the street, they were immediately detected by an aerial surveillance aircraft circling
overhead. Syrian artillery units quickly adjusted their target away from the Media Center
and towards these survivors by firing shells into the street.
70.

Marie Colvin, Rémi Ochlik, and all the other journalists at the Media

Center were non-combatant civilians.

None were members of any of the warring

factions, and none were participating in hostilities. No armed rebels were present at or
near the Media Center at the time of the attack. Neither Marie Colvin, nor any of the
other victims, were ever charged, convicted, or sentenced by any Syrian court for any
crime punishable by execution.
71.

The February 22, 2012 assault on the Media Center was part of the Assad

regime’s conspiracy to silence the media and terrorize civilians. The Assad regime
targeted Marie Colvin and the other journalists in the Media Center with full knowledge

24

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that the victims were innocent civilians who did not participate in or contribute to
hostilities.
72.

After the attack on the morning of February 22, 2012, Syrian intelligence

and military officials gathered at the office of General Shahadah and received reports
confirming the deaths of Marie Colvin and Rémi Ochlik.

Major General Issam

Zahreddine and Lieutenant Colonel Kenan Muhammad Ghaliya were congratulated on
the successful attack against the Media Center.
73.

Tellingly, on or around February 25, 2012, Maher al-Assad awarded

shabiha leader Khaled al-Fares with a black luxury automobile in recognition of the
assassinations of Colvin and Ochlik.
74.

The deliberate killing of Marie Colvin has caused intense anguish and

emotional suffering to Colvin’s grief-stricken family members, including Plaintiffs
Cathleen Colvin and Justine Araya-Colvin.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
75.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
Syria is Liable for the Unlawful Acts Committed by Its Officials, Employees, and
Agents in Furtherance of a Conspiracy to Assassinate Journalists
76.

As detailed above, Syrian government officials and agents of the shabiha

militia operating at the instruction of the Assad regime devised a criminal plan to surveil
and kill civilian journalists as part of a broader strategy to create a media blackout in
which they could kill innocent civilians with impunity. Officials at the highest levels of
the Assad regime, including but not limited to those identified below, participated in this
plan:
25

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

MAHER AL-ASSAD, brother to President Bashar al-Assad, Commander of the 4th
Division of the Syrian Army, and member of the Central Crisis Management Cell
(“CCMC”);



GENERAL ASSEF SHAWKAT, Deputy Minister of Defense and member of the
CCMC (now deceased);



MAJOR GENERAL ALI MAMLUK, Director of the General Intelligence Directorate
and member of the CCMC;



BRIGADIER GENERAL RAFIQ SHAHADAH, Chief of the Homs Military-Security
Committee;



GENERAL GHASSAN BELAL, Chief of Security, 4th Division of the Syrian Army;



BRIGADIER GENERAL MUHAMMAD ZAMRINI, Chief of Branch 261 of the Syrian
Military Intelligence Directorate;



MAJOR GENERAL ISSAM ZAHREDDINE, Officer of the 104th Brigade of the
Republican Guard of the Syrian Army;



LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUHAMMAD KENAN GHALIYA, Officer of the Special
Forces of the Syrian Army; and



KHALED AL-FARES, shabiha death squad leader and liaison to the Homs MilitarySecurity Committee (collectively, “Senior Officials”).
77.

These Senior Officials entered into this illicit conspiracy, with others

known and unknown, with the goal of perpetrating and directing attacks on civilian
journalists in violation of international and U.S. law. The participants in this conspiracy
specifically intended to kill Marie Colvin and other foreign and Syrian journalists.
78.

The Senior Officials, and others known and unknown, perpetrated

numerous illicit acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including the surveillance of Marie
Colvin and other journalists, the recruitment and use of informants, and the planning and

26

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execution of the February 22, 2012 rocket attack on the Media Center. Acting in concert
and at the behest of the Assad regime, the Senior Officials directly and proximately
caused the death of Marie Colvin and other injuries alleged herein.
79.

The Senior Officials, and others known and unknown, planned and

perpetrated the extrajudicial killing of Marie Colvin while acting within the scope of their
office, employment or agency. They acted pursuant to the Assad regime’s plan or policy
of directing attacks against civilians in Homs, and journalists in particular, as a means of
terrorizing the democratic opposition into submission. As alleged above, this plan or
policy was formulated at the highest levels of the Syrian government, by Maher al-Assad,
Ali Mamluk, and other members of CCMC. This plan or policy was implemented by the
Homs Military-Security Committee under the command of Brigadier General Rafiq
Shahadah and executed by members of the Syrian military and intelligence forces,
including Major General Issam Zahreddine of the Syrian Republican Guard and
Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Kenan Ghaliya of the Syrian Special Forces. Moreover,
Khaled al-Fares and other members of the shabiha death squads participated in the
conspiracy and the killing of Marie Colvin as clandestine agents of the Syrian
government, acting at the behest and under the operational control of Maher al-Assad and
the Security Section of the 4th Division.
80.

Because these officials and agents of the government of Syria entered into

a conspiracy and engaged in these unlawful acts while acting within the scope of their
office, employment, or agency, Syria is liable for the personal injury and wrongful death
alleged herein.

27

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PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Extrajudicial Killing Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(c)
81.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

the paragraphs 1 through 80 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.
82.

The killing of Marie Colvin constituted an extrajudicial killing in violation

of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).
83.

At all relevant times, Syria has been designated by the United States as a

state sponsor of terrorism.
84.

The Syrian officials and agents described above purposefully and

knowingly conspired to kill Marie Colvin and other journalists. Acting in concert and
with premeditation, these officials and agents deliberately killed Marie Colvin by
launching a targeted rocket attack against the Media Center on February 22, 2012.
85.

At all relevant times, the Syrian officials and agents described above acted

within the scope of their office, employment, or agency, and at the behest and under the
operational control of the government of Syria. These officials and agents acted pursuant
to a Syrian government plan or policy to spread terror among the civilian population and
silence journalists through violence.
86.

The killing of Marie Colvin was not authorized by any judgment

pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

Moreover, Marie Colvin and the

journalists and media activists present at the Baba Amr Media Center were unarmed noncombatants and did not pose a real or apparent threat to persons or property that would
have justified the use of deadly force. There were no lawful military targets in the

28

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vicinity of the Media Center on or about February 22, 2012, when the attack was
launched.
87.

The killing of Marie Colvin was a war crime in violation of international

law. Colvin was killed in the course of the internal armed conflict occuring in Homs on
February 22, 2012. Her killing was therefore subject to the international law of armed
conflict, which regulates the conduct of hostilities during internal armed conflicts and
protects civilians against intentional attack, including journalists.
88.

Specifically, the killing of Marie Colvin violated Syria’s obligations under

Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Article 3, which reflects customary international
law, prohibits the murder of persons taking no active part in hostilities during internal
armed conflicts. Such murder is also a war crime under customary international law,
giving rise to both state responsibility24 and individual criminal liability, as evidenced in
domestic and international jurisprudence, 25 international treaties, 26 and Title 18 of the
United States Code.27
89.

As a civilian journalist, Marie Colvin was entitled to protection under the

Fourth Geneva Convention and customary international law—which Syria forcibly
denied her. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1738 states that “journalists . . . engaged in
24

See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, RULE 149, Customary IHL Database, https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter42_rule149 (collecting sources).
25

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 445–457 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946) (recognizing deliberate
killing of civilians as a violation of the international law of war); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d
Cir. 1995) (same). See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, RULES 1, 156, Customary IHL Database,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home (collecting sources).
26

See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(c)(i), 8(2)(e)(i); Article 51(2) of
Additional Protocol (I) and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions (June 8,
1977).
27

See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(D) (2014) (war crime of murdering civilians).

29

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dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as
civilians and shall be respected and protected as such, provided that they take no action
adversely affecting their status as civilians.” S.C. Res. 1738, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1738
(Dec. 23, 2006). The immunity of journalists from attack is confirmed by Rule 34 of the
International Committee of the Red Cross’s compilation of the customary international
law governing non-international armed conflicts and Article 79 of Additional Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which Syria has ratified.
90.

Finally, the Assad regime’s deliberate killing of Marie Colvin, without

justification or even a semblance of judicial process, constitutes an arbitrary deprivation
of the right to life, in breach of Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, to which Syria is a party.
91.

Syria is liable for the wrongful acts of its officials, employees, and agents,

which directly and proximately caused the extrajudicial killing of Marie Colvin and the
wrongful death and personal injuries alleged herein.
Theories of Recovery
Wrongful Death
92.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), Plaintiffs Cathleen Colvin, as the parent and

next friend of minors C.A.C. and L.A.C., heirs-at-law and beneficiaries of the estate of
Marie Colvin, and Justine Araya-Colvin, as an heir-at-law and beneficiary of the estate of
Marie Colvin, are entitled to recover compensatory damages from Syria for economic
losses resulting from the premature death of Marie Colvin, including lost anticipated
earnings. The amount of these compensatory damages shall be determined at trial.

30

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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Solatium
93.

Defendant Syria, through its officials, employees, and agents, engaged in

extreme and outrageous conduct by launching a deliberate attack on civilian journalists.
Defendant Syria thereby intentionally and recklessly caused severe emotional distress to
Marie Colvin’s immediate family members, including her sister Plaintiff Cathleen
Colvin.
94.

The Assad regime’s assassination of Marie Colvin was designed to

intimidate and terrorize the civilian population of Syria, the victims’ loved ones, other
journalists, and the international community. The brutality of the killing of Marie Colvin
caused Cathleen Colvin to suffer emotional pain and deprived her of the society and
comfort of her sister, with whom she had a close emotional relationship.
95.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), Plaintiff Cathleen Colvin, in her individual

capacity, is entitled to recover compensatory damages for personal injury and solatium in
an amount to be determined at trial.
Punitive Damages
96.

Defendant Syria’s conduct was criminal in nature, deliberate, willful,

wanton, malicious, a threat to international peace and security, and in violation of
fundamental norms of international law protecting human rights and civilians in conflict.
97.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), an award of punitive damages should be

imposed against Defendant Syria in an amount to be determined at trial.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant and the following relief:
(a)

Compensatory damages according to proof;

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(b)

Punitive and exemplary damages according to proof;

(c)

Reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses according to proof; and

(d)

Such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

32

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Dated: July 9, 2016
/s/ Scott A. Gilmore
Scott A. Gilmore (D.C. Bar 1002910)
sgilmore@cja.org
L. Kathleen Roberts (pro hac vice motion to be
filed)
kroberts@cja.org
CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY
One Hallidie Plaza, Suite 406
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 544-0444 (telephone)
Henry Weisburg (pro hac vice motion to be filed)
hweisburg@shearman.com
Daniel Lewis (D.C. Bar 489636) (pro hac vice
motion to be filed)
daniel.lewis@shearman.com
Mark Lanpher (D.C. Bar 1014490) (pro hac vice
motion to be filed)
mark.lanpher@shearman.com
Inyoung (Sarah) Hwang (pro hac vice motion to be
filed)
sarah.hwang@shearman.com
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
599 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 848-4000 (telephone)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Cathleen Colvin and Justine
Araya-Colvin

33