IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 3:13-1060 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Brown PLAINTIFF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and Local Rule 83.01(f)(7), Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") hereby moves the Court for entry of default judgment against The Industrial Labor Management Group, Inc. (“ILM” or “Defendant”). ILM has failed to defend this action and on March 31, 2015, the Clerk entered default against ILM. (Docket No. 50). Accordingly, the EEOC requests the Court enter Default Judgment against Defendant. To support its Motion for Default Judgment, the Commission relies upon its Amended Complaint, the Admissions, Declarations, and exhibits to establish Defendant’s liability. The Commission seeks the remedies of back pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages and injunctive relief. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Commission filed the instant lawsuit on September 30, 2013. (Docket No. 1). The Commission amended its Complaint on April 23, 2014. (Docket No. 24). In the Amended Complaint, the Commission alleges ILM failed to refer or place Sherry Brewer and other Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 180 qualified female applicants for employment, because of their gender in violation of Title VII. Id. Further, the Commission alleges ILM unlawfully limited, segregated, or classified its applicants for employment in a way which would tend to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their sex. Id. In this action the Commission seeks back pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages and injunctive relief. Id. On January 21, 2015, Defendant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw its representation of ILM. (Docket No. 42). Counsel also noted the company did not intend to defend itself 1. Id. Accordingly, the Commission moved for Entry of Default and the Clerk entered default against ILM on March 31, 2015 for its failure to defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 50). The Commission now moves for Default Judgment against Defendant in the amount of $162,807.43. BACKGROUND FACTS The filed Charge of Discrimination by Sherry Brewer, the Commission’s Amended Complaint, Defendant’s written discovery responses, the Declarations of Sherry Brewer and other claimants and the Declaration of Attorney Markeisha Savage provide the facts to establish liability against Defendant. ILM is a national employment/staffing agency based in California 2. It maintained at least two offices in California and one in Murfreesboro, Tennessee 3. In March 2010, Defendant began providing temporary workers to its Shelbyville, Tennessee client - Manuli Stretch. (Docket No. 1). In 2011, ILM placed 55 male employees with Manuli Stretch as Laborer. (Exh. 1 , Declaration of Markeisha Savage). They were paid $8.50/hr. Id. Despite having at 1 The court entered an order granting the Motion to Withdraw. (Doc. No. 43). Defendant, employed at least 15 employees in 2011and was an “employer” within the definition of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 The Commission’s last communication with ILM revealed that it has closed its Tennessee office and ceased operations in California. 2 2 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 181 least 44 female applicants in 2011, ILM did not place any female applicants with Manuli Stretch. Id. Manuli Stretch’s Laborer position (i.e., the only position that ILM filled at Manuli Stretch) was a low-skilled position. It required, among other things, basic math skills, ability to multi-task and move quickly, good communication skills, positive attitude, the ability to follow directions and safety rules and regulations as given. (Exh. 2, Declaration of Katharine Kores). A Laborer is presumably responsible for supplying machines with necessary product, handling, packing and palletizing products, and lifting of up to 75 pounds 4. Id. ILM maintained color-coded files it separated by gender. (Exh. 1, Declaration of Markeisha Savage (RFA)) Female files had yellow applications attached. Id. Male files had bluish/teal applications attached. Id. The file cabinet containing Manuli Stretch personnel files contained only bluish/teal colored files. Id. Claim of Sherry Brewer In January 2011, Sherry Brewer submitted a resume in response to an advertisement by Defendant seeking applicants to work in Shelbyville, Tennessee. (Docket No. 24; Exh. 3, Declaration of Sherry Brewer). ILM later contacted Ms. Brewer regarding her resume and instructed her to come into its office to complete an application. Id. Ms. Brewer went to Defendant’s office and interviewed with a recruiter. Id. Ms. Brewer expressed her interest in working in Shelbyville, Tennessee. Id. When Ms. Brewer later called to check on the status of her application, the recruiter told her that ILM only hires men for the job. Id. ILM never referred or placed Ms. Brewer with Manuli Stretch or any other client company. Id. 4 ILM referred and placed male applicants with Manuli Stretch who admitted to the hiring recruiter during their interview that they could not lift up to 75 lbs or do heavy lifting. (Exh. 1, Declaration of Markeisha Savage (RFP)). ILM rejected qualified female applicants who expressly stated during their interview that they could lift up to and over 75 lbs. (Exh. 2, Declaration of Katharine W. Kores) 3 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 182 After submitting her application with ILM, Ms. Brewer continued to seek employment. (Exh. 3, Declaration of Sherry Brewer). She eventually found a job with McDonald’s in May 2011. Id. She earned approximately $625.00. Id. From October 2011 to December 2011, multiple staffing agencies placed Ms. Brewer with various client companies. Id. She earned approximately $3,896.00 during this time period. Id. The gender discrimination caused Ms. Brewer to suffer a great deal of stress, anxiety, and anger. Id. Ms. Brewer could not pay her bills or assist with meeting the needs of her grandchildren because ILM refused to refer her for employment. Id. Ms. Brewer felt angry because although qualified for the job, she knew that the only reason ILM would not refer for the job was because she is a woman. Id. Ms. Brewer filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission against ILM on April 4, 2011, alleging sex discrimination. (Exh. 2, Declaration of Katharine Kores). Other Claimants The experiences of the other claimants in this matter are practically identical to that of Ms. Brewer. (Docket No. 24). All of the claimants applied for employment with ILM. (Docket No. 24; Exh 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). They were qualified to work at Manuli Stretch because they had previously worked in other industrial/warehouse settings doing same or similar work as the Manuli Stretch Laborer position 5. (Exh. 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). Despite their qualifications, ILM never 5 There is ample evidence in the record that ILM rejected qualified females because of its reliance on a stereotype, that females could not lift up to 75 pounds. However, a bona fide lifting requirement cannot be implemented by the blanket exclusion of all females. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969). Rather, it may be implemented only by a valid test measuring strength directly. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). 4 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 183 hired any of the claimants. Docket No. 24; Exh 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). ILM told some of the claimants directly that it did not hire women for heavy lifting. (Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). These claimants all experienced stress and anxiety associated with worrying about meeting their financial obligations because of ILM’s failure to hire the claimants. (Exh. 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). Many also experienced embarrassment because they often had to borrow money from family and friends to meet their obligations. (Exh. 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). Those claimants who ILM directly told it did not hire women understandably were upset about ILM’s refusal to consider them for the job although they were qualified. (Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). APPLICABLE LAW AND ARGUMENT DEFAULT JUDGMENT “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). After default has been entered, the party seeking relief from the defaulting party may apply for a default judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). Notice of the motion is not required unless the party against whom a default judgment is sought is a minor or incompetent. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55( b)( 2). A default constitutes an admission of all the facts ‘well pleaded’ in the complaint, except those pertaining to the amount of damages. Trice v. Lake & County Real Estate, No. 86–1205, 1987 WL 38852, *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1987). To determine the amount of damages, the Court 5 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 184 may, within its discretion, conduct a hearing Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2)(B); Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 Fed Appx. 351, 354–55 (6th Cir. 2009). An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, however, if sufficient evidence is submitted to support the request for damages, Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir.1997), or if the amount claimed is one capable of ascertainment from definite figures in the documentary evidence of affidavits. United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 867 (5th Cir.1979). A. The Commission Can Establish Defendant’s Liability Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of her sex. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(b). A plaintiff can establish sex discrimination through direct evidence. Jacklyn v. Schering–Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir.1999). Direct evidence is “that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions.” Id. Here, ILM decided not to hire the claimants because of their gender. This fact is made clear in Defendant’s unequivocal statement to at least three of the claimants (Brewer, Christmas, and Jackson) that it did not place women in positions that require heavy-lifting. (Docket No. 24) The claimants were definitely qualified for placement at Manuli Stretch. (Exh 3, Declaration of Sherry Brewer; Exh. 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). As stated above, each claimant possessed previous work experience in industrial type positions. Id. They were previously employed in warehouses and factories as pickers, packers, inspectors, assembling, etc. Id. In addition, they all state they could do heavy lifting and could pass a background check. Id. Because of its 6 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 185 reliance on a stereotype that women could not lift up to 75 pounds, however, ILM, never questioned any of the women about lifting 75 lbs. Additionally, there is no evidence such a lifting requirement was bona fide. The evidence shows ILM placed male applicants with Manuli Stretch who indicated they could not meet a 75 pound lifting requirement. (Exh. 2, Declaration of Katharine Kores). It also refused to place female applicants who stated they could meet a 75 pound lifting requirement. Id. As for the background check, ILM never asked most of the claimants to consent to a background check. (Docket No. 24). When it did, the claimant willingly consented. (Docket No. 24). All of the claimants had no reason to believe they would not pass a background check and each would have willingly consented, if requested. (Exh 3, Declaration of Sherry Brewer; Exh. 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). Finally, the fact that ILM has never placed a female applicant with Manuli Stretch and color coded its applications based on gender supports the establishment of Defendant’s liability. B. The Admissions in this Case Establish Other Unlawful Employment Practices Since at least March 2010, ILM unlawfully limited, segregated or classified its applicants for employment in such a way which would tend to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their sex in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ILM issued color coded applications based on sex. (Exh. 7, Admissions). Female applicants received yellow applications. Id. Male applicants received blue/teal applications. Id. ILM kept files separated by sex, maintaining the female files in the top two drawers. Id. The file drawer designated for Manuli Stretch did not contain any yellow applications because ILM never placed any female applicants with Manuli Stretch. Id. This practice of color-coding and separating applications based upon sex, violates Title VII. 7 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 186 C. The Remedies of Back Pay, Compensatory Damages, Punitive Damages, and Injunctive Relief Are Appropriate in This Case In Title VII cases, prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to the equitable relief, including that of back pay. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 533–34, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(1) allows a party to also recover compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII cases such as this one. Under the law, the Commission seeks back pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages and injunctive relief. The Commission contends an evidentiary hearing (which is within the court’s discretion) is unnecessary. There is sufficient evidence to support the request for damages. The Commission requests the Court enter a final judgment in this action, and order the following monetary remedies: (a) $37,807.43 as a total back pay award; (b) $75,000 as a total compensatory damages award; and (c) $50,000 as a total award of punitive damages. 1. An Award of Back Pay is Appropriate in this Case to Make the Claimants Whole Back pay is an equitable remedy that is “presumptively favored in employment discrimination cases.” Suggs, 72 F.3d at 1233 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975)). The 6th Circuit has held that claimants are entitled to be made whole (i.e., placed in the position they would have been in but for discrimination) through an award of back pay. Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 626 (6th Cir.1983). Where a court finds that discrimination has taken place in violation of Title VII, the district court has broad discretion to fashion remedies to make the victims whole, including discretion to award back pay. Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404, 414 (6th Cir.2005). 8 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 187 Although the formula for computing back pay is within its sound discretion of the court, absolute accuracy in the calculation of back pay is not necessary. Thornton v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1974). Christopher v. Stouder Mem'l Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 880 (6th Cir.1991). Backpay should be awarded even where the precise amount of the award cannot be determined. Rasimas at 628. Where there is ambiguity regarding the amount that the claimant would have received but for discrimination, it should be resolved against the discriminating employer. Id. Here, the Commission has calculated back pay for many of the claimants using its automated Pay Calc program. The calculations consider the interim earnings of each claimant and also includes accumulated interest. Id. The Commission requests the Court award a total back pay amount of $37,807.43 as calculated by the Commission. 2. Compensatory Damages Are Appropriate in this Case Because of the Emotional Distress Suffered by the Claimants The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that an employer with 15-100 employees can be liable for up to $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages plus back pay for each aggrieved individual. Here, ILM could be liable for up to at least $550,000. The Commission however, only seeks a reasonable amount in both compensatory damages. Courts may award compensatory damages to account for future pecuniary losses, emotional damages, suffering, inconvenience, mental distress, hedonic losses, and other nonpecuniary losses. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The claimants in this case are eligible for compensatory damages if the Commission can prove that ILM’s unlawful actions caused the claimants to suffer emotional distress. Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F. 3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996) citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263–64, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1052–53, 55 9 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 188 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). A claimant’s own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain the Commission’s burden in this regard. Id. The Commission seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000 for the claimants who knew (because the ILM recruiter told them so) that ILM would not hire them because of their gender - Ms. Brewer ($50,000) and Ms. Jackson ($25,000). In Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710 (6th Cir.1985), the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff in a housing discrimination case may assert a claim for emotional distress based on a discriminatory statement relating to a specific discriminatory action. Here, by same analogy, Ms. Brewer and Ms. Jackson may assert a claim for emotional distress based on the discriminatory statement made by the ILM recruiter stated that ILM did not hire women. As a result of this intentional discrimination, the claimants suffered stress, anxiety and/or embarrassment due to the gender discrimination. (Exh 3, Declaration of Sherry Brewer; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). The claimants needlessly worried about their survival and often borrowed money from family and friends. Id. They were understandably angry and upset over the obvious discrimination. Id. Such emotional distress warrants an award of compensatory damages. Id. 3. Punitive Damages Are Appropriate in this Case Because ILM Acted with Malice and Reckless Indifference. To recover punitive damages under Title VII, the Commission must introduce evidence proving ILM “engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of [the] aggrieved individual[s].” 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(1). The focus on the punitive damages inquiry should be “on the actor’s state of mind.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999). In order to have the requisite mental state “an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law. . . .” Id. at 536. A 10 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: 189 plaintiff may prove the requisite mental state by: (1) demonstrating that the relevant individuals knew of or were familiar with the antidiscrimination laws and the employer’s policies for implementing those laws [but discriminated despite this knowledge] or (2) showing that the defendant’s employees lied, either to the plaintiff or to the jury, in order to cover up their discriminatory actions. Sackett v. ITC Deltacom, Inc., 347 F.Supp.2d 602, 619 (quoting Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 2001)). The Commission need only fulfill one of the two prongs to demonstrate Defendant’s requisite mental state. In the case at bar, ILM clearly lied in order to cover up its discriminatory actions. Such deceptive behavior is evident in ILM’s Answer to the Commission’s Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 25). In its Answer, ILM provides the same response to the claims related to every single claimant. Id. ILM states that every claimant was unqualified to work at Manuli Stretch and they each failed to provide the requisite background information or experience. Id. Such response is wholly disingenuous. The Laborer position (i.e., the only position that ILM filled at Manuli Stretch) was a very low-skilled position. (Exh. 2, Declaration of Katharine Kores). It required, among other things, basic math skills, ability to multi-task and move quickly, good communication skills, positive attitude, the ability to follow directions and safety rules and regulations as given. Id. A Laborer is presumably responsible for supplying machines with necessary product, handling, packing and palletizing products, and lifting of up to 75 pounds. Id. Every claimant was fully qualified to work at Manuli Stretch. (Exh 3, Declaration of Sherry Brewer; Exh. 4, Declaration of Mary Barrett; Exh 5, Declaration of Rose Crigger; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). They all had experience in industrial/warehouse settings. Id. They all worked as either pickers, packers, assemblers, inspectors, etc. Id. While the position appears to require heavy lifting up to 75 pounds, there is no evidence this was a bona fide requirement. In fact, the evidence shows ILM placed male applicants with Manuli Stretch who 11 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 190 indicated they could not meet a 75 pound lifting requirement. (Exh. 2, Declaration of Katharine Kores). Additionally, while ILM argues it did not place applicants based upon gender, the fact it did not place even one female at Manuli Stretch and that it took special care to separate and color-code applications based on gender, is clear evidence to the contrary. ILM has demonstrated malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of the claimants, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court award punitive damages in the amount of $50,000. 4. Injunctive Relief is Appropriate in this Case to Ensure Future Compliance with the Law In addition to the monetary relief mentioned above, the Commission also requests the Court order that in the event ILM or a successor company re-start business operations, they be subject to the following non-monetary relief: (a) Defendant and its successors are enjoined from engaging in sex discrimination against female job applicants, including but not limited to refusal to refer or place with client companies because of sex; and (b) Defendant and its successors are enjoined from engaging in retaliation against any person for engaging in conduct protected under Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The Commission believes injunctive relief is appropriate in this case. The Sixth Circuit has stated that “upon a finding of any intentional employment discrimination, a district court possesses broad discretion to craft an injunction that will ensure the employer's compliance with the law.” See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 467 (6th Cir. 1999), quoting EEOC v. Wilson Metal Casket, 24 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1999). In crafting the injunction, the Circuit explains “[]the proper scope of an injunction is to enjoin conduct which has been found to have been pursued or is related to the proven unlawful conduct.” Id. at 836. 12 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: 191 In this case, injunctive relief is appropriate because there is abundant evidence of intentional sex discrimination. First, an ILM recruiter told at least three of the claimants, in no uncertain terms, that ILM does not consider female applicants for heavy lifting positions. (Docket No. 24; Exh 3, Declaration of Sherry Brewer; Exh 6, Declaration of Rosheta Jackson). In fact, true to its word, ILM never placed any females with Manuli Stretch. (Exh. 7, Admissions). To ensure there would not be any inadvertent referral of female applicants ILM color-coded its applications (yellow for females and teal/blue for male applicants). (Exh. 7, Admissions). To ensure the Defendant does not engage in similar discrimination in future, the Commission believes injunctive relief is appropriate. See EEOC v. Mid-American Specialties, Inc., 774 F.Supp.2d 892, 894 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) quoting Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 660 (4th Cir. 1990) (The trial court must “exercise its discretion in light of the prophylactic purposes of the Act to ensure that discrimination does not recur”). CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Commission respectfully requests the Court find ILM has defaulted by not defending this action and enter a judgment in this case against Defendant setting forth the relief described above. A proposed judgment is attached to this Motion. Respectfully submitted, P. DAVID LOPEZ General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel FAYE A. WILLIAMS Regional Attorney TN Bar No. 011730 faye.williams@eeoc.gov 13 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 192 s/ Markeisha K. Savage MARKEISHA K. SAVAGE Trial Attorney TN Bar No. 024693 markeisha.savage@eeoc.gov EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1407 Union Avenue, Suite 900 Memphis, TN 38104 (901) 544-0133 s/ Anica C. Jones ANICA C. JONES Trial Attorney TN Bar No. 25325 anica.jones@eeoc.gov EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 220 Athens Way, Suite 350 Nashvi lle, TN 37228 (615) 736-2105 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on April 14, 2015, a copy of the foregoing was served vi a regular U.S. Mail and upon Defendant: Gina Mendoza, President Industrial Labor Management Group PO BOX 188 Huntington Park, CA 90255 s/ Markeisha K. Savage 14 Case 3:13-cv-01060 Document 53 Filed 04/14/15 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 193