mo? eon l' Empress at the minim! ?lms medium. 3.6. January 29. 2003 The Honorable George J. Tenet Director of Central Intelligence Washington. DC 20505 Dear Director Tenet: As you know. the final report of the Joint inquiry into the events of September 11 has been submitted to the intelligence Community for declassl?cation review. We look forward to early release of the public report so that e?orts at reforms can be accelerated. Having been privileged to lead this bipartisan. bicameral investigation last year. we are committed to working in the current Congress to help secure implementation of its recommendations. in furtherance of that goal. we are writing to the President and heads of departments and agencies about portions of the Joint Inquiry?s recommendations that may be of particular concem to them. Our ?rst recommendation calls for establishment of a Director of National intelligence. or who in addition to being the President's principal intelligence adviser ?shatl have the full range oi management. budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the U5. intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole: To help promote both strong leadership of the entire intelligence Community leadership and an effective CIA. the Joint inquiry also recommended that Congress provide that the DNI not simultaneously serve as director of the or any other agency. in considering this recommendation. the Congress will certainly, we believe. bene?t from learning of yourviews about the strengthening oi the role of head of the Intelligence Community. A number at the recommendations that follow address proposed tasks of the Director of National intelligence, but as that reform will require study and deliberation. for the immediate future those further recommendations are directed to the Director of Central Intelligence as the present statutory head of the Intelligence Community. The Joint inquiry found that prior to September 11 neither the 0.5. Government as a whole nor the intelligence Community had a comprehensive countenen'orist strategy. One of our recommendations calls on the National Security Couno'l. in conjunction with key agency and department heads. to prepare such a strategy for the President?s approval. The recommendation states that the strategy should be The Honorable George J. Tenet January 29. 2003 Page 2 "government wide.? apply both ?home and abroad.? and include 'the growing tenorism threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies.? The recommendation asks that this strategy identify and fully engage the intelligence as well as foreign policy. economic. military and law enforcement elements that are ?critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism.? The Director of Central full participation in this overall process will be essential. as will the DCl's development of the Intelligence Community component of the full strategy. The Joint inquiry recommended that the Intelligence Community?s component of the overall strategy include a number of important items. among them deveIOpment of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks. To provide to the Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intelligence estimates on terrorism. the Joint inquiry has recommended establishment on the National Intelligence Council of the position of National intelligence Of?cer for Terrorism. The recommendation suggests that the person holding this position also assist the intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic analysis. Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the Administration to ensure development within the Departmenth Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center. as mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The success of that fusion center will depend. as the recommendation states, on the center?s ?fult and timely access to all counterterrorism- related intelligence information. including 'ravr' supporting data as needed.? Your action to ensure full cooperation between the entire intelligence Community (including. of course. the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Security writ be fundamental to the success of this vital reform. We applaud the President's announcement of the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat integration Center. which we understand will be located under the Director of Central Intelligence. The important challenge, we believe. is to assure the full and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion requirement of the Homeland Security Act and the center that the President announced. The recommendations include a list of signi?cant reforms that the intelligence Committees believe are essential for strengthening the FBi's domestic intelligence capability. in regard to these critically needed reforms. the Joint inquiry has recommended that Congress should direct that the head of the Intelligence Community. together with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. should report to Congress on the FBI's progress. The report should include 'the speci?c manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the United The Honorable George J. Tenet January 29. 2003 Page 3 States. recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil liberties.? The Committees expressed their strong conviction that ?the intelligence Community's employees remain its greatest resource.? They recommend that the head of the intelligence Community "should require that measures be implemented to greatly enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts.? Several particular actions are set forth in the recommendation. One is that intelligence Community agencies should expand and improve counterterrorism training. including about information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence personnel. the use of the Foreign intelligence Surveillance Act. and watchlisting. The recommendation includes steps to improve Intelligence Community language capabilities and the utilization of the skills and experience of retired personnel. it calls on the intelligence Community to ?enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce.? A further personnel recommendation proposes, in part. that Congress enact legislation. modeled on the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. to help instill the concept of ?jointness? throughout the intelligence Community and ensure that its components will work more closely together than has been the case. The mechanisms identified in the recommendation include such things as joint tours for intelligence and law enforcement personnel as well as incentives for joint service throughout the Intelligence Community. in developing these ideas. Congress would benefit from the Administration?s detailed proposals. The Joint inquiry identi?ed several important objectives concerning classi?ed information. including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community. by state and local authorities. and by the American public. To this end. we recommended that the Director of Central intelligence. in consultation with the heads of key components of the Intelligence Community. including the Attorney General. should report to the Intelligence Committees on ?proposals for a new and more realistic approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of sensitive and classified informalion.? The report should also address 'proposals to protect against the use of the classification process as a shield to protect agency self- interest.? The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and response to these and other matters identi?ed in the course of the Joint inquiry. Further. we are con?dent that the Congress will bene?t from other recommendations The Honorable George J. Tenet January 29. 2003 Page 4 that you might have for legislative or adminlsvatlve action to improve the Nation's oounlerterrorist capabilities. Smcerely. Bob Graham Porter Chairman. Senate Intelligence Chaln'nen. House Intelligence Committee. 107m Congress Committee. 107?? and 108?" Congresses 2 a Rlohard Shelby Nancy Pelosl Vice Chairman. Senale Intelligence Ranking Minority Member. House Committee. 107'? Congress Intelligence Committee. 107'? Congress and Member ex of?cio (as Minority Leader). 108? Congress Enclosure: As stated s. REPT No SESSION H. No. 107- INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMM UNITY BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEIVIBER 11, 2001 REPORT OF THE US. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. ON INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. HOE-SE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE TOGETHER WITH VIEWS DECEMBER 2002 PART DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE, REGARDING CERTAIN SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS 20. Finding: "Nhilc in the United States, some of the 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primorin from FBI sources, at least two of those individuals were alleged by some to he Saudi intelligence of?cers. The: Joint Inquiry?s review con?rmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of which has yet to be independently veri?ed. indicating that individuals associated the Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to nl-Qn?idn and other terrorist groups. The FBI and CIA have. informed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September l1 attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only :1 limited understanding of the Saudi Government?s ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony, neither CIA nor FBI witnesses Were able to identify de?nitively the extent ofSaudi support for terrorist activit}I globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support. if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. The FBl?s V?l?nshington Field Of?ce created a squad devoted to only and at least in part due to the Joint Inquiry?s locus on this issue, did the FBI and CIA csmhiish a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view of the Joint Inquiry, this gap in intelligence coverage is unacceptable, given the magnitude and immediacy ofthc potential risk to US. national security. The Intelligence Communin needs to address this area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible- Discussion: One reason for the limited understanding is that it was only after September 11 that the US. Government began to aggressively investigate thin issue. Prior to September the FBI apparently did not incur. investigatch resources on? Saudi nationals in the United States due to Saudi Ambie's status as an American "ally A representative oftlic FBI?extolled that, prior to . September 11. 2001, the FBI received "no reporting from of the intelligence Community" that thou: was a- presence in the United States. According to vanOus Bl documents and at least one CIA memorandum. some of the ll hijackers, whilc in the United States. apparently had contacts with individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. While the Iotnt Enquiry uncovered this material during the course of its review and CIA documents. it did not to investigatc and assess the accuracy and significance of this information independently, that such a task would be beyond the scope oi Jomt inquiry. Instead, the Jomt inquiry roster-red a dctailcd compilation of information uncowrcd by the Inquiry in documents and to the FBI and CIA for further investigation by the Intelligence Community and, if appropriate. law enforcement agencies. A brief summary of the available mfomtanon rcgarrl'mg some of these individuals is illustrative for purposes of this report: - Omar al-Bayoumi. The FBI has received numcrous rcporLs from individuals in the Muslim community, dating back to 1999, alleging that al-Bayourm may be a Saudi of?cer. FBI ?les suggest that al-Bayoumi prm'idcd substantial assistance to hijackers Khalid al-Mihd'uar and Nawal' til-Hamil aftcr thcy arrived in San Diego in l-?chruary 2000. Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers at a public plat: shortly after his meeting with an individual at the Saudi consulate and are indications in the ?les that his cncountcr with the hijackers may not have been accidental. During this some timeframe, alvBayoumi had with Saudi Government establisluncms :31 th: United States and received ?nancial support frorn a Saudi company af?liated with the Saudi Ministry ochfertss. According to FBI files,- at the company said that al- Bayo umi received a salary even though he had been there on only one occasion. This support increased substantially in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived in San Diego, decreased in 2000. and is.de at that same level until August 3001. Thai company rcportcdiy had tics to Usame. Bin Ladm and nl-Qa'ida. [n addition, the FBI determined that al-Bayoumi Was in contact will: several individuals nod cr FBI investigation and with the Holy Land Foundation, which has been under- investigation as .a fundraising front for llamas; 41:; LUJ A Aidan-?12 0 05mm Bassnan. Bassnan may have been in conmct with al?M?nlhzu and nl-Hazmi during their time in San Diego. Bassnan was a closc associate of al-Bayouini and Omar Bakarbashat, another one of the hijackers' close Estimates. Pie also lived across 1b.: street from the hijackers, and made a comment to an FBI asset that he did more than al- Bayounli did for the hijackers. According to an FBI document. Ewan told another individual that he met al-anmi through al-Baynmni and Intzr 1:12.: he met two of the hijackers through al-Bnyoumi. He also told the asset that al-Bayoumi was arresttci because he know :11 Una-mi and nl-Mihdhur vary The decumcm goes on to sum: that Bassuan and ail-Bayoumi havc been "close lo each other for 5. long mm: Bassoon has many tics to ll): Saudi including past cmpqumcnt by the Saudi Ambizn: Education Mission, referral to in FBI as The FBI also received reports ??om individuals in the Muslim community alleging than Bassnan might bl: a Saudi of?cu. According to a CIA memo, Bassnan rrccivcd finding and poSSEbly a fake passport from Saudi Government of?cials. He and his wife have rcc-zivcd ?naimial support from In: Saudi Ambassador to the United States and his Wifl.? A CIA top-on .1130 indicates that Bassnac travelcd to Houston in 2002 and met with an individual who was - The report status that during that trip a of tho Saudi Royal Family provided Bassoon with a signi?cant amount of cash. FBI infonnation indicatus that Bassnan is an and Supponcr 13m Ladin, and. has 'nccu L0 111: Eritrean lslamic Jihad and Blind Shaykh; - al-Thumairy. According to FBI documenas and a CIA memorandum. al-lqumi and may haw: bean in contact with Shaykh :il-?l?humairy, an accredited diploma: the Saudi Consulate in Los Angels and one of 1hr. "imoms" oi the King Fahad mosque in Culvor City. Cali?orru'a~ A150 according to FEE documents. 112:. mosque wills built in 1995 from funding provided by Saudi Arabia's Crown Pnnco Abduluziz. The mosque is reportedly attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angelo: and is widely recognized for its anti-Weston: views; 1 W1 ?7 - Saleh al-Ilussayen. In September 2001. Saleh aI?Hassaycn, reportedly a Saudi Interior Ministry of?cial, stayed at the same hotel in Hcmdon, Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying. \thle :tl-Hussaycn claimed after September 11 not to know the hijackers. FBI agents believed he was being deceptive. He was able to depart the Lnited States desptte FBI efforts to locate and rc?interview him; and Abdullah 5m Ladin. Abdullah Btu Ladin claims to work for the Sand: Embassy in Washington. DC. as an of?cer. He is identi?ed by the FBI as 135m: Bin Ladin's half brother. He 15 a close friend nfMohammed Quadir-llarunani. a possible associate of Mohammad Ana and Marwan al-Shehhi prior to September 1 l, 2001. The Joint htquiry also found other animations that individuals connected to the Saudi Government have ties to terrorist networks, including: - The CLJX and FBI have identi?ed the Tamtyah Mosque in Culver City as a. site of extremist?related activity. Several subjects of FBI investigations prior to September 11 had close connections to the mosque and are beliewd to have laundered money through this mosque to non?pro?t organizations overzeas af?liated with USama Btu In an interview, an FBI agent said he believed that Saudi Government money was hemg laundered through the mosque; - Another Saudi national with c105c ties to the Saudi Royal Family,_, is the subject of FBI countcnerrotism investigations and reportedly was checking security at the United States' southwest border in 1999 and discussing the poss?lility of in?ltrating individuals into the United Status; 0 According to FBI documents. several oftht: phone numbers found tn the phone book of Abu Zu?oaida, a senior al-Qa?ida operative captured on Pakistan in March 2002. could be linked, at least indirect] y, to telephone in the United States. One of those US. numbers is subscribed to by the ASPCOL Corporation, which is located in Aspen. - n? ?1 Colorado, and manages lh: affairs of the Colorado ofthc Saudi Ambassador Honda. The FBI noted that ASPCOL has an unlisted iclep'nonc numhcr. A 18, 200?. FBI responso to the Joint Inquiry states that traces have revealed no direct links between numbers found in Zu'naida's phone book and numbers in the Unitcd Slants." According to an FBI document, the telephone number ofa bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, who some have alleged may be a? aico Found in Abu Iubnidu?r. and According to an FBI agcn: in Phoenix. tlic FBI Mohanuncd al-Qudhaccin of being_ Al-Qudhacoin was involved in a 1999 mcidcnl aboard an America ?ight, which the lilJI?h Phoenix of?ce now may have been a ?dry run? to test airline security. Doing the ?jglil, ul-Qud?oaccin and his assocmtc asked the [light ancndams a variety of suspicious questions; al-Qudhaccin limo to enter the cockpit on two occasions. Al-Qudhaccm and his associate were: ?ying to Washington, C. 10 amend a party at tho Saudi Embassy, and both claimed Eha?i their tickets paid for by the Saudi Embassy. During the source oi'its investigations, the FBI has discovered that both al-Qudhaccin and the other individual involvcd in this incident had connections to terrorism. Finally, the Commiuccs arc particularly about :11: serious nan-n; or allegation: contruncd in a CIA memorandum found by the Joint Inquiry Staff in in: ?les of ?ne 131's Sari Dicgo Field 0135:: That memorandum, which discusses alleged ?nuomal connections 1h: September I hijackers, Saudi of?cials, and mcm'ocrs of the S?udi Royal Family. was draftc-d by a CIA of?cer?, relying primarily on information from ?les. CIA officer Scot it to the to determine: whether CIA had additional information. He also provided a copy to the FBI agent rcsponsible for :nvcsogatioo of one ofthc individuals discussed in the memorandum. Dzspiic the clcar national implications of the CIA mcmorandum. the. agent included 1hr: memorandum in an moi? idoa?. case ?le and did not forward ll. tc- FBI Headquarters. FBI Hoodquaners, therefore, W31 unuwuc I I Mum?Mow 419 of statements in the memorandum until 1h: Join! inquiry brought the mcmormdum's museums to me Bureau's Possible Saudi Connuctious to Terrorism and Terrorisl Groups While in the United States, 53m: oi'thc ll hijackers in Contact wiih, and support or assistance from, individuals who may he. connected to the Saudi Govo.:uucnt. TIICIC is mforznahuu, from FBI [Lat at {out :wu ui?lhum: wuc be. Saudi intelligence of?cers. The Joml lnquiry's review con?rmed {h at the [Lining-mac Community also has inform-anon, much of which remains speculative and ya: to b: verified, indicating that Saudi Government officials in the Unilcd States may have 01111:: lies to al-Qa?idu and other terror-in groups. Th: Committees are paniculazly about the serious namrc of allegations contamch in a CIA memorandum found within the ?les ofthc FBI's Sun 1313;?) Field Of?ce Thar memorandum, which discusses alleged ?nancial connectons between the hijackers. Saudi Government of?cials, and members othr: Saudi Royal Family, was drafted by a CIA of?ccr?. primarily on information from FBI ?les. in 11121!" [estimoziy before-s the Joint Inquiry, this CIA nor the FBI was; ab]: 10 de?nitively identify for 111656 Committees extent ol'Saudi support for lcnurist activity globaily or within the United States and Lht: extent to which such suppor.. it?ll exists, is intentional or immch in nature. Both 11]: FBI and CIA have imlicatcd to this that they are now aggressively purwing Saudi-rclatcd terrorimn issues. Prior to September 11m, the FBI apparently did not. focus invcsiigauv. _Swdi in th: United States due. to Saudi Arabia's status as an American "ally".? A representative of the testi?ed in closai '1 M1 OWN WI itcarings that, prior to September 1 FRI received "no reporting Croat any member of the Intelligence Coznmumty? that there is 3? presence in the United States- it should be clear that this Joint inquiry has made no final detennittations as to the reliability or suf?ciency ofthc information regarding these issues that we found contained in FBI and CIA documents. It was not the task of this Joint inquiry to conduct 1 .c kind of investigation that would be required to detemtincd the true signi?cance of any such alleged connections to Saudi Government. On the one hand. It is possibie that lites:- buds of connection: could sugguSL. as indicatth in 3? detail Sui) 2. 2002, "incontrovcn?alc evidence that there is support for these terrorists within the Saudi On the other hand, it is also possible that further allegations could reveal legitimate! and innocent, explanations for these associations. Given the serious national security implications of this information, however. the leadership of the Joint Inquiry is referring the staff's compilatiOn of tcicvant information to both the F31 and the CIA for investigative review and appropriate investigative and intelligence action. Possible Connections Between the September 11 Hijackers and Saudi Government Of?cials in the United States In reviewing FBI documents and the CIA memorandum, the Joint Inquiry examined information suggesting that: - One individual who provided assistance to avat'al-Haumi and Khalid ni-Mihdhar may he LEI the Saudi A second individual who may have been in contact With al-l Iazmi and Al-Mihdhar also has ties to the Saudi Including connections to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. than: is reporting in FBI ?les that persons have allegcd that both ofthese individuals may be Saudt intelligence of?cers; ?3 k- - The September I hijackers may have been in contact With othcr Saudi of?ci?s in the United States prior [0 the September '11 attacits; and - Saudi Government of?cmls in the Unit-sci States may have ties tc Lisztma. Bin Lattm's terrorist network. Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan Two individuals known to the F131 prior to ll, 2001 Omar al-Bayoumi and Osnma Bassnun may have provided or support to aE-Hazmi and ul-Mihdlia: while the two hijackers-twist: were: living in San Diego. While the documentary that al-Bayoumi providcd assistance to al-llazmi and ail-Minolta: is solid. the ?les contain only limitcd that Osamn Bassnan had contacts with the two individuals. When al-Hazmi and al?Mihdltar moved to San Diego, til-Bayoumi provided them With considerable assistance. Before 1h: hijackers mot-co in with the. lung~timc FBI informan; they stayed at al-Buyoumi's apartment for several days until 31-83onst was able to find them an apartment. Al-Bayoumt than co-sig-ocd their lease and may have paid their first month's rent and security deposit.1 After :tl-llazmi and zl?Mi'ndhar movcd into their own apartment. til-Baymimi threw a party to welcome them to the San Diego uurmnurdty He also Abdullah, moths: individual from this Islamic Come: of San Dicgu (ICSD). to help them acclimated to the United Status. Abdulla'n served as their translator, helpcd them get tlrivcrs' licenses, and assisted them in locating ?ight schools. The nous, in IS 1.5. 20GB. response that "financial Indian: 1 cash tlspusu of the 3.2m: mucus: as the cashier's chezlt into al-Bayostni?s bank account on tho same day. which suggests that the hijacker. reimbursed him." FBI November IS R?spomt. 3. another FBI document, dated Dctu?m: 14, 20023.. appears to reach a different mnclusion This sutcs that "a review ot'ICnalid Al-L-?htihar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi's bank :ccords indicate that: is no bank that suppam 517th: mat mncy}, or any monies to Omar Al-Bayoumi {tom al-H azmi or Al-Midhat.? During the post-September tl investigation, the FBI discovered that al-Bayouzni had far more extensive ties to the Saudi than previously realized. in fact, according to an October 14, 2002 FBI document, ul-Bayoumi has ?cxzensive ties to the Saudi Gavctiuncnt." The connections identi?ed by the FBI are: - Al-Bayoumi had been an accountant at the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration from 1976 to 1993. when he relocated to the United States: - According to the FBI, al-Baynumi was in frequent contact with the Emir at the Seed: Ministry of Defense, responsible for air traf?c control; - The FBI has also located records, indicating that aI-Bayoumi received $20,000 front the Saudi Ministry of Finance at one point; 0 _When al?Bayoumi applied to schools in the United States in 1998, he had a letter from .3 Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was getting a lull scholarship from the Government of Saudi Ambia; and - While in San Diego, ul-Bayoumt was receiving money from the Saudi Mintery of Defense through a Saudi company called "Ercan." ofthet company informed the FBI aft-er Scotcmber . 2001 that. although al-Bayounu only showed up at the company on one occasion. he received a salary and allowances. stated that, at ?rst, he attempted to roles: In pay al-Buyounii a monh?iiy salary. but he was told that his compete) would lose their contract if he did riot pay - the. FBI that at the time, he attributed this '0 Saudi corruption. Al?Bayoumi also had frequent contact with Saudi in the United States. In a renew of telephone toll records. the FBI learned that al-Bayoumi called Saudi Govermnent establishments in the United States nJmOSt 100 times between January and May of 2000. According to the FBI, al-Baynumi was in contact with at least three 2! the Sandi Embassy in Washington. t-so inditiduuls the Saudi Ambimi .?vtissimi in DC. and three individuals at tin: Saudi Consuiuti: it". 1.05 Angel-ca. In a search ui' Etayouzni's--, they also that it: find the phone number for an :ndividuu! :it the Saudi Conmilzitc in London. Two San Diego addressed the 155th ui'whctitcr .15 an of?cer :1 tin: October 9, 2003 cloacd hearing. The futmcr agent who Muppct Instifzcd? [Al-Bayoumi] actcd like :1 Saudi of?cer, in my opinion. And ifhi: was involved with the hijackers. which it looks like 11!: was. iflic signed teases. it"nc prm'idcd sum: 50:1 nf ?nancing tar afar-21:: sun. than I would say that there's it clear possibility that then: might be .1 connection between Saudi mtciligmcu and Assistant Spcciui Agent in Charge in San Diego lcsti?cd that the FBI received "Intuit-m .15, 1 would say 'nuit'u citizen" reports from l11d1'\'tduais who batman-2.5 that al-lmyuumi was a Saudi intutligcncu of?cer. The Nowmi?vr rcaponsc inconsistent as In witctitcr the FBI is ticsngiirittng :zi-Bnymimt :15 :l susgicctuti Saudi it' Its :Cspmisc. ii}: nuts: that until 3311': I but lhl.? rcaponw atso twat-:5 that is no cz'izlcizcc" to t'nn'. :iL uroumi 'sn a "n CC 0. ICC. uihi 11 The FBI had receivni reporting from a Source well prinr to I I. 20?? incicutmg that ui-Rnyoumi might be :i Siudi intelligence officcn as known In itm'u in large amounts nt?monuy fram Saudi ."J'itbiu. despite th: fact that he diti not amen.- tu :iuid 33.011 On an: prior to September 1 i. the that iti- Uuyoumi 11nd rutcn'w 5400,00? twin Saudi Anthni to help fund a new nimquc in 3163?. His: cunductcd a. on al-Bawumi ?:93 and 199'). but Cloned the investigation at that point. WA Since September 11, 2001 FBI int-catigaticn revealed that al-Bayoumt has. some tics to terrorist elements. Pasquale]. D'Amuro. the Executive Assistant Ducctor for and tosti?ccl in the October 9, 2002 hcanng that [we've talking with the_ Government about collation on an individual named - who has tics to al?Qa'ida, who has ties to Bayoumi. In addition, the FBI reported tlic rcsulL?i ofthoir scorch ofnl-Bayeumi?-that, "after an exhaustive translations of Bayoumi's documents. it is clear that Bayoumi's con cspoudcnco he: is providing guidance to young Muslims and some ofhis ?Things can b: as jihadist." According to information acquired by the FBI alter Septembc.? 1, 20m, nl~Bayoumi also notcd on on: of his school applications that ht: worked for a. company called ?Dallnli/Avcu.? According to the. FBI, Email is a San Diego subcontractor ol'Dallah/Avco. According to a sepmtc .iocumcnt, Dalluh and Avco are under the saint: umbrella company, Avcu Dalian Trams Arab, which is a subsidiary ofAl Bamlmal investment and Development Company. Avco Dnllah reportedly holds the contracts for cleaning and maintenancc at the three major airports in Saudi Arabia. The - document states that 121: company has links to Usama Ladin. FHE was informed of the af?liation between Dallnh/Avco and A1 Bamkant in Fcbmury 2001. but the San Dicgn Field Ollicc apparently never got this infonnalion. According to FBI documents, al-Bayounu?s pay increased during tli: :imc tho: al-H azmi and al-Mihdliar in the Unitcd States. According to a nalysis of tics between 1hr tarmac? altar-la: and elemmts of the Saudi Gsvemmaiu, before nl-Hazmi and nl-Milidhnr anivoci in the 113., al-Bayoumi generally Approximately 5465 month in "allowances." According tn the. document. in March 1000, a month after al-chmi and al- Milidhzir arrived in San Diego. his "allowances" jumped to over 53700 a month and stayed constant until December 2000, when al-Hazmi left San Die-go. Al?Bnyouini's allowances: were then decreased to approximately $3,200 a month and stayed at that rate until Bayoumi left m: United in August 2001. approximazcly one month before the September 11? attacks. Tilt-memorandum dated July 2, 2003. Incorrcc?y not-3d 1113.1 ttI-Iluyounti's Wt" .. white hung tn Sm IJicgo. $1200 a month from Hatt?u Emu Suttan. the wifc Bundur. the Saudi Ambasmdor to the United Status. Th: 35.5] has now con?mtcd that only 05am: Bassnan's wti menu}- directly from Prince Randy?s wife, but tha: al- thyoumi's wit": attempted to deposit ot'thc checks from Prince Bandar's wifc. which wen: payable to Bussnan's wxi'e. into her own accounts. The Joint Inquiry also found. in T231 ?les. infr-rmatic-n suggesting that 0.5.1314 mqu hat-3 also been contact with and Includmg: Bitssnutt was a very close ?)men ttI-B ayoumi's and war: in tuicphottc contact with ni-Bayuumi suvcral ["1125 a day whit: they were 'tmt'n in .?un Diego. .1130 has close ties to a nutzt'mrr ufuthcr individuals to tit.- hijackers, inciuding Omzu' dtscusscd hclow. who is ref-crud to tn as Bassnan?s btothcr?in-lzm; According to an October In, 3001 document. an asset that it: had mut Nmtafttl-Humni through ui-Bnynumi. He wen: or. tu any that It: wut um 05 the :Ezrcu?n Omar aI-ISayt-ttmt'. According to the FBI .Iucumcnt. tald the asset that nt-Buyoumi was because he :tl-Ha'xmi and }ulihdhar wry Wei]. Tin: document 011 to stutc that ant! ul-Buytmmi have bean ?dose to each other for a lung Bussnun livczi in the ('anch in San Diego across. the s: u: from a! Ham-.3 and Bassum made a cozntnun: to an FBI after the 5-: utumour I attacks I My 5 Lhat he did more for the: hijackers than did; u" . The l-?Bi is aware ofeuntaet between the hijackers and 2. ch. 3: friend ofBassnon?s, Khalui al-Knyed, a commercial airline pilot and certi?cd ?ight instructor living to San Diego. [kiln-{led to the FBI that in May 2005'. a] and al~ Emmi contacted him about learning to fly Boeingjet aircraft; FBI documents speculate that Osama Basman The November 18, 2002- response contends that this was an early investigative theory based on assetreporting which the FBI has not been able to corroborate. However, there is also additional information possibly mug Basso-an In 1992, while he was living in Washington, DC, Bass?n?en listed his employment as the Saudi Arabian Education Mission. documents state that? Bossrtan also has other ties to the Saudi Government. wife received stipend from Princess Haifa. In a recent search residence. the FBE located copies at? cashiers cheeks totaling $74,000. during the period Fobruary '32, 199?) to May 30, 1002 These checks were payable to Bowman's Wife. mid were drawn on the Riggs Bank account of Prince Bandar's wife. The FBI has determined that there has been a sounding ordcr on Ptincoss Haifa's account since January i999 to send- 52000 a moot-t to Bassnan's Bassnan's wife was allegedly receiving the funding for ?nursing son'iccs," but. according to the - document, the. is no evidence that Bassnan's wife provided nursing services. On at least one occasion, Ransom received a check directly from Prince account. According to the FBI, or: May 14, 1998, Cash-3d a check from Bender in the amount Bassnan's wife also received at least on: since}: directly From Bandar She also received one additional check frnm'B andar's wife. which she cashed or; January 8, 1998. for $10,000. in the October 9, 2002 hearing FBI Executive Assistant Director D'Amuro commented 0:1 this funding: believe that we do have money going from Bandar's wife, 52,000 a. month up to about $64,000. What the money was for is what we don?t know." . She gives money to a lot of different gmups and peeplc from around the world. We've been able to uncover a. number of those.. .but maybe if we can disc-Over that she gives to 20 different radical groups, well, See, maybe there's 1 pattern here. The FBI has also developed additional information clearly indicating that Bassoon is an extremist and supporter of Usama Bm Ladm. In 1993, became aware that Bassnan had hosted a party for the Blind Shaykh at his house in Washington. DC in October [992. Bassnan has made many laudatory remarks to l-?Bl assets about Bin Ladin, referring to Bin Ladin as the of?cxal Khalifate and the ruler Islamic world. Acmrdir.g to an FBI asset, Basenan spoke of Bin Ladin ?as ifhe were a god." Bussnan also stated to an FBI that he heard that the U.S. Government had Stopped approving visas for foreign students. lie Considered such measures to be insuf?cient as there are already enough Muslims in the United States to destroy the United States and make it an Islamic state within ten to fifteen years According to documents. Bassnan also knew Bin Ladin?s family in Saudi Arabia and speaks on his mobile telephone with members of the family who are living, in the United States. Phone Numbers Linking Abu Zubaidu to a Company in the United States and a Saudi Diplomat in Washington On March 28. 2002 US. and coalitiori forces retrieved the telephone book ofAbu Zubaida. whom the U.S. has identified as :1 Senior al-Qa'ida operational coordinator According to an FBI document. ?a review of toll records hm; linked several of the numbers found in Zubaida?s phonebonk with US. phone numbers.? One of the numbers is unlisted and subscribed to by the Commotion in Aspen, Colorado. On July 15, 2002, 1'38 Wt mum?mm? oat-M 0W FBI Headquarters sent a lead to the Denver Field Of?ce requesting that it investigate this connection. On September 19, 2002 agents of the Denver Field Office responded. statzng, that they had completed their initial investigation. According to the Denver O?ice, ASPCOL is the umbrella corporation that rmnages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar. the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The facility is protected by Scimitar Security. Agent: of the Denver Field Of?co noted that neither ASPCOL nor Scimitar Security is listed in the phone book or is easily locatahle. in addition. the Colorado Secretary ofStme?s of?ce has no record The Denver of?ce did not attempt to make any local inquiries about ASPCOL, as they believed that any inquiries regarding would he quickly known by Prince Bandar's employees. Due to the sensitivityr of this matter. they decided to hold theix investigation of ASPCOL in abcyancc until they received additional guidance from FBI Headqua?era. According to the FBI, the phone number of an intiivtdual nameti? of McLean. Virginia was found within the effects of A211: Ztibaidn 15 reportedly :t bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. DC. The now suapeets that he may be a In 3 September 17,2002 document, the FBI notes that the Bureau IS Opening an investigation on- due to the size and value of his residence and his suspicious activity in approaching U.S. Intelligence Community personnel. 1: also appears tita- has been in contact with which is located at. in McLean, Virginia The FBI has identi?ed this address a: the address: of l'nnee Bandar. According to the is oz?tietully' a drive: for the Saudi Embassy. _1umbcr Was also linked to Prince Builder?s umbrella company located in Colorado. It should be noted that the FBI's November 13, 2002 reSponse states that traces have revealed no direct (emphasis added) links between numbers found in Zu?oaida's phone book and numbers in the United States." 4:0 1w WI The 11.5. Government also located another Virginie numbcr at no Usztma Bin Ladirt safehouse in Pakistan. The. number is subscribed to by an individual named? was inlco'ivwcd by the FBI in Me 2002. He could not explain Why his number ended up a: a safehouse in Pakistan, but stated the: he regularly provides servi as to a couple who are personal assistants a: Prince Bender This couple?s driver is an Lndividual named?, who is assigned to the Saudi Embassy in DC. According to- regularly called? businrss and frequently travels back and tom: to Pakiman. Other Saudi Cavernment Of?cials in the United States Who May Have Been in Contact with the September 11 Hijackers Among the individuals who may have been assocaates of In: al-Ilazmi 2nd zit-Miltdlinr was Shayi?t ai-Thuntairy. According lo the-memorandum reviewed by the Joint inquiry Staff, ?initial indications are that aI-Thumairy may have had a nr ?nancial connection to ai-i'lazmi and aJ-Mihdhar, but we are still looking at this Aj-Thumairy is an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in 1.0: Angeli-.5 and is also one ofthe "imms" the King Fahad Mosque in Cuivcr City. California. According to documents, the King Fahad mosque was imiit in 1998 from funding ?rm: the Saudi Arabim Crown Prince Abduiaziz. The mosque is attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angelcs and is widely known for its anti-Western FBI documents indicate that Moiiditar Abdulieh d-ovc Lil-Ila:sz and ai-Mihdhar to the King Fahad Mosque. before al-Mihdhar returned to Saudi Arabia. Several individuals on the lies: Coast whom the hijackers may have met ma). 3150 had connections to the Saudi Government. After the terrorist attacks. the FBI discovered that! during September 200} an individual named Saki: at?Iiusseyen stayed at ti?tc an :2 beta? tr. Her-noon, Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying at the time. According to F3: documents 31- I?lussayen is apparently a ?Saudi Interior Ministry He chimed not to know the. hijackers. .. I Aw hut agents in the FBI's Washington Field Of?ce: bclicvod h: was being deceptive. The intcn'icw was when al-Hussaycn :ithar passed out or feigned a seizure requiring medical. ucainlcut. He was rclcascd from the hospital days later and managed to dcpm?. the United States dcsgiite law enforcement efforts to Innate and rc-inlorvizw him. Salch al-Husxayen is the uncle ofSam: Omar al-Hussaycn. Sami a!-Hussaytn is to I'm: Islamic Asscinhiy of North America (IANA) and i5 tho sulijcut of an FBE counteiierron'sm investigation. The FBI has also discovered that 8:11:31 aI-Hussayen is a major coon-1mm: to m: LANA, a non-pro?t organization based in th is dcdioatud to 11:: spread oflslam worldwid 0. According to the FBI, the mission is actually to spread Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the Umch Stats and the world at large. The LANA solicits ?uids from wealthy Saudi benefactors, oxircmim Islamic Shaykhs. 9:161 susme organizations. According to documents. LANA has solicited money from Prime: BanduI, but the are unaicz: as to Whethc: Honda.? actually money to this organization. FBI documents aiso indicate at scvoral Sand; Naval of?ccrs wot-31:1 contact with the. ll hijackers. FBI documents sutc that the San Diego I-?iclc?. Of?cc opened a hivcstigalion on an individual named Osama Noo?n. a Saudi Naval officer, due to his association with Nawaf al-Huzmi and Khaiid al-Mihdhar. Lu addition. [.351 nl Hubi, another Saudi Naval of?cer, was in telephonic contact with flight 77.hijackers Khniid al-Mihd'nar and Nawaf ai?Hazmi on nine occuions from March 11, 2000 to March 27, 2000. The acksonvillc FBI Field Of?ce is conducting an investigation to determine Salch Ahmed Bedaiwi, :1 Saudi Nova} of?ce:- within its toiritory was in contact with any hiacke- .. u" WI annual?Hum Tho FBI has also some more tenuous commotion}; Saudi Government personnel and the hijackers during the course of the investigation. For example. according to the FBI, an individual Fahati Abdullah Saloh Baku}: was close flicnds with I I hijackers Pinned rind I-Izimm ai~Gh2mdi Bakttla prevmusly ?marked a: a pilot for the Saudi Royal family. flying Usama Bin Ladin Afghanistan and Saudi Ambient dining UBL's exile." In addition, an FBI source stoic-:1 after I '.h:11 tic/she was 5 ?I?n sur: that aI-?viihdhar was a at an apartment in McLean. Virginia that was 'occupicd in July and August 2001 by Hamad Aiotaibi ofthc Saudi Embassy Military Division. FBI Cocumtms also not: that September I I Sacco Alghamdi may have also 17:1. address. Connections Between Saudi Guvcrmiicut Of?cials in the United Statcs and Other l?oa?sihlc Terrorist Operatives The Joint Inquiry also reviewed information in FBI Eics, suggesting other possible connections between Saudi of?cials and terrorist Operatives. For example, accmding to FBI documents, than: is that hijackers vazm al- S?nc'nhi and Mohammad ALLA in contact with B?Iohammcd Rafiquc Quotiir Hamnurii, Iii: suhject of an FBI investigation since 1999 and uiose 3553:1311: oI'Abdullai; Bin Ladin. who is to in FBI documents as Usama Bin Ladin's half brother. man-um Bin Ladin, who is the subject of chaml FBI investigations, is currently in the United States. He claims in 'he Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC :15 an administrative of?cer. Bin Ladin has ?nanced Quudir's company and is listed by Quadir as the emergency contact for Quudir?s children. They an: frequent email and phon: contact as wail Wt 43* ?mm According to the FBI, Abdullah Bin Ladin has a number 01? connections to terrorist organizations. He is the President and Director of the World Arab Muslim Yoth Assom'ation (med?r') and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America Both organizations are local branches ol'non-govemmenlal organizatiom (N605) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that is ?closely associated with the ?mding and ?nancing of international terrorist actiwties and in the part has provided logistical support to indmduals wishing to ?ght in the Afghan War." In 1998, the CIA published a paper characterizing AMY :1 N60 that provides funding, logistical support and training with connections to the Arab network, Hamas, Algerian and Philippine - - 2 mlhtants. Also of potential intercsL at least in retrospect, is the 1999 incident involving Mohammed al-Qudhaeein and al-Shalawi Al-Qudhaocir?. and al-Shalawi were flying from Phoenix to Washington. DC to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. After they boarded the plane in Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questioas about the ?ight that the ?ight attendants found suspicious. When the plane was in ?ight, al?Qudhaeeir. asked where lhe hathroorz: was: one of the ?ight attendants pointed him to the back of the plane. Nevertheless, al?Qudhaccin went to the front of the and attempted on two occasions to enter the cockpit. The plane made an emergency landing and the 81 Investigated the inetdem, but decided not to pursue a prosecution. At the tune, al-Qudhaecin and al-Shalawi claimed that the Saudi Embassy paid for their airplane rickets. After the discovered that an individual in Phoenix who was the subject of a colintenerrorism investigation was driving ?-Slralawi's car, the Bureau Opened :1 counterterrorism investigation on al?Shalawi. In November 2000. the FBI received reporting from - that al-S'nalawi had trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had received explosives training to perform ?Kho'ozu 'l?owers?-type attacks. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Of?ce attached even potentially greater at gni?eance to that 1999 I meldenz. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory behind this. ?Phoenix FBI now 1' Accordmg to the Nowell-bet 18, ?002 response, Ilthougl: 5r.va of?crals in WAMY support al-Qa'i-ie and ether tenonst groups. the intelligence is imuf?cicnl to show whether the orgamzztion as a whole and its senior leadership support terronsm ?1'w 433 believes both men were to the scuurity of America Wesi Airlines in preparation for and in furtherance of UBIJAI Qucdn operations." in testimony be For: the Joint Inquiry, the agent who drafted the ?Phoenix statcd: In a post 9/11 world. back and looksd at that as possibly being some sort ofdry run. It is undcr September 11.200: momma? [n intcn'icws, a Phoenix FBI agan stated that Phoenix belicvcd that al-Qutihaccin might bc?. His pro?le is similar to that or" al-Bayourni and Bassnan. He is in Unitcrl States as a student and 60:5 not hat-c a visibl: ofincornc. H: is in ?'oqucnt contact with Saudi Government establishments in the United Status and appears to be very involved in the at airs of the local Saudi community. Ilc nuts 2. ?Saudi Club" in Phoenix, and assists Saudi students in the area. The FBI has also developed information that aZ-Qudhaccin was receiving money from the Saudi Government but. as of August 2002, had not obtained the rcicvant bunk rccords for The FBi's Phoenix Field Of?ce has speculated that and others may be arc other indications in FBI files that oflhc Saudi may have provided Support to Inn'nriSt network; For ct ample, 1hr FBI had idrriti?od "19 Tim Tnmiynh Mosque in Culvcr City :15 :1 silt: activity both before anti a?c: September ll. Several subjects of San Diego investigation prior to September ll had close connections to the mosque. Based on interviews and review of FBI lilcs, San Diego FBI agents believed at thi: timc that those subjects were laundering money through this mosqu: ?rst to Somali non-pro?t organizations and than to cctitics af?liated with Usuma Bin Ladir. =13 in approximately 1998. the FBI became aware of millions of dollars in wire transfers from the Somali community in San Diego to Al Bunkers: Trading Company and other businesses af?liated with Usama Bin Ladin. At the time, the funding appeared to be originating ?rm! the local Somali in the form of donations to various Somali non-pro?ts. However, the FBI now believes that the some of the funding actually originated from Saudi Arabia and that both the Ibn Ismiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego Were involved in laundering the money. According to the format FBI agent in San Diego who was irrvolVed in this investigation, this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide nl~Qn'ida with ?mding through covert or indirect means. In his October 9, 2002 testimony the {cutter agent commented on the possible money laundering: My guess Saudi-it's connected somehow with the Saudis. And knowing that probably 70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Usnrna Bin Ladin, it might be an indication. There are also indications of Saudi governmental support for terrorist activity through charitable organizations. The'Saudi-bascd Umm al-Qura Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is an Islamic organization linked to terrorist support activities. According to a May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary, the UQ's activities in support of terrorism include: suspicious money transfers, document forgery. providing jobs to wanted terrorist suspects, and ?nancing travel for youths to attendjihad training. The Defense communication notes that since September 2001. UQ couriers have transported over $330,000 in cash, most of which they received from Saudi Embassies in the Far East in January 2002. UQ administrator Yassir El-Sayid Mohammed traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately $200,000 from the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, the personal assistant to the HQ administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. l-lc tetumed with tens of thousands of dollars. according to the Department of Defense. CIA. Treasury, and FBI of?cials have all expressed their concern about the al-Hararnain Foundation's ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity. According to the PB l?s 435 November 2002 reSponse, the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HEF) has clear ties to the Saudi Government. and intelligence report?s-lg suggests it is providing ?nancial and logistical support to al-Qa'ida. In 1993, HIP established its U.S.-ba.scd of?ce in Ashlantl, Oregon, and that office has since received appronmalcly $700,000 from the parent of?ces in Saudi Arabia. The FBI has aperiting investigation and the activities ofthe Portland Of?ce. As discussed above. the FBI has located correspondence between al-Bayourni and the HIE. From the documents, it is clear that HIP was interested in appointing the imam of the mosque in Cajun. California, that al-Bayoumi managed. The Treasury General Counsel testi?ed about his agency?s concern about the foundation: MR. Second, and this is important point. it also rises out oijclz?s testimony, on al-Hararnain. the two branch of?ccs that we took a public and joint action against, al-Haramain really docs represent a signi?cant issue for the FCC and for terrorist ?nancing and for the United States policy. It is, of course. the largest, 1 think the largest Islamic charity in the world name is synonymous with charity in the Islamic world. Its direct oVersecrs are members of the Royal Family; signi ?cnnt contributors are members of the Royal Family. We don?t have a great deal of intelligence on the headquarters, about whether they are knowingly assisting people in al?Qa'ida and others; but in signi?cant branch of?ces yet to be designated and under current investigation, we have ample evidence that large cash amounts are being couricred to these batch of?ces, that large wire transfers of money are being sent to those of?ces. that a great deal of the money is being dissipated through missPenrling. unaccounted for, and ?nally. that those of?ces have signi?cant contacts with extremists, Islamic extremists. CIA of?cials recently testi?ed that they are making progress on their investigations of al- Harmain: A year ago we had a lot of reporting suggesting branch of?ces were tied to al- Qa'ida, ..Over the last year we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement information and we prepared a paper about a month, six. weeks ago which assembled all of paper gave us the first clear indication that the hood ofthe central of?ce is complicit in supporting tcrrorism, and it also raisod questions about Prince Nayef. Finally, -, the subject of Phoenix and Portland investigations. also has close ties to a member of the Saudi royal family. - no longer resid? in the United States. but is still the subject of no investigation. The FBI opened an 43" wr aunt?mmr investigation of- an employee ofSaudi Arabian Airlines, in 1999 after receiving information_ that Bin Ladin lieutenant Ahu Zitbaititi had been in contact with a telephone number associated with- in Portland. In May 2001, two Individuals were arrested in Bahrain and later admitted they were on their way to blow up US facilities in Saudi Arabia. One ofthem had a passport that had heen issued to one of- -Tne FBl's Phoenix Field Of?co also received source reporting, in 1999 that was checking security tit the Southwest border and discussing the possibility of infiltrating. individuals into the United States. The has developed information that- has elase ties with One of the Saudi primes and accompanies him on many trips. including travel to the United States. According to the was recently interrogated at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. Ile informal the FBI that- got the oh at Saudi Arabian Airlines through his contacts. He said that- did not earn much money in thisjoh. but that he "had another source of income through a Saudi prince" named Khalid aJ?ESandar. Aesording to - performed miscellaneous tasks for the Prince. such as handling real estate matters and as. isring the Prince's grandmother. - traveled many places with the Prince. including Europe, and often to the United Arab Emirates. made the comment that nobody ?knew everything about-" Although his name Was an the State Department?s watchlist,- was apparently able to circumvent the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service because he was traveling With the Saudi prince. The FBI only learned ofthe tn'p after the fact. Agents in the l'Bl's Portland Field Office expressed their concern that- and others were using their status as Saudi Arabian Airlines employees as a cover to enable them to transport weapons in and out of the United Lack of Saudi Cooperation in Counter-terrorism Investigations in testimony and interviews, a number of FBI agents and CIA of?cers complained to the Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 1 attacks. For example, a veteran New York FBI agent stated that, From his ?u 437 point of view, the Saudis have been tireless and obstructionist for years. In this agent?s opinion, the Saudis will only act when it is in their self-interest. When a high-level - of?cer was asked how the September 1 attacks might have been prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation, pointing to an example ?om the summer of 2001, when the US. Government requested Saudi assistance, with no success. In May 2001, the US. Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Abu Zubaida and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qa'ida operation. The US. Government pressured the Saudi Government to locate him. The Saudis informed tho U.S. Government that they required additional information to do so. The US Government agency that had originally learned of this individuals knowledge refused to provide the Saudis with additional information because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tried to pressure the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without the additional information According to some FBI personnel, this type of response is typical from the Saudis. For example, one FBI agent described one investigation atter September 1 in which he provided the Saudi Government with capies of the subjects Saudi passports. The Saudi Govanment maintained that they had no record of the subjects. According to the format Chiefof Alec Station, the unit in the Center established in 1996 to focus speci?cally on Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from about 1996 that the Saudi Gowmrnent would not cooperate with the United States on rnatters relating to Usama Bin Ladin. There is a May 1996 memo from the DCl's Countertermrist Center- - stating that the Saudis had stopped providing background information or other assistance on But Ladin because Bin Ladin had "too much information about of?cial Saudi dealings with Islamic extremists in the 19808 for Riyadh to deliver him into US. hands." In a June 1997 memo to the DCL Alec Station reemphasizcd the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there was little prospect of ?xture cooperation regarding Bin Ladin The former Chief of Alec Station thought that the U3. 60vetnment?s hope of eventually obtainingSaudi cooperation was unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the US. Government on this matter was contrary to Saudi national wt whom?mums 433 testi?ed on this issue on October 9? 0n the issue of al-Qa?ida and Saudi intelligence. that goes back to our eEorts to interact with the Saudi to get them to help us on investigating al-Qa?ida. ..for the most part it was a very trouwa relationship where the Saudis were not providing us quickly or very vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn't. It was just very slow in coming. Both FBI and CIA personnel cited an individual nnmod Madani as a speci?c case in which theSaudis were uncooperative. The CIA and the FBI had been pressuring the Saudis for years for permission to talk to at-Tayyib. According to the fonner head of ALEC Station, ai-Tayyib managed all of Bin Lndin?s ?nances when Bin Lmlin was in Sudan, and any expense over $1,000 had to be approved by al-Tayyib. Al-Tayyib moved to London in 1996 to work with Khalid al-Fawwaz, another important al~Qa?ida ?gure who has since been arrested 1n the summer of 1996. al-Tayyab returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continuously refused the and the requests to talk to al-Tayyib, stating, in the words of an FBI agent. that al- Tayyih was ?just a poor man who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything." The former chief of Alec Station also cited the example of Mohammad Jamal Khalifa. Khaan is Bin Ladin's brother-in-law and an important ?gure in al-Qa?ida. The US. Geo/eminent arrested Khalifa in the United States in 1994. Khalifa had been sentenced to death in absenu'a by the Jordanian Government for his role in a bombing in Jordan. As a result, the US. agreed to extradite him to Ionian. The Jordanians then reuxmed him to Saudi Ambin. In the opinion of the CIA o?'ieer, the Saudis ?bought oft? the Jordanians for the return of Khalit?a. According to the CIA of?cer. when Khalifa subsequently arrived in Saudi Arabia, he was met by at least one important government of?cial Khalit?a now works for a Riyadh-based N60 and travels and operates freely. The General Counsel of the US. Treasury testi?ed at the July 23, 2002 hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation with the U.S.: I. 439 A uuvgwA=ggkuua. .- There is an almost intuitive some, that things are not being volunteered. So want to fully inform you about ll. that we have to ask and we have to oak and we have to atrqu I will give you one-and-a-halfexamples. The :"usl is, after some period. the Sautlis have agreed to the designation ofa man named Iulaydin, who is notoriously involved in all of this; and his designation will be public within the next 10 days. The}r came forward to us 2 weeks ago and said, okay, we think we should go forward with the designation and a freeze order against Mr. We asked. What do you have on him? Because they certainly know what we have on him. because we shared it as we tried to convince them that they ought to join us. The answer bael: was, nothing new. MR. BEREUTER: Do you believe that? MR AUFIIAUSER. No. 1 think that taxes ct'edulity, or (her: is another motive we are no: being told. Status of the Intelligence Community?s Investigations into Connections Between Terrorism and Saudi Government Of?cials Both the FBI and the CM. have informed the Cort-induces Liza! they are treating the Saudi issue seriously. I?tCeortling to the November 18, 1002 F81 response. the FBI and CIA have established a working group to look into the Saudi issue. The PM fumed 2t squad at the Washington Field Of?ce? to investigate issue antl- w?MI?m?mur 440 WI ?Wm?mm? However, both the FBI and the CIA still have only :1 limited understanding oflhe Saudi Govemment'a ties to elemcuLs. In the October 9, 2002 closed heating. Director Mlicllu stated: If I have one preliminary note ofcaulion. it is that at this point then: are man: questions than answers, Md 1 would caution againstjumping to conclusmns before we know 3 Eur more. A document located by the .inint Inquiiy Staff con?rms that the FBi's Washington Field Of?ce is still in the early stages of focusing on these investigations. In an Augusi 15, 3.002, communication, a ?eld of?ce agent stated that in that same document, the Washington Field Of?ce asked? ?_uc:mowledgwanms tesumoriy that m. understanding nft?nis issue is limited as well.- With regard to the speci?c question of have we seen the Saudi supponing terror 3:011:15, I think the record is not clear al. all or. that. Both the FBI and CIA recognizer! the possibility that indivuzuals connected to the Saudi Government may be providing support to terrorists. So there is certainly a good, good chants that there an: sympa?nzers ur extremism, sympathizers possibly for al-Qn?ida within the Security services. also noted that. Abu Zubayduh said he?s con?dent that al-Qa?ida mus: have contact certainly wuh Saudis in the United States and that al-Qa'ida and Usama Hin Ladin are anicularly- they We ?Went??WW? invest signi?cant energy in cultivating what Abu Zubaydah called good relationships with Saudis of all . .He said bin Lndin ?15 very pleasad when Saudis in the military, those successful in business and those close to the royal fmily to lend active support to his cause. He said bit: Ladin actively seeks out such relationships Other CIA and FBI of?cials echoed these remarks in Congressional testimony. l?md: What we ?nd troubling about the cases that we learned about from both the [.05 Angeles cases and some of the cases that the Washington Field Of?ce has looked at, in which you?re Seeing Saudi money going to peeple, is that it ?ts sort ofa pattern that we?ve seen in terms ofdirect payments Earn the Saudis, the Saudi Government's lougstanding suppon for vcty fundamentalist Wahabi and Sala? charities and movements around the world. which in a sense you see the money is going to fundamentalism and you would be very surprised if some of it doesn?t bleed over into terronst had a lot ofsuspiciom before September 1] which we documented in a number of different papers, and again it?s a lot ofsmoke and the issues that come up are who knows about the payments, on whose behalf are the payments hemg made, are they being made on behalf of the central government or are they being. made by a. 10031 of?cial or a person. Do the people who are making the payments know what's happening to the money? lfthey do know what?s happening, why are they making the payments? Is it a form of blackmail? Do they recogniZe the terrorist support? There's the issue of are they regulating as well as are the},r doing the due diligence that they ought to. FBI Executive Assistant Director Pasquale D?Amuro testi?ed int same hearing: To date Ican't sit here and tell you that those he; go back. that we can prove that the Saudi royal family is sponsoring, terrorism. But there's enough smoke that we are conducting several investigations to try to determine what other information is out there. What :5 clear is that the FBI did not treat the Saudis as a Uchal prior to September 1 1. 2001. WI ?mm?Jaw? 4?42 Michael Rolincc, the former head of the International Terrorism Operations Section at 1:131 testi?ed: The answer to your question is pre?9/ll there were not an}? signi?cant preliminary inquiry or full investigations, with relatively few exceptions. conducted by the FBI looking at Saudi or support to terrorism. . .I'm not going to stand here, Ms. Hill, and tell you in any way, shape or form 'lhe former Asmstant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego continued this in his testimOny: Basicau_- were not a. country identi?ed by the State as a state sponsor of terrorism. And the theme or the common modus operandi that we saw in San Diego was that if there were? there, their primary objective was to monitor dissidents in the interest ofprotecting the royal family. So they were not viewer. art inimie? threat to 1131101131: security. In the October 9, 2002 closed hearing. Direztor Mueller aclaitawiedged that he became aware ofsomc of'the facts regarding the Saudi issue onng as a result ot'the investigative work of the Joint Inquiry Staff: I'm saying the sequence of events here, I thin}: the staff probed and. as a result ofthe probing, some facts came to light here and to me, ?mt?aly, that had not come to light before, and perhaps would not have come to light had the staff not probed. 'l?hat's what I?m telling you. So I?m agreeing with you that the staff probing brought out face: that may not have come to this Committee." Senator Dex-wine: But what you're aiso saying. though. is that that probing then brought fact: to your nttentiOn. Director Mueller: Yes.