July 2016

MISCONDUCT AT TSA THREATENS
THE SECURITY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC
HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE MAJORITY STAFF REPORT

Rep. Scott Perry
Oversight & Management
Efficiency Subcommittee
Rep. John Katko
Transportation Security
Subcommitee

 CONTENT
Executive Summary
I. TSA’s Bureaucratic Process for Addressing Misconduct
Entities that Investigate and Adjudicate Misconduct
Processes for Adjudicating Employee Misconduct
Process for Removing Employees for Misconduct
TSA’s Employee Code of Conduct

II. Employee Misconduct Continues to Grow While TSA Investigations & Punishments Decline
Misconduct Allegations Overall
Misconduct Allegations by Type
Misconduct Allegations by Airport
Outcomes of Misconduct Allegations

III. Misconduct Occurs from the Top to the Bottom of TSA
Misconduct Allegations by Job Category and Pay Band
Employees with Numerous Complaints
Loopholes in TSA Policies Allow for Senior Level Misconduct

VI. TSA’s Bloated Bureaucracy Cannot Effectively Address Misconduct
TSA’s Misconduct Industrial Complex Limits its Ability to Manage Misconduct
TSA Is Not Reviewing Misconduct Data Systematically or On an Ongoing Basis
TSA Lacks Mechanisms Needed to Address Misconduct
Other Agencies Identified Misconduct TSA Missed
TSA’s Implementation of Watchdog Recommendations Fell Short

V. TSA’s Growing Misconduct Corrodes Morale

Conclusion
Recommendations/Legislative Proposals
Appendix I: TSA Data on Misconduct Allegations by Category
Appendix II: TSA’s Implementation of Internal Controls to Address Misconduct
2

 Executive Summary
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in the immediate aftermath of
9/11. Today, it has roughly 60,000 employees working at about 450 airports. For years, news
media outlets have reported on serious instances of misconduct by TSA employees across
the country, ranging from assaulting passengers to participating in large-scale criminal
conspiracies. Although TSA has taken some steps to address employee misconduct,
sadly, these stories continue to be in the news and in the mind of the public. Given these
seemingly continuous scandals, the House Homeland Security Committee conducted an
investigation to review TSA’s efforts to identify, adjudicate, and address misconduct.

TSA agent accused of helping smuggle
illegal immigrants into US

Former TSA Agent: Groping Scandal Is
Business as Usual

Another TSA Scandal: 73 Airport
Workers Revealed To Be On
Terror Watchlist
Dozens Punished by
TSA for Whistle-Blowing
Are Later Exonerated

Besieged by
misconduct,
TSA sows culture of
dysfunction and distrust

Why the TSA
catches your water
bottle, but guns and
bombs get through

TSA Officer Accused of
Molesting Traveler in
Latest Scandal to Hit
Controversial Agency

3

 TSA data shows that misconduct has grown over time—both before and after a watchdog
investigation. For example, in 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reported that misconduct by TSA employees increased by almost 27% from fiscal year 2010
to 2012, and that TSA did not have the processes in place to adequately address it.1 GAO
recommended that TSA establish a process to review misconduct cases to ensure that
airport-level staff complied with existing policies, issue guidance describing the process for
recording misconduct data, track cycle times for investigating and adjudicating misconduct,
and reconcile completed investigations with
adjudication decisions. GAO also reported
Example of Misconduct:
that Transportation Security Officers (TSO)
In 2015, three TSA Federal Air
engaging in misconduct raised security
Marshals in Chicago, IL, were
concerns because those were the very
accused of hiring prostitutes
employees charged with helping to ensure
and using government funds to
the security of the nation’s aviation system.
pay for hotels rooms to engage
GAO concluded that it was imperative for
in sexual misconduct. One air
TSA to effectively manage instances of
marshal resigned and the other
employee misconduct and take steps to
two were indefinitely suspended
mitigate future occurrences. Although TSA
without pay while TSA is in the
implemented these recommendations,

recent TSA data shows that misconduct
continued to grow by almost 29% from
fiscal year 2013 to 2015.

process of adjudicating the matter.
Sources: Associated Press, TSA

According to information provided by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), TSA
employees have been caught, for example, smuggling drugs and people through TSA
checkpoints. One TSO was caught accepting bribes in exchange for smuggling foreign
nationals through a TSA-regulated checkpoint into one of the nation’s largest airports.2
According to Frank Cilluffo from the George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and
Homeland Security, “smuggling is smuggling is smuggling.”3 Given that employees have
engaged in this type of activity, serious concerns exist around the potential for TSA insiders
to knowingly or unknowingly put the traveling public at grave risk. The ever-evolving threat
landscape and increased concern about the insider threat to aviation security underscores
the need for a capable aviation security workforce to detect and stop nefarious activity.
As a result, it is vitally important for TSA to ensure that its workforce is focused on its
mission to secure the aviation system.
Our investigation found that senior management officials at TSA have also allegedly been
involved in serious misconduct and abuse of internal policies, indicating that misconduct
occurs at all levels of TSA. Specifically, numerous individuals came forward to the
Committee alleging that senior TSA officials used the practice of directed reassignments,
or mandated employee transfers around the country, as, in some cases, retaliation for
employees elevating security concerns. This practice poses significant security risks where
senior leaders ignore possible vulnerabilities, while also potentially presenting significant
costs to taxpayers because TSA covers the expenses of those forced to relocate. This
behavior erodes employees’ confidence in an organization that has struggled with
improving employee morale and wastes taxpayer dollars.
4

 Employee misconduct of all types corrupts TSA’s core mission to protect the traveling
public and poses serious security vulnerabilities. Every minute TSA is forced to handle
employee misconduct is one minute less that they could be addressing security matters.
It is important for TSA to have the policies and internal controls in place to ensure that
employees at all levels—including those at the very top—are beyond reproach and held
accountable.

I. TSA’s Bureaucratic Process for Addressing Misconduct
Depending on the type of misconduct allegation, different offices within DHS generally, and
TSA specifically, are responsible for investigating and adjudicating employee misconduct.
Entities that Investigate and Adjudicate Misconduct
Passengers, other TSA employees, and
other federal agency personnel can file
complaints against TSA employees for
alleged misconduct. These allegations are
sent to TSA’s Office of Inspection (OOI),
which then refers many of them to the
DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) for
investigation.4 The OIG has the right of first
refusal for investigating all TSA misconduct
cases, but generally prioritizes allegations
with potential criminal misconduct. It
refers all others back to OOI based on an
agreement with TSA. Once an investigation
is completed, the OIG and OOI produce a
Report of Investigation (ROI) that includes
information related to the case. ROIs are
subsequently forwarded to the relevant
office
responsible
for
adjudicating
misconduct cases.

Example of Misconduct:
In December 2015, a TSA officer
from Oakland International Airport
was charged by a federal grand
jury for using her position to
facilitate drug smuggling through
the security checkpoint. The officer
allegedly smuggled over 100
kilograms of marijuana over a two
year period. This case was a result
of an investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Alameda
County Sheriff’s Office, and TSA’s
Office of Inspection.
Source: Department of Justice

Allegations related to misconduct that are more administrative in nature, such as time
and attendance abuse, are referred to the employee’s office or airport where they are
investigated through TSA’s administrative inquiry process at the local level or by supervisors
at the checkpoint. During this process, airport or office leadership designates an inquiry
official to obtain information related to the case and produce a report similar to an ROI,
which is then referred to the relevant office responsible for adjudication.
TSA’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) adjudicates all misconduct allegations
that involve senior officials and law enforcement officers, as well as all cases investigated
by the DHS OIG. According to TSA officials, former Administrator John Pistole established

5

 OPR as an independent office within TSA to ensure that disciplinary actions were applied
consistently to employees under its jurisdiction. In addition, airport management officials
have the authority to adjudicate employee misconduct allegations that do not fall under
OPR’s jurisdiction. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the relevant entities related to
investigating and adjudicating employee misconduct at TSA.
Figure 1: Entities that Investigate and Adjudicate TSA Employee Misconduct

Who investigates?
Who makes
allegations?
• 
• 
• 
• 

TSA airport staff
TSA employees and
officials
Passengers
Other federal agency
personnel

• 
• 

• 
• 

• 

DHS OIG (criminal conduct)
TSA OOI (criminal conduct
referred by OIG, misconduct
by senior staff and law
enforcement officials)
TSA OSO (common employee
issues)
Airport checkpoint managers
(common complaints made by
passengers)
TSA senior airport managers
(complex, sensitive
complaints)

Who adjudicates?
• 

• 
• 

TSA OPR (all
OIG cases and
misconduct by
senior staff and law
enforcement officials)
TSA OSO
TSA airport officials

Source: TSA documentation

Processes for Adjudicating Employee Misconduct
When adjudicating misconduct, airport officials and managers at the checkpoint are
required to follow policy when administering actions to address misconduct.5 Specifically,
managers should use TSA’s Table of Offenses and Penalties for Appropriate Discipline
for Common Offenses (Table of Offenses and Penalties) as guidance, which establishes
recommended ranges of penalties for specific types of misconduct, when administering
disciplinary and adverse actions against an employee.6
For example, the Table of Offenses and Penalties recommends that employees caught
consuming alcohol while on duty should be fired from TSA. Additionally, it recommends
that employees who treat a supervisor inappropriately or disrespectfully receive penalties
ranging from a Letter of Reprimand to a 10-day suspension. TSA’s Table of Offenses and
Penalties allows flexibility for managers to provide lesser or more stringent penalties
depending on “mitigating factors,” such as self-reporting, and “aggravating factors,” such

6

 as failing to report misconduct. Moreover, TSA’s Table of Offenses and Penalties states
that “supervisors and law enforcement officers are held to a higher standard” and, as
such, should be given the higher end of the penalty range. These policies also apply to
personnel at Screening Partnership Program airports. See Figure 2 for types of actions
related to employee misconduct.
Figure 2: Types of Outcomes for Adjudicated Misconduct Cases

Non-Disciplinary Action

•  Counseling
•  Guidance memo
•  Training

Disciplinary Action

•  Letter of reprimand
•  Suspension between
1 and 14 days

Adverse Action

•  Suspension of 15
or more days
•  Demotion
•  Removal

?

?

Source: TSA documentation

Process for Removing Employees for Misconduct
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which governs virtually all of TSA’s
activities, does not authorize a specific process TSA should use to remove employees
from its workforce.7 Consequently, TSA has issued policies outlining procedures for
removing employees, which includes an expedited adjudication process. According to
TSA, most disciplinary and adverse actions taken against an employee are administered
through a two-step process where a management office notifies the employee in writing of
a proposed action and provides an opportunity for him or her to respond. Then, a different
management official will review the entire case and issue a written decision.
Additionally, TSA uses a one-step process to remove TSOs who commit severe violations,
such as theft, drug and alcohol use, serious security breaches, and felonies. As part of this
process, TSA holds a pre-decisional meeting with the employee to discuss the misconduct
complaint and allows the employee to respond to the allegation. TSA is not required to
provide a written notice of the proposed action to the employee. TSA may also use the
one-step process when issuing reprimands in lieu of suspension for three days or less,
suspensions of three days or less, and indefinite suspensions.

7

 Employees may use several avenues to
appeal disciplinary and adverse actions
administered by TSA. Employees may
appeal certain types of disciplinary actions,
such as removal, involuntary demotions,
and indefinite suspensions, to OPR’s
Appellate Board. Employees may also
bring litigation against TSA through an
administrative appeals process or contest
TSA actions to the Office of Special Counsel,
which is an independent investigative and
prosecutorial agency that serves federal
employees.

Example of Misconduct:
In 2015, a male TSA employee
at New York’s LaGuardia Airport
sexually assaulted a female
passenger after convincing her that
she needed additional screening.
He was later charged with forcible
touching, official misconduct,
and
unlawful
imprisonment.
Sources: Reuters, CNN

TSA’s Employee Code of Conduct
Employees are required to comply with TSA’s code of conduct and accompanying
handbook, which outline the agency’s standards of behavior.8 TSA’s code of conduct states
that employees should report to work on time, fully comply with instructions provided by
supervisors, and report all personal arrests, among other things. The code of conduct
also requires managers and supervisors to ensure that all employees review the code
of conduct policy and accompanying handbook or a comprehensive summary of ethical
standards each year.

II. Employee Misconduct Continues to Grow While TSA Investigations & Punishments Decline
Based on data provided by TSA, allegations of employee misconduct have increased
substantially over time, despite the agency’s attempts to address unacceptable behavior.
Misconduct allegations related to TSA employees involve a variety of offenses ranging from
unexcused absences to serious criminal activities, such as bribery and drug smuggling.
According to information provided by the DHS OIG, TSA employees have been criminally
charged for using cocaine on the job, facilitating large scale drug and human smuggling,
and engaging in child pornography activities. When asked by Committee staff, TSA’s Chief
Human Capital Officer (CHCO) could not explain the causes behind any of the changes in
misconduct discussed below.
Misconduct Allegations Overall
The number of misconduct allegations filed against TSA employees increased by 28.5%
from fiscal year 2013 to 2015. In fiscal year 2015, TSA data shows that 17,627 allegations
of employee misconduct were filed compared with 13,722 in fiscal year 2013. This number
of allegations could be equivalent to one in every three TSA employees. TSA had 54,129
full-time equivalent (FTE) in fiscal year 2013 and 55,016 in fiscal year 2015, which indicates

8

 that the nearly 30% increase in allegations
was likely not correlated with the about
1.6% increase in FTEs. In a letter provided
to the Committee, TSA stated that the
high numbers of misconduct allegations
“demonstrate that TSA has created an
environment in which all concerns are
addressed in furtherance of TSA’s mission.”9

Example of Misconduct:
In 2012, a Deputy Federal Security
Director was accused of promoting
a subordinate with whom he had a
romantic relationship.
Sources: Reuters, DHS OIG

Misconduct Allegations by Type
From fiscal year 2013 to 2015, allegations of employee misconduct increased across eight
out of 19 misconduct categories, including misconduct related to integrity and ethics and
disruptive behavior, such as sexual misconduct. Specifically, allegations of misconduct
related to the category “neglect of duty” nearly doubled during that time period, representing
the largest percentage increase.
Misconduct allegations related to attendance and leave constituted nearly half of all
allegations in fiscal year 2015. While this category includes reporting to duty late or not
at all, Federal Security Directors (FSD), who are responsible for managing airports, told
us that this is a serious impediment to executing the mission. For example, one FSD
reported that TSOs “going AWOL is devastating” because it degrades the ability to plan
for staffing needs and means that fewer TSOs are available to screen passengers and
their belongings. Employees’ failure to report to duty compounds TSA’s current challenge
in managing excessive wait times at checkpoints, because officers scheduled to screen
passengers do not report for duty. According to TSA’s CHCO, many TSOs do not fully
understand the requirements for reporting to work when they come onboard, which can
lead to instances of misconduct such as failure to report for duty.
Further, 17% of misconduct allegations in fiscal year 2015 were related to TSA employees
failing to follow instructions. This category includes misconduct related to insubordination,
ignoring policies or security procedures, and disrespectful behavior. See Appendix I for a
complete list of types of misconduct.
Misconduct Allegations by Airport
On average, 58 allegations were filed
at each airport in fiscal year 2015, with
the number of misconduct allegations by
airport ranging from 0 to nearly 1,400. The
largest airports in the country experienced
the highest rates of misconduct, including
Los Angeles International Airport, Newark
International Airport, and Boston Logan
International Airport.

Example of Misconduct:
In 2013, a TSO was charged for
smuggling illegal aliens through
TSA-regulated airports. This case
was investigated by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, TSA
Office of Inspection, and the DHS
Office of Inspector General.
Source: DHS OIG

9

 In addition to these airports experiencing the highest rates of misconduct, they also
experienced large increases in the number of allegations filed from fiscal year 2013 to 2015.
Similarly, one large airport in Florida had 620 allegations of misconduct in fiscal year 2015
compared to 137 in in fiscal year 2013, representing a 353% increase. One small airport
in the Northeast had 77 allegations of misconduct in fiscal year 2015 compared to two in
fiscal year 2013, representing a 3,750% increase. In fact, 35% of airports experienced
an increase in the number of allegations of employee misconduct, with some airports
having nearly 40 times the number of allegations than in fiscal year 2013.

In fact, 35% of airports experienced an increase in the number
of allegations of employee misconduct, with some airports
having nearly 40 times the number of allegations than in
fiscal year 2013.

Outcomes of Misconduct Allegations
Investigations
While the number of employee misconduct
complaints has increased over time, TSA
has investigated fewer of them. From
fiscal year 2013 to 2015, the number
of investigations opened and closed
decreased by 15% and 28%, respectively.
More specifically, in fiscal year 2013, TSA
opened 780 investigations out of 13,722
misconduct allegations, representing about
6% of the total misconduct allegations filed.
In contrast, in fiscal year 2015, TSA opened
663 investigations out of 17,627 misconduct
allegations, representing about 4% of total
allegations.
Similarly, based on data provided by the
OIG, the number of complaints related to
TSA employee misconduct referred to the
OIG for investigation also increased from
fiscal year 2013 to 2015. Specifically, 933
complaints were filed against 1,518 TSA

10

Misconduct
Allegations

29%

Investigations
Opened

15%

Investigations
Closed

28%

 employees in fiscal year 2015 compared with 811 complaints against 986 employees in
fiscal year 2013, representing an increase in the number of TSA employees named in
complaints of 54%. Examples of complaints about TSA employee referred to the OIG in
fiscal year 2015 include criminal misconduct (290 complaints), employee corruption (33),
theft (19), violation of civil rights (48), and suspicious activity (26).
Actions Taken
While the number of misconduct
allegations has increased over time, TSA
has taken fewer disciplinary actions against
employees. From fiscal year 2013 to 2015,
TSA increased the use of non-disciplinary
actions by almost 80%, while it decreased
the use of disciplinary and adverse
actions by 14% and 23%, respectively. As
a result, TSA has offered fewer and lesser
punishments and, instead, has provided
more counseling and letters that explain
why certain behaviors were not acceptable.

Non-Disciplinary
Actions

80%

Disciplinary
Actions

14%

In fiscal year 2015, about two-thirds (66%)
Adverse
of adjudicated cases resulted in nondisciplinary actions, such as counseling,
Action
guidance, leave restriction, or training,
while about one-third (27%) resulted in
disciplinary actions, such as letters of
reprimand or suspensions of up to 14 days.
Only about 6% of allegations resulted in
adverse actions, such as suspension of 15 days or more, demotion, indefinite suspension,
removal, termination, or retiring. Moreover, four out of seven non-disciplinary actions are
not included in TSA’s Table of Offenses and Penalties, which managers should consult when
determining what action to take. These included guidance, leave restriction, performance
improvement plans, and Specific, Mutually-acceptable, Appropriate, Realistic and Timebased (SMART) agreements, which identify actions the employee has agreed to take to
improve conduct or performance.

23%

11

 III. Misconduct Occurs from the Top to the Bottom of TSA
Misconduct Allegations by Job Category and Pay Band
From fiscal years 2013 to 2015, allegations of misconduct by TSOs constituted the majority
of allegations made against TSA employees across all job categories. However, misconduct
increased among both TSOs and Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) during that time
period (see Table 1).
Table 1: Misconduct Allegations by Job Category
 

FY 2013

FY 2014

FY 2015

All FYs

Percentage

Transportation Security Officers
(TSO)

12,222

16,050

16,117

44,389

90.8%

Management, Administrative, &
Professional Employees

804

800

754

2,358

4.8

Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS)

644

691

730

2,065

4.2

32

21

10

63

0.1

13,702

17,562

17,611

48,875

100%

TSA Senior Executive Service
Officials (Senior Managers)
 

Source: TSA data

Specifically, allegations against TSOs increased by 32% and against FAMS by 13%.
Additionally, about 60% of all misconduct allegations were related to TSOs in the E pay
band, which has a pay range of $30,190 to $45,340.10 The number of misconduct allegations
increased among this subset of employees by almost 55% from fiscal year 2013 to 2015.
However, four out of nine pay bands and several specific job types within those pay bands
experienced significant increases of misconduct allegations during that time period. For
example, from fiscal years 2013 through 2015, the number of misconduct allegations
filed against FAMS in the I pay band, which has an annual salary range of $60,268 to
$93,465, increased by 21% from 601 to 729. According to officials from TSA’s Office of
Law Enforcement, FAMS are evaluated each year on the competency “maintaining a
culture of accountability,” which holds FAMS accountable for misconduct. Given the rise in
misconduct, the inclusion of this competency in FAMS’ performance evaluations does not
appear to have a positive impact enough impact to deter misconduct on its own. Despite
this, however, other TSA positions are not evaluated on such criteria.
Finally, 63 senior managers had allegations of misconduct filed against them, which
indicates that misconduct occurs at all levels of the organization. For example, the former
Assistant Administrator for Security Operations was placed on administrative leave after
Congress and the media learned that he received about $90,000 in bonuses that were
recommended by a subordinate. In fact, we received numerous allegations of senior
management misconduct by TSA sources, which we discuss in detail later in this report.

12

 Employees with Numerous Complaints
Almost half of TSA’s entire workforce allegedly committed misconduct, and almost
half of that number allegedly did so repeatedly. According to TSA data, from fiscal year
2013 through 2015, almost 27,000 unique employees had an allegation of misconduct
filed against them. Moreover, about half of those employees had two or more misconduct
allegations filed against them, with some employees having 14, 16, and 18 allegations. In
fact, 1,270 employees had five or more misconduct allegations filed against them (see
Table 2).
In addition, TSA provided data showing that 781 employees received paid administrative
leave while under investigation for alleged misconduct from fiscal years 2013 through 2015,
with 20 of these employees receiving such leave for six months or more. Five employees
received paid administrative leave for 1 year or more. In total, TSA spent almost $5.9 million
paying these 781 employees while they were being investigated for alleged misconduct.
TSA could not explain to Committee staff
in a briefing on this topic why employees
might have a significant number of
complaints filed against them, nor why
headquarters had not identified or
handled these repeat offenders. Despite
having a policy that recommends more
stringent penalties for aggravating
factors, such as prior disciplinary
offenses, almost half of TSA’s workforce
allegedly committed misconduct multiple
times. This indicates that the number
of misconduct allegations is not due to
an environment where concerns are
addressed, as TSA stated. Instead, it
appears as though minimal accountability
is provided with certain employees
engaging in ongoing misconduct.

Table 2: Number of Employees with More
than 1 Complaint during Fiscal Years 2013
to 2015
Number of
Complaints

Number of
Employees

1

15,385

2

6,195

3

2,778

4

1,250

5

606

6

304

7

149

8

118

9

44

10

22

11

9

12

8

13

4

14

4

16

1

18

1

Total

26,878
Source: TSA data

13

 Loopholes in TSA Policies Allow for Senior Level Misconduct
During the course of this investigation, nearly a dozen individuals came forward to the
Committee to report serious alleged misconduct by senior management officials at
TSA. Specifically, these individuals alleged that senior officials abused TSA’s directed
reassignment policy, which allows the agency to reassign or move employees to other
locations at their discretion.11 According to these sources, certain senior leaders at TSA
have reassigned employees to other locations around the country as retaliation for, in
some cases, employees raising security concerns.
On March 10, 2016, Chairman McCaul requested data from TSA on the number of directed
reassignments that have taken place to understand the depth of this type of misconduct
and to give TSA an opportunity to present information in its defense. However, almost four
months later, TSA has only provided about half of the requested data stating that it has
required manual review of case files. If this information is not readily available to provide
to Congress, it is likely not readily available to TSA decision-makers, and indicates that
TSA is not providing oversight of these types of reassignments.
Based on data TSA provided to date,
TSA issued 1,690 involuntary notices for
Example of Misconduct:
directed reassignments from fiscal year
In 2015, a senior official allegedly
2013 to 2015. TSA covers the costs of these
approved $60,000 in cash awards
forced relocations, but could not provide us
for a relative who also worked at
with the total costs associated with these
TSA. The DHS Office of Inspector
nearly 1,700 reassignments. According
General investigated this case and
to TSA policy, managers may reassign
found that there was no evidence
employees involuntarily without loss in
that this official was related to
pay band or basic pay and must give an
anyone in his command, but that
employee at least 60 days advance notice.
TSA had limited oversight of the
Despite these policy requirements, 40% of
award process.
directed reassignments resulted in a loss in
Sources: DHS OIG
pay and about 160 employees were given
less than 60 days advance notice. Over
200 employees declined this forced reassignment with some leaving TSA altogether.
Despite TSA having a policy in place to govern the process and establishing an Executive
Resources Council to review these types of personnel actions, TSA does not appear to
have a clear grasp of what directed reassignments have taken place.
Additionally, according to a 2013 DHS OIG report, TSA OOI did not use its staff and
resources efficiently to conduct cost-effective inspections, internal reviews, and covert
testing.12 The report found that TSA OOI misclassified its criminal investigators as law
enforcement officers, which resulted in higher pay and enhanced retirement benefits.13
According to the Office of Personnel Management, law enforcement officers spend, in
general, 50 percent of their time investigating, apprehending, or detaining individuals
suspected or convicted of violating criminal laws. However, OOI’s criminal investigators

14

 spent less than half their time on these activities despite being paid to do so, and other
employees performed the same work at a lower cost. The DHS OIG reported that classifying
certain individuals as criminal investigators allowed those employees to receive premium
pay and other benefits for which they would otherwise be ineligible, resulting in as much
as $17.5 million over five years.14
To address this problem, members of this Committee introduced the TSA Office
of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015, which became law in September 2015.15
This law requires TSA to certify to Congress, and the DHS OIG to validate, that only TSA
employees who meet the relevant legal and regulatory requirements are classified as
criminal investigators and receive premium pay.

VI. TSA’s Bloated Bureaucracy Cannot Effectively Address Misconduct
Five entities within TSA have responsibility for some part of the process to address
misconduct—OOI, OPR, Office of Human Capital (OHC), Office of Security Operations
(OSO), and airports. However, no one senior official or office at headquarters has been
clearly designated as responsible for overseeing misconduct issues, despite TSA having
20 direct reports to the Administrator and nearly 3,000 headquarters employees.16
Of these, about 230 are in the OHC alone, indicating that hundreds of headquarters staff
are tasked with overseeing employee human resources functions and, as part of those
responsibilities, should be overseeing employee misconduct.
TSA’s Misconduct Industrial Complex Limits its Ability to Manage Misconduct
According to officials from both the Office of Law Enforcement and OPR, OHC is the
office responsible for leading misconduct efforts at TSA. However, TSA’s Chief Human
Capital Officer (CHCO) stated that OHC is responsible for issuing policies and guidance
related to human resources, while the FSD at each airport is responsible for ensuring
that employees follow them. We spoke with four FSDs from some of the nation’s largest
airports and found that the extent to which FSDs manage or ensure that employees follow
policies varies by airport. For example, one
FSD had two TSO managers investigating
Example of Misconduct:
low-level misconduct offenses as part of
In 2012, a Supervisory TSO and a
a formal collateral duty where they were
Lead TSO were found guilty of using
part of a team that met regularly to review
cocaine while on duty at Dallas
allegations. In contrast, another FSD said
Fort Worth International Airport.
all TSO managers were responsible for
Both employees were arrested
investigating these types of issues as
and charged for possession and
they arose. This indicates a disconnect
resigned from their positions with
between the policies generated by OHC
TSA.
and how well or how often those policies
Source: DHS OIG
are followed in the field.

15

 According to TSA’s CHCO, each airport employs its own human resources staff responsible
for ensuring TSA policies are implemented. Further, the CHCO stated that OHC provides
limited training on an ad hoc basis to airport human resources staff but does not follow up
with airport leadership to ensure that policies are followed consistently.
Additionally, TSA’s CHCO stated that most disciplinary and non-disciplinary penalties are
given by lower level managers at airport checkpoints with potentially very little oversight
by the airport’s FSD, much less by headquarters. However, the four FSDs with whom we
spoke said that all actions taken in response to misconduct are reviewed by local human
resources staff and that these cases are entered into the national database, which is
managed by the CHCO. This demonstrates a lack of oversight by headquarters of the
adjudication process at the airport level and a lack of clarity related to headquarters’
role in overseeing that process, which limits headquarters’ ability to address misconduct
nationwide. TSA has developed a bloated, top-heavy bureaucracy to process misconduct
allegations, but does not effectively provide leadership over it to ensure that misconduct
is consistently addressed. Furthermore, TSA has failed to properly address misconduct
despite using a significant amount of resources to manage or, in this case, mismanage, the
misconduct process.
TSA Is Not Reviewing Misconduct Data Systematically or On an Ongoing Basis
TSA is also not systematically reviewing the data on misconduct allegations that airport
level staff enter into TSA’s national database to identify trends, which limits TSA’s ability to
identify necessary policy changes to address misconduct. In fact, based on our interviews
with TSA personnel, it was not clear whether TSA had reviewed the data contained in its
misconduct database until the Committee requested this information.
According to the CHCO, FSDs have access to misconduct data but may not be reviewing it
because that there is no requirement to do so. According to one FSD with whom we spoke,
misconduct data is available for review by FSDs but it is up to them to determine how
often it will be reviewed and what actions will be taken as a result of such a review. In fact,
in our interviews with four FSDs from airports around the country, the level of review and
oversight of misconduct allegations varied. For example, at one airport, the FSD reviewed
aggregate misconduct data by the type of misconduct offense and the length of the process
to adjudicate allegations. In contrast, the FSD at another airport only reviewed misconduct
information on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, although some local airports may be
reviewing this information, it is not systematically funneled up to TSA at headquarters to
be reviewed. According to DHS’s Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO), systematic review
of this type of data is critical to addressing misconduct and ensuring consistency. When
this does not occur, the DHS CHCO said that it is likely that a “rash of [misconduct] activity
occurs and spills over into the agency providing paid administrative leave” as it deals with
the issue. As a result, TSA is not using all of the tools it has at its disposal to identify and
address employee misconduct and is wasting taxpayer dollars.

16

 TSA Lacks Mechanisms Needed to Address Misconduct
TSA does not have mechanisms in place to ensure that employees follow headquarters
policies and guidance. For example, according to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control,
management should use information to evaluate and report on issues, such as employee
misconduct, and develop corrective actions to address them.17 However, TSA is not using
all of the tools it has at its disposal to do this. Although TSA requested airports to input
data related to employee misconduct allegations, it does not (1) systematically review
misconduct data, (2) use that data to develop strategies to address misconduct, or (3)
monitor progress—either nationally or at the airport level—in addressing misconduct.
Without systematically reviewing data it already collects, TSA will likely be unable to
address employee misconduct in the future.
Further, GAO reported that the tone at the top should demonstrate TSA leadership’s
commitment to integrity and ethical values.18 However, individuals have come forward to
the Committee stating that TSA’s oversight body, the Executive Resources Council, has,
at times, used directed reassignments to punish employees or force them to quit. Also,
allegations of employee misconduct related to senior managers indicate that there is not a
commitment to integrity and ethical values. As a result, the confidence that TSA’s workforce
has in its senior leadership is undermined.
Additionally, management should evaluate performance and hold individuals accountable
for their internal control responsibilities, but TSA does not hold FSDs responsible for
implementing misconduct guidance at their airports. According to TSA’s CHCO, FSDs are
not required to track employee misconduct at their airports and, according to numerous
complaints made by individuals who came forward to the Committee, senior leaders are
not held accountable for their actions. If TSA delegates authority to the airport’s leadershiplevel, then it should hold those officials accountable for addressing or, at a minimum,
monitoring misconduct that occurs at the airports for which they are responsible.
In order to ensure that TSA’s organizational
structure effectively delegates authority to
the local level, TSA needs mechanisms to
ensure that employees are adhering to
guidance. If these are not implemented,
TSA will likely be unable to ensure that
misconduct declines over time. Although
TSA has issued guidance related to
employee conduct and expects that all
employees review and adhere to it, it does
not have mechanisms in place to ensure
that the policy is implemented at the local
level (e.g. reporting procedures, random
inspections, pre-employment polygraphs,
or ongoing and routine training). However,

Headquarters
No mechanisms to connect
policies generated by
headquarters & the employees
expected to follow them.

Employees
17

 TSA has not employed any of these to ensure that guidance is followed. See Appendix II
for our assessment of deficiencies related to managing TSA misconduct.
Other Agencies Identified Misconduct TSA Missed
According to DHS OIG information, other components and agencies identified misconduct
by TSA employees through the pre-employment screening process when they applied
for positions in those agencies. For example, during Customs and Border Protection’s
(CBP) pre-employment polygraph process, TSA employees admitted to committing
crimes, at which point CBP provided information on these individuals to the DHS OIG, who
subsequently referred these cases to TSA OOI. Some serious examples of misconduct
identified through this process include:
•  CBP reported to the DHS OIG that one TSA employee admitted to selling and using
drugs, accepting bribes, engaging in prostitution, and being involved in a credit card
scheme during the course of a pre-employment polygraph and interview.
•  The U.S. Postal Inspection Service reported to the DHS OIG that another TSA employee
admitted to participating in the production, possession, and distribution of child
pornography; abuse of an animal; and shoplifting.
While we acknowledge that these egregious types of misconduct are not indicative of
the entire TSA workforce, it is indicative of TSA’s inability to effectively identify, root out,
and address misconduct when it does occur. We find it concerning that other agencies
identified these serious instances of employee misconduct rather than TSA.
TSA’s Implementation of Watchdog Recommendations Fell Short
The increase in misconduct allegations over time is of particular concern considering TSA
implemented GAO’s recommendations aimed at improving efforts to address employee
misconduct. GAO recommended that TSA establish a process to review misconduct cases
to ensure that airport level staff responsible for adjudicating employee misconduct were
complying with TSA’s policies and procedures. According to GAO, TSA implemented this
recommendation because its Audits and Inspections Division audited disciplinary actions
at airports in November 2014 and developed an inspection checklist that included items
related to disciplinary files. However, TSA has not provided evidence that it has conducted
any audits since that single audit in November 2014. Further, TSA’s CHCO told Committee
staff that TSA relies on airport leadership to address employee misconduct and comply with
headquarters policies. TSA must strengthen its commitment to more rigorous oversight to
ensure its senior leaders are complying with policy.

18

 V. TSA’s Growing Misconduct Corrodes Morale
As misconduct has grown across TSA, morale has declined from low to even lower. The
Federal Viewpoint Survey shows that DHS, as a whole, is at the bottom of the entire federal
government for employee morale.19 According to an analysis of data from the Federal
Viewpoint Survey, Federal News Radio reported that:
“DHS’ specific data shows employees like what they do, are willing to put in extra
effort or come up with new ideas to improve how they meet their mission. But they
say poor performers are not dealt with properly, good work is not recognized in a
meaningful way and employees do not feel personally empowered to be creative
or innovative.”20
Similarly, the Partnership for Public Service found that TSA ranked 313 out of 320 agency
subcomponents for the best places to work in the Federal government.21 TSA’s overall index
score fell three points from 2013 to 2015. Scores related to fairness—the category related
to how employees view whether arbitrary action and personal favoritism is tolerated and if
employees feel comfortable reporting illegal activity without fear of reprisal—declined from
2013 to 2015. In addition, scores related to performance-based rewards and advancement
were the lowest among agency subcomponents and were down from 2013, which indicates
that employees have little confidence that they are rewarded in a fair manner.
Individuals who spoke with Committee staff
reinforced these views as many believed
they faced reprisals and recrimination
for attempting to bring issues forward to
improve the agency. Some were forced to
other assignments, denied promotions, or
forced to move across the country. Such
views by TSA’s workforce demonstrate how
misconduct contributes to dysfunction and
further corrodes morale.

Example of Misconduct:
In 2014, a Supervisory TSO was
charged with smuggling narcotics
through a TSA-regulated airport in
the Caribbean onto airplanes. The
DHS Office of Inspector General
investigated this case.
Source: DHS OIG

Research shows that organizational culture is one of the primary factors driving individual
behavior in general and misconduct in particular.22 Organizations that have a dysfunctional
organizational culture are likely to have more examples of failed employee conduct,
policies, and programs. Similarly, a recent Homeland Security Advisory Council report on
CBP employee conduct outlined factors that affect integrity within an organization:
“Several factors contribute to and promote integrity within an organization. A
workforce that is well qualified and trained, one that is highly motivated by its
mission, one that believes that personnel and other decisions are made on the
merits is far less likely to have integrity lapses and corruption issues. Also important is
deterrence and a strong ethos internalized within the organization that emphasizes
corruption will not be tolerated and is, in fact, dealt with in a prompt and decisive
way, i.e., by prompt investigations and disciplinary actions.”23
19

 Research has also shown that internal reporting, or whistleblowing, is beneficial to healthy
organizations, because it allows leadership to investigate and remediate issues quickly.24
This early detection better positions an organization to prevent small issues from festering
into systemic issues.25 Studies also show that “in strengthening internal governance
controls, organizations are encouraged to expand opportunities for employee disclosure.”26
It is important for TSA to identify the root causes behind employee misconduct and low
morale in order to ensure that both improve over time. Although much can be done to
improve management and oversight of specific programs and policy issues, it is up to
TSA management to hold employees at all levels accountable for their actions, as well as
to establish systems to ensure that proper conduct is rewarded and improper conduct is
addressed.

Conclusion
The Committee is alarmed by the longstanding dysfunction at TSA and the serious examples
of misconduct that appear to exist at all levels of the organization. During the course of this
investigation, it became clear to the Committee that TSA has not taken all the necessary
steps to ensure that employees follow policies and that misconduct is properly addressed.
TSA has issued policies and the Table of Offenses and Penalties that, in theory, should
provide guidance to employees about appropriate conduct and processes for addressing
misconduct. However, TSA has not put in place effective mechanisms to ensure that
policies are followed.
While we commend Administrator Peter Neffenger for the changes he has made to
improve TSA to date, it is unclear whether these changes will be institutionalized as the
next Administration begins its term. TSA needs bold reform, led by senior officials with a
strong commitment and willingness to change in the face of criticism in order for lasting,
positive change to take hold. To improve, significant management reforms at TSA must be
made.

Recommendations/Legislative Proposals
Based on this investigation’s findings, we recommend that the TSA Administrator implement
the following actions:
1.  Identify a senior executive to be responsible for overseeing the misconduct process.
2.  Direct the Chief Human Capital Officer to coordinate with the Department’s Chief
Human Capital Officer to identify and develop strategies for best addressing employee
misconduct.
3.  Identify a senior executive to conduct spot checks or random inspections of disciplinary
and non-disciplinary actions taken.

20

 4.  Direct the Office of Security Operations to ensure that local level managers are
appropriately adjudicating misconduct according to the Table of Offenses and Penalties.
5.  Direct the Office of Human Capital to:
a.  Holistically and systematically review misconduct allegation data.
b.  Explicitly include all acceptable disciplinary, non-disciplinary, and adverse actions
that may be administered for misconduct in the Table of Offenses and Penalties.
c.  Properly align misconduct policies with those generated by DHS’s Management
Directorate.
d.  Develop and implement strategies for addressing attendance and leave issues
nationwide.
e.  Incorporate addressing misconduct into FSD performance evaluations.
f.  Provide clearer job descriptions on employment announcements so that
appropriately qualified candidates apply for positions.
g.  Develop and deliver training and on-the-job resources for supervisors to
appropriately address performance and misconduct issues, including increasing
the emphasis placed on ethics and integrity in basic training.
h.  Develop and implement a process for identifying and quickly addressing repeat
offenders.
i.  Provide clear guidance to all TSA employees on how to report misconduct.
j.  Develop a strategy to address the root causes of misconduct with specific
outcomes to assess performance.
6.  Make misconduct information readily available to Congress and, as appropriate, to TSA
personnel and the public.
We also recommend that the Department’s Chief Human Capital Officer:
1.  Issue a department-wide misconduct policy for components to follow, including a
Table of Offenses and Penalties, consistent with best practices.
2.  As part of the CHCO’s Executive Steering Committee, review TSA’s policies and
processes related to addressing misconduct and develop strategies to address the
systemic issues that exist.

21

 Appendix I: TSA Data on Misconduct Allegations by Category
Figure 1: Top Misconduct Allegations Filed Against TSA Employees

9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Attendance
& Leave
FY 2013

Failure to
Follow
Instructions

Screening
& Security

Neglect of
Duty
FY 2014

Disruptive
Behavior

Integrity
& Ethics

All Other
Categories
FY 2015

Source: Analysis of TSA data

Note: These misconduct types were the top six for all three fiscal years, although the
order varied from year to year. However, attendance and leave allegations were the most
common for all three fiscal years. The category “All Other Categories” includes the following in fiscal year 2015: drugs and alcohol (209); personal appearance and hygiene
(191); falsification and dishonesty (158); failing to meet reporting responsibilities (126);
property misuse and damage (119); safety, security, health concerns (68); failure to safeguard information (50); weapons (44); unauthorized taking or possession (33); inquiries
and investigations (14); other (11); and mishandling classified information (11).

22

 Table 1: Types of TSA Employee Misconduct Allegations for Fiscal Years 2013 - 2015
Misconduct Category

Category Description

Neglect of Duty

FY 2013

FY 2015

Percent
Change from
FY2013 to
FY2015

Inattention to duty resulting 603
in a loss of property or
life, careless inspection;
negligent performance
of duties; failure to
exercise due diligence in
performance of duties;
failure to follow procedures.

1206

100%

Attendance and Leave

Unexcused and/or
5214
excessive absences or
tardiness, absent without
leave, failure to follow leave
procedures, etc.

8382

61%

Personal Appearance &
Hygiene

Uniform violations,
keeping an unprofessional
appearance.

191

52%

Failure to Follow
Instructions

Failure to comply with a
2389
lawful order of a supervisor/
manager, insubordination,
ignoring policies and
security procedures,
disrespectful conduct.

3023

27%

Other

 

9

11

22%

Disruptive Behavior

Inappropriate or sexual
misconduct, fighting,
abusive language, or use of
authority.

1040

1160

12%

Integrity and Ethics

Bribing, conflicts of interest,
criminal conduct, nepotism,
charge card abuse,
misuse of government
identification, accepting a
gift, improper association.

516

574

11%

Property Misuse/
Damage

Misuse of Government
property, negligent
operation of Government
property, unauthorized use
of Government property,
failure to follow proper
procedures for handling
Government property,
damaging Government
property, losing
Government property.

118

119

1%

126

23

 Safety/Security/Health

Failure to observe safety
69
procedures, unsafe use of
Government equipment,
failure to follow instructions,
careless performance
of duties, negligent
performance of duties,
inattention to duty, improper
use of Government
equipment.

68

-1%

Safeguarding
Information

Failure to secure
Government information,
careless and/or negligent
handling of personally
identifiable information
(PII) or other materials
covered by the Privacy Act;
unauthorized disclosure
of PII or other materials
covered by the Privacy
Act; violation of security
procedures covering
information, documents,
records, or other material
that is classified or SSI.

51

50

-2%

Reporting
Responsibilities

Failure to report arrest,
150
failure to timely report
arrest, failure to comply with
reporting obligation, failure
to report lost property,
failure to safeguard
Government property.

126

-16%

Screening and Security

Failure to follow Standard
2678
Operating Procedure (SOP),
bypass screening, failure to
conduct checks, sleeping
on duty.

2248

-16%

Weapons-Related

Failure to report the
58
discharge of a firearm
or use of a weapon as
required by applicable
policy, improper handling of
a weapon, failure to follow
proper safety practices, loss
of TSA-issued firearm.

44

-24%

Falsification/Dishonesty

Lack of candor; forgery;
unauthorized recording;
time and attendance fraud,
making misstatements or
misrepresentations with the
intent to mislead including
material and/or intentional
falsification.

158

-28%

24

219

 Inquiries and
Investigations

Refusal to cooperate in
22
agency investigation, failure
to cooperate in agency
investigation, failure to
follow instructions.

14

-36%

Drugs and Alcohol

Use of drugs or alcohol on
duty, refusal of drug test,
positive drug or alcohol
test, driving under the
influence, use or sale of
drugs.

344

209

-39%

Unauthorized Taking/
Possession

Unauthorized use, removal,
or possession of a thing of
value belonging to another
employee or private citizen
and colluding with others
to commit such acts;
actual or attempted theft,
or other unauthorized
taking of funds or property
owned or controlled by the
Government and colluding
with others to commit such
acts.

81

33

-59%

Mishandling of
Classified Information

Violation of security
procedures covering
information, documents,
records, or other material
that is classified.

30

11

-63%

Property Misuse/Loss/
Damage

Misuse of law enforcement
equipment, failure to follow
procedures.

5

 0

-100%

Total

13722

17627

28.5%
Source: TSA data

Note: The total number of misconduct allegations by fiscal year include all misconduct allegations by job category in addition to a small number of allegations where the job category
or pay band was not specified.

25

 Appendix II: TSA’s Implementation of Internal Controls to Address Misconduct
GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which sets internal control standards for federal agencies, outlines specific components and principles for an internal control system, which include having effective oversight and monitoring.27 GAO has
found that the tone at the top, oversight, expectations of confidence, and accountability
are essential to having effective controls over an organization. It has also reported that
effective monitoring within an agency includes reporting and evaluating issues, as well as
taking corrective actions.
Our analysis of TSA’s efforts to address misconduct found that TSA lacks effective oversight and monitoring of employee misconduct as they relate to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control. Specifically, TSA has not effectively implemented any of the seven specific
principles related to effective internal controls or monitoring.
Table 1: Analysis of TSA Internal Controls Related to Employee Misconduct
Principles

Examples

Explanation

Consequence

Although TSA has issued
policies specifying its code
of conduct, TSA does not
have a process to ensure that
employees adhere to it.

This undermines the confidence
that TSA’s workforce has in its
leadership.

Control Environment
The oversight
body and
management
should
demonstrate
a commitment
to integrity and
ethical values.

Tone at the top
Standards of
conduct
Adherence to
standards of
conduct

Further, individuals have
come forward stating that
TSA’s oversight body, the
Executive Resources Council,
uses directed reassignments
to punish employees or force
them to quit.
Additionally, allegations of
employee misconduct related
to senior managers indicate that
there is not a commitment to
integrity and ethical values.

The oversight
body should
oversee the
entity’s internal
control system.

26

TSA does not have an oversight
body that oversees employee
misconduct or any internal
Oversight for the
control systems related to
internal control
addressing such misconduct.
system
According to TSA’s CHCO,
Input for remediation headquarters issues policies
that employees are to follow but
of deficiencies
does not have compensating
internal controls to ensure that
employees actually follow that
guidance.
Oversight structure

TSA cannot ensure that
employees are following policies
and guidance intended to
address misconduct.

 Management
should establish
an organizational
structure, assign
responsibility,
and delegate
authority
to achieve
the entity’s
objectives.

Organizational
structure

Management
should
demonstrate a
commitment to
recruit, develop,
and retain
competent
individuals.

Expectations of
competence

Management
should evaluate
performance and
hold individuals
accountable
for their
internal control
responsibilities.

Assignment of
responsibility and
delegation of
authority
Documentation of
the internal control
system

Recruitment,
development,
and retention of
individuals

TSA established an
organizational structure that
delegates authority to airport
leadership but does not do
so in a way that achieves its
objectives—namely, to address
employee misconduct—
because TSA is not ensuring
that employees follow policies.

TSA’s organizational structure
limits headquarters’ ability to
address employee misconduct
nationwide.

TSA has struggled to recruit and
retain the right employees. For
example, according to TSA, in
fiscal year 2014, almost 4,700
employees left the agency while
only 373 employees joined the
agency.

Although Administrator
Neffenger has made strides in
improving TSA, TSA will likely
have new leadership with the
change in administration, and it
is unclear whether the officials
that stay with TSA will continue
to demonstrate this type of
commitment.

Succession and
contingency plans
and preparation

Also, Administrator Neffenger
has testified that TSA has
4,000 fewer staff than in it did
four years ago, which poses
significant challenges for TSA to
achieve its mission.

Enforcement of
accountability

TSA’s CHCO stated that FSDs
are not required to address
employee misconduct at their
airports.

Consideration of
excessive pressures

Further, numerous individuals
stated that senior leaders are
not held accountable for their
actions.

If TSA delegates authority to
airport leadership, then it should
hold those officials accountable
for addressing or, at a minimum,
monitoring misconduct that
occurs at those airports.

Monitoring
Management
should establish
and operate
monitoring
activities to
monitor the
internal control
system and
evaluate the
results.

Establish baseline

Management
should remediate
identified
internal control
deficiencies on a
timely basis.

Report Issues

Monitor internal
control system
Evaluate results

Evaluate Issues
Issue Corrective
Actions

Although TSA required
airports to input data related
to employee misconduct
allegations, it does not
(1) systematically review
misconduct data, (2) use that
data to develop strategies
to address misconduct,
or (3) monitor progress—
either nationally or at the
airport level—in addressing
misconduct.

TSA is not using all of the tools
is has at its disposal. Without
systematically reviewing data it
already collects, TSA will likely
be unable to address employee
misconduct in the future.

TSA agreed with GAO’s 2013
recommendations but has not
fully implemented them.

TSA has not adequately
addressed the deficiencies
identified in GAO’s report.
This indicates that TSA is not
taking serious steps to address
employee misconduct.

Source: Assessment of TSA practices against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
27

 Endnotes
1. 
GAO, Transportation Security:
TSA Could Strengthen Monitoring of
Allegations of Employee Misconduct,
GAO-13-624 (Washington, D.C.: July 30,
2013).
2. 
For public information, see: http://
www.foxnews.com/us/2013/09/14/tsaagent-accused-helping-smuggle-illegalimmigrants-into-us/
3. 
The George Washington University,
Mexico and the Triple Threat, Sharon L.
Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, Bert B. Tussing
(Washington, D.C., October 20, 2011).
4. 
DHS, Management Directive
810.1 The Office of Inspector General,
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2004). From
fiscal year 2013 to 2015, the DHS Office
of Inspector General (OIG) conducted
139 investigations related to misconduct
by TSA employees. According to TSA,
OOI refers specific types of misconduct
allegations to DHS, including those
involving criminal and serious non-criminal
offenses and senior level employees,
among others.
5. 
TSA, TSA Management Directive
No. 1100.75.-3 Addressing Unacceptable
Performance and Conduct, (Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2014).
6. 
TSA, Table of Offenses and
Penalties for Appropriate Discipline for
Common Offenses, (Washington, D.C. May
15, 2014).
7. 

28

Pub. L. 107-71.

8. 
TSA, TSA Management Directive
No. 1100.73.-5 Employee Responsibilities
and Code of Conduct, (Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 2013).
9. 
TSA, Letter from Administrator Peter
Neffenger to Chairman Michael McCaul,
(Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2016).
10. TSA pay bands system ranges from
A through M, and is roughly equivalent to
the executive branch’s General Schedule
(GS) pay system. These pay bands include
TSOs, and administrative, management,
and professional employees.
11. 
TSA, TSA Management Directive
No. 1100.30-4 Permanent Internal
Assignments, (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16,
2010).
12.  DHS OIG, Transportation Security
Administration Office of Inspection’s Efforts
to Enhance Transportation Security, OIG13-123 (Washington, D.C.: September 24,
2013).
13.  Law enforcement officers qualify
for enhanced retirement at the age of 50,
with full benefits after 20 years of service;
receive a faster accruing pension; and
are eligible for receiving an additional 25
percent of their basic pay.
14. 

OIG-13-123.

15. 

P.L. 114-53.

16.  As of May 2016, TSA headquarters
had a total of 2,945 employees onboard.

 17. 
GAO, Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G
(Washington, D.C.: September 2014). GAO
defines an internal control as a process
used by management to help an entity
achieve its objectives.
18. 

25. 

Berry. 2004.

26. 

Berry. 2004.

27. 

GAO-14-704G.

GAO-14-704G.

19.   
https://www.unlocktalent.
gov/department-of-homeland-security
20.  Federal News Radio, “For DHS,
improving employee engagement
is not one-size-fits-all.” April 8,
2016. http://federalnewsradio.com/
management/2016/04/dhs-improvingemployee-engagement-not-one-size-fits/
21.  http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/
rankings/detail/HS10
22.  Vardi, Yoav. The Effects of
Organizational and Ethical Climates on
Misconduct at Work, Journal of Business
Ethics Vol. 29, Issue 4 2001-02. Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
23.  Homeland Security Advisory
Council, Final Report of the CBP Integrity
Advisory Panel, (Washington, D.C.: March
15, 2016).
24.  Berry, Benisa. Organizational
Culture: A Framework and Strategies for
Facilitating Employee Whistleblowing,
Employee Responsibilities and Rights
Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2004. Plenus
Publishing Corporation.

29