7/14/2016 8:50:08 AM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 11624640
By: bradley darnell
Filed: 7/13/2016 7:13:15 PM

CAUSE NO. 201642848
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Petitioner.

(Jeffrey Stuart Brown, M.D.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
129th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

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IN RE: USADA,

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

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Petitioner United States Anti-Doping Agency, Inc. (“USADA”) hereby responds to

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Jeffrey Brown, M.D.’s Motion to Dismiss and, Alternatively, Opposition to Petitioner’s Rule 202

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Petition, and respectfully shows as follows:

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I.
SUMMARY

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USADA is currently investigating potential claims against Dr. Brown for violating anti-

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doping rules he contractually agreed to as a member of USA Track and Field (“USATF”). In

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connection with its investigation, USADA has received and tendered to Dr. Brown and to the
Court seven (7) signed releases from former patients of Dr. Brown, each of whom specifically

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asks that Dr. Brown “respond to any and all questions about my care in a videotaped and

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recorded deposition taken by USADA.” Each of these seven patients, who are also elite athletes,

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have affirmed in writing to Dr. Brown that “[d]isclosure of this information and your cooperation
with USADA is essential to my personal and professional wellbeing, and I request that you and
all Health Care Providers fully and completely cooperate with USADA’s investigation.” This is
the second time Dr. Brown has been given detailed releases by these same patients asking that he
discuss their care with USADA.

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 USADA’s authorization to obtain vital information about the services Dr. Brown
provided to these patients could not be more clear. Yet, in direct opposition to his patients’
wishes, Dr. Brown has for months given USADA the stiff-arm, refusing to abide by his
obligation to fully explain the services he provided. Dr. Brown’s refusal to comply with the

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written requests of his patients has led to USADA’s need to file the instant Rule 202 Petition
(“Petition”) in order to continue its investigation into potential doping claims against Dr. Brown.
Fortunately, as explained herein, Rule 202 provides the means for USADA to question Dr.

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Brown about his illegible medical records and the nature of his treatments without having to

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unnecessarily commence an arbitration against him that might have otherwise been avoided.

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Rule 202 is an important mechanism for businesses and individuals to investigate claims

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or suits before bringing them. USADA, an out-of-state business authorized to do business in

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Texas, has satisfied all of the substantive and procedural requirements for obtaining a Rule 202

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deposition and has amply shown that the likely benefit of allowing the requested deposition far

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outweighs the burden or expense—if any—one Dr. Brown.

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Petition should be granted.

USADA’s Verified Rule 202

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USADA Is Investigating Potential Claims Against Dr. Brown.

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A.

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II.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

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When Dr. Brown joined USATF he contractually agreed to be subject to and bound by
USADA’s anti-doping rules. See Affidavit of William Bock, III (“Bill Bock Aff.”) ¶¶ 9-10, 21, a
true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 1 As set forth in its Petition and
herein, USADA is currently investigating whether Dr. Brown’s treatment of USATF

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The Bill Bock Affidavit is submitted in support of USADA’s Petition and is filed herein with leave of Court granted on
July 11, 2016. The Bill Bock Affidavit is incorporated herein and into Petitioner’s Verified Rule 202

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 athlete/patients in Houston, Texas violated those rules. Until its investigation is complete,
USADA will not know whether a violation occurred, and thus, whether it has a claim against Dr.
Brown that can be asserted.
The details concerning USADA’s investigation of Dr. Brown, the reasons it needs his

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deposition to investigate its claims, and the likely benefits and burdens of the requested
deposition are set forth in the Bill Bock Affidavit attached hereto.

This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Personal Jurisdiction Over Dr.
Brown.

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B.

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Dr. Brown contends that the existence of an arbitration agreement deprives this Court of

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subject matter jurisdiction. Not so. Arbitration agreements are a type of forum selection clause.

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In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 115 & n. 28 (Tex. 2004, pet. denied). Forum selection

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clauses do not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Gen. Res. Org., Inc. v. Deadman,

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907 S.W.2d 22, 27-28 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied), 932 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1996,

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writ denied) (forum selection clauses do not deprive a court of subject matter or personal

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jurisdiction”); Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997) (same).

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Indeed, if an arbitration agreement deprived a court of jurisdiction, how could a court ever rule

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exists here.

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on a motion to compel arbitration or confirm an arbitration award? Subject matter jurisdiction

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Similarly, this proceeding does not involve any questions of personal jurisdiction.
USADA is investigating potential claims against Dr. Brown, who by his own admission lives,
works and treats USATF athletes in Houston, Texas. See Response at 3-4. The jurisdictional
requirements of Rule 202 are therefore satisfied.

See In re John Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603 (Tex.

Aug. 29, 2014, pet. denied).

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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Rule 202 Can Be Used To Investigate Potential Claims That May Ultimately Be
Subject To Arbitration.
USADA has not yet determined that it has a claim against Dr. Brown, and thus, whether

arbitration against him can be commenced. Because it makes little sense to commence full-

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blown arbitration for the purpose of discovering whether arbitration should have been initiated in
the first place, USADA seeks to investigate claims pursuant to Rule 202.1(b). This is expressly
authorized by the rule.

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Rule 202.1(b) is not limited to investigating potential lawsuits, but instead allows for the

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investigation of potential “claims or suits”:

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TRCP 202. DEPOSITION BEFORE SUIT OR TO INVESTIGATE CLAIMS

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202.1 Generally. A person may petition the court for an order authorizing the
taking of a deposition on oral examination or written questions either:
to perpetuate or obtain the person’s own testimony or that of any other
person for use in an anticipated litigation; or

(b)

to investigate a potential claim or suit.

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(a)

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TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1 (emphasis added). Because “claim” is not defined in the rule, it must be

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given its plain meaning. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “claim” as: (1) “[a] statement that

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something yet to be proved is true;” (2) “[t]he assertion of an existing right; any right to payment

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or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional;” and (3) “[a] demand for money,

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property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil
action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.” Claim, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).

The definition of “claim” is exceedingly broad, and as used in Rule 202 encompasses
claims that may be asserted in court or claims that, if pursued, may ultimately be asserted in

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 arbitration. To hold otherwise fails to give every word in Rule 202 effect and would render the
following words or phrases meaningless or superfluous:
TRCP 202. DEPOSITION BEFORE SUIT OR TO INVESTIGATE CLAIMS

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202.1 Generally. A person may petition the court for an order authorizing the
taking of a deposition on oral examination or written questions either:
(a)

to perpetuate or obtain the person’s own testimony or that of any other
person for use in an anticipated litigation; or

(b)

to investigate a potential claim or suit.

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This is impermissible.

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“Investigating a potential claim or suit is one of the express purposes of Rule 202.” In re

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Emergency Consultants, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 78, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007) (orig.

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proceeding). USADA should be permitted to explore whether claims exist without having to

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commence arbitration in order to do so. See id. “Any other holding would eviscerate the

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investigatory purpose of Rule 202,” as it would require that USADA assert a claim against Dr.

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Brown for violating anti-doping rules before determining whether any such violation occurred.

There Are No Current Claims To Arbitrate, And Arbitration Cannot Be Compelled
Here In Any Event.

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See id. Such an outcome makes no sense.

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USADA has not yet determined it has a claim against Dr. Brown. Accordingly, at the

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current time there is no claim to be brought in arbitration. Moreover, a proceeding under Rule
202 is unique. It is not a proceeding on the merits or an independent lawsuit. A trial court,
therefore, does not have jurisdiction to consider a motion to compel arbitration of the potential

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 claims that are being investigated under Rule 202. This is doubly-true here since Dr. Brown has
not even moved to compel arbitration in the first instance. 2
E.

USADA’s Potential Claims Against Dr. Brown Are Contract Claims, Not Federal
Statutory Claims.

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Dr. Brown errs when he contends that USADA’s potential claims against him are federal
and statutory in nature. As explained herein, any claims which USADA may have against Dr.
Brown for violation of sports anti-doping rules are purely contractual. Bill Bock Aff. ¶¶ 9, 10,

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21. The relationship between a voluntary association and its members is a contractual one and,

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by joining such an organization, the member agrees to submit to its rules and regulations and

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assumes the obligations incident to membership. See, e.g., Stolow v. Greg Manning Auctions

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Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 80 F. App’x 722 (2d Cir. (N.Y.) 2003)

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(“Bylaws of an unincorporated association express the terms of a contract which define

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privileges secured and the duties assumed by those who have become members.”); Burge v. Am.

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Quarter Horse Ass'n, 782 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ) (“Burge agreed

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to follow the rules and regulations and to be bound by decisions of the Executive Committee of

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the AQHA when he voluntarily became a member of the association.”); Maltese v. Dubinsky,

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304 N.Y. 450, 455, 108 N.E.2d 604 (1952) (same). 3

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Arbitration is not a general, all-encompassing concept. To the extent Dr. Brown contends this 202 proceeding is subject
to arbitration, it is incumbent on him to move to compel arbitration and prove that the arbitration provision between the
parties encompasses not just actual claims, but also the investigation of potential claims.
3
See also Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Am. Capital Corp., No. 96-CV-440, 1996 WL 280830, *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 15, 1996)
(holding that, by virtue of their membership in the NASD, the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes); Coenen v. R. W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1211 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); Sands Bros. & Co, Ltd. v. Nasser, No. 03 CIV. 8128 (BSJ),
2004 WL 26550, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2004) (explaining that party agreed, by virtue of its membership in the NASD, to
arbitrate all disputes under the NASD Code of Arbitration).
PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 By joining USATF, Dr. Brown contractually agreed to USATF’s rules. Those rules
require USATF members to submit to the anti-doping rules of USATF, the USOC and USADA,
and provide that claims for violations of those rules may be brought by USADA in arbitration.4
Bill Bock Aff. ¶¶ 9, 10, 21. As it relates to Dr. Brown, these obligations are based in contract, as

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they would not apply absent his agreement to be bound by them.

The Ted Stevens Act Does Not Preclude Use of Rule 202.

Dr. Brown argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over USADA’s Rule 202 petition

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because any claim USADA would have against Brown is allegedly premised upon a federal

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statute known as the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (the “Sports Act”). Not only

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is Brown’s argument at odds with his contention that he is not subject to the Sports Act, see

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Motion at 11 (“Dr. Brown is not an athlete, a coach, a trainer team physician or medical support

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personal”), his legal analysis is incorrect.

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In the event USADA asserts claims against Dr. Brown, those claims will not be based on

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the Sports Act. Courts have repeatedly held that the Sports Act does not create a private right of

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action. Oldfield v. Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 506–507 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding Sports Act

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contains no express private right of action); Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 156

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(7th Cir. 1984) (“Michels has no private cause of action under the Amateur Sports Act”); Lee v.

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U.S. Taekwondo Union, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1257 (D. Haw. 2004) (coach has no private right
of action under the Act); Walton–Floyd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 965 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (court notes, in considering a track and field athlete's

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USADA’s disciplinary proceedings are not dissimilar from internal disciplinary proceedings of other private bodies that
have been considered in Texas courts. See, e.g., Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Burge,
782 S.W.2d at 353 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ); Harden v. Colonial Country Club, 634 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Adams v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 583 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo
1979, writ ref’d n.r.e ); Hoey v. San Antonio Real Estate Bd., 297 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1956, writ
denied); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1937, writ dism’d).

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 challenge to a drug determination, that the legislative history of the [Amateur Sports] Act
“indicates that Congress did not intend to provide individual athletes a private cause of action”).
Indeed, the Sports Act does not create a right of action or even set forth the rules upon which an
eligibility claim is based. There can be no claims based on the Sports Act at all. Thus, contrary

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to what Dr. Brown contends, USADA’s claims against Brown—if ultimately brought—are not
federal claims or founded upon a federal statute.

Rather, as explained herein, any potential claims against Dr. Brown will be based upon

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contract law and ultimately addressed in arbitration. The Sports Act would only enter the picture

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in the event that Dr. Brown were to attempt to have claims related to his sport eligibility or

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standing with USATF decided in court. In such an instance, a court would be bound to find that

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the Sports Act and the decisions thereunder provide that eligibility determinations made by the

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USOC, its members and USADA are reserved for resolution exclusively in arbitration. In this

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regard, the Sports Act operates merely as a forum selection clause, and simply confirms that

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athlete and athlete support personnel eligibility determinations in Olympic sports are to be made

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in arbitration.

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Nothing about this precludes the use of Rule 202 here. In fact, courts considering the

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question have regularly held that the Sports Act’s preclusion of eligibility determinations being

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made in court does not limit the applicability of other statutes intended to address matters other
than sport eligibility. This is so even if the other statute applies to the same factual matters at
issue in the eligibility claim. For instance, it has been held that the Sports Act does not pre-empt
a Title IX claim or a race discrimination claim under section 1981. See Lee, 331 F. Supp. 2d at
1260. The Lee court said, “the Amateur Sports Act does not nullify or supersede other federal
laws that provide private rights of action to ensure freedom from discrimination.”

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 Furthermore, the Lee court made clear that there was a larger principle operating in its decision
than merely that federal discrimination statutes could be read in harmony with the Sports Act.
The Lee court indicated it was a basic principle that to the extent possible all statutes
should be read in harmony with the Sports Act and where possible the provisions of both statutes

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(the Sports Act and any not inconsistent law) should be given effect. The Lee court was guided
by the principle that, “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . .
. to regard each as effective.” Lee, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.

There is no reason advanced by Dr. Brown why USADA should not be

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of co-existence.

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Likewise, this Court should find that both Texas Rule 202 and the Sports Act are capable

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permitted to obtain a deposition under Rule 202 to determine whether it has a claim against Dr.

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Brown, giving effect to Rule 202, while at the same time recognizing that were USADA to

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USADA Is A Business Fully Authorized And Registered To Do Business In The
State of Texas.

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proceed with a sports eligibility case against Dr. Brown it could only do so in arbitration.

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To the extent Dr. Brown contends that USADA does not have authority to commence this

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proceeding, that, too, is incorrect. USADA is a not for profit corporation organized under the

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Colorado Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act. It has employees in, and does business in, the

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State of Texas. USADA is registered with the Texas Secretary of State and is fully authorized to

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do business in the State of Texas as a foreign business corporation. There is therefore no reason
why USADA should not be entitled to rely upon Texas Rule 202 to investigate potential claims
in furtherance of its corporate purposes.
USADA’s corporate purposes set forth in its Articles of Incorporation include
“foster[ing] national and international amateur sports competition,” “develop[ing] and
provid[ing] for a fair, timely and impartial adjudication system that will hear cases of alleged
PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 performance enhancing drug use and doping methods,” and “undertak[ing] such other activities
which may be consistent with these purposes.” 5 USADA’s purposes are therefore clearly broad
enough to encompass USADA’s investigation of possible doping claims against Dr. Brown.
Furthermore, USADA’s legal powers in pursuit of its corporate purposes are broad. USADA’s

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Articles of Incorporation provide:

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In furtherance of the foregoing purposes and objectives (but not otherwise) and
subject to the restrictions set forth in Section 3.3, the corporation shall have and
may exercise all of the powers now or hereafter conferred upon nonprofit
corporations organized under the laws of Colorado and may do everything
necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of any of the corporate purposes,
either alone or in connection with other organizations, entities or individuals, and
either as principal or agent, subject to such limitations as are or may be prescribed
by law. 6

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USADA’s organizing documents clearly permit USADA to investigate, charge and

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adjudicate potential claims of doping, and nothing in the law or in USADA’s bylaws prevent it

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There Are No HIPPA/Privacy Concerns - Dr. Brown’s Patients Have Consented To
His Deposition and Have Provided USADA With Signed Medical Releases.

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from using Rule 202 to investigate claims in furtherance of USADA’s corporate purposes.

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Feigning ignorance, Dr. Brown complains that USADA’s Petition fails to identify the
patient/athletes it seeks to depose him on.

While USADA did not expressly name these

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individuals in its Petition, it did so to protect their privacy. Dr. Brown knows who they are, as he

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previously provided some of their (highly illegible) medical records to USADA. Nevertheless,

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to avoid any confusion, USADA intends to question Dr. Brown concerning his treatment of the
following individuals:
1.
2.

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;
;

See USADA Articles of Incorporation Section 3.1, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit E to the Bill

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 3.

;

4.

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;

6.

; and

7.

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5.

Each of these athletes has signed a HIPAA directive/release (1) certifying that they have
been a patient or client of Dr. Brown and Endocrinology Associates of Houston, (2) authorizing

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the release of all of their patient records to USADA, and (3) requesting that Dr. Brown submit to

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a deposition taken by USADA concerning their care. Unredacted copies of these directives have

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been provided to Dr. Brown’s counsel, and redacted copies are attached hereto. See Bill Bock

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Aff. ¶ 15.

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Any confidential patient information elicited from Dr. Brown in the requested deposition

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will be limited to patients for whom USADA has received signed medical releases, and USADA

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in no way seeks to impede Dr. Brown’s right to assert the physician/patient privilege for matters
In short, Dr. Brown’s

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pertaining to patients for whom no release has been obtained.

USADA Is Not On A “Fishing Expedition.”

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privacy/HIPAA argument has no merit. 7

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Citing In re DePinho, ___ S.W.3d____, No. 15-0294, 2016 WL 2979797 (Tex. May 20,
2016), Dr. Brown argues that USADA’s is “fishing” or that its claims are “unripe.” DePinho
does not control. The petitioner in DePinho sought to investigate future, speculative events that
by his own admission may or may not come to pass. Id. at *1. The Court rejected his request,

Affidavit.
6
Id. at Section 3.2.
7
Contrary to what Dr. Brown argues, these patients are not required to be joined to this proceeding, and since a deposition
has not yet been noticed the requirements of Rule 205.3 have not been triggered(c).
PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 holding that a Rule 202 investigation must be of an existing, not future or speculative, potential
claim. As set forth in the Bill Bock Affidavit, USADA is not investigating future, speculative
events. It is investigating past occurrences which may give rise to a claim against Dr. Brown.
J.

USADA Is Not Making An End-Run Around Arbitration Rules.

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Nor is USADA attempting to make an “end-run” around any arbitration rules. USADA
seeks Dr. Brown’s deposition so it can determine whether it has a claim to assert. If USADA
determines that it does have a claim and pursues it in AAA arbitration, USADA will have the

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ability to compel Dr. Brown’s testimony through a subpoena just as it seeks to do here. USADA

USADA Has Fully Complied With Rule 202’s Procedural Requirements.

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is not seeking testimony that would otherwise be prohibited.

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Finally, USADA has fully complied with Rule 202’s procedural requirements for seeking

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to investigate a potential claim or suit against Dr. Brown. Although Dr. Brown argues that

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USADA has not given notice to third parties whose interests are adverse to USADA’s, that

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requirement only applies when suit is anticipated. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.2(f); 202.3(b).

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Here, USADA is investigating potential claims against Dr. Brown. Timely notice was provided

III.
PRAYER

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to him, and all other procedural requirements of Rule 202 have been satisfied.

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WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned respectfully requests that
the Court grant Petitioner’s Verified Rule 202 Petition, order the deposition duces tecum
requested by USADA, and grant such other relief to which USADA is justly entitled.

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 Respectfully submitted,

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/s/ Chad Arnette
Chad Arnette
State Bar No. 24014751
chad.arnette@kellyhart.com
Preston R. Mundt
State Bar No. 24058465
preston.mundt@kellyhart.com
KELLY HART & HALLMAN LLP
201 Main Street, Suite 2500
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Phone: (817) 332-2500
Fax: (817) 878-9280

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and

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

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William Bock, III
Indiana Bar No. 14777-49
wbock@kgrlaw.com
KROGER GARDIS & REGAS, LLP
111 Monument Circle, Suite 900
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Telephone: (317) 777-7412
Facsimile: (317) 777-7412
Pro Hac Vice pending

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Joan Lucci Bain
BAIN & BAIN PLLC
10810 Katy Freeway, Suite 102
Houston, Texas 77043
jbain@bainandbainlaw.net
Attorney for Respondent Jeffrey Brown, M.D.

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/s/ Chad Arnette
Chad Arnette

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This is to certify that on this 13th day of July, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served upon the following counsel of record via the Court’s electronic
case filing system pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a:

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO JEFFREY BROWN, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S RULE 202 PETITION

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