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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW
YORK,
Plaintiff,

1:15-cv-32
(GLS/CFH)

v.
JEFF WISE, in his official capacity
as Executive Director of the New
York State Justice Center for the
Protection of People with Special
Needs, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Disability Rights New York
725 Broadway, Suite 450
Albany, NY 12207

ANDREW A. STECKER, ESQ.
CLIFF ZUCKER, ESQ.
MICHAEL W. GADOMSKI, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224

HELENA LYNCH
Assistant Attorney General

Gary L. Sharpe
Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction

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Plaintiff Disability Rights New York (DRNY) commenced this action
against defendants Jeff Wise, in his official capacity as Executive Director
of the New York State Justice Center for the Protection of People with
Special Needs (hereinafter “the Justice Center”), and Robin A. Forshaw, in
her official capacity as General Counsel of the Justice Center, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental
Illness (PAIMI) Act,1 and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act of 20002 (hereinafter “the DD Act”). (See generally Compl.,
Dkt. No. 1.) Pending is defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 10.)3 For the reasons that follow,
defendants’ motion is denied.
II. Background4

1

See 42 U.S.C. § 10801-10851.

2

See 42 U.S.C. § 15001-15115.

3

In its response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, DRNY requests that the court enter
summary judgment in its favor, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact in
this case. (Dkt. No. 16 at 7 n.2.) However, DRNY has not filed a motion for summary
judgment. Moreover, defendants have yet to file an answer in this case and, thus, have yet to
admit or deny the facts alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, the court will not consider
summary judgment on its own. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(f)(3) (“After giving notice and a
reasonable time to respond, the court may . . . consider summary judgment on its own after
identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.”).
4

The facts are drawn from DRNY’s complaint and presented in the light most favorable

to it.

2

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In order to ensure that the rights of individuals with mental illness or
developmental disabilities are protected, the PAIMI and DD Acts condition
certain federal funding for states on the establishment of protection and
advocacy (hereinafter “P&A”) systems. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10801(b)(1),10803, 15001(b)(2), 15043(a)(2)(A); Disability Advocates,
Inc. v. N.Y. Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, Inc., 675 F.3d 149, 152-53
(2d Cir. 2012); Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Pers. with Disabilities
v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (D. Conn. 2005), aff’d,
464 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006). DRNY, an independent nonprofit
organization, is New York’s designated P&A agency. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7-9.)
The Justice Center, an agency within the New York State Executive
Department, is charged with investigating reported incidents of abuse,
neglect, or injury of persons with disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Under the
PAIMI and DD Acts, DRNY has the authority to review the records of
individuals with mental illness or developmental disabilities under certain
circumstances,5 including reports prepared by agencies charged with
5

As relevant here, DRNY has the authority to access all records of an individual with
developmental disabilities or mental illness who: (1) authorizes DRNY to access their records;
or (2) by reason of their mental or physical condition is unable to authorize the release of
records, does not have a guardian or representative, or the representative refuses to act after
being offered assistance from DRNY, and DRNY has received a complaint regarding the
individual’s treatment or has probable cause to believe the individual has been subjected to

3

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investigating alleged incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury of such
individuals. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 15); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 10806(b)(3)(A),
15043(c)(2). When DRNY makes a request for access to such records,
such records must be provided promptly. (Compl. ¶ 17); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 15043(a)(2)(J)(i) (requiring that requested records be provided not later
than three business days after the P&A system makes a written request);
42 C.F.R. § 51.41(a) (“Access to records shall be extended promptly to all
authorized agents of a P&A system.”). If access to such records is delayed
or denied, DRNY must be promptly provided with a written statement of
reasons for the denial. (Compl. ¶ 18); see 42 C.F.R. § 51.43; 45 C.F.R.
§ 1386.26.
In November 2012, F.S., an individual who suffered from a mental
illness, committed suicide in a facility operated by the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). (Compl.
¶¶ 26-27.) In October 2014, DRNY reviewed a redacted version of an
investigatory report completed by a predecessor agency of the Justice
Center, which concluded that F.S. received inadequate mental health
treatment during his incarceration. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28-29, 31.) The information
mistreatment. (Compl. ¶ 13); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 10805(a)(4)(A)-(B),15043(a)(2)(I)(i)-(iii).

4

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contained in the redacted report caused DRNY to determine it had
probable cause to believe that F.S. was abused and neglected while in the
custody of DOCCS. (Id. ¶ 31.) Based on that belief, DRNY requested that
the Justice Center provide it with “a complete, unredacted copy of the
investigatory records relating to F.S.” (Id. ¶ 32.) DRNY again requested
F.S.’ records on two subsequent occasions, but never received a response
from the Justice Center. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)
In October 2013, DRNY received a complaint of abuse of L.B., who
suffers from a mental illness and resided at a facility operated by the New
York State Office of Mental Health. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.) On three separate
occasions beginning in November 2013, DRNY requested that the Justice
Center provide it with records regarding the alleged abuse of L.B. (Id.
¶¶ 39, 41, 43.) In March 2014, the Justice Center responded to DRNY,
explaining that it had not yet completed its investigation into the alleged
abuse of L.B. (Id. ¶ 44.) After contacting the Justice Center on three more
occasions, and providing a signed release from L.B. authorizing the
release of the requested records, in October 2014, DRNY received the
Justice Center’s report, which had been “heavily” redacted. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 4748, 50, 52-53.)
5

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In October 2013, DRNY also received a complaint of abuse and
neglect of A.T., a minor with a developmental disability who resided in a
facility licensed by the Office of Child and Family Services and approved by
the New York State Education Department. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 56.) DRNY
requested “all documents related to the Justice Center’s investigation of
the alleged abuse and neglect of A.T.” in April 2014. (Id. ¶ 57.) After
providing a signed consent form from A.T.’s guardian authorizing the
release of the requested records, the Justice Center provided DRNY
“heavily” redacted documents. (Id. ¶¶ 58-60.)
In March 2014, DRNY received a complaint of abuse and neglect of
R.T., a person with a developmental disability who resided in a facility
licensed by the New York State Office for People with Developmental
Disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 61-63.) On March 20, 2014, DRNY requested
“information regarding the steps the Justice Center took to investigate the
alleged abuse and neglect,” and the Justice Center responded, on April 18,
2014, that it had not yet completed its investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 64-65.)
Thereafter, DRNY contacted the Justice Center numerous times in April,
May, and June 2014, by phone and mail, requesting an update on the
status of the investigation and providing a release signed by R.T.’s
6

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guardian, authorizing release of the investigative file. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 68, 70,
73-74.) DRNY received no response to these requests until October 9,
2014, at which time the Justice Center provided “heavily” redacted
documents. (Id. ¶¶ 67, 69, 72, 75-76.)
DRNY alleges that it made efforts to resolve the dispute regarding its
right to timely access of unredacted records from the Justice Center, but
the Justice Center maintained that it is not required to provide an
investigative report to DRNY until the Justice Center has determined that
the report is final, and further, it may redact from the records it provides
DRNY information that identifies individuals reporting abuse or neglect to
the Justice Center, staff members who are subject to abuse or neglect
allegations, and individuals cooperating in investigations, as well as mental
health provider records or information and individual service recipient
information. (Id. ¶¶ 77-84, 86.) The Justice Center based its position on
New York Executive Law § 558(b)(iii), New York Public Officers Law § 96,
and New York Social Services Law § 496. (Id. ¶ 85.) Because it could not
resolve the dispute, on January 9, 2015, DRNY commenced this action
seeking a declaratory judgment that defendants have violated DRNY’s
rights under the PAIMI and DD Acts and New York Executive Law § 558,
7

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New York Public Officers Law § 96, and New York Social Services Law §
496, as interpreted and applied by defendants, are preempted by federal
law. (Id. at 17-18.) DRNY further seeks an injunction ordering defendants
to provide DRNY with complete, unredacted copies of all records requested
pursuant to its P&A authority, including those regarding F.S., L.B., A.T.,
and R.T., as well as ordering defendants to provide timely and complete
responses to all future records requests made pursuant to DRNY’s P&A
authority, and an award of attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 18.) Shortly
after this action was filed, defendants filed the pending pre-answer motion
to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 10), which the court now considers.
III. Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions
is well settled and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the
standard, the court refers the parties to its decision in Ellis v. Cohen &
Slamowitz, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on
other grounds by Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 786 F.3d 191
(2d Cir. 2015).
IV. Discussion
A.

Access to Records Under the PAIMI and DD Acts
8

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Defendants argue that DRNY’s complaint should be dismissed
because the PAIMI and DD Acts do not authorize the Justice Center to
disclose anything other than what was included in its responses to DRNY.
(Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 at 13-21.) Specifically, defendants contend that the
PAIMI and DD Acts do not require disclosure of the information redacted
by the Justice Center, and authorize the disclosure of only finalized reports.
(Id. at 14-19.) Further, they assert that the Justice Center has not
interfered with DRNY’s federal mandates. (Id. at 19-20.) DRNY counters,
and the court agrees, that it is authorized to review complete, unredacted
records from the Justice Center, which must be provided in accordance
with the required time lines. (Dkt. No. 16 at 8-19.)
DRNY seeks the records of F.S. and L.B. under the PAIMI Act, and
the records of A.T. and R.T. under the DD Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 88-111.) As,
defendants point out, the relevant provisions of the respective statutes are
substantially identical. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 at 13 n.6.) In particular,
under the PAIMI Act, DRNY is entitled to access “all records” of individuals
whose records are subject to disclosure,6 and the term “records” includes

6

The parties appear to agree that the four individuals whose records DRNY seek, F.S.,
L.B., A.T. and R.T., are each within a category of individuals whose records are subject to
disclosure. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 at 4-5 n.3.)

9

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“reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of
incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at [a] facility that describe
incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the
steps taken to investigate such incidents.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 10805(a)(4);
10806(b)(3)(A). Similarly, under the DD Act, DRNY has access to “all
records” of individuals whose records are subject to disclosure, including “a
report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating
reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at [any
location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to
individuals with developmental disabilities], that describes such incidents
and the steps taken to investigate such incidents.” Id. § 15043(a)(2)(I),
(c)(2).
Defendants argue that neither statute authorizes the Justice Center
to identify individuals, including witnesses, subjects, and sources, or to
provide underlying treatment records or individual service recipient
information. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 at 14.) To that end, defendants claim
that the words “describe” and “report” qualify the disclosures the Justice
Center must make under the PAIMI and DD Acts. (Id. at 14-16.) They
argue that DRNY has no right to access the Justice Center’s “records,” but
10

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only its “reports.” (Id. at 15.) Further, they contend that only the portion of
the Justice Center’s reports that “describe” alleged incidents of abuse or
neglect, the steps taken to investigate the incidents, and the information
and records used and reviewed in preparing the reports are required to be
disclosed by the Justice Center. (Id.) According to defendants, only the
facilities that render care and treatment to individuals whose records are
subject to disclosure may actually identify individuals or release the
facilities’ own records. (Id. at 14) Based on this interpretation of the
statutes, the Justice Center redacted such information from the reports it
provided to DRNY. (Id.) After analyzing the PAIMI and DD Acts, however,
the court disagrees that the statutory language at issue limits access to
records in the manner defendants suggest.
As the Second Circuit has explained, statutory interpretation must
“begin with the plain language, giving all undefined terms their ordinary
meaning while attempt[ing] to ascertain how a reasonable reader would
understand the statutory text, considered as a whole.” Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Trust Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc., 810 F.3d 861, 868 (2d Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Prot. & Advocacy For
Pers. With Disabilities, Conn. v. Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 448
11

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F.3d 119, 124 (2d. Cir. 2006). If a statutory provision is ambiguous, the
court must “then turn to canons of statutory construction for assistance in
interpreting the statute.” Greathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 111
(2d Cir. 2015) (citing Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408,
423 (2d Cir. 2005)). “These include looking to the purpose of [a statute],
and affording some degree of weight to the interpretations of the agencies
charged with enforcing it.” Id. at 113.
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “describe” as “to
represent or give an account of in words.” Describe, Merriam Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997). Under this definition, the court sees
no basis for interpreting the PAIMI and DD Acts as permitting the Justice
Center to redact from its disclosure to DRNY the identities of individuals,
including witnesses, subjects, and sources involved in allegations of abuse,
or mental health provider and individual service recipient information. The
court agrees with DRNY that a reasonable reader would understand the
statutory text, considered as a whole, to require the disclosure of the
entirety of reports that contain “an account of” alleged incidents of abuse or
neglect. (Dkt. No. 16 at 9-10); see Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for
Pers. With Disabilities v. Kirk, 354 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201-02 (D. Conn.
12

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2005) (concluding that the phrase “that describe incidents of abuse,
neglect, and injury” in the PAIMI Act “simply distinguishes between reports
pertaining to the incident in question and reports that do not pertain to the
incident”), aff’d sub nom. Prot. & Advocacy For Pers. With Disabilities,
Conn., 448 F.3d 119.7 The statutes make clear that P&A systems such as
DRNY are entitled to all records of subject individuals, and give no
indication that investigative agencies should redact or withhold portions of
their reports. Even if the court were to accept defendants’ contention that
only the portions of the Justice Center’s reports that describe an alleged
incident of abuse or neglect must be disclosed, defendants fail to explain
why a description of such an alleged incident should not include the identity
of any individuals involved in, or witness to, the incident. (Dkt. No. 10,
Attach. 1 at 14.)
Turning to the disclosure of facility records, while it is clear from the
plain language of the statute that DRNY is entitled to receive such records,
it is arguably less clear whether an investigatory agency, such as the
7

Defendants argue that Kirk is inapplicable here, because that case involved the
disclosure of peer review reports by facilities that render care and treatment to individuals with
mental illness. (Dkt. No. 17 at 3-4.) However, the decision in Kirk included an analysis of the
exact statutory language at issue here, and the reasoning applied is equally persuasive where
the disclosure is made by an agency investigating allegations of abuse. See 354 F. Supp. 2d
at 199-200, 201-02.

13

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Justice Center, can be required to produce them when the facility records
are not contained in the agency’s report itself. Defendants assert that,
where the plain language of the statutes is ambiguous, the Justice Center’s
interpretation of the statutes is entitled to deference. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach.
1 at 2, 12.) This argument is fundamentally flawed. Defendants rely on the
rationale of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Under, Chevron, an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is
responsible for administering is entitled to deference so long as it is
reasonable in light of the two-step analysis set forth by the Supreme Court.
See 467 U.S. at 842-44. As DRNY points out, “[t]he Justice Center is not a
federal agency, nor is it charged with enforcing the P&A Acts.” (Dkt. No.
16 at 7.) Thus, the court agrees with DRNY that Chevron is irrelevant.
See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 490, 501
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The deference accorded federal agencies under
Chevron is based upon the federal agency’s expertise and familiarity with
the subject matter of its mandate and the need for coherent and uniform
construction of a federal law nationwide. . . . Those considerations are not
applicable to a state agency’s interpretation of federal law.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)). Instead, the court must consider
14

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whether the Justice Center’s interpretation of the statutes is consistent with
federal law, an issue that is subject to de novo review in federal court. See
Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989).
As noted above, when statutory language is ambiguous, the court
can look to the purpose of the statute as well as the interpretations of the
agencies charged with enforcing it. See Greathouse, 784 F.3d at 113.
Congress enacted the PAIMI after finding that “individuals with mental
illness are vulnerable to abuse and serious injury” as well as neglect, and
“State systems for monitoring compliance with respect to the rights of
individuals with mental illness . . . are frequently inadequate.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 10801(a). Accordingly, the purposes of the PAIMI Act relevant to this
litigation are “to assist States to establish and operate a [P&A] system for
individuals with mental illness which will . . . protect and advocate the rights
of such individuals to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and
Federal and State statutes; and . . . investigate incidents of abuse and
neglect of individuals with mental illness.” Id. § 10801(b). The DD Act was
similarly enacted to “protect the legal and human rights of individuals with
developmental disabilities,” id. § 15041, after Congress found that such
individuals “are at greater risk than the general population of abuse,
15

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neglect, financial and sexual exploitation, and the violation of their legal
and human rights,” id. § 15001(a)(5).
To accomplish these purposes, the PAIMI and DD Acts entitle P&A
systems, such as DRNY, with statutory authority to “pursue administrative,
legal, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of
individuals with mental illness” or developmental disabilities. Id.
§§ 10805(a)(1)(B); 15043(a)(2)(A)(i). Further, to carry out the statutory
objectives, the PAIMI and DD Acts authorize P&A systems broad access to
individuals, facilities, and records. See id. §§ 10805(a)(3)-(4);
15043(a)(2)(H)-(J); see also Ctr. For Legal Advocacy v. Hammons, 323
F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he statutory phrase ‘all records of . . .
any individual’ is quite broad.”); Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S.
Tarwater Developmental Ctr., 97 F.3d 492, 497 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing
the scope of access granted to a P&A system as broad).8 Clearly, the
purpose of the statutes weighs in favor of robust disclosure. Nevertheless,
defendants defend their position, in part, on the ground that the information

8

The discussion in Tarwater pertains to the 1975 Developmental Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975), which was repealed and
replaced with the DD Act in 2000. See 97 F.3d at 497; The DD Act, Pub. L. No. 106-402,
§ 401, 114 Stat. 1677 (2000).

16

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at issue is sensitive and confidential. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 at 2.) Both
the PAIMI and DD Acts, however, impose a duty of confidentiality on P&A
systems. See 42 U.S.C. § 10806(a); 45 C.F.R. § 1386.28. Thus, the court
agrees with DRNY that the Justice Center cannot withhold records based
on their confidential nature. (Dkt. No. 16 at 16); see, e.g., Disability Rights
Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, 463 F.3d 719, 729-30 (7th Cir.
2006) (“The point of the federal P&A statutes is to establish and equip a
specialized agency to look out for individuals with mental illness.
Confounding the agency in the name of an illusory concern for privacy
defeats that very important goal.”).
A review of the implementing regulations of the PAIMI and DD Acts
further clarifies a P&A system’s right of access under the statutes. Under
the PAIMI Act’s implementing regulations,
[i]nformation and individual records, whether written or
in another medium, draft or final, including
handwritten notes, electronic files, photographs or
video or audio tape records, which shall be available
to the P&A system . . . shall include, but not be limited
to . . . [r]eports prepared by an agency charged with
investigating abuse[,] neglect, or injury occurring at a
facility rendering care or treatment . . . that describe
any or all of the following:
(i) Abuse, neglect, or injury occurring at the facility;
(ii) The steps taken to investigate the incidents;
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(iii) Reports and records, including personnel records,
prepared[,] or maintained by the facility, in connection
with such reports of incidents; or
(iv) Supporting information that was relied upon in
creating a report, including all information and records
used or reviewed in preparing reports of abuse,
neglect[,] or injury such as records which describe
persons who were interviewed, physical and
documentary evidence that was reviewed, and the
related investigative findings.
42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c)(2). The regulations implementing the DD Act contain
almost identical language. See 45 C.F.R. § 1386.25(b)(2). The breadth of
records which the regulations require disclosure of, as well as the fact that
they contain an inclusive and not exhaustive list of records that must be
disclosed, supports DRNY’s contention that it is entitled to all relevant
records in possession of the Justice Center. (Dkt. No. 16 at 14-17.)
Although the regulations specify that P&A systems are entitled to merely
an investigatory agency’s reports describing underlying records, the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has explained
that 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c)(2) provides P&A systems access to “supporting
information relied upon in creating a record, including all information and
records used or reviewed in preparing reports of abuse, neglect, [or]
injury.” 62 Fed. Reg. 53,548, 53,560 (Oct. 15, 1997) (emphasis added).

18

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That DHHS interprets the PAIMI Act as authorizing P&A systems access to
such underlying records further supports DRNY’s claims.
Defendants somewhat confusingly argue that DRNY is not entitled to
draft documents, handwritten notes, electronic files, photographs, or video
or audio tape records from investigatory agencies such as the Justice
Center, because the reports that such agencies must disclose are not
“information” or “individual records.” (Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 at 17-19.)
According to defendants, only facilities that render treatment are required
to disclose “individual records” under the regulations. (Id. at 18.) Such an
interpretation is contrary to the express language of the regulations, which
includes the reports of investigatory agencies in the list of “individual
records” which are subject to disclosure. See 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c)(2); 45
C.F.R. § 1386.25(b)(2). Thus, the regulations, on their face, require the
disclosure of draft reports from investigatory agencies.
Finally, defendants argue that DRNY’s claim that the Justice Center
has interfered with its federal mandates is baseless. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach.
1 at 19-20.) According to defendants, DRNY does not have a statutory
mandate to determine whether investigations conducted by state agencies
charged with investigating allegations of abuse and neglect were fully and
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independently conducted. (Id.) The fact that such language is not
contained in the PAIMI or DD Acts is of no moment. By redacting and
withholding portions of its reports, the Justice Center has interfered with
DRNY’s mandate to protect and advocate on behalf of individuals with
mental illness and developmental disabilities, and particularly its mandate
to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect. Defendants contend that the
Justice Center has not interfered with such mandates because DRNY can
access the information it seeks from facilities that provide treatment to
individuals with disabilities. (Id. at 21.) However, as DRNY points out, by
withholding portions of its report, including underlying facility records and
treatment information, the Justice Center potentially precludes DRNY from
accessing such information at all. (Dkt. No. 16 at 21 (“Facility [r]ecords
held by the Justice Center may have been lost, destroyed, or altered by the
facility that created them.”).) Further, defendants’ contention that access to
the entirety of information included in the reports of investigatory agencies
is not essential to a P&A system’s statutory mandates is contrary to the
explicit language of the statutes granting P&A systems access to such
reports. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 804 F.3d 617, 623 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“[The court] must . . . strive to avoid interpretations of a statute
20

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that would render any phrase or provision superfluous.” (citing TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001))); see also Dunn v. Dunn, No.
2:14cv601–MHT, 2016 WL 324990, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 27, 2016)
(“Congress, by authorizing unfettered access to ‘all records,’. . . manifested
its view that access to such records is critical to the efficacy of efforts to
protect and advocate for the mentally ill.”).
B.

Federal Preemption
Defendants also seek to dismiss DRNY’s claims that New York’s

Executive Law, Public Officers Law, and Social Services Law, as
interpreted and applied by defendants, are preempted by the PAIMI and
DD Acts. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 at 21-22); see N.Y. Exec. Law § 558; N.Y.
Pub. Off. Law § 96; N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 496. According to defendants,
these laws are consistent with the PAIMI and DD Acts, as New York Social
Services Law § 496 and New York Executive Law § 558 authorize the
disclosure of the Justice Center’s reports to DRNY. (Id.) Further, they
assert that New York Public Officers Law § 96 permits disclosure of
information where specifically authorized by state or federal statute. (Id. at
22.) Under defendants’ interpretation of the PAIMI and DD Acts, this
prevents the Justice Center from disclosing the identity of reports, subjects,
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or witnesses, mental health provider records, or individual service recipient
information. (Id.) The court has determined, however, that such
disclosures are authorized by the PAIMI and DD Acts.
It is axiomatic that “state law is naturally preempted to the extent of
any conflict with a federal statute, or where, under the circumstances of [a]
particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d
202, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), aff’d, 742 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2014). While they are clearly not in
conflict with the PAIMI or DD Acts on their face, accepting as true DRNY’s
allegation that the Justice Center informed it that these state statutes
authorize the withholding of the Justice Center’s complete records, (Compl.
¶ 85), the court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss DRNY’s claim that
such laws, as interpreted and applied by defendants, are preempted by
federal law. See N.Y.S. Comm’n on Cable Television v. F.C.C., 669 F.2d
58, 62 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that, in determining whether a state law
conflicts with a federal law, courts must “‘consider the relationship between
state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as
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they are written’” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526
(1977))).
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 10) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants file an appropriate responsive pleading
within the time allotted by the rules; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 18, 2016
Albany, New York

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