$1.00
SECRET DETENTION
by the
/
CHICAGO POLICE"
A REPORT BY THE American Civil Liberties Union,
ILLINOIS DIVISION
.
i PE
BL
“*
digi, EE PRESS, GLENCOE, ILLINOIS I’


l
RO0932 17036
FOREWORD
THIS STUDY was initiated by the Police and Criminal Law Com-
mittee of the Illinois Division, American Civil Liberties Union,
under the co-chairmanship of Charles Licbman and Mrs. John
Bartlow Martin.

The formation and direction of the project was undertaken
by Donald Page Moore, staff counsel for the Division, 1956 to
1958. He was also responsible for the basic writing and organiza-
tion of the Report. In the collection and tabulation of the statisti-
cal material he was assisted by Karen Hillman, Kenton Smith,
Morris Gordon, Sylvia Callistein, Michael Kirk, Patricia Van Metre,
Anne Davis, Anne Heisler, and Patricia Aldrich.

Bernard Weisberg, the Division's General Counsel, assumed,
with the aid of the Editorial Committee below, responsibility for
the final draft. On the statistical material, valuable help was given
by Leo Herzel and by William Kruskal and Paul Meier. The
statement by Drs. Kruskal and Meier is reproduced in full as
Appendix A.

Special acknowledgment is due to Charles Liebman whose
interest over the years in police and criminal law problems has
been a stimulus to ACLU work in this field.

The Board of Directors of the Illinois Division now submits
this report with its approval, in the hope that it will help to eradi-
cate serious infringements on individual liberty.

Chicago, Illinois
January 1959
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Edgar Bernhard
Kenneth Douty
Alex Elson
' Stanley Kaplan
| I. M. Lieberman
Charles Licbman
Frances Martin
Donald Page Moore
Bernard Weisberg


| —_
SECRET DETENTION
| by the
CHICAGO POLICE
REFERENCE
|


chao ~ Pollee, Qegl .
© COPY A
Copyright © 1959
by the American Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division
‘There is no restriction on the use of this material.
:
[3
SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT
THE CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY
0cT 2 0191


|
| CONTENTS
|
Introduction PAGE 5 |
| 1 Preliminary Criminal Procedure: The Law and Practice
of Arrest, Detention, and Preliminary Hearing 9
t THE LAW OF ARREST |
THE THIRD DEGREE
POLICE BRUTALITY AND THE CONVICTION OF
THE INNOCENT: THE CASE OF LESLIE WAKAT
COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND POLICE EFFICIENCY
USURPATION OF JUDICIAL PROCESS:
THE USE OF DETENTION AS PUNISHMENT
1 The Extent of Secret Detention by the Chicago Police:
Results of the ACLU Study 2
m Conclusions and Recommendations 30
APPENDICES
A Statement Concerning Statistical Aspects of ACLU Secret
Detention Study—William Kruskal AND Paul Meier, |
DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 35 |
8 Description of Sampling Methods Used in ACLU Study 42 {
C Tables 4s |
Db Data from Municipal Court Branches Not Included |
in Detailed ACLU Analysis a |
]


|
1
|
INTRODUCTION | |
|
THis 1s A REPORT on the Chicago police practice of holding ar- FE |
rested persons secretly for long periods of time without bringing |
them promptly before a magistrate, as the law requires. It is the |
first systematic study ever made of the frequency of lengthy secret
detentions by a municipal police force. It is based upon actual
cases in the files of the Municipal Court of Chicago. It demon-
strates, beyond any question, that each year thousands of persons
are held illegally by the Chicago police.
‘This problem is invisible to the great majority of law abiding
citizens who rarely have any direct contact with the police. The
poor, and racial and ethnic minorities—these are the people who
suffer most from police lawlessness. But police violation of per-
sonal liberty can happen to anyone—and has.
In November, 1953, it happened to Circuit Court Judge John
T. Dempsey. Jack Mabley of the Chicago Daily News aptly de-
scribed the incident in a recent column: “A few years ago a little
girl claimed that a man with a dog molested her in a West Side
park. One of our distinguished citizens, Judge John T. Dempsey,
happened to be walking his dog in a West Side park. Two police-
men arrested him, and he was pushed, knocked down, and taken
to an abandoned police station. After an hour he was released.
He wondered what would have happened to him if he were not a
judge.” Daily News, May 20, 1958. Judge John Gutknecht has
stated that “what happened to Judge Dempsey could happen to
anyone.” Sun-Times, November 21, 1953.
It does happen to many thousands of people in Chicago each
year who are held in police stations for extended periods of time
without being charged with any crime, without bail and without
communication with the world outside. A projection of the cases
sampled in the ACLU study indicates that in 1956 approximately
20,000 defendants were held incommunicado for at least 17 hours
in cases eventually brought before the nine branches of the
Municipal Court studied. Almost 2000 of these defendants were
51


[61 SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
held for 48 hours or more. And these figures do not include any
detentions in the other branches of the Municipal Court which
handle criminal cases.
The results of the ACLU study are summarized in the accom-
panying charts.
Chart 1 Chart 2
Interval between Arrest and Booking Breakdown of Pre-Booking Detentions
as Shown by Police Arrest Slips in of More than 17 Hours in Cases
Cases Brought to 9 Branches of Brought to 9 Branches of the
the Municipal Court of Chicago Municipal Court of Chicago
During the Year 1956 During the Year 1956
1A Cg
ETT a 30%: 2
Chee)
- i om
Nay a
L A 18%
AN frig co
Q —
To 900; rr aves sores aes 0 wh
erate on
The law requires that the police bring arrested persons
promptly to court. This protects the personal liberty of every one
of us. Its strict observance is needed to prevent arbitrary arrests
and the abuses which inevitably accompany the practice of hold-
ing prisoners incommunicado. When a prisoner is brought to
' court promptly after his arrest, a hearing can then be conducted
it in which the evidence against him is impartially weighed to see
if it is sufficient to justify his being held. A judicial officer can
decide whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is enough evidence to require holding the prisoner for trial or
grand jury action.


1 |
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [71

When the prisoner is brought to court he can have bail
set, he has the opportunity to be advised by his lawyer and he
is able to let his family know where he is. Every prisoner not
brought promptly to court, i incommunicado, is
duce a confession or-to-punish-him without 2 trial.

Widespread secret detention has existed for many years in
‘Chicago. The American Civil Liberties Union has tried to attack

| this practice in several ways:

1. It has pressed for legislation which would remove any pos-
sible doubts about the duty of the police to take all arrested per-
sons “forthwith” before a magistrate.

I 2. It has pointed to the mounting number of cases in which
| substantial money damages have been recovered in civil actions
against police officers for false arrest and assault—damages which
| in most cases have been paid from the city treasury. Such suits
I are one of the most effective sanctions available to the victims
| of police lawlessness, and for this reason serve an important public
I interest.
f 3. It has issued public statements from time to time about
i individual cases in which prisoners have been held for long periods
of time without being brought to court.

4. Tt has called attention to the decisions of our courts holding
that the police have no right to arrest suspects for the purpose of
questioning them in a police station.

5. It has called for more vigorous disciplinary action by the

f Police Department and the Civil Service Commission against of-
ficers found guilty of violating the rights of prisoners.

Despite ACLU’s campaign, illegal detention continues to be
a regular Chicago police practice. The reaction of police officials
has been either silence or a refusal to acknowledge that any real
problem exists. Efforts to stimulate public discussion have been
handicapped because the general public has little understanding

| of the processes of the criminal law. Further, the public and in-
| deed many public officials have not had the facts. Although the
I practice of secret detention is common knowledge to lawyers and
EB eas


r y
[8] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
other persons who have day to day experience with law enforce-
ment in Chicago, it has not been possible to point to data which
show the actual frequency of prolonged detention of prisoners by
the police.

This report attempts to meet these obstacles to rational public
discussion. Part I of this report explains the law and practice of
arrest and secret detention. This section describes the laws which
are violated by this practice and the evils which it produces. A
detailed description of the American Civil Liberties Union study
is contained in Part II. The concluding section sets forth a series
of recommendations for needed reforms.

'
k
E1111


I
|
4
PRELIMINARY CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE:
} The Law and Practice of Arrest, Detention,
| and Preliminary Hearing
| “The history of liberty has largely been
the history of observance of proce-
dural safeguards,
| THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
i UNITED STATES, PER MR. JUSTICE
! FRANKFURTER, IN McNabb.
United States, 318 US. 332, 347
J (1943)
| Th seem won att 5
method of arresting, holding, and
! questioning people on mere suspicion
was in accordance with “the usual po-
lice procedure of questioning a sus-
pect”. . - However usual this prac-
| tice, it is in violation of law.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
BLACK, IN Upshaw v. United
States, 335 US. 410, 414 (1948)
| THE LAW OF ARREST
Tae ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE requires that every
4 person arrested without a warrant “shall, without unnecessary de-
lay, be taken before the nearest magistrate in the county . . ."
Tilinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 38, §660.
Under Section 50 of the Municipal Court Act, persons arrested
| in Chicago “shall have the right to be brought immediately before
|
| 0]


4
[10] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
the Municipal Court . . . to be dealt with . . . according to law.”
Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 37, §406.

When an arrested person is brought to court, it is possible to
hold a preliminary hearing in which a judicial tribunal can hear
the available evidence and decide whether a crime has been com-
mitted and whether there is some probability that he is the guilty
party. Unless the court finds both of these things to be true, the
prisoner must be set free. On the other hand, if the court finds
such “probable cause,” in misdemeanor cases a trial date is
set, while in felony cases the prisoner is bound over to the grand
jury which decides whether he is to be indicted and stand trial.
When he is brought to court for a hearing, the prisoner has several
other important rights. He is entitled to an opportunity to make
reasonable bail. He can consult a lawyer so that he may under-
stand his rights and intelligently decide haw to defend any criminal
charge which is placed against him. And he has an opportunity to
contact family or friends.

‘The statutes which require that all arrested persons be promptly
brought to court are designed to insure the observance of all of
these fundamental rights. In addition, these laws are a needed
bulwark against two persistent abuses of police power: illegal
arrests based on suspicion, and the use of “third degree” methods
in questioning prisoners.

ARRESTS ON SUSPICION

A policeman has the right to make an arrest only when a
crime has been committed and the officer has some reasonable
ground for believing that the arrested person committed it. In
common sense terms, this means that an arrest cannot be made

' without some evidence. “Suspicion” is not a crime known to our

h law and arrests which are based only on suspicion are themselves

violations of the law. It follows, as our courts have said time and

again, that the police have no right to detain a person suspected
— ees


I

|

i SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE (1)
of crime for the purpose of questioning him in a police station.

But the police, in effect, insist that they cannot function with-

| out_the opportunity to question suspects while under arrest and

| in seclusion. Almost dally the Chicago newspapers report police

| “vestigations in which suspects are taken into custody for ques-
tioning. Frequently the fictitious charge of disorderly conduct is
given as a pretext when these prisoners are eventually brought to
court. LeRoy McHugh, veteran police reporter, wrote in the
Chicago American on August 29, 1957:

“In my two score years as a police reporter I have covered
many murder investigations. I have seen police officials drag in
dozens of persons a day for intensive questioning—just for the
record and without any real belief it would aid solution of the

| case.”
‘The main reason for questioning a suspect in a police station
is the coercive influence of arrest and incommunicado detention.
| The police can question anyone at any time without placing him
I under arrest. But he may refuse to speak and cannot be forced to
| answer questions. A man who is restrained and held in isolation
| from the outside world is more likely to answer questions. This is
borne out by the widespread practice of the Chicago police of
refusing to allow an arrested person to call a lawyer before he is
| questioned. It is said that the lawyer will advise him of his right
not to answer questions and the police will then find it more diffi-
cult to gather the evidence they need to solve crime.
But arrests based on suspicion for the purpose of interrogation
are made in flat disregard of the law. The requirement that prisoners
| be brought to court promptly after they are arrested is intended to
prevent just such police misconduct.
As the Illinois Supreme Court has said:
Our statutes are intended to insure that persons who are arrested
shall not be detained without reasonable cause, and to afford them
an opportunity to be released upon bail. The fact that there is as
yet insufficient evidence to justify preferring charges against a
Criminal suspect is not an excuse for detention, but is precisely the
| evil which the statute is aimed at correcting. Fulford v. O'Connor,
i 3 IIL 2d 490, 500 (1954).
|
]
| CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY
| MUNICIPAL REFERENCE COLLECTION


r TT II—
[12] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
Sf THE THIRD DEGREE

Since 1874, Illinois Law has provided:

If two or more persons . . . shall imprison another . . . for the
purpose of obtaining a confession . . . (they) shall be imprisoned
in the penitentiary not less than one year . . . Illinois Revised
Statutes, Ch. 38, §379.

Under this statute, the police themselves commit a crime every
time they arrest a suspect and try to obtain a confession by ques-
tioning him in a police station.

The Illinois Supreme Court has stated the proposition in terms
too clear for misunderstanding.

It is not the right of policemen anywhere in this state to arrest
men supposed to be guilty of or charged with crime, and confine
them in a police station or other such place and deprive them of
the lawful right of bail and the right of counsel, and of a speedy
hearing before a legal tribunal authorized to give such hearing
... for the unlawful and criminal purpose of extorting a con-
fession, or of obtaining a confession by any means in such sta-
tions . . . People V. Frugoli, 334 Il. 324,333 (1929).

Arresting suspects and questioning them in the hope of ob-
taining confessions seems an easy way to solve crimes. However,
the appeal is a dangerous one. The quest for confessions from
suspects who are held incommunicado inevitably produces three
related evils:

1. Police brutality,

2. The conviction of innocent persons, and

3. The deterioration of police efficiency.

Each of these evils is traceable to systematic flouting of the
law which requires the prompt production of criminals in court.
Incommunicado detention is the condition under which coercive

\ interrogation flourishes.

k Since police brutality takes place behind closed doors, the
charges frequently made by prisoners that they have been beaten
are almost impossible to prove. The police are usually the only
witnesses to a beating, and they invariably deny such charges.

—————— eee


| (
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [13]
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the practice of Third
Degree methods continues, almost always the fruit of lengthy
secret detentions.
The courts have unanimously and vigorously condemned the
mistreatment and abuse of prisoners by police officers. As Justice
Douglas of the United States Supreme Court has said:
What happens behind doors that are opened and closed at the |
sole discretion of the police is a black chapter in the history of i
every country—the free as well as the despotic, the modern as |
well as the ancient . . . United States Vv. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, i
46 (1951) (concurring opinion). i
In 1929, President Hoover appointed a group of distinguished
lawyers, headed by Cornelius Wickersham, to survey law enforce-
ment in the United States. The volume of its report which deals with
police lawlessness still shocks the reader with its descriptions of
Third Degree methods found to be in common use by the police
departments of major American cities. The Wickersham report
thus described the methods then employed in Chicago:
“The methods . . . in Chicago include the application of rubber
hose to the back or the pit of the stomach, kicks in the shins,
beating the shins with a club, blows struck with a telephone book
on the side of the victim's head. The Chicago telephone book is
a heavy one and a swinging blow with it may stun a man without
leaving a mark.” VI, Report, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement,
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, n. 8,
Pp. 126.
Lawyers with experience in the criminal courts know the tech-
niques most often employed. A blow to the abdomen rarely leaves
a bruise. Almost everyone can recall the feeling of helplessness
and momentary panic caused by a blow to the solar plexus which
“knocks the wind out” of a person. Yet such a blow almost never
leaves a mark or bruise. A hard slap—or a number of such blows
—will momentarily redden the victim's face, but leave no other
mark. Negroes are particularly vulnerable to police beatings be-
cause their skin color tends to obscure bruises. A prisoner can be
stunned by striking his head (not his face) with a fist, a telephone
book, or even a blackjack, without more than a superficial swell-
ing which disappears in one or two days.


[14] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
One tactic for making a prisoner talk has been alleged with
alarming frequency, time and again for over twenty years. It has
been repeatedly charged, and on one occasion it apparently was
proved, that the police have shackled a prisoner's hands behind
him, looped a rope through the handcuffs and over a door top,
and hoisted the victim until his feet dangled, his toes barely touch-
ing the floor. There is no point in detailing the results of such
treatment on the victim's willingness to give a statement. But it
does not leave marks, so long as the victim's wrists are bandaged
in advance. Charges of the use of this technique were made as
carly as 1936. People V. Reck, 7 Ill. 2d 261 (1955) (testimony
of Emil Reck, Transcript of Record pp. 80-84, 111, 113, 114;
testimony of Michael Livingston, Tr. Rec. pp. 772-777). They
were made in 1946 by Hector Verburgh, the janitor who was the
famous “wrong man” in the Suzanne Degnan murder case. Ver-
burgh was held incommunicado for three days by the police. He
was strung up by his hands in the manner described above. His
attorney finally secured his release from detention on a writ of
habeas corpus. Shortly thereafter it was discovered that Verburgh
bad no connection with the Degnan, or any other, crime. Verburgh
sued the responsible police officers and the case was settled for
$20,000. (Chicago Tribune, Feb. 21, 1948.) From time to time,
charges of similar torture are published in the local press. But
when the complainants are not involved in sensational murder in-
vestigations or are persons of no wealth and little community
standing, they receive little attention. See, for example Chicago
Daily News, August 21, 1951, “Captain Doubts Cops Tortured
2 Suspects.”
Confessions may be coerced during the course of secret de-
\, - tentions, not only by physical brutality, but also by psychological
| pressure. As the courts have pointed out, the psychological coercion
{of intensive questioning by relays of police officers for long periods
' of time is often enough to extort an involuntary confession, with-
i ) out a hand having been laid on the prisoner. As the late Judge
$ Jerome Frank put it:
Policemen have discovered that they need neither intricate devices
nor violence. The easiest way to persuade a man fo confess to
EE —


SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE 115) |
whatever you want is to deprive him of sleep beyond the point |
of normal exhaustion, questioning him endlessly. Frank & Frank,

Not Guilty (New York, 1957) p. 181

Judges have correctly understood that the heart of the prob-

| lem of prisoner mistreatment lies in the practice of secret detention.

The procedure breeds coerced confessions. It is the root of the
evil. It is the procedure without which the inquisition could not
flourish in the country. Watts v. Indiana, 338 US. 49, 57 (1949)
(Douglas, J., concurring).

Laws requiring the prompt production of prisoners in court,

the United States Supreme Court tells us, are intended to outlaw

those
easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is substituted for
brains as an instrument of crime detection. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943). |

POLICE BRUTALITY AND THE CONVICTION OF
THE INNOCENT: THE CASE OF LESLIE WAKAT
In the late afternoon of September 21, 1946, Leslie George

Wakat was arrested by Chicago police officers “for investigation.” |

On September 23, a relative learned his whereabouts and his wife {

contacted an attorney who at once filed a petition for habeas corpus

on behalf of Wakat. On September 24, Judge Harold G. Ward

ruled that Wakat's detention was illegal and ordered his release.

Four hours after Judge Ward's decision, the Chicago police
rearrested Wakat “for investigation.”
For the next three days, the police held Wakat at the Town

Hall Police Station. Soon after his re-arrest, his lawyer attempted

to confer with him. He went to the police station, saw that Wakat

was in one of the offices there and started toward him. “When I

tried to step into the room,” Wakat's attorney said, “an officer

jumped up and said, ‘who the hell are you? He told me to go

into the outer hall and then closed the door. A lieutenant then

came out and I told him I represented Mr. Wakat and should be


[16] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
in there while he was being interrogated. He told me I couldn't
go in.” Testimony of H. Howard Jones, in People v. Wakat,
Illinois Supreme Court Gen. No. 32829, Abstract of Record, p. 8.

Throughout the period covered by Wakat's two detentions, he
was not charged with any crime; he was held without bail, without
criminal charge, and without communication with the world out-
side.

By the morning of September 27, six days after the original
arrest, the five detectives assigned to interrogate Wakat had what
they wanted: a signed confession of burglary. Then, and only then,
did the police take Wakat to court and charge him with a crime.
Basing their case on the confession, the police obtained a convic-
tion. Wakat was sent to prison to serve a 10-20 year sentence.

Seven years later, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered Wakat's
release.” He had at last managed to prove that his confession had
been extorted from him by a series of violent beatings administered
by police during his secret detention of September 21-27.

On May 31, 1957, a jury in the Federal court of Judge Walter
J. LaBuy awarded Wakat $15,000 for the violation of his con-
stitutional rights.? On March 4, 1958, in an opinion written by
Judge Elmer J. Schnackenberg, a unanimous three judge panel of
the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment below,®
holding that the police had deprived Wakat of due process of law
and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Leslie Wakat's success in proving that police brutality had
forced his confession was due to proof of certain key circum-
stances. Among them was the fact that at the conclusion of his
secret “interrogation,” Wakat was suffering from broken bones in
his right hand, multiple bruises on his chest, arms, buttocks, shins
and shoulders, and from injuries to his left leg and knee so serious

\ as to require eight months treatment. The police account of the
k 1. People v. Wakat, 415 TL. 610, 114 N.E. 2d 706 (1953). The opinion of
Mr. Justice Schaefer contains a revealing summary of the evidence which led the
trial court to conclude that much of the police testimony was false.
3 aka v. Haris, tal, US. Dit. Ct, ND. Tl, E. Div, Dit. No. 56 C 36
OS vata . Haris, 253 F. 20 59 (7h Cir. 1958).
————————————————————————— ————


———
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [17]
‘manner in which Wakat had sustained his injuries (“He grabbed |
for my revolver and we both tangled and fell down the stairs about |
25 or 30 feet™) was demonstrated to be false. According to ex-
pert medical testimony, certain of his injuries could not possibly |
have occurred in the manner claimed by the police.® |
i The Wakat case illustrates the inadequacy of existing legal |
sanctions against secret detention and police brutality. The laws |
requiring production of prisoners in court promptly after arrest |
and the law forbidding imprisonment for the purpose of obtaining |
a confession were simply ignored and the offenders were not prose- |
cuted. Although a total of 12 Federal court jurors and 12 judges |
in State and Federal courts found or approved findings that Sgt.
Peter Harlib beat Wakat in order to secure a confession and Judge
Graber of the Criminal Court of Cook County found that Harlib
had lied about material matters in the Wakat case, no disciplinary
action has ever been taken against Harlib by his superiors. This is
in spite of repeated unanswered communications on the subject
from ACLU to Police Commissioner O'Connor.
Wakat's was the rare case in which a prisoner convicted
on the basis of a coerced confession was able to prove what
happened, obtain a new trial and recover damages in a civil ac-
tion. But no one can contend that these remedies were adequate
to accomplish the purpose of the law, which is to prevent such
misconduct, not to put a price on it.
COERCIVE INTERROGATION
AND POLICE EFFICIENCY
A Police brutality and the conviction of innocent persons are
inevitable when police come to rely on coercive interrogation as
a major tool in criminal investigation. What is frequently over-
3 Tesimony of Sgt. Peter Harlb, in People v. Wakar, Tincis Supreme
Court Gen. No. 32829, Abstract of Record, P. 20 (1953).
5. Teaimony of Dr. Alfred Lipsey, in Wakat v. Harp, et al, US, Court of
Appeals, Gen, No. 12151, Appellants Appendix, p. 29, Record, pp. 44348 (7h
OF Salmon of Judes Graber, People v. Waka, op. it, . 4, Abts . 30,
Record, p- 30


[18] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
looked is that when the police concentrate on obtaining confes-
sions they tend to slight other investigative methods which, in
the long run, produce more reliable evidence.

As Professor Glueck of Harvard Law School has pointed out
“. . such methods, aside from their brutality, tend in the long
run to defeat their own purpose; they encourage inefficiency on
the part of the police.” Glueck, Crime and Justice, p. 76 (1936).

Sir James Stephens, the authoritative historian of English
criminal law, made the same point more picturesquely:

“During the discussions which took place on the Indian Code
of Criminal Procedure in 1872 some observations were made on
the reasons which occasionally lead native police officers to ap-
ply torture to prisoners. An experienced civil officer observed,
“There is a great deal of laziness in it. It is far pleasanter to sit
comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's
eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.’ This was
a new view to me, but I have no doubt of its truth.”

History of Criminal Law, p. 442 (1883).

Professor Fred Inbau of Northwestern University has said that
the privilege against self-incrimination serves the same purpose
of encouraging more effective police investigation. In his view,
this is “. . . the policy which justifies the existence of the privilege
at the present time. It exists mainly in order to stimulate the police
and prosecutor into a search for the most dependable evidence
procurable by their own exertions; otherwise there probably would
be an incentive to rely solely upon the less dependable admissions
that might be obtained as a result of a compulsory interrogation.”
Self-Incrimination, pp. 6 to 7 (1950).

J. Edgar Hoover, in explaining how the F.B.L has achieved
its excellent reputation for crime-detection while eschewing coer-
cive interrogation and third-degree methods has pointed out:

“Civil rights violations are all the more regrettable because they
are so unnecessary. . . . Technical crime-detection methods have

' greatly reduced arbitrary intrusions on civil liberties. The appre-

k hended suspect ‘won't talk’: Third-degree methods, the ill-trained
officer might think, perhaps a severe beating will force a confes-
fession. But the trained officer, schooled in the latest techniques

—————————————————————————————————————
EE ee ———————————


————

SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE (191 |
of crime detection, will think otherwise—he will go to work, lo- |
cating a latent fingerprint, a heel-print in the mud, or a tool mark |
on the safe.” |

Quoted in Frank and Frank, Not Guily, p. 185 (1957)

|
USURPATION OF JUDICIAL PROCESS: |
THE USE OF DETENTION AS PUNISHMENT |
Confessions coerced by physical or psychological mistreatment |
and deterioration of police efficiency are not the only evil results of |
the police practice of secret detention. A related issue raised by this {
practice concerns the preservation of the integrity of the judicial |

process as the exclusive method by which innocence or guilt is

established and punishment determined.

Where the practice of secret pre-arraignment detention has

become a commonplace of police procedure, the police invari-

ably begin to usurp the function of the courts by arrogating to

themselves the right to punish individuals of whom they strongly

disapprove. Without notice, hearing, testimony, argument, or ary

of the other incidents of a trial, they launch into the practice of

arrest and confinement of prisoners “on general principles.” This

has actually happened in Chicago and it is still happening.

As the Kohn Report put it:
‘The Police Commissioner admits that it is his policy to ignore the
constitutional rights of civilians by arresting them without con
forming to legal procedures. Crime and Politics in Chicago, LV.
ed. (1953) p. 108.

Police Commissioner O'Connor stated flatly to the City Coun-

cil's “Big Nine” crime investigating committee that:
My policy has always been that while it may be illegal, and I have
received some complaints from the civil-liberties group relative to
orders to pick up criminals, simply because they are criminals, I
still think they should be picked up and locked up on every occa-
sion possible. The Kohn Report, p. 87.
|


E TT
| [20] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE

The following colloquy took place during a 1954 habeas
corpus hearing before Judge Richard Austin of the Criminal
Court of Cook County:

OFFICER swiTzeR: This man was arrested by two officers of
our unit last night at seven o'clock. He's been in custody ever since,
and we have nothing on him.

JUDGE AUSTIN: Why was this man arrested?

A. Well, it would probably come under the category, your
honor, of a routine pickup in instances like this.

Q. What is a “routine pickup”?

A. Well, as you well know, there has always been, supposedly
a list of men that they care to question to ascertain if they would
have any information as to the case of these various killings . . .
Pree

Q. Can you explain to the court why, after the interrogation
ended, this man was kept in custody all night?

A. No sir, I would not be able to explain to you, your honor.
All T can say is that it's been going on for years relative to the
same thing.

JUDGE AUSTIN: ... T will not tolerate these publicity pickups,
where there is no evidence . . .

OFFICER SWITZER: I assure your honor that I will take your
message back downtown.

People ex. rel. Guzik v. O'Connor, H.C. 37619, Rpt. of Pro-
ceedings, 2-9 (1954).

Apparently, the officer neglected to carry the word “back down-
town.” Three years later, in connection with a similar arrest and
detention, Commissioner O'Connor stated: *. . . we will continue
functioning as we have in the past.” Chicago Daily News, May 1,
1957, p. 24.

The Chicago Police Department even went so far as to attempt
to legitimize its practice by formally promulgating a regulation
authorizing it. Rule 465 of the Chicago Police Department Rules
and Regulations which were in effect until January 1, 1959 pro-
vided that:

! In case of an arrest . . . the offender shall be brought before a
§ judge . . . as speedily as possible, as an officer becomes a tres-
passer if he delays longer than the necessity of the case compels.
This, however, does not apply when the offender is a well-known
criminal who is held pending investigation. . .
Rly Hr —————————


I —
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE. (211
The U. S. Court of Appeals in Chicago recently held this rule
invalid in Wakat v. Harlib, et al, 253 F. 2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958).
‘The express authorization for illegal detentions contained in former
Rule 465 has apparently been dropped in the new Police Depart-
ment Rules which went into effect on January 1, 1959. But in
view of the history summarized above, this change in the rules
does not provide an adequate basis for concluding that the de-
partment will stop the practice.
Once the police have arrogated to themselves the right to de-
cide who is a “criminal” and may thus be locked up and punished
without a trial, abuses multiply.
Even more dangerous is the fact that police who have official ap-
proval to make illegal arrests of hoodlums inevitably use the same
abuse of authority to render injustice to minor offenders and inno-
cent persons. The Kohn Report, p. 108.
Jack Mabley, in a column titled “How Our Cops Get the ‘Truth’;
Just Beat ’Em—That's All,” wrote:
“Complications enter, however, when the police arrest a man, |
classify him as a wise guy or probably guilty, and beat him up.
The complication is that he is not guilty.” Chicago Daily News, |
May 20, 1958. |
|
|
|
|
J


l
THE EXTENT OF SECRET
DETENTION BY
THE CHICAGO POLICE:
Results of the ACLU Study
IN May 1957, spurred by the controversy over the 90-hour de-
tention without charge of Edward “Bennie” Bedwell in the Grimes
murder investigation, the Illinois General Assembly passed a bill
intended to clarify existing law by requiring the police to produce
their prisoners in court “forthwith” upon arrest. House Bill No.
215 in Senate, 70th General Assembly (1957). (The existing law
requires production in court “without unnecessary delay.”) This
bill was vetoed by Governor Stratton after Police Commissioner
O'Connor and State's Attorney Adamowski had said that the long
secret detention was a rarity and that the bill would please “only
the criminal element.” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 29, 1957.
Most public discussion of the “forthwith” bill assumed that the
persons victimized by long incommunicado imprisonment were a
comparatively limited number of “criminals” who occasionally
were held too long. Virgil W. Peterson, director of the Chicago
Crime Commission, speaking with reference to court decisions and
statutes outlawing secret detention said, shortly after the “forthwith”
bill was vetoed, that such doctrines “give criminals more pro-
tection than law abiding citizens.” In the same speech, Peterson
\ referred to the “rights, mostly imaginary, of persons accused
i of crime.” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 4, 1957. Some months later,
Peterson stated, with reference to the “forthwith” bill among others,
that “It is a sad commentary that proposed legislation which aids
the criminal appears to be passed with ease.” Peterson, 4 Report
on Chicago Crime in 1957, Chicago Crime Commission (1958)
36.
=)
TFS,


[J "|,
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [23]
Governor Stratton did concede that:
It is probably true that under the present statutes there have been
some abuses. Veto message, Illinois State News, 655%*57**Bi.
But some of the legislators who passed the “forthwith” bill
BY were convinced that secret police detention was a widespread prac-
tice. During the Illinois Senate Debate, Senator Marshall Korshak
stated that “During my service in the Cook County State's At-
torney's office, I learned that in many cases police held prisoners
for two or three days before booking them.” Chicago Daily Tribune,
3 May 28, 1957:
The discussion of the “forthwith” bill made it clear that an {
\ objective study of the facts was necessary. 1
The ACLU has completed that study; this is its report. It is the i
first systematic effort ever undertaken in the United States to de- i
termine on an empirical basis the frequency and length of secret |
detentions by a municipal police department. |
The ACLU study was based upon raw data obtained from
2038 Chicago Police Department “Arrest Slips.” In every case
where an individual is arrested, charged with an offense and taken
to court, a copy of the police department's basic prisoner record
—the arrest slip—is attached to the Municipal Court file on the
case. These files are public records, and constitute the official
court history of the particular case, from arrest to final disposition
by the Municipal Court.
Thus, official court files containing copies of the Chicago
Police Department's own records constituted ACLU’s source of
information concerning the frequency of lengthy secret detentions
by the Department.
The 2038 cases sampled by ACLU were drawn from drawers
in the file vault of the Municipal Court which contain almost all
the non-traffic criminal and quasi-criminal' case records for the
year 1956. ACLU’s researchers had no knowledge of the contents
of any file prior to the moment of its selection; the files were “picked
blind” without conscious bias. The researchers abstracted the rele-
I. Quasiriminal offenses are those created by ordinances of the City Council,
such as the disorderly conduct ordinance. Criminal offenses are defined by acts
of the General Assembly.
A ————————————


[24] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
vant data from each of the files so chosen, and these data were
subsequently tabulated and checked and double-checked against
the original work sheets of the samplers. A description of the
sampling methods used is contained in Appendix B. \

On every arrest slip the arresting officer is supposed to enter
the “Time and Date Arrested” and the “Time and Date Booked.” 1
The length of detention without charge is the period between
these two times. The term “booking” is crucial. “Booking” means
the time when the policeman enters a formal charge against the
prisoner, sets the amount of bail (in minor cases) and designates
the branch of court to which he will be taken.

Ordinarily in Chicago a prisoner is held incommunicado until
he is booked. His family does not know where he is; he is not
allowed to call a lawyer. On occasion a prisoners lawyer does
learn he is under arrest before he is booked. But more often the
prisoner is held incommunicado until he is booked. It is this period
before booking—and this period only—that the ACLU study
covers.

But the situation in Chicago is really much worse than the
study indicates.

For booking does not fulfill the legal requirement of a prompt
hearing before an impartial magistrate. Only appearance in court
or release on bail can do that. Booking takes place in the police
station—and after a prisoner is booked, if bail is not set or if he can-
not make bail immediately, he may be held much longer before he
appears in court. So this period of additional detention after book-
ing should be added to the period before booking. This the ACLU
study does not do, since figures are not available. Thus, the ACLU
study significantly understates the actual length of detentions in
the cases which were sampled.

The ACLU study also understates the extent of secret deten-
tions because the police frequently fail to enter the “Time and Date

) Booked” on the slip, thereby rendering it impossible to ascertain
k the length of detention prior to booking from the court file. This
was true in approximately one-third of the cases examined in the
ACLU study. The Detective Bureau, which has long been notorious
’
eT


—
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [25]
as the Police Department's most flagrant violator of the rules which
require prompt booking and production of prisoners in court, nearly
always fails to record the time and date of booking on the copy
of the arrest slip which is attached to the court file.
Sixteen branches of the Municipal Court of Chicago dispose
of nearly all of the criminal cases brought before that court.
ACLU’s researchers concentrated upon case files recording pro-
ceedings in nine of these 16 branches. The reasons for choosing
these nine branches are described in Appendix B. A total of
i] 1686 case files from these nine branches were analyzed.
| ‘The nine court branches are listed in the charts on the follow-
\ ing pages. In addition to the 1686 cases involving these nine |
Vf branches, a total of 352 cases from eleven other branches were 1
sampled. The data concerning these cases is reported in Appen-
NED |
N Among the significant facts revealed by the ACLU study are |
the following: i
50% of the police prisoners produced in Felony Court have been
i held without charge for 17 hours or longer, according to the ACLU
sample of 334 cases. Another 30% could not be accounted for in
terms of pre-booking detention because of police failure to com-
plete the arrest slip. Only 20% of the files showed on their face
that the defendant was booked within 17 hours of his arrest.
Nearly 10% of the defendants produced in Women's Court
had been held for 17 hours or longer without charge. Another
29% of the 185 cases in this sample were held for unknown
lengths of time.
45% of the 242 Narcotics Court cases examined involved
if defendants who were held 17 or more hours prior to booking.
| Another 42% could not be accounted for because of police failure
| to complete the arrest slip.
hi One out of every ten Felony Court defendants in the sample
had been held for 48 hours or longer. One out of every 20 had
been held for 60 hours or longer. One out of every 40 had been
. held for at least three days, before he was charged with an offense.
A projection of ACLU's sample of cases in Branch 44 (Felony
Court) indicates that in 1956 approximately 3600 defendants in that
court were held for 17 or more hours before they were booked.
CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY |
MUNICIPAL REFERENCE COLLECTION


|
[26] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
Similarly, it appears that approximately 700 of these 3600 prisoners
were held for two days or longer prior to booking.

A projection of the ACLU sample indicates that in the nine
branches studied approximately 20,000 defendants were held for
at least 17 hours prior to booking in 1956. About 2000 of these
defendants were held for two days or longer. Approximately 800
of these were held for 60 or more hours. Approximately 350
were held for at least three days without charge, without bail
having been set, without any vestige of “due process of law” having
been accorded them. These figures are for the nine court branches
included in the ACLU Study. They do not include any estimate
of detentions in the other branches of the Chicago Municipal
Court which handle criminal and quasi-criminal matters.

The following charts summarize the results of the ACLU
study. Complete figures are in a set of tables contained in Appendix
C to this report. Appendix A consists of a technical analysis of
the ACLU study prepared by Messrs. William Kruskal and Paul
Meier of the University of Chicago Department of Statistics.
Length of Detentions between Arrest and Booking in Cases Brought
to Nine Branches of the Municipal Court
of Chicago during 1956
1k 38% [A
A
[Yrs ary 66%
\ nl \ re
: 45% yout
k INO TIME SHOW
\ »
N
Branch 27 (Rackets) Branch 34 (Wabash Ave.)


So ————y
ISECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [27]
5 4%
B Bo 5
Ew, oon | [EA R oa
gt \
\ zz
im |
i \
Li
Branch 36 (Grand Crossing) Branch 40 (Women's)
ANY 1
La
Fe oh, Rika
vn A 5
\ \ LES bx
, =, EA
20% =
frre
Fg
Branches 42, 42A, and 55 Branch 44 (Felony) |
(Boys and Allied Branches) |
|
1
|
|


[28] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
AN
PEN
 se-sames
FR
LL N
\
42% oD
L NEN DD
nN
Branch 57 (Narcotics)

The ACLU study proves that lengthy secret detentions are not
exceptional abuses, they are a regular police practice in Chicago.
This is not to say that every prisoner who is held for 17 hours or
more is mistreated. Many of these detentions are due to nothing
more than waiting to book a prisoner until the officer who arrested
him on one day appears for his shift of duty on the following day.
‘This type of unnecessary delay is not detention for the purpose of
questioning but represents an inexcusable indifference to the law
and the rights of prisoners.

The law requiring that persons be produced in court without
unnecessary delay allows the police a reasonable time to get to
the nearest magistrate. What is a reasonable time will depend on
the circumstances. But any delay which is for the purpose of ques-
tioning the prisoner is illegal. The courts have made this clear time
and again. For this reason, it is difficult to conceive of circum-
stances in which a detention of 17 hours or more would not be

i illegal.

] ‘A complete list of the relevant data in each of the 2038 cases
surveyed in this study is available in the ACLU office in Chicago
for examination by any interested persons. Each case is identified
by its Municipal Court file number.

Exhibit I is a photostatic copy of the official arrest slip—an
actual recent case.

A


———

SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [29]
POLICE DEPARTMENT — CITY OF CHICAGO
rl a =
= > [ole t. lic 2 quae

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Cte 6. cot VPEE55~ Hog és. momedd
GsSousies | mmm | iig—-
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ZZrd Y Zaln-e-5h 22 = th
TW ron! #5326 PT amt LIEF
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Horre, G Rove T
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ii Hori7
Zilina? J | daddse
Photostat of an oficial Police Arrest Sip showing detention of 43 hours and
15 minutes. Crucial snes, on which ACLU study is based, are those on Line 10
for "DATE AND TIME OF ARREST" and "DATE AND TIME BOOKED."
These show tha th defendant was rested at 1113 Fa on De 4 and booked
an Des. at 6:30 7. The slip does no show whether he was then released on
Sond. The charges preferred (193-1.13) eft to th locring secon of te ord
nance forbidding dhordery conduc, This ordinance i often vsed when 8 person
picked Up “on Sepiion” proves to be innocent of any crime. The ca retorded
Ea his Arrest Slip rested Ino non-suit on Dec. 5, when the defendant fink
appeared. befor a ode. in, Municipal Cour, Entries which might Kentity the
GEfindant have been blacked out.


fl
it
CONCLUSIONS AND
{ RECOMMENDATIONS
{

1 We are not sentimentalists; we don’t
believe in “coddling” men accused of
crime. We stand for swift and vigor-
ous prosecution and oppose the prac-
tices which we have pointed out not

: merely or even chiefly because they
are unlawful, but because in the long

i run they do’ much more harm than

i good.

Report, COMMITTEE ON LAWLESS
§ ENFORCEMENT OF LAW, SECTION
| ON CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOL-
| GY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
3 P. 17 (1930).
l
i THE ACLU STUDY proves what has long been common knowledge
i among lawyers and other persons familiar with the operations of
# the Chicago Police Department—that the practice of holding per-
i sons for substantial periods of time in seclusion without bringing
! them to court is so widespread as to constitute organized police
H lawlessness.
i To a greater degree than perhaps any other servant of gov-
1 ernment, the police officer is in personal contact with the everyday
i life and people of his community. To millions of Americans he
symbolizes government and the ultimate functions of organized
society: protection of life and property, enforcement of the public
\ peace. In a real sense the police officer is “the law” to these people.
h He is the living manifestation of our common determination to
! preserve order and protect ourselves from those who would invade
our “rights.”
| 30]
3


———
EIS,
\
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [31]
When the policeman himself becomes an agent of lawlessness,
‘when the most conspicuous representative of public justice violates
the very canons he is sworn to enforce, then cynicism flourishes,
our society becomes increasingly brutalized and our liberties are
endangered.
‘This report contains serious charges against public officials,
charges which are not made lightly. In making them, the American
Civil Liberties Union emphasizes that it is not questioning the
character or motives of the men entrusted with leadership of the
Chicago police. It is calling attention to a police practice which
has been with us for years but which we believe violates the letter
and the spirit of our fundamental law.
The values at stake were eloquently stated a generation ago {
by the late Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis:
“In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our govern- i
‘ment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, 1
it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. 1
If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for !
laws; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites |
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means—to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private crimi-
nal—would bring terrible retribution.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1925).
‘The police in Chicago frequently attempt to justify their dis.
ségard of the law on the ground That they have a difficult job to do,
a
eT
‘persomat fiberty:-it-is-aiso-s-ponrsubstitute-for effective police work.
History demonstrates that whenever the police are permitted this
arbitrary power, the inevitable abuses are accompanied by a de-
terioration in police efficiency. |
Our police are entitled to all of the public support which they
need in order to do a good job, including increased funds to pay
adequate salaries and attract men of good caliber and to make use
of the most modern crime detection techniques. But they must not
}


132) SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
be allowed in the interests of false expediency to sacrifice any of
the personal rights which constitute the hallmark of civilized gov-
ernment.

The citizens of Chicago and Illinois are not helpless in the
face of the institutionalized violation of civil liberty described in
this report.

Specific steps can be taken. Some of them are suggested here.

1. Substantially increased appropriations for the Chicago Police
Department should be included in the next annual budget sub-
mitted to the City Council. These appropriations should be for
the purpose of increasing police salaries, improving police selection
and training and taking all other possible action to insure that
Chicago has the most efficiently manned and equipped police de-
partment which can be obtained.

2. The Police Commissioner should promulgate a police de-
partment rule stating that all arrested persons are entitled to contact
their families and attorneys upon request, and this rule should be
prominently posted in all police stations where it will be seen by
all prisoners. Vigorous disciplinary action should be taken against
any officer found guilty of violating this rule,

3. The police should be required by law to advise all arrested
persons that they are not compelled to answer any questions, that
any statements which they make may be used against them, and
that they are entitled to call a lawyer and their family. Police inter-
rogation of prisoners who do not consent to being questioned should
be forbidden by court rule. This is the practice followed by the
agents of the FBI and the police in England, both forces which
have an excellent law enforcement record.

4. The Commissioner of Police should be required, either by
Municipal Court rule or by city ordinance to account each day to
the Chief Justice of the Municipal Court for the prisoners cur-

\ rently in police lockups, giving their names, the time and date of

h their arrests, and the reason for their continued detention. Such
report should be a matter of public record, so that the public can
know at all times the frequency and length of prisoner detentions
by the police department.


————————
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE (331

5. The Municipal Court of Chicago should formally promul-
gate a rule of court under which any judge of that court would be
empowered to cite for contempt any police officer found to have
been responsible for the illegal detention of a prisoner whose case
is eventually brought before him. The Municipal Court has ample
power to enact such a rule. By statute, the Hlinois General Assem-
bly has made Chicago police officers ex officio bailiffs of the Munici-
pal Court. Clearly, given this status, any officer who wilfully breaks
the law by holding a prisoner for an unreasonable time before
bringing him to court could be held responsible through the con-
tempt procedure.

6. The Illinois General Assembly should enact a statute making /
inadmissible in evidence at a criminal trial any confession obtained
from the defendant in the course of an illegal police detention. This
rule would make impossible the conviction of innocent men from
whom false confessions have been extorted by violence or psycho-
logical coercion. This rule is presently the law in all criminal cases
tried in the Federal courts.

7. The States Attorney should begin to enforce the criminal laws
against police officers who violate the rights of prisoners.

8. The mayor should establish an independent bureau to receive
citizen complaints against members of the police department, This
office should be staffed by civilians and located away from City
Hall in order to make it clear that all charges of police misconduct
wil be impartially investigated.

Other measures are required to make this program effective.

‘The Mayor must require the Commissioner of Police to assert |
his command powers in an effort to stop illegal detentions by his
subordinates. The Department has long been notorious for non-
feasance when it comes to taking action against those in its own
ranks who break the law. A current example is the Department's
inaction in the case of Sgt. Peter Harlib, described in Part I of
this report.

In so acting, Mayor Daley will then be only carrying out his |
campaign pledges made in the last election when, in response to |
an ACLU questionnaire which was sent to both mayoralty candi-


i
[34] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE

| dates, he committed himself to a policy of law enforcement against
i police officers who break the law by holding prisoners illegally.
i The ACLU questions and Mayor Daley's responses were as follows:
i QuEsTION: Will you require the police to book every prisoner

d immediately after arrest?

it ANSWER: Yes.

QuEsTION: Will you require the police to bring all prisoners
to court on the day arrested, if possible, and not later than the fol-
lowing morning?

} ANSWER: Yes.

Question: Will you require disciplinary proceedings to be
brought against any member of the Police Department who violates
either of the foregoing requirements?

i ANSWER: Yes.
{ Chicago's newspapers and its bar also have vital responsibilities.
American lawyers and journalists have traditionally been our in-
| dispensable first line of defense against invasions of constitutional
i liberties. Theirs is the duty to inform the public and to press for
i needed reforms. One of Chicago's leading newspaper executives
recently urged mid-western publishers to “keep the eternal spot-
light of publicity on public servants.” This spotlight must be as
aggressively and constantly focused upon violations of civil liberties
in the police and criminal law field as it is on the handling of
: public moneys.
i
|
d
k |
|
i
i
i
|
i


ER —
|
APPENDIX A
STATEMENT CONCERNING
STATISTICAL ASPECTS OF
ACLU SECRET DETENTION STUDY
BY William Kruskal AND Paul Meier
DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1. Summary. The opinions expressed in this statement are based
upon detailed information given us by Mr. Donald Moore, former Staff
Counsel, Tilinois Division, ACLU. For a summary of this information,
see Appendix B. We did not ourselves participate in the data-gathering
pat of the survey, but we did perform some of the computations lead-
ing to the tables of the report.

Based on the information from Mr. Moore, and assuming the sub-
stantial correctness of the information in Police Department Arrest
Slips and figures in the 1956 Municipal Court Statistical Summary, our
general opinion is that, although it is impossible to set statistically valid
limits of error on the summary figures of the report, there is no question
that there were many thousands of lengthy (17 hours or more) secret
detentions during 1956. In other words, the data of this survey show
beyond reasonable doubt that lengthy secret detentions are not rare
or occasional occurrences, but happen frequently. Given the manner
of sampling, no biases that we can think of would affect this general
conclusion.

2. Basic numerical results. We now tum to more detailed matters.
First of all, we give a table of the basic results of the survey, together
vith certain computations, in a less rounded form than in the report
proper and Appendix C. These may be of value to others who wish
10 perform further computations

£35]
CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY
MUNICIPAL REFERENCE COLLECTION


ACLU Detention Time Survey, Nine Municipal Court Branches, 1956
Boric Totes and Computations
on kd = Ee Ra RAORSORS RD ORD
Tow Na de om wm ow 2202
met Na Tm Uy um Se Ww 8
otal IR Rv I
jee Solope wm ap mw we rm ue ow a
adh man foto pl AA HR A


———
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE 137]

Note that this table shows (by court branch) the number of un-
known times, the number of times less than 17 hours, and the numbers
of times equal to or greater than 17, 24, 36, 48, 60, and 72 hours.
‘Thus most of the table gives the data cumulated to the right.

For most of the table three figures are shown, as follows:

a. Top line. The actual number of some category observed in the
sample. For example, in the sample of 341 cases drawn from branch
27, there were 59 cases with detention times of 17 hours or more.

b. Middle line. The percentages of the sample. For example, in the
above instance, (100) (59)/341 = 17.30 per cent of the cases had
detention times of 17 hours or more.

c. Bottom line. Projected total numbers, obtained by multiplying
the percentage by the number of 1956 cases filed. For example, in the
above instance we obtain (1730) (22,100) = 3,824.

‘Thus one has the following partial cross-checks:

a. The sum of the left three top line numbers in the main body of
the table should be the sample size. For branch 27, 154 4 128 +- 59
=341

b. The sum of the left three middle line numbers should be 100.
For branch 27, 45.16 + 37.54 4 17.30 = 100.00.

c. The sum of the left three bottom line numbers should be the
number of cases filed. For branch 27, 9,981 + 8,296 + 3,824 =
22,101 as compared with 22,100 cases filed. The difference of one
case results from rounding.

The over-all figures (bottom lines of table) were obtained by adding
together in each column the projected total numbers. This gives the
figure in the bottommost line. For example, in the = 60 hr. column,
65+ 146 + 180 + 325 4 102 = 818. (There are a few small round-
ing discrepancies, since we actually worked to tenths of cases in the
computations.) The next-to-bottom line in the table was obtained by
dividing this sum by the over-all number of 1956 cases filed in the
nine branches, 79,331. For example, in the = 60 hr. column, (100)
(818)/79,331 = 1.03 per cent. Thus the over-all percentages are not
simple averages of the branch percentages, but rather weighted aver-
ages, with the weights reflecting disproportions between branch sample
sizes and branch numbers of 1956 cases fled.

In the tables in the other parts of the report, further rounding has


[38] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
been performed, and hence an over-all projected total there may not
quite be the sum of the corresponding several branch projected totals.
Such small discrepancies are inevitable.

3. Errors. The percentages and projected totals in the tables are of
course not exactly equal to their true values, i.e. the values one would
have obtained if all possible cases had been accurately examined. It is
convenient to classify the sources of such error into three categories.

We now describe and discuss these three kinds of sources of error.

L Recording and computation errors, etc. Errors may appear in
transcribing data from the files, in tabulating these data, in performing
computations on the data, and in preparing the report for publication. i
On the basis of our knowledge of this survey, we feel that appropriate. |
precautions have been taken to keep these errors at a negligible level.

Errors in the Municipal Court files themselves are of course beyond
the scope of this survey, and we have no way of evaluating them. The
numbers of 1956 cases filed were taken from an official Court docu-
ment and are presumably substantially correct, but we have no direct
knowledge of this document's accuracy. One source of error in this
connection is that the Court files used in the survey do not contain files
of cases not yet disposed of by the time the sampling was actually done. i
We are informed that only a small number of cases filed in 1956 were
still not disposed of by the time of sampling.

IL Chance errors. If the survey were to be repeated in the same
general manner, somewhat different numbers would result because dif-
ferent files would have been chosen. We now discuss this sampling or |
chance error.

Although the samples were not drawn at random in the technical |
sense, a crude lower bound for error may reasonably be obtained by
treating the survey as if it provided a stratified over-all sample with {
random sampling within each of the branches. Proceeding in this man- !
ner, we find that the approximate sampling standard deviations of the
‘percentages in the = 17 hours column range from 29% to about 3%3 %. |
Approximate 95% confidence intervals in the technical sense may be {
found by doubling the standard deviations and adding and subtracting |
these amounts from the observed per cents. The following table sum-
marizes this information: |

|
|
{
_ A


=
SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE. [39]
«
on
tench Zou we le Ce
Founded in sample
= hon a
Aoproxsend. dovof% 20 30 38 21 28 27 ma
oe R00 EES
The projected branch totals have sampling standard deviations
ranging from 176 (Branch 34) to 453 (Branch 27). The over-all
projected total has an approximate sampling standard deviation of 817,
50 that we would be quite safe in supposing that the true over-all total,
if only chance errors occur, is roughly between 18,600 and 21,900.
Similarly the over-all weighted per cent, 25.56, has a sampling stand-
ard deviation of about 1%, so that we would be quite safe in sup-
posing that the over-all per cent of = 17 hour detentions in the 9
branches lies between 23% and 27% if we were sure that we were
dealing only with the chance errors of stratified random sampling.
It might be more conservative to consider the sampling method as
~ one based on randomly chosen clusters, in the technical sense, within
strata, where the clusters are file drawers. Whether or not the result of
such an approach would differ appreciably from that of stratified sam-
pling depends on whether file drawers differ from each other more than
one would expect on the basis of detention time variation within drawers.
Although the data are not arranged so as to make an investigation of
this point feasible, we understand that no noticeable sharp fluctuations
© fom drawer to drawer were observed. It seems most unlikely that
his effect would increase the sampling error of the major percentages
and totals so much that the general conclusions would be affected. {
© Itis possible, however, that some comparisons between court branches !
might be affected. |
| In short, for the purposes of this study, chance errors alone had
| moderate effects on the individual branch figures and nearly negligible |
effects on the over-all figures. |
IIL Possible errors of bias. If the survey were to be repeated in i
: the same general way a great many times and the resulting figures
5 averaged, so that chance errors would be driven down to completely
i
1
4
Fo


[40] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE {
negligible levels, the averages might still not be the true values because i
of possible biases stemming from the method of sampling. To take an l
extreme example, if thicker files tended to be associated with longer
detention times, and if the survey personnel tended to choose thicker ]
files, detention times in the sample would tend to be longer than in the i
entire group of cases. The only way to be sure of avoiding bias is to i
introduce randomization at some stage of the sampling procedure; that ]
is, to take what may generally be called a probability sample. When this i
is impossible for practical reasons, as it often is in surveys connected i
with serious human problems, one must evaluate as best one can the
magnitude of possible biases.
If one were to estimate the frequency of long detentions by proba- 1
bility sampling methods one would prefer to start with a list of the
numbers actually assigned to cases filed in the various court branches. |
One could then choose a sample of these numbers for each branch by i
a suitable randomization procedure and examine the arrest slips cor- i
responding to these numbers. Tn practice, when lists are not available, i
a sampling scheme may be considered satisfactory if, say, drawers are |
sampled at random, estimates are made of the number of cases filed in i
each drawer, and a random selection is made from the slips found in i
each drawer. {
In the ACLU sample, the number and arrangement of the file |
drawers was learned only after the selection of the sample was under |
way. Although an attempt was made to end up with a selection of {
drawers more or less uniformly distributed over the set of drawers i
containing the arrest slips for each court branch, no formal randomiza- !
tion was used. Within each drawer approximately every cighth to twelfth i
file was usually examined. We are informed that occasional files (of the
order of one in 35) are noticeably thicker than others, and these may
have been somewhat under- or oversampled. We are further informed
that when two successively drawn files obviously resulted from a group {
of arrests made on the same occasion, then no more files from this i
group were drawn. !
The above-mentioned differences from a probability sample could |
conceivably lead to biases as follows. First, as the drawers contain files |
in numerical order, ie. in the order in which cases were filed, a non- |
random sample of drawers might tend to be concentrated around time |
|
i


Wi

SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [41]

‘periods in which the number of long detentions was greater (or smaller)

than the average. The effort to use drawers scattered evenly from first

1o last suggests that this source of bias is not very great.

‘An additional possible source of bias might arise in the selection of

files within a sampled drawer. Inasmuch as the files are arranged in

‘numerical sequence and thus no concentration of long detentions in the

front or back of the drawer is to be anticipated, the only evident possi-

‘bility for bias is in the under- or over-representation of the thicker files.

As these were few in number, and no tendency for them to have more

or fewer long detentions than did other files was noted, the amount of

bias from this source is considered quite small. We are informed that

other physical characteristics of the files, such as color, wear, etc.

could either not be detected when a file was chosen, or else had no con-

nection with detention time.

In sum, the conceivable sources of bias were not such as to lead

10 errors of the same order of magnitude as the numbers of lengthy |

detentions reported. |

!
| |

§


APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLING METHODS
USED IN ACLU STUDY
THE RAW DATA gathered in the ACLU study were secured from the
case files of the Municipal Court of Chicago. These files are stored in
the Municipal Court file vault, located in Room 1010, City Hall. This !
vault contains the records of all criminal and quasi-criminal cases dis-
posed of by the Court except those cases heard by branches sitting at
the Traffic Center, 321 North LaSalle Street.
‘The files are kept in numerical order (each file having an official
number) in long narrow drawers in the vault. Approximately two hun-
dred files are normally kept in each drawer. Every file contains a docket
sheet which shows the Municipal Court file number, the branch of
court which handled the case, the nature of the charge, the name of
the judge, the amount of bail, if any, the dates of court appearances
and the ultimate judgment and sentence in the case. Also included in
each file are a copy of the complaint and a copy of the Chicago Police
Department “Arrest Slip” which gives the circumstances of the arrest,
the time and date of the arrest, the time and date of booking, and other
data.
Before being placed in the drawers, these various documents are
pinned together, folded and placed on end in the drawer in such a way
that the file clerk or sampler can see only the official file number at
the top of the center fold as he thumbs through the drawer. He cannot |
discover the facts about the arrest and booking of the defendant in a
particular case unless he removes the file from its place among the
two hundred others in the drawer, spreads it out before him and scans
the arrest slip. Usually, in order to see the arrest slip at all, he must
not only open up the folds in the file, but must also look beneath the
complaint since the arrest slip is ordinarily the center document in the
fle, with the docket sheet constituting the “outside” page of the file
and the complaint constituting the “inside” page.
re]
i
f


SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE [43] |
Each case receives its official file number when the arrest slip and
complaint are first brought into a branch of the Municipal Court. Each
branch of the Court is assigned large blocks of numbers in advance
by the Clerk's office in City Hall. Assignment of numbers is a routine.
operation—a case receives the next number available when it is first
filed with the branch court clerk.
Tnitially, ACLU’s samplers planned to sample no more than 200
cases in order to assemble data for a press release dealing with the |
incidence of illegal secret detention in Chicago. The number of secret
detentions uncovered in this initial spot check was so large, however,
that it was decided to attempt a more ambitious study. Unfortunately,
the physical layout of the file vault, the necessity of not interfering
with the routine work of the Municipal Court clerks who manned the
vault, and the impossibility of securing formal official permission to
work in the vault prevented ACLU’s samplers from first making a
thorough check on the number and location of the file drawers con-
taining 1956 cases. Thus, in the carly stages of the ACLU study no
precise notion of the storage lay-out of the raw data for the study {
could be obtained. Necessarily, therefore, the unsystematic nature of i
the early drawer selection made it impossible to obtain a “random |
sample” in the technical sense. Much later, as the ACLU samplers tended |
to become established as regular inhabitants of the vault, they were 1
able to appraise the number and layout of the 1956 file drawers. i
‘Thereafter care was taken to select drawers so as to obtain a reason- i
ably uniform sample within each court branch. However, no formal i
randomization procedures were used. i
Once a particular drawer had been selected by an ACLU sampler,
the sampler would then select approximately 10 or 12 files from
among the 200 in the drawer. No formula was employed in deter-
mining which files to select. The sampler was simply instructed to
attempt to select files from the whole length of the drawer. Every case
fle which was removed from the drawer was opened, its contents
noted on work-sheets made up for this purpose, and the file was then
replaced.
‘The instructions to the ACLU samplers, combined with the physi-
cal circumstances of file storage within the drawers (nothing was |
visible to the sampler prior to case selection except the case file number
and the thickness of the file) permitted no conscious bias on the part |


I [44] SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE
of the samplers in selecting files. (Over half the sampling was done
by the ACLU lawyer in charge—the remainder was done under his
close supervision).
Soon after the decision to attempt a large-scale survey of arrest
slips was taken, it became apparent that it would be impossible to
secure an adequate number of cases from each of the many branches
of the Municipal Court which handle criminal or quasi-criminal mat- |
ters. It was then decided to concentrate on files from nine branches
of the Municipal Court, so that a fairly large number of cases from
each of these nine branches could be analyzed. The nine branches i
chosen include all of the more important specialized branches of the !
Municipal Court which deal with arrested persons (such as Boys Court, }
Felony Court, Narcotics Court, etc.) together with two of the so-called
“outlying branches.” After determining which drawers contained files
| from these nine branches, ACLU's researchers thenceforth pulled only
| those drawers. A larger number of cases was sampled from certain
branches in which there was special interest because of their impor-
tance. However, as explained in Appendix A, the percentages and pro-
jected totals in this report are weighted in such a way that they are
not affected by the varying sample sizes from the branches studied. |


Police Datetions of 17 OR MORE HOURS Batwesn Ames and Booking,
‘Nine Municipal Court Branches, Chicago, Ines, for he Year 1956;
Obama umbr of Dt Losin 1 Vo a loge Home ww ww wm
Bt Ski pt te fe] wh wh mh ew ew wn ww ar
Cn ib ne ss sm em ww sae was man
rion of AC Sri ? swe ee eo ue um um sm mw
ama Ld wh wh ew ww wn ow we eer
Police Detentions of 24 OR MORE HOURS Bowaen Arrest and Booking,
‘Nine Municipal Coun Branches, Chicago, linas, for he Year 1956:
Te he ne en ea Wh ook ed wa oh a wn om
Tl ee Co i (1954 Sc Sm, Mos
nS me sm sw ew ww rae ums man
ET er A Pr) ST a wt of Oheree nt X
EAE SE SE RE maT TR Ann °


|
Police Detentions of 36 OR MORE HOURS Barween Arrest and Booking,
‘Nine Municipal Court Branches, Chicago, llinols, for the Year 1956: |
Police Detentions of 48 OR MORE HOURS Batween Arest and Booking,
‘Nine Municipal Cour Branches, Chicago, lini, or he Yeor 1956;
on vn 10 skin en pr con of samp OW aM) on em em wr
Com wp TAO nae sex smo ew ww rae ums man
oiaion of AC Semple : wow ° ow wm ww
pt ———— . — {


APPENDIX D
DATA FROM MUNICIPAL COURT BRANCHES
NOT INCLUDED IN |
DETAILED ACLU ANALYSIS
|
|
}
mn