CO657939O N?atSe'CAet - (rs/q? the) The lives of the CIA and foreignl {374 ?les) -- This document is intended to provide"alassa?caub??gurdance' regarding information related to the Central Intelligence Agency?s (CIA) Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program (?the RDI Program? or ?the Program?). Because the RDI Program was executed under CIA authorities, information related to the Program is controlled by the CIA. The CIA protects information about the RDI Program to ensure, among other things, that: Ml identities of'covert CIA?o?icer-swho' assistedtheCIA i'ri" NatSecAct Updated 23 September 2011 CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RENDITION, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM INFORMATION PURPOSE OF THE GUIDANCE NatSecAct - rsr/l hm '?e'foreign'governnient'sthat assistants hearings; NatSecAct Program remain politically viable so that they can continue to assist the US Government in executing counterterrorism operations; of?cers who assisted the CIA in executing the Program are not threatenecrby NatseCACt terrorists at?large; . - . - ?871 The identities'ofthe'huma? sources (?assets?) Who assisted the? CIA in executing the Program are not revealed so that the assets can continue to assist the CIA in executing counterterrori operations without fear of retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile foreign intelligence services; and NatSecAct executing the Program are not revealed so that the of?cers can be posted outside of the US. where they can continue to conduct the foreign intelligence mission without fear of retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile foreign intelligence made promisesto all persons entities was partiCipated in or assisted the CIA in executing the RDI Program that the CIA would keep their participation or assistance secret. If the CIA were unable to keep that promise, it would affect those persons? and entities? willingness to assist the CIA in the future. The CIA is highly dependent upon foreign governments, foreign intelligence of?cers, and assets to execute counterterrorism Operations all over the world. Therefore, if the CIA were unable to recruit foreign governments, foreign intelligence of?cers, or assets to assist the CIA in conducting) future counterterrorisrn operations, it would cause grave damage to national seCurity. ClAAct NatSecAct NatSecAct (106579390 ssgz?i (b)(3)NatSecAct Because the unauthorized release of information related to the RDI Program would cause grave damage to national security, such information can only be of?cially released or declassi?ed by the President of the United States, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, or a CIA of?cer with original classi?cation authority. Accordingly, leaked documents, statements by former intelligence of?cers, or reports by senior of?cials of other government agencies cannot declassify CIA information related to the RDI Program. 1 Similarly, reports in the media even those sourced to of?cials do not constitute an of?cial declassi?cation of CIA information related to the RDI Program. Over time, certain information about the RDI Program has been of?cially declassi?ed and released to the public. On 6 September 2006, President Bush acknowledged that fourteen named High Value Detainees ?iVDs) who were previously in CIA custody were transferred to Department of Defense (DOD) custody at the US. - Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). By 2008, President Bush had announced that two additional named HVDs who were previously in CIA custody had been transferred to DOD custody at GTMO. In January 2008, CIA Director Hayden released the names of three HVDs who had been waterboarded. On 16 April 2009, President Obarna released redactedversitms of four memos regarding the RDI Program, which were written by the Department of Justice?s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). . Those four memos were dated 1 August 2002, 10 May 2005 (two memos), and 30 May 2005. On 24 August 2009, President Obama released pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act litigation the CIA Inspector General?s Special Review of the RDI Program Special Review?), an OLC memo dated 31 August 2006, and an OLC memo dated 20 July 2007. Following the raid on Usarna bin Laden?s compound on 1 May 2011, the CIA released certain information about the RDI Program. (Ii/50(0) Apart from these limited releases, most of the information regarding the RDI Program remains classi?ed. Determining whether certain RDI Program information remains classi?ed and, if so at what level, often depends on subtle nuances and carefully parsed distinctions. The guidance provided in this document is intended to educate the user and help the user make informed decisions about whether cert?ain information related to the RDI Program may be classi?ed. The guidance does not constitute an exhaustive list of all categories of classi?ed information related the RDI Program. Thus, if the user is uncertain whether a particular piece of information is classi?ed or at what level a particular piece of information is classi?ed, the user should handle the information at the highest classi?cation level and seek guidance or a classi?cation determination from a CIA of?cer who is an original classi?cation authority. The guidance does not constitute a classi?cation review by a CIA original classi?cation authority of any particular piece of RDI information, and the guidance may not be used in lieu of submitting information for a classi?cation review by a CIA original classi?cation authority. (ll/W0) One example is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report, which was leaked to the New York Review of Books in early 2009. 2 NatSecAct ma .- .- CO657939O scarier/i NatSecAct CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE Declassi?ed Information Relating to the RBI Program The 1 August 2002 OLC memo listed ten Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) that could be applied to HVD Zayn al Abidin Muhammad Husayn (aka: Abu Zubaydah). The May 2005 OLC memos released the names and descriptions of the thirteen EITs that were approved for use at that time, and speci?ed the parameters within which the HTS must be applied. 7 The 10 May 2005 ?Combined Techniques? OLC memo released the fact that dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation were used in combination with waterboarding. The 10 May 2005 and 30 May 2005 OLC memos released the fact that detainees were watched via closed-circuit television. (Ill/F080) The 30 May 2005 OLC memo and the OIG Special Review released the fact that Abu Zubaydah had been waterboarded 83 times during August 2002, and that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had been waterboarded 183 times during March 2003. The 30 May 2005 ULC memo released certain intelligence that was gleaned from HVD interrogations. Such information is also detailed in two Directorate of Intelligence papers on detainee reporting, which were released in August 2009. Both releases provide that Abu Zubaydah and KSM supplied information about numerous plots and that their information led to the capture of other HVDs. The releases also provide that information from detainee interrogations was analyzed and cross-checked with other intelligence information, and that this process enabled the CIA to con?rm certain intelligence information and uncover plots in which other HVDs or A terrorists at-large were involved. The 30 May 2005 memo noted that, as of 2004, over 6,000 intelligence reports had been issued based upon information provided by HVDS. The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that, as of the writing of that memo, 94 detainees had been in the RBI Programand that 28 had experienced ElTs. manner? Noy?m~ (b)(3)NatSecAct CO6579390. NatSecAct The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that the waterboarding interrogation technique was used only against three HVDs: Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiril The memo also released that waterboarding has not been used since March 2003. (Ul/kald) The 30 May 2005 and the 31 August 2006 OLC memos described other ?standard techniques? such as shaving, solitary con?nement, white noise, shackling, etc. that would be employed in an attempt to get a detainee to cooperate, prior to employing any ElTs. The 31 August 2006 OLC memo released the fact that detainees were held in solitary con?nement. I The CIA released pursuant to a FOIA litigation that the CIA destroyed 92 videotapes on 9 November 2005. The CIA also released that the videotapes were of Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah. The 010 Special Report released that twelve of the videotapes showed BIT applications. The July 2007 OLC memo describes six EITs that are minimally necessary to maintain an effective interrogation program. The memo also released the fact that, as of the writing of that memo, the CIA had a total of 98 detainees in the RDI Program and that the CIA had only used EITs with a total of 30 detainees. (ox/1:900) Various OLC memos have stated that CIA Of?ce of Medical Service doctors and monitored detainees? health during the application of HTS, but that medical personnel did not'participate in any interrogations themselves. The OIG Special Review released the fact that Nashiri underwent unauthorized interrogation techniques. (U/IForfn The CIA released the fact that Abu Faraj al-Libi received EITs. However, Speci?c EITs applied to Abu Faraj remain classi?ed. The CIA released the fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true name of Abu Ahmad al?Kuwaiti, the courier/facilitator who the CLA tracked to uncover the location of Usama bin Laden. - The CIA released the. fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true location of Usama bin Laden. The CIA released the fact that KSM and Abu araj al-Libi provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. However, all speci?c information provided regarding Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti remains classi?ed. secr?nl 4' (b)(3)NatSecAct (306579390 .saeREr/l - NatSecAct (umber information that is Unclassi?ed: 0 General allegations of torture by HVDs unless such allegations NatSecAct?m ]detentionl reveal Speci?c details about EITs as applied to the the identities (egg. names, physical descriptions) of CIA personnel or contractors; themlocatioiis of detention sites (including the name of any?untry in whiehthe? detention site was allegedly located); or any foreign! inyolvement in NatSecAct NatSecAct' Information Relating to the RDI Program that Remains Classi?ed ill?) The names of'or identifying any in "m Ogle"; than Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Nashin', and Abu Faraj al-Libi against whom Em were applied. NatSecAct tars) rAny-infonnation-about Effsasapplied to individual'detaine?s, except the fact that Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Nashiri were waterboarded. The 1 August 2002 OLC memo was written in anticipation of using EITs against Abu Zubaydah if he did not cooperate after using less coercive means of questioning. The I August 2002 OLC memo did not affum that EITs would be applied to Abu Zubaydah, if he did not cooperate. NatSecAct Any information regarding the. Speci?c application of a particular EIT sequencing, duration, etc.), as applied to named detainees; including Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Nashiri, and Abu Faraj al-Libi. (8/1 is?) Names "of or 'iderrt?ify?i'ng'in?mnatioii about anyaetz?ame?? held in CM NatSecAct custody, other than the 16 HVDs publicly identi?ed by President Bush. ?374 infomrationabont thei'operation'o'r Iotatioii'ot'any 'oiierseas a detention facilities, including the name of any country inwhich the detention facility was allegedly located. NatSecAct NatSecAct Any-informationregarding? 'CtA'pers'orinet ?or centract'nrs'imolved 7 the RDI Program; including names, pseudonyms, physical descriptions, or any identifying information. NatSecAct Any information regarding CIA assets; inCluding namesp?m? descriptions, or any identifying information. NatSecAct ?soma? .. 5, NatSecAct saga/ii?? (306579390 NatsecAct mm mam I a. NatSecAct 18/11 NF) Any information regarding any foreign! i'cooperation with CIA in administering or hosting any aSpect of the RDI Brogam; including the names of or identifying information about foreignl names {of or identifying information about individual members of foreifi-l 7 jor any other details regarding foreigni a NatSecAct 3374??) Any information regarding the capture of individual detainees, i NatSecAct - cal lair-)7 ofa detaineez: NatSecAct NatSecAct a itheleng'm'bf the trip; and amval, departure, layover, and ?nal destination locations involved in atse'cAct the transfer. Mm - ?cg/l M) NatSecAct detainee; Whil'eh'e'wasin NatSecAct i ?Jens 0 - 514 NatSecAct meni?"?" _]custody. . NatSecAct NatSecAct I asked to'de't'ainees'in CIA debrie?ng NatSecAct or interrogation sessions and the answers the detainee provided. Information about gaps in intelligence that the CIA had and was trying to ?ll by questioning the detainees. . NatSecAct Other Classi?ed Information Not Relating to the RDI Program 0 All information that is not speci?c to the RDI Program, but is otherwise classi?able under applicable law and Executive Orders including intelligence sources, methods, and activities. - (mm NatSecAct SE Tl" (b)(3)NatSecAct